Solidarity on the Battlefield: A Social History of ZANU and FRELIMO on the Mozambican frontier, 1975-1980

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Clinarete Victória Luís Munguambe

St Antony's College

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Abstract

During the 1960s and 1970s, a number of Southern Africa's liberation movements undertook armed struggles to end colonial rule. The Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) were two liberation movements which engaged in armed struggle to liberate their countries. The struggle was aided by the spirit of solidarity that tied the liberation movements of Southern Africa together, along with the newly independent countries willing to host and support them. These relationships also allowed the liberation movements to forge worldwide connections with governments prepared to support them with military, humanitarian, and financial resources. It was in this spirit that FRELIMO and ZANU established military cooperation from the later 1960s, in their struggle against the Portuguese colonial and Rhodesian settler regimes in their respective countries. The FRELIMO-ZANU relationship was strengthened after Mozambique achieved independence in June 1975 under FRELIMO. This study critically examines the solidarity relationships that developed on the battlefield between Mozambican soldiers serving this new state, known as the *Forças Populares de Libertação de Moçambique* (FPLM - Mozambique People's Liberation Forces), and fighters of the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA). It also looks at the relationships that developed between the Mozambican population and Zimbabweans who used Mozambican territory to set up refugee and military camps and as a rear base. The study argues that apparently divisive Cold War pressures on the leadership of the liberation movements had less impact than other factors on the soldiers who fought the war in the rural areas. Soldiers from FRELIMO and ZANU had diverse military cultures but nonetheless developed and forged forms of solidarity independent of their political leaders. Although differences created tensions and friction between soldiers of the two armies, they were able to create a shared military language and culture while fighting together. Fighters incorporated their own forms of solidarity into the war, different from the orientations of the liberation movements' political leadership. These efforts revealed soldiers' understanding of the war they were fighting, their motivations, and how they reinterpreted military training and strategy to fight together at the Rhodesian front.

List of Abbreviations

AAPSO	Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organisation
ANC	African National Congress
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CONCP	*Conferência das Organizações Nacionalistas das Colónias Portuguesas* (Conference of Nationalist Organizations of the Portuguese Colonies)
COREMO	*Comité Revolucionário de Moçambique* (The Revolutionary Committee of Mozambique)
CC CPSU	Central Committee for the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CPHLLN	*Centro de Pesquisa da História da Luta de Libertação Nacional* (Centre for Research on the History of the Struggle for National Liberation)
FPLM	*Forças Populares de Libertação de Moçambique* (Mozambican People's Liberation Forces)
FRELIMO	*Frente de Libertação de Moçambique* (Mozambique Liberation Front)
GDR	German Democratic Republic
IESE	*Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Económicos* (Institute of Social and Economic Studies, Maputo
MANU	Mozambique African National Union
MPLA	*Movimento Popular para a Libertação de Angola* (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola)
MNR	Mozambique National Resistance
MK	uMkhonto weSizwe (Spear of the Nation - armed wing of the ANC)
ODID	Oxford Department of International Development
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
PAC	Pan Africanist Congress
PAIGC	*Partido Africano para a Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde* (African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde)
PIDE	*Polícia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado* (International and Defence Police)
RENAMO	Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (Mozambique National Resistance)
SED	Socialist Unity Party of Germany
SNASP	*Serviço Nacional de Segurança Popular* (The People's National Security Service)
SWANU	South West Africa National Union
SWAPO	South West Africa People's Organisation

TANU	Tanganyika African National Union
TTLs	Tribal Trust Lands
TPDF	Tanzanian People's Defence Forces
UDENAMO	*União Democrática Nacional de Moçambique* (National Democratic Union of Mozambique)
UNAMI	*União Nacional Africana de Moçambique Independente* (African National Union of Independent Mozambique)
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNITA	*União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola* (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola)
UNIP	United National Independence Party
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner Refugees
WFP	World Food Programme
ZANU	Zimbabwe African National Union
ZANLA	Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army
ZAPU	Zimbabwe African People's Union
ZIPRA	Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army
ZIPA	Zimbabwe People's Army



Map 1: Entry and exit routes from Mozambique to Rhodesia

Credit: José Brito, IESE, 2024

Introduction

“We are gathered here today to say the tobacco regime is over, Smith is no longer in charge, Smith has been defeated, and he can no longer attack the People’s Republic of Mozambique”.[1] These were the first words uttered by President Samora Machel at the beginning of the popular rally held in Maputo on 23 December 1979 to celebrate the signing of the Lancaster House agreement on 21 December 1979. The agreement brought to an end the armed struggle waged by the Zimbabwe African National Union, ZANU, and the Zimbabwe African People’s Union, ZAPU, and Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence, proclaimed by Ian Smith in 1965.

Machel took this moment to congratulate the Zimbabwean people, who "were able to take up weapons and accept the sacrifices"[2] of the armed struggle. Machel said that the end of the armed struggle in Rhodesia and the signing of the Lancaster House agreement "was the historical achievement of the Patriotic Front – of ZANU and ZAPU, and their leaders, Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe."[3] He also seized the occasion to trace the historical role played by Mozambique in the liberation of Zimbabwe. He held that the "Mozambican people, through its sacrifices and blood, wrote in history their contribution to the solidarity between people".[4] Starting from the relationship established between the *Frente de Libertação de Moçambique*, FRELIMO, while it was still waging its liberation struggle and ZANU in 1972, Machel asserted that:

> We handed over our weapons and ammunition to the Zimbabwean fighters. During this period, we trained many combatants at our military bases. We welcomed Zimbabweans who fled repression into our liberated areas. Under bombardment, our people transported supplies on their heads for the Zimbabwean fighters from the Zambian border to Zimbabwe. Our people transported food, medicine, weapons, and ammunition to the Zimbabwean guerrillas.[5]

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[1]Samora Machel, *A Vitória do Povo do Zimbabwe é Fruto da Luta Armada, da Unidade e do Internacionalismo*, (Maputo: Partido FRELIMO, 1980), p.5. Available at: http://www.mozambiquehistory.net/politics/frelimo/_palavras_de_ordem/19791223_no.16.pdf

[2]Ibid.p.6.

[3]Ibid.

[4]Ibid.p.9.

[5]Ibid.

Machel also discussed the importance of Mozambique as the rear base for Zimbabwean guerrillas after the country's independence in 1975. Even though the country faced devastating bombing raids by the Rhodesian forces, Machel asserted that "this did not divert us from our internationalist duty of solidarity".[6] He also used the opportunity to declare his pride in the 500 soldiers of the *Forças Populares de Libertação de Moçambique* (FPLM, People's Forces of Mozambique Liberation) who had fought side by side with the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA, the armed wing of ZANU) in the interior of Rhodesia and to emphasise how essential the military cooperation between FPLM soldiers and ZANLA was on the battlefield.[7]

Solidarity relationships between FRELIMO and ZANU were substantial and took many forms. On the ground, these relationships developed rapidly from 1971 as the two liberation movements responded to much intensified conflict with Portuguese and Rhodesian military forces in the Zambezi valley. Between Mozambican independence in 1975 and Zimbabwean independence in 1980, the new Mozambican government allowed ZANU soldiers to establish guerrilla bases and develop their military offensive into Rhodesia. To support these operations, Mozambique established forces at the border with Rhodesia and, as Machel noted, sent around 500 Mozambican soldiers to fight alongside ZANLA inside Rhodesia.[8] In the rural areas, civilians engaged closely with ZANLA fighters and Zimbabwean refugees, providing food, intelligence on the movements of Rhodesian forces and helped transport war materials to the Rhodesian border. People in the cities expressed their solidarity with the struggle for Zimbabwe through rallies and cultural manifestations such as songs and poetry and the contribution of funds.

FRELIMO's decision to host and support ZANU's armed struggle was part of the broader set of alliances established between and among liberation movements during the struggles for independence in Southern Africa. It has been argued that this struggle was generally marked by a spirit of solidarity among the various liberation movements, which

[6]Ibid.p.14.
[7]Ibid.p.14-15.
[8]See Clinarete Munguambe, "Nationalism and Exile in an Age of Solidarity: FRELIMO-ZANU relations in Mozambique (1975-1980)", *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 43, 1 (2017).

established ties, shared military strategies and training camps, and hosted civilians and soldiers in their national territories, all of which was crucial to the success of these movements' armed struggles. However, many aspects of these relationships remain unexplored, notably the day-to-day interactions that shaped military strategy and social and political relations on the ground, between soldiers as well as between them and civilians. These aspects are essential because they allow us to understand the kind of solidarity that shaped the liberation struggle on the battlefield and the exchanges it produced as well as its legacies. My research aims to address these shortcomings by exploring the dynamics of solidarity and collaboration between Mozambican soldiers and civilians and ZANLA fighters in the border areas of Mozambique and on the battlefield inside Rhodesia.

This thesis explores the historical relationship developed between FRELIMO, first as a liberation movement and then as the party that governed newly independent Mozambique, and the ZANU liberation movement, offering a critical historical examination of the dynamics of solidarity and collaboration between Mozambican soldiers and civilians and ZANU fighters. It explores what happened when the solidarity relationship was taken from refugee and military training camps to the battlefield and analyses how the discourse of loyalty from the political leadership and Cold War geopolitical influences were manifested on the ground. The thesis also explores the incorporation of social and cultural aspects such as religion into the war, and the ways in which it shaped the interaction between the liberation movements. In addition, it examines the role of Mozambican civilians in supporting ZANLA guerrillas while undertaking military training in Mozambique and using it as the rear base from which they launched military operations inside Rhodesia. I argue that although the Cold War context influenced the relationship of solidarity between FRELIMO and ZANU, these influences imposed from above had a lesser impact locally. While ZANU and FRELIMO political rhetoric and propaganda were informed by the geopolitical influence of the Cold War era, which in some instances was very important in gaining military and financial aid essential to the waging of the armed struggle against intransigent regimes, the rank-and-file soldiers of both liberation movements were able to develop their own forms of solidarity at the grassroots, independent of the leaders.

Before I explore how scholars have analysed the connections established among liberation movements and international supporters during the struggle for independence in Southern Africa, let me examine the concept of solidarity and its evolution in the next section.

Towards understanding the Concept of Solidarity

The liberation movements that fought for independence in Africa called the network of alliances and connections they created worldwide "solidarity." This term first emerged in the 18th century when it had a religious connotation, relating to the Roman law expression, *obligation in solidum,* which was linked to the principle of friendship and natural brotherhood.[9] Looking at the etymological and historical conceptualisation of solidarity, Karl Metz and Kurt Bayertz have demonstrated that the meaning of the concept of solidarity changed over time.[10] Solidarity acquired new social and cultural aspects in the aftermath of the French Revolution and started being used to claim legal aspects of *liberty, equality and fraternity.*[11]

The concept of solidarity took on new meanings in the Cold War era which are contested among scholars. Those who explored the alliances created during the struggle for independence in Southern Africa have looked at solidarity from two perspectives. The first explores the solidarity between liberation movements and the outside world as a political category imagined by international activists and social organisations and movements that were demanding the liberation of countries under colonial regimes. Håkan Thörn explores solidarity expressed through the international anti-apartheid

[9]Arto Laitinen and Anne Birgitta Pessi, "Solidarity: Theory and Practice. An Introduction", in Arto Laitinen and Anne Birgitta Pessi (ed), *Solidarity: Theory and Practice* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2014), p.2; Hauke Brunkhorst, *Solidarity: From civic Friendship to a Global Community* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005), p.2.

[10] Karl Metz, "Solidarity and History" in Kurt Bayertz (ed), *Solidarity, Philosophical Studies in Contemporary Culture,* Vol.5 (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1999); Kurt Bayertz, "Four uses of Solidarity", in Kurt Bayertz (ed), *Solidarity, Philosophical Studies in Contemporary Culture,* Vol.5 (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1999).

[11]A. Laitinen and A. Birgitta Pessi, "Solidarity: Theory and Practice. An Introduction", p.7; Kurt Bayertz, "Four uses of Solidarity", p.29.

movement as a collective identity made by social movements, such as those participating in organising demonstrations or political boycotts, which functioned as a “transnational political culture”.[12]

In an edited book titled *Transnational Solidarity: Anticolonialism in the Global Sixties*, the authors explore the relationship of solidarity established during the revolutionary era of the Sixties, which created links between "anti-imperialists, decolonizing nations, decolonizing people, revolutionary policies and practices".[13] Like Thörn, the authors explore the concept of solidarity as a political category in which activists create connections across racial and national barriers. They argue that "solidarity emerged as a means of framing political discourse and thus positioning a specific situation within the broader anti-imperialist struggle." The authors suggest that this network of solidarity was driven by an imaginary of political and cultural desires, in which transnational actors could support causes and struggles that were often distant but based on identifying a shared form of oppression. In this way, solidarity served as a tool which activists used to fight for their causes.[14]

Toni Weis shares the same notion of solidarity as a political instrument but explores it in regard to state solidarity rather than activists and social organisations. He shows how the notion of solidarity was essential to forging the German Democratic Republic’s (GDR) support for the struggle of the Southwest Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO). The author suggests solidarity was defined by the GDR as mutual support and commitment and the willingness to help and sacrifice, and was imposed by the state as part of what he calls a "politics machine".[15] This machine functions within the sphere of

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[12]Håkan Thörn, “The Meaning(s) of Solidarity: Narratives of Anti-Apartheid Activism”, *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 35,2 (2009). See also Håkan Thörn, “The Liberation Struggles in Southern Africa and the Emergence of a Global Civil Society: Suggestions for Further Research”, in Chris Saunders, *Documenting Liberation Struggle in Southern Africa* (Pretoria: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2010), p.112.

[13] Zeina Maasri, Francesca Burke, and Cathy Bergin (ed), *Transnational Solidarity: Anticolonialism in the Global Sixties* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2022), p.12.

[14] Ibid, p.4. On the transnational connection and cross-border interactions see Hilary Sapire, “Liberation movements, Exiles and International Solidarity: An Introduction”. *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 35, 2 (2009), p.271-286.

[15]Toni Weis, “The Politics Machine: on the Concept of Solidarity in East German support for Swapo”, *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 37,2 (2011), p.351-367

the political framework, defined and controlled by the interests of the state – "the ethic of solidarity itself was not imposed from above, but rather the framework within which it could operate".[16]

A second perspective on solidarity relates to the relationships developed among liberation movements in southern Africa. For John Day, Henning Melber, David Martin and Phyllis Johnson, Christian Williams, Chris Saunders and others, the evocative concept of solidarity among African liberation movements was expressed in exile, particularly at the military training camps as well as relations among the political leaders and political/diplomatic representatives. For John Day, solidarity encompasses the regional networks of patronage and dependence, fighting side by side, living in the same neighbourhoods and camps, exchanging views and information, and hosting each other.[17] Henning Melber defines solidarity established among liberation movements as a moral, ethical and political obligation which "entails empathy as much as the loyalty to fundamental human values of equality and dignity to which all human beings should be entitled in an undivided manner".[18] This kind of relationship encompasses a different kind of solidarity created outside Africa – through both state and liberation movements. Regional solidarity was used to create common identities and sympathies among movements and, in the "political machine" of host states governed by former liberation movements, had to function within the political framework of the moment. This means that liberation movements in exile had to be loyal to the host leadership – to a state and its interests – and function within the spectrum and interests of the host leadership.[19]

Building on these concepts of solidarity as transnational imaginaries shared by movements and as 'political frameworks' imposed by states, I demonstrate that although

[16]Ibid. p.359.
[17]John Day, *International Nationalism: The Extra-Territorial Relations of Southern Rhodesian African Nationalists* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967).
[18]Henning Melber, "On the Limits to Liberation in Southern Africa" in C. Saunders, *Documenting Liberation Struggle in Southern Africa* (Pretoria: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2010), p.40.
[19]Blessing-Miles Tendi, "Transnationalism, Contingency and Loyalty in African Liberation Armies: the case of ZANU's 1974-1975 Nhari Mutiny", *Journal of Southern African Studies,* 43,1 (2017), p.143-159; Michael Panzer, "A Nation in Name, a "State" in Exile: the FRELIMO Proto-State, Youth, Gender, and the Liberation of Mozambique, 1962-1975", (PhD thesis, State University of New York, Albany, 2013).

the concept of solidarity changes over time and forms part of the political sphere shaped by the interests of the political leaderships, it also acquired its form and characteristics at a grassroots level. The solidarity established between Mozambican soldiers and civilians with ZANU and its guerrillas was imposed by the political leadership and defined by the Mozambique government's framework. Nonetheless, cultural ties and historical identification with the cause of Mozambican soldiers and civilians by ZANLA guerrillas served to build a different kind of solidarity. This solidarity was forged by day-to-day interactions outside the political sphere: in the personal contacts between FPLM and ZANLA soldiers who fought together inside Rhodesia and between ZANLA guerrillas and refugees who circulated and inhabited the rural border areas of Mozambique and the Mozambican people they interacted with.

A separate body of literature which discusses specifically how the solidarity relationship was shaped and the kind of exchanges it produced and forged during the struggle for independence in southern Africa is considered in the next section.

Perspectives on liberation movement alliances and the politics of support

An extensive body of scholarly work has illuminated how the various strands of alliance and connection established among liberation movements and international supporters shaped solidarity during the liberation struggle in southern Africa. Two perspectives have dominated the field. I call the first “global Cold War literature”, which focused on Cold War political significance in the anti-colonial struggle. This “global” perspective poses questions relating to ideological motivations, political agendas, and the dynamics produced by the movement of people between Africa and the Eastern bloc. Methodologically, these studies are based on official archives from Eastern countries and interviews with liberation movements' high-level political and military leaders.[20]

The second perspective, which I call 'regional', focuses on the everyday life of liberation movement participants, such as students, nationalists and diplomats, who

[20]Jocelyn Alexander and JoAnn McGregor, “African Soldiers in the USSR. Oral Histories of ZAPU Intelligence Cadres’ Soviet Training, 1964-1979”, *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 43, 1 (2017), p. 51.

crossed borders in southern Africa seeking exile. Different from the global perspective, the regional perspective focuses on African views of internationalist solidarity in the region. These scholars pose questions about the experience of nationalists in the host countries, their life in exile and the relationship developed with their hosts.

The 'global' perspective relates to the alliances between the liberation movements and international support networks outside Africa. These studies explore international organisations, churches, and governments' role in Southern Africa's liberation struggles.[21] As mentioned before, most of these studies look at these struggles from a Cold War angle. I identify two slightly different approaches with a problem-solving perspective: one that focuses on political and diplomatic developments and another (more recent) that considers the cultural and social aspects of liberation solidarity.

