Credita res auctore suo est:

Narrative authority in the poetry of Ovid

A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Classical Languages and Literature at the University of Oxford

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Despite the prevailing interest in authority in Ovidian studies, studies have often focussed on Ovid's response to political authority in his individual works rather than narrative authority, the means by which the poet claims authority to narrate and constructs a persona that his audience will find persuasive and believable. Evidence of Ovid's interest in authority can be found throughout his body of work, but it is particularly explicit in the *Metamorphoses*, *Fasti*, *Tristia* and *Epistulae ex Ponto*, whose contrasting genres, content and mood allow Ovid to entertain an exceptionally broad range of different perspectives on authority. The primary bases of narrative authority in Ovid's poetry are age and memory, references to tradition, the prophetic/poetic status of *vates*, and sight, all of which had acquired a strong cultural and literary currency in Augustan Rome. Ovid challenges his readers not to believe things simply because of the authority of their narrator, encouraging them instead to engage with narratives and to critically evaluate their authority. He thereby undermines the traditional perception of authority as monumental and unchanging. Ovidian authority is a far more fluid concept, which acknowledges the inherent flaws in narrative as a transmitted medium. Narrative authority can be undermined, destroyed, or transformed, and is always open to being questioned. As such, it is in a constant state of change, and the reader is an active participant in its negotiation.

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Ovid is not much impressed with the task of editing (*Pont.* 3.9.17-26) and I am inclined to agree with him. I owe thanks to Caroline Moughton for going far beyond the call of duty in reading my thesis and to Caitlin Gale, whose useful and sarcastic annotations seemed to vividly bring her back across the Atlantic for a while.

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dumque legar, mecum pariter tua fama legetur.

L.C.M.A.

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Table of Contents

Abbreviations **1**
General Abbreviations 1
Editions 1

Introduction **2**

Chapter 1: The Authority of Age and the Past **9**
The *Metamorphoses* and Age Authority **14**
The Vulnerabilities of *Vetustas*: Age, Tradition, and Memory 15
Beyond Old Age: Transferring Memory and Authority 29
Problems with Authority: Can You Believe It? 33
Age and Antiquarianism: The Poetics of Ovid's *Fasti* **40**
The Oldest of Them All 40
Eroding the Past 47
Aged Hosts and Authoritative Sources 51
Throwing Off Old Age: Age and Aetiology 54
Age Authority at Rome 58
Exilic Age and the 'Loss' of Poetic Authority **64**
Saving the Best Until Last: Swan Songs 70
Age and Local Colour 73
The Authority of Age **76**

Chapter 2: Narrative Authority and Literary Memory **78**
The *Metamorphoses* and Tradition **84**
The Authority of *Fama* 84
Memory and Forgetting 91
The *Fasti* and its Sources **96**
My Calendar and Other Footnoted Sources (Or the Lack Thereof) 98
Problems with *Fama* 109
Perfect Recall? 116
Sources *versus* Informants 118
Footnoting the Exile Poetry **121**
Footnoting the *Tristia* 126
Epistulae ex Ponto and Tradition 128
Literary Memory and Narrative Authority **136**

Chapter 3: *Vates* and Poetic Authority **138**
Vates* in the *Metamorphoses **140**
'Trust Me, He's a *Vates*' 150
Audience Response to Vatic Authority 154
Vatic Narrative Control 168
Ovid as *Vates* 172
Vates* in the *Fasti **176**
Ovid the *Vates* and the Gods 179
The *Vates* Leading the *Vates* 186
***Vates* in Ovid's Exile Poetry** **194**
Vaticinor Ergo Vates Sum 202
***Vates* and Authority in Ovidian Poetry** **208**

Chapter 4: The Authority of Sight 211
Sight in the *Metamorphoses* 216
Omnivision and Omniscience 218
See (Or Visualise) for Yourself 227
Sight in the *Fasti* 232
Divine Eyewitnesses 232
Authoritative Autopsy 235
Authorising Dream Vision 238
Sight in the Exile Poetry 243
Seeing is Believing 243
Enargeia and Visualisation 245
Seeing Spectacles at Rome 251
Substitute Viewers 256
Alternative Eyewitnesses 259
The Authority of Sight 265
Conclusion 267
Bibliography 276

Abbreviations

Abbreviations of Latin and Greek authors and texts for the most part follow the conventions of the *Oxford Latin Dictionary* and *The Oxford Classical Dictionary*, with minor exceptions for clarity.

The principal of these are:

AA *Ars Amatoria*

Her. *Heroides*

Contr. *Controversiae* of Seneca

D.H. *Antiquitates Romanae* of Dionysius of Halicarnassus

General Abbreviations

CAF Kock, T. 1880. *Comicorum Atticorum fragmenta* (Lipsiae).

LSJ Liddell, H.G., R. Scott and H.S. Jones (edd.) 1968. *A Greek-English Lexicon* (Oxford).

OCT Oxford Classical Texts

OLD Glare, P.G.W. 1968. *The Oxford Latin Dictionary*. (Oxford).

RE Pauly, A., G. Wissowa and W. Kroll (edd.) 1930. *Paulys Real-Encyclopädie der Classischen Altertumswissenschaft* (Stuttgart).

SH Lloyd-Jones, H. and P.J. Parsons (edd.) 1983. *Supplementum Hellenisticum* (Berlin).

TLL 1900-. *Thesaurus linguae Latinae* (Leipzig).

Editions

In quoting Ovid, I have used Owen's *OCT* edition for the text of the *Tristia* and *Epistulae ex Ponto*, Tarrant's *OCT* edition for the *Metamorphoses*, and Alton, Wormell and Courtney's Teubner edition for the *Fasti* (with consonantal *u* normalised to *v*). Translations are my own.

Introduction

Ovid's interest in authority has been widely observed. Myers draws attention to the 'pervasive Alexandrian self-conscious preoccupation with narrative authority' and suggests that Ovid is following Callimachus and Apollonius in his exploration of the 'creation of narrative credibility'.[1] It is in the context of this ongoing dialogue about poetic authority that Ovid offers his own exploration. When discussing authority, critics have often felt constrained to link it to political and Augustan concerns.[2] This thesis is not concerned with Ovid's interaction with the Augustan regime and political authority, which has been well covered, but rather seeks to understand how Ovid interrogates the relationship of narrator and audience, and poet and reader, in his own poetry and that of other ancient writers. Existing scholarship has frequently confined itself to the study of individual passages or poems.[3] This thesis aims to take a broader view, bringing together contrasting Ovidian works and exploring how each contributes to Ovid's exploration of narrative authority.

This thesis examines the ways that Ovid constructs, negotiates and challenges narrative authority in his poetry. Narrative authority (and authority in general) is a metaphor or shorthand for talking about its effects, namely the ability to persuade an audience or reader either to accept a story as objectively 'true' or merely to accept the author's authority by continuing to listen to him. It is not concerned with the literal 'truth' of Ovid's myths, nor whether he himself believed them religiously, a topic

[1] Myers 1994, 18
[2] Fantham 1995; Ziogas 2015; Feldherr 2010; Habinek 2002 (esp. 61); Barchiesi 1997 (esp. 272).
[3] e.g. Davis 2008 on Ovid's 'Iliad'.

which has been summarily dealt with by Galinsky.[4] Lincoln relates *auctoritas* to 'the capacity to perform a speech act that exerts a force on its hearers greater than that of simple influence, but less than that of a command'.[5] He points out, however, that in practice, 'the consequentiality of authoritative speech may have relatively little to do with the form or content of what is said,' giving the example that 'Neither officers' commands nor experts' opinions need to be artfully phrased or even make sense in order to yield results.'[6] In Ovid's poetry, the content of narratives may contribute to or detract from authority, but so too may the identity of the speaker. Old men's words and prophets' utterances can be effective because of the intrinsic authority of the speakers; essentially, the authority which resides within, for example, priestly office 'warrants acceptance of the speech'.[7] Lincoln also distinguishes the exercise of authority from the practice of persuasion. He suggests that although authorities presume or pretend that authority is a shorthand for persuasion, actually 'If authority involves the willingness of an audience to treat a given act of speech as credible because of its trust in the speaker, then under the sway of authority an audience acts *as if* it has been persuaded, *when in fact it has not*.'[8]

When speaking about narrative authority this thesis commences from a similiar standpoint to Marincola, who in his evaluation of how authors claim authority in ancient historiography states, 'The term "authority" has many meanings over a range of disciplines, but in this book it is used to refer to literary authority, the rhetorical means by which the ancient historian claims the competence to narrate and explain

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[4] Galinsky 1975, 16 - 'For Ovid, unlike Vergil, the traditional verity of myth did not exist... To Ovid, the verity of myth lay, above all, in its narrative qualities, in the way he could tell it.'
[5] Lincoln 1994, 2
[6] Ibid., 4. Lincoln himself disclaims being an authority able to produce an authoritative account of authority (Ibid., 74).
[7] Lincoln 1994, 5
[8] Ibid., 5-6

the past, and simultaneously constructs a persona that the audience will find persuasive and believable.'[9] Unlike historians, however, prophets and poets also claim authority to narrate the future.

When Classicists refer to an 'author', we are again speaking figuratively. Literary critics have proposed various concepts to justify their stance on this issue, such as the 'ideal author' as distinct from the historical figure who wrote the poems and also from the poet narrator, the 'I' speaker within the poem.[10] This thesis uses the term 'the Ovidian narrator' to refer to the poetic 'I', aiming to differentiate him from 'Ovid, the historical figure', the constructed author. We must also be aware of the danger of using a constructed 'author' to give authority to a favoured reading; when we say 'Ovid intends to do something', what we mean is that something has a particular effect on the reader, for it is impossible to reconstruct Ovid's actual intentions.[11] The construction of Ovid as a witty, subversive poet, eager to undermine and complicate the traditional authority of tradition is no more than a figment of the imagination. However, the prevalence of this view among readers of Ovid may grant it authority. Moreover, Ovid's poetry displays a considerable amount of self-awareness and control. Although his authority may function in tension with that of the reader, it is not abnegated altogether, for to make such a claim would be to deny an integral part of the role of the poet.[12]

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[9] Marincola 1997, 1

[10] Claassen (2008, 8) states that the difference between poet and persona is taken as axiomatic in modern criticism, but still wishes to distinguish instances when the poet is speaking from those when a first person narrator does.

[11] The so-called 'intentional fallacy' (Wimsatt and Beardsley 1946, 471); in fact, 'the design or intention of the author is neither available nor desirable' (Ibid., 468).

[12] cf. Wimsatt and Beardsley 1946, 470 - 'The poem is not the critic's own and not the author's (it is detached from the author at birth and goes about the world beyond his power to intend about it or control it). The poem belongs to the public.'

Whilst all Ovid's poetry shows an interest in authority, it is particularly explicit in what are arguably Ovid's two most ambitious works, the *Metamorphoses* and the *Fasti*. Ovid appears to have worked concurrently on these in the decade before his exile,[13] and scholars have argued for considering the two works together. Fantham speaks of Ovid writing 'ambidextrously' in epic and elegiac metres,[14] while Hutchinson's view is that the '*Fasti* and *Metamorphoses* are to be read together in a vast syncrisis where elegy and the Roman (predominantly) are set against hexameter and the Greek (predominantly).'[15] Furthermore, it seems clear that Ovid continued the process of revising (and composing) the *Metamorphoses* and the *Fasti* in exile in Tomis[16] and Kenney argues that 'intertextual exploitation of earlier poetry is an essential element in the poetic strategy which informs the *Tristia*.'[17] Self-referential allusions offer Ovid the opportunity to reflect upon his earlier works and reinterpret them.[18] This thesis engages with the ways in which the theme of narrative authority is brought to the fore in four contrasting Ovidian works. Each shows an interest in questions of narrative authority, but their varying tones, genres, and content allow Ovid to explore different perspectives. This discussion is structured at the macroscopic level according to four main bases of authority, and then organised by poem.

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[13] Wilkinson 1955, 241; Otis 1966, 21-22; Fantham 1998, 3; Bömer 1988, 207-21. Bömer (1957a, 15) reserves judgement on whether this was the case ('Ob Ovid, als er sich der aitiologischen Dichtung zuwandte, an den Metamorphosen, den Phaenomena und den Fasten gleichzeitig gearbeitet, ob er die Werke nur gleichzeitig konzipiert und nacheinander ausgefuhrt hat oder umgekehrt, ist m. E. nicht mehr festzustellen.'). Syme (1978, 21) insists on the *Fasti*'s priority.
[14] Fantham 1995, 50
[15] Hutchinson 2011, 241
[16] Re-dedication of the poem at *Fasti* 1.3-26 (Fantham 1985, 244, 256-57); explicit reference to exile at *Fa.* 4.81-4 (Fantham 1998, 3-4); *Met.* 15.871-9 (Kovacs 1987, 463-65; Ingleheart 2011, 5). Episodes which play up the theme of exile in the *Met.* may also have been added (Harrison 2007, 134-39; Hardie 1995, 213 and n. 47).
[17] Kenney 1992, xxv
[18] Claassen 2008, 161

In the poetry of Homer, 'the narrator's authority is absolute',[19] and is implicit in the narrator's invocation of the Muse, who informs the poet and thus guarantees his narrative.[20] In contrast, Ovid offers a more fluid image of authority as something which can be established, questioned, and ultimately overturned or transformed. Ovid encourages his readers to engage with authority while reading his poetry, and to collaborate in constructing a new image of authority based on their reading. In Ovid's poetry, narrative authority is variously troped by age and memory, references to tradition, prophecy, and sight. These are all connected to, and in many ways symbolic of, the authority of the poet and of poetry itself.

This study begins by exploring how an individual's old age functions as a basis for authority, providing the potential for extended memory and narratorial control, but also for descent into forgetfulness and senility. Since aged figures such as Nestor often embody tradition, and old age serves as a metaphor for tradition through the dual meanings of *vetustas*,[21] Ovid is able to transpose problems with the authority of personal age onto poetic tradition, and to explore their implications for poetic authority. Chapter one also considers how age maps onto questions of genre and poetic primacy, even serving as a measure of poetic quality.

Chapter two is closely connected in theme to the preceding chapter, for just as age is concerned with its relationship with literary tradition, so too reflexive annotations like Alexandrian footnotes invoke the authority of tradition for the present text,[22] troping

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[19] Marincola 1997, 4
[20] Thucydides offers an account which is impersonal and assured. As Marincola (Ibid., 9) argues, 'No doubt part of the purpose of such assuredness is that the author wishes to avoid questions about the source of his knowledge - whether autopsy, inquiry, hearsay or even written sources.'
[21] *OLD* s.v. 1 and 3.
[22] Stinton 1976, 65

allusive activity as learned citation.[23] Such citations are frequently problematic; where a story differs from its predecessors, a footnote appended by Ovid can often serve 'to indicate the superiority of his own treatment'[24] and may even refer to non-existent source texts, thereby drawing attention to Ovidian innovations. Horsfall comments that in the poetry of Virgil 'the new is then often dressed up as old... Among modern scholars, chaos usually follows.'[25] This chapter aims to bring some order to the chaos, arguing that by marking the new as old the poet seeks to canonise it, and by pre-aging it, to authorise it for the future. This chapter also draws attention to the generality and unspecificity of Alexandrian footnotes, which may lack the authority that can pertain to a specific old man. Frequently Ovid combines the two, attributing his tales to 'a certain old man' and inviting the reader to assess the authority which is given to the tale.

Chapter three shows how whilst the aged look only backward, *vates* or seers also look forward, gaining authority from their expanded visionary scope. The *vates* figure is a complex one, standing for poets as well as prophets, and the status of *vates* varied in pre-Ovidian literature, growing in status in Augustan poetry. Ovid illustrates the successes but also the difficulties of vatic authority, including the problematic nature of the divine inspiration from which it derives. His self-presentation as a *vates* fluctuates from effacing himself in favour of a series of vatic analogues in the *Metamorphoses* to overtly questioning the divine basis of vatic authority in the *Fasti*, and asserting poetic authority as a viable alternative to political authority in the exile poetry. The diversity of Ovid's presentation of vatic authority across his body of work encourages his readers to embrace greater nuance in their conception of that authority.

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[23] Hinds 1998
[24] Thomas 1982, 146
[25] Horsfall 1991, 34

Chapter four engages with sight, which offers the authority of immediacy and proximity, and was considered the most reliable source of information in antiquity. Ovid frequently exhorts or invites his readers to 'behold' an event in order to immerse them in it and grant it the authority of sight, despite this being a physical impossibility. Given the traditional superiority of sight to hearing, the ability to achieve such *enargeia* is important in the process of authorising a narrative, and is thus vital to both rhetoricians and poets. However, the eye is susceptible to error and may be limited by distance. Universal vision is a divine or poetic trait, but even the authority of gods and poets is exposed to Ovidian scrutiny.

Age, reflexive annotation, *vates* and sight all trope ways in which Ovid challenges traditional authority in his poetry and remakes it in his idiosyncratic Ovidian style.

Chapter 1: The Authority of Age and the Past

Authority in the Roman world is troped by age, which was central to the Roman system of cultural values, and the past, which Ennius makes the foundation of Roman identity.[26] Ker and Pieper argue that 'In one or more of its multiple shapes and forms, antiquity lurked almost everywhere, at almost every time and for almost everyone in the Greek and Roman World.'[27] It was generally felt that the past gave authority to the present; indeed, at times the past was considered inherently authoritative and was invoked to enhance speakers' authority.[28] In Augustus' Forum, the past is used for political legitimisation;[29] the central statue of Augustus is contextualised by a 'sculptural programme of famous Romans, which securely locates Augustus and his adoptive father in a continuous line of Roman heroes reaching all the way back to Troy and Aeneas... So even as Augustus breaks with tradition in becoming a one-man centre of authority at Rome, he also characterizes himself as the continuation of the republican tradition of heroic statesmen.'[30] Moreover, hierarchies of values frequently judged the past superior to the present;[31] the Latin word *antiquus* can mean 'ancient', but can also be used in the sense of 'good' in the comparative and superlative.[32] As the title of Ker and Pieper's *Valuing the Past in the Greco-Roman World* implies and

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[26] *Ann.* fr. 156 Sk - *moribus antiquis res stat Romana virisque.*
[27] Ker and Pieper 2014, 5
[28] Seneca *ap Gell.* 12.2.10 comments on Virgil using Ennianisms purely so that Ennians would see something old in his new poem (*adgnosceret in novo carmine aliquid antiquitatis*).
[29] Hardie (1997, 185) - 'Augustus' political exploitation of Roman antiquarianism needs no discussion.' For discussion, cf. Libby 2015, 77; Ker and Pieper 2014, 3.
[30] Libby 2015, 77
[31] 'The veneration of the past is one of the most characteristic features of Imperial Greek culture' - Ker and Pieper 2014, 5.
[32] *OLD* s.v. 10; cf. Ker and Pieper 2014, 5-6. Mamoojee (2003, 67) points out Latin's richness in adjectives signifying prior or long existence (particularly delightful examples are *capularis* - 'bier-ready' and *depontanus* - 'fit to be thrown from the bridge' i.e. sexagenarian), ranging from the monosemic to the polysemic which are 'complex, multi-functional, pliable between neutrality and positive or negative connotation,' of which the most versatile are *antiquus* and *vetus*.

the editors confirm,[33] the past was constantly evaluated in antiquity, a practice in which modern scholars continue to be engaged. It is thus not surprising that Ovid invites his readers to consider the authority of age and the past in his poetry.

The authority of age in speech is apparent from rhetoric. Quintilian states that an accomplished orator should be able to cite old and new exempla (*Inst.* 12.4.1 - *cum veterum tum etiam novorum*), but that these need not always be historical, since poetic exempla are sanctioned by the guarantee of antiquity (*vetustatis fide tuta sunt*).[34] Quintilian performs an adroit feat of logic here; the more exempla that an orator knows the better, and this gives old men authority because they have lived longer so they know more and have seen more (*Sciat ergo quam plurima. unde etiam senibus auctoritas maior est, quod plura nosse et vidisse creduntur (quod Homerus frequentissime testatur)* - *Inst.* 12.4.2). Quintilian practises what he preaches, citing the suitably ancient Homer as his exemplum. The youth is encouraged to circumvent the slowness of the natural aging process by studying, which will give the impression that he has the superior knowledge of the old, and hence grant him authority. However, a speaker is more authoritative if he appeals to a memory which his audience shares;[35] indeed, age is inadequate without audience recognition (*Inst.* 1.6.41 - *ut novorum optima erunt maxime vetera, ita veterum maxime nova*).[36] This means

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[33] Ker and Pieper 2014, 2

[34] 'The literary canonization obviously is more important for the functioning of the *exemplum* than its historical truth: an 'invented antiquity' is better than an obscure one' - Ibid., 7.

[35] 'Generally, a memory of the past that the speaker shares with his audience has an (almost) undisputed value *per se* and thus can lend legitimacy and authority to anyone who is in control of it... Basically, any episode from the past might work as an historica *exemplum*, yet the more often it is repeated and therefore the better it is recognized by the public, the stronger its effects are. A logical consequence of this is that the speaker will not choose any arbitrary event but one that is already part of the shared memory.' - Ibid.

[36] cf. *Inst.* 1.6.39 (archaic expressions give a speech *maiestatem* due to having *auctoritatem antiquitas*), Cicero *Brut.* 120 (the mention of antiquity gives a speech *auctoritatem... et fidem*). In Ennius *Ann.* 8.282-284 Sk., the counsellor's knowledge of the past qualifies him as trustworthy. This is generally accepted as a self-portrait (cf. Elliott 2013, 230 on the authority of this claim in antiquity) whence Ennius claims figuratively and literally to contain knowledge of the past, for *tenentem* indicates that he

that ‘archaisms, even if in principle they are considered to be authoritative, should not be so remote and forgotten that one’s audience are precluded from a shared understanding of their meaning.’[37] The authority derived from living longer must be balanced against the authority of shared knowledge.

This attribution of authority to old people, as opposed to past times and events, underpins Roman society. The fact that the name of the *senatus*, the key political body in Rome, was often etymologised as deriving from being the assembly of the elders,[38] and that its decisions were guided by the model of their forebears (*mos maiorum*), is an indication that ‘Roman society was deeply grounded in such a respect for old age;’[39] indeed, the senate was ‘the incarnation of the power of age’.[40] Ker and Pieper rightly claim that ‘concepts of antiquity and of (human) old age are intertwined, and both are regularly valued in positive terms.’[41] Age had a privileged status in antiquity.[42]

One reason for this collective cultural acknowledgement of gerontic authority is that the old remember the past and communicate it to the next generation. Cokayne suggests that ‘the memory of the old was relied upon to maintain the social mores

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is ‘a vessel for the relocation of the primeval author of epic to Rome’ (Sciarrino 2011, 98), containing Homer’s soul and knowledge.

[37] Ker and Pieper 2014, 8

[38] *Fa.* 5.64 - *nomen et aetatis mite senatus habet*; Cicero *Sen.* 56 - *senatores id est senes*; Servius (acknowledging alternative explanations as well) ad *Aen.* 1.426 - *alii senatum a senectute... dictum volunt*, ad *Aen.* 5.758 - *senatores autem alii a senecta aetate... dictos accipiunt*; Isidorus *Orig.* 9.4.8 - *Senatui nomen aetas dedit, quod seniores essent.*

[39] Ker and Pieper 2014, 8

[40] Minois 1989, 84

[41] Ker and Pieper 2014, 8-9. Ripoll (2003, 674), in contrast, highlights ‘l’image majoritairement pathétique du vieillard dans la tradition épico-tragique’.

[42] The ancient view of the past was not uniformly positive. Seneca the Younger is ‘especially versatile in adopting multiple perspectives on antiquity and its valuation’ (Ker and Pieper 2014, 12). 4th century Greek orators preferred contemporary exempla, for ‘references to the non-mythical distant past... lacked familiarity and were thus in danger of estranging the audience. Proximity to the world of the audience in general increased the persuasiveness of *exempla* marshalled by orators’ (Grethlein 2014, 336). cf. Isocrates *Paneg.* 4.30 (recent things are more trustworthy). Minois (1989, 77) states ‘The Romans talked a lot about the old, but rarely to praise them.’

and to instruct the young in occupational skills.'[43] The greater someone's age, the longer his memory, and the greater the volume of memories contained within it. With increasing age also comes rarity value, as contemporary accounts die off. In poetry, old men are often the sole source for a tale,[44] granting them unmatched authority. The old serve as repositories for collective social memory or cultural tradition, a role which they are uniquely able to perform, and this grants them authority in their society.

Memory and age are closely connected and codependent, and contribute to the authority of their possessors. However, this aspect of age is highlighted by its opposite, oblivion. As time passes, things can be forgotten, and with increasing age, senility may encroach upon the memory and destroy poetic abilities. Ovid is not the first to test the accepted authority of age, but he offers a distinct counter-narrative to the tendency of Augustan Roman society (especially its poetry) to canonise a particular version of the past and its poets, and to regard it as authoritative.

Whilst speakers' old age makes them appropriate representatives of tradition, tradition can also have an aging effect. Homer was considered the archetypal figure of epic poetry and epic tradition, and, despite a dearth of biographical information, is depicted almost exclusively in ancient portraits as an old man.[45] R. and E. Boehringer identify four types of Homer image, all of which depict the poet in this way.[46] Graziosi suggests that this standard depiction of Homer 'probably symbolised the

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[43] Cokayne 2011, 67

[44] cf. *Her.* 14.109-10 - *ultima quid referam, quorum mihi cana senectus auctor?*

[45] Graziosi 2002, 67. An exception is a 3rd century AD Roman mosaic, which depicts Homer as a typical Roman youth. The *Margites* introduces an aged bard (γέρων και θεῖος ἀοιδος), who is identified as Homer. Until the Byzantine period, depictions of Homer as an old man were standard (e.g. Tz. *H.* 4.866ff. Leone - ὁ γέρων).

[46] Epimenides-typus: 'der Kopf eines alten Mannes' (Boehringer 1939, 19); Apollonios-typus: 'der Kopf eines bejahrten aber nicht altermüden Mannes' (Ibid., 42); Hellenisticher-typus: 'Ein Greisenkopf mit blicklosen Augen' (Ibid., 73). Ibid., 18 - 'Gemeinsam ist den Typen Binde, Bart, und Würde das Alters'.

great antiquity and authority of his poems'[47] and that 'his authority and the antiquity of his poetry probably influenced the choice of portraying Homer as old.'[48] The poet's age reflects the age and antiquity of his poetry. Homer was the accepted authority for the events of the Trojan War.[49] This is not to say that the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* were regarded as fact, but that 'Homeric poetry commanded an immense cultural authority throughout antiquity.'[50] Homer stood at the head of tradition, as its most authoritative voice, and was often identified as older than Hesiod in order to emphasise his pre-eminence.[51] Kim points out that Strabo 'takes the poet's authority for granted on the basis of his antiquity and cultural pre-eminence',[52] and even the more ambivalent among the other writers whom he discusses lay claim to Homer's cultural authority.[53]

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[47] Graziosi 2002, 67
[48] Ibid., 152
[49] Lattimore 1951, 13
[50] Kim 2010, 2
[51] Graziosi 2002, 101-09.
[52] Kim 2010, 10
[53] Even Homer was not universally seen as an infallible source of unembellished historical truth. Thucydides 1.10.3 ponders poetic exaggeration and questions whether Homer's testimony is trustworthy. 1.9.4 and 1.10.3 resemble the belief parentheses of the *Metamorphoses* - 'if we can believe Homer's testimony' is much like 'if we can believe the testimony of *vetustas*'. cf. Hdt. 2.116.1.

The *Metamorphoses* and Age Authority

To invoke the authority of Homer, as later writers attempt to do, is to claim the authority of the past, and of antiquity. In the *Metamorphoses*, Ovid includes a Homeric character, Nestor, who not only draws on the past, but also embodies Homer himself. Nestor's centauromachy 'stands, essentially, for Homer's *Iliad*',[54] and its narrator both replaces the traditional bard who 'sings of heroic action for the entertainment of warriors at a feast',[55] and serves as a substitute Homer, claiming authority from his predecessor's antiquity. Perhaps due to the authority of Homer's depiction, Nestor becomes an archetypal old man,[56] against whom other aged narrators must be read. His age was proverbial;[57] in both the *Iliad* and the *Metamorphoses*, Nestor predicates his authority upon his age.[58] Age is emphasised from the beginning of his narrative in *Metamorphoses* 12.[59] Nestor mentions that he knows a story of the past (*olim* - *Met.* 12. 171), and is referred to as an old man (*senex* - *Met.* 12.178; *senior* - *Met.* 12.182). Nestor also contrasts *quondam* and *nunc* (*Met.* 12.549 and 12.573), emphasising the time that has passed between the events and his account. Moreover, Nestor is addressed as an eloquent old man and 'the wisdom of our age' (*facunde senex, aevi prudentia nostra* - *Met.* 12.178) by Achilles, in a public acknowledgement of the fact that he has acquired his status by living through several

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[54] Mack 1988, 128. The Centauromachy is 'a distorted reflection of the many battle scenes in the *Iliad*' (Ellsworth 1980, 26) and 'a "surrogate" for the *Iliad*' (Nagle 1989, 117).
[55] Mack 1988, 128
[56] Dippel (1990, 34) classifies Nestor as 'Ideal eines Greises'. cf. Latacz 1985, 127 - 'Er... repräsentiert Weisheit des Alters, geboren aus Erfahrung und Vernunft.'
[57] Juvenal 10.246-7 - *rex Pylius, magno si quicquam credis Homero, / exemplum vitae fuit a cornice secundae*. The crow lives nine generations (Braund 2004, 386 n.44) whereas Nestor is in his third century.
[58] Minois (1989, 46) suggests, however, that the old have authority based on their glorious past as fighting heroes, rather than their present age.
[59] Also in *Met.* 13.66 where Ajax emphasises the weakness of age in order to make Ulixes' abandonment of Nestor appear more heinous.

ages.[60] Nestor self-consciously connects his age to his memory (*si quem potuit spatiosa senectus / spectatorem operum multorum reddere* - *Met.* 12.186-7). His unusually long life has produced an extraordinarily long memory which allows him to give authoritative eyewitness accounts of many events.[61] Nestor's citation of this authority emphasises his greater-than-average length of autoptic experience (*vestro fuit unicus aevo / contemptor ferri... at ipse olim... vidi* - *Met.* 12.169-72), and recalls the Homeric Phoenix' introduction of the story of Meleager in terms which explicitly point out the age of the story and its consequent authority, as well as implicitly positioning Phoenix as older and more authoritative than the other heroes at Troy (μέμνημαι τόδε ἔργον ἐγὼ πάλαι οὔ τι νέον γε / ὡς ἦν: ἐν δ' ὑμῖν ἐρέω πάντεσσι φίλοισι - *Il.* 9.527-8).[62] Citing age is standard practice for narrators, for doing so produces authority for their narratives.

The Vulnerabilities of *Vetustas*: Age, Tradition, and Memory

Nestor assumes a commemorative role, drawing upon his extensive memory to deliver knowledge of his experiences to his younger audience. It is this transfer of information from past to present which is responsible for events becoming part of the collective memory of epic tradition, as opposed to merely Nestor's own memory. The interdependency of personal and collective memories is complicated, however, by the fact that personal memories are inherently fallible, since they are based upon attempts

[60] Davis (2008, 432) points out that the Homeric Nestor's age is plausible, but the Ovidian Nestor's age is not. If he is unreliable about his own age, how can his authority be trusted? Davis concludes that it can't. Dippel (1990, 36) suggests that 'Ovids Nestor ist die Persiflage des homerischen Nestor', and dismisses Achilles' words as a *captatio benevolentiae* (Ibid., 34).
[61] cf. The Iliadic Nestor, whose preeminence as an authoritative speaker is located in his 'ability to remember and remind' (Martin 1989, 80-81).
[62] Martin 1989, 80-81

to reconstruct experiences,[63] and 'with reconstruction comes distortion'.[64] Such distortion may be 'a natural consequence of memory's inherent fallibility, and does not necessarily reflect a deliberate attempt to mislead.'[65] The bi-fold process of encoding and retrieval heightens the vulnerability of the information being remembered,[66] particularly when additional variables are introduced, such as the passing of time and the consequent transmission of a memory via several individuals.[67] With the passage of time, memory becomes increasingly flawed, and 'as the event is re-told, the original story will be transformed in accordance with each teller's values, beliefs, and desires.'[68] The performative nature of transmission thus affects memory. A memory has to be articulated in order to commemorate; remembering is an active process. Consequently, memory is not inert, but continually negotiated and constructed,[69] and is vulnerable to the vagaries of time and narrators. Its authority is conditional upon the transformative acts of reconstructing events and then rendering that memory into speech. Nestor's language in *Met.* 12.429-31 draws

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[63] 'A remembrance is in very large measure a reconstruction of the past with data borrowed from the present, a reconstruction prepared, furthermore, by reconstructions of earlier periods wherein past images had already been altered' - Halbwachs 1980, 69.

[64] Bernstein, Nourkova and Loftus 2008, 158. Their study focusses upon oral history, but the close association of historiography, epic and rhetoric makes their insights useful. On this, cf. Woodman 1988, 100 - 'Though we today see poetry, oratory and historiography as three separate genres, the ancients saw them as three different species of the same genus - rhetoric' and Agath. *praef.* 7-13, quoted by Norden (1958, 92).

[65] Bernstein, Nourkova and Loftus 2008, 176. Distortion *may* reflect a deliberate attempt to mislead.

[66] Writing permits an original viewpoint to be 'decoded' even years later ('the time when the decoding occurs is not important' - Small 1997, 8), without interference from the mediating influences which act upon human memory. Himmelfarb (2004, 17) comments on 'the fallibility and selectivity inherent in the writing of history, and the fallibility and subjectivity of the historian', which make it impossible to fully recapture the past.

[67] Gellius displays particular concern with the vulnerability of knowledge in its transmission from the past, and how this multiplies with successive mediators of the information (e.g. *NA* 4.11). As Howley (2014, 475) points out, 'The antique is thus handed down by a chain of individuals, each of whose uncertain ability as interpreter might introduce errors to the transmission.'

[68] Bernstein, Nourkova and Loftus 2008, 159. cf. Bartlett 1932.

[69] Memory seeks to reduce the distance created by time passing between an event and the present. Nevertheless, as A. Robinson (2011, 5) points out, a narrative 'derives from memories of varying reliability and authenticity in which a *remembering* self now recalls (and narrates) a *remembered* self'. cf. Plato *Tht.* 191c.ff., which likens memory to tablets containing varying quality wax; one forgets what is obliterated and what never made an impression in the first place.

attention to this process, emphasising that memory is 'a mental process whereby we recreate or reconstruct the events of the past' and underlining the fact that 'however objective epic narratives might seem to be, their authority derives from a process which is essentially subjective.'[70] The preservation of memories through successive re-rendering into speech creates tradition, for 'tradition is information remembered.'[71] Moreover, 'to refer to and use a tradition is inevitably to modify the tradition'.[72] Subsequent accessors of memories, particularly when directly citing information as memory (for example, with *memini*), are both drawing on and perpetuating tradition, and thereby transmitting it from generation to generation.

Considerable ambiguity and weakness underlies the apparent authority of age and *vetustas* in the *Metamorphoses*. Ovid highlights the fact that age, memory and tradition are dualities. *Vetustas* has parallel positive and negative connotations, embodying not only the positive side of aged memory coded as tradition, but also the negative, namely deliberate or accidental forgetting and erasure. These two aspects are embodied within fifty lines of each other in *Met.* 1. At *Met.* 1.400, *vetustas* is the sole credible testimony of a miraculous past event (*quis hoc credat nisi sit pro teste vetustas*?).[73] Anderson suggests for *vetustas* here a sense of 'venerable tradition', for which he states that Romans had great respect.[74] However, as Gildenhard and Zissos note, Ovid uses the parenthesis to turn '*vetustas*... into a criterion for *veritas*... slyly counting on, while at the same time subverting, the Roman investment in tradition.'[75]

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[70] Davis 2008, 434
[71] Vansina 1985, xiv
[72] Segal in Conte 1986, 10
[73] Galinsky (1975, 178) argues that 'deliberate in achieving the desired opposite result are Ovid's pseudo-credulous appeals to the venerable age of a mythical tradition', as at *Met.* 1.400 or 9.252.
[74] Anderson 1997 ad 1.400-2. Leo (1913, 171) notes that *vetustas* archaises and heroises nouns. cf. Segal (2001, 98) who sees Numa's trip to learn from Pythagoras as reflecting a 'desire by the Romans generally, as latecomers, to reach out to absorb an earlier tradition of prestigious wisdom'.
[75] Gildenhard and Zissos 2016, 21

Mindless respect for age is not the *modus operandi* in Ovidian poetry, where the authority of *vetustas* is frequently challenged. At *Met.* 1.445, a mere 45 lines later, Apollo is obliged to institute the Pythian games in order to avoid his deed's fame being wiped out by *vetustas* (*neve operis famam possit delere vetustas, / instituit sacros... ludos* - *Met.* 1.445-6). *Vetustas* can obliterate as well as commemorate. The Ovidian narrator also mentions this aspect of *vetustas* in *Met.* 15.871-2, where he asserts that his *opus* cannot be undone by *edax... vetustas*.[76] *Vetustas* is thus a contradictory entity; it can both destroy and embody tradition.

Pythagoras' appeal to the Muses to answer his question in *Met.* 15.622ff. also acknowledges this; it is based not only on the Muses' knowledge, but also on their ability not to be deceived by *vetustas* (*scitis enim, nec vos fallit spatiosa vetustas* - *Met.* 15.623), which is here a criterion of credibility, age, and uncertain tradition.[77] As deceitful tradition, *vetustas* is not admissible as a source to Pythagoras, who refers to the Muses for the truth. This is, however, problematised by the fact that tradition says that the Muses, despite their authority as the daughters of Memory,[78] may not necessarily tell the truth (ἴδμεν ψεύδεα πολλὰ λέγειν ἐτύμοισιν ὁμοῖα, / ἴδμεν δ', εὖτ' ἐθέλωμεν, ἀληθέα γηρύσασθαι. - *Theog*. 27-8). When poets appeal to the Muses it is frequently a figure for calling upon poetic tradition,[79] which brings the question of the authority of tradition full circle, for the Muses' inherent authority is also not entirely reliable. *Vetustas* is thus an ambivalent force in the *Metamorphoses*. As Micozzi comments, 'la *vetustas* è infatti forza infida e ambivalente, che può anche seppellire il

[76] There is a certain inevitability to such decay. cf. *Aen.* 12.686, where Turnus en route to his final battle with Aeneas is likened to a rock loosened by *vetustas* (Nickbakht 2010, 58).
[77] Bömer 1986, 420 ad 15.622 - '*spatiosa vetustas* als Kriterium der Glaubwürdigkeit und Alter, aber auch als Kriterium unsicherer Überlieferung'.
[78] e.g. Pindar *Pae.* 6.54-6 - γάρ, ἴσᾳτ[ε], Μο[ῖ]σαι, / πάντα, κε[λαι]νεφεῖ σὺν / πατρὶ Μναμοσ[ύν]ᾳ.
[79] Nagy 1979, 16 - The poet invokes the Muse 'whose message is equated with that of creative tradition'.

passato'.[80] In contrast, in late antiquity, Nonius equates antiquity (*antiquitas / vetustas*) with authority (*auctoritas*).[81]

In the *Metamorphoses*, Nestor is a good analogy for the dual aspects of *vetustas*,[82] for his age seems to simultaneously enable and impede his narratorial abilities. Nestor has seen many things in his long lifetime, which he is able to recall (*plura tamen memini* - *Met.* 12.184) as a result of his *spatiosa senectus* (*Met.* 12.186). However, Nestor also admits that age hinders him in his recollections (*quamuis obstet mihi tarda vetustas* - *Met.* 12.182), and that he has forgotten many things (*multaque me fugiant* - *Met.* 12.183). His ability to remember or not is reinforced by the juxtaposition of *memini* and *non memini* at *Met.* 12.452 and 12.461 respectively. Thus Nestor's memory and the account that he produces from it are incomplete, and this deficiency calls their authority into question.

The positive and negative effects of age on memory depicted by Nestor seem to broadly correlate with the account of Seneca the Elder in his introduction to the *Controversiae*, providing authoritative evidence that Nestor's narratorial fallibility is inadvertent. Like Nestor, Seneca is asked to convey information about the past to his young audience. He emphasises memory as being most at risk of being affected by age (*Contr.* 1 *praef.* 2) and contrasts his former prodigious feats of memorisation (two thousand names or two hundred verses of poetry at a time) to his forgetfulness now that his memory has been undermined by age (*nunc et aetate quassata et longa desidia* - *Contr.* 1 *praef.* 3). Likewise, Nestor cannot remember the wounds in his catalogue of warriors and wounds in the centauromachy (*vulnera non memini,*

[80] Micozzi 2007, 71
[81] Chahoud 2007, 72
[82] The old Roma figure popular in the 4th century also encapsulates the duality of the old age metaphor: 'Roma's old age is used at times as a symbol of decline, but also as an image that should inspire respect and veneration in the audience' (Sogno 2007, 88).

numerum nomenque notavi - *Met.* 12.461).[83] Seneca warns his audience that he may not be able to draw upon all his memories in chronological order:[84]

> *Illud necesse est impetrem, ne me quasi certum aliquem ordinem velitis sequi in contrahendis quae mihi occurrent; necesse est enim per omnia studia mea errem et passim quidquid obvenerit adprehendam... non enim, dum quaero aliquid, invenio, sed saepe quod quaerenti non comparuit, aliud agenti praesto est* (*Contr*. 1 *praef*. 4-5).
>
> I must ask you not to want me to follow any strict order in assembling what I come across; for I must wander through all my studies and seize on something here and there as it comes... For I don't always find something while I'm looking for it, but often what did not appear while I was looking for it is at hand when I'm doing something else.

Nestor, having told of Peleus' attack on Crantor, suddenly backtracks to earlier events (*ante tamen* - *Met.* 12.378, with the pluperfect *dederat* emphasising the action's anteriority). Although this could be merely an instance of epic flashback, it may also represent the random nature of memory and the difficulty not merely of recalling events but of doing so in the correct order.[85]

Nestor deviates from Seneca's experience regarding what is remembered. Seneca states that his memory was not only swift to acquire information, but also reliable in retaining it (*sed etiam ad continenda quae acceperat solebat bonae fidei esse* - *Contr.*

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[83] The Muses note everything (*Fa*. 5.10 - *dictaque mente notant*), but whereas the Homeric narrator has their assistance and can therefore provide authoritative and detailed accounts of wounds, Ovid's Nestor does not. As Musgrove (1998, 227) notes, 'Unlike the more superhuman Homeric or Virgilian narrator, Nestor has no outside source of authority.' cf. *Contr*. 1 *praef*. 18, where Latro remembers everything. Dippel (1990, 35-36) finds Nestor's ability to remember even 'achtäg(!) Namen' implausible, suspecting Nestor of invention and of being 'die personale Ausgestaltung des Abstraktums "Fama"'.

[84] Quintilian characterises having a series of unconnected thoughts as juvenile (*Inst. Or.* 2.11.6-7), the poor craft of schoolboys, whereas Seneca attributes it to the vagaries of old age, and says that he is led astray by the caprices of his memory (*Contr.* 1 *praef.* 5). As Gunderson (2003, 34) notes, 'Such diction recalls more the scandalous outlook of a *senex amans* than the tones of a reputable old man'; this is 'a memory dedicated to pleasure and incapable of properly memorializing'. However, Gunderson also suggests that Seneca's wandering memory means that 'instead of recording after the manner of a stenographer Seneca recalls in the fashion of a poet or even of a dreamer'. His collection of disparate episodes unconstrained by chronology recalls a specific poet, Ovid, and his *Metamorphoses*.

[85] This lack of control over one's memory is also noted by Quintilian (*Inst.* 11.2.7), who comments upon memory's control of sequencing (*Inst.* 11.2.8) and Cicero's use of mnemonic techniques to combat the issue (Quint. *Inst.* 11.2.22ff. cf. Cic. *de Orat.* 2.86.354).

1 *praef.* 3).[86] He notes that this has been affected by age (*aetate quassata*), but is pleased to find that he can recollect his youth perfectly, though he cannot remember very recent events.[87] In this, he differs from Nestor, who claims to have forgotten many things seen in his youth (*multaque me fugiant primis spectata sub annis* - *Met.* 12.183). This pattern of memory might constitute an early indication that Nestor's forgetfulness of his early years may not be in keeping with normal old age.

It is not only Nestor's memory of his earliest years which is affected, for Nestor's authoritative narrative falters concerning the relative chronology of the marriage of Peleus and Thetis, and the courting of Caenis (*Met.* 12.194-5). Nestor's punctilious commentary on his mnemonic failings gives a veneer of reliability to his narrative. Whilst he does not remember every event perfectly, he is aware of what he does not know and indicates this. Consequently his audience gets an impression of reliability even without complete knowledge. It thus appears that an authoritative narrative can still be produced even when age has affected the memory. Nestor's internal audience (with the exception of Tlepolemus) does not challenge his narrative, and even Tlepolemus purports to attribute Nestor's omissions to age when he expresses wonder at the forgetfulness of the old man (*Herculeae mirum est oblivia laudis / acta tibi, senior* - *Met.* 12.539-40); perhaps respect for Nestor's aged authority prevents Tlepolemus from directly calling him a liar. Nestor's age seems not to discourage acceptance of his authority; on the contrary, it results in him being given the benefit of the doubt (or at least the courtesy of such an excuse). It is his inherent age authority that Nestor intends to strengthen with the example that Mopsus's account of Caeneus' metamorphosis is believed because of its source (*credita res auctore suo est* -

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[86] Seneca owns that Latro's perfect recall makes books redundant (*Contr.* 1 *praef.* 18). cf. Gunderson 2003, 46 - 'Memory's apotheosis is to write the text as an indelible possession in the soul.'
[87] Quintilian (*Inst.* 11.2.6-7) reflects upon forgetting recent events and rembering old ones.

*Met.*12.532). Just as Mopsus' tale is believed because of its source, so Nestor's account should be believed because its source is Nestor, who has the authority of age. As it turns out, 'Nestor's remark, in spite of its intentions, does not lend the story greater credibility;' in fact, as we will see, we should disbelieve Nestor's tales 'precisely because he is their *auctor*'.[88]

Although Nestor implies that any faults in his narrative will be due to normal gerontic memory lapses (*Met.* 12.182-3),[89] it becomes evident that this is not actually the case. Tlepolemus claims that Nestor's centauromachy is incomplete, offering an alternative version that his father Hercules often used to tell him, in which Hercules defeated the centaurs (*certe mihi saepe referre / nubigenas domitos a se esse solebat* - *Met.* 12.540-1). The two narratives are placed in parallel and in competition by the use of the same verb for their telling (*referente* - *Met.* 12.537; *referre* - *Met.* 12.540). Heslin suggests that 'When Tlepolemus says that he has heard a different version... it harks directly back to the multiplicity of narrators in Ovid's description of the cave of Fama'[90] where the same verb is used (*vocesque refert iteratque quod audit* - *Met.* 12.47). This raises the question of whether Nestor and Hercules' narratives are as unauthoritative as Fama's whispers. Tlepolemus insists on the authority of his information that Hercules was involved in the centauromachy (*certe* - *Met.* 12.540), which he was told often (*saepe* - *Met.* 12.540). The attentive reader will remember that Hercules did mention defeating the centaurs at *Met.* 9.191 (*nec mihi Centauri*

[88] Looney 1996, 111
[89] Levy and Langer (1994) have found that the Chinese do not suffer from age-related memory deterioration because they do not know they should. cf. Small 1997, 190.
[90] Heslin 2016, 75

potuere resistere), but literary tradition has no precedent for Hercules' participation with the Lapiths in this centauromachy.[91]

There are three possible explanations for the discrepancy between Nestor and Tlepolemus' tales. Firstly, that Tlepolemus is (deliberately[92] or subconsciously) conflating two separate centauromachy tales. Secondly, that Hercules lied to his son in an attempt to increase his glory.[93] Thirdly, that Nestor left Hercules out (intentionally or due to age-induced memory loss). The reader, being well-acquainted with tradition, expects that Nestor will declare the first or second of these possibilities to be the case, and Nestor duly states that Hercules did things that were *maiora fide* (*Met.* 12.545), implying exaggeration.[94] However, Nestor then effectively says that Tlepolemus is right; though he protests at being made to remember evils (*quid me meminisse malorum / cogis* - *Met.* 12.542-3), he admits that he would prefer to deny Hercules' merits (*quod mallem posse negare* - *Met.* 12.546), and confirms that he is avenging his brothers by being silent about Hercules' deeds (*fortia facta*[95] *silenda* - *Met.* 12.575).[96] This forces the reader to conclude that 'Ovid means to imply that

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[91] In Apollodorus 2.5.4, centaurs attack Hercules when he is dining with Pholus. Nestor mentions a centaur named Pholus at *Met.* 12.306.

[92] Tlepolemus' status is based on his father's renown. cf. *Il.* 5.638-42 where Tlepolemus relies on hearsay (φασι - *Il.* 5.638), and Sarpedon's reply echoes that of Nestor, acknowledging Tlepolemus' words, but turning to other matters (Τληπόλεμ᾽ ἤτοι κεῖνος ἀπώλεσεν Ἴλιον ἱρὴν... δ᾽ - *Il.* 5.648-52; *ille quidem maiore fide (di!) gessit*... *sed* - *Met*. 12.545-7). Glenn (1986, 166) dismisses Tlepolemus as 'irrelevant and petulant'.

[93] Hercules' numerous famous deeds multiply in tradition independently (*Met.* 9.134-5, 12.545-6).

[94] Hercules' deeds are actually far better attested than Caeneus' metamorphosis (Galinsky 1975, 178).

[95] *Factum* can mean fact as opposed to fiction (*OLD* s.v. 3), so may imply 'by being silent about the truth'.

[96] At *Met.* 12.429-31, Nestor pointedly mentions characteristic features of Hercules, only to apply them to someone else (*ante oculos stat et ille meos, qui sena leonum / vinxerat inter se conexis vellera nodis, / Phaeocomes*). Nestor recasts Tlepolemus' question about the reliability of memory to ask whether evil-doers should be commemorated. Praise, blame, memory and oblivion are closely connected (Detienne 1996, 47), and Ovid's *Invidia* bears considerable resemblance to Virgil's *Fama* (Keith 1992, 130). Balancing praise and blame is particularly problematic for historians (Liv. 8.40.2-5), for as Hardie (2012, 232) notes, 'Noble families, in their eagerness to construct traditions that will lead to being preferred to others in esteem, make it impossible for the historian to establish due ranking between his authorities.' Like the poet, 'the historian as a narrator of deeds is himself involved in their glory' (Marincola 1997, 58).

Hercules really did take part in the battle of the Lapiths and the Centaurs and that the canonical mythological tradition is in error.'[97] The authority of tradition is thus completely overturned.

As well as this deliberate excision of Hercules from tradition, Nestor's account displays the augmentation of tales which was highlighted in the Fama ecphrasis earlier in *Met.* 12. The increased prominence of Peleus in his narrative is 'an offhand ad-hoc invention designed to please a particular hearer',[98] namely Nestor's chief addressee, Peleus' son Achilles.[99] Moreover, Nestor's admission that he has edited his account of the past is disingenuous, for he refers to Elis as a blameless city destroyed by Hercules (*immeritas urbes Elinque Pylonque / diruit* - *Met.* 12.550-1), whereas the Homeric Nestor states that he himself defeated Elis, and that it owed reparation to the the Pylians (*Iliad* 11.670-761), so it was hardly blameless. The way that Nestor speaks about past events reveals his approach; things can be concealed with time (*obductos annis* - *Met.* 12.543)[100] and narrators have the power to keep quiet (*utque alios taceam* - *Met.* 12.552).[101] Nestor omits, adds and falsifies parts of tradition, manipulating and distorting it to suit his own purposes.[102]

Re-reading the centauromachy with narratorial self-interest in mind reveals a number of examples which support the view of narration as self-serving and subjective. The

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[97] Heslin 2016, 76
[98] Heslin 2016, 76
[99] Peleus features in *Met.* 12.193-5, 363-80, 388-9, 440. Nestor encourages Achilles to regard his father as an authority for events (perhaps suggesting that Peleus will tell a similar tale due to desire for self-promotion), just as Tlepolemus does later in the episode, but Peleus does not appear to have told his son the story. Is this a sign that Peleus' prominence has been exaggerated?
[100] Gamel 1984, 129. cf. *fidum Nestora* - *Met.* 13.63.
[101] Looney (1996, 112) cogently asks, 'What else remains untold?'
[102] Pelling 2010, 367 - 'Destroying memory is difficult, distorting it is easier - and that is what makes memory difficult to control.' A. Robinson 2011, 5 - 'On the one hand, the benefit of hindsight offers the opportunity for an honest confrontation with one's past, aided by the possible clarity of chronological distance from the emotional and perceptual confusion with which the events were originally experienced. On the other hand, it offers the opportunity for inconsistencies, embarrassments, hesitations, failures or mistakes to be edited out of the record... We view the past through the filtering lens of our present interests.'

parenthesis to the account of Pallas warning Theseus to retreat (*credi sic ipse volebat* - *Met.* 12.360) reminds the reader that the only authority for Minerva's assistance is Theseus himself, and suggests that the story was created by Theseus 'as a means of magnifying his own significance', for only prominent heroes received divine aid.[103] Nestor's emphasis on his martial prowess revises the unflattering Ovidian description of Nestor fleeing from the Calydonian boar at *Met.* 8.365-8. The narrator manipulates, alters, and outright invents his account in order to perpetuate in tradition a story that is to his advantage. He is both *auctor* in the sense that he is an epic hero acting and *auctor* in the sense of epic singer, so he can refine his image while commemorating it. Narrative authority is problematised when it is 'the participants in a heroic action whose biased, personal narratives shape our knowledge of events'.[104]

Age authority is affected by the fact that long life gives exclusive access to experiences and memories. For past events such as the centauromachy, Nestor is the only narrator available to the Greeks.[105] As Musgrove points out:

> Nestor's insistence on his authority and control of his narrative reminds us of our complete dependence (at least during the course of a given act of narration) on the narrator for perspective, memory, and objectivity. Like Odysseus, Nestor has outlived all the corroborating witnesses to his story, so we must take his word, however improbable, for the events he recounts.[106]

Nestor emphasises his sole access at the beginning of his speech, contrasting *vestro aevo* (*Met.* 12.169, acknowledged by Achilles in *Met.* 12.178 - *aevi nostri*) with his own past experience (*at ipse olim... vidi*) and referring to his *tertia aetas*. Seneca adopts a similarly exclusive role, repeatedly remarking that only his prodigious

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[103] Davis 2008, 434
[104] Heslin 2016, 75
[105] He 'extends from the epic past into the *Iliad*'s present' (Turkeltaub 2010, 133), and performs the same role in the *Metamorphoses*.
[106] Musgrove 1998, 229. cf. Phoenix's knowledge of the Meleager story at *Il.* 9.527. Grethlein (2014, 326) suggests that this story 'implies that temporal distance heightens the authority of *exempla*'.

memory can provide a gateway to the marvels of declamatory history.[107] Like Nestor, Seneca highlights his importance as a conduit for memory, balancing his own familiarity (*qui in aetatem meam inciderunt* - *Contr.* 1 *praef.* 1) against his audience's lack of knowledge (*quamvis notitiae vestrae subducti sint* - *Contr.* 1 *praef.* 1).[108] Without Seneca, his audience has only untrustworthy hearsay. Papaioannou rightly notes, therefore, that 'longevity is a prerequisite for the preservation and propagation of past memory,'[109] since age both establishes its possessor as a unique authority who can control the transmission of the past once he has outlived his contemporaries, and gives him material of which to speak.

Heslin suggests that just as Hercules repeatedly told the story of his role in the centauromachy to his son, so Nestor told the tale throughout his life, consistently and deliberately leaving Hercules out.[110] Over time 'his censored version became canonical, as he outlived all the other participants who might have told the truth',[111] so he goes unchallenged except on this rare occasion, when someone in his audience has external knowledge of the events being related and can reveal that 'a totally different "truth" could exist'.[112] This isn't entirely convincing, for some of Nestor's Greek audience would surely have heard a story he frequently retold, but in fact they all want to hear about the novelty (*Met.* 12.176-7).[113] Ovid reverses the standard pattern of authorisation; here the authority of the aged eyewitness is undermined by his revenge-motivated narrative (which also deauthorises the concurring literary

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[107] e.g. *Contr.* 1 *praef.* 1, *praef.* 10.
[108] Similar emphasis recurs repeatedly in the Preface: *Contr.* 1 *praef.* 1, *praef.* 4, *praef.* 6.
[109] Papaioannou 2005, 63
[110] Being forgotten is like death. cf. *Met.* 12.80, 14.150-1.
[111] Heslin 2016, 76
[112] Mack 1988, 131
[113] Perhaps it could be better interpreted as an act of memory; each time Nestor recalls the centauromachy, he refuses to remember the involvement of the hated Hercules. Heslin (2016, 78-81) thinks Achilles may have private motives for not mentioning his knowledge of invulnerable heroes.

tradition), whilst the repeatedly retold Herculean narrative emerges as a model of accuracy and authority. Nestor's age allows him to control the transmission of past memory, but his (ab)use of that ability undermines the reliability of his account. He is thus a problematic repository for and conservator of social memory, since he prioritises vengeance and audience-pleasing over his duty to provide a full account of events for commemoration in tradition for future generations.[114] Tradition exists only as it is promulgated, and Tlepolemus' question demonstrates just how easily tradition can be 'manipulated or reworked for the needs of a character, audience, or narrator'.[115] Long life gives greater opportunity to develop grudges or feuds and devise ways of exacting revenge.

It is not only Nestor's authority which is problematised here, for Ovid uses him 'to draw attention to the question of authority in epic narrative'.[116] As Musgrove points out, 'By means of Nestor's frequent but imperfect resemblance to the narrators of the *Iliad*, *Odyssey*, and *Aeneid*, Ovid also calls attention to some of the ways in which those narrators strain credibility, logic, or precedent.'[117] Nestor's extended first-person flashback mirrors those found in *Odyssey* 9-12 and *Aeneid* 2-3, and asks how their narrators can be so implausibly omniscient as to remember events in such vivid and comprehensive detail so long after they took place. This is highlighted by the postscript to Nestor's tale, which reiterates Nestor's gerontic status (*a sermone senis* - *Met.* 12.578) and refers to him in terms which recall the famously honeyed words of his Homeric counterpart (*dulci Neleius edidit ore* - *Met.* 12.577; Νέστωρ ἡδυεπὴς ἀνόρουσε λιγὺς Πυλίων ἀγορητής, / τοῦ καὶ ἀπὸ γλώσσης μέλιτος γλυκίων ῥέεν αὐδή

[114] cf. Reed (2013, 437 ad 536-76) on Nestor's narrative as a 'rovesciamento dell'imperativo epico di preservare κλέα ἀνδρῶν' which retrospectively authorises doubts about Nestor's account.
[115] Musgrove 1998, 228
[116] Davis 2008, 431
[117] Musgrove 1998, 228

- *Il.* 1.247-9). As Reed notes, 'l'eloquenza e dolcezza... del discorso di Nestore è un dato tradizionale.'[118] The Ovidian Nestor is not as convincing as his Homeric counterpart, and suggests that the Iliadic Nestor may share his flaws.

Nestor also reflects upon the Homeric narrator, for both are characterised as old men telling epic stories. Indeed, Nestor's centauromachy 'stands, essentially, for Homer's *Iliad*',[119] and Heslin draws attention to the 'extraordinarily omniscient and Homeric style' of the Ovidian narrative, which is 'replete with names and the kind of blow-for-blow detail we associate with Homeric epic'.[120] Given that Nestor represents Homer, the undermining of his authority as a narrator has far-reaching effects on that of literary tradition, for it suggests that even so authoritative a speaker as Homer, who is endorsed by antiquity, cannot be entirely trusted. Nestor's self-interest[121] and willingness to manipulate tradition prompts readers to re-think their acceptance of the authority of the apparently omniscient and impartial narrator of the *Iliad*, and to reassess his objectivity. What would the *Iliad* be like if told from a Trojan perspective, for example? As Liveley comments, 'Nestor's reliability as an epic narrator - and perhaps the reliability of any narrator - is brought into question... All narratives are unreliable it seems, subject to biases and prejudices, inventions and exclusions.'[122] Amid this general problematisation of narrators, Ovid proves more troublesome than most since, like Nestor, he tells tales of metamorphosis. Ovid's nominally 'continuous' song from creation to the present day cannot possibly include

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[118] Reed 2013, 440 ad 557
[119] Mack 1988, 128
[120] Heslin 2016, 73-74. The centauromachy, like the 'wrath of Achilles' episode, stands for the whole Trojan War. cf. Musgrove 1998, 223.
[121] The effect of the speaker's perspective on his narrative is also evident in the debate between Ajax and Ulixes in *Met.* 13. Davis (2008, 436) argues that Ovid 'presents narrative authority in epic as residing not in the greatest warrior but in the most persuasive speaker'. Nestor claims narrative authority by being so old that his story cannot be contested. This is no better basis for authority than facility at arms or persuasion.
[122] Liveley 2011, 125

every event in history,[123] but is packed with the poet's novel inventions and additions. The example of Nestor shows that readers of the *Metamorphoses* must also be wary of the Ovidian narrator.[124] Far from expecting the reader to accept without question the reliability of authoritative narratorial figures, Ovid invites the reader to re-evaluate, and be profoundly sceptical of, the entire epic tradition.[125] Antiquity is a prevalent, but unreliable basis for authority.[126]

Beyond Old Age: Transferring Memory and Authority

The use of aged memory as a figure for tradition damages the authority of age.[127] In *Met.* 15, Ovid presents an alternative vehicle for the transfer of memories and authority. Like Nestor, Pythagoras has a long memory which positions him as an embodiment of tradition.[128] Unlike Nestor, however, Pythagoras does not mention his age; he is introduced in *Met.* 15.60 as a *vir*, not as a *senex*.[129] As will become apparent, physical age is irrelevant to his authority. Pythagoras gives the impression of age through the ancient soul he has acquired, through his seniority as teacher to

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[123] von Albrecht (1991, 182) points out that in the proem to the *Metamorphoses*, *perpetuum carmen* pertains not to permanence of memory, but to the successful perpetuation of the poem. He interprets Ovid (Ibid., 183-89) as meaning 'poetic memory' and as being 'remembered' and attributed authority by his poetic successors. Does Ovid expect his poem to remain in a static, permanent form, or to undergo perpetual metamorphoses, growing under the influence of *fama*? Is Ovid's prediction that he will be read in *Met.* 15.878 an explanation that he will achieve permanence by being a written text rather than an oral one?

[124] Mack 1988, 135

[125] Heslin 2016, 98 n. 13

[126] At *Met.* 9.421-43, Jove depicts age depriving its possessors of authority. Minos has no authority to rule on account of his age (*Met.* 9.437). Anderson (1972, 448 ad 427-32) suggests that the exhortation, *o nostri si qua est reverentia*, functions 'either to emphasise Jupiter's venerability or to question it'.

[127] Also of poetry, for '*Nascitur enim poesis ex memoria*' (von Albrecht 1991, 181).

[128] Papaioannou 2011, 41 - 'His longevity extends back centuries, and his experience identifies with the history of humanity - or alternatively, literary tradition in its totality.' As Barchiesi (1989, 84) notes, the name of Pythagoras' father Mnesarchus ('he who remembers his own origin') points to Pythagoras' role. cf. Aristox. fr. 11A Wehrli.

[129] Pythagoras is an *exul* and the exilic Ovid self-presents as an old man.

Numa,[130] and by equivalency with the old man who enlightens Numa at *Met.* 15.10ff. These links to venerability lead Crahay and Hubaux to dub Pythagoras 'le représentant le plus vénérable de la pensée grecque'.[131] In Pythagoras' speech, age frequently serves as a contrast and context for the immortality and cyclical nature of the soul. One example of this is in Pythagoras' description of the seasons, particularly at *Met.* 15.210ff., where autumn bears the white hair sported by the *maturus* Lelex in *Met.* 8,[132] whilst winter has an old man's white or lacking hair (*aut spoliata suos aut quos habet alba capillos* - *Met.* 15.213). In the subsequent description of the life-stages of man, age exhibits a deteriorative trend (*labitur occiduae per iter declive senectae. / subruit haec aevi demoliturque prioris / robora* - *Met.* 15.227-9), exemplified in Milon and Tyndaris, who rue their enervation by *invidiosa vetustas*. Old age is thus a blight. Pythagoras argues that continual change and renewal provide an escape from the deterioration associated with age. He suggests that whilst bodies perish by fire or through the decay inflicted by *vetustas* (*Met.* 15.156), souls move into new homes (*Met.* 15.158-9). This is exemplified by the phoenix, which is even more long-lived than Nestor (*ubi quinque suae complevit saecula vitae* - *Met.* 15.395), and is reportedly reborn (*Met.* 15.401-2). The difficulty in the cycle of renewal arises in the transfer and continuity of the soul's memory. Pythagoras' continued memory is crucial in authorising his narrative of events prior to his own lifetime. Instead of being limited to the length of a human life (with the potential for mental and mnemonic deterioration which old age entails), Pythagoras' memories are passed on by

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[130] Hill (2000b, 203 ad 57-60) suspects Ovid of mischief in 'making Pythagoras even earlier than Numa, rather than contemporaneous as in the tradition, or much later as in the truth'. Perhaps Ovid aims to thereby increase Pythagoras' antiquity.
[131] Crahay and Hubaux 1958, 292
[132] *sparsus quoque tempora canis* - *Met.* 15.211; *raris iam sparsus tempora canis* - *Met.* 8.568, with *tempora canis* in the same metrical position for emphasis. cf. *Her.* 14.109-10, where Hypermnestra contrasts what she has learned herself with what she has learned from the authority of white-haired old age. Palmer **(**1898, 418 ad 109) opines that '*cana senectus*... can hardly be for *cana vetustas*'. cf. Hinds 2006, 34.

transmigration of the soul and theoretically retain their accuracy. Pythagoras is, therefore, 'un candidato ideale al ruolo di tramite fra passato e futuro'.[133]

No narrator lives forever; even an implausibly long-lived old man like Nestor has a limited possible lifespan. However, by recounting his memories (that is, by passing on the tradition) he can ensure that they live on, and his successor can claim the authority of those old memories. Ennius draws upon the authority of the past by claiming to have acquired Homer's soul,[134] for 'The Ennian Dream lends to the founder of the Latin hexameter tradition nothing less than the authority of Homer himself.'[135] Ennius' dream legitimates his claim to tradition, and asserts his authority to perpetuate it;[136] he becomes '*alter Homerus*, capable of unfolding the epic story of Roman greatness'.[137] Moreover, 'it was up to Ennius to interpret what it meant to be an *alter Homerus*.'[138] Having appropriated the authority of Homer, Ennius is able to exert it in defining 'Roman' Homeric epic. The transfer of the soul symbolises the passing of the aegis of presenting and generating tradition to a new poet. Ovid's Pythagoras claims to go one better (and distinctly older) than even so ancient and authoritative a soul as Homer.[139] He asserts that he has received not the soul of Homer, or any other poet writing of past times (though by allusion and theme he

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[133] Barchiesi 1989, 84. cf. Papaioannou 2007, 121 - 'On account of his omniscience of the past he is in a position to utter predictions for the future since the progression of time follows a circular pattern and every event repeats itself.'

[134] Skutsch 1985, 147-53, especially 147 on the possibility raised by Lucretius and Propertius that Ennius met the Muses. In order to meet the Muses in *Aetia* fr. 2, Callimachus enters a state of dreaming sleep, which the Greeks considered akin to death (*Il.* 14.231, 16.672 = 16.682; *Od*. 13.80. cf. Bing 1988, 70). This reverses the process in Ennius' proem (and Call. *Iamb.* 1), for 'There the dead encroached on the world of the living, thus forging a link between past and present; here a living poet assumes a death-like state and thus has access to the experience of the past' (Ibid., 70-71). In exile, Ovid's deathlike state allows him to access Rome. Death (or katabasis) provides omniscience in the form of 'instantaneous access to a kind of worldwide web of the past' (Hardie 2004, 143).

[135] Hardie 1997, 186

[136] Ibid., 187 - 'this is a literary device that claims an extra-literary authority, one based on the 'real' extra-literary authority of the poet.'

[137] Clausen 1964, 185. Both Lucilius (1189) and Horace (*Ep.* 2.1.50) call Ennius '*alter Homerus*'.

[138] Bing 1988, 70. cf. Theocritus *Idyll* 16.20, which suggests that Homer's poetry suffices.

[139] 'By staging an interview with Pythagoras Ovid... stakes a claim to priority over the Ennian Dream, in which Ennius had used a device that depends on the authority of Pythagoras' - Hardie 1997, 186.

assimilates the authority of Empedocles, Lucretius, Virgil and Ennius),[140] but the soul and accompanying memories of Euphorbus, a participant in the Trojan War, as authorisation for his tale.[141] Pythagoras' self-identification as Euphorbus (*ipse ego (nam memini) Troiani tempore belli / Panthoides Euphorbus eram* - *Met.* 15.160-1) grants him access to memories that are far older than those available to Nestor, who is constrained by the limits of his finite lifespan.

Pythagoras associates his acquisition of Euphorbus' soul with memory,[142] indicating the soul's importance in increasing his capacity to remember firsthand experiences which will strengthen the authority of his account. Pythagoras' memory is also a poetic memory of Ennius' *Annales* 1.[143] Pythagoras' claim, *nam memini* (*Met.* 15.161), recalls the Ennian Homer's comment, *memini me fiere pavom* (*Annales* 1.11 Sk.) and invokes the authority of tradition by using the literary device of soul-transfer to represent poetic succession.[144] By triggering this memory, Ovid's Pythagoras invokes the authority not only of Euphorbus, but also of Homer and Ennius, the past and future incarnations of this soul.[145]

The multiplicity of memories implicit in the Ovidian Pythagoras' claim to have been Euphorbus recalls the vatic ability of poets to access the comprehensive memories of

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[140] Segal 2001, 64

[141] cf. Stesichorus (quoted in Plato *Phdr.* 243a) who asserts his authority by 'seeing the principal character in the story - in a dream' (Bowie 1993, 27). This is probably Helen (*Suda* 4.433 s.v. Stesichorus), so Stesichorus' experience combines Callimachean dream-access and Pythagorean character-immediacy. As Bowie points out (Ibid., 37), 'Stesichorus already views the corpus of myths that he shares with hexameter epic not as an immutable *mémoire collective* but as stories where his own invented fictions may be substituted for what earlier poets have sung.' He can do so due to the authority he gains from a participating character.

[142] *Met.* 15.160 (*nam memini*), 15.436 (*quantumque recordor*), 15. 451 (*mente memor refero*). cf. D.L. 8.4-5, which claims that in a previous life Pythagoras requested the ability to retain his memories through life and death.

[143] Also intertextual memories of the *Iliad*: *Met.* 15.161ff. = *Il.* 17.43ff. cf. *memini* in Catullus 64 and *memoro* at *Met.* 14.812ff.

[144] Hardie 1997, 187

[145] Ovid's Pythagoras lives prior to Ennius in the chronology of the *Met.*, but in literary history, Ennius precedes Ovid's Pythagoras. For the various versions of the soul's chronology, cf. Murphy 1997, 114-15. The peacock symbolised immortality in antiquity.

the Muses through poetic inspiration.[146] Furthermore, as Hardie notes, 'Pythagoras' fragmented outline of the course of human history from the Golden Age... to the greatness of Rome... offers a miniature recapitulation of the whole of Ovid's *Metamorphoses*'.[147] Consequently, Pythagoras' narrative authority figures that of Ovid.[148] Although Ovid doesn't claim the mantle of Homer in a dream, his poem draws upon tradition and bears a startling similarity to a series of connected memories linked by the vagaries of mental filing and subject to change as the whim of the poet strikes. Moreover, Ovid's insistence in *Met.* 15 that he will live, immortalised through his poetry (*ore legar populi, perque omnia saecula fama,... vivam* - *Met.* 15.878-9), restates the transmission of memory and tradition, not as a single transfer of the epic mantle from poet to poet, but as a necessary aspect of the interaction of reader and poet. The cycle of renewal represented by Pythagoras and by the phoenix is also true of poets.

Problems with Authority: Can You Believe It?

The cycle of memorialisation described by Pythagoras proves inadequate in practice. Pythagoras relays the memories of the Trojan Euphorbus. This is not an Ovidian invention, but a well-known part of the Pythagoras legend.[149] The references to memory[150] encourage the reader to access this knowledge and consequently to accept Pythagoras' reliability.[151] Diodorus Siculus describes Pythagoras' recognition of his

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[146] Detienne (1996, 41) notes that in Chios the Muses were called '"remembrances" (*mneai*), since they made the poet "remember"'.
[147] Hardie 1995, 213
[148] Hardie 1997, 189 - 'Pythagoras is the last and grandest of the many characters within the *Metamorphoses* who figure, more or less obliquely, the poet himself.' Hardie comments (Ibid., 188) that 'Pythagoras' memory of his incarnation as Eurphorbus is to be read as Ovid's memory of the speech of Helenus in *Aeneid* 3.' Metempsychotic memory figures the poetic memory of tradition.
[149] Miller 1994, 474
[150] On memory references as allusion, cf. Miller 1993.
[151] Miller 1994, 474

(Euphorbus') shield (D.S. 10.6.1-3; cf. *Met.* 15.163-4), providing Pythagoras' claim in indirect speech, and expanding on it with an Alexandrian footnote (ὅτι φασὶν). Just as the Ovidian narrator describes Pythagoras as *docta quidem... sed non et credita* (*Met.* 15.74), so Diodorus states that Pythagoras was not believed and was thought to be mad (ἀπίστως δὲ διακειμένων καὶ μανίαν αὐτοῦ καταγινωσκόντων), though his Pythagoras refutes such criticisms with visual evidence (σημεῖον ἐρεῖν ἔφησεν ἀληθὲς τοῦ ταῦθ' οὕτως ἔχειν). The tradition of disbelieving Pythagoras reinforces the inclination of Ovid's readers not to accept his authority.

