Elasticised Ecclesiology

The Concept of Community after Ernst Troeltsch

Submitted in Fulfilment of the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Theology
Trinity 2015

Ulrich Schmiedel
St Benet's Hall
University of Oxford

For where two or three are gathered together in my name,
there am I in the midst of them.

(Matthew 18:20)

CONTENTS

Abstracts		iii
Acknowledgements		x
Abbreviations		xii
Introduction: Church(es) in Crisis		1
Part I: Religiosity		15
1	**The Traces of Trust**	17
	Trusting the Other	18
	Experiencing Trust	25
	Expressing Trust	34
2	**The Drive for Difference**	43
	The Difference within Religion	46
	The Drive within Religion	57
	Trust: Dealing with the Drive for Difference	65
3	**The Togetherness of Trust**	75
	Transcendence and Transformation	77
	Transformation and Trust	91
	Trust and Togetherness	101
Part II: Community		115
4	**The Construction of Community**	120
	The Centre of Christian Community	124
	The Closure of Christian Community	130
	The (Re)Construction of Christian Community	145

5 The Attack on Alterity 150
The Chimera of Community 153
The Anthropoemic and the Anthropophagic 158
The Community of Concern 164

6 The Promise of Plurality 171
The Diagnosis of Secularisation 174
The Diagnosis of De-Secularisation 181
The Cost of Community 193

Part III: Identity 205

7 The Trouble with Trust 208
The Technique of Trust 210
The Trouble of Trust 214
The Truth of Trust 221

8 The Power of Practice 229
Solid Identity 231
Liquid Identity 239
The Politics of Power 248

9 The Elasticisation of Ecclesiology 269
Doing Identity 270
Undoing Identity 283
Re-Doing Identity 292

Conclusion: Crisis in Church(es) 309

Bibliography 326

Abstract I

ELASTICISED ECCLESIOLOGY
The Concept of Community after Ernst Troeltsch

Submitted in Fulfilment of the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Theology
Ulrich Schmiedel, St Benet's Hall, University of Oxford
Trinity 2015

Churches are always already in crisis. In this study, I take the current crisis of churches as a point of departure in order to offer a critical and constructive account of church as open(ed) community. In conversation with Ernst Troeltsch (1865-1923) – a conversation which concentrates on a hermeneutical-constructive rather than a historical-critical retrieval of his interdisciplinary thinking – I argue that the communities which constitute church need to be elasticised in order to engage the 'finite other' (the creature) and the 'infinite other' (the creator).

My study counters common characterisations of the current crisis of churches in which diversification is interpreted as the reason and de-diversification is interpreted as the response to crisis. In these characterisations, churches are closed off against the 'other'. In three parts which examine the controversial but connected concepts of 'religiosity', 'community', and 'identity', I suggest that the sociological closure against the finite other and the theological closure against the infinite other are connected. Taking trust as a central category, I argue that both the finite other and the infinite other are constitutive of church. Trust opens identity to alterity. Thus, I advocate a turn in the interpretation of the identity of Christianity – from identity as a 'propositional possession' to identity as a 'performative project'. The identity of Christianity is 'done' rather than 'described' in the practices of church. Church, then, is a 'work in movement', continually constituted through the encounter with the finite and the infinite other in Jesus Christ.

My study contributes to ecclesial practices and to reflections on ecclesial practices in the current crisis of churches through the elasticisation of ecclesiology. It retrieves Troeltsch's interdisciplinary thinking for the controversies which revolve around the construction of community today, opening up innovative and instructive approaches to the investigation of the practices of Christianity past and present.

Abstract II

ELASTICISED ECCLESIOLOGY
The Concept of Community after Ernst Troeltsch

Submitted in Fulfilment of the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Theology
Ulrich Schmiedel, St Benet's Hall, University of Oxford
Trinity 2015

Churches are always already in crisis. In this study, I take the current crisis of churches as a point of departure to offer a critical and constructive account of church as open(ed) community. In conversation with Ernst Troeltsch (1865-1923) – a conversation which concentrates on a hermeneutical-constructive rather than a historical-critical retrieval of his interdisciplinary thinking – I argue that the communities which constitute church need to be elasticised in order to engage the 'finite other' (the creature) and the 'infinite other' (the creator). My study counters common characterisations of the current crisis of churches in which diversification is interpreted as *the* reason and de-diversification is interpreted as *the* response to crisis. In these characterisations, churches are closed off against the 'other'. In three parts which examine the controversial but connected concepts of 'religiosity', 'community', and 'identity', I suggest that the sociological closure against the finite other and the theological closure against the infinite other are connected. Taking trust as a central category, I argue that both the finite other and the infinite other are constitutive of the religiosity, the community, and the identity of church. Hence, for the practices of church, plurality is a promise rather than a problem.

Part I on 'religiosity' analyses the significance of both the finite other and the infinite other for the experiences of transcendence which are crucial to religiosity. I argue that transcendence might be experienced in the exposure to any other. Religiosity, then, is strengthened in engagements (rather than disengagements) with the other. It calls for diversification rather than de-diversification. In Chapter 1, I examine William James's classical concept of the experience of transcendence. I argue that the circle of trust – a notion which runs through the philosophy of religion and the psychology of religion proposed by James – is vital for these experiences. Inspired by James, I define trust as a relation to the other which is characterised by openness to the other's

otherness. James himself, however, draws a distinction between the transcendence of the finite other and the transcendence of the infinite other which eventually evokes the individualisation and the interiorisation of the experience of transcendence. James's distinction is rooted in his interpretation of language. For James, the experience of trust in the transcendent is contaminated by the expression of trust in the transcendent. Hence, his interpretation of language falls for what John L. Austin calls 'the descriptive fallacy'. Turning to Rowan Williams's Gifford Lectures, I investigate a theory of language which acknowledges the significance of expressions of transcendence for experiences of transcendence – a theory in which language operates through trust as much as trust operates through language. Thus, I reframe the (Jamesian) circle of trust as both a condition of the relation to the other and a consequence of the relation to the other. Trust is relational.

Relationality is crucial for Chapter 2 where I enquire into Troeltsch's reception of James's philosophical-psychological approach to religion. Analysing Troeltsch's seminal study, 'Die Selbständigkeit der Religion', I argue that Troeltsch conceptualises a tacit theory of trust which connects the relation to the finite other with the relation to the infinite other – a theory which has crucial consequences for his ecclesiology. In the Troeltschian triangle of event, experience, and expression, the experience of transcendence is co-constituted by event and expression. Transcendence is thus interpreted as effable and ineffable alike; it is a 'mystery'. The experience of transcendence, then, evokes a drive for difference which runs through religion(s) in the past and in the present: in the practices of religion, concepts of the transcendent are constructed and destructed at once. According to Troeltsch, who comes close to Jacques Derrida's notion of deconstruction here, the drive for difference is important and instructive for the practices of church. Like James, Troeltsch cautions against what I call 'the postliberal risk': constructions of community which are too solid, thus losing track of the significance of personalities for religiosity. Unlike James, Troeltsch cautions against what I call 'the liberal risk': constructions of community which are too liquid, thus losing track of the significance of communities for religiosity. Hence, Troeltsch's tacit theory of trust charts the contours of a togetherness of trust – a way of being together in which trust in the finite other interrelates with trust in the infinite other and trust in the infinite other interrelates with trust in the finite other. Here, the community is neither too solid nor too liquid, but *elastic*. Trust is embodied in personalities and embedded in communities.

In Chapter 3, I argue that trust is the experiential connection between the experience of the transcendence of the finite other and the experience of the transcendence of the infinite other. My comparative combination of the sociological definition of the experience of transcendence developed by Hans Joas and the theological definition of the experience of transcendence developed by Jörg Lauster suggests that the transcendence of the other is experienced as transformative if one encounters the other in trust. Crucially, such transformative transcendence can be experienced in the relation to the finite other *and* in the relation to the infinite other. In critical conversation with Ingolf U. Dalferth's definition of 'trust' and 'transcendence', I argue that openness to the otherness of the finite other and openness to the otherness of the infinite other are vital for the togetherness of trust. Drawing on Graham Ward's reflections on the requirements of transcendence, I point out that Dalferth's categorical contradistinction between the transcendence of the finite other and the transcendence of the infinite other is arbitrary, if the *experience* of transcendence is taken into account. On the contrary, by opening oneself up to the transcendence of the finite other, one can learn how to trust in the infinite other; and by opening oneself up to the transcendence of the infinite other, one can learn how to trust in the finite other.

Part II on 'community' surveys the concepts of community constructed in the history of Christianity in conversation with both current sociologists and current sociologists of religion. Chapter 4 explores and expands on Troeltsch's tripartite typology of 'ecclesiasticism', 'sectarianism', and 'mysticism'. I argue that Troeltsch anticipates Nicholas M. Healy's compelling critique of blueprint ecclesiologies. For Troeltsch, the practice of Jesus and the memorisation of the practice of Jesus blur those ecclesiological blueprints which disrupt the hermeneutical circle running from ecclesial practice to ecclesiology to ecclesial practice. Nonetheless, blueprint ecclesiology characterises the Troeltschian types of ecclesiasticism, sectarianism, and mysticism which close Christianity off against the other. Troeltsch's typology allows me to distinguish three types of closure. Connected to the notion of Christendom, ecclesiasticism acknowledges neither otherness nor openness; sectarianism accepts otherness but not openness, while mysticism accepts openness but not otherness. Thus, alterity – the otherness of the other – is instrumentalised either for the bonding of a homogeneous identity of Christianity or for the bridging of a heterogeneous identity of Christianity. Against these instrumentalisations of alterity for the construction of

identity, Troeltsch recommends a return to the resistance against closure characteristic of both the practice of Jesus and the memorisation of the practice of Jesus.

In Chapter 5, I apply Troeltsch's typology to today's sociology. I argue that Zygmunt Bauman's account of community offers a fully-fledged parallel to Troeltsch's typology. With the help of Bauman, I expose Troeltsch's ecclesiasticism as a chimera. Ecclesiasticism never existed. Either a retrospective or a prospective projection, ecclesiasticism aetiologically accounts for the complaints about the collapse of community which permeate so much of modern and postmodern thought. Building on Bauman, I identify the neutralisation of the other in Troeltsch's sectarianism and in Troeltsch's mysticism as 'anthropoemic' and 'anthropophagic' attacks on alterity. In order to counter these neutralisations, I examine Bauman's concept of the community of concern. However, since Bauman ignores the role which religion might play in the provocation and the preservation of concern for the other, his sociology is instructive to conceptualise the conditions but not to cope with the consequences of individualisation.

In Chapter 6, I apply Troeltsch's typology to the paradigms which dominate today's sociology of religion. I argue that the paradigm of secularisation (as exemplified by Steve Bruce), the paradigm of pluralisation (as exemplified by Laurence Iannaccone), and the paradigm of individualisation (as exemplified by Grace Davie) employ the types of Troeltsch's typology as criteria to 'measure' the development of religion past and present. The paradigm of secularisation operates with the criterion of ecclesiasticism. Thus, it concludes with the diagnosis of secularisation. The paradigms of pluralisation and of individualisation take sectarianism and mysticism as their criteria, thus they arrive at a diagnosis of de-secularisation. I demonstrate that all three paradigms interpret alterity as a threat to Christian and non-Christian communities. In critical conversation with Peter L. Berger's theories of plurality, I portray the plurality of religious and non-religious ways of life as a promise rather than a problem for the practices of church. Corroborating the critique of Berger articulated by Hans Joas and, following Joas, Charles Taylor, I conclude that the exposure to the other might allow for experiences of transformative transcendence. Part II, then, follows the thrust of Troeltsch's *The Social Teachings of the Christian Churches*: it does not explain how church is to be constructed, but it does explain how church is not to be constructed. The community of church must not be closed. Turned from the negative to the positive, *the* criterion for the construction of church is openness to otherness.

I start Part III on 'identity' by assessing identity as *the* problem for the elasticisation of ecclesiology. Since concepts and constructs of identity separate the insider from the outsider, they close community off against the other, thus inhibiting experiences of transformative transcendence. In Chapter 7, I return to the notion of the togetherness of trust. I argue that trust troubles any notion of identity which rests on the absence of alterity. Investigating Arne Grøn's phenomenological-philosophical account of trust, I argue that the encounter with the other is the site which allows for the recognition of the other's otherness. But such recognition works neither through a 'trust without doubt' nor through a 'doubt without trust'. Instead, the togetherness of trust requires what, inspired by Claudia Welz, I call 'doubt *within* trust'. Thus, the trouble with trust is productive rather than destructive: it opens communities up to the other in a critical and self-critical search for the manifestation of truth. The togetherness of trust, therefore, unsettles the causalities often assumed in the relation between identity and community: it is not the construct of an identity which creates the practice of community, but it is the practice of community which creates the construct of an identity. Practice, then, is vital for the togetherness of trust.

Chapter 8 investigates the turn to practice in today's ecclesiology. I compare three ecclesiological examples: one which turns ecclesiology from the liquid to the solid, one which turns ecclesiology from the solid to the liquid, and one which turns ecclesiology neither to the solid nor to the liquid. On my comparative account, both the liquid and the solid model support the attack on alterity: the solid identity of church, advocated by John Milbank, falls for Troeltschian anthropoemic sectarianism; the liquid identity of church, advocated by Pete Ward, falls for Troeltschian anthropophagic mysticism. The ecclesiology in-between the liquid and the solid, advocated by Graham Ward, weakens the identity of Christianity in order to enable both church learning from culture and culture learning from church. Yet Ward's theocratic turn to a politics of power effectively reintroduces the rejected distinction between insider and outsider along the frontline of Carl Schmitt's combat between *Freund* and *Feind*. Hence, although these three ecclesiologies take 'practice' as their point of departure, all of them fall for constructions of identity which inhibit the togetherness of trust.

Drawing on the consequences of the turn to practice in ecclesiology, I reframe the interpretation of the identity of Christianity in Chapter 9. I investigate Judith Butler's political philosophy of performativity in search for a theory and a terminology which allows for a rereading of Troeltsch's 'What does Essence of Christianity mean?'

today. I argue that Troeltsch conceptualises a hermeneutics of the identification of Christianity which turns identity from what I call a 'propositional possession' into what I call a 'performative project'. Like Butler, Troeltsch anchors his hermeneutics in the gap between performative practices and repetitions of performative practices. But, unlike Butler, Troeltsch tackles the gap *theologically*, conceiving of what I call a 'God of the gaps' who opens identity up to the other – the God in the Crib and the God on the Cross. I argue that the practices of the interpellation and the interpretation of the significance of Jesus Christ, in which Christianity is continuously identified and re-identified, resemble a togetherness of trust. Building on Troeltsch's hermeneutics of identification, I depict the elasticisation of ecclesiology on a propositional level (elasticity in 'describing' Christianity) and on a performative level (elasticity in 'doing' Christianity). I conclude with a concept of church in which hermeneutical practices enable the practitioners of church to interrelate their relations to the finite other with their relations to the infinite other in Jesus Christ. Since there is no programmatic plan for these hermeneutical practices, I characterise the concept of church which is inherent in the elasticisation of ecclesiology as a 'work in movement' – a work which is completed in practice, ever again and ever anew.

Through the elasticisation of ecclesiology, then, my study contributes to ecclesial practices and to reflections on ecclesial practices in the current crisis of churches. Countering the closure of community which characterises much of modern and postmodern thought on ecclesial and non-ecclesial communities, alterity is interpreted as constitutive of church. If transcendence has to do with both the finite and the infinite other, then the closure against alterity would prevent the provocation as well as the preservation of experiences of transformative transcendence in trust. To enable such experiences, church must be opened and open to the other. With the account of church as open(ed) community, my study assesses, augments, and applies Troeltsch's interdisciplinary thinking of elasticity to the controversies which revolve around the construction of community today, opening up innovative and instructive approaches to the investigation of the practices of Christianity past and present.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The idea to write a doctoral dissertation on the concept of community was planted. And it was Werner G. Jeanrond who planted it during our conversations in Glasgow. Thus, he nurtured my work even before I noticed it. As a supervisor at the University of Oxford, he has continued to foster and facilitate my theological thinking. His vision of theology as *Relations*- rather than *Religionsvetenskap* has inspired me immensely. With hermeneutical comments on both the style and the substance of each and every chapter I sent to him – 'Don't write what you want to say, write what you want the reader to hear' – he has helped me to find my voice. Following a formulation from the country in which both of us were born, I am tempted to call him my *Doktorvater*. But since he hesitates to use this formulation, I switch to a metaphor he favours: I am grateful for his midwifery.

I thank Brian Klug. From the first assignment he gave me when I started working on my doctoral dissertation – 'Until our next session, you have to try at least three different ales' – his advice has proven invaluable. In our intriguing and inspiring conversations, he has shown me social thought in action, thought which lurks between the lines of this study. I am grateful for his philosophical chutzpah.

Thanks are due to Marijn de Jong and Tobias Tan. Both of them worked their way through the pages of my doctoral dissertation, the one with an eye for the metaphysical and the other with an eye for the physical. For me, the time they spent reading page after page was well spent. I thank them for the discussions we had (not all of them in the pub), for not letting go of those points which are crucial to their theological thinking, and for continuing to agree and to disagree with me. Both where we did and where we did not concur, I have learned a lot from them. Despite their eagle-eyed proof-reading, mistakes may have crept into the text. Unfortunately, these are my own.

I also thank James M. Matarazzo, Jr. and Rens Krijgsman, companions on the way to the completion of the doctoral dissertation, with whom I shared so many

conversations, coffees, and cigarettes. The work on my study would have been dreary and drab without their friendship.

I am grateful for the support of the *Studienstiftung des deutschen Volkes*. Without the *Stiftung*, from which I gained much more than financial funding during my studies both inside and outside Germany, I could not have focused on the doctoral dissertation in the way I did. Institutions which I would also like to thank include the Society for the Study of Theology in the UK and the American Academy of Religion in the US. More than once, their conferences allowed me to present my sometimes finished and sometimes not-yet-finished thoughts to international and interdisciplinary audiences. Of course, I am also grateful to St Benet's Hall, Oxford. A place in transit and in transformation, it turned out to be a space where I was met with more encouragement than I could have hoped for. Thus, St Benet's has exemplified the excellent and exciting environment for which the University of Oxford is renowned.

Last – not least! – I am grateful to Hannah M. Strømmen. She has suffered but survived countless conversations about church. She has taken me to factual and fictional churches which I would not have dared to enter without her. And she has distracted me whenever I ran the risk of drowning in the depths of my doctoral dissertation. I am especially grateful for her creative critique, critique which she voiced with the proverbial English elegance that makes it so much easier to accept. Her sensitivity in identifying both crude substance and clumsy style rendered my doctoral dissertation much more readable. I would not know how to write theology without her. To use a performative-propositional formulation which will appear again and again throughout my study, I cannot tell you how grateful I am!

This study is dedicated to my parents, Beate and Claus Schmiedel, whose encouragement and entrustment enabled me to write a doctoral dissertation. I wish I could discuss its concerns and its concepts with my father who died before I started studying theology. From my parents, I have learned both what it is like to be an insider to the practices of church and what it is like to be an outsider to the practices of church. And what it is to trust God inside and outside churches.

Oxford, Trinity Term 2015
Ulrich Schmiedel

ABBREVIATIONS

Texts written by Ernst Troeltsch[1]

AC	*The Absoluteness of Christianity and the History of Religions*
AG	Artikel 'Gnade Gottes, dogmatisch'
AK	Artikel 'Kirche, dogmatisch'
BF	*Briefe an Friedrich von Hügel*
BP	*Zur Bedeutung des Protestantismus für die Entstehung der modernen Welt*
CF	*The Christian Faith: Based on Lectures delivered at the University of Heidelberg in 1912 and 1913*
DR	'The Dogmatics of the "Religionsgeschichtliche Schule"'
EM	'The Essence of the Modern Spirit'
EP	'Empiricism and Platonism in the Philosophy of Religion: To the Memory of William James'
FV	*Fünf Vorträge für England und Schottland*
GL	*Glaubenslehre: Nach Heidelberger Vorlesungen aus den Jahren 1911 und 1912*
HD	'Historical and Dogmatic Method in Theology'
HI	Entry 'Historiography'
HP	*Der Historismus und seine Probleme*
KG	'Die Kirche im Leben der Gegenwart'

[1] Where available, I refer to the English translations of Ernst Troeltsch's writings. Whenever I refer to primary or secondary literature in German, the translations are my own unless stated otherwise.

MO	'My Books'
MÜ	'Meine Bücher'
NL	'Stoic-Christian Natural Law and Modern Secular Natural Law'
NR	'Das stoische-christliche Naturrecht und das moderne profane Naturrecht'
PE	*Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie in der Religionswissenschaft: Eine Untersuchung über die Bedeutung der Kantischen Religionslehre für die heutige Religionswissenschaft*
PP	*Protestantism and Progress: The Significance of Protestantism for the Rise of the Modern World*
RI	'Religiöser Individualismus und Kirche'
RP	'Religionsphilosophie'
R1	Review 'Religionsphilosophie und Theologische Principienlehre (Jahresbericht 1896)'
R2	Review 'Religionsphilosophie und Principielle Theologie (Jahresbericht 1897)'
R3	Review 'William James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature*'
SH	'The Significance of the Historical Existence of Jesus for Faith'
SK	'Schleiermacher und die Kirche'
SL	*Die Soziallehren der christlichen Kirchen und Gruppen*
SP	'The Social Philosophy of Christianity'
SR	'Die Selbständigkeit der Religion'
ST	*The Social Teaching of the Christian Church*
WD	'What does "Essence of Christianity" Mean?'

WH	‘Was heißt “Wesen des Christentums”?’
WL	‘Die wissenschaftliche Lage und ihre Anforderungen an die Theologie’
WM	‘Das Wesen des modernen Geistes’
ZM	‘Die Zukunftsmöglichkeiten des Christentums im Verhältnis zur modernen Philosophie’
ZR	Review, ‘Zur Religionsphilosophie: Rudolf Otto, Das Heilige’

Introduction

CHURCH(ES) IN CRISIS

Churches are in crisis. Across Europe, the Christian churches attract fewer and fewer practitioners – in their pews and in their pulpits. Exemplified by the Church of England, [1] the statistics are shocking, projecting the loss of practitioners to a point where church disappears in 'a puff of smoke'.[2] In England, the increase in female (often non-stipendiary) ministry cushioned the decrease in male (often stipendiary) ministry, but current calculations clarify that the Church of England cannot keep up with the rapid and radical loss.[3] Since practitioners are deserting the practices of church, the Church of England is confronted with its 'extinction'.[4]

In this study, I take the current crisis of churches across Europe as a point of departure to offer a critical and constructive account of church as open or opened community. The theme of my study is ecclesiology; the topic of my study is the concept of community; and the thesis of my study is that the communities which constitute church need to be elasticised in order to engage the other.

---

[1] In my summary of the situation of the Church of England, I draw on the 'Church Health Check', a selection of studies which combines sociological and theological accounts of Anglicanism in the United Kingdom. Published by *The Church Times* in 2014, the 'Church Health Check' attracted attention both inside and outside academia. Here, I refer to the compilation in which the studies were collected, *How Healthy is the Church of England? The Church Times Health Check*, ed. Malcolm Doney (Norwich: Canterbury Press, 2014). The Church of England excellently exemplifies the crisis of churches throughout Europe. As Detlef Pollack and Gergely Rosta argue in their sociological study, *Religion in der Moderne: Ein internationaler Vergleich* (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 2015), the loss of practitioners marks the practices of European and non-European churches. This loss is dangerous for Christianity because, empirically, communities like the Christian churches are indispensable for the vitality of religion. See esp. ibid., 473-475.

[2] Linda Woodhead, 'Time to get serious', in *How Healthy is the Church of England?*, 14.

[3] Linda Woodhead, 'Not enough boots on the ground', in *How Healthy is the Church of England?*, 50.

[4] Woodhead, 'Time', 14.

In the Church of England, ecclesiologists with both sociological and theological expertise recommend transforming church into a 'franchise'.[5] Interpreting diversification as *the* reason and de-diversification as *the* reaction to the current crisis of churches, these ecclesiologists argue that this 'enfranchisement' allows for a combination of different and distinct communities under a common conception of church. The model of the franchise, then, has been developed in order to cope with the diversification of ways of life so characteristic of modernised and modernising contexts.[6] Instead of coercing Christians who prefer to practise church *this* way into that congregation and Christians who prefer to practise church *that* way into this congregation, the Church of England should, according to the model of the franchise, enable and equip Christians to practise church in their preferred way. This strategy of 'amicable separation'[7] would compartmentalise the Church of England into communities characterised by coherence and consistence, connected by a comprehensive 'Anglican identity'.[8]

[5] Linda Woodhead, 'A remedy for an ailing church', in *How Healthy is the Church of England*, 118. See also ibid., 119-120.

[6] Diversification is the core characteristic of modernised and modernising contexts. For David Tracy, these contexts are so diversified that 'we live in an age that cannot name itself'. David Tracy, 'On Naming the Present', in David Tracy, *On Naming the Present: God, Hermeneutics and Church* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1994), 3. Hence, regardless of whether the current context of church is called 'modernity' or 'postmodernity', it is a diversified and diversifying context. See Gerard Mannion, *Ecclesiology and Postmodernity: Questions for the Church in Our Time* (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2007), 8-24. Mannion focuses on the neutralisation of difference through exclusion. See the contributions to *Ecclesiology and Exclusion: Boundaries of Being and Belonging in Postmodern Times*, ed. Dennis M. Doyle, Timothy J. Furry and Pascal D. Bazzell (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 2012), which discuss his ecclesiology. I aim to argue that difference can be neutralised through both inclusion and exclusion. See esp. Chapter 6 of my study.

[7] Woodhead, 'A remedy', 117.

[8] The contributors to the 'Church Health Check' refer to the 'identity' of Anglicanism repeatedly, albeit without describing or defining it. See *How Healthy is the Church of England?*, 16, 26, 30, 37, 97, 104, 105, 116, 150.

By diverging into different and distinct communities, the Church of England could control diversification.[9] While the strategy appears to de-diversify church on the intra-congregational level and diversify church on the inter-congregational level, it aims to avert exposure to difference. The assumption of the 'enfranchisement' is that in order to cope with diversity one must neutralise the difference in one's proximity, so as not to be confronted or challenged by it. The rationale behind the strategy of amicable separation is easily explained: communities in crisis close ranks.[10] However, the current crisis of churches is more complicated and more complex than those ecclesiologists contend who concentrate on coherent and consistent communities which compete on a market of religious and nonreligious ways of life.[11]

Etymologically, crisis comes from 'κρίσις' – a situation which demands a tough decision: either this way or that way.[12] Hence, the interpretation of the situation of church *as* crisis tacitly transports what can and what cannot count as the recommended reaction to the situation – a tough decision is demanded to demarcate who is inside the community and who is outside the community. If diversification is seen as the process which causes the crisis, de-diversification is seen as the programme which could control the crisis. Yet the interpretation of the situation of church *as* crisis is neither sociologically nor theologically neutral. In order to think through a church in crisis, the

[9] Thus, the compartmentalisation of church is indebted to the homogenous unit principle, proposed by missiologists in the 1970s. See Martyn Percy, *Shaping the Church: The Promise of Implicit Theology* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2010), 77-78, who snippily summarises this principle as 'like attracts like', stressing that the principle runs the risk of legitimising 'ageism, sexism, racism, classism and economic divisiveness'.

[10] See also the critical considerations of Maggi Dawn, 'Read the signs of the times', in *How Healthy is the Church of England?*, 151-153. Such closure characterises both ecclesial and non-ecclesial communities which conceive of themselves in crisis. See Hartmut Rosa et. al., *Theorien der Gemeinschaft: Zur Einführung* (Hamburg: Junius, 2010), 54-65, 91-115. See also Chapters 5 and 6 of my study.

[11] The concentration on competition is also criticised within the 'Church Health Check', see esp. Martyn Percy, 'It's not just about the numbers', in *How Healthy is the Church of England*, 127-130. See also his piercing and provocative thought experiment, 'Faith in the Free-Market: A Cautionary Tale for Anglican Adults', in Martyn Percy, *The Ecclesial Canopy* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2012), 197-204.

[12] For the history of the concept of crisis, see Reinhard Koselleck, 'Crisis', *Journal of the History of Ideas* 2 (2006), 357-400.

ecclesiologist has to assume a concept of a 'normal' church and in order to think through a 'normal' church, the ecclesiologist has to assume a concept of a church in crisis. But whatever else the history of ecclesiology emphasises, it exposes that churches are always already in crisis.[13] The crises of church evoked the thinking and the talking about church which is known as ecclesiology.[14] Hence, crisis is the norm and the norm is crisis. It might not be the church that is in crisis but the crisis that is in the church.

Empirically, it is striking that the practitioners who leave their church commonly criticise it *not* for being 'church', but for *not* being 'church'.[15] What, then, characterises the crisis of churches throughout Europe? Are the statistics pointing to churches rapidly losing their practitioners or to practitioners rapidly losing their churches? What could the practices of church look like in a diversified and diversifying situation? What should the practices of church look like in a diversified and diversifying situation? What indeed *is* church?

In my study, I respond to these questions by conceptualising 'church' as an open or an opened community which engages the other. Who is the other? 'Alterity', the otherness of the other, is a controversial concept with a chequered career in philosophy

[13] Already Paul's ecclesiology is articulated in response to the crises of the communities which he founded (1 Cor. 3:1-23; 10:14-22; 12:1-31; 2 Cor. 5:11-21; Rom. 6:1-11). For the crises in the history of ecclesiology, see Roger D. Haight's trilogy, *Christian Community in History*, 3 vols (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2014).

[14] Natalie K. Watson, *Introducing Feminist Ecclesiology* (London: Sheffield Academic Press, 2002), 4: 'Ecclesiology as a theological discipline was born out of a historical need, a situation which made it necessary for the church to define itself'. Crucially, she uses the concept of 'crisis' to describe this situation (ibid., 4-5)

[15] See Woodhead, 'Time', 17-18, where she points to a generational gap between those who confirm and those who criticise the Church of England. See also Robert Warner, 'Why young people turn their backs on church', in *How Healthy is the Church of England?*, 25-27. Philip Giddings, 'Listening out for the laity's voice', in ibid., 55-58, argues that a 'persistent clericalism' in the Church of England has prevented the church from considering its internal and external critics (ibid., 55).

and theology.[16] Hermeneutically, the other signals difference: culturally, socially, politically or sexually, alterity differs from identity. In his trilogy, 'Philosophy at the Limit', Richard Kearney points to the pitfalls in the construction of such difference:[17] 'if others become too transcendent' and 'if others become too immanent', one cannot relate to them.[18] 'The trick is therefore', he contends, 'not to let the foreign become *too* foreign or the familiar *too* familiar'.[19] Throughout my study, I conceive of alterity as a relational rather than a non-relational concept: the other is other *in* relation. I wager that the alterity of what I call the finite other (which is to say, the creature) and the alterity of what I call the infinite other (which is to say, the creator) could and should be at the core of the practices of church.[20] I aim to argue that the practices of church are about engaging rather than disengaging the otherness of the other. [21] By 'practice', I mean a combination of actions and reflections on actions.[22] In churches, these combinations of actions and reflections could and should revolve around *relationality*. Through the practices of church, practitioners relate to the finite and to the infinite other. Church is

[16] For a short history of the notion of alterity in philosophy and theology, see Pamela S. Anderson, 'The Other', *The Oxford Handbook of Theology and Modern European Thought*, ed. Nicholas Adams, George Pattison, and Graham Ward (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 83-104.

[17] The trilogy, 'Philosophy at the Limit', consists of *The God Who May Be: A Hermeneutics of Religion* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2001), *On Stories* (London: Routledge, 2002), and *Strangers, Gods and Monsters: Interpreting Otherness* (London: Routledge, 2003).

[18] Kearney, *Strangers, Gods and Monsters*, 11.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Throughout my study, I use the terminology of 'finite other' and 'infinite other' to signal the difference between creator and creature, because I aim to argue that the exposure to both others – the finite and the infinite – involves transcendence. Terminologically, I follow Friedrich Schleiermacher, who, in *On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers*, trans. Richard Couter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), argued that religion is characterised by the relation between the finite and the infinite. For Schleiermacher, 'infinity' has more than a mathematical meaning: it is open to one's 'intuition' (ibid., 13). See ibid., 23-26, 45-48, 59-70, 89-95, 115-118. For a short summary of the meaning(s) of infinity with reference to Schleiermacher, see Dirk Evers, 'Infinity, Philosophy of Religion', in *Religion Past and Present*, vol. 6, ed. Hans Dieter Betz, Don S. Browning, Bernd Janowski and Eberhard Jüngel (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 483-484.

[21] Anna Strhan, 'What do we believe?', in *How Healthy is the Church of England?*, 33-35, points to the alterity of both the finite and the infinite other as a core concern in the practices of church.

[22] The concept of practice to which I refer throughout my study relates to the Greek concept of πρᾶξις. For a short summary of this concept, see Kearney, *On Stories*, 130. Like Kearney, I use the spelling of 'practice' rather than the spelling of 'praxis' for the sake of consistency with the literature which will be consulted throughout my study.

where relations to the finite other intersect with relations to the infinite other in Jesus Christ.[23] Since relations are always already relations to the other, alterity is vital for the practices of church.

For the conceptualisation of the community of church, the engagement with the other is of sociological *and* of theological importance: the sociological closure of the church against the finite other might evoke theological closure against the infinite other and theological closure against the infinite other might evoke the sociological closure of the church against the finite other. Described differently, the engagement with the finite other might enable the practitioners of church to encounter the infinite other and the engagement with the infinite other might enable the practitioners of church to encounter the finite other. The connection between these others will be investigated throughout my study. Thus, I aim to offer a critical and constructive account of church as open or opened community – a church which is open(ed) to the other.

For my account, I have chosen Ernst Troeltsch (1865-1923) as interlocutor. Troeltsch was without doubt a prominent and provocative thinker. Trained as a theologian, he combined the theological with the non-theological fields of the humanities, focusing on history, philosophy, sociology, and theology.[24] Eventually, he took up a professorship of philosophy at the University of Berlin which allowed him to continue his forays into these fields. He repeatedly referred to this professorship as

[23] The characterisation of church through the interrelation of the relation to the finite other with the relation to the infinite other is, of course, not uncontroversial. It could be considered a translation of the definition of church advanced by the Reformation. For the Reformers, the church is where the Gospel is communicated. See 'The Augsburg Confession (1530)', article VII, in *The Book of Concord: The Confessions of the Evangelical Lutheran Church*, trans. Theodore G. Tappert (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1959), 32. Throughout my study, I conceive of such communication not as a 'describing' of the Gospel but as a 'doing' of the Gospel. If the Gospel is done rather than described, its communication engenders relations to the finite and to the infinite other. As will be argued in Chapter 4, the concern for these interrelated relations can be traced back to the practice of Jesus.

[24] For Troeltsch's biography, see Hans-Georg Drescher, *Ernst Troeltsch: Leben und Werk* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck, 1991), ET: *Ernst Troeltsch: His Life and Work*, trans. John Bowden (London: SCM, 1992). Drescher's biography is not free from flaws. See the review by Mark Chapman, 'Review of Drescher, *Ernst Troeltsch: Leben und Werk*', *Journal for Theological Studies* 44 (1993), 437-440, which points out how the biography fails to connect the life and the work of Troeltsch.

'tailor-made' for him.[25] Thus, Troeltsch has defied labelling – in the past and in the present. His polyphonic thinking cannot be captured in philosophical, sociological or theological one-liners.

Due to its concentration on history and historicisation,[26] Troeltsch's thinking has been characterised as the epitome of 'liberalism'.[27] The label of liberalism earned him both respect and rejection.[28] But given that he criticised liberalism explicitly and expressively, it might be a misnomer.[29] Troeltsch neither continued the thought of a school nor created the thought of a school. On the contrary, he advocated thinking beyond the dogmatism of schools, whether it came in a liberal or in a non-liberal guise.[30] In his autobiographical account, 'My Books', he announced already at the outset: 'I have no system'.[31] Tentatively tracing the possibilities and the impossibilities for a systematisation of his thought, he argued that his thinking does not form a 'system' because it is both fragmentary and fragile.[32] Troeltsch's assessment of his work comes close to a hermeneutical circle where the 'system' informs the trajectory of

[25] Drescher, *Ernst Troeltsch*, 216. The transfer from a professorship of theology to a professorship of philosophy does *not* mark his abandonment of theology (as past and present critics of Troeltsch would have it). Theology remained important to Troeltsch's thinking throughout his life. See MO, 373-375. See also Mark D. Chapman, *Ernst Troeltsch and Liberal Theology: Religion and Cultural Synthesis in Wilhelmine Germany* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), esp. 1-12 and 161-186.

[26] For the notion of historicism, see, with reference to both the philosophy and the theology of Troeltsch, John H. Zammito, 'Historicism', in *The Oxford Handbook of German Philosophy in the Nineteenth Century*, ed. Michael N. Forster and Kristin Gjesdal (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 779-805.

[27] For the reception of Troeltsch's thought, see the comprehensive contextualisation by Chapman, ibid., 1-12.

[28] Ibid.

[29] See KG, 101-102, for Troeltsch's critique of ecclesial liberalism and FV, 178-181, for Troeltsch's critique of political liberalism. If Troeltsch is labelled a 'liberal', 'liberalism' has to be carefully defined or re-defined in a way which incorporates Troeltsch's critique of liberalism. See Jörg Lauster, 'Liberale Theologie: Eine Ermunterung', *Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie* 49/3 (2007), 291-307. See also Friedrich Wilhelm Graf, 'What has London (or Oxford or Cambridge) to do with Augsburg? The Enduring Significance of the German Liberal Tradition in Christian Theology', in *The Future of Liberal Theology*, ed. Mark Chapman (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002), 18-38.

[30] AK, 102.

[31] MO, 365. See also MÜ, 3: 'Ich habe kein eigentliches System und dadurch unterscheide ich mich von den meisten anderen deutschen Philosophen'.

[32] MO, 365.

empirical research and the trajectory of empirical research informs the 'system'.[33] Troeltsch's thinking, then, is characterised by a hidden hermeneutics.[34]

For Troeltsch's ecclesiology, both the fragmentation and the fragilisation of his system had crucial consequences. He considered himself not a theologian for confessional churches but a theologian for those who seek transcendence inside and outside churches: a theologian for 'those who are restless'.[35] Thus, ecumenicity characterised Troeltsch's thinking prior to the formulation and the formalisation of ecumenical ecclesiologies in the conversations between ecclesial functionaries.[36] Building on Troeltsch, an inter-denominational approach to ecclesiology will be taken throughout my study – an approach which is located in-between denominations so as to allow for critical and self-critical reflection on their confessional ecclesiologies.[37]

Moreover, both thematically and methodologically, Troeltsch's thinking is pertinent and promising for conceptualising church as open(ed) community. Thematically, community was a core concern for Troeltsch, sometimes implicitly and

---

[33] MO, 375-376.

[34] The hidden hermeneutics in Troeltsch's thought has been noticed by Gregory Baum, 'Science and Commitment: Historical Truth according to Ernst Troeltsch', *Philosophy of the Social Sciences* 1 (1971), 259-277, and Andrzej Pryzlebski, 'Troeltschs Kultursynthese als halbierte Hermeneutik', in *'Geschichte durch Geschichte überwinden': Ernst Troeltsch in Berlin*, ed. Friedrich Wilhelm Graf (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 2006), 137-153. For a succinct summary of the hermeneutical circle, see Werner G. Jeanrond, *Theological Hermeneutics: Development and Significance* (London: SCM, 2002), 5-6.

[35] BF, 61. See also BF, 75, 115.

[36] For a short history of ecumenicity, see Thomas F. Best, 'Ecclesiology and Ecumenism', in *The Routledge Companion to the Christian Church*, ed. Gerard Mannion and Lewis Seymour Mudge (London: Routledge, 2008), 402-420. According to Gesa E. Thiesen, ecclesiology *must* be done ecumenically today. Differences are apparent both intra- and inter-denominationally which is why ecumenicity cannot be escaped. See the contributions to *Ecumenical Ecclesiology: Unity, Diversity and Otherness in a Fragmented World*, ed. Gesa E. Thiesen (London: T&T Clark, 2009).

[37] Haight concludes his instructive and influential trilogy, *Christian Community in History*, with what he calls 'an essay in transdenominational ecclesiology' (Haight, *Christian Community in History*, vol. 3: 'Ecclesial Existence', xi). Transdenominational ecclesiology, he explains, 'refers to an abstraction' (ibid., 11) because its referent is not a concrete church. Instead, its referent is constituted by those 'elements' which are shared by 'all ecclesial existence' throughout history (ibid.). While I appreciate Haight's effort to emphasise 'the possibilities for a mutual recognition of churches' (ibid., 27; see also ibid., 270-292), I prefer an *inter-denominational* approach to ecclesiology. The inter-denominational approach allows the ecclesiologist to engage differences in and in-between denominations critically and self-critically. Thus, recognition is sought in conversation and in conflict; it is not merely tolerated or transcended through the notion of a shared ecclesial existence.

sometimes explicitly. Throughout his oeuvre, he explored the conditions and the consequences of the construction of ecclesial and non-ecclesial communities within modernised and modernising contexts. But unlike so many of his colleagues and contemporaries, he refrained from complaints about the collapse of community.[38] His concern was not how churches are dying but how churches are *not* dying. Thus, Troeltsch's thinking resonates with my thematic approach.

Methodologically, Troeltsch's thinking was interdisciplinary, using both sociology and theology. 'Interdisciplinarity' is admittedly anachronistic in Troeltsch's case because he worked prior to the demarcations of sociology and theology into distinct disciplines. Considering the history of sociological self-definitions over against theology and of theological self-definitions over against sociology subsequent to Troeltsch,[39] his account of both disciplines is 'undisciplined': he approached both theology and sociology without fear or favour. His location in-between sociology and theology has raised suspicion: sociological scholars tend to find him too theological and theological scholars tend to find him too sociological; his combination of theology and sociology has even been considered a maligned mixture, a 'syndrome' which has to be cured.[40] Yet Troeltsch's interdisciplinary thinking is significant for the interpretation of

[38] For these complaints, see the summary by Gerard Delanty, *Community* (London: Routledge, 2004), 7-23.

[39] See esp. John Milbank, *Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006). The controversies stirred by the cooperation between theology and sociology will be revisited in Chapters 4 through 6.

[40] William H. Swatos, 'Weber or Troeltsch? Methodology, Syndrome, and the Development of Church-Sect Theory', *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 15/2 (1976), 129-144. See again, Milbank, *Theology and Social Theory*, esp. 89-100. For Milbank, Troeltsch is guilty of both 'liberalism' and 'positivism'. Hence, Troeltsch is, in a way, the personification of what Milbank argues against. See esp. Milbank's introduction 'Between Positivism and Liberalism', xi-xxxii. For a compelling critique of 'Milbank's Troeltsch', see Lori Pearson, 'The Uses and Abuses of Troeltsch in American Debates over Religion, Social Theory, and Theology', in *Religion(en) deuten: Transformationen der Religionsforschung*, ed. Friedrich Wilhelm Graf and Friedemann Voigt (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2010), 331-360.

church as a practice which calls for sociological and theological accounts.[41] Thus, Troeltsch's thinking resonates with my methodological approach.

Nonetheless, my conversation with Troeltsch comes with a crucial caveat. My study is not a study of Troeltsch which focuses on the concept of community. Rather, my study is a study of community which focuses on Troeltsch's concept. The difference is subtle but significant. It is signalled in my concentration on the concept of community 'after' Troeltsch. I aim to analyse, assess, and augment Troeltsch's thinking today – *after* Troeltsch. Methodologically, my focus is precarious: I have to pose questions to Troeltsch which he neither asked nor answered. But the precarious turn from what could be called a *historical-critical examination* of Troeltsch's oeuvre to what could be called a *hermeneutical-constructive exploration* of Troeltsch's oeuvre is instructive because it enables a creative and critical conversation with him.[42] The argument which will be developed, discussed, and defended throughout my conversation with Troeltsch exemplifies the turn from a historical-critical to a hermeneutical-constructive approach. As mentioned above, I aim to argue that churches are to be elasticised in order to enable a connection between the relation to the finite other and the relation to the infinite other in the practices of church. For church to be church, it has to be open to the other. The concept of elasticity is Troeltsch's concept. He referred to the 'elasticised' – literally, '*elastisch gemachte*' – church when he explained how contemporary churches ought to operate.[43] For Troeltsch, the concept of

[41] For a discussion of this call, see Neil Ormerod, 'Ecclesiology and the Social Sciences', in *The Routledge Companion to the Christian Church*, 639-654.

[42] However, the hermeneutical-constructive account of Troeltsch's thinking is rooted in the historical-critical account of Troeltsch's thinking. Since Troeltsch's oeuvre has been rediscovered as a 'classic' for both sociology and theology in the 1960s (a re-discovery which took place primarily in English-speaking and secondarily in German-speaking countries), a multitude of material has been published by now. Particularly Ernst Troeltsch, *Kritische Gesamtausgabe* is significant for the scholarship on Troeltsch's thinking. It is a collection of all the texts written by Troeltsch in twenty (partly published and partly not yet published) volumes. The Ernst-Troeltsch-Forschungsstelle, located at the Ludwig-Maximilians-University of Munich, Germany, is responsible for this collection.

[43] KG, 104.

elasticity gestured towards a church which allows for internal and external diversity. Etymologically, however, 'elasticity' captures more than the diversification of church. 'Elasticity' comes from the Greek 'ἐλασω' which means 'to propel' or 'to project'. Building on Troeltsch, I aim to argue that the elasticisation of ecclesiology implies that church is propelled by encounters with the other. Encounters with the finite and the infinite other, then, *constitute* church.

However, these encounters require a turn in the interpretation of the identity of Christianity from what I call a propositional possession (an identity which Christians can own) to what I call a performative project (an identity which Christians cannot own). If Christianity revolves around the interrelation of the relation to the finite other with the relation to the infinite other, church defies complete conceptualisation: it occurs performatively rather than propositionally.[44] In the practices of church, Christianity is 'done' rather than 'described'. Thus, my study will culminate in the interpretation of church as a 'work in movement' – a work which is moving and moved by the finite as well as the infinite other.[45] Hence, neither the practices of the open church nor the reflections on the practices of the open church can be captured completely. Nonetheless, church can be practised: performatively rather than propositionally, ever again and ever anew. Thus, the elasticisation of ecclesiology which I aim to advocate is not a repetition but a response to Troeltsch's interdisciplinary thinking – it is articulated in critical and creative conversation with Troeltsch.

---

[44] Of course, my distinction between performativity and propositionality draws on John L. Austin's *How To Do Things With Words? The William James Lectures delivered at Harvard University in 1955*, ed. James O. Urmson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962). It will be discussed in Chapter 1.

[45] The concept of 'work in movement' is taken from Umberto Eco, *The Open Work*, trans. Anna Cancogni (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1889). See Chapter 9 of my study for a detailed discussion.

Since the current crisis of churches throughout Europe is the context for my study, my conversation with Troeltsch concentrates on the connected and controversial concepts which are vital in order to tackle this crisis: 'religiosity', 'community', and 'identity'. As exemplified by the debates about the Church of England, these concepts tend to be taken as exclusive rather than inclusive terms which keep the other outside.[46] Yet, establishing trust as a central category for sociology and theology, I aim to argue that both the finite other and the infinite other are constitutive of the religiosity, the community, and the identity of Christian churches. Hence, for the practices of church, plurality is a promise rather than a problem.

Part I on 'religiosity' will redefine the point of departure for ecclesiology. I shall argue that the ecclesiologist ought to start with the concept of trust because 'trust' is crucial to characterise both the relations to the finite other and the relations to the infinite other – the relations around which the practices of church revolve. Exploring William James's concept of the experience of transcendence (Chapter 1) and Ernst Troeltsch's reception of William James's concept of the experience of transcendence (Chapter 2), I shall define trust as a relation to the other which is characterised by openness to otherness. Transcendence, I shall argue, might be experienced when one encounters both the finite other and the infinite other in trust (Chapter 3). Therefore, the other is vital for religiosity. The elasticisation of ecclesiology which emphasises the interrelation of the relation to the finite other with the relation to the infinite other requires a community which provokes and preserves trust. In a togetherness of trust, a way of being together which fosters and facilitates openness, one can learn to trust the finite other by trusting the infinite other and to trust the infinite other by trusting the finite other.

[46] For case studies of ecclesiological exclusion, see again the contributions to *Ecclesiology and Exclusion*.

Part II on 'community' will examine Troeltsch's tripartite typology of community concepts in order to chart the contours of such a togetherness of trust. By exploring and elaborating on the Troeltschian types of 'ecclesiasticism', 'sectarianism', and 'mysticism', I shall investigate how 'community' has been lived throughout the history of Christianity (Chapter 4). I shall apply Troeltsch's typology to today's sociology (Chapter 5) and to today's sociology of religion (Chapter 6) in order to argue that community is commonly constructed at the cost of the other. In these constructions of community, alterity – the otherness of the other – is instrumentalised either for the bonding of a homogeneous identity or for the bridging of a heterogeneous identity. Following the thrust of Troeltsch's *The Social Teachings of the Christian Churches*,[47] I shall conclude negatively rather than positively by cautioning communities against closure. Turned from the negative to the positive, *the* criterion for the elasticisation of ecclesiology is openness to otherness.

Part III on 'identity' will tackle the questions and the quandaries of identity. After exploring how the togetherness of trust troubles any conception of identity which closes community by separating those who count as trustworthy insiders from those who count as non-trustworthy outsiders (Chapter 7), I shall scrutinise the turn to practice characteristic of current ecclesiologies. Examining three ecclesiological examples, I shall expose how this turn to practice reintroduces those constructs of identity which it rejected – constructs which seek a strict separation, amicable or not so amicable, between insiders and outsiders (Chapter 8). Finally, I shall return to Troeltsch. By elaborating on Troeltsch's 'What does "Essence of Christianity" mean?' with the help of political philosophies of performativity, I shall suggest a turn in the construction of the identity of Christianity – a turn from identity as a propositional

[47] SL, 979-980.

possession to identity as a performative project. Such a turn allows the community of church to be opened and open to the other, thus engendering a togetherness of trust (Chapter 9). My conversation with Troeltsch will conclude by describing and defining 'church' as an open or opened work in movement. It is a work which is continuously constituted and continuously reconstituted in performative practices of trust where relations to the finite other and relations to the infinite other are connected.

Moving from 'religiosity' to 'community' to 'identity', then, my study takes a step back from the concrete conflicts which characterise the practices of church in the current context. I focus on the concept of community after Troeltsch in order to expose and examine the arguments and the assumptions which are hidden in these conflicts. Such conceptual clarification brings Troeltsch's thinking to bear on the controversies which revolve around the construction of community in both sociology and theology today, opening up innovative and instructive approaches to the investigation of the practices of Christianity past and present. Of course, the aim of my study is not to reinvent the Christian church.[48] Rather, the aim is to offer a sociological-theological rationale for those open(ed) communities which are already sporadically and spontaneously manifested in ecclesial and non-ecclesial practices: communities which engage rather than disengage the other. I aim to argue that the other is crucial for church. Hence, I advocate *more* than the appreciation of the other through churches.[49] Alterity is at the centre of what the church is: there can be no church without finite and infinite others.

---

[48] Throughout my study, I concentrate on the communities which constitute Christianity. However, as will be argued in the Conclusion, the difference between Christian and non-Christian communities has to be relativised. If church is concerned with the other, it cannot reduce alterity to the Christian other at the cost of the non-Christian other. For a comparative account of the concept of community in the context of inter-religious conversations, see Keith Ward, *Religion and Community* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

[49] The appreciation of plurality is a core concern in current ecclesiologies. See especially Haight, *Christian Community in History*, vol. 1-3. While I agree with Haight, I aim to argue that appreciation is not enough, because the other is *vital* for the practices of church.

Part I

RELIGIOSITY

William James's Gifford Lectures, *The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature*, delivered at the University of Edinburgh in 1901 and 1902, introduced the terminology of 'religious' as opposed to 'nonreligious experience' into the study of religion.[1] Since James, 'experience' is a term which cannot be easily escaped when one thinks and talks about religion.[2] But the emphasis on experience which followed in the wake of James has been criticised: experience is the core concern in the controversy between 'liberal' and 'postliberal' theologies.[3] Arguably, liberals examine how experiential religiosity produces religion, while postliberals examine how religion produces experiential religiosity.[4] What is at stake here is the definition of religion: for liberals, religion is effectively a personal experience which provokes expressions; for postliberals, religion is

[1] William James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature*, The Works of William James, vol. 15, ed. Frederick H. Burkhardt, Fredson Bowers, and Ignas K. Skurupskelis (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987).

[2] For a succinct survey of the literature on experience, see Ann Taves, 'Religious Experience', in *Encyclopaedia of Religion*, vol. 11, ed. Lindsay Jones (Detroit, MI: Thompson Gale, 2005), 7736-7750. See also the contributions to *Religious Experience: A Reader*, ed. Craig Martin and Russell T. McCutcheon with Leslie Dorrough Smith (Sheffield: Equinox, 2012).

[3] For a detailed discussion see John Allen Knight, *Liberalism versus Postliberalism: The Great Divide in Twentieth-Century Theology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).

[4] See George A. Lindbeck, *The Nature of Doctrine* (London: SPCK, 1984), 30-45, esp. 30, where he distinguishes between the liberal model in which experiences produce religions and the postliberal model in which religions produce experiences.

effectively a communal expression which provokes experiences.[5] Because religion is experienced personally and expressed communally, liberals concentrate on 'personalities' while postliberals concentrate on 'communities'.[6]

Ecclesiology, then, is caught in a double-bind: either the ecclesiologist starts with 'experience' (but then it is doubtful whether she will actually arrive at a notion of community) or the ecclesiologist starts with 'expression' (but then it is doubtful whether she will actually arrive at a notion of personality). Where does ecclesiology start? The elasticised ecclesiology which I shall conceptualise throughout my study argues that the practices of church must allow persons to challenge 'their' communities and communities to challenge 'their' persons. It must start, then, by defining or redefining its start. The concept of trust, I shall argue in the following three chapters, allows for a concept of the experience of transcendence which is neither merely personal nor merely communal, but *both*. Trust is relational: it involves the other. Because trust is embodied in personalities and embedded in communities, it cuts across the double-bind in which the controversy between liberalism and postliberalism has caught ecclesiology.

[5] In as much as the term 'religiosity' refers to the personal while the term 'religion' refers to the communal, both terms might be distinguished. However, since I shall argue that the experience of transcendence requires both the personal and the communal, I avoid such a distinction. Following the primary and the secondary literature which I consult throughout my study, I use both terms interchangeably.

[6] Historically, the etymologies of 'community' and 'personality' have overlapped with the etymologies of 'collectivity' and 'individuality'. Throughout my study, I use 'collectivity' and 'individuality' as *exclusive* concepts and 'community' and 'personality' as *inclusive* concepts. Hence, there is no community without personalities and there is no personality without communities. My usage is inspired by Rowan Williams, 'The Person and the Individual: Human Dignity, Human Relationships and Human Limits', *Theos Annual Lecture* (London: Theos, 2013).

Chapter 1

THE TRACES OF TRUST

The experientialism of William James is at the core of the controversy between liberalism and postliberalism. In this chapter, I shall scrutinise James's concepts of religious and nonreligious experience. I aim to argue that the Jamesian notion of the circle of trust allows for a resolution of the dilemma between personality and community which has haunted ecclesiology. Trust is relational, embodied in personalities and embedded in communities.

I shall proceed in three steps. (1) I shall examine James's notion of the circle of trust. Drawing on James, I shall define trust as a relation to the other which is characterised by openness to the other's otherness. The difference which makes the other 'other' is experienced in *relations* with the other. James, however, loses track of these relations. The reason is the way he understands experience. For James, language is a source of contamination which turns pure experiences into impure expressions. I shall offer (2) a critical analysis and (3) a constructive assessment of James's interpretation of language. Both the analysis and the assessment are significant for Ernst Troeltsch's reception of James's approach to religion which I shall explore in the following chapter. Troeltsch's compelling critique of James encapsulates a tacit theory of trust which connects the self's relation to the finite other with the self's relation to the infinite other – a connection which has crucial consequences for ecclesiology.

1 Trusting the Other

The concept of trust is central both to James's philosophy of religion and to James's psychology of religion.[1] He characterises trust as a 'circle' in which trust creates trust.[2] Exploring his interpretation of the famous-infamous wager in Pascal's *Pensées*,[3] I shall argue that transcendence is at the core of the Jamesian circle of trust. Following James, I shall define trust as a relation to the other which is characterised by openness to the other's otherness.

James introduces the concept of trust in a facetious but forceful response to the wager presented by Pascal.[4] Transcendence is the condition of this wager: since the transcendent creator is beyond the immanent creature, empirical evidence can neither prove nor disprove the existence of God.[5] Accordingly, Pascal presents the options of belief in the existence of God and non-belief in the existence of God as a choice: 'What will you

---

[1] For the terminology of trust, see esp. William James, *The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy*, The Works of William James, vol. 6, ed. Frederick H. Burkhardt, Fredson Bowers, and Ignas K. Skrupskelis (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979), 19, 28-29, 40-42, 49, 51-54, 76. In *The Varieties*, James repeatedly refers to 'trust'. See esp. ibid., 42, 44-45, 84, 200, 229-230, 257, 261, 286-287, 296-297, 299, 356-358, 376, 413. Given the statistical significance of 'trust' in James's oeuvre, it is puzzling that his conceptualisation of trust has, as far as I can ascertain, not been studied. For a commendable exception, see Hartmut von Sass, 'Vorgängiges Vertrauen – Nachdenklicher Glaube: Ein theologischer Essay zu Rudolf Bultmann und William James', *Hermeneutische Blätter* 1 (2010), 52-66, who indicates that James might be a crucial collocutor for the interpretation of trust today.

[2] See William James, *Some Problems of Philosophy*, The Works of William James, vol. 7, ed. Frederick H. Burkhardt, Fredson Bowers, and Ignas K. Skrupskelis (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979), 115-116.

[3] Blaise Pascal, *Pensées. With an Introduction by Thomas S. Eliot*, trans. William F. Trotter (New York: Dutton, 1958).

[4] William James, 'The Will to Believe', in *The Will to Believe*, 13-33.

[5] 'Transcendence' is a notoriously nebulous notion. If it is defined through the contradistinction of 'transcendence' and 'immanence', then transcendence is – *by definition* – beyond immanence. See Johann Figl, 'Transcendence and Immanence, Religious Studies', in *Religion Past and Present*, vol. 13, 63. I am critical of the categorical contradistinction between immanence and transcendence. See Chapter 3 of my study.

wager?'[6] He points out that one's choice ought to be rooted in the consequences of belief or non-belief. Pascal explains: if God does not exist, the choice is irrelevant, neither belief nor non-belief has consequences; but if God does exist, the consequence for the believer is God's reward and the consequence for the nonbeliever is God's retribution. Therefore, Pascal announces unambiguously, belief trumps non-belief: 'If you gain, you gain all; if you lose, you lose nothing. Wager, then, without hesitation'.[7]

James, however, is not convinced. He snippily summarises, 'stupefy your scruples'.[8] For James, the conditions of the wager are wrong, because neither belief nor non-belief can be reduced to the cognitive calculation of risks or rewards. James argues that the choice between belief and non-belief is '*passional*':[9] the choice of faith is made emotionally rather than cognitively.[10] What follows from the 'passionality' of belief and non-belief is that religiosity has to be conceived of as pre- rather than post-argumentative.[11] As Pascal admits at the close of his *Pensées*, neither belief nor non-belief can be *created* by arguments.[12] But where do belief and non-belief come from then? For James, belief and non-belief are matters of trust.

---

[6] Pascal, *Pensées*, 66.
[7] Ibid., 68.
[8] James, 'The Will to Believe', 16.
[9] Ibid., 11 (my emphasis).
[10] Ibid., 15-16, 20-21, 24-25, 31. Terminologically, James is ambiguous: sometimes he does and sometimes he does not distinguish between the term 'faith' and the term 'belief'. The German 'Glaube', which will become important in my analysis of Troeltsch's reception of James in Chapter 2, draws no distinction between these two terms. Thus, I use both of them interchangeably.
[11] The interpretation of faith as pre-argumentative rather than post-argumentative is a core concern in Hans Joas's analysis of James's approach to religion. See Hans Joas, *The Genesis of Values*, trans. Gregory Moore (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 35-53.
[12] Pascal, *Pensées*, 68.

In response to Pascal's wager, James discusses trust – as far as I can ascertain, he does not define it – by painting a picture of interpersonal attraction:[13] 'Do you like me?'[14] For James, the answer depends on both your attitude towards me and my attitude towards you. It is not a matter of empirical evidence which could be gathered through objective observation. But if we meet each other 'half way', I might contribute to your liking of me as much as you might contribute to my liking of you.[15] Hence, when I flirt with you, I always already operate on the assumption that you like me; when you flirt with me, you always already operate on the assumption that I like you. Our flirtation lies in the play between us, you acting *as if* you knew I like you and I acting *as if* I knew you like me. Elsewhere, James offers a conceptual account of the attraction between persons, elaborating on the 'circle' of 'trust' in which 'we ... jump with both feet off the ground ... towards a world of which we trust the other parts to meet our jump'.[16] James's metaphor of the 'jump' accentuates the vulnerability which one has to accept when one trusts the other.[17] Because the other might fail to reciprocate – you might not appreciate my advances, returning my flirtations with a resounding slap – trust runs the risk of disappointment. Trust, therefore, evokes a curious combination of feelings of security and insecurity which are not far from Rudolf Otto's preeminent phenomenology of *The Holy*.[18]

---

[13] For a succinct summary, see Joas, *The Genesis of Values*, 43. See also Charles Taylor, *Varieties of Religion Today: William James Revisited* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 45-46.

[14] James, 'The Will to Believe', 23.

[15] Ibid., 24.

[16] Ibid., 28.

[17] Here, James anticipates Annette Baier's concept of trust as 'accepted vulnerability to another's possible but not expected ill will'. See Annette Baier, 'Trust and Antitrust', *Ethics* 96/2 (1986), 235. For the concept of vulnerability, see Sturla J. Stålsett, 'The Ethics of Vulnerability, Social Inclusion and Social Capital', *Forum for Development Studies* 34/1 (2007), 45-62, who explores both the conditions and the consequences of an anthropology of the '*homo vulnerabilis*' (ibid., 46). I shall return to the concept of vulnerability in Chapter 9.

[18] Rudolf Otto, *The Idea of the Holy: An Inquiry into the Non-Rational in the Idea of the Divine and its Relation to the Rational*, trans. John W. Harvey (London: Oxford University Press, 1924), argues that the 'Holy' simultaneously generates feelings of attraction and of aversion. I shall return to Otto in Chapter 2.

Trust, then, has to do with the transcendence of the other – the other who is by definition beyond my control. Accordingly, James characterises trust as 'previous', 'preliminary',[19] and 'precursive'.[20] 'It is only by risking our persons ... that we live at all'.[21]

Accordingly, James operates with a two-track concept of trust: 'trust' captures the as-if assumption which allows for the relation *and* the relation which allows for the as-if assumption.[22] For James, the as-if assumption, embodied 'in' the trusting persons, might create the relation of trust; and the relation of trust, embedded 'in-between' the trusting persons, might create the as-if assumption. Hence, *relationality* is indispensible to trust.[23] Building on the Jamesian circle of trust, I define trust as a relation to the other which is characterised by openness to the other's otherness – a definition which will be crucial throughout my study. I deliberately leave open whether the term 'other' refers to the

[19] James, 'The Will to Believe', 28-29. Here, James uses 'trust' for faith and 'faith' for trust. However, these terms are not always interchangeable, because, according to James, trust is the *centre* of faith. See *The Varieties*, 200.

[20] James, *Some Problems of Philosophy*, 116.

[21] James, 'Is Life Worth Living', in *The Will to Believe*, 59.

[22] See Joas, *The Genesis of Values*, 43, who points to the significance of the 'advance in faith' in James's concept of the circle of trust. Crucially, in the German original Joas uses the concept of trust when he interprets the advance in faith as 'Vertrauensvorschuss'. See Hans Joas, *Die Entstehung der Werte* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1997), 71.

[23] To take James's stress on the relationality of trust into account would be particularly pertinent for today's trust theories in which trust is increasingly individualised. For a critique of the individualisation of trust, see Ingolf U. Dalferth and Simon Peng-Keller, 'Kommunikation des Vertrauens Verstehen: Hermeneutische Annäherung', in *Kommunikation des Vertrauens*, ed. Ingolf U. Dalferth and Simon Peng-Keller (Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 2012), 19-20. See also Martin Hartmann, *Die Praxis des Vertrauens* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2011).

creator or to the creature, because James tacitly transforms the 'other' in his interpretation of Pascal's wager.[24]

In Pascal, the one who is trusted is the creator, the *infinite* other. Because the infinite other is transcendent (which is to say, beyond control), the relation to the creator cannot be rooted in empirical evidence. In James's response to Pascal, the one who is trusted is the creature, the *finite* other. Because the finite other is transcendent (which is to say, beyond control), the relation to the creature cannot be rooted in empirical evidence. James's transformation of the one who is trusted from the infinite other to the finite other points to the *transcendence* of both the finite and the infinite other: the other is other – which is to say, she is beyond control. Alterity, the otherness of the other, transcends my evaluations and my expectations of the other: the other is ultimately undeterminable by my knowledge of her: she surprises me. The experience of transcendence, then, has to do with being surprised.[25]

In Pascal, the one who trusts responds to the lack of control induced by the transcendence of the other through cognitively disengaging the other. In James's response to Pascal, the one who trusts responds to the lack of control induced by the transcendence of the other through emotionally engaging the other. Following James, then, transcendence might be experienced in the exposure to each and every other – when the other is the infinite creator and when the other is the finite creature. If I relate to the other in trust, I

[24] What connects the experience of trust in the creator to the experience of trust in the creature is that the one who is trusted cannot be controlled by the one who trusts. See James, 'Is Life Worth Living', 57. Matthias Jung, *Erfahrung und Religion: Grundzüge einer hermeneutisch-pragmatischen Religionstheorie* (München: Alber, 1999), 198-199, criticises James's turn from nonreligious trust in the creature to religious trust in the creator. He argues that the relation to the finite other is independent of the subject, while the relation to the infinite other is dependent on the subject. Yet Jung neglects that the one who trusts can control neither the finite trusted one nor the infinite trusted one. Thus, James is correct when he argues that trust might be disappointed, regardless of whether the one who is trusted is finite or infinite.

[25] I shall return to the concept of transcendence in Chapter 3.

allow her to transcend and transform me. If I relate to the other in distrust, I disallow her to transcend and transform me.[26] Trust, then, is a way to relate to a transcendence which transforms me.[27]

Charles Taylor argues that James's interpretation of Pascal's wager captures the controversy between believers and nonbelievers under the conditions of modernity.[28] For Taylor, James characterises this controversy as an 'open space where you can feel the winds pulling you, now to belief, now to unbelief'.[29] 'Standing in the Jamesian open space requires that you ... can actually feel some of the force of each opposing position'.[30] James is the 'philosopher of the cusp'.[31] On the cusp, one has to jump – because neither the existence of God nor the nonexistence of God can be excluded by empirical evidence. Both the jump with 'anticipatory confidence' towards the existence of God and the jump without 'anticipatory confidence' towards the existence of God are risky.[32] Taylor's notorious notion of 'the immanent frame' resonates with the Jamesian open space:[33]

> [M]y understanding of the immanent frame is that, properly understood, it allows of both readings, without compelling us to either. If you grasp our

[26] Terminologically, 'mistrust' (an unintentional lack of trust) and 'distrust' (an intentional lack of trust) might be distinguished from trust. See Ingolf U. Dalferth, 'Vertrauen und Hoffen: Orientierungsweisen im Glauben', in *Gottvertrauen: Die ökumenische Diskussion um die fiducia*, ed. Ingolf U. Dalferth and Simon Peng-Keller (Freiburg: Herder, 2012), 412.

[27] For the transformativity of transcendence, see my comparative combination of sociological and theological concepts of transcendence in Chapter 3.

[28] Taylor, *Varieties of Religion Today*, 58.

[29] Charles Taylor, *A Secular Age* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 549.

[30] Ibid.

[31] Taylor, *Varieties of Religion Today*, 59.

[32] Taylor, *A Secular Age*, 550-551, 674-675, 703, 833n 17, 844n 38, uses 'anticipatory confidence' to characterise James's concept of the jump. I shall return to Taylor's concept of anticipatory confidence in Chapter 6.

[33] See Taylor, *A Secular Age*, 539-593.

> predicament without ideological distortion ..., then you see that going one way or another requires what is often called a 'leap of faith'.[34]

Accordingly, the Jamesian jump is required for belief *and* for non-belief alike. Life involves trust – a trust which James marshals against the 'worshippers of science'.[35]

To summarise, transcendence is at the core of the Jamesian circle of trust. The alterity of the other transcends my evaluations and my expectations of her. Trust, then, is a relation to the other which is characterised by openness to the other's otherness. In trust, I allow the other to transform me – a transformation which might be triggered by both the finite other and the infinite other. Since there is no evidence which rules out either belief or non-belief, both belief in the existence of God and non-belief in the existence of God are – strictly speaking – beliefs.[36] Hence, it is neither simply nonreligious to be rational nor simply non-rational to be religious.[37] However, considering the Jamesian account of the circle of trust, there is a difference between believing in the existence of God and believing in the nonexistence of God. If the mutual as-if assumption of trust creates the relation of trust (and the relation of trust creates the mutual as-if assumption of trust), then the 'only opportunity' to make God's 'acquaintance' is to 'jump' towards God in trust.[38] Acquaintance with God is a core concern of James's Gifford Lectures.

---

[34] Ibid., 550.

[35] Richard H. King, 'Religion, Sociology and Psychology: William James and the Re-Enchantment of the World', in *William James and the Transatlantic Conversation: Pragmatism, Pluralism, and Philosophy of Religion*, ed. Martin Halliwell and Joel D. S. Rasmussen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 49-64, argues that James advocates a re-enchantment of society. While I agree that James opposes secularist accounts of society, I argue that the notion of a 're-enchantment' is too strong. James points to the *ambiguity* of the world which allows for religious *and* nonreligious interpretations.

[36] See William James, 'The Sentiment of Rationality', in *The Will to Believe*, 76: 'Faith means belief in something concerning which doubt is still theoretically possible; and as the test of belief is willingness to act, one may say that faith is the readiness to act in a cause the prosperous issue of which is not certified to us in advance'.

[37] James anchors trust anthropologically. See ibid., 75-76. See also Joas, *The Genesis of Values*, 43.

[38] James, 'The Will to Believe', 28.

2 Experiencing Trust

In his Gifford Lectures, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, James describes and defines religion as the experience of transcendence.[39] Here he introduces the concept of trust in the context of a comparison between religious and nonreligious attitudes towards God.[40] Both attitudes, James concedes, might assume the existence of the transcendent. Hence, the distinction between what is religious and what is nonreligious is not necessarily a 'difference of doctrine'.[41] Instead, the emotions which accompany the doctrine make the distinction.[42] James repeatedly refers to Job's cry '"Though he slay me, yet I will trust in him!'" (Job 13:15) to exemplify the emotions which mark a religious rather than a nonreligious attitude.[43] I shall argue that James's concept of experience forces him to draw a distinction between the transcendence of the finite other and the transcendence of the infinite other. This distinction eventually evokes the individualisation and the interiorisation of religiosity.

[39] See James, *The Varieties*, 34. Of course, James uses the concept of divinity here. However, in order to include experiences of theistic and non-theistic religions, I deviate from James's usage. For a similar deviation, see Jörg Lauster, *Religion als Lebensdeutung: Theologische Hermeneutik Heute* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2005), 20-21. Considering the diversity of approaches to the definition of religion in James's oeuvre, such a deviation is in line with James. For James's approaches to religion, see Jeremy Carrette, *William James's Hidden Religious Imagination: A Universe of Relations* (London: Routledge, 2013).
[40] James, *The Varieties*, 42.
[41] Ibid.
[42] Ibid.
[43] Ibid., 42, 68-69, 353.

Considering its centrality, it is puzzling that there is no definition of the concept of experience in James's Gifford Lectures.[44] However, in *The Principles of Psychology*, written over the course of twelve years, James comes close to conceptualising what he means by 'experience'.[45] This concept is at the core of his notion of consciousness. For James, consciousness is a 'stream' which continuously captures a subject's internal and external sensations.[46] Either voluntarily or involuntarily, the subject selects a subset of data from the set of data in the stream of her consciousness in order to experience data. Hence, experience is the result of the subject's selection.[47] The selection of data is not without consequences – both in terms of what is selected (and thus experienced) and in terms of what is not selected (and thus not experienced):

> The mind works on the data it receives ... as the sculptor works on his block of stone. In a sense the statue stood there from eternity. But there are a thousand different ones beside it, and the sculptor alone is to thank for having extricated this one... Other sculptors, other statues from the same stone.[48]

---

[44] For a critical and constructive account of James's concept of experience, see Nicholas Lash, *Easter in Ordinary: Reflections on Human Experience and the Knowledge of God* (London: SCM, 1988), 9-17. A short summary is offered by Richard R. Niebuhr, 'William James on Religious Experience', in *The Cambridge Companion to William James*, ed. Ruth A. Putnam (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 214-236, who stresses that *The Varieties* employs the concept of experience 'rather loosely' (ibid., 202). Niebuhr argues that one has to take James's whole oeuvre into account in order to understand his concept of experience.

[45] William James, *The Principles of Psychology*, 3 vols, The Works of William James, vols 8-10, ed. Frederick H. Burkhardt, Fredson Bowers, and Ignas K. Skurupskelis (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981).

[46] James, *The Principles of Psychology*, vol. 1, 233.

[47] Ibid., 380 (emphasis in the original): '*My experience is what I agree to attend to*.' Accordingly, James's concept of consciousness captures what is conscious and what is non-conscious. The difference between the conscious and the non-conscious is drawn *through* the concept of experience.

[48] Ibid., 278.

Accordingly, for James, experience is simultaneously a reaction and a construction.[49] He stresses that this simultaneity is structured through language. By 'language', he means a system of signifiers in which a signifier signifies a signified in spite of the difference between signifier and signified.[50] Language is necessary for experience: the term 'signified' encapsulates the set of *immediate* data, while the term 'signifier' encapsulates the subset of *mediate* data. Language mediates between set and subset: language selects what is experienced from what is not experienced; language turns the stone into the sculpture.

However, James is strikingly suspicious of the turn from stone to sculpture.[51] To paraphrase him: when a subject is angry, she is angry; but when a subject says 'I am angry', language introduces a difference between her and her anger. She is not in the state of 'I-am-angry'; she is in the state of 'I-say-I-am-angry'.[52] To mix up these states is branded as the 'psychologist's fallacy'.[53] The difference between experience and expression, around which the psychologist's fallacy revolves, runs through the philosophy and the psychology of James.[54] In *The Principles of Psychology*, he draws a distinction

---

[49] See Lauster, *Religion als Lebensdeutung*, 20-21.

[50] James, *The Principles of Psychology*, vol. 2, 980.

[51] See James, *The Principles of Psychology*, vol. 1, 193-196, where James discusses language as a source of error in psychology. See also 'Thought Before Language: A Deaf-Mute's Recollection', in William James, *Essays in Psychology*, The Works of William James, vol. 13, ed. Frederick H. Burkhardt, Fredson Bowers, and Ignas K. Skrupskelis (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983), 278-291, where James analyses the reports of a deaf-mute who learned to speak in order to defend the possibility of thought *prior* to language.

[52] James, *The Principles of Psychology*, vol. 1, 191.

[53] Ibid., 195.

[54] James uses the concept of experience for both 'mediate experiences' and 'immediate experiences'. Only occasionally he reserves 'experience' for the immediate as opposed to the mediate. See Niebuhr, 'William James on Religious Experience', 215. In 'Experience', in William James, *Essays in Philosophy*, The Works of William James, vol. 5, ed. Frederick H. Burkhardt, Fredson Bowers, and Ignas K. Skrupskelis (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977), 95, James defines experience as 'the entire process of phenomena, of present data considered in their raw immediacy, before reflective thought has analyzed them into subjective and objective aspects'.

between modes of knowledge which pairs with the distinction between 'immediate experience' and 'mediate experience'. James argues that interpersonal encounters demonstrate that the direct knowledge one gains through relations differs from the indirect knowledge one gains through reflections: relation pertains to existential acquaintance while reflection pertains to non-existential analysis.[55] Again, language points to the difference between both modes of knowledge.[56] Eventually, in his posthumously published *Essays on Radical Empiricism*, James refers to 'pure experience' and 'impure experience' in order to capture the difference language draws within experiences: pure experience comes without a distinction between set and subset, while impure experience comes with a distinction between subset and set.[57] The metaphor of purity demonstrates that James defines language as a source of *contamination*:[58] it transforms the immediate experience which is gained through relations into the mediate experience which is gained through reflections; it turns the pure into the impure.[59]

In *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, the suspicion towards language is pushed to the extreme. According to James, mystical experiences – experiences of a union between

---

[55] James, *The Principles of Psychology*, vol. 1, 216-218. See also Niebuhr, 'William James on Religious Experience', 222-223.

[56] James, *The Principles of Psychology*, vol. 1, 217.

[57] William James, 'A World of Pure Experience', in William James, *Essays in Radical Empiricism*, The Works of William James, vol. 3, ed. Fredson Bowers and Ignas K. Skurupskelis (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), 21-44. James turns from epistemology to ontology when he argues that the linguistic subject-object distinction is introduced retrospectively, after the fall from the pure into the impure (ibid., 37). Accordingly, 'subjectivity and objectivity are functional attributes..., realized only when the experience is "taken" ... by a new retrospective consciousness'. William James, 'Does Consciousness Exist?', in *Essays in Radical Empiricism*, 13. For a discussion of the shift from ontological dualism to ontological monism which is implied by James distinction between pure experience without subject-object distinction and impure experience with subject-object distinction, see Jung, *Erfahrung und Religion*, 168-169. Jung emphasises that it is unclear why the distinction between subject and object is introduced into the experience in the first place if it is not anchored in what is experienced.

[58] See Lash, *Easter in Ordinary*, 38-50.

[59] For the implications of James's 'Reinlichkeitsmetaphorik', see Jung, *Erfahrung und Religion*, 172-175.

creature and creator – are the core of religiosity.[60] The central characteristic of mysticism is that the experience has a 'noetic quality' which is ineffable rather than effable.[61] The union *can* be experienced, but it *cannot* be expressed. When it comes to God, the state of 'I-say-I-trust-the-transcendent' would contaminate the state of 'I-trust-the-transcendent'; expression would contaminate experience. James's understanding of the experience of transcendence implies that there are two modes of transcendence: the experience of the transcendence of the finite other is expressible, while the experience of the transcendence of the infinite other is inexpressible. Thus, the finite other is contrasted to the infinite other.

James's characterisation of language as a source of contamination is important for the notion of trust which he conceives of in conversation with Martin Luther. Following a theological trajectory which can be traced to Augustine, Luther distinguished two dimensions of faith: *fides qua creditur* or *fiducia* (the believing) and *fides quae creditur* or *fides* (the beliefs).[62] For Luther, these dimensions were inextricably interwoven. However, since, for James, language is a source of contamination, he seeks to extricate the inextricable. When he assumes that *fides qua* is essential and *fides quae* is nonessential, he pairs 'believing' with the pure immediate experience of transcendence which is established through relations and he pairs 'beliefs' with the impure mediate experience of transcendence which is established through reflections.[63] Thus, the essence of faith is

[60] James, *The Varieties*, 301-339.
[61] Ibid., 302-303.
[62] Luther uses *fides* for *fides quae* and *fiducia* for *fides qua*. Fiducia translates as trust. Wolf-Friedrich Schäufele, 'Fiducia bei Martin Luther', in *Gottvertrauen*, 163-181, points out that *fiducia* is the centre of Luther's concept of faith, although 'fiducia' is, statistically speaking, not a central concept for him.
[63] James, *The Varieties*, 200. James refers to *fides qua* as 'essential' which means that *fides quae* is nonessential. Since for Luther the term 'fides' does, whereas the term 'fiducia' does not, include the object of faith, he adds the object – God – to 'fiducia' when it is used in isolation from 'fides'. Hence, a separation of *fides qua* and *fides quae* is impossible in Luther's concept of faith. See Schäufele, 'Fiducia bei Martin Luther', 166-168.

conceived of as a 'state of confidence' in which the creature and the creator are 'at one'.[64] James refers to the state of confidence as 'trust'.[65] Trust is *fides qua* rather than *fides quae*. Echoing Luther, James distinguishes between total and partial trust: the infinite other can but the finite other cannot be trusted totally.[66]

James explains the shift from partial trust in the finite other to total trust in the infinite other with the critical concept of 'selfsurrender'.[67] He stresses that in a conversion the agency of trust is shifted from the finite other to the infinite other.[68] Accordingly, the concept of self-surrender captures the 'jump' of James's circle of trust. With this concept, James aims to answer the dilemma of the genesis of faith which has haunted theology even prior to Luther. Is faith created by the creature or by the creator? Is the creature choosing to believe or chosen to believe? James answers that trust in the transcendent is experienced not as choosing but as being-chosen.[69] Both the finite other and the infinite other are active in faith because it takes the self to surrender the self. Self-surrender is a jump into trust. In trust, the self lets go of the self. Thus, self-surrender combines the activity and the passivity of the self. This combination offers an elegant response to the haunting dilemma of the genesis of faith. Faith is neither created by the creature nor by the creator – rather, it is co-

[64] James, *The Varieties*, 200, refers to the research conducted by his contemporary and colleague James Leuba. Jacob A van Belzen, 'Was ist spezifisch an einer religiösen Erfahrung? Überlegungen aus religionspsychologischer Perspektive', in *Religiöse Erfahrung: Ein interdisziplinärer Klärungsversuch*, ed. Friedo Ricken (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2004), 40-55, points out that the separation of *fides qua* and *fides quae*, or experience and expression, was at stake in the discussion between James and Leuba. Van Belzen argues, following Leuba, that both cannot be separated.
[65] James, *The Varieties*, 200.
[66] Ibid., 230. I shall return to the distinction of total and partial trust in Chapter 3.
[67] James, *The Varieties*, 170-176, See also ibid., 69, 215, 250, 400.
[68] Ibid., 261.
[69] Joas, *The Genesis of Values*, 51-52.

created by both of them.[70] Despite the 'oneness' between the truster and the trustee which is achieved in the mystical union, the union is not tantamount to a 'substantial identity'.[71] Faith, trust in the transcendent, is relational – it requires a difference between the one who trusts and the one who is trusted.

However, as a consequence of his distinction between the effable experience of the transcendence of the finite other and the ineffable experience of the transcendence of the infinite other, James *separates* the relation to the creature from the relation to the creator. Because trust in the creator is incommensurable to trust in the creature, religion, the experience of trust in the transcendent occurs to 'individual men [sic] in their solitude'.[72] In his definition of religion, then, James reduces transcendence to the experience of a solitary subject; the experience of the transcendence of the finite other is *independent* of the experience of the transcendence of the infinite other. The corollary of James's understanding of experience is the individualisation and the interiorisation of religion.

According to James, the experience of transcendence cannot be transmitted because transmission from person to person would result in the contamination of experience through expression. To be sure, James acknowledges that through the expression of the experience, a subject might set a pattern of religiosity, a 'pattern' which is then followed by subject after subject.[73] Yet since these subjects follow mediate expressions without immediate experiences, trust in the transcendent turns into talk about trust in the

[70] Similarly, Troeltsch assumes that the decision either for the agency of the finite or for the agency of the infinite in the genesis of faith is only to be made if the finite and the infinite are separated in the first place. Although, for Troeltsch, the logical problem remains, he argues that, in the experience of transcendence, the finite and the infinite are interrelated. See AG, 1470-1474. See also Sarah Coakley, *Christ Without Absolutes: A Study of the Christology of Ernst Troeltsch* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 92n. 28.
[71] William James, 'Reflex Action and Theism', in *The Will to Believe*, 106.
[72] James, *The Varieties*, 34.
[73] Ibid., 15.

transcendent. Hence, for James, the genesis of religion leads from the personal to the communal, not from the communal to the personal: it is unidirectional. Religion is rooted in the interiorised and individualised experience of a religious 'genius'.[74] Thus, in the transmission from the 'pattern setter' to the 'set pattern', the state of I-trust-the-transcendent is turned into the state of I-say-I-trust-the-transcendent 'until all that remains is "dull habit"'.[75] Consequently, James distinguishes between primary personal religion and secondary communal religion. Scornfully, he characterises the religion started and sustained by communities as 'second-hand'.[76]

Through the individualisation and interiorisation of religion, James attempts to defend persons from the pressure of communities. He interprets churches as structures of suppression rather than structures of support.[77] Through their dogmatic domestications of trust, churches invent orthodoxies and heterodoxies in order to 'excommunicate those whose trust is different'.[78] Against the dogmatisation of religion, James demands the de-dogmatisation of religion: trust in the transcendent can be experienced 'without a single dogma or definition'.[79] Richard Rorty characterises James's concept of religiosity as 'romance'.[80] For Rorty, romance is what remains of religiosity when its concrete content is lost: the loss is inevitable in concepts of religion which focus on *fides qua* at the expense of

---

[74] Ibid., 12. See ibid., 173. See also Lash, *Easter in Ordinary*, 44-46.

[75] James, *The Varieties*, 15. See also Taylor, *Varieties of Religion Today*, 5.