Scholars focusing on political rhetoric and diplomacy in aiding the liberation of Southern Africa explain the political influence and the motivation of this support, looking at geopolitical influences. Tor Sellström, who explored solidarity between Sweden and Southern African liberation movements, argues that the solidarity expressed by international organisations and states, particularly the Nordic countries, was driven in part

[21]Many authors have written about international solidarity in Southern African liberation movements. See, for example, the volumes edited by the Nordic Africa Institute: Tor Sellström, *Sweden and National Liberation in Southern Africa: Vol. I, Formation of a Popular Opinion (1950-1970),* (Uppsala: Nordiska Africainstitutet, 1999); Tor Sellström, *Sweden and National Liberation in Southern Africa: Vol. 2, Solidarity and Assistance (1970-1994),* (Uppsala: Nordiska Africainstitutet, 2002); Iina Soiri and Pekka Peltola, *Finland and National Liberation in Southern Africa* (Uppsala: Nordiska Africainstitutet, 1999); Tore Eriksen, *Norway and National Liberation in Southern Africa,* (Uppsala: Nordiska Africainstitutet, 2000); Christopher Morgenstieme, *Denmark and National Liberation in Southern Africa: A Flexible Response* (Upssala: Nordiska Africainstitutet, 2003). The collection *Road to Democracy in Southern Africa, Volume III,* explores international solidarity with the ANC. See, for example, Peter Limb, "The Anti-apartheid Movements in Australia and Aotearoa/New Zealand", in South African Democracy Education Trust, *The Road to Democracy in South Africa, vol. 3, International Solidarity* (Pretoria: Unisa Press, 2008); Sietse Bosgra, "From Jon Van Riebeck to Solidarity with the Struggle: The Netherlands, South Africa and Apartheid", in South African Democracy Education Trust, *The Road to Democracy in South Africa, vol. 3, International Solidarity* (Pretoria: Unisa Press, 2008). The Hashim Mbita Project's *Southern Africa Liberation Struggles, 1960-1994: Contemporaneous Documents,* composed of 9 volumes, edited by Arnold Temu and Joel das Neves Tembe, was published in Dar es Salaam by Mkuki na Nyota Publishers. See, for example, Arnold Temu and Joel das Neves Tembe (eds), *Southern Africa Liberation Struggles: Countries and Regions outside SADC* (Dar es Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota Publishers, 2014).

by moral and humanitarian causes.[22] However, as he adds, the fact that the minority regimes were supported by the majority of the Western powers and the liberation movements by the Soviet Union and Eastern bloc introduced the Cold War into the struggle.[23] Jeremy Friedman claims that by supporting liberation movements, the Soviet Union was trying to compete with the West in order to "detach" newly independent countries and install "its non-capitalist path of development".[24] However, scholars like Vladimir Shubin dismiss the idea of Soviet support being determined by the rivalry of the Cold War. According to him, Soviet intervention in the liberation struggle was a response to demands for emancipation from African leaders.[25] As Jocelyn Alexander and JoAnn McGregor argue, it was much easier for the USSR to affirm the moral solidarity that the USSR had with the southern African liberation movements, which faced white minority regimes, than in regard to other interventions, such as that in the Horn of Africa.[26]

Some scholars have questioned the idea of analysing this historical process through the East vs West dichotomy/bipolarity. Odd Westad's book *The Global Cold War* changed the whole direction of Cold War research on the global south. He argues that, although the process of decolonisation was not of itself a product of the Cold War, it was influenced by it in the sense that it framed the world in the ways we see it today.[27] As he explains, the competition for influence in the third world was an important aspect of the Cold War; this competition inspired third-world leaderships struggling for independence in Africa.[28] Tony Smith makes a similar claim at a more general level, considering that, although the struggle between East and West influenced the struggle for independence, the process of decolonisation was not something projected by the centre on the periphery.

[22]Sellström, "Sweden and National Liberation in Southern Africa", Vol. I, p. 25.
[23]Ibid.
[24]Friedman, "Soviet Policy", p. 249.
[25]Vladimir Shubin, *The Hot Cold War: The USSR in Southern Africa* (London: Pluto Press, 2008), p.3.
[26]Alexander and McGregor, "African Soldiers in the USSR", p.50-51.
[27]Westad, *The Global Cold War*, p.396. On the Global Perspective on the Cold War also see Justin Pearce, "Global Ideologies, Local Politics: The Cold War as Seen from Central Angola", *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 43, 1 (2017); Stephen Ellis, *External Mission: the ANC in Exile 1960-1990* (London: Hurst, 2012); Jeffrey Byrne, "Africa's Cold War", in Robert McMahon, *The Cold War in the Third World: Reinterpreting History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013).
[28]Westad, *The Global Cold War,* p.397.

"Junior Actors" (liberation movements), he argues, had a significant role in the ways in which the liberation struggle and Cold War played out in the region.[29] Justin Pearce offers a more subtle interpretation. He agrees that the intervention of the Cold War and superpower rivalry in decolonisation was motivated by ideological competition, which influenced and framed the struggle. Still, he argues that 'ideologies of stateness' had a more significant impact on building national and sub-national identities than geopolitical competition.[30] While this literature traces the role of the Cold War in the process of decolonisation and the ways in which the Cold War ideology influenced (or did not influence) liberation movements, it says little about the impact of the Cold War on the liberation wars' battlefields. There is also little attention to how the movement of soldiers from Africa to Eastern countries shaped the struggle in Southern Africa.

'Global' scholars who privilege the social and cultural dynamics of solidarity, by contrast, trace the movement of soldiers from the liberation armies and the influence that supporting countries in the Eastern bloc exerted on them.[31] They also explore 'the networks that shaped individuals and ideas from Southern Africa to the East and from the East to Southern Africa'.[32] Introducing this new approach into the Cold War era permits understanding the range of experiences produced between the liberation movement members (guests) and the East bloc (hosts).[33] In other words, this approach analyses the lessons and practices created by these multiple interactions. It explains the role that individuals played in the process of liberation, as well as the kind of connections they had with the "outside world".[34] Although these approaches to the global Cold War literature do not analyse how the movement of people and experience shaped the armed struggle for independence on the battlefield, they do show how Cold War competition framed and

[29]Tony Smith, “New Bottles for New Wine: A Pericentric Framework for the Study of the Cold War, *Diplomatic History*, 24,4 (2000), p.568-570.
[30]Pearce, “Global Ideologies, Local Politics”, p.14-16.
[31]See Alexander and McGregor, “African Soldiers in the USSR”.
[32]Lena Dallywater et al (eds), *Southern African Liberation Movements and the Global Cold War ‘East’: Transnational Activism 1960-1990* (Berlin: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2019), p. 6-7. See also Natalia Telepneva, *Cold War Liberation: The Soviet Union and the Collapse of the Portuguese Empire in Africa* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press).
[33]Dallywater et al (eds), *Southern African Liberation Movements and the Global Cold War ‘East’: Transnational Activism 1960-1990*, p.2-3.
[34]Ibid, p. 21.

shaped the various connections between liberation movements and the outside world. Such literature demonstrates the multiple entanglements of connections in search of support. It also allows us to understand the various interests that played out in these exchanges and interconnections, the different agendas that drove the process, and the military and social contexts individuals from Southern African liberation movements experienced, as well as the financial and humanitarian aid received.

The regional perspective explores the relationships that developed among liberation movements in exile, training camps, and local host communities in Africa. According to Christian Williams, movements such as FRELIMO, the Southwest Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO), the *Movimento Popular para a Libertação de Angola* (MPLA), the African National Congress (ANC), ZANU and ZAPU developed a guerrilla-affiliated matrix of relationships, sharing military strategies as well as military and political cultures.[35] As Williams points out, these solidarity networks also developed between fighters and local civilian populations from host countries, with whom the militants interacted, shared food, medicines, and so on.[36] Maria Suriano and Arianna Lissoni have gone further to explore the interaction between ANC exiles and Tanzanian women and argue that the relationship between exiled fighters and local women created links through marriage and parenthood that helped the exiles to 'make and imagine a national community'.[37] This new literature on cross-border interactions between host communities and liberation movement fighters, as well as among liberation movement fighters, offers an analysis of the social dynamics created by the presence of the liberation movements in host countries, the conflicts and frictions that emerged, and the role played by the host states in shaping, influencing and mediating differences and tensions.[38]

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[35]Christian Williams, "Practicing Pan-Africanism: An Anthropological Perspective on Exile-Host Relations at Kongwa, Tanzania", *Anthropology Southern Africa*, 37, 3 (2014**),** p.277.
[36]Ibid, p.277.
[37]Maria Suriano and Arianna Lissoni, "Married to the ANC: Tanzanian Women's Entanglement in South Africa's Liberation Struggle", *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 40, 1(2014), p.132.
[38]See, for example, Christian Williams, *National Liberation in Postcolonial Southern Africa, A Historical Ethnography of Swapo's Exile Camp* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015); Christian Williams, "Exile Biography and the Un-national History: The History of Kaufilwa Napelilo", *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, 11,1(2017), p.151-65*;* Christian Williams, "Education in Exile: International Scholarships, Cold War Politics and Conflict among Swapo Members in Tanzania, 1961-

One crucial dimension of this story, which has gained ground more recently, is what Luise White and Miles Larmer call the 'transnational' character of Southern Africa's liberation struggles. As the authors argue, this transnationality is produced because the networks of solidarity and the ensuing connections transcend the category of nation and what became national borders. Liberation struggles in Southern Africa were 'un-national' in the sense that the struggles for independence were never fully contained by the nation. As they argue, the struggle 'took place in and from spaces that were categorically different from the national frame.'[39] Jocelyn Alexander, JoAnn McGregor and Miles Tendi highlight the importance of exploring the liberation struggle in Southern Africa from a transnational perspective too. According to them, this perspective allows us to follow the movement of people, 'African soldiers, diplomats, and politicians', and trace the ways in which they 'promoted and adopted a great range of cultural, political, and military influences in African host countries.[40]

Within the transnational regional view, scholars have developed a new line of analysis focused on joint military alliances forged by liberation movements in operational areas.[41] Rendani Moses Ralinala, Jabulani Sithole, Gregory Houston and Bernard Magubane explore the joint military alliance established between the armed wings of the ANC and ZAPU on the battlefield in Rhodesia, known as the Wankie and Sipolilo campaigns that took place in 1967 and 1968. In this study, the authors argue that even though the joint army had problems and failed to achieve it objective on the operational

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1968", *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 43,1(2017), p.125-41; Tendi, "Transnationalism, Contingency and Loyalty in African Liberation Armies: The case of ZANU's 1974-1975 Nhari Mutiny", p.143-59.

[39]Luise White and Miles Larmer, "Introduction: Mobile Soldiers and the Un-national Liberation of Southern Africa", *Journal of Southern Africa Studies*, 40, 6(2014), p.1271.

[40]Alexander et al, "The Transnational Histories of Southern Africa Liberation Movements", p.1-2.

[41]See:Vilho Shigwedha, "The relation between Unita and SWAPO: Allies and Adversaries", *Journal of Southern African Studies* 4,6,(2014); Rendani Moses Ralinala, Jabulani Sithole, Gregory Houston and Bernard Magubane, "The Wankie and Sipolilo Campaigns", Chapter 12, in SADET (eds), *The Road to Democracy in South Africa, vol.1, 1960-1970* (Zebra Press: Cape Town, 2004); Sifiso Ndlovu, "ANC in Exile", Chapter 11, in SADET (eds), *The Road to Democracy in South Africa 1960-1970*, Vol.1 (Zebra Press: Cape Town, 2004); João Lourenço (et al.), "Angola and the Anti-apartheid struggle:1975-1991", Chapter 18, in SADET (eds), *The Road to Democracy in South Africa, African Solidarity, Vol.5* (Pretoria: Unisa Press, 2013).

front, which was to inflict defeats on the Rhodesian and South African forces, it was crucial to the armed struggle. It showed the fighters' willingness to engage in armed confrontation against intransigent regimes, thus raising the fighters' morale and allowing the liberation armies to redefine their military strategies and tactics, while causing crippling mutinies in both armies.[42] In the same vein of military cooperation, Vilho Shigwedha explores the military relationship between SWAPO and the *União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola* (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola - UNITA), in the operational area of south-east Angola and northern-east Namibia during the 1960s-1970s. Here, he sought to illustrate how the two liberation movements' fighters fought together against the Portuguese and South Africa armies. Shigwedha stresses that the sharing of borders, as well as political values and ethnic ties, strengthened the establishment of the military ties between UNITA and SWAPO up to 1975, when SWAPO turned against UNITA and made an alliance with its rival, the MPLA.[43] Although this strand of literature takes a step further from the gender and military connections created in exile at the military training camps and explores the military alliances at the operational front, it is more concerned with describing the historical and political connections of the military alliance rather than the day-by-day interactions between the soldiers on the battlefield.

My project builds particularly on this second, regional, strand of literature on liberation solidarity and explores the movements' solidarity on the battlefield. By examining the transnational cross-border character of the military alliance between ZANLA and the Mozambican army, the Mozambican People's Liberation Forces (*Forças Populares de Liberatação de Moçambique* -FPLM), which was facilitated by the geographical proximity between Mozambique and Rhodesia, shared enemies, language and ethnicity and shared military backers, my project aims to explore a specifically military kind of solidarity. It goes much further than the authors cited above by exploring the complexity of these military connections in the combat zones. More specifically, it asks what happened when soldiers who lived and trained together in exile went onto the battlefield. What social dynamics emerged in the war zones among

[42]Ranilala (et al), "The Wankie and Sipolilo Campaigns".
[43]Shigwedha, "The relation between Unita and SWAPO: Allies and Adversaries".

themselves and the local communities with whom they interacted? What shape did solidarity take amidst the day-to-day necessities of warfare?

I contend that to fully understand the military cooperation established between liberation movements in Southern Africa as well as civilians during their armed struggle, it is essential to take into consideration how the soldiers who fought the war at the front understood it, the forms of solidarity that shaped the day-by-day interaction on the battlefield, and the kinds of exchange that took place among soldiers from different liberation movements and civilians on the ground.

The battlefield and its significance

The war between Rhodesian forces and the Zimbabwean liberation struggle has long been a focus of military history. Luise White, had explores the battlefield scenario by looking at what she called the Rhodesian Bush war, also known as the Zimbabwean liberation struggle. White explores how soldiers understood the war and interpreted the day-by-day experience of the battlefield.[44] Arguing that the Rhodesian army was trained to fight a counterinsurgency war, White contends that they thought they had to learn how to survive the hardships of ‘the bush’ and understand the wild environment as their enemies' African soldiers did. White argues that for white Rhodesian soldiers, the experience of the war differed from the Rhodesian leadership’s narrative – in which they "won every battle".[45] In reality, white soldiers’ perception of the war was defined by their daily routine. It had to do with the strategy of hunting and tracing the guerrillas, doing ambushes and patrols, acknowledging the landscape, and reading wild places and their flora and fauna, rather than in the practice of shooting and killing the guerrillas themselves. The perception of warfare was also defined by the military strategies and the use of different weapons between the Rhodesian forces and guerrillas. Notably, the Bush War was critical to white soldiers' understanding of the reasons they were fighting their enemies, which, according

[44]Luise White, *Fighting and Writing: The Rhodesian Army at War and Postwar* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2021).
[45]Ibid, p.51.

to White, was to "negotiate a settlement" and avoid a future in a country governed by black Africans.[46]

Like the work mentioned above the thesis will look at the battlefield in Rhodesia. But differently from looking at the day-to-day interactions over land and with guns of the Rhodesian soldiers, this study aims to explore the battlefield significance of the war, not from the perspective of the Rhodesian forces' understanding of the Zimbabwean liberation war, but from the view of Mozambican and ZANLA soldiers who fought the liberation struggle. The picture of the battlefield that emerges from this dissertation is more complex. It is a product of a mixing of soldiers from different armies who undertook different military training in various parts of the world and employed different weapons, and different identities, and politics. It makes two contributions to the as-yet-unexplored military solidarity between ZANU and Mozambican soldiers and civilians during the Zimbabwean liberation struggle.

The first contribution concerns political and diplomatic alliances between the liberation movement's political leaderships and its allies worldwide and how this shaped rank and file soldiers. The liberation struggle in Southern Africa created a worldwide network that liberation movements navigated in search of different kinds of support. Aid for military training was one of them. Eastern European countries, the Soviet Union, China, North Korea, and various African independent countries, especially the "hubs of decolonisation", provided a range of support to Southern African liberation movements, including training their guerrilla armies.[47] However, geopolitical tensions directly related to the Cold War and the Sino-Soviet rift also conditioned this military assistance and compelled liberation movements to find a middle ground to harness the support of different and sometimes conflicting backers while competing for the same aid with rival liberation armies.[48] This thesis demonstrates that the political and diplomatic relationships made in the search for weaponry and other aid were not static. The relationship of ZANU and FRELIMO's leadership shows that opportunistic, multi-polar relations in which

[46]Ibid, p.226.

[47]On the hub of decolonisation countries see: Eric Burton, "Hubs of Decolonisation. African Liberation Movements and 'Eastern' Connections in Cairo, Accra, and Dar es Salaam", in Dallywater et al. (eds), *Southern African Liberation Movements and the Global Cold War 'East'*, p.25-56.

[48]Alexander and McGregor, "African Soldiers in the USSR", p.3.

African liberation movements and states searched for material and financial aid to liberate their countries, and the socialist countries sought to widen their ideological influence, were flexible. The liberation movements had to develop a strategy incorporating contingency, flexibility, ruptures and renegotiations, reinterpretation, and deception. Exploring liberation in this way allows us to understand the different layers of solidarity that shaped the struggle for independence in Southern Africa. Beyond looking at solidarity as a political framework defined by states or the connections between movements, my thesis adds a new understanding of solidarity forged among the rank-and-file soldiers and civilians at the grassroots. Thus, solidarity could also be defined as moral support to individuals who share the same language, culture, and ethnicity, as well as the same historical background and enemies.

The second contribution, which is the more important, deals with how soldiers who fought in joint military collaborations comprehended the war and shaped the legacy of the battlefield. It demonstrates that the soldiers' perceptions about the war they fought differed from the political propaganda and discourses informed by the political leaderships' agenda. The applications of a multitude of military training, strategies, and weaponry shaped by the geopolitical influence of the Cold War, as well as soldiers' cultural beliefs, applied on the battlefield, created differences and conflicts in day-by-day interaction at the grassroots. However, it also reveals the soldiers' understanding of the war, the motivations, and the reinterpretations of the military strategies that led them to find common ground and fight the same battles. The soldiers' perceptions were also shaped by the support they needed and received from civilians. Thus, this thesis will add a new layer to the study of the liberation movement alliances in southern Africa by exploring the contexts in which armies supported each other on the battlefield. It will also introduce a new approach to understanding the battlefield as a place from which soldiers of different liberation movements and states would find common ground to fight the same war together and where, rather than being a scenario of collapse due to the tensions and frictions of differing ideologies, strategies and techniques of fighting, the battlefield would also be a place where soldiers would share military knowledge and experience, shaping their collaboration and producing new legacies of the war.

Methods and Sources

This study grows from my work with war veterans who fought the FRELIMO liberation struggle at the *Centro de Pesquisa da História da Luta de Libertação-CPHLLN* (Centre for Research on the History of the Struggle for National Liberation) at the Ministry of War Veterans Affairs in Mozambique. The history of the armed liberation struggle in Mozambique and southern Africa, in general, has been recounted extensively by the authors who participated in the liberation struggle. However, their histories are dominated by the view of the political leaderships, who occupied high positions during the liberation struggle and within the government after independence. Nonetheless, my interaction with the war veterans made me realise that the soldiers who fought the armed struggle on the battlefield remember and recount their trajectory in a different way from political leaderships.

In studying the complexity of the war on the battlefield, I conducted my research on both the political leadership and ordinary soldiers and civilians. I used both written materials and oral testimonies. I consulted the physical archive of *Rádio Moçambique* and *Arquivo Histórico de Moçambique* (Mozambique National Archive). At the *Rádio Moçambique* archive, I consulted news material containing interviews with soldiers, ordinary people, and Mozambican and Zimbabwean leaderships, documentaries, rallies, political discourses, and songs. At the *Arquivo Histórico de Moçambique,* I consulted the daily *Notícias* and the weekly *Tempo*; FRELIMO and ZANU official publications, such as *Mozambican Revolution,* which was strategically published in English by FRELIMO, so as to reach diverse audiences around the world; and *Zimbabwe News,* available at the Aluka-JSTOR online archive. These online sources alongside the materials available at the online database of Mozambique History Net constituted some of the primary sources for this study. They provide extensive newspaper clippings and other press articles published in Mozambique, Rhodesia and elsewhere from 1975-1980. Particularly important were the Mozambican daily newspapers *Notícias* and *Notícias da Beira* (later *Diário de Moçambique*), as well as the news magazines *Tempo*, *Zimbabwe News*, *Southern Africa Magazine* (published in North America), and international newspapers such as *The Point*, *Daily News* and the *Washington Star,* and the *Zambia Daily Mail*. The Wilson Center Digital archive provided me with formerly secret documents about the

relationship between ZANU and FRELIMO (as a liberation movement and governing party) with the Eastern bloc countries. The United States' unclassified documents, published on the Office of the Historian page of the US government and the *Wikileaks* website, offer documents that show how the US, Britain and other Western countries regarded Mozambique's support for ZANU's armed struggle, the view of war inside Rhodesia as well as their perceptions about the war.

