


“RUSTICATION”: PUNISHMENT OR REWARD? STUDY
OF THE LIFE TRAJECTORIES OF THE GENERATION OF
THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION

Qianhan Lin

St Antony's College

*Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy*



Department of Sociology, University of Oxford

Hilary 2012

Abstract

This thesis contributes to a growing body of research on the impact of China's rustication programme—a social mobilisation, transferring urban school graduates to rural communities during the Cultural Revolution—on the lives of the Cultural Revolution cohort (CR cohort), and more broadly, to research on the impact of socialist campaigns on social mobility.

The analyses of this thesis are based on two national surveys as well as interviews that I conducted with former rusticates and non-rusticates.

Distinct from earlier studies which stated that the rustication programme had indiscriminate and adverse effects on all social groups, my results show the process itself was socially stratified: (1) children from the bad class origin and highly-educated families were intensively targeted, and (2) the privileged military families were spared from the mobilisation, and their children were sent to join the People's Liberation Army (PLA).

In view of the timing of major life transitions, rusticates lag behind their non-rusticated counterparts and individuals from adjacent cohorts, despite the fact that the delayed attainment of further education was experienced by all members of the CR cohort.

After controlling for experience of rustication, children of party officials have a higher chance of obtaining a college degree than those from other social backgrounds. The analysis of the complete work-life histories of the CR cohort as a whole reveals four employment trajectories: Rusticates are more likely to be in the trajectory group characterised by unemployment in the late stage of their career than non-rusticates. Children of party members have a higher likelihood to be in the trajectory dominated by managerial work with short initial spells in the PLA. Rusticates are found to be less satisfied with their lives, their current situation is more deprived and they are more likely to be active in conflict solving, as opposed to non-rusticates and members of adjacent cohorts.

Interviews suggest that rusticates viewed the experience of rustication as being an important part of their past and display a thirst for public recognition. Yet, the extent of the transformation that this experience has made in their lives is stratified by their work-life experiences. Non-rusticates reckoned their lives were also affected by the rustication through their close links with rusticates.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

The changing from one discipline to another has proved to be not an easy process to me; the long time taken for me to finish this thesis is the result of it. During the twists and turns of producing this intellectual work, there are numerous people who advised, assisted and supported me, and to whom I owe immense debts of gratitude. Firstly, to my supervisor, Jonathan Gershuny, for his resourcefulness, cheerfulness, unstinting support and constant persuasion to me to produce more discursive and extended discussions of my statistical work; to my husband, William, for reading, re-reading, helping me edit every single draft of this thesis and meanwhile enduring with fortitude my frequent absences; to my families in China, not merely for their faith in me producing good work, but for sharing their past experience, which was the inspiration behind this thesis, with me; to Michel Bonnin, who became one of my examiners thanks to the efforts put by my supervisor, for his great work on the sent-down generation which guided me to find my original contribution to the existing knowledge.

I also owe a particular due to friends and mentors in Oxford, who have helped or challenged me to explore the ideas presented in this thesis. In particular, Moonju Seong, advised me not to attempt overscaled questions for a doctorate; Jiweon Jun and Jeongwoo Park, took a great interest in my study and endeavoured to deliver their concerns smoothly over those post-dinner chats; Andrea Canales, read one chapter and my interview questionnaire; Michael Biggs, Emily Hannum, Takehiko Kariya each read several chapters and Anthony Heath read the whole manuscript. I have a similar debt to Patricia Dyer, not only for her invaluable service of proof-reading my thesis, but for her patience and gracious ways.

Thesis writing can be a daunting and lonely experience, I want to thank good friends in Oxford for helping me get re-charged from time to time owing to their kindness and encouragement: Yunjeong, Moonju, Sascha, Ross, Mathieu, Dorothée, Jiweon, Kathleen, Didier, Alexey, Raya, Jing, Ran, Keke and Suyu. Particular thanks to, the three precious people at the “Happy Corner” of the department, Samina, Andrea and Sumeet, for all the stimulating conversations we shared and the never-ending “farewell” parties they organised for me; and Tai, for his warm hospitality every time I returned to Oxford.

I am fortunate to have worked as a research assistant for the Centre for Time Use Research, and to have Kimberly Fisher as the leader of the group, and Man-Yee Kan as my colleague. Both of them have become my mentors and friends. I am grateful to Jane Gerig for her administrative supports and for forwarding my mails wherever I was around the world.

I must thank the Sociology Department of Renmin University in China, and especially to Jingming Liu for his assistance with the data. St Antony’s college provided me with a doctoral grant and the Department of Sociology sponsored several of my attendances to the summer school and conferences.

Last, I wish to thank my extended families in France for their years of love and supports.

To my parents and their siblings.

CONTENTS

1. <i>Introduction</i>	1
1.1 Historical Remarks	5
1.1.1 The red guard and rustication (sent-down) movements	5
1.1.2 China ever since	12
1.2 A Life Course Framework	13
1.2.1 Timing, duration and cohort specific experience	15
1.2.2 Human agency under abrupt system change	19
1.2.3 Event-based model approach	20
1.3 Life Chances and Social Transformations	22
1.3.1 Social stratification in comparative perspective	24
1.3.2 Class stratification before and during the Cultural Revolution	27
1.3.3 Institutional changes after the Cultural Revolution	31
1.3.4 The changing pattern of capitals and labels on life chances	34
1.4 Thesis Outline	36
1.5 An Important Note	40
2. <i>Data, Variable Construction and Some Definitions</i>	41
2.1 The CR cohort as being the risk pool	41
2.1.1 Cohorts in comparison	42
2.2 Introducing the CGSS	43
2.2.1 Variable: sent-down	45
2.3 The 1996 LHSC	46
2.3.1 Variable: sent-down	46

3.	<i>Selection to, Duration and Alternatives of the Rustication</i>	48
3.1	The Selection Process of Rustication	52
3.1.1	The importance of class backgrounds	52
3.1.2	The effects of other factors on the probability of being rusticated	65
3.1.3	Who was rusticated?	67
3.2	The Duration of the Rustication	75
3.3	The Alternatives to the Transfer programme	81
3.4	Chapter Conclusion	87
3.5	Appendix	90
4.	<i>The Consequences of Being Rusticated: Transitions and Sequences</i>	96
4.1	Living Through the Economic Transformation	96
4.2	Research Questions	99
4.3	Source of Evidence: the 2003 CGSS	100
4.4	The Timing at Important Life-course Events	100
4.4.1	Age Distribution at the First Marriage	101
4.4.2	Age Distribution at Completion of the Highest Level of Education	105
4.5	Highest Educational Attainment	109
4.6	Studying the Whole Career Sequences	112
4.6.1	Previous Research	112
4.6.2	What Can Optimal Matching Offer?	115
4.6.3	Data and Initial Exploration	116
4.6.4	A Short Introduction to Optimal Matching and the Analytical Strategy	120
4.6.5	The Cluster Sets	126
4.7	Predicting the Employment Sequence Types	131
4.8	Chapter Conclusion	132
4.9	Appendix	136

5. <i>The Consequences of Being Rusticated: Attitudes and Beliefs</i>	138
5.1 Generation-specific Social and Political Attitudes	138
5.1.1 Data Source and Methods	140
5.1.2 Are Rusticates Less Happier than Non-rusticates?	141
5.1.3 Do Rusticates Experience Higher Level of Deprivation?	143
5.1.4 Collective Action in terms of Conflict Solving	146
5.1.5 Political Beliefs	148
5.2 Chapter Conclusion	152
5.3 Appendix	153
6. <i>The Rustication Experience in Retrospect</i>	162
6.1 The Aim and Research Questions	162
6.2 Finding the Interviewees	163
6.2.1 Beijing during the Cultural Revolution	167
6.3 Interviewees	167
6.3.1 Rusticated interviewees	167
6.3.2 Non-rusticated interviewees	168
6.4 In Their Shoes - Comparisons of Life Trajectories between Rusticates and Non-rusticates	168
6.4.1 Various reasons for non-rustication	173
6.5 Collective Memories of the Rustication	177
6.6 Generational Identity	180
6.6.1 Linked lives?	182
6.7 Chapter Summary	183
7. <i>Conclusion</i>	187
7.1 Life Chances under Radical State Action	187
7.2 Life Course Principles Revisited	189
7.2.1 Changes of life course patterns	189

Contents

7.2.2	Human agency	191
7.2.3	Linked lives	192
7.3	Future Inquiries	193
7.4	Concluding Remarks	193

LIST OF FIGURES

1.1	Chinese Birth Cohorts by Age and Year of historical events	18
1.2	Thesis outline.	37
3.1	The distribution of number of former sent-down youth over reported sent-down years and over reported returning years, 1996 LHSC. . . .	50
3.2	The distribution of number of former rusticates over reported sent- down years and over reported returning years, 2003 CGSS.	51
3.3	The administrative family class scheme in socialist China	56
3.4	Biplot for cross-tabulation of father's occupations by respondent's class origin for the CR cohort.	59
3.5	Kaplan-Meier estimates of the rate of transition from the year of rustication to the year of return as a function of rustication duration for the CR cohort and its two sub-cohorts.	75
3.6	Real times of events, 1996 LHSC.	92
4.1	Cumulative proportion of men who had their first marriage at differ- ent ages, by cohort.	103
4.2	Cumulative proportion of women who had their first marriage at dif- ferent ages, by cohort.	103
4.3	Transition to first marriage for men and women born in the 1947-1953 (top panel) and the 1954-1960 (bottom panel) cohorts, by rustication experience.	104
4.4	University student enrolment per population, by year.	105

List of Figures

4.5	Cumulative proportion of men completing college education at different ages, by cohort.	106
4.6	Cumulative proportion of women completing college education at different ages, by cohort.	107
4.7	Transition to completion of college education for men and women born in the 1947-1953 (top panel) and the 1954-1960 (bottom panel) cohorts, by rustication experience.	108
4.8	Sequence index plot of the CR Cohort.	119
4.9	An example of how one career sequence looks like	120
4.10	Sequence index plots with order from Optimal Matching by Cluster. .	128

LIST OF TABLES

3.1	Occupation labeling	60
3.2	Estimated Coefficients for Multinomial Logit Regression Model Predicting Social Origin Membership.	62
3.3	Predicted Probabilities for the Multinomial Logit Model	64
3.4	Logistic regression model predicting probability that respondent is a sent-down youth	71
3.5	A Comparison of the 1947-1953 and 1954-1960 cohorts: logistic regression	74
3.6	Linear regression models of variables affecting the duration of the sent-down episode	79
3.7	A Comparison of the 1947-1953 and 1954-1960 cohorts: Linear regression	80
3.8	Description and characteristics of six clusters	85
3.9	Background statistics for six clusters	86
3.10	Results of Fitting Logistic Regression Models with additional cohort variable and its interactions with other predictors.	90
3.11	Parameter estimates for Model 8	91
3.12	Coordinates and contribution to inertia of row and column points for the 1996 LHSC data	93
3.13	Construction of 10-category classification of employment status	94
3.14	Parameter estimates for the model with cohort interactions	95

4.1	The starting and the ending years of sent-down episodes for the 1947-1953 cohort and the 1954-1960 cohort.	100
4.2	Predictors of college education attained by the CR Cohort.	111
4.3	List of labour market status.	118
4.4	Average duration at each episode for five clusters.	127
4.5	Descriptions of four-cluster solution.	130
4.6	Estimates from multinomial logistic models of work-life clusters on selected independent variables.	133
4.7	Multinomial logit model for work-life clusters - marginal effects at sample means.	134
4.8	Supplementary characteristics of the rusticates and the non-rusticates.	137
5.1	Q. "Generally speaking, how do you personally feel about your life?" (%)	142
5.2	Q. What is your socioeconomic status compared with that of three years ago?	144
5.3	Q. What is your socioeconomic status compared with those of others in the same birth cohort?	144
5.4	Distribution of attitude on collective action across cohorts	147
5.5	Perspectives on political beliefs by cohorts.	150
5.6	Estimates from linear regression models on happiness.	154
5.7	Estimates from ordered logit regression models on relative deprivation (Vertical comparison).	155
5.8	Estimates from ordered logit regression models on relative deprivation (Horizontal comparison).	156
5.9	Estimates from binary regression models on collective action (Model 1).	157
5.10	Estimates from binary regression models on collective action (Model 2).	158

5.11 Estimates from ordered logistic regression models on collective action
(Model 3). 159

5.12 Estimates from binary logistic regression models on political attitudes
(all cohorts). 160

5.13 Estimates from binary logistic regression models on political attitudes
(within the CR cohort). 161

6.1 Interviewed rusticates according to destination, duration and cohort. 168

6.2 Descriptive table of how rusticated interviewees are grouped. 169

6.3 Descriptive table of how non-rusticated interviewees are grouped. . . 174

1. INTRODUCTION

What makes the field of life course study distinctive is its relation to historical time, in which it underscores that human lives are embedded in a socio-historical context where historical periods perform as a sequence of regimes that regulate the life course [Mayer, 2004, Elder and Pellerin, 1998a]. Being one of the most dynamic and puzzling societies, especially for the past 70 years, China has experienced a succession of social disruptions, political movements as well as policy changes on its economy and population. These include the Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945) and the Civil War (1946-1949), state-directed campaigns and movements during the 1950s, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), the economic reforms and liberalisation of the 1980s, the privatisation of state-owned enterprises of the 1990s and assorted policies to deal with urban expansion and inequality faced at the beginning of this century. Some of these unprecedented events provide natural experiments for studying the relationship between large-scale social upheavals and individual life chances.

The temporal significance of the Cultural Revolution is marked by historians as a watershed in modern Chinese history [Esherick et al., 2006a]. Its termination signifies a start of a new era of socialist revolution and construction¹, its harsh legacy has left a deep imprint in the lives of those who experienced the turbulence. A decade of political purges, social convulsion and economic stagnation combined with brutish “struggle sessions”, purges, idiotic study campaigns and forced rustication shattered the normal lives of ordinary Chinese people. Previous studies have

¹ In the preface of the 1978 nation’s constitution law, it is written: “The end of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution has led to the new era of our nation’s socialist revolutions and constructions.”

1. Introduction

shown that amidst all who suffered during this period of turmoil, the degree and the result of endurance varied between birth cohorts [Hung and Chiu, 2003] and class backgrounds [Deng and Treiman, 1997]. The wide participation of the Revolution led to the disruption of formal education for the youths in the city, and only a few of them resumed their schooling during or at the end of the Revolution [Deng and Treiman, 1997, Meng and Gregory, 2002, Giles et al., 2007]. Between 1966 and 1978, about 17 million urban school graduates were instigated to leave their cities of origin and become rural labourers, many having spent several years in the rural areas before returning to their original homes, causing the most intensive social mobilisations in the history of Modern China². Because of their relatively educated backgrounds and special experiences, they are often known collectively as the ‘Intellectual Youth’ (*zhiqing*), ‘Sent-down Youth’ or **Rusticates**. Most of them were once the hot-blooded ‘Red Guards’, but are now labelled as the ‘Lost Generation’³ because of their deprived youth spent in the mountainous areas or farming villages where they lost the social network and lifestyle they once had. Those adolescents who belonged to the same generation and managed to remain in the cities found little or no opportunity for education or professional training.

This thesis focuses on the Cultural Revolution cohort (**CR cohort**), former rusticates and non-rusticates who spent their formative years during the period of the Revolution, aiming to evaluate the impact of radical state policies on their life transitions and trajectories. There are at least three reasons why it is of interest to study the life courses of rusticates as well as the cohort they belong to – the CR cohort. Firstly, many influential literatures written by the former rusticates have portrayed the hard lives of those young people during the Cultural Revolution⁴, there

² Apart from young people in cities, intellectuals—professionals, cultural elites, and technocrats—and bureaucrats were also required to spend several years engaged in agricultural labour in ‘May 7th Cadre Labour Camps’.

³ The coining of the expression is traditionally attributed to the American writer Gertrude Stein, who referred it to members of the expatriate community in Paris from the period which saw the end of World War I to the beginning of the Great Depression. The term of ‘lost generation’ used unofficially inside China, often relates to youth during the Cultural Revolution [Bonnin, 2006].

⁴ For a summary of these literatures, please see Qin [2006].

1. Introduction

were considerably much less literatures about their lives after they returned from the countryside. When the rusticates returned to cities from their long-term deprivation in the countryside, a swift shift from a socialist redistributive regime to a market-orientated regime had begun. On the one hand, they had to cope with an urban life with which they had become unfamiliar. On the other hand, a market oriented economy meant new opportunities and future prospects for dampened spirits. How were their lives carried on in the period of thirty years after the Cultural Revolution? Have their past experiences necessarily determined their current status?

Secondly, although the rusticates represent only one of the age groups which experienced the turbulence, they are distinct from other cohorts for bearing a unique combination of disadvantages. Their precipitous misfortunes made them the victims under drastic state policies: They were the first generation affected by the late-marriage policy⁵; the first group of parents who were restricted to have one child only. In their late 40s or early 50s, they became a major source of the urban laid-off workers during the reform on the state enterprise [Hung and Chiu, 2003]. They are not only witnesses of the nation's history since the end of the civil war, but the experimental ones of a sequence of state policies and social changes under the Communist rule thereafter. Their recognition of lack of personal autonomy highlights the depth of state intervention on the lives of this cohort⁶ [Tang and Parish, 2000, *pp.* 290-291].

Thirdly, scholars studying socialistic states have recognised the special Chinese context where a highly volatile political environment and changing social policies not only have affected the life chances of different social groups⁷, but have characterised the social stratification structure and process [Whyte and Parish, 1984b, Zhou et al., 1996]. Most of the studies documented the effects of economic trans-

⁵ The late-marriage policy was introduced in the 1970s as part of efforts to reduce the birth rate. The policy encouraged men to marry no earlier than 28 years old (25 in rural areas) and women no earlier than 25 years old (23 in rural areas).

⁶ Tang and Parish [2000] found that compared with other age groups, those who were born between 1946 to 1956 did not think individuals could get ahead by their own efforts

⁷ Life chances here stand for events related to individual's socioeconomic well-being, such as educational opportunities, status attainment and political status.

1. Introduction

formations on China's social stratification evolution but lacked a bridging of the macro-level institutional change to micro-level biographies. Rusticates' biographical specific trajectory and their shared memories of the Cultural Revolution should provide a great deal of resources for evaluating the impacts of radical policies implemented during the Cultural Revolution, providing unique data about downward and upward mobility caused by institutional change or industrial restructuring. However, voluminous studies have set their focus on the overall experience of the Cultural Revolution without making differentiation based on cohort-specific experience, very little research has focused on the rusticates examining their life trajectories and making comparisons with those of the non-rusticates as well as those of adjacent cohorts. Among the few studies that exist [Gold, 1980, Chen, 1999b, Zhou and Hou, 1999, Hung and Chiu, 2003, Xie et al., 2006], the results on how the rustication programme affected the lives, career development and economic outcomes of the rusticates were somewhat inconsistent.

The proposition of this study is based on the recognition that state policies alter the opportunity structure and stratification dynamics, which subsequently affect an individual's life chances [Bian, 2002, Zhou et al., 1997, Zhou and Moen, 2001]. It aims to set out a long view of an individual's life, establishing a causal connection between the early policy intervention and later life outcomes. A life course perspective will help us, not only to speculate any lasting impacts of drastic state policies on the life trajectories of the affected cohort, but also to understand reflectively the people whom we have become through our ascendent's stories.

As the thesis title suggests, rustication may yield either positive or negative consequences. Some human resources accumulated before the economic reform and the adaptive skills learned in the rustication years possibly helped them to promote career mobility afterwards, or contrarily might lose their values, or even became hindrance. Thus an understanding of structural change is necessary for examining the socio-economic outcomes of the upheavals, and for comparing the adaptation of

1. Introduction

the rusticates with that of non-rusticates coevals and with previous and subsequent cohorts in the post-reform era.

The rest of this introductory chapter is organised as follow: The next section provides historical background information on the Cultural Revolution, the rustication movement (programme) and the policies implemented during the period of the economic reform that may have a direct impact on the lives of the CR cohort. This is followed by a brief review of the life course study and the theories developed around it, and literature review of prior research on examining the life course of the CR cohort. In the section that follows, I give an overview of theory and research relating to the social stratification process in China and other former socialist countries, the institutional changes in China in the era of economic reform. The last section offers a summary of the rest of the thesis.

1.1 *Historical Remarks*

1.1.1 *The red guard and rustication (sent-down) movements*

China's Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was seen as the most important political event after the nation's civil war. Much unlike its international revolutionary predecessors, it was initiated and directed by the highest authority of the country – a 'revolution from above'. There has always been a debate over the duration of the Revolution. Historian sociologist Michel Bonnin notes that it depends on what definition of the Revolution that one follows: Although the 'Ten Years of Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1976' is given as an official definition, the period from 1969 until 1976 after the death of Mao and the arrest of the 'Gang of Four' should be differentiated as it was not 'revolutionary'. However, he argues that because rustication movement was a significant part of the 'Revolution in Education', there exists an "objective unity" between the two periods [Bonnin, 2006]. This argument seems to be supportive to the red-guard generation, for most of them played two roles during the Cultural Revolution, rebellious 'Red Guards' first, then as the dev-

1. Introduction

astated rusticates. Hence, they are more inclined to view the ten-year turbulence as a coherent event, and divide it into two distinct phases based on their experiences [Jiang and Ashley, 2000].

First Phase: Red Guards of Mao, 1966-1968

In May 1966, three months before the declaration of the Cultural Revolution, the first group of ‘Red Guards of Mao’ was formed at a middle school in Beijing. At that time, no one had anticipated that this group would multiply exponentially among students and sweep the country in a few months.

As early as June of 1966, the government suspended admissions of school and university programmes for the 1966-1967 academic year. Mao, realised the potential power of the students for being the most visible protagonists of the revolution, personally receiving 13 million students and Red Guards eight times between mid-August and November, inciting them to rebel even outside the schools. As he asserted at a Red Guard rally in August 1966:

“You should put politics in command, go to the masses and be one with them, and carry on the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution even better [Schrarn, 1971].”

With the approval of Mao, the intrepid young warriors, instead of learning at schools, rushed into the participation of what they believed at that time, an extraordinary event. With no clear definition of who the ‘representatives of the capitalists’ were, students publicly assaulted and humiliated academic representatives of ‘bourgeois’ title, and party cadres “infected with revisionist ideas”. By the end of the summer of 1966, schools and universities were closed, as the Red Guards responded to the Four Olds campaign⁸ of 1966-1967. Destructive raids including burning historical books, smashing antiques and religious symbols, desecrating temples and destroying old buildings, created a tremendous mess in the society.

⁸ Four Olds: old thought, old culture, old customs and old habits.

1. Introduction

Internally, the class struggle within the classroom became acute, leading to the eventual split of the Red Guards into two factions⁹ comprising of students with polarised class origins [Chan et al., 1980]. The conservative (also referred as loyalist) group had a more privileged status, including students whose parents were high officials or belonged to ‘red’ social classes¹⁰. They were either active members or revolutionary leaders of the Red Guards in 1966, and were identified as a group of “Red Supremacist” who mobilised the ‘Red Terror’ movement, attacking and prosecuting those with inferior class origins (families of old elites) [Chan, 1993]. The rebel group, on the other hand, comprised students from educated middle class or bourgeois families. Their formation was argued to be a way of seeking liberation from the long political repression, an attempt to contend against the potentates [Chan, 1993]. Factionalism between the Red Guards was largely considered to be caused by the inequality of class origins, Walder [2001] argues that it is also a consequence of political action to win in this no-win game.

By the end of 1967, the chaotic situation became even more uncontrollable, Mao withdrew his backing to the anarchy, bringing in the army to restore order. The government started urging students to return to schools. The Red Guards were officially disbanded in Spring 1968.

The important roles of the Red Guards movement played during the early years of the Cultural Revolution are summarised into three general points: First, its so-called “Red Sea Campaign” raised the personality cult to Mao to its peak point. It provided the foundation of conviction for advancing the Cultural Revolution [Tang, April 5th, 2001]. Second, their violence against property during the Four Olds campaign formed the initial model of the factional conflicts and created a hectic climate necessary for the complete unfolding of the Cultural Revolution. It would show later during the middle period of the Revolution where the number of fatalities

⁹ According to Chan’s interviews conducted with respondents who had been high school students in Guangzhou in the 1960s, around 65% of them had once belonged to one of the Red Guard factions.

¹⁰ I will detail the class labelling utilised in Mao’s era in Chapter three.

1. Introduction

reached its peak [Esherick et al., 2006b]. Third, as the Red Guards travelled across the country to practise the ‘Great Revolutionary Exchange (*Geming Da Chuanlian*)’, it made the Cultural Revolution a popular social movement nationwide.

Although in fact, the Red Guards were responsible for some of the most vivid and unforgettable acts of violence and destruction in the early years of the Cultural Revolution, even today some of those who participated in the savage acts still found it hard to admit the crimes they committed. Many remained silent and felt they were utilised by the top leaders as pawns in their political struggle and a few claimed to be ‘moral idealists’ [Jiang and Ashley, 2000, p. 61] and that their attacks were ‘largely by ink’¹¹.

Second Phase: The Rusticated Youth, 1968-1980

The year of 1968 marked a significant year for students in many countries around the world. Whilst Socialist states and some Post-industrial countries were witnessing a series of student protests responding to the communist dictatorship or the waves of social movements, the highest authority in China was embarking on a campaign which would change the fate of millions of urban red guards and their contemporaries.

Dissatisfied by the unsettled Red Guards factionalism within schools, in summer 1968, Mao dispatched the “working-class propaganda teams” to academic institutions to take controls. To Mao’s surprise, students did not appreciate the garrison of the “working-class propaganda teams” at all, causing several brutish incidents. Later that year, a national newspaper conveyed Mao’s instruction on the necessary re-education of urban youth by the poor and lower-middle peasants in the rural areas. His call on “revolution in education” was soon taken up by local govern-

¹¹ It refers to the Big-character posters. Big-character posters (*Da Zi Bao*), were wall-mounted posters written in traditional Chinese calligraphy, often used as a means of protest, propaganda or other political expression. The first Big-character poster was published by a university lecturer in Beijing to attack the administrative authority at the very university. Mao was fully aware of the poster, and published his own Big-character poster to incite his followers to “Bombard the Headquarters.” This effectively made Big-character poster ubiquitous for the following period of struggle.

1. Introduction

ments who actively promoted the “Up to the Mountains and Down to the Villages (*Shangshan Xiaxiang*)” campaign¹². By the end of 1969, there had been some 4 million urban youth, mainly secondary school students rusticated ([Bonnin, 2005a]; The National Statistics Bureau of China, 1987).

Researchers have wondered the motivations behind Party’s rhetoric on the rustication movement. Was it a solution resolved by Mao and other party leaders to restore the lost urban order? The general explanation on this is economic. From 1966 to 1968, the dilemma created by the closure of higher education opportunity and shortage of urban employment resulted in 10 million redundant students in cities. Alleviating the pressure of high unemployment rates in urban areas became a crucial social problem confronted to the Party leaders. Although researchers tend to buy this argument, scholars have challenged it by enquiring the purpose of recruiting the rural-urban migrants to cities to fill the gap in labour force in cities [Zhao, 2000]. If the aim of the party leaders was to control the urban unemployment, why was the rural-urban migration allowed even after the full implementation of the household registration system? The core motivation of the rustication movement may be revealed in the sequence of actions instructed by Mao. The catastrophic “Great Leap Forward” and the consequential famine removed Mao from actual power. After launching the Cultural Revolution and successfully eliminating his own rivals inside the Party, Mao had a fear of China following “revisionist” ideology after his death. The turmoil generated by the Red Guards factionalism eventually led him to list the rebellious students and Red Guards as revolutionary targets in the main national newspaper published¹³ in July 1967. In this editorial, he expressed his resentment of the gathering of students and intellectuals, and their independent “kingdoms”. Followed by the failure of bringing the “working-class propaganda teams” to academic institutions to resolve the threats, Mao decided it was the time for the Red

¹² Prior to the official beginning of the rustication programme at the end of 1968, from 1955 to 1966, 1.2 million urban youth left the cities to go to the countryside and remote frontiers. Unlike the “Up to the Mountains and Down to the Villages” campaign, the early rustication was on a more voluntary basis

¹³ “Working class must lead all” by Wenyan Yao, *People’s Daily*, July 26th, 1976.

1. Introduction

Guards and intellectuals to be “re-educated”. The motivation of the rustication programme for the youth is multi-lateral, but surely this unprecedented social experiment served Mao’s own purpose of intensifying power built upon his ideology and political strategy [Bonnin, 2005b,a,c].

Having a sincere wish of thriving in the “wide world”, each of the urban youth claimed their loyalty as they went:

“We will walk steadfastly on the path you (Mao) have shown, we are going to the rural areas to be re-educated by the peasants. We will temper our infinitely loyal hearts until they become redder and redder [Short, 2007].”

Despite the brave words, for most of them the life in rural areas was a rude awakening. With no prior experience of living in rural areas and living independently, they were engaged in backbreaking agricultural and manual work in the field, often over long working hours. For some of the youth who left for the northern frontier Provinces, their experience of the send-down was even more bitter. These areas were often underpopulated with severe natural environment. Rusticates also suffered from the long-time separation from their families. In many cases, they were given very few holidays to visit homes over years. The extremely harsh conditions made those “Vanguards of Mao’s thought” begin to doubt the superiority of the socialism¹⁴. The pre-emptive coup planned by Mao’s successor and “best pupil” – Lin Biao, and his downfall left many people feeling betrayed, and they started to sense the conspiracy of political conflicts held at the highest authority in China. The rusticates became skeptical of the purpose of the rustication movement, if it was necessary for them to be re-educated by the “laggar” peasants. On the other hand, discontent also grew from the peasant’s side. Many rural communities were reluctant to accept urban youth who had neither the experience of working in the

¹⁴ “We all saw the lives of peasants were extremely bitter, they lived in terrible conditions. We began to doubt the superiority of the socialism...” - Xu Youyu, philosopher, ex-Red Guard [Short, 2007]

1. Introduction

farms nor familiarity of their culture. They considered the rusticates as their burden and consequently marginalised them [Bonnin, 2005a].

In such an unexpected situation, opportunities for returning to the urban areas became valuable and eagerly wanted. The family social background played a crucial role in providing such opportunities. Children whose parents were high-rank cadres succeeded in bringing them back through various channels and political connections [Zhou and Hou, 1999]. Those who did not have such privileges were more desperate, and some took hazardous risks, such as stowing away to other countries, returning to cities illegally, and in some exceptional cases female students offered sexual services to the local cadres who potentially could help them return to cities [Bonnin, 2005a].

In June 1970, the Party announced the admission to some universities where reformed and vocational programmes were offered. The students enrolled would be later called “Worker-Peasant-Soldier students”; as the name implies, they were selected primarily from the three Proletarian classes. Only a very small proportion of the rusticated students were recommended by their rural working community for such chance.

If the mobilisation was on a voluntary basis before 1968, its manifestation afterwards on stressing urban youth to forfeit their urban residence and re-settle permanently in the countryside could be seen as forced migration. More and more rusticates became disillusioned with their rural lives and this mounting despair eventually broke out in 1978. Student protests and strikes taken place in several Provinces effectively made the Party relax the strict regulation of migration control. After the national rusticates conference, it was permitted for rusticates to return to cities if they were proved to be physically unfitted to the agricultural labour, or had aging or sick parents or were the only child in the families. Similarly, urban middle school graduates could be exempted from going to the countryside under such conditions. Gradually, with the ending of the Cultural Revolution and the death of Mao in 1976 and the increasing pressure of continuous riots by the students, the rustication

1. Introduction

programme was finally phased out.

1.1.2 *China ever since*

The end of the send-down era did not imply an immediate start of a new life for most rusticates. When 8 million of them returned to homes in the cities in 1979, the first wave of Chinese baby boomers¹⁵ reached the working ages. Together, they created an urban job waiting list of 15 million [Chen, 1999a]. The mounting pressure of unemployment forced the post-Mao government to find ways to relocate returned rusticates and new middle school graduates within the urban system. Solutions given to resolve the problem included the expanding of the higher educational enrollments, legitimising self-employment, squeezing out some resources from capital intensive state-owned enterprises to sponsor labour collective enterprises and labour service facilities (*laodong fuwu gongsi*) [Whyte and Parish, 1984b, Zhou and Hou, 1999]. All these efforts were made possible under the premise of the transformation from a state planned economy to a socialist market-based economy.

The economic reforms begun in December 1978, initially in rural areas and then in cities, abandoned the Maoist model of development, opened new job opportunities and new economic sectors, subsequently generated a variety of occupational trajectories. But it was difficult for the rusticates to take advantage of the new system. They had been in poverty for so long and found little money to set up their own business so many of them eventually ended up in the state or collective enterprises. Yet their peaceful time did not last long, since the property rights had steadily shifted from traditional state or collective ownership towards private ownership in the mid-1990s [Walder and Oi, 1999], resulting in a gradually loosening social contract between the government and the workers in the socialist firms. This has brought challenges to the economic well-beings of the state employees and their families [Tang and Parish, 2000]. Prior to the urban labour market reform, many state-owned enterprises were characterised by the lack of capital, labour surplus and

¹⁵ Chinese Baby Boomers were born between 1962 to 1970.

1. Introduction

inefficient productivity. They, on the other hand, had to provide housing, pensions, medical and other social benefits for their employees. A series of enterprise reforms started since 1984, has firstly replaced the socialist lifetime employment with term contracts to lower the retirement age, then later in 1997 forced the unprofitable state-owned enterprises to close, which led to the redundancy of millions of workers. Among those who were laid off, many of them were former rusticates; they became the most vulnerable ones during this selection process of industrial restructuring [Chen, 1999b, Hung and Chiu, 2003]. As members of a cohort of inadequately educated and poorly skilled individuals having suffered from the long halt of the education system and the elimination of the labour market caused by the Revolution, their turbulent lives were put to the test again.

After a long separation from homes, the rusticates yearned to form families more than anyone else. The implementation of the abrupt birth control policy in 1979 was no doubt another difficult acceptance made by this generation of reproductive age. This planned birth policy, still in action at present, known also as the “one child policy”, restricts one couple to having only one child. Although the policy is more relaxed in the rural areas due to the need of agricultural labourers, having additional children risks the urbanites the cost of losing job-related advancement and benefits, in addition to the fines of “social compensation fee”. Once again, the rusticates fell victims to radical policies.

1.2 *A Life Course Framework*

Evidently not only rusticates but all members of the CR cohort bear witness to most of the turbulence of contemporary China, such as disruption of education, the labour market retrenchment and the economic reform. The former two events pose risks to the pursuit of further schooling and the stability of career, whilst the latter one creates new opportunities. The primary aim of this thesis is to understand if there is any divergence in the outcome of these economic or social events between

1. Introduction

rusticates and non-rusticates. In other words, can differences in later life outcomes be explained by the experience of rustication? To achieve this objective, a life course research design is called to study the effects of rustication and to assess if they are transitory or enduring. This section explains why the life course study offers a framework to link historical events and life stages. It begins by reviewing some of life course principles, their conceptual significance and then explains how they can be applied to understand how the rusticates, or the cohort they belong to, have been shaped by the past.

The study of the life course as a field of inquiry originated between the two world wars. Thomas and Znaniecki's (1918) pioneering study of the polish immigrant community in Europe and the United States of America for the first time used life histories as an instrument to capture social issues by examining the relation between individuals development and the historical context. Another highly-cited article written in the same period by Karl Mannheim (1928) introduced the concept of "the generation" as historically collective actors to point out that society's development is a result of different generations existing, interacting, and supplanting each other. Life course emerged as a developmental theory through pioneering longitudinal studies of child development in the 1940s and 1950s (see review by Elder [1998]). These early studies were extended beyond their initial confinement on childhood, to a recognition of continued and changing developmental process throughout life. One of the most prominent examples of these extended works is Elder's landmark study on lives of a particular cohort grown up during the Great Depression [Elder, 1974]. In this study, he not only re-stresses the close link between historical change and age-graded life patterns, but also reminds us of Mannheim's remark of linked generations. By the mid-1970s, the life course approach became a salient research paradigm for studying social changes and human lives. Since then, it has established a conceptual bridge between life course development of individuals and changing society in part through historically situated cohorts [Ryder, 1965].

1. Introduction

In concept, the life course refers to a process shaped by the interaction of individual continued behaviour with changing social contexts; it is seen as the sequence of states and events in different life domains spanning from birth to death. The life course perspective is grounded in several tenets, to analyse life courses and abrupt system change. This thesis is guided by the following theories.

1.2.1 Timing, duration and cohort specific experience

Timing plays a crucial role in affecting life course outcomes, and relates to two temporal dimensions: biographical and historical time. Cohort has a property of embracing both of these dimensions, since they are individuals exposed to sequences of historical circumstances collectively as birth cohorts. Ryder [1965] advised sociologists to exploit the consistency between social changes and cohort differentiation, noting that cohorts manifest the consequences of social or economic transformations in their own characteristics ways. This approach was empirically addressed well among some of Elder's early specimens. The stories of children in the Great Depression era and men during the wartime mobilization showed the impact of dramatic social upheavals resulted in cross-cohort variations [Elder, 1974, 1986]. Another example is given by a study on happiness which found that the lower levels of happiness expressed by baby-boomer cohort was related to their adverse experience in formative years caused by the large numbers of them competing for schooling and jobs [Yang, 2008].

Cohort differences, in a sense, are also life stage differences. The effect of social experience depends not only on the personal experience but also on where individuals are at their life stages when the event takes place. The early or late exposure to critical events affects the remaining life time for other life activities, also has unintended and unforeseen consequential impacts on subsequent outcomes. Boys of the Berkeley cohort in Elder's study experienced the Depression in their childhood, endured a higher cost of hardship in adulthood than boys of the Oakland cohort

1. Introduction

who were adolescents at the time of the Depression [Elder, 1974]. Older cohort at the breakout of the war were more reluctant to join the military service than the younger cohort because of family and career. And for those who had served in the military, the older veterans experienced more family and career disruption later in life and ensured higher socioeconomic costs from the service than their younger counterparts [Elder, 1987]. Transitional societies have observed that young adults were at advantageous ages when the reforms set off, and became the winners in the early years of the transformation [Titma and Tuma, 2005].

One great outcome of the drastic twists and abrupt turns of political history of modern China is transforming the nation into a “geologically layered” society, where members of different cohorts bear distinctively historical experiences [Tang and Parish, 2000]. Zhou and Moen [2001] showed cohort-based differences in response to new opportunities created by the expansion of market effect in China. Members of younger cohort at the start of economic reform were found to be more prone to seize new opportunities in the market process than their older counterpart, while the latter inclined to be more entrenched into the state redistributive system. In the case of those who were born after the economic reform, they were adolescents when the urban labour retrenchment was at its full pace, old enough to perceive changes in society or parents’ job statuses impelled by the reform, but too young to have become exposed to an occupation, a family of procreation or other later life chances.

In what way then, could birth cohorts in this study be defined to characterise their cohort-specific experience? Figure 1.1 illustrates how each birth cohort is related to specific events and experiences in the historical context of contemporary China. In the plot, the vertical axis represents historical time in calendar year, the horizontal axis marks chronological age, while the shaded areas indicate where the cohort of my interest, the CR cohort, belong (the 1947-1953 and the 1954-1960 cohorts) and their corresponding experience of history at different ages. The full

1. Introduction

explanation of who belong to the CR cohort and who the rusticates are is given in Chapter Two. To explore the risk of exposure of different cohorts to state policies, we take the Cultural Revolution as an example. It is clear that the cohorts born before 1940 had already spent a significant amount of years in established careers at the start of the Cultural Revolution (1966); by contrast, the 1940-1946 cohort ranging in age from 20 to 26 stood at the crucial start of their career formation, whilst the CR cohort was confronted by the issues of disruption of education and its consequential urban youth unemployment. Consider another state action: The reforms of state-owned enterprises in the late 1990s. The laid-off or the loss of a job caused by the reforms has different implications to cohorts given their difference in life cycle positions: The cohorts born before 1947 were at ages near retirement, whilst younger members of the CR cohort were at the maturity of their career and the succeeding cohorts were at the stage of either family formation or the early-phase of employment. A comparison of adaptations made in the reform era between different cohorts may reveal the unique characteristics of the rusticates, unfortunately, this was missed out in early studies [Chen and Cheng, 1999].

The study of inter-cohort differences provides clues as to why change has occurred. However, focusing on birth-cohort comparisons alone cannot explain the underlying mechanisms which link historical change and individual life patterns. This is indeed where intra-cohort study fits in. It has been observed that cohort experiences differ by the social positions to which they belong, and hence react to social and historical events in diverse and often unpredictable ways [Mannheim, 1952]. Although the comparison between life courses of those who were sent down and those who remained in cities is necessary [Zhou and Hou, 1999, Xie et al., 2006], I argue that comparing the CR cohort with the preceding and succeeding cohorts should disclose more meaningful information of the unique traits of those individuals who spent their formative years in the country's most turbulent period [Chen and Cheng, 1999].

1. Introduction

To make a comparison of cohorts for studying social and individual changes, we consider the cohort effect as well as the age and period effects. Cohort effects occur at the intersection of biographical and historical time when impacts of historical events or processes become significant on the long-term outcomes of a particular cohort. For instance, given labour market uncertainties in East Germany after the unification, women who entered childbearing age after the event postponed their first parenthood later than the post-unification cohorts [Huinink and Kreyenfeld, 2006]. Period effects become obvious when the impingement of historical events is relatively uniform across successive cohorts. A common example of such effects is seen through the widespread changes in war. The effects of ageing manifest through development and maturation in one's biographical time, they appear relatively uniformly across historical time.

Besides the biographical and historical time, process time or duration of life events is another important factor affecting subsequent life courses. Prolonged exposure to combat increased the risk of postwar physical decline for World War II veterans [Elder, 1987]. In the context of this thesis, the duration of rustication is of special interest in a couple of ways. The early return ensures an early and smoother adaptation to the work and life in the cities, whilst the extended stay in the countryside may delay the entries in further education, the urban labour market and the family formation.