[76] James, *The Varieties*, 15, 33, 270. Jeremy Carrette, 'Passionate Belief: William James, Emotion, and Religious Experience', in *William James and the Varieties of Religious Experience: A Centenary Celebration*, ed. Jeremy Carrette (London: Routledge, 2005), 79-93, traces James's tacit acknowledgement of the sociality of religious experiences and of religious emotions. Nonetheless, he concludes that James's concern is individual psychology rather than social psychology.

[77] See James, *The Varieties*, 6.

[78] James, 'Is Life Worth Living', 51. See also Lash, *Easter in Ordinary*, 52-60.

[79] James, 'Is Life Worth Living', 52.

[80] Richard Rorty, 'Religious Faith, Intellectual Responsibility, and Romance' in *The Cambridge Companion to William James*, 84-102. See also Richard Rorty, 'Pragmatism as Romantic Polytheism', in *The Revival of Pragmatism* , ed. Moris Dickstein (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998), 21-36.

fides quae.[81] 'What matters is the insistence itself – the romance'.[82] However, whether one approves or disapproves of a characterisation of religion as romance,[83] the prioritisation of experience over expression implies the experientialism which interprets personality at the cost of community and community at the cost of the personality.

To summarise, James's concept of experience forces him to give up on the notion of the transcendence of the other with which he characterised the circle of trust. The circle of trust pertained to both finite and infinite others, because transcendence qualifies the relation to both of them. Now, in his interpretation of religious as opposed to nonreligious experience, James separates trust in the finite other from trust in the infinite other – nonreligious experience comes with a transcendence which can be expressed and religious experience comes with a transcendence which cannot be expressed. As a consequence of the inexpressibility of God's transcendence, James isolates the relation to the creator from the relation to the creature. Nicholas Lash concludes: 'If James's account were correct, then the best way to prepare someone for the experience of God would seem to be to abandon them, at birth, in some untracked waste far from human habitation'.[84] The reason for James's separation of the relation to the finite other from the relation to the infinite other is his understanding of language as a source for the contamination of transcendence. But does his understanding of language hold?

---

[81] Rorty, 'Religious Faith, Intellectual Responsibility, and Romance', 93-94, 96.
[82] Ibid., 97.
[83] Richard Rorty's concept of romance captures James's separation of *fides qua* and *fides qua*. However, Rorty's stress on the relativism in both James's philosophy and James's psychology might push the romance too far. For a critique of Rorty's reading of James, which concentrates on the concept of experience, see Martin Halliwell and Joel D. Rasmussen, 'Introduction: William James and the Transatlantic Conversation', in *William James and the Transatlantic Conversation*, 8-9.
[84] Lash, *Easter in Ordinary*, 58.

3 Expressing Trust

John L. Austin's William James Lectures, *How to Do Things with Words?,* published in 1955, identify a 'revolution'[85] in the conceptualisation of language. This revolution revolves around the discovery of what Austin calls the '"descriptive" fallacy'.[86] By 'descriptive fallacy', he means notions of language in which language is reduced to description.[87] Although James is not mentioned in Austin's William James Lectures, I shall argue that James's interpretation of language falls for the descriptive fallacy. Building on the theory of language explored in Rowan Williams's 2013 Gifford Lectures, published as *The Edge of Words,*[88] I shall sketch an alternative account of language in which language is both 'describing' and 'doing' transcendence. Such an account might allow me to indicate the significance of community for experiences of transcendence which will be explored and elaborated on in Chapter 2.

Austin argues that language is both 'describing' and 'doing'. Terminologically, he distinguishes 'performative utterances' which *do* things from 'constative utterances' which *describe* things, or (to put it more plainly) 'performatives' from 'constatives'.[89] Austin's core concern is to free language from the descriptive fallacy which assumes that a statement has to describe what it states such that the description can be characterised as either correct or incorrect. Hence, he argues that performativity is neither correct nor

[85] Austin, *How To Do Things With Words?*, 3.
[86] Ibid.
[87] Ibid., 5.
[88] Rowan Williams, *The Edge of Words: God and the Habits of Language* (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2014).
[89] Austin, *How To Do Things With Words?*, 6n. 2.

incorrect.[90] Utterances like 'I thank you' are not 'describing' thanks, but 'doing' thanks; therefore, they are neither correct nor incorrect (Austin refers to them as 'happy' or 'unhappy').[91]

Austin's discovery of performativity exposes a problem in James's characterisation of language. For James, language describes; and since this description introduces a difference between the description and the described – a difference which leads to the distanciation of the describer from the described[92] – it is characterised as a source of contamination: language turns the pure into the impure because it breaks with immediacy.[93] Put in Austin's terminology, James aims to analyse a pure performance of trust – a doing of trust which is not tainted by a describing of trust.

Initially, Austin had a similar intuition. Like 'a botanist impressed by the variety of species',[94] he attempted to isolate utterances which do things from utterances which describe things. But his attempt failed: doing and describing cannot be separated because 'the *same* sentence is used on different occasions of utterance in *both* ways'.[95] Hence, it is 'hopeless from the start if we are to leave utterances *as they stand*'.[96] He concludes that one

---

[90] See James Loxley, *Performativity* (London: Routledge, 2007), 7-9.

[91] See 'Lecture II' and 'Lecture III' in Austin's *How To Do Things With Words?*, 12-24 and 25-38.

[92] The concept of distanciation has been coined by Paul Ricoeur. Like James, Ricoeur assumes that mediation implies distanciation. But, unlike James, Ricoeur argues that distanciation allows for the understanding of that which has been mediated. Without distance between the one who understands and the one who is understood, understanding is impossible. See esp. Paul Ricoeur, 'The Hermeneutical Function of Distanciation', in Paul Ricoeur, *Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences: Essays on Language, Action and Interpretation*, trans. John B. Thompson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 131-144.

[93] The interpretation of language as a 'break with immediacy' marks philosophy and theology prior to the linguistic turn. See Steven Shakespeare, 'Language', in *The Oxford Handbook of Theology and Modern European Thought*, 105-126.

[94] Jennifer Hornsby, 'Speech Acts and Performatives', in *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language*, ed. Ernest Lepore and Barry C. Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 902.

[95] Austin, *How To Do Things With Words?*, 67.

[96] Ibid., 67 (emphases in the original).

'must consider the total situation in which the utterance is issued – the total speech act'.[97] Sketching a theory of speech acts, Austin distinguishes between the locutionary force of the utterance (the describing) and the illocutionary force of the utterance (the doing):[98] 'whenever I "say" anything ... I shall be performing both locutionary and illocutionary acts'.[99] Austin's analysis echoes James's assumption that there is a difference between doing something and saying that one is doing something. Yet Austin distinguishes between *dimensions of utterances* as opposed to *utterances*. Utterances like 'I am grateful' – to pick up the example of thanksgiving again – are both 'describing' gratitude and 'doing' gratitude. Similarly, utterances like 'I trust you' are both describing trust and doing trust. It is James's insistence on the strict separation of the state of 'I-trust-you' and the state of 'I-say-I-trust-you' which makes him fall for the descriptive fallacy.

What is needed in order to retrieve the Jamesian circle of trust is a theory of language which allows language to describe *and* to do transcendence. Such a theory has been worked out by Rowan Williams.[100] Williams's *The Edge of Words* maps 'a future of natural theology'.[101] He argues that the alternative between a natural theology and a non-natural theology is a *false* alternative. For him, these theologies evade history by concentrating on ahistorical standards which are either natural (as opposed to revealed) or

---

[97] Ibid., 52.

[98] Ibid., 101-102. See also, Loxley, *Performativity*, 15-19.

[99] Austin, *How To Do Things With Words?*, 132. Eventually, Austin draws a distinction between 'locution', 'illocution', and 'perlocution' (ibid., 101-102) to capture the dimensions of speech acts: locution captures the describing of things, while illocution and perlocution capture the doing of things whereby 'doing' is distinguished according to the act (illocution) and the consequence of the act (perlocution). For Austin's detailed description of these three dimensions see 'Lecture IX', in ibid., 108-119. It is noteworthy that Austin offers no definition of locution. As he himself admits, locution is rather a negative than a positive category, capturing what is neither illocutionary nor perlocutionary (ibid., 96). See also Hornsby, 'Speech Acts and Performatives', 895-896.

[100] See Williams, *The Edge of Words*.

[101] Ibid., 1.

revealed (as opposed to natural).[102] He concentrates on language in order to revise natural theology. For his revision, the eccentricities and extremes – 'the edges' – of language are significant, because these edges characterise

> the point at which we run out of things to say in the discourse we started with but recognise that this running out is not simply an ending. ... It is a different kind of accuracy or adequacy that is called for, something that is not descriptive in the usual sense.[103]

Although Austin is not referred to in these lectures, Williams is acutely aware of Austin's warning of the descriptive fallacy. His lectures offer a compelling critique of the interpretation of language as 'a mapping exercise'.[104] According to Williams, language is *representation*.[105] For my assessment of the notion of language in James's Gifford Lectures, it is crucial that Williams's concept of representation implies that 'ordinary' talk about the finite other and 'extraordinary' talk about the infinite other cannot be strictly separated (as James would have it). In both cases language re-presents: talk makes present what is talked about.[106] Like James, Williams argues that language introduces a difference between the represented and the representation. But, unlike James, Williams argues that this difference is not destructive but constructive for experience. The represented is reformed and reformulated in the representation *in order to* make it present. Therefore,

---

[102] Ibid., 2-3.
[103] Ibid., 17.
[104] Ibid., 22.
[105] For his concept of representation, see the appendix to *The Edge of Words*, 186-197, in which he traces conceptualisations of representation in philosophy and theology. However, it seems to me that for Williams 'representation' is itself defined by what it is not rather than by what it is. Williams writes: 'I am once again – rather obviously – trying to avoid speaking of a "world" beyond language, if only to avoid a not very helpful word/world dualism which encourages us to think of language as the labelling of a passive environment' (ibid., 92).
[106] Ibid., 22.

language is rather non-literal than literal, metaphor is its metier. Language as representation, then, is a matter of *imaginative response* rather than *imitating repetition*.[107]

Williams applies Paul Ricoeur's concept of distanciation to the analysis of relations to the other.[108] Representation, he argues, implies a relation between the knower and the known in which the known is active rather than passive – 'active "beyond" the grasp of the knower'.[109] Here, Williams points to the transcendence of the other which is so crucial to the Jamesian circle of trust. Williams uses 'trust' to explicate 'how speech works' in the relation to the transcendent other.[110] Language requires trust: I trust that my speech is intelligible to the other (which means that it has effects on her); the other trusts that her speech is intelligible to me (which means that it has effects on me).[111] Communication is rooted in trust.[112]

> The fact that we work on our words in such a way that we come to trust one another, to be confident that what we are talking about is what another speaker is talking about, so that we can negotiate shared activities – this tells very seriously against the idea that 'describing things as we please' could be a constitutive strategy of our language.[113]

[107] Ibid., 163.
[108] See again Ricoeur, 'The Hermeneutical Function of Distanciation', 131-144. Williams echoes Ricoeur's concept of distanciation, although Ricoeur is not explicitly engaged by him.
[109] Williams, *The Edge of Words*, 31.
[110] Ibid., 113.
[111] Ibid., 113-114.
[112] Ibid., 116.
[113] Ibid., 41.

Language operates as representation because it involves trust:[114] without trust, language does fall for the descriptive fallacy; with trust, language does not fall for the descriptive fallacy. Trust enables metaphorical edges and metaphorical extremes. James reduces language to description because he neglects that trust is always already operative *in* language.[115]

Williams argues that if language is interpreted as representation, then 'we do not need to invoke a non-representable level of reality – a strictly non-*speakable* level of agency'.[116] Thus, representation cuts through James's distinction between effable experiences and ineffable experiences. As a consequence, James's separation of the effable transcendence of the finite other and the ineffable transcendence of the infinite other collapses. Instead, representation allows for the continuous deferral of closure.[117] For Williams, such deferral is exemplified by the parables of Jesus which represent God.[118] In these parables, God is narrated. The narratives engage and expose their addressees to the alterity of God by continuously deferring constative conceptual closure.

---

[114] Ibid., 114. Williams cautions against the (ab)use of the concept of trust: 'As we have just noticed, it may be misleading even to speak of "trust" here. It is not that I make a leap of faith in assuming that there is such a thing as shared significance. ... Yet it is not completely nonsensical to use the language of trust here: we speak to another in the confidence that hitherto unknown collections of sounds will register as I wish them to' (ibid., 114). For the significance of trust for communication, see also Emil Angehrn, 'Grundvertrauen zwischen Metaphysik und Hermeneutik', in *Grundvertrauen: Hermeneutik eines Grenzphänomens*, ed. Ingolf U. Dalferth and Simon Peng-Keller (Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 2013), 161-185.

[115] There are different concepts of trust at work here. Williams seems to define trust as a practical attitude. James, as mentioned above, operates with a two-tracked concept of trust which points out how the presumption of trust creates the relation of trust as much as the relation of trust creates the presumption of trust. For Williams's concept of trust, see esp. Rowan Williams, *Tokens of Trust: An Introduction to Christian Belief* (London: Canterbury Press, 2007), 11-19, 46-47, 82, 105-106, 159.

[116] Williams, *The Edge of Words*, 78 (emphasis in the original).

[117] Ibid., 78-79.

[118] Ibid., 89-99, 148-149.

Eventually, Williams – like James – refers to mysticism. Mysticism, however, is now characterised neither by ineffability nor by effability.[119] Instead, mysticism, like the parables of Jesus, defers closure. Austin's distinction between locution (describing) and illocution (doing) as *dimensions* of speech acts is instructive for the deferral: Williams uses the utterance 'I can't tell you how grateful I am' to illustrate how gratitude is represented.[120] Following Austin, I suggest that the utterance can be distinguished in its locutionary force ('I cannot say how grateful I am') and its illocutionary force ('I am grateful'), thus pinpointing how the sentence is 'doing' gratitude paradoxically and precisely by *not* 'describing' gratitude. Williams concludes that language about the transcendence of the other might be tested as to whether it does or does not respect alterity: if it aims to *dispossess* the other through imaginative response, it does and if it aims to *possess* the other through imitating repetition, it does not pass the test.[121]

Of course, Williams is writing about the transcendence of God. Yet the test can be applied to both finite and infinite others. If it is applied to James's talk about the other, James fails the test. Both his understanding of the finite other and his understanding of the infinite other aim to 'own' the transcendent: the transcendence of the finite other is characterised as completely knowable (and thus effable), the transcendence of the infinite other is characterised as completely unknowable (and thus ineffable). In both cases, the other is confined by one's evaluations and expectations of the other: the infinite other cannot make herself known and the finite other cannot make herself unknown. There is no space for surprises. This conceptual confinement culminates in 'Is Life Worth Living',

[119] Ibid., 175.
[120] Ibid., 163: Williams borrows the example from Dewi Z. Philips, *Faith after Foundationalism* (London: Routledge, 1988), 278-279, but neither of them utilise Austin's distinction between locution and illocution to analyse it.
[121] Williams, *The Edge of Words*, 175.

where James argues that the subject of trust *creates* the object of trust through trust.[122] Here, the difference and the distance which constitute the relation between truster and trustee collapses: the one who trusts and the one who is trusted fall into one.

In conclusion, James defines religion as the experience of transcendence. But James's interpretation of experience draws a distinction between the effable transcendence of the finite other and the ineffable transcendence of the infinite other in order to distinguish religious experience from nonreligious experience. He loses track of the relationality of trust, because, through his distinction, the finite other becomes too immanent while the infinite other becomes too transcendent. In both cases, a relation to the other is impossible. James's notion of language cannot account for the relationality of trust insofar as it interprets the transcendence of the other either as completely describable or as completely indescribable. The corollary of James's separation of the effable experience of transcendence and the ineffable experience of transcendence is the experientialism which interiorises and individualises religiosity. However, if language is conceived of as representation, it cuts across these distinctions: the finite other is made 'more' transcendent and the infinite other is made 'more' immanent when language is seen as imaginative response to the other.[123] This imaginative response, however, is always already rooted in the relationality of trust. The (Jamesian) circle of trust, then, is both a condition of communion with the other and a consequence of communion with the other. In the circle of trust, trust creates trust. James loses sight of this creative circularity.

---

[122] James, 'Is Life Worth Living', 61. Matthias Jung offers a detailed discussion of how James turns the 'principle of projection (*Projektionsprinzip*)', which can be traced back to Ludwig Feuerbach, from a critique of religion into a confirmation of religion. See Jung, *Erfahrung und Religion*, 162-168, 197-201.
[123] See again, Kearney, *Strangers, Gods and Monsters*, 10-12.

In the famous-infamous wager with which I started, Pascal acknowledges the significance of community for faith. He admits that the argument of the wager might not suffice to *create* faith because faith is pre- rather than post-argumentative. Pascal asks: What if I 'am so made that I cannot believe? What, then, would you have me do?'[124] He answers with a recommendation to follow those 'who know the way' – by which he means to join a church.[125] His recommendation indicates that joining finite others might have consequences for one's faith in the infinite other as much as one's faith in the infinite other might have consequences for joining finite others. Hence, Pascal implies that religiosity is not a matter of solitary but of social subjects. One cannot be religious on one's own. Thus, his evasion – 'stupefy your scruples' James summarised – may be more promising for trust than James admits. For the elasticisation of ecclesiology, then, James's dismissal of Pascal's wager might have been too hasty and too haughty.[126]

[124] Pascal, *Penseés*, 68.
[125] Ibid.
[126] I shall return to Pascal's wager in Chapter 9.

Chapter 2

THE DRIVE FOR DIFFERENCE

Ernst Troeltsch was fascinated by the turn to experience.[1] According to Troeltsch, William James's concentration on experience had been anticipated by Friedrich Schleiermacher's speeches *On Religion*.[2] But Troeltsch suggests that the essentialism in Schleiermacher's definition of religion stranded in a 'stiff scholasticism' which acknowledged neither historical nor cultural flux.[3] James's empirical explorations of experience caused 'a stir' among the stiff scholastics who followed Schleiermacher.[4] But Troeltsch was neither uncritical nor uncreative in his conversation with James.

In this chapter, I shall explore Troeltsch's reception of James.[5] In response to James, Troeltsch demands the exploration of the role of community.[6] Effectively, he criticises the distinction between 'religion' and 'second-hand-religion' which James draws

[1] Troeltsch repeatedly refers to James's approach to religion. Initially, he discusses James's philosophy in reviews from 1896 and 1897 (R1 and R2). James's psychology of religion is assessed in a review from 1904, even before his studies where translated into German (R3). Troeltsch takes these reviews up in PE. For a summary in English, see also Troeltsch's obituary to James (EP).

[2] See Schleiermacher, *On Religion*. For the significance of Schleiermacher for the turn to experience, see Hans Joas, 'Schleiermacher and the Turn to Experience in the Study of Religion', in *Interpreting Religion: The Significance of Friedrich Schleiermacher's "Reden über die Religion"*, ed. Dietrich Korsch and Amber L. Griffioen (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2011), 147-161.

[3] R3, 365. See also EP, 16-17.

[4] EP, 401.

[5] Portraying Troeltsch's reception of James's approach to religion is promising because Troeltsch formed and reformed his theories in conversation. For a summary of Troeltsch's approach to reviews, see Maren Bienert, *Protestantische Selbstverortung: Die Rezensionen Ernst Troeltschs* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2014), 1-12.

[6] R2, 366.

out of neglect for the 'conjunction (*Verknüpfung*)' between experience and expression.[7] Yet, Troeltsch's rhapsodising reviews come without detailed discussion.[8] Hence, a magnifying-glass is needed in order to corroborate Troeltsch's critique. Troeltsch's 'Die Selbständigkeit der Religion', a study which appeared piece-by-piece between 1895 and 1896, might fulfil this function.[9] Published prior to *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, this study sketches the state of Troeltsch's research when he encounters the philosophy and the psychology of James. Although Troeltsch's study would not be published today – 'revise and resubmit' is the peer-review evaluation which Troeltsch would have to expect[10] – it remains instructive for both sociology and theology.[11] 'Die Selbständigkeit der Religion', then, offers a pertinent and promising point of departure for me to fill in what Troeltsch's explicit engagement with James's research on religion left open.[12]

Following a hint by Cornelia Richter,[13] I shall argue that Troeltsch's reception of James gestures towards a tacit theory of trust which connects the self's relation to the finite other with the self's relation to the infinite other. I shall assess Troeltsch's theory of trust as 'tacit' because he avoids the terminology of trust when he thinks through the connections

---

[7] PE, 17.

[8] See also Bienert, *Protestantische Selbstverortung*, 173n. 753.

[9] SR was published in *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche* 5 (1895) and 6 (1896). I follow the recent re-publication of Troeltsch's study in *Kritische Gesamtausgabe*.

[10] Hans Joas, 'Die Selbständigkeit religiöser Phänomene: Ernst Troeltsch als Vorbild der Religionsforschung', *Fuge* 6 (2010), 16. Joas excavated SR before these articles were re-published in *Kritische Gesamtausgabe*.

[11] Joas, 'Die Selbständigkeit', 15-28. See also Jörg Lauster, 'Die Selbständigkeit der Religion', in *Die Aufgeklärte Religion und ihre Probleme*, ed. Ulrich Barth, Christian Danz, Wilhelm Gräb, and Friedrich Wilhelm Graf (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2013), 431-445.

[12] Christian Albrecht 'Einleitung', in Ernst Troeltsch, *Kritische Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 1: 'Schriften zur Theologie und Religionsphilosophie (1888-1902)', ed. Christian Albrecht in collaboration with Björn Biester, Lars Emersleben and Dirk Schmid (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2009), 17, argues that SR shows those concerns of Troeltsch's research which remain relevant throughout his career.

[13] Cornelia Richter, 'Vertrauen – im Wachsen: Eine Skizze zum theologischen Forschungsstand', *Hermeneutische Blätter* 1 (2010), 25-44, indicates that Troeltsch could be characterised as a 'prominent precursor (*Vordenker*)' of the theorisation of trust past and present (ibid., 34).

between the relation to the finite other and the relation to the infinite other. In three steps, I aim to argue that he *does* talk about trust implicitly, although he *does not* talk about 'trust' explicitly. (1) I shall analyse Troeltsch's concept of religion. I shall argue that the relation to the transcendent is at the core of his concept of religion. For Troeltsch, religion *is* relation. Since the transcendent is conceived of as other and outside of the self, alterity drives the historical-cultural development of religion past and present. (2) I shall analyse Troeltsch's account of the experience of the other. Criticising James, Troeltsch conceives of the transcendence of the other as both effable and ineffable. I shall argue that the tension between the effability and the ineffability of alterity results in a definition of revelation as a dynamic drive for difference. Finally (3), I shall explore why Troeltsch avoids the terminology of trust when he interprets religion as relation. I shall argue that in his avoidance of the term 'trust' he reintroduces the notion of experience which he rebuffed. Turning Troeltsch against Troeltsch, I shall conclude by rereading his reflections as a tacit theory of trust which conveys the contours of a concept of community circling around trust.

My exploration of Troeltsch's reception of James is organised thematically rather than historically.[14] Without diving too deeply into the conversation between pragmatism and historicism, I shall investigate the core concepts and the core concerns which are instructive for my account of trust in the following chapter.[15]

---

[14] See Wilhelm Hennis, 'The Spiritualist Foundation of Max Weber's "Interpretative Sociology": Ernst Troeltsch, Max Weber and William James's Varieties of Religious Experience', *History of the Human Sciences* 11/2 (1998), 83-106. Hennis analyses how Troeltsch introduced Max Weber to James's concept of religion, but without taking account of Troeltsch's reception of James's concept.

[15] For the impact of William James's pragmatism on European philosophies, see Jaime Nubiola, 'The Reception of William James in Continental Europe', in *William James and the Transatlantic Conversation: Pragmatism, Pluralism and Philosophy of Religion*, 15-29, although Nubiola makes no mention of Troeltsch. The fact that Troeltsch was vital for the reception of pragmatism in Europe is pointed out by Hans Joas, 'Pragmatismus und Historismus: Meads Philosophie der Zeit und die Logik der Geschichtsschreibung', *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie* 36/1 (2015), 1-21.

1 The Difference within Religion

The title 'Die Selbständigkeit der Religion' already announces the core concern of Troeltsch's definition of religion. Yet, as is often or all too often the case with Troeltsch's titles, it is difficult to translate: 'Die Selbständigkeit der Religion' – literally 'the self-standing-ness of religion' – suggests an anti-reductionist concept of religion. I shall argue that the relation to the other is at the core of Troeltsch's anti-reductionism. Religion is a relation which cannot be reduced to either the natural or to the supernatural.[16]

Throughout his oeuvre, Troeltsch combines theological and non-theological approaches.[17] The study of religion offers the framework in which these approaches can be combined.[18] For if it ascertains that religion cannot be reduced non-theologically to the natural or theologically to the supernatural, the study of religion allows for a strong and striking apology of religion.[19] In his apology, Troeltsch mocks essentialisations of religion:

---

[16] Joas, 'Die Selbständigkeit', 17-18. See also Kristian Fechtner, *Volkskirche im neuzeitlichen Christentum: Die Bedeutung Ernst Troeltschs für eine künftige praktisch-theologische Theorie der Kirche* (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 1995), 38-39.

[17] SR, 367. Accordingly, Troeltsch follows what Friedrich Schleiermacher called a general philosophical as opposed to a special theological hermeneutics. See Friedrich Schleiermacher, *Brief Outline of the Study of Theology*, trans. William Farrer (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1850), 142-145. See also the succinct summary in Jeanrond, *Theological Hermeneutics*, 159-164.

[18] For Troeltsch's concept of the study of religion, see Michael Pye, 'Troeltsch and the Science of Religion', in Ernst Troeltsch, *Writings in Theology and Religion*, trans. Robert Morgan and Michael Pye (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1977), 234-252.

[19] SR, 365. Ulrich Barth, *Gott als Projekt der Vernunft* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003), 363-365, argues that Troeltsch understands 'apologetics' in a non-dogmatical rather than a dogmatical way. Troeltsch's critique of dogmatism follows from his collaboration with the *Religionsgeschichtliche Schule*. According to the 'History of Religion School', Christianity is to be contextualised in the history of religions which includes both Christian and non-Christian traditions. For a succinct summary, see Mark D. Chapman, 'History of Religion School', in *The Blackwell Companion to Nineteenth Century Theology*, ed. David Fergusson (Chichester: Blackwell, 2010), 434-454. Because of its turn to the history of religion, 'Die Selbständigkeit der Religion' marks a striking step in Troeltsch's disengagement from his theological teacher Albrecht Ritschl. See Christophe Chalamet, 'Ernst Troeltsch's Break from Ritschl and his School', *Journal for the History of Modern Theology* 19/1 (2012), 34-71.

> Here it would be a scholastic misunderstanding ... if one would want to find a definition of religion which could fit all cases – as it happened often or all too often, losing its credibility because it was skewed, shallow or superficial. Instead, what one has to find is the crucial point or the crucial points which characterise all ... religion.[20]

In order to find the(se) characteristic(s) of religion, Troeltsch turns to experience. Like James, he proposes to take experiences of transcendence as the point of departure.[21] But, unlike James, he combines synchronic and diachronic accounts of these experiences. Troeltsch's circular combination comes close to a hermeneutics: the synchronic account of religion is rooted in the analysis of the diachronic account of religion, and the analysis of the diachronic account of religion is rooted in the synchronic account of religion.[22] Hence, to learn about religion today, one has to examine its history; and to examine its history, one has to learn about religion today. Crucially, the fundamental feature of both accounts of religion is the 'relation (*Beziehung*)' between the immanent and the transcendent.[23] I shall consider Troeltsch's synchronic and diachronic approaches to the relationality of religion in turn.

In his synchronic approach, Troeltsch portrays religion as a relation between the religious subject (in theological terminology, the creature) and the religious object (in theological terminology, the creator). He stresses that the creature experiences the creator as a 'Wesenheit'.[24] Again, Troeltsch employs a concept which defies exact translation. The experience of a 'Wesenheit' implies that subject and object of religion cannot be collapsed:

---

[20] RP, 468. See also Lori Pearson, *Beyond Essence: Ernst Troeltsch as Historian and Theorist of Christianity* (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2008), 71-85.
[21] Lauster, 'Die Selbständigkeit', 434.
[22] Ibid., 455.
[23] SR, 399. For the significance of the 'relation (*Beziehung*)' to the transcendent for religion, see also SR 397, 398, 401, 416, 419, 441, 457, 466, 497, 506, 507, 509.
[24] SR, 395.

there remains a *difference* between creature and creator in the experience. Because of this difference, the creature experiences the creator as other and as outside of herself.[25] As a consequence, the experience of transcendence cannot be demonstrated in a detached manner: the transcendence of the other is to be received in person rather than in principle.[26] Religiosity has to be experienced. Troeltsch admits that his characterisation of religion as relation may raise suspicions. Countless critics of religion have attempted to debunk the creator as a projection of the creature. 'With the calm confidence of an accountant', Troeltsch surveys these critiques.[27] Focusing on Ludwig Feuerbach,[28] he concentrates on the concept of 'need (*Bedürfnis*)'.[29] According to Troeltsch, the critiques of religion as projection share the assumption that religion satisfies a need. But for two reasons, Troeltsch argues, this assumption is flawed. On the one hand, the projection theories cannot explain why the need arises.[30] Why indeed would the self start a need? On the other hand, the projection theories cannot explain why the need is not assuaged.[31] Why indeed would the self not satisfy the need? For Troeltsch, the difference characteristic of the relation between creature and creator implies that the creator remains other – *in* the relation.[32] The

[25] Ibid. Michael Mack, 'The Other', in *The Oxford Handbook of German Philosophy in the Nineteenth Century*, 736-750, distinguishes between a Kantian notion of the other in which otherness is disengaged by the self and a post-Kantian notion of the other in which otherness is engaged by the self. For him, Friedrich Schleiermacher exemplifies the post-Kantian notion of the other – a notion which would also be applicable to Troeltsch's thinking.

[26] SR, 393-394.

[27] Lauster, 'Die Selbständigkeit', 433.

[28] SR, 400-405. See also Ludwig Feuerbach, *The Essence of Christianity*, trans. Marian Evans (London: Tübner, 1881), esp. §2, where Feuerbach interprets religion in terms of a satisfaction of needs (ibid., 12-32).

[29] SR, 405.

[30] SR, 405-409.

[31] SR, 412-413.

[32] SR, 419. See also Brian A. Gerrish, 'Ernst Troeltsch and the Possibility of a Historical Theology', in *Ernst Troeltsch and the Future of Theology*, 132-134.

other cannot be a projected other because the other starts and satisfies the need – a satisfaction which is neither full nor final: the other remains other.

Elaborating on the difference between creature and creator, Troeltsch offers a phenomenology of religious relationality.[33] He utilises the concept of 'Ehrfurcht' which could be rendered as 'awe' as it links 'adoration' to 'apprehension'.[34] In the eyes of the creature, the creator is a 'mystery (*Mysterium*)' – a mystery seen or sensed in the two 'keynotes (*Grundtöne*)' of attraction and aversion.[35] The mystery of transcendence inspires fascination and fear at once.[36] Troeltsch's depiction of the relation between the subject and the object of religion anticipates Rudolf Otto's phenomenology of *The Holy*.[37] Through the concept of 'Ehrfurcht', Troeltsch stresses that the experience of the relationality of religion escapes conceptual closure.[38] Troeltsch avoids ascribing the relation to either the religious subject or the religious object. Both logically and phenomenologically, the relation requires the agency of the finite and the infinite – even if the creature is pulled to the creator 'like a butterfly to the flame'.[39] Thus, Troeltsch's synchronic approach interprets religion as a relation which is characterised by the difference between the creature and the creator. It comes close to James's circle of trust.

---

[33] The concept of phenomenology is anachronistic if applied to SR, where Troeltsch refers to 'psychology' rather than 'phenomenology'. However, in his autobiographical account, Troeltsch argues that his interdisciplinary thinking anticipated the phenomenology of religion. See MB, 370. Moreover, James L. Cox includes Troeltsch into his *A Guide to the Phenomenology of Religion* (London: T&T Clark, 2006), esp. 67-102.

[34] SR, 412.

[35] SR, 430.

[36] Ibid.

[37] See again Otto, *The Idea of the Holy*. For Troeltsch's anticipation of Otto's phenomenology, see ZR. See also Lauster, 'Die Selbständigkeit', 432. Joas, 'Die Selbständigkeit religiöser Phänomene', 20, points to the critique of Schleiermacher which lurks between the lines of Troeltsch's phenomenology of religion: religion does not emerge from a feeling of dependency. Rather, religion engenders complex constellations of feelings which Troeltsch circles with the concept of *Ehrfurcht*.

[38] Lauster, 'Die Selbständigkeit', 434-435. See also RP, 478.

[39] SR, 430.

In his diachronic approach, Troeltsch argues that relationality operates as a criterion for evaluating the development of religion past and present.[40] If religion is a relation between creature and creator, the development of religion is the corollary of their relation.[41] Troeltsch captures this corollary by means of a christological concept – 'Gottmenschlichkeit'.[42] Hence, the incarnation, conceived of as intertwined interaction between creator and creature, runs through the history of religion. It is confined neither to Christ nor to Christianity.[43]

In his evaluation of the connection between creature and creator in the history of religion, Troeltsch engages with the philosophy of Georg F. W. Hegel.[44] He is committed to counter Hegel's teleology, announcing that one has to attend to the dreadful regress as well as to the delightful progress within the history of religion.[45] According to the characterisation of religion as relation, religions with emphasis on relationality supersede religions without emphasis on relationality.[46] Troeltsch borrows the concept of the 'germinative principle' from Edward Caird's 1891-1892 Gifford Lectures, *The Evolution of*

[40] SR, 439.
[41] SR, 460.
[42] SR, 472.
[43] Following Coakley's *Christ Without Absolutes*, Troeltsch's theology is often characterised as a critique of the notion of incarnation. Coakley refers to the '"Cumulative Case" against Incarnational Christology' (ibid., 103-135). However, by transposing the notion of incarnation from the Christian religion to the Christian and the non-Christian religions, Troeltsch – it could be argued – is not rejecting but *radicalising* the notion of incarnation.
[44] See esp. Georg W. F. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion I-II*, Werke 16-17, ed. Eva Moldenhauer and Karl M. Michel (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1986). For a short summary of Hegel's philosophy of history, see Sally Sedgwick, 'Philosophy of History', in *The Oxford Handbook of German Philosophy in the Nineteenth Century*, 436-452. For Troeltsch's reception of Hegel in 'Die Selbständigkeit der Religon', see Lauster, 'Die Selbständigkeit', 436-437. For a retrieval of the challenge which Hegel's teleology represents for the history of religion today, see Jörg Lauster, 'How To Do Transcendence With Words? The Problem of Articulation in Religious Experience', in *Experience or Expression? Religious Experience Revisited*, ed. Thomas Hardtke, Ulrich Schmiedel, and Tobias Tan (Leiden: Brill, forthcoming).
[45] SR, 458.
[46] SR, 460.

Religion, in order to elaborate on the evaluation of religion.[47] Caird argues that a definition of religion cannot be construed as overlap of the beliefs and behaviours of different religions. According to Caird, such a definition would tie religion to past (and, for him, undeveloped) religions as opposed to present (and, for him, developed) religions.[48] On the contrary, for the definition of religion 'a principle of the genesis of religions' – which is to say, a 'germinative principle' – is imperative.[49] Through such a principle, the historian can 'cast the light of the present upon the past'.[50] Hence, this principle 'is a seed which works secretly in the minds of those who receive it ... till, ultimately, ... it produces results which were present to none of those who first accepted it'.[51]

Troeltsch qualifies the concept of the germinative principle with the notion of 'Trieb', which translates as 'desire' or 'drive'.[52] Transposing his reflections on the start and the satisfaction of needs from the synchronic to the diachronic, Troeltsch argues that a 'drive' comprises both its 'excitation (*Erregung*)' and its 'exciter (*Erreger*)'.[53] The exciter is experienced *through* the excitation. Thus, whoever or whatever drives the drive remains in 'twilight (*Halbdunkel*)'.[54] It cannot be captured. If 'drive' is turned from a nonreligious into a religious concept, the drive is the 'precursor (*Vorläufer*) of all conscious and

[47] See Edward Caird, *The Evolution of Religion: The Gifford Lectures delivered before the University of St Andrews in Sessions 1891-92* (Glasgow: Maclehose, 1893), 2 vols.
[48] The distinction between developed and undeveloped religions is also apparent in James's account of religion. See James, *The Varieties*, 12. For a summary, see Lash, *Easter in Ordinary*, 20-21. Troeltsch's theology is not free from it either. See FV, 134-187.
[49] Caird, *The Evolution of Religion*, vol. 1, 43.
[50] Ibid., 47.
[51] Caird, *The Evolution of Religion*, vol. 2, 296.
[52] SR, 473. In *The Future of An Illusion*, trans. James Strachey (New York: Norton, 1961), Sigmund Freud argues that religion offers a mechanism to cope with the dissatisfaction of drives – drives which are rooted in each and every person. Writing prior to Freud, Troeltsch asks *how* drives are rooted in a person.
[53] SR, 473.
[54] Ibid.

conceptual religion'.[55] The excitation drives the creature to consciously and conceptually capture the self-communication of the creator in the excitation, such that the drive can be understood as the 'affection (*Affizierung*)' of the creature through the creator.[56] Hence, for Troeltsch, the drive of religion is rooted in the relation between creature and creator. The mystery of transcendence causes a desire to express the transcendent – a desire which drives the development of religion past and present because it cannot be satisfied fully or finally. Troeltsch concludes that if the historian takes this drive as the criterion for the assessment of the development of religion, she has to interpret the criterion as a process rather than as a point. Thus, the criterion *cannot* be construed propositionally. A propositional criterion would require the end of history, not history. But the historian can infer the drive from the development of religion. Troeltsch identifies three tendencies which refer to theological, cosmological, and anthropological trajectories.

Theologically, Troeltsch identifies the process of the 'personalisation' of the concept of God.[57] Accordingly, the relation between creature and creator is interpreted increasingly as *interpersonal* relation. Troeltsch is aware of the danger of anthropomorphism.[58] But he accepts it in order to point to the 'universalisation' of God which is closely connected to the process of God's personalisation.[59] If the creator relates personally to each and every creature, it cannot be assumed that the relation is limited to those who belong to a particular political or ecclesial corporation.[60]

---

[55] Ibid.
[56] Ibid.
[57] SR, 504.
[58] Ibid.
[59] SR, 505.
[60] Ibid.

Cosmologically, Troeltsch identifies the process of the differentiation between transcendence and immanence: in as much as the creator is interpreted as transcendent, the creature is interpreted as immanent.[61] However, Troeltsch does not fall for a 'myth of purity'[62] which strictly separates immanence and transcendence, but stresses that the differentiation of the transcendent creator from the immanent creature results in their 'intersection (*Durchkreuzung*)'.[63] Again, it is the difference which allows the creature to see the creator as other. The recognition of this difference is the condition for their relation.

Anthropologically, Troeltsch identifies the process of the sacralisation of the person which follows from the theological and the cosmological evolution of religion.[64] If the creator is related to the creature in personal rather than impersonal terms, the person is elevated and exalted from immanent significance to transcendent significance – which is to say, sacralised. Troeltsch stresses the centrality of the concept of the soul as the connection between the transcendent and the immanent in the person.[65]

Finally, Troeltsch concludes that these trajectories confirm the relationality at the core of religion. The creature differs from the creator; through this difference, the relation between creature and creator is made possible; and this relation eventually elevates the creature to the creator.[66] According to Troeltsch, Christianity is *the* religion which crystallises relationality.[67] Thus, Troeltsch responds to a concern which has haunted

---

[61] SR, 506.

[62] For the concept of 'the myth of purity', see Espen Dahl, *Phenomenology and the Holy: Religious Experience after Husserl* (London: SCM, 2010), esp. 10-12. Dahl argues that the myth of purity, according to which the immanent is *purely* immanent and the transcendent is *purely* transcendent, prevents phenomenology from exploring the in-breaking of the transcendent into the immanent.

[63] SR, 506.

[64] SR, 509.

[65] Ibid.

[66] SR, 519.

[67] Ibid.

theology since Schleiermacher – the concern for the absoluteness of Christianity.[68] Because Christianity crystallises the relationality of religion, Troeltsch concludes, it is the absolute religion.

However, what Troeltsch's conclusion demonstrates is, first and foremost, a deficiency in his methodology. Even if one is willing to concede that the history of religion displays tendencies like those identified by Troeltsch,[69] it is clear that his synchronic criterion dictates his diachronic conclusion:[70] his synchronic account of religion is tied to Christianity; thus, his diachronic account of religion is tied to Christianity.[71] The way Troeltsch looks at the history of religion, he cannot but confirm the absoluteness of Christianity. The fact that he uses the christological concept of 'Gottmenschlichkeit' in order to assess the history of religion tells its own tale. Zigzagging between teleological and non-teleological concepts of history, Troeltsch cannot keep his commitment to go beyond Hegel. A Hegelian teleology in which Christianity trumps non-Christianity runs through 'Die Selbständigkeit der Religion'. Hence, Troeltsch's evaluation of history is too

[68] Ibid. See also SR, 520-523. The quest for the absoluteness of Christianity followed from Schleiermacher's approach to theology. Once Schleiermacher had anchored Christianity in a concept of religion rather than a concept of revelation, the Christian theologian had to prove that the Christian religion is superior to non-Christian religions: Christianity as *the* religion. For a study on the quest for the absoluteness of Christianity, see AC. Throughout his career, Troeltsch becomes less and less sure about the absoluteness of Christianity. See his 1922 lecture on 'The Place of Christianity Among the World Religions' in FV, 134-187.

[69] The notion of the axial age points to processes in the history of religion which come close to those identified by Troeltsch. See the contributions to *The Axial Age and its Consequences*, ed. Robert N. Bellah and Hans Joas (Cambridge/MA: Harvard University Press, 2012).

[70] Joas, 'Die Selbständigkeit', 28.

[71] In *The Invention of World Religions: Or, How European Universalism Was Preserved in the Language of Pluralism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 309-323, Tomoko Masuzawka assumes that Troeltsch's integration of Christian and non-Christian religions within the study of religion failed, arguing that his concept of religion originates in Christianity. However, notwithstanding Troeltsch's concentration on Christianity, he is not interested in a concept of religion which fits each and every case. For Troeltsch, it would be conceivable to create a variety of concepts of religion for a variety of contexts of religion. For a convincing critique of Masuzawaka's account of Troeltsch, see Aimee Burant Chor, 'Ernst Troeltsch and the Politics of "Christianity": Context, Pragmatics, and Method in the Historiography of Modern Theology', *Mitteilungen der Ernst-Troeltsch-Gesellschaft* 20/21 (2008), 78-97.

nice and too neat to convince.[72] Even Troeltsch is not convinced. He continues to struggle with the philosophy of history throughout his life, becoming less and less sure of teleology.[73]

However, Troeltsch is cautious. When he concludes that the 'ultimate (*endgültig*) breakthrough ... can be found in Christianity which ... connects ... transcendence and immanence as the two constitutive elements of religion in a way which cannot be conceptualised',[74] he qualifies what he means by 'ultimate': here, the absoluteness of Christianity is interpreted in a historical rather than a non-historical manner. For Troeltsch, the development of religion past and present must be assessed from *within* the development. Since this development is on-going, Christianity could be superseded – potentially and actually.[75] Hence, Troeltsch argues that neither Christ nor Christianity can be taken as the absolute manifestation of religion in an ahistorical sense: they are absolute inside history, not outside history.[76] Troeltsch stresses that one has to trust in absoluteness, because through 'swaying sentiments (*schwankende Stimmungsseligkeit*)' one would defraud oneself of its effects.[77] 'The claim cannot be proven, because it is the nature of such a claim to be unprovable'.[78] What lurks behind Troeltsch's caution could be

[72] See Joas, 'Die Selbständigkeit', 27-28. See also Lauster, 'Die Selbständigkeit', 444.
[73] Joas, 'Die Selbständigkeit', 27-28.
[74] RP, 484.
[75] SR, 520-523.
[76] See Hans Joas, 'Selbsttranszendenz und Wertbindung: Ernst Troeltsch als Ausgangspunkt einer modernen Religionssoziologie', in *Religion(en) deuten*, 58. The historicisation which leads Troeltsch from the a-historical 'non-relative' concept of absoluteness to the historical 'relative' concept of absoluteness anticipates the argument advanced in AC.
[77] SR, 526. Coakley identifies the 'faith' in the superiority of Christianity as a 'Ritschlian' remainder in Troeltsch's concept of religion. She argues that it counters his interpretation of the evolution of religion. See Coakley, *Christ Without Absolutes*, 55. What Coakley calls a 'half-way' (ibid.), however, seems to me to follow from Troeltsch's zigzag between teleology and non-teleology in his interpretation of history. When he moves from teleology to non-teleology, he emphasises the significance of faith. When he de-emphasises the significance of faith, he moves from non-teleology to teleology.
[78] SR, 528. See also Lauster, 'Die Selbständigkeit', 437.

characterised as the mystery of transcendence. In both his synchronic and his diachronic approach to religion, Troeltsch stresses the difference between creator and creature. The other remains other – even in the relation to the other. The fact that the other cannot be conceptualised completely drives the development of religion past and present. The relation to the alterity of God releases a drive for difference.

To summarise, Troeltsch characterises religion as a relation to the other which is marked by openness to the other's otherness. When Troeltsch encountered the philosophy and the psychology of William James, he had already developed a concept of religion which focused on experience. Troeltsch concurs with James, arguing that the experience of transcendence points to the difference between creature and creator. God understands God, but 'we do not ascribe religion' to God.[79]

> For humans, however, who cannot understand ... reality because they experience merely a minimum of it – and even the minimum in a fragmentary manner – only the code of conduct which we call religion is possible: the ... trusting surrender to the different ... traces of his [sic] revelation.[80]

However, the way in which Troeltsch understands the impossibility to conceptualise God differs from James's understanding. For Troeltsch, the experience of religious relationality is neither ineffable (along the lines of James) nor effable (against the lines of James), but ineffable and effable at the same time.

[79] SR, 381.
[80] Ibid.

2 The Drive within Religion

Countering James's binary distinction between pure immediate experience and impure mediate experience, Troeltsch offers a triangle of event, expression, and experience. While Troeltsch's 'event' refers to James's 'immediate experience' and Troeltsch's 'expression' refers to James's 'mediate experience', Troeltsch's 'experience' refers to the combination of event and expression.[81] In the Troeltschian triangle, mystical experiences are neither simply effable nor simply ineffable but *simultaneously* effable and ineffable.[82] I shall argue that the simultaneity of the effability and the ineffability of alterity results in a characterisation of revelation as a dynamic drive for difference.

Mediation is crucial for Troeltsch. In 'Die Selbständigkeit der Religion', he stresses the significance of 'imagination (*Phantasie*)' for religion.[83] Since the content of religion is inextricably intertwined with the 'media (*Medien*)' through which the content comes to the subject's consciousness, these media are 'imbibed (*einverleibt*)' into religion.[84] 'Imagination' refers to the subject's engagement with these media which have been transmitted to her through tradition. Media are 'indispensable' for the self-actualisation of the event in the experience.[85] However, Troeltsch admits that self-actualisation through expression does not imply a one-to-one correspondence between the event and the

[81] Troeltsch employs a number of concepts in order to argue that the event of religion (in James's terminology, pure experience) and the expression of religion (in James's terminology, impure experience) *co-constitute* the experience of religion. See esp. SR, 399, 419-420, 423, 448. See also Lauster, 'Die Selbständigkeit', 434-435.
[82] PE, 16-17.
[83] SR, 388.
[84] Ibid.
[85] Ibid.

experience.[86] He highlights that self-actualisation is always already alteration.[87] Troeltsch coins the concept of 'das Unaussprechlichste':[88] the (substantially and stylistically incorrect) superlative of 'the ineffable' highlights that the event cannot be captured completely in the experience. Thus, the triangle of event, expression, and experience counters the binary distinction between what is expressed and what is experienced without fusing experience and expression.

Turning from non-theological to theological terminology, Troeltsch uses the concept of revelation to elucidate the relationality of religion within the triangle of event, expression, and experience.[89] Revelation includes both event and expression in its experience: it requires both *fides qua* and *fides quae*.[90] The event of revelation cannot be accessed without the experience of the event of revelation; and the experience of the event of revelation cannot be accessed without the expression of the event of revelation.[91] Accordingly, experience is co-constituted by event and expression. Troeltsch emphasises that the experiencing subject is both active and passive in the experience, describing the mediation of the event in the experience through the expression as the subject's imaginative intuition of God: '*Gottesanschauung*'.[92] According to Troeltsch, everything – the personal, the textual or the musical[93] – might become a mediation of revelation through which the religious subject expresses the relation between the immanent and the

[86] RP, 476-477.
[87] SR, 395.
[88] SR, 436.
[89] SR, 420.
[90] Ibid.
[91] SR, 423.
[92] SR, 441.
[93] However, Troeltsch never discusses in detail how the personal, the textual or the musical functions as mediations of religion. See Coakley, *Christ Without Absolutes*, 193-194.

transcendent in her experience.[94] As he argues in his article on 'Historiography', revelation implies 'the absolute in the relative, yet not fully and finally in it, but always pressing on towards fresh forms of self-expression'.[95]

Troeltsch draws a distinction between the majority of 'reproductive' subjects and the minority of 'productive' subjects.[96] He argues that each and every subject draws from expressions of past revelatory events in order to formulate expression of present revelatory events, thus changing the reservoir of mediations either in ways which confirm tradition (reproductive) or in ways which create tradition (productive).

According to Troeltsch, Jesus exemplifies the production of tradition rather than the reproduction of tradition.[97] But since revelation is always already dependent on mediation, the distinction between production and reproduction is used to *contextualise* Jesus: Jesus is understood in the context of Judaism, inside rather than outside history.[98] In comparison to James, Troeltsch offers a more subtle and more sophisticated account of the founding figures of religions. The difference between the founder of a religion and the follower of a religion is a *difference in degree*: one uses the context more productively; another uses the context more reproductively.

On Troeltsch's account, Jesus is the founder and the focus of Christianity; thus, 'the personality of Jesus (*Persönlichkeit Jesu*) is the continuing medium' for the experience of revelation in Christianity.[99] As a medium, the personality of Jesus operates as 'the means to

---

[94] SR, 378-388, 423. Here, Troeltsch anticipates the core concern of Mircea Eliade's, *The Sacred and the Profane*, trans. Willard R. Trask (London: Harcourt, 1959), esp. 10-15.
[95] HI, 722. See also Coakley, *Christ Without Absolutes*, 84-85.
[96] SR, 427.
[97] SR, 427-428.
[98] Coakley, *Christ Without Absolutes*, 57-58. I shall return to Troeltsch's interpretation of the relation of Jesus and Judaism in Chapter 4.
[99] SR, 423.

excite and to express religious experience', becoming a 'continuing ... vehicle for the intuition of God (*Gottesanschauung*)'.[100] In her analysis of Troeltsch's christology, Sarah Coakley points out that in 'Die Selbständigkeit der Religion', christology is 'conspicuous by its absence'.[101] But the distinction between productive and reproductive revelation is significant for Troeltsch's understanding of christology, because it contextualises Jesus in the history of religion.[102] The consequence of such a contextualisation is what Troeltsch articulates as 'dynamic' revelation.[103]

For Troeltsch, the event of revelation is accessed via the detour of mediations.[104] This detour cannot be escaped or evaded – not even in the encounter with Jesus.[105] In as much as God cannot be completely captured in the mediation by Jesus, Jesus cannot be completely captured in the mediations by those who follow Jesus. Gerd Theissen's *The Shadow of the Galilean,* a novel which communicates the historical-critical research on Jesus in a narrative, excellently exemplifies Troeltsch's account of Jesus: in the novel, the reader never encounters Jesus; what she encounters is the 'shadow' of Jesus in the ways his contemporaries – companions and critics alike – talk about him.[106] Because of the 'ultimate unknowability of God',[107] the encounter with Jesus, which mediates the encounter with God, evokes the (re)production of mediations of encounter: fresh forms of the self-

---

[100] Ibid.

[101] Coakley, *Christ Without Absolutes*, 55. She argues that SR marks a transition in the development of Troeltsch's christological thought.

[102] CF, 100.

[103] CF, 41. In German, Troeltsch distinguishes between 'dynamischer Offenbarung' and 'mechanischer Offenbarung'. See GL, 41.

[104] CF, 49.

[105] Coakley, *Christ Without Absolutes*, 45-79, 136-163, 164-187, traces how Troeltsch's theology shifts from assuming the direct relationship of the believer to Jesus to assuming the indirect relationship of the believer to Jesus.

[106] See Gerd Theissen, *The Shadow of the Galilean: The Quest of the Historical Jesus in Narrative Form*, trans. John Bowden (London: SCM, 1987).

[107] Coakley, *Christ Without Absolutes*, 82.

expression of revelation.[108] Accordingly, Troeltsch understands revelation as a process of mediation which is driven by the mystery of the other. The process of revelation has neither an absolute point of departure (because the event of revelation is to be expressed in order to be experienced) nor an absolute point of destination (because the event of revelation is not to be expressed completely or conclusively). Both absolute departure and absolute destination would be beyond history. Troeltsch's concept of dynamic revelation conveys a process of revelation *through* history.[109]

Troeltsch returns to the issue of assessing the process of revelation along the lines of his concept of the evolution of religion. He argues that this process cannot be seen either simply as progress or simply as regress.[110] As mentioned above, although he zigzags between teleology and non-teleology, he eventually trains and tames revelation into a clear-cut teleology.[111] However, with or without teleology, it is important that the evaluation of the process of revelation is itself always already a matter of expressing the event of revelation.[112] Therefore, the evaluation of revelation is part and parcel of revelation. Through the interpretation of Jesus's revelation, the followers of Jesus reproduce Jesus's revelation: productive revelation is continued in reproductive revelation. The hermeneutical circle in Troeltsch's conception is clear: the interpretation of Jesus guides the interpretation of Christianity today, the interpretation of Christianity today guides the interpretation of

---

[108] Ibid., 86

[109] See Chapman, *Ernst Troeltsch and Liberal Theology*, 69.

[110] In CF, 38, Troeltsch rejects what he calls the 'inexact word "progress"'. In German, GL, 37, he uses '*spießig*' which also renders as 'stuffy'. Troeltsch argues that the process has to be assessed again and again in order to decide what must be considered progress and what must be considered regress.

[111] See Coakley, *Christ Without Absolutes*, 85.

[112] CF, 41-43.

Jesus. The experience of revelation – including both event and expression – is emphasised as a processual rather than a punctual revelation.[113]

> The concept of reproductive revelation already suggests the image of a spark that leaps from heart to heart, igniting a different flame in each, according to what it finds therein. Productive revelation already carries the reproductive revelation within itself.[114]

Because Troeltsch conceives of the mediations of Jesus as part and parcel of revelation,[115] Coakley calls his christology a '*christologie totale*' – a christology which combines analyses of Jesus and of the reception of Jesus in 'the rich variety of Christ-centred believing'.[116] I shall return to Troeltsch's christology throughout my study. Here, it is significant that Troeltsch's concept of the triangle of event, expression, and experience escapes the attempts at purification in James. For Troeltsch, the experience of transcendence is simultaneously effable and ineffable. The corollary of this simultaneity is a concept of revelation as a dynamic drive for difference.

To summarise, in contrast to William James's binary model of experience and expression, Troeltsch offers a triangular model of event, expression, and experience. If the tension between event and expression is reduced to either a 'pure' event which sees the other as completely ineffable or a 'pure' expression which sees the other as completely effable, the dynamics which drives religion is destroyed. Troeltsch concludes that religion

---

[113] CF, 39.

[114] CF, 47.

[115] Accordingly, Troeltsch's concept of revelation comes closer to the classic position of Catholicism rather than the classic position of Protestantism. See CF, 45. See also BF, 64.

[116] Coakley, *Christ Without Absolutes*, 194. Coakley's concept of *christologie totale* adopts the historiographical method of 'l'histoire totale'. See ibid., 194n. 3. Incidentally, Troeltsch's *christologie totale* inspired Coakley's '*théologie totale*'. See Sarah Coakley, *God, Sexuality, and the Self: An Essay 'On the Trinity'* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 33-65, although she dropped the reference to Troeltsch here.

cannot be reduced to either naturalistic or super-naturalistic causes. Religion is a relation between the created (natural) other and the creating (supernatural) other, it is both natural and supernatural. Against theological reductionisms, Troeltsch argues that the revelatory event is at least in part dependent on the historical and cultural conditions under which it is expressed. And against non-theological reductionisms, Troeltsch argues that the revelatory event is at least in part independent of the historical and cultural conditions under which it is expressed. The event influences the expression as much as the expression influences the event.

For Troeltsch, then, religious relationality requires the combination of the cataphatic construction of a concept of God with the apophatic destruction of a concept of God.[117] Accordingly, Troeltsch's interpretation of the other passes the test devised in Rowan Williams's Gifford Lectures (which I discussed in Chapter 1): it aims at respect for the other through the deferral of conceptual closure. For Troeltsch, God is the radical other – which is to say, religious relationality requires the destruction as well as the construction of one's conceptions of the other: openness to the other's otherness. The controversial concept of deconstruction, which lurks between the lines here, has been coined by Jacques Derrida.[118] His account of religiosity and rationality in *Acts of Religion* comes close to Troeltsch's.[119] Derrida likens both religiosity and rationality to 'a trust that "founds" all

[117] Lauster, 'Die Selbständigkeit', 443.

[118] For a short summary, see Simon Morgan Wortham, 'Deconstruction', in *The Derrida Dictionary* (London: Continuum, 2010), 31-33, who argues that the 'nickname' deconstruction is neither exclusively negative nor exclusively positive, but affirms difference and deferral (ibid., 32). Deconstruction 'puts a question mark against the very grounds of the subject and object alike' (ibid), thus arriving at 'a strategic overturning of the hierarchies implicit in binary oppositions' (ibid., 33).

[119] See Jacques Derrida, 'Faith and Knowledge', trans. Samuel Weber, in *Acts of Religion*, ed. Gil Anidjar (London: Routledge, 2010), 40-101.

relation to the other in testimony',[120] identifying a 'contradictory structure: immunitary and auto-immunitary' in religion.[121] What he means by 'immunity' and 'auto-immunity' is that religion cultivates a tension between the knowability and the unknowability of the other. Described differently, in order to cultivate trust in the other, religion has to secure the concept of God from solid and secure determination (knowability) and from liquid and insecure indetermination (unknowability). Thus, the event which is oriented towards the transcendence of God and the expression which is oriented towards the immanence of God are to be connected. As Derrida argues, '"Religion" figures their *ellipse*'.[122] Hence, religion requires the continuous deconstruction of one's concepts of the other.[123]

Troeltsch's characterisation of religion captures the empirical explorations of James's Gifford Lectures more precisely and more pointedly than James himself, for James's survey is indeed not a survey of experiences but a survey of *expressions* of experiences.[124] When James admits that he himself has not had mystical experiences,[125] he admits that *The Varieties of Religious Experience* is dependent on (in his terminology) impure as opposed to pure experiences. Troeltsch can account for this dependency.

---

[120] Ibid., 56.
[121] Ibid., 82.
[122] Ibid., 72.
[123] Combining both theological and anti-theological arguments, Derrida's notion(s) of God are notoriously nebulous. His core concern is to counter concepts of God which concentrate on pure presence. See again the contributions to *Acts of Religion*. See also Steven Shakespeare, *Derrida and Theology* (London: T&T Clark, 2009), 77: Derrida's 'work does open possibilities for theological imagination... In the difference between God and God, there may be no resolution, but the coming of something unexpected'. For Shakespeare, the unexpected implies attraction and aversion alike – a notion which closely corresponds to the phenomenological account of 'Ehrfurcht' offered by Troeltsch. For the diverse ways in which Derrida reflects on God, see Shakespeare, *Derrida and Theology*, esp. 69-148.
[124] See Niebuhr, 'William James on Religious Experience', 232.
[125] James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, 301.

3 Trust: Dealing with the Drive for Difference

Troeltsch's references to trust are few and far between. I shall argue that the concept of trust which is conveyed by these references rests on a separation of *fides qua* and *fides quae* – a separation which Troeltsch criticises in his reception of James. Since such a separation makes no sense within Troeltsch's triangle of event, experience, and expression, I shall turn Troeltsch against Troeltsch, so to speak, in order to assess his reflections on the relationality of religion as a tacit theory of trust.

In his *Glaubenslehre*, the lectures on 'The Christian Faith' which he delivered at the University of Heidelberg in 1912 and 1913,[126] Troeltsch – in line with theological traditions in the past and the present – uses the terminology of trust when he explores faith (*Glaube*).[127] According to Troeltsch, faith is a response to revelation, where the experience of the revelatory event entails expressions of the revelatory event. Hence, 'a dogmatic exposition of revelation itself is not possible; what is possible is a dogmatic exposition of faith... It is through faith that revelation becomes accessible in the first place.'[128] Troeltsch's combination of the revelatory event and the expression of the revelatory event in the concept of faith implies that 'faith' is a 'twofold' concept.[129]

As mentioned above, the two aspects of faith are traditionally termed *fides qua* and *fides quae* or *fiducia* and *fides*. Troeltsch alludes to this traditional terminology when he

[126] Walter E. Wyman, *The Concept of Glaubenslehre: Ernst Troeltsch and the Theological Heritage of Schleiermacher* (Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1983), established that these lectures were delivered in 1912 and 1913 rather than 1911 and 1912 (ibid., xv, 208n. 37).
[127] In CF, 48-50, 'Vertrauen' has been rendered as 'confidence'. See GL, 51-52. See also Richter, 'Vertrauen – im Wachsen', 33-34.
[128] CF, 49.
[129] Ibid. Garett E. Paul has chosen to translate 'Glaube' with 'faith' rather than 'belief'. I follow Paul's translation, especially since William James, as mentioned above, usually uses both terms interchangeably.

points out that Protestantism tends to stress the significance of *fides qua* (the believing), while Catholicism trends to stress the significance of *fides quae* (the belief).[130] Yet, against any confessional contention, Troeltsch insists that both are *equally* significant. However, when he argues that one's trust (*fides qua*) has to be complemented by the cognitive acceptance of whom or what one trusts (*fides quae*), and the cognitive acceptance of whom or what one trusts (*fides quae*) has to be complemented by trust (*fides qua*), Troeltsch tacitly defines the term 'trust' through the very separation of *fides qua* and *fides quae* which he rejects.[131]

Drawing on the concept of trust as *fides qua* without *fides quae* – to recall, it is the concept which Richard Rorty characterised as the Jamesian 'romance'[132] – Troeltsch criticises theologies that revolve around the concept of trust. As exemplified by Wilhelm Herrmann, these theologies isolate theological research from non-theological research.[133] Building on 'trust', Herrmann constructs a theology which is rooted in the Reformer's assumption that *fiducia* centres faith.[134] Exploring the centre of faith, Herrmann argues that the 'fact' of Jesus evokes trust in God:[135] Jesus 'so overpowers' his followers that they cannot but trust. Since Christianity is grounded in the fact of Jesus, Herrmann assumes, this fact 'cannot stand on shifting ground' – which is to say, it cannot be grounded in historical

---

[130] Ibid.

[131] CF, 48.

[132] See again Rorty, 'Religious Faith, Intellectual Responsibility, and Romance', 84-102. See also the analysis of James's concept of experience in Chapter 1 above.

[133] Chapman, *Ernst Troeltsch and Liberal Theology*, 89-110, identifies isolationism as the core concern in Troeltsch's critique of Wilhelm Herrmann. See also Brent W. Sockness, *Against False Apologetics: Wilhelm Herrmann and Ernst Troeltsch in Conflict* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1998).

[134] See Andreas Hunziker, 'Glaube als radikales Vertruaen?', in *Gottvertrauen*, 157-294.

[135] Wilhelm Herrmann, *The Communion of the Christian with God: Described on the Basis of Luther's Statements*, trans. J. Sandys Stanion (London: Williams, 1906), 59-64. See Brent W. Sockness, 'The Ideal and the Historical in the Christology of Wilhelm Herrmann', *The Journal of Religion* 72/3 (1992), 366-388.

claims.[136] But by locating encounters with Jesus outside rather than inside history in order to ground trust in God, Herrmann 'betrays' a 'lack of appreciation for the ... representational character' of faith[137] – the representational character which Troeltsch emphasises by tracing the influence of revelation in tradition and of tradition in revelation. Hence, for Herrmann, trust allows for an encounter with Jesus without mediation.

In his analysis of Troeltsch's critique of Herrmann, Mark D. Chapman investigates how Herrmann isolates the theological from the non-theological by building his dogmatics and his ethics on the ground or the grounding – in German, Herrmann refers to 'Grund'[138] – of an experience of trust which is 'self-authenticating'.[139] For Herrmann, a theological approach is concerned with inward experience, while a non-theological approach is concerned with outward experience.[140] Troeltsch argues against such isolationism. His critique concentrates on Herrmann's lack of appreciation for representation.[141] For Troeltsch, experience is inward *and* outward, direct *and* indirect. Considering Troeltsch's controversy with Herrmann's isolationism, it is reasonable to assume that Troeltsch avoids the concept of trust because it is associated with theologies like Herrmann's – theologies which seek to safeguard Christianity from historical-cultural flux by rooting it in a 'pure' trust.

Yet, when Troeltsch restricts 'trust' to *fides qua* in contrast to *fides quae*, he backhandedly buys into the purification of experience which he criticises. Consequently, he

---

[136] Sockness, 'The Ideal and the Historical in the Christology of Wilhelm Herrmann', 384-485.
[137] Ibid., 387.
[138] See Wilhelm Herrmann, 'Grund und Inhalt des Glaubens', in Wilhelm Herrmann, *Gesammelte Aufsätze*, ed. Friedrich W. Schmidt (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1923), 275-294. See also Hunziker, 'Glaube als radikales Vertrauen', 269-270.
[139] Chapman, *Ernst Troeltsch and Liberal Theology*, 97.
[140] Ibid., 93.
[141] Ibid., 107.

has to assess 'trust' as 'event' without 'expression'. Within Troeltsch's triangle of event, expression, and experience, however, such an assessment is absurd. Experience is co-constituted by event and expression. Hence, the distinction between event and expression is merely analytical: in actual experience, both are always already intertwined which is why Troeltsch criticises James's distinction between 'pure' immediate experience and 'impure' mediate experience. Turning Troeltsch against Troeltsch, I am criticising the reduction of 'trust' into an event without an expression. To recall the concept of trust which I defined in Chapter 1, trust is a relation to the other which is characterised by openness to the other's otherness. Trust involves the event of otherness and the expression of otherness. Thus, the concept of trust is applicable to Troeltsch's account of relationality of religion.

In her review of theological theories of trust, Cornelia Richter indicates that Troeltsch might be interpreted as a pioneer of the theorisation of trust in theology.[142] If, following her lead, Troeltsch's reflections on the relationality of religion are assessed as a tacit theory of trust, then the assessment conveys the contours of a concept of community which circles around trust. I suggest that the tacit theory of trust in Troeltsch's 'Die Selbständigkeit der Religion' connects the self's relation to the finite other with the self's relation to the infinite other. This connection is instructive for a conceptualisation of church because it counters the Jamesian separation of the self's relation to the infinite other (what James calls 'religion') from the self's relation to the finite other (what James calls 'second-hand-religion') which leads to the interiorisation and individualisation of religion.

[142] Again, see Richter, 'Vertrauen – im Wachsen', 34.

Initially, Troeltsch's assessment of dogmatics as 'petrification (*Versteinerung*)'[143] or 'ossification (*Verknöcherung*)'[144] of religion comes close to James's: 'The great geniuses know nothing about it, only their heirs start the business of systematisation ... thus dressing their heroes in dogmatical straitjackets'.[145] Regardless of whether one follows Troeltsch's romantic(ising) reference to the 'geniuses' of religion, it is crucial to note how Troeltsch's notion of dogmatisation differs from James's. For James, the expression of the experience implies its contamination which is why he separates *fides qua* and *fides quae*. Accordingly, he draws a distinction between primary personal and secondary communal religion.[146] Troeltsch argues against James's separation. He points out that the expression cannot completely capture the event. Nonetheless, without expression of the event there would be no experience. Dogmatisation, for Troeltsch, then, refers to the 'stones' (petrification) and 'bones' (ossification) of dogmatics which would solidify the drive for difference by claiming that the ultimate unknowability of God has been overcome, as if they had arrived at a clear-cut concept of the radical other either as completely knowable or as completely unknowable.[147]

Troeltsch's triangle of event, expression, and experience allows him to balance the demands for the construction of conceptions of the other and for the destruction of conceptions of the other. Like James, Troeltsch argues that if the relation to the other is expressed in concepts which are too solid, the relation is lost.[148] The result would be an expression of the other without an event of the other – which is to say, the other could not

[143] SR, 425.
[144] SR, 436.
[145] SR, 425.
[146] See again Lash, *Easter in Ordinary*, 54-56.
[147] Here, Troeltsch anticipates Lash's critique of James. See ibid., 51-70.
[148] See also WL, 825-826.

be experienced. Unlike James, Troeltsch argues that if the relation to the other is expressed in concepts which are too liquid, the relation is lost, too.[149] The result would be an event of the other without an expression of the other – which is to say, the other could not be experienced. Combining elements of cataphatic and apophatic theology, Troeltsch balances experience in-between event and expression. He argues that the event has to be expressed in terms which are neither too solid nor too liquid. Hence, what Troeltsch advocates is *elastic* terms. Of course, Troeltsch employs the concept of elasticity in his ecclesiology, but there is no reason not to transfer it to his theology.[150] The acknowledgement of the knowability of God, on the one hand, and of the unknowability of God, on the other, provokes Troeltsch neither to demand a solid dogmatisation of religion nor to demand a liquid de-dogmatisation of religion.[151] Instead, Troeltsch demands a stance between liquidity and solidity to live a relation to the other which is characterised by openness to otherness. Theo-logy, thinking and talking about God, then, is to be elasticised.

According to Troeltsch, ecclesiology mirrors theology. Building on the triangle of event, expression, and experience, he concludes that the transmission of religion 'always already (*stets*)' occurs through 'the transfer of religious imagination (*Vermittelung der religiösen Vorstellungswelt*)'.[152] According to Troeltsch, community is the site for such transfers.[153] Troeltsch concurs with James's critique of churches, stressing the rigidity with which churches put pressure on Christians and non-Christians alike to conform to

[149] Ibid.
[150] See KG, 104.
[151] Lauster, 'Die Selbständigkeit', 443, argues that Troeltsch offers a 'programme for the de-dogmatisation of religion (*Programm einer Entdogmatisierung der Religion*)'. However, in comparison to James's demand for de-dogmatisation, Troeltsch's 'programme' is to be located *in-between* dogmatisation and de-dogmatisation.
[152] PE, 17.
[153] SR, 427-428.

dogmatically domesticated orthodoxies.[154] He continues, however, that churches can impact religion either negatively or positively, depending on the ecclesiology of the respective church: churches can be structures of support as much as structures of suppression. Eventually, he cautions against two ecclesiological risks which mirror the dangers of either dogmatisations which are too solid or de-dogmatisations which are too liquid. Returning to the ecclesiological double-bind which I analysed above, I term these risks the 'postliberal risk' and the 'liberal risk' respectively.

As for the ecclesiological risk in postliberal solidity, Troeltsch – like James – argues that if the communal expression is prioritised over the personal event, the prioritisation results in a structure of community which is *too* solid.[155] Here, one could imagine a religious collectivism which does not allow for personal variations – the repetition of the collectivised same without alterity. In order to avoid this solidifying risk, the community must allow persons to challenge the traditions of the community. Otherwise, the community would separate the event from the expression, perverting religion from a relation into a reflection. The person would be concerned with the traditions which *reflect* the transcendent instead of the transcendent; religion would be nothing but rational assent, '*Fürwahrhalten*':[156] *fides quae* separated from *fides qua*. Here, the community would drain the person.

As for the ecclesiological risk in liberal liquidity (the inversion of the risk in solidity to which Troeltsch alludes), Troeltsch – unlike James – argues that if the personal event is prioritised over the communal expression, the prioritisation results in a structure of

[154] SR, 436.
[155] SR, 427.
[156] SR, 436.

community which is *too* liquid.[157] Here, one could imagine a religious individualism which does not allow for communal traditions – the repetition of the individualised same without alterity. In order to avoid this liquefying risk, the subject must allow the community to challenge her challenges of the community. Otherwise, the subject would separate the event from the expression: *fides qua* separated from *fides quae*. Thus, she would lose the ability to experience the event. Eventually, the person would misinterpret her expressions of the event for the event because her interpretation could not be challenged.[158] Here, the person would drain the community.

I have structured these ecclesiological risks in parallel: solidifying dogmatisation and liquefying de-dogmatisation turn community into a structure which prevents religious relationality: if a church strips one's relation to the finite other of its otherness (either through collectivisation or through individualisation), the robbery impacts one's relation to the infinite other. Thus, for Troeltsch, religion is neither simply a matter of personal de-dogmatisation, nor simply a matter of communal dogmatisation. Troeltsch seeks to steer ecclesiology in-between collectivism and individualism, stressing that experience and expression cannot be separated because both are dependent on the subject's imagination. To trigger religious imagination, a dynamics between experience and expression is indispensable. If a church evokes a dynamics in which persons can challenge their communities as much as communities can challenge their persons, the church is turned from a structure of religious suppression into a structure of religious support because it is transformed into a space where one can encounter the other. Countering James's

[157] SR, 427-428.
[158] SR, 435-436.

privatisation of religion, Troeltsch anchors relationality not in a solitary subject but in-between social subjects.

In conclusion, reconceived as a tacit theory of trust, 'Die Selbständigkeit der Religion' corroborates Troeltsch's critique of James's interpretation of religion. Like James, Troeltsch takes the experience of transcendence as a point of departure for the exploration of trust in the transcendent. But, unlike James, he combines synchronic and diachronic approaches. Like James, Troeltsch assumes that religion revolves around the experience of alterity – the otherness of the other. But, unlike James, Troeltsch argues that the experience implies a *relation* to the other whose otherness is experienced. For Troeltsch, relationality is at the core of religiosity. He highlights that trust ought not to be reduced to either the religious subject or the religious object.

Phenomenologically, religion cultivates a spectrum of experiences. Troeltsch characterises the relation to the transcendent as a mystery which defies conclusive conceptualisation. Troeltsch's characterisation of the relationality of religion resonates with James's phenomenology of trust. But Troeltsch is more careful than James. While James argues that the claim to conceptualisation contaminates trust, Troeltsch argues that it is the claim to *conclusive* conceptualisation which contaminates trust. Troeltsch's triangle of event, expression, and experience implies that trust is always already ineffable and effable, immediate and mediate or pure and impure, personal and communal: the event needs to be expressed in order to be experienced. Therefore, the religious relation to the transcendent cannot be experienced without language. Language allows a subject to draw the distinction

between transcendence and immanence in the first place.[159] Accordingly, religion is a combination of the primary and the secondary; it always already involves what James calls 'the second hand'. But for Troeltsch, the 'second hand' is not to be eliminated but to be emphasised. The relation between the immanent and the transcendent implies a tension between ineffability and effability which drives the deconstructive dynamics of religion.

For Troeltsch, religions which focus on relationality surpass religions which do not focus on relationality. Although 'Die Selbständigkeit der Religion' remains in the clutches of a teleology which interprets Christianity as the culmination of religion, Troeltsch's conclusion is cautious. Faith is crucial for both the perception and the conception of the dynamic drive for difference.

Theologically, it is instructive that Troeltsch uses 'revelation' not to describe a point in history, but to describe a process in history. He conceives of a dynamics of revelation which implies that tradition is part of revelation and that revelation is part of tradition. Consequently, he portrays the theological and the ecclesiological constitution of communities much more favourably than James. For Troeltsch, the theology and the ecclesiology of a community function as the sites for the expression of the event in the experience. Troeltsch's account of religion implies his elasticisation of ecclesiology.

Troeltsch's reception of James's concept of the experience of transcendence, then, allows me to redefine the point of departure for ecclesiology as what I call 'togetherness of trust', a way of being together which interrelates the relations to the finite other with the relations to the infinite other.

[159] CF, 48-49. See also, Lauster, *Religion als Lebensdeutung*, 24-25. For explorations of poetic expressions of transcendence, see the contributions to *The Poetics of Transcendence*, ed. Elisa Heinämäki, P. M. Mehtonen, and Antti Salminen (Leiden: Brill, 2015).

Chapter 3

THE TOGETHERNESS OF TRUST

In Chapter 1 and Chapter 2, I explored the Jamesian account of the experience of transcendence and Ernst Troeltsch's reception of the Jamesian account of the experience of transcendence. William James uses 'trust' to interpret experiences of transcendence. For him, trust is a two-track concept: the relation of trust requires the presumption of trust as much as the presumption of trust requires the relation of trust. Because of its creative circularity, trust, as James asserts, is 'previous', 'precursive', and 'preliminary'. Yet James interiorises and individualises trust, thus losing track of the relationality of religion. For Troeltsch, however, relationality is the core of religion. Countering James's separation of experience and expression, he proposes a triangle of event, expression, and experience. Experience is co-constituted by event (James's 'immediate' experience) and expression (James's 'mediate' experience). Accordingly, Troeltsch argues that communities offer resources to provoke and to preserve experiences of transcendence.

In this chapter, I shall argue that trust involves a connection between the experience of the transcendence of the finite other and the experience of the transcendence of the infinite other – a connection which is implied in the Jamesian circle of trust. Trust, a relation to the other which is characterised by openness to the other's otherness, connects the relation to the finite other with the relation to the infinite other. In order to argue for this connection, I seek to spell out the structural similarities between the experience of trust

in the finite other and the experience of trust in the infinite other. With the notion of 'structural similarities', I stress the characteristics which are common to both experiences of trust. Although it would be exciting to explore the dissimilarities between trust in the creature and trust in the creator, my argument is that the similarities form and inform the connections of creature and creator in the experience of trust.

Again, I proceed in three steps: (1) I shall turn from classic to contemporary accounts of the experience of transcendence in order to clarify how transcendence implies the destabilisation of the distinction between religious and nonreligious experience. Transcendence is experienced whenever the other is encountered in trust, because openness to otherness allows the other to transcend me – irrespective of whether the other is finite or infinite. (2) In order to dispel any suspicion that my conceptualisation of trust minimises the creator to the size of the creature or maximises the creature to the size of the creator, I shall discuss Ingolf U. Dalferth's account of trust which is rooted in a categorical contradistinction between the immanent and the transcendent. (3) Criticising both theological and non-theological reductionisms in the interpretation of transcendence, I shall conclude that trust points to the relation to the transformative transcendence of finite and infinite other. In trust, the relation to the finite other might become an opening to the relation to the infinite other and the relation to the infinite other might become an opening to the relation to the finite other. The web of relations in which the relation to the finite other interrelates with the relation to the infinite other is what I shall term togetherness of trust. The open(ed) church which resists both sociological and theological closure is centred in such a togetherness of trust.

1 Transcendence and Transformation

How can one relate to the other who transcends and transforms one's expectations and evaluations of her? Turning from classical to contemporary accounts, I aim to account for the experience of transcendence in a way which blurs the boundaries between religious and nonreligious experience in order to explore relations to the finite other *and* relations to the infinite other as sites for the experience of a transcendence which transforms the self. I shall argue that the concept of transcendence allows for the destabilisation of the distinction between extraordinary religious experience and ordinary nonreligious experience, because transcendence might be experienced whenever the other is encountered – openness to the other *is* what allows the other to transcend the self. I have chosen Hans Joas's sociologically-oriented account of the experience of transcendence and Jörg Lauster's theologically-oriented account of the experience of transcendence. Both of them expand on James and on Troeltsch's reception of James. Thus, their accounts are instructive for a portrayal of the experience of transcendence which is compatible with on-going sociological and theological discussions.

Although inspired by James, Joas rarely refers to the terminology of 'religious' and 'nonreligious' experience. Rather, he employs the concept 'experience of self-transcendence (*Erfahrung der Selbsttranszendenz*)'.[1] According to Joas, this concept

[1] Joas refers to the 'experience of self-transcendence' in *Die Entstehung der Werte*. See also the lectures collected in *Braucht der Mensch Religion? Über Erfahrungen der Selbsttranszendenz* (Freiburg: Herder, 2003). ET: *Do We Need Religion? On the Experience of Self-Transcendence*, trans. Alex Skinner (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2008).

captures experiences in which a subject 'transcends herself'.[2] This self-transcending of the subject is experienced not as a 'pulling' but as a 'being pulled' beyond the confines of the self, such as in the experience of what is aptly articulated as 'falling' in love.[3] '*Ergriffensein*', 'being-grasped', is the term Joas uses in German; reminiscent of the phenomenology of religion, he points out that such a being-grasped provokes feelings of both security and insecurity.[4]

Who is the agent of self-transcendence? In line with Troeltsch, Joas assesses the self as simultaneously active and passive. When he depicts the experience of self-transcendence, he shifts between the self as grammatical object and the self as grammatical subject – sometimes within the space of one sentence.[5] However, Joas does not discuss the agency of self-transcendence in detail. Joas's point is that experiences of self-transcendence are anthropologically anchored: 'There is no doubt that we have such experiences' – regardless of whether we self-identify as religious or as nonreligious.[6] Hence, to separate a religious experience in which the self is transcended (and thus is assumed to be passive) from a nonreligious experience in which the self transcends (and thus is assumed to be active) would miss the point.

What qualifies the experience of self-transcendence as either religious or nonreligious is *not* the experience, but the *articulation* or the *interpretation* of the experience.[7] Joas uses 'articulation' and 'interpretation' interchangeably; however,

---

[2] Hans Joas, 'Do We Need Religion?', in *Do We Need Religion?*, 7.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Hans Joas, 'Braucht der Mensch Religion?', in *Braucht der Mensch Religion?*, 17, ET: 7.
[5] Joas, 'Do We Need Religion', 7.
[6] Ibid. Joas provides a long list of examples of experiences of self-transcendence from religious as well as non-religious contexts. See also Hans Joas, '"Diese Erfahrung ist universell": Gläubige haben kein Geheimwissen, sagt der Soziologe Hans Joas. Sie reden nur anders.', *Zeit Wissen* 1 (2013), 24-28.
[7] Ibid., 11.

'interpretation' – in German he writes 'Deutung'[8] – takes centre-stage, because on Joas's account of the experience of self-transcendence, there is 'a gap' between the experience and the expression of the experience.[9] The German term *Deutung* points to this gap which opens an interpretative space; thus, *Deutung* is used in cases where a plurality of interpretations is inevitable.[10] Joas criticises the (Jamesian) notion that interpretation contaminates the experience it interprets.[11] For him, there is no re-turn behind the linguistic turn.[12] He argues that all experiences are excessive: experiences always already exceed their expression.[13] Even the excess has to be expressed. Through language one can articulate an experience and one can articulate that one cannot articulate an experience.[14] Echoing the drive for difference so crucial to Troeltsch's account of the experience of transcendence, Joas stresses the creativity which is involved in the excess. The fact that experience cannot be expressed completely provokes creative expression after creative expression.[15]

Correspondingly, Joas argues that experiences of self-transcendence require expressions and that expressions of self-transcendence require experiences.[16] Joas comes closer to Troeltsch's reception of James than to James: experience and expression are

[8] Joas, 'Braucht der Mensch Religion?', 22.
[9] Joas, 'Do We Need Religion?', 12.
[10] See Lauster, *Religion als Lebensdeutung*, 9-30.
[11] Hans Joas, 'On the Articulation of Experience', in *Do We Need Religion?*, 37-48. Throughout his study, Joas alludes to James. These allusions seem to counter my reading of James when Joas interprets James in a way that connects experience and expression closely (ibid. 41-42). However, he does not discuss these allusions in detail. On the contrary, Joas seems to confirm my reading of James by turning to the critical colleague of James, Josiah Royce, whenever he points to the pragmatist sensibility for language.
[12] Ibid., 37-38.
[13] Joas, 'On the Articulation of Experience', 42.
[14] Ibid., 43.
[15] Ibid., 44. See also Hans Joas, *The Creativity of Action*, trans. Jeremy Ganes and Paul Keast (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).
[16] Joas, 'Do We Need Religion?', 12-13.

closely connected.[17] For Joas, the experience of self-transcendence 'can start at both ends':[18] the interpretation can be triggered by an experience of self-transcendence and an experience of self-transcendence can be triggered by an interpretation.[19] What follows from Joas's account is that certain experiences trigger certain interpretations and that certain interpretations trigger certain experiences. Drawing on the notion of the circle of trust in James's *The Will to Believe* which I discussed in Chapter 1, Joas points to 'sacramental experiences'[20] to identify the significance of interpretation. Only if one takes Jesus's interpretation of the bread he shared, 'Take, eat, this is my body', seriously, can one eat more than bread during the Eucharist. Without the interpretative words of institution, the bread remains bread. [21] Hence, along the lines of Troeltsch, Joas concludes that 'traditions' and 'institutions' are vital to excite *and* to express experiences of self-transcendence because they preserve interpretations like Jesus's 'This is my body'.[22]

The excitations and expressions of experience through traditions and institutions are the concern of Lauster's account of religion as 'Lebensdeutung', 'interpretation of life'. The concept of 'Deutung' is also vital for Lauster.[23] He argues that subjects create their life-world through the 'interpretation (*Deutung*)' of their world.[24] What distinguishes religious from nonreligious subjects is the 'how' of their respective interpretations.[25] Is the

[17] See Joas's account of Troeltsch in Joas, 'Die Selbständigkeit'. Joas's lectures on the experience of self-transcendence were written *before* he discovered Troeltsch. See Joas, 'Selbsttranszendenz und Wertbindung', 51.
[18] Joas, 'Do We Need Religion?', 12.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Ibid., 14.
[21] Ibid., 13-14.
[22] Ibid., 14.
[23] Lauster, *Religion als Lebensdeutung*, 9-30.
[24] Ibid., 12.
[25] Ibid.

world interpreted with or without a 'reference to transcendence (*Transzendenzbezug*)'?[26] For Lauster, the reference (not necessarily the relation) to transcendence decides whether an experience counts as religious or as nonreligious. While Joas allocates the concept of transcendence to religious *and* to nonreligious experiences, Lauster asserts that there is – strictly speaking – no *experience* of transcendence.[27] He locates transcendence on the level of *expression* rather than on the level of *experience*.[28] Thus, on Lauster's account, Joas's experience of self-transcendence can be interpreted with or without reference to a transcendent.[29] Joas's experience of self-transcendence is the experience of the transformation of the self through self-transcendence. Lauster argues that if this transformative experience is interpreted with reference to a transcendent outside of the self, the experience counts as religious and if this transformative experience is interpreted without reference to a transcendent outside of the self, the experience counts as nonreligious.[30] Transcendence functions as a conceptual container with changing cargoes.