FRELIMO and ZANU official documents such as *Mozambique Revolution* and *Zimbabwe News* are very important because they contain their military philosophies, speeches of the leaders, guidelines for armed struggle, official reports, interviews with fighters, commanders and liberation movement leaders, travel reports and the kind of alliances established around the world, and war reports, among other information. *Zimbabwe News* provided communiqués about the war inside Rhodesia, with detail of the number of battles that took place on specific days and places, the impact of the attacks, and the number of the Rhodesian forces killed, though it is silent about ZANLA's losses as well as the Rhodesian Forces' successes on the battlefield. The press articles and Wikileaks and Wilson Center Digital archive documents provide evidence of the international manoeuvres and their perception of the liberation struggle, and the diplomatic and political alliances. All these materials are important in the sense that they helped me to address questions relating to the political alliance between ZANU and Mozambique, the nature of military training and the type of weapons that soldiers used, the philosophies of war embraced by ZANU and FRELIMO, the dynamics of the war inside Rhodesia, diplomatic exercises and Mozambique's role in shaping ZANU through its alliances, and the battles that took place in Rhodesia. However, these documents are silent about what happened in the joint military operations between ZANLA and FPLM soldiers, the day-to-day interactions between civilians and soldiers, the military setbacks, and failures. Moreover, many of these documents are also explicitly intended as propaganda, produced as part of publicity to project the image of the liberation movements, and mobilise support for their struggle.

I used veterans' political memoirs and oral interviews with war veterans from Mozambique and Zimbabwe to address this gap. These sources describe soldiers' perceptions of the war, military strategies and tactics, the controversial aspect of religion

in warfare, battles inside Zimbabwe, and soldiers' failures and successes. They allowed me to explore forms of solidarity developed on the battlefield, in particular how geopolitical ideologies and diverse military training influenced the relationship between ZANLA and FPLM soldiers. They also told me about soldiers' engagement and commitment to the war, the kinds of conflicts, tensions, and similarities that they encountered in merging different war techniques and weaponry in the terrain of war, as well as the kind of exchanges that took place not only between soldiers themselves but also between them and civilians supporting the war. This material allows us to understand how the leadership's discourse and propaganda, as well as the geopolitical influence of the Cold War, were manifested on the ground, and the interaction and exchange that took place between soldiers from different countries with different military training.

I interviewed FPLM and ZANU soldiers who fought in the Zimbabwe liberation struggle and civilians who engaged with ZANU's fighters and Zimbabwean refugees at the Mozambique border areas. In Mozambique, I conducted interviews in Maputo city and Matola, Manica province (in Chimoio, Manica and Gondola districts), Gaza province (Chicualacuala, Mapai and Xai-Xai), and Tete Province (Tete City, Moatize and Changara). I also interviewed Zimbabwean war veterans in Harare, Zimbabwe. In these interviews, I was interested in exploring what happened and how soldiers and civilians remembered their relations during this war. My job at the Ministry of War Veterans in Maputo gave me credentials and facilitated my access to both Mozambican and Zimbabwean War veterans.

I interviewed both political leadership and ordinary soldiers from Zimbabwe and Mozambique. In Mozambique, while both categories of war veterans were willing to tell their histories, I think that the political leaderships were much more concerned with shaping their narrative to reinforce official history and legitimise FRELIMO's power. As Amélia de Souto stresses, in Mozambique the political pluralism and change of ideology from a socialist regime after independence to multi-partyism after 1992 prompted FRELIMO's veterans look for ways to reconstruct their identity as protagonists of the liberation struggle.[49] One way to do so was to tell Mozambicans and young people about their 'heroic sacrifices' in the anti-colonial struggle within what Borges Coelho calls the

[49]Amélia de Souto, "Memory and Identity in the History of FRELIMO: Some Research Themes", *Kronos*, 39, 1 (2013), p.294-295.

'Liberation script'.[50] However, the narratives emerging from the soldiers who fought the war were much more concerned with the details of the operations on the war front, highlighting their view and understanding of the operations, conflicts, difficulties, setbacks, and hardships of the battlefield, than to conform to an official script. This group of ordinary war veterans, who were mostly illiterate, interpreted my contact with them as a way of adding their voices and views about the war, which, according to them, were being recounted by political leaders who were comfortably installed in power and well off financially, even though they had never faced the enemy at the front and "haven't smelled gunpowder."[51] To raise their voices and talk about their sacrifices and heroism at the front both in Mozambique and Zimbabwe, my Mozambican interviewees insisted that I use their real names in my thesis.

The Zimbabwean case is similar, with the political leaderships forming their narrative into what Terence Ranger called "Patriotic History" to legitimise their successful journey to power.[52] However, in Zimbabwe, in contrast to Mozambique, some political and veteran voices had begun to challenge Patriotic History narratives and explicitly criticise how ZANU leaders conducted the war. Some of these veteran authors expressed disillusionment with the past. Others have axes to grind in the present and are motivated by the division and violence that characterised Zimbabwe after independence. Some were pushed out of or left the party and government positions they occupied after independence. Telling their stories is one way they can redress their grievances and challenge ZANU(PF)'s patriotic narrative. The Zimbabwean war veterans I interviewed in Zimbabwe echoed their Mozambican contemporaries in highlighting the toughness of the military confrontation with the Rhodesian forces, and the fear, pain, and sacrifices of their encounters in the battlefield, so that younger generations might acknowledge their role in liberating their country. However, in contrast to the political leaderships of both

[50]The term "liberation script" was coined by Joao Paulo Borges Coelho to describe the nationalist, patriotic history of FRELIMO, often written in a fixed narrative *corpus* that operates within FRELIMO's broader political narrative to justify its political legitimacy. João Paulo Borges Coelho, "Politics and Contemporary History in Mozambique: A set of Epistemological Notes," *Kronos*, 39, 1 (2013), 21; see also Souto, "Memory and Identity in the History of FRELIMO."

[51]Almost all of my interviewees stated that most of the political leadership hardly engaged the enemy on the battlefield, including Samora Machel.

[52]Terence Ranger, "Nationalist Historiography, Patriotic History and the History of the Nation: The Struggle over the Past in Zimbabwe", *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 30, 2 (2004).

Zimbabwe and Mozambique and ordinary Mozambican soldiers, ordinary Zimbabwean soldiers preferred to hide their real names. Most of them preferred to use their Chimurenga name (war name), which, in their perception, carried the "strength of their suffering during the war". Others preferred to remain anonymous. To protect their identity, anonymous interviews are identified by the pseudonym *Chimurenga* followed by a number and then a brief identification in the text or footnote about the year a person joined the liberation struggle, the places where they had undertaken military training, the areas where they operated, and their gender. For those who preferred to use their Chimurenga name, I acknowledge it as a war name in the footnote. I used the real names of public figures and all those who consented and preferred to be quoted as such. Most Zimbabweans wanted to be anonymous or use a chimurenga name for fear of retribution.

Oral history is often narrated in a context of political transformation and so often reflects contemporary circumstances as well as the past. Looking at the political context of Mozambique and Zimbabwe today, the narrative accounts told by soldiers could be used to legitimise the power of states, particularly in the case of leaders who have been occupying high positions in government. But they also could be used to address political agendas that challenge the party's dominant narrative as a way of claiming some kind of recognition and moral compensation. The best critical approach is to read these personal narratives as a social construction set in a context rather than an individual narrative on its own.[53] I analysed these personal narratives as collective identities of a specific group (the liberation movement fighters) that shared the same experience in a particular context.[54] This is a complex process of interpretation: as Kirk Hoppe argues, ‘oral history should be comprehended and articulated as a layering of different discourses, and as multiple interactions of shifting meanings’.[55] Looking at my interviewees’ personal narratives in this way allowed me to pay close attention to the context in the past and the present and pose new questions, and develop lines of interpretation with regard to my topic.

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[53]Luise White, “Telling More: Lies, Secrets and History”, *History and Theory*, 39, 4 (2000), p.18.
[54]Ibid, p.18.
[55]Kirk Hoppe, “Whose Life is it Anyway? Issues of Representation in Life Narrative Texts of African Women”, *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 26, 3, (1993), p. 636.

Some divergent or ‘outlier’ voices are mentioned in this thesis. I am aware that outliers’ voices are important to counterbalance majority voices. However, my aim was to include as much divergent detail as possible about the problems and tensions arising in the guerrilla struggle from as many informants as possible rather than explore ‘outliers’ as a discrete grouping.

I started this project during my master's degree at the University of the Western Cape, South Africa, in 2016. I have collected interviews about the relationship between Mozambican and ZANU fighters since 2015. This thesis incorporated some of my 2015, 2016 and 2017 interviews as well as interviews from 2020 to 2023. In total I interviewed some 75 people.

Due to several national lockdowns and travel bans because of COVID-19, I started fieldwork a year later than intended. I also tried to do long-distance interviews using phone or video calls to limit close contact and avoid spreading the disease, but I found it very difficult to apply this method. My interlocutors rarely agreed to give interviews which were not face-to-face (I had phone and Zoom call interviews with only two Mozambicans). Some did not have access to the internet, smartphones or computers, and others did not trust the indirect method, preferring to have personal (face-to-face) contact instead. To avoid putting my interviewees and myself at risk, I avoided doing group interviews, and tried to establish physical distancing with my interviewees, using a face mask.

My interest in studying gender in the relationship between ZANLA and FPLM soldiers was moved by the idea that like religion, gender is an important dimension that has occupied a central space in studies of guerrilla war here and elsewhere. As Sita Ranchod-Nilsson points out, the study of gender in the liberation struggle illuminates the nature of the commitment that liberation movements had to gender equality. It tells us about the ways in which the participation of women in the struggle shaped the nature of the liberation war and solidarity.[56] It gives us a picture of how the liberation movements incorporated women in the struggle and the kind of gender and political ideology behind this process. Both liberation movements incorporated women in their armies, but in different ways, that reflected their gender ideologies and practical approaches to war. In

[56] S. Ranchod-Nilsson, ‘Gender Politics and National Liberation: Women Participation in the Liberation of Zimbabwe’, PhD Thesis, (Northwestern University, 1992), p. 6.

1966, FRELIMO created the *Destacamento Feminino* (Women's Detachment) after women themselves had requested training as soldiers.[57] Women underwent military training in camps such as Nachingwea in southern Tanzania, but their role in the operational front was carefully delimited. They did not participate in battles. Commanders assigned them tasks such as intelligence, the mobilisation of support in areas not then controlled by FRELIMO, porterage of war materials, as well as managing schools, nurseries, and agricultural production.[58] This tells us about the ways in which ideology and historical practice framed the presence of women in the struggle as well as the space that male leadership delimited for them.

Like FRELIMO, ZANU incorporated women in their war effort. At the beginning of the 1970s, women were recruited not for combat duties but as porters, cooks, nurses, and child carers.[59] Their integration into ZANLA also served implicitly to mobilize reluctant men to join the struggle by targeting their masculinity. Sita Ranchod-Nilsson argues that in a patriarchal society such as Zimbabwe's, men who were not soldiers were likely to feel ashamed to see women in uniform.[60] Beginning in 1978, ZANU employed women in operational areas, particularly in the areas bordering Mozambique. In 1979 women operated alongside men inside Rhodesia. Josephine Nhongo-Simbanegavi reports that although women served as soldiers, their number was militarily insignificant and they were mostly deployed to "feminised spaces", that is, in the liberated zones where ZANLA men had neutralised the enemy.[61]

Unravelling these gender relations and exploring how FRELIMO and ZANU spoke about and justified the presence of women in the operational front, taking into account the different approaches the two liberation movements had towards the presence of women in the battlefield, proved difficult. A fuller understanding of the extent to which ideas about gender shaped solidarity politics and military strategy and what role women played in the construction of wartime masculinity and femininity remains a matter for

[57] I. Casimiro, *Paz na Terra, Guerra em Casa* (Pernambuco, Universidade Federal de Pernambuco, 2014), p. 230.
[58] H. West, 'Girls with Guns: Narrating the Experience of War of FRELIMO's "Female Detachment'", *Anthropological Quarterly*, 73, 4 (2006), p. 183.
[59] J. Nhongo-Simbanegavi, *For Better or Worse: Women and ZANLA in Zimbabwe's Liberation Struggle* (Harare, Weaver Press, 2000), p. 42.
[60] S. Ranchod-Nilsson. 'Gender Politics and Gender Backlash in Zimbabwe', *Politics & Gender*, 4, 4 (2008), p. 644.
[61] Nhongo-Simbanegavi, *For Better or Worse*, p. 83.

further research. Neither FRELIMO nor ZANU allowed me access to their archives, and thus to data on recruitment, leadership philosophy, decision making, and field operations necessary for the assessment of gender dynamics and the role of militarised masculinities. My interviewees from both Mozambique and Zimbabwe were also reluctant to discuss at any length the interaction of gender and militarised masculinity. The argument of Mozambican soldiers was that ZANLA never sent them to any area where ZANLA female detachments were operating. In turn, ZANLA soldiers said that, knowing FRELIMO'S position against women in battle, they intentionally deployed FRELIMO soldiers away from areas where ZANLA women were operating: a preventive measure to avoid conflicts which might disrupt the war.

However, their reluctance in talking and in deploying FRELIMO fighters to fight alongside ZANLA women tells us about the solidarity forged between liberation movements and the kind of flexibility and manoeuvres that liberation movements used so as not to lose their hosts' support during the struggle for independence in Southern Africa. Because ZANU political leaders and military commanders knew the FRELIMO position on the deployment of women at the war front, it also used strategies to avoid conflict which put at risk support from their hosts. As a 'guest' liberation movement it could not afford to lose the support of its main host. [see Chapters /sections below]

Overview of the Chapters

My thesis encompasses an introduction, conclusion and four chapters. The first chapter deals with the politics and diplomacy that shaped the alliances searching for military and material support to wage the armed struggle. Specifically, it explores the means through which FRELIMO (first as a liberation movement and then as the ruling party of independent Mozambique) and ZANU worked towards establishing a military relationship despite being beneficiaries of military backing by geopolitically rival countries in the context of the Cold War and the Sino-Soviet conflict. It also explores how Mozambique, as an independent country and a member of the Frontline States, hosted ZANU and shaped its diplomatic and military connections worldwide. I argue that although the relationship between FRELIMO and ZANU was influenced by the genealogies of different geopolitical strategies and rivalries, this did not prevent

FRELIMO from building up a military alliance with ZANU, a splinter and "inauthentic" liberation movement not sponsored by the Soviet Union, nor regarded by it as representative of the Zimbabwean liberation struggle. However, FRELIMO's solidarity with ZANU was also limited by the framework imposed by Mozambique as the host country, putting ZANU in a vulnerable position because it had to operate within the spectrum of what FRELIMO considered acceptable.

The second chapter deals with the contexts and the mechanisms through which FRELIMO supported ZANU's armed liberation struggle militarily by exploring the joint military cooperation established between FPLM soldiers and ZANLA guerrillas on the battlefield inside Rhodesia and in border areas inside Mozambique. This chapter aims to understand what happened when the ideological influence of the Cold War, military exchanges and the tensions created in exile, and the different "military imaginaries" produced at foreign training camps were taken to the battlefield. I contend that the multitude of military training processes and ideologies created friction between FRELIMO soldiers and ZANLA on the battlefield in the sense that it generated tensions and conflicts about military strategies, and how in practice soldiers would engage the Rhodesian forces. However, these tensions did not prevent interaction between guerrillas which shaped specifically military solidarities and legacies on the battlefield, endorsing the fluid the relationship between two different armies, thus not disrupting the course of the war. In so doing, this chapter demonstrates how solidarity relationships were forged and played out on the battlefield.

The third chapter expands the discussion introduced in Chapter Two and analyses how the ideological influence of the Cold War and exposure to different military training in various parts of the world were incorporated with the social and cultural beliefs of the fighters on the battlefield. It argues that FPLM and ZANLA commanders had different leadership approaches regarding the use of traditional religion in the field of operation. They were exposed to different military techniques, strategies an\d ideologies, secular beliefs about traditional religion, kindness, and cultural ties. Yet the opportunistic strategy of engaging with peasants for their support was essential in forging common ground between the FPLM and ZANU fighters on the role of traditional religion. The ideologies of the movements' leaders had less impact on the beliefs held by the soldiers, even when

the leader's ideologies discouraged the use of such beliefs. The use of religion on the battlefield allows us to understand the connections that shaped the thinking of rank-and-file soldiers and the strategies and methods they implemented to fight their enemies.

Finally, the fourth chapter examines the relationship between Mozambican civilians and Zimbabwean fighters and refugees. It discusses the exchanges between ZANLA fighters, Zimbabwean refugees, and Mozambican civilians who supported the Zimbabwean liberation war. I argue that Mozambican civilian support for ZANLA soldiers and refugees was influenced by persuasion and a degree of coercion through FRELIMO's political control, discourse, and propaganda, as well as its institutional interventions. The grassroots context nevertheless permitted soldiers and civilians to build up their own forms of solidarity, independent of the guidelines outlined by political leaders. Flexibility of the political framework was facilitated by kinship and historical ties between Mozambican and Zimbabwean people, particularly in the border areas where Zimbabwean refugee camps were set up and from where ZANLA soldiers constantly circulated in and out of Rhodesia. This means that in some instances, Mozambican popular support for ZANLA guerrillas and Zimbabwean refugees extended much further than the expectations and agreed policy conditions established by the government.

The concluding chapter reviews the whole spectrum of the relationship and connections between ZANU and FRELIMO before and after Mozambique's independence in 1975.

Chapter I

FRELIMO and ZANU's Military Solidarity Relations: The Search for Weapons and Military Training Support

Introduction

On 9 September 1976, the Mozambican National Radio station (RM) broadcast a press conference given by President Samora Machel in Lusaka. The press conference was held after a Frontline summit on the struggle for Zimbabwe the previous day in Tanzania. Speaking to an audience of Mozambican journalists, Machel addressed questions regarding the Frontline States' diplomatic and military support of the Zimbabwean liberation movement. Machel began by stating that waging armed struggle was the only possible path to Zimbabwean independence since Ian Smith showed no interest in peacefully resolving the Zimbabwean conflict. Machel recalled that, after the meeting held in Quelimane (Mozambique) in September 1975, the Frontline States had decided that the Zimbabwean liberation fighters needed to reorganise so as to intensify operations on the battlefield.[62] Machel stated:

> There is a difference between the first operations undertaken in 1972 and those launched in 1976. There has been a progressive increase in the fighting and dispersion of the enemy since, unlike in 1972, we can now define the target: the policy and the armed forces of Ian Smith. This Lusaka meeting served to outline new strategies for the war. We all, the Frontline leaders, and the Zimbabwean liberation movements, are for the armed struggle.[63]

Machel's words confirm the Frontline States' identification with the Zimbabwean liberation movements and their commitment to armed struggle as fundamental to

[62] "Conferência de Imprensa com Samora Machel", *Radio Mozambique Archive*, 9 September 1976. About the Frontline States meeting held in Dar es Salaam see: "Front Line Summit", *Daily Telegraph*, 8 September summarised in ARB 15/10/76.
[63] Ibid.

overthrowing the Rhodesian regime. In achieving this goal, FRELIMO played a substantial (and influential) role in building military and political relations with ZANU.