1.2.2 *Human agency under abrupt system change*

The sociological study of the life course aims to describe and explain the processes and distributions of individuals into social positions over the lifespan. The sudden system rupture in former socialist societies has provided a testing ground for examining the impacts of societal breakdowns on life courses, and relevant studies have made contributions on advancing life course research in general [Mayer, 2009].

Human agency defines that the social environment provides both constraints and

1. Introduction

opportunities; individuals as “social actors” construct their life courses through the choices and actions they take within such social environment. In the comparative study of transitional societies, evidences of human agency were ample in countries where new opportunities were created by the transitions, and are exemplified by the high career mobility of young adults; whilst evidence of human agency was hard to find in countries where social and cultural institutions confined the actions of individuals [Titma and Tuma, 2005]. In the context of modern China, we expect to see evidence of human agency more readily in the form of greater intra-generational mobility after the reform period. For drastic social changes or historical events, human agency also indicates how adaptive and resilient the affected individuals are to abrupt changes. During the period of the Great Depression, to keep the household running, mothers sought for limited works to support the family financially while children adapted to help out with housework [Elder, 1974]. Since the end of the Cultural Revolution, the social and economic conditions under which the members of the CR cohort live have markedly changed. It is reasonable to hypothesise that rusticates, who may have tempered their perseverance and developed a risk-taking attitude through the hard manual labours in the countryside, are more likely than non-rusticates or members of other cohorts to be more adaptive to the radical changes brought by the economic reform. For rusticates, the capacity of adaption may vary according to their individual biography, family resources and the timing and duration of their rustication experience.

1.2.3 *Event-based model approach*

The life course research establishes an “endogenous causal system [Mayer and Tuma, 1990a]”. It is based on the proposition in which earlier conditions and experiences may consequentially shape the later outcomes. Hence, events within single life domains cannot be studied in isolation. A multi-level and multi-time framework is required to relate not only individuals’ characteristics such as cohorts, ethnic groups,

1. Introduction

nationalities, belonging social groups and organisations, but also individual duration over a life domain such as duration in a social class, historical eras such as the war, Great Depression time, and cross-sectional events such as an implementation of a state policy.

Applied to the case of the rusticates, how can these principles help us to learn about their lives? How to model the relationship between historical change and life histories of rusticates? Elder and Pellerin [1998b] propose two approaches for linking social history and life history. The first one is an outcome-based approach, where one outcome is investigated to find out how proximal and distal threads and events may cause on it. The second approach is the converse to the first one, in which a historical event becomes the centre of interest to trace its influence through proximal and distal outcomes. The first approach is argued for its failure to capture the full range of potential influences from a single outcome, in which case an “event-based” model is more satisfactory as it follows the effect of a historical event systematically through several life domains.

Past life course studies of the rusticates have followed the “event-based” model approach, and so does this thesis. This approach requires researchers to have sensitivity in determining which events possibly have impacts on lives, and for which groups of people this impact may vary [Elder and Pellerin, 1998b]. In Elder [1974]’s study, he argued that a specific condition in a historical period varies in its effect on different population subsets. In his analysis, to show how the childhood experiences shaped the experiences later in lives, he subdivided his sample not only by the measure of decline in income (contrasting “deprived” with “non-deprived”), also by the class situation of the families (contrasting “middle-class” with “working class”).

China has a more complicated history filled with radical changes in social structure for the past century. Under Mao, the central planning economy produced a rigid status hierarchy. The Cultural Revolution’s anti-establishment uprising altered the social order survived since the beginning of the 20th century. The post-reform

1. Introduction

regime witnessed the abandon of the hierarchy of the state socialism, creating new paths of social mobility. Whilst most of the literature focus on the changes in social stratification at the institutional level, only a few studies examined how the transformation is processed on the level of individual life courses. By enlisting members of the Cultural Revolution cohort as the study of analysis, we can demonstrate how state policies interplay with the social stratification structure over time. The theoretically significant contribution of Zhou and Hou [1999]’s work is its examination of the change in social structure through looking at the life courses of their “Children of the Cultural Revolution”. Their investigation of how resistant class backgrounds are to the Cultural Revolution’s uprising is theoretically interesting, however, to gain a full understanding of the rustication experience it is also important to extend this assessment beyond the Revolution, as the impact of family background on people’s lives varies over time and is far-reaching.

It is the second theme of this thesis, on the basis of existing literatures, to detect the mediating effect of family background on the later life course outcomes. In the following section, I take a close look at how individuals’ opportunity structures are shaped by social institutions.

1.3 Life Chances and Social Transformations

Weber’s concept of life chances is probabilistic; it implies how likely, given certain factors, those who are in a similar situation would result in an alike position or different positions. In the example of rural families in socialist Hungary studied by Szelényi [1988], many rural families captured the reopening entrepreneurial opportunities, successfully transformed from their semi-proletarian status to the positions of “socialist entrepreneurs”. Another example is given by the East German Life History Study on how some people succeeded or failed after the fall of the Berlin wall given their qualifications and resources acquired before 1989 [Mayer, 2006, chp4]. So far as the concept of probability is concerned, a social turbulence or system upheaval

1. Introduction

does not necessarily mean that all lives are steered into certain directions. Prior research has demonstrated that social transformation generates discernible, sometimes contrasting life outcomes for individuals, vastly depending on two aspects: (1) the social groups to which they belong defined by their occupation or class background and (2) the experiences and biography they share as a cohort or a generation. The first aspect brings out the function of social stratification in mediating the relationship between state activities and individual life chances. Amongst studies close to this thesis, Zhou and Hou [1999] show that children of high-rank cadres returned to cities much earlier than children whose fathers were ordinary workers. In terms of educational attainment, children whose fathers held administrative positions were less negatively affected by the disruption of education in the Cultural Revolution than were other youth [Deng and Treiman, 1997, Meng and Gregory, 2002, Giles et al., 2007]. The second aspect emphasises on the cohort-specific experience when a society gets caught up by a historical event, which I have talked through in the preceding section. Take again the Cultural Revolution as an example, Chen [1999b] and Hung and Chiu [2003] believe the CR cohort, because they were at the vulnerable age when radical changes took place, were most adversely affected by the Revolution.

For the remaining part of this chapter, I go into addressing the first aspect of the social transformation on the stratification dynamic in China, I start by comparing the main differences in social stratification patterns between the industrialised market societies and state socialist societies. This should help place into context the social stratification process with Chinese characteristics. I then look into various respects addressed in sociological research—ranging from the theory of a transitional market to the political foundation of economic growth—published on the shift from the pre-reform hierarchy to the new social order with its abolishment of old class screening, and on whether initial conditions appreciated in the pre-reform or pre-revolution era shaped the life course outcome during the abrupt social change. Fur-

1. Introduction

thermore, by reviewing these literatures, I aim to find the relationship of my thesis to the growing body of research on the impact of China’s economic transformation on lives of individuals.

1.3.1 Social stratification in comparative perspective

Modern macro-sociological theories of social stratification in capitalist countries stem from the process of industrialisation, following the timeline from pre-industrial societies to industrial and then to post-industrial ones. The liberal theory of industrialism is one of its kinds developed to determine how social structure evolves during the economic development. It rejects Marx’s prediction on the evolution of capitalist societies [Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992, chp1][Parsons, 1964], positing “liberal democracy” as the ultimate objective towards which industrialised societies are moving. Liberal theorists believe that industrialisation generates new opportunities, requiring a structural change of the social division of labour, hence, the stratification of the working population needs to be revised from Marx’s distinction between the bourgeois and the proletariat classes. The advanced proposition of the liberal theory is that, in comparison to the pre-industrial societies, the allocation of individuals to different positions within the division of labour is regulated through a meritocratic mechanism. Industrialised societies are expected to see high rate of social mobility from one generation to the next, and in the life course of individuals.

Empirically, the liberal theory of industrialism has received little support. Unlike what it assumes, no discernible trend is shown, rather, patterns of social mobility are relatively consistent over time in industrialised market societies [Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992], despite the significant variation in social regimes cross-nationally. Featherman, Jones, and Hauser’s study (FJH) in the U.S. pursuing in the spirit of Sorokin’s approach suggests that such invariance in patterns of mobility takes place in industrial societies with “a market economy and a nuclear family system.”

In common, both the liberal and the FJH theses describe a similar course of de-

1. Introduction

velopment of different classes across industrial societies – “the long-term shrinking of agricultural classes, the rise then decline of industrial working classes, and the long-term expansion of the service class [Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992, chp11].” When modelled at a micro-level by regarding the outcomes of social mobility as the action and interaction of individuals and organisations [Breen, 2005, p. 390], the FJH thesis, different from the liberal theory for which the meritocracy is seen as the product of market competition, implicitly reflects another characteristic of the social stratification process in industrial countries: the constant mobility rate observed is due to the fact that those who are at the top use their control over resources to retain their privileged position, and transmit to their children if possible. This argument has raised another aspect which should be addressed in understanding the channels of social mobility. It is known that initial resource endowments have a penetrative effect on acquisition of social position. These resources could be material, cultural or genetic, are possessed by one generation and transmitted to the following one [Bourdieu and Passeron, 1977]. Their role in retaining the social status inherited from their parents is often compared against acquired human and social capitals. This forms a model which is widely used by sociologists in formularising the mobility process – the so-called “OED triangle”. Its analysis on the path from class origin to class destination pictures a triangular relationship between class origins, education and class destinations. The liberals who advocate for meritocracy over “ascription” expect to see a weakening effect of class origins in form of family-based social inheritance on educational attainment and on class destinations respectively, and a strengthening effect of education on class destinations. The most recent study on social mobility in post-industrial countries in Europe shows only a declining ascription, education playing a minor role when compared with the residual effect from origins to destinations [Breen, 2005].

Overall, the theoretical assumption of stratification that capitalist countries posit is that a class situation is “ultimately a market situation [Weber, 1978]” where the

1. Introduction

economics and meritocratic mechanisms allocate individuals into structural positions created through the market's demands. In a comparative perspective, mobility trend in industrial societies was expected to reach a "convergence". But cross-national comparison studies find that the stage of the economic development varies little between most European countries, mobility trends are significantly different between capitalist societies and formerly state socialist societies (Hungary and Poland), and between the former and capitalist societies politically dominated by social democratic parties (Norway and Sweden). The distinctive institutional configurations and political economies of the socialist societies were argued to be the reason for such differences [Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992, Breen, 2005]. In detail, social democratic governments in Sweden have been pursuing policies to retain a comparatively low degree of social inequality through its welfare system. For instance, the role of education as a main factor in mediating the impact of origins on destinations is the greatest in Sweden. Similarly, state socialist societies also introduced comprehensive educational systems to lessen the role of ascriptive attributes in educational and occupational attainments. In addition, social inequalities were tackled through policies which particularly favoured children from peasant and working-class backgrounds.

Although both state socialist and social democratic societies exhibit high rates of mobility, the two societies differ fundamentally in their redistributive mechanism [Szelényi, 1978]. The pattern of state expenditure in social democratic societies has resulted in the reduction of urban-rural and class differences in living standards [Jonsson and Mills, 2002], albeit the underlying pattern of wealth concentration is unchanged [Gough, 1979]. On the contrary, the redistributive mechanism in the state socialist societies, argued by Szelényi, only adds more advantages to the already privileged "redistributors", deepening social inequality between them and the "direct producers". In the rest of the section, I shift the attention from social stratification patterns perceived in industrialised market societies to those in state socialist ones.

Comparative sociologists have long recognised the arguments posed by Parkin

1. Introduction

[1969] and later by Szelényi [1978] on the fundamental difference of mechanisms of stratification between the market systems and the state socialist redistributive systems. Unlike the market economy where direct intergenerational transferring of resources plays an important role in determining the social position, literatures on state socialism have shown that the state and the ruling Communist Party had control over all forms of resources and their distribution. Power and privilege are re-allocated among different social groups to ensure political stabilisation. The political status of the proletarian class was remarkably elevated. Their socio-economic conditions were improved through various governmental programmes: The egalitarian income policies narrowed down the wage differentials between manual workers and professional employees; people in proletarian class were given free medical and welfare services, their children were given priority in the competition for places in higher educational institutions. The socialist ideology ensured the state applied a significantly different reward system from that of capitalism. Ample evidences from state socialist countries in East Europe suggest that political loyalty, especially party membership was one of the most important selection criteria for career advancement [Parkin, 1969, Solga, 2006, Szelényi, 1987]. By contrast, the significant role of human capital experienced in market economy was much less valued. These changes in opportunity structure on the one hand promoted an upward mobility of the formerly under-privileged proletarian class [Parkin, 1969]. On the other hand, the demotion of the middle class showed an opposite direction of social mobility in the socialist states.

1.3.2 *Class stratification before and during the Cultural Revolution*

Unlike the USSR and former state-socialist societies in Eastern Europe, the Communist Party promised equality and security for everyone during the early socialist era in China, especially of greater opportunities for the previously disadvantaged. Some genuine successes were made through various policies and development programmes

1. Introduction

in the increase of life expectancy and reducing the rate of epidemic diseases in rural areas. In cities, unemployment rate was kept low, economic security was guaranteed for the employed. Elementary and secondary education made available for most people including women [Whyte and Parish, 1984b]. Life chances were seemingly fair to many urban and rural dwellers. Nevertheless, political and economic movements and campaigns never ceased since the ruling of the Communist party. By the time it reached the Cultural Revolution, a series of state-initiated actions ranging from class labelling to migration controls had re-classified individuals, creating more social layers. No citizen of China was spared even taking into account of their socio-economic statuses [Zhou, 2004, p. 20].

Based on Bian [2002]’s extensive literature review on China’s social stratification during the country’s state socialism, I list three fundamental visible and invisible classifications which persisted from the early years of the Communist regime through the Cultural Revolution. They were (1) the rural-urban divide in residential status, (2) the cadre-worker dichotomy in urban occupational classification, and (3) the “revolution-antirevolution” split in political characterisation. In the following few pages, I discuss each of them in turn as they provide the necessary backgrounds on the social order constructed by the Communist Party during its pre-reform period: who were those in control of power and privileges and who were those at the bottom of the social or political hierarchy; the formation of some of the pre-defined class titles which would become blessings or invisible and heavy shackles to their holders at drastic social and political events.

The rural-urban divide in residential status

In pre-revolutionary China, there was a close tie between urban and rural areas and the mobility between the two was high as young men left the countryside to go to cities searching for jobs, rural degree-holders sat for the Confucian examination organised by imperial bureaucracy to receive an official post, and, from the other direction, retired officials would spend retirement years in native villages where they

1. Introduction

altered their fate through passing the examination system [Whyte and Parish, 1984b, chp2].

The formal introduction of the household registration (*Hukou*) system in 1958 to discern individuals by their birth origins, either urban or rural, was one of the strategies made by the communist party to consolidate its administrative control. Its strict implementation in 1961 following the “Great Leap Forward” was a decisive response to the mounting demographic pressure of rural-urban migration caused by the rapid socialist industrialisation during the early years of state planning. The *Hukou* system strictly restricted internal migration, virtually building an impermeable set of administrative walls around cities to bind the peasants to the land and cut them off from urban social welfare. Such a migration restriction proved to be unusually severe even among other state socialist countries. The rustication campaigns of transferring redundant urban youth to rural areas was another government solution for attacking the demographic problem in cities. Those who were rusticated had their urban/non-agricultural “*Hukou*” converted to rural/agricultural status permanently. The rural exile was clearly a downward mobility for rusticates who were born and had lived in cities, though by government’s rhetoric, peasants had a higher political status than ordinary urbanites. The prolonged years of being in the countryside resulted in severe discontent and anxiety for the affected households, and the altered life chances of the rusticated youth.

The cadre-worker dichotomy in urban occupational classification

From the outset of the Communist regime in 1949, the Chinese government worked with full steam to eliminate classes and their attached privileges. Although the effort was seen distinctively in its promotion of educational opportunities for children of peasant and worker families, the political logic of inequality exists between “redistributors” and “direct producers” in reality [Szelényi, 1978]. Zhou [2004, pp. 9-13] gives three criteria to identify who the members of the bureaucratic class are, *i.e.*, the “redistributors”: They were advantageous in socioeconomic situations; were

1. Introduction

able to exercise political control and managerial authority in the work organisations; and their social class may be reproduced inter-generationally.

Although state cadre were relatively small in quantity under central planning, around 5% of the total workforce [Bian, 2002, p. 93] were considered as “redistributors”. They had higher political status than other social groups; generally occupied prestigious managerial and professional jobs; and most of their children attended elite schools. Political membership was crucial for entry into administrative positions in socialist societies [Solga, 2006], but it was not the sole selection criteria for cadre positions in China. Walder’s [Walder, 1995a] dual path model demonstrates the importance of both educational and political credentials to positions with “considerable authority and clear material privileges”. On the other extreme, workers had completely different wage scheme and qualification for recruitment. Upward mobility opportunities for state workers were almost impossible, their children received fewer years of education in lower quality schools. In the worst scenario during the Cultural Revolution, children from working and peasant classes were believed to be rusticated with priority.

The “revolution-antirevolution” split in political characterisation

In China, from the early 1950s to late 1970s, all individuals and households were labelled through party’s investigation to identify their “class origins”. The primary class designation was based on a person’s father or grandfather’s occupation before the land reform between 1948 to 1950 [Bian, 2002, p. 94]. It varied between regions. For instance, in Guangzhou, the deciding criterion was the father’s occupation for three years before Guangzhou’s liberation [Chan et al., 1980]. The class labels were crude and ranked hierarchically. Two opponent classes indicated the party’s initiative to invert the old class order: “Red” class marked as “revolutionary” included formerly deprived families who were labelled as “poor and lower-middle peasants”, while formerly advantaged groups such as the landlord and capitalist families were classified as the opposite “black” or “counter-revolutionary”. Between the “red”

1. Introduction

and “black” classes, professionals, white-collar workers and middle-peasant families were ranked as the “middle class”, which remained a relatively neutral class neither entirely trusted nor despised.

Such class labels, however, could be reversed by a person’s political performance in numerous party-led campaigns and tussles [Walder, 1986]. Each campaign generated political opportunities for class re-labelling and re-grouping, with the victors of the campaign regaining political status and the victims being purged from their positions. It was exemplified by the Hundred Flowers campaign of 1957 where half a million outspoken people, in particular the intellectuals, were labelled as “rightists”, becoming members of the “black” class [Zhou, 2004].

Class labels showed their strong effects in determining life chances before and during the Cultural Revolution. One of the manifestations was exemplified in educational recruitment policies. To be able to enter into universities, not only did students have to excel academically, but also their inherited class labels counted significantly [Chan et al., 1980]. Among the “red” class, the most privileged ones were individuals or heads of households who were party officials or People’s Liberation Army officers. Their children entitled as “revolutionary-cadre children”, were given priorities by admission offices at universities. Furthermore, these ascriptive labels were also an important criterion in mate choice [Walder, 1989]: males of the “black” status found almost no chance of marrying someone outside this status, while females of the “black” status eagerly wanted to marry a person with better class label.

1.3.3 Institutional changes after the Cultural Revolution

The reforms from the planned to market-oriented economy in the late 1970s have brought dramatic changes in the society’s overall opportunity structure over years. New chances as well as risks have emerged; the role of the state once again plays its central part in the new structure of opportunities and individual life chances.

The political logic under economic reform: the embourgeoisement process

China's path of economic change has proved to be distinctive among countries undergoing transition economies. Its sustaining economic growth and retaining of the Communist rule and socialist regime have generated questions on the articulation of the expansions of markets and existing social and political institutions, and subsequently on the continuity of stratification order constructed during state socialism. Nee [1989] in his influential paper on "market transition theory", contends that the transformation from socialist redistributive economy to market economy evidently involves shifts of power and privilege, and changes in opportunity structures and incentives, leading to the alteration of the stratification order. Later studies (including Nee's own work) have contested this proposition by examining the impacts of economic transformation on China's system of social stratification [Bian and Logan, 1996, Walder, 1995a, 1996, Zhou et al., 1996, 1997, Nee, 1989, 1996]. The main critique on Nee's market transition theory stems from its overlook of the resistance of old and existing institutions and lacking explanation on how redistributive power interplays with emerging markets during the transitional period. The important role of local government, the persistence of political power and network are shown to violate market transition theory's prediction of a decline of political authority and advantages of redistributors as market-like transaction replaces redistributive allocation [Bian and Logan, 1996, Walder, 1995a,b, 1996, Walder and Oi, 1999].

After losing the control over many public assets in the 1990s, local governments have gained greater administrative ascendance through new "regulatory, taxation and licensing powers" in the market economy [Wank, 1999]. The enduring power of local government attracts entrepreneurs to forge ties with officials to seek or enhance business opportunities. Reciprocally, local state officials (cadres) uses their political power coupled with control of public resources and business opportunities to trade for personal gains from private entrepreneurs. Wank [1995] later suggests a market-bureaucracy interaction approach to account for this inter-dependent re-

1. Introduction

lationship. Nee and Lian [1994] entitle the economic behaviour of the state cadres as an embourgeoisement process in their opportunism model. It is noted that not only private enterprises seek to foster a good relationship with political authorities, but a rent-seeking behaviour is identified in all other economic agents [Parish and Michelson, 1996]. Zhou [2004] points out that the China's unique path of transformation leads the state to evolve in favour of market's interest because of competitive advantages of market institutions and increasing contribution from non-state firms to economic growth, but on the other hand it allows the politics and markets to co-evolve for which market's economic activities are constrained by politics.

Nevertheless the private economy in China produces clientelist ties between the state officials and private entrepreneurs. The level of corruption of political elites in their captures of state assets has never reached as high as that of Russia and other post-socialist societies. China has maintained the commitment to public ownership for a very long time.

Redistribution in the emerging labour market

With the refined interest of the state and adopted policies to allow market expansion, redistribution of the resources under the market's rules becomes inevitable. As a result, the formerly protected state-owned firms are exposed to market competitions with non-state entities which have grown in noticeable paces. The state's gradual loosening of control of the labour market grants state enterprises greater managerial autonomy, but also exposes them to risks of financial losses and even to bankruptcy. Between 1985 to 1995, the percentage of profits of state-owned industries over the net value of fixed assets dropped from 19 to 4 percent, and the losses of the loss-making enterprises increased from 4 percent of the profits of the profit-making enterprises to 49 percent [Knight and Song, 2005]. The poor performance of the state-owned enterprises in the market competition has a striking impact on their workers. Before the economic reform people in the workforce, if not a farmer, would very likely work in a state sector. In these units, workers were provided with

1. Introduction

cradle-to-grave benefits such as housing and health care, and even jobs for children (*Dingti*). Given the declining profitability and rising incidence of loss-making in the state-owned sector, reform was enforced by the government in the mid-1990s. As consequences, many of the smaller state-owned enterprises declared bankruptcy, thousands of urban workers were made redundant. Post-1978 market reforms eroded the previously homogenous urban working class and divided it into separate groups depending on their status, income and security [Knight and Song, 2005, chp2].

Followed by the decline of the employment in state sectors, private firms and self-employment have grown from very little to nearly one fifth of the urban labour force over twenty years after the initial economic reform [Knight and Song, 2005, p. 31], contributing significantly to China's sustainingly growing economy. By bearing all of the risk on their own, government has no ownership rights on private firms except through the forms of regulation and taxation. Governmental declaration on its Party recruitment of private entrepreneurs in 2001 officially recognised and elevated the social status of this formerly despised group.

1.3.4 *The changing pattern of capitals and labels on life chances*

Prior to the Cultural Revolution, human capital was the key predictor of a career success [Whyte and Parish, 1984b]. Maoist socialism despised the educational credential, specialised skills and diploma were derogated in favour of political loyalty and "revolutionary experience". During the Mao period, intellectuals had the lowest social prestige, they were the prominent targets of political purges and cultural campaigns. Their human resources did not bring them career advantage, large number of intellectuals were sent to be re-educated through performing manual labour in the rural farms or factories. The striking change in the post-reform era is the rising demand of college educational qualification for party membership. Findings from the career histories data collected for a national survey in the mid-1990s show that a college education is the most important single predictor of party membership

1. Introduction

after 1988 (ten years after the economic reform), six times more likely than those with lower educational qualification [Walder et al., 2000]. College education has also become a criterion for administrative positions after the end of the Mao's era [Walder et al., 2000]. Intellectuals were finally given a “revolutionary” class label by the new administrative leaders at the end of the Cultural Revolution and have enjoyed a higher status since then.

The role of political capital on life chances under the state socialism exhibits a different historical trend from that of human capital. Since the ruling of the Communist party, political reliability has become a very crucial requirement of the party's recruitment to ensure the political stability. Candidates for career advancement would be screened¹⁶ for loyalty and so would be students for higher education [Walder, 1995a]. Walder et al. [2000] show that party membership, though, is an important criterion for administrative positions, has never been a necessary selection standard for professional positions. Status attainment study also remarks the declining predictive power of party membership on the attainment of occupational status in the post-reform era [Xie and Lin, 1988]. The collapse of the Communist Party in the former Soviet Union and other socialist states in the late 1980s seemingly curtailed the population of party candidates. Yet the early educational reforms in the re-opening of schools and the expansion of the higher education started showing their impacts indirectly on producing the candidate pool for party members among the educated young graduates. As the supply of college graduates increased tremendously in the post-reform era. The significant role of college education played in career advancement has been shifted, since having a college diploma was no longer a distinguishable capital, party membership has hence become much more important as a competitive condition among the highly educated. The percentage of college

¹⁶ The screening process is based on individual's political dossier (*Dangan*) – the files are kept by the personnel department of the work unit where the employee works or the school where the student attends. They record a complete political history of employees, students and their immediate families, which includes the class background, occupational history, political punishments and criminal convictions [Walder, 1983]. The *Dangan* stays with an individual for his or her entire working life.

1. Introduction

students who were party members increased from 1.2 percent in 1990 to 8 percent in 2003 [Walder, 2004].


Lastly, I draw the attention to the changing roles of family based capitals on life chances. As noted in Section 1.3.2, the politically defined ascriptive categories based crudely on parent's occupation classified in 1949 had direct effects on one's educational attainment and career mobility. Children from the "red" classes - party and military officials, were favoured in admission to better schools and more decent jobs, while those labelled "black" – the former exploiting classes and party's political enemies, struggled to get into the ordinary schools and finding a job. When the Maoist era was over, the ascriptive labels were abolished. A sampling survey conducted in the mid-1980s in one of the three municipalities noted that neither parent's occupational class nor education had significant effect on a child's occupational attainment, but the child's own education was shown to have a strong predictive effect [Blau and Ruan, 1990]. This would suggest an emerging meritocracy, yet Walder [2004] worries the changing ownership of property and the mounting population with wealth may intensify the inter-generational transmission of status for those who are close to the upper band of the society, leading the mechanism of selection to a different prospect than what it seems to be meritocratic.

1.4 Thesis Outline

Chapter 2, "Data, Variable Constructions and Some Definitions," presents the two sets of data used for the analyses in detail: The 1996 Life History and Social Changes (1996 LHSC) and the 2003 China General Social Survey (2003 CGSS). The variable and criteria used for selecting the population of interest—the CR cohort which includes rusticates and non-rusticates—is also discussed.

The analytical part of the thesis is organised into four chapters, Figure 1.2 recapitulates central issues dealt in each chapter and shows how they are related to each other. The outline of each of them is shown as follows.

Fig. 1.2: Thesis outline.



Chapter 3, “Selection to, Duration and Alternatives of the Rustication,” is the first empirical centerpiece of the thesis. It examines, the role that family endowment, family composition, individual’s resources before the rustication play as conditions in three aspects of the rustication process: the risk of being rusticated, the duration of rustication episode and other life chances for non-rusticates. Family class label is looked at in great detail alone because of its utilisation as a prominent arbiter in the selection process of the programme suggested by previous research. On the one hand, several findings are consistent to findings from previous studies: Those labelled with a bad class are more likely to be rusticated and spend longer in the countryside as opposed to children from other class labels. Having a college graduated father increases the chance of rustication. Junior and senior high school graduates are more likely to be rusticated than individuals with lower level of education. On the other hand, several findings stand out: The methods of sequence analysis reveal six different paths taken by non-rusticates as opposed to rustication. For those who joined the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)—arguably the most desirable destination for the CR cohort—a great proportion of them whose father was a communist party member. By dividing the CR cohort further according to their

1. Introduction

birth year, the significance of impacts of family class label, family composition, educational level and geographical origin prior to the programme varies throughout the life span of the programme. Father's occupational status replaces family class label to be the important factor in determining rusticates' duration of time spent in the countryside.

Chapter 4: "The Consequences of Being Rusticated: Transitions and Sequences," serves to explore consequences of radical policies on objective life course outcomes of the CR cohort. This involves two aspects. One is the issue of whether rustication experience disrupts normal life transitions. Results show that in view of timing at major life transitions, rusticates lag behind their non-rusticated counterparts and individuals from adjacent cohorts in entry to urban labour market, entry to matrimony and parenthood. Cohort effect is exemplified by the delayed attainment of college degree by the CR cohort overall, rusticates and non-rusticates regardless. The second issue is whether the prior experience such as the rustication episode and family resources influenced their educational attainment, labour market success and failure after the economic transformation. Findings demonstrate that rusticates who spent less time in the countryside have a higher chance of obtaining a college degree than either rusticates who stayed longer or non-rusticates; children of high-rank cadre or educated parent also have a higher likelihood of college attainment. Using the holistic work-life histories of the 2003 CGSS, the remaining part of this chapter employs the optimal matching and cluster analysis to characterise employment trajectory clusters for the CR cohort. Results reveal four distinctive groups, rusticates are more likely to be in the trajectory group characterised by unemployment in the later stage of their career than non-rusticates. Following the finding in chapter 4, those privileged non-rusticates who joined the military service during the Cultural Revolution demonstrate an inclination of being in an employment trajectory dominated by managerial posts.

Chapter 5: "The Consequences of Being Rusticated: Attitudes and Beliefs," ex-

1. Introduction

amines the second part of the consequences of rustication: on subjective well-being, social attitudes and beliefs. The main results of the chapter are that as opposed to non-rusticates, rusticates are less satisfied with their lives, more deprived with their current situation and more likely to be active in conflict solving. The cluster of employment trajectory developed from chapter 4 is employed as an independent variable in the function, and the ‘white-class work stable’ group dominated by a long employment of professional jobs, in comparison to other groups, tend to be happier with life, less deprived and more proactive in conflict solving.

Chapter 6: “The Rustication Experience in Retrospect,” explores further how rusticates view the significance of the rustication experience in their lives; for those non-rusticates who were seeming intact by the programme, how their lives have been affected by the experience of their rusticated siblings, spouses or classmates. This is done through analysis of the interview material gathered from the CR cohort. These interviews suggest that despite the consensus reached by rusticates that the rustication experience was a source of spiritual wealth, answers to the question of how the rustication experience changes their lives were stratified by work-life experiences of rusticates. Collectively, rusticated interviewees displayed an anxiety of generational identity loss. Non-rusticated interviewees imagined they would be in a much worse situation if they were ever sent down; those who joined the PLA during the Cultural Revolution recognise their superior family background had brought them advantages and privileges which they enjoyed even in the era of economic reform.

In Chapter 7: “Conclusion,” I summarise and discuss the overall research findings, and provide suggestions on future research related to the study of the CR cohort.

1.5 An Important Note

The terms of **sent-down** youths and **rusticates** refer to the same group of people, I use these two terms inter-exchangeably throughout my thesis. Similarly, the **sent-down** and **rustication** both refer to the programme of “Up to the Mountains and Down to the Villages”.

2. DATA, VARIABLE CONSTRUCTION AND SOME DEFINITIONS

This thesis uses quantitative data as well as interview materials. A key question in the quantitative data concerns the risk of being rusticated, thus a risk pool needs to be drawn out which contains only individuals who were available for experiencing the rustication – the CR cohort. The first part of this chapter discusses the selection criteria of this risk pool and the rusticates, adjacent cohorts in comparison are also mentioned. The second part introduces the surveys and the variables used for analysis. Information regarding the collection of interview data is discussed in Chapter 6.

2.1 *The CR cohort as being the risk pool*

The Revolution was a national-scale social event, nevertheless it played different roles in urban and rural areas. We are reminded that the rustication policy only applied to educated youth in the cities.¹ It is crucial to ensure that this risk pool includes only those who had been urban residents before the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution, were in their late adolescence and were junior or senior high school graduates between 1966 and 1978.

Following this guideline, the CR cohort is considered to comprise all urban people

¹ The “educated” youth refers to both youths whose families reside in the urban areas and to youths from peasant families who left to cities for education. The term “sent-down educated youth”(rusticates) refers to urban school graduates, while “returned educated youth” refers to the peasant youths. Returned educated youth are more numerous than the sent-down educated youth. By restricting our attention to urban areas only, we cannot obtain information on those rusticates who have settled down permanently in the rural areas. But they are the minority compared to those who returned to cities.

2. Data, Variable Construction and Some Definitions

born between 1947 and 1960, the year of 1947 corresponds to the birth year of roughly the oldest senior high school graduate in 1966, and 1960 corresponds to the birth year of roughly the youngest junior high school graduates in 1978.

I am also interested in its two sub-cohorts: those who were born between 1947 and 1953, and between 1954 and 1960. The birth cohort of 1947-1953 consists of those who are famously known as the ‘old-three classes (Lao San Jie)’, because the majority of them belonged to the six graduating classes of 1966, 1967 and 1968 at both junior and senior middle school levels. Along with ‘capitalist-roaders’ from the bureaucratic class and intelligentsia, they were the major targets of the governments social mobilisation. The birth cohort of 1954-1960 includes those who were in the graduating classes from 1970 onwards. Compared with the preceding cohort who were sent down during the ‘Golden Period’ of the rustication movement, most members of the cohort of 1954-1960 were rusticated when the movement experienced its turbulent period. They were given more opportunities in the cities than their older counterpart. Similar to Zhou and Hou [1999]s attempt to analyse the risk of rustication in two periods, dividing the interested population into two cohort groups allows us to detect the temporal effects of state policies on the selection process of the rustication. Whilst the 1947-1953 cohort was once Maos Red Guards, depicted as pioneers of the rustication movement, enthusiastic and supportive to this governments decision, the 1954-1960 cohort was less willing to go to the countryside, presumably discouraged by the sudden recruitment in urban production units and the harsh living conditions in the countryside disclosed by their older counterparts [Pan, 2003].

2.1.1 Cohorts in comparison

I have already discussed the sociological implication of cohort. In essence, cohort comprises everyone born in a certain geographical location and in a limited span of consecutive years arbitrarily chosen. Each cohort is special with its demography,

2. Data, Variable Construction and Some Definitions

such as its gender, race, social and economic compositions. Because of these differential factors inherent to cohorts, one can discern the unique pattern of a particular cohort by comparing it with other cohorts. To examine the unique characteristics of rusticates and the cohort to which they belong, in addition to comparison in life-course outcomes between rusticates and non-rusticates, comparisons with adjacent birth cohorts should reveal more meaningful information. Figure 1.1 provides the delineation of different birth cohorts; we can see that the CR cohort is preceded by the cohort born before 1947 and is succeeded by the 1961-1967 cohort². At the outbreak of the Revolution, the youngest members of the pre-1947 cohort were at the crucial crossroad for choosing the career paths, while the youngest members of the 1961-1967 cohort barely began their lives. The turmoil of the Revolution and state actions implemented around this period caught them at different life stages and may have had potentially different implications for their life courses as opposed to that of the CR cohort or the rusticates.

2.2 Introducing the CGSS

The China's General Social Survey (CGSS) is the first annual survey aiming to gather longitudinal data on social trends in China. It was initiated by the HKUST's Survey Research Center, and its first survey came into existence in late 2003, in collaboration with the Sociology Department of Peking University of China. The general themes of the CGSS lie in the fields of inequality and stratification, Chinese personality, rural-urban transformation, aging and the governance of social life [Bian and Li, 2005]. Because of the limited research funds, the 2003 CGSS only covers the urban areas.

A four-stage stratified sampling scheme was adopted.³ In the first stage, a total of 125 counties or county-level cities were selected as primary sampling units,

² I exclude the youngest cohort who were born after 1967 for the sake of comparison with other cohorts, as they were too young to have experienced some of these important life course events.

³ Please consult Bian's paper [Bian and Li, 2005] for more details.

2. Data, Variable Construction and Some Definitions

and then, in each of these units, townships and city sub-districts were selected as secondary sampling units. Neighbourhood committees in towns and cities were the third sampling units. Ultimately, households were selected in each of these units as the final sampling units, and one eligible person aged 18 to 69 was randomly selected from each sampled household to serve as the survey respondent. As a result, a sample of 5,894 urban respondents were collected in October and November 2003 using a pretested questionnaire, with a response rate of 77%. Because two of the central themes of the 2003 CGSS are social stratification and occupational mobility, the data include retrospective information on each respondent's educational mobility, migration history, and occupational trajectory. As well as the major life course events, the survey provides complementary information on historical episodes caused by the state policies, notably the rustication episode. There are also a good number of standard attitude questions about political aspects of the transformation and quality of life.

An important limitation of the 2003 CGSS for analysing the lives of rusticates is imposed by its covering of urban residents; lives of those rusticates who failed to return at the time of the data collection cannot be traced from the survey, let alone those who died during their sent-down. This limitation is regrettable since these rusticates were the most disadvantaged and for them, the rustication experience is of paramount importance as their lives were changed forever by it. Nonetheless, the ratio of the number of stayers to the number of returners is low. In 1980, two years after the economic reform, there were around 0.8 million of rusticates still in the countryside [Bonnin, 2009], which equals roughly 4% of the total number of rusticates who were sent down (17 million); a significant proportion of them were married to local peasants. This thesis, hence, considers only those who survived the harsh conditions in the rural areas and successfully returned to cities.

2. Data, Variable Construction and Some Definitions

2.2.1 Variable: *sent-down*

Before we identify those former rusticates from the data, the imperative step is to find out who belong to the CR cohort – the risk pool. The 2003 CGSS collected information on respondent’s current *hukou* status and residential history. Urban residents at the time of the interview constitute the sample, they include both individuals with an urban *hukou* and rural-urban migrants (those who live in urban areas but hold a rural *hukou*). The data show that 423 respondents are rural-urban migrants (7.2% of overall sample) and of which 325 reported having never changed their rural status. Also, 213 respondents had changed their residences from rural to urban areas before the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution. As the CR cohort contains only those who were available for experiencing rustication, these respondents were consequently removed from the risk pool. The close look-up of respondents’ residential histories reveals a total number of 1755 members of the CR cohort in the sample.

The precise question asked to respondents of the 2003 CGSS was “Did you experience the ‘Up to the mountain, down to the villages’? (in other words, the question asked if respondents were ever rusticated)” There were 628 respondents who answered “Yes” to this question. Related to this variable, there are also two variables corresponding to the year in which the person was rusticated and the year in which the person returned. It is important to note that this number does not correspond to the legitimate number of former rusticates in the sample for the following two reasons: (1) The forced migration also applied to some members of older cohort (those born before 1947) who were framed as “capitalist-roaders” and were sent to labour camps in rural farms as a form of punishment (*xiafang*). They should not be considered as rusticates. Because these people had an occupation prior to the sent-down, they can be identified in the data if the ending year of one of their occupations was before or on the year that they were sent. (2) The Cultural Revolution ended in 1977, followed by the abolishment of the policy of “revolution

2. Data, Variable Construction and Some Definitions

in education” in 1978 [Bonnin, 2006]. This thesis excludes rustication made after 1980.

After applying the criteria listed above, the total number of rusticates in the 2003 CGSS is 494, constituting 28% of the CR cohort.

2.3 The 1996 LHSC

The second data used in the analyses of this thesis are based on interviews of a nationally representative sample of 3,087 Chinese urban residents born between 1927 and 1976, who participated in the survey 1996 of the Life Histories and Social Change⁴ (LHSC). The data include retrospective information on respondents’ complete educational and occupational histories, which is desirable for exploring the early career trajectories of non-rusticates in the last part of this section. One useful feature of this survey is that it includes information on the family class label assigned to every citizen in Mao’s era, which was a vital indicator of one’s socio-political status at the time [Zhou et al., 1996, 1998]. Perhaps due to the growing irrelevance of the family class label to the modern context, most of the recent social surveys no longer collect information on it, the survey of 2003 China’s General Social Survey (the analyses of chapter 3 and 4 will base analysis on its data) is one example.

2.3.1 Variable: *sent-down*

Unlike the 2003 CGSS, the 1996 LHSC did not have the complete residential histories collected from its respondents. Instead, the respondents were inquired about their living administrative place and *hukou* at three time points – at birth, at age 14 and at present. These pieces of information enabled me to identify the CR cohort. Among 625 members of the CR cohort, 365 answered “Yes” to the question whether they were ever rusticated to the countryside. After applying the filtering process based on the criteria listed for obtaining the legitimate number of former rusticates

⁴ The full documentation of the LHSC and the access to its data can be found at <http://dataarchives.ss.ucla.edu/lhscs/chinaweb.html>.

2. Data, Variable Construction and Some Definitions

in the 2003 CGSS, the number of former rusticates in the survey was reduced to 239 (38% of the CR cohort).

3. SELECTION TO, DURATION AND ALTERNATIVES OF THE RUSTICATION

The rustication programme, though implemented on a large scale, did not send the entire population of urban youth to the countryside. It is recorded that even during the years of intensive rustication of mid-1970s, universal transfer of school graduates was not prevalent in all regions [Bernstein, 1977, p. 104]. In the 2003 CGSS, only around 30% of the 1947-1960 cohort (493 respondents) were reported to have been sent down, and around 40% for the cohort (239 respondents) in the 1996 LHSC. We do not know how they compare with the precise statistics because of the lack of data on relevant age groups. According to the statistical data reported in Bernstein's book on the sent-down movement [Bernstein, 1977, p. 30], the average number of the urban youths of thirteen cities who had been sent down by 1974 was around 11% of the combined population. The blue bins shown in Figures 3.1 and 3.2 indicate the proportion of numbers of respondents who were rusticated at each reported sent-down year using the survey data of 2003 and 1996, respectively. Although the number of rusticated youths in both surveys are very small, the plots displayed a common trend which fits well to Bernstein's [Bernstein, 1977, p. 31] description on the transfer statistics of urban-youth to the countryside:

“Actually, the flow was heavy at the start of the Cultural Revolution and light in 1971 and 1972; it rose again in 1973 and climbed sharply in 1974 and 1975.”