In *Religion als Lebensdeutung*, Lauster rarely refers to Troeltsch. Nonetheless, he offers a Troeltschian combination of 'event', 'expression', and 'experience'.[31] Countering James's distinction between a primary immediate experience and a secondary mediate expression, Lauster argues that experiences are always already 'second-hand' 'in as much as they are regulated by the cultural conditions of the subject of experience'.[32] Hence, in order to experience, a subject has to draw on the reservoir of interpretations which is

[26] Ibid., 24.
[27] Ibid. with recourse to Immanuel Kant.
[28] Ibid. See also Lauster, 'How To Do Transcendence With Words?'.
[29] Lauster, *Religion als Lebensdeutung*, 25. Strictly speaking, Lauster does not offer a definition of 'transcendence', but he suggests that the term signifies the super-sensual or the super-natural (ibid.).
[30] Ibid.
[31] Ibid., 23. For Lauster's account of Troeltsch see Lauster, 'Die Selbständigkeit'.
[32] Lauster, *Religion als Lebensdeutung*, 23.

preserved in traditions and institutions.[33] The 'patterns of interpretation (*Deutungsmuster*)' enable the subject to have experiences.[34] While Joas is more interested in the experience, Lauster is more interested in the expressions of the experience.[35] According to Lauster, the notion of religion as interpretation of life allows for a rapprochement between liberal theology and the critique of liberal theology.[36] With the liberals (who tend to see experience as produced by the subject and thus focus on the concept of religion), Lauster stresses the activity of the subject. With the critics of the liberals (who tend to see experience as received by the subject and thus focus on the concept of revelation), Lauster stresses the passivity of the subject.[37] Building on his rapprochement, Lauster redefines the task of a hermeneutics of Christianity today.

Perhaps predictably, his hermeneutics takes Jesus as its point of departure. The first followers of Jesus interpreted their encounters with the Nazarene as the 'in-breaking of transcendence (*Transzendenzeinbruch*)'.[38] Jesus transformed their lives in a way which provoked them to interpret the world with reference to a transcendent: Jesus as the Christ. The transformative in-breaking of transcendence released 'schemes of interpretation (*Deutungsschemata*)' with which the followers saw the world anew.[39] These schemes of interpretation triggered the transmission of interpretations of the in-breaking of

[33] Ibid.
[34] Ibid., 24.
[35] However, it is important to bear in mind that both of them reject strict separations of experience and expression.
[36] Ibid., 27-30.
[37] Ibid., 27.
[38] Ibid., 28.
[39] Lauster, *Religion als Lebensdeutung*, 28.

transcendence which have shaped Christianity.[40] The task of the hermeneutics of Christianity is the analysis and the assessment of the history and of the history of the effects of these schemes of interpretation.[41] The criterion for assessment is whether the interpretations confess their own limitations, so to speak.[42] Lauster argues that liberal theology is not a bankrupt project (as its neo-orthodox and neo-neo-orthodox critics would have it) precisely because it points to the indispensable difference between experience and expression.[43]

Accordingly, Joas's more sociological and Lauster's more theological understanding of religion validate Troeltsch's reception of James. The alternative between experience and expression is a false alternative: experience is manifested *through* expression and expression is manifested *through* experience. However, there are decidedly different concepts of revelation at work in the more sociological and in the more theological account.

Joas reserves the concept of revelation for experiences in which experience and expression fall into one for the experiencing subject: 'die Erfahrung geht restlos im Ausdruck auf', 'the experience merges completely into the expression' – both are 'indissolubly fused'.[44] According to Joas, the fusion of experience and expression is what distinguishes extraordinary revelatory experiences from ordinary non-revelatory

[40] Lauster has concentrated on the role and relevance of the Bible for the process of transmission. See ibid., 31-88; and Jörg Lauster, *Prinzip und Methode: Die Transformation des protestantischen Schriftprinzips durch die historisch-kritische Methode von Schleiermacher bis zur Gegenwart* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2004).

[41] Lauster, *Religion als Lebensdeutung*, 28.

[42] In *Die Verzauberung der Welt: Eine Kulturgeschichte des Christentums* (München: C. H. Beck, 2014), Lauster has put his programme of the hermeneutics of Christianity into practice. For an English account see my review in *Reviews in Religion and Theology* 22/2 (2015), 170-173.

[43] See Lauster, 'Liberale Theologie', 291-307. See also Lauster, 'How To Do Transcendence With Words?'.

[44] Alex Skinner rendered Joas's statement 'die Erfahrung geht restlos im Ausdruck auf' as 'experience is completely transformed into expression' although the German retains an analytical difference between experience and expression. See Joas, 'Braucht der Mensch Religion?', 24, ET: 12.

experiences. He assumes that every experience exceeds its expression:[45] such excess might still characterise revelation objectively; subjectively, however, the excess is nullified in the experience of the human self. The consequence of the fusion of experience and expression is that, as subjects who have had a revelation, 'we are then very hesitant even to discuss our interpretation'.[46] For Joas, the congruence of experience and expression is what causes controversy in religion. Since the subject registers no distinction between experience and expression, she is not prepared to acknowledge alternative expressions. Although Joas does not elaborate on the rejection or refusal of the plurality of interpretations, it is clear that intra- and inter-religious controversies might be traced back to such a concept of revelation.

Lauster also assumes that in revelation experience and expression go hand in hand.[47] The experience of revelation is characterised as an experience of 'overpowering (*Überwältigtwerden*)' which is triggered by a transcendent – outside, not inside the subject.[48] Thus the subject experiences herself as *responding* to revelation: the response combines her reaction and her action. In contrast to Joas, however, Lauster does not assume revelation to be rooted in an indissoluble fusion of experience and expression.[49] When he stresses the excess at the core of the experience of transcendence, he argues along the lines of Troeltsch who pointed out that experiences of transcendence are experienced as mysterious: both subjectively and objectively, they can never be expressed completely.[50] For Lauster, revelation does not liquidate the difference between experience and expression. The excess is what has triggered the creation of the schemes of interpretation

[45] Joas, 'On the Articulation of Experience'.
[46] Joas, 'Do We Need Religion', 12.
[47] Lauster, *Religion als Lebensdeutung*, 27.
[48] Ibid., 25.
[49] Ibid., 27-28.
[50] Ibid., 23-25.

throughout the history of Christianity; nonetheless, Christianity is more than these schemes of interpretations, because the excess as such cannot be captured.[51] Hence, Lauster's hermeneutics of Christianity is rooted in the excess of the experience of transcendence – which is to say, the difference between experience and expression.

What is at stake here is the issue of the effability or the ineffability of transcendence. Conceptualising 'transcendence' as a transcendent which is outside rather than inside the subject, Lauster tries to engage with the issue which Joas omits.[52] In particular, Lauster points out that it is precisely the excess of the experience which makes the experience a revelatory experience. Here, Lauster agrees with Troeltsch who, as examined in Chapter 2, argues that the experience of transcendence is expressible and inexpressible at once. However, Lauster's core concept of transcendence remains curiously under- if not undefined. To be sure, he uses 'transcendence' because it enables him to characterise distinct and diverse experiences of excess. But I wonder whether and why the transcendent 'behind' the different and diverse experiences of excess can be assumed to be the same. In order to escape the assumption of a self-same transcendence which the subject refers to but not necessarily relates to in the experience of excess, Lauster's concept of revelation ought to be connected with Joas's concept of a transformative transcendence. What would such a connection look like?

If elaborated on, Joas's terminology of 'articulation' and 'interpretation' allows for an assessment of how transcendence can be characterised as simultaneously effable and ineffable. I draw a distinction between articulation and interpretation *within* the concept of

[51] Lauster, *Die Verzauberung*, 617.

[52] In 'Do We Need Religion?', Joas makes no mention of the issue of the in/effability of transcendence. Given that he emphasises the excess of the experience over the expression in 'On the Articulation of Experience', his silence on this issue is puzzling.

expression: expression includes both articulation and interpretation.[53] Accordingly, the experience of transcendence implies that the subject articulates the event of transcendence. But if transcendence means that the subject's self is transcended in the event of transcendence, her *interpretation* of the event of transcendence relativises her *articulation* of the event of transcendence.[54] Described differently, the subject articulates the experience as experience of transcendence. But simultaneously she interprets her articulation as inadequate because the articulation cannot characterise transcendence completely. The transcendent would not transform her if transcendence could be conceptually captured.

To be sure, the experiences of transcendence which I am analysing with my admittedly abstract account of articulation and interpretation are everyday experiences. Consider the cases in which one is surprised by the other. In the relation to my spouse, for instance, I form mental images of who she is for me. But the relation between us is in danger if I confine her to these images. Rather, our relation rests on my openness to the fact that she is other than I imagine her to be. She escapes or exceeds my imagination. Thus, the play between my creation of images of her (on the level of articulation) and my correction of images of her (on the level of interpretation) is indispensable for me to relate to my spouse. Through this play, I experience the transformativity of her transcendence whenever she surprises me. Transcendence is ultimately undeterminable. Hence, in order to account for the effability *and* for the ineffability of the excess in the experiences of the other, the

[53] The distinction between articulation and interpretation comes close to the slogan of 'Erfahrung mit der Erfahrung' which is easily traced back to Eberhard Jüngel, *Unterwegs zur Sache: Theologische Erörterungen* (München: Christoph Kaiser Verlag, 1972), 8; and Gerhard Ebeling, 'Die Klage über das Erfahrungsdefizit der Theologie als Frage nach ihrer Sache', in *Wort und Glaube*, vol. 3 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1975), 3-28.
[54] Both dimensions of expression are *interpretative*. Hence, what I call 'articulation' could also be described as the interpretation of the event, and what I call 'interpretation' could also be described as the interpretation of the interpretation of the event.

(Troeltschian) triangle of event, expression, and experience requires a dialectical concept of expression: articulation and interpretation.[55]

Building on Joas, I describe and define 'transcendence' functionally rather than substantially – by what it *does*, so to speak.[56] What does the transcendent do? It *transforms* the subject's self in a way which cannot be curtailed or controlled by the self. Accordingly, my concept of transcendence comes close to Joas's concept of transformative self-transcendence. But I prefer to speak of 'transcendence' rather than 'self-transcendence' to stress, following Troeltsch and Lauster after Troeltsch, that the transformation is experienced as a transformation triggered from the outside rather than the inside: the transformative transcendent is both other and outside of the self.

Because it is conceptualised functionally rather than substantially, my concept of transcendence requires an account of revelation which stresses the *divergence* rather than the *convergence* between experience and expression – the account which Lauster has offered. The transformation of the subject's self is registered by the subject through the difference between the articulation and the interpretation of the experience. The difference is at the core of what I dubbed the drive for difference in Troeltsch's hermeneutical combination of the synchronic and the diachronic approach to religion. The drive for

[55] By 'articulation', I mean the way in which a subject registers internal and external stimuli. Hence, 'articulation' might capture different forms of language, verbal and non-verbal. It includes the 'protolanguage' which is exemplified by what neuroscientists refer to as 'limbic speech': utterances like 'oh' or 'uh' or 'ah' relating to stimuli which the limbic sphere processes instantaneously. In limbic speech, the event is registered, but not reflected. Graham Ward, *Unbelievable: Why We Believe and Why We Don't* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2015), 58-59. Crucially, limbic speech is oriented towards the other. As Ward puts it, 'limbic speech is "infective"' (ibid., 59).

[56] I borrow the distinction between functional and substantial approaches to definitions from the controversial conversations about the concept of religion: the functional approach focuses on what religion does, while the substantial approach focuses on what religion declares. For a short summary, see Grace Davie, *The Sociology of Religion* (London: Sage, 2007), 19-20.

difference which prompts and propels the historical-cultural development of religion can thus be assessed as a transforming transcendence which is ultimately undeterminable.

Finally, the difference between the dimensions of articulation and interpretation is instructive for the concepts of religious and nonreligious experience. If transcendence is experienced as a transformation – registered by a difference between one's articulation and one's interpretation of the experience – then transcendence is triggered by the other. Alterity, the otherness of the other, implies that the other differs from one's concept of the other. One is surprised by the other – otherwise the other would not be other. Surprisingly, the other transcends one's concept of the other.[57] I shall return to the concept of transcendence below. What is important here is that *both* the 'transcendent' other (theologically speaking, the creator) and the 'immanent' other (theologically speaking, the creature) *transcend* one's concepts of them. Thus, it is more precise to refer to the 'finite other' and the 'infinite other' (as I have throughout my study), because both others are transcending. In the exposure to *any* other – be it the other or the self as other – I might be transformed.[58] *Experientially*, the exposure to the finite other and the exposure to the infinite other are *structurally similar*.

Accordingly, on my account, the distinction between religious and nonreligious experience is *not* drawn by the engagement with transcendence. Both the finite and the infinite other confront a subject with a transformative transcendence. Religion, I am arguing, is rooted in the radical dissonance between the articulation and the interpretation

[57] My concept of transcendence comes close to the typology of minor, medium, and maximum transcendences which Thomas Luckmann developed in the appendix to the re-translation of *The Invisibile Religion: The Problem of Religion in Modern Society* (New York: Macmillan, 1967) into German. See Thomas Luckmann, *Die unsichtbare Religion* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1991), 166-171. However, Luckmann neither discussed nor defined the significance of alterity for the experience of transcendence.

[58] As Paul Ricoeur, *Oneself As Another*, trans. Kathleen Blamey (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992), argued, the self can also be conceived of as other.

of the experience of transcendence: religious experience is the *hermeneutical* experience in which one's interpretation highlights the radical inadequacy of one's articulation.[59] What follows from the structural similarities between the experience of the finite other's transcendence and the experience of the infinite other's transcendence is that transcendence might be experienced in the encounter with both God and God's creature. Whenever I am open to the other, I allow the other to transcend and to transform myself.

To summarise, the shift from classical accounts of religion to contemporary accounts of religion has allowed me to rethink the distinction between what counts as religious experience and what counts as nonreligious experience. Troeltsch's critique of James's contrast between immediate experience and mediate expression has been validated. The contemporary accounts by both Joas and Lauster acknowledge the complex connection between experience and expression; they come close to the Troeltschian triangle of event, expression, and experience. Thus, they point to the seminal significance of traditions and institutions for both the excitation and the expression of experiences of transcendence.

The decisive difference between the more sociological account by Joas and the more theological account by Lauster lies in their respective concept of revelation: while Joas defines revelation through the convergence between experience and expression, Lauster defines revelation through the divergence between experience and expression. Taking inspiration from Joas's concept of transformative (self-)transcendence, I have argued for a functional as opposed to a substantial conceptualisation which defines transcendence by what it does: namely, to transform. Yet in order to account for how the

[59] For the concept of hermeneutical experience, see Werner G. Jeanrond, 'The Complexity of Hermeneutical Experience: Transcendence and Transformation', in *Experience or Expression?* (forthcoming).

subject registers the transformative transcendent, I have built on Lauster's emphasis on the difference between experience and expression. I have drawn a distinction within the concept of expression between its dimension of articulation and its dimension of interpretation. If the subject's interpretation relativises the subject's articulation – if she realises a difference between these two dimensions – she registers transcendence. Revelation is thus conceptualised not through the congruence of articulation and interpretation, but through the divergence of articulation and interpretation. The dissonance triggers the drive for difference which Troeltsch included in his concept of revelation. In Troeltsch's terminology, the exciter is present in the excitation, but neither fully nor finally. Building on Troeltsch, transcendence cannot be completely conceptualised.

As a consequence, any other – finite or infinite – might confront the subject with transformative transcendence in so far as the other transcends one's concepts of the other: the exposure to the finite other and the exposure to the infinite other are structurally similar. The relationship between a more radical difference and a more routine difference between articulation and interpretation stresses that a *clear-cut* distinction between religious experience and nonreligious experience is impossible. Both are rooted in transcendence. My account of transcendence is *not* intended to turn God into a creature or to turn a creature into God. Instead, it is intended to demonstrate that the way a subject encounters God is intimately and inextricably interwoven with the way a subject encounters God's creature and that the way a subject encounters God's creature is intimately and inextricably interwoven with the way a subject encounters God. What is at stake in both treatments is the subject's engagement (or, indeed, disengagement) with the transformative transcendence of the other.

2 Transformation and Trust

To recall the conclusions drawn from the Jamesian circle of trust in Chapter 1: I conceive of trust as a relation to the other which is characterised by openness to the other's otherness. When one trusts the other, one relates to her without confining or controlling her alterity: one allows the other to transform oneself. Accordingly, I shall argue that 'trust' encapsulates an experiential connection between the relation to the finite other and the relation to the infinite other. If the transcendence of the creature and the transcendence of the creator are structurally similar, then trust in God's creature might be a gateway for the radical experience of God as much as trust in God might be a gateway for the routine experience of God's creature.[60] The way one relates to God's creature impacts the way one relates to God and the way one relates to God impacts the way one relates to God's creature – admittedly an abstract articulation of the double commandment of love

[60] Within Christian theology, the interrelation of the relation to the finite other with the relation to the infinite other is commonly conceived of as a one-way track: the relation to God is seen as that which enables the relation to God's creatures, but the relation to God's creatures is *not* seen as that which enables the relation to God. Drawing on Martin Buber's philosophy of dialogical personalism, Nicholas Lash, *Easter in Ordinary*, 178-218, points to both ways in which the interrelated relations might work. Building on Buber, Lash is sceptical of the concept of experience which could confine the relation to the subject who experiences the relation (ibid., 242). While I appreciate the danger of reducing what happens 'in-between' subjects to what happens 'in' subjects, I retain the concept of experience in order to point to the experiential impact of the interrelated relations.

(Matthew 22:37-40; see 1 John 4:20).[61] Whether the transcendence of these others is experienced as transformative or non-transformative depends on whether one relates to the transcendent in trust (thus allowing the other to transform oneself) or in distrust (thus not allowing the other to transform oneself). Trust, I shall suggest, is *the* way to relate to the transformative transcendence which is inherent in the confrontation with the other.[62] In what I shall term 'togetherness of trust', then, the relation to the finite other and the relation to the infinite other are *interrelated*.

Admittedly, to argue that the relation to God corresponds to the relation to God's creature and that the relation to God's creature corresponds to the relation to God might be suspect to both theologians and non-theologians. It suspiciously smells of reductionism; in theological terminology, it sounds idolatrous. In order to dispel the suspicion of idolatry, I shall engage with Ingolf U. Dalferth's concepts of 'trust' and 'transcendence'. Dalferth's concepts are promising, because he also criticises the interiorisation and the individualisation of trust against which I have argued above in Chapter 1 and in Chapter

[61] The reference to the double commandment of love blurs the boundaries between the semantic fields of love (which includes moments of trust) and trust (which includes moments of love). When I define 'trust' as a relation which is characterised by openness to the other's otherness, I come close to Werner G. Jeanrond's concept of love which emphasises both relationality and alterity. See Werner G. Jeanrond, *A Theology of Love* (London: T&T Clark, 2010). I chose the concept of trust, because – unlike 'love' – 'trust' stresses the risk which is involved in any relation to the other. Thus, it escapes the 'trivialization' from which the concept of love suffers in contemporary culture – a trivialisation which strips 'love' of the 'full force of otherness'. See Werner G. Jeanrond, 'Love', in *The Oxford Handbook for Theology and Modern European Thought*, 250. For a detailed discussion of Jeanrond's concept of love, see Ulrich Schmiedel, '(Instead of the) Introduction: Open to the Other. The Dynamics of Difference in Werner G. Jeanrond's Hermeneutical Theology', in *Dynamics of Difference: Christianity and Alterity: A Festschrift for Werner G. Jeanrond*, ed. Ulrich Schmiedel and James M. Matarazzo, Jr. (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2015), 1-16.

[62] When I refer to trust as '*the*' way to relate to the transformative transcendence of the other, my point is not to confine all experiences of a transformative transcendence to trust. Rather, my point is to emphasise the particularly promising potential for transformation inherent in trust.

2.[63] However, his account separates 'trust' from 'trust in God' in order to defend the categorical contradistinction between creator and creation. Thus, a constructive critique of Dalferth's depiction of trust and transcendence might substantiate my account of the experience of transcendence which locates transcendence in both the finite and the infinite other.

What is trust? According to Dalferth, trust is a 'mode (*Modus*)' of the practice of community.[64] Although he assumes that community might be practised in the modes of 'mistrust' (an unintentional lack of trust), 'distrust' (an intentional lack of trust), or trust,[65] trust makes a difference to the community's practice: through trust, a community goes beyond confinement and control.[66] Dalferth argues that if it does foster trust, the community is 'humane'; and if it does not foster trust, the community is 'inhumane'.[67] To live one's life as both someone who is trusted and someone who is trusting is what makes one's life humane. Dalferth contends that if someone is neither trusted nor trusting, her humanity withers: she fails to realise the possibilities of her life; for her, the potential is confined to the actual.[68] There is no room for transcendence and transformation. Hence,

[63] Dalferth has explored trust in a variety of publications which he tied together in Ingolf U. Dalferth, *Selbstlose Leidenschaften: Christlicher Glaube und menschliche Passionen* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2013). Together with Simon Peng-Keller, he directed the trans-disciplinary research project 'Vertrauen Verstehen' at the University of Zurich from 2009 to 2012. The project resulted in a 'trilogy of trust' edited by Ingolf U. Dalferth and Simon Peng-Keller, consisting of the volumes *Kommunikation des Vertrauens*; *Gottvertrauen: Die ökumensiche Diksussion um die fiducia*; and *Grundvertrauen: Hermeneutik eines Grenzphänomens*. See also my review article on the trilogy of trust, Ulrich Schmiedel, 'Vertrauen Verstanden? Zur Vertrauenstriologie von Ingolf U. Dalferth und Simon Peng-Keller', *Neue Zeitschrift für Systehamtische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie* 56/3 (2014), 379-392.

[64] Dalferth, *Leidenschaften*, 270. See also Dalferth, 'Vertrauen und Hoffen', 406-434, esp. 410.

[65] Ingolf U. Dalferth, '"In God We Trust": Trust, Mistrust and Distrust as Modes of Orientation', in *Trust, Sociality and Selfhood*, ed. Arne Grøn and Claudia Welz (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010), 136.

[66] Dalferth, 'Vertrauen und Hoffen', 412. See also Ingolf U. Dalferth, 'Vertrauen ist menschlich', *Hermeneutische Blätter*, 2 (2010), 142-157.

[67] Ibid.

[68] Ibid., 146-149.

according to Dalferth, trust is a descriptive as well as a prescriptive concept.[69] It refers to how persons live *and* to how persons ought to live, indicating what a humane community looks like.[70]

Grammatically, Dalferth assesses trust as a 'three-place relation':[71] X trusts Y with reference to Z.[72] The relation between '*truster*' (X) and '*trustee*' (Y) refers to 'a *domain* of action or interaction' (Z) in which the trustee is entrusted by the truster.[73] Dalferth is interested in the responsiveness of the relation of trust. Trustworthiness is the response to the gift of trust, a gift which one cannot give oneself.[74] But the response is *not* automatic: the trustee might turn out to be either trustworthy or non-trustworthy, but in any case she requires the gift of trust from the truster to prove her trustworthiness.

Dalferth also analyses the limits of trust. For him, the definition of these limits comes down to the individual person: it differs from person to person whether and when she can or cannot trust the other.[75] Yet Dalferth suggests 'a rule of thumb' which distinguishes trust according to the trustee: in the case of persons, one should '*place trust before distrust*'; and in the case of institutions, one should '*place distrust before trust*'.[76]

---

[69] Dalferth, 'Vertrauen und Hoffen', 410-411.
[70] Dalferth, *Leidenschaften*, 271.
[71] Dalferth, 'In God We Trust', 138.
[72] Dalferth, *Leidenschaften*, 276; and Dalferth, 'Vertrauen und Hoffen', 413.
[73] Dalferth, 'In God We Trust', 138 (emphasis in the original). For the qualification of trust as personal or impersonal, Dalferth distinguishes 'Vertrauen' from 'Vertrautheit': personal trust is conceived of as 'Vertrauen'; impersonal trust is conceived of as 'Vertrautheit' (which could be rendered as 'reliance') (Dalferth, 'Vertrauen und Hoffen', 413-414).
[74] Ibid., 419-420. See also Dalferth, 'In God We Trust', 147.
[75] Dalferth, 'Vertrauen und Hoffen', 417-418.
[76] Dalferth, 'In God We Trust', 143 (emphasis in the original). However, Dalferth's rule is not more than a rule of thumb. The contributions to *Trust and Organisations: Confidence across Borders*, ed. Marta Reuter, Filip Wijgström, and Bengt Kristensson Uggla (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), demonstrate that trust is vital for persons and institutions. See esp. Bengt Kristensson Uggla, 'The Grammar of Trust as Ethical Challenge', in ibid., 165-179, who, analysing cases of both the placement and the misplacement of trust, argues that personal and institutional trust have to be connected and disconnected simultaneously. Rules like Dalferth's, then, are in danger of failing if applied to concrete cases.

For both cases, he stresses the significance of the person's community. If the community creates a climate of trust, it will support trust; if the community creates a climate of distrust, it will support distrust. Hence, the climate in the community might invigorate or inhibit trust.[77] Eventually, however, Dalferth argues that trust is counter-factual: trust is 'truly (*wahrhaft*)' trust when a truster trusts in a trustee who is *not* trustworthy.[78]

Dalferth comes close to the circle of trust so crucial to James and to Troeltsch's reception of James. The presumption of trust creates the relation of trust and the relation of trust creates the presumption of trust. For Dalferth, trust is strictly speaking not a relation, but a *mode* of a relation: 'trust' points out how relations are performed – in a mistrusting, a distrusting or a trusting manner. When I nonetheless refer to trust as a relation, my reference does not point to a purification of trust into a relation of trust which is nothing but a relation of trust. Rather, my reference points to the fact that trust is established and experienced 'in-between' subjects rather than 'in' subjects – which is to say, *within* relations.[79] In his critique of the interiorisation and the individualisation of trust, Dalferth makes a similar case. For him, too, the responsive relationality of trust is embedded in the practice of interpersonal relations. However, whereas I have pointed to the structural similarities between trust in the finite other and trust in the infinite other, Dalferth constructs a *categorical contradistinction* between the 'grammar of *trust*' and the 'grammar of *trust in God*'.[80]

---

[77] Dalferth, 'Vertrauen und Hoffen', 418.
[78] Ibid.
[79] I insist on the relationality of trust in order to emphasise that trust has to do with the other. As Ricoeur, *Oneself As Another*, demonstrates, even when one trusts oneself (self-confidence), one trusts another.
[80] Dalferth, 'In God We Trust', 135 (emphasis in the original). See also Dalferth, *Leidenschaften*, 280-281n. 11, 316-320.

According to Dalferth, these grammars are incommensurable. He sets out by separating total (or absolute) trust from non-total (or non-absolute) trust:[81] the one is appropriate in relation to the infinite other; the other is appropriate in relation to the finite other.[82] Thus, he defines trust in the finite as antithesis of trust in the infinite other.[83] Dalferth asserts that while trust in the finite other is grammatically structured as 'X trusts Y with reference to Z', trust in the infinite other is grammatically structured as 'X trusts God', where X is primarily passive.[84] In German, he depicts the passivity of X with the sentence 'Gott macht sich X vertraut' which could be rendered as 'God makes X familiar with God'. Dalferth's core concern is clear: *God* is the subject; therefore, he discusses trust as a 'passion (*Leidenschaft*)' characterised by 'radical passivity'.[85]

The grammatical distinction between subject and object is easily traced back to classical and contemporary readings of Martin Luther's theology which stress that Luther interpreted faith as the activity of God in contrast to the activity of God's creature.[86] Like James, Dalferth builds on Luther. But unlike James, Dalferth argues that trust in God is grounded in 'Glauben': the theological terminology of 'belief (*Glauben*)' and 'unbelief

[81] The terminology Dalferth uses to pinpoint the difference between total and non-total trust is diverse. See Dalfeth, 'In God We Trust', 148-149. In German he also uses 'eingeschränkt (limited)' and 'uneingeschränkt (unlimited)'. See Dalferth, *Leidenschaften*, 320.
[82] Dalferth, 'Vertrauen und Hoffen', 415.
[83] Ibid., 421.
[84] Ibid.
[85] See Dalferth, *Leidenschaften*, 5. In German, Dalferth refers to trust in God as 'einstelliges Prädikat' which is to say that, grammatically, the subject of the creature's trust in God is not the creature but the creator (ibid., 319). Hence, trust in God is *not* interpreted as a relation between creature and creator; it is what the creator does to and through the creature.
[86] Dalferth 'Vertrauen und Hoffen', 422-423. However, Mary Gaebler, *The Courage of Faith: Martin Luther on the Theonomous Self* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2013), has convincingly challenged such readings.

(*Unglauben*)' is vital to decide whether trust is theologically appropriate or inappropriate,[87] because a person's belief or unbelief decides whether she trusts in 'Gott' or 'Abgott' – which is to say, in God or in a false God.[88] Theologically, *fides quae* is what determines and decides about *fides qua*.[89] There is no neutral position between belief and unbelief; there is no non-belief. Trust in God is correct when it is rooted in belief rather than un-belief.

Drawing on Luther, Dalferth concludes from the (grammatical) shift in the agency of trust that trust in the finite other ought to be partial, while trust in the infinite other ought to be total.[90] Precisely because the creator is the creator, trusting the creator means trusting totally; precisely because the creature is the creature, trusting the creature means trusting partially. The issue behind the (Lutheran) distinction of total trust in the creator and non-total trust in the creature which James took up in his interpretation of trust (as examined above in Chapter 1) is the *trustworthiness of the trustee*: the creator is deemed absolutely trustworthy, while the creature is not deemed absolutely trustworthy. Hence, if the domain of action or interaction which the truster entrusts to the trustee is total, then the trustee is treated as God.

---

[87] For this terminology, see Ingolf U. Dalferth, 'Ist Glauben menschlich?', *Denkströme: Journal der Sächsischen Akademie der Wissenschaften* 8 (2012), 185-186. See also Ingolf U. Dalferth, *Radikale Theologie* (Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 2010), where Dalferth develops the theological terminology of 'Glaube' and 'Unglaube' in conversation with Martin Heidegger and Rudolf Bultmann. I am uneasy with Dalferth's assumption that the binary distinction of 'belief' and 'unbelief' is at the centre of theology. While (following the Jamesian circle of trust) I agree with him that non-belief is not an option in relation to God – either one does or one does not 'jump' – it seems to me that the binary of 'belief' and 'unbelief' is too static and too strict to cope with the complexities of intra- and inter-religious practice, because, within Christian theology, it implies a classification of non-Christian believers as 'unbelievers' rather than 'believers'.

[88] Dalferth, 'Vertrauen und Hoffen', 421-423, where he draws on Luther's reading of the First Commandment in the 'The Large Catechism (1529)', in *The Book of Concord*, 365-368.

[89] Dalferth, 'Vertauen und Hoffen', 421-423.

[90] For Luther's concept of trust, see Schäufele, 'Fiducia bei Martin Luther', 163-181, who argues that the background for Luther's distinction is a (tacit) theology of creation: creation provides the creature with the 'experience' of God's trustworthiness (ibid., 176). My account of the structural similarities between the experiences of finite and infinite others follows a similar thrust.

As Luther argued in his exposition of the first commandment, 'That to which your heart ... entrusts itself is, I say, really your God'.[91] Thus, *to render total trust* to the creature and *not to render total trust* to the creator is idolatrous: it puts the creature in the place of the creator and the creator in the place of the creature. The under- or overtones of a competition between the 'creating trustee' and the 'created trustee' for the truster's trust are not discussed by Dalferth.[92] But he asserts that any 'totalisation (*Totalisierung*)' of non-absolute trust to absolute trust – which is to say, any shift from trust in the finite other to trust in the infinite other – falls for an '*anthropomorphic fallacy*'.[93] For Dalferth, then, the account of structural similarities between the experience of the finite other's transcendence and the experience of the infinite other's transcendence (the close connection which I have advocated above) means destroying the difference between creator and creature.

However, if trust is conceived of as (the mode of) a relation 'in-between' rather than 'in' subjects, it cannot be characterised with the categories of activity (or subjectivity) and passivity (or objectivity).[94] Any relation requires the activity *and* the passivity of both parties.[95] Like Dalferth, I argue that if God's creature was the *only* subject in the relation between creator and creature, God would become the creature's projection. The creature would trust in the creature – via the detour of God. Unlike Dalferth, however, I also argue that if God was the *only* subject in the relation between creator and creature, the creature

---

[91] See Luther, 'The Large Catechism', 365.

[92] For a discussion of the issue of competition, see Hartmann, *Die Praxis des Vertrauens*, 359-363. However, Claudia Welz clarified convincingly that Luther's concept of trust does not necessarily presuppose the competition between creator and creature. Rather, for Luther, trust in God is the key to trust in creatures; it allows for the orientation and ordering of inter-human relations. Claudia Welz, *Vertrauen und Versuchung* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010), 110-111.

[93] Dalferth, 'Vertrauen und Hoffen', 426 (my emphasis).

[94] Cornelia Richter, 'Melanchthons Fiducia: Gegen die Selbstmächtigkeit des Menschen', in *Gottvertrauen*, 209-242, argues that 'trust might be understood as the moment in which activity and passivity ... merge into each other (*ineinander fallen*)' (ibid., 231).

[95] See the critique of Dalferth by Claudia Welz, 'Vertrauen und/oder Gewissheit', in *Gottvertrauen*, 371n. 95. See also Welz, *Vertrauen und Versuchung*, 88-97.

would become God's projection. God would trust in God – via the detour of the creature. Dalferth counters a (Jamesian) non-theological reductionism through a (non-Jamesian) theological reductionism. But, as my exploration of Troeltsch's critique of these reductionisms in Chapter 2 has emphasised, reductionism remains reductionism, regardless of whether trust is reduced non-theologically to the creature or theologically to the creator. In both reductions, the other is neutralised: the self trusts the self. For trust to occur, however, both parties must participate; both parties must be trusted and trusting. Hence either form of reductionism undermines the relationality of trust. Accordingly, it is imperative to stress the (subjectifying) activity and the (objectifying) passivity of creator *and* creature in the relation of trust between them.[96]

Similarly, the characterisation of religious trust in the infinite other as 'total' and the characterisation of nonreligious trust in the finite other as 'partial' is problematic. If one acknowledges the otherness of both finite and infinite others, nonreligious trust and religious trust converge, because both have to do with transcendence: in both cases, the trustee transcends and transforms the truster.[97] Accordingly, the distinction between trust in the finite other and trust in the infinite other is misconceived if it is constructed as a *categorical* contradistinction. Experientially, the transcendence of trust in the finite other might be radicalised by the trusting acceptance of the loss of control, as much as the transcendence of trust in the infinite other might be routinised by the distrusting non-acceptance of the loss of control. The account of structural similarities between trust in the finite other and trust in the infinite other does not undermine the difference between creator

[96] Welz, 'Vertrauen und/oder Gewissheit', 358, elaborates on the notion of God believing in God through God's creature (albeit without reference to Dalferth).
[97] See the critique of Dalferth by Richter, 'Melanchthons *fiducia*', 232n. 51.

and creation. Yet in order to make a difference, this difference is to be registered by the creature: it is to be *experienced*.

Overall, I do not fall for an 'anthropomorphic fallacy' when I argue for structural similarities between trust in the finite other and trust in the infinite other. If trust is embedded in practices (as Dalferth argues) then these practices must be marked by openness to the other's otherness. Dalferth assumes that trust in the finite other is oriented towards the factual because the creature conforms to one's expectations (excluding the possibility of surprise), while trust in the infinite other is oriented towards the counter-factual because the creator does not conform to one's expectations (including the possibility of surprise); hence, this trust does and that trust does not rest on one's expectations.[98] Yet, due to the distinction between factual and counter-factual orientations of trust, Dalferth misses that both others might be (ab)used as warrants for the factual or the counter-factual. The history of Christianity is rife with concepts of God as a guarantor of the status quo. In contrast to Dalferth, I have argued that 'trust' encapsulates an experiential connection between the relation to the finite other and the relation to the infinite other. Alterity cannot be total(ised) in either of these cases;[99] rather, the otherness of the other is *relational*: the other is always already one's other: actual and acute, never abstract. Only in a relation of trust where the self is open to the otherness of the other can the transformative transcendence of the other be registered and recognised. Hence, transformation is experienced through trust in both potential others, the finite one and the infinite one. I can relate to transformation in a trust which enables the other to surprise me.

[98] Ingolf U. Dalferth, 'Grundvertrauen: Problemdimensionen eines sozialen Konstrukts', in *Grundvertrauen,* 205.
[99] See again Kearney, *Strangers, Gods and Monsters*.

3 Trust and Togetherness

As mentioned above, I am interpreting transcendence in functional rather than substantial terms: the transcendent is that which transforms. Dalferth, however, claims to counter such a functionalisation of transcendence. In 'The Idea of Transcendence', he offers a concise and comprehensive account of the thinking of transcendence in philosophy and theology past and present.[100] He is interested in what he calls 'The Logic of Transcendence'[101] which draws a categorical contradistinction between theological and non-theological transcendence. Pointing out how his account of transcendence mirrors his account of trust, I shall argue that – experientially – Dalferth's contradistinction between theological and non-theological transcendence collapses.

At the centre of Dalferth's logic of transcendence is the distinction between immanence and transcendence: 'transcendence is the reverse of immanence' and 'immanence is the reverse of transcendence'.[102] Crucially, Dalferth argues that the distinction between immanence and transcendence is drawn *in* immanence.[103] To escape the sphere of the immanent, he adds the contrast between absolute 'Immanence' (with capital 'I') and absolute 'Transcendence' (with capital 'T') to the contrast between relative 'immanence' and relative 'transcendence': the immanence/transcendence distinction refers to immanence and transcendence *within* the re-entry into Immanence, whereas the

[100] Ingolf U. Dalferth, 'The Idea of Transcendence', in *The Axial Age and Its Consequences*, 146-188.
[101] Dalferth, 'The Idea of Transcendence', 153-160.
[102] Ibid., 153.
[103] Ibid., 154.

Immanence/Transcendence distinction refers to Immanence and Transcendence *without* the re-entry into Immanence.[104]

Dalferth's contrast is decisive for the distinction he draws between a theological and a non-theological concept of self-transcendence.[105] The theological concept conveys the *infinite* other's movement of self-transcendence (thus, the self-transcendence of the creator's Transcendence): the creator transcends the creator. The non-theological concept conveys the *finite* other's movement of self-transcendence (thus, the self-transcendence of the creature's Immanence): the creature transcends the creature.[106] With the help of this technical terminology, Dalferth explains that both movements of self-transcendence are decidedly different because of their allocations of agency. The non-theological concept of self-transcendence signifies the activity of the human self in which the self opens herself up for Transcendence.[107] Ultimately, this movement is unsuccessful since Immanence is by definition confined to Immanence. The theological concept of self-transcendence, however, signifies the passivity of the human self in which the self is opened up for Transcendence. Ultimately, this movement is successful since Transcendence is by definition not confined to Immanence.[108]

Dalferth's categorical contradistinction between types of transcendence, therefore, mirrors the categorical contradistinction he has drawn between types of trust. Described differently, theological self-transcendence is successfully attempted by the infinite other (the creator's self-transcendence is not confined), whereas non-theological self-

[104] Ibid., 155.
[105] Ibid. 149-150, 163-165.
[106] Ibid., 160-165.
[107] Ibid., 166.
[108] Ibid.

transcendence is unsuccessfully attempted by the finite other (the creature's self-transcendence is confined). Similarly, trust in God is the work of the creator and not the work of the creature. Obviously, Dalferth's distinction between theological self-transcendence and non-theological self-transcendence reproduces Karl Barth's famous-infamous distinction between 'revelation' and 'religion' according to which revelation is attributed to the activity of God while religion is attributed to the activity of God's creature.[109]

Although Dalferth's account of transcendence is carefully crafted, he neglects the *experience* of transcendence. The contradistinction between Immanence and Transcendence is a distinction drawn before, behind or beyond experience. Such a distinction catapults the one who draws it from physics to metaphysics, so to speak.[110] Dalferth's 'catapult-contradistinction' between Immanence and Transcendence runs the risk of isolating theological from non-theological thinking about transcendence. For Dalferth, the theologian's access trumps the non-theologian's access to transcendence. But the contradistinction between his non-theological (experiential) concept of transcendence and his theological (non-experiential) concept of Transcendence is inadequate.[111] When Dalferth describes the in-breaking of Transcendence,[112] his description of the experience offers no device to distinguish between an in-breaking infinite 'Transcendence' and an in-

[109] See Karl Barth, *Church Dogmatics* , trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1963), vol. I/2, §17.
[110] For the issue of metaphysics, see the contributions to *Gott denken – ohne Metaphysik: Zu einer aktuellen Kontroverse in Theologie und Philosophie*, ed. Ingolf U. Dalferth and Andreas Hunziker (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2014).
[111] For Dalferth's concept, the scheme of orientation is always already in place: 'Transcendence is ... human self-transcending into the divine self-transcending ... enabled by the divine self-transcending toward human persons. Understood in this sense, "transcendence" ... is an interpretative theological category' (Dalferth, 'The Idea of Transcendence', 178). Interpretative theological categories 'are used to signify a way in which phenomena of this life are reinterpreted in the light of a particular ... scheme of orientation' (ibid.).
[112] Ibid., 167-172.

breaking finite 'transcendence'. In the picture painted by Dalferth, the one who experiences the break-in must always already know who or what breaks in. As Joas argues, self-transcendence – in Dalferth's technical terminology, non-theological self-transcendence of the creature rather than theological self-transcendence of the creator – is also experienced as a being-pulled rather than as a pulling. How, then, does the person who experiences transcendence ascertain by whom or what she is being pulled?

The problem with Dalferth's concept of transcendence is not that the person who experiences transcendence cannot know clearly whether she is transformed by the finite or the infinite other. Rather, the problem is that his categorical contradistinction between theological transcendence and non-theological transcendence *presupposes* that she could or that she should know. Hence, if experience is taken as a point of departure, Dalferth's contradistinction between transcendence and Transcendence appears to be arbitrary.

In *Unbelievable*, Graham Ward depicts transcendence differently.[113] Ward's concept of transcendence is worth considering here, because he acknowledges the distinction between absolute and non-absolute transcendence but nonetheless arrives at a conclusion which casts doubt on Dalferth's interpretation. Ward draws on the phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty to assess transcendence *within* immanence.[114] Consider the example of the six sides of a cube: 'We can only see two or three. And yet we know that a cube, to be a cube, has to have six equal sides. In seeing the cube, then, we "project" the missing sides in making sense of what we see. We see *as*.'[115] In order to 'see

[113] Ward, *Unbelievable*, 195-199, 214-221.

[114] See Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1968). For a theological account of Merleau-Ponty's distinction between immanence and transcendence, see Andreas Nordlander, 'The Wonder of Immanence: Merleau-Ponty and the Problem of Creation', *Modern Theology* 29/2 (2013), 104-123.

[115] Ward, *Unbelievable*, 195.

as', one projects what one cannot see. Following Merleau-Ponty, Ward calls such seeing-as 'perceptual faith'.[116] But while Merleau-Ponty draws a distinction between non-absolute (projected) transcendence and absolute (non-projected) transcendence close to the distinction maintained by Dalferth, Ward exposes such distinctions as epistemologically arbitrary. Pointing to mystical experiences, he asks who would be able to decide whether such experiences gesture towards absolute or non-absolute transcendence.[117] Who can draw the line between these experiences of transcendence? For Ward, transcendent invisibility 'leaks from' immanent visibility; thus, a construal of a non-absolute transcendent 'cannot be divorced from ... a construal of an absolute transcendent'.[118]

Turning to theology, Ward points to the alternative between the subject and the object of faith. Faith could be described as 'a self-conscious acceptance of believing: a belief in the fundamental disposition to believe'.[119] Here, the creature is primarily the active subject (and thus the creator is only secondarily active). However, faith could also be described as 'a response to an invisible that operates always within the visible ... and moves us then *beyond*.'[120] Here, the creator is primarily the active subject (and thus the creature is only secondarily active). When Ward concludes that 'no choice is necessary', he comes close to the theological trajectory which I have traced from classical to contemporary

[116] Ibid., 196.
[117] Ibid., 197.
[118] Ibid.
[119] Ibid., 200
[120] Ibid.

accounts of religious and nonreligious experience.[121] For Ward, transcendence can be freed neither from the activity (and indeed passivity) of the creature nor from the activity (and indeed passivity) of the creator. On the contrary, Ward lists 'requirements for transcendence' which point to the relation between creature and creator.[122]

Transcendence, Ward suggests, is both other and outside of the self. The 'exteriority' of the object – be it personal or impersonal – has to be registered and recognised by the subject in order to experience transcendence.[123] Already the registration of the other cannot be captured with the concept of passivity, because it includes the activity of the subject who registers the object: activities of projection which make the object 'meaningful to me'.[124] Transcendence thus requires a relation between the subject of the experience of transcendence and the object of the experience of transcendence: registering transcendence requires *relationality*.

Such relationality, in turn, requires that one has what Ward calls 'consciousness' and 'consciousness of the contents of one's consciousness'.[125] The consciousness of consciousness is necessary to recognise the 'distance and difference that characterises transcendence'.[126] This difference between 'consciousness' and 'consciousness of the contents of one's consciousness' confirms my assessment of the experience of transcendence: transcendence requires the difference between one's articulation of the

[121] Ibid. However, Ward is suspicious of this theological trajectory. Criticising Paul Tillich's concept of experience, he argues that there is no generic experience of religion. Because of the productive power of imagination, expression changes experience as much as experience changes expression; hence, the experience of religion is the experience of a *concrete* religion (ibid., 220). Although I cannot engage Ward's reading of Tillich's theology here, it seems to me that he is more 'Tillichian' than he admits when he grounds 'belief' in the biological make-up of humanity.
[122] Ibid., 214.
[123] Ibid.
[124] Ibid., 215.
[125] Ibid.
[126] Ibid.

event of transcendence (akin to Ward's 'consciousness') and one's interpretation of one's articulation of the event of transcendence (akin to Ward's 'consciousness of the contents of one's consciousness'). The difference between articulation and interpretation enables a subject to register how the other transcends the way she thinks and talks about the other. Accordingly, Ward also rules out absolute and abstract concepts of alterity: 'the otherness of the other ... is not an incommensurate otherness... If that was the case there could be no shared understanding. The other would be incomprehensible to me'.[127]

Finally, Ward points to the subject's 'freedom' as a 'characteristic and consequence of transcendence'.[128] 'Transcendence constitutes the subject in his or her freedom ... because it expands consciousness by opening up the world before us'.[129] Freedom, according to Ward, is exercised as 'an invitation to play; an invitation for imaginative acts in which believing is both engaged and expressive'.[130] Described differently, the dissonance between articulation and interpretation which characterises the experience of transcendence causes psychological and physiological reactions; it might make the subject literally shiver or sweat.[131] But when a subject registers such difference in cognitive or non-cognitive modes, her imagination is triggered.[132] Through imagination, the subject engages with transcendence which is why, as Troeltsch already argued, imagination is indispensable for religion. Imagination is vital for the drive for difference.

Equipped with these requirements for transcendence, Ward returns to the distinction of absolute and non-absolute transcendence. He concludes that his account of

[127] Ibid., 216.
[128] Ibid.
[129] Ibid.
[130] Ibid.
[131] Ibid., 95.
[132] Ibid.

transcendence 'does not demonstrate ... the existence of God', but: 'such a notion cannot be ruled out a priori'.[133] Evidently, Ward's caution against reductionism targets non-theological reductionism (which reduces the experience of transcendence to the natural) rather than theological reductionism (which reduces the experience of transcendence to the super-natural). Nonetheless, both non-theological and theological reductionists fail to answer why the experience of self-transcendence should 'lead to a cul-de-sac'? 'Religious believing points beyond that cul-de-sac.'[134] Accordingly, if the *experience* of transcendence is taken seriously, then drawing a distinction between infinite and absolute Transcendence, on the one hand, and finite and non-absolute transcendence, on the other, is arbitrary. *Experientially*, one cannot draw a line between these 'transcendences'.

Dalferth acknowledges that his distinction between absolute and non-absolute transcendence is *not* experiential. It is a distinction, he argues, which passes a verdict about experience.[135] Dalferth's verdict is that trust in the finite other ought *not* to be total (because it can, by definition, be disappointed), while trust in the infinite other ought to be total (because it can, by definition, not be disappointed).[136] Literally, he states that '*trust in God cannot be disappointed*'.[137] If trust in God could be disappointed, Dalferth adds, the disappointment would be due to the truster rather than the trustee, the creature rather than the creator.[138] This statement shows that 'trust in God' and 'trust' are constructed as opposites. While 'trust' is 'truly' trust when the trustee is not trustworthy; 'trust in God' is 'truly' trust in God when the trustee is trustworthy.

---

[133] Ibid., 216.
[134] Ibid., 217.
[135] Dalferth, 'The Idea of Transcendence', 180-181.
[136] Dalferth, 'Glauben und Hoffen', 428-431; see also Dalferth, 'Grundvertrauen', 194.
[137] Dalferth, 'In God We Trust', 148 (emphasis in the original).
[138] Ibid.

I am uneasy with Dalferth's distinction between trustworthy creator and non-trustworthy creature. Christianity vouches for the trustworthiness of God. Yet Christianity also acknowledges experiences of godforsakenness.[139] Jesus, at the Cross, 'at about three in the afternoon', cried 'My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?' (Mark 15:34, Matthew 27:46). Jesus's prayer is the prayer of someone whose trust in God has been disappointed. If one continues reading the Gospels of Mark and Matthew, one discovers that God's trustworthiness may have been played out precisely and paradoxically in the godforsakenness of the cross.[140] However, if theology escapes or evades experiences of godforsakenness through absolute and abstract statements like 'trust in God cannot be disappointed', it loses touch with the ways in which God has been experienced in the past and in the present.

God relates to God's creatures within concrete contexts. In *Ich glaube an Gott und so weiter...*, a feminist reading or rather a rereading of the Apostels' Creed, Ina Praetorius elegantly expresses how theology loses touch with experience.[141] She describes how her aunt gave the signifier 'God' to her. 'Her gift turned out to be life-leading'.[142] But the theologians who taught Pretorius were not interested in the life-leading gift:

> The professors of theology did not ask me, who had given the signpost signifier 'God' to me. Like the pastor who confirmed me they spoke about GOD as if HE existed without my aunt, somewhere in a higher sphere of set and

[139] See Welz, *Vertrauen und Versuchung*, 14-32. See also Claudia Welz, 'Trust and Lament: Faith in the Face of Godforsakenness', in *Evoking Lament: A Theological Discussion*, ed. Eva Harasta and Brian Brock (London: T&T Clark, 2009). 118-135.

[140] See Konrad Schmid, 'Was heißt Vertrauen? Biblische Erkundungen', in *Gottvertrauen*, 31-47, who points to the story of Abraham's sacrifice of his son Isaac to tackle the issue of God's non/trustworthiness in critical conversation with Dalferth. For the fascinating and flabbergasting conclusions which might be drawn from this story for the concept of trust, see Welz, *Vertrauen und Versuchung*, 158-177.

[141] Ina Praetorius, *Ich glaube an Gott und so weiter...: Eine Auslegung des Glaubensbekenntnisses* (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 2011).

[142] Ibid., 13.

> sempiternal truth. If I had asked a theologian, what he thought of my aunt, he surely would have been startled.[143]

The example of Praetorius's aunt is instructive because it demonstrates two problems in Dalferth's concept of trust: on the one hand, the creator is interpreted to be trustworthy by definition (which contradicts everyday experience); on the other hand, the creature is interpreted to be untrustworthy by definition (which also contradicts everyday experience). What Praetorius captures in her autobiographical account, namely that one's relation to the creator cannot be divorced from one's relation to the creature, has been condensed conceptually in Mayra Rivera's postcolonial theology of God, *The Touch of Transcendence*. Rivera details and discusses a model of '*relational transcendence*', pointing to the correlation of the difference between creator and creature with the difference between creature and creature.[144] Against Karl Barth's hypostatisation of transcendence, according to which the creator touches the creation through revelation 'as a tangent touches a circle, that is, without touching it',[145] she re-conceives transcendence as 'a verb' – a re-conception which comes close to my move from substantial transcendence to functional transcendence.[146] Crucially, Rivera marshals her verbalisation of transcendence as resistance against any claim to have grasped the other. She explains that claiming to have understood the otherness of the creator implies claiming to have understood the otherness of the creature – correlative claims with their catastrophic

[143] Ibid., 13-14.
[144] Mayra Rivera, *The Touch of Transcendence: A Postcolonial Theology of God* (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2007), x (emphasis in the original).
[145] Ibid., 5, with reference to Karl Barth, *The Epistle to the Romans*, trans. Edwyn C. Hoskyns (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 30.
[146] Rivera, *Touch*, 7.

consequence of colonialism in the past and in the present.[147] In order to counter these consequences, she suggests understanding transcendence as 'inexhaustible' or 'irreducible' rather than 'absolute', thus allowing for a relation to the other which does not claim to know how transcendent her transcendence is.[148] She arrives at the following axiom:

> *Transcendence designates a relation with a reality* irreducibly different *from my own reality, without this difference destroying the relation and without the relation destroying this difference*. ... Our aim to open ourselves to transcendence in the face of the Other leads us to give special attention to our relationships with those who are marginalized in our communities ... not because we define transcendence as sociopolitical exclusion, but because we recognize exclusion as an effect of having ignored the transcendence of the Other.[149]

Elaborating on philosophies and phenomenologies of touch, Rivera concludes that when one is touched by the other creature one is touched by God; and when one is touched by God, one is touched by the other creature.[150] The touch of transcendence requires critical and self-critical attention to the concrete circumstances in which the other is engaged or not engaged.

Ward affirms these interrelations, explaining that relationality is at the core of religion.[151] He identifies 'eccentricity', 'the going out of oneself' which is evoked and entailed by relationality, as the 'origin' of belief.[152] Taking inspiration from his repeated reference to 'trust' and 'entrustment', I am arguing that religion originates in the practices

---

[147] Ibid., 10-11.
[148] Ibid., 73, 81.
[149] Ibid., 82 (emphasis in the original).
[150] Ibid., 127-140.
[151] Ward, *Unbelievable*, 54-55, 58-59.
[152] Ibid., 54. Ward identifies 'the going out of oneself' as the origin of conscious as opposed to unconscious belief. The distinction is indispensable for his analysis which traces beliefs in the biological make-up of humanity. Ward alludes to 'trust' and 'trusting' in ibid., 54-55: 'Belief ... concerns that which we can come to trust. ... Belief is a relational category' (ibid., 55).

of trust because practices of trust *are* practices in which the subject goes out of herself in order to open herself to the other.[153] Since the trustworthiness of the other cannot be established prior to the trust in the other – recall James's 'jump' from Chapter 1 – trust requires that I en-trust myself to the other. There is no way to bypass the jump, neither in the relation to the finite other nor in the relation to the infinite other. A type of togetherness in which the jump is encouraged is what I call togetherness of trust. In the togetherness of trust the self jumps towards both the finite and the infinite other, trusting that the other meets her jump. This jump towards the other is not a one-off occurrence. Rather, in the togetherness of trust, one jumps again and again in order to let the other surprise oneself.

To summarise, I have substantiated my concept of trust. 'Trust' encapsulates an experiential connection between the relation to the finite other and the relation to the infinite other. In critical conversation with Dalferth's concepts of trust and transcendence, I have explained how trust interrelates the relation to the finite other with the relation to the infinite other. How can I learn how to trust the infinite other? I can learn it by trusting finite others, letting go of myself. And how can I learn how to trust finite others? I can learn it by trusting the infinite other, letting go of myself. Relationality is at the core of trust which is why trust in the finite other might reinforce trust in the infinite other and trust in the infinite other might reinforce trust in the finite other.[154]

In conclusion, I defined trust as a relation to the other which is characterised by openness to the other's otherness. By comparing and combining sociological and

[153] See the contributions by Arne Grøn, 'Trust, Sociality, Selfhood' and Claudia Welz, 'Trust as Basic Openness and Self-Transcendence', in *Trust, Sociality and Selfhood*, 13-30 and 45-64. See also, Arne Grøn, 'Grenzen des Vertrauens: Kritische Bemerkungen zur Rede von Grundvertrauen', in *Grundvertrauen*, 145-158, where Grøn also interprets the going out of oneself as "eccentricity (*Exzentrizität*)". See also Chapter 7 of my study.

[154] For the interrelation of the relation to the finite other and the relation to the infinite other, see also Werner G. Jeanrond, *Call and Response: The Challenge of Christian Life* (New York: Continuum, 1995), 39-41.

theological accounts of the experience of transcendence, I have clarified how the concept of transcendence implies the destabilisation of the distinction between religious experience and nonreligious experience: transcendence might be experienced whenever the other is encountered. I have substantiated my account of the hermeneutical experience of transcendence by discussing Dalferth's depiction of trust. Through a critique of his categorical contradistinction between the 'grammar of trust' and the 'grammar of trust in God', I have explained how the otherness of the other transforms me when I encounter the other in a trusting rather than a distrusting way – regardless of whether the other is finite or infinite. Thus, the concept of trust conveys the relation to the transformative transcendence of the other. In a togetherness of trust, then, the relation to the finite other might be experienced as an opening to the relation to the infinite other and the relation to the infinite other might be experienced as an opening to the relation to the finite other.

Troeltsch assesses these interrelated relations as the 'double character (*Doppelcharakter*)' of Christianity:[155] in Christian communities, then, the relation to the finite other and the relation to the infinite other connect in Jesus Christ.[156] For Troeltsch, Christianity implies a concern for the infinite other *and* a concern for the finite other; it destabilises the categorical distinction between what counts as religious and what counts as nonreligious. In Jesus's words: 'whatever you did to one of the least..., you did for me' and 'whatever you did not do for one of the least..., you did not do for me' (Matthew 25:40,45). The (or a) point of Jesus's parable is to surprise by connecting without collapsing the

[155] ST, vol. 1, 57, translation altered. Olive Wyon's translation of *Doppelcharakter* with "double aspect" is deceptive because Troeltsch argues that the interrelated relations to the finite and the infinite other are the *characteristic* (not only *aspects* of the characteristic) of Christianity. See SL, 41. Since Wyon's translation is often inaccurate, I refer to the German original of *The Social Teachings of the Christian Churches* throughout my study.

[156] *Christentum*, for Troeltsch, means 'Christianity' rather than 'Christendom'. Troeltsch's concept of Christianity will be discussed in Chapters 4 and 9 below.

relation to the finite other with the relation to the infinite other. Christian community, then, could be conceived of as togetherness of trust – a way of being together where the relations to the finite other and the relations to the infinite other are connected through Jesus Christ.

To recall what I asked at the outset of my study: Where does ecclesiology start? The elasticisation of ecclesiology starts by redefining its starting point. The concept of 'trust', I have argued through Chapters 1 to 3, allows for a concept of the experience of transcendence which is neither solely personal nor solely communal, but both: trust is relational. The togetherness of trust, in which relations to the finite other are interrelated with relations to the infinite other, cuts across the double-bind in which the controversy between liberalism and postliberalism has caught ecclesiology. Arguably, togetherness is at the core of communities. But which types of community can and which types of community cannot engender the togetherness of trust?

Part II

COMMUNITY

Trust, I argued in Part I, is vital for the experience of transformative transcendence. But in order to connect the relation to the finite other with the relation to the infinite other, togetherness must be structured in a way that allows for trust. After my redefinition of the point of departure for ecclesiology, the core concern of the elasticisation of ecclesiology, then, is not *whether* community engenders a togetherness of trust but *which* community engenders a togetherness of trust. What kind of community can provoke practices of trust? What kind of community can preserve practices of trust? And what kind community is open(ed) to the otherness of the other?

The following three chapters revolve around these questions. In order to answer them, I shall combine theological and sociological approaches to the construction of community. However, any such combination is a minefield as it runs the risk of reducing what is religious to what is non-religious.[1] In order to sweep the mines, I shall argue that interdisciplinary combinations of sociology and theology are not necessarily reductionist.[2]

[1] For a detailed discussion, see the contributions to *Im Dialog: Systematische Theologie und Religionssoziologie*, ed. Ansgar Kreutzer and Franz Gruber (Freiburg: Herder, 2014), 23-55.

[2] See also Austin Harrington, 'Social Theory and Theology', in *Handbook of Contemporary European Social Theory*, ed. Gerard Delanty (London: Routledge, 2006), 37-47.

John Milbank's archaeological account of the history of the cooperation between theology and sociology excavates the anti-theological origins of much sociology and the anti-sociological outcomes of much theology.[3] He argues that sociologies are anti-theologies 'in disguise' as much as theologies are anti-sociologies 'in disguise'.[4] Either one assumes that reality is fundamentally religious (for Milbank, Christian) or one assumes that reality is fundamentally anti-religious (for Milbank, anti-Christian).[5] There is no neutral assumption. Hence, the 'queen of the sciences' is either theology or sociology: this queen promotes what is Christian and that queen promotes what is anti-Christian.[6] Thus Milbank arrives at a clear conclusion: theology must rule sociology. Hans Joas, however, is uneasy with Milbank's conclusion.[7] Joas's review of Milbank's influential interpretation of the relation between theology and sociology is instructive here because Joas concentrates on the concept of experience.[8]

Joas argues that Milbank mistakes the *origin* of the application of a concept for the *outcome* of the application of a concept. For Milbank, the origin of the introduction of 'experience' into theology is liberal; thus, the outcome of the introduction of 'experience' into theology is liberal. Once theology is infected with liberalism, it utilises the concept of experience to police religion, reducing it from the political to the private.[9] Milbank, then, clearly chooses sides in the controversy between liberal and postliberal theologies. Yet for

[3] See Milbank, *Theology and Social Theory*.
[4] Ibid., 3.
[5] Ibid., xi-xxxii.
[6] Ibid., 382.
[7] Hans Joas, 'Sociology and the Sacred: A Response to John Milbank', *Ethical Perspectives* 7 (2004), 233-243. See also Mark D. Chapman, 'On Sociological Theology', *Journal for the History of Modern Theology* 15/1 (2008), 3-15.
[8] For the impact of Milbank's archaeological account, see the articles in *New Blackfriars* 73 (1992).
[9] Milbank, *Theology and Social Theory*, 384-385.

Joas, the identification of origin and outcome on which Milbank's choice is based misses the redefinitions of 'experience' which were discussed after William James.[10]

My analysis of Ernst Troeltsch's reception of James's experientialism is a case in point. Troeltsch cuts across the alternative between a Jamesian liberalism which concentrates on the personal and a non-Jamesian postliberalism which concentrates on the communal, depicting the experience of transcendence as embodied in personalities and embedded in communities. Although he concentrates on the concept of experience, then, religion is neither a private nor a privatised matter for Troeltsch.[11] Considering cases like Troeltsch's, it is not as evident as Milbank assumes that the origins of sociology determine the outcome of sociology. Nonetheless, he accuses present sociologists for the failures of past sociologists. The reason why Milbank's archaeological account was criticised in many sociological accounts while it was celebrated in many theological accounts might be that he reduces sociology to its past. He attacks past phantoms instead of present players, thus inadvertently 'increasing the intellectual isolation from which Milbank set out to release theology'.[12]

Graham Ward shifts from the archaeology of sociology to the architecture of sociology, so to speak. He stresses that current sociology construes religion as epiphenomenal rather than phenomenal: *by definition*, then, the non-religious may impact the religious, but the religious may not impact the non-religious.[13] For Ward, 'it is evident' that sociologists interpret religion negatively rather than positively, thus denying religion

---

[10] Joas, 'Sociology', 237.

[11] See Chapman, *Ernst Troeltsch and Liberal Theology*, esp. 161-186. Throughout, Chapman characterises Troeltsch's theology as 'public'.

[12] Joas, 'Sociology', 241.

[13] Graham Ward, *The Politics of Discipleship: Becoming Postmaterial Citizens* (London: SCM, 2009), 121-125.

the 'intrinsic ... import' it deserves.[14] He concludes: 'Sociologists have a vested interest in maintaining the secularization thesis. The foundation of their discipline was the critique of religion at the forefront of the Enlightenment agenda'.[15] I am arguing that neither the archaeological nor the architectural 'evidence' holds. If sociological scholarship is explored empirically, a turn in the definition of religion becomes apparent in the 1980s – before Milbank's account was published.[16] This turn points to what David Smilde calls a 'strong program' in the sociology of religion, a programme which conceives of religion as 'independent variable' rather than 'dependent variable'.[17] Behind this statistics-speak lurks a critique of Ward's critique: if 'religion' is understood as independent of non-religious factors, then it is seen as phenomenal (and thus as causing societal developments), if 'religion' is understood as dependent on non-religious factors, then it is seen as epiphenomenal (and thus as not causing societal developments). Smilde's empirical evidence for the turn to the 'strong program' in the sociology of religion, rooted in the analysis of sociological publications which have appeared in the last thirty years, speaks against the archaeological and the architectural critiques of sociology.[18] According to Smilde, publications with positive socio-evaluative findings for religion outrun publications with negative socio-evaluative findings for religion in sociology today.[19] Hence, whatever else sociologists assume about religion, they do *not* assume, *pace* Ward, that it is detrimental. The corollary of the turn to the strong programme is the rejection of

---

[14] Ibid., 124. Ward draws on James Sweeney, 'Revising Secularization Theory', in *The New Visibility of Religion*, ed. Michael Hoelzl and Graham Ward (London: Continuum, 2008), 15-29.
[15] Ward, *Politics*, 121.
[16] See the empirical exploration by David Smilde and Matthew May, 'The Emerging Strong Program in the Sociology of Religion', *SSRC Working Papers 2008*, esp. the concise chart which visualises the findings (ibid., 5).
[17] Ibid., 23-25.
[18] Ibid., 2.
[19] Ibid., 13.

the secularisation thesis. When both its proponents and its opponents argue that the secularisation thesis is 'unfashionable' among sociologists today, then it must be asked who has a 'vested interest' in its maintenance.[20] Thus, I suggest that neither the archaeology of sociology nor the architecture of sociology speak against its cooperation with theology.

My point of departure for the combination of theological and sociological approaches is, again, Ernst Troeltsch. In the following three chapters, I shall explore Troeltsch's tripartite typology of ecclesiasticism, sectarianism, and mysticism. I shall argue that Troeltsch understands Christian community in a way which prohibits its closure against alterity. I shall apply Troeltsch's typology to the on-going debates in sociology and sociology of religion. Following the thrust of Troeltsch's *The Social Teachings of the Christian Churches*, my exploration will result in a negative rather than a positive lesson: I shall propose *not* how to conceptualise community but how *not* to conceptualise community.[21] In order to provoke and preserve the togetherness of trust, community ought not to be closed. But if the lesson is turned from the negative to the positive, it makes a crucial contribution to the elasticisation of ecclesiology: in order to engender a togetherness of trust, community is to be open(ed) to the other.

---

[20] See Steve Bruce, *Secularization: In Defence of an Unfashionable Theory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

[21] See SL. For instructive studies on the core concerns and the core concepts in Troeltsch's *The Social Teachings of the Christian Churches*, see *Ernst Troeltschs 'Soziallehren': Studien zu ihrer Interpretation*, ed. Friedrich Wilhelm Graf and Trutz Rendtorff (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 1993).

Chapter 4

THE CONSTRUCTION OF COMMUNITY

Ernst Troeltsch's massive and monumental study, *The Social Teachings of the Christian Churches*, published in 1912, surveys the history of Christianity for its concept(s) of community. Troeltsch conceives of Christianity as 'practice (*Praxis*)'.[1] His survey of the practice of Christianity seeks to uncover possibilities and impossibilities for the 'construction of community (*Gemeinschaftsbildung*)' in contemporary contexts.[2] According to Troeltsch, three types of community are characteristic of Christianity past and present: ecclesiasticism, sectarianism, and mysticism. Entangled in three ecclesiologies, these types effectively entail three conceptions of the identity of Christianity.[3] Troeltsch's tripartite typology, then, tells a story of ecclesiologies – in the plural rather than the singular.[4]

In this Chapter, I aim to analyse the systematic structures in Troeltsch's tripartite typology. I shall argue that Troeltsch anticipates Nicholas M. Healy's compelling critique of 'blueprint ecclesiologies'.[5] Like blueprints, these ecclesiologies reduce 'church' to a

[1] SL, viii.
[2] Ibid.
[3] For a short summary, see DR, 12-13. See also Pearson, *Beyond Essence*, 65-67.
[4] Arije L. Molendijk, *Zwischen Theologie und Soziologie: Ernst Troeltschs Typen der christlichen Gemeinschaftsbildung* (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 1996), offers a comprehensive account of Troeltsch's typology. For an ecclesiological exploration, see Fechtner, *Volkskirche*, 79-122.
[5] Nicholas M. Healy, *Church, World and the Christian Life: Practical-Prophetic Ecclesiology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

clear-cut concept in order to provide programmatic plans for what can and what cannot count as church. When these plans are 'put into practice', the blueprint may shape the practice of concrete churches, but the practice of concrete churches may not shape the blueprint.[6] Thus, ecclesiology loses touch with ecclesial practice and ecclesial practice loses touch with ecclesiology.

In three steps, I shall explore how Troeltsch blurs these ecclesiological blueprints: (1) I shall examine Troeltsch's account of the practice of Jesus. Although the practice of Jesus, his actions and his reflections on his actions, engenders Paul's ecclesiology, Jesus is interpreted as the focus of the church but not as the founder of church. I shall argue that, for Troeltsch, the practice of Jesus and the reception of the practice of Jesus by Paul resist the closure of community. (2) I shall examine ecclesiasticism, sectarianism, and mysticism as community concepts which follow and flow from the picture of the practice of Jesus in Paul's emerging ecclesiology. In these types, community is closed off against the other. I shall argue that the neutralisation of the otherness of the other inherent in these types reduces ecclesiology to blueprint ecclesiology. Finally (3), I shall examine how Troeltsch concludes *The Social Teachings of the Christian Churches*. Transposing his core criterion for the construction of church from a negative formulation into a positive formulation, I shall argue that Troeltsch opens church to the otherness of the other. Thus, Troeltsch makes a crucial contribution to the account of the open(ed) community for which my study advocates.

[6] Ibid, 25-51.

Methodologically, Troeltsch combines theology and sociology. His combination is inspired by his interpretation of Karl Marx.[7] Troeltsch accepts the Marxist distinction between material 'structure' and ideal 'superstructure'. But structure and superstructure, he argues, are ordered in circularity rather than causality: structure conditions superstructure as much as superstructure conditions structure. Since theology tends to tackle the 'superstructure' of the practices of Christianity and sociology tends to tackle the 'structure' of the practices of Christianity, Troeltsch combines both approaches for a comprehensive interpretation of practice.[8] He continues to criticise both theological reductionism and non-theological reductionism (as examined in Chapters 2 and 3 above) when he contends that one has to decide 'from case to case' whether the Christian influenced the non-Christian or the non-Christian influenced the Christian.[9] Contrary to the contention of his critics past and present, then, Troeltsch concedes that religion – in his case, Christianity – can be both phenomenal and epiphenomenal.[10]

However, despite its innovative interdisciplinary design, Troeltsch's methodology comes with difficulties. His typology might be characterised as a conversation between two Troeltschs: one Troeltsch who conducts his research historically and one Troeltsch who conducts his research systematically. Troeltsch's oeuvre points to these two Troeltschs, highlighting the twofold interest of his research.[11] But often or all too often, the historian

[7] For Troeltsch's discussion of what he calls the 'Marxist Method', see HP, 536-598. Warren S. Goldstein investigates the impact of Marx and Marxism on Troeltsch in 'Reconstructing the Classics: Weber, Troeltsch, and the Historical Materialists', *International Archive of the History of Ideas* 26/4-5 (2015), 470-507.
[8] SL, 1-15.
[9] SL, 10. See also NR, 166-168.
[10] Pearson, *Beyond Essence*, 71-86, analyses how Troeltsch draws the distinction between religious and non-religious factors in his account of history. She argues that this distinction allows him to conceive of religion as influencing social causation, on the one hand, and as influenced by social causation, on the other. See also ibid, 168-171.
[11] SL, vii.

Troeltsch (with his critical interest) trumps the systematician Troeltsch (with his constructive interest).[12] However, as I shall show in the following chapters, the systematic structures inherent in his typology are significant to understand the attacks on alterity which are inherent in past and present constructions of community which neutralise the other.

In order to highlight that I am concerned with the systematic structures implied by the Troeltschian typology, I deviate from Troeltsch's designations of the three types. What Troeltsch calls 'church' is what I call 'ecclesiasticism'. For Troeltsch, the concept of church captures a comprehensive community. Consequently, he hesitates to call the Christian communities subsequent to the *Corpus Christianum* 'church' – a consequence which I aim to avoid.[13] By adding the suffix 'ism' to all of the types, I draw attention to the fact that ecclesiasticism, sectarianism, and mysticism convey programmatic plans for the practice of church. These programmatic plans neutralise the otherness of the other. I refer to 'neutralisation' here because the absence of alterity might, paradoxically, be accomplished either through the exclusion of others or through the inclusion of others – a paradox which needs to be explored and explained in order to understand church as open(ed) community.

[12] See Johannes Zachhuber, *Theology as Science in Nineteenth-Century Germany: From Ferdinand Christian Bauer to Ernst Troeltsch* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 275-276, 284, 286-288. Zachhuber argues that the imbalance characteristic of Troeltsch's work stresses the impasse which contemporary discourses about theology had reached.

[13] See AK, 1154, where Troeltsch suggests to use 'christliche Gemeinschaft' to refer to churches after the *Corpus Christianum*.

1 The Centre of Christian Community

In his seminal study on practical-prophetic ecclesiology, Healy offers a critique of what he calls 'blueprint ecclesiologies'.[14] These ecclesiologies condense church into a 'single concept', creating a 'bipartite structure' for ecclesiology which at once posits what *can* count as church and what *cannot* count as church.[15] Ecclesiology, then, operates prescriptively rather than descriptively.[16] Healy's core contention is that the application of these concepts disrupts the 'hermeneutical circle' which runs from ecclesial practice to ecclesiology to ecclesial practice:[17] equipped with the ecclesial blueprint, the ecclesiologist can criticise church but church cannot criticise the ecclesiologist; thus, the ecclesiologist is enabled to be critical but not to be self-critical. Through the disruption of the hermeneutical circle, ecclesiology is divorced from ecclesial practice as much as ecclesial practice is divorced from ecclesiology.[18] Anticipating Healy's compelling critique, the Troeltschian typology of ecclesiasticism, sectarianism, and mysticism traces the emergence of blueprint ecclesiologies throughout the history of Christianity. I shall argue that, for Troeltsch, the practice of Jesus engenders the ecclesiology of Paul which escapes the closure of community through engagement with finite and infinite others.

According to Troeltsch, the practice of Jesus concentrates on the verbal as well as the nonverbal communication of the basilei,a tou/ qeou – the kingdom of God.[19] Exegetes

[14] Healy, *Church, World and the Christian Life*, 25-51.
[15] Ibid., 26.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Ibid., 46.
[18] For a short summary, see Clare Watkins, 'Practising Ecclesiology: From Product to Process', *Ecclesial Practices* 2/1 (2015), 26-30.
[19] SL, 34-35, 968-969.

in the past and in the present have argued that the kingdom of God is a central concept in the communication of Jesus.[20] For Troeltsch, it conveys a 'turn to the ... transcendent' which announces God's presence. [21] Jesus's announcement is vital for the 'double character' of Christianity (already encountered in Chapter 3 above):[22] Christianity, Troeltsch contends, is characterised by a web of relations to the finite other and to the infinite other.[23] Throughout his oeuvre, he coins a variety of concepts to depict these relations.[24] His concern is that God, as articulated when Jesus addresses God as 'Father' (Matthew 6:9-13), connects the children of God in God. Thus, the relation to the finite other and the relation to the infinite other are interrelated.[25]

Troeltsch's characterisation of Christianity retrieves the double commandment of love (Matthew 22:34-40) for the construction of community: those who relate to God personally relate to each other communally and those who relate to each other communally relate to God personally.[26] The kingdom of God inspires 'the order of love'.[27] Historically, it was contested whether Jesus invented the double commandment of love, but – whether

[20] See the overview in Gerd Theissen and Annette Merz, *The Historical Jesus: A Comprehensive Guide*, trans. John Bowden (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1998), 240-280

[21] SL, 39.

[22] SL, 41.

[23] Ibid. See also Pearson, *Beyond Essence*, 86-87, 112.

[24] In SL, 41, Troeltsch refers to 'individualism' and 'universalism' both of which are qualified as 'absolute'. But Troeltsch's terminology is tricky because he argues that, within the double character of Christianity, individualism does not exclude universalism and universalism does not exclude individualism. Rather, as Troeltsch assumes in NR, 168-169, for Christianity, universalism is a 'correlate' of individualism (ibid., 169).

[25] SL, 41.

[26] See Fechtner, *Volkskirche*, 60-62.

[27] SP, 213.

he did or did not – he centred his communication in it.[28] Troeltsch assesses the interrelated relations, around which the double commandment revolves, as 'absolute'.[29] Thus, the practice of Jesus communicates two contradictory conditions for the construction of Christian community. On the one hand, the creature is related to the creator in an absolutely personal manner – a relation which might challenge the demands of her communal relation to the finite other. On the other hand, the creature is related to the creature in an absolutely communal manner – a relation which might challenge the demands of her personal relation to the infinite other. The order of love could combine these contradictory conditions.[30] Yet since the order of love is, as Troeltsch argues, 'above all the act of God',[31] such a combination is 'utopian'.[32] Ecclesiologically, the concept of οὐτοπία – 'non-place' – is instructive:[33] it allows for a critical and creative distanciation from any practice of church which claims to capture the contradictory conditions for the construction of Christian community completely. The kingdom of God cannot be 'transformed into a social-philosophical or a social-theological theory' without falling for

[28] See Jeanrond, *A Theology of Love*, 33-35. As Wolfgang Stegemenn, 'Zur Deutung des Urchristentums in den Soziallehren', in *Ernst Troeltschs 'Soziallehren'*, 51-79, argues, Troeltsch's account of the Jewishness of Jesus is insufficient. But, considering his context, it is noteworthy that Troeltsch is aware of the Jewishness of Jesus at all. See Pearson, *Beyond Essence*, 70. Moreover, whereas his colleagues and contemporaries take the conflicts between Jesus and the Jews as reported in the Gospels as a point of departure for their portrayals of Jesus, Troeltsch contextualises Jesus within Judaism. See Johann Hinrich Claussen, *Die Jesus-Deutung von Ernst Troeltsch im Kontext der liberalen Theologie* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1997), 288-289.

[29] SL, 41.

[30] Conceptually, Troeltsch draws a distinction between two individualisms: a religious one *with* reference to God and a non-religious one *without* reference to God. The religious one allows, and the non-religious one disallows, for the inclusion of community. Pearson, *Beyond Essence*, 111-123, traces these individualisms to Troeltsch's interpretation of Stoicism, where Stoicism sides with the non-religious rather than the religious individualism. The distinction is also apparent in Troeltsch's account of the Enlightenment.

[31] SP, 212.

[32] SP, 213. See also SL, 48-49, 985-986. For the combination of these interrelated relations in Troeltsch's notion of the kingdom of God, see Claussen, *Jesus-Deutung*, 184-188.

[33] The eschatology of Jesus stirred up considerable controversy among the contemporaries of Troeltsch. The core concern was whether the establishment of the kingdom of God is to be interpreted eschatologically or non-eschatologically. See the overview in Claussen, *Jesus-Deutung*, 78-124.

'confused chiliastic fantasies'.[34] However, if the kingdom of God is (as Troeltsch asserts) simultaneously come and to come,[35] then it is not a non-place.[36] It has a place, albeit not finally or fully. Thus, it is an eschatological rather than an ecclesiological category.

Troeltsch conceives of the interrelated relations to the finite other and to the infinite other as the centre of Christian community. Because the centre is eschatological rather than ecclesiological, it is characterised by a 'duality' of prolepsis and participation: present in its absence, absent in its presence.[37] Eschatology, then, enables the ecclesiologist to resist the freeze-frame of communal closure. The relations to the finite other and the relations to the infinite other interrelate in the centre of Christian community, but their interrelation can be conceptualised neither fully nor finally.[38] As Troeltsch put it, scribbling into the margins of his *The Social Teachings of the Christian Churches*, the practice of Jesus is 'vor' – which is to say, temporally and spatially prior to – the construction of community.[39] For Troeltsch, then, Jesus is the focus of church but not the founder of church.

Nonetheless, the movement which gathered around Jesus, 'free and floating' as it was, has inspired community.[40] In his emerging ecclesiology, Paul defines or redefines the centre of Christian community *christologically* – a (re)definition which has been influential

[34] SP, 213.
[35] SL, 34.
[36] I shall return to the discussion of 'utopia' in Chapters 5 and 8.
[37] SP, 212.
[38] Pearson, *Beyond Essence*, 88.
[39] Troeltsch, cited in Drescher, *Ernst Troeltsch*, 337n. 305, ET: 410n. 305.
[40] SL, 58.

throughout the history of Christianity. [41] For Paul, the relation to the finite other and the relation to the infinite other interrelate evn Cristw, a metaphor which occurs throughout his letters.[42] On Troeltsch's account, Paul perceives Christ as the 'Pneuma-Christ'.[43] Pneumatologically, Christ is interpreted as the interrelation of the relation to the infinite other with the relation to the finite other.[44] Through Christ, then, Christians become the sw/ma cristou/, the body of Christ (1 Cor. 12:1-30; Rom. 12:3-8).[45] Christ lives through them and they live through Christ.

Paul's ecclesiology retrieves the centre of community which is implied in Jesus' communication of the kingdom of God for the construction of church; it retrieves eschatology *for* ecclesiology. His ecclesiology marks the invention of a Christian in contrast to a non-Christian community.[46] Yet Paul escapes the closure of church through the metaphor of the body of Christ. 'The metaphor is self-evident: many make up one', thus acknowledging difference and abolishing division.[47] Paul utilises this metaphor to

[41] SL, 49, 968-969. For a contextualisation of Troeltsch's interpretation of Paul's theology, see Claussen, *Jesus-Deutung*, 125-156. The question was whether Paul should be considered a continuation or a corruption of the person and preaching of Jesus. For Troeltsch, Paul's ecclesiology is a consequence of the practice of Jesus. However, it is noteworthy that the early ecclesiologies of Christianity cannot be reduced to Paul's. See Paula Gooder, 'In Search of the Early Church: The New Testament and the Development of Christian Communities', in *The Routledge Companion to the Christian Church*, esp. 17-18.

[42] SL, 60. Here, Troeltsch comes close to Albert Schweitzer, *Die Mystik des Apostels Paulus* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1931), who argued that the metaphor of evn Cristw is crucial for what he interpreted as Paul's mysticism. See also the exegetical and historical accounts in 'In Christ' in Paul, ed. Michael J. Thate, Kevin J. Vanhoozer, and Constantine R. Campbell (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2014).

[43] SL, 59.

[44] Ibid.

[45] SL, 59-60. See also Haight, *Christian Community in History*, vol. 1, 77-83.

[46] SL, 58-59, 69. See Fechtner, *Volkskirche*, 61-62.

[47] Haight, *Christian Community in History*, vol. 3, 86. While the metaphor of the body implies the recognition of difference and diversity, it has been interpreted to exclude the other throughout the history of theology. See Watson, *Introducing Feminist Ecclesiology*, 42-44. In Chapter 8 of my study, I shall scrutinise the interpretations of the metaphor of the body of Christ in the ecclesiologies of Pete Ward and Graham Ward for their accounts of the other.

engage alterity.[48] As Troeltsch argues, for Paul the otherness of the other offers the 'motivation and the matter for the activity of love (*Liebestätigkeit*)' – which is to say, for a construction of community characterised through interrelated relations.[49]

The otherness of the other is recognised through a subordination in which everybody respects everybody because of their relation to God.[50] For Troeltsch, Paul draws a distinction between equality in the religious realm (equality in front of the infinite other) and equality in the non-religious realm (equality in front of the finite other).[51] In Paul's ecclesiology, equality is primarily theological and secondarily sociological because it is rooted in the turn to the transcendent as communicated by Jesus.[52] According to Troeltsch, these Pauline priorities were interpreted differently throughout the history of Christianity, allowing for both the confirmation and the critique of social, cultural, political or economic inequality.[53] For Troeltsch, the christological concept of the church as body of Christ is the Pauline manifestation of the interrelated relations to the finite and to the infinite other which characterise the centre of Christian community.[54] Christ is (at) the centre of community. But like a body consisting of different and diverse parts, this centre escapes communal closure.

