- Despite its apparent ubiquity, philosophers have not talked much about sentimental value. One exception is Anthony Hatzimoysis (The Philosophical Quarterly 53: 373-379, 2003). Those who wish to take sentimental value seriously are likely to make use of Christine Korsgaard's ideas on two distinctions in value. In this paper I show that Hatzimoysis has misrendered Korsgaard's idea before showing how Hatzimoysis' treatment of it is mistaken.
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- Peer reviewed
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- Springer Science + Business Media B. V.
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- The full-text of this article is not currently available in ORA, but the original publication is available at springerlink.com (which you may be able to access via the publisher copy link on this record page). Citation: Fletcher, G. (2009). 'On Hatzimoysis on sentimental value', Philosophia 37(1), 149-152. [Available at http://www.springer.com/philosophy/journal/11406]. N.B. Dr Fletcher is now based at the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford.
On Hatzimoysis on sentimental value
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