Scholars have explored the connections developed between different actors in supporting liberation movements to wage their armed struggle against the intransigent settler and colonial regimes in Southern Africa. As outlined in the introduction, there were two strands of literature. In the first, scholars explored the transnational connections among liberation movements, which was vital in providing support to each other in exile. These scholars explored the relationships established in everyday life, focusing on the social and political relations built between the host countries and their guests.[64] Some of these scholars explored the military exchanges established in the military training in exile and the joint military operations on the warfront.[65] The second tradition of writing

[64] See, for example, Christian Williams, *National Liberation in Postcolonial Southern Africa, A Historical Ethnography of Swapo's Exile Camp* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015); Christian Williams, "Exile Biography and the Un-national History: The History of Kaufilwa Napelilo", *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, 11, 1 (2017), p.151-65*;* Christian Williams, "Education in Exile: International Scholarships, Cold War Politics and Conflict among Swapo Members in Tanzania, 1961-1968", *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 43, (2017), p.125-41; Blessing-Miles Tendi, "Transnationalism, Contingency and Loyalty in African Liberation Armies: The case of ZANU's 1974-1975 Nhari Mutiny", *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 43, 1 (2017), p. 143-59; Maria Suriano and Arianna Lissoni, "Married to the ANC: Tanzanian Women's Entanglement in South Africa's Liberation Struggle", *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 40, 1 (2014), p.129-50. See also: Arnold Temu and Joel Tembe (eds), *Southern Africa Liberation Struggle 1960-1994: Introduction*, SADC Hashim Mbita Project, Vol.1 (Dar es Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota, 2019); Arnold Temu and Joel Tembe (eds), *Southern Africa Liberation Struggle 1960-1994: Liberation War Countries*, SADC Hashim Mbita Project, Vol. 2 (Dar es Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota, 2019); Arnold Temu and Joel Tembe (eds), *Southern Africa Liberation Struggle 1960-1994: Namibia*, SADC Hashim Mbita Project, Vol 3 (Dar es Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota, 2019); Arnold Temu and Joel Tembe (eds), *Southern Africa Liberation Struggle 1960-1994: Liberation War Countries*, SADC Hashim Mbita Project, Vol. 3 (Dar es Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota, 2019); Arnold Temu and Joel Tembe (eds), *Southern Africa Liberation Struggle 1960-1994: Namibia*, SADC Hashim Mbita Project, Vol 4 (Dar es Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota, 2019); Arnold Temu and Joel Tembe (eds), *Southern Africa Liberation Struggle 1960-1994: Liberation War Countries and Frontline States*, SADC Hashim Mbita Project, Vol 5 (Dar es Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota, 2019); Arnold Temu and Joel Tembe (eds), *Southern Africa Liberation Struggle 1960-1994: Frontline States*, SADC Hashim Mbita Project, Vol 6 (Dar es Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota, 2019); Arnold Temu and Joel Tembe (eds), *Southern Africa Liberation Struggle 1960-1994: Frontline States and Extension Countries*, SADC Hashim Mbita Project, Vol 7 (Dar es Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota, 2019); Arnold Temu and Joel Tembe (eds), *Southern Africa Liberation Struggle 1960-1994: Countries and regions Outside SADC*, SADC Hashim Mbita Project, Vol 8 (Dar es Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota, 2019); Arnold Temu and Joel Tembe (eds), *Southern Africa Liberation Struggle 1960-1994: Countries and regions Outside SADC and International Organisations*, SADC Hashim Mbita Project, Vol 9 (Dar es Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota, 2019).

[65] See Vilho Shigwedha, "The relation between Unita and SWAPO: Allies and Adversaries", *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 4, 6 (2014), Gregory Houston (et al), "The Wankie and Sipolilo Campaigns", in SADET (eds), *The Road to Democracy in South Africa*, vol.1, 1960-1970 (Cape Town: Zebra Press, 2004); Sifiso Ndlovu, "ANC in Exile", in SADET (eds), *The Road to Democracy in South Africa 1960-1970*, Vol.1 (Cape Town: Zebra Press, 2004); João Lourenço (et al.), "Angola and the Anti-apartheid struggle:1975-1991", in SADET (eds), *The Road to Democracy in South Africa, African Solidarity,* Vol.5 (Pretoria: Unisa Press, 2013).

explored the varied connections created between liberation movements and the Eastern bloc in the context of the global Cold War.[66] These scholars detailed the diversity of support, encompassing military training and weapons and humanitarian and financial aid, arguing that this support was never static and uniform. However, scholars have ignored complexities of the connections created between liberation movements that came from different spheres of ideological influence of the Cold War, and how formerly rival liberation movements managed to interact and influence each other as they sought to obtain support from geopolitically antagonistic and rival actors. This chapter addresses this gap in the literature by probing the relationship developed between FRELIMO and ZANU, liberation movements supported by antagonistic geopolitical powers (USSR and China). It demonstrates how the notion of solidarity, explored by Toni Weis and discussed in the introduction as a "politics machine", worked out between ZANU and FRELIMO.[67] I contend that this solidarity was forged in the political framework by which all ZANU and ZANLA activities inside Mozambique were ultimately controlled by FRELIMO during and after Mozambique's liberation war. It was also motivated by military strategies as defined by the Mozambican leadership's short and medium-term regional interests – as the host country from which ZANU had to operate.

The Sino-Soviet split and Cold War global competition for geopolitical influence created divisions among liberation movements competing for the support of these actors. ZANU and FRELIMO were initially at odds, partially trapped in these divisions, with FRELIMO belonging to the group of six liberation movements supported by the Soviet Union and considered "authentic", along with the Zimbabwean African People's Union (ZAPU), ZANU's direct rival; the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (*Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola, MPLA*); the South West Africa People's organisation (SWAPO); the African National Congress (ANC); and the African Party for Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (*Partido Africano para Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde, PAIGC*). The authentic liberation movements were identified as such at an Afro-Asia People's Solidarity organisation (AAPSO) conference sponsored by the Soviet Solidarity Committee and held in Khartoum in January 1969, though their various

[66] Hilmi Yousuf, "The OAU and African Liberation Movements", *Pakistan Horizon*, 38, 4 (1985), p. 58.
[67] Toni Weis, "The Politics Machine: on the Concept of Solidarity in East German support for Swapo", *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 37,2 (2011).

alliances with the USSR pre-dated this meeting. The six liberation movements invited to the conference were regarded by the USSR as the sole representatives of their respective national struggles, thereby excluding rival liberation movements, which were labelled as "inauthentic". These included ZANU; the National Union for Total Independence of Angola (*União Nacional para Total Independência de Angola, UNITA*); the Revolutionary Committee of Mozambique (*Comité Revolucionário de Moçambique*, COREMO); the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC); and the South West Africa National Union (SWANU), which relied on China as their leading supporter.[68]

After ZANU broke away from ZAPU in 1963, accessing support regionally and outside Africa was difficult. Having relations with China, which supported groups excluded by the Soviet Union following the Sino-Soviet split, was crucial to ZANU.[69] FRELIMO was unusual in that it received support from both sides of Sino-Soviet divide. This flexibility was possible because FRELIMO adopted a non-alignment strategy, meaning they tried to show neutrality in the Sino-Soviet ideological conflict.[70] Another important reason was that FRELIMO did not have to compete with any other substantial national movement – as was the case with ZAPU versus ZANU, ANC versus PAC, MPLA versus UNITA. Although COREMO, FRELIMO's rival constituted by Eduardo Mondlane's presidential opponents, was founded in 1965, it never mounted a significant challenge to FRELIMO as other "non-authentic" liberation movements did. Coupled with the work and networks of its charismatic leaders, this seems to have allowed FRELIMO to retain a position of greater independence in the context of the Sino-Soviet split than any other liberation movement. FRELIMO was also aided in this by the support and loyalty that it enjoyed from Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere, whose country hosted the Southern African liberation movements, and received backing from China as well as supporting ZANU.[71] However, though FRELIMO managed to navigate the Sino-Soviet

[68] For more details on this see for example: Sergey Radchenko, *Two suns in the Heaven: The Sino-Soviet Struggle for Supremacy, 1962-1967* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009); Natalia Telepneva, *Cold War Liberation: The Soviet Union and the Collapse of the Portuguese Empire in Africa* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press).
[69] See Gerald Mazarire, "ZANU's External Networks 1963-1979: An Appraisal", *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 43, 1, (2017), p.83-106.
[70] Yousuf, "The OAU and African Liberation Movements."
[71] For more on this see Michael Panzer, "A Nation in Name, a 'State' in Exile: The FRELIMO Proto-State, Youth, Gender, and the Liberation of Mozambique,1962-1975", (PhD thesis, State University of New York, Albany, 2013).

rift, this process came with significant challenges and complications since both China and the USSR looked at FRELIMO this liberation movement with some suspicion, fearing the influence of their rival on its ideology and loyalty.

This chapter aims to unpack these entanglements by tracing the military assistance that both FRELIMO and ZANU negotiated from supporters worldwide. It also explores how FRELIMO, as the ruling party of independent Mozambique and a member of the Frontline States group, hosted ZANU and shaped its diplomatic and military connections and autonomy. In so doing, the chapter aims to illustrate the means through which FRELIMO (first as a liberation movement and then as a ruling party) and ZANU worked towards establishing a military relationship despite being beneficiaries of military backing by geopolitically rival countries in the context of the Cold War and the Sino-Soviet conflict. This affords a new understanding of how 'solidarity' was constructed and operated at these various levels and also allows us to see how diverse was the formation of liberation movement military cultures and alliances.

This chapter shows that the relationship forged between FRELIMO and ZANU leaderships in the early 1970s, strengthened after Mozambique's independence, was built on solidarity relations in the context of the shared commitment to liberating southern African countries from colonialism. However, as mentioned in the introduction, more than being a political commitment to national liberation, solidarity for both ZANU and FRELIMO leaders developed in response to the reality of the liberation war in the Zambezi basin. As I will show, the FRELIMO leaders at first allied with ZANU because of their desire to push back the Rhodesian forces cooperating with the Portuguese in northern and central Mozambique. Later the FRELIMO leadership strengthened solidarity with ZANU as a way of removing the neighbouring hostile UDI regime – a threat to Mozambique's independence and sovereignty. ZANU leaders, in turn, saw the alliance as an opportunity to use Mozambican territory to open operational areas inside Rhodesia and take advantage of geographic proximity to infiltrate weapons and guerrilla fighters. They also sought to use FRELIMO's diplomatic connections worldwide. I argue that although the relationship between FRELIMO and ZANU was influenced by the genealogies of different geopolitical strategies, by contestation and by rivalry, this did not prevent FRELIMO from building up a military alliance with a splinter and "inauthentic"

liberation movement, to the point of backing ZANU to obtain military support from rival and conflicting powers, thus demonstrating the nature of solidarity that was shaped by the two liberation movements. These liberation movements' solidarity was primarily motivated by compatible military goals and was powerful enough to counter the lines of Sino-Soviet (and Frontline) division. However, FRELIMO's solidarity with ZANU was also limited by the 'framework', in Weis's sense of the term, imposed by Mozambique, which reflected its interest in ending the threat that neighbouring Rhodesia represented, without necessarily backing all of ZANU's political and military goals.

FRELIMO and ZANU military training

FRELIMO and ZANU developed their armed struggle to overthrow intransigent settler regimes in Mozambique and Rhodesia. As indicated by the "global Cold War" literature discussed in the introduction, the struggle for independence in Southern Africa was powerfully propelled by the alliances and connections between the liberation movements and international support networks outside Africa.[72] National movements navigated these networks in search of different kinds of support. Aid for military training was one of them. However, geopolitical tensions directly related to the Cold War and the Sino-Soviet rift also conditioned this military assistance. It compelled liberation movements to find a middle ground where they could harness the support of different and sometimes

[72] Many authors have written about international solidarity with Southern African liberation movements. See, for example, the volumes edited by Nordic Africa Institute: Tor Sellström, *Sweden and National Liberation in Southern Africa: Formation of Popular Opinion (1950-1970),* vol I (Uppsala: Nordiska Africainstitutet, 1999); Tori Sellström, *Sweden and National Liberation in Southern Africa: Solidarity and Assistance (1970-1994),* Vol II (Uppsala: Nordiska Africainstitutet, 2002); Iina Soiri and Pekka Peltola, *Finland and National Liberation In Southern Africa* (Uppsala: Nordiska Africainstitutet, 1999); Tore Eriksen, *Norway and National Liberation in Southern Africa,* (Uppsala: Nordiska Africainstitutet, 2000); Christopher Morgenstieme, *Denmark and National Liberation in Southern Africa: A Flexible Response* (Uppsala: Nordiska Africainstitutet, 2003). The collection *Road to Democracy in Southern Africa, Volume III,* explores international solidarity with the ANC. See, for example, Peter Limb, "The Anti-apartheid Movements in Australia and Aotearoa/New Zealand", in South African Democracy Education Trust, *The Road to Democracy in South Africa, vol. 3, International Solidarity* (Pretoria: Unisa Press, 2008); Sietse Bosgra, "From Jon Van Riebeck to Solidarity with the Struggle: The Netherlands, South Africa and Apartheid", in South African Democracy Education Trust, *The Road to Democracy in South Africa, vol. 3, International Solidarity* (Pretoria: Unisa Press, 2008). The Hashim Mbita Project's *Southern Africa Liberation Struggles, 1960-1994: Contemporaneous Documents,* composed of 9 volumes, edited by Arnold Temu and Joel das Neves Tembe, were published in Dar es Salaam by Mkuki na Nyota Publishers. See, for example, Arnold Temu and Joel das Neves Tembe (eds), *Southern Africa Liberation Struggles: Countries and Regions outside SADC* (Dar es Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota Publishers, 2019).

conflicting backers while competing for the same aid with rival liberation armies.[73] Before I explore the connections established between FRELIMO and ZANU, it is essential to analyse the kind of military training and weaponry that both FRELIMO and ZANU had access to. I argue that the liberation movements' navigation of the divisions and demands of international(ist) solidarity among Cold War powers and regional hosts produced diverse military cultures through diverse training regimes for both ZANU and FRELIMO.

Soon after its formation in Tanzania in 1962, FRELIMO sought sources of support for its nationalist cause, mainly military training and weaponry. When it launched its armed struggle in 1964, committing to four operational fronts in Cabo Delgado, Niassa, Zambézia, and Tete, support had come from diverse, ideologically opposed sources: Algeria, the Soviet Union, China, and the Scandinavian nations, as I will discuss further below.[74] As mentioned before, FRELIMO adopted a non-aligned stance towards the Cold War and the Sino-Soviet conflict from the beginning of its struggle. FRELIMO's first President, Eduardo Mondlane, underlined that his liberation movement would not take sides in other countries' conflicts. For him, FRELIMO's focus was on overthrowing Portuguese colonialism, not gathering enemies.[75] His successor, Samora Machel, followed this non-aligned orientation. As Corrado Tornimbeni put it, this enabled FRELIMO to exploit the divisions of the Cold War "rather than being entrapped by it".[76] This non-alignment strategy was explained by Aquino de Bragança, a member and Secretary of the *Conferência das Organizações Nacionalistas das Colónias Portuguesas* (Conference of Nationalist Organizations of the Portuguese Colonies, CONCP), created in 1961 in Rabat, Morocco, in which he represented the Goa People's Party. He recalled a vital episode of the second CONCP conference presided by Eduardo Mondlane in Dar es Salaam in 1967, in which both Chinese and Soviet leaders were present.

[73]Alexander and McGregor, "African Soldiers in the USSR", p. 3.

[74]Although FRELIMO started its war on four fronts in September 1964, Tete and Zambézia faced setbacks in 1965 and reopened the war by 1969/1971. Besides Portuguese force retaliations, those fronts also faced stockouts and resupply difficulties due to the lack of communication with the central command in Tanzania. For example, the guerrillas of the Zambezi front relied heavily on Malawi as a transit point, but due to the latter's alliance with the Portuguese, access was vetoed. Interview, Gabriel Maulate, Quelimane, 10 June 2022.

[75]Sérgio Vieira, *Participei, por isso Testemunho* (Maputo: Ndjira, 2011), p.559.

[76]Corrado Tornimbeni, "Nationalism and Internationalism in the Liberation Struggle in Mozambique: The role of the FRELIMO's Solidarity Network in Italy", *South Africa Historical Journal*, 70,1, (2018), p.99.

> We [FRELIMO] were able, although with great difficulty, to make it clear to the Soviet and Chinese comrades that, without wanting to resolve the conflict that separated them, we thought that there were other problems for discussion at that conference (…) This showed great maturity on the part of FRELIMO, as early as 1967. FRELIMO was probably the only movement in southern Africa that refused to be drawn into the Sino-Soviet conflict. And it did so not for opportunism but rather because of a practice introduced into the party by the two great teachers, Eduardo Mondlane and Samora Machel: to define the enemy correctly at each stage of the struggle.[77]

FRELIMO's non-alignment in the context of the Cold War allowed its soldiers to experience a particularly diverse set of military training traditions and support. In 1962, FRELIMO sent its first cadres for military training in Algeria and Egypt. In Egypt, the training lasted six months, and FRELIMO recruits were joined by trainees from the South African ANC and ZAPU. Despite their different origins, cultures, and languages, all these trainees formed one company under the same instructors.[78] In Algeria, the training lasted six months, and it also joined FRELIMO and ANC recruits together. Algeria also trained recruits from ZAPU, who first arrived there in 1965, Angola's FNLA, MPLA and South-West Africa's SWAPO.[79] MPLA cadres also trained with ZAPU in 1966 and SWAPO.[80] In subsequent years, FRELIMO sent more groups for training in Egypt (1964) and Algeria (1965). Samora Machel was part of the latter group.[81]

Outside Africa, a number of socialist countries became FRELIMO allies owing to their anti-colonial position. Sérgio Vieira offers a detailed account. He was a FRELIMO member since its foundation in 1962, and occupied various positions such as FRELIMO representative in Algeria and Egypt from 1964-1967. He was appointed as Eduardo Mondlane's personal secretary in 1967. After Mozambican independence, Vieira held senior positions within government, having been presidential secretary to Samora Machel from 1975-1978. He states that FRELIMO looked at these socialist countries, and China

[77]Interview with Aquino de Bragança in *Diário de Lisboa*, December 1981: see Colin Darch and Marco Mondaini, *Independence, and revolution in Portuguese-Speaking Africa* (Cape Town: HSRC, 2019), p.53-54. In 1976, Aquino de Bragança was appointed Director of the Centro de Estudos Africanos (African Studies Centre) at Eduardo Mondlane University. He was also a trusted adviser of Samora Machel and died alongside him in the plane transporting President Machel and his entourage, in October 1986.
[78]Lopes Tembe Ndelane, *Da Udenamo à FRELIMO, à Diplomacia Moçambicana* (Maputo: Marimbique, 2012), p. 62-63.
[79]Eduardo Nihia, *M'Toto: Combatente pela Liberdade* (Maputo: Imprensa Universitária, 2016), p. 59.
[80]Ibid.
[81]Ndelane, *Da Udenamo à FRELIMO*, p. 81.

and the Soviet Union in particular, "as the beacons of friendship in the darkness of isolation that the liberation movement experienced."[82] FRELIMO cultivated good relations with China in 1963 and 1964, when two of the movement's top leaders, Marcelino dos Santos and Mondlane, visited China. Dos Santos met directly with the Chinese premier, Mao Zedong.[83] As result of these contacts, ten FRELIMO recruits went to China for military training.[84] This FRELIMO approach to China created discomfort for the Soviets, who understood that FRELIMO was leaning towards the Chinese side in the Sino-Soviet conflict, as I will explore further below.

Following the agreement made by Eduardo Mondlane with Zhou Enlai, the Chinese premier, when he visited Tanzania in June 1965, Chinese instructors trained FRELIMO personnel at Nachingwea, its main military camp by in southern Tanzania, from late 1965 to independence in 1975.[85] While international diplomacy played a role, it is crucial to stress that the FRELIMO-China relationship was strongly influenced by Julius Nyerere, the Tanzanian President, who acted as a bridge between FRELIMO's leaders and the Chinese leadership, who frequently visited Tanzania. Moreover, It seems that the Chinese presence in Nachingwea was part of the military cooperation accord that Nyerere made with the Chinese so that they could train the Tanzanian army.[86] The transfer of FRELIMO from Kongwa, a Pan-African military training camp hosting a number of liberation movements, and the creation of Nachingwea military training camp, designed to train only FRELIMO cadres, was done to facilitate the presence of Chinese instructors at FRELIMO's camp.[87] Lopes Tembe suggests that FRELIMO cadres turned to President Nyerere to request the allocation of their own military camp, separate from other liberation movements, complaining about the lack of discipline and commitment that recruits from other liberation movements showed in Kongwa.[88] FRELIMO leaders'

[82]Vieira, *Participei*, p. 581.
[83]Aluka, "Boletim de Informação", *Mozambique Revolution*, January 1964; see also Vieira, *Participei*, p. 614.
[84]José Moyane, *Memórias de Um Guerrilheiro na Frente de Combate* (Maputo: King Ngungunhane Institute, 2009), p.54.
[85]Vieira, *Participei*, p. 581.
[86] Benedito Machava, *The Morality of Revolution: Urban Clean up Campaigns, reeducation Camps, and Citizenship in Socialist Mozambique, 1974-1988*, PhD Thesis (Michigan: University of Michigan, 2018), p. 67. On China-Tanzania relations see Martin Bailey, "Tanzania and China", *African Affairs*, 74, 294 (1975), p.40, and Charles Thomas, "The Tanzanian People's Defense Forces: An Exercise in Nation-building", PhD Thesis (Austin: University of Texas, 2012).
[87] Interview, Lopes Tembe, Maputo, 18 April 2018.
[88] Ibid.

preference was to have its military training camp near the border with Mozambique to facilitate the transportation of war material and the deployment of the guerrillas inside Mozambique.[89] Attending to FRELIMO's request, the Tanzanian government allocated a site in the south of Tanzania which had been a colonial farm famously called Farm 17, less than 100 kilometres from the border.[90]

In addition to lobbying and backing FRELIMO's diplomatic relations with the Chinese, Nyerere was also influential in FRELIMO's ideology. The spreading of Mao Zedong propaganda material and socialist rhetoric in Tanzania was prominent in shaping FRELIMO discourse and its socialist rhetoric.[91] Nyerere cultivated good relations with the leaders of the Mozambican liberation movements present in Tanzania in the early 1960s. It was Nyerere who advised the leaders of the *União Democrática de Moçambique* (UDENAMO, National Democratic Union of Mozambique) and *União Nacional Africana de Moçambique Independente* (UNAMI, African Union For Independent Mozambique) to write to Eduardo Mondlane, a person he believed had the credentials to lead and unite the three Mozambique liberation movements operating in Tanzania.[92] For Nyerere, the success of a liberation movement was based on unity.[93] Under Mondlane's leadership FRELIMO was formed in Tanzania through the unification of three small and regional liberation parties, namely the Mozambique African National Union (MANU), UDENAMO and UNAMI, in 1962.