To summarise, the centre of Christian community cannot be captured. In the practice of Jesus, the interrelated relations to the finite and to the infinite other are characterised as eschatological rather than ecclesiological. In Paul's reception of the

[48] SL, 66.
[49] Ibid.
[50] SL, 68-69. According to Troeltsch, then, Paul adds the notion of a hierarchy to the interrelated relations to the finite and to the infinite other. See Claussen, *Jesus-Deutung*, 145.
[51] SL, 60-62.
[52] Ibid. See also Pearson, *Beyond Essence*, 115-116.
[53] Troeltsch's argument runs through SL, 60-68. The fact that, throughout history, Christians both confirmed and criticised slavery is a case in point. See Lauster, *Die Verzauberung*, 549-554.
[54] Pearson, *Beyond Essence*, 106, 115-116.

practice of Jesus, christology is employed to transpose the centre from eschatology to ecclesiology. Christ is where the relations to the finite and to the infinite other intersect. According to Troeltsch, Paul offered the classic concept of the contradictory conditions for community inherent in the practice of Jesus: the personal relation to the creator and the communal relation to the creature are reconciled in Christ.[55] Crucially, Paul's classic concept resists closure. When Troeltsch contends that there is no absolute anchor in which constructions of church could be fixed, he formulates the core criterion of his ecclesiology negatively rather than positively.[56] Ecclesiology ought not to be closed off against the other.[57]

But what happens to the resistance against the closure of community in the history of Christianity? How have Christians lived the relation to their finite other? How have Christians lived the relation to their infinite other? Troeltsch aims to ask and answer these questions with his tripartite typology.

2 The Closure of Christian Community

At the inauguration of the *Deutsche Gesellschaft für Soziologie* in 1910, Troeltsch presented the tripartite typology of ecclesiasticism, sectarianism and mysticism for the first

[55] SL, 76.
[56] SL, 977.
[57] SL, 986. The distinction Troeltsch draws between the practice of Jesus and the memorisation of the practice of Jesus in Paul is instructive: it allows for an analysis of the origin(s) of Christianity as plurality rather than singularity. See Claussen, *Jesus-Deutung*, 150-151. See also Gooder, 'In Search of the Early Church', 9-27.

time.[58] In his lecture, Troeltsch argued that Christianity's concept of community is easily explained.[59] Again, his characterisation points to the way in which the relation to the finite other and the relation to the infinite other interrelate.[60] But Troeltsch's point is that the communities which followed from the communication of these interrelated relations in the practice of Jesus distanced themselves from both the religious and the non-religious communities in their context.[61] What Troeltsch bears in mind here is the complex and complicated process of the construction of identity. Of course, the concept of identity is controversial.[62] As it involves notions of what can and what cannot count as the same, it immediately alludes to what is included and what is excluded, who is an insider and who is an outsider, and how the distinction between identity and alterity is drawn by a community. According to Troeltsch, Christianity allows for *universalist*, *particularist*, and *individualist* constructions of identity.[63] In his lecture, which offers a succinct summary of *The Social Teachings of the Christian Churches*, he analysed how these identities were accentuated throughout history, resulting in the typology of ecclesiasticism, sectarianism, and mysticism.[64] Although Troeltsch's study on the history of Christianity ought not to be

[58] A collection of the lectures delivered at the conference appeared as *Verhandlungen des Ersten Deutschen Soziologentages*, ed. Deutsche Gesellschaft für Soziologie (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1911). Christopher Adair-Toteff translated the lectures (but not the discussions which followed the lectures). See his *Sociological Beginnings: The First Conference of the German Society for Sociology* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2005).

[59] NL, 323. See also NR, 168.

[60] NL,323-324.

[61] Ibid.

[62] For a short summary, see Steph Lawler, *Identity: Sociological Perspectives* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008).

[63] NL, 328. Exegetically, Gerd Theissen, *Studien zur Soziologie des Urchristentums* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1989), affirmed Troeltsch's account. For Theissen, ecclesiasticism, sectarianism, and mysticism are rooted (albeit indirectly rather than directly) in the movement which gathered around Jesus.

[64] NR, 328.

reduced to the tripartite typology,[65] I shall concentrate on ecclesiasticism, sectarianism, and mysticism to explore how the concepts of community inherent in these three types neutralise the other.

Troeltsch's typology has been analysed again and again.[66] By pointing to convergences and divergences between the socio-historical conditions of the past context and the socio-historical conditions of the present context of Christianity, these analyses concluded that the types are not appropriate today.[67] Troeltsch, too, followed such a method of analysis. He concluded by pointing to the differences between pre-Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment societies in order to argue that the three types could not survive under contemporary conditions.[68] However, building on Troeltsch's argument that the interrelated relations to the infinite other and to the finite other are at the centre of community, I shall argue systematically rather than historically: I wager that the types of Troeltsch's tripartite typology are inappropriate in *both* the past *and* the present, because they close church off against the other. The corollary of this closure is that the concrete

---

[65] Pearson, *Beyond Essence*, 134-135. Interestingly, Troeltsch had not developed the typology in advance; hence, he did not use the typology to structure the historical material of his research, but he did use the historical material of his research to structure the typology. Writing *The Social Teachings of the Christian Churches*, he construed a variety of typologies before he concluded with the three types of ecclesiasticism, sectarianism, and mysticism. See Friedrich Wilhelm Graf, '"Endlich große Bücher schreiben": Marginalien zur Werkgeschichte der Soziallehren', in *Ernst Troeltschs 'Soziallehren'*, 27-48. For a detailed discussion, see also the Chapter, 'Die Entwicklungsgeschichte der Typologie' in Molendijk, *Zwischen Theologie und Soziologie*, 33-84.

[66] See Roland Robertson, 'On the Analysis of Mysticism: Pre-Weberian, Weberian and Post-Weberian' *Sociological Analysis* 36 (1975), 241-266. He argues that Troeltsch's typology has often been 'slaughtered' – 'accomplishment of such is ... one of the earliest rites of passage which sociology-of-religion neophytes have to undergo' (ibid., 242). Molendijk, *Zwischen Theologie und Soziologie,* offers a comprehensive historical analysis. For a short summary in English, see Pearson, *Beyond Essence*, 128-130.

[67] Richard Niebuhr, *The Social Sources of Denominationalism* (New York: Henry Holt, 1929), lead the way for the reconstructions of Troeltsch's typology, arguing that the context in the United States of America created a type in-between ecclesiasticism and sectarianism – namely, denominationalism.

[68] SL, 979-986. Troeltsch's account of modernity stresses the ambiguity of the consequences of the Enlightenment. See EM, 237-272. See also Lori Pearson, 'Ernst Troeltsch on the Enlightenment, Modernity, and Cultural Values', in *Die aufgeklärte Religion und ihre Probleme*, 449-459. For a succinct summary of Troeltsch's interpretation of the Enlightenment, see Chapman, *Ernst Troeltsch and Liberal Theology*, 152-156.

church is reduced to the conceptual church – blueprint ecclesiology as criticised by Healy. I shall look at each of the three closures in turn.

Ecclesiasticism

Ecclesiasticism ('church' in Troeltsch's terminology) has been influential for ecclesiologies in both the past and the present. Connected to the *Corpus Christianum*, it captures the criteria of a comprehensive church.[69] For Troeltsch, these criteria are consciously or unconsciously carried into contemporary ecclesiologies: both Catholicism and Protestantism dream the dream of a comprehensive church.[70] To characterise ecclesiasticism, Troeltsch coins the concept of 'Einheitskultur', pointing to the unified-and-unifying control of church over culture.[71] Troeltsch assesses the church's control as a 'culture of coercion'.[72] For ecclesiasticism, there is no difference between Christian culture and non-Christian culture: one cannot escape the ecclesial institution(alisation) which is either inherited or imposed.[73] Crucially, the ecclesial institution combines Christian and non-Christian elements in its ecclesiology – a combination which requires the 'mediation (*Vermittelung*)' of the natural and the supernatural.[74]

According to Troeltsch, Thomas Aquinas's theology exemplifies the mediation of the natural and the supernatural. For Thomas, the non-Christian is the precursor of the

---

[69] SL, 233.
[70] SL, 179-180.
[71] SL, 223. See also Ulrich Köpf, 'Die Idee der "Einheitskultur" des Mittelalters', in *Ernst Troeltschs 'Soziallehren'*, 103-121.
[72] SL, 223.
[73] SL, 371. 'Institution' translates the technical term of *Anstalt* which Troeltsch borrowed from contemporary concepts of corporate law. The central characteristic of the institution is that it is un-chosen rather than chosen by its members. See Fechtner, *Volkskirche*, 81-84.
[74] SL, 264.

Christian and the Christian is the perfection of the non-Christian.[75] Thus, both Christian and non-Christian elements are mediated through the 'common conception (*Zweckzusammenhang*)' of church.[76] What follows is a unified and uniform concept of church – Troeltsch terms it 'einheitlich'.[77] Manifesting the unity and the uniformity of the church, both the Christian and the non-Christian are compromised. Both have to make concessions to each other.[78] Troeltsch mistakes the theology of Thomas for the theology of Thomism here.[79] But there is method to Troeltsch's mistake. He is interested in the present rather than the past. As he pointedly puts it, ecclesiasticism 'provokes the exhilaration that the church alone holds the keys to all social insight in her hands, as the modern Thomists, facing today's social crises, preach triumphantly'.[80]

Ecclesiasticism revolves around the concept of a universalist identity of Christianity. But can it cope with alterity? Ecclesiasticism promotes comprehensive control over Christians and non-Christians alike. Although such control cannot be maintained in practice,[81] the other is interpreted as the object of church rather than the subject of church. The other is to be converted or coerced into the church. The other's otherness, then, offers only the occasion for coercion and conversion. Since salvation is interpreted as objective rather than subjective – which is to say, independent of the practitioners of the church – ecclesiasticism can compromise with culture.[82]

---

[75] For Troeltsch's account of Thomas Aquinas, see SL, 252-285.
[76] SL, 292.
[77] Ibid.
[78] SL, 292-293.
[79] Köpf, 'Die Idee der "Einheitskultur" des Mittelalters', 118-120.
[80] SL, 293.
[81] SL, 179-180. See also Chapter 5 of my study.
[82] SL, 967.

In the *Einheitskultur* of church and culture, Christ is interpreted as the redeemer who always already accomplished redemption, thus establishing and endowing the church with it.[83] Through the sacraments, the church communicates this redemption.[84] However, any attempt to communicate it uniformly and universally, Troeltsch argues, founders if it is made without coercion and control. Ecclesiasticism, then, forces the other into what it holds to be redemptive for the other.[85]

Compared to the interrelated relations which mark the centre of community in Paul's picture of the practice of Jesus, ecclesiasticism 'depersonalizes' both the finite other and the infinite other in an overarching institution.[86] The universalism of ecclesiasticism, then, contains a strategy to neutralise the other: others are interpreted as objects rather than subjects. Through the incapacitation of the other, ecclesiasticism prevents relations to the other, because the other is sociologically and theologically confined to the ecclesial conception of her from above. There is neither otherness nor openness in ecclesiasticism. Ecclesiasticism provides a programmatic plan for the universalist church.[87] Without the 'relativisation (*Relativierung*)' of both church and culture in a comprehensive compromise, the unified-and-unifying culture of ecclesiasticism would be impossible.[88] However, it is such relativisation which provokes the types of sectarianism and mysticism as anti-types to ecclesiasticism.

[83] SP, 220.
[84] SL, 968.
[85] SL, 971.
[86] SP, 220.
[87] SL, 794.
[88] SL, 264.

According to Troeltsch, sectarianism and mysticism are 'complementary movements (*Komplementärbewegungen*)' to ecclesiasticism.[89] While these movements were contained within Christendom, the Reformation provoked sectarianism and mysticism to gain independence from ecclesiasticism.[90] Terminologically, Troeltsch points out that it is deceptive to define sectarianism and mysticism as heresies.[91] The distinction between orthodoxy and heterodoxy is drawn from the stance of ecclesiasticism: ecclesiasticism homogenises sectarianism and mysticism into the category of heresy.[92] Their heterogeneity, however, is indispensable for Troeltsch.

Sectarianism

Sectarianism counters the mediation between the Christian and the non-Christian which characterises ecclesiasticism. It strictly separates the insider from the outsider.[93] The 'conscious choice'[94] of the practitioner to be either inside the sect or outside the sect allows for this separation which results in the association of practitioners vis-à-vis the association of non-practitioners.[95]

> Therefore, everything is dependent on personal performance and participation; everybody has a share in the community... Connections are not mediated through the communal possession, but manifested ... through the personal relation of life (*Lebensbeziehung*).[96]

---

[89] SL, 794.
[90] Ibid. I shall discuss Troeltsch's account of the Reformation in Chapter 6.
[91] SL, 367-368, 849.
[92] SP, 221.
[93] SL, 361-362.
[94] SL, 372.
[95] The concept of 'association (*Verein*)' is the counter-concept to the concept of 'institution': one can choose to join an association but one cannot choose to join an institution. SL, 838-839.
[96] SL, 372.

The choice of the practitioners provokes the strict separation between the Christian and the non-Christian which is constitutive of sectarianism. Accordingly, the sectarianist church of choice is not comprehensive but confined. As a consequence, it is capable of radicalism rather than relativism.[97] Compromise, the core category of ecclesiasticism, is ruled out. Either conflict or competition flow from the separation of insiders and outsiders.[98] Sectarianism, then, operates with a particularist concept of the identity of Christianity.

When examining sectarianism for its approach to the otherness of the other, it is important to distinguish between internal others and external others. Since sectarianism still aims for control, the other is allocated to the outside rather than to the inside. Internally, sectarianism is marked by the absence of alterity. It formulates ethical and dogmatical requirements which have to be met by its members.[99] These requirements shape the particularist identity of sectarianism. The otherness of the other is acknowledged in her conversion or non-conversion to the requirements of identity – which is to say, the decision to join or not to join. But once the decision has been made, she has to conform in her beliefs and behaviours.

Conformity is instigated through a reinterpretation of redemption. Redemption is not the possession of the church, but the project of the church: it is subjective rather than objective, achieved rather than ascribed.[100] Christ is interpreted as the 'Lord' whose 'law' leads the practitioners of church in contrast to the practitioners of non-church.[101] Since redemption is interpreted as a reward, it is closely connected to the conditions set by

[97] SL, 427, 967.
[98] SL, 804-805.
[99] SL, 370.
[100] SL, 370.
[101] SL, 370-372, 380-381, 968.

sectarianism: whoever follows these conditions is an insider, whoever does not is an outsider. The corollary is that sectarianism concentrates on 'the constant control of faith'.[102] This control enables a characterisation of otherness as a matter of the outside rather than the inside.

Troeltsch stresses that sectarianism is not corroded but constituted through its concentration on choice: the practitioner has to prove herself by following the code of conduct characteristic of her church.[103] The one who cannot follow this code is expelled from the community. Thus, the other fulfils a function which is essential to the survival of sectarianism. She is instrumentalised in the interest of the bonding of a homogeneous community. The community includes whatever does conform and excludes whatever does not conform to itself, thus strengthening its identity.[104] Here, alterity confirms identity. To offer a current example, one could imagine a community which excludes any person with what is construed as 'deviant' sexuality, assuming that her sexuality impacts the relation to God. Indeed, the community would have to abolish any form of sexuality which deviates from its posited norm, thus losing its ability to engage the other self-critically. Here, there can be no critique of norms without dissolving the sectarianist separation of insider and outsider.

Compared to the interrelated relations which mark the centre of community in Paul's picture of the practice of Jesus, sectarianism neutralises the other. God is connected to those inside the church; God is unconnected to those outside the church. Thus, the otherness of God is not respected. God is owned by the sect. The sectarianist bipartition of

[102] SP, 221.
[103] SL, 372.
[104] SL, 372-373.

God leads to a binary interpretation of reality. Yet Troeltsch acknowledges that the practitioners hold to this bipartition without being or becoming 'mad (*irre*) with regard to the absoluteness of their truth'.[105] The corollary of the binary partition of God is the binary partition of God's creatures – insiders versus outsiders.[106] Thus, sectarianism allows for otherness, but not for openness: the other is external as opposed to internal. Sectarianism, then, provides a programmatic plan for the particularist church.

Mysticism

Mysticism is rooted in what Troeltsch calls 'Unmittelbarmachung':[107] it renders Christianity immediate to the individual Christian. The mystical immediacy counters both ecclesiasticism and sectarianism. In mysticism, then, Christianity is neither universalist nor particularist but individualist. Troeltsch even evaluates it as 'radical individualism'.[108]

In the reception of Troeltsch's typology past and present, mysticism has been a controversial and contested type of community. Is it a community at all? Already at the conference in 1910, where Troeltsch presented his typology, the concept of mysticism stirred controversy.[109] Martin Buber argued that mysticism is what he characterised as the 'apperception of God (*Apperzeption Gottes*)' – a psychological rather than a sociological

[105] SL, 972.

[106] Pearson, *Beyond Essence*, 129n. 20, points out that, for Troeltsch, sectarianism demands tolerance *in-between* communities but dismisses tolerance *in* communities.

[107] SL, 850, 967.

[108] SL, 864. I am aware of the fact that mysticism might be misunderstood if it is reduced to individualism. See esp. the introduction to the history of mysticism by Bernard McGinn, 'The Nature of Mysticism: A Heuristic Sketch', in Bernard McGinn, *The Presence of God: A History of Western Christian Mysticism*, vol. 1: 'The Foundations of Mysticism' (London: SCM, 1991), xiii-xx. Here, however, I focus on Troeltsch's type of mysticism for which individualism is *the* core characteristic.

[109] See Fechtner, *Volkskirche*, 98-99.

category which negates community.[110] Georg Simmel asked whether Christianity has social significance at all.[111] Interestingly, Troeltsch responded not by redefining the typology according to the critique, but by redefining the critique according to the typology. For Troeltsch, the assumption that Christianity has no social significance, that it is a psychological rather than a sociological force, was 'nothing but an illustration of' his type of mysticism.[112]

Troeltsch distinguishes conceptual mysticism and concrete mysticism – a distinction which is 'confusing, if not confused'.[113] On the one hand, conceptual mysticism signifies a form of religiosity which is characterised by experience. On the other hand, concrete mysticism signifies a reaction to the dogmatism inherent in ecclesiasticism and sectarianism. Thus, concrete mysticism draws on conceptual mysticism in order to free religion from its dogmatic domestications. The concrete cases which Troeltsch bears in mind are the transformations of Christianity through which Christians are enabled to live

[110] Martin Buber, cited in *Verhandlungen*, 206.

[111] Georg Simmel, cited in *Verhandlungen*, 205. The response to Simmel is instructive for Troeltsch's reception of Simmel. See Friedemann Voigt, *'Die Tragödie des Reiches Gottes': Ernst Troeltsch als Leser Georg Simmels* (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 1998).

[112] Troeltsch, cited in *Verhandlungen*, 213.

[113] Joel D. S. Rasmussen, 'Mysticism as a Category of Inquiry in the Philosophies of Ernst Troeltsch and William James', in *Exploring Lost Dimensions in Christian Mysticism*, 53. Rasmussen analyses the impact of James's concept of experience on Troeltsch's type of mysticism. Although Troeltsch refers to James only once in *The Social Teachings of the Christian Churches*, Rasmussen argues that James's concept of experience is crucial for Troeltsch's third type (ibid., 62-63). Since Troeltsch criticises James for the individualisation and interiorisation of experience, Rasmussen concludes: 'Somewhat incongruously, then, Troeltsch apparently comes under his own critique here' (ibid., 63). However, Rasmussen does not take into account that Troeltsch is critical of mysticism. See also Joel D.S. Rasmussen, 'Empiricism and Mysticism in Ernst Troeltsch's Philosophy of Religion', *Mitteilungen der Ernst-Troeltsch-Gesellschaft* 13 (2000), 48-65. For a contextualisation and conceptualisation of Troeltsch's mysticism, see Arie L. Molendijk, 'Bewußte Mystik: Zur grundlegenden Bedeutung des Mystikbegriffs im Werk von Ernst Troeltsch', *Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie* 41/1 (1999), 39-61.

their faith outside rather than inside churches.[114] Hence, Troeltsch's mysticism is a modern rather than a pre-modern phenomenon. By labelling these transformations of Christianity 'mysticism', Troeltsch provides them with a pedigree which can be traced back to the practice of Jesus.[115] Thus, he argues that the individualisation of religion cannot be written off as its past and present critics would have it.[116]

For Troeltsch, mysticism is characterised by the 'urge' for 'immediacy' and 'interiority' which aims for 'contemporaneity' with the 'event' of religion.[117] This urge reacts to the objectification of religion in religious institutions and religious traditions, attempting to subjectify these objectifications.[118] If it is driven too far, mysticism results in the obliteration of history, thus neglecting or negating the construction of community.[119] But Troeltsch argues that with or without the obliteration of history, mysticism aims for a community which encompasses humanity so as to render the construction of concrete communities redundant. Communities are simply seen as concessions to the need for conviviality[120] – the 'parallelism of religious spontaneities (*Parallelismus religiöser Spontaneitäten*)' which accepts authority as internal but not as external.[121] The fact that

---

[114] See Johannes Zachhuber, 'Mysticism as a Social-Type of Christianity', in *Exploring Lost Dimensions in Christian Mysticism*, 74-75. Thus, it could be argued that Troeltsch's mysticism anticipates and augments the notion of the spiritual revolution in Paul Heelas and Linda Woodhead, *The Spiritual Revolution: Why Religion is Giving Way to Spirituality* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005).

[115] Zachhuber, 'Mysticism as a Social-Type of Christianity', 79-80. See also Trutz Rendtorff, '"Meine eigene Theologie ist spiritualistisch": Zur Funktion der "Mystik" als Sozialform modernen Christentums', in *Ernst Troeltschs 'Soziallehren'*, 188.

[116] Zachhuber, 'Mysticism as a Social-Type of Christianity, 74-75. The critique of secularisation theory led to a re-discovery of Troeltsch's type of mysticism. See William A. Garrett, 'Maligned Mysticism: The Maledicted Career of Troeltsch's Third Type', *Sociological Analysis* 36 (1975), 205-223; Karl-Fritz Daiber, 'Mysticism: Troeltsch's Third Type of Religious Collectivities', *Social Compass* 49/3 (2002), 329-341.

[117] SL, 850. See also NR, 22.

[118] Ibid.

[119] SL, 940.

[120] SL, 864.

[121] Ibid.

authority is internalised and individualised has consequences for the theology of mysticism: the immediate and internal experience is marshalled against authority.[122]

In mysticism the relation to God is interpreted as independent from its historical or cultural expression such that both Christian and non-Christian elements can be incorporated into mystical theology.[123] Expressions are not an end but the means to an end – the stimulation of the precious personal event of religion in which redemption is rooted.[124] Hence, redemption is neither objective as in ecclesiasticism, nor subjective as in sectarianism, but relative: it is 'redemption in the ... religious event'.[125] In mysticism, then, Christ is interpreted as a 'principle' rather than a 'person'.[126] The truth of the principle 'lies ineffably beyond the literal forms'.[127] Mysticism operates with an individualist concept of the identity of Christianity because the truth of this principle is experienced internally and individually. Again, to offer a current example, one could imagine a community which includes any person with what is construed as 'deviant' sexuality, assuming that her sexuality does not impact her relation to God. Indeed, the community would have to acknowledge any form of sexuality, thus losing its ability to engage the other critically. Here, there can be no construction of norms without dissolving the mysticist unification of insider and outsider.

Compared to the interrelated relations which mark the centre of community in Paul's picture of the practice of Jesus, mysticism prioritises one of these relations: the

[122] SL, 858.
[123] SL, 866.
[124] SL, 858.
[125] SL, 876.
[126] SL, 968.
[127] SL, 972.

relation to God.[128] The relation to God is individualised. Consequently, the mystic's concept of God cannot be challenged because the creator is always already imbibed into the creature. Community is conceived of as 'invisible church' rather than 'visible church'.[129] Such a conception of church allows for the toleration of the other.[130] However, tolerance is rooted in the neutralisation of the otherness of the other: the other can be tolerated because her otherness is deemed irrelevant for the relation to God. Thus, the other fulfils a function which is essential to the survival of mysticism. She is instrumentalised for the bridging of a homogeneous community. The community includes each and everybody, but in a loose confederation of others where otherness is not engaged or encountered, merely passively present.[131] Here, alterity confirms identity. Mysticism allows for openness but not for otherness. The otherness of both the infinite and of the finite other is neutralised. Mysticism, then, offers a programmatic plan for the individualist church.

To summarise, in *The Social Teachings of the Christian Churches*, Troeltsch argues historically rather than systematically. Contrasting the socio-cultural conditions of the past to the socio-cultural conditions of the present, he concludes that ecclesiasticism, sectarianism, and mysticism are obsolete. Examining Troeltsch's types for their engagement or non-engagement with alterity, I have uncovered *systematic* shortfalls in the three Troeltschian types of community. Compared to the centre of community in Paul's picture of the practice of Jesus, ecclesiasticism, sectarianism, and mysticism are to be

[128] SL, 864.
[129] SL, 865. In the history of theology, the distinction between 'visible' and 'invisible' church can be traced back to Augustine. It is indispensable to the ecclesiology of Martin Luther. For a succinct summary, see Ulrich Barth, 'Sichtbare und unsichtbare Kirche', in *Christentumstheorie*, ed. Klaus Tanner (Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 2008), 179-230. For a Lutheran critique of this distinction, see Harald Hegstad, *The Real Church: An Ecclesiology of the Visible* (Cambridge: James Clarke & Co, 2013).
[130] SL, 872.
[131] SL, 372-373.

characterised as closures of ecclesiology. Ecclesiasticism recognises neither openness nor otherness. Its culture of comprehensive control incorporates the infinite and the finite other. This incorporation requires the universality of Christianity which was disrupted by the Reformation.

Both sectarianism and mysticism react to the pluralisation of Christianity provoked by the Reformation. Yet these types also announce the neutralisation of alterity. Whereas sectarianism recognises otherness without openness, aiming for the particularist manifestation of Christianity, mysticism recognises openness without otherness, aiming for the individualist manifestation of Christianity. Either the other is neutralised through exclusion in order to 'bond' a homogeneous community, or the other is neutralised through inclusion in order to 'bridge' a heterogeneous community.[132]

The consequences are the same in both cases: like ecclesiasticism, sectarianism and mysticism construe communities which are characterised by the absence of alterity – blueprints for a construction of church which disrupts the hermeneutical circle running from ecclesial practice to ecclesiology to ecclesial practice. How can the ecclesiologist avoid such a disruption?

[132] For the terminology of 'bridging' and 'bonding', see Robert D. Putnam, *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000), 22-23, who refers to 'bonding' in order to point to the excluding effects of communities and to 'bridging' in order to point to the including effects of community. As Robert Wuthnow, 'Religious Involvement and Status-Bridging Social Capital', *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 41/4 (2002), 670-673, argues 'bridging' and 'bonding' have to be distinguished according to the respective point of reference. In my case, the point of reference is the identity of the community.

3 The (Re)Construction of Christian Community

Troeltsch concludes *The Social Teachings of the Christian Churches* by asking what his study might be contributing to the construction of church in crisis.[133] But his answers turn out to be sketchy. He argues that Christianity hinges on the construction of community,[134] but it is unclear which type of community he has in mind. For Troeltsch, ecclesiasticism outruns sectarianism and mysticism because it holds on to the characterisation of Christianity in terms of the gift of grace,[135] drawing in persons from a variety of contexts.[136] However, the conditions for ecclesiasticism are corroding.[137] Ecclesiologists of both Protestantism and Catholicism are still dreaming the dream of a comprehensive church, but Troeltsch knows that this dream is over.[138] After the Enlightenment, the culture of coercion inherent in ecclesiasticism is no longer desirable or defensible. The influx of both sectarianism and mysticism into church is inevitable. Since their constructions of community counter the depersonalisation inherent in ecclesiasticism, sectarianism and mysticism are vital for the communities of church. Hence, eventually and effectively, Troeltsch advocates the combination of ecclesiasticism, sectarianism, and mysticism.[139] Through their combination, he contends, churches might become communities, 'in which the different Christian minds can ... work together peacefully'.[140]

---

[133] SL, 979-980.
[134] SL, 980.
[135] Ibid. See also Molendijk, *Zwischen Theologie und Soziologie*, 150-151.
[136] See Pearson, *Beyond Essence*, 135.
[137] SL, 981.
[138] SL, 982.
[139] Ibid.
[140] SL, 982-983.

Considering these conclusions, Troeltsch's study ends abruptly without turning from critique to construction. It comes as no surprise that it has been assessed as a story of failure:[141] 'Troeltsch is a failed theologian'.[142] Troeltsch's allegedly promising call for combination is actually problematic. He has shown that ecclesiasticism, sectarianism, and mysticism are entangled in contradictory ecclesiologies, both their theologies and their sociologies diverge. But how can these contradictions be reconciled in an ecclesiology which attempts to combine the three types? In *The Social Teachings of the Christian Churches*, Troeltsch offers no answers.[143] Yet even if the study is a failure, it fails productively rather than destructively.[144] Troeltsch does *not* teach how ecclesiology ought to be done but how ecclesiology ought *not* to be done.

It is striking that ecclesiasticism, sectarianism, and mysticism comply with the characteristics of ecclesiological blueprints as explicated by Nicholas M. Healy. Condensed in the concepts of universalist, particularist, and individualist identities of Christianity, these ecclesiologies put programmatic plans into practice, thus disrupting the hermeneutical circle which runs from ecclesial practice to ecclesiology to ecclesial practice. In these ecclesiologies, the ecclesiologist can be critical with the practitioners of

---

[141] For the reception of *The Social Teachings of the Christian Churches*, see Friedrich Wilhelm Graf, 'Weltanschauungshistoriographie: Rezensionen zur Erstausgabe der Soziallehren', in *Ernst Troeltschs 'Soziallehren'*, 226-227; and Gangolf Hübinger, 'Ernst Troeltschs Soziallehren in außertheologischer Sicht', in *Ernst Troeltschs 'Soziallehren'*, 230-240.

[142] Walter Bodenstein, *Neige des Historismus: Ernst Troeltschs Entwicklungsgang* (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 1959), 207. Here, Bodenstein formulates the sharpest statement about Troeltsch's failure. For a short summary of the reception of Troeltsch's oeuvre in ecclesiology, see Fechtner, *Volkskirche*, 17-26.

[143] Pearson, *Beyond Essence*, 157-161, argues that, for Troeltsch, the combination of ecclesiasticism, sectarianism, and mysticism can take recourse to Schleiermacher's ecclesiology. See SK. However, even in his reading of Schleiermacher's ecclesiology, Troeltsch neglects the fact that the ecclesiologies of ecclesiasticism, sectarianism, and mysticism are – on his own account – irreconcilable. For Troeltsch's reading of Schleiermacher, see also Fechtner, *Volkskirche*, 114-122. I shall return to the reception of Schleiermacher's ecclesiology by Troeltsch in the Conclusion of my study.

[144] Whether Troeltsch's study should or should not be read as a failure depends on what Troeltsch set out to achieve. Concentrating on ecclesiology, my reading pinpointed problems in his proposal. Yet these problems should not hide the fact that Troeltsch's study offers a history of Christianity which is as innovative as it is instructive in its methodology. See Pearson, *Beyond Essence*, 65-162.

church, but the practitioners of church cannot be critical with the ecclesiologist. Healy commended a combination of ecclesiology and ethnography to blur the blueprints which have turned concrete churches into appendixes of conceptual churches.[145]

In a recent rejoinder, however, Healy revisits his recommendation.[146] Ethnographically, he argues, churches cannot be conceived of as communities at all.[147] For Healy, 'coherence and consistency among the members of any given congregation are not ... to be expected.'[148] In my analysis, Healy falls for a sociological rather than a theological blueprint. He applies a programmatic plan of community – one which concentrates on coherence and consistency – to the practices of church.[149] Troeltsch's study of the history of Christianity, however, indicates that Christian community could be conceived through both that which is coherent and consistent and that which is incoherent and inconsistent. Troeltsch's assessment of the emerging ecclesiology of Paul which followed from the practice of Jesus escapes the coherent and consistent conceptual closure of the blueprint. Confronting ecclesiology with eschatology, Troeltsch stresses that Jesus's communication of the kingdom of God which has come and is to come resists full and final theorisation. Hence, taking the interrelated relations to the finite and to the infinite other as anchor and aim of the practices of church allows ecclesiologists to approach these practices critically and creatively. Troeltsch's story of ecclesiologies operates with a negative rather than a

---

[145] Watkins, 'Practicing Ecclesiology', 30-36.

[146] Nicholas M. Healy, 'Ecclesiology, Ethnography and God: An Interplay of Reality Descriptions', in *Perspectives on Ecclesiology and Ethnography*, ed. Pete Ward (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2012), 182-199. The reason for his rejoinder might be that Healy's *Church, World and the Christian Life*, in effect, entails elements of the blueprint ecclesiologies which it criticises. See Mannion, *Ecclesiology and Postmodernity*, 36-38. Thus, I read *Church, World and the Christian Life* not as a critique of any normative account of ecclesiology. Rather, it cautions the ecclesiologist to be both critical and self-critical.

[147] Ibid., 188.

[148] Ibid., 187-188.

[149] Ibid., 191.

positive criterion: ecclesiology ought *not* to be closed. If it is transposed from the negative to the positive, it could be articulated as 'openness to otherness'.

Troeltsch has been criticised because his conclusion offers no clear-cut criteria for the construction of community.[150] Yet in order to manifest the interrelated relations to the finite and to the infinite other, ecclesiology is to be continuously created, thus allowing the other to remain other. Through openness to the other's otherness, the interrelated relations which characterise Christianity escape the freeze-frame of closure. Accepting the exposure to the other which was avoided in the ecclesiasticism of the *Corpus Christianum*, sectarianism and mysticism instrumentalise the other either for the bonding of a homogeneous identity (otherness without openness) or for the bridging of a heterogeneous identity (openness without otherness). Alterity, the otherness of the other, is neutralised.

Healy falls for the sociological rather than the theological neutralisation of alterity when he assumes that community is characterised by identity rather than alterity.[151] *Theologically*, he argues that church might be about 'the capacity to bring its members into a closer relationship with God, however that relation is understood'.[152] Drawing on Troeltsch, 'a closer relationship with God' comes with a closer relationship with God's creatures and a closer relationship with God's creatures comes with 'a closer relationship with God' – 'however that relation is understood'. The attack on alterity which I have exposed in the ecclesiasticist, the sectarianist, and in the mysticist types of community, then, must be added to Healy's convincing critique of ecclesiological blueprints. For if the attack on alterity turns ecclesiology into blueprint ecclesiology, then – by inversion –

[150] See Graf, 'Weltanschauungshistoriographie', 226-227.
[151] See Watkins, 'Practicing Ecclesiology', 28-29.
[152] Healy, 'Ecclesiology, Ethnography and God', 193.

attention to alterity might be capable of turning it back. Thus the ecclesiologist cannot bypass community; for the conceptualisation of community, she could retrieve rather than reject sociology; and for this retrieval, I turn to the conceptualisation of community in the sociology of Zygmunt Bauman.

Chapter 5

THE ATTACK ON ALTERITY

Zygmunt Bauman is not a sociologist of religion. He treats religion only in passing, criticising both functional and substantial definitions.[1] What is at stake with the 'survival strategy' of religion, he argues, is a person's awareness of her limits[2] – an awareness which is historically and culturally conditioned.[3] Through the processes of modernisation, the conditions for this awareness have changed such that it is increasingly found in nonreligious rather than religious forms and formulations.[4] Bauman's thought, then, is implicitly indebted to the theory of secularisation.[5]

However, Bauman is a sociologist of community. In this chapter, I shall argue that Bauman's sociology identifies the attacks on alterity inherent in Ernst Troeltsch's types of ecclesiasticism, sectarianism, and mysticism. I shall proceed in three steps: (1) I shall analyse how Bauman's interpretation of community as utopia exposes Troeltsch's type of ecclesiasticism as a chimera. The construction of the unified-and-unifying community of

---

[1] Zygmunt Bauman, *Postmodernity and its Discontents* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997), 165-185. Kees de Groot, 'Three Types of Liquid Religion', *Implicit Religion* 11/3 (2008), 279, criticises that Bauman has not or not yet offered 'a systematic account of religion'.

[2] Zygmunt Bauman, 'Survival as a Social Construct', *Theory, Culture and Society* 9/1 (1992), 13-14. See also the interview with Bauman conducted by Michael Hviid Jacobsen and Michael C. Kear, 'Liquid Immortality – An Interview with Zygmunt Bauman', *Mortality: Promoting the Interdisciplinary Study of Death and Dying* 19/3 (2014), 303-317.

[3] Bauman, *Postmodernity*, 168-170.

[4] Ibid., 197.

[5] De Groot, 'Three Types', 277. In the interview conducted by Jacobsen and Kear, 'Liquid Immortality', 311, Bauman refers to secularisation as a much used and abused concept. See also Zygmunt Bauman, 'Postmodern Religion', in *Religion, Modernity and Postmodernity*, ed. Paul Heelas (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), 55-78.

universalism is a utopia which has haunted the past and the present. (2) I shall analyse Bauman's account of how the construction of community might neutralise the other either through anthropoemic strategies (neutralisation by exclusion of the other) or through anthropophagic strategies (neutralisation by inclusion of the other). Bauman's concentration on the (neutralisation of) the other is instructive for substantiating my analysis of the closure of community in Troeltsch's types of sectarianism and mysticism. With the help of Bauman, I shall explore the significance which one's choice has for one's relation to the other. If a community interprets engagement with the other as a choice, it runs the risk of instrumentalising her. Finally, (3) I shall sketch the contours of Bauman's concept of a 'community of concern'. With this concept Bauman attempts to chart ways beyond the attacks on alterity in order to enable communities to engage the other by concentrating on the practices of translation. However, Bauman neglects religion as a resource for his account of community. Thus, his sociology helps to clarify possible problems of individualisation, but not possible solutions to the problems of individualisation.

Bauman is interested in the causes and consequences of individualisation – a process which he famously formulates as the shift from a 'solid' modern to a 'liquid' postmodern modernity.[6] Hence, for Bauman, modernity and postmodernity are not mutually exclusive.[7] He argues that 'liquefaction' is the feature of both modernities; yet while solid modernity liquefies with the aim of improved solidity, liquid modernity

[6] See esp. Zygmunt Bauman, *Liquid Modernity* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000).

[7] Terminologically, Bauman tends to substitute the distinction between modernity and postmodernity by the distinction between 'solid modernity' and 'liquid modernity' since the publication of *Liquid Modernity*. For a short summary of the considerations which led him to this substitution, see Zygmunt Bauman and Keith Tester, *Conversations with Zygmunt Bauman* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001), 96-98.

liquefies without the aim of improved solidity: liquidity for the sake of liquidity.[8] According to Bauman, the consequence of liquefaction is that the '"public" is colonized by the "private"'.[9] The 'table, so to speak, has been turned: the task of critical theory has been reversed ... The task is now to defend the vanishing public realm, or rather to refurnish and repopulate the public space fast emptying'.[10] Bauman is aiming to address the causes and the consequences of individualisation in view of its casualties. He accounts for these casualties through a concentration on alterity. 'Notions of "inside" and "outside" dominate most of Bauman's writing, questions of who is to be "excluded" and who is to be "included"'.[11] Thus he interprets individualisation through a reflection on the possibilities and the impossibilities of relationality. One scene which captures the issue of relationality is – according to Bauman – biblical. When God confronts Cain with what he did to his brother, Cain responds: 'Am I my brother's keeper?' (Genesis 4:9). In this response, which simultaneously answers and asks, Cain acknowledges that he *is* his brother's keeper, albeit grudgingly.[12] But what could or should a response to God's confrontation look like today?

For my analysis, it is crucial to stress the significance of metaphors for Bauman's sociology. He combines the poetic and the prosaic, utilising stark and striking images in order to awaken his readers to their responsibility to the other.[13] 'Bauman's use of

[8] Bauman, *Liquid Modernity*, 2-5.
[9] Ibid., 37.
[10] Ibid., 39. See Zygmunt Bauman, 'Seeking Shelter in Pandora's Box', *City* 9/2 (2005), 161-168.
[11] Michael Hviid Jacobson and Sophia Marshman, 'Bauman on Metaphors – A Harbinger of Humanistic Hybrid Sociology', in *The Sociology of Zygmunt Bauman: Challenges and Critique,* ed. Michael Hviid Jacobson and Paul Poder (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), 24.
[12] See Zygmunt Bauman, *The Individualized Society* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001), 72-73. See also Jacobson and Marshman, 'Bauman on Metaphors', 30.
[13] Jacobson and Marshman, 'Bauman on Metaphors', 21-22.

metaphor is part and parcel of his wider "sociology of possibility"'.[14] Metaphors are the tools for his 'sociological strategy' of 'defamiliarization': they are 'transferring', 'transmuting', 'transforming', and 'transcending', thus opening up opportunities for critical and creative engagement with the causes and consequences of individualisation.[15] Bauman's metaphors of the 'solid' and the 'liquid' for modern and postmodern modernities are strikingly similar to Troeltsch's concept of elasticity, although 'elasticity' is in-between the solid and the liquid. Hence, Bauman's metaphors might prove useful in transposing Troeltsch's typology from the past to the present.

1 The Chimera of Community

Bauman's oeuvre is peppered with the concept of community;[16] however, as if putting on rubber gloves in order to avoid contamination with the ambiguity of community, he repeatedly refers to 'community' in inverted commas.[17] 'Unlike so many critics of modernity, Bauman feels no nostalgia for community'.[18] Rather, he understands community as a utopia. Either a past or a potential paradise, community is *never* in the

[14] Ibid., 22.
[15] Ibid., 23.
[16] See esp. Zygmunt Bauman, *Alone Again: Ethics after Certainty* (London: Demos, 1994). Bauman's analysis of community is summarised in *Community: Seeking Safety in an Insecure World* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001).
[17] See the preface to the 2012 edition of *Liquid Modernity*, Zygmunt Bauman, 'Liquid Modernity Revisited', *Liquid Modernity* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012), esp. vii-xix.
[18] Fred Alford, 'Bauman and Levinas: Levinas cannot be used', *Journal for Cultural Research* 18/3 (2014), 251.

present; it 'is not, regrettably, available to us'.[19] I shall argue that Bauman's utopia of community exposes Troeltsch's ecclesiasticism as a chimera.

According to Bauman, the reason for the utopian unavailability of community is the anthropologically anchored tension between the personal and the communal, a tension which 'is unlikely ever to be resolved and so likely to go on for a long time to come; not finding the right solution and being frustrated by the one that has been tried will not prompt us to abandon the search – but to go on trying'.[20] Bauman's utopianism could be characterised as a translation (perhaps secularisation) of Troeltsch's combination of ecclesiology and eschatology. Similar to Troeltsch's concept of the kingdom of God, which I examined in Chapter 4, Bauman conceives of community as a concept which cannot be put into practice. But because of its utopian quality, 'community' might regulate communal practices critically and creatively. Hence, Troeltsch's concentration on the interrelation of the personal relation to the infinite other with the communal relation to the finite other and Bauman's emphasis on the tension between the personal and the communal fulfil a strikingly similar function. Both relativise current communities, opening them up for critical and creative action. Already in *Socialism: The Active Utopia,* Bauman argued for the force of utopias which, through the relativisation of a practice, allow practitioners to reshape their practice.[21] Whereas Bauman is concerned with the relativisation of culture, Troeltsch is concerned with the relativisation of church.

Bauman traces the change of community throughout historical and cultural developments, starting with Ferdinand Tönnies's famous formula of *Gemeinschaft und*

[19] Bauman, *Community*, 3.
[20] Ibid., 5.
[21] Zygmunt Bauman, *Socialism: The Active Utopia* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1976), 13-16. See Michael Hviid Jacobson, 'Bauman on Utopia – Welcome to the Hunting Zone', in *The Sociology of Zygmunt Bauman*, 214.

Gesellschaft.[22] Tönnies assumed that there are two modes of togetherness: the 'organic' togetherness of a community (*Gemeinschaft*) which is ascribed to the members of the community and the 'mechanic' togetherness of a society (*Gesellschaft*) which is achieved by the members of the community.[23] With the advent of modernity, he argued, mechanic togetherness superseded organic togetherness, society superseded community. Bauman criticises the romanticisation of community in Tönnies's argument.[24] For Bauman, Tönnies's concept of community is a chimera. It is *never* available – neither in the past nor in the present – because organic and mechanic togetherness are always already interwoven. A community which '*precedes* all agreements and disagreements' is impossible.[25] Actually, community is both the origin and the outcome of agreements and disagreements: it is ascribed and achieved; it is *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*.

However, Bauman nonetheless uses Tönnies's core concepts of community and society as tools to rethink the conditions of togetherness.[26] He stresses that the availability of increasing and intensifying speed in the means of physical and non-physical communication gives the impression of a shift from organic to mechanic togetherness.

> It was primarily the availability of fast means of travel that triggered the typically modern process of eroding ... all locally entrenched social and cultural

[22] Ferdinand Tönnies, *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft: Grundbegriffe der reinen Soziologie* (Berlin: Karl Curtius, 1922), ET: *Community and Civil Society*, trans. Jose Harris and Margaret Hollis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). For issues connected to the translation of Tönnies' study, see the translator's account in ibid., xxxviii-xl. In order to avoid confusion, I stick to Bauman's translation of 'Gemeinschaft' and 'Gesellschaft' with 'community' and 'society'.

[23] Tönnies, *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft*, 8-81. (ET: 22-91). Accordingly, Tönnies argues that 'Gemeinschaft' and 'Gesellschaft' are 'Grundbegriffe' – fundamental or foundational concepts – for sociology. For a succinct summary of Tönnies' argument, see Delanty, *Community*, 21-23.

[24] Bauman, *Community*, 9-12.

[25] Ibid., 10.

[26] Accordingly, Bauman accepts 'Gemeinschaft' and 'Gesellschaft' as 'Grundbegriffe'. But while he concurs with Tönnies's theoretical argument, he criticises Tönnies's empirical argument about the supersession of community by society.

> 'totalities'; the process first captured ... by Tönnies's famous formula of modernity as the passage from *Gemeinschaft* to *Gesellschaft*.[27]

Today, intra- and inter-community communication accelerate to the same speed – '*both* are instantaneous' – which is why the distinction is increasingly irrelevant.[28] But if the local cannot be discretely distinguished from the global, togetherness cannot be taken for granted. Community is thus turned into a 'task', it is an 'achievement' as opposed to an 'ascription'.[29]

According to Bauman, the construction of the identity of a community is a reaction to the increase of mechanic togetherness and the decrease of organic togetherness. The distinction between inside and outside produces 'certainty and uncertainty'.[30] If community is dissolved, this distinction, too, is dissolved. Accordingly, the concept of identity which captures precisely this distinction between uncertain outside and certain inside is increasingly of concern. If one belongs to *Gemeinschaft* as opposed to *Gesellschaft*, the identity of the community is irrelevant: it is taken for granted.[31] But if one belongs to *Gesellschaft* as opposed to *Gemeinschaft*, the opposite is the case. Bauman emphasises that identity, 'today's talk of the town ... owes the attention it attracts ... to being a surrogate of community: ... of that circle that stays warm however cold the winds outside'.[32] However, in order to fulfil the function of distinguishing between certainty and uncertainty, to offer safety and security,

---

[27] Zygmunt Bauman, *Culture as Praxis: New Edition* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000), xxii.
[28] Ibid., xxiv.
[29] Ibid., xxix.
[30] Ibid., xxiii.
[31] Ibid., xxx.
[32] Bauman, *Community*, 15.

> identity must belie its origin; it must deny being 'just a surrogate' – it needs to conjure up a phantom of the self-same community which it has come to replace. Identity spouts on the graveyard of communities, but flourishes thanks to the promise of a resurrection of the dead.[33]

Thus, Bauman concludes that contemporary 'seekers of community are doomed to share Tantalus' lot'.[34] If community is achieved as opposed to ascribed, if it is a consequence of choice, it remains *Gesellschaft* as opposed to *Gemeinschaft*.[35] The nourishment is in reach, but whenever Tantalus reaches for it, it retracts from him.

The similarities to Troeltsch's typology are striking. Like Troeltsch, Bauman interprets individualisation as the imperative of choice which turns community from the ascribed to the achieved. In the unified-and-unifying culture of Troeltsch's ecclesiasticism, one cannot choose. Community is inherited or imposed. But after the end of the unified-and-unifying culture, one cannot *not* choose anymore. Bauman's critique of Tönnies's separation of ascribed *Gemeinschaft* and achieved *Gesellschaft* exposes Troeltsch's ecclesiasticism as a chimera.

The concept of a comprehensive church haunts both past and present accounts of ecclesiology. But a unified-and-unifying culture is considered either past or potential, a nebulous nostalgia which is never present. For Troeltsch, the *Corpus Christianum* is not what 'Romanticism would have us believe' because it was 'full of conflict'.[36] If 'seen from a distance', he argues, the present is 'perhaps not much more anarchical than' the past.[37] Agreeing with Bauman's critique of Tönnies, Troeltsch concludes: 'The decisive point is

[33] Ibid., 16.
[34] Ibid., 17.
[35] Ibid., 14.
[36] FV, 181.
[37] FV, 181-182.

the realisation that monistic conceptions ... are a fantastic delusion. No Present has ever had such a view of itself; it has existed only in those Utopian longings'.[38] Hence, I am arguing that Troeltsch's ecclesiasticism can be classified as *aetiology*: it interprets the imperative of choice as a consequence of the collapse of the comprehensive church. Troeltsch already alludes to the interpretation of ecclesiasticism as a chimera in *The Social Teachings of the Christian Churches* where he portrays it as more a matter of principle than a matter of practice.[39] But he seems to sway between interpretations of ecclesiasticism as historical fact and interpretations of ecclesiasticism as historical fiction.[40]

Bauman cautions those who are constructing ecclesial or non-ecclesial communities against the chimera of a comprehensive community. He uses the concepts of *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* to tackle the consequences of a person's choice to enter or not to enter a community. How are the causes and the consequences of such a choice negotiated? Troeltsch understands the types of sectarianism and mysticism as a reaction and a response to the imperative of choice. These types are mirrored by Bauman's curious concepts of 'Ghetto' and 'Carnival' to which I now turn.

2 The Anthropoemic and the Anthropophagic

If the aspiration to become or to be a comprehensive community – allegedly ascribed as opposed to achieved – is put into practice under the conditions of either the modern or the

[38] FV, 182. See also FV, 186-187.
[39] SL, 113, 179.
[40] According to Pearson, *Beyond Essence*, 138-140, Troeltsch conceives of the types as both (factual) entities in the course of history and (fictional) entities in the historian's interpretation of the course of history.

postmodern liquefaction, it implies the neutralisation of the other who disturbs and distorts the utopian – dystopian? – unity and uniformity. Bauman distinguishes two strategies of neutralisation: the anthropoemic (neutralisation by exclusion of what is other) and the anthropophagic (neutralisation by inclusion of what is other). The consequences of these strategies are apparent in the 'ghettoisation' or the 'carnivalisation' of community. I shall argue that both strategies correspond to Troeltsch's types of sectarianism and mysticism respectively.

As explored above in Chapter 4, Troeltsch's sectarianism is characterised by the separation of inside and outside. Such separation is also the marker of what Bauman calls the 'ghetto'. With 'ghetto' he refers to communities which attempt to offer safety and security through the division between insiders and outsiders.[41] The result of the separation *is* the gated community, the 'voluntary ghetto'.[42] In such a ghetto, insiders can go out (although they would not want to), but outsiders cannot go in (although they would want to).[43] The corollary of the gated community of ghettoisation is the absence of alterity.[44] Whoever or whatever does not conform to the identity of the community is expelled in order to produce safety and security. Hence, as in Troeltsch's sectarianism, cooperation with the other is ruled out. The defence of the community against internal and external others is the ghetto's core commitment.[45]

[41] Bauman, *Community*, 114-117.
[42] Ibid., 116.
[43] Ibid., 117.
[44] Ibid., 115.
[45] Ibid., 141-142.

However, the insecurity which the ghetto aims to avert is paradoxically its condition.[46] For if one feels too safe and too secure, one might leave the ghetto in order to sit 'at the same table with "the aliens", rubbing shoulders while visiting the same places'.[47] In order to avoid blurring the boundaries between inside and outside, the ghetto aims 'principally at the perpetuation of division'.[48] According to Bauman, the ghetto is characteristic for religion in postmodernity. Sectarianism – one could refer to 'fundamentalism'[49] – responds to the centrality of choice by masking that it is chosen.[50] A person chooses sectarianism, drawing the distinction between inside and outside. Retrospectively, her choice is interpreted as the only choice. This interpretation masks the fact that she could, or perhaps should, have chosen otherwise. Thus, the ghetto conveys the impression of safety and security in spite of the uncertainty of choice.[51] Hence, Bauman's concept of ghetto validates my analysis of the significance of choice for Troeltsch's sectarianism: the choice is masked, not unmasked.

As explored above in Chapter 4, Troeltsch's mysticism is characterised by the combination of inside and outside. Combination is also the marker of what Bauman calls

---

[46] Ibid., 142.

[47] Ibid., 141.

[48] Ibid., 141-142. According to Bauman, the ghetto(ised) community is the core concept of communitarianism. Criticising Charles Taylor, Bauman repeatedly refers to the tacit totalitarianism in communitarian concepts of community. See esp. Bauman, *Culture as Praxis*, xxxvi-xlv. Here, I cannot trace whether Bauman's critique is correct for points and phases in the development of Taylor's thought (For Bauman's critique of communitarianism, see Delanty, *Community*, 86-87, 91-91). Yet the critique certainly misses Taylor's account of the cohabitation of persons with religious and nonreligious worldviews. Here, Taylor stresses the significance of the 'overlapping consensus' in 'diverse democracies', a consensus which is to be negotiated and renegotiated. See Charles Taylor, 'Why We Need a Radical Redefinition of Secularism', in *The Power of Religion in the Public Sphere*, ed. Eduardo Mendieta and Jonathan Vanantwerpen (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 48.

[49] See de Groot, 'Three Types', 280. Mannion's critique of what he calls 'neo-exclusivism' points to sectarianism. See Mannion, *Ecclesiology and Postmodernity*, 43-74.

[50] Bauman, *Postmodernity*, 182-183.

[51] Ibid., 184.

'carnival'. For Bauman, 'carnival communities'[52] are communities which are continuously chosen and continuously changed.[53] Formed around the centre of extraordinary social, cultural or political events like carnivals, these communities are 'transient'.[54] In the carnival community, the separation of inside and outside is collapsed – one can be simultaneously inside and outside. Thus, the community is interpreted as the manifestation of individuality.[55] It tolerates everybody and everything. Bauman evaluates the experience of the event – the centre around which the community is formed – as a 'peg' on which a person can hang her fascinations and frustrations. The peg is what turns the carnival into a community because it offers safety and security in spite of personal differences.[56] Playing with the concept of the peg, Bauman repeatedly labels these communities 'cloakroom communities', communities where one changes one's concern as quickly as one's coat.[57]

However, like the ghetto, the carnival or the cloakroom is characterised by the absence of alterity. The peg comes without commitment.[58] If a person in the community disturbs the carnival – which is to say, if she challenges the communal identity of non-commitment – she is met with a tolerance that is tantamount to indifference.[59] As soon as otherness matters, the other is stripped of her otherness. Because one chooses this peg today and that peg tomorrow, 'peg communities' lose their drive to organisation in institutional or traditional structures.[60] Hence, the insecurity which the carnival aims to

[52] Bauman, *Community*, 72.
[53] Ibid., 64.
[54] Ibid., 70
[55] Ibid.
[56] Ibid., 71.
[57] Bauman, *Liquid Modernity*, 199-201.
[58] Bauman, *Community*, 71.
[59] Ibid., 72.
[60] Ibid., 71.

avert is actually not averted. It is covered by the event of carnival. According to Bauman, the carnival – one could refer to mysticism or spiritualism[61] – is characteristic for religion in postmodernity, a religion which is outside religious institutions and traditions.[62] It concentrates on experience.[63] A person chooses mysticism without drawing a distinction between the inside and the outside of the mystical community. Retrospectively, her choice is emphasised. She is always already free to choose, to be included or excluded from the peg event. Since she can choose and change continuously, the community conveys the factual or fictional impression of safety and security. Hence, Bauman's concept of carnival confirms my analysis of the significance of choice for Troeltsch's mysticism: choice is unmasked, not masked.

Overall, the critique of community runs through Bauman's analysis of togetherness in solid and liquid modernity. Communities offer safety and security through the neutralisation of the other. Community is construed through the absence of alterity.

As mentioned above, Bauman distinguishes between two strategies to expel alterity from identity, thus neutralising the other: the 'anthropoemic' ghetto and the 'anthropohagic' carnival.[64] This distinction pairs with Troeltsch's distinction between sectarianism and mysticism: the anthropoemic strategy allows for the 'sectarianist' acknowledgement of otherness without openness and the anthropophagic strategy allows for the 'mysticist' acknowledgement of openness without otherness. In my analysis of Troeltsch's typology in Chapter 4, I described these strategies as the exclusivist bonding of a homogeneous identity and the inclusivist bridging of a heterogeneous identity. Because

[61] See de Groot, 'Three Types', 280.
[62] Bauman, *Postmodernity*, 179-180.
[63] Ibid., 179-180. See also de Groot, 'Three Types', 279.
[64] Bauman, *Liquid Modernity*, 101-102. See also his *Mortality, Immortality and Other Life Strategies* (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1992), 131-132.

of the potency of these strategies for the construction of community, Bauman puts on rubber gloves when he examines community. If engagement with the other is conceived of as a choice, the otherness of the other is likely to be neutralised because one is tempted to choose the other who is the least challenging to one's ideas and ideologies: like attracts like. Bauman points out that community runs the risk of totalitarianism through the neutralisation of the other.[65] But he concludes: 'Whatever the quality of the answers it supplies, the questions which it answers are genuine. The problem is not how to dismiss the gravity of the questions, but how to find answers free from totalitarian genres'.[66]

Like Troeltsch, Bauman draws on the utopia of community for critical and creative engagement with contemporary society; like Troeltsch, Bauman traces the historical and cultural development of community in what could be characterised as three types; and like Troeltsch, Bauman concludes that none of these types are adequate to contemporary conditions. Troeltsch, too, attempts to find answers free from totalitarian genres in a critical and creative recombination of the three types of his typology. Through this recombination, Troeltsch asks for the elastication of community. Bauman, however, calls for communities of concern to chart ways beyond the attacks on alterity inherent in ecclesiasticism, sectarianism, and mysticism.

[65] Such totalitarianism has led to criticism – even abandonment – of the concept of community in ecclesiology. See Watson, *Introducing Feminist Ecclesiology*, 48-52.
[66] Bauman, *Postmodernity*, 185.

3 The Community of Concern

Kees de Groot stresses that Bauman's concept of the 'community of concern' 'has been left out' of both sociological and theological analyses.[67] The community of concern 'is a concept that belongs to the semantic field of hope': Bauman turns from the descriptive to the prescriptive, probing the opportunities for community construction beyond totalitarian genres.[68] Throughout his writings, the community of concern is never completely described or conclusively defined. Yet Bauman hints at what a community could look like if it would engage internal and external others. It would be a community rooted in 'mutual care', a 'concern ... for the equal right to be human'.[69]

Like Troeltsch, Bauman refrains from the description and definition of such a community of concern. For him, the difference between the modern solid modernity and the postmodern liquid modernity entails the 'withdrawal of planners'[70] – a withdrawal which echoes Nicholas M. Healy's critique of blueprint ecclesiology as explored above in Chapter 4. Under the current conditions of what Bauman calls instant and individual gratification, utopias cannot be planned and programmed.[71] In order to challenge the current context, community concepts have to be 'heuristic',[72] negatively pointing to what the utopia is not rather than positively pointing to what the utopia is. The turn from the

[67] De Groot, 'Three Types', 281.
[68] Ibid.
[69] Bauman, *Community*, 149-150.
[70] Ibid., 220.
[71] See Jacobson, 'Bauman on Utopia', 221.
[72] Ibid., 224.

positive to the negative responds to the ambiguities of utopia which can be turned into totalitarian tools to exclude whoever cannot conform to the plan and the programme.[73]

The core concept for the community of concern is what Bauman calls 'the stranger'. Bauman's attention to the stranger can be traced back to his writings from the 1950s and 1960s. It is summarised in *Culture as Praxis*.[74] Here the stranger is portrayed as the insider on the outside or the outsider on the inside. The stranger, then, is always already other. Because of her location in-between inside and outside, the stranger problematises the implicit and explicit assumptions in the practices of a community.[75] The stranger is a 'category that falls betwixt and between'.[76] Bauman stresses that the alterity of the stranger does not authorise the community to neutralise her through exclusion or inclusion. For Bauman, neutralisation eventually entails attempts to eviscerate the stranger. The history of Judaism is the eminent example for such attempts. According to Bauman, the Jews exemplify the casualties of the processes of modernisation that are obsessed with clear-cut distinctions between who is an insider and who is an outsider.[77] Through such distinctions, strangers are displaced, deported, and eventually destroyed. And such destructions have haunted both the past and the present.[78]

A community of concern is a community of concern for the stranger who blurs the boundaries between the inside and the outside. Existential difference is engaged, not neutralised according to anthropoemic or anthropophagic strategies. In her reflections on

---

[73] Ibid., 226-227.
[74] Bauman, *Culture*, 104-112. See Niclas Månson, 'Bauman on Strangers – Unwanted Peculiarities', in *The Sociology of Zygmunt Bauman*, 155-174.
[75] Bauman, *Culture*, 104-105.
[76] Månson, 'Bauman on Strangers', 159.
[77] Ibid., 162-163. See Zygmunt Bauman, *Modernity and the Holocaust: With a New Afterword by the Author* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000).
[78] Ibid.

the controversies stirred by Judaism and Zionism, Judith Butler points out that the stranger is *not* a matter of choice.[79] She is a given and a gift.[80] Unlike the communities of the sectarianist ghetto and the mysticist carnival, the community of concern accepts that it is 'a condition of social and political life itself' that a person must not choose with whom she cohabits.[81] The claim to such a choice runs the risk of genocide.[82] But because the stranger might be vile and violent, she entails both chances and challenges for the construction of community.[83] Communities of concern cannot but engage her. For a construction of community without the absence of alterity, Bauman is thus important and instructive. But how is attention to alterity practised?

According to Bauman, one's relation to the stranger is enabled in the practice of translation. Translation allows the outsider and the insider to relate to each other. Interpreting 'culture' as 'praxis', Bauman highlights that cross-cultural translation 'is a continuous process' which allows for 'cohabitation'.[84] He argues that through the process of translation both parties 'emerge from their encounter changed', a continuous change because translation follows translation.[85] The trick of translation is 'to be at home in many homes, but to be ... inside and outside at the same time', combining attachment and

---

[79] See Judith Butler, *Parting Ways: Jewishness and the Critique of Zionism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014), 114-180.

[80] Judith Butler, 'Is Judaism Zionism?', in *The Power of Religion*, 70-91 (a reworked version of which appeared in Butler, *Parting Ways*, 114-150). See also her 'The Charge of Anti-Semitism', in Judith Butler, *Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence* (New York: Verso, 2004), 101-127.

[81] Butler, 'Is Judaism Zionism?', 83.

[82] See Butler's insightful interpretation of Hannah Arendt's *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil* (New York: Penguin Books, 2006) in the Chapter, 'Quandaries of the Plural', in *Parting Ways*, 151-180. According to Butler, Arendt's point is that Adolf Eichmann claimed to be entitled to choose with whom to cohabit and with whom not to cohabit. The choice of cohabitation, the claim to have a say in who is and who is not one's neighbour, has genocidal consequences – potentially and actually.

[83] Månson, 'Bauman on Strangers', 167-170.

[84] Bauman, *Culture*, xlviii.

[85] Ibid.

detachment in a critical concern for the other.[86] 'Learning the trick is the chance of the exile'.[87] For Bauman (unlike Jürgen Habermas), there is no Esperanto – religious or nonreligious – which could stop the process of translation.[88] Bauman's sociology speaks from the exile, the location of the stranger. It is engaged. For him, a 'non-committal sociology is an impossibility'.[89]

Bauman anticipates the critique that content might be 'lost in translation'.[90] He admits that loss is inevitable, but for him such loss is of no concern. He argues that since one cannot know what is lost in translation (otherwise it would not be lost), there is no point in worrying about this loss. Bauman announces: 'Let us count the gains instead'.[91] His politics of translation is promising for a construction of a community which engages the internal and the external other because translation blurs the boundaries between insider and outsider. Hermeneutically, however, Bauman's announcement to count the gains of translation might be both too hasty and too haughty.

Elaborating on intra- and inter-religious encounters, Werner G. Jeanrond points to philosophical and sociological risks in current theories of translation. Philosophically, theories of translation reject alterity when they conceive of the content which is 'lost in

---

[86] Bauman, *Liquid Modernity*, 207.
[87] Ibid.
[88] Jürgen Habermas's theory of the translation between religious and nonreligious languages assumes that religious language tends to be private while nonreligious language tends to be public. See Jürgen Habermas, 'Religion in the Public Sphere', in Jürgen Habermas, *Between Naturalism and Religion*, trans. Ciaran Cronin (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008), 127-150. Accordingly, the secular sphere fulfils a function like the language of Esperanto. See Habermas's comments in 'Concluding Discussion', in *The Power of Religion*, 109-117. However, Charles Taylor asked: 'Were Martin Luther King's secular compatriots unable to understand what he was arguing for when he put the case for equality in biblical terms? (Charles Taylor, 'Why We Need a Radical Redefinition of Secularism', 58n. 13). The example of Martin Luther King's speeches runs through their discussion, pointing out how controversial and contested the boundaries between religious and nonreligious 'language' are.
[89] Bauman, *Liquid Modernity*, 216.
[90] Bauman, *Culture*, xlvii.
[91] Ibid.

translation' as irrelevant.[92] While translation is vital for the encounter with religious and nonreligious others, it might be turned into a tool to strip the stranger of her strangeness.[93] Sociologically, theories of translation are – plainly put – 'too late'.[94] The actual or virtual encounter with the other shapes both the insiders and the outsiders of communities which is why the identities of communities are heterogeneous. It is ultimately unclear who translates for whom.[95] When Bauman advocates theorising plurality as a 'cultural plurality' instead of a 'plurality of cultures', he inadvertently interprets the current context as a context in which translation loses its significance for communication in-between communities.[96] Communities are always already inter-mixed. Hence, attention to the other needs *more* than translation.

Arguably, for Bauman, religions are 'impotent' when it comes to the redirection of attention to the other.[97] But while Bauman's call for a politics of response and responsibility to the other is well-suited to draw attention to alterity, I am arguing that the practice of such a politics is in need of religion. It is not a coincidence that Cain's response 'Am I my brother's keeper?' is a response to God. When Bauman refers to Cain's response, he neglects the fact that the scene between God and God's creature highlights how the relation to the finite other and the relation to the infinite other are inextricably

[92] Werner G. Jeanrond, 'Towards an Interreligious Hermeneutics of Love', in *Interreligious Hermeneutics*, ed. Catherine Cornille and Christopher Conway (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2010), 49.
[93] Ibid., 48-50.
[94] Ibid., 50.
[95] Ibid. See also Werner G. Jeanrond, 'Interkulturalität und Interreligiösität: Die Notwendigkeit einer Hermeneutik der Liebe', in *Kontextualität und Universalität: Die Vielfalt der Glaubenskontexte und der Universalitätsanspruch des Evangeliums*, ed. Thomas Schreijäck and Knut Wenzel (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2012), 156-173.
[96] Bauman, *Culture*, xlv.
[97] Månson, 'Bauman on Strangers', 170. Alford, 'Bauman and Levinas', 249-262, argues that Bauman fails to account for the religious roots of Emmanuel Levinas' concept of the other when he uses it in his sociology.

interwoven (Genesis 4:1-15). These interrelations tell a different story – a story to which I shall return.[98]

In conclusion, I have explored Bauman's conceptions of community, pointing to the congruence between nonreligious and religious communities. Bauman's sociology offers a fully-fledged parallel to Troeltsch's tripartite typology. His critique of the core concepts of *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* exposes Troeltsch's ecclesiasticism as a chimera which haunts the construals of community in both the past and the present. His concentration on the other substantiates my analysis of the strategies that neutralise the other in Troeltsch's types of sectarianism and of mysticism. Following Bauman, I have characterised these strategies as the anthropoemic exclusion of the other for the bonding of a homogeneous ghetto-identity and as the anthropophagic inclusion of the other for the bridging of a heterogeneous carnival-identity. In both attacks on alterity, the other is instrumentalised in the interest of the identity of community. In order to sidestep these strategies, Bauman's concept of a 'community of concern' attempts to engage the otherness of the other. His attempt, however, neglects the question of how alterity challenges the practices of translation.

In the context of ecclesiology, however, this challenge might be addressed critically and creatively. As mentioned above, in *The Social Teachings of the Christian Churches*, Troeltsch concluded that there is no absolute anchor for Christian community. Nonetheless, in the past and in the present, Christian communities have offered occasions for trust and for entrustment to the other. Since Bauman dismisses the resource of religion, his sociology identifies the problems of individualisation, but not the solutions to the problems of

[98] See Chapters 7 through 9 below.

individualisation. In order to sketch such solutions, I shall return to Troeltsch. His thought might allow for a notion of the identity of Christianity as concern for the finite other and for the infinite other. But before I return to Troeltsch, I shall analyse how the attacks on alterity, which I exposed in the ecclesiologies of ecclesiasticism, sectarianism, and mysticism, are appropriated and applied in the sociology of religion today.

Chapter 6

THE PROMISE OF PLURALITY

Three paradigms currently characterise the sociology of religion: secularisation, pluralisation, and individualisation.[1] A paradigm, as Thomas S. Kuhn argued in 1962, is a way of perceiving data.[2] Data can be perceived in *this* way or in *that* way, but there is no way to perceive them *without* a paradigm because the paradigm provides the concepts and the criteria which are required to make sense of data in the first place. In the paradigms which characterise the sociology of religion, data – both qualitative-empirical and quantitative-empirical – are perceived to support either a diagnosis of *secularisation* or a diagnosis of *de-secularisation*. The same data, then, are perceived in decidedly different

[1] In sociology of religion, different designations are used for these three paradigms. I label them according to the process which they identify as decisive for the development of religion. As far as I can ascertain, the distinction of the sociological scene into three paradigms was first drawn by Detlef Pollack and Gert Pickel. See the comprehensive overview in Gert Pickel, *Religionssoziologie: Eine Einführung in zentrale Themenbereiche* (Wiesbaden: VS-Verlag, 2011), 135-226. See also Detlef Pollack, *Säkularisierung – ein moderner Mythos?* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003); and Detlef Pollack, *Rückkehr des Religiösen?* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2009). For empirical explorations, see *The Social Significance of Religion in the Enlarged Europe: Secularization, Individualization and Pluralization*, ed. Detlef Pollack, Olaf Müller, and Gert Pickel (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2012). However, the scene has been divided differently by Oliver Tschannen, *Les Théories de la sécularisation* (Genève: Droz, 1992). His account – summarised in 'The Secularization Paradigm: A Systematization', *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 30/4 (1991), 395-415 – distinguishes between the paradigm of secularisation, on the one hand, and the critique of the paradigm of secularisation, on the other. I follow Pollack's and Pickel's model because Tschannen's binary distinction (often overlaid with 'European' versus 'American' sociology) mixes the arguments of secularisation theorists and the arguments of individualisation theorists into one paradigm. Thus, even explicit critics of the paradigm of secularisation are characterised as its proponents.

[2] Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2012). For the concept of paradigm, see esp. the introduction by Ian Hacking, ibid., xvii-xxv.

ways.[3] The consequence is that the proponents of secularisation criticise their opponents for their concepts and criteria as much as the proponents of de-secularisation criticise their opponents for their concepts and criteria. Discussion across paradigms can be delicate.

In this chapter, I shall apply Ernst Troeltsch's tripartite typology to the delicate discussion in the sociology of religion. Again, I employ a three-step structure: (1) I shall examine the concepts and criteria of those sociologists who perceive empirical data to support a process of secularisation – the paradigm of secularisation. (2) I shall examine the concepts and criteria of those sociologists who perceive empirical data to support a process of de-secularisation – the paradigm of pluralisation and the paradigm of individualisation. I shall argue that these three paradigms take the concepts of community in Troeltsch's tripartite typology as criteria for the evaluation of the development of religion: the paradigm of secularisation is rooted in Troeltsch's ecclesiasticism; pluralisation is rooted in Troeltsch's sectarianism; and individualisation is rooted in Troeltsch's mysticism. Considering that the Troeltschian types construe community through the neutralisation of alterity, I shall continue to argue that the defenders and the despisers of secularisation share a common concern – namely that alterity is a threat to religion, a threat which is to be neutralised through anthropoemic exclusion or anthropophagic inclusion of the other. Finally (3), I shall turn to the sociological study of plurality. Plurality is the cipher through which sociologists discuss the issue and the impact of alterity on religion. Exploring the central interpretations of plurality in the sociology of religion, I shall argue that alterity is

[3] The controversies stirred by the definition of religion excellently exemplify these differences. In the sociology of religion, representatives of a substantial definition of religion (as utilised in the paradigm of secularisation) and representatives of a functional definition of religion (as utilised in the paradigm of individualisation) are to be distinguished from representatives which combine elements of both definitions (as utilised in the paradigm of pluralisation). See Pickel, *Religionssoziologie*, 218-221, esp. the concise chart ibid., 218. Hence, the paradigms prefigure what can and what cannot count as religion.

not the problem but the solution to the problem of religion in modernity. Plurality is a *promise* rather than a *problem*.

My application of Troeltsch's typology to the sociology of religion comes with caveats. Since I am concerned with Christianity, I focus on the references to Christian rather than non-Christian religions in the three paradigms. Yet even with the focus on Christianity, the reference to 'the' paradigm of secularisation, 'the' paradigm of pluralisation, and 'the' paradigm of individualisation is simplifying: different theorists accentuate different theories differently. I have chosen Steve Bruce's account of the paradigm of secularisation, Laurence Iannaccone's account of the paradigm of pluralisation, and Grace Davie's account of the paradigm of individualisation. These three theorists are promising for my application of Troeltsch's typology to the sociology of religion, because they concentrate on the concept of community. Their concentration can be traced back to the discussion of Robert D. Putnam's *Bowling Alone.*

Putnam's study of the collapse of community caused considerable controversy in the sociology of religion. Essentially, he argued that communities, both religious and nonreligious, are collapsing because the impact of mass media on modernised and modernising societies increasingly inhibits face-to-face encounters.[4] Putnam's study was instantly integrated into the sociological paradigms, where it was interpreted either as support for the paradigm of secularisation or as support for the paradigms of de-secularisation.[5] Although 'community' was thus recognised as a core category in the

[4] Putnam, *Bowling Alone*, 277-287.

[5] See the articles by Steve Bruce, 'Praying Alone? Church-Going in Britain and the Putnam Thesis'; by Grace Davie, 'Praying Alone? Church-Going in Britain and Social Capital: A Reply to Steve Bruce'; and by Robin Gill, 'A Response to Steve Bruce's Praying Alone?', all of which appeared in *Journal for Contemporary Religion* 17/3 (2002), 317-328, 329-334, and 335-338. See also the succinct summary in Pickel, *Religionssoziologie*, 301-307.

sociology of religion, the instant integration of Putnam's argument into the three paradigms prevented sociologists from rethinking them. I shall explore the concepts of community implied in the three paradigms, concentrating on their accounts of the development of religion in Europe.[6] Troeltsch's tripartite typology is instructive for my exploration. It opens up the delicate discussion between the paradigms of secularisation, pluralisation, and individualisation.

1 The Diagnosis of Secularisation

Steve Bruce summarises the paradigm of secularisation as follows: 'it is assumed that all right thinking people are against it'.[7] Nonetheless, Bruce (right-thinking or not right-thinking) defends the paradigm against its despisers.[8] Although his seminal study, *God is Dead*,[9] might sound like a slogan for secularity or secularism, he stresses that the paradigm of secularisation it depicts has to be distinguished from the propagation of secularism.[10]

[6] I concentrate on Europe to allow for comparisons with Troeltsch's account of the development of religion. However, the issue of 'exceptionalism' is of interest to the sociology of religion. The despisers of the paradigm of secularisation argue that the European development of religion is exceptional, while the defenders of the paradigm of secularisation argue that the American development of religion is exceptional. See Grace Davie, *Europe: The Exceptional Case. Parameters of Faith in the Modern World* (Darton: Longman and Todd, 2002). However, as José Casanova pointedly puts it, 'When it comes to religion, there is no global rule', José Casanova, 'Rethinking Secularization', *The Hedgehog Review* Spring/Summer (2006), 17; see also his 'Beyond European and American Exceptionalism: Towards a Global Perspective', in *Predicting Religion: Christian, Secular and Alternative Futures*, ed. Grace Davie, Paul Heelas, and Linda Woodhead (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), 17-29.

[7] Steve Bruce, 'What the Secularization Paradigm Really Says', in *Religiosität in der säkularisierten Welt: Theoretische und empirische Beiträge zur Säkularisierungsdebatte in der Religionssoziologie*, ed. Manuel Franzman, Christel Gärtner, and Nicole Köck (Wiesbaden: VS-Verlag, 2006), 39.

[8] Bruce, *Secularization*, where Bruce takes on the paradigm of pluralisation (ibid., 141-176) and the paradigm of individualisation (ibid., 79-99).

[9] Steve Bruce, *God is Dead: Secularization in the West* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002).

[10] Ibid., 38-39.

The historical-cultural process of secularisation differs from the historical-cultural point of secularity and from the historical-cultural politics of secularism. And the paradigm of secularisation examines the *process* of secularisation. It explains why religion loses significance.[11] However, in order to measure the loss of significance, the paradigm requires a criterion. I shall argue that the paradigm of secularisation takes the concept of community which Troeltsch describes as *ecclesiasticism* as a criterion to distinguish between increases and decreases in the significance of religion.

The paradigm of secularisation plots the process of secularisation on macro-, meso-, and micro-sociological levels.[12] On all three levels, secularisation is considered a process of modernisation: the more modern a society is, the more secular it is; and the more secular a society is, the more modern it is. According to Bruce, the Reformation is crucial.[13] By dissolving Christianity into Christianities, it instigated or invigorated the processes of differentiation, pluralisation, and individualisation.[14]

On the macro-sociological level, the Reformation caused society to draw a distinction between religious and nonreligious realms, where the religious realm fulfils religious functions and the nonreligious realm fulfils nonreligious functions. Originally, the aim of the functional differentiation was to avoid war between the defenders of Protestantism and Catholicism. Differentiation kept religion out of politics and politics out

[11] Bruce, *Secularization*, 1-4.

[12] Karel Dobbelaere, *Secularization: An Analysis at Three Levels* (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2002) introduced the distinction between macro-, meso-, and micro-sociological secularisations. See also his summary, 'Towards an Integrated Perspective of the Processes Related to the Descriptive Concept of Secularization', *Sociology of Religion* 60/3 (1999), 229-247.

[13] Steve Bruce, *Religion in Modern Britain* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 4-7

[14] On Bruce's account, the processes of pluralisation and individualisation are rooted in the process of differentiation. See his 'Secularization Paradigm', 39-41. See also Pickel, *Religionssoziologie*, 164-172.

of religion.[15] But the process assumed a life of its own, differentiating a variety of societal subsystems such as education or economy from the influx of religion. The consequence of the process of differentiation is that Christianity loses control over society – a loss which could be characterised either negatively as 'extrusion' or positively as 'emancipation'.

On the meso-sociological level, the Reformation caused the pluralisation of Christianity. But if there are two Christianities, the adherents of this one condemning the adherents of that one to hell, Christianity loses plausibility. It becomes both disputable and disputed.[16] Bruce argues that the 'loss of state support', on the one hand, and the 'loss of social support', on the other, is a corollary of the pluralisation of Christianity.[17] Thus, the shift from the indisputable status to the disputable status is important for the process of secularisation: while religions in a mono-religious context can continuously confirm their systems of beliefs and behaviours, religions in a multi-religious context cannot – which ultimately 'calls into question the certainty that believers can accord their religion'.[18]

On the micro-sociological level, the Reformation caused the individualisation of Christianity. Bruce argues that the Reformers prioritised personal religion over communal religion; amplified by the Enlightenment, these priorities distorted the tradition and disrupted the transmission of Christianity.[19] He explains the 'impotence' of religion which

---

[15] Matthias Pohlig, 'Religionsfrieden als pax politica: Zum Verhältnis von Religion und Politik im konfessionellen Zeitalter', in *Umstrittene Säkularisierung: Soziologische und historische Analysen zur Differenzierung von Religion und Politik*, ed. Karl Gabriel, Christel Gärtner, and Detlef Pollack (Berlin: Berlin University Press, 2012), 225-241, points out that the promotion of peace is a crucial cause for the process of differentiation, although, historically, it is unclear who concluded when and why that religion ought not to be considered a cause of war anymore.

[16] The shift from a non-disputable to a disputable status is vital to Peter L. Berger's theorisation of the process of pluralisation as secularising and as de-secularising. Berger's theories will be discussed in detail below.

[17] Bruce, 'Secularization Paradigm', 41.

[18] Bruce, *God is Dead*, 17.

[19] Steve Bruce, 'Secularization and the Impotence of Individualized Religion', *The Hedgehog Review* Spring/Summer 2006, 35-45.

follows from the 'individualization' of religion when he argues that parents who 'believe that their children will go to hell if they do not follow in the one true way work extremely hard to socialise their children in the faith'.[20] Yet once 'the one true way' is individualised, even parents 'with an active faith continue with it till they die but each generation fails to recruit its children at the rate required to remain stable'.[21] Eventually, the system of beliefs and behaviours is so disintegrated that it cannot be transmitted from generation to generation – 'fuzzy fidelity'.[22] Nonetheless, Bruce baulks at the prognosis that secularisation ends in the point of secularity or in the politics of secularism.[23] Because of counter-trends in which religions such as Christianity are utilised to invigorate identity, it is more likely that remnants of religion survive in secularised and secularising societies.[24]

The paradigm of secularisation, then, plots a process which leads from the past significance of religion to the present insignificance of religion. Before the Reformation, Bruce argues, Christianity was thriving throughout Europe.[25] He portrays Christianity in the *Corpus Christianum* through concepts which resonate with Troeltsch's ecclesiasticism: Christianity is 'co-extensive' with both the religious and the nonreligious realm;[26] its 'authoritative world-view' connects church and culture;[27] and the connection between church and culture is objective rather than subjective – which is to say, it is independent of

[20] Bruce, 'Secularization Paradigm', 42.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Bruce, *Secularization*, 21-22, draws on David Voas, 'The Rise and Fall of Fuzzy Fidelity in Europe', *European Sociological Review* 25/2 (2009), 155-168.
[23] Bruce, *God is Dead*, 41-43.
[24] Ibid., 30-36, where Bruce explains counter-secularising trends in which religion is used to invigorate personal or communal constructions of identity.
[25] Bruce, *Religion in Modern Britain*, 1.
[26] Bruce, 'Secularization Paradigm', 43.
[27] Ibid.

believers and nonbelievers.[28] With recourse to Troeltsch's tripartite typology, Bruce summarises secularisation as a process which turns Christianity 'from cathedrals to cults'.[29] Hence, present and pluralised religion is '*parasitic*' on past and non-pluralised religion.[30] I am arguing that the criterion with which the paradigm of secularisation measures the development of religion is Troeltschian *ecclesiasticism*: whatever does not conform to ecclesiasticism is seen as secularising and whatever does conform to ecclesiasticism is seen as de-secularising. But for Troeltsch, ecclesiasticism was a matter of principle rather than a matter of practice. Ecclesiasticism (as I explained in Chapters 4 and 5) comes close to Bauman's chimera of community: it is a romanticisation of the *Corpus Christianum*. Incidentally, the idealisation of ecclesiasticism can be traced back to the Romantic Novalis who already argued that 'with the Reformation Christianity was done for'.[31] Against the romanticisation of religion, Troeltsch stresses that both sectarianism and mysticism belie the 'death certificates' which have been issued for Christianity since the Reformation.[32] His account of the Reformation is much more subtle and much more specific than is acknowledged in the interpretation of the Reformation as the point of departure for secularisation.[33]

---

[28] Bruce, *Religion in Modern Britain*, 1-28.

[29] Steve Bruce, *Religion in the Modern World: From Cathedrals to Cults* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).

[30] Steve Bruce, 'The Problems of Liberal Religion: A Sociologist's View', in *The Future of Liberal Theology*, 239 (my emphasis).

[31] Novalis, 'Christianity or Europe: A Fragment', in *The Early Political Writings of the German Romantics* , ed. Frederick C. Beiser (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 67. For a succinct summary, see Lauster, *Die Verzauberung*, 474-476.

[32] EM, 263, translation altered. See WM, 327.

[33] Lori Pearson, 'Ernst Troeltsch and Contemporary Discourses of Secularization', *Journal for the History of Modern Theology* 19/2 (2012), 173-192.

To the outrage of past and present theologians,[34] Troeltsch characterises the Reformation as 'a modification of Catholicism', countering the narratives which plot it as a radical rupture towards modernity[35] – narratives which entail either an uncritically negative assessment or an uncritically positive assessment of the Reformation, depending on the narrator's view of modernity. For Troeltsch, whose account is confirmed by Charles Taylor, the central ecclesiological concepts of both Protestantism and Catholicism are ecclesiasticist.[36] Thus, Troeltsch distinguishes pre-Enlightenment Protestantism from post-Enlightenment Protestantism to point out that the *Enlightenment* instigated the processes of modernisation.[37] Hence, Protestantism requires the Enlightenment for its modernisation.