The distribution of number of rusticated youths over the returning years is shown in red in Figures 3.1 and 3.2. The number of returning youths in both plots steps

3. Selection to, Duration and Alternatives of the Rustication

up between 1970 and 1971, correspondingly less number of youths were sent down. During this period, schools or residential organisations made intensive publicity to appeal for the transfer; urban youths were assigned to the rural farming units or army farms regardless of their ages, health state, whether they were single child or returned overseas Chinese [Liu, 2008, ch. 7]. The inflow number is light between 1971 and 1973; the massive recruitment in production sector caused by an overestimation of the labour needs in the cities, the reopening of the universities (on a limited basis) coupled with the discontent of the rural experience shared by the early sent-down youths, together contributed to the slump occurring in 1971 [Liu, 2008, ch. 5][Bernstein, 1977, ch. 2]. Although the movement was able to upsurge after 1974, more variations in the send-down policy affected the rate of transfer. The inflow pattern mirrors the outflow pattern towards the end of the Cultural Revolution. Its sharp rise in 1978 and 1979 shows significant number of returns of urban youths from the countryside, indicating the termination of the decade of social upheaval.

If the rustication was not a universal phenomenon to all urban youths then who were more likely to be rusticated than others? Rustication was part of the social mobilisation during the Cultural Revolution. For those who stayed behind in cities, it was imperative that they continued paying their contribution in the production and construction of the socialist country in other ways. Yet, just a year before the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution, the government suspended enrollment to tertiary education, inciting primary and secondary schools to stop regular classes so that students could participate in the Revolution. How would the non-rusticates be allocated given most of the schools shut down under the order? These puzzles faced by the local authorities who acted as executors to top leaders' decisions, are the main questions treated in this chapter. In addition, this chapter looks at the duration of the sent-down episode, and investigates how the difference in the duration is related to the rusticates' characteristics.

Fig. 3.1: The distribution of number of former sent-down youth over reported sent-down years and over reported returning years, 1996 LHSC.





Fig. 3.2: The distribution of number of former rusticates over reported sent-down years and over reported returning years, 2003 CGSS.



3. Selection to, Duration and Alternatives of the Rustication

3.1 *The Selection Process of Rustication*

In the explorations of what might be the requirements for assigning urban youths to rural service, besides certain rules and regulations to exempt the handicapped or the exceptionally poor, scholars have found much less publicised criteria used to determine who would be sent down in the first place. These informal requirements can be summarised in three aspects:

Social status aspect – ascriptive class origin labels that the CCP imposed on society after Liberation [Bernstein, 1977, Unger, 1979, Zhou and Hou, 1999];

Institutional aspect – the industrialisation strategy of equalising both developments in urban and rural sectors [Bernstein, 1977].

Policy-related aspect – the number of children in a family [Unger, 1979, Xie et al., 2006];

In the following pages, I discuss the function of each of these factors in the rustication programme.

3.1.1 *The importance of class backgrounds*

Social mobility studies in industrial market societies often take parent's occupation when the respondent was at age 14 as a reference for the class origin [Goldthorpe, 1987]. This measure may not be applicable in China's class labelling before the market reform, since the latter took into account the family's market position and political trustfulness. The class label was a product of class conflict of the revolution to distinguish the allies and enemies [Kraus, 1981], and a measure utilised by rising new political elites after the revolution wars to secure and retain their power and privilege [Wang, 1995, ch. 2].

It is difficult to make sense of the contribution of class label to the risk of rustication without understanding the following: First, the social structure that was in place before the governing of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP): What was

3. Selection to, Duration and Alternatives of the Rustication

the old class order? Who were the old elites? Second, the rationale of class label on which it was based: What were the components of class label? How different is family class label to father's occupation status?

The pre-revolutionary China had a feudalistic agrarian system, an immense secondary sector made up with workers in petit workshops and individual artisans and a very small industrial sector [Knight and Song, 2005, *pp.* 16-20]. Up until the middle of the 19th century, cities in China were ruled by imperial officials, the urban working population consisted of merchants and handicraftsmen who were subordinated to bureaucracy [Whyte and Parish, 1984b, ch. 2]. As China opened up to foreign trade after the Opium War, coastal cities experienced a period of rapid growth of industrial enterprises and the establishment of bureaucratic structures and professional institutions. During the ruling of Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist Party, the emergence of privately owned enterprises in large cities and its flourish incurred the formation of a pool of new capitalists different from the traditional petty capitalists. Marx's portraits of the exploiting and exploited positions occupied by the capitalists and workers respectively were applicable to pre-revolutionary China. Workers received small wages with no basic job or social security, the working condition was cruel and labour turnover was high. The dissatisfaction of workers was expressed through a string of strikes and protests when the Nationalist Party was in control; these labour insurgences later helped the working-class to be identified as the most revolutionary class by the CCP, resulting its empowerment in Mao's era [Zhang and Lu, 2002].

When the CCP claimed the leadership of the country, they set off to fulfill the ideals of creating an egalitarian society without class privilege. To do this, financial advantage and status privilege enjoyed by the old elites inevitably needed to be eliminated together with the hindrance of inter-generational transfer of wealth and resources to their offspring, since the proletarian class had nothing to pass down. One of the foremost important actions that the CCP took to achieve the ideals

3. Selection to, Duration and Alternatives of the Rustication

was to invert the pre-revolutionary social hierarchy, assigning each individual with a class label.

From the mid-1950s to the late 1970s, every Chinese citizen carried an administrative class label (*jiating chushen*) showing their class origin. The initial categorisation of class labels rested on Marxist theory of social relationships that people are classified by their relation to means of production. Over 60 class designations were created on the grounds of the parent's (mostly father's) or grandparent's employment before 1949 for urban dwellers, and property ownership before the land reform for rural residents. The additional assignment of party loyalty was prompted under a political climate in which decision-makers asserted that antagonistic classes existed in the society and there was a potential threat from ideologies generated by them to the development of a socialist state. As a result, the abundant designations were grouped into three main categories and several subcategories with clear identification of how trustworthy individuals were politically by the CCP. This class scheme spanned from the revolutionary 'red' or 'good' classes to the opposite 'black' or 'bad' classes whose members were regarded as 'party enemies'. Those assigned with red-class origins were considered to be politically reliable, whilst families of black-class origins were regarded as party enemies. Between the two polar classes, there existed a 'middle class'. Members of this class were neither entirely trusted nor discriminated against.

Figure 3.3 demonstrates this hierarchically structured class scheme [Chan et al., 1980, p. 402]. The right column shows the basic class labels ('Red', 'Middle' and 'Black'). The panel in the middle presents the disaggregated fivefold class label. The red-class origin consisted of those who belonged to the revolutionary class and the working class: The former, emerging as the country's new elites after the wars, enjoyed the superiority of their class origin. Children of the Revolutionary class were granted the title of "revolutionary-cadre children" [Chan et al., 1980, pp. 401]. The latter group includes families of pre-liberation manual workers and peasants

3. Selection to, Duration and Alternatives of the Rustication


with no property ownership of lands. They were the ones who had the worst market situation before, but had risen to prominence in political status since the CCP took control. Individuals assigned with middle-class labels included families of peasants who had a property ownership of their lands, pedlars, merchants, white-collar workers, professionals and intellectuals. The list of occupational classifications embedded in the category of ‘black’ class were revised several times after a series of political campaigns¹.

The ascriptive class label was a crucial indicator of individual’s life chances in Mao’s era for two reasons: First, before its abolition in the late 1970s, the class label was mandatory to be shown in school and employment dossiers, and individuals were obliged to report their labels on applications to further studies, party membership, jobs and promotions. Second, it was utilised for discretion to determine an individual’s educational opportunity, career advancement, political future, and more related to my study, the probability of being rusticated. The forced rustication programme in 1968 initially targeted largely at urban youths from “non-Red” classes. In the retrospective study conducted by Chan et al. [1980] in Canton, when randomly selected youths were asked to recall historical information about their former classmates, they revealed that almost everyone assigned to ‘black’ class label was rusticated, as opposed to just over half of those who were in the ‘revolutionary’ class.

Although many stratification studies on China have examined the relationship between occupation and class, and the mapping of occupations into a particular class scheme, none of those have looked into the issue of how occupational categories, similar to those in industrialised market societies, are related to ascriptive class labels imposed by the CCP, *i.e.*, how the same individuals were allocated in the class scheme officially defined by state policies and the general occupational categories.

¹ These campaigns include the Elimination of Counter-revolutionaries Campaign (1955-1956), the Socialist Transformation Campaign (1956) and the Anti-Rightist Campaign (1957-1958).

Fig. 3.3: The administrative family class scheme in socialist China



3. Selection to, Duration and Alternatives of the Rustication

This extra exploration will, on the other hand, assist for constructing the variable of class label for the 2003 CGSS where such variable is absent, as well as serve for other analyses where social origin variable is missing from the data. In the following few pages, I will match occupations into class labels before examining the effect of class label on the risk of being sent down.

To proceed with the matching, we need a dataset which owns information on both father's occupation before Liberation and ascriptive class labels. The 1996 LHSC survey is appropriate to fulfil this purpose because, first, it contains both the class origin variable and the variable which identifies father's occupation when the respondent was at his/her teens. Second, its occupational coding is based on the 1995 Chinese Standard Classification of Occupations, compatible to that of 2003 CGSS.

Frequency tables provide a straightforward way to analyse the relationship between two categorical variables, but they are not very helpful when the number of categories is large. Correspondence analysis (CORA) provides a technique to distinguish the characteristics of data by projecting a table of numbers on a low-dimensional plot [Bartholomew et al., 2002]. To ease the visual identification of distinctive groups, I classify roughly 150 occupations into 14 occupational groups, aggregating 13 family labels to 5 broad categories according to class hierarchy table shown in Figure 3.3. The initial chi-squared statistics for a test of independence between the occupational categories and 4 class origins is 518.12 on 52 degrees of freedom, which indicates that there is a significant association between occupation and family class origin. The plot to be produced is known as biplot, through which the distribution of respondents across the class labels for each occupational category are represented by points in preferably two-dimensional space. It is useful to examine the association between the row and column categories by assessing the proximity of the points produced through their distributions over one another; and also of interest, is to determine if any row or column categories can be combined for

3. Selection to, Duration and Alternatives of the Rustication


further analysis, which matches the purpose of this section.

The biplot illustrated in Figure 3.4 shows the row and column proportions for the 1996 LHSC data. The coordinates for occupational groups labelled as high and mid-level cadres² and revolutionary class labels are both positive and large on dimension 1, suggesting a relatively positive association between the top categories in the occupational group and politically red-class labels. The cluster located at the positive end of dimension 2 and delimited by an arc corresponds to those respondents whose fathers have a more professional occupation such as senior teaching professional, medical doctors, lawyers and engineering professionals; these respondents are much likely to be labelled as Intelligentsia. The negative coordinates for agricultural and industrial workers on both dimensions lead to the interpretation that respondents in the bottom categories of the occupational group are relatively less associated with class category of privilege or intelligentsia, but closely associated to a working-class origin that was also considered to be “Red” or “Good”. Around the origin of the axes gathers fathers’ occupations classified as low-rank professionals (junior teachers, sale&service worker, clerical worker and economics personnel). Class origins which have similar profiles across occupational categories are the “Bad” class and “Middle” class labels.

With the reference of the coordinates and contribution shown in Table 3.12, it is possible to interpret the indication of two dimensions. Dimension 1 tends to separate occupations with lower skill (agricultural and industrial workers) from those with higher skill (high-rank and mid-rank cadres); whilst dimension 2 separates occupations closely linked to red-class origins from occupations which belonged to the class origin of Intelligentsia. Given the results obtained from correspondence analysis, I construct the occupational classification of respondent’s father in Table 3.1.

² The Chinese bureaucratic hierarchy is divided into four levels, they are *bu* (ministry), *ju* (department), *chu* (division) and *ke* (section). I use the level of *chu* as the benchmark to distinguish high-level cadre, middle-level cadre and low-level cadre: Those holding ranks above *chu* level are classified as high-level cadres, at *chu* level are middle-level cadres, and below *chu* level are low-level cadres.

Fig. 3.4: Biplot for cross-tabulation of father's occupations by respondent's class origin for the CR cohort, Survey of Life Histories and Social Change in Contemporary China, 1996.



Father's occupations:

- High level cadre
- Mid-level cadre
- Low level cadre
- Medical&legal professional
- Senior teaching professional
- Engineering professional
- Economics personnel
- Clerical worker
- Junior teaching professional
- Sale&service worker
- Industrial worker
- Agricultural worker
- Self-employed
- Other

Family class labels:

- ▲ Revolutionary class
- ▲ Working class
- ▲ Middle class
- ▲ Intelligentsia
- ▲ Bad class

3. Selection to, Duration and Alternatives of the Rustication

Tab. 3.1: Occupation labeling

Occup.classification	Typical occupations
High-rank cadre	High-level cadre, Middle-level cadre.
High-skill professional	Engineer, Technician, Medical and legal professional, Senior teaching professional.
Low-rank cadre	Economics personnel, Clerical worker, Low-level cadre.
Low-skill professional	Junior teaching professional, Sale and Service worker, Self-employed.
Worker	Agricultural labour, Industrial worker.

Correspondence biplot is fairly consistent with original row and column frequency tables between father's occupation and family class label, but to gain accurate estimation of proportions of occupational classification, a proper model specification and possible predictors of the membership of the classification are required [Wagmiller et al., 2006, *pp.* 856-857]. Communist Party membership and education are the two obvious candidates for the predictors. So far as the prediction of attainment of high-status occupations in post-reform China is concerned, many studies have shown the contributing effects of party membership and education, of which the most forceful results are discussed by Walder et al. [2000] about the different career paths led by these two credentials using the 1996 LHSC data. Figure 3.4 shows Intelligensia class origin consists of occupations which acquire a high degree of education; high-level cadres are with high political capital. To find out what the prediction for less capital-related classes (Bad class, Middle class and Working class) will be, I carry out a multinomial logit regression of the form:

$$\log \frac{p(j)}{p(\text{Rev})} = \alpha_j + \beta_j \text{ fparty} + \beta_j \text{ fedu} + \beta_{j,i} + \text{other terms}, \quad (3.1)$$

3. Selection to, Duration and Alternatives of the Rustication

where, $j = \text{Work, Mid, Intl, or Bad}$.

$$\beta_{j,i} = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } i = \text{high-rank cadre,} \\ \beta_{j,HP} & \text{if } i = \text{high-skill professional,} \\ \beta_{j,LC} & \text{if } i = \text{low-rank cadre,} \\ \beta_{j,LP} & \text{if } i = \text{low-skill professional,} \\ \beta_{j,WR} & \text{if } i = \text{worker.} \end{cases}$$

The five-category class label is the response variable (Revolutionary class, Working class, Middle class, Intelligentsia and Bad class); father's Party membership (**fparty**), educational qualification (**fedu**), occupational classification (**focc**) are the explanatory variables; and “**other terms**” control for respondents' age and gender.

Table 3.2 shows estimates and standard errors for the β coefficients in determining the relative probabilities of entering the different destination origins. The privilege origin is the reference category, with $\beta_{\text{Priv}} = 0$. The negative values of the effects of father's political affiliation indicate that the relative risk of privilege category (relative to non-privilege categories) is much greater if the father is a party member, holding other variables constant. Indeed, having a father who is a party member multiplies the odds of belonging to the revolutionary class by 34 ($e^{3.531} = 34$) as opposed to the bad class, and by 12 comparing to the Intelligentsia and middle classes and by 4 to working class. If we look at the effect of father's education (its results are not shown in Table 3.2), the probability of being in the intelligentsia relative to being in the working class origin is 7 times more if the father graduates from senior high school or above; the probability of being in the bad class origin is also 7 times more (relative to being in the working class origin) if the father has at least a high-school level education.

Table 3.3 reports the predicted probabilities computed from the model 3.1 hold-

Tab. 3.2: Estimated Coefficients for Multinomial Logit Regression Model Predicting Social Origin Membership (the “revolutionary” class label as reference category).

	Working class	Middle class	Intelligentsia	Bad class
Age	0.048 (0.035)	0.072* (0.035)	0.079* (0.037)	0.084* (0.037)
Male	-0.865* (0.416)	-0.653 (0.433)	-0.618 (0.489)	-0.779 (0.480)
Father’s Polit. Affil. <i>party membership</i>	-1.291* (0.550)	-2.490*** (0.598)	-2.629*** (0.688)	-3.531*** (0.914)
Father’s Education <i>senior high</i>	-1.166* (0.575)	-0.247 (0.627)	0.901 (0.640)	0.753 (0.670)
High-skill professional	3.137*** (0.877)	18.580*** (1.842)	3.526** (1.328)	19.550*** (1.935)
Low-rank cadre	2.901*** (0.575)	19.160*** (1.686)	2.867* (1.244)	18.860*** (1.815)
Low-skill professional	3.953*** (0.788)	19.900*** (1.743)	3.138* (1.346)	19.140*** (1.866)
Worker	6.351*** (0.916)	21.310*** (1.803)	2.981* (1.459)	21.020*** (1.905)
Constant	-1.645 (1.772)	-19.640 .	-4.640* (2.251)	-21.230 .

n = 1,584

Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (two-tailed test).

Source: 1996 LHSC

3. Selection to, Duration and Alternatives of the Rustication

ing individual characteristics (age and gender) at their median values, allowing the predictions to vary across levels of three main explanatory variables. It should be noted that the predicted probabilities shown in the table are those with the highest probabilities computed: each set of values of the explanatory variables yields five predicted outcomes which sum up to 1, only the highest percentage among the five is recorded in the table (shown in table below Table 3.3). The theoretically interesting result is that, if a hypothetical respondent's father is a well educated high-rank cadre but not a party member, the predicted probability of that respondent being in the Intelligentsia class is much higher than being in the privilege class. It is reasonable to conclude that the party membership of the father has a determining power in securing the privilege class for his children regardless of how prestigious or skillful the father's occupation is. Table 3.3 shows that those so-called high-rank cadres were those at administrative-level positions, and a high proportion of them were party members.

It is argued that Mao's appeal for 'class struggle' led to the witch-hunts of antagonistic classes. Historical facts showed that by antagonistic classes meant not only those who were assigned with black-class labels, but most of the time included everyone who were non-red. On the other hand, social cleavage existed also within the red-class labels. Although many members of the revolutionary class originally came from working-class backgrounds, they possessed the revolutionary asset which facilitated them to get promoted to ruling positions. As exemplified by my analysis, the revolutionary class is made up of high and middle-level cadres, and they resembled Djilas's description of the new class – "who have special privileges and economic preference because of the administrative monopoly they hold." [Djilas, 1957].

Ever since Liberation, the political authority owned by those belonging to the revolutionary class had been under constant threats led by the old professional elites who were endowed either with intelligentsia or bad-class labels. It has been suggested that the class labels were used as a weapon by the new political elites

Tab. 3.3: Predicted Probabilities for the Multinomial Logit Model

x_1 : Father's membership	x_2 : Father's party education	x_3 : Father's occupation					
		Hrank. Cadre	Hpres. Prof.	Lrank. Cadre	Lpres. Prof.	Worker	
Party member	$\geq$ High school	$p(y=\text{Priv} x)$ 0.707	$p(y=\text{Priv} x)$ 0.514	$p(y=\text{Work} x)$ 0.434	$p(y=\text{Work} x)$ 0.684	$p(y=\text{Work} x)$ 0.832	
	$<$ High school	$p(y=\text{Priv} x)$ 0.741	$p(y=\text{Priv} x)$ 0.454	$p(y=\text{Work} x)$ 0.680	$p(y=\text{Work} x)$ 0.852	$p(y=\text{Work} x)$ 0.925	
Non-party member	$\geq$ High school	$p(y=\text{Int1} x)$ 0.626	$p(y=\text{Int1} x)$ 0.491	$p(y=\text{Int1} x)$ 0.318	$p(y=\text{Work} x)$ 0.376	$p(y=\text{Work} x)$ 0.548	
	$<$ High school	$p(y=\text{Int1} x)$ 0.385 ^a	$p(y=\text{Work} x)$ 0.319	$p(y=\text{Work} x)$ 0.510	$p(y=\text{Work} x)$ 0.672	$p(y=\text{Work} x)$ 0.787	

Note: These probabilities are based on the calculation from prediction equation 3.1. Only the highest probabilities are shown in this table.

x : fparty = 0 fedu = 0 focc = 1	predicted probability	95% C.I.
^a	$p(y=\text{Work} x)$	[0.073, 0.230]
	$p(y=\text{Mid} x)$	[0.091, 0.320]
	$p(y=\text{Int1} x)$	[0.184, 0.586]
	$p(y=\text{Bad} x)$	[0.010, 0.167]
	$p(y=\text{Priv} x)$	[0.001, 0.338]

3. Selection to, Duration and Alternatives of the Rustication

with revolutionary origins to maintain their authoritative positions in the political hierarchy by degrading the old professional elites to diminish their competitiveness for power [Wang, 1999]. This social conflict between the two groups became an indispensable factor in agitating the Red Guards factionalism during the early years of the Cultural Revolution [Chan, 1993].

3.1.2 The effects of other factors on the probability of being rusticated

1. The geographic origins of the rusticated

The core motivation of the rustication programme, despite the rhetoric of the political ideology, believed by many people was a response to the problem of potential urban unemployment. Bernstein [1977, ch. 2] gathered evidences drawn from the census data to argue that regional disproportion of numbers of youths having been rusticated was the government's goal to achieve equalisation of urban development nationwide. Bonnin [2005a] also doubts the conventional belief of the motivation of the rustication, used the employment statistics to show that the amount of transfer of labours from rural to urban areas was similar to the amount of transfer at the other direction during the Cultural Revolution period [Bonnin, 2005a]. In fact, as early as 1955 some of the urban policies were proposed on controlling the expansion of the large cities and the dispersion of industrial sectors. Building more middle-sized than large-sized cities was also part of the urban plans. Although the subsequent urbanisation process was derailed from these early urban policies, reduction of the urban population became the primacy following the outburst of the Revolution. The rustication programme can be regarded as an example of labour transfer to achieve the egalitarian perspective of economic development [Li, 2008, pp. 92-93], for which the urban youths were rusticated to balance the populations between dense cities and sparse rural areas.

The geographic origin of the rusticated may also be one of the attributions of how far they were sent from homes. Liu [2008, ch. 3] points out the geo-administrative

3. Selection to, Duration and Alternatives of the Rustication

stratification of the resettlement of the rusticated: the resettlement range was wider for youths who were from cities of higher administrative level and denser population. Border provinces received urban youths rusticated mainly from municipalities and several populated provincial capital cities, whilst large numbers of prefecture or county-level urban youths were sent to nearby suburban areas. The distance proximity to an urban home provides a crucial vantage – “a continued contact with urban culture.”

Drawing on the discussion above, it is reasonable to postulate that the rustication selection process is stratified by the geographic origins of the urban youths. In the 1996 LHSC, the geographic locations of the respondents before the Revolution are given by the recollection of residential history of respondents. Residential areas are classified according to China’s administrative divisions as town, county-level city, prefecture-level city, province capital and municipality under the central government³. The central municipalities are in the highest level of classification of cities in China, have the strongest relationships with the central government and are the primacies in the allocation of resources and indicators of socioeconomic developments. They are followed by provincial capital cities.

2. *The number of siblings*

In 1973, the Communist Party Committee held a working congress on the issues which rose as a result of the sent-down movement. Along with those who were disabled, injured and in poor health, the congress passed regulations to prescribe families with multiple sent-down youths to keep one child at home and allowed children from one-child families to be exempted from the rustication [Liu, 2008, ch. 8].

Bernstein [1977, p. 105] gathered evidence from his informants to reason that this rule governing the number of children in a family to remain in the city, in fact, was set informally before 1973, and adjusted itself to the rate of transfer: When the

³ The 1996 LHSC included three of four municipalities: Beijing, Shanghai and Tianjin.

3. Selection to, Duration and Alternatives of the Rustication

rate was low, more children in the same family were allowed to stay behind. Whilst in 1973 when the rate became high, only one child was permitted to remain. In Zhou and Hou's study, they find no effect of number of siblings on the likelihood of being rusticated even analysed separately at two refined periods [Zhou and Hou, 1999]. This outcome was argued by the authors to be counter-intuitive, given the sibling policy introduced⁴. One explanation to the non-significant effect of number of siblings may lie in the fact that the sibling policy was of no force to urban youths who graduated between 1968 and 1971, except to reduce the sent-down duration of some of those who were already in the countryside and who satisfied the criteria of the policy. For those who graduated in 1973 and after, during which time sibling policy tightened to allow only one child to stay, unless the survey data provide information to show they were one-child or their siblings had been sent down, the number of siblings may wind up showing no effect on the possibility of being rusticated.

In the following regression models, I will test the effect of "number of siblings" by regarding it respectively as a dichotomous variable for 0 siblings (single child) versus 1 or more siblings and a continuous variable.

3.1.3 Who was rusticated?

Given the inclusion of the potential predictors discussed above, the inferential model also adds respondent's age, age squared, gender and educational level as the covariates:

$$\text{Logit}(\hat{\pi}) = \alpha + \beta_i^E + \beta_i^{FE} + \beta_i^{ME} + \beta^S \text{ sibling} + \beta_i^{PO} + \beta_i^{CL} + \beta_i^{GO} + \text{other terms}, \quad (3.2)$$

⁴ As suggested by other studies, it might be the birth order of siblings which matters - the older siblings have higher risk of being rusticated [Chen and Cheng, 1999, Shi, 1995, Xie et al., 2006], though this factor has never been empirically assessed. Unfortunately, I cannot examine this, since both the 2003 CGSS and 1996 LHSC do not have birth information on all the siblings of respondents.

3. Selection to, Duration and Alternatives of the Rustication

where,

$$\begin{aligned}
 \beta_i^E &= \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } i = \text{junior high school,} \\ \beta_{ES}^{FE} & \text{if } i = \text{elementary school or below,} \\ \beta_{SH}^{FE} & \text{if } i = \text{senior high school or above.} \end{cases} \\
 \beta_i^{FE} &= \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } i = \text{elementary school or below,} \\ \beta_{JH}^{FE} & \text{if } i = \text{junior high school,} \\ \beta_{SH}^{FE} & \text{if } i = \text{senior high school,} \\ \beta_{SH}^{FE} & \text{if } i = \text{college or above.} \end{cases} \\
 \beta_i^{PO} &= \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } i = \text{manual/agricultural worker,} \\ \beta_{HC}^{PO} & \text{if } i = \text{high-rank cadre,} \\ \beta_P^{PO} & \text{if } i = \text{professional,} \\ \beta_{OW}^{PO} & \text{if } i = \text{office worker,} \\ \beta_{SW}^{PO} & \text{if } i = \text{service worker.} \end{cases} \\
 \beta_i^{CL} &= \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } i = \text{working class,} \\ \beta_{RC}^{CL} & \text{if } i = \text{revolutionary class,} \\ \beta_{MC}^{CL} & \text{if } i = \text{middle class,} \\ \beta_I^{CL} & \text{if } i = \text{intelligentsia,} \\ \beta_B^{CL} & \text{if } i = \text{bad class.} \end{cases} \\
 \beta_i^{GO} &= \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } i = \text{township or county-level city,} \\ \beta_{PrC}^{GO} & \text{if } i = \text{prefecture-level city,} \\ \beta_{PC}^{GO} & \text{if } i = \text{province capital,} \\ \beta_M^{GO} & \text{if } i = \text{municipality.} \end{cases}
 \end{aligned}$$

sibling = { 0, 1, ..., 7 or above }.

other terms = { age, sex }.

where $\hat{\pi}$ is the estimated probability of being rusticated rather than remaining in the city; and FE and ME are the shorthands for father's and mother's education

3. Selection to, Duration and Alternatives of the Rustication

respectively; PO is for parent's occupation; CL is for class label; GO is for geographical origin and E is for educational level at the time when the sent-down campaign started⁵.

The output in Table 3.4 reports estimates of several models of risk of being sent down. Model 1 shows that age and gender have no statistically significant effect on the odds of being sent down. The educational level assessed was the formal education acquired by the cohorts of interest before the closing of schools and universities. Compared with youths who were in junior high school, the estimated odds of being sent down are reduced by 74% ($= 1 - e^{-1.364}$) if youths only had elementary education or received no formal education, holding demographic characteristics constant. There is no statistically significant difference of the estimated odds between those who were at junior high school and those at senior high school when the rustication programme set out. Questions on why junior and senior high school students became the main targets of the rustication programme have centred around two speculations: The first came from a pragmatic perspective, a solution to the widespread closing of secondary and tertiary educational institutions and to alleviate urban unemployment. The second speculation was political, as these formerly Red Guards followed Mao's design of the "re-education" programme in the countryside for them after creating enough chaos in the cities and being utilised by Mao to overthrow his political rivals [Bonnin, 2006].

Model 2 and Model 3 examine the hypothesis that the chance of being sent down is determined by the educational levels of father and birth order respectively. It appears that respondents whose mothers have a senior high-school education are significantly less likely to be rusticated than mothers with an elementary school education. The number of siblings does not make a significant difference in the chance of being sent down⁶.

⁵ Precisely, for the rusticates, their educational levels are measured at the time of rustication. For the non-rusticates, this is taken at the highest educational level obtained during the CR.

⁶ In table 3.4, I only report the estimates of the effect of the sibling size by treating it as a continuous variable. It was also coded as a dichotomous variable to differentiate between respondents with no siblings and respondents with one or more siblings. The effect of this was also not

3. Selection to, Duration and Alternatives of the Rustication

Model 4 is the core model as it controls for the family class label, arguably the most salient factor in predicting the likelihood of being sent down. In the table presented, I set the working-class label as the reference category as it is the class label into which the majority of respondents fall. As opposed to the working-class label, respondents assigned with bad-class labels have a higher chance of being rusticated. The estimates of effects of class labels other than bad-class labels seem to be indifferent from each other, and this has been tested to be so⁷. In particular, those who were labelled ‘revolutionary class’ do not show to have advantages over those in other class labels.

The final model includes the geographical origin. The probability of being rusticated shows to vary between the geographical locations where respondents lived at the time when the sent-down campaign prevailed. For residents of municipalities, their chance of being rusticated was half that of those who lived in county-level cities.

Cross-Cohort Differences

For the urban youths coming of age during the Cultural Revolution, those who were born between 1947 and 1953 are famously known in China as the “old-three generation (*Lao San Jie*)⁸”, because a good proportion of them were from the graduating classes of 1966, 1967 and 1968 at both junior and senior middle school levels. Along with a large quantity of urban citizens, they were the major target of the government’s social mobilisation policy to relieve the employment pressure in the cities. Compared with this age group who were rusticated during the “Golden Period”, urban youths born between 1954 and 1960 were sent down when the movement experi-

statistically significant.

⁷ By setting “Intelligentsia” as the reference category, the relative estimates of effects of class labels other than “Bad class” were negative though statistically non-significant, indicating that youths of intellectual families were potentially among the main targets for the initial sent-down mobilisation.

⁸ In the dictionary of the Cultural Revolution [Chao, 1993], the term of ‘*Lao San Jie*’ is defined as follows: *Lao San Jie* refers to students who graduated from junior high or senior high schools in either 1966, 1967 or 1968. They were deprived of the pursuit of further studies, and became the first targets of the ‘Up to the Mountain and Down to the Countryside movement’.

Tab. 3.4: Logistic regression model predicting probability that respondent is a sent-down youth

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5		Model 6	
	$\hat{\beta}$	s.e.	$\hat{\beta}$	s.e.	$\hat{\beta}$	s.e.	$\hat{\beta}$	s.e.	$\hat{\beta}$	s.e.	$\hat{\beta}$	s.e.
Age	0.006	0.027	-0.001	0.028	0.001	0.028	-0.003	0.028	-0.003	0.028	-0.008	0.029
Male	0.197	0.182	0.236	0.185	0.243	0.186	0.239	0.187	0.244	0.189	0.232	0.191
Education												
<i>Elementary or below</i>	-1.364***	0.312	-1.382***	0.315	-1.380***	0.315	-1.407***	0.318	-1.375***	0.321	-1.427***	0.327
<i>Senior H.S. or above</i>	-0.345	0.215	-0.390†	0.218	-0.372†	0.219	-0.384†	0.221	-0.373†	0.223	-0.493*	0.229
Father's education												
<i>Junior H.S.</i>			0.369†	0.221	0.368†	0.221	0.430†	0.231	0.381	0.234	0.393†	0.236
<i>Senior H.S.</i>			-0.014	0.365	0.010	0.366	0.034	0.386	-0.068	0.399	-0.068	0.406
<i>College or above</i>			0.546	0.493	0.553	0.491	0.540	0.515	0.510	0.522	0.506	0.525
Mother's education												
<i>Junior H.S.</i>			0.197	0.354	0.239	0.356	0.270	0.364	0.283	0.369	0.234	0.373
<i>Senior H.S.</i>			-1.247*	0.587	-1.214*	0.590	-1.275*	0.611	-1.220*	0.619	-1.153†	0.628
<i>College or above</i>			0.413	0.766	0.407	0.767	0.386	0.776	0.481	0.820	0.540	0.821
Number of siblings ^a					0.058	0.055	0.058	0.055	0.057	0.055	0.054	0.056
Parent's occupations ^b												
<i>High-rank cadre</i>							0.096	0.502	0.005	0.612	-0.122	0.617
<i>Professional</i>							0.003	0.440	0.019	0.457	0.059	0.463
<i>Office worker</i>							-0.262	0.272	-0.299	0.291	-0.370	0.296
<i>Service worker</i>							-0.310	0.246	-0.336	0.251	-0.292	0.253
Class label												
<i>Revolutionary</i>									0.154	0.456	0.219	0.461
<i>Middle class</i>									0.068	0.288	0.055	0.291
<i>Intelligentsia</i>									-0.066	0.474	-0.062	0.478
<i>Bad class</i>									1.446*	0.678	1.483*	0.688
Geographical origin												
<i>Prefecture-lvl city</i>											-0.155	0.243
<i>Province capital</i>											0.330	0.257
<i>Municipality</i>											-0.637*	0.324
Constant	-2.036	1.280	-1.891	1.303	-2.215†	1.342	-1.986	1.351	-1.972	1.362	-1.693	1.393
Δ Log-likelihood	23.95***		34.88***		35.69***		37.92***		43.47**		51.61***	
df	4		10		11		15		19		22	

† $p < .10$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (two-tailed test).
n = 536. Source: 1996 LHSC.

^a The sibling size variable is treated as continuous.

^b Parent's occupation is mainly based on father's occupation when respondent was 14. Mother's occupation is recorded only when respondent's father was not employed at that time.

3. Selection to, Duration and Alternatives of the Rustication

enced its turbulent period. Members of this cohort—known as the “new sent-down youth”—confronted more opportunities in the cities than their older counterpart.

The study of Zhou and Hou [1999, p. 23] shows that the magnitudes of determinants on sent-down rate varies over the two periods defined by them⁹. However, the separate analyses of different periods are undertaken in a way that do not allow any tests of statistical significance of coefficients across these two periods. To truly detect the temporal effects of state policies on the selection process of the rustication, I create a dichotomous variable to distinguish the cohorts – “0” for the 1947-1953 cohort versus “1” for the 1954-1960 cohort. This cohort variable is incorporated in the equation 3.2 except that the variable “age” is subsequently omitted due to its high correlation with the cohort variable. The new equation is used as a baseline model (Table 3.10), each following model includes an interaction term between cohort and one of the explanatory variables of the baseline model¹⁰. Models are compared individually with the baseline model. The analysis of deviance shows that Models 3 which includes an interaction term between cohort and father’s education and Model 5 with an interaction term between cohort and number of siblings fit the data better than the baseline model. In model 9, therefore, both interaction terms are added and yields the best fitting model providing the largest change of deviance with a statistically significant p -value. The results of estimated coefficients for the predictors of this model are shown in Table 3.11. By including the variable cohort and its interactions, we notice the change in significance of the main effect of father’s education. This effect also seems significantly dependent on cohort. The main effect of sibling size is not significant; however, the effect of the number of sibling on the estimated odds is mediated by the cohort that one belongs to. It follows that for the 1954-1960 cohort compared to the 1947-1953 cohort, the odds increase 1.20 ($= e^{(-0.059+0.237)}$) times for every additional sibling that the respondent

⁹ In Zhou and Hou [1999]’s paper, they analyse the probability of sent-down events for two refined periods: 1967-1971, and 1972-1978.

¹⁰ The equation with all the explanatory variables interacted with the cohort is shown in Appendix 3.14.

3. Selection to, Duration and Alternatives of the Rustication

has.

Table 3.5 presents parameter estimates of the odds of the probability of being sent down for two cohorts. The additional effects of some predictors emerged after splitting the population of interest into two. For the 1947-1953 cohort, father's educational attainment shows to be significant. The estimated odds are that respondents are 10 times more likely to be rusticated if their father has a college education as opposed to an elementary school education. This result complies with the general discrimination during Mao's era against the intellectuals, and their children could not be spared when such a social movement came.

Comparing these two cohorts, the policy intervention appears to be apparent for the 1954-1960 cohort in two features. First, the effect of number of siblings changes in sign across two cohorts. The significance of the effect of sibship size for the younger cohorts indicates higher risk of rustication for each additional sibling, controlling for individual attributes and social background. Although most of the members of the 1954-1960 cohort graduated from schools around 1973 when multiple revised policies were introduced to relax the forced urban-rural migration, the sent-down rate sloped up since 1973 for two or three years. It has been stressed earlier that when the sent-down rate was high, the policy only allowed one child to remain in the cities. Hence, respondents with more siblings have a lower chance to be exempted. As Zhou and Hou [1999] suggest – the effect of sibship size is more accurately estimated when the sent-down statuses of siblings are known. Unfortunately, like the survey used by Zhou and Hou, neither 1996 LHSC nor 2003 CGSS has such information.

Second, living in a municipality as opposed to a county-level city reduces the probability of being sent down by 60%. This reflects the massive recruitment led by extensive economic development in early 1970s, especially in cities like Beijing and Shanghai.

Tab. 3.5: A Comparison of the 1947-1953 and 1954-1960 cohorts: logistic regression

	Cohort 1947-1953		Cohort 1954-1960	
	$\hat{\beta}$	<i>s.e.</i>	$\hat{\beta}$	<i>s.e.</i>
Age	-0.094	0.086	-0.031	0.066
Male	0.545†	0.315	0.012	0.258
Education				
<i>Elementary or below</i>	-1.134**	0.429	-1.738**	0.588
<i>Senior H.S. or above</i>	-0.415	0.502	-0.419	0.276
Father's education				
<i>Junior H.S.</i>	0.594	0.375	0.192	0.337
<i>Senior H.S.</i>	0.033	0.645	-0.276	0.570
<i>College or above</i>	2.301*	1.042	-0.352	0.823
Mother's education				
<i>Junior H.S.</i>	0.902	0.710	-0.349	0.518
<i>Senior H.S.</i>	-1.361	1.114	-1.048	0.871
<i>College or above</i>	1.228	1.510	1.223	1.181
Number of siblings	-0.051	0.077	0.154†	0.085
Parent's occupations				
<i>High-rank cadre</i>	-0.735	1.116	-0.436	0.886
<i>Professional</i>	0.226	0.712	0.128	0.722
<i>Office worker</i>	-0.511	0.542	-0.277	0.376
<i>Service worker</i>	-0.292	0.422	-0.356	0.335
Class origin				
<i>Revolutionary</i>	1.040	0.804	-0.029	0.621
<i>Middle class</i>	-0.094	0.460	0.012	0.413
<i>Intelligentsia</i>	-0.284	0.864	-0.202	0.649
<i>Bad class</i>	2.072†	1.189	1.017	0.886
Geographical origin				
<i>Prefecture-lvl city</i>	-0.702	0.442	-0.0183	0.321
<i>Province capital</i>	0.492	0.394	0.258	0.37
<i>Municipality</i>	-0.407	0.470	-1.154*	0.504
Constant	2.270	4.025	-0.977	2.76
N		236		301
Δ Log-likelihood		44.03**		32.24†
<i>df</i>		22		22

† $p < .10$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (two-tailed test).


Source: 1996 LHSC.

3. Selection to, Duration and Alternatives of the Rustication

3.2 The Duration of the Rustication

Figure 3.5 shows the survivor functions for the entire cohort of sent-down, and the 1947-1953 cohort and 1954-1960 cohort respectively. One observes that the sent-down youths of the 1954-1960 cohort generally experience a significantly shorter send-down episode than their older counterparts. The difference widens after the first three years of being in the countryside. About 90% of the younger cohort have returned to the cities after a duration of 6 years, while about 40% of the older cohort still remained in the countryside.

Fig. 3.5: Kaplan-Meier estimates of the rate of transition from the year of rustication to the year of return as a function of rustication duration for the CR cohort and its two sub-cohorts.



DATA SOURCE: LHSC, 1996

The cohort difference in the duration of being sent down may be a result of a difference in the exposure time to the event: the sent-down programme sustained for a finite number of years, those who were born towards middle or the end of the Revolution, thus have a relatively shorter experience of the programme. What

3. Selection to, Duration and Alternatives of the Rustication

interests us more are potential factors affecting the duration of the rustication given the specific cohort one belongs to.

Table 3.6 estimates ordinary least squares regression models with the number of years spent in the countryside for the sent-down youths as the dependent variable. Consistent results are found across these nested models. First, consistent to what we observe in Figure 3.5 there is a strong age/cohort effect suggesting a decreasing number of years spent in the countryside over time in all equations.

Second, the rusticates with basic education or no formal education seem to spend longer period in the countryside than those with a higher level of education. This may respond to the change of policy on the recruitment of college, vocational and technical schools in the early 1970s which often required the desired candidates to have at least a junior high school education [Committees, 1990, p. 439].

