Problems with Participation:

Critical Deliberative Democracy,

Embodied Identity, and Affect



Zoë May Sullivan

Somerville College

Doctor of Philosophy in Politics

Department of Politics and International Relations

This thesis is submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor in Philosophy in Politics in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Oxford

Words: 93,518
(Including Acknowledgements, Table of Contents, Footnotes, and Bibliography)

Problems with Participation: Critical Deliberative Democracy, Embodied Identity, and Affect

Abstract: Jürgen Habermas and Seyla Benhabib create normative models of moral and political decision-making that are intended to enable ordinary people to identify themselves and to emancipate themselves from unjust conditions. When creating these models, both thinkers endorse deliberative models of democracy that reflect the central tenets and core commitments of 'discourse ethics'. Most importantly, Habermas and Benhabib claim that decisions about norms to govern society and institutional arrangements should only be treated as legitimate when they satisfy a number of demands. These demands include that the persons who create them recognize each other as worthy interlocutors with valid concerns and express themselves through modes of praxis and forms of communication that are devoid of coercion and domination-free. That said, in their normative models of moral and political decision-making, Habermas and Benhabib rely, albeit implicitly, upon a conception of the subjects who are involved as abstract and disembodied linguistic beings. Consequently, they tacitly overlook and bracket off a range of subtler, less obvious, and more insidious manifestations of power, along with a range of real-world problems with people's participation in politics that they produce. To build a more nuanced account of these issues, this thesis develops a concept of 'embodied identity' that appreciates the personal-political significance of the body and the experience of living life within it as an embodied being. Subsequently, this thesis considers how treating individuals as embodied beings contributes to on-going discussions in contemporary political theory. These discussions include debates about how best to understand what makes contemporary society unfair or unjust and what can be done to ensure that the democratic, decision-making process is as inclusive and egalitarian as possible, given the reality of socio-cultural difference, contemporary society, and actual political praxis.

For family; past, present, and future.

‘For pain words are lacking.’

Virginia Woolf, *The Waves*

‘Man's inability to communicate is a result of his failure to listen effectively, skilfully, and with understanding to another person.’

Carl Rogers, 1961

‘Prejudice and privilege do not emerge in deliberative settings as bad reasons, and they are not countered by good arguments. They are too sneaky, invisible, and pernicious for that reasonable process.’

Lynn Sanders, *Against Deliberation*

‘There is much pain that is quite noiseless; and vibrations that make human agonies are often a mere whisper in the roar of hurrying existence. There are glances of hatred that stab and raise no cry of murder; robberies that leave man or woman for ever beggared of peace and joy, yet kept secret by the sufferer - committed to no sound except that of low moans in the night, seen in no writing except that made on the face by the slow months of suppressed anguish and early morning tears. Many an inherited sorrow that has marred a life has been breathed into no human ear.’

George Eliot, *Felix Holt, the Radical*

Contents

Acknowledgements .....

Introduction 1

1. Deliberative Democracy: Responding to the Challenge of Diversity and Disagreement in Contemporary Society 19

2. Bodies that Matter: Deliberation, Embodied Identity, and Difference 90

3. Asking Too Much: Deliberation, Habitus, and Affect 133

4. Redistribution or Recognition? Reflections on Axel Honneth and Nancy Fraser's Political-Philosophical Exchange 182

5. Being Realistic about Politics: Deliberation, Power, and Non-Deliberative Praxis 225

Conclusion 275

Bibliography 284

Acknowledgements

A doctoral thesis is an acutely personal project, but something that cannot be written alone. I never would have started this doctorate nor finished it, if it were not for my family and friends, whose love and support has carried me through even the hardest of times.

Although it is impossible to acknowledge everyone who has helped me reach this stage of my academic endeavours, thanks are particularly owed to my supervisor, Dr Daniel Butt. Without his generosity, academic guidance, and good humour, I would not have finished this doctorate and, for that, I cannot thank him enough.

I would also like to thank my parents, Ms Rosemary Cooper and Mr Brian Sullivan, whose unwavering support and belief in my abilities has helped me achieve so many things in my life, which I never thought were possible, Mr John Hawkins, my brilliant, immeasurably patient, and far too kind better half, and Murray, our "bundle" of cantankerous, fluffy, four-legged "joy". Studying for this doctorate has been a project of blood, sweat, and tears. I thank you all from the bottom of my heart and hope to one day repay your kindness and support.

This thesis is dedicated to all those mentioned above, along with my grandmothers, Mrs Rene Cooper and Mrs Marie Sullivan, who passed away before it was completed, and John's mother, Mrs Audrey Hawkins, whose family miss her very much.

Introduction

Thesis Overview

Consider the following three vignettes. The first is taken from Veena Das's ethnographic research into the widespread silence surrounding the violence that was enacted against women during the partition of India:

> '…at least one hundred thousand women from both sides of the border were forcibly abducted and raped. The figures given in the Legislative Assembly during the Constituent Assembly debates in 1949 confirm this. It also affirmed that processions of women who were stripped naked were organized with the accompaniment of jeering crowds in cities like Amritsar and Lahore…When asking women to narrate their experiences of the Partition I found a zone of silence around the event. This silence was achieved either by the use of language that was general and metaphoric but that evaded specific description of any events so as to capture the particularity of their experience, or by describing the surrounding events but leaving the actual experience of abduction and rape unstated. It was common to describe the violence of the Partition in such terms as rivers of blood flowing and the earth covered with white shrouds right unto the horizon. Sometimes a woman would remember images of fleeing, but as one woman warned me, it was dangerous to remember. These memories were sometimes compared to poison that makes the inside of the woman dissolve, as a solid is dissolved in a powerful liquid…At other times a woman would say that she is like a discarded exercise book in which the accounts of past relationships were kept - the body, a parchment of losses. At any rate, none of the metaphors used…emphasized the need to give expression to this hidden knowledge...The sliding of the representations of the female body between everyday life into the body that had become the container of the poisonous knowledge of the events of the Partition perhaps helped women to assimilate their experiences into their everyday lives'.[1]

The second is taken from Elspeth Probyn's reflections on the painful and debilitating toll that writing her latest book took on her body:

[1]Das, Veena, 'Language and Body: Transactions in the Construction of Pain', *Daedalus*, Winter 1996, vol.125., no.1., pp.67. – 91., pp.84. – 85.

> ‘I first began to have sympathy for Charles Darwin when I read the terrible toll his research and writing seem to have taken on his body…I thought about Darwin when, between waking and thinking, I felt the presence of something dreadfully pressing. Ah, yes, the book. And then I retched. This kept happening as I pondered my case. There was no great stress in my life. I was on research leave far away from the pressures of my job, and all I had to do was to write, rewrite, and rewrite a book. I tried to ignore this little routine my body had set up. That didn’t work; my body insisted I pay attention...On waking I would notice that my hands and feet hurt. It became clear that during the night my body contorted itself: my fists tightened, my feet tensed, and I ground my teeth…it dawned on me that I was experiencing the terror of not being equal to the interest of my subject. The idea that I would not interest readers triggered what seemed to be a mixture of fear and shame’.[2]

The third is taken from Pierre Bourdieu’s reflections on an interview that he carried out with a young, working-class ‘Beur’[3] during sociological research into the lived, personal experience of *la misère*, meaning poverty in economic, spiritual, and moral terms and ordinary, everyday suffering and misery on both the collective and individual level, in contemporary French society:

> ‘…everything in his expression, his bearing, his clothing, even his speech, gives a feeling of greater ease, doubtless associated with the physical charm that he cannot be unaware of. He also conveys a feeling of fragility and instability…he cannot sit still and seems to always be moving…he continually moves between an almost childish insouciance and anxious seriousness. He often loses his train of thought and openly worries about it… Right from the beginning of the interview, after a long silence, he remarks that he “cannot find his words”. A little later he impatiently observes that he’s forgetting yet another word…he blames himself for the confusion…that he sometimes falls into when, intimidated by the interview situation…he launches into sentences that he does not finish’.[4]

On the surface, these vignettes appear markedly different, describing the experiences of people who are disconnected from each other in time and space,

---

[2]Probyn, Elspeth, ‘Writing Shame’, in Gregg, Melissa and Gregory J. Seigworth, eds., *The Affect Theory Reader* (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 2010), pp.71. – 72.

[3]‘Beur’ is a colloquial term that is used to designate people born in Europe whose parents or grandparents are immigrants from North Africa.

[4]Bourdieu, Pierre, et al., *The Weight of the World: Social Suffering in Contemporary Society,* trans. Ferguson, Priscilla Pankhurst, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999), pp.427. – 428.

living divergent and, indeed, unequal lives. However, on a deeper level they betray a key commonality – namely, a depiction of the relationship between subjective experience, the human condition of life as a being that is situated within a physical and material form, that is, embodied, and communication. More precisely, they depict the sometimes destructive effect that the connection between these three phenomena has on individuals' abilities to express and articulate themselves. In the case of the women that Das interviewed, this effect presents as a reticence to talk about their experiences of pain, especially by using ordinary, everyday language, and continued suffering. In Probyn's case, it takes the form of physical manifestations of the anxieties that she had about giving her research sufficient respect through the written word. In the case of the young man that Bourdieu interviewed, it exhibits as a corporeal uneasiness and an inability to make effective use of language and linguistic communication.

Given the vested interest that deliberative democrats have in communication and intersubjective praxis, one would expect them to pay close attention to the connection between personal experience, embodied existence, and communication. Yet, the sad reality is that deliberative democrats pay remarkably little attention to these phenomena and do little to investigate what the connection between them might mean for their normative models of politics. Indeed, deliberative democratic theory is, for the most part, characterized by an implicit assumption that attending to the connection between subjective experience, embodied existence, and communication serves to disprove – namely, that subjects who are involved in processes of making decisions about

moral and political matters through discursive or deliberative means are not only willing, but also able, to talk about their viewpoints and concerns.

The initial presumption might be that deliberative democrats who belong to the wider tradition of liberal, Anglo-American, analytic political theory are the target of the criticism in this thesis. After all, John Rawls, whose claims about how a deliberative procedure might be used to create robust principles of justice have been, and continue to be, indispensable for the development of liberal tradition of deliberative democratic thought,[5] is often thought to rely upon an abstract, disembodied, and socially disembedded vision of the subjects who are involved.[6] However, liberal deliberative democrats are not the intended targets of this critique. For, whilst it may be true that liberal deliberative democrats, including those who are influenced by Rawls's work, tend not investigate nor often attend to the connection between communication, subjective experience, and embodied existence, this is, in large part, because of the approach that they take towards their work, which requires them to deliberately set aside and overlook these phenomena. Specifically, liberal deliberative theorists, like many other liberal, Anglo-American, analytic political theorists, engage in a type of reasoning that presumes and, indeed, seeks to preserve the freestanding nature of normative theorising. From this perspective, as Lois McNay explains, the process of reflecting on normative principles should 'be without social weight' in as much as it expresses a logic that is as objective as possible and free from

[5]For Rawls's description of the deliberative procedure, which he refers to as the 'original position', see Rawls, John, *A Theory of Justice,* revised edn, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2003), pp.102. – 171. For a succinct discussion of Rawls's ideas, including those pertaining to the 'original position', see Maffettone, Sebastiano, *Rawls an Introduction,* (Cambridge and Malden, Massachusetts: Polity Press, 2010)

[6]For Example, see Sandel, Michael, *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice*, 2nd edn., (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010)

the troubles of the reality of daily social life.[7] To accuse liberal deliberative theorists of ignoring the reality of communication, subjective experience, and embodied existence and/or the connection between these phenomena would, therefore, be to accuse them of something that they openly admit to and, indeed, aim to do.

Instead, deliberative democrats whose work is influenced by Critical Theory and the tradition of deep social critique that it is associated with, whom this thesis refers to as critical deliberative democrats,[8] are the targets of this thesis's critique. Jürgen Habermas and Seyla Benhabib are *the* most significant representatives of the critical deliberative democratic stance. Drawing on the model of 'discourse ethics'[9] that he develops in the middle and latter stages of his work, Habermas produces a model of moral and political reasoning that treats the outcomes of discussions about moral and political matters as reflecting collective 'we perspectives' that all of those who are involved have agreed to through a gradual process of rational deliberation and self-reflection, during which the force of better arguments is allowed to come to the fore.[10] In the most recent stages of his work, in which he presents his democratic model of political

[7]McNay, Lois, *The Misguided Search for the Political: Social Weightlessness in Radical Democratic Theory,* (Cambridge and Malden, Massachusetts: Polity Press, 2014)
[8]'Critical deliberative theory' is a term is taken from Dryzek's discussion of the differences between liberal deliberative theory and what he refers to as the 'critical alternative' i.e. critical deliberative theory. See Dryzek, John S., *Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics and Contestations,* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp.8. – 31.
[9]The term 'discourse ethics' refers to a type of argument that attempts to establish normative or ethical truths by examining the presuppositions of discourse. Although used by thinkers from a variety of political and ethical backgrounds, Jürgen Habermas and Karl-Otto Apel are regarded as the founders of modern 'discourse ethics'. See Habermas, Jürgen, *Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse Ethics*, trans. Cronin, Ciaran P., (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1993) and Apel, Karl-Otto, *The Response of Discourse Ethics to the Moral Challenge of the Human Situation as Such and Especially Today: Mercier Lectures, Louvain-la-Neuve, March 1999 (Morality and the Meaning of Life),* (Leuven: Peeters Publishers, 2002)
[10]See Habermas, Jürgen, *The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory,* eds. Cronin, Ciaran and Pablo De Greiff, (Massachusetts, Cambridge and Maldon: Polity Press, 2005), pp.57. – 58.

decision-making, Habermas has also taken steps to make this model of 'discourse ethics' relevant for current discussions about law, politics, and institutional arrangements, claiming that it ought to be accompanied by processes of socialization that allow for its institutionalization as a deliberative model of democracy.[11] In the areas of Benhabib's work where she critically engages with Habermas and the ideas of other normative theorists, Benhabib uses the central principles and commitments of Habermas's model of 'discourse ethics' to outline a vision of moral and political reasoning that, she claims, is sensitive to the plight of oppressed groups in society and women in particular.[12] In other aspects of her work, Benhabib, like Habermas, also uses the claims that she makes about 'discourse ethics' to defend a deliberative model of democracy.[13]

Unlike many liberal deliberative democrats, critical deliberative democrats eschew the separation between normative theorizing and social reality. Critical deliberative democrats even base their models of moral and political reasoning upon the actual praxis of real, concrete individuals. However, whilst one would expect the approach that they take towards their work to mean that they are fiercely attentive to the connection between communicative praxis, subjective experience, and embodied existence, steps that they take when designing their normative models of political decision-making tacitly overlook and bracket off

[11]See Habermas, Jürgen, *Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy,* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996)
[12]See Benhabib, Seyla, *Situating the Self: Gender, Community, and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics,* 1st edn., (Cambridge: Polity Press,1992), especially introduction and chapters 3 and 5.
[13]See Seyla Benhabib, 'Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy', in Benhabib, Seyla, ed., *Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political*, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1996)

these phenomena. This oversight, in turn, leads them to implicitly disregard a range of problems that the relationship between these phenomena create with regards to the ability that people have to act and behave in the ways that they endorse. Unfortunately, what one is therefore left with, after reading critical democrats' normative political theories, are suggestions for what the process of creating decisions about moral and political matters ought to look like that are not only divorced from reality and, as such, likely to be infeasible and undemocratic in the real world, but are also ill-equipped to achieve the aim towards which they are intended to contribute – namely, allowing ordinary people to become more aware of and oppose issues in society that prevent them from living their lives to the full.

To investigate flaws in critical deliberative democrats' work, and Habermas's and Benhabib's work in particular, this thesis draws on personal testimony, sociological research, and viewpoints belonging to a broad range of continental[14] thinkers. These thinkers include Pierre Bourdieu, Axel Honneth, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Simone de Beauvoir, Frantz Fanon, Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari, and Michel Foucault. Two concepts are especially significant for the investigation in this thesis: 'embodied identity' and 'affect'. The first of these concepts, 'embodied identity', which this thesis develops by drawing on the work of (New) materialist thinkers and older materialist thinkers like Merleau-Ponty, Beauvoir, and Fanon, treats individuals' distinctive features and aspects

[14]When preceding the words 'philosophy' and 'political theory', the term 'continental' is used to refer to a set of 19th, 20th, and 21st century traditions emanating from mainland Europe. Usually opposed to the liberal, Anglo-American, analytic tradition, examples of so-called 'continental traditions' include German idealism, phenomenology, existentialism, hermeneutics, structuralism, poststructuralism, deconstruction, French feminism, psychoanalytic theory, and the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School and related branches of Western Marxism.

of their personhood and subjectivities as grounded-in, and inextricable from, their material and physical forms, that is, the bodies they inhabit. The second concept, 'affect', which this thesis takes from the burgeoning literature in affect theory in the humanities and social sciences, refers to all of those bodily impulses, surges, and movements that lie just beyond the grasp of human consciousness and comprehension, but nonetheless move individuals and their bodies to new states of being, forms of praxis, and activity.

Using the concepts of 'embodied identity' and 'affect', this thesis reveals how problems with Habermas's and Benhabib's work can be traced back to their reliance upon a fallacious understanding of the subject that presumes that those who are involved in the process of moral and political reasoning can, in some sense, transcend their bodies and/or set differences between their bodies to one side. In other words, how problems with Habermas's and Benhabib's normative political theories can be traced back to their tacit reliance upon a conception of subjects who are involved as abstract and disembodied linguistic beings. Then, after using the concepts of 'embodied identity' and 'affect' to critique critical democrats' work, and Habermas's and Benhabib's work in particular, this thesis considers the import that its investigation has for two, specific debates in contemporary political theory. The first debate, which relates to a central concern in critical theory, has to do with how best to understand what makes people who belong to different groups in society unequal. The second debate, which is particularly pertinent for contemporary democratic theory, centres upon the question of how best to design the contemporary, political decision-making process to make it as genuinely democratic, inclusive and egalitarian as possible

whilst keeping differences between people and the groups to which they belong in society in mind.

When engaging with these two, key debates in contemporary political theory, this thesis uses insights into life as an embodied being, including those that emerge from the critique of Habermas's and Benhabib's work, to engage with the on-going 'redistribution' or 'recognition' debate in contemporary political theory.[15] Specifically, this thesis argues that whilst the notion of 'recognition' has a role to play in understanding what makes contemporary society unfair or unjust, there are significant ontological and normative advantages to using it in conjunction with the term 'redistribution' rather than by itself. These advantages include helping to pick apart and make sense of the negative effect that living in contemporary society has on ordinary people in their day to day lives and avoiding reifying those aspects of individuals that are contingent products of misdeveloped social processes and societal arrangements characterizing contemporary, late capitalist society. Subsequently, after engaging with this debate, this thesis ends the discussion by using observations about embodied existence, including those that flow from the critique of Habermas's and Benhabib's work, to make the case in favour of a "realistic" approach towards thinking about what the contemporary process of political reasoning and decision-making should or ought to look like. At its heart, this approach rejects idealist models of politics like the ones that Habermas and Benhabib produce and is open-minded, flexible, and results-focused about what steps or measures

[15]Specifically, this thesis engages with the debate between Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth in *Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange*, which provides the most in-depth and nuanced engagement with the 'redistribution' or 'recognition' debate in recent times. See Fraser, Nancy and Axel Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange*, (London and New York: Verso, 2003)

might need to be taken in order to make the political decision-making process in contemporary society (more) genuinely democratic given the reality of embodied existence and the relationship that it shares with actual social conditions and the reality of real-world political praxis.

Methodology

Part of this thesis's originality lies in its use of diverse sources and divergent, if not contrasting, philosophical systems of thought to contribute to discussions in contemporary political theory. These discussions include those that are more established, such as critiques of deliberation and deliberative models of democracy that are undertaken by thinkers who have an interest in difference and power like Lynn Sanders, Iris Marion Young, Lois McNay, John Medearis, Anne Phillips, John Dryzek, Chantal Mouffe, and William Connolly. These discussions also include relatively new and emergent conversations about how normative theorizing might respond to the conditions of contemporary society, in which rates of mental and physical hardship are high and ordinary people's interest in political engagement is low, and also discussions resulting from research in the humanities as social sciences about how best to understand the "matter"[16] of the subject, by which is meant not just the subject itself, but the material from which it and all other, living and non-living, human and non-human things are comprised.

[16]In this context, the term 'matter' is used as a pun, playing on the double meaning of the word to refer to the subject and the materiality of the subject.

In bringing together a broad range of research and literature, the aim of this thesis is not just to contribute to well-known arguments in current and emergent debates in contemporary political theory, but also to view them with fresh eyes. In particular, this thesis seeks to challenge the orthodoxy of the 'deliberative turn'[17] that has dominated contemporary democratic theory over the last half a century or so whilst, at the same time, demonstrating how flaws in deliberative models of moral and political reasoning also pertain to models of political decision-making that are frequently offered as alternatives to them. In exploring these issues, the aim of this thesis is not to deny the value of normative theorizing, but, rather, to show the importance of continuing to question and engage with debates from as many perspectives, new and old, as possible, and adopting an innovative, creative, and open-minded mindset when undertaking such questioning and engagement.

In *Sex, Culture and Justice: The Limits of Choice,* Clare Chambers pursues a similar strategy to the one that this thesis pursues to challenge widely accepted ideas about autonomy, freedom, and choice. Drawing on the work of continental thinkers like Bourdieu, Foucault, and Judith Butler, Chambers analyses seemingly disparate aspects of women's experience such as elective cosmetic surgery, gendered patterns of work, and female genital mutilation to force a reconsideration of the kinds of practices that ought to be regarded as harms and, as such, that the state has a legitimate place to intervene to stop in liberal,

[17]This phrase is taken from John Dryzek's analysis of the various debates and dominant strands of thinking in deliberative democratic theory. See Dryzek, John S., *Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics and Contestations,* p.1.

multicultural society.[18] If this thesis manages to capture just part of the effect of Chambers's approach towards exploring these issues – namely, producing an argument that is different from the norm, forces the reader to think about established "truths" twice, and is also compelling on a personal level – then it will have gone at least some of the way to satisfying the aim that inspired its undertaking in the first place.

Chapter Plan

To open the discussion, chapter one explores the rise to prominence of deliberative models of democracy in contemporary political theory and investigates differences in the two predominant schools of thought in deliberative democratic theory: liberal and critical. Reflecting on concerns that are frequently voiced about aggregative models of democracy, chapter one considers how and why deliberative models of democracy are frequently perceived as offering a template for moral and political decision-making that best capture the spirit of democracy. This perceived benefit, advocates argue, is traceable back to a key feature of deliberative models of democracy: the fact that deliberative models of democracy treat the decision-making process as a discursive, gradual learning process about what norms, institutional arrangements, and so forth are truly in the best interests of all. Then, turning to analyse differences in the work of thinkers who endorse deliberative models of democracy, chapter one explores how deliberative democratic theory is divided into two predominant schools of thought. The first, liberal deliberative

[18]See Chambers, Clare, *Sex, Culture, and Justice: The Limits of Choice,* (University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania University State Press, 2008)

democratic theory, includes thinkers who belong to the wider tradition of liberal political theory and philosophy. The second, critical deliberate democratic theory, includes thinkers, of whom Habermas and Benhabib are the two most significant, who are influenced by the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School and the tradition of deep social critique with which it is associated.

Examining what sets liberal and critical deliberative democrats apart from one another, chapter one highlights fundamental differences in the motivations that lie behind liberal deliberative democrats' and critical deliberative democrats' endorsement of deliberative models of democracy and how this difference leads the second group of thinkers to tailor their models of moral and political decision-making to counteract power relations and the impact that power relations have on communicative praxis. Subsequently, after exploring these issues, chapter one considers how steps that critical deliberative democrats take in their work to counteract power relations and, in doing so, allow as many people to participate as possible, lead them to implicitly overlook the import that people's backgrounds and histories have for their capacities to articulate and express themselves. This oversight, chapter one argues, points to a wider problem with the way in which critical deliberative theorists implicitly imagine and present those who are involved in processes of producing decisions about moral and political matters. In particular, that they are, in some sense, capable of transcending or setting-aside the particular material and physical forms, i.e. the bodies, in which they are embodied. Finally, chapter one ends by attending to representative models of democracy and considering whether or not they might offer an alternative answer to the question of what the contemporary political

decision-making process should like, highlighting one possible strength that chapter five addresses later in the discussion – namely, that they require less of ordinary citizens in terms of their participation in politics.

Continuing to critique deliberation and deliberative models of democracy, chapter two builds on assertions that chapter one makes about Habermas's and Benhabib's normative models of politics to investigate how the implicit lack of attention that both thinkers pay to the connection between people's backgrounds and histories and the capacities that they have to articulate and express themselves points to a tacit disembodiment of the subjects in their visions of what the process of generating decisions about moral and political issues ought to look like. Drawing on critiques of deliberation and processes of deliberative decision-making in the real world, chapter two examines how critical deliberative democrats' stipulations about the kinds of praxis and modes of communication that are considered to be appropriate for inclusion in the deliberative, democratic decision-making process indirectly require those who are involved to transcend or set aside their particular, material and physical forms and, as such, implicitly disregard the deep, inescapable connection that individuals share with their bodies that allows them to develop as subjects and to engage with the world that surrounds them in the first place. Subsequently, chapter two uses work by (New) Materialist thinkers and older materialist ontologies that these thinkers draw upon in their work to develop a concept of 'embodied identity' to build a more nuanced account of these issues, and, in doing so, show how the demands that critical deliberative democrats make of those who are involved in their models of moral and political reasoning not only

render their normative political theories undemocratic and worryingly disrespectful of individuals' socio-cultural differences, but also mean that they are likely to be unworkable in the real world and, as such, infeasible.

To further explore problems with critical deliberative democrats' normative political theories that chapter two highlights and also respond to a possible defence of those models, chapter three uses research into a particular aspect of embodied existence – affect – to critique the ideal of deliberation. Responding to claims that problems with deliberation in the real world point towards issues with implementing the ideal of deliberation rather than the ideal itself, chapter three draws on sociological research and social theory to demonstrate how people's experiences of living in contemporary society get into or inside of their bodies as affective habits and dispositions that make it very difficult for all individuals, but especially those who belong to disadvantaged groups, to articulate their concerns in public discussions. From this perspective, the ideal of deliberation is best understood as being fundamentally unjust and founded upon privileged mode of praxis and form of communicative praxis that, if implemented, is likely to result in exclusionary and unjust outcomes. Then, after using insights into the impact that the experience of living in contemporary society has on individuals to critique the ideal of deliberation, chapter three uses the notion of 'affect' to explore how people's negative experiences of living in contemporary society not only make it difficult for them to engage in the process of thinking about and coming to agreements about moral and political issues, but also have the potential to propel them towards new ways and states of being, including engaging in activities that express sentiments that challenge the status

quo and might, in turn, be used to transform society for the better. The irony is though, as chapter three explains, that the claims that critical deliberative democrats make about what the process of moral and political reasoning ought to look like effectively dismiss these sources of discontent as inappropriate for inclusion in democratic decision-making process. Thus, what chapter three demonstrates is that the models of political reasoning and decision-making that critical deliberative democrats design are not only fundamentally flawed and, as such, inherently undemocratic and unfeasible in the real world, but also ill equipped to deliver the "goods" that they are designed in order to deliver in the first place, i.e. to allow ordinary people, especially those who are the worst affected by their experiences of living in contemporary society and have the most to gain from current social, political, and economic arrangements being changed, to contribute to the process through which those issues are identified and have the chance to be addressed.

Temporarily setting the work of deliberative democrats to one side to engage in one of the key debates in contemporary critical theory, chapter four uses insights into embodied existence, including those that chapters one, two, and three generate, to contribute to the on-going debate amongst critical theorists about how best to understand what is unfair or unjust about contemporary society. Making use of Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth's discussion in *Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange* in particular,[19] which is perhaps the most comprehensive engagement with this debate in recent times, chapter four uses insights into life as an embodied being

[19]Fraser, Nancy and Axel Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange*

to show how and why injustice is best thought of as having two, conceptually distinct, but interrelated forms. The first form, redistributive injustice, which is traceable back to the class system that underpins contemporary society, pertains to material and/or economic inequalities between people, including disparities in the amount of physical resources, income, and wealth that they have. The second form, injustice that is linked to the notion of 'recognition', which is traceable back to the status system in contemporary society and the cultural ordering of values that acclaims some people's identities and lifestyles, but denigrate others, stems from inequalities in the opportunities that individuals have to be positively regarded by others and to be treated with respect – i.e. from inequalities in the opportunities that they have to be recognized.

Returning to the work of deliberative democrats and critical deliberative democrats specifically, chapter five ends the discussion by considering how being attentive to embodied existence can help to move discussions in contemporary political theory and contemporary democratic theory forward towards devising more genuinely democratic models of moral and political decision-making. Reflecting on the work of Difference Democrats in particular,[20] which is frequently held up as providing an alternative approach to deliberative models of democracy, chapter five explores how insights into life as an embodied being undermine the suggestions that Difference Democrats make in much the same way as they undermine the suggestions of deliberative democrats in general and critical deliberative democrats in particular. Specifically, chapter five uses Foucault's notion of power as a positive, generative, and productive as well as

[20]The term 'Difference Democrat' is taken from John Dryzek's discussion of dominant strands of thinking in deliberative democratic theory. See Dryzek, John S., *Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics and Contestations,* especially chapter 3.

negative, constraining, and restrictive force and McNay's criticism of a 'social weightlessness' way of thinking about politics[21] to demonstrate how models of political decision-making that Difference Democrats produce implicitly demand that the subjects who are involved to act as if they were, in some sense, outside of their bodies, that is to say, disembodied. Finally, to conclude the discussion, chapter five draws on the work of thinkers who call for greater realism in contemporary political theory to consider how discussions in democratic theory might be driven forward, past the debate between thinkers who either reject or endorse deliberation, in two ways. Firstly, by rejecting one of the fundamental premises that both deliberative democrats and Difference Democrats base their work upon – namely, that real-world democratic praxis can be made more genuinely democratic by trying to realise idealised models of political decision-making. Secondly, by taking an approach towards making politics more inclusive and egalitarian that is more "realistic" towards discussions and, indeed, decisions about what the process of making decisions about moral and political matters ought to look. By "realistic", what is meant is an approach that is attentive to the reality of personal, social, and political conditions in contemporary society and less idealistic, more flexible, and results-focused about how to best to attain or at least come closer to attaining normative principles such as political inclusion, political equality, and democracy itself.

[21]McNay, Lois, *The Misguided Search for the Political: Social Weightlessness in Radical Democratic Theory*

1. Deliberative Democracy: Responding to the Challenge of Diversity and Disagreement in Contemporary Society

In contemporary political theory it is common to encounter the argument that laws and public policies should only be treated as legitimate when the individuals that they are intended to govern have contributed to the discussions and negotiations through which they were produced. Models of politics that reflect this claim are known, in general, as deliberative models of democracy. In fact, deliberative models of democracy are so commonplace in contemporary political theory that citizens' involvement in discussions and negotiations is widely accepted as a precondition of the legitimacy of the political decision-making process. Commenting on the ubiquity of deliberative models of democracy in contemporary political theory, John Dryzek notes that, 'the essence of democracy itself is now widely taken to be deliberation'.[1]

Two schools of thought dominate deliberative democratic theory. The first school of thought, liberal deliberative theory, includes the work of thinkers like John Rawls, Joshua Cohen, Amy Gutmann, and Dennis Thompson, who are

[1]Dryzek, John S., *Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics and Contestations,* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), p.1.

influenced by the liberal tradition of political theory and philosophy. The second school of thought comprises of models of politics that are produced by thinkers who are influenced by critical theory and the tradition of deep, social critique with which it is associated. Most notable amongst these are Jürgen Habermas and Seyla Benhabib, whom this thesis refers to as critical deliberative democrats.

At the heart of the demarcation between liberal and critical deliberative theory lies a fundamental difference. For liberal deliberative democrats, deliberation is valued primarily for its ability to justify the use of coercive force by the state and, as such, legitimise political power. In contrast, critical deliberative democrats place more emphasis on deep social critique and highlight the role that, they argue, deliberation can play in allowing ordinary people to themselves identify and find routes past maldeveloped social processes and arrangements that, in critical deliberative democrats' eyes, make contemporary society unjust.[2] In his critique of the public sphere and how it has changed over time, Habermas is especially critical of the impact that, he argues, 'steering media' such as money and power have on intersubjective praxis and communication.[3] Likewise, but rejecting the division of the just from the good that, she claims, underpins Habermas's and other 'contractarian' models of moral and political reasoning, Benhabib criticizes liberal, democratic politics for reinforcing the sex-gender

[2]Dryzek makes an argument similar to this in his analysis of the key differences between liberal and critical deliberative democrats. In Dryzek's eyes, though, the two schools of thought are more similar and closely aligned than thinkers from either would perhaps like to admit. See Dryzek, John S., *Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics and Contestations*, pp.17. - 27.
[3]Habermas, Jürgen, *The Theory of Communicative Action Vol.2: Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason,* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989), p.267.

system in contemporary society through marginalizing women and treating their concerns as inappropriate subjects for discussion in the moral-political realm.[4]

That said, when it comes to devising their own, normative models of moral and political decision-making, Habermas and Benhabib tacitly overlook a range of reasons why people are unequally unable to participate in politics in the real world and, in doing so, produce models of determining moral and political matters that are likely to be unworkable, unfeasible, and exclusionary and unjust if enacted. In essence, this problem with Habermas's and Benhabib's work arises because they presume that individuals are equally skilled and/or practised at using types of praxis and modes of forms of communication that they endorse in their models of moral and political decision-making. The reality is, though, that individuals who belong to different groups in society and have different backgrounds and histories are imbued with different, indeed, unequal, communicational habits and dispositions, which, in turn, render them more or less capable of articulating themselves and expressing their concerns in the ways that Habermas and Benhabib endorse.

To explore these issues and begin to consider how they point towards a wider problem with the way that Habermas and Benhabib implicitly present political subjects in their normative political theories, chapter one investigates the reasons behind the popularity of deliberative models of politics in contemporary political theory before exploring differences in liberal and critical deliberative theorists' work. Specifically, chapter one examines the challenge that contemporary,

[4]See Benhabib, Seyla, *Situating the Self: Gender, Community, and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics,* 1st edn., (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), especially the introduction and chapters 3 and 5.

complex society poses to contemporary political theory before moving on to examine the notion of 'immanent critique' and the role that it plays in critical deliberative democrats' work, and Habermas's and Benhabib's work in particular. Subsequently, after exploring these issues, chapter one draws on aspects of Pierre Bourdieu's system of thought, particularly his ideas surrounding the concepts of 'habitus' and 'capital', to investigate how the normative models of politics that Habermas and Benhabib produce tacitly underestimate the profound and long-lasting impact that people's backgrounds and histories have on their abilities to act as successful political subjects. Finally, chapter one ends by engaging with the work of thinkers who advocate representative models of political decision-making, considering how those models might offer an alternative approach to the ones that deliberative democrats like Habermas and Benhabib endorse.

Diversity, Disagreement, and Deliberation

Contemporary society with its ever-increasing complexity, fluidity, and diversity poses a particular challenge for contemporary political theorists. How, such theorists ask, is it possible to govern a population that disagrees about so many issues and shares so little common ground? Moreover, how is it possible to ensure that the way (or ways) that the population is governed is not just legitimate, but also fair and capable of securing citizens' compliance? In other words, what kind of politics "fits" with the conditions of complexity, diversity, and disagreement in modern-day society? Capturing the uncertainty and uneasiness that belies these questions and others like them, Gutmann and Thompson claim in the introduction of *Democracy and Disagreement,* a landmark text in contemporary democratic

theory, that, 'of the challenges that American democracy faces today, none is more formidable than the problem of moral disagreement. Neither the theory nor the practice of democratic politics has so far found an adequate way to cope with conflicts about fundamental values'. [5] Likewise, but from a more global perspective, Benhabib notes in the introduction to the equally influential *Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political*, that whilst 'the global trend toward democratization is real…so also are the oppositions and antagonisms asserting themselves against this trend in the various forms of "difference" – ethnic, national, linguistic, religious, and cultural'.[6]

During most of the twentieth century, answers to the question of how to govern the public life of the *polis* commonly portrayed political decision-making as a process of struggle and competition. More precisely, of citizens struggling to ensure that laws and public policies reflect their interests through competitive mechanisms like political representation, party politics, and voting.[7] In Joseph Schumpeter's renowned attack on the 'classical' doctrine of democracy, for example, the correct democratic method is described as 'that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote'.[8] So too, in his highly influential account of 'polyarchy', Robert Dahl defines democracy as a system of competitive elections, which prevents any permanent

[5]Gutmann, Amy and Dennis Thompson, *Democracy and Disagreement*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1998), p1.
[6]Seyla Benhabib, 'Introduction: The Democratic Moment and the Problem of Difference', in Benhabib, Seyla, ed., *Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political*, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1996), p.3.
[7]For example, see Heywood, Andrew, *Political Theory: An Introduction,* 4th edn., (Basingstoke, Hampshire and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), chapter 6.
[8]Schumpeter, Joseph, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, (New York: Harper, 1942), p.260.

elite from emerging and ensures wide, if imperfect, access to the political process.[9]

Today, twentieth century ideas about what constitutes good governance continue to influence discussions about what the political decision-making process ought to look like, underpinning both the political systems that we are familiar with and the conception of democracy that underlies and, indeed, justifies those systems.[10] Especially in developed nations in the West, it is common to encounter the argument that citizens ought to participate in politics through systems of decision-making with certain shared characteristics. These characteristics include fair, free, and competitive elections between multiple, distinct political parties, a separation of powers into different branches of government, the rule of law in everyday life as part of an open society, and the equal protection of human rights, civil rights, civil liberties, and political freedoms. Remarking on the prevalence and, indeed, dominance of this way of thinking about politics, Jane Mansbridge notes that,

> 'the West believes that it invented democracy, and that institutions like Parliament, representation, and universal adult suffrage are synonymous with democracy itself. Every…schoolchild knows that when you set up a democracy you elect representatives…[when] you do not agree, you take a vote, and the majority rules. This combination of electoral representation, majority rule, and one citizen/one vote *is* democracy'.[11]

[9]See Dahl, Robert, 'A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model', *The American Political Science Review*, June 1958, vol.52., no.2., pp.463 – 469.
[10]For an account of the institutional arrangements and political ideal that is typically associated with the notion of aggregative democracy, see Miller, David, 'Deliberative Democracy and Social Choice', *Political Studies*, 1992, XL, Special Issue, pp.54. – 67.
[11]Mansbridge, Jane, *Beyond Adversarial Democracy,* new edn. with a revised preface, (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1983), p.3.

That said, from the 1990s onwards, a definite 'deliberative turn' occurred in thinking about politics and democratic theory in particular. During that time, understandings about the democratic ideal shifted away from the notion of collating individuals' preferences through familiar mechanisms such as voting and political representation.[12] Instead, democratic legitimacy, it was argued, required more than the mere 'turn of the ballot box' - to quote Held[13] - and was to be found in more discursive, contemplative, and cooperative forms of praxis. More specifically, it consisted in the ability of all of the individuals who are subject to a collective decision to engage in authentic, public deliberation about that decision. These individuals, as Dryzek explains, should only accept a decision if it could be justified to them in convincing terms.[14] Reflecting this conception of political decision-making, Bernard Manin, claims that, 'the source of legitimacy [of political decisions] is not the predetermined will of individuals…but rather the process of its formation, that is, deliberation itself.[15] In a similar vein, James Bohman and William Rehg state that, '[b]roadly defined, deliberative democracy refers to the idea that legitimate lawmaking arises from the public deliberation of citizens'.[16] Further still, Cohen, in what is one of the most often-cited articles in the deliberative canon, explicitly states that, 'outcomes are democratically legitimate if and only if they could be the object of free and reasoned agreement

[12]The term 'deliberative democracy' was first coined by Joseph Bessette ten years earlier in 1980. In using the term, Besette's aim was to show why the United States constitution provided a set of principles that were compatible with ensuring effective public deliberation, especially within Congress. See Bessette, Joseph, 'Deliberative democracy: the major principal in republic government', in Goldwin, Robert and William Schambra, eds., *How Democratic is the Constitution?,* (Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1980).
[13]Held, David, *Models of Democracy,* 3rd edn., (Cambridge and Malden, Massachusetts: Polity Press, 2006), p.232.
[14]Dryzek, John S., *Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics and Contestations*, Preface.
[15]Manin, Bernard, 'On Legitimacy in Deliberation', *Political Theory,* August 1987, vol.15., no.3., pp.338. – 368., p.351.
[16]Bohman, James and William Rehg, 'Introduction', in Bohman, James and William Rehg, eds., *Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Logic,* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1997), p.ix.

among equals'.[17] So too, Benhabib argues that, 'legitimacy in complex democratic societies must be thought to result from the free and unconstrained public deliberation of all about matters of common concern'.[18] Finally, Bohman explains that, today, the term, 'deliberative democracy' is used to refer 'any one of a family of view according to which public deliberation of free and equal citizens is the core of legitimate political decision-making and self-governance'.[19]

Arguably, the popularity of models of democracy that emphasise deliberation is traceable back to two prongs of attack against earlier, more familiar models and systems of democratic decision-making. One prong of this attack relates to Mansbridge's distinction between 'unitary' and 'adversarial' models of democracy.[20] The other is connected to Cohen's critique of 'aggregative' models of democracy.[21]

According to Mansbridge, two predominant, yet contrasting models of democracy bely contemporary discussions about politics. The first model, 'unitary' democracy, which Mansbridge associates with Ancient Greek politics and political movements in the 1960s and 1970s that were committed notions of 'participatory democracy' and 'community control' celebrates friendship across common interests. The second model, 'adversary' democracy, which Mansbridge identifies with familiar systems of decision-making like voting, majority rule, and

[17]Cohen, Joshua, 'Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy', in Goodin, Robert E. and Philip Pettit, eds., *Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Anthology*, 2nd ed., (Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell, 2006)
[18]Seyla Benhabib, 'Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy', in Benhabib, Seyla, ed., *Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political*, p.68
[19]Bohman, James, 'The coming of age of deliberative democracy', *The Journal of Political Philosophy,* 1998, vol.6., no.4., pp.400. – 425., p.401
[20]See Mansbridge, Jane, *Beyond Adversarial Democracy*
[21]See Cohen, Joshua, 'Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy'

political representation, presumes conditions of conflicting interests.[22] In distinguishing between 'unitary' and 'adversarial' models of democracy, Mansbridge explains that her aim is not to argue in favour of either 'unitary' or 'adversarial' democracy, but, rather, to explore how they might be 'knitted together' so as to respond to the reality of contemporary society: 'every polity contains both common and conflicting interests and… every polity therefore needs both unitary and adversary institutions to make democratic decisions'.[23] That said, Mansbridge makes it clear that she believes that there are serious shortcomings to 'adversary' models of democracy. In particular, she decries their moral bankruptcy, stating that 'adversary' democracy is the 'democracy of a cynical society' and 'replaces common interest with self-interest, the dignity of equal status with baser motives of self-protection, and the communal moments of face-to-face council with the isolation of a voting machine'.[24] Influenced by Mansbridge's negative assessment of 'adversary' democracy, thinkers in the 1980s turned to alternative ideas with the aim of realising a richer, more genuinely democratic system of political decision-making. In this context, deliberation, with its focus on discussion, understanding, and consensus emerged as an alternative means of making decisions in complex, modern-day society.

Like Mansbridge, Cohen's critique of familiar systems of political decision-making betrays a scepticism of mechanisms like political representation, voting, and majority rule. However, Cohen's particular concern lies with the way in which such mechanisms "aggregate" citizens' interests to produce agreements.

[22]Mansbridge, Jane, *Beyond Adversarial Democracy,* p.ix.
[23]Mansbridge, Jane, *Beyond Adversarial Democracy,* p.xi.
[24]Mansbridge, Jane, *Beyond Adversarial Democracy,* p.18.

Building on comments that Rawls makes in his discussion about democracy,[25] Cohen claims that democratic politics in a just society ought to contain three features. Specifically, it ought to reflect a conception of the common good that is more extensive than mere self-interest and arrived through a process of discussion, have egalitarian implications that must be satisfied in ways that are manifest to citizens, and positively impact on citizens, encouraging self-respect, fostering political competence, and encouraging the creation of a sense of justice. According to Cohen, when properly conducted, democratic politics in the Rawlsian sense, 'involves public deliberation focused on the common good, requires some form of manifest equality among citizens, and shapes the identity and interests of citizens in ways that contribute to the formation of a public conception of common good'.[26] Cohen accepts that, in reality, deliberation may not always produce consensuses and, as such, it may be necessary to resort to voting and majority rule. However, Cohen does not believe that such instances undermine the desirability of a "deliberative" model of democracy nor eliminate their distinctiveness from more familiar, aggregative models. For, in Cohen's own words,

> 'The institutional consequences [of both models] are likely to be different in the two cases, and the results of voting among those who are committed to finding reasons that are persuasive to all are likely to differ from the results of an aggregation that proceeds in the absence of this commitment'.[27]

Thus, for Cohen, as with thinkers whose work his thoughts influenced, 'the appropriate ways of arriving collective decisions' in modern, complex society is

[25]See Cohen, Joshua, 'Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy'
[26]Cohen, Joshua, 'Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy', p.160.
[27]Cohen, Joshua, 'Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy', p.163.

to be found in 'seeking to mirror a system of ideal deliberation in social and political institutions'.[28]

In reality, thinkers who endorse "deliberative" democracy disagree about many issues, including what deliberation ought to look like, where it should take place, and who ought to be involved. Indeed, when treated as a distinct school of thought, 'deliberative democracy' is frequently admonished for a lack of consensus and agreement. Echoing this negative assessment, Pettit criticises deliberative democracy for being 'inherently ambiguous' when it is 'taken as a model for how groups should make collective judgments and decisions'.[29]

The lack of agreement between thinkers who subscribe to the idea of deliberation is especially noticeable in discussions about how successful and extensive deliberation can be when it comes to enabling people with diverse perspectives and contrasting points of view to come to reasonable, mutually acceptable, and beneficial agreements.[30] Cohen, for example, argues that when citizens are socialised according to institutionalised liberal values they are enabled to act in good faith and imbued with the ability to make choices that are good for themselves *and* others when they participate in political debates about how commonly experienced public institutions ought to be organised and structured.

[28]Cohen, Joshua, 'Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy', p.161.
[29]Pettit, Philip, 'Deliberative Democracy and the Discursive Dilemma', *For Philosophical Issues,* 2001, vol.11., no.1., pp.268. – 299., p.268.
[30]Another particularly prominent debate in deliberative democratic theory concerns what topics are appropriate subjects of discussion. For some deliberative democrats, only constitutional rules and principles ought to be up for discussion in deliberative contexts. For others, matters pertaining to all aspects of social life ought to be discussed. For an overview of this debate in deliberative democratic theory, see Dryzek, John S., *Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations*, pp.8. – 27. and Parvin, Phil, 'Is Deliberative Democracy Feasible: Political Disengagement and Trust in Liberal Democratic Societies', *The Monist*, 2015, vol.98., no.4., pp.407. – 423., pp.419. – 420.

As Cohen explains, 'people living within institutions and a political culture shaped by certain ideas and principles are likely to come to understand those ideas and principles and to develop some attachment to them'[31] and, thus,

> 'what makes agreement possible in this case is that citizens who grow up within a reasonably stable democracy will find this self-conception familiar and attractive: the political ideas "expressed" in common, public institutions and appealed to in the culture to justify those institutions will shape the moral-political education of citizens'.[32]

In contrast, other deliberative theorists are not so convinced about the ability of deliberation to provide the deep, transformative impact on individuals that is necessary for creating substantive, mutually acceptable agreements or are, perhaps, more realistic about the possibility for this to happen in contexts of diversity and disagreement. Gutmann and Thompson, for example, argue that when deliberation is based upon principles of 'reciprocity, publicity, accountability' and underpinned by the 'capacity [of citizens'] to seek fair terms of social cooperation for their own sake' it has the potential to enable individuals to become more knowledgeable about others and more tolerant of their beliefs.[33] Yet, in Gutmann and Thompson's opinion, people's connectedness to their moral and ethical stances means that it is likely that deliberation will often result in uneasy consensuses, especially about divisive issues such as abortion, which are based on agreements to disagree, rather than a more substantive agreements.[34] They explain that,

> 'while the locus and content of particular disagreements shift over time, moral disagreement is a permanent condition of democratic politics. We believe that a deliberative perspective can help to resolve some moral disagreement in democratic politics, but we suspect that

[31]Cohen, Joshua, *Philosophy, Politics, Democracy: Selected Papers*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2009), p.190.
[32]Cohen, Joshua, *Philosophy, Politics, Democracy: Selected Papers,* p.190.
[33]Gutmann, Amy and Dennis Thompson, *Democracy and Disagreement*, pp.52. - 53.
[34]Gutmann, Amy and Denis Thompson, *Democracy and Disagreement*, p.54.

> its greatest contribution can be to help citizens treat one another with mutual respect as they deal with the disagreements that inevitably remain'.[35]

That being said, beneath differences in individual models of deliberative democracy lies a fundamental idea that is largely responsible for the support that deliberative models of democracy enjoy in contemporary political theory – namely, that rather than treating politics as a competition between individuals with set, pre-existing points of view with clear winners and losers, deliberative models of democracy treat politics as a learning process that enables participants to come to terms with the range of issues that they need to understand and/or appreciate in order to hold sound and reasonable political judgements and, as such, produce agreements that are in the common interest of all. Gone then, are ideas of conflict, struggle, and competition that are so prevalent in older models of democracy, replaced by something far more collaborative, indeterminate, and open-minded. Or, as Held puts it when making reference to the work of Claus Offe and Ulrich Preuss,[36] an 'open-ended' and 'continuous' 'learning process' in which the roles of 'teacher' and 'curriculum' are raised and 'where the matter of what is to be learnt has to be settled in the process of learning itself'.[37]

Of course, as soon as deliberative models of politics are accepted in theory, the question then becomes how to realise them in the real world. In fact, one of the distinctive features of deliberative democracy, which Held points out in his discussion of its development, is that because deliberative models democracy demand a particular type of political praxis that is centred upon a principle of

[35]Gutmann, Amy and Denis Thompson, *Democracy and Disagreement*, p.9.
[36]See Offe, Claus and Ulrich Preuss, 'Democratic institutions and moral resources', in Held, David, ed., *Political Theory Today,* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), p.168.
[37]Held, David, *Models of* Democracy, p.233.

'reciprocity',[38] they effectively necessitate judgements about how close the reality of politics is to the ideal and, following on from this judgement, opinions on how the two might be brought closer together if needed: 'that democratic theory needs to think not just about the contexts in which people form views and test their opinions but also about the kinds of mechanisms that are in operation in democracies that either reinforce existing viewpoints, or help to create new ones'.[39] To explore this point further and to investigate how it divides deliberative democratic theory into two dominant schools of thought, the next section of chapter investigates differences in the motivations that lie behind liberal deliberative democratic theory and critical deliberative democratic theory and the impact that these differences have on the work of thinkers who are associated with each school of deliberative democratic thought.

The Liberal versus Critical Tradition of Deliberative Democratic Theory

In general, deliberative democrats' assessments of contemporary society and contemporary political life are fairly bleak.[40] Dryzek, who is broadly sympathetic towards the deliberative paradigm in democratic theory, especially in his earlier work, offers a wide-ranging critique of the increasing dominance of instrumental, self-regarding rather than other-regarding rationality, and objectivism in contemporary society, which, he claims, leads to bureaucratization and the concentration of power in the hands of a group of technically skilled elite who

[38]Held, David, *Models of Democracy*, p.233.
[39]Held, David, *Models of Democracy*, p.234.
[40]For an overview of the problems that deliberative democrats frequently point to in their negative assessments of contemporary society, see Held, David, *Models of Democracy*, p.232. - 236.

treat politics as the domain of experts rather than ordinary citizens.[41] Phil Parvin, who is open minded about the use of deliberation in democratic decision-making, although sceptical about the feasibility of deliberative models of democracy *per se*, is critical of the widespread lack of interest in 'political talk' in contemporary society along with the 'erosion' of conditions that are conducive to this type of communicative praxis, including reciprocity and trust among citizens.[42] Even James Fishkin, one of the pioneers of deliberative democracy who is perhaps best known for his work on Deliberative Polling,[43] criticizes the lack of concern and apathy about public affairs in contemporary society. He judges debate within it to be, on-the-whole, superficial, ill-informed and thoughtless, more likely to be based upon sound-bites, celebrity gossip, and candidates being selected 'more or less the way we choose detergents' rather because of principled political argument or discussion.[44] Likewise, Jon Elster, another prominent deliberative theorist, criticizes political arrangements in contemporary society for fostering a spirit of consumer choice, which he claims is, at its heart, self-regarding rather than other-regarding and, in his eyes, more appropriate to market relations than to the kind of discursive rationality that ought to characterise a public meeting place or site of discussion.[45]

---

[41]See Dryzek, John S., *Discursive Democracy: Politics, Policy, and Science,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990)
[42]See Parvin, Phil, 'Is Deliberative Democracy Feasible: Political Disengagement and Trust in Liberal Democratic Societies' and Parvin, Phil, 'Democracy Without Participation: A New Politics for a Disengaged Era', *Res Publica*, 2018, vol.24., no.1., pp.31. – 52.
[43]See, for example, Fishkin, James S., *Democracy and Deliberation: New Directions for Democratic Reform,* (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1991), Fishkin, James S., *When the People Speak: Deliberative Democracy and Public Consultation*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), and Fishkin, James S. and Laslett Peter, eds., *Debating deliberative democracy*, (New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons Hoboken, 2008)
[44]Fishkin, James, *Democracy and Deliberation: New Directions for Democratic Reform*, p.3.
[45]See Elster, Jon, 'The market and the forum: three varieties of political theory', in Bohman, James and William Rehg, eds., *Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Logic*

Having said that, whilst deliberative democratic thinkers share a common concern about the current state of contemporary society and the conditions of political praxis within it, the concerns that they have are motivated by different reasons. In the eyes of liberal deliberative democrats, who comprise one of the most notable schools of deliberative democratic thought, problems with contemporary society and the current state of politics within it are concerning because they threaten the legitimacy of the state and the legitimacy of the decisions that the state makes. For critical deliberative democrats, whose work is influenced by the wider tradition of critical theory and the methodology of deep social critique with which it is associated, contemporary society and the state of politics within it is concerning because of the prevalence of power relations between groups with different backgrounds and histories and the impact that those power relations have on the political decision-making process, which, in critical deliberative democrats' eyes, renders agreements about moral and political matters fundamentally unjust. Habermas, the foremost representative of critical deliberative democratic thought, is especially critical about 'steering media' such as money and power in contemporary society and the impact that, he argues, they have on intersubjective praxis and communication, which, in his opinion, skews collective decisions.[46] Remarking on this central aspect of Habermas's work, Dryzek, whose assessment of contemporary society[47] shares similarities with Habermas's, explains that,

> 'Habermas has long contemplated the sorts of reason that can operate in society since the Enlightenment, distinguishing between instrumental rationality (the capacity to devise, select and effect good means to clarified and consistent ends) and communicative rationality…Communicative rationality is found to the degree that

[46]Habermas, Jürgen, *The Theory of Communicative Action Vol.2: Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason,* p.267.
[47]See Dryzek, John S., *Discursive Democracy: Politics, Policy, and Science*

> communicative action is free from coercion, deception, self-deception, strategizing, and manipulation. Both forms of reason have their proper place in human affairs. The central problem of modern society to Habermas is that instrumental rationality has invaded and conquered realms where it does not belong, leading to the thorough scientization, bureaucratization, and commercialization of social life and politics. Thus the full potential of communicative rationality has not been realized'.[48]

Similarly, but with gender inequality in mind, Benhabib criticizes liberal, democratic politics for reinforcing the sex-gender system in contemporary society through marginalizing women and treating their concerns as inappropriate subjects for discussion in the moral-political realm.[49]

In reality, there is a fair degree of crossover between liberal and critical deliberative democrats with thinkers on both sides of the divide having an interest in the relationship between deliberation and political legitimacy and injustice. Cohen, for example, who is usually thought of as a liberal deliberative democrat, but whose work is influenced by both Rawls and Habermas, is keenly aware of injustice in contemporary society and the challenges that it poses to democratic politics.[50] Likewise, but usually regarded as being on critical side of the critical-liberal divide, Benhabib, who draws heavily on Habermas's ideas about deliberation and is often regarded as creating a feminist version of his work, uses deliberation to explain the legitimization of political power in contemporary society:

> 'the basis for legitimacy in democratic institutions is to be traced back to the presumption that the instances which claim obligatory power themselves do so because their decisions represent an impartial

[48]Dryzek, John S., *Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics and Contestations*, p.22.
[49]See Benhabib, Seyla, *Situating the Self: Gender, Community, and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics,* 1st edn., (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), especially the introduction and chapters 3 and 5.
[50]See, Cohen, Joshua, 'Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy', pp.166. – p.167.

> standpoint said to be equally in the interests of all. This presumption can be fulfilled only is such decisions are in principle open to appropriate public processes of deliberation by free and equal citizens'.[51]

That said, whilst the liberal and critical school of deliberative democratic thought are not strictly divided from nor opposed to one another, they do differ. This difference is especially acute or visible with regards to their principal motivations and methodological commitments. To further explore these differences between the liberal and critical school of deliberative democratic thought and investigate the impact that these differences have on the work of both groups of theorists, it is worth briefly reflecting on their histories as part of the wider traditions of liberal and critical political-philosophical thought.

Historically, liberal political philosophy has been concerned with protecting individuals from arbitrary interference by the state. For most nineteenth century liberals, such protection is found in legal means. However, such laws need not emanate from the kind of democratic politics that we are most familiar with today with some nineteenth century liberals endorsing non-majoritarian rather than majoritarian conceptions of democracy. Indeed, most nineteenth century liberals are highly sceptical about government and stress the need to protect individual freedom against oppressive democratic majorities.[52] John Stuart Mill who, Dryzek convincingly argues, is properly regarded as the 'grandfather of contemporary liberal constitutionalist deliberative democracy'[53] stands out in this regard. As Dryzek explains, on the one hand, Mill's aim is to find ways of protecting

[51]Benhabib, Seyla, 'Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy', p.69.
[52]These concerns continue to inform the work of liberal democratic thinkers today. For an overview of the relationship between liberalism and democracy, see Held, David, *Models of Democracy,* chapter 3.
[53]Dryzek, John S., *Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics and Contestations*, p.9.

individuals from the 'tyranny of the majority', on the other hand, Mill advocates an enlarged and informed public debate albeit constrained to avoid disturbing the rationality of government.[54]

During the twentieth century, the situation in liberal political philosophy changed with the doctrines of liberalism and democracy coming closer together and eventually overlapping to such an extent that by the end of the twentieth century 'liberal democracy' was *the* political ideology. A tension between the two doctrines remained, though, with some political theorists struggling to reconcile the fundamental principles of individual rights and individuals' freedom with majority rule and popular control. Here, arguably, is where deliberative models of democracy stepped-in, as it were, finding their place in contemporary political theory by offering, in the eyes of the thinkers who endorsed them, an effective means of reconciling tensions between liberalism and democracy. Specifically, twentieth century liberal deliberative democrats resolved the tension between individual rights and popular control in at least three key, often interrelated ways.[55] Firstly, twentieth century liberal deliberative democrats argue that there are basic rights that must be respected for the effective exercise of democratic citizenship and, as such, for deliberative democracy itself. These rights include free expression and association, basic education, and, at least in some liberal deliberative theorists' opinion, a certain level of material wellbeing. Cohen, for example, argues that deliberative democracy requires political equality in the form of equal political rights and a commitment to a set of substantive political

[54]See Mill, John Stuart, 'Tocqueville on Democracy in America' in Himmelfarb, Gertrude, ed., *John Stuart Mill, Essays on Politics and Culture*, (New York: Doubleday, 1962)
[55]This argument draws on John Dryzek's analysis of the history of liberal democratic thought and the relationship that it shares with deliberative democratic thought. See Dryzek, John S., *Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics and Contestations,* chaper.1.

principles, many of which are, of course, valued by liberals.[56] In a similar vein, Gutmann and Thompson, whose work, like Cohen's, is influenced by Rawls's, argue that the liberal values of 'liberty' and 'opportunity' should act as 'constitutional principles' [57] to guide deliberation and also claim, more controversially, that deliberation requires welfare state arrangements that guarantee individuals' basic material needs.[58] Secondly, twentieth century liberal deliberative democrats draw on the idea already present in liberalism that constitutions are necessary for enabling individuals to enjoy a private life free from interference to emphasise, instead, the role that the liberal constitution ought to play in creating a public realm of deliberation. Rawls, for example, claims 'a framework of constitutional democratic institutions that specifies the setting for deliberative legislative bodies' [59] is one of the three 'essential elements of deliberative democracy'.[60] Thirdly, some twentieth century liberal deliberative democrats utilise the liberal belief in the value of constitutions to highlight the role that deliberation should play in creating constitutions i.e. argue that constitution making should itself be a deliberative practice. In Rawls' work, this idea is reflected in the claim that 'a well-ordered constitutional democracy' should be 'understood also as a deliberative democracy'.[61] In Gutmann and Thompson's work, it underpins the argument that deliberation ought to take place under constitutional arrangements that are themselves produced through deliberative means.[62]

---

[56]Cohen, Joshua, 'Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy', in Benhabib, Seyla, ed., *Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political,* pp.106. – 107.
[57]Gutmann and Thompson, *Democracy and Disagreement*, p.199.
[58]Gutmann and Thompson, *Democracy and Disagreement*, p.200.
[59]Rawls, John, 'The idea of Public Reason Revisited', *The University of Chicago Law Review,* September 1997, vol.64., no.3., pp.765. – 807., p.772.
[60]Rawls, John, 'The idea of Public Reason Revisited', p.772.
[61]Rawls, John, 'The idea of Public Reason Revisited', pp.771 – 772.
[62]Gutmann, Amy and Dennis Thompson, *Democracy and Disagreement*, p.200.