According to what Hans Joas terms the 'Troeltsch thesis', the turn from objective religion to subjective religion is what the Reformation contributed to the processes of modernisation.[38] But this turn – Joas characterises it as a 'religious' rather than a 'nonreligious' 'individualization'[39] – is *neither* the cause *nor* the consequence of secularisation. For Troeltsch, the Reformation has *not* caused the end of Christianity. He argues that the movements of sectarianism and mysticism are part and parcel of ecclesiasticism.[40] While the comprehensive church of the *Corpus Christianum* confined

---

[34] See Friedrich Wilhelm Graf, 'Einleitung', in HP, 12-13.

[35] PP, 41: 'The point of primary importance is that, historically and theologically regarded, Protestantism ... was, in the first place, simply a modification of Catholicism, in which the Catholic formulation of the problems was retained, while a different answer was given to them'. In German, Troeltsch refers to 'Umbildung' (BP, 32).

[36] Taylor, *Varieties of Religion Today*, 72; *A Secular Age*, 449.

[37] The distinction between pre-Enlightenment Protestantism (*Altprotestantismus*) and post-Enlightenment Protestantism (*Neuprotestantismus*) is essentially ecclesiological: pre-Enlightenment Protestantism cannot accept a secular state, post-Enlightenment Protestantism can. PP, 34-40, 87-101.

[38] Hans Joas, *Glaube als Option: Zukunftsmöglichkeiten des Christentums* (Freiburg: Herder, 2012), 91, ET: *Faith as an Option: Possible Futures for Christianity*, trans. Alex Skinner (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014), 53.

[39] Ibid. To recall, Troeltsch distinguishes between a religious and a nonreligious process of individualisation: the religious one comes with, and the nonreligious one comes without, a connection to community.

[40] SL, 230-231.

sectarianist and mysticist tendencies, the turn from the objective to the subjective released these tendencies from the church's confinement. It triggered the emancipation of the sectarianist and the mysticist movement from the comprehensive church of ecclesiasticism. Hence, according to Troeltsch, the Reformation implies changes in the conditions for the construction of community.[41]

Troeltsch traces these changes back to the core characteristic of the Reformation which he finds in Martin Luther's concept of grace.[42] Luther turned grace from the externally objective to the internally subjective.[43] Grace is thus not found in relation to God's church, but in relation to God.[44] For Troeltsch, Luther retrieves the practice of Jesus for the reconstruction of church.[45] The turn to the transcendent, which (as argued above in Chapter 4) characterises the practice of Jesus, engenders relations to both the finite other and the infinite other.[46] Luther's return to Jesus, then, implies not the *replacement* of church, but the *reform* of church: the 're-transformation (*Zurückverwandlung*)' of what could be called a 'Christianity of Church' into what could be called a 'Christianity of Christ'.[47] What the 'individualization' of the 'Troeltsch thesis' implies, then, is that Luther

[41] The fact that the Reformation changed the conditions for the construction of community is reflected by Haight's *Christian Community in History*. His account of the Reformation shifts the methodology of his history of ecclesiology from 'Historical Ecclesiology' in volume 1 to 'Comparative Ecclesiology' in volume 2.
[42] SL, 431, 436-437.
[43] SL, 437-438.
[44] SL, 440.
[45] Ibid. For Troeltsch, Martin Luther represents one of the historical 'hubs (*Knotenpunkte*)' (SL, 211) in which the religious realm changed the nonreligious realm. See also NR, 212; and SL, 432-433.
[46] SL, 441.
[47] SL, 450.

returns to the interrelation of the relation to the finite other with the relation to the infinite other – a return 'which does not mean that he gives up the idea of a universal church'.[48]

To summarise, Bruce's paradigm of secularisation is propagating neither secularity nor secularism.[49] It measures how religion loses significance in a process of secularisation. But the measurement is rooted in the criterion of ecclesiasticism: what does not correspond to ecclesiasticism is secularising, what does correspond to ecclesiasticism is de-secularising. As a consequence, Bruce takes the Reformation as a point of departure to plot the process of secularisation. For Troeltsch, however, ecclesiasticism is complemented and countered by the movements of sectarianism and mysticism throughout history. Why, then, should the development of religion be measured with the criterion of ecclesiasticism?

2 The Diagnosis of De-Secularisation

Troeltsch's account of the adaptability of Christianity prevented him from the conceptualisation of a fully-fledged theory of secularisation (which permeated much of the research of his contemporaries). For Troeltsch, both sectarianism and mysticism demonstrate how Christianity has reacted to the changed and changing conditions for constructing community after the Enlightenment. I shall argue that the critique of the paradigm of secularisation resonates with Troeltsch's typology: in the paradigm of pluralisation, *sectarianism* is taken as a criterion to measure the development of religion; in

[48] Haight, *Christian Community in History*, vol. 2: 'Comparative Ecclesiology', 65. See also the detailed discussion of Luther's ecclesiology in ibid., 13-69.

[49] Bruce's account of the paradigm of secularisation is characteristic for the current concepts of secularisation in sociology of religion. Historically, however, sociologists have claimed to emancipate society from Christianity, a *prescriptive* rather than a *descriptive* claim which can be traced back to Auguste Comte.

the paradigm of individualisation, *mysticism* is taken as a criterion to measure the development of religion.

The process of differentiation is assumed by the defenders and the despisers of the paradigm of secularisation alike.[50] Hence, the differentiation of religious and nonreligious realms has been unanimously accepted as a central condition for religion in modernised and modernising societies by all the paradigms which characterise the sociology of religion today.[51] The differences between the paradigms of secularisation, pluralisation, and individualisation, then, are not located on the macro-sociological level. Rather, both the meso- and micro-sociological conclusions which are drawn from the process of functional differentiation are stirring controversy. I shall examine the paradigm of pluralisation and the paradigm of individualisation in turn in order to explore these controversies.

Pluralisation

The paradigm of pluralisation takes 'commodification' and 'competition' as its core categories.[52] For Laurence Iannaccone, religion *is* a commodity – a commodity which is

[50] See Philip S. Gorski, 'Historicizing the Secularization Debate: Church, State and Society in Late Medieval and Early Modern Europe ca. 1300 to 1700', *American Sociological Review* 65 (2000), 138-167, who conceives of differentiation as the core category of both the paradigm of secularisation and the paradigm of pluralisation. He argues that both paradigms could be combined. See also Philip S. Gorski, 'Historicizing the Secularization Debate: An Agenda for Research', *Handbook of the Sociology of Religion*, ed. Michele Dillon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 110-122. Gorski works with a binary model which moulds the paradigm of individualisation into the paradigm of secularisation.

[51] Joas problematises the concept of differentiation. In 'Gefährliche Prozessbegriffe: Eine Warnung vor der Rede von Differenzierung, Rationalisierung und Modernisierung', in *Umstrittene Säkularisierung*, 603-622, he points out that the concept implies a secularism which confines religion to a religious as opposed to a nonreligious sphere. Religion, however, claims relevance in each and every sphere. Joas calls for a historicisation of the concept of differentiation in order to expose it to alternatives. See also Joas, *Faith as an Option*, 67-72.

[52] Laurence Iannaccone, 'The Consequences of Religious Market Structure: Adam Smith and the Economics of Religion', *Rationality and Society* 3 (1991), 158.

examined through economics: 'Voodoo Economics' as he puts it.[53] Taken together, the production and the consumption of the commodity of religion form a 'religious market that – like other markets – tends towards a steady-state equilibrium'.[54] Competition triggers the vitality of those religions which are traded on the market because it forces producers to create and cultivate products which are desired by consumers. Through these products, the consumers' religion is invigorated or even instigated.[55] Accordingly, the paradigm of pluralisation plots a story in which the consequences of pluralisation are de-secularising rather than secularising.

On the macro-sociological level, the comprehensive church of the *Corpus Christianum* is interpreted as a curse to religion. A pioneer of the paradigm of pluralisation, Rodney Stark, puts it the following way: 'Everyone "knows" that once upon a time the world was pious... But, like so many once-upon-a-time tales, this conception of a pious past is mere nostalgia'.[56] Stark argues that ecclesiasticism settled for conformity without conversion.[57] But the Reformation provoked the church to convert Christians to either this Christianity or that Christianity. The Reformation, then, slowly but surely created a market of religions.[58]

The significance of the market is seen on the meso-sociological level. Iannaccone assumes that the demand for religion has remained constant throughout history.[59] But

---

[53] Laurence Iannaccone, 'Voodoo Economics: Reviewing the Rational Choice Approach to Religion', *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 34 (1995), 76-88.
[54] Ibid., 77. See also Laurence Iannaccone, 'Religious Markets and the Economics of Religion', *Social Compass* 39 (1992), 123-131.
[55] Because of its concentration on the supply-side, the paradigm of pluralisation is repeatedly referred to as 'supply-side approach'. See Pickel, *Religionssoziologie*, 198-217.
[56] Rodney Stark, 'Secularization R. I. P.', *Sociology of Religion* 60/3 (1999), 255.
[57] Ibid., 260. See Iannaccone, 'Voodoo Economics', 84-85
[58] See the critique by Bruce, *God is Dead*, 45-59.
[59] Iannaccone, 'Voodoo Economics', 77.

whether the demand is or is not actualised depends on the intensity of the competition on the market of religions. It is the task of the producers to turn it from a potential into a potent demand: producers stimulate the desire of consumers in order to satisfy it through their products. Freed from regulation, the market plies a plurality of producers and products, creating competition.[60] Competition between producers allows the market to provoke both the stimulation and the satisfaction of demand.[61] Therefore, Iannaccone argues, the European market (characterised by states regulating churches) leads to the devitalisation of religion, whereas the American market (characterised by states not regulating churches) leads to the vitalisation of religion.[62] The paradigm of pluralisation, then, implies the application of 'liberal' or 'neo-liberal' economics to the sociology of religion[63] – which is to say: regulation inhibits competition, deregulation invigorates competition.[64]

On the micro-sociological level, the economic analysis of religion results in the emphasis on 'exchange' between the creature and the creator which is interpreted as the core to the practice of religion: the created 'customer' offers to the creator and the creator offers to the created 'customer': *do ut des*.[65] Both 'sacrifice and stigma' are accepted in the

[60] See Rodney Stark and Laurence Iannaccone, 'A Supply-Side Reinterpretation of the "Secularization" of Europe', *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religio*n 33/3 (1994), 232. Here, Rodney Stark modifies his theory of religion which initially assumed that markets tend towards monopolisation. See William S. Bainbridge and Rodney Stark, *A Theory of Religion* (New York: Peter Lang, 1987).

[61] Laurence Iannaccone, 'Religious Practice: A Human Capital Approach', *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 29/3 (1990), 297-314.

[62] Laurence Iannaccone, 'Extremism and the Economics of Religion', *The Economic Record* 88 (2012), 111.

[63] Iannaccone traces his approach back to Adam Smith. See Iannaccone, 'The Consequences', 156-177.

[64] See the empirical explorations by Stark and Iannaccone, 'A Supply-Side Reinterpretation of the "Secularization" of Europe'; and by Laurence Iannaccone, Roger Finke, and Rodney Stark, 'Deregulating Religion', *Economic Inquiry* 35/2 (1997), 350-364.

[65] Laurence Iannaccone, Colleen Haight, and Jared Rubin, 'Lessons from Delphi: Religious Markets and Spiritual Capitals', *Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization* 77/3 (2011), 326-338.

exchange in which the customer aims for eschatological compensation.[66] The choice of the customer is vital.[67] If there is no choice, the producers of religion become more and more indifferent to the desires of their customers which is why the customers turn their backs to the product of religion, sliding from what is religious to what is nonreligious.

The paradigm of pluralisation, then, turns the paradigm of secularisation inside-out. Since the process of pluralisation is a condition for competition, the paradigm announces not the death of religion, but the death of the death of religion: 'Secularization R. I. P.'.[68] However, like the paradigm of secularisation, the paradigm of pluralisation requires a criterion to measure de-secularisation. What is the criterion with which the paradigm of pluralisation works?

In critical conversation with Troeltsch, Iannaccone examined the significance of community for the paradigm of pluralisation.[69] As his answers to 'Why strict churches are strong?' suggest, the paradigm is rooted in a community which separates insiders and outsiders in order to invigorate competition.[70] To explain the success of the strict church, Iannaccone distinguishes between religious and nonreligious commodities. Following religious norms, a consumer can earn religious commodities; following nonreligious norms, a consumer can earn nonreligious commodities.[71] However, if these norms are non-

---

[66] Laurence Iannaccone, 'Sacrifice and Stigma: Reducing Free-Riding in Cults, Communes and Other Collectives', *Journal of Political Economy* 100/2 (1992), 271-291.

[67] Iannaccone, 'Voodoo Economics', 77.

[68] Stark, 'Secularization R. I. P.'. See also the contributions to *The Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Religion* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), ed. Rachel M. McCleary, esp. the editor's introduction, 'The Economics of Religion as a Field of Enquiry', 3-38.

[69] See Laurence Iannaccone, 'A Formal Model of Church and Sect', *American Journal of Sociology* 94 (1988), 241-268, where he attempts to replace the typology of ecclesiasticism and mysticism with a theory of ecclesiasticism and sectarianism.

[70] Laurence Iannaccone, 'Why Strict Churches are Strong', *American Journal of Sociology* 99 (1994), 1180-1211. See also the response to his critics, Laurence Iannaccone, 'Strictness and Strength Revisited', *American Journal of Sociology* 101 (1996), 1103-1108.

[71] Iannaccone, 'Why Strict Churches are Strong', 1183-1184.

identical, the consumer faces a 'trade-off': investing here implies loss there and investing there implies loss here.[72] In the consumer's trade-off, churches with a clear-cut inside-outside distinction 'out-compete' churches without a clear-cut inside-outside distinction because a separation of insiders and outsiders screens out 'free-riders'. Free-riders are those who gain from the collective commodity of religion without giving to the collective commodity of religion.[73] If these free riders were let into the community, the commodity would lose value. Hence, the demand for sacrifice and stigma which belongs to sectarianism rather than ecclesiasticism is what makes the strict church strong.[74] Thus, I am arguing that the criterion with which the paradigm of pluralisation measures the development of religion is Troeltschian *sectarianism*:[75] whatever does not conform to sectarianism is seen as secularising and whatever does conform to sectarianism is seen as de-secularising.[76]

Individualisation

The paradigm of individualisation rests on Thomas Luckmann's critique of the paradigm of secularisation. In *The Invisible Religion*, Luckmann argues that the paradigm of secularisation identifies religion with the institutional rather than the individual

[72] Iannaccone, 'A Formal Model', 249.

[73] Iannaccone, 'Why Strict Churches are Strong', 1186-1188. See also Iannaccone, 'Sacrifice and Stigma', 271-291.

[74] Iannaccone, 'Extremism and the Economics of Religion', 113.

[75] Iannaccone also allows for the notion of mysticism which he, expectedly, explains economically. Because 'religions are risky', '"religious investors" will be tempted to diversify their own religious portfolios, devoting their time and money to a variety of different religions'. For him, sectarianism is a predominantly 'Western' type of religion, while mysticism is a predominantly 'Eastern' type of religion. Iannaccone, 'Voodoo Economics', 81. However, for the paradigm of pluralisation, sectarianism is crucial.

[76] In as much as ecclesiasticism and sectarianism might be characterised as type and anti-type, the paradigm of secularisation and the paradigm of pluralisation might be characterised as paradigm and counter-paradigm. See the comprehensive critique by Steve Bruce, *Choice and Religion: A Critique of Rational Choice Theory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). For Bruce, the shift from ecclesiasticism to sectarianism is not sidestepping secularisation. Instead, it is a step *in* the process of secularisation.

manifestations of religion – which is to say, with churches.[77] However, the process of individualisation, which is part and parcel of modernisation, makes institutions increasingly irrelevant: with the advent of modernity, the subject is deprived or relieved (depending on one's point of view) of institutional norms. When individualisation hits religion, it is not the individual religion but the institutional religion which loses significance.[78]

Accordingly, the paradigm of individualisation aims to analyse a 'metamorphosis' or a 'mutation' of religion from the public to the private which makes religion invisible to the sociologist who looks for it in churches. Luckmann admits that the individualisation of religion shrinks experiences of the transcendent from a maximum to a minimum,[79] which is why his study is interpreted from time to time as a conception rather than a critique of secularisation.[80] Luckmann, however, would criticise such interpretations. For him, secularisation is 'a modern myth'.[81]

Drawing on Luckmann,[82] Grace Davie has adopted and adapted the distinction between individual religion and institutional religion. She agrees with the proponents of the paradigm of secularisation and the proponents of the paradigm of pluralisation in her

---

[77] Thomas Luckmann, *The Invisible Religion*.

[78] According to the characterisation of the experience of transcendence which I articulated in Chapters 1 to 3 above, the (Jamesian) distinction Luckmann draws between individual and institutional religion is dubious. For Luckmann, community and religiosity are correlated anti-proportionally rather than proportionally.

[79] See the typology of transcendences in Luckmann, *Die Unsichtbare Religion*, 166-171. See also Thomas Luckmann, 'Shrinking Transcendence – Expanding Religion?', *Sociological Analysis* 51/2 (1990), 127-138.

[80] José Casanova, *Public Religions in the Modern World* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1994), 35-37, argues that Luckmann 'radicalizes' the theory of secularisation. Casanova is interested in the de-privatisation rather than the privatisation of religion. For his convincing critique of Luckmann, it is irrelevant whether Luckmann's concept of the turn of religion from the public to the private is or is not characterised as secularisation. See also Casanova, 'Rethinking Secularization: A Global Comparative Perspective', 18-19, where he argues that his concept of de-privatisation holds for the macro- and the meso-sociological level, while Luckmann's concept of privatisation holds for the micro-sociological level.

[81] Thomas Luckmann, 'Säkularisierung – ein moderner Mythos', in *Lebenswelt und Gesellschaft: Grundstrukturen und geschichtliche Wandlungen* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1980), 161-172. See also the critique by Pollack, *Säkularisierung – ein moderner Mythos?*.

[82] For Davie's assessment of Luckmann, see her entries 'Luckmann, Thomas' and 'Invisible Religion' in *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Society*, ed. William H. Swatos, Jr. (London: Sage, 1998), 275-276 and 238-239. See also Davie, *The Sociology of Religion*, 38, 53-54.

analysis of the macro-sociological level. Yet she argues that the functional differentiation of society into religious and nonreligious realms inspired a mutation of religion on meso- and micro-sociological levels. What follows from the mutation are 'two religious economies'[83] which could be characterised with the slogans of 'believing without belonging' and 'belonging without believing'. For Davie the combination of these economies points to the 'persistent paradox' of religion.[84]

With 'believing without belonging', Davie argues that the connection between one's religious believing and one's religious belonging is not as clear-cut as the paradigm of secularisation assumes. Accordingly, a loss of belonging is not necessarily a loss of believing.[85] Here, she effectively restates Luckmann's argument. Drawing on empirical explorations in the United Kingdom, Davie points to persons who would claim to have had experiences of transcendence. These persons might or might not attend church: religion can be lived both inside and outside churches.[86] Davie goes so far as to argue that, empirically, believing and belonging are not *proportionally* but *anti-proportionally* related – the more one believes, the less one belongs and the more one belongs, the less one believes.[87] However, in response to critique,[88] she retracted from her strikingly strong statement, admitting that the correlation between increase in believing and decrease in belonging

[83] Grace Davie, 'Religion in Europe in the 21st Century: The Factors to Take into Account', *European Journal of Sociology* 47/2 (2006), 293.
[84] For a summary, see Grace Davie, *Religion in Britain: A Persistent Paradox* (Chichester: Blackwell, 2015), 71-90.
[85] Grace Davie, *Religion in Britain since 1945: Believing without Belonging* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994).
[86] Ibid., 83.
[87] See Davie, *Europe*, 8.
[88] See Pollack, *Rückkehr des Religiösen?*, 45-46.

holds for what she calls 'creedal religion endorsed by the churches'.[89] For religions which are not endorsed by the churches, however, she admits 'I am much less sure'.[90]

With 'belonging without believing', Davie argues for the significance of what she calls 'vicarious religion'.[91] The concept captures the crucial connection between the enthusiastically believing minority inside churches (not necessarily clerical) and the less enthusiastically believing majority outside churches (not necessarily non-clerical) in a society.[92] By practising religion in churches, the minority keeps religion on life-support for the majority. Hence, the minority is interpreted to believe 'on behalf of' the majority'.[93] The majority approves of the life-support through the minority. Their approval is what Davie calls 'vicarious religion': the majority believes *vicariously* through the minority.

The paradigm of individualisation, then, turns the paradigm of secularisation inside-out. Modernisation is not secularising but individualising religion. Religion mutates: it is found outside churches rather than inside churches. Nonetheless, churches are still significant: in the background of both believers and nonbelievers, they keep Christianity alive. However, like the paradigm of secularisation, the paradigm of individualisation requires a criterion to diagnose de-secularisation. What is the criterion with which the paradigm of individualisation works?

---

[89] Davie 'Religion in Europe', 276.

[90] Ibid. In 'Let Theology and Sociology Interact!', *Ecclesiology* 10 (2014), 362-371, Davie goes even further: 'I have moved away from the notion of "believing without belonging" as an organizing principle, favouring instead the idea of "vicarious religion".' (ibid., 364).

[91] Strictly speaking, Davie does not use the slogan 'belonging without believing'. It was coined by her colleague and companion Danièle Hervieu-Léger, 'Religion und sozialer Zusammenhalt in Europa', *Transit: Europäische Revue* 26 (2004), 101-119.

[92] Grace Davie, *Religion in Modern Europe: A Memory Mutates* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 59-60.

[93] Davie, 'Religion in Europe', 277. The critics of the concept argue that it is applicable to the integrated culture of the past, but not to the disintegrated culture of the present. See Steve Bruce and David Voas, 'Vicarious Religion: An Examination and Critique', *Journal of Contemporary Religion* 25/2 (2010), 243-259. See also the rejoinder by Grace Davie, 'Vicarious Religion: A Response', *Journal of Contemporary Religion* 25/2 (2010), 261-266.

Although Davie has not elaborated on Troeltsch's tripartite typology,[94] her characterisation of communities which keep religion alive comes close to Troeltsch's mysticism. These communities, Davie argues, emerge from time to time because the coincidence of believing and belonging is not continuous. To create sporadic coincidences of believing and belonging, Davie contends, communities have to concentrate on 'experiential' religion.[95] With 'experience', she loosely labels emotional events in which 'the abnormal becomes normal'.[96] These experiences are vital for both economies of religion, 'believing without belonging' and 'belonging without believing', because they create appreciation for community. The community, then, revolves around experiences without compulsory forms of expression. It revolves around what Davie calls 'the "feel-good" factor'.[97] Seeking what feels good, one can choose this community today and that community tomorrow which is why the boundaries between the insiders and the outsiders of the community are blurred.[98] Thus, I am arguing that the criterion with which the paradigm of individualisation measures the development of religion is Troeltschian *mysticism*: whatever does not conform to mysticism is seen as secularising and whatever does conform to mysticism is seen as de-secularising.

---

[94] However, Danièle Hervieu-Léger, 'Individualism, the Validation of Faith, and the Social Nature of Religion in Modernity', in *The Blackwell Companion to the Sociology of Religion*, ed. Richard K. Fenn (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), 161-175, distinguishes three types of religious validation which she connects to Troeltsch's typology in order to assess the contemporary de-institutionalisation of religion. Thus, she applies Troeltsch's typology to the paradigm of individualisation.

[95] Grace Davie, 'Belief and Unbelief: Two Sides of a Coin', *Approaching Religion* 2/1 (2012), 5. For the significance of experience, see also Davie, *Religion in Britain: A Persistent Paradox*, 20, 164, 168.

[96] Davie, 'Vicarious Religion', 265. For the concentration on emotionality, see Davie, 'Belief and Unbelief', 5.

[97] Davie 'Religion in Europe', 284.

[98] Davie, 'The Persistence of Institutional Religion in Modern Europe', in *Peter Berger and the Study of Religion*, ed. Linda Woodhead (London: Routledge, 2001), 105. See also the exploration of the consequences of the state-church system in Scandinavia in Grace Davie, 'From Obligation to Consumption: A Framework for Reflection in Northern Europe', *Political Theology* 6/3 (2005), 281-301.

To summarise, I have examined how the development of religion is measured in the three paradigms which currently characterise the sociology of religion: secularisation, pluralisation, and individualisation. Like any measurement, the measurement of religion requires a criterion which determines when religion is developing positively (which is to say, when it is thriving) and when religion is developing negatively (which is to say, when it is not thriving). I have conveyed that the criteria in the three paradigms coincide with the concepts of community in Troeltsch's tripartite typology. The paradigm of secularisation takes the concept of community which Troeltsch characterised as ecclesiasticism as its criterion for measuring religion. Religion is thriving in communities of unity and uniformity – communities which allow neither for openness nor for otherness. But Troeltsch already alluded to the fact that such a concept of community might be aetiological: it is never present, but a projection into the past which explains the present.

Troeltsch's critique of the interpretation of the Reformation as a radical rupture towards modernity is echoed by the critics of the paradigm of secularisation: the proponents of the paradigm of pluralisation and the proponents of the paradigm of individualisation. The paradigm of pluralisation takes the concept of community which Troeltsch characterised as sectarianism as its criterion. Religion is thriving in communities which are created through the separation of insiders and outsiders, communities which recognise otherness without openness. The paradigm of individualisation takes the concept of community which Troeltsch characterised as mysticism as its criterion. Religion is thriving in communities which are rooted in the combination of insiders and outsiders, communities which recognise openness without otherness. My exploration of the paradigms of secularisation, pluralisation, and individualisation, then, has shown that the

sociology of religion operates *normatively* since the paradigms evaluate the development of religion according to their respective norms.

Transposing the norms from the implicit to the explicit, I have described how the 'measurement' of the development of religion depends on the respective paradigms. If the paradigmatic criterion is set as ecclesiasticism, the past is more religious than the present: hence secularisation. If the paradigmatic criterion is set as either sectarianism or mysticism, the present is more religious than the past: hence de-secularisation. However, my point is not *that* criteria are applied to the measurement of religion, but *which* criteria are applied to the measurement of religion. To recall the conclusions of Chapters 4 and 5: the concepts of community in Troeltsch's tripartite typology construe community through the attack on alterity. Ecclesiasticism is marked by the absence of alterity; and whereas sectarianism instrumentalises the other for the anthropoemic bonding of a homogeneous community (otherness without openness), mysticism instrumentalises the other for the anthropophagic bridging of a heterogeneous community (openness without otherness). What is at stake when these concepts of community are taken as criteria in the sociology of religion is whether religion – in my case, Christianity – is understood through appreciation of or attack on alterity. Despite their differences, the paradigms of secularisation, pluralisation, and individualisation all assume that the exposure to the otherness of the other is a problem for religion. Thus, these paradigms counter the notion of a togetherness of trust in which the relation to the finite other interrelates with the relation to the infinite other. What, then, is the other – a problem or a promise?

3 The Cost of Community

In the sociology of religion, alterity is discussed through the cipher of plurality, because plurality – the multiplication of religious and nonreligious options to choose from – follows from the exposure to the other. Plurality is the core concern of Peter L. Berger, whose life-long study of religion revolves around the puzzle of pluralisation.[99] He shifted from an interpretation of plurality as secularising to an interpretation of plurality as both secularising and de-secularising. This shift makes his studies particularly promising to assess the interpretation of alterity in the sociology of religion.[100] Exploring both Berger's theories and the critique of Berger's theories, I shall argue that alterity is a promise rather than a problem for Christianity. Christian community, then, cannot be constructed at the cost of the other.

In *The Many Altars of Modernity: Toward a Paradigm for Religion in a Pluralist Age*, published in 2015, Berger ties together his studies of pluralisation.[101] He argues that modernisation produces a 'social situation' in which ways of life – a variety of religious as well as nonreligious ways of life – come into contact.[102] Modernity, then, comes with two

[99] See the contributions to *Peter Berger and the Study of Religion* for an overview of his oeuvre, esp. Linda Woodhead, 'Introduction', 1-8.
[100] See the comprehensive (albeit critical) account by Steve Bruce, 'The Curious Case of the Unnecessary Recantation', in *Peter Berger and the Study of Religion*, 87-100.
[101] Peter L. Berger, *The Many Altars of Modernity: Toward A Paradigm for Religion in A Pluralist Age* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2015).
[102] Ibid.

pluralities: it puts religion in contact with different religious and nonreligious ways of life.[103] Yet what are the consequences of these pluralities?

Initially, Berger argued that plurality erodes religion.[104] He coined the concept of the 'heretical imperative' to account for this erosion: αἵρεσις refers to 'the choice' or to 'the chosen'.[105] In as much as modernisation evokes the pluralisation of choices – which is to say, plurality – it leads to secularisation. Berger's heretical imperative identifies the significance of choice along the lines of Troeltsch's types of sectarianism and mysticism. If perceived from the perspective of ecclesiasticism, both are heresies – choices of heterodoxy over orthodoxy. According to Berger, a choice cannot alleviate the contingency which is connected to the pluralisation of options: once one has chosen a way of life, one is conscious of the fact that one could have chosen otherwise or that one should have chosen otherwise. 'Thus various forms of interaction with different worldviews ... initiate a process of relativization.'[106]

Troeltsch argues that Christians have maintained their choice on the cost of the other either through the sectarianist or through the mysticist construction of community, in which alterity is neutralised. By contrast, Berger focuses on the articulation or re-articulation of arguments for the choice of Christianity. Under the conditions of plurality,

---

[103] According to Berger, for the practitioner of a religion, the impact of nonreligious plurality is identical to the impact of religious plurality. Hence, in my account, I shall not distinguish between two pluralities. Moreover, for the sake of simplicity, Berger refers to 'pluralism' rather than 'plurality'. He notes: 'I had to keep explaining what I was talking about' (ibid., 1). Since Berger admits that 'plurality' would be the correct concept for the phenomenon which he has in mind, I have chosen to refer to 'plurality' rather than 'pluralism' throughout.

[104] Peter L. Berger, *The Sacred Canopy: Elements of A Sociological Theory of Religion* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1967), 105-174.

[105] Peter L. Berger, *The Heretical Imperative: Contemporary Possibilities of Religious Affirmation* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1979).

[106] Berger, *The Many*, 3. Berger coined the concept of 'plausibility structure' by which he means 'the social context in which any cognitive or normative definition of reality is plausible' (ibid., 31). He argues that mono-religious contexts confirm their religion while multi-religious contexts corrode their religion.

faith has to be affirmed; arguments for the choice of this faith in contrast to the choice of that faith need to be articulated. Berger traces these argumentative affirmations throughout the history of theology, pinpointing 'deductive', 'reductive', and 'inductive' theological trajectories.[107] Although these trajectories allow theologians to contain the cognitively corrosive consequences of contingency, the erosion of faith cannot be checked completely. 'The management of doubt becomes a problem for every religious tradition.'[108] Therefore, pluralisation is what links modernisation and secularisation.

However, Berger has developed doubts about the link between modernisation and secularisation.[109] These doubts have led him to switch from a linear theory of secularisation to a non-linear theory of secularisation and de-secularisation.[110] Although he still assumes that choice is cognitively corrosive for religions,[111] Berger admits that he has misconceived the relation between modernisation, pluralisation, and secularisation.[112] Pluralisation cannot link modernisation to secularisation because plurality can have *either* secularising *or* de-secularising consequences. Berger hints at these consequences when he writes about the pluralisation as well as the individualisation of faith. These hints have been taken up by those who criticise the paradigm of secularisation which I have already analysed: the concept of a religious market, which is important for the paradigm of pluralisation, can be

[107] Ibid. For Berger, the inductive option is exemplified by Friedrich Schleiermacher, the deductive option is exemplified by Karl Barth, and the reductive option is exemplified by Rudolf Bultmann. Berger himself sides with Schleiermacher.

[108] Berger, *The Many*, 32. However, Berger's point could be expanded: plurality is a problem for every religious and for every nonreligious tradition.

[109] These doubts can be traced back to Peter L. Berger, *Religion in a Revolutionary Society* (Washington D.C.: American Institute for Public Policy Research, 1974), 16-17. See also Berger, *The Many*, 19-21.

[110] Peter L. Berger, 'The Desecularization of the World: A Global Overview', in *The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics*, ed. Peter L. Berger (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1999), 1-18.

[111] Peter L. Berger, 'Dialogue between Religious Traditions in an Age of Relativity', in Peter L. Berger, *Dialog zwischen religiösen Traditionen in einem Zeitalter der Relativität* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2011), 14.

[112] Peter L. Berger, 'Postscript', in *Peter Berger and the Study of Religion*, 194.

traced back to Berger, while the concept of a religious mutation, which is important for the paradigm of individualisation, can be traced back to Berger and Luckmann.[113]

In *The Many Altars of Modernity*, Berger proposes 'a paradigm for religion in a pluralist age' in which religious and nonreligious ways of life can be practised *sequentially*: when I do this (say, going to the circus), I am primarily nonreligious; when I do that (say, going to the church), I am primarily religious.[114] But the space which both 'individuals' and 'institutions' allocate to the religious way of life, on the one hand, and to the nonreligious way of life, on the other, has to be negotiated.[115] In these negotiations individuals and institutions are connected: what occurs on an individual level impacts the institution and vice versa.[116] Examining these negotiations and re-negotiations, Berger concludes, the sociology of religion ought to operate with the notion of an 'interplay of secularizing and de-secularizing forces'[117] to account for the fact that today's societies are 'as furiously religious as ever'.[118]

However, how can one assess Berger's move from a linear theory of secularisation to a non-linear theory of secularisation and de-secularisation? Reflecting on Berger's move,

[113] See Peter L. Berger, 'A Market Model for the Analysis of Ecumenicity', *Social Research* 30 (1963), 77-93. For the significance of his collaboration with Luckmann, see Davie, *The Sociology of Religion*, 53-54.
[114] Berger, *The Many*, 57. In her response to Berger, Nancy T. Ammerman, 'Modern Altars in Everyday Life', in ibid., 94-110, argues that religious and nonreligious worldviews might even be mixed; they can be held simultaneously rather than sequentially.
[115] See Berger, *The Many*, Chapter 2 on 'individuals' (ibid., 17-33) and Chapter 3 on 'institutions' (ibid., 34-50).
[116] Ibid. 60.
[117] Berger, 'The Desecularization of the World', 7.
[118] Ibid., 2. See also Berger, *The Many*, 1-16.

sociologists opt either for the 'linear Berger' against the 'non-linear Berger' or for the 'non-linear Berger' against the 'linear Berger'.[119] Hans Joas, however, opts against both.

In a seminal study, 'Religion in the Age of Contingency', Joas criticises Berger for both of his theories.[120] Joas is neither historically nor systematically convinced by Berger's arguments. Historically, Berger overemphasises the difference between the non-pluralised past and the pluralised present. He falls for the chimera of a comprehensive church in the *Corpus Christianum*.[121] And, systematically, Berger overemphasises the cognitive corrosion which is provoked by the contingency of choice. As analysed above in Chapter 3, for Joas, religious and nonreligious faiths are rooted in experiences of self-transcendence.[122] These experiences are not experiences of choice but experiences of being chosen. Hence, Joas criticises the ubiquitous application of the concept of choice in the sociology of religion.[123] He argues that the argumentative affirmations which Berger traces throughout the history of theology are eventually expandable for faith: faith is not created by arguments; therefore, faith is not corroded by arguments.[124] Instead, faith, according to Joas, is comparable to trust.[125] He exemplifies the phenomenon of trust with reference to the relation between him and his spouse. The fact that he could have chosen a different spouse does not shatter the connection to his spouse. Analogically, Joas argues in a train of

---

[119] See Bruce, 'The Curious Case', 87-100. See also the response by Detlef Pollack, 'Toward a New Paradigm for the Sociology of Religion', in Berger, *The Many*, 111-122, who argues that Berger's paradigm of pluralisation is still implicitly and inadvertently supporting the paradigm of secularisation.

[120] Hans Joas, 'Glaube und Moral im Zeitalter der Kontingenz', in *Braucht der Mensch Religion?*, 32-49, ET: 'Religion in the Age of Contingency', in *Do We Need Religion?*, 21-35.

[121] In *The Many*, Berger does not refer or respond to Joas's critique. Although his interpretation of the *Corpus Christianum* is more careful than in previous publications, Berger still holds that pluralisation marks the difference between premodern and modern societies.

[122] As mentioned in Chapter 3 above, what Joas calls experience of self-transcendence can be traced back to Joas, *The Genesis of Values*.

[123] Joas, *Glaube als Option*, 9-11. ET: xi-xii.

[124] Joas, 'Glaube und Moral im Zeitalter der Kontingenz', 32-49, ET: 21-35.

[125] Joas, *Faith as an Option*, 85.

thought reminiscent of William James,[126] the fact that he could have chosen a different faith does not shatter the connection to his faith.[127] The conversion – be it the conversion to his finite (significant) other or to his infinite (significant) other – is experienced not as a choice, but as a being chosen.[128]

Charles Taylor endorses Joas's compelling critique.[129] In *The Secular Age*, Taylor traces the emergence of what he calls 'the immanent frame', which 'constitutes a "natural" order to be contrasted to a "supernatural" order'.[130] However, the present 'immanent frame' is neither the distortion nor the destruction of the past transcendent frame: 'The immanent order can ... slough off the transcendent. But it doesn't necessarily do so'.[131] Rather, there are conflicts between the closure and the non-closure of the immanent frame over against the transcendent: pressure, counter-pressure, and 'people who have been cross-pressured between these two basic orientations'.[132] A consequence of pluralisation, these pressures cause the 'fragilization' of both the closed frame and the non-closed frame. Taylor's account of modernisation comes close to Berger's theory of secularisation and de-secularisation, but he distinguishes his concept of the 'fragilization' of faith from Berger's. Irrespective of the convergences and the divergences of these accounts, Taylor argues that pluralisation increases the possibilities of 'conversion' between a variety of religious and a variety of nonreligious ways of life. This increase, however, 'says nothing about ... the

[126] See again the account of James' creative circle of trust in Joas, *Die Entstehung der Werte*, 58-86, ET: 35-53.
[127] Joas, *Faith as an Option*, 85.
[128] Ibid.
[129] Taylor, *A Secular Age*, 808n. 4, 833-834n. 19.
[130] Ibid., 542.
[131] Ibid., 543.
[132] Ibid., 458.

firmness of the faith'.[133] It can either increase or decrease one's commitment to one's faith. Taylor's account of the openness of the immanent frame is instructive for the sociological study of alterity. To recall the citation from Chapter 1 above, the immanent frame allows for both religious and nonreligious interpretations.

> [M]y understanding of the immanent frame is that, properly understood, it allows for both readings, without compelling us to either. If you grasp our predicament without ideological distortion ..., then you see that going one way or another requires what is often called a 'leap of faith'.[134]

Although Taylor – unlike Joas – hesitates to use the terminology of trust, his account of faith could be described along these lines. Drawing on William James's metaphor of the jump (which I examined in Chapter 1), he assesses the leap of faith as 'anticipatory confidence'.[135] He traces how the openness of the immanent frame for such anticipatory confidence is closed by what he calls 'spins'. By 'spin', Taylor means 'a way of convincing oneself that one's reading is obvious' – a strategy which closes the immanent frame.[136] For Taylor, closures might operate in two directions, the vertical one and the horizontal one: I might convince myself of the obviousness of the necessity of the transcendent, such that going to church and going to the circus are radically religious; or I might convince myself of the obviousness of the necessity of the immanent, such that

[133] Ibid., 808n. 4, 833-834n. 19
[134] Ibid., 550.
[135] Ibid.. According to Taylor, the theistic traditions which refer to trust in God in terms of a leap of faith refer to the *contents* of faith. Taylor, however, is interested in the mode(s) in which these contents of faith are received.
[136] Ibid., 551, 555.

going to church and going to the circus are radically nonreligious for me. But in fact he analyses only those spins which close the frame off against the transcendent.[137]

Taylor admits that his account of these spins rests on intellectualisation and idealisation, linking his methodology to Max Weber's 'ideal-types'.[138] He analyses the secularist spins, distinguishing between 'three categories' of what he calls 'closed world structures'.[139] It is not essential (although it would be exciting) to compare these three categories to Troeltsch's typology in order to uncover how alterity – in Taylor's case, the alterity of the creator; in Troeltsch's case, the alterity of the creator and of the creature – is neutralised in order to turn from the state of ambiguity to the state of non-ambiguity.[140] Taylor argues that all of his ideal-types are variations on a sole and single theme: 'a narrative of coming of age'.[141] The (phylo-)genetic narrative plots the maturation process of humanity from a premature state of ambiguity (which is to say, openness to transcendence – going to church, so to speak) to a mature state of non-ambiguity (which is to say, non-openness to transcendence – going to the circus, so to speak). Thus, the closure of the immanent frame is naturalised, unchallenged and unchallengeable. If the exposure to alterity might trigger, as I have argued in Chapter 3, the experience of a transformative transcendence, Taylor's closed world structures can be assessed as secularist strategies for the neutralisation of alterity which closes the self off against transcendence and transformation. When these strategies succeed, trust (in Taylor's terminology: the leap of

[137] Ibid., 556.
[138] Ibid., 557.
[139] Ibid., 551.
[140] Ibid., 449, Taylor refers to Troeltsch's typology. However, he merely mentions ecclesiasticism and sectarianism; mysticism is lacking in Taylor's account. See also Taylor, *Varieties of Religion Today*, 72. This lack is striking because Taylor is interested in the process of individualisation. Here Troeltsch's third type would have been useful to him, because it allows for a more subtle account of the optionality which comes with individualisation by distinguishing between sectarianism and mysticism.
[141] Taylor, *A Secular Age*, 589.

faith which is rooted in anticipatory confidence) becomes impossible. There is no trust without ambiguity and alterity.

Taylor responds to these secularist strategies through a historical-hermeneutical account of conversions.[142] He characterises conversions as experiences in which the frame is opened to what is beyond the frame, which 'changes the meaning of all the elements of the frame'.[143] As a consequence, the distinction between the natural and the supernatural – the immanent and the transcendent – is challenged. Taylor explores poetry as a medium in which these challenges can be articulated. Even without delving into the intricacies of his analysis, I infer from it that the experience of conversion is *not* a conversion from an exclusively immanent frame (circus versus church) into an exclusively transcendent frame (church versus circus). Instead, it is the reintroduction of ambiguity into the immanent frame (traces of church in the circus and traces of circus in the church). Through ambiguity, then, the immanent frame is opened to alterity. In my analysis, Taylor's account of experiences of transcendence is similar to Troeltsch's account of experiences of transcendence: religiosity revolves around the experience of the transcendence of the other.[144]

Like Troeltsch, Taylor explores how the ambiguity in one's life-world is dogmatically domesticated. He argues that the convert 'is in a unique situation'.[145] Since ecclesiasticism – Taylor refers to it as 'Christendom' – permeates the religious and the nonreligious imagination today, 'the sense can easily arise, that the task of breaking out of the dominant immanentist orders today is already defined by the model of the

[142] Ibid., 728-772.
[143] Ibid., 731.
[144] Pearson, 'Ernst Troeltsch and Contemporary Discourses of Secularization', 178n. 16, also points to similarities between Taylor and Troeltsch.
[145] Taylor, *A Secular Age*, 734.

Christendom'.[146] Taylor is hesitant to endorse the return to Christendom, portraying both its advantages and disadvantages. He prefers and proposes the continuous combination of multiple models from the past and from the present. To argue for his proposal, he – like Troeltsch – refers to Leopold von Ranke's slogan that each and every time is 'unmittelbar zu Gott'[147] – immediate to God. It is striking how much Taylor's conclusion sounds like Troeltsch's conclusion of a combination of ecclesiasticism, sectarianism, and mysticism:

> Neither of us grasps the whole picture. ... But there are a great many of us, scattered through history, who have had some powerful sense of some facet of this drama. Together we can live it more fully than any one of us could alone. Instead of reaching immediately for the weapons of polemic, we might better listen for a voice which we could never have assumed ourselves, whose tone might have been forever unknown to us if we hadn't strained to understand it. We will find that we will have to extend this courtesy even to people who would never have extended it to us.[148]

Hence, the convert or reconvert is dependent on the voices of others. Taylor, seemingly aware of the 'sermon-sound' of his statement, stresses that the issue between the two ways of relating to the history of Christianity – either privileging or not privileging one of its past periods – 'is not likely to be resolved calmly'.[149] Therefore, 'religious faith can be dangerous. Opening to transcendence is fraught with peril. But this is particularly so if we respond to these perils by premature closure, drawing an unambiguous boundary between the pure and the impure through the polarization of conflict'.[150] Against such polarisation,

[146] Ibid., 734-735.
[147] Ibid., 745.
[148] Ibid., 754.
[149] Ibid., 766.
[150] Ibid., 769.

Taylor argues that the point of equilibrium in the immanent frame is fragile: some desire to move further 'inward' and some desire to move further 'outward'.[151]

The difference between these desires is to be discussed in conversation – a conversation for which, according to both Taylor and Troeltsch, a community would be crucial. As Taylor explains, 'The Church was rather meant to be the place in which human beings, in all their difference and disparate itineraries, come together; and in this regard we are obviously falling short.'[152] Taylor and Troeltsch, then, call for a construction of community – in their case, church – which is open(ed) to the other. Alterity is not the problem of religion in modernity; alterity is the promise of religion in modernity, because the exposure to the otherness of the other might allow for experiences of a transforming transcendence. Thus, church has to engage rather than disengage the other. Church is – as Rowan Williams argues – about 'the unique gift of the *other* that God has given you to live with'.[153] Accordingly, the point is not to choose a church which one agrees with rather than a church which one disagrees with.[154] Since the other is, by definition, *not* chosen, the point is rather to claim and reclaim church together with the other.

To summarise, I have explored the concepts of community at work in the paradigms which dominate the discussion in the sociology of religion: the paradigm of secularisation operates with a concept of community which Troeltsch would call ecclesiasticist; the paradigm of pluralisation operates with a concept of community which Troeltsch would call sectarianist; and the paradigm of individualisation operates with a concept of

[151] Ibid., 770.

[152] Ibid., 772. For Taylor's account of church, see also Percy, *The Ecclesial Canopy*, 94-105.

[153] Williams, *Tokens of Trust*, 106 (emphasis in the original). For the significance of trust in Williams's ecclesiology, see Jesse Zink, 'Patently Living With Difference: Rowan Williams' Archiepiscopal Ecclesiology and the Proposed Anglican Covenant', *Ecclesiology* 9 (2013), 223-241.

[154] See also the Chapter, 'Beyond "In" or "Out": Reframing Ecclesiological Debate', in Watson, *Introducing Feminist Ecclesiology*, 101-115.

community which Troeltsch would call mysticist. Because the three paradigms take different concepts as criteria, they arrive at different conclusions concerning empirical data: either the data are seen to support the diagnosis of secularisation or the data are seen to support the diagnosis of de-secularisation. This paradigm perceives data this way, that paradigm perceives data that way. My concern is not *that* criteria are used but *which* criteria are used. The criteria employed in the paradigms of secularisation, pluralisation, and individualisation share a central assumption: community is constructed through the attack on alterity. Criticising their central assumption, I have argued that alterity could be reframed as a promise rather than a problem.

In conclusion, following the thrust of Troeltsch's and Taylor's studies, my analysis (Chapter 4) and my applications (Chapter 5 and 6) of the tripartite typology taught ecclesiology a negative rather than a positive lesson: not *how* to contstruct community but how *not* to construct community. If a community aims to foster and facilitate relations to the other, it cannot be constructed at the cost of the other. Rather, community is to be open(ed) to the other. Thus, I return to the concept of trust. In Chapters 1 to 3, I have defined trust as a relation to the other which is characterised by openness to the other's otherness. As mentioned above, in *Faith as an Option*, Joas suggests that 'faith ... should be understood in light of the phenomenon of trust-forming'.[155] He offers no in-depth or in-detail analysis of trust, but confirms that trust engages rather than disengages the other. To understand Christianity 'in the light of the phenomenon of trust-forming', then, calls for a radical rethinking of church as a togetherness of trust.

[155] Joas, *Faith as an Option*, 85.

Part III

IDENTITY

The task of Christian community is to interrelate the relations to the finite other with the relations to the infinite other. To fulfill its task, church must *not* be closed. Moving from the concept of religiosity in Part I to the concept of community in Part II, I have examined the elements which are essential to resist the closure of church. Exploring Ernst Troeltsch's reception of William James's approach to the experience of transcendence (Chapter 1 and Chapter 2), I have discussed two ecclesiological risks against which Troeltsch cautioned – the postliberal risk of ecclesial solidity, in which the communal drains the personal, and the liberal risk of ecclesial liquidity, in which the personal drains the communal. If ecclesiology falls for these risks, it prevents the provocation and the preservation of the togetherness of trust, advocated in Chapter 3. In trustful togetherness, the transformative transcendence of the finite other might be experienced as a gateway into a relation to the infinite other as much as the transformative transcendence of the infinite other might be experienced as a gateway into a relation to the finite other.

Troeltsch traced the interrelation of these relations to the practice of Jesus and the memorisation of the practice of Jesus in Paul's emerging ecclesiology. However, as I continued to argue in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, throughout the history of Christianity, the

communities which followed and flowed from the practice of Jesus have often been constructed at the cost of the other. In the clutches of the chimera of the comprehensive church of ecclesiasticism, both theological and sociological thinkers have understood the identity of Christianity either as sectarianist ecclesial 'blueprints' which solidify church by anthropoemically neutralising the other through exclusion (the postliberal risk), or as mysticist ecclesial 'blueprints' which liquefy church by anthropophagically neutralising the other through inclusion (the liberal risk). By putting these programmatic plans of the identity of Christianity into practice, ecclesiologists have conceived of plurality as a threat. But in Chapter 6, I have argued that the other is a *promise* for Christianity, because the exposure to the otherness of the other might allow for experiences of transforming transcendence. Thus, church has to engage rather than disengage the other.

The concept of identity has been exposed as *the* problem for the elasticisation of ecclesiology, because a construction of the identity of Christianity immediately implies a separation of insiders and outsiders – a separation through which church is controlled and curtailed, closed off against the other. Hence, to seek a concept of identity which includes rather than excludes alterity is to square a circle; the question of identity is the quandary of identity.

In the following and final three chapters, I shall investigate the questions and the quandaries of the identity of Christianity. I aim to advocate a turn in the interpretation of the identity of Christianity – from what I call a *propositional possession* to what I call a *performative project*. By drawing this distinction,[1] I signal that the identity of Christianity ought not to be fixed in a freeze-frame. The practices of Christianity have been changing

[1] With the distinction of 'performativity' and 'propositionality', I deviate from the terminology of Austin's *How To Do Things With Words* (as examined Chapter 1) in order to emphasise that I am taking Austin's analysis out of its confinement within speech-act theory.

continually in the past *and* in the present – changes which are vital for Christianity. Christianity could and should not to be owned by Christians. The identity of Christianity, then, is a *task*, a project rather than a possession.[2] In order to tackle the task of conceptualising a continually changing identity, I shall argue, the identification of Christianity is not to be anchored in a 'describing' of locutionary identity but in a 'doing' of illocutionary identity. The turn from propositional possession to performative project has explosive effects: it engages identity with alterity, envisioning a notion of the identity of Christianity which defies anthropophagic and anthropoemic neutralisations of alterity. Such a concept of identity, I shall continue to argue, enables church to be open(ed) to the other. Hence, the elasticisation of ecclesiology which I have developed, defined, and discussed throughout my study concludes in an account of church as a 'work in movement' – a work which is to be done again and again.[3]

[2] For the analysis of identity as 'achieved' rather than 'ascribed', Paul Ricoeur's distinction between 'ipse identity', revolving around the notion of the self, and 'idem identity', revolving around the notion of the same, is important. See Ricoeur, *Oneself As Another*, 115-118, 140-168. Inspired by Ricoeur, Jeanrond, *Theological Hermeneutics*, 159-182, interprets the identity of Christianity as 'a task', shifting Christianity from the notion of same to the notion of self. The understanding of identity as a task is also the culmination of Kathryn Tanner's *Theories of Culture: A New Agenda for Theology* (Minneapolis, MN: Augsburg Fortress, 1997), esp. 151-155.

[3] For the notion of 'work in movement', see Eco, *The Open Work*. I shall return to this notion in Chapter 9.

Chapter 7

THE TROUBLE WITH TRUST

Trust, I have argued above in Chapters 1 to 3, is *relational*: it requires relations to the respective other. I have called the web of relations in which the relation to the finite other interrelates with the relation to the infinite other 'togetherness of trust' – a way of being together in which one can learn how to trust the infinite other by trusting the finite other and how to trust the finite other by trusting the infinite other.

In this chapter, then, I shall return to trust. I shall depict the togetherness of trust in more depth and in more detail in order to discuss concepts and concerns which are imperative to rethink the identity of Christianity in terms of trust in Chapters 8 and 9. I shall argue that the togetherness of trust troubles the identity of any community. But the trouble with trust is creative rather than corrosive. To recall Zygmunt Bauman:

> [I]dentity must belie its origin; it must deny being 'just a surrogate' – it needs to conjure up a phantom of the self-same community which it has come to replace. Identity spouts on the graveyard of communities, but flourishes thanks to the promise of a resurrection of the dead.[1]

In order to allow communities to flourish, any essentialisation inherent in concepts and constructions of identity must be exploded. Trust has explosive effects. It disintegrates the

[1] Bauman, *Community*, 16. See also my analysis in Chapter 5 above.

concept of causality against which Bauman cautions: if a community is conceived of as a togetherness of trust, it is not the *identity* which creates the practice of community, but the practice of *community* which creates the identity. Trust calls for a turn to practice.

I shall proceed in three steps: (1) I shall characterise togetherness as a technique of trust. Practices of trust are neither manufactured nor maintained through the construction of identity. Instead, the exposure to alterity inherent in any togetherness can count as *the* technique of trust because it opens up a space for the recognition of the otherness of the other in which trust is rooted. (2) I shall explore the significance of suspicion for the togetherness of trust. I shall argue that the togetherness of trust is characterised neither by trust without doubt nor by doubt without trust. In trust, the other is engaged in what could be called a *trusting* doubt. But in spite of the significance of suspicion for trust, the intentional or unintentional betrayal of the truster by the trustee cannot be ruled out. Finally (3), I shall argue that the trouble with trust, which keeps communities open to the other, is vital for the manifestation of truth. If truth is transformative, then a person enables truth to manifest itself by opening herself up to the other. In order to resist stagnation in the search for truth, however, openness to otherness ought to be complemented by critical and self-critical reflections on any assertion that truth has been fully or finally identified.

Throughout, I shall refer to the interpretation of trust advanced by Claudia Welz and Arne Grøn. These two phenomenological-philosophical theologians conceive of trust with the metaphors of 'openness' or 'opening', indicating the interrelation of trust to the finite other and to the infinite other for which I have argued in Chapter 3 above.[2] What makes

[2] See Arne Grøn and Claudia Welz, 'Introduction: Trust in Question', in *Trust, Sociality, Selfhood*, 1-9.

them particularly pertinent for a characterisation of the togetherness of trust is that they elucidate why trust could and why trust should be provoked and preserved.

1 The Technique of Trust

Etymologically, 'technique' comes from τεχνικός which means 'pertaining to art'. Hence, 'technique' points to the artistic rather than the automatic; and the Greek concept of τέχνη conceives of art as the ability to practise and to perform. What I mean by 'technique of trust' is the ability to practise and perform trust. I aim to advocate togetherness as a technique of trust. I shall argue that togetherness – being together – is the condition for the exposure to the other; that the exposure to the other is the condition for the recognition of the transformative transcendence of the other; and that the recognition of the transformative transcendence of the other is the condition for trust. Thus, trust is to be facilitated indirectly rather than directly; it cannot be forced, but it can be fostered in a space which allows for exposures to the other – a space which I call 'togetherness of trust'.

Arne Grøn investigates the conditions of trust. He criticises interpretations of trust which take trust as a *firm* rather than a *fragile* fundament.[3] He argues that sociality, the structuring of interpersonal relations, is not built on trust – as concepts of 'basic' or 'basal' trust would have it.[4] Rather, trust is what is at stake in sociality.[5] Grøn comes close to

[3] See Arne Grøn, 'Trust, Sociality, Selfhood', in *Trust, Sociality, Selfhood*, 13-30; and Arne Grøn, 'Grenzen des Vertrauens: Kritische Bemerkungen zur Rede von "Grundvertrauen"', in *Grundvertrauen*, 145-158.

[4] Erik H. Erikson's distinction between 'basic trust' and 'basic mistrust' inspired these concepts. For critical comments see also Welz, *Vertrauen und Verschuchung*, 71-75. Brigitte Boothe, 'Urvertrauen und elterliche Praxis', in *Grundvertrauen*, 67-86, has offered a convincing reinterpretation of Erikson's theory. She argues that the trust of a child is generated in the parental practice of entrusting their child.

interpreting trust as a relation to the other which is characterised by openness to otherness, when he, pointing to notions of trust in the wake of Martin Luther, emphasises that trust is 'eccentric': when one trusts, 'one is outside oneself'.[6]

The 'eccentricity' of trust implies that the truster is open to the trustee. As a consequence, the one who trusts relinquishes control over the one who is trusted – she is simultaneously 'subject' and 'subjected'.[7] This simultaneity confirms the mixture of activity and passivity in the practice of trust (as analysed in Chapters 1 through 3 above). Grøn coins the concept of the 'ambiguity of subjectivity' to point to this mixture.[8] What follows from the ambiguity of subjectivity in the practice of trust is that the truster acknowledges the trustee without confining her to what she acknowledges.[9] In the practice of trust, the other is allowed to transform the way one thinks and talks about her. Grøn points to the 'process of recognition'.[10] Of course, 'recognition' is a complex concept with a chequered career in philosophy and theology.[11] Grøn conceives of recognition as a way of seeing:

> If we think that we can see the other *as* she is 'in herself', we fail to recognize her as a self relating to herself. By contrast, to see *that* she is 'in herself', beyond that as which we see her, is to recognize her in the strong sense of seeing her as standing on her own feet, being independent of our relation to her.

---

[5] See again Grøn, 'Trust, Sociality, Selfhood', 13-30; and Grøn, 'Grenzen des Vertrauens', 145-158.

[6] Grøn, 'Trust, Sociality, Selfhood', 17. On the notion of eccentricity see also Grøn, 'Grenzen des Vertrauens', 148-149: 'eccentricity' points to the structure of subjectivity in which the subject is outside of the subject. According to Grøn, trust is a way to cope with this structure.

[7] Grøn, 'Trust, Sociality, Selfhood', 16.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Ibid., 21.

[10] Ibid., 14.

[11] See *The Philosophy of Recognition: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives*, ed. Hans-Christoph Schmidt am Busch and Christopher F. Zurn (Lanham: Lexington, 2010).

> The other is beyond our relation to her already in responding on her own to what we do to her.[12]

Described differently, recognition means to *register* and to *respect* the transcendence of the other so as to allow her to transform one's evaluations and one's expectations of her: transformative transcendence. Trust, as Grøn argues, 'demands' to acknowledge the other as other – 'seeing her beyond our identification. She is *in-visible'*.[13] By 'in-visibility', he means the simultaneity of the visibility and the invisibility of the other, that which one can know about her and that which one cannot know about her. 'Ethically, trust implies a strong notion of alterity'.[14]

Considering its creative circularity, the experience of trust is more an experience of being chosen than an experience of choosing.[15] Trust might be demanded or commanded, but one cannot force it. One cannot force oneself to trust: sometimes, one *does not* trust the other although one decided to trust her and sometimes one *does* trust the other although one decided not to trust her.[16] Hence, trust is neither manufactured nor maintained. On the contrary, 'it "gives itself"'.[17] Drawing the conclusions from the ambiguity of subjectivity in the practice of trust, Grøn argues that trust is to be created indirectly rather than directly.

---

[12] Grøn, 'Trust, Sociality, Selfhood', 16 (emphasis in the original). For Grøn's account of the ethics of vision, see Arne Grøn, 'Ethics of Vision: Seeing the Other as Neighbour', in *Dynamics of Difference*, 63-70. For a diverse discussion on the ethics of in-visibility see the contributions to *Ethics of In-Visibility*: *Imago Dei, Memory and Human Dignity in Jewish and Christian Thought,* ed. Claudia Welz (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2015). A short summary can be found in my review Ulrich Schmiedel, 'Rezension zu Claudia Welz (Hg.), Ethics of In-Visibility: Imago Dei, Memory and Human Dignity in Jewish and Christian Thought', *Theologische Literaturzeitung* (forthcoming).

[13] Grøn, 'Trust, Sociality, Selfhood', 28 (emphasis in the original).

[14] Ibid. The 'strong notion of alterity' is what I approached through the terms 'transcendence' and 'transformation' in Chapter 3 above.

[15] Grøn, "Trust, Sociality and Selfhood", 13-14, 26-29.

[16] Ibid., 24.

[17] Ibid.

Trust flows in an '*indirect* process' rather than a '*direct* programme'.[18] His point is that a creation of trust which *aims* for a creation of trust would destruct what it wants to construct. He explains:

> If I only trust the other in order to win her trust, I do not trust her. In trust, we expose ourselves in the sense that we cannot reduce each other to what might be the interest which drives us. ... If she discovers that we only trust in order for her to trust us, she is likely to react to us.[19]

Accordingly, to trust the other *in order to* create the trust of the other would turn trust into its opposite: closure and control. The other would be instrumentalised and incapacitated in the 'economy of exchange, which reduces reciprocity to what would serve each of us'.[20] Such an economy could not be challenged by the other. Hence, the production of trust may paradoxically provoke the perversion of trust, but in the circle of trust, *trust gives trust*.

Overall, what I infer from Grøn's phenomenological-philosophical exploration of trust is that one ought to allow for the subject's exposure to the otherness of the other from which recognition of the other's transformative transcendence *might* follow – a recognition which is vital for trust.[21] Such recognition must not be instrumentalised. Trust requires a space for encounters with the other. Togetherness – being together – is a technique of trust if it opens up the space for the recognition of the otherness of the other and of the self as other. Here, Grøn echoes William James's circle of trust examined above in Chapter 1: ultimately, trust creates trust.[22] The togetherness of trust, then, would be distorted by the

[18] Grøn and Welz, 'Introduction', 3 (emphasis in the original).
[19] Grøn, 'Trust, Sociality, Selfhood', 27.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Ibid., 13-14, 26-29.
[22] As far as I can ascertain, Grøn has not discussed James's concept of trust.

construction of identity which distinguishes between the trustworthy insider and the non-trustworthy outsider. Such a construction of identity would not create but corrode the togetherness of trust. Yet what would the togetherness of trust, the mode of being together which provokes rather than prevents trust, look like?

2 The Trouble of Trust

Claudia Welz investigates correspondences between trust and temptation.[23] She understands trust as a person's 'opening (*Öffnung*) or openness (*Offenheit*) for the other', where both opening and openness are experienced as 'self-transcendence'.[24] Hence, she comes close to my definition of trust as a relation to the other which is characterised by openness to otherness. I shall explore her investigation of the limits of trust in order to chart what a togetherness of trust would look like. I shall argue that the togetherness of trust engenders hermeneutical practices which are marked by what I call 'doubt within trust' in contrast to either 'doubt without trust' or 'trust without doubt'.

Welz approaches the limits of trust through a phenomenology of 'judgement (*Urteil*)' and 'misjudgement (*Fehlurteil*)'.[25] A person exposes the judgement she has made as either correct or incorrect through a judgement about the judgement she has made: the judgement after and about the judgement enables the 'self-relocation' of the person with

[23] See Welz, *Vertrauen und Versuchung*.
[24] Ibid., 5; see also 91-93. For a detailed discussion of the openness of trust, see also Welz, 'Trust as Basic Openness', 45-64.
[25] Welz, *Vertrauen und Versuchung*, 33-68.

regard to her judgement.[26] But when the person judges trust, Welz argues, her judgement is not a post-judgement but a pre-judgement: a 'prejudice (*Vor-Urteil*)'.[27] Since the trustworthiness of the other cannot be judged *prior* to the relation to the other, one has to be prejudiced to trust her in order to judge her trustworthiness or her non-trustworthiness.[28] Welz concludes that the prejudice of trust allows for the practice of trust and that the practice of trust allows for the prejudice of trust.[29] But should one trust one's trust?[30]

Welz insists that suspicions about the other's trustworthiness or non-trustworthiness are *not* neutral.[31] When one asks whether one should or should not trust the other, trust has become suspicious; the practice of trust is distorted where trust is distrusted (and distrust is trusted).[32] The result of the creative circle of trust is that trust is *always* appropriate – when the other is trustworthy *and* when the other is not trustworthy.[33] Trust is even appropriate when the truster has been disappointed by the trustee. If the truster terminates trust because her trust has been betrayed by the trustee, then she renders the start or the restart of a relation between them impossible.[34] Without the truster's prejudice of trust, it is impossible for the trustee to gain or regain the truster's trust. Hence, with or without disappointment, the prejudice of trust – the (Jamesian) jump – is the point of departure for relations with the

---

[26] Ibid., 38.
[27] Ibid., 39.
[28] Ibid.
[29] Neither James's philosophy nor James's psychology of trust are engaged with in *Vertrauen und Versuchung*; nonetheless, Welz comes close to the Jamesian circumscription of the circle of trust.
[30] See Welz, *Vertrauen und Verschung*, 57.
[31] Thus, Welz counters those concepts of trust which are inspired by rational-choice theory, such as Diego Gambetta, 'Can We Trust Trust?', in *Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations*, ed. Diego Gambetta (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988), 213-237.
[32] Welz, *Vertrauen und Verschung*, 57.
[33] I am not demanding a 'blind' trust in the other. As I shall explain below, the trust which is always appropriate is a trust which includes rather than excludes suspicion about the other.
[34] Welz, *Vertrauen und Versuchung*, 60-67.

other.[35] Trust creates trust. The moment trust is calculated through the construction of conditions of trustworthiness or non-trustworthiness, one closes oneself off against the other.[36] Such controlling closure is in danger of stopping the transformation which might be triggered by a relation to the other.[37] The other is curtailed; confined to one's concepts and one's constructs of her. Hence, disappointment – the intentional or the unintentional betrayal of the truster by the trustee – cannot be excluded without turning trust into distrust.[38] Yet, again, should one trust one's trust? What about the real and reasonable suspicions one might have regarding the other?

Welz is careful *not* to rule out such suspicions. Although she concentrates on the relation to God,[39] her discussion of 'doubt (*Zweifel*)' holds for both suspicion in relation to the finite other and suspicion in relation to the infinite other. The purpose of Welz's discussion is to expose the alternative of 'trust without doubt' and 'doubt without trust' as a *false* alternative.[40] Welz analyses doubtless trust and trustless doubt, arguing that both confine the other to one's concept of the other. What I infer from her analysis is that while trust without doubt concentrates on the identity of the other (a concentration which claims that the other is totally calculable), doubt without trust concentrates on the alterity of the other (a concentration which claims that the other is totally incalculable).[41]

---

[35] Ibid. It could be argued that Welz clarifies Dalferth's notion that trust is 'truly' trust when the trustee who is trusted by the truster is *not* trustworthy (examined in Chapter 3 above). See again Dalferth, 'Vertrauen und Hoffen', 418.

[36] See also Dalferth, 'In God We Trust', 143-146.

[37] See Welz, *Vertrauen und Verschung*, 61-62, where she emphasises that the success of one's own orientation ought not to be the criterion according to which one does or does not give trust. Otherwise one would not trust the other, but one's evaluations and expectations of the other.

[38] Ibid., 60-67.

[39] See the detailed discussion of the 'trial of faith (*Glaubensprüfung*)' in ibid., 158-177.

[40] Ibid., 201. My formulas of 'trust without doubt' and 'doubt without trust' are based on the discussion of doubt which Welz offers in ibid., 192-202.

[41] Ibid.

In the realm of religion, doubtless trust amounts to a fundamentalism which has unwavering confidence that it knows God, while trustless doubt amounts to a scepticism which has unwavering confidence that it does not know God.[42] Further, doubtless trust and trustless doubt prevent a relation in which the other is allowed to transform one's concept of the other.[43] There is no space for surprises. What is needed, then, is neither 'trust without doubt' nor 'doubt without trust', but what I call 'doubt *within* trust'. According to Welz, a trusting doubt might accomplish the opposite of closure and control, because doubt within trust is capable of opening up the concepts into which one has confined the other.[44] If it is not rooted in the relationality of trust, doubt destroys the otherness of the other. But if it is rooted in the relationality of trust, doubt defends the otherness of the other. Such a defence, however, requires the prejudice of trust, because it implies that the suspicion is directed towards the truster rather than the trustee. Hence, in comparison to the phenomenology of judgement and misjudgement, a relocation of the subject is not provoked by a judgment about a judgement. On the contrary, the self-relocation is provoked by a pre-judgment rather than a post-judgement.[45]

---

[42] Ibid., 133-134. See also Welz, 'Vertrauen und/oder Gewissheit', 345-380.

[43] Identifying the im-possibility of hospitality, Jacques Derrida has pointed to the dilemma of trust without doubt and doubt without trust. In order for hospitality to be hospitality, he argues, there can be no qualitative distinction made between the hostile other and the non-hostile other because such a distinction reveals pre-conceived notions of who or what the other is, thus turning hospitality into inhospitality. He points to the term *hostis*, which is the Latin root for both hospitality and hostility, to stress the ambivalence in any such hospitable encounter with the other. Derrida, then, points to what I have called the prejudice of trust. See the contributions to Jacques Derrida, *Of Hospitality: Anne Dufourmantelle invites Jacques Derrida to Respond* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000).

[44] Welz, *Vertrauen und Verschuchung*, 134-135, 144-146, 202-209.

[45] Welz describes trust as a 'groundless ground (*grundloser Grund*)' (ibid., 113); however, she stresses that her combination of 'ground' and 'groundless' is not paradoxical. On the one hand, trust is groundless because one always already lacks the 'grounds (*Gründe*)' to reason for trust: what is grounded with reasons is mistrust as opposed to trust. On the other hand, trust is grounding because reasons for trust and mistrust are offered on the ground of trust which is itself not grounded by these reasons. Hence both 'trust and mistrust are grounding precisely because they are groundless, which is to say, they cannot be caught by arguments' (ibid.).

With the reference to 'pre-judgement', Welz adopts Hans-Georg Gadamer's 'rehabilitation' of the 'prejudice' in the process of interpretation.[46] Gadamer's hermeneutics pinpoints the productive power of prejudices: a prejudice is needed in order to approach the object of interpretation (whatever it may be), because it allows the subject of interpretation to form and inform a perspective. Although the prejudice might be changed in the process of interpretation, interpretation is impossible without prejudices.[47] Building on the rehabilitation of the prejudice allows for an analysis of doubt within trust – beyond the false alternative of 'trust without doubt' and 'doubt without trust'. Here, trust without doubt could be rendered as reading a text without even considering to criticise it, while doubt without trust could be rendered as criticising a text without even considering to read it. What is needed, then, is a reading which allows for critique and self-critique. Gadamer, however, displaces the centrality of critique in the process of reading – which is to say, he is suspicious of suspicion. Thus, his critics flanked his rehabilitation of prejudice with a rehabilitation of the critique of prejudice.[48]

Werner G. Jeanrond combines Gadamer and the critics of Gadamer in what I term a three-dimensional concept of interpretation.[49] His concept might underpin the role and relevance of doubt within trust. Examining the tension between the text and the reader of

[46] See Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, trans. revised Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (London: Sheed and Ward Limited, 1989), 265-306. Welz does not refer to Gadamer; however, she, like Gadamer, develops the rehabilitation of prejudice in critical conversation with Immanuel Kant. See Welz, *Vertrauen und Versuchung*, 43-54.

[47] For a succinct account of Gadamer's hermeneutics see Jeanrond, *Theological Hermeneutics*, 64-70.

[48] See ibid, 67-77, where Jeanrond refers to Jürgen Habermas and Paul Ricoeur. Ricoeur, of course, is *the* thinker who took both sides – the prejudice and the critique of prejudice – into account when he coined the concept of the 'hermeneutics of suspicion'. See esp. Ricoeur's 'Hermeneutics and the Critique of Ideology', in Paul Ricoeur, *Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences*, 63-100.

[49] For a summary of Jeanrond's three-dimensional concept of interpretation, see Schmiedel, '(Instead of the) Introduction: Open to the Other', 1-16, esp. 2-6.

the text, Jeanrond builds on Gadamer to depict reading as an 'existential activity'.[50] The reader opens herself to the text in order to be transformed by her reading – the prejudice of trust. However, Jeanrond insists that the reader's openness must not override critical and self-critical explanations of the text because transformation is ambiguous, allowing for disclosures and distortions of meaning. He points to Paul Ricoeur's critique of Gadamer which highlighted the distinction between a primary naïveté and a secondary naïveté: interpretation involves an existential pre-understanding (primary naïveté) which is followed by critical and self-critical explanation, which is then followed by an existential understanding (secondary naïveté).[51] Here, the secondary naïveté becomes the primary naïveté as the process of interpretation begins again and again. In critical conversation with Ricoeur, Jeanrond stresses the interrelation of these moments within the process of interpretation where the existential and the explanatory cannot be nicely and neatly distinguished.[52] Jeanrond also invokes the *ethical* responsibility which is involved in existential and explanatory interpretation: the ideologies of both the text and the reader of the text must come under critique in every interpretative act. Interpretation, therefore, combines existential, explanatory, *and* ethical dimensions.[53]

Drawing out the implications of Jeanrond's concept of interpretation, I am arguing that the practice of trust is characterised by three hermeneutical dimensions. Trust requires

---

[50] Jeanrond, *Theological Hermeneutics*, 110.

[51] See Paul Ricoeur, *The Rule of Metaphor: The Creation of Meaning in Language*, trans. R. Czerny (London: Routledge, 2003), 376-377. For a comprehensive account of Ricoeur's philosophy, see Bengt Kristensson Uggla, *Ricoeur, Hermeneutics and Interpretation* (London: Continuum, 2010). Particularly for Ricoeur's hermeneutics, see Jeanrond, *Theological Hermeneutics*, 70-76. Jeanrond highlights how Ricoeur reworked the distinction between primary and secondary naïveté through the concepts of 'prefiguration', 'configuration', and 'refiguration' (ibid., 191-192n. 92).

[52] See Werner G. Jeanrond, *Text and Interpretation as Categories of Theological Thinking*, trans. Thomas J. Wilson (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1988), 68-71.

[53] See ibid., 68-71, 74, 120-128. See also Jeanrond, *Theological Hermeneutics*, 113-117.

existential openness to the other. Yet this openness has to be flanked by explanatory and ethical moves. What criterion could be used in these moves? Jeanrond's pointer to the critique of ideology is pertinent. He conceives of 'ideology' as the refusal to have one's prejudice challenged by one's object of interpretation.[54] Hence, what I have described as 'trust without doubt' in fundamentalism and 'doubt without trust' in scepticism could be characterised as ideologies, because both curtail the other: trust without doubt is obsessed with the other's identity, assuming the absolute knowability of the other; doubt without trust is obsessed with the other's alterity, assuming the absolute unknowability of the other. In the ideologies of trust without doubt and doubt without trust, then, the engagement with the other is stopped by a prejudice which claims to be unchallenged and unchallengeable. These ideologies prevent what Grøn calls 'recognition': seeing the other *as* other. The ideological claims to both the absolute knowability of the other and the absolute unknowability of the other, then, need to be criticised in the practice of trust. *The* criterion for critique in the togetherness of trust is that truster and trustee remain open to the other.

Overall, the construction of conditions which would have to be fulfilled by the trustee in order for the truster to trust her results in a slippery slope on which the truster slides from trust to distrust. The understanding of identity which provokes trust in the insider and prevents trust in the outsider is troubled by trust. Crucially, the risk inherent in trust cannot be ruled out. The Jamesian jump – the prejudice of trust – cannot be escaped; trust is, as James poignantly put it, previous, precursive, and preliminary. However, critique operates *within* trust rather than *without* trust. In the togetherness of trust, hermeneutical practices are required to identify the distortions of trust into distrust in which

[54] Ibid., 5-6.

the otherness of the other is confined or curtailed – either by the truster or by the trustee. The togetherness of trust, then, allows for critical and self-critical reflections on competing claims to truth.

3 The Truth of Trust

Can truth manifest itself in the togetherness of trust? Since the manifestation of truth is accessed through the detour of competing and conflicting claims to truth,[55] the togetherness of trust appears to stop the search for truth because the prejudice of trust presupposes that one is open to *any* claim to the manifestation of truth. But this appearance might be deceptive. I shall advocate for a construction of the hermeneutical notion of 'truth as manifestation' through the categories of performativity and propositionality.[56] In critical conversation with Hans-Georg Gadamer, I shall argue that critical and self-critical reflections on competing truth claims are imperative for the manifestation of truth in the togetherness of trust. Thus, I shall map the coupling of the rehabilitation of prejudice with the rehabilitation of the critique of prejudice, called for by thinkers such as Jeanrond, onto my conceptualisation and concretisation of the togetherness of trust.

To recall the analysis of John L. Austin's speech act theory in Chapter 1 above: Austin is interested in the distinction between language as a 'describing' of things (the

[55] See Paul Ricoeur, *The Conflict of Interpretations* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1974). In the Chapter, '"As Books Should be Read": Philosophy of Action and the Death of the Author: Paul Ricoeur', in *Ricoeur, Hermeneutics and Globalization*, 9-29, Kristensson Uggla gives a succinct summary of Ricoeur's understanding of the production and the reception of texts within the conflict of interpretations.

[56] The notion of truth as manifestation which is significant for hermeneutics can be traced back to Martin Heidegger. For a succinct summary of notions of truth in the history of hermeneutics, see Kristensson Uggla, *Ricoeur, Hermeneutics and Globalization*, 32-40. I have taken the term 'truth as manifestation' from David Tracy, *Dialogue with the Other: The Interreligious Dialogue* (Louvain: Peeters, 1990), 43-45.

locutionary force of language) and language as a 'doing' of things (the illocutionary force of language).[57] For Austin, the concept 'truth' pertains to the describing rather than the doing. Performatives, he argues, are neither true nor untrue. However, through the restriction of the concept of truth to locutionary language, Austin buys into the descriptive fallacy which he debunked. He himself reduces truth to the propositional in contrast to the performative in order to criticise the application of constative truth criteria to performances.[58] The notion of truth as manifestation, however, allows for a concept of performative truth in which truth both 'does' things *and* 'describes' things.

It is well-known that Gadamer portrays 'play (*Spiel*)' as the site for the manifestation of truth.[59] Since play takes place in-between its players, it cannot be reduced to either of them: 'the primordial sense of playing is the medial one'.[60] Gadamer argues that the play requires relations in-between the players – relations which he depicts as 'movement' between the players.[61] These movements cannot be methodologically controlled: the player is not playing the game, but the game is playing the player. 'Play fulfils its purpose only if the player loses himself in the play'.[62] With the concept of play, then, Gadamer points to experiences which cannot be controlled by the one who has these experiences.[63] Drawing on Gadamer, the togetherness of trust might be conceived of as

---

[57] Austin, *How To Do Things With Words*, 3.

[58] See Matthias Petzoldt, 'Wahrheit als Begegnung: Dialogisches Wahrheitsverständnis im Licht der Analyse performativer Sprache', in Matthias Petzoldt, *Christsein angefragt: Fundamentaltheologische Beiträge* (Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 1998), 25-50.

[59] Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 101-134. See also Jeanrond, *Text and Interpretation as Categories of Theological Thinking*, 20-21.

[60] Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 103.

[61] Ibid. Gadamer points to the etymology of *Spiel* which can be traced back to 'dance', thus emphasising the movement in-between the players (ibid).

[62] Ibid., 102. See also Gaetano Chiurazzi, 'Truth Is More Than Reality: Gadamer's Transformational Concept of Truth', *Research in Phenomenology* 41/1 (2011), 61.

[63] Chiurazzi, 'Truth', 61.

play, especially since he stresses the 'risk' which is inherent in any play.[64] He even echoes James's notion of self-surrender when he writes that the play 'absorbs' the players.[65] The togetherness of trust, then, resembles play: like play, trust is relational; like play, trust can be controlled neither by the truster nor by the trustee; and like play, trust requires eccentricity.

Only if the players let go of themselves, Gadamer argues, might truth manifest itself in the 'transformation' of the players through the play.[66] For Gadamer, this 'transformation is a transformation into the true'.[67] Truth, then, is neither objective nor subjective but takes place through the play in-between the object of knowledge and the subject of knowledge.[68] Gadamer employs the concept of recognition to point to the manifestation of truth. 'But what is recognition?'[69] For Gadamer, the 'joy of recognition' is not 'knowing' but 'knowing *more*'.[70] Gaetano Chiurazzi summarises: '*Truth is ... more than reality*. It is something that does not leave reality as it is ... but, on the contrary, ... *makes difference*'.[71] According to Chiurazzi, Gadamer operates with 'a transformational concept of truth'.[72] In experiencing truth, a person recognises that something is different – a difference which has an impact on the subject of knowledge (the knower) and on the object of knowledge (the

---

[64] Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 106.
[65] Ibid., 105. Self-surrender – to recall my analysis in Chapter 1 above – means the jump of the self out of the self. Hence, self-surrender is provoked by the play in which the players lose themselves.
[66] Ibid., 111. Gadamer refers to the 'transformation into structure' which is propelled by play: 'Thus transformation into structure means that what existed previously exists no longer. But also that what now exists, what represents itself in the play..., is the ... true' (ibid.).
[67] Ibid., 112.
[68] See ibid., 102.
[69] Ibid., 113.
[70] Ibid., 114 (emphasis in the original).
[71] Chiurazzi, 'Truth', 69 (emphasis in the original).
[72] Ibid., 70.

known).[73] Would it be too far-fetched to describe the experience of truth with the terminology of Chapter 3 above – namely as the truth of the transformative transcendence of the other?[74]

In any case, for Gadamer, truth is a performative rather than a propositional concept: it is not describing things, it is doing things. Truth is *existential*. However, as mentioned above, Gadamer marshals the existential concept of truth against the explanatory concept of truth[75] – a move which has impacted the history of hermeneutics immensely.[76] He asks the players to dismiss their doubts for the sake of play: one must 'expose oneself consciously to the play which playfully expresses itself to us as truth'.[77] Again, he agrees with James. James argues that interpersonal encounters demonstrate that the direct knowledge one gains through relations differs from the indirect knowledge one gains through reflections: relation pertains to existential acquaintance and reflection pertains to non-existential analysis.[78] Language points to the difference between these modes of knowledge because, for James, it turns the direct immediate experience into the

[73] Jeanrond, *Text and Interpretation*, 21, characterises Gadamer's concept of truth as 'revelatory'.

[74] For Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 140, truth is 'increase in Being (*Zuwachs an Sein*)'. He explains it with reference to the Neoplatonic notion of emanation: 'Essential to an emanation is that what emanates is an overflow. What it flows from does not thereby become less. ... For if the original One is not diminished by the outflow of the many from it, this means that being increases' (ibid.). See also Chiurazzi, 'Truth', 66. Hence, Gadamer's notion of transformative truth differs from my notion of transformative transcendence which understands transcendence *functionally* rather than *substantially*. However, the experience of transformative truth and the experience of transformative transcendence are strikingly similar: transformation implies the experience of a difference.

[75] See Chiurazzi, 'Truth', 70. For Chiurazzi, the contrast between existential and explanatory truth is not a cause for concern. He makes no mention of the critics of Gadamer who called for a rehabilitation of the critique of prejudice in addition to the rehabilitation of prejudice.

[76] See Kristensson Uggla, *Ricoeur, Hermeneutics and Globalization*, 32-40.

[77] Jeanrond, *Text and Interpretation*, 21.

[78] James, *The Principles of Psychology*, vol. 1, 216-218. For James's pragmatic concept of truth, see Hermann Deuser, 'Zum Religions- und Wahrheitsbegriff bei William James', in *Religionsphilosophie: Historische Positionen und systematische Reflexionen*, ed. Matthias Jung, Michael Moxter, and Thomas M. Schmidt (Würzburg: Echter, 2000), 151-164. Strikingly, Deuser stresses that, for James, truth includes that which escapes complete conceptualisation (ibid., 162).

indirect mediate expression; it turns relation into reflection; trust into talk about trust.[79] Countering the contamination of relation through reflection, James, I have argued, seeks a *pure* performative: performativity *without* propositionality. In contrast to James, Gadamer appreciates language as a medium for the disclosure rather than the distortion of truth.[80] Nonetheless, he follows the Jamesian proclivity for purification when he rejects the application of criteria of truth such as correspondence, coherence and consensus from the manifestation of truth.[81]

As Jeanrond argues, Gadamer's rejection is dangerous: 'we must ... ask ourselves what exactly is being played here, what plays itself out through us, what precisely is this process that playfully releases truth? ... What corroborates the conviction in us that we are not perhaps manipulated in a playful manner?'[82] In order to criticise the Gadamerian contrast between the existential and the explanatory, Austin's speech act theory is instructive. From his survey of speech acts, he concludes that performativity and propositionality cannot be separated: performative speech acts speak through propositional speech acts because every speech act has both illocutionary and locutionary force.[83] For Austin, there is no pure performative. Hence, if 'performativity' pairs with the existential and if 'propositionality' pairs with the explanatory, then Austin's conclusion implies that the existential and the explanatory are complementary rather than contradictory. If the manifestation of truth, then, is characterised as *performative*, it allows – *pace* Gadamer –

---

[79] James, *The Principles of Psychology*, 217.