At Nachingwea, Chinese instructors worked side by side with Mozambican instructors. They lived alongside their trainees in harsh conditions, mending their own uniforms and eating what they produced in their gardens.[94] According to Hélder Martins, besides giving military training to FRELIMO cadres, the Chinese instructors also worked

[89]Salésio Nalyambipano, *A Minha Contribuicão para a Independência e Edificacão do Estado Moçambicano: Memórias de um General da Linha da Frente*, (Maputo: Gabinete de Estudos da Presidência da República, 2013), p.57.
[90] For a description of Nachingwea (Farm 17), see Joaquim Carvalho, in Ana Bouene Mussanhane, ed. *Protagonistas da Luta de Libertação Nacional*, (Maputo: Marimbique, 2012), p.404-406; Cândido Mondlane, in Mussanhane, ed. *Protagonistas da Luta de Libertação Nacional*, p.260.
[91] For more details on Nyerere's influence on FRELIMO's socialist ideology, see Telepneva, *Cold War Liberation*, p.126; Panzer, "A Nation in Name", p.176.
[92] Interviews: António Nunes, Chimoio 15 May 2021; See also Lopes Tembe, *Da Udenamo À FRELIMO,* p. 57-58.
[93] Panzer, "A Nation in Name", p. 176.
[94]Óscar Monteiro, *De Todos se Faz um País* (Maputo: Associação dos Escritores Moçambicanos, 2012), p.142-143.

as political advisers.[95] The presence of Chinese instructors at Nachingwea galvanised the struggle as it allowed many FRELIMO cadres to be trained on African soil, at far less cost than training military contingents in China.[96]

Initially, Nachingwea was intended to train battalions in several groups of 500 cadres. However, only the first group trained in Nachingwea reached 500 men; the subsequent groups were limited to companies of 120-130 recruits.[97] Due to the logistical difficulty of training such a large number of soldiers as well as for security reasons – FRELIMO feared that the Portuguese would invade the military base and kill the 500 men at one time – it was decided from 1966 onwards to send instructors into Mozambique's operational areas where initial guerrilla training could be given in FRELIMO military bases.[98] Here, recruits would engage in basic military drills, such as learning how to march and crawl. The training administered inside Mozambique (called by FRELIMO the "interior") was done with wooden guns, not the proper weapons.[99] Only then were people sent to Nachingwea to train in companies of 120-130 people or in platoons of 40-50 recruits. It was usually at Nachingwea that recruits had their first contact with a real gun.[100] There, the introductory courses were given by Mozambican instructors, with specialised courses run by the Chinese.[101]

Chinese instruction consisted mainly of political education and the philosophy of guerrilla warfare, armaments, sabotage, and operational tactics such as camouflage, ambush, and radio communication.[102] The Chinese taught trainees how to assemble and disassemble weapons, and how to handle explosives and grenades. They were also responsible for politico-military classes and promoting debates about the objective of the armed struggle. These debates were preceded by the "*narração de sofrimento*" (narration of suffering), in which a trainee described their own experience and knowledge of colonialism. The objective of this narration was to make people from different parts of

[95] Hélder Martins, *Porquê Sakrani: Memórias dum Médico duma Guerrilha Esquecida* (Maputo: Editorial Terceiro Milénio, 2001), p.313.
[96] Ndelane, *Da Udenamo,* p. 80.
[97] Cândido Mondlane, in Mussanhane, ed. *Protagonistas da Luta de Libertação Nacional,* p.260-261.
[98] Ibid.
[99] Interviews: Antonio Bapichino, Chimoio, 21 May 2021; Adelino Joaquim, Chimoio, 17 May 2021; Mouzinho Sande, Chimoio, 17 May 2021.
[100] See Carvalho, in Mussanhane, ed. *Protagonistas da Luta de Libertação Nacional,* p.404-406.
[101] Mondlane, in Mussanhane, ed. *Protagonistas da Luta de Libertação Nacional,* p.260-261.
[102] Ibid.

the country understand that their enemy was the same.[103] The Chinese instructors supplemented these military pedagogies with rudimentary training, for example, replacing wooden guns with weapons during military drills, sacks adapted as military backpacks, and other local materials.[104] The application of such simple methods of military instruction facilitated the formation of recruits with little or no literacy. Because these recruits constituted many of FRELIMO's soldiers, who mainly came from rural areas in northern Mozambique, they could more easily replicate the Chinese methods when they trained recruits in FRELIMO's liberation areas inside Mozambique.[105] It is important to note that although the Chinese instructors used the Chinese language to communicate, they had interpreters in Portuguese.[106] Because recruits who joined FRELIMO came from different parts of Mozambique and spoke different vernacular languages, the FRELIMO leadership decided from the beginning that Portuguese would be the language of national unity for better understanding between each other.[107]

Aside from military training, China also supported FRELIMO with military equipment, namely AK-47 rifles, 82 mm mortars, 55 mm cannons, and bazookas. This equipment replaced the less effective French-made weapons provided by Algeria (for example, the Pistol Max 47, the first weapon that FRELIMO used in military operations in 1964).[108] Indeed, between 1965 and 1971, the majority of FRELIMO's armaments came from China and were channelled through the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Liberation Committee.[109] Hilmi Yousuf argues that getting war material through the OAU Liberation Committee rather than directly from the Chinese put FRELIMO in a "safe place", helping it maintain neutrality in the Sino-Soviet conflict.[110] However, due to increased need for war material as the war escalated, Machel visited China in 1971 and negotiated directly for the delivery of weapons and materials to FRELIMO.[111] From 1971 onward, China directly sent to FRELIMO tons of weapons and ammunition, military

[103] Carvalho, in Mussanhane, ed. *Protagonistas da Luta de Libertação Nacional*, p. 405.
[104]Interview, Mouzinho Sande, Chimoio, 17 May 2021.
[105] Ndelane, *Da Udenamo*, p.80-81.
[106] Óscar Monteiro recalls that FRELIMO's leaders used to play ping pong with the Chinese translators at Nachingwea. See Monteiro, *De Todos se Faz um País*, p.143.
[107] Fernado Ganhão, *O papel da Língua portuguesa em Moçambique*, (Maputo: Ministério da Educação e da Cultura, 1979).
[108]Interview, António Hama Thai, 27 October 2021.
[109]Ibid.
[110] Yousuf, "The OAU and the African Liberation Movements", p.58.
[111]Vieira, *Participei*, p.619.

uniforms, and some four-by-four vehicles, and took a strong interest in the war's development.[112] Vieira recalls a particular episode during Machel and his entourage's visit to China. The meeting started at 7pm and ended the next morning at 5am. Instead of only listening to FRELIMO requests, Premier Zhou Enlai brought a map of Mozambique and spent all night discussing military strategies and tactics with Machel.[113]

The multiplicity of connections that FRELIMO had during the liberation struggle not only allows us to explore the kind of military culture that soldiers were exposed to in the different sites where they trained but also the kind of interaction, they had with recruits from other African liberation movements with whom they trained, as well as the nature of the solidarity they developed with Chinese instructors that trained them at Nachingwea.

However, due to the changing military needs as the war progressed, Chinese military assistance was insufficient, and FRELIMO turned to the Soviet Union for military and financial assistance, as I explore in the next section.

FRELIMO and the Soviet Union

Despite the Sino-Soviet conflict, FRELIMO managed to garner military support from the Soviet Union as well as China. Their lobbying was facilitated by its leaders ability to participate in an international network of activists against colonialism which, while allowing them to shape their identity and strategies, enabled them to establish their own international network to mobilise resources for their struggle.[114] Even while receiving support from China, Marcelino dos Santos, FRELIMO's Secretary for External Relations, submitted a request to the Soviet Embassy in Tanzania requesting military assistance, and humanitarian and financial aid, which was conceded, although delayed because of the Zanzibar crisis.[115] In May 1964, Eduardo Mondlane and Marcelino dos Santos travelled to the Soviet Union to discuss how Soviet support would get to FRELIMO. While the USSR accepted supporting FRELIMO, they did so within limits.[116] Two aspects explain the

[112]Ibid.
[113]Ibid.
[114]Daniel Kaiser, "Makers of Bonds and Ties: Transnational Socialisation and National Liberation in Mozambique", *Journal of Southern African Studies,* 43,1 (2017).
[115] Telepneva, *Cold War Liberation*, p.93-95.
[116] Ibid.

initial low level of support from the Soviet Union. The first was FRELIMO's relationship with China. The USSR looked at FRELIMO with great caution, fearing Chinese influence on FRELIMO's political alignment.[117] Second, the fact that Mondlane had a close relationship with the US also raised Soviet suspicions as they thought that he was connected to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The United States government, through the Ford Foundation and the American Committee on Africa, supported FRELIMO's educational services, providing an amount of 99,700 US dollars to FRELIMO's Secondary School, the Mozambique Institute, run by Mondlane's wife, Janet Mondlane.[118] The CIA also provided FRELIMO with a subsidy of 60,000 US dollars via the African-American Institute in New York.[119] Mondlane's relations with the US developed after he had met Attorney General Robert Kennedy in 1963 to request support for FRELIMO's educational activities.[120] Even though FRELIMO's relations with the US government focused on educational programs and not on the military, it shows the capacity of FRELIMO to navigate opposing forces.[121] American support for FRELIMO was facilitated by Mondlane's educational background, having received an advanced academic degree in the US, and his work for the United Nations (UN), and his marriage to an American.[122] The Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Joseph Palmer II, had a favorable impression of him, stating that he "seemed to be a Pro-West leader".[123]

Despite Soviet concerns, in 1965, FRELIMO sent its first group of recruits for six months of military training in the Soviet Union. These recruits had already undergone military training in different parts of the world such as Egypt, Algeria and China, which means that they were sent to the Soviet Union to get additional technical capacity and

[117] Ibid.
[118] Ibid. For more details on the relation between FRELIMO and the United States, see Panzer, "A Nation in Name", p. 234-245.
[119] Panzer, "A Nation in Name", p. 234-245.
[120] Ibid.
[121] Witney Schneidman, *Engaging Africa: Washington and the Fall of Portuguese's colonial Empire* (Lanham: University of America Press, 2004) cited by George Roberts, "The assassination of Eduardo Mondlane: FRELIMO, Tanzania, and the politics of exile in Dar es Salaam", in *Cold War History*, vol.17, 1, 2017, p. 149. Although the US government saw this support as a strategy to contain the spread of communist ideology among African liberation movements, it was short-lived, lasting only from 1962 to 1964. The US Government then determined not to be interpreted as supporting communism in Africa, and betraying its NATO ally, Portugal. See Panzer, "A Nation in Name", p.236-238.
[122]Ibid.
[123] "Minutes of the meeting of the 303 Committee of 27 October 1967", *Department of State*, November 1967 available online at US Department of State, Office of the Historian.

specialisation. Going to the Soviet Union was a top secret mission, with recruits using false names and identifying themselves as Tanzanian students to avoid being arrested by PIDE, the Portuguese Secret Police.[124] In contrast to Chinese military training, in which any recruit was eligible, training in the Soviet Union demanded a certain level of education because, aside from the technical component, instruction included lectures on Marxism-Leninism and Maths.[125] After the first encounter with the Soviet instructors and getting acclimatised to the cold climate and unfamiliar food, the recruits were introduced to a new approach in military training.[126] In comparison to Chinese training, which the majority of the recruits were already familiar with, and which focused on guerrilla warfare and political mobilisation of the masses, in the USSR the recruits learned to use maps and compasses, mount ambushes and surprise attacks, handle more sophisticated weapons, and manufacture and use explosives. They also learned to organise sabotage, operate communication devices like portable radios, and gather intelligence.[127]

Soviet training combined the theory and practice of military tactics and strategies. My interviewees stated that the USSR had a military camp equipped with all the material found on the battlefield, where recruits were taken to put the theoretical lessons learned in the classroom into "battlefield" practice. In the practice camps, Soviet trainers could, for example, place a building in the field, surrounded by barbed wire, a river, and a bridge and then simulate a plane bombing the area with napalm. The idea was to practice how an isolated soldier would escape from this ambush and how the group of soldiers would coordinate counterattacks, among other military strategies. There was also practical

[124]Pelembe, *Lutei pela Pátria*, p.64.

[125]Ndelane, *Da Udenamo*, pp. 80-81. Daniel Caetano, a former FRELIMO soldier who underwent military training in the Soviet Union and deserted to join Renamo in Rhodesia, related to Rhodesian forces the requirement of having what he called the *"communist doctrinarian"* while still in the Soviet Union. Although this must be taken with a grain of salt since it was in line with Rhodesian propaganda, most of my interviewees recall the obligation of having theory classes on Marxism-Leninism while in the Soviet Union. See: "Accounts of Mozambique Resistance Movement claims". *Voice of Free Africa*, broadcast on 8 January (1979). Material kindly offered by Colin Darch.

[126]Pelembe, *Lutei pela Pátria, p.* 64. On the difficulties of acclimatisation and food see also Augusto Navando, *A História no Arquivo dos Mundos* (Maputo: CPHLLN, 2020). For more details about the military training of African Soldiers, see Jocelyn Alexander and JoAnn McGregor, "African Soldiers in the USSR. Oral Histories of ZAPU Intelligence Cadres' Soviet Training, 1964-1979", *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 43, 1 (2017); Alexander and McGregor, "Adelante: Military Imaginaries, the Cold War, and Southern Africa's Liberation Movement Armies", *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 62,3, (2020).

[127]Pelembe, *Lutei pela Patria,* p.64.

crossfire training but with fake bullets.[128] The men I interviewed reported that what differentiated Soviet from Chinese training was essentially the intensity and the duration of training, the more modern and technologically advanced military equipment and the practical classes that recruits were subjected to.[129] Due to the broader scope of military fields covered and technical specialisation, Soviet training also took much longer than the Chinese training in Nachingwea.[130] This means that for the soldiers' needs, the technical training and getting bigger and more guns from the Soviet Union were much more important than ideological differences.

Even though the USSR was providing war material and training FRELIMO's cadres in Moscow and elsewhere, FRELIMO realised that its support was less substantial than that given by China. In an effort to change this situation, Mondlane revisited Moscow in November 1966. This time, he seemed to apply an opportunistic strategy to appeal to the Soviets. Documentation reported by Natalia Telepneva suggests that Mondlane praised Soviet socialism and criticised China's anti-Soviet attitude and their behaviour during international conferences.[131] He also stated that FRELIMO was unable to openly voice criticism of the Chinese to avoid a clash with Tanzanian leaders, who hosted FRELIMO in its territory and had a strong relationship with the Chinese.[132] This shows that even though FRELIMO had total support of TANU to work from Tanzania, it had to function within what Michael Panzer calls "contingent sovereignty", in the sense that it had to show its loyalty to TANU and could not stray far from Nyerere's vision if it wanted substantial support to continue.[133]

Even with Mondlane's lobbying for the needs of the guerrillas, the Soviet supply of armaments to FRELIMO remained insignificant until 1971. The annual contribution could barely equip a battalion of 500.[134] Moreover, the Soviet Union rarely resupplied

[128] Interviews: Maulate, Quelimane, 10 June 2022; Mateus Kida, Maputo, 22 March 2022.

[129] José Moyane noted a similar difference between the Chinese and North Korean military training, when his group of soldiers went to North Korea for a six-month army internship (May to December 1968). As he states, in contrast with the Chinese, Korean military training was much more modern since it combined guerrilla warfare and guerrilla movement and speed. See José Moyane in Mussanhane, ed. *Protagonistas da Luta de Libertação Nacional,* p. 466.

[130] Ibid.

[131] Dolidze to CC CPSU, December 6, 1966, RGANI, f. 5. op. 58, d. 335, cited by Telepneva, *Cold War Liberation*, p.127.

[132] Ibid.