Third, the negative effects of having a high-rank cadre as a parent reduce the mean of duration significantly as opposed to having a parent who works in a production unit or agricultural lands, with other factors held constant. This effect of having a cadre parent also shows to statistically significantly decrease the duration of rustication when compared with other occupational categories. The effect of class label remains significant through the magnification of the disadvantageous bad class – the duration of being rusticated is higher if the respondent has a bad class label as opposed to a working class label, controlling respondent's cohort. The revolutionary class label, does not show to have a particular merit to curtail the duration compared to the bad class origin; rather the working class origin proves to be more effective.

Being in a Revolutionary class shows no apparent vantage over other non-black class labels in preventing its members to be rusticated or bringing them home earlier. Yet parent's occupation which reflects the market position surfaced to be important in deciding fates of rusticates at the end of the Cultural Revolution. This conforms with historical studies which point that parental occupation during the Revolution

3. Selection to, Duration and Alternatives of the Rustication

seems to be influential in the rural-urban return of the rusticates. In particular, high-ranking cadres were revealed in the press for exercising their power or using social connections to facilitate the transfer for their offspring [Liu, 2008, ch. 8] [Bernstein, 1977, ch. 6]. It was a common tactic practised by cadres regarding the sent-down mobilisation to follow suit initially by letting their children go to the countryside, but to have them reassigned from the countryside when the state pressure became less intense [Bernstein, 1977, p. 110].

Fourth, respondents whose fathers had a relatively high education appear to spend longer in the countryside than those whose fathers received an elementary level education or no formal education. This evidence can be born out in many autobiographies written by children of intellectuals who depicted how their parents were severely purged at political campaigns, and the fact that they were among the last bunch to return from the countryside. Finally, rusticates sent down from the municipalities spent twice as much time in the countryside than their counterparts from town or county-level city origins. This is particularly true for the Shanghai sent-down youths of whom many were rusticated to the remote frontiers; their appeals to the high authority to grant their returns lasted for two years and were finalised four years after the official end of the Cultural Revolution.

Cross-Cohort Differences To detect if the factors on the duration of being sent down vary over time, a rich model is fitted including second-order interactions with cohort and all explanatory variables. The result shows that none of the cohort interactions appear to be statistically significant (3.14). The cohort subgroup analysis in Table 3.7 further confirms that despite the net difference between two cohorts on the duration of the rustication, most of the effects of independent variables show no distinctive disparity across cohorts except that respondents in 1954-1960 cohort, who had only elementary education at the time of being sent down, seem to spend three times longer in the countryside as opposed to those who graduated from junior high school. Also the effect of being in a ‘Bad’ class is marginally significantly

3. Selection to, Duration and Alternatives of the Rustication

different from being in a working class for respondents in 1947-1953 cohort, not for the members of the 1954-1960 cohort.

Tab. 3.6: Linear regression models of variables affecting the duration of the sent-down episode

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5		Model 6	
	$\hat{\beta}$	s.e.	$\hat{\beta}$	s.e.	$\hat{\beta}$	s.e.	$\hat{\beta}$	s.e.	$\hat{\beta}$	s.e.	$\hat{\beta}$	s.e.
Age	0.208***	0.058	0.226***	0.058	0.226***	0.059	0.232***	0.059	0.223***	0.058	0.219***	0.058
Male	-0.526	0.368	-0.406	0.357	-0.386	0.362	-0.305	0.368	-0.281	0.365	-0.205	0.348
Education												
<i>Elementary or below</i>	1.719*	0.767	1.945**	0.739	1.937*	0.742	1.868*	0.753	1.845*	0.765	2.194**	0.739
<i>Senior H.S. or above</i>	-0.718†	0.410	-0.596	0.389	-0.592	0.391	-0.530	0.399	-0.521	0.398	-0.174	0.392
Father's education												
<i>Junior H.S.</i>			-1.236**	0.435	-1.239**	0.436	-1.331**	0.448	-1.376**	0.446	-1.357**	0.425
<i>Senior H.S.</i>			1.688**	0.641	1.694**	0.644	1.578*	0.685	1.152	0.697	1.508*	0.672
<i>College or above</i>			0.358	0.769	0.350	0.772	0.559	0.862	0.400	0.872	0.266	0.842
Mother's education ^a												
<i>Junior H.S.</i>			0.470	0.611	0.421	0.628	0.513	0.672	0.482	0.670	0.754	0.646
<i>Senior H.S.</i>			-1.288	0.832	-1.309	0.837	-1.213	0.851	-1.254	0.918	-0.871	0.886
Number of siblings					-0.045	0.128	-0.045	0.129	-0.014	0.129	0.024	0.124
Parent's occupations												
<i>High-rank cadre</i>							-1.114	0.914	-1.417	1.101	-1.873†	1.054
<i>Professional</i>							-0.146	0.790	-0.364	0.791	-0.355	0.754
<i>Office worker</i>							0.091	0.495	-0.168	0.527	-0.048	0.505
<i>Service worker</i>							0.423	0.462	0.315	0.468	0.008	0.453
Class origin												
<i>Revolutionary</i>									0.534	0.737	0.337	0.706
<i>Middle class</i>									0.725	0.552	0.966†	0.535
<i>Intelligentsia</i>									0.969	0.979	0.697	0.945
<i>Bad class</i>									1.974*	0.787	2.092**	0.762
Geographical origin												
<i>Prefecture-lvl city</i>											0.510	0.457
<i>Province capital</i>											0.133	0.453
<i>Municipality</i>											2.441***	0.617
Constant	-2.598	2.588	-3.413	2.552								
R ²	0.197		0.309		-3.289	2.585	-3.690	2.619	-3.630	2.585	-4.268†	2.567
					0.310		0.325		0.364		0.438	

† $p < .10$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (two-tailed test).
n = 147. Source: 1996 LHSC.

^a Mother's education is recoded into three categories instead of four due to the small proportion of college qualified mothers.

Tab. 3.7: A Comparison of the 1947-1953 and 1954-1960 cohorts: Linear regression

	Cohort 1947-1953		Cohort 1954-1960	
	$\hat{\beta}$	<i>s.e.</i>	$\hat{\beta}$	<i>s.e.</i>
Age	0.291	0.259	0.321**	0.117
Male	-0.622	0.854	0.119	0.368
Education				
<i>Elementary or below</i>	1.710	1.403	2.709*	1.098
<i>Senior H.S. or above</i>	-0.353	1.293	-0.214	0.379
Father's education				
<i>Junior H.S.</i>	-2.023†	1.010	-0.584	0.480
<i>Senior H.S.</i>	2.587	1.568	1.401†	0.824
<i>College or above</i>	0.503	1.582	-0.445	1.203
Mother's education				
<i>Junior H.S.</i>	0.590	1.256	0.948	0.927
<i>Senior H.S.</i>	-1.356	2.121	0.092	1.054
Number of siblings	0.106	0.292	0.151	0.147
Parent's occupations				
<i>High-rank cadre</i>	-2.050	2.290	-0.367	1.410
<i>Professional</i>	-1.294	1.778	0.433	0.962
<i>Office worker</i>	-0.454	1.458	0.423	0.541
<i>Service worker</i>	-1.216	1.107	0.410	0.523
Class label				
<i>Revolutionary</i>	-0.141	1.592	0.226	0.845
<i>Middle class</i>	0.799	1.374	0.828	0.594
<i>Intelligentsia</i>	0.062	2.482	1.522	1.034
<i>Bad class</i>	2.977†	1.730	0.948	0.893
Geographical origin				
<i>Prefecture-lvl city</i>	-0.662	1.737	1.121*	0.469
<i>Province capital</i>	-0.499	1.022	0.641	0.574
<i>Municipality</i>	3.262*	1.231	1.620*	0.794
Constant	-6.194	11.850	-9.857*	4.734
R^2	0.560		0.381	

† $p < .10$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (two-tailed test).

Source: 1996 LHSC.

3. Selection to, Duration and Alternatives of the Rustication

3.3 *The Alternatives to the Transfer programme*

When millions of junior and senior high school students were transferred to the countryside in the late 1960s, some of their peers, who managed to stay behind, faced different opportunities.

The hope of further schooling had been slim since the outbreak of the Revolution, when the educational opportunities at the upper secondary level and especially at the tertiary level were strictly limited in late 1960s. The fear of producing privileged elites coupled with the financial constraint in higher education resulted in much lower enrollment numbers for colleges and universities than those of pre-Revolution years. The normal schooling was greatly affected by the abrupt shut-downs of secondary level institutions from 1966 to 1968 and most tertiary level institutions from 1966 to 1971 [Meng and Gregory, 2002][Bernstein, 1977, ch. 2]. Even though universities were re-opened in 1972, the new recruitment was by recommendation only from those who worked in agricultural fields, production or the People's Liberation Army (PLA).

Other alternative destinations were to be assigned to a work in the city or to join the PLA. Under central planning, recognised jobs were not found by individuals but were allocated by the state. The ideal work for young job hunters was to be employed as a manual worker in an established work unit such as state-owned enterprises. Factory workers, during Mao's era, not only enjoyed a glorious social status, but also benefited from subsidies in housing, health treatment and even nursery from any publicly owned organizational units in cities [Knight and Song, 2005, pp. 26-29]. Compared to one third of sent-down youths who struggled to make both ends meet¹¹, most young factory workers in cities were able to bring regular salaries home.

The types of work undertaken could range from peddling to working at a production unit. Although no official data have recorded precisely how many urban youths

¹¹ According to a national survey on the self-sufficiency of the sent-down youth, 34% of the youths were reported to be self-sufficient, 35% were able to be self-sufficient on food only, and the remaining 31% were not self-sufficient, living on parental reliefs [Liu, 2008, pp. 178-182].

3. Selection to, Duration and Alternatives of the Rustication

were employed at each sector, it is generally believed that majority of working youths ended up as manual workers in either a collective or a state-owned enterprise.

To characterise the work-life trajectories of non-rusticates during the sent-down mobilisation, I employ sequence analysis (See Chapter 4 for the details on optimal matching and cluster analysis) to explore the holistic activity history of non-rusticates over fourteen years from 1966 to 1980. Unlike other methods for the analysis of life-course data, sequence analysis is treated more as a descriptive and exploratory technique, as it provides a holistic perspective of a longitudinal process taking into account the duration and ordering of various statuses, not focusing on the single events or specific transitions [Halpin, 2008]. This quality is desirable for the present analysis to serve its aims of identifying distinct clusters of work-life sequences of non-rusticates.

The sequence analysis generally involves two steps: The first step employs the optimal matching method to compare all labour market sequences and to measure the difference between every two sequences. The second step adopts cluster analysis to group similar sequences based on the difference computed in the first step. As the present analysis focuses on the labour market status of youths who were not rusticated during the CR, in the 1996 LHSC there are 377 respondents who have a complete activity history between 1966 and 1980, hence information from these individuals will be analysed.

I adopt the classification of occupations and the labour activities provided by the survey to construct a 10-category of employment status (See Appendix for the detail of the coding). Categories of occupations include agricultural worker, unskilled worker, manual/service worker, professional and managerial personnel; labour activities consist of higher education, school (junior/senior middle school), military service, waiting for work, and inactivity.

The cluster analysis generates six clusters which characterise the labour status patterns of 377 respondents. The typology of activity sequence between 1966 and

3. Selection to, Duration and Alternatives of the Rustication

1980 for non-rusticated youths is as follows:

Agricultural labour dominated:

Dominated by long spells (10 years) in agricultural sector.

Managerial or Professional work dominated:

Long spells (8 years) in professional works.

Military Service dominated:

6 years in military service, succeed by short spells in manual, service or professional works. In this cluster, the dominant family class origin of respondents is working class. All respondents are men. More than 80% of them are in the 1947-1953 cohort.

Manual or Service work dominated:

Dominated by long spells (11 years) in manual or service works.

Unskilled work dominated:

6 years of unskilled-manual work, preceded by short spells of waiting or schooling.

Education dominated:

Dominated by long and continuous spells (10 years) in schooling, leading to spells in manual or service works. Members of this cluster are all from the 1954-1960 cohort.

Table 3.8 shows the mean cumulative duration (in years) spent in different labour market statuses by cluster membership. The first cluster is dominated by agricultural labour work, containing about 10% of the sample; its members spend on average 70% of the 14-year period engaging in the agricultural labourers. Unlike the rusticates, respondents in this cluster worked as agricultural labours. They reported

3. Selection to, Duration and Alternatives of the Rustication

in the survey of no rustication experience. Their families might have worked and lived in villages adjacent to towns or cities before the end of the Revolution, and because of the expansion of cities as part of the urbanisation process which had taken place since then, these villages had already become part of towns or cities when the survey was conducted. Most members of this cluster have a working class label (See Table 3.9). Respondents in the second cluster spend on average 8 years in managerial or professional work. About 7% of its members' fathers graduated from colleges. The third cluster is dominated by those who served in the PLA during the Revolution. Members of this cluster typically spend around 6 years in the army before dispersing to enter other activities. Table 3.9 shows that father's education is low, junior high school or below, for members of this cluster. But the statistics also reveals advantageous backgrounds of members of this cluster: more than 60% of members' fathers join the Communist Party; the dominant family class label is "Red" (either a Revolutionary or Working class label), none of the members are labelled Intelligentsia or Bad class. It is disclosed that joining the PLA was regarded as the most desirable and glorified destination at that time [Bonnin, 2005a, Bernstein, 1977, *pp.* 103-120]. Soldiers in the PLA experienced a relatively stable and fruitful life, taking advantage of subsidised material goods and the military and medical training. Manual and service work dominate the general activity pattern of cluster 4. Members of this cluster spend on average of 11 years working in production or service sector. Members of cluster 5 typically wait a couple years after school before working as an unskilled worker. The last cluster is dominated by education, members of this cluster have a spell of 10 years in schools. The average age of respondents who fall into this cluster is 5 to 7 years younger than that of respondents in other clusters, with 70% of them born after 1958. They had barely reached school age at the outbreak of the Revolution, and were not affected by the interruption of secondary education taking place between 1966 and 1968.

From all aspects, life in the city for young urbanites was far more comfortable

Tab. 3.8: Description and characteristics of six clusters

Cluster	Description	N (%)	Agricul. labour	Average duration in						H.E.	Waiting	School	M.S.	Inact ^a
				Unskill. work	Getihu	Mnu./Srv. work	Mng./Prf. work							
1	Agricultural work dominated	36 (9.6%)	10.9	0	0.1	0.2	0.4	0.1	0.1	0.1	1.6	0.1	0.8	
2	Manag./Prof. work dominated	74 (19.6%)	0.3	0	0	1.5	8.2	0.1	0.3	0.1	4.1	0.1	0.1	
3	Military service dominated	16 (4.2%)	0.4	0.2	0	2.4	2.4	0	0.3	0.3	2.6	5.8	0.1	
4	Manual/Service work dominated	93 (24.7%)	0.6	0.1	0	11.0	0.1	0	0.5	0.1	2.3	0.1	0.1	
5	Unskilled work dominated	64 (17.0%)	0.3	5.8	0.6	0.9	0.4	0	2.1	0.4	3.4	0.2	0.9	
6	Education dominated	94 (24.9%)	0.2	0.4	0.0	2.3	0.1	0.1	0.8	0.1	10.2	0.3	0.3	
Total Sample		377	1.4	1.1	0.1	3.9	1.9	0.1	0.8	0.1	4.8	0.4	0.4	

Source: 1996 LHSC, own calculations.

^a Inactivity includes maternity or sick leave, being in prison and staying at home because of disability.

Tab. 3.9: Background statistics for six clusters

	Agricultural work dominated	Manag./Prof work dominated	Military service dominated	Manual/Service work dominated	Unskilled work dominated	Education dominated
Cohort						
<i>1947-1953 Cohort</i>	58.3	54.1	81.3	65.6	46.9	0.0
<i>1954-1960 Cohort</i>	41.7	45.9	18.7	34.4	53.1	100.0
Male						
<i>Male</i>	50.0	40.5	100.0	61.3	50.0	51.0
<i>Female</i>	50.0	59.5	0.0	38.7	50.0	43.0
Class label						
<i>Revolutionary</i>	0.0	10.8	20.0	3.2	4.7	11.7
<i>Working class</i>	88.9	66.2	73.3	76.3	62.5	75.5
<i>Middle class</i>	5.6	18.9	6.7	12.9	23.4	7.5
<i>Intelligentsia</i>	5.6	2.7	0.0	7.5	7.8	4.3
<i>Bad class</i>	0.0	1.4	0.0	0.0	1.6	1.1
Father's education						
<i>Elementary or below</i>	94.3	71.2	81.3	79.4	83.9	76.6
<i>Junior H.S.</i>	2.9	17.8	18.7	12.0	8.1	11.7
<i>Senior H.S.</i>	2.9	4.1	0.0	6.5	6.5	6.4
<i>College or above</i>	0.0	6.9	0.0	2.2	1.6	5.3
If father was a Party member						
<i>No</i>	94.3	62.2	37.5	83.9	85.9	57.0
<i>Yes</i>	5.7	37.8	62.5	16.1	14.1	43.0
Geographical origin						
<i>Township</i>	69.4	50.0	43.8	38.7	45.3	41.5
<i>Prefecture-lvl city</i>	11.1	25.7	12.5	24.7	29.7	28.7
<i>Province capital</i>	11.1	13.5	31.2	15.1	12.5	17.0
<i>Municipality</i>	8.3	10.8	12.5	21.5	12.5	12.8

3. Selection to, Duration and Alternatives of the Rustication

and securer than their counterparts in the countryside. In a report published by the government in 1973, six years after the launch of the Cultural Revolution, around 40% of sent-down youths nationwide had no proper housing, living in barns, storage rooms or deserted temples [Liu, 2008, *pp.* 182-186]. The physical prosecution, perhaps, was the most appalling part of the revelation of the sent-down lives: the same report published in 1973 uncovers 23,000 cases of physical abuse conducted on sent-down youths in twenty-four provinces, of which sexual abuses accounted for 70% [Liu, 2008, p. 189].

3.4 Chapter Conclusion

This chapter has chiefly studied the changes of opportunity structure for the CR cohort during the period of rustication mobilisation from 1967 to 1978, identifying potential factors which affect the hazard of being rusticated and the duration of the sent-down episode if rusticated. It has also explored the alternatives of rustication sought by those unaffected.

I adopted two statistical methods to examine the relationship of family class origin and occupation based on the early system of class designation. The results show consistency of the methods. Also this extra work proved to be significant in stressing the important role of party membership played in securing the privilege class.

The ideals of China's planned socialism involved inverting the old social class order, eliminating the class reproduction and hence building a classless society. The establishment of the class label served to introduce a new class scheme to favour those with revolutionary origin and members of the former proletarian class, and to reject the old elites. In regard to the event of rustication, family class label had much of its intended effect, as it was shown to be a strong factor in determining the extent of this disruptive sanction towards the urban youths. Compared to members of other class labels, children of the bad class origins which consisted of the preceding

3. Selection to, Duration and Alternatives of the Rustication

privileged groups had a higher chance of being rusticated—especially for the 1947-1953 cohort who were rusticated in the earlier period of the programme—and were more likely to spend a longer time in the countryside. The change of old status hierarchy was also shown through the positive relationship between the hazard of being rusticated and father's educational level. So far as the inversion of the pre-revolutionary class order is concerned, the rustication programme was successful in hand-picking children of old elites and intellectuals for the rural exile.

On the other hand, in view of the socialist concern of 'eliminating the class differences', we can argue that the rustication programme was less effective as it not only tightly restricted children of a previously advantageous group in pursuit of other life chances, but turned a blind eye to the fact that a substantial number of members of the PLA officials and party cadres managed to shelter their children from the rural assignment by sending them to the PLA, the most desirable destination for the urban youths during the Revolution (this will later be confirmed by the analyses in succeeding chapters and recognised by interviewees in Chapter 6).

The class label lost its importance in its association with one's life chances towards the end of the rustication programme; instead, we witnessed the rising of the significance of the old measurement of social origin: parent's occupation. My analysis showed that children of high-rank cadres returned to cities earlier than those whose parents were in other occupational status. This finding was consistent with that of Zhou and Hou [1999].

Besides the main effects of social backgrounds, ascriptive characteristics like cohort/age, educational level as well geographical origin exerted significant influence both to the rate of rustication and the rate of return.

Although most members of this generation were adversely affected by the state actions such as the closing of schools and rustication programme, some went through persistent humiliations throughout the Revolution because of their class label, some remained intact. For the rusticates, they were not given many options apart from

3. Selection to, Duration and Alternatives of the Rustication

learning to adapt to the rural lives. For those who remained in cities, they learned to build a new life course under the constraints of no educational advancement and restricted labour market. And for those privileged youths who joined the PLA, they received subsidies from the state as well as training which were profitable in future employment. Their respective fate and the assessment of the consequences of the rustication will be explored further in subsequent chapters.


3. Selection to, Duration and Alternatives of the Rustication

3.5 Appendix

Tab. 3.10: Results of Fitting Logistic Regression Models with additional cohort variable and its interactions with other predictors.

Model	Model description	log likelihood	df	Model Comparison	$\Delta\log$ likelihood	Δdf	p
1	baseline model	-335.178	22		-	-	-
2	baseline model + cohort $\times$ edu	-334.982	24	1-2	0.196	2	0.822
3	baseline model + cohort $\times$ fedu	-331.300	25	1-3	3.878	3	0.051
4	baseline model + cohort $\times$ sibling	-332.676	23	1-5	2.502	1	0.025
5	baseline model + cohort $\times$ focat	-332.277	26	1-6	2.901	4	0.433
6	baseline model + cohort $\times$ label	-332.835	26	1-7	2.343	4	0.321
7	baseline model + cohort $\times$ geo	-333.064	25	1-8	2.114	3	0.238
8	baseline model + cohort$\times$fedu + cohort$\times$sibling	-329.215	26	1-9	5.963	4	0.018
Full	baseline model + all cohort interactions	-323.141	43	9-10	6.074	17	0.791

Administration units in China urban areas




Tab. 3.11: Parameter estimates for Model 8

	β	s.e.
1954-1960 Cohort	-0.653	0.509
Male	0.229	0.194
Education		
<i>Elementary or below</i>	-1.405***	0.331
<i>Senior H.S. or above</i>	-0.366	0.231
Father's education		
<i>Junior H.S.</i>	0.621	0.332
<i>Senior H.S.</i>	0.197	0.597
<i>College or above</i>	2.111*	0.937
Mother's education		
<i>Junior H.S.</i>	0.188	0.384
<i>Senior H.S.</i>	-1.292	0.660
<i>College or above</i>	1.045	0.919
Number of sibling	-0.059	0.077
Parent's occupation		
<i>High-rank cadre</i>	-0.273	0.644
<i>Professional</i>	0.253	0.481
<i>Office worker</i>	-0.371	0.302
<i>Service worker</i>	-0.277	0.256
Class label		
<i>Revolutionary</i>	0.380	0.471
<i>Middle class</i>	0.003	0.296
<i>Intelligentsia</i>	-0.307	0.500
<i>Bad class</i>	1.478*	0.693
Geographical origin		
<i>Prefecture-lvl city</i>	-0.207	0.248
<i>Province capital</i>	0.305	0.263
<i>Municipality</i>	-0.702*	0.329
Interactions with Cohort		
Father's education		
<i>Junior high</i> $\times$ <i>Cohort</i>	-0.516	0.459
<i>Senior high</i> $\times$ <i>Cohort</i>	-0.634	0.785
<i>College</i> $\times$ <i>Cohort</i>	-2.487*	1.101
Sibling $\times$ Cohort	0.237*	0.117
Constant	-1.729**	0.537

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (two-tailed test).

n = 536. Source: 1996 LHSC.

Fig. 3.6: Real times of events, 1996 LHSC.



Tab. 3.12: Coordinates and contribution to inertia of row and column points for the 1996 LHSC data

	coordinate	coordinate	contribution to inertia	contribution to inertia
Father's occupation	Dim 1	Dim 2	Dim 1	Dim 2
High-lvl cadre	4.845	-0.376	0.331	0.003
Mid-lvl cadre	3.781	-1.240	0.453	0.080
Low-lvl cadre	0.659	-0.047	0.047	0.000
Medical&legal prof.	0.656	2.882	0.010	0.313
Sen.teaching prof.	0.726	2.808	0.010	0.251
Engineering prof.	0.461	2.157	0.006	0.216
Economics prof.	0.383	0.555	0.011	0.037
Clerical worker	0.298	0.137	0.003	0.001
Junior teaching prof.	-0.277	0.187	0.001	0.001
Sale&Service worker	-0.095	0.077	0.002	0.002
Industrial worker	-0.339	-0.226	0.052	0.038
Agricultural worker	-0.300	-0.174	0.053	0.029
Self-employed	-0.166	0.841	0.000	0.021
Other	1.296	-0.620	0.021	0.008
Class origin				
Privilege	3.301	-0.580	0.902	0.046
Working	-0.229	-0.157	0.064	0.050
Middle	-0.116	0.171	0.003	0.010
Intelligentsia	0.681	2.938	0.029	0.876
Bad	-0.204	0.474	0.002	0.018

Tab. 3.13: Construction of 10-category classification of employment status

10-category of employment status	1996 LHSC labour activity	1996 LHSC occupation category	Educational attainment
Agricultural worker		Agricultural worker	
Unskilled manual worker		Unskilled manual worker	
Manual/service worker		Skilled manual worker Sales and service worker	
O./M./H. manager/ professional	Working	Ordinary office worker Mid-lvl management personnel High-lvl management personnel Ordinary or lower level professional Mid-lvl professional High-lvl professional	
Getihu		Individual entrepreneur(getihu)	
Military service	Military service	Solider	Higher education Junior/Senoir middle school
Higher education School	Attending school		
Waiting for work	Waiting for work Too young to work		
Inactivity	In prison Disabled Keeping house		
Missing	Missing time period		

Tab. 3.14: Parameter estimates for the model with cohort interactions

	$\hat{\beta}$	s.e.
Cohort	-4.146*	-1.655
Male	-0.672	-0.67
Education		
<i>Junior H.S.</i>	1.533	-1.097
<i>Senior H.S.</i>	-0.33	-1.017
Father's education		
<i>Junior H.S.</i>	-1.622*	-0.743
<i>Senior H.S.</i>	2.768*	-1.227
<i>College or above</i>	0.703	-1.237
Mother's education		
<i>Junior H.S.</i>	0.508	-0.987
<i>Senior H.S.</i>	-0.885	-1.636
Number of siblings	0.093	-0.229
Parent's occupations		
<i>High-rank cadre</i>	-2.362	-1.789
<i>Professional</i>	-1.421	-1.396
<i>Office worker</i>	-0.512	-1.146
<i>Service worker</i>	-1.313	-0.869
Class origin		
<i>Revolutionary</i>	-0.091	-1.252
<i>Middle class</i>	0.723	-1.08
<i>Intelligentsia</i>	0.209	-1.951
<i>Bad class</i>	3.031*	-1.361
Geographical origin		
<i>Prefecture-lvl city</i>	-0.817	-1.362
<i>Province capital</i>	-0.634	-0.799
<i>Municipality</i>	3.090**	-0.961
Interactions with Cohort		
Male×Cohort	0.656	-0.81
Education		
<i>Junior high×Cohort</i>	1.068	-1.736
<i>Senior high×Cohort</i>	0.058	-1.118
Father's education		
<i>Junior high×Cohort</i>	1.13	-0.947
<i>Senior high×Cohort</i>	-1.202	-1.588
<i>College×Cohort</i>	-0.581	-1.909
Mother's education		
<i>Junior high×Cohort</i>	0.634	-1.503
<i>Senior high×Cohort</i>	0.839	-2.085
Sibling×Cohort	0.089	-0.292
Parent's occupation		
<i>Cadre×Cohort</i>	1.342	-2.471
<i>Professional×Cohort</i>	1.348	-1.814
<i>Office worker×Cohort</i>	1.163	-1.32
<i>Service worker×Cohort</i>	1.601	-1.078
Class label		
<i>Revolutionary×Cohort</i>	0.149	-1.623
<i>Middle class×Cohort</i>	0.213	-1.302
<i>Intelligentsia×Cohort</i>	1.363	-2.327
<i>Bad class×Cohort</i>	-1.847	-1.743
Geographical origin		
<i>Prefecture city×Cohort</i>	1.647	-1.473
<i>Province capital×Cohort</i>	1.174	-1.064
<i>Municipality×Cohort</i>	-1.503	-1.369
Constant	7.018***	-1.149

† $p < .10$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (two-tailed test).
n = 536. Source: 1996 LHSC.

4. THE CONSEQUENCES OF BEING RUSTICATED: TRANSITIONS AND SEQUENCES

“One major aspect of life course is their internal temporal ordering, that is, the age distribution at various events or transitions, the relative duration times in given states (activities) as well as the sequencing of events and states [Mayer, 2004, p. 163].”

4.1 *Living Through the Economic Transformation*

The end of the rustication era did not imply an immediate start of a new life for most rusticates. When 8 million of them returned to homes in the cities in 1979, the first wave of Chinese baby boomers¹ reached the working age. Together, they created an urban job-waiting-list of 15 million [Chen, 1999a]. The mounting pressure of unemployment forced the post-Mao government to find ways to relocate returned rusticates and new middle school graduates within the urban system. Solutions given to resolve the problem included the expansion of the higher educational enrolments, legitimising self-employment, squeezing out some resources from capital intensive state-owned enterprises to sponsor labour collective enterprises and labour service facilities (*laodong fuwu gongsi*) [Whyte and Parish, 1984b, Zhou and Hou, 1999]. All these efforts were made possible under the premise of the transformation from a state planned economy to a socialist market-based economy.

The economic reforms began in December 1978, initially in rural areas and then in the urban areas, abandoning the Maoist model of development, opening new

¹ Chinese Baby Boomers were born between 1962 to 1970.

4. The Consequences of Being Rusticated: Transitions and Sequences

job opportunities and new economic sectors, subsequently generating a variety of occupational trajectories. But it was difficult for the rusticates to take advantage of the new system; they had been in poverty for so long and found little money to set up their own business, many of them eventually ended up in either state or collective enterprises [Chen, 1999b], as the government transformed most of the private firms to public enterprises to eliminate capitalism. State-owned enterprises, in particular, directly administered and operated by the central or local government agencies, enjoyed larger redistributive resource and their employees received better welfare programmes. The property rights steadily shifted from traditional state or collective ownership towards private ownership since the mid-1990s [Walder and Oi, 1999]. Further, a gradually loosening social contract between the government and the workers in the socialist firms has brought challenges to the economic well-beings of the state employees and their families [Tang and Parish, 2000]. Before the industrial reforms began, many state-owned enterprises were characterised by the lack of capital, labour surplus and inefficient productivity. They, on the other hand, had to provide housing, pensions, medical and other social benefits to their employees. A series of enterprise reforms started since 1984 has firstly replaced the socialist lifetime employment with term contracts to lower the retirement age; later in 1997 they forced the unprofitable state-owned enterprises to close, which led to the redundancy of millions of workers. A large proportion of those lay-offs are believed to be former rusticates who were close to the marginal age of retirement and lack of seniority due to their delayed entry into the urban labour market [Hung and Chiu, 2003].

From the aspect of education, along with secondary-level institutions, universities were shut down from 1966 until 1972 [Bernstein, 1977]. This re-opening in 1972 did not imply a door-opening opportunity for the CR cohort to pursue further education. On the one hand, the Education Department at that time encouraged “workers, peasants, and soldiers with two or more years of working experience” to apply – a

4. The Consequences of Being Rusticated: Transitions and Sequences

condition met by majority of the CR cohort. But on the other hand, they faced not only fierce competition for a considerably limited number of places offered in universities, but on top of their work performance, a strict scrutiny of family class origin and party loyalty. As a result, only a small proportion of members of the CR cohort were admitted. The end of the Cultural Revolution and the following resumption of nationally competitive examination to university in 1977 marked the new beginning of Communist China's educational system and changed some lives of members of the CR cohort forever. It abandoned the by-recommendation only recruitment system, guaranteeing merit-based selection into higher education and subsequently facilitating upward mobility for those who were qualified. To boost the number of highly skilled individuals, other types of college programmes in the form of technical schools or vocational colleges became widely open to everyone who wished to pursue schooling opportunities.

At the late stage of the Revolution, the CR cohort experienced the transitions in their lives of joining the urban labour workforce, re-entering school, also of the entry of first marriage and having the first child. Given that rusticates spent on average seven years in the countryside and were in their early to mid-teens at the outbreak of the Revolution, they would have been at the right age for dating and marriage sometime in the mid or late 1970s. In actual fact, the marriage rate was extremely low among rusticates over the period of the rustication movement [Bernstein, 1977, p. 161]. Such a low rate may be partly due to the fear of taking root in the village life, and partly because of the financial constraints of rusticates (especially males). More importantly, it is owing to the state's intervention on marriage through its promotion of late-marriage policy to restrict population growth [Bernstein, 1977, pp. 161-166] [Liu, 2008, pp. 314-320]. Accordingly, the timing of childbearing was affected.

4.2 *Research Questions*

This chapter aims to explore consequences caused by rustication and other drastic social policies implemented during and after the Cultural Revolution through examining different life-course aspects. It consists of two parts: I start by comparing timing of some important life-course transitions between different cohorts and between rusticates and non-rusticates in the CR cohort. The analyses carried out in the second part exploit the longitudinal information on educational and occupational histories, to assess whether the rustication generates negative or positive consequences or none. The specific questions that this chapter will look at are as follows:

- Between the CR cohort and its adjacent cohorts, as well as within the CR cohort, are there significant differences in
 - the timing of the first marriage and the first child?
 - the timing of finishing tertiary education?
 - the timing of the acquisition of the first job?
- Within the CR cohort:
 - After the re-opening of universities, who are more likely to pursue a college education, rusticates or non-rusticates? What are other potential factors?
 - What are the distinctive work-life trajectories this cohort follow after their first entry to the urban labour market? What are the predictors of trajectory group membership? Has the rustication experience become an asset or a liability in the work histories of rusticates? Has father's educational or occupational status continued to be influential in predicting life course indicators of this cohort?

4. The Consequences of Being Rusticated: Transitions and Sequences

4.3 Source of Evidence: the 2003 CGSS

The main dataset used for this chapter is the 2003 CGSS which has been described in Chapter 2 of this thesis. I use the restricted sample of 4,074 respondents, born between 1926 and 1967, for the analyses. The later cohorts are precluded as they were too young to have experienced some of the life events at the time of the interview. There are 615 respondents who reported having been sent down, this number is reduced to 494 on the principle of selection of the rusticated population detailed in Chapter 2. The starting and ending years of the sent-down episode of the CR cohort and its two sub-cohorts are shown in Table 4.1. We can see from this table that the 1947-1953 rusticates spend on average of four more years in rustication than rusticates from the younger cohort.

Tab. 4.1: The starting and the ending years of sent-down episodes for the 1947-1953 cohort and the 1954-1960 cohort.

	Rusticates in 1947-1953 cohort	Rusticates in 1954-1960 cohort	Rusticates in CR cohort
Rustication Year <i>mean (s.d.)</i>	1968.5 (2.05)	1974.2 (2.63)	1971.5 (3.67)
Return Year <i>mean (s.d.)</i>	1975.1 (4.47)	1977.8 (2.54)	1976.5 (3.83)
Number of respondents	236	258	494

Source: the CGSS 2003.

4.4 The Timing at Important Life-course Events

In a normal life, important life transitions are believed to occur within a short span of time: schooling, the starting of the first job, marriage, becoming a parent. Under a highly volatile political or economic condition, the conventional order of these major life-course events are likely to be disrupted, proceeding with its own logic [Elder, 1999]. There is a broad consensus among scholars who have studied the generation of the rusticates: the Cultural Revolution “delayed” this generation,

4. The Consequences of Being Rusticated: Transitions and Sequences

postponing a normal social life that they should have had [Chen, 1999b, Zhou and Hou, 1999, Meng and Gregory, 2002]. These studies mainly focused on comparing life outcomes between rusticates versus non-rusticates and generally lack comparison between difference cohorts. To examine the unique characteristic of the rusticates, in this section, I contrast the life course transitions of the rusticates against their non-rusticated counterparts, also against the preceding and succeeding cohorts. I exclude the non-rusticates from the CR Cohort in the cohort comparison, as the aggregation of these two groups will lead to the confusion of two distinctly causal impacts: the effect of rustication and the effects of the other state actions implemented during the Cultural Revolution on non-rusticated youths.

4.4.1 *Age Distribution at the First Marriage*

Figures 4.1 and 4.2 illustrate the distribution of age at the first marriage by gender for four consecutive cohorts. It is worth noticing that the marital rate is extremely high in the sample, only less than 2% of our 4074 respondents were single or had unknown marital status at the time of the interview. The rusticates are shown to enter into the first marriage later than members of two adjacent cohorts. This is true for both men and women. It is noted that men in the 1947-1953 cohort have lagged marriage compared to the 1954-1960 cohort.

I consider further the difference between the rusticates and the non-rusticates for the CR cohort. Figure 4.3 displays the survival curves for the transition to the first marriage. For both men and women in the 1947-1953 cohort, the median age at first marriage—the age at which 50 percent of the people in this group have married for the first time—is two years higher than their non-rusticated counterparts (28 versus 26; 25 versus 23). This difference is less noticeable between those with and without sent-down experience among the younger cohorts (26 versus 26; 24 versus 23).

In summary, these graphs show that the CR cohort has, in general, a “delayed” marriage as opposed to their previous and succeeding cohorts, and within cohorts

4. The Consequences of Being Rusticated: Transitions and Sequences


older rusticates marry later than their non-rusticated peers. The results can be broadly interpreted as predominantly responses to time-variant governmental policies. In spite of the difference in residence, mean age at first marriage rose sharply during the first half of the 1970s reacting to the “later, longer, less” family planning campaigns. The older members of the CR cohort were believed to be mostly affected by the policy as they turned into their second decades in 1970s. This mean marriage age, however, dropped in 1981 after the implementation of the new Marriage Law [Feeney and Wang, 1993].

The effect of rustication can be accounted for in the difference in marital age between the rusticates and the non-rusticates, as well as between the older and the younger rusticates. Although a marriage to a rusticated fellow or a rural resident was not impossible, the cost attached to it might be insufferable. As all the rusticates were forced to change their household registration status (*Hukou*) from urban to rural, marrying either to their rusticated fellows or to rural residents would likely destine them a lifetime in the countryside. Besides, neither the “worker-peasant-soldier” programme² of becoming a university student nor the urban enterprises accepted the recruitment of married people [Chen, 1999b]. The fear of being stranded in the countryside for life might prevent the rusticates from dating and hence, marrying at an appropriate age. The duration of the sent-down episode also matters, according to Table 4.1 the ‘Older Rusticates’ took 4 years (on average) longer to return to cities than the ‘Younger Rusticates’, their marriages were delayed even more acutely.

As a consequence of lack of detailed information on respondents’ offspring, I cannot examine another similar life transition: the transition to first birth. However, as the pre-marital cohabitation is extremely low among the cohorts of the sample. It is plausible to infer that the general picture on the transition to first parenthood


² The “worker-peasant-soldier” programme recruited students who were “of age around 20, having a good political thought, healthy, workers, peasants and soldiers with three or more years of working experience, having knowledge equivalent to the junior middle school level [Liu, 2008].” The programme abolished the unified examination, its admission was by recommendation only.

Fig. 4.1: Cumulative proportion of men who had their first marriage at different ages, by cohort.




DATA SOURCE: CGSS, 2003

Fig. 4.2: Cumulative proportion of women who had their first marriage at different ages, by cohort.



DATA SOURCE: CGSS, 2003

Fig. 4.3: Transition to first marriage for men born in the 1947-1953 (top panel) and the 1954-1960 (bottom panel) cohorts, by rustication experience. Kaplan-Meier survival curve. The shaded area is the 95% of confidence interval.




4. The Consequences of Being Rusticated: Transitions and Sequences

is a similar one to the transition to first marriage.

4.4.2 Age Distribution at Completion of the Highest Level of Education

In the pre-reform era, the value of the educational qualification was depreciated, education had to yield to the family class background as a selecting device in determining one's mobility opportunity into the society. Consequently, conventional schooling was simplified and politicised [Whyte and Parish, 1984a]. College and university graduate programmes were abbreviated, and eventually suspended in 1966. The re-admission to universities in 1972 did not see a substantial increase in numbers of student enrolment as only certain courses were made available on demand of the economy. The plot in Figure 4.4 illustrates the general trend of university student enrolment spanning 52 years. The percentage starts very low, and increases from the mid-1950s with the expansion of the national literacy; then slumps before the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution. It maintains a steady increase after the re-opening of the universities in 1972 until it soars up at the end of the last century.

Fig. 4.4: University student enrolment per population, by year.




DATA SOURCE: China Data Online (<http://chinadataonline.org>)

4. The Consequences of Being Rusticated: Transitions and Sequences

The impact of state-directed reform on tertiary education is assumed to act differently across the cohorts. The CR cohort clearly stands out in its comparison in age at completing college education with other cohorts, shown in Figures 4.5 and 4.6. The minimum university-leaving age for the youngest male cohort of the sample (born in 1961-1967) is 18, and 21 for the 1947-1953 cohort and 25 for the 1954-1960 cohort. The same is true for the female cohorts; rusticates are shown to complete their college educations at relatively older ages. The pre-1947 cohort appeared “to have caught the last train” [Elder et al., 1993] of the access to higher education, while the successive two cohorts had to wait till its restoration in the late 1970s, and the youngest cohort were left unaffected.

Fig. 4.5: Cumulative proportion of men completing college education at different ages, by cohort.




DATA SOURCE: CGSS, 2003

Figure 4.7 displays the survival curves for the transition to completion of college education by sent-down experience for both men and women of the CR cohort, respectively. Since the university attainment rate for the CR cohort is extremely low, Y-axis is not cut off from zero in order to present a better view of the survival

4. The Consequences of Being Rusticated: Transitions and Sequences

Fig. 4.6: Cumulative proportion of women completing college education at different ages, by cohort.