Despite its uncertain beginnings, by the end of the twentieth century, deliberative democracy had become an influential model of political decision-making in liberal political philosophy and, as such, one of the key means of justifying the legitimacy the state and the state's interference into people lives. In Rawls's work, the positive regarding of deliberation for this reason is reflected in the 'liberal principle of legitimacy', which states that, 'our exercise of political power is fully proper only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens as free and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to their common human reason'.[63] In Cohen's work, it is reflected in the claims that 'when properly conducted…democratic politics involves public deliberation focused on the common good'[64] and 'citizens in such an order share a commitment to the resolution of problems of collective choice through public reasoning, and regard their basic institutions as legitimate in so far as they establish the framework for free public deliberation'.[65] In Gutmann and Thompson's, whose commitment to a deliberative model of democracy is guided by liberal principles such as according citizens equal respect and accompanied by an awareness of the reality of diversity and disagreement in contemporary society, it is reflected in the statement that 'there are better or worse ways of living with moral disagreement, and among the better is political democracy'.[66]

From the perspective of liberal deliberative democrats like Rawls, Cohen, Gutmann, and Thompson, problems in contemporary society, especially those

[63]Rawls, John, *Political Liberalism,* expanded edn., (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), p.137.
[64]Cohen, Joshua, 'Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy', p.160.
[65]Cohen, Joshua, 'Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy', p.161.
[66]Gutmann, Amy and Denis Thompson, *Democracy and Disagreement*, p.26.

pertaining to the public sphere and those that threaten the inclusivity and authenticity of deliberative praxis such as lack of citizenry engagement are especially worrying because they threaten the very foundation of state legitimacy. Even Rawls, who is frequently held-up as an archetype (if not stereotype) of abstract, idealized, liberal political theory,[67] speaks about the need to set deliberation free from the 'curse of money' through the public financing of election campaigns when outlining the setting for deliberative exchanges.[68]

Like liberal deliberative democrats, critical deliberative democrats are deeply concerned about the state of contemporary society and politics within it. However, for them, the principal concern is with understanding injustice and revealing those aspect of society that make it unjust so that they might be improved upon or changed. Reflecting on the relationship between critical theory in general and critical deliberative democratic theory in particular, Dryzek explains that,

> 'in its broadest sense, critical theory is concerned with charting the progressive emancipation of individuals and society from oppressive forces. It follows that such forces are ideological contingencies rather than necessities…Emancipation follows understanding of these forces on the part of those on the receiving end, who come to understand both the contingent character of the forces in question and what might be done to counteract them'.[69]

At the heart of critical theorists' interest in and concern about injustice lies the notion of 'pathology'. As Axel Honneth explicates, in the critical theory tradition, the term 'pathology' is used to describe facets of social life that are maldeveloped and, as a result, prevent individuals, or at least some individuals, from living their lives to the full: 'social philosophy [by which Honneth means the tradition of

[67]For example, see Benhabib, Seyla, 'Towards a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy'
[68]Rawls, John, 'The Idea of Public Reason Revisited', p.772.
[69]Dryzek, John S., *Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics and Contestations*, p.20.

critical theory, broadly understood] is primarily concerned with determining and discussing processes of social development that can be viewed as misdevelopments, disorders, or "social pathologies"'.[70] In Karl Marx's work, which represents a vital developmental stage in the tradition of both critical theory and Critical Theory, these 'pathologies' are economic in character, pertaining to structures, organizations, and relations of labour that stop individuals from attaining full self-realization by preventing them from engaging in self-determined labour.[71] In the work of thinkers who founded and are associated with the Frankfurt School, they are the totalitarian state (Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno), post-war mass culture (Herbert Marcuse), the meaninglessness and disenchantment of capitalist society (Walter Benjamin), and the alienation underpinning both Western capitalism and Soviet communism (Erich Fromm).

Progressing the tradition of critical theory to which they belong, critical deliberative democrats are especially concerned about 'pathologies' in contemporary society that prevent individuals from fully engaging in the process of discussing and making judgements about moral and political matters. In the work of thinkers who are associated with this school of thought, this concern manifests in two key ways. First, as the current section of chapter one discusses, in efforts to distinguish between 'normal' and 'pathological' communicative praxis. Second, as the next section of chapter one discusses, to create and, indeed, justify a procedural account of moral and ethical reasoning that allows ordinary

[70]Honneth, Axel, *Disrespect: The Normative Foundations of Critical Theory*, (Cambridge and Malden, Massachusetts: Polity Press, 2007), p.4.
[71]See Honneth, Axel, '*Pathologies of the Social: The Past and Present of Social Philosophy',* in Honneth, Axel, *Disrespect: The Normative Foundations of Critical Theory*, pp.3 – 18.

individuals to themselves identify and produce means of tackling 'pathologies' that negatively affect their lives and the lives of others in contemporary society.

To get a sense of the critiques of liberal democratic society that critical deliberative democrats produce, it is worth examining the comments that Habermas makes about the public sphere in modern, capitalist society and how the public sphere has changed over time. Reflecting on his work, Habermas overtly acknowledges that the topic of the public sphere has preoccupied the various stages of his philosophical and political thought: 'the public sphere as a space of reasoned communicative exchanges is the issue that has concerned me all my life. The conceptual triad of 'public space,' 'discourse,' and 'reason,' in fact, has dominated my works as a scholar and my political life'.[72] In what is widely regarded as one of his earliest major works, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeoisie Society*, Habermas claims that prior to the 18th century, Europe was dominated by a 'representational'[73] culture whereby those in power imposed themselves onto their subjects through overwhelming force. Habermas claims, however, that with the rise of capitalism and the development of free trade, an embryonic public sphere emerged, initially in response to merchants' need for accurate information about distant markets, that allowed citizens to hold government to account by giving them a safe space to discuss its decisions and criticize them if/when they failed to respond to the public need.[74] In other words, Habermas treats the emergence of

[72]Habermas, Jürgen, *Between Naturalism and Religion: Philosophical Essays,* trans. Cronin, Ciaran, (Cambridge and Maldon, Massachusetts: Polity Press, 2008), pp.12. – 13.
[73]Habermas, Jürgen, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: Inquiry into the Category of Bourgeoisie Society,* (Cambridge, Polity Press: 1989), pp.5. – 12.
[74]Habermas, Jürgen, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: Inquiry into the Category of Bourgeoisie Society*, pp.14. – 26.

the public sphere as synonymous with the unfolding of a particular type of rational-critical, political debate that kept the authorities within their bounds and in-check, lest their decisions and rulings be ridiculed. Subsequently, in the second half of *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere,* Habermas shifts his attention to the public sphere in modern-day, capitalist society, arguing that changes to the socio-economic fabric of society brought about by industrialization have led the public sphere to lose its critical potential and the role that it once played as providing space for genuinely open, rational, critical debate.[75] Specifically, Habermas argues that, over time, the line between public and private, state and society have become blurred through a series of interventions that have eventually resulted in the modern welfare state. Furthermore, Habermas highlights a series of what he believes to be pernicious effects that increasing commercialization and consumerization have had on the public sphere through the rise of mass media, public relations, and consumer culture. Elsewhere in his work, especially the two volumes of *The Theory of Communicative Action*, which, together, are often regarded as his *magnum opus*, Habermas develops this line of reasoning further, claiming that processes of state administration, economic rationalization, and mass consumerism have effectively undermined the potential for rational-critical, political debate by encouraging instrumental, 'purposive rational action' [76] rather than open-minded, other-centred 'communicative action'.[77] Indeed, Habermas argues that this 'colonization'[78] of the 'lifeworld'[79] of

[75]Habermas, Jürgen, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: Inquiry into the Category of Bourgeoisie Society*, pp.222. – 236.
[76]Habermas, Jürgen, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: Inquiry into the Category of Bourgeoisie Society*, pp.236. – 244.
[77]Habermas, Jürgen, *The Theory of Communicative Action Vol.1: Reason and Rationalization of Society*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1984), pp.273. – 338.
[78]Habermas, Jürgen, *The Theory of Communicative Action Vol.2: Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason,* pp.332. – 374.

human, intersubjective praxis by the 'system'[80] of socioeconomic forces and the imperatives of 'steering media'[81] such as money and power that guide them is so acute that it constitutes a form of 'structural violence'.[82]

Out of the comments that Habermas makes about the public sphere and how it has changed over time, emerges a palpable dissatisfaction with the prevailing social, political, and economic order in liberal, democratic society and a corresponding concern with the impact that that order has on individuals, especially with regards to their communication. Of course, what Habermas's account of the public sphere implicitly fails to address, which feminist critics of his work point out, is how the connection that he traces between communication, the public sphere and the various social, political, and economic forces in contemporary society impacts differently on persons with different socio-cultural identities and backgrounds and histories. Recognising this omission in Habermas's work, Fraser explains that whilst, in her opinion, 'Habermas's idea of the public sphere is indispensable to critical social theory and to democratic political practice', [83] it 'needs to undergo some critical interrogation and reconstruction if it is to yield a category capable of theorizing the limits of

[79]Habermas, Jürgen, *The Theory of Communicative Action Vol.2: Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason*, pp.113. - 119.
[80]Habermas, Jürgen, *The Theory of Communicative Action Vol.2: Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason*, pp.113. – 199.
[81]Habermas, Jürgen, *The Theory of Communicative Action Vol.2: Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason*, p.267.
[82]Habermas, Jürgen, *The Theory of Communicative Action Vol.1: Reason and Rationalization of Society*, p.187.
[83]Fraser, Nancy, 'Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy', *Social Text*, 1990, no.25/26., pp.56. – 80., p.57.

actually existing democracy'[84] not least to take gender, class, race, and ethnicity into account. When making her argument, Fraser explains:

> 'Habermas's account of the bourgeois conception of the public sphere stresses its claim to be open and accessible to all. Indeed, this idea of open access is one of the central meanings of the norm of publicity. Of course, we know…the bourgeois public's claim to full accessibility was not in fact realized. Women of all classes and ethnicities were excluded from official political participation precisely on the basis of ascribed gender status, while plebeian men were formally excluded by property qualifications. Moreover, in many cases, women and men of racialized ethnicities of all classes were excluded on racial grounds'.[85]

Likewise, Jean Cohen, who is broadly sympathetic towards Habermas's work as a whole and even defends it against Fraser's criticism, acknowledges that he suffers from an unfortunate blindness towards gender that ignores the differential social and political statuses between men and women and that, as such, his vision of modernity requires revision and reconceptualization.[86]

In recent times, Habermas has responded to feminist criticisms of his account of the public sphere[87] by taking steps to better incorporate gender into his philosophical system of thought.[88] As early as 1989, Habermas described the bourgeoisie public sphere that he celebrates in his earlier work as 'patriarchal' and admitted that the exclusion of women from political-public life had a 'structuring

[84]Fraser, Nancy, 'Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy', p.57.
[85]Fraser, Nancy, 'Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy', p.63.
[86]Cohen, Jean, 'Critical Social Theory and Feminist Critiques: The Debate with Jürgen Habermas', in Meehan, Johanna, ed. and intro., *Feminists Read Habermas: Gendering the Subject of Discourse,* (New York and London: Routledge, 1995)
[87]See Habermas, Jürgen 'Further Reflections on the Public Sphere', in Calhoun, Craig, ed., *Habermas and the Public Sphere,* (Cambridge, Massachusetts MIT Press, 1996)
[88]See Habermas, Jürgen, *Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy,* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996)

significance' that he had earlier neglected.[89] Mirroring Habermas's own acknowledgment of these issues, thinkers who have an interest in precisely the kinds of issues that he overlooks, at least in his earlier work, also have taken his critique of contemporary society and sought to make it more attentive to difference. Benhabib, in particular, who is influenced by both the critical and normative aspects of Habermas's work, marries his central concerns and concepts with her own interest in the 'gender-sex system' of contemporary society to analyse how 'societies and cultures reproduce embodied individuals' and, in doing so, contribute 'to the oppression and exploitation of women'.[90]

In summary, in the eyes of both liberal deliberative democrats and critical deliberative democrats there is a not insignificant gap between the ideal of a deliberative model of moral and political decision-making and the reality of contemporary society and the political life within it. For both sets of thinkers, the challenge is, therefore, to find ways of bringing what currently "is" in contemporary society in line with what, they believe, "ought" to be. For some deliberative democrats, this bringing together requires substantial change being made to the prevailing social, political, and economic order. Cohen, for example, argues that structural change ought to be a condition of deliberative democracy.[91] Likewise, Archon Fung states that, 'deliberative democracy is a revolutionary political ideal that requires fundamental changes in political institutions, bases of

[89]Habermas made these comments whilst speaking at the end of the 1989 conference to celebrate the translation and publication of *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* in English. For an overview of what was said at the conference, see Calhoun, Craig, ed., *Habermas and the Public Sphere*

[90]Benhabib, Seyla, *Situating the Self: Gender, Community, and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics*, p.152.

[91]For example, see Cohen, Joshua and Charles Sabel, 'Directly-Deliberative Polyarchy', *European Law Journal*, 1997, vol.3., no.4., pp.313. – 342.

collective decision making, and the distribution of resources'.[92] For other deliberative democrats, the bringing together of what "is" and what "ought" to be is imagined as working with and, indeed, within, the pre-existing conditions of contemporary society. In this regard and in the context of this discussion, the suggestions that Habermas makes about the realisation of deliberative democracy are especially interesting. For, as critics of his work *and* thinkers who are sympathetic to his work point out, whilst Habermas is highly critical about contemporary society, especially in his earlier work, the comments that he makes about the realisation of deliberative politics in his later work and especially in *Between Facts and Norms: Contributions. To a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy*, which represents the culmination of his thinking over the last half a century, effectively amounts to an endorsement of a system of political, legal, and institutional arrangements very close to that already found in contemporary society.[93] Commenting on Habermas's efforts to link deliberative praxis to constitutional law in particular, James Chriss states thus,

> 'this move is controversial for a theorist coming out of the critical-theory tradition, because Habermas seems to embrace normative theories of democracy that suggest values, and hence laws, are created out of a consensus of citizens coming together to decide their fate collectively through representation. By contrast, critical theories of democracy hold that values are created primarily by elites who, wielding enormous social and political power through ideological hegemony, control the substance of public deliberation and, hence, are able to pass into legislation laws that reflect and defend their own interests at the expense of the relatively powerless masses…as I see it, Habermas went too far in attempting to show that, no matter how bad things seem to be getting, citizens living in post-conventional societies (i.e., in constitutional democracies) still have the power to create conditions for their existence that all could agree upon form a valid and just form of life (as per the discourse principle). But Habermas

[92]Fung, Archon, 'Deliberation before the Revolution: Towards an Ethics of Deliberative Democracy in an Unjust World', *Political Theory*, 2005, vol.33., no.2., pp.397. – 419., p.397.
[93]See Habermas, Jürgen, *Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy*

need not point to law as functioning only in a positive or beneficial direction'.[94]

One possible reason for Habermas's reluctance to advocate more substantial change to the prevailing social, political, and legal order in contemporary society relates back to concerns that critical theorist have about their role in bringing about positive change. As David West explains, in critical theory and continental philosophy in general, a tension exists around the role of the theorist.[95] Critical theorists are, on a fundamental level, committed to wanting to change society for the better. However, reflecting the concerns that they have about power and ideology, critical theorists also view their own perspectives and opinions with at least some degree of scepticism, regarding themselves as potentially susceptible to the same kinds of distortions and skewed understandings that affect society as a whole. Thus, at least partially as a consequence of the scepticism that they have about themselves and their own activities, critical theorists instead focus their efforts on helping ordinary individuals to become more aware of and motivated to change 'pathologies' in society that negatively affect their lives. As the preceding discussion briefly mentions[96], in critical deliberative democrats work in particular, this aim manifests in two ways - firstly, in efforts to distinguish between 'normal' and 'pathological' aspects of society and, secondly, in the production of procedural accounts of moral and ethical judgement that, in critical deliberative democrats' eyes, allow ordinary individuals to themselves identify harmful, i.e.

[94]Chriss, James J., 'Review essay of Jurgen Habermas's Between Facts and Norms', *Theory and Society*, 1998, vol.27., no.3., pp.417. – 425., pp.419. – 425.
[95]West, David, *An Introduction to Continental Philosophy*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), especially chapter 3.
[96]Many other deliberative democrats are far more cautious about the role that deliberation, at least by itself, can play in addressing real-world inequality and injustice. For example, see Fung, Archon, 'Deliberation before the Revolution: Towards an Ethics of Deliberative Democracy in an Unjust World'

pathological, aspects of society. To explore this latter aspect of critical deliberative democrats' work further and investigate the impact that it has on their normative models of moral and political decision-making, the next section of chapter one examines the relationship between critical deliberative democratic theory and the wider tradition of critical theory, especially with regards to the methodological principle of 'immanent critique'.

Shades of 'Immanent Critique' in Critical Theory and Critical Deliberative Democratic Theory

Critical deliberative democratic theorists like Habermas and Benhabib share a complex relationship with 'critical theory', understood as an approach towards thinking about moral and political concerns that stresses the importance, indeed, primacy, of reflectively assessing and evaluating society and the cultural, social, political, economic forms that exist within it, which is strongly associated with the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School. On the one hand, critical deliberative democrats are committed to critiquing contemporary society and to identifying problems within it. On the other hand, critical deliberative democrats differ from many other thinkers whose work adopts the key tenets and commitments of critical theory, in that they aim to not only critique contemporary society, but to also devise normative models of moral reasoning and political decision-making that, in their eyes, can overcome the issues within it. Moreover, whilst there can be little doubt about the intellectual debt that critical deliberative democrats like Habermas and Benhabib owe to the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School, their intellectual heritage is far more wide-ranging and complex. In the case of

Habermas in particular, recent research has led scholars to claim that his association with the Frankfurt School, and the impact that it had on his intellectual endeavours, is inflated well beyond what it actually was, especially when compared to other events in both his personal life and political life.[97] Furthermore, some commentators on his work make the provocative argument that what actually makes Habermas a recognizable representative of the tradition of critical theory is his interventionist stance in the public sphere rather than any aspect of his philosophical program.[98]

The aim of this discussion is not to wade into the debate about whether or not Habermas is best thought of as a member of the Frankfurt School. Rather, it is to explore how methodological commitments underpinning the wider tradition of 'critical theory' and the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School contribute to setting critical deliberative democratic theory apart from the tradition of liberal deliberative democratic theory. Specifically, how critical deliberative democrats' commitment to the methodological principle of 'immanent critique', which also underpins the work of key figures in the tradition of critical theory and the research of the Frankfurt School, leads critical deliberative democrats to focus on producing models of politics that, in their eyes, enable individuals living in liberal democratic society to become more aware of and aid their emancipation from oppressive and unjust forces.

[97]In particular, commentators on Habermas's work point towards his involvement with the Hitler Youth and subsequent horror as the atrocities committed by the Nazis, which led him away from Martin Heidegger's intellectual philosophical system and towards the work of the Frankfurt School. See Martin, Jay, *Reason After Eclipse: On Late Critical Theory,* reprint edn., (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 2017), Müller-Doohm, Stefan, *Habermas: A Biography,* (Cambridge and Malden, Massachusetts: Polity Press, 2016), and Spectre, Matthew, *Habermas: An Intellectual Biography,* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010)
[98]Müller-Doohm, *Habermas: A Biography*, pp.4. – 5.

In philosophy, the humanities, and social sciences, the term 'immanent critique' refers to an approach towards analysing society that identifies contradictions in its systems or rules: a method of social analysis that focuses on that gap between what "is" in society and what "should" or "ought" to be, or the difference between what is "real" and what is "ideal". In focussing on what currently "exists" or "is" in a society, the aim of 'immanent critique' is not only to criticise, but also to identify those societal arrangements and social processes that provide the best potential for enabling emancipatory social change and, in doing so, help to bring about that change. Often, this process involves an attentiveness to ideology and the role that ideas and other cognitive artefacts play in shaping society. Discussing the essentially critical, but also forward-thinking ethos that lies at the heart of the notion of 'immanent critique', David Harvey explains that,

> 'immanent critique…"enters its object," so to speak, "boring from within"…Upon 'entering' the theory, orthodoxy's premises and assertions are registered and certain strategic contradictions located. These contradictions are then developed according to their own logic, and at some point in this process of internal expansion, the one-sided proclamations of orthodoxy collapse as material instances and their contradictions are allowed to develop "naturally"'.[99]

Also picking up on the critical and forward-thinking character of the notion of 'immanent critique', McNay states that,

> 'in the absence of any objective perspective, normative political thought and critical social theory enter into a dialectical exchange where each perspective is used to probe the limitations of the other… The ultimate aim of this critical exchange is the exploration of the entanglement of the ought with the is, namely, the "emancipatory" potential that pertains not to acceptability under ideal epistemic conditions, but, instead, resides within existing social practices albeit obscured by current injustices and oppression'.[100]

---

[99]Harvey, David, 'Critical Theory', *Sociological Perspectives,* 1990, vol.33., no.1., pp.1. – 10., p.5. (grammar added)

[100]McNay, Lois, 'Recognition as fact and norm: the method of critique', in Leopold, David and Marc Stears, eds., *Political Theory: Methods and Approaches,* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), p.86.

Likewise, in his summary of the place of 'immanent critique' in critical theory, Robert Antonio explains that, 'immanent critique is a means of detecting the societal contradictions which offer the most determine possibilities for emancipatory social change'.[101]

As a method of social analysis and means of encouraging positive, societal transformation, 'immanent critique' is traceable back to the dialectic of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, and Marx's criticisms of his idealist account of social change. Today, the term is perhaps most strongly associated with the work of the Frankfurt School thinkers, especially Horkheimer and Adorno. However, as commentators point out, the role that 'immanent critique' plays in their work is complex and far from straightforward.[102] For, ultimately, many of the Frankfurt School thinkers, including Adorno and Horkheimer, came to accept or at least resign themselves to the idea that oppressive social forces were so embedded and enduring that very little, if nothing, could be done to oppose them apart, perhaps, in Adorno's case, for instances of individualistic, artistic expression.[103] Consider, as an example of this resignation, the rhetorical question that Marcuse asks about what happens 'if the development outlined by the theory does not occur? What if the forces that were to bring about the transformation are suppressed and appear to be defeated?' [104] Moreover, in the eyes of some of the Frankfurt School theorists, their work directly conflicts with the aim of securing positive social

[101]Antonio, Robert, 'Immanent Critique as the Core of Critical theory: Its Origins and Developments in Hegel, Marx, and Contemporary Thought', *British Journal of Sociology,* 1981, vol.32., no.3., pp.330. – 345., p.333.
[102]For a discussion of the role 'immanent critique' plays in Adorno's work in particular, see Finlayson, Gordon, 'Hegel, Adorno and immanent criticism', *British Journal for the History of Philosophy*, 2014, vol.22., no.6., pp.1142. – 1166.
[103]Adorno, Theodor, *Negative Dialectics,* (New York: Continuum, 1973)
[104]Marcuse, Herbert, 'Philosophy and Critical Theory', in Bronner, Stephen Eric and Douglas MacKay Kellner, intro. and eds., *Critical Theory and Society: A Reader*, (New York and London: Routledge, 1989), p.63.

change. Take, for example, the comments that Horkheimer makes in his seminal discussion about the difference between 'traditional' and 'critical theory'.[105] In this discussion, Horkheimer defines 'critical theory' as 'a social theory oriented toward critiquing and changing society as a whole'.[106] Horkheimer also explains that the 'real function' of the theoretician is not only to describe the 'concrete historical situation' of societal contractions, but to also act as 'a force within it to stimulate change'.[107] Yet, at the same time, Horkheimer asserts that while the oppressed strive for happiness they do not necessarily know how to achieve it, so the theorist must step in and help them attain critical consciousness: 'even the situation of the proletariat is…no guarantee of correct knowledge'[108]. In other words, Horkheimer believes that the importance of suffering is not always evident to those who experience it nor is it always enough for them to identify its source. Consequently, it is the job of the theorist to elaborate on this significance so that their suffering might have practical effect. In fact, there are times in this discussion when Horkheimer points towards the critical theorist being superior to or "above" the oppressed: 'it is the task of the critical theoretician to reduce the tension between his own insight and oppressed humanity in whose service he thinks'.[109] Referring to the various complications in the stance that the Frankfurt Schools thinkers took towards the possibility of positive social change, West describes a 'mood of pessimism' that 'haunts'[110] the writing of the Frankfurt School. So too, Honneth, in his detailed account of the methodological and philosophical commitments underpinning twentieth century critical theory,

[105]Horkheimer, Max, 'Traditional and Critical Theory', in Horkheimer, Max, *Critical Theory: Selected Essays,* trans. O'Connell, Matthew and others, (New York: Continuum Publishing, 2002)
[106]Horkheimer, Max, 'Traditional and Critical Theory', p.244.
[107]Horkheimer, Max, 'Traditional and Critical Theory', p.215.
[108]Horkheimer, Max, 'Traditional and Critical Theory', pp.211. – 215.
[109]Horkheimer, Max, 'Traditional and Critical Theory', p.221.
[110]West, David, *An Introduction to Continental Philosophy*, p.67.

describes the social critiques of the Frankfurt School as predominantly 'negativist' in character.[111]

Setting discussions about the possibility of positive social change in the work of thinkers who are associated with the Frankfurt School to one side, the methodological principle of 'immanent critique' is especially important for thinkers who are associated with critical deliberative democratic theory. In the case of Habermas who, McNay convincingly argues, is the most prominent contemporary proponent of normative thought as critique,[112] the specific target of his 'immanent critique' of contemporary society is the relationship between structural forces, communication, and the kinds or types of reason this relationship encourages. For Benhabib, who draws upon aspects of Habermas's work, especially the impact of power relations on communication, it is the 'gender-sex system' in contemporary society, by which she means the 'social-historical, symbolic constitution, and anatomical differences of the sexes', through which, she argues, 'societies and cultures reproduce embodied individuals' and, in doing so, contribute 'to the oppression and exploitation of women'.[113] Specifically, Benhabib's concern is with how processes of decision-making about moral and political issues that fail to pay due diligence to people's 'embedded' and 'embodied' identities contribute to the reproduction of relations of oppression and exploitation in society because of their inability to respond to

[111]See Honneth, Axel, 'The Social Dynamics of Disrespect: On the Location of Critical Theory Today', trans. Farrell, John, *Constellations,* 1994, vol.1., no.2., pp.255. – 296., also reprinted in Honneth, Axel, *Disrespect: The Normative Foundations of Critical Theory.*
[112]McNay, Lois, 'Recognition as fact and norm: the method of critique', p.86.
[113]Benhabib, Seyla, *Situating the Self: Gender, Community, and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics*, p.152.

the demands of 'concrete, embodied selves, striving for autonomy'.[114] Outlining the function of her social critique, Benhabib explains that her aim is to contribute to building a feminist critical theory by providing an 'anticipatory-utopian critique of universalistic moral theories from a feminist standpoint', which reveals how dominant visions of the moral domain lead to the 'privatization of women's experience and to its exclusion from the moral domain'.[115]

That said, in the work of thinkers who are associated with critical deliberative theory, the notion of 'immanent critique' plays a slightly different role than it does in the work of other critical theorists, especially those that are associated with the Frankfurt School. For, rather than limiting the role that they, as theorists, play in helping to bring about positive social change to illuminating contradictions in society, critical deliberative democrats like Habermas and Benhabib take a more practical approach to this issue. Specifically, they produce normative models of moral and political decision-making that, in their eyes, enable ordinary individuals to identify societal contradictions and devise means of opposing them themselves. In this sense, whilst their work reflects Horkheimer's vision of the critical theorist acting as 'a force within it to stimulate change',[116] critical deliberative democrats believe that their role, as a theoretician, is twofold. Firstly, to criticize contemporary society and to produce social critiques of it that highlight contradictions, i.e. 'pathologies', within it, which, in Habermas's

[114]Benhabib, Seyla, *Situating the Self: Gender, Community, and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics*, pp.152. – 153.
[115]Benhabib, Seyla, *Situating the Self: Gender, Community, and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics*, p.152.
[116]Horkheimer, Max, 'Traditional and Critical Theory', p.215.

words, act a 'thorn [that] sticks in the flesh of any social reality'.[117] Secondly, to produce models of moral-political reasoning and decision-making in which the process of 'immanent critique' is in-built, as it were, conducted by the same individuals that misdeveloped social processes and societal contradictions negatively affect and, in doing so, stop living their lives to the full.

Comments that Habermas and Benhabib make about how those who are involved in the process of creating decisions about moral and political issues ought to be understood during their critical engagements with other, normative political theories, provide a route to understanding how the notion of 'immanent critique' is built into the more normative and less critical aspects of their work. In the case of Habermas, comments that he makes during his public exchange with Rawls, particularly during their back-and-forth published in *The Journal of Philosophy*[118] about the need to regard those who are involved in the process of thinking about and producing agreements about moral and political issues as dialogical and other-aware, are especially relevant for understanding this aspect of his work. In the case of Benhabib, the comments that are most relevant are those

[117]Habermas, Jürgen, *Postmetaphysical Thinking: Philosophical Essays,* trans. Hohengarten, William Mark, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1992), p.47.
[118]For Habermas's criticism of Rawls during their debate in *The Journal of Philosophy* see Habermas, Jürgen, 'Reconciliation through the Public Use of Reason: Remarks on John Rawls's *Political Liberalism*', *The Journal of Philosophy*, March 1995, vol.93., no.3., pp.109. – 131., also reprinted as 'Reconciliation through the Public Use of Reason', in Habermas, Jürgen, in *The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory,* eds. Cronin, Ciaran and Pablo De Greiff, (Massachusetts, Cambridge and Maldon: Polity Press, 2005). For Rawls's response to Habermas during the same debate, see Rawls, John, 'Reply to Habermas', *The Journal of Philosophy*, March 1995, vol.92., no.3., pp.132. – 180., also reprinted in Rawls, John, *Political Liberalism*. For an overview of the Habermas-Rawls debate both in *The Journal of Philosophy* and elsewhere see Finlayson, James Gordon and Freyenhagen, Fabian (eds.), *Habermas and Rawls: Disputing the Political,* (New York, Abingdon, Oxford: Routledge, 2010), Hendrick, Todd, *Rawls and Habermas: Reason, Pluralism, and the Claims of Political Philosophy,* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2010), Maffettone, Sebastiano, *Rawls an Introduction,* (Cambridge and Malden, Massachusetts: Polity Press, 2010) especially p.177. – p.188., and McCarthy, Thomas, 'Kantian Constructivism and Reconstructivism: Rawls and Habermas in Dialogue', *Ethics*, October 1994, vol.105, pp.44. – 63.

that she makes during her critique of so-called 'contractarian' models of moral and political reasoning, which forms part of her wider discussion about the benefits of understanding those who are involved in the process of moral-political judgement as not just dialogical and other-aware (in the Habermasian sense), but also as concrete beings with particular concerns and needs arising from their distinct socio-cultural identities, backgrounds, and histories.[119]

As Sebatiano Maffettone notes, Rawls and Habermas broadly share the same aim - namely, to produce pluralist, but normative social philosophy.[120] As Maffettone also notes, Rawls and Habermas share a commitment to taking Kant as the basis for their normative social philosophy.[121] Overtly acknowledging these points of convergence in his and Rawls's work, Habermas explains that he endorses Rawls's general 'project', which he refers to as 'an intersubjective account of Kant's Categorical Imperative'.[122] Yet, this is also where Rawls and Habermas part company with one another, raising a number of concerns and objections about the steps that each other take in order to satisfy these aims. In the case of Habermas, the concerns that he raises about Rawls's work are found in a number of places, throughout his work.[123] In contrast, the comments that Rawls makes about Habermas are confined to their exchange in *The Journal of Philosophy.*

[119]See Benhabib, Seyla, *Situating the Self: Gender, Community, and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics*, especially introduction and chapters 3 and 5.
[120]Maffettone, Sebastiano, *Rawls an Introduction*, p.178.
[121]Maffettone, Sebastiano, *Rawls an Introduction*, p.178.
[122]Habermas, Jürgen, *The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory*, p.49.
[123]For example, see Habermas, Jürgen, *Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy,* especially chapters 2 and 3., Habermas, Jürgen, *Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse Ethics*, trans. Cronin, Ciaran P., (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1993), Habermas, Jürgen, 'Reasonable versus True, or the Morality of Worldviews', in Habermas, Jürgen, *The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory: Studies in Political Theory*, and Habermas, Jürgen, 'Religion in the Public Sphere', *European Journal of Philosophy,* March 2006, vol.14., no.1., pp.1. – 25.

During his critical engagement with Rawls's work, Habermas specifically explains that to resolve issues that he identifies with Rawls's work, it is best to adopt a strictly 'proceduralist' account of the process of creating agreements about moral and political concerns and that, in order to create such an account, it is best to draw upon the central principles and commitments of 'discourse ethics'.[124] These principles and commitments include treating those who are involved in the process of moral and political reasoning as dialogical and other-regarding beings with specific worldviews and points of view. Referring to the notion of 'discourse ethics', Habermas explains that, '[d]iscourse ethics….views the moral point of view as embodied in an intersubjective praxis of argumentation which enjoins those involved to an idealizing enlargement of their interpretive perspectives'.[125] In Habermas's opinion, one of the principal benefits of adopting his approach is that doing so reveals how it is possible to generate impartial decisions about moral and political issues without denying information to the subjects who are involved by imposing mechanisms such as Rawls's 'veil of ignorance'.[126] When outlining this aspect of his argument, Habermas explains that discourse ethics relies upon 'the intuition that the application of the principle of universalization, properly understood' calls for 'a joint process of "ideal role taking"', during which those who are involved are required to 'take the perspective of everyone else' and to 'project themselves into the understandings of self and world of all others', eventually resulting in the creation of joint '"we perspectives"' from which 'all can test in common whether they wish to make a controversial norm the basis of their shared practice'.[127] In other words, in

[124]Habermas, Jürgen, *The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory*, pp. 57 - 58.
[125]Habermas, Jürgen, *The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory*, p.58.
[126]Habermas, Jürgen, *The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory,* p.57.
[127]Habermas, Jürgen, *The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory,* pp.57. – 58.

Habermas's eyes, it is subjects' abilities and, indeed, willingness to be open to others, their concerns and viewpoints, that renders the process of generating decisions about moral and political matters inclusive, neutral regardless of whatever differences and/or inequalities between individuals and groups of individuals exist in wider society, and truly in the best interests of all.

Like Habermas, Benhabib builds on her criticism of other normative political theories to make a case in favour of an understanding of moral and political reasoning that draws upon the central claims and commitments of 'discourse ethics'. Also like Habermas, Benhabib claims that those who are involved in the process of discussing and making decisions about moral and political matters ought to be understood as dialogical and other-regarding beings. However, she disagrees with Habermas about precisely what both of these commitments require, especially when it comes to ensuring that those decisions are inclusive and fair. In her analysis of 'universalistic contractarian theories from Hobbes to Rawls',[128] Benhabib explains that her principal concern lies with the way that the theories that she criticizes treat the moral self, which, in her eyes, privatizes women's' experience and excludes it from the moral point of view.[129] Benhabib claims that discussions about the moral domain typically make a distinction between justice and the good life, which is, in turn, connected to a division between 'public' and 'domestic' and to other pairs of terms such as autonomy and nurturance, and independence and bonding.[130] Moreover, Benhabib argues that, as a result of this

[128]Benhabib, Seyla, *Situating the Self: Gender, Community, and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics*, p.152.
[129]Benhabib, Seyla, *Situating the Self: Gender, Community, and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics,* p.153.
[130]Benhabib, Seyla, *Situating the Self: Gender, Community, and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics,* pp.152. – 157.

approach towards thinking about the moral domain, a number of prejudices and problems exist. These problems include questions of the good life, which pertain to the nature of the relationship of kinship, love, friendship, and sex, being treated as personal and private rather than moral and public issues,[131] the autonomous self being viewed as disembedded and disembodied, moral impartiality being treated as learning to recognize claims of an "other" who is just like oneself, fairness being conflated with public justice, and a public system of rights and duties being viewed as the best way to arbitrate conflict, to distribute rewards and to establish claims.[132] In Benhabib's opinion, ultimately, the distinction that she identities in the political theories that she criticizes between justice and the good life leads to a 'generalized' conception of self-other relations in the moral domain, which requires individuals to view others as the same as themselves, with the same rights and duties, but fails to appreciate individuals as beings with concrete histories, identities, and affective-emotional constitutions.[133] In addition, Benhabib argues that when understandings of the moral domain are based upon this conception of self-other relations, it not only generates the types of problems and prejudices that she identifies, but also generates a wider, 'epistemic blindness' towards the needs of concrete beings,[134] including women, whose voices it 'silences'[135] and whose concerns it ignores.[136] Indeed, Benhabib criticizes Habermas for the same reason, claiming that his model of moral and political

[131]Benhabib, Seyla, *Situating the Self: Gender, Community, and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics*, p.153.
[132]Benhabib, Seyla, *Situating the Self: Gender, Community, and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics*, p.157.
[133]Benhabib, Seyla, *Situating the Self: Gender, Community, and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics*, pp.158. – 159.
[134]Benhabib, Seyla, *Situating the Self: Gender, Community, and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics*, pp.158. – 164.
[135]Benhabib, Seyla, *Situating the Self: Gender, Community, and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics*, p.170.
[136]Benhabib, Seyla, '*Situating the Self: Gender, Community, and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics,* p.13.

reasoning is underpinned by the same distinction between justice (the right) and the good that she identifies in 'contractarian' political theories and that, as a result, suffers from the same 'gender blindness' towards women that these theories suffer from, especially by overlooking 'the issue of "difference" and differences in the experiences of male versus female subjects in all domains of life'.[137] In making this point, Benhabib explains that although she broadly endorses Habermas's model of 'discourse ethics', she wishes to depart from it due to its 'excessive rationalism', which, in her mind, makes it insensitive to gender and unable to fully cognize gender difference[138] and that, to aid this departure, subjects who are involved in the process of moral and, by extension, political judgement ought to be understood as both generalized and concrete beings, as deserving of universalistic rights and protections, but also with specific, identity-dependent, needs and claims. When describing the general aim of her engagement with 'contractarian theories' and the ways that they understand the moral domain, Benhabib explains thus: 'my aim is to develop a universalistic moral theory that defines the "moral point of view" in light of the reversibility of perspectives and an "enlarged mentality"…that allows us to recognize the dignity of the generalized other through an acknowledgement of the moral identity of the concrete other'.[139]

Out of the claims that Habermas and Benhabib make in their critiques of other normative political theories emerges a vision of individuals enjoined in open-

[137]Benhabib, Seyla, *Situating the Self: Gender, Community, and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics*, p.109.
[138]Benhabib, Seyla, *Situating the Self: Gender, Community, and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics*, pp.7. – 8.
[139]Benhabib, Seyla, *Situating the Self: Gender, Community, and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics*, p.164.

minded, respectful discussions about moral-political matters in which they expand their knowledge and become more attentive to others' point of view. Elsewhere, when Habermas discusses the impact that people's involvement in communication has on them, he even uses the notion of 'validity' to describe the effect that this process has on the quality of people's knowledge, [140] presenting individuals' involvement in discussions about moral and political issues as conducive to helping them to form more comprehensive or accurate viewpoints about the world that surrounds them. Likewise, when Benhabib discusses the relative benefits of endorsing a model of moral and political reasoning that draws upon 'discourse ethics', including treating subjects as both generalised and concrete beings, she claims that doing so produces a moral standpoint that is universalist in that it is acceptable to all, but also recognizes and, indeed, responds to the need of concrete, embodied selves, striving for autonomy. [141] Here, then, in both Habermas's and Benhabib's work, 'immanent critique' is effectively brought inside of the process of discussing and creating decisions about moral and political matters. Commenting on this aspect of Habermas's model of 'discourse ethics' in particular, Honneth, one of Habermas's best-known students, explains that, 'in communicative action, subjects encounter each other within the horizons

[140]In his early treatment of this issue, Habermas argues that because the propositions that people make about the world are based upon claims of truth, empirical "truth" or "validity" equates with ideal justifiability and is, as a result, a product of ideal consensus. In his later work, Habermas revises these claims, moving towards a model of 'pragmatic epistemological realism', which holds that truth refers to an objective world that is distinct from language, but that it is revealed through people's rational communication with one another. See Habermas, Jürgen, 'Reflections on the linguistic foundations of sociology: The Christian Gauss Lectures', in Habermas, Jürgen, *On the Pragmatics of Social Interaction: Preliminary Studies in the Theory of Communicative Action (Studies in Contemporary German Social Thought)*, trans. Fultner, Barbara, 2nd revised edn., (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003) and Haberman, Jürgen, *Truth and Justification*, trans. Fultner, Barbara, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003), especially chapter 8.

[141]Benhabib, Seyla, *Situating the Self: Gender, Community, and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics*, p.153.

of normative expectations whose disappointment becomes a constant source of moral demands that go beyond specifically established forms of domination'.[142]

Of course, as with questions about the implementation and realisation of deliberative models of democracy in general, as soon as the onus for identifying routes for positive social change is placed on participants in the process of moral and political decision-making, the question then becomes how to best facilitate this process, especially given the social conditions within which it takes place: that is to say, how best to ensure that the in-built process of 'immanent critique' functions despite societal contradictions and allows ordinary people to identify what aspects of society need to change in order for their and/or others' emancipation from unjust forces to occur. This, as the next section of chapter one discuses, is the crucial task that Habermas and Benhabib set themselves when detailing what, precisely, subjects' involvement in the process of moral and political reasoning and decision-making should look like in order for decisions that they create to be treated as legitimate. Moreover, it is also precisely this aspect of Habermas' and Benhabib' work that is problematic from the standpoint of embodied existence and, more precisely, the impact that individuals' existence as embodied beings has on their abilities to participate in politics.

Matters of Procedure: 'Habitus' and 'Linguistic Capital'

To protect the aspect of 'immanent critique' that is in-built in their models of moral and political reasoning and ensure that it is has the opportunity to function,

[142]Honneth, Axel, *Disrespect: The Normative Foundations of Critical Theory*, p.69.

Habermas and Benhabib endorse rules to govern communication between the subjects who are involved, which, in both thinkers' minds, render that communication coercion- and domination-free. In the case of Habermas, these rules limit the types and content of communicative praxis that is treated as appropriate for creating legitimate decisions about moral and political issues. In the case of Benhabib, these rules create a framework for enabling discussions about moral and political matters to be 'free' and 'open to all'[143] of the individuals that they affect.[144]

As early as the 1970s, Habermas showed an interest in exploring the connection between domination-free communication and positive societal change. Utilizing the concept of 'rational reconstruction', Habermas initially advanced the argument that individuals and, indeed, societies develop through a learning process that is based upon changes in the rational basis of the ideas that persons judge to be acceptable on the individual level and that are deemed to be legitimate on the collective level.[145] A little later, during his encounter with speech act theory and the 'universal pragmatics' of language, Habermas expanded on these ideas to investigate the conditions that are necessary to reach understanding through communication and to foster the kinds of enlightenment, good will, and agreement that enable the development of positive social forms.[146] The task of

[143]Benhabib, Seyla, 'Toward a Deliberative Model of Political Legitimacy', p.74.
[144]In Benhabib's mind, it is not actually necessary for all of those who are affected by decisions about moral and political issues to be directly involved in their formulation. Rather, decisions about these matters ought to be produced in certain conditions and be agreeable to all those who are affected by them in principle. See Benhabib, Seyla, 'Toward a Deliberative Model of Political Legitimacy', p.70.
[145]For example, see Habermas, Jürgen, 'Towards a Reconstruction of Historical Materialism', *Theory and Society,* Autumn 1975, vol.2., no.3., pp.287. – 300. And Habermas, Jürgen, *Legitimation Crisis*, trans. McCarthy, Thomas, (Boston, Massachusetts Beacon, 1975),
[146]For example, see Habermas, Jürgen, *Communication and the Evolution of Society*, trans. McCarthy, Thomas, (Boston, Massachusetts, Beacon, 1979), and Habermas, Jurgen, 'Discourse

'universal pragmatics', Habermas wrote at the time, 'is to identify and reconstruct universal conditions of possible understanding'.[147] Later, in the mature stages of his writing, Habermas moved away from the ideas of 'universal pragmatics' and the 'ideal speech situation', but continued to develop his ideas about rationality and communication in at least three interconnected ways. Firstly, to develop the notion of 'communicative action', which he defines as an inherently consensual form of social coordination in which actors 'mobilize the potential for rationality' given with ordinary language and its telos of rationally motivated agreement by 'adopting a practical stance oriented toward reaching understanding'.[148] Secondly, to identify the 'pragmatic presuppositions' of communicative action, which he treats as both idealised and playing a factual, functional role in structuring communication and discourse.[149] The four presuppositions that Habermas argues are the most important for this task are as follows: (i) no one capable of making a relevant contribution has been excluded, (ii) participants have equal voice, (iii) they are internally free to speak their honest opinion without deception or self-deception, and (iv) there are no sources of coercion built into the process and procedures of discourse.[150] Thirdly, to outline his model of moral and political reasoning and decision-making that is based upon the notions of 'discourse ethics' and 'communicative action', which, he claims, is capable of establishing of normative and ethical truths through the examination of the 'presuppositions of discourse',[151] but, in order to do so, requires certain conditions to be in place.

Ethics: Notes on a Program of Philosophical Justification', in Habermas, Jürgen, *Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action*, trans. Lenhardt, Christian and Shierry Weber Nicholsen, reprint edn., (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2001)

[147]Habermas, Jürgen, Jürgen Habermas, *Communication and the Evolution of Society*, p.1.

[148]Habermas, Jürgen, *On the Pragmatics of Communication*, ed. Cooke, Maeve, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1998), p.1.

[149]See Haberman, Jürgen, *Truth and Justification*, pp.85. – 86

[150]See Habermas, Jürgen, *Between Naturalism and Religion: Philosophical Essays*, p.89.

[151]See Habermas, Jurgen, *Discourse Ethics: Notes on a Program of Philosophical Justification*

These conditions include limiting discussions between subjects to matters of justice as opposed to matters of the good[152] (as Benhabib criticizes in her engagement with his work),[153] demanding that the subjects who are involved express themselves through illocutionary speech acts alone,[154] and permitting 'an inclusive and noncoercive rational discourse between free and equal participants' in which 'everyone is required to take the perspective of everyone else and thus to project herself into the understanding of self and world of all others' alone.[155]

Like Habermas, Benhabib has an interest in determining what kinds of intersubjective, communicative praxis are conducive to producing desirable social change. In her critical engagement with other normative political theories, including Habermas's, in which her overriding aim is to defend an understanding of moral and political judgement that demonstrates the superiority of universal rights that are attentive to difference and the needs of groups that have histories of oppression, especially women, Benhabib explains that she broadly endorses Habermas's model of 'discourse ethics' and the theory of 'universal pragmatics' upon which it is based.[156] Benhabib states in particular that the first step towards her aim of formulating a 'postmetaphysical universalist position' is to endorse a 'discursive, communicative concept of rationality'[157] and that, in her eyes, 'the moral point of view corresponds to the stage of reasoning reached by individuals for whom a disjunction emerges between the social validity of norms and of

[152]Habermas, Jürgen, *Postmetaphysical Thinking: Philosophical Essays*, p.190. and p.191.
[153]See Benhabib, Seyla, *Situating the Self: Gender, Community, and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics,* especially the introduction and chapters 3 and 5.
[154]Habermas, Jürgen, *Postmetaphysical Thinking: Philosophical Essays*, p.80.
[155]Habermas, Jürgen, *The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory*, p.80.
[156]Benhabib, Seyla, *Situating the Self: Gender, Community, and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics*, pp.4. – 5.
[157]Benhabib, Seyla, *Situating the Self: Gender, Community, and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics*, p.5.

normative institutional arrangements on the one hand, and the hypothetical validity from the standpoint of some standard of justice, fairness, and impartiality'.[158] Likewise, when she outlines her argument in favour of a deliberative model of democracy,[159] Benhabib reasserts her commitment to 'discourse ethics', arguing it provides the 'general principles' and 'moral intuitions' behind the validity claims of a deliberative model of democracy, which offers, in her mind, the best route towards producing legitimate decisions about moral and political issues in contemporary society.[160] These principles and intuitions, Benhabib argues, are reflected in the idea that 'only those norms (i.e. general rules of action and institutional arrangements) can be said to be valid (i.e. morally binding), which would be agreed to by all those affected by their consequences, if such an agreement were reached as a consequence of a process of deliberation' that has certain features.[161] These features include 1) participation in such deliberation is governed by the norms of equality and symmetry; all have the same chances to initiate speech acts, to question, to interrogate, and to open debate; 2) all have the right to question the assigned topics of conversation; and 3) all have the right to initiate reflexive arguments about the very rules of the discourse procedure and the way in which they are applied or carried out.[162]

As Mansbridge discusses,[163] in the forty or so years since Habermas first started discussing the connection between communication and positive societal

[158]Benhabib, Seyla, *Situating the Self: Gender, Community, and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics*, p.6.
[159]Benhabib, Seyla, 'Towards a Deliberative Model of Political Legitimacy', p.68.
[160]Benhabib, Seyla, 'Towards a Deliberative Model of Political Legitimacy', p.70.
[161]Benhabib, Seyla, 'Towards a Deliberative Model of Political Legitimacy', p.70.
[162]Benhabib, Seyla, 'Toward a Deliberative Model of Political Legitimacy', p.70.
[163]See Mansbridge, Jane, 'Deliberative and Non-Deliberative Negotiations', (Harvard University: HKS Faculty Research Working Paper Series, John F. Kennedy School of Government, 2009)

change, he has come to accept the inevitability of forms of intersubjective praxis and modes of expression in discussions about moral and political concerns other than those he associates with 'communicative action'. As early as 1989, Habermas had already discussed the reality of a process of collective will formation that was based upon concession, compromise, and/or accommodation rather than true consensus:

> 'modern societies also are characterized by the need for regulations that impinge only on particular interests. While these matters do require regulation, a discursive consensus is not needed; compromise is quite sufficient in this area. Let us keep in mind, though, that fair compromise in turn calls for morally justified procedures of compromising'.[164]

Shortly after, in *Between Facts and Norms*, where Habermas presents his deliberative theory of democracy, he acknowledges a range of real world, non-ideal "truths" about moral and political reasoning. These include the fact that democracies often face instances in which, in his own words, 'no generalizable interest or clear priority of some one value' is 'able to vindicate itself'.[165] Moreover, Habermas states that, in these cases, democracies require alternative means of creating decisions about moral and political issues that deploy forms of praxis and modes of communication that are orientated towards attaining success (i.e. strategic action) rather than mutual understanding (i.e. communicative action) such as 'threats and promises...material resources, manpower and the like'.[166] Although, as Mansbridge also discusses,[167] in *Between Facts and Norms* and elsewhere, Habermas claims that bargaining power must be equally distributed

[164]Habermas, Jürgen, 'Morality and Ethical Life: Does Hegel's Critique of Kant Apply to Discourse Ethics?', *Northwestern University Law Review,* 1989, vol.83., no.1., pp.38. – 53.
[165]Habermas, Jürgen, *Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy*, p.165.
[166]Habermas, Jürgen, *Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and* Democracy, p.166.
[167]See Mansbridge, Jane, 'Deliberative and Non-Deliberative Negotiations'

amongst the parties who are involved in these situations in order to prevent instances of domination and coercion from emerging: [168] 'insofar as these compromises come about under fair bargaining conditions, they must be acceptable in principle to all parties, even if on the basis of respectively different reasons'.[169]

In some quarters, the claims that Habermas makes about the inevitability of strategic action in democratic settings has led thinkers who are inspired by his work to integrate into their accounts of political decision-making forms of praxis and modes of communication that contravene his claims about the ideal conditions of moral and political reasoning. Simone Chambers, for example, defines 'a legitimate political order' as 'one that could be *justified* to all those living under its laws'[170] when such justifications cover bargains in which citizens deliberate and decide when and where bargaining is a fair and appropriate method of dispute resolution'. [171] Yet, as commentators on his work point out, [172] Habermas has never actually used the word 'legitimate' to refer to strategic, non-deliberative forms of praxis and modes of communication like bargains and negotiations[173] and, in his more recent discussions about 'communicative action', he reiterates his commitment to non-strategic communication and praxis:

[168]See Habermas, Jürgen, *Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy*, pp.108. – 109. and Habermas, Jürgen, 'Discourse Ethics: Notes on a Program of Philosophical Justification', p.72.
[169]Habermas, Jürgen, *Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy,* p.108.
[170]Chambers, Simone, 'Behind Closed Doors: Publicity, Secrecy, and the Quality of Deliberation', *Journal of Political Philosophy,* 2004, vol.12., no.4., pp.389. – 410., p.308.
[171]Chambers, Simone, Chambers, Simone, 'Deliberative democratic theory', *Annual Review of Political Science,* 2003, vol.6., pp.307. – 326., p.309.
[172]For example, see Mansbridge, Jane, 'Deliberative and Non-Deliberative Negotiations' and Dryzek, John S., *Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics and Contestations*
[173]Habermas, Jürgen, *Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and* Democracy, p.166.

'participants in argumentation cannot avoid the presupposition that...the structure of their communication rules out all external or internal coercion other than the force of the better argument and thereby also neutralizes all motives other than that of the cooperative search for truth'.[174] Moreover, in his latest major work, *Between Facts and Norms*, Habermas reasserts his belief in the ability of communication between ordinary people that is based upon the principles of 'communicative action' to contribute to positive social-societal change, claiming the formation of public opinion in civil society through 'communicative action' is a means of creating agreements about issues of not only truth and morality, but what should be done to translate agreements into binding decisions that are capable of implementation, including when values and interests unavoidably conflict,[175] and to hold the 'administrative power' of the state to account by way of a 'siege'.[176] It seems, therefore, that even in his later work, Habermas is committed to basing the process of moral and political reasoning and decision-making upon the kinds of rational, reasonable, and dispassionate forms of communication and modes of intersubjective praxis that he endorses in his earlier work.

Like Habermas, Benhabib acknowledges, but also rejects as inappropriate for inclusion in the procedure of creating legitimate decisions about moral and political issues, forms of intersubjective praxis and modes of communicative that do not meet the strict requirements of 'communicative action'. When responding

[174]Habermas, Jürgen, 'Discourse Ethics: Notes on a Program of Philosophical Justification', pp.88. – 89.
[175]See Dryzek, John S., *Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics and Contestations*, pp.24. – 25.
[176]Habermas, Jürgen, *Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy*, pp.486. – 487.

to feminist suspicions about deliberative models of democracy, Benhabib explains that whilst types of communication that defy the constraints that, she argues, ought to be placed upon communicative praxis in moral and political discussions have a 'place within the informally structured process of everyday communication' in contemporary, democratic society,[177] it is neither necessary nor plausible for democratic theorists to try to formalize and institutionalize these communicative every day competences.[178] Rather, Benhabib argues, it is better to adhere to the three-part framework for collective decision-making that, she argues, logically emerges from a commitment to the central ideas and principles of 'discourse ethics'.[179] Specifically, that such collective decision-making ought to be based upon deliberation that is governed by the norms of equality and symmetry, meaning that all have the same chances to initiate speech acts and to question, to interrogate, and to open debate and that all have the right to question the assigned topics of conversation and to initiate reflexive arguments about the very rules of the discourse procedure and the way in which they are applied or carried out.[180]

The reality is, of course, that people communicate in different ways and have a tendency towards using different linguistic habits and dispositions to express themselves. As Habermas's and Benhabib's critiques of contemporary society and critical engagements with other political theories make clear, both thinkers evidently have an interest in people's differences. So too, in the normative aspects of their work, Habermas and Benhabib acknowledge that people are beings with

[177]Benhabib, Seyla, 'Toward a Deliberative Model of Political Legitimacy', p.82.
[178]Benhabib, Seyla, 'Toward a Deliberative Model of Political Legitimacy', pp.82. – 83.
[179]Benhabib, Seyla, 'Toward a Deliberative Model of Political Legitimacy', pp.70. – 84.
[180]Benhabib, Seyla, 'Toward a Deliberative Model of Political Legitimacy', p.70.

different perspectives (in the case of Habermas) and different socio-cultural identities (in the case of Benhabib). Picking up on this point, McNay argues that because of the attention that Habermas pays to differences in people's point of view, he is rightly understood as an Identity or Recognition Theorist.[181] Likewise, Charles Taylor posits that Habermas's political theory is particularly appealing to those who endorse the political recognition of particularistic and group-specific claims of justice.[182] Having said that, when it comes to specifying rules to govern communication and, in doing so, protect the process of moral and political reasoning and decision-making from instances of coercion and domination, Habermas and Benhabib demand that everyone who is involved articulates and expresses themselves in the same way (or ways). Implicitly, what Habermas and Benhabib do, then, is overlook and fail to consider how people's backgrounds and histories shape the ways that they communicate and, in doing so, make those who live within contemporary society more or less effective at articulating themselves in the kinds of ways that they endorse. Making a similar argument, McNay explains that,

> 'Habermas sets up a series of conditions governing discourse ethics about the nature of speech and equality between participants…It is certainly the case that Habermas recognizes the distorting effects of power upon communicative structures which is why he sets out procedures to ensure equality between participants in discussions. These procedures seem ineffectual, however, if power is not understood as a post hoc distortion of pure understanding but…as ineluctably inscribed upon bodies and embedded in the structure of speech'.[183]

[181]McNay, Lois, 'Recognition as fact and norm: the method of critique', p.87.
[182]Taylor, Charles, 'Language and Society', in Honneth, Axel and Hans Joas, eds., *Communicative Action: Essays on Jürgen Habermas's "The Theory of Communicative Action*", trans. Gaines, Jeremy and Doris L. Jones, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1991), pp.29. – 35.
[183]McNay, Lois, 'Recognition as fact and norm: the method of critique', pp.95. – 97.

Bourdieu's notions of 'habitus'[184] is useful for exploring how the rules that Habermas and Benhabib design to govern communication in their normative models of moral and political decision-making implicitly overlook how people's backgrounds and histories shape the ways that they communicate. In his investigations of the process of social reproduction, Bourdieu uses these three central terms to explain the correlation between subjects and the societies that they live within, especially when it comes to understanding how individuals' subjectivities come to accord with objective social divisions and structures and, in doing so, aid their reproduction. Using the notion of 'habitus', Bourdieu argues that, from a young age, and also throughout their lives, individuals are encouraged to acquire habitual ways of being and doing things that correspond to their place in society. A 'doxic' situation occurs, according to Bourdieu, when individuals' subjectivities come to correspond with their place in society so closely that, in effect, their ways of being and behaving accord with external, macrocosmic structures of power, resulting, ultimately, in the social world being perceived and treated as natural, taken-for-granted, and commonsensical. [185] From this perspective, the ways that people are and act, including how they express themselves and communicate with others, are not neutral, but, rather, bodily manifestations of inequalities in wider society and the relations of domination and oppression between those who live within it that they create.

[184]The concept of 'habitus' has been used as early as Aristotle and Ancient philosophy, but was brought into contemporary usage by Marcel Mauss, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Pierre Bourdieu. Bourdieu elaborates the notion of habitus (Hexe) present in Aristotle's work to explain how behaviours or beliefs become habitual and correspond with structures of power and influence. See Bourdieu, Pierre, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, ed. Goody, Jack, trans. Nice, Richard, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp.72. – 87.
[185]See Bourdieu, Pierre, *Outline of a Theory of Practice* and Bourdieu, Pierre, *Pascalian Meditations,* trans. Rafalko, Robert, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000)

In reality, Habermas and Benhabib are keenly aware of inequalities in contemporary society and the connection that they share with communication. Indeed, the rules and regulations that both thinkers design to govern the process of determining moral and political concerns can be read as attempts to insulate the process of creating decisions about moral and political matters from these issues and, in doing so, protect those decisions themselves. Claims that both thinkers make when outlining their normative models of moral and political decision-making support this interpretation of their work. In his critical engagement with Rawls's work in particular, Habermas argues that one of the key advantages of the model of 'discourse ethics' that he endorses is that it requires no secondary mechanism such as Rawls's 'veil of ignorance' to ensure the condition of impartiality.[186] Likewise, when Benhabib explains the reasoning behind her endorsement of a deliberative model of democracy, she claims that it offers the best possible solution to the problem of how to create legitimate agreements about what norms and arrangements ought to govern contemporary society given the difference and diversity of those who live within it.[187]

Having said that, the problem with Habermas's and Benhabib's normative models of moral and political reasoning and decision-making is that they not only require individuals to participate in the same way, but they also endorse forms of praxis and modes of communication that are rightly understood as a scarce resource that individuals who belong to the most advantaged groups in society have privileged access to and are the most practised at using. Consequently, in this facet of their work, Habermas and Benhabib not only present subjects in a

[186]Habermas, Jürgen, *The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory*, p.57.
[187]Benhabib, Seyla, 'Toward a Deliberative Model of Political Legitimacy', p.69.

way that implicitly overlooks the profound impact that people's backgrounds and histories have on their capacities to communicate, but also proffer a procedure for creating decisions about moral and political matters that, if implemented in the real world, is likely to result in a 'Gentleman's Club' [188] of privilege and exclusion, to use Dryzek's words. To illustrate this point, it is useful to consider the claims of thinkers who study the real-life impact of basing politics upon the types praxis and modes of communication that Habermas and Benhabib endorse. Lynn Sanders, for example, argues that although contemporary society appears to be politically equal because of universal emancipation, the fact that powerful groups in society are the best at 'articulating their arguments in rational, reasonable terms', which are often associated with the focus on rationality and consensus in deliberation, means that forms of political inequality and exclusion 'play out' in ways that are 'sneaky, invisible, and pernicious'.[189] In a similar vein, Iris Marion Young argues that, in reality, modern systems of politics that include the types of deliberation-based communicative praxis that Habermas and Benhabib endorse, privilege communication that is 'assertive and confrontational', 'formal and general', 'dispassionate and disembodied',[190] which 'correlates with other differences of social privilege'[191] and which excludes 'the speech culture of [oppressed social groups like] women and minorities'.[192]

[188]Dryzek, John S., *Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics and Contestations*, p.57.
[189]Sanders, Lynn, 'Against Deliberation', *Political Theory*, 1997, vol.25., no.3., pp.347 – 376., p.353.
[190]Young, Iris Marion, 'Communication and the Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy', in *Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political*, pp.123. – 124.
[191]Young, Iris Marion, 'Communication and the Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy', p.124.
[192]Young, Iris Marion, 'Communication and the Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy', p.124.