[133] Panzer, *A Nation in Name.*

[134] Vieira, *Participei*, p.599.

ammunition for weapons, forcing FRELIMO to stockpile Soviet weapons due to lack of ammunition.[135] This rather cumbersome arrangement stemmed from the lower status FRELIMO enjoyed with its Soviet ally compared to other African liberation movements. As Sérgio Vieira put it, the Soviet Union regarded FRELIMO as a "second class" liberation movement, in comparison to the support they gave to the other Lusophone liberation movements such as the PAIGC and MPLA.[136] Moreover, in contrast to Amilcar Cabral and Agostinho Neto, the leaders of the PAIGC and MPLA, respectively, Mondlane was excluded from participating in the twenty-third congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in Moscow in 1966, demonstrating the lower esteem that the Soviet leadership had for Mondlane.[137] FRELIMO's crisis of the late 1960s, culminating in the assassination of Eduardo Mondlane in 1969, seems to have added to the Soviet tendency to take FRELIMO's demands with a grain of salt.[138]

FRELIMO's relationship with the USSR did have one strong connection: its Secretary for External Relations, Marcelino dos Santos, had cultivated and forged a close relationship within European leftist circles and the Soviet bureaucratic and military leaderships while he worked as the CONCP's Permanent Secretary.[139] Dos Santos's background helped FRELIMO receive Soviet support even though it distrusted Eduardo Mondlane. It seems that this trust in dos Santos and in some instances in Urias Simango, FRELIMO's Vice-president, alongside its alliance with the other Southern African liberation movements allied to the Soviet Union, such as ZAPU, MPLA and PAIGC, facilitated the incorporation of FRELIMO into the so-called authentic liberation movements in 1969, the group considered by the Soviets as genuine liberation movements and sole representatives of their countries, meaning that only this group received support from the Soviet Union.[140]

The Soviet perception of FRELIMO seems to have improved further from April 1971 after Samora Machel visited the Soviet Union and met with some of the highest officers of the Soviet Armed Forces. On this trip, Machel successfully negotiated a

[135]Ibid.
[136]Ibid, p. 597.
[137]Telepneva, *Cold War Liberation,* p. 124.
[138] Ibid.
[139] For more details on Marcelino dos Santos's connections see Telepneva, *Cold War Liberation.*
[140] See Telepneva, *Cold War Liberation.*

substantial increase in Soviet military supply, particularly anti-aircraft weaponry, crucial in responding to Portuguese air raids.[141] After this, not only did the USSR increase the number of vehicles, weapons and ammunition it supplied, but it started to provide sophisticated weapons such as the Cannon B10 and B11, the recoilless rifle used as anti-tank and against infantry positions; the easily transportable and individually operated rocket launcher, GRAD-P, used in aerial defence; the anti-aircraft rocket ZGU, and a surface-to-air missile, the STRELA 2M which could strike low-flying aircraft.[142] These powerful and technically advanced weapons enabled FRELIMO to undermine the Portuguese (and, in some instances, the Rhodesian force's incursion in Mozambique, as I will discuss later), which used fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters against the guerrillas.[143] This new equipment also led the Soviet Union to send instructors to Arusha, Tanzania, to train FRELIMO soldiers in their management, especially the GRAD P and STRELA 2M.[144]

Machel's visit to Moscow in 1971 seemed to the CPSU hierarchy like a FRELIMO turn in the direction of Soviet ideology,[145] but from FRELIMO's point of view the move was motivated by the escalation of Portuguese attacks on FRELIMO's war fronts, not by an ideological shift; it was precipitated by real changes in the scale and nature of the counterattack mounted by the enemy. In 1970, the Portuguese General Kaúlza de Arriaga launched *Operação No Górdio* (Operation Gordian Knot), a large-scale military offensive that used mainly aircraft to bomb FRELIMO's bases. FRELIMO's approach to the Soviet Union was thus about acquiring more and better weapons to fight a changing war. FRELIMO commanders had implemented a Maoist guerrilla warfare strategy as early as 1964-65 with the creation of the military training camp, Nachingwea, and the arrival of Chinese military instructors. It had relied on the mobilisation of the peasantry. But now the military need was also for a growing number of soldiers in semi-conventional units, that would operate with a more powerful arsenal to

[141]Vieira, *Participei,* p.599.
[142]Ibid.
[143] For more on the military capacity of this weaponry, see Telepneva, *Cold War Liberation,* p. 117 and 140; Al Venter, *Portugal's War in Guiné -Bissau* (Pasadena: Munger Africa Library Notes, 1973).
[144]Telepneva, *Cold War Liberation,* p.152.
[145]Natalia Telepneva, "Letters from Angola: Soviet Print Media and the liberation of Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau, 1961-1975" in Lena Dallywater et al (eds). *Southern African Liberation Movements and the Global Cold War 'East': Transnational Activism 1960-1990* (Berlin: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2019), p. 146-147.

confront the powerful military capacity implemented by Gordian Knot.[146] As Natalia Telepneva puts it, African liberation movements, faced with this change in their enemies' strategy looked at "Soviet military technology as a symbol of modernity and a practical tool of their own liberation".[147] For the USSR, this presented an opportunity to get FRELIMO on its side in the Sino-Soviet competition. However, FRELIMO's approach to the Soviet Union was not enough to cause the Chinese to halt their support for FRELIMO. Indeed, Óscar Monteiro, FRELIMO's representative in Algeria in the late 1960s, records that before FRELIMO approached the Soviet Union requesting more sophisticated weaponry to deal with the Portuguese, Samora Machel travelled first to China with the same request. The Chinese advised him to go to the Soviet Union, stating that they were embracing the cultural revolution and did not know how to help — "go to the Soviets. We have differences, but we are comrades".[148] It is not possible confirm this from my sources, but FRELIMO managed to garner increased Soviet aid while retaining Chinese support at the same time. The fact that the Chinese took a step back with the Cultural Revolution (the official line being that they were focusing on domestic politics) would also help explain the change in Chinese engagement with FRELIMO.

Although China and the Soviet Union constituted the primary source of FRELIMO's weapons and military training, FRELIMO also acquired military assistance from the German Democratic Republic (GDR), Israel, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.[149] FRELIMO also benefited from visits to its operational areas of journalists, officers specialising in air raids, and military instructors from the Soviet Union, China, Bulgaria, and GDR. The

[146]See: Nalyambipano, *A Minha Contribuição para a Independência*; Atanásio M'tumuke, *O fim da Luta de Libertação em Moçambique: Operação Omar* (Maputo: Author edition, 2019); Alberto Chipande, *Como eu vivo a minha história*, vol. 1 (Maputo: Author edition, 2018).
[147] Telepneva, *Cold War Liberation*, p.102.
[148] Monteiro, *De Todos se faz um País*, p.143.
[149] FRELIMO sent only one group of 16 cadets to Israel in 1963, where they underwent military training and health courses. Israel ended its support of FRELIMO in 1964 after Portugal, Israel's ally, complained. Interview, Hilário Muwanga, Chimoio, 20 May 2021. On Yugoslavia, see Milorad Lazic, "Comrades in Arms: Yugoslavia Military Aid to Liberation Movements of Angola and Mozambique, 1961-1976", in Lena Dallywater et al. (eds), *Southern African Liberation Movements and the Global Cold War 'East': Transnational Activism 1960-1990* (Berlin: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2019), p.174-176; On the relation between FRELIMO and Czechoslovakia, see Eric Burton, "Hubs of decolonisation: African Liberation Movements and Eastern Connections in Cairo, Accra and Dar es Salaam" in Lena Dallywater et al (eds). *Southern African Liberation Movements and the Global Cold War 'East': Transnational Activism 1960-1990* (Berlin: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2019), p. 34-35.

military officers and instructors aimed to study the performance of the Portuguese offensive and outline military strategies to overcome it.[150] The presence of international journalists in FRELIMO's liberated areas functioned as a tool of propaganda to publicise the war around the world and criticise Portuguese policy.[151] In addition to military support, FRELIMO also managed to obtain humanitarian aid from a constellation of supporters, such as Scandinavian countries, Italy, Yugoslavia, and several social and political organisations in the Western world.[152] The diversity of support obtained by FRELIMO means that rather than being limited by geopolitical Cold War conflicts, FRELIMO was much more interested in developing its own liberation struggle in its own context. Solidarity for this liberation movement was powerfully driven by the needs of the battlefield, its guerrillas and liberated civilians more than the ideological conflicts of the Cold War.

While FRELIMO successfully navigated the Cold War and Sino-Soviet rift through its non-alignment strategy, it came with significant challenges and complications for the liberation movement. Besides the limited support from the Soviet Union before 1971, China also started looking at FRELIMO with suspicion. While continuing to support FRELIMO, China also began channelling resources to FRELIMO's rival group, COREMO, which started its military operations in Tete province in 1965.[153] Armando Guebuza was barred from participating at the Afro-Asian Writers Conference in Beirut, Lebanon, in March 1967 because he did not sign an anti-Soviet declaration.[154] In Nachingwea, Chinese instructors began to have conflicts with FRELIMO cadres because they insisted on teaching Chinese songs about Mao Zedong, to which FRELIMO was no longer as receptive. Chinese instructors also showed some reluctance to using Soviet-

[150]Nalyambipano, *A Minha Contribuição para a Independência,* p.134.
[151]See Alba Luque, "We have Made History": Yugoslav Visual Solidarity with FRELIMO's struggle (1967-1975)" in Chris Saunders; Hélder Fonseca; Lena Dallywater (eds), *Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and Africa: New perspective on the Era of Decolonization, 1950s to 1990s* (Berlin: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2023).
[152]The magazine *Mozambique Revolution*, published by FRELIMO, strategically, in English, has many reports of visits and connections that FRELIMO's leaders made with such organisations in both east and west.
[153]COREMO was a Mozambique liberation movement formed in 1965 in Zambia, and like FRELIMO, it undertook guerrilla struggle in Tete.
[154]Vieira, *Participei*, p. 615; The Afro-Asian Writes Conference was a series of literacy gatherings of Asians and Africans, sponsored mainly by China, intended to establish cultural interaction, and denounce the Western countries.

made weapons during military training, fearing that those could be “sabotaged” by the Soviets.[155] Although with some reluctance, Chinese instructors did teach FRELIMO how to clean *Mausers* from Bulgaria, destined for the self-defence of the Militias, the military forces recruited from the masses who supported FRELIMO’s soldiers in the front. The Chinese also taught FRELIMO’s cadres how to handle Soviet-made weapons such as the Mortar 82 mm and Cannon 75 mm.[156] In the end, in the relationship between the Chinese instructors and FRELIMO, military needs overcame ideological objections that were strongly felt and important but nonetheless handled by the political leadership.

FRELIMO's non-alignment strategy, which allowed it to manage differences and antagonisms in the diverse spheres of Cold War influence, demonstrated the multiple entanglements and connections it developed in search of military support. It allows us to explore how "junior actors" (in Tony Smith's words) like FRELIMO, framed the struggle for independence in the Cold War era. Even though this solidarity was shaped by the political framework defined by geopolitical power competition for ideological influence, FRELIMO's military connection shows another, material, nature of solidarity, powerfully determined by military needs rather than ideologies. Yet the network of connections and movement of soldiers to get military training in a divisive and competing geopolitical power permits us to understand how soldiers' experiences were shaped and the kind of military culture they produced.

In the next section I will explore ZANU’s connections around the world before I turn to the connections created between ZANU and FRELIMO during the Liberation struggle and after Mozambican independence.

ZANU's military connections

In contrast to FRELIMO, which from its inception, was the dominant Mozambican liberation movement, ZANU was a splinter group that broke from ZAPU in 1963. This factor complicated its search for alliances because ZAPU had already established links with key actors. After being banned in Rhodesia in 1964, some ZANU leaders moved to Zambia, where they struggled to survive because Kenneth Kaunda preferred UNIP's

[155] Monteiro, *De Todos se Faz um País,* p.143.
[156] Ibid.

longtime ally, ZAPU.[157] The OAU only recognised ZANU as a 'genuine' Zimbabwean liberation movement in 1966, three years after its foundation.[158] The recognition of the OAU was crucial for any liberation movement, enabling it to benefit from arms, war material, and financial support channelled through the OAU Liberation Committee. ZANU's exclusion made accessing military training and weapons worldwide challenging, though it did receive early support from Ghana, Egypt and especially Tanzania. Even after OAU recognition in 1966, ZANU complained that all the Liberation Committee support was going to ZAPU.[159] To add to this, many of ZANU's attempts to get international and regional aid were blocked by ZAPU, which dominated the networks that controlled the channelling of resources and campaigned against ZANU among its allies, labelling it a splinter group which did not deserve attention.[160] Being ZAPU's rival also meant ZANU was excluded from international forums, conferences and meetings in which the liberation movements created connections with global organisations like AAPSO, sponsored by the Soviet Union, which gave financial, military training and weaponry.

The Sino-Soviet split in 1963, the year in which ZANU was formed, and the exclusion of the non-authentic liberation movements by the USSR divided the liberation movements into two antagonistic poles of support. As we have seen, the USSR only recognised six liberation movements as genuine, setting aside their rivals. Being labelled by the Soviets as 'inauthentic', meant that ZANU did not receive any direct support from the USSR.[161] However, the Sino-Soviet split meant that the inauthentic/splinter movements like ZANU received support from China precisely because the Soviet Union excluded them — "the Chinese search for new clients coincided with ZANU's search for a patron".[162] It led China, which had supported and trained ZAPU earlier, to focus its support on ZANU to gather more ideological influence.[163]

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[157]Gerald Mazarire, "ZANU's External Networks", p.85.
[158]Ibid.
[159]William Reeds, "International Politics and national Liberation: ZANU and the Politics of Contested Sovereignty in Zimbabwe", *African Studies Review*, 36,2, (1993), p.39.
[160] Ibid.
[161] John Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution: Exile Politics and Guerrillas Warfare (1962-1976*), vol II (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1978), p.224.
[162] Reeds, "International Politics and national Liberation", p. 40.
[163] Ibid.

Even with the support of China, ZANU almost disappeared in the 1960s. In contrast to FRELIMO, ZANU was forced to publicly take sides in geopolitical conflicts, owing to its exclusion from the Soviet sphere. ZANU and other 'non-authentic' liberation movements sidelined by their Soviet-backed counterparts, namely SWANU-South West Africa National Union, COREMO, UNITA and the PAC, wrote a series of articles published in 1966 and 1969 in the Chinese newspaper, *People's Daily*, denouncing what they called 'Soviet Revisionism'.[164] In 1969, after the formal delineation of the "authentic" liberation movements, ZANU cadre Chokwada wrote an article for the *Zimbabwe News*, ZANU's official publication, criticising the Soviet Union for having summoned the conference in Khartoum, Sudan, to which it had invited only the liberation movements that it considered 'authentic', putting aside other African liberation movements. Chokwada accused the USSR of not being interested in the success of a "genuine revolution in Southern Africa".[165] For ZANU taking one side in the Sino-Soviet conflict and denouncing the Soviet action in Khartoum so vehemently was now a matter of survival: by doing so, ZANU sought to ensure China's support in a context in which the movement was being globally marginalized and ignored, and its existence threatened.

To worsen the situation for ZANU, its rival, ZAPU, forged a military alliance with the ANC and its armed wing uMkhonto weSizwe (MK), undertaking the largest infiltrations of the war in 1967/8. Even though these campaigns ultimately failed militarily and caused ZAPU to split once more, the immediate result was a region wide propaganda success that the OAU and other organisations celebrated. FRELIMO itself held a meeting of the Central Committee months after its second congress (in Madjedje, Niassa, in 1968), in which it analysed the waging of joint military cooperation between ZAPU and the ANC. In its magazine, *Mozambique Revolution*, FRELIMO congratulated both liberation movements for their actions against Rhodesian forces inside Rhodesia and stated that:

> Considering the excellent cooperation between FRELIMO, ZAPU, and ANC, and convinced of the necessity of intensifying our friendships, collaboration, and mutual

[164]Steven Jackson, "China's Third World Foreign Policy: The cases of Angola and Mozambique, 1961-93", *The China Quarterly*, 142, June (1995), p.399.
[165]"International Scenes: Friends, enemies and Saboteurs", *Zimbabwe News*, 4, 3, 24 February 1969.

> solidarity, FRELIMO wants to declare its complete support for as much cooperation as possible with ZAPU and ANC liberation movements...[166]

While ZAPU was celebrated for its military incursions alongside MK, ZANU was living with the threat of having its camps shut down in Tanzania, struggling to recruit, and doing very little militarily. ZANU had gained support from Nyerere at its formation in 1963, in part because of Nyerere's connection with some ZANU leaders, particularly Herbert Chitepo who was appointed as the Director of Public Prosecutions in Tanzania, and Ndabaningi Sithole. However, by the later 1960s, Nyerere threatened ZANU with the loss of their training camp at Mgagao if it did not prove that they were militarily engaged, as ZAPU was.[167] China's support was crucial for ZANU's survival. It had benefited from China's support since shortly after its formation, and in September 1963 sent its first group of five recruits to be trained in China, a group led by Emmerson Mnangagwa, including John Shoniwa, Eddison Shirihuru, Jameson Mudavamba and Laurence Swoswe. In China, they underwent six months of military training, which included ideological classes. The second group of ZANU cadres went to China in 1965. This group had already undergone basic training in Ghana and went to China to be trained as military instructors. The group comprised four cadres: William Ndangana, Bernard Matuma, Silas Mushonga, and Felix Santana (who had trained in Egypt in 1962, and in China in 1963). The third group, led by Josiah Tongogara, consisting of 11 cadres, went to the Nanking Military Academy in 1966, where they underwent military training in mass mobilisation strategy and tactics.[168]

ZANU's most important military training was in Tanzania, where the OAU LC set up ZANLA camps in Itumba (called Mgagao) and Chenga (a base shared with the South

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[166] "Consolidate the bonds of friendship ANC/ZAPU and FRELIMO", *Mozambique Revolution*, 35, 1 September 1968.

[167] Reeds, "International Politics and national Liberation, pp. 37-38. See also Tugamirai's account in Josiah Tungamirai, "Recruitment to the ZANLA: Building up a war Machine", in Terence Ranger and Ngwabi Bhebe (eds), *Soldiers in Zimbabwe Liberation war* (London: James Currey, 1995).

[168] David Martin and Phyllis Johnson, *The Struggle for Zimbabwe: The Chimurenga War* (London: Faber and Faber, 1981), p.11. See also, "Communist Support and Assistance to Nationalist Political groups in Rhodesia", appendix XVI, in *Hearings on H.R. 1287: To Amend the UN Participation Act of 1945 to Halt the importation of Rhodesia Chrome* (Washington: US Government Printer Office, 1975), p.261. This report was prepared by the Rhodesian Information Office and Circulated to the US Government Office. It gives rich details on the military training of ZAPU and ZANU in what they called "Communist Countries"- the Soviet Union, China, Bulgaria, North Korea, and African countries.

African PAC).[169] This offer was always in danger of being cancelled, as was the case for other liberation movements, if ZANU did not prove capable of delivering recruits to the camps for military training and showing that they were fighting.[170] From 1965, ZANU received Chinese instructors to train ZANLA cadres in its military camps in Tanzania. For a brief period, ZANU (like ZAPU) used coercion to recruit new cadres to avoid the closure of its camps.[171] From 1966, ZANU only sent cadres for specialised courses in China and trained most of its recruits in Tanzania. It seems that by 1970, around 20 Chinese instructors were training ZANLA cadres at Mgagao.[172] Other cadres were trained inside Mozambique after its independence in 1975.[173] In contrast to FRELIMO's camp at Nachingwea, in which the Chinese lived together with FRELIMO cadres, the Chinese instructors at Mgagao lived in separate camps, at a distance of around 1.5 km from the ZANLA camp and 300 meters from the MPLA training camp.[174] They trained ZANLA recruits from 8am to 5pm on weekdays. Chinese training of ZANLA recruits in Tanzania ceased in 1975, when ZANLA's own instructors took over the role.[175]

Although China was its primary supporter, providing ZANU with Chinese-made weapons, such as the AKM-47, hand Grenades, Bazookas, Light Machine Guns, RPG-2s, explosives, and small arms, China's level of weapons supply was low, as it had been for FRELIMO, and ZANLA often suffered from an arms shortage, particularly during the first period of its liberation struggle and in the later period when it was overwhelmed by recruits in Mozambique.[176] Unlike FRELIMO, ZANU was not able to forge a military alliance with the Soviet Union to alleviate its weapons shortage, particularly for the supply of the sophisticated weapons it needed to deal with the heavy Rhodesian air force raids in the late 1970s on camps in Mozambique and the battlefield inside Rhodesia.[177]

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[169] On the PAC's sharing with ZANU see: Gregory Houston, Thami Ka Plaatje and Thozama April, "Military Training and Camps of the Pan Africanist Congress of South Africa, 1961-1981", *Historia*, 60, 2, (2015).

[170]Mazarire, "ZANU's External Networks", p.91.

[171]Ibid. See also Norma Kriger, *Guerrilla Veterans in Post-war Zimbabwe: Symbolic and Violent Politics, 1980-1987* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 27-28. The same happened in ZAPU, which started recruiting by forcing its cadres in the mid to late 1960s for a short period.

[172] Reed, "International Politics and National Liberation," p. 84.

[173]Tobias Dai recalls training around 100 ZANLA women at FRELIMO's military camp, Nachingwea, in 1974. Interview, Tobias Dai, Maputo, 30 September 2015.

[174] Wilfred Mhanda, *Dzino: Memories of a Freedom Fighter* (Harare: Weaver Press, 2011), p.18.

[175] Ibid.

[176] Ibid.