Diodorus' account closely adheres to its authoritative source text, *Iliad* 17. In contrast, flaws emerge in the Ovidian Pythagoras' account, even though Pythagoras 'guarantees its authority on the basis that he remembers having heard it'[152] (*quantumque recordor* - *Met*. 15.436). This reference to memory draws attention to the issue by encouraging the reader to recall previous accounts. Pythagoras states in *Met.* 15.160-2 that as Euphorbus he remembers receiving a chest wound, but in *Iliad* 17.43-60 the wound is to his neck (ἀντικρὺ δ' ἀπαλοῖο δι' αὐχένος ἤλυθ' ἀκωκή - *Il.* 17.49), a discrepancy which Miller deems irreconcilable through Homeric or Ovidian inspecificity.[153] Pythagoras' claim to have heard Helenus' prophecy to Aeneas at the fall of Troy is similarly problematic. The precise delineation of the prophecy's temporal juncture in *Met.* 15.437 (*cum res Troiana labaret*) highlights the fact that Euphorbus is killed in *Iliad* 17, making it impossible for him to have heard the prophecy. Wheeler feels that 'this inconsistency suggests that Pythagoras has invented

[152] Wheeler 1999, 191
[153] Miller 1994, 476. Wheeler (1999, 191) thinks the audience may not notice it, but finds other anomalies.

his memory of Helenus's prophecy'.[154] However, since Pythagoras is the sole narrator of this Iliadic material within the *Metamorphoses* (the prophecy is not mentioned in 'Ovid's *Aeneid*'),[155] he is able to present his memories as the definitive account, just as Nestor did for the Centauromachy. Numa's knowledge of the minutiae of the Trojan War is unknown, but the reader's view of Pythagoras' (and by extension, Ovid's) reliability will be affected by the inclusion of invented material.[156]

Miller acknowledges that the Ovidian Pythagoras' deviation from *Iliad* 17 (which as the first and most definitive account of Euphorbus might claim to be authoritative) could be *imitatio cum variatione*, but rejects this interpretation on the basis that since Pythagoras is explicitly evoked here it 'seems legitimate to read the lines consistently in terms of that character'.[157] The two views are not mutually exclusive. Ovid might be utilising *variatio* to make a point about his narrator as well as to avoid tedious *imitatio*. As Miller points out, 'the slippage in Pythagoras' most famous transmigrational recollection seems humorously to suggest that his fantastic claims should not be believed.'[158] Ovid is encouraging his readers to challenge how they read tradition[159] and their acceptance of the reliability of authoritative narratives.[160]

Pythagoras' metempsychotic memory promises his narrative the authority of literary tradition, but his story deviates from that tradition, undermining the authority upon

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[154] Wheeler 1999, 191. cf. Miller 1994, 476 - 'The philosopher's much vaunted memory... is... imperfect.'
[155] Helenus' prophesy in *Aen.* 3 is also omissive, despite a disclaimer (*Aen.* 3.433-4). cf. O'Hara 1990, 28ff.
[156] Horace *Carm.* 1.28 refers to Pythagoras as an authority (*non sordidus auctor*), but Quinn (1980, 176 ad 7-15) thinks that here too 'we catch the cynical tone of the speaker'.
[157] Miller 1994, 474
[158] Ibid., 479
[159] cf. Ovid's 'corrections' of the *Aeneid* elsewhere in the *Metamorphoses* (Boyd 1990; Casali 2007; Mack 1988, 118).
[160] cf. Fontcuberta 2012 which explores the relationship between photography and truth, and between fact and fiction, by presenting 'authoritative' exhibits which are actually fictional (*vrai-faux*). Fontcuberta argues that the viewer has a responsibility to challenge authority and its discourse, rather than accepting them uncritically.

which it was based. If such direct transmission as transmigration of the soul is insufficient to ensure accuracy, what authority has a poet, whose references to tradition invoke its authority for variant or novel tales? Pythagoras' problematised authority is indicative of the *Metamorphoses*' dubious relationship with literary tradition. The *Metamorphoses* constantly promises to base itself within literary tradition, particularly epic, but rarely confines itself to the limits of that tradition, preferring to vary, alter or completely metamorphose its subject matter. Ovid more or less entirely replaces the expected account of the Trojan War with Nestor's centauromachy and the Cycnus episode. However, such divergence from authoritative tradition problematises narratorial authority.

The authority of age is also illustrated by the responses of internal audiences to the narratives of aged figures in the *Metamorphoses*. Pythagoras' inability to convince his audience (perhaps including Numa) raises the broader question of how internal audiences in the *Metamorphoses* respond to aged figures, and whether they acknowledge age authority. Lelex's account successfully moves the audience in *Met.* 8.725 because of its *auctor*, whose age is emphasised (*ante omnesque Lelex animo maturus et aevo* - *Met.* 8.617).[161] However, the aged (*seniles* - *Met.* 8.210) Daedalus fails to speak authoritatively,[162] for his instructions are not obeyed. This is highlighted by the repetition of *dux* in Daedalus' assumption of an authoritative role (*me duce carpe viam* - *Met.* 8.208) and in Icarus' rejection of that authority (*deseruitque ducem* - *Met.* 8.224).[163] Fowler argues that authority is an important aspect of fatherhood and that 'Power is always with the father, and in particular the speech of the father... The

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[161] cf. *Met.* 8.568. Galinsky (1996, 13) argues that an *auctor*'s *auctoritas* 'comes from special insight and is so weighty that the person seeking advice will almost certainly accept it'.
[162] Daedalus uses imperatives and indirect commands (*Met.* 8.203-8); *moneo* - *Met.* 8.203 (*monitus* - *Met.* 8.210); *iubeo* - *Met.* 8.207.
[163] Morgan 2003, 81

words of the father, moreover, bring order and peace through this authority',[164] but in the *Metamorphoses* when older, fatherly figures try to exert their authority over the young, they find themselves flouted. As Morgan notes, 'This is a poem where models of authority are topsy-turvy, and the kids are in charge.'[165]

Age authority is more strongly rejected by Pentheus in *Met.* 3, and Arachne in *Met.* 6. Pentheus' sacrilege[166] and poor judgement are illustrated by his treatment of the old throughout the episode. His contempt for the elderly Tiresias (*Met.* 3.514-6)[167] proves ill-advised, for the old man's words soon receive confirmation (*dicta fides sequitur* - *Met.* 3.527). Pentheus attacks *senes* in *Met.* 3.538, and his grandfather rebukes him in *Met.* 3.564-5 without success (*frustra*). Furthermore, though Acoetes' age is not given, Pentheus' criticisms of his rambling tale in *Met.* 3.692-3 (*his longis... ambagibus*; *mora*) characterise it as resembling the lengthy stories of old men.[168] The most in-depth discussion of age authority is in *Met.* 6, when Pallas, disguised as an old woman (*Met.* 6.26-7),[169] warns Arachne that the authority of age should be respected because with age comes experience (*non omnia grandior aetas / quae fugiamus habet; seris venit usus ab annis. / consilium ne sperne meum* - *Met.* 6.28-9).[170] Arachne rejects Minerva's counsel, explicitly stating that she has not been won over by the old woman's authority (*neve monendo / profecisse putes, eadem est sententia nobis* - *Met.* 6.40-1), and claims that age is enfeebling and useless (*mentis*

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[164] Fowler 2000, 226
[165] Morgan 2003, 75. Morgan finds similar results for Apollo and Sol, with generic implications.
[166] Ovid's description of Pentheus as *contemptor superum* might also contain a hint as to his attitude towards the old, since *superus* can also be used with reference to time to mean 'earlier, previous' (*OLD* s.v. 4), and the old are those who have lived earlier.
[167] Tiresias' age is emphasised: *senis* - *Met.* 3.515, *albentia tempora canis* - *Met.* 3.516. In Seneca's *Oedipus* 667, Oedipus refers to Tiresias as a *falsus senior* who lies.
[168] e.g. Nestor's monumentally long speech in *Met.* 12.
[169] cf. Vertumnus' failure to convince Pomona in his old woman's guise (*Met.* 14.765-6), despite claiming to know many things from *vetustas* (*etenim mihi multa vetustas / scire dedit* - *Met.* 14.695-6). In contrast, at *Met.* 3.275ff. Juno disguises herself as an old woman and successfully convinces Semele to obey her (harmful) advice.
[170] cf. Eur. *Phoen.* 528ff.

inops longaque venis confecta senecta, / et nimium vixisse diu nocet - *Met.* 6.37-8). Arachne's rejection of age authority also has a generic dimension; Minerva is 'disguising herself as a very old woman to speak for the authoritarian point of view' and conventional epic, whereas Arachne is 'staking her modernity and independence against tradition'.[171]

Arachne and Pentheus are punished as much for their rejection of the authority of age as for impiety; Icarus also meets his fate through not hearkening to the guidance of age. The implication is that gerontic authority should be respected, and that the pronouncements of the old are correct. In the light of this, Ovid's depiction of Nestor and Pythagoras is somewhat surprising, for their authority is undermined by the disbelief displayed by constituents of their internal audiences (Tlepolemus objects to Nestor's account - *Met.* 12.537ff.; Pythagoras is learned but not believed - *Met.* 15.74), but the unbelievers are not punished for not accepting age authority. Moreover, Ovid problematises Nestor's authority, and seems to suggest that it is acceptable for the reader to contest the authority of age (and indeed tradition). Contrary to Cole's contention that the 'uniform deference accorded to age and its wisdom in these books is in marked contrast with the mixed reception it has received earlier,'[172] it can thus be seen that Ovid complicates the authority of age in the later books of the *Metamorphoses*.

Although Nestor and Pythagoras represent epic and Ovidian tradition, Ovid calls their authority into question. The *Metamorphoses* might be expected to overthrow and supplant the Iliadic tradition as represented by Nestor, but in doing so it threatens its

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[171] Leach 1974, 115
[172] Cole 2008, 98. Cole also points out that in *Met.* 1-5 the main characters (with the exceptions of Tiresias, Ino, and perhaps Coronis) are young and subject to an authority figure, whilst in *Met.* 6-12 the main characters are mostly old enough for marriage, and in *Met.* 13-15 the age level rises.

own foundations and ultimately, via the creation of doubt in Pythagoras, undermines itself. The Ovidian narrator's prediction in *Met.* 15 of his future poetic immortality is also problematised. He claims that his poem cannot be destroyed by Jove's anger, by fire or sword, nor by *edax vetustas*, suggesting that it is safe from political, physical and temporal threats, and contrasts its immortality (*perennis* - *Met.* 15.875;[173] *perque omnia saecula* - *Met.* 15.878) with his own brief lifespan (*incerti spatiam mihi... aevi* - *Met.* 15.874). The Ovidian narrator has overcome the pitfalls of physical mortality and inevitable aging process in yet another way - by relocating himself into his own poetry.[174] Yet, as Nestor and Pythagoras demonstrated, no transmitted narrative is entirely safe from the negative effects of *vetustas*, and a degree of transformation is inevitable in the cycle of renewal. The Ovidian narrator appears to acknowledge this with his final parenthesised comment (*si quid habent veri vatum praesagia* - *Met.* 15.879); it has been shown that the statements of bards are not always true. Perhaps Ovid is drawing a distinction with *legar* (*Met.* 15.878) between the earlier oral transmission of tradition, prone to change and deterioration and his own poetry, which in written form may be less vulnerable to alteration. He nevertheless states that he will live in *fama*, whose mutability and kinship with *vetustas* reiterate that the immortality to which the Ovidian narrator lays claim in the *Metamorphoses* is dependent upon an unreliable process of transmission.

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[173] *Perennis* recalls Lucretian punning on the name of Ennius (*Ennius... perenni* - *DRN* 1.117-8). cf. Jove's description of the House of the Fates in *Met.* 15.811ff., which is similarly safe from destructive forces (*neque concussum caeli neque fulminis iram / nec metuunt ullas tuta atque aeterna ruinas*) and contains *fata* cut in everlasting adamant (*incisa adamante perenni* / *fata*). The reader, however, gets only Jove's memory of it (*animoque notavi / et referam* - *Met.* 15.814-5), prefiguring the enactment of transmission at the end of the poem. Note the famous ambiguity of *situs* in Horace *Carm.* 3.30, where the word is used in the unusual sense of 'site', but 'decay' lurks beneath; perhaps Horace's metaphorical *monumentum* is also vulnerable (cf. Fowler 2000, 197-98).

[174] Ovid's claim that he will live forever (*ore legar populi... vivam* - *Met.*15.878-9) could also translate as 'I will be caught on the lips of the people' (Farrell 1999, 132**)**, evoking the Roman belief that a dying person's soul could be caught with their last breath (cf. *Aen.* 4.684-5; *Met.* 7.860-1, 12.425; Hardie 2002b, 76), and pointing to Pythagorean metempsychosis as the means for Ovid's afterlife (Martelli 2013, 163; Hardie 2002b, 95).

Age and Antiquarianism: The Poetics of Ovid's *Fasti*

Although the *Fasti*, like the *Metamorphoses*, has a heterodiegetic narrator, it contains fewer lengthy narrations from old men. Surprisingly for a poem based on uncovering the aetiologies of things, there is no major mortal embodiment of aged tradition like Nestor or Pythagoras whose reliability reflects on the authority of tradition or of Ovid's poetry. However, during his research, Ovid encounters several aged figures: Janus, Tiber, an elderly host (*hospitis antiqui* - *Fa*. 4.687), a veteran (*senior* - *Fa.* 4.378), an old woman (*anus* - *Fa.* 6.399).[175] Their age is significant, for it allows them all to have participated in or to have been eyewitnesses of what they relate.[176] It also aligns them with the vague *antiqui senes* also cited by Ovid (e.g. at *Fa.* 2.584).[177] Age is a source of information, and Ovid's informants are 'the repositories of a living oral tradition'.[178]

The Oldest of Them All

The first of Ovid's authoritative informants in the *Fasti*, Janus, is programmatic both for such interactions and for age authority throughout the poem. Here, as elsewhere in

[175] There has been much critical debate over whether Ovid's encounter with the *anus* really took place (although old men are accepted as ciphers for tradition). Frazer (1929, 174 ad 6.249) and Wilkinson (1955, 249) take it literally. Porte (1985, 18) is more sceptical, and Harries (1989, 183 esp. n. 94) is outright dismissive. Williams (1991b, 188) claims that Ovid is using the *anus* to show that he has done his research in the Roman streets.
[176] Miller 1982, 404. Williams (1991b, 188) argues that Ovid is practising the ancient concept of compatibility between an informant's age and their information. An aged narrator is an authoritative source of antiquarian knowledge, as in Callimachus *Aet.* fr. 75.54 and 66 Pf. Although the *anus* is not as old as Rome, the reference to her age in *Fa.* 6.399 sets the correct tone for an authoritative narrative (cf. *Fa.* 6.415, where her age is mentioned close to the *causa* it qualifies her to relate).
[177] Miller 1982, 404. De Bonniec argues that individual old men avoid the suspicion of literary fiction which adheres to general *antiqui* ('le vague de l'expression fait soupçonner une fiction littéraire. Le vieil hôte pélignien... semble plus réel' - Le Bonniec 1969, 90 ad 584).
[178] Miller 1982, 404

antiquity,[179] Janus is characterised as old. He is the first god to appear in the *Fasti* (*primum* - *Fa.* 1.64),[180] so in a sense he is the oldest, and he is the *origo* (*Fa.* 1.65), the beginning of the year, but also the beginning of time.[181] Janus self-presents as old, specifying that he received the name of Chaos[182] in the past because he is an ancient thing (*me Chaos antiqui (nam sum res prisca) vocebant* - *Fa.* 1.103).[183] The parenthesis emphasises Janus' age,[184] and is intended 'to highlight his unique longevity and hence establish himself as an authority for speaking on ancient matters'.[185] Just as Nestor's age gives him privileged access to the past, necessitating that his audience rely upon his word, so in the *Fasti* Janus' knowledge of the past 'depends on his status as a *res prisca* so that an "old thing" mediates the poet's access to the past'.[186] Janus' antiquity enables him to sing of a lengthy period of time (*aspice quam longi temporis acta canam* - *Fa.* 1.104); he is an authority due to the knowledge he has acquired over the years. Indeed, 'as a being of remote antiquity Janus spans the gap between the primitive history of Rome and the realities of the present day, the temporal division inherent in the whole project of writing aetiological poetry.'[187]

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[179] Le Bonniec 1961, 40 ad 103-114 - 'aux Romains, Janus apparaissait comme une des divinités le plus archaïques'.
[180] *primum* Aς: *-us* UMς. cf. *Fa.* 1.172 (*cur... Iane, tibi primum tura merumque fero?*). Martelli (2013, 116) and Hardie (1991, 54) read *primus*, emphasising Janus' role as god of beginnings. *Primus* identifies Janus even more strongly as first by both name and nature. cf. *Fa.* 2.52 (*primus enim Iani mensis, quia ianua prima est*) which might echo *Fa* 1.64 (*inque meo primus carmine Ianus adest*). Ovid's emphasis on Janus' position in his song may allude to the Muses' instructions to hymn them first and last in *Theog*. 34 (σφᾶς δ' αὐτὰς πρῶτόν τε καὶ ὕστατον αἰὲν ἀείδειν).
[181] Janus' association with the beginning of time, as its *origo*, also purports to have an etymological basis. cf. Martelli 2013, 117.
[182] Green (2004a, 75 ad 103) suggests that this 'extravagant etymology may have been an Ovidian innovation... or else it was suggested by his contemporary Verrius Flaccus.' cf. Santini 1991, 111; Martelli 2013, 117. Paulus *Fest.* 45 L. has an etymological derivation (*Janus* - *hiare* - χάσκειν - χάος).
[183] Janus is also associated with antiquity by his experiences in past times, as at *Fa.* 1.131-2, 193, 197-200, 220-21.
[184] 'Le distique 103 sq. insiste sur ce caractère' - Le Bonniec 1961, 40 ad 103-114.
[185] Green 2004a, 75-76 ad 103
[186] Pasco-Pranger 2000, 282
[187] Hardie 1991, 63. cf. Bing (1988, esp. 71-75), who argues that the Hellenistic poets use allusion to create continuity with the distant past from which they are isolated, but that this rupture with the past is fructifying, for it allows them to use the past innovatively. Newlands (1995, 80) suggests that aetiology is 'one way of forging a link between past and present'.

Janus' association with Chaos reinforces his antiquity,[188] for by giving Chaos' authoritative personal experience of creation Janus supersedes the accounts of creation provided by the Ovidian narrator and Pythagoras in the *Metamorphoses*. Although metempsychosis greatly extends Pythagoras' memory, only a divinity like Janus can remember primordial chaos.

Janus' age means that his memory encompasses Saturn's long-ago arrival (*hac ego Saturnam memini tellure receptum* - *Fasti* 1.235). Indeed, he is probably the only figure able to remember it, as *ego* emphasises. This contrasts with the destructive effect of time on physical objects (*noscere me... posses... ni vetus ipsa dies extenuasset opus* - *Fa.* 1.231-2).[189] Green postulates that 'by suggesting that the present event is retold from memory, Janus attempts to establish himself as an authoritative figure.'[190] Janus is a repository of memories of the most ancient events, and is thus an authority able to explain them.[191]

Janus differs from other depictions of old men, however, in that he does not only look backward at his memories, but also looks forward to the coming year, due to the fact that he has two faces (*Iane biceps* - *Fa.* 1.65).[192] He therefore represents the end and beginning of time, standing 'al punto di convergenza, in cui la fine diviene l'inizio'.[193] The embodiment of the ability to look forward and backward in the single figure of Janus forges a connection between past, present, and future, and as Martelli notes, 'problematises any distinction between a new and an old year, time future and

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[188] Martelli 2013, 117. cf. Barchiesi (1997, 230) - 'Janus is a god of absolute and unsurpassable antiquity.'
[189] This foreshadows the doubt-inducing *si memini* of Tiber at *Fa.* 5.646, which suggests that age also destroys intangible things like memory.
[190] Green 2004a, 115 ad 235
[191] von Albrecht (1991, 181) - *Jani similis es, memoria: nam partes in duas prospicis, quippe quae et poetas in componendis carminibus adiuves, et posteros in recordandis.*
[192] cf. Macrobius 1.9.4 - *quidam ideo eum dici bifrontem putant quod et praeterita sciverit et futura providerit*. In *Fa*. 1.633-6 Porrima and Postverta sing of what was and what will be.
[193] Santini 1991, 110

time past'.[194] Rather than representing a division in time, Janus is a two-way aperture through which time can flow, permitting a neverending cycle[195] akin to Pythagoras' endless transmigration of the soul in the *Metamorphoses*.[196]

Janus' age authority is not necessarily well-founded, for January is not one of the original (older) ten months. The Ovidian narrator mentions at *Fasti* 1.43-4 that Numa added two months to the ancient ones which already belonged to the calendar, one being that of Janus. Hence Janus is distinguished for not being among the ancient months (*mensibus antiquis* - *Fa.* 1.44). However, Numa adds Janus' month to the beginning of the existing calendar, so that Janus comes before the other months, and is hence 'older', despite being a new addition. This is reflected in the verb used for Numa's action (*praeposuitque* - *Fa.* 1.44), which not only refers to the months being 'placed before' the others, but implies that they 'supersede' them, for the new months are given priority.[197] The new months 'create a calendar text that transforms and replaces the older version in its entirety'.[198] The new version is the authoritative one, supplanting the old (and outdated or inaccurate) ones.[199] This is reiterated in the Ovidian narrator's statement of Janus' precedence at *Fasti* 1.64 (*inque meo primum carmine Ianus*). Again, the new god is given first place (Janus' newness as a Roman god, with no authorising Greek past, is mentioned at *Fa.* 1.90 - *nam tibi par nullum Graecia numen habet*). This novelty stands in tension with Janus' age authority.

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[194] Martelli 2013, 117
[195] cf. *Fa.* 1.151 (*tunc est nova temporis aetas*) where the cycle of renewal applies to spring.
[196] This cyclical view of time contrasts with the Malagasy conception that the future flows into the back of the head from behind ('any aofiana'), becoming the past as it stretches out in front of a person, because the past (one's own, and the experiences of one's ancestors) is known and therefore visible in front of the eyes ('teo alohan'ny maso'). cf. Dahl 1995.
[197] *OLD* s.v. 3.
[198] Martelli 2013, 119 n. 47
[199] References to calendar revision: *Fa.* 1.43-4, 2.53-4 (possibly erroneously), 3.155-66. Martelli (Ibid., 110) notes that the *Fasti* stops short before it has to acknowledge Augustus' additions to the calendar. Ovid refers to several calendrical sources (*Fa.* 3.87-98, 6.59-64). The *Fasti*'s astronomical material invokes an alternative form of measurement and its authority. cf. Feeney 2007.

Janus' characterisation as 'an embodiment of the ancient beginnings of time',[200] and the authority that he derives from his age are undermined by his role as a novel successor; perhaps he is only pseudo-archaic.

Pseudo-archaising to appropriate the authority of the past is a widespread cultural phenomenon in the Augustan period, for 'Augustus concurred with a Roman tendency to present new things as restorations of the old and to encourage future generations to model themselves on the past.'[201] Ovid highlights this by positioning the aged Janus as god of the New Year. In fact 'no extant source attests to the customary celebration of a special religious festival for Janus on the kalends of January',[202] for the proper feast of Janus was the Agonia (the fifth day before the Ides of January).[203] Janus' receipt of consular sacrifices on their first day of office is set as the 1st January only from 153 BC,[204] so this is a relatively recent development, as the Ovidian narrator acknowledges in *Fasti* 1.81-2 with his threefold emphasis of newness (*novi, nova, nova*) in the description of the consuls' procession to the Capitol. Janus is a far more recent addition to the calendar than his claimed antiquity suggests. As Martelli notes, 'Despite Ovid's best efforts to characterise Janus as god of beginnings... the task of proving primacy inevitably slips out of control.'[205] Two-faced Janus is both the

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[200] Martelli 2013, 119
[201] Beagon 2009, 302. cf. *RG* 8; Bonfante and Cyrus 1997, 487; Galinsky 1996, 294ff.; Spawforth 2011, 1. On Augustan reconstruction of rituals and religious practice, see e.g. Ogilvie 1965, 128-29. Herbert-Brown's suggestion that at *Fa.* 1.121-4 and 279-82 Ovid is reflecting contemporary uncertainty since 'the ostensibly ancient tradition... was still in the process of being formulated' (1994, 196), is modified by Cogitore (2003, 201-4) who argues that Ovid is pointing to Augustus' invention of tradition and 'sans être dupe de l'appel à la tradition qu'Auguste brandit pour justifier ses innovations, le poète, donnant de Janus un portrait ambigu, ne souscrit pas à nouvelle image qu'Auguste façonnait et se fonde sur d'autres aspects de la tradition.'
[202] Martelli 2013, 118
[203] York 1986, 203. Ovid duly mentions this at *Fa.* 1.317-8. cf. *Fa.* 6.101-96, which uniquely associates Janus with this date (Martelli 2013, 127).
[204] Feeney 2007, 171. cf. Michels 1967, 98.
[205] Martelli 2013, 116

beginning and the end, but the emphasis on novelty detracts from the authority of antiquity.

This is reiterated in Janus' contradictory liking for the tastes of contemporary Rome, as opposed to the rusticity of the past (*Fa.* 1.223ff., especially 225 - *laudamus veteres, sed nostris utimur annis*). Barchiesi does not view this modernity as detracting from Janus' age, but argues that Janus is 'so very antique that he becomes modern, ironical, open to novelties'.[206] Green too distances Janus from the modern, commenting that 'Janus sees himself as detached from the modern age.'[207] Indeed, he suggests that Janus' exempla here are decidedly clichéd by Ovid's day, and that Janus' display of nostalgia enhances his apparent age, for it offers a stereotypical depiction of an old man.[208]

In a further problematisation of his authority, Janus does not always provide a single authoritative account. Disconcertingly, on several occasions in his narrative Janus presents more than one explanation, including when the event in question is his own double shape, for which Janus offers three explanations (*Fa.* 1.101ff., *causa... altera* - *Fa.* 1.115, *causam* - *Fa.* 1.133). As Hardie notes, 'it is surprising that a god of origins, indeed the original god himself, should simply give two explanations with no expression of preference. He, if anyone, should be in a position to say.'[209] Perhaps insisting upon a single explanation oversimplifies reality. Before Janus' re-explanation, he states that the Ovidian narrator already partially perceives the answer (*iam tamen hanc aliqua tu quoque parte vides* - *Fa*. 1.134), suggesting that his

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[206] Barchiesi 1991, 15. cf. Labate's view (2005, 183) that Janus represents the excursion 'tra antico (anzi antichissimo) e moderno (anzi modernissimo)' which Ovid undertakes in the *Fasti.*
[207] Green 2004a, 97 ad 191-2
[208] Ibid., 98 ad 193-226. cf. Tibullus 1.10.43-4.
[209] Hardie 1991, 63. Barchiesi (1997, 237) claims that Janus is 'more trustworthy than such informants usually are, not only because he has one eye on the past and one on the future but above all because he is the only god who has two mouths to speak with.'

explanation will elaborate rather than supplant the previous ones. Janus' shape stems from his chaos-origins, his job, and his ability to perform his job on time. The reader must decide whether to accept these parallel aetiologies as equally true, or view them as undermining Janus' narrative authority. Despite the plethora of explanations for his shape which existed in antiquity, two of those provided by Janus are new and unparalleled (*Fa.* 1.113-4 and 143-4).[210] Far from relieving the discord with an authoritative pronouncement from the best authority (Janus himself), the new explanations add to the confusion.

Janus' authority is also undermined by the confusion in the *Fasti* over whether the year begins in January or some other month. The possibility of alternative chronologies is raised as early as *Fasti* 1.149-60, when the Ovidian narrator suggests spring as more suitable. Although rejected by Janus in *Fasti* 1.163-4, the spring option is reiterated in *Fasti* 3.235-42, for it would have been the start of the year in the old ten month calendar. April appropriates Janus' powers of opening to suggest that this too might be the proper start of the year and presents its own spring at *Fa.* 4.125-8. The shape of the calendar (which Janus represents) is left uncertain and unauthoritative, due to the repeated interruption of alternative narratives.

Janus functions as an *alter*-Ovid in the *Fasti*. The resemblance is particularly strong due to Janus' proximity to the beginning of the poem, where Ovid sets out his poetic subject as *tempora cum causis* and *signa* (*Fa.* 1.1-2). When Janus states that he too will sing about *tempora* (*longi temporis acta* - *Fa.* 1.104) and discusses *causas* (*Fa.* 1.115, 133), he positions his tale as a miniature *Fasti*, and himself as a reflection of

[210] Green 2004a, 79 ad 113-4

the Ovidian narrator.[211] Janus' claim to be a *res prisca* (*Fa.* 1.103) echoes Ovid's proposed *sacra... annalibus eruta priscis* (*Fa.* 1.7). Thus 'Janus aligns himself closely to the thematic plan of the poem itself.'[212] Whilst Macrobius 1.7.20 suggests Janus' two faces may be a reference to the expectation that a wise king should know the past and foresee the future, in the *Fasti* it represents the role of the poet, as part of the unending cycle of authoritative transmission.[213] Janus' authority does not go unchallenged, for his age credentials are thrown into doubt. He is symptomatic of Augustan tendencies to archaise and classicise in order to acquire authority. The god raises the question of how the reader should interpret the Ovidian narrator's avowal to be singing about the past in his all-new *Fasti* (new genre, new calendar, new festivals, new aetiologies).

Eroding the Past

Another semi-divine figure who is significant in the *Fasti*'s exploration of age authority is Tiber.[214] The Ovidian narrator requires someone who can provide an authoritative and truthful (*doce verum* - *Fa.* 5.635) account of an old tradition (*fama vetus* - *Fa.* 5.625). Tiber is a suitable candidate, for he is older than the city of Rome (*tua ripa vetustior Urbe est* - *Fa.* 5.635) and his age enables him to have witnessed

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[211] This is reinforced by their claims, *canam* (*Fa.* 1.2 and 104). At *Fa.* 6.65, the Ovidian narrator looks back (*respeximus*), just as Janus does at *Fa.* 6.124 (*respicit*). The Ovidian narrator is *Romani conditor anni* (*Fa.* 6.21), while Janus is *anni...origo* (*Fa.*1.65). Martial 8.2.1, which refers to *Fastorum genitor parensque Ianus*, emphasises the link between god and poet, for his Janus is not only in charge of the consular records, but updates and adds to them (Mart. 8.66.9ff.). cf. *Silvae* 4.1.11 (*immensi reparator maximus aevi*) and 4.1.29 - (*dinumera fastos*). Janus' claim to regulate the motions of Jupiter at *Fa.* 1.126 may remind us that Ovid not Augustus controls the calendar in the *Fasti*.

[212] Green 2004a, 75 ad 103-4. The Janus episode is 'an outline in miniature of the plan of the *Metamorphoses*, *prima... ab origine mundi... ad mea tempora*' - Hardie 1991, 52.

[213] In *Fa.* 1.288, the Ovidian narrator asks Janus to grant that the *auctor* of the peace shall not forget his work. Janus' cyclical nature symbolises the unending transmission of tradition, and *auctor* might also refer to the poet.

[214] One reason for their affinity is the tradition (unmentioned in the *Fasti*) that Tiber is the son of Janus. cf. Servius *ad Aen.* 8.330.

the rite's origin (*principium ritus tu bene nosse potes* - *Fa.* 5.636).[215] Tiber's age is emphasised throughout his speech by the use of the archaising form of his name (*Fa.* 5.635, 637),[216] his references to earlier events, the contrast of *nunc* and *tunc* in *Fasti* 5.641-2, and the explanation that he possessed a name in an earlier time (*Albula, si memini, tunc mihi nomen erat* - *Fa.* 5.646).[217] However, the use of the conditional *si memini* illustrates the fragility of Tiber's knowledge of the past[218] and casts doubt on his authority. Contrary to Bömer's assertion that in Ovid's poetry *memini* has become merely 'eine Formel oder ein Mittel der elegischen Technik',[219] Rutledge argues that with its use 'the poet is gently mocking his aged informant's failing memory.'[220] Ovid thus introduces the possibility that Tiber may not remember correctly. Tiber is a particularly appropriate figure to show how age can obliterate memory because the river was renowned in antiquity for its erosive powers.[221] Indeed, Janus mentions these powers in *Fasti* 1.242 (*radit harenosi Thybridis unda*) while he is remembering (*memini* - *Fa.* 1.235), and time's similar ability has just been mentioned (*ni vetus ipsa dies extenuasset opus* - *Fa.* 1.232).[222] Tiber serves as a reminder that, like the river, time can erode the memory and it is not just a question of whether one remembers correctly, but whether one remembers at all. Tiber's former name, Albula, has a strong literary tradition (invoked by the footnote *si memini*) both intratextually

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[215] *Vidi* - *Fa.* 5.639.
[216] Fantham 1998, 100 ad 47-8. This form is also found (and possibly introduced - Jenkyns 1998, 401) in *Aen.* 8.64, which is evoked by the references to Evander (and *refertur*) in *Fa.* 5.643 and 647. Although *Thybris* is often seen merely as a poetic alternative, Green (2004a, 116 ad 241-2) argues that it was 'strictly speaking, believed to have been an old name for the river'. cf. Plin. *Nat. Hist.* 3.53 (*Tiberis ante Thybris appellatus et prius Albula*), Liv. 1.3.6 (*fluvius Albula, quem nunc Tiberim vocant*), which emphasise the change in Tiber's name over time.
[217] The sequences of name changes undergone by Tiber and Janus over time echo the changing hosts of the transmigrating soul in the *Met*. In *Fa.* 1.127-32. Janus' earlier names are produced by *rudis vetustas*, further associating him with antiquity.
[218] Rutledge 1980, 302 - 'his age, rather than enhancing his *dignitas*, seems to have turned him into a chatty, likeable, but not too keen character'.
[219] Bömer 1958, 80 ad 4
[220] Rutledge 1980, 302
[221] Green 2004a, 116 ad 241-2. cf. *Aen.* 8.63, with Servius *ad loc.*
[222] cf. *Fa.* 2.443 - *nomen longis intercidit annis*.

(*Albula, quem Tiberim mersus Tiberinus in undis reddidit* - *Fa.* 2.389-90) and elsewhere,[223] which confirms Tiber's memory of his old name is accurate. Virgil's version of Tiber's etymology at *Aeneid* 8.330-2 is, however, very different to that in other sources. Perhaps *si memini* serves as a sidelong comment on Virgilian memory and an assertion of the authority of the Ovidian account, which is endorsed elsewhere in literary tradition, over his poetic predecessor's eroded one.[224]

In *Fasti* 6.105, Ovid associates the Tiber with antiquity through the collocation of *antiquus Tiberino* in his reference to the ancient grove near the river (*adiacet antiquus Tiberino lucus Alerni*).[225] This is preceded by a more developed version of the theme of temporal memory erosion. The Ovidian narrator asserts that he can relate the tradition which time has eroded (*obscurior aevo / fama,*[226] *sed e nostro carmine certus eris* - *Fa.* 6.103-4). This reads as an assertion of the superiority of his *carmen* over dimmed *fama*,[227] but given that Ovid is part of tradition,[228] it is unclear whether Ovid's version will be complete or time-damaged. Moreover, much of this story has never been part of tradition at all, for it is an Ovidian invention,[229] albeit reminiscent of other rape and cave scenes in literary tradition.[230] In this poetically charged context, with Tiber representing the effects of time and Janus embodying tradition, Ovid emphasises the negative effect that time can have on tradition, whilst simultaneously relying on that effect on his readers' memories in order to pass off his

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[223] Varro *L.* 5.30, Liv. 1.3.8, D.H. 1.71.1, D.S. 7.5.10. Accounts differ as to how waterlogged Tiberinus was before the Albula received his name.
[224] The Ovidian Tiber's appearance in *Fa.* 5.637-8 glosses *Aen.* 8.31-5 in a condensed form, borrowing older poem's authority. cf. Tiber's departure at *Fa.* 5.661-2 and *Aen.* 8.66-7.
[225] This episode also mentions renaming through time (*Cranaën dixere priores* - *Fa.* 6.107) and Janus.
[226] cf. *Aen.* 7.205 - *fama est obscurior annis* (also in a context of aetiological exegesis).
[227] A parallel might be found in the metaphor of polishing tablets and poetry as in Catullus 1, where wearing away was a positive concept which improved poetry, rather than detracting from it.
[228] cf. Ovid's claim for his song in *Met.* 15.878-9 - *fama... vivam*.
[229] The connection with *cardonis* is invented (Littlewood 2006, 39 ad 101), as is the name Crane which does not appear in any other extant text (Ibid., 41 ad 107).
[230] e.g. Daphne - *Met.* 1; Dido - *Aen.* 4.

new tale as an old one. Neither tradition nor the poet can be relied upon as an authority.

Ovid's depiction of Tiber recalls the Virgilian Tiber, who also takes on a didactic role (*docebo* - *Aen.* 8.50; *doce verum* - *Fa*. 5.635) and is a serious and imposing figure, in part due to his age (*senior* - *Aen.* 8.32). Ovid's rendition is somewhat light-hearted in comparison, but assumes some of the authority of his prophesying predecessor, for the reader knows that the Virgilian Tiber's prophecy is fulfilled. Newlands characterises Tiber in both poems as 'an optimistic, soothing authority who attempts to cheer his listener'.[231] Virgil's Tiber soothes Aeneas' cares (*curas his demere dictis* - *Aen.* 8.35) by describing the founding of Alba. However, this is at best omissive and at worst misleading,[232] for Tiber does not mention the major war which will have to be fought in Italy before the founding of the city, saying not to fear war (*Aen.* 8.40-1).[233] Tiber's account is highly selective, arousing suspicion that he is deliberately suppressing information which might discourage Aeneas. In the light of Virgil's depiction of Tiber, Ovid's plea, *doce verum* (*Fasti* 5.635), is no mere polite invocation, but a genuine plea for accuracy, for the literary precedent which has been invoked by linguistic echoes and mnemonic allusion suggests that Tiber may tell the truth authoritatively, but erode parts of it. It also draws attention to other omissions in the *Aeneid*; Newlands suggests that Ovid is seeking to correct the Virgilian undervaluation of Evander,[234] and that truth is 'an unstable commodity in dealing with

[231] Newlands 1995, 64
[232] O'Hara 1990, 32 - 'Tiberinus' whole speech is a more extreme case of deceptive prophetic encouragement'. Virgil's Tiber is deliberately 'eroding' his account of the future.
[233] Ibid. - 'This is simply not true', though Tiber offers proofs of his accuracy (*Aen.* 8.42).
[234] Newlands 1995, 98. cf. the ironic coment at *Fa.* 5.643 - *Arcadis Evandri nomen tibi saepe refertur.*

the Roman past'.[235] It may not be time which dims a tale's *fama*, but the selectivity of the storyteller.

Whilst Janus represents a cyclical, unending transmission of tradition, endorsed by the authority of age, Tiber shows the corrosive effect of time on that cycle. Though Ovid claims to be free of such deterioration, the authority which age grants him is problematised by these divine exempla.

Aged Hosts and Authoritative Sources

The old offer access to a past that is otherwise inaccessible to their audiences. In *Fasti* 4, the Ovidian narrator describes travelling to Paelignia, where his elderly host tells him why foxes are burned at the festival of Ceres. The old man states that the story has been lost except for the *monimenta* of legal and festive custom (*factum abiit, monimenta manent* - *Fa.* 4.709), but he is able to pass on a fuller, more authoritative tradition compared with that offered by mere custom. With this source, Ovid's poem will provide a more informed *monimentum*, which details both the act and the explanation. *Monimenta* also has literary connotations, recalling Horace' claim, *exegi monumentum* (*Carm.* 3.30.1), and Ovid's *opus exegi* (*Met.* 15.871), as well as Livy's preface, which contrasts the unmediated historical evidence of *monumenta* with orally transmitted poetic *fabulae* (*Quae ante conditam condendamve urbem poeticis magis decora*[236] *fabulis quam incorruptis rerum gestarum monumentis traduntur* - Liv. *praef.* 6-7).[237] As Miles notes:

> The essential attribute of *monumenta*... is that they are themselves direct survivals from the past for which they provide evidence: they represent an

[235] Ibid., 64
[236] *Decora* implies embellishment, an accurate description of what happens to stories transmitted through *fama* (cf. *Met.* 12.58).
[237] Feldherr 1998, 6; Miles 1997, 16-17

> unbroken link with the past, a part of the past that is still available for direct, personal inspection. By implicit contrast, oral tradition, *fama*, *fabula*, is *corrupta*, that is, composed of a series of independent repetitions, of retellings.[238]

When Livy refers to his own work as a *monumentum* (*in inlustri... monumento* - Liv. *praef.* 1.10), therefore, this creates expectations of accuracy in its depiction of the past. In *Fasti* 4, however, *monimenta* are critically differentiated from *factum* (*Fa.* 4.709); *monimenta* provide incomplete information, whilst oral tradition recalls the details. This is disorienting, for the custom does not invent an explanation, whereas the story is Ovidian invention.[239] The authority of *monimenta* remains entangled with poetry. Ovid suggests that poetry, like history, can be an authoritative *monimentum*;[240] the *Fasti* has the potential to become a *monimentum* like Horace's *Odes*, but its stories may not deserve such authority.

Ovid's journey also represents the process of acquiring authority and inspiration for his poetry. From a position of ignorance and lack of composed poetry (symbolised by the *frigida Carseolis... terra* in *Fa.* 4.683-4),[241] Ovid travels to Paelignia, his *natalia rura* (*Fa.* 4.685), which is described as *parva, sed assiduis obvia semper aquis* (*Fa.* 4.686). The land's fruitfulness mirrors the abundant knowledge of Ovid's host,[242] who, typically of the old, is loquacious and full of obscure details, not all of which are relevant to the poet's present theme (*is mihi multa quidem, sed et haec narrare solebat, / unde meum praesens instrueretur opus* - *Fa.* 4.689-90). The Ovidian narrator must sift through the old man's knowledge to find relevant information. The

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[238] Miles 1997, 17. cf. Jaeger 1997, 16 - A *monumentum* 'recalls the past and provides information to the present'.
[239] Bömer 1958, 269 ad 679ff.
[240] cf. *Tr.* 5.14.1-6, where the Ovidian narrator claims to have created poetic *monumenta* for his wife, but it turns out that he will commemorate her only if she obeys his admonishment to remember him (*moneri* - *Tr.* 5.14.43, *monet... monendo* - *Tr.* 5.14.45). cf. Varro *L.* 6.49; Martelli 2013, 174-79.
[241] Carseoli is chilly, unsuitable for growing olives, and appears almost equivalent to Ovid's depiction of Tomis as a cold land barren of poetic inspiration.
[242] This is perhaps anticipated by the unusual use of *ingeniosus* in *Fa.* 4.284, which is more commonly applied to human ability.

repetition of *solitas*, *solebat* emphasises the normality of such practices for the poet, who styles himself as a researcher of the past.[243] Indeed, *solebat* is 'a favourite for citation of supposedly oral sources in Ciceronian dialogues',[244] as in *Republic* 2.1.2, where Cicero introduces an account heard from the aged Cato (*Catonis hoc senis est* - *Rep.* 2.1.1) with *is dicere solebat*, which Ovid echoes closely (*is... narrare solebat* - *Fa.* 4.689). Both Cicero and Ovid treat an old man as an authority and source of information. However, the Paelignian old man's account is 'unattested and highly implausible',[245] problematising his authority.

The watery nature of Ovid's native land[246] is also significant due to the poetic assocations of streams[247] and the 'capacity of the waters of a poet's homeland to symbolize his *ingenium*'.[248] Greek springs are 'conceived as sources of poetic inspiration and figures for poetry itself, and in all cases associated with Muses'.[249] Indeed, inspiration 'demands that the poet take in some power from without'[250] and this is symbolised by drinking water imbued with the presence of the Muses. Thus Ovid is not simply lingering 'affectionately over his own well-watered family farm',[251] but indicating whence he derives his poetic inspiration. This is made more explicit in *Fasti* 3 when Ovid calls on Egeria to inform him of her deeds (*mone... ad tua facta veni* - *Fa.* 3.261-2), but acquires that knowledge by physically drinking from her stream (*inde bibi... Egeria est quae praebet aquas* - *Fa.* 3.274-5). As one of the

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[243] It also evokes the common trope of visits to aged hosts; e.g. Anius in the *Metamorphoses* or Nestor in the *Odyssey*, or perhaps, given the aquatic and *parva* nature of the destination, Callimachus' Hecale.
[244] Fantham 1998, 222 ad 689-90
[245] Newlands 1995, 67
[246] cf. *Am.* 2.1.1, 2.16.1-10, 3.15.11-14; *Tr.* 4.10.3; *Pont.* 1.8.42ff.
[247] Callimachus *Aet.* 1 fr. 1.27-8. cf. the *magni fontes* of Ennius (Prop. 3.3.5) and the *Philitea aqua* of Propertius (Prop. 3.3.52).
[248] Morgan 2009, 136
[249] Ibid., 135. cf. *Fa.* 5.7.
[250] Steiner 1986, 44
[251] Fantham 1998, 221 ad 685-6

Camenae (who came to be identified with the Muses[252]), Egeria is an excellent source of knowledge, whether counsel for Numa (*consiliumque* - *Fa.* 3.276)[253] or poetic inspiration for Ovid. Ovid states that he has often drunk from this murmuring ghyll with little sips (*saepe, sed exiguis haustibus* - *Fa.* 3.274), which in this poetically-charged context 'activates the play between "big" and "small" so common in disscussions of epic and the lesser genres'.[254] Like Horace in *Odes* 3.13, Ovid 'effectively claims membership of the Greek literary club',[255] assimilating himself to the great Greek poets of the past, and invoking the authority of ancient literary tradition for his own poetic inspiration.

Throwing Off Old Age: Age and Aetiology

There is a strong underlying tension in the *Fasti* between the authority of age and tradition for aetiologies, and the authority of the innovative poet. This is reflected in the tendency of aetiological poetry to draw attention to the relationship between the past and the present, particularly in Callimachus' *Aetia*.[256] In *Aetia* fr. 1.1-6, Callimachus complains that the Telchines accuse him of behaving like a child (παῖς ἄτε) for not writing a lengthy poem in keeping with his age.[257] Without venturing to comment on the identity of the Telchines, they are indubitably old ('chthonic figures

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[252] Frazer 1929c, 87 ad 3.275. cf. Varro *L.* 7.26.
[253] Pasco-Pranger (292-4) suggests that Ovid 'adduces Numa as a model in his own vatic activity', for both are informed by Egeria (*Egeria... monente* - *Fa.* 3.154; 3.261). cf. Myers 1994, 81 on Numa's research in *Met.* 15.4-11 mirroring Ovid's own antiquarian activities.
[254] Pasco-Pranger 2002, 294
[255] Morgan 2009, 136
[256] Nelis (2005, 81) points out that 'Callimachus seems to show ways in which the past created the present both by telling stories where narrative thus moves from the past towards the present, and also by including tales which begin from phenomena in the present and look back into the past.' The poem aetiologises the present and looks teleologically into its future, the reader's present. cf. Harder 2003.
[257] cf. Nestor's reproach in *Il.* 2.337-8. *Il.* 18.569-70 offers a more positive view of a child's singing. Ovid is accused of 'schoolboy pyrotechnics' (Elliott 1985, 10-11) by Seneca (*ni tantum impetum ingenii et materiae ad pueriles ineptias reduxisset* - *Nat.* 3.27.13-15) and Quintilian (*puerilis est... adfectatio* - *Inst*. 4.1.77). cf. Morgan 2003, 70-71.

who belonged to the pre-Olympian past'[258]), and when they say that Callimachus should grow up, they mean that he should 'adopt a poetics sanctioned by time and archaic practice'[259] as well as appropriate moral *gravitas*. Callimachus, however, declares that he prefers to sing like a cicada and to throw off the heavy weight of old age. His reference to the cicada invokes the long history of associations between cicadas, old age, immortality and song,[260] even whilst rejecting it, and expressing a desire to be like Plato's cicadas, who were the first poets and thus were not constrained by tradition and the burden of the past which old age represents.[261]

The Florentine scholia to *Aetia* 1 fr. 2 Pf. explains that *Aetia* 1-2 were presented as a dream in which Muses bestowed the *aetia* on the poet as a young man.[262] It is unclear whether this means that as a young man Callimachus dreamed that he met the Muses or whether he dreamed in his old age of meeting the Muses as a youth. If the latter, the dream fulfils Callimachus' desire for rejuvenation by revisiting his lost youth,[263] but also recalls the motif of young poets starting their careers.[264] Callimachus states that the Muses will not reject their youthful devotees when they grow old (Μοῦσαι γὰρ ὅσους ἴδον ὄθματι παῖδας / μὴ λοξῷ, πολιοὺς οὐκ ἀπέθεντο φίλους - *Aetia* fr.

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[258] Acosta-Hughes and Stephens 2002, 241
[259] Fantuzzi and Hunter 2004, 75-76
[260] Prop. 2.18a.17-20; Plato *Phdr.* 259e-259d; *Il.* 3.150-2 (the aged Trojans' voices are like those of cicadas). The Byzantine commentator ad *Il.* 11.1 states that Eos transformed Tithonus into a cicada so that she could always listen to him. cf. Gardner 2013, 5 n. 11; Harder 2012, 70 ad 1,30.
[261] 'Tradition is figured in terms of human aging' - Fantuzzi and Hunter 2004, 75.
[262] ὡς κ]ατ' ὄναρ σ(υμ)μείξας ταῖς Μούσ[αις ἐν Ἑ-
λι]κῶνι εἰλήφοι π(αρ' α)ὐτ(ῶν) τ(ὴν) τ(ῶν) αἰτίων [ἐξήγη-
σιν ἀ]ρτιγένειος ὤν, ωνκ΄ῦεμνησε
....ἀ]π' αὐτ(ῶν) ἀρχὴ[ω] λαβὼν ε΄οσ΄α [.....
]λόγου⟩ (*Schol. Flor.* ad fr. 2)
cf. fr. 253 *SH*, especially possible references to sleep in fr. 253.7 *SH* and dreams fr. 253.10, 11 (quoted in Artemidorus' *Interpretation of Dreams* 4.84) and 12-14 *SH*.
[263] Harder 2012, 114 ad 2d.3. Nisetich (2001, 234 ad 44-5) suggests that 'the wish to be free of old age is granted, at least momentarily, for in the dream... he appears as a young man.'
[264] cf. the two phases of Hesiod's life, as shepherd and poet.

1.37-8 Pf.), suggesting that poetic talent may not necessarily deteriorate with age.[265] Callimachus is old at the time of writing, but does not harness the authority of age, preferring the lightness of youth for his poetry. The generic emphasis is key in this fragment. The poetic length mentioned initially becomes old age, and acquires a weight equivalent to the physical mass of an island.[266] However, old age is not alone in being weighty, for so is literary tradition. The exaggerated comparison 'hints at the weight of the literary tradition, which Callimachus would like to shake off in order to make a fresh start'.[267] Callimachus equates length, weight, and age in a series of analogies which play upon genre and literary tradition. It seems that to the dichotomy noted by Barchiesi, in which 'the older and more familiar tradition inclines towards mountains, billowing sails, the open sea, rivers and torrents, broad highways, hundreds of tongues and thundering voices; on the other hand, the preference is for hills or plains, little boats and short-distance coastal sailing, limpid fountains and streams, untrodden paths, low-toned voices,'[268] must be added respectively age and youth.

Ovid's aetiological *Fasti* is concerned with the authority of antiquity; Hardie argues that the *Fasti* 'grounds the Roman religious calendar both in the authority of the past history of Rome and in the invariability of the celestial motions.'[269] However, the poem also cannot avoid evoking the shadow of Callimachus, and thus renews the combative relationship between old and new. The *Fasti*'s six books comprise a length

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[265] The love of the Muses 'served as an indication of poetic quality' (Harder 2012, 83 ad 1,37-8) cf. *Od.* 8.62; *Theog.* 81ff. In Callimachus' second *Iambus*, according to *Dieg.* vi 23ff., the swan asks the gods to take away old age. The *Aetia*'s Prologue (39-40) mentions dying swans. cf. Call. *Iamb.* 4; Euripides *HF* 637-43, 692-4; *Ba.* 1361.
[266] Acosta-Hughes and Stephens 2002, 245 - 'Length becomes old age, the weight of old age has its analogue in the island.'
[267] Harder 2012, 81 ad 1,35-6. On the weight of influence, see Bloom 1973.
[268] Barchiesi 1997, 67
[269] Hardie 1997, 185

equivalent to the four books of the *Aetia*, but if the *Fasti* were to complete the year with an additional six books, it would be far weightier than the *Aetia*, for its stature would be equivalent to that of the *Aeneid*.[270] Ovid writes aetiologies in a moderate-sized poem which purports to be a mere part of a weightier poem, and does so in a novel way despite dealing with the ancient past, setting up tensions between epic scale and Callimachean brevity. The opening couplet of the *Fasti* (*tempora cum causis Latium digesta per annum / lapsaque sub terras ortaque signa canam*) is programmatic, announcing the forthcoming generic conflict. Ovid juxtaposes *causis* and *Latium* at the main caesura, recalling the poetic precedent of Propertius (*sacra diesque canam et cognomina prisca locorum* - 4.1.69), who wrote five aetiological elegies on Roman topics, assuming the role of a Roman Callimachus. Ovid's aims are greater than those of Propertius. Ovid broadens his theme from mere *dies* to *tempora*[271] and *annum*, running the risk of acquiring the heavy weight eschewed by Callimachus. *Fasti* 1.2 evokes Aratus' didactic poem, the *Phaenomena*, expanding Ovid's scope to be more reminiscent of epic than elegy,[272] and recalling the opening of the *Aeneid.*[273] Thus at the start of the *Fasti*, Ovid brings to mind the martial epic of the *Aeneid*, the didactic epos of the *Phaenomena* and the aetiological elegy of the *Aetia*,[274] setting up generic tensions for his poem.[275] The sense that Ovid is transgressing the normal bounds of elegy is reinforced by the fact that Ovid's explicitly elegiac rejection of martial themes is followed by an expression of commitment not to the expected amatory elegy, but to a more scholarly subject,

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[270] Barchiesi 1997, 73
[271] *Tempora* is also a key thematic word in the *Metamorphoses* (*Met.* 1.4).
[272] Miller 1991, 9. Martin 1985, 263 notes the couplet's 'epic urgency'.
[273] cf. Korzeniewsky 1964, 195 - 'der Anfang laßt sich auch als episch ansehen'.
[274] Hardie (1997, 185) - 'The *Fasti* ground the Roman religious calendar both in the authority of the past history of Rome and in the invariability of the celestial motions.'
[275] As Hinds (1992a, 82) notes, central to the *Fasti* is the 'self-conscious strain put on the elegiac form by the epic weightiness of much of the poem's subject matter'.

religious aetiology (*Caesaris arma canant alii: nos Caesaris aras* - *Fa.* 1.13). Though not an epic theme, this new subject is associated with Caesar and is weightier than elegy conventionally supports. Throughout the *Fasti*, Ovid revisits this tension between *arma*, and *sidera* and *sacra*,[276] self-consciously disrupting expectations of either 'old' or 'young' genres, and instead using them 'to represent the *Fasti*'s distinctive aspiration to move towards its *own* version of poetic elevation',[277] rejecting the constraints of authoritative generic boundaries.

Age Authority at Rome

The old men who address the Ovidian narrator in the *Fasti* make important points about the authority of age. In *Fasti* 4.377ff. the veteran is described as *quidam... senior*, and mentions from his own experience that this is the anniversary of Caesar's victory at Thapsus. The former soldier momentarily fulfils the main role of the old in society, giving access to a time prior to Ovid's lifetime and educating his listener about their shared Roman cultural and civic memory, which the Ovidian narrator can convey to the reader with the additional authority of a source old enough to have been present at the battle.[278] Ovid gets his information 'directly from the most competent authority on the subject of Julius' victory: a patriotic veteran who had proudly served in that very battle'.[279] It soon becomes clear, however, that the veteran is engaging in Nestorian practices. As Newlands notes, 'The battle of Thapsus is commemorated by

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[276] cf. *Fa.* 1.27-30, where Romulus is better acquainted with arms than stars. Hinds (1992b, 118) notes the contrast between Romulus, the representative of martial themes, and the positive depiction of Numa, who in *Fa.* 3.277-84 explicitly endorses *sacra* and *arae* and attempts to eradicate *arma*, with knowledge programmatically derived from a Callimachean narrow stream belonging to Egeria. *Fa.* 2.3-10 references *sacra* and *tempora fastis* but also *militia* and *arma.* cf. *Fa.* 3.3, 4.1-16, 6.21-2. Hinds (Ibid., 115) comments that 'the terms of the opposition are immediately "collapsed" in 2.9-10 by a rhetorical equation which seems to mimic the well-known conceit of *militia amoria: sacra*, etc. serve as *arma*.'

[277] Hinds 1992b, 113

[278] This is flagged by *memini* in *Fa.* 4.377 - the authority of the old is based on knowledge of the past.

[279] Herbert-Brown 1994, 112

a veteran who reveals his Caesarean bias by completely suppressing the Roman involvement in the opposition.'[280] There is no mention of Lucius Scipio, nor of the fact that the battle of Thapsus was a civil war which ended with the slaughter of 10,000 troops who wished to surrender (including many Romans) and precipitated the suicide of Cato.[281] The veteran 'treats the battle as a fight... against a foreign king alone',[282] thereby whitewashing the memory of his beloved commander. Ovid draws attention to the omission by mentioning that there is more to say on the subject (*plura locuturi* - *Fasti* 4.385). It remains ambiguous, however, what more was going to be said. Was the veteran going to admit to the negative aspects of the day's history? Was the Ovidian narrator going to correct the record? Neither in the reported conversation nor in his composition of the *Fasti* does Ovid reconstruct what remains to be said; instead he highlights the need to do so, and leaves his readers to do so for themselves. Both the veteran and Ovid have benefitted from the current regime (*hanc ego militia sedem, tu pace parasti, inter bis quinos usus honore viros* - *Fa.* 4.383-4), which may influence their narratives. The veteran's comment may be an attempt to emphasise his authority, for in general, as the shower of rain symbolises, the war-won offices of veterans have been superseded by the civil honours of the young.[283]

Whilst Ovid presents this as a problem with a personal account, Fantham notes that 'the battle was represented at Caesar's triumph and in Augustan texts as a victory only over the barbarian enemy.'[284] The veteran's account is thus symptomatic of a wider Augustan practice of rewriting the past. An account which has the potential to

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[280] Newlands 1995, 90
[281] In contrast with Appian *B. Civ.* 2.96 and Cassius Dio 43.3-11.
[282] Newlands 1995, 90
[283] Seating shows status. cf. Rawson (1993, 103-05) on the *lex Iulia theatralis* giving current or ex-*tribuni* and minor magistrates privileged seats before the *equites*, and subdivision of the *equites* by age. The transition from war to peace recalls Marasco's interpretation of the *Corycius senex* in *Georgics* 4 as a retired pirate in post-Actium peacetime (Marasco 1990, 407).
[284] Fantham 1998, 165 ad 377

turn sour is halted by a shower of rain. Although on one level, Ovid's reference to Libra releasing the heavenly waters in a downpour on 6th April is straightforward almanac material, well-attested in tradition,[285] on another it is highly symbolic.[286] While Newlands suggests that the rain may punish the veteran for his 'manipulation of history,'[287] she does not attribute it to a particular source. However, the constellation of Libra, which releases the rain, was Augustus' birth sign,[288] and although as Abry notes, 'les tésmoignages qui associent Auguste à la constellation de la Balance sont rares,'[289] *Georgics* 1.33-5 connects the catasterised Augustus with Libra.[290] Moreover, Ovid frequently tropes Augustus' power over him with lightning.[291] It therefore seems reasonable to interpret this as a symbolic representation of Augustus silencing historical details which he feels should not be commemorated. Ovid thus shows how both personal bias and broader political expediency motivate the omission or silencing of information.

There is a further element to this, which will bring us back to age. The veteran tells his tale while watching the show on the third day of the Megalensia (*Fa.* 4.377-8), a new Augustan festival.[292] The account of the Caesarean anniversary is framed by references to the Megalensia (*Fa.* 4.377-8, 387), which seem to assert the new order,

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[285] Degrassi 1963, 437-38. cf. Col. 11.2.34 (*Octavo idus Aprilis Vergiliae vespere celantur. Interdum hiemat*), Pliny *Nat.* 18.247 for 8th April (*Caesari VI idus significatur imber Librae occasu*). Gee (2000, 201) states that 'Ovid's single reference bears no similarity to Aratus.'
[286] This is one of two downpours in *Fasti* 4 that represent victory. cf. *Fa.* 4.627-8.
[287] Newlands 1995, 90
[288] Abry 1988, 104 - 'les tables planétaires ont clairement montré que dans la nativité d'Auguste, la Balance est à la fois signe solaire et signe ascendant.'
[289] Ibid., 111. cf. Green 2014, 97 on Capricorn as 'the dominant astrological symbol of his career' and the merits of the Libra connection.
[290] Barton 2002, 192 n. 61. Manilius (Man. 4.542-6, 769-77) links Libra to an imperial ruler, but it may be Tiberius, given that Manilius praises Capricorn as Augustus' birth sign at Man. 2.509. Libra symbolised justice (Johnston 1980, 82 n. 28).
[291] e.g. *Tr.* 1.1.72, 4.3.69. cf. Helzle 1989, 103 ad 4.3.56. Knox (2016, 185) claims the motif features in over thirty of the *Tristia*'s fifty-one poems. Bretzigheimer (1993) discusses *Jupiter Tonans* in the *Metamorphoses* and as a 'Leitmotiv' in the *Tristia*. The Fates' records are immune to lightning (*Met.* 15.811), as is the poem itself (*Met.* 15.871), which Kovacs (1987, 463) deems a reference to Augustus.
[292] Herbert-Brown 1994, 115

having washed away the recollection of the past and rewritten it.[293] Herbert-Brown suggests that the old man and his memories 'create the impression that Julius' festal day is remembered, not by the Roman public at large, but by a diminishing number of an aged, war generation, and even they, despite their reverence for their dead commander are spending the day watching the *ludi* honouring the Great Mother instead of paying active tribute by sacrifice to their leader on the holiday commemorating his victory.'[294] The old man is a 'remnant of the vague, vanished past'[295] and provides a snapshot of a past which is all but forgotten and whose erasure is being hastened by Augustus. Political authority may not permit old men to relate everything that they remember. However, Ovid's preservation of his memory (*memini* - *Fa.* 4.377) of the conversation in a poem allows him to bypass Augustus' rainy silencing and commemorate the past in a more permanent form than an old man's memories, making the omission evident without being dangerously explicit.[296] As Libby notes, 'because so much was at stake under Augustus in how Romans recollected the past years so full of civil war, memory grew increasingly into a way of shaping the future rather than commemorating the past.'[297]

The authority which the past grants an account is dependent upon whether it has suffered interference from an intermediary. Ovid suggests that not all versions of the

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[293] cf. *Res Gestae* 8.5, *Fa.* 1.14 (*quoscumque sacris addidit ille dies*). Hardie (1997, 188) notes that 'tradition... as Augustus knew well, is easily malleable', while Pasco-Pranger (2006, 37) discusses Augustus' 'reconstruction of the past'. Gowing (2005, 1-2) notes Tiberius' choice to forget (Sen. *Ben.* 5.25.2), stating that 'memory lay at the very heart of power under the Principate' and 'the ability to control and even suppress memory became a crucial component of political authority'. The power to persuasively rewrite history may be suggested in *Fa.* 4.385-6 by the use of words which have senses connected with authority, for *seducere* can mean not only 'led apart', but also 'led astray' or 'enticed' (*OLD* s.v. 1c), while *movere* elsewhere marks an audience response to an authoritative narrative (*OLD* s.v. 14 and 15).
[294] Herbert-Brown 1994, 112-14
[295] Johnson 1978, 10
[296] Herbert-Brown (1994, 115) claims that Ovid is trying to disguise the fact that this is a civil war, but the pointed tone of the passage suggests the opposite, whilst maintaining convincing disclaimers.
[297] Libby 2015, 77

past are authoritative. This impression is strengthened by Urania's double-edged statement in *Fasti* 5.69-70 that the role of old men is to give sage advice and moderate public behaviour. Urania cites the worth and respect due to the old in the past, but destabilises their current authority by suggesting that elders prioritise their own interests (*aetati consuluisse suae* - *Fa.* 5.74), and planting the suspicion of undue familial influence (*nec avum sustinuisse nepos* - *Fa.* 5.76). Unlike the other Muses,[298] Urania receives no direct endorsement for her claims, and the hint at gerontic partiality is left unproven. Nevertheless, the suspicion remains that old men may be swayed by personal motivation, even in political matters. Their authority thus cannot necessarily be trusted.

Whilst the *Fasti* lacks prominent aged figures for the poet, the work's divine and mortal old men and women embody the way in which age constitutes a source of information, and its possessors function as archives of tradition. Janus is presented as an ancient god, able to pronounce authoritatively on events as far back as primordial chaos, so that his account supersedes Ovid's *Metamorphoses*. However, this aged status conflicts with his recent addition to the calendar. Through Janus' contested status, Ovid draws attention to the issue of pseudo-archaising; things which appear to have the authority of age are not always entitled to such privilege. Age and time also erode memory (and the commemoration of tradition) and can also be used to rewrite history, with political authority superseding the position of the old as narrators of the past. Finally, in a poem of aetiologies, which clearly owes much to Callimachus, the

[298] The Muses' accounts conflict and they have lost their customary unity. cf. Barchiesi 1991, 7 - 'The Muses' principal and most familiar characteristic is their harmony'; *Theog.* 39 (ὁμηρεῦσαι) and 60 (ὁμόφρονας); Naevius *Bellum Punicum* 1 Mor. (*concordes*). The shock of the Muses' disunity is heightened by their description as *dissensere deae*, an *unpoetisch* and rare word. cf. Concordia's self-serving theory in *Fa.* 6.1-100 which does not bring harmony.

authority of age and tradition is in tension with the authority of the poet as innovator, and asks whether age is to be thrown off or embraced for its authority.

Exilic Age and the 'Loss' of Poetic Authority

In Ovid's *Metamorphoses*, age is a source of authority, albeit one which the poet undermines in his characteristically irreverent style, showing that tradition is as fallible and prone to change or unreliability as the old men who embody it. Meanwhile, in the *Fasti*, age and the past are central to the generic and political tensions which underpin the poem. The *Tristia* and the *Epistulae ex Ponto* take a contrasting point of departure. Ovid presents age as the negative result of his exile, implying that the deteriorative effects of age outweigh its authority. Evans argues that old age is the main theme of *Tristia* 4, for 'the grimness and hardships of exile are presented through the framework of his old age.'[299] However, the picture of age which emerges from beneath this negative veneer is quite different, for age actually contributes to Ovid's poetic authority and highlights other forms of authority acting upon the poet.

Whilst the *Metamorphoses* has a heterodiegetic narrator, and the Ovidian narrator in the *Fasti* is of indeterminate age, the exile poetry presents itself as autobiographical, and its narrator as encountering the full force of the aging process. Although other aged narrators appear, the main figure whose authority age affects is Ovid himself. Relegated to Tomis, Ovid ages prematurely. He details this at the beginning of *Ex Ponto* 1.4, emphasising age as the problem.[300] Similarly, in *Tristia* 3.8, Ovid describes his illness in terms which stand figuratively for aging. His pallor is like autumnal frost damage (*quique per autumnum percussis frigore primo / est color in foliis, quae nova laesit hiems* - *Tr.* 3.8.29-30), which recalls the use of the seasons to represent aging in

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[299] Evans 1983, 74

[300] *Pont.* 1.4.1-2 - *Iam mihi deterior canis aspergitur aetas, / iamque meos vultus ruga senilis arat*. cf. *Pont.* 1.4.7 - *confiteor facere hoc annos*.

Pythagoras' speech in *Met.* 15, but here 'The implication is that Ovid has reached the autumn of his days and the harvest of his life has been gathered.'[301] The adjective ascribed to winter, *nova*, is suggestive not only of the beginning of winter, but also of premature winter, since it encroaches upon the autumn (*per autumnum*). Ovid's wintry hue and age has come upon him before the due time. The theme of premature old age is reinforced in *Ex Ponto* 1.4.1-3 by the threefold anaphora of *iam*, which 'emphasizes that Ovid has aged earlier than would have been natural.'[302] Ovid states outright that old age has come upon him too soon:

> *iam mihi deterior canis aspergitur aetas,*
> *iamque meos vultas ruga senilis arat:*
> *iam vigor et quasso languent in corpore vires,*
> *nec, iuveni lusus qui placuere, iuvant.*

His sufferings, Ovid proclaims, are the cause of this sudden and premature decline into old age, reiterated at *Ex Ponto* 1.4.20 (*ante meum tempus cogit et esse senem*).[303] A similar anaphora appears in *Tristia* 4.8.1-4:

> *iam mea cycneas imitantur tempora plumas,*
> *inficit et nigras alba senecta comas.*
> *iam subeunt anni fragiles et inertior aetas,*
> *iamque parum firmo me mihi ferre grave est.*

The premature onset of old age is central to Ovid's self-presentation in the exile poetry. Old age represents the suffering of exile, and exile itself.

Ovid suggests that age prevents him from writing poetry. This accords with the common use of old age as a metaphor for decline in ancient literary criticism.[304] The

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[301] Lee 1949, 117. cf. *Fa.* 6.149-50.
[302] Gaertner 2005, 273 ad 1-3. Triplex anaphora is chiefly elegiac and avoided by Vergil, Lucan, etc. Emphatic repetition is common in the exilic poems concerned with age (*Tr.* 3.8; *Tr*. 4.8; *Pont.* 1.4). Wheeler's translation (1965, 131) of 'now' fails to convey the 'already' sense of *iam*. Boethius provides a later example of premature aging due to misfortune.
[303] cf. *Tr.* 4.10.93-4: *iam mihi canities pulsis melioribus annis / venerat, antiquas miscueratque comas*. Ovid suggests that his wife has also aged due to his misfortune (*Pont*. 1.4.47).

proximity of the description of Ovid's wintry ills in *Tristia* 3.8.23-34 to his expression of his thwarted desire to fly tacitly implies that age is the cause of his volitational inability. Ovid's desire for flight not only represents his desire to return to Rome (his mythological exempla are exiles who can fly away), but also constitutes a ubiquitous metaphor for poetic composition.[305] Daedalus in particular has often been identified as functioning as a poet-figure in *Met.* 8.183ff.[306] Thus when Ovid hypothetically wishes in *Tristia* 3.8 to stand in the chariot of Triptolemus,[307] to bridle Medea's dragons, and to have Perseus' and Daedalus' wings, he is also giving voice to a poetic desire for his former generic heights.[308] Ovid states that he cannot aspire to this kind of poetry until Augustus gives him feathers and winged chariots (*ille tibi pennasque potest currusque volucres / tradere* - *Tr.* 3.8.15-6).[309] Sick with the onset of premature old age, the poet will regain his wings only if Augustus permits his return to Rome (*det reditum, protinus ales eris* - *Tr.* 3.8.16). Unlike Callimachus, Ovid is unable to

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[304] Sogno 2007, 87. cf. Cicero *Tusc.* 2.5.

[305] cf. *Georgics* 3.8-9, challenging Ennius *var.* 7-10 (*volito vivos per ora virum*). Also Horace's metamorphosis into a swan (*Carm.* 2.20) and Aristophanes *Av.* 1374-1409. 'Winged words' feature in Homer. Theognis (237-52) claims that poetry gives wings and eternal life and fame as a song to his addressee, rather than the poet:
σοὶ μὲν ἐγὼ πτέρ᾽ ἔδωκα, σὺν οἷς ἐπ᾽ ἀπείρονα πόντον
πωτήσει καὶ γῆν πᾶσαν ἀειρόμενος
ῥηϊδίως: θοίνης δὲ καὶ εἰλαπίνῃσι παρέσσῃ
ἐν πάσαις, πολλῶν κείμενος ἐν στόμασιν,
καί σε σὺν αὐλίσκοισι λιγυφθόγγοις νέοι ἄνδρες
εὐκόσμως ἐρατοὶ καλά τε καὶ λιγέα
ἀσονται. καὶ ὅταν δνοφερῆς ὑπὸ κεύθεσι γαίης
βῇς πολυκωκύτους εἰς Ἀΐδαο δόμους,
οὐδέποτ᾽ οὐδὲ θανὼν ἀπολεῖς κλέος, ἀλλὰ μελήσεις
ἄφθιτον ἀνθρώποις αἰὲν ἔχων ὄνομα,
Κύρνε, καθ᾽ Ἑλλάδα γῆν στρωφώμενος ἠδ᾽ ἀνὰ νήσους,
ἰχθυόεντα περῶν πόντον ἐπ᾽ ἀτρύγετον,
οὐχ ἵππων νώτοισιν ἐφήμενος, ἀλλά σε πέμψει
ἀγλαὰ Μουσάων δῶρα ἰοστεφάνων
πᾶσιν ὅσοισι μέμηλε, καὶ ἐσσομένοισιν ἀοιδὴ
ἔσσῃ ὁμῶς, ὄφρ᾽ ᾖ γῆ τε καὶ ἠέλιος.

[306] Pavlock 2009, 62

[307] Flying chariots are a metaphor for poetic composition. cf. Wimmel 1960, 105ff.; Asper 1997, 21ff.; Nünlist 1998, 255ff.

[308] These are the topics of an epic like the *Metamorphoses* (cf. *Met.* 4-5), or a tragedy, not exilic elegy.

[309] In fact Ovid recounts Medea's story in his next poem, *Tr.* 3.9.

throw off the weight of old age.[310] He is forced to abdicate authority over his poetry, for the *princeps* is preventing the production of epic by subjecting the poet to the aging effects of exile.[311]

Should the reader accept Ovid's account of poetic impotence, however, even backed by the age authority he has acquired? Ovid is being disingenuous,[312] for he is manifestly still able to write poetry in exile. His disclaimers are made in the third book of his exile poetry, immediately after he states that he has returned to his Muses, making shift to write elegiacs (*ad Musas... reverti, / aptaque in alternos cogere verba pedes* - *Tr.* 3.7.9-10[313]). Admittedly, Ovid is not writing epic poetry. However, it might be argued that Ovid's exile poetry constitutes a transformation or renewal of the elegiac genre.[314] Ovid is claiming a 'new and even ambitious literary space',[315] through the 'creation of the literary genre of exile poetry'.[316] As Rimell points out, 'The land of exile represents undiscovered psychic or imaginary territory, and is code for going where no writer has gone before. Even the "dismemberment" of exile can be recast as great marketing, or as having one's books and reputation scattered over as wide an area as possible.'[317] Ovid acknowledges this in *Ex Ponto* 3.1.49-56 (*exposuit memet populo Fortuna videndum, / et plus notitiae, quam fuit ante, dedit... nos quoque conspicuos nostra ruina facit*). Exile becomes a prerequisite of *fama*, and

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[310] *Aet.* fr. 1.35-6 Pf. Callimachus throws off the weight of old age, the requirement to write epic and the burden of literary tradition.
[311] This transforms the usual *recusatio* (e.g. Ov. *Am.* 1.1, 1.15, 2.1, 2.18, 3.1. cf. Horace *Carm.* 1.6, where wings are associated with more elevated genres). Typically the *princeps* demands an epic and the poet excuses himself with an apologetic elegy.
[312] Evans 1976, 103
[313] i.e. elegy - cf. Luck 1977, 200 ad 3.7.9ff.
[314] Evans 1983, 32
[315] Harrison 2002b, 90
[316] Claassen 1999, 241
[317] Rimell 2015, 284

Ovid's location at the end of the world emphasises how far his fame has spread.[318] Just as Pythagoras depicted a cycle of renewal in the *Metamorphoses*,[319] so in the exile poetry, Ovid comes full circle, and reinvents his former genre in a new mode. Age has not detracted from his poetic abilities; the aged Ovid is a misleading authority.[320] As the originator of a new exilic genre, Ovid is the first (and therefore the most authoritative)[321] poet in it. In order to achieve this status, however, Ovid erases the existing literary tradition of exilic writers, such as Cicero.[322] In doing so, the Ovidian narrator recalls the practices of Nestor in the *Metamorphoses*, eliminating elements of the past which he does not wish to include in his authoritative account of the creation of exilic writing. Exilic old Ovid produces a secondary narrative of primacy, but the lacunae which he makes in order to do so may undermine his authority.