DATA SOURCE: CGSS, 2003

curves. Also because of the small sample size, the confidence intervals are wide. For the 1947-1953 cohort, there is a remarkable difference between rusticated and non-rusticated men. Although both groups seem to be affected by the disruption to education as shown by the belated graduation age compared to other cohorts, the rusticates appear to have a higher attainment of tertiary education than the non-rusticates after a certain age. Similar difference can also be observed between women with and without sent-down experience. For the 1954-1960 cohort, the difference between rusticates and non-rusticates is not as distinctive as observed in the older cohort, the overlapping confidence intervals confirm this. Considering the average age at first non-agricultural job attainment for the rusticates, which is several years younger than their average university enrollment age, it is reasonable to postulate that they also have a higher likelihood of returning to education after entering the labour market.

The descriptive analyses in Figures 4.1-4.7, firstly, confirm some of the results

Fig. 4.7: Transition to completion of college education for men born in the 1947-1953 (top panel) and the 1954-1960 (bottom panel) cohorts, by rustication experience. Kaplan-Meier Survival Curve. The shaded area is the 95% of confidence interval.



4. The Consequences of Being Rusticated: Transitions and Sequences

acquired in previous studies of Zhou and Hou [1999] and Elder et al. [1993] that the rustication, or rather the Cultural Revolution, leads to the postponement of certain life-course events for the rusticates as opposed to the non-rusticated peers. Secondly, they further suggest that the impact of the rustication is exclusive to the rusticates in comparison to the preceding and succeeding cohorts, and more forceful to rusticates in the older cohort (the 1947-1953 cohort).

4.5 *Highest Educational Attainment*

Figure 4.7 has shown that more rusticates obtain higher education later in life than non-rusticates. This section, thus, aims to assess if this disparity is caused by the rustication experience alone, or mediated by other factors.

One of the potential factors is social class origin. There have been a few studies which set their theoretical focus on the issue of education and social stratification, and results of early studies on this have been updated by more recent ones: One of the earliest studies of such was based on data collected in early 1980s; it found that the Revolution successfully fulfills its initial attempt to undermine the association between family backgrounds and educational attainment [Deng and Treiman, 1997]. Abstracting longitudinal information from the 1994 national survey, Zhou et al. [1998]’s analysis of education across the period before, during and after the Cultural Revolution showed that social origin (as measured by father’s education, occupation and family class origin) plays an important role in educational advancement, however, its magnitude has been greatly affected by changes of state policies, which can be exemplified by the weakening educational reproduction during the Cultural Revolution.

Table 4.2 utilises the results from the logistic regression model fitted to the CR cohort to predict college degree attainment by rustication, social background variables, geographical origins³ and demographic characteristics. The indication of

³ Supposedly, large majority of rusticates who successfully returned to cities, to origins from where they were sent down.

4. The Consequences of Being Rusticated: Transitions and Sequences

the effect of rustication is twofold: First, controlling for the explanatory variables listed above, the odds of having a tertiary education for rusticates with shorter sent-down episode were more than twice as high as those of non-rusticates. It is noted that the chance of going to university helped to cut these rusticates' sent-down episode short, bringing them back to cities early. It can also be argued that the rustication experience filled with material and spiritual deprivations might have aroused rusticates' yearning for a better life, and having a college degree is the most effective stepping-stone for upward mobility. Yet there seemed to be a time-limit between desire and reality, as rusticates who spent a longer time in the countryside showed no statistically discernible difference relative to non-rusticates, suggesting the extended stay in the rural areas may cripple aspiration and adversely prepare those rusticates for the university entrance exams. Second, from the perspective of non-rusticates, I suspect that the value of a college degree certificate was not viewed highly as many had secured a stable urban job before the re-admission of university, as the pursuit of further education inevitably led to the forfeit of the current job.

Respondent's own educational level revealed a significant effect on the likelihood of college degree acquisition: The odds of attainment for those who had received the highest educational level equivalent to senior high-school education before university's re-admission were more than four times greater than those who had a junior high-school education.

The effects of social origins are worth noticing: Fathers with higher level of education or were high-ranked officials multiply the chance of children's university attainment. These results are consistent with the previous findings of Zhou et al. [1998], implying a restoration of the old pattern of educational stratification, which was temporarily disrupted during the Revolution. The answer to the question—should social origins play vital roles in other key lifecourse variables, such as occupational attainment—will be disclosed in the following section.

Other factors also matter: Those who lived in provincial capitals or municipalities

4. The Consequences of Being Rusticated: Transitions and Sequences

are more likely to acquire a university degree than their counterparts who lived in smaller cities; The odds of college attainment for men are more than twice as high as those of women.

Tab. 4.2: Predictors of college education attained by the CR Cohort.

	$\hat{\beta}$	s.e.
1954-1960 Cohort	-0.591	(0.31)
Male	0.880**	(0.30)
Senior H.S.	1.526***	(0.33)
Father's education		
<i>Elementary school or above</i>	ref.	
<i>Junior H.S.</i>	0.224	(0.38)
<i>Senior H.S.</i>	1.308**	(0.46)
<i>College or above</i>	1.334**	(0.52)
Father's occupation		
<i>Working class</i>	ref.	
<i>High-rank cadre</i>	0.997*	(0.50)
<i>High-prestige professional</i>	0.131	(0.54)
<i>Low-rank cadre</i>	0.329	(0.40)
<i>Low-prestige professional</i>	-0.038	(0.41)
Geographical origin		
<i>Township or county-level city</i>	ref.	
<i>Prefecture-lvl cite</i>	0.931	(0.60)
<i>Prov. Capital/Municipality</i>	1.115***	(0.32)
Rustication experience		
<i>No rustication experience</i>	ref.	
<i>Rustication duration < 5</i>	0.863**	(0.33)
<i>Rustication duration ≥ 5</i>	0.356	(0.37)
Constant	-3.340***	(0.90)
N	566	
pseudo R^2	0.196	

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (two-tailed test).

Source: 2003 CGSS.

4.6 *Studying the Whole Career Sequences*

4.6.1 *Previous Research*

While my analyses on life course events succeeding the rustication conform to findings in previous literatures—the rusticates experience lagged life-course events (marriage, childbearing, entering the urban labour market)—impacts on the key indicators of lifetime well-being, such as labour market performance remained mixed. This contention is mainly kept between studies based on the micro-level data evidences and those based on interviews and macro-level data evidences. The qualitative findings show that the rusticates were victims of the Cultural Revolution and were among the most vulnerable ones during the selection process of industrial restructuring in the economic reform era [Chen, 1999b, Hung and Chiu, 2003]. Quantitative findings, however, suggest that the rustication led to neither positive nor negative socioeconomic consequences for the rusticates [Elder et al., 1993, Zhou and Hou, 1999, Meng and Gregory, 2002, Xie et al., 2006]. Interestingly, one can tell the difference between these studies from the terms they used to label the rusticates: The bitterly toned ‘Lost Generation’ is for studies focusing on the negative consequences of being sent down, while studies which found the rustication experience neither beneficial nor detrimental, characterised the rusticates with a more neutral term – ‘Children of the Cultural Revolution’.

Both Chen and Hung (and Chiu)’s studies commenced with a proposition that most lives of the CR cohort were negatively affected by a series of state policy changes, with the rustication event as one of them; they then proceeded by offering explanations as to specifically how the whole cohort was lost at each turbulence in Modern China’s history. Because of the limitation of qualitative research, both studies face the problem of lack of generalisability, especially Hung and Chiu’s work, which instead of selecting the sample from the CR cohort, chose theirs from already disadvantaged laid-off workers whose life trajectory can only be representative of the most unsuccessful ones in this cohort.

4. The Consequences of Being Rusticated: Transitions and Sequences

The quantitative counterparts do not have the problem of generalisability as their sample was randomly selected from the appropriate population. In regard to investigating the consequential life events of the cohort of interest, the work of Xie et al. [2006] is the most thorough of its kind. Building on top of Zhou and Hou [1999]’s research, Xie et al. [2006] assessed the effect of being sent down on a total of six indicators of socioeconomic statuses. Their results mostly agreed with those of Zhou and Hou’s – there is no difference in social outcomes between rusticates and non-rusticates. They attributed the indifference to the lack of other alternative life chances to being sent down. Methodologically, all these literatures have a restriction which is inherent to cross-sectional surveys. The socioeconomic indicators that they used only reflected the social statuses of those of particular interest at one snapshot. Zhou and Hou [1999] tried in their study to measure income at three time points, the experience of rustication showed no significant effects on income. Given the alternative destinations to rustication discussed in the previous chapter (Section 1.3), one may wonder why the lives of those who remained in the cities and whose years of experience in professional work or in military service⁴ would not have the pull over those of rusticates who spent the same period of time struggling with basic needs in the countryside.

One important aspect of the life course that students of China’s rustication study look at is the labour market performance of those who are with the sent-down experience in comparison to those who are without, and further to this is – how much influence the impact of the policy has in determining their labour market’s success or failure. Both Zhou and Hou [1999] and Xie et al. [2006] showed no difference in high-status occupational attainment between the rusticates and the non-rusticates at the beginning of the labour market experience. A recent study, based on analyses of the 2003 CGSS, attempted to complete what earlier empirical studies were unable to achieve. It showed a disparity at retirement for the CR cohort: The rusticates are

⁴ Zhou shows that military personnel is one of the largest supplies to administrative lines in the Chinese bureaucracy in the post-CR era [Zhou, 2004, ch. 6].

4. The Consequences of Being Rusticated: Transitions and Sequences

more likely to retire at the time of the interview than the non-rusticates [Qian and Hodson, 2010]. This recent study manages to extend and update the career profiles of the CR sample, as well as highlighting the chain effect of rustication on the affected generation during the market transition period. Yet it must be noted that although we have now gained information about the labour market performances of two subgroups of the CR cohort, it is restrained to two time points, at the beginning and close to the end of their careers. The intervening movements between the two points are overlooked from the analyses. What they have omitted to explain is the pathways through which these unfortunate individuals move between their origin to destination occupations. An individual who started working in low-status job, then returned to college, landed a professional job, and became unemployed at the end of his career surely experienced downward mobility differently from another individual who worked in low-status job for most of his career and was unemployed at the end. It is also of great interest to find out various work-life trajectories which the CR cohort experience since first entry to urban labour market. To the fact that more rusticates fell victims to the labour market retrenchment, we may raise questions regarding rusticates who were unaffected. What kinds of work-life trajectories do they pursue if not laid off? Which individual assets prove to be employable for them to remain in non-unemployment trajectories?

By and large, findings shown by previous studies have only drawn partial pictures of the work lives of the CR cohort, a holistic analysis of intra-career pathways should provide more revelation on the process causing the downturn of rusticates at the end of their careers, as “social mobility should be conceived and modelled as sequences of moves and events unfolding over time [Mayer and Tuma, 1990b, p. 8].” In this section I apply the techniques of optimal matching and cluster analysis on the longitudinal work-life histories of a sample of the CR cohort to assess the primary working hypothesis: There are number of distinct work-life trajectories that the CR cohort members typically pursue. The generation of the typology of employment sequences

4. The Consequences of Being Rusticated: Transitions and Sequences

leads to the assessment of whether the experience of rustication generates adverse or positive consequences. The rest of the section is organised in three parts: In the first part I begin with a brief review of methods utilised for dealing with sequential data, providing a description of the optimal matching technique. In the second part I identify distinct work-life trajectories via the techniques described, examining how trajectory group membership is related to various explanatory variables in the multinomial logistic regression model. I then conclude in the third part based on the results obtained from the analyses.

4.6.2 *What Can Optimal Matching Offer?*

To analyse work-life trajectories, we need to find a method which is capable of maximally processing sequential information provided in the data. Among the few candidates, the most convenient one is through calculating the transition rate from a mobility table for which the first occupation is considered to be the position of origin and the occupation recorded at the time of the interview is the position of destination. Although models of transition matrices have been shown to be theoretically meaningful in understanding the overall process of career shift between two time points, the information between the study period, such as sequences of states across the entire occupational life, is neglected from this type of analysis.

The event history analysis, as opposed to the origin-destination model, has a powerful modelling frame for computing transitions between and durations of states within a given period [Mayer and Tuma, 1990a]. The concept that causality can be embodied by the dependency of the hazard rate of job mobility on the covariates, such as previous labour market experience, makes the event history analysis a popular technique in social mobility research [Blossfeld et al., 2007]. It is widely applicable where one is seeking to explain individual behaviour based on events, or patterns of changes from one specific state to another (for instance, how long it takes before employed people become unemployed). Nevertheless, when we model the employ-

4. The Consequences of Being Rusticated: Transitions and Sequences

ment trajectory of an individual who has experienced multiple employment states, the trajectory is then divided into several transitions and each transition is modelled separately. It is limited in helping researchers find out how the covariates affect the whole sequence of employment, in other words, the event history analysis does not provide a holistic perspective on life-long career.

Compared to the two modelling frames described above, the Optimal Matching technique (OM) is an exploratory approach, yet it is capable of piecing together the chain of events and giving us a complete picture of what careers look like. To recall, the main research question of this section is to examine the differences between the career trajectories of rusticates and non-rusticates of the CR cohort, and the mechanism which leads to the bifurcation between the two comparison groups in recent years. The OM, therefore, stands out because of its capability of identifying similarities or dissimilarities between employment sequences; its comparison result helps to generate a typology of work-life trajectories driven by the data. By treating the whole sequence holistically (*i.e.*, as a unit), it takes into account the ordering of the employment statuses, the transitions from one to another, and the duration spent at each state of employment.

4.6.3 Data and Initial Exploration

The respondent's labour market status comes from the retrospective occupational history collected in the 2003 CGSS. Respondents, who it is supposed had worked before, were asked to give details of each job they undertook as well as any change of employment status, such as exit to house-keeping or unemployment. The classification of occupational status is based on an occupation schema developed by the Department of Sociology, People's University in China – one of the creators of the 2003 CGSS. Their classification takes account of the important characteristics intrinsic to urban China's labour market. One of these characteristics is the significant role played by the working unit, as the distribution of the social resources is

4. The Consequences of Being Rusticated: Transitions and Sequences

closely linked to the type of the working unit. The research team of the 2003 CGSS groups occupations into seven categories. Because of the small number of private entrepreneurs in the sample, I recode them into other categories according to the size of the enterprises that they served. Also, I extract the service workers from the general workers' category to differentiate them from the production workers. Table 4.3 summarises the 12 categories of employment status.

I impose three restrictions on the sample of analysis: First, I retain only the respondents who belong to the CR Cohort in order to assess the effect of rustication on career sequence between rusticates and non-rusticates. Second, in order to fully exploit the employment history data, I set the length of the sequences to be analysed to twenty-five years since the first entry of labour force. For the rusticates, this means the counting starts after they returned from the countryside, through this way we can assess the adaptation of rusticates in the reform years. Note that a few respondents are right-censored as they did not reach the 25th year of career at the time of the survey. On the whole, the sample for this section is made up of 1759 individuals born between 1947 and 1960. The last restriction applies on the number of missing sequences. To include as many cases as possible without preventing the analysis to find the genuine sequential characters, I allow each respondent to have at most a missing spell of 10 years. I then set the missing episode to be one of the categories of employment status so that all the individuals have equal sequence length. Under these conditions, the sample produces 1599 observed sequences, 808 of which are distinct.

In the following I sketch out an initial exploration of the employment sequence via graphical presentation. Figure 4.8 shows a sequence index plot⁵ for all the members of the CR cohort. Each horizontal line represents a sequence, and each colour denotes an employment status. A close-up of one of the sequences is shown in Figure 4.9: In this case, the respondent started as a service worker, then spent

⁵ The term of Sequence index plot was proposed by Brderl and Scherer and applied for the first time by Scherer [Scherer, 2001].


Tab. 4.3: List of labour market status.

	Labels of categories	Occupations included	labour market description
1	Manager/Bureaucrats	Administrative senior and middle level managers or leading cadres in managerial personnel or government agencies, Party organizations or large medium size enterprises and institutions.	
2	Professional	Senior, middle or junior level professional with no managerial potency.	
3	Clerical Worker	Administrative staff, clerical and related staff with low level or no managerial potency	
4	Self-employed	Individual entrepreneurs (<i>getihu</i>)	
5	Service Worker	Salesperson, service worker	
6	Industrial Worker	Production, transportation and related worker with or without skills	
7	Agricultural Worker	Family, forestry, animal husbandry and fishery workers	
8	Unemployed		Being laid-off with prior working experience
9	Inactivity		Housekeeping, retirement
10	School/Training		Attending university (full-time/part-time), specialized college (full-time/part-time), graduate school, vocational training
11	PLA (Military Service)		Joining the People's Liberation Army
12	Missing		Missing episode

4. The Consequences of Being Rusticated: Transitions and Sequences

a few years working as a clerk, had a short spell in education before becoming a manager.

Fig. 4.8: Sequence index plot of the CR Cohort.




DATA SOURCE: CGSS, 2003

Patterns in Figure 4.8 illustrate the following features: The majority of our respondents in the CR cohort started as industrial workers (in red). This is the case as we are reminded that state-owned and collective enterprises were the two main sectors of urban work organisations during the period of planned socialism to eliminate private firms. As the number of years being in the labour force increases, there are more and more people exiting the urban production units, dispersing to other occupations or other employment statuses such as unemployment. This decreasing trend is a reflection of the redistribution of labour as a result of structural transformation of the economy coupled with a series of enterprise reforms strengthening over time [Knight and Song, 2005]. This plot provides some initial ideas of how career sequences look at an aggregate level; to create a typology of employment trajectories, we ought to compare differences between individual career sequences, and

4. The Consequences of Being Rusticated: Transitions and Sequences

Fig. 4.9: An example of how one career sequence looks like



DATA SOURCE: CGSS, 2003

this comparison can be made simple through the technique of optimal matching.

4.6.4 A Short Introduction to Optimal Matching and the Analytical Strategy

The sequence analysis approach incorporates two stages: The first stage involves the pairwise comparison of distance measure between sequences, and on the basis of the distance calculated, in the second stage, sequences with close resemblance are grouped together into clusters. The technique which carries such pairwise comparison is known as the ‘OM algorithm’.

The OM algorithm emerged four decades ago from the field of information theory as an instrument to find efficient ways of data transmission. It became much more established in molecular biology for studying DNA sequences (See the short history of OM by Lesnard [Lesnard, 2006]). The first application of OM to sociology took place in 1986 [Abbott and Forrest, 1986], and was marked later as a “revolution” by Andrew Abbott, the pioneer in the development of sequence analysis in social science. Abbott’s work has stimulated a growing number of applications of OM, especially in labour market research. Through these studies, we have gained better

4. The Consequences of Being Rusticated: Transitions and Sequences

understanding of the transition process from school to work [Brzinsky-Fay et al., 2006, Scherer, 2001, McVicar and Anyadike-Danes, 2002], retirement patterns [Han and Moen, 1999] and career patterns in general [Abbott, 1990, Halpin and Chan, 1998, Polloack et al., 2002].

The OM algorithm looks at the difference between every possible pair of sequences in the data. This difference is measured by their distance defined as the number of basic operations it takes to transform one sequence into the other. The basic operations involved are: substituting one element for another and inserting or deleting an element. The latter two operations are collectively known as ‘indels’. Each use of an operation bears an associated cost. To calculate the distance, we align two sequences, and sum up the costs for the number of substitutions and indels used. The mission of the OM algorithm is to find the optimal distance (incurring the lowest cost) between the two sequences out of all possible alignments. This is facilitated by the Needleman-Wunsch algorithm [Needleman and Wunsch, 1970], which produces a matrix consisting of optimal distances computed between all pairwise sequences.

To illustrate how OM works, I make up the following example. Assume that there are two sequences of the same length, where each letter (or element) within the sequences belongs to the set $\{I, L, N, Y\}$. Take for instance the following two sequences:

Sequence 1: L I L Y L I N

Sequence 2: L I N L I L Y

We fix the first sequence as the reference. The aim is to transform the second sequence into the first one by using only the three basic operations: insertion, deletion and substitution (denoted by ‘i’, ‘d’ and ‘s’ respectively).

Using only substitutions the two sequences can be made identical as follows:

L	I	L	Y	L	I	N
L	I	N	L	I	L	Y
		s	s	s	s	s

4. The Consequences of Being Rusticated: Transitions and Sequences

where the third line indicates the operation used on the corresponding element of the sequence.

Using both insertion and deletion the following two transformations are possible:

L I L Y L I N	L I L Y L I N
L I L Y L I N L I L Y	L I L N L I L Y L I N
i i i i d d d d	d d d i i i

If all three operations are allowed then the transformation can be done using only 4 applications of basic operations:

L	I	L	Y	L	I	N	
L	I	L	N	L	I	L	Y
		i	s			s	d

In the first example both sequences are aligned and we substitute the letter of the second sequence if it differs from that of the first sequence. This yields a total of five substitution operations. In the second example we shift the second sequence four letters to the right, leaving four gaps in which we insert the required letters, and we delete the last four letters. In the third example the second sequence is shifted three letters to the left and the transformation can be done by deleting the first three letters and inserting three letters at the end. In the fourth example we observe that the first letter to differ between the two sequences is the third one. We therefore insert the required letter ('L') in third position which subsequently shifts the rest of the sequence one letter to the right. The remaining part can then be transformed using only substitution and deletion.

The overall cost of a transformation is given by the sum of the cost attached to each operation used. The *Levenshtein distance* between the two sequences is defined as the smallest cost among all possible transformations. For instance suppose we assign the same cost to the three operations, say 1, then the four transformations given above will have costs of 5, 8, 6 and 4 respectively, in which case the Levenshtein distance between the two sequences is 4. Now if substitution has a higher cost, say 3,

4. The Consequences of Being Rusticated: Transitions and Sequences

then the transformations have costs of 15, 8, 6 and 8 respectively and the Levenshtein distance equals 6.

The specification of substitution and indel (insertion and deletion) costs is an indispensable step for performing the optimal matching, and has consequential effect on the proportion of stable clusters produced later [Lesnard and Kan, 2009]. The application of any combination of these operations also leads to different “after-maths”: Because of the inherent outcomes of insertion and deletion, once they are applied, the timing of the processes will be warped; they will preserve events however. On the contrary, the operation of substitution corrects the dissimilar events but conserve time. As a rule of thumb, if the absolute position of a particular event is important, the indel costs should be set at least half as much as the highest substitution cost⁶. In such a way, the indel operation is avoided. For the analysis of this chapter, the relative rather than the absolute position of labour market status is important (*i.e.*, in the case where two sequences have the same states but the temporal occurrences of states are different from one to the other). I give the value of 1 to the indel cost to allow the algorithm to utilise the indel operations.

Assigning the substitution cost is arguably the most challenging part of the OM method. Owing to how sensitive cluster results are responding to different substitution costs, the sequence analysis was seen by some as an “opaque” method [Wu, 2000]. A few researchers have chosen to set substitution and indel costs to a single value on the grounds that the theoretical reasoning was absent [Dijkstra and Taris, 1995]. Halpin and Chan in their study of sequence analysis on class career adopt the EGP class scheme as a benchmark for their cost scheme [Halpin and Chan, 1998]. Instead of assigning the same value of cost to all substitutions (like the example that I demonstrated early), I develop a cost matrix, and my rationale for this is similar to that of Halpin and Chan, that the employment mobility is driven by the hierarchically embedded social structure, thus the “transformation”

⁶ Conventionally, substitution cost is set twice as much as the indel costs, since each substitution is a combination of one insertion and one deletion.

4. The Consequences of Being Rusticated: Transitions and Sequences

cost from being an agricultural labourer to a production worker is different from being an agricultural labourer to a highly skilled professional. The following table shows the upper triangular substitution cost matrix. Each number represents a cost needed to switch from the elements in the row to corresponding elements in the column. The matrix can be seen in two parts: The first part contains seven occupational statuses, the assignment of the cost values for them is based on an acknowledged social classification: Administrative personnel and professionals are in the first group, and can be classified as China's "new" middle class [Lu, 2004]; clerks, self-employed and service workers are in the second group, classified as the non-manual class; industrial workers belong to the manual class and agricultural workers form the last group. Intra-group switching costs 1 and inter-group switching varies depending on how many groups the switching crosses. The second part of the cost matrix regards the occupational types as one category - employment, switches from any occupation under the category of "Employment" to other labour market statuses (Retire, Unemployment, Inactivity, Training, College and Army) are fixed to 2. Switches from the "missing episode" to other statuses are set to equal to, the sum of one deletion and one insertion, 2.

- Table: Substitution cost matrix.

	Employment						
	(Manag.	Prof.)	(Clerk	Semp.)	(SW	IW)	(AW)
Manag.	0	1	2	2	3	3	4
Prof.		0	2	2	3	3	4
Clerk			0	1	2	2	3
Semply				0	2	2	3
Ser. Worker					0	1	2
Indu. Worker						0	2
Agr. Worker							0

- Switches between employment and other labour market statuses (Retire, Un-

4. The Consequences of Being Rusticated: Transitions and Sequences

employment, Inactivity, Training, College and Army) = 2.

- Indel (insertion and deletion) cost = 1.
- Switches from the “missing episode” to other statuses count = 1.

In the example that I demonstrated earlier, I fixed one of the two sequences to be a reference sequence allowing the other sequence to compare with. This is one way of doing the matching; another way is to compare with the most frequent one. As for my analysis, because no particular type of career sequence is pre-defined, I request every possible pair-wise distance comparison to be calculated. The computed distances are stored in a matrix, to be used via a grouping method to generate a cluster of sequences. This introduces us to the third stage of the OM - the cluster analysis.

With the distance calculated by OM, sequences with close resemblance can be grouped together via cluster analysis, which is an obvious candidate for fusing large amounts of information into a small number of clusters with similar patterns. Even though it is popular, cluster analysis, as most visualisation methods, can be ineffective in discovering interesting groupings because simply different clustering algorithms provide different solutions. A sensitivity analysis practise on different clustering methods is therefore called to find the most noteworthy clusters by applying different clustering methods [McVicar and Anyadike-Danes, 2002]. In this analysis, single linkage, complete linkage and Ward’s hierarchical methods were attempted. By comparing the results given by these algorithms, the result given by Ward’s algorithm tends to characterise the employment status history of its members more distinctively than that of the other two methods. It suggests that the number of clusters is 6. Because the 5th and 6th clusters are very small and contain mainly missing episodes, I merge them with the largest cluster. This step gives me the final four-cluster solution.

4.6.5 The Cluster Sets

To ensure that the sequential character of the data can be retained without merging into single events, Brzinsky-Fay et al. [2006] propose two preliminary assessments to be carried out before the comparison: the description of the characteristics of each cluster and the visualisation with the aid of plots. Table 4.4 presents in the fashion of occupation-time budget [Gershuny, 1993] to show the average duration spent on each of the employment states by cluster membership. Figure 4.10 provides the descriptive information of elements of the four clusters and their sequential characteristics of the career transitions respectively.

Cluster 1 - working class upward trajectory

Cluster 1, represents 17% of the sample, containing interesting features. Employment trajectories of this cluster are dominated by relatively long employment in managerial position. Typical members of this cluster started either serving in the People's Liberation Army (in purple), or working in the industrial (in red) or service sector (in teal) before occupying managerial positions. Short spells of off-the-job training can be observed (in navy).


Cluster 2 - white-collar work stable The second cluster represents 21% of people in the sample. Professional (in black) and clerical work (in orange) dominate this cluster, which on average amount to 10 and 7 years respectively, within twenty-five years since first entry to the labour market.

Cluster 3 - blue-collar work stable Cluster 3, the largest cluster, represents 45% of people in the sample dominated by blue-collar work. Roughly half the members of this cluster had long durations of staying in a single employment sector, working either as an industrial worker (in red) or a service worker (in teal). The average number of years spent in these two employments is 14 and 7 years respectively, as opposed to the overall sample mean of 9 and 4 years.

Tab. 4.4: Average duration at each episode for five clusters.

Cluster	Manag.	Prof.	Clerk	Semp.	Serv. Worker	Average duration in			Unemp.	Education	Army	Missing
						Indus. Worker	Agric. Worker	Inact.				
1	8.5	0.8	1.5	0.3	4.0	4.4	0.4	0.0	0.0	1.1	3.1	0.9
2	0.9	10.7	6.5	2.0	0.5	1.1	0.4	0.4	0.0	1.0	0.0	1.5
3	0.0	0.1	0.6	0.4	6.7	13.8	1.6	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.0	1.5
4	0.8	1.2	1.2	0.6	3.2	9.7	0.5	0.1	5.6	0.2	0.2	1.7
Total	1.8	2.7	2.1	0.7	4.4	8.8	0.9	0.2	0.9	0.5	0.6	1.4

Source: 2003 CGSS, own calculations.

Fig. 4.10: Sequence index plots with **order** from Optimal Matching by cluster.

DATA SOURCE: CGSS, 2003

4. The Consequences of Being Rusticated: Transitions and Sequences

Cluster 4 - working class downward trajectory The sequences in the final cluster are characterised by a relatively long employment in the industrial sector before being laid off, the mean number of years in unemployment (in yellow) within this cluster is 6 years, much higher than the overall sample mean, which is less than one year. This cluster represents 17% of people in the sample.

The summary of the four clusters is shown in Table 4.5. About 45% of members in the sample fall into the “blue-collar worker stable” trajectory, half of which stayed as an industrial worker during the holistic observation period, with no short spells of changes into other types of occupation⁷. This feature of job immobility echoes with studies which compare labour mobility across cohorts. One study using a 1995 national survey notes that urban residents in China have the longest average job tenure of 20 years as opposed to other countries in transition economy [Knight and Yueh, 2004]; for job entry cohorts of 1975-1984 (they belong to the same birth cohort as the sample of my analysis), the percentage of those that have never changed jobs within twenty years of employment is as high as 70% [Knight and Song, 2005, ch. 7]. State workers, given the “iron rice bowls” of lifelong employment, might have found that the cost of changing jobs to other sectors was high. Scholars attribute such job immobility to the bureaucratic system of job assignments and the non-existence of labour market in China’s planned socialism [Whyte and Parish, 1984a, p33] [Knight and Song, 2005].

The high concentration of respondents in Cluster 3, and to a lesser degree, in Cluster 2 indicates what typical career trajectories the cohort of interest would have taken up. Zhou and Hou [1999]’s study shows that 70% of their children of the Cultural Revolution were employed as production or service workers for their first urban job, whereas 17% were employed as professionals or clerks [Zhou and Hou, 1999]. The selection into Cluster 2 rather than Cluster 3 presumably associates with

⁷ Because of the way that each occupation is classified for the present analysis, it is only possible to know if the genre of the occupation was changed, but not for cases where respondents maintained the same job but moved to different working units.

4. The Consequences of Being Rusticated: Transitions and Sequences

Tab. 4.5: Descriptions of four-cluster solution.

Cluster	N	Brief Description
1	270 (16.9%)	Dominated by long spells in managerial work, sometimes preceded by short spells working in industrial, service sectors or serving in the PLA.
2	341 (21.3%)	Typical white-collar working life: long and continuous spells in professional or clerical work.
3	722 (45.2%)	The largest cluster. Typical blue-collar working life: long and continuous spells in industrial or service work.
4	266 (16.6%)	Working life is cut short by spells of unemployment. Typical types of occupation before being unemployed are industrial works.
Total	1599	

the implementation of meritocratic principle in the recruitment process at the end of the Revolution: The re-opening of universities and the restoration of university entry exam played full roles in facilitating this meritocracy. The former gave equal opportunities for the rusticates, non-rusticates to compete against each other as well as against fresh high school graduates; the latter enabled the revival of the old recruitment selection judging on the basis of the exam results of individuals. Given the interrupted education, only a small percentage of the CR cohort passed the exam and were assigned to good positions in state-owned enterprises or to working units where high skills were required, whereas the vast majority of the cohort started with shop-floor jobs [Liu, 2008].

What makes Figure 4.10 more interesting are the smaller clusters - the “working class upward trajectory” and the “working class downward trajectory” - which exhibit contrasting career trajectories. The occupational trajectory displayed in Cluster 1 demonstrates a trend of career advancement for members of this cluster. A number of them obtained managerial positions after years serving in the army. Extreme cases were discussed in Bonnin’s paper where children of top-ranked offi-

4. The Consequences of Being Rusticated: Transitions and Sequences

cials were sent to the PLA during the Revolution and who later became the country's political elites [Bonnin, 2006]. Dominated by long spells of unemployment, Cluster 4 represents a group of people who lost in the economic transition. The redundancy programme launched fully in mid-1990s in urban China, around 20 years after the older ones of the CR cohort joined the labour force, and 10 years since the first entry for the younger ones. About two third of respondents in Cluster 4 undertook industrial work before unemployment, and one third were in service work. Based on 1999 urban survey, Knight and Song pointed out that industrial and service workers bore great risks of retrenchment with other factors held in constant [Knight and Song, 2005, ch. 6].

4.7 *Predicting the Employment Sequence Types*

To answer the research question of whether the rustication episode has any enduring effect on the particular career sequences followed by the rusticates, I use the output of cluster sets as the dependent variables in a regression model. The covariates include father's occupation when the respondent was aged 18 (which measures respondent's social origin), respondent's educational attainment and party membership, father's educational and political backgrounds and gender.

Estimated results given in Table 4.6 come from the multinomial logistic regression; and Table 4.7 gives the marginal effects of covariances. The effect of being rusticated increases the likelihood of membership in the “working class downward trajectory” cluster (Cluster 4). This corresponds to Qian and Hodson [2010]’s findings of early retirement of former rusticates. Also, longer duration of rustication episode enhances this effect. As opposed to non-rusticates, former rusticates are less likely to experience a working-class-upward trajectory or a white-collar-work-stable trajectory.

Educational credential is a strong indicator in recruitment into three clusters. Holding other variables constant, the CR cohort with higher degree of education in-

4. The Consequences of Being Rusticated: Transitions and Sequences

creases the likelihood of following a ‘white collar work stable’ employment trajectory (Cluster 2), and decreases the likelihood of having an employment trajectory of ‘blue collar work stable’ (Cluster 3) or ‘working class downward’ (Cluster 4). The effect of party membership shows to be statistically significant in recruitment into working-class-upward trajectory (Cluster 1). The fact that a good proportion of people in this cluster have joined the PLA boosts the likelihood of party membership.

Father’s occupation at respondent’s age 18 and father’s education show no statistically discernible impact on the risk of being in a particular employment cluster. Yet those respondents whose fathers were party members have a marginally significant, higher likelihood of having an employment trajectory of ‘working class upward’, and a lower likelihood of having a blue-collar-work stable trajectory.

Compared with men, women have a lower chance to be in the ‘working class upward trajectory’ cluster (Cluster 1), and are more likely to be experiencing a white-collar-work stable work-life (Cluster 2) or unemployment at later stage of employment history (Cluster 4).

4.8 Chapter Conclusion

In this chapter, I examined the issue of how the rustication policy affected the later lives of rusticates by exploring two life course aspects: the timing of important life transitions and the work-life sequence.

In comparison to the preceding and succeeding cohorts, the CR cohorts are shown to have lagged entries into various life stages: the first marriage (the first childbearing), the completion of college education and attainment of the first urban job. Within the CR cohort, there is a disparity in the temporal order of life events between rusticates and non-rusticates, and this difference is even greater between the older rusticates and their contemporaries.

The study of the entire work-life history using the OM technique generates a four-cluster typology of career sequences from the first employment to the labour market

Tab. 4.6: Estimates from multinomial logistic models of work-life clusters on selected independent variables (Cluster: 1, working class upward trajectory; 2, white-collar class stable; 3, blue-collar class stable; 4, working class downward trajectory).

	1v3		2v3		4v3	
Intercept	-2.689***	(0.29)	-1.567***	(0.24)	-1.062***	(0.21)
Male	1.110***	(0.20)	-0.487**	(0.16)	-0.553***	(0.16)
Education						
<i>Elementary school or above</i>	ref.		ref.		ref.	
<i>Junior H.S.</i>	-0.047	(0.28)	-0.106	(0.28)	-0.022	(0.23)
<i>Senior H.S.</i>	0.331	(0.29)	1.323***	(0.27)	0.283	(0.25)
<i>College or above</i>	2.319***	(0.41)	3.313***	(0.38)	0.680	(0.47)
Party member	2.131***	(0.21)	0.642**	(0.21)	0.438†	(0.24)
Father's occupation						
<i>Working class</i>	ref.		ref.		ref.	
<i>High-rank cadre</i>	0.582	(0.38)	-0.144	(0.36)	-0.222	(0.38)
<i>High-prestige professional</i>	-0.024	(0.45)	0.196	(0.35)	0.052	(0.37)
<i>Low-rank cadre</i>	-0.031	(0.29)	-0.164	(0.26)	-0.267	(0.27)
<i>Low-prestige professional</i>	0.203	(0.25)	0.343	(0.22)	-0.094	(0.23)
Father is a party member	0.510*	(0.23)	0.297	(0.20)	0.247	(0.21)
Father's education						
<i>Elementary school or above</i>	ref.		ref.		ref.	
<i>Junior H.S.</i>	-0.190	(0.27)	0.183	(0.21)	-0.278	(0.24)
<i>Senior H.S.</i>	-0.952*	(0.42)	-0.064	(0.33)	0.049	(0.34)
<i>College or above</i>	-0.373	(0.49)	0.164	(0.40)	-0.383	(0.47)
Rustication Experience						
<i>No rustication experience</i>	ref.		ref.		ref.	
<i>Rustication Duration < 5</i>	-0.412	(0.27)	-0.436†	(0.23)	0.373†	(0.23)
<i>Rustication Duration ≥ 5</i>	-0.441	(0.31)	-0.018	(0.23)	0.738***	(0.20)

Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.

† $p < .10$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (two-tailed test).

n = 1417.

Source: 2003 CGSS.

Tab. 4.7: Multinomial logit model for work-life clusters - marginal effects at sample means (Cluster: 1, working class upward trajectory; 2, white-collar class stable; 3, blue-collar class stable; 4, working class downward trajectory).

	Cluster 1	Cluster 2	Cluster 3	Cluster 4
Male	0.153***	-0.092***	0.026	-0.088***
Education				
<i>Elementary school or below</i>	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.
<i>Junior H.S.</i>	-0.002	-0.016	0.016	0.002
<i>Senior H.S.</i>	-0.013	0.225***	-0.186***	-0.026
<i>College or above</i>	0.064	0.523***	-0.457***	-0.130***
Party member	0.299***	-0.006	-0.256	-0.037
Father's occupation				
<i>Working class</i>	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.
<i>High-rank cadre</i>	0.093	-0.036	-0.016	-0.041
<i>High-prestige professional</i>	-0.010	0.034	-0.024	-
<i>Low-rank cadre</i>	0.007	-0.017	0.041	-0.031
<i>Low-prestige professional</i>	0.015	0.059	-0.043	-0.031
Father is a party member	0.047†	0.025	-0.083*	0.011
Father's education				
<i>Elementary school or below</i>	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.
<i>Junior H.S.</i>	-0.020	0.049	0.013	-0.041
<i>Senior H.S.</i>	-0.080†	0.007	0.046	0.027
<i>College or above</i>	-0.036	0.055	0.031	-0.050
Rustication Experience				
<i>Non-rusticates</i>	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.
<i>Rustication Duration < 5</i>	-0.042†	-0.073*	0.026	0.089*
<i>Rustication Duration ≥ 5</i>	-0.061	-0.027	-0.051	0.139***

Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.

† $p < .10$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (two-tailed test).

n = 1417.

Source: 2003 CGSS.

4. The Consequences of Being Rusticated: Transitions and Sequences

status in the 25th year since first entry. The preservation of the temporal order of career events helps to define a discernible career-pathway type for each cluster. The multinomial logistic regression explains how cluster membership relates to a string of background characteristics. In particular it assists in determining whether the rustication experience raises the likelihood of being in a specific career-pathway type. Results show that respondents from the CR cohort with rustication experience have a higher risk of being in a ‘working class downward’ trajectory which leads to unemployment in the later stage of their career, than their peers with no such experience.

Another theoretically valuable finding is the separate effects of educational credential and party membership on the pursuit of two types of employment trajectories both leading to elite positions. Controlling for the effects of other variables, on the one hand, respondents with superior education are more prone to pursue a white-collar-work-stable career trajectory (Cluster 2), and to a lesser extent, pursuing a working-class-upward trajectory (Cluster 1). On the other hand, those who possess political credentials have a higher chance of following an employment trajectory dominated by being at the managerial position, yet those credentials do not increase the likelihood of following a trajectory dominated by professional works. These findings conform to outcomes of previous studies which specified different effects of party membership and education on dual career paths to elite positions [Walder, 1995a, Walder et al., 2000]. Also consistent with previous studies is the immobility between these two trajectories where respondents who follow the trajectory dominated by administrative work rarely take up professional positions, and vice versa. Previous social mobility studies on China have focused on the risk of transition from one social position to another one; the usual transition would be entry into administrative or professional positions. This analysis is, to my knowledge, the first to employ the holistic career sequence to inspect the mechanism of career paths in Modern China.

Qian and Hodson [2010] argued that the sent-down experience delayed rusticates’

4. The Consequences of Being Rusticated: Transitions and Sequences

entries to the urban labour market, costing them the chance of promotion, leading to their eventual lay-offs during labour market retrenchment.

Given the remarkably small number of college graduates produced by the CR cohort, the shortage of highly educated candidates might well be one of the reasons of these distinctive career paths [Walder et al., 2000]. As the supply of college graduates multiplies year by year since the re-opening of the universities, comparisons with employment trajectories of succeeding cohorts would help to understand the changes of effects of political and educational credentials on career paths, and to detect if such divergence is exclusive to the CR cohort.

There is no straightforward answer to the question of whether the rustication generates positive or negative consequences to the lives and career development of those affected. Older rusticates, due to their longer episode of rustication, are more saliently affected by the rustication in terms of the timing of important life-course events. Although every individual of the CR cohort confronted limited life chances such as high urban unemployment and the closure of universities during the country's upheaval, a small proportion of individuals were selected to join the PLA, enjoying a relatively upward spiral of success after the service.

4.9 Appendix

Tab. 4.8: Supplementary characteristics of the rusticates and the non-rusticates.