The need for more sophisticated weapons led ZANU to scour the world to obtain military training and weaponry. In the early days, ZANU, like FRELIMO, benefitted from the support of Ghana, where ZANLA cadres underwent basic military training in 1964.[178] From 1976, Romania and Yugoslavia offered ZANU military training facilities and weapons.[179] In Romania, ZANLA recruits were trained in ground-to-ground missiles. In Yugoslavia, ZANLA cadres were trained in heavy weapons.[180] By 1978, ZANU felt the necessity of changing its approach in its more intensive confrontation with the Rhodesian forces, just as FRELIMO had in the face of Gordian Knot, and it tried to create a conventional capacity on the battlefield (I discuss this in detail in Chapter II).[181] In 1978, Mugabe started travelling the world to garner support for ZANU's new strategy. After a visit by Mugabe's, North Korea offered firearms and training facilities to ZANLA.[182] From 1978, around 1,000 ZANLA cadres were given infantry training by Soviet instructors in Soviet-aligned Ethiopia, alongside ZIPRA. Ethiopia also trained pilots, maintenance technicians, and ground crews, demonstrating its role in supporting a diversity of liberation movements.[183] Cuba, another Soviet ally, made a military alliance with ZANU after Mugabe met Fidel Castro in Cuba in 1978. Cuba sent military advisers to Mgagao to train ZANLA cadres using the Soviet-made weapons Ethiopia had donated to ZANLA.[184] The diversity of training is further illustrated by cadres within ZANU having received military training while they were still members of ZAPU's armed wing

[177] Ngwabi Bhebe and Terence Ranger (ed), *Soldiers in Zimbabwe's Liberation War* (London: James Curry, 1995); see also Zvakanyorwa Sadomba, *War Veterans in Zimbabwe's Revolution: Challenging Neo-Colonialism and Settler and International Capital* (London: James Currey, 2011), p.53.
[178]Martin and Johnson, *The Struggle for Zimbabwe*, p.11.
[179]See Tungamirai, "Recruitment to the ZANLA: Building up a war Machine, in Ranger and Bhebe (eds), *Soldiers in Zimbabwe Liberation war*, p.42; see also "The Cold War International History project", in *Digital Archive*.
[180]Mazarire, "ZANU's External Relation", p. 104.
[181] "Towards a Conventional War: Smiths' ides of March, Comrade Josiah Tungamirai", *Zimbabwe News*, 10, 2, March (1978).
[182]Lyong Choi and II Young Jeong, "North Korea and Zimbabwe 1978-1982: From the Strategic Alliance to the Symbolic Comradeship between Kim II Sung and Robert Mugabe", *Cold War History,* 17,4, 2 Jun (2017).
[183]Burton, "The Hubs of Decolonization", p. 33-38; Agrippah Mutambara. *The Rebel in Me: A ZANLA Guerrilla Commander in the Rhodesian Bush War, 1974-1980* (Pinetown: 30 Degrees South Publishers, 2014), p.217; Sadomba, *War Veterans in Zimbabwe's Revolution: Challenging Neo-Colonialism and Settler and International Capital*, p.54.
[184] See Reeds, "International Politics and national Liberation", p.46.

in Algeria, Egypt, Bulgaria, and the Soviet Union. This was the case of Rex Nhongo, for example, who became a ZANLA high command member.[185]

The fact that a wider set of countries trained ZANLA (and FRELIMO) indicates that the search for military support had broken the stereotype of Soviet-backed or China-backed imposed by geopolitical conflict. It also demonstrates that both liberation movements followed a similar military trajectory in needing to get beyond China's level of basic guerrilla arms support so as to meet the challenges of the wars they were fighting with heavier weapons and technical training from the Soviet Union.

In fact, besides this additional military training, it seems that ZANU's lack of weapons was alleviated after 1975 when it began to benefit indirectly from the acquisition of Russian weapons, particularly anti-aircraft batteries that allowed them to deal with the Rhodesian air attacks in the camps and the operational front.[186] Mozambique and Ethiopia offered these weapons.[187] Tanzania also supplied ZANU with the Soviet-made ground-to-air missile, the SAM 7.[188] To support ZANLA operations in the border areas with Rhodesia, in 1976, Machel also sent FRELIMO military to the Soviet Union for training in advanced anti-aircraft weapons such as the B11, known as the RG107, a recoilless rifle used by both airborne forces and motorised infantry, and the Strella 2M, a light-weight surface-to-air missile, designed to destroy aircraft at low altitude. These weapons were affectionately called by Mozambican fighters "Cachucha" and "O Jato do Povo" (The Jet of the People), respectively.[189] This means that even though ZANU did not manage to get the political support of the Soviet Union, it was able to access its sophisticated weaponry through the indirect routes of its 'authentic' allies.[190] My sources are silent about the Soviet reaction to these Soviet-supported countries passing on weapons to China-aligned ZANLA and training them for use in some instances. However, these exchanges demonstrate that, although there was a geopolitical conflict that divided the patronage of liberation movements, this division did not prevent

[185]Blessing-Miles Tendi, *The Army and Politics in Zimbabwe: Mujuru, The Liberation Fighter and Kingmaker* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020), p.27.
[186] "Minutes of Todor Zhivkov – Robert Mugabe conversation in Sofia", in *Digital Archives*, 1, 532. Translated by Kalina Brataneva, 29 July 1979.
[187] Ibid.
[188]"Communist Support and Assistance to Nationalist Political groups in Rhodesia", p.262.
[189]Interviews: António Fole, Chimoio, 21 May 2021; Fernando Joia, Changara, 1 June 2021. See also "Rhodesian Raids Provocation for Foreign Help", *The Washington Star*, December 1976.
[190] Reed, "International Politics and National Liberation, p.47.

liberation movements from helping each other where it was militarily efficacious to do so; solidarity relations existed across the Sino-soviet split on the ground level, thus breaching the spheres of geopolitical influence demarcated by the Cold war.

FRELIMO-ZANU/ZANLA relations

More than the discourse of internationalist solidarity among like-minded liberation movements, strategic self-interest brought ZANU and FRELIMO together. FRELIMO and ZANU's first contact started in Tanzania in 1968 when ZANU approached FRELIMO to access FRELIMO's Tete front to open the northeastern war front inside Rhodesia. Martin and Johnson argued that opening that front helped ZANU avoid the *Cordon Sanitaire* created by Rhodesia alongside the Zambezi River on the frontier with Zambia, following the joint MK/ZAPU military campaigns.[191] As seen in the previous section, ZANU's connections differed from FRELIMO's. The fact of having split from ZAPU, a liberation movement that FRELIMO considered its natural ally for having helped it (under its previous name of National Democratic Party) form the *União Democratic de Moçambique* (Democratic Union of Mozambique, UDENAMO) in 1960, made it difficult for ZANU to ally with FRELIMO. UDENAMO was formed in Rhodesia by Mozambican migrant workers who lived in Bulawayo and were inspired by the activities of the National Democratic Party led by Joshua Nkomo. Lopes Tembe, a UDENAMO member who later became a FRELIMO cadre, argues that Nkomo and other ZAPU members advised UDENAMO to move from Rhodesia to Tanzania as a security precaution. ZAPU gave credentials to UDENAMO leaders to present themselves to the United National Independence Unity (UNIP) in Zambia.[192] In Tanzania in the late 1960s, FRELIMO and ZAPU (as well as SWAPO and the ANC) inhabited neighbouring camps at Kongwa, where they frequently organized joint events to promote cultural exchange.[193] As we have seen, FRELIMO cadres also underwent military training alongside ZAPU in

[191]Martin and Johnson, *The struggle for Zimbabwe*, pp.16-17.
[192]Ndelane, *Da Udenamo à FRELIMO*, p. 39.
[193]Interview, Lopes Tembe.

Egypt and Algeria. Lopes Tembe remembers training there alongside ZAPU and ANC recruits in 1964 at the *Military Academy of Enchasse*, where they formed a company.[194] Another FRELIMO group went to Egypt in 1965 and trained alongside ZAPU and ANC.[195] In addition, ZAPU had already forged an alliance based on "political affinity and cooperation" with the Conference of Portuguese Nationalist Organizations (CONCP), which encompassed Lusophone liberation movements including FRELIMO.[196] Matsinha records that because of this backdrop of collaboration, FRELIMO looked at ZAPU with respect and admiration and was sceptical about ZANU.[197]

In the context of earlier FRELIMO-ZAPU association, FRELIMO's relationship with ZANU was at first one of suspicion and doubt. Sérgio Vieira states that although Eduardo Mondlane and other FRELIMO leaders had contact with Herbert Chitepo while he was still Attorney General in Tanzania (in 1968), FRELIMO distrusted ZANU and regarded it as a 'splinter group' that had a relationship with COREMO, FRELIMO's opponent.[198] Óscar Monteiro recalls taking ZAPU's side and ignoring ZANU representatives at the Conference of Heads of State and Government of the OAU held in Algeria in 1968.[199] In Algeria, where he was a FRELIMO representative, Monteiro remembers that the 'authentic' liberation movements kept to themselves and were hostile to other liberation movements like ZANU, calling them puppet groups, a label with the terrible connotation of collaboration with imperialist forces.[200]

ZANU took the initiative to contact FRELIMO to form a military alliance. The first contact between ZANU and FRELIMO was established at the Twiga Hotel in Tanzania, where Chitepo met with Eduardo Mondlane and Machel in 1968. Then, in 1969, a team composed of Noel Mukono, Josiah Tongogara, Cletus Chigowe, and William Ndangana met with FRELIMO leaders in Zambia, where they officially requested access to the Tete Front. Machel promised to consider ZANU's request.[201] He

[194]Ibid.
[195]In his autobiography, Lopes Tembe wrote ZANU instead of ZAPU. However, during our interview, he corrected himself and acknowledged the mistake. See Ndelane, *Da Udenamo à FRELIMO*, p.81.
[196] Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution.* p.224.
[197]Interview, Mariano Matsinha, 9 October 2014.
[198]Vieira, *Participei*, p.412.
[199]Monteiro, *De Todos se Faz um País*, p.127-128. Monteiro was later cautioned by Eduardo Mondlane for this posture, however, Ibid.
[200]Ibid.
[201]Martin and Johnson, *The Struggle for Zimbabwe*, p.16.

argued that FRELIMO's front in Tete was still not consolidated, so it could be challenging to host ZANU.[202] Machel's response was also a way of gaining time so that FRELIMO could offer this opportunity to its 'natural' ally, ZAPU. FRELIMO was also concerned that a military alliance with ZANU would be seen as a betrayal by ZAPU, and of the authentic group and of Soviet support.[203] ZAPU was, however, unable to accept FRELIMO's invitation due to internal divisions created by a revolt in 1971, which nearly destroyed it and prevented it from undertaking military operations.[204]

FRELIMO eventually accepted the presence of ZANU in the Tete Front out of strategic necessity and self-interest. FRELIMO's interest in having a Zimbabwean force using Tete to intensify the armed struggle inside Rhodesia had to do with the fact that Rhodesian troops, in joint operations with the Portuguese to protect the Cahora Bassa Dam, escalated military attacks against FRELIMO in Tete.[205] FRELIMO expected that its support of ZANU would force Ian Smith to fight inside Rhodesia instead of Mozambique.[206] In 1971, FRELIMO accepted the ZANU proposal of joint action, and that year sent a team to Tete to survey the area and investigate possibilities. The team comprised Meya Urimbo, Ernest Kadungure, Justin Chauke, and Joseph Chimurenga.[207] A subsequent team included Josiah Tongogara, Rex Nhongo, Joseph Chimurenga, and Dakarai Badza. They went to Tete in 1972, took a refresher course in guerrilla warfare from FRELIMO, and infiltrated weapons inside Rhodesia. They also participated in FRELIMO's confrontation with the Portuguese.[208] Furthermore, a team composed of 45 ZANLA fighters went to Tete for six months, carrying weapons and other war materials to infiltrate Rhodesia and mobilize the masses.[209] Antonio Ibrahim, a FRELIMO soldier on the Tete Front, recalls having helped his ZANLA comrades transport war material from Zambia to Tete using FRELIMO's canoes.[210] This war material was to be hidden in mattresses, corn sacks, fish baskets, etc. Using a travelling trader's licence, which allowed

[202]Ibid.
[203]Interview, Matsinha.
[204]Dumiso Dabengwa, "ZIPRA in the Zimbabwe War of National Liberation", in N. Bhebe and T. Ranger (eds), *Soldiers in Zimbabwe's Liberation War* (London: James Currey, 1995).
[205]Pelembe, *Lutei pela Pátria,* p.141.
[206]Ibid.
[207]"The war is here, everywhere, interview with Josiah Tongogara", *Zimbabwe News,* 10,3, 1978.
[208]"War is here, everywhere".
[209]Ibid.
[210]Interview, Antonio Ibrahimo, Maputo, 12 October 2020.

them to transport goods without suspicion by the colonial authorities, FRELIMO guerrillas could disguise the weapons shipment without trouble.[211] The ZANU-FRELIMO relationship in the Tete Front was vital for ZANLA's advance.

Sérgio Vieira's memoir affirms that, before accepting ZANLA's presence in Tete, Machel sent José Moyane, then the Commander of the Tete front, on a secret reconnaissance trip inside Rhodesia to investigate ZANLA's military operations.[212] Moyane's report stated that ZANLA was heavily engaged in military operations against Rhodesian forces, infiltrating many fighters and weapons while simultaneously carrying out political mobilization. He did not, however, see a ZAPU presence in these areas.[213] Even so, after Moyane's report, Machel sent Joaquim Chissano and Sérgio Vieira to try again to persuade ZAPU to use Tete. They contacted James Chikerema and Jason Moyo, but they were unable to accept the offer.[214]

ZANLA fighters were placed near the Rhodesian border at Mukumbura, in FRELIMO's Sector IV. Antonio Hama Thai interacted with the ZANLA counterparts in Mukumbura and recalls that the they had little experience of operational front activity, and some, like Joseph Chimurenga, seemed to have more trust in spirit mediums than in military tactics, showing the first signs of different 'military cultures' between the two liberation movements, discussed further in subsequent chapters.[215] Lopes Tembe, appointed as FRELIMO's official Portuguese-Shona-Ndebele translator in the Tete front, remembers helping ZANLA comrades mobilise the population to transport war material to the border with Rhodesia. Tembe also states that his ability to speak both Shona and Ndebele created some conflicts with his Zimbabwean comrades, particularly with Joseph Chimurenga, who accused him of being a ZAPU spy, merely because he spoke Ndebele, a clear demonstration of ethnic prejudice within ZANU.[216] Before joining FRELIMO, Lopes Tembe learned Zimbabwean languages while he lived in Rhodesia during the 1950s and worked at the Salisbury Mercantile Company as a travelling salesman supplying clothes and groceries in rural Zimbabwe, an occupation which allowed him to

[211]Interview, Maulate.
[212]Vieira, *Participei*, p.412.
[213]Ibid.
[214]Vieira, *Participei*, p.412.
[215]Interview, Hama Thai, Maputo, 27 October 2021.
[216] See Ndelane, *Da Udenamo à FRELIMO*, p.108.

interact with different cultures and learn local languages.[217] FRELIMO and ZANLA joint operations improved considerably during the war in Tete. According to *The Rhodesian Information Report*, the presence of ZANLA fighters in the Tete Front made a substantial contribution to its armed struggle since it considerably enhanced ZANU's operations, which the Rhodesians missed in the early years of the liberation struggle to the extent of ZANLA fighters entering Rhodesia without the knowledge of the Rhodesian forces and remaining hidden for weeks.[218]

It seems that the presence of ZANU in Tete helped FRELIMO achieve its objective: to push the Rhodesian forces back to Rhodesia, contributing to the consolidation of FRELIMO's hold on Tete province. According to Lopes Tembe, from 1973 to 1974, with the intensification of the armed struggle inside Rhodesia and the consequent withdrawal of the Rhodesian forces from Tete, Portuguese soldiers reduced their attacks on FRELIMO.[219] In this way FRELIMO and ZANU/ZANLA collaboration demonstrates that the military need to fight against Rhodesia and the Portuguese dictated the nature of the relations of solidarity between the two liberation movements. Liberation movements apparently divided by the Sino-Soviet split developed effective ways of supporting each other, rather than remain trapped in broad geopolitical divisions.

The relationship with ZANU was further strengthened after Mozambique became independent in 1975, and FRELIMO began governing the newborn nation, as I explore in the next section.

FRELIMO's framework for ZANLA operations in Mozambique

When Mozambique became independent in 1975, FRELIMO, now the ruling party in the process of establishing its administration and territorial control, followed the Pan-African tradition of hosting and supporting liberation movements. It decided to host ZANU in Mozambique, allowing it to transfer its headquarters from Zambia and to establish

[217] Ibid.
[218] "Communist Support and Assistance to Nationalist Political groups in Rhodesia", p.262.
[219] Ndelane, *Da Udenamo à FRELIMO*, p.111.

military bases and refugee camps in its territory that year. For Machel the independence of Mozambique could not be complete while it was surrounded by the hostile regimes of Rhodesia and South Africa. Hosting ZANU was justified as contributing to the removal of these threats militarily in the near future, as well as fulfilling the duty of Pan-Africanism.

However, Samora Machel established a 'framework' in which ZANLA had to operate inside Mozambique. This meant that the main guidelines of the solidarity relationship with ZANU/ZANLA were defined and determined by the governing party. The first intervention was made in April 1975 in the context of the emergence of the Frontline States. This was an attempt to unify the Zimbabwean liberation movements during the *détente* exercise initiated by Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda and South African Prime Minister John Vorster in 1974.[220] The Frontline States included Tanzania, Zambia, and Botswana and then incorporated Mozambique and Angola, after those countries' independence in 1975. The failure of détente, owing to its origin as a Kaunda-Vorster initiative rather than an initiative of Zimbabwean nationalists and the UDI-Smith regime, and to the arrest of members of the ZANU and ZANLA leadership due to the assassination of ZANU leader Herbert Chitepo in Zambia on 18 March 1975, led the Frontline States to attempt to reorganise the armed forces of the two Zimbabwean liberation movements. In an interview with BBC radio, Machel stated that restructuring the armed forces would intensify operations on the battlefield while allowing the unification of the liberation movements, thus ending the opportunity that Ian Smith had of playing them off against each other.[221] Samora Machel insisted that the unification of the two liberation armies was to avoid the two groups fighting each other.[222] The ideal of unification was shared by Nyerere, who was, by this time, the leader of the Frontline States.[223]

At a meeting held in Maputo from 24 to 26 November 1975, Machel and Nyerere obliged ZANU and ZAPU to agree on the formation of the Zimbabwe People's Army,

[220]"ZANU in Nutshell", *Zimbabwe News*, 9,5-6, July 1977.
[221]"Entrevista do Presidente Samora Machel à BBC", *Rádio Moçambique Archive*, 2 October 1976. The same interview was published at *Notícias* Newspaper, see "A Luta Armada no Zimbabwe termina com à Independência: Afirma o Presidente Samora Machel em entrevista à BBC", *Notícias*, 2 October 1976.
[222]Vieira, *Participei*, p.426.
[223] "Frontline Presidents endorse ZIPA as the unified army to persecute the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe", 26 July, 177. WikiLeaks.

ZIPA, which combined ZIPRA, ZAPU's military wing, and ZANLA.[224] ZANLA and ZIPRA cadres were to be brought together under the rubric of ZIPA at Mgagao and Morogoro military training camps in Tanzania. After the inactivity of the armed struggle in 1974 and 1975 due to the détente and negotiations, ZIPA resumed the war in January 1976.[225] The formation of ZIPA meant that Mozambique's formal hosting of ZANU was made through ZIPA. However, the combination of the two armies was the Frontline State's goal rather than that of the liberation movements themselves. In a meeting held in Quelimane (where Machel installed Robert Mugabe and Edgar Tekere in 1975) between Robert Mugabe, Edgar Tekere and US Congressman Stephen Solarz on 7 July 1976, Mugabe stated that ZANU was, reluctantly, "against the combination of ZIPRA and ZANLA armies", and that this came about owing to the Frontline States who threatened to deny support for their armed struggle if they refused to unify.[226]

Indeed, the from the start, it was clear that ZIPA's forces were not unified, as indicated by the declaration of its leaders to the press. On 30 September 1976, Wilfred Mhanda [Dzinashe Machingura], ZIPA's Deputy Political Commissar and a member of ZANLA, held a press conference in which he claimed that ZIPA was an independent body that did not identify itself with either ZAPU or ZANU leaders, who were divided because of "political ambition and power struggle".[227] He also stressed that ZIPA would transform itself into a political party.[228] Two days after Machingura's declarations, Alfred Nikita, ZIPA's Political Commissar and a ZIPRA member held a press conference to deny the statements made by his deputy. He denied that ZIPA was an independent body which would transform into a political organisation: it was a united military body that belonged to ZAPU and ZANU.[229] In addition to these clashes between ZIPA commanders, it seems that ZANU pushed the idea that ZIPA was its liberation army alone. Mugabe identified himself as General Secretary of ZIPA, which, according to him, was dominated by ZANLA's high command.[230]

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[224]"News in Brief", *Zimbabwe News*, 9, 2, January -February 1977.
[225]Ibid.
[226] "Congressman Solarz held one hour and half conversation with Robert Mugabe" 9 July 1976, available at WikiLeaks. For more details on the Solarz trip to Quelimane see: *Southern Africa*, vol, 9, 8, 1 September 1976.
[227] "ZIPA News Conference", *WikiLeaks*, 30 September 1976.
[228] Ibid.
[229] "ZIPA Political Commissar challenge right of his deputy to speak for ZIPA", *WikiLeaks*, 1 October 1976.
[230] "Attempts to unify Zimbabwe political factions in disarray", *WikiLeaks*, September 1976.