The reliability of Ovid's claims of poetic deterioration due to exile or age is also problematised by the fact that exile was recognised as 'an essential component of the experience of the historian and that of the philosopher'.[323] Exile conceptualised not only banishment, but also the disassociation of an individual from their state,[324] and was seen as a condition that 'provokes a profound change of perspective and offers knowledge and greater insight'.[325] Thucydides reflects upon how exile benefitted his writing by allowing him to learn the truth of events (διὰ τὴν φυγήν, καθ' ἡσυχίαν τι

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[318] *Pont.* 2.7.65-6 - *est aliquid patriis vicinum finibus esse: / ultima me tellus, ultimus orbis habet*; *Tr.* 4.9.9 - *sim licet extremum, sicut sum, missus in orbem.* Like Aeneas, Ovid reverses Ulysses's homeward wanderings (cited in *Pont.* 3.1.53), heading outward to found a new genre.
[319] Pythagoras is a voluntary exile due to his hatred of tyranny. Pythagoras' anachronistic conversation with Numa, a Roman ruler, might emphasise the parallels with Ovid's situation (Harrison 2007, 137).
[320] Presumably motivated by a desire for reprieve.
[321] cf. Hinds 1998, 54–55 on *Georgics* 3.8-11.
[322] Gaertner 2007, esp. 157-9
[323] Ibid., 10-11
[324] Diogenes Laertius (2.10) states that Anaxagoras claimed that he was not bereft of the Athenians, but they from him. cf. D.L. 6.49.
[325] Gaertner 2007, 10

αὐτῶν μᾶλλον αἰσθέσθαι - 5.26.5), while Plutarch comments approvingly on men who exile themselves from the cares and distractions of their native lands, and adds that the Muses themselves utilised exile for historical writing:

> καὶ γὰρ τοῖς παλαιοῖς ὡς ἔοικεν αἱ Μοῦσαι τὰ κάλλιστα τῶν συνταγμάτων καὶ δοκιμώτατα φυγὴν λαβοῦσαι συνεργὸν ἐπετέλεσαν... πάντες οὗτοι καὶ πλείονες ἄλλοι τῶν πατρίδων ἐκπεσόντες οὐκ ἀπέγνωσαν οὐδ᾽ ἔρριψαν ἑαυτούς, ἀλλ᾽ ἐχρήσαντο ταῖς εὐφυΐαις ἐφόδιον παρὰ τῆς τύχης τὴν φυγὴν λαβόντες, δι᾽ ἣν πανταχοῦ καὶ τεθνηκότες μνημονεύονται· τῶν δ᾽ ἐκβαλόντων καὶ <κατα>στασιασάντων οὐδὲ εἷς λόγος οὐδενὸς ἀπολέλειπται. διὸ καὶ γελοῖός ἐστιν ὁ νομίζων ἀδοξίαν τῇ φυγῇ προσεῖναι. (*De Exilio* 605c-d)
>
> For the Muses, it seems, perfected for the ancients the best and most excellent of their writings having taken exile as their tool...[326] All these and many more when driven from their homeland did not despair or cast themselves down, but used natural cleverness, taking exile as a provision from fortune, through which they are remembered everywhere, even having died. But of those who banished and opposed them not one has any repute. Consequently he who thinks obscurity is attached to exile is ludicrous.

Syme consequently suggests that 'exile may be the making of a historian.'[327] In that case, exile may also be the making of a poet. Ovid dwells on the misery of his exile, but he must be aware of the Greek tradition of profiting from exile in terms of writing and of fame. Aging in exile grants Ovid experience, unique knowledge and memories, and prompts him to generic innovation. His pose of advanced age is a mechanism which permits Ovid to look back both temporally and geographically, offering a new and original perspective on the events of his life, and also on events in Rome. Exile may therefore paradoxically confer authority upon the poet rather than withholding it, granting him 'power through poetic knowledge'.[328] Ovid's refusal to acknowledge this aspect of exilic writing is all the more reason to consider it. Like the sleight-of-hand magician, Ovid's talent is to mislead his audience and thereby conceal his still-present poetic control.

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[326] Plutarch lists the many historians who wrote in exile. Cicero *Tusc.* 5.37.107 also lists numerous exiled philosophers.
[327] Syme 1962, 40
[328] McGowan 2009, 19. McGowan argues that 'in Tomis the poet gains a critical perspective from which to comment on the Augustan, and thus the first, phase of the Roman principate.'

Saving the Best Until Last: Swan Songs

One of the most prominent symbols of old age in the exile poetry is white hair, which is compared in *Tristia* 4.8.1-2 to swans' plumage (*iam mea cycneas imitantur tempora plumas, / inficit et nigras alba senecta comas*).[329] Swans and song are closely connected with death and aging in tradition, as Ovid acknowledges (*dicitur* - *Tr.* 5.1.12).[330] Consequently, poets are often compared to swans;[331] in *Tristia* 5.1.11-13, Ovid likens his singing to a swan's dirge (*utque iacens ripa deflere Caystrius ales / dicitur ore suam deficiente necem, / sic ego*).[332] Luck suggests that in *Tristia* 4.8, 'Die 'Schwanenfedern' sind ein besonders schönes, pathos-reiches Bild fur den alternden Dichter, der nun an der Schwelle des Todes seinen Schwanengesang erklingen lässt.'[333] Whilst the narrative of the exile poetry as Ovid's swan song is beguiling, this interpretation is problematised when read in conjunction with Ovid's claims of poetic decline.[334] Literary tradition holds that swans sing most beautifully at their deaths,[335] which conflicts with the image of aging poetic decline which Ovid constructs in the exile poetry, since on this basis, Ovid's exile poetry should be his finest work, rather than the poor quality stuff that he claims.[336] However, as we have seen Ovid's poetic decline is merely a pose,[337] for he is the prime authority in his innovative exilic genre.

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[329] cf. Aristophanes *Vesp.* 1064-5. The Chorus prefers old age to youthful effeminacy.
[330] Bibliography at Newlands 1995, 184 n. 26. *Aen.* 10.189-93 emphasises the connection, punning on *canit* and *canentem*, and linking old age with feathers (*canentem molli pluma duxisse senectam*).
[331] Nisbet and Hubbard 1978, 341-2 ad 2.20.10
[332] *Met.* 14.429 - Canens is like a dying swan; *Fa.* 2.109-10 - Arion's lyre when he is dying plays like a swan. This swan bears a particular resemblance to Ovid at various points in his poetic career; white-browed and singing while dying, it recalls the exilic Ovid, but it sings of *tempora*, the *Fasti*'s subject (*Fa.* 1.1). cf. Newlands 1995, 184-85.
[333] Luck 1977, 259 ad 4.8.1ff.
[334] This deterioration is claimed so frequently that it becomes suspect (Hinds 1985, 14).
[335] Plato's *Phd.* 84e5ff.; Callimachus *Iamb.* 4.45ff - ὦ πάντα κᾳλή, τῶν ἐμῶν τὸ κ[άλλιστον / ἐν τῇ τελευτῇ κύκνος [ὡς Ἀπόλλωνος / ἤεισας. cf. Cicero *Tusc*. 1.30.73; Ov. *Her.* 7.1-2. Frazer 1929b, 307 ad 2.109 - 'The ancients thought that the swan sang with peculiar sweetness at the point of death.'
[336] e.g. *Tr.* 5.1.69.
[337] Williams 1994, 49

The connection of aging to swan songs reinforces Ovid's poetic ability, whilst undermining the reader's trust in the Ovidian narrator.

A further complication to the swan song analogy arises from the fact that much of the bird imagery in literary tradition represents grander poetry.[338] In *Odes* 2.20.1-2 Horace likens himself to a swan (*non usitata nec tenui... ferar / penna*), accepting the greater themes (*tenues grandia* - *Carm.* 1.6.9) which he formerly left to Varius, the right sort of bird for the Homeric job (*Maeonii carminis alite* - *Carm.* 1.6.2).[339] In the *Tristia*, however, the swan-like Ovid states that there will be no more grand projects for him unless he is recalled to a leisurely life in Rome (*Tr.* 3.8.15). His swan analogy evokes Lucretius, who expresses a preference for short songs like those of the swan (*suavidicis potius quam multis versibus edam; / parvus ut est cycni melior canor, ille gruum quam / clamor in aetheriis dispersus nubibus austri* - *DRN* 4.180-2 = *DRN* 4.909-11). Lucretius' swan reference is 'strikingly Callimachean',[340] for as Donohue points out, 'he seems to be recommending poetry which is short and elegant over poetry which is long and powerful'[341] and to thereby be demonstrating his adherence to the aesthetics of Callimachean poetry.[342] His swans represent short poetry. Ovid's swan images invoke the authority of an alternative poetic tradition; despite his claims, the exile poetry is the brief, high quality poetry endorsed by Callimachus. Moreover,

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[338] As Hinds (1987, 47) notes, '*TLL* and *OLD* between them offer eleven non-Ovidian examples of swans (*cycnus* or *olor*) envisaged specifically as singing birds from poetry up to the end of the Augustan period. In no fewer than nine of these, there are clear evocations of "poets and other literary men". And a *full* survey of singing swans in Ovid (*Her.* 7.1-2; *Met.* 2.252-6, 5.386-7, 14.429-30; *Fa.* 2.108-10; *Trist.* 5.1.11-12) shows... allusion to song of the literary kind in every case.' Donohue (1993, 18-34) traces the swan's literary associations from Homer to Ovid. On metapoetic swans, cf. Thompson 1936, 178-87; Nisbet and Hubbard 1978, 333-334 ad 2.20; Ahl 1982, 373-77. Papaioannou (2004) discusses how swans in the *Met.* figure Ovid's role as rival and successor to Virgil.
[339] cf. Commager 1962, 313 n. 7 on *tenuis* lyrics.
[340] Brown 1982, 82. Brown suspects that Lucretius was inspired here by an epigram of Asclepiades that describes Erinna's scant poetic output as γλυκὺς... πόνος, οὐχι πολὺς μέν... ἀλλ' ἑτερων πολλῶν δυνατώτερος (*A.P.* 7.11).
[341] Donohue 1993, 1
[342] cf. Call. *Aet*. fr. 1.3-4, fr. 465.

Ovid admits that the Muse still deigns to come to him (*Tr.* 4.10.117-22), recalling Callimachus' statement that the Muse does not abandon in old age the poet to whom she was a friend in youth (Μοῦσαι γὰρ ὅσους ἴδον ὄθματι παῖδας / μὴ λοξῷ, πολιοὺς οὐκ ἀπέθεντο φίλους - *Aetia* fr. 1.37-8 Pf.). Ovid, singing his swan song in his old age, retains his Muse, and abandons the grand themes of epic[343] in favour of exilic elegy, accompanied by the authority of Callimachean tradition embodied in his swan imagery.

Swans are linked not only to aging and death, but also to immortality. At the end of *Odes* 2.20, Horace states that he will elude death and live on through metamorphosis into a *canorus ales* (*Carm.* 2.20.15-16).[344] The swan's feathers, which Ovid's hair resembles in *Tristia* 4.8, link the swan to the winged immortal soul.[345] Poetic immortality is important to Ovid; in the epilogue to *Met.* 15, he announces that his poem cannot be destroyed by time (*nec edax abolere vetustas* - *Met.* 15.872) and that through it, he will live forever (*perque omnia saecula fama... vivam* - *Met.* 15.878-9). Despite his frequent references to his advanced age and death, he continues to claim to be able to escape them through his poetry. Ovid asserts that he can transcend the ravages of time (*tempus edax igitur praeter nos omnia perdet* - *Pont.* 4.10.7), in terms which echo the claim that he made in the *Metamorphoses*, and denies that his fate will be lasting death (*non solet ingeniis summa nocere dies, / famaque post cineres maior venit* - *Pont.* 4.16.2-3). Ovid thus utilises the imagery of swans and age to achieve immortality outside the control exerted over Augustan Rome.

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[343] Ovid revisits the incompatibility of age with epic elsewhere in the exile poetry, depicting himself as a latter-day Priam, a grey-haired *senior* who takes up arms with shaking hands (*induimus trepida protinus arma manu* - *Tr*. 4.1.76), evoking *Aen.* 2.509-11. Ovid's use of the word *trepidus* begs the question of whether he is trembling from age (*OLD trepidus* s.v. 4) or fear (*OLD trepidus* s.v. 1).
[344] cf. Ennius *var.* 17: *nemo me lacrimis decoret nec funera fletu / faxit. cur? volito vivo per ora virum*.
[345] cf. Plato *Phdr.* 246d.

Age and Local Colour

The Getans, among whom Ovid dwells in exile, were famous in antiquity for a specific characteristic, namely their belief in the universal immortality of the soul.[346] In *Ex Ponto* 1.5.66 Ovid refers to the *inhumanos Getas*. Since the Getae are also referred to as *duros* (*Pont.* 1.5.12) and *hirsutos* (*Pont.* 1.5.74)[347] it is easy to read *inhumanos* in its primary sense of 'uncivilised'.[348] However, read in its second sense of 'divine',[349] it recasts the question that follows, *quo mihi diversum fama contendere in orbem* (*Pont.* 1.5.67), in a new light. According to local beliefs, Ovid does not need to strive for poetic immortality with grand poetry, since immortality is open-access (although Ovid carefully emphasises in *Ex Ponto* 1.5.63-4 that he is the preeminent poet in this locale). There is a similar emphasis in *Ex Ponto* 4.13, where the Getae are referred to as *inhumanos* (*Pont.* 4.13.22)[350] when Ovid is describing his local acclaim, reiterating the fact that immortality can be achieved in Tomis without recourse to Latin poetry or to Rome.

Ovid's choice of subject for his Getan poetry is deliberate. The deification of Augustus may be unbelievable for a Roman audience, but the Getans would have no such difficulty.[351] Indeed, their approval might serve to authorise the Ovidian narrator's account (and also his claim of immortality in the *Metamorphoses*), for the

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[346] Casali 1997, 94. cf. Herodotus 4.93-6 - πρώτους αἱρέει Γέτας τοὺς ἀθανατίζοντας.
[347] These epithets evoke epic and tragedy (particularly Tragedy's unkempt hair in *Am.* 3.1), the enemies of elegy, and of *cultus*. As Barchiesi (1997, 35) comments, 'Paradoxically the Getans have become the subject matter of a type of poetry that rejects them.'
[348] *OLD* s.v. 1.
[349] *OLD* s.v. 2.
[350] *Pont.* 1.5.66, 3.5.28, 4.13.22 - *inhumanos... Getas*; *Tr.* 3.9.2 - *inhumanae... barbariae* (assimilated with the *Getae* of *Tr.* 3.9.4, and in the same sentence as an aside on belief). Getae are also epithetised as *infestos* (*Tr.* 3.14.42), *rigidos* (*Tr.* 5.1.46), *extremos* (*Tr.* 5.12.10), *duros* (*Pont.* 1.5.12, 3.2.102), *hirsutos* (*Pont.* 1.5.74, 3.5.6 (*-is*)), *saevos* (*Pont.* 4.8.84), *pellitos* (*Pont.* 4.10.2). Propertius 4.53.9 refers to *hibernique Getae*, an image which will be familiar to Ovid's readers from *Tr.* 3.8.
[351] Casali 1997, 94

Getans were 'des gens qui se veulent spécialistes de l'audelà et des questions de l'immortalité'.[352] There is, however, a further dimension to Ovid's Getan poem. Having supposedly written the poem in Getan, Ovid merely summarises it in Latin, and thereby witholds it from Rome. Instead of immortalising Augustus in poetry,[353] Ovid mentions Augustus gaining immortality via deification, a method which would be less concrete and less credible to a Roman audience. Ovid thus retains some poetic authority. He is able to achieve immortality independently of Rome, and to control his subject matter in Latin,[354] so he can deny Augustus' immortality the authorisation of his poetry.

Ovid's self-presentation as old connects the poet with authority in a manner reminiscent of the old men of the *Fasti* or the *Metamorphoses*, namely as an elderly local source of knowledge.[355] He depicts himself as a well-regarded figure in Tomis, who has found favour and recognition among the Getae (*et placui (gratare mihi) coepique poetae / inter inhumanos nomen habere Getas* - *Pont.* 4.13.21-2). Indeed, Ovid claims that he is almost a Getan poet (*faciam paene poeta Getes* - *Pont.* 4.13.18).[356] Consequently, Ovid takes on the role of the local old man who tells marvellous tales to tourists, akin to the *non vani senes* whose information is the basis of Lelex's narrative in *Met.* 8. However, the method by which he does so is transformed; rather than visitors coming to visit the place and view it as evidence,[357]

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[352] Hartog 1978, 23
[353] *Pont*. 4.8.55 - *di quoque carminibus... fiunt.* Poetic fame benefits rulers (*Pont.* 4.8.45ff.).
[354] cf. *Tr.* 3.7.47-8, where Ovid states that Caesar has no authority over his *ingenium*.
[355] Appeals to local authorities are characteristic of aetiological poetry. cf. Nicander *A.L* 30.4.
[356] This claim problematises Ovid's authority, for a Getan traditionally typified a 'old and cunnning servant deceiving his masters' (Barchiesi 1997, 38). cf. Ovid speaking Getic at *Pont.* 3.2.40.
[357] cf. *Met.* 5.258-9, 8.723-4; *Pont.* 3.2.49. In such cases, Myers (1994, 17) argues, aetiology is 'accounting for the present through past events and... simultaneously confirming these events through contemporary evidence'. Boardman (2002, 190-91) argues that the Greeks used physical relics 'to justify status and power', but that 'Intelligent Romans were not deceived about the Greek ability to attribute improbable antiquity to "antiques".' Pausanias is skeptical, preferring expert knowledge to local traditions (Paus. 1.24.8). cf. Howley 2014, 470.

Ovid sends the tale to them in Rome, removing the veneer of substantiated authority which local landmarks provided to Lelex's old men. Ovid's subject matter is as remote from Rome as Lelex's tales (although a larger proportion of Ovid's narrative is based upon his own experiences). This raises the question of whether Ovid can be numbered among *non vani senes*, an old man whose authority can be trusted. Ovid is not a true *indigenus* of Tomis; the emphasis on his age masks the fact that he has only recently arrived and begun to acquire firsthand knowledge. Moreover, like Lelex's old men, he has an ulterior motive in his reports, namely to secure his return to Rome.

In the exile poetry, Ovid's use of age as a metaphor for exilic suffering complicates its relationship with authority. Whereas in the *Metamorphoses* and *Fasti* Ovid attacks the assumption of inherent authority in age, in the *Tristia* and *Epistulae ex Ponto* age has a more ambiguous status. Ovid states that his exile-induced age causes his inability to write poetry, withholding poetic authority from the poet. However, closer interrogation reveals that age enforces Ovid's engagement with lesser themes, resulting in his recreation of the exilic poetic genre in a new form, whereby he can claim the authority of generic primacy. Exile offers perspective, increasing the authority of the exile to comment upon his homeland. Furthermore, the swan imagery linked to age emphasises that the poet has the authority of the Muse and Callimachus for his poetry. Ovid's access to poetic and Getan immortality allows him to continue to assert his poetic authority, particularly in his choice of subject matter, and also to bolster the authority of his earlier works. The poet thus gains authority from age even as he claims to lose it. Ovid's depiction of age in the exile poetry, far from substantiating his deteriorative suffering as he claims, reveals many compensations and even increases in authority, expressed in so subtle a manner as to demonstrate that his poetic ability is indisputably retained.

The Authority of Age

In ancient culture, age is attributed a high value in terms of authority, though this is tempered by its correspondingly low value where the desirable characteristics of age have been lost. Thus age as a facilitator of the acquisition of memory is a positive force, but senility and forgetfulness undermine it.

In the *Metamorphoses*, the connection between age, memory and authority is particularly prominent, for the exclusive access to the past which a lengthy lifespan offers grants unmatched authority to its possessor. However, exclusivity means that accounts are at risk from biased narrators. Moreover, memory can be fallible. With each successive retelling (required for commemoration), the vulnerability of information increases. Age as *vetustas* has dual senses of age and venerable tradition, and as a destructive force. When Ovid offers metempsychosis as an alternative to long life for increasing memory span, however, it is revealed that memories can still be flawed. The transmission of information from past to present inevitably creates uncertainty in its authority.

In the *Fasti*, age creates authoritative witnesses, for their years allow these witnesses to have seen more, and therefore to speak authoritatively about events which took place in the past. The elderly figures in the poem are repositories for tradition, providing authoritative accounts to the antiquarian Ovidian narrator. Ovid highlights the fact that over-emphasis on the authority of the past leads to pseudo-archaisation. His Janus is old enough to provide an autoptic account of primordial chaos, but is also a new month, evoking Augustus' use of age to authorise political acts. Augustus rewrites the past, silencing old men who can provide authoritative counter-accounts. Ovid notes that with the passing of time, memories of the past are eroded, so that

histories are not necessarily complete or accurate; their authority may consequently be undermined. There is also tension between age and tradition as authority for the aetiologist, and the authority of innovation espoused by Callimachus.

The exile poetry provides a contrasting narrative of age to Ovid's earlier poetry. Whilst the *Fasti* and the *Metamorphoses* undermine the accepted authority of age, the exile poetry adopts the opposite starting point, for the Ovidian narrator himself is aged, but instead of the mature authority of years, he possesses the premature sterility of exilic age. Age is a destructive force which prevents Ovid from accessing his poetic genius. However, it would be a mistake to accept this representation of the situation at face value. Not only was exile traditionally seen as beneficial to writers in giving them a valuable detached perspective, but Ovid's writing has not actually deteriorated. His supposed swan song creates a new genre in which he can claim primacy. Moreover, age for the Getans approaches immortality, allowing Ovid to establish his independence from Augustan authority and his ability to create his own poetic immortality in exile, so long as one is able to trust his account.

Thus in his poetry Ovid explores the obverse of the accepted trope of age as authority, and thereby formulates his position within tradition as part of a history of literary endeavour and as an innovator, with the authority to create as well as report.

Chapter 2: Narrative Authority and Literary Memory

Ovid uses old age as a trope for literary tradition and as a key to his interrogation of narrative authority, but another way in which poets look back at past literary tradition is by the use of 'Alexandrian footnotes';[358] that is, words and phrases that allude to literary tradition and signal to the reader the need to recollect an earlier text.[359] Ovid's self-conscious incorporation of Alexandrian footnotes into his poetry sets up an anchor in the past for his present text,[360] giving it a solid foundation. Invoking tradition to authorise one's work is not an Ovidian innovation. The practice has a long (and authorising) history, for 'whenever Greek poets did not credit their ability to craft poetry to the Muses, Apollo, or an inbuilt talent, they attributed it to what they had learned from their poetic predecessors.'[361] Pindar often uses Alexandrian footnotes rather than depending exclusively on the Muses for access to the past,[362] and is particularly explicit in using footnotes to discuss existing narrative tradition in *Isthmian* 8, where the σοφοί are poets. Poets are able to rely upon a 'Cultural, Poetic

[358] So-called by Ross (1975, 78). On Alexandrian footnotes in ancient literature, cf. Barchiesi 1993; Fantuzzi and Hunter 2004; Hebel 1989; Hinds 1995; Hinds 1998; Horsfall 1990; Miller 1982; Morrison 2011; Pasquali 1968; Ross 1975; Thomas 1993; Townshend 2015, and with particular reference to Ovid, Hinds 1997; Miller 1993; Rosati 2002; Hinds 2006; Hardie 2012.

[359] 'Alexandrian footnotes': *dicitur, fama est, ferunt, fertur, feruntur, fama ferebat, memorant, memoro, vetustas, prior edidit aetas*, forms of *notus*. Suggested additions: *constat, constabant, credunt, creditur, alii ferebant*, forms of *credere*, forms of *fides, verum, fictus*.

[360] Burrow 1999 esp. 271-2

[361] Klooster 2011, 43

cf. e.g. Ἕτερος ἐξ ἑτέρου σοφός — One poet gets his wisdom from another,
τό τε πάλαι τό τε νῦν. — Thus it was and thus it is now.
[Οὐδε γὰρ ῥᾴστον] — [For it is not easy] to find
ἀρρήτων ἐπέων πύλας — The gates to words that have never been spoken.
ἐξευρεῖν (Bacchylides *Paean.,* fr. 5 Maehler).

[362] Morrison 2011, 339. e.g. Pindar *Ol.* 6.28-30 (λέγεται); *Ol.* 7.54-56 (φαντὶ δ' ἀνθρώπων παλαιαί / ῥήσιες); *Isthm.* 8.46a-48. Morrison (2007, 88-89) argues that it is 'the narrator's own authority, built up through strong ethical statements, not the Muses, which authorizes rejections of myth' and that Pindar 'often cites tradition as the source of his narrative, with no explicit mention of the Muses'.

memory that establishes and preserves poetic traditions and enables readers and poets over ages and vast gulfs of time to communicate and commemorate.'[363] Particularly in Hellenistic poetry, 'an illustrious predecessor often steps in to teach the new poet the ropes and how to proceed... or else he verifies and ratifies the correctness of the method the new poet has followed.'[364] Thus Callimachus, whom Hutchinson differentiates from other Greek poets for the prominence of his use of sources,[365] cites Xenomedes as his authority for the story of Acontius and Cydippe, and emphasises his predecessor's comprehensiveness (ὅς ποτε πᾶσαν / νῆσον ἐνὶ μνήμῃ κάτθετο μυθολόγῳ - fr. 75 Pf.), his concern with truth (πρέσβυς ἐτητυμίῃ μεμελημένος),[366] and his age and antiquity (ἀρχαίου Ξενομήδεος). Fantuzzi and Hunter suggest that 'stressing the time gap between chronicler and poet... serves to emphasise the unbroken line of tradition upon which Callimachus... draws'.[367] However, the temporal interval may also distance the poet from his poetic predecessor, so it is not an uncomplicated emphasis. Thus Alexandrian footnotes trope the way that past poets authorise present ones.

Quintilian (*Inst.* 12.4.1-2) emphasises that command of the past grants authority to a speaker, but that what is described does not necessarily need to have actually

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[363] Klooster 2011, 34 (capitalisation original). In Hellenistic poetry 'the past did continue to possess authoritative and legitimizing functions: it remained eminently present, even if very different from the present' (Ibid., 45).
[364] Fantuzzi and Hunter 2004, 1. e.g. Callimachus *Iamb.* 1.1 - Ἀκούσαθ' Ἱππώνακτος. Morrison (2011, 330) says that Hipponax is 'a good example of... an illustrious predecessor used to authorize a particular poetic tradition and the legitimacy of the new Hellenistic addition to it'. Note Farrell's argument (2013, 223) that 'a greater appreciation of what Ovid may owe to his fellow poets... should not be allowed to obscure his debt to mythographic treatises and encyclopedias.'
[365] Hutchinson 2011, 241-42
[366] Callimachus cites witnesses (ἐπιμάρτυρες - fr. 75.48 Pf.), but refers to sources with different versions of Cean history in his summary. Körte and Händel 1960, 74ff. see this as a tongue-in-cheek underlining of the trustworthiness of narrator and narrative. Harder (2012, 634-35 ad 75.54) comments that with ἀρχαίου (usually used of very old things), Callimachus 'seems to project Xenomedes back into the mythical past of Acontius', making him seem even older, but notes that this kind of qualification 'may be used to indicate that the source is trustworthy, but it is also found in contexts which emphasize that the source is worthless.'
[367] Fantuzzi and Hunter 2004, 66

happened, since 'a memory of the past that the speaker shares with his audience has an (almost) indisputed value *per se* and thus can lend legitimacy and authority to anyone who is in control of it.'[368] The more often an exemplum is repeated, the better it is recognised and the stronger its effects; consequently wise speakers select exempla which are already part of the cultural memory that they share with their audience. Ker and Pieper argue that 'the literary canonization obviously is more important for the functioning of the *exemplum* than its historical truth: an "invented antiquity" is better than an obscure one'.[369] Perhaps a similar argument holds good for poets. Tales that have a literary pedigree and will be recognised by the reader are pre-authorised and have a more authorising effect than innovations. Though Ovid's readers will be conscious of where he has used handbooks and prose treatises, 'still more prominent sources in readers' conception of the poet's activity will be famous poets, whose presence will be obvious'.[370] These sources and authorities for the poet's work can be cited by means of Alexandrian footnotes, and the more frequently such sources are called upon, the more authoritative they become.

The term 'Alexandrian footnote' usefully emphasises the way in which such phrases mimic the citation style of the academic-poetic tradition of Callimachean-style poetry, but does not adequately encompass the Ovidian uses of such references.[371] Stephen Hinds has emphasised the range and flexibility of the tropes used by Roman poets to reflexively annotate their allusive activity,[372] including scholarly activity, distancing,

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[368] Ker and Pieper 2014, 7
[369] Ibid.
[370] Hutchinson 2011, 242
[371] Wheeler (1999, 48) objects to the term's misleading suggestion that the poet is 'employing a textual means of authenticating his story'. In his view, footnotes are based on the conventions of oral communication, and can be traced to archaic poetry.
[372] Hinds 1995, 41 - 'Certain allusions are so constructed as to carry a kind of built-in commentary, a kind of *reflexive annotation*, which underlines or intensifies their demand to be intrepreted *as* allusions.'

and metaphorising allusion with the vocabularies of memory (personal and general), time, and prophecy.[373] However, since this is the most recognised and widely-used terminology for phrases of this kind, it can be usefully employed to denote this category of reflexive annotation. Alexandrian footnotes are a nexus for authority conflict because they demand authority by referring to tradition (this may be undermined if no such tradition actually exists[374]), but ostensibly refuse to pin down so specific and definite a source as a particular eyewitness or piece of evidence. In practice, they are expected to recall a particular source,[375] and if they do not, their authority may be problematised.[376]

The function of Alexandrian footnotes has been defined by critics as being to imply doubt in or create distance from the material,[377] to allude to literary tradition, or to contribute to narrative authority by invoking sources or connected stories. In most contexts the performance of these roles is not mutually exclusive, but the last is most pertinent to the present discussion. Hinds argues that at a basic level Alexandrian footnotes should be read as meaning '"are said (sc. in tradition)," but also, specifically "are said (sc. in my literary predecessors)"'.[378] A reference to a literary predecessor elevates a tale from being merely part of general knowledge ('everybody knows...') to having the authority of specificity ('a particular poet has said'). In effect, every

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[373] Hinds 1998, 3; Townshend 2015; Wills 1996, 31. Littlewood 2006, 86 ad 257 - 'words such as *memini* and *memoro* traditionally introduce a "poetic memory" or "Alexandrian footnote" alluding to the same theme treated by an earlier poet'. cf. Conte 1986, 40-100; Miller 1992b; Hinds 1998, 1-20.
[374] Hebel 1989 - allusions may be truly intertextual or pseudointertextual.
[375] Varro attaches 'an authoritative name' (Graf 2002, 118) to each of his sources for variant *aetia* (e.g. *L.* 5.148-50).
[376] Or it may not be. Graf (Ibid., 110) argues that 'the tradition was not only open to change in point of detail: an individual poet always had the freedom to create his own myth.'
[377] cf. Horsfall (1990) on play between footnoting and distancing as constructions of the Alexandrian footnote, and Thomas' response (1993, 79) that 'Virgil, rather than referring to prose or historiographical sources, may rather be giving an *impression* of doing so.'
[378] Hinds 1995, 41

allusive text may be self-reflexively saying 'I belong in a tradition', and thus publicising its canonicity and authority.[379]

In Ovidian poetry, tradition and *fama* are not necessarily the authorities that they appear to be. Ovid's poetry contains an ongoing tension between different narrative authorities, particularly between tradition and eyewitness reports. Moreover, an Alexandrian footnote can contribute to narrative authority, but it can also have the opposite effect. Rosati sums up these oppositions as follows:

> Ovid problematizes the appeal to tradition by altering, or rather by overturning, the meaning of an attribution to the so-called 'Alexandrian footnote,' i.e., the 'bibliographical' references with which Alexandrian poets documented the source of their knowledge and so authenticated its truths... Rather than certifying the truth, however, they lead to the opposite conclusion: to declare 'it is said' or 'rumour reports' is equivalent to saying 'I have not seen it myself'.[380]

Consequently, Alexandrian footnotes can destabilise narrative authority; in fact, Ovid may use them to renounce 'the opportunity to impose a point of view that is unified, secure and authoritative'.[381]

Barchiesi points out that, 'In recognizing an allusion the reader moves backwards in time from the text she is reading towards an earlier tradition, already familiar'.[382] The reader is inverting the poetic process in which the poet works toward the new from the old. Allusion is thus a bi-directional activity, depending on one's role in the creative process. This two-way functionality also surfaces in the way that Alexandrian footnotes can be either active or passive, authorising the narrative by referring to a source work or tradition whose authority the reader will accept, but also prompting

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[379] Barchiesi 1993, 352
[380] Rosati 2002, 303
[381] Ibid., 303-4
[382] Barchiesi 1993, 333. Barchiesi also points out that a writer can create dramatic irony by referring to a character's future which is yet to occur in this narrative but has happened in the past in another.

the reader to investigate further, to 'contextualize and interpret this reference'.[383] The question then presents itself of what happens when a reader does not recognise the allusion signalled by an Alexandrian footnote. Pasquali suggests that allusions only work if the reader remembers the text being cited.[384] Do footnotes function solely on the basis of reader recollection or is this stage of reader recognition not actually required?

This chapter will explore how Ovid uses Alexandrian footnotes in his poetry to complicate and challenge narrative authority, and note the ways in which their function differs in his varied body of work. Although footnotes attempt to authorise a text by invoking the authority of sources in literary tradition, those sources are themselves often footnoted, problematised, or non-existent. This has consequences for the authority both of literary tradition and of the present text. Ovid's footnotes are not passive sign-posts to his sources, but instead play an active part in the construction and deconstruction of authority, whether through their presence or their absence.

[383] Miller 1982, 404
[384] Pasquali 1968, 275

The *Metamorphoses* and Tradition

Rosati suggests that there is a central problem to the *Metamorphoses*, namely 'tracing the contents (of a poem that, as we know, does not invoke the inspiration of the Muses) back to precise sources of knowledge, and... anchoring it to secure foundations that can act as a guarantee of truth'.[385] One method of doing so and thereby acquiring additional authority is the use of Alexandrian footnotes, which appear frequently in the *Metamorphoses*.

The Authority of *Fama*

The most prevalent footnote in the *Metamorphoses* is *ferunt*, but *fama est* is also common. Whilst any Alexandrian footnote can be pointed, those incorporating *fama* are particularly loaded, due to *fama*'s ambiguous status, simultaneously demanding and problematising authority. *Fama* in the sense of 'tradition' is an authority for what has happened in the past; *fama* is also a means through which the past can retain its existence in the present.[386] The inherent contradiction in *fama* also has a broader temporal dimension, since '*fama* may represent the claim of words faithfully to record the past, but equally it stands for the power of words to create a world that has no extratextual reality.'[387] In order to understand Alexandrian footnotes involving *fama*, it is first necessary to examine the ecphrasis of the House of Fama in *Metamorphoses* 12, which is a *locus* for conceptions of *fama* throughout the poem.

In the Fama ecphrasis, Ovid provides an extended characterisation of *fama*, both as a source of knowledge and as a generator of exaggeration and lies, which is

[385] Rosati 2002, 291
[386] Hardie (2009, 557) comments on how '*Fama* as tradition, or as fame, can only introduce an analepsis, but *fama* as report or rumour can also introduce a prolepsis, of a kind.'
[387] Hardie 2012, 8

programmatic for the rest of the poem,[388] since as Brown points out, it 'may be read not only as evoking rumour in general, but also the production and dissemination of literary works'.[389] The ecphrasis depicts the House of Fama as containing a crowd of true and false stories (*mixtaque cum veris commenta* - *Met.* 12.54),[390] recalling the brief description of Fama in *Met.* 9.138-9 (*quae veris addere falsa / gaudet et e minimo sua per mendacia crescit*) prior to her false tale of Hercules' fidelity.[391] Deianira's downfall is her mistaken belief in this false rumour (*credit* - *Met.* 9.141), and in *Met.* 12 Credulitas is located in the House of Fama, alongside Error and Whispers from a dubious source (*dubioque auctore Susurri* - *Met.* 12.61).[392] It seems reasonable to identify these whispers with Alexandrian footnotes, which claim either *fama* or no explicitly stated source. The unreliability which characterises Fama points to an innate potential for instability and unreliability in footnotes. Moreover, the ecphrasis reinforces Alexandrian footnotes' ability to provide interpretative commentary upon narrative authority.

The representation of *fama* is particularly influential for the Alexandrian footnotes in the narration of Nestor later in *Met.* 12, despite the fact that Fama truthfully makes known the arrival of the Greeks at the beginning of the episode (*Met.* 12.64).[393] Nestor's narrative contains five Alexandrian footnotes, including two which cite *fama*

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[388] Wheeler 1999, 143 n. 157

[389] Brown 1999, 23. cf. Zumwalt 1977, 212.

[390] Tissol (1997, 87) suggests that this 'calls attention to the questionable nature of narrative authority, whether one may choose to question Ovid's, or that of his predecessors, or both'.

[391] cf. Fama in *Aen.* 4.188-90, which is said to speak truth and falsehood. References to authoritative Fama at *Met.* 15. 3 and 15.58.

[392] Papaioannou (2007, 47-48) sees this as Ovid acknowledging 'his embrace of source manipulation as a fundamental narrative strategy throughout'.

[393] Hardie (2009, 559) argues that the Virgilian Fama's multiple visual and auditory organs give her 'something like the omniscience of Jupiter'. Feldherr (2014, 26) suggests that Fama never stops speaking, for 'Since there is no corresponding ending point to what she reports, *Fama* becomes at once the source and the voice of Ovid's poem from here on, a fact that invites the reader simultaneously to measure the truth criterion of history against the aim of glorification that motivates epic and to locate Ovid's narrative within the figurative murmur of competive, and repetitive, voices that make up *Fama*.'

as their source (*fama ferebat* - *Met.* 12.197 and 200).[394] These footnotes perform a number of roles. Nestor uses them to transparently demarcate a section of his narrative which he did not personally witness and hence cannot authorise. However, this lack of witnesses means that *fama*'s accuracy is impossible to corroborate, and Davis suggests that Ovid 'makes Nestor draw attention to the story's implausibility by having him cite as his authority nothing more than a rumour (*fama ferebat* - *Met.* 12.197, 200)'.[395] The footnotes also function on a metaliterary level; the story of Caeneus is mentioned earlier in the *Metamorphoses*, including the sex change element which is footnoted here (*iam non femina Caeneus* - *Met.* 8.305). By using a footnote to refer to the earlier account, Ovid intratextually authorises the later narrative. Caeneus also has a pedigree in literary tradition, contrary to the newness which his name appears to claim;[396] he may be a novelty to Nestor's audience (*monstri novitate moventur* - *Met.* 12.175), but not to Ovid's readers.[397] Even his change of sex has previously been mentioned at *Aeneid* 6.448. Nestor's tale is presented as an expansion of a 'Kiemzelle'[398] in tradition, claiming the authority of that tradition for itself. However, Caeneus is a mere name in Homer, and the transformation of this into the *Metamorphoses*' narrative of more than 300 lines is perhaps straining the limits of the authority which the tradition invoked by the *fama* footnotes can provide. The Fama ecphrasis (which itself develops Virgil's description of Fama) exemplifies how stories are expanded and transformed anew in *fama* (*mensuraque ficti / crescit, et auditis*

[394] *Met.* 12.197, 200, 264, 332 and 522-3.
[395] Davis 2008, 432
[396] Bömer 1982, 64 ad 12.168-209. cf. Austin 1977, 161 ad 6.448.
[397] Austin (1977, 161 ad 448) suggests his metamorphosis is an Ovidian innovation, but Reed (2013, 400 ad 168-535) states that 'La sua trasformazione in un uccello è attestata per la prima volta in Ovidio... per quanto senza dubbio risalga alla letteratura greca anteriore.'
[398] Ludwig 1965, 64.

aliquid novus adicit auctor[399] - *Met.* 12.57-8), prompting Hardie to assert that this line is 'an unveiled definition of the dynamic of a literary tradition.'[400] The phrase *novus auctor* encompasses a wide range of authority levels, for it can describe 'the producer of a text, the guarantor of a pre-existing information, or the latecomer who brings a little something new to add to the series of fictions'.[401] The *auctor* 'è insieme l'ultima «fonte» della diceria e «colui che incrementa» la misura di falsità e di novità'.[402] Feldherr rightly notes that '*Fama* moves further and further away from the real events she describes, not only in time but in accuracy,'[403] as each new addition to a tale increases its proportion of falsehood. In the course of its transformation from a name in Homer into Nestor's lengthy account Caeneus' tale has had a great deal added to it in this way, as the *fama* footnotes acknowledge.[404] The second footnote also enacts this process of augmentation, for in it Nestor adds the word *eadem* to the footnote he has just used. We hear the same rumour and the same footnote, yet as the House of Fama demonstrates, *fama* never remains constant, but is perpetually changing. If the new *auctor* is to be distrusted for his additions, what of the authority of the original? The House of Fama suggests that a source may be dubious (*dubioque auctore Susurri* - *Met.* 12.61) and that tradition or *fama* is not necessarily a trustworthy authority.

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[399] On Fama and growth, cf. *Aen.* 4.176-7 and *Met.* 9.137-9. *Auctor* derives from *augeo* - 'to increase' (*Schol. Bern. Verg. Georg.* 1.27; Benveniste 1973, 420), so the author is by definition an augmentor of existing tradition. Ovid plays on the same etymology when he reduces the *Amores* from five to three books (McKeown 1989, 5 ad 1-2). Marincola (1997, 14) argues that 'the goal of ancient composition was not to strike out boldly in a radical departure from one's predecessors, but rather to be incrementally innovative within a tradition, by embracing the best in previous performers and adding something of one's own'. cf. Tarrant's 'collaborative interpolation' concept (1989, 137), where 'the reader seems to take on the role of a co-author who revises, expands, or varies the text, not because it appears defective or obscure but simply because it allows for further elaboration'.

[400] Hardie 2012, 157. It is also an excellent guide to the *Metamorphoses*, a poem concerned with new bodies and changed shapes (*Met.* 1.1-2). *Novus auctor* could refer to 'the most recent authority' or to 'the innovating author'.

[401] Barchiesi 2002, 196

[402] Reed 2013, 388 ad 57

[403] Feldherr 2014, 27

[404] Ziogas (2010, 297) dubs it 'an extreme case of the new author's additions'.

There is another significant use of a *fama* footnote in *Met.* 10, where Ovid embarks upon the myth of Orpheus in the Underworld. So powerful is the bard's song, Ovid states, that the dead cease their toil and the Eumenides are overcome by (the) song and weep. It is in this poetically charged context that the footnote is found, and its collocation with *carmine* in *Met.* 10.45 further encourages a metapoetic interpretation, based on the role of *fama* as tradition. This story has an obvious precedent in *Georgics* 4.81, though as Hill points out, 'Everything that Virgil omits, Ovid dwells upon and everything that Virgil concentrates on, Ovid changes or omits.'[405] Immediately prior to the footnote, Ovid fails to include Cerberus in his narrative, but adds Tantalus, Tityos, the Danaids and Sisyphus where Virgil has only Ixion.[406] This lengthy list has generated a range of critical responses; Bömer draws attention to it ('Wo für Vergil der Name Ixion stellvertretend für alle klassischen Büßer der Unterwelt steht, bringt Ovid den ganzen Katalog'),[407] and Frécaut condemns it as tasteless augmentation of the 'plus discret' Virgilian version ('l'amplification d'une notation virgilienne frôle le comique et le mauvais goût').[408] Why then does Ovid make this inclusion, and mark it with an obvious reference to tradition? By alluding so overtly to Virgil, Ovid compels the reader to consider the concept of selectivity in tradition and the proposition that *fama* may be incomplete. Ovid not only lengthens Virgil's list of sinners, but makes an entirely new addition to tradition, the weeping of the Eumenides.[409] The novelty of this addition is accentuated by the use of *primum*, which asserts the primacy of the story and could modify *victarum carmine* and

[405] Hill 1992, 125
[406] Ibid., 128
[407] Bömer 1980, 26 ad 42
[408] Frécaut 1972, 245
[409] Reed 2013, 176 ad 45-6 - 'la storia non è altrimenti attestata'.

suggest 'priorità rispetto a qualche altra loro sconfitta',[410] such as the Furies' suppression at the end of Aeschylus' *Eumenides*. The footnote highlights both the authoritative tradition which Ovid is drawing upon for this story, and the capacity of *fama* to embrace perpetual growth and innovation.[411] In a context where Ovid is dramatically overblowing the power of poetry (especially its effect on the Eumenides, who 'should, by definition, be tearless'[412]), *fama est* has particular significance, for it reminds the reader of the power which poetry or *fama* exerts over audiences.

Alexandrian footnotes appear with notable frequency in *Met.* 15, where one might expect fewer footnotes (or at least for footnotes to apply to actual historians) as Ovid moves into the realms of written history as opposed to myth.[413] At the beginning of *Met.* 15, *fama* is described as *praenuntia veri*, and immediately before Pythagoras' speech as *certa... fama* (*Met.* 15.58). How does this *fama* relate to the unreliable *fama* of *Met.* 12, and is it really a sure authority? One tale that is directly attributed to *fama* in Pythagoras' narrative (*fama est* - *Met.* 15.356) is the story of the feathered men in Pallene, for which there is no literary precedent.[414] Pythagoras dismisses the story (*haud equidem credo* - *Met.* 15.359), though he adds a similar story about Scythian women, again marked with a footnote (*memorantur* - *Met.* 15.360). The tale appears

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[410] Ibid. ad 45-6
[411] Segal (1972, 481) suggests that 'Ovid's self-conscious *fama est* shows his awareness of the strangeness of the scene.'
[412] Anderson 1972, 479 ad 45-7
[413] It also seems ironic that the Muses are not invoked until Ovid reaches an era for which written historical sources are available (Feeney 1991, 209; Barchiesi 1997, 188). Barchiesi (1991, 5) comments that the Muses 'only make an entrance when there is no longer any need for them, when for once the subject-matter is history, recent, official and well-documented history'. Granobs (1997, 83) suggests that their redundant inclusion is intended to make metamorphosis more believable in historical times ('So wird an dieser Stelle noch einmal die mythische Vergangenheit beschworen, in der ein phantastisches Geschehen wie eine Verwandlung stattfinden kann, ohne daß man es rational hinterfragen wollte.').
[414] Haupt, Ehwald and von Albrecht 1966, 450 ad 356-417 - 'Die beiden folgenden Wunder werden in den uns erhaltenen Sammlungen von παράδοξα nicht erwähnt'; Hardie 2015, 528 ad 356-60 - 'Non ci sono testimonianze precedenti per il fenomeno descritto ai vv. 356-7'; Hill 2000a, 213 ad 357. Dubious growth of feathers is footnoted with *fama est* in *Am.* 1.8.13-5.

to be pure Ovidian invention, footnoted for spurious authorisation purposes. Myers argues that the concentration of footnotes here enhances 'the properly objective tone of Pythagoras' "scientific discourse"',[415] but Beagon dismisses them as 'half-hearted passing references to isolated third-party authorities of a distinctly vague and unconvincing nature', despite the fact that 'the citation of multiple sources for the enhancement of authority in the case of what were often tales based solely upon literary sources'[416] was a common technique in paradoxographical literature. The story which Pythagoras attributes to *fama*, and declines to authorise since he does not believe it, is exactly the kind of tale which abounds in the preceding fourteen books of the *Metamorphoses*. The footnotes thus deauthorise the tales of the poet as well as those to which they are directly appended. Just as Ovid undermines Pythagoras' authority at the beginning of his narrative (*Met.* 15.72-4), so Pythagoras' use of footnotes problematises the reader's acceptance of Ovidian authority. As Jones notes, 'Each comments on the other's material in terms of disbelief.'[417]

The rising of Rome in *Met.* 15.431 is footnoted with *fama est*. Though *Met.* 15.433 (*haec igitur formam crescendo mutat*) refers to Rome, the footnote recalls *Met.* 12 where Fama was discussed in similar terms (*mensuraque ficti / crescit* - *Met.* 12.57-8) and where *fama*'s authority was problematised. The 'densa concentrazione di parole connesse a tradizione, memoria e autorità' in these lines encourages a metapoetic view, serving as 'un tentativo di autenticare il passato che in modo ironico rende relativa questa narrazione del fato'.[418] Lamacchia suggests that 'il poeta, sotto pretesto di offire una garanzia di obiettività al proprio racconto, prevenendo il sospetto della

[415] Myers 1994, 140
[416] Beagon 2009, 293
[417] Jones 2005, 12. Ovid acknowledges that his metamorphoses may be incredible at *Tr.* 2.64.
[418] Hardie 2015, 539 ad 431-52

propria invenzione, distanzia tuttavia la notizia e non nasconde quanto questa fama sia lontana da incondizionata fiducia.'[419] However, the memory footnote, *quantum recordor* (*Met.* 15.436), which falls in the same line as *ferunt*, seems to qualify the wholehearted acceptance of the authority of *fama* here. Unlike boundless *fama*, Pythagoras' memory is limited by *quantum*, despite his claim to speak from his mindful memory (*mente memor refero* - *Met.* 15.451). This acknowledgement of limitations 'vuole aggiungere autorevolezza al racconto, ma in realtà risponde all'esigenza razionalistica del poeta di corredare di particolari realistici la sua narrazione.'[420] Once again *fama est* makes the authority of the narrative ambiguous. As Rosati states, 'The frequent invocation in the poem of *fama* and of the *uetustas* of a tradition has an ambiguous outcome: while it is sometimes intended as a guarantee of credibility, at other times it emphasizes the *in*credibility of what has been narrated.'[421]

Memory and Forgetting

The other major trope of allusion via Alexandrian footnotes is memory. Memory has an innate backward reach and draws on both the authority of the past and the authority of the present, for those who remember something now were eyewitnesses of it in the past.[422] However, memory can be faulty, and this has the potential to undermine its authority.[423]

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[419] Lamacchia 1960, 316
[420] Lamacchia 1960, 316
[421] Rosati 2002, 299
[422] Libby (2015, 76) - 'it is important to recognize that memory, like allusion, ensures continuity because it also works both backwards and forwards in time'.
[423] Miller (1994, 476) discusses how memory-related reflexive annotation in Pythagoras' speech comments upon literary allusion, pointing out that the strong emphasis upon *memoria* and Pythagoras' grand claims thereof are undercut by the faultiness of Pythagoras' memory of how he died in his previous incarnation as Euphorbus. Pythagoras' account also alters the traditional location of Aeneas

Nestor aims to activate the authorising power of footnotes through repeated references to his memory in *Met.* 12.182-8.[424] Ziogas sees the emphasis on memory as aligning him with the Muses;[425] it is hence an authorising measure akin to the use of memory words as Alexandrian footnotes.[426] However, the authority of Nestor's memory is sometimes ambiguous; like *fama* footnotes, memory transmission is linked to the untrustworthy voices of the House of Fama,[427] for memory can also add to an original account. When Tlepolemus challenges Nestor's authority on the basis that Nestor has left out information which was present in Hercules' account (*certe mihi saepe referre / nubigenas domitos a se pater esse solebat* - *Met.* 12.540-1),[428] he uses the verb *referre* which also denotes Nestor's narrative (*Pylio referente* - *Met.* 12.537), and hence aligns the two as competing versions of tradition whose authority must be assessed. Although both Nestor and Hercules are named sources, Nestor is also a paradigm for old men more generally, while Hercules is not actually present, but is merely cited by Tlepolemus as his source for the tale (and an alternative eyewitness to Nestor). Thus their transmission of stories bears a close resemblance to footnotes; 'my father used to tell', or 'the old Pylian relates' is not so very different from 'I was told this by reliable old men' (*Met*. 8.721-2).[429] Tlepolemus' counter-citation has problematic authority. The descriptions of the centauromachy in *Iliad* 1.264, *Odyssey* 21.295-8, and Pseudo-Hesiod's *Shield* 178-90 do not mention Hercules, and Diodorus

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and Helenus' conversation (Buthrotum - *Aen.* 3.393) to allow Pythagoras-Euphorbus to witness it. The account's unreliability is flagged by Pythagoras' disclaimer, *quantumque recordor* - *Met.* 15.436, 'un dettaglio pungente' (Barchiesi 1989, 84), since it bookends with Pythagoras' closing remark, *mente memor refero* (*Met.* 15.451), which seems to imply his reliability.

[424] Musgrove 1998, 226-29

[425] Ziogas 2010, 297

[426] At *Met.* 12.540, Nestor objects to being made to recall (*meminisse*), which could be a complaint about having to footnote or justify his narrative.

[427] Galinsky (2015, 8) - 'Neither autobiographic nor collective/cultural memories are static. Rather, they keep evolving and adding new layers, which can be contradictory.'

[428] Ziogas (2010, 298) argues that by leaving out what is important, Nestor minimises Hercules even when he talks about him; that is, 'He turns a footnote into the main text and the main text into a footnote.'

[429] cf. the interchangeable old men at *Met.* 11.751 and 15.10.

Siculus describes two separate battles between the Lapiths and the Centaurs, one involving Heracles (4.12.3-7) and no wedding, and the other involving the wedding of Pirithous (4.70.3-4).[430] The footnoting of alternative traditions in the accounts of Nestor and Hercules illustrates how even an apparently authoritative narrative may suppress other traditions.

This is played out in Alexandrian footnotes, which inherently indicate that the account being told is not the only version available. This kind of footnote encourages the reader to look to tradition not only for authorisation, but also for disauthorisation. The last footnote in Nestor's speech is *alii... ferebant* (*Met.* 12.522-3, which invokes the authority of Apollonius' description of the same events:[431]

> Καινέα γὰρ ζῶόν περ ἔτι κλείουσιν ἀοιδοὶ
> Κενταύροισιν ὀλέσθαι, ὅτε σφέας οἷος ἀπ᾽ ἄλλων
> ἤλασ᾽ ἀριστήων: οἱ δ᾽ ἔμπαλιν ὁρμηθέντες
> οὔτε μιν ἐγκλῖναι προτέρω σθένον, οὔτε δαΐξαι:
> ἀλλ᾽ ἄρρηκτος ἄκαμπτος ἐδύσετο νειόθι γαίης,
> θεινόμενος στιβαρῇσι καταΐγδην ἐλάτῃσιν. (*Argonautica* 1.59-62)

This connection is strengthened by the fact that Nestor's footnote, *alii ferebant*, re-renders a footnote in the source passage, κλείουσιν ἀοιδοὶ.[432] It is not clear which ἀοιδοὶ Apollonius is citing, and his account differs in certain details from the extant sources,[433] revealing that the supposedly authoritative precedent for Ovid has its own less than authoritative sources, though these are perhaps more specific than Nestor's *alii*, being limited to ἀοιδοὶ. In the *Metamorphoses* the assumption that bards can be

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[430] Hercules more conventionally battles against the centaurs in Arcadia as in *Met.* 9.191-2 than in Thessaly as in *Met.* 12 (Williams 2009a, 161).
[431] The Tartarus reference makes it 'at once obvious that Ovid is alluding to... Apollonius' (Smith 1997, 75).
[432] Ibid., 76 - 'Ovid transforms Apollonius' κλείουσιν ἀοιδοὶ into *alii... ferebant*, presumably including in his *alii* Apollonius himself.'
[433] The catalogue of Lapiths in *Shield* 178ff. mentions the Centaurs fighting Caeneus and Mopsus with fir trees (ἐλάτῃς). Hesiodic fragments also seem to describe Caeneus being crushed by trees (fr. 83.16-8 M-W, fr. 88 M-W), cf. Ziogas 2013, 187-88.

trusted is challenged.[434] It might also be argued that the doubling of footnotes increases the distance between the event and the reader, weakening the authority of the footnoted version in the *Metamorphoses.* The reference is immediately rejected by Mopsus (*abnuit Ampycides* - *Met.* 12.524) and, by implication, by Nestor too. Mopsus' account of what he saw (*pariterque animo est oculisque secutus* - *Met.* 12.529) is universally accepted because of its source (*credita res auctore suo est* - *Met.* 12.532).[435] Authoritative sources are important.[436] An eyewitness account is preferred over hearsay,[437] even though Nestor is asking his audience to accept his own report.

Thus the plethora of Alexandrian footnotes in the *Metamorphoses* has a mixed effect upon narrative authority. While footnotes can anchor tales to a past source, invoking the authority of literary tradition, they also display a fundamental fragility. *Fama* footnotes bear the full implications of the inherent duality of *fama*; they can cite reliable report or insubstantial (or false) rumour. Footnotes may refer back to a source which does not exist, or which is so insignificant as to barely substantiate the Ovidian version. Authorial additions are another characteristic of *fama*. Given the unreliability

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[434] *Met.* 15.879 summarises questions of reliability from throughout the poem. cf. *Met.* 15.283; *Am.* 3.12.41-2; Aristotle *Po.* 1460a19.

[435] Nestor is demonstrating how he wishes his own audience of Greeks to respond. But at whom are footnotes directed? Footnoted material goes unchallenged by internal audiences in the *Met.* Are these audiences more literarily naive, than, for example, the narrators of the *Heroides*, who actively engage with their previous intertextual incarnations, or Ariadne in *Fa.* 3.471-6 remembering Catullus 64 (Hinds 1998, 3-4)?

[436] cf. *Met.* 13.218, where Agamemnon can defend his orders to withdraw because of their source. *Met.* 12.522 and 532 particularly recall *Met.* 12.419 (*auctor in incerto est*), where Davis (2008, 442) notes the ambiguous meaning of *auctor*, which could refer to the javelin-thrower, or to 'the guarantor of the truth of the narrator's claim', and almost quotes *Aen.* 12.320. cf. *Fa.* 6.435 *(auctor in incerto, res est Romana*), which is preceded by *ferunt*, and which, though usually understood as meaning that the thief is uncertain, could also be interpreted as 'the source is uncertain'.

[437] The identity of the *auctor* fully realises its authority only when it incorporates Mopsus' literary heritage in the same tradition whose footnote was rejected. Antiphanes suggests that a mere mention could conjure a character's literary heritage into the reader's mind (ὥσθ' ὑπομνῆσαι μόνον / δεῖ τὸν ποητήν· Οἰδίπουν γὰρ ἂν μόνον / φῶ, τἄλλα πάντ' ἴσασιν - *CAF* 11.191.4-6) and here the Alexandrian footnote evokes the authority of Apollonius' Mopsus, who is an expert in the interpretation of bird signs (*Argonautica* 3.545ff.) and thus ideally qualified to pronounce on a Caenian bird.

of personal memory, it is unsurprising that Alexandrian footnotes, which can have a remembering function, suffer from a similar issue. In the *Metamorphoses*, footnotes draw attention to narrative authority. Pythagoras and the Ovidian narrator exchange comments on the reliability of their respective accounts. Moreover, as much of the *Metamorphoses* is Ovid's own invention,[438] footnotes can be spuriously appended to tales which have no basis in literary tradition or which have been so transformed in *fama* as to bear little resemblance to their authorising source.

[438] Feeney 1991, 225 - 'As the (virtually) sole acknowledged originator of his fifteen book world, Ovid sports ceaselessly with his power to command or suspend our credence in his fictions.'

The *Fasti* and its Sources

Whereas at the beginning of the *Metamorphoses* Ovid calls upon the gods to inspire what he has begun, at the beginning of the *Fasti* Ovid declares that he will relate *sacra... annalibus eruta priscis* (*Fa.* 1.7).[439] The two works might thus appear to have very different authorisation strategies, but Hutchinson takes a more cohesive view, reading the *Metamorphoses* and the *Fasti* symbiotically, as engaging in interplay between scholarly references and epic-style Alexandrian footnotes. He suggests that the *Fasti* 'makes the reader of the *Metamorphoses* all the more aware of the Callimachus-like scholarly and intellectual work behind both poems but overtly cloaked in one by epic annotation.'[440] Ovid places his sources at the centre of his aetiological poem from the outset. Indeed, the phrase *sacra... annalibus eruta priscis* itself functions as an Alexandrian footnote, since *annalibus* could point to specific sources,[441] such as the *Annales* of Ennius or Accius, or the *Annales Maximi*, but might also be 'attempting to establish a suitably solemn and erudite tone to his work',[442] which will contribute to the poet's authority by presenting him as a well-qualified writer. Referring to sources is complicated even at this early stage, for critics differ as to whether to accept such references as serious authorities. Whilst Green interprets *Fasti* 1.7 as a claim to 'serious antiquarian research',[443] Bömer suggests that, 'Der antiquarische Tenor ist beinahe zu stark betont. - Das will trotzdem nicht sagen, daß Ovid nach Art moderner oder auch nur antiker Wissenschaftler älteste Quellen

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[439] cf. *Fa.* 4.11 - *tempora cum causis, annalibus eruta priscis*.
[440] Hutchinson 2011, 241
[441] *Eruta* may point to Varro *L.* 6.2 - *quae obruta vetustate ut potero eruere conabor.* cf. Bömer 1958, 8 ad 7 - 'Ovid könnte seinen Gebrauch unmittelbar aus varronischen Gedanken entlehnt haben.'
[442] Green 2004a, 35 ad 7. cf. Cicero *Mur.* 16. Le Bonniec 1961, 24 ad 7 - '*priscis* implique une nuance de vénération pour le passé.'
[443] Green 2004a, 35 ad 7

studiert habe.'[444] Depicting himself as a scholar who references properly is one technique which Ovid uses to authorise his narrative.[445] The presence of Alexandrian footnotes suits the learned persona which he is attempting to project.

Despite this initial commitment to sources and scholarly research, Ovid refrains from explicitly naming his literary sources other than at *Fasti* 3.87-96, 3.844 and 6.59-63; the majority of his named sources are the human and divine eyewitnesses whom the poet interviews.[446] Ovid does, however, attribute much of his knowledge to unspecific past sources by means of Alexandrian footnotes. Lowrie sees a contrast in approach towards research in the *Fasti* and the *Metamorphoses*, saying that, 'While the *Fasti* exposes with great fanfare the research that has gone into the poem's production, the *Metamorphoses* confines this aspect decorously to the Alexandrian footnote. The *Fasti* produces authority for the poet as a researcher and writer, while the *Metamorphoses* assumes it through song.'[447] Whilst it is true that Ovid makes much of his scholarship in the *Fasti*, a major way in which he does so is by the use of Alexandrian footnotes. Despite its shorter length, the *Fasti* contains roughly as many footnotes as the *Metamorphoses*. Lowrie is perhaps right, however, to note the differing character of the Ovidian narrator in the two works, though her statement that the 'almost manic exposition of sources pervading the *Fasti* contrasts further with the cool assumption of authority in the *Metamorphoses*'[448] underplays the evident concern of the narrator in the *Metamorphoses* to establish (or undermine) authority.

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[444] Bömer 1958, 8 ad 7
[445] Ovid occasionally makes references to the process of research. Harries (1989, 168) argues that these 'support the appeal to antiquity as an authenticating source'.
[446] By referring to different types of source, Ovid compares their authority. However, Le Bonniec (1961, 9) contends that 'Il trouvai chez Varron, Verrius et Tite-Live toute la documentation dont il avait besoin... On n'imagine pas Ovid accumulant les fiches, comme Pline l'Ancien'. Ovid is not a true antiquarian, but a user of literary tradition.
[447] Lowrie 2009, 202
[448] Ibid., 203

The narrator of the *Fasti* appears to be less an inspired *vates* (although his vatic status is significant) and more a researcher and antiquarian, and thus his sources intersect with his authority differently. The Alexandrian footnote is part of a wider strategy of self-authorisation in the *Fasti*, demonstrating that the Ovidian narrator has done his research.

My Calendar and Other Footnoted Sources (Or the Lack Thereof)

Ovid's *Fasti* has a prominent (and ever-present) source, the Julian calendar.[449] As Wheeler notes, 'Ovid exploits the tension between his calendar and the official calendar' and invites the reader to draw comparisons between them.[450] Moreover, using footnotes in the *Fasti* draws attention to the fact that 'the Roman calendar itself never consisted of a single authoritative text.'[451] Rather, when Ovid is writing, the Roman calendar has just received its most recent modification in a long series of calendar reforms (mentioned in *Fasti* 1.14 - *quoscumque sacris addidit ille dies*). Consequently, the *Fasti* displays 'a heightened awareness both of its own revised status and of the process of revision to which its calendar model has been repeatedly subjected' and 'cannot help but comment on the history of the calendar's reform'.[452] Despite being inscribed in stone, the Roman calendar had never been mono-

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[449] Le Bonniec 1961, 8 - 'il va de soi que les fastes officiels sont à la base de son travail'. Wheeler (1999, 45) comments that 'Ovid's *Fasti* was based on one of the most familiar written documents displayed publicly in Rome and local Italian cities', and Wallace-Hadrill (1987, 227) suggests that 'Any contemporary seeing Ovid's new poem would find an image vividly evoked of the sort of public monument he would meet in the forum at Praeneste'. This recognition, according to Quintilian's argument for the authority of familiarity, would help to authorise the *Fasti*. In Augustan Rome *fasti* 'denotes not only the annual calendar but also the list of eponymous chief magistrates, the elected officials (usually consuls) who gave their names to the year and enabled orientation in past time' (Feeney 2007, 167). Both types of *fasti* are authorities who ordain the course of the year. *Fasti* are traditionally commemorative, as people give their names to days. cf. *Odes* 4.14.3-4, where Horace asks how Rome will immortalise Augustus' virtues (*per titulos memoresque fastos*).
[450] Wheeler 1999, 45. This is particularly evident at *Fa.* 1.11-12.
[451] Martelli 2013, 111
[452] Ibid., 104

authoritative.[453] When Ovid uses Alexandrian footnotes to invoke the authority of the past, particularly when he refers directly to past calendars (*Fa.* 3.87-96, 3.844 and 6.59-6),[454] he is invoking a more fluid authority (albeit one endorsed by previous custom), namely the authority of a successor to transform and update the calendar to create his own authoritative version. Feeney comments that 'Ovid shows how aware he is of the differences between the old and new calendars, and also of the way that this annotation of the *fasti* is something that will continue on into the future, with each succeeding generation.'[455] An anti-Augustan might also see Ovid's *Fasti* as an assertion of the poet's authority over the calendar in the face of Augustan calendrical reform, for the poem does not include the months which Augustus added to the calendar.[456]

The changeable nature of so apparently definitive a source as the calendar provides a clue that other sources will prove similarly elusive. The Alexandrian footnotes in the *Fasti* reflect this uncertainty; they can contribute to the authority of a narrative, but may also undermine it. Whilst it is not necessarily true to say that a narrative is only as authoritative as the source it cites, the citation does have a perceptible effect upon the narrative's authority. In *Fasti* 5.601, Ovid notes from 'sure authorities' (*non dubiis auctoribus*) that the summer begins. Myers interprets this as an example of Ovid using 'traditional formulae to authenticate his narrative'.[457] However, doubt

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[453] Salzman 1991, 7. The Augustan reformation of the calendar makes it for the first time a reliable means of measuring time. cf. Green 2004b, 224. Approximately fifty festivals had been added to the public *fasti* by Augustus' death.
[454] This reference occurs in the narration of Juno, whose status as record-holder makes her references to the past authoritative.
[455] Feeney 2007, 187
[456] Ovid's song *ad mea tempora* may be an assertion of Ovid's era against Augustus' era (as compared with the exile poetry, which accepts Caesar's *tempora*) (Ibid., 143). McKeown (1984, 177) prefers to ignore political implications, arguing that 'the *Fasti* as a whole was inspired primarily by the literary tradition.'
[457] Myers 1994, 93

about that authentication creeps in with the question of the idenity of those *auctores*. Do reliable authorities in literary tradition tell Ovid that this is when summer begins, or is Ovid referring to the stars themselves as reliable indicators of the start of summer? Ovid's reference to a source here serves as an Alexandrian footnote; the rising of the Pleiades may allude to Aratus' description of the setting Pleiades as a sign of winter (Arat. 1066 and 1085), and use the correspondence of the two seasonal changes to authorise Ovid's own account. Gee suggests, however, that *non dubiis auctoribus* could be interpreted as 'referring, with some levity, to the opposition between literary and pragmatic tradition'.[458] She cites *Arati Phaenomena* 32-3 (translating Arat. 259-61), in which Cicero 'develops Aratus' distinction between tradition and perception into what seems like a comment on the role of the literary tradition in shaping how the *vulgus* perceives the stars, following Homer and Hesiod rather than their own observation'.[459] Given the strong emphasis in Ovid's *Fasti* on reader observation of the stars (including at *Fasti* 5.599 - *aspicies*), one wonders whether Ovid intends his audience to prioritise tradition or observation, to privilege poets or sight. Gee argues that read through a Ciceronian filter, one might interpret *Fasti* 5.601 as suggesting that 'for reliance on the Pleiades as a meteorological sign, there is no need of reference to the *dubii auctores* belonging to a poetic tradition.'[460]

Supposedly authorising Alexandrian footnotes can refer to sources which problematise or undermine the authority of a tale. An example of this appears at *Fasti* 5.116, where Ovid relates a tale about Jupiter's concealment in the woods as a babe, footnoting it with *dicitur*. To what literary source might the footnote refer? Both Aratus and Callimachus offer stories about the birth of Zeus, but Ovid makes the

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[458] Gee 2000, 197
[459] Ibid.
[460] Ibid.

footnote more selective by preceding it with a statement of Amalthea's renown on Cretan Ida (*Cretaea nobilis Ida* - *Fa.* 5.115). Amalthea has this fame through the writings of Callimachus, and the references to Crete at *Fasti* 5.115 and 118 (*Dictaeos... greges*) securely tie the Ovidian version to its Callimachean source.[461] However, Ovid switches between the Aratean and the Callimachean version of the story of Zeus' birth.[462] *Dicitur* is 'directing us back to compare the Callimachean and Ovidian versions',[463] and hence invokes the poet who most problematises the authority of this story.[464] Indeed, *Cretaea* in *Fasti* 5.115 refers specifically to the point at issue, namely that Callimachus states that Cretans who lay claim to Zeus' birthplace cannot be trusted because the god says that Cretans are liars (Κρῆτες ἀεὶ ψεῦσται - *Hymn* 1.8).[465] This sentence is a quotation from Epimenides, who creates the famous paradox by being Cretan. As Barchiesi states, 'the authority that Callimachus's text derives from the past has the effect of endangering his own credibility, and exposes the connection between fiction, tradition, and antiquarian research.'[466] According to Callimachus' *Hymn* 1.60-1, poets are liars and make spurious claims about Zeus' acquisition of the realm of heaven (δηναιοὶ δ' οὐ πάμπαν

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[461] Boyd 2000, 73

[462] *Ab Iove surgat opus* (*Fa.* 5.111) echoes ἐκ Διὸς ὀρχώμεσθα (Aratus *Phaen.* 1); *Olenia* (*Fa.* 5.113) derives from Aratus (Ωλενιή Αἴξ - *Phaen.* 679), and Gee (2000, 129) points out that the Romans 'seem to have seen it as a sort of Aratean "signature"; Ovid is no exception.' cf. Kidd 1997, 41. Amalthea derives from Callimachus. Both Callimachus and Aratus are concerned with the issue of authority (εἰ ἐτεὸν δή, / Κρήτηθεν in *Phaen.* 30-1 alludes to Callimachus).

[463] Boyd 2000, 73 n. 30

[464] The tale was relatively uncontroversial prior to Callimachus. cf. Ibid.

[465] The Cretans also say that Zeus is dead, when in fact he is immortal (καὶ γὰρ τάφον, ὦ ἄνα, σεῖο / Κρῆτες ἐτεκτήναντο - Call. *Hymn* 1.8-9). The shared syllables of αἰεὶ and αἰείδειν (Call. *Hymn* 1.1) imply that Zeus' immortality will be assured by songs like this one (Hopkinson 1984, 139). cf. Ovid's own claims of poetic immortality.

[466] Barchiesi 1993, 352. cf. Barchiesi 1997, 182, which states that in Callimachus' new tradition, 'the practice of turning to antique traditions for information... ends up by producing effects of irony and ambiguity, and not any firm or reliable guarantee'. The past authority to which Callimachus binds himself is 'revealed to be open to doubt and interpretation'.

ἀληθέες ἦσαν ἀοιδοί˙ / φάντο πάλον Κρονίδῃσι διάτριχα δώματα νεῖμαι).[467] This is further problematised by the fact that Callimachus himself expresses a desire to be a more convincing liar than other poets (ψευδοίμην ἀίοντος ἅ κεν πεπίθοιεν ἀκουήν - *Hymn* 1.65), for as Hopkinson states, 'Not only is their version a lie - it is an incredible lie, one unlikely to convince an audience.'[468] Callimachus' authority is thus called into question by his own poetry; he denies authority to the Cretans and to other poets, but himself wishes to deceive. Ovid's footnoted reference to Callimachus thus undermines the authority of the tale it is supposed to authorise. As Boyd explains, 'Ovid indicates clearly that his authority for this tale comes from Callimachus; yet the reliability of Callimachus as authority is cast into doubt by the very tale Ovid chooses to recall.'[469] In fact, 'Ovid here simultaneously sends us back to his sources and thwarts our ability to rely upon them.'[470] The external authority has a detrimental effect upon the authority of Ovid's narrative, and this is far from being the only occasion in Ovid's poetry when this is the case. In a poem concerned with aetiological tales and their sources, Ovid makes evident just how flimsy such authorities can be. Consequently, comments from the Ovidian narrator like that at *Fasti* 4.203-4 (*pro magno teste vetustas / creditur; acceptam parce movere fidem*) seem rather ironic.[471] What is Ovid doing, when he deauthorises both his own narrative and that of his sources, if not shaking the general faith in *vetustas*?