As before, Bourdieu's ideas about social reproduction are useful for understanding the potential impact of implementing the rules and regulations that Habermas and Benhabib claim ought to govern processes of moral and political reasoning in the real world. Using the terms 'social fields'[193] and 'capital',[194] Bourdieu claims that society is divided into a number of social fields or arenas, each of which is characterized by a particular material or non-material good, which those who occupy the most privileged position within that field have privileged access to and the most opportunities to acquire.[195] Amongst the goods that Bourdieu lists are tangible, material phenomena such as money and economic resources, and also more symbolic, social, cultural and linguistic competencies, skills, qualifications, and predilections, including the ability to use language in what are deemed to be appropriate and/or socially desirable ways. From this perspective, the capacity that people have to articulate themselves and to communicate with others is not equal and open-ended, but, rather, determined by the position they occupy in society. Using the term 'symbolic violence', Bourdieu explains, therefore, that contrary to how language is commonly thought about and

[193]Instead of analysing society in terms of classes as Marx does, Bourdieu uses the concept of 'field' to designate a structured social space with its own rules, schemes of domination, inequalities, legitimate opinions etc. He cites the arts, education, politics, law and economy as the main 'fields' of contemporary society. See Bourdieu, Pierre, *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste,* trans. Nice, Richard, 1st edn., (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1984)

[194]Pierre Bourdieu first used the term 'cultural capital' along with Jean-Claude Passeron in 'Cultural Reproduction and Social Reproduction' to explain differences in children's outcomes in France during the 1960s. Since then, Bourdieu has elaborated on the notion to include other types of capital, including social, cultural, economic, and linguistic forms. For Bourdieu, the term 'capital' demarcates something that is rare or worthy of being sought after, and that acts as a social relation within a system of exchange, which includes an accumulated cultural knowledge about something or skill in using it that confers status and power. See Bourdieu, Pierre and Jean-Claude Passeron, 'Cultural Reproduction and Social Reproduction', in Brown, Richard, eds., *Knowledge, Education and Cultural Change: Papers in the Sociology of Education*, 1st edn., (London: Harper & Row Barnes & Noble, 1973) and Bourdieu, Pierre, 'The Forms of Capital', in Richardson, John, eds., *Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education*, (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood, 1986)

[195]See Bourdieu, Pierre, *Language and Symbolic Power*, new edn., (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), p.35.

understood, it is not an impartial medium for personal expression and intersubjective interaction, but, rather, a learned, social aptitude, that is intimately tied to social values or norms, that makes those who live within a society more or less effective linguistic subjects according to their position within it.[196]

To conclude this section of chapter one, Habermas and Benhabib are clearly aware of differences and, indeed, disparities in people's communicational habits and dispositions. Habermas and Benhabib are also clearly aware of the connection between these differences between individuals and inequalities in wider society. However, by including mechanisms that effectively require individuals to participate in the same way, the models of moral and political reasoning and decision-making that Habermas and Benhabib design tacitly "bracket off" and disregard differences in individuals communicational habits and dispositions. Moreover, Habermas's and Benhabib's basing of their models of generating decisions about moral and political matters upon deliberative forms of praxis and modes of communication, means that, if implemented, these models of moral and political decision-making are likely to implicitly favour powerful groups in society and produce agreements that favour their viewpoints as well. Before turning to the concept of embodied identity to explore these issues in further detail and to investigate what they mean for not only Habermas's and Benhabib's work, but also the work of other deliberative democrats and contemporary democratic theorists in general, the final section of chapter one considers an alternative answer to the question of what sort of politics best fits with and is suited to the complexity and diversity of contemporary society.

[196]Bourdieu, Pierre, *Language and Symbolic Power*, p.91.

Representative Democracy: An Alternative Model?

Given insights into individuals' linguistic habits and dispositions and knowledge about the impact that these habits and dispositions have on people's communicative praxis, the argument could be made that there are advantages to endorsing a system of political decision-making that is less involved or demanding than the ones that deliberative democrats like Habermas and Benhabib put forward. The intuition behind this argument runs as follows: because individuals are unequally able to articulate themselves clearly and succinctly in ways that are typically associated with deliberation, demanding less of citizens in terms of their participation in the process of political decision-making might actually produce a more inclusive and egalitarian decision-making process. Making an argument that is similar to this whilst critiquing deliberative models of democracy in light of the widespread unwillingness and inability of ordinary citizens to engage in politics in modern-day society, Parvin states that,

> 'the case for deliberative democracy is weakened by its reliance on a conception of civil society that is not found in the contemporary liberal democratic states suffering from the most significant declines in political participation, and the most significant forms of political inequality…once we take seriously the nature and scale of the civic and political changes which have given rise to the participatory inequalities which characterise liberal democratic states, and the specific problems that these changes pose for democratic theory and practice…it becomes clear that the agenda for democratic reform must be to reject *deliberative* and *participatory* models of democracy in favour of a more robust model of *representative* democracy which can produce outcomes which are as fair as possible in the absence of widespread citizen participation'.[197]

[197]Parvin, Phil, 'Democracy Without Participation: A New Politics for a Disengaged Era', pp.32. – 33.

Parvin is certainly not the first nor only contemporary democratic theorist to advocate a representative political system. Michael Saward, for one, insists that representative, indirect participation constitutes a necessary and, indeed, desirable aspect of political decision-making: 'if we, as democrats, are to take citizenship seriously and treat citizens equally, then democratic legitimacy can only properly be conceived of as voting for the outcomes one prefers in the context of an "open society"'.[198] Historically, though, representative models of democracy have met with at least three, well-versed objections. The first of these objections centres upon the claim that representative models of democracy do not allow individuals to develop in ways that models of political decision-making that require direct, more involved and substantive forms of citizenry participation enable. The second objection stems from the claim that representative models of democracy are ill equipped to provide a robust answer to the question of why individuals that are subject to the law can still be said to be autonomous and/or free. The third objection is connected to the argument that representative models of democracy are unsuited to producing fair, inclusive, and, indeed, just political agreements - a problem that, their critics argue, is exacerbated by the tendency that they have, in the real world, to create conditions in which minority groups rarely get their way or fail to 'get [their] way enough'.[199]

As David Held explains with regards to the first set of objections to representative models of democracy, one of the guiding intuitions of democratic

[198]Saward, Michael, 'Less than meets the eye: Democratic legitimacy and deliberative theory', in Saward, Michael, ed., *Democratic Innovation: Deliberation, Representation and Association (ECPR Studies in European Political Science)*, (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), p.66.
[199]Christiano, Thomas, 'Democratic Equality and the Problem of Persistent Minorities', *Philosophical Papers,* 1994, vol.XXIII., no.3., pp.169. – 190., p.169.

theory is that involving individuals in the political decision-making process has a positive, transformative impact on both those same individuals and the society that they belong to as a whole. Briefly, the argument that underpins this claim runs as follows: by involving individuals in the political, decision-making process, they become exposed to viewpoints and opinions that they would otherwise be insulated from and, as a result, are enabled to become more knowledgeable about issues to which they would otherwise be oblivious to and more attentive to collective concerns. In other words, citizens' participation in politics is treated as a means of unfurling civic virtue and also as key part of a wider process of individuals' self-discovery and self-fulfilment. However, as Held points out, if individuals' participation in politics is limited to them voting in elections and choosing others to represent their interests, as is often the case in contemporary society, then logic dictates that those same individuals will be denied the knowledge and meaningful exposure to others' points of view that would otherwise allow them (and the societies to which they belong) to develop in these ways. Instead, their participation in politics becomes what advocates of more involved forms of participation, such as Benjamin Barber and Carole Pateman, deem to be a pointless, empty ritual of casting a vote every couple of years for politicians who can only be replaced by electing another set of self-serving politicians.[200] As Held writes, when charting key issues in debates between advocates and critics of representative and direct models of democracy: '[a] spectre haunts democratic politics, namely, that while entrenching the accountability of rulers to the ruled, and extending the scope of the *demos* across

[200]For an example of this flavour of critique of representative models of democracy, see Barber, Benjamin, *Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age,* 20th century edn. with new preface, (Berkley and Los Angeles, California: University of California Press, 2004) and Pateman, Carol, *Participation and Democratic Theory,* (Cambridge, New York, and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1975)

all facets of public life, politics [can] be reduced to the lowest possible denominator - to governance by the masses who are neither well informed nor wise'.[201]

The second set of objections to representative models of democracy pertains to the republican ideal of political liberty, understood as non-domination or independence from arbitrary power. Frequently associated with the work of Philip Pettit, who has done more than perhaps any other contemporary political theorist to develop the republican ideal of liberty philosophically and politically,[202] and other advocates of the notion of civic republicanism,[203] the republican ideal of political liberty contends that individual freedom demands a certain form of democratic participation that protects citizens from the arbitrary or uncontrolled power of their government through good institutional design. Political freedom is, in other words, constituted by rightly-ordered laws, institutions, and norms that are designed, in Pettit's words, to ensure that individuals 'enjoy such non-domination' and are 'in a position where no one can interfere arbitrarily in [their]

[201]Held, David, *Models of Democracy,* p.231.
[202]See Pettit, Philip, 'Freedom as Antipower', *Ethics*, 1996, vol.106., no.3., pp.576. – 604., Pettit, Philip, *Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), Pettit, Philip, 'Republican Freedom and Contestatory Democratization', in Shapiro, Ian and Casiano Hacker-Cordon, eds., *Democracy's Value*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), Pettit, Philip, *A Theory of Freedom: From the Psychology to the Politics of Agency*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), Pettit, Philip, 'Agency-Freedom and Option-Freedom', *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 2003, vol.15, no.4, pp.387. – 403., and Pettit, Philip, *On the People's Terms: A Republican Theory and Model of Democracy*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012)
[203]For example, see Laborde, Cécile, *Critical Republicanism: The Hijab Controversy and Political Philosophy*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), Laborde, Cécile, 'Republicanism and Global Justice: A Sketch', *European Journal of Political Theory*, 2010, vol.9., pp.48. – 69., Lovett, Frank, 'Domination: A Preliminary Analysis', *The Monist*, 2001, vol.84., pp.98. – 112., Lovett, Frank, *A General Theory of Domination and Justice*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), Maynor, John W., *Republicanism in the Modern World*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003), Skinner, Quentin, *Liberty Before Liberalism*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), and Skinner Quentin, 'Freedom as the Absence of Arbitrary Power', in Laborde, Cécile and John Maynor, eds., *Republicanism and Political Theory*, (Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishing, 2008)

affairs' by inhibiting potential arbitrary interference.[204] In the eyes of thinkers who subscribe to the republican notion of political liberty, much of the apparatus for political decision-making that is commonly associated with representative models of democracy is useful for achieving the aim of non-domination - constitutionally entrenched basic rights, the rule of law, the separation of powers, free elections, and so forth. Yet, advocates of the republican notion of liberty also argue that these arrangements only go so far to protect citizens from the arbitrary use of state power because, no matter how carefully designed they might be, the day-to-day operation of government requires a considerable degree of discretion on the part of officials and public authorities both in terms of responding to changes in circumstance and the process of setting laws and public policies in the first place[205]. From this perspective, there is, then, always the possibility for state domination, against which individual liberty needs protection, to creep in. To offer a solution to this problem, advocates of the republican ideal of political liberty do two things. Firstly, they reject one of the fundamental ideas underpinning representative models of democracy - namely, that laws and public policies must express the collective will of the people in order to be treated as legitimate. Secondly, they argue in favour of alternative, augmented models of democracy that endorse some form of 'qualified populism'[206] or 'contestatory democracy'. [207] Roughly speaking, the idea lying behind these models of democracy is that properly designed democratic institutions should give citizens

[204]Pettit, Philip, *Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and* Government, p.107.
[205]See Pettit, Philip, *Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government* and Richardson, Henry S., *Democratic Autonomy: Public Reasoning About the Ends of Policy*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002)
[206]See Richardson, Henry S., *Democratic Autonomy: Public Reasoning About the Ends of Policy*
[207]Pettit, Philip, *Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government*, Pettit, Philip, 'Republican Freedom and Contestatory Democratization', Pettit, Philip, *A Theory of Freedom: From the Psychology to the Politics of Agency*, and Pettit, Philip, *On the People's Terms: A Republican Theory and Model of Democracy*

the effective opportunity to contest the decisions of those who represent them and, in doing so, make the various agents of the government answerable to a public understanding of the goals or ends they are meant to serve *and* the means they are allowed to employ in order to achieve them. Typically, the "properness" of democratic institutions is deemed to have three requirements.[208] Firstly, discretionary decision-making must be guided by the norm of deliberative public reasoning, meaning that relevant decision-makers are compelled to present the reasons for their decisions and present them for public debate.[209] Secondly, opportunities for democratic contestation must be equitable and equally open to all persons and groups who live within the society that laws and public policies affect.[210] Thirdly, following on from the previous two points, there must be a range of impartial, institutionalized forums for discussions, debate, and contestation, in which citizens can criticize, challenge, and raise objections to laws and public policies.[211]

The third set or class of objections to representative models of democracy pertains to worries about treating individuals as political equals and/or producing fair and inclusive political agreements. As thinkers who voice this concern point out, in countries where representative models of political decision-making

[208]For a discussion and analysis of these three requirements, see Pettit, Philip, *Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government*

[209]Pettit, Philip, *Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government*, Sunstein, Cass R., 'Beyond the Republican Revival', *Yale Law Journal*, 1988, vol.97., pp.1539. –1590., and Sunstein, Cass R., *The Partial Constitution*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: Harvard University Press, 1993)

[210]Pettit, Philip, *Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government* and Bellamy, Richard, *Political Constitutionalism: A Republican Defense of the Constitutionality of Democracy*, 1st edn., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007)

[211]Pettit, Philip, *Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government*, Pettit, Philip, 'Republican Freedom and Contestatory Democratization', Pettit, Philip, *A Theory of Freedom: From the Psychology to the Politics of Agency*, Pettit, Philip, *On the People's Terms: A Republican Theory and Model of Democracy*, and Richard, *Political Constitutionalism: A Republican Defense of the Constitutionality of Democracy*

operate, political decisions have a tendency to routinely exclude the interests of minority groups. For, if/when a society is divided into two or more highly unified voting blocks in which the members of each group vote in the same ways as all the other members of that group, then the group in the minority will always find itself on the losing end of the vote. Frequently, this issue is referred to as the problem of 'persistent minorities'.[212] As thinkers with an interest in this issue point out, by itself, the fact that certain groups' interests are routinely excluded from political decisions does not necessarily constitute an instance of injustice. It may be the case that the majority group, who is usually, if not always, on the winning side of elections, treats the minority group well and with respect rather than using their power to exploit or oppress them, although this is not often the case. However, for thinkers who worry about the problem of 'persistent minorities', this is not enough to quell their criticism of representative models of politics. For some, this is because being a persistent minority is unjust and highly oppressive in-and-of-itself because members of that group are publicly treated as inferior to others through their fundamental interests being routinely publicly ignored or set back. For others, this is because the existence of 'persistent minorities' is troubling because it threatens one of the central commitments of democratic politics - the principle of public equality - and, in doing so, undermines the perceived intrinsic worth or value of a democratic system of politics.[213]

---

[212]For a discussion of the debates and issues surrounding the problem of 'persistent minorities', see Miller, David, 'Deliberative Democracy and Social Choice', Jones, Peter, 'Equality and Majority Rule', in Miller, David and Larry Siedentop, ed., *The Nature of Political Theory*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983) and Saunders, Ben, 'Democracy, Political Equality, and Majority Rule', *Ethics,* October 2010, vol.121., no.1., pp.148. – 177.

[213]For an overview of both strands of this argument against representative models of democracy, see Jones, Peter, 'Equality and Majority Rule' in *The Nature of Political Theory*, Saunders, Ben, 'Democracy, Political Equality, and Majority Rule', and Christiano, Thomas, 'Democratic

Given objections to representative models of democracy, it is perhaps understandable why democratic theorists in general and deliberative democrats in particular find the suggestion of demanding less from citizens in terms of their participation in politics and perhaps limiting it to their voting in elections alone troubling. Yet, contemporary discussions in representative democracy reveal important advances in theorising the concept of political representation that complicate the seeming clear-cut distinction and, indeed, choice between representative/deliberative and direct/indirect democracy. Consider, for example, the argument that indirect forms of political participation prevent citizens from becoming more knowledgeable about others and their concerns. Underpinning this argument is the idea that political representation consists of a simple, one-way relationship between the represented and representative. Yet, one of the most important shifts in representative theory in recent times hinges on acknowledging that the relationship between the represented and representative is far more complicated than older, representative models of democracy typically acknowledge or allow for. Specifically, it is now widely accepted that citizens in representative systems of political decision-making represent themselves both informally and formally,[214] that representatives play an active role in creating and framing the identities and claims of those they represent,[215] that those who are represented contribute to framing the political agenda by judging the success of those that represent them and withdrawing their support if they are found to be

---

Equality and the Problem of Persistent Minorities', *Philosophical Papers,* 1994, vol.XXIII., no.3., pp.169. – 190.

[214]For example, see Warren, Mark, 'Citizen Representatives', in *Designing Deliberative Democracy: The British Columbia Citizens' Assembly*, Warren, Mark and Hilary Pearse, eds., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008)

[215]For example, see Saward, Michael, 'The Representative Claim', *Contemporary political theory*, 1996, vol.5., no.3., pp.297. – 318.

lacking,[216] and that representatives' viewpoints and praxis are not only influenced by the viewpoints of those that they represent, but also their own experiences and worldviews.[217] Next, consider objections to representative models of democracy that claim they are exclusionary, unjust, and undemocratic, particularly with regards to minority groups and their interests. Whilst empirical evidence from the real world supports this charge, an increasing number of thinkers with an interest in political inequality and difference are using representative models of democracy to find ways of including groups whose viewpoints have been historically excluded from collective decisions. Melissa Williams, for example, recommends an understanding of representation as 'mediation'.[218] According to Williams, there are three dimensions of political life that representatives must 'mediate'; the dynamics of legislative decision-making, the nature of legislator-constituent relations, and the basis for aggregating citizens into representable constituencies. In Williams's eyes, each of the aspects of mediation can be explained through using a corresponding theme (voice, trust, and memory) and by drawing on the experiences of marginalized groups in the United States. In making this argument, Williams argues that, historically, disadvantaged groups have needed and continue to need a 'voice' in legislative decision-making. However, consistent patterns of betrayal by privileged white citizens have given and continue to give groups like African-Americans good reason for distrusting white representatives and the institutions themselves, effectively destroying the

[216]For example, see Mansbridge, Jane, 'Rethinking Representation', *American Political Science Review*, 2009, vol.97., no.4., pp.515. – 28., Mansbridge, Jane, 'Representation Revisited: Introduction to the Case Against Electoral Accountability', *Democracy and Society*, 2006, vol.2., no.I., pp.12. – 13., and Mansbridge, Jane, 'A Selection Model of Representation', *Journal of Political Philosophy*, 2009, vol.17., no.4., p.369. – 398.
[217]For example, see Mansbridge, Jane, 'Rethinking Representation'
[218]Williams, Melissa, *Voice, Trust, and Memory: Marginalized Groups and the Failings of Liberal Representation*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1998)

relationship of trust that, in her mind, has to underpin the representative-represented relationship. Therefore, in order to remedy this issue, Williams recommends that legislative institutions include individuals who have direct access to historically excluded perspectives, explaining that the relationships of distrust can be 'at least partially mended if the disadvantaged group is represented by its own members'.[219] As another example, Anne Phillips, who is a leading figure in feminist theory and a prolific writer in the intersection of representation, equality, multiculturalism, and difference, argues in favor of a 'politics of presence' that utilises measures such as the use of gender quotas in the selection of parliamentary candidates and 'race conscious' districting to increase the electoral chances of ethnic minority representatives.[220] Phillips argues that, together, measures such as these can help to ensure a more equitable representation of women and/or ethnic minority citizens within elected assemblies and the political decision-making system broadly understood. As yet another example, Nadia Urbinati advocates understanding the idea of 'representation' as 'advocacy'.[221] For Urbinati, the point of representation is not the aggregation of interests, as it is commonly thought to be, but rather, the preservation of disagreements that are necessary for preserving liberty. When explaining what she means by 'advocacy', Urbinati identifies two main features. The first is the representative's passionate link to the electors' cause, which, in Urbinati's eyes, motivates representatives to deliberate with each other and their constituents. The second is the representative's relative autonomy of judgement. Understood as

[219]Williams, Melissa, *Voice, Trust, and Memory: Marginalized Groups and the Failings of Liberal Representation*, p.14.
[220]See Phillips, Anne, *The Politics of Presence*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995)
[221]See Urbinati, Nadia, 'Representation as Advocacy: A Study of Democratic Deliberation', *Political Theory*, 2000, vol.28., pp.258. – 786. and Urbinati, Nadia and Mark Warren, 'The Concept of Representation in Contemporary Democratic Theory', *Annual Review of Political Science*, 2008, vol.11., pp.387. – 412.

such, representation comes very close to the discursive, open-ended praxis that deliberative democrats like Habermas and Benhabib endorse, albeit premised upon the activity of representatives rather than citizens themselves.[222]

As the preceding discussion serves to illustrate, insights into differences in the ways that people communicate and the impact that such differences have on individuals' success as linguistic subjects raise a number of questions. Not least, they raise the question of what kind of politics is best suited to the conditions of difference and inequality in contemporary society? Should politics, as deliberative democrats like Habermas and Benhabib argue, be based upon deliberation? Or, should politics demand less of citizens as advocates of representative models of democracy argue? Or, perhaps something else? To explore these questions further, chapter two and three of this thesis use insights into embodied existence to critique deliberation, both as it exists in the real world and as an ideal form of communicative practise that deliberative democrats like Habermas and Benhabib deem to be suited to the process of generating decisions about moral and political matters. In making its exploration of these questions, chapter two uses insights into embodied existence to cast doubt on the desirability and feasibility of deliberative models of democracy by investigating the reality of deliberation in contemporary society and, in doing so, revealing a "gap" that exists between the way that deliberative democrats like Habermas and Benhabib imagine

[222]In this regard, representation is especially close to Benhabib's deliberative model of democracy. When outlining her deliberative model of democracy, Benhabib claims that citizens do not necessarily need to be involved in the deliberative process through which decisions about moral and political matters are produced in order for those decisions to be treated as legitimate. Rather, the legitimacy of those decisions hinges on whether they would be agreed to by all those that they affect. It could therefore be the case that legitimate decisions are the result of representatives' deliberations. See Benhabib, Seyla, 'Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy', p.70.

deliberation and how deliberation actually exists in contemporary society as power-ridden, inegalitarian, and exclusionary communicative praxis. Then, after investigating the reality of deliberation in contemporary society, chapter three uses insights into embodied existence to critique and challenge the perceived value of the ideal of deliberation according to deliberative democrats like Habermas and Benhabib by revealing how it relies upon a privileged mode of praxis and forms of communication that, if used to create decisions about moral and political matters in the real world, is likely to skew those same decisions to privilege the viewpoints and opinions of groups that have the most amount power in society and, correspondingly, exclude viewpoints and opinions of groups that have the least. Lastly, turning to pertinent debates in contemporary critical theory and contemporary democratic theory, chapters four and chapter five of this thesis use insights into embodied existence and the light that they shed onto to problems with deliberation to engage in two key debates. The first debate, which chapter four addresses and is fundamental for the tradition of critical theory to which this thesis belongs, concerns how best to understand what about contemporary society makes it unfair or unjust. The second debate, which is key for contemporary democratic theory and debates amongst contemporary democratic theorists about matters such as the relative benefits and drawbacks of deliberative versus representative models of democracy, concerns the question of how best to ensure that the political decision-making process is as inclusive and egalitarian as possible given the complexity and diversity of contemporary, democratic society.

2. Bodies that Matter: Deliberation, Embodied Identity, and Difference

The aim of chapter two is two-fold. Firstly, to explore the underlying reason why Habermas's and Benhabib's normative models of moral and political decision-making implicitly disregard and "bracket off" differences and, indeed, inequalities in individuals' linguistic habits and dispositions. Secondly, and related to the first point, to investigate how appreciating the underlying reason for this oversight in Habermas's and Benhabib's models of moral and political decision-making poses a challenge to not only their own work, but also the work of other thinkers who endorse deliberation as a means of making decisions about moral and political matters. More specifically, how it reveals significant problems with the possible realisation and workability of models of political decision-making that rely upon deliberation by shedding light on the experience of living life as an embodied being.

On a fundamental level, the blinkeredness that Habermas and Benhabib implicitly exhibit towards differences, and, indeed, disparities in individuals' communicative habits and dispositions in their models of moral and political decision-making can be traced back to their reliance upon an understanding of the subjects who are involved as abstract, disembodied beings. For, what are linguistic tendencies, habits, and dispositions if not unconscious, normalised, patterns of being and doing things, grounded deep in individuals' bodies, that give

them and their praxis shape? Of course, Habermas and Benhabib know that people have bodies. Both thinkers even claim that the subjects who are involved in the process of creating decisions about moral and political issues ought to be understood as actual beings with distinct moral perspectives that are connected to their identities, backgrounds, and histories.[1] Recognizing the visibility of 'the body' in the tradition of 'discourse ethics', to which both Habermas and Benhabib belong, Diana Coole explains that one of the key features 'is an emphasis… on social, face-to-face encounters where a speech act is an action and there is a material, bodily presence'.[2] That said, when it comes to describing what the process of formulating judgements on moral and political matters should or ought to look like, Habermas and Benhabib implicitly imagine the subjects who are involved as, in some sense, separable from their bodies and/or capable of transcending their distinct material and physical forms. Yet, as treating individuals as embodied beings serves to demonstrate, the reality is that people's bodies, their physiological differences, and corporeal styles of being, provide not just the means, but, rather, the fundamental foundations, for their engagement with the world that surrounds them. There can, therefore, be no rising above nor setting aside of their bodies or erasing of the differences between them in the ways that Habermas and Benhabib indirectly assume and, indeed, rely upon in their models of moral and political decision-making, thereby raising doubts about

[1]See Habermas, Jürgen, 'Reconciliation through the Public Use of Reason', in Habermas, Jürgen, in *The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory,* eds. Cronin, Ciaran and Pablo De Greiff, (Cambridge and Maldon Massachusetts: Polity Press, 2005) and Benhabib, Seyla, *Situating the Self: Gender, Community, and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics,* 1st edn., (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), especially introduction and chapters 3 and 5.
[2]Coole, Diana, 'Experiencing Discourse: Corporeal Communicators and the Embodiment of Power', *British Journal of Politics & International Relations,* 2006, vol.9., no.3., pp.413. – 433., p.418.

the possibility and, indeed, desirability of realising their models of producing decisions about moral and political issues in the real world.

In making its argument, chapter two uses insights into embodied existence to develop a concept of embodied identity that reveals the "gap" between the reality of deliberation in contemporary society and the ideal of deliberation as Habermas and Benhabib imagine it in their normative political theories. This "gap", chapter two argues, is especially apparent in relation to differences in the ways that individuals regard or treat each other, which effectively make it far harder for individuals who belong to groups that lack power in society to have what they say be listened to and be taken seriously by others. Utilizing critiques of deliberation and deliberative political decision-making in the real world by thinkers with an interest in difference in particular, chapter two investigates how the claims that Habermas and Benhabib make about what the process of moral and political decision-making should or ought to look like effectively present the subjects who are involved as interchangeable with one another and, as such, separable from their distinct physical and material forms. The reality is, though, as work by (New) Materialist thinkers and phenomenological accounts of life as an embodied being demonstrate, that people's bodies and the differences between those bodies, which are imbued with social meaning and invested with power, provide the very foundation for their engagement with the world that surrounds them. Save for some kind of massive project of social change and/or deep programme of personal transformation, it seems doubtful, therefore, that Habermas's and Benhabib's specific models of moral and political decision-making and/or models of moral and political decision-making that rely upon deliberation in general are realisable

and workable in the real world. Indeed, insights into embodied existence suggest quite the opposite; that it may not only be incredibly difficult to realise models of political decision-making that rely upon deliberation in the real world, but also that efforts to do so run the risk of disparaging differences between individuals and exacerbating inequalities that already make their participation in discussions about moral and political matters unequal. To explore these issues further, chapter two uses work by (New) Materialist thinkers and older materialist ontologies that such thinkers draw upon their work to develop a concept of embodied identity.

Habermas's and Benhabib's Ideal of Deliberation versus the Reality of Deliberation

When describing what the process of moral and political decision-making should look like, Habermas and Benhabib provide guidance specifying how the subjects who are involved ought to act in order for the decisions that they create to be treated as legitimate. In the case of Habermas, this guidance centres upon limiting the content of discussions about moral and political issues to matters of justice (as opposed to matters of the good)[3] and restricting the praxis of those who are involved to speech acts with illocutionary aims [4] and 'an inclusive and noncoercive rational discourse' in which 'everyone is required to take the perspective of everyone else and thus to project herself into the understanding of self and world of all others'[5]. In the case of Benhabib, who broadly endorses Habermas's claims about the need to regulate the activity of the subjects who are

[3]Habermas, Jürgen, *Postmetaphysical Thinking: Philosophical Essays,* trans. Hohengarten, William Mark, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1992), p.190. and p.191.
[4]Habermas, Jürgen, *Postmetaphysical Thinking: Philosophical Essays*, p.80.
[5]Habermas, Jürgen, *The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory*, p.80.

involved in the process of moral and political reasoning,[6] this guidance relates to three key features that, she argues, need to be present for the outcomes of discussions about moral and ethical matters to be treated as legitimate.[7] These features include that participation in such deliberation is governed by norms of equality and symmetry and that all of those who are involved have the same chances to initiate speech acts, to question, to interrogate, and to open debate and have the right to question the assigned topics of conversation and initiate reflexive arguments about the very rules of the discourse procedure and the way in which they are applied or carried out.[8]

According to Habermas and Benhabib, when the process of moral and political judgement functions according to the guidelines that they specify, the decisions that those who are involved create are not only mutually acceptable, but also genuinely in the best interest of all. In the Habermasian ideal of deliberation those who are involved in the process of discussing and making decisions about moral and political issues are imagined as engaging in intersubjective praxis that is aimed at reaching mutual understanding rather than pursuing strategic, self-interested objectives. Specifically, Habermas claims that subjects' willingness to listen to others and reflect on their pre-existing viewpoints enables them to enlarge their own, personal perspectives to create a 'collective "we perspectives"' from which all 'can test in common whether they wish to make a controversial

[6]See Benhabib, Seyla, *Situating the Self: Gender, Community, and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics*, especially the introduction and chapters 3 and 5. and Benhabib, Seyla, 'Toward a Deliberative Model of Political Legitimacy', in Benhabib, Seyla, ed., *Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political*, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1996)

[7]In Benhabib's later work, it is not actually necessary for ordinary citizens to be directly involved in this process. Rather, as she explains, decisions about moral and political matters must be in principle agreeable to all of those who are affected by them and created within a framework with key features. See Benhabib, Seyla, 'Toward a Deliberative Model of Political Legitimacy', p.70.

[8]Benhabib, Seyla, 'Toward a Deliberative Model of Political Legitimacy', p.70.

norm the basis of their shared practice'.[9] In a similar vein, Benhabib, who builds upon the Habermasian ideal of deliberative decision-making along with the key principles and tenets of 'discourse ethics' that underpin it, argues that when those who are involved in the process of moral and political reasoning recognize others as universal rights holders *and* concrete beings, they are enabled to 'enlarge' their mentalities to generate norms that are in the best interests all *and* respond to specific groups' concrete struggles for emancipation. [10] Moreover, when Benhabib outlines her deliberative model democracy, which again draws on the 'general principles' and 'intuitions' of 'discourse ethics', she claims that this provides the best possible solution to the problem of how to secure the "good" of political legitimacy in spite of diversity and disagreement in contemporary society.[11]

When read together, the claims that Habermas and Benhabib make about what the process of moral and political decision-making ought to look like generate a vision of subjects enjoined with one another in a nexus of mutually respectful, intersubjective relations through which they express their viewpoints, recognize each other as worthy interlocutors with valid concerns, and alter or adjust their viewpoints when reason dictates. From this perspective, as McNay explains, the formation of democratic will comes about not through a convergence of previously held beliefs or viewpoints, but, rather, through a process of gradual reflection and consideration that allows the power of better arguments to come into play in order to make decisions about what are and what are not "good" practices and clarify the content of universally binding moral and political

[9]Habermas, Jürgen, *The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory*, p.58.
[10]See Benhabib, Seyla, *Situating the Self: Gender, Community, and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics*, especially the introduction and chapters 3 and 5.
[11]See Benhabib, Seyla, 'Toward a Deliberative Model of Political Legitimacy', p.70.

norms.[12] Yet, as even a brief reflection on the reality of the practice of deliberation and deliberative forms of decision-making demonstrates, there is a not insignificant disparity between the ways that Habermas and Benhabib imagine those who are involved in their models of moral and political decision-making and the activity of those who are actually involved in these types of activities in the real world.

Concerns that thinkers raise about the infiltration of disparities in wider society into the practice of deliberation in the real world are constructive for elucidating the disparity that exists between how Habermas and Benhabib present subjects in their models of moral and political reasoning and the actual activity of concrete beings. In her influential article 'Against Deliberation', Sanders argues that the popularity of deliberative models of democracy is based upon an implicit neglect of the impact that people's socio-cultural identities have on their abilities to deliberate in the real world, which, in effect,[13] mean that 'learning to deliberate' is 'inseparable from indoctrination in routes of hierarchy and deference'.[14]According to Sanders, 'the achievement of mutual respect', which is understood as citizens addressing each other as equals and acknowledging their status as valid interlocutors by offering reasonable, morally justifiable arguments to each other, is one of the primary aspects of deliberation that deliberative democrats typically fail to analyse in sufficient depth.[15] As Sanders explains, whilst deliberative democrats presume that those who are involved in deliberation

[12]See McNay, Lois, 'Recognition as fact and norm: the method of critique', in Leopold, David and Marc Stears, eds., *Political Theory: Methods and Approaches* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008)
[13]Sanders, Lynn, 'Against Deliberation', *Political Theory*, 1997, vol.25., no.3., pp.347. – 376., p.348.
[14]Sanders, Lynn, 'Against Deliberation', p.362.
[15]Sanders, Lynn, 'Against Deliberation', p.348.

recognize and treat each other with respect, the reality is that 1) those who are best at articulating their viewpoints in ways that are considered to be 'characteristic' of deliberation, such as by using 'rational, reasonable' terms, are the most likely to be recognized,[16] 2) those who are best at articulating themselves in the ways that are 'characteristic' of deliberation are unlikely to be those 'who are already underrepresented in formal political institutions and who are systematically materially disadvantaged, namely women; racial minorities, especially Blacks; and poorer people',[17] 3) even if/when everyone can deliberate and learn how to give reason in the ways that deliberative models of democracy require, insidious prejudices may still 'incline citizens to hear some arguments and not others'.[18] Making an argument that is similar to this, Fraser claims that the public sphere is rightly understood as designating 'a theatre' where participation occurs in 'an institutional area of discursive interaction'[19] and is governed by exclusionary 'protocols of style and decorum' that act as 'informal impediments to participatory parity'.[20] Similarly, McNay draws on Bourdieu's notion of language as a social competency to argue that the 'apparently neutral state of certain discourse', especially that which is associated with deliberation, 'conceals the gap that always exist between the universal recognition of a language as legitimate and the much more limited competence or authority of a language within this language',[21] which disposes individuals to 'hear some speakers and some arguments rather than others'.[22]

[16]Sanders, Lynn, 'Against Deliberation', pp.348. – 349.
[17]Sanders, Lynn, 'Against Deliberation', p.349.
[18]Sanders, Lynn, 'Against Deliberation', p.353.
[19]Fraser, Nancy, 'Rethinking the Public Sphere', in Fraser, Nancy, *Justice Interruptus: Critical Reflection on the "Postsocialist" Condition,* (New York and London: Routledge, 1997), p.70.
[20]Fraser, Nancy, 'Rethinking the Public Sphere', p.78.
[21]McNay, Lois, 'Recognition as fact and norm: the method of critique', p.98.
[22]McNay, Lois, 'Recognition as fact and norm: the method of critique', p.97.

Ironically, the critiques of contemporary society that Habermas and Benhabib produce suggest that they are very much aware of the kinds of problems with deliberation and deliberation-based decision-making in the real world that thinkers like McNay, Fraser, and Sanders highlight. So too, the claims that both thinkers make in their critiques of other normative political theories demonstrate that they are both committed to understanding subjects who are involved in the process of generating decisions about moral and political matters as real beings with distinct moral perspectives that stem from differences in their backgrounds and histories.[23] Benhabib even goes as far as to claim that those who are involved in the process of moral and political reasoning ought to be understood as 'finite, embodied, and fragile creatures rather than disembodied cognitos or abstract unities of transcendental apperception to which may belong one or more bodies'.[24] That said, when it comes to the advice that Habermas and Benhabib provide about what the process of moral and political decision-making ought to look like, the guidelines that they specify effectively require and, indeed, rely upon those who are involved acting as if they have identical physical forms and/or are able to act "outside" of their bodies. The reality is, though, that people live "within" bodies that are different from one another physically and physiologically. This difference relates to phenomena like somatic processes, corporeal functions, and what Coole refers to as more 'totalizing distinctions'[25] such as age, sex, race, ethnicity, and so forth. This difference also relates to the tendencies that they have towards certain ways of being and doing things i.e. their

[23]See Habermas, Jürgen, *The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory*, especially chapter 2. and Benhabib, Seyla, *Situating the Self: Gender, Community, and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics*, especially the introduction and chapters 3 and 5.
[24]Benhabib, Seyla, *Situating the Self: Gender, Community, and Postmodernism in Contemporary* Ethics, p.5.
[25]Coole, Diana, 'Experiencing Discourse: Corporeal Communicators and the Embodiment of Power', p.419.

'bodily styles'[26] and the social meanings that are invested in these practices. Again, then, a disjuncture exists between how Habermas and Benhabib imagine those who are involved in processes of moral and political reasoning and the reality of life as embodied beings. To illustrate this point, it is worth noting responses that were given by women MPs to questions that were posed to them about their experience of acting as political representatives, which detail their inability to be listened to and taken seriously by their counterparts. In one of these studies, the majority of the women MPs who were interviewed identified a tendency of both themselves and other women MPs to exhibit 'feminine' 'patterns of behaviour' that they classed as being 'distinct' from masculine patterns of behaviour in that they were less theatrical, combative, and aggressive.[27] According to the women MPs questioned, instead of being a genuinely alternative, neutral style of bodily praxis, the 'feminized' patterns of behaviour that they identified were frequently judged, especially by their male counterparts, as 'an inferior *modus operandi*'.[28] Moreover, this judgement, they argued, was frequently used by others to disparage them and dismiss their viewpoints in discussions and debates. In other words, the ability that the women MPs had to be recognized by others as valuable interlocutors with legitimate points of view was undermined simply by the fact that they inhabited bodies with particular styles of deportment, tendencies, and dispositions. In another study, the women MPs that were interviewed highlighted a similar point, describing their male colleagues'

[26]This term is taken from Diane Coole's discussion of embodied experience and the import it has for individuals' effectiveness as communicating subjects. See Coole, Diana, 'Experiencing Discourse: Corporeal Communicators and the Embodiment of Power', p.419.
[27]See Childs, Sarah, 'A feminised style of politics? Women MPs in the House of Commons', *British Journal of Politics & International Relations*, 2004, vol.6., no.1., pp.3. – 19., p.4.
[28]Childs, Sarah, 'A feminised style of politics? Women MPs in the House of Commons', pp.14. - 15.

tendency to comment on aspects of their corporeal style during discussions in order to intimate and belittle them.[29]

Here, the argument could be made that what inequalities in people's abilities to articulate themselves and be recognized by others in real-world deliberative exchanges demonstrate is not a neglect or oversight on Habermas's and/or Benhabib's part, but, rather, the imperfect implementation of their guidance about what the process of moral and political judgement should look like. From this perspective, the route to making people with different backgrounds and histories equitable with one another in the process of deliberation and systems of decision-making that rely upon deliberation lies in increasing and/or intensifying the measures that Habermas and Benhabib endorse. Or, bringing what currently "is" in line with what Habermas and Benhabib claim it ought to be. However, whilst this argument makes logical sense and is supported by some empirical evidence - people are clearly capable of learning new bodily styles and practices and research shows that they are also capable of shifting their viewpoints and opinions[30] - being attentive to people's physical and material forms and the impact that they have on their ways of being and doing things reveals at least two interrelated problems with pursuing this aim. Firstly, that bringing the reality of deliberation close enough to how Habermas and Benhabib imagine it, both in terms of the praxis of those who are involved and the quality of the outcomes that they produce, is likely to require a project of personal and social transformation so

[29]See Puwar, Nirmal, *Space Invaders*, (Oxford: Berg, 2004), especially chapter 5.
[30]For example, see Fishkin, James S., *Democracy and Deliberation: New Directions for Democratic Reform,* (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1991), Fishkin, James S., *When the People Speak: Deliberative Democracy and Public Consultation*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), and Fishkin, James S. and Laslett Peter, eds., *Debating deliberative democracy*, (Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, 2008)

drastic that it renders the exercise practically unworkable. Secondly, in focusing attention in this way, there is a risk of feeding into discourses about differences between people that disparage the bodies, bodily praxis, and bodily states of being of those who are the least advantaged in society by presenting them as, in some sense, problematic and in need of being either altered or changed. To explore these points further, the remaining two sections of chapter two draw upon the work of (New) Materialist thinkers along with aspects of older materialist ontologies that they draw upon to develop a concept of 'embodied identity', which treats people's unique characteristics as distinct individuals as grounded in and fundamentally connected to their physical and material forms.

The (New) Materialist Subject and Embodied Identity

One can imagine a number of ways that the reality of deliberation might be brought closer to the ideal that Habermas and Benhabib imagine. Programmes of training and education could be implemented that "school" people to succinctly articulate themselves in rational, reasonable, and dispassionate ways. Similarly, programmes of education and training could be implemented to combat prejudices and biases, encouraging people to treat each other with respect instead regardless of their sex, gender, race, ethnicity, and so forth. The result of programmes such as these, one could argue, would be a situation of linguistic and interpersonal equity between individuals with different backgrounds and histories on both "sides" of communicative exchanges. Yet, what suggestions such as these fail to grasp is the depth and fundamentality of the relationship that individuals share with their bodies, bodies that are not only distinct from one another in terms of

their physiological differences and corporeal styles, but also permeated by social meanings and structural-power relations. To create the kind of deliberative, interpersonal equity and respect that Habermas and Benhabib imagine in their models of moral-political reasoning and decision-making, would therefore require an impractical if not infeasible level of personal transformation and/or social change. In order to further investigate this claim, it is worth consulting the work of thinkers who are associated with contemporary (New) Materialist movement across the Social Sciences, Arts, and Humanities along with aspects of older materialist ontologies that they draw upon, which is attuned to the significance of the relationship between individuals and their bodies and also goes to great lengths to explore this relationship and what it means for individuals, their praxis, worldviews, and subjectivities.

Generally speaking, thinkers who are associated with the (New) Materialist movement are united by a commitment to studying the materiality of life, of which individuals' physical and material forms are just one part, and to analysing the import that this materiality has for discussions about a diverse range of issues, including how best to think about nature, understand social-political relationships, and conceptualise the subject and associated terms such as 'agency', 'freedom', and 'autonomy'. The following question that Diana Coole and Samantha Frost ask readers in the opening paragraph of *New Materialisms: Ontology, Agency, and Politics*, which is one of the first published collections of writings by (New) Materialist thinkers, succinctly captures the essence of the (New) Materialist perspective:

> 'as human beings we inhabit an ineluctably material world. We live our everyday lives surrounded by, immersed in, matter. We ourselves

> are composed of matter. We experience its restlessness and intransience even as we reconfigure and consume it. At every turn we encounter physical objects fashioned by human design and endure natural forces whose imperatives structure our daily routines for survival….In light of this massive materiality, how could we be anything other than materialist? How could we ignore the power of matter and the ways it materializes in our ordinary experience experiences or fail to acknowledge the primacy of matter in our theories?'[31]

In calling themselves (New) Materialists, thinkers who are associated with this school of thought have two, specific aims. Firstly, to highlight the intention that they have to respond to contemporary innovations and discoveries in the natural sciences, medicine, and technology, which, they argue, bring into focus the inadequacy and bias of mainstream ways of understanding the world and the phenomena from which it is comprised, which are decidedly non-material in focus. Secondly, to demarcate their work from older, materialist ontologies that they frequently draw upon in order to rectify the non-materialist bias that they identify in more, widely accepted and commonly held approaches towards thinking about the world and those who live within it. Again, comments that Coole and Frost make in the introduction to *New Materialisms* serve to illustrate these points of view:

> '[(New) Materialists] draw inspiration from materialist traditions developed prior to modernity or from philosophies that have until recently remained neglected or marginalized currents in modern thinking. From this perspective their interventions might be called *renewed* materialisms. If we nevertheless persist in our call for an observation of a *new* materialism, it is because we are aware that unprecedented things are currently being done with and to matter, nature, life, production, and reproduction. It is in this contemporary context that theorists are compelled to rediscover older materialist traditions whilst pushing them in novel, and sometimes experimental, direction or toward fresh applications.'[32]

[31]Coole, Diana and Samantha Frost, 'Introduction', in Coole, Diana and Samantha Frost, eds., *New Materialisms: Ontology, Agency, and Politics*, (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 2010), p.1.
[32]Coole, Diana and Samantha Frost, 'Introduction', p.4.

In the opinion of most of the thinkers who are associated with the (New) Materialist movements, there are a number of problems with mainstream, non-materialist approaches to thinking about the world and the phenomena that comprise it. First and foremost, they argue, is the tendency that they have to overlook matter and to instead focus on non-material things, such as values, meaning, language, consciousness, subjectivity, agency, mind, soul, and so forth. Secondly, and more worryingly in their minds, is the tendency that they have to not only overlook matter, but also to regard it as, in some sense, passive, inactive, and dead, or, worse still, posing a risk to non-material phenomena. The following statement that Jane Bennett makes when explaining the claims that she makes about humans and 'things' in *Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things*, which provides one of the clearest examples of a (New) Materialist ontology, gives the flavour of the concerns that (New) Materialist thinkers have about more mainstream approaches towards understanding the world:

> 'this book has a philosophical project and, related to it, a political project. The philosophical project is to think slowly an idea that runs fast through modern heads: the idea of matter as passive stuff, as raw, brute, or inert… The quarantines of matter and life encourage us to ignore the vitality *of* matter and the lively powers *of* material formations'.[33]

According to thinkers who are associated with the (New) Materialist movement, the propensity that mainstream approaches towards understanding and thinking about the world have to overlook matter and/or treat it as either inactive or a risk to non-material phenomena is especially telling when it comes to thinking about the subject. Citing the continued dominance of Rene Descartes's

[33]Bennett, Jane, *Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things,* (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 2010), p.vii.

ideas about the superiority of cognition over sensory perception, [34] (New) Materialists argue that mainstream understandings about the subject are overwhelmingly predicated upon a conceptual bifurcation of mind and body that 1) treats these phenomena as divisible or separable from one another and 2) ranks the former over the latter, thereby presenting the body as either irrelevant for, or a danger to, consciousness. Writing about the impact that, she believes, this way of thinking about the subject has on philosophy in particular, Elizabeth Grosz claims that, 'Descartes, in short, succeeded in linking the mind/body opposition to the foundations of knowledge itself', a link which puts the mind in a position of 'hierarchical superiority over and above nature, in the nature of the body' so that, 'from that time until the present, subject or consciousness is separated from and can reflect on the world of the body, objects, qualities'.[35] This separation, Grosz argues, 'of course, has its costs',[36] specifically, that, 'since the time of Descartes, not only is consciousness positioned outside of the world, outside its body, outside of nature; it is also removed from direct contact with other minds and a socio-cultural community'. [37]

In contemporary political theory, there is evidence to support the claims that (New) Materialists make about the prevalence of a 'somatophobic'[38] attitude (i.e. an attitude that is fearful, mistrustful, or otherwise prejudiced against the body and phenomena that are associated with it) towards understanding the world and

[34]Grosz, Elizabeth, *Volatile Bodies: Towards a Corporeal Feminism,* (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1994), pp.6. – 9.
[35]Grosz, Elizabeth, *Volatile Bodies: Towards a Corporeal Feminism*, p.6.
[36]Grosz, Elizabeth, *Volatile Bodies: Towards a Corporeal Feminism*, p.6.
[37]Grosz, Elizabeth, *Volatile Bodies: Towards a Corporeal Feminism*, p.6.
[38]Diana Coole's uses this term to explain the implicit neglect of 'the body' in contemporary political and philosophy. See Coole, Diana, 'Experiencing Discourse: Corporeal Communicators and the Embodiment of Power', p.413.

those who live within it. Particularly in discussions about political legitimacy, in which, as chapter one argues, deliberative models of democracy are especially popular, there is a tendency to tacitly overlook modes of praxis and forms of communication that are based upon anything other than rational, reasoned, dispassionate deliberation, including more "bodily" elements, or to encounter the claim that practices that do not conform to the deliberative ideal are directly opposed to the democratic spirit.[39] Discussing the background reasons for the 'dissonant' place that social movements and contentious forms of speech and activity that are associated with them occupy in deliberative democratic theory in particular, [40] John Medearis explains that one of the 'basic premises [in deliberative democratic theory] is that the only decisions that are legitimate are those that are - or could be - supported by citizens for reasons they have reflected upon and think are good ones[41] and that, as a result, all other forms of praxis and modes of communication, including emotional appeals, rhetorical speeches, boycotts, strikes, co-ordinated civil disobedience and non-cooperation, marches and jail packing, are either implicitly overlooked or held to be in direct opposition

[39]See Medearis, John, 'Social Movements and Deliberative Democratic Theory', *British Journal of Political Science*, 2005, vol.35., pp.53. – 75.
[40]As Medearis points out, deliberative democrats' treat social movements and contentious forms of speech and/or activity inconsistently. Some, including Habermas and Benhabib, view them as bringing latent or otherwise ignored problems to the attention of politics. For examples, see Benhabib, Seyla, 'Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy', p.73., Bohman, James, *Public Deliberation: Pluralism, Complexity, and Democracy,* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1996), pp.132. – 42, and Habermas, Jürgen, *Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy,* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), pp.357. – 358. Others have made efforts to interpret them as "deliberative". For examples, see Gutmann, Amy and Dennis Thompson, *Democracy and Disagreement*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1998), p.133., Rawls, John, *Political Liberalism,* expanded edn., (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), pp.247. – 254., Rawls, John, 'The idea of Public Reason Revisited', *The University of Chicago Law Review,* September 1997, vol.64., no.3., pp.765. – 807., and Rawls, John, *The Law of Peoples*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: Harvard University Press, 1999), pp.131. – 154. For Medearis's original comments, see Medearis, John, 'Social Movements and Deliberative Democratic Theory', pp.53. – 55.
[41]Medearis, John, 'Social Movements and Deliberative Democratic Theory', p.55.

to the democratic, decision-making process.[42] Likewise, in her account of the neglect of activist groups and the types of activity that are commonly associated with them by mainstream democratic theorists, especially deliberative democratic theorists,[43] Young claims that the tendency that these two sets of thinkers have to link the ideal of political legitimacy to the notion of 'reasonableness' and to define 'reasonableness as a person's willingness to change his or her mind through the force of rational argument alone', has led to an indirect dismissal of activities and practices that do not "fit" with this normative requirement.[44] These include, Young argues, 'demonstration and direct action',[45] 'street marches, boycotts',[46] 'sit-ins',[47] 'picketing, leafleting, guerrilla theatre',[48] 'disrupting meetings and blocking building entrances',[49] 'pictures, song, poetic imagery, and expressions of mockery and longing performed in rowdy and even playful ways'.[50]

As chapter five discusses, in reality, the relationship between deliberative and non-deliberative forms of praxis and modes of communication in contemporary political theory and contemporary democratic theory in particular is not one of simple opposition. There are also valid reasons why contemporary political

[42]Medearis, John, 'Social Movements and Deliberative Democratic Theory', pp.55. – 57.
[43]As Young Points out, there are exceptions to this rule. Andrew Arato and Jean Cohen theorize the place of social movements and civil disobedience in the context of civil society. See Arato, Andrew and Jean Cohen, *Civil Society and Political Theory*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1992). Likewise, John Dryzek discuss the democratic value of oppositional movements in civil society that stand outside the state and use tactics like demonstration and protest activity. See Dryzek, John S., *Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics and Contestations,* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), especially chapter 4., and Dryzek, John S., *Democracy in Capitalist Times: Ideals, Limits and Struggles*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996)
[44]Young, Iris Marion, 'Activist Challenges to Deliberative Democracy', *Political Theory,* 2001, vol.29., no.5., pp.670. – 690.
[45]Young, Iris Marion, 'Activist Challenges to Deliberative Democracy', p.670.
[46]Young, Iris Marion, 'Activist Challenges to Deliberative Democracy', p.670.
[47]Young, Iris Marion, 'Activist Challenges to Deliberative Democracy', p.673.
[48]Young, Iris Marion, 'Activist Challenges to Deliberative Democracy', p.687.
[49]Young, Iris Marion, 'Activist Challenges to Deliberative Democracy', p.687.
[50]Young, Iris Marion, 'Activist Challenges to Deliberative Democracy', p.687.

theorists, democratic theorists, and deliberative democrats in particular tend to favour rational, reasonable, and dispassionate forms of praxis and modes of communication. Specifically, rational, reasonable, and dispassionate forms of praxis and modes of communication are frequently regarded as a tool that can be used to ensure that discussions and decisions about moral and political issues remain coercion, and, domination, free. In Habermas's and Benhabib's work, this perspective is reflected in the contention that decisions about moral and political matters ought to be treated as legitimate when subjects articulate their viewpoints succinctly, with good reasons, and listen to others' points of view instead of trying to compel them to accept their opinions and points of view through force or threats. Habermas writes, 'participants in argumentation cannot avoid the presupposition that...the structure of their communication rules out all external or internal coercion other than the force of the better argument and thereby also neutralizes all motives other than that of the cooperative search for truth'.[51] Having said that, the overall effect of the tendency in contemporary political theory, democratic theory, and deliberative democratic theory to tacitly overlook modes of praxis and forms of communication that are based upon anything other than rational, reasoned, dispassionate deliberation is an implied setting aside of all other forms of praxis and modes of communication, including those that are deemed to involve more "bodily" elements. This setting aside, in turn, connects to a wider issue with Habermas's and Benhabib's models of moral and political decision-making – namely, the manner in which the guidance that they provide about what the activity of those whose are involved should look like relies upon an implicit disembodiment of subjects from their bodies. How, then, do (New)

[51]Habermas, Jürgen, *Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action,* trans. Lenhardt, Christian and Shierry Weber Nicholson, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1990), pp.88. – 89.

Materialists seek to address a 'somataphobic' attitude towards the body? Moreover, what import does their approach to doing so have for Habermas's and Benhabib's models of moral and political judgement and how might it contribute to producing a more nuanced account of the kinds of issues with deliberation that the way that they present subjects tacitly overlook and "bracket off"?

Spurred on by concerns about mainstream approaches towards thinking about the world and the phenomena that comprise it, (New) Materialist thinkers devote their time to devising alternative ontologies that treat matter as vital in both senses of the word: integral and active. In the case of some (New) Materialist thinkers, especially those who criticize mainstream approaches towards thinking about the subject, this aim is reflected in devising alternative conceptions of the subject that treat individuals' characteristic features, i.e. their identities, as rooted in, and products of, the inextricable connection that they share with their bodies. Sara Ahmed, for example, considers how it is possible to conceive of individuals' orientations towards the world as coming into being through their bodies and the contact between theirs and others' bodies.[52] Likewise, Sonia Kruks considers how individuals' personhood is shaped through the interplay between material phenomena, including human bodies, claiming that appreciating this process is 'the only way of adequately capturing the complexities of human life'.[53] In the case of other (New) Materialist thinkers, especially those whose concern is with challenging the idea that non-human matter is inactive or dead, this shift is reflected in ontologies that treat human and non-human phenomena as lying along

[52]See Ahmed, Sara, 'Orientations Matter', in Coole, Diana and Samantha Frost, eds., *New Materialisms: Ontology, Agency, and Politics*
[53]Kruks, Sonia, 'Simone de Beauvoir: Engaging Discrepant Materialisms', in Coole, Diana and Samantha Frost, eds., *New Materialisms: Ontology, Agency, and Politics*, pp.259. – 260.

a continuum of 'actants'[54] and as being comprised of the same active, emergent forces and flows of energy albeit existing in different, concrete forms instead of opposed to, and drastically different from, one another. Bennett, for example, aims to show how treating the bodies of non-human or not-quite human things such as 'edibles, storms, metals', as 'vital and quasi-agents or forces' with 'trajectories, propensities, or tendencies of their own' might contribute to changes in political discourse and patterns of praxis pertaining to ecological and environmental issues such as recycling, matters of public health, and debates about scientific discovery such as stem cell research.[55] Likewise, Connolly investigates how treating geological and biological phenomena and climate systems as 'self-organizing ecologies' helps to shed light on the 'fragility' of the world that they play an active role in constituting and, in doing so, can inspire individuals who appear to be different from them to realise their affinities and to come together in a 'militant pluralist assemblage' that cuts across creed, class, gender, sexual orientation, and ethnicity to create a democratic politics that aims at challenging the neoliberal status quo.[56]

For (New) Materialist thinkers, the first step to creating reformulated conceptions of the subject lies in rejecting the Cartesian distinction between mind and body. Drawing upon the ideas of Merleau-Ponty,[57] (New) Materialists argue that the body, as the location of sensory perception, rather than the mind, provides the fundamental means by which individuals develop as beings with the capacity

[54]This term is taken from Jane Bennett's description of 'vital materialism'. See Bennett, Jane, *Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things*, p.viii.
[55]Bennett, Jane, *Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of* Things, p.viii.
[56]See Connolly, William E., *The Fragility of Things: Self-Organizing Processes, Neoliberal Fantasies, and Democratic Activism,* Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 2013)
[57]See Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, *Phenomenology of Perception,* trans. Smith, Colin, (Abingdon, Oxfordshire: Routledge, 1962)

for agency by allowing them to gain knowledge about the world and, in doing so, makes relationships between the world, them, other individuals, and other, non-human objects possible. Drawing upon these and other elements of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological philosophy, Coole contends that his ideas about the 'body-in-the-world' 'help us to rethink agency: not as an essential characteristic of the rational subject, a deity or some vital force, but as those contingent capacities for reflexivity, creative disclosure, and transformation that emerge hazardously within the folds and reversals of material/meaningful flesh'. [58] Similarly, Connolly describes how, in placing Merleau-Ponty, Michael Foucault, and Gilles Deleuze 'in conversation with each other', it is possible to produce a philosophy of immanence that explains the ushering-in of new, including human, states of being that is not dependent upon a higher power nor reducible to mechanistic materialism, but, rather, indebted to the 'uncertain exchanges' between stabilized, material formations and 'mobile forces that subsist within and below them'.[59]

For (New) Materialist thinkers, the second step to creating reformulated conceptions of the subject consists of rejecting the idea that subjects are, in any meaningful sense, divisible into definite, constituent parts such as mind and body. The image of the Mobius strip or Mobius band, which (New) Materialist thinkers frequently draw upon in their work, is useful for illustrating this aspect of the (New) Materialist approach towards thinking about the subject. [60] As Grosz

[58]Coole, Diana, 'The Inertia of Matter and the Generativity of Flesh', in Coole, Diana and Samantha Frost, eds., *New Materialisms: Ontology, Agency, and Politics*, p.113.
[59]See Connolly, William, E., 'Materialities of Experience', in Coole, Diana and Samantha Frost, eds., *New Materialisms: Ontology, Agency, and Politics*, pp.178. – 180.
[60]For example, see Frost, Samantha, 'Fear and the Illusion of Autonomy', in Coole, Diana and Samantha Frost, eds., *New Materialisms: Ontology, Agency, and Politics*, p.160. and Kruks, Sonia,

explains, in the image of the Mobius Strip, the subject is likened to an inverted, three dimensional figure of eight, in which the body and mind are treated, 'not as two distinct substances or two kinds of attributes of a single substance but somewhere in between these two alternatives' as 'twisting, turning, and mutually informing one another' through the 'inflection of mind into body and body into mind'.[61]

Out of the claims that (New) Materialist thinkers make about how the subject should be understood emerges a vision of individuals becoming conscious beings with the capacity for agency through their bodies and the experience of living within them as embodied beings. From this perspective, and contrary to how Habermas and Benhabib implicitly present those who are involved in the process of moral and political reasoning, there is no way for subjects to transcend, set aside, or act apart from their bodies. Rather, they are, and will always be, at all times, embodied within them. For, it is the condition of being embodied that provides the foundation for their agency in the first place. Therefore, if one subscribes to this way of thinking about subjects, then there are at least two key problems with trying to alter or change aspects of people's physical and material being, including for "good" reasons such as trying to make communicational praxis more inclusive and fairer as deliberative models of democracy implicitly require. Firstly, attempts to do so are likely to face an uphill task, battling against aspects of individuals that are ingrained deep within them and essential for their subjectivity. Secondly, attempts to do so run the risk of devaluing precisely that aspect of individuals' being human that allows them to become agents that are

'Simone de Beauvoir: Engaging Discrepant Materialisms', in Coole, Diana and Samantha Frost, eds., *New Materialisms: Ontology, Agency, and Politics*, p.53.
[61]Grosz, Elizabeth, *Volatile Bodies: Towards a Corporeal* Feminism, p.xii.

capable of engaging in interpersonal, communicative praxis in the first place. Together, these two points, as the final section of chapter two now investigates by drawing upon phenomenological accounts of the lived experience of embodied existence by Simone de Beauvoir and Frantz Fanon, are especially critical once social conditions and differences in people's backgrounds and histories are taken into account, suggesting that realising a deliberative model of democracy like the ones that Habermas and Benhabib devise is not only infeasible, but also unpalatable if one is truly committed to respecting individuals' diversity and difference.