[80] See Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 383-491. To James's concept of language as a source for the contamination of experience, Gadamer would respond: 'It is from *language as a medium* that our whole experience of the world ... unfolds' (ibid., 457, emphasis in the original).

[81] For a short account of the development of these criteria, see Hans-Peter Großhans, 'Truth, Philosophy', in *Religion Past and Present*, vol. 13, 130-132.

[82] Jeanrond, *Text and Interpretation*, 21.

[83] Austin, *How To Do Things With Words*, 101-102.

for critical and self-critical reflections on competing claims to truth. These reflections are not only not rejected, but *required* for the manifestation of transformative truth.

In relation to the examination of 'trust without doubt' and 'doubt without trust', a claim to truth can come in two guises: either the knower concentrates on the identity of the known (thus always already knowing that it can know the other) or the knower concentrates on the alterity of the known (thus always already knowing that it cannot know the other). These claims to truth have strikingly similar consequences: whether one claims the complete knowability of the other (trust without doubt) or the complete unknowability of the other (doubt without trust), the other is *controlled* – confined to one's concept of her. Thus, the other is incorporated into economies of exchange which cannot be challenged or changed by the other. Hence, constructions of identity which keep the insider inside are as dangerous as constructions of alterity which keep the outsider outside. Both the critical and self-critical reflections on ideological claims which control the other are indispensable to open these economies up to the other. The manifestation of truth, then, requires the critique of ideology in the togetherness of trust.

Overall, the claim to the complete knowability of the other is the flipside of the claim to the complete unknowability of the other. Truth manifests itself otherwise. Thus, truth requires the construction and the destruction – the deconstruction – of claims to truth, deferring claims to have fully and finally identified what is true.[84] Austin's combination of performativity and propositionality saves the hermeneutical concept of truth as manifestation from the contrast between the existential-performative and the explanatory-

[84] See my short summary of Jacques Derrida's notion of deconstruction in Chapter 1 above.

propositional. Performative truth is open to the prejudice and to the critique of the prejudice.

Trust causes trouble in the construction of identity because it resists closure. Openness to the other is indeed the condition for trust. The exposure to the other opens up a space in which trust might emerge in the first place. Only in the exposure to the other can the otherness of the other be registered and respected – which is to say, recognised. Togetherness, then, is a technique of trust. But the togetherness of trust does not rule out suspicions. Instead, it evokes hermeneutical practices in which explanatory moves and ethical moves complement the existential move of openness to otherness. The existential move, the prejudice of trust, is indispensable for the manifestation of transformative truth.

However, as my account of the manifestation of truth in terms of Austin's speech act theory has shown, critical and self-critical reflections on competing claims to truth open ideological assertions up to the challenge of the other. Hence, the central criterion for the hermeneutical practices which characterise the togetherness of trust is openness to the otherness – existentially, explanatorily, and ethically. In the togetherness of trust, the otherness of each and every other is recognised as the site for the manifestation of truth. To rule out the prejudice of trust through constructs of identity and alterity which retain a strict insider/outsider distinction would mean to rule out the possibility for the manifestation of the truth in advance. But if one must not decide *in advance* whether the other is or is not trustworthy, the risk of disappointment – the intentional or unintentional betrayal of trust by the other – is unavoidable.[85] Identity cannot save the community from disappointment because the communal practice of the togetherness of trust is not created by identity but

[85] See David Jasper's mesmerising meditation on 'betrayal' at the centre of community in David Jasper, *The Sacred Community: Art, Sacrament, and the People of God* (Waco: Baylor University Press, 2012), 31-44.

identity is created by the communal practice of the togetherness of trust. Thus, trust calls for a turn to practice.

Chapter 8

THE POWER OF PRACTICE

Ecclesiology has turned to practice. According to Nicholas M. Healy, ecclesiologists are increasingly interested in the church as it is *practised* rather than the church as it is *preached*.[1] What lurks behind the turn to practice is the insight into the performative power of practice.[2] Ecclesiologists have realised that 'church' cannot be designed on a drawing board because the construction of the identity of Christianity requires the 'lived' practice of church more than the 'lived' practice of the church requires the construction of the identity of Christianity. Practice, then, is interpreted not as the *consequence* but as the *condition* for identity.

[1] Nicholas M. Healy, 'Practices and the New Ecclesiology: Misplaced Concreteness?', *International Journal for Systematic Theology* 5/3 (2003), 287-308. Healy argues that the turn to practice has characterised ecclesiologies in the last decade.

[2] Michel Foucault pioneered the insight into the performative power of practice. Drawing on structuralist studies, he shows that power is not necessarily attributed to active agents. Instead, strategies and structures of power are at work in practices such that power produces fields of knowledge, and is produced by fields of knowledge. *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage, 1979), is probably *the* study on the performative power of practice. For a succinct summary of Foucault's concept of power, see Alec McHoul and Wendy Grace, *A Foucault Primer: Discourse, Power and the Subject* (London: Routledge, 2002), 57-90.

In this chapter, I shall investigate the turn to practice, considering three ecclesiological examples. Cautioned by Healy,[3] I shall ask *which* concept of practice is taken as a point of departure in these examples. I have chosen the ecclesiologies of John Milbank, Pete Ward, and Graham Ward for my comparative investigation because all of them use the collapse of community in contemporary culture as a point of departure for their ecclesiologies. While John Milbank assesses the collapse more negatively, advocating the return from a 'liquid identity' to a 'solid identity', Pete Ward assesses the collapse more positively, affirming the turn from a 'solid identity' to a 'liquid identity'.[4] I shall argue that the propagation of ecclesial solidity echoes Troeltsch's sectarianism, while the propagation of ecclesial liquidity echoes Troeltsch's mysticism. Hence, both ecclesiologies close the church off against the other even though they take practice as their point of departure. After exploring (1) the ecclesiology of solid identity and (2) the ecclesiology of liquid identity, (3) I shall analyse Graham Ward's ecclesiology. Graham Ward contends that alterity is at the centre of the practice of the body of Christ – a body which he maps onto ecclesial *and* non-ecclesial practices. His ecclesiology frees itself from the clutches of the chimera of a comprehensive community when it culminates in the claim that the 'assertion "I am a Christian" is not an identity statement'.[5] Ward avoids the pitfalls of ecclesial solidity and ecclesial liquidity, but he eventually envisions a 'theocracy' to govern the practices of the

[3] Healy, 'Practices', explores the concept of practice in Stanley Hauerwas's and Reinhold Hütter's ecclesiologies. I have extended Healy's critique of these concepts in Ulrich Schmiedel, 'Praxis or Talk about Praxis? The Concept of Praxis in Ecclesiology', *Ecclesial Practices: Journal for Ecclesiology and Ethnography* (forthcoming) by arguing that John Milbank exemplifies the post-liberal turn to practice as a turn to the doctrine of the practice of churches rather than to the practice of churches, because Milbank draws neither on quantitative-empirical nor on qualitative-empirical explorations of concrete churches. Here, I extend my critique of Milbank's ecclesiology in comparison to Pete Ward's and Graham Ward's ecclesiologies.

[4] The metaphors of 'liquidity' and 'solidity' are inspired by Bauman's sociology of *Liquid Modernity*.

[5] Graham Ward, *Cities of God* (London: Routledge, 2000), 259.

body of Christ. The politics of power inherent in Ward's turn to theocracy, I shall continue to argue, reintroduces the clash between identity and alterity which he at first rejected.[6]

Although the three ecclesiologies which exemplify the turn to practice continue the attack on alterity explored in Chapters 4 and 5 above, they also contribute to the elasticisation of ecclesiology for which I have argued throughout my study. Their contribution will be addressed in the following and final Chapter.

1 Solid Identity

According to John Milbank, dogmatics is *church* dogmatics.[7] The practice of church is the foundation of theology. But what is practice? Milbank defines practice as a 'mode of action' – strictly speaking, a 'definite' mode of action – which forms and informs its practitioners.[8] One cannot step outside of practice; one can only switch from *this* mode of action (say ecclesial practice) to *that* mode of action (say non-ecclesial practice). Since there is no neutral position outside practice, the practice of churches offers the only foundation for the reflection on churches.[9]

Milbank stresses that the foundation of practice is itself anti-foundationalist. Following George A. Lindbeck, he clarifies how the concept opposes the foundationalism

[6] Ward, *Politics*, 294-302.
[7] With reference to Karl Barth, John Milbank, *Being Reconciled: Ontology and Pardon* (London: Routledge, 2003), 105-137.
[8] Milbank, *Theology and Social Theory*, 382.
[9] Ibid., 382-383.

of religious subjectivism and religious objectivism.[10] Yet Milbank criticises Lindbeck's division of practice into a material narrative, on the one hand, and a formal reflection on the material narrative, on the other. Such a division results in the ahistoricity of the narrative –'narrativism', so to speak. Milbank emphasises that a discourse cannot operate as a foundation for a meta-discourse since the formal impinges on the material as much as the material impinges on the formal. Thus, Milbank extends the post-liberal anti-foundationalism: practice captures both the material discursive action and the formal meta-discursive reflection on the discursive action.[11]

According to Milbank, the task of theology is to identify the practice of the church: here, the identification of what is church entails the identification of what is non-church and the identification of what is non-church entails the identification of what is church. Milbank is not concerned with the 'essence' of *this* definite mode of action in contrast to the 'essence' of *that* definite mode of action; rather, he is concerned with the *contrast* between these modes of action – church *vis-à-vis* non-church. He defines church as 'counter-society': by definition, the exemplary practice of the church counters the non-exemplary practice of the non-church.[12] It could be concluded that the modes of action of counter-society and society are intricately interlinked, or – more mischievously – that Milbank simply subsumes everything that he finds destructive under the label 'society' and everything that he finds constructive under the label 'counter-society'.[13] But Milbank qualifies the contrast between church and non-church.

---

[10] Ibid., 384-387. See Lindbeck, *The Nature of Doctrine*, esp. 15-45.
[11] Milbank, *Theology and Social Theory*, 388-390.
[12] Ibid., 390-440.
[13] Edmund Arens, 'Öffentliche oder gegenöffentliche Kirche? Ekklesiologische Konzepte Politischer Theologie', in *Extra Ecclesiam... Zur Institution und Kritik von Kirche*, ed. Henning Klingen, Peter Zeilinger, and Michael Hölzl (Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2013), 160-162.

Following Alasdair MacIntyre's communitarian account of Aristotelianism,[14] Milbank elaborates on why the contrast between the practice of society and the practice of counter-society is due to the τέλος of practice: a practice operates according to a goal. But whereas the non-church sets goals (the attainment of which has to be enforced and re-enforced), the goal of the church is a 'goal beyond goal'.[15] The goal of the church *is* the church: church practises church.[16] To clarify how church practises church, 'charity' is important for Milbank. Christ offers the gift of charity which is remembered by the church. The memories of Christ, Milbank stresses in *The Future of Love*, 'provide us – within the whole network of tradition within which they belong – with a new language of community. The Christian claim is that the narratives about Christ show what love ... is'.[17] Milbank emphasises that the continuation of the narrative is not a repetition but a response.[18] Accordingly, he does not structure the narrative of the church christologically – as if a christology could be applied and re-applied – but ecclesiologically. This structure echoes his critique of Lindbeck's 'narrativism'. To act charitably, the church has to enact charity practically and poetically.[19] The enactment of charity requires a faith which Milbank understands as 'trust in the unknown'.[20] With the concept of trust, Milbank depicts faith not

---

[14] Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory* (London: Duckworth, 1985), 181-203.

[15] Milbank, *Theology and Social Theory*, 409, 422.

[16] As Milbank explains in response to critique of his ecclesiology, the Eucharist exemplifies the church practising 'church' for him. John Milbank, 'Enclaves, or Where is the Church?', *New Blackfriars* 73/861 (1992), 341-352.

[17] Milbank, *The Future of Love: Essays in Political Theology* (London: SCM, 2009), 337-351, esp. 346. Here, Milbank seems to switch from the concept of charity to the concept of love without reflecting on this switch. Crucially, he defines love as *Christian* love. For a concise critique of the Christianisation of love by the doctrinal discourses of Christianity, see Jeanrond, *A Theology of Love*, 132-134.

[18] Milbank, *Future of Love*, 347.

[19] See 'A Christological Poetics' and 'The Name of Jesus', in John Milbank, *The Word Made Strange: Theology, Language, Culture* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), 123-144 and 145-168. For Milbank's christological concept of ποίησις, see Steven Shakespeare, *Radical Orthodoxy: A Critical Introduction* (London: SPCK, 2007), 72-79.

[20] Milbank, *Future of Love*, 152.

as securing, but as un-securing: faith implies the acceptance of a 'risk' – acceptance which finds 'security in the mode of hopeful delight in the unknown'.[21]

Finally, Milbank specifies charity as non-violence. Unsurprisingly, the church's non-violence is contrasted to the non-church's violence. Countering the non-church which violently enforces and re-enforces its goals, the church non-violently enacts and re-enacts its goal-beyond-goal – which is to say, charity. As a consequence, church 'allows us to unthink the necessity of violence'.[22] According to Milbank, the un-thinking of violence requires that the church is itself the harmony of differences without the harmonising of differences.[23] Milbank's church – the definite ecclesial mode of action vis-à-vis the definite non-ecclesial mode of action – educates its practitioners in a charitable way of life. The practitioners of the ethics of counter-secularity in the church educate the practitioners of the ethics of secularity in the non-church, thus enabling and equipping culture to overcome culture through church.[24] When culture is converted by church, it allows modernised and modernising societies to go 'beyond' the collapse of community imposed by secularity.[25]

However, who composes the ecclesial harmony? Who constructs the identity of church vis-à-vis the identity of non-church? For Milbank, the consensus of the church decides what is church and what is non-church. As 'absolute consensus' it is not a matter of

---

[21] Ibid., 154.

[22] Milbank, *Theology and Social Theory*, 416.

[23] Ibid., 422: Literally, Milbank holds that 'Christianity is ... "differences in continuous harmony"'.

[24] John Milbank, 'Education and Ethos: Beyond Romanticism and Enlightenment', *Ecclesiology* 9/3 (2013), 347-366.

[25] The preposition 'beyond' is central to Milbank's theological trilogy which envisions a way of life beyond secularity. While his contrast of theology and sociology attempts to go 'beyond secular reason', his contrast of theology and philosophy attempts to go 'beyond secular order'. Milbank is working on a contrast of theology and the history of religion which similarly takes the inception or invention of secularity as its point of departure. For a short summary of his theological trilogy, see Milbank, *Beyond Secular Order: The Representation of Being and the Representation of the People* (Chichester: Blackwell, 2014), 1-18. For Milbank, the collapse of community is an effect of the secularity beyond which he would like to go. See Milbank, *Theology and Social Theory*, 9: 'Once there was no "secular". ... Instead, there was the single community of Christendom'.

compliance because it allows for differences in ideas and ideologies (otherwise it would violently enforce and re-enforce compliance like the non-church).[26] Milbank interprets the consensus as an 'event', emphasising its performative rather than its propositional quality.[27] Nonetheless, Milbank's recourse to the concept of consensus begs the question of who composes church as opposed to non-church. A consensus needs to be discerned. Who discerns it? Milbank explains that the discernment is based on 'the "sense"' of the authenticity or inauthenticity of the practice of church in contrast to the practice of non-church; and such a sense 'can only be acquired through the effort of composition'.[28] But, again, *who* composes the consensus?

Milbank stresses the significance of the practitioners in the church, past and present, which is why the consensus of church is synchronic as well as diachronic.[29] Put plainly, church composes church. He explains that such a circular composition is similar to a hermeneutics.[30] However, what is crucial is that Milbank's hermeneutics is 'safeguarded' by what he identifies as '*ecclesiastical elite*'.[31] Effectively, Milbank envisions a mixture of democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy to govern practice, whereby ecclesial practice converts non-ecclesial practice into this mixed mode of government. The mixture has to be saved and sustained against what Milbank assesses as 'the tyranny of mass opinion' –

[26] Milbank, *Being Reconciled*, 128.
[27] Ibid. However, Milbank does not elaborate on the evaluation of the consensus as a performative (in contrast to a constative) consensus.
[28] Milbank, *Future of Love*, 175-220, esp. 180.
[29] Milbank, *Being Reconciled*, 123-126.
[30] Milbank, *Future of Love*, 180.
[31] Milbank, *Being Reconciled*, 129 (my emphasis).

practice has to be policed by elites.[32] By aligning (or realigning) the practice of church to the medieval *Corpus Christianum*, he claims that the elite are 'gathered around the bishops' since the *cathedra* of the bishop is the spatial and temporal symbol of the church's consensus.[33]

Although Milbank admits that church has to prompt the 'purging of ... excessive priestly dominance',[34] he offers no criterion to decide when such dominance has been turned from essential elitism to excessive elitism. I wonder who could undertake such a 'purge'? Who safeguards the safeguards? Who polices the police? For Milbank, it is invariably the ecclesiastical-episcopal elite which define church in contrast to non-church.[35] However, by identifying the safeguards of what counts as the practice of church and non-church, Milbank interprets the practice of concrete churches as an appendix to the doctrinal discourse of these safeguards. Hence, Milbank's ecclesiology turns to the *doctrine* of practice instead of practice.

The discrepancy between practice and talk about practice follows from Milbank's concept of identity.[36] For Milbank, identity is not a consequence of the practice of church but a condition for the practice of church: identity is applied as a criterion for authentic or

---

[32] Milbank, *Beyond Secular Order*, 254. Here, the combination of democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy of *Being Reconciled* is articulated as a combination of government through 'the Many', 'the Few', and 'the One' (ibid., 9-10, 170-176, 247-254, 264-271), culminating in Milbank's recommendation of constitutional monarchy as the most adequate and the most appropriate mode of government today (ibid., 253).

[33] Milbank, *Being Reconciled*, 123-130. Similarly, Jean-Luc Marion, *God Without Being*, trans. Thomas A. Carlson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 152, claims that '*only the bishop merits ... the title of theologian*' (emphasis in the original).

[34] Milbank, *Beyond Secular Order*, 256.

[35] According to the 'Introduction' to Milbank's *The Word Made Strange*, today, 'theology is tragically too important. For all the current talk of a theology that would reflect on practice, the truth is that we remain uncertain as to where today to locate true Christian practice. ... In his or her uncertainty as to where to find this, the theologian feels almost that the entire ecclesial task falls on his own head' (ibid., 1). Hence, one might wonder whether Milbank considers himself to be *the* (or a part of *the*) ecclesiastical-episcopal elite. Also, who, I wonder, called Milbank's 'theologian' to tragically fulfil the 'entire ecclesial task'?

[36] See Schmiedel, 'Praxis or Talk about Praxis?'

inauthentic practice. However, Milbank's ideal(isation) of church *vis-à-vis* non-church ignores that practitioners might conceive of practice differently from whoever or whatever claims to be the ecclesiastical-episcopal elite. Since practitioners are members of a multitude of definite or not-so-definite modes of action,[37] the practice of church is inevitably infused with the practice of non-church.[38] Practitioners, therefore, might not characterise the identity of Christianity in terms of the contrast between non-violent church and violent non-church. Milbank acknowledges that the distinction between different modes of action is not easily drawn – and yet he draws it according to the criterion of identity.[39] Thus, Milbank's ecclesiology constructs the identity of what is church at the expense of the identity of what is non-church as demonstrated by the use of binaries, such as 'church versus non-church' and 'charity versus non-charity' or 'non-goal versus goal' and 'non-violence versus violence'.[40] What follows is that, for Milbank, the ecclesiastical elite *make* the practice of church the practice of church.

According to Milbank, whoever and whatever is non-church, is 'on the path of damnation'.[41] Salvifically, the non-violent counter-society counters the violent society. But, as Graham Ward indicates, the countering of violence through non-violence runs the

[37] See Tanner, *Theories of Culture*, 93-119. For the intersection of intra- and inter-religious practice, see also Werner G. Jeanrond, 'Belonging or Identity? Christian Faith in a Multi-Religious World', in *Many Mansions? Multiple Religious Belonging and Christian Identity* (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2002), 106-107.

[38] See Healy, 'Ecclesiology, Ethnography, and God', 191-193. See also Healy, 'Practices', 292-293.

[39] See Tanner, *Theories of Culture*, 97. It is noteworthy that Shakespeare, *Radical Orthodoxy*, 102-107, points to passages in which Milbank seems to open ecclesiology to critiques from the inside as well as from the outside. However, ultimately, the openness to (self-)critique is curtailed by Milbank's ecclesiastical elite.

[40] For a detailed discussion of the charge of 'dualism' against Radical Orthodoxy, see Shakespeare, *Radical Orthodoxy*, 150-159.

[41] Milbank, *Theology and Social Theory*, 390.

risk of turning into violence itself.[42] Milbank anticipates and admits this risk: to counter non-Christians, Christians have to 'coerce' non-Christians into Christianity.[43] Yet, according to Milbank, the interpretation of coercion is dependent on one's perspective: from a non-Christian perspective, it is a demonstration of power; but from a Christian perspective, it is a demonstration of peace. Milbank claims that since there is no neutral position outside of practice, a person realises how she was persuaded by truth –'"*truly*" persuaded'[44] – only through turning from the non-ecclesial perspective to the ecclesial perspective.[45] Hence, coercion can be retrospectively 'redeemed' by the coerced.[46] Thus, Milbank is consistent when he proclaims the 'end of dialogue' between what (according to the elite) is Christian and what (according to the elite) is non-Christian.[47]

To summarise, Milbank's ecclesiology entails the neutralisation of the other. Through the ecclesiastical-episcopal elite, alterity is allocated to the exterior of church, while identity is allocated to the interior of church. Milbank attempts to guarantee that the practice of church counters the practice of non-church. Practice is indeed a *definite* mode of action for him: defining who is in and who is out. Therefore, the choice to enter or not to enter the practice of church is retrospectively masked. Thus, Milbank's attempt falls prey to what my analysis of Troeltsch's typology exposed as sectarianism. Sectarianism is

---

[42] Graham Ward, 'John Milbank's *Divina Comedia*', *New Blackfriars* 73/861 (1992), 311-318. See also Romand Coles, 'Storied Others and Possibilities of Caritas: Milbank and Neo-Nietzschean Ethics', *Modern Theology* 8/4 (1992), 331-351. For a comprehensive and critical analysis of the role of violence in Milbank's theology to date, see Scott MacDougall, 'Scapegoating the Secular: The Irony of Mimetic Violence in the Social Theology of John Milbank', in *Violence, Transformation, and the Sacred,* ed. Margaret R. Pfeil and Tobias L. Winright (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 2011), 85-98.

[43] Milbank repeatedly refers to 'coercion' in his ecclesiology. See esp. the Section 'Christianity and Coercion' in *Theology and Social Theory*, 423-429.

[44] Milbank, 'Enclaves, or Where is the Church?', 348 (my emphasis).

[45] Ibid., 348-349.

[46] Milbank, *Theology and Social Theory*, 422.

[47] See the Chapter, 'The End of Dialogue', in *Future of Love*, 279-300. See also, Shakespeare, *Radical Orthodoxy*, 110-116.

marked by the separation of inside and outside – a separation which is the core characteristic of what Bauman assessed as the anthropoemic neutralisation of alterity. However, if trust in the transformative transcendence of the other is at the core of Christianity, the anthropoemic neutralisation of the other counters what Christianity is about.

2 Liquid Identity

According to Pete Ward, too, dogmatics is *church* dogmatics.[48] He endorses Milbank's argument that there is no neutral position outside of practice.[49] However, he is 'a little uneasy' with Milbank's reduction of practice to either theological or non-theological discourse.[50] For Ward, both ecclesial and non-ecclesial practice is 'much more than' discourse.[51] He argues that theology cannot abandon sociology and sociology cannot abandon theology when the practice of churches is at stake.[52]

The combination of theology and sociology is affirmed autobiographically. In his work as a youth minister, Ward has aimed to turn the practice of church 'upside down', because (youth) ministry is not about bringing people to the territory of the church, but

[48] See Pete Ward, *Participation and Mediation: A Practical Theology for the Liquid Church* (London: SCM, 2009), 17, where theology – strictly speaking, 'practical theology' – is defined as critical and constructive reflection on the practice of churches.
[49] Ibid., 19.
[50] Ibid., 20.
[51] Ibid.
[52] Ward combines ecclesiology and ethnography to counter the reduction of practice to theological or non-theological discourse. For a short summary, see Pete Ward, 'Attention and Conversation', in *Perspectives on Ecclesiology and Ethnography*, 36-49. See also Paul S. Fiddes and Pete Ward, 'Affirming Faith at a Service of Baptism in St Aldates Church, Oxford', in *Explorations in Ecclesiology and Ethnography*, ed. Christian B. Scharen (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2012), 51-70.

about bringing the territory of the church to people.[53] In order to understand these territories, Ward draws on empirical explorations.

According to Ward, sociological surveys have shown that Christians and non-Christians alike seek spirituality outside rather than inside churches.[54] He draws on studies such as *The Spiritual Revolution* in which Linda Woodhead and Paul Heelas defined the 'subjectivization thesis' in order to examine the features and facets of spirituality in contemporary culture.[55] Utilised in both accounts of the secularisation of culture and accounts of the sacralisation of culture, 'spirituality', they argue, is a contested concept.[56] Rooted in their empirical exploration of ecclesial and non-ecclesial spiritualities in Kendal, a town in Cumbria, England, the subjectivisation thesis seeks to make sense of the controversy of secularisation versus sacralisation. It does so by elaborating on a turn to the subject which displays a shift in the location of authority from the external to the internal, from the objective to the subjective.[57] As a consequence of the subjectivisation of contemporary culture, spiritual seekers assume community to be shaped by the subject rather than the subject to be shaped by community.[58] Ward argues that in order to accept and accommodate spiritual seekers *after* the spiritual revolution, ecclesiology requires a shift from the paradigm of 'solid church' to the paradigm of 'liquid church'.[59] Accordingly,

---

[53] Ward, *Participation and Mediation*, 27.

[54] Ibid., 14. See also Sarah Dunlop and Pete Ward, 'From Obligation to Consumption in Two-and-a-half Hours: A Visual Exploration of the Sacred with Young Polish Migrants', *Journal of Contemporary Religion* 27/3 (2012), 433-451.

[55] Heelas and Woodhead, *The Spiritual Revolution*.

[56] Ibid., 1-2.

[57] Ibid., 1-11.

[58] See ibid., 11, where 'subjectivization' is distinguished from 'individualization': 'For, as we will see, above all else subjective-life spirituality is "holistic", involving a self-in-relation rather than a self-in-isolation'.

[59] Pete Ward, *Liquid Church* (Carlisle: Paternoster, 2002), 17. For Ward's account of the subjectivization thesis, see Ward, 'Attention and Conversation', 42-43.

in contrast to Milbank, Ward assumes that the core concern of ecclesiology is not a church which converts culture, but a culture which converts church.

Practice is important for Ward's ecclesiology. He understands church as a conglomerate of 'signifying practices'.[60] Ward refers to practices which allow practitioners to make meaning. Participation in these practices – such as singing a Christian song, to take one of Ward's examples – enables spiritual seekers to learn the language of the symbols and the signs of Christianity.[61] Accordingly, signifying practices allow for 'shared communication' of symbolic signs among Christians, thus starting and sustaining relationships.[62] Again, Ward agrees with Milbank's ecclesiology: practice is at the centre of ecclesiology. But while Milbank sees the centre as definite, Ward sees the centre as indefinite. Accordingly, Ward criticises the focus of ecclesiology on the clear-cut category of congregation: 'Congregation characterizes solid church. By congregation I mean the tendency to emphasise one central meeting. Usually this meeting is a worship service held weekly on a Sunday morning'.[63] Since the congregation stresses a spirituality of 'standardisation' rather than a spirituality of de-standardisation,[64] it loses touch with the spirituality in contemporary culture. Ward argues that the contrast between church and culture is indeed the core concern of the congregation which looks inward as opposed to outward.[65] Through the paradigm shift from solid to liquid ecclesiology, then, he tries to turn ecclesiologies around, looking outward as opposed to inward – to the spiritual seekers.

---

[60] Ward, *Participation and Mediation*, 71.
[61] Ibid.
[62] Ibid., 72.
[63] Ward, *Liquid Church*, 17.
[64] Ibid., 19.
[65] Ibid., 26-30.

Ward marshals christological and theological arguments for his turn.[66] Referring to the ecclesiology of Paul, he reflects on the main metaphor of evn Cristw/|.[67] According to Ward, the metaphor allows for the alternative between 'in Christ' and 'in Church' – an alternative which Milbank's account of practice rejected by arguing that church is connected to Christ as much as Christ is connected to Church: the church *is* where one can connect to Christ. For Ward, however, 'believers are one with each other because they are joined to Christ. The temptation is to reverse these priorities, so that by being joined to the church one is joined to Christ'.[68] Hence, countering ecclesiologies where practice is construed ecclesiologically rather than christologically, Ward argues that ecclesiology ought to resist this temptation in order to make 'room for new ways of being church'.[69]

These new ways of being church are reflected in what Ward articulates as 'The Liquid Dance of God'.[70] He retrieves the concept of pericw,rhsij from Paul S. Fiddes's Trinitarian theology in order to prioritise the dynamic over the static in the concept of God:[71] 'The dancing flow of relationship is open-ended, thus drawing us into its current'.[72] The result of Ward's theology is the 'vision of a church as network of relationships'.[73] The theology of the Trinity undergirds the liquefaction of church, the criterion of which is not 'congregation', but 'communication'.[74]

---

[66] See Kees de Groot, 'The church in liquid modernity: A sociological and theological exploration of a liquid church', *International Journal for the Study of the Christian Church* 6/1 (2006), 92.
[67] Ward, *Liquid Church*, 33-39.
[68] Ibid., 36.
[69] Ibid.
[70] Ibid., 49-55.
[71] See esp. Paul S. Fiddes, *Participating in God: A Pastoral Doctrine of the Trinity* (London: DLT, 2000).
[72] Ward, *Liquid Church*, 53-54. See also Ward, *Participation and Mediation*, 24-26.
[73] Ward, *Liquid Church*, 55.
[74] Ibid., 87.

Ward elucidates the sharing of communication with the two core concepts of his ecclesiology: 'participation' and 'mediation'. Participation in the flow of communication means mediating the flow to others; mediating the flow to others means participation in the flow of communication.[75] Thus, participation and mediation of the flow are assessed as techniques or tools for 'identity formation'.[76] According to Ward, Christians become Christians through their incorporation into the flow of communication,[77] for example, the creation and consumption of the songs written by Christian singer-songwriters.[78] The doctrine of the Trinity allows for a notion of God as participation and mediation which 'means that the cultural expression of the Church is seen as a place of divine encounter'.[79] Through incorporation into the flow of communication – like listening to Christian singer-songwriters – Christians encounter and experience God. Ward argues that participation and mediation of the flow of communication cannot 'be reduced to attendance at worship'.[80] To escape the focus on the congregation, he coins the concept of 'theological capital'[81] which is accumulated 'in the context of an active sharing in the communication of the Church' – communication which is disseminated both inside and outside of congregations.[82] Hence, with or without attendance at the worship of a congregation, Christians can accumulate the theological capital which 'has a transforming impact' on them.[83]

---

[75] Ibid., 93-134.
[76] Ibid., 78.
[77] Ibid.
[78] Ibid., 81-92, 150-167. See also Pete Ward, *Selling Worship: How What We Sing Has Changed the Church* (Carlisle: Paternoster, 2005)
[79] Ward, *Participation and Mediation*, 98.
[80] Ibid., 119.
[81] Ibid., 118-119. The concept of theological capital is defined in conversation with Pierre Bourdieu. See Pierre Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice*, trans. Richard Nice (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), esp. the Chapter on 'Symbolic Capital', 112-121.
[82] Ward, *Participation and Mediation*, 119.
[83] Ibid.

But how can churches foster and facilitate the accumulation of theological capital outside as opposed to inside congregations? Ward's provocative response is: 'commodification'.[84] 'It is provocative to use the language of consuming and commodities, but it is deliberate, because it points toward my main motivation for suggesting why we need a new pattern in church life: mission'.[85] Accordingly, Ward's shift from the paradigm of solid church to the paradigm of liquid church amounts to the affirmation of contemporary consumerism in the church.[86] But, for Ward, affirmation of contemporary culture is not necessarily selling or selling-out the church. He stresses that 'regulating the flow' is indispensable.[87] The criterion for the regulation is anchored in what he labels 'the Christian story', a story which, for Ward, is the same, even if it is expressed differently under different circumstances.[88] While Milbank constructs the identity of the church through ecclesiastical elites which safeguard the Christian story, Ward constructs the identity of the church through the Christian story. Although Ward never tells this story in detail, he is convinced that it 'connects the liquid church to its theological roots. A commitment to orthodoxy provides assurance in the midst of the flow'.[89]

The community which characterises Ward's liquefaction of church revolves around the Christian story, albeit in communication as opposed to congregation. Hence, 'constant communication' which includes both virtual and non-virtual means is vital for the participation and the mediation of the Christian story.[90] To facilitate constant

[84] Ward, *Liquid Church*, 63.
[85] Ibid., 3. See also Kees de Groot, 'The church', 93.
[86] Ward, *Liquid Church*, 56-57.
[87] Ibid., 65-71, 78-89.
[88] Ibid., 70.
[89] Ibid., 71.
[90] Ibid., 88.

communication, churches 'Christianise' contemporary consumer culture. Accordingly, the liquefaction of church implies the intake of culture into church rather than the intake of church into culture.

In his sociological and theological critique of the *Liquid Church*, Kees de Groot identifies the implications of Ward's liquefaction of church: 'The possibility that capitalism would turn ... relationships ... into commodities was the ultimate nightmare for Marxists but Ward welcomes this process'.[91] According to de Groot, Ward's assumption is that the church ought to fit into culture in order to accommodate spiritual seekers. Since mission is the core concern for Ward's church, it is clear how the church benefits from such accommodation. It is unclear, however, how the seekers benefit.[92] De Groot insists that, instead of accommodating contemporary culture, Zygmunt Bauman's sociology – the sociology which has inspired Ward's liquid church – ought to provoke theology to reconsider its interpretation of community and society.[93]

However, in *Participation and Mediation: A Practical Theology for the Liquid Church*, Ward argues that 'the Church adopts culture in order to communicate and connect, but as it does so it must also seek to adapt ... the culture in which it is situated'.[94] According to Ward, the Jesus Movement exemplifies the process of adaption as 'it had a decisive impact on the culture of contemporary Church both in the UK and in the USA'.[95] Its impact has been decisive because it created a 'subcultural style' in the communication

[91] Kees de Groot, 'The church', 93. De Groot argues that Ward takes the 'the sting' out of Bauman's sociology.
[92] Ibid., 99.
[93] Ibid., 98.
[94] Ward, *Participation and Mediation*, 137.
[95] Ibid., 143. For Ward's analysis of the Jesus Movement, see also Ward, *Selling Worship*.

of the Christian story.[96] Hence, even if Ward focuses on the change of church through culture rather than the change of culture through church – the Jesus Movement exemplifies how culture converted church[97] – de Groot's critique might be too sweeping. In principle, Ward affirms the critique of culture through church as much as he affirms the critique of church through culture. His ecclesiology is an attempt to understand both of these critiques through empirical explorations. For Ward, the practices of concrete churches have to be taken into account. He is interested in practice rather than the doctrine of practice; abstract condemnations of consumerist culture through church, or of church through consumerist culture, would distort his ethnographical-ecclesiological accounts of practice.[98]

However, the communities of communication which Ward envisions are 'communities of choice'.[99] Both the construction and the consumption of certain styles of cultural or subcultural communication make the community a community. But if a community is established in the choice of a style – according to one's taste in different Christian singer-songwriters, for example – it becomes self-selective and self-selecting.[100] Ward anticipates this critique:

---

[96] Ward, *Participation and Mediation*, 143-144, 151-167.

[97] See Tanya M. Luhrmann's anthropological analysis, *When God Talks Back: Understanding the American Evangelical Relationship with God* (New York: Vintage Books, 2012), 3-38, where she traces how the Jesus Movement was inspired by the Hippie movement.

[98] See Pete Ward, 'Blueprint Ecclesiology and the Lived: Normativity as a Perilous Faithfulness', *Ecclesial Practices* 2/1 (2015), 74-90. He argues that the practice of church has a 'gravitational pull' (ibid., 76). This gravitational pull is exemplified by his comparison of two ecclesiologies which take the doctrine of the Trinity as their point of departure. Although both centre their ecclesiology in the same doctrine, they arrive at different ecclesiologies: one emphasising and one de-emphasising the significance of the hierarchy for the church (ibid., 70-77). The difference in their emphases, Ward argues, is easily explained if one considers the churches to which the two ecclesiologists belong. The gravitational pull of church, then, has a significant impact on how one understands church.

[99] Ward, *Liquid Church*, 89.

[100] Ward, *Participation and Mediation*, 189.

> A potential criticism of churches as a self-selecting group is that such a group will be less socially diverse ... But most churches are already fairly limited in the kinds of people they gather. Communities based around choice could bring a wide diversity together precisely because they are based on shared interest.[101]

Ward's argument is plausible. If the solid church is characterised by self-selection, self-selection cannot be marshalled as a critique against the shift from the solid to the liquid church. However, he neglects that the neutralisation of the other which follows from self-selection might invalidate both of these paradigms, the solid and the liquid, thus exposing the alternative as a false alternative.

To summarise, Ward's ecclesiology eventually entails the neutralisation of the other. By concentrating on the commodification of the Christian story, the other is placed simultaneously on the inside and the outside of church. But since the Christian story is never told, it is almost impossible to identify whether it makes a difference to ecclesial or non-ecclesial practice. Thus, the practice of the church rather confirms than counters the practice of the non-church. Ward's practice, then, is indeed an *indefinite* practice: it defines neither who is in nor who is out. Instead of engaging with the other – how the other resonates with, or resists, the story – the otherness of the other is deemed irrelevant as long as she favours the same style of story-telling. Therefore, the choice to enter or not to enter the practice of church is not retrospectively masked, but retrospectively unmasked. Since one can choose this style today and that style tomorrow, church comes without commitment. Thus, Ward's ecclesiology falls prey to what my analysis of Troeltsch's typology exposed as mysticism. Troeltsch's mysticism is marked by the combination of inside and outside – a combination which is also the core characteristic of what Bauman

[101] Ward, *Liquid Church*, 90.

assesses as the anthropophagic neutralisation of alterity. However, if trust in the transformative transcendence of the other is at the core of Christianity, the anthropophagic neutralisation of the other counters what Christianity is about.

3 The Politics of Power

Graham Ward's account of theology offers a subtle but significant alternative to the practice of a solidified church which counters culture and the practice of a liquefied church which confirms culture. In *Cities of God*, Ward argues that contemporary culture is both a challenge and a chance for theology 'in the face of unprecedented social atomism'.[102] Hence, Ward also assumes a collapse of community in contemporary culture, although his assumption is not rooted in the comparison of a past comprehensive community with a present collapsing community – he would consider such comparisons 'nostalgia', phantoms which haunt the perception of the present.[103] Countering the accounts of ecclesial solidity and ecclesial liquidity above, Ward carefully complicates the relation between church and culture. For Ward, there 'is no pure theological discourse'.[104]

[102] Ward, *Cities*, ix.

[103] Ward's interpretation of the collapse of community is somewhat confusing. In *Cities of God*, he appears to assume that the 'Christendom' of the past actually entailed a comprehensive community (ibid., 237, 257). However, in 'Linearity and Complexity in Ecclesiology', in *Extra Ecclesiam*, 99-130, he argues that if one idealises medieval Christianity, one runs the risk of being haunted by 'the phantoms of nostalgia' (ibid., 126). Ward, *Politics*, also argues that the notion of church as a network of relations is not pre-modern, modern or post-modern, but characteristic of the church throughout history (ibid., 203-204n. 32).

[104] Ward, *Cities*, 14-15.

Theologians must neither completely disconnect nor completely connect church and culture.[105] Instead, they have to explore critically and constructively how culture resonates with, or indeed resists, church and how church resonates with, or indeed resists, culture in order to examine possibilities and impossibilities for the construction of a Christian 'world-view' in contemporary culture.[106] 'World-view' means a way of seeing the world. The concept of *Deutung* (as analysed above in Chapter 3) could be applied to Ward's world-view since he stresses that such a seeing would have to be 'weak': recognising a plurality of world-views in constant conversation.[107]

The 'body' is the core concept of Ward's construction of a Christian world-view,[108] a world-view which aims to allow its adherents to see the world *analogically*, as participating in God.[109] Ward's analogical world-view proceeds from 'the ontological scandal' of 'transcorporeality' in the body of Jesus Christ.[110] To explore transcorporeality, he traces the displacement of Jesus's body through the moments and motifs of incarnation, circumcision, transfiguration, resurrection, and ascension.[111] His central concern is the (memorisation of the) breaking of the body of Christ in the Eucharist. '"Take, eat, this is my body." The shock-wave in these words emerges from the depth of an ontological

[105] Ibid., 7-9, 43-51, 69-70.
[106] Ibid., 9-14.
[107] Ibid., 17-21 with reference to Gianni Vattimo, *Beyond Interpretation: The Meaning of Hermeneutics for Philosophy*, trans. David Webb (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997).
[108] Ward, *Cities*, 23.
[109] 'Analogy' is a core category for Ward. In a 'Platonic' or 'Platonising' approach, he argues that '[a]nalogy as *ana*-logical is theologically frightened' because it points to the participation of the creator in the creation and the creation in the creator while retaining the difference between creator and creation. See esp. ibid., ix.
[110] Ibid., 81.
[111] Ibid., 97-116.

scandal; the scandal of that "is"'.[112] That 'is' which connects 'bread' and 'body' performs transcorporeality.[113]

> With transcorporeality ... the body does not dissolve or ab-solve, it expands *en Christo*. While always located within a specific sociological and historical context, it nevertheless is continually being opened up, allowing itself to open up, in acts of following which affect the transferral, the transduction. Transcorporeality is an effect of following in the wake of the eternal creative Word. Discipleship becomes transfiguring.[114]

Drawing conclusions from the ontological scandal of the transcorporeality of the body of Christ, Ward argues that in 'the brokenness of the transcorporeal body God's grace operates through his creation'.[115] He emphasises the fracture – the moment in the Eucharist when the priest breaks the bread-as-body – as the essential element of his ecclesiology: 'Participation follows from fragmentation; only on the basis of the broken body of Christ can the distribution of that body be effected. The fracturing here is positive, not negative.'[116] According to Ward, this fracture is taken up by the church as the broken body of Christ. Both the christological body and the ecclesiological body are to be 'broken like the bread, to be food dispersed throughout the world'.[117]

The corollary of this fracture is what Ward calls the 'erotic community' which 'is itself a fractured and fracturing community'.[118] With the help of the concepts of 'erotic' and 'erotics', he points to the desire at work in the broken body. Here, he emphasises how

[112] Ibid., 82.
[113] Ibid., 92.
[114] Ibid., 95.
[115] Ibid., 95-96.
[116] Ibid., 152.
[117] Ibid., 112.
[118] Ibid., 154.

the body of Christ engages with internal and external others: 'Desire issues from difference... Difference can only be difference because it stands *in relation to* that which is other'.[119] Because of the relationality at the core of the broken body, the body of Christ counters the 'logic of privation'[120] which characterises modern and postmodern practices of desire as Ward's survey of the sex shop demonstrates.[121] In order to counter the practices which are rooted in the logic of privation, the institutional churches are vital: 'Only as institutions can they offer places for the organisation of a different kind of space, a liturgical space'.[122] Consequently, the liturgy – started and sustained by the institutions of church – is the point of departure for the practice of love in ecclesial and non-ecclesial bodies. However, although started and sustained by the institution, the liturgy cannot be confined or controlled by it.

> The institutional churches are necessary, but they are not ends in themselves; they are constantly transgressed by ... an erotic community. ... The body of Christ desiring its consummation opens itself to what is outside the institutional Church; offers itself to perform in fields of activity far from chancels and cloisters.[123]

According to Ward, then, the practice of love spills out of the liturgy of the churches, from church to culture and from culture to church. There is no ecclesiastical or episcopal elite

[119] Ibid., 172.
[120] Ibid., 77.
[121] Ibid., 118-120. See also his perceptive and piercing analyses of interpretations and applications of 'desire' since Sigmund Freud in ibid., 52-78 and 117-151.
[122] Ibid., 177.
[123] Ibid., 180.

which could keep 'identity' inside and 'alterity' outside.[124] 'What is loved in love is difference.'[125]

Thus, the practice of love implies recognition and respect for the other: 'The Church must sanctify difference, must ... discern difference in all the relationships it sanctifies. For it is from difference that the Church receives the power to be and participate in the power to become'.[126] Thus, identity is infused with alterity and alterity is infused with identity. Ward rejects the communitarianism of confessional communities which he traces back to the 1980s and the 1990s.[127] He insists that what is church cannot be modelled in contrast to what is non-church because ecclesial and non-ecclesial 'boundaries cannot be patrolled'.[128]

> Christianity, the practice of the faith that I can speak for or from, comes in a diversity of forms. ... The interdependence and interrelationality of all things, which is what I have argued for throughout ..., cannot defend the walls of some medieval notion of Christendom. Christendom is over; and with it Christian hegemony.[129]

Christians, then, 'these physical bodies that every day or every week or every month or every year partake of the eucharistic body, belong to various ecclesial bodies, view ... their lives with respect to dwelling in the body of Christ'.[130] It is such a view of their lives, such a Christian world-view, which allows them to take account of culture in church and of

---

[124] See esp. Graham Ward, 'Performing Christ: The Theological Vocation of Lay People', *Ecclesiology* 9/3 (2013), 323-334, which could be read as a critique of Milbank's notion of the ecclesiastical-episcopal elite, although Milbank is not mentioned.
[125] Ward, *Cities*, 201.
[126] Ibid., 202.
[127] Ibid., 247, where he mentions Alasdair MacIntyre and George A. Lindbeck on whom John Milbank is drawing. However, again, Milbank is not mentioned.
[128] Ibid.
[129] Ibid., 257.
[130] Ibid.

church in culture: analogically, then, both church and culture participate in God through Christ.

Ward's ecclesiology of the emerging and emergent church is thus opened to the 'possibilities of performances of Christ beyond any idolisation of Christianity'.[131] Its emphasis on 'participation' counters the 'atomism' of contemporary culture through both ecclesial and non-ecclesial performances of the broken body of Christ.[132] According to Ward, Christians 'belong to a community that is open-ended'.[133] And because the body of Christ is open-ended, 'there is no room for Christian imperialism'; eschatology and ecclesiology make the community a community which engages with the other, resisting the neutralisation of alterity.[134] The body of Christ cannot 'coerce'[135] the other through either anthropoemic exclusion or anthropophagic inclusion, because the assertion

> 'I am a Christian' is not an identity statement. For my intellectual grasp upon what it is to be a Christian is weak... I follow. I do not know what it is I say when I say 'Christ'. I give myself over to that which I have come to recognise is more than I.[136]

Here, Ward pushes his ecclesiology of the broken body of Christ to the extreme: alterity – the 'more' of the ultimately unknown – is anchored in (the body of) Christ. Ecclesiology which accepts the alterity of Christ weakens the identity of Christianity, making room for alterity in the body of Christ, for alterity in ecclesial bodies as well as for alterity in non-

[131] Ward, 'Linearity and Complexity in Ecclesiology', 128.
[132] Ward, *Cities*, 75. Throughout, he uses 'practice' and 'performance' interchangeably. See also Ward, 'Performing Christ, 323-334.
[133] Ward, *Cities*, 258.
[134] Ibid., 259.
[135] Ibid. Again, Ward's critique of coercion could be read as a critique of John Milbank, although Milbank is not mentioned.
[136] Ibid.

ecclesial bodies. Through these bodies, the erotic community which is sustained in the fracture of the Eucharist practises its desire for difference: bodies participate in bodies, each and every body participates in God. For Ward, it is *the* task of the theologian to keep the Christian world-view of participation alive either along the lines of contemporary culture or against the lines of contemporary culture, because the Christian world-view of participation, started and sustained in the liturgies of churches, enables hope – a hope which fuels political projects in the face of unprecedented social atomism.[137] In *The Politics of Discipleship*, Ward zooms in on these political projects. Crucially, he points out that his 'ecclesiology maps on to what Pete Ward describes as the liquid church'.[138] However, he restricts the congruence between these two ecclesiologies, pointing out that the concept of the church as a 'network of relationships' has been the character of the church throughout history. Thus, it is not necessary to understand church along the lines of contemporary consumerism, marshalling the non-institutional liquid against the institutional solid.[139]

The Politics of Discipleship is not 'polite' but 'political'.[140] It conceives of the church as a political player in contemporary culture, stressing that the church, as 'a vast network of interrelations posing what Paul terms a body or a building', cannot accept a clear-cut distinction between what is church and what is non-church.[141] But it is nonetheless called to act politically. To account for these acts, Ward analyses contemporary

[137] Ibid., 259-260.
[138] Ward, *Politics*, 203n. 32.
[139] See ibid., 203-204n. 32. Ward borrows the concept of network from Bruno Latour's *Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). See Ward, *Politics*, 202n. 31.
[140] Ibid., 21.
[141] Ibid., 28.

culture. The core concept for his analysis is the preposition 'post',[142] although he points out that this preposition 'does not help us to characterize accurately the contents of the shift' from the modern to the postmodern.[143] He concentrates on the shift from the *secular* to the *postsecular* which characterises contemporary culture.[144] Since the philosophical and theological thinkers who assume such a shift do not offer clear-cut definitions of it,[145] Ward provides a comprehensive analysis of what he calls the 'resurgence of religion'.[146]

Exploring three examples of the new (or not so new) visibility of religion, Ward points out that 'religion is currently dominating the public sphere at all levels'.[147] This dominance is due to a 'resurgence of religion': a metamorphosis of religion has taken place within the shift from the secular to the post-secular.[148] Ward assesses the metamorphosis of religion in contemporary culture as *the* source for de-secularisation.[149] The fact that this metamorphosis is not necessarily a 'commodification of religion',[150] 'suggests that postmodernity is running out of steam; like capitalism of late, it is experiencing a credit squeeze'.[151] In contrast to Pete Ward, Graham Ward discovers *more* in contemporary

---

[142] See also Graham Ward, 'Theology and Postmodernism: Is It All Over?', *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 80/2 (2012), 466-484.

[143] Ward, *Politics*, 154-155.

[144] Strictly speaking, Ward explores a shift in politics (ibid., 37-76), in economics (ibid., 77-116) and in culture (ibid., 117-160), but the cultural shift from secularity to post-secularity is seemingly the most significant for him.

[145] See ibid, 155. See also Ola Sigurdson, 'Beyond Secularism: Towards a Post-Secular Political Theology', *Modern Theology* 26/2 (2010), 177-196.

[146] Ward, *Politics*, 131. See also ibid., 117-158.

[147] Ibid., 154. Ward extensively explores fundamentalism (ibid., 135-138) as well as the recurrence of religion in the political sphere (ibid., 139-146) and in the cultural sphere (ibid., 147-154). See also the contributions to *The New Visibility of Religion*.

[148] Ward, *Politics*, 131.

[149] Ibid., 147.

[150] Ibid., 153.

[151] Ibid., 157. For the centrality of capitalism and consumerism, see also Ward, 'Theology and Postmodernism'.

culture than consumerism.[152] It is this more that he revisits and retrieves for his politicised ecclesiology.

> The politics of Christian discipleship is about first unmasking the theological and metaphysical sources of current mythologies and revealing the distortions and perversions of their current secularized forms. Then we need to reread and rewrite the Christian tradition back into contemporary culture.[153]

Building on his analysis of the resurgence of religion, Ward returns to the core concept of the body, revising his 'metaphysics of the body'.[154] Criticising the point of departure he posited in *Cities of God*, he now argues that 'beginning with the human body, even if it belongs to Jesus of Nazareth, capitulates ... to modern individualism'.[155] To counter individualism, he shifts from the christological body to the ecclesiological body.

Ward characterises church as a 'movement'.[156] Church is a body that 'continually overreaches itself' which is to say that church spills into culture as culture spills into church.[157] Aptly, he refers to a 'location of liminality'.[158] Such a location is to be thought through in terms of 'tradition' rather than in terms of 'institution'.[159] However, the turn from institution to tradition does not turn church from the political to the apolitical. The opposite is the case. Ward points to the actions of a political discipleship. These actions

---

[152] The 'more' allows Ward to 'move beyond postmodernity entirely'. (Ward, *Politics*, 76).
[153] Ibid., 165.
[154] The metaphysics of the body runs through Ward's theology. He explores the Eucharist as the embodiment of Christ in *Cities*, before he discusses the notions of body and embodiment in phenomenological perspectives in *Christ and Culture* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), 61-72, 120-127. *Politics*, esp. 225-226, returns to the metaphysics of the body.
[155] Ward, *Politics*, 225-226
[156] Ibid., 187.
[157] Ibid., 188.
[158] Ibid., 189.
[159] Ibid., 188.

occur outside rather than inside ecclesial institutions.[160] Ward mentions a variety of activities of charity which do not stop short of 'pulling pints for the thirsty'.[161] The agents of these actions are rooted in Christ: the agents act in Christ and Christ acts in the agents.[162] Again, Paul's concept of being evn Cristw/| proves vital for Ward's ecclesiology.[163] Following his reconfiguration of the agents as both acting and acted upon, Ward stresses that it is not necessarily the individual action, but the practice to which the individual action belongs, that makes these activities Christian. The 'act takes its nature and naming from the practice of which it is a part'.[164] It is a practice which participates analogically in the actions of God.[165] 'The church, then, as a body of Christians, is constantly active; it is a network of actors'.[166] Focusing on both actions and actors, Ward explains that the study of church could be captured as 'ecclesiality' as opposed to 'ecclesiology', because 'church is only what this body of Christians do'.[167] The concentration on action rather than reflection sharpens the political edge of Graham Ward's, in comparison to Pete Ward's, ecclesiology.

Since Christians are already doing church, Graham Ward rejects the concept of utopia. Eschatology is not about a non-place, but about a place in-between the kingdom come and the kingdom to come.[168] 'Acts of charity persist' as 'operation of God' such that

[160] See ibid., 189. Unlike Pete Ward, Graham Ward is careful not to pit non-institutional practice against institutional practice, the liquid against the solid.
[161] Ward, *Politics*, 189.
[162] See ibid., 184-185.
[163] See Ibid., 249-250.
[164] Ibid., 192.
[165] See ibid., 193-194, 195-198.
[166] Ibid., 201.
[167] Ibid., 202.
[168] See ibid., 169-171, 283. See also Ward, *Cities*, 225-226.

the 'messianism of a "politics which are to come" is already being practised'.[169] Ward's ecclesiology names and renames the acts of charity done by Christians 'church'. Through such a (re)naming, these actions can be characterised as God's acts with God's creatures. Hence, in Ward's understanding of ecclesiology there is no clear-cut distinction between what is church and what is non-church;[170] the church cannot be spatially or temporally confined; it is characterised by vulnerability because it is beyond control.[171] But does Ward's turn from ecclesiology to ecclesiality allow for a community which engages rather than disengages with the otherness of the other?

Ward denies the charge of individualism. Characterising his ecclesiology as 'communitarian',[172] he adds a 'body politic' to his metaphysics of the body, arguing against the prioritisation of the individual over the social. What his body politic turns out to be is a dazzling rethinking of politics through philological and philosophical analyses of Paul's concept of the body. The outcome of Ward's rethinking is the notion of a body which is *communal*, a body in which Christians are connected to Christians through submission to Christ.[173] It is the sacramental 'submission' which allows Christians 'the disciplining of their desires by Christ', a disciplining that is 'exercised so far beyond the precincts of the parish and the priesthood that it is open wide to making mistakes'.[174] Both

[169] Ibid., 171. Ward's rejection of utopia and utopianism cautions against Troeltsch's concept of the kingdom of God. The concept of the kingdom of God allows for a critical and creative engagement with ecclesiology precisely because it is simultaneously practised and not yet practised. See Chapter 4 above.
[170] See Ward, *Politics*, 21-33, 202.
[171] Ibid., 202-203.
[172] Ibid., 203.
[173] Ibid., 249.
[174] Ibid.

inside and outside parish and priesthood, 'con-formity' with Christ is what the body politic is about.[175]

Echoing Troeltsch's core concept, Ward stresses the necessity of compromise: 'compromises' are 'the risk the church runs in being the church'.[176] Hence, the fact that the community of church is not clearly circumscribed – a community with frazzled and fraying margins, so to speak – does not mean that it is not a community. For Ward, the community is created through submission to Christ. The concept of the body allows Ward to reformulate alterity within the community in terms of *function*. In the Pauline body of Christ, which connects Christian to Christian, differences are not elided.[177] 'The differences, functions as such, live out this polity', because the body consists of the mediation of the universal and the particular: the body *is* the body through its parts.[178] In Ward's ecclesiology, then, difference is at the centre of the concept of church. Difference cautions ecclesiology against strong and striking notions of identity. 'The body is never there as such (as if a static object in a freeze-framed still photo); the body is there only because it moves'.[179] Consequently, 'there are neither designated insiders nor outsiders'.[180]

Ward's concept of the body politic overcomes the separation of insiders and outsiders since – ultimately – the body is a gift to each and everybody.[181] Ward reframes exclusion as self-exclusion: 'Those who do not act become those who are excluded because they could not receive the gift of Christ that was given... Political discipleship thus begins

[175] Ibid., 276.
[176] Ibid., 203.
[177] Ibid., 150.
[178] Ibid.
[179] Ibid., 255-256.
[180] Ibid., 260. Hence, 'in the incorporation into Christ', 'otherness' is 'unsublatable' (ibid., 257).
[181] Ibid., 260.

with being able to receive the gift'.[182] Whether a person can or cannot receive the gift, whether she includes or excludes herself, is a matter of what Ward calls the 'act of entrustment'.[183] The engagement with the polity and the politic of the body of Christ is 'one of trusting, of entrusting oneself to the future promise of what has yet to be revealed'.[184]

Ward concludes by stressing that recognition and respect for difference instigate the politics of discipleship. Echoing Troeltsch's *Doppelcharakter* of the kingdom of God, he points to a 'double axis': the political action that promotes equality is grounded in a relation to God which he describes as 'theocratic'.[185] With 'theocracy' he points out how the sacramental submission to God in Christ allows for equality between those who submit to Christ.[186] The equality which follows from theocracy enables the politics of discipleship to unmask 'the powers that operate in the world' through inequality.[187] According to Ward, Christian and non-Christian faith-based movements are putting this politics into practice.[188] Ultimately, however, it is God's power that works against the de-humanising political powers in contemporary culture.[189] Thus, the kingdom of God, simultaneously the anchor and the aim of discipleship, inspires Christianity to overcome 'depoliticization'.[190]

Ward's notion of the practice of church in-between the solid and the liquid resonates with the elasticisation of ecclesiology for which I argue. However, I wonder how,

---

[182] Ibid.
[183] Ibid., 278.
[184] Ibid., 279.
[185] Ibid., 299.
[186] Ibid., 297.
[187] Ibid., 291-292.
[188] Ibid., 301.
[189] See ibid., 294-301.
[190] See ibid., 69-70, 262, 264-67, 269-70.

for Ward, today's disciples might cope with contradictions or controversies about the forms and the features of the kingdom of God. For the polity of a theocracy[191] – the theocracy which Ward explicitly rejected in *Cities of God*[192] – requires discernment of what can and what cannot count as submission to God in christological conformity.[193] Who discerns? Theocracies run the risk of sliding down a slippery slope into hierocracies, resulting in the inequality between priestly rulers and non-priestly ruled.[194]

When Ward writes that the politics of Christian discipleship means that 'we need to reread and rewrite the Christian tradition back into contemporary culture', it is ultimately unclear who this 'we' is. Are 'we' always agreed on what the Christian tradition is? The acts of charity to which Ward repeatedly refers might create conflict within that 'we'. Is it a charitable act to distribute condoms? Is it a charitable act to allow for the ecclesial marriage or the ecclesial ministry of same-sex couples?[195] Is it a charitable act to assist a patient in palliative care in her suicide? Issues like these demonstrate the disagreement amongst disciples who have to decide what is charitable. Is charity submission to Christ or subversion through Christ? Or could acts of charity be submissive and subversive at once?

Ward concludes that the core concern of the polity and the politics of the body of Christ is overcoming 'depoliticization'. His conclusion is correct. But the question is which political practices the disciples are called to. Ward's assessment of the current political

---

[191] By 'polity', Ward means 'a particular form of political organization, a form of government' (ibid., 40).
[192] Ward, *Cities*, 229.
[193] See Sigurdson, 'Beyond Secularism', 191-192.
[194] Although Ward, *Politics*, 294-295, refers to Josephus, he neglects that this slippery slope is already apparent in Josephus's concept of theocracy. See the analysis by Peter Schäfer, 'Theokratie: Die Herrschaft Gottes als Staatsverfassung in der jüdischen Antike', in *Politik und Religion: Zur Diagnose der Gegenwart*, ed. Friedrich Wilhelm Graf and Heinrich Meier (München: C. H. Beck, 2013), 199-240.
[195] Ward is crystal-clear in his advocacy of same-sex marriage. See Ward, *Cities*, 182-202. However, he offers no account of how proponents and opponents of same-sex marriage within church could or should discuss this issue.

condition draws on Carl Schmitt's notion of the political.[196] Clearly, Schmitt's argument that concepts of the state are indebted to theology is instructive for a politics of discipleship, especially since Schmitt concludes that both legal and political theory are in need of theology.[197] Yet what is less clear is how Schmitt's concept of the political might be instructive. Schmitt defines the political according to the question of who is and who is not the enemy.[198] The political is rooted in 'the ultimate distinction' between *Freund* and *Feind*.[199] By 'enemy' Schmitt means 'the other, the stranger; and it is sufficient for his nature that he is, in a specially intense way, existentially something different'.[200] The distinction between who is and who is not the enemy is a public as opposed to a private distinction for Schmitt. It refers to the frontline between communities.[201] The concept of frontline is applicable here because for Schmitt the engagement with the enemy eventually entails 'the real possibility of physical killing'.[202] 'War follows from enmity. War is the existential negation of the enemy'.[203] Schmitt continues:

> What always matters is the possibility of the extreme case taking place, the real war, and the decision whether this case has or has not arrived. That the extreme case appears to be an exception does not negate its decisive character but

[196] For Ward's use of Schmitt in *Politics*, see 44-50, 58-59, 66-70, 176-178, 286.

[197] See the famous formula in Carl Schmitt, *Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty*, trans. George Schwab (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985), 36: 'All significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized theological concepts'. See also the introduction to Carl Schmitt in *Religion and Political Thought*, ed. Graham Ward and Michael Hoelzl (London: Continuum, 2006), 190-194.

[198] Carl Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*, trans. George Schwab (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1996).

[199] Ibid., 26. Throughout his study, Schmitt's use of the concepts of 'Freund' and 'Feind' seems to shift such that 'Feind' might from time to time rather be translated as 'foe'. Nonetheless, I follow George Schwab who translates with 'enemy'.

[200] Ibid., 27.

[201] See ibid., 28-29.

[202] Ibid., 32.

[203] Ibid., 33.

> confirms it all the more... From this most extreme possibility human life derives its specifically political tension.[204]

The distinction between public and private concepts of enmity allows Schmitt to remove the biblical commandment to love one's enemy: for Schmitt, it pertains to the private as opposed to the public enemy; it is individual as opposed to social.[205]

Schmitt argues that the distinction between who is and who is not the enemy cannot be drawn from a neutral position: *this* community decides whether *that* community is a threat, *that* community decides whether *this* community is a threat. There is no neutral position beyond these communities.[206] The threat is a threat when it pertains to the identity of the community. For Schmitt, the community is rooted in a way of life: if this way of life motivates the community to fight for its self-preservation, it is political.[207] A de-politicised community is tantamount to consumerism: each and everything would be reduced to mere consumption, such that the fight against the enemy would be covered up in the practice of 'perpetual competition'.[208] Ward builds on Schmitt's critique of the economisation of politics.[209] Indeed, Schmitt's point is plausible. Ultimately, it is insignificant whether a war is fought by military or by non-military means. Economic competition, too, takes lives, potentially and actually.

---

[204] Ibid., 35. In '"The Political": The Rational Meaning of a Questionable Inheritance of Political Theology', in *The Power of Religion*, 22, Jürgen Habermas convincingly criticises Schmitt for his concept of the political that 'is superficially adapted to mass democracy but preserves the authoritarian kernel of a sovereign power with its legitimizing relation to sacred history'. He labels this concept of the political a 'clericofascist conception' (ibid., 23).

[205] See Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*, 28-29. Ward, however, argues that 'through love, not law, is the just order established; through love is the alienated citizen once more called to play his or her part. ... And yet how strange this sounds – that love is political' (Ward, *Politics*, 271). However, Ward does not use this politics of love to call Schmitt's distinction between *Freund* and *Feind* into question.

[206] See Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*, 27.

[207] See ibid.

[208] Ibid., 72. See Habermas, '"The Political"', 21-22.

[209] See Ward, *Politics*, 69-70.

However, Schmitt's conclusion is *not* to overcome both military and non-military conflicts. His conclusion is to affirm war: 'A world in which the possibility of war is utterly eliminated, a completely pacified globe, would be a ... world without politics'.[210] Blurring the boundary between *Freund* and *Feind* would mean that 'man could not be required to sacrifice life'.[211] Against such depoliticisation, Schmitt claims that the defence of the political – which is to say, the defence of the distinction between *Freund* and *Feind* – is what justifies taking lives, one's own as well as the other. Schmitt affirms difference. However, in his concept of the political it is the difference *in-between* communities not the difference *in* communities.[212] The political or politicised community has to expel its enemies: the other is to be located on the other side of the frontline in order to combat her.[213] Thus, there is a totalitarianism in Schmitt's concept of the political, a totalitarianism which resulted in his support of Adolf Hitler's regime in Germany.[214]

To summarise, I have pointed out that Ward's concept of church finds fault with the absence of alterity, both internally and externally. It would be wrong to accuse him of complicity with Schmitt's totalitarianism. Ward has convincingly cautioned ecclesiology against ecclesial and non-ecclesial totalitarianisms.[215] Thus, I am not criticising Ward's politicised ecclesiality for what it has stated, but for what it has *not* stated. Ward mentions

---

[210] Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*, 35.

[211] Ibid. But as Habermas, '"The Political"', 21, points out: 'Against Carl Schmitt, we might ask: why shouldn't *the political* find an impersonal embodiment in the normative dimension of a democratic constitution?'. See also Jürgen Habermas, 'Politik und Religion', in *Politik und Religion*, 287-300.

[212] Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*, 53-55.

[213] Habermas's core critique is that Schmitt refuses to cope with both internal and external pluralism. See his '"The Political"', 31: 'Ultimately the leader and the nation, in the person of its leader, must decide who is friend or foe'.

[214] For the reception of Schmitt's concepts in Europe after 1945, see Jan Werner-Müller, *A Dangerous Mind: Carl Schmitt in Post-War European Thought* (Yale: Yale University Press, 2003).

[215] See esp. Graham Ward, 'Hosting the Stranger and the Pilgrim: A Christian Theological Reflection', in *Saintly Influence: Edith Wyschogrod and the Possibilities of Philosophy of Religion*, ed. Eric Boynton and Martin Kavka (Fordham: Fordham University Press, 2009), 63-81.

Schmitt's conclusion that 'liberal democracy was itself depoliticizing, for in allowing all sides to have their say, no enemy ... could be identified',[216] but without critically engaging its dubious causes and its devastating consequences.[217] Here, he misses the chance to elaborate on how contradictions or controversies in and in-between communities could or should be negotiated.

Ward's definition of the 'political' as 'an act that entails power' leaves open whether power confirms or criticises Schmitt's distinction between *Freund* and *Feind*.[218] Thus, his demand for the politicisation or re-politicisation of ecclesiology might betray the weak(ening) of the identity of Christianity in today's cities of God. Can the broken body of Christ break other bodies, the bodies of Christian and non-Christian others? It seems to me that, if overcoming de-politicisation requires a Schmittian contradistinction between *Freund* and *Feind* – and nowhere does Ward say that it does not! – then it requires a singular, strong, and striking concept of identity. How, then, can the disciples be rescued from attacking whoever and whatever has a different notion of discipleship? How can the disciples relate to those who do not dare to enter into the 'act of entrustment' through which a person is drawn into the body of Christ, its polity and its politics? And what could or should the invitation to trust others and to entrust oneself look like? Although questions like these remain to be answered, Graham Ward contributes to a concept of the practice of church which avoids the pitfalls of either a solidified church that only counters culture or a liquefied church that only confirms culture.

---

[216] Ward, *Politics*, 69.

[217] See ibid., 69. Ward mentions that, for Schmitt, the political is rooted in the ultimate distinction between *Freund* and *Feind*. Starting the next sentence with 'Be that as it may', he misses the chance to challenge this distinction.

[218] Ward, *Politics*, 27.

In conclusion, I have examined three ecclesiologies – one which solidifies identity, one which liquefies identity, and one which turns neither to the liquid nor to the solid. Central to all of these ecclesiologies is the concentration on the practice of church. John Milbank's ecclesiology exemplifies the ecclesiological turn to practice. However it is defined in detail, practice is what constitutes church. The communication of the signification and the significance of Jesus Christ equips practitioners in the pews and in the pulpits to practise a Christian way of life. Milbank calls it love. Pete Ward as well as Graham Ward (and, indeed, Ernst Troeltsch) would agree with him. The decisive difference lies in the way in which these three ecclesiologists understand the practice of church, whereby the interpretation of church invariably entails an interpretation of culture and vice versa. Here the solid ecclesiology and the liquid ecclesiology mirror each other. For the solid church, culture is corrosive: thus, church challenges culture to become like church (underplaying the need to criticise church). For the liquid church, culture is creative: thus, culture challenges church to become like culture (underplaying the need to criticise culture).[219]

Thus, these ecclesiologies spell out what Chapter 2 has interpreted as the risk of ecclesial solidity and the risk of ecclesial liquidity against both of which Troeltsch cautioned ecclesiologists: solidity comes with the anthropoemic neutralisation of alterity characteristic of Troeltsch's type of sectarianism; liquidity comes with the anthropophagic neutralisation of alterity characteristic of Troeltsch's type of mysticism.

[219] My account comes close to H. Richard Niebuhr's classic typology in *Christ and Culture* (New York: Harper, 1951), because my account – like Niebuhr's – is inspired by Troeltsch's tripartite typology, especially the types of sectarianism and mysticism. Unlike Niebuhr, however, I have concentrated on the neutralisation of alterity inherent in the three ecclesiologies which I analysed.

Both ecclesiologies entail a conception of power: operating with solid identity, power is allocated to the church such that church may convert culture; operating with liquid identity, power is allocated to culture such that culture may convert church. Here, the power of church clashes with the power of culture. The clash of powers is arguably characteristic of debates in concrete churches today, where the claims of culture collide with the claims of church. The consequence is an arms race which renders conversation between those who would like to accept contemporary culture in the church and those who would like to abolish contemporary culture in the church impossible. What is needed to open up a space for conversation about compromises is a weak power which allows both sides to be transformed by the other. What is needed is trust in the other – be it the other of culture from whom the church might learn, or the other of church from whom culture might learn.

Trust is vital for Graham Ward's ecclesiology which neither falls for the solidifying of church nor for the liquefying of church. Rooted in what Ward calls the scandal of transcorporeality, the broken body of Christ allows for critical and creative assessments of both contemporary church and contemporary culture: church is enabled to learn from culture as much as culture is enabled to learn from church. Ward's hermeneutical weakening of Christian identity is the centre of the interrelation of church and culture, because it allows the body of Christ to be open(ed) to others – ecclesiologically open to the finite other and eschatologically open to the infinite other. Yet, as Ward appears to assert in *The Politics of Discipleship*, the open(ed) practice of church might slide down a slippery slope into the arbitrary acceptance of each and every other which anchors the de-politicisation of church: anything goes. To counter such de-politicisation, Ward employs

Carl Schmitt's political philosophy. This employment, however, risks reintroducing the rejected distinction between a positive counter-cultural practice of church (the Schmittian *Freund*) and a negative cultural practice of counter-church (the Schmittian *Feind*). Here, Ward echoes the communitarianism of confessional communities which his ecclesiology of the broken body of Christ has convincingly criticised. Ward seems to be stuck in the alternative which I detailed in Chapter 7 above: either trust without doubt or doubt without trust. How, then, can the identity of Christianity be reframed in a practice which allows for critique and self-critique in a togetherness of trust?

Chapter 9

THE ELASTICISATION OF ECCLESIOLOGY

According to Ernst Troeltsch, the identity of Christianity is not a fixed freeze-frame which would allow him to draw a clear-cut distinction between who or what might be identified as 'Christian' or 'non-Christian'. For Troeltsch, identity is '*in motion*'.[1] In this chapter, I shall return to Troeltsch. I shall argue that he offers a hermeneutics for the identification of Christianity which turns identity from what I call a *propositional possession* into what I call a *performative project*. The Troeltschian turn revolves around what I designate the 'God of the gaps'. Troeltsch's God of the gaps, however, is decidedly different from the God who is commonly conceived of under the label of 'gap-god'.[2] It is a God whose transformative transcendence is experienced wherever and whenever one is opened up to the other. The God of the gaps, then, keeps the identity of Christianity open to alterity – openness which shapes the centre of both the elasticised practices of church and the reflections on the elasticised practices of church.

But before I delve into Troeltsch's hermeneutics of identification, I shall scrutinise Judith Butler's philosophy of performativity. Both the construction and the destruction of identity through performative practice is the core concern of Butler's political-

[1] WD, 153 (my emphasis).

[2] The notion of the God of the gaps is usually used in theologies which take gaps in the explanations of science as proof for the existence of God. Here, the concept of God is what closes the gap. The notion of 'God of the gaps' which I shall develop following Troeltsch, however, interprets God not as the one who closes gaps, but as the one who uncloses gaps.

philosophical project. Building on Butler, I shall examine the significance of 'practice' and 'performance' for the construction of identity in ecclesial and non-ecclesial communities. Her account of the politics of the performative offers the terminology and the theory through which I shall reread Troeltsch's account of the identification of Christianity.

To argue for the turn from propositional possession to performative project, I shall proceed, once again, in three steps: from (1) the 'doing of identity' through interpellation to (2) the 'undoing of identity' through interpretation to (3) the 're-doing of identity' where interpellation and interpretation are coupled through the notion of a God who opens gaps.[3] I shall conclude by characterising Troeltsch's concept of community as a togetherness of trust. Troeltsch calls for practices of recognition in which the prejudice of trust prevents the separation of ecclesial insiders and non-ecclesial outsiders in order to stress the critical and self-critical search for transformative truth. The concept of church which is inherent in the elasticisation of ecclesiology, then, is a 'work in movement' – a work which is simultaneously complete and incomplete because it must be constituted again and again in performative practice.

1 Doing Identity

To recall, John L. Austin argues that the illocutionary operates *through* the locutionary: there is no pure performative.[4] As the utterance 'I cannot tell you how grateful I am'

[3] The concepts of interpellation and interpretation will be explained below. What is important here is that practices of interpellation operate with fixed notions of identity, while practices of interpretation operate with flexible notions of identity. Their coupling, then, enables a notion of identity which remains open to the other.
[4] Austin, *How To Do Things With Words*, 108-119. See also the analyses in Chapters 1 and 7 above.

exemplifies, by describing that one cannot describe one's gratitude, one is doing one's gratitude. Austin's interpretation of performativity is crucial to understand how identity is constructed – *the* theme of the political philosophy of Butler.[5] I shall argue that Butler's philosophy of the politics of the performative provides the theory and the terminology to understand the identity of Christianity in a way which keeps identity open to what is other.

Butler reads Austin through the lens of Jacques Derrida. In Chapter 1, I have already indicated that Derrida is concerned with Austin's analysis of 'happy' and 'unhappy' performatives, performatives that do and performatives that do not work.[6] Whether a performative is happy or unhappy, Austin asserts, depends on the circumstances under which it is uttered – the 'total speech act' consisting of the one who speaks, the one who is spoken to, and the speaking.[7] The core condition for a performative to operate happily rather than unhappily is that it follows 'conventions'.[8] From Austin's interest in conventions, Derrida concludes that a performative is *repeatable* and *repeated*: its 'iterability', as Derrida calls it, is what makes the performative happy rather than unhappy.[9] For Derrida, every performative is a citation, recalling and repeating previous performatives.[10] Yet 'iterability' combines repetition and rupture because repetition always already introduces a *difference* between the repeated and the repetition of the repeated – a

[5] Judith Butler's account of the construction of identity is rooted in her *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity* (London: Routledge, 1999). However, she incorporated Austin's theory of speech acts only in *Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative* (London: Routledge, 1997). See Judith Butler, 'Afterword', in *Bodily Citations: Religion and Judith Butler*, ed. Ellen T. Armour and Susan M. Ville (New York: University of Columbia Press, 2006), 286. Thus, I concentrate on *Excitable Speech*. For a summary of Butler's account of performativity see Loxley, *Performativity*, 112-138.

[6] Austin, *How to Do Things with Words?*, 14.

[7] Ibid., 52.

[8] Ibid., 106.

[9] Jacques Derrida, 'Signature, Event, Context' in Jacques Derrida, *Limited Inc*, trans. Samuel Weber and Jeffrey Mehlman (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1988), 7.

[10] Ibid., esp. 13-19. Derrida argues that there is no clear-cut distinction between factual and fictional discourse because every discourse is a citation. For the significance of Derrida's concept of iterability for the interpretation of performativity, see again Loxley, *Performativity*, 77-87.

combination of repetition and rupture which will become important below.[11] Butler follows up on Derrida's concept of iterability to argue against Austin's notion of a 'sovereign subject' as author of the performative.[12] She asserts that the subject is authoring the performative as much as the performative is authoring the subject: subjects produce discourses as much as discourses produce subjects.[13] The co-production of subject through discourse and discourse through subject is explained in her analysis of Louis Althusser's infamous interpretation of ideological interpellation.[14]

Drawing on Pascal's wager, Althusser makes a Marxist move to explain the operations of ideology.[15] To recall the wager which was encountered in William James's interpretation of trust in Chapter 1, although Pascal argues for the rationality of faith, he admits that his argument might not *create* faith. To those whose faith has not been awakened by his arguments, Pascal recommends going to church because faith might not be the origin of church-going but the outcome of church-going. Similarly, Althusser argues that ideologies are not the origin of action but the outcome of action. Actions are repeated until they coagulate in '*rituals*' which make the ideology, the set of meanings which is sustained through rituals, undisputed and undisputable.[16] Althusser, then, points to the performative power of practice.

---

[11] For a short summary of Derrida's notion of iterability, see Simon Morgan Wortham, 'Iterability', in *The Derrida Dictionary*, 78.
[12] Butler, *Excitable*, 15.
[13] Ibid., esp. 1-24, 127-164.
[14] Ibid., 32-33. See also the Chapter, 'Conscience Doth Make Subjects of Us All: Althusser's Subjection', in Judith Butler, *The Psychic Life of Power: Theories in Subjection* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), 106-131.
[15] Louis Althusser, 'Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes towards an Investigation)', in Louis Althusser, *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays*, trans. Ben Brewster (New York: MR Press, 1971), esp. 168-169.
[16] Ibid., 168 (emphasis in the original).

Butler uses the concept of ritual to connect Austin and Althusser in order to critique Austin's notion of the sovereign subject. She refers to a street scene – imagine a dark and dangerous alley – of which Althusser writes in his interpretation of ideology. In the dark and dangerous alley, a policeman shouts 'Hey, you there!', provoking a person to turn around, thus reacting and responding to the policeman's shouting by recognising that she is the one shouted at.[17]

For Althusser, the street scene demonstrates how ideology works: reacting to the policeman's address, a person recognises the meanings which are encapsulated in the policeman's address: she recognises the set of meanings which defines what counts as criminal and what counts as non-criminal, what is to be done with criminals and non-criminals, and where on the spectrum between criminal and non-criminal she is located. Thus, the street scene demonstrates how ideology produces a subject and how a subject produces ideology through *interpellation*: the address (the policeman's shouting) and the acceptance of the address (the turn to the policeman's shouting) of ideology.[18] The production of ideology is anchored in what Althusser analyses as 'recognition' of a shouting 'Subject' by a shouted at 'subject' and as 'recognition' of a shouted at 'subject' by a shouting 'Subject'.[19] Althusser argues that such 'mutual recognition'[20] or 'mirror recognition'[21] is the inauguration of the subject.[22] In the face of ideology, the choice is

[17] Ibid., 174.
[18] Ibid., 174-175.
[19] Ibid., 179. Althusser links the 'Subject' with capital 'S' to the un-subjected subject of the creator and the 'subject' without capital 'S' to the subjected subject of the creature, thus taking Christianity as the epitome of ideology. See Butler, *Excitable*, 25-26, 30-31. The notion of the sovereign subject – be it creator or creature – is what Butler criticises.
[20] Althusser, 'Ideology', 181.
[21] Ibid., 182.
[22] For a critical discussion of the concept of recognition, see Judith Butler and Athena Athanasiou, *Dispossession: The Performative in the Political* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013), 75-91.

between recognising oneself as the 'shouted at' subject and thus becoming a subject by recognising ideology; or not recognising oneself as the 'shouted at' subject and thus not becoming a subject by not recognising ideology: for Althusser, one has a choice between being a subject, on the one hand, and being a non-subject, on the other – which is to say, one has *no choice*.[23] For Althusser, the mirror of recognition closes ideology to what is other and outside of ideology. As a consequence, ideology *naturalises* the status quo, rendering it uncriticised and uncriticisable.[24]

With the help of Althusser, Butler exposes Austin's sovereign subject as subjected: the performative produces the subject as much as the subject produces the performative.[25] The interpellation of the ideology which prioritises 'white' over 'black' – to take one of Butler's examples[26] – means that both whites and blacks 'internalise' that whiteness is superior to blackness. I use 'internalise' in inverted commas because Butler's point is precisely that there is neither a white identity nor a black identity prior to ideological interpellation. What follows from interpellation, then, is the cementation of a status quo through the assignment of identity – in the example, a white identity superior to a black identity.

Butler's Austinian-Althusserian account of the inauguration of identity through ideological interpellation echoes the turn to practice in ecclesiology. As exemplified by John Milbank's ecclesiology, explored above in Chapter 8, practice is taken as the anti-

[23] Ibid., 181-182. Tied up with the sequence of Althusser's scene of interpellation, the (Marxist) discussion revolves around the issue of what the subject is before it is 'interpellated' as subject. See the analyses of Althusser in the contributions to *Mapping Ideology*, ed. Slavoj Žižek (London: Verso, 2012). It seems to me that Althusser's example is simply taken too seriously here. For him, interpellation is always already at play. For a short summary, see also Won Choi, 'Inception or Interpellation? The Slovenian School, Butler and Althusser', *Re-Thinking Marxism: A Journal of Economics, Culture and Society* 25/1 (2013), 23-37.
[24] Althusser, 'Ideology', 181-182.
[25] Butler, *Excitable*, 15-16, 24-28.
[26] Ibid., 43-70, 158-159.

foundationalist foundation of theology in the ecclesiological turn to practice. But against the accusation that the practice of the church sustains the status quo – an accusation which runs through Althusser's interpretation of ideology[27] – Milbank would claim that the practice of church *counters* the practice of non-church, thus countering rather than cementing the status quo. The epitome of ideology, for Althusser, is the comprehensive catholic church of Christendom.[28] Although Milbank's model aligns or realigns church to Christendom, he posits two practices: the practice of the church with its ideology counters the practice of the non-church with its ideology. While Althusser argues that 'ideology has no outside',[29] Milbank argues that the charitable practice of the church produces an outside to the uncharitable practice of the non-church: church counters non-church (and non-church counters church). Thus, charitable identity confronts non-charitable identity.

However, as I argued in Chapter 8, the solid and the liquid models of church are – like Althusser's account – in the clutches of the chimera of a comprehensive community. Thus, either alterity is excluded through the bonding of a homogeneous identity (solid church) or alterity is included through the bridging of a heterogeneous identity (liquid church). In both cases, the other is rendered irrelevant to the practice of ideology. Hence, once the struggle of action and counter-action between ecclesial and non-ecclesial ideology is stopped – either by church converting culture (solid church) or by culture converting church (liquid church) – the status quo is cemented. The *neutralisation* of alterity implies the *naturalisation* of identity. Ultimately, both the solid church and the liquid church fit Althusser's model according to which ideological interpellation sustains the status quo.

[27] Althusser, 'Ideology', esp. 128-134, 148-170. See also Butler's critique in *Excitable*, 24-25, 31-32.
[28] Althusser, 'Ideology', 133, 153-157, 177-183.
[29] Ibid., 175 (emphasis in the original).

But, against Althusser's concentration on the perpetuation of ideology, Butler is interested in how to subvert ideology from the inside rather than from the outside – an interest which makes her innovative and instructive for the ecclesiological turn to practice.