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[467]cf. *Amores* 3.6.17 - *veterum mendacia vatum*. Callimachus even rejects the authority of Homer, who is usually considered the ultimate authority in tradition ('Homer is the absolute "master-text"' - Graf 2002, 110). cf. Townshend 2015, 9 - 'Liars and poets do the same thing, namely, tell stories.'
[468] Hopkinson 1984, 144
[469] Boyd 2000, 74
[470] Ibid., 74
[471] Ibid. n. 34 - 'Ovid once again draws particular attention both to the provenance of the tale and to its questionable reliability.'

Another problematic situation is where an Alexandrian footnote is attached to material for which multiple contradictory sources exist,[472] as at *Fasti* 2.669 (*ut veteres memorant*). Townshend points out that Virgil often uses Alexandrian footnotes to 'draw attention precisely to the allusive content of an utterance - to the fact that the material belongs to an earlier tradition, or even a plurality of competing traditions'.[473] This is also the case in the Ovidian example mentioned, for although Ovid's story of Terminus being the only god not to give place to Jupiter is widely found in literary tradition,[474] other versions of the story relate that Iuventas also refused to move.[475] Indeed, many sources offer intratextually as well as externally conflicting accounts. Dionysius, who includes the two-god variant at *Antiquitates Romanae* 3.69.5, claims that his story is found in all the histories of Rome (Ἄξιον δὲ καὶ τὰ πρὸ τῆς κατασκευῆς αὐτοῦ γενόμενα διελθεῖν, ἃ παραδεδώκασιν ἅπαντες οἱ τὰς ἐπιχωρίους συναγαγόντες ἱστορίας - D.H. 3.69.3), but Livy, despite offering a similar version to Dionysius at 5.54.7, gives an account which, like Ovid's, only includes Terminus at 1.55.3-4. The tradition invoked by Ovid's footnote reminds the reader that alternative versions press their case and does not simply access the authority of a single unified story. Ovid, however, makes a definitive statement, rather than acknowledging each of these different possibilities as he does elsewhere in the *Fasti*.[476] One possible interpretation is that Ovid is here asserting his narrative authority; as the latest in the lengthy line of literary tradition, it is his right to define it. Thus Ovid is not only

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[472] Alluding to alternative versions of a story is 'an old and respected technique, well-known to scholarship' (Horsfall 1991, 36). Claassen (2008, 160) argues that 'By definition, there is no single, canonical version of myth... no author may be accused of "subverting the true version" in any re-telling of a particular tale.' However, versions' authority can vary depending on factors such as their age, prevalence, and the nature of their sources.
[473] Townshend 2015, 77
[474] Cato *Orig*. fr. 24 Peter; Liv. 1.55.3-4; Serv. *Aen*. 9.446; Lact. *Inst*. 1.20.38.
[475] D.H. 3.69.5. Gjerstad (1967, 16 n. 5) implausibly suggests that 'Later Iuventas joined Terminus in this story.' Augustine (*C.D.* 4.23) adds Mars to Iuventas and Terminus.
[476] Most famously in the disagreement of the Muses in *Fasti* 5.

authorising his own poem, but also the past accounts which concur with it, even while these past texts loan their authority to Ovid's account. The process of authorisation is not monodirectional; instead, past and present authors simultaneously transfer authority.[477]

Alexandrian footnotes often refer to sources which are themselves footnoted. In *Fasti* 2.114, in a poetically-charged context,[478] Ovid marks the story of the dolphin rescuing Arion with *memorant*. This is a tale with a well-known precursor in Herodotus, where the whole story is related in indirect speech, framed by attributions to the people of Corinth and Lesbos, and the action of the dolphin is specifically footnoted with λέγουσι.[479] Critics differ as to how to interpret Herodotus' version of the story, and whether Herodotus is convinced by it (despite the lack of a gnõme of belief[480]) or is distancing himself by relating it at secondhand. Fowler argues that Herodotus' concept of truth is founded on the absence of loose ends, such that 'Corroborative accounts must dovetail perfectly.'[481] On this basis, Ovid heightens the authority of his narrative by invoking a text which concurs with it. Conversely, it might be contended that whilst a named source can authorise a narrative which cites it, when that source then refers to another text, the increased distance created between narrative and source destabilises the narrative's authority. However, it also makes a story appear older, which could have an authorising effect. The act of footnoting becomes an

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[477] M. Robinson (2011, 427 ad 669) notes that the footnote destroys the illusion that Ovid is presenting a hymn at the festival, damaging the authority of verisimilitude while claiming the authority of tradition.
[478] At *Fa.* 2.91 Arion's marvellous singing is also footnoted (*fertur*) and his fame has spread (*nomen Arionium Siculas impleverat urbes* - *Fa.* 2.93). The proximity of *fertur* to *saepe* may illustrate the retellings implied by the footnote. It also asks whether something retold frequently is more prone to growing errors, as in the House of Fama in the *Metamorphoses*.
[479] τῷ δὴ λέγουσι Κορίνθιοι (ὁμολογέουσι δέ σφι Λέσβιοι) - Hdt. 1.23.1, ταῦτα μέν νυν Κορίνθιοί τε καὶ Λέσβιοι λέγουσι - Hdt. 1.24.8. cf. Hdt. 1.24.1 - λέγουσι; Hdt. 1.24.6 - λέγουσι.
[480] Gray 2001, 16 and 19. Gould (1989, 30) argues that the 'coincidence of these different testimonies seems to have been enough in itself to convince Herodotus of the truth of a story involving abnormal... experiences.'
[481] Fowler 1996, 82

process of repetition and hence guarantees its authority by suggesting that the story has always been told in the same way. Ovid often adds modifying parenthetic comments to his Alexandrian footnotes (e.g. *fide maius* - *Fa.* 2.113). Robinson views the parenthesis as expressing incredulity,[482] but Stinton offers an alternative interpretation, in which the intention is not to express scepticism but to comment upon particularly striking aspects of the story.[483]

Alexandrian footnotes often draw attention to a source in order to invoke its authority. A complication arises, however, when no such source exists, as the apparent authority of a footnoted tale may be illusory. One might expect such absent sources to damage Ovid's narrative authority. Not only has he no authorising source or confirmation by reiteration, but he self-consciously draws attention to this lack with an Alexandrian footnote. At *Fasti* 6.571, *constat* footnotes a story on which consensus has certainly not been reached. On the contrary, 'far from being "agreed" (*constat*) that the statue represented Servius, the identity of the ancient gilded cult statue was much debated until it was examined and proved to be Fortuna.'[484] Similarly, at *Fasti* 2.584, the Ovidian narrator declares, *disce per antiquos quae mihi nota senes*. As Robinson notes, we 'can choose to read this as good practice for anthropological fieldwork, with the *antiqui senes* reserving facts from long ago, or we may be tempted to see this as an acknowledgement that the tale Ovid is about to narrate is unusual, if not

[482] M. Robinson 2011, 134 ad 113-4. cf. Le Bonniec 1969, 26 ad 113 - 'note de scepticisme fréquente chez Ovide'.
[483] Stinton 1976
[484] Littlewood 2006, 174 ad 571. Dionysius 4.40.7 and Valerius Maximus 1.8.11 state that the statue is of Servius Tullius. Pliny *Nat.* 8.197, D.H. 58.7.2, Varro *Non.* 278L. identify it as Fortuna.

invented.'[485] Critics take both views; Aronen says that Ovid preserves an ancient tale here, whereas Frazer asserts that the story is unique to Ovid.[486]

Ovid is not the first to make sourceless citations; Sayce and Panofsky long ago questioned the veracity of Herodotus' source citations, and Fehling has demonstrated that such citations often demarcate Herodotean inventions,[487] to the point that Corcella argues that 'the very criteria for judging the truth or falsehood of stories fail.'[488] Horsfall, discussing Virgil, says that such 'window-dressing' of poetic material with Alexandrian footnotes, which may be actual references to sources, is 'entirely traditional and should never be taken at its face value'.[489] He comments that 'The new is then often dressed up as old ("it is told that"). Among modern scholars, chaos usually follows.'[490] This use of Alexandrian footnotes is standard practice - 'the "Alexandrian footnote"... as often conceals the licence of a poetic invention as it footnotes a pre-existing tradition.'[491] Critics differ, however, over its effect. Horsfall suggests that Virgil uses footnotes to allow him to innovate while distancing himself from the innovation,[492] but Townshend opines that when Virgil 'uses these "faux footnotes" to invoke a nonexistent tradition, rather than distancing himself from the story he is telling, he actively signals the lack of source material and highlights his

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[485] M. Robinson 2011, 377 ad 584
[486] Aronen 1989; Frazer 1929b, 452 ad 583
[487] Sayce 1883; Panofsky 1885. Herodotus invents 'false contradictions' as straw men to refute, which Fehling (1989, 59) dubs 'bogus conflicts with figments of his own imagination'. cf. *Il.* 9.528 where a new story is told as though old (Horsfall 1991, 33 n. 20 - 'some such authorial declarations are true; many are designed to challenge or wilfully to confuse').
[488] Corcella 2013, 52
[489] Horsfall 1991, 33. His characterisation of Virgil is one in which Ovid too is easily recognisable - 'Virgil inherits a largely unrecognized freedom to invent... from a poetic mannerism, to fill a void, or out of a sense of mischief.'
[490] Ibid., 34
[491] Hardie 2012, 110
[492] Horsfall 1990, 55-58

own power as a creator of fiction'.[493] The footnote serves to highlight, rather than explain away, the invention.

Townshend writes, pertinently:

> As well read as poets can be - and Vergil is among the most learned - they are not scholars writing for journals: by all means, check their citations for accuracy, but do not be surprised when the footnotes prove to be an artifice, a kind of poetic smoke and mirrors. This is particularly the case when the poet overtly gestures to the tradition at precisely the moment he deviates from it... he seems almost to dare his readers to take a second look. This is an ironic use of the Alexandrian footnote. After all, 'traditions' must begin somewhere, and it is appropriate that new traditions should be born in the presence of the old, for it is at that moment that the poet asserts and realizes his potential as a creator of fiction.[494]

What, therefore, is the effect of these mislabelled inventions in Ovid's *Fasti*? If the reader does not recognise that a source is missing, the acceptance of the illicitly authorised new story will canonise it as an authoritative part of tradition. But if the reader recognises that they do not know a source for a story, they must either believe themselves to be an *indoctus lector*,[495] or that they have been wilfully misled by the poet, who has thereby proved himself to be an untrustworthy authority.[496] Such cases may also claim authority for the narrator, who asserts himself as a new authority (a *novus auctor*), with the capacity to supersede or transform preceding tradition. Miller describes Ovid's self-created aetiologies as being 'in the spirit of the amateur going the antiquarians one better';[497] Ovid's Alexandrian footnotes indicate both the competition and the prize. Ovid is not just competing with past antiquarians, however.

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[493] Townshend 2015, 78
[494] Ibid., 94
[495] Horsfall (1991, 34) insists that the *Aeneid* can be enjoyed even though not everyone can follow the elevated play with which the poet challenges his most learned readers, but that one should not deny its existence - 'This note is no more than short reminder on climbing the *Aeneid* straight up the North Face.' Fränkel (1945, 147) argues that the *Fasti* was 'written neither by a scholar nor for scholars', but given the prevalence of references to tradition, Ovid's readers must surely expect to detect them.
[496] What kind of reader is desirable? Perhaps one who recognises the illusive nature of Alexandrian footnotes, and appreciates the poet's authoritative virtuosity in using them to mark his own innovation.
[497] Miller 1992b, 19-20. Miller views Ovid's reluctance to select one of the many possible answers as an indication of his amateur status (Ibid., 22).

Fantham points out the overwhelming dominance of Virgilian mythology in Ovid's world ('Virgil's rewriting of legend enjoyed an authority that outranked even the respected Livian narrative')[498] and argues that Ovid's authorial choices for the *Fasti* must be read in the light of this, with his choice of heroes seen as 'an assertion of poetic independence: "Ich mache es anders"'.[499] The same might be true of his choice to use Alexandrian footnotes. Ovid places himself within an established tradition whose authority might seem unchallengeable, but nevertheless asserts his own narrative authority in the face of it, whether to alter details, change priorities or select different viewpoints, or even to encode his own inventions in the language of authoritative narratorial discourse to position himself as the culmination of the tradition.

Ovid reflexively annotates his poetry's position in tradition, and relates it to the work of his poetic predecessors.[500] As Miller states, 'a poet of any worth does not simply (selectively) "report", even when his poetic persona claims to be doing so',[501] for to do so is to abnegate the individual's inspiration and powers of creativity. Ovid's footnotes are a means of self-authorisation, through which Ovid can claim his own place in tradition. Once an innovation has been assimilated into tradition, it becomes in its turn a potential source for future poets, to which they can refer with their own Alexandrian footnotes. Ovid short-circuits this process (and the linear progression of time and tradition) to footnote his own material and pre-authorise it; his Alexandrian footnotes look forward as well as back. The dichotomy between Alexandrian footnotes as signifiers of past tradition and as markers of innovative new tradition is

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[498] Fantham 1992b, 157
[499] Ibid.
[500] Hinds 1997. Each time you quote, you create the tradition anew.
[501] Miller 1992a, 6

central to their status, for they are 'notoriously self-conscious of their equivocation between being a claim to the (potentially unreliable) authority of previous tradition, and a licence for the poet to invent his own "tradition"'.[502] Each footnote requires the reader to assess what demands it is making of narrative authority.

Problems with *Fama*

There are fewer footnotes which mention *fama* in the *Fasti* than in the *Metamorphoses*. This may be attributable to the differing generic affiliations of the two poems. *Fama* is a driving force in epic, particularly in the *Metamorphoses*, whereas the antiquarian world might prefer to rely upon written source material. *Fama* in the *Fasti* retains its inherently ambivalent nature, asserting authority whilst making that authority vulnerable to suspicion. It thus mirrors the ambiguity of Alexandrian footnotes more widely. Hardie considers the Alexandrian footnote in general to be an example of 'authority flipping into uncertainty';[503] this is all the more the case when an Alexandrian footnote involves *fama*. *Fama* can be rumour and unsubstantiated gossip or tradition and authoritative report, and it is impossible to be certain which type of *fama* is in play at any given time.

The problematic nature of *fama* footnotes emerges in Ovid's various accounts of the story of Anna Perenna in *Fasti* 3. The footnotes contrast with the reference to autopsy as a source which precedes them (*sunt spectacula volgi* - *Fa.* 3.539; *occurrit nuper (visa est mihi digna relatu)*[504] */ pompa* - *Fa.* 3.541-2). The contradictory footnoted stories that follow may grant the material authorised by autopsy an authority that it

[502] Hardie 2012, 4
[503] Hardie 2012, 8
[504] *Digna relatu* may make implications of selectivity and worth which may affect the poet's authority.

does not deserve.[505] Ovid purports to be presenting an authoritative *fabula*, countering the rumours that are wandering about (*quoniam rumoribus errat, / fabula proposito nulla tegenda meo* - *Fa.* 3.543-4). The reader is shortly disabused of this, however, for Ovid relates a plethora of those very rumours, which pile contradiction upon contradiction, each marked by footnotes and culminating with one directly predicated upon *fama*.

> *Sunt quibus haec Luna est, quia mensibus impleat annum;*
> *pars Themin, Inachiam pars putat esse bovem.*
> *invenies qui te nymphen Azanida dicant*
> *teque Iovi primos, Anna, dedisse cibos.*
> *haec quoque, quam referam, nostras pervenit ad aures*
> *fama, nec a veri dissidet illa fide.* (*Fa.* 3.657-662)

Multiple aetiology (with or without an expression of preference) is common in ancient scholarship, and does not necessarily reflect negatively upon the authority of the poet. Critics disagree as to whether in the *Fasti* multiple aetiology is a sign of authoritative didactic mastery or amateurish incompetence,[506] but Graf suggests that it was not rare in ancient scholarship and that consequently Ovid 'plays with the traditions of the genre rather than giving several reliable traditions'.[507]

Bettini's demonstration of the close connection of *fabula* to *fama*[508] is particularly telling in the context of Ovid's first story at *Fasti* 3.543ff., where *rumores* are already floating around, and one might expect *fabula* to refer to a source in literary tradition.

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[505] Horsfall 1974, 196 - 'Ovid claims to have seen the homewards-reeling crowd himself, but his evidence must be treated with some caution: in aetiological poetry, from Callimachus onwards, it was the author's custom often to claim to have seen the festival or rite himself, or else to have heard of it from some authoritative individual... a claim to autopsy such as Ovid's needs to be scrutinized with care. To him and his poetic forebears, it is the outward form of claiming to have used a certain source, whether poetic, oral, or visual, that matters, and not the truth of that claim.'
[506] Miller 1992b with bibliography. Myers (1994, 158) says that Ovid 'refuses to choose authoritatively between the multiple aetiologies he offers'. cf. Newlands (1992, 47-50), who argues that Ovid abandons any claim to narrative authority, 'calls attention to the multiplicity and ambiguity of tradition and challenges the authoritarian view of Rome's history'.
[507] Graf 2002, 118. cf. Loehr 1996.
[508] Bettini 2006, especially 207-8.

In fact, the first story has no literary precedent;[509] Frazer complains that 'This childish explanation seems to have no better foundation than the accidental coincidence or resemblance of words.'[510] It is, however, the version to which Ovid devotes the most space (the other explanations are given less than a line), and is treated as authoritative by subsequent literary tradition. Silius Italicus closely follows Ovid's version in his own account at *Punica* 8.50-201, only substituting Cyrene for Melite, and precedes it with a highly extended Alexandrian footnote (*Multa retro rerum iacet atque ambagibus aevi / obtegitur densa caligine mersa vetustas, / ... sed pressis stringam revocatam ab origine fama narrandi metis breviterque antiqua revolvam* - 8.44-9),[511] signalling his debt and acknowledging that *fama* and tradition can be uncertain authorities.

The penultimate story is also attributed to *fama* (*Fa.* 3.661-2), again prompting the reader to seek a source in tradition. The lines are almost oxymoronic, claiming personal *autoakousis* of unreliable *fama*, and Ovid explicitly discusses the story's authority (*nec a veri dissidet illa fide*)[512] with a 'paradoxical insistence on its plausibility'.[513] In Ovid's poetry, insistence on reliability often warns the reader against taking a story at face value. Here his commentary is puzzling; is it reassuring to know that the tale is not far from the truth, or deauthorising? It might be seen as evidence of Ovid's narrative authority that he includes a *fama*-based story for the sake of completeness, but lets his readers know that it is not necessarily correct. This is a case where, as often, 'Ovidian inventions might hide behind the many stories that he

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[509] 'Alter, Herkunft und Vorgeschichte dieser Erzählung sind völlig rätselhaft' - Bömer 1958, 182 ad 543.
[510] Frazer 1929b, 114 ad 543
[511] These lines echo *Georgics* 4.285 (*Altius omnem / expediam prima repetens ab origine famam*), which also comments on literary sources. cf. Spaltenstein 1986, 502 ad 8.48.
[512] Bömer 1958, 190 ad 661ff. - '*Fides* ist hier *actio credendi sive confidendi*.'
[513] Graf 2002, 118

purports to have heard personally.'[514] Indeed, Harrison concludes that Ovid invented this story, arguing that his claims at *Fasti* 5.661-2 'need not of course exclude a conscious fiction'.[515] A possible literary source is Eratosthenes' *Hermes* (fr. 10 Powell), which features a cake-baking old woman. However, her resemblance to Ovid's Anna increases the fictionality of the Ovidian story,[516] rather than contributing to its authority. Ovid's caveats about this story's nearness to the truth illustrate his poetic policy; the tale is one of his innovations, and will only now become part of literary tradition. Curiously, Ovid does not footnote his final tale about Anna at *Fasti* 3.675ff., despite its ribald nature and the fact that it seems to derive from an earlier mime work.[517]

The footnote *fama refert* at *Fasti* 2.203 is similarly problematic. Lines 203-4 are omitted in two manuscripts and some editors support the exclusion.[518] Thus for the modern reader, the couplet's authority is called into question by the text. However, it also makes useful points about narrative authority. The traditional number of Fabii is 306, not 300 as *fama* claims here. Ovid himself uses the more common number at *Fasti* 2.196 (*ter centum Fabii ter... duo*).[519] The two main accounts (D.H. 9.15-22 and Liv. 2.48.7-50.11) generally concur, but Ovid's version seems particularly indebted to that of Livy;[520] Richard comments, 'Il nous semble plus important que le récit

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[514] Ibid.
[515] Harrison 1993, 455 - 'This Anna is a minor character, otherwise unknown, associated with a cult of obscure origins and a major historical event... This alone would make it likely that Ovid is inventing her here as circumstantial detail.' Further details mean that 'any probability of Ovid's story being a fully historical report vanishes'. cf. Bömer 1958, 190 ad 661ff. - 'Dieses kleine Geschichtchen hat keine Parallelüberlieferung', though he admits the unlikely possibility of a real tradition from Bovillae ('Es ist möglich, daß Ovid mit der Anna aus Bovillae... echte Überlieferung bietet').
[516] Harrison 1993, 455 n. 2
[517] Giancotti 1967, 16ff.
[518] De Bonniec (1969, 38 ad 202), however, argues that 'Rien n'est plus ovidien que ces répétitions.'
[519] Following Liv. 2.49.4 (*sex et trecenti milites*), D.H. 9.15.3 (ἐκ δὲ τοῦ Φαβίων γένους ἓξ καὶ τριακόσιοι ἄνδρες). Richard 1988b, 217 n. 1 provides a comprehensive list of references.
[520] Harries 1991, 151

d'Ovide doive beaucoup à celui de Tite-Live.'[521] At times Ovid almost quotes the Livian account, invoking its authority.[522] Dionysius, meanwhile, knows two versions of the story, one similar to Livy's account, and one different (D.H. 9.18.5 - διττός φέρεται λόγος, ὁ μὲν ἧττον πιθανός, ὁ δὲ μᾶλλον τῆς ἀκηθείας ἁπτόμενος. θήσω δ' αὐτούς ἀμφοτέρους, ὡς παρέλαβον).[523] He engages in a protracted presentation and logical assessment of each option, making a reasoned decision as to which seems the most credible. This is, therefore, a story which has a complex and multiplex history in literary tradition, and it is this tradition which Ovid's footnote invokes.

A mere seven lines after mentioning 306 Fabii, Ovid refers to rumour saying 300 Fabii (*illa fama refert Fabios exisse trecentos* - *Fa.* 2.203). The discrepancy is strikingly obvious, and a variety of explanations for it have been posited. Firstly, Ovid is not unique in using this figure; *fama* (in the sense of tradition) transmits it elsewhere. Robinson notes that in all these cases it is unclear if this is an approximation or a separate tradition,[524] but it is presented in a way which allows it to at least be considered to be a variant tradition. This footnote may be functioning as an abbreviation for Dionysius' longer references to tradition. Ovid sources the tale from the more ambiguous *fama*, rather than distinguishing between credible stories and those ἐκ παρακούσματος.

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[521] Richard 1988a, 531

[522] *Fa.* 2.197 - Liv. 2.49.1; *Fa.* 2.200 - Liv. 2.49.4; *Fa.* 2.201 - Liv. 2.49.8. Ovid's unique dating of the ambush to 13th February may draw on the second source which Ogilvie (1965, 360-61) identifies in Livy's narrative. Liv. 51.1-3 suggests February, whilst 6.1.11 suggests 18th July.

[523] Dionysius regards the first, at D.H. 9.19.1ff. (Τινὲς μὲν οὖν φασιν...), as less credible (D.H. 9.19.3), and the second, at D.H. 9.20.1ff., as closer to the truth (ἀληθέστερον); the account, he says, is τοιόσδε τίς ἐστιν ('somewhat as follows'). He reassesses them at 9.21.6, stating that their varying credibility, both are found in Roman writings of good authority (φέρονται δ' ἐν γραφαῖς Ῥωμαίων ἀξιοχρέοις ἀμφότεροι). There follows in 9.22.1-4 discussion of the story of the survival of a single Fabian child, which Livy presents as fact but Dionysius says has been invented by the multitude from a false report (ἐκ παρακούσματος δέ τινος πεπλασμένον ὑπὸ τοῦ πλήθους) and resembles stage fictions (μύθοις γὰρ δὴ ταῦτά γε καὶ πλάσμασιν ἔοικε θεατρικοῖς). Dionysius provides a 'true' alternative in 9.22.5.

[524] M. Robinson 2011, 187 ad 203-4, listing D.S. 11.53.6, Sil. 6.637ff., 7.46, Plutarch *Cam*. 19.1. At *Pont.* 1.2.3 Ovid uses the 300 figure again.

In banal terms, Robinson points out that 300 is metrically easier for the poet.[525] Metapoetically, approximating the number of Fabii to 300 allows the poet to evoke an earlier glorious 300, the Spartans who died at Thermopylae. Whilst there are a number of reasons why doing so might be beneficial,[526] viewed in the light of *fama*, it comments on (and attempts to coopt) the greater drama and fame of the Spartans, whose heroism is authoritatively attested by writers such as Herodotus. The Spartans live on in *fama*, and the link to them may help to memorialise the Fabii in *fama* by association. Ogilvie suggests that the Greek story brings a certain pressure to bear upon the Roman one, so that 'What guided the course of the story and may even have determined the numbers involved was unquestionably the synchronism with the Battle of Thermopylae.'[527] Synchronism and similarity may blur the distinctions between separate stories in *fama*, given how tales mingle in the House of Fama.

It has been suggested that Ovid is using a private Fabii family tradition of what happened as his source, particularly for the different date.[528] Richard rejects this proposition, saying that, 'L'hypothèse... est infirmée par les analyses qui précèdent.'[529] However, as Robinson notes, 'Against the background of these competing traditions, Ovid's opening phrase *haec fuit illa dies* (*Fa.* 2.195) strikes a

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[525] Ibid. ad 203-4. Robinson (Ibid., 184 ad 196) praises Ovid's ingenuity in expressing the number 306 in elegiacs. Ovid's evident skill in doing this lessens the likelihood of Ovid saying 300 due to metrical expediency.

[526] On the benefit to the Romans and particularly the Fabii of this association, cf. Dillery 2009, 89.

[527] Ogilvie 1965, 359

[528] Bömer 1958, 96 ad 195 - 'Von den vielen Vermutungen über den Grund der Abweichung durch Ovid ist die am wahrscheinlichsten, daß Ovid hier eine Familientradition der Fabier... berücksichtigte'. cf. Bömer 1957b, 114-15; Le Bonniec 1969, 37 ad 195 - 'Pour expliquer la date du 13 février qu'Ovide est seul à attester, on suppose avec vraisemblance que le poète se fonde sur une tradition familiale des Fabius.' Ogilvie (1965, 359-60) mentions the theory that Ovid is 'deferring to the private chronology of the Fabii'. Williams (1991b, 195) points out that Ovid is the sole authority for a convenient coincidence at *Fa.* 6.461-8, and suggests that the earlier potential falsifying of dates undermines the later instance.

[529] Richard 1988a, 542. Richard is unimpressed by the attribution of the date to Ovidian confusion by Niebuhr 1834, 261 n. 441 ('Il faut qu'Ovide ait confondu le jour de leur sortie avec celui de leur mort') and Mommsen 1859, 90 n. 128 ('wenn Ovid... dafür den 13. Febr. nennt, so hat er wahrscheinlich den Auszugstag mit dem Schlachttag verwechselt'), and to (deliberate?) error by Lefèvre 1980, 154-59 and Porte 1985, 375.

polemical note. It is a reminder that whatever sources were available, Ovid rather than the calendar has located this particular narrative in this particular location.'[530] Like Dionysius, Ovid implicitly claims the authority to make decisions for his poetry. The fact that unlike Dionysius he does not explicitly express a preference for one story over another here does not preclude his ability to do so, and his choice of date illustrates this authority.

Perhaps Ovid is giving the reader a pair of 'snapshots' from different points in the development of a single tradition to demonstrate the transformative nature of *fama*. Ovid initially gives an unfootnoted figure of 306, which might be seen as the 'accurate' benchmark, but as time passes (7 lines),[531] *fama*'s rendition of the story becomes less precise, more prone to approximating or equating the tally to the number of other famous forces. The effect is mirrored in the text itself - the events described prior to the footnote are more vivid, whilst the *fama* footnote catapults the events it describes back into the distant past. At *Fasti* 2.205ff., Ovid applies *fama*'s capacity to bring the past to life, with the use of the historic present. Bömer, along with his standard interpretation of *fama* as a way for the poet to distance himself from unconfirmed material, suggests that it can also be used 'zur Projektion in alte Zeiten'.[532] Even with the inexactness of numbers introduced by time, *fama* still gives an authoritative impression of events. The discrepancy created by *fama*'s omission of six men from its version of events also points to the additional exclusion, even in Ovid's narrative, of the 4000 troops who were present alongside the Fabii.[533] Livy too

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[530] M. Robinson 2011, 184 ad 195
[531] Ovid often skips over large periods of time in a few lines. cf. *Met.* 12, where Nestor's story replaces the entire Trojan War. M. Robinson (Ibid., 188 ad 207-8) comments on the furious pace of the narrative at *Fa.* 2.207-8, which 'seems to be an accelerated version... of Dionysius'.
[532] Bömer 1958, 97 ad 202-204
[533] 'Bien entendu, il faut ajouter aux 306 Fabius leur clientèle: 4 000 hommes' - Le Bonniec 1969, 37 ad 196. cf. D.H. 9.15.3.

neglects to mention the 4000 men who detract from the heroic image of the lone 300. By drawing attention to the varying numbers given in tradition, Ovid interrogates that tradition (and the reader) as to why it quibbles over a mere six Fabii when 4000 have been forgotten.[534] The Alexandrian footnote in *Fasti* 2.203 is a clue that Ovid is providing his own commentary upon the multiple existing traditions.

Perfect Recall?

Fama usefully embodies the dual authorising and deauthorising functions of the footnotes which refer to it, but so too do Alexandrian footnotes concerned with memory. Memory tropes a way that poets look back at the past[535] and refer to literary tradition for authorisation; indeed, Conte suggests that poetic memory's function is 'the "authentication" of a new text by an authoritative old one'.[536] However the fragility of memory also serves as a reminder that tradition may be incomplete (as well as drawing it closer in nature to elusive cultural memory and *fama*). [537] As the daughters of Memory, the Muses are ideally placed to illustrate memory's function, for there is a certain correspondence between Ovid's interviews with the Muses ('the Muse said...') and references to collective memory ('it is remembered'). The Muses have perfect recall and provide incontestable authority, for they are 'traditionally the

[534] Given that the figure of 300 invokes the Spartans at Thermopylae, Ovid may also be pointing out that popular memory forgets the additional troops who fought there as well: 300 Spartans, 1000 from Tegea and Mantinea, 120 from Orchomenus, 1000 from the rest of Arcadia, 400 Corinthians, 200 from Phlius, 80 Mycenaeans, 700 Thespians and 400 Thebans (cf. Herodotus *Hist.* 7.202).
[535] It also tropes how poets speak about the past. Singing is remembering. cf. *Il.* 2.452; Ford 1992, 49-50. Crotty (1994, 101) notes that 'the poet's memory is not memorization or a meticulous recording of past events, but rather a kind of mindfulness, which consists in his making a scene powerful and vivid in his mind, so that he can speak it "*kata kosmon*" - just as it was, even though he has not actually witnessed the events themselves.'
[536] Conte 1986, 59
[537] In *Fa.* 3.793, *si commemini* signals allusion but also indicates the potential for incorrect memory.

supreme sources of poetic authority'.[538] However, in *Fasti* 5 this authority is thrown into doubt. Ovid refers to the Muses with language which evokes memory (*silent aliae, dictaque mente notant* - *Fa.* 5.10), emphasising the connection between the Muses and the process of accessing and footnoting tradition. The three Muses each offer different *aetia*, and thus none of these *aetia* receive the 'special authoritative stamp which the Muses' support would normally confer'.[539] The device of incorporating the Muses fails, and not only their personal authority but that of tradition is undermined.

The role of memory as a source is encapsulated at *Fasti* 6.183-4, where the founding of the temple of Juno Moneta is reported with the footnote *memorant*. The third person verb seems to refer to people (and specifically poets) of the past successively memorising and memorialising their history. However, it also describes the process which the poet Ovid and his readers must undertake, remembering tradition in order to find the source to which *memorant* points. Memory is thus a way of looking back, and of bringing the past into play in the present. This passage is particularly charged because Juno is given the title Moneta, which she shares with Mnemosyne, Memory herself. Juno Moneta guards 'an unimpeachable record of historical events from Roman posterity',[540] for in her temple are kept the *Libri Lintei* - the consular records. How authoritative is this Alexandrian footnote? Frazer points out that the Venusian calendar and Macrobius' *Saturnalia* 1.12.30 confirm the date of dedication given by Ovid.[541] Here, then, the authority of memory and of records is upheld.

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[538] Newlands 2002, 207. Callimachus' Muse is not omniscient, but merely good at choosing sources (ἔνθεν ὁ πα[ι]δός / μῦθος ἐς ἡμετέρην ἔδραμε Καλλιόπην - fr. 75 Pf). cf. Klooster 2009, 220.
[539] Harries 1989, 172
[540] Littlewood 2006, 58
[541] Frazer 1929, 147 ad 183

Similarly at *Fasti* 6.284, Ovid explicitly sets out to discover *causas*. He relates these with two footnotes, *memorant* at 6.285 and *feruntur* at 6.287, which emphasise that he is citing the authority of tradition for his account. *Memorant* marks a direct quotation from Hesiod (*Theogony* 453-4),[542] invoking Hesiodic authority for the following scientific explanation of Vesta's virginity.[543] Frazer points out that this is 'a piece of purely Greek mythology masquerading as Roman',[544] but the authority of Hesiod is such that this literary pedigree heightens rather than detracts from the story's authority. Moreover, Littlewood argues that 'It was not unusual for Greek or Roman philosophical writers to use Hesiod's mythology to illustrate a scientific point as though the myth provided an allegorical interpretation of a scientific truth.'[545] She comments that the use of Hesiodic myth is to enhance Ovid's account. The implication is surely that it increases its authority.

Sources *versus* Informants

In the *Fasti*, Ovid contrasts two methods of acquiring and authorising knowledge - from earlier sources (written and spoken), which can be footnoted, and from identifiable informants, particularly the old. The boundary between these two categories is less distinct than one might expect, blurring at the point where Ovid uses phrases like 'an old man said...'.[546] As Miller points out, 'most of the interlocutors are described as "old", as if to suggest that these are the *antiqui*[547] whom Ovid elsewhere

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[542] Ibid., 215 ad 285
[543] Littlewood 2006, 94 ad 285-6
[544] Frazer 1929, 215 ad 285
[545] Littlewood 2006, 94 ad 285-6
[546] Fantham (1998, 108 ad 89) differentiates between *memorant* at *Fasti* 4.89, 'a typical indefinite 3rd pers. plur. of reported tales and explanations' and 'the specific 2.669 *ut veteres memorant*'. cf. *Met*. 15.325 - *quod indigenae memorant*.
[547] Cairns (1996, 32) says that 'the "ancients" and the "countrymen" crop up frequently in Varro as authorities for, or in explanations of, etymologies' and lists occurrences of *(ut) antiqui*

cites generally as a source.'[548] Furthermore, Ovid's informants speak on the basis of their memories, for they are 'the repositories of a living oral tradition'.[549] *Memorant*, a long-accepted form of Alexandrian footnote, echoes the most important aspect of old men, their capacity to remember the past and hence to personally authorise the events they are narrating. Divinities directly answering Ovid's questions function much like divine inspiration, where the poet receives authorisation and tale in a single package. *Feruntur* in *Fasti* 2.271 contrasts with *dicite, Pierides* in *Fasti* 2.269. This is the first time that Ovid invokes the Muses in the *Fasti* (cf. *Aen*. 1.8; *Met*. 16.622), and the collocation must be deliberate.

In *Fasti* 5, a plethora of footnote-marked tales (*fabula nota* - *Fa.* 5.604, *alii... dixere* - *Fa.* 5.619, *fama vetus* - *Fa.* 5.625, *pars putat* - *Fa.* 5.633)[550] activates competing traditions,[551] forcing Ovid to look elsewhere for an authoritative account (*Thybri, doce verum* - *Fa.* 5.635). Tiber is qualified to pronounce authoritatively by his age (*tua ripa vetustior Urbe est; / principium ritus tu bene nosse potes* - *Fa.* 5.635-6), which has allowed him to witness the events which he describes.[552] The Alexandrian footnotes represent clashing, unauthoritative voices, whereas the aged eyewitness is an authoritative source.

Wheeler suggests that Ovid's appeal to sources is a veneer and that he prefers interviews with human and divine conlocutors, which 'raises the question of how oral

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dicebant/appellarunt. He proposes (Ibid., 31) that *antiquus, vetus*, etc may function as etymological markers in Tibullus.
[548] Miller 1982, 404
[549] Ibid.
[550] cf. *Fa.* 2.549 (*dicitur*), 551 (*vix equidem credo*; *feruntur*), 554 (*ferunt*).
[551] *Fabula nota* supports Europa as the origin, *alii dixere* prefers Io. Confusion also arises around the accounts marked by *fama vetus* and *pars putat*.
[552] Emphasised with *vidi* (*Fa.* 5.639).

and written sources of inspiration are to be integrated or reconciled'.[553] In *Fasti* 1, the more colourful, detailed (but possibly flawed) account of Janus contrasts with the bare facts of an existing calendar (*quod tamen ex ipsis licuit mihi discere fastis - Fa.* 1.289). Ovid highlights the comparison by introducing it with *tamen* (*Fa.*1.289),[554] and changing from Janus' lengthy explanations to very short sentences which echo the brevity of calendar inscriptions.[555] However, 'the abbreviated comment in the calendars only acts as a starting-point for Ovid, who gives his treatment of the temples poetic colouring and even fresh imperial significance.'[556] Moreover, *Fasti* 1.288 asks Janus to facilitate the *auctor*. Lowrie sees the preceding scene as a means for Ovid to claim divine authority whilst also conveying information about the past, but thinks that it is overly staged, so that by 'foregrounding the conventions of authorization Ovid effectively calls his own bluff and at the end of this section he more realistically reveals an alternative, written source, the calendar itself.'[557] Ovid thus emphasises the importance of comparing different authority bases.

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[553] Wheeler 1999, 47
[554] Green (2004a, 133 ad 289) notes Ovid's reversion to the role of researcher consulting calendars.
[555] The Praenestine calendar of Verrius Flaccus reads for 1st January, *(Aescu)lapio Vediovi in insula* (Frazer 1929b, 130 ad 290). Frazer consequently postulates that Verrius Flaccus was Ovid's authority for this passage. Green is more circumspect, hedging his comments with conditions ('If Ovid does have any particular *fasti* in mind here... The *Fasti Praenestini* might be the most important source' - Green 2004a, 133 ad 289). Miller (2002, 173) notes that only the Fasti Praenestini states that both temples are on Tiber Island.
[556] Green 2004a, 133 ad 289. cf. Miller 2002, 173-4; Green 2004a, 229-30.
[557] Lowrie 2009, 203

Footnoting the Exile Poetry

There are very few Alexandrian footnotes in the exile poetry, even allowing for its relatively small volume in comparison with Ovid's earlier works. This might stem from the exile poetry's different generic characteristics, though Alexandrian footnotes appear in Ovid's earlier elegies, particularly in the *Heroides*,[558] and in the poetry of Propertius, Tibullus and others. Although Ovid's exile poetry draws upon the origins of elegy in lamentation poetry,[559] it is an innovation, a new type of poetry whose terms Ovid himself delimits.[560] Given the self-conscious nature of this generic creation, Ovid might be making a deliberate decision that in exilic poetry one makes less use of Alexandrian footnotes. Alternatively, perhaps Ovid chooses to use different tropes of intertextuality in the exile poetry, for the poem is certainly not lacking in allusions; indeed, Williams argues that 'Ovid's subtle redeployment of literary reminiscences is a constant and prominent artistic feature in both his pre-exilic and exilic poetry.'[561] However, Ovid employs such techniques in his earlier poetry in combination with Alexandrian footnotes, so their presence does not demand a corresponding absence of footnotes. Ovid's subject matter itself may preclude their use. There are fewer tales of the past and fewer passages of aetiological excursus in the exile poetry. Moreover, Ovid's exilic self-construction claims that geographical

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[558] cf. Ziogas' interesting discussion (2013, 44) of how 'Helen's poetic renown will be put to the test when the visions created by Helen's *fama* are set against her physical presence' in *Heroides* 16. This poem marks the transition from imagining to seeing, with Paris uniquely able to use eyewitness authority to compare Venus and Helen. cf. Michalopoulos 2006. The *Heroides* are themselves footnotes, telling self-referential eyewitness accounts of past tradition, while asserting the authority of their new versions. cf. Barchiesi 1993; Jolivet 2001.

[559] 'Ovid creatively returns elegy to its alleged origins as a song of lament' - Myers 2010, 34.

[560] Lee (1959, 409) argues the exile poetry is 'an Ovidian invention, without parallel in Greek or Latin literature... a modern renewal and adaptation of that ancient elegiac tradition'. Kenney 1965, 38-39 - 'All Ovid's poetry hitherto had fallen into reconizable categories... For the type of poetry that Ovid was now called upon to write there was no precedent and no model... Ovid was feeling his way towards a type of poetry that should be appropriate to his feelings and his situation.'

[561] Williams 1994, 57

remoteness causes his cultural as well as physical dislocation (or amputation) from Rome. Ovid depicts himself as cut off from the Roman cultural milieu, with its libraries and its reading circles, unable to access them[562] and bereft of the cultural anchor which Rome represents as the 'sole source of both artistic and political authorization'.[563] The absence of Alexandrian footnotes may symbolise this. Just as Ovid disingenuously proclaims the poor quality of his poetry, so he eliminates the Alexandrian footnotes which represent his connection to Rome and its literary tradition, while continuing to make allusions in more subtle ways. The reports (and rumours) that Ovid receives from Rome may function in a similar way to footnotes, but alluding to Rome rather than tradition. Distance makes Rome as tenuous an authority as tradition.

Fantham points out Ovid's lack of personal engagement and reciprocity with his audience in exile, noting that Ovid compares 'writing where there is noone to hear your verse to dancing in the dark: a listener stimulates enthusiasm, and talent thrives on praise.'[564] Ovid may begrudge the loss of the audience who appreciated his subtleties and mythological games in the *Metamorphoses*;[565] a *doctus lector* is sadly lacking in Tomis according to Ovid (*nullus in hac terra, recitem si carmina, cuius / intellecturis auribus utar, adest* - *Tr.* 3.14.39-40), and the locals presumably do not share the cultural background upon which such allusions depend.[566] The telling of the tale of Iphigenia by the Scythian old man is the exception which proves the rule.

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[562] His poems have greater access.
[563] Habinek 1998, 153. Matzner (2011, 320) suggests that Ovid's contributions to Roman discourse have been 'cut off from the centre from which and in interaction with which they gain their significance'.
[564] Fantham 2013, 133
[565] Green 2005, 254 ad 3.14.37 - 'The absence of an appreciative and sophisticated audience... was almost certainly true, and a very real handicap.'
[566] Williams (1994, 50) notes Ovid's cultural and linguistic isolation. The modern reader may miss allusions that were obvious or had nuances apparent to a contemporary audience.

Iphigenia's tale is so famous that even a Scythian knows it, or perhaps he knows it only because it is set locally; his version prioritises local characters. Although Ovid's poems from exile are still intended for a Roman audience, perhaps the spark of allusion lost some of its spice when the poet stopped being able to see and hear a reaction.

Fantham suggests that in addition to cultural isolation, lack of access to his personal library was an impediment to 'Ovid's old style of learned and allusive composition',[567] and Marshall also implies that the absence of his library causes Ovid's change of theme.[568] Such a complaint has literary precedent;[569] Catullus claims to be unable to send Manlius distracting poetry because he doesn't have access to as many books in Verona as he would in Rome, or, as Godwin interprets, 'he needs to consult a larger library to be able to compose "learned" verses modelled on Alexandrian Greek poetry'[570] (*nam, quod scriptorum non magna est copia apud me,... huc una ex multis capsula me sequitur* - Catullus 68a.33-4). Thinking about why Ovid's exile poetry lacks footnotes, and noting the absence of those footnotes, may prompt a reference to the Catullan poem, and claim its authority for some of the thematic aspects of Ovid's poetry, such as displacement from Rome,[571] death, and inability to write poetry.

Critics differ as to how seriously to take the disclaimers of Ovid and Catullus. Thomson claims that it 'seems artificial to suppose that C. needs a whole library to

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[567] Fantham 2013, 133
[568] Marshall 1976, 255 - 'His personal library had to be left in Rome, and his work grows introspective and autobiographical.'
[569] Horace carefully equips himself with reading material when he leaves Rome (*Serm.* 3.2.11-12).
[570] Godwin 1995, 313 ad 33. cf. Fordyce 1961, 348 ad 68.33 - 'The excuse is revealing evidence of the methods and ideals of the *doctus poeta*; what is expected of him is Alexandrian poetry, translated from, or modelled on, Greek, and for that he needs his library.'
[571] On displacement in Catullus 68, cf. Stevens 2013, 141.

cope with a friend's request for lines to take a vexed mind "out of itself"; after all, the friend presumably knew C. was at Verona, away from Rome and his books. Nor should we imagine that M. expected C. to sit down there and then and compose a long, learned work for which histories and encyclopaedias were indispensable.'[572] Fantham is inclined to take Ovid's difficulties seriously, arguing that as a poet even more widely read than Catullus, 'It is doubtful whether he could remember the immense range of his previous reading with the precision necessary for the allusive art he had practiced,'[573] and that this may be one reason that the exile poetry focusses on Ovid's own experiences as opposed to traditional literary themes. In contrast, Kenney suggests that the lack of books at Tomis had little impact upon Ovid, pointing out that due to the reading Ovid must have engaged in before writing the *Metamorphoses* and the *Fasti*, 'the material was probably for the most part in his head or his notebooks at the time of his exile' and thus constituted 'an opportunity to turn to account a surplus that would otherwise have been wasted.'[574] Ovid's receipt of letters from Rome indicates that he could easily have sent for books.[575] As Green notes, 'the prodigal allusiveness of the *Ibis*[576] suggests either that Ovid much exaggerates the lack of library facilities, or else that his well-stocked mind and retentive memory could quite well dispense with such aids.'[577]

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[572] Thomson 1997, 478 ad 33
[573] Fantham 2013, 133
[574] Kenney 1982, 454
[575] There were literary sales in the provinces (Pliny *Ep.* 9.11.2), so books could be acquired. The quality of the merchandise, however, may not have been up to Ovid's standards ('we hear much complaint about the inaccuracies and deficiencies of commercial copies' - Marshall 1976, 353. cf. Winsbury 2014, 130).
[576] Kenney 1982, 454 - 'For his catalogue of unenviable deaths... he had combed the highways and byways of the learned tradition, and the expression is often as obscure as the sources.'
[577] Green 2005, 254 ad 3.14.37

Ovid complains about his lack of books at *Tristia* 3.14.37-8 (*non hic librorum, per quos inviter alarque, / copia*),[578] which echoes Catullus 68a.33-4 (*nam, quod scriptorum non magna est copia apud me,... huc una ex multis capsula me sequitur*).[579] Ovid's dearth of books is apparently worse than that of Catullus, for he has no *copia* at all, whereas Catullus has no *magna copia*, but does have one book-box. Ovid is not only indulging in another piece of exilic oneupmanship,[580] but is also 'alluding to another man's books precisely at the moment that he would have us believe that the absence of just such books hamstrings his own verse'.[581] Ovid is thus clearly capable of allusion, but is using it to illustrate the hardship of his exile from the literary capital of the Roman empire. The paucity of Alexandrian footnotes in Ovid's exile poetry, though purportedly due to the literary drought in Tomis, in fact draws attention to Ovid's position, and hopes to inspire in his readers an appetite for his return to Rome, to form, and to the sophisticated literary games of allusion which he had once spun.

This impression is supported by the fact that some of the exile poems incorporate Alexandrian footnotes and mythological tales,[582] demonstrating that actually Ovid 'could have retold the tale of Medea or Iphigenia as many times as he chose'.[583] Ovid's authorial choice to relate his own experiences focusses attention on his

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[578] cf. Condee 2014, 60 on how Milton reverses this sentiment in *Elegia Prima* 25-6 (*Tempora nam licet hic placidis dare libera Musis, / Et totum rapiunt me mea vita libri*), comparing his experience to that of Ovid, whom Milton characterises as unable to fulfil his poetic potential (*Elegia Prima* 21-4).
[579] Luck 1977, 230 ad 37ff. - 'Das Motiv erinnert an Cat. 68, 33ff... braucht aber deswegen nicht rein literarisch zu sein.' The irony of the Catullan allusion is surely that although Catullus claims to have no books, he appears to be sending a whole *capsula* full of them to his friend (On this interpretation, cf. Leigh 2016, 206).
[580] cf. Ovid's claim to have suffered more than Ulysses.
[581] Leigh 2016, 203-04
[582] *Tr.* 3.9, 4.4; *Pont.* 3.2.
[583] Fantham 2013, 133

authority as autoptic narrator. When he looks back, it is to his own earlier poems,[584] whose reception he must formulate and revise for their future survival. As Myers notes, 'Ovid's poems are characterized by a marked tendency to locate themselves self-consciously within the poetic tradition and within the poet's own career... In his exile poetry Ovid reviews and seeks to shape the reception of his poetic career, past, present, and future, and to compare it with those of other poets.'[585]

Footnoting the *Tristia*

Ovid's exile poetry sometimes displays extensive close engagement with and allusion to literary tradition. One example of this is its use of the myth of Iphigenia in Tauris.[586] The first reference to this story is at *Tristia* 1.9.27-28, where Ovid footnotes his account of Thoas' approval of Pylades with *narratur*. Neither this approbation, nor that of the following examples, one of which is also footnoted (*dicunt* - *Tr.* 1.9.32), is attested in literary tradition.[587] The footnotes invoke the myths in a general sense whilst twisting their content to suit Ovid's present purpose, and thus pretend to more authority than they deserve.[588] This foreshadows the ambiguous authority of footnotes in other passages of the exile poetry concerned with Orestes.

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[584] Huskey 2005, 383 - 'By including his own poetry in such a complex and ornate series of allusions, Ovid asserts that his poetry has a lasting place in Roman literary culture and deserves to be remembered along with the poetry of Tibullus and his other predecessors.'
[585] Myers 2014, 14. Also Barchiesi and Hardie 2010, 59. On Ovid's concern with recalling and revising, cf. Hinds 1999 especially 382; Burrow 2002.
[586] Ingleheart (2010b, 221) states that Ovid responds to Euripides 'in a detailed and multifaceted way'. Fantham (1992a, 272) argues that Ovid's Euripidean echoes 'are not details that would depend on close memory or reading of the Euripidean text' but are 'well within Ovid's power of free invention, or could have come to Ovid from post-Euripidean versions of the Iphigenia myth'. Fantham (Ibid., 269) also makes the suggestion that 'since Ovid was cut off from...[the literary and artistic] traditions from the moment that he reached Tomi, the difference between the first and second narrative is not one of new sources for the myth or even exposure to new literary stimuli of any kind: both versions draw on the same intellectual stock', but this seems to accept Ovid's claims of library-lack too readily.
[587] Fantham 1992a, 271. The closest is Thoas' forgiveness of Iphigenia and Orestes in Euripides *IT* 1477-8. cf. Luck 1977, 76 ad 29ff. - 'das Hektor die Freundschaft von Achilles und Patroklos gelobt habe, ist in der grieschichen Dichtung, jedenfalls in der Ilias, nicht bezeugt'.
[588] cf. *Tr.* 5.6.25-8, where Ovid proclaims it *nec procul a vero* that Orestes struck Pylades.

Ovid introduces his rendition of the myth in *Tristia* 4.4 with a reference to the old name of the Euxine Sea (*dictus ab antiquis Axenus ille fuit* - *Tr.* 4.4.56). The tell-tale citation of what men of old say signals an Alexandrian footnote. The word *Axenus* is found only here in Ovidian poetry, which might lessen its authority, but the footnote also points towards 'the long literary pedigree of punning on the name of the Euxine Sea',[589] including in Euripides' *Iphigenia in Tauris*, the source for the story which Ovid is about to tell. Ovid thus uses the footnoted pun to invoke his source for the alert reader several lines prior to the story's main footnote in *Tristia* 4.4.65. In *Tristia* 4.4.61, Ovid mentions a bloodthirsty race whom his listeners hear about (*illi, quos audis hominum gaudere cruore*), but from whom do they hear about this race? From Ovid himself, who emphasises the marauding and bloodthirsty tribes in his vicinity.[590] The following lines link this tribe to the *Taurica ara* of Artemis, famously depicted by Euripides, and this allusion is reinforced by the footnote *ut memorant* in *Tristia* 4.4.65, which indicates the depths of Ovid's debt to tradition in this passage.[591] Ingleheart suggests that the reference to hearing is particularly 'alluding to the role played by oral tradition in the other major ancient account for this local practice, a major source for Euripides himself, Herodotus 4.103'.[592] The Herodotean passage is full of footnotes, both inspecific (οἱ μὲν δὴ λέγουσι... οἱ δὲ κατὰ μὲν τὴν κεφαλὴν ὁμολογέουσι... μέντοι... λέγουσι) and more geographically specific (λέγουσι

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[589] Ingleheart 2010b, 223. In Euripides *IT* 94 Tauris is referred to as ἄξενον, which is amusing, given that strangers are sacrificed there. cf. *Tr.* 3.13.27-8 (*Pontus, / Euxinus falso nomine* dictus); *Tr.* 5.10.13 (*Euxini mendax cognomine*).

[590] Ovid is stretching the truth to describe Tauris as *nec procul* (*Tr.* 4.4.63). Ingleheart (2010b, 224) points out a parallel at *Tr.* 2.191-2, where Ovid claims that the Colchians are threatening Tomis, evoking Medea even though Colchis is actually far away. cf. *Pont.* 3.2.46, again of Tauris.

[591] Ibid., 225-26 explores the allusions to Euripides in detail.

[592] Ibid., 224. Ingleheart (Ibid. n. 14) accepts the differences between Herodotus and Euripides' accounts noted by Kyriakou (2006, 21) and Wright (2005, 175ff.), but upholds the view that Euripides' 'debt to Herodotus was considerable' (Hall 1989, 111).

αὐτοὶ Ταῦροι... φασὶ δὲ...), and thus emphasises the existence of differing opinions, and particularly that locals may have their own traditions. This is an important precedent for Ovid's account of the old man telling the story of Orestes and Pylades in *Ex Ponto* 3.2.

Epistulae ex Ponto and Tradition

A more complex version of the story of Iphigenia in Tauris appears in *Ex Ponto* 3.2, related by an old man. Once again, Ovid heralds the upcoming reference to tradition with an Alexandrian footnote to a minor point (*Tauros dixere priores* - *Pont.* 3.2.45[593]). The story contains an Alexandrian footnote, *fama refert* (*Pont.* 3.2.51), which marks the transition from the old man's own direct knowledge of his country (the people worship Diana, and there is a temple with steps) to a story that he has heard. The old man appears conscious of *fama*'s shortcomings, and follows up the footnote by responding to his listener's doubts (*quoque minus dubites, stat basis orba dea* - *Pont.* 3.2.52) and confirming the present evidence (which he may have seen himself) for the past tale. The footnote refers to the authority of literary tradition; further footnotes appear at *Ex Ponto* 3.2.62 (*dicunt*) and 3.2.64 (*creditur*); a few lines later, the narrator mentions Orestes and Pylades, saying that *nomina fama tenet* (*Pont.* 3.2.70)[594] and reinforcing the earlier footnote. The *nomen* or *fama* of the youths survives as a living tradition which has been successfully transmitted in Scythia. This is reiterated in *Ex Ponto* 3.2.95-6 (*quamvis abiere tot anni, / in Scythia magnum nunc quoque nomen habent*) and at *Ex Ponto* 3.2.97, where Ovid punningly describes the

[593] For similar phraseology, cf. Staffhorst 1965, 88 ad 45.
[594] Staffhorst (Ibid., 99 ad 70) describes the footnote as 'eine Art Begründung, daß der alte Skythe die fremden Namen so gut im Gedächtnis hat'. The justification increases the narrator's authority.

tale as a *fabula vulgaris*;[595] it is not a story known only to the speaker, but is verifiable from other sources.[596] In fact, this tale has become so ubiquitous that knowledge of it is shared by Ovid and the old man, and the old man's authority can be confirmed by Ovid's (and the reader's) knowledge of the tale. The old man is, unlike Lelex's informants in the *Metamorphoses*, not the sole source of his tale, but one of many commemorators of a cultural memory which his audience shares, highlighting the authority of age and communally-held tradition.

Ingleheart argues that *fama refert* 'alludes to Ovid's tragic source',[597] and that it should be seen (in combination with *caeleste*) as an allusion to *IT* 87-88, where Orestes reports that men say the statue of Artemis fell from heaven (φασιν - *IT* 87). The footnote in the Scythian old man's tale thus performs a bridging function in temporal terms, reaching backward ('in alte Zeiten zurückrichenden')[598] in order to authorise the story. The source so-reached, however, also footnotes the story.[599] As in such cases in the *Fasti*, this has a distancing effect, holding the authority for the story at a remove from each narrator. Like the old man, Orestes does not guarantee the story on his own authority.

Despite the footnote which authorises the story on the basis of its past iterations in literary tradition, the story is in many respects an innovation. Fantham points out that 'it is probably Ovid himself who introduced Orestes and Pylades into the Roman

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[595] Barchiesi 1997, 36 - 'on the one hand the story is presented as a genuine piece of Pontic folklore handed down over the centuries (*vulgaris* = "popular"); on the other hand it is a summary of an extremely well-known text... (*vulgaris* = "trite, overworked")'. This much-mentioned *vulgaris fabula* recalls the *leve vulgus* of repeated rumours in the House of *Fama* in *Met.* 12.53.
[596] Bettini 2006 equates *fama* and *fabula*.
[597] Ingleheart 2010b, 233
[598] Staffhorst 1965, 91 ad 3.2.51
[599] Ingleheart (2010b, 233) sees the old man's proof of the myth as a 'witty reference to Euripides' characteristic fondness for providing *aetia* for contemporary cult'.

elegiac traditions.'[600] Moreover, Ovid presents the story from a Taurian perspective, which Ingleheart identifies as another Ovidian development.[601] Although the old man's footnotes invoke the authority of a long Greco-Roman tradition for the Scythian folklore, his own role is a novelty. Ovid emphasises the fact that Thoas is well-known in this part of the world (*clarus* - *Pont.* 3.2.59, *nec fuit Euxinis notior alter aquis* - *Pont.* 3.2.60), whilst Iphigenia is merely *nescioquam* (*Pont.* 3.2.62), a 'faux naïve touch'.[602] Fantham deems this local angle 'the single most innovative element' of the account.[603] Ovid's innovation becomes part of the authorised tradition of Orestes and Pylades, for over a century later in Lucian's *Toxaris* a Scythian explains that Orestes and Pylades' friendship was hugely celebrated among his countrymen, such that the tale was inscribed by their ancestors (ἀναγράψαντες οἱ πρόγονοι - *Tox.* 6) and all children know it (θᾶττον γοῦν τοὔνομ᾽ ἂν ἕκαστος αὐτῶν ἐπιλάθοιτο τοῦ πατρὸς ἢ τὰς Ὀρέστου καὶ Πυλάδου πράξεις ἀγνοήσειεν - *Tox.* 6). The footnotes in *Ex Ponto* 3.2 invoke for Ovid the authority of Euripides, the Greek tragedian famous for his rendering of this myth, which gives Ovid the freedom to innovate upon a known story, creating a variation whose authority is upheld by its broader confirmation in literary tradition.[604]

Like other aged figures in Ovidian poetry, the Scythian old man functions as an Alexandrian footnote, promulgating social memory, and as a comment on authority. The old man's identity remains curiously imprecise; he is merely a *senex quidam*

[600] Fantham 1992a, 270
[601] Ingleheart 2010b, 231
[602] Ingleheart 2010, 231
[603] Fantham 1992a, 276
[604] cf. Ibid., 278 - 'There is no limit to the variety that a skilled artist can obtain from a familiar theme, and the telling of the myth in *ex Ponto* does honour to the highest standards of post-Callimachean invention.'

(*Pont.* 3.2.41) whom Ovid meets by chance.[605] Ingleheart suggests that Ovid 'may thereby comment on a device typical of Euripidean tragedy, where minor characters who hasten along his plots are left unnamed and their identity vague and open to speculation'.[606] They essentially act as mouthpieces for information which the dramatist wishes to introduce and cannot themselves impart authority to their words; they have only the authority of their creator. Given the tradition of referring to poetic predecessors as old men and hence implying their antiquity and authority,[607] Ingleheart also raises the possibility of the *senex* representing Euripides, if one is prepared to minimise the *senex*'s putative identity as Taurian.[608] Euripides' 'priority in telling this myth, and literary stature, would... be signalled by the label *senex*'.[609] By placing this tale in the mouth of a figure implied to be its most authoritative narrator, Ovid lays claim to the authority of the tradition that Euripides created. Similarly, if one wished to give greater weight to the old man's identity as a foreign traveller (*haec ego sum terra... ortus* - *Pont.* 3.2.47), he could be identified with Euripides' source Herodotus, with his age signalling that he lived in the past, and created an earlier, authoritative tradition. Finally, given Ovid's self-presentation as a

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[605] *forte* - *Pont.* 3.2.41. Barchiesi (1997, 35) comments that the speaker 'typically enough in the case of information "on the spot", is a wise and loquacious old man; what is odd is the fact that he is not actually a local.'

[606] Ingleheart 2010b, 231. cf. Euripides *IT* 275, *Ba.* 717.

[607] cf. *Tr.* 2.364 - *lyrici Teïa Musa senis* = Anacreon, who self-presents as an old man in his poetry (Ingleheart 2010a, 296 ad 363-4); *Pont.* 4.14.32 - *agricolae Musa... senis* = Hesiod; *Eclogues* 6.70 - *Ascraeo... seni* = Hesiod. Clausen (1994, 203 ad 70) draws a parallel with Callimachus' *Hymn* 4.304 (Λυκίοιο γέροντος = Olen, with caveats by Mineur 1984, 238 ad 304ff.). cf. Harrison (2004, 113) who argues that the *senex* in *Georgics* 4 figures Virgil's poetic predecessor, Nicander, so that 'the source-poet's supposed age, expressed by the noun *senex*, points not to his biological age but to his role as potential model and literary ancestor'.

[608] The Taurian identification may be a shorthand for authority, as a native may be an eyewitness and thus possess greater knowledge. cf. the main characteristics of the old man of Croton in *Met.* 15.10-11 (*e senioribus unus / rettulit indigenis, veteris non inscius aevi*), who recalls *Aen.* 8.627 (*haud vatum ignarus venturique inscius aevi*). The *Met.* 'grounds certainty in the past rather than in the future' (Hardie 1997, 184) and attributes knowledge to an old man, not the divine *ignipotens.*

[609] Ingleheart 2010b, 232

senex in the exile poetry,[610] and the implausibility of him learning Getic or the tribe-beset Tomitans having time to listen to him lauding Cotta, this 'may be a case of the author tipping a wink to his readers that he himself is pulling all the strings in this narrative'.[611] Though Ovid presents countless internal narrators in his poetry, ultimately their words and authority stem from him.

In *Ex Ponto* 1.8.13, Ovid footnotes the foundation tale of Aegisos with *de se si credimus ipsis*, an Ovidian abbreviation for 'if we believe the inhabitants in what they say concerning themselves' which Tissol likens to the common situation in the *Fasti* where 'local inhabitants are the authority for recherché aetiological information'.[612] This footnote seems to hint that partial authorities provide flawed information. Here a greater difficulty arises, for this myth is not mentioned elsewhere. Gaertner summarises its possible provenance as follows: 'Ovid may be relying on a local tradition... he may be drawing from some literary source... or he may have invented the story.'[613] The footnote emphasises the lack of a secure tradition to authorise this story. Gaertner views Ovid's tale with acute scepticism ('Whatever Ovid's source, Aegissos is unlikely to be a barbarian foundation, as its name resembles common Greek toponyms'[614]). However, the possibility of the local people having their own (more glorious) explanation for their city's foundation seems not improbable. Ovid's footnote illustrates the fact that narrators may have their own motivations for telling a certain tale and for doing so in a particular way, and that their narrative authority

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[610] cf. *Tr.* 2.544, 4.1.73.
[611] Ingleheart 2010b, 233
[612] Tissol 2014, 125 ad 1.1.13-14. Gaertner 2005, 437-8 ad 1.8.13 - 'since the reflexive pronoun *se* is usually used in reference to the object of a clause only after the prepositions *inter*, *per*, *propter*..., the present expression is best interpreted as a brachylogy standing for *si credimus incolis quid ipsi de se dicant*'. cf. *Fa.* 4.685-90, 905-9, etc.
[613] Gaertner 2005, 437 ad 1.8.13
[614] Ibid. ad 18.13

should be treated with suspicion. Here the critique of authority functions at a more personal level than mere 'Skepsis über die mündliche Überlieferung'.[615]

Ovid also uses an Alexandrian footnote in the *Epistulae ex Ponto* to demarcate a story which other writers had earlier rejected, namely that Numa was the pupil of Pythagoras (*Pythagoraeque ferunt non nocuisse Numam* - *Pont.* 3.3.44). The use of *ferunt* is particularly pointed due to the story's contested status in tradition. Ogilvie states that the 'only historical fact about the second king of Rome, Numa Pompilius, is his name... Nothing else about him has any foundation, and it is possible to study the stages by which his legendary biography was constructed.'[616] *Ferunt* thus signals the *fama*-like growth of Numa's legend. Ogilvie suggests that the tale of Numa learning from Pythagoras was originally a Greek fiction, quickly adopted in Rome, so that 'by the time that the Romans first came to write their own history... his alleged discipleship under Numa was common currency.'[617] This account, however, began to be refuted,[618] the earliest objection being raised by Cicero in *Republic* 2.28-9,[619] where the story is discussed specifically in terms of tradition and authority. Manilius asks about the *memoria*, contrasting the fact that elders say it and that it is commonly believed with the fact that it cannot be proved by the authority of the public annals (*saepe enim hoc de maioribus natu audivimus et ita intellegimus vulgo existimari; neque vero satis id annalium publicorum auctoritate declaratum videmus*), and Scipio

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[615] Helzle 2003, 212 ad 1.8.13-14
[616] Ogilvie 1965, 88 ad 18-21. cf. Little 1970, 341, who dubs it a 'flagrant contradiction of well-known historical fact'.
[617] Ibid., 88-89 ad 18-21
[618] Wilkinson (1955, 213) wrongly attributes the discrepancy to Ovid's 'indifference to truth which is characteristic of the average Roman'.
[619] Ennius may have objected earlier. Skutsch (1985, 263) argues that 'he can hardly have told the old tale that Numa was a pupil of Pythagoras. That story... must have seemed even more absurd to Ennius, whose foundation date for Rome... would make Numa half a millennium older than Pythagoras.' cf. Hardie 2015, 478 n. ad 4-11 - 'il fatto che Numa avesse incontrato Pitagora potrebbe già essere stato rifiutato da Ennio'. Jocelyn (1972, 1011 and 1013), conversely, denies that Ennius wrote a 'naively factual chronicle'. cf. Zetzel 1995, 184-85; Garbarino 1973, 63-72; Myers 1994, 136-37.

assures him that it is *falsum*, and *neque solum fictum, sed etiam imperite absurdeque fictum*. The account of the 8th century Numa meeting the 6th century Pythagoras is also rejected on the grounds of chronological impossibility in Livy and Dionysius (Liv. 1.18.2-4; D.H. 2.59).[620] As Crahy and Hubaux argue, 'Ovide n'ignore certainement pas qu'il contredit ici toutes les données authentiques et c'est avec quelque intention particulière qu'au Livre 15... il s'attache à une tradition dont les esprits scientifiques on démontré le charactère légendaire. Toutefois, cette tradition est ancienne également.'[621]

Ovid's *ferunt* footnote here may recall his own previous reference to Pythagoras as Numa's teacher in *Metamorphoses* 15, which is also marked with *ferunt* (*Met.* 15.479). It is provocative on Ovid's part that the obvious interpretation of the Alexandrian footnotes is that hearsay is unauthoritative, given that in *Met.* 15 the story of Pythagoras is preceded by an acceptance of the authority of *certa fama* (*Met.* 15.58). However, as Wheeler points out, 'If poet and audience know that the meeting between Numa and Pythagoras is an anachronism, then the *ferunt* acknowledges the fictionality of Numa's meeting with Pythagoras.'[622] Ovid's insertion of the Alexandrian footnote functions as a transparency device, reminding the reader that this is only a story, as literary tradition attests. Ovid forestalls the inevitable accusations that his account is *solum fictum* by admitting that this is the case. He thereby retains narratorial control over poem and reader.

Thus although footnotes appear less frequently in the exile poetry than in the *Fasti* or the *Metamorphoses*, their versatility remains very much in play. Whilst footnotes can

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[620] 'Numa lebte vor Pythagoras' - Staffhorst 1965, 131 ad 3.3.44. cf. Livy's named source (40.29.8).
[621] Crahay and Hubaux 1958, 291
[622] Wheeler 1999, 127-28

demonstrate the connection of a narrative with an authoritative literary past, they can also serve as a reminder of the insubstantiality of tradition, as it grows and is (re)generated like *Fama* itself.

Literary Memory and Narrative Authority

Throughout Ovid's poetry, literary memory and Alexandrian footnotes complicate and often problematise the stories which they purport to authorise. The duality of *fama* as both authoritative tradition and insubstantial rumour is mirrored by the potential for inherent fragility of memory. Ovid is not consistent in his use of Alexandrian footnotes; their authority is perpetually in question, but can at times serve to authorise his innovations and grant him a place as an authoritative narrator in ancient literary tradition.

Within the sphere of narrative authority, Alexandrian footnotes are linked to other tropes of narrative authority, particularly to age, since they refer to the past and invoke its authority for the present. Footnotes draw directly upon the testimony of a past source in order to authorise the present tale. However, often a source is itself footnoted, problematic, or non-existent, in which case footnotes demarcate an innovation which is to be incorporated into tradition, and assert the poet's authority to create and mould the tradition as he wishes. This merges into ideas of 'correcting' tradition, amending omissions by poetic predecessors and even challenging them, particularly those who have an authoritative cultural status like Virgil. A later author cannot claim the authority of being first, but he can be *novus*, and set his own culminating, authoritative stamp upon tradition. Footnotes may thus actively signal a narrative's lack of source in order to highlight the narrator's creative power, and serve as a means whereby the present poet can self-authorise and canonise his poetry. In both the *Metamorphoses* and the *Fasti*, Ovid makes use of Alexandrian footnotes to mark his innovations, whereas in the exile poetry, Ovid innovates by leaving the footnotes out.

The close connection of footnotes with *fama*, and particularly with the Fama ecphrasis in the *Metamorphoses* (whose influence they cannot escape), positions them as commentary upon tradition and on the narrator's role within it. Fama as tradition is perpetually growing and being added to by successive authors, whether for good (and the inclusion of fuller details) or ill (and the addition of falsehoods presented as truth). This image reverberates throughout Ovid's poetry, and is crucial to his role as a poet. Ovid uses footnotes in the *Fasti*, for example, not merely to annotate the process of revision which the Roman calendar is perpetually undergoing, and his own authority to transform and update it, but also to annotate the ongoing process of transformation and addition which it (and literary tradition) will continue to undergo in the future.

The exile poetry is significant for including fewer Alexandrian footnotes than the *Fasti* and the *Metamorphoses*. Various explanations for this have been proposed; the most plausible is that Ovid is illustrating his exilic condition through his sparse verse. The exile poetry engages closely with myth and literary tradition, but the footnotes that appear in the *Epistulae ex Ponto* reach backward only to distance the narrator from the story. Footnotes can be used to intentionally make a claim as to the fictionality of a narrative and such transparency can, contradictorily, heighten the poetic authority of the Ovidian narrator. There is thus considerable variation in how footnotes are deployed across the poetry of Ovid and in how they function within his individual works.

Chapter 3: *Vates* and Poetic Authority

In archaic and classical Greece, seers exercised considerable authority, which was partly inherent within their religious role and partly dependent upon their heritage in established families of effective seers.[623] The dichotomy in the treatment of seers in Greek literature mirrors the dual conceptions of old age as encompassing either memory or senility. The seers of epic and tragedy are ultimately proven right and their authority and wisdom is implicit, even if initially denied by the misguided, whereas in comedy seers are usually wrong or otiose.[624] Despite the authority attributed to seers in Greek culture, the Roman *vates* has a somewhat fraught status, which is subject to ongoing negotiation by successive poets. Ennius disparages the songs of *vates* (*Scripsere alii rem / vorsibus quos olim Faunei vatesque canebat* - *Ann.* 206-7), refusing to use the verb *canere* for his own poetry due to its 'negative association with vatic utterance'.[625] However, despite his admiration for Ennius as a literary figure (*Ennius... noster* - *DRN* 1.117; *aeternis... versibus* - *DRN* 1.120), Lucretius groups Ennius with those same *vates*, casting him as a singer (*DRN* 1.117 - *Ennius ut noster cecinit*). Like other *vates*, in Lucretius' view, Ennius spreads falsehoods about the

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[623] Flower 2008, 37

[624] Ibid., 19. This dichotomy is also found in Roman drama. Plautus' tragicomic *Amphitryon* marks where it turns from tragedy to comedy by making Tiresias' advice redundant (*missum facio Teresiam senem* - Pl. *Am.* 1145). Jupiter is a better authority (*hariolos, haruspices / mitte omnis; quae futura et quae facta eloquar, / multo adeo melius quam illi, quom sum Iuppiter* - *Am.* 1132-4). cf. the Muses' knowledge at *Theog.* 38. cf. Moore 1995.