The Lived Experience of Embodiment and Difference

Phenomenological accounts of life as an embodied being lend weight to criticisms of deliberation in the real-world, revealing that whilst, for some people, their bodies are sites of "I can", for others, they are sites of "I can't".[62] In the specific context of deliberation, this "can" and "can't" pertains to both sides of the communicational exchange. More specifically, to differences in individuals' abilities to express themselves using socially acceptable and politically effective forms of communication, and also to the capacities that they have for what they say to be listened to and taken on board by others.

[62]This claim draws on the argument that Sonia Kruks makes in her analysis of differences in Simone de Beauvoir's understanding of the subject and the understanding of the subject that underpins the work of other phenomenological and/or existential thinkers, including those that she draws upon. These thinkers include Jean Paul Sartre and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. See Kruks, Sonia, *Retrieving Experience: Subjectivity and Recognition in Feminist Politics,* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2001), especially chapters 1 and 3.

Beauvoir's comments about "becoming" a woman provide one of the most influential phenomenological accounts of life as an embodied being and the import that life as an embodied being has for differences in people's abilities to do and be certain things. Like Merleau-Ponty, Beauvoir, whose ideas feature in (New) Materialist reformulations of the subject, regards subjectivity as a state of being that is attained through the experience of living within the body as an embodied being. However, unlike Merleau-Ponty, who, critics argue,[63] tacitly assumes that this process produces subjects that are identical to one another in terms of their capacity for agency, Beauvoir's aim is to show how the process of becoming of a subject imbues individuals with varying degrees of autonomy and freedom. Specifically, how it contributes to women's oppression by making them more rather than less likely to act in ways that defy their domination by men and inferior social position. Discussing the cultural and historical 'fact' of women's subordination in *The Second Sex* and how it compares to the situations of other social groups, especially the proletariat, Beauvoir explains, '[women's] dependency is not the result of a historical event or social change…if woman seems to be the inessential which never becomes the essential, it is because she herself fails to bring about this change…male and female stand opposed within a

[63]Beauvoir makes gestures towards this argument herself, referencing Merleau-Ponty's claim 'Woman, like man is her body', but also adding 'but her body is something other than herself'. Beauvoir, Simone de, *The Second Sex,* trans. and ed. Parshley, H. M., new edn., (London: Vintage Books, 1997), p.29.

primordial *Mitsein*,[64] and woman has not broken it'[65] and 'woman's body is one of the essential elements of the situation she holds in the world'.[66]

Before writing *The Second Sex,* Beauvoir clearly had an interest in the connection between socio-cultural difference, embodied existence, and unequal subjectivity.[67] As Kruks explains, in Beauvoir's critical engagement with Sartre's account of freedom in particular, her aim is to account for the impact that social fields have on individuals' abilities to make use of their contexts to further their own endeavours and engage in a practical form of subjectivity.[68] As Beauvoir herself explains when reflecting on this aspect of her work, 'I maintained that, from the point of view of freedom, as Sartre defined it – not as a stoical resignation but as an active transcendence of the given – not every situation is equal: what transcendence is possible for a woman locked up in a harem?'[69] Yet, it is only in *The Second Sex* that Beauvoir systemically analyses the connection between the experience of living within a biologically female body and the production of subjects with traits and capacities that limit what women can do and, as such, reinforce rather than contest their oppression. Specifically, the underlying idea in this stage of Beauvoir's work is that living life as an embodied being produces subjects that are not just different from one another in terms of

[64]Martin Heidegger coined the phrase 'primordial Mitsein'. In Heideggerian terminology, this phrase it is used to express a fundamental, ontological category of human experience and existence – namely, the state of already being with others of the same kind. For a discussion of how Heidegger uses the concept of 'Mitsein' in his work, see Olafsen, Frederick, *Heidegger and the Ground of Ethics: A Study of Mistein,* (Cambridge, New York, and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1998)
[65]Beauvoir, Simone de, *The Second Sex*. pp.18. – 19.
[66]Beauvoir, Simone de, *The Second* Sex, p.37.
[67]For a detailed account of Beauvoir's ideas about the connection between socio-cultural difference, embodied existence, and unequal subjectivity, see Kruks, Sonia, *Retrieving Experience: Subjectivity and Recognition in Feminist Politics*, chapter 1.
[68]See Kruks, Sonia, *Retrieving Experience: Subjectivity and Recognition in Feminist Politics*, especially chapter 1.
[69]Beauvoir, Simone de, *The Prime of Life,* trans. Green, Peter, (New York: World Publishing Company, 1960), p.34.

behaviour, but also responsible for the continuation of society-wide relations of power.

To explore how women contribute to the replication of relations of power in society, Beauvoir begins *The Second Sex* by asking the question, 'what is a woman?' before immediately answering that woman is defined in relation to man and as that which man is not, i.e. as man's other.[70] Throughout the rest of *The Second* Sex, the discussion is then committed to explaining how the "othering" of woman results in women's oppression and domination partly through their experiences of living within bodies that are deemed to be, in some sense, flawed or lacking. To illustrate this point, Beauvoir offers a number of examples of how women's living within their bodies generates feelings of shame, revulsion, and horror alongside a deep distrust and lack of faith in their bodies and bodily capacities, which means that they are less likely than men are to "take up" and make use of their freedom and autonomy. Discussing the 'peculiarity' of the 'situation of women', Beauvoir explains that although she is 'a free and autonomous being like all human creatures...the drama of woman lies in [a] conflict between the fundamental aspirations of every subject (ego)…and the compulsions of a situation in which she is the inessential'.[71]

Like Beauvoir, Fanon provides a seminal account of how life as an embodied being reinforces relations of power between groups in society through creating differences at the level of subjective praxis. Unlike Beauvoir, Fanon's focus is on race and his primary objectivity is to explain how the experience of being a

[70]Beauvoir, Simone de, *The Second Sex*, p.xxii.
[71]Beauvoir, Simone de, *The Second Sex*, p.29.

black man in a racist society produces racialized subjects that are incapable of engaging in the 'authentic upheaval'[72] that is necessary for them to claim their freedom from their white masters.[73] Shame, Fanon argues, is the fundamental category of life for the Black man in racist societies, creating a neurosis inside of him in which there is a constant effort to try to escape or abandon his black identity rather than to contest the status quo. As Fanon writes, the black man suffers from a 'situational neurosis…a constant effort to flee (de fuir) his own individuality, to nihilate his own presence (de neantiser son etre-la).[74] According to Fanon, attitudes towards blackness in white, colonial society are the origin of the Black man's shame and neurosis: in particular, the opposition of the 'Black man', which, Fanon claims, is treated as the very 'symbol of Evil and Ugliness'[75] to whiteness and values that are associated with whiteness, including justice, truth, and virginity. Confronted with these attitudes, Fanon argues that there are a number of possible responses that the black man takes and can possibly take towards his oppression.[76] The first, which Fanon claims is the most prevalent and likely, is to internalize the 'negrophobe's' gaze and engage in the kind of self-objectification that Beauvoir describes when women accept their position as the inferior "other" of man. Speaking about his personal reaction to being confronted with racism, which mirrors this response, Fanon writes, 'on that day… completely dislocated, unable to be abroad with the other, the white man, who unmercifully imprisoned me, I took myself far off from my own

[72]Fanon, Frantz, *Black Skin, White Masks,* trans. Markham, Charles Lam, (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1967), p.10.
[73]For a detailed discussion of Fanon's writings on racism and his personal experience of living in racist society, Kruks, Sonia, *Retrieving Experience: Subjectivity and Recognition in Feminist Politics*, chapter 3.
[74]Fanon, Frantz, *Black Skin, White Masks*, p.60.
[75]Fanon, Frantz, *Black Skin, White Masks*, p.180.
[76]For a detailed account and analysis of these strategies, see Kruks, Sonia, *Retrieving Experience: Subjectivity and Recognition in Feminist Politics*, chapter 3.

presence, and made myself an object'.[77] The second option, Fanon argues, is that the black man can try to reason against his oppression through appeals to the universal, though, in his experience, such praxis is constantly thwarted by everyday practices of racism that deny non-white subjects the same status as white subjects.[78] The third, Fanon explains, is that the black man, accepting that he is born into an unfair situation, can look to reclaim his black identity and assert himself. Yet, in Fanon's eyes, this practice is riddled with problems because much of what is positively associated with black identity relies upon disempowering stereotypes of black culture, meaning that even if the black man gains recognition through the "reclaiming" of his black culture, then white culture still has numerous ways of devaluing black experience and, in doing so, preventing social change.[79] Lastly, Fanon argues that instead of looking back to past black culture, the black man can try to create a new future by treating himself as his 'own foundation'.[80] In this regard, Kruks argues that Fanon appears to endorse a notion of bodily transcendence that assumes it is possible for the subject to attain some level of separation or distance from the body that it inhabits, which is clearly at odds with how Beauvoir imagines subjects.[81] This difference aside, for Fanon, as with Beauvoir, embodied existence is clearly not just a fundamental category of human existence, but also the inescapable means through which differences in individuals' subjectivities are produced and relations of power between groups in society are reproduced.

---

[77]Fanon, Frantz, *Black Skin, White Masks*, p.101.
[78]Fanon, Frantz, *Black Skin, White Masks*, p.186.
[79]In particular, Fanon describes the experience of being refused entry into a Parisian Hotel that refused to rent rooms to 'Negro pilgrims' simply because their white, Anglo-Saxon customers threatened to move out. See, Fanon, Frantz, *Black Skin, White* Masks, p.186.
[80]Fanon, Frantz, *Black Skin, White* Masks, p.231.
[81]Kruks, Sonia, *Retrieving Experience: Subjectivity and Recognition in Feminist Politics*, pp.103. – 104.

Unsurprisingly, the role that Beauvoir and Fanon claim that oppressed people play in constituting themselves as subjects that are somehow lacking in autonomy and freedom and actively contributing to relations of domination and oppression raises a number of difficult and controversial questions.[82] Is it really the case, as a less generous reading of their work suggests, that women and Black subjects are at fault for their oppression and ought to be held responsible for it? If so, then what room is there for them to challenge and contest their oppression? Not, much, the answer would appear to be. Moreover, should women and Black subjects be blamed for not only their own immiseration and suffering, but also the collective suffering and immiseration of all women and non-white subjects along with the power relations that these problems can be traced back to? Yes, is the answer that a more derivative reading of Beauvoir's and Fanon's work appears to suggest, as Kruks points out[83]. Yet, as thinkers who draw on Beauvoir's and Fanon's ideas argue,[84] to say that oppressed people constitute themselves as subjects with a limited or restricted degree of freedom and autonomy is not necessarily the same as saying that they ought to be held responsible for their domination, nor is it to say that they are incapable of contesting their oppression even within the frameworks of understanding Beauvoir and Fanon provide. Rather, it is to make the point that the experience of living within the body, a body that is different from other bodies, socially embedded in conditions that are characterised by power relations, and invested

[82]For an engagement with questions such as these, see Kruks, Sonia, *Retrieving Experience: Subjectivity and Recognition in Feminist Politics*

[83]Kruks, Sonia, *Retrieving Experience: Subjectivity and Recognition in Feminist Politics*, chapter 1.

[84]For example, see Kruks, Sonia, *Retrieving Experience: Subjectivity and Recognition in Feminist Politics*, chapter 1.

with social meaning, has a lasting impact on the ways that individuals orientate themselves to the world and engage with it.

Utilizing Beauvoir's and/or Fanon's ideas, a number of thinkers with an interest in embodiment, difference, and power explore how subtle and inconspicuous differences and, indeed, inequalities in people's everyday experiences, understandings, and praxis contribute to the entrenchment and reproduction of power relations between different groups in society over time. In her widely acclaimed essay, 'Throwing Like a Girl: A Phenomenology of Feminine Body Comportment, Motility, and Space', Young applies Beauvoir's account of 'becoming' a woman to phenomenological descriptions of the 'basic modalities of feminine body comportment, manner of moving, and relation in space'[85] to do two things. Firstly, to examine 'observable and rather ordinary ways in which women in our society typically comport themselves and move differently from the ways that men do',[86] and, secondly, to show how these observable differences in women and men's bodily praxis contribute to 'keeping women in their place', especially by preventing them from opening their bodies in 'free, active, open extension'.[87] Explaining that her aim is to examine the modalities of feminine bodily existence of women who are situated in industrial, urban, and commercial society in particular, [88] Young claims that differences in the ways that men and women move centre upon the fact that the latter are far

[85]Young, Iris Marion, 'Throwing Like a Girl: A Phenomenology of Feminine Body Comportment, Motility, and Space', in Young, Iris Marion, *Throwing Like a Girl and Other Essays in Feminist Philosophy and Social Theory,* (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1990), p.143.
[86]Young, Iris Marion, 'Throwing Like a Girl: A Phenomenology of Feminine Body Comportment, Motility, and Space', p.155.
[87]Young, Iris Marion, 'Throwing Like a Girl: A Phenomenology of Feminine Body Comportment, Motility, and Space', p.143.
[88]Young, Iris Marion, 'Throwing Like a Girl: A Phenomenology of Feminine Body Comportment, Motility, and Space', p.143.

less open and free with their bodies and far less likely to make full use of the space that they inhabit than the former.[89] With reference to walking, Young explains that, 'typically, the masculine stride is longer proportional to a man's body than is the feminine stride to a woman's. The man typically swings his arms in a more open and loose fashion than does a woman and typically has more up and down rhythm in his step'.[90] Likewise, when discussing standing still and leaning, Young states that, 'men tend to keep their feet farther apart than do women, and we (women) also tend more to keep our hands and arms touching or shielding our bodies'.[91] Drawing upon her observations about differences in men and women's bodily existence, Young subsequently insists, as Beauvoir does, that commonalities in the way that women experience and use their bodies are not natural, but, rather, are traceable back to the 'situation of women as conditioned by their sexist oppression in contemporary society'.[92] Specifically, Young argues that, in patriarchal society, women are not only denied the opportunity to use their 'full body capacities in free and open-engagement with the world' and prevented from developing the kinds of skills that would enable them to do so, but that they are also encouraged to engage in a process of shaping their bodies and bodily praxis so that it complies with their place as the subordinate object of another's gaze and the subject of their intentions and manipulations rather than their own 'action and intention'[93] - so that it "fits" with their oppression, in other words. In order to illustrate this

[89] Young, Iris Marion, 'Throwing Like a Girl: A Phenomenology of Feminine Body Comportment, Motility, and Space', pp.145. – 146.
[90]Young, Iris Marion, Throwing Like a Girl: A Phenomenology of Feminine Body Comportment, Motility, and Space', p.145.
[91]Young, Iris Marion, Throwing Like a Girl: A Phenomenology of Feminine Body Comportment, Motility, and Space', p.145.
[92]Young, Iris Marion, Throwing Like a Girl: A Phenomenology of Feminine Body Comportment, Motility, and Space', p.153.
[93]Young, Iris Marion, Throwing Like a Girl: A Phenomenology of Feminine Body Comportment, Motility, and Space', pp.154. – 155.

argument, Young notes three things. Firstly, that the play of girls is often more sedentary and enclosed than the play of boys is and is actively encouraged to be as such. Secondly, how, from a young age, girls are taught and learn to adopt a 'feminine' style of deportment through learning how to walk like a girl, tilt their heads like a girl, sit and stand like a girl, gesture like a girl, and so forth, all of which, Young argues, encourages the girl in question to deliberately hamper and/or constrain her movement so that it complies with her objectification.[94] Thirdly, the great deal of time, money, and effort that women spend trying to conform to norms about appropriate styles of bodily praxis, adornment, dress, and so forth. Summarizing her findings, Young concludes that,

> 'the source of this objectified bodily existence is in the attitude of others regarding her, but the woman herself often takes up her body as a mere thing. She gazes at it in the mirror, worries about how it looks to others, prunes it, shapes it, molds and decorates it…to open her body in free, active extension and bold outward-directedness is for a woman to invite objectification…the objectifying regard keeps her in her place'.[95]

The picture that Young paints in her analysis of women's embodied existence is of individuals being trained, shaped, and schooled to accord with disparities and relations of power in society. Making similar arguments, thinkers who are influenced by the work of Beauvoir and/or Fanon, but whose interest primarily lies with the intersection of race, embodied existence, and power, analyse how the experience of living within racialized body racializes all interrelated aspects of individuals' subjectivity, including their perspectives on the world that surrounds them, self-understanding, and praxis. In 'Phenomenology and Racial Embodiment', Linda Alcoff, argues that although concerns might be raised about

[94]Young, Iris Marion, Throwing Like a Girl: A Phenomenology of Feminine Body Comportment, Motility, and Space', p.155.
[95]Young, Iris Marion, Throwing Like a Girl: A Phenomenology of Feminine Body Comportment, Motility, and Space', pp.154. – 155.

attending to the experience of living within 'culturally embedded' and 'marked bodies', [96] especially with regards to how doing so risks 'naturalizing' or 'fetishizing' racial experience,[97] properly understanding the impact that race has on subjectivity and agency and challenging its negative aspects requires such an approach. Speaking about the 'racialization' of perception in particular, which, Alcoff argues, shapes not only how people see others, but also how they see themselves as racialized beings, and, in doing so, shapes their experiences of and engagement with the world, she writes: 'Racial identity… permeates our being in the world, our being-with-others, and our consciousness of our self as a being-for-others'.[98] In a similar vein, in the collection of essays entitled *Living Alterities: Phenomenology, Embodiment, and Race,*[99] the contributors, of whom Alcoff is one, draw upon their own experiences along with ideas belonging to a broad range of phenomenological thinkers, including Fanon and Beauvoir, to analyse how the connection between race and embodied experience forecloses and also makes available the opportunities that individuals have to develop in particular ways, participate in certain practices, and make use of certain skills, capacities, and abilities. In his contribution to the collection, George Yancy draws on themes that he develops elsewhere[100] to explore the idea that racialized bodies are constituted as such through the intentional acts (gazes) of agents whose own agency is itself conditioned by their own racialized bodies. Yancy argues that, within a racist social context (an anti-black world), the racialization of bodies normalizes,

[96]Alcoff, Linda, Alcoff, Linda, 'The Phenomenology of Racial Embodiment', *Radical Philosophy*, 1999, vol.95, pp.15. – 26., p.16.
[97]Alcoff, Linda, 'The Phenomenology of Racial Embodiment', p.18.
[98]Alcoff, Linda, 'The Phenomenology of Racial Embodiment', p.26.
[99]Lee, Emily S., ed., *Living Alterities: Phenomenology, Embodiment, and Race*, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2014)
[100]For example, see Yancy, George, *Black Bodies, White Gazes: The Continuing Significance of Race in America,* 2nd edn., (London: Roman and Littlefield, 2017) and Yancy, George, *Look, A White!: Philosophical Essays on Whiteness*, (foreword. Zach, Naomi), (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: Temple University Press, 2012)

valorises, and affirms of all of those aspects of subjectivity that are associated with whiteness while also pathologizing, marginalizing, and denigrating those that are associated with non-whiteness.[101] In addition, Yancy argues that, in turn, the range of mundane ways that white power and privilege shape subjectivity, curtail the potential action and modes of praxis of non-white subjects. To illustrate this point, Yancy describes a banal encounter between a black man and white woman in an elevator. Reacting to the women's either real or perceived fear at a black body, Yancy claims the black man views himself as she does – namely, as undesirable and a potential threat or danger - and, as a result, feels himself "shrink", lose confidence in his abilities, and doubt himself.[102] In a similar manner, in the contribution to the collection that David Kim makes, he analyses the on-going subordination of Asian Americans and how their subordination shapes their agency, especially by generating shame and other emotions that are connected with negative self-evaluation.[103] According to Kim, there are at least three forms of anti-Asian stigma in Western culture: 1) the aesthetic devaluation of Asian faces and bodies, 2) the derogation of alleged Asian personality traits, especially in terms of passivity, non-individuality, or social ineptness, and 3) the derogation of alleged Asian foreignness, alienness, or being an FOB (Fresh of the Boat).[104] Kim argues that despite their efforts to assimilate, these forms of anti-Asian stigma continue to have the potential to generate shame and self-contempt amongst those who are ethnically Asian. Moreover, Kim claims that, in turn, the shame and self-contempt that is generated by the experience of living life in

[101]See Yancy, George, 'White Gazes: What it Feels Like to be an Essence', in Lee, Emily S., ed., *Living Alterities: Phenomenology, Embodiment, and Race*
[102]See Yancy, George, 'White Gazes: What it Feels Like to be an Essence', p.54. – p.59.
[103]Kim, David, 'Shame and Self-Revision in Asian American Assimilation', in Lee, Emily S., ed., *Living Alterities: Phenomenology, Embodiment, and Race*
[104]Kim, David, 'Shame and Self-Revision in Asian American Assimilation', p.119.

society that is characterized by anti-Asian stigmas and other types of racism has the effect of 'trapping' individuals, by which he means leading them to lack material and status-related resources that would enable them to act in ways that contravene and contest their oppression.[105] To illustrate the point, Kim quotes qualitative research into the lived experience of the variety of Asian Americans, including the following statement by Rosalind Chou and Joe Feagin:

> 'some respondents report having gotten openly angry about racist events, or have worked collectively to respond, but such overt responses are relatively rare. Instead, our respondents mostly seem to manage discriminatory incidents internally and individually. The personal battle with hostility and discrimination often leads to feelings of isolation, sadness, disillusionment, or hopelessness. Serious consequences flow from such emotional withdrawal, and/or suppression of memories of racial hostility and discrimination. Seeking out professional assistance appears to be relatively rare for these respondents or their families. Moreover, when a few have tried to find help, they usually have not known where to turn or have been misunderstood or rejected by those whom they contacted'.[106]

Evidently, some of the differences between individuals that thinkers with an interest in embodied existence highlight may be amenable to change and transformation. As chapter two argues earlier on, people are clearly capable of learning new ways of articulating and expressing themselves. They can also be moved to change their perspectives in non-coercive ways. Indeed, research into deliberative polling suggests that deliberation itself, when conducted "properly" (i.e. when it is truly open-spirited, rational, and inclusive), can be conducive to helping people to transcend their pre-existing points of views by supplying them with new information and, in doing so, encouraging them to reflect on and reconsider their pre-existing points of view. Exactly how effective deliberation is,

[105]Kim, David, 'Shame and Self-Revision in Asian American Assimilation', pp.121. – 122.
[106]Chou, Rosalind and Joe Feagin, *The Myth of the Model Minority: Asian Americans Facing Racism*, (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2008), p.101.

though, with regards to this matter, remains open to debate.[107] That said, one of the key insights to emerge from analyses of the connection between difference, embodied existence, and subjectivity is that the process of becoming a subject, a subject that has different capacities, skills, traits, habits, etc., begins as soon as an individual is born into their body and carries on throughout their life, on all levels of society. To implement measures to change or influence this process would therefore require a programme of personal construction, deconstruction, and reconstruction and social change and transformation so extensive and intrusive into people's daily lives that it is likely to be a practical impossibility to attain. Indeed, being attentive to embodied existence suggest that there are some differences between people that relate to embodied existence that simply may not be liable to being changed or transformed in this way. Take, for example, the case of race and biological sex. Whilst it may be possible to train people's bodies in different ways, it is certainly less feasible to alter their physiological makeups and aesthetic differences. Take also, the matters of age and disability, which have traditionally been overlooked in accounts of human experience and existence, but thinkers with an interest in embodied existence are increasingly turning their attention to examine.[108] Again, these are differences between people that have crucial import for their being and practical engagement with the world that surrounds them and appear, at least at first glance, to defy easy change, reversal, or transformation.

---

[107]For example, see Fishkin, James S., *Democracy and Deliberation: New Directions for Democratic Reform,* Fishkin, James S., *When the People Speak: Deliberative Democracy and Public Consultation*, and Fishkin, James S. and Laslett Peter, eds., *Debating deliberative democracy*

[108]See, for example, Hurd, Laura, 'Older Women's Body Image and Embodied Experience: An Exploration', Journal of Women & Aging, 2000, vol.12., no.3. – 4., pp.77. – 97., Garland, David, *Punishment and Modern Society: A Study in Social Theory,* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), and Titchkosky, Tanya, *Reading and Writing Disability Differently: The Textured Life of Embodiment*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007)

To illustrate the longevity of differences in individuals' subjectivities that stem from their existence as embodied beings, it is conducive to consider the claims that Miranda Fricker makes about 'epistemic injustice', which, she argues, is a 'wrong' that is committed against a person 'in their capacity as a knower'.[109] According to Fricker, there are two types of 'epistemic injustice'. The first, 'testimonial injustice', Fricker argues, occurs 'when prejudices cause a hearer to give a deflated level of credibility to a speaker's word'.[110] Examples of 'epistemic instance' that Fricker gives include a black man who is not believed by a jury due to racist prejudices[111] and a woman who is not believed in a business meeting and dismissed out of hand, even though she makes a good case, because sexist stereotypes cause listeners to believe her arguments to be incompetent or insincere and, as such, unbelievable.[112] The second, 'hermeneutical injustice', Fricker explains, occurs 'at a prior stage, when a gap in collective interpretative resources puts someone at an unfair disadvantage when it comes to making sense of their social experience' at least partly because of their histories of being excluded from public debates and decision-making processes.[113] In other words, before a subject is even given the opportunity to speak and have others listen to what they say. Examples of 'hermeneutic injustice' that Fricker provides include a woman attending a meeting in the late 1960s at which post-partum depression was discussed: in this case, she argues, the shared social resource - a linguistic label and sharing of experiences - enabled an understanding of a condition she had

[109]Fricker, Miranda, *Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing,* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), p.1.
[110]Fricker, Miranda, *Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing*, p.1
[111]Fricker, Miranda, *Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing*, p.25.
[112]Fricker, Miranda, *Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing*, p.7.
[113]Fricker, Miranda, *Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing*, p.1

experienced and for which she had previously blamed herself.[114] In making her claims about 'epidemic injustice', Fricker's overriding aim is not to analyse how the bodies of individuals lead them to suffer in the ways she describes. In fact, she explores a variety of background social mechanisms that, she argues, contribute to this process.[115] However, the uncomfortable implication to emerge from Fricker's general arguments is that people's grounding and situatedness in bodies that are marked by difference, especially with regards to their physical characteristics and overall aesthetic, skews the interactions and exchanges that they share with others, meaning that even if or when they are able to articulate and express themselves "well" and/or have the opportunity to be listened to and taken seriously by others, they may still not be able to successfully contribute to those exchanges and interactions and, in doing so, contribute to the outcomes they produce. For thinkers who are critical of deliberation, this point is especially important because it suggests that communicational inequalities between individuals' that are linked to their situatedness in different physical and material forms are likely to defy measures that are intended to remove them and continue to operate "below" them instead. As Sanders explains, this is because inequalities such as these are too 'sneaky, invisible, and pernicious' to be dealt with by 'a process as rational and reasonable as deliberation is meant to be'.[116]

To be clear, this is not to deny that measures could be devised and implemented to make people that are situated within all types of bodies better able and more equally able to engage in deliberation and the deliberative decision-making process, including as Habermas and Benhabib imagine. Feasibly, this aim

[114]Fricker, Miranda, *Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing*, chapter.7.
[115]See Fricker, Miranda, *Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing*, pp.1. – 4.
[116]Sanders, Lynn, 'Against Deliberation', p.353.

could be achieved through a combination of two strategies.[117] One strategy would be to focus on removing or decreasing the impact of processes, arrangements, structures, and so forth, that shape people's bodies, bodily styles, and bodily praxis in ways that are counterproductive to the types of praxis and modes of communication that they endorse. A second strategy would be to focus on implementing and/or intensifying processes, arrangements, and structures of subjective development that contribute to the formation of aspects of bodies, bodily practice, and bodily styles that are conducive to types of praxis and modes of communication that they endorse. The focus in both of these strategies is on making incremental rather than great leaps of change. However, the possibility of bringing the reality and ideal of deliberation closer together through altering or changing people's bodies, bodily styles, and bodily practices so that they better accord with or are at least more conducive to fostering the types of praxis and modes of communication thinkers like Habermas and Benhabib endorse is likely to require substantial, deep, ongoing social and personal change. Moreover, the possibility of doing so raises an important, additional question – namely, whether or not it is right and/or desirable to try to change or alter people, their bodies, bodily practices, and bodily states of being and/or to implement measures that seek to bring them in line with the deliberative ideal? There are powerful reasons against acting in this way. For, doing so not only implicitly disrespects or at least devalues those aspects of personhood and subjectivity that make individuals unique and provide them with the foundation for their agency in the first place, but also risks feeding into patterns or oppression and consolidating arrangements

[117]A further, different strategy, which chapter three discusses, is to design institutions surrounding the moral and political decision-making process so as to make deliberation more accommodating of bodily difference. As chapter three discusses, this suggestion is often used to defend the ideal of deliberation whilst acknowledging the worrying reality of deliberation and how deliberation currently exists and operates in contemporary society.

and processes in society that contribute to them being unequally able to successfully participate in deliberative exchanges in the first place. Take the problem of prejudices and biases for example, which analyses of deliberation in the real world demonstrate frequently skew the ways in which people are regarded and treated by their social peers so as to render those who belong to disadvantaged groups less likely to have their concerns listened to and taken seriously by others. As thinkers with an interest in deliberation point out, often prejudices and biases are justified through negative judgements of how members of disadvantaged groups are and/or act. Sexist discourses about women, for example, frequently justify women's marginalisation in debates and decisions about moral and political matters by claiming that they lack the traits or skills necessary for attaining success such as the requisite rationality that is, in contrast, typically associated with men.[118] As Grosz explains,

> 'misogynistic thought has commonly found a convenient self-justification for women's secondary social positions by containing them within bodies that are represented, even constructed as frail, imperfect, unruly, and unreliable, subject to various intrusions which are not under conscious control…and, at the same time, these very functions render women vulnerable, in need of protection or special treatment, as variously prescribed by patriarchy'.[119]

Likewise, when Battersby defines the term 'patriarchy', she claims that it ought to be understood as 'a form of social organization that takes male bodies and life-patternings as both norm and ideal in the exercise of power'.[120] Therefore, to contend that bringing real world deliberation closer to the ideal that Habermas and Benhabib propose requires that women and other groups in society be trained

[118]For example, see Grosz, Elizabeth, *Volatile Bodies: Towards a Corporeal Feminism* and Battersby, Christine, *The Phenomenal Woman: Feminist Metaphysics and the Patterns of Identity,* (New York and Abingdon, Oxford: Routledge, 1998)
[119]Grosz, Elizabeth, *Volatile Bodies: Towards a Corporeal Feminism*, p.13.
[120]Battersby, Christine, *The Phenomenal Woman: Feminist Metaphysics and the Patterns of Identity*, p.15.

and/or facilitated to participate in the ways that they imagine risks feeding into systems of privilege and oppression that justify groups' exclusion from real-world deliberation and deliberative decision-making by claiming that it is caused by problems or flaws in the ways that individuals who belong to them behave, act, carry, express, articulate themselves, and so forth. In contemporary literature about disability in particular, an argument that is similar to this is made in discussions about how governments should to try to make society more egalitarian and inclusive given disadvantages and/or advantages that stem from differences in people's bodies and bodily states of being. Specifically, thinkers who are engaged in these discussions argue that rather than viewing disability as representing a body and/or bodily state of being that deviates from the norm and, as such, is less than ideal, it ought to be understood as a social phenomenon that confers disadvantage onto individuals partly because of how it is commonly thought about – specifically, as signalling something that is inherently flawed, bad, or substandard.[121]

Thus, what one is left with after taking individuals' existence as embodied beings seriously is a seeming insurmountable gap between how thinkers like Habermas and Benhabib imagine deliberation and how deliberation actually exists in the real world. Moreover, taking individuals' embodied existence into account suggests that there are significant complications with, and drawbacks to, trying to close the gap between the ideal and reality of deliberation. So much so, that it is not entirely clear that efforts ought to be made to do so.

[121]For example, see Wolff, Jonathan and Avner De-Shalit, *Disadvantage*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007) and Barnes, Elizabeth, *The Minority Body: A Theory of Disability* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016)

At this point, defenders of deliberation and deliberative decision-making might respond to these claims by arguing that although the reality of embodied existence highlights challenges to attaining "good" deliberative praxis in the real world, it does not signify a deficiency in the ideal itself. From this perspective, the challenge is one of implementation and, as such, the value of deliberation still holds, suggesting that efforts ought to be made to think about what kinds of institutional arrangements or processes are best suited to realising the key principles and values deliberation in the real-world whilst remaining mindful of reality of embodied existence. More specifically, efforts ought to be made to determine what kinds of institutional arrangements or processes can help realise the key principles and values of deliberation whilst respecting difference and avoiding excluding or disadvantaging different kinds of embodied identity. To explore this defence of deliberative models of democracy further and to offer a response to it, chapter three uses insights into a particular aspect of embodied existence – namely, affect – to show how the ideal of deliberation is itself flawed. This flaw, chapter three argues, is due to the tacit reliance of the ideal of deliberation upon a privileged mode of praxis that is inherently exclusionary and inegalitarian and, if used as the basis for the process of making decisions about moral and political matters, likely to yield outcomes that are exclusionary inegalitarian as well. Subsequently, chapters four and five of this thesis then use insights into embodied existence and the import that they have for Habermas's and Benhabib's models of moral and political decision-making to engage in key debates in contemporary political theory concerning how best to understand what is unjust about contemporary society and what can be done to make politics within it inclusive and egalitarian regardless of the answer to that question.

3. Asking Too Much: Deliberation, Habitus, and Affect

Following on from chapter two, chapter three uses insights into a specific aspect of embodied existence – namely, affect - to critique the ideal of deliberation by revealing how it relies upon a privileged mode of praxis that, if used as the basis for generating decisions about moral and political matters, is likely to produce decisions that privilege the viewpoints and opinions of groups that have the most amount of power in society and, correspondingly, exclude the viewpoints and opinions of groups that have the least. As an ideal, deliberation requires individuals to come together, discuss their viewpoints, reflect on them, and choose principles and arrangements that respond to the collective perspective that this discussion produces. It is this mutual learning that, deliberative democrats like Habermas and Benhabib argue, allows politics to better respond to the diversity and difference that characterizes contemporary society, helping it to become more than a zero-sum game with ought right winners are losers. Yet, as chapter three now explores, the affective relationship that individuals share with the world that surrounds them through their bodies as embodied beings makes it especially difficult, if not impossible, for those who belong to groups that lack power in society to fully comprehend let alone articulate their experiences, especially in front of others in public settings. The implication is, therefore, that by requiring individuals to act in this way, the ideal of deliberation is itself inherently exclusionary and inegalitarian and that measures that are designed to

realise the deliberative ideal, including with regards to the process of creating decisions about moral and political issues, are likely to produce skewed interactions and outcomes that favour the voices and viewpoints of those who belong to the most powerful and advantaged groups in society, have the most, and suffer the least. From this perspective, the problem with deliberation therefore pertains not only to just how it exists as real communicative praxis, but is also inherent or intrinsic to the ideal itself. In recent times, Habermas himself has acknowledged this fact about the ideal of deliberation when responding to feminist criticisms of his work by acknowledging that the types of deliberative praxis that he so celebrates in his comments about the historical development of the public sphere are, on a fundamental level, patriarchal and premised upon women's exclusion.[1]

Here, a caveat is needed: it is true that insights into embodied existence and the affective relationship that individuals share with the world that surrounds them suggest that it is very difficult, if not impossible, for individuals who belong to groups that lack power in society to act as the ideal of deliberation requires. However, this does not mean that those same individuals lack political agency and simply acquiesce or comply with their circumstance. Rather, insights into embodied existence and affect suggest that moments of social disruption and 'immanent critique' that they are based upon, which critical theorists like Habermas and Benhabib so value, are likely to emerge in ways that are not always

[1]See Habermas, Jürgen 'Further Reflections on the Public Sphere', in Calhoun, Craig, ed., *Habermas and the Public Sphere,* (Cambridge, Massachusetts MIT Press, 1996) and Habermas, Jürgen, *Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy,* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996)

in line with the ideal of deliberation - as inchoate, passionate, sporadic outburst for example.

To further investigate these issues and consider the import that they have for Habermas's and Benhabib's models of moral and political judgement and the tradition of deliberative democracy in general, chapter three investigates how the experience of living in contemporary society as an embodied being gets into and inside of people's bodies, affecting their physical-psychological-emotional states of being so severely and so negatively that their viewpoints and concerns often remain fragmented and are prevented from reaching the level of cognization and articulation that is required for them to effectively engage in the process of deliberative decision-making. Or, in other words, how the ideal of deliberation effectively asks too much from citizens, especially when it comes those who have the least and suffer the most in contemporary society. Then, turning its attention to the more positive implication of using insights into embodied existence and affect to critique the ideal of deliberation, chapter three investigates how never knowing, in advance, what the impact or affect that subjects' interactions with the world that surrounds them is likely to have on them and their bodies, leaves open the possibility for the voices of those who suffer the most in contemporary society to emerge. The irony is, though, as the preceding caveat mentions, that this emergence is unlikely to be in the ways and displayed through forms of praxis that are typically associated with the ideal of deliberation, but, rather, in more emotional, fragmented, and grass-roots ways.

Suffering and Hardship in Contemporary Society

Phenomenological accounts of life in contemporary society detail a broad range of problems that people face in their day-to-day lives, burdening those who are subject to them, causing them suffering and pain. History is, of course, littered with examples of adverse socio-cultural conditions - war, famine, civil strife, and so forth. Yet, as Richard Wilkinson and Kate Pickett, authors of the critically acclaimed *The Spirit Level: Why Equality is Better for Everyone*, argue, there is something particularly troubling about contemporary societies in which unprecedented levels of economic development, technological advancement, scientific achievement, and relative peace and stability, are accompanied by high levels of suffering, pain, immiseration, and hardship.[2] Referring to research detailing the rise in anxiety and depression in developed countries over the last half of a century along with the physical, emotional and mental issues with which these conditions are associated, Wilkinson and Pickett note, 'given the unprecedented material comfort and physical convenience of modern societies, it might seem sensible to be sceptical of the way everyone talks of stress, as if life was barely survivable. However…evidence [suggests] that we really are much more anxious than we used to be'[3] and 'reviews of research conclude that people in many developed countries have experienced substantial rises in anxiety and depression. Among adolescents, these have been accompanied by increases in the frequency of behavioural problems, including crime, alcohol, and drugs'.[4]

[2]Wilkinson, Richard and Kate Pickett, *The Spirit Level: Why Equality is Better for Everyone*, (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2010), p.33.
[3]Wilkinson, Richard and Kate Pickett, *The Spirit Level: Why Equality is Better for Everyone*, p.33.
[4]Wilkinson, Richard and Kate Pickett, *The Spirit Level: Why Equality is Better for Everyone*, p.35.

According to Pickett and Wilkinson, the immiseration and suffering that people face in their day-to-day lives in contemporary society is a consequence of the 'pernicious effects' that income inequality has on them as individuals and society as a whole; 'eroding trust', 'increasing anxiety and illness', and 'encouraging excessive consumption'.[5] Drawing on statistical data from reliable, independent sources, Wilkinson and Pickett identify eleven different categories of health and wellbeing, which, they argue, have significantly worse outcomes in more unequal rather than equal countries regardless of whether the countries in question are rich or poor overall. These categories include physical health, mental health, drug abuse, education, obesity, imprisonment, social mobility, community life and trust, violence, teenage pregnancies, and child well-being. In addition, Pickett and Wilkinson argue that statistical data reveals that it is not just poor people that do badly according to these measures of personal health and wellbeing in unequal societies, but, rather, everyone, from all levels of the social hierarchy. Citing the need to make more people aware of the 'scale of inequality and injustice in our societies' along with the damage that it causes to 'the vast majority of the population', Pickett and Wilkinson conclude *The Spirit Level* by appealing for greater information and education about these matters and for discussions about public policy and political decision-making to reflect the need to alter how contemporary society is economically organized,[6] especially with regard to income inequality, the addressing of which, they claim in the title of *The*

[5]Taken from Richard Wilkinson's reflections on *The Spirit Level* in his interview with Brook Jarvis, printed as Wilkinson, Richard, 'Want the Good Life? Your Neighbors Need It, Too', (*Yes! Magazine,* 4th March 2010)
[6]Wilkinson, Richard and Kate Pickett, *The Spirit Level: Why Equality is Better for* Everyone, p.298.

Spirit Level, will be beneficial for everyone and is the key to improving people's lives overall.[7]

In his review of *The Spirit Level*, Will Kymlicka argues that Wilkinson and Pickett's research provides an 'impressive body of evidence… which is highly relevant for debates' and 'raises some big questions'.[8] In a similar vein, Will Hutton applauds *The Spirit Level*, claiming it is a 'remarkable book' with 'profound implications'.[9] Yet, Wilkinson and Pickett's research is not without critics, especially when it comes to the premises that they base their arguments upon. More specifically, the argument that income inequality is the principal reason why people suffer hardship in contemporary society. Eminent sociologist John Goldthorpe argues that by narrowly focusing on income inequality, Wilkinson and Pickett ignore other forms of inequality, including broader forms of economic inequality, and provide a 'one-dimensional' account of social stratification that equates social class with income and treats the former as a marker for the latter.[10] In Goldthorpe's eye, what is needed is more research into suffering and hardship in contemporary society to evaluate Wilkinson and Pickett's 'account of the psychosocial generation of the contextual effects of inequality on health' and judge other, 'rival neo-materialist' accounts.[11] Also raising questions about Wilkinson and Picket's focus on income inequality, but

[7]The latest subtitle of *The Spirit Level* is *Why Equality is Better for Everyone*. However, *The Spirit Level* was originally published as *The Spirit Level: Why More Equal Societies Almost Always Do Better* by Allen Lane in 2009 and with the new sub-title: *Why Greater Equality Makes Societies Stronger* by Bloomsbury Press later that same year.
[8]Kymlicka, Will, 'The Injustice Gap', (*The Globe and Mail*, 19th May 2009)
[9]Hutton, Will, 'Look no further than inequality for the source of all our ills', (*The Observer*, 15th March 2009)
[10]See Goldthorpe, John H., 'Analysing Social Inequality: A Critique of Two Recent Contributions from Economics and Epidemiology', *European Sociological Review*, 2009, vol.26., no.6., pp.731. – 744.
[11]See Goldthorpe, John H., 'Analysing Social Inequality: A Critique of Two Recent Contributions from Economics and Epidemiology'

from a slightly different perspective, Gerry Hassan argues that although *The Spirit Level* has done a 'public service, bringing a debate about the merits of equality and inequality to the centre of public debate in the UK and elsewhere', it also has a central weakness. Specifically, Hassan argues that *The Spirit Level* strikingly ignores neoliberal politics and the role that it has played in organising society over the last thirty or so years, making changes that have resulted in people being exposed to immense adversity, distress, and pain.[12] In fact, in Hassan's mind, neoliberal politics rather than income inequality lies at the heart of individuals' suffering and hardship within contemporary society.

Wilkinson and Pickett's critics are right to question treating income inequality as the sole explanation for individuals' suffering and hardship. Generally speaking, debates about unfairness or injustice acknowledge that there is a wide range of reasons why those who live within contemporary society can be said to be unequal. Likewise, many critics agree with Hassan's argument about the need to recognize the political machinations and ramifications of neo-liberal capitalism as the root cause for why people are exposed to disparities, including with regards to their income, in the first place. However, putting debates about the attention that Wilkinson and Pickett pay to income inequality to one side, *The Spirit Level* is helpful for drawing attention to a key theme that comes up time and time again in accounts of the experience of living in contemporary society. Namely, that in spite of rising living standards, technological innovation, and affluence, the experience of living within contemporary society has a habit of getting under the skin and into people's bodies, negatively affecting them and their physiological,

[12]Hassan, Gerry, 'The Spirit Level lacks all balance to be correct', (*The Scotsman,* 30th July 2009)

emotional, and psychological states of being deep down. In Simon Charlesworth's investigation into the personal effects of growing up as a member of the modern-day working class of Rotherham, South Yorkshire, he uses interviewees' descriptions of their lives to identify a number of ways that their experiences of belonging to a poor and dispossessed social group are 'manifest in the mental and physical ill-health that afflicts people'.[13] Similarly, in their investigation into the personal consequences of being a 'blue collar' worker in contemporary America, Richard Sennett and Jonathan Cobb use personal testimony to support their claims about 'injuries' being caused to people's psyches and emotional states of being through their lived-experience of modern class difference as opposed to older forms of class-based struggle: [14] '…just as the material penalties of the old capitalism fell hardest on the workers… so now the moral burdens and the emotional hardships of class are the thorniest and most concentrated among manual laborers'.[15]

How does one explain how people's experiences of living in contemporary society get into their bodies, undermining their wellbeing, broadly understood? To begin to answer this question, it is worth attending to sociological research that Bourdieu and his colleagues have conducted into ordinary's people's experience of living in contemporary France, which was published in English as *The Weight of the World: Social Suffering in Contemporary Society* in 1999. Based upon 182 semi-structured interviews with people from diverse backgrounds and many different walks of life, Bourdieu explains in the introduction to *The Weight of the*

[13]Charlesworth, Simon, *A Phenomenology of Working Class Experience* (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 2000), p.6.
[14]See Sennett, Richard and Jonathan Cobb, *The Hidden Injuries of Class,* (New York and London: Norton Paperback, 1993)
[15]Sennett, Richard and Jonathan Cobb, *The Hidden Injuries of* Class, p.76

World, that, 'we are providing here the accounts that men and women have confided to us about their lives and the difficulties they have in living those lives'.[16] In Bourdieu and his colleagues' opinion, what the interviews that they carried out reveal is that contemporary society is characterised by a number of crises that frustrate individuals' efforts to live a dignified social existence and disrupt key social institutions, such as the family, education, and workplace, especially by causing them to feel despondent about their lives and the possibility for their prospects to change for the better. These crises include, amongst other things, bouts of long-term unemployment, material deprivation and poverty, "flexible" employment patterns, the technologicalization of the workplace, successive waves of immigration from aboard, movement from the countryside to the cities, and an increasing feminization of poverty.

When one reads the interviewees' descriptions of their lives in *The Weight of the World*, the overwhelming impression that is given is that the conditions Bourdieu and his colleagues identify as negatively affecting their lives - long term unemployment, social fragmentation, material deprivation, and so forth – are not "outside" or external to their physical and material states, but, rather "inside", buried deep in their mental, physical, and affective states of being – a fundamental category of their experience as embodied beings, as it were. One of the interviewees, Danielle, an employee from the Paris central sorting office explains, for example, that the lack of opportunities for 'girls like her', who have moved from the countryside to the city to find work,[17] means that she has no choice but

[16]Bourdieu, Pierre. et al., *The Weight of the World: Social Suffering in Contemporary Society*, p.1.
[17]Bourdieu, Pierre. et al., *The Weight of the World: Social Suffering in Contemporary* Society, p.22.

to carry out exhausting, emotionally-draining, back-breaking work.[18] Another interviewee, Gerard, a lifelong assembly line worker in the Peugeot plant in Sochaux, details how changes in the workplace are manifest in him feeling an acute fear about the impending possibility of impoverishment, which threatens him and his family.[19] Yet another interviewee, Antonio, a Portuguese immigrant, admits that although he was initially optimistic about moving to France to provide a better life for his wife and his children, his inability to find a fulfilling, well paid job means that he 'feels rejected everywhere' and is distressed because of a growing realization that becoming part of (good) French society was only ever an illusion'.[20] Indeed, in their notes on the interviewees' responses to their questions, Bourdieu and his colleagues claim that the toll that the experience of living in contemporary society has taken on the bodies of those that they interviewed was visible in the ways that they expressed themselves, effectively "weighing" them and their bodily deportment down. Describing the interview that he conducted with two, young male immigrants from North Africa, Bourdieu explains, for example, that 'as I was listening to these two young men describe [their lives], in the most natural way…so present in their words and actions was the "inert violence" in the order of things, the violence inscribed in the implacable wheels of the job market, the school market, racism'.[21] Likewise, in his summary of his interview with Rickety, a "professional hustler", Loïc Wacquant, one of the most well-known members of Bourdieu's research team, notes that there was 'the

[18]Bourdieu, Pierre. et al., *The Weight of the World: Social Suffering in Contemporary* Society, p.23.
[19]Bourdieu, Pierre. et al., *The Weight of the World: Social Suffering in Contemporary Society*, pp.273 – 273.
[20]Bourdieu, Pierre. et al., *The Weight of the World: Social Suffering in Contemporary Society*, pp.361. – 362.
[21]Bourdieu, Pierre. et al., *The Weight of the World: Social Suffering in Contemporary Society*, p.64.

profound symbiosis between one the one hand, Rickety's person, his physical constitution, his manner of speaking and holding his body…and, on the other hand, his surroundings and life strategies'.[22] The picture that emerges from both the interviewees' descriptions of their lives and the comments that Bourdieu and his colleagues make about them is, therefore, that the conditions that characterise contemporary society are ingrained in people's bodies, are manifest in their bodily states of being, and "flow" through their bodies when those bodies are put into motion.

Widely acclaimed, supporters of *The Weight of the World* argue that its key strength lies in the space that it gives to the voices of ordinary people like Danielle, Gerard, and Antonio, utilizing what they say to build-up a picture of what *la petite misère* (ordinary, everyday suffering) feels like to ordinary people as part of the day-to-day experience of life as an embodied being rather than trying to make their experiences fit with some sort of pre-selected, interpretative structure. Yet, as Nick Couldry rightly points out, there are drawbacks to focusing too closely on people's personal perspectives, especially when using them as an access point into 'the social' and the problems that are contained within it.[23] For this discussion, one of the most significant limitations of *Weight of the World*, which Alan Warde notes in his critique,[24] is that, save for a few points where gestures are made towards his wider social theory,[25] the attention that Bourdieu

[22]Bourdieu, Pierre. et al., *The Weight of the World: Social Suffering in Contemporary Society*, p.144.
[23]See Couldry, Nick, 'The individual point of view: learning from Bourdieu's 'The weight of the world', *Cultural Studies ↔ Critical Methodologies*, 2005, vol.5., no.3., pp.354. – 372.
[24]Warde, Alan, 'Constructions of Pierre Bourdieu', *Sociology*, 2003, vol.36., no.4., pp.1003. – 1009., p.1007
[25]In the introduction, for example, Bourdieu repeats claims he makes elsewhere about linguistic habits and dispositions forming part of a person's 'habitus', stating the interviews he and his colleagues carried out were reconstructed to bring out 'everything that is at once hidden and

and his colleagues pay to the personal perspective comes at the expense of them providing a clear, overarching framework for analysing the vignettes of personal insight that they proffer.[2627] Consequently, after reading *The Weight of the World,* one is left asking how is it possible to explain the process through which people's experiences of living in contemporary society get into or inside of their bodies to become an essential part of their embodied experience?

Elsewhere, Bourdieu goes to great lengths to analyse how people's experiences of living in contemporary society correspond with a particular 'habitus' or distinct, embodied way of being that is invested deep in their physical and material existence, permeating every level and aspect. As Charlesworth explains when outlining Bourdieu's ideas about 'habitus' as part of his methodological approach to investigating the experience of belonging to the modern-day working class of Rotherham, beneath the notion of 'habitus' lies the principal idea that

---

disclosed, not only in the transcribed discussion but also in the pronunciation and intonation, every-thing transcription eradicates, from body language, gesture, demeanor, mimicry and looks to silences, innuendos, and slips of the tongue'. Likewise, in the section entitled 'Site Effects' Bourdieu makes explicit reference to the notion of 'habitus', explaining 'if the habitat shapes the habitus, the habitus also shapes the habitat', and also to both cultural and linguistic capital'. See Bourdieu, Pierre. et al., *The Weight of the World: Social Suffering in Contemporary Society*, p.viii., p.2., and, p.128., respectively.

[26]In fact, it appears as if Bourdieu's intention is to actively avoid addressing the issue how the research he and his colleagues collected ought to be theorized, stating 'I am loth to engage too insistently here in reflections on the theory or method addressed to researchers' in the chapter entitled 'Understanding'. See Bourdieu, Pierre. et al., *The Weight of the World: Social Suffering in Contemporary Society*, p.607.

[27]According to Wacquant, one of the best-known members of research behind *The Weight of the World,* Bourdieu's aims when writing this book were threefold: to capture the diversity of the daily struggles people face in their lives; to enable people to become more aware of the problems that characterize contemporary society and, as a result, more motivated to challenge them; and to avoid forms of censorship that might undermine the impact the book had by thrusting raw, unadulterated data into the public domain. From this perspective, the omission of an explanatory framework from *The Weight of the World* can be interpreted as a deliberate strategy that Bourdieu and his colleagues adopted in order to avoid over-intellectualizing their research. The presumption also might be that reader of The Weight of the World is already familiar with Bourdieu's wider social theory. Comments Priscilla Parkhurst Ferguson makes in the 'Translators Preface' to the English version would appear to support this argument. See Wacquant, Loïc, 'Bourdieu 1993: A Case Study in Scientific Consecration', *Sociology*, 2013, vol.4., no.1., pp.15. –29. and Bourdieu, Pierre. et al., *The Weight of the World: Social Suffering in Contemporary* Society, p.ix.

individuals acquire a set of corporeal capacities and habitus or dispositions through their interactions with the social world, which, in return, determine how they engage with social world as subjects.[28] From this perspective, the experience of living in contemporary society corresponds to what individuals' bodies *are* as a collection of corporeal capacities, dispositions, and tendencies along with what their bodies actually *do* by providing the means for individuals to interact and engage with the world that surrounds them. As Charlesworth explains when reflecting on this aspect of Bourdieu's theoretical framework, 'at the heart of habitus are our corporeal capacities, through which we learn habits or disposition, through which in turn we are able to engage with the world of others.[29]

As Bourdieu makes clear in one of his more recent discussions of 'habitus', in his eyes, the relationship between 'the individual' and 'the social' does not exist merely on the surface of people's bodies and their bodily states of being, but, rather extends all the way down into every aspect of their bodies and bodily states of being. As he explains in *Pascalian Meditations* in particular, 'habitus' ought to be understood as including the immediately obvious propensities that people have to hold and use their body in certain ways, such as by deploying particular styles of demeanour, deportment, posture and accent, and also more abstract mental habits, schemes of perception, classification, appreciation, intuition, feeling, and action.[30] According to this viewpoint, individuals are to be understood as beings that are situated within material or physical forms that correspond with the conditions that surround them on every level and in every aspect of their

[28]Charlesworth, Simon, *A Phenomenology of Working Class Experience*, pp.29. – 30.
[29]Charlesworth, Simon, *A Phenomenology of Working Class Experience*, p.30.
[30]See Bourdieu, Pierre, *Pascalian Meditations,* trans. Rafalko, Robert, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000), pp.138. – 142.

embodied existence, including those that are visible and immediately obvious and those that are less easily observable and exist "beneath" the surface such as values, perceptions, emotions, and feelings.

Of course, in developing the concept of 'habitus', Bourdieu's aim is not to treat everyone the same. Rather, as Probyn points out, Bourdieu uses the notion of 'habitus' to designate how social structures and divisions in society as whole are concretized in individuals' bodies and their everyday, bodily practice.[31] In particular, Bourdieu argues that the process of social reproduction relies upon, and operates through, the concretization of external social structures and societal divisions in people's bodies and their bodily states of being, broadly understood. When using the concept of 'habitus' to make this argument, Bourdieu explains that, from a young age, individuals with similar backgrounds and histories - in terms of their social class, religion, nationality, ethnicity, education, and profession – are taught to acquire similar ways of perceiving and appreciating the world, which, in turn, orientate them towards the world and shape their action in the future.[32] Moreover, Bourdieu argues that because individuals are embodied beings that access the world through their corporeal capacities, their "taking-up" of different ways of perceiving and appreciating the world is effectively grounded in the body. The result of this process are physical and psychological dispositions that predispose individuals to think, feel, act in ways that are appropriate for their place in the society in which they live. Michel de Certeau, a leading French critic of Bourdieu, explains that in Bourdieu's work, the whole idea of individual

[31]Probyn, Elspeth, 'Everyday Shame', *Cultural Studies,* 2004, vol.18., no.2. – 3., pp.328. – 349., p.330.
[32]See Lizardo, Omar, 'The cognitive origins of Bourdieu's Habitus', *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour*, 2004, vol.34., no.4., pp.375. – 448.

practice depends on an 'economy of the proper place'.[33] This economy not only teaches people what are and what are not acceptable ways for them to think, feel, and act according to the group that they belong to in society and the position that they occupy vis-à-vis others, but, in doing so, disposes them towards partaking or displaying appropriate states of being and behavior. To explore this point further and to consider the significance that it has for Habermas's and Benhabib's models of moral and political decision-making in particular and deliberative model of democracy in general, the next section of chapter three uses Honneth's account of intersubjective identity formation to explore how people's experiences of belonging to disadvantaged groups with histories of being oppressed in contemporary society imbues them with affective tendencies and dispositions that make it especially hard for them to fully comprehend let alone talk about their experiences, especially to others in public settings.

Axel Honneth: Affective Tendencies and Dispositions

To build his account of intersubjective identity formation, Honneth takes from Hegel's early work the idea that full human flourishing depends upon the existence of well-established, ethical social relations.[34] However, to move away from what Honneth deems to be the 'speculative, metaphysical nature' of Hegel's moral philosophy, he turns to George Herbert Mead's research in social psychology along with empirical research in psychology, sociology, and history to identify the actual, concrete conditions for individuals' self-realisation as subjects

[33]See Certeau, Michel de, *The Practice of Everyday Life*, (Berkley and Los Angeles, California: University of California Press, 1984)
[34]See Honneth, Axel, *The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts*, trans. Anderson, Joel, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), especially the introduction.

with cohesive, fully developed identities.[35] These conditions are, according to Honneth, social relations that are governed by positive normative principles that allow individuals to develop positive self-understandings and attain the level of physical and emotional stability that is necessary for them to realise their worth, needs, and desires as fully autonomous and individuated persons.[36]

When outlining his model of intersubjective identity formation, Honneth argues that when social relations are characterised by positive normative sentiments, such as care, affection, and love, individuals are recognised by their social peers in ways that allows them to acquire a 'degree of basic individual self-confidence indispensable for autonomous participation in public life'.[37] However, Honneth argues the reverse is also true, meaning that when people are unable to engage in social relations that are governed by positive normative sentiments and not recognised by their social peers, the physical and emotional qualities of their personhoods are "broken-up" from the outside, bringing their identities to the 'point of collapse' and, as such, undermining their abilities to act as fully individuated and autonomous persons.[38] Referring to the influence that Hegel's ideas and Mead's research have on his work, Honneth argues that, 'drawing on Meads' social psychology, it becomes possible to take that idea the young Hegel outlined with such brilliant rudimentariness and make it the guiding thread of a social theory with normative content: that practical identity-formation presupposes intersubjective recognition.[39]

[35]Honneth, Axel, *The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts*, p.1.
[36]Honneth, Axel, *The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social* Conflicts, p.1.
[37]Honneth, Axel, *The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts*, p.107.
[38]Honneth, Axel, *The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts*, pp.131 – 132.
[39]Honneth, Axel, *The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts*, p.92.

At a later stage of his development of the account of intersubjective identity formation, Honneth turns his attention to the question of how people's unequal abilities to engage in social relations that are characterised by positive normative sentiments undermine their abilities to do a number of things, including engage in intersubjective, communicate praxis. Honneth argues that when people are unable to engage in social relations that are characterised by positive normative sentiments they suffer from a particular, affective state of being that undermines the practical capacities that they have for engaging with the external world. When describing this affective state of being, Honneth explains that it takes the form of a particular kind of 'moral shame', which comprises emotional content that is based around a lowering of the feeling of self-worth and lack of trust or confidence of oneself.[40] Then, moving on to the question of how this affective state of being impacts on those who suffer from it, Honneth argues that individuals' experiences of 'moral shame' have two possible outcomes: individuals can either be motivated to engage in practices that demand changes to the status quo or have their abilities to do so undermined by experiencing 'crises in communication' that prevent them from voicing their concerns in order to demand redress for their suffering.[41] Writing about the latter of these two possible responses, Honneth explains that, 'the moral crisis in communication is triggered here by the agent being disappointed with regard to the normative expectations that he or she believed could be placed on another's willingness to respect him or

[40]Honneth, Axel, *The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts*, pp.137 – 137.
[41]Honneth, Axel, *The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts*, pp.137 – 139.

her'[42] and 'in this sense… moral shame represents the emotion that overwhelms subjects, who… are incapable of simply going ahead with an action'.[43]

Sociological and ethnographic research broadly supports the claims that Honneth makes about how people's inabilities to engage in positive social relations can produce affective states of being that undermine their abilities to articulate themselves and engage in activities that aim at some sort or recognition or redressing of their experiences. In his account of personal reflections on the lived-experience of belonging to the modern-day working class, Charlesworth argues that the personal consequences of growing-up as a member of a dispossessed and stigmatized social group intimately affects individuals' bodies, generating feelings of shame, misery, and humiliation.[44] Moreover, Charlesworth argues that whilst Marxist analyses of class treat material deprivation and poverty as necessary antecedents to class-based solidarity, his research reveals that the experience of being part of an impoverished socio-cultural group undermines collective forms of action by preventing people from talking about their experiences and discussing them with others.[45] Specifically, Charlesworth argues that one of the central outcomes of belonging to the modern-day working class is a 'muteness', 'silence', and 'inarticulacy'[46] that stems from individuals' inabilities 'to articulate their existence'.[47] Likewise, but with violence against women and women's maltreatment by their social peers in mind, Das notes how the women that she interviewed during her ethnographic research into the violence that was

[42]Honneth, Axel, *The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts*, p.138.
[43]Honneth, Axel, *The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social* Conflicts, p.138.
[44]See Charlesworth, Simon, *A Phenomenology of Working Class Experience*
[45]Charlesworth, Simon, *A Phenomenology of Working Class Experience*, pp.7 – 8.
[46]Charlesworth, Simon, *A Phenomenology of Working Class Experience,* p.2.
[47]Charlesworth, Simon, *A Phenomenology of Working Class Experience,* p.2.

enacted against women during the partition of India were both incapable of and/or unwilling to speak about their experiences. Moreover, Das explains that when the women that she interviewed did speak, the majority of them utilized metaphorical rather than ordinary forms of expression, explaining that their experiences were too potent, visceral, and diffuse to think about let alone talk about in usual or common ways.[48] Referring to a 'zone of silence' that continues to surround the mass abduction and rape of women during the partition of India from Pakistan, Das notes that,

> 'when asking women to narrate their experiences…I found a zone of silence around the event. This silence was achieved either by the use of language that was general and metaphoric, but that evaded specific description of any events so as to capture the particularity of their experience, or by describing the surrounding events, but leaving the actual experience of abduction and rape unstated…as one woman warned me, it was dangerous to remember…this code of silence protected women'.[49]

Clearly, the claim that people's experiences of living in contemporary society get into and inside of their bodies, producing an affective state of being that makes it difficult for them to articulate themselves is troubling for anyone who is committed to systems of political decision-making that values ordinary individuals' involvement in debates or discussions about moral and political matters. Capturing the spirit of this concern, Bourdieu and his colleagues directly

[48]Das's particular area of research is the mass abduction and rape of women during the partition of India from Pakistan. Exploring both men's and women's reactions to these events, Das notes both men and women are incredibly reluctant to talk about what happened to women. This silence, especially on the behalf of women, Das argues, is especially surprising given the role that women in Indian society usually perform during times of societal schism and discord, during which they are expected to carry out the majority of the labour associated with mourning and, in doing so, help the community to heal. To illustrate this argument, Das explores the practise of women wailing and enacting violence upon themselves at funerals for murder victims and those who die unexpectedly. This praxis, she argues, allows the social group to express its collective grief and 'come to terms' with the loss. The task Das sets herself is to understand precisely why the events surrounding Partition are different to other moments of societal schism and the import women's silence has for Indian society as a whole. See Das, Veena, 'Language and Body: Transactions in the Construction of Pain', *Daedalus*, Winter 1996, vol.125., no.1., pp.67. – 91.