	Rusticates	Non-rusticates
Mean Age (in 2003)	49.2	48.6
Percent female	54.5	48.2
Percentage of women who ever joined the labour force	96.3	89.3
Marital Status		
<i>Percent single</i>	1.2	0.9
<i>Percent married</i>	89.1	90.0
<i>Percent divorced</i>	6.0	5.5
Educational Level		
<i>Percent elementary or below</i>	6.5	19.0
<i>Percent junior high</i>	45.6	38.4
<i>Percent senior high</i>	32.0	31.2
<i>Percent college</i>	16.0	11.4
Father's education		
<i>Percent elementary or below</i>	63.9	75.6
<i>Percent junior high</i>	20.2	14.2
<i>Percent senior high</i>	8.0	6.2
<i>Percent college</i>	8.0	4.1
Father's occupation when respondent at age 18		
<i>Percent high-rank cadre</i>	8.9	5.8
<i>Percent high-prestige professional</i>	8.0	7.0
<i>Percent low-rank cadre</i>	15.7	11.9
<i>Percent low-prestige professional</i>	19.5	15.9
<i>Percent worker</i>	47.9	59.4
Number of respondents	494	972

Data source: 2003 CGSS

5. THE CONSEQUENCES OF BEING RUSTICATED: ATTITUDES AND BELIEFS

5.1 *Generation-specific Social and Political Attitudes*

McAdam's engrossing book "Freedom Summer" reveals, that the three-month living experiences with the poor rural blacks in Mississippi in summer 1964 left a remarkable imprint on the lives of the elite white college participants of the Freedom Summer campaign [McAdam, 1990]. The short-lived experience was pervasive enough to transform the young minds: their assorted views on society, culture and politics were challenged, new ideologies were fostered during the exposure to new lifestyles. McAdam finds many of these participants have remained activists to this day.

Having been exposed to a new environment much longer than their American contemporaries, did the Chinese rusticates form a different view of life contradictory to Maoist revolutionary ideology, which later affected their political attitudes and social behaviours? When explaining the legacy of the rustication, Zhou and Hou [1999] pointed out the acute impact of its experience on the attitudes and behaviours of the rusticates, the fact that this generation not only produced a cohort of reformers who were masterminds behind several state policies, but more enduringly developed a 'materialistic orientation' which shaped the ideologies of subsequent cohorts.

For most of the early rusticates, they were more volunteers rather than being forced to leave home to go to the countryside. Similar to those white elite students who came forward to participate in the 1964 Freedom Summer campaign in hope to bring more blacks to vote, they thought they were making the history of building

5. The Consequences of Being Rusticated: Attitudes and Beliefs

more “socialist villages”. Both experiences have become vital turning points in the lives of those affected, the difference is that the Freedom Summer transformed its participants to radicals, prompting them to get involved in more social movements. By contrast, rusticates spent fruitless years in the countryside experiencing the sentimental transformation from pursuit of ideology to disappointment to the final disillusionment.

I have shown in the previous chapter that the rusticates experienced delays in social life. Compared with other birth cohorts and the non-rusticates, they were late in marriage, reproduction, getting the college degree (not with the non-rusticates) and entering the labour market. In terms of work history, they are more likely to follow an employment trajectory dominated by a long spell of unemployment. Their life experience appears to be vulnerable to the misfortunes of history.

One study in explaining the puzzling emotional shift of the sent-down generation from rejecting the experiences of the rustication right after their return to the cities to the collective nostalgia for the past a decade later, remarked that the transformed reflections of this generation were greatly influenced by their status quo or living conditions in the economically reformed China [Yang, 2003]. Unemployment was the greatest issue confronting this generation when the nostalgia emerged in the early 1990s.

Painful memories of the years away from home, vulnerable feelings regarding their situation during the country’s transitional period are common traits disclosed in memoirs or short essays collected from former rusticates [Jiang and Ashley, 2000, Xu, 1998, Chen, 1999b, Hung and Chiu, 2003]. Yet there is lack of empirical evidence to unravel how the sent-down episode is related to later depression.

This chapter continues investigating the consequences of the rustication, but on softer outcomes, precisely it examines rusticates’ subjective well-being (happiness), relative deprivation, collective action and attitudes towards current social issues. The concluding part summarises the collective characteristics demonstrated by the

5. The Consequences of Being Rusticated: Attitudes and Beliefs

CR cohort, and attempts to highlight the parts which are unique to the rusticates.

5.1.1 Data Source and Methods

For the empirical analysis of this chapter, I use the attitudinal part of the 2003 CGSS to offer a continuation of results obtained in the previous chapter: the employment clusters will be incorporated to predict individual's perspectives on social matters.

As part of the main themes of the CGSS to examine the quality of life and perceptions toward important social issues [Bian and Li, 2005], the survey includes a handful of indicators which are sufficient for answering the inquiries. I selected seven questions after the initial data exploration. Each of them intends to represent one aspect of an individual's general well-being, social behaviour and political belief.

The first three questions consist of happiness, relative deprivation and collective action; the last four questions manifest the respondent's social and political inclinations. Life course theory advocates that it is not possible to characterise the consequence of the rustication without comparing the rusticates with the non-rusticates and other cohorts. Even within the rusticates, suggested by the results from the previous chapter, the duration of being sent down and difference in birth year generate different consequences. Thus, for each attitudinal outcome, I incorporate variables to distinguish these subgroups. For each question I present the results of two models. The first includes all the respondents who were born before 1967 in the survey, and intends to show whether there are significant differences not only between rusticates and non-rusticates, but also between rusticates and preceding and succeeding cohorts when other factors are held constant. The second model only looks at those who belong to the CR cohort. Rusticates are further classified based on the duration of their sent-down experience. The model incorporates the work-life clusters derived from the previous chapter. The description of additional independent variables introduced in the models are as follows:

Married/Cohabiting To identify respondents' marital status. It is coded 1 if they

5. The Consequences of Being Rusticated: Attitudes and Beliefs

were married or cohabiting, and 0 if they were not living with a spouse or partner. Note that the value ‘1’ includes re-married people who were previously divorced or widowed.

Log(income) The common logarithm of total annual income in year 2002.

Work-life cluster These are clusters of employment trajectories obtained in the previous chapter for members of the CR cohort only. The reference category is “blue-collar work stable”.

Happiness is coded in 5 categories, and to simplify its interpretation I use a linear regression model for the analysis. I adopt ordered logit regression model¹ and multinomial regression model for the analyses of relative deprivation and collective action respectively. Logit model is used to deal with binary responses in questions concerning political beliefs.

5.1.2 *Are Rusticates Less Happier than Non-rusticates?*

Happiness, or subjective well-being in a broader term, has been enlisted in recent years by social scientists, especially economists as one of the important measures of quality of life. It attempts to capture people’s well-being beyond a mere evaluation of economic resources. Past literature suggests various factors determine the level of life satisfaction, such as age, income, marital status, employment status, etc. Yet such studies rarely look at the impact of adverse biographical experiences like fighting in the war, growing in economic hardship, childhood abuse on later subjective well-being; the main reason is that we do not know how penetrating the effects of these traumatic situations are to a subjective outcome collected at one snapshot in the future. Ideally comparisons of measure of happiness at various time points should provide the true effect of adverse biography. Because of the limitation of the data, I attempt to examine if the experience of rustication influences overall life satisfaction via cohort comparisons.

¹ The parallel regression assumption is tested for the ordered logit model.

5. The Consequences of Being Rusticated: Attitudes and Beliefs

The measure of life gratification is derived from the following question: “Generally speaking, how do you personally feel about your life?” Respondents chose their answer from a five-point scale ranging from “very unhappy” to “very happy”.

Table 5.1 provides the distribution of responses to the life satisfaction scale by cohorts. Compared to other cohorts, those born before 1947, growing up during China’s golden age of early socialism, appear to be more satisfied with their lives. This is not surprising given that this cohort enjoyed a relative stability in the pre-reform era (except the very few who were in the position of authority and were severely purged) and career advancement via the seniority-based system before the start of retrenchment policies. Rusticates in both 1947-1953 and 1954-1960 cohorts score the lowest on average in life gratification.

Tab. 5.1: Q. “Generally speaking, how do you personally feel about your life?” (%)

	Very unhappy	Unhappy	So-so	Happy	Very happy	Average score*
pre-1947 Cohort	1.7	8.7	44.1	38.5	7.0	2.405
1947-1953 Non-rusticates	3.4	14.5	47.6	28.7	5.7	2.189
1947-1953 Rusticates	3.8	10.6	57.5	25.1	3.0	2.128
1954-1960 Non-rusticates	3.2	13.1	51.5	29.4	2.9	2.159
1954-1960 Rusticates	4.7	12.8	56.0	22.6	3.9	2.082
1961-1967 Cohort	1.9	12.0	51.3	30.9	4.0	2.232
Total	2.6	11.6	49.5	31.5	4.8	2.243

H_0 : diff = mean(rusticates) - mean(non-rusticates in all cohorts) = 0. $t = 4.036$, $p < .001$.

* Based on score of ‘very unhappy’ = 0. ‘unhappy’ = 1, ‘so-so’ = 2, ‘happy’ = 3, ‘very happy’ = 4.

‘Don’t know’ and ‘no answer’ responses are omitted.

Source: 2003 CGSS.

The descriptive analysis reveals the cohort difference, a multivariate analysis

5. The Consequences of Being Rusticated: Attitudes and Beliefs

allows us to filter out various ascriptive characteristics and other factors which shape life reflections. Model I in Table 5.6 confirms that the oldest cohort (those born before 1947) is the happiest cohort. Rusticates tend to be the least satisfied with life as opposed to the cohort born before 1947, reducing the happiness score by 25% for the 1947-1953 rusticates and 30% for the 1954-1960 rusticates. Both models I and II show that respondents are happier if they are female, financially better off, members of the Communist Party, and live as part of a couple. When looking at all the cohorts together, respondents with a college education or above appear to be happier than those with no or basic level of education. Also having a father who is a party member increases the degree of life satisfaction. Within the CR cohort, rusticates with longer sent-down duration were significantly less happier than the non-rusticates. Employment trajectory groups show to be predictive of happiness. Respondents in working-class upward and white-collar work stable trajectory groups are more satisfied with their lives in general than those of blue-collar work stable trajectory group.

5.1.3 *Do Rusticates Experience Higher Level of Deprivation?*

The following two questions relate respondent's current socioeconomic situation to that of three years ago and those of peers in their age groups. Both questions intend to measure relative deprivation, each with different reference group. Among all the cohorts, the oldest cohort (born before 1947) has the highest percentages of responding "Better" or "Same" in both the vertical (Table 5.2) and horizontal (Table 5.3) measures of relative deprivation. The rusticates in the 1954-1960 cohort has the highest percentages of responding "Worse" in both questions.

In the multivariate analysis (Model I of Tables 5.7 and 5.8), the advantaged position of the cohort born before 1947 shows to be salient, as opposed to the 1954-1960 rusticates; the odds of reporting an unchanged or worse socioeconomic situation compared to three years before are 46 percent higher for rusticates in

Tab. 5.2: Q. What is your socioeconomic status compared with that of three years ago?

	Better	Same	Worse
pre-1947	28.3	46.8	24.9
1947-1953 Non-rusticates	23.4	38.9	37.7
1947-1953 Rusticates	22.4	40.5	37.1
1954-1960 Non-rusticates	23.1	39.9	37.0
1954-1960 Rusticates	15.0	40.2	44.7
1961-1967 Cohort	26.9	39.7	33.5
Total	25.0	41.6	33.4

H_0 : $\text{diff} = \text{mean}(\text{rusticates}) - \text{mean}(\text{non-rusticates in all cohorts}) = 0$. $t = 4.090$, $p < .001$.
‘Hard to say’ responses are omitted.

Source: 2003 CGSS.

Tab. 5.3: Q. What is your socioeconomic status compared with those of others in the same birth cohort?

	Better	Same	Worse
pre-1947 Cohort	6.2	51.9	41.9
1947-1953 Non-rusticates	3.7	47.1	49.2
1947-1953 Rusticates	4.4	49.6	46.0
1954-1960 Non-rusticates	4.5	46.1	49.3
1954-1960 Rusticates	4.2	42.7	53.1
1961-1967 Cohort	3.5	47.5	48.9
Total	4.6	48.2	47.2

H_0 : $\text{diff} = \text{mean}(\text{rusticates}) - \text{mean}(\text{non-rusticates in all cohorts}) = 0$. $t = 1.064$, $p = .288$.
‘Hard to say’ responses are omitted.

Source: 2003 CGSS.

5. The Consequences of Being Rusticated: Attitudes and Beliefs

the 1947-1953 cohort and 94 percent higher for rusticates in the 1954-1960 cohort, with other variables held constant. Within the CR cohort, compared to the non-rusticates, the rusticates with longer sent-down episode are more likely to think their own situations are the same or worse than those of three years ago. The difference between sent-down experience is not significant when respondents make comparison with their age peers. Members of four employment trajectories review different degree of deprivation relative to their historical situation and to their age peers. Compared to those who experienced ‘blue-collar work stable’ employment trajectory, all else being equal, members of ‘working class upward’ and ‘white-collar work stable’ groups are more likely to respond a better socioeconomic situation than those of three years ago; members of the ‘white-collar work stable’ group also were inclined to think they are in a better situation than their age peers.

Income plays an important role in both measures of relative deprivation. Respondents tend to be more positive about their economic situation if they earn higher income. In comparison to the situation of members of the same age cohort, the effects of educational level and geographical location are significant. The more educated favour to consider themselves in a better situation as opposed to their age peers. Surprisingly, respondents from municipalities, compared to their counterparts in small towns, are more likely to think they are in no better situation than their contemporaries. This mirrors the large increase in overall level of inequality in urban areas.

It is of interest to note that in the 1996 LHSC respondents were asked how their family’s current situation was compared to that of ten years ago, the average percentage of people who responded “Better” was as high as 82%. Yet when the General Social Survey conducted in 2003, the average percentage of people who thought their socioeconomic situation was better than three years ago was merely one quarter. This bifurcation in perception suggests that though nationally China has enjoyed a steady growth since the late 1970s, there has been a nonlinear progres-

5. The Consequences of Being Rusticated: Attitudes and Beliefs

sion of economic situation at individual level. The first one and half decades after the economic reform witnessed a significant soar in living conditions of ordinary Chinese households; however, the widening income gap and radical urban reforms from the mid-1990s to the beginning of this century may contribute to the overall fall in perception of one's socioeconomic situation.

5.1.4 *Collective Action in terms of Conflict Solving*

Individuals participate in collective actions for organised interests. Given that China is under a totalitarian regime in which collective actions induced by organised political interests are saliently prohibited, the survey of 2003 CGSS managed to seek for the attitude towards the participation to collective actions by setting the scene in a hypothetical conflict resolution situation. The question asked in the survey is shown below.

Question:

In an adjustment of wages or positions, suppose a large number of workers including yourself were treated badly and unfairly. Under this situation, if someone moves to talk and negotiate with employers, and they ask you to join them, what would you do?

Responses:

- Never join them;
- I will see how the situation evolves before making any decision;
- Involved in, but not be the leader;
- Positively support and actively involved in.

Table 5.4 shows an age effect in comparing different cohorts responding to the question: When unfairly treated at work place, the younger cohorts (the 1954-1960 cohort and the 1961-1967 cohort) gravitate to a more active approach than most of the older cohorts (the pre-1947 cohort and the 1947-1953 cohort), as the latter

5. The Consequences of Being Rusticated: Attitudes and Beliefs

prefer to stay out in such situation. More rusticates, compared to non-rusticates in the same cohort, choose to be proactive in negotiating with the authority.

Tab. 5.4: Distribution of attitude on collective action across cohorts

	Never join	Free-rider	Involved	Activist	Average Score
pre-1947 Cohort	38.2	15.2	21.4	25.2	1.336
1947-1953 Non-rusticates	29.5	16.6	23.4	30.6	1.550
1947-1953 Rusticates	27.6	14.9	21.9	35.5	1.654
1954-1960 Non-rusticates	25.0	18.3	25.5	31.3	1.631
1954-1960 Rusticates	17.2	13.6	33.2	36.0	1.880
1961-1967 Cohort	18.0	19.9	26.5	35.6	1.797
Total	27.0	17.1	24.6	31.3	1.602

H_0 : diff = mean(rusticates) - mean(non-rusticates in all cohorts) = 0. $t = -2.918$, $p < .01$.

* Based on score of ‘never join’ = 0. ‘bystander’ = 1, ‘involved’ = 2, ‘activist’ = 3. ‘Don’t know’ and ‘no answer’ responses are omitted.

Source: 2003 CGSS.

The disparity between the older and younger cohorts remains striking even after holding a string of variables constant (Table 5.11). The odds of being more active are almost double for the rusticates and the “After 1960” cohort, as opposed to the “Before 1947” cohort. The choices of resolutions in social conflict given by younger cohorts may suggest a changing pattern of grievance actions from an individualist approach in the early days [Tang and Parish, 2000, p. 191] to a corporatist approach.

Among the CR cohort, rusticates do not show to be more prone to stand up to defend their rights compared to non-rusticates. Different work-life clusters result in diverse social actions in conflict solving: First, members of the “white-collar work stable” are more likely to be actively involved in such hypothetical wage conflict than members of the “blue-collar work stable” group. As discussed in the previous

5. The Consequences of Being Rusticated: Attitudes and Beliefs

chapter, this group represents the majority of China's middle class. Although early studies have noted the lack of common values and participation in collective actions of this middle class [Wright, 1997, Pearson, 1997], the response of the "white-collar work stable" group seems to conform to the results from one recent work, hinting at a change in the role played by the new middle class in social conflicts to gain a more autonomous position from state control [Song and Wu, 2009]. Second, compared to other trajectory groups, members of the "working class downward" group are more inclined to be actively involved in wage conflict. With a long spell of unemployment in work-life history, this group forms the new urban poverty stratum; it has constituted the dominating force of recent urban labour protests complaining about layoffs and pensions [Lum, 2006].

5.1.5 *Political Beliefs*

The indoctrination of the Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought occupied almost the entire upbringing of the CR cohort. They were taught to glorify "heroism, patriotism and altruism" and were made to be idealistic [Chen, 1999a]. The emergence of visible social differences and inequities in recent years clearly contradicts the egalitarian ideology instilled into them. What is the general attitude of this cohort regarding focal issues like the rise of inequality and democracy, for they have experienced the crude awakening from the disastrous Revolution and may have developed cynicism towards government's or Party's rhetoric and imposed ideology?

The data used to measure political beliefs come from four survey questions concerning perspectives on democracy and social equity in the 2003 CGSS. Respondents were asked if they agreed or disagreed with the following four statements:

1. It is fair that today some people earn more money than others.
2. Children of peasants and industrial workers have same opportunities to become rich and achieve high status as those of other classes.

5. The Consequences of Being Rusticated: Attitudes and Beliefs

3. Democracy means that citizens have direct voices and decision power on national and local matters
4. To discuss important national and local matters requires high levels of knowledge and competence, and only people with high-level knowledge and competence should do it.

The first two statements intend to understand people's attitude on focal issues which have distressed the Chinese government. The rusticates are reminded here that one of the fundamental reasons of their sojourn in the countryside was to reduce inequalities in incomes and opportunities between urban and rural areas and between large and small cities. Yet the current status quo is that these inequalities have not reduced but have widened instead; industrial workers, were once the leading class, and peasants, portrayed as its ally, are on the losing end of current social changes, and their children are among the worst-off. Both the first and second statements relate to Rawls' principle of social justice while Statement 1 concerns the justification of economic inequality, Statement 2 stresses *fair equality of opportunity* [Rawls, 1971] for everyone regardless of their socioeconomic status.

Although China's political system has progressed to be more open, it is a far cry from being democratic. Because of the state's unwillingness to prompt democracy, it is assumed that people may have various ideas of what democracy implies; the last two statements aim to find this out. Statements 3 and 4 are like two sides of the same coin: The former depicts the form of democracy which supports political participation of all citizens, the latter goes directly against it by arguing that those with merits deserve to be more influential.

The differences between cohorts are not statistically significant in their political attitudes, and neither are those between the rusticates and non-rusticates and other cohorts (Tables 5.12 and 5.13). Except for the youngest cohort (the 1961-1967 cohort) in the sample, more than half of respondents in other cohorts find it unfair that today some people earn more than others (Table 5.5). The 1961-1967 cohort

Tab. 5.5: Perspectives on political beliefs by cohorts.

	Social inequality		Equal opportunity		Direct democracy		Elitist attitude	
	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree
pre-1947 Cohort	42.0	58.1	79.7	20.3	69.46	30.54	33.57	66.43
1947-1953 Non-rusticates	40.3	59.7	81.2	18.9	73.48	26.52	40.87	59.13
1947-1953 Rusticates	42.8	57.2	78.1	21.9	69.19	30.81	36.61	63.39
1954-1960 Non-rusticates	47.8	52.2	78.7	21.3	72.46	27.54	40.8	59.2
1954-1960 Rusticates	41.1	59.0	79.8	20.2	65.81	34.19	33.2	66.8
1961-1967 Cohort	51.5	48.5	78.4	21.6	72.16	27.84	38.84	61.16
Total	45.5	54.5	79.3	20.7	71.08	28.92	37.57	62.43

‘Don’t know’ responses are omitted.

Source: 2003 CGSS.

5. The Consequences of Being Rusticated: Attitudes and Beliefs

who spent most of their formative years after the Cultural Revolution, do not seem to have inherited the legacies of Maoist ideology of an egalitarian society. In regard to other political beliefs, the majority of respondents ascertain a fair opportunity for children from the least advantaged backgrounds and agree that democracy denotes the fact that citizens can participate directly in the decision-making of national and local matters. Less than half of respondents have elitist attitude.

After controlled for other variables, educational level is a strong predictor on the statement of social inequality, with the better educated more likely to accept the current situation of inequality. In the same vein, within the CR cohort, compared to the “working-class stable” and “working-class downward” groups, the “white-collar work stable” group with its members having the higher level of educations than those of other groups, is expected to agree that the current earning disparity is fair. It is reasonable to think that members of the “white-class stable” group resemble China’s middle class in their political attitudes – they support government’s economic reforms and have the tendency to think the current social challenges are inevitable for ultimate advancement.

On the issue of fair opportunity for children from least advantaged families, the significance and signs of several coefficients change when considering all cohorts together and CR cohort separately: First, when looking at all cohorts together, after holding other variables in constant, respondents whose fathers are high-rank cadres or party members are more likely than those whose fathers are workers or non-party members to agree that children of peasants and industrial workers have equal chances of achieving high status as others. On the contrary, father’s educational level is negatively correlated with agreement of the statement. Within the CR cohort alone, however, these family background factors are not statistically significant. Second, only the educational level of the respondents appears to be statistically significant – the better educated the respondent is the less likely she or he agrees that the current society is socially mobile. The outcomes of Models 1b and 2b sketch the

5. The Consequences of Being Rusticated: Attitudes and Beliefs

intelligentsia of the CR cohort as being more affirmative with the current economic policy, and less agreeable of opportunities of upward mobility for children born in disadvantage groups.

Although statements 3 and 4 pose opposite political stances, Models 3a and 4a suggest that on the one hand party members and the highly educated significantly disapprove the notion of democracy, on the other hand along with those who are financially better-off, disagree also with the belief that elites deserve more influence. Within the CR cohort, party membership and education are not significant variables for attitude on democracy (Model 3b). Those in municipalities are more likely to have an elitist attitude than those in smaller areas (Model 4b).

5.2 Chapter Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter is to find out if the legacy of the rustication is visible through collective attitudes, behaviours or beliefs. The results suggest three attitudinal responses which are more likely to be related with the rustication experience: happiness, relative deprivation (vertical comparison) and action on conflict solving. Rusticates, especially those with longer duration in the countryside, tend to be less happier with their lives in general, feel more deprived compared to their socio-economic situation three years ago and are more prone to stand up, defending their rights in grievance action.

Respondents' political beliefs are based on four questions related to the themes of social equity, social mobility, democracy and elitist attitude. Earlier studies suggested that the rusticates or the CR cohort held a sense of resentment over the socialist regime and sceptism towards the reform policies because they experienced a broken social contract between the state and themselves [Hung and Chiu, 2003, Jin, 1998]. To the contrary, the results in this chapter show no significant character of the rusticates or the CR cohort: Like people in other groups, more than half of them disagree with the current inequality situation, supporting the ideal of opportunities

5. The Consequences of Being Rusticated: Attitudes and Beliefs

for an upward mobility for children from socially disadvantage families, and approve a democracy but disprove the principle of meritocracy.

The rustication experience overall is shown to have a long-lasting impact on the subjective well-being of the affected. Rusticates' particular discontent with their life is expressed through their nostalgia for the Maoist period when the society was generally equal, though equally poor [Hung and Chiu, 2003]. Yet this nostalgia does not mean a wish to return to the “good old days”, as the 1996's survey shows rusticates agree consistently with other groups that in ten years after the end of the Revolution, their economic situation had significantly improved. It is perhaps the cumulative disadvantages over their life course which engender their pessimistic view of life. Or it may be as suggested by Yang [2003] that a feeling of lack of public recognition by the state for what they have endured, especially during the period of political turmoil, contributed to their sense of having been abandoned by the state.

Although rusticates share many similarities in their perspectives on life and socio-economic attitude, this chapter also shows their views are shaped by their work-life trajectories. The “white-class work stable” group within the CR cohort sticks out not only to be more satisfied with life, and less deprived, but also tends to be proactive in conflict solving, and has a higher proportion of supporters to the current economic policy.

Over other focal issues, the rusticates exhibit similar concerns as the rest of respondents in the whole sample. At the top of the list of the most important social problems facing the nation, they put down unemployment, corruption and rich-poor polarisation.

5.3 Appendix

Tab. 5.6: Estimates from linear regression models on happiness ('very unhappy' = 0, 'unhappy' = 1, 'so-so' = 2, 'happy' = 3, 'very happy' = 4).

Model I: Comparisons between cohorts			Model II: Comparisons within CR cohort		
	$\hat{\beta}$	s.e.		$\hat{\beta}$	s.e.
Male	-0.128***	(0.03)	Male	-0.152**	(0.05)
Married/Cohabiting	0.360***	(0.07)	Married/Cohabiting	0.473***	(0.11)
Party member	0.211***	(0.04)	Party member	0.208**	(0.07)
Log(income)	0.316***	(0.03)	Log(income)	0.372***	(0.04)
Education			Education		
<i>Junior H.S.</i>	0.061	(0.05)	<i>Junior H.S.</i>	0.091	(0.08)
<i>Senior H.S.</i>	0.061	(0.05)	<i>Senior H.S.</i>	0.075	(0.08)
<i>College or above</i>	0.166**	(0.06)	<i>College or above</i>	0.118	(0.11)
Location			Location		
<i>Prefercture-lvl city</i>	0.049	(0.04)	<i>Prefercture-lvl city</i>	0.092	(0.07)
<i>Provincial capital</i>	0.059	(0.04)	<i>Provincial capital</i>	0.100	(0.07)
<i>Municipality</i>	-0.000	(0.04)	<i>Municipality</i>	0.084	(0.07)
Father's occupation			Father's occupation		
<i>High-rank cadre</i>	0.039	(0.08)	<i>High-rank cadre</i>	0.116	(0.11)
<i>High-prestige professional</i>	0.065	(0.07)	<i>High-prestige professional</i>	0.200†	(0.12)
<i>Low-rank cadre</i>	-0.002	(0.06)	<i>Low-rank cadre</i>	0.083	(0.08)
<i>Low-prestige professional</i>	-0.075	(0.05)	<i>Low-prestige professional</i>	-0.024	(0.07)
Father's education			Father's education		
<i>Junior H.S.</i>	-0.036	(0.05)	<i>Junior H.S.</i>	0.017	(0.07)
<i>Senior H.S.</i>	0.121†	(0.07)	<i>Senior H.S.</i>	0.097	(0.11)
<i>College or above</i>	-0.034	(0.09)	<i>College or above</i>	-0.180	(0.13)
Father is a party member	0.077†	(0.04)	Father is a party member	0.041	(0.06)
Cohort			Work-life cluster		
<i>pre-1947 cohort</i>	ref.		<i>Blue-collar work stable</i>	ref.	
<i>1947-1953 non-rusticate</i>	-0.123*	(0.05)	<i>Working class upward</i>	0.159*	(0.08)
<i>1947-1953 rusticates</i>	-0.242**	(0.07)	<i>White-collar work stable</i>	0.225**	(0.07)
<i>1954-1960 non-rusticates</i>	-0.183***	(0.05)	<i>Working class downward</i>	0.090	(0.07)
<i>1954-1960 rusticates</i>	-0.278***	(0.07)	1954-1960 Cohort	-0.074	(0.05)
<i>post-1960 cohort</i>	-0.140**	(0.05)	Rustication Experience		
			<i>Rustication Duration < 5</i>	-0.045	(0.07)
			<i>Rustication Duration ≥ 5</i>	-0.230**	(0.08)
Constant	1.657***	(0.13)	Constant	1.227***	(0.24)
N	2325		N	934	
R^2	0.139		R^2	0.194	
adj. R^2	0.130		adj. R^2	0.172	

† $p < .10$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (two-tailed test).

Source: 2003 CGSS.

Tab. 5.7: Estimates from ordered logit regression models on relative deprivation (Vertical comparison).

Model I: Comparisons between cohorts (better-same-worse)			Model II: Comparisons within CR cohort (better-same-worse)		
	$\hat{\beta}$	s.e.		$\hat{\beta}$	s.e.
Male	0.043	(0.08)	Male	0.177	(0.13)
Married/Cohabiting	-0.227	(0.17)	Married/Cohabiting	-0.132	(0.28)
Party member	-0.132	(0.11)	Party member	0.102	(0.18)
Log(income)	-0.840***	(0.10)	Log(income)	-1.083***	(0.17)
Education			Education		
<i>Junior H.S.</i>	0.060	(0.12)	<i>Junior H.S.</i>	-0.618**	(0.21)
<i>Senior H.S.</i>	0.211†	(0.12)	<i>Senior H.S.</i>	-0.419†	(0.22)
<i>College or above</i>	0.053	(0.16)	<i>College or above</i>	-0.323	(0.29)
Location			Location		
<i>Prefercture-lvl city</i>	-0.225*	(0.11)	<i>Prefercture-lvl city</i>	-0.262	(0.17)
<i>Provincial capital</i>	-0.146	(0.11)	<i>Provincial capital</i>	0.065	(0.19)
<i>Municipality</i>	-0.025	(0.11)	<i>Municipality</i>	0.045	(0.17)
Father's occupation			Father's occupation		
<i>High-rank cadre</i>	0.289	(0.20)	<i>High-rank cadre</i>	0.562†	(0.30)
<i>High-prestige professional</i>	0.153	(0.19)	<i>High-prestige professional</i>	0.319	(0.31)
<i>Low-rank cadre</i>	0.029	(0.14)	<i>Low-rank cadre</i>	-0.050	(0.20)
<i>Low-prestige professional</i>	0.200†	(0.12)	<i>Low-prestige professional</i>	0.442*	(0.19)
Father's education			Father's education		
<i>Junior H.S.</i>	0.042	(0.13)	<i>Junior H.S.</i>	-0.245	(0.19)
<i>Senior H.S.</i>	0.018	(0.17)	<i>Senior H.S.</i>	0.002	(0.28)
<i>College or above</i>	-0.151	(0.22)	<i>College or above</i>	-0.242	(0.34)
Father is a party member	-0.163	(0.11)	Father is a party member	-0.096	(0.17)
Cohort			Work-life cluster		
<i>pre-1947 cohort</i>	ref.		<i>Blue-collar work stable</i>	ref.	
<i>1947-1953 non-rusticate</i>	0.360**	(0.13)	<i>Working class upward</i>	-0.324	(0.20)
<i>1947-1953 rusticates</i>	0.377*	(0.19)	<i>White-collar work stable</i>	-0.547**	(0.18)
<i>1954-1960 non-rusticates</i>	0.325**	(0.12)	<i>Working class downward</i>	0.205	(0.20)
<i>1954-1960 rusticates</i>	0.660***	(0.18)	1954-1960 Cohort	0.213	(0.14)
<i>post-1960 cohort</i>	0.024	(0.12)	Rustication Experience		
			<i>Rustication Duration < 5</i>	0.017	(0.17)
			<i>Rustication Duration ≥ 5</i>	0.398†	(0.21)
cut1 (Same)			cut1 (Same)		
Constant	-4.662***	(0.41)	Constant	-5.929***	(0.82)
cut2 (Worse)			cut2 (Worse)		
Constant	-2.718***	(0.41)	Constant	-3.910***	(0.81)
N	2266		N	918	
Pseudo R^2	0.036		Pseudo R^2	0.064	

† $p < .10$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (two-tailed test).

Source: 2003 CGSS.

Tab. 5.8: Estimates from ordered logit regression models on relative deprivation (Horizontal comparison).

Model I: Comparisons between cohorts			Model II: Comparisons within CR cohort		
	$\hat{\beta}$	s.e.		$\hat{\beta}$	s.e.
Male	-0.024	(0.09)	Male	0.037	(0.15)
Married/Cohabiting	-0.389*	(0.20)	Married/Cohabiting	-0.337	(0.33)
Party member	-0.550***	(0.12)	Party member	-0.317	(0.20)
Log(income)	-1.201***	(0.12)	Log(income)	-1.209***	(0.19)
Education			Education		
<i>Junior H.S.</i>	0.008	(0.13)	<i>Junior H.S.</i>	-0.151	(0.23)
<i>Senior H.S.</i>	-0.245†	(0.14)	<i>Senior H.S.</i>	-0.558*	(0.25)
<i>College or above</i>	-0.386*	(0.18)	<i>College or above</i>	-0.814*	(0.33)
Location			Location		
<i>Prefercture-lvl city</i>	-0.106	(0.12)	<i>Prefercture-lvl city</i>	-0.347†	(0.19)
<i>Provincial capital</i>	0.072	(0.12)	<i>Provincial capital</i>	0.059	(0.20)
<i>Municipality</i>	0.369**	(0.12)	<i>Municipality</i>	0.613**	(0.19)
Father's occupation			Father's occupation		
<i>High-rank cadre</i>	-0.195	(0.22)	<i>High-rank cadre</i>	-0.186	(0.33)
<i>High-prestige professional</i>	-0.388†	(0.21)	<i>High-prestige professional</i>	-0.374	(0.35)
<i>Low-rank cadre</i>	-0.320*	(0.15)	<i>Low-rank cadre</i>	-0.308	(0.23)
<i>Low-prestige professional</i>	0.116	(0.13)	<i>Low-prestige professional</i>	-0.012	(0.20)
Father's education			Father's education		
<i>Junior H.S.</i>	0.256†	(0.14)	<i>Junior H.S.</i>	0.213	(0.21)
<i>Senior H.S.</i>	-0.032	(0.19)	<i>Senior H.S.</i>	-0.172	(0.32)
<i>College or above</i>	-0.074	(0.25)	<i>College or above</i>	0.196	(0.40)
Father is a party member	-0.193	(0.12)	Father is a party member	-0.036	(0.19)
Cohort			Work-life cluster		
<i>pre-1947 cohort</i>	ref.		<i>Blue-collar work stable</i>	ref.	
<i>1947-1953 non-rusticate</i>	0.168	(0.15)	<i>Working class upward</i>	-0.473*	(0.23)
<i>1947-1953 rusticates</i>	0.006	(0.21)	<i>White-collar work stable</i>	-0.377†	(0.20)
<i>1954-1960 non-rusticates</i>	0.232†	(0.14)	<i>Working class downward</i>	0.220	(0.21)
<i>1954-1960 rusticates</i>	0.552**	(0.20)	1954-1960 Cohort	0.316*	(0.16)
<i>post-1960 cohort</i>	0.289*	(0.14)	Rustication Experience		
			<i>Rustication Duration < 5</i>	0.061	(0.19)
			<i>Rustication Duration ≥ 5</i>	0.085	(0.24)
cut1 (Same)			cut1 (Same)		
Constant	-8.684***	(0.54)	Constant	-8.463***	(0.94)
cut2 (Worse)			cut2 (Worse)		
Constant	-5.289***	(0.51)	Constant	-4.843***	(0.90)
N	2196		N	886	
pseudo R^2	0.089		pseudo R^2	0.114	

† $p < .10$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (two-tailed test).

Source: 2003 CGSS.

Tab. 5.9: Estimates from binary regression models on collective action.
 (“Never join” and “Bystander” are coded as 0, “Involved” and “Activist” are coded as 1.)

Model I: Comparisons between cohorts			Model II: Comparisons within CR cohort		
	$\hat{\beta}$	s.e.		$\hat{\beta}$	s.e.
Male	0.051	(0.09)	Male	-0.002	(0.14)
Married/Cohabiting	-0.048	(0.18)	Married/Cohabiting	0.016	(0.30)
Party member	-0.155	(0.12)	Party member	-0.012	(0.19)
Log(income)	-0.192*	(0.08)	Log(income)	-0.168	(0.13)
Education			Education		
<i>Junior H.S.</i>	0.193	(0.13)	<i>Junior H.S.</i>	-0.033	(0.22)
<i>Senior H.S.</i>	0.186	(0.14)	<i>Senior H.S.</i>	-0.032	(0.24)
<i>College or above</i>	0.337+	(0.17)	<i>College or above</i>	0.094	(0.31)
Location			Location		
<i>Prefercture-lvl city</i>	-0.186	(0.12)	<i>Prefercture-lvl city</i>	-0.415*	(0.19)
<i>Provincial capital</i>	-0.033	(0.12)	<i>Provincial capital</i>	-0.110	(0.20)
<i>Municipality</i>	-0.260*	(0.12)	<i>Municipality</i>	-0.312+	(0.18)
Father's occupation			Father's occupation		
<i>High-rank cadre</i>	0.037	(0.22)	<i>High-rank cadre</i>	0.262	(0.33)
<i>High-prestige professional</i>	0.088	(0.20)	<i>High-prestige professional</i>	0.077	(0.33)
<i>Low-rank cadre</i>	-0.095	(0.15)	<i>Low-rank cadre</i>	-0.085	(0.22)
<i>Low-prestige professional</i>	0.035	(0.13)	<i>Low-prestige professional</i>	0.208	(0.20)
Father's education			Father's education		
<i>Junior H.S.</i>	0.066	(0.14)	<i>Junior H.S.</i>	0.021	(0.20)
<i>Senior H.S.</i>	0.172	(0.19)	<i>Senior H.S.</i>	-0.136	(0.31)
<i>College or above</i>	0.049	(0.24)	<i>College or above</i>	-0.524	(0.38)
Father is a party member	0.025	(0.12)	Father is a party member	0.020	(0.18)
Cohort			Work-life cluster		
<i>pre-1947 cohort</i>	ref.		<i>Blue-collar work stable</i>	ref.	
<i>1947-1953 non-rusticate</i>	0.202	(0.14)	<i>Working class upward</i>	0.062	(0.22)
<i>1947-1953 rusticates</i>	0.359+	(0.20)	<i>White-collar work stable</i>	0.155	(0.20)
<i>1954-1960 non-rusticates</i>	0.274*	(0.13)	<i>Working class downward</i>	0.576**	(0.22)
<i>1954-1960 rusticates</i>	0.707***	(0.20)	1954-1960 Cohort	0.096	(0.15)
<i>post-1960 cohort</i>	0.436***	(0.13)	Rustication Experience		
			<i>Rustication Duration</i> < 5	0.376*	(0.19)
			<i>Rustication Duration</i> ≥ 5	0.118	(0.23)
Constant	0.707+	(0.37)	Constant	0.726	(0.70)
N	2233		N	916	
pseudo R^2	0.018		pseudo R^2	0.023	

† $p < .10$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (two-tailed test).

Source: 2003 CGSS.

Tab. 5.10: Estimates from binary regression models on collective action.
 (“Never join” is coded as 0, “Bystander”, “Involved” and “Activist” are coded as 1.)

Model I: Comparisons between cohorts			Model II: Comparisons within CR cohort		
	$\hat{\beta}$	s.e.		$\hat{\beta}$	s.e.
Male	-0.013	(0.10)	Male	-0.006	(0.16)
Married/Cohabiting	-0.072	(0.21)	Married/Cohabiting	-0.047	(0.35)
Party member	-0.275*	(0.13)	Party member	-0.205	(0.22)
Log(income)	-0.035	(0.09)	Log(income)	0.083	(0.14)
Education			Education		
<i>Junior H.S.</i>	0.264†	(0.14)	<i>Junior H.S.</i>	0.122	(0.25)
<i>Senior H.S.</i>	0.105	(0.15)	<i>Senior H.S.</i>	0.051	(0.26)
<i>College or above</i>	0.360†	(0.19)	<i>College or above</i>	0.046	(0.35)
Location			Location		
<i>Prefercture-lvl city</i>	0.053	(0.13)	<i>Prefercture-lvl city</i>	0.121	(0.22)
<i>Provincial capital</i>	0.016	(0.14)	<i>Provincial capital</i>	0.185	(0.24)
<i>Municipality</i>	-0.256†	(0.13)	<i>Municipality</i>	-0.253	(0.20)
Father’s occupation			Father’s occupation		
<i>High-rank cadre</i>	-0.208	(0.26)	<i>High-rank cadre</i>	-0.322	(0.38)
<i>High-prestige professional</i>	0.035	(0.24)	<i>High-prestige professional</i>	-0.061	(0.38)
<i>Low-rank cadre</i>	-0.046	(0.18)	<i>Low-rank cadre</i>	-0.087	(0.26)
<i>Low-prestige professional</i>	-0.245†	(0.14)	<i>Low-prestige professional</i>	-0.073	(0.22)
Father’s education			Father’s education		
<i>Junior H.S.</i>	0.250	(0.17)	<i>Junior H.S.</i>	0.233	(0.25)
<i>Senior H.S.</i>	0.463*	(0.24)	<i>Senior H.S.</i>	-0.387	(0.33)
<i>College or above</i>	-0.106	(0.27)	<i>College or above</i>	-0.350	(0.41)
Father is a party member	0.272†	(0.15)	Father is a party member	0.430†	(0.22)
Cohort			Work-life cluster		
<i>pre-1947 cohort</i>	ref.		<i>Blue-collar work stable</i>	ref.	
<i>1947-1953 non-rusticate</i>	0.314*	(0.15)	<i>Working class upward</i>	-0.023	(0.24)
<i>1947-1953 rusticates</i>	0.467*	(0.23)	<i>White-collar work stable</i>	0.383	(0.23)
<i>1954-1960 non-rusticates</i>	0.477**	(0.15)	<i>Working class downward</i>	0.649*	(0.27)
<i>1954-1960 rusticates</i>	0.862***	(0.23)	1954-1960 Cohort	0.207	(0.17)
<i>post-1960 cohort</i>	0.794***	(0.15)	Rustication Experience		
			<i>Rustication Duration < 5</i>	0.314	(0.22)
			<i>Rustication Duration ≥ 5</i>	0.244	(0.27)
Constant	0.701†	(0.41)	Constant	-0.038	(0.81)
N	2233		N	916	
pseudo R^2	0.039		pseudo R^2	0.033	

† $p < .10$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (two-tailed test).