[625] Wheeler 1999, 64. Ennius claims to be a *poeta* (*Enni poeta* - *Sat.* fr. 11). As Fisher (2014, 32) notes, 'If Ennius and Homer are *poetae* who write in a meter other than the one used by the *vates* and *Faunei*, it is a reasonable inference that, in the eyes of Ennius, the *vates*, who employ the Saturnian meter, are inferior to *poetae*, who compose in hexameters.' In Sil. 12.390-3, Silius appeals to the Muses to allow him to glorify Ennius, referring to him as *vates* in Sil. 12.392 and 409.

afterlife, particularly his claimed encounter with Homer's ghost (*DRN* 1.120-6).[626] Lucretius famously attacks *vates* for inventing *somnia* which lead to irrationality:

> *Tutemet a nobis iam quovis tempore vatum*
> *terriloquis victus dictis desciscere quaeres.*
> *quippe etenim quam multa tibi iam fingere possunt*
> *somnia, quae vitae rationes vertere possint*
> *fortunasque tuas omnis turbare timore!* (*DRN* 1.102-6)

It is only with the Augustan poets that the term *vates* begins to be reclaimed as an elevated term for *poeta*, combining the ancient Roman seer who sang in verse with the Greek primitive poet who sang about gods and the universe.[627] When Virgil and Horace call themselves *vates*, they are assuming a title of significant status which is imbued with religious and poetic authority.[628] The famously irreverent Ovid is well-placed to explore the poetic and prophetic roles of *vates*, and to (re)assess their authority. The roles and authority of prophets and poets overlap and are often deliberately blurred. This allows poets to enjoy the quasi-religious authority of prophets, for both types of *vates* control the past and future, and are ultimately authorised by divine inspiration. The contested role of *vates* is one which Ovid himself assumes, inviting his reader to consider the consequent implications for his own poetic authority.[629]

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[626] cf. Gale 1994, 108; Harrison 2002a, 2 (especially on the 'clear distinction' between admiration and critique, emphasised by the unique collocation, *etsi praeterea tamen*); Wheeler 1999, 63.
[627] Dahlmann 1948; Newman 1967, 99-206. O'Hara (1990, 176-84) suggests that the Augustans exploit the negative past connotations of the *vates*.
[628] Virgil *Aen.* 7.41; Horace *Ep.* 1.7.11; Lucan 7.553, 9.980, 9.984. Munro (1928, 41 ad 1.102) - 'Virgil and succeeding writers made *uates* once more a name of honour'. cf. Nisbet and Hubbard 1970, 15 ad *Carm.* 1.1.35. Sperduti (1950, 221) notes that the Augustan poets 'revived the word deliberately, conscious of its more ancient religious connotation; and by so doing renewed the ancient alliance between poetry and prophecy'. Hardie (1995, 209) states that 'used as a self-description it appropriates to the poet a lofty position as social and religious spokesman'.
[629] cf. O'Higgins (1988, 209-10) on how Lucan self-presents as a *vates* and makes the 'occasional intervention to prophesy himself, or to corroborate, supplement, or correct what his fellow-*vates* say, as if they were colleagues, not creations'. His character-*vates* 'build a composite image of their vatic creator'.

Vates in the *Metamorphoses*

In the *Metamorphoses*, Ovid exploits the duality of *vates* as prophets and poets[630] to expose the metaliterary implications of their authority. The prophet-*vates* in the *Metamorphoses* all function, in various ways, as poets, and their authority figures that of Ovid himself. Conversely, the poet-*vates* are also prophets. Thus although Ovid largely effaces his vatic persona from the poem until the epilogue, he presents a series of substitute *vates* who illustrate different aspects of vatic authority, particularly in a poetic sense, and allow him to explore how that authority is asserted and problematised in varying contexts, and its implications for his own authority.

Seers feature throughout the *Metamorphoses*,[631] but are most prominent towards the later stages of the poem, where Ovid turns to Iliadic and Virgilian themes and the ongoing questions of authority come to the fore. Calchas, the first *vates* to feature in *Met.* 12, is introduced as *augur*[632] *Thestorides*, which evokes his authority as a seer as well as his role in literary tradition as an authoritative prophet. As Papaioannou notes, 'this distinctive mode of introduction... casts the Greek prophet in the light of his earlier epic appearance,'[633] for Calchas' patronymic is used by Homer only in *Iliad* 1.69 (Κάλχας Θεστορίδης).[634] The Homeric Calchas knows the present, the future and the past (ὃς ἤδη τά τ᾽ ἐόντα τά τ᾽ ἐσσόμενα πρό τ᾽ ἐόντα - *Il.* 1.70) and the Homeric line encapsulates the role of the seer, who not only knows the past as an old man

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[630] Lovatt (2013, 122) - 'the prophet is a doublet for the epic poet, the poet can be a sort of prophet.'
[631] *Met.* 3.348, 511, 527; 7.761; 9.407; 10.11; 11.68, 249; 13.320, 335, 720, 733, 774; 14.129; 15.155, 283, 435, 622, 867, 879.
[632] Although *augur* technically differs from *vates*, referring to an observer and interpreter of bird signs, poets used the two terms interchangeably. cf. *OLD* s.v. *augur* 2 - 'A seer, prophet'. *Augur* may be linked to *auctor*, since both derive from *augeo* (Benveniste 1973, 422).
[633] Papaioannou 2007, 35-36
[634] The reference is made exclusive (Ibid., 36) by Ovid's omission of Calchas' name, which demands familiarity with his Homeric source. *Augur* literally translates οἰωνοπόλων ὄχ᾽ ἄριστος (*Il.* 1.69).

remembering does, but also has authority over the future. Ovid mentions only Calchas' ability to foresee accurately (*veri providus*[635] - *Met.* 12.18), focussing on the unique temporal aspect of vatic authority, to see and explain what is to come. Ovid's use of *verum* directs attention towards Calchas' credibility and the authority of his predictions. The successful placation of Diana and return of fine weather implicitly affirms Calchas' vatic authority[636] and strengthens the rejection of the alternative narratives which were offered (*et sunt qui parcere Troiae / Neptunum credant... / at non Thestorides* - *Met.* 12.25-6). Whilst in the *Iliad* counterfactual statements in prophecies parallel the alternative narrative possibilities which are available to the narrator selecting from the threads of tradition, in the *Metamorphoses* Calchas' speeches are authoritatively definitive; what he says comes to pass.[637]

The Ovidian narrator uses this episode to comment upon the authority of Homer. The presence of Calchas' patronymic encourages the reader to compare the Homeric and Ovidian accounts of Calchas' augury. As Kirk notes, *Iliad* 2.318-9 is problematic, suspected as an interpolation by ancient grammarians.[638] Ovid not only draws upon the authority of the Homeric Calchas for his seer, but uses the authority of his own Calchas to assert the credibility of the Homeric version, particularly the petrification which is only mentioned in *Iliad* 2.319. However, Ovid also modifies the Homeric chronology,[639] for the Iliadic snake is petrified before the portent is interpreted (*Il.* 2.318-9), but in the *Metamorphoses* the transformation occurs after the seer's

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[635] cf. Themis in *Met.* 9.418 - *venturi praescia*. Themis' prophecy is typically omissive; she does not mention that Alcmaeon will trick Phegeus into giving up the *fatale aurum* (Apollodorus 3.7.5ff.). It is also highly allusive; Themis' foreknowledge of the future is a memory of Greek literature written prior to the *Metamorphoses*. cf. Hill 1999, 153 ad 404**;** Kenney (2011, 440 ad 418) notes how 'il verso mescola, tipicamente, innovazioni ovidiane e virgiliane'.
[636] Calchas' authority is influential in Poseidon's decision to take on his appearance in *Il.* 13.
[637] cf. the close of Odysseus' account of Calchas' prophecy in *Il.* 2.330: κεῖνος τὼς ἀγόρευε: τὰ δὴ νῦν πάντα τελεῖται.
[638] Kirk 1985, 149-50 ad 2.318-19. Aristarchus wholly athetizes 319.
[639] Musgrove 1997, 278-79 n. 29

interpretation (*Met.* 12.22-3). Ovid's vividly present version supersedes the reported and remembered version of the *Iliad*, suggesting that memory of past events may not be accurate. The *providus* Calchas is thus looking not forward but backward into literary tradition to provide an authoritative new reading.

Calchas assumes a poetic as well as prophetic role.[640] In *Met.* 12.27 he returns the narrative to the path which it takes in epic tradition; like the poet, he knows that what is needed next is a sacrifice to placate Diana (*nec enim nescitve tacetve / sanguine virgineo placandam virginis iram / esse deae* - *Met.* 12.27-9),[641] regardless of which branch of literary tradition is adopted (i.e. whether the sacrifice is Iphigenia or a substitute deer),[642] and he makes this known so that it can be accomplished. Calchas thus has the ability not only to interpret events but also to direct and enact them, just as his Homeric counterpart is accused by Agamemnon of bringing to pass the evils he foretells (ἐσθλὸν δ' οὔτέ τί πω εἶπας ἔπος οὔτ' ἐτέλεσσας - *Il.* 1.108). Calchas' two interpretations control the plot of Ovid's 'Iliad', mirroring the Ovidian narrator's control over the *Metamorphoses*. Calchas is thus simultaneously authorised by tradition in what he says (because the sacrifice has already happened in tradition), and authoring it (prompting the next action in this particular narrative).

Calchas' ability to predict and direct the future, and to interpret how it relates to the past and present mirrors the author's overview and foreknowledge of the course his work will take.[643] Although the Ovidian narrator's perspective might seem to mirror

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[640] Papaioannou (2007, 46) - 'A *vates*, both a prophet (and because of this) an epic poet'.
[641] Papaioannou (Ibid., 38) notes that the litotis, *nec nescitve*, 'toys with the seer's omniscience captured in *Iliad* 1.70.'
[642] Acknowledged, perhaps, by *fertur* in *Met.* 12.34.
[643] This is made explicit in Statius' *Achilleid*, where Calchas (a substitute for Statius and like him, inspired by Apollo - *Ach.* 1.9, 529) is 'an excellent "protector of the plot" of the Trojan War, as he ensures that the narrative moves forward by causing certain actions which trigger its continuation along the path of traditional myth - unavoidably, since the *Cypria*...and the *Iliad*... had already been written'

the analeptic viewpoint of an old man like Nestor because he is speaking of the distant past (*origine mundi* - *Met*. 1.3), it more closely resembles that of a *vates* like Calchas, since Ovid does not (despite the convoluted progress of his narrative) look only backward. From the outset, the narrator has in mind the endpoint of his poem (*ad mea... tempora* - *Met.* 1.4). Though primarily a seer, the *vates* Calchas thus also displays metaliterary characteristics, making him a figure for the Ovidian narrator. His authority is both prophetic and poetic, and he is always right. Although Calchas' prophecies are proleptic from his own perspective, they are analeptic for the poet and reader. As Calchas' Iliadic patronymic signals, the poetic tradition which relates Calchas' future has already been written in Homer. It is easy for prophets to be authoritative if their prophecies have already been proven accurate.

Calchas' role as a *vates* gives him greater knowledge than the dumbfounded ignorant masses (*obstipuere omnes* - *Met.* 12.18), but he is also not silent about it (*nec.. tacetve* - *Met.* 12.27). *Tacetve* has a number of shades of meaning. It alludes to the Iliadic Calchas' choice to remain silent about his vatic knowledge until Achilles guarantees his safety from Agamemnon's wrath (*Il*. 1.76-79). However, it also refers to the ability of narrators (and particularly poets) to be selective in their accounts, and to choose what to mention and what to omit.[644] Calchas displays selectivity in his pronouncements. He begins his interpretation of the bird omen with the Greek victory at Troy (*vincemus... gaudete, Pelasgi* - *Met.* 12.19), only afterwards adding the vague caveat that there will be a delay in achieving it (*sed erit nostri mora longa laboris* -

(Fantuzzi 2012, 88). Calchas' cry *quid aufers? / Non patiar!* (*Ach.* 1.527-8) is a metapoetic intervention, providing Ulixes with the information required to retrieve Achilles, and mirroring the Ovidian narrator's demands in *AA* 1.691-6 (*quid facis, Aeacide?*).

[644] cf. Nestor's omission of Hercules from his centauromachy.

Met. 12.20).[645] As Musgrove notes, 'Calchas' explanation ignores the agony of the ten-year war for people on both sides,'[646] omitting the perspectives of a large number of Trojans and Greeks. Calchas foresees the truth (*veri providus* - *Met.* 12.18),[647] and remains an authoritative figure (as demonstrated by his success in persuading the Greeks to sacrifice Iphigenia), but the reader cannot ignore the fact that prophecies may only offer a single voice. The Ovidian narrator is also selective in his narration; he will 'omit what Homer discusses and concentrate on what Homer omits'.[648]

In contrast to Calchas' truthful but mono-Hellenic perspective, the following Fama ecphrasis displays indiscriminate multivocality, mixing truth and falsehood (*Met.* 12.54). This may heighten the impression of Calchas' truthful authority. However, Calchas and Fama are not entirely disparate entities, for both have extraordinary knowledge and the ability to report and direct events. The Fama ecphrasis may emphasise the limitations of Calchas' monoperspective and invite the reader to recognise that silence can be as misleading as indiscriminate inclusion, and hence to revisit Calchas' speeches in a more pluralistic manner. The question is whether doing so will increase or detract from Calchas' authority. Although Calchas 'exemplifies the Ovidian narrator, the epic *vates* with comprehensive knowledge of earlier literature',[649] Fama represents the Ovidian narrator's strategy of fusing multiple strands of tradition with innovation to create his poem. How much does the unreliability of Fama colour the authority of Calchas and the Ovidian narrator?

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[645] The length of the delay is reported by the Ovidian narrator at *Met.* 12.21.
[646] Musgrove 1997, 279. Musgrove shows how Ovid's allusions to the *Aeneid* and the *Iiad* highlight contrasting perspectives.
[647] *Providus* can also mean prudent (*OLD* s.v. 2), recalling Calchas' caution in *Il.* 1.76-79.
[648] Hill 1999, 218 ad 584
[649] Papaioannou 2007, 46

Another vatic analogue for Ovid in the *Metamorphoses* is Pythagoras.[650] However, his vatic identity (and hence authority) is complicated by the tension between his roles as philospher, prophet, and poet. At *Met.* 15.282-3, Pythagoras' parenthesis (*nisi vatibus omnis / eripienda fides*) comments on the trustworthiness of bards and implicitly places Pythagoras among them.[651] Pythagoras uses vatic language (*vaticinor* - *Met.* 15.174) to invoke the authority of *vates*,[652] and the traditions of the Pythagoreans attribute mantic powers to him.[653] Pythagoras also presents himself as a *vates* in *Metamorphoses* 15.143ff. in terms which refer equally well to poetic and oracular inspiration.[654] He states that he is divinely inspired (*et quoniam deus ora movet, sequar ora moventem / rite deum* - *Met.* 15.143-4), presenting himself as a passive mouthpiece for the god, before asserting vatic authority in his ability to unlock the oracles of the sublime mind (*augustae*[655] *reserabo oracula mentis* - *Met.* 15.145).[656] Divine inspiration, particularly from Apollo, is equally applicable to prophets and poets, and this is the start of Pythagoras' poetic proem, in which he declares, *canam* (*Met.*15.147), recalling Ovid's own declaration at the beginning of the *Fasti* (*tempora*

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[650] Hardie 1997, 189 - 'Pythagoras is the last and grandest of the many characters within the *Metamorphoses* who figure, more or less obliquely, the poet himself.'
[651] Galinsky (1975, 174) notes that Ovidian irony 'does not at all mean the contrary of what is said, but merely serves to call it slightly into question'.
[652] Hill (2000b, 207 ad 15.174) states that *vaticinor*'s 'strong sense of speaking with divine authority' may jar with the philosophical context, since Lucretian principles (as at *Met.* 15.165) condemn *vates*.
[653] Pythagorean prophecies of earthquakes, etc. - Riedweg 2005, 4. Pythagorean divination is cited in D.L. 8.20. D.L. 8.21 mentions that Aristippus etymologises Pythagoras' name as deriving from the Pythia and his prophetic powers (as a compound of Πύθιος and ἀγορεύειν), but Bömer **(**1986, 295 ad 15.144-5**)** thinks a reference to this at *Met.* 15.144 unlikely.
[654] Pythagoras was associated with Apollo and the Muses (Iamb. *Vit. Pyth.* 9), showing his prophetic and poetic affiliations. Myers 1994, 143-44 - 'Ovid plays with the dual, and to Lucretius antithetical, associations of the *vates*, as, on the one hand, a figure of supernatural, even sacerdotal, authority, and, on the other hand, as a scientific investigator of and knowledgeable authority on philosophical truths.'
[655] The oracular context of *augustae* foreshadows the oracles concerning Augustus at *Met.* 15.446-9, 807-42 (Ibid., 142).
[656] Pythagoras claims that he will open up his Delphi (*Delphosque meos... recludam* - *Met.* 15.144, but Hill (2000b, 205 ad 144) argues that Delphi 'is used here metaphorically for Pythagoras' understanding, attributed by him to divine assistance'.

cum causis... lapsaque sub terras ortaque signa canam - *Fa.* 1.1-2),[657] though in the *Metamorphoses* Ovid uses the verb *dicere* (*Met.* 1.1) in pointed avoidance of the expected *canam.* Pythagoras intends to use his vatic insight for a Lucretian revelation of the hidden workings of the natural world.[658] Though primarily a reference to Lucretius, these lines might also imply the revelation of the past,[659] just as Ovid's *Metamorphoses* begins from the beginnings of the world. Thus by 'calling his philosophical internal narrator a *vates*, Ovid forges a connection between Pythagoras and his own role as primary narrator.'[660]

The representation of Pythagoras as a *vates* is troubling, however, given that elsewhere Pythagoras condemns the false fears in which bards induce credence (*materiem vatum*, *falsique pericula mundi* - *Met.* 15.155) and *nomina vana* (*Met.* 15.154). Should the authority of *vates* be affirmed or denied? This distrust of *vates* is reminiscent of Lucretius' *De Rerum Natura*, which Pythagoras' speech frequently evokes:[661]

> *Tutemet a nobis iam quovis tempore vatum*
> *terriloquis victus dictis desciscere quaeres.*
> *quippe etenim quam multa tibi iam fingere possunt*
> *somnia, quae vitae rationes vertere possint*
> *fortunasque tuas omnis turbare timore!*
> *et merito; nam si certam finem esse viderent*
> *aerumnarum homines, aliqua ratione valerent*
> *religionibus atque minis obsistere vatum.* (*DRN* 1.102-9)

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[657] Call. *Aet.* 1.21-4; *Aen.* 1.1; *Theb.* 1.4. Pythagoras' next comment is also poetic (*iuvat ire per alta / astra* - *Met.* 15.147-8). Ovid will be carried *above* the stars (*Met.* 15.875-6). cf. Horace *Carm.* 1.1.35-6.
[658] *Met.* 15.146-7 - *magna nec ingeniis investigata priorum / quaeque diu latuere, canam. DRN* 1.408-9 - *poteris caecasque latebras / insinuare omnis et verum protrahere inde*.
[659] Bettini 2008, 368 - 'the practice of divination at Rome (as in ancient Greece) dealt not only in revealing the future but also in bringing to light events clouded by the shadows of history.' On Pythagoras' foresight, cf. Empedocles 31 B 129 D-K (ὁππότε γὰρ πάσῃσιν ὀρέξαιτο πραπίδεσσιν, / ῥεῖ ὅ γε ὄντων πάντων λεύκσσεσκεν ἕκαστον / καί τε δέκ' ανθρώπων καί τ' εἴκοσιν αἰώνεσσιν).
[660] Myers 1994, 159
[661] Hardie 1995

Like Pythagoras, Lucretius rejects the superstitions that priests practise upon the credulous. However, Lucretius' philosophical approach differs from that espoused by Pythagoras, for he claims that due to the mortality of the soul there is nothing to fear after death, whereas Pythagoras asserts a cyclical existence (*morte carent animae* - *Met.* 15.158; *omnia mutantur, nihil interit* - *Met.* 15.165). By citing his presence in the Trojan War, Pythagoras evokes Homer, who is presumably one of the *vates* whom Lucretius critiques, since the *Odyssey* features a journey to the Underworld.[662] Pythagoras' dismissal of *materiem vatum* sits uneasily beside his self-presentation as a reincarnated Homeric prophet. Ovid is playing upon the contradictory traditional view of the *vates* as inspired poet and the Lucretian rejection of *vates* in favour of the philosophical scientist whose authority is based upon reason.[663] Pythagoras claims the authority of logic and inspiration, 'mirroring Ovid's own practice in the rest of the poem of juxtaposing, but not thereby necessarily opposing, science and myth'.[664] However, the competing conceptions of *vates* prompt the audience to question Pythagoras' authority.

Although almost half of *Met.* 15 is devoted to his speech, Pythagoras' authority is undermined at the outset by the Ovidian narrator's description of Pythagoras' utterances as *docta quidem... sed non et credita* (*Met.* 15.74). The Ovidian narrator offers two criteria by which Pythagoras' speech can be judged. Being *docta* might be seen as a marker of authority, for it can be 'a conventional and complimentary synonym for "poet"'[665] and an indicator of knowledge.[666] However, *docta* can also be negatively construed as a characteristic of the 'stock character of the crazed

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[662] Katabasis is also depicted in the *Aeneid* of Virgil, a Roman *vates*. Hieronymus says that Pythagoras himself went to Hades (D.L. 8.21).
[663] Rather than misunderstanding the Augustan concept of *vates*, as Newman (1967, 108) suggests.
[664] Myers 1994, 157-58
[665] Kenney 1970, 366
[666] cf. *doceo* - *Met.* 15.172; *docebo* - *Met.* 15.238. Lucretius uses *doceo* at *DRN* 1.931.

philosopher'.[667] The Ovidian narrator's reference to the incredibility of Pythagoras' teaching at *Met.* 15.74 recalls a similar comment about Claudia Quinta in *Fasti* 4.307 (*casta quidem, sed non et credita*), who, unlike Pythagoras, proves that she is telling the truth (*credita vix tandem teste pudica dea* - *Fa.* 4.344). As Hardie states, 'Non essere creduto è un ulteriore elemento che collega il Pitagora ovidiano al poeta delle *Metamorfosi*,'[668] for Ovid admits in *Tristia* 2.64 that his own *Metamorphoses* is unbelievable (*in non credendos corpora versa modos*). Although Pythagoras' speech is *non credita*,[669] it is nevertheless deemed worthy of inclusion in its entirety in the *Metamorphoses*. Perhaps the lack of belief hints at the Ovidian narrator's unreliability as an assessor of tales (implying that the narrative is worthy of belief). Pythagoreanism was notorious in antiquity for its outlandish statements, and there was a tradition that the section of any epic espousing Pythagorean views could be dismissed as eccentric fantasy. This seems to be what Horace is getting at when he refers to *somnia Pythagorea* in *Epistles* 2.1.51-2.[670] On this basis, Pythagoras' authority is undermined.

How is this ambiguous authority to be reconciled with the silent and approving audience described in *Met.* 15.66-8? Barchiesi points out that an attentive audience is 'an important accessory for any didactic text',[671] and that Pythagoreans particularly emphasise the importance of listening, silence, and unconditional reverence.

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[667] Volk 2015, 34. In Callimachus' *Iamb*. 1.61-3, Euphorbus is also not listened to. Pythagoras' model, Lucretius, is, Barchiesi notes (1989, 77), a 'tipico esempio di poesia «non creduta»', for though his poetry was *doctus* (cf. Statius *Silv*. 2.7.76), it fails to convince Memmius or the Roman audience whom he represents (on whether Memmius represents the Roman audience or is judged by it, cf. Barchiesi 2006, 299 and Mitsis 1993); he too is *non credita*. cf. Barchiesi 2001, 65.
[668] Hardie 2015, 494 ad 72-4
[669] This may reflect the fact that 'in antiquity - and in Roman culture in particular - Pythagoras' status as a teacher is a highly resisted one' (Barchiesi 2001, 63). Numa is guided by Egeria (*Met.* 15.479) and does not follow Pythagoras' teachings.
[670] Brink 1971, 100 ad 52; Rudd 1989, 82 ad 51-2. Prinzen's (1998, 253-56) suggestion that Horace is distancing himself from Ennius' Pythagoreanising views is the most convincing.
[671] Barchiesi 2001, 64

Pythagoras thus appears to have the perfect audience, which naturally accepts his authority since it is comprised of his followers. The wonder which Pythagoras evokes in his audience, a 'nota chiave del discorso di Pitagora',[672] is typical of audiences throughout the *Metamorphoses*.[673] While Lucretius denounces wonder (*DRN* 4.595) in favour of scientific rationale (*DRN* 4.572ff.), Pythagoras and Ovid embrace it,[674] with Pythagoras' speech 'mirroring Ovid's own practice in the rest of the poem of juxtaposing... science and myth'[675] and inviting his audience to marvel at it. Pythagoras' speech thus functions as a miniature rendition of the *Metamorphoses*. It includes transformations which feature elsewhere in the *Metamorphoses*,[676] and its acceptance suggests the authority of Ovid's own narrative, at least for some audiences.[677] Barchiesi points out, however, that *silentes* is used as a noun elsewhere in Latin only in the metaphorical sense of 'the deceased',[678] suggesting that Pythagoras' audience consists of the dead, in particular Numa, who predeceased him by two centuries.[679] One therefore wonders whether this audience that accepts Pythagoras' authority actually exists, and the external reader is left to ponder the

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[672] Hardie 2015, 492 ad 67. cf. *Met.* 15.317, 321, 408, 410, etc.
[673] Anderson 1963, 4 - 'The poet himself or a narrator within the poem may claim attention with a *res mira*; or the person being changed may react to his alteration with astonishment; or finally people may be surprised after the metamorphosis has occurred.' cf. Hardie 2015, 492 ad 67 - 'la sorpresa è anche una reazione tipica alle narrazioni di metamorfosi.'
[674] *Met.* 15.317, 15.66-7.
[675] Myers 1994, 157
[676] *Met.* 15.319 recalls *Met.* 4.285-388; *Met.* 15.385 recalls *Met.*1.722-3. cf. Book 1's flood and *Met.* 15.262-312; 15.270-86 (esp. 73-6) recalls 5.635-41. cf. Jones 2005, 12-13 on how Pythagoras and the Ovidian narrator express mutual disbelief in each other's tales.
[677] Barchiesi 1994, 245 - 'Il poeta introduce il suo pubblico a una scena piena di illusioni, e tiene aperta un'alternativa perpetua fra partecipazione ingenua e distacco, credulità e ironia.' cf. Wheeler 1999, esp. 166ff. - 'The responsibility for deciding between belief and disbelief lies squarely with the audience.' Galinsky (1998, 315) asks if Pythagoras serves as foil or complement to the poet Ovid.
[678] Barchiesi 2001, 64 For *silentes* used metaphorically, see e.g. *Met.* 13.25, Horace *Epod.* 5.51. Another *vates* who speaks to the dead is Orpheus.
[679] The Ovidian narrator claims that Numa listened to Pythagoras, a chronological impossibility that had been discredited in Augustan culture (Feeney (1999, 22) dubs it 'the most famous anachronism in Roman history'). Numa is thought to have lived almost 200 years prior to Pythagoras (D.H. 2.59ff.; Cicero *Tusc.* 4.1, *Rep.* 2.28; Liv. 1.18.2-3). *Pont.* 3.3.44 qualifies the statement that Pythagoras taught Numa with *ferunt*, while *Fa.* 2.153ff. mentions Egeria as an alternative source. When Ovid mentions the Camenae in *Met.* 15.482 in addition to Pythagoras, it reminds the reader that the two were traditionally *alternative* informants of Numa (Barchiesi 2001, 66).

strength of Pythagoras' vatic authority. Given the resemblance of Pythagoras and his narrative to the Ovidian narrator and his *Metamorphoses*, Ovidian authority is also problematised.

'Trust Me, He's a *Vates*'

Some speakers in the *Metamorphoses* incorporate seers into their narratives in the hope of coopting vatic authority. Pythagoras refers to unnamed prophets and oracles in tradition (*vates / faticinasque ferunt sortes* - *Met.* 15.435-6),[680] and then introduces a specific seer, Helenus (*Met.* 15.436), whose provenance is well-known,[681] and whose prophecy he can personally remember via metempsychosis, in order to heighten the authority of his narrative. Papaioannou notes the 'aura of authority that Pythagoras enjoys on account of Helenus'.[682] Helenus' authoritative vatic vision is well-established,[683] but proves not entirely straightfoward. He is introduced by his patronymic, *Priamides* (*Met.* 15.48), which draws attention to his Homeric heritage, but also reminds the reader that in *Iliad* 20.345ff. it is not Helenus but Poseidon who provides this prophecy. Pythagoras' reiteration that Helenus' speech comes from his own memory in *Met.* 15.450 (*mente memor refero*) highlights the fact that the signalled intertext provides a different record of events. Ovid's Helenus also recalls the prominence of Helenus' prophetic authority in *Aeneid* 3, where Virgil emphasises his wide-ranging oracular skill, encompassing bird signs, haruspicy, astrology, and knowledge of Phoebus' will (*Aen.* 3.359ff.), and the respect he is afforded by Aeneas. Virgil's qualification of this at *Aeneid* 3.432-4 initially appears rhetorical, designed to

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[680] Lowrie (2009, 205 n. 75) argues that here vatic prophecy 'is assumed to carry authority.'
[681] Helenus has an authoritative literary heritage, and belongs to a family of seers.
[682] Papaioannou 2011, 38. The Iliadic Helenus primarily has authority as a warrior and wise counsellor; his prophetic powers are downplayed (Ibid., 36).
[683] cf. *Met.* 13.720-3 where the *vates* Helenus (*vati Phrygio*), predicts the future reliably so that his listeners are certain of it (*futurorum certi, quae cuncta fideli / Priamides Helenus monitu praedixerat*).

emphasise Helenus' authority.[684] However, the prophecy of the Virgilian Helenus is incomplete (as he himself admits at *Aen.* 3.377 - *pauca... e multis*), despite being the longest prophecy concerned with Aeneas' journey in the *Aeneid*,[685] and at times untrue.[686] Moreover, he features in a different context to his counterpart in the *Metamorphoses* and his prophecy deals with Aeneas' journey rather than the future of Rome, so it cannot corroborate Pythagoras' memory. The remembered Helenus suggests that the authority of Ovid's Helenus may be also problematic; *donec* in *Met.* 15.442 echoes Virgil's *dum* (*Aen.* 1.5), and highlights that the war which will precede Italy being *amicius* (*Met.* 15.443) has not been mentioned by Ovid's Helenus, unlike Virgil (*multa quoque et bello passus* - *Aen*. 1.5). Helenus' problematic speech leaves the reader wondering whether Pythagoras has sufficiently understood his prophecy (*Met.* 15.439-40). As Papaioannou notes, 'neither Pythagoras the prophet, no[r] his acclaimed source of authority are reliable in terms of credibility'.[687]

Like Pythagoras, Ovid includes parentheses which uphold the reliabity of his narrative as long as *vates* tell the truth,[688] but demand belief in unlikely things, suggesting not *in vate veritas*, but *in vatibus mendacium*.[689] In *Met.* 13.733-4, the Ovidian narrator parenthetically comments on the truthfulness of bards (*si non omnia vates / ficta reliquerunt*).[690] The context is problematic because whilst the rejection of

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[684] cf. *Met.* 15.283-4 - *nisi vatibus omnis / eripienda fides*. Horsfall (2006, 320 ad 433-4) comments that the repetitions characterise Helenus with 'lofty prolixity'.
[685] Virgil's Helenus omits Polyphemus, Anchises' death, the storm, Dido, the return to Sicily.
[686] At *Aen.* 3.458-60, Helenus says the Sibyl will explain the wars, but actually the by-then-deceased Anchises will do so. Aeneas complains in vain about his false prophecy in *Aen.* 6.343-6, for it was true, albeit fulfilled in 'the barest, cruellest terms' (Segal 1965, 649).
[687] Papaioannou 2011, 35
[688] *Met.* 15.284, 15.879. The *in vate veritas* topos dates back at least as far as the elder Cato (*dicam de istis Graecis suo loco... et hoc puta vatem dixisse* - *De Med.* fr.1 (Plin. *NH* 39.7).
[689] Cole 2008, 161
[690] cf. *Met.* 15.282-3, 15.879. Hopkinson 2000, 210 ad 13.733-4 - 'conditional expressions such as this one generally serve not to cast doubt on a statement, but to reinforce it.' cf. Stinton 1976. Note Feeney 1991, 228 - 'We cannot accept as "truth" anything which this bard tells us, coming as it does with his health warning.'

certain myths dates back to Pindar,[691] Ovid's use of the topos is coloured with self-irony for the Ovidian narrator who here incites belief in the Scylla story uses the same tale in *Amores* 3.12.19-22 as an example of the fictionality of poetry and includes his own verses among those which should be disbelieved.[692] Ovid decries poets' creation of the Scylla tale,[693] but is himself one of the *vates* who tells it.[694] Indeed, Ovid is the first and only *vates* to describe Scylla's girlhood in extant poetry,[695] so it is his own authority that he is questioning.[696] Ovid's Scylla narrative also affects the authority of the Virgilian Helenus, for its parenthesis recalls Helenus' speech in *Aeneid* 3, which contains a similar conditional appeal to vatic authority following an account of Scylla (*praeterea, si qua est Heleno prudentia vati, / si qua fides, animum si veris implet Apollo* - *Aen.* 3.433-4).[697] Ovid's parenthesis reflects on Helenus,[698] for as Tissol comments, 'It is comically disrespectful of Ovid to summon before his readers' minds the solemn and, in context, unimpeachably accurate prophecy of a Vergilian *vates*, only to interject a story, not mentioned by Vergil, in which the bards may have left nothing but falsehoods.'[699] Ovid thus calls into question the authority of both the Virgilian Helenus, and Virgil himself, as well as his own credibility, and creates a subtle commentary upon 'the standardization of the literary motif of epic prophecies

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[691] Galinsky 1975, 176-77
[692] In *Tr.* 4.7.14 Scylla appears on Ovid's list of impossible things. cf. Plin. *NH* 8.80.
[693] On *licentia vatum* and lack of *fides*, cf. *Am.* 3.12.41ff. In 43-44 Ovid bewails too-credulous readers.
[694] Galinsky 1975, 176
[695] Ovid's description of Scylla (*virginis ora gerens et... / aliquo quoque tempore virgo* - *Met.* 13.733-4) echoes Virgil's description of Venus (*virginis os habitumque gerens et virginis arma / Spartanae* - *Aen.* 1.315-6) and suggests an irreverent reinterpretation of the goddess as a lapsed virgin.
[696] Hill 2000b, 164 ad 13.733
[697] Although the Virgilian Helenus appeals to vatic authority not to claim the truth of the Scylla story, but to underscore the importance of the advice he is about to give (the move to the new topic is marked by *praeterea* in *Aen*. 3.433), the parenthesis strengthens the link with the Ovidian passage.
[698] Casali 2006, 152
[699] Tissol 1997, 112

about Rome's glorious destiny to succeed Greece as the political and cultural ruler of the world'.[700]

In *Met.* 12, Nestor uses Mopsus to heighten the authority of his narrative. He prefers Mopsus' explanation of Caeneus' metamorphosis to other possibilities, but needs Mopsus' inherent vatic authority to establish it as the authoritative account, given the existence of competing, discordant voices.[701] As a *vates*, Mopsus has 'considerable authority, superior knowledge, vision and foresight,'[702] and this enables him to induce belief in his narrative, which according to Nestor is believed because of its source (*credita res auctore suo est* - *Met.* 12.532). This statement could refer to Mopsus as an authoritative reporter, but also could suggest his authorship of his account, indicating his ability to narrate his own creation which contradicts eyewitness accounts (*ferebant* - *Met.* 12.523).[703] Ovid may be using his internal narrators to assert the authority of a tale of metamorphosis which he has invented, and 'roguishly to suggest how easy it is to be inventive with metamorphosis as a literal subject and that neither the resulting stories nor their author should be believed too readily'.[704] But who is Mopsus' own *auctor*? Surely his vatic father,[705] Ampyx, who was mentioned in *Metamorphoses* 5.109-10, and by whose name Mopsus is introduced (*Ampycides* - *Met.* 12.524). The fact that Ampyx was also a seer[706] tacitly contributes to Mopsus' vatic credentials and the authority of his statements. Nestor wishes 'obliquely to claim

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[700] Papaioannou 2011, 33
[701] cf. *Argonautica* 1.65-6 and 80 where Mopsus is explicitly identified as a skilled seer.
[702] Papaioannou 2007, 118. Her conclusion that as a *vates* Mopsus is 'someone not likely to lie' is suspect, for as she herself states (Ibid., 116),'he is a seer, a *vates*, and so a speech manipulator'.
[703] The account is focalised from Mopsus' perspective (*vidit* - *Met.* 12.525, *aspexit* - *Met.* 12.529) and closely matches Herodotus' description of the phoenix (Hdt. 2.73).
[704] Galinsky 1975, 178. There is no mention of Caeneus' transformation in Apollonius 1.59-64.
[705] cf. Mopsus' introduction as *Ampycides sagax* at *Met.* 8.316. Another version of Mopsus' heritage states that he was the son of Manto, daughter of the seer Tiresias. Both versions assert Mopsus' membership of an oracular family, a basis for his authority.
[706] Bremmer 2008, 137

for himself the reverend authority of a Mopsus, thus enhancing the credibility of his version of the battle'.[707] Here Mopsus is engaged not in scheduled haruspicy, but in the most difficult aspect of vatic performance, the apparently-spontaneous accreditation and interpretation of unpredicted phenomena, in this case a variation on traditional bird signs. His authority is thus unusually reliant on vatic charisma. However, the fact that Mopsus' pronouncement is related by Nestor allows the latter to mention other bases of the seer's authority such as his familial connections, in order to increase the authority of the accredited seer whom he is citing to add authority to his own sighting of the bird Caeneus (*quae mihi tum primum, tunc est conspecta supremum* - *Met.* 12.526). Mopsus is, according to Nestor, successful in convincing his audience of Lapiths of the authority of his explanation (*credita res auctore suo est* - *Met*. 12.532). However, Davis and Musgrove point out the absence of convincing evidence to back up his claims.[708] The reader may not be so easily convinced as the grieving Lapiths. Mopsus' vatic authority has enabled Nestor to construct a new version of tradition, and to make it believable. At *Met.*12.532 he is 'acknowledged as a bard, an author and narrator of his own epic creation'.[709] Mopsus' authority has given Nestor authority.

Audience Response to Vatic Authority

Whilst the authority of *vates* in the *Metamorphoses* can be prodigious, it is also problematised and undermined. As we have already seen in the case of Pythagoras, the response of internal audiences is a contributory factor in this. Vatic authority is

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[707] Williams 2009b, 161
[708] Davis 2008, 436 - 'The story gains belief not because it is probable, not because it is supported by convincing evidence, but because a prophet says it's true'; Musgrove 1998, 228 - 'a seer... who was believed merely because of his own *auctoritas*, not because of any concrete evidence'.
[709] Papaioannou 2007, 119

frequently tested by audiences and is often rejected.[710] *Vates*, whether prophets or poets, rely on their authority to convince their audiences, and in the *Metamorphoses* many of Ovid's prophetic *vates* have metaliterary significance. When their authority is rejected, prophets and poets speak or sing in vain.

The way that audiences respond to Tiresias illuminates his authority and also comments upon that of the Ovidian narrator. Ovid establishes Tiresias' vatic status and associated authority by recounting how he acquired them (*Met.* 3.316-38). Tiresias' first (failed) exercise of authority is in a legal sense, rather than a vatic one.[711] Although he is *doctus*[712] (*Met.* 3.322), Juno does not accept his authority (nor his affirmation of Jupiter's statement). The weakness of experience-based authority here contrasts with its strength in the *Ars Amatoria*, where the Ovidian narrator claims to have authority based on *usus* rather than divine inspiration (*AA* 1.25-30), juxtaposing the two types of authority (*vati parete perito* - *AA* 1.29). The confirmation of Tiresias' vatic utterances by events (*exitus illam / resque probat* - *Met.* 3.349-50) is a modification of the *usus* authority criterion; Tiresias' authority is predicated not on his own experiences, but on those of others, which he has foretold and which have subsequently come to pass. His reputation as a seer is based upon such occurences (*Cognita res meritam vati... attulerat famam* - *Met.* 3.511-12). This is highlighted at *Met.* 3.527 (*Dicta fides sequitur*[713] *responsaque vatis aguntur*), where the fulfilment of the *vates*' predictions results in *fides*. *Responsa* also picks up on the earlier statement that Tiresias gives *inreprehensa responsa* (*Met.* 3.340). In the Narcissus

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[710] In *Met.* 13.774 Polyphemus scorns Telemon (*o vatum stolidissime*), but he is speaking the truth (*vera monentem* - *Met.* 13.775). cf. the *Iliadic* seers - Cassandra, Calchas, Chryses.
[711] Balsley 2010; cf. Coleman 1990 on the use of judicial language in this episode.
[712] *Doctus* here is generally seen as alluding to his role as *vates* (Bömer 1989, 532 n.ad 323 - 'Das Adjektiv wird zur Bezeichnung des *vates* seit Enn. ann. 18 verwendet'; Coleman 1990, 573 n. 9). cf. *Met.* 15.74, where Pythagoras is *docta... sed non et credita*.
[713] The repetition of the verb from the previous line (*talia dicentem* - *Met.* 3.526) emphasises its truth.

and Pentheus episodes which illustrate Tiresias' accuracy, his vatic status is repeatedly mentioned, reinforcing his authority and its vatic basis.[714]

Tiresias' accuracy and legitimacy is tested several times by his audiences. Liriope's query is presented not as a desire to learn the future, but as a test of Tiresias' reliability and authority (*prima fide vocisque ratae temptamina sumpsit* - *Met.* 3.341). The Ovidian narrator provides the *vates*' prophecy in direct speech, warning that it long seemed empty (*vana diu visa est vox auguris* - *Met.* 3.349),[715] but it is subsequently confirmed. Liriope's opinion of Tiresias' authority remains unspecified; it is perhaps subsumed into the universal respect for Tiresias that results from his prophecy's fulfilment. One suspects, however, that she might not consider Tiresias to have given *inreprehensa responsa* (*Met.* 3.340);[716] though true, his prophecy was misleading, or at best obscure. Liriope's acceptance of Tiresias' authority is implicit in the Ovidian narrator's statement that Pentheus is unique (*ex omnibus unus* - *Met.* 3.513) in rejecting the seer's words, which as *praesaga verba* (*Met.* 3.514-5) reiterate his prophetic powers.[717] After all, it would be blasphemous to think otherwise.[718]

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[714] *Augur* - *Met.* 3.349 and 511, *vates* - *Met.* 3.527. The near pleonasm of *fatidicus vates* (*Met.* 3.348) emphasises the vatic authority of the prophetic words that follow and recalls *Aen.* 8.340 (*vatis fatidicae*), where Carmentis gives an authoritative prophecy. Newman (1967, 95) sees Propertius' use of *vates* for Tiresias at 4.9.57 as a sign of the term's devaluation, whereas Balsley (2010, 29 n. 30) insists, 'Ovid, I think, makes quite clear the claims Tiresias had.'

[715] The reader too must wait a long time - until *Met.* 3.463ff.

[716] cf. the prophecy that Pentheus will complain that Tiresias has seen too much. (*Met.* 3.525).

[717] Tiresias' daughter Manto is 'a female surrogate for Tiresias' (Michalopoulos 2012, 226) for she is similarly prescient (*venturi praescia* - *Met.* 6.158), an attribute she shares with other authorities (*Aen.* 6.65-6; *Met.* 9.418-9, 13.162). Manto has the authority of divine inspiration (*fuerat divino concita motu / vaticinata* - *Met.* 6.158-9*)* and of being related to a seer (*sata Tiresia* - *Met.* 6.157). Manto's literary heritage (e.g. *Aen.* 10.198-200) affirms her prophetic gifts (Ibid., 225), and her name is etymologically suggestive of prophecy (*RE* 1355.63-4 s.v. Manto). Capdeville (2000, 167 n.161) suggests that, given that Diodorus (4.66.5-6) names her Daphne, 'Il est possible que Μαντώ soit à l'origine un surnom, se référant précisément à sa qualité de devineresse.'

[718] Pentheus is a *contemptor superum* (*Met.* 3.513). cf. Mezentius, a metrically identical *contemptor divum* in *Aen.* 7.648. Ovid's use of *praesaga verba* strengthens the link, for Virgil introduced the word *praesaga* in connection with Mezentius' doom (*Aen.* 10.843). cf. Anderson 1997, 390 ad 513-6.

Tiresias' prophecy to Pentheus incorporates many of the aspects of his authority which feature elsewhere in *Met.* 3. He invokes his vatic status linguistically (*auguror* - *Met.* 3.519); with *auguror*, he is saying not only 'I foresee', but also 'I am a *vates*.'[719] Tiresias emphasises the future fulfilment of his words by moving from conditional statements to a definitive one (*eveniet* - *Met.* 3.524), whose force is magnified by its brevity. As Bömer notes, 'Das verbum ist geradezu ein Terminus für das In-Erfüllung-gehen von Wünschen, Gebeten, Prophezeiungen.'[720] The Ovidian narrator's subsequent confirmation of the event, mirroring that following the Narcissus prophecy, reinforces Tiresias' authority.

The story of Narcissus is framed by proleptic and retrospective references to Tiresias' fame (*Met.* 3.339, *Met.* 3.511-12). These differ in that his fame subsequent to the Narcissus episode is described as deserved (*meritam... famam* - *Met.* 3.511-2). The proof which the Narcissus episode provides of Tiresias' efficacy in prophecy thus has a perceptible effect on his reputation and vatic authority. The emphasis on Tiresias' authority becomes particularly significant if the combination of the myths of Narcissus and Echo is an Ovidian innovation.[721] Tiresias has a long literary pedigree which reinforces his prophetic accuracy[722] and by associating the tale with the authoritative *vates*, Ovid heightens the authority of his invention.

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[719] Pythagoras makes a similar claim with *vaticinor* (*Met.* 15.174).
[720] Bömer 1989, 574 ad 524. cf. *Met.* 6.370, where there is an actual fulfilment (*eveniunt optata deae*), and *Fa.* 4.775 (*quae precor, eveniant*).
[721] The fragmentary Hellenistic evidence is inclusive. Hardie 2002b, 152; Anderson 1997, 372.
[722] *Od.* 10.492-95, 11.90-151; Attic tragedy. Keith (2002, 298) suggests that by referring to Tiresias' longevity Statius 'hints metapoetically at his character's illustrious literary genealogy and anticipates the series of allusions he will make to different versions of Tiresias'. Ovid's references to Tiresias' age (*Met.* 3.514, 3.516) may do likewise. The emphasis on Tiresias' vatic status identifies him with his prophetic counterpart in Sophocles' *Oedipus Tyrannus*, rather than the unheeded advisor in Euripides' *Bacchae*, 'correcting' Euripides (Gildenhard and Zissos 2016, 48).

The alliteration of the final prophecy in the poem, made by the *vates* Ovid (*(si quid habent veri vatum praesagia) vivam* - *Met.* 15.879),[723] links back to Tiresias (*fatidicus vates, 'si se non noverit,'*[724] *inquit. / vana diu visa est vox auguris* - *Met.* 3.348-9),[725] where not only the prophecy but also the framing account alliterates. Given the emphasis upon Tiresias' infallible omniscience, this may be intended to heighten the authority of Ovid's prophecy. Moreover, 'alliteration has been regarded as a kind of inaugural precondition for Latin poetry',[726] most famously used by the authoritative Roman poet, Ennius. The *vates* Tiresias, then, is not just an authoritative prophet, he is an authoritative poet, because he speaks like one.[727]

The references to Tiresias' fame (*Ille per Aonias fama celeberrimus urbes*[728] - *Met.* 3.339; *Cognita res meritam vati per Achaidas urbes / attulerat famam* - *Met.* 3.511-12) are also of metaliterary import. As Ovid describes in the Fama ecphrasis,[729] Tiresias' *fama* grows during *Met.* 3 from being known in Boeotia in *Met.* 3.339 to having reached all of Greece by *Met.* 3.511. This is emphasised and literalised in *Met.* 3.512 (*nomenque erat auguris ingens*) which repeats the previous phrase;[730] since the *fama* of the seer has grown, it has become *ingens*. Whereas epic poetry usually bestows renown upon characters by naming them, here it is conferred upon the teller

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[723] As Butler (2015, 86) notes, this alludes to Ennius' epitaph (*volito vivos per ora virum*), the source of Ovid's *ore legar populi* (*Met.* 15.878), 'scooping up along the way the similarly inspired *victorque virum volitare per ora*... of Virgil's third *Georgic*.'

[724] Tiresias' prophesy inverts the maxim inscribed on the temple of Apollo, Γνῶθι σαυτὸν **(**Pausanias 10.24.1), which recalls Tiresias' role in tradition as 'il depositario di un autorevole legame con l'oraculo du Apollo' (Barchiesi and Rosati 2007, 183 ad 348).

[725] Balsley 2010, 29

[726] Butler 2015, 86. Conte (1994, 82) suggests that a later poet such as Virgil will often alliterate 'to sound Ennian, to give his verses the ring of a poetry more ancient and traditional', but Butler (2015, 221 n. 96) thinks that archaisation cannot account for the importance of alliteration in Ovidian poetry.

[727] Tiresias also bears a certain resemblance to the blind bard, Homer.

[728] This is a typical way of describing the spread of *fama*. cf. Nonnus *Dion*. 18.1ff.; Statius *Theb.* 2.205ff.; Sil. 4.1ff.; *Aen.* 4.174ff. The epanalepsis of *fama* in *Aen.* 4.173-4 emphasises how reports are spread by repetition. cf. Hesiod *Op.* 460ff.

[729] *hi narrata ferunt alio, mensuraque ficti / crescit, et auditis aliquid novus adicit auctor* - *Met.* 12.57-8. cf. *Met.* 9.139 - *e minimo sua per mendacia crescit*.

[730] Henderson 1981, 93 ad 512

of the story (the foreteller), who is a 'stand-in mouthpiece for the bard Ovid'.[731] Ovid too, has *fama*; he claims that he will live in it (*fama... vivam* - *Met.* 15.878-9). Moreover, his *fama* will extend not only geographically (*quaque patet... Romana potentia* - *Met.* 15.877) like Tiresias', but temporally (*perque omnia saecula* - *Met.* 15.878). The description of Tiresias (*Cognita res meritam vati per Achaidas urbes / attulerat famam* - *Met.* 3.511-12) could be applied to Ovid; spreading awareness of his novel story brings him fame.[732] Thus Pentheus is 'scorning not just Bacchus but the power of epic, and blindly slighting the shape-shifting... Ovid'.[733] Given Pentheus' fate, Ovid's readers must consider what this suggests for their own role as listeners to an authoritative *vates*.

Like Tiresias, Orpheus is repeatedly referred to as a *vates* in *Met.* 10-11,[734] emphasising his vatic status; the responses of the *vates*' audiences offer insight into his authority. All the vatic figures in the *Metamorphoses* have metaliterary significance due to the co-existing senses of *vates* as prophet and poet,[735] but the majority are prophets. Orpheus' prophetic aspect is almost entirely elided in the *Metamorphoses*, though his katabasis could be seen as a prophetic-vatic act;[736] moreover, the Maenads are called *sacrilegae* (*Met.* 11.41) due to the fact that Orpheus is a priest of Apollo (*sacrorum vate suorum* - *Met.* 11.68),[737] and Ovid describes Orpheus' head floating off to Lesbos (*Met.* 11.55-9), which may allude to the tradition

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[731] Gildenhard and Zissos 2016, 121. cf. Balsley 2010, 29.
[732] *Meritam* takes on a knowing tinge in this reading.
[733] J. Henderson, cited at Gildenhard and Zissos 2016, 121.
[734] *Met.* 10.11-12, 82, 88, 143; 11.2, 8, 19, 27, 38.
[735] The link between prophets and poets is very old. The Greeks considered that 'poetry and prophey spring from the same source' (Ustinova 2009, 168).
[736] Engaged in by the Sibyl (*Met.* 14.120-1, 15405), Tiresias (*Od.* 11), and Pythagoras (D.L. 8.21).
[737] Orpheus' use of *auguror* (*Met.* 10.27) refers to his own deductions, rather than a prophecy. Ovid makes no reference to Orpheus' association with mystery cults (Griffin 1997, 59). cf. *Aen.* 6.645-7, where Orpheus is in the Underworld dressed in priest/prophet robes. Orpheus is a prophet-poet in Statius (Lovatt 2007) and in Strabo 7 fr. 18-19 (ἐνταῦθα τὸν Ὀρφέα διατρῖψαί φησι τὸν Κίκονα, ἄνδρα γόητα, ἀπὸ μουσικῆς ἅμα καὶ μαντικῆς καὶ τῶν περὶ τὰς τελετὰς ὀργιασμῶν ἀγυρτεύοντα τὸ πρῶτον), for prophets traditionally practised music (τι τὸ παλαιὸν οἱ μάντεις καὶ μουσικὴν εἰργάζοντο).

of it giving oracles there (Philostr. *Heroicus* 28.8; *V A* 4.14).[738] When Orpheus explicitly discusses his poetic authority at *Met.* 10.19-20, however, he does so in prophetic terms. Orpheus is a *vates* who is primarily not a seer, but a singer, the paradigmatic poet of the ancient world. He, if anyone, must be an authoritative singer, just as Tiresias was an authoritative prophet. In fact, however, Orpheus has more in common with the other *vates* of the poem, for his authority is problematised. Prophets' authority may be challenged, but time ultimately proves them right, which increases their authority. As a singer, Orpheus' authority is measured by his efficacy in moving his audiences, and their varied responses reflect on his vatic authority.

Orpheus is the preeminent *vates* in the ancient consciousness, famed for his surpassing skill and power over animate and inanimate audiences. Indeed, 'Orpheus is a figure often used by poets and critics, ancient and modern, for exploring the power of poetry.'[739] By directing attention towards audience response, however, Ovid presents an unusual picture of the famous *vates*. This is telegraphed from the outset; the first mention of Orpheus' voice in the *Metamorphoses* is in terms of failure rather than success (*Orphea nequiquam voce vocatur* - *Met.* 10.3). Although Orpheus has summoned Hymenaeus (*adfuit ille quidem* - *Met.* 10.4), he fails to bring about the happy outcome which such an invocation expects. Whilst this passage underlines the tragic nature of fate, since Orpheus cannot avert disaster, it may also be symptomatic of Ovid's intention to challenge the authority of the most famous *vates* in antiquity, and thereby vatic authority more widely.

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[738] Faraone 2004, 5. The most common version (which is implied in the *Met.*) has the head continuing to sing, signifying the immortal nature of poetry. Just as Tiresias is famed across the Greek world for his prophesying, so too is Orpheus' head (Philostr. *Heroicus* 28.7-12). The head's prophetic powers are shown in fifth century Red-Figure art (e.g. Basel BS 481). cf. Gantz 1993, 724-25; Watson 2013.
[739] Lovatt 2007, 148

Orpheus experiences both success and failure in using his vatic authority to sway his audiences in the *Metamorphoses*. The success which has attracted most attention (and controversy) is Orpheus' song in the Underworld to convince Persephone and Pluto to release Eurydice. The description of the spirits in the Underworld being moved[740] emphasises Orpheus' vatic power, making it seem reasonable that his specific addressees, Persephone and Pluto, are also won over in *Met.* 10.46-7. Ovid highlights the unexpected responses to Orpheus' song from miscreants undergoing punishment[741] and the Eumenides. Ovid uses the Greek name for the Furies in *Met.* 10.46; usually 'the well-disposed ones' is an ironic misnomer, but in typically topsy-turvy Ovidian style, here the name is accurate. Orpheus' success in not only persuading his divine audience but also moving the Furies and the throng of listening spirits highlights his vatic authority. As VerSteeg and Barclay point out,[742] Orpheus' persuasion of Pluto is unique, while Johnson considers this 'the only successful artistic performance by a mortal in the *Metamorphoses*'.[743]

The spell of this successful performance does not extend to many readers of the *Metamorphoses*, however. Critics range from deeming it a success to considering it a total failure,[744] at least in terms of Ovid convincing his readers that they are hearing the actual words of the most talented of *vates*. Furthermore, theories as to why Ovid might produce so banal an effort span a spectrum from Virgilian parody[745] to Ovidian

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[740] Moving an audience is a marker of a successful exercise of authority by a speaker.
[741] Their responses may also be comic. Neumeister (1986, 175-76) argues that 'hat der Dichter in seine Beschreibung dieser Wirkung auch noch einige witzige Pointen eingebaut' and 'Lustig auch, wie Tantalus unter dem Eindruck dieser Rede sogleich aufhört, nach Wasser zu schnappen, und Sisyphus Pause macht, wobei er, sehr praktisch, gleich seinen Stein benutzt, um sich hinzusetzen.'
[742] VerSteeg and Barclay 2003, 396
[743] Johnson 2008, 108. It is not an unqualified success, since Orpheus' retrieval of his wife is complicated by the condition that he cannot look back (*Met.* 10.51-2) but must trust Pluto's word that Eurydice is following.
[744] Primmer (1979, 129-30) unsatisfactorily claims that if we are disappointed by Orpheus' rhetoric, it is because he is so overcome by emotion that he forgets his skill.
[745] Otis 1966; Anderson 1982b; Segal 1989; Neumeister 1986.

incompetence and self-indulgence,[746] an error of poetic judgment compared with Virgil's modest restraint. In the face of such varied readings, it would be foolish to take too a extreme a view. As Galinsky points out, 'The very fact of multiple and divergent receptions of Ovid's presentation of Orpheus is an impulse to reflection on Ovid's poetic aims and probably was intended that way.'[747] Ovid aims to be provocative[748] and to make his readers think about vatic authority, and here he indubitably succeeds.

The first of Orpheus's two remaining songs, a fruitless attempt to persuade the ferryman to allow him to cross back into the underworld, is passed over in a mere two lines (*orantem frustraque iterum transire volentem / portitor arcuerat* - *Met.* 10.72-3). *Frustra* recalls Orpheus' ineffectual invocation of Hymenaeus at the beginning of the episode; the failures are now beginning to mount up. The second, Orpheus' song to the trees, is presented as an initial success, assembling an audience of trees and neutralising the weapons intended to harm him (*concentu victus vocisque lyraeque est* - *Met.* 11.11; *cunctaque tela forent cantu mollita* - *Met.* 11.15). This vivid evidence of vatic power (*carmine.... Threicius vates* - *Met.* 11.1-2) heightens the contrast between Orpheus' success and failure. However, the power of Orpheus' song has limits; it does not work if it cannot be heard. As early as *Met.* 11.3, Ovid draws attention to the visual, not aural, nature of the Ciconian women (*ecce!*). Vatic power is countered (*tum denique saxa / non exauditi rubuerunt sanguine vatis* - *Met.* 11.18-19), for

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[746] cf. Quintilian *Inst.* 10.1.88 and Seneca *Contr.* 9.5.17 and 2.2.12. Anderson (1989, 3) argues that such criticisms miss the fact that Ovid is depicting *Orpheus*' self-regard, noting that 'Orpheus becomes the perfect embodiment of the quality so often attributed to Ovid: *nimium amator ingenii sui.*' Does the fact that Orpheus is equally guilty redeem Ovid from the charge?
[747] Galinsky 1999, 310
[748] cf. Seneca *Contr.* 2.2.12.

Orpheus' song fails to engage the Ciconian women,[749] and they tear him apart[750] while the birds are still fascinated by his singing (*attonitas etiamnum voce canentis* - *Met*. 11.20). The women attack the *vates* (*Met.* 11.27, 11.38), and Ovid again highlights the failure of vatic authority, with the ironic claim that this is the first time Orpheus has spoken in vain (*tendentemque manus atque illo tempore primum / inrita dicentem nec quidquam voce moventem*[751] - *Met.* 11.39-40). This is patently false, since it is at least the third time Orpheus' vatic authority has failed him.[752] Yet even this is not a total failure, for Orpheus is not fully silenced by death (*flebile lingua / murmurat exanimis* - *Met.* 11.52-3), just as Ovid prophesies that he himself will retain a *nomen... indelebile* (*Met.* 15.876).[753]

Ovid's Orpheus is thus a far less authoritative figure than the Orpheus of earlier tradition. In Greek tragedy, Orpheus is the most persuasive speaker of all.[754] In the *Metamorphoses*, while Orpheus' power over the natural world initially seems to illustrate his vatic authority because the response of trees and plants is supernatural, it comes to represent his limitations. Orpheus' song is effective in influencing inanimate objects, the natural world, and the dead,[755] but powerless to move angry women who refuse to listen. Perhaps Ovid is advocating that the audience well-disposed towards

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[749] The Maenads specifically attack Orpheus' mouth (*Met.* 11.7-8), symbolising their rejection of his vatic status cf. *Met.* 12.456-8.
[750] Ovid depicts himself being torn apart at *Tr.* 1.3.73-4. cf. Theodorakopoulos 1999, 160.
[751] As Murphy (1972, 46 ad 40) notes, Orpheus was previously able to move his listeners emotionally and physically (*Met.* 11.1-2), but now cannot.
[752] Griffin (1997, 75 ad 39) argues that this might be pointed out by a 'very alert and perhaps unduly critical reader' but the average reader 'is unlikely to cavil at *primum* or to remember *Met.* 10.72-3 at this point.' Since Ovid highlights failed authority here, most readers would probably notice.
[753] Many MSS read instead *indeflebile* (Anderson 1989, 11), which links the afterlives of Orpheus and Ovid. For Anderson (Ibid., 2), this is 'the paradigmatic moment when art demonstrates its power over death, its claim to be eternal'. The ongoing mumur of Orpheus' voice echoes *fama*. cf. *parvae murmura vocis* (*Met*. 12.49) and *incertae murmura famae* (*Her.* 9.41).
[754] Aeschylus *Pers.* 688-90; Euripides *Med.* 543, *Alc.* 35-62.
[755] The dead are *leves populos simulacraque functa sepulcro* (*Met.* 10.13) and thus resemble the *leve vulgus* of rumours in the House of Fama in *Met.* 12.53, foregrounding the metapoetic issues.

the poet should be willing to believe, in order to enable the narrative to proceed.[756] Anderson remarks that Orpheus' audience 'is so undiscriminating - like so many contemporary Roman audiences of performing poets and *rhetores* - that he bewitched it'[757] and warns the reader against being similarly fooled. Ovid would then be taunting his readers, setting up Orpheus as an 'emperor who has no clothes'. Who will dare point out that the song of the *vates par excellence* is actually not that good? Surely noone would in Augustan Rome be so foolish as to believe a poet.

Orpheus self-consciously mentions his own authority, introducing his song with a caveat (*si licet et falsi positis ambagibus oris / vera loqui sinis* - *Met.* 10.19-20). He acknowledges that he is not the ultimate authority for what he can say, and refers to putting aside the ramblings of a false mouth. Given the apparent control of the gods over Orpheus' mouth, this reads as if Orpheus is describing a prophetic frenzy[758] and suggesting that it is falsehood. This recalls the Lucretian and Pythagorean aversion to priestly fabrications (*DRN* 1.102-6; *Met.* 15.155). The parenthesis thus highlights the potential for Orpheus to utter falsehoods (like divinely-inspired prophets), whilst claiming divine endorsement for his truthfulness, but it is not clear whether the gods ultimately permit Orpheus to speak the truth. Consequently, Orpheus' statement 'dovrebbe metterci in guardia contro tutto ciò che Orfeo dice'.[759] Moreover, Orpheus soon casts further doubt upon narratives, this time not his own, but those conveyed by tradition. In *Met.* 10.27, Orpheus uses the verb *auguror* to solemnise something about which he is uncertain (*dubito*), before parenthesising the possibility of *fama* being false (*famaque si veteris non est mentita rapinae* - *Met.* 10.28). This has extra

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[756] This is a defining feature of audiences in ancient rhetorical criticism. cf. Ahl 1984, 197; Feeney 1993; Wheeler 1999, 78-79.
[757] Anderson 1982b, 47
[758] Oracular mouths produce *ambages*. cf. the Sibyl at *Aen.* 6.99 and the Sphinx at *Met.* 7.761.
[759] Reed 2013, 170 ad 19

resonance because the bringing of love to the Underworld and the old story of the rape of Persephone were related by no less an authority than the Muse Calliope (Orpheus' mother) in *Met.* 5.364-408. Orpheus thus casts doubt upon the authority of Muses[760] (and parents), and 'uses this sly dig at an earlier tale in the poem to strengthen his own claims to be speaking truthfully'.[761]

At *Met.* 10.300-303, Orpheus extraordinarily asks his listeners not to listen, or if they must listen, not to believe him (*desit in hac mihi parte fides, nec credite factum*).[762] He then says that if they believe, they must believe in the punishment as well, and thereby implies that they should believe more rather than less. Thus the requested response has gone from disbelief to total credence in the space of four lines, 'una completa sconfessione del divieto originale'.[763] *Met.* 10.304-5 is ambivalent; Fantantuono suggests that *Met.* 10.304 (*si tamen admissum sinit hoc natura videri*) 'again raises the idea that Orpheus' song is a lie',[764] but it might equally well insist upon its truth.[765] When Orpheus repudiates his listeners in *Met.* 10.300, he briefly appears to renounce his own authority to command their attention. It is notable that though he abjures daughters and parents (*procul hinc, natae, procul este, parentes* - *Met.* 10.300), his audience at this point is comprised of trees (*Met.* 10.90-143) and animals (*ferarum / concilio... turba volucrumque* - *Met.* 10.143-4).[766] Later in the episode, however, Ovid refers to the Maenads as *nurus* (*Met.* 11.3) and *matres* (*Met.*

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[760] The authority of the Muses has already been problematised by their biased manipulation of the Pierides' song (Ziogas 2013, 91; Mack 1988, 134-35). Orpheus himself is reputed elsewhere to have composed songs on this topic (Reed 2013, 172 ad 26-9).
[761] Myers 1994, 164. cf. Pythagoras, who casts doubt on the Ovidian narrator's authority.
[762] cf. *AA* 1.30-2, especially *vera canam* (30) contrasting with *dira canam* (*Met* 10.300), and *este procul* (31). Also *Am.* 2.1.3ff. (*procul hinc, procul este, severae*).
[763] Reed 2013, 233 ad 300-10
[764] Fratantuono 2015, 143 ad 304
[765] On expressions of disbelief as heightening discourse, not scepticism, cf. Stinton 1976.
[766] Technically, some of the trees in Orpheus' audience at *Met.* 10.90ff. are (or were) daughters and parents: the Heliades (10.91) were Phaethon's sisters, the laurel (10.92) appeared with her father in *Met.* 1, Dryope was a breastfeeding mother (*Met.* 9.356-8). The pinetree metaphorically represents a woman wearing her hair up (Hill 1999, 170 ad 103).

11.69).[767] By framing the passage with *nurus* and *matres* Ovid connects the two, recalling the fact that the followers of Bacchus are *matresque nurusque* at *Met.* 3.529 and 4.9. The Maenads are thus parents and daughters, precisely the people whom Orpheus ordered not to listen to him at *Met.* 10.300 and they go to extreme lengths (murder) in order to obey. Ovid thus reveals a difficulty with authority; when the *vates* countermands himself, which version is his audience to accept?

Anderson suggests that Orpheus' rhetorically-clever but emotionally frigid song embodies a type of poetry which Ovid is equally guilty of composing.[768] Its failure therefore has implications for Ovid's own vatic authority. Orpheus has often been thought to function as an analogue for Ovid,[769] but just as the impression of Orpheus' success is misleading, so too is the conception of Orpheus as a mirror for Ovid, since the very things which evoke the poet often turn out to be differences rather than similarities. Orpheus announces that he has sung a Gigantomachy (*Met.* 10.150), which Ovid does only briefly in the *Metamorphoses* (*Met.* 1.151-62) and claims to have embarked upon in *Amores* 2.1.11-16, only to abandon it in favour of elegy;[770] he also invokes the Muse (*Musa parens* - *Met.* 10.148), which Ovid refrains from doing until *Met.* 15.622, and states that all things yield to Jove (*cedunt Iovis omnia regno* - *Met.* 10.148), a rule which Ovid casts off in *Met.* 15 in his declaration that he has created a work which Jove cannot destroy. Is Orpheus a better (or more traditional) poet than Ovid, and might Ovid be suggesting that the old poets (his literary predecessors) were actually not as good as the authority attributed to them suggests?

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[767] *Met.* 11.3 (*nurus Ciconum*) recalls *Ciconum matres* (*Georgics* 4.520). Reed (2013, 305 ad 3) sees this as an Ovidian correction of Virgil, to which Ovid returns at 69.
[768] Anderson 1982b, 40 - 'the song he assigns Orpheus is anything but unique: it makes no emotional appeal whatsoever, but works with cheap, flashy, and specious rhetoric to persuade Hades'.
[769] Orpheus' song as a miniature *Metamorphoses*: Eigler 2012, 364; Nagle 1988, 99; Young 2008, 6. Orpheus as a surrogate for Ovid: Pavlock 2009, 108; Young 2008, 5-6. Spahlinger 1996, 141 states that 'der Dichter legt seiner Figur Orpheus sein eigenes poetologisches Programm in den Mund'.
[770] Owen 1924, 63-81; della Corte 1971, 437. cf. *Met.* 5.319, 10.149; *Tr*. 2.333ff.; *Fa*. 5.35ff., 5.555.

VerSteeg and Barclay point out that 'Ovid implicitly suggests that he is as good as Orpheus if he can quote his words directly.'[771] Orpheus takes over the narrative, usurping the authority of the Ovidian narrator with a song almost 600 lines long,[772] and assumes the role of the extradiegetic narrator to close out *Met.* 10. Only in *Met.* 11.1 does Ovid reclaim his narrative authority, with the phrase *carmine dum tali*. However, not all Orpheus' songs are conveyed in direct speech; the Ovidian narrator retains overall control of his narrative and it is surely a fillip to his authority that 'the narrator seems to control the greatest poet with narrative'.[773] Orpheus' authority stems from his *carmen*, just as Ovid's poetic authority stems from his *Metamorphoses*. By setting out to underwhelm with Orpheus' legalistic banalities, Ovid invites the reader to compare Orpheus' words with his own narration, and to find them wanting.[774] However, ultimately Orpheus' words are Ovid's, and form part of the *Metamorphoses* by which Ovid's poetic authority will be judged.

Through his presentation of audience responses to Orpheus, Ovid undermines the authority of *vates*. Whilst some of the prophetic vatic figures depicted by Ovid in the *Metamorphoses* have their authority upheld (Calchas' prophecies are enacted; Tiresias is tested and found to be correct), Orpheus, the primarily poetic *vates*, displays a mixture of success and failure. His successes are limited to particular audiences, and do not always convince the reader. This should not, however, be seen as a failure on

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[771] VerSteeg and Barclay 2003, 396. In contrast, Virgil (whose *Georgics* 4.461 is evoked by *Rhodopeius vates* at *Met.* 10.11-2) does not attempt a direct rendition of Orphic song. It seems possible, however, that Ovid is not seeking primarily to usurp Virgil's poetic authority (*pace* Eigler 2012, 355), but to assert his own and to encourage the questioning of established authoritative poets.
[772] 'The impression arises that he consciously competes with Orpheus and reflects on his own poetry' - Eigler 2012, 366.
[773] Ibid., 357
[774] cf. Pythagoras' speech in *Met.* 15, a 'specimen of the kind of epos that he wisely chose not to write... composed expressly to show the public, by boring it, what it had been spared: what, in less accomplished hands, the whole poem might have been like' (Kenney 1976, 50, following Galinsky 1975, 103-07).

the part of Ovid in his *Metamorphoses*, but rather as an expression of how a sophisticated audience can reassess the vatic authority of poets.

Vatic Narrative Control

Unlike Tiresias and Calchas, the Sibyl has a direct link to Apollo, the god who authorises seers, so her information is not mediated through bird signs. Her first utterance is a prophecy to Aeneas, and its authority is immediately demonstrated by Aeneas' acquiesence and the prophecy's fruition (*Paruit Aeneas et formidabilis Orci / vidit opes* - *Met.* 14.116-7). Thus far, the Sibyl appears as authoritative as her counterparts in tradition; indeed, her divinely-inspired frenzy (*deo furibunda recepto* - *Met.* 14.107) is reminiscent of that of the authoritative Virgilian Sibyl.[775] Although the Ovidian Sibyl has not yet received the title of *vates*, she has given an authoritative prophecy[776] and her authority is so pronounced that Aeneas assimilates her to a goddess.[777]

When the Sibyl is finally referred to by the title of *vates* in *Met.* 14.129 it appears to be a continuing manifestation of the respect in which she is held by Aeneas. However, the Sibyl refuses divine status,[778] and undermines her vatic authority by deliberately depicting herself not as a figure of authority, but as a fallible human being, blind to the consequences of her ill-considered request, who fails to apply her foresight to herself. The Sibyl's voice is reduced from authoritative prophetic rantings into light entertainment to beguile Aeneas' journey (*cum duce Cumaea mollit sermone laborem* - *Met.* 14.121), whereas Virgil dwells upon the supernatural power of the Sibyl

[775] *Aen.* 6.46-51, 77-82, 98-102, 262.
[776] *Met.* 14.113 quotes Helenus from *Aen*. 3.383 (Wills 1996, 455).
[777] cf. *Aen.* 6.65ff., where Aeneas respectfully addresses her as *sanctissima vates*.
[778] There is no apparent effect on Aeneas' impression of her authority. The sacrifices he offers at *Met.* 14.156 (*sacrisque ex more litatis*) might conceivably be the fulfilment of Aeneas' promise at *Met.* 14.128 (*templa tibi statuam, tribuam tibi turis honores*).

(*horrendaeque... Sibyllae... magnam cui mentem animumque / Delius inspirat vates aperitque futura.* - *Aen.* 6.10-12).[779] Ovid's Sibyl has been humanised, stripped of her reverential status[780] and its accompanying authority. In purely narratorial terms, however, this striking humanity may increase the credibility of the Sibyl's account in Aeneas' eyes,[781] for it narrows the gap between the Sibyl and Aeneas. It may also heighten the credibility of this un-Sibylline conversation for the reader, even though this particular version of the Sibyl's story is not recorded in any source prior to Ovid.[782] Deprived of the trappings of oracular authority, Ovid's Sibyl undergoes a trial of the personal eyewitness authority of a normally vatic figure.

Regardless of her authority as a humanised eyewitness narrator, the Sibyl's attempt to disabuse Aeneas of his impression of her divinity undermines her prophetic authority. However, the same speech reclaims her prophetic powers, including her enactive capacity, and also demonstrates her powerful narrative authority. The Sibyl is the most authoritative speaker about her own past since, like Nestor in *Met.* 12, she is the only person old enough to have witnessed it, but she also goes a step further by exercising her ability to prophesy and create her own future; the Sibyl is a true bard of the self, an *auto-aoidos*. By exercising her prophetic ability like a poet she is able to guide her prophecy's fruition so that whilst it will come true (and uphold her prophetic authority), it is not the disaster that it appears to be.