[49]Das, Veena, 'Language and Body: Transactions in the Construction of Pain', pp.84 - 85.

appeal to the readers of *The Weight of the World* to help to change the political circumstance of contemporary society in which, they argue, 'politicians capable of understanding and expressing their constituents' expectations and demands are becoming increasingly rare'[50] and outbreaks of senseless violence, racist crimes, and 'the electoral success of the prophets of doom, eager to exploit and magnify the most primitive expression of moral suffering'[51] act as 'social signs' of people's inabilities to express themselves and to have their concerns heard.[52]

Before turning to consider the import that research into the connection between affect and communication has for Habermas's and Benhabib's normative models of moral and political decision-making in particular and deliberative democratic theory in general, it is important to address a key criticism of Honneth's work, which McNay highlights in her critique of the role that the idea of 'recognition' plays in contemporary social and cultural theory. According to McNay, Honneth's account of intersubjective identity formation is based upon an inadequate understanding of power relations.[53] In making her argument, McNay argues that the principal problem with Honneth's account of intersubjective identity formation is that it relies upon the 'naïve' presumption that the subjective experience of suffering and hardship in contemporary society necessary leads to 'spontaneous and authentic feelings with inherent moral status',[54] which motivate individuals to engage in contestatory political activity. To evidence her claim,

[50]Bourdieu, Pierre. et al., *The Weight of the World: Social Suffering in Contemporary Society*, p.628.
[51]Bourdieu, Pierre. et al., *The Weight of the World: Social Suffering in Contemporary Society*, p.629
[52]Bourdieu, Pierre. et al., *The Weight of the World: Social Suffering in Contemporary Society*, p.628
[53]McNay, Lois, *Against Recognition*, (Cambridge and Malden, Massachusetts: Polity Press, 2008), pp.126 – 147.
[54]McNay, Lois, *Against Recognition*, p.138.

McNay refers to the comments that Honneth makes about individuals being motivated to challenge the status quo through their experiences of being unable to engage in social relations that are characterised by positive normative sentiments, i.e. through their experiences of moral 'shame'.[55] In McNay's eyes, what Honneth misses when he makes this argument is the fact that individuals' development as subjects is coexistent rather than subsequential to power relations and, as such, 'no straightforward continuum between suffering and oppositional consciousness' exists.[56] Rather, McNay argues, it is far more likely that those who suffer will experience affective states of being that undermine rather than motivate their participation in politics: 'suffering might simply be internalized....[in] resignation, frustrated, rage and boredom'.[57] Indeed, McNay argues that Bourdieu's concept of 'habitus' is preferable to Honneth's account of intersubjective identity formation precisely with regards to explaining these issues. This is, McNay contends, because Bourdieu's ideas about 'habitus' treat power relations and individuals' development as subjects as coeval or coexistent and, as such, recognize that 'emotions are not elemental or spontaneous givens, but are a type of social relation that are generated by, and mediate the interactions between, embodied subjects and social structures'[58] and, in doing so, reminds us 'there is no-prepolitical realm of suffering – no discourse that speaks for itself – waiting to be discovered'[59] and that 'all experience is shaped by pre-constituted discourses'.[60]

[55]McNay, Lois, *Against Recognition*, p.139.
[56]McNay, Lois, *Against Recognition*, p.139.
[57]McNay, Lois, *Against* Recognition, p.140.
[58]McNay, Lois, *Against Recognition*, p.138.
[59]McNay, Lois, *Against Recognition*, p.139.
[60]McNay, Lois, *Against Recognition*, p.139.

McNay is right to raise concerns about the impact that differences between people have on their development and praxis as subjects, including with regards to their affective states of being. The modern-day working-class of Rotherham which Charlesworth analyses is, after all, not just any group in society, but one that is deprived and socially stigmatized. The chances are, then, that those individuals who belong to this group are affected by the experience of living in contemporary society in ways that differ from those who belong to groups that are materially better off and have more status. Likewise, research into the experience of belonging to a disadvantaged group in society reveals that those who belong to these groups are more likely to suffer from affective states of being that make it difficult for them to express and talk about their experiences than those who belong to relatively advantaged groups. To illustrate this point, it worth reflecting on Hosu Kim's account of the personal experience of growing up as a member of the Korean diaspora in the United States. In this, Kim explains that her being caught between her home and host culture led her to experience a particular kind of humiliation and shame[61] that affected her in such diffuse, immediate, and severe ways that she was (and still is) unable to properly comprehend, let alone articulate and talk about, her experiences growing-up. Writing about the interplay between her cultural heritage, the extreme effort it takes to talk about their experiences, and affective aspects of her personhood, Kim writes thus: 'the broken tongue not only denotes the political economy of language in English, of the dominant society, but also makes claims to many

[61]Kim, Hosu, 'The Parched Tongue', in Clough, Patricia Ticineto and Jean Halley, eds., *The Affective Turn: Theorizing the Social,* 1st edn., (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 2007)

different, unrecognized tongues, bodies, and memories'[62] and 're-membering our tongue has been embodiment of shame, pain, and violence'.[63]

McNay is also right that Honneth's focus in his earlier work is on explaining how social struggles arise at least partially as a consequence of people's inabilities to be recognised by their social peers rather than exploring connections between their affective states of being and problems with their participation in social struggles and political praxis per se. Indeed, there are points in Honneth's earlier work where he seems to dismiss these issues altogether, especially when he explains that his aim is to demonstrate how people's inability to be recognized by their social peers acts as the driving force behind contestatory activity in the public sphere and as a motor for wider, social progress: 'processes of societal change are to be explained with reference to the normative claims that are structurally inherent in relations of mutual recognition'.[64] Having said that, the connection that Honneth traces between 'moral shame' and the 'crisis in communication' that he identifies makes it clear that he is aware that it is not always the case that people will be able to act in the ways that he envisions, but, rather, that their ability to do so depends upon the conditions of the societies they live in:

> '…empirically, whether the cognitive potential inherent in feeling hurt or ashamed becomes a moral-political conviction depends upon above all on how the affected subject's cultural-political environment is constructed: only if the means of articulation of a social movement are available can the experience of disrespect become a source of motivation for acts of political resistance'.[65]

[62]Kim, Hosu, 'The Parched Tongue', p.34.
[63]Kim, Hosu, 'The Parched Tongue', p.39.
[64]McNay, Lois, *Against Recognition*, p.2.
[65]Honneth, Axel, *The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts*, pp.138 – 139.

In addition, in his more recent work, Honneth specifically explores how people's experiences of living in social conditions that are characterized by power relations between socio-cultural groups negatively affects the bodies and bodily states of being of those who have the least amount of power, making it especially difficult for them to engage in activities in the public-political sphere, including mounting effective challenges to the status quo. In *Disrespect: The Normative Foundations of Critical Theory* in particular, Honneth argues that agencies of social reproduction in late capitalist society, including the media, education system, and forums of public debate, create a particular type of cultural exclusion that consists of strategies that limit the opportunities that people have to articulate their experiences as cohesive, successful social movements, especially with regards to experience of the modern-day working-class:[66] 'those sectors of the horizon of individual experience which consist of class-specific deprivations and injuries are thereby largely excluded from public discussion, and can be expressed at the individual level only with great effort'.[67] Likewise, in his debate with Nancy Fraser in *Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Debate*, Honneth explains that his intention is to create a critique of contemporary society that addresses a fundamental flaw in other approaches towards analysing the social, especially in older Critical Theory. This flaw, according to Honneth, lies 'in the tacit initial premise that "social movements" can serve…as a kind of empirically visible guiding thread for normatively relevant problem areas [in contemporary society]'[68] whereas, in reality, Honneth argues that social struggles are often prevented from reaching this level of articulation in the public sphere

[66]Honneth, Axel, *Disrespect: The Normative Foundations of Critical Theory*, (Cambridge and Malden, Massachusetts: Polity Press, 2007), p.88.
[67]Honneth, Axel, *Disrespect: The Normative Foundations of Critical Theory*, p.88.
[68]Honneth in Fraser, Nancy and Axel Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange,* (London and New York: Verso, 2003), p.120.

because those who belong to them are unable to engage in the types of social relations that would otherwise allow them to develop the affective tendencies and dispositions that are conducive to their engagement in society as full and equal members.[69] Bringing this evidence together, comments that Honneth makes in both earlier and later stages of his work demonstrate that he is aware of power relations in contemporary society along with the way that they get into or inside of people's bodies, producing different kinds of affective tendencies and dispositions, the result of which is a situation in which not all individuals are able to articulate their experiences and/or engage in cohesive, well-organised political praxis to challenge the conditions that they live within. How, then, do these claims by Honneth impact on the contentions that deliberative democrats like Habermas and Benhabib make about the process of moral and political decision-making?

To answer the question of what insights into people's affective habits and dispositions in contemporary society mean for Habermas's and Benhabib's models of decision-making, it is worth briefly re-examining the demands that both thinkers make of processes of moral and political judgement in order for the outcomes that they generate to be treated as legitimate. For Habermas, these demands include restricting speech acts to those with high locutionary content alone,[70] limiting the topic of discussions to matters of justice rather than the good,[71] and basing the process upon 'an inclusive and noncoercive rational discourse between free and equal participants' in which individuals recognize

[69]Honneth in Fraser, Nancy and Axel Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition: A Political-Philosophical Exchange*, pp.135. – 159.
[70]Habermas, Jürgen, *Postmetaphysical Thinking: Philosophical Essays,* trans. Hohengarten, William Mark, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1992), p.80.
[71]Habermas, Jürgen, *Postmetaphysical Thinking: Philosophical Essays*, p.190. and p.191.

each other and enlarge 'their interpretive perspectives' to create a 'collective we-perspective'. [72] For Benhabib, who broadly endorses Habermas's model of 'discourse ethics' when outlining her own, deliberative model of democracy, they require that certain 'features' needed to be present in order to ensure those who are involved have the equal opportunity to express their viewpoints and listen to others.[73] These features are that participation in such deliberation is governed by the norms of equality and symmetry and that all of the subjects who are involved have the same chances to initiate speech acts, to question, to interrogate, and to open debate, have the right to question the assigned topics of conversation, and have the right to initiate reflexive arguments about the very rules of the discourse procedure and the way in which they are applied or carried out.[74] On the most basic level, what Habermas's and Benhabib's models therefore clearly rely upon is the ability of the subjects who are involved to articulate their concerns and respond to others' points of view with the same level of expression and articulation. Here, though, is where accounts of contemporary society reveal a fundamental flaw with deliberative accounts of moral and political decision-making and Habermas's and Benhabib's models in particular – namely, that people are not always willing and/or able to talk about their experiences, especially in public and in front of others, because of a range of reasons, including the fact that they are often too ashamed and blame themselves for their suffering, their experiences are too raw and painful to talk about, and their experiences are so upsetting that they defy comprehension let alone articulation in public settings.

[72]Habermas, Jürgen, in *The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory,* eds. Cronin, Ciaran and Pablo De Greiff, (Cambridge and Maldon, Massachusetts: Polity Press, 2005), pp.57. - 58.
[73]Benhabib, Seyla, 'Toward a Deliberative Model of Political Legitimacy', in Benhabib, Seyla, ed., *Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political*, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1996), p.71.
[74]Benhabib, Seyla, 'Toward a Deliberative Model of Political Legitimacy', p.70.

Moreover, accounts of contemporary society also suggest that the individuals who are the least willing and/or able to talk about their experiences are those who have the least and suffer the most in society.

In fairness to Benhabib, she at least recognizes that there are problems with basing models of moral-political reasoning and decision-making upon too stringent or demanding methods of engagement. When criticizing other, normative political theories, including Habermas's model of 'discourse ethics', Benhabib explains that she rejects the idea that subjects need to articulate their concerns as universalist, formal claims of justice, claiming that doing so has a tendency to exclude the voices of disadvantaged groups in society with histories of oppression and exploitation by erasing the particularity of their experiences. [75] So too, in her slightly later work, Benhabib acknowledges that individuals sometimes enter into political real-world discussions and negotiations with confused, incomplete or inconsistent viewpoints:

> 'on complex social and political issues, more often than not, individuals may have views and wishes but no ordered set of preferences, since the latter would imply that they would be enlightened not only about the preferences but about the consequences and relative merits of each of their preferred choices in advance'.[76]

Having said that, Benhabib, like Habermas, presumes that individuals' experiences as 'concrete beings' provide them with sets of perspectives and viewpoints that emanate from their particular backgrounds and histories and

[75]See Benhabib, Seyla, *Situating the Self: Gender, Community, and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics,* 1st edn., (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), especially the introduction and chapters 3 and 5.
[76]Benhabib, Seyla, 'Toward a Deliberative Model of Political Legitimacy', p.71.

reflect their own conceptions of the good.[77] Moreover, Benhabib claims that the deliberative process helps contribute to individuals' resolving of partial perspectives and/or inconsistencies in their viewpoints.[78] What underpins Benhabib's work is, then, a presumption that those who are involved in the process of moral and political reasoning are capable of understanding their experiences at least on some level and are also willing to articulate the concerns and perspectives that they generate in front of others. This presumption is, however, precisely that aspect of the deliberative ideal that research into suffering and immiseration reveals as being false, suggesting that if deliberation were to play a key part in making decisions about moral and political matters, there will be sections of society that simply cannot participate and, as such, are unable contribute to the decisions that the deliberative process produces. Moreover, the likelihood is that the individuals who are the least able to participate are those who are the most disadvantaged and suffer the greatest. Making an argument that is similar to this in her critique of deliberation, Young argues that because deliberative frameworks of conflict resolution operate within the idiom of those individuals and groups in society who have the most power in society, they consistently produce outcomes that exclude the experiences of those that lack power.[79] Therefore, from Young's perspective, the problem with deliberation lies in the fact some people and groups in society are better practised at making "use" of deliberation, which, in turn, renders them more successful as deliberative and, indeed, political subjects.

---

[77]See Benhabib, Seyla, *Situating the Self: Gender, Community and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics*, especially chapter 5.
[78]Benhabib, Seyla, 'Toward a Deliberative Model of Political Legitimacy', p.71.
[79]Young, Iris, Marion, 'Inclusive Political Communication: Greeting, Rhetoric, and Storytelling in the Context of Political Argument', (Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, 1998), pp.6. – 7.

At this point in the discussion, it is important to address a possible response that advocates of deliberation might make to criticism of deliberative accounts of democracy and Habermas's and Benhabib's models of moral and political decision-making in particular concerning the reality of embodied existence. Specifically, the argument that could be made that whilst it is important to acknowledge the destructive affect that living in contemporary society has on individuals', their bodies, and praxis, it is possible to design inclusive and egalitarian political practices and arrangements that are committed to implementing the key principles and values of deliberation. According to this perspective, the challenge for advocates of deliberation is to think about how to design institutional arrangements and structures in order to deliver the deliberative ideal (or at least some aspect of quality of the deliberative ideal) whilst avoiding excluding or disadvantaging sections of society, especially with the reality of embodied existence in mind. In order words, how to take the best bits of deliberation and make them workable in the real world given the reality of embodied existence.

In contemporary political theory, there is a growing trend towards thinking about how institutional arrangements and procedures might be arranged and organised so as to respond to changing patterns of political participation in contemporary society. Associated with this trend is a broad range of empirical research into what Graham Smith calls 'democratic innovation',[80] which, amongst other things, considers how aspects of the ideal of deliberation might be implemented in the real world so as to respond to concrete problems and issues

[80]Smith, Graham, *Democratic Innovations: Designing Institutions for Citizen Participation*, (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 2009)

such as political inequality, exclusion, and apathy. Notable amongst the research into 'democratic innovation', which Smith discusses,[81] is the work on randomly selected mini-publics, participatory budgeting, and e-democracy, all of which seek to incorporate deliberative elements such as respectful interpersonal interaction, succinct, well-reasoned intersubjective discussion, and neutral collective agreements or consensuses in real-world, political decision-making.

With regards to work on mini-publics, a number of contemporary democratic thinkers have made the case in favour of incorporating randomly selected bodies within contemporary political systems. Four decades ago, Robert Dahl began exploring the potential of incorporating randomly selected advisory councils into already existing systems of political decision-making in advanced industrial democracies[82], claiming that,

> 'Suppose an advanced democratic country were to create a 'minipopulus' consisting of perhaps a thousand citizens randomly selected out of the entire demos. Its task would be to deliberate, for a year perhaps, on an issue and then to announce its choices…one minipopulus could exist for each major issue on the agenda. A minipopulus could exist at any level of government – national, state, or local…In these ways…the democratic process could be adapted once again to a world that little resembles the world in which democratic ideas and practices first came to life'.[83]

More recently, and viewing randomly selected bodies as a replacement or alternative to the institutions of advanced industrial democracies rather than a complement to them, other contemporary democratic thinkers have considered how selection for legislative assembles might no longer be based on competitive

[81]See, Smith, Graham, *Democratic Innovations: Designing Institutions for Citizen Participation*,
[82]See Dahl, Robert, *After the Revolution*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), pp.149. – 153. and Dahl, Robert, *Democracy and Its Critics,* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989)
[83]Dahl, Robert, *Democracy and Its Critics,* p.340.

elections, but some form of random selection instead.[84] Some of these thinkers even advocate using a process of random selection to create minipublics that extend beyond the nation state to oversee global political issues affairs. Bruno Frey and Alois Stutzer, for example, argue in favour of implementing global, randomly selected bodies that are made up of citizens that have been randomly chosen from all nations to oversee the constitution of international organisations such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund.[85]

Like thinkers who advocate the use of randomly selected minipublics, thinkers with an interest in participatory budgeting explore how already existing democratic systems of government can be innovated and, as such, improved upon. As an institutional design, participatory budgeting originates in Porto Alegre in Brazil in 1989. Complex, the design has evolved over time, adjusting to become more technically efficient, mobilize citizens, and disseminate knowledge about the administrator's activities. However, the key elements are as follows:[86] a combination of popular assemblies at the neighbourhood and regional (or district) level with regional representative forums that allow citizens who are elected at

[84]For examples, see Barnett, Anthony and Peter Carty, *The Athenian Option: Radical Reform for the House of Lords,* (London: Demos, 1998), Bridgehouse, Harry and Erik Olin Wright, 'A Proposal to Transform the House of Lords into a Citizens' Assembly', https://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~wright/Published%20writing/Democratizing-House-of-Lords.pdf., Burnheim, John, *Is Democracy Possible?,* (Cambridge: Polity, 1985), and Goodwin, Barbara, *Justice by Lottery,* (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2005)

[85]Frey, Bruno and Alois Stutzer, 'Strengthening the Citizens' Role in International Organizations', *Review of International Organizations,* 2006, vol.84., pp. 338. – 342. See also, Mansbridge, Jane, James, Bohman, Simone Chambers, Thomas Christiano, Archon Fung, James Parkinson, Dennis Thompson, and Mark. E. Warren 'A Systematic Approach to Deliberative Democracy', in Parkinson, John and Jane Mansbridge, eds., *Deliberative Systems*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012) and Fishkin, James S., *Democracy and Deliberation: New Directions for Democratic Reform,* (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1991). For a discussion of the work of thinkers who have an interest in 'minipublics' see Parvin, Phil, 'Is Deliberative Democracy Feasible: Political Disengagement and Trust in Liberal Democratic Societies', pp.419. – 420.

[86]For a discussion of the history and key features of participatory budgeting, see Smith, Graham, *Democratic Innovations: Designing Institutions for Citizen Participation*, especially chapter 2.

popular assemblies to control and shape the distribution of a large amount of the city's budget through reviewing investment priority lists that are created at the neighbourhood level to create an overall, regional priority list. From here, the Council of the Parliamentary Budget (also known as the Municipal Budget Council), comprising of elected budget councillors from each region and thematic area, a representative from the union of neighbourhood associations, and a representative from the municipal employees' union, then produces the budget for investments prioritised by the budget forms in line with clear criteria for their making decisions. In 2000/2001, for example, the three criteria for decision-making were 'the priorities established by the residents; shortcomings in services and basic facilities; and population base'.[87] Finally, the Mayor reviews the budget and it is presented to the city's legislative assembly, after which the Council of the Parliamentary Budget meets to discuss and decide what rules ought to guide the distribution of resources the following year. As Smith discusses, for thinkers who are sympathetic to the idea of participatory budgeting, the idea is appealing because it incorporates elements of popular or decentralised political decision-making such as open engagement, grass-root involvement, and face-to-face interaction, but combines these elements with mechanisms for ensuring those discussions are converted in determinate outcomes that are capable of guiding actual political praxis.[88] This strength, as Smith also discusses, is lacking from other, decentralised methods of democratic decision-making such as popular assemblies and practices that are associated with the term 'participatory appraisal' such as interviews with marginalized groups, group discussions and exercises,

[87]Gret, Marion and Yves Sintomer, *The Port Alegre Experiment: Learning Lessons for Better Democracy*, (London: Zed Books, 2005), p.44.
[88]Smith, Graham, *Democratic Innovations: Designing Institutions for Citizen Participation*, pp.30. – 71.

preference ranking, drawing, and mapping, all of which have failed to prove themselves as inclusive, empowering, and practical in the real world.[89] As Smith explains with reference to the well documented example of the New England town meetings and less well known Chicago Community Policing meetings,

> 'while designs [such as these] offer impressive modes of engagement in self- and co-governance respectively, there are limits to the extent to which they can be used as templates for citizen engagement at higher levels of authority. What is particularly attractive about PB as established in Porto Alegre is the way in which engagement in an area of strategic policy is grounded in open popular assemblies and yet can realise a compelling combination of goods of democratic institutions. The institutionalisation of this form of participatory governance has mobilised citizens from social groups who are traditionally difficult to engage and drawn them into a transparent budgetary decision-making process.[90]

Finally, in the work of thinkers who have an interest in e-democracy, the focus is on exploring how advances in information and communication technology might offer a route to expanding and deepening citizens' engagement with, and participation in, politics. In some commentators' eyes, despite extensive innovations in how information and communication technology is used commercially, the state been comparatively slow to consider how phenomena such as the internet, smart phones, and AI might be used with regards to political decision-making.[91] Having said that, there are a number of contemporary democratic thinkers and political parties and politicians who are keenly interested in the intersection of politics and information and communication technology and what this intersection might mean for increasing citizens' political participation. Together, their efforts proffer a range of digital and computerized designs for

[89]Smith, Graham, *Democratic Innovations: Designing Institutions for Citizen Participation*, pp.30. – 71.
[90]Smith, Graham, *Democratic Innovations: Designing Institutions for Citizen Participation*, pp.70 – 71.
[91]For a critical review of the relationship between technology and politics, see Smith, Graham, *Democratic Innovations: Designing Institutions for Citizen Participation*, especially chapter 5.

involving more, ordinary citizens in the political, decision-making process, mostly by creating means for virtual interaction and communication. These designs include using aspects of information and communication technology such as email, SMS messaging, and websites to modernize the archetypical Town Meeting between citizens and political representatives, open online discussion forums, some of which are specifically devoted to political matters, ICT-enabled direct legislation that allows voting through digital or virtual means, secure websites that allow ordinary citizens and political representatives to engage with one another, and online deliberative polling as found in some of Fishkin's most recent work, which allows geographically dispersed persons to deliberate topics.[92]

Clearly, research into 'democratic innovation' offers new ways of thinking about politics, including the question of how the ideal of deliberation and aspects of that ideal might be realised the real-world. Empirical evidence also lends weight to the arguments that advocates of innovative democratic mechanisms such as mini-publics, participatory budgeting, and e-democracy make, suggesting that they may well offer a means of making the actual practice of political decision-making processes more inclusive and egalitarian. In Canada, for example, a number of Citizens' Assemblies, comprising of randomly selected members and an independent Chair, have been organised to review the current electoral system and recommend changes if necessary. Although they have not yet led to electoral change, these assemblies are credited with giving the participants crucial opportunities for learning, allowing them to ask questions, share ideas,

[92]Ackerman, Bruce and James S. Fishkin, *Deliberative Day*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004)

build consensus, generate solutions, and so forth.[93] In addition, the system of participatory budgeting that is used in Porto Alegre is held to have mobilised large sections of society, notably the least advantaged and poorest, that have typically resisted political participation.[94] Furthermore, whilst it is still early days in terms of knowing the impact that technology and communication technology have had and will continue to have on citizens' participation in politics - this is, not least, because of the constant innovation that is taking place - there are early signs that as long as access to information and communication technology is equitable, it may provide a means of making formal processes of political decision-making more inclusive and egalitarian. This includes by making it easier for individuals to give their opinions on matters, increasing knowledge about political matters, and helping them to build the necessary confidence to speak up, including in front of others.[95] Reflecting the positive attitude towards information and communication technology regarding the potential that it is held to have to improve real-world politics by making it more inclusive and egalitarian, Tom Watson, Deputy Leader of the UK Labour Party, is quoted as saying,

> 'It feels like the Labour frontbench is further away from our members than at any point in our history and the digital revolution can help bring the party closer together ... I'm going to ask our NEC to see whether we can have digital branches and digital delegates to the conference. Not replacing what we do but providing an alternative platform. It's a way of organising for a different generation of people who do their politics differently, get their news differently'.[96]

---

[93]Citizens' Assembly on Electoral Reform, *Making Every Vote Count: The Case for Electoral Reform in British Columbia (Technical Report),* (Vancouver: Citizens' Assembly on Electoral Reform, 2004), p.240.
[94]See Smith, Graham, *Democratic Innovations: Designing Institutions for Citizen Participation*, pp.30 – 71.
[95]For example, see Fountain, Jane, *Building the Virtual State: Information technology and Institutional Change,* (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2001)
[96]Waugh, Paul, "Tom Watson Interview: On Jeremy Corbyn, Tony Blair, Leveson, Digital Democracy; And How He Sleeps At Night", *The Huffington Post*, 30th July 2005

That said, whilst models of democratic innovation may well be better equipped to deal with the reality of life as an embodied being than more conventional, deliberative models of democracy are, being mindful of the experience of living in contemporary society and the harmful, disruptive, and destructive affect that it has on individuals suggests that there are good reasons for remaining sceptical about how deep and wide ranging the success of those mechanism can be. Firstly, much of the work and research surrounding the idea of democratic innovation is still fairly new and, as such, unproven. Secondly, for as long as contemporary society remains unjust and harmful to people's physical and mental wellbeing, which evidence suggest that it is and will continue to be unless major steps are taken and changes are made,[97] then it is likely that some sections of society, especially those that have the least and suffer the most, will continue to struggle and find it very difficult, if not impossible, to fully understand and talk about their experiences, especially in front of other others in public settings. The question that therefore remains, which chapter five answers by calling for a "realistic" approach towards thinking about the question of what kind of politics is best suited to and fits with contemporary society, is how best to use research into democratic innovation and harness the potential, democratic value of mechanisms such as mini-publics, participatory budgeting, and e-democracy to make the process of creating decisions about moral and political matters more inclusive and egalitarian whilst remaining mindful of embodied existence and what it means for people, in the broadest possible sense.

[97]For example, see Wilkinson, Richard and Kate Pickett, *The Spirit Level: Why Equality is Better for Everyone*, Charlesworth, Simon, *A Phenomenology of Working Class Experience,* and Honneth, Axel, *The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts*

Here, a pause in the discussion is warranted in order to make an important clarification: the aim of this discussion is not to claim that people who belong to disadvantaged groups in society lack political agency or simple comply and acquiesce with the conditions that they live in. Rather, the aim of this discussion is threefold. Firstly, to show how damaging the experience of living in contemporary society is, not only to people's bodily states of being, but also their capacities to do certain things, including to articulate themselves in discussions about moral and political matters. Secondly, to illustrate why, if implemented, deliberative models of moral and political decision-making in general and Habermas's and Benhabib's models in particular are likely to produce unfair, exclusionary agreements that reflect the interests of those who belong to groups that suffer the least and occupy the most privileged positions in society. Thirdly, as the final section of chapter three now discusses, to investigate how the claims that Habermas and Benhabib make about what the process of moral and political decision-making ought to look like risk excluding precisely those moments of 'immanent critique' that both thinkers spend so much time and energy trying to include in their models of moral and political reasoning. In order to explore this final point further, the final section of chapter three uses Deleuze's ideas about the body, which are indispensable for the contemporary 'turn to affect'[98] in the humanities and social science, to explore how the experience of living life in contemporary society as an embodied being not only affects individuals

[98]This term is taken from analyses of the increasing interest in the ideas of 'affect' in the humanities and social science. See Leys, Ruth, 'The Turn to Affect: A Critique', *Critical Inquiry*, Spring 2011, vol.37., no.3., pp.434. – 472., Clough, Patricia Ticineto, 'Introduction', in *The Affective Turn: Theorizing the Social*, and Hoggett, Paul and Simon Thompson, eds., *Politics and the Emotions: The Affective Turn in Contemporary Political Studies*, (New York and London: Bloomsbury, 2012)

negatively, but also helps to generate praxis that defies patterns of oppression and contests the status quo.

Deleuzean Bodies: The Capacity to Affect and to be Affected

The concept of 'affect' has become increasing popular in discussions in the humanities and social science over the last twenty or so years. Used by Baruch Spinoza, and elaborated on by thinkers like Henri Bergson, Deleuze, and Guatarri, to emphasise bodily experience, current-day writings about 'affect' use the term to refer to aspects of being human that are related to, but not quite the same as, feeling and emotion. As Gregory Seigworth and Melisa Gregg explain in the introduction of *The Affect Theory Reader* – one of the first published compendiums of essays about the subject of 'affect':

> 'affect, at its most anthropomorphic, is the name we give to those forces – visceral forces beneath, alongside, or generally *other than* conscious knowing, vital insisting beyond emotion – that can serve to drive us toward movement, toward thought and extension, that can likewise suspend us (as if in neutral) across a barely registering accretion of force-relations, or that can even leave us overwhelmed by the world's apparent intractability'.[99]

For thinkers who belong to the 'affective turn', the notion of 'affect' is helpful for two, interrelated reasons. Firstly, for providing a means of referring to those aspects of bodily existence and experience that lie somewhat outside of conscious perception and that mainstream paradigms of representation struggle to capture. Secondly, for helping to explain how and why individuals change and develop over time. Indeed, for thinkers like Brian Massumi, whose work is almost

[99]Seigworth, Gregory, J., and Melissa Gregg, 'An Inventory of Shimmers', in Gregg, Melissa and Gregory J. Seigworth, eds., *The Affect Theory Reader,* (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 2010), p.1.

canonical for affect theorists, 'affect' is *the* means of explaining how new activities or practices emerge, including those that are different from the norm and challenge the status quo. As Massumi explains in his conversation with Mary Zournazi in *The Politics of Affect,* 'I use the concept of affect as a way of talking about that margin of manoeuvrability, the "where we might be able to go and what we might be able to do" in every present situation. I guess "affect" is the word I use for "hope"'.[100]

To illustrate how thinkers like Massumi use the notion of 'affect' to explain the emergence of new and/or innovative practices, it is worth reflecting on Deleuze's ideas about the body, which are vital for many of the 'vectors' in current-day discussions about affect.[101] As commentators on his work note, the body does not actually feature as a specific category of investigation in Deleuze's work.[102] In addition, Deleuze's ideas about the body are fairly obscure and difficult to understand. Indeed, Deleuze rejects the idea that it is possible to determine precisely what the body is, frequently using the term 'body' to refer to a broad range of things rather than a corporeal body.[103] As a consequence, the body is, in a sense, both nowhere and everywhere in Deleuze's writings, occupying a key, although complicated, role in his philosophical system of thought.

[100]Massumi, Brian, *Politics of Affect,* (Cambridge and Malden, Massachusetts: Polity Press, 2015), p.3.
[101]Seigworth, Gregory, J. and Melissa Gregg, 'An Inventory of Shimmers', p.6.
[102]For example, see Guillaume, Laura and Joe Hughes (eds.), *Deleuze and the Body,* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011)
[103]For example, see Olkowski, Dorothea, 'Tragedy. Nihilism, and the Body without Organs', in Boundas, Constantin V., and Dorothea Olkowski, eds., *Gilles Deleuze and the Theatre of Philosophy*, (Abingdon, Oxford and New York: Routledge, 1994)

Despite complications in his treatment of the matter, at the heart of Deleuze's ideas about the body lie two ideas. Firstly, that the body ought to be understood as an affected assemblage of every-changing intensities and energies. According to Rosi Bradotti, one of the most prominent Deleuzean thinkers in discussions about affect, in Deleuze's eyes, the body is not an essence or a biological substance, but, rather, 'a play of forces, a surface of intensities; pure simulacra without originals' that achieve equilibrium fleetingly and come together differently, in different ways, and at different times to produce new states of being.[104] Likewise, Eugene Young and his collaborators explain in *The Deleuze and Guattari Dictionary* that, for Deleuze, the body cannot be defined in terms of forms, processes, functions, organs, or subjects in the manner that science or medicine dictates, but, rather, ought to be thought of as kinetic in terms of an infinite number of particles that are in constant relations of 'motion and rest'[105] and dynamic in terms of having the capacity for 'affecting and being affected'.[106] Secondly, although Deleuze talks about 'the body' singular, he does not define the body in isolation from other bodies, but, rather, claims that it is always imbricated in wider webs of affective relations with other organic and also inorganic phenomena. Indeed, it is this imbrication of individuals' bodies with one another that, according to Deleuze, imbues individuals with the capacity to be affected by the world and to affect it in return, producing new configurations and concentrations of bodily energies and intensities, which, he claims, only define an individuals' state of being and existing at any given point in time and space. Deleuze writes thus: 'a body affects

[104]Braidotti, Rosi, *Nomadic Subjects: Embodiment and Sexual Difference in Contemporary Feminist Theory,* 2nd edn., (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), p.247.
[105]Young, Eugene, B., Gary Genosko, and Janell Watson, *The Deleuze and Guattari Dictionary,* (Bloomsbury Academic, 2013) pp.123 – 124.
[106]Young, Eugene, B., Gary Genosko, and Janell Watson, *The Deleuze and Guattari Dictionary* pp.123 – 124.

other bodies, or is affected by other bodies; it is this capacity for affecting and being affected that also defines a body in its individuality'.[107]

Deleuze's ideas about the 'Body without Organs',[108] which he develops in conjunction with Guattari, serve to illustrate his avowedly non-traditional ideas about the body. When Deleuze first introduces the term 'Body without Organs', he uses it to trace differences between two peripheral ways of encountering the world: The Little Girl (whose exemplar is Alice)[109] and the Schizophrenic (whose exemplar is Artaud)[110]. Explaining what sets Alice and Artaud apart, Deleuze claims that whilst Alice explores the metaphysical world of 'surfaces', the ever changing and shifting realm of social appearances and words, which nonetheless function and seem make sense,[111] Artaud is a superior explorer of 'depths', who rejects sense-making surfaces and returns, instead, to the 'body without organs', which operates 'entirely by insufflation, respiration, evaporation and fluid transmission.[112] Here, even at this earlier stage of Deleuze's writings about the 'Body Without Organs', the body is therefore presented in a non-traditional manner, as something that is disassembled and comprising of a minutia of corporeal functions and processes rather than an entity that is easily divisible into

[107]Deleuze, Gilles, 'Ethology: Spinoza and Us' in *Incorporations* (eds. Crary, Jonathan and Sanford Kwinter) (MIT Press, 1992), p.625.
[108]For a brief definition of the term 'Body without Organs', see Buchannan, Ian, *Oxford Dictionary of Critical Theory*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010)
[109]The Alice Deleuze refers to is Alice in Wonderland from the novels by Lewis Carroll. For a discussion of the role Alice plays in Deleuze's work, see Olkowski, Dorothea, 'After Alice: Alice and the Dry Tail', *Deleuze Studies*, vol.2, issue supplement, pp.107. – 122.
[110]Antonin Artaud was a French dramatist, poet, actor, and theatre director, widely recognized as one of the leading figures of the twentieth century theatre and European avant-garde. Throughout his life, Artaud suffered from mental illness, frequently being committed to psychiatric institutions. The phrase 'the body without organs', which Deleuze uses in both his independent work and his work with Guattari, comes from Artaud's 1947 radio play, 'To Have Done with the Judgement of God'.
[111]See Deleuze, Gilles, 'The Schizophrenic and the Little Girl', in Deleuze, Gilles, *The Logic of Sense,* trans. Boundas, Constantin V., Mark Lester, and Charles J. Stivale, (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2015)
[112]Deleuze, Gilles, 'The Schizophrenic and the Little Girl', p.101

discrete parts such as mind and body. In his later work, Deleuze then develops the notion of a 'Body without Organs' further along these lines, explaining that thinking about the body in a non-traditional way is vital for helping to contest sources of social control in contemporary society and forms of repression and stratification that engender them. In his collaboration with Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze specifically asks, 'How do you make yourself a Body without Organs?' before explaining that 'You never reach the Body without Organs, you can't reach it, you are forever attaining it, it is a limit'.[113] What the 'Body without Organs' actually consists of, then, is experimenting with the body: using it in new and innovative ways so that its intensities and speeds change to produce new states of being. In fact, it is this experimentation that, Deleuze and Guattari argue, enables the disruption of efforts to maintain social structures and place limits on the body.[114]

Before moving on to consider the import that Deleuze's ideas about the body have for understanding 'affect', especially with regards to explaining how new activities and practices that defy the status quo arise, it is important to consider and also respond to a criticism of Deleuze's ideas about the 'Body without Organs'. According to Deleuze's critics, one of the central problems with the idea is that it presents the body as being in a constant state of change and flux. What then, Deleuze's critics ask, is the 'Body without Organs' able to tell us about the body and what it is?[115] Not very much, is their answer. Moreover, his critics argue

[113]Deleuze, Gilles and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia,* trans. and foreword. Massumi, Brian, new edn., (New York: Continuum, 2004), p.165.
[114]Deleuze, Gilles and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, pp.175. - 178.
[115]See Buchanan, Ian, 'The Problem of the Body in Deleuze and Guattari, Or, What Can a Body Do?', *Body & Society*, September 1997, vol.3., no.73., pp.73. – 91.

that there are some points in his and Guattari's formulation of the notion of 'Body without Organs' where the two thinkers come worryingly close to endorsing the wanton destruction or annihilation of the body. Drug takers and masochists, for example, which are groups that Deleuze and Guattari provide as examples the 'Body without Organs',[116] do, as their critics point out, indeed challenge social conventions, but, they also run the risk of causing themselves pain and suffering in the process.[117] Is it the case, Deleuze's critics ask, that subscribing to the notion of the 'Body without Organs' means endorsing reckless, potentially harmful behaviour towards the body in either theory and/or real-life practice?[118] Yes, his critics argue, the answer would seem to be.

As thinkers who defend and draw upon Deleuze's ideas point out, the notion of the 'Body without Organs' is not actually intended to provide an explanation for what the body is or what it should be. Rather, it is a statement about what the body can do or is capable of once more traditional understandings about it are abandoned.[119] In other words, it is a device that is intended, firstly, to show how imposing order on the body by treating it in traditional ways, such as being divisible into component parts or organs, forecloses the inherent potential it has for attaining new, previously unknown and unpredictable states of being and, secondly, to inspire people to reject this way of thinking about their bodies, and, in doing so, help to disrupt the status quo. As Ian Buchanan explains, although

[116]Deleuze, Gilles and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, pp.166. - 168.
[117]Here, a question might be raised about whether or not it is right to judge these activities and to what extent the effect they have on individuals constitutes a discernible 'harm'.
[118]See Buchanan, Ian, 'The Problem of the Body in Deleuze and Guattari, Or, What Can a Body Do?'
[119]Buchanan, Ian, 'The Problem of the Body in Deleuze and Guattari, Or, What Can a Body Do?', p.73.

there is much 'fear' and 'confusion' surrounding the way Deleuze treats the body, 'the body…is not and cannot be a body without organs, but must forever grapple with the [Body without Organs] as its conduit to the real'.[120] In a similar vein, Braidotti, who draws on Deleuze's ideas of the body to develop her concept of 'nomadic subjects', claims that, following Deleuze's ideas about the body, 'we simply must assume that we do not know what the body can do, what our embodied selves are capable of'.[121] In fact, in *A Thousand Plateaus,* Deleuze and Guattari distinguish between three kinds of healthy and not-so-healthy forms of the 'Body without Organs' - cancerous, empty, and full - that seem to head-off concerns that their critics voice. The empty 'Body without Organs'*,* Deleuze and Guattari explain, is 'catatonic' in that is completely deorganized, with the energies and flows that comprise it having no direction, and, as such, non-productive. The full 'Body without Organs', which is, in their opinion, the healthy 'Body without Organs' is productive, but not stuck or petrified in its organization. Lastly, the cancerous 'Body without Organs' is that which, they argue, is trapped in a pattern of endless reproduction of the self-same pattern and, again, unproductive.[122] Describing how to attain the healthy 'Body without Organs', Deleuze and Guattari write thus:

> 'This is how it should be done. Lodge yourself on a stratum, experiment with the opportunities it offers, find an advantageous place on it, find potential movements of deterritorialization, possible lines of flight, experience them, produce flow conjunctions here and there, try out continua of intensities segment by segment, have a small plot of new land at all times. It is through a meticulous relation with the strata that one succeeds in freeing lines of flight, causing conjugated flows

[120]Buchanan, Ian, 'The Problem of the Body in Deleuze and Guattari, Or, What Can a Body Do?', p.88.
[121]Braidotti, Rosi, *Nomadic Subjects: Embodiment and Sexual Difference in Contemporary Feminist Theory*, p.12.
[122]See Deleuze, Gilles and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia,* pp.165. – 184.

> to pass and escape and bringing forth continuous intensities for a BwO'.[123]

Today, Deleuze's ideas about the body and claims about the 'Body without Organs' continue to be the subject of much debate. However, the claim that we do not yet know what the body can do or is capable of is indispensable for affect theory, especially for expressing the idea, to use Lone Bertelson and Andrew Murphie's words, that 'each event, each body, carries the "affective potential" for things to turn out differently', including in ways that contradict or undermine the status quo.[124] In Massumi's work, for example, which draws heavily upon Deleuze's ideas about the body, affect is defined as autonomic bodily responses, stemming from a 'visceral' type of perception that precedes and exceeds conscious states of perception.[125] Yet, instead of treating the body's various processes and responses as reducible to empirical quantification, as is the approach that is typically taken towards them in science or medicine, Massumi draws on philosophical terminology to frame individuals' autonomic bodily responses as emergent and indeterminate acts that contribute to bridging the gap between the 'actual' or what-currently-is and the 'virtual' or what-is-yet-to-be.[126] Moreover, Massumi uses the claims that he makes about the body's various responses and processes to the world that surrounds it as 'emergent' and indeterminate acts to explain the emergence of activities and praxis that are

[123]Deleuze, Gilles and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and* Schizophrenia, p.178.
[124]Bertelsen, Lone and Andrew Murphie, 'An Ethics of Everyday Infinities and Powers: Félix Guattari and the Refrain', in Gregg, Melissa and Gregory J Seigworth., eds., *The Affect Theory Reader*, p.153.
[125]See Massumi, Brian and Mary Zournazi, 'Navigating Moments', in Zournazi, Mary, ed., *Hope: New Philosophies of Change,* (Annandale, New South Wales: Pluto Press, 2002)
[126]See Bertelsen, Lone and Andrew Murphie, 'An Ethics of Everyday Infinities and Powers: Félix Guattari and the Refrain', in *The Affect Theory* Reader, p.145

unexpected and innovative in that they lie outside of the usual patterns of being and behaving. Discussing anger in particular, Massumi explains that,

> 'I think affective expressions like anger…are perhaps the most powerful because they interrupt the situation. They are negative in that sense. They interrupt the flow of meaning that's taking place: the normalized interrelations and interactions that are happening and the functions that are being fulfilled…Anger…forces the situation to attention, it forces a pause'.[127]

To illustrate Massumi's claims about how the body's capacity to be affected can lead to the emergence of activities and praxis that go against, and even challenge, the status quo, it is worth exploring Kruks's comments about women's lived experience of sexism and misogyny, which she makes during her wider exploration of affective aspects of embodied existence.[128] As Kruks acknowledges, women are not a unified social group and, as such, their experiences differ according to their race, ethnicity, sexuality, and class. However, in Kruks's eyes, important commonalities between women exist, especially when it comes to how they are treated by their social peers. These commonalities, Kruks argues, centre upon women being disrespected by their social peers and subjected to daily forms of violence, harassment, and abuse, including seemingly trivial cases of abuse such as 'sexist and objectifying remarks made by a passing group of men'[129] and more extreme cases like rape and domestic abuse. When reflecting on the shared aspects of women's experience, Kruks argues that when women are mistreated by their social peers it affects them negatively and in ways that are potentially limiting to, or detrimental for, their agency. Referring to the humiliation that is caused to a woman by being cat-called

[127]Massumi, Brian, *Politics of Affect*, pp.8. – 9.
[128]See Kruks, Sonia, *Retrieving Experience: Subjectivity and Recognition in Feminist Politics,* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2001)
[129]Kruks, Sonia, *Retrieving Experience: Subjectivity and Recognition in Feminist Politics*, p.147.

in the street as an example, Kruks explains that 'she [the woman] feels herself become an object in response…She tightens, shrinks, and turns rigid (thing like); she feels her face flush, her hands sweat, her stomach knot'.[130] Yet, Kruks also argues that, at the same time, women's experiences of being maltreated by their social peers can lead them to feel, think, and do things that interrupt rather than comply with the situation, including, at one end of the spectrum, being angered enough to throw back a verbal retort[131] and, at the other, being motivated to engage in activity that speaks out and contest the current conditions of contemporary society. [132] To illustrate this argument, Kruks cites her own, personal experience of meeting a woman who had the visible signs of being physically assaulted during the time she spent as a volunteer at a battered women's shelter in London. As Kruks explains, despite not feeling these injuries herself nor sharing in the women's experience of receiving them or what led up to this moment, seeing the women's bruises and other physical injuries caused a range of immediate, physical reactions in her body such as her stomach knotting and feeling nauseous and also triggered in her a deep desire to help this women and stop others from suffering as she had.[133] In other words, it was her feeling both "for" and "with" this women that made her want to do something to change the situation. Indeed, when discussing the import of her work in general. Kruks argues that the ability individuals' have to "feel" with others as she did with the women that she met at the battered women's shelter can provide the foundation for a modern-day women's movement that is capable of uniting women from

[130]Kruks, Sonia, *Retrieving Experience: Subjectivity and Recognition in Feminist* Politics, p.147.
[131]Kruks, Sonia, *Retrieving Experience: Subjectivity and Recognition in Feminist Politics*, p.147.
[132]Kruks, Sonia, *Retrieving Experience: Subjectivity and Recognition in Feminist* Politics, chapters 5 and 6.
[133]Kruks, Sonia, *Retrieving Experience: Subjectivity and Recognition in Feminist Politics*, p.166.

diverse backgrounds and histories. Speaking about the possibility of 'feminist world travelling', Kruks explains as follows:

> 'I take it as my starting point…that affective relations are desirable, even necessary, for a viable feminist movement precisely because of our difference…To sustain any kind of long-term feminist movement in the face of a multiplicity of distinctions in power and privilege among women, forms of recognition that are grounded in affect are also necessary. Feelings of concern for others must develop'.[134]

There is, of course, a long way to go from affective expressions like anger and frustration to full-blow forms of social unrest and contestation. Moreover, the route from one to the other is far from simple with many complexities and complications. However, a point to take away from the work of thinkers who utilise the notion of 'affect' to explain personal and social change is that even though people's bodies are shaped to accord with the conditions they live within, there is always the possibility for their experiences of suffering, humiliation, immiseration, and so forth, to generate moments of schism, which carry with them the potential for things to turn out differently. From this perspective, the experience of living in contemporary society is best understood as imbuing individuals with affective habits and dispositions that make it difficult for them to articulate and express themselves, but, at the same time, also open up the potential for them to speak out and be motivated to engage in collective forms of action. The likelihood is, though, as Honneth points out in his critical engagement with the tendency Critical Theory has to focus on well organised social movements,[135] that when these moments of social contestation and unrest, i.e. 'immanent critique', do appear, they are unlikely to take the forms of well-articulated

[134]Kruks, Sonia, *Retrieving Experience: Subjectivity and Recognition in Feminist* Politics, p.155.
[135]For example, see comments that Honneth makes against Fraser's decision to focus on 'folk paradigms of injustice' in Fraser, Nancy and Axel Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition: A Political-Philosophical* Exchange, pp.111. – 125.

viewpoints or formal claims of justice in the ways that deliberative democrats like Habermas and Benhabib imagine and are instead more likely to be immediate and visceral in character. In other words, they are far more likely to take the form of praxis that deliberative democrats like Habermas and Benhabib explicitly reject as inappropriate for the modern political decision-making process when designing their models of moral and political reasoning. Consequently, by deeming these forms of praxis as inappropriate for inclusion in the contemporary process of coming to decisions about moral and political matters, deliberative democrats like Habermas and Benhabib risk excluding precisely those moments of 'immanent critique' that they work so hard to include in their normative political theories. With this in mind, the question that remains is given the reality of embodied existence and what it means for individuals, both in terms of what they can do in their day-to-day lives and what they can do with regards to their participation in politics, what should the contemporary political decision-making process look like? Before reflecting on this question and ultimately arguing in favour of a "realistic" approach towards answering it, chapter four of this thesis engages with another key question in contemporary political theory, which is especially important for thinkers who belong to the tradition of critical theory such as myself. Specifically, how is best to understand what is unfair or unjust about contemporary society and, in doing so, explain what makes those who live within it unequal from one another, including with regards to their participation in the process of generating decisions about moral and political matters?

4. Redistribution or Recognition? Reflections on Axel Honneth and Nancy Fraser's Political-Philosophical Exchange

As chapter one discusses, one of the central aims of critical theorists is to identify what makes contemporary society unjust. As chapter one also discusses, typically in critical theory this aim is reflected in a commitment to deep social critique, which is intended to encourage moments of 'immanent critique' during which ordinary people become more aware of injustice and more motivated to challenge that injustice themselves. In Habermas's and Benhabib's work, which stands out from earlier critical theory in this regard, the commitment to understanding and revealing what is unjust about contemporary society differs. For, whilst Habermas and Benhabib create critiques of contemporary society that are intended to shed light on pathological structures, arrangements, and processes that are within it, they also proceduralise the process of 'immanent critique', incorporating it into their models of moral and political decision-making.

Given this thesis's focus on identity and difference, one might expect it to endorse a recognition-centric account of injustice. More specifically, one might expect this thesis to agree with the argument that contemporary society and the

structures and arrangements that govern ought to be understood as unjust because they currently fail to adequately 'recognize' individuals' identities and differences in individuals' socio-cultural backgrounds and histories that they are connected to. In Charles Taylor's work, which is indispensable for this way of thinking about politics and the so-called "turn" towards 'recognition' in contemporary political theory that has occurred since the 1990s, the argument that society is unjust because it fails to properly recognize individuals' identities and differences is reflected in the contention that 'recognition' is not just a courtesy that individuals owe to each other, but, rather, a 'universally acknowledged',[1] 'vital human need'[2] that requires political implementation in the public sphere.[3] Likewise, Iris Marion Young,[4] whose discussion about what justice in contemporary society requires forms part of the "turn" towards "recognition" since the 1990s, not only broadly endorses the notion of 'recognition', but also claims that an adequate conception of justice must acknowledge group difference instead of taking what she deems as being a 'difference-blind'[5] approach.

Certainly, this thesis agrees with recognition theorists like Taylor and Young about the importance of appreciating the connection between injustice and differences between individuals pertaining to their socio-cultural backgrounds and histories. In particular, this thesis advocates appreciating the deep and longstanding impact that differences between people, including those that relate to

[1]Taylor, Charles, 'The Politics of Recognition', in Taylor, Charles, *Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition*, ed. and intro. Gutmann, Amy, (Princeton, New Jersey and Chichester, West Sussex: Princeton University Press, 1994), p.26.
[2]Taylor, Charles, 'The Politics of Recognition', p.26.
[3]Taylor, Charles, 'The Politics of Recognition', p.37.
[4]For example, see Young, Iris Marion, *Justice and the Politics of Difference,* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990) and Young, Iris Marion, 'Unruly Categories: A Critique of Nancy Fraser's Dual Systems Theory', *New Left Review*, 1997, vol.0., no.222., pp.147. – 161.
[5]Iris Marion Young, *Justice and the Politics of Difference,* p.3.

their backgrounds and histories, have on the type and range of things that they can do. Even more specifically, the impact that differences between people have on the abilities that individuals who belong to different groups in society have to communicate with one another and act as successful political subjects. That said, this thesis also disagrees with thinkers like Taylor and Young about treating injustice as explainable solely due to problems with how people and their identities are recognized by others. This is, not least, because the reality of embodied existence and life as an embodied being reveals the constructed and inherently power-ridden nature of individuals' identities. To use these identities and the differences between individuals that they are associated with as the basis for politics is, therefore, to treat as natural or innate something that is actually contingent and, in doing so, risk reproducing those facets and relations of power that shape individuals 'identities' and inform differences between individuals or, more accurately, perceived differences between individuals in the first place.

To contribute to the pressing debate in contemporary critical theory about how best to understand injustice, chapter four uses insights into life as an embodied being to engage with Honneth and Fraser's seminal philosophical-political discussion in *Redistribution or Recognition?*, which provides one of the most significant contributions to discussion about injustice in contemporary critical theory in recent times. Taking Honneth and Fraser's disagreement about the ontological accuracy of the terms 'redistribution' and 'recognition' as its starting point, chapter four argues, firstly, that whilst it may be possible to explain differences and, indeed, inequalities between individuals through the paradigm of 'recognition', there are distinct advantages to adopting an approach that is based

upon the interrelated, but conceptually distinct notions of 'redistribution' and 'recognition' instead. These advantages include helping to generate a more empirically accurate account of the toll that individuals' experiences of living in contemporary society takes on their physical, emotional, and mental states of being and, as such, produce a better understanding of the problems that people face when it comes to their participation in politics. Then, after outlining the argument in favour of endorsing a two-dimensional approach to understanding injustice, chapter four considers the implications of using the claims that Honneth and Fraser make about how injustice in contemporary ought to be understood to produce a normative theory of justice, concluding, ultimately, that whilst it may be possible to endorse a 'recognition-centric' approach as Honneth does, there are good reasons for instead endorsing a 'two-dimensional' approach like Fraser's. These reasons include helping to side-step a number of issues that flow from using the notion of 'recognition' by itself to explicate injustice. These issues include 1) explaining "away" aspects of embodied existence that are detrimental to individuals and their participation in society as full and equal members as personal faults or intersubjective flaws and 2) reifying aspects of individuals' personhoods that are actually the contingent products of power relations and contribute to making individuals with different background and histories unequal with one another in the first place.

Understanding Injustice: 'Redistribution' or 'Recognition'?

At the start of their debate in *Redistribution or Recognition?*, Honneth and Fraser explain that they agree that understanding what is unfair or unjust about

contemporary society requires attending to inequalities that are typically associated with the notions of 'redistribution' *and* 'recognition': 'an adequate understanding of justice must encompass at least two sets of concerns: those that are cast in the Fordist era as struggles of distribution and those often cast today as struggles of recognition'.[6] At the same time, Fraser and Honneth also explain that this is where they part company with one another. For, whilst Fraser believes that understanding what is unjust about contemporary society requires endorsing a 'two-dimensional' model of injustice that treats disparities between people that are associated with the terms 'redistribution' and 'recognition' as interrelated, but conceptually distinct, Honneth believes that all that is unfair or unjust about contemporary society can be subsumed under the single rubric of 'recognition'. Referring to this fundamental difference in their approach to critiquing contemporary society, Fraser and Honneth thus explain:

> 'One of us, Axel Honneth, conceives recognition as the fundamental, over-arching moral category, whilst treating distribution as derivative…The other one, Nancy Fraser, denies that distribution can be subsumed under recognition. Thus, she proposes a "perspectival dualist" analysis that casts the two categories as co-fundamental and mutually irreducible dimensions of justice.'[7]

To justify the claims that they make about how injustice ought to be understood, Fraser and Honneth cite what, in their minds, are indicators of displeasure or dissatisfaction in contemporary society. In the case of Fraser, these indicators are social movements that are aimed at attaining a more just distribution of resources such as material goods and wealth and social movements that demand society is more respectful of people's socio-cultural differences. In

[6]Fraser and Honneth in Fraser, Nancy and Axel Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange,* (London and New York: Verso, 2003), p.2.
[7]Fraser and Honneth in Fraser, Nancy and Axel Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange*, p.3.

the case of Honneth, they are the multitude of ordinary, more or less well-articulated expressions of suffering and immiseration, which, he argues, are generated by people's experiences of being denied respect by their social peers and positive forms of acknowledgment, that is to say, 'recognition', by others.