Butler criticises Pierre Bourdieu's concept of performative practice which posits the reproduction of ideology through the repetition of practice.[30] Against Bourdieu, she draws on Derrida. Like Bourdieu, Derrida argues that performatives do work through the *repetition* of performative practice. But, unlike Bourdieu, Derrida argues that performatives do not work through the *self-same repetition* of performative practice. As mentioned above, for Derrida's account of performativity, the combination of repetition and rupture is decisive. He stresses 'the force of the rupture'[31] within iterability, asserting that the repetition of a performative is un-identical to the performative: the 'iterability of an element divides its own identity' which means that the logic of iterability ties identity to alterity.[32] Thus, Derrida's concept of iterability implies what Butler calls 'the gap' between the (always already repeated) performative and the repetition of the (always already repeated) performative: there is *rupture* in each and every repetition.[33]

Anchoring her account of performative practice in this gap, Butler argues that ideological interpellations sometimes 'fire' and sometimes 'misfire'.[34] She retells the street scene told by Althusser, but with a twist. 'Imagine the ... scene in which one is called by a

---

[30] Butler concentrates on Pierre Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice*, and Pierre Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power*, trans. Gino Raymond and Matthew Adamson (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991). For my analysis it is irrelevant whether Butler's account of Bourdieu is correct or incorrect. However, see Amy Hollywood, 'Performativity, Citationality, Ritualization', in *Bodily Citations*, 252-275, who discusses both Butler's reading of Bourdieu and Butler's reading of Derrida.

[31] Derrida, 'Signature, Event, Context', 9. See also Shakespeare, *Derrida and Theology*, 78-79.

[32] Jacques Derrida, 'Limited Inc a b c ...', in *Limited Inc*, 53. See also again, Wortham, 'Iterability', 78.

[33] Butler, *Excitable*, 14-15, 129, 151-152. To be precise, Butler marshals Derrida against Bourdieu (who, on her account, overemphasises repetition) as much as she marshals Bourdieu against Derrida (who, on her account, overemphasises rupture). The combination of both accounts of performative practice allows her to rethink performativity as both repetition and rupture. See ibid., 142-145.

[34] Ibid., 19. The terms 'fire' and 'misfire' are taken from Austin.

name', she writes, but 'turns around only to protest the name: "That is not me, you must be mistaken!"'.[35] Accordingly, the gap between practice and repetition of practice is opened, a gap which allows for 'resistance'.[36] Translated into the terminology which I have developed in Part I and Part II of my study, Butler's gap allows for engagements with the otherness of the other, defying the anthropophagic and the anthropoemic strategies of the neutralisation of alterity. Butler's gap allows for a politics of the performative.

For Butler, the 'politics of the performative' is an ambiguous phrase: the performative produces the subjection of the subject (when interpellation fires) as much as it produces the subversion of the subject (when interpellation misfires). But her point is to turn the politics of the performative from the subjection to the subversion of the status quo. To illustrate her point, she returns to a slippage in Bourdieu's account of authority. Performative practice rests on authority. But while Bourdieu connects 'being authorized to speak' and 'speaking with authority', Butler disconnects both phrases.[37] The politics of the performative is turned from subjection to subversion of the status quo when the unauthorised subject speaks authoritatively. Butler points to the example of Rosa Parks, the African-American Civil Rights activist, who refused to give up her seat in the section of the bus reserved for whites, thus augmenting the analysis of the interpellation of racial identity I mentioned above. Butler writes:

> When Rosa Parks sat in the front of the bus, she had no prior right to do so... And yet, in laying claim to the right for which she had no *prior* authorization

[35] Ibid., 33.
[36] Ibid., 12, 19, 40, 83, 137, 155, 163. In 'Afterword', 285, Butler disclaims the concept of resistance because it invokes a clear-cut position of counter-ideology against a clear-cut position of ideology. Instead, she prefers the concept of 'subversion' which defies such an inside/outside structure.
[37] Butler, *Excitable*, 157.

> she endowed a certain authority on the act, and began the insurrectionary process of overthrowing those established codes of legitimacy.[38]

When the unauthorised speak with authority – like Parks 'spoke' when she sat down in the front of the bus – they choose being non-subjects over being subjects in the face of ideological interpellation. Such a choice, Butler argues, takes the outside of ideology into the inside of ideology, thus imploding the inside/outside structure.[39] Such a choice – the black doing what the white is supposed to do or the white doing what the black is supposed to do – is what 'rattles' the status quo.[40] It is a 'performativity ... that propels the precarious into political life'.[41] For Butler, the criss-crossing of drag is a trope for such rattling resistance.[42]

Butler completes her account of the politics of the performative by formulating the rattling of the status quo as *the* political task for today. The 'encounter of alterity' is at the core of this task, as it emphasises that 'we do not simply move ourselves, but are ourselves

---

[38] Ibid., 147 (emphasis in the original).

[39] Ibid., 160. Butler's central critique of Althusser's account of ideological interpellation is that it cannot allow for such acts of subversion. For a defence of Althusser against Butler, see Noela Davies, 'Subjected Subjects? On Judith Butler's Paradox of Interpellation', *Hypatia* 27/3 (2012), 881-897.

[40] Butler, *Excitable*, 145.

[41] Butler and Athanasiou, *Dispossession*, 101.

[42] 'Drag' is a core category in Butler's *Gender Trouble*, esp. 163-190. However, ibid., xxii-xxii, she cautions her readers that the 'discussion of drag that *Gender Trouble* offers to explain the ... performative dimension of gender is not precisely *an example of subversion*. ... The point is rather different. If one thinks that one sees a man dressed as a woman or a woman dressed as a man, then one takes the first term of each of those perceptions as the "reality" of gender: the gender that is introduced through the simile lacks "reality", and is taken to constitute an illusory appearance. ... The moment in which one's ... perceptions fail, when one cannot read with surety the body that one sees, is precisely the moment when one is no longer sure whether the body encountered is that of a man or a woman. ... When such categories come into question, the *reality* of gender is also put into crisis: it becomes unclear how to distinguish the real from the unreal'. Evidently, the example of Rosa Parks fulfils a similar function: when the black behaves as a white (and the white behaves as a black), the realities of whiteness and blackness are subverted. See also, Butler, 'Afterword', 282.

moved by what is outside us, by others'.[43] Elaborating on the Derridean concept of 'reinscription',[44] she concludes:

> The task, it seems, is to compel the terms of modernity to embrace those they have traditionally excluded... This is not a simple assimilation and accommodation of what has been excluded into existing terms, but, rather, the admission of a sense of ... futurity into modernity that establishes for that time an unknown future, one that can only produce anxiety in those who seek to patrol its conventional boundaries. If there can be a modernity without foundationalism ..., then it will be one in which the key terms of its operation are not fully secured in advance, one that assumes a futural form for politics that cannot be fully anticipated.[45]

As mentioned above, Althusser takes church – strictly speaking, the church of Christendom – as the epitome of ideology. Butler, combining Althusser and Austin through Derrida, thinks along these lines, allocating religion to the side of that which is to be resisted rather than to the side of that which is resisting.[46] However, rereading Butler's account of the politics of the performative with the Bible in mind, I suggest that such an allocation could and should be challenged.

A variety of scenes and stories in the Bible might be read as accounts of ideological interpellation where the protagonist 'chooses'[47] being a non-subject over being a subject – which is to say, twists and tweaks the operations of interpellation to subvert the status quo.

---

[43] Butler and Athanasiou, *Dispossession*, 3.

[44] Butler, *Excitable*, 145.

[45] Ibid., 161.

[46] For Butler's engagement with religion, see the contributions to *Bodily Citations*. However, as Butler affirms in her 'Afterword', 276-277, these contributions precede her work on Jewish identity, its critique and its self-critique. In *Parting Ways*, Butler points to the paradox of Jewish identity: on the one hand, criticising Israel seems to counter Jewish identity; on the other hand, confirming Israel seems to counter Jewish identity. However, as far as I can ascertain, she has not engaged with the texts of the Bible.

[47] Butler, 'Afterword', 285, points out that 'choice' is not necessarily *intentional* choice (which would – like 'resistance' – require a clear-cut stance of counter-ideology countering a clear-cut stance of ideology). Interestingly, such ambiguity of choice also runs through the Bible where the prophets 'choose' being prophets despite their choice not to be prophets.

The prophet Ezekiel was instructed by God to bake bread 'using human excrement for fuel' to point to the devastated and devastating future of Israel in the exile (Ezek. 4:12). Only after pleading, God allows him to use 'cow dung' instead (Ezek. 4:14). Whatever else Ezekiel's action signifies, it signifies that he, instructed by God, chooses being a non-subject over being a subject, locating himself on the outside rather than the inside of state ideology, and thus voicing a subversive critique of its operations.

The narratives about Jesus, inspired by prophets like Ezekiel, tell of similar choices. Throughout, Jesus challenges the functionaries of religious and non-religious ideologies. These challenges culminate on the cross – *literally* a choice of being a non-subject over being a subject. How Jesus's choice resists ideological interpellation is spelled out in the scenes which revolve around his trial (Mark 14-15, Matthew 26-27, Luke 22-23, John 18-19). To use the terminology in Butler's twist of Bourdieu, Jesus is one who speaks 'with authority' but 'without authorisation'.

Jesus's resistance against ideological interpellation is what Paul theologises as the ska,ndalon of the cross (1 Cor. 1:23), elaborating how it turns weakness into strength and strength into weakness (1 Cor. 1:25). Hence, although it cannot be denied that the religions which revolve around the Bible have also been used as a power to conserve rather than challenge ideology, Butler's account of the subversion of the status quo through the subversion of ideological interpellation is anticipated in a variety of texts of the Bible. What conclusions, then, can be drawn from the politics of the performative for the construction of the identity of Christianity?

The three ecclesiological examples of the postliberal turn to practice analysed in Chapter 8 above confirm the performativity of practice. Building on the performativity of

practice, particularly prominent in Milbank's ecclesiology, theologians have developed two models for the church which mirror each other: the solid church where church counters culture and the liquid church where culture converts church. But, to put it in Butler's terminology, in the case of the solid church and in the case of the liquid church, the practice of the church is modelled *without* the (Derridean) slippage in the ritualised repetition of the performative which opens the practice of church up for what is outside and other. Thus, the practice of the church is perverted into the ecclesial or not so ecclesial interpellation of identity which implies the repetition of the same.

Graham Ward's ecclesiology takes the inside to the outside and the outside to the inside, so to speak, by advocating a weak concept of the identity of Christianity. He allows for the slippage in the ritualised repetition which opens the church: the body of Christ is broken and broken up: repeated and ruptured. If one works within Butler's Austinian-Althusserian account of ideology, Ward's ecclesiology shows that ideology might be critical and self-critical. In *Excitable Speech*, Butler operates with a binary logic: 'dog' versus 'underdog' – ideology aims for the subjection of the other, while the other aims for the subjection of ideology. In Butler's binaries, then, Ward would be the 'inverted ideologist' who works to challenge rather than to cement his ideology. Thus, his interpretation of the weak identity of Christianity allows for the critique of Butler's binary logic: Christianity, an 'ideology' rooted in the resistance to ideological interpellation repeatedly reported by the Bible, must not aim for the subjection of the other. Rather, it ought to be open to the other's otherness. Thus, the 'ideology' of Christianity exemplifies a critical and self-critical ideological interpellation of identity, ideology which is other to itself, a repetition and a rupture.

To summarise, Butler's politics of the performative explores moves and modes of subversion against the ideological interpellation of identity. Thus, she emphasises a crucial concern neglected in the models of liquid church and solid church where resistance is, if at all, located externally rather than internally. Ward's ecclesiology of the broken body elaborates on Christianity as a practice which offers un-ideological interpellations of identity – a performative practice which resists ideology. However, as analysed above in Chapter 8, Ward's ecclesiology eventually entails the distinction between *Freund* and *Feind*, developed by Carl Schmitt, which closes the performative politics of Christianity off against the other. In his theory of theocracy, he turns the body of Christ from an un-ideological interpellation which is 'broken' into an ideological interpellation which 'breaks'. Through the *Freund/Feind* distinction, Christianity mimics the ideological interpellation which forces subjects to choose either being subject or being non-subject, inside or outside. Accordingly, what is needed to draw the conclusions from Butler's account of the politics of the performative for ecclesiology is a concept of the identity of Christianity which keeps Christianity open to the other – a concept of the identity of Christianity which operates with the prejudice of trust. Like Butler's politics of the performative, such a concept of identity would be rooted simultaneously in repetition and rupture.

2 Undoing Identity

As discussed above, for Troeltsch, Christianity is 'practice';[48] the identity of Christianity is '*in motion*', a matter of interpretation rather than interpellation.[49] Thus, his concept of identity might anticipate and add to the turn to the performativity of practice. I shall argue that in order to keep Christianity in motion – moved and moving – Troeltsch opens the conceptualisation of the identity of Christianity to the other. He anticipates the philosophical-theological notions of identity which turn identity into a task: a project rather than a proposition.[50] As I shall continue to argue, he anchors the anticipated turn in the performativity rather than the propositionality of identity.

Rejecting the foundationalisms of religious subjectivism and religious objectivism, Troeltsch depicts 'dogmatics as a branch of practical theology': dogmatics means critical and self-critical theory of practice, teaching practitioners and being taught by practitioners.[51] Hence, for Troeltsch, dogmatics is church dogmatics.[52] Despite the postliberal critique of Troeltsch's liberalism,[53] here the 'liberal' concept of practice comes curiously close to the 'postliberal' concept of practice. As explored in Chapters 2 and 4 above, Troeltsch combines theological and non-theological approaches to the practice of Christianity past and present, integrating diachronic and synchronic accounts. Hence, in

[48] SL, viii.
[49] WD, 153 (my emphasis).
[50] See again, inspired by Ricoeur, Jeanrond, *Theological Hermeneutics*, 159-182. See also Tanner, *Theories of Culture*, 151-155.
[51] DR, 17.
[52] However, whereas for the postliberal followers of Karl Barth, dogmatics *is* theology, dogmatics is only *one* branch of theology – namely, a practical branch – for Troeltsch. See the analysis by Wilhelm Gräb, 'Dogmatik als Stück der Praktischen Theologie: Das normative Grundproblem in der praktisch-theologischen Theoriebildung', *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche* 85 (1988), esp. 485-487.
[53] Milbank, *Theology and Social Theory*, 94-95.

order to learn about Christianity today, one has to examine its history and in order to examine its history, one has to learn about Christianity today. For Troeltsch, then, the identification of Christianity is not a condition but a consequence of practice.[54] In accordance with the three ecclesiological examples analysed above in Chapter 8, Troeltsch affirms the power of practice.

In 'What does "Essence of Christianity" mean?', published in 1903 and republished in 1913, Troeltsch dissects the concept of identity.[55] To be precise, the concept of 'essence' translates the German concept of *Wesen*, popularised by Adolf von Harnack's lectures *Das Wesen des Christentums*.[56] It might be rendered as 'identity' such that Troeltsch asks 'What does "Identity of Christianity" mean?'.[57] He answers not by writing about identity, but by writing about writing about identity.[58]

According to Troeltsch, the function of the concept of identity is to distinguish between what is Christian and what is non-Christian.[59] Yet, whereas the identification of Christianity with the tradition (rather than the Bible) in orthodox Catholicism or with the Bible (rather than the tradition) in orthodox Protestantism appears to be able to draw such a

[54] See Fechtner, *Volkskirche*, 26-28, 189.

[55] For a short summary of the differences between the 1903 edition and the 1913 edition, see Stephen W. Sykes, 'Note', in Ernst Troeltsch, *Writings on Theology and Religion*, 180-181.

[56] The controversy about the 'essence' of Christianity is easily traced back to Friedrich Schleiermacher. For a discussion of the (history of the) debate, see Pearson, *Beyond Essence*, 21-39. Adolf von Harnack's *Das Wesen des Christentums* (Leipzig: Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung, 1902) is a repeated reference point for Troeltsch.

[57] See Stephen W. Sykes, *The Identity of Christianity: Theologians and the Identity of Christianity from Schleiermacher to Barth* (Philadelphia/PA: Fortress Press, 1984), 149-173. See also Stephen W. Sykes, 'Ernst Troeltsch and Christianity's Essence', in *Ernst Troeltsch and the Future of Theology*, 139-171. Sykes argues that Troeltsch's thinking on the identity of Christianity is 'muddled' (ibid., 165); however, his argument rests on the assumption that the interpretation of the identity of Christianity ought to offer a clear-cut distinction between what is Christian and what is non-Christian – an assumption Troeltsch argues against.

[58] WD,124-128.

[59] WD, 137-145.

distinction, the interpretation of Christianity as practice does *not*.[60] For if one takes the past and the present of the practice of Christianity into account – in his *Glaubenslehre,* Troeltsch refers to 'tradition' as opposed to 'traditionalism'[61] – one is confronted with a plurality of practices.[62] Hence, for Troeltsch, the identity of Christianity is a *construction*.[63]

Acknowledging that such a denaturalisation of the concept of identity might provoke the opposition of 'disturbed dogmaticians',[64] who prefer 'identity' to offer a fixed and firm fundament for Christian practice, Troeltsch argues that the identity of Christianity cannot be 'complete and closed' as long as Christianity is practised.[65] The closure and completion of identity would mean that Christianity is *not* practised: Christianity as a 'museum' or 'mausoleum'. Thus, Troeltsch highlights that Christianity has a moved and moving identity 'which is not yet fully clear about itself'.[66] Identity is a matter of interpretation. But how, then, can the interpretation of Christianity arrive at the identification of Christianity?

---

[60] WD, 128-137. See also Pearson, *Beyond Essence*, 58. For Troeltsch's account of the significance of the Bible for theology, see Jörg Lauster, 'Das Ende des Bibeldogmas. Ernst Troeltschs Aufhebung des protestantischen Schriftprinzips durch die historische Kritik und die Reaktion der Bibeltheologie', *Mitteilungen der Ernst-Troeltsch-Gesellschaft* 16 (2003), 5-30.

[61] WD, 125. See also CF, 32. For Troeltsch's notion of tradition, see Brian A. Gerrish, 'Ernst Troeltsch and the Possibility of a Historical Theology', in *Ernst Troeltsch and the Future of Theology*, 121-127.

[62] WD, 125.

[63] Troeltsch's account of history as a construction by the historian is a central concern throughout Pearson's *Beyond Essence*. See esp. her conclusion ibid., 211-212.

[64] WD, 125. With 'disturbed dogmaticians' Troeltsch mocks theologians who adhere to the dogmatic as opposed to the historical method. See ibid., 131. See also HD, 11-32. For a summary see Pearson, *Beyond Essence*, 48-53.

[65] WD, 132.

[66] WD, 141. Troeltsch's argument that the identity of Christianity might not or not yet be 'clear about itself' smacks of a metaphysics of history inspired by Georg W. F. Hegel. In Chapter 2, I have already explored Troeltsch's oscillation between teleological and non-teleological concepts of history. The consequence of Troeltsch's oscillation is the combination of existentialism and historicism: an existentialist could understand Christianity without historicism, while a historicist could understand Christianity without existentialism. Troeltsch, however, wants both.

Troeltsch conceives of what I call a *hermeneutics of identification*. With a preconception of what is Christian and what is non-Christian both the past and the present practices of Christianity are interpreted. The outcome of this interpretation is a concept of the identity of Christianity; this concept of identity, however, is itself only a preconception for further interpretation(s) of the practices of Christianity.[67] The identity of Christianity, therefore, is a circular concept, continually changing. Because the identity of Christianity is in motion, Troeltsch's hermeneutics is a hermeneutics of 'identification' rather than 'identity'. Admittedly, he does not use the technical terminology of hermeneutics which would have been available to him. Yet when he assesses his combination of critique and construction as 'immanent criticism' in which 'the historical is measured by the historical', he echoes the terminology of past and present hermeneuts.[68]

Troeltsch stresses that his hermeneutics of identification cannot be reduced to either engaged subjectivism or disengaged objectivism.[69] As it combines the subjective and the objective, the identification of Christianity is not 'neutral'.[70] Rather, it is – as Troeltsch pointedly puts it – 'personal'.[71] He explains that the personality of the one who identifies Christianity is involved because the interpretation of identity is neither simply a matter of the past nor simply a matter of the present. In addition to the past and the present, the identification of Christianity has to take the *future* into account. The 'projected continuation' of the trajectory of Christianity depends on whether one assumes that

[67] WD, 130-137, 141, 163-177.
[68] WD, 142. In WD, 143, Troeltsch adds that his concept of immanent criticism is 'no different from the immanent criticism of any book'. For the hidden hermeneutics in Troeltsch's thinking, see again Baum, 'Science and Commitment', and Pryzlebski, 'Troeltschs Kultursynthese als halbierte Hermeneutik', 137-153.
[69] WD, 143, succinctly summarises: 'Wesensbestimmung ist Wesensgestaltung'.
[70] Ibid.
[71] WD, 145 and 159.

Christianity will or will not thrive in the future.[72] Thus, the identification of Christianity is simultaneously a rather objective *deduction* and a rather subjective *decision* about Christianity's past, present, and potential. '*Here indeed is to be found the ... knot of the whole problem*. But this knot – to give the answer at once – cannot be undone at all'.[73] For Troeltsch, subjectivity and objectivity seek 'to be knotted together, not divided. The knotting, however, can never be achieved by theory'.[74] Rooting his hermeneutics of identification in practice, Troeltsch argues that the combination of deduction and decision turns the identification of Christianity into a 'courageous' and 'creative' 'act'.[75]

In his studies on historicism, published in 1922 and 1923, which refine his hermeneutics of identification,[76] Troeltsch refers to the concept of 'leap (*Sprung*)' in order to convey the courageous and creative act.[77] The existential(ist) leap emphasises that the identification of Christianity can be served but cannot be secured by historical or meta-historical analyses. In the 'existential historicism' or the 'historical existentialism' of Troeltsch, the future will show in what respects one's identification of Christianity is in continuity or in discontinuity with the practice of Christianity.[78] Prior to the eschatological

---

[72] WD, 157-158.

[73] WD, 160. See also WH: '*Hier liegt nun allerdings der ... Knoten des ganzen Problems*. Aber dieser Knoten ist auch – um die Antwort sofort zu geben – überhaupt nicht auflösbar.'

[74] WD, 160.

[75] Ibid.

[76] Pearson, *Beyond Essence*, 182-197, argues that Troeltsch's studies on historicism use the concept of 'synthesis (*Synthese*)' to refer to the essence of a cultural complex. For a summary of the constructive concern of Troeltsch's historicism see also Chapman, *Ernst Troeltsch and Liberal Theology*, 156-160.

[77] See HP, esp. 226, 293-294, 382-383, 534-535, 948, 979. See also the succinct summary by Graf, 'Einleitung', 63-68.

[78] For the concept of 'existential historicism', see Hans Joas, *The Sacredness of the Person: A New Genealogy of Human Rights*, trans. Alex Skinner (Georgetown: Georgetown University Press, 2013), 122, with reference to Eduard Spranger, 'Das Historismusproblem an der Universität Berlin seit 1900', in *Studium Berolinense: Aufsätze und Beiträge zu Problemen der Wissenschaft und zur Geschichte der Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität zu Berlin*, ed. Hans Leussink, Eduard Neuman, and Georg Kotowski (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1960), 425-243. Joas defines Troeltsch's method for the conceptualisation of 'synthesis' as an 'affirmative genealogy', Joas, *The Sacredness of the Person*, 97-139.

end of history, the identification of Christianity is open and open-ended. In as much as Troeltsch's reference to the leap resonates with the Jamesian jump, it implies that the identification of Christianity requires trust.[79] Troeltsch's hermeneutics of identification is rooted in what I assessed as the prejudice of trust in Chapter 7: a prejudice of trust which includes rather than excludes critique and self-critique within its hermeneutics.

Drawing out the implications of the hermeneutics of identification for theology, Troeltsch argues that dogmatics must not reflect on 'unchangeable' dogmas since such reflection would lead to a dogmatics only for dogmaticians.[80] Rather, theology must reflect on the practice of Christianities, past, present, and potential, respecting the 'autonomy' of the practitioners.[81] Troeltsch decidedly distinguishes between 'autonomy' and 'autarchy': the 'concept of autonomy does not mean that everything has to be self-produced' (a meaning which, Troeltsch adds, 'would quickly put an end to all mathematics!'); rather, autonomy is about the personal approximation of the past in the present.[82]

Respecting the practitioners of the practice of Christianity has consequences for theology. Since 'the religious development … takes minimum account of the theologentsia (*Theologentum*)', the theologentsia has to take maximum account of the religious development.[83] Troeltsch is not, however, substituting the ecclesiastical elite of the official theologians in the pulpits with the non-ecclesiastical elite of the unofficial theologians in

[79] Here, Troeltsch comes close to Graham Ward's emphasis on the act of entrustment. The centrality of trust for Troeltsch's studies on historicism also becomes apparent in Chapman, *Ernst Troeltsch and Liberal Theology*, 184-185.
[80] DR, 17.
[81] See Bradley E. Starr, 'Individualism and Reform in Troeltsch's View of the Church', *Modern Theology* 7/5 (1991), 447-463.
[82] CF, 80. According to Troeltsch, autonomy allows for authority as long as the authority is accepted and appropriated autonomously. See WD, 167-168. For a succinct summary of the ambiguity of autonomy in Troeltsch, see Chapman, *Ernst Troeltsch and Liberal Theology*, 155-156.
[83] WD 169 (translation altered). See WH, 439.

the pews.[84] Instead, Troeltsch is critical of the concept 'elite' altogether.[85] Accordingly, his dogmatics requires quantitative-empirical and qualitative-empirical studies of concrete churches.[86] For if one wants to know what Christianity is, one has to listen and to learn from those practising Christianity.

For Troeltsch, then, Christianity is a *project* rather than a possession. However, those whom Troeltsch calls 'disturbed dogmaticians' could argue that his depiction of practice is developed the wrong way around. If one does not know what the identity of Christianity is, concrete church communities cannot be identified; if one cannot identify concrete church communities, the practice which discerns the identity of Christianity cannot be identified; and if one cannot identify the practice which discerns the identity of Christianity, one cannot put Troeltsch's hermeneutics of identification into practice. Troeltsch would agree. If the concept of identity is a matter of interpretation, *everybody* is invited to participate in the interpretation. The limitation of the participants would already imply a concept of identity; thus, the result of the interpretation would have been reached *prior* to the interpretation.

---

[84] Hence, Troeltsch would criticise Milbank's notion of the ecclesiastical-episcopal elite. Terminologically, I distinguish between 'offical' and 'unoffical' theologians in order to avoid the terminology of 'ordinary theology' for those in the pews and 'extraordinary theology' for those in the pulpits. For the commendable project of 'ordinary theology', see Jeff Astley, *Ordinary Theology: Looking, Listening and Learning in Theology* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2002) and *Exploring Ordinary Theology: Everyday Christian Believing in the Church*, ed. Jeff Astley and Leslie J. Francis (Farnham: Ashgate, 2012).

[85] Throughout WD, Troeltsch conveys the impression that the identification of Christianity might require the elitism of 'intellectual leaders' (ibid., 161): the identification of Christianity is a 'task that cannot be demanded ... of anyone', because it requires 'scientific and spiritual resources' (ibid., 142). These resources map onto Troeltsch's combination of historicism and existentialism such that the scientific pairs with the historical and the spiritual pairs with the existential. However, what is crucial for both resources is openness to potential and actual corrections (ibid., 131, 142-143, 157, 161, 167, 175). Hence, if one can speak of elitism in Troeltsch's hermeneutics of identity at all, it is an elitism which defies any scientific or spiritual closure.

[86] Troeltsch's involvement in concrete churches was a source for his critical and constructive reflection on Christianity inside and outside the church. See Starr, 'Individualism', 447-463.

From Troeltsch's hermeneutics of identification it is not clear whether he is conscious of these implications. However, he argues that the identification of Christianity requires a 'comparative history of religions',[87] admitting that such a comparative contextualisation of the past, the present, and the potential practices of Christianity destabilises any clear-cut distinction between who or what counts as Christian and who or what counts as non-Christian. To be sure, the distinction between the Christian and the non-Christian is not *rejected* but *relativised* by Troeltsch.[88] The boundaries are blurred boundaries. They can neither be patrolled nor policed.

Responding to the 'disturbed dogmaticians', I build on Troeltsch by arguing that everybody who is *concerned* with Christianity is invited to participate in the interpretation of what is Christian and what is non-Christian. With the concept of concern, I take up Zygmunt Bauman's 'communities of concern' explored in Chapter 5 above. The concept of concern extends the scope of the practice at stake: in order to be concerned with Christianity, one does not necessarily have to be identified or self-identified as 'Christian'. If one's (self-)identification as 'Christian' was the criterion for participation in the interpretation of Christianity, it would indeed reintroduce the rejected concept of a clear-cut identity. Instead, 'concern' moves the identification of Christianity from the category of *propositionality* to the category of *performativity*. Troeltsch, writing before the linguistic turn, could not make recourse to the distinction between discourse as locutionary 'describing' and illocutionary 'doing'. Yet Troeltsch's hermeneutics of identification resonates with the move from propositionality to performativity. For Troeltsch, identity is more about the performance of interpretation rather than the propositions of interpretation:

[87] WD, 133. See also, DR, 1-21.
[88] See CF, 36.

one's continuity with Christianity is anchored in hermeneutical practice rather than the *result* of hermeneutical practice.[89]

To summarise, Troeltsch concentrates on what Butler calls the 'gap' between the (always already repeated) performative practice and the repetition of the (always already repeated) performative practice of Christianity. His hermeneutics of identification conceives of identity as a task: identification with Christianity is accomplished through tackling the task; thus, it is opened to the other who cannot be neutralised in advance. Alterity – the otherness of the other – fulfils a fundamental function because it prevents declared or self-declared elites from claiming that the identity of Christianity has been fully or finally fixed. Thus, the gaps which open up willy-nilly between the performative practice of interpretation and the repetition of the performative practice of interpretation keep the interpretation of the identity of Christianity in motion: the gaps prevent the reification of the identity of Christianity. For Troeltsch, then, Christianity is vulnerable.

Sturla Stålsett explores 'vulnerability' as a core category for a philosophical-theological anthropology which accepts the notion of the '*homo vulnerabilis*'.[90] He stresses the ambiguity of 'vulnerability', pointing to its negative side (vulnerability as a cause of victimisation) and to its positive side (vulnerability as a critique of victimisation).[91] My vulnerability allows me to empathise with the vulnerability of the victim. To overcome victimisation, then, Stålsett argues, the 'intrusion' of the other is vital.[92] Through the intrusion of the other, the ambiguity of vulnerability might be accepted; identity might be opened to alterity, thus creating a space in which vulnerability can be recognised and

[89] See also Fechtner, *Volkskirche*, 191-193.
[90] Stålsett, 'The Ethics of Vulnerability', 46 (emphasis in the original).
[91] Ibid., 52-55.
[92] Ibid., 56.

respected – as exemplified by (the movement which followed) Rosa Parks who made herself vulnerable to the other.[93]

Troeltsch's concentration on the gap, then, could create such a space: a space in which the challenge of the other is not attacked but accepted. Troeltsch admits that his hermeneutics of identification 'opens the door wide'.[94] And he keeps the door he opened wide open.

3 Re-Doing Identity

Troeltsch operates with a concept of Christian identity which echoes the turn to practice. With the model of the liquid church, Troeltsch's concept acknowledges the *sociological* necessity to incorporate the practice of concrete church communities into the on-going project of identification. With the model of the solid church, Troeltsch's concept acknowledges the *theological* necessity to incorporate the reflection on the practice of concrete church communities into the on-going project of identification. And with Graham Ward's account of the body of Christ, located in-between the liquid and the solid, Troeltsch's concept shares the critique of the reification of the identity of Christianity. Thus, my description and my discussion of Troeltsch's hermeneutics of identification confirm the combination of repetition and rupture indispensable to Butler's political philosophy. However, I shall argue that Troeltsch tackles the gap *theologically*. I call the notion of God which runs through Troeltsch's theology a 'God of the gaps'. It is a God

[93] Ibid., 60-61.
[94] WD, 166.

who is communicated performatively rather than propositionally – a God who *opens* gaps. Thus, one relates to the God of the gaps by being opened up to what is other. A relationship to such a God comes with rupture – a rupture, however, which is dependent on the interpretation and the reinterpretation of the signification and the significance of Jesus Christ.

In 'What does "Identity of Christianity" mean?', Troeltsch conveys how christology and theology relate to the identification of Christianity: identity is closely connected to the God revealed through the practice of Jesus Christ.

> A criterion for the maintenance of continuity in advance does not exist. It is precisely the ... creative characteristic of religion that its continuity asserts itself only in this continuous ... process. Christianity is affirmed when one has the Father of Jesus Christ present.[95]

Here, Troeltsch offers a criterion for the identification of Christianity, a criterion which is simultaneously theological and christological: *the presence of the Father of Jesus Christ*. When he elucidates the presence of God as 'experience', he qualifies his combination of theology and christology.[96] As analysed in Chapter 2 above, Troeltsch theorises the experience of the transformative transcendence of God in a triangle of event, expression, and experience: experience is co-constituted by the event (which pairs with theology here) and by the expression (which pairs with christology here). In the practice of Christianity, Jesus is the medium through which the experience of transformative transcendence is

[95] WD, 170. See also WH, 440: 'Die Christlichkeit ist behauptet, wenn man den Vater Jesu Christi ... gegenwärtig hat'.

[96] WD, 170.

excited and expressed;[97] therefore, the experience of the transcendence of God is the experience of the Father of Jesus Christ.[98]

Troeltsch's insistence on experience has consequences for his hermeneutics of identification. The central criterion for continuity with Christianity is the experience of the presence of God – a *transformative* presence which runs through the practice of Christianity, thus connecting the past to the present to the potential. As I have argued in Chapter 2, for Troeltsch, the process of revelation in history has neither an absolute point of departure (because the event of revelation always entails its expression) nor an absolute point of destination (because the event of revelation always exceeds its expression). Therefore, the identity of Christianity is never 'naked'.[99] To recall Troeltsch's conclusion from Chapter 2 above

> The concept of reproductive revelation already suggests the image of a spark that leaps from heart to heart, igniting a different flame in each, according to what it finds therein. Productive revelation already carries the reproductive revelation within itself.[100]

Put plainly, if one has been 'sparked' by the experience of the transcendence of God, if one has been touched and transformed by God, one is in continuity rather than in discontinuity with Christianity. But since the flame which is ignited by the spark differs from person to person, the spark cannot be completely conceptualised.

---

[97] See Claussen, *Jesus-Deutung*, 259-286.

[98] With Butler's political philosophy of performative practice in mind, the potentially patriarchal and paternalistic metaphor of father could be criticised. In as much as it stresses the combination of apophatic and cataphatic theologies, Troeltsch's account of the experience of transcendence, analysed and assessed in Chapter 2, would allow for such criticism.

[99] WD, 162.

[100] CF, 47. See also Chapter 2 above.

Here, the categories of performativity and propositionality are instructive. Since there is no pure performative, the spark is *the performativity within the propositionality* of revelation. Throughout his oeuvre, Troeltsch uses a variety of metaphors to depict the spark. Appropriating concepts such as 'force (*Kraft*)'[101] or 'driving force (*Triebkraft*)',[102] he argues that it is 'the decisive and driving religious ... power' which identifies Christianity as Christianity. Accordingly, Troeltsch's account of the identity of Christianity is *primarily theological* and *secondarily sociological*. As a consequence, identity is more performative than propositional.

Troeltsch distinguishes the sociological and the theological mode of identification in a comparative rather than a categorical way, because eventually sociological identification is required for theological identification as much as theological identification is required for sociological identification. There is no pure performative, no experience without performative event *and* propositional expression. Accordingly, it is the theologian's task to trace the performative in the propositional: to trace the force which drives the practice of Christianity past, present, and potential.[103]

Troeltsch tackles the task of tracing performativity within propositionality *christologically*. In the practice of Christianity, the experience of transformative transcendence is expressed through the medium of Jesus Christ. Hence, Troeltsch argues that the centre of the practice of Christianity is the response to the 'personality and

[101] WD, 137.
[102] WD, 142.
[103] WD, 129.

preaching of Jesus'.[104] Crucially, he acknowledges the christological controversies which have characterised Christianity when he refers to Jesus Christ as 'the classic'.[105] For Troeltsch, 'the classic' is a concept from 'the vocabulary of history' which allows him to stress that Jesus Christ exceeds complete conceptualisation.[106] Admitting that 'each age interprets him really quite differently',[107] Troeltsch anticipates David Tracy's concept of the classic as a 'category of reception'.[108] In accordance with Tracy, Troeltsch argues that the significance of Jesus Christ can only be accessed through the signification of Jesus Christ: Jesus Christ is accessed through 'the faith of the community'.[109] And because Jesus Christ is accessed through the faith of the community – *indirectly* rather than *directly* – he remains mysterious.

The corollary of the mystery of Christ is the 'mysticism of Christ (*Christusmystik*)'.[110] The mysticism of Christ, 'which will remain the centre of all actual and authentic Christianity', considers Jesus Christ the core of the Christian faith.[111] Thus, the one who has faith in Jesus Christ conceives of herself as 'emission (*Ausstrahlung*)' from the christological centre such that all those who have faith 'connect again and again in

---

[104] WD, 146. For a comprehensive account of Troeltsch's christology, see Coakley, *Christ without Absolutes*. Coakley calls Troeltsch's concentration on the personality and the preaching of Jesus 'realist': Troeltsch's point is that 'Christology be in some sense grounded ... in verifiable facts about Jesus of Nazareth' (ibid., 136). For the term personality as it is used by Troeltsch, see ibid., 171-172

[105] WD, 146-148. See also CF, 24-25.

[106] WD, 147. See also Pearson, *Beyond Essence*, 55-58.

[107] WD, 147.

[108] See David Tracy, *The Analogical Imagination: Christian Theology and the Culture of Pluralism* (London: SCM Press, 1981), 99-153. For Tracy's concept of the classic as a 'category of reception', see Jeanrond, *Text and Interpretation*, 140.

[109] WD, 148.

[110] For Troeltsch's 'Christusmystik', see Coakley, *Christ Without Absolutes*, 174-180. It is noteworthy that the mysticism of Christ is akin to the mysticism described in Troeltsch's third type. However, unlike the third type, the mysticism of Christ enables the construction of community.

[111] ZM, 848.

the ... interpretation (*Deutung*) of Jesus as the one who lifts us above ourselves'.[112] Troeltsch argues that the mysticism of Christ retrieves the core concern of the classic christological dogma of the church: an internal rather than an external 'connection (*Verbundenheit*)' of the congregation with Jesus Christ 'in the actualisation (*Vergegenwärtigung*) of which the Christian cult (*Kultus*) is actually accomplished'.[113]

As Sarah Coakley argues, the mysticism of Christ implies neither a direct move from history to faith (à la Harnack) nor a direct move from faith to history (à la Herrmann) with Harnack reducing faith to the historical Jesus and Herrmann reducing the historical Jesus to faith.[114] Instead, on Troeltsch's account, Jesus is conceived of as the centre of 'cult' and 'community'.[115] Both cult and community revolve around the interpretation and the reinterpretation of the classic of Christianity throughout history.[116] Coakley criticises that Troeltsch's assertion of the identity between the historical Jesus and the memorisation of the historical Jesus comes without convincing arguments.[117] How can Troeltsch assume 'continuity'[118] between Jesus and the memorisation of Jesus, if he points to the importance of 'imagination (*Phantasie*)'[119] in this memorisation? How can Troeltsch know that the picture of Jesus which is painted in the practice of Christianity is an interpretation rather than an invention?[120]

---

[112] Ibid.
[113] ZM, 851.
[114] See Coakley, *Christ Without Absolutes*, 168.
[115] SH, 183-207.
[116] In SH, Troeltsch applies sociological and psychological theories to point out that Jesus is at the core of cult and community. Coakley, *Christ Without Absolutes*, 136-187, assesses Troeltsch's argument as a sociological or a psychological rather than a theological Christocentrism.
[117] Coakley, *Christ Without Absolutes*, 175.
[118] Ibid., 174.
[119] Ibid., 168.
[120] Ibid., 174.

The distinction between performativity and propositionality allows me to respond to Coakley's critique. The continuity between the historical Jesus and the memorisation of the historical Jesus is a performative rather than a propositional continuity. The memorisation of Jesus – including imaginations and inventions – is vital to transmit the performative, the 'spark', which is communicated by the personality and preaching of Jesus Christ from the past to the present in cult and community. The communication of Jesus Christ is not about *concepts* of Christ (propositionality), but about *concerns* for Christ (performativity). If one is concerned with Jesus Christ, one will participate in the interpretation of Jesus Christ which exceeds completion and closure. Troeltsch echoes the performativity-propositionality distinction with a myriad of metaphors, one of which Coakley takes up:

> Thus Jesus himself – Troeltsch does say Jesus here and not Christ – can be said to be present through the mediation of the community. ... Or, as he puts it more pictorially in the *Glaubenslehre*, Christian believers are like a searchlight (*Lichtkegel*) always being beamed out anew from a central source, Jesus.[121]

My transposition of Troeltsch's christology into the terminology of performativity and propositionality highlights that the practice of Christianity combines continuity and discontinuity: it is a practice which is in need of both repetition and rupture. In the simultaneity of repetition and rupture, the structure of Troeltsch's christology repeats the structure of Troeltsch's theology.[122] Jesus remains the other; his 'ultimate unknowability'

[121] Ibid., 175.

[122] Ibid., 186, Coakley argues that Troeltsch's theology and Troeltsch's christology are disconnected rather than connected. The 'logical gap', she adds, 'constitutes the most significant flaw in his doctrinal system' (ibid.). While I agree with Coakley that Troeltsch does not connect theology and christology explicity, I argue that the structural similarity between both attends to the 'logical gap'. The gap, then, is paradoxically not filled with the *identity* of Christ, but with the *alterity* of Christ.

means that the orientation towards Jesus is not a possession, but a project.[123] Discipleship, then, is rooted in a drive for difference which leads from interpretation to reinterpretation, appropriating again and again the experience of transformative transcendence in Christ. Thus, the practice of Christianity is a *hermeneutical practice*: the interpretation of the interpretations of the classic in the past, the present, and the potential in critical and self-critical conversation with the other. When Troeltsch argues that a 'sense (*Gefühl*)' for what is Christian and for what is non-Christian runs through the hermeneutical practice of Christianity, he points to performativity.[124]

The transcendence of the other has performative rather than propositional effects: a sense of Christianity which escapes conceptual closures. It is baffling that Milbank exactly echoes Troeltsch's account of the identification of Christianity through a 'sense' of what is Christian and what is non-Christian.[125] But while Milbank limits the 'sense' propositionally through a turn to the *doctrine of practice*, Troeltsch de-limits the 'sense' performatively through a turn to *practice*. Accordingly, Troeltsch allows for a plurality of constructions for the identity of Christianity, since what counts is that the force or driving force of the transformative transcendence of God as communicated in Jesus Christ runs through these constructions.[126] The performative pulsates and propels Christianity. To construe the identity of Christianity in propositional rather than performative terms would mean to curtail or close it.[127]

---

[123] Ibid., 82, Coakley employs 'ultimate unknowability' for Troeltsch's concept of God. As I have argued, it is useful for both Troeltsch's concept of God and Troeltsch's concept of Christ.
[124] WD, 152. WH, 419.
[125] Milbank, *Future of Love*, 180.
[126] See Claussen, *Jesus-Deutung*, 268-279.
[127] Troeltsch thus agrees with Graham Ward's ecclesiology of the emerging and emergent church which is open to the 'possibilities of performances of Christ beyond any idolisation of Christianity', Ward, 'Linearity and Complexity in Ecclesiology', 128.

As a consequence of the pluralisation of identity, Troeltsch accepts and allows for discussion and dissent about the identification of Christianity in the practice of Christianity.[128] Indeed, it is crucial for Troeltsch's hermeneutics of identification that the conflict of interpretations is not to be stopped but to be sustained. In this conflict, alterity fulfils its function for the identity of Christianity: by opening Christianity to what is other, alterity keeps Christianity alive. One could put Butler's announcement into Troeltsch's mouth:

> Let a thousand conflicts of interpretation bloom, I say! And I say this not because pluralism alone will ease our minds but because the proliferation of possible interpretations may well lead to the subversion of an authority that grounds itself in what may not be questioned.[129]

For Butler, the conflict of interpretations points to the gap between the (always already repeated) performative practice and the repetition of the (always already repeated) performative practice. This gap is decisive for Troeltsch's hermeneutics of identification.

However, Troeltsch tackles the gap *theologically*. If God is the radical other, then the mediation of God in Jesus Christ reflects God's radical otherness; if the mediation of God in Jesus Christ reflects God's radical otherness, then the identity of Christianity is 'nowhere simply to be grasped'.[130] Thus, any claim to have grasped the identity of Christianity implies *not* to have grasped the identity of Christianity because it would stop the drive for difference at the centre of the practice of interpretation. The drive for difference is central for Christianity because it is propelled by the performative effects of

[128] WD, 152-153.
[129] Butler, 'Afterword', 289.
[130] Troeltsch, WD, 153.

the transformative transcendence of God. The claim to have grasped the identity of Christianity would turn Christianity inside-out, taking the primary theological performativity as secondary and the secondary sociological propositionality as primary. Engagement with the other – finite and infinite – opposes such a turn.

Accordingly, Troeltsch's hermeneutics of the identity of Christianity could be conceived of as the simultaneity of constructing and destructing identity – which is to say: the *deconstruction of identity*. In Chapter 2, I already acknowledged how close Troeltsch comes to Jacques Derrida's notion of deconstruction in response to the transcendence of the finite and the infinite other. If the other is ultimately unknowable, one relates to the other by cataphatically constructing concepts of the other *and* by apophatically destructing concepts of the other. In the oscillation between construction and destruction, Troeltsch weakens the identity of Christianity in a way that allows for the recognition of both repetition and rupture in the past, the present, and the potential practice of Christianity.

Thus, my account of Troeltsch's concept of practice, inspired by Butler's political philosophy, defies the ideological interpellation of identity at work in the models of solid and liquid church. For Troeltsch, the *interruption* of ideological interpellation is not allocated to the outside but to the inside of Christianity.[131] While the liquid model would map onto a scepticism of identity which assumes the absolute alterity of God in Christ, the solid model would map onto a fundamentalism of identity which assumes the absolute identity of God in Christ: against the liquid model, Troeltsch would stress the construction of identity; against the solid model, Troeltsch would stress the destruction of identity. In

[131] It would be interesting to explore the similarities between Troeltsch's combination of repetition and rupture with Lieven Boeve's theology of interruption. See esp. Lieven Boeve, *God Interrupts History: Theology in a Time of Upheaval* (London: Continuum, 2007).

Troeltsch's terminology, identity is 'to be conceived of as being in motion', thus allowing for 'opposites' and 'oscillation' within the hermeneutics of identification.[132]

As analysed above in Chapter 4, for Troeltsch, the kingdom of God, simultaneously come and to come, is of the utmost importance for the identity of Christianity: it keeps identity open to be transformed by the transcendence of the other, finite and infinite. Troeltsch refers to it as 'surplus (*Überschuß*) which is never given up with all the development which takes place'.[133] Here, God shows Godself as a God of the gaps. Because of the 'surplus' of the kingdom of God over all attempts to own God, a theocratic politics of power is ruled out. The God of the gaps is a God who relinquishes or resists power for the sake of openness to otherness, a God of the Crib and a God of the Cross – a vulnerable other.

In Troeltsch's terminology, alterity is conveyed with the concept of *novelty* – a concept which resonates with Butler's notion of the 'performative surprise'.[134] Troeltsch asks practitioners of Christianity to 'trust the Christ who comes to us through history', because Christ has 'the power to create new life even within us'.[135] Thus, when 'we are

[132] WD, 153.

[133] WD, 155 (translation altered). See also WH, 422, which refers to 'ein Überschuß, der in aller Entwickelung nicht aufgeht' which could be rendered as 'a surplus which does not merge into all the development'.

[134] Butler, *Gender Trouble*, xxvi; as well as Butler and Athanasiou, *Dispossession*, 127. See also WD, 168.

[135] WD, 168.

certain that ... Christ, through history, is speaking a new *word* to us, we do not need to be ashamed to admit that it is a *new* word'.[136]

To summarise, Troeltsch does not fall into the trap of either subjective or objective foundationalism. He already anticipates practice as the (non-foundational) foundation for dogmatics, concentrating on the interpretations of the identity of Christianity in both diachronic and synchronic perspectives. For Troeltsch, identity emerges from the practice of concrete churches which is why it is changing continually. As he pointedly puts it: 'An unchangeable Christianity would mean the end of Christianity itself.'[137] Thus, he defies the models of liquid and solid church.

Instead, Troeltsch's hermeneutics of identification implies a model of church which comes close to Graham Ward's ecclesiology of the broken body. Like Ward, Troeltsch brings eschatology to bear on ecclesiology in order to keep it open to the other; like Ward, Troeltsch insists that theology is not a function of ecclesiology but that ecclesiology is a function of theology; and, like Ward, Troeltsch weakens the identity of Christianity. However, *unlike* Ward, the Troeltschian hermeneutics of identification resists the temptation of theocracy. For Troeltsch, God is a God of the gaps to whom one relates precisely by opening Christianity up to the other – the challenge of the other has to be

[136] Ibid. In his 'Note' to WD, Sykes compares the 1903 edition with the 1913 edition of Troeltsch's study. He discovers a subtle but significant difference: with regard to the maintenance of identity, the 1903 edition points to the significance of the 'continued close relationship to the congregation' and the 1913 edition points to the significance of the 'continued *more or less* close relationship to the congregation'. Does Troeltsch's hermeneutics of identification prevent the construction of community? I would argue that the difference between these editions should be traced back to *The Social Teachings of the Christian Churches*, published in 1912. Whatever else Troeltsch concluded from his study of the constructions of community in the history of Christianity, he could not have escaped the conclusion that the concept of community is like a chameleon – it changes its colour according to its context. Hence, when he restricts the significance of congregation, he recognises that it remains to be seen how 'congregation' is lived. If the congregation is constituted by the anthropophagic or the anthropoemic neutralisation of alterity, 'the continued close relationship to the congregation' would corrode rather than conserve the identity of Christianity. Troeltsch's hermeneutics of identity, then, is not restricting community but restricting certain constructions of community which come at the cost of the other.

[137] DR, 21. See also Ward, 'Linearity and Complexity in Ecclesiology', 99-130.

heard inside and outside Christianity because it prevents the Schmittian slide into a politics of power. If one is concerned with Christianity, one is not concerned with the distinction between who or what counts as Christian and who or what counts as non Christian. Instead, the identity of Christianity, Troeltsch concludes, 'remains in the hand of the same God who turns towards us in our present-day Christianity'.[138]

In conclusion, my account of Troeltsch's hermeneutics of identification turns identity from a propositional possession into a performative project. In Butler's terminology, the Troeltschian hermeneutics requires the repetition of the performative practice as well as the rupture of the performative practice of the Christian tradition.[139] What distinguishes Troeltsch from Butler (and Butler from Troeltsch) is that he thinks the politics of the performative theologically. For Troeltsch, Christianity is not an ideology but an un-ideology, a hermeneutical practice in which 'ideology' weakens 'ideology' through the recognition of the openness and the open-endedness of the on-going process of interpretation.

Troeltsch's hermeneutics of identification, then, is rooted in what I characterised as the togetherness of trust in Chapter 7: Troeltsch calls for the recognition – the registration and the respect – of alterity; Troeltsch calls for the prejudice of trust, a prejudice which prevents the separation of trustworthy insiders and non-trustworthy outsiders; and Troeltsch calls for the search for transformative truth through critical and self-critical reflection. He maintains that participation in the 'service (*Gottesdienst*)'[140] is imperative for

[138] WD, 175.
[139] In WD, 176, Troeltsch points to one's devotion with regard to the past of Christianity and one's daring with regard to the potential of Christianity. See also Troeltsch, WH, 448.
[140] See RI, 109-133.

the search for truth, but criticises services which are obsessed with proclamation rather than communication:

> Is the ... service … an administration of an objectively completed truth, this time perceived more from the right, that time perceived more from the left? Or does one have to admit that … we are all searching so that the ... service is ... a common search for truth?[141]

In the togetherness of trust, then, the identity of Christianity is practised. In 'Die Kirche im Leben der Gegenwart', where Troeltsch characterises the 'elasticised' – literally, '*elastisch gemachte*' – church, he calls for practices which engage rather than disengage the other.[142] Here, 'elasticity' refers to the structure of the church, a structure which is stretched to welcome alterity into identity.[143]

However, the Greek concept 'ἐλασω' means 'to propel' or 'to project'. Building on Troeltsch, I am concluding that the elasticisation of church implies that church is propelled by encounters with the other. Church requires the community in which the other is encountered as other: it is *co-constituted* by openness to the other's otherness. Elasticity, then, can be rendered on a propositional and on a performative level: propositionally, it points to the centre of the practice of church which can only be described in elastic terms; performatively, it points to the construction of the practice of the church which can only be done in elastic terms. If Christianity revolves around the interrelation of the relation to the finite other with the relation to the infinite other, then the community of Christianity – the church – exceeds complete conceptualisation: it occurs performatively rather than

[141] RI,126. See also BF, 56.
[142] KG, 105.
[143] See Molendijk, *Zwischen Theologie und Soziologie*, 148-154.

propositionally. Church is done rather than described. Ecclesiology cannot create the practice of church but it can describe the practice of church. It follows practice. But what could or should the practice of church look like in practice?

Since the elasticisation of both ecclesial practices and reflections on ecclesial practices concluded that the practice of church is open, it is imperative *not* to answer this question with a programme for the church. Any answer which programmes the hermeneutical practice of identification would fall for a concept of identity as propositional possession rather than performative project. It would control, curtail, and close ecclesial practice and reflection on ecclesial practice *in advance*. Consequently, Troeltsch hesitates to delimit or define the practices of identification – a hesitance which is constitutive of the elasticisation of ecclesiology.[144]

I am characterising the practice of elasticised ecclesiology as 'a work in movement'.[145] Umberto Eco's concept of 'work in movement', owed to his acquaintance with avant-garde artists,[146] is rooted in the distinction he draws between *two modes of openness*. 'Every work of art', he highlights, 'is effectively open to a virtually unlimited

[144] See Friedrich Wilhelm Graf, 'Religion und Individualität: Bemerkungen zu einem Grundproblem der Religionstheorie Ernst Troeltschs', in *Protestantismus und Neuzeit,* ed. Friedrich Wilhelm Graf and Horst Renz (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 1984), 230, where Graf coins the concept of 'systemkonstitutive Unabgeschlossenheit' (a 'non-closed-ness' which is constitutive for the system) in order to characterise Troeltsch's systematic study of religion.

[145] See Eco, *The Open Work*. When, inspired by Troeltsch, I understand the church as 'a work in motion', I follow a hint of Christoph Schwöbel. In '"Die Idee des Aufbaus heißt Geschichte durch Geschichte überwinden": Theologischer Wahrheitsanspruch und das Problem des sogenannten Historismus', in *Ernst Troeltschs 'Historismus',* 261-284, Schwöbel comes to the conclusion that Troeltsch's philosophy of history resembles 'an open work of art (*ein offenes Kunstwerk*)' (ibid., 284) which is completed not by its production but by its reception. Here, I elaborate on Schwöbel's conclusion with reference to Eco's analysis of open works. Pushing Schwöbel's conclusion further, I argue that church is not only completed but constituted again and again.

[146] See the Chapter 'The Death of the Gruppo 63', in Eco, *The Open Work,* 236-249. See also the 'Introduction' by David Robey, in ibid., vii-xxxii.

range or possible readings'.[147] Yet there are different modes of openness at work in art. 'Openness' might refer to the reception of the work, on the one hand, or to the production of the work, on the other. The difference is easily explained if one explores the example of theatre. Imagine a performance in which the audience is imbibed into the play – audience turned actor – such that the actions and the reactions of the audience co-constitute the play. Here, 'openness' is not at work on the level of *reception*, but on the level of *production*. Both the author(s) and the actor(s) have relinquished the power of performative productivity to their audience. Literally, the play is out of control.

Eco calls plays like these '"works in movement", because they characteristically consist of unplanned ... structural units'.[148] Due to these unplanned structural units, these works are *intrinsically* mobile rather than *extrinsically* mobile.[149] Eco explains:

> Every performance explains the composition but does not exhaust it. ... In short, we can say that every performance offers us a complete ... version of the work, but at the same time makes it incomplete for us, because it cannot simultaneously give all the other artistic solutions which the work would admit.[150]

Accordingly, the work in movement is simultaneously complete and incomplete: 'the author offers ... a work *to be completed*'.[151]

If elasticised ecclesiology envisions church as 'work in movement' – a work which is moving and moved by the transformative transcendence of finite and infinite alterity – then it cannot offer a plan for church to be put into practice. Both the practices of the open

[147] Eco, 'The Poetics of the Open Work', in *The Open Work*, 21.
[148] Ibid.,12
[149] Ibid.
[150] Ibid., 15.
[151] Ibid., 19 (emphasis in the original).

church and the reflections on the practices of the open church cannot be completely conceptualised. But church can be constituted through the transformation by finite and infinite others, performatively rather than propositionally, ever again and ever anew.

Conclusion

CRISIS IN CHURCH(ES)

To recall what I wrote at the outset of my study: in the discourse about the current crisis of churches across Europe, the diversification of ways of life is interpreted as *the* reason and the de-diversification of ways of life is interpreted as *the* response to crisis.[1] Drawing on these interpretations, ecclesiologists recommend transforming the Church of England into a franchise which would compartmentalise church into coherent and consistent communities under the common conception of 'Anglican identity'.[2] Through this strategy of 'amicable separation', the Church of England could be turned into a corporation which would eventually ensure that Christians who prefer to practise church *this* way could find a congregation that fits them and Christians who prefer to practise church *that* way could find a congregation that fits them.[3] Differences could be disengaged. The other could be kept at bay.

Throughout my exploration of Ernst Troeltsch's interdisciplinary thinking on ecclesial and non-ecclesial communities, I have offered a critical and constructive account

[1] See again, Woodhead, 'Time', 14-19. See also the introduction to my study.

[2] The fact that the concept of 'Anglican identity' remains under- if not undefined in *How Healthy is the Church of England* is easily explained. If Anglicanism is interpreted as a 'franchise' which incorporates distinct and diverse communities, then the identity of Anglicanism escapes its definition. Following my discussion of identity in Chapters 7 to 9 above, I advocate the notion of an opened or open identity. In the rhetoric of the 'Church Health Check', however, 'Anglican identity' is used as if it was a firm rather than a fragile concept: a propositionally open concept used for closure rather than a performatively open concept used for un-closure.

[3] Woodhead, 'A remedy', 117.

of church as opened or open community which counters the disengagement of difference. In what follows, I shall summarise how I arrived at the concept of the open(ed) church. Returning to the text which inspired my conversation with Troeltsch, I shall explore what impact the elasticisation of ecclesiology might have on the current crisis of churches. In conclusion, then, I aim to chart the contours of a church which opens its doors to finite and infinite others.

Ecclesiology, I have argued in Part I, is caught in a double-bind between a theological liberalism which is in danger of focusing on personal religiosity at the cost of community and a theological postliberalism which is in danger of focusing on community at the cost of personal religiosity. So where should ecclesiology begin? I suggested that ecclesiology could begin by redefining its beginning. Trust is instructive for ecclesiology because, *in* trust, transformative transcendence is encountered not either personally or communally, but *relationally*. Thus, trust cuts across the double-bind between liberalism and postliberalism.

In Chapter 1, I examined William James's account of religious and nonreligious experience in order to explore why trust is indispensable for encounters with both the finite and the infinite other. I have explained that the circle of trust – a notion which runs through the philosophy of religion and the psychology of religion proposed by James – conceives of trust as relational. Drawing on James, I have defined trust as a relation to the other which is characterised by openness to the other's otherness. But as my critical analysis and my constructive assessment of James's concept of experience have demonstrated, James draws a distinction between the transcendence of the finite other and the transcendence of the infinite other which eventually evokes the individualisation and the interiorisation of trust.

James's distinction is rooted in his interpretation of language. For James, the expression of trust in the transcendent contaminates the experience of trust in the transcendent. Thus, his interpretation of language falls for what John L. Austin called the descriptive fallacy. Turning to Rowan Williams's Gifford Lectures, *The Edge of Words*, I have investigated a theory of language which acknowledges the significance of expressions of transcendence for experiences of transcendence – a theory in which language operates through trust as much as trust operates through language. Thus, I have reframed the (Jamesian) circle of trust both as a condition and as a consequence of the relation to the other. Trust is relational, embodied in personalities and embedded in communities.

Relationality has been crucial for Chapter 2 where I enquired into Troeltsch's reception of James's philosophical-psychological approach to religion. Analysing Troeltsch's seminal study, 'Die Selbständigkeit der Religion', I have argued that Troeltsch conceptualises a tacit theory of trust which connects the self's relation to the finite other with the self's relation to the infinite other – a connection which has consequences for his ecclesiology. In the Troeltschian triangle of event, experience, and expression, experience is co-constituted by event and expression. The event of transcendence is thus interpreted as effable and ineffable; transcendence is a mystery. Hence, the experience of transcendence evokes a drive for difference which runs through religion past and present: in the practices of religion, concepts of the transcendent are constructed and destructed at once. For Troeltsch, who comes close to Jacques Derrida's notion of deconstruction here, the drive for difference impacts the practices of church. Like James, Troeltsch cautions against what I called the postliberal risk: constructions of community which are too solid. Unlike James, Troeltsch cautions against what I called the liberal risk: constructions of community which

are too liquid. Thus, Troeltsch's tacit theory of trust charts the contours of a togetherness of trust – a way of being together in which trust in the finite other and trust in the infinite other interrelate with each other. Here, the community is neither too solid nor too liquid, but *elastic*.

In Chapter 3, I argued that trust is the experiential connection between the experience of the transcendence of the finite other and the experience of the transcendence of the infinite other. My comparative combination of the sociological definition of the experience of transcendence developed by Hans Joas with the theological definition of the experience of transcendence developed by Jörg Lauster has demonstrated that the transcendence of the other is experienced as transformative if one encounters the other in trust. Crucially, such transformative transcendence can be experienced in the relation to the finite other *and* in the relation to the infinite other. In critical conversation with Ingolf U. Dalferth's definition of 'trust' and 'transcendence', I have argued that openness to the otherness of the finite other and of the infinite other is indispensable for the togetherness of trust. Drawing on Graham Ward's reflections on the requirements of transcendence, I have pointed out that the categorical contradistinction between the transcendence of the finite other and the transcendence of the infinite other drawn by Dalferth is arbitrary, if the *experience* of transcendence is taken into account. On the contrary, by opening oneself up to the transcendence of the finite other, one can learn how to trust the infinite other; and by opening oneself up to the transcendence of the infinite other, one can learn how to trust the finite other.

Part II surveyed concepts of community constructed in the history of Christianity. In Chapter 4, I explored and expanded on Troeltsch's tripartite typology of

'ecclesiasticism', 'sectarianism', and 'mysticism'. I have argued that Troeltsch anticipates Nicholas M. Healy's compelling critique of blueprint ecclesiologies. For Troeltsch, the practice of Jesus and the memorisation of the practice of Jesus blur those ecclesiological blueprints which disrupt the hermeneutical circle running from ecclesial practice to ecclesiology to ecclesial practice. Nonetheless, throughout the history of Christianity, church has been reduced repeatedly to ecclesiological blueprints by closing community off against the other. Troeltsch's typology has allowed me to distinguish three types of closure. Connected to Christendom, ecclesiasticism acknowledges neither otherness nor openness; and while sectarianism accepts otherness but not openness, mysticism accepts openness but not otherness. Thus, alterity – the otherness of the other – is instrumentalised either for the bonding of a homogeneous identity of Christianity or for the bridging of a heterogeneous identity of Christianity. Against these instrumentalisations of alterity for the construction of identity, Troeltsch recommended the return to the resistance against closure characteristic of both the practice of Jesus and the memorisation of the practice of Jesus.

In Chapter 5, I applied Troeltsch's typology to today's sociology. I have argued that Zygmunt Bauman's account of community offers a fully-fledged parallel to Troeltsch's typology. With the help of Bauman, I exposed ecclesiasticism as a chimera. Ecclesiasticism never existed. Either a retrospective or a prospective projection, ecclesiasticism aetiologically accounts for the complaints about the collapse of community which permeate so much of modern and postmodern thought. Building on Bauman, I identified the attacks on alterity inherent in sectarianism and mysticism as 'anthropoemic' and 'anthropophagic' neutralisations of the other. In order to counter these neutralisations, I examined Bauman's concept of the community of concern. Bauman, however, ignores the role religions might

play in the provocation and the preservation of concern for the other. Thus, his sociology is instructive to conceptualise the conditions but not to cope with the consequences of individualisation.

In Chapter 6, I applied Troeltsch's typology to today's sociology of religion. I have argued that the paradigm of secularisation (as exemplified by Steve Bruce), the paradigm of pluralisation (as exemplified by Laurence Iannaccone), and the paradigm of individualisation (as exemplified by Grace Davie) employ the types of Troeltsch's typology as criteria to 'measure' the development of religion past and present. The paradigm of secularisation operates with the criterion of ecclesiasticism. Thus, it concludes with the diagnosis of secularisation. The paradigms of pluralisation and individualisation take sectarianism and mysticism as their criteria, thereby arriving at a diagnosis of de-secularisation. I have demonstrated that these three paradigms interpret alterity as a threat to community. In critical conversation with Peter L. Berger's theories of plurality, I portrayed the plurality of religious and nonreligious ways of life as a promise rather than a problem. Corroborating the critique of Berger in Hans Joas and, following Joas, Charles Taylor, I have concluded that the exposure to the other might allow for experiences of transformative transcendence. Part II, then, followed the thrust of Troeltsch's *The Social Teachings of the Christian Churches*: it did not explain how church is to be constructed, but it did explain how church is not to be constructed. The community of church must not be closed. Turned from the negative to the positive, *the* criterion for the construction of church has been articulated as openness to otherness.

I started Part III by assessing identity as the problem for the elasticisation of ecclesiology. Since concepts and constructs of identity separate the trustworthy insider

from the non-trustworthy outsider, they close the communities which constitute church off against the other. In Chapter 7, I have argued that trust troubles any notion of identity which rests on the absence of alterity. The exposure to alterity is inherent in trust. Investigating Arne Grøn's phenomenological-philosophical account of trust, I have argued that the encounter with the other is the site which allows for the recognition of the other's otherness. Yet such recognition works neither through a trust without doubt nor through a doubt without trust. Instead, the togetherness of trust requires what, inspired by Claudia Welz, I called 'doubt *within* trust'. Thus, the trouble with trust is productive rather than destructive: it opens communities up to the other in a critical and self-critical search for the manifestation of truth. The togetherness of trust, I have concluded, unsettles the causalities assumed in the relation between identity and community: it is not the construct of an identity which creates the practice of community, but it is the practice of community which creates the construct of an identity. Practice, then, is vital for the togetherness of trust.

In Chapter 8, I assessed the turn to practice in today's ecclesiology. I examined three ecclesiological examples: one which turns ecclesiology from the liquid to the solid, one which turns ecclesiology from the solid to the liquid, and one which turns ecclesiology neither to the solid nor to the liquid. On my account, both the liquid and the solid model assume the attack on alterity: the solid identity of church, advocated by John Milbank, falls for anthropoemic exclusion (as in Troeltsch's sectarianism); the liquid identity of church, advocated by Pete Ward, falls for anthropophagic inclusion (as in Troeltsch's mysticism). The ecclesiology in-between the liquid and the solid, advocated by Graham Ward, weakens identity to allow for both church learning from culture and culture learning from church. But, ultimately, Ward's theocratic turn to a politics of power reintroduces the rejected

distinction between insider and outsider along the frontline of Carl Schmitt's combat between *Freund* and *Feind*. Hence, although these three ecclesiologies take practice as their point of departure, all of them fall for constructions of identity which inhibit the togetherness of trust.

Drawing the conclusions from the turn to practice in ecclesiology, I interpreted or reinterpreted the identity of Christianity in Chapter 9. I have investigated Judith Butler's political philosophy of performativity for a theory and a terminology which allows for a creative and constructive rereading of Troeltsch's 'What does Essence of Christianity mean?' today. I have argued that Troeltsch offers a hermeneutics of the identification of Christianity which turns identity from a propositional possession into a performative project. Like Butler, Troeltsch anchors his hermeneutics in the gap between performative practices and the repetition of performative practices. But, unlike Butler, Troeltsch tackles the gap *theologically*, conceiving of what I have called a 'God of the gaps' who opens identity up to the other – the God in the Crib and the God on the Cross. I have argued that Troeltsch's account of the practices in which Christianity is identified and re-identified resemble a togetherness of trust. Building on Troeltsch's hermeneutics of identification, I depicted the elasticisation of ecclesiology on a propositional level (elasticity in describing Christianity) and on a performative level (elasticity in doing Christianity). I have concluded with a concept of church in which hermeneutical practices in-between interpellation and interpretation enable the practitioners of church to interrelate their relations to the finite other with their relations to the infinite other in Jesus Christ. Since there is no programmatic plan for these hermeneutical practices, I have characterised the concept of

church which is inherent in the elasticisation of ecclesiology as 'work in movement' – a work which is completed in practice, ever again and ever anew.

Considering my exploration of Troeltsch's interdisciplinary thinking, which moved from 'religiosity' to 'community' to 'identity', what conclusions may be drawn for ecclesiology today? Are the statistics of loss pointing to critics leaving their churches or to churches leaving their critics? What could and should church look like today? In response, I return to the text which inspired the elasticised ecclesiology developed, discussed, and defended throughout my study. At the outset of 'Die Kirche im Leben der Gegenwart', Troeltsch criticises both ecclesiologists who diagnose the ruin of religion today and ecclesiologists who diagnose the return of religion today: 'might happen, might not happen'.[4] Rejecting pessimistic scenarios which could paralyse the ecclesiologist through shock as well as optimistic scenarios which could paralyse the ecclesiologist through slumber, he reflects, calmly and confidently, on churches in contemporary contexts.[5]

Troeltsch insists that the sociological problem of church and the theological problem of church cannot be separated.[6] 'Both problems ... condition and crisscross each other'.[7] Hence, sociologically and theologically, Troeltsch points to the 'Kompromißnatur' of church: church is a compromise which needs to be negotiated and renegotiated by those practising church.[8] In these negotiations, the practitioners who prefer *this* model of church and the practitioners who prefer *that* model of church have to make concessions to each

[4] KG, 97. In German: 'Kann sein, kann auch nicht sein' (ibid.).
[5] KG, 98.
[6] SK, 697-688. See also Starr, 'Individualism and Reform in Troeltsch's View of the Church', 447-463.
[7] SK, 687. See also Molendijk, *Zwischen Theologie und Soziologie*, 178-179.
[8] KG, 104.

other. There is no uniformity.[9] However, unity – not uniformity – is offered by what Troeltsch calls 'göttlicher Gemeingeist', a concept which could be rendered as 'God's common spirit'.[10] With this concept, Troeltsch points to the effect which the encounter with Jesus Christ has on those who have encountered him in the past and in the present: 'certainty (*Gewissheit*)' of God's unconditional grace.[11] Irrespective of the sociological and theological differences among those who practise church, the church is constituted by practising the gospel – a practice which cannot be closed, controlled or confined.[12]

The critique of coercion is at the centre of Troeltsch's recommendations for the practices of church. With respect to both the 'official theologians' in the pulpits and the 'unofficial theologians' in the pews, he demands 'releasing (*freigeben*)' their practice from any tutelage.[13] Thus, the congregation could increase the scope – 'Spielraum', the 'room for play', is what he refers to in German – for the internal (λιτυργεια) and the external (διακονία) organisation of the practices of church.[14] For Troeltsch, the practitioners of church have to be in continual conversation with each other, thus 'eliciting the government of the church out of its bureaucratic uniformity'.[15] He acknowledges conflicts and

[9] Ibid.

[10] Ibid. For the concept of 'Gemeingeist', see Arie L. Molendijk, 'Ernst Troeltsch über Friedrich Schleiermachers Auffassung von der Kirche', in *Die aufgeklärte Religion und ihre Probleme*, esp. 374-381. Molendijk argues that the concept of 'Gemeingeist' combines both the continuity of church supported by communal tradition and the discontinuity of church supported by personal innovation. The fact that Troeltsch argues that the 'Gemeingeist' of Christianity exceeds complete conceptualisation suggests interpreting it as a performative rather than a propositional category. See also BF, 73.

[11] KG, 106.

[12] KG, 108. Through the emphasis on God's grace in the practice of the Gospel, Troeltsch returns to the interpretation of church characteristic of the Reformation. See again *'The Augsburg Confession (1530),* article 7. See also GG and AK. However, the conclusions Troeltsch draws from the emphasis on God's grace counter the ecclesiasticism inherent in the ecclesiologies of Protestantism prior to the Enlightenment

[13] KG, 101.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Ibid.

controversies as potential and actual dangers in these conversations.[16] Yet he argues that the conversation must be 'reckless' or 'ruthless' because nothing, neither dogmatics nor ethics, can be exempt from the critical and self-critical search for the manifestation of truth.[17] Thus, Troeltsch advocates engaging rather than disengaging the other, accepting that practising the gospel creates 'differences and disparities' within the church.[18]

The core of Troeltsch's critique of coercion, then, could be characterised as a concentration on communication. Troeltsch focuses on the communication within concrete church communities because through communication, the elasticisation of both ecclesial practices and reflections on ecclesial practices could be accomplished. He insists that the concentration on communication is neither liberal nor non-liberal. His aim is not to replace 'liberal uniformity' with 'non-liberal uniformity'.[19] Rather, he aims to allow for the practice of church as 'Provisorium'[20], practices where both liberals and non-liberals engage each other 'without scorn and without sneer'.[21] In these provisional practices, churches are 'elastic'[22] or 'elasticised'.[23]

If one accepts that uniformity is *not* constitutive of community, Troeltsch argues, then 'the separation which is always dumb and dangerous becomes redundant'; instead, the community is turned into an 'unfinished task'.[24] Here, he turns the discourse on the crisis of churches throughout Europe inside-out: what causes the crisis is not the diversification

[16] Ibid.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Ibid.
[19] KG, 102. Explicitly, Troeltsch only refers to 'liberalism', but from his reflections it can be inferred that he is critical of both liberal and non-liberal dogmatism. See also FV, 178-181.
[20] KG, 102.
[21] KG, 101.
[22] KG, 104.
[23] KG, 105.
[24] SK, 696.

of practice but the de-diversification of practice. Openness to otherness does *not* mean to dissolve differences. With regard to ecumenism, for instance, Troeltsch suggests that ecclesiologists should confirm different and distinct practices while rejecting competition between them. The 'continual immersion (*Vertiefung*) in one's own confession' and the 'renunciation of ... absolute confessional churches' coincide in the 'trust in the force of the ... life of Christ which builds itself each and every time in a way appropriate to its church'.[25]

Translated into the terminology which I have formulated throughout my study, Troeltsch's conclusion suggests that the transformative transcendence of the other finds its conduit in the practices of church: the church is where what Troeltsch calls 'force' is communicated performatively rather than propositionally so as to interrelate the relations to the finite with the relations to the infinite other in Jesus Christ. Christianity is done rather than described. Troeltsch almost articulates the distinction between performativity and propositionality when he concludes that 'one can believe in this church ... because one believes in the ... force ... of the spirit emanating from Christ'.[26]

Such a church, then, counters the absence of alterity characteristic of the construction of community throughout Christianity past and present.[27] For Troeltsch, it is 'a new concept of church'.[28] What is 'new' about it is that the communities of church are understood not through their coherence and consistence but through their incoherence and

[25] Ibid.
[26] SK, 700.
[27] Ibid.
[28] Ibid. According to Troeltsch, the 'new' concept of church can be traced back to Friedrich Schleiermacher's *The Christian Faith*, where he countered the individualism of his speeches *On Religion*. See Schleiermacher, *The Christian Faith*, trans. Hugh R. Mackintosh and James S. Stewart (London: T&T Clark, 1991), 532-732. See also the account of Schleiermacher's ecclesiology in Haight, *Christian Community in History*, vol. 2, 311-335. For Troeltsch's reception of Schleiermacher, see again, Molendijk, 'Ernst Troeltsch über Friedrich Schleiermachers Auffassung von der Kirche', 365-381.

inconsistency.[29] Church is *constituted* by the engagement with the other – finite and infinite. Neither sociologically nor theologically can Troeltsch be pinned down further. Within the church, he argues

> any proclamation is adequate, which knows itself to draw from the 'Word', and the conflict between ways of proclamation which follows from this is ... to be reconciled without ... coercion through the firm religious trust that in the conflict ... God's spirit will assert itself.[30]

Troeltsch focuses on intra-religious rather than inter-religious communication.[31] It would be intriguing to apply his thinking also to the dialogues among religions. If transformative transcendence is experienced when one encounters the other in trust, these encounters pertain to both intra-religious and inter-religious others. Strangely, Troeltsch has been portrayed both as the 'inclusivist', who can confine salvation to Christianity,[32] *and* as the 'pluralist', who cannot confine salvation to Christianity.[33] But if Troeltsch's concept of church is pushed to its conclusion, then he can be characterised neither as inclusivist nor as pluralist: inclusivisms, pluralisms (and indeed exclusivisms) operate with fixed concepts of the identity of Christianity. Such concepts, however, are *not* applicable to Troeltsch's

---

[29] For Troeltsch, such a concept of community is instructive for both ecclesial and non-ecclesial communities. See FV, 160-187.

[30] KG, 106.

[31] Fechtner, *Volkskirche*, 150-151.

[32] For the resemblance of Troeltsch's theology to inclusivism, see the Chapter, 'The Question of Hegemony: Ernst Troeltsch and the Reconstituted European Universalism', in Masuzawa, *The Invention of World Religions*, 309-324. See also Chapter 4 above.

[33] For the resemblance of Troeltsch's theology to pluralism, see Peter De Mey, 'Ernst Troeltsch: A Moderate Pluralist? An Evaluation of His Reflections on the Place of Christianity among the other Religions', in *The Myriad Christ: Plurality and the Quest for Unity in Contemporary Christology*, ed. Terrence Merrigan and Jaques Haers (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2000), 349-380; and Perry Schmidt-Leukel, 'Die Herausforderung der Religionsgeschichte für die Theologie', in *Christlicher Wahrheitsanspruch – historische Relativität: Auseinandersetzungen mit Ernst Troeltschs Absolutheitsschrift im Kontext heutiger Religionstheologie*, ed. Reinhart Bernhardt and Georg Pfleiderer (Zürich: Theologischer Verlag Zürich, 2004), 111-130.

hermeneutics of identification in which the identity of Christianity is interpreted as flexible and fluctuating. For Troeltsch, there is no clear-cut distinction between intra-religious and inter-religious dialogue. He argues that the 'contradiction between the Christian and the non-Christian remains, but is no longer absolute; it is now conceived in terms of a relative contrast'.[34] Hence, the elasticisation of ecclesiology understands exposures to the intra-religious other and to the inter-religious other as opportunities for the experience of transformative transcendence. The prejudice of trust pertains to each and every other.[35]

The elasticisation of ecclesiology, then, arrives at recommendations for the practices of church which counter the compartmentalisation of church into coherent and consistent communities. Communication is at the core of the practices of church. Elasticised ecclesiology has no fixed and firm criterion to reflect on the current context of churches. Hence, elasticised ecclesiology does not judge the contemporary practices of church against its conceptual standard but its conceptual standard against the contemporary practices of church. How, then, can the current crisis of churches in Europe be characterised?

The answers are ambiguous. If church is understood as a work in movement, then the current context of churches in Europe can be characterised neither simply as a crisis nor simply as a non-crisis. Both conclusions are valid: churches are losing their practitioners and practitioners are losing their churches. However, if church is where relations to the

[34] CF, 36. See also Michael Pye, 'Ernst Troeltsch and the End of the Problem about "Other" Religions', in *Ernst Troeltsch and the Future of Theology*, 171-195.

[35] Here, Troeltsch comes close to David Tracy's concept of inter-faith dialogue as developed in *Dialogue with the Other*, 95: 'It cannot be overemphasized that, if genuine dialogue is to occur, we must be willing to put everything at risk'. See also David Tracy, 'The Other of Dialectic and Dialogue', in *Dynamics of Difference*, 105-113, where he succinctly summarises the notion of dialogue in the following way: 'In fact, dialogue with the other ... demands the willingness to risk one's present self-understanding' (ibid., 113).

finite other are interrelated with relations to the infinite other in Jesus Christ, then the *absence of alterity* is at the root of the current crisis. The elasticisation of ecclesiology, therefore, recommends *diversification* rather than *de-diversification*. It suggests that the practices of church may be opened to the other. Through the compartmentalisation of church, the opportunity to experience the transformative transcendence of the other so crucial to the practice of church would be taken away from the practitioners. Thus, the sociological closure against the finite other would prevent experiences of the transcendence of the infinite other as much as the theological closure against the infinite other would prevent experiences of the transcendence of the finite other. The separation from the other – amicable or not-so-amicable – which is recommended in the discourse about the Church of England, then, is dubious and dangerous. Trust *evaporates* where the outsider remains outside and the insider remains inside.

Given the diversity which has characterised the Church of England from its inception,[36] Anglicanism is destined to exemplify the elasticisation of ecclesiology. In the Church of England, opportunities to engage the other are countless.[37] In these engagements, the elasticisation of ecclesiology could and should be performed.[38] Could one dare to ask the proponents of same-sex marriage to celebrate services with the

[36] For an introduction to Anglicanism which points to its diversity, see Mark D. Chapman, *Anglican Theology* (London: T&T Clark, 2012). Chapman's introduction explores how the search for 'an elusive Anglican identity became a common-place activity among the different parties that emerged from the eighteenth and nineteenth century' (ibid., 2-3). He explains: 'While most churches that emerged from the Reformation could rely on a long history of carefully argued dogmatic theology ..., the Church of England lacked such a clear-cut theological tradition' (ibid., 4).

[37] A 'comprehensiveness' which allows for differences and diversity has been a theological trait of Anglicanism. For a short summary on the chequered career of the concept of comprehensiveness, see Andrew Pierce, 'Comprehensive Vision: The Ecumenical Potential of a Lost Ideal', in *Ecumenical Ecclesiology*, 76-87. For the difficulties and differences faced by the Anglican Communion today, see Mark D. Chapman, 'Inclusion and Exclusion in the Anglican Communion: The Case of the Anglican Covenant', in *Ecclesiology and Exclusion*, 295-306.

[38] See again Zink, 'Patently Living', 225-234.

opponents of same-sex marriage? Could one imagine those who defend assisted suicide caring for a dying person who rejects it and those who despise assisted suicide caring for a dying person who requires it? Could one envision a male bishop ordaining a female bishop although he rejects female episcopacy or a female bishop ordaining a male bishop although he rejects female episcopacy? Church would not be concerned with the preservation of identity through *quantitative* growth but with the preservation of alterity through *qualitative* growth,[39] church would be concerned with finite and infinite others rather than itself – a church *for* the other. In such a church, the otherness of the other could be registered and respected in the practices of community – regardless of who the other is.[40] Conflict, then, 'without sneer and without scorn' could be appreciated as a site where one might encounter God in the other: the 'liberal' practitioner could encounter God in the 'non-liberal' other, and the 'non-liberal' practitioner could encounter God in the 'liberal' other. Everybody would be invited to join, to encounter the other and to be encountered by the other. Church would be elasticised performatively and propositionally in provisional practices where the practitioners hope to encounter the transformative transcendence of the finite and the infinite other. The church could not leave its critic alone because the critic might communicate God to the church and the critic could not leave the church alone because the church might communicate God to the critic.

In conclusion, the communities which constitute church would not be consistent or coherent but *compromised*. Compromise could turn church into a work in movement, open and open-ended. Such compromised communities are already spontaneously and

[39] See again Percy, 'It's not just about the numbers', 127-130. See also Percy, *Shaping the Church*, 81-112.

[40] For an ethnographic account of such a community, see Mary McClintock Fulkerson, '"They Will Know We Are Christians by Our Regulated Improvisation": Ecclesial Hybridity and the Unity of the Church', in *The Blackwell Companion to Postmodern Theology*, ed. Graham Ward (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), 265-279.

sporadically practised by churches inside and outside Europe. What would happen, if *their* elasticised ecclesiologies were taken as the criterion to tackle the current crisis of churches diagnostically and therapeutically? Practitioners could reclaim the practices of their churches – *their* pews and *their* pulpits.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Adair-Toteff, Christopher. *Sociological Beginnings: The First Conference of the German Society for Sociology*. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2005.

Adams, Nicholas, Pattison, George and Ward, Graham, eds. *The Oxford Handbook of Theology and Modern European Thought*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.

Albrecht, Christian. 'Einleitung', in Ernst Troeltsch, *Kritische Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 1: 'Schriften zur Theologie und Religionsphilosophie (1888-1902)'. Edited by Christian Albrecht in collaboration with Björn Biester, Lars Emersleben and Dirk Schmid, 1-38. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2009.

Alford, Fred. 'Bauman and Levinas: Levinas cannot be used'. *Journal for Cultural Research* 18/3 (2014): 249-262.

Althusser, Louis. 'Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes towards an Investigation)'. In Louis Althusser, *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays*. Translated by Ben Brewster, 127-186. New York: MR Press, 1971.

Ammerman, Nancy T. 'Modern Altars in Everyday Life'. In Peter L. Berger, *The Many Altars of Modernity: Toward a Paradigm for Religion in A Pluralist Age*, 94-110. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2015.

Anderson, Pamela S. 'The Other'. In *The Oxford Handbook of Theology and Modern European Thought*. Edited by Nicholas Adams, George Pattison, and Graham Ward, 83-104. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.

Angehrn, Emil. 'Grundvertrauen zwischen Metaphysik und Hermeneutik'. In *Grundvertrauen: Hermeneutik eines Grenzphänomens*. Edited by Ingolf U. Dalferth and Simon Peng-Keller, 161-185. Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 2013.

Arendt, Hannah. *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil*. New York: Penguin Books, 2006.