As a *vates*, the Sibyl has the power to reinterpret the past as well as predicting the future. This role is signalled in her introduction by the Ovidian narrator (*respicit hunc*

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[779] Virgil's description of the Sibyl and her caves (*Aen.* 6.42-4, 6.100) is echoed by the appearance of the seer Calchas and the Fama ecphrasis in *Met.* 12. This parallel emphasises how Fama, often seen as a commentary on poetic tradition (Hardie 2012, 151ff.), mirrors the role of seers.
[780] Galinsky 1975, 224-29
[781] Papaioannou 2005, 48
[782] Bömer 1986, 42-43 ad 14.101-57

vates - *Met.* 14.129), for she looks back at Aeneas not only literally but also vatically, bringing into view earlier themes of the *Metamorphoses*.[783] Aeneas' courteous address at *Met.* 14.123 (*seu dea tu praesens seu dis gratissima*) is a type commonly found in epic poetry,[784] but the Sibyl's personal experience offers a new perspective in which being favoured by the god is a decidedly ambivalent privilege.[785] Looking back still further, this 'unique time perspective'[786] grants the reader new insight into the negative and lasting consequences of rape, which went almost unnoticed in the flurry of metamorphoses in *Met.* 1-4.[787] The vastly-extended life that Apollo has granted her increases the Sibyl's control over her narrative, for as Papaioannou notes, 'Longevity is a prerequisite for the preservation and propagation of past memory.'[788] She is able to resist being assimilated into the catalogue of Phoebus' 'loves' found at the beginning of the *Metamorphoses* and, unlike them,[789] to offer a counterpoint to Apollo's version of events. Looking into the past, the Sibyl prevents the Apollo-centric narrative as depicted in the early books of the poem from recurring, instead asserting her own perspective.

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[783] Hinds (1995, 48) on the matron in Lucan's *Pharsalia* 1.685-6 - 'As a prophet she recognises Pompey... who will lie decapitated... 20 months and seven books of *De Bello Civili* later. But as a reflexive annotator, engaged in another kind of vatic interpretation, she recognises Priam - dramatising our own realisation, as readers, that we too have seen this decapitated trunk before: in the second book of the *Aeneid.*' cf. O'Higgins 1988.
[784] Bömer (1986, 53 ad 123-4) notes that Ovid outdoes Virgil, whose Sibyl is only *sanctissima vates*. Carmentis is also *Dis gratissima* in *Fa.* 1.585. cf. *Met.* 4.320-1.
[785] *Met.* 1.578, 13.670-1.
[786] Galinsky 1975, 228
[787] The link to *Met.* 1-4 gives a sense of continuity to the story of the Sibyl, which is not found pre-Ovid (Papaioannou 2005, 54).
[788] Ibid., 63. Papaioannou (2005) likens the Sibyl to Nestor, Pythagoras, and Anius. cf. *Fa.* 4.158, which emphasises the Sibyl's age (*Cumaeam... anum*) and ability to exert authority; she is consulted by the ancients and successfully orders that a temple be built (*Fa.* 4.169). Seers share the marginality and the authority of the old (Parkin 2002, 258-59). Women, children, and old men occupied an intermediate position between the mortal and divine realms, since they were thought to require particular support from the supernatural due to their natural weakness, which made them especially suitable vehicles for prophecy. cf. Wiedemann (1989, 177) - 'the old are thought to be particularly numinous'.
[789] Daphne seeks to escape Apollo through metamorphosis, but Phoebus claims her anyway. The description of the laurel assenting by seeming to nod her branches is dubious, overtly favourable to Apollo's schema of events and focalised through him. cf. Green 2013, 71. Myers (2009, 78 ad 107) thinks that *deo... recepto* (*Met.* 14.107) suggests Apollo is substituting prophetic for sexual possession.

The Sibyl predicts in *Met.* 14.150-1 what Apollo's narrative will be three hundred years hence; after a thousand years, when no one else remembers her fate, Apollo will deny her existence. Papaioannou suggests that this is her true death,[790] for being forgotten by the god of omniscience[791] is oblivion, even if physically she remains alive. The Sibyl is, however, fully cognisant of the dangers of being forgotten. Despite the fact that her tale purports to minimise her vatic authority, the Sibyl fully utilises that authority on a metaliterary level, drawing upon her vatic ability to precipitate events. Her apparently inevitable prophecy (*tempus erit* - *Met.* 14.147ff.) is no such thing, for by telling her tale, she has ensured that both it and she will be remembered and has regained control of her narrative.

The Sibyl prophesies that once her body is gone, she will be known by her voice (*voce tamen noscar* - *Met.* 14.153),[792] a continued existence which recalls Orpheus, whose limbless head, although lifeless (and despite the fact that Orpheus' vatic authority has been undermined), keeps murmuring (*Met.* 11.52-3). This is also similar to the form of immortality that the Ovidian narrator claims in *Metamorphoses* 15. Indeed, the Sibyl's use of *ferar* in *Met.* 14.152 is suggestive for Ovid's claim, *ferar*, in *Met.* 15.876, reminding us that it has the sense of being borne aloft (cf. Horace *Carm.* 2.20.1), but also means 'I shall be spoken of', and thus is 'turning the poet's personal survival into a construct of *fama*',[793] for *ferar* puns on phrases like *ferunt* which describe rumour and report.[794] Ovid, like the Sibyl, is creating himself as tradition. The Sibyl is hence a fundamentally literary *vates* who 'fuses prophecy with

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[790] Papaioannou 2005, 51
[791] Given this omniscience, perhaps Apollo will be deliberately omissive.
[792] Both the Fates and authoritative utterances (*fata*) will preserve the Sibyl in this voice-only form (which resembles *fama*). cf. Papaioannou 2005, 67; Plutarch *Mor.* 397A.
[793] Hardie 2002b, 94
[794] Feeney 1991, 249 n. 223

tradition'[795] and memory, which is emphasised by the Ovidian narrator's use of the word *memorante* (*Met.* 14.154) to describe her reminiscing but also foretelling.[796] She possesses the authority of divine inspiration for her prophecies and the authority of age, far greater in scope than Nestor's impressive but mortal span of years and without the artificial expansion of Pythagoras' metempsychosis.[797] As a *vates* the Sibyl also exerts control over the future, guiding both Aeneas' narrative and her own. Poetic authority is encapsulated in her prophetic authority; the Sibyl sees the future and the past, and commands both.[798]

Ovid as *Vates*

Although Ovid does not claim the role of *vates* for himself until the end of the *Metamorphoses*, this is perhaps in keeping with the traditional impersonality of the epic genre.[799] Ovid begins the poem by requesting that the gods inspire him and help to bring his poem to its due conclusion.[800] At the end of the *Metamorphoses*, Ovid

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[795] Papaioannou 2005, 62

[796] In *Aen.* 6, the Sibyl is a prophet for her internal audience, but a historian of Rome for the reader. cf. the high priests' role in creating history by compiling their records into the annals of Rome (Servius ad *Aen.* 1.373). Priests had the authority to write the past. cf. Elliott 2013, 25.

[797] Papaioannou (2005, 78) suggests that the physical metamorphosis of the aging Sibyl represents the effect of tradition without innovation. The Sibyl's aging process enacts the way that memory deteriorates with the passing of time. The Sibyl is prevented from being an unchanged memory (eternal youth) and resorts to the more risky process of transmitting her tale by telling it.

[797] Both the Fates and authoritative utterances (*fata*) will preserve the Sibyl in this voice-only form (which resembles *fama*). cf. Ibid., 67; Plutarch *Mor.* 397A.

[798] The affinity between seer and poet is reiterated in *Met.* 14.157 (*litora adit nondum nutricis habentia nomen*), where the Ovidian narrator anticipates his deferred account of Caieta's burial in *Met.* 14.441-4. Myers (2009, 88 ad 157) suggests that Ovid is mock-correcting Virgil with *nondum*, since in *Aen.* 6.900, the shores are anachronistically described by the name they receive in *Aen.* 7.[798] cf. Servius ad *Aen.* 6.900 - *a persona poetae prolepsis: nam Caieta nondum dicebatur.* The word *nondum* is also loaded, since intertextually-speaking it is untrue, because the *Aeneid* has already been written.

[799] 'The poet of epic all but effaces himself from his own text, and the lingering trace of himself serves only to point to that act of effacement, in a gesture that simultaneously asserts both the greatness of his authority and his identity with the tradition' - Beecroft 2010, 62.

[800] This divine assistance is requested after Ovid's own *animus* has moved him to relate metamorphoses. The proem of the *Metamorphoses* also introduces generic confusion ('il problema di come un *carmen deductum* sia anche un *carmen perpetuum*' - Barchiesi 2005, 144-45 ad 4) and asks what kind of *vates* the Ovidian narrator will turn out to be. cf. Hinds 1987, 121; Heyworth 1994, 72-76; Rosati 1999, 245-47; Kenney 1976, 51-52 - 'a poem cannot be both *deductum* and *perpetuum*, both

calls upon the gods again (*di* - *Met.* 15.861ff.), including those whom it is right and pious for a *vates* to call upon (*quosque alios vati fas appellare piumque est* - *Met.* 15.867). He thus implicitly identifies himself as a *vates*, and vatically predicts the future life of his poem and his own consequent immortality, making a final definitive and grandiose statement, which, as so often in Ovid's poetry, is tempered by a parenthesis:[801]

> *Iamque opus exegi, quod nec Iovis ira nec ignis*
> *nec poterit ferrum nec edax abolere vetustas.*
> *cum volet, illa dies, quae nil nisi corporis huius*
> *ius habet, incerti spatium mihi finiat aevi;*
> *parte tamen meliore mei super alta perennis*
> *astra ferar, nomenque erit indelebile nostrum;*
> *quaque patet domitis Romana potentia terris*
> *ore legar populi, perque omnia saecula fama*
> *(si quid habent veri vatum praesagia) vivam.* (*Met*. 15.876-9)

Ovid's poetic immortality is conditional upon the vatic authority that he has explored throughout the *Metamorphoses*. Since it is he who is now making prophecies, it is his own authority that Ovid exposes to examination for the problems exhibited by his vatic exempla. This passage recalls Horace's *Odes* 3.30 which makes a correspondingly bold assertion in similar terms.[802] Both poets claim to have created a lasting monument which, immune to destructive external forces (including time itself), will immortalise the poet. The *praesagia* of the *vates* Horace are self-evidently

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Callimachean and un-Callimachean; but that, if we press the word *deducite*, is the implication'. cf. Ross 1975, 134-35; O'Hara 2004, 150-52; Gilbert 1976.

[801] Lovatt (2013, 122) draws attention to the way that the authority of the prophet 'is hedged about with qualifications', even whilst prophetic visions contribute to epic authority. cf. O'Hara (1990, 55-56) on qualifications with *si non vana* in the *Aeneid.* Lovatt cites this parenthesis as an example of how the prophet's 'simultaneous power and powerlessness is often related to the poet's anxiety about the truth and effectiveness of poetry.'

[802] *Exegi monumentum aere perennius*
regalique situ pyramidum altius,
quod non imber edax, non aquilo impotens
possit diruere aut innumerabilis
annorum series et fuga temporum.
non omnis moriar multaque pars mei
vitabit Libitinam; usque ego postera
crescam laude recens... (*Carm.* 3.30.1-8)
cf. Hardie (2015, 617-19 n. ad 871-9) on the close link between these two passages.

true, because he continues to be read, as Ovid's allusion illustrates. Ovid comments on his own prophecy in *Tristia* 4.10.125-32. The prediction, *legar*, becomes *in toto plurimus orbe legor* (*Tr.* 4.10.128). Ovid's prophecy is already being fulfilled; despite his exilic 'death', he has not perished, since his poetry is read.[803] Ovid revisits his parenthesis almost word for word,[804] again prophesying that he will not be consigned to the earth in death. The repetition recalls the authority of the *Metamorphoses*' fulfilled prophecy and consequently grants authority preemptively to the prophecy of the *Tristia*.

The duality of meaning inherent in the term *vates* means that the *vates* who appear in the *Metamorphoses*, whether primarily prophets or poets, are overlaid with the other aspect of *vates*. Consequently, they mirror or serve as foils to the Ovidian narrator, who also embraces the dual roles of prophet and poet. Prophetic *vates* exert poetic authority over their narratives, foreseeing events and potentially guiding them to fulfilment, as Calchas and the Sibyl illustrate. The implied exhortation by internal narrators to trust them on the basis of the authoritative vatic speakers they have included in their narratives reflects on the *Metamorphoses*, for the Ovidian narrator has self-evidently included *vates*. However, the inclusion of Helenus and Mopsus in the respective narratives of Pythagoras and Nestor proved detrimental to their authority. Moreover, as has become apparent, the authority of many of the *vates* in the *Metamorphoses* is problematic, and many of the contexts in which they appear have been invented by Ovid himself, without any evidence of divine inspiration to back up his poetic authority. Ovid thus challenges the assumption that *vates* have inherent

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[803] This is presumably not how Ovid foresaw his prophecy being fulfilled when he completed the *Metamorphoses*. The poet has fallen foul of the ambiguity of his own prophecy.
[804] *Met.* 15.879 - *si quid habent veri vatum praesagia.*
Tr. 4.10.129 - *si quid habent igitur vatum praesagia veri.*

authority and can contribute it to the narratives to which they are attached. He suggests that their statements, like the rumours in the House of Fama, can be false ones mixed with true. Despite the punishment of Pentheus for scorning the authority of Tiresias, in general, the appropriate way of reading vatic pronouncements is less black and white. Ovid's authoritative claim that he will live in *fama* is justly parenthesised (*si quid habent veri vatum praesagia* - *Met.* 15.879), and the reader is responsible for deciding how much truth to accept and how authoritative the *vates* may be.

Vates in the *Fasti*

In the *Metamorphoses*, the Ovidian narrator refrains from explicitly asserting his identity as a *vates* until the end of the poem, whereas in the *Fasti*, the homodiegetic narrator places far more emphasis on his vatic status. Vatic authority is explored in the *Metamorphoses* through a series of intermediaries, who allow Ovid to problematise the authority of the *vates* whilst he remains aloof from the difficulties which besiege his characters. In contrast, the more personal elegiac genre naturally supports a greater degree of self-reflection by the narrator.[805] Newlands notes that 'since elegy is a more intimate genre than epic and is closely linked with self-expression, it allows Ovid to make his didactic persona more personal.'[806]

The prominence of the Ovidian narrator in the *Fasti* (and his involvement in what he describes) requires that he establish the basis of his authority. Assuming the role of *vates*, with its links to religious as well as poetic affairs, allows Ovid to draw on the traditional authority of *vates* for his verse. The poet's chosen subject in the *Fasti* is *tempora cum causis* and *signa* (*Fa.* 1.1-2), but particularly *sacra* which have been unearthed (*annalibus eruta priscis* - *Fa.* 1.7). Ovid's status as a *vates* and his subject matter are closely connected; he claims to have a particular right to see the gods,[807] due either to the fact that he is a *vates*, or the fact that he sings about *sacra* (*vel quia sum vates, vel quia sacra cano* - *Fa.* 6.8). In religious contexts, *vates* frequently offer their authoritative utterances in verse, which increases the role's appropriateness for

[805] Anderson 1982a, 50-51
[806] Newlands 1995, 16
[807] Vesta is an exception to this right (*Fa.* 6.253-4). Ovid claims *not* to have seen the goddess, a lie that poets tend to tell; *valeant* is a 'formula of scornful dismissal' (*OLD* s.v. 3d - cf. *Fa.* 6.701). However, Ovid invokes Vesta's authority through his *sacra* (*Fa.* 6.250) in a context which has the features of an epiphany without the actual appearance of the god. Littlewood (2006, 85 ad 253) notes that this '"proof" of his veracity is intended to enhance the vatic integrity of the chronicler of the Roman year'.

Ovid's purposes. Indeed, this is a duty which Ovid undertakes in the *Fasti*, giving directions for the conduct of religious rites and festivities.[808] In this poem concerned with *fasti*, on a number of occasions the term *fas* is associated with vatic activity, activating the religious aspects of the role (*Fa.*1.25, 6.7-8). By associating his vatic title with *fas*, Ovid locates himself firmly in the realms of what is permitted, no longer a licentious poet of a *turpis carmen* (*Tr.* 2.211),[809] but a *fas*-ical prophet-bard, who speaks piously (*nobis concessa canentur / quaeque pio dici vatis ab ore licet - Fa.* 3.325-6). The gods endorse Ovid's vatic credentials (*Fa.* 1.101, 3.177) and Ovid uses his vatic status to invoke their favour (*Fa.* 3.714, *Fa.* 4.14).[810]

Ovid emphasises his vatic privileges, including divine endorsement as well as inspiration,[811] in order to assert his narrative authority. In *Fasti* 3.167-8, the Ovidian narrator calls on Mars to answer him, on the basis that *vates* are permitted to hear the secret presagings of the gods (*si licet occultos monitus audire deorum / vatibus, ut certe fama licere putat*). The fact that Mars not only responds, but explicitly confirms Ovid's vatic status by addressing him as *vates operose* (*Fa.* 3.177) offers him the authority of divine endorsement. The *vates* is able to offer insights akin to cultic knowledge by virtue of his vatic status.[812] Mars' address to Ovid illustrates the bi-fold aspects of being a poet and hints at the reason for his authority - Ovid remembers the past as well as having divinely-provided knowledge of the future.[813] Mars' use of the

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[808] e.g. *Fa.* 4.731ff.
[809] *AA* 3.407 - *sanctaque maiestas et erat venerabile nomen / Vatibus*. Ovid is playing on vatic authority and experience to define himself as a 'love prophet' (Ahern 1990).
[810] Pasco-Pranger 2000
[811] Myers 1994, 69 - 'the epiphanies serve the dual purpose of vouching for the poet's divine inspiration and for the authentication of the truth of his narrative - both important aspects of his pose in the *Fasti* as a *vates*.'
[812] Harries (1989, 169) argues that *vates* can receive inspiration and information from the gods, and that 'the vatic persona's function is to "guarantee" by this means the authority of the story told'.
[813] Lovatt (2013, 124) - 'A special relationship with the divine gives prophet figures authority and privileged knowledge of things far away, deep inside and to come.'

title *vates operose* echoes Janus' use of it in *Fasti* 1.101, and 'this grand title for the poet is given particular weight here and elsewhere by its being uttered by a deity.'[814] As Janus is the first god to directly address the poet in the *Fasti*, his words are programmatic for the poet's role and authority throughout the poem. The Ovidian narrator's claim to the title of *vates* is recognised and acknowledged, establishing his authority. However, the connection of *vates* with *operosus* creates a striking image of the bard. The collocation condenses 'the tension between the vatic ideal of inspired poetry and the work of poetic composition' and reflects 'the complex relationship between Callimacheanism, vaticism, and antiquarianism in the *Fasti*'.[815] Whilst being a *vates* grants the poet the privilege of divine inspiration and instruction, Ovid is a *vates operosus*, who must work to unearth the *sacra* he describes rather than simply being inspired with knowledge of them by the all-knowing Muses, and who must inscribe the words of wisdom that he receives in his memory (*voces percipe mente meas* - *Fa.* 1.102; *memori pectore dicta nota* - *Fa.* 3.178). This transformation of the vatic role might contribute to Ovid's authority; his poetry appears to possess the authority of hard work as well as divinity.

The description of the Ovidian narrator as *vates operose dierum* (*Fa.* 1.101, 3.177) also evokes Hesiod's *Works and Days* (*Opera et Dies* in Latin),[816] particularly when it is preceded by the strongly didactic command, *disce*. Ovid's subject matter is certainly *dies*, albeit festal rather than work days. Janus and Mars address the Ovidian narrator as a latter-day Hesiod, imbuing him with the authority of his poetic predecessor, the progenitor of didactic. Callimachus suggests that the histories

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[814] Green 2004a, 74. cf. *Fa.* 3.177, 6.21.
[815] Pasco-Pranger 2000, 275
[816] Green 2004a, 75 ad 101. cf. *Fa.* 6.13 where *praeceptor arandi* refers to Hesiod, but recalls Ovid's role as *praeceptor amoris* in the *Ars Amatoria*.

supplied to Hesiod by the Muses included not only the birth of Chaos (Χάεος γένες - fr. 2.3 Pf), but both the *Theogony* and the *Works and Days*.[817] Despite their ability to lie, the Muses contribute to Hesiod's authority, and the Hesiodic allusion in the *Fasti* lends Ovid that authority, positioning the gods as informants equivalent to Hesiod's Muses. The Ovidian narrator is thus positioned as an authoritative successor to Hesiod in didactic tradition.

The use of the title of *vates* also legitimises the generic strain which the *Fasti* self-consciously places on its elegiac form through the epic weightiness of its subject. This is a concern which recurs later in the poem. In *Fasti* 4.1-16, Ovid and Venus address the fact that although Ovid's poetic steeds now tread an *area maior*, as a *vates* he still belongs to Venus and the elegy to which he bade farewell in *Amores* 3.15.1-2 and which this passage thematically and verbally evokes.[818] Ovid finds his greater sphere still in elegy.[819] Moreover, in *Fasti* 6.21-2, Juno makes explicit what is implied by Janus' and Mars' description of Ovid as *vates operose*; grand and weighty themes may legitimately be tackled in slender measures (*per exiguos magna... modos*) by a *vates*.

Ovid the *Vates* and the Gods

The privileges granted to *vates* are reiterated at the beginning of *Fasti* 6, where the Ovidian narrator re-establishes his position as an authoritative *vates* and plays off the poetic and religious aspects of the *vates* role against each other. In response to the posited belief that deities are not seen by mortals (*nullaque mortali numina visa*

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[817] Barchiesi 1997, 233
[818] cf. *Fa.* 2.3-8 where his elegiacs sail with greater sails.
[819] Hinds 1992a, 83-87. Ovid's *area maior* (*Fa.* 4.10) is not in epic or tragedy, as *Am.* 3.15 might suggest, but in elegy.

putent - *Fa.* 6.4), he describes an internal god, stirring the poetic mind with inspiration (*Fa.* 6.5-7).[820] Miller suggests that the philosophical language here (*semina mentis* - *Fa.* 6.6) evokes the philosophical concept that the divine heritage of the human soul gives rise to the visions of seers (and of ordinary mortals in dreams).[821] Varro prioritises the vatic mind in deriving *vates* from *vi mentis* (Isid. *Etym.* 8.7.3). However, Ovid's comments might also be seen as a pragmatic (and Lucretian)[822] rejection of vatic claims of actual epiphanies.[823]

Ovid asserts his particular right to see the faces of the gods (*fas mihi praecipue voltus vidisse deorum* - *Fa.* 6.7) due to being a *vates* or to his subject matter. He is, moreover, not just any *vates*.[824] Ovid differentiates himself from the throng of *vates* in poetic tradition by providing a second basis for his rights (*vel quia sacra cano* - *Fa.* 6.8). This specifically identifies Ovid as the individual writing this poem by recalling his statement of purpose in *Fasti* 1.7 (*sacra recognosces*). Ovid's use of the word *fas*, imbued with its full sense of divine sanction,[825] emphasises the exceptional nature of the poet's status. The phrase *fas... mihi vidisse* echoes the ancient formula, *fas sit vidisse*, which was traditionally uttered as a prayer by mortals confronted by an epiphany.[826] Ovid marks his preeminence and authority in religious matters over other

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[820] cf. *Est deus in nobis* - *AA* 3.549-50, asserting the superiority of poets.
[821] cf. Cicero *Div*. 1.113-8 and 128-9, especially *Div.* 1.51.115.
[822] *Semina mentis* echoes *semina rerum* (*DRN* 1.176).
[823] cf. *AA* 1.25-8, where the Ovidian narrator says that he will not falsely claim Hesiodic epiphany or divine inspiration, and *usus* inspires the *peritus vates* (*AA* 1.29), evoked by multiple parallels with the present passage: references to Ascra (*Fa.* 6.14, *AA* 1.28); *praeceptor amandi* (*Fa.* 6.13) echoes *praeceptor amoris* (*AA* 1.17). In both poems, the Ovidian narrator insists that he is telling the truth (*facta canam* - *Fa.* 6.3; *vera canam* - *AA* 1.30).
[824] Miller (1991, 154 n. 97) believes that here '*vates = poeta*'.
[825] Ibid., 37
[826] cf. Sen. *Ep.* 115.4; Ovid *Her.* 16.63.

bards and other mortals by the fact that unlike them he does not need to beg permission to see the gods. The subsequent epiphany of Juno proves his claim.[827]

Ovid locates himself in an idyllic location, a *locus amoenus* suited to a poet,[828] where he experiences a Callimachean-style epiphany. Juno's appearance renders the Ovidian narrator speechless (*tacitoque* - *Fa.* 6.19), but she contributes to his authority by authorising the comments that he has just made. Juno addresses Ovid explicitly as a *vates* (*Fa.* 6.21), endorses his undertaking and its mode (*ause per exiguos magna referre modos* - *Fa.* 6.22),[829] and justifies his right to look upon a divinity on the basis of his topic, though she refers to *festa* (*Fa.* 6.24) not *sacra* (*Fa.* 6.8). Here it is *ius* that supports Ovid's right to view divinities and grants the *Fasti* authority, rather than the *fas* that the Ovidian narrator claimed at *Fasti* 6.7. The only aspect of Ovid's preceding claims that Juno does not mention is the assertion of internal divine inspiration, which Miller dismisses as 'silly indirection' irrelevant to Juno's use of the term *vates*.[830] The important factor is his choice of subject - *magna* (*Fa.* 6.22), *festa* (*Fa.* 6.24).

Juno also refers to Ovid as *conditor* (founder) of the Roman year (*Fa.* 6.21; *condere* is reiterated at *Fa.* 6.24), a title which Littlewood suggests takes on a meaning closer to 'founder of a genre' than 'author'.[831] As the originator of a new genre, Ovid gains the authority of primacy, as age allowed him to do in the exile poetry.[832] Ovid's claim to

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[827] At *Fa.* 6.13 and *Fa.* 1.63 Ovid introduces a divinity with *ecce* so that as Miller (1991, 59) notes, 'Ovid seems in the very act of sighting (and interpreting) a divine sign'.
[828] Littlewood (2006, 9 ad 9-10) dubs it 'a literary *locus* for poetic inspiration'. cf. Callimachus' *Aet.* 1 fr. 1.27-8 Pf., *Hymn* 2.112.
[829] Ibid., 14 ad 22. *Audere* traditionally signifies the courage of writers attempting a new form or style (e.g. Catullus 1.5-6; Horace *Serm*. 2.1.62; *Georgics* 2.175-6). *Exiguos* is paired with *elegos* by Horace (*AP* 73-98).
[830] Miller 1991, 43
[831] Littlewood 2006, 13 ad 21-3. Miller (1991, 41) considers this 'one of those occasions where a word means two things simultaneously', but notes that 'founder' is the dominant sense.
[832] cf. *Tr.* 5.1.10 (*sumque argumenti conditor ipse mei*), where (*pace TLL*) Ovid is the creator of his theme. Ovid also uses *conditor* to denote his creation of the *Ars Amatoria* (*Pont.* 2.11.2 - *Naso, parum faustae conditor Artis*), where Miller (1991, 155 n. 114) suggests that Ovid is playing upon the word's

be the first to deal with grand themes in elegy challenges Propertius' primacy in this sphere; Ovid's statement, *sacra cano... tempora* (*Fa.* 2.7), asserts that he has outdone Propertius' offering (*sacra diesque canam* - Prop. 4.1.69).[833] Claims of primacy in a genre are problematic and frequent in Latin literature.[834] Ovid's concern with being first resurfaces in *Fasti* 2.3 (*nunc primum*). He succeeds in convincing at least one reader, for Miller attempts to justify Ovid's claim, suggesting that Propertius fails to sing of the *sacra diesque* as he promised.[835] Ovid's conversion of the future (and ultimately unfulfilled) promise, *canam*, into a present (and enacted) *cano* asserts his primacy. It also plays on vatic viewpoints; where Propertius looked forward, Ovid, who looked into the future with *canam* in *Fasti* 1.1-2 (*tempora cum causis... signa canam*) is now, in his second book, concerned with the present (*cano*). The status of the *vates* (in both religious and poetic terms) is thus highly dependent upon Ovid's special relationship with the gods.

A prophet-*vates* gains his authority from the god speaking through him;[836] indeed, 'authority, especially divine authority, can induce belief in otherwise quite unconvincing positions.'[837] However, this is not universally the case in the *Fasti.* When Ovid disclaims seeing Vesta in *Fasti* 6.253 (*valeant mendacia vatum*) it

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dual senses ('Ovid is the 'author' of the *Ars Amatoria* and the 'founder' or 'inventor' of the *ars* taught in that work'). Ovid even claims innovation for the *Heroides* (*AA* 3.346). Miller (Ibid. n. 116) notes that *conditor* is used later to mean the founder of a literary genre (cf. Pliny *NH praef.* 26, 35.199), which if in currency in Ovid's time would add to the programmatic quality of the statement.

[833] Miller 1991, 16-21. cf. M. Robinson 2011, 57 n. 2) on the manuscript *versus* the *OCT* reading of *sacra deosque* here, which slightly lessens the effect of the allusion.

[834] *Georgics* 3.12; Horace *Carm.* 3.30.13 (despite Catullus' prior ventures); Propertius 3.1.3-4 despite Gallus; Tibullus; Propertius' own earlier poetry.

[835] Miller 1991, 20

[836] This is not always true; when, as in *Fa.* 6, the gods contradict each other, the Ovidian narrator slips from being 'the authoritative mouthpiece of the gods to the uncertain, judicially impotent arbiter' (Williams 1991b, 183). The gods compromise as well as impart his vatic authority.

[837] Harries 1989, 177, as when Lemuria is implausibly explained as a more easily pronounced substitute for 'Remuria', of which Bömer (1958, 320 ad 5.479) states 'Die Ableitung... ist nicht haltbar.' The divine authority accrued to this explanation is shattered six days later, when Mercury is invoked as the god who endorses future perjury and washes away past sins (*Fa.* 5.690), and recalls his own deceit in stealing the Ortygian cattle (*Fa.* 5.692). M*emor* links the lying god and authoritative *vates* uncomfortably closely.

initially appears to strengthen his authority, for as Ovid himself states at *Fasti* 6.296-8, there were no statues of Vesta in her temple, so she was not seen. Ovid reiterates his privileged vatic status by adding that his ignorance and errors were corrected through inspiration, rather than a fallible human instructor (*Fa.* 6.255-6). Yet the account which he provides is not in direct speech from Vesta, nor even from the inspired poet. On the contrary, 'it soon becomes apparent that the information purveyed by this inspired *vates* of supposedly privileged insight is substantially derivative.'[838] Likewise, *dicitur* at *Fasti* 6.266 points to an account which is a commonplace of tradition,[839] rather than being unique to Ovid. The flood of footnotes underlines the fact that Ovid's sources are literary, not divine.[840] The relationship between the Ovidian *vates* and his inspiring goddess Vesta is mediated by literary tradition.

Consequently, Ovid's invention of an implausible derivation for Vesta's name at *Fasti* 6.299,[841] and reversal of the conventional Roman order of prayer prior to a legitimate etymology at *Fasti* 6.301,[842] are problematic. The information which is not attested by tradition, and must therefore stem from the *vates*' inspiration, is not entirely reliable. As Williams points out, 'Ovid's cavalier departure from convention on these points strains the reader's confidence in his vatic pose as Vesta's unerring, inspired mouthpiece.' The supposedly inspired poet's information is either derived from tradition or false, which undermines his pose as a privileged mouthpiece of divinely-endorsed information. Ovid is merely a pretender to vatic status at this point, despite the apparent success of his relationship with the gods elsewhere in the *Fasti*.

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[838] Williams 1991b, 184
[839] e.g. Cass. Dio. 2.66.
[840] *memorant* - *Fa.* 6.285; *feruntur* - *Fa.* 6.287.
[841] Frazer 1929, 220 ad 299 - 'The derivation... is of course absurd.'
[842] Attested by Varro in Servius ad *Aen.* 11.211.

Ovid's narratorial authority thus has a note of ambivalence; he is 'hanging uneasily between the posturings of the independent, inspired *vates* and the humble poet who has to depend upon his available sources'.[843] Moreover, Ovid's rejection of the lies of poets in *Fasti* 6.253 (*valeant mendacia vatum*) now looks decidedly disingenous. Perhaps rather than using *valeant* in a 'formula of scornful dismissal' ('farewell lies!'), he is actually using it to mean 'may the lies of poets (and particularly this poet) prevail/have influence'.[844] This poet has presented other poets' stories which are not lies, but reliable, and has embraced the ability of poets to produce *mendacia* himself. Williams, however, sees the resultant variation in Ovidian narratorial authority as a mark of the poet's authority, suggesting that he is asserting his authority over his subject matter;[845] the calendar may be the subject of the *Fasti*, but it is not its controlling force. Ovid intends rather to confront the reader with the question of narrative authority.

There is another possible explanation for the problematic material which Ovid derives from divine inspiration, namely that the goddess herself provides flawed information. The footnotes may be intended to draw attention to the Ovidian narrator's unquestioning acceptance of the story and invite the reader to be more discerning. There are other instances in the *Fasti* which show that a god's trustworthiness may affect the prophet's status. In *Fasti* 6, Apollo is consulted, apparently directly, and gives a non-lying response (*hos non mentito reddidit ore sonos* - *Fa.* 6.426), which is borne out by subsequent events. As with other aetiologies in the *Fasti*, the prophecy is meant to justify the present. As Littlewood states, 'Apollo's oracle confers the

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[843] Williams 1991b, 185
[844] *OLD* s.v. 3d and 8; cf. the honest embrace of poetic licence at Lucian *VH* 1.4 - κἂν ἓν γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο ἀληθεύσω λέγων ὅτι ψεύδομαι.. γράφω τοίνυν περὶ ὧν μήτε εἶδον μήτε ἔπαθον μήτε παρ᾽ ἄλλων ἐπυθόμην, ἔτι δὲ μήτε ὅλως ὄντων μήτε τὴν ἀρχὴν γενέσθαι δυναμένων. διὸ δεῖ τοὺς ἐντυγχάνοντας μηδαμῶς πιστεύειν αὐτοῖς.
[845] Williams 1991b, 185

authority of antiquity on the Roman dictum that Rome's survival as an imperial power depended on the safeguarding of Vesta's *sacra*.'[846] Mortals apply for guidance to whichever god is relevant to their situation; in the case of prophets and poets, this is often Apollo.

In the *Fasti*, however, Ovid takes this tactic a step further. Rather than invoking Apollo or the Muses to assist him,[847] the Ovidian narrator applies to a god who is personally involved.[848] This more specific divine assistance gives an initial impression of increased authority, but divinities are as prone to bias as any other eyewitness authority.[849] This is particularly apparent at *Fasti* 4.808ff., where Ovid calls on Quirinus to assist him in singing about the events of early Roman history in which he was personally involved.[850] There are many problems with this, for Romulus 'sponsors an exculpatory account of Remus' murder that lays the blame on a guard Celer, not Romulus'.[851] Ovid has already alluded to the standard,[852] but less complimentary, version of Remus' death at *Fasti* 2.143 (*te Remus incusat*). Now, by 'virtually allowing Romulus to explain himself through his vates, Ovid has succeeded in making him utterly unbelievable and untrustworthy.'[853] The reader has been disabused of his faith in the objectivity of Ovid's source and also the account which that source inspired. Indeed, Romulus' involvement has the opposite effect. As Barchiesi asserts, 'the tendentious nature of the account is glossed by the very

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[846] Littlewood 2006, 133 n. ad 427
[847] Ovid's contradictory information in *Fa.* 5 lacks the 'special authoritative stamp which the Muses' support would normally confer' (Harries 1989, 172). The Muses are transformed from an authoritative source of inspiration into the cause of the poet's inability to provide an authoritative account.
[848] Personal involvement usually grants authority. cf. *Fa.* 1.469 (*de se si creditur ipsi*).
[849] cf. Nestor in the *Met*. Harries (1989, 170) - 'Ovid's Minerva, Mercury, Janus, Vesta, Carmentis, Egeria, Flora and Pales all illustrate in their different ways how the invoked patron can be presented as determining the content of what the poet transmits to the reader.'
[850] Quirinus = Romulus. cf. *Fa.* 2.475-6 - *Quirino, / qui tenet hoc nomen (Romulus ante fuit)*.
[851] Harries 1989, 170
[852] Bömer 1958, 279-80 ad 4.809
[853] Harries 1989, 171

invocation of the god that acts as its prologue, and that by rights should ensure a relationship of truth between the poet and his subject matter'.[854] Consequently the effectiveness of the concluding pronouncements on Rome and the Caesars is also undermined, for having been called into doubt 'as a biased historian of his house, Romulus will scarcely be trusted as a prophet of its fate!'[855] Far from contributing to the authority of the *vates* whom he has informed, the god detracts from it.

The *Vates* Leading the *Vates*

Although the Ovidian narrator is the most prominent *vates* in the *Fasti*, other *vates* also appear, including Carmentis, who has metapoetic significance and functions as an analogue for Ovid. She is initially invoked by the Ovidian narrator as a provider of information like other divinities in the poem; Ovid uses the verb *mone*, just as he does when invoking Egeria in *Fasti* 3.261. The sense of *Fasti* 1.467 (*quae nomen habes a carmine ductum*) might be stretched to infer 'you who draw your name from a specific poem, namely that most monumental of poems, the *Aeneid*'.[856] This may highlight an additional allusion in the use of *mone*, namely to *Aeneid* 7.41, where Virgil identifies himself as a *vates*, requesting that Erato prompt him in his enterprise. The Ovidian narrator is thus aligned with Virgil, a vatic figure requesting divine guidance. However, the resulting account depicts Carmentis functioning as a *vates* whom a god inspires to prophesy (*Fa.* 1.472-3). Though she is not explicitly dubbed a *vates* when she first appears in *Fasti* 1, the title is twice attributed to her when she reappears in *Fasti* 6.[857] Ovid's Carmentis assumes a role similar to that of

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[854] Barchiesi 1997, 202
[855] Harries 1989, 171
[856] Green 2004a, 215 ad 467
[857] *Fa*. 6.535, 537. In *Aen.* 8.340, Carmentis is a prophetic nymph, *vatis fatidicae*. Servius *ad loc.* - *bene addidit 'fatidicae': nam vatem et poetam possumus intellegere, unde solum plenum non erat.*

Germanicus, she is a *vates* who can guide the *vates* Ovid. Ovid seeks a pilot for his ship (*deriget in medio quis mea vela freto? - Fa.* 1.466), a metaphor for a poetic guide. Carmentis is an ideal candidate, since she guides her son in a real boat (*Fa.* 1.499-500, 504).[858] Carmentis is not just any *vates*, however. Whereas in *Aeneid* 8.336ff. she is merely a nymph, in the *Fasti* she gains an upgraded status;[859] she is sacred and contributes to the status of Evander (*Fa.* 1.472) rather than receiving her significance from him. Ovid's Carmentis is an authority and a future divinity (*ego perpetuis olim sacrabor in aris - Fa.* 1.535), who may enhance the status of *vates* in the poem, including Ovid. Might they too warrant deification?

The truth of Carmentis' foretellings and her resultant authority are heavily emphasised in *Fasti* 1.[860] She instructs her son, *crede mihi* (*Fa.* 1.496), and is cited as *doctae Carmentis* (*Fa.* 1.499) which reinforces her position as a possessor of privileged knowledge. Carmentis does express doubts (*fallor - Fa.* 1.515; *quis tantum fati credat habere locum? - Fa.* 1.518), but these seem intended to reinforce the credibility of the whole. Carmentis sings *carmina vera* (*Fa.* 1.474),[861] which in the present context naturally refers to her prophetic utterances. However, Ovid is playing on the dual senses of *carmen*. *Carmina* in their most familiar sense are songs or poems, and this is the key to Carmentis. Her name encapsulates prophecy and poetry, and has been viewed as descriptive of her prophetic frenzy.[862] The Ovidian narrator supports this interpretation, addressing Carmentis as *quae nomen habes a carmine*

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[858] Green 2004a, 215 ad 466
[859] Herbert-Brown 1994, 162
[860] *Fa.* 1.474 - *ore dabat pleno carmina vera dei*, 476 - *multaque... tempore nacta fidem*, 477 - *nimium vera*, 499 - *doctae... Carmentis.*
[861] I follow Green (2004a, 219 ad 474) in preferring the reading of AUω (*ore dabat pleno carmina vera dei*) to Mς (*ore dabat vero carmina plena dei*) which is given in the Teubner (with the caveat that the former is perhaps correct. The MSS for *Fa.* 5.525 display a similar issue), as the former reading allows Ovid to engage in his favoured ploy of transferring epithet (*pleno* from person to mouth) and *vera* means that 'stress is put on the authority that Carmentis commands in the sphere of prophecy'.
[862] *Carens mentis* - 'out of her wits'. cf. Plut. *Rom*. 21-3.

ductum (*Fa.* 1.467). Her name has been etymologised as deriving from *carmen* in the sense of prophecy,[863] but, crucially it also identifies her connection to poetry. Carmentis-*vates* is a poet-*vates* who sings *carmina vera.* Green's proposal[864] that *Fasti* 1.467 alludes to the appearance of Carmentis' *nomen* in the *Aeneid* is also suggestive of another point; a *nomen* can mean not a nomenclature but fame itself, one's reputation. Carmentis is known from the *Aeneid* (though her divine status in the *Fasti* may indicate that her Ovidian *nomen* is greater). *Fasti* 1.466 might imply that her *nomen* (reputation) derives from *carmina vera* (*Fa.* 1.474). She is a Carmentis *vera*, who sings true things and is innately true and credible. It is also another way in which Carmentis parallels Ovid, and that her prophecies mirror Ovid's poetry,[865] for having a *nomen* from a poem is central to Ovid's own pursuit of fame, as expressed in the sphragis to the *Metamorphoses* (*nomenque erit indelebile nostrum* - *Met.* 15.876).[866]

Both Carmentis and Ovid's vatic speeches begin with a divine invocation, *di*,[867] invoking divine authorisation. Carmentis evokes not only the *Metamorphoses* and the *Fasti*, but also the *Tristia*. Her words of comfort to the banished Evander, assuring him that his exile is fated and due to an offended god (*sic erat in fatis; nec te tua culpa fugavit, / sed deus: offenso pulsus es urbe deo* - *Fa.* 1.481-2), vividly echo Ovid's own exculpations in exile. Carmentis excuses herself from from detailing all the exilic exempla she can call to mind as it would take too long (*quos praeterea*

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[863] Eden 1975, 110 ad 336. cf. Bömer 1958, 52-53 ad 462. *Origo* 1.5.2 derives *carmen* from Carmentis, rather than *vice versa*. Sperduti (1950, 221) thinks this is evidence of Augustan poets trying to give a religious (and authoritative) tone to their poetry.
[864] Green 2004a, 215 ad 467
[865] In *Fa.* 6, Ovid states that time has obscured the story (*obscurior aevo / fama* - *Fa.* 6.103-4), but that it can be learned from his *carmen*. Given the dual senses of *carmen* as prophecy and poetry, this illustrates how the *vates* is able to speak authoritatively with greater knowledge than ordinary mortals.
[866] This is revisited in Ovid's reworking of that prophecy in *Tr.* 4.10.121-2, where he claims to have been granted while alive a *sublime... nomen, ab exequiis quod dare fama solet*.
[867] *Fa.* 1.509; *Met.* 1.2.

longa referre mora est - *Fa.* 1.492) recalling Ovid's use of this poetic device elsewhere. Carmentis succeeds in her speech in doing what Ovid claims is his aim in the proem to the *Metamorphoses*;[868] she brings her story down to Ovid's era (*talibus ut dictis nostros descendit in annos* - *Fa.* 1.537). The Ovidian narrator of the *Metamorphoses* is prophesying his intent for his poem at the outset, at a point where it has not yet been fulfilled. Carmentis, in contrast, has succeeded; her words have already been proven (*tempore nacta fidem* - *Fa.* 1.476).[869] Carmentis also recalls the Ovidian narrator of the *Fasti*; she will speak of *causas horum moremque sacrorum* (*Fa.* 1.465), whilst Ovid's concerns are *tempora cum causis* (*Fa.* 1.1) and *sacra* (*Fa.* 1.7). Carmentis halts in the midst of her discourse (*substitit in medio praescia lingua sono* - *Fa.* 1.538),[870] just as Ovid himself will stop after *Fasti* 6, where Carmentis next appears, when only six months of the year are complete. With Carmentis serving as a mirror for Ovid and his poetry, and in a passage so thickly woven with metapoetic threads, her authority has great significance for Ovid's own poetry. Carmentis' *carmina vera*, inspired by the gods, will by association confer authority upon Ovid's own *carmen*.

However, Carmentis' authority is not absolute. Ovid lets slip that Carmentis might have an interest in helping him. She should favour his enterprise, he says, *ne tuus erret honor* (*Fa.* 1.468), for the events at hand are ones in which Carmentis was

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[868] *di, coeptis...* / *aspirate meis primaque ab origine mundi* / *ad mea perpetuum deducite tempora carmen* - *Met.* 1.2-4.
[869] cf. *Fa.* 4.857 - *quis tunc hoc ulli credere posset?* Prophecies in poetry often purport to tell the future, but are always correct since they generally describe events which are in the past of the poet.
[870] She begs the question raised by Auden in *Secondary Epic* of how far the poet as *vates* can ever properly act as a prophet:
No, Virgil, no:
Not even the first of the Romans can learn
His Roman history in the future tense,
Not even to serve your political turn:
Hindsight as foresight makes no sense...

directly involved and she risks not getting her due. This reveals a possible motivation for her involvement, namely self-promotion and self-bias for a positive account which will grant her more *honor* (which comes at the expense of her son, who in the *Fasti* is a weak and colourless youth far removed from the strong Virgilian figure). Though she should know best about her own experiences, 'far from ensuring accuracy, Carmentis' aid may in fact create a biased telling of the story'.[871] This passage also addresses the matter of personal knowledge. In *Fasti* 1.469, the Ovidian narrator parenthesises a land's claimed name (*de se si creditur ipsi*).[872] Should one take its word about itself? As is the case with Ovid's divine informants, doing so is decidedly problematic. The warning to be sceptical about those talking about themselves undermines the authority of Carmentis' story.

Carmentis has an authoritative (though potentially partial) voice; however, many of her prophecies are not related in her own voice, but are reported by the Ovidian narrator.[873] Barchiesi believes that Carmentis is speaking more or less implicitly (though even he acknowledges that 'there is no marker of direct speech between lines 468 and 469 to introduce her report'),[874] but it is not until *Fasti* 1.479 that Carmentis provably speaks. The blurring of the speaker's identity complicates the authority of the speech; whilst it appears to invoke Carmentis' personal authority, the account is filtered through the Ovidian narrator, who emphasises the truth of her prophecies. He notes Carmentis' divine inspiration in uttering the truth (*ore dabat pleno carmina vera dei* - *Fa.* 1.474). The proof of her foretelling of her own suffering is delayed,

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[871] Green 2004a, 215 ad 468
[872] As Green (Ibid., 218 ad 469) points out, Ovid is conscious that 'natives may be prone to exaggerate or glamorise the legend surrounding their own particular land'. cf. *Pont.*1.8.13.
[873] Ovid acknowledges that this is less than ideal in *Fa.* 6.656 (*possim utinam doctae verba referre deae*) but tells the story anyway, leaving the reader to wonder whether he may have conveyed an inexact account previously without flagging it.
[874] Barchiesi 1997, 197

however, by the Ovidian narrator's claim that many of her other prophecies were proved true by time (*multaque praeterea tempore nacta fidem* - *Fa.* 1.476) until *Fasti* 1.478-9, when it becomes *nimium vera*. Barchiesi argues that 'an effect of greater objectivity is achieved' by the Ovidian narrator rather than Carmentis herself providing information about the goddess, on the basis that it would 'be asking too much of the reader that he should accept a prophetess who, after a thousand years and more, recalls her own superexact predictions.'[875] According to this view, the increased objectivity of retreating into Ovidian narration contributes to the authority of the account, for it frees the story from the vagaries of memory. Yet Carmentis is the goddess to whom the Ovidian narrator appealed for enlightenment (*ipsa mone* - *Fa.* 1.467), and as the Ovidian narrator notes, believing people about themselves is questionable. The obscuration of how far Carmentis controls the account provided by the Ovidian narrator makes it difficult for the reader to evaluate its accuracy.

Ovid heightens his vatic authority by associating himself with another high status *vates*. At the beginning of the *Fasti*, Ovid dedicates the poem to Germanicus and invokes him as an alter-*vates* (*vates rege vatis habenas* - *Fa.* 1.25), not only in a poetic role (*scimus et, ad nostras cum se tulit impetus artes, / ingenii currant flumina quanta tui* - *Fa.* 1.23-4),[876] but also as an *auspex* or *augur* (*auspice* - *Fa.* 1.26). The word is appropriate, since Germanicus belonged to the princely college of augurs, and *auspex* has a sense of 'one who procures omens'.[877] However, Germanicus' religious status is elevated beyond this to that of 'a divine figure who could actually send good

[875] Barchiesi 1997, 198. He also finds it preferable - 'A prophet who verifies his own prophecies *ex eventu* with an "I told you so" is always rather offensive.'
[876] Germanicus' output includes a translation of Aratus' *Phaenomena*, one of the models for the *Fasti*.
[877] *OLD* s.v. 1

omens'.[878] Germanicus is addressed like a god or Muse for the enterprise of the *Fasti*. Ovid too takes on an elevated role as a *vates*. Miller sees Ovid in the Kalends of January as 'a sort of Augustan high priest, a *vates* or even a *sacerdos*, at first presiding over, and then solemnly unfolding for us, a celebration of the might of the Roman nation'.[879] Like a seer conveying the supposed words of a god, Ovid functions as an intermediary. By writing, he brings good omens for the Roman year, and his authority is increased by the enactment of his words.

Ovid's claim that he will sing the truth, though some will say he lied (*facta canam; sed erunt qui me finxisse loquantur* - *Fa.* 6.3) recalls the classic dilemma of earlier ancient prophets who spoke the truth but were not believed.[880] This is also the quandary of the poet, particularly a poet so concerned as Ovid with interrogating authority. It is not only the words of the *vates* that are at issue. The words of the gods can be cryptic (as, for example, at *Fasti* 3.336-7), whilst divinities may have limits placed upon what they may say (*magna petis, nec quae monitu tibi discere nostro / fas sit: habent fines numina nostra suos* - *Fa.* 3.312-3).[881] Although Miller interprets Ovid's occasional assertions (or questioning) of the truth of his account as intended to 'enhance the authority and scholarly discrimination of his narrative persona',[882] they do not necessarily do so. As the poem progresses, the *vates*-Ovid becomes increasingly uncertain and less able to interpret what he encounters. He has not a guiding divinity but a whole collection of them, who offer conflicting accounts and

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[878] Miller 1991, 58. cf. *Fa.* 4.830 (*auspicibus vobis hoc mihi surgit opus*), which is addressed to deities. Also Horace *Ep.* 1.3.13 (*auspice Musa*).
[879] Miller 1991, 71
[880] e.g. Cassandra. cf. Aeschylus *Ag.* 1202-1212. Ovid comments ironically on this at *Her.* 16.125, where Cassandra is for once believed, but only through 'a willful misconstruction of her words' (Kenney 1996, 101 ad 123-6).
[881] cf. Ocyroe, who experiences *vaticinos furores* (*Met*. 15.640). She is condemned for overspeaking, even though she is divinely inspired to prophesy.
[882] Miller 1991, 36

hence do little to stabilise his authority. Ovid's claim to disseminate Truth in *Fasti* 6.3 is traditional in poetic prologues.[883] Ovid offers evidence in support of his authoritative standpoint in imitation of Callimachean didactic;[884] his account can be confirmed from the stage (*Fa.* 4.326,[885] 6.612), antiquity (*Fa.* 4.203-4),[886] or his own experience (*Fa.* 3.370). The authority of such proofs remains open to debate, however. It has already been seen that *vetustas* is not necessarily an authoritative *magnus testis*. Moreover, eyewitness accounts are similarly problematic. This leaves us with the stage, which is also no certain authority, due to its inherent fictionality.[887]

Ovid frequently draws upon the authority of his position as *vates*, for which he has divine endorsement. However, the gods cannot always be trusted to be truthful sources; self-interest frequently colours their reports, whether these are provided in direct speech by the god, or by the divinely-inspired poet. In the light of this, Ovid's own authority is weakened. Unable to rely upon his own knowledge, he is forced to consult others, but the authorities who are supposedly most authoritative offer divergent accounts, leaving the Ovidian narrator increasingly at sea.

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[883] cf. *Theogony* 27-8; *AA* 1.1
[884] Miller 1991, 155 n. 116
[885] The stage is Ovid's evidence for the aetiology for the Megalensia, despite the fact that, as Barchiesi (1997, 196) notes, 'to say "it is a stage tale" is a well-known way for a narrator to say "it is a tall story" or something of the kind'. cf. D.H. 9.22.3 - μύθοις γὰρ δὴ ταῦτά θε καὶ πλάσμασιν ἔοικε θεατρικοῖς, a strong disclaimer in the mouth of a historian.
[886] Fantham (1998, 133 ad 203-4), who notes that citing places as witnesses is a generic feature of the *Fasti* imitating Callimachean aetiological didactic (fr. 442 Pf; *Fa.* 4.69, 344; 2.273, 3.707, 6.765). cf. *Met.* 1.400 - *pro teste vetustas*; *Aen.* 9.79 - *prisca fides facto, sed fama perennis*.
[887] cf. *Tr.* 2.517-9 which implies that the fictionality of the stage grants greater licence to its writers.

Vates in Ovid's Exile Poetry

Ovid's self-identification as a *vates* becomes increasingly important during his exile; this is reflected in the increasing references to *vates* from *Tristia* 4 onwards.[888] In poetry written while Ovid is physically separated from Rome, the ability to continue to engage with Rome is of vital importance in permitting him to maintain his poetic career. Vatic authority transcends mortal capabilities, and thus enables Ovid to do this. Seeing the future (whether through omens, dreams, or direct divine inspiration) is akin to the concept of seeing as a poetic device; it allows the poet to legitimise his poetry, in spite of his exile from Rome. Ovid's exilic *vates* seems to represent 'the figure of the marginalized Roman poet in general, which tradition has determined is not only holy but also privy to a body of knowledge not vouchsafed to the non-poet and able to transcend the limits of life on earth'.[889] The exiled *vates* exercises his poetic powers to connect himself with Rome despite the realities of his position. Yet even in the exile poetry, where it might seem vital for Ovid to uphold the authority of *vates* in order to maintain his authority and status (which Ovid often does), Ovid also continues to display the concern to interrogate vatic authority which typifies his *Fasti* and *Metamorphoses*.

In the exile poetry Ovid is careful to link *vates* with what is permitted (*fas*). For the banished poet, it is important to associate himself with poetry which might earn him a recall to Rome. There might also be a hint at Ovid's desire for reprieve in his claim to be an explicitly Roman *vates* (*ille ego Romanus vates* - *Tr.* 5.7.55),[890] for where else does a Roman poet belong than in Rome? McGowan interprets the association of *fas*

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[888] McGowan 2002, 136. Not until *Tr.* 5.3.31 does Ovid use the term *vates* solely of himself. There are earlier references to *vates* at *Tr.* 1.6.21, 3.7.20, 3.14.7, 4.10.42 and 129.
[889] Ibid., 144
[890] Also resistance to his status as a Sarmatian exile.

with the sacred status of the *vates* as 'defining Ovid's position as poet in relation to the role of the divine *princeps* as upholder of the law in Rome'.[891] Being a *vates* grants Ovid the authority to offer an alternative narrative to that of the *princeps*.[892] In *Tristia* 5.9, the last use of the term *vates* in the *Tristia*, Ovid explicitly connects 'the figure of the sacred bard of Roman lore with the political exile of Augustan Rome',[893] referring to himself as *exul* (*Tr.* 5.9.6) and *vates* (*Tr.* 5.9.10) in close proximity. For the exile, time extends only as far as the present (*si tamen urbe legor* - *Tr.* 5.9.6), because Rome is only in his past. The *vates*, however, has an extended authority, encompassing past and future,[894] and through his writings can escape *vetustas* and be preserved (*scripta vetustatem si modo nostra ferunt* - *Tr.* 5.9.8). He looks not only to the past but also to the future, connected to 'the trans-historical continuum that is the literary tradition'.[895]

Vatic authority over the future as well as the past intrinsically links the roles of poets and prophets. In *Ex Ponto* 2.1, the Ovidian narrator asserts not only that his prophecy has value (since it comes from a *vates*), but also that it will be fulfilled (*quod precor, eveniet: sunt quiddam oracula vatum* - *Pont.* 2.1.55).[896] The poet 'touts his own ability as *vates* to predict the future',[897] and, more importantly, his ability to commemorate it authoritatively (*carminibus referam fortasse* - *Pont.* 2.1.63). The

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[891] McGowan 2002, 120
[892] cf. Horace's daring claim to be not merely *primus*, a recurring motif in Roman poetry, but *princeps* in *Carm.* 3.30.13 (Ziogas 2015, 117; Hinds 1998, 52-63).
[893] McGowan 2002, 145
[894] 'The term *vates* looks to the future and is to be connected with the immortality of his verse' - Ibid., 146. At *Tr.* 4.8.29 Ovid presents his past self as ignorant of the travails to come (*animo quondam non divinante futura*), abandoning his pose of possessing knowledge spanning past and future in order to emphasise the shock of his fate. Ovid claims knowledge of the future even in the past (*hoc eventurum iam tum... vidi* - *Tr.* 1.9.41), which he states was not a standard prophecy based upon signs (*Tr.* 1.9.49-50), but a conjecture for the future based upon reason (*Tr.* 1.9.51). This passage is replete with the language of divination, the very art which Ovid appears to reject.
[895] Ibid., 145
[896] Fulfilment of prophecies leads to the conclusion that the prophecies were correct (*Pont.* 2.1.6-8).
[897] McGowan 2002, 151

poet is functioning like a prophet, combining both aspects of the *vates*. The *vates* is also capable of exercising authority over future events. In Ovid's *Ibis*, Clotho avoids speaking a lengthy prophecy, instead prophesying a *vates* who will do so (*'fata canet vates qui tua,' dixit, 'erit'* - *Ib.* 244), and the poet immediately claims the authority of her prophecy for his self-identification as a *vates* (*ille ego sum vates* - *Ib.* 245).[898] Hinds considers this transfer of prophetic duties to be extraordinary, suggesting that it 'may be Roman poetry's most overt (or perverted) enactment of the *vates*-concept'.[899] Rather than being inspired by the Muses, Ovid has replaced them with Fates[900] who delegate their duties (and their control over the futures that they are spinning)[901] to him. This poet's words have weight,[902] and have the power to cause (and not merely predict) pain (*Ib.* 247-8).

The *vates*' lengthy memory allows him to recreate in words the events of the past, and he does not merely see the future, but by the act of speaking actually enacts or even creates it. The authority of the *vates* lies in his creative abilities. Ovid's ability to control and create his past and his future allows him to stand against the *iustus princeps* who has exiled him. Moreover, this power is more significant to Ovid as a poet than his present Augustus-controlled circumstances, for 'poetical power in Ovid's day was measured in terms of posterity.'[903] The *princeps* might exert

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[898] McGowan 2009, 160 - 'Ovid assumes the epithet *vates* in order to... demonstrate his own power over his enemy... the poet is not merely using his power as *vates* to recreate in his mind what has already happened, but rather to see into the future. The knowledge of future events is a source of power for Ovid over his enemy, just as it will become an empowering source of poetic creativity in the face of the *princeps*' direct control of events in Rome, in particular the legal circumstances of the poet's exile.'
[899] Hinds 1999, 64
[900] In *Aen.* 3.379-80, the Fates (and Juno) control how much Helenus can tell Aeneas.
[901] Before foretelling a *vates*' advent, Clotho orders that a promise have power, transforming it into a prophecy of future events which she can ensure come to fruition (*Ibis* 243-4). Her spinning is part of the process of metamorphosing possibility into result. Prophetic words (*dixerat*) are not just words.
[902] cf. *Am.* 3.12.19-20. Here Ovid is concerned with poets, and makes this explicit by not using the word *vates*. Ovid prefers that his verses hold no weight, like the testimony of other poets. In exile he finds his Muse too accurate and too weighty (*Pont.* 3.9.49-50). cf. Williams 1994, 101.
[903] McGowan 2002, 204

immediate control over Ovid's existence, but this power ends with Augustus' rule, whereas Ovid, as a *vates*, has a greater temporal scope against which to define himself, and his concern for the exilic here and now is much less important to him than the immortality which convention affords him in the future through his poetry.[904] Vatic authority always gets the last word.

Or does it? Augustus exerted exceptional control over literary works during his rule. Ziogas' definition of *auctor* as both 'writing poetry and controlling its interpretation, influence and reception' allows for the way that Augustus as *auctor* exerts control over Roman poets.[905] Donatus (*vita Verg.* 40-41) states that the *Aeneid* was published *auctore Augusto*, overruling Virgil's wish that it be destroyed. Ovid demonstrates his awareness of this in *Tristia* 2.533, where he refers to Virgil as *tuae felix Aeneidos auctor*, before challenging Augustus' *auctoritas* over the *Aeneid* with a subversive new reading of it as a *non legitimo foedere iunctus amor* (*Tr.* 2.536), which aims to place Ovid, not Augustus, in control of Virgilian reception. The *auctor*-Augustus has the power to self-censor (Suet. *Aug.* 85) and to censor others, particularly by book-burning. Suetonius mentions Augustus burning over 2000 prophetic books (*Aug.* 21); the double meaning of *vates* as prophet and poet suggests that poetry books are also in danger. Consequently Ovid's claim that his poem cannot be destroyed by Jove's anger and fire (*nec Iovis ira nec ignis* - *Met.* 15.871) appears all the more pointed. In *Tristia* 1.7, Ovid intends to burn his book (*ipse mea posui maestus in igne manu* - *Tr.* 1.7.16), although he ends up adding to it.[906] In *Tristia* 1.7.33-4, he asks the reader to take on

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[904] McGowan 2002, 159 - 'nearly all Greek and Latin poets were obsessed with their place in the canon, and the desire for literary fame and immortality vouchsafed by a readership in the future had long become conventional'. cf. Strabo on Homer surpassing all men, past and future (*Geog.* 1.2).
[905] Ziogas 2015, 120. cf. *Met.* 15.833-6; *Res Gestae* 34 - *auctoritate omnibus praestiti*.
[906] This positions the *auctor* as augmentor; Augustus, in contrast, does not increase the *Aeneid* by completing the missing half-lines. Ovid's burning of the *Metamorphoses* alludes to the fate which Virgil intended for the *Aeneid*, and which Augustus thwarted; cf. Hinds 1985, 22.

an *auctor*ial role, deciding whether to add his proem (*hos quoque sex versus, in prima fronte libelli* / *si praeponendos esse putabis, habe*). As Ziogas notes, 'Reception of poetry exceeds authorial intentions and imperial authority'.[907] Multiple copies and readers liberate the work from the control of an *auctor*, whether poet or prince, and Ovid is happy to pay the price of relinquishing control for the reward of immortality. *Ibis* 245 (*ille ego sum vates*) is, as Farrell notes, 'ominous and impressive'.[908] Moreover, the phrase to which Ovid appends his claim, *ille ego*, is curiously significant in his work, and frequently appears in contexts concerned with the poet's reputation and status.[909] This is particularly apparent in *Tristia* 5.7.55 (*ille ego Romanus vates*). Farrell's interpretation of the phrase as a recurring Ovidian reference to a specific line of earlier poetry, located in the pre-proemium which Servius claims was removed from the beginning of the *Aeneid*,[910] greatly increases the pointedness of this line, for 'against the the sound of the "Virgilian" *ille ego*, the hollowness of this vaunting titulature underscores the misery of life under relegation.'[911] Whereas Virgil was a true *Romanus vates*, lauded in Rome, Ovid's attempt to retain that title in spite of the evidence of his own poetry (*Tr.* 5.7.56, 58) is comparatively pitiful. Ovid also

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[907] Ziogas 2015, 123

[908] Farrell 2004, 50

[909] e.g. *Am.* 2.1.2 (emphasised by the contrasting repetition of *hoc quoque* in *Am.* 2.1.1 and 2.1.3) - *ille ego nequitiae Naso poeta meae*; *Am.* 3.8.23 - *ille ego Musarum purus Phoebique sacerdos*. Also *Pont.* 1.2.129ff. and 4.3.9-18, in which Ovid claims to have been thought to be an *unica Musa*. Contexts unrelated to poetic status include *AA* 2.452; *Her.* 16.246; *Met.* 1.757, 4.226, 15.500; *Tr.* 4.5.12.

[910] *Ille ego qui quondam, gracili modulatus avena*
carmen et egressus siluis vicina coegi
ut quamuis avido parerent arva colono,
gratum opus agricolis; at nunc horrentia Martis
arma virumque cano... (Servius, *in Aen. praef.*)
Conte (1986, 84-87) controversially suggests that Ovid models the proemium to *Amores* 1-3 on these earlier verses, though they are usually seen as a post-Ovidian interpolation. Austin 1968 sets out the conventional position. On these lines, cf. Austin 1971, 25–27; Camps 1969, 121–23; Farrell 2004; Fontaine 2004; Kayachev 2011; Koster 1988, 31–47; La Penna 1985; Maleuvre 2003; Theodorakopoulos 1997 esp. 160-1.

[911] Farrell 2004, 50. The contrast between the pre- and post-exilic tone of this phrase is relevant for Ovid's use of the *vates* concept more generally. The *vates* in the exile poetry is very different to the jaunty vatic figure of the *Amores* and *Ars Amatoria*, as well as the *vates* of the *Metamorphoses* and *Fasti.*

uses the phrase in *Tristia* 4.10.1 (*ille ego qui fuerim, tenerorum lusor amorum*), but here it is used in a declaration of past as opposed to present identity. The poet is obliquely identifying himself as the former poet of the *Amores* in a later temporality, addressed to *posteritas* (*Tr.* 4.10.2). As with the Virgilian pre-proemium, the phrase opens the poem, but Ovid plays on the concept of retrospective viewing; just as the Virgilian line was considered to be a later interpolation, so Ovid is here making an assertion not of present poetic authority, but of past poetic identity.

Throughout this autobiographical poem, Ovid affirms his identity as a poet. The use of a phrase which calls Virgil to mind sets Ovid in a tradition of authoritative poets, which is reinforced by other allusions to poetic tradition in the poem.[912] Ovid considers contemporary poets, equating these *vates* to gods (*Tr.* 4.10.42). The first, Macer, is described in terms of his age (*grandior aevo* - *Tr.* 4.10.43), reinforcing the authority of *vates* and age that is frequently attributed to both prophets and poets. Ovid also lists Virgil, although he claims to have only seen him (*Vergilium vidi tantum* - *Tr.* 3.10.51), an amusing twist, given that he has echoed Virgil's words in this very poem. Ovid locates himself within a temporal sequence of *vates* (*utque ego maiores, sic me coluere minores* - *Tr.* 4.10.55), though his own vatic inspiration emanates from a girl, not a god (*moverat ingenium... Corinna* - *Tr.* 4.10.60) and he continues to claim renown and the guidance of the Muse (*Tr.* 4.10.119-22). In a poem concerned with the past and with the passing of time, Ovid's reference to the malignant force Envy recalls his depictions of *vetustas* elsewhere.[913] *Livor* is a temporal entity (*qui detractat praesentia* - *Tr.* 4.10.123) who gnaws upon finished works just as *Vetustas* does. Against this background, Ovid reiterates the prophecy of

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[912] Might *Tr.* 4.10.32 allude to Horace *Carm.* 1.3.8, or *Tr.* 4.10.36 to *Carm.* 1.6.9?
[913] Especially *Met.* 15.234-6. For the 'traditional topos of *Livor edax*' (Harrison 2011, 175), cf. *Am.* 1.15.1. *Edax Vetustas* - *Met.* 15.872; *Pont.* 4.8.49.

his own immortality which he made at the end of the *Metamorphoses*. Like the explicit statement of his place among the canonic poets (*Tr.* 4.10.125ff.), Ovid's use of a phrase which alludes to Virgil marks his work with the authority of one who shares his title of *vates*.

Ovid's emphatic declaration of the authority of his words at *Ex Ponto* 2.1.55-6[914] is illustrative of a wider concern with asserting and justifying vatic authority against the stereotype that poets lie.[915] The question of the credibility and authority of vatic utterances arises in *Amores* 3, where Ovid ironically bewails the fact that he has done his job too well; his praise of his beloved has brought her to the attention of others and is viewed as having weight, even though, as he himself complains, poets are not customarily brought as witnesses (*Am.* 3.12.19-20). Ovid proclaims the unimpeded creativity of bards (*exit in immensum fecunda licentia vatum, / obligat historica nec sua verba fide* - *Am.* 3.12.41-2), purporting to lament his listeners' credulity (*credulitas nunc mihi vestra nocet* - *Am.* 3.12.44), when it actually demonstrates his success and his vatic authority. This image of the *vates* differentiates the poet's versatile, reflective vision. As McGowan points out, 'Where poetry looks forward, history only looks back in recording detail to draw a realistic picture of the past.'[916] Recalling the wide-eyed disingenuousness of the narrator of the *Amores*, in the *Tristia* the Ovidian narrator disclaims his previous work as *mendax... et ficta* (*Tr.* 2.355). The earlier, morally suspect poetry can (and must, in pursuit of reprieve) be dismissed as fictions, lacking in vatic authority. At the same time, the poet needs his present words to be believed. Ovid emphasises that vatic prophecies are not empty (*inrita votorum*

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[914] Helzle 2003, 264 ad 2.1.55-6 - 'Ovid wird hier viel emphatischer und ernster.'
[915] *Theog.* 27-8 - ἴδμεν ψεύδεα πολλὰ λέγειν ἐτύμοισιν ὁμοῖα, / ἴδμεν δ', εὖτ' ἐθέλωμεν, ἀληθέα γηρύσασθαι; Sol. 25 GP - πολλὰ ψεύφουσιν ἀοιδοί. Conversely: *Met.* 15.879; *Tr.* 4.10.129.
[916] McGowan 2002, 13

non sunt praesagia vatum - *Pont.* 3.4.89), they come not from the poet (*nec mea verba legis* - *Pont.* 3.4.91), but from a god speaking through him (*iam pondus dices omen habere meum. / crede, brevique fides aderit* - *Pont.* 3.4.98-9). At the end of the poem, Ovid calls upon the gods to prove the validity of his words (*di, quorum monitu sumus eventura locuti, / verba, precor, celeri nostra probate fide* - *Pont.* 3.4.113-4).[917] The success of Ovid's poetry depends upon his audience's acceptance of his present authority, which is founded upon the condemnation of earlier works.

In *Tristia* 4.10, Ovid avows his poetic authority even in the face of his contemporaries (*magnos poetas* - *Tr.* 4.10.125). However, he delegates that claim to ungrudging *fama* and the anonymous agents of the passive verb *dicor*. Ovid caveats his future poetic immortality almost as he did in *Metamorphoses* 15,[918] stating that he will live on if there is truth in the prophecies of poets. However, general opinion and the poet's own statements have just been shown to differ; Ovid places many before himself (*praeponam multos mihi* - *Tr.* 4.10.127), but is said to be their equal. Ovid is fulfilling the prophecy for the future which he made in the *Metamorphoses*, whilst also extending it into his future from his exilic present. The repeated line makes the connection explicit. Ovid prophesied, *ore legar populi* (*Met.* 15.878), using the future tense, and in *Tristia* 4.10.128 he confirms that his own prophecy is being fulfilled in the present tense (*in toto plurimus orbe legor*). As Martelli points out, 'the poet can now observe his own *fama* as a fait accompli.'[919] Ovid has acquired fame in the past of his exilic narrator, which was still in the future of the narrator of the *Metamorphoses*. The caveat to his claim is thus very knowing; the *vates* is

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[917] This echoes Ovid's vatic invocations in the *Fasti*, with *di* and *monitu* recalling his request, *mone.*
[918] *Met.* 15.879 - *siquid habent veri vatum praesagia, vivam*; *Tr.* 4.10.129 - *si quid habent igitur vatum praesagia veri.*
[919] Martelli 2013, 170

underwriting the authority of his own previous prophecies by making another prophecy.