Source: 2003 CGSS.

Tab. 5.11: Estimates from ordered logistic regression models on collective action (Model 3).

Model I: Comparisons between cohorts			Model II: Comparisons within CR cohort		
	$\hat{\beta}$	s.e.		$\hat{\beta}$	s.e.
Male	0.067	(0.08)	Male	0.086	(0.12)
Married/ Cohabiting	-0.073	(0.16)	Married/ Cohabiting	0.061	(0.26)
Party member	-0.089	(0.11)	Party member	-0.002	(0.17)
Log(income)	-0.217**	(0.07)	Log(income)	-0.188	(0.12)
Education			Education		
<i>Junior H.S.</i>	0.169	(0.12)	<i>Junior H.S.</i>	-0.093	(0.20)
<i>Senior H.S.</i>	0.162	(0.12)	<i>Senior H.S.</i>	-0.071	(0.21)
<i>College or above</i>	0.268†	(0.15)	<i>College or above</i>	-0.021	(0.28)
Location			Location		
<i>Prefercture-lvl city</i>	-0.158	(0.10)	<i>Prefercture-lvl city</i>	-0.247	(0.16)
<i>Provincial capital</i>	0.040	(0.11)	<i>Provincial capital</i>	0.136	(0.18)
<i>Municipality</i>	-0.249*	(0.11)	<i>Municipality</i>	-0.240	(0.16)
Father's occupation			Father's occupation		
<i>High-rank cadre</i>	0.216	(0.20)	<i>High-rank cadre</i>	0.177	(0.29)
<i>High-prestige professional</i>	0.096	(0.18)	<i>High-prestige professional</i>	0.035	(0.30)
<i>Low-rank cadre</i>	-0.065	(0.13)	<i>Low-rank cadre</i>	-0.131	(0.19)
<i>Low-prestige professional</i>	-0.053	(0.11)	<i>Low-prestige professional</i>	0.010	(0.17)
Father's education			Father's education		
<i>Junior H.S.</i>	0.100	(0.12)	<i>Junior H.S.</i>	0.043	(0.17)
<i>Senior H.S.</i>	0.135	(0.16)	<i>Senior H.S.</i>	-0.252	(0.28)
<i>College or above</i>	-0.019	(0.21)	<i>College or above</i>	-0.497	(0.34)
Father is a party member	-0.005	(0.11)	Father is a party member	0.091	(0.16)
Cohort			Work-life cluster		
<i>pre-1947 cohort</i>	ref.		<i>Blue-collar work stable</i>	ref.	
<i>1947-1953 non-rusticate</i>	0.270*	(0.13)	<i>Working class upward</i>	0.062	(0.19)
<i>1947-1953 rusticates</i>	0.535**	(0.18)	<i>White-collar work stable</i>	0.314†	(0.18)
<i>1954-1960 non-rusticates</i>	0.365**	(0.12)	<i>Working class downward</i>	0.507**	(0.18)
<i>1954-1960 rusticates</i>	0.632***	(0.17)	1954-1960 Cohort	0.062	(0.13)
<i>post-1960 cohort</i>	0.551***	(0.12)	Rustication Experience		
			<i>Rustication Duration < 5</i>	0.260	(0.16)
			<i>Rustication Duration ≥ 5</i>	0.286	(0.20)
cut1 (Never join)			cut1 (Never join)		
Constant	-1.553***	(0.33)	Constant	-1.582*	(0.64)
cut2 (Bystander)			cut2 (Bystander)		
Constant	-0.750*	(0.33)	Constant	-0.777	(0.64)
cut3 (Involved)			cut3 (Involved)		
Constant	0.309	(0.33)	Constant	0.305	(0.64)
N	2233		N	916	
pseudo R^2	0.013		pseudo R^2	0.013	

† $p < .10$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (two-tailed test).

Source: 2003 CGSS.

Tab. 5.12: Estimates from binary logistic regression models on political attitudes (all cohorts).

	Model 1a		Model 2a		Model 3a		Model 4a	
	$\hat{\beta}$	s.e.	$\hat{\beta}$	s.e.	$\hat{\beta}$	s.e.	$\hat{\beta}$	s.e.
Male	0.160†	(0.09)	-0.175†	(0.10)	-0.162	(0.10)	-0.116	(0.09)
Married/ Cohabiting	-0.016	(0.19)	0.147	(0.20)	0.066	(0.21)	-0.244	(0.19)
Party member	-0.116	(0.13)	-0.118	(0.13)	-0.530***	(0.13)	-0.463***	(0.13)
Log(income)	-0.016	(0.08)	-0.113	(0.09)	-0.126	(0.10)	-0.247**	(0.08)
Education								
<i>Junior H.S.</i>	0.262†	(0.14)	0.161	(0.14)	-0.346*	(0.16)	-0.268*	(0.13)
<i>Senior H.S.</i>	0.369*	(0.14)	0.228	(0.15)	-0.652***	(0.17)	-0.533***	(0.14)
<i>College or above</i>	0.814***	(0.18)	0.024	(0.19)	-1.014***	(0.20)	-0.701***	(0.19)
Location								
<i>Prefercture-lvl city</i>	0.136	(0.12)	0.171	(0.13)	-0.023	(0.14)	0.150	(0.12)
<i>Provincial capital</i>	0.096	(0.13)	0.23	(0.14)	-0.088	(0.14)	-0.109	(0.13)
<i>Municipality</i>	-0.279*	(0.13)	-0.102	(0.13)	0.185	(0.14)	0.128	(0.13)
Father's occupation								
<i>High-rank cadre</i>	-0.282	(0.23)	0.570*	(0.27)	0.109	(0.25)	-0.268	(0.23)
<i>High-prestige professional</i>	0.261	(0.21)	0.261	(0.23)	0.087	(0.23)	-0.273	(0.22)
<i>Low-rank cadre</i>	-0.035	(0.16)	0.252	(0.17)	0.117	(0.17)	0.022	(0.16)
<i>Low-prestige professional</i>	0.18	(0.13)	0.224	(0.15)	-0.175	(0.14)	-0.095	(0.14)
Father's education								
<i>Junior H.S.</i>	-0.058	(0.14)	-0.499***	(0.15)	-0.066	(0.16)	0.151	(0.15)
<i>Senior H.S.</i>	0.156	(0.19)	-0.074	(0.21)	0.240	(0.21)	0.039	(0.20)
<i>College or above</i>	-0.411	(0.25)	-0.586*	(0.27)	-0.038	(0.26)	0.053	(0.26)
Father is a party member	0.109	(0.13)	0.250†	(0.14)	-0.089	(0.14)	0.211†	(0.13)
Cohort								
<i>pre-1947 cohort</i>	ref.		ref.		ref.		ref.	
<i>1947-1953 non-rusticate</i>	-0.055	(0.16)	-0.128	(0.16)	0.135	(0.17)	0.265†	(0.16)
<i>1947-1953 rusticates</i>	0.004	(0.22)	-0.15	(0.22)	-0.063	(0.23)	0.297	(0.21)
<i>1954-1960 non-rusticates</i>	0.264†	(0.14)	-0.092	(0.15)	0.146	(0.16)	0.307*	(0.14)
<i>1954-1960 rusticates</i>	-0.035	(0.20)	-0.199	(0.21)	0.225	(0.22)	0.033	(0.21)
<i>post-1960 cohort</i>	0.258†	(0.14)	-0.021	(0.15)	0.283†	(0.15)	0.231	(0.14)
Constant	-0.677†	(0.36)	1.276**	(0.41)	1.952***	(0.44)	1.009**	(0.37)
N	2025		2197		2076		2153	
pseudo R^2	0.023		0.017		0.045		0.038	

† $p < .10$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (two-tailed test).

Source: 2003 CGSS.

Tab. 5.13: Estimates from binary logistic regression models on political attitudes (within the CR cohort).

	Model 1b		Model 2b		Model 3b		Model 4b	
	Social inequality		Equal opportunity		Direct democracy		Elitist attitude	
	$\hat{\beta}$	s.e.	$\hat{\beta}$	s.e.	$\hat{\beta}$	s.e.	$\hat{\beta}$	s.e.
Male	0.115	(0.15)	-0.168	(0.16)	-0.103	(0.16)	-0.096	(0.15)
Married/Cohabiting	0.174	(0.33)	-0.036	(0.35)	0.124	(0.33)	-0.608*	(0.31)
Party member	-0.183	(0.21)	-0.294	(0.21)	-0.330	(0.21)	-0.558**	(0.21)
Log(income)	-0.128	(0.13)	-0.242	(0.16)	0.049	(0.14)	-0.249*	(0.12)
Education								
<i>Junior H.S.</i>	0.496*	(0.25)	-0.368	(0.29)	0.023	(0.25)	-0.221	(0.23)
<i>Senior H.S.</i>	0.531*	(0.26)	-0.589*	(0.30)	0.215	(0.27)	-0.353	(0.25)
<i>College or above</i>	1.063**	(0.34)	-1.146**	(0.36)	-0.032	(0.34)	-0.365	(0.33)
Location								
<i>Prefecture-level city</i>	0.116	(0.20)	-0.092	(0.22)	0.009	(0.21)	0.184	(0.20)
<i>Provincial capital</i>	0.035	(0.22)	-0.157	(0.23)	0.091	(0.23)	0.167	(0.21)
<i>Municipality</i>	-0.234	(0.20)	-0.034	(0.21)	-0.330	(0.20)	0.446*	(0.19)
Father's occupation								
<i>High-rank cadre</i>	-0.181	(0.35)	0.097	(0.36)	0.296	(0.37)	-0.481	(0.35)
<i>High-prestige professional</i>	0.299	(0.36)	-0.109	(0.38)	0.542	(0.39)	-0.339	(0.36)
<i>Low-rank cadre</i>	0.193	(0.24)	0.080	(0.25)	0.535*	(0.26)	0.011	(0.23)
<i>Low-prestige professional</i>	0.495*	(0.21)	-0.024	(0.22)	0.336	(0.22)	-0.127	(0.21)
Father's education								
<i>Junior H.S.</i>	-0.027	(0.22)	-0.277	(0.22)	-0.476*	(0.22)	0.118	(0.22)
<i>Senior H.S.</i>	0.072	(0.32)	0.177	(0.34)	-0.166	(0.35)	0.274	(0.31)
<i>College or above</i>	-0.176	(0.41)	0.235	(0.43)	-0.173	(0.44)	0.435	(0.41)
Father is a party member	0.268	(0.19)	-0.065	(0.20)	0.215	(0.21)	0.061	(0.19)
Work-life cluster								
<i>Blue-collar work stable</i>	ref.		ref.		ref.		ref.	
<i>Working class upward</i>	0.114	(0.24)	-0.062	(0.25)	-0.071	(0.24)	0.174	(0.24)
<i>White-collar work stable</i>	0.389†	(0.21)	0.232	(0.23)	0.214	(0.23)	0.150	(0.21)
<i>Working class downward</i>	-0.070	(0.22)	0.008	(0.24)	0.388	(0.24)	0.218	(0.21)
1954-1960 Cohort	0.184	(0.16)	0.189	(0.17)	-0.081	(0.17)	-0.118	(0.16)
Rustication Experience								
<i>Rustication Duration</i> < 5	-0.179	(0.19)	-0.125	(0.20)	-0.143	(0.20)	-0.133	(0.19)
<i>Rustication Duration</i> ≥ 5	-0.238	(0.24)	0.029	(0.26)	-0.153	(0.25)	-0.274	(0.24)
Constant	-1.106	(0.73)	2.196*	(0.85)	0.803	(0.77)	1.647*	(0.71)
N	805		845		890		867	
pseudo R^2	0.037		0.039		0.027		0.030	

† $p < .10$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (two-tailed test).

Source: 2003 CGSS.

6. THE RUSTICATION EXPERIENCE IN RETROSPECT

A note on personal account

My parents are former rusticates. For them attending the reunion parties organised by their rusticated fellows is the inexorable programme at the end of each lunar year.

6.1 The Aim and Research Questions

In the preceding chapters, I have shown that rusticates are more likely to fall into a downward work-life trajectory owing to the cumulative disadvantage initiated by the rustication, and the long-lasting consequences of this experience on life satisfaction and social actions of the rusticates. These results have been obtained from the analyses of survey data which were not exclusive to the CR cohort. It has become apparent to me that rusticates' own recognition of the biographical legacy of the rustication experience will add important values to this thesis as the rusticates themselves have the key to unlock the answer of whether the experience of rustication has played a crucial role in their lives and which has consequently generated their assorted life views.

I thus conducted interviews with both groups of former rusticates and non-rusticates. Interviews began with narratives of their life stories during and after the Cultural Revolution. The purpose of these recounts was not to amass anecdotal evidence of stories of struggles or resilience of the rusticates which have been ample, but to draw off the questions listed below. The first two questions are the core of this chapter. The first one intends to understand what the experience of rustication has meant to the rusticates and how it has shaped their lives in ways clearly distin-

6. The Rustication Experience in Retrospect

guishing them from the non-rusticates and those in other cohorts. The idea behind the second question is to explore rusticates' feelings about the consequences of the rustication experience by taking reference to the life experience of their unaffected peers.

1. How do you weigh the rustication experience in your life? In what ways has it changed your life, your outlook of life and attitude?
2. Do you have siblings, friends, classmates or neighbours of similar age who remained in cities during the rustication mobilisation? How are their life experiences compared with yours?
3. Do you have a child? Have you talked about your rustication experience with your child? If you have not, why not?
4. Are you keeping in touch with your rusticated fellows? How do you regard the reunion parties for rusticates?

Interviews with the non-rusticates enabled us to explore from the other side of the fence. So far as the experience of rustication is concerned, how did their post-rustication lives differ from the biographies of those who were sent down? How did they perceive the differences between themselves and their rusticated acquaintances?

1. Do you have siblings, friends, classmates or neighbours of similar age who were rusticated? How are their life experiences compared with yours?
2. In what ways do you think that your life would have been different if you were rusticated?

6.2 *Finding the Interviewees*

With research questions in mind for this chapter, I was confronted with the quest of finding the interviewees. One ideal solution to this was to interview respondents

6. The Rustication Experience in Retrospect

of surveys used for quantitative analyses, either the 1996 LHSC or the 2003 CGSS. Unfortunately as a user of these datasets I was not authorised to follow up and seek more information from the respondents.

Another conventional way was to find a registration list of the targets interested. To serve the rustication mobilisation, the government at the time established the corresponding “Intellectual Young People Office of the State Council” in Beijing to oversee the whole programme. Satellite offices were set up all over the country to register fresh school graduates to the programme, allocating them to designated farming units in the countryside and monitoring them following their sent-downs. However, when the rustication programme drew to a close in the late 1970s followed by major rectifications in rustication policies, such offices were either withdrawn or merged with local bureaus of labour. As rusticates joined the urban labour force, their personal dossiers (*Dang'an*) were subsequently transferred from these bureaus to individual working units, hence it became impossible to retrieve the original registration lists.

As I searched for an alternative, I realised another channel through which I could reach the former rusticates—that was—social gatherings run by former rusticates which aim to bring together long-lost rusticated fellows. Such social gatherings between former rusticates stemmed from a collective nostalgia in the 1990s, which Yang [2003] noted explicitly in his analysis that ‘social gatherings became a more or less regular part of the lives of many members of their generation’. Although more recently, the virtual gatherings through the social networking websites where members can either share stories of the past and the present or organise group activities are getting popular, the old way of meeting is still a prevalent practice among the former rusticates.

To get to such social gatherings was not a difficult task given my parents were former rusticates who had been attending their respective reunion parties for years. But there are two concerns raised regarding the selection pool. The first one was

6. The Rustication Experience in Retrospect

whether I could secure a good measure of life stories close enough to represent that of a subgroup of the rusticates from these social gatherings. An understanding of what these gatherings consist may provide clues to this question. To be sure, the sizes of such social gatherings vary widely. Yet like school class reunions, the typical informal meeting unites former rusticates who were sent to the same agricultural production unit, survived and successfully returned to the original cities from which they were rusticated. There has not been a detailed research on the background information of rusticates who were sent to different destinations. The general impression is that despite a high percentage of children of ‘bad’ class origins who were rusticated, which were small in absolute number, and a high percentage of youths from municipalities who were rusticated to distant border provinces (see chapter 3 for the detailed explanation), the distributions of ascriptive characteristics of rusticates in different agricultural production units within the same geographical location should be similar. In the case of rusticates’ networking groups to which my parents belong, there is a fair proportion of men and women. A small fraction of them were classmates in schools before the rustication, and the rest came from various schools in Beijing.

The second concern, or question, related to the first one, is that given my parents’ present social positions, would the specific reunion parties that they attended draw together only people with similar social backgrounds? To seek answers to this question I talked to the organiser of one rusticates’ gathering. I quote his words below which in a way explain how these gatherings are managed to ensure that they bring back as many target members as possible who have not met for years and are in all walks of life.

“Former rusticates are aware of the widening social positions between them. To enable a maximum attendance and ensure no one is embarrassed by their own or other’s social prominence or obscurity, collectively and consciously they neither leave their working address or telephone number on the address book, nor talk about their political views and opinions, nor seek for business cooperations.”

6. The Rustication Experience in Retrospect

After I had decided to reach potential interviewees through my parents' respective networks of rusticated fellows, I chose to attend their social gatherings to conduct interviews in order to save time and travelling. I was put into contact with the organiser who was in charge of social events from each network. I explained to them my research, and my intention of interviewing former rusticates. Responses from both parties were positive; as a result I was invited to attend two reunion parties around China's Spring Festival during which social activities reach the highest of the year.

Interviews with former rusticates at the gatherings were conducted in the following manner: Most of the attendees of the gatherings (except those who made it clear that they did not wish to participate) were handed a number, those with a specific number chosen randomly by me prior to the gatherings were interviewed. I managed to interview three former rusticates in the first gathering owing to the time constraint; yet interviewed nine in the second gathering. These casual meetings offered a relaxing environment for my subjects to talk candidly. All former rusticates interviewed at gatherings were born before 1954, so to make a cohort comparison I interviewed separately two additional former rusticates born after 1953 who were the younger siblings of two of the interviewees, which added up to a total of fourteen rusticated interviewees.

The comparable group, the non-rusticates, comprised siblings, spouses and friends of fourteen rusticated interviewees. The rationale to select people who were related to the rusticates was that they, through their shared lives, have indirectly experienced the rustication, providing seemingly different but linked life trajectories to the rusticates and offering their subjective impression of the great event.

All interviews were conducted in Chinese, and were taped, transcribed and edited later. I encouraged my interviewees to speak without reservation by making a pledge of keeping them anonymous and no distribution of the recorded conversations. Accordingly many of my subjects were willing to reveal their past histories and present

6. The Rustication Experience in Retrospect

lives to me.

6.2.1 *Beijing during the Cultural Revolution*

Beijing, as the political capital of the country, was at the foremost frontier of the rustication movement. Between 1962 and 1972, there were around 0.3 million urban youths rusticated from Beijing, of which more than 80% were sent to distant places, and the rest to nearby suburban communes or state farms [Liu, 2008, p. 112]. Among those who were rusticated to outside Beijing, nearly half of them were assigned to the “Heilongjiang Production and Construction Corps¹” (HPCC), the northernmost frontier of China, constituting the largest pool of Beijing rusticates. All the interviewees, rusticates and non-rusticates included, had been living as residents in Beijing before the outbreak of the Revolution.

6.3 *Interviewees*

6.3.1 *Rusticated interviewees*

Among the fourteen rusticated interviewees, nine were rusticated to the HPCC, and five to villages outside Beijing. The first reunion party I attended brought together former rusticated fellows who had worked in the same farming unit in *Zhaozhuang* – an agricultural village located in *Tongzhou* district which lies about 80km from central Beijing. They were in their first or second year of junior high school when the Cultural Revolution started, they proclaimed themselves to be members of “Lao San Jie” (The definition of “*Lao San Jie*” is provided in the footnote of page 70.).

The second gathering comprised former rusticates whose ages were one or two years younger than that of interviewees of *Lao San Jie*. When it was the time of their graduation, the rustication movement reached its climax where entire classes were rusticated, leaving far fewer students in cities than in the previous year. As a result,

¹ These corps were established in 1968 in Heilongjiang province to prevent armed incursions from the former Soviet Union with which China had a deteriorating relation.

6. The Rustication Experience in Retrospect

villages in rural Beijing struggled to contain so many students, and therefore many graduates of their year were sent to frontier settlements, predominantly to the HPCC [Liu, 2008, p. 112]. By comparison, their experience of rustication was much more profound, as they were dispatched to places farther away from home, and in general they spent a longer period in the countryside than the earlier and later cohorts of rusticates. On the other side of the line I included two former rusticates who belong to the 1954-1960 cohort—with a much shorter experience of rustication—to capture any contrasting differences in their recount of life experiences.

Tab. 6.1: Interviewed rusticates according to destination, duration and cohort.

Rustication destination	Rustication duration (median)	Cohort	# Interviewees
HPCC	9 yrs	1947-1953 cohort	9
		1954-1960 cohort	0
Villages outside Beijing	3 yrs	1947-1953 cohort	3
		1954-1960 cohort	2

6.3.2 Non-rusticated interviewees

Four out of seven non-rusticated interviewees belong to the 1947-1953 cohort, and the other three are in the 1954-1960 cohort. Separate interviews with them took place either at their homes or workplaces.

6.4 *In Their Shoes - Comparisons of Life Trajectories between Rusticates and Non-rusticates*

To explore the feeling towards the rustication experience, rusticated interviewees were asked not only to depict their own life stories, but those of their non-rusticated friends. Similarly, I gave an opportunity to non-rusticated interviewees to imagine—based on knowledge of life stories gathered from their rusticated sibling, relatives or classmates—in which ways their biographical trajectories would have been different if they were rusticated.

6. The Rustication Experience in Retrospect

Provided with the recounts of life stories of rusticated respondents, especially their experience after the rustication, I shall present them by categorising them into groups. Ways of categorisation include grouping by their present social positions or social origins. Yet, both methods have their defects, given that most members of the CR cohort are in retirement at present and family class origin was shown in the fourth and fifth chapters of the thesis to have little impact in either respondent's later status attainment or attitude and behaviour. Given the fact that all interviewees have joined the workforce, I chose to divide the target pool by the type of employment trajectory they had experienced until the interview, or up until retirement which ever came first. Of the fourteen former rusticates interviewed, two had a stable trajectory in managerial posts, two experienced a rising trajectory to high-ranked administrative positions from manual occupations. Five had a stable trajectory in either professional or manual occupations until formal retirement and four had experienced a transition to unemployment (*xiagang*) from manual occupations.

Tab. 6.2: Descriptive table of how rusticated interviewees are grouped.

	Work-life trajectory	# Interviewees
Rusticates	White-collar work stable	2
	Working-class upward	2
	Blue-collar work stable	4
	Working-class downward	5

White-collar work stable I start first with the life histories of those who have experienced a stable trajectory in managerial posts. Two interviewees (one male and one female) under this category were born and rusticated in the same year to the Northern Frontier.

The first interviewee joined the Communist Party during the rustication, and thus was assigned to office work at the industrial development bureau upon return. Her working unit later supported her to read part-time labour economics at uni-

6. The Rustication Experience in Retrospect

versity. With a college qualification and many years of experience working for the government, she is now a high-rank official at the social security bureau.

The life story for the second interviewee was more eventful. Because of his mother's 'capitalist' background, and though he claimed to work extremely hard to win a recommendation to go to the university, his application was never considered, even though he was admitted to the Communist Party. He returned to Beijing after having spent nine years in HPCC farms, and sat for the university entrance exam which had just been resumed, passing it and winning a scholarship to read a degree in history. He started his first job as a lecturer at the Central Party school, gained a master degree subsequently. Intrigued by the flourishing of personal entrepreneurship in 1992, he resigned from his position and left for southern China where he would work in various businesses ranging from real estate to credit union. In 1996, he returned to Beijing, together with a few friends, established the first nationwide joint-stock property insurance company in China. He now serves as the vice-president of the company.

When asked how their life experiences were compared with that of their non-rusticated friends of the same cohort, they perceived no or little disparity as they asserted both groups went through a period in which they could not be the masters of their own lives. Nevertheless, they remarked that the real difference in life experience in this generation was not between those who were rusticated and those who were not, but between those who had acquired a college education and those who had not.

“Although we left to go to the countryside, the lives of those who stayed in the cities were also interrupted. [...] The college qualification created a divide between us, some went further in career because of it. ” (Ms Min, Gathering 2)

“We (the rusticates and the non-rusticates) were all in the same social context. Even those who remained in the cities, most of them were assigned to local factories. The only difference which distinguishes people in our generation is whether we went to university after the rustication or not. The formation of my value of life and attitudes towards the history and society started when I was at the university.” (Mr Duan, Gathering 2)

6. The Rustication Experience in Retrospect

Working class upward trajectory From interviewees stable in managerial positions for most of their careers, I move next to those who experienced a trajectory in employment rising from manual occupations to managerial or professional occupations. There are two interviewees under this category, one is older than the other. They were rusticated to different locations (one went to the village outside Beijing, the other left to the Northern Frontier) and for different periods of time (one was rusticated for two years and the other for six years). Upon return to Beijing, they both worked as a manual labourer for a few years before attending the university to gain a college degree. A further acquirement of party membership boosted the advancement of their career, leading them eventually to administrative positions.

In the comparisons interviewees in this category made between themselves and their non-rusticated friends, what was chiefly notable is the resemblance of their views to that of those in the first category. They recounted the enviable situations of their non-rusticated counterparts in the mobilisation period; the discrepancy in later life experience, views and values they noted, however, related not to the rustication experience but to difference in educational attainment.

“There were 50 students in my class, of which 2 or 3 remained in the city of Beijing. There were time during the rustication, we envied those who stayed, but reflecting back now, we do not. [...] Those of us who gained a college qualification were clearly in a better-off situation as our lives after the Cultural Revolution were much more stable and much less affected by the turbulence caused by the reforms.” – Mr Lin (Gathering 1)

“There may be discrepancy at the beginning right after the rustication between us and non-rusticates, after all these years, our views and values are more and more unified. [...] I may find more topics to share with my university friends as our experiences are more similar.” – Mr Zheng (Gathering 2)

Interviewees in categories 1 and 2 recognized the rustication experience and college attainment as life-changing events, for the former molded their character and attitude towards life, and the latter equipped them with necessary skills and abilities for accomplishment in work.

6. The Rustication Experience in Retrospect

Blue-collar work stable There were four interviewees who had a long and stable work-life in either manual or professional occupations, three of whom were in the cohort of 1947-1953, and the other two in the cohort of 1954-1960. Three out of four spent their entire career in the same working unit as a semi-skilled manual worker, the fourth one had worked as a primary school teacher in various schools. Their perception of differences in life experience between themselves and their non-rusticated counterparts had a temporal variation: they thought a big part of the disparity between themselves and their non-rusticated friends was not only the better-off economic situation of the latter, but their desperate fear of never-returning to home. However, they believed this disparity disappeared soon after they joined the urban labour force.

“There were 30 percent of students in my class who stayed in Beijing at that time. [...] Their lives during the Cultural Revolution were better than that of ours, they at least received regular salaries from their work places. On the contrary, we embraced the thought of spending the rest of lives in the countryside, had no hope of returning to our old lives.” – Mr Li (Gathering 1)

“We all grew up receiving the same education, living in the era of worshipping communism and Mao. Even during the Cultural Revolution our ideas were united, we all fought for selfishness and repudiated revisionism. For these we are not much different.” – Ms Feng (Gathering 2)

Working class downward trajectory This grouping of interviewees have experienced a bumpier work-life than those in other categories. All of them were in their first year of junior high school when they were rusticated, and spent on average seven years in the Northeastern Frontier. They had been working in state-owned enterprises for many years before being made redundant or taking early retirement in the late 1990s when the labour retrenchment became acute at enterprises. For most of them, in order to support themselves and their families, they had taken a string of part-time or temporary jobs until the present day or when they reached the official retirement age.

6. The Rustication Experience in Retrospect

They chiefly recognised the difference in life experience between themselves and their non-rusticated friends. The dominant themes in their accounts were not only about what they had gone through during the rustication mobilisation, but grievances related to their disadvantageous positions at the beginning of their careers, when non-rusticated counterparts who entered the urban labour market a few years ahead had accumulated enough skills and learned survival strategies at the workplace.

“When we returned from the Northern Frontier, entering the factory, non-rusticates had worked for 10 years already, they knew for example an educational certificate was important for career advancement.” – Ms Ding (Gathering 2)

“In my class there were some who were not rusticated. [...] They have always been better off than us; they had more chances than us for they entered the factory earlier than us; their career paths were much wider than ours.” – Ms Hao (Gathering 2)

“Despite belonging to the same age group, non-rusticates do not have the experience of rustication, our attitudes towards life, hence, are different. [...] When I returned to Beijing, I joined the same working unit as my non-rusticated classmates who had been there since we were sent down. Before I familiarised myself with the job, some of them had been promoted to a higher level. ” – Ms Liu (Gathering 2)

6.4.1 *Various reasons for non-rustication*

Although indisputably lives in the city of Beijing were less dramatic and harsh than in the countryside during the Revolution period, non-rusticates due to their various backgrounds and specific life trajectories were expected to show variant degrees of awareness on differences between themselves and their rusticated acquaintances in life experiences beyond the Revolution. Based on what they did during the mobilisation, non-rusticated interviewees are categorised into three groups (See Table 6.3).

The privileged few As I have earlier remarked in Chapter 3 by revealing alternative pathways to rustication, joining the PLA during the Cultural Revolution

6. The Rustication Experience in Retrospect

Tab. 6.3: Descriptive table of how non-rusticated interviewees are grouped.

	Reasons for non-rustication	# Interviewees
Non-rusticates	The privileged few	2
	Continued education	2
	Beneficiaries of relaxed policies	3

was mainly restricted to those who came from a privileged family background – parents who were high-ranked officials in the PLA. There are two non-rusticated interviewees who followed this pathway, they are spouses of two of my rusticated interviewees. What was chiefly notable about them was their revelation of a sense of superiority when they joined the PLA, and frank admission of being extremely lucky in lives.

Both interviewees were born in 1955 to families where fathers were working in the field army, the only sector that was not required to participate in the Revolution. They joined the PLA—in fact a special programme set up in 1968 when the massive rustication movement started in hope to protect children of senior cadres and army officials from being rusticated—in early 1970s through their fathers’ internal networks, did not go through the standard recruitment process where rigid scrutiny of physical fitness and political background was applied. During their military service, in contrast to the harsh condition suffered by rusticates, they not only had a pledge of material comfort provided by the Central Military Commission, but received training in medicine or military strategies respectively. At the end of the Cultural Revolution, they were discharged and went to universities to earn a college qualification followed by a continuous and stable work-life.

They were highly aware of their advantageous positions in comparison to the rusticates during the Revolution and beyond, in particular to those who were sent down on the eve of the movement. They commented to be the beneficiaries of all good things – protected from being rusticated, assigned to good jobs and given a much bigger quota for entering universities.

6. The Rustication Experience in Retrospect

“Often when I met someone who was rusticated she or he tends to think I was privileged not to experience the hardship. It is true by joining the army my political background was proven to be trustworthy, and in the assignment of jobs I was treated specially.” – Ms Tian, wife of Mr Zheng (gathering 2)

“Our normal course of life has been much less affected than that of former rusticates [...] for rustication wasted the most precious time of their lives. Except for those who were intelligent and industrious, the lives of most of them were held back, and the majority of them are now living in the middle or lower strata of the society.” – Mr Han, husband of Ms Min (gathering 2)

Continued education Two non-rusticated interviewees under this group had an even different experience during the Cultural Revolution to other non-rusticates during which their pursuits in education were uninterrupted. They both belonged to the upper band of the 1947-1950 age cohort. After graduating from junior high schools, they were selected to study at the specialised schools established by a steel factory and a printing plant respectively. These factories were among the first of their kinds which aimed to produce elites who had both technological and managerial skills. Upon completion of their respective studies, they were subsequently employed by the factories and have remained there since then.

They perceived that the difference between themselves and their rusticated peers mainly existed in current economic situations, and attributed their better-off situation to luck and their ability to seize the opportunities brought by luck. On the one hand, they displayed their perception of being in the same cohort as the rusticates, pointing out the same social and cultural context in which all people of their age grew up, rusticated or non-rusticated regardless, whose thoughts and behaviours bore the imprints of this specific period. On the other hand, they underscored certain social behaviours and attitudes which characterised the rusticates.

“I think I have been lucky—especially during the Revolution era—to be able to carry on studying when most people could not. [...] Yet my current well-being is mostly the result of my own efforts. I would not let good opportunities slip away.” – Mr Yang, husband of Ms Shi (ungrouped)

“Although we (himself and rusticated classmates) are different in our experiences, the social education we were brought up with and the histories we participated in are the same.” – Mr Yuan, friend of Mr Lin (gathering 1)

6. The Rustication Experience in Retrospect

“Most of the former rusticates, from my observation, have gained habits of smoking and drinking which I do not have. [...] We are different because rustication transformed their view of society and perception of life, they experienced the pursuit of ideology to – disappointment – to final disillusionment.”
– Mr Yang, husband of Ms Shi (ungrouped)

Beneficiaries of the relaxed policy There are three interviewees in this group who were the beneficiaries of the relaxation of sent-down policy which allowed one child of the household not to be rusticated. Two of them were born in 1950, permitted to stay in Beijing based on the fact that their elder siblings were already in the countryside. While their classmates were rusticated one after the other, they began working at state-owned enterprises not far from homes. Their career trajectories had been very similar until one of the interviewees had to apply for early retirement because of the closing of his factory.

The third interviewee was born in 1956, the youngest among all my respondents. Being the only child of the household, she escaped the fate of rustication when she graduated from senior high school in 1973. Because of her relatively higher level of education, she worked initially as an accountant trainee, and was later promoted to be a senior accountant after she gained a qualification from the specialised college.

When interviewees were asked to envisage what their lives would have been if they were rusticated, like non-rusticates in the previous groups, they imagined a much worse situation than their status quo. Relative to their rusticated friends or classmates, they, including the interviewee who had a disruption in work-life, noted that their lives had been much smoother, perceiving the negative effects of rustication on the lives of those affected.

“I think my life on the whole has been much less of twists and turns. I have more opportunities in life than what they (the rusticates) have. When I started working in the factory, I knew I was lacking in professional knowledge, I used all my leisure to improve on this. Whilst former rusticates were old when they returned, it was hard for them to catch up for the years lost.” – Mr Wang, brother of Ms Ding (gathering 2)

Furthermore, the younger interviewee specified that the magnitude of such im-

6. The Rustication Experience in Retrospect

pact varied for rusticates with different lengths of rustication duration. In her mind, the lives of those who were sent down longer were much more affected in adverse ways as opposed to her rusticated classmates who spent a considerably shorter time in the countryside.

“The only difference between my life trajectory and that of my rusticated classmates is that they were rusticated and I started working. After two or three years, they all returned, and some of them ended up in the same position as me. Yet for most of my seniors who were rusticated much longer, they were no longer young when they came back to Beijing, without any skills, they were in a poor position for job-hunting. I can give one example of someone whom I knew. She was an excellent student at school, and was proactive in getting involved in the rustication programme. When she returned to Beijing at age 30, she was assigned to work at a local factory near home. Her factory was dismantled in late 1990s; she was laid off and survived on a small sum of compensation until she reached the official retirement age lately when she could start receiving her pension. I think the rustication has truly wasted her life.” – Ms Yi, wife of Mr Qing (upgrouped)

6.5 *Collective Memories of the Rustication*

Despite where and how long they were rusticated, what is primarily notable in the comparisons made between these former rusticates are not differences but striking similarities in their memories of the rustication experience.

Interviewees remembered precisely the date they were sent down, which they describe as one of the most important days of their lives. Before rustication, they recounted how excited they had become as the date of rustication drew close, cherishing hopes of putting ideology into practice and imagining life in the countryside. They were however, disillusioned during their rustication, though at different time points. For them the biggest impact was to realise the living conditions in the countryside were far worse than what they learned through the media. One interviewee was quoted saying:

“Most my classmates and I went to the countryside voluntarily; at first I felt a great sense of mission to help close the gap between the countryside and the city. Changes start with ourselves, so that we could carry the great Cultural Revolution till the end. We hoped to put our ideals into practice. Once we

6. The Rustication Experience in Retrospect

got into the countryside, we were in for a great shock. The reality of China had nothing to do with what was in our books, or with our brief experience of farming practice. The lives of the peasants were truly miserable.” – Mr Zhou (Gathering 1)

The feeling of disappointment was even greater for interviewees rusticated to the northeastern frontier. Their heroic dream of participating in the war against the former Soviet Union was instantly shattered upon arrival in the corps.

“I remembered the night when we arrived in the designated corp after a day of travelling. There was no road or light, we had to across an endless field of wormwood by the moonlight to our lodging [...] All of us cried that night, firstly girls then boys. But we encouraged each other that we were soldier-to-be, were here to defend our country. The next morning we expected to be given a gun, but instead we were handed a sickle.” – Ms Liu (Gathering 2)

Remarkd by all rusticated interviewees, what was more devastating was not the hard manual labour or material shortage, but the spiritual deprivation – the lack of connection with the outside world or exchange of new and intellectual thoughts. As far as rusticated interviewees who were sent down before 1974 are concerned, their experience of rustication contrasts with that of rusticates who were sent down later in respect of hope of returning to cities. For the former, they left home with a thought of settling in the countryside, none of them knew if and when they would return. When the initial revolutionary fervour gave away to disillusion, many of the interviewees experienced a painful period of depression. One of them stated that:

“The hardest thing was passing the winter when the weather was severely cold and there was no heating in the room [...] Yet it was nothing compared to the bleak picture I had regarding my future. I constantly asked myself how I would live if everyday of the rest of my life was going to be like now.” – Ms Ai (Gathering 2)

As for the latter, by the time they were sent down, regulations of rustication had been relaxed. They knew they had to go to the countryside notwithstanding, they would return eventually.

“Given that I had never spent more than one day in a collective farm before, life in the countryside was particularly hard at the beginning. But the hard time passed quickly for us, without knowing, we were all back to Beijing. ” – Ms Shi (Ungrouped)

6. The Rustication Experience in Retrospect

“We knew we were going to the state farms after the graduation. It had become part of the job requirement if you sought employment after return. Fortunately, we were sent to nearby locations and only for a short period.”—
Mr Qing (Ungrouped)

Mayer [2006, p. 15] notes that “persons enter periods of upheaval with their past biographies and might be increasingly resilient to change the older they are.” In understanding the experience of the Great Depression, Elder [1974] noted that Oakland cohort tended to use the depression experience as a benchmark for gauging subsequent life experiences [Elder, 1974, *pp.* 258-262]. In the same vein, when rusticated interviewees were asked how they view their rustication experiences, all of them responded it was an important experience in life. To them, living conditions back in the cities have upswung, hardship endured in the countryside therefore has transformed to an inspiration for facing further difficulties in life. They embraced the experience of having been in the countryside as a life-changing event, in their words:

“It has become a standard of my life, whatever problems I encountered afterwards, I compared them with my experience of rustication, they were always better.” – Mr Li (Gathering 1)

“It (rustication experience) formed my character and changed my attitude towards life; it effectively trained my endurance for hardship. Without it, I would not be as perseverant and tolerant as I am now. I am equipped for further upheavals or hardship in the days to come.” – Ms Shi (Ungrouped)

The prolonged years of staying in the countryside seem to have left an intangible legacy to rusticated interviewees of 1947-1954 cohort. While all rusticated interviewees collectively agreed that rustication had disrupted their education and delayed timing for social experiences, these older rusticates spoke of a loss of a great proportion of their youth but gained in exchange forbearance and fortitude.

The transmission of the rustication experience to their offspring is another way that they remember the past and underscore value. Most of my rusticated interviewees had shared their experience in the countryside with their children. The purpose of discussing the rustication experience with children is straightforward:

6. The Rustication Experience in Retrospect

they wished their stories of endurance of hardship could inspire the next generation when they are discontent with or grumble about the current situation. Yet they also indicated a great difficulty in making their children understand the past.