When making the case for understanding injustice as she does, Fraser starts by reasserting claims she that makes in her 1996 Tanner Lectures on Human Values,[8] which revise a subsection of her earlier, 1995, article, 'From Redistribution to Recognition? Dilemmas of Justice in a 'Post-Socialist' Age'.[9] According to Fraser, in today's world, claims about social justice are divided into two types. On the one hand, and most 'familiar' amongst these, are redistributive claims, which seek a more just distribution of resources such as material goods and wealth. On the other hand, are less well-established, but increasingly prominent, demands for redress that are framed by a 'politics of recognition' and argue in favour of a 'difference-friendly world'.[10] Fraser argues that in contemporary society, these two distinct approaches towards thinking about social justice tend to be associated with one of two 'folk paradigms' about injustice, which correspond with specific social movements. The outcome of this correlation is, Fraser contends, that whilst claims of justice that are framed around 'redistribution' are typically associated with class politics, those that are connected to a 'politics of recognition' tend to be assimilated to 'identity politics', which is, in turn, equated with struggles of

[8]Fraser, Nancy, 'Social Justice in the Age of Identity Politics: Redistribution, Recognition, and Participation', (Delivered at Stanford University as part of The Tanner Lectures on Human Values) (April 30 – May 2, 1996), reprinted in Ray, Larry and Andrew Sayer, eds., *Culture and Economy After the Cultural Turn*, (London: Sage Publications, 1999)
[9]Fraser, Nancy, 'From Redistribution to Recognition? Dilemmas of Justice in a 'Post-Socialist' Age', *New Left Review,* July 1995, vol.1., no.212., pp.68 – 93.
[10]Fraser in Fraser, Nancy and Axel Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange*, p.7.

specific socio-cultural groups in society pertaining to gender, sexuality, nationality, ethnicity, race, and so forth.[11] Setting out the foundation of her critique of contemporary society, Fraser explains that, 'the terms "redistribution" and "recognition" refer…to *folk paradigms of justice*, which inform present-day struggles in civil society'.[12]

To illustrate her comments about the 'constellation'[13] of discourse and praxis about injustice in contemporary society, Fraser invites the reader to engage in a hypothetical 'thought experiment' to consider where disadvantaged and subordinated social groups ought to be placed on a spectrum of injustice that runs from matters of 'redistribution' to matters of 'recognition'.[14] The result of this experiment is, according to Fraser, a "spread" of delineated types of injustice. At one end lie social groups, which Fraser refers to as 'exploited classes', that are subject to 'redistributive' forms of injustice that stem from the economic structure of society.[15] At the other end lie social groups, which Fraser refers to as 'despised sexualities', that suffer from issues pertaining to 'recognition' that are traceable back to the 'status order' of society and corresponding institutionalized patterns of cultural value that deem only some lifestyles to be worthy of respect and denigrate others.[16] In the middle, however, things 'become murkier'[17] according to Fraser,

[11]Fraser in Fraser, Nancy and Axel Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange*, p11.
[12]Fraser in Fraser, Nancy and Axel Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange*, p.11.
[13]Fraser in Fraser, Nancy and Axel Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange*, p.11.
[14]Fraser in Fraser, Nancy and Axel Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange*, p.16.
[15]Fraser in Fraser, Nancy and Axel Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange*, pp.16. – 17.
[16]Fraser in Fraser, Nancy and Axel Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange*, pp.17 – 19.

with groups like women and ethnic minorities that combine features of both exploited classes *and* despised sexualities. Referring to social groups that fall into this middling category as 'bivalent' and 'two-dimensional' collectivities,[18] Fraser writes:

> 'when we posit a type of social division located in the middle of the conceptual spectrum, we encounter a hybrid form that combines features of the exploited class with features of the despised sexuality…two-dimensionally subordinated groups suffer both maldistribution and misrecognition *in forms where neither of these injuries is an indirect effect of the other, but where both are primary and cooriginal'*.[19]

Like Fraser, Honneth uses real-world sentiments of displeasure and dissatisfaction to formulate his critique of contemporary society. However, unlike Fraser, Honneth charts everyday instances of suffering and immiseration, arguing that doing so contributes to building a more nuanced and thorough account of injustice than Fraser's focus on 'folk paradigms of injustice' and organized social movements provides. Specifically, Honneth explains that he believes, as Fraser does, that the task of Critical Theory is accurately to reflect the concerns of ordinary people, struggling against the conditions within which they live, i.e. to unearth already existing moment of 'immanent critique'. However, Honneth also argues that rather than focusing on concerns that are visible in the public sphere, this aim is best served by attending to less well articulated, disorganized, everyday expressions of suffering - 'simply recalling' the 'everyday dimension of

---

[17]Fraser in Fraser, Nancy and Axel Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange*, p.19.
[18]Fraser in Fraser, Nancy and Axel Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange*, p.16.
[19]Fraser in Fraser, Nancy and Axel Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange,* p.19.

moral feelings of injustice'[20] - and that, when this task is complete, what is shown is that what is typically called 'injustice' in theoretical language is, in reality, experienced by those who are affected 'as social injury to well-founded claims to recognition'.[21] In other words, Honneth believes that all that is unfair or unjust about contemporary society can be traced back to individuals' inability to be recognized by others. Summarising how he and Fraser differ with regards to the explanations for what makes contemporary society unfair or unjust, Honneth writes as follows: 'it…seems more plausible to me that experiences of injustice can be conceived along a continuum of forms of withheld recognition – of disrespect – whose differences are determined by which qualities or capacities those affected take to be unjustifiably unrecognized or not respected'.[22]

At first glance, insights into experience of living within a body as an embodied being broadly support Honneth's claims about injustice in contemporary society being caused by the inability that people have to be "recognized" by others. Take, for example, the descriptions of *la petite misère* (ordinary, everyday suffering) that are detailed in the summaries of interviews that Bourdieu and his colleagues carried out with ordinary French citizens in *The Weight of the World'*, which Honneth cites to support his claims about 'recognition' being 'the appropriate tool for categorically unlocking the social experience of injustice as a whole':[23] 'anyone seeking a rough overview of typical forms of socially caused suffering…

[20]Honneth in Fraser, Nancy and Axel Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange*, p.114.
[21]Honneth in Fraser, Nancy and Axel Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange*, p.114.
[22]Honneth in Fraser, Nancy and Axel Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange*, p.136.
[23]Honneth in Fraser, Nancy and Axel Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition: A Political-Philosophical* Exchange, p.154.

would not be ill advised to consult the impressive study *The Weight of the World'*.[24] One respondent, *Lydia,* explains how the suffering that she experiences in her day-to-day life is traceable back to others' ridiculing and criticizing her for her inability to find a job.[25] Another respondent, *Corrine,* tells the interviewer about the misery that she experiences at work due to her inability to gain respect from others.[26] In both of these cases, the painful, physically and mentally draining effects that living in contemporary society have on individuals and their bodies are traceable back to their inability to be "recognized" by family members and the wider circle of social peers. Yet, delving a little deeper, at the same time that the interviewees' responses lend weight to Honneth's claims about injustice in contemporary society having one, root cause, i.e. the inability of individuals to be "recognized" by others, they also undermine his argument and support Fraser's claims that injustice in contemporary society ought to be understood as having two distinct, but interrelated causes. *Lydia* explains, for example, that the feelings of frustration and self-loathing that she experiences because of her inability to find a job are caused not only because she is ridiculed by others, but also because her lack of a job means that she suffers from material impoverishment and a lack of access to economic resources.[27] In a similar manner, *Corrine* explains that the distress that she experiences is as much a result of the lack of alternative, well-

[24]Honneth in Fraser, Nancy and Axel Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange*, p.118.
[25]See Bourdieu, Pierre, et al., *The Weight of the World: Social Suffering in Contemporary Society,* trans. Ferguson, Priscilla Pankhurst, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999), pp.370. – 381.
[26]See Bourdieu, Pierre. et al., *The Weight of the World: Social Suffering in Contemporary* Society, pp.529. – 535.
[27]See Bourdieu, Pierre. et al., *The Weight of the World: Social Suffering in Contemporary* Society, pp.370. – 381.

paid employment opportunities as her failure to be positively regarded and acknowledged by others.[28]

In fact, whilst Honneth claims that all of what is unfair and unjust about contemporary can be traced back to individuals' inability to be "recognized' by others, research into the experience of living within the body as an embodied being supports Fraser's argument that, for some groups in society at least, only 'redistributive' forms of injustice are relevant. Take Andrew Sayer's sociological research into the 'morality' of the working class.[29] Sayer argues that to access the experience of belonging to the modern-day working class, it is necessary to take account of 'sentiments such as pride, shame, envy, resentment, compassion and contempt'.[30] These forms of 'affect', Sayer argues, are not just emotions or feelings, but, rather, evaluative judgements that enable the researcher to pinpoint phenomena impacting on the individual and their lives.[31] In Sayer's hands, therefore, 'affect', i.e. that aspect of living within the body as an object that is both shaped by the world and shapes it in return, is treated as a means of gaining access to the experience of living in contemporary society in a manner that is akin to the way that Honneth treats suffering as an indication of injustice i.e. as an access point to already existing instances of 'immanent critique'. Taking shame as a specific example, Sayer argues, that whilst it may be true that members of the working class often lack recognition by others, analyses of their being ashamed reveal that 'redistributive' forms of injustice are the most pressing and relevant

[28]See Bourdieu, Pierre, *et al., The Weight of the World: Social Suffering in Contemporary Society*, pp. 529. – 535.
[29]See Sayer, Andrew, 'Class, Moral Worth and Recognition', *Sociology*, 2005, vol.39., no.5., pp.947. – 963. and Sayer, Andrew, *The Moral Significance of Class*, (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005)
[30]Sayer, Andrew, 'Class, Moral Worth and Recognition', p.1.
[31]Sayer, Andrew, 'Class, Moral Worth and Recognition', pp.2. – 6.

reasons for why they suffer in their lives.[32] As he explains, '…the poor are not disadvantaged primarily because others fail to value their identity and misrecognize and undervalue their cultural goods, or indeed because they are stigmatized…rather they are disadvantaged primarily because they lack the means to live in ways which they as well as others value'.[33] Indeed, Sawyer argues that whilst members of the working class are often treated badly by others, the fact that they are treated badly is traceable back to their lack of material indicators that would otherwise lead them to be regarded as worthy of respect rather than vice versa as Honneth might argue. As Sayer explains, using Frasers' words, there can be, therefore, 'no recognition without redistribution'[34] and, in the case of some social groups at least, especially those Fraser labels as 'exploited classes', forms of injustice only pertain to the notion of 'redistribution'. Bringing insights into suffering that it provides together, the implication of research like *The Weight of the World* and Sayer's analysis is that injustice is best understood as having two distinct, but interrelated axes that people who belong to different groups in society suffer from in different combinations and to varying degrees.

Actually, Honneth is anything but unaware of 'redistributive' forms of injustice, overly acknowledging that history has witnessed a '…trend toward growing impoverishment of large parts of the population; the emergence of a new "underclass" lacking access to economic as well as sociocultural resources: the steady increase of the wealth of a small minority'.[35] Yet, to respond to insights into embodied existence that sociological research reveals and to address the

[32]Sayer, Andrew, 'Class, Moral Worth and Recognition', pp.6. – 8.
[33]Sayer, Andrew, 'Class, Moral Worth and Recognition', p.1.
[34]Sayer, Andrew, 'Class, Moral Worth and Recognition', p.12.
[35]Honneth in Fraser, Nancy and Axel Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical* Exchange, p.112.

challenge that they pose to his claim that 'recognition must represent the unified framework for [a critical social theory],'[36] Honneth has to show how and why inequalities in society, which are usually referred to by the term 'redistribution', are subsumable under the term of 'recognition'. Or, to use Christopher Zurn's words, prove that 'issues of material distribution' can be 'systematically integrated' into his 'overarching theory of intersubjective recognition'.[37]

Unsurprisingly, perhaps, integrating redistributive forms of injustice into his theory of recognition is precisely the task that Honneth sets himself in *Redistribution or Recognition?,* albeit after providing an initial overview of his recognition-centric approach towards understanding what is unfair and unjust about contemporary society. As the next section of chapter four argues, however, even with the adjustments that Honneth makes to his account of injustice in order to incorporate 'redistributive' inequalities, Fraser's account of injustice is still more effective when it comes to painting an empirically accurate picture of what is unjust about contemporary society. This strength of Fraser's work is, as the next section of chapter four also argues, especially apparent when it comes to understanding the complexity of the reasons behind the toll that individuals' experiences of living in contemporary society takes on their bodies and bodily states of being, which, in turn, renders it particularly difficult for some individuals to live their lives to the full and fully engage in society, including by participating effectively in the political decision-making process.

[36]Honneth in Fraser, Nancy and Axel Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical* Exchange, p.113.
[37]Zurn, Christopher, 'Recognition, Redistribution, and Democracy: Dilemmas of Honneth's Critical Social Theory', *European Journal of Philosophy,* 2005, vol.13., no.1., pp.86. – 126., p.91.

Understanding 'Redistributive' Inequalities as Struggles for 'Recognition'

To show how and why 'redistributive' forms of injustice can be explained through the paradigm of 'recognition', Honneth produces a historical reconstruction of the 'recognition order' (i.e. an account of how people regard or treat each other have changed over time) that treats 'distributional conflicts'[38] as the product of a 'specific struggle for recognition'[39] concerning the interpretation and evaluation of the idea of achievement.[40] According to Honneth, during the transition from pre-modern to modern, late capitalist society, patterns of recognition have become increasingly institutionally differentiated, allowing for the development of normatively positive patterns of recognition.[41] These positive patterns of recognition, Honneth argues, include the universalist recognition of individuals as rights-holders simply because they are persons, the acknowledgement of individuals as beings in need of love and care and the specialisation of familial personal relations to attend to these needs, and the conferring of social esteem to individuals according to the contribution that they make to society through their skill or ability.[42] Honneth also argues, though, that a persistent problem undermines patterns of recognition in modern, late capitalist society – namely, the ideological interpretation of the 'principle of achievement',[43] which is closely linked to the conferring of 'social esteem' and takes the activity of the

[38]Honneth in Fraser, Nancy and Axel Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical* Exchange, p.137.
[39]Honneth in Fraser, Nancy and Axel Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical* Exchange, p.137.
[40]Honneth in Fraser, Nancy and Axel Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical* Exchange, p.137.
[41]Honneth in Fraser, Nancy and Axel Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange,* pp.138. – 144.
[42]Honneth in Fraser, Nancy and Axel Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange*, pp.138. – 144.
[43]Honneth in Fraser, Nancy and Axel Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange*, p.140.

independent, middle-class, male bourgeois as its reference point.[44] Ultimately, Honneth argues, what the conflation of the conferring of social esteem with the principle of achievements results in is the production of 'hierarchically organized social relations' and acts of 'material violence' that distribute economic-material goods unfairly rather than according to the contribution that individuals and groups of individuals actually make to society through their labour, broadly understood.[45] To illustrate these claims, Honneth cites a number of disparaging and demeaning discourses about groups in society that Fraser refers to as 'exploited classes' and 'two-dimensional', 'bivalent' collectivities, which, in Honneth's opinion, result in the 'practical efforts' of individuals that belong to these groups not being viewed as proper forms of employment or work.[46] Discussing misogynistic ways of thinking about women that denigrate the labour that they carry out with regards to carework and childrearing in particular, Honneth explains as follows:

> 'Only this cultural mechanism, the (naturalistically grounded) denigration of female capacities for achievement, can explain how it is that that, on bourgeois-capitalist society's understanding of its own premises, the *de facto* women's activities of housework and childcare do not conceptually register as "work" at all…All this shows how much the legitimation of the social distribution order owes to cultural views of the contribution of different status groups or strata to social reproduction'.[47]

In the eyes of thinkers who are sympathetic to Honneth's work, his explanation for how and why 'redistributive' forms of injustice are explicable through the

[44]Honneth in Fraser, Nancy and Axel Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical* Exchange, p.141.
[45]Honneth in Fraser, Nancy and Axel Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical* Exchange, p.141.
[46]Honneth in Fraser, Nancy and Axel Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange*, p.148.
[47]Honneth in Fraser, Nancy and Axel Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical* Exchange, p.153.

paradigm of 'recognition' has distinct advantages *vis-à-vis* the work of other recognition theorists. Jean-Philippe Deranty claims, for example, that contrary to Marxist and Marxist-inspired objections to Honneth's critical social theory that claim that Honneth overlooks 'redistributive' forms of injustice, Honneth actually provides a valuable explanation for the role that struggles around the interpretation of societal norms play in processes of social reproduction.[48] In a similar vein, Zurn explains that although he has some reservations about Honneth's critical social theory overall, the connection that Honneth draws between 'redistributive' forms of injustice, problems of 'recognition', and socio-cultural difference has a number of advantages. These advantages include, on the most basic level, acknowledging the importance of redistributive equality as a category of injustice in contemporary society, which, Zurn claims, other recognition-centric theorists of injustice tend to simply ignore.[49]

Having said that, though supporters of Honneth's work might be correct about the strengths of his social critique *vis-à-vis* other recognition theorists, insights into embodied existence suggest that it is still better to treat 'redistributive' inequalities and inequalities pertaining to the opportunities that people have to be positively regarded by their social peers as distinct from one another as Fraser does. This is, not least, because doing so helps to separate the various strands of people's experiences of living in contemporary society as embodied beings and to capture qualitative differences between them. To illustrate this point, it is worth

[48]See Deranty, Jean-Philippe, 'Marx, Honneth and the Tasks of a Contemporary Critical Theory', *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice,* 2013, vol.16., pp.745 –758., p.745. and Deranty, Jean-Philippe, 'Injustice, Violence and Social Struggle. The Critical Potential of Honneth's Theory of Recognition', *Critical Horizons: A Journal of Philosophy and Social Theory,* 2004, vol.5., no.1., pp.297. – 322.
[49]Zurn, Christopher, 'Recognition, Redistribution, and Democracy: Dilemmas of Honneth's Critical Social Theory', p.98.

attending to biographical accounts (which often appear in semi-fictionalized form) that so-called housewives provide about the negative effect that their daily lives in contemporary society have on their physical, mental, and psychological states of being.[50] As Beate Rössler points out,[51] when one reads these accounts, which describe the isolation, the meaninglessness, and the torture of constant repetition in housekeeping and family work, the impression that is given is that social recognition is, indeed, one reason for their suffering.[52] However, a more appropriate interpretation, which Rössler delineates, would be that the women in question expect something *more* from their lives, something that might, indeed, provide social recognition, but might also be described as "rewarding" in a different sense. Picking up on this point in *Redistribution or Recognition?*, Fraser cites findings from a broad range of social research that suggests that those who live in contemporary society are unhappy and dissatisfied for not one, but a range of reasons.[53] These reasons include things that can be easily explained as facets of 'recognition' and things that can not, such as resentment at unearned privilege, abhorrence of cruelty, aversion to arbitrary power, revulsion against gross disparities of income of wealth, antipathy to exploitation, dislike of supervision, and indignation at being marginalised or excluded'.[54] Explaining why, in her opinion, it is misleading and inaccurate to try to subsume the discontent in contemporary society under a single rubric and, as such, argue that injustice has a single cause as Honneth does, Fraser writes, '…it is by no means clear that daily

[50]See, for example, Hochschild, Arlie and Anne Machung, *The Second Shift,* revised edn., (New York Penguin: Books, 2012)
[51]See Rössler, Beate, 'Work, Recognition, Emancipation', in Brink, Bert van den and David Owen (eds.), *Recognition and Power: Axel Honneth and the Tradition of Critical Social Theory,* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010)
[52]See Rössler, Beate, 'Work, Recognition, Emancipation'
[53]Fraser in Fraser, Nancy and Axel Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange*, p.203.
[54]Fraser in Fraser, Nancy and Axel Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange*, p.203.

discontent is always a matter of denied recognition. In fact, the idea that one single motivation under-lies all such discontent is prime facie implausible'.[55]

In reality, Honneth accepts that there are a multitude of sentiments and feelings about injustice in contemporary society, including those that Fraser mentions in her critique of his work. Honneth's wider point, though, which he reiterates throughout his debate with Fraser in *Redistribution or Recognition?*, is that beneath the variety of expressions of discontent that, he acknowledges, change from one historical and cultural context to the next,[56] it is possible to identify a single moral thread. This thread, Honneth refers to as the 'unitary structure of feelings of illegitimately withheld recognition'[57] when explaining, his 'hypothesis that all social integration depends upon reliable forms of mutual recognition, whose insufficiencies and deficits are always tied to feelings of misrecognition'.[58] In other words, for Honneth, the notion of 'recognition' alone captures all of what is unfair or unjust about contemporary society, regardless of what differences may or may not exist on the surface of how that injustice is articulated.

Honneth may be right about it being theoretically possible to expand the concept of 'recognition' so as to cover all expressions of injustice, including those that are commonly associated with the notion of 'redistribution'. The result, though, is a concept of recognition that is effectively meaningless for describing

[55]Honneth in Fraser, Nancy and Axel Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange*, p.203.
[56]Honneth in Fraser, Nancy and Axel Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange*, p.247.
[57]Honneth in Fraser, Nancy and Axel Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange*, p.246.
[58]Honneth in Fraser, Nancy and Axel Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical* Exchange, p.245.

what about contemporary society makes individuals unequal from one another if one takes seriously the task of using already existing forms of 'immanent critique' to produce an account of injustice. For, as Zurn points out,[59] if the concept of recognition is required to be all things to all people at all times, then Honneth is forced to confront a generality/concretisation dilemma.[60] According to this dilemma, Honneth must choose to adopt either an 'empirically accurate but theoretically useless abstract social theory' in which the idea of 'recognition' is broken down to cover all aspects of people's negative experiences of living in contemporary society to the point of "exploding" the concept. In other words, choose to endorse a concept of recognition and theory of injustice that is inadequate to describe the particular quality of the experiences that it is meant to capture i.e. the experience of being denied 'recognition'. Or, Honneth must choose to adopt a 'theoretically productive but empirically inaccurate concrete social theory' in which 'recognition' must be solely responsible for describing all of the aspects of people's experiences even when they themselves claim that they point towards distinct issues.[61] In other words, choose to endorse a concept of recognition and theory of injustice that it is inadequate to properly distinguish between differences in the quality of the sources of displeasure that people talk about in their phenomenological accounts. Making an argument that is similar to this in her debate with Honneth, Fraser explains that, contrary to Honneth's contentions, '…recognition alone cannot bear the entire burden of critical theorizing. By itself, it is not sufficient to capture the formative deficits of

[59]See Zurn, Christopher, 'Recognition, Redistribution, and Democracy: Dilemmas of Honneth's Critical Social Theory'
[60]Zurn, Christopher, 'Recognition, Redistribution, and Democracy: Dilemmas of Honneth's Critical Social Theory', p.105.
[61]Zurn, Christopher, 'Recognition, Redistribution, and Democracy: Dilemmas of Honneth's Critical Social Theory', p.105.

contemporary society, the societal processes that generate them, and the political challenges facing those seeking emancipation'.[62]

In fact, even if one accepts that it is theoretically possible for the concept of 'recognition' to be expanded to respond to all expressions of displeasure and discontent, being attentive to the reality of embodied existence suggests that there are still advantages to adopting a differentiated account of injustice as Fraser's does. To explore this point further, the next section of chapter four considers the implications of using the claims that Fraser and Honneth make about what is unfair or unjust about contemporary society to produce a normative theory of justice, especially with regards to how each thinker presents the causal reasons for injustice. Subsequently, to end the discussion, the final section of chapter four considers if problems that this thesis identifies with Honneth's recognition-central account of injustice can be remedied by endorsing an alternative, more mainstream, but still recognition-centric approach.

'Normative Monism' versus 'Perspectival Dualism'

On a fundamental level, both Fraser and Honneth are committed to using their explanations of what is unfair or unjust about contemporary society to provide guidance for how to improve pre-existing, socio-political-economic conditions. Fraser explains that, in an increasingly divided, diverse, and globalized world, it is necessary for a conception of justice to show how to adjudicate claims across

[62]Fraser in Fraser, Nancy and Axel Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange*, p.233.

'divergent value horizons'[63] whilst, at the same time, remaining non-sectarian and not favouring any particular lifestyle over the rest.[64] Fraser also explains that she believes that her account of injustice is uniquely placed to respond to this demand, especially when compared to Honneth's, which, she argues, fails to provide a practicable theory of justice'.[65] In a similar vein, but on the other side of the debate between Fraser and himself, Honneth explains that the underlying aim in his identification of 'recognition' as the sole category of injustice is to produce a conception of justice that can contribute to the realisation of social progress over time: 'it now seems justified [to me] to accept the historically developed recognition order of modern society as the normative presupposition of an egalitarian concept of justice in order to arrive at criteria for evaluating current processes of transformation'.[66]

Despite their joint desire to produce a robust normative theory of justice, Fraser and Honneth fundamentally disagree about what improving contemporary society requires. More specifically, whether it requires a singular or dualistic strategy. For Fraser, justice requires measures that treat material-economic inequalities, that is, those that are associated with the term 'redistribution', and problems with the ways that individuals are treated or regarded by others that stem from inequalities in the opportunities they have to be "recognized", separately. Both Fraser and Honneth refer to the understanding of justice that, Fraser argues, flows from these

[63]Fraser in Fraser, Nancy and Axel Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange*, p.223.
[64]Fraser in Fraser, Nancy and Axel Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange*, p.228.
[65]Fraser in Fraser, Nancy and Axel Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange*, p.228.
[66]Fraser in Fraser, Nancy and Axel Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical* Exchange, p.262.

claims as 'two-dimensional'[67] and reflecting a 'perspectival-dualist' approach to justice.[68] In contrast, Honneth argues that justice requires measures that aim solely at improving the quality of social relations in contemporary society and the normative sentiments that characterize them in order to tackle problems with the ways that individuals are regarded or regarded by others and, in doing so, give individuals the equal opportunity to be "recognized" by others. Both Honneth and Fraser refer to the approach towards thinking about justice that follows from these claims as being based upon the 'normative monism of recognition'.[69]

When outlining her theory of justice, Fraser appeals to the notion of 'participatory parity'.[70] Outlining what, precisely, she means by 'parity', Fraser makes two points. Firstly, she explains that since she coined the term in 1990, many social movements, especially those that are connected to the struggle for women's emancipation, have used it, with increasing frequency, to demand equal political representation in strictly numerical terms, such as calling for women to occupy 50% of seats in parliament and other political, decision-making bodies. Fraser explains that, in contrast, for her, 'parity' means the condition of one being a 'peer' and on a par or equal footing as everyone else. Consequently, Fraser leaves open the question as to exactly what degree or level of equality is necessary to ensure parity between people. Secondly, Fraser explains that, in her formulation, the term 'parity' refers, in the first instance, to the possibility that

[67]Fraser and Honneth in Fraser, Nancy and Axel Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition: A Political-Philosophical* Exchange, p.3.
[68]Fraser and Honneth in Fraser, Nancy and Axel Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition: A Political-Philosophical* Exchange, p.3.
[69]Fraser and Honneth in Fraser, Nancy and Axel Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition: A Political-Philosophical* Exchange, p.3.
[70]Fraser in Fraser, Nancy and Axel Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition: A Political-Philosophical* Exchange, p.36.

members of society have to engage in its various processes and, in the second, to what their participation should look like, if and when they choose to participate. As such, the notion of 'participatory parity' does not actually require that citizens participate in society's various processes and arrangements, but, rather, is committed to ensuring that individuals have the opportunity to do so, if they so wish.[71] Then, building on the idea of 'participatory parity', Fraser argues that "redistributive" inequalities and problems in society pertaining to the concept of "recognition" correspond to the economic 'class' a person belongs to and the social 'status' they have. By 'class', Fraser explains that she means the economic system in society that is structured in ways that complement market imperatives.[72] By 'status', Fraser explains that means the institutionalized pattern of norms that prevents some groups in society from gaining 'status"; leading to them being disrespected and treated poorly by others.[73] For, Fraser, what justice therefore requires are measures that are aimed at resolving problems with *both* the economic structure of society *and* the 'status system' within it. Fraser writes that,

> 'the normative core of my conception [of justice] is the notion of parity of participation…For participatory parity to be possible, I claim, at least two conditions must be satisfied…Thus, a two-dimensional conception of justice orientated to the norm of participatory parity encompasses both redistribution and recognition, without reducing either one to the other'.[74]

---

[71]Fraser makes this point to ensure that the term 'participatory parity' is not taken as an expression of the endorsement of one conception of the 'good' over others. This, Fraser argues, is a problem that has been particularly problematic in feminist discussions, in which claims are often made about the legitimacy and illegitimacy of different women's conceptions of the 'good'. To illustrate this point, Fraser cites Liberal Feminist claims about women's emancipation necessarily requiring the abandonment of traditional ideas about femininity and womanhood, which, they argue, are paternalistic and condescending, but other women deem to be an important and, indeed, valuable aspect of their worldviews. Fraser in Fraser, Nancy and Axel Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition: A Political-Philosophical* Exchange, p.101.
[72]Fraser in Fraser, Nancy and Axel Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition: A Political-Philosophical* Exchange, p.36.
[73]Fraser in Fraser, Nancy and Axel Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition: A Political-Philosophical* Exchange, p.36.
[74]Fraser in Fraser, Nancy and Axel Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition: A Political-Philosophical Exchange*, pp.36. – 37.

In *Redistribution or Recognition?* and elsewhere, Fraser argues that measures that are designed to tackle the economic structure of society and the status order within can take one of two approaches. Either they can 'affirm' pre-existing conditions or 'deconstruct' and radically alter them. The appropriateness of the choice, according to Fraser, depends what specific type of injustice or combination of injustice needs to be addressed.[75]

Like Fraser, Honneth bases his theory of justice upon a key 'moral principle': namely, the idea that society ought to be structured so as to give individuals the chance to engage in social relations that allow them to develop as autonomous beings and, in doing so, acquire the capacities that are necessary for them to engage in the 'public' side of social life as full and equal members.[76] When outlining his theory of justice, Honneth argues that whilst Fraser 'leaps' from the claims that she makes about what is unjust about contemporary society to the notion of 'participatory parity' without any obvious justification,[77] he proceeds from what, he argues, is the unified basis of social disconnect and displeasure, i.e. the disappointment of people's expectations of being 'recognized' by their social peers:[78] '…I proceed from the premise that the purpose of social equality is to enable the personal-identity formation of all members of society. For me this

[75]Elsewhere and in *Redistribution or Recognition?* Fraser argues measures that are designed to alter the economic structure and status order in contemporary society can take one of two approaches. Either, they can 'affirm' the pre-existing conditions or 'deconstruct' and radically alter them. The choice, according to Fraser, is dependant what social group in is question and what specific form or form(s) of injustice they suffer from. Fraser, Nancy, 'From Redistribution to Recognition? Dilemmas of Justice in a 'Post-Socialist' Age' pp.82. – p.86. and Fraser in Fraser, Nancy and Axel Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition: A Political-Philosophical* Exchange, pp.72. – 78.
[76]Honneth in Fraser, Nancy and Axel Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange*, pp.170. – 180.
[77]Honneth in Fraser, Nancy and Axel Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical* Exchange, pp.175. – 177.
[78]Honneth in Fraser, Nancy and Axel Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical* Exchange, pp.170. – 177.

formulation is equivalent to saying that enabling individual self-realization constitutes the real aim of the equal treatment of all subjects in our societies.[79] Then, drawing on his claims about what the aim of justice should be, Honneth argues that in order to give individuals the equal opportunity to become fully formed, autonomous beings, measures ought to be implemented that govern the ethical life of society so as to ensure that social relations are characterised by positive normative principles, particularly those that he identifies in his historical reconstruction of the recognition order: love, legal equality, and social esteem.[80] Furthermore, when Honneth proffers an abbreviated summary of the kinds of measures that, he believes, might be implemented in order to enhance social relations in this way, he argues that the most expedient route[81] to making society more just is to continue to advance the principle of legal equality into areas it does not currently cover and which are currently governed by more ideological principles.[82] Examples that Honneth cites to illustrate this point include the legal recognition of unpaid work and domestic labour, which is predominantly undertaken by women, [83] explaining, 'here, the central argument is that, in view of the structural domination of men in the private sphere, the preconditions for women's self-determination can only be secured when they take the form of

[79]Honneth in Fraser, Nancy and Axel Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical* Exchange, p.177.
[80]Honneth in Fraser, Nancy and Axel Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical* Exchange, p.180.
[81]To make this argument, Honneth explains he takes as given that the conditions of modern society are more normatively desirable than the conditions of pre-modern society. Honneth also explains that, in his opinion, the emergence of the institutionalized, rights-based sphere of recognition is the most significant difference between modern and pre-modern society. Thus, Honneth, explains that, for society to continue to progress and develop, it is necessary for the rights-based sphere of recognition and the laws that govern it to continue to advance. Honneth in Fraser, Nancy and Axel Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange*, pp.184. – 188.
[82]Honneth in Fraser, Nancy and Axel Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical* Exchange, pp.184. – 189.
[83]For an in-depth analysis of the import Honneth's account of justice has for feminist theory see Young, Iris Marion, 'Recognition of Love's Labour: Considering Axel Honneth's Feminism', in Brink, Bert van den and David Owen, eds., *Recognition and Power: Axel Honneth and the Tradition of Critical Social Theory*

contractually guaranteed rights, and hence are made an imperative of legal recognition'[84]

On the surface, little appears to separate Fraser and Honneth's normative theories of justice. Both thinkers are committed to a principle of 'equality' that, they argue, ought to pertain to all aspects and all levels of society. Both thinkers also believe that attaining equality between individuals requires reducing disparities in material-economic resources *and* intersubjective interactions. However, Honneth and Fraser do, of course, disagree about whether reducing these disparities is better served by pursuing a singular, recognition-centric approach or a dualistic approach that treats 'redistributive' inequalities and inequalities in the opportunities people have to be "recognized" as others distinct from one another.

Having said that, beneath the similarities that exist on the surface of Honneth and Fraser's normative theories of justice lies a deeper, more fundamental difference, which insights into embodied existence reveal imbue Fraser's differentiated account of injustice with a particular strength in comparison to Honneth's recognition-centric account. Specifically, whilst the claims that Honneth makes about injustice and what justice requires present inequalities between individuals in contemporary society as traceable back to problems with individuals' face-to-face encounters with other individuals, Fraser's claims about the same issues look beyond individuals and their intersubjective interactions to wider social processes and societal structures. This difference, in turn, means that

[84]Honneth in Fraser, Nancy and Axel Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange*, p.189.

whilst Honneth runs the risk of presenting individuals as responsible for their own suffering and other, negative effects that their experience of living in contemporary society have on both theirs and others' bodies and bodily states of being, Fraser treats phenomena that lie beyond 'the individual' as responsible instead.

To illustrate how the claims that Fraser and Honneth make in their accounts of injustice focus attention on individuals (in the case of Honneth) and beyond individuals (in the case of Fraser), it is worth revisiting the claims that Honneth makes about how the term 'recognition' should be understood. According to Honneth, in current-day discourses about injustice the term 'recognition' is typically used in connection to 'present social-development trends'[85] that argue in favour of acknowledging group difference through the implementation of a 'politics of identity'.[86] Against this background, Honneth explains that, for him, 'recognition' means something different - the positive regard or acknowledgement that individuals give each other in the various spheres of social relations that comprise society as a whole or, as occurring between individuals in their face-to-face encounters with other individuals. Picking up on this point in their critical engagement with Honneth's work, Jean-Philippe Deranty and Emmanuel Renault explain 'In Honneth's theory, recognition tends to be conceived of as a single interaction between me and you'.[87]

[85]Honneth in Fraser, Nancy and Axel Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange*, pp.125 – 126.
[86]Honneth in Fraser, Nancy and Axel Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange*, p.125.
[87]Deranty, Jean-Philippe and Emmanuel Renault, 'Politicizing Honneth's Ethics of Recognition', *Thesis Eleven*, February 2007, no.88., pp.92. – 111., p.92.

In contrast to Honneth, comments that Fraser makes in both her account of injustice in contemporary society and normative theory of justice divert attention away from individuals towards wider, socio-cultural processes and arrangements. One way that Fraser does this is to claim that forms of injustice that are captured by the term 'redistribution' and 'recognition' are traceable back to two distinct methods of 'ordering' society i.e. 'class' and social 'status'. Another way that Fraser does this is to argue that the methods of social ordering and types of injustice that she identifies are not just the result of goings-on at the level of intersubjective interactions, but, rather, the outcome of a complex interplay of a multitude of cultural and political-economic factors. Discussing disparities in the wages that people earn for their labour in contemporary society, for example, Fraser argues that whilst Honneth may be right that these inequalities are partly the result of the inability that people have to be recognized as making a valuable contribution to society due to ideological distortion of intersubjective, social relations, they are also the result of other factors. These factors include the supply and demand for different types of labour, the balance of power between labour and capital, the stringency of social regulations, including the minimum wage, the availability and cost of productivity enhancing technologies, the ease with which firms can shift their operations to locations where wages are lower, and so forth.[88] Arguably, after reading Honneth's and Fraser's critiques of contemporary society and their normative theories of justice, the impression that one is left with is that whilst, for Honneth, injustice is traceable back to problems with how individuals regard and treat each other, for Fraser it is phenomena that lie beyond the individual and their interactions with other that are to blame.

[88]Fraser in Fraser, Nancy and Axel Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical* Exchange, pp.214. – 215.

Actually, Honneth openly acknowledges phenomena that lie beyond 'the individual' and discusses the role that these phenomena play in creating injustice in contemporary society. Referring to the family, the state, and the legal system in particular, Honneth claims that clichés, stereotypes, and cultural ascriptions skew social relations so not every person has the opportunity to be "recognized" by others.[89] Yet, as commentators on Honneth's work point out,[90] when Honneth discusses these and other phenomena that lie beyond the individual, he presents them as reflecting or expressing what is already happening at the level of individuals' face-to-face encounters with others and, as such, tacitly denies that they play an active role in creating injustice themselves. Acknowledging this facet of his work himself, Honneth draws on David Lockwood's distinction between 'social integration' and 'system integration'[91] to explain 'I have… conceded a certain primacy to social integration as against system integration'[92] and 'continue to assume that even structural transformations in the economic sphere are not independent of the normative expectations of those affected, but depend at least on their tacit consent'.[93]

Of course, there a number of potential implications of treating injustice as traceable back to problems with ways individuals treat other another. However, a specific drawback, which critics of Honneth highlight, is that it appears to place responsibility for the conditions that characterize contemporary society squarely

[89]Honneth in Fraser, Nancy and Axel Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange*, pp. 138. – 155. and p.188.
[90]See Deranty, Jean-Philippe and Emmanuel Renault, 'Politicizing Honneth's Ethics of Recognition'
[91]Lockwood, David, 'Social Integration and System Integration', in Zollschan, George and Walter Hirst (eds.) *Explorations in Social Change,* (Dublin: Houghton Mifflin, 1964)
[92]Honneth in Fraser, Nancy and Axel Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical* Exchange, p.250.
[93]Honneth in Fraser, Nancy and Axel Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical* Exchange, p.250.

on the shoulders of those individuals who live within it. From here, they argue, it is but a small step to blaming individuals for the impact that their experiences of living in contemporary society have on them, including with regards to the toll that these experiences take on their bodies and bodily states of being and also the import that this toll has with regards to the abilities that they have to engage successfully in society and effectively participate in the process of making decisions about moral and political matters. Raising a similar concern to this, but with the comments that Honneth makes elsewhere in his work about the connection between recognition, personal flourishing, and individuals' psychological-emotional[94] in mind, Fraser argues that Honneth's treatment of injustice as a personal and/or interpersonal issue risks 'implanting an excessively personalized sense of injury'[95] and that, 'when misrecognition is identified with internal distortions in the self-consciousness of the oppressed, it is but a short step to blaming the victim or, indeed, the victims blaming themselves'.[96]

At this point in the discussion, the argument might be made that what critiquing Honneth's account of injustice in contemporary society reveals is not issues with "recognition-centric" explanation for what is unfair or unjust about contemporary society in general, but, rather, weaknesses in the way that Honneth specifically understands and presents 'recognition'. However, as the final section of chapter four now discusses, insights into embodied existence suggest that even when an alternative concept of "recognition" is used, there are drawbacks to

[94]See Honneth, Axel, *The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts*, especially, chapter 6.
[95]Fraser in Fraser, Nancy and Axel Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical* Exchange, p.204.
[96]Fraser in Fraser, Nancy and Axel Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical* Exchange, p.31. See also, McNay, Lois, 'The Trouble with Recognition: Subjectivity, Suffering, and Agency', *Sociological Theory*, 2008, vol.26., no.3., pp.271 – 296.

basing the evaluation of contemporary society and arguments about how it might be improved on the notion of 'recognition' alone, which a two-dimensional and dualistic account such as the one Fraser produces avoids. To explore this argument further, the final section of chapter four considers Deranty and Renault's critical engagement with Honneth's work along with recognition-centric accounts of injustice that are more mainstream than Honneth's and are based upon a less individual-centric definition of 'recognition' than the one that Honneth endorses.

The Politics of Recognition

In Deranty and Renault's critical engagement with Honneth's work, they make it clear that they endorse the critical and normative aspects of his 'recognition theory': 'our conviction is that Honneth's ethics of recognition offers the most robust model today for a renewed critical theory of society'.[97] Yet, Deranty and Renault also caveat their support for Honneth, claiming that his 'ethics of recognition' can only provide the basis for 'a renewed critical theory of society' so long as it 'does not shy away from its political dimensions'.[98] Indeed, it is Honneth's neglect of 'the political' that, in Deranty and Renault's opinion, constitutes a discernable weakness in his critical and normative political theory. Commenting on this perceived weakness of Honneth's work, they write that,

> 'One striking feature of Axel Honneth's theory of recognition is that, despite its fundamental normative and critical dimensions, Honneth makes a conscious effort to avoid referring to it as a politics of recognition…this avoidance of the term political is symptomatic of a

[97]Deranty, Jean-Philippe and Emmanuel Renault, 'Politicizing Honneth's Ethics of Recognition', p.93.
[98]Deranty, Jean-Philippe and Emmanuel Renault, 'Politicizing Honneth's Ethics of Recognition', p.93.

> weakness…Honneth's project is to devise a normative theory of society that will rejuvenate the original project of critical theory…to secure a sound normative base, on which social critique can identify contemporary pathologies and point to the directions of emancipation. This, however, is a mission, which is fully political.[99]

As Deranty and Renault point out, the reason why Honneth is so reluctant to talk about 'the political' in both the critical and normative aspects of his work is that he views his role as a critical theorist as limited to identifying the means of progress in society rather than providing substantive guidance about what steps or arrangements that progress requires. Lending weight to this argument, in *Redistribution or Recognition?,* Honneth explains, specifically, that by focusing on the concept of 'recognition', which, in his mind, underpins all instances of suffering and immiseration in contemporary society, his aim is to show how people's failures to be "recognized" by their social peers expresses an 'unmet demand of humanity' that exists at any given time and in any given place, remerging time and time again albeit expressed in different ways, including through the 'folk paradigms' about injustice that Fraser uses as the basis for her social critique.[100] Elsewhere in his work, Honneth also explains that he believes he can, and, indeed, should, make a limited contribution to the task of securing social progress by shedding light on displeasure and discontent with the prevailing social-economic-political order, but not offer detailed, comprehensive guidance for what kinds of laws and/or public policies are best suited to addressing the issues or problems that individuals identify as creating barriers to their living of

[99]Deranty, Jean-Philippe and Emmanuel Renault, 'Politicizing Honneth's Ethics of Recognition', p.93.
[100]Honneth in Fraser, Nancy and Axel Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical* Exchange, p.244.

their lives.[101] In the last few, closing lines of *The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflict,* for example, Honneth essentially denies the capacity of the theorist to offer a detailed interpretation of the structural criteria that are necessary to achieving recognition between individuals, stating that,

> 'As is clear…our formal conception of post-traditional ethical life would be incomplete if it were unable to indicate the position occupied by substantive values…whether these substantive values point in the direction of a political republicanism, an ecologically based asceticism, or a collective existentialism, whether they presuppose changes in socio-economic circumstances or are compatible with the conditions of a capitalist society – this is no long a matter for theory but rather for the future of social struggles'.[102]

To remedy the neglect of the political that they identify in Honneth's work, Deranty and Renault take a number of steps to 'politicize' the claims that he makes. The first step they take, which Honneth himself takes in his debate with Fraser in *Recognition and Redistribution?,* is to link the claims that Honneth makes about 'recognition' to contemporary forms of social struggle in order to explain such struggles as the by-product of individuals' experiences of being denied recognition by others: 'the ethics of recognition can be used to elaborate a normative framework at the very level of the motivation of political action, in order to describe its normative dynamic and its specific claims to validity'.[103] The second step that Deranty and Renault take is to reject Honneth's 'expressive' treatment of phenomena that lie beyond the individual in favour of a 'constitutive' approach that treats social processes and structures as playing a role in both

[101]For an analysis of this aspect of Honneth's work, see Deranty, Jean-Philippe and Emmanuel Renault, 'Politicizing Honneth's Ethics of Recognition'
[102]Honneth, Axel, *The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts*, trans. Anderson, Joel, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), pp.178. – 179.
[103]Deranty, Jean-Philippe and Emmanuel Renault, 'Politicizing Honneth's Ethics of Recognition', p.98.

structuring relations of recognition and "recognizing" individuals themselves.[104] Setting out the objection that they have towards Honneth's approach towards understanding phenomena that lie beyond the individual, especially institutions and the connection between those phenomena and injustice, Deranty and Renault explain that they agree with Honneth that the study of recognitive interactions offers the best means to describe the normative content of socialization and social struggles.[105] However, Deranty and Renault also explain that gaining a full understanding of recognitive interactions requires appreciating how these interactions are structured by material conditions such as natural and artificial things, bodies and institutions, which are themselves shaped by wider social structures and historical systems.[106] The third step that Deranty and Renault take is to tie Honneth's claims about the importance that people's recognition has for them to their socio-cultural identities. Specifically, Deranty and Renault explain that whilst Honneth does not consider the lack of recognition of cultural identities as a form of injustice in-and-of-itself, in their opinion it is difficult to establish a sharp distinction between the three patterns of recognition that he identifies from the recognition of individuals' identities. To illustrate this point, Deranty and Renault cite the example of an employee that judges that his or her wage involves a denial of recognition of the social value of his or her existence. Deranty and Renault explain that, certainly, this instance of depreciative recognition can be understood as a denial of recognition of the employee's value as a human being or even as a denial of his or her demand to be recognized in the social part of his or

[104]Deranty, Jean-Philippe and Emmanuel Renault, 'Politicizing Honneth's Ethics of Recognition', pp.99. - 101.
[105]Deranty, Jean-Philippe and Emmanuel Renault, 'Politicizing Honneth's Ethics of Recognition', p.100.
[106]Deranty, Jean-Philippe and Emmanuel Renault, 'Politicizing Honneth's Ethics of Recognition', p.100.

her dignity, but, they argue, it is also quite clear, from his or her own perspective, that this wage is a denial of the specific social value of his or her work, i.e. that it is a denial of recognition of his or her professional identity.[107]

In effect, the steps that Deranty and Renault take to develop Honneth's 'ethics of recognition' and "politicize" it bring the claims that he makes about 'recognition' and what 'recognition' requires closer to the claims that are made by most other recognition theorists. In particular, they replace Honneth's definition of 'recognition' as an interaction occurring between individuals with a more obviously difference-sensitive and 'politicized' definition that looks beyond individuals to wider and socio-cultural phenomena and attests to the need of the state to put measures in place that overtly acknowledge individuals' different backgrounds and histories. The question that remains, is whether the concept of recognition that Deranty and Renault develop in their work avoids the problems with the way that Honneth defines it, which insights into embodied existence serve to draw attention to?

At first glance, there appear to be some advantages to endorsing the concept of recognition that Deranty and Renault develop as opposed to the one that Honneth uses. To begin with, in Deranty and Renault's work, 'recognition' is no longer equated with individuals' positive treatment of each other, but, rather, conceptualised as involving a range of phenomena that lie beyond individuals in wider society such as institutions, social structures, and historical systems of socio-economic integration. Secondly, whilst Honneth treats phenomena that lie

[107]Deranty, Jean-Philippe and Emmanuel Renault, 'Politicizing Honneth's Ethics of Recognition', p.103.

beyond the individual as merely reflecting what is going on at the level of individuals' interactions with other individuals, Deranty and Renault view phenomena that lie beyond the individual as playing an active role in shaping relations of 'recognition' throughout and on every level of society. Taken together, the claims that Deranty and Renault make about 'recognition' therefore seem to avoid equating what is unjust or unfair about contemporary society with problems with how individuals treat one another, which is where Honneth's account of contemporary society runs into difficultly by implicitly blaming individuals for their suffering and immiseration. That said, insights into embodied existence also reveal that, on a deeper level, there are still problems with the way that Deranty and Renault define recognition, which point towards a wider problem with how the concept of 'recognition' is typically used, especially in arguments in favour of pursuing some sort of identity politics.

Taylor's article, 'The Politics of Recognition' is instructive for exploring the wider problem with how the concept of 'recognition' is used, with relevance to the idea of embodied existence. Written ten or so years before Honneth and Fraser's debate in *Redistribution or Recognition,* 'The Politics of Recognition', which is in large part responsible for the turn towards 'recognition' in discussions about how best to address injustice in contemporary society, comprises of three stages. The first stage is Taylor's justification of his interest in the idea of 'recognition', which, he argues, underpins a number of strands in contemporary politics, including the activities of feminists, race movements, and multiculturalists.[108] The second stage is Taylor's assessment of how the idea of

[108]Taylor, Charles, 'The Politics of Recognition', p.25.

'recognition' features in contemporary approaches to making decisions about laws and public policies. The third stage is Taylor's defense of a 'politics of difference' as the foundation for political decision-making, which has, in turn, been used to defend a politics of recognition and the claims of thinkers who endorse a form of identity politics. When evidencing his interest in 'recognition', Taylor does three things in particular. Firstly, Taylor endorses the Hegelian notion of 'recognition', which, he explains, treats individuals' attainment of their status as autonomous beings with distinct identities as a dialogical process.[109] Secondly, Taylor notes changes that, he argues, have occurred in how society is organized over time that reflect a collapse in social hierarchies and movement away from the idea of 'honor' towards 'dignity' in modern society.[110] Thirdly, Taylor cites the rise to prominence of the idea of individualized 'authenticity' that, he claims, emerged during the latter half of the end of the eighteenth-century and expresses the ideal of being true to oneself and one's unique way of being: 'Before the late eighteenth century, no one thought that the differences between human beings had this kind of moral significance…. But this notion [of authenticity] gives a new importance to being true to myself. If I am not, I miss the point of my life; I miss what being human is for me'.[111] Focusing his attention on how the idea of 'recognition' has featured in the process of making decisions about laws and public policies, Taylor argues that efforts to 'recognize' individuals in contemporary society tend to adhere to one of two contrasting and, indeed, competing approaches. The first set

[109]By languages, Taylor explains he means language in a 'broad sense, covering not only the words we speak, but also other modes of expression whereby we define ourselves, including the "languages" of art, of gesture, of love, and the like'. The broad range individuals interact and communicate with one another, in other words. Taylor, Charles, 'The Politics of Recognition', p.32.
[110]Taylor, Charles, 'The Politics of Recognition', pp.26. – 27.
[111]Taylor, Charles, 'The Politics of Recognition', p.30.

of approaches are 'difference-blind'[112] in that they aim to make those who live within contemporary society the same as each other: 'with the move from honor to dignity has come a politics of universalism, emphasizing the equal dignity of all citizens, and the content of this politics has been the equalization of rights and entitlements'.[113] The second set of approaches are based upon a 'politics of difference' that focuses on the uniqueness of individuals and differences in the groups to which they belong. Explaining the key differences between these two approaches, Taylor writes, 'with the politics of equal dignity, what is established is meant to be universally the same, an identical basket of rights and immunities; with the politics of difference, what we are asked to recognize is the unique identity of this individual or group, their distinctness from everyone else.[114] Lastly, drawing on examples of minority groups living in multicultural societies, such as the Quebecoise community in Canada, Taylor makes a case in favour of the 'politics of difference', arguing that because the concept of equal dignity, which, he claims, underpins 'difference blind' approaches to 'recognition', often (if not always) derives the idea of what rights and/or entitlement are worth having from the perspective of the hegemonic culture, the expectation is that minority groups must conform to the expectations of dominant culture and, as such, relinquish their particularity. Explaining his preference for a 'politics of difference', Taylor states that, 'dominant groups tend to entrench their hegemony by inculcating an image of inferiority in the subjugated' whereby failure to conform ultimately results in the minority culture being derided and ostracised by the dominant culture.[115]

[112]Taylor, Charles, 'The Politics of Recognition', p.43.
[113]Taylor, Charles, 'The Politics of Recognition', p.37.
[114]Taylor, Charles, 'The Politics of Recognition', p.38.
[115]Taylor, Charles, 'The Politics of Recognition', p.66.

Taylor's claims, especially about the harmful effects of universalist laws and public policies, have been the subject of much debate. However, his endorsement of a 'politics of difference' succinctly captures the flavour of approaches towards thinking about politics that reconfigure the notion of injustice and, indeed, justice in terms of improving 'recognition' or, more precisely, granting 'recognition' where 'recognition' has previously been absent to secure conditions in which individuals can realise their authentic identities and, at the same time, improve how they regard and treat one another. Summarising this way of thinking about politics, McNay explains that, 'the idea of recognition is regarded not just as a useful analytical tool for unravelling processes of subject formation but is also seen as a potent way of expressing a normative ideal of egalitarian self-realization.'[116]

Bearing insights into embodied existence in mind, on the face of it, the normative force of the idea of 'recognition' is attractive. It speaks, in particular, to problems that people face with regards to having others respect them and listen to what they say. It also speaks to the need to appreciate rather than devalue differences between people, including those that pertain to their bodies and bodily states of being, which insights into embodied experience help to reveal. From this perspective, it might therefore seem that understanding both what is wrong about contemporary society and what making society fairer requires is best served by recognizing people's differences through a politics of recognition. That said, although insights into embodied existence chime with some of the central concerns and commitments that are associated with the idea of 'recognition', they

[116]McNay, Lois, *Against Recognition*, (Cambridge and Malden, Massachusetts: Polity Press, 2008), p.6.

also reveal a fundamental flaw in the concept, which, in turn, points to drawbacks to using it to explain what is unfair and unjust about contemporary society and also how contemporary society might be improved – namely, whilst the concept of 'recognition' tends to treat group and/or personal identity as something that is natural or innate, insights into embodied existence reveal that differences between people that are commonly referred to in terms of 'identity' are actually the contingent product of pre-existing inequalities between individuals and the wider societal arrangements, structures, and processes that produce them. To accept people's identities and to acknowledge them on either a personal and/or political level is therefore to risk "feeding into" those very aspects of contemporary society that make it unfair or unjust in the first place.

Observations about the ways in which individuals become subjects through the experiences of living within bodies that are marked by difference serve to illustrate this fundamental flaw with the notion of 'recognition'. As thinkers like Beauvoir and Fanon, who have an interest in the phenomenology of embodied existence, demonstrate, whilst people may be born into physiologically distinct bodies, it is their experience of living within those bodies that produces different kinds of subjects with different capacities for agency. From this perspective, to "recognize" people's socio-cultural differences is therefore to reify that aspect of their selfhood and subjectivities that ought to be treated as a product of the conditions that people live within and critiqued accordingly. In the work of post-structuralist critics of the idea of 'recognition', this argument is reflected in a trend towards 'destabilising' accounts of the individual subject, which attempt at

showing how the subject is always constructed through and within networks of power and discourse.[117]

In fairness, not all 'recognition theorists' are committed to the 'recognition' of group difference. Honneth, for one, presents the recognition of socio-cultural groups as a means of improving the ways in which individuals are regarded and treated by others in the three spheres of recognition that, he claims, are characterised by the principle of love, equality, and social esteem.[118] Yet, as McNay observes,[119] in the theories of thinkers who utilise the notion of 'recognition', there is still a tendency to present 'recognition' as the means of discovering or revealing some core element of individuals' identity and, as such, to neglect the need to critically evaluate and transform the processes, arrangements, and structures that contribute to the production of those aspects of a person's selfhood in the first place. Take Taylor, for example, whom McNay refers to as an example of her argument.[120] Although Taylor endorses a Hegelian understanding of subjective development and stresses that his account of 'recognition' is not committed to an essentialist account of the self, remarks that he makes imply the opposite. Describing the modern view of how individuals produce a sense of 'full being', Taylor notes that, rather than being connected to some aspect or source outside of ourselves, 'the source we have to connect with is

[117]For example, see Foucault, Michel, *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972 – 1977*, ed. Gordon, Colin, trans. Gordon, Colin, Leo Marshall, John Mepham, and Kate Soper, (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester, 1980), Butler, Judith, *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity*, 1st edn., (New York and London: Routledge, 1990), Haraway, Donna, *Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature*, (New York and Abingdon, Oxfordshire: Free Association Books, 1991), Lloyd, Moya. *Beyond Identity Politics: Feminism, Power & Politics*, (London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi: Sage, 2005), and McNay, Lois, *Against Recognition*

[118]Honneth in Fraser, Nancy and Axel Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical* Exchange, pp.187. – 188.

[119]See McNay, Lois, *Against Recognition*

[120]See McNay, Lois, *Against Recognition*, especially the introduction and chapter 2.

deep within us'[121] and writes that, 'being true to myself means being true to my own originality, which is something only I can articulate and discover'[122] - authenticity 'calls on me to discover my own original way of being. By definition, this way of being cannot be socially derived, but must be inwardly generated'.[123] In a similar vein, although Honneth, who McNay also cites when making her argument,[124] is committed to understanding subjects as socially embedded, embodied, and reliant upon their relations with others to develop as autonomous beings, he presents 'recognition' as the means by which individuals are guaranteed to attain the emotional-psychological-physical states of being that are necessary for them to flourish and pursue their own, self-chosen concepts of the good.[125] In other words, Honneth fails to consider how those aspects of a person that he so values might be shaped by inequalities in wider society and actually hostile or counterproductive to making contemporary society more genuinely inclusive and egalitarian. Feminist critiques of theories of politics that are based upon the idea of 'recognition', including those that evaluate the work of Taylor[126] and Honneth,[127] make a similar argument, contending that women's emancipation in late capitalist society cannot be achieved by their acknowledgement on a personal and/or political level alone, but instead requires fundamental changes being made to the cultural ordering of values *and* the economic structure of society that provide space for evaluating how those "identities" are currently conceived and enabling them to be transcended, if necessary. Relatedly, during

[121]Taylor, Charles, 'The Politics of Recognition', p.29.
[122]Taylor, Charles, 'The Politics of Recognition', p.31.
[123]Taylor, Charles, 'The Politics of Recognition', p.32.
[124]See McNay, Lois, *Against Recognition*, especially the introduction and chapter 4.
[125]Honneth in Fraser, Nancy and Axel Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange*, p.259.
[126]See, for example, McNay, Lois, *Against Recognition,* especially chapters 2 and 4.
[127]See, for example, Rössler, Beate, 'Work, Recognition, Emancipation' and Young, Iris Marion, 'Recognition of Love's Labour: Considering Axel Honneth's Feminism'

her debate with Honneth, Fraser explains that she believes that in order for 'participatory parity' between men and women to be realised, it is necessary to counteract systemic forms of disadvantage resulting from the 'economic structure' of society *and* deconstruct sexist discourses stemming from the 'androcentric status order' with which it is imbricated.[128]

Effectively, worries that feminists have about 'recognizing' women bring the discussion in chapter four full circle, suggesting that whilst the notion of 'recognition' has a role to play in understanding what is unfair or unjust about contemporary society, it is better to endorse a differentiated approach like the one that Fraser endorses that also draws upon the notion of 'redistribution'. In particular, feminist concerns about the notion of 'recognition' suggest that relying upon that notion alone to unpick all of what makes people who live in contemporary society and belong to different groups within it unequal from one another risks treating people's identities as pre-given, innate, or natural and, in doing so, overlooking, if not feeding into, the very processes through which people come to be subjects with different kinds of capacities and abilities in the first place. With this in mind, logically, one of the next questions to ask, which chapter five explores in detail, is what kind of system or process of generating decisions about moral and politics matters is best suited to contemporary society given all of what is known (and this thesis discusses) about the connection between embodied existence, socio-cultural difference, and inequality, and the import that this connection has for individuals, broadly understood.

[128]Fraser in Fraser, Nancy and Axel Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange*, p. 219.

5. Being Realistic about Politics: Deliberation, Power, and Non-Deliberative Praxis

Chapters one, two, and three of this thesis reveal a range of problems with people's participation in processes of deliberative decision-making in the real world that stem from their situation as embodied beings. Chapters one, two, and three also demonstrate that whilst, hypothetically, it may be possible to alleviate some of the problems that people face with regards to participating in deliberative exchanges and the deliberative, decision-making process, there are other problems that, in practice, are likely to be too subtle, intangible, and intractable to address and that there also possible drawbacks to attempting to do so. Bearing insights into embodied existence in mind, it therefore seems reasonable to suggest that discussions about what the moral and political decision-making process should or ought to look like might actually benefit from looking beyond deliberative forms of praxis and modes of communication to forms of praxis and modes of communication that fail to meet the strict, deliberative standard.

In the work of 'Difference Democrats',[1] the idea of expanding the concept of the political to recognize non-deliberative forms of praxis and modes of

[1]The term 'Difference Democrat' is taken from John Dryzek's discussion of dominant strands of thinking in deliberative democratic theory and the work of thinkers who criticize deliberative models of democracy. Dryzek, John S., *Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics and Contestations,* (New York Oxford University Press, 2002), especially chapter 3.

communication is reflected in the argument that pre-existing forms of democratic governance ought to be radically altered so as to better accommodate difference. Briefly, the argument that underpins this way of thinking about politics runs as follows: because individuals who belong to different groups in society with different backgrounds and histories are unequally able to access seemingly rational and/or neutral political processes and arrangements, including those that are based upon the ideal of deliberation, the democratic decision-making process ought to be restructured so as to include measures that incorporate non-deliberative forms of participation and modes of engagement. These measures include guaranteeing politically marginalized groups a presence in political discussions through rights of representation,[2] giving groups that lack power in society the opportunity to veto decisions that directly affect them,[3] and allowing groups that have histories of being marginalized in political discussions and excluded from political decisions to express their concerns through using compelling and/or cultural forms of communication.[4]

At first glance, the claims that Difference Democrats make are appealing, seeming to offer a way of "recovering" the voices of groups in society that a focus on deliberation in discussions about moral and political matters marginalizes or altogether excludes. However, on closer inspection, insights into embodied existence undermine the claims that Difference Democrats make by revealing a

[2]For example, see Phillips, Anne, *Democracy and Difference,* (University Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993), pp.96. – 99

[3]For example see, Young, Iris Marion, 'Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship', *Ethics,* 1989, vol.99., pp.250. – 274. and Young, Iris Marion, 'Communication and the Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy', in Benhabib, Seyla*,* ed., *Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political*, (Princeton, New Jersey Princeton University Press, 1996)

[4]For example see, Young, Iris Marion, 'Communication and the Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy' and Young, Iris, Marion, 'Inclusive Political Communication: Greeting, Rhetoric and Storytelling in the Context of Political Argument', pp.23. – p.27.

number of ways in which altering the democratic decision-making process to include the measures that they endorse is not only insufficient, but counterproductive to addressing difference-based political inequality and exclusion. It appears, therefore, contrary to the claims that deliberative democrats *and* difference democrats make, that neither premising the process of moral and political reasoning upon deliberation *nor* rejecting deliberation outright and basing the process of moral and political reasoning upon non-deliberative forms of praxis and modes of communication is the best way forward.

To explore these issues and consider how becoming less idealistic and more "realistic" about political decision-making offers a possible way forward in discussions about what the moral and political decision-making process ought to look like, chapter five begins by critically evaluating Difference Democrats' claims from the standpoint of embodied existence. Whilst carrying out this critique, chapter five argues that whilst research suggests that the idea of shifting the democratic decision-making process away from deliberation to non-deliberative forms of praxis and modes of communication has the potential to include groups in society in collective decisions that have histories of being excluded, it also suggests that doing so has the potential to worsen barriers to effective political engagement that members of those same groups experience. This is, not least, because the premises that underpin such measures fail to properly account for the constituent and long-lasting impact that people's experiences of living within their bodies has on their capacities to do and be certain things. Subsequently, after critiquing Difference Democrats' work and exploring the relationship between thinkers who either endorse or reject

deliberative and non-deliberative forms of praxis and modes of communication, chapter five draws on the work of thinkers who call for greater realism in contemporary political theory to explore the potential benefits of moving away from trying to realise idealistic models moral and political decision-making, be these based upon deliberative or non-deliberative modes of praxis and modes of communication, and make the case in favour of adopting a more "realistic", context-sensitive, and result-centred approach towards these same issues.