Vaticinor Ergo Vates Sum

In exploring the authority of *vates*, Ovid uses not only the term *vates* itself, but also its cognate verb *vaticinor. Vaticinor* is not used in Virgil, Horace or Propertius, and appears only once in Tibullus (1.6.44).[920] In contrast, it appears a dozen times in Ovid's poetry;[921] Ovid deliberately selects this verb, often in contexts concerned with his poetic authority, to play upon its etymological connection with *vates*. Both instances of *vaticinor* in the *Heroides* are connected to the prophecies of the *vates* Cassandra. However, key aspects of poetry linked with *vates* also emerge, signalled at *Heroides* 5.112 by the use of *canebat* to describe Cassandra's prophesying. The speakers focus on the truth of Cassandra's prophecies (*nimium miserae vates mihi vera fuisti* - *Her.* 5.123; *erat verax vaticinata soror* - *Her.* 16.280). Whereas elsewhere *vates* look backward into the past as well as forward into the future, here the speakers recall a prophecy that was made in the past and has now been proved true (*nam recolo* - *Her.* 5.112; *nam repeto* - *Her.* 16.279). There is a similar grouping of vatic concepts in *Ex Ponto* 2.1. Ovid demands that attention be paid to his vatic words (*dicta tibi vaticinante nota* - *Pont.* 2.1.62). He uses his Lieblingswort, *vaticinari*, not only to emphasise the truth of his prophecy here, but also to create an etymological connection between *vaticinari* and *carminibus* (*Pont*. 2.1.63).[922] This lends his poetry the authority of prophecy. Here, however, the prophecy is made in

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[920] Anderson (1972, 173 ad 6.159-62) - 'In earlier epics *vaticinor* does not introduce direct speech.'
[921] *Her.* 5.114, 16.280; *Met.* 4.9, 6.158, 8.773, 15.174; *Ibis* 270; *Tr.* 1.8.9, 2.426; *Pont.* 1.1.47, 2.1.62, 3.4.94.
[922] Helzle (2003, 265 ad 2.61-2) - 'Hier steht es nicht nur, um die Wahrheit der Prophezeiung zu betonen, sondern auch um einen etymologischen Bezug zwischen *vaticinari* und *carminibus*... zu schaffen.'

the present. Ovid asserts that his prayer will be fulfilled (*quod precor eveniet* - *Pont.* 2.1.55) and that his vatic status has value because the god has given him a confirmatory sign (*sunt quiddam oracula vatum: / nam deus optanti prospera signa dedit* - *Pont.* 2.1.55-6). Furthermore, he makes a second prophecy (*Pont.* 2.1.62ff.), although this is marked by modifiers of uncertainty (*fortasse, si modo, si non*). Since the prophecy concerns the future and has not yet happened, there follows not an assertion of the prophecies' *vera*, but a further prophecy that they will achieve that status.[923]

In *Ex Ponto* 1.1.47, Ovid declares himself to be a prophet (*vaticinor moneoque*).[924] The cognate verb to *vates* is here pointedly used in a religious context, whilst *monere* is also used in religious and oracular language.[925] The collocation is emphatic, emphasising the performative and persuasive aspects of the *vates*' role, and Gaertner points out that near tautologies of this kind are typical of religious formulae,[926] supporting the vatic role of the poet. This language imbues the poet's words with the authority of religion, and may even subconsciously signal that authority to the ancient reader. The Ovidian narrator establishes his authority in the *Tristia* and *Epistulae ex Ponto* on the basis of being a *vates* of *sacra*.[927] As McGowan notes, 'Ovid's consistent use of the term *sacer* with poetry[928] shows the exiled poet attempting to bestow upon his professional pursuit a degree of sacredness and perhaps even to

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[923] cf. *Met.* 4.9, 6.158 and 8.773, where subsequent events illustrate the veracity of prophecies.
[924] Also in *Ex Ponto* 3.4.94 (*praedico vaticinorque*). cf. *Met.* 13.723 - *monitu praedixerat*; *Aen.* 3.436 - *praedicam... monebo.*
[925] Helzle 2003, 64 ad 47-8. cf. *Aen.* 3.366, *Met.* 15.794-5. The feature may have parallels in rhetorical prose (Gaertner 2005, 119 ad 47).
[926] Gaertner 2005, 119 ad 47
[927] cf. *Am.* 3.9, *Am.* 1.1.6 (*Pieridum vates*).
[928] *Sacer* associated with *vates* and poetry: *Tr.* 3.7..32, 4.10.19, 5.3.15, 5.3.33; *Pont.* 2.5.71-2, 4.2.25, 4.2.49, 4.8.76, 4.8.81.

elevate his art into something "worthy to be regarded as divine".'[929] With Augustus assuming an increasingly divine role (assimilated to Jove in punishing Ovid with a thunderbolt), Ovid's sacred poetry grants him a counterposition to that role, or even an equivalent authority.[930] McGowan links Ovid's exilic assumption of the role of *vates* to *Odes* 4.9.25-8.[931] Whereas Horace mourned heroes who had no *sacer vates* like Homer to memorialise them, Ovid mourns himself, becoming his own Homer to self-memorialise and achieve poetic immortality.[932]

Ovid also uses *vaticinor* at *Tristia* 1.8.9, emphasising his creational role in the prophecy with *ego*. The whole prophecy is provided before the identity of the prophet is revealed and is concerned with reversion, emphasised particularly in the first two lines (*retro*; *recurret*).[933] The poetic subject matter looks back to Ovid's description of Chaos in the first book of the *Metamorphoses*.[934] The verb *vaticinari* is also used in *Tristia* 2.426,[935] describing an act of Lucretius (*explicat ut causas rapidi Lucretius ignis, / casarumque triplex vaticinatur opus* - *Tr.* 2.425-6). In the *De Rerum Natura*, Lucretius describes man's acquisition of fire (*DRN* 5.1091-1101) and the causes of lightning (*DRN* 6.160-210, 269-73, 363), rejecting the superstition that Jove punishes the wicked with thunderbolts. However, the actualisation of this concept by equating Augustus with Jove and exilic punishent with thunderbolts is a prominent theme in

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[929] McGowan 2009, 155
[930] In the *Fasti*, the connection of poets to *sacra* grants the *vates* the right to recuse himself from singing of Augustus' military endeavours (*Fa.* 1.13-14) and hence authority over his subject matter.
[931] McGowan 2009, 165
[932] cf. *Tr.* 1.5.57-8, where Ovid demands that *docti poetae* sing of him not Ulysses. The connection of *sacer vatum labor* to immortality conferred by Homer is made explicit in Lucan 9.980-6.
[933] Much of the rest of the poem (*Tr.* 1.8.13ff.) looks backward to the shared experiences of Ovid and his friend. In the final couplet Ovid looks forward again, not with a prophecy but a command (*effice* - *Tr.* 1.8.49) which, like many of his prophecies, hopes to enact the future.
[934] cf. Heracleitus' concept of ἐκπύρωσις in which the earth born from fire ends in fire, and the NeoPythagorean view that cycles of history lead to renewal rather than destruction (μετακόσμησις).
[935] Hinds 1999, 59 n. 22 attributes the 'suggestive parallel' to Philip Hardie.

Ovid's exile poetry,[936] so the Lucretian reference undermines Ovid's account of his exile. The threefold destruction of the world is found at *De Rerum Natura* 5.92-109.[937] Ovid ironically describes Lucretius prophesying, though in the intertext Lucretius is concerned with establishing reason and rationality as factors in belief. In *De Rerum Natura* 5.110ff., Lucretius uses language which evokes prophecy (*Qua prius adgrediar quam de re fundere fata*), but explicitly clarifies that this is not a Pythian-type utterance (*sanctius et multo certa ratione magis quam / Pythia quae tripode a Phoebi lauroque profatur* - *DRN* 5.111-2)[938] and that he is grappling against superstition (*religione refrenatus ne forte* - *DRN* 5.114). The Lucretian model of the vatic poet is 'qualified to reveal important truths about the cosmos because of his knowledge of the inner workings of nature',[939] and is antithetical to religious falsity. Given Lucretius' rejection of the religious aspects of vatic utterances,[940] Myers suggests that his supernatural claims are 'most likely to be understood as his exploitation of literary convention for the purpose of emphasizing the *truth* of Epicureanism'.[941]

Ovid's use of a term which alludes to a champion of rationalism over superstitious belief attaches a sense of rationality to the *Tristia*, even for events which seem supernatural. In *Tristia* 1.9.47, Ovid is moved (*commotus*) to prophesy, but explicitly disallows the involvement of religious signs or interpretation by citing three major methods thereof, haruspicy, brontoscopy, and augury (*haec mihi non ovium fibrae*

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[936] *Tr.* 1.1.72-4, 1.1.81-2, 1.2.3, 1.4.25-6, 1.5.77-8, 2.33-34, 4.3.69, etc.
[937] Unlike Ovid's, Lucretius' lasting fame is limited by the end of the world which he has prophesied.
[938] = *DRN* 1.738-9, describing Empedocles rather than Lucretius referring to his own pronouncements.
[939] Myers 1994, 143
[940] cf. *DRN* 1.102-9, followed by Lucretius rejecting the doctrines of a specific *vates*, Ennius, 'with a pointed and ironical glance at Ennius' own dismissive reference to earlier writers of Saturnian verses as *vates*' (Hardie 1986, 18), which occurs at *Ann.* 206-7 (cf. Skutsch 1985, 372 on its 'disparaging tone').
[941] Myers 1994, 143

tonitrusve sinistri, / linguaeve servatae pennave dixit avis - *Tr.* 1.9.49-50).[942] Instead, he tells us, his prediction is made on the basis of reason, a thoroughly Lucretian *modus operandi* (*augurium ratio est et coniectura futuri: / hac divinavi notitiamque tuli* - *Tr.* 1.9.51-2). Ovid uses vatic language in a rational, philosophical manner, recalling Lucretius' prophecy. He is able to reinforce his prophecy because it was made in the past; its authority is unquestionable because it has proved true (*vera est* - *Tr.* 1.9.53). Ovid plays on the dichotomy of the concepts of the *vates* as a speaker of philosophical or religious truth, and unlike Lucretius, is not averse to drawing upon both forms of authority for his poetry.

Ovid's use of the verb *vaticinor* at *Tristia* 1.8.9 endows his words with quasi-religious authority,[943] contrasting Ovid the trustworthy *vates* with his *fallax* friend. Ovid uses his vatic status to add weight to his impressively ominous prediction; he 'deliberately clothes himself in the mantle of the *vates* to predict this reversion to chaos'.[944] Instead of making a direct threat of impending punishment, Ovid implicitly suggests that betraying friendship is an act contrary to nature, an act which will precipitate a reversion to chaos, or the end of the world, and thus ultimately have worse consequences than one who holds friendship cheaply might think. However, Ovid's use of vatic language here has a contrary aspect which may detract from the impression of authority given at the beginning of the poem. In his guise of *vates*, Ovid predicts impossibilities,[945] and states that they should be believed, because if his friend could be treacherous, anything is possible (*et nihil est, de quo non sit habenda fides* - *Tr.* 1.8.8). He then acknowledges that he himself has been deceived (*sum*

[942] The three disciplines feature in Lucan 1.587ff. - *fulminis edoctus motus venasque calentes / fibrarum et monitus errantis in aere pinnae.* cf. Cicero *Fam.* 6.6.7 (234 S-B).
[943] *Canere* can be viewed as a claim of vatic authority, given that the 'poetic activity of a *vates* was often described by the word *canere*' (Littlewood 2006, 9 ad 6.7-8). cf. *Fa.* 2.2.
[944] Hinds 1999, 59
[945] cf. (also in reproaches to a neglectful friend) *Tr.* 4.7.11ff.

deceptus - *Tr.* 1.8.9); the *vates* is not infallibly clear-sighted, for he should not have believed his friend, and his belief that his friend would help him was flawed (*Tr.* 1.8.10). The *vates* who was misled by his own expectations for the future now claims to be making an authoritative prophetic pronouncement which others should believe, even though such events have previously been dismissed as impossible (*omnia iam fient, fieri quae posse negebant* - *Tr.* 1.8.7). Perhaps the abnegation is merely temporary hyperbole intended to emphasise the extent of the betrayal the poet has experienced. Alternatively, it suggests that just as Ovid was a fool to trust his friend, so the reader is a fool to trust the fallible *vates*.

Ovid's personal and poetic aims merge in the exile poetry. His exilic status makes it imperative for him to uphold his vatic authority in the face of imperial authority. Despite his physical absence, Ovid in exile remains, he insists, a *Romanus vates* (*Tr.* 5.7.55) with corresponding poetic authority to prophesy and immortalise, and he utilises opportunities to assert this authority in the *Tristia* and the *Epistulae ex Ponto*. As a *Romanus vates*, Ovid can define his future, and has 'a sphere of influence that does not depend on his relation to the *princeps*'.[946] However, having interrogated the authority of *vates* in his earlier works, Ovid does not neglect to provide a more nuanced presentation, denouncing even his own poetry and judgement. Authority must be constantly re-assessed, for the *vates* may prove unreliable.

[946] McGowan 2009, 164

Vates and Authority in Ovidian Poetry

A *vates* may speak authoritatively, since vatic authority has many strong potential bases, including divine endorsement, professional status, and personal charisma. Ovid depicts *vates* (including himself) utilising all these bases in his poetry, and they are frequently successful in doing so.

Ovid uses his varied poems to explore different aspects of vatic authority. In the *Metamorphoses*, Ovid dwells less upon his own role as a *vates* than on a series of vatic substitutes, whose authority he undermines. Ovid's own persona is effaced in the poem except in the proem and epilogue, for in *Met.* 15, Ovid is a *vates*[947] providing an authoritative narrative and it is not clear whether the authority of *vates* can be trusted. The Ovidian narrator avoids intruding too heavily into the consciousness of his reader while engaged in his authoritative work. This contrasts with Virgil's self-identification in *Aeneid* 7.41 as a *vates*, the divinely inspired composer of an authoritative epic poem. Ovid illustrates the untrustworthy nature of many *vates* while refraining from making the obvious connection to explore how this bears upon his own vatic authority, though his readers are prompted to do so. Yet Ovid is well-aware, when he finally makes his triumphant grandiose prophecy for his own immortality, that he is taking an authoritative stance, and winks at the reader, acknowledging that his authority may or may not be accepted, like that of his vatic exempla.

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[947]Ovid is *the* vates. Vendryes 1948, 302 states that 'ofydd' in Welsh replaces the ancient word *vatis* - 'pour remplacer sans doute l'ancien mot **vātis*, on est allé chercher le nom d'Ovide, le poète latin, qui jouissait dans tout le moyen-âge d'une extraordinaire réputation comme prophète et comme magicien... Ce nom est également connu en Irlande, *oibid*.' Schilling (1968, 9 n. 1) glosses, 'cet ofydd correspond au nom d'Ovide, preuve éclatante du prestige dont jouissait alors le poète latin'.

In the *Fasti* Ovid uses his didactic stance to overtly question his own vatic authority and its basis in the information of his divine sources, thus bringing into consideration the authority of divine inspiration for poets more widely, for, as his exempla show, gods are not entirely impartial or devoid of self-interest. Ovid uses his didactic predecessors' representation of poetic inspiration as epiphanic conversations to draw attention to the accepted but unsubstantiated norms of how poets get their ideas. Moreover, Ovid's self-identification as a *vates operose dierum* (*Fa.* 1.101) positions his account not only as a combination of divinely inspired truth and mining of the past, but also as a successor to Hesiod's *Works and Days* in an authoritative didactic tradition. Whereas the *vates* of the *Ars Amatoria* was a *peritus vates* (*AA* 1.29), whose authority stemmed directly from his own experience, the *vates* of the *Fasti* draws his authority from a combination of painstaking antiquarian research and divinely provided information. The Ovidian narrator himself often lacks knowledge or is under misapprehensions, which must be corrected by his informants. Ultimately, however, these resources prove problematic, and the poet is sometimes left unable to take an authoritative position on any basis at all.[948]

In the exile poetry Ovid's poetic position alters again. Whereas in the *Metamorphoses* he could afford to invite challenges to his epic vatic authority, here Ovid displays more concern with establishing his poetic authority as a viable alternative to the political control which Augustus exerts over him. However, Ovid continues to present the authority of vatic speakers as eligible for questioning, including his own. Ovid rejects his past work as vatic fictions, but nevertheless attempts to claim vatic authority for his present prophecies for his poetry. The authority of *vates* in the exile poetry is thus highly ambiguous.

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[948] *Fa.* 5.108-10, 6.1-4.

It thus appears that while *vates* possess divinely endorsed and inspired authority, by virtue of their ability to read the future as well as the past, and even to control events, this authority can be challenged. The parallels between prophets and poets frequently bring into question the authority of poetry itself as well as that of seers. Though Ovid refrains from overturning vatic authority completely, and frequently draws on it himself, he also illustrates that it is not unassailable. Poets, like prophets, can suffer from problematic sources and their authority as *vates* is left exposed.

Chapter 4: The Authority of Sight

Sight is integrally linked to authority. Although Squire has emphasised the relativity of visual perception, rejecting the assumption that seeing is a transhistorical and transcultural absolute,[949] the dominant way in which humans interact with their surroundings is through the senses, particularly sight. Throughout antiquity, despite the varied ways in which the Greek and Roman philosophical schools conceived of sight and its mechanics, there remained 'a residual sense of sight's sensory hegemony'.[950] As the aphorism that the eyes are more accurate witnesses than the ears expresses,[951] the Greeks considered eyewitness knowledge to be 'the highest possible form of knowledge'.[952] Vision creates authority, as well as immediacy and vividness.[953] Thucydides explicitly states that he is writing from personal experience and after investigating the reports he has received (*Hist.* 1.22.1-2), differentiating his own autopsy and the eyewitness testimony of others.[954] This recalls *Odyssey* 8.489-91, where Odysseus suggests that a bard must have been at Troy himself, so accurate is his account of it.[955] Robinson comments, 'If vividness or the sense of actually being

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[949] Squire 2016, 3
[950] Ibid., 12
[951] ὀφθαλμοὶ γὰρ τῶν ὤτων ἀκριβέστεροι μάρτυρες, attributed at Polybius 12.27 = 22 B 101a D-K to Heracleitus. cf. Thucydides 3.38.4. Herodotus regularly alludes to this attitude (e.g. at 1.8.2), explicitly pointing out his autoptic narrative at 1.8.8 (Woodman 1988, 15). Varro *L.* 6.80 (*Video a visu, <id a vi>: qui<n>que enim sensuum maximus in oculis*). Lovatt (2013, 10) comments that in the *Aeneid*, 'Words are deceptive, while vision successfully persuades', though Rogerson (2007) notes that visual stimuli can in fact be less authoritative in directing a response than verbal ones.
[952] Clay 1983, 13. Emphasis on seeing for yourself - *Od*. 3.93-4, 4.200-2, 4.556, 16.470.
[953] Lovatt 2013, 127
[954] *Contra* Thucydides, 'there are occasions in his work where it is virtually certain that he is *not* relying on personal experience despite giving the impression of having done so' (Woodman 1988, 15).
[955] Demodocus is blind, so could not have been an eyewitness even if he had been present. For bards, like seers, blindness often serves as a shorthand for truthfulness, accuracy, and authority. e.g. *Fa.* 6.204 where the blind censor Appius sees clearly mentally. Barasch (2001, 41) suggests that in the *Odyssey*, the blind Demodocus 'is the bard endowed with that rare divine gift of an inner vision that reaches into the depths of a future that regular human beings cannot know.' The authority of sight is not limited to physical sight, but also encompasses the inner vision of the blind, who can 'see more' than the average

there is the main source of Thucydides' ability to persuade, I don't see how one can easily distinguish his performance from that of a novelist, who also deludes us into believing that we are live witnesses to the events portrayed in his book.'[956] Fundamentally, historian and poet both seek to convince, and sight is one of the key weapons at their disposal. Visual authority is created in a number of ways in Ovidian poetry. Narrators may make claims of autopsy (*ego vidi*), increasing their authority by virtue of their firsthand knowledge of events,[957] as well as injecting vividness (*enargeia*) into the reader's own experience, so that the reader can generate a stronger mental visualisation of what is being described. Alternatively, they may draw upon eyewitness accounts.

Sight is defined by presentness and vividity.[958] However, although things can be seen and described in the present, they may also have been seen in the past, and be called to mind in the present in the poet's memory and in the words that he speaks to conjure up events before the eyes of his audience. It is a function of poetry to make the past be seen in the present, though the extent to which it is construed as 'real' in the present varies. Bakker describes the past in Homer as 'not so much an event referred to, as a state of mind in the present',[959] created by an authoritative speaker, whilst Ricoeur conceptualises the past as 'what I would have seen, what I would have witnessed if I had been there',[960] conceiving it as a visualised poetic construction. Both models emphasise the immediacy of the past, whether to the hypothetical eye or the mind's

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sighted person. The blind seer 'thus becomes the personification of the dialectic tension inherent in vision, the inbuilt provocative contradiction of seeing with an inner eye' (Ibid., 29).

[956] Robinson 1985, 21

[957] Beagon (2009, 293 n. 15) notes that *vidi* 'can of course occur as a didactic topos, giving emphasis while not necessarily implying literal autopsy'. cf. La Penna 1987, 108-09.

[958] The Mesopotamians had the opposite conception of time. The Akkadians and Sumerians etymologise the past with 'front' or 'eye' and the future with 'back' or 'behind'. Thus they back into the future, while facing the past. cf. Maul 1997, 1-2; Wilcke 1982.

[959] Bakker 1997, 12

[960] Ricoeur 1984, 185

eye. This conception of past sight as present visualisation is reflected in *Met.* 14.204-6, where Achaemenides says that an image of an event stuck in his mind (*mentique haerebat imago / temporibus illius, quo vidi bina meorum / ter quater affligi sociorum corpora terrae*). As critics have noted, the lines form a 'cue for still more allusions to Virgil and Homer',[961] but they also link the visual act of witnessing with the act of recollection. Achaemenides is reminded of a vivid event that he saw in the past, which he sees in his mind in the present. Thus sight functions in a wider and more fluid temporality than its presentness suggests. The author as autoptic viewer may be a present or past eyewitness, and this status can affect his authority. The reader is more often a present viewer, invited to behold or visualise[962] (and visually participate in) the narrative.

Ovid is not the first to question the authority of sight. Despite (or because of) the authority of sight, sight is 'expressly challenged, questioned and problematized' in the ancient world, for as sight could persuade, so 'visual appearances could also be prone to leading viewers astray'.[963] Ovid is particularly inclined to question authority in poetry, and sight lends itself to his interrogation. The generic eclecticism of Ovid's oeuvre allows him to tackle the question of sight authority in a variety of ways. In epic poetry, the narrator, unable to witness for himself the events of his account, is reliant upon the Muses. As Pratt notes, the poet often 'becomes a passive mouthpiece of the divine Muses... The Muses themselves are assumed to be reliable eyewitnesses, who not only know everything but desire to reveal it fully to the poet and the mortal

[961] Hinds 1998, 115**.** cf. Myers 2009, Bömer 1986 *ad loc.*
[962] Ford (1992, 55) suggests that the Homeric poems 'make the invisible past appear to its hearers'.
[963] Squire 2016, 18. Seneca in *Nat.* 1.3.7 refers to *infirma vis oculorum*, which prevents people from seeing through the air and in 1.3.9 states that *nihil esse acie nostra fallacius*, both through distance thwarting accurate examination and through misperception of what is nearby.

audience.'[964] The Muses inform the poet in so vivid a fashion that the poet visualising events is able to translate them into his own poem. Indeed, Bakker argues that 'epic narrative is typically presented as... a *description of things seen*, with the narrator (performer) posing as eyewitness';[965] the poet-narrator is, however, a mental visualiser rather than a true physical eyewitness. In the *Metamorphoses* Ovid famously does not call upon the Muses to show him (or tell him, thereby creating mental images) his poem, but asks for divine assistance in a task that he has already begun. The authorisation of the epic poem through the omnivision of the Muse remains unspoken.

In the *Metamorphoses*, eyewitness sight is focalised through Ovid's characters,[966] while Ovid uses vividness to grant his narrative the authority of being easily visualised by its audience. In contrast, autoptic claims are frequently found in didactic poetry like the *Fasti*. Myers argues that the 'appeal to the reliability of an eyewitness... and invocation of personal experience are common features of aetiological poetry'.[967] Ovid's frequent recourse to this device in the *Fasti* (albeit with one self-consciously ironic eye on his audience) is thus characteristic and character-establishing for his researcher-narrator. Myers states that it is 'the practice of the didactic persona... to underline personally and overtly the reliability of his information'[968] and identifies this practice in didactic poems such as the *Fasti* and Virgil's *Georgics*, and not in epic narration.[969] The autoptic authority of the exile poetry is very different. The *Tristia* and *Epistulae ex Ponto* are elegies which deal

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[964] Pratt 1993, 7
[965] Bakker 1993, 15
[966] Wheeler 1999, 164
[967] Myers 1994, 83. Call. fr. 384.47-9. cf. *Fa*. 1.389, 2.27, 4.725-8, 936, 6.13.
[968] Ibid., 84
[969] Myers (Ibid. n. 102) cites Kenney's list (1958, 202), which includes *DRN* 4.577, 6.1044; *AA* 1.721, 3.378, 487; *Rem.* 101; *Med.* 99. Thomas (1988, 101 ad 1.193) identifies *vidi* as 'not autobiographical, but didactic, emphatically asserting the veracity of the detail which follows'.

with the personal experiences (or purported experiences) of the poet. As such, they are highly autoptic, and base their authority on what the poet claims to have seen. Ovid creates an additional dimension to these works, however, by interrogating the tensions which his distance from Rome due to exile sets up with the authority of sight. The exile poetry contains eyewitnesses and corroborative viewers, as well as sight substitutes such as seeing with the mind, and prioritises and problematises mental visualisation. In all Ovid's poems, however, sight is complicated as an authority basis. Seeing is not necessarily believing.

Sight in the *Metamorphoses*

In the *Metamorphoses*, Ovid undermines the authority which is traditionally afforded to sight, exploring how it can be misapplied or used misleadingly. Ovid purports to uphold the traditional view of sight as the strongest authority at *Met.* 6.170ff. where although Niobe is guilty of hubris, she expresses the established ancient preference (*quis furor auditos... praeponere visis / caelestes?*).[970] Similarly, in *Met.* 7.833-4 Procris refuses to believe what she hears unless she sees it for herself (*indicioque fidem negat et, nisi viderit ipsa, / damnatura sui non est delicta mariti*). In *Met.* 5.250ff., Minerva comes to see the fountain that Pegasus is reputed to have created in order to make a visual confirmation of what she has heard. Minerva contrasts the *fama* that she has heard of a new spring (*fama novi fontis nostras pervenit ad aures* - *Met.* 5.256) with the *factum* she can see (*volui mirabile factum / cernere* - *Met.* 5.258-9). Autopsy is thus presented as more authoritative than mere hearsay. The Muse affirms the truth of *fama* (*vera tamen fama est* - *Met.* 5.262), and brings Minerva to see the spring for herself. When Minerva witnesses the pool, the explanation of its creation, previously presented as mere *fama* heard by the goddess (*dura Medusaei quem praepetis ungula rupit* - *Met.* 5. 257), becomes a factual account related by the Ovidian narrator (*quae mirata diu factas pedis ictibus undas* - *Met.* 5.264).[971] What has been seen is accounted authoritative.[972]

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[970] Sight is more open than speech to multiple interpretations. In *AP* 180-2 Horace uses the rhetorical terminology of *evidentia* to describe the vividity of onstage presentation - onstage action is more vivid than what enters the ears (Brink 1971, 245 ad 181). Lucretius (*DRN* 5.99-104) discusses the difficulty of convincing an audience of what they cannot see. cf. Herodotus 1.8.2, Seneca *Ep.* 6.5.

[971] Minerva refers in *Met.* 5.257 to her journey's *causa*, recalling the significance of *causae* in the *Fasti*.

[972] Minerva offers her own eyewitness authority to the most miraculous aspect of this story, Pegasus' birth (*vidi ipsum materno sanguine nasci* - *Met.* 5.259).

However, Ovid also tacitly makes clear the emptiness of many of these claims of autopsy by depicting characters who demand the authority of autopsy when what they have seen does not fully account for what they have said. An example of this can be found in *Met.* 8, where Lelex begins and ends his tale by emphasising his autoptic knowledge of its setting (*ipse locum vidi* - *Met.* 8.622; *equidem pendentia vidi / serta super ramos* - *Met.* 8.722). Lelex has an obvious rhetorical motive for deploying autopsy; he needs to establish his authority (and hence that of his tale), because Pirithous has just accused the previous narrator, Achelous, of falsehood (*Met.* 8.614-5). Lelex' past visit to the place allows him to speak about it authoritatively. He has seen the trees that are said to have previously been the old couple of his story (*de gemino vicinos corpore truncos* - *Met.* 8.720) and the garlands hanging upon them, and appears convinced by the story, placing his own garlands (*serta...ponensque recentia* - *Met.* 8.723). Yet the authority that Lelex's claim of autopsy gives to his tale is misplaced. Having visited the *place* does not make him a witness of the *event*.[973] This is highlighted by the fact that Lelex describes a pond which was once habitable land (*Met.* 8.624), while the events of his story play out in a setting full of homes (*Met.* 8.628-9) which is later flooded (*Met.* 8.696-7). Lelex has not personally witnessed the events in the home of Baucis and Philemon, but merely the supposed result of them. He has been told the story by *non vani senes* (*Met.* 8.721-2), who were also presumably not eyewitnesses to it, since the only survivors of the flood were Baucis and Philemon (*Met.* 8.696-7), who told the story of the place (*locique... casus* - *Met.* 8.713-4). The use of *equidem* emphasises the transition, 'from the oral testimony

[973] cf. Propertius 1.13, in which the poet claims to have seen things for himself. Scioli thinks that it is possible for one guaranteed thing to inform the authority of another ('Possession of this visual proof lends legitimacy to the advice he offers in the remainder of the poem' - Scioli 2015, 100).

of others... to the testimony of his own eyes'.[974] Lelex can personally attest to what he saw with uncontested authority, but attempts to apply the authority of personal sight to a tale that can not support it.[975] It is thus implicitly made apparent that the authority of sight is static in time. One can only see what *is* currently the case, and must *infer* its causes; such inferences may be based on little or no evidence. The authority of autoptic claims cannot be relied upon, because autoptic authority is conditional upon temporality. Present autopsy guarantees only present fact, and not unseen past events.

Omnivision and Omniscience

The temporal limitations of sight contrast with its geographical universality. Gods, particularly the Sun, and other lesser divinities such as the Muses and Fama, are attributed authority due to their omnivision.[976] Since they see everything, they also know everything, and can therefore narrate it. Consequently the assistance of the Muses or a god is indispensable to poets, who do not possess universal vision and would otherwise rely upon hearsay. As Lovatt notes, 'the narrator's reliance on the Muses for knowledge is matched by his assumption of the divine perspective to create narrative authority.'[977] The divine gaze is closely associated with narrative

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[974] Anderson 1972, 400 ad 8.722

[975] Achelous tells his audience that they can see (*ut ipse vides* - *Met.* 8.884) he is missing a horn; the explanation is given subsequently (*Met.* 9.85-6). Achelous's autopsy increases his authority.

[976] The ecphrasis in *Met.* 12 strongly associates *Fama* with sight. Papaioannou 2007, 46 - 'The outstanding importance of comprehensive vision as the core of Fama's identity is underlined by means of a closural repetition, and simultaneously a ring composition.' Everything is looked at (*Met.* 12.41-2) and Fama looks into everything (*Met.* 12.62-3). cf. Virgil's Fama (*Aen.* 4.181-90) and Laird 1999, 303-4 - 'In fact everything she reports is just as it has already been narrated. Within the world of the story, then, Fama is peddling only facts'. In the Homeric corpus, Zeus has the epithet εὐρύοπα, 'far-seeing' (or 'far-sounding' - *LSJ ad loc*.; for citations, cf. Lovatt 2013, 33 n. 19). As Lovatt (Ibid., 42) points out, 'The Iliadic narrator shares this divine perspective, using the god's-eye view... to give a broad overview of the action, before swooping in to pick out a particular narrative focus.'

[977] Lovatt 2013, 71. In *Met.* 15, Ovid's flight above the world verbalises the apotheosis of the poet and actualises the epic poet's need for a divine viewpoint, just as Pythagoras' mental flight earlier in *Met.* 15 gives him a divine perspective for his narrative and (combined with metempsychosis) 'a spatio-temporal advantage over ordinary mortals' (Beagon 2009, 293). Phaethon's god's-eye view is associated with failure.

authority,[978] and it is to this universality of vision and authority that the poet aspires. The Muses are, as Hesiod notes, present for everything,[979] and thus have seen everything and can provide eyewitness accounts of it, which is the best way to ensure that a narrative has authority[980] because it elevates poetry above mere rumour. However, the Muses famously do not necessarily tell the truth (*Theogony* 27). Whilst their autopsy strengthens the authority of what they tell truthfully, it may also erroneously reinforce the authority of a lie.

In *Iliad* 2.484ff. Homer invokes the Muses to name the leaders of the Danaans, on the basis that the goddesses are present and know everything (ἔσπετε νῦν μοι Μοῦσαι Ὀλύμπια δώματ᾽ ἔχουσαι / ὑμεῖς γὰρ θεαί ἐστε πάρεστέ τε ἴστέ τε πάντα - *Il.* 2.484-5). The close association between seeing and knowing is integral to the Greek language, since οἶδα ('I know') is the aorist form of the verb ἰδεῖν ('to see').[981] In contrast, mortals hear rather than see and thus know nothing (ἡμεῖς δὲ κλέος οἷον ἀκούομεν οὐδέ τι ἴδμεν - *Il.* 2.486).[982] Olsen has suggested that the κλέος which mortals hear may be 'oral report', and thus hearsay;[983] as Papaioannou states, 'in other words, *kleos* may be equivalent to *fama*.'[984] Hence mortals have only unreliable *fama* to work from and know nothing, whereas the Muses have been present at everything, and therefore 'know the truth about every event because they have seen it'.[985] In Homeric poetry, the inspiration of the Muses allows the poet to expand his vision to

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[978] Lovatt 2013, 78
[979] The Sirens claim to be omniscient (*Od.* 12.184-91), in similar terms to the Muses (*Il.* 2.484-7). cf. Fagan (2013, 54) on the Sirens lacking the Muses' authority.
[980] 'The Muses, then, have an eyewitness knowledge of the past, and for Homer, in the Greek tradition, the surest and clearest knowledge is of that which you see yourself' - Ford 1992, 61.
[981] 'In ancient Greek, however, the difference between 'seeing' and 'knowing' amounts to no more than a shift in aspect of a single verbal root' - Blundell *et al.* 2013, 11.
[982] cf. *Il.* 20.203-5, where knowledge of the past is contrasted with actually seeing.
[983] Olson 1995, 2. cf. The senses of κλέος in *LSJ* include 'rumour'. Nagy (2003, 45) objects to Olson's view, saying that κλέος is '"glory" as conferred by poetry'. Perhaps κλέος supports both senses.
[984] Papaioannou 2007, 61 n. 125
[985] Clay 1983, 19

match their universal scope, and to see what ordinary mortals cannot. Pindar, in *Paean* 7b.13-15, says that the man who seeks the steep path of wisdom without the Muses is blind, for the poet needs the Muses to expand his vision. Yet the Muses' knowledge is actually conveyed to the poet aurally, even though the Muses acquire it through sight. The poet invites the Muse to tell him what happened, presenting himself as her addressee (μοι ἔννεπε, μοῦσα - *Od.* 1.1),[986] or asks the Muse to sing (ἄειδε θεὰ - *Il.* 1.1),[987] and thereby places 'the authority of his own poetic voice... under the control of the Muses'.[988] Although Ovid does not explicitly invoke the Muses at the opening of his epic poem, the role of divine eyewitnesses is implied. Ovid calls upon the gods to inspire what he has begun, namely telling of metamorphoses, and explains that the gods performed the transformations (*nam vos mutastis et illa - Met.* 1.2).[989] The gods were thus actively involved in the events about which Ovid is speaking; they are eyewitnesses, and their inspiration will inform and authorise Ovid's poem.

The omnivision displayed by a poet can be justified on the basis of implicit or explicit autopsy by his Muse, but verges on the absurd when attributed to an internal narrator such as Nestor, who lacks divine assistance for his narrative. Nevertheless, Nestor emphasises his autoptic status in order to increase his authority.[990] With *vidi ego* at *Met.* 12.327, 'Nestore riafferma sia la sua soggettività di narratore sia il suo *status* di

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[986] cf. *Il.* 2.485; *Homeric Hymn* 14.1-2; *Aen.* 1.12 - *Musa, mihi causas memora*.
[987] cf. *Homeric Hymn* 17.1.
[988] Calame 2005, 22. Calame notes a third type of opening, 'I (the poet) begin to sing', which affirms the poet's authority without the intervention of the Muses.
[989] Scholarly consensus now broadly supports Lejay's emendation of *illa* in place of *illas*, following the interventions of Kenney 1976, Tarrant 1982, and Kovacs 1987. cf. Barchiesi 2005, 138-40 ad 1.2 for discussion of the development of this interpretation and the readings it promises for the proem.
[990] Zumwalt 1977, 215; Nikolopoulos 2004, 193. *Met.* 12.172 - *vidi*, 183 - *multaque... spectata*, 187 - *spectatorem operum multorum*, 327 - *vidi ego*, 429 - *ante oculos... meos*. Reed (2013, 417 ad 327) argues that conversely *ferebant* (*Met.* 12.332) 'immediatamente distanzia l'autorità di Nestore dall'azione, implicando che ben presto la visione diretta gli era stata preclusa dal tumulto'.

testimone oculare.'[991] Indeed, Nestor 'takes pains to note his own vantage point as a witness, although it is logically unlikely that any set of mortal eyes could have had a good view of so many incidents in the thick of a very bloody battle.'[992] Nestor is inexplicably able to observe the fighting without suffering the ignominious fate of other non-participants such as the sleeping Aphidas (*Met.* 12.316ff.) and is even able to simultaneously fight his own battles and observe the *aristeia* of others (*Met.* 12.383ff.). The impossible visual abilities which Ovid attributes to Nestor play upon 'a long-established critique of the implausible and unrealistic nature of traditional epic battle narrative',[993] which is also expressed in Euripides' *Suppliant Women*:

> ἓν δ' οὐκ ἐρήσομαί σε, μὴ γέλωτ' ὄφλω,
> ὅτῳ ξυνέστη τῶνδ' ἕκαστος ἐν μάχῃ
> ἢ τραῦμα λόγχης πολεμίων ἐδέξατο.
> κενοὶ γὰρ οὗτοι τῶν τ' ἀκουόντων λόγοι
> καὶ τοῦ λέγοντος, ὅστις ἐν μάχῃ βεβὼς
> λόγχης ἰούσης πρόσθεν ὀμμάτων πυκνῆς
> σαφῶς ἀπήγγειλ' ὅστις ἐστὶν ἀγαθός.
> οὐκ ἂν δυναίμην οὔτ' ἐρωτῆσαι τάδε
> οὔτ' αὖ πιθέσθαι τοῖσι τολμῶσιν λέγειν·
> μόλις γὰρ ἄν τις αὐτὰ τἀναγκαῖ' ὁρᾶν
> δύναιτ' ἂν ἑστὼς πολεμίοις ἐναντίος. (*Supp*. 846-56)
>
> But one thing I shall not ask you, lest I incur laughter, which of the enemy each of them met in battle, or from which spear each received his wound. For these are empty tales both for those listening and the one telling them, that a man who is in a battle, with showers of spears flying before his eyes, should report clearly who is valiant. I could neither ask this nor trust those who dare to say. For when someone is facing the enemy, he can scarcely see beyond his own situation.[994]

The authority which Nestor's tale derives from his autopsy is undermined by the implausibility of his omniscience in the heat of battle.

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[991] Reed 2013, 417 ad 327
[992] Musgrove 1998, 227
[993] Heslin 2016, 74. cf. Musgrove 1998, 229 - 'Where exactly is Aeneas located when he sees the death of Priam? How does he know the manner of the Greeks' exit from the horse?' Aeneas emphasises his autopsy at *Aen*. 2.499, 501.
[994] cf. Eur. *El.* 377 with Cropp (1988, 124 ad 377-8), who points out that in this era 'the old traditions of awards for excellence... and calling on witnesses to one's valour... were in question'.

There are additional problems with the authority of Nestor's autoptic pose. In *Met.* 12.461 Nestor claims to have remembered the (unspoken) names of the enemy but forgotten their (visible) wounds, which is odd, for as Heslin comments, 'Given that he was a member of the enemy force, how is it that Nestor's knowledge of the individual names of the Centaurs killed by Caeneus is better than his memory of the wounds he claims to have seen them suffer?'[995] It would surely be easier to remember the wounds, unless Nestor is claiming to recognise all the named Centaurs by sight. Moreover, wounds are difficult to see from a distance; this is demonstrated in *Met.* 12.125-7, where Achilles mistakenly believes that he has wounded Cycnus due to seeing blood.[996] Nestor admits to relying on hearsay for some of his narrative[997] and cites the more authoritative autopsy of the *vates* Mopsus (*vidit* - *Met.* 12.525; *aspexit pariterque animo est oculisque secutus*[998] - *Met.* 12.529), for an event which he himself saw (*quae mihi tum primum, tunc est conspecta supremum* - *Met.* 12.526).[999] Finally, Nestor's pose of all-seeing omniscience is undermined by Tlepolemus' complaint at Hercules' omission, for this reveals that Nestor has not related everything that he saw. Musgrove rightly states that the 'final undercutting of Nestor's reliability also suggests some similar questions that we may have harbored

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[995] Heslin 2016, 74

[996] Heslin (Ibid., 81-88) argues that Ovid here suggests that Homer is wrong to believe in Achilles' vulnerability, suggesting that Agenor's viewpoint is as distant as that of Achilles, so he too may mistake a spattering of someone else's blood for the wounding of an invulnerable hero. He concludes that Achilles keeps quiet about his own invulnerability in the *Metamorphoses*, misinforming Homer, who becomes 'a mere conduit of battlefield rumor and surmise, having no more authoritative perspective on events than Agenor' (Ibid., 85). Homer, the supposedly objective epic narrator, is not selectively mendacious like Ovid's Nestor but fundamentally gullible, reliant on traditions (or *fama*) that are rooted in the subjective, self-serving accounts of the Iliadic heroes themselves, which as much of *Met.* 12 and 13 has shown (cf. Nestor's centauromachy, Theseus' 'divine assistance', Ajax and Ulysses' accounts of the Trojan War) are not trustworthy. Epic authority is thoroughly undermined.

[997] *Ferebant* (*Met.* 12.332) detracts from *vidi ego* (*Met.* 12.327).

[998] This reflects the power of the poet to see physically and mentally, which is important in the exile poetry (*Tr.* 2.4.56ff., 4.2.57ff.; *Pont.* 2.4.7). cf. *Met.* 15.63-4; Cicero *Div. in Caec.* 42, *Planc.* 56.

[999] cf. Papaioannou 2007, 116-17 on why Nestor requires Mopsus' corroboration.

about previous epic narrators.'[1000] By granting supposed omniscience to a character whose account and sight are flawed, Ovid underlines the fact that the authority of external narrators may also have an uncertain basis. Nestor's centauromachy thus problematises omniscient narratorial claims of authority on the basis of autopsy.

A difficulty also arises when supposedly all-seeing figures are blinkered or distracted. In *Met.* 2.32 the Sun is depicted as typically omniscient (*oculis iuvenem quibus aspicit omnia vidit*),[1001] reiterating Clymene's invocation of the Sun to witness her oath as *quod nos auditque videtque* (*Met.* 1.769), irrespective of geographical distance. However, the Sun later reveals that he cannot actually see everything; his blind spot is the Styx (*oculis incognita nostris* - *Met.* 2.46). Barchiesi recognises the ironic anticipation of the Sun's throwaway comment;[1002] as a result of the oath the Sun is swearing, the earth will crack and expose the Underworld, presumably including the Styx, to the rays of the sun (*dissilit omne solum, penetratque in Tartara rimis / lumen* - *Met.* 2.260-1). Since, as Barchiesi notes, 'I raggi del sole sono pensati come sguardi del dio',[1003] the Sun can 'see' the Styx. The Sun's physical inability to see the Underworld mirrors his inability to foresee the consequences of his rash promise (*Met.* 2.49), Ovid thus tempers the Sun's divine powers of sight with humanised fallibility. The incongruity of the Sun's blindspot lays him open to ridicule. This

[1000] Musgrove 1998, 229
[1001] Musgrove 1998, 229 is outraged that earlier critics cite only *Il.* 3.277 as a parallel example, and provides myriad Greek and Latin examples. References to the Sun seeing everything appear at *Met.* 4.172, 4.195, 4.227-8, 7.97, 13.852-3. cf. *AA* 2.561, 573; *Fa.* 4. 577, 581; Aeschylus *Prom*. 91. The Iliadic citation states that Helios not only sees but also hears everything, making him 'il testimone per eccellenza' (Barchiesi 2005, 242 ad 45-6). cf. *Fa.* 6.436 on Vesta.
[1002] Barchiesi 2005, 242 ad 45-6
[1003] Ibid. ad 45-6

might be seen as a comic undermining of divine universal vision; the gods claim to see everything, but actually are as blind as humans.[1004]

Despite the authority that is associated with sight, and particularly with eyewitness vision, sight can be unclear or wrong, and appearances can be misleading. In so elusive (and illusive) a poem as the *Metamorphoses*, one cannot always rely upon the evidence of the eyes,[1005] since a viewer may be deceived by their own conscious or unconscious mind, or by the interference of others. In her terrified flight, Arethusa believes that she sees the shadow of her pursuer overtaking her, but acknowledges that her fear may be creating visions, rather than a true representation of events (*vidi... nisi si timor illa videbat - Met.* 5.614-5). Sight is uncertain, whereas sound provides sure confirmation of her peril (*sed certe sonitusque - Met.* 5.616).[1006] Likewise, Morpheus deceives the eye, as a *simulator figurae* (*Met.* 11.634) able to assume the likeness of others. Morpheus beguiles Alcyone by assuming the voice as well as the appearance of her husband (*adicit his vocem Morpheus, quam coniugis illa / crederet esse sui - Met.* 11.671-2). Her eyes deceive her, though he feigns that they are a reliable source (*non haec tibi nuntiat auctor / ambiguus, non ista vagis rumoribus audis - Met.* 11.666-7). Alcyone correctly believes that her husband is dead, because she has seen him in a vision (*vidi agnovique - Met.* 11.686), but the vision is false.[1007]

The personae of the *Metamorphoses* can be deceived by their sight, which undermines sight as an authoritative basis of knowledge. How does this map onto the experience

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[1004] cf. Theseus' inability to clearly discern the number of islands on the sea (*Met.* 8.577), since they are disguised by the distance (*Met.* 8.578). Given Theseus' error, Achelous' invitation to see for himself at *Met.* 8.590 is surely ironic. On distance impeding sight, cf. *Met.* 11.470 and 724.
[1005] Daedalus' maze is designed to confuse the sight in *Met.* 8.160-8 (*lumina flexa / ducit in errorem variarum ambage viarum - Met.* 8.160-1). The visually disorienting line similarly confuses the reader.
[1006] cf. *Met.* 3.412ff.; Narcissus is deceived by his own image (*Met.* 3.440) and believes that his reflection is replying because he sees its mouth move, even though he hears nothing (*Met.* 3.461-2).
[1007] Griffin (1997, 252-53 ad 651-2) details how the imposter Morpheus 'behaves in all respects like a genuine *umbra*.' cf. *Aen.* 8.42 and 10.636-42.

of the reader, who sees a mental visualisation of the events described by the narrators of the *Metamorphoses*, guided primarily by the Ovidian narrator? Ovidian narration is often coloured by the focalisations of its characters; it does not always uphold authorial neutrality.[1008] Such focalisations are not necessarily clearly indicated in the text, so readers must be alert to unheralded filters being placed before their eyes,[1009] and weigh the effect of these on the authority of what they are shown. In *Met.* 1.567, the Ovidian narrator depicts the metamorphosed Daphne apparently assenting to being appropriated as Apollo's tree (*utque caput visa est agitasse cacumen*). It is not, however, certain that this is what happened. Daphne visibly rejected the god in *Met.* 1.556 (*refugit tamen oscula lignum*), and the verb *agitasse* bears 'connotations of upset and distress'.[1010] Moreover, although the context of this passage (in a poem of wonders and immediately following the metamorphosis of a human into a tree) seductively invites the reader to interpret the shaking of the tree in anthropomorphic terms, at the most literal level the reason that trees shake is due to being disturbed by the wind, and this has no significance whatsoever. Consequently, the following couplet is often regarded as a focalisation through the biased viewpoint of Apollo, rather than as truly impartial narration.[1011] In the preceding clause, Ovid uses an active verb, *adnuit*, which seems to state Daphne's assent as a definite fact, but this is undermined by the qualification of the description of her top nodding like a head with *visa est*, which casts the previous nodding into doubt. Did she nod or did she only

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[1008] Nikolopoulos (2004, 88) suggests that, indeed, 'A character whose focalisation is adopted has a special claim not only on readers' attention but also on their sympathy'. Narration of a focalisation grants it authority. cf. Bal 1997, 147 - 'the reader watches with with the character's eyes and will, in principle, be inclined to accept the vision presented by that character'.

[1009] Discussing this concept in the *Aeneid* (Fowler 2000, 40–63), Fowler dubs such non-coincidence of narrator and focaliser 'deviant focalisation', noting that 'there is always a push to unite focalizer and narrator' (Ibid. , 63). cf. Nikolopoulos (2004, 87–88) on the distinction between external and internal (usually character) focalisation, and the fact that narrators can vocalise what someone else sees.

[1010] Liveley 2011, 28. Daphne was also unmoved by Apollo's seduction attempt in *Met.* 1.514-24.

[1011] Green 2013, 71 - 'Daphne's acquiescence to the deity's adoption of her as his emblem is focalized through Apollo himself.'

seem to do so? As Barchiesi comments, 'Ovidio segnala l'ambiguità della situazione attraverso l'incertezza fra essere e sembrare.'[1012] One might equally well translate *visa est* as 'seemed' or 'was seen', and these dual translations prompt the reader to wonder by whom she was seen. The Ovidian narrator is speaking, but his own narration at *Met.* 1.556 gives the lie to this interpretation, and the ambiguity of *visa est* suggests that it should not be taken at face value. Apollo, having asserted his possession of the tree, sophistically takes its shaking branches as assent. Interpretation, it appears, can be affected by the identity of the viewer through whom we receive it, particularly when the focaliser is a would-be rapist.[1013] This elicits the question of what the reader sees. Ovid asks his readers whether they see the nodding treetop as assent, concurring with Apollo's viewpoint, or not, and whether they see Daphne as an inanimate tree or a being who retains self-determinacy. The authority of what seems to have been seen is thus problematised.[1014]

A similar case of uncredited focalisation of natural events occurs in *Fasti* 2, where the corpse of Lucretia appears to ratify Brutus' speech (*illa iacens ad verba oculos sine lumine movit, / visaque concussa dicta probare coma* - *Fa.* 2.845-6). Given that Lucretia is at least half-dead (*semianimi corpore* - *Fa.* 2.838), the reality of her endorsement is tenuous at best, but it serves Brutus' political designs (as does his

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[1012] Barchiesi 2005, 214 ad 564-7

[1013] cf. *Met.* 6.479-81, where Tereus interprets a sight as encouragement, when it is clearly not intended to evoke such a response; *Fa.* 2.770, where lustful memory inflates the beauty seen.

[1014] cf. *Amores* 3.2 where the Venus statue in the procession 'nods' approval of the lover's designs (*annuit et motu signa secunda dedit* - *Am.* 3.2.58) as directed (*annue, diva* - *Am.* 3.2.56). Boyd (1997, 221) aligns herself with Ovid's addressee, accepting Ovid's claim that the statue 'appears to come to life momentarily'. A more cynical view is that Ovid exploits the cult convention of treating a goddess's statue as a living deity for his own purposes (Miller 1989, 404). Davis (1979, 65) argues that 'Since such a »nod« would be symptomatic of any image being borne along unsteadily in a procession, the interior motives of the author... are immediately evident to his audience, although presumably not to his addressee'. As Bretzigheimer (2001, 195) notes, 'Die Gunst des Augenblicks weiß er zu nutzen und die Bewegung es Bildes als Nicken und Zeichen der Zustimmung umzudeuten.'

exposure of her wounded corpse to the Quirites at *Fa.* 2.849 - *volnus inane patet*).[1015] The sight is interpreted to suit the agenda of a male protagonist,[1016] in this case, one whose capacity for dissembling emerges in *Fasti* 2.717-20, where Brutus' fall is misinterpreted by those who witness it. The episode demonstrates how a speaker can re-present what he sees in order to benefit himself or to deceive others. Unscrupulous focalisers like Brutus and Apollo illustrate the unreliability of sight, and of narrators. How can the reader trust the authority of sight when it is mediated through biased eyes and may even permeate into what the reader sees in Ovidian narration?

See (Or Visualise) for Yourself

Ovid provides a lengthy example of how sight can be more authoritative than an aural account in the Perseus episode in *Met.* 4-5. This story is the only one to appear on the lists of *mendacia vatum* and *licentia vatum* in both *Amores* 3.6 and 3.12 and Ovid acknowledges the tale's paradigmatic status by including expressions of disbelief throughout.[1017] Klein argues that this 'dramatization of the responses to the marvellous enables the poet to shape the readers' attitude towards his own fantastic stories of unbelievable metamorphoses.'[1018] In *Met.* 4.787ff., Perseus' status as a witness of the things he is relating (*vidisset*) should heighten the credibility of his narrative, which is well-attested in literary tradition. Klein suggests that the witnessing motif is a traditional feature in upholding the credibility of *mirabilia.*[1019] Here, however, reinforcement is provided not by a complementary eyewitness (Perseus is the sole witness for his account), but through the sense of touch (*tetigisset*

[1015] Newlands 1995, 154
[1016] While Brutus does not rape Lucretia, he is using her body. As Newlands (Ibid.) notes, 'Brutus is presented in such a way as to suggest his similarity with Sextus Tarquinius'.
[1017] *Met.* 4.610-11, 4.641, 5.182, 5.195-6, 5.246, 5.24.
[1018] Klein 2009, 191. cf. Ovid's efforts at a similar exercise in *Tr.* 2.64.
[1019] Ibid., 204

- *Met.* 4.789), and undermines Perseus' narrative authority. As Klein states, 'this additional sense is destroying all the credibility it was supposed to reinforce, since it makes the (unbelievable) claim that Perseus touched the stars with his wings.'[1020]

Perseus cites an eyewitness for Medusa's beautiful hair (a feature whose *aetion* is original to Ovid)[1021] which had been transformed by the time he saw her (*inveni, qui se vidisse referret* - *Met.* 4.797). The inspecificity of this eyewitness is hardly reassuring, followed as it is by the even more general *dicitur* (*Met.* 4.799). This attempt to cite the authority of an eyewitness (a practice which underpins the veracity of accounts in both the *Fasti* and the *Metamorphoses*[1022]) is also undermined by the irony of someone claiming that he has looked at Medusa and not been petrified.[1023] Sight thus detracts from Perseus' authority rather than supporting it.

What model does the Perseus episode suggest for the ideal reader? Klein believes that the episode 'allegorizes the reader's self-conscious suspension of disbelief'.[1024] Thescelus' petrification could symbolise the reader unmoved by the narration; he explicitly refuses to be moved (*'quaere alium, tua quem moveant miracula' dixit* - *Met.* 5.181). However, being petrified is also a 'famous and traditional metaphor for the stupefied assent of the creduous believer',[1025] as *Met.* 5.205-6 exemplifies (*dum stupet Astyages, naturam traxit eandem / marmoreoque manet vultus mirantis in ore*). Just as Perseus looks at Medusa's reflection rather than the sight itself, so Ovid's readers must detach themselves from the narrative, suspending disbelief without being

[1020] Ibid.
[1021] Bömer 1969, 225 ad 791 - 'Das... Aition... ist vor Ovid nicht bekannt.'
[1022] Myers 1994, 76
[1023] Ibid. - 'there may be a joke in this assertion of *vidisse*, since Medusa is not someone whom one could have *looked* at any time after her transformation.'
[1024] Klein 2009, 209
[1025] Ibid., 208

overly credulous. Perhaps this is the kind of acceptance for which poetic authority strives.

The vividness of Ovid's poetry invites his readers to visualise events, seeing them in the mind's eye, and consequently making them more convincing and authoritative. The *Metamorphoses* is replete with exhortations pertaining to sight, particularly *ecce* and *en*. These have traditionally been viewed in dramatic terms, as marking sudden introductions or entrances into a scene,[1026] but their effect is also important in the visual sphere. Such interjections heighten the vividness of the scene by framing it as a visual rather than an aural experience.[1027] Anderson dubs it 'a dramatic expletive made popular by Virgil... introducing especially powerful and vivid scenes in epic. The audience is invited not merely to imagine the incident, but to see it.'[1028] Effectively, the narrator invites the reader to see the scene for himself, rather than merely listening to an account of it, and makes the reader an eyewitness of it. Events recounted in this way thus gain the authority of the reader's own autopsy. Miller notes that in *Met.* 6.165, 'we see rather than hear the approach of Niobe'.[1029] Similarly, at *Met.* 12.215, Nestor draws his audience into a witnessing role with *ecce*, so that the maiden is present (*adest virgo* - *Met.* 12.216) not only for Nestor at the wedding, and now in his memory, but also in the mental visualisations of his listening audience. Peppering the text with sight exhortations heightens its vividness and as a result readers may be caught up in the visual onslaught and prevented from questioning what they are encountering. The internal speaker, Ulixes, does this at *Met.* 13.264

[1026] Anderson 1997, 240 ad 92-4 - 'This adverb is often used... with a verb of seeing, to emphasise the dramatic effect.' Miller 1920, 423 n.1 - 'This entrance is regularly indicated by *ecce*, which, while it is used by Ovid in its simple adverbial meaning also, more frequently has this interjectional force indicating the entrance of an actor upon the scene.' Hardie (2002b, 18) says *ecce* announces presence.
[1027] e.g. *Met.* 13.91-2.
[1028] Anderson 1972, 174 ad 6.165. cf. *Aen.* 2.57, 203, 270, 318.
[1029] Miller 1920, 423

(*aspicite en!*), when he shows the audience his body immediately after admonishing them not to believe empty words (*nec vanis credite verbis* - *Met.* 13.263).[1030] When the Ovidian narrator uses the technique, it is in a less literal sense, but nevertheless appeals to the same authority. 'Look,' he is saying, 'at this scene, which I have conjured up before your eyes with the power of my storytelling.'

The converse of this use of *ecce* is illustrated in *Met.* 12.521, where the narrator, Nestor, expands it with a verb of seeing (*quam cernimus, ecce*), inviting his audience to disengage from his narrative to view a geographical feature in their own present which will provide an analogy for what he is describing. There are thus two main variants of audience involvement via sight which speakers can utilise for authorisation; speakers can cite what their internal audience can actually see in their immediate surroundings, that is, use their physical sight, but they can also make visual exhortations which are based not on reality, but on internal sight or mental visualisation. Of the latter, the first kind is the purely fictive '*Ecce*, something happened or someone came', which relies upon the speaker's authority and the listener's imagination. The second type, '*Ecce*, just like...', adds a simile to assist the reader or listener in visualising the scene, by relating something that they may well

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[1030] cf. Nestor's invitation to inspect a scar at *Met.* 12.444 (*signa vides*). The usual caveats to visual evidence authorising past events apply; is the scar from a javelin wound or a paper cut? Ulixes is a focus for the crisis of eyewitness testimony in ancient poetry. Though *Od*. 19.203 (ἴσκε ψεύδεα πολλὰ λέγων ἐτύμοισιν ὁμοῖα) recalls Hesiod's depiction of the all-seeing narrative-authorising Muses in *Theog*. 27, his lying tales in the *Odyssey* make him an unreliable narrator, but Emlyn-Jones (1986, 1) suggests that his Phaeacian audience do not actually care, being more concerned to hear an elegant tale which is vivid enough to *sound like* an eyewitness account (*Od*. 11.363-9). Virgil's Aeneas differentiates himself from Odysseus, emphasising his eyewitness status (*quaeque ipse miserrima vidi* - *Aen*. 2.5) so that Dekel (2012, 73) argues that 'Aeneas' third-person account of the scene, complete with dialogue, thus creates an impression of greater authenticity than Odysseus' first-person reminiscence of an ambiguous description that he himself once gave' even though 'There is no objective reason to privilege Aeneas' representation of Neoptolemus over Odysseus': Aeneas may be fabricating the content or the tone of the quoted speeches, his memory of the events may be confused, or his original observation might have been compromised in some way' (emphasis mine). Papaioannou (2005, 159) states that 'Aeneas' narrative has the very same effect as the narrative of Ulixes,' namely to enchant the listener.

not have seen to something that they probably have seen. At *Met.* 4.706-8, the Ovidian narrator invites his audience to picture the sea monster (*Ecce, velut navis praefixo concita rostro / sulcat aquas iuvenum sudantibus acta lacertis, / sic fera*), supplementing the command, *ecce*, with additional information which will make it easier for the listener to visualise the scene. Sight interjections serve as prompts for both physical and mental sight; physical sight bolsters the authority of the narrative with visible evidence, whilst mental sight contributes the authority of visualisation.[1031]

Thus in the *Metamorphoses*, Ovid problematises traditional notions of divine and narratorial omnivision and the superiority of autopsy. Gods and Muses who see everything may be distracted or choose not to tell the truth about what they saw, and narrators may claim autopsy for more than they can possibly have seen. There is always a risk when readers cannot see for themselves that narratorial filters may have skewed the presentation. The motives underlying a particular representation may or may not be apparent. Audiences (including readers) are, however, encouraged to see for themselves, through mentally visualising, really seeing, or the use of similes, which increases the authority of the narrative. Sight is thus a highly ambiguous authority; despite, or perhaps even because of, its traditional status as the strongest basis for credibility, it is frequently deceptive.

[1031] Pythagoras more subtly invites the reader to self-witness. Pythagoras' subject matter is common knowledge, positioning Pythagoras as witness rather than justifier, particularly of the everyday wonders in *Met.* 15.353-407. Beagon (2009, 294) notes that 'the specific source citation lacking in the previous section is present, but the authority cited is not some learned writer, nor even Pythagoras himself, but the reader' (references to reader's authority at *Met.* 15.362, 382 365, 369-70). The significance of the reader's autoptic verification of Pythagoras' speech is highlighted by the dismissal of the preceding stories at *Met.* 15.356 (*fama est*) and 359 (*haud... credo*). The most authoritative things are those which one can prove in one's own garden or from one's own experience, rather than relying on hearsay or the 'remote and bookish authorities' (Ibid., 297) of the paradoxographers. Other parts of Pythagoras' speech can be verified from familiar existing tradition (e.g. Pliny *HN* 8.105-7, 120-2) or the *Metamorphoses* (*Met.* 1.425-9, 4.750-2).

Sight in the *Fasti*

The authority of sight in the *Fasti* broadly conforms to the categories of knowledge-acquisition available to the historian,[1032] namely autopsy and reports from eyewitnesses. This mirrors the dual emphases of the poem. The causes of the calendar's order belong to the past, so the Ovidian narrator cannot authorise them via his own autopsy, though he can describe the festivals which commemorate them. The *Fasti*'s other subject is astronomy, which the Ovidian narrator (and the reader) can witness for themselves. Ovid usually couches his references to the stars in terms of what the reader can see on a particular day.[1033] The stars function as a visual reminder, a memorial and authority for past events.[1034] Indeed, the whole calendar (and the *Fasti* itself) revolves round what the reader can see in the sky.[1035] Sight is thus the constant authority behind the poem.

Divine Eyewitnesses

The centrality of sight to the authority of song is established in the first book of the *Fasti*. In *Fasti* 1.104, Ovid's Janus invites the Ovidian narrator to observe the long ages of which he will sing (*aspice quam longi temporis acta canam*). Whilst partly a joking comment upon the written form of annals in general, and the *Fasti* in particular, this line also illustrates the greater authority of seeing compared with hearing. The Ovidian narrator will not merely hear at second-hand about the creation of the world, but witness it through the power of Janus' voice.[1036] Given that Janus'

[1032] Thucydides *Hist.* 1.22.1-2.
[1033] *Fa.* 2.79, 5.599, 6.241.
[1034] *Fa.* 2.265-6 - *antiqui monimenta perennia facti, / Anguis, avis, Crater sidera iuncta micant.*
[1035] *suspice... videbis* - *Fa.* 3.450, 3.459.
[1036] The Ovidian narrator gets a visual answer to his query (*Quem tamen esse deum te dicam, Iane biformis?* - *Fa.* 1.89), namely Janus' epiphany, described in terms of sight (*Fa.* 1.95-6). Hardie

plan mirrors Ovid's own path for the *Fasti* (*tempora... canam* - *Fa.* 1.1-2),[1037] Janus' policy of authorising visually may apply to the poet. Janus' authority for his speech is due to having been the sole witness to the events that he describes, including the creation of the world. The god's two faces give him universal vision (*Fa.* 1.117-8, *Fa.* 1.139-40,[1038] *Fa.* 1.283-4) and he is the only god able to look behind himself (*solus de superis qui tua terga vides* - *Fa.* 1.66).[1039] His vision, knowledge, and therefore authority are absolute.[1040] Janus' universal vision makes him the first to announce Germanicus' victory. In contrast, the Ovidian narrator sees only partially until he is granted fuller information by Janus (*iam tamen hanc aliqua tu quoque parte vides* - *Fa.* 1.134). Authority in the *Fasti*, as in the *Metamorphoses*, is conferred by witnessing things personally.[1041]

The superiority of temporally and geographically universal divine vision compared with Ovid's limited scope is a topos which recurs throughout the *Fasti*. The Ovidian narrator's awareness of his failing prompts him to constantly invoke divinities in the *Fasti* to obtain information about them and their concerns. It is not that Ovid the poet

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(1991, 56) notes, 'The first word of the first hexameter of the Janus episode, *ecce*, minimizes the distance between word and event, as does also the last word of the pentameter, *adest*.'

[1037] Green 2004a, 75 ad 103-4

[1038] Murgatroyd (2005, 74) sees the repetition of *video* at *Fa.* 6.119 and the two verbs for seeing in *Fa.* 6.123-4 (*videt, respicit*) as 'slyly alluding to the god's (very important) two sets of eyes'. Varro also mentions Janus' ability to view East and West (*Ant.* fr. 233 Card.), an ability more commonly associated with the Sun (*Met.* 2.190) - Ibid., 84-85 ad 1.140. cf. Ceres, who visits everywhere in the world (*Fa.* 4.574) and the Stars (*Fa.* 4.577) who fail to find Persephone. The Sun has universal vision (*Fa.* 4.582), and Macrobius links Janus to the sun in *Sat.* 1.9.9, saying that some think Janus' two faces are intended to represent sunrise and sunset. Janus is sometimes depicted as quadrifrontal (Macrobius 1.9.13, Servius ad *Aen.* 7.607).

[1039] cf. *Fa.* 6.123-4; Persius 1.62. Janus' unique occipital vision precludes blind-spots.

[1040] The Salii view him as 'god of gods' (Macrobius 1.9.14). In *Fasti* 1.85-6 Jove looks out over the world from a stance that should afford him universal vision, and sees nothing but the Roman empire (this creates a hint of doubt about Jove's omnivision). This is 'the common conceit that Rome is tantamount to the whole world' (Green 2004a, 66 ad 85-6), since *urbs* and *orbis* are similar (cf. Hardie 1986, 364-66; *Fa.* 2.684; *AA* 1.174), and plays on the fact that if Jupiter looks out from the Capitol on the *city*, he will see Rome (cf. *Met.* 1.163). cf. *Tr.* 1.5.69, and particularly *Tr.* 3.7.51-2, where Roma views the conquered (i.e. Roman) world.

[1041] 'In the *Fasti* the evidence of eyewitnesses is very important for asserting the veracity of the account being given' - Myers 1994, 76. This is common in aetiological poetry - Ibid., 83. cf. Call. fr. 384.47-9.

considers himself in need of divine assistance, but that his persona as an inquiring antiquarian requires that he base his reports on those of eyewitnesses, and what better eyewitnesses are there than the all-seeing gods? As Barchiesi notes, the gods 'are better informed, or carry more authority, not only because they are gods but also because they are eyewitnesses'.[1042] The gods' witnessing abilities increase their authority, and thereby the authority of the Ovidian narrator. However, that authority is inevitably accompanied by the risk of personal bias in a god's account. As Schiesaro states, 'it would be impossible to grant the gods of the *Fasti* (let alone the *Metamorphoses*) an indisputable claim to authority and truth. They are, for one thing, as much characters of the poem as their human counterparts, fully involved in the action of the plot.'[1043] Furthermore, 'their authority is regularly invoked on matters that touch them very closely, and where they have, inevitably, a biased point of view.'[1044] Even the authority of such powerful eyewitnesses as the gods is open to question.

Barchiesi suggests that Ovid's questioning of the gods in sightings also constitutes an aspiration to a greater status than that normally available to a narrator, since in Roman religious tradition, 'access to the "visibility" of the gods is limited to professionals licensed by the institutions of the magistracy and the priesthood, and it is restricted to precise occasions of worship.'[1045] It is therefore perhaps a display of cheek on Ovid's part (or an assertion of vatic supremacy) to claim personal access to the gods.[1046] By asserting the right to look upon the gods, Ovid lays claim to a semi-religious

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[1042] Barchiesi 1997, 192
[1043] Schiesaro 2002, 64.
[1044] Ibid., 65. cf. Carmentis (*Fa.* 1.469), and Romulus. On the traditional unreliability of divine interlocutors, cf. Barchiesi 1997 esp. 230-2.
[1045] Barchiesi 1997, 192
[1046] It may also problematise Augustus' addition of a shrine of Vesta to his own house.

authority, which he can access at any time, since his queries always result in epiphany.

Authoritative Autopsy

Functioning in parallel with the authority of divine eyewitnesses is the authority of autopsy. The Ovidian narrator features prominently in the *Fasti*, and much of what he relates consists of things that he himself has seen and can talk about with authority. In *Fasti* 1.389*,* the Ovidian narrator says that he has witnessed an offering of entrails (*vidi*), whilst in *Fasti* 2.27, the Ovidian narrator emphasises the fact that he saw what he is describing with *ipse ego... vidi*. This phrase is often used by Ovid to claim the authority of autopsy in the *Fasti*,[1047] as is common practice in didactic poetry.[1048] Indeed, this is the 'formula didascalica dell'autopsia;'[1049] for it expresses 'the insistence upon personal experience proper to a didactic poet'.[1050] Claims of autopsy thus function a little like Alexandrian footnotes; it is the presence of the claim, not its literal truth, which contributes to the authority of the narrative. Autoptic phrases may therefore give an account of the authority of the didactic genre, not of the eyewitness speaker. Thus Thomas on *Georgics* 1.193 (*vidi equidem*) comments that 'this is not autobiographical, but didactic, emphatically asserting the veracity of the detail which

[1047] *Fa.* 1.389, 2.27, 3.274, 4.725-8, 4.905-42, 6.395-416.
[1048] Kenney 1958, 202. cf. *DRN* 4.577, 6.1044 (Lucretius prefers *videmus* (70x, all but 3 at end of hexameter), *vides* (33x), *videas* (10x), *videres* (5x) - La Penna 1987, 108); *Georgics* 1.193, 197, 316-8, 4.125-7; *AA* 1.721, 3.378, 487. Propertius 1.13 links autopsy with authority, rejecting *rumor* and *augur* (*vidi ego* - 1.13.14, 15). cf. Scioli 2015, 100 - 'In using the phrase *vidi ego* specifically to demonstrate that autopsy connotes authority, Propertius draws upon the precedents of didactic poetry and oratory, in which the verb (with and without *ego*) is used to bolster a narrator's claim.' In the *Amores*, Ovid uses *vidi ego* four times 'manipulating (and parodying) its familiar didactic function to suit his own needs' (Ibid., 234 n. 24).
[1049] La Penna 1987, 108.
[1050] Hollis 1977, 142 ad 721

follows.'[1051] Yet the distinction between a didactic sight claim and an eyewitness knowledge sight claim can be slight.[1052] Both types of sight claim are ultimately made in order to increase the authority of an account.

Ovid enlivens his use of autoptic phrases and divine informants in *Fasti* 6.253 by taking advantage of the conventional epiphanic setting to overturn his readers' expectations of sight.[1053] These preconceptions have been set up by Ovid throughout the *Fasti*, so that as Barchiesi points out, 'our narrator rejects the conventional methods of approach to the divine on which he has based much of his poem.'[1054] This gives rise to comedy in what could have been a serious experience of religious or poetic inspiration.[1055] The poet challenges his readers to decide whether he can maintain his authority when he cannot see. Ovid teeters on the brink of a visual epiphany, even describing the purple light which shines about him (*laetaque purpurea luce refulsit humus* - *Fa.* 6.252),[1056] before negating the anticipated expression of viewing to say the opposite (*non equidem vidi* - *Fa.* 6.253). Ovid does not see Vesta, but claims poetic authority from precisely this lack of sight; this allows him to claim that unlike other poets, he does not lie (*valeant mendacia vatum* - *Fa.* 6.253), and nor does he look upon a goddess who is not to be looked upon[1057] (*te, dea, nec fueras aspicienda viro* - *Fa.* 6.254). As Littlewood comments, 'With comic sophistry Ovid

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[1051] Thomas 1988, 101 ad 193. The phrase serves 'to communicate the speaker's authority on some aspect of farming that the reader would otherwise have to take on faith' (Scioli 2015, 100).
[1052] La Penna 1987, 109 - 'Ma sopprattutto bisogna aggiungere che il vidi didascalico non differisce molto dal vidi delle sentenze, il quale serve a richiamare esperienze del passato in appoggio a una verità da dimostrare, e questo tipo è più frequente e più antico.'
[1053] Ovid's traditional hymnic opening (*Vesta, fave* - *Fa.* 6.249) omits the usual reference to a particular physical and humanising characteristic of the deity. cf. Littlewood 2006, 84 ad 249.
[1054] Barchiesi 1997, 205
[1055] Littlewood dubs it a 'humorous adaptation of the epic formula', contrasting the context here with the grimly dramatic context of *vidi egomet* in *Aen.* 3.623.
[1056] Refulgence is a typical epiphanic feature. cf. *lucidior... domus* (*Fa.* 1.94).
[1057] Only Vestal Virgins and Roman *matronae* entered Vesta's shrine (Littlewood 2006, 86 ad 254). Note the physicality of the images of Vesta at *Fa.* 3.45-6, which are said, though not seen, to have covered their eyes.

assures his readers that he will not claim to have seen Vesta herself because he does not lie in the manner of other poets. This "proof" of his veracity is intended to enhance the vatic integrity of the chronicler of the Roman year'.[1058] The non-appearance of Vesta is no slight to the poet. Indeed, her presence is a mark of the poet's special status, and a divine endorsement of his words (once she has corrected them).[1059] Thus as Bömer notes, this is 'eine interessante und typische ovidisch Variante', combining 'in spielerischer Parodie' the *topoi* of *vidi* and divine epiphany to poets.[1060] Far from sight providing authority here, the opposite is true. Not seeing the goddess gives Ovid authority, and 'the poet is compensated for this nonexistent vision with the revelation of the truths behind a cult that he finds obscure.'[1061] This is comically incongruous in the context of the sight-prioritisation in the rest of the *Fasti*. Is Ovid really claiming authority from an absence? Ovid overturns the conventions of autoptic epiphany that he has set up throughout the *Fasti*; he can claim authority from not seeing as well as from sight, for he has inner vatic vision.

Ovid's emphasis on autopsy and authoritative eyewitness accounts in the *Fasti* transforms his audiences from passive receivers of information provided by the divinely inspired and authoritative poet into eyewitnesses. Thus at *Fasti* 1.63, Ovid uses *ecce* when addressing Germanicus (*Ecce... Germanice*). Whilst the use of *ecce* in epiphanic contexts to mark an arrival is commonplace, Ovid makes his named reader see and thus creates a co-eyewitness to authorise his narrative to other readers.[1062] For the reader, visual elements heighten the vividity and hence the authority of the Ovidian narrator's account. At *Fasti* 2.711 the Ovidian narrator embellishes the

[1058] Littlewood 2006, 85 n. ad 253
[1059] *Fa.* 6.255-6 has the authority neither of sight nor of the deity's voice (as Barchiesi (1997, 205) succinctly puts it, 'No more dialogues, just mystical telepathy').
[1060] Bömer 1974, 506 n. 7
[1061] Barchiesi 1997, 205
[1062] cf. *Fa.* 1.75 - *cernis?* See pp. 224-6 on the effects of *ecce* in the *Met.*

exhortation (*ecce, nefas visu*). Invitations to verify the Ovidian narrator's account visually also contribute to its authority (*Fa.* 3.837 - *videas*). The Ovidian narrator uses first person plural verbs[1063] to include his readers in his narrative, enticing them to participate in seeing what is described. Ovid's readers can thus see and authorise the narrative for themselves.