“My children found my stories ridiculous. I wish they could understand how hard our lives once were, yet they find it is too hard to comprehend as the lives they are experiencing are a far cry from ours.” – Mr Li (Gathering 1)

“I have tried to talk about my rustication experience with my child in order to inspire him to overcome difficulties in his life, but he cannot bear to listen to it.” – Ms Feng (Gathering 2)

“I have shared my experience in the countryside with my daughter because I want her to know about my past and how the country was during that period which you could not learn from the textbooks. But as she grew older, she became less patient with my stories. She did not live through that period, it was hard for her to understand or envision.” – Ms Yu (Gathering 2)

Another interviewees recounted:

“Once I told my teenage daughter that there was a difficult time during the rustication when we only found sweet potatoes to fill the stomach, my daughter replied: “Sweet potatoes are delicious! I would like to have sweet potatoes every day!” From this you can deduce that tough period we experienced is so discrepant from the life that they know.” – Mr Lin (Gathering 1)

A few chose not to say much about their rustication experience to their children for the reason of a remarkable contrast between the past and the present :

“I do not actually talk about my rustication experience with my child, because I do not think they have the patience to listen to it, also they will not understand it.” – Mr Zheng (Gathering 2)

“I do not think my experience would change his view of life. He has his value of and outlook on life, he does not understand our past [...] their living context is so different from when we were growing up, their life trajectories will surely not repeat ours.” – Ms Ai (Gathering 2)

6.6 *Generational Identity*

Generation, as Mannheim [1952] conceptualised, implies more than just a group of people with associated births, but requires its members to have participated in certain historical events within the confined period. If we follow the logic of Mannheim’s

6. The Rustication Experience in Retrospect

notion of generation, rusticates and non-rusticates do not belong to the same generation since the latter did not participate in one of the most momentous events for the youths in the Cultural Revolution. However, it may also be appropriate to find out if former rusticates identify themselves as being in the same generational group as non-rusticates, and should their participation in the rustication mobilisation make them disagree of sharing a joint identity? To conclude this chapter, this section attempts to understand interviewees' subjective mark of Mannheim's definition of generation. The precise question asked to both rusticated and non-rusticated interviewees was if they agreed that rusticates and non-rusticates could be categorised into the same group.

Among three rusticated interviewees who answered yes, two of them followed the working class upward trajectory and the third one had been stable in white-collar work. Similar to previous comparisons which they made between themselves and their non-rusticated friends, on the one hand they recognised the same cultural heritage shared and social context lived by everyone who was born at about the same time, agreed that rusticates and non-rusticates should belong to the same cohort group. On the other hand, they noted the existence of subgroups within, differentiated by educational levels or social positions. These subgroups, because of these differences, have sometimes opposite viewpoints to current affairs and values of things. One of them summarised it well:

“We (the rusticates and the non-rusticates) should belong to the same group. We were born in a ‘sterile’, closed and relatively homogenous society, growing up with the indoctrination of socialist ideas and Mao’s thoughts. We were all equally naive before the rustication at least. Although the subsequent life course varied between us, the imprint of collective education received when we were young manifests in our perception of life. But within us, there are definitely disparities, owing to the differences in our life experience or educational level, in regard to our understanding of things. For example, my non-rusticated friend and I may have contrasting understanding of what rustication means for our generation.” – Mr Duan (Gathering 2)

For those who thought rusticates and non-rusticates cannot be grouped together, the majority, as might be expected in view of their remarks on life experience dif-

6. The Rustication Experience in Retrospect

ferences and how highly they regarded the rustication history in their lives, based their judgement on whether an individual was a former rusticate or not. They highlighted the differences in character and attitude towards life which were attributed to the rustication experience, picturing themselves as being tougher and more able to endure hardship and social changes than their non-rusticated counterparts. Their tendency of drawing a line between themselves and the non-rusticates was also reflected through their deliberate exclusion of the non-rusticates from their social networks.

“No, we cannot be categorised into the same group. Because of the rustication experience, we tend to endure hardship better than they do, shoulder more risks and survive in the plight. [...] I, as well as many other former rusticates, do not wish to keep contact with non-rusticates.” – Ms Yu (Gathering 2)

“Although we belong to the same age peer, the experience of rustication has made us distinctively different from those who remained in the cities. We do not give up easily when confronted with difficulties. [...] I do have classmates who were not rusticated, I am not close to them.” – Ms Liu (Gathering 2)

6.6.1 *Linked lives?*

The majority of non-rusticates thought they could not be categorised into the same group as their rusticated peers. As well as stressing the significance of the rustication experience in the lives of their rusticated counterparts, they perceived the latter had a greater capacity to stand strains.

“I think because my life has been smooth, compared to my husband who was a former rusticate, my endurance is much weaker than his. The rustication experience has become a spiritual treasure for them.” – Ms Tian, wife of Mr Zheng (gathering 2)

“All of them (the rusticates) were more or less transformed by it (the rustication), unlike us whose lives have been smooth; they had aspirations of making achievements in life. Their characters have been tempered by this experience, they know well that a happy life does not come easily.” – Ms Xi, sister of Mr Lin (gathering 1)

Even though non-rusticated interviewees considered themselves different from the rusticates, largely owing to the lack of rustication experience and its consequential

6. The Rustication Experience in Retrospect

factors, the fact that their lives were lived in tandem with the latter was expressed throughout their interviews, and made explicitly by one of the non-rusticates (see below). For some of non-rusticated interviewees, the depiction of life in the countryside from their rusticated brothers or sisters formed their early impression of rustication; they also experienced that family tension mounted when their returned siblings struggled to find jobs after the rustication. Spouses of the rusticates remembered how their partners relied on them to take care of the family in order to spend time preparing for the slim chance of getting into the university.

“We do not have the rustication experience, but we have siblings, relatives or friends and classmates who were rusticated. Their lives intertwined with ours.” – Mr Han, husband of Ms Min (gathering 2)

“I visited my brother while he was farming in a commune outside Beijing. Although his rustication place was not very far from home, he had scarce holidays to visit home. I witnessed how physically demanding his labour was and how hard the living conditions in the countryside were, I was sure myself that I would try hard not to follow this path when it was my turn.” – Mr Xi, sister of Mr Lin (gathering 1)

“Like most of the rusticated youths, my older sister was confronted with unemployment upon return. My parents considered her as a ‘free-rider’ at home, hence passed loads of housework to her including cooking for me at lunchtime. During that period, I grew closer to her as I was the only person in the family who showed her compassion. She kept reminding me how lucky I was to be born later, and having a smooth and uninterrupted life.” – Mr Wang, brother of Ms Ding (gathering 2)

“He put everything behind to prepare for the university exam. He would not move from his desk either if he heard the door ringing or water running or even our baby crying. It was a hard period for me, but I learned to understand that rusticates like him eagerly wanted to make up for the lost years.” – Ms Tian, wife of Mr Zheng (gathering 2)

6.7 Chapter Summary

The central focus of this chapter is, through examining the recounts of life histories of the CR cohort and their responses to inquiries, related to the experience of rustication, to investigate further the significance of such a remarkable experience in the

6. The Rustication Experience in Retrospect

lives of those who went through it and particularly in their adaptation process in the years of economic reform which followed. Twenty one informants of the CR cohort were interviewed in Beijing—more than thirty years after the end of the Cultural Revolution—fourteen of whom were former rusticates and seven non-rusticates.

Now, more than thirty years have passed since the end of the Revolution; when former rusticates were asked about their personal reflections on the sent-down episode, there was a general consensus of admitting the impact of rustication over the course of their lives. A large proportion of this impact was manifested through profound memories of the rustication. The harsh period in the countryside seemed to have provided the rusticates with more a spiritual wealth than anything practical. Collectively, rusticated interviewees appreciate the great social adaption and tolerance developed from the hardship in the countryside, and have taken strength from the sent-down experience to live through subsequent life experiences, for better or worse.

Yet so far as the question of how the rustication experience has changed their lives in tangible ways is concerned, there is a stratified consciousness of experience depending on the work-life trajectories one has followed since the end of the rustication. In comparison with life experiences of non-rusticates, among rusticated interviewees stable in white-collar class or upwardly mobile from working class, they perceived little impact of rustication on the change of their opportunity structures which would be readily distinguishable from those of their non-rusticated peers. Instead, they noted that having gained a college degree had differentiated them from other members of the same cohort. By contrast, men's downward occupational histories markedly deepened memories of the rustication as a highly influential experience in life.

Overall, non-rusticated interviewees recognised that the sent-down episode was an important life experience for the rusticates – notably for those who were rusticated at the early stage of the campaign owing to their longer duration of the episode and subsequently delayed life events; the role of such experience was seen

6. The Rustication Experience in Retrospect

in relation to the building of a stronger character which prepares them to confront further turbulence in life. While envisioning what their life trajectories would have been if they were rusticated, they admitted in reality life had treated them better at least for the period of the Revolution. The privileged few who joined the military army during the rustication mobilisation were particularly aware of their superior family backgrounds through which special benefits and advantages were attained.

The collective memories of the sent-down episode provided by the interviewees have the following characteristics: First, the arrival day to the rusticated destination seems to be remembered more vividly than all the ones that followed. Rusticated interviewees referred to this day as one of the most important days of their lives. This strong impact on memory may be largely due to the feeling of disappointment caused by the sharp contrast between the kinds of life they knew in the cities and the one that they were facing. Second, depression appeared to be the dominant theme in memories of the sent-down period by rusticates of the 1947-1953 cohort in relation to those rusticates from a younger cohort. It is not only because this cohort of rusticates stayed longer in the countryside, but more forcefully the disillusion of hopes of ever returning to Beijing they suffered which was never experienced by the succeeding rusticates.

Yang [2003] suggests that the collective reminiscence of the rustication period displayed by former rusticates relates closely to their generational identity crisis experienced under current conditions. Such insecurity of losing generational identity has manifested in two aspects: First, the regular attendance of exclusive social gatherings for former rusticates and the reluctance to mingle with non-rusticates reflect their consciousness of clustering themselves to a single group. By this way, their identity should survive and be made distinctive. The transmission of the rustication experience from former rusticates to their offspring is another reflection of such insecurity. Most of the rusticated interviewees have tried to share stories of their past with their children in hope to either keep the history alive or underscore

6. The Rustication Experience in Retrospect

values. Yet the friction they received from their offspring who rejected these stories because they found it difficult to relate their parents' experience to the present situation may exacerbate this insecurity.

7. CONCLUSION

Building on the event-based model, this thesis unfolds around the event of rustication. By examining its selection process and tracing its impact through proximal, distal and lifecourse outcomes on affected cohort, this thesis aims to serve two themes: The dominant theme considers one of the building blocks of lifecourse research, that is, the impact of events or experiences in the formative years on subsequent life outcomes. The secondary theme centres around the mediating effects of family background in the relationship established under the first theme, seeking to understand more broadly the impact of socialist campaigns on social mobility. In this concluding chapter, I summarise and discuss key findings drawn from the empirical analyses and interviews in hope to bring new insights into this extraordinarily important historical episode.

7.1 *Life Chances under Radical State Action*

This thesis, in its third chapter, began with examinations on three tenets related to the rustication process per se: The risk and duration of exposure to rustication provided platforms to assess the persistence of status protection under radical state action. The additional exploration of concurrent non-rustication activities offered an opportunity to investigate competing processes for the CR cohort during the period of turbulence, which proved to be useful in subsequent chapters for understanding the divergence later in life between rusticates and non-rusticates.

The rustication mobilisation, despite the fact that it provided the way out for the young unschooled and unemployed, was a programme for young urbanites to be

7. Conclusion

“re-educated” by manual workers and peasants. In line with findings from Zhou and Hou [1999]’s study, results in Chapter 3 revealed that those labelled with a bad class and children of intelligentsia were the main targets for this “re-education”. Families of bad class origin and families of intellectuals were considered to be politically untrustworthy, and suffered discriminations throughout the pre-reform history. Parents in such families were incapable of sparing their children from being rusticated, and many viewed rustication as an opportunity for their children to show that they could be re-educated and eventually to renovate social statuses.

Djilas [1957] pinpointed that “ the Communist revolution is the first to be carried out to the advantages of the revolutionaries. They, and the bureaucracy which forms around them, harvest its fruits. ” Since the 1960s, Mao had officially framed his revolutionaries the paragons of learning for the general masses. In the Communist class scheme (family class labelling) PLA officers or party officials topped the “red” classes. During the period of rustication mobilisation, the most desirable destination was to join the PLA [Liu, 2008, *pp.* 211-212]. The distinction between rustication and joining the PLA was, in fact, a difference in mobility trajectory: Urban youths, by participating in rustication programme, made themselves the targets of re-education and were subordinate to peasants. Those who joined the PLA boosted their social statuses and became the privileged ones looked up to by ordinary people. Results in Chapter 3 showed that among those who joined the PLA during the Cultural Revolution, a significantly large proportion of them had a father who was a party member and only 5% of them were in non-red classes. These findings reflected the authoritarian power possessed by the PLA officials and party elites, which enabled them to protect their children from a downward mobility in the period of turbulence. Interviews with children of the PLA officials (Chapter 6: “The privileged few”) enhanced this inspection; they were fully aware of their privileged positions and admitted to being the most fortunate ones at the time of upheaval.

Despite the party’s initiative of eliminating class differences, China remained

7. Conclusion

a class society in Mao's era [Whyte and Parish, 1984b, p. 45] where stratification manifested through the process of rustication. Distinct from earlier studies which stated that the rustication movement had indiscriminate and adverse effects on all social groups, my results were able to show (1) children from the bad class origin and highly-educated families were intensively targeted, and (2) the privileged military families were spared from the mobilisation. The presence of resilience was also shown by cadres who did not manage to prevent their children from being rusticated—presumably having fallen from grace during political campaigns—but were able to shorten the sent-down episode when their statuses were rehabilitated (Table 3.6).

What died with the Cultural Revolution and its derivative political campaigns was the family class labelling. Results in Chapter 3 showed the diminishing role it played in life chances of the CR cohort towards the end of the chaotic period. With the economic reform following tightly after the Revolution, China was steering towards a different direction than the one which Mao had wanted it to follow. The changes in institutional arrangements ensured variations in the social stratification process. Yet, unlike the former Soviet elites who lost their advantageous positions and failed to transmit their statuses to their children after the country's political transformation, Table 4.2 reveals that children of high-rank cadres are more likely to have a college attainment than children of ordinary workers. In addition, the effect of father's party membership was found to be significant on the membership of a work-life trajectory dominated by managerial work, and this trajectory typically started with a short spells in the PLA (Table 4.7). These results provide evidences of the continuity of social reproduction of those old revolutionaries.

7.2 *Life Course Principles Revisited*

7.2.1 *Changes of life course patterns*

Much of the interest in the rustication programme revolve around its impacts on the affected lives through two main arguments: (1) whether such a drastic event

7. Conclusion

disrupts normal life transitions and (2) whether it changes the lives of the affected in positive or adverse ways as questioned in the thesis title – “Rustication: Punishment or Reward?”.

Considering the transitions at important life events, this thesis makes comparisons between rusticates and non-rusticates as earlier studies have done, but in addition compares rusticates and members of adjacent cohorts in hope to examine the unique characteristics of the rusticates. Results are consistent with previous findings in literature: The rustication episode disrupts the social lives of this generation and causes delays in entry to matrimony, parenthood¹ and urban labour market. Changes in the timing of key life transitions, from a sociological perspective, often indicate social changes. Since no secular trend was found across birth cohorts, the delayed transitions point out the marked role the state played in interference in each individual’s life course patterns. The delayed college attainment exemplifies a cohort effect: the participation of schools in the political campaigns and the shut-down of colleges were most affective to members of the CR cohort², making their pathways to higher education impossible during the first few years of social chaos.

To evaluate the consequences of the rustication programme, the results gathered from empirical chapters can be brought in three aspects: First, looking at the university attainment after the re-opening of tertiary institutions, rusticates appear to have a higher chance of obtaining a college degree than non-rusticates, after controlling for cohort, ascribed characteristics and social backgrounds. The de-categorisation of rusticates by their sent-down durations reveal that, in fact rusticates who spent less than five years in the countryside experienced positive effects and are more likely to have a college attainment than either non-rusticates or rusticates who spent more years. Second, considering the work-life trajectory, rusticates are more likely to be

¹ The timing of entry to parenthood was not tested due to the absence of such information in the data, I infer its delay from the fact that entry into marriage is delayed and that pre-marriage birth was extremely low in China in the 1980s.

² Very few vocational schools affiliated to state enterprises were opening to train future skilled workers during the period of school shut-downs. This was exemplified by two non-rusticated interviewees in Chapter 6, under the heading of “Continued education”.

7. Conclusion

in the ‘working-class downward mobility’ trajectory characterised by unemployment in the later stage of their career than non-rusticates. The magnitude of the effect of rusticates with longer sent-down episode on this likelihood is stronger than that of rusticates with shorter duration. Third, after controlling for cohort, rusticates who spent more than five years in the countryside tend to be less satisfactory with their lives and feel more deprived with their current situation than their non-rusticated counterparts.

Overall, the rustication programme and other state actions are shown to have remarkable and long-lasting impacts on rusticates. In this relationship, duration of rustication is shown to be a substantial factor, even after holding cohort in constant³. The extended exposure to the rustication experience seems to trigger chain effects on subsequent outcomes, affecting the amount of time left for other life activities. Rusticates with longer sent-down episode are the most disadvantaged: The prolonged stay in the countryside made those affected more ill prepared for educational opportunities when colleges were re-opened than those who returned to cities earlier; it delayed their entry to work whilst others had accumulated enough skills and grasped survival strategies at the workplace. When the labour market retrenchment began, their lacks of educational qualification and seniority made them the most vulnerable ones to the reform, leading to their eventual lay-off and unemployment. In review of their lives, their cumulative disadvantages prompt them to harbour more grievances than anyone else.

7.2.2 *Human agency*

In contrast to the highly constrained political and economic conditions during the state socialist period, evidence of human agency is more readily identified among the CR cohort in terms of intra-generational mobility in post-reform China. Despite the general trend showing that the majority of members of the CR cohort remained

³ it is suggested by the data that rusticates in 1947-1953 cohort spent on average 4 years longer than rusticates of the 1954-1960 cohort.

7. Conclusion

in their pre-reform employment status, the urban labour market witnessed greater career mobility and that new opportunities made available by the market transition were seized by a small proportion of individuals who turned themselves into entrepreneurs or managers of state enterprises. Based on empirical evidence reported in Table 4.7 in Chapter 4, after controlling for family social backgrounds and rustication experience, we notice that an individual's own merits—such as educational credential and party membership—yield promising work-life trajectories.

Elder [1998] remarks that the central theme of lives of the “children of the great depression” is not the harsh legacy of the depression experience, but the accounts of how many of these children successfully overcame disadvantages in their lives. The lives of some rusticates, similarly, have embodied the real examples of accomplishments amidst adversity. Among my rusticated interviewees, some rose above the disadvantages or confinement resulting from the rustication through getting a college degree, becoming a party member and securing a good job. They were able to select the paths they followed within the opportunities and constraints of social context. The qualification and credential they received had influences on their work-life trajectory which in the long term shaped their view on the role rustication played in their lives (Chapter 6).

7.2.3 *Linked lives*

Elder [1998] used the example of linking fathers' emotional states and the parenting style received by their children during the Great Depression to demonstrate that “the misfortune of one member is shared through relationships”. The notion of “linked lives” has been exemplified in interviews with non-rusticated family members of former rusticates. Younger siblings built up their impressions of rustication through witnessing the hardship and subsequent jolts endured by their rusticated brothers or sisters; Spouses shouldered the responsibility of homemaking and child rearing to allow their rusticated husbands or wives to pursue the incomplete education

7. Conclusion

disrupted during the Cultural Revolution. Similarly, the fact that the CR cohort holds great expectation on academic achievements of their children, owing to their own deprived education, embodies another aspect of linked lives.

7.3 *Future Inquiries*

The advantage of confining analysis of the work-life trajectories of the CR cohort is countered by its limitation of putting employment patterns in context. To determine the success and failure of individuals, age is arguably a significant factor. Older people in post-socialist countries are losers in comparison to younger adults because of their unfortunate historical timing, ill-prepared for new opportunities created by the transformation [Titma and Tuma, 2005]. A cohort comparison of work-life trajectory, a similar kind to Zhou et al. [1997]’s previous analysis on job-shift patterns, may underscore rusticates’ disadvantageous position even more markedly.

7.4 *Concluding Remarks*

In comparison to their American contemporaries who participated in the “Freedom Summer” campaign and who made politics the centre of their lives, the experience of rustication seems to show little impact on reviving the political activism which rusticates once had as Mao’s red guards. The cause of this difference is that volunteers who participated in the “Freedom Summer” were caught in the tide of the remarkable Civil Rights Movement whereas their Chinese counterparts were confronted with the termination of havoc created by the Revolution and the dramatic transformation of the economy. In this regard, Mao’s intention to re-educate the young failed, as not only the rusticates did not thrive politically in the countryside, but they embraced readily both traditional and new capitalist values with which Mao himself was against. Yang [2003]’s analysis of nostalgia of the CR cohort suggests that there has been a shift of this cohort’s interest from “the macropolitics of mass political campaigns” in the chaotic years of the Revolution to “a micropolitics

7. Conclusion

with a social and cultural orientation” in the present day.

The entire thesis tries to explain how the rusticates, or the CR cohort, have been shaped by the past. The historical significance of the rusticates may seem to have ended with the termination of the Cultural Revolution, yet, the inquiries surrounding the CR cohort persist about the ways it will shape the country’s future. As of now, even the youngest members of the CR cohort (who were born in 1960) have entered their fifth decade. They are replacing the elders to form the backbone of Chinese political leadership, they will be in control of the public opinion and the decisions which will determine the way China develops. The forthcoming election of China’s new leadership will bring on a new generation selected from the CR cohort. Among the popular figures (Xi Jinping, Li Keqiang and Wang Qishan) who were expected to be in the Politburo Standing Committee, they all have a brief rustication history. Would their rustic experience grant them grassroots consciousness, helping them to win endorsements from people? The problem is that since Mr Xi belongs to an emerging political force in China known as the “party of princelings” (children of former party elites), was elected by the forerunners with specific criteria, his ability of representing the true aspiration of his cohort remains in question [Bonnin, 2006].

For ordinary members of the CR cohort, they are having other worries. Since the majority of the CR cohort are in their retirement now, they face up to the patchy and costly health-insurance coverage and a changeable pension scheme. Another problem envisaged is that they expect to receive less personal care from their singleton children than their parents expected from them even though care for the old was made a legal obligation in 1996 in China.

The halt of schooling disrupted the pursuit of education for many people in the CR cohort, but it prompted them to instill the desire and expectation for higher education in their children. As shown by a result in the 2003 CGSS, compared to the earlier cohort, the CR cohort invests more money on their children. This is exemplified by the sponsorship contribution they paid for their children to attend

7. Conclusion

schools at all different levels.

The lives of the CR cohort traverse from the three-year famine, the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution of the 1950s and 1960s, to the transformation from planned economy to market economy and the *Tian'anmen* Square protest of the 1970s and 1980s, and to the urban industrial reforms and the economic expansion of the 1990s and 2000s. In literature, rusticates have been called “Mao’s children”, “the lost generation”, “the delayed generation” and “the deceived generation”. My last question to each of my rusticated interviewees was to use one term to describe their generation. I provided them with a list of choices. As a result, “the generation of the Cultural Revolution” was the most selected. It is argued by them that one adjective is not enough to summarise the collective state of their generation; the Cultural Revolution marks a turning point in their lives, representing a period as they grew to maturity. Therefore, as in the title of this thesis, I feel it appropriate to follow their suggestion, and refer to them simply as the generation of the Cultural Revolution.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- A. Abbott. Measuring resemblance in sequence data: An optimal matching analysis of musician's careers. *The American Journal of Sociology*, 96(1):144–185, 1990.
- A. Abbott and J. Forrest. Optimal matching methods for historical data. *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, 14(3):471–494, 1986.
- D. J. Bartholomew, F. Steele, I. Moustaki, and J. I. Galbraith. Correspondence analysis. In *The Analysis and Interpretation of Multivariate Data for Social Scientists*. Chapman & Hall/CRC, 2002.
- T. P. Bernstein. *Up to the Mountains and Down to the Villages: the transfer of youth from urban to rural China*. Yale University Press, 1977.
- Yanjie. Bian. Chinese social stratification and social mobility. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 28:91–116, 2002.
- Yanjie. Bian and Lulu. Li. *China's General Social Survey 2003 (CGSS 2003): a methodological report*. Proceedings of JGSS Colloquium, Osaka University of Commerce, 2005.
- Yanjie. Bian and J. W. Logan. Market transition and the persistence of power: The changing stratification system in urban China. *American Sociological Review*, 61: 739–758, 1996.
- P. M. Blau and D. Ruan. Inequality of opportunity in urban China and America. *Research in Social Stratification and Mobility*, 9:3–32, 1990.

Bibliography

- H-P. Blossfeld, K. Golsch, and G. Rohwer. *Event History Analysis with STATA*. Psychology Press, 2007.
- M. Bonnin. Shangshan xiexiang yundong zai pingjia (Re-evaluation of the sent-down movement). *Shehui xue yanjiu (Sociology Research)*, 119:154–179, 2005a.
- M. Bonnin. A “old class three” foreigner who studies the Chinese “Zhi Qing” - introduce my new book. *Zhi Qing (Zhi-Qing Association of Southern California)*, 7:4–7, 2005b.
- M. Bonnin. Research in studies of the sent-down movement: several controversial problems. In Y. Y. Song, editor, *The Cultural Revolution: Historical Truth and Collective Memories (Part 2)*, China in the 21st Century Series. Tian Yuan Shu Wu, 2005c.
- M. Bonnin. The “Lost Generation”: Its definition and its role in today’s Chinese elite politics. *Social Research*, 73(1):245–274, 2006.
- M. Bonnin. *Shiluo de yidai (Chinese translation of Génération Perdue)*. Chinese University of Hong Kong Press, 2009.
- P. Bourdieu and J.C. Passeron. *Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture*. Berverly Hills: Sage, 1977.
- R. Breen, editor. *Social Mobility in Europe*. Oxford University Press, 2005.
- C Brzinsky-Fay, U Kohler, and M. Luniak. Sequence analysis with stata. *The Stata Journal*, 6(4):435–460, 2006.
- Anita Chan. Dispelling misconceptions about the Red Guard movement - the necessity to re-examine Cultural Revolution Factionalism and Periodization (in Chinese). *Papers of the Center for Modern China*, IV(6):1–29, 1993.

Bibliography

- Anita. Chan, S. Rosen, and J. Unger. Students and class warfare: The social roots of the red guard conflict in Guangzhou (Canton). *China Quarterly*, 83 (September): 397–446, 1980.
- Feng. Chao, editor. *Wenhua da geming cidian (Dictionary of the Cultural Revolution)*. Dragon(H.K.) Publishing Co., 1993.
- Kevin. Chen and Xiaonong. Cheng. Comment on zhou & hou: A negative life event with positive consequences? *American Sociological Review*, 64(1):37–40, 1999.
- Yinxin. Chen. Cong xiafang dao xiangang: 1968-1998 (from sent-down to laid-off: 1968-1998). *The 21st Century (Er Shi Yi Shi Ji)*, 12, 1999a.
- Yixin. Chen. Lost in Revolution and Reform: the socioeconomic pains of China's Red Guards Generation, 1966-1996. *Journal of Contemporary China*, 8(21):219–239, 1999b.
- Modern China Committees, editor. *Labour Force Management in Modern China*. China Social Sciences Press, 1990.
- Zhong. Deng and D.J. Treiman. The impact of the Cultural Revolution on trends in educational attainment in the People's Republic of China. *The American Journal of Sociology*, 103(2):391–428, 1997.
- W. Dijkstra and T. Taris. Measuring the agreement between sequences. *Sociological Methods & Research*, 24:214–131, 1995.
- M. Djilas. *The New Class: An Analysis of the Communist System*. Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1957.
- G. H. Elder. Military times and turning point in men's lives. *Developmental Psychology*, 1986.
- G. H. Elder. War mobilization and the life course: A cohort of world war ii veterans. *Sociological Forum*, 2(3):449–472, 1987.

Bibliography

- G. H. Elder and L.A. Pellerin. Linking history and human lives. In *Methods of life course research : qualitative and quantitative approaches*. Thousand Oaks, California, 1998a.
- G. H. Jr. Elder. *Children of the great depression: Social change in life experience*. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1974.
- G.H. Elder. The life course as developmental theory. *Child Development*, 69(1): 1–12, 1998.
- G.H. Elder. The adult years. In *Children of the Great Depression: Social change in life experience*. Westview Press, 1999.
- G.H. Elder and L.A. Pellerin. Linking history and human lives. In *Methods of life course research : qualitative and quantitative approaches*. Thousand Oaks, Calif. ; London : Sage,, 1998b.
- G.H. Elder, W.Q. Wu, and J.H. Yuan. State-initiated change and the life course in Shanghai, China. Carolina Population Center: Unpublished manuscript, 1993.
- R. Erikson and J. H. Goldthorpe. *The Constand Flux: a study of class mobility in industrial societies*. Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1992.
- J.W. Esherick, P.G. Pickowicz, and A.G. Walder, editors. *The Chinese Cultural Revolution as History*. Stanford University Press, 2006a.
- J.W. Esherick, P.G. Pickowicz, and A.G. Walder. The Chinese Cultural Revolution as history: An introduction. In *The Chinese Cultural Revolution as History*. Stanford University Press, 2006b.
- G. Feeney and Feng. Wang. Parity progression and birth intervals in China: The influence of policy in hastening fertility decline. *Population and Development Review*, 19(1):61–101, 1993.

Bibliography

- J. Gershuny. Post-industrial career structures in Britain. In Gosta Esping-Andersen, editor, *Changing Classes: Stratification and Mobility in Post-industrial Societies*, pages 136–170. London: Sage, 1993.
- J. Giles, A. Park, and M.Y. Wang. The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution disruptions to education, and returns to schooling in urban China. *World Bank Policy Research Working Paper*, 4729, 2007.
- T. B. Gold. Back to the city: The return of Shanghai’s educated youth. *The China Quarterly*, 84:755–770, 1980.
- J.H. Goldthorpe. *Social mobility and class structure in modern Britain*. Oxford University Press, 1987.
- I. Gough. *The Political Economy of the Welfare State*. The Macmillan Press LTD, 1979.
- B. H. Halpin. Optimal matching analysis and life course data: the importance of duration. *Department of Sociology Working Paper Series, University of Limerick*, WP2008-01:1–21, 2008.
- B. H. Halpin and T. W. Chan. Class careers as sequences: An optimal matching analysis of work-life histories. *European Sociological Review*, 14:111–130, 1998.
- Shin-Kap. Han and P. Moen. Clocking out: Temporal patterning of retirement. *The American Journal of Sociology*, 105(1):191–236, 1999.
- J. Huinink and M. Kreyenfeld. Family formation in times of abrupt social and economic change. In *After the Fall of the Wall: Life Courses in the Transformation of East Germany*. Stanford University Press, 2006.
- E. P. W. Hung and Stephen. W. K. Chiu. The lost generation: life course dynamics and Xiangang in China. *Modern China*, 29(2):204–236, 2003.

Bibliography

- Yarong. Jiang and David. Ashley. *Mao's Children in the New China: Voices from the Red Guard Generation*. Routledge, 2000.
- Dalu Jin. *Shiyun yu mingyun: Guanyu laosanjie ren de shengcun yu fazhan (Social forces and destiny: on the lives and development of the Laosanjie)*. Shanghai Renmin Press, 1998.
- J. O. Jonsson and C. Mills, editors. *Cradle to Grave: life-course change in modern Sweden*. Sociologypress, 2002.
- J. Knight and Lina. Song. *Towards a Labour Market in China*. Oxford University Press, New York and Oxford, 2005.
- J. Knight and L. Yueh. Job mobility of residents and migrants in urban China. *Journal of Comparative Economics*, 32:637–660, 2004.
- R.C. Kraus. *Class Conflict in Chinese Socialism*. Columbia University Press, 1981.
- L. Lesnard. Optimal matching and social sciences. *Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique Working Papers Series*, 01, 2006.
- L. Lesnard and M. Y. Kan. Two-stage optimal matching analysis of workdays and workweeks. *Sociology Working Papers of the Department of Sociology, Oxford*, 2009-04, 2009.
- Qiang. Li, editor. *Social Changes in China, 1978-2008*. Social Sciences Academic Press (China), 2008.
- Xiaomeng. Liu. *Zhongguo zhiqing shi: Dachao, 1966-1980 (The History of Chinese Sent-down Youth: The Big Wave, 1966-1980)*. Contemporary China Publishing House, 2008.
- Xueyi. Lu, editor. *Social Mobility in Contemporary China*. Social Sciences Documentation Publishing House, Beijing, China, 2004.

Bibliography

- Thomas. Lum. Social unrest in China. Technical report, CRS Report for Congress, 2006.
- K. Mannheim. The problem of generations. In *Essays in the sociology of knowledge*, pages 276–322. Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul., 1952.
- K. U Mayer. Whose lives? how history, societies, and institutions define and shape life course. *Research in Human Development*, 1(3):161–187, 2004.
- K. U. Mayer and N. B. Tuma. *Event History Analysis in Life Course Research*. The University of Wisconsin Press, 1990a.
- K.U. Mayer, editor. *After the fall of the wall: life courses in the transformation of East Germany*. Stanford University Press, 2006.
- K.U. Mayer. New directions in life course research. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 35: 413–433, 2009.
- K.U. Mayer and N.B. Tuma. Life course research and event history analysis: An overview. In *Event History Analysis in Life Course Research*. The University of Wisconsin Press, 1990b.
- D. McAdam. *Freedom Summer*. Oxford University Press, US, 1990.
- D. McVicar and M. Anyadike-Danes. Predicting successful and unsuccessful transitions from school to work by using sequence methods. *Journal of Royal Statistical Society*, 165(2):317–334, 2002.
- Xin. Meng and R. G. Gregory. The impac of interrupted education on subsequent educational attainment: A cost of the Chinese Cultural Revolution. *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 50(4):935–959, 2002.
- V. Nee. A theory of market transition: From redistribution to markets in state socialism. *Americal Sociological Review*, 54(5):663–681, 1989.

Bibliography

- V. Nee. The emergence of a market society: Changing mechanisms of stratification in China. *American Journal of Sociology*, 101(4):908–949, 1996.
- V. Nee and P. Lian. Sleeping with the enemy: a dynamic model of declining political commitment in state socialism. *Theory and Society*, 23:253–196, 1994.
- S. Needleman and C. Wunsch. A general method applicable to the search for similarities in the amino acid sequence of two proteins. *Journal of Molecular Biology*, 48:443–453, 1970.
- Yihong Pan. *Tempered in the Revolutionary Furnace: China's Youth in the Rustication Movement*. Lexington Books, 2003.
- W.L. Parish and E. Michelson. Politics and markets: Dual transformations. *American Journal of Sociology*, 101:1042–1059, 1996.
- F. Parkin. Class stratification in socialist societies. *The British Journal of Sociology*, 20(4):355–374, 1969.
- H. L. Parsons. The prophetic mission of Karl Marx. *Journal of Religion*, 44, 1964.
- M. Pearson, editor. *China's Business Elite: The Political Consequences of Economic Reform*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997.
- G. Polloack, V. Antcliff, and R. Ralphs. Work orders: Analysing employment histories using sequence data. *Socioal Research Methodology*, 5:90–105, 2002.
- Zhencao. Qian and R. Hodson. ‘Sent Down’ in China: Stratification challenged but not denied. *Research in Social Stratification and Mobility*, 2010.
- Liyan Qin. The sublime and the profane: A comparative analysis of two fictional narratives about Sent-down Youth. In J.W. Esherick, P.G. Pickowicz, and A. G. Walder, editors, *The Chinese Cultural Revolution as History*. Stanford University Press, 2006.

Bibliography

- J. Rawls. *A Theory of Justice*. Belknap, 1971.
- N. B. Ryder. The cohort as a concept in the study of social change. *American Sociological Review*, 6:843–861, 1965.
- S. Scherer. Early career patterns: A comparison of Great Britain and West Germany. *European Sociological Review*, 17:119–144, 2001.
- S. R. Schrarn. *The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung*. London: C. Nicholls, 1971.
- Weimin. Shi. Shangshan xiaxiang qingnian de “bingtui”, “kuntui” wenti (The issues of the “bingtui” and “kuntui” of the sentdown youth). *Youth Studies*, 5:46–49, 1995.
- Philip Short. Documentary film: Mao’s bloody revolution: Revealed, May 2007.
- H. Solga. The rise of meritocracy? Class mobility in east Germany before and after 1989. In *After the fall of the wall: life course in the transformation of East Germany*. Stanford University Press, 2006.
- Xi. Song and Xiaogang. Wu. Values and modes of conflict resolution: A portrait of the Chinese new middle class. Technical report, the 104th Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association, San Francisco, CA., August 2009.
- I. Szelényi. Social inequalities in state socialist redistributive economies. *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, 19:63–87, 1978.
- I. Szelényi. Social inequality and party membership: Patterns of recruitment into the hungarian socialist worker’s party. *American Sociological Review*, 52:559–573, 1987.
- I. Szelényi. *Socialist Entrepreneurs: Embourgeoisement in Rural Hungary*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press and Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988.
- Shaojie Tang. Mao zedong yu qinghua daxue (mao zedong and the tsing hua university). *Nan Fang Daily*, April 5th, 2001.

Bibliography

- Wenfang. Tang and W.L Parish. The urban social world. In *Chinese Urban Life under Reform: the changing social contract*. Cambridge University Press, 2000.
- M. Titma and N. B. Tuma. Human agency in the transition from Communism: Perspectives on the life course and aging. *Historical Influences on Lives and Aging*, pages 108–143, 2005.
- J. Unger. China’s troubled down-to-the-countryside campaign. *Contemporary China*, 3(2):79–92, 1979.
- L. Wagmiller, L. Kuang, J. L. Aber, M.C. Lennon, and P.M. Alberti. The dynamics of economic disadvantage and children’s life chances. *American Sociological Review*, 71:847–866, 2006.
- A. Walder. Career mobility and the communist political order. *American Sociological Review*, 60:309–328, 1995a.
- A. G. Walder. Organized dependency and cultures of authority in Chinese industry. *The Journal of Asian Studies*, 43(1):51–76, 1983.
- A. G. Walder. *Communist Neo-Traditionalism: Work and Authority in Chinese Industry*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986.
- A. G. Walder. Social change in Post-revolution China. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 15:405–24, 1989.
- A. G. Walder. Local governments as industrial firms: An organizational analysis of China’s transitional economy. *American Journal of Sociology*, 101(2):263–301, 1995b.
- A. G. Walder. Markets and inequality in transitional economies: Toward testable theories. *American Journal of Sociology*, 101(4):1060–1073, 1996.
- A. G. Walder. Beijing Red Guard factionalism: Social interpretations reconsidered. Technical report, The Asia/Pacific Research Center, University of Stanford, 2001.

Bibliography

- A. G. Walder and J. C. Oi. Property rights in the Chinese economy: Contours of the process of change. In *Property Rights and Economic Reform in China*, pages 1–24. Stanford University Press, 1999.
- A. G. Walder, B. Li, and D. J. Treiman. Politics and Life Chances in a State Socialist Regime: Dual Career Paths into Urban Chinese Elite, 1949-1996. *American Sociological Review*, 65:April:191–209, 2000.
- A.G. Walder. The party elite and China’s trajectory of change. *China: an international journal*, 2(2):189–209, 2004.
- Shaoguang. Wang. *Failure of Charisma: The Cultural Revolution in Wuhan*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.
- Shaoguang. Wang. ‘New trends of thought on the Cultural Revolution. *Journal of contemporary China*, 8(21):197–217, 1999.
- D. Wank. Bureaucratic patronage and private business: Changing networks of power in urban China. In *The Waning of the Communist State: Economic Origins of Political Decline in China and Hungary*, pages 153–183. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995.
- D. L. Wank. Producing property rights: Strategies, networks, and efficiency in urban China’s nonstate firms. In J. C. Oi and A. G. Walder, editors, *Property Rights and Economic Reform in China*. Stanford University Press, 1999.
- M. Weber. *Economy and Society*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978.
- M. K. Whyte and W.L. Parish. Social services and supplies. In *Urban Life in Contemporary China*. The University of Chicago Press, 1984a.
- MK. Whyte and WL. Parish. *Urban Life in Contemporary China*. University of Chicago Press, 1984b.

Bibliography

- E. O. Wright, editor. *Class Counts: Comparative Studies in Class Analysis*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
- Lawrence. L. Wu. Some comments on “sequence analysis and optimal matching methods in sociology: Review and prospect”. *Sociological Methods and Research*, 29:41–64, 2000.
- Wen. Xie and Nan. Lin. Occupational prestige in urban China. *Amercian Journal of Sociology*, 93:793–832, 1988.
- Yu. Xie, Yang. Jiang, and E. Greenman. Did send-down experience benefit youth? - a reevaluation of the social consequences of forced urban-rural migration during China’s Cultural Revolution. Research Report 06-603, Population Studies Center: University of Michigan, 2006.
- Youyu. Xu, editor. *1996: Women na yidai ren de huiyi (1966: The Reminiscences of Our Generation)*. Beijing: Zhongguo wenlian chuban gongsi, 1998.
- Guobin. Yang. China’s zhiqing generation: Nostalgia, identity, and cultural resistance in the 1990s. *Modern China*, 29(3):267–296, 2003.
- Yang. Yang. Social inequalities in happiness in the United States, 1972 to 2004: An age-period-cohort analysis. *Amercian Sociological Review*, 73(2):204–226, 2008.
- Fei. Zhang and Weiming. Lu. Dangdai zhongguo gongren jieji jiegou bianhua fenxi (the analysis of change in working-class structure in contemporary china). *Lilun Daokan (Journal of Socialist Theory Guide)*, 7:28–30, 2002.
- Yaohui. Zhao. Rural-ro-urban labor migration in China: The past and the present. In L. A. West and Y. H. Zhao, editors, *Rural Labor Flows in China*. Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley., 2000.
- Xueguang. Zhou. *The State and Life Chances in Urban China: Redistribution and Stratification, 1949-1994*. Cambridge University Press, 2004.

Bibliography

- Xueguang. Zhou and Liren. Hou. Children of the Cultural Revolution: The state and the life course in the People's Republic of China. *American Sociological Review*, 64:12–36, 1999.
- Xueguang. Zhou and P. Moen. Explaining life chances in Chinas economic transformation: A life course approach. *Social Science Research*, 30 (4):552–577, 2001.
- Xueguang. Zhou, N. B. Tuma, and P. Moen. Stratification dynamics under state socialism: The case of urban China. *Social Forces*, 74(3):759–796, 1996.
- Xueguang. Zhou, NB. Tuma, and P. Moen. Institutional Change and Job-shift Patterns in Urban China. *American Sociological Review*, 62:339–365, 1997.
- Xueguang. Zhou, P. Moen, and N.B. Tuma. Educational stratification in urban China: 1949-94. *Sociology of Education*, 71:199–222, 1998.