Arens, Edmund. 'Öffentliche oder gegenöffentliche Kirche? Ekklesiologische Konzepte Politischer Theologie'. In *Extra Ecclesiam... Zur Institution und Kritik von Kirche*. Edited by Henning Klingen, Peter Zeilinger, and Michael Hölzl, 150-168. Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2013.

Astley, Jeff. *Ordinary Theology: Looking, Listening and Learning in Theology*. Farnham: Ashgate, 2002.

Astley, Jeff and Francis, Leslie J., eds. *Exploring Ordinary Theology: Everyday Christian Believing in the Church*. Farnham: Ashgate, 2012.

'The Augsburg Confession (1530)'. In *The Book of Concord: The Confessions of the Evangelical Lutheran Church*. Translated by Theodore G. Tappert, 23-96. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1959.

Austin, John L. *How To Do Things With Words? The William James Lectures Delivered at Harvard University in 1955*. Edited by James O. Urmson. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962.

Baier, Annette. 'Trust and Antitrust'. *Ethics* 96/2 (1986): 231-260.

Bainbridge, William S. and Stark, Rodney. *A Theory of Religion*. New York: Peter Lang, 1987.

Barth, Karl. *The Epistle to the Romans*. Translated by Edwyn C. Hoskyns. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991.

Barth, Karl. *Church Dogmatics*, vol. I/2. Translated by Geoffrey W. Bromiley. Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1963.

Barth , Ulrich. *Gott als Projekt der Vernunft*. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003.

Barth, Ulrich. 'Sichtbare und unsichtbare Kirche'. In *Christentumstheorie.* Edited by Klaus Tanner, 179-230. Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 2008.

Barth, Ulrich, Danz, Christian, Gräb, Wilhelm and Graf, Friedrich Wilhelm, eds. *Die aufgeklärte Religion und ihre Probleme*. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2013.

Baum, Gregory. 'Science and Commitment: Historical Truth according to Ernst Troeltsch'. *Philosophy of the Social Sciences* 1 (1971): 259-277.

Bauman, Zygmunt. *Socialism: The Active Utopia*. London: Allen and Unwin, 1976.

Bauman, Zygmunt. *Mortality, Immortality and Other Life Strategies*. Cambridge, Polity Press, 1992.

Bauman, Zygmunt. 'Survival as a Social Construct'. *Theory, Culture and Society* 9/1 (1992): 1-36.
Bauman, Zygmunt. *Alone Again: Ethics after Certainty*. London: Demos, 1994.
Bauman, Zygmunt. 'Postmodern Religion'. In *Religion, Modernity and Postmodernity*. Edited by Paul Heelas, 55-78. Oxford: Blackwell, 1998.
Bauman, Zygmunt. *Postmodernity and its Discontents*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997.
Bauman, Zygmunt. *Culture as Praxis: New Edition*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000.
Bauman, Zygmunt. *Modernity and the Holocaust: With a New Afterword by the Author*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000.
Bauman, Zygmunt. *Liquid Modernity*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000.
Bauman, Zygmunt and Tester, Keith. *Conversations with Zygmunt Bauman*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001.
Bauman, Zygmunt. *Community: Seeking Safety in an Insecure World*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001.
Bauman, Zygmunt. *The Individualized Society*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001.
Bauman, Zygmunt. 'Seeking Shelter in Pandora's Box'. *City* 9/2 (2005): 161-168.
Bauman, Zygmunt. 'Liquid Modernity Revisited'. In Zygmunt Bauman, *Liquid Modernity*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012, iii-xix.
Bellah, Robert N. and Joas, Hans, eds. *The Axial Age and its Consequences*. Cambridge/MA: Harvard University Press, 2012.
Belzen, Jacob A. van. 'Was ist spezifisch an einer religiösen Erfahrung? Überlegungen aus religionspsychologischer Perspektive'. In *Religiöse Erfahrung: Ein interdisziplinärer Klärungsversuch*. Edited by Friedo Ricken, 40-55. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2004.
Berger, Peter L. 'A Market Model for the Analysis of Ecumenicity', *Social Research* 30 (1963): 77-93.
Berger, Peter L. *The Sacred Canopy: Elements of A Sociological Theory of Religion*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1967.
Berger, Peter L. *Religion in a Revolutionary Society*. Washington D.C.: American Institute for Public Policy Research, 1974.
Berger, Peter L. *The Heretical Imperative: Contemporary Possibilities of Religious Affirmation*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1979.
Berger, Peter L. 'The Desecularization of the World: A Global Overview'. In *The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics*. Edited by Peter L. Berger, 1-18. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1999.
Berger, Berger L. 'Postscript'. In *Peter Berger and the Study of Religion*. Edited by Linda Woodhead, 189-198. London: Routledge, 2001.
Berger, Peter L. 'Dialogue between Religious Traditions in an Age of Relativity'. In Peter L. Berger, *Dialog zwischen religiösen Traditionen in einem Zeitalter der Relativität*. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2011, 6-83.
Berger, Peter L. *The Many Altars of Modernity: Toward A Paradigm for Religion in A Pluralist Age.* Berlin: De Gruyter, 2015.
Bernhardt, Reinhart and Pfleiderer, Georg, eds. *Christlicher Wahrheitsanspruch – historische Relativität: Auseinandersetzungen mit Ernst Troeltschs Absolutheitsschrift im Kontext heutiger Religionstheologie*. Zürich: Theologischer Verlag Zürich, 2004.
Best, Thomas F. 'Ecclesiology and Ecumenism'. In *The Routledge Companion to the Christian Church*. Edited by Gerard Mannion and Lewis Seymour Mudge, 402-420. London: Routledge, 2008.
Bienert, Maren. *Protestantische Selbstverortung: Die Rezensionen Ernst Troeltschs*. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2014.
Bodenstein, Walter. *Neige des Historismus: Ernst Troeltschs Entwicklungsgang*. Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 1959.
Boeve, Lieven. *God Interrupts History: Theology in a Time of Upheaval*. London: Continuum, 2007.
Boothe, Brigitte. 'Urvertrauen und elterliche Praxis'. In *Grundvertrauen: Hermeneutik eines Grenzphänomens.* Edited by Ingolf U. Dalferth and Simon Peng-Keller, 67-86. Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 2013.
Bourdieu, Pierre. *The Logic of Practice*. Translated by Richard Nice. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990.
Bourdieu, Pierre. *Language and Symbolic Power*. Translated by Gino Raymond and Matthew Adamson. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991.
Boynton, Eric and Kavka, Martin, eds. *Saintly Influence: Edith Wyschogrod and the Possibilities of Philosophy of Religion*. Fordham: Fordham University Press, 2009.
Bruce, Steve. *Religion in Modern Britain*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.

Bruce, Steve. *Religion in the Modern World: From Cathedrals to Cults*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997.
Bruce, Steve. *Choice and Religion: A Critique of Rational Choice Theory*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
Bruce, Steve. 'The Curious Case of the Unnecessary Recantation'. In *Peter Berger and the Study of Religion*. Edited by Linda Woodhead, 87-100. London: Routledge, 2001.
Bruce, Steve. 'The Problems of Liberal Religion: A Sociologist's View'. In *The Future of Liberal Theology*. Edited by Mark D. Chapman, 221-242. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002.
Bruce, Steve. *God is Dead: Secularization in the West*. Oxford: Blackwell, 2002.
Bruce, Steve. 'Praying Alone? Church-Going in Britain and the Putnam Thesis'. *Journal for Contemporary Religion* 17/3 (2002): 317-328.
Bruce, Steve. 'What the Secularization Paradigm Really Says'. In *Religiosität in der säkularisierten Welt: Theoretische und empirische Beiträge zur Säkularisierungsdebatte in der Religionssoziologie*. Edited by Manuel Franzman, Christel Gärtner, and Nicole Köck, 39-48. Wiesbaden: VS-Verlag, 2006.
Bruce, Steve. 'Secularization and the Impotence of Individualized Religion'. *The Hedgehog Review* Spring/Summer 2006: 35-45.
Bruce, Steve and Voas, David. 'Vicarious Religion: An Examination and Critique'. *Journal of Contemporary Religion* 25/2 (2010): 243-259.
Bruce, Steve. *Secularization: In Defence of an Unfashionable Theory*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
Butler, Judith. *Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative*. London: Routledge, 1997.
Butler, Judith. *The Psychic Life of Power: Theories in Subjection*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997.
Butler, Judith. *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity*. London: Routledge, 1999.
Butler, Judith. *Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence*. New York: Verso, 2004.
Butler, Judith. 'Afterword'. In *Bodily Citations: Religion and Judith Butler*. Edited by Ellen T. Armour and Susan M. Ville, 276-291. New York: University of Columbia Press, 2006.
Butler, Judith. 'Is Judaism Zionism?'. In *The Power of Religion in the Public Sphere*. Edited by Eduardo Mendieta and Jonathan Vanantwerpen, 70-91. New York: Columbia Press, 2011.
Butler, Judtih and Athanasiou, Athena. *Dispossession: The Performative in the Political*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013.
Butler, Judith. *Parting Ways: Jewishness and the Critique of Zionism*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2014.
Caird, Edward. *The Evolution of Religion: The Gifford Lectures delivered before the University of St Andrews in Sessions 1891-92*, 2 vols. Glasgow: Maclehose, 1893.
Carrette, Jeremy. 'Passionate Belief: William James, Emotion, and Religious Experience'. In *William James and the Varieties of Religious Experience: A Centenary Celebration*. Edited by Jeremy Carrette, 79-93. London: Routledge, 2005.
Carrette, Jeremy, ed. *William James and the Varieties of Religious Experience: A Centenary Celebration*. London: Routledge, 2005.
Carrette, Jeremy. *William James's Hidden Religious Imagination: A Universe of Relations*. London: Routledge, 2013.
Casanova, José. *Public Religions in the Modern World*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1994.
Casanova, José. 'Beyond European and American Exceptionalism: Towards a Global Perspective'. In *Predicting Religion: Christian, Secular and Alternative Futures*. Edited by Grace Davie, Paul Heelas, and Linda Woodhead, 17-29. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003.
Casanova, José. 'Rethinking Secularization'. *The Hedgehog Review* Spring/Summer (2006): 7-22.
Chalamet, Christophe. 'Ernst Troeltsch's Break from Ritschl and his School'. *Journal for the History of Modern Theology* 19/1 (2012): 34-71.
Chapman, Mark D. 'Review of Drescher, *Ernst Troeltsch: Leben und Werk*'. *Journal for Theological Studies* 44 (1993): 437-440.
Chapman, Mark D. *Ernst Troeltsch and Liberal Theology: Religion and Cultural Synthesis in Wilhelmine Germany*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.
Chapman, Mark D., ed. *The Future of Liberal Theology*. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002.
Chapman, Mark D. 'On Sociological Theology'. *Journal for the History of Modern Theology* 15/1 (2008): 3-15.

Chapman, Mark D. 'History of Religion School'. In *The Blackwell Companion to Nineteenth Century Theology*. Edited by David Fergusson, 434-454. Chichester: Blackwell, 2010.

Chapman, Mark D. 'Inclusion and Exclusion in the Anglican Communion: The Case of the Anglican Covenant'. In *Ecclesiology and Exclusion*: *Boundaries of Being and Belonging in Postmodern Times*. Edited by Dennis M. Doyle, Timothy J. Furry and Pascal D. Bazzell, 295-306. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 2012.

Chapman, Mark D. *Anglican Theology*. London: T&T Clark, 2012.

Chiurazzi, Gaetano. 'Truth Is More Than Reality: Gadamer's Transformational Concept of Truth'. *Research in Phenomenology* 41/1 (2011): 60-71.

Choi, Won. 'Inception or Interpellation? The Slovenian School, Butler and Althusser'. *Re-Thinking Marxism: A Journal of Economics, Culture and Society* 25/1 (2013): 23-37.

Chor, Aimee Burant. 'Ernst Troeltsch and the Politics of "Christianity": Context, Pragmatics, and Method in the Historiography of Modern Theology'. *Mitteilungen der Ernst-Troeltsch-Gesellschaft* 20/21 (2008): 78-97.

Claussen, Johann Hnirich. *Die Jesus-Deutung von Ernst Troeltsch im Kontext der liberalen Theologie.* Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1997.

Clayton, John Powell, ed. *Ernst Troeltsch and the Future of Theology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976.

Coakley, Sarah. *Christ Without Absolutes: A Study of the Christology of Ernst Troeltsch*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988.

Coakley, Sarah. *God, Sexuality, and the Self: An Essay 'On the Trinity'*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.

Coles, Romand. 'Storied Others and Possibilities of Caritas: Milbank and Neo-Nietzschean Ethics', *Modern Theology* 8/4 (1992): 331-351.

Cornille, Catherine, ed. *Many Mansions? Multiple Religious Belonging and Christian Identity*. Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2002.

Cox, James L. *A Guide to the Phenomenology of Religion*. London: T&T Clark, 2006.

Dahl, Espen. *Phenomenology and the Holy: Religious Experience after Husserl*. London: SCM, 2010.

Daiber, Karl-Fritz. 'Mysticism: Troeltsch's Third Type of Religious Collectivities'. *Social Compass* 49/3 (2002): 329-341.

Dalferth, Ingolf U. '"In God We Trust": Trust, Mistrust and Distrust as Modes of Orientation'. In *Trust, Sociality and Selfhood*. Edited by Arne Grøn and Claudia Welz, 135-152. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010.

Dalferth, Ingolf U. *Radikale Theologie*. Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 2010.

Dalferth, Ingolf U. 'Vertrauen ist menschlich', *Hermeneutische Blätter*, 2 (2010): 142-157.

Dalferth, Ingolf U. 'Ist Glauben menschlich?'. *Denkströme: Journal der Sächsischen Akademie der Wissenschaften* 8 (2012): 173-192.

Dalferth, Ingolf U. 'The Idea of Transcendence'. In *The Axial Age and Its Consequences*. Edited by Robert Bellah and Hans Joas, 146-188. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012.

Dalferth, Ingolf U. 'Vertrauen und Hoffen: Orientierungsweisen im Glauben'. In *Gottvertrauen: Die ökumenische Diskussion um die fiducia*. Edited by Ingolf U. Dalferth and Simon Peng-Keller, 406-434. Freiburg: Herder, 2012.

Dalferth, Ingolf U. and Peng-Keller, Simon, eds. *Gottvertrauen: Die ökumenische Diskussion um die fiducia*. Freiburg: Herder, 2012.

Dalferth, Ingolf U. and Peng-Keller, Simon, eds. *Kommunikation des Vertrauens*. Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 2012.

Dalferth, Ingolf U. and Peng-Keller, Simon. 'Kommunikation des Vertrauens Verstehen: Hermeneutische Annäherung'. In *Kommunikation des Vertrauens*. Edited by Ingolf U. Dalferth and Simon Peng-Keller, 10-32. Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 2012.

Dalferth, Ingolf U. and Peng-Keller, Simon, eds. *Grundvertrauen: Hermeneutik eines Grenzphänomens*. Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 2013.

Dalferth, Ingolf U. *Selbstlose Leidenschaften: Christlicher Glaube und menschliche Passionen*. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2013.

Dalferth, Ingolf U. 'Grundvertrauen: Problemdimensionen eines sozialen Konstrukts'. In *Grundvertrauen: Hermeneutik eines Grenzphänomens*. Edited by Ingolf U. Dalferth and Simon Peng-Keller, 187-208. Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 2013.

Dalferth, Ingolf U. and Hunziker, Andreas, eds. *Gott Denken – ohne Metaphysik: Zu einer aktuellen Kontroverse in Theologie und Philosophie*. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2014.

Davie, Grave. *Religion in Britain since 1945: Believing without Belonging*. Oxford: Blackwell, 1994.

Davie, Grace. 'Invisible Religion'. In *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Society*. Edited by William H. Swatos, Jr., 238-239. London: Sage, 1998.

Davie, Grace. 'Luckmann, Thomas'. In *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Society*. Edited by William H. Swatos, Jr., 275-276. London: Sage, 1998.

Davie, Grace. *Religion in Modern Europe: A Memory Mutates*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.

Davie, Grace. 'The Persistence of Institutional Religion in Modern Europe'. In *Peter Berger and the Study of Religion*. Edited by Linda Woodhead, 101-111. London: Routledge, 2001.

Davie, Grace. 'Praying Alone? Church-Going in Britain and Social Capital: A Reply to Steve Bruce'. *Journal for Contemporary Religion* 17/3 (2002): 329-334.

Davie, Grace. *Europe: The Exceptional Case. Parameters of Faith in the Modern World*. Darton: Longman and Todd, 2002.

Davie, Grace, Heelas, Paul and Woodhead, Linda, eds. *Predicting Religion: Christian, Secular and Alternative Futures*. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003.

Davie, Grace. 'From Obligation to Consumption: A Framework for Reflection in Northern Europe', *Political Theology* 6/3 (2005): 281-301.

Davie, Grace. 'Religion in Europe in the 21st Century: The Factors to Take into Account'. *European Journal of Sociology* 47/2 (2006): 271-296.

Davie, Grace. *The Sociology of Religion*. London: Sage, 2007.

Davie, 'Vicarious Religion: A Response'. *Journal of Contemporary Religion* 25/2 (2010): 261-266.

Davie, Grace. 'Belief and Unbelief: Two Sides of a Coin'. *Approaching Religion* 2/1 (2012): 3-7.

Davie, Grace. 'Let Theology and Sociology Interact!'. *Ecclesiology* 10 (2014): 362-371.

Davie, Grace. *Religion in Britain: A Persistent Paradox*. Chichester: Blackwell, 2015.

Davies, Noela. 'Subjected Subjects? On Judith Butler's Paradox of Interpellation'. *Hypatia* 27/3 (2012): 881-897.

Dawn, Maggi. 'Read the signs of the times'. In *How Healthy is the Church of England? The Church Times Health Check*. Edited by Malcolm Doney, 151-153. Norwich: Canterbury Press, 2014.

Delanty, Gerard. *Community*, London: Routledge, 2004.

Delanty, Gerard, ed. *Handbook of Contemporary European Social Theory*. London: Routledge, 2006.

Derrida Jacques. *Limited Inc*. Translated by Samuel Weber and Jeffrey Mehlman. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1988.

Derrida, Jacques. *Of Hospitality: Anne Dufourmantelle invites Jacques Derrida to Respond*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000.

Derrida, Jacques. *Acts of Religion*. Edited by Gil Anidjar. London: Routledge, 2010.

Deuser, Herman. 'Zum Religions- und Wahrheitsbegriff bei William James'. In *Religionsphilosophie: Historische Positionen und systematische Reflexionen*. Edited by Matthias Jung, Michael Moxter, and Thomas M. Schmidt, 151-164. Würzburg: Echter, 2000.

Deutsche Gesellschaft für Soziologie, ed. *Verhandlungen des Ersten Deutschen Soziologentages*. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1911.

Dillon, Michele, ed. *Handbook of the Sociology of Religion*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

Dobbelaere, Karel. 'Towards an Integrated Perspective of the Processes Related to the Descriptive Concept of Secularization'. *Sociology of Religion* 60/3 (1999): 229-247.

Dobbelaere, Karel. *Secularization: An Analysis at Three Levels*. Brussels: Peter Lang, 2002.

Doney, Malcolm, ed. *How Healthy is the Church of England? The Church Times Health Check*. Norwich: Canterbury Press, 2014.

Doyle, Dennis M., Furry, Timothy J. and Bazzell, Pascal D., eds. *Ecclesiology and Exclusion: Boundaries of Being and Belonging in Postmodern Times*. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 2012.

Drescher, Hans-Georg. *Ernst Troeltsch: Leben und Werk*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck, 1991.

Drescher, Hans-Georg. *Ernst Troeltsch: His Life and Work*. Translated by John Bowden. London: SCM, 1992.

Dunlop, Sarah and Ward, Pete. 'From Obligation to Consumption in Two-and-a-half Hours: A Visual Exploration of the Sacred with Young Polish Migrants'. *Journal of Contemporary Religion* 27/13 (2012): 433-451.

Ebeling, Gerhard. 'Die Klage über das Erfahrungsdefizit der Theologie als Frage nach ihrer Sache'. In Gerhard Ebeling, *Wort und Glaube*, vol. 3, 3-28. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1975.

Eco, Umberto. *The Open Work*. Translated by Anna Cancogni. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1889.

Eliade, Mircea. *The Sacred and the Profane*. Translated by Willard R. Trask. London: Harcourt, 1959.

Evers, Dirk. 'Infinity, Philosophy of Religion'. In *Religion Past and Present*, vol. 6. Edited by Hans Dieter Betz, Don S. Browning, Bernd Janowski and Eberhard Jüngel, 483-484. Leiden: Brill, 2009.

Fechtner, Kristian. *Volkskirche im neuzeitlichen Christentum: Die Bedeutung Ernst Troeltschs für eine künftige praktisch-theologische Theorie der Kirche*. Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 1995.

Fergusson, David, ed. *The Blackwell Companion to Nineteenth Century Theology*. Chichester: Blackwell, 2010.

Feuerbach, Ludwig. *The Essence of Christianity*. Translated by Marian Evans. London: Tübner, 1881.

Fiddes, Paul S. *Participating in God: A Pastoral Doctrine of the Trinity*. London: DLT, 2000.

Fiddes, Paul S. and Ward, Pete. 'Affirming Faith at a Service of Baptism in St Aldates Church, Oxford'. In *Explorations in Ecclesiology and Ethnography*. Edited by Christian B. Scharen, 51-70. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2012.

Figl, Johann. 'Transcendence and Immanence, Religious Studies'. In *Religion Past and Present*, vol. 13. Edited by Hans Dieter Betz, Don S. Browning, Bernd Janowski and Eberhard Jüngel, 63. Leiden: Brill, 2013.

Forster, Michael N. and Gjesdal, Kristin, eds. *The Oxford Handbook of German Philosophy in the Nineteenth Century*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.

Foucault, Michel. *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*. Translated by Alan Sheridan. New York: Vintage, 1979.

Freud, Sigmund. *The Future of An Illusion*. Translated by James Strachey. New York: Norton, 1961.

Gabriel, Karl, Gärtner, Christel and Pollack, Detlef, eds. *Umstrittene Säkularisierung: Soziologische und historische Analysen zur Differenzierung von Religion und Politik*. Berlin: Berlin University Press, 2012.

Gadamer, Hans-Georg. *Truth and Method*. Translation revised by Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall. London: Sheed and Ward Limited, 1989.

Gaebler, Mary. *The Courage of Faith: Martin Luther on the Theonomous Self*. Minneapolis: Fortress, 2013.

Gambetta, Diego. 'Can We Trust Trust?'. In *Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations*. Edited by Diego Gambetta, 213-237. Oxford: Blackwell, 1988.

Garrett, William A. 'Maligned Mysticism: The Maledicted Career of Troeltsch's Third Type'. *Sociological Analysis* 36 (1975): 205-223.

Gerrish, Brian A. 'Ernst Troeltsch and the Possibility of a Historical Theology'. In *Ernst Troeltsch and the Future of Theology*. Edited by John Powell Clayton, 100-138. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976.

Giddings, Philip. 'Listening out for the laity's voice'. In *How Healthy is the Church of England? The Church Times Health Check*. Edited by Malcom Doney, 55-58. Norwich: Canterbury Press, 2014.

Gill, Robin. 'A Response to Steve Bruce's Praying Alone?'. *Journal for Contemporary Religion* 17/3 (2002): 335-338.

Goldstein, Warren S. 'Reconstructing the Classics: Weber, Troeltsch, and the Historical Materialists'. *International Archive of the History of Ideas* 26/4-5 (2015): 470-507.

Gooder, Paula. 'In Search of the Early Church: The New Testament and the Development of Christian Communities'. In *The Routledge Companion to the Christian Church*. Edited by Gerard Mannion and Lewis Seymour Mudge, 9-27. London: Routledge, 2008.

Gorski, Philip S. 'Historicizing the Secularization Debate: Church, State and Society in Late Medieval and Early Modern Europe ca. 1300 to 1700'. *American Sociological Review* 65/1 (2000): 138-167.

Gorski, Philip S. 'Historicizing the Secularization Debate: An Agenda for Research'. In *Handbook of the Sociology of Religion*. Edited by Michele Dillon, 110-122. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

Gräb, Wilhelm. 'Dogmatik als Stück der Praktischen Theologie: Das normative Grundproblem in der praktisch-theologischen Theoriebildung'. *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche* 85 (1988): 474-492.

Graf, Friedrich Wilhelm. 'Religion und Individualität: Bemerkungen zu einem Grundproblem der Religionstheorie Ernst Troeltschs'. In *Protestantismus und Neuzeit*. Edited by Friedrich Wilhelm Graf and Horst Renz, 207-230. Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 1984.

Graf, Friedrich Wilhelm. '"Endlich große Bücher schreiben": Marginalien zur Werkgeschichte der Soziallehren'. In *Ernst Troeltschs 'Soziallehren': Studien zu ihrer Interpretation*. Edited by Friedrich Wilhelm Graf and Trutz Rendtorff, 27-50. Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 1993.

Graf, Friedrich Wilhelm. 'Weltanschauungshistoriogrpaphie: Rezensionen zur Erstausgabe der Soziallehren'. In *Ernst Troeltschs 'Soziallehren': Studien zu ihrer Interpretation.*, Edited by Friedrich Wilhelm Graf and Trutz Rendtorff, 216-229. Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 1993.

Graf, Friedrich Wilhelm, ed. *Ernst Troeltschs 'Historismus'*. Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 2000.

Graf, Friedrich Wilhelm. 'What has London (or Oxford or Cambridge) to do with Augsburg? The Enduring Significance of the German Liberal Tradition in Christian Theology'. In *The Future of Liberal Theology*. Edited by Mark D. Chapman, 18-38. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002.

Graf, Friedrich Wilhelm, ed. *'Geschichte durch Geschichte überwinden': Ernst Troeltsch in Berlin*. Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 2006.

Graf, Friedrich Wilhelm and Rendtorff, Trutz, eds. *Ernst Troeltschs 'Soziallehren': Studien zu ihrer Interpretation*. Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 1993.

Graf, Friedrich Wilhelm. 'Einleitung'. In Ernst Troeltsch, *Der Historismus und seine Probleme (1922)*, Kritische Gesamtausgabe, vol. 16/1. Edited by Friedrich Wilhelm Graf in collaboration with Matthias Schloßberger, 1-80. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2008.

Graf, Friedrich Wilhelm and Renz, Horst, eds. *Protestantismus und Neuzeit*. Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 1984.

Graf, Friedrich Wilhelm and Voigt, Friedemann, eds. *Religion(en) deuten: Transformationen der Religionsforschung*. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2010.

Graf, Friedrich Wilhelm and Meier, Heinrich, eds. *Politik und Religion: Zur Diagnose der Gegenwart*. München: C. H. Beck, 2013.

Grøn, Arne 'Trust, Sociality, Selfhood'. In *Trust, Sociality and Selfhood*. Edited by Arne Grøn and Claudia Welz, 13-30. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010.

Grøn, Arne. 'Grenzen des Vertrauens: Kritische Bemerkungen zur Rede von Grundvertrauen'. In *Grundvertrauen: Hermeneutik eines Grenzphänomens*. Edited by Ingolf U. Dalferth and Simon Peng-Keller, 145-158. Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 2013.

Grøn, Arne. 'Ethics of Vision: Seeing the Other as Neighbour'. In *Dynamics of Difference: Christianity and Alterity. A Festschrift for Werner G. Jeanrond,*. Edited by Ulrich Schmiedel and James M. Matarazzo, Jr., 63-70. London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2015.

Grøn, Arne and Welz, Claudia, eds. *Trust, Sociality and Selfhood*. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010.

Grøn, Arne and Welz, Claudia. 'Introduction: Trust in Question'. In *Trust, Sociality, Selfhood*. Edited by Arne Grøn and Claudia Welz, 1-9. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010.

Groot, Kees de. 'The church in liquid modernity: A sociological and theological exploration of a liquid church'. *International Journal for the Study of the Christian Church* 6/1 (2006): 91-103.

Groot, Kees de. 'Three Types of Liquid Religion'. *Implicit Religion* 11/2 (2008): 277-296.

Großhans, Hans-Peter. 'Truth, Philosophy'. In *Religion Past and Present*, vol. 13. Edited by Hans Dieter Betz, Don S. Browning, Bernd Janowski and Eberhard Jüngel, 130-132. Leiden: Brill, 2013.

Habermas, Jürgen. *Between Naturalism and Religion*. Translated by Ciaran Cronin. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008.

Habermas, Jürgen. '"The Political": The Rational Meaning of a Questionable Inheritance of Political Theology'. In *The Power of Religion in the Public Sphere*. Edited by Eduardo Mendieta and Jonathan Vanantwerpen, 15-33. New York: Columbia University Press, 2011.

Habermas, Jürgen. 'Politik und Religion'. In *Politik und Religion: Zur Diagnose der Gegenwart.* Edited by Friedrich Wilhelm Graf and Heinrich Meier, 287-300. München: C. H. Beck, 2013.

Haight, Roger D. *Christian Community in History*, vol. 1: 'Historical Ecclesiology'. London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2014.

Haight, Roger D. *Christian Community in History*, vol. 2: 'Comparative Ecclesiology'. London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2014.

Haight, Roger D. *Christian Community in History*, vol. 3: 'Ecclesial Existence'. London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2014.

Halliwell, Martin and Rasmussen, Joel D. S. 'Introduction: William James and the Transatlantic Conversation'. In *William James and the Transatlantic Conversation: Pragmatism, Pluralism, and Philosophy of Religion.* Edited by Martin Halliwell and Joel D. S. Rasmussen, 1-14. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.

Halliwell, Martin and Rasmussen, Joel D. S. eds. *William James and the Transatlantic Conversation*: *Pragmatism, Pluralism, and Philosophy of Religion*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.

Harasta, Eva and Brock, Brian, eds. *Evoking Lament: A Theological Discussion*. London: T&T Clark, 2009.

Hardtke, Thomas, Schmiedel, Ulrich and Tan, Tobias, eds. *Experience or Expression? Religious Experience Revisited*. Leiden: Brill, forthcoming.

Harnack, Adolf von. *Das Wesen des Christentums*. Leipzig: Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung, 1902.

Harrington, Austin. 'Social Theory and Theology'. In *Handbook of Contemporary European Social Theory*. Edited by Gerad Delanty, 37-47. London: Routledge, 2006.

Harris, Jose and Hollis, Margaret. 'A Note on Translation'. In Ferdinand Tönnies, *Community and Civil Society*. Translated by Jose Harris and Margaret Hollis, xxxviii-xl. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

Hartmann, Martin. *Die Praxis des Vertrauens*. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2011.

Healy, Nicholas M. *Church, World and the Christian Life: Practical-Prophetic Ecclesiology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.

Healy, Nicholas M. 'Practices and the New Ecclesiology: Misplaced Concreteness?'. *International Journal for Systematic Theology* 5/3 (2003): 287-308.

Healy, Nicholas M. 'Ecclesiology, Ethnography and God: An Interplay of Reality Descriptions'. In *Perspectives on Ecclesiology and Ethnography*. Edited by Pete Ward, 182-199. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2012.

Heelas, Paul, ed. *Religion, Modernity and Postmodernity*. Oxford: Blackwell, 1998.

Heelas, Paul and Woodhead, Linda. *The Spiritual Revolution: Why Religion is Giving Way to Spirituality*. Oxford: Blackwell, 2005.

Hegel, Georg W. F. *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion I-II*, Werke 16-17. Edited by Eva Moldenhauer and Karl M. Michel. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1986.

Hegstad, Harald. *The Real Church: An Ecclesiology of the Visible*. Cambridge: James Clarke & Co, 2013.

Heinämäki, Elisa, Mehtonen, P.M. and Salminen, Antii. eds. *The Poetics of Transcendence*. Leiden: Brill, 2015.

Hennis, Wilhelm. 'The Spiritualist Foundation of Max Weber's "Interpretative Sociology": Ernst Troeltsch, Max Weber and William James's Varieties of Religious Experience'. *History of the Human Sciences* 11/2 (1998): 83-106.

Herrmann, Wilhelm. *The Communion of the Christian with God: Described on the Basis of Luther's Statements*. Translated by J. Sandys Stanion. London: Williams, 1906.

Herrmann, Wilhelm. 'Grund und Inhalt des Glaubens'. In Wilhelm Herrmann, *Gesammelte Aufsätze*, Edited by Friedrich W. Schmidt, 275-294. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1923.

Hervieu-Léger, Danièle. 'Individualism, the Validation of Faith, and the Social Nature of Religion in Modernity'. In *The Blackwell Companion to the Sociology of Religion*. Edited by Richard K. Fenn, 161-175. Oxford: Blackwell, 2001.

Hervieu-Léger, Danièle. 'Religion und sozialer Zusammenhalt in Europa', *Transit: Europäische Revue* 26 (2004): 101-119.

Hoelzl, Michael and Ward, Graham, eds. *The New Visibility of Religion*. London: Continuum, 2008.

Hollywood, Amy. 'Performativity, Citationality, Ritualization'. In *Bodily Citations: Religion and Judith Butler*. Edited by Ellen T. Armour and Susan M. Ville, 252-275. New York: University of Columbia Press, 2006.

Hornsby, Jennifer. 'Speech Acts and Performatives'. In *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language*. Edited by Ernest Lepore and Barry C. Smith, 893-909. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.

Hübinger, Gangolf. 'Ernst Troeltschs Soziallehren in außertheologischer Sicht'. In *Ernst Troeltschs 'Soziallehren': Studien zu ihrer Interpretation*. Edited by Friedrich Wilhelm Graf and Trutz Rendtorff, 230-240. Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 1993.

Hunziker, Andreas. 'Glaube als radikales Vertruaen?'. In *Gottvertrauen: Die ökumenische Diskussion um die fiducia*. Edited by Ingolf U. Dalferth and Simon Peng-Keller, 157-294. Freiburg: Herder, 2012.

Iannaccone, Laurence. 'A Formal Model of Church and Sect'. *American Journal of Sociology* 94 (1988): 241-268.

Iannaccone, Laurence. 'Religious Practice: A Human Capital Approach'. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 29/3 (1990): 297-314.

Iannaccone, Laurence. 'The Consequences of Religious Market Structure: Adam Smith and the Economics of Religion'. *Rationality and Society* 3 (1991): 156-177.

Iannaccone, Laurence. 'Religious Markets and the Economics of Religion'. *Social Compass* 39 (1992): 123-131.

Iannaccone, Laurence. 'Sacrifice and Stigma: Reducing Free-Riding in Cults, Communes and Other Collectives'. *Journal of Political Economy* 100/2 (1992): 271-291.

Iannaccone, Laurence. 'Why Strict Churches are Strong'. *American Journal of Sociology* 99 (1994): 1180-1211.

Iannaccone, Laurence. 'Voodoo Economics: Reviewing the Rational Choice Approach to Religion'. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 34 (1995): 76-88.

Iannaccone, Laurence. 'Strictness and Strength Revisited'. *American Journal of Sociology* 101 (1996): 1103-1108.

Iannaccone, Laurence. 'Extremism and the Economics of Religion'. *The Economic Record* 88 (2012), 110-115.

Iannaccone, Laurence, Finke, Roger and Stark, Rodney. 'Deregulating Religion: The Economics of Church and State'. *Economic Inquiry* 35/2 (1997): 350-364.

Iannaccone, Laurence, Haight, Colleen and Rubin, Jared. 'Lessons from Delphi: Religious Markets and Spiritual Capitals'. *Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization* 77/3 (2011): 326-338.

Jacobson, Michael Hviid and Poder, Paul, eds. *The Sociology of Zygmunt Bauman: Challenges and Critique*. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008.

Jacobson, Michael Hviid. 'Bauman on Utopia – Welcome to the Hunting Zone'. In *The Sociology of Zygmunt Bauman: Challenges and Critique*. Edited by Michael Hviid Jacobson and Paul Poder, 209-230. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008.

Jacobson, Michael Hviid and Marshman, Sophia. 'Bauman on Metaphors – A Harbinger of Humanistic Hybrid Sociology'. In *The Sociology of Zygmunt Bauman: Challenges and Critique*. Edited by Michael Hviid Jacobson and Paul Poder, 19-40. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008.

Jacobsen, Michael Hviid and Kear, Michael C. 'Liquid Immortality – An Interview with Zygmunt Bauman'. *Mortality: Promoting the Interdisciplinary Study of Death and Dying* 19/3 (2014): 303-317.

Jasper, David. *The Sacred Community: Art, Sacrament, and the People of God*. Waco: Baylor University Press, 2012.

James, William. *Essays in Radical Empiricism*, The Works of William James, vol. 3. Edited by Fredson Bowers and Ignas K. Skurupskelis, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976.

James, William. *Essays in Philosophy*, The Works of William James, vol. 5. Edited by Frederick H. Burkhardt, Fredson Bowers, and Ignas K. Skrupskelis. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977.

James, William. *The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy*. The Works of William James, vol. 6. Edited by Frederick H. Burkhardt, Fredson Bowers, and Ignas K. Skrupskelis. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979.

James, Williams. *Some Problems of Philosophy*. The Works of William James, vol. 7. Edited by Frederick H. Burkhardt, Fredson Bowers, and Ignas K. Skrupskelis. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979.

James, William. *The Principles of Psychology*, 3 vols, The Works of William James, vols 8-10. Edited by Frederick H. Burkhardt, Fredson Bowers, and Ignas K. Skurupskelis. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981.

James, William. *Essays in Psychology*, The Works of William James, vol. 13. Edited by Frederick H. Burkhardt, Fredson Bowers, and Ignas K. Skrupskelis. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983.

James, William. *The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature*. The Works of William James, vol. 15. Edited by Frederick H. Burkhardt, Fredson Bowers, and Ignas K. Skurupskelis. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987.

Jeanrond, Werner G. *Text and Interpretation as Categories of Theological Thinking*. Translated by Thomas J. Wilson. Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1988.

Jeanrond, Werner G. *Call and Response: The Challenge of Christian Life*. New York: Continuum, 1995.

Jeanrond, Werner G. *Theological Hermeneutics: Development and Significance*. London: SCM, 2002.

Jeanrond, 'Belonging or Identity? Christian Faith in a Multi-Religious World'. In *Many Mansions? Multiple Religious Belonging and Christian Identity*. Edited by Catherine Cornille. 106-120. Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2002.

Jeanrond, Werner G. *A Theology of Love*. London: T&T Clark, 2010.

Jeanrond, Werner G. 'Towards an Interreligious Hermeneutics of Love'. In *Interreligious Hermeneutics.* Edited by Catherine Cornille and Christopher Conway, 44-60. Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2010.

Jeanrond, Werner G. 'Interkulturalität und Interreligiösität: Die Notwendigkeit einer Hermeneutik der Liebe'. In *Kontextualität und Universalität: Die Vielfalt der Glaubenskontexte und der Universalitätsanspruch des Evangeliums*. Edited by Thomas Schreijäck and Knut Wenzel, 156-173. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2012.

Jeanrond, Werner G. 'Love'. In *The Oxford Handbook for Theology and Modern European Thought*. Edited by George Pattison, Nicholas Adams, and Graham Ward, 233-252. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.

Jeanrond, Werner G. 'The Complexity of Hermeneutical Experience: Transcendence and Transformation'. In *Experience or Expression? Religious Experience Revisited.* Edited by Thomas Hardtke, Ulrich Schmiedel and Tobias Tan. Leiden: Brill, forthcoming.

Joas, Hans. *The Creativity of Action*. Translated by Jeremy Ganes and Paul Keast. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996.

Joas, Hans. *Die Entstehung der Werte*. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1997.

Joas, Hans. *The Genesis of Values*. Translated by Gregory Moore. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000.

Joas, Hans. *Braucht der Mensch Religion? Über Erfahrungen der Selbsttranszendenz*. Freiburg: Herder, 2003.

Joas, Hans. *Do We Need Religion? On the Experience of Self-Transcendence*. Translated by Alex Skinnner. Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2008.

Joas, Hans. 'Sociology and the Sacred: A Response to John Milbank'. *Ethical Perspectives* 7 (2004): 233-243.

Joas, Hans. 'Die Selbständigkeit religiöser Phänomene: Ernst Troeltsch als Vorbild der Religionsforschung'. *Fuge* 6 (2010): 6-28.

Joas, Hans. 'Selbsttranszendenz und Wertbindung: Ernst Troeltsch als Ausgangspunkt einer modernen Religionssoziologie'. In *Religion(en) deuten*: *Transformationen der Religionsforschung*. Edited by Friedemann Voigt and Friedrich Wilhelm Graf, 51-64. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2010.

Joas, Hans. 'Schleiermacher and the Turn to Experience in the Study of Religion'. In *Interpreting Religion: The Significance of Friedrich Schleiermacher's "Reden über die Religion"*. Edited by Dietrich Korsch and Amber L. Griffioen, 147-161. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2011.

Joas, Hans. 'Gefährliche Prozessbegriffe: Eine Warnung vor der Rede von Differenzierung, Rationalisierung und Modernisierung'. In *Umstrittene Säkularisierung: Historische und soziologische Analysen zur Differenzierung von Religion und Politik*. Edited by Karl Gabriel, Christel Gärtner and Detlef Pollack, 603-622. Berlin: Berlin University Press, 2012.

Joas, Hans. *Glaube als Option: Zukunftsmöglichkeiten des Christentums*. Freiburg: Herder, 2012.

Joas, Hans. *Faith as an Option: Possible Futures for Christianity*. Translated by Alex Skinner. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014.

Joas, Hans. *The Sacredness of the Person: A New Genealogy of Human Rights*. Translated by Alex Skinner. Georgetown: Georgetown University Press, 2013.

Joas, Hans. '"Diese Erfahrung ist universell": Gläubige haben kein Geheimwissen, sagt der Soziologe Hans Joas. Sie reden nur anders'. *Zeit Wissen* 1 (2013): 24-28.

Joas, Hans. 'Pragmatismus und Historismus: Meads Philosophie der Zeit und die Logik der Geschichtsschreibung'. *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie* 36/1 (2015): 1-21.

Jung, Matthias. *Erfahrung und Religion: Grundzüge einer hermeneutisch-pragmatischen Religionstheorie*. München: Alber, 1999.

Jüngel, Eberhard. *Unterwegs zur Sache: Theologische Erörterungen*. München: Christoph Kaiser Verlag, 1972.

Kearney, Richard. *The God Who May Be: A Hermeneutics of Religion*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2001.

Kearney, Richard. *On Stories*. London: Routledge, 2002.

Kearney, Richard. *Strangers, Gods and Monsters: Interpreting Otherness*. London: Routledge, 2003.

King, Richard H. 'Religion, Sociology and Psychology: William James and the Re-Enchantment of the World'. In *William James and the Transatlantic Conversation: Pragmatism, Pluralism, and Philosophy of Religion*. Edited by Martin Halliwell and Joel D. S. Rasmussen, 49-64. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.

Klingen, Henning, Zeitlinger, Peter and Hölzl, Michael, eds. *Extra Ecclesiam... Zur Institution und Kritik von Kirche*. Berlin: Lit, 2013.

Knight, John Allen. *Liberalism versus Postliberalism: The Great Divide in Twentieth-Century Theology*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.

Köpf, Ulrich. 'Die Idee der "Einheitskultur" des Mittelalters'. In *Ernst Troeltschs 'Soziallehren': Studien zu ihrer Interpretation.* Edited by Friedrich Wilhelm Graf and Trutz Rendtorff, 103-121. Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 1993.

Korsch, Dietrich and Griffioen, Amber L., eds. *Interpreting Religion: The Significance of Friedrich Schleiermacher's "Reden über die Religion"*. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2011.

Koselleck, Reinhard. 'Crisis'. *Journal of the History of Ideas* 2 (2006): 357-400.

Kreutzer, Ansgar and Gruber, Franz, eds. *Im Dialog: Systematische Theologie und Religionssozioloige*. Freiburg: Herder, 2014.

Kristensson Uggla, Bengt. *Ricoeur, Hermeneutics and Interpretation*. London: Continuum, 2010.

Kristensson Uggla, Bengt. 'The Grammar of Trust as Ethical Challenge'. In *Trust and Organisations: Confidence across Borders.* Edited by Marta Reuter, Filip Wijgström and Bengt Kristensson Uggla, 165-179. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.

Kuhn, Thomas S. *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2012.

Lash, Nicholas. *Easter in Ordinary: Reflections on Human Experience and the Knowledge of God*. London: SCM, 1988.

Latour, Bruno. *Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.

Lauster, Jörg. 'Das Ende des Bibeldogmas. Ernst Troeltschs Aufhebung des protestantischen Schriftprinzips durch die historische Kritik und die Reaktion der Bibeltheologie'. *Mitteilungen der Ernst-Troeltsch-Gesellschaft* 16 (2003): 5-30.

Lauster, Jörg. *Prinzip und Methode: Die Transformation des protestantischen Schriftprinzips durch die historisch-kritische Methode von Schleiermacher bis zur Gegenwart*. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2004.

Lauster, Jörg. *Religion als Lebensdeutung: Theologische Hermeneutik Heute*. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2005.

Lauster, Jörg. 'Liberale Theologie: Eine Ermunterung'. *Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie* 49/3 (2007): 291-307.

Lauster, Jörg. 'Die Selbständigkeit der Religion'. In *Die aufgeklärte Religion und ihre Probleme*. Edited by Ulrich Barth, Christian Danz, Wilhelm Gräb, and Friedrich Wilhelm Graf, 431-445. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2013.

Lauster, Jörg. *Die Verzauberung der Welt: Eine Kulturgeschichte des Christentums*. München: C. H. Beck, 2014.

Lauster, Jörg. 'How To Do Transcendence With Words? The Problem of Articulation in Religious Experience', in *Experience or Expression? Religious Experience Revisited*. Edited by Thomas Hardtke, Ulrich Schmiedel, and Tobias Tan. Leiden: Brill, forthcoming.

Lawler, Steph. *Identity: Sociological Perspectives*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008.

Lepore, Ernest and Smith, Barry C., eds. *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.

Lindbeck, George A. *The Nature of Doctrine*. London: SPCK, 1984.

Loxley, James. *Performativity*. London: Routledge, 2007.

Luckmann, Thomas. *The Invisibile Religion: The Problem of Religion in Modern Society*. New York: Macmillan, 1967.

Luckmann, Thomas. 'Säkularisierung – ein moderner Mythos'. In Thomas Luckmann, *Lebenswelt und Gesellschaft: Grundstrukturen und geschichtliche Wandlungen*, 161-172. Paderborn: Schöningh, 1980.

Luckmann, Thomas. 'Shrinking Transcendence – Expanding Religion?'. *Sociological Analysis* 51/2 (1990): 127-138.

Luckmann, Thomas. *Die unsichtbare Religion*. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1991.

Luhrmann, Tanya M. *When God Talks Back: Understanding the American Evangelical Relationship with God*. New York: Vintage Books, 2012.

Luther, Martin. 'The Large Catechism (1529)'. In *The Book of Concord: The Confessions of the Evangelical Lutheran Church*. Translated by Theodore G. Tappert, 357-462. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1959.

MacDougall, Scott. 'Scapegoating the Secular: The Irony of Mimetic Violence in the Social Theology of John Milbank'. In *Violence, Transformation, and the Sacred*. Edited by Margaret R. Pfeil and Tobias L. Winright, 85-98. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 2011.

MacIntyre, Alasdair. *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory*. London: Duckworth, 1985.

Mack, Michael. 'The Other'. In *The Oxford Handbook of German Philosophy in the Nineteenth Century*. Edited by Michael N. Forster and Kristin Gjesdal, 736-750. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.

Mannion, Gerard. *Ecclesiology and Postmodernity: Questions for the Church in Our Time* . Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2007.

Mannion, Gerard and Mudge, Lewis Seymour, eds. *The Routledge Companion to the Christian Church*. London: Routledge, 2008.

Månson, Niclas. 'Bauman on Strangers – Unwanted Peculiarities'. In *The Sociology of Zygmunt Bauman: Challenges and Critique*. Edited by Michael Hviid Jacobson and Paul Poder, 155-174. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008.

Marion, Jean-Luc. *God Without Being*. Translated by Thomas A. Carlson. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991.

Martin, Craig and McCutcheon, Russell T. with Dorrough Smith, Leslie, eds. *Religious Experience: A Reader*. Sheffield: Equinox, 2012.

Masuzawka, Tomoko, *The Invention of World Religions: Or, How European Universalism Was Preserved in the Language of Pluralism*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005.

McCleary, Rachel M., ed. *The Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Religion*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.

McCleary, Rachel M., 'The Economics of Religion as a Field of Enquiry'. In *The Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Religion*. Edited by Rachel M. McCleary, 3-28. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.

McClintock Fulkerson, Mary. '"They Will Know We Are Christians by Our Regulated Improvisation": Ecclesial Hybridity and the Unity of the Church". In *The Blackwell Companion to Postmodern Theology*. Edited by Graham Ward, 265-279. Oxford: Blackwell, 2001.

McGinn, Bernard. *The Presence of God: A History of Western Christian Mysticism*, vol. 1: 'The Foundations of Mysticism'. London: SCM, 1991.

McHoul, Alec and Grace, Wendy. *A Foucault Primer: Discourse, Power and the Subject*. London: Routledge, 2002.

Mendieta, Eduardo and Vanantwerpen, Jonathan, eds. *The Power of Religion in the Public Sphere*. New York: Columbia Press, 2011.

Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. *The Visible and the Invisible*. Translated by Alphonso Lingis. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1968.

Merrigan, Terrance and Haers, Jaques, eds. *The Myriad Christ: Plurality and the Quest for Unity in Contemporary Christology*. Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2000.

Mey, Peter de. 'Ernst Troeltsch: A Moderate Pluralist? An Evaluation of His Reflections on the Place of Christianity among the other Religions'. In *The Myriad Christ: Plurality and the Quest for Unity in Contemporary Christology*. Edited by Terrence Merrigan and Jaques Haers, 349-380. Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2000.

Milbank, John. 'Enclaves, or Where is the Church?'. *New Blackfriars* 73/861 (1992): 341-352.

Milbank, John. *The Word Made Strange: Theology, Language, Culture*. Oxford: Blackwell, 1997.

Milbank, John. *Being Reconciled: Ontology and Pardon*. London: Routledge, 2003.

Milbank, John. *Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason*. Oxford: Blackwell, 2006.

Milbank, John. *The Future of Love: Essays in Political Theology.* London: SCM, 2009.

Milbank, John. 'Education and Ethos: Beyond Romanticism and Enlightenment'. *Ecclesiology* 9/3 (2013): 347-366.

Milbank, John. *Beyond Secular Order: The Representation of Being and the Representation of the People*. Chichester: Blackwell, 2014.

Molendijk, Arije L. *Zwischen Theologie und Soziologie: Ernst Troeltschs Typen der christlichen Gemeinschaftsbildung*. Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 1996.

Molendijk, Arie L. 'Bewußte Mystik: Zur grundlegenden Bedeutung des Mystikbegriffs im Werk von Ernst Troeltsch'. *Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie* 41/1 (1999): 39-61.

Molendijk, Arie L. 'Ernst Troeltsch über Friedrich Schleiermachers Auffassung von der Kirche'. In *Die aufgeklärte Religion und ihre Probleme*. Edited by Ulrich Barth, Christian Danz, Wilhelm Gräb, and Friedrich Wilhelm Graf, 365-382. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2013.

Morgan, Robert and Pye, Michael, eds. Ernst Troeltsch, *Writings in Theology and Religion*. Translated by Robert Morgan and Michael Pye. Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1977.

Nelstrop, Louise and Potmore, Simon D., eds. *Exploring Lost Dimensions in Christian Mysticism: Opening to the Mystical*. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2013.

Niebuhr, Richard H. *The Social Sources of Denominationalism*. New York: Henry Holt, 1929.
Niebuhr, Richard H. *Christ and Culture*. New York: Harper, 1951.
Niebuhr, Richard R. 'William James on Religious Experience'. In *The Cambridge Companion to William James*. Edited by Ruth A. Putnam, 214-236. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
Nordlander, Andreas. 'The Wonder of Immanence: Merleau-Ponty and the Problem of Creation'. *Modern Theology* 29/2 (2013): 104-123.
Novalis, 'Christianity or Europe: A Fragment'. In *The Early Political Writings of the German Romantics*. Edited by Frederick C. Beiser, 59-80. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
Nubiola, Jaime. 'The Reception of William James in Continental Europe'. In *William James and the Transatlantic Conversation: Pragmatism, Pluralism, and Philosophy of Religion.* Edited by Martin Halliwell and Joel D. S. Rasmussen, 15-29. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.
Ormerod, Neil. 'Ecclesiology and the Social Sciences'. In *The Routledge Companion to the Christian Church*. Edited by Gerard Mannion and Lewis Seymour Mudge, 639-654. London: Routledge, 2008.
Otto, Rudolf. *The Idea of the Holy: An Inquiry into the Non-Rational in the Idea of the Divine and its Relation to the Rational*. Translated by John W. Harvey. London: Oxford University Press, 1924.
Pascal, Blaise. *Pensées. With an Introduction by Thomas S. Eliot*. Translated by William F. Trotter. New York: Dutton, 1958.
Pearson, Lori. *Beyond Essence: Ernst Troeltsch as Historian and Theorist of Christianity.* Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2008.
Pearson, Lori. 'The Uses and Abuses of Troeltsch in American Debates over Religion, Social Theory, and Theology'. In *Religion(en) deuten: Transformationen der Religionsforschung*. Edited by Friedrich Wilhelm Graf and Friedemann Voigt, 331-360. De Gruyter: Berlin, 2010.
Pearson, Lori. 'Ernst Troeltsch on the Enlightenment, Modernity, and Cultural Values'. In *Die aufgeklärte Religion und ihre Probleme*. Edited by Ulrich Barth, Christian Danz, Wilhelm Gräb and Friedrich Wilhelm Graf, 449-459. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2013.
Pearson, Lori. 'Ernst Troeltsch and Contemporary Discourses of Secularization'. *Journal for the History of Modern Theology* 19/2 (2012): 173-192.
Petzoldt, Matthias. 'Wahrheit als Begegnung: Dialogisches Wahrheitsverständnis im Licht der Analyse performativer Sprache'. In Matthias Petzoldt, *Christsein angefragt: Fundamentaltheologische Beiträge*, 25-50. Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 1998.
Percy, Martyn. *Shaping the Church: The Promise of Implicit Theology*. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2010.
Percy, Martyn. *The Ecclesial Canopy*. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2012.
Percy, Martyn. 'It's not just about the numbers'. In *How Healthy is the Church of England? The Church of England Health Check*. Edited by Malcolm Doney, 127-130. Norwich: Canterbury Press, 2014.
Philips, Dewi Z., *Faith after Foundationalism*. London: Routledge, 1988.
Pickel, Gert. *Religionssoziologie: Eine Einführung in zentrale Themenbereiche*. Wiesbaden: VS-Verlag, 2011.
Pierce, Andrew. 'Comprehensive Vision: The Ecumenical Potential of a Lost Ideal'. In *Ecumenical Ecclesiology: Unity, Diversity and Otherness in a Fragmented World*. Edited by Gesa E. Thiesen, 76-87. London: T&T Clark, 2009.
Pohlig, Matthias. 'Religionsfrieden als pax politica: Zum Verhältnis von Religion und Politik im konfessionellen Zeitalter'. In *Umstrittene Säkularisierung: Soziologische und historische Analysen zur Differenzierung von Religion und Politik*. Edited by Karl Gabriel, Christel Gärtner, and Detlef Pollack, 225-241. Berlin: Berlin University Press, 2012.
Pollack, Detlef. *Säkularisierung – ein moderner Mythos? Studien zum religiösen Wandel in Deutschland und Europa*. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003.
Pollack, Detlef. *Rückkehr des Religiösen? Studien zum religiösen Wandel in Deutschland und Europa II*. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2009.
Pollack Detlef, Müller, Olaf and Pickel, Gert, eds. *The Social Significance of Religion in the Enlarged Europe: Secularization, Individualization and Pluralization*. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2012.
Pollack, Detlef and Rosta, Gergeley. *Religion in der Moderne: Ein internationaler Vergleich*. Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 2015.
Praetorius, Ina. *Ich glaube an Gott und so weiter...: Eine Auslegung des Glaubensbekenntnisses*. Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 2011.

Pryzlebski, Andrzej. 'Troeltschs Kultursynthese als halbierte Hermeneutik'. In *'Geschichte durch Geschichte überwinden': Ernst Troeltsch in Berlin*. Edited by Friedrich Wilhelm Graf, 137-153. Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 2006.

Putnam, Robert D. *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community.* New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000.

Putnam, Ruth A., ed. *The Cambridge Companion to William James*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

Pye, Michael. 'Ernst Troeltsch and the End of the Problem about "Other" Religions'. In *Ernst Troeltsch and the Future of Theology*. Edited by John Powell Clayton, 171-195. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976.

Pye, Michael. 'Troeltsch and the Science of Religion'. In Ernst Troeltsch, *Writings in Theology and Religion*. Translated by Robert Morgan and Michael Pye, 234-252. Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1977.

Rasmussen, Joel D. S. 'Empiricism and Mysticism in Ernst Troeltsch's Philosophy of Religion'. *Mitteilungen der Ernst-Troeltsch-Gesellschaft* 13 (2000): 48-65.

Rasmussen, Joel D. S. 'Mysticism as a Category of Inquiry in the Philosophies of Ernst Troeltsch and William James'. In *Exploring Lost Dimensions in Christian Mysticism: Opening to the Mystical*. Edited by Louise Nelstrop and Simon D. Potmore, 51-68. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2013.

Rendtorff, Trutz. '"Meine eigene Theologie ist spiritualistisch": Zur Funktion der "Mystik" als Sozialform modernen Christentums'. In *Ernst Troeltschs 'Soziallehren'*: *Studien zu ihrer Interpretation*. Edited by Friedrich Wilhelm Graf and Trutz Rendtorff, 178-192. Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 1993.

Reuter, Marta, Wijgström, Filip and Kristensson Uggla, Bengt, eds. *Trust and Organisations: Confidence across Borders.* New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.

Richter, Cornelia. 'Vertrauen – im Wachsen: Eine Skizze zum theologischen Forschungsstand'. *Hermeneutische Blätter* 1 (2010): 25-44.

Richter, Cornelia. 'Melanchthons Fiducia: Gegen die Selbstmächtigkeit des Menschen'. In *Gottvertrauen: Die ökumenische Diskussion um die fiducia*. Edited by Ingolf U. Dalferth and Simon Peng-Keller, 209-242. Freiburg: Herder, 2012.

Ricken, Friedo, ed. *Religiöse Erfahrung: Ein interdisziplinärer Klärungsversuch*. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2004.

Ricoeur, Paul. *The Conflict of Interpretations*. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1974.

Ricoeur, Paul. *Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences: Essays on Language, Action and Interpretation*. Translated by John B. Thompson, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981.

Ricoeur, Paul. *Oneself As Another*. Translated by Kathleen Blamey. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992.

Ricoeur, Paul. *The Rule of Metaphor: The Creation of Meaning in Language*. Translated by R. Czerny. London: Routledge, 2003.

Rivera, Mayra. *The Touch of Transcendence: A Postcolonial Theology of God*. Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2007.

Robertson, Roland. 'On the Analysis of Mysticism: Pre-Weberian, Weberian and Post-Weberian'. *Sociological Analysis* 36 (1975): 241-266.

Robey, David. 'Introduction'. In Umberto Eco. *The Open Work*. Translated by Anna Cancogni, vii-xxxii. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1889.

Rorty, Richard. 'Religious Faith, Intellectual Responsibility, and Romance'. In *The Cambridge Companion to William James*. Edited by Ruth A. Putnam, 84-102. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

Rorty, Richard. 'Pragmatism as Romantic Polytheism'. In *The Revival of Pragmatism*. Edited by Moris Dickstein, 21-36. Durham: Duke University Press, 1998.

Rosa, Hartmut et. al. *Theorien der Gemeinschaft: Zur Einführung*. Hamburg: Junius, 2010.

Sass, Hartmut von. 'Vorgängiges Vertrauen – Nachdenklicher Glaube: Ein theologischer Essay zu Rudolf Bultmann und William James'. *Hermeneutische Blätter* 1 (2010): 52-66.

Schäfer, Peter. 'Theokratie: Die Herrschaft Gottes als Staatsverfassung in der jüdischen Antike'. In *Politik und Religion: Zur Diagnose der Gegenwart*. Edited by Friedrich Wilhelm Graf and Heinrich Meier, 199-240. München: C. H. Beck, 2013.

Scharen, Christian B., ed. *Explorations in Ecclesiology and Ethnography.* Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2012.

Schäufele, Wolf-Friedrich. 'Fiducia bei Martin Luther'. In *Gottvertrauen: Die ökumensiche Diskussion um die fiducia*. Edited by Ingolf U. Dalferth and Simon Peng-Keller, 163-181. Freiburg: Herder, 2012.

Schleiermacher, Friedrich D. E. *Brief Outline of the Study of Theology*. Translated by William Farrer. Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1850.

Schleiermacher, Friedrich D. E. *On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers*. Translated by Richard Couter. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.

Schleiermacher, Friedrich D. E. *The Christian Faith*. Translated by Hugh R. Mackintosh and James S. Stewart. London: T&T Clark, 1991.

Schmid, Konrad. 'Was heißt Vertrauen? Biblische Erkundungen'. In *Gottvertrauen: Die ökumensiche Diskussion um die fiducia*. Edited by Ingolf U. Dalferth and Simon Peng-Keller. 31-47. Freiburg: Herder, 2012.

Schmidt am Busch, Hans-Christoph and Zurn, Christopher F., eds. *The Philosophy of Recognition: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives*. Lanham: Lexingtion, 2010.

Schmidt-Leukel, Perry. 'Die Herausforderung der Religionsgeschichte für die Theologie'. In *Christlicher Wahrheitsanspruch – historische Relativität: Auseinandersetzungen mit Ernst Troeltschs Absolutheitsschrift im Kontext heutiger Religionstheologie*. Edited by Reinhart Bernhardt and Georg Pfleiderer, 111-130. Zürich: Theologischer Verlag Zürich, 2004.

Schmiedel, Ulrich. 'Vertrauen Verstanden? Zur Vertrauenstriologie von Ingolf U. Dalferth und Simon Peng-Keller'. *Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie* 56/3 (2014): 379-392.

Schmiedel, Ulrich, 'Review Jörg Lauster, Die Verzauberung der Welt: Eine Kulturgeschichte des Christentums [The Enchantment of the World: A Cultural History of Christianity]'. *Reviews in Religion and Theology* 22/2 (2015): 170-173.

Schmiedel, Ulrich. '(Instead of the) Introduction: Open to the Other. The Dynamics of Difference in Werner G. Jeanrond's Hermeneutical Theology'. In *Dynamics of Difference: Christianity and Alterity: A Festschrift for Werner G. Jeanrond*. Edited by Ulrich Schmiedel and James M. Matarazzo, Jr., 1-16. London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2015.

Schmiedel, Ulrich and Matarazzo, James M., Jr., eds. *Dynamics of Difference: Christianity and Alterity. A Festschrift for Werner G. Jeanrond*. London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2015.

Schmiedel, Ulrich. 'Rezension zu Claudia Welz (Hg.), Ethics of In-Visibility: Imago Dei, Memory and Human Dignity in Jewish and Christian Thought'. *Theologische Literaturzeitung* (forthcoming).

Schmiedel, Ulrich. 'Praxis or Talk about Praxis? The Concept of Praxis in Ecclesiology'. *Ecclesial Practices: Journal for Ecclesiology and Ethnography* (forthcoming).

Schmitt, Carl. *Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty*. Translated by George Schwab. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985.

Schmitt, Carl. *The Concept of the Political*. Translated by George Schwab. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1996.

Schweitzer, Albert. *Die Mystik des Apostels Paulus*. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1931.

Schwöbel, Christoph. '"Die Idee des Aufbaus heißt Geschichte durch Geschichte überwinden": Theologischer Wahrheitsanspruch und das Problem des sogenannten Historismus'. In *Ernst Troeltschs 'Historismus'*: Edited by Friedrich Wilhelm Graf, 261-284. Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 2000.

Sedgwick, Sally. 'Philosophy of History'. In *The Oxford Handbook of German Philosophy in the Nineteenth Century*. Edited by Michael N. Forster and Kristin Gjesdal, 436-452. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.

Shakespeare, Steven. *Radical Orthodoxy: A Critical Introduction*. London: SPCK, 2007.

Shakespeare, Steven. *Derrida and Theology*. London: T&T Clark, 2009.

Shakespeare, Steven. 'Language'. In *The Oxford Handbook of Theology and Modern European Thought*. Edited by Nicholas Adams, George Pattison and Graham Ward, 105-126. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.

Sigurdson, Ola. 'Beyond Secularism: Towards a Post-Secular Political Theology'. *Modern Theology* 26/2 (2010): 177-196.

Smilde, David and May, Matthew. 'The Emerging Strong Programme in the Sociology of Religion', *SSRC Working Papers 2008*.

Sockness, Brent W. 'The Ideal and the Historical in the Christology of Wilhelm Herrmann'. *The Journal of Religion* 72/3 (1992): 366-388.

Sockness, Brent W. *Against False Apologetics: Wilhelm Herrmann and Ernst Troeltsch in Conflict*. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1998.

Spranger, Eduard. 'Das Historismusproblem an der Universität Berlin seit 1900'. In *Studium Berolinense: Aufsätze und Beiträge zu Problemen der Wissenschaft und zur Geschichte der Friedrich-Wilhelms-*

Universität zu Berlin. Edited by Hans Leussink, Eduard Neuman, and Georg Kotowski, 425-423. Berlin: De Gruyter, 1960.

Stålsett, Sturla J. 'The Ethics of Vulnerability, Social Inclusion and Social Capital'. *Forum for Development Studies* 34/1 (2007): 45-62.

Stark, Rodney. 'Secularization R. I. P.'. *Sociology of Religion* 60/3 (1999): 249-273.

Stark, Rodney and Iannaccone, Laurence. 'A Supply-Side Reinterpretation of the "Secularization" of Europe'. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religio*n 33/3 (1994): 230-252.

Starr, Bradley E. 'Individualism and Reform in Troeltsch's View of the Church'. *Modern Theology* 7/5 (1991): 447-463.

Stegemenn, Wolfgang. 'Zur Deutung des Urchristentums in den Soziallehren'. In *Ernst Troeltschs 'Soziallehren': Studien zu ihrer Interpretation*. Edited by Friedrich Wilhelm Graf and Trutz Rendtorff, 51-79. Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 1993.

Strhan, Anna. 'What do we believe?'. In *How Healthy is the Church of England? The Church Times Health Check*. Edited by Malcolm Doney, 33-35. Norwich: Canterbury Press, 2014.

Swatos, William H. 'Weber or Troeltsch? Methodology, Syndrome, and the Development of Church-Sect Theory'. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 15/2 (1976): 129-144.

Sweeney, James. 'Revising Secularization Theory'. In *The New Visibility of Religion*. Edited by Michael Hoelzl and Graham Ward, 15-29. London: Continuum, 2008.

Sykes, Stephen W. 'Ernst Troeltsch and Christianity's Essence'. In *Ernst Troeltsch and the Future of Theology*. Edited by John Powell Clayton, 139-171. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976.

Sykes, Stephen W. 'Note'. In Ernst Troeltsch, *Writings on Theology and Religion*. Translated by Robert Morgan and Michael Pye, 180-181. Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1977.

Sykes, Stephen W. *The Identity of Christianity: Theologians and the Identity of Christianity from Schleiermacher to Barth*. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1984.

Tanner, Kathryn. *Theories of Culture: A New Agenda for Theology*. Minneapolis, MN: Augsburg Fortress, 1997.

Tanner, Klaus, ed. *Christentumstheorie*. Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 2008.

Taves, Ann. 'Religious Experience'. In *Encyclopaedia of Religion*, vol. 11. Edited by Lindsay Jones, 7736-7750. Detroit, MI: Thompson Gale, 2005.

Taylor, Charles. *Varieties of Religion Today: William James Revisited*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002.

Taylor, Charles. *A Secular Age*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007.

Taylor, Charles. 'Why We Need a Radical Redefinition of Secularism'. In *The Power of Religion in the Public Sphere*. Edited by Eduardo Mendieta and Jonathan Vanantwerpen, 34-59. New York: Columbia University Press, 2011.

Thate, Michael J., Vanhoozer, Kevin J. and Campell Constantine R., eds. *'In Christ' in Paul*. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2014.

Theissen, Gerd. *The Shadow of the Galilean: The Quest of the Historical Jesus in Narrative Form*. Translated by John Bowden. London: SCM, 1987.

Theissen, Gerd. *Studien zur Soziologie des Urchristentums*. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1989.

Theissen, Gerd and Merz, Annette. *The Historical Jesus: A Comprehensive Guide*. Translated by John Bowden. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1998.

Thiesen, Gesa E., ed. *Ecumenical Ecclesiology: Unity, Diversity and Otherness in a Fragmented World*. London: T&T Clark, 2009.

Tönnies, Ferdinand. *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft: Grundbegriffe der reinen Soziologie*. Berlin: Karl Curtius, 1922.

Tönnies Ferdinand. *Community and Civil Society*. Translated by Jose Harris and Margaret Hollis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

Tracy David. *The Analogical Imagination: Christian Theology and the Culture of Pluralism*. London: SCM Press, 1981.

Tracy, David. *Dialogue with the Other: The Interreligious Dialogue*. Louvain: Peeters, 1990.

Tracy, David. *On Naming the Present: God, Hermeneutics and Church*. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1994.

Tracy, David. 'The Other of Dialectic and Dialogue'. In *Dynamics of Difference: Christianity and Alterity. A Festschrift for Werner G. Jeanrond.* Edited by Ulrich Schmiedel and James M. Matarazzo, Jr., 105-113. London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2015.

Troeltsch, Ernst. 'Die Selbständigkeit der Religion (1895/96)'. In Ernst Troeltsch, *Kritische Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 1: 'Schriften zur Theologie und Religionsphilosophie (1888-1902)'. Edited by Christian Albrecht in collaboration with Björn Biester, Lars Emersleben and Dirk Schmid, 364-535. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2009.

Troeltsch, Ernst. 'Religionsphilosophie und Theologische Principienlehre (Jahresbericht 1896)'. In Ernst Troeltsch, *Kritische Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 2: 'Rezensionen und Kritiken (1894-1900)'. Edited by Friedrich Wilhelm Graf in collaboration with Dina Brandt, 213-309. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2007.

Troeltsch, Ernst. 'Religionsphilosophie und principielle Theologie (Jahresbericht 1897)'. In Ernst Troeltsch, *Kritische Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 2: 'Rezensionen und Kritiken (1894-1900)'. Edited by Friedrich Wilhelm Graf in collaboration with Dina Brandt, 366-486. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2007.

Troeltsch, Ernst. 'Historical and Dogmatic Method in Theology (1898)'. In Ernst Troeltsch, *Religion in History*. Translated by James Luther Adams and Walter F. Bense, 11-32. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1991.

Troeltsch, Ernst. 'Die wissenschaftliche Lage und ihre Anforderungen an die Theologie (1900)'. In Ernst Troeltsch, *Kritische Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 1: 'Schriften zur Theologie und Religionsphilosophie (1888-1902)'. Edited by Christian Albrecht in collaboration with Björn Biester, Lars Emersleben and Dirk Schmid, 801-840. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2009.

Troeltsch, Ernst. *Briefe an Friedrich von Hügel 1901-1923*. Edited by Karl-Ernst Apfelbacher and Peter Neuner. Paderborn: Bonifacius, 1974.

Troeltsch, Ernst. 'William James: The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature (1902) (1904)'. In Ernst Troeltsch, *Kritische Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 4: 'Rezensionen und Kritiken (1901-1914). Edited by Friedrich Wilhelm Graf in collaboration with Gabriele von Bassermann-Jordan, 364-371. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2004.

Troeltsch, Ernst. *The Absoluteness of Christianity and the History of Religions (1902/1912)*. Translated by David Reid. Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2005.

Troeltsch, Ernst. *Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie in der Religionswissenschaft: Eine Untersuchung über die Bedeutung der Kantischen Religionslehre für die heutige Religionswissenschaft*. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1905.

Troeltsch, Ernst. 'Die Bedeutung des Protestantismus für die Entstehung der modernen Welt (1906/1911)'. In Ernst Troeltsch, *Kritische Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 8: 'Schriften zur Bedeutung des Protestantismus für die Entstehung der modernen Welt (1906-1913)'. Edited by Trutz Rendtorff in collaboration with Stefan Pautler, 183-315. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2001.

Troeltsch, Ernst. *Protestantism and Progress: The Significance of Protestantism for the Rise of the Modern World*. Translated by William Montgomery. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1986.

Troeltsch, Ernst. 'Religionsphilosophie'. In *Die Philosophie im Beginn des Zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts: Festschrift für Kuno Fischer*. Edited by Wilhelm Windelband, 423-486. Heidelberg: Carl Winters, 1907.

Troeltsch, Ernst. 'Das Wesen des modernen Geistes'. In *Aufsätze zur Geistesgeschichte und Religionssoziologie*, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 4. Edited by Hans Baron, 297-337. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1924.

Troeltsch, Ernst. 'The Essence of the Modern Spirit (1907)'. In Ernst Troeltsch, *Religion in History*. Translated by James Luther Adams and Walter F. Bense, 237-272. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1991.

Troeltsch, Ernst. 'Gnade Gottes, dogmatisch', in *Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*, vol. 2. Edited by Friedrich Michael Schiele and Leopold Zscharnack, 1469-1474. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1910.

Troeltsch, Ernst. 'Schleiermacher und die Kirche (1910)'. In Ernst Troeltsch, *Kritische Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 6/1: 'Schriften zur Religionswissenschaft und Ethik (1903-1912)'. Edited by Trutz Rendtorff in collaboration with Katja Thörner, 684-702. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2013.

Troeltsch, Ernst. 'Das stoische-christliche Naturrecht und das moderne profane Naturrecht'. In *Verhandlungen des Ersten Deutschen Soziologentages*. Edited by Deutsche Gesellschaft für Soziologie, 166-191. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1911.

Troeltsch, Ernst. 'The Significance of the Historical Existence of Jesus for Faith (1911)'. In Ernst Troeltsch, *Writings on Theology and Religion*. Translated by Robert Morgan and Michael Pye, 182-207. Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1977.

Troeltsch, Ernst. 'Stoic-Christian Natural Law and Modern Secular Natural Law (1911)'. In Ernst Troeltsch, *Religion in History*. Translated by James Luther Adams and Walter F. Bense, 321-342. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1991.

Troeltsch, Ernst. 'Art. Kirche, dogmatisch'. In *Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*, vol. 3. Edited by Friedrich M. Schiele and Leopold Zscharnack, 1147-1155. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1912.

Troeltsch, Ernst. *Die Soziallehren der christlichen Kirchen und Gruppen*. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1912.
Troeltsch, Ernst. *The Social Teaching of the Christian Church* [sic], 2 vols. Translated by Olive Wyon. London: Macmillan 1931.
Troeltsch, Ernst. 'Empiricism and Platonism in the Philosophy of Religion: To the Memory of William James'. *The Harvard Theological Review* 5/4 (1912): 401-422.
Troeltsch, Ernst. *Glaubenslehre: Nach Heidelberger Vorlesungen aus den Jahren 1911 und 1912* [sic]. München: Dunker, 1925.
Troeltsch, Ernst. *The Christian Faith: Based on Lectures Delivered at the University of Heidelberg in 1912 and 1913*. Translated by Garrett E. Paul. Augsburg/MN: Fortress Press, 1991.
Troeltsch, Ernst. 'The Dogmatics of the "Religionsgeschichtliche Schule"'. *American Journal of Theology* 17/1 (1913): 1-21.
Troeltsch, Ernst. 'Historiography'. In *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, vol. 6. Edited by James Hastings, 716-723. Edinburgh: T&T Clark 1913.
Troeltsch, Ernst. 'Die Kirche im Leben der Gegenwart'. In Ernst Troeltsch, *Zur Religiösen Lage, Religionsphilosophie und Ethik*, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 2, 91-108. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1913.
Troeltsch, Ernst. 'Religiöser Individualismus und Kirche'. In Ernst Troeltsch, *Zur Religiösen Lage, Religionsphilosophie und Ethik*, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 2, 109-133. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1913.
Troeltsch, Ernst. 'Was heißt "Wesen Des Christentums"?'. In Ernst Troeltsch, *Zur Religiösen Lage, Religionsphilosophie und Ethik*, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 2, 386-451. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1913.
Troeltsch, Ernst. 'Die Zukunftsmöglichkeiten des Christentums im Verhältnis zur modernen Philosophie'. In Ernst Troeltsch, *Zur Religiösen Lage, Religionsphilosophie und Ethik*, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 2, 837-862. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1913.
Troeltsch, Ernst. 'What does "Essence of Christianity" Mean?'. In Ernst Troeltsch, *Writings on Theology and Religion.* Translated by Robert Morgan and Michael Pye, 124-181. Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1977.
Troeltsch, Ernst. 'Zur Religionsphilosophie: Rudolf Otto, Das Heilige (1917)'. In Ernst Troeltsch, *Kritische Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 13: 'Rezensionen und Kritiken (1915-1923)'. Edited by Friedrich Wilhelm Graf in collaboration with Diana Feßl, Harald Haury and Alexander Seelos, 412-425. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2010.
Troeltsch, Ernst. 'Der Historismus und seine Probleme (1922)'. In Ernst Troeltsch, *Kritische Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 16: 'Der Historismus und seine Probleme'. Edited by Friedrich Wilhelm Graf in collaboration with Matthias Schloßberger, 159-1100. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2008.
Troeltsch, Ernst. 'Meine Bücher'. In *Aufsätze zur Geistesgeschichte und Religionssoziologie*, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 4. Edited by Hans Baron, 3-20. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1924.
Troeltsch, Ernst. 'My Books (1922)'. In Ernst Troeltsch, *Religion in History*. Translated by James Luther Adams and Walter F. Bense, 365-378. Minneapolis: Fortress, 1991.
Troeltsch, Ernst. 'The Social Philosophy of Christianity (1922)'. In Ernst Troeltsch, *Religion in History*. Translated by James Luther Adams and Walter F. Bense, 210-235. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1991.
Troeltsch, Ernst. *Fünf Vortäge zu Religion und Geschichtsphilosophie für England und Schottland: Der Historismus und seine Überwindung (1924)/Christian Thought: Its History and Application (1923)*, *Kritische Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 17. Edited by Gangolf Hübinger in collaboration with Andreas Terwey. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2006.
Tschannen, Olivier. *Les Théories de la sécularisation*. Genève: Droz, 1992.
Tschannen, Olivier. 'The Secularization Paradigm: A Systematization'. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 30/4 (1991): 395-415.
Vattimo, Gianni. *Beyond Interpretation: The Meaning of Hermeneutics for Philosophy*. Translated by David Webb. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997.
Voas, David. 'The Rise and Fall of Fuzzy Fidelity in Europe'. *European Sociological Review* 25/2 (2009): 155-168.
Voigt, Friedemann. *'Die Tragödie des Reiches Gottes': Ernst Troeltsch als Leser Georg Simmels*. Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 1998.
Ward, Graham. 'John Milbank's *Divina Comedia*'. *New Blackfriars* 73/861 (1992): 311-318.
Ward, Graham. *Cities of God*. London: Routledge, 2000.
Ward, Graham, ed. *The Blackwell Companion to Postmodern Theology*. Oxford: Blackwell, 2001.
Ward, Graham. *Christ and Culture*. Oxford: Blackwell, 2005.
Ward, Graham and Hoelzl, Michael, 'Introduction to Carl Schmitt'. In *Religion and Political Thought*. Edited by Graham Ward and Michael Hoelzl, 190-194. London: Continuum, 2006.
Ward Graham and Hoelzl, Michael, eds. *Religion and Political Thought*. London: Continuum, 2006.

Ward, Graham. 'Hosting the Stranger and the Pilgrim: A Christian Theological Reflection'. In *Saintly Influence: Edith Wyschogrod and the Possibilities of Philosophy of Religion*. Edited by Eric Boynton and Martin Kavka, 63-81. Fordham: Fordham University Press, 2009.
Ward, Graham. *The Politics of Discipleship: Becoming Postmaterial Citizens*. London: SCM, 2009.
Ward, Graham. 'Theology and Postmodernism: Is It All Over?'. *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 80/2 (2012): 466-484.
Ward, Graham. 'Linearity and Complexity in Ecclesiology'. In *Extra Ecclesiam... Zur Institution und Kritik von Kirche*. Edited by Henning Klingen, Peter Zeitlinger and Michael Hölzl, 99-130: Berlin: Lit, 2013.
Ward, Graham. 'Performing Christ: The Theological Vocation of Lay People', *Ecclesiology* 9/3 (2013): 323-334.
Ward, Graham. *Unbelievable: Why We Believe and Why We Don't*. London: I. B. Tauris, 2015.
Ward, Keith. *Religion and Community*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.
Ward, Pete. *Liquid Church*. Carlisle: Paternoster, 2002.
Ward, Pete. *Selling Worship: How What We Sing Has Changed the Church*. Carlisle: Paternoster, 2005.
Ward, Pete. *Participation and Mediation: A Practical Theology for the Liquid Church*. London: SCM, 2009.
Ward, Pete. 'Attention and Conversation'. In *Perspectives on Ecclesiology and Ethnography*. Edited by Pete Ward, 36-49. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2012.
Ward, Pete, ed. *Perspectives on Ecclesiology and Ethnography*. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2012.
Ward, Pete. 'Blueprint Ecclesiology and the Lived: Normativity as a Perilous Faithfulness'. *Ecclesial Practices* 2/1 (2015): 74-90.
Warner, Robert. 'Why young people turn their backs on church'. In *How Healthy is the Church of England? The Church Times Health Check.* Edited by Malcom Doney, 25-27. Norwich: Canterbury Press, 2014.
Watkins, Clare. 'Practising Ecclesiology: From Product to Process', *Ecclesial Practices* 2/1 (2015), 23-39.
Watson, Natalie K. *Introducing Feminist Ecclesiology*. London: Sheffield Academic Press, 2002.
Welz, Claudia. 'Trust and Lament: Faith in the Face of Godforsakenness'. In *Evoking Lament: A Theological Discussion*. Edited by Eva Harasta and Brian Brock, 118-135. London: T&T Clark, 2009.
Welz, Claudia. *Vertrauen und Versuchung*. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010.
Welz, Claudia. 'Vertrauen und/oder Gewissheit? Kontroverstheologische und religonsphilosophische Fragen im Anschluss an Luther, Kierkegaard und Wittgenstein'. In *Gottvertrauen: Die ökumenische Diskussion um die fiducia.* Edited by Ingolf U. Dalferth and Simon Peng-Keller, 345-380. Freiburg: Herder, 2012.
Welz, Claudia. 'Trust as Basic Openness and Self-Transcendence'. In *Trust, Sociality and Selfhood*. Edited by Arne Grøn and Claudia Welz, 45-64. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2012.
Welz, Claudia, ed. *Ethics of In-Visibility*: *Imago Dei, Memory and Human Dignity in Jewish and Christian Thought.* Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2015.
Werner-Müller, Jan. *A Dangerous Mind: Carl Schmitt in Post-War European Thought*. Yale: Yale University Press, 2003.
Williams, Rowan. *Tokens of Trust: An Introduction to Christian Belief*. London: Canterbury Press, 2007.
Williams, Rowan. 'The Person and the Individual: Human Dignity, Human Relationships and Human Limits', *Theos Annual Lecture*. London: Theos, 2013.
Williams, Rowan. *The Edge of Words: God and the Habits of Language*. London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2014.
Woodhead, Linda. 'Introduction'. In *Peter Berger and the Study of Religion*. Edited by Linda Woodhead, 1-8. London: Routledge: 2001.
Woodhead, Linda. 'Time to get serious'. In *How Healthy is the Church of England? The Church Times Health Check.* Edited by Malcolm Doney, 14-19. Norwich: Canterbury Press, 2014.
Woodhead, Linda. 'Not enough boots on the ground'. In *How Healthy is the Church of England?The Church Times Health Check.* Edited by Malcolm Doney, 50-54. Norwich: Canterbury Press, 2014.
Woodhead, Linda. 'A remedy for an ailing church', in *How Healthy is the Church of England? The Church Times Health Check.* Edited by Malcolm Doney, 116-121. Norwich: Canterbury Press, 2014.
Wortham, Simon Morgan. 'Iterability'. In *The Derrida Dictionary*. London: Continuum, 2010, 78.
Wortham, Simon Morgan. 'Deconstruction'. In *The Derrida Dictionary*. London: Continuum, 2010, 31-33.
Wuthnow, Robert. 'Religious Involvement and Status-Bridging Social Capital'. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 41/4 (2002): 669-684.
Wyman, Walter E. *The Concept of Glaubenslehre: Ernst Troeltsch and the Theological Heritage of Schleiermacher*. Chico, CA: Scholar Press, 1983.

Zachhuber, Johannes. *Theology as Science in Nineteenth-Century Germany: From Ferdinand Christian Bauer to Ernst Troeltsch*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.

Zachhuber, Johannes. 'Mysticism as a Social-Type of Christianity? Ernst Troeltsch's Interpretation in its Historical and Systematic Context'. In *Exploring Lost Dimensions in Christian Mysticism: Opening to the Mystical*. Edited by Louise Nelstrop and Simon D. Potmore 69-84. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2013.

Zammito, John H. 'Historicism'. In *The Oxford Handbook of German Philosophy in the Nineteenth Century*. Edited by Michael N. Forster and Kristin Gjesdal, 779-805. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.

Zink, Jesse. 'Patently Living With Difference: Rowan Williams' Archiepiscopal Ecclesiology and the Proposed Anglican Covenant'. *Ecclesiology* 9 (2013): 223-241.

Žižek, Slavoj, ed. *Mapping Ideology*. London: Verso, 2012.