Authorising Dream Vision

The value of granting authorising vision to the reader is especially evident in the peculiar problems pertaining to dream vision,[1064] which in *Fasti* 3 is presented in highly visual terms.[1065] Although autopsy confers authority, it can be undermined by lack of corroboration. This is particularly the case for dreams, due to the fundamental exclusivity of this viewing experience. As Scioli states, 'When a viewer, awake, tries to imagine a sleeper's dream, the effort points out an inherent paradox: the privilege of knowing a sleeper's dream is inaccessible to anyone but the sleeper.'[1066] Thus

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[1063] *Fa.* 6.241, 6.785.

[1064] On ancient attitudes to dreams, cf. Harris 2003; Harris 2009; Harrisson 2013; Scioli 2015; van Lieshout 1980. Harris (2009, 15–16) usefully defines a dream as 'a life-like sequence of images... seen while one is sleeping' and notes that 'The visual image may be vivid but it is often out of focus or inadequate.' Harrisson (2013, 2) highlights the ancient world's lack of unanimity of opinion on dreams.

[1065] Rhea Silvia sees a dream vision (*imagine somni vidimus* - *Fa.* 3.27-8). The verb *vidimus* 'explicitly characterizes her dream as a visual experience' (Scioli 2015, 189). Introducing the dream description with *vidimus* not *vidi* may include the reader in the act of viewing. Scioli (Ibid.) suggests that references to Rhea Silvia's viewing experience 'suggest a mode of viewing for the reader to emulate'. Unusually, Propertius 2.26a uses *vidi* (Ibid., 190), which both introduces the dream narrative and describes Propertius' physical act of seeing within the dream. Fedeli (2005, 736 ad 1-6) suggests that Propertius uses *vidi* for direct experiences (1.13.14, 15; 2.16.49; 4.2.53**;** 4.5.61, 67), the plural, *vidimus*, for dream experiences and *videor* for night visions (2.31.5, 3.3.1, 4.7.3). Heyworth (2007, 223 ad 1) notes that Propertius begins a line with *vidi* on five other occasions, all followed by enclitic *ego*, even when not required. Elision unifies the two words into a single unit in the reader's aural as well as visual experience. cf. Platnauer 1951, 74. The Roman conception of dreaming as a visual experience is supported by dedicatory inscriptions' preference for using *ex viso/visu* ('from something having been seen' / 'from a vision') rather than phrases like *somnio monitus* (Scioli 2015, 5).

[1066] Scioli 2015, 212. cf. Cicero *Div.* 2.136 - *Sed haec externa ob eamque causam ignota nobis sunt, non nulla etiam ficta fortasse. Quis enim auctor istorum?*. Scioli (Ibid., 19) suggests that whilst readers accept literary dreams, the use of a first-person narrator is a reminder that 'the listener or reader, as the recipient of the dream account, has only the authority of the dreamer to go on in terms of its claim to authenticity'. Dreams are fleeting and hard to pin down (Aristotle *Div. somn.* 464b8-9), but *enargeia* can restore their credibility. cf. Ibid., 20 and Lieshout 1980, 18-19.

when Rhea Silvia questions whether her dream was so clear that it might have been a waking vision (*an somno clarius illud erat?* - *Fa.* 3.28), the implication is that the latter experience could be corroborated by another witness, whereas a dream cannot be shared. Scioli points out 'the discrepancy between what a sleeper claims to see behind his or her closed eyes while dreaming and the fact that, from the perspective of an outside viewer, the sleeper actually sees nothing'.[1067] The reader's shared experience of Rhea Silvia's account of her dream is a physical impossibility, but the reader still 'dreams along' with Rhea Silvia's account. This is highlighted by *ecce* in *Fasti* 3.35, which 'places the dream scenario before the eyes of narrator and reader, thus increasing the reader's sensation of being present as a witness to the images of the dream while reading the narrator's account'.[1068] The vivid account of the dream attempts to create *enargeia*, making the reader seem to see the dream vision as Rhea Silvia re-visualises it in her memory (though this is not the same as witnessing the dream firsthand). Consequently Rhea Silvia takes on a role similar to that of Ovid himself,[1069] making the reader a witness of the unwitnessable.

Rhea Silvia describes her vision in detail, presenting it as something she actually saw.[1070] However, Rhea Silvia's authority is problematic. She is the sole witness of her dream, which reduces her credibility,[1071] and her lack of understanding and insight into the meaning of her dream (*Fa.* 3.25, 27-8) detracts from her authority. This prophecy about the future founders of Rome is reduced to the confused ramblings of a

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[1067] Scioli 2015, 197
[1068] Ibid., 192. cf. *Am*. 3.5.10 and *Aen*. 2.270-1.
[1069] Scioli (Ibid., 214) suggests that Rhea Silvia is a proxy for Ovid in elegiac terms, for she 'engages in an action that is typical for the elegiac poet-narrator, who recounts his dream and reveals some aspect of his emotional response without providing any interpretation of its significance for the reader'.
[1070] Even Rhea Silvia's reality resembles a dreamscape in *Fa.* 3.13, recalling Ennius' *Annales* 1.38-9 (Ibid., 175; Merli 2000, 51) and the cave of Somnus in *Met.* 11.603-4.
[1071] There is no indication of the dream's source, as Murgatroyd (2005, 19) parenthesises ('was Mars or someone else responsible for the dream?').

naive rape victim, who would have every reason to try to establish the authority of her vision, given the penalties for non-virgin Vestals.[1072] Rhea Silvia's repeated questions and uncertainty about her experience reflect the reader's difficulties with her credibility. The reader is placed in a position of seeing more than Rhea Silvia, and understanding that her dream account looks both back at the dream and forward towards the pregnant consequences of her rape, forming 'a confluence of prophecy and retrospective narration'.[1073] It is left to the reader to decode the dream vision of the unauthoritative dreamer.

The reader receives a visualised impression of the dream vision created by the recounting of it by the dreamer. Whilst Rhea Silvia's dream appears to authoritatively allegorise the future history of Rome, dreams in ancient literature more widely are not authoritative.[1074] Lucretius denounces the interpretation of *somnia* in *De Rerum Natura* 1.102-11 as lies created by *vates*[1075] to induce fear in men, and presents dreams as devoid of useful information, content or prophecy, thereby 'unravelling the authority of earlier poets'.[1076] Not only are dreams unauthoritative, but so is the poetry of Lucretius' predecessors who cite dreams as their authorisation, including Ennius (who claims Homer appeared to him in a dream) and Callimachus (who engages in dream-conversation with the Muses). Fantham delineates two distinct traditions of dream visions, namely real visitations of the dead, and the sending of false dreams by the gods.[1077] In *Met.* 11 the second masquerades as the first (*exstinctique iube Ceycis imagine mittat / somnia ad Alcyonen veros narrantia casus* - *Met.* 11.587-9; *somnia*

[1072] Livy is sceptical: Liv. 1.4.2 - *vi compressa Vestalis,... seu ita rata, seu quia deus auctor culpae honestior erat, Martem incertae stirpis patrem nuncupat.* cf. Beard 1995.
[1073] Scioli 2015, 191. Murgatroyd (2005, 19) is intrigued by this example of prolepsis within analepsis.
[1074] cf. *Aen.* 6.283-4 - *somnia vana*, *Aen.* 1.407-8.
[1075] *Vates* refers to both poets *and* priests, 'for it is the poet who invents dreams for the reader in poetry' (Earnshaw 2013, 269).
[1076] Ibid., 270
[1077] Fantham 1979, 339

quae veras aequent imitamine formas - *Met.* 11.626). Moreover, Ovid subverts Lucretius for 'his dream spectre is false, but this is clearly marked in the storyline (and therefore true), and is false in a different way from that which Lucretius intended.'[1078] The reader is forced to question what kind of dream vision is being presented, and to assess its authority (as dreamers themselves sometimes do).[1079] Is it a vision of true things, a false vision of true things, or a false vision of untrue things?[1080] Even the experience of dreaming is dangerously seductive. In *Fasti* 3.19, sleep is described as *blanda*,[1081] and overpowers Rhea Silvia's eyes stealthily (*furtim*). Likewise in *Met.* 11 dreams are described in terms of falsity (*varias imitantia formas / somnia vana* - *Met.* 11.614-5). Morpheus is an artificer (*artificem simulatoremque figurae* - *Met.* 11.634), and Phantasos does everything deceitfully (*fallaciter* - *Met.* 11.643). Since Morpheus serves as 'an embodiment of the close alliance between poetry and dreams',[1082] the falsity of dreams also has implications for the authority of poetry.[1083] Tissol identifies a parallel 'between Morpheus' imitation of forms and the powerfully suggestive *phantasia* of the author addressed to the imagination of his readers';[1084] indeed, the power of Morpheus and the power of the poet may be one and the same.[1085] The visualisations induced in the reader's mind by the poet have

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[1078] Earnshaw 2013, 271
[1079] *Fa.* 3.28. cf. *Aen.* 5, where the dream's authority is undermined by its teller's disguise.
[1080] In *Il.* 2, Zeus bids the Dream convey false words accurately (*Il.* 2.10) in the assumed guise of Nestor. cf. *Met.* 13.216.
[1081] cf. *Il.* 2.2 and 14.243 - νήδυμος Ὕπνος.
[1082] Hardie 2002b, 9. When Morpheus claims in *Met.* 11.666 to be a reliable *auctor*, while lying about his identity, he expresses fundamental truths for Ovid's poetry.
[1083] On winged words and winged dreams, cf. Norden 1957, 216-17. Shakespeare takes his cue from this conception of the relationship of poetry and dream vision: *A Midsummer Night's Dream* 5.1.417-20 - 'If we shadows have offended, / Think but this and all is mended, / That you have but slumbered here / While these visions did appear'; *The Tempest* 4.1.1882 - 'the baseless fabric of this vision'.
[1084] Tissol 1997, 79-80
[1085] Hardie 2002b, 277 - 'the power of Morpheus is the power of the poet to work on the imagination of the reader through the suggestive force of *phantasia*'. Hardie states that 'Morpheus is one of the great metapoetic figures for the writer in the *Metamorphoses.*'

similar characteristics to the dreams created by Morpheus. The authority of such visions is doubtful, since they are a manufactured experience.

Thus in the *Fasti* Ovid presents positive and negative aspects of sight authority. Eyewitnesses and autopsy are offered as the primary forms of information-gathering, although divine biases suggest that eyewitnesses may not be entitled to all the authority that they claim. Ovid is obliged to refer to eyewitnesses because his own autopsy is incomplete; he lacks divine omnivision and when contradictory accounts are presented to him towards the end of the poem, he is in difficulties. In order to heighten the authority of autopsy, Ovid invites his audience to participate in seeing. Anyone can confirm the authority of his account, simply by visualising it for themselves. The weakness of sight is that it is frequently not a shared experience. As in the case of Rhea Silvia's dream, this issue limits the authority of accounts which rely solely upon the authority of a narrator. Moreover, the poet's ability to manufacture a visual experience just as Morpheus constructs dreams out of *phantasia* makes it difficult to see such sights as authorising.

Sight in the Exile Poetry

Whereas the *Fasti* is located primarily in the locales of Rome and beneath its familiar night sky, much of the exile poetry is set far away. This allows Ovid to provide an autoptically-authorised narrative of his experiences of exile, whilst negotiating and creating tension around the distancing and distorting effect that his removal from Rome may have on his reader's experience. Sight is a key theme in the exile poetry; Ingleheart observes that 'the vocabulary of sight... permeates the exile corpus'.[1086] Although Ingleheart's comment pertains to sight's role in causing Ovid's exile, the prominence of sight is also significant for Ovid's exploration of authority. The roadblock to the reader's sight created by Ovid's exile creates 'visible' constraints for reader vision. Autopsy is the preferred method of authorising a narrative, and Ovid devotes the majority of his exile poetry to his own experiences, which, whether it is explicitly stated or merely understood, are an autoptic account. The converse of the author/reader collaborative experience is that the reader must be able to visualise the account (and expects to be able to do so) by means of *enargeia*. Where the authority of autopsy or *enargeia* falls short, the eyewitness accounts of others may lend the authority of their own sight to Ovid's account.

Seeing is Believing

Ovid plays on the fact that a sighted individual is an eyewitness of his life, and the best able to report on it (ignoring the fact that in emotionally-charged circumstances, he may not be best-placed to observe the facts). Due to his geographical isolation

[1086] Ingleheart 2006, 67

from Rome, Ovid is the only and best witness of his life.[1087] He highlights this with visual language; his exile is explicitly envisioned in visual terms at *Tristia* 3.8.35ff., where he sees the figure of his fate standing before his eyes, and what he sees in the present prompts his memory. The relationship of sight with truth and authority is particularly clear at *Tristia*. 3.10.35ff., where Ovid notes that he cannot hope for credence for his improbable account, but argues that he should be believed because he has seen the things he describes (*vidimus* - *Tr.* 3.10.37,[1088] 3.10.49). Ovid attempts to assert the authority of autopsy over that of credibility.

The authority of Ovid's autoptic account may be increased by the fact that no competing narratives are offered. Since his narrative is the only one available, there is little choice but to accept it. Yet, as in the case of Rhea Silvia's dream, sole-vision is not a strong basis for belief. The most authoritative narratives (as the Roman rhetorical and legal schools were well-aware) are those which evoke *enargeia* in their audience, making them 'seem to see' what is described and thereby share in the viewing experience conjured up by the speaker. A narrative does not have to have been truly seen even by the speaker himself to be convincing, it merely needs to be believable (Quint. *Inst.* 6.3.31-2). In poetry, this is part of the collaborative relationship of poet and audience.

[1087] Ovid is thus similar to Aeneas and Odysseus (cf. *Tr.* 1.5.63). Zumwalt (1977, 214) comments, 'Aeneas' narrative is that of a personal participant and eyewitness (*Aen.* 2.5ff), as was, of course, that of Odysseus in *Od.* 9-12. Who should know the truth of events which have taken place better than the participants themselves?' cf. *Her.* 16.63 with Mazurek (2006, 56) - 'His words, particularly *visa* juxtaposed with *referre*, point precisely to that gap between seeing events and telling them that simultaneously empowers and impairs the eyewitness narrator or autobiographer. Not even the most impartial observer can mirror a moment in words as it actually happened; one can never completely circumvent the subtle filters of preference and prejudice' and Ziogas 2013, 45 - 'His memory does not depend on what he has read but on what he has witnessed, and his reference to eyewitnessing implies that the version he is about to narrate is the most authoritative.' Paris is an *arbiter* (*Her.* 16.69), an 'eyewitness' or 'spectator' (*OLD* s.v.1).

[1088] Luck (1977, 213 ad 37ff.) notes that *vidimus* is used to highlight Ovid's own experience ('um das eigene Erlebnis hervorzuheben').

Enargeia and Visualisation

As a poet trained in the rhetorical schools, Ovid is 'particularly aware of the effect of *enargeia* in both speeches and poetry',[1089] using it to heighten the authority of his narrative by activating his readers' powers of visualisation. The ability to create such vividity (*enargeia*) of description that his listeners seem to see things before their eyes is an integral part of ancient poetry,[1090] and indeed rhetoric.[1091] *Enargeia* is a satisfactory substitute for physical sight, for 'it is impossible to distinguish what the sightseer sees on the spot from the vivid verbal pictures of these famous places in poetic ecphrases.'[1092] Indeed, Ovid often incorporates set-pieces of poetic *enargeia* like the flames of Mount Etna[1093] into his poetry so that he can draw upon cultural memory of such set-pieces as well as relying on his own writing.

Dionysius (*Lys*. 7; I.14,17 Us.-Rad.) describes how *enargeia* transforms the listener into an eyewitness:[1094]

[1089] Norton 2013, 26

[1090] Quintilian's examples of *enargeia* in *Inst.* 6.2.32 derive from the *Aeneid* (*Aen.* 9.476, 11.40, 11.89, 10.782), linking poetic and prophetic powers. In Gellius 15.18.1-3, the inspired priest sees the course of a battle as if he were a participant, and communicates every detail to his audience. This recalls Longinus 15.1 (Quintilian *Inst.* 6.2.29-30), where one route to authoritative speech is to form visions (*phantasiai*) for oneself and thus make one's listeners also seem to see. cf. D.H. *Lys.* 7.1.14, 17. Visions are typically described in visual terms (Leigh 1997, 10 - 'the attestation of a vision in one's mind's eye... is typical of prophecy in ancient literature'). cf. *cerno* in prophecies - *Aen.* 6.86-7; Seneca *Ag.* 730; Valerius Flaccus 1.226. Papaioannou (2005, 105) argues that 'a *vates* is also an *auctor*, a performance producer: he has the ability to see, and make others see with him, future action and to describe it in gestures as words'). The prophet, like the poet, renders visual representations in his listeners' minds. Hinds (1998, 115) views references to vision, whether physical or mental, as markers of reflexive annotation, used for allusion.

[1091] *Ad Herenn.* 4.55.68. cf. Cicero *Part.* 6.20; Quintilian *Inst.* 8.3.62ff., 9.1.27, 9.2.40. Quintilian expands at *Inst.* 6.3.29-32 on the production of *phantasiai*, which place the images of absent things before our minds so that we seem to see them with our eyes. *Enargeia* is also required for authoritative history - Lucian *Hist.Consc.* 51. cf. Walker 1993.

[1092] Hardie 2002b, 323

[1093] Sen. *Ep.* 79.5-7

[1094] Zanker 1981, 297. Zanker (Ibid., 298) states that *ecphrasis* and *enargeia* are sometimes interchangeable. cf. Theon *Prog.* 118.7 - ἔκφρασις ἐστὶ λόγος περιηγηματικὸς ἐναργῶς ὑπ' ὄψιν ἄγων τὸ δηλούμενον. cf. Krieger 1991, 7 n. 8 - 'ekphrasis would seem to overlap, almost totally, the rhetorically encouraged virtue of *enargeia*, which is also defined as vivid description addressed to the

> ἔχει δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐνάργειαν πολλὴν ἡ Λυσίου λέξις. αὕτη δ᾽ ἐστὶ δύναμίς τις ὑπὸ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἄγουσα τὰ λεγόμενα, γίγνεται δ᾽ ἐκ τῆς τῶν παρακολουθούντων λήψεως. ὁ δὴ προσέχων τὴν διάνοιαν τοῖς Λυσίου λόγοις οὐχ οὕτως ἔσται σκαιὸς ἢ δυσάρεστος ἢ βραδὺς τὸν νοῦν, ὃς οὐχ ὑπολήψεται γινόμενα τὰ δηλούμενα ὁρᾶν καὶ ὥσπερ παροῦσιν οἷς ἂν ὁ ῥήτωρ εἰσάγῃ προσώποις ὁμιλεῖν.
>
> Lysias' style has a great deal of *enargeia*. And this is a certain power he has of conveying what he is describing to the senses, and it is produced from his grasp of detail. He who turns his thoughts to the speeches of Lysias will not be so stupid, peevish or slow-witted that he will not suppose that he sees the actions which are being set forth as they happen and that he is meeting face-to-face those whom the orator introduces.

Mental visualisation is thus a crucial aspect of authoritative narrative.[1095] Poetry's connection with the visual is also manifest in the saying attributed to Simonides, *poëma loquens pictura, pictura tacitum poëma debet esse*.[1096] However, art only shows what is visible, whilst poetry can make what is absent visible. The visual results of poetry, effected by *enargeia*, are illusion,[1097] for poetry 'tricks us into believing that we see what is not there'.[1098] It is the ultimate exercise of poetic authority to create authoritative visual images in the minds of the audience through mimicry of the act of perception.[1099] This is reflected in Ovid's narration of his readers seeing, as at *Ex Ponto* 1.4.11 (*cernis ut in duris... arvis / fortia taurorum corpora frangat opus*) and *Ex Ponto* 1.5.5 (*cernis ut ignavum corrumpant otia corpus*). Gaertner comments on the fact that the phrase *cernis ut* is usually used of something which the speaker and addressee can indeed see, whereas the cases in the

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inner eye'. This is ecphrasis in its earlier, broader sense, rather than the later narrower one of a literary description of an artwork, which is common in recent scholarship (Norton 2013, 57).

[1095] Webb (2013, 24) posits different responses from ancient and modern audiences, suggesting that 'ancient audiences were more consciously attuned to visual effects and did "see" the subject of poems and speeches in their minds' eye'. cf. Vasaly (1993, 99) - 'ancient, nonliterate society may well have possessed powers of pictoral visualization much greater and more intense than our own'; Yates (1966, 20) - 'Ancient memories... could depend on faculties of intense visual memorization which we have lost'. Papaioannou (2007, 109) links visualisation and remembering, saying that *enargeia* 'can invade the domain of memory'. A recent study (Zeman, Dewar and Della Sala 2015) found that some people lack the power of mentally visualising images, a condition called *aphantasia*.

[1096] Quoted in *Ad Herenn.* 4.28.39.

[1097] Hardie 2002b, 5 - '*Enargeia* effects the illusion of sight.'

[1098] Norton 2013, 29

[1099] Webb 2013, 38. *Enargeia*'s close connection to physical sight is evident from the adjective ἐναργής - *LSJ* s.v. 1 - 'visible'; s.v. 2 - 'manifest to the mind's eye'.

Epistulae ex Ponto merely introduce exempla.[1100] Seeing and visualising are thus more or less equivalent here; successful production of *enargeia* has the dual effects of persuading the audience or reader that something is visible before their eyes, and also (or perhaps, as a result) that something is true. As Hardie notes, in ancient literary criticism 'vividness, *enargeia*, is closely associated with persuasiveness or plausibility, *pithanotēs*, *fides*'.[1101] Epicurus (*Hdt.* 50-2) presents *enargeia* as a vital prerequisite for credible sense impressions (*phantasiai*); this is 'the quality of clarity... that allows us to trust its reliability'.[1102] By inducing (mental) sight, Ovid can ensure trust in his authority.

Seeing in the mind can be surprisingly effective. Although Ovid fears that Macer's mental picture of him may have faded with time (*an tibi notitiam mora temporis eripit horum, / nec repetunt oculi signa vetusta tui* - *Pont.* 2.10.5-6), he is able revive it in *Ex Ponto* 2.10 by evoking places that they have mutually seen in the past in a shared poetic experience.[1103] In doing so, 'Ovid appeals to an inner vision that is always fresh, and which protects memory from the fading effects of time. This is the inner vision available to fellow poets.'[1104] If he were to remember Ovid in terms of their shared poetic journey, Macer could see him (*haec tibi cum subeant, absim licet, omnibus annis / ante tuos oculos, ut modo visus, ero* - *Pont.* 2.10.43-4), just as Ovid claims to behold Macer in his heart (*te tamen intueor quo solo pectore possum* - *Pont.* 2.10.47), creating a more vivid visualisation through association with memory. Shared viewing experience can translate through memory to still function even when the participants in that experience are in different locations (*quorum te memorem,*

[1100] Gaertner 2005, 280 ad 1.4.11. cf. *Aen.* 10.20 *versus Pont.* 1.3.19.
[1101] Hardie 2002b, 6
[1102] Vasaly 1993, 94 n. 11 (emphasis mine).
[1103] cf. Williams 1994, 42-48 on Ovid's travels being a poetic journey.
[1104] Hardie 2002b, 323

quamquam procul absumus, esse / suspicor - *Pont.* 2.10.19-20). Ovid uses repetition to emphasise the cooperative nature of this type of sight (*te duce* - *Pont.* 2.10.21, 2.10.22), as well as first person plural verbs, which could be interpreted as poetic plurals referring to Ovid, or as genuine plurals referring to him and his addressee:

> *te duce magnificas Asiae perspeximus urbes:*
> *Trinacris est oculis te duce visa*[1105] *meis.*
> *vidimus Aetnaea caelum splendescere flamma* (*Pont.* 2.10.21-3).

The shared nature of this sight is reiterated at *Ex Ponto* 2.10.31, where Ovid states that he has mentioned only a small part of the things they both saw (*quas vidimus ambo*). The consistency of a shared memory visualisation grants authority to one party's account of it.

Whilst it is relatively straightforward for Ovid to evoke *enargeia* for his addressee, Macer, on the basis of their memories of shared experiences, it is presumably more difficult to do so for a non-specific reader.[1106] The poet must make his readers visualise his exilic locale in order for his narrative to have authority and induce their sympathy.[1107] Ovid utilises on a broader level a technique similar to that which he used for Macer, invoking the shared memories of Roman culture. Since the topos of wintry Scythia would be as familiar to Ovid's readers as it was to Ovid himself, the foundations for the visualisation are already in place in their memories. Ovid needs only to trigger those recollections, which he does by pointedly alluding to the literary antecedents, as in *Tristia* 3.10, which echoes Virgil's representation of Scythia in

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[1105]Galasso 1995, 428 ad 2.10.22. Helzle (2003, 396 ad 21-2) opines that 'Die Wiederholung des Verbs durch *vidimus*... ist kein Gegengrund.'

[1106] Still more so for the reader 2000 years later, without the benefit of shared cultural conceptions. Cultures perceive things in different ways. cf. Squire 2016, 3; McCullagh 2002, 24.

[1107] Though not like witnessing it for themselves, visualisation can have a powerful effect. As Vasaly (1993, 94) notes, 'While noone could claim that a listener might mistake the mental image created by verbal description for the visual experience of an existing object or objects, the use of the concept of clarity or *enargeia* to describe both *visiones* hints at the belief that these two avenues to the memory and emotions had a similarly potent effect.'

Georgics 3.349-83. The reader has 'seen' this Scythia before, for '*ein literarisches Novum ist das durchaus nicht*',[1108] and it is thus with the ease of familiarity that he pictures it at Ovid's behest. There is, however, a certain weakness to utilising cultural memory, not of real sights (as Ovid does when he cites buildings in Rome), but of the visions resulting from literary works, namely the fact that the Scythian topos was well-known to be a traditional literary fiction. As Helzle notes:

> Before Ovid, Scythia had always been a product of an author's imagination. No poet or historiographer went there, but nevertheless they wrote about it.[1109] For Ovid, however, the poetic topos had become reality and distant Rome almost imaginary.[1110]

Whilst the image of Scythia is familiar to the reader, it is one which is known to be fictional and accounts of Scythian winter are hence expected, or even assumed, to be fictions. The genericism of the Virgilian description (and Ovid's) points to the fictionality of the image, and undermines the reality of Ovid's account.

Rather than remaining vaguely evocative, Ovid deliberately draws attention to sight in this section of the *Tristia* by repeatedly emphasising his autoptic viewing experience. In *Tristia* 3.10, Ovid stresses that he is seeing Scythia (*vidimus* - *Tr.* 3.10.37, 49; *aspiceres* - *Tr.* 3.10.75) and, if even sight proves an inadequate authority, experiencing it for himself (*nec vidisse sat est. durum calcavimus aequor* - *Tr.* 3.10.39). He insists that as a witness he should be believed (*ratam debet testis habere fidem* - *Tr.* 3.10.36).[1111] This emphasis on autopsy would increase the authority of the account, and create a highly detailed mental picture for his reader, so that his reader too feels that he 'seems to see' the landscape Ovid is describing, were it not for the

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[1108] Besslich 1972, 179. cf. Evans 1975.
[1109] Richter 1957, 304ff. ad 349ff. - 'In der Schilderung des scythischen Klimas lag eine ehrwürdige Literatur vor.' e.g. Herodotus 4.28.1; *Georgics* 3.349ff.; *Met.* 1.64 with Bömer 1989, 37 ad 1.64; *Met.* 8.788ff. cf. Martin 1966, 286ff.
[1110] Helzle 1989, 106
[1111] Williams 1994, 35 thinks these the most obvious indications that this is 'an ecphrastic artifice'.

fact that the emphasis seems specifically designed to upset the careful allusions to Scythia as a fictional landscape which Ovid has already set up.

To further complicate matters, Ovid's claims of autopsy are entirely spurious. Although Bömer states that Ovid is one of the few Romans to claim to have actually seen Scythia in real life,[1112] Ovid isn't actually in Scythia as he claims in *Tristia* 1.3.61 and 3.2.1, but in Tomis, Moesia. Williams rightly rejects the suggestion that this is 'typical of the licence with which Roman poets often distort geographical detail';[1113] it is the result of considered intent on the part of the poet. Ovid purports to be able to give a more authoritative description of Scythia, due to his exile. Indeed, Bellamy argues that 'his eyewitness reports pointedly rewrite Vergil's Scythian digression: if nothing else, Ovid's exile means that he, not Vergil, is the more reliable authority of Scythia.'[1114] In fact, however, Ovid is no more knowledgeable about Scythia than his literary predecessors, despite his efforts to be convincing. Why, then, does Ovid claim to be in Scythia? Martin suggests that Ovid 'a été frappé par la ressemblance et même par la similitude du paysage qu'il avait sous les yeux avec le paysage décrit par Virgile',[1115] and Lozovan comments that 'le manque d'«originalité» plaide ici en faveur de la véracité'.[1116] By substituting Scythia, a stock image of literary tradition, in place of Tomis, Ovid creates a more vivid image of the place in the mind of his reader. This image is not necessarily an accurate image of what he himself sees,[1117] but a vivid image of what he wishes to be seen. Ovid is a

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[1112] 'Nach der Relegation ist Ovid einer der wenigen Römer gewesen, die dies persönlich aus näherer Entfernung feststellen konnten' - Bömer 1989, 37 ad 1.64.
[1113] Williams 1994, 8. On such distortion, cf. Thomson 1951; Syme 1987.
[1114] Bellamy 2013, 153
[1115] Martin 1966, 295
[1116] Lozovan 1959, 358
[1117] Ovid sees Tomis through the filter of his Roman-ness, differentiating himself from the Tomitans. He may present Tomis in the negative light of Scythia due to his negative emotional response to exile. Matzner (2011, 320) argues that 'his clinging on to Rome... pre-empts any interaction with or engaged

poet, not a geographer (Williams points out that 'elegy was never the medium for the bland reporting of geographical surveys'[1118]), and thus conjures up for his reader a poetic vision which is equivalent to his own environs, but whose literary familiarity will allow it to come more easily to the eye of the Roman reader who has never been physically to either Scythia or Tomis. This is true throughout the exile poetry. Ovid pretends to be providing an autoptic travelogue, when he is actually primarily 'seeing' poetically not physically. The mental vision which projects him to Rome is the same which he is applying to Tomis.

Seeing Spectacles at Rome

Ovid's depiction of Scythia in *Tristia* 3.10 is a counterpoint to his account of the triumph in *Tristia* 4.2. Whereas the poet's description of an exilic land is something which (at least superficially) he can see and his reader must visualise, the triumph in Rome is something which his reader can see and Ovid must visualise (and which, like Scythia, is an illusion which is only actually seen in the imagination). This is the same kind of visualisation as that through which Ovid attempts to make his readers see Scythia, except that he is in control of his own imaginings. Ovid's mind can bring his eyes to Rome (*illa meos oculos mediam deducit in urbem, / inmunes tantis nec sinit esse boni; / invenietque animus, qua currus spectet eburnos* - *Tr.* 4.2.61-3) and his exilic vision is free to travel freely (*illa per inmensas spatiatur libera terras, / in caelum celeri pervenit illa fuga* - *Tr.* 4.2.59-60),[1119] possessing a scope as great as the

representation of the the place of exile; instead, his Tomis remains a literary construction, largely based on Greek and Latin literary tradition.'

[1118] Williams 1994, 7

[1119] In *Am.* 3.12.4 poetic license is measureless but untrammeled by truth. Pythagoras uses mental vision for exilic travel through time and space in *Met.* 15.62-4. cf. Hardie 2002b, 10.

universal vision of a god or Caesar, though it lacks the authority of physical sight (*vera tamen capiet populus spectacula felix* - *Tr.* 4.2.65).

Ovid emphasises the difference between what he can see in exile by visualising,[1120] and what his Roman readers can physically view. In *Ex Ponto* 1.8, he distinguishes mental and physical sight (*cunctaque mens oculis pervidet usa suis* - *Pont.* 1.8.34), providing an ironic list of what he 'sees' in his mind's eye (*nunc fora, nunc aedes, nunc marmore tecta theatra* - *Pont.* 1.8.35[1121]) in order to elicit a visualisation of it by his Roman readers, despite the fact that those readers are able to actually walk around Rome and look at it. In *Tristia* 4.2, Ovid lists in detail what the Roman crowd will see,[1122] emphasising their sight (*omnis populus poterit spectare triumphos* - *Tr.* 4.2.19; *videbit* - 4.2.22; *cernet* - 4.2.23), and using *en* (*Tr.* 4.2.43) to stress that his reader can behold directly, a superior sort of sight like Caesar's vantagepoint from on high like a god (*super in curru* - *Tr.* 4.2.47; *cernes* - *Tr.* 4.2.54).[1123] Ovid, in contrast, can only see the events of the triumph in his mind's eye (*haec ego summotus qua possum mente videbo* - *Tr.* 4.2.57), and provides 'a sober assessment of the contrast between the capacities of the Roman people and of himself, between things seen and things heard, true visions and distant reports that can be given visual immediacy only through poetic feigning'.[1124] He is limited to imagining and hearing rather than seeing, relying on comparatively dubious authorities (*at mihi fingendo tantum*

[1120] Ovid is an 'obsessive visualiser' (Ibid., 6), like Pythagoras in *Met.* 15.62-4. cf. Williams 1991a, 171; Nagle 1980, 91–98; Hardie 2002a, 39 - 'In his exile poetry Ovid has an urgent personal need for a visual illusionism that might conjure up images of distant Rome, but a heavy investment in the gaze also marks his earlier works, above all the *Metamorphoses* which strives to give the reader a vivid sense of viewing the bizarre events unfolding.'
[1121] The repeated *nunc* creates immediacy, signalling the moment the eye lights upon a new building.
[1122] This contrasts with *Pont.* 4.9.23ff., where Ovid describes what he would like to see if he were in Rome and points out the discrepancy between the immediacy of sight and the distance of mere mental imaginings (*Pont.* 4.9.37-8). Ovid refers to his mental vision in compensatory terms (*Pont.* 4.9.41-2).
[1123] The reference to Jupiter in *Tr.* 4.2.56 strengthens Augustus' identification with Jove's omnivision.
[1124] Hardie 2002b, 308-09

longeque remotis / auribus - *Tr.* 4.2.67-8), since he is so far away that only *fama parva* (*Tr.* 4.2.18) can reach him. To heighten the authority of his account of the triumph, Ovid focalises it through a Roman eyewitness, explaining what he sees. The account is extremely vivid; so vivid, in fact, that it is easy to miss the fact that Ovid subverts the witness's authority by pointing out that he may be as ill-informed as the poet about what is seen (*pars referet, quamvis noverit illa parum* - *Tr.* 4.2.26). Ovid undermines the authority of this Roman spectator's physical sight, presenting the triumph as an parade of illusions to fool the onlooker (images, staged tableaux, paintings, in some cases outright fakery).[1125] Ovid's authoritative eyewitness may lack insight,[1126] and may simply be reading (and taking at face value) the labels on the displayed captives (*cumque ducum titulis oppida capta leget* - *Tr.* 4.2.20). Moreover, his lack of identification reveals him to be no specific person but an imagined *typus*.[1127]

Triumphs were always a confusing spectacle,[1128] and accounts of them, whilst purporting to be accurate, are often the opposite. Triumphs seem to function for their directing generals rather like exile poetry for Ovid. Polybius suggests that triumphs are a way for generals to bring a vivid impression of their achievements before the eyes of the Roman people:

> τοὺς γὰρ προσαγορευομένους παρ᾽ αὐτοῖς θριάμβους, δι᾽ ὧν ὑπὸτὴν ὄψιν ἄγεται τοῖς πολίταις ὑπὸ τῶν στρατηγῶν ἡ τῶν κατειργασμένων πραγμάτων ἐνάργεια... (Polyb. 6.15.8)

[1125] Hardie 2002, 309. cf. *Pont.* 2.1.37-9 which also hints at triumphal illusion. cf. Suetonius *Cal.* 47 on dressing up Gauls as captive Germans, satirised in Persius 6.46-7.
[1126] cf. *AA* 1.222 and 1.227-8 where the lover is directed to give answers to his beloved even if doesn't know the truth. He must construct a spurious, but plausible account, just as ancient authors do, but the reader can see through the fiction. The reality of triumphs is little more real. Ovid draws attention to the 'sheer under-determinacy of the images... that pass by in a triumph' (Beard 2007, 184).
[1127] Hardie 2002b, 308 - 'The magnificent procession is presented to the reader through the eyes and words of an imaginary bystander.'
[1128] Beard 2007, 143ff.

Ancient accounts of triumphs are lavish. Josephus gives an elaborate triumph description in *Bellum Judaicum* 7.132-52, despite claiming that it is impossible to do so (Ἀμήχανον δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν εἰπεῖν τῶν θεαμάτων ἐκεινων τὸ πλῆθος). However, Beard points out that one should ask, 'How far can we take at face value those lavish accounts of the triumphal parade?... And how far can we trust those sometimes very precise tallies given by ancient writers?' [1129] Ovid is drawing attention to the unreality of triumph descriptions. His own account, though formed through mental vision and imagination, may be no more inaccurate than other accounts, which 'may also derive in part from eyewitness account and popular memory (however reliably or unreliably transmitted), as well as being the product of misinformation, wild exaggeration, over-optimistic reinvention, and willful misunderstanding'.[1130] Particularly dangerous is the account 'dressed up with spurious precision',[1131] a technique that Ovid uses to make his account convincing. Ovid extends the joke, however. His account predictively describes a procession that never took place.[1132] Thus the 'real' procession is just as fictional as Ovid's account of it, if not more so, for Ovid's triumph at least has a fleeting existence in the imagination of the poet and his readers. Just as Ovid the eyewitness reporter from Scythia proved to be describing a literary landscape, so his triumph is illusory.

Ovid's account of his wintry exile is equivalent to the triumph; it has the correct labels ('I see'; 'frozen wine'), and because it is so vivid and so effective a combination, it is convincing. Ovid is rather like the men in *Tristia* 4.2.26 or *Ars Amatoria* 1.222-8, who speak plausibly even when not actually telling the truth. The

[1129] Beard 2007, 163. cf. Ibid., 171 for detailed analysis of discrepancies between accounts of the same triumph. Overlaps do not guarantee validity, for they 'may indicate a standard authoritative tradition or... copying of the same piece of misinformation' (Ibid., 173).
[1130] Beard 2007, 172
[1131] Ibid., 173
[1132] Ibid., 181

authority of sight in Ovid's poetry is as deceptive as Adelson's lightness illusions.[1133] The reader is lulled into accepting the apparent authority of sight, even when that authority has no actual basis.

Ovid distinguishes between his own poetic experience and that of other *vates*, stating that other poets merely record faithfully what they have seen (*spectatum vates alii scripsere triumphum: / est aliquid memori visa notare manu* - *Pont.* 3.4.17-18). Again the triumph, a highly visual spectacle, provides the vehicle for Ovid's dichotomy of sight. Ovid acclaims the act of seeing something and writing about it as the norm of poetic composition (though poets often write about things beyond their normal existence and perception). The norm which Ovid has constructed contrasts with Ovid's poetic process; Ovid can only write about what he has heard from rumour and *fama* must act as his eyes (*atque oculi fama fuere mei* - *Pont.* 3.4.20). Ovid claims that the same passion and vigour comes from what has been heard and what has been seen (*scilicet adfectus similes, aut impetus idem / rebus ab auditis conspicuisque venit* - *Pont.* 3.4.21-2), but immediately gives the lie to this with his statement that seeing places, people, and battles would have fed his verse (*sed loca, sed gentes formatae mille figuris / nutrissent carmen proeliaque ipsa meum, / et regum vultus, certissima pignora mentis, / iuvissent aliqua forsitan illud opus* - *Pont.* 3.4.25-8). *Fama* is inferior to physical sight; indeed, it is one of the *dubii auctores* that Ovid mentions in *Ex Ponto* 3.4.37. Due to *fama*'s shortcomings as a source, Ovid tells his reader, he does not know the names of the leaders or of the places (*Pont.* 3.4.39-40), and he has no *materia*. This recalls the triumph described in the *Tristia*; the viewer who is present in person can simply read the labels which explain who is passing (or invent answers), whereas the one who is absent has no such authority.

[1133] Adelson 2000

Substitute Viewers

Fama's role as a substitute viewer for Ovid is reiterated in *Ex Ponto* 4.4. Here Ovid, describes an epiphany (an inherently visual meeting) with no visual element; he can hear but not see Fama (*respicio, nec erat corpus, quod cernere possem, / verba tamen sunt haec aure recepta mea* - *Pont.* 4.4.13-4).[1134] This is perhaps unsurprising, given that *fama* is made up of voices.[1135] Fama's first word to Ovid (*en* - *Pont.* 4.4.15) is indicative of the co-mingled relationship of sight and speech in poetry. Fama's prophecy is so authoritative that Ovid seems to witness it (*cernere iam videor* - *Pont.* 4.4.27) down to the smallest detail, which gives vividity for both poet and reader.[1136] Whereas in the *Metamorphoses*, Fama could speak falsely, here her words are unquestioned. Helzle's emendation of *niveos* in *Ex Ponto* 4.4.31 to *video* increases the impact of sight at this point; it moves Ovid from a vision of the future (23-6) through a distanced present (27) to true visual immediacy, as the poet 'does not only seem to see but he really sees'.[1137] Ovid is reversing the norms of sight authority to grant visual immediacy to mere words. Helzle suggests that 'the imaginary and the real are turned upside down' in the exiled Ovid's experience, for 'he presents the apparition of Fama (7-22) - which is a complete figment of his imagination - as real, but imagines

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[1134] This ambiguity is also characteristic of the *Metamorphoses*' House of Fama, for as Kelly (2014, 69) notes, 'There is an underlying ambiguity as to whether the rumours materialise into people upon entrance into the house, that is whether they become momentarily visual or remain purely vocal in essense'. cf. Brown 1999, 24 - 'The verb *vagantur*... may mean no more than "to be diffused", a reading consistent with the incorporeal, purely verbal character of rumours, but it could also be translated "to roam, to wander", thus allowing for the possibility that the rumours have an actual physical reality, that they are being semi-personified by Ovid.'

[1135] Fama is a 'personification of verbal action' (Kelly 2014, 88), despite appearing in an ecphrasis in *Met.* 12. cf. Hardie (2002b, 313), who says that Fama's lack of visual appearance is logical since she is 'a personification of words, not images'.

[1136] 'Il primo giorno di consolato è proposto con una ricchezza di dettagli riferiti anche ad aspetti di minore importanza, come l'immagine della folla che si accalca, che conferiscono alla rappresentazione una notevole concretezza' - Galasso 2008, 304.

[1137] Helzle 1989, 107 ad 4.4. *Video* is the reading in D, *niveos* in BCς.

Sextus Pompeius' first day in office... which will be a real event'.[1138] Later in the poem, however, Ovid begins to dismantle the authority of the vision which Fama's prophecy conjured up before his eyes. He notes that he will not actually see the events Fama prophesied taking place (*me miserum, turba quod non ego cernar in illa, / nec poterunt istis lumina nostra frui!* - *Pont.* 4.4.43-44). Mental vision is now viewed as a limitation rather than an authority; Ovid can only see Sextus Pompeius in his mind's eye (*quod licet, absentem qua possum mente videbo: / aspiciet vultus consulis illa sui* - *Pont.* 4.4.45-46). The visions which Fama conjures up have authority temporarily, but this is swiftly dispersed. Their power lasts only while they are invoked. Fama functions like a poet, who can use the authority of sight to command his readers to see and believe what he is describing; when his readers cease to read, however, they escape their *enargeia*-charged visions.

Ovid frequently describes mental sight as if it is physical sight, using the language of sight to authorise imagination. Ovid writes that Atticus' image stands constantly before his eyes (*ante oculos nostros posita est tua semper imago* - *Pont.* 2.4.7), and that he seems to see his face in his mind (*videor vultus mente videre tuos* - *Pont.* 2.4.8).[1139] The topos of the eyes of the mind and mental vision recurs frequently in many different contexts,[1140] whether philosophical, amatory, oneiric, or rhetorical, and is particularly widespread in Cicero and Ovid.[1141] The phrase *ante oculos* appears around thirty-six times in Ovid's poetry.[1142] In *Tristia* 3.4.55-9, Ovid uses the phrase

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[1138] Ibid., 106 ad 4.4
[1139] cf. Cicero *Fam.* 14.2.3.
[1140] Galasso 1995, 233-34 ad 7-8, esp. 234 - 'La diffusione dell'immagine è davvero notevole, come ci è provato da testi populari.' cf. *Od.* 1.115, 20.80-1.
[1141] Cicero *Ep.* 5.13.5, 14.2.3, 3.2, 15.14.3, 16.1. Galasso (Ibid., 234 ad 7-8) states that the theme 'è ripreso e variato senza fine da Ovidio'. cf. *Her.* 10.135; compare *Tr.* 3.4.55ff. with *Pont.* 1.8.34, 9.7, 2.10.43, 3.5.47, 4.9.41.
[1142] *Met.* 11.562-5 juxtaposes mental and physical vision; Ceyx remembers his wife (i.e. brings her before his mental gaze), but *ante oculos* refers to physical sight - Ceyx wishes his body to be before

twice, emphasising that he is able to see his home and wife despite his geographical separation from them by seeing them with his mind (*sic tamen haec adsunt, ut quae contingere non est / corpore, sunt animo cuncta videnda meo* - *Tr.* 3.4.55-6).[1143] The things seen by Ovid wander before his eyes (*ante oculos errant domus, urbsque et forma locorum* - *Tr.* 3.4.57) in much the same way as the rumours flit about the House of Fama (*mixtaque cum veris passim commenta vagantur* - *Met.* 12.54).

Mental vision is imbued at least temporarily with authority. In *Ex Ponto* 1.2.43ff. Ovid says that he is beguiled by dreams in which he sees Rome (*aspicio patriae tecta relicta meae* - *Pont.* 1.2.48) and even converses with his friends and wife, whilst in *Tristia* 3.3.13-20 he writes of things stealing into his mind (*omnia cum subeant*). Things seen in the mind can be extremely persuasive. Ovid is sometimes so far removed from the physical bonds of seeing with the eyes that he strays into the realms of hallucination and the madness of mental vision.[1144] The organs of perception are not limited to the eyes, but can also be the *mens* or *pectus*,[1145] whilst seeing is akin not only to remembering but also to imagining or inventing. Wishful thinking can also lead to sight being traduced, as at *Ex Ponto.* 2.8.71-4, where Ovid seems to see the emperor's portrait softening in expression (*aut ego me fallo.....nam minus et minus est facies in imagine tristis, / visaque sunt dictis adnuere ora meis*). Emotions can effect mental sight, which, whilst authoritative to the viewer affected by them, may be less convincing to the unincluded reader.

Alcyone. The Morphean *imago* of Ceyx comes before Alcyone's eyes in her dreams before his physical body does in real life. cf. Tissol 1997, 75, on the familiarity of Ovid and his audiences with the use of the *ante oculos* formula in dreams (*Aen.* 3.150) and visions (*Aen.* 2.270).

[1143] Reiterated in *Tr.* 3.4.73-4.

[1144] Nagle (1980, 93) posits a 'continuum of increasing vividness from the abstract verb *subire* through the notion of mental vision to hallucination and even mental travel and transportation', adding, 'These elements are not segregated, but appear in combination, so that any passage in which the motif occurs may incorporate elements of differing vividness.'

[1145] *pectore* - *Pont.* 2.10.47; *mente* - *Tr.* 4.2.57. The mind sees clearly with *oculis suis* - *Pont.* 1.8.34.

Alternative Eyewitnesses

Having undermined the authority of autopsy and mental vision (and *enargeia*) in his account of winter conditions in Scythia, Ovid turns to alternative sight authorities. In two of the three *epistulae* which include detailed descriptions of winter conditions in Tomis (*Pont.* 4.7, 4.9; cf. 4.10), Ovid calls upon eyewitnesses to corroborate his account, bolstering the authority of his sight with theirs. The opening lines of *Ex Ponto* 4.7 indicate that this is the role that Ovid wishes Vestalis to play (*aspicis en praesens, quali iaceamus in arvo, / nec me testis eris falsa solere queri* - *Pont.* 4.7.3-4). Ovid cites specific things which Vestalis can see and authenticate: the icy Pontus, frozen wine, and so forth. The verb of seeing is emphasised by its triplicate repetition prominently at the start of each line,[1146] and the authority of personal sight is also reinforced by *ipse*:[1147]

> *ipse vides certe glacie concrescere Pontum,*
> *ipse vides rigido stantia vina gelu;*
> *ipse vides, onerata ferox ut ducat Iazyx*
> *per medias Histri plaustra bubulcus aquas.*
> *Aspicis et mitti sub adunco toxica ferro,*
> *et telum causas mortis habere duas.* (*Pont.* 4.7.7-12)

The things which Vestalis sees might appear to be random wintry exempla, but in fact are carefully curated. They validate Ovid's earlier work, since several of the sights listed in *Ex Ponto* 4.7 correspond with what Ovid mentioned seeing in *Tristia* 3.10, namely the frozen sea being used as a bridge, frozen wine, and poisoned arrows.[1148] The other *epistulae* in which winter conditions are viewed refer to similar images. Thus in *Ex Ponto* 4.9 Ovid instructs Graecinus to question the previous commander of

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[1146] Repetition was thought to produce vividness, cf. Demetrius *Eloc.* 211 (πολλάκις καὶ ἡ διλογία ἐνάργειαν ποιεῖ μᾶλλον).
[1147] Helzle (1989, 106 ad 4.7.7 notes that *ipse vides* seems to be related to *vidi ego*. Both phrases reinforce autoptic authority.
[1148] *Pont.* 4.7.7 and *Tr.* 3.10.37; *Pont.* 4.7.8 and *Tr.* 3.10.23-4; *Pont.* 4.7.9-10 and *Tr.* 3.10.33-4 (and *Tr.* 3.12.29-30); *Pont.* 4.7.11-12 and *Tr.* 3.10.63-4. cf. Williams 1994, 35 n. 66; Gahan 1978.

the region, Flaccus, who, by implication, will have witnessed the same conditions that Ovid claims to suffer (*Pont*. 4.9.83-6) and can thus offer 'la propria testimonianza'.[1149] However, the aspects of the Scythian winter to which Ovid draws particular attention are the same features which are found in earlier descriptions. Accounts of the Scythians driving wagons over the frozen sea can be found in Herodotus 4.28.1 and *Georgics* 3.360-2, while frozen wine is mentioned in *Georgics* 3.364 (*indutae caeduntque securibus umida vina*).[1150] Just as the autoptic authority of Ovid's account of Scythian winter was undercut by its apparent reliance on vivid literary descriptions, so the account of this supposed eyewitness embraces the literary motifs of Ovid's non-Scythia-visiting literary predecessors.

Purporting to have encountered readerly disbelief (*vix vos ea credere dicunt - Pont.* 4.10.35), Ovid cites another witness so as to insist upon his authority (*crede tamen - Pont.* 4.10.37). Ovid claims to be speaking precisely and in such detail merely to pass the time (*si roget haec aliquis cur sint narrata Pedoni, / quidve loqui certis iuverit ista modis - Pont.* 4.10.65-6), but this is disingenuous. By doing so, he creates a vivid image in the mind of his addressee both of what occurs and of the scientific explanations for it, which he hopes will procure his addressee's previously withheld belief. Ovid's descriptions in the *Epistulae ex Ponto* lack the extremes (such as dolphins unable to leap) recounted in *Tristia* 3.10, since eliminating these less

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[1149] Galasso 2008, 315. In *Pont.* 4.9.123 Ovid denies bringing things before his addressees' eyes, but is doing just that.

[1150] Some ancient writers deny that wine freezes, including Servius ad *Georgics* 3.364 and Quintilian 8.6.40. Mynors (1990, 234 ad 249-83) notes Meuli's belief (Meuli 1975) that the *Georgics* section is 'so accurate and lively that it ought to come from a single well-informed source'. Martyn (1827, 307 ad 3.364) strives to establish the phenomenon's validity, describing how while wintering in Greenland in 1619 and 1620 Captain Monck found that 'no wine or brandy was strong enough to be proof against the cold, but froze to the bottom, and that the vessels split in pieces, so that they cut the frozen liquor with hatchets'.

plausible elements may increase the overall credibility of the account.[1151] The consistency with which other aspects of Tomitian winter are viewed and described by Ovid and others gives them greater authority than one-off sightings which might be attributable to poetic invention.[1152]

Tristia 3.10's theme of experiencing as well as seeing resurfaces in *Ex Ponto* 4.7 in Ovid's calculating expression of regret that Vestalis has not merely seen but experienced the region (*atque utinam pars haec tantum spectata fuisset, / non etiam proprio cognita Marte tibi!* - *Pont.* 4.7.13-14). Vestalis' experience is beneficial to Ovid, for it increases the authority of Ovid's account. The second half of the poem provides a contrast to this representation of authoritative sight, for Ovid relates Vestalis' conquest of Aegisos, despite not having witnessed it. Ovid describes the scene vividly, in visual terms (*conspicuus longe fulgentibus armis* - *Pont.* 4.7.31), but admits that it is difficult for him to relate the details (*dicere difficile est quid Mars tuus egerit illic, / quotque neci dederis quosque quibusque modis* - *Pont.* 4.7.45-46); he is reduced to generalities (*inpositoque Getes sub pede multus erat* - *Pont.* 4.7.48).[1153] Ovid proclaims his song's ability to forever bear witness to Vestalis' deeds (*testataque tempus in omne / sunt tua, Vestalis. carmine facta meo* - *Pont.* 4.7.53-4), but the authority of the account suffers by comparison with the sight-based evidence presented in the first half of the poem. Ovid has not seen Vestalis' deeds for himself, and his account consequently lacks authority. Moreover, the description of Vestalis' military prowess is part of a 'reciprocal arrangement'[1154] which places the commander in a dilemma. Ovid has bound the authority of his account of Vestalis'

[1151] Gahan 1978, 202
[1152] Ibid. - 'About the extremes we can assume that Ovid was being fanciful.'
[1153] These may be over-embellished epic tropes, exaggerated beyond belief (cf. Williams 1994, 40-41).
[1154] Ibid., 36

deeds to his own description of Tomis, so denying the veracity of one would also abnegate the other. Vestalis must therefore uphold the authority of Ovid's Tomitian description, or surrender his own claims to greatness.

Since eyewitness accounts retain the greatest sight authority, it is inevitable that Ovid invites Augustus to examine the *Metamorphoses* (*inspice* - *Tr.* 2.63) for evidence of his praise, implying that sight and reading are more authoritative than hearing. Ovid comments several times upon Augustus' divine vision, likening him to Jove, but sometimes suggests that this vision falls short of perfect authority. Ovid points out that small things may elude both ruler and god:

> *utque deos caelumque simul sublime tuenti*
> *non vacat exiguis rebus adesse Iovi,*
> *de te pendentem sic dum circumspicis orbem,*
> *effugiunt curas inferiora tuas.* (*Tr*. 2.215-8)

Augustus, he suggests, does not have time to personally examine Ovid's poetic output:[1155]

> *non ea te moles Romani nominis urget,*
> *inque tuis umeris tam leve fertur onus,*
> *lusibus ut possis advertere numen ineptis,*
> *excutiasque oculis otia nostra tuis.* (*Tr*. 2.221-4)

The emphatic position of *tuis* in *Tristia* 2.224 draws attention to the fact that it is personal examination (autopsy) in which Augustus should engage so as to reach an authoritative conclusion about Ovid's poetry. Ovid excuses Augustus' remissness in not having personally read his book, but points out that if he were to do so he would find it innocent in comparison to immoralities he has seen on stage (*luminibusque tuis.../ scaenica vidisti lentus adulteria* - *Tr.* 2.513-4).[1156] The poet also draws

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[1155] Ingleheart (2010a, 214 ad 224) notes that 'the focus on the act of seeing is typical of *Tristia* 2'.
[1156] The emphasis on Augustus' sight contrasts with Ovid's accidental viewing (cf. *Tr.* 2.103-4), but also draws attention to the authority of autopsy.

attention to Augustus' divine but divided vision, looking half at Rome, and half at wars far away (*dimidioque tui praesens es et aspicis urbem, / dimidio procul es - Tr.* 2.175-6).[1157] Augustus' sight is thus problematised.

Ovid's concern with sight establishing authority translates into a use of visual language for reading, so that he refers to 'seeing' works of literature.[1158] Ingleheart connects this usage with *Tristia* 2.77-80 and *Tristia* 2.237-8. At *Tristia* 2.77, Ovid laments an enemy selectively reading his poetry to Augustus. Augustus' aural reception of the work would hence be incomplete, and the ruler might not be aware of the omissions of which viewing would have informed him. Of course, Ovid himself is equally guilty of selectivity. He gives Augustus specific instructions as to which sections of the Ovidian corpus he should read in order to see their innocuousness and assume that the rest is similarly harmless.[1159] Ovid also refers to his poetry being presented with dancing in *Tristia* 2.519-20, and enjoyed in this visual medium by Augustus. Presumably this too will have been a selective rendition.

Ovid thus comprehensively breaks down the authority of sight in the exile poetry. His exile poetry, the supposedly authoritative tell-all account of his sufferings is revealed to be at times merely a literary illusion (albeit perhaps one which gives a true impression of his experiences, which can be readily imagined by his readers). Yet, as Ovid points out, physical sight is not a certain authority either, when triumphs are performative and perplexing spectacles, designed to be seen in a particular way, and understanding is reliant upon the interpretation of the viewer and their selective gaze.

[1157] cf. Nugent 1993, 251-52 on this passage as a damaging critique of Augustus' judgement.
[1158] Ingleheart 2006, 77 n.3
[1159] *Tr.* 2.239-44, 557-64, 211-14, 275-6.

Eyewitnesses do not necessarily provide any assistance either. Their inclusion is filtered through the words of the poet, and can be manipulated.

The Authority of Sight

Sight had overwhelming precedence among the senses in ancient thought, and was regarded as the strongest authority for narratives, whether in the form of autopsy, eyewitnessing, or *enargeia*. However, Ovid's poetry shows that this authority does not always stand up to scrutiny.

In the *Metamorphoses*, autoptically-authorised accounts are focalised through internal narrators, along with claimed eyewitness accounts. The Ovidian narrator, although he invokes the assistance of the gods in completing his task, does not explicitly lay claim to divine omnivision in doing so. Such omnivision, whilst credible for a god, is less plausible for a mortal eyewitness such as Nestor in the heat of battle. Ovid demonstrates that sight can mislead, and that later physical evidence cannot actually establish the authority of an account, despite characters' eagerness to see it for themselves. Narrators in the *Metamorphoses* heighten their authority by using invocations of sight such as *ecce* and *en* to encourage their audiences either to see something currently in front of them, or to visualise something which resembles something they have seen before.

In the *Fasti*, the Ovidian narrator's own autopsy proves insufficient to inform him of all the events and aetiologies that he wishes to relate. The antiquarian also seeks out, therefore, the historian's other traditional source, eyewitnesses to interview. Since many of these eyewitnesses are gods, their omnivision comes to the Ovidian narrator's aid and bolsters his authority. However, it is evident that an account filtered through the viewpoint of even a divine eyewitness may be tinted by their interests and biases. Ovid also emphasises the difficulty of verifying an account for which there may be only a single witness. This is particularly true in the case of dreams; in order

to heighten the authority of such sole-witness accounts, Ovid visualises them for the reader, so that the reader seems to see the dream for himself, and hence becomes complicit in verifying the narrative's authority.

In the exile poetry, Ovid is the sole viewer of his surroundings. The difficulty is that Tomis (or the representation of Tomis that he wishes to create) is so remote from urban Roman experience that Ovid's autoptic account loses much of its authority, becoming 'unreal'. Ovid seeks to counter this loss by using the literary imagery of Scythia to aid the reader in vividly visualising and 'experiencing' his exile. Ovid is unable to be present in Rome, so *enargeia* and mental vision become a vital substitute for physical sight in creating persuasive and authoritative poetry. Ovid reveals that even sights which are personally witnessed, such as triumphs in Rome, are often only a series of impressions, which may or may not be accurate, despite the convincing semblance of authority which they and their viewers claim. In exile, however, Ovid is forced to call upon other witnesses to corroborate his narrative. Yet even this authority is problematised; witnesses can always be written into a corner when the poet has the power to promulgate their future commemoration. Sight thus remains a strong, yet unreliable authority.

Conclusion

The discourse of authority is central to Ovid's poetry. Ovid constructs, deconstructs and reconstructs authority in his narratives, inviting his readers to question what a narrator is founding his authority upon. By Ovid's day many of the bases of authority have become truisms, authorities accepted in their own right. The authority of age is proverbial, and the weight of tradition sits heavily on the shoulders of the Augustan poets, while sight is regarded as the most trustworthy of the senses. Ovid, as ever, is disinclined to accepted such authority at face value. Instead, he engages his readers in a sustained exercise of authority exploration throughout his poetry, emerging with few authority bases intact or unquestioned. The result is a new sense of authority as not inert and monumental, but constantly changing, creating a Protean, and ultimately wholly Ovidian, authority.

In Augustan culture, age holds a curiously Janus-esque status. On the one hand it embodies the authority of the past, of tradition, and of the Senate. On the other it represents weakness, negativity, and irrelevance. Age authority in the *Metamorphoses* is linked to *vetustas* in the sense of age and tradition. Long life grants its possessors many memories of things they have witnessed, and this is the basis of their authority. An innate characteristic of age is that of continuity, providing a direct link between the present and the past, and thus authorising the knowledge of the past which is provided. However, that authority is undermined by the inherent vulnerability of *vetustas*. Time has a destructive effect upon memory, and can lead to an unreliable narrator being an audience's sole access to the past from the present. This is exemplified in *vetustas* itself, which is used both in the sense of venerable tradition

and preserved memory, and in the sense of destructive time (*edax... vetustas* - *Met.* 15.871-2), which damages memory. A figure as old as Nestor has seen many things, which he can authoritatively relate. However, he has also had time to forget things, and his status as the sole-survivor from a past era gives him the power to (re)write tradition as he transmits memories.

Given these problems with the authority of age, Ovid considers an alternative, namely Pythagoras' theory of metempsychosis, which is not limited by the span of a single lifetime. Transmigration of the soul between bodies offers a lengthy memory of the past to the present narrator, imbuing his narrative with the authority of eyewitnesses. However, Pythagoras is a problematic example of this technique; inaccuracies and inconsistencies between his account and those recorded in tradition come to light, and the conclusion the reader ultimately reaches is that metempsychosis is no more reliable than time and tradition as a means of transmitting information. Ovid thus illustrates that all narratives are subject to bias, invention and omission, and invites his reader to reevaluate the prevailing acceptance of age as a strong basis for authoritative narrative. Whilst earlier in the poem, audiences who reject the authority of age are punished severely, this is not the case in *Met.* 12-15. Despite dissent from Tlepolemus and disbelief from Pythagoras' audiences, there is no overt penalty for not accepting their age-based authority. Indeed, their narratives suggest that one should not, at least not without reflection and without keeping one eye on the poet.

Ovid's *Fasti* is deeply concerned with the past, as can be deduced from its subject matter, *sacra* unearthed from *annalibus priscis* (*Fa.* 1.7). Age is an important authority basis in the poem, since it produces eyewitnesses who can give authoritative accounts of past events. In the *Fasti*, Ovid continues the exploration of different ways of combating the deauthorisation of age that he undertook in the *Metamorphoses*.

Tiber epitomises how time can erode the memory and the physical record of the past, and emphasises that antiquity is not necessarily a guarantee of authority or accuracy; in addition, narratives can be affected by narrators choosing to please their listeners or themselves by omitting information. Janus is a god who explicitly characterises himself as old (*sum res prisca* - *Fa.* 1.103) and is thus able to speak authoritatively about Chaos, but who is simultaneously a relatively new addition to the calendar, undermining his aged authority. The *Fasti* displays the poet's awareness of the way that Augustus utilised the past to authorise present changes, presenting them as a return to the ways of the past (the authoritative 'original' way). Ovid indicates that such practices may constitute pseudo-archaisation, spuriously claiming the authority of the past to authorise present actions. The potential for erasure of the past is an inherent weakness in the authority of age; Ovid draws attention to the silencing of the veteran, which highlights how the past can be rewritten by a new political regime, and thus can not be considered a trustworthy authority. Moreover, Ovid creates tension between the authority of age and the authority of poets to innovate, adding his own twist to an issue which had already occupied Callimachus.

In the exile poetry, Ovid targets his own age authority. He self-presents as old, but not in an authoritative sense. Instead, he uses the elegiac conception of age as weakness and deauthorisation. Age is part of the package of pathos whereby the Ovidian narrator seeks reprieve and return to Rome. Age is presented as preventing him from writing good poetry, and symbolises the way in which Augustus has supposedly taken away Ovid's authority. However, closer examination reveals that this diminishment is only skindeep. Presumably Ovid thinks that his poetry will be effective; he expects it to have the desired effect on his audience - to function as authoritative poetry, and to

attract a response.[1160] Age is also connected to swan imagery, particularly when swans are representative of old poets. This suggests that age has not detracted from Ovid's poetic authority, and may even strengthen it, for its quality remains, and exile, as earlier writers had already suggested,[1161] can be good for authors, since it enhances their objectivity. Ovid thus acquires authority from age in the exile poetry whilst simultaneously pretending to lose it. Being an old man in Tomis equates Ovid to the apparently reliable old men seen in the *Metamorphoses*, who are often self-interested and self-promoting narrators and whose authority is consequently highly questionable. It also links him to the immortality beliefs attributed to the Getans, allowing him to exercise his poetic authority to resist Augustus' claims to immortality and to promote his own.

In Ovidian poetry, Alexandrian footnotes reflexively annotate allusive activity, calling into question the authority of past tradition through the tension which arises between their demands to authorise authenticated material and the potentially inadequate or inspecific sources to which they are pointing. In the *Metamorphoses*, aside from the ubiquitous *ferunt*, the most common footnotes are *fama est* and those related to memory. The use of *fama* is strongly influenced by Ovid's celebrated ecphrasis of the House of Fama, which encapsulates many of the problems with the authority of *fama* which are played out elsewhere in the poem. *Fama* can be authoritative tradition or unauthoritative hearsay, and memory can be as insubstantial as *fama.* Moreover, *fama* involves the addition of material to accounts or their metamorphosis. As stories are expanded and transformed in *fama*, and the inherent sense of addition in an *auctor*'s role is laid bare, inaccuracies can undermine the authority which *fama* footnotes

[1160] It never elicits the hoped-for reprieve, so in that sense perhaps it fails.
[1161] cf. Thucydides 5.26; Plutarch *Mor.* 605c-d.

claim. The sources to which footnotes refer can be authoritative, contradictory, or even non-existent. Their authority is thus always open to debate.

As a self-identified scholarly work, the *Fasti* displays concern for its sources (*annalibus* - *Fa.* 1.7), whose presence contributes to the poet's learned persona. These sources are, however, for the most part not named histories, but anonymously footnoted. Ovid's *Fasti* sits in tension with the newly modified Augustan calendar, reminding the reader that the Roman calendar had never been an authoritative monotext. Footnotes often refer to problematic sources, which challenge the reader as to whether to trust them (*non dubiis auctoribus* - *Fa.* 5.601). When sources are themselves footnoted, their authority is further undermined because the reader's distance from an authoritative source text is increased. Ovid thus frequently points the reader to sources but withholds the reassurance of their authority. Footnoting can, however, be a bi-directional process. On occasion, Ovid uses footnotes to authorise past texts at the same time as those sources authorise his own narrative. Sourceless citations, moreover, can serve as markers of the new poet's right to innovate (the *auctor* can add), and to make himself part of tradition, shortcutting the process of canonisation, and effectively self-authorising. To simply report would be to abnegate the poet's personal creative authority. Ovid also contrasts the authority of aged eyewitnesses with that of footnotes; both have variable authority.

The exile poetry displays a marked lack of footnotes. It has been suggested that this is due to the lack of an appreciatively *doctus* audience, or to a dearth of available source material to cite, but it seems more likely that Ovid is being disingenuous. Ovid exhibits in the exile poetry a close engagement with tradition, and incorporates some myths in detail, which rules out a genuine inability to make references. It appears that Ovid's real concern is not with anchoring his present poetry in the past, but with using

it to rehabilitate his past poetry in the present and to control its reception in future tradition. How can others cite his poetry and ensure its continued existence in the future if it is censored, blacklisted, or burned?

In the *Metamorphoses*, Ovid depicts a number of vatic figures who represent the poet, who is himself a *vates*. Vatic authority can be prodigious, for *vates* possess divinely-inspired omniscience of the past and future, and control the access of ordinary mortals to their knowledge. However, the authority of seers is not always accepted by the internal audiences of the *Metamorphoses*. Even Orpheus, the quintessentially authoritative *vates*, is unable to provoke a desirable response from human audiences (and the value of his authority over trees and rocks is questionable). Repeated parentheses highlight the credibility (or lack of it) of *vates*, keeping the question of vatic authority in view throughout the poem, right up to its final line (*si quid habent veri vatum praesagia* - *Met.* 15.879). Ovid demonstrates how narrators incorporate *vates* in their narratives in order to heighten their authority, such as Nestor's insertion of Mopsus in his account of the Centauromachy or Pythagoras' depiction of Helenus, but the authority of these *vates* is flawed. His inclusion of *vates* whose authority is questionable affects his own status, for it invites the reader to adopt a sceptical attitude towards vatic authority, even Ovid's own. However, as Ovid shows in the case of the Sibyl, even while abnegating vatic authority, *vates* can continue to exercise authority over their own narratives, for their voices are immortal.

In the *Fasti*, Ovid assumes the persona of *vates* as well as antiquarian researcher, for as Lovatt notes, 'Prophecy allows the poet to articulate a relationship with the present, the future and all that comes in between.'[1162] As a *vates* he is able to directly

[1162] Lovatt 2013, 122

communicate with the gods on points of detail, gaining divine authority for his narrative. This is, however, problematised by the fact that in *Fasti* 6 the gods offer contradictory accounts, leaving the *vates* uncertain which is authoritative. Ovid thus illustrates the limitations of vatic authority (at least in the case of interview-derived information, rather than directly inspired knowledge). Information from the gods can be flawed, for their eyewitness status accompanies personal involvement and possible bias. Romulus, for example, is a patently biased historian and thus an unauthoritative prophet, while Carmentis appears to be a reliable prophet, but is also potentially self-interested.

In his exile poetry, Ovid self-identifies as a *vates* in parallel with his role as the *poeta relegatus*.[1163] He draws on the language of prophecy to exercise his vatic vision, fulfilling the prophecies of the *Metamorphoses*, and seeks to establish vatic authority as an alternative to Augustus' political authority. As a *vates*, he can exert his own form of authority to grant himself a quasi-religious poetic status. However, as he himself acknowledges, there are occasions where his vatic judgment is flawed, which calls into question his vatic authority. Ovid disclaims his earlier poetry as vatic fictions, but claims the truth of his present prophecies. He is concerned with the future of his poetry and the immortal fame that vatic authority allows him to claim, whilst also controlling the past.

Universal vision and knowledge are the basis of the authority of the Muses and the gods, who see everything, know everything and therefore can tell everything, and can inform the inspired poet of everything. They might, however, choose not to do so, which undermines their authority, since a narrative may not be complete. The

[1163] Despite dubbing himself *exul* in *Tristia* 1.1.3, Ovid generally maintains the Roman distinction of *exilium* and *relegatio*. cf. McGowan 2009, 51.

Metamorphoses illustrates how seeing for oneself (autopsy) may appear to be an authoritative basis for a narrative. It invites the reader to see (*ecce!*) or visualise, which has the potential to broaden the exclusivity of dream vision, and to claim the authority of the sense which Romans considered the most trustworthy. Sight can not only persuade, however, but also mislead, which problematises its authority. Even the all-seeing gods may be mistaken, and the authority of sight is thus correspondingly lessened. Seeing should not always be believing.

In the *Fasti*, Ovid's antiquarian persona demands that he utilises divine eyewitnesses and his own autopsy to give authority to his narrative. Divine witnesses are particularly useful to Ovid since their supernatural lifespans allow them to see more. Janus, whose two faces symbolise the importance of sight, offers an eyewitness account of the creation of the world. This divine omnivision contrasts with the mortal eyes of the Ovidian narrator, who sees only in part until he is better informed by his interlocutors. Secondhand sight can, however, help to authenticate his account. When Ovid is in doubt, he resorts to making the reader an eyewitness, for shared sight is a stronger authority. Claims of autopsy are, however, like footnotes, not necessarily true, and sight does not always authorise the full story, particularly in the case of aetiologies.

In the exile poetry, Ovid has the advantage of autopsy for his exilic surroundings. However, his lived experience is so far from that of his Roman readers that his own autopsy proves an inadequate authority for his narrative. Ovid therefore calls upon alternative eyewitnesses to corroborate his account, although these are filtered through Ovidian narration, which creates further distance between the reader and the authority. Ovid highlights how *enargeia* (the proof of the success of an authoritative narrative) heightens the authority of an account by making its audience 'seem to see'

it. Effectively, *enargeia* is imagined autopsy. Ovid also utilises mental vision, visualising what is taking place in Rome in order to make his account of it more authoritative despite his absence. Triumphs are unauthoritative spectacles anyway, so Ovid's invention is no less real than the 'real thing'. Ovid also indicates how shared memory visualisation can authorise an account. Making readers visualise something they have not seen is far more difficult, leading Ovid to resort to invoking a literary memory of Scythia as a visualisable equivalent of seeing Tomis. The literary descriptions are more vivid to his audience than the accounts of autopsy, which says little for the authority of sight.

Ovid often undermines narrative authority, but his relationship with authority is more complicated than that. In his poetry, Ovid explores the key bases of narrative authority, engaging with age, literary memory, vatic status, and sight, and (de/re)constructing what authority means for poet and reader. For Ovid, authority is the product of a cyclical process of authorisation and deauthorisation which is negotiated between the poet and the reader. Very often in Ovidian poetry, the authority of internal narrators and of the Ovidian narrator (and the bases upon which it is founded) is undermined. This has ramifications for our reading of Ovid's poetry. Things should not be believed simply because their narrator's authority has a strong basis. On the contrary, the reader should refrain from being misled by narratorial authority; apparent authority is there to be interrogated. Myers argues that Ovid 'is ultimately more interested in drawing attention to the narrative strategies traditionally employed to create authentication and verisimilitude than in maintaining his own authority'.[1164] Perhaps a more positive interpretation is that Ovid consciously sets out to destabilise traditional narrative authority in order to establish a new and wholly

[1164] Myers 1994, 158

Ovidian kind of authority, arising from an active negotiation of what authorities can and cannot be trusted, and in whose creation the reader is an active participant.

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