Difference Democracy: Deliberative versus Non-Deliberative Forms of Praxis and Modes of Communication

In contemporary political theory, it is common to encounter a distinction between deliberative and non-deliberative forms of praxis and modes of communication. By "deliberative", what is usually meant are forms of intersubjective praxis and types of communication that encourage individuals to reflect on and critically asses their pre-existing preferences, viewpoints, values, and interests in a non-coercive manner that is free from domination. By "non-deliberative", what is usually meant are all other, unregulated activities and types of communicative praxis that, classed as not being "deliberative", are deemed to involve at least some element or elements of coercion.[5] Drawing on Dryzek's definition of

[5]Opinion differs about what, precisely, non-deliberative activities and forms of praxis consist of. In their independent critiques of deliberative democratic theory, Young and Medearis point to the implicit neglect and dismissal of practices that are associated with social movements and activist groups, suggesting these are commonly thought about as being "coercive". However, Medearis also argues these practices ought to be endorsed by deliberative democrats due to the fact that they do not utilize overt forms of coercion such as threats and force. Likewise, in her review of common threads of thinking in deliberative democratic theory, Mansbridge argues non-deliberate forms of praxis and communication include any that deviate from the ideal of rational, 'communicative action' with the aim of reaching mutual understanding such as bargains. See Medearis, John, 'Social Movements and Deliberative Democratic Theory', *British Journal of Political Science*, 2005, vol.35., pp.53. – 75. and Mansbridge, Jane, et al., 'The Place of Self-

deliberation in his examination of the role that the ideal of deliberation plays in contemporary political theory, Jane Mansbridge writes, 'deliberation might be defined broadly as 'communication that induces reflection on preferences, values and interests in a non-coercive fashion'.[6]

In deliberative democratic theory, the distinction between deliberative and non-deliberative forms of praxis and modes of communication is reflected in regulative ideals that specify what deliberative forms of democracy should ideally look like. These regulative ideals demand that deliberation meets several criteria. These include 1) that deliberation is open to all of those who are affected by the decision that the deliberative process creates either as participants themselves or through the activity of those who are authorized to speak on their behalf,[7] 2) that participants have the equal opportunity to influence the deliberative process, 3) that participants treat one another with mutual respect, aim at finding fair terms of cooperation, speak truthfully, give reasons to one another that they think others can comprehend and accept, and achieve their ends by a process of mutual justification rather than trying to change others' behaviour through the exercise of coercive power. In Habermas's work, the regulative ideals about deliberation take the form of rules that limit the content and type of communicative praxis that is treated as appropriate for creating legitimate decisions about moral and political

---

Interest and the Role of Power in Deliberative Democracy', *The Journal of Political Philosophy*, 2010, vol.18., no.1., pp.64. – 100.

[6]For Dryzek's definition of 'deliberation', see Dryzek, John S., *Deliberation and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations,* p.76. For Mansbridge's definition, see Mansbridge, Jane, et al. 'The Place of Self-Interest and the Role of Power in Deliberative Democracy', p.65.

[7]For example, see literature on 'all affected' principle, including Goodin, Robert E., 'Enfranchising all affected interests, and its alternatives', *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, 2007, vol.35, no.1, pp.40. – 68., Owen, David, 'Constituting the polity, constituting the demos: on the place of the all affected interests principle in democratic theory and in resolving the democratic boundary problem', *Ethics & Global Politics*, 2013, vol.5., no.3., pp.129. – 152., and Näsström, Sofia, 'The Challenge of the All-Affected Principle', 2011, *Political Studies,* vol.59., no.1., pp.116. – 134.

issues. These rules include limiting the content of discussions to matters of justice (as opposed to matters of the good),[8] restricting the communicative praxis of those who are involved to speech acts with illocutionary aims alone,[9] and demanding that those who are involved engage in 'an inclusive and noncoercive rational discourse' in which 'everyone is required to take the perspective of everyone else and thus to project herself into the understanding of self and world of all others'.[10] In Benhabib's work, which builds upon the claims that Habermas makes about what the process of moral and political judgement ought to look like, they are reflected in a framework for governing discussions about moral and political matters with three key features. These features are 1) that participation in such deliberation is governed by the norms of equality and symmetry; all have the same chances to initiate speech acts, to question, to interrogate, and to open debate; 2) all have the right to question the assigned topics of conversation; 3) and all have the right to initiate reflexive arguments about the very rules of the discourse procedure and the way in which they are applied or carried out.[11]

In reality, the relationship between the terms 'deliberative' and 'non-deliberative' in contemporary democratic theory is more complex than one of simple opposition, and is better conceptualised in terms of a sliding scale. At one end of the scale are thinkers like Habermas and Benhabib who celebrate deliberation and reject non-deliberative forms or praxis and modes of

[8]Habermas, Jürgen, *Postmetaphysical Thinking: Philosophical Essays,* trans. Hohengarten, William Mark, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1992), p.190. and p.191.
[9]Habermas, Jürgen, *Postmetaphysical Thinking: Philosophical Essays*, p.80.
[10]Habermas, Jürgen, in *The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory,* eds. Cronin, Ciaran and Pablo De Greiff, (Cambridge and Maldon, Massachusetts: Polity Press, 2005), p.80.
[11]Benhabib, Seyla, 'Toward a Deliberative Model of Political Legitimacy', in Benhabib, Seyla, ed., *Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political*, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1996), p.70.

communication as inappropriate with regards to the contemporary political and moral decision-making process. At the other end of the scale are thinkers, including Difference Democrats,[12] who are the exact opposite, voicing concerns about deliberation and deliberative forms of praxis, but receptive to non-deliberative forms of praxis and modes of communication. Lastly, in the middle of the scale are thinkers who are receptive to deliberation and also non-deliberative forms of praxis and communication. These thinkers include deliberative democrats who argue that there are at least some instances when non-deliberative activity and praxis has a legitimate place in democratic settings and also thinkers who reject deliberative forms of democracy, but are amenable to the use of deliberation in democratic contexts.[13]

Deliberative democrats who promote the legitimacy of non-deliberative praxis and modes of communication make three main arguments when justifying their viewpoints. The first argument appeals to notions of political inclusion and political equality, claiming that deliberation has limited applicability in contexts of power relations and that, as such, other methods of participation and engagement have a legitimate role to play in allowing individuals and groups in society to contribute to the political decision-making process. Echoing the spirit of this argument whilst contending that there is less opposition than is typically

[12]This term is taken from Dryzek's analysis of trends in deliberative theory. Dryzek acknowledges Difference Democrats are not a self-consciously united school of thought, but, rather, a collection of thinkers, from diverse backgrounds, whose interest in patterns of oppression and domination in contemporary society has led to them to argue in favour of tailoring political arrangements and processes so as to accommodate difference. For a detailed discussion of the work of so-called Difference democrats and an analysis of some of the similarities and differences between the work of the thinkers who are associated with the term, see Dryzek, John S., *Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations,* chapter 3.

[13]For example, see Parvin, Phil, 'Is Deliberative Democracy Feasible: Political Disengagement and Trust in Liberal Democratic Societies', *The Monist*, 2015, vol.98., no.4., pp.407. – 423. and Parvin, Phil, 'Democracy Without Participation: A New Politics for a Disengaged Era', *Res Publica*, 2018, vol.24., no.1., pp.31. – 52.

thought to exist deliberation and persuasive, even forceful activity that is typically associated with political activism, Fung states that,

> '… the most sensible stance for a deliberative democrat who lives and acts in circumstances characterized by inequality is to advance deliberation through persuasion when possible, but not to limit his means to persuasion only. I call this perspective deliberative activism because it holds that widespread inequality and failures of reciprocity can justify nonpersuasive, even coercive, methods for the sake of deliberative goals'.[14]

The second argument that deliberative democrats who promote the legitimacy non-deliberative praxis and modes of communication make is that activities such as strikes, boycotts, pickets, and marches, which are frequently viewed as alternatives to deliberation, can actually be seen as trying to promote deliberation and, as such, complementary to the commitments, aims, and objectives of deliberative democracy. Medearis who is, strictly speaking, not a deliberative democrat, but makes recommendations to deliberative democrats whilst exploring the 'internal relation between 'deliberative democracy' and social movements',[15] makes an argument similar to this when claiming that, 'democratic theorists who value inclusive politics should view… tactics – which are necessarily strategic and non-deliberative, but still thoroughly entwined in public discourse – with great sympathy'.[16] The third argument that deliberative democrats who promote the legitimacy of non-deliberative praxis and modes of communication make is that non-deliberative tactics and activities can go hand in hand with a strong endorsement of deliberation in the context of organizing to engage in non-deliberative action. It may be, for example, that deliberation that is internal to

[14]Fung, Archon, 'Deliberation before the Revolution: Towards an Ethics of Deliberative Democracy in an Unjust World', p.399.
[15]Medearis, John, 'Social Movements and Deliberative Democratic Theory', *British Journal of Political Science*, 2005, vol.35., pp.53. – 75., p.54.
[16]Medearis, John, 'Social Movements and Deliberative Democratic Theory', p.55.

activist groups not only helps them to mobilise and organise and, thus, become effective, but also enables them to include a greater variety of opinions and viewpoints in the decisions that they make. In both cases, it is the conjoining of activities and practices that are associated with deliberation and not associated with deliberation that imbues the group in question with greater democratic potential.

Like deliberative democrats who are receptive to non-deliberative forms of praxis and modes of communication, Difference Democrats see the potential democratic value of including a greater range of forms of praxis and modes of communication in the process of making decisions about moral and political matters. However, unlike deliberative democrats, they are profoundly sceptical about deliberation and doubt the role that deliberation can play in producing genuinely inclusive, equitable agreements. The scepticism of Difference Democrats towards deliberation is traceable back to the homogenising and exclusionary impact that, they claim, deliberation has on socio-cultural difference.

Influenced by debates in the 1990s about the importance of recognizing people's socio-cultural identities for the purposes of addressing patterns of oppression and domination, Difference Democrats mistrust so-called rational and neutral processes of political decision-making in democratic settings. Difference Democrats claim that, in reality, political processes, structures, arrangements, and activities that purport to be rational and neutral in fact operate to systematically exclude and/or marginalise the voices of groups in society that lack power and

have histories of being dominated and oppressed. Discussing the guiding claims and contentions behind the work of Difference Democrats, Dryzek writes that,

> 'difference democrats are those who stress the need for democratic politics to concern itself first and foremost with the recognition of the legitimacy and validity of the particular perspectives of historically oppressed segments of the population…Quite what form this politics should take is a matter of continuing debate…What they all share is a stress on the variety of oppressions and so subject-positions, leading them to oppose ostensibly neutral rationalistic practices that in fact exclude or silence particular kind of oppressed subjects'.[17]

In Difference Democrats' opinion, deliberative forms of praxis and modes of communication are concerning because, in practice, they demand types of praxis and foster virtues that are exclusionary and have a sedative effect on unruly behaviours, especially on the part of members of the least advantaged and powerful groups in society. In her influential critique of deliberation, Sanders explains, for example, that 'deliberation is a request for a certain kind of talk: rational, constrained, and orientated to a shared problem'.[18] In other words, deliberation demands a mode of participation that effectively erases the particularity of people's experiences and perspectives. Moreover, Sanders argues that, in practice, the focus on finding shared interests in political arrangements that incorporate deliberation has a habit of universalising the interests of the wealthy and powerful whilst, at the same time, overlooking the interests of the poor, disadvantaged, and powerless.[19] In her opinion, rather than being rational or neutral, deliberation is therefore best thought of as a type of communicative praxis that is exclusionary, inegalitarian, and fundamentally unjust.

---

[17]Dryzek, John S., *Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations*, pp.57. – 58.
[18]Sanders, Lynn, 'Against Deliberation', *Political Theory*, 1997, vol.25., no.3., pp.347 – 376., p.370.
[19]Sanders, Lynn, 'Against Deliberation', p.370.

As Dryzek points out, in reading Sanders, it is sometimes hard to distinguish between her critique of deliberation in unjust settings and her critique of deliberation in-and-of itself.[20] It is certainly true that, in criticizing deliberation and models of politics that are based upon deliberation, Sanders' specific aim is to reveal how deliberation in the context of US liberal democracy produces such a deep form of difference-based political exclusion and inequality that means 'learning to deliberate in American might be inseparable from indoctrination in familiar routines of hierarchy and deference'.[21] With this in mind, one might argue that, whilst real, the problems with deliberation that Sanders highlights point towards issues with the real-world implementation of the deliberative ideal rather than flaws with the ideal of deliberation in-and-of-itself. Yet, dismissing this defence of deliberation, other Difference Democrats take issue with the fundamental premises of deliberation, making the argument that using it as the basis for the political decision-making process produces forms of inequality and exclusion regardless of the fairness or unfairness of the contexts in which that ideal is implemented. Drawing on Lyotard's concept of 'difference', Young argues, for example, that because deliberative frameworks for conflict resolution always operate within the idiom of the group or groups who have the most power in society, they consistently exclude the experiences of those that lack power.[22] From this perspective, the problem with deliberation lies in the fact some people society have an "edge" when it comes to making "use" of deliberation that others lack, which, in turn, renders them more successful at articulating themselves and their concerns. In a separate discussion, Young also attacks the focus on unity in

[20]Dryzek, John S., *Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations*, p.65.
[21]Sanders, Lynn, 'Against Deliberation', p.362.
[22]Young, Iris, Marion, 'Inclusive Political Communication: Greeting, Rhetoric, and Storytelling in the Context of Political Argument', pp.6. – 7.

deliberative models of political decision-making, claiming that, in practice, definitions of the common good that are created though systems with a focus on unity always favour the privileged in society and their interests.[23] Thus, in the eyes of Young and thinkers who share her concerns, deliberation is not a genuinely neutral, rational, and open method of producing decisions about collective concerns, but, rather, a hard-fought battle with winners and losers in which groups that lack power in society usually end up on the losing side.

Insights into embodied experience broadly support the claims that Difference Democrats make about the dangers of premising politics upon forms of praxis and modes of communication that are commonly associated with deliberation in two key ways. Firstly, they reveal how, in reality, individuals' experiences of living within their distinct bodies silences the voices of groups that are disadvantaged and lack power in society by shaping and training people's bodies so as to produce different, and indeed, unequal linguistic habits and dispositions, making it hard for people who belong to disadvantaged and powerless groups to be listened to by others, and preventing members of those groups from fully cognizing and articulating their experience in the first place. Secondly, they suggest that problems with people's participation in deliberation and deliberative forms of decision-making in the real world do not signal the imperfect implementation of the deliberative ideal, but, rather, what is likely to be the unavoidable reality of premising the process of making decisions about moral and political issues upon deliberation in socio-political-economic condition that are skewed by power relations, riddled by inequality, and unjust. With these insights

[23]Young, Iris, Marion, 'Communication and the Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy', pp.125. – 126.

in mind, it seems logical to ask the following two questions: firstly, what are the suggestions that Difference Democrats make for addressing problems that they identity with so-called neutral and rational forms of political decision-making, including those that are based upon deliberation? Secondly, how might the suggestions that they provide help to formulate an alternative approach to the question of what the model of moral and political decision-making ought to look like in contemporary society, given the reality of embodied existence and the impact that it has on individuals?

Collectively, Difference Democrats agree that democratic politics must become more accommodating of difference. For some Difference Democrats, this aim requires radical and innovative approaches that connect democratic politics to efforts to contest the status quo and resist the liberal, capitalist order. Chantal Mouffe, for example, presents democratic politics as the route to not just negotiating identity and difference, but also to disrupting dominant political orders that typically stifle difference. This politics constitutes what she and Ernesto Laclau refer to as a 'radical and plural democracy'.[24] Elsewhere in her work, Mouffe also draws on her work with Laclau to make an argument in favour of a vision of democratic politics that is anti-deliberation, anti-consensus, and founded upon a principle of 'agonistic pluralism'.[25] In a similar vein, Connolly presents democratic politics as *the* means of exploring difference and identity and

[24]Laclau, Ernesto and Chantal Mouffe, *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics,* (London and New York: Verso, 1985)

[25]Mouffe believes in the inevitability of conflict and contestation in political settings. Rather than seeking to deny this inevitability, Mouffe claims it is better to consider how accepting it might be used to build a more genuinely democratic politics. See Mouffe, Chantal, *The Return of The Political*, (London and New York: Verso, 1993), Mouffe, Chantal, 'Democracy, Power, and the "Political"', in *Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the* Political, Mouffe, Chantal, *The Democratic Paradox*, (London and New York: Verso, 2000), Mouffe, Chantal, *On The Political,* (London and New York: Routledge, 2007), and Mouffe, Chantal, *Agonistics: Thinking The World Politically,* (London and New York: Verso, 2013)

as a never-ending game that involves the creative and sometimes playful questioning of identities through encounters with disparate others.[26] Likewise, Dryzek, although being critical about some of the underlying features of Difference Democracy,[27] endorses a model of 'insurgent democracy' that views activities that are typically treated as inappropriate for inclusion in democratic politics as playing a vital role in making society more inclusive and socially progressive. [28] For other Difference Democrats, making politics more accommodating of difference requires less radical and extreme measures that are designed to reform rather than overhaul pre-existing processes and structures of decision-making that are associated with the liberal democratic state. Anne Phillips, for example, calls for a 'politics of presence' in which efforts are made to ensure members of disadvantaged social-cultural groups are present in the institutions of liberal democracy, such as parliament.[29] Although, in practice, Phillips is only comfortable with recommending quotas for women, specifically, in parliament on the grounds the category of 'women' is inclusive enough to cover a number of different identities.[30] In a similar vein, but requiring more substantial change, Young supports adjustments being made to how groups are currently represented in the liberal democratic state. These changes include giving disadvantaged groups veto rights and guarantees of consultation over policies that

[26]See Connolly, William E., *Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox,* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1991) and Connolly, William E., The Ethos of Pluralization, (Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1995)
[27]In particular, Dryzek takes issue with Difference Democrats' claims about the need to bring the activity of groups that are currently excluded from democratic politics "into" the official decision-making structures and arrangements, claiming that doing so risks naturalizing the critical "force" of their praxis. See Dryzek, John S., *Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations*, especially, chapter 4.
[28]See Dryzek, John S., *Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations*, especially, chapter 4.
[29]See Phillips, Anne, *The Politics of Presence*, pp.96. – 99.
[30]See Phillips, Anne, *Democracy and* Difference, pp.96. – 99

affect them[31] and altering what participation in politics looks like by incorporating non-deliberative forms of praxis and communication. These include 'storytelling', which shares similarities with Sanders' idea of 'testimony', or telling one's own story in one's own language such as folk stories, cultural tropes, and rap music, which, Young claims, allows groups that are usually excluded from politics to couch their concerns in ways that are familiar to them and 'reveals the particular experiences of those in social locations, experiences that cannot be shared by those situated differently but that they must understand in order to do justice to others.[32] They also includes greeting and rhetoric, the first of which, according to Young, involves interlocutors not just introducing themselves to others at the start of their communicative encounters, but being polite to and having a concern for each other during the process and the second of which, Young explains, refers to context-dependent forms of speech that aim at persuading listeners and drawing their attention towards particular perspectives and concerns that usually remain marginalized in political discussions.[33] The specific forms of speech that Young endorses when making this argument include jokes, anger, laughter, ridicule, flattery, and hyperbole.[34]

On the face of it, Difference Democrats' suggestions for how to make democratic politics more accommodating of difference appear to offer a suitable template for responding to the reality of embodied experience. This is because, on

[31]See Young, Iris Marion, 'Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship' and Young, Iris Marion, 'Communication and the Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy'
[32]Young, Iris, Marion, 'Communication and the Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy, p.131.
[33]Young, Iris, Marion, 'Inclusive Political Communication: Greeting, Rhetoric and Storytelling in the Context of Political Argument'
[34]Young, Iris, Marion, 'Communication and the Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy', pp.130. – 131.

a basic level, their suggestions endorse working with individuals' differences. This includes giving individuals who belong to different groups in society the opportunity to express their viewpoints in a range of ways instead of making them use forms of praxis and modes of communication that they are unequally skilled at and sometimes incapable of using. It also includes empowering individuals belonging to groups that are usually excluded from discussions about moral and political matters to express themselves through forms of praxis and modes of communication that they are skilled at using, are suited to capturing their viewpoints, and encourage if not compel others to listen to what they say and take it seriously. Lastly, in some cases at least, Difference Democrats' suggestions effectively guarantee individuals with different backgrounds and histories a place in discussions about moral and political matters (Phillips) and even allow members of groups in society that have histories of being excluded from these discussions to bypass the usual process of debate and directly feed into the decisions it creates (Young). In the real world, there are multiple examples of the success that measures like these have had in terms of making discussions and decisions about moral and political matters more inclusive and responsive to difference. Take, for example, the use of gender quotas in the selection of parliamentary candidates and race conscious districting to increase the electoral chances of ethnic minority representatives, which are widely held to have diversified the make-up of those who are responsible for making decisions about moral and political matters, broadened the topics that are discussed, and contributed to making decisions reflective of a broader range of perspectives. In the UK in particular, the use of female only shortlists by the Labour Party during the 1997 general election is widely credited with contributing to the break-down

of prejudices that previously impeded the selection of women and discouraged them from offering their candidacy in parliamentary seats, making it easier for women to be selected in non-all-women shortlist seats, and increasing the parliamentary visibility of issues such as women's health, domestic violence, childcare.[35]

That said, delving a little deeper into Difference Democrats' suggestions, especially with the reality of embodied existence in mind, a number of problems with, and drawbacks to, implementing the measures that they endorse emerge. Take, for example, the suggestions that Difference Democrats make about giving groups that are routinely marginalised in, or excluded from, moral and political discussions the opportunity to articulate their concerns in non-deliberative ways and/or the chance to veto decisions that affect them. Accounts of the destructive, debilitating toll that the experience of living in contemporary society as an embodied being takes on individuals' bodies suggest that many people, especially those belonging to disadvantaged groups in society, may be so exhausted, worn-out, and downtrodden by the daily grind of their lives that they are unable to fully understand, yet along muster the desire and confidence necessary to talk about, their experiences. It may therefore simply not be enough to give people increased opportunities to express, speak about, or discuss their viewpoints. Making an argument similar to this, McNay examines how feelings of shame, boredom, hopelessness, and so on, which she treats as corporeal dispositions that are the effect of embodied domination, silence groups that are deprived in contemporary

[35]See Cutts, David, Sarah, Childs, and Edward, Fieldhouse, 'This is what happens when you don't listen? All Women Shortlists at the 2005 General Election', *Party Politics*, 2008, vol.14., no.5., pp.575. – 595. and Childs, Sarah, *New Labour's Women MPs: Women Representing Women*, (New York and London: Routledge, 2004)

society. [36] So too, thinkers who analyse the actual state of political participation in contemporary society point towards the widespread apathy, indifference, and political disengagement amongst ordinary citizens. Succinctly capturing the essence of the argument that thinkers who are engaged in this research make, Parvin explains that, 'citizens are increasingly disengaged from politics. The problem is not that existing democratic systems are incapable of incorporating political talk into the process of decision-making. It is that citizens are increasingly uninterested in engaging in political talk.' [37] Next, consider the suggestion that some Difference Democrats make about reformulating democratic politics to replace the emphasis on consensus and rational, reasoned, and dispassionate deliberation with an acknowledgement of agonistic elements such as conflict and contestation. As with the previous example, at first glance, this suggestion appears well suited to allowing groups that have histories of being excluded from political decisions, especially those that struggle to articulate themselves through deliberative forms of praxis and modes of communication, to engage with. the political decision-making process. Indeed, this suggestion seems especially well suited to responding to the fact that people's experiences of living in contemporary society are likely to lead them to express their concerns in fragmented, sometimes incoherent, and emotional ways. However, like the previous example, accounts of the experience of living life as an embodied being highlight a number of barriers that make it difficult, if not impossible, for individuals to make use of the types of subjective capacities and skills that these

[36]See McNay, Lois, 'Suffering, Silence and Social Weightlessness: Honneth and Bourdieu on Embodiment and Power', in Gonzalez-Arnal, Stella, Gill Jagger, and Katheleen Lennon, eds., *Embodied Selves*, (Basingstoke, Hampshire and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012)
[37]Parvin, Phil, 'Is Deliberative Democracy Feasible: Political Disengagement and Trust in Liberal Democratic Societies', *The Monist*, 2015, vol.98., no.4., pp.407. – 423., pp.419. – 420.

suggestions require. They may, for example, be too angry, hurt, resentful, or disillusioned to voice their experiences and the concerns that they generate. In fact, being attentive to embodied existence draws attention to way in which transforming democratic politics to accept elements of agonism such as contestation and conflict may actually open the door to potentially troublesome and undesirable facets of intersubjective praxis, such as anger, contempt, and frustration, which models of politics that are based upon deliberative rather than non-deliberative forms of praxis and modes of communication are designed to address. Therefore, it may well be, as Habermas and Benhabib argue when outlining their models of moral and political reasoning, that there are benefits to be gained from placing regulative mechanism upon the subjects who are involved, such as requiring them to articulate themselves calmly, give good reasons for their opinions, and treat each other with mutual respect, i.e. adhere to what is typically thought of as a deliberative model of communicative praxis.

The irony is that Difference Democrats are keenly aware of real-world problems with people's participation in generating decisions about moral and political matters. Indeed, their attentiveness to patterns of oppression and domination in wider society and the import that those patterns have for persons' subjectivity and the political decision-making process drives their criticism of seemingly neutral and rational methods of making decisions in the first place. That said, in a manner akin to the Habermas and Benhabib, the suggestions that Difference Democrats' make for how the process of formulating decisions can be made more accommodating of difference exhibit an implicit neglect of the deep, profound, and long-lasting impact that people's experiences of living within their

bodies as embodied beings has on both the range and types of things they can do. To explore this point further, the next section of chapter five draws on Foucault's ultra-radical[38] definition of power as a productive and positive as well as a negative force alongside McNay's notion of 'social weightlessness', which she develops when critiquing so-called radical models of democracy, some of which also fall into the category of Difference Democrat.

Power and Social Weightlessness

Throughout the various stages of his writings, Foucault makes a number of assertions about power and how it ought to be conceptualized. Central to his claims, especially during the so-called genealogical stage of his writings,[39] is the idea that power is not only negative or repressive in that it prohibits, constrains, or sets limits on what an agent or agents might do or desire, but is also positive and productive in that it 'traverses', 'produces' and 'induces' things, including knowledge, discourses, pleasures, and so forth.[40] More specifically, as Steven Lukes notes, Foucault claims that power produces subjects, 'making people up'[41] - to use Ian Hacking's phrase – 'forming their character' and 'normalizing' them so that they are willing and able to adhere to norms about acceptable ways of

[38]Steven Lukes uses this term when developing a 'three dimensional' concept of power that he contrasts with, and claims is superior to, other, 'one dimensional' and 'two-dimensional' definitions. When making this argument, Lukes argues that Foucault's definition of power is especially useful for shedding light on how the powerful secure the compliance of those they dominate through both repressive and productive means. See Lukes, Steven, *Power: A Radical View,* 2nd edn., (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005), p.88.

[39]It is generally agreed this stage of Foucault's writings include *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, the first volume of *The History of Sexuality*, and number of interviews and lectures that he gave at around the same time. See McLaren, Margaret, A., *Feminism, Foucault, and Embodied Subjectivity,* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002), pp.3. – 5.

[40]Foucault, Michel, *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972 – 1977*, ed. Gordon, Colin, trans. Gordon, Colin, Leo Marshall, John Mepham, and Kate Soper, (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester, 1980), p.119.

[41]Hacking, Ian, 'Making up People', in Heller, Thomas C., Morton Sosna, and David E. Wellbery (eds.) *Reconstructing Individualism,* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1986)

being and behaving in various areas of social life, including health, sexuality, and sanity.[42] As David Garlands explains in his concise summary of the nature of power in Foucault's work, to endorse Foucault's understanding of power is to treat it as, 'a pervasive aspect of social life…as productive in its effect rather than repressive in so far as power shapes the actions of individuals and harnesses their bodily power to its ends. In this sense power operates "through" individuals rather than against them and helps constitute the individual who is at the same time its vehicle'.[43]

Key to Foucault's conceptualization of power is his understanding of individuals as self-scrutinizing and self-forming subjects that play at least some role in securing their compliance with domination. In *Discipline and Punish*, where Foucault develops many of his ideas about power, he claims that a particular form of power operates in modern society, which disciplines people's bodies, correcting errant behaviours so that they become 'docile' and, as such, accord with the imperatives of the nation state. This process, Foucault claims, is carried out through various institutions in society, including the school, the factory, the prison, and army barracks, and involves three primary techniques of control - hierarchical observation, normalizing judgement, and examination – all of which, Foucault argues, make it possible for the state to control individuals and their activity by gaining knowledge about individuals through examining and documenting them.[44] Subsequently, in *The History of Sexuality*, where Foucault

[42]See Lukes, Steven, *Power: A Radical View,* 2nd edn., (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005), p.91.
[43]Garland, David, *Punishment and Modern Society: A Study in Social Theory,* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), p.138.
[44]See Foucault, Michel, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, trans. Sheridan, Alan, new edn., (London: Penguin, 1991), especially the introduction.

somewhat shifts his thinking about disciplinary power, he stresses an additional aspect of 'disciplinary power' – namely, the idea that power not only operates through knowledge that others have about individuals, but also through knowledge that individuals have about themselves and their internalization of norms that are laid down by society. Drawing on the notion of 'bio-power'[45] in particular, Foucault claims that during the nineteenth century the deployment of sexuality became the greatest 'technology of power'[46] – a 'life-administering power'[47] that was concerned with using social science and statistics to 'normalize', control, and regulate the life and health of the population by detailing what were and were not acceptable ways of being and behaving. Foucault argues that, over time, these values and judgements became encoded into social practices as well as embedded in human behaviour, meaning that individuals have come to acquiesce to subtle regulations and expectations of the social order and are, as such, at least partly responsible for their compliance with domination. Citing comments that Foucault makes about the 'immense labour to which the West has submitted generations in order to produce…men's subjection: their constitution as subjects in both senses of the word',[48] Lukes claims that the pun that Foucault invokes here perfectly captures the central idea in this stage of his writing about power – namely, that 'the subject is 'constituted' through subjection to power'.[49]

Not surprisingly, claims that Foucault makes in *Discipline and Punish* and *The History of Sexuality* about individuals being at least partly responsible for, and

[45]Foucault, Michel, *History of Sexuality, vol 1: The Will to Knowledge,* trans. Hurley, Robert, new ed., (London: Penguin, 1998), p.140.
[46]See Foucault, Michel, *History of Sexuality, vol 1: The Will to Knowledge*
[47]See Foucault, Michel, *History of Sexuality, vol 1: The Will to Knowledge*
[48]Foucault, Michel, *History of Sexuality, vol 1: The Will to Knowledge*, p.60.
[49]Lukes, Steven, *Power: A Radical* View, p.95.

constituted by, their subjection to domination are controversial. Not least because this way of thinking about the subject seems to blame individuals for the propagation of relations of power and deny the possibility for more positive alternatives forms of praxis and modes of subjectivity to emerge, including individuals coming to contest or challenge relations of power and the instances of domination and oppression they produce. Feminist critics of Foucault's work in particular, express concerns about the implications that Foucault's way of thinking about the subject have for the women's movement. In Toril Moi's opinion, 'the price for giving into his [Foucault's] powerful discourse is nothing less than the depoliticisation of feminism'.[50] Likewise, Nancy Hartsock claims that, 'poststructuralist theories such as those put forward by Michel Foucault fail to provide a theory of power for women'.[51] So too, Linda Alcoff warns that, 'a wholesale appropriation of Foucault by feminist theorists is unwise'.[52]

Concerns that Foucault's critics voice about the potential implications of his view on power are compounded by the fact, as Amy Allen points out,[53] that Foucault never provides a detailed, empirical account of resistance, and the only social actors that he speaks about are the dominating agents.[54] As Allen observes, in Foucault's work one reads about delinquents, schoolchildren, perverts, and hysterical women, but never the strategies that these individuals employ or might

[50]Moi, Toril, 'Power, Sex and Subjectivity: Feminist Reflections on Foucault', *Paragraph: A Journal of Modern Critical Theory,* 1985, vol.5., pp.95. – 102., p.95.
[51]Hartsock, Nancy, 'Foucault on Power: A Theory for Women?', in Nicholson, Linda, ed., *Feminism/Postmodernism,* 1st edn., (New York and London: Routledge, 1990), p.158.
[52]Alcoff, Linda, 'Feminist Politics and Foucault: The Limits to a Collaboration', in Dallery, Arleen B., Charles E. Scott and Holley P. Roberts, eds., *Crisis in Continental Philosophy,* (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1990), p.69.
[53]For a critique of Foucault's work that incorporates Allen's claims, see Lukes, Steven, *Power: A Radical* View, pp.95 – 96.
[54]See Allen, Amy, *The Power of Feminist Theory: Domination, Resistance, Solidarity,* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1999)

employ to resist and contest the disciplinary, bio-power that is exercised over them.[55] Moreover, as Lukes notes in his discussion of Foucault's notion of power,[56] when Foucault does tackle the issue of resistance, he has a tendency to present it as something that is "internal to", generated by, and, as such, reliant upon, power: 'where there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power'.[57] As a consequence, the question that is left after reading Foucault's comments on power is what do his ideas about power mean for thinking about the subject, especially with regards to concepts like freedom, autonomy, and agency?

As Lukes highlights when giving answers to these and other questions that Foucault work on power anticipates, Foucault's later work on 'governmentality' provides a more balanced, less pessimistic answer to the question of what his ideas about power mean for the subject than one might expect given the comments that he makes in *Discipline and Punish* and *The History of Sexuality*.[58] When outlining what he means by 'governmentality', Foucault explains that he uses the term to refer to 'the totality of practices, by which one can constitute, define, organize, instrumentalize the strategies which individuals in their liberty can have in regard to each other'.[59] Here, at this stage of his thinking, there is therefore at least some level of voluntarism in his ideas about the subject, which is, in turn, made more explicit in other comments that Foucault makes during the same period. In 'The Subject and Power', for example, Foucault explains that

[55]Allen, Amy, *The Power of Feminist Theory: Domination, Resistance,* Solidarity, p.54.
[56]See Lukes, Steven, *Power: A Radical View*, pp.94. – 96.
[57]Foucault, Michel, *History of Sexuality, vol 1: The Will to Knowledge*, p.95.
[58]Lukes, Steven, *Power: A Radical View*, p.96.
[59]Foucault, Michel, 'The Ethic of Care for the Self as Practice of Freedom: an Interview with Michel Foucault on 20 January 1984', in Bernauer, James and David Rasmussen, eds., *The Final Foucault,* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1988), p.19.

power is 'exercised only over free subjects, and only insofar as they are free. By this we mean individual or collective subjects who are faced with a field of possibilities in which several ways of behaving, several reactions and diverse comportments may be realized'. [60] Likewise, when Foucault discusses the 'practice of freedom' in detail, he states that, 'the subject constitutes himself in an active fashion, by the practices of the self', which 'are not something the individual invents by himself' but, rather, 'patterns that he finds in the culture and which are proposed, suggested and imposed on him by his culture, his society, and his social group'.[61]

Combined, the vision that emerges from Foucault's comments about power and 'governmentality' is of individuals being constituted through their submission to relations of power whilst, at the same time, imbued with the capacity to contest and oppose such relations, albeit from within a nexus of interpersonal struggles and negotiations.[62] In comments that Foucault makes during the later stages of his thinking, he refers to this complex interplay of submission and contestation as a 'strategic game' between 'liberties', asserting that, 'we must distinguish the relationships of power as strategic games between liberties – strategic games that result in the fact that some people try to determine the conduct of others – and the states of domination, which are what we

[60]Foucault, Michel, 'The Subject and Power', published as the After-word to Dreyfus, H. L and Paul Rabinow in Dreyfus, Hubert L. and Paul Rabinow, eds., *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics,* (Chicago, Illinois Chicago: University Press, 1982), p.221.
[61]Foucault, Michel, 'The Ethic of Care for the Self as Practice of Freedom: an Interview with Michel Foucault on 20 January 1984', p.11.
[62]Not all commentators on Foucault's work, especially those with an interest in gender, are convinced by the potential his ideas have to explain the emergence of activities and practices that reject and/or challenges the status quo. For example, See McNay, Lois, 'Gender, Habitus and the Field: Pierre Bourdieu and the Limits of Reflexivity', *Theory, Culture & Society*, 1999, vol.16., no.1., pp.95 – 117.

ordinarily call power'.[63] Thus, from Foucault's perspective, the crucial task, once the reality of these strategic games is accepted, is to determine how such games of power can be 'played out with minimum domination'[64] by which he means where 'the relations of power are fixed in such a way that they are perpetually asymmetrical and the margin of liberty is extremely limited'.[65] In other words, how to ensure no single entity is perpetually triumphant.

Again, Difference Democrats are keenly aware of the problem of oppression and domination in contemporary society. Difference Democrats are also aware that patterns of domination and oppression in wider society shape individuals' praxis and generate forms of exclusion and inequality in the process of making decisions about moral and political issues. However, what Difference Democrats' suggestions for what the process of political decision-making ought to look like implicitly underestimate, which Foucault's understanding of power helps to draw attention to, is the way in which patterns of oppression and domination work "through" people's bodies, constituting their subjectivities and shaping their aptitudes and competencies so as to accord with patterns of oppression and domination. Simply providing individuals with increased opportunities to engage with the process of making decisions about moral and political matters and/or allowing them to participate in a greater range of different ways is therefore likely to be insufficient to make them equitable with one another in the ways that Difference Democrats imagine. Moreover, it implicitly promulgates, what McNay

[63]Foucault, Michel, 'The Ethic of Care for the Self as Practice of Freedom: an Interview with Michel Foucault on 20 January 1984', p.19.
[64]Foucault, Michel, 'The Ethic of Care for the Self as Practice of Freedom: an Interview with Michel Foucault on 20 January 1984', p.18.
[65]Foucault, Michel, 'The Ethic of Care for the Self as Practice of Freedom: an Interview with Michel Foucault on 20 January 1984', p.12.

refers to as a 'social weightlessness'[66] way of thinking about politics, that tacitly overlooks the deep-seated impediments that people's experiences of living within their bodies as embodied creates with regards to their abilities to make use of whatever modes or means of engaging with the process of moral and political reasoning are on offer. In the case of deliberative democrats like Habermas and Benhabib, these would, of course, be forms of praxis and modes of communication that are typically associated with deliberation. In the case of Difference Democrats, they include a wide variety of measures that seek to transform democratic politics, including by moving it away from the focus on deliberation.

In *The Misguided Search for the Political: Social Weightlessness in Radical Democratic Theory*, where McNay develops the term 'social weightlessness', she argues that since the 1990s a 'turn' towards abstraction has occurred in political theory.[67] The result of this 'turn', McNay argues, is that whilst 'the present moment abounds with diverse and competing models of democracy',[68] thinking about politics has become strangely abstract and free-floating, typified by a transcendentalism, especially when compared to political theory in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s.[69] As McNay explains, her critique is actually less concerned with normative political theory as a whole and more concerned with so-called radical models of democracy. In McNay's eyes, whilst, on the face of it, her

[66]McNay, Lois, *The Misguided Search for the Political: Social Weightlessness in Radical Democratic Theory,* (Cambridge and Malden, Massachusetts: Polity Press, 2014), p.1.
[67]McNay, Lois, *The Misguided Search for the Political: Social Weightlessness in Radical Democratic* Theory, p.1.
[68]McNay, Lois, *The Misguided Search for the Political: Social Weightlessness in Radical Democratic* Theory, p.1.
[69]McNay, Lois, *The Misguided Search for the Political: Social Weightlessness in Radical Democratic* Theory, p.2.

argument would appear to target the work of analytical, liberal political theorists, which is frequently associated with the term 'ideal theory', this is not the case. For, as McNay explains, analytical democrats deliberately approach normative theorizing with the aim of identifying a logic that is as 'objective' as possible and 'unclouded' by 'the concerns of daily existence'.[70] To accuse them of producing an abstract vision of the political, would, therefore, be to accuse them of something they may not deny doing: 'given, the intellectual terms in which ideal theorists operate, it is not possible to conduct the kind of immanent critique that I am interested in pursuing here with the notion of social weightlessness'[71] and 'to accuse analytical liberals of social weightlessness is, in some sense, to talk past them, given that their concern is explicitly not with examining social inequalities but rather with producing logically robust normative proposals'.[72] Instead, McNay explains that radical democratic theory is the target of her critique, especially those types of radical democratic theory that could be loosely classified as agonist in nature,[73] some of which, including Mouffe's vision of radical, democratic politics, fall into the category of Difference Democracy as well. For McNay, the primary problem with radical democratic theory is not that it is idealist per se, but, rather, that it relies upon a particular type of ideal theory, which, in focusing on the way that things ought to be, tacitly disregards the actual or given, especially with regards to the import that people's experiences of living their lives as embodied beings have for their realisation of certain capacities and capabilities.

[70]McNay, Lois, *The Misguided Search for the Political: Social Weightlessness in Radical Democratic Theory*, p.5.
[71]McNay, Lois, *The Misguided Search for the Political: Social Weightlessness in Radical Democratic* Theory, p.6.
[72]McNay, Lois, *The Misguided Search for the Political: Social Weightlessness in Radical Democratic* Theory, p.8.
[73]McNay, Lois, *The Misguided Search for the Political: Social Weightlessness in Radical Democratic* Theory, p.6.

Drawing on Onora O'Neill's criticism of the use of idealized abstraction in normative political theory[74] and Charles Mills' distinction between different kind of ideal theorizing, which builds on O'Neill's discussion,[75] McNay explains that,

> 'idealization is clearly not the cause of social weightlessness in radical democratic theory' because 'radical democrats would agree with sceptical assessments of the value of idealizing abstractions…and would strongly endorse the idea that political norms should be linked more securely to an examination of the crucial social reality of inequality'.[76]

Rather, the problem, McNay explains, is 'one of ontology' – the over-reliance by radical democrats on a certain ontological way of thinking about the political that disregards how things actually are and, as such, undermines the emancipatory import that their theories have.[77] This implicit disregarding, McNay argues, is especially acute with regards to the lived, embodied experience, of inequality[78] and, relatedly, the way in which 'political dynamics are played out in the social world and, in particular, in asymmetrical relations of power'.[79]

In Difference Democrats' work, the 'social weightlessness' way of thinking about politics that McNay identifies in radical democratic theory is reflected in a focus on trying to bring groups with histories of being excluded from democratic politics into or inside of the official processes, structures, and arrangements of the

[74]For O'Neill, Onora, *Towards Justice and Virtue: A Constructivist Account of Practical Reasoning,* (Cambridge, New York, and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1996). For McNay's discussion of O'Neill's viewpoint, see McNay, Lois, *The Misguided Search for the Political: Social Weightlessness in Radical Democratic* Theory, p.8.
[75]For Mills, Charles, W., "'Ideal Theory" as Ideology', *Hypatia*, 2005, vol.20., no.3., pp.165. – 184. For McNay's discussion of Mill's argument see McNay, Lois, *The Misguided Search for the Political: Social Weightlessness in Radical Democratic* Theory, p.9.
[76]McNay, Lois, *The Misguided Search for the Political: Social Weightlessness in Radical Democratic Theory*, p.11.
[77]McNay, Lois, *The Misguided Search for the Political: Social Weightlessness in Radical Democratic* Theory, p.11.
[78]McNay, Lois, *The Misguided Search for the Political: Social Weightlessness in Radical Democratic Theory*, p.12.
[79]McNay, Lois, *The Misguided Search for the Political: Social Weightlessness in Radical Democratic Theory*, pp.11. - 12.

decision-making process without adequately considering the potential problems with, and, indeed, drawbacks to, implementing the suggestions that they make,[80] In deliberative democrats' work and Habermas's and Benhabib's work in particular, the 'social weightlessness' way of thinking about politics is reflected in the requirement that everyone who participates in the decision making process participates in the same way, that is, by using forms of praxis and modes of communication that are commonly associated with deliberation, without sufficient attention being paid to inequalities in people's abilities to act in these ways due to their embodiment in their physical and material forms. To further examine these flaws with both Difference Democrats' and deliberative democrats' work and to also consider how discussions in democratic theory, especially those about what the process of generating decisions about moral and political matters ought to look like, might be pushed forward, past the debate between these two sets of thinkers, the final section of chapter five draws on the central concerns and commitments of thinkers who call for greater realism about politics in contemporary political theory.

Being Realistic About Politics

Deliberative democrats like Habermas and Benhabib and Difference Democrats share a core belief – namely, that it is possible to improve the process of

[80]The focus in this discussion has been on problems people experience with participating in discussions about moral and political matters in the ways Difference Democrats endorse. In his engagement with Difference Democracy, Dryzek also raises concerns about the suggestions they provide for how politics might be made more accommodating of difference. However, his focus is on how bringing groups that are routinely excluded into the official structures, arrangements and processes of the decision-making process might dampen the critical force of their activity and praxis. See Dryzek, John, *Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations*, especially chapter 5.

generating decisions about moral and political matters in the real world by specifying, in advance, idealised visions of what that process ought to look like and trying to realise those models through the implementation of various rules, measures, mechanisms, and so forth. For deliberative democrats like Habermas and Benhabib, this specification amounts to limiting participation in discussions about moral and political issues to forms of praxis and modes of communication that are commonly associated with deliberation. For Difference Democrats, it requires the dismissal of deliberation as the foundation for moral and political decision-making [81] and endorsement of non-deliberative forms of praxis and modes of communication, which, in their opinion, serve to recover the voices of groups in society that deliberation typically obscures. Commenting on the approach towards thinking about normative political theorizing in deliberative democratic theory in particular, Bohman and Rehg explain that, 'one can construe real democratic procedures as approximations of [the deliberative] ideal', that is, as more or less accurate realisations of the deliberative, decision-making procedure.[82]

Insights into embodied existence fundamentally challenge the work of deliberative democratic theorists like Habermas and Benhabib and Difference Democrats by showing that it may not be possible nor desirable for real-world arrangements and processes for making judgements about moral and political matters to align with their visions of what those arrangements and processes

[81] Anne Phillips is at outlier in this regard, explaining the representative measures she endorses in order to create a 'politics of presence' are compatible with deliberative models of democracy. See Phillip, Anne, *The Politics of Presence,* chapter 6.
[82] Bohman, James and William Rehg 'Introduction', in Bohman, James and William Rehg (eds.), *Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Logic,* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1997), p.xvi.

should look like. Specifically, insights into embodied existence demonstrate that applying idealised visions of what the process of making decisions about moral and political matters to the real world is insufficient to address prevalent forms of political inequality and exclusion, and, worst still, that efforts to do so can have the unintended consequence of reproducing instances of political inequality and exclusion or of generating them anew.

This is not to say that insights into embodied existence suggest that there is no hope for improving real-world politics. In fact, insights into embodied existence suggest two things: firstly, that there may be times when opening politics up to include non-deliberative forms of praxis and modes of communication might help to make the decision-making processes more inclusive and egalitarian, and, secondly, that there may be times when limiting political discussions to forms of praxis and modes of communication that are associated with deliberation might play a positive role in limiting the presence of negative aspects of intersubjective, communicative praxis in discussions about moral and political matters. Having said that, what insights into embodied existence do suggest is that neither strictly limiting political participation to deliberative forms of praxis and modes of communication *nor* expanding the understanding of 'the political' to include non-deliberative forms of communication and praxis is likely to be feasible or sufficient to make political decision-making in contemporary society, as it currently stands and is likely to continue to stand unless drastic action is taken, inclusive and egalitarian. With this in mind, it seems reasonable to suggest that discussions in democratic theory may benefit from a shift in thinking away from a focus on the production and realization of idealised models of politics, be these

based upon deliberative or non-deliberative forms of praxis and modes of communication, towards an alternative approach that is less idealistic and more "realistic" about what can or might be achieved.

Cries for greater realism about politics are echoed by numerous voices and schools of thoughts in contemporary political theory. Traditionally associated with International Relations,[83] the term 'realist political theory' is used to denote an approach towards thinking about politics that rejects idealised or abstract models of political decision-making in favour of more "realistic" apprehensions of the political, both in term of which currently is and what might possibly be. In the work of some "realist" political theorists, this commitment to being realistic about politics is reflected in an interest in passions and emotions and the role that they play in political settings.[84] In the work of other "realist" political theorists, it is connected to the belief that conflict – amongst both values and interests – and coercive power are unavoidable aspects of political activity.[85] In the work of yet other "realist" thinkers, it is linked to a focus on contextual aspects of political decision-making such as the cultural and historical arenas, frameworks, and structures in which real political agreements are made.[86]

---

[83]For a discussion of the history of the term 'realism' in International Relations, see Bell, Duncan (ed.), *Political Thought and International Relations: Variations on a Realist Theme*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), Boucher, David, *Political Theories of International Relations: From Thucydides to the Present*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), and Williams, Michael, *The Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005)

[84]See Galston, William, 'Realism in political theory', *European Journal of Political Theory,* 2010, vol.9., no.4., pp.385. – 411.

[85]See Stears, Marc, 'Liberalism and the Politics of Compulsion', *British Journal of Political Science,* 2007, vol.37., no.3., pp.533 – 553.

[86]See Floyd, Jonathan and Marc Stears (eds.), *Political Philosophy versus History? Contextualism and Real Politics in Contemporary Political Thought*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011). For a critical discussion of this viewpoint, see Floyd, Jonathan, 'Is Political Philosophy too Ahistorical?*', Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy,* 2009, vol.12., pp.513. – 533.

As commentators note, there are two dominant, interrelated strands of thinking that underpin calls for greater realism in contemporary political theory.[87] The first strand, which Alice Baderin labels as the 'detachment critique',[88] makes the argument that contemporary political theory is excessively abstract, infeasible, and fails to adequately inform actual political decision-making.[89] Take, as an example of the 'detachment critique', concerns that realist political theorists voice about contemporary political theory being too 'utopian' in its thinking about politics. Indeed, some commentators argue that a commitment to being 'anti-utopian', both in terms of what is politically and what might possibly be, is the hallmark of realist political theory.[90] Particularly concerned about normative concepts such the Rawlsian principle of full compliance and the ideal of agreement in liberal, democratic theory that are commonly employed by contemporary political theorists, realist political theorists who are associated with the 'detachment critique' make two primary claims. Firstly, that these concepts are based upon naïve and implausibly optimistic assumptions about human nature, which render the models of politics that they are used to construct unworkable in the real world.[91] Secondly, that, in fostering an idealised vision of what political praxis should or ought to look like, these concepts obscure significant facets of

[87]For example, see Baderin, Alice, 'Two Forms of Realism in Political Theory', *European Journal of Political Theory,* 2014, vol.13., no.2., pp.132. – 153. and Freeden, Michael, 'Interpretative realism and prescriptive realism', *Journal of Political Ideologies,* 2012, vol.17., no.1., pp.1. – 11.,
[88]Baderin, Alice, 'Two Forms of Realism in Political Theory', p.132.
[89]For examples of the 'detachment critique' of contemporary political theory in realist political theory, see Valentini, Laura, 'Ideal vs. Non-ideal Theory: A Conceptual Map', *Philosophy Compass,* 2012, vol.7., no.9., pp.654. – 664., Gilabert, Pablo and Holly Lawford-Smith, 'Political Feasibility: A Conceptual Exploration', *Political Studies,* 2012, vol.60., pp.809. – 825., Juha, Räikkä, 'The Feasibility Condition in Political Theory', 1998, *The Journal of Political Philosophy*, vol.6., no.1., pp.27. – 40., and Bellamy, Richard, 'Dirty hands and clean gloves: liberal ideals and real politics', *European Journal of Political Theory*, 2010, vol.9., no.4., pp.412. – 430., p. 416.
[90]See Stears, Marc, 'Liberalism and the Politics of Compulsion', Valentini, Laura, 'Ideal vs. Non-ideal Theory: A Conceptual Map', and Rossi, Enzo and Matt Sleat, 'Realism in Normative Political Theory', *Philosophy Compass,* 2014, vol.9., no.10., pp.689. – 701.
[91]For examples, see Stears, Marc, 'Liberalism and the Politics of Compulsion', Valentini, Laura, 'Ideal vs. Non-ideal Theory: A Conceptual Map', and Rossi, Enzo and Matt Sleat, 'Realism in Normative Political Theory', *Philosophy Compass,* 2014, vol.9., no.10., pp.689. – 701.

real-world political praxis.[92] The challenge for thinkers who share 'displacement' concerns about contemporary political theory, is, therefore, to find ways of making normative political theory more realistic, less abstract, and less idealistic. To meet this demand, 'displacement' realist political theorists deploy a range of strategies, including highlighting feasibility considerations and stressing the importance of engaging with social scientific evidence, whilst frequently advocating the priority of 'non-ideal' over 'ideal' theory. The second strand of thinking that underpins calls for greater realism in contemporary political theory, which Baderin labels as the 'displacement critique',[93] claims that contemporary political theory threatens or, in some sense, disrespects real politics with undesirable, if not dangerous, results by reaching "beyond" the proper role of the political theorists by aspiring to pre-empt or resolve issues that only real-world political praxis can work out. [94] The following statement by Bonnie Honig, which is made when referencing a 'mysterious phenomenon' – namely, 'the displacement of politics' in contemporary political theory, from which Baderin takes the notion of 'displacement', succinctly captures the tone of the 'displacement critique':

> 'Those writing from diverse positions – republican, liberal, and communitarian – converge in their assumption that success lies in the elimination from a regime of dissonance, resistance, conflict, or struggle. They confine politics . . . to the juridical, administrative, or regulative tasks of stabilizing moral and political subjects, building consensus, maintaining agreements, or consolidating communities and identities. They assume that the task of political theory is to resolve

[92]For some political realists, facets of political decision-making that contemporary political theory tends to overlook are undesirable and need removing. For others, they are derisible or, at least, unavoidable aspects of real-world political praxis.
[93]Baderin, Alice, 'Two Forms of Realism in Political Theory', p.133.
[94]For examples of the 'displacement critique' of contemporary political theory in realist political theory see Williams, Bernard, *In the Beginning was the Deed: Realism and Moralism in Political Argument*, sel., ed., and intro. Hawthorn, Geoffrey, (Princeton, New Jersey and Woodstock, Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2005), Geuss, Raymond, *Philosophy and Real Politic,* (Princeton, New Jersey and Woodstock, Oxfordshire: Princeton University Press, 2008), and Dunn, John, *Rethinking modern political theory,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985)

> institutional questions, to get politics right, over, and done with, to free modern subjects and their sets of arrangements [from] political conflict and instability'.[95]

For thinkers who subscribe to the 'displacement critique' of contemporary political theory, the primary danger of mainstream political theory lies in an implicit overstepping of its role. Thus, to avoid this danger, thinkers who subscribe to the 'displacement critique' eschew providing suggestions for how politics might be improved upon or what is should look like in favour of analysing the status quo and producing theories that help them to do so. In the case of Bernard Williams, this approach is reflected in the argument that greater autonomy ought to be given to 'distinctly political thought'[96] and the claim that political philosophy should be treated as a distinct, independent discipline requiring 'distinctively political concepts such as power, and its normative relative, legitimation.[97] In the case of Raymond Geuss, this approach underpins his identification of a number of steps that, he argues, need to be taken in order to create a more empirically sensitive, if not empirically accurate, way of 'doing' political theory/philosophy.[98]

In this discussion, the aim is not to espouse a substantive "realist" political theory, nor is it to explore, in exhaustive detail, the arguments that "realist" political theorists make against the thinkers that they criticise or vice versa. Instead, the aim of this discussion is more modest; to consider how some of the

[95]Honig, Bonnie, *Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics*, (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1993), p.2.
[96]Williams, Bernard, *In the Beginning was the Deed: Realism and Moralism in Political Argument*, sel., ed., and intro. Hawthorn, Geoffrey, (Princeton, New Jersey and Woodstock, Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2005), p.1.
[97]Williams, Bernard, *In the Beginning was the Deed: Realism and Moralism in Political Argument*, p.77.
[98]Geuss, Raymond, *Philosophy and Real Politic,* (Princeton, New Jersey and Woodstock, Oxfordshire: Princeton University Press, 2008), p.13.

central concerns and commitments that underpin the calls for greater realism in political theory can help to move democratic theory forward, past the debate between thinkers who either endorse or reject deliberative forms of praxis and modes of communication as the foundation for decision-making, to provide a more feasible and potentially effective solution to the problem of how to realize key normative principles such as political equality, political inclusion, and, indeed, democracy itself. More specifically, how the claim that contemporary political theory needs to be less idealistic, abstract, and utopian, which informs the 'detachment critique' of contemporary political theory, can contribute to making the political decision-making process in contemporary society more inclusive and egalitarian given insights into embodied existence and what it means for people, their subjectivities, and praxis.

Before considering how the contention that contemporary political theory needs to be more realistic and less idealistic can help to move discussions in contemporary democratic theory forward, it is important to address a key criticism of realist political theory. As William Galston notes, realist political theory is frequently criticized by more mainstream political theorists for being conservative and overly pessimistic about the possibility of positive political and social change.[99] This conservatism, critics of political realism argue, relates to a number of tendencies amongst thinkers who are associated with calls or greater realism in contemporary theory. Specifically, the tendencies to produce theories to explain

[99]Galston, William, 'Realism in political theory', *European Journal of Political Theory*, pp.400. – 407.

political reality and to fail to provide affirmative alternatives to the idealised and abstract approaches towards thinking about politics that they criticize.[100]

Reading the work of some "realist" political theorists, their critics' concerns are understandable. As commentators on realist political theory point out, thinkers who are associated with calls for greater realism in contemporary political theory tend to adopt one of two approaches in their work.[101] The first approach, which relates to the 'detachment critique' of contemporary political theory, responds to the observation that political theorists do not pay adequate attention to factors that constrain political decision-making in the real world by attending to real-world political complexities and determining how normative ideals such as democracy and political equality and inclusive might be realized in the real world.[102] From this perspective, according to Michael Freeden, the role of the political theorists is to determine 'what can be recommended and aspired to, and even asserted normatively, within the constraints of political life and, most significantly, of human nature' rather how normative ideals should or ought to be refined.[103] In contrast, the second approach that realist political theorists take in their work, which is connected to the 'displacement critique' of contemporary political theory, responds to worries about ignoring political reality and overstepping the role of political theorists by moving away from efforts to theorize political reality and maintaining a skeptical attitude about attempts to change or improve that

[100]See Galston, William, 'Realism in political theory', *European Journal of Political Theory*, pp.400. – 407.
[101]For example, see Freeden, Michael, 'Interpretative realism and prescriptive realism', *Journal of Political Ideologies,* 2012, vol.17., no.1., pp.1. – 11., p.1.
[102]In its strongest form, Baderin argues this approach rejects the usefulness of ideal norms of values for political theorising. See Baderin, Alice, 'Two Forms of Realism in Political Theory', p.136.
[103]Freeden, Michael, 'Interpretative realism and prescriptive realism', pp.3. – 4.

reality through theoretical means. From this perspective, the role of political theorist is focused on and also limited to the analysis and exploration rather than normative theorising. Or, to use Freeden's words, 'elucidator and explorer' rather than 'teacher and missionary'.[104]

Certainly, insights into embodied existence reveal problems with trying to realise idealised models of moral and political decision-making in the real world and underestimating or overlooking factors that pose barriers to those models realisation, lending weight to some of the arguments that realist political theorists make. In particular, insights into embodied existence support a 'detachment critique' of widely accepted normative principles by demonstrating that models of moral and political decision-making that are devised by both deliberative democratic theorists like Habermas and Benhabib and Difference Democrats rely upon naive, impossibly high standards of political engagement and participation that not all members of society can currently meet or may ever be able to meet. That said, insights into embodied existence also highlight the potentially positive role that political theorists can play in making the decision-making process more inclusive and egalitarian so as long as they are attentive to embodied existence and what it means for different means, modes, and mechanisms of political participation and engagement. More specifically, insights into embodied existence show how suggestions that both deliberative democrats like Habermas and Benhabib and Difference Democrats make have the potential to render the process of producing decisions about moral and political matters more inclusive and egalitarian by working "with" individuals' situation as embodied beings and

[104]See Freeden, Michael, 'Interpretative realism and prescriptive realism', pp.3. – 4.

keeping their situation as embodied beings in mind. Taking these reflections on the work of deliberative democrats like Habermas and Benhabib and Difference Democrats into account, insights into embodied existence therefore support a 'realism' about politics that is attentive to the reality of political praxis and takes a common sense, practical viewpoint about what might be achieved in the real world, but is still hopeful about change and improvement. In other words, a 'realism' that is closer aligned to the work of thinkers who are associated with the "detachment" critique rather than "displacement" critique of contemporary political theory in Baderin's terms. Specifically, a realism, to use Richard Bellamy's words, that is 'real' about what political reality consists of and what might be realized within that reality whilst 'remaining clothed in a degree of…idealism'.[105]

Of course, if insights into embodied existence and the impact that embodied existence has on individuals are to be believed, then as long as society is characterized by unfair or unjust conditions then it is unlikely that any single theoretical strategy, measures, or approach will be sufficient to realise the democratic ideal. Instead, there will always be sections of society whose subjectivities are shaped so as to better align with whatever opportunities or means of engaging with the process of creating decisions about moral and political matters are on offer. In addition, it is likely that those individuals and groups of individuals who are best at engaging with or participating in the process of creating decisions about moral or political matters will be the same groups who are the least disadvantaged and have the most power in society. Having said that,

[105]Bellamy, Richard, 'Dirty hands and clean gloves: liberal ideals and real politics', p.416.

whilst being attentive to the reality of embodied existence and the import that it has for people's subjectivities suggests that the democratic ideal may be unobtainable as long as the conditions characterizing contemporary society remain unfair or unjust, being attentive to the reality of embodied existence also suggests that it is possible to move the reality of political praxis forward, towards the democratic idea, by working "with" and accepting rather than going "against" and ignoring the reality of the differences and, indeed, inequalities between people. In Amartya Sen's work, including *The Idea of Justice* and papers like 'What Do We Want From A Theory of Justice?'[106] in which Sen objects to what he calls a 'transcendental approach to justice,[107] this kind of approach towards thinking about social arrangements justice requires is reflected in his endorsement of a 'comparative approach'.[108] According to Sen, the 'comparative approach' towards thinking about politics is based upon the argument that less time should be spent on identifying perfectly just social arrangements and more time should be spent ranking alternative societal arrangements in order to make society more just. For, in Sen's own words,

> 'The transcendental approach cannot, on its own, address questions about advancing justice and compare alternative proposals for having a more just society, short of proposing a radical jump to a perfectly just world. Indeed, the answers that a transcendental approach to justice gives – or can give – are quite distinct and different from the type of concerns that engage people in discussions on injustice and justice in the world, for example, iniquities of hunger, illiteracy, torture, arbitrary incarceration, or medical exclusion as particular social features that need remedying. The focus of these engagements tends to be on the ways and means or advancing justice – or reducing injustice – in the world by remedying these inequities, rather than on looking only for the simultaneous fulfilment of the entire cluster of

[106]Sen, Amartya, 'What Do We Want from a Theory of Justice?', *The Journal of Philosophy*, 2006, vol.103., no. 5., pp.215. – 238.
[107]Sen, Amartya, 'What Do We Want from a Theory of Justice?', p.218.
[108]Sen, Amartya, 'What Do We Want from a Theory of Justice?', p.218.

> perfectly just societal arrangement demanded by a particular transcendental theory'.[109]

In the paper, 'Democracy Without Participation: A New Politics for a Disengaged Era', Parvin offers a vision for what being realistic about politics and working "with" political reality might involve. Drawing on empirical evidence into political participation that has been collated over the last half-century, Parvin argues that patterns of political engagement and participation fundamentally undermine traditional approaches to democratic theory and practice. Specifically, Parvin claims that whilst the vast majority of democratic theory, and deliberative democratic theory in particular, assume, if not openly advocate, the need for widespread citizen participation, empirical evidence strongly suggests that many citizens do not have the meaningful opportunity to participate in the ways that many democratic theorists require, and do not participate in anything like the numbers that democratic thinkers believe or deem to be necessary. Indeed, evidence suggests quite the contrary and that those who do participate in politics are the most privileged and advantaged in society. Referring to the discrepancy between how participation in politics is imagine in democratic theory and exists in reality, Parvin states thus:

> 'Rates of political participation among citizens of liberal democratic states are low and becoming more unequal; participation is becoming increasingly concentrated among those at the top end of the wealth and income distribution, and as a consequence political power and influence have also become increasingly concentrated among members of this group…This is a problem for democratic theory and practice. Citizen participation in a democracy acts as a check on elite power. It prevents the rise of civil oligarchies and the capture of democratic institutions by privileged groups, and ensures that democratic structures are not reformed in ways which result in the systemic exclusion of non- elites over the longer term'.[110]

[109]Sen, Amartya, 'What Do We Want from a Theory of Justice?', p.218.
[110]Parvin, Phil, 'Democracy Without Participation: A New Politics for a Disengaged Era', p.31.

In Parvin's eyes, changing patterns of interest and participation in politics over the last half a century are traceable back to the decimation of civil society by a range of overlapping social, political, cultural, and economic forces that disconnect citizens from political life and weaken the various networks of civil associations, groups, and organisations that mobilise political action. In Parvin's opinion, this decimation is so severe and runs so deep that efforts for political reform that emphasise wider and richer forms of citizen participation at the level of mass society are likely to fail. Contrary to the majority of democratic theorists and deliberative democratic theorists in particular, Parvin therefore argues that the agenda for democratic reform ought to involve rejecting deliberative and participatory models of democracy in favour of a more robust model of representative democracy that requires less substantive involvement from citizens, but is more capable of producing outcomes that are as fair as possible in the face of the absence of widespread citizen engagement and participation: 'citizen participation, traditionally conceived, can no longer provide the check on elite power that the system requires…and so we need a new check: an institutional check which incorporates citizens' voices into the democratic system but which does not rely on widespread citizen participation'[111] and,

> 'deliberative democracy is not a viable strategy for democratic reform. It sets the bar too high and requires too much of citizens. What democrats interested in genuinely reforming democracy for the better should seek is a form of democracy which builds in the scale and nature of the challenges facing democracy in the contemporary era. We need…a 'democracy for realists': a conception of democracy that fits the world in which we live, a world in which citizens face vast and entrenched obstacles to participating, in which many citizens possess little or no political knowledge or enthusiasm for contributing to democratic debates, and in which politics has become marginal to their lives. Instead of focusing on how we can improve participation, therefore, I suggest we focus on how to improve representation by

[111]Parvin, Phil, 'Democracy Without Participation: A New Politics for a Disengaged Era', p.33.

> embracing the trajectories of change that I have described herein, rather than seeking to reverse or ignore them'.[112]

Parvin's argument is compelling, especially with insights into embodied existence in mind, because it turns received wisdom about how to make politics more egalitarian and inclusive on its head; advocating an approach that is based upon working with what most people, including those who are the least advantaged in society, can do or are likely to be able to do rather than not. Gone, therefore, is the viewpoint that implicitly informs 'participatory' models of democracy and deliberative models of democracy in particular - namely, that making politics more inclusive and egalitarian requires all individuals in society, including those who suffer the most and have the least, to "live up" to an idealised and, indeed, privileged vision of what political engagement should or ought to look like.

In response to the suggestion that politics ought to demand less in terms of citizens' participation, thinkers who defend 'participatory' models of democracy, including deliberative democrats like Habermas and Benhabib, might argue that the situation is not as dire as thinkers like Parvin claim it to be. Certainly, there is a broad range of research and evidence that supports this point of view, showing how ordinary people's participation in politics can be increased and/or enhanced, especially through encouraging activities that foster the kinds of skills that insights into embodied existence suggest only the powerful possess and build the kinds of solidarity that Parvin argues are lacking in contemporary society. Consider, for example, research into community organization and community

[112]Parvin, Phil, 'Democracy Without Participation: A New Politics for a Disengaged Era', p.45.

unions, which shows how the coming together of individuals in groups with shared concerns can help to build their confidence and furnish them with the kinds of skills and abilities that increases their political entanglement and also renders their engagement more effective. For example, in Saul Alinsky's seminal contribution to this field of research, he outlines a plan for community organizers to successfully run a movement for change and help low-income communities gain greater social, political, legal, and economic power. Building on his previous experience, Alinsky identifies ten steps that, he argues, community organizers should use to grow grassroots activity.[113] Since first being published in the 1970s, Alinsky's principles have been successfully applied to many government, labour, community, and congregation-based organisation and, today, research into community based organizations and unions continues to highlight the positive impact that organisations such as these have on individuals and their political engagement. Janice Fine's research into work-based associations, for example, highlights the strength of citizens' participation in activities that help to build activism across multiple industry sectors in contemporary society and gives valuable insight into the organization of those associations, from the ground up, and by a population of workers that is typically thought as being unorganisable, disinterested, and disengaged.[114] Next, consider research into participatory budgeting that highlights the role that the state can play in better involving citizens in the political decision-making process by giving them the opportunity to identify, discuss, and prioritize public spending projects. Crucially, evidence clearly suggest that such measures are helping to enhance the power that ordinary

[113]See Alinsky, Saul, *Rules for Radicals: A Pragmatic Primer for Realistic Radicals*, 2nd edn., (New York: Vintage Books, 1989)
[114]See Fine, Janice, *Worker Centers: Organizing Communities at the Edge of the Dream*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006)

individuals have to make real decisions about how money is spent by government.[115] Finally, consider research into social capital that shows how membership of certain kinds of communities can contributes to the building of citizen's 'democratic capacity', to use a Knight and Johnson's term.[116] In Knight and Johnson's eyes, there are a number of 'functionings' that are relevant for political equality.[117] These functionings include 'the capacity to formulate authentic preferences', 'the effective use of cultural resources', and, most importantly, 'basic cognitive abilities and skills'.[118] According to Knight and Johnson, economic and social inequalities undermine political equality and make individuals democratic capacity unequal in a number of ways. Firstly, by disrupting the capacity for disadvantaged groups in society to formulate authentic preferences because of the problem of adaptive preferences and the tendency to adapt to adverse conditions.[119] Secondly, by privileging certain forms of communication and preventing disadvantaged groups in society from learning to articulate their perspectives effectively in these ways.[120] Thirdly, by unequally distributing resources, resulting in diminished intellectual capacities in adults who belong to disadvantaged socio-cultural groups.[121] Therefore, to ensure effective opportunities to participate in the deliberative, democratic process as equal, Knight and Johnson conclude that it is necessary to limit social and economic

[115]For example, see Gret, Marion and Yves Sintomer, *The Port Alegre Experiment: Learning Lessons for Better Democracy*

[116]See Knight, Jack, and James, Johnson, 'What Sort of Equality Does Deliberative Democracy Require?', in Bohman, James and William Rehg, eds., *Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Logic*

[117]Knight, Jack, and James, Johnson, 'What Sort of Equality Does Deliberative Democracy Require?', pp.298 – 299.

[118]Knight, Jack, and James, Johnson, 'What Sort of Equality Does Deliberative Democracy Require?', p.305.

[119]Knight, Jack, and James, Johnson, 'What Sort of Equality Does Deliberative Democracy Require?', p.306.

[120]Knight, Jack, and James, Johnson, 'What Sort of Equality Does Deliberative Democracy Require?', p.307.

[121]Knight, Jack, and James, Johnson, 'What Sort of Equality Does Deliberative Democracy Require?', p.306.

inequalities. [122] Efforts to operationalise the notions of 'functioning' and 'capabilities' in the real world lend weight to the arguments that Knight and Johnson make, suggesting that their approach may offer a possible route forward in making individuals with different backgrounds and histories more politically equitable. In the paradigm of development in particular, public policies that utilise the notions of 'functioning' and 'capability' are widely discussed and commonly accepted.[123]

To reiterate, evidence supports the argument that steps can be taken to increase and equalise ordinary citizens participation in politics, especially by thinking about politics in new and innovative ways. The key point, though, which insights embodied existence serve to demonstrate, is that deliberation is a privileged form and mode of intersubjective, communicative praxis. Therefore, unless drastic action is taken to make contemporary society more just, equitable, and fair – and currently there is no reason to believe that is going to happen any time soon, in fact, recent history suggests quite the opposite – then the individuals who live within it are likely to remain unequally able to access and influence the process of producing decisions about moral and political issues if/when it is based upon deliberation. Take, for example, relations of solidarity that community organization and community unions help to foster. On one hand, these may help people to better understand their experiences and give those same people the

[122]Knight, Jack, and James, Johnson, 'What Sort of Equality Does Deliberative Democracy Require?', p.306.
[123]For example, see Sen, Amartya, *Development as Freedom,* new edn., (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), Nussbaum, Martha, *Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach,* new edn., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), Anand, Paul, Hunter, Graham and Ron Smith, 'Capabilities and well-being: evidence based on the Sen–Nussbaum approach to welfare', *Social Indicators Research*, 2005, vol.74., no.1., pp.9. – 55., and Clark, David A., 'Capability Approach', in Clark, David A., (ed.), *The Elgar Companion to Development Studies*, (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2005)

confidence to talk about their experiences where, previously, they would have remained silent. Significantly, Kruks's discussion of her personal experience of visiting a battered women's shelter, which chapter three discusses in the context of the concept of 'affect', lends weight to this argument by showing how Kruks's experience motivated her to want redress for an issue that she had previously known about, but had not "felt' with the same voracity.[124] On the other hand, insights into embodied experience, especially those that are connected to the concept of 'affect', suggest that the experience of living in contemporary society takes such a destructive toll on people's bodies and is so disconcerting, isolating, and demotivating, that activities that foster confidence and solidarity may simply not be enough to help individuals overcome barriers to fully understanding and effectively talking about their concerns and viewpoints. With this in mind, there are good reasons, to suggest that instead of treating deliberation as a requirement of political legitimacy, it is better to treat it as a potentially desirable enhancement or added extra to a less "demanding" model of democracy like the one Parvin outlines. Making a not dissimilar argument to this, Parvin endorses a representational model of democracy that, he explains, aims to introduce more democratic deliberation by including mechanisms such as 'minipublics' to create 'a regime which can continue to produce democratic outcomes, and which satisfies the requirements of political equality…but which does not rely on widespread citizen participation'.[125] Moreover, the same evidence suggests that it is advantageous to accept, contra to deliberative democrats like Habermas and Benhabib, that making individuals with different backgrounds and histories more

[124]See Kruks, Sonia, *Retrieving Experience: Subjectivity and Recognition in Feminist Politics,* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2001) p.168.
[125]Parvin, Phil, 'Democracy Without Participation: A New Politics for a Disengaged Era', pp.31. – 52.

equally effective political subjects is likely to be served by expanding the concept of the "political" to better acknowledge the concerns and viewpoints of groups that are engaged in and express themselves through forms of praxis and modes of communication that do not necessarily "fit" with the deliberative ideal. Thus, the vision that emerges is of a hybrid, representative model of democracy that accepts the reality of political praxis, but looks to make democratic gains within that reality by being attentive individuals and groups of individuals in society who find participating in politics the hardest and least appealing.

Finally, in the closing remarks of the final chapter of this thesis, it is worth highlighting one of the most exciting and promising implications about being "realistic" about politics, namely - that making the real world process of producing decisions about moral and political matters more inclusive and fairer is likely to benefit from an open-minded, creative, and innovative mindset that is divorced from current orthodoxy and focused on finding new ways of solving well-known and much debated problems. In the work of all the thinkers that this thesis discusses, there is an element of this open-minded attitude. In the work of thinkers who are hopeful about the possibility of increasing ordinary people's political participation, this attitude is reflected in an openness towards the question of what political praxis ought to look like. In the work of thinkers who are engaged in discussions about democratic innovation, this attitude is reflected in the exploration of the democratic value of already existing, geographically and context specific political processes and technological innovations. In Difference Democrats' work, this attitude is reflected in the rejection of deliberation in favour of means of political engagement that use non-deliberative forms of praxis

and modes of communication. Even in deliberative democrats work, this attitude is reflected in a rejection of aggregative models of democratic decision-making in favour of something more convivial and conversational.

Now, it may well be that, as things currently stand, what an open-minded and realistic attitude towards politics equates to is an endorsement of a representative model of democracy that does not treat deliberation as a necessary condition of the legitimacy of political decisions and arrangements, but, rather, as one form of activity and communicative praxis that has a legitimate place in democratic setting. From this perspective, deliberation ought to be encouraged alongside other forms of praxis and communication, the democratic value of which needs to be further evaluated with insights into embodied existence in mind, by giving individuals as many opportunities as possible to come together, forge alliances, and discuss and debate moral and political matters. The key point, though, is that the decision about what the process of making decisions about moral and political matters should look like in contemporary society ought to be attentive to reality, ongoing, open, and active, and that, as such, there is still a great deal of very valuable work to be done.

Conclusion

The vignettes that began this discussion were chosen for a specific reason: they "spoke" to me. They "spoke" to me, not just because of the struggles that they described, but because they captured a problem that has plagued me throughout my life: an inability to properly articulate my viewpoints and talk about the things that matter most to me in life. Sometimes this problem presents as a deep frustration, burning deep in my chest, sometimes as tripping over my words or a complete inability to know how to express myself about a given topic, in a given situation, and sometimes as fear pure and simple, a churning, choking, eye-watering kind of fear that rises up at the very idea of opening myself up to the judgement of others and their potential ridicule and derision. Even now, as I type, I struggle to express what I feel and what I want to say; the words I select seem insufficient and ill-suited to the task.

Is it ironic that it took my engagement in this project to fully realise these things about myself. Yet, I have always wondered how the struggles that I face with regards to expressing myself and communicating with others might affect other individuals, especially those who are less fortunate or privileged than me. Where, I often ask myself, do these struggles come from; what part of my being or my background causes them; why do I suffer from them if others don't - if, indeed, they don't?; how are these struggles best understood; are they flaws, inevitable facets of human existence or something else?; and, perhaps most importantly, what might these struggles mean for those who suffer from them?

specifically, how might they put them at a disadvantage for getting on in life and for engaging in certain tasks or, indeed, enable them to do and be certain things?

Tacitly, this thesis has used these questions and others that flow from them to frame a critique of Habermas's and Benhabib's normative models of moral and political decision-making. Focusing on the assumption that implicitly underpins Habermas's and Benhabib's work – specifically, that people who belong to different groups in society are equally able to participate in the process of moral and political reasoning in the ways that they imagine – this thesis has explored how the models of moral and political judgement that they produce rely, albeit implicitly, upon a conception of the subjects who are involved as abstract and disembodied linguistic beings who are able to, in some sense, transcend or set aside differences in the material and physical forms that they embody. The reality is, though, as this thesis demonstrates, that people are fundamentally grounded in and connected to their bodies, bodies that are trained, shaped, and affected by the world that surrounds them. There can therefore be no disembodiment of individuals from their bodies in the kinds of ways that Habermas's and Benhabib's normative models of moral and political decision-making indirectly presume and, indeed, require in order to produce the kinds of impartial and inclusive outcomes that they desire.

Responding to a possible defence of Habermas's and Benhabib's work, i.e. that it describes what "ought" to be rather than what already "is" with regards to the process of creating decisions about moral and political matters, this thesis reveals that whilst it is possible to take steps towards making individuals who belong to

different groups in society at least more equally able to participate in the process of moral and political reasoning in the ways that they imagine, there are a number of fundamental problems with trying to do so. Firstly, doing so is likely to require a project of social transformation so massive and personal deconstruction so deep that it is practically unfeasible. Secondly, doing so runs the risk of making troubling judgements about the need to homogenise differences between people and their bodies. Thirdly, even if steps are taken to respect differences and inequalities between individuals, doing so is likely to exclude the viewpoints of groups who lack power in society and, as such, foreclose the process of generating decisions about moral and political matters to the viewpoints that are imbued with precisely the kind of insight and knowledge that Habermas and Benhabib design their models of moral and political decision-making to include in the first place. It is therefore better, this thesis contends, even from Habermas's and Benhabib's own standpoints, to look away from deliberative models of moral and political decision-making towards alternative suggestions for what the decision-making process should look like.

As an alternative to Habermas's and Benhabib's models, this thesis considers the work of thinkers who endorse the inclusion of non-deliberative forms of praxis and modes of communication in the process of creating decisions about moral and political matters. More specifically, this thesis uses insights into embodied experience to evaluate the suggestions that Difference Democrats make about how the democratic decision-making process might be made more accommodating of difference by implementing measures that seek to empower individuals who belong to groups that lack power in society. These suggestions

include guaranteeing politically marginalized groups a presence in political discussions through rights of representation, giving disadvantaged groups in society the opportunity to veto decisions that directly affect them, and allowing groups that have histories of being marginalized in political discussions and/or excluded from political decisions to express their concerns by using compelling and/or cultural forms of communication.

Weighing up the suggestions that Difference Democrats make with insights into embodied existence in mind, this thesis highlights a number of advantages of allowing individuals to participate in discussions in the ways that they endorse. These advantages include allowing individuals who belong to groups in society to express themselves in ways that they are skilled and confident in using and allowing them to contribute directly to decisions rather than being subjected to problems that affect the discursive process such as prejudice and bias. However, at the same time, this thesis also uses insights into embodied existence to highlight a number of problems with the suggestions that Difference Democrats make. Specifically, this thesis reveals how Difference Democrats, like Habermas and Benhabib, rely upon an understanding of the subject as somehow separable from the physical and material forms that they inhabit and, as a result, overestimate the ability that individuals have to act and behave in the ways that they endorse, especially by falsely presuming that individuals are able to full cognize their experiences and are both willing and able to articulate them to others. Moreover, this thesis reveals how altering democratic politics in the ways that Difference Democrats endorse may actually introduce undesirable, undemocratic elements into that same process that adhering to a deliberative

process serves to at least limit. It therefore seems, this thesis concludes, that neither the suggestions that Habermas and Benhabib *nor* Difference Democrats make are sufficient to satisfy the aim of making the process of making decisions about moral and political matters truly inclusive and egalitarian and that, consequently, satisfying this aim might be better served by adopting a different approach altogether.

To consider what an alternative approach to making the process of moral and political decision-making might look like, this thesis draws on some of the central claims and commitments of the work of thinkers who call for greater realism in contemporary political theory and the 'detachment critique' of contemporary political theory in particular. Highlighting a shared characteristic of Habermas's and Benhabib's and also Difference Democrats' work – namely, the commitment to specifying, in advance, an idealised vision of what the process of making decisions about moral and political matters ought to look like - this thesis explores how making democratic politics more truly democratic might be better served by being "realistic" about politics. By "realistic", what this thesis means is an approach towards thinking about politics, both as it currently "is" and what it might one day be, that works with the reality of embodied existence and real-world political praxis rather than trying to make those who live within contemporary society "fit" with whatever idealized vision is on offer.

When making the argument in favour of being "realistic" about politics, this thesis contends two things. Firstly, that differences between people, including their bodily functions and aesthetics, body styles, bodily states of being, bodily

practices, and so forth, ought not be thought of as needing to "live up" or be brought in line with an idealised vision of what they should or ought to look like and, as such, homogenised or standardised, but, rather, as the inescapable reality that the process of moral and political reasoning needs to work "with" to become more inclusive, egalitarian, and genuinely democratic. Secondly, this thesis contends that a representative model of democracy, which includes "extra" means and methods of bringing individuals together to discuss moral and political matters and get involved in the political decision-making process, may be the best way of responding to this reality. With this in mind, a task moving forward is to further consider how this suggestion aligns with the reality of embodied existence and what other kinds of practices and arrangements might be suited to enhancing this hybrid, representative model of moral and political decision-making.

Finally, in making the claim about the need for politics to be more "realistic", the thesis argues that, on a basic level, what being attentive to the connection between embodied existence, subjective experience, and communication reveals is that as long as the conditions in which individuals live are unfair and unjust, then the likelihood is that the process of creating decisions about moral and political matters will be unfair and unjust too. In making this claim, the aim of this thesis is not to accept this reality, but, rather, to impress upon the reader the need for substantial changes to be made to the prevailing social, political economic system that underpins contemporary society whilst keeping the reality of embodied existence and what it means for people's subjectivity and agency in mind. Naturally, in Habermas's and Benhabib's work, the underlying, implicit assumption is that society needs to be changed so as to allow individuals to

participate in politics in the ways that they imagine, i.e. by using forms of praxis and modes of communication that are commonly associated with deliberation, which will, in Habermas and Benhabib eyes, further improve society by enabling those same individuals to identify and find ways of addressing pathological aspects of the social, political, and economic order. However, on a fundamental level, this thesis rejects this argument for the three reasons mentioned above, instead arguing that judgements about what steps need be taken to make society fairer and just need to be attentive to and "work" with differences between people whilst appreciating what those differences are appreciated really are – namely, complex, deep, habitual ways of being and doing things that are socially constructed, but nevertheless indispensable for individuals' subjectivities and personhoods. In contemporary debates about how best to understand injustice, this argument is reflected in a dualistic conception of injustice that treats the concepts of "redistributive" and "recognition" as capturing two distinct, but interrelated aspects of injustice. In contemporary literature about disability in particular, an argument that is similar to this is made in discussions about how governments might make society more egalitarian and inclusive given disadvantages and/or advantages that stem from differences in people's bodies and bodily states of being. Thinkers who are engaged in these discussions argue that rather than viewing disability as representing a body and/or bodily state of being that is less than ideal, it ought to be understood as a social phenomenon that confers disadvantage onto individuals partly because of how it is commonly thought about and understood – specifically, as signalling something that is inherently flawed, bad, or substandard.[1] Thus, a second task moving forward is to consider how

[1]For example, see Wolff, Jonathan and Avner De-Shalit, *Disadvantage*, (New York: Oxford

treating individuals as embodied beings might contribute to discussions about injustice, the connection between difference and inequality, and vice versa.

To end this discussion, it is worth returning to Das's ethnographic research into the silence surrounding the violence that was enacted against women during the partition of India. As Das explains, analyses of the silence surrounding the events that occurred during the partition of India and Pakistan can be interpreted in two ways. The first, which is the approach that is commonly taken by the Indian and Pakistani government, is to treat women's silence as signalling their acceptance of what happened to them and an indication of the success of policies of repatriation that have returned women who were abducted and subsequently settled and raised families on the other side of the border to their families. The second approach, which dominates sociological and ethnographic accounts of the same matter, is to regard women's silence as a sign of their victimhood and another facet of their subordinate position in Indian society. Contrary to both of these approaches, Das argues that even though it is very difficult for women to talk about the violence surrounding Partition, their silence has the curious effect of preventing what happened to them from being forgotten on both a personal level and the collective consciousness of Indian society. What their silence actually does, in Das's eyes, is therefore empower women. For, without their forgiveness, Indian society as whole is unable to heal, forget what happened, and move on.[2]

University Press, 2007) and Barnes, Elizabeth, *The Minority Body: A Theory of Disability* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016)

[2]To illustrate this argument, Das explores a number of ways in which women usually carry out the majority of the labour that is associated with grief in Indian society. These include women's enactment of violence upon themselves at funerals for murder victims and those who die unexpectedly Das argues that, in carrying out this labour, women effectively allow the social group to express its collective grief and, in doing so, move on from the loss that has occurred. See Das, Veena, 'Language and Body: Transactions in the Construction of Pain', *Daedalus*, Winter 1996, vol.125., no.1., pp.67. – 91.

On one hand, Das's research is useful and also heartening for illustrating how, no matter how unjust the system, dire the situation, or painful the experience, there is always a glimmer of hope for changing things for the better. On the other hand, there are clearly a number of troubling implications of the continued silence amongst women surrounding the events that accompanied Partition when it comes to their participation in politics. For, no matter how much their silence empowers them in the way that Das argues it does, if women are unable and/or unwilling to talk about experiences and/or to act on them, then the danger is that their experiences and the viewpoints that they generate will remain excluded from the process of making decisions about moral and political matters. Bearing this tension in mind, the crucial task for those who are fortunate enough to be in the position to reflect on matters like these is to engage in the timely and, indeed, pressing task of thinking about what steps might be taken to make the process of making decision about moral and political matters more genuinely democratic given the reality of contemporary society, the state of real-world politics, and the day-to-day trials and opportunities of embodied existence. After all, despite their silence, Das was able to glean insight into the experiences of the women that she interviewed, which, in turn, allowed her to make them public to the wider, academic community. Likewise, being "realistic' about politics and, as such, attentive to embodied existence and the connection that it shares with real-world political praxis, suggests that there are ways of enhancing the voices of groups that lack power in society and better including them decisions about moral and political matters.

Bibliography

Ackerman, Bruce and James S. Fishkin, *Deliberative Day*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 2004

Adorno, Theodor, *Negative Dialectics,* Continuum, New York, 1973

Alcoff, Linda, 'The Phenomenology of Racial Embodiment', *Radical Philosophy*, 1999, vol.95., pp.15. – 26.

Alinsky, Saul, *Rules for Radicals: A Pragmatic Primer for Realistic Radicals*, 2nd edn., Vintage Books, New York, 1989

Allen, Amy, *The Power of Feminist Theory: Domination, Resistance, Solidarity,* Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1999

Anand, Paul, Hunter, Graham and Ron Smith, 'Capabilities and well-being: evidence based on the Sen–Nussbaum approach to welfare', *Social Indicators Research*, 2005, vol.74., no.1., pp.9. – 55.

Antonio, Robert, 'Immanent Critique as the Core of Critical theory: Its Origins and Developments in Hegel, Marx, and Contemporary Thought', *British Journal of Sociology,* 1981, vol.32., no.3., pp.330. – 345.

Apel, Karl-Otto, *The Response of Discourse Ethics to the Moral Challenge of the Human Situation as Such and Especially Today: Mercier Lectures, Louvain-la-Neuve, March 1999 (Morality and the Meaning of Life),* Peeters Publishers, Leuven, 2002

Arato, Andrew and Jean Cohen, *Civil Society and Political Theory*, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1992

Baderin, Alice, 'Two Forms of Realism in Political Theory', *European Journal of Political Theory,* 2014, vol.13., no.2., pp.132. – 153.

Barber, Benjamin, *Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age,* 20th century edn. with new preface, University of California Press, Berkley and Los Angeles, California, 2004

Barnes, Elizabeth, *The Minority Body*: A Theory of Disability, Oxford University Press, New York, 2016

Barnett, Anthony and Peter Carty, *The Athenian Option: Radical Reform for the House of Lords,* Demos, London, 1998

Barry, Brian, *Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism,* Polity Press, Cambridge, 2001

Battersby, Christine, *The Phenomenal Woman: Feminist Metaphysics and the Patterns of Identity,* Routledge, New York and Abingdon, Oxford, 1998

Beauvoir, Simone de, *The Prime of Life,* trans. Green, Peter, World Publishing Company, New York, 1960

Beauvoir, Simone de, *The Second Sex,* trans. and ed. Parshley, H. M., new edn., Vintage Books, London, 1997

Bell, Duncan (ed.), *Political Thought and International Relations: Variations on a Realist Theme*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2009

Bellamy, Richard, *Political Constitutionalism: A Republican Defense of the Constitutionality of Democracy*, 1st edn., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007

Bellamy, Richard, 'Dirty hands and clean gloves: liberal ideals and real politics', *European Journal of Political Theory*, 2010, vol.9., no.4., pp.412. – 430.

Benhabib, Seyla, *Situatin*g *the Self: Gender, Community, and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics,* 1st edn., Polity Press, Cambridge, 1992

Benhabib, Seyla (ed.), *Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1996

Bennett, Jane, *Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things,* Duke University Press, Durham, North Carolina, 2010

Bernauer, James and David Rasmussen (eds.), *The Final Foucault,* MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1988

Bohman, James, 'The coming of age of deliberative democracy', *The Journal of Political Philosophy,* 1998, vol.6., no.4., pp.400. – 425.

Bohman, James, *Public Deliberation: Pluralism, Complexity, and Democracy,* MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1996

Bohman, James and William Rehg (eds.), *Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Logic,* MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1997

Boucher, David, *Political Theories of International Relations: From Thucydides to the Present*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1998

Boundas, Constantin V., and Dorothea Olkowski, (eds.), *Gilles Deleuze and the Theatre of Philosophy*, Routledge, Abingdon, Oxford and New York, 1994

Bourdieu, Pierre, *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste,* trans. Nice, Richard, 1st edn., Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1984

Bourdieu, Pierre, *Language and Symbolic Power*, new edn., Polity Press, Cambridge, 1992

Bourdieu, Pierre, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, ed. Goody, Jack, trans. Nice, Richard, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997

Bourdieu, Pierre, et al., *The Weight of the World: Social Suffering in Contemporary Society,* trans. Ferguson, Priscilla Pankhurst, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1999

Bourdieu, Pierre, *Pascalian Meditations,* trans. Rafalko, Robert, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2000

Braidotti, Rosi, *Nomadic Subjects: Embodiment and Sexual Difference in Contemporary Feminist Theory,* 2nd edn., Columbia University Press, New York, 2011

Bridgehouse, Harry and Erik Olin Wright, 'A Proposal to Transform the House of Lords into a Citizens' Assembly', https://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~wright/Published%20writing/Democratizing-House-of-Lords.pdf

Brink, Bert van den and David Owen (eds.), *Recognition and Power: Axel Honneth and the Tradition of Critical Social Theory,* Cambridge University Press, New York, 2010

Bronner, Stephen Eric and Douglas MacKay Kellner (intro. and eds.), *Critical Theory and Society: A Reader*, Routledge, New York and London, 1989

Brown, Richard (eds.), *Knowledge, Education and Cultural Change: Papers in the Sociology of Education*, 1st edn., Harper & Row Barnes & Noble, London, 1973

Buchanan, Ian, 'The Problem of the Body in Deleuze and Guattari, Or, What Can a Body Do?', *Body & Society*, September 1997, vol.3., no.73., pp.73. – 91.

Buchanan, Ian, *Oxford Dictionary of Critical Theory*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2010

Burnheim, John, *Is Democracy Possible?,* Polity, Cambridge, 1985

Butler, Judith, *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity*, 1st edn., Routledge, New York and London, 1990

Calhoun, Craig (ed.), *Habermas and the Public Sphere,* MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1996

Certeau, Michel de, *The Practice of Everyday Life*, University of California Press, Berkley and Los Angeles, California, 1984

Chambers, Clare, *Sex, Culture, and Justice: The Limits of Choice,* The Pennsylvania University State Press, University Park, Pennsylvania, 2008

Chambers, Simone, 'Deliberative democratic theory', *Annual Review of Political Science,* 2003, vol.6., pp.307. – 326.

Chambers, Simone, 'Behind Closed Doors: Publicity, Secrecy, and the Quality of Deliberation', *Journal of Political Philosophy,* 2004, vol.12., no.4., pp.389. – 410.

Charlesworth, Simon, *A Phenomenology of Working Class Experience* University of Cambridge Press, Cambridge, 2000

Childs, Sarah, 'A feminised style of politics? Women MPs in the House of Commons', *British Journal of Politics & International Relations*, 2004, vol.6., no.1., pp.3. – 19.

Childs, Sarah, *New Labour's Women MPs: Women Representing Women*, Routledge, New York and London, 2004

Chou, Rosalind and Joe Feagin, *The Myth of the Model Minority: Asian Americans Facing Racism*, Paradigm Publishers, Boulder, 2008

Chriss, James J., 'Review essay of Jurgen Habermas's Between Facts and Norms', *Theory and Society*, 1998, vol.27., no.3., pp.417. – 425.,

Christiano, Thomas, 'Democratic Equality and the Problem of Persistent Minorities', *Philosophical Papers,* 1994, vol.XXIII., no.3., pp.169. – 190.

Citizens' Assembly on Electoral Reform, *Making Every Vote Count: The Case for Electoral Reform in British Columbia (Technical Report),* Citizens' Assembly on Electoral Reform, Vancouver, 2004

Clark, David A., (ed.), *The Elgar Companion to Development Studies*, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2005

Clough, Patricia Ticineto and Jean Halley (eds.), *The Affective Turn: Theorizing the Social,* 1st edn., Duke University Press, Durham, North Carolina, 2007

Cohen, Joshua, *Philosophy, Politics, Democracy: Selected Papers*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2009

Cohen, Joshua and Charles Sabel, 'Directly-Deliberative Polyarchy', *European Law Journal*, 1997, vol.3., no.4., pp.313. – 342.

Connolly, William E., *Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox,* Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 1991

Connolly, William E., *The Ethos of Pluralization*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, Minnesota, 1995

Connolly, William E., *The Fragility of Things: Self-Organizing Processes, Neoliberal Fantasies, and Democratic Activism,* Duke University Press, Durham, North Carolina, 2013

Coole, Diana, 'Experiencing Discourse: Corporeal Communicators and the Embodiment of Power', *British Journal of Politics & International Relations,* 2006, vol.9., no.3., pp.413. – 433.

Coole, Diana and Samantha Frost (eds.), *New Materialisms: Ontology, Agency, and Politics*, Duke University Press, Durham, North Carolina, 2010

Couldry, Nick, 'The individual point of view: learning from Bourdieu's 'The weight of the world', *Cultural Studies ↔ Critical Methodologies*, 2005, vol.5., no.3., pp.354. – 372.

Crary, Jonathan and Sanford Kwinter (eds.), *Incorporations,* Massachusetts, MIT Press Cambridge, 1992

Cutts, David, Sarah, Childs, and Edward, Fieldhouse, 'This is what happens when you don't listen? All Women Shortlists at the 2005 General Election', *Party Politics*, 2008, vol.14., no.5., pp.575. – 595.

Dahl, Robert, 'A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model', *The American Political Science Review*, June 1958, vol.52., no.2., pp.463. – 469.

Dahl, Robert, *After the Revolution*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1970

Dahl, Robert, *Democracy and Its Critics,* Yale University Press, New Haven, 1989

Dallery, Arleen B., Charles E. Scott and Holley P. Roberts (eds.), *Crisis in Continental Philosophy,* State University of New York Press, Albany, New York, 1990

Das, Veena, 'Language and Body: Transactions in the Construction of Pain', *Daedalus*, Winter 1996, vol.125., no.1., pp.67. – 91.

Deleuze, Gilles and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia,* trans. and foreword. Massumi, Brian, new edn., Continuum, New York, 2004

Deleuze, Gilles, *The Logic of Sense,* trans. Boundas, Constantin V., Mark Lester, and Charles J. Stivale, Bloomsbury Academic, London, 2015

Deranty, Jean-Philippe, 'Injustice, Violence and Social Struggle. The Critical Potential of Honneth's Theory of Recognition', *Critical Horizons: A Journal of Philosophy and Social Theory,* 2004, vol.5., no.1., pp.297. – 322.

Deranty, Jean-Philippe and Emmanuel Renault, 'Politicizing Honneth's Ethics of Recognition', *Thesis Eleven*, February 2007, no.88., pp.92. – 111.

Deranty, Jean-Philippe, 'Marx, Honneth and the Tasks of a Contemporary Critical Theory', *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice,* 2013, vol.16., pp.745. –758.

Dreyfus, Hubert L. and Paul Rabinow (eds.), *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics,* Chicago University Press, Chicago, Illinois, 1982

Dryzek, John S., *Discursive Democracy: Politics, Policy, and Science,* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990

Dryzek, John S., *Democracy in Capitalist Times: Ideals, Limits and Struggles* Oxford University Press, New York, 1996

Dryzek, John S., *Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics and Contestations,* Oxford University Press, New York, 2002

Dunn, John, *Rethinking modern political theory,* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1985

Dworkin, Ronald, 'What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources', *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, Autumn 1981, vol.10., no.4., pp.283. – 345.

Fanon, Frantz, *Black Skin, White Masks,* trans. Markham, Charles Lam, Grove Weidenfeld, New York, 1967

Fine, Janice, *Worker Centers: Organizing Communities at the Edge of the Dream*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 2006

Finlayson, James Gordon and Freyenhagen, Fabian (eds.), *Habermas and Rawls: Disputing the Political,* Routledge, New York, Abingdon, Oxford, 2010

Finlayson, Gordon, 'Hegel, Adorno and immanent criticism', *British Journal for the History of Philosophy*, 2014, vol.22., no.6., pp.1142. – 1166.

Fishkin, James S., *Democracy and Deliberation: New Directions for Democratic Reform,* Yale University Press, New Haven, Connecticut, 1991

Fishkin, James S., *When the People Speak: Deliberative Democracy and Public Consultation*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2011

Fishkin, James S. and Laslett Peter (eds.), *Debating deliberative democracy*, John Wiley & Sons Hoboken, New Jersey, 2008

Floyd, Jonathan, 'Is Political Philosophy too Ahistorical?*', Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy,* 2009, vol.12., pp.513. – 533.

Floyd, Jonathan and Marc Stears (eds.), *Political Philosophy versus History? Contextualism and Real Politics in Contemporary Political Thought*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2011

Foucault, Michel, *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972 – 1977*, ed. Gordon, Colin, trans. Gordon, Colin, Leo Marshall, John Mepham, and Kate Soper, Harvester, Hemel Hempstead, 1980

Foucault, Michel, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, trans. Sheridan, Alan, new edn., Penguin, London, 1991

Foucault, Michel, *History of Sexuality, vol 1: The Will to Knowledge,* trans. Hurley, Robert, new ed., Penguin, London, 1998

Fountain, Jane, *Building the Virtual State: Information technology and Institutional Change,* Brookings Institution Press, Washington, 2001

Fraser, Nancy, 'Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy', *Social Text*, 1990, no.25/26., pp.56. – 80.

Fraser, Nancy, 'From Redistribution to Recognition? Dilemmas of Justice in a 'Post-Socialist' Age', *New Left Review,* July 1995, vol.1., no.212., pp.68. – 93.

Fraser, Nancy, *Justice Interruptus: Critical Reflection on the "Postsocialist" Condition,* Routledge, New York and London, 1997

Fraser, Nancy and Axel Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange,* Verso, London and New York, 2003

Freeden, Michael, 'Interpretative realism and prescriptive realism', *Journal of Political Ideologies,* 2012, vol.17., no.1., pp.1. – 11.

Frey, Bruno and Alois Stutzer, 'Strengthening the Citizens' Role in International Organizations', *Review of International Organizations,* 2006, vol.84., pp. 338. – 342.

Fricker, Miranda, *Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing,* Oxford University Press, New York, 2007

Fung, Archon, 'Deliberation before the Revolution: Towards an Ethics of Deliberative Democracy in an Unjust World', *Political Theory*, 2005, vol.33., no.2., pp.397. – 419.

Galston, William, 'Realism in political theory', *European Journal of Political Theory,* 2010, vol.9., no.4., pp.385. – 411.

Garland, David, *Punishment and Modern Society: A Study in Social Theory,* Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990

Garland-Thompson, Rosemarie, *Extraordinary Bodies: Figuring Physical Disability in American Culture and Literature*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1997

Geuss, Raymond, *Philosophy and Real Politic,* Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey and Woodstock, Oxfordshire, 2008

Gilabert, Pablo and Holly Lawford-Smith, 'Political Feasibility: A Conceptual Exploration', *Political Studies,* 2012, vol.60., pp.809. – 825.

Gitlin, Todd, *The Twilight of Common Dreams: Why America is Wracked By Culture Wars,* Henry Holt & co, New York, 1995

Goldthorpe, John H., 'Analysing Social Inequality: A Critique of Two Recent Contributions from Economics and Epidemiology', *European Sociological Review*, 2009, vol.26., no.6., pp.731. – 744.

Goldwin, Robert and William Schambra (eds.), *How Democratic is the Constitution?,* American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington, 1980

Gonzalez-Arnal, Stella, Gill Jagger, and Katheleen Lennon, eds., *Embodied Selves*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, Hampshire and New York, 2012

Goodin, Robert E. and Philip Pettit (eds.), *Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Anthology*, 2nd ed., Blackwell, Malden, Massachusetts, 2006

Goodin, Robert E., 'Enfranchising all affected interests, and its alternatives', *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, 2007, vol.35., no.1., pp.40. – 68.

Goodwin, Barbara, *Justice by Lottery,* Imprint Academic, Exeter, 2005

Gregg, Melissa and Gregory J. Seigworth (eds.), *The Affect Theory Reader,* Duke University Press, Durham, North Carolina, 2010

Gret, Marion and Yves Sintomer, *The Port Alegre Experiment: Learning Lessons for Better Democracy*, Zed Books, London, 2005

Grosz, Elizabeth, *Volatile Bodies: Towards a Corporeal Feminism,* Indiana University Press Bloomington, Indiana, 1994

Guillaume, Laura and Joe Hughes (eds.), *Deleuze and the Body,* Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 2011

Gutmann, Amy and Dennis Thompson, *Democracy and Disagreement*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1998

Habermas, Jürgen, 'Towards a Reconstruction of Historical Materialism', *Theory and Society,* Autumn 1975, vol.2., no.3., pp.287. – 300.

Habermas, Jürgen, *Legitimation Crisis*, trans. McCarthy, Thomas, Beacon, Boston, Massachusetts, 1975

Habermas, Jürgen, *Communication and the Evolution of Society*, trans. McCarthy, Thomas, Beacon, Boston, Massachusetts, 1979

Habermas, Jürgen, *The Theory of Communicative Action Vol.1: Reason and Rationalization of Society*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1984

Habermas, Jürgen. 'Morality and Ethical Life: Does Hegel's Critique of Kant Apply to Discourse Ethics?', *Northwestern University Law Review,* 1989, vol.83., no.1., pp.38. – 53.

Habermas, Jürgen, *The Theory of Communicative Action Vol.2: Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason,* Polity Press, Cambridge, 1989

Habermas, Jürgen, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: Inquiry into the Category of Bourgeoisie Society,* Polity Press, Cambridge, 1989

Habermas, Jürgen, *Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action,* trans. Lenhardt, Christian and Shierry Weber Nicholson, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1990

Habermas, Jürgen, *Postmetaphysical Thinking: Philosophical Essays,* trans. Hohengarten, William Mark, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1992

Habermas, Jürgen, *Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse Ethics*, trans. Cronin, Ciaran P., MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1993

Habermas, Jürgen, 'Reconciliation through the Public Use of Reason: Remarks on John Rawls's *Political Liberalism*', *The Journal of Philosophy*, March 1995, vol.93., no.3., pp.109. – 131.

Habermas, Jürgen, *Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy,* Polity Press, Cambridge, 1996

Habermas, Jürgen, *On the Pragmatics of Communication*, ed. Cooke, Maeve, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1998

Habermas, Jürgen, *Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action*, trans. Lenhardt, Christian and Shierry Weber Nicholsen, reprint edn., MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2001

Habermas, Jürgen, *On the Pragmatics of Social Interaction: Preliminary Studies in the Theory of Communicative Action (Studies in Contemporary German Social Thought)*, trans. Fultner, Barbara, 2nd revised edn., Polity Press, Cambridge, 2003

Haberman, Jürgen, *Truth and Justification*, trans. Fultner, Barbara, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2003

Habermas, Jürgen, in *The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory,* eds. Cronin, Ciaran and Pablo De Greiff, Polity Press, Cambridge and Maldon, Massachusetts, 2005

Habermas, Jürgen, 'Religion in the Public Sphere', *European Journal of Philosophy,* March 2006, vol.14., no.1., pp.1. – 25.

Habermas, Jürgen, *Between Naturalism and Religion: Philosophical Essays,* trans. Cronin, Ciaran, Polity Press, Cambridge and Maldon, Massachusetts, 2008

Haraway, Donna, *Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature*, Free Association Books, New York and Abingdon, Oxfordshire, 1991

Harvey, David, 'Critical Theory', *Sociological Perspectives,* 1990, vol.33., no.1., pp.1. – 10.

Hassan, Gerry, 'The Spirit Level lacks all balance to be correct', *The Scotsman*, 30th July 2009

Held, David (ed.), *Political Theory Today,* Polity Press, Cambridge, 1991

Held, David, *Models of Democracy,* 3rd edn., Polity Press, Cambridge and Malden, Massachusetts, 2006

Heller, Thomas C., Morton Sosna, and David E. Wellbery (eds.) *Reconstructing Individualism,* Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 1986

Hendrick, Todd, *Rawls and Habermas: Reason, Pluralism, and the Claims of Political Philosophy,* Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 2010

Heywood, Andrew, *Political Theory: An Introduction,* 4th edn., Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, Hampshire and New York, 2015

Himmelfarb, Gertrude (ed.), *John Stuart Mill, Essays on Politics and Culture*, Doubleday, New York, 1962

Hochschild, Arlie and Anne Machung, *The Second Shift,* revised edn., Penguin Books, New York, 2012

Hoggett, Paul and Simon Thompson (eds.), *Politics and the Emotions: The Affective Turn in Contemporary Political Studies*, Bloomsbury, New York and London, 2012

Honig, Bonnie, *Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1993

Honneth, Axel and Hans Joas (eds.) *Communicative Action: Essays on Jürgen Habermas's "The Theory of Communicative Action*", trans. Gaines, Jeremy and Doris L. Jones, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1991

Honneth, Axel, 'The Social Dynamics of Disrespect: On the Location of Critical Theory Today', trans. Farrell, John, *Constellations,* 1994, vol.1., no.2., pp.255. – 296.

Honneth, Axel, *The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts*, trans. Anderson, Joel, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1995

Honneth, Axel, *Disrespect: The Normative Foundations of Critical Theory*, Polity Press, Cambridge and Malden, Massachusetts, 2007

Horkheimer, Max, *Critical Theory: Selected Essays,* trans. O'Connell, Matthew and others, Continuum Publishing, New York, 2002

Hurd, Laura, 'Older Women's Body Image and Embodied Experience: An Exploration', Journal of Women & Aging, 2000, vol.12., no.3. – 4., pp.77. – 97.

Hutton, Will, 'Look no further than inequality for the source of all our ills'*, The Observer*, 15th March 2009

Juha, Räikkä, 'The Feasibility Condition in Political Theory', 1998, *The Journal of Political Philosophy*, vol.6., no.1., pp.27. – 40.

Kruks, Sonia, *Retrieving Experience: Subjectivity and Recognition in Feminist Politics,* Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 2001

Kymlicka, Will, 'The Injustice Gap', *The Globe and Mail*, 19th May 2009

Laborde, Cécile and John Maynor (eds.), *Republicanism and Political Theory*, Blackwell Publishing, Malden, Massachusetts, 2008

Laborde, Cécile, *Critical Republicanism: The Hijab Controversy and Political Philosophy*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008

Laborde, Cécile, 'Republicanism and Global Justice: A Sketch', *European Journal of Political Theory*, 2010, vol.9., pp.48. – 69.

Laclau, Ernesto and Chantal Mouffe, *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics,* Verso London and New York, 1985

Lee, Emily S. (ed.) *Living Alterities: Phenomenology, Embodiment, and Race*, State University of New York Press, Albany, 2014

Leopold, David and Marc Stears (eds.), *Political Theory: Methods and Approaches,* Oxford University Press, New York, 2008

Leys, Ruth, 'The Turn to Affect: A Critique', *Critical Inquiry*, Spring 2011, vol.37., no.3., pp.434. – 472.

Lizardo, Omar, 'The cognitive origins of Bourdieu's Habitus', *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour*, 2004, vol.34., no.4., pp.375. – 448.

Lovett, Frank, 'Domination: A Preliminary Analysis', *The Monist*, 2001, vol.84., pp.98. – 112.

Lovett, Frank, *A General Theory of Domination and Justice*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010

Lloyd, Moya. *Beyond Identity Politics: Feminism, Power & Politics*, Sage London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi, 2005

Lukes, Steven, *Power: A Radical View,* 2nd edn., Palgrave MacMillan, Basingstoke, Hampshire, 2005

Maffettone, Sebastiano, *Rawls an Introduction,* Polity Press, Cambridge and Malden, Massachusetts, 2010

Manin, Bernard, 'On Legitimacy in Deliberation', *Political Theory,* August 1987, vol.15., no.3., pp.338. – 368.

Mansbridge, Jane, *Beyond Adversarial Democracy,* new edn. with a revised preface, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1983

Mansbridge, Jane, 'Representation Revisited: Introduction to the Case Against Electoral Accountability', *Democracy and Society*, 2006, vol.2., no.I., pp.12 – 13.

Mansbridge, Jane, 'Rethinking Representation', *American Political Science Review*, 2009, vol.97., no.4., pp.515 – 28.

Mansbridge, Jane, 'A Selection Model of Representation', *Journal of Political Philosophy*, 2009, vol.17., no.4., p.369 – 398.

Mansbridge, Jane, 'Deliberative and Non-Deliberative Negotiations', HKS Faculty Research Working Paper Series, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 2009

Mansbridge, Jane, et al., 'The Place of Self-Interest and the Role of Power in Deliberative Democracy', *The Journal of Political Philosophy*, 2010, vol.18., no.1., pp.64. – 100.

Martin, Jay, *Reason After Eclipse: On Late Critical Theory,* reprint edn., University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, Wisconsin, 2017

Massumi, Brian, *Politics of Affect,* Polity Press, Cambridge and Malden, Massachusetts, 2015

Maynor, John W., *Republicanism in the Modern World*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2003

McCarthy, Thomas, 'Kantian Constructivism and Reconstructivism: Rawls and Habermas in Dialogue', *Ethics*, October 1994, vol.105., pp.44. – 63.

McLaren, Margaret, A., *Feminism, Foucault, and Embodied Subjectivity,* State University of New York Press, Albany, 2002

McMurrin, Sterling (ed.) *Tanner Lectures on Human Values*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1980

McNay, Lois, 'Gender, Habitus and the Field: Pierre Bourdieu and the Limits of Reflexivity', *Theory, Culture & Society*, 1999, vol.16., no.1., pp.95. – 117.

McNay, Lois, 'The Trouble with Recognition: Subjectivity, Suffering, and Agency', *Sociological Theory*, 2008, vol.26., no.3., pp.271. – 296.

McNay, Lois, *Against Recognition*, Polity Press, Cambridge and Malden, Massachusetts, 2008

McNay, Lois, *The Misguided Search for the Political: Social Weightlessness in Radical Democratic Theory,* Polity Press, Cambridge and Malden, Massachusetts, 2014

Medearis, John, 'Social Movements and Deliberative Democratic Theory', *British Journal of Political Science*, 2005, vol.35., pp.53. – 75.

Meehan, Johanna (ed. and intro.), *Feminists Read Habermas: Gendering the Subject of Discourse,* Routledge, New York and London, 1995

Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, *Phenomenology of Perception,* trans. Smith, Colin, Routledge, Abingdon, Oxfordshire, 1962

Miller, David and Larry Siedentop (ed.), *The Nature of Political Theory*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1983

Miller, David, 'Deliberative Democracy and Social Choice', *Political Studies*, 1992, XL, Special Issue, pp.54. – 67.

Mills, Charles, W., "'Ideal Theory" as Ideology', *Hypatia*, 2005, vol.20., no.3., pp.165. – 184.

Moi, Toril, 'Power, Sex and Subjectivity: Feminist Reflections on Foucault', *Paragraph: A Journal of Modern Critical Theory,* 1985, vol.5., pp.95. – 102.

Mouffe, Chantal, *The Return of The Political*, Verso, London and New York, 1993

Mouffe, Chantal, *The Democratic Paradox*, Verso, London and New York, 2000

Mouffe, Chantal, *On The Political,* Routledge, London and New York, 2007

Mouffe, Chantal, *Agonistics: Thinking The World Politically,* Verso, London and New York, 2013

Müller-Doohm, Stefan, *Habermas: A Biography,* Polity Press, Cambridge and Malden, Massachusetts, 2016

Näsström, Sofia, 'The Challenge of the All-Affected Principle', 2011, *Political Studies,* vol.59., no.1., pp.116. – 134.

Nicholson, Linda (ed.), *Feminism/Postmodernism,* 1st edn., Routledge, New York and London, 1990

Nussbaum, Martha, *Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach,* new edn., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001

O'Neill, Onora, *Towards Justice and Virtue: A Constructivist Account of Practical Reasoning,* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, New York, and Melbourne, 1996

Olafsen, Frederick, *Heidegger and the Ground of Ethics: A Study of Mistein,* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, New York, and Melbourne, 1998

Olkowski, Dorothea, 'After Alice: Alice and the Dry Tail', *Deleuze Studies*, vol.2., issue supplement, pp.107. – 122.

Owen, David, 'Constituting the polity, constituting the demos: on the place of the all affected interests principle in democratic theory and in resolving the democratic boundary problem', *Ethics & Global Politics*, 2013, vol.5., no.3., pp.129. – 152.

Parkinson, John and Jane Mansbridge (eds.) *Deliberative Systems*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2012

Parvin, Phil, 'Is Deliberative Democracy Feasible: Political Disengagement and Trust in Liberal Democratic Societies', *The Monist*, 2015, vol.98., no.4., pp.407. – 423.

Parvin, Phil, 'Democracy Without Participation: A New Politics for a Disengaged Era', *Res Publica*, 2018, vol.24., no.1., pp.31. – 52.

Pateman, Carol, *Participation and Democratic Theory,* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, New York, and Melbourne, 1975

Pettit, Philip, 'Freedom as Antipower', *Ethics*, 1996, vol.106., no.3., pp.576. – 604.

Pettit, Philip, *Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government*, Clarendon Press, 1997

Pettit, Philip, *A Theory of Freedom: From the Psychology to the Politics of Agency*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2001

Pettit, Philip, 'Deliberative Democracy and the Discursive Dilemma', *For Philosophical Issues,* 2001, vol.11., no.1., pp. 268. – 299.

Pettit, Philip, 'Agency-Freedom and Option-Freedom', *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 2003, vol.15., no.4., pp.387. – 403.

Pettit, Philip, *On the People's Terms: A Republican Theory and Model of Democracy*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2012

Phillips, Anne, *Democracy and Difference,* Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park, Pennsylvania, 1993

Phillips, Anne, *The Politics of Presence*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995

Probyn, Elspeth, 'Everyday Shame', *Cultural Studies,* 2004, vol.18., no.2. – 3., pp.328. – 349.

Puwar, Nirmal, *Space Invaders*, Berg, Oxford, 2004

Rawls, John, 'Reply to Habermas', *The Journal of Philosophy*, March 1995, vol.92., no.3., pp.132. – 180.

Rawls, John, 'The idea of Public Reason Revisited', *The University of Chicago Law Review,* September 1997, vol.64., no.3., pp.765. – 807.

Rawls, John, *The Law of Peoples*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, 1999

Rawls, John, *A Theory of Justice,* revised edn., Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2003

Rawls, John, *Political Liberalism,* expanded edn., Columbia University Press, New York, 2005

Ray, Larry and Andrew Sayer (eds.) *Culture and Economy After the Cultural Turn*, Sage Publications, London, 1999

Richardson, Henry S., *Democratic Autonomy: Public Reasoning About the Ends of Policy*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2002

Richardson, John (ed.), *Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education*, Greenwood, Westport, Connecticut, 1986

Rorty, Richard, *Achieving Our Country: Leftist Thought in Twentieth-Century,* Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1990

Rossi, Enzo and Matt Sleat, 'Realism in Normative Political Theory', *Philosophy Compass,* 2014, vol.9., no.10., pp.689. – 701.

Sandel, Michael, *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice*, 2nd edn., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge and New York, 2010

Sanders, Lynn, 'Against Deliberation', *Political Theory*, 1997, vol.25., no.3., pp.347. – 376.

Saunders, Ben, 'Democracy, Political Equality, and Majority Rule', *Ethics,* October 2010, vol.121., no.1., pp.148. – 177.

Saward, Michael, 'The Representative Claim', *Contemporary Political Theory*, 1996, vol.5., no.3., pp.297–318.

Saward, Michael, (ed.), *Democratic Innovation: Deliberation, Representation and Association (ECPR Studies in European Political Science)*, Routledge, London and New York, 2000

Sayer, Andrew, 'Class, Moral Worth and Recognition', *Sociology*, 2005, vol.39., no.5., pp.947. – 963.

Sayer, Andrew, *The Moral Significance of Class*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge and New York, 2005

Schumpeter, Joseph, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, Harper, New York, 1942

Sen, Amartya, *Development as Freedom,* new edn., Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York, 2001

Sen, Amartya, 'Human Rights and Capabilities', *Journal of Human Development,* 2005, vol.6., no.2., pp.151. – 166.

Sen, Amartya, 'What Do We Want from a Theory of Justice?', *The Journal of Philosophy*, 2006, vol.103., no. 5., pp.215. – 238.

Sennett, Richard and Jonathan Cobb, *The Hidden Injuries of Class,* Norton Paperback, New York and London, 1993

Shapiro, Ian and Casiano Hacker-Cordón (eds.) *Democracy's Value*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999

Skinner, Quentin, *Liberty Before Liberalism*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998

Smith, Graham, *Democratic Innovations: Designing Institutions for Citizen Participation*, University of Cambridge Press, Cambridge, 2009

Spectre, Matthew, *Habermas: An Intellectual Biography,* Cambridge University Press, New York, 2010

Stears, Marc, 'Liberalism and the Politics of Compulsion', *British Journal of*

Political Science, 2007, vol.37., no.3., pp.533. – 553.

Sunstein, Cass R., 'Beyond the Republican Revival', *Yale Law Journal*, 1988, vol.97., pp.1539. –1590.

Sunstein, Cass R., *The Partial Constitution*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, 1993

Taylor, Charles, *Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition*, ed. and intro. Gutmann, Amy, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey and Chichester, West Sussex, 1994

Titchkosky, Tanya, *Reading and Writing Disability Differently: The Textured Life of Embodiment*, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 2007

Urbinati, Nadia, 'Representation as Advocacy: A Study of Democratic Deliberation', *Political Theory*, 2000, vol.28., p.258 – 786.

Urbinati, Nadia and Mark Warren, 'The Concept of Representation in Contemporary Democratic Theory', *Annual Review of Political Science*, 2008, vol.11., pp.387 – 412.

Valentini, Laura, 'Ideal vs. Non-ideal Theory: A Conceptual Map', *Philosophy Compass,* 2012, vol.7., no.9., pp.654. – 664.

Wacquant, Loïc, 'Bourdieu 1993: A Case Study in Scientific Consecration', *Sociology*, 2013, vol.4., no.1., pp.15. –29.

Warde, Alan, 'Constructions of Pierre Bourdieu', *Sociology*, 2003, vol.36., no.4., pp.1003. – 1009.

Warren, Mark and Hilary Pearse (eds.), *Designing Deliberative Democracy: The British Columbia Citizens' Assembly*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008

Waugh, Paul, 'Tom Watson Interview: On Jeremy Corbyn, Tony Blair, Leveson, Digital Democracy; And How He Sleeps At Night', *The Huffington Post*, 30th July 2005.

West, David, *An Introduction to Continental Philosophy*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1996

Wilkinson, Richard and Kate Pickett, *The Spirit Level: Why Equality is Better for Everyone*, Bloomsbury Press, New York, 2010

Wilkinson, Richard, 'Want the Good Life? Your Neighbors Need It, Too', *Yes! Magazine*, 4th March 2010

Williams, Bernard, *In the Beginning was the Deed: Realism and Moralism in Political Argument*, sel., ed., and intro. Hawthorn, Geoffrey, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey and Woodstock, Oxford, 2005

Williams, Melissa, *Voice, Trust, and Memory: Marginalized Groups and the Failings of Liberal Representation*, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, 1998

Williams, Michael, *The Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations,* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005

Wolff, Jonathan and Avner de-Shalit, *Disadvantage*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2007

Yancy, George, *Look, A White!: Philosophical Essays on Whiteness*, foreword. Zach, Naomi, Temple University Press, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 2012

Yancy, George, *Black Bodies, White Gazes: The Continuing Significance of Race in America,* 2nd edn., Roman and Littlefield, London, 2017

Young, Eugene, B., Gary Genosko, and Janell Watson, *The Deleuze and Guattari Dictionary,* Bloomsbury Academic, New York, 2013

Young, Iris Marion, 'Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship', *Ethics,* 1989, vol.99., pp.250. – 274.

Young, Iris Marion, *Justice and the Politics of Difference,* Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1990

Young, Iris Marion, *Throwing Like a Girl and Other Essays in Feminist Philosophy and Social Theory,* Indiana University Press, Bloomington, Indiana, 1990

Young, Iris Marion, 'Unruly Categories: A Critique of Nancy Fraser's Dual Systems Theory', *New Left Review*, 1997, vol.0., no.222., pp.147. – 161.

Young, Iris, Marion, 'Inclusive Political Communication: Greeting, Rhetoric and Storytelling in the Context of Political Argument', Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, 1998

Young, Iris Marion, 'Activist Challenges to Deliberative Democracy', *Political Theory,* 2001, vol.29., no.5., pp.670. – 690.

Zollschan, George and Walter Hirst (eds.) *Explorations in Social Change,* Houghton Mifflin, Dublin, 1964

Zournazi, Mary (ed.), *Hope: New Philosophies of Change,* Pluto Press, Annandale, New South Wales, 2002

Zurn, Christopher, ‘Recognition, Redistribution, and Democracy: Dilemmas of Honneth’s Critical Social Theory’, *European Journal of Philosophy,* 2005, vol.13., no.1., pp.86. – 126.