Machel realised that his and the Frontline States' attempt to unite ZAPU and ZANU's militaries had failed. Soon after ZIPA was formed, FRELIMO grasped that the ZIPRA side was not joining ZANLA in Mozambique. According to Sérgio Vieira, in 1976 Machel met with Jason Moyo at *State House* in Maputo to discuss why this was.[231] Vieira claims that Moyo justified the non-deployment of ZIPRA by arguing that ZAPU's cadres were highly specialised and would only be needed in the final phase of the war. After Machel's condemnation of this posture, ZAPU sent a small number of ZIPRA to join ZANLA while the majority were kept in Zambia and Tanzania.[232]

Where ZANLA and ZIPRA did come together in one place, there were conflicts. José Moyane, then governor of Manica Province, recalls having been called to Junta, where ZIPRA and ZANLA cadres were located, to solve their frequent quarrels.[233] Moyane's appeal for unity did not work, and ZIPRA cadres who had joined ZANLA in Mozambique began to flee into Rhodesia. Dzinashe Machingura states the ZIPRA soldiers deployed to the war front to engage the Rhodesian troops started fleeing, crossing the whole of Rhodesia, usually on foot, fighting and recruiting along the way, then entering Botswana. They then flew from Francistown to Zambia because of the lack of confidence and the distrust and rivalry between ZANLA and ZIPRA.[234] ZIPRA cadres claim that the ZIPRA soldiers deployed to Rhodesia because they were being killed by ZANLA cadres in the operational areas, and tortured by ZANLA in Mozambique in collaboration with Mozambican soldiers.[235] The reasons why FRELIMO took ZANLA's side and not ZIPRA's is not clear through my sources. However, the most suggestive clues lie in the military relationship built between ZANLA and FRELIMO soldiers in the Tete front during the early 1970s.

After July 1976, ZIPA was only composed of ZANLA soldiers since the few ZIPRA that had joined withdrew following the clashes in Morogoro and Mgagao camps, where around 50 ZIPRA guerrillas were killed by ZANLA with the help of the Chinese and Tanzanians.[236] Many factors triggered this lack of trust between ZIPRA and ZANLA.

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[231]Vieira, *Participei*, p.426.
[232]Ibid.
[233]José Moyane, *Memories of a Guerrilla Fighter* (Maputo: King Ngungunhane Institute, 2012), p.149.
[234]Mhanda, *Dzino.*
[235] For more details see Tendi, *The Army and Politics in Zimbabwe*, p.75-81.
[236]Fay Chung, *Reliving the Second Chimurenga. Memories from Zimbabwe's liberation struggle*, (Stockholm: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2006), p. 147. See the interview of ZANLA cadres G and H cited by

According to ZANLA cadres accounts, the different types of training and military capacity was one reason. ZIPRA cadres seemed to be better trained than ZANU, and their physical presentation and appearance seemed much more sophisticated. They wore military uniforms and boots and had sophisticated weapons, while the ZANLA guerrillas dressed like peasants and were less well trained.[237] ZANLA recruits joined ZIPRA soldiers who had two years of training in Morogoro camp (ZIPRA's military training camp). As a result, each group undertook separate exercises.[238] ZIPRA forces at Mgagao (ZANLA's military camp) distrusted the military training given by Chinese instructors, describing it as very poor, particularly in terms of weapons management, since the recruits trained with wooden guns and only had access to firearms when deployed to the front inside Rhodesia. Chinese instructors, in turn, reacted with intolerance to the Soviet oriented reading of Marxism-Leninism that ZIPRA soldiers followed.[239]

Besides these attempts to enforce military 'unity', Machel also tried to control the ZANU leadership and its relationship to ZANLA. He moved Mugabe from the guerrilla camp at Junta[240] in Chimoio to Quelimane, far from Rhodesia's borders and the ZANLA guerrillas, where he was given the task of teaching English classes at a local Secondary School.[241] The argument used by Machel was related to alleged security risks, given that the Rhodesian forces were patrolling the area on the border.[242] However, since Mugabe's unexpected appearance as ZANU's leader at the Frontline meeting in 1974, instead of Ndabaningi Sithole, Machel had regarded Mugabe with suspicion.[243] Sérgio Vieira held that the security reason for moving Mugabe was Machel's excuse: he wanted to buy time to investigate Mugabe secretly since he suspected that he had an alliance with the Rhodesians.[244] Machel created a team composed of Vieira, José Moyane and Sebastião Mabote to investigate views of Mugabe held by his ZANLA comrades at the military camps in Mozambique and Tanzania. The report concluded that the ZANLA guerrillas

Miles Tendi, who discusses in detail this bickering between ZANU and ZAPU; Tendi, *The Army and Politics in Zimbabwe*, p.75-81.

[237] Tendi, *The Army and Politics in Zimbabwe*, p.75-81.

[238] Ibid.

[239] Ibid.

[240] Junta was a former Portuguese barracks used to train *Flechas*, an exclusive group of soldiers that fought FRELIMO guerrillas.

[241] Interview, Mariano Matsinha, 9 October 2014, see also Renato Matusse, *Mateus Kida*, pp.160-161.

[242] Vieira, *Participei*, p. 417.

[243] Ibid.

[244] Ibid.

identified themselves with Mugabe.[245] The acceptance of Mugabe as ZANU leader was also expressed in the Mgagao declaration, in which the guerrillas appointed ZANU's General Secretary (Mugabe) to replace ZANU's President Ndabaningi Sithole.[246] Mateus Kida, by then FRELIMO's Manica province Political Commissar, suggests that because Machel came from FRELIMO's military wing, he seemed to have had more affection for and trust in Josiah Tongogara, the Chief of Operations of ZANLA, than in Mugabe.[247] Edgar Tekere relates that during a conversation with Machel, in which they discussed the bombing raids at Chimoio Headquarters in November 1977 (I discuss these raids in subsequent chapters), Machel said he had respect for Mugabe but distrusted his military ability. Because he was not a military leader, he did not "measure up to the scale of military operations and planning", which, in Machel's opinion, resulted in the escalation of the attacks on ZANU targets in Mozambique.[248] For Tekere, Machel, an army man, did not like Mugabe, a politician.[249] Kidas' and Tekere's interpretations seem to be corroborated in Óscar Monteiro's narrative:

> I remember seeing Machel crying twice in my life. The first time was at a meeting of the FRELIMO Central Committee, where we were paying tribute to the comrades who died during the FRELIMO liberation struggle. When the name of Josina Machel, Machel's wife who died of illness in 1972, was mentioned, Machel burst into tears, and we had to interrupt the meeting…The second time we were informed of the death of Josiah Tongogara, Machel burst into tears and said between sobs, *'so much effort to free Zimbabwe for nothing'*, … Tongogora was regarded by Machel as a military chief in a different mould from [Zimbabwe's] political leadership.[250]

Realising that ZIPA had failed, the Frontline leaders began the process of uniting ZAPU and ZANU at the political rather than the military level. This materialised following the Dar es Salaam Frontline summit on 8 October 1976, where the Frontline leaders persuaded Nkomo and Mugabe to form the Patriotic Front. With the agreed overall aim of waging armed struggle inside Rhodesia, the Patriotic Front would present a common approach at the Geneva Conference held soon after the Dar summit, from 28

[245]Ibid.
[246]John Saul, "The ZIPA Moment: Dzino, Mugabe and Samora Machel", *Review of African Political Economy,* 43,1 August (2014), p.305.
[247] Interview, Mateus Kida, Maputo, 22 March 2022.
[248] Edgar Tekere, *A Lifetime of Struggle* (Harare: Sapes Books, 2007), p.88.
[249] Ibid.
[250]Monteiro, *De Todos se faz um País*, p.169.

October to 15 December.[251] However, each liberation movement maintained its independence and identity.[252] On the basis of this loose alliance, in 1977, the OAU recognised the Patriotic Front as the political and military representative of the Zimbabwean Liberation struggle, meaning the Patriotic Front was regarded internationally as the sole representative of Zimbabwe liberation struggle.[253] Regardless of the failure to unify the Zimbabwean liberation movements' military, Machel insistently treated them as if they were unified. In his official discourse, Machel avoided mentioning them separately, referring to them instead as the Patriotic Front or Zimbabwean liberation movements, even though it was widely known that Mozambique was, materially, only supporting ZANU. The most suggestive reason for this lies in Machel's diplomatic strategy, which sought to hide from his audience the Frontline States' failure to unite the Zimbabwean liberation movements. Another possible explanation could be the weight on his conscience of being allied with the rival of his 'natural' ally, ZAPU.

Besides the pressure for unification of the two Zimbabwean Liberation movements, as the host of ZANU in Mozambique, Machel sought to establish conditions under which ZANLA would operate in its territory. In addition to acting politically as the Patriotic Front (since the military unification had failed), ZANU and ZANLA were expected to follow many other rules, both political and military.

[251] *Zimbabwe News*, 9,2, January-February 1977.
[252] Ibid.
[253] "Liberation Committee Stresses Armed Struggle", *Southern Africa*, August 1977. See also, Mutambara, *The Rebel in Me*, p. 231.

Figure 1: Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo shaking hands during the formation of the Patriotic Front in Maputo under the satisfied smile of Samora Machel.

Source: *Zimbabwe News*, vol.9, n.2,1977.

The relationship Machel had built with the USSR during Mozambique's liberation struggle strengthened after its independence (as explored further in Chapter II). Great Britain, if with some reluctance, was trying to find a solution to the Zimbabwean war. It had declared the Smith regime illegal, applied sanctions against Rhodesia and now attempted to solve the Rhodesian situation through the Anglo-American proposals. On 10 May 1975, some 6 weeks before the proclamation of Mozambique's independence, Judith Hart, the British Minister of Overseas Development, met Machel in Tanzania and requested that the new Mozambican government apply sanctions against Rhodesia, in return for British financial compensation for the losses incurred.[254] Later, the British

[254] Óscar Monteiro, "Samora e o Mundo", in António Sopa (ed), *Samora Homem do Povo* (Maputo: Maguezo, 2001), p.58; although Monteiro's text has the meeting taking place on 10 May 1974, it is clear

Foreign Secretary, David Owen, publicly condemned Rhodesian raids targeting ZANU's refugee camps and military bases in Mozambique, and called on Smith to withdraw his forces.[255]

A similar approach was applied by the Americans, who had a series of meetings with the Mozambican government to discuss the Rhodesian situation. In 1977, Machel met with the US Ambassador, John Owen, to talk about the Rhodesian raids on Mozambique territory and the details of the Anglo-American proposals. Machel asked the Americans and British to provide weapons to deal with the Rhodesian attacks.[256] One day after the meeting between Machel and Owen, US President Jimmy Carter sent a letter to President Machel condemning the Rhodesian raids and promising to support the Zimbabwean refugees hosted in Mozambique, ignoring, however, Machel's request for arms.[257] In 1978, the Mozambican Minister of Foreign Affairs, Joaquim Chissano, met Congressman Charles Diggs to discuss the contours of the armed struggle in Rhodesia.[258] Although Machel and the Frontline States had concluded that armed struggle was essential to achieve Zimbabwean independence, they regarded a negotiated solution the much preferred, less damaging, option. Besides facing security problems, with the Rhodesian forces undertaking bombing raids in Mozambican territory and destroying economic infrastructure, the decision to support the Zimbabwean liberation struggle brought severe economic damage to Mozambique. The decision to apply UN sanctions against Rhodesia on 3 March 1976 resulted in the loss of revenue from the transit of Rhodesia's imports and exports through Maputo and Beira, one of the country's largest sources of foreign income. The Mozambican Minister of Finance, Solomão Munguambe, estimated that in the year 1976-1977, the country lost more than 1.5 million escudos due to the border closure with Rhodesia.[259]

In this period of crisis, Mozambique's supportive relations with ZANU became more conditional. FRELIMO's objection at this time to ZANU's overt positions against

from the context that 10 May 1975 is meant; see also Pedro Aires Oliveira, "The United Kingdom and the Independence of Portuguese Africa (1974-1976): Stakes, Perceptions and Policy Options", *Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique*, 18, 2 (2013), p.105-128.

[255] Ibid.

[256] "Rhodesian: meeting with Machel", *WikiLeaks*, 3 Dec 1977.

[257] "Presidential Message for Machel", *WikiLeaks*, 4 dec 1977.

[258] "Codel Diggs meeting with Mozambican Foreign Minister", *WikiLeaks*, 25 March 1978.

[259] "We have received little, says Mozambique", *Zambia Daily Mail*, 30 April 1977.

other countries, such as the URSS, was not, in fact, driven by ideology but pragmatism, and an extension of its 'non-aligned' approach. It was intended to allow both ZANU and Mozambique to retain a wide base of international support and help align the Frontline States with Anglo-American diplomacy to bring independence to Zimbabwe as soon as possible. This would free Mozambique of its hostile neighbour and allow it to reopen the border with Zimbabwe and recover significant revenue from the existing transport infrastructure.[260] Allowing ZANU to campaign against the Soviet Union, FRELIMO's liberation struggle ally, also put at risk substantial Soviet economic and military support to independent Mozambique (see chapter II).

Machel enforced other conditions on ZANU. He did not allow the changing of ZANU's leaders to be discussed and decided by ZANLA soldiers at a military camp inside Mozambican territory, nor did he allow the execution of white people captured by ZANLA inside Zimbabwe.[261] There were also rumours that the Vashandi, a group of ZANLA soldiers led by Dzinashe Machingura, ZIPA deputy Political Commissar, wanted to depose Mugabe and Tongogara at the military training camp in Manica.[262] ZANU imprisoned this group with the help of FRELIMO for three years in Mozambique. Matsinha stated that ZANU leaders wished to execute them, but Machel did not allow this to happen.[263] The most probable explanation for Machel's decision is that he did not want ZANU executing people inside Mozambique. This is analogous to the limitations under which FRELIMO operated in Tanzania. Essentially, host countries which supported liberation movements were against the execution of opponents inside their countries.[264]

There were other rules that applied to the camps. Mozambican authorities prohibited ZANLA from carrying weapons inside the Zimbabwean refugee camps. Only Mozambican forces protecting the refugee camps were allowed to carry weapons.[265] The Mozambican authorities had separated Zimbabweans into two types of camp. One was the refugee camps, where all civilians were located; although people at the refugee camps

[260] For more on Machel's pragmatism see Tendi, *The Army and Politics in Zimbabwe*, p. 86.
[261]Vieira, *Participei*, p.427.
[262] Interview, Matsinha. See also Vieira, p.427-428.
[263] Ibid.
[264] On Nyerere's framework of FRELIMO operations in Tanzania territory see: Michael Panzer, *A Nation in name, A State in Exile.* p.169-215. President Kaunda also was very strict with the execution of ZANU leaders inside its territory, see for example: Luise White, *The Assassination of Herbert Chitepo*: *Text and Politics in Zimbabwe* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003).
[265]Interview, Mouzinho Sande.

underwent basic military training, they used wooden guns instead of real ones. ZANLA administrated these camps in collaboration with the FRELIMO authorities. The other camps were the military training bases, located far away from the population, in which ZANLA recruits were undergoing military training. The military bases were administrated and controlled by ZANLA. I will develop the difference between refugee camps and military bases in the following chapters.

The rules for ZANU and ZANLA actions show again that Mozambique, as the host country, centralized the solidarity guidelines through which ZANU and ZANLA had to operate in Mozambique. ZANU had the opportunity to use Mozambican territory for its military operations as long as it maintained unity at least at the political level with ZAPU through the Patriotic Front. ZANU and ZANLA had also not to stray from FRELIMO ideology; they could not overtly campaign against foreign powers, so as not to cause reactions hostile to Mozambique and ZANU itself. These restrictions were evolved in the context of prestige and respect surrounding Mozambique's independence, and Machel's patronage of regional liberation. The complexity of this relationship between FRELIMO and ZANU enables us to understand the nature of solidarity between the liberation movements and the dynamics it produced.

However, while ZANU and ZANLA tried to function within this framework of operation – set up by the "politics of machine" imposed by the Mozambican state so that they would not lose the support of their host – they also managed their affairs so as not jeopardize their survival, as I will see in the next section.

ZANU modus operandi inside Mozambique

Faced with a lack of alternatives and in order to survive, ZANU accepted the 'framework' imposed by the FRELIMO authorities (backed by the Frontline States) but found ways to claim and reinforce its independence. Even though Mugabe was treated with hostility by Machel and initially moved to Quelimane, several hundred kilometres away from the

guerrilla bases, he found ways of communicating with them through Rex Nhongo and Wilfred Mhanda (aka Dzinashe Machingura), who travelled secretly to Quelimane and briefed him about ZANLA affairs.[266] Mugabe also wrote letters from Quelimane in the name of ZANU, appealing for international aid.[267]

ZANU and ZANLA continued to undermine Frontline States' pressure to unify with ZAPU. Although ZIPA waged the armed struggle by organizing military forces and opening new military offensives, and the Patriotic Front subsequently functioned as the political voice of the two Zimbabwean liberation movements on the international front, unity was little more than a pretence acted out the behest of Machel and the Frontline leaders. ZANU (and ZAPU) were not interested in uniting with each other. Mutambara, a ZANLA cadre who underwent military training in Mozambique, reports that Josiah Tongogara, ZANLA's Chief of Operations, used to say to the guerrillas that, "if ZANU provided your gun, you must move the ZANU way, and you talk the ZANU way. There was not a Patriotic Front".[268] Mutambara explains this play acting of ZANU in the following words:

> Both ZANU and ZAPU [ZANLA and ZIPRA] knew that unity was an illusion visible to expectant external supporters… When our audiences were the Frontline States or the OAU, we sang songs glorifying our unity. Still, in our military camps, we would express outright condemnation of unity with ZAPU. ZAPU also harboured the same sentiment.[269]

Dzinashe Machingura, ZIPA deputy political Commissar, stated that the differences within ZIPA came more from the contending ZANU-ZAPU leadership rather than soldiers in ZIPA itself, which was committed to waging the war in Zimbabwe. Machingura claimed that this vision was the same view of the Zimbabwean liberation movement's leadership as that held by Samora Machel who, as he says, "did not consider the leadership of both liberation movements equally committed to a long and difficult struggle to liberate their country."[270] In Machingura's account, Machel (and Nyerere)

[266]Tendi, *The Army and Politic in Zimbabwe*, p. 83.
[267]Sadomba mentions that Mugabe had written a letter to the Church of Sweden Mission asking for aid to Zimbabwean refugees that were living in Mozambique, see Sadomba, *War Veterans in Zimbabwe Revolution*, p.23.
[268]Mutambara, *The Rebel in Me*, p. 229-230.
[269]Ibid.
[270]Machingura, *Dzino*, p.94.

viewed ZIPA as a 'Third Force' composed of younger military leaders like Machingura himself, who were much more committed to waging the liberation war, rather than the 'old guard' which was always engaged in internal conflict. However, in Mutambara's account, the failure of military unity between ZANLA and ZIPRA seems to do more with his sense that both ZANU and ZAPU leaderships as well as the junior soldiers distrusted each other, thus making ZIPA unity an illusion. Members of the old military guard like Josiah Tongogara, ZANLA's Chief of Operations, who used to instil in the guerrillas that there was no unity between ZAPU and ZANU/ZIPRA and ZANLA, would partially incite the juniors to distrust each other; but other aspects like the different military approach and cultures as well as ideology contributed to the distrust between junior soldiers.[271]

Although ZIPA ceased to exist after the withdrawal of ZIPRA forces in July 1976, ZANLA and ZANU continued to pretend to be part of ZIPA until 1977, and while *Zimbabwe News* referred to ZIPA in its war reports, it always made clear that the military operations were waged by ZANLA within the context of ZIPA, separating itself from ZIPRA. Mugabe explained the absence of ZIPRA within ZIPA in an interview with Gargle Brar, the representative of the *Zimbabwe Solidarity Front* in London in 1977, in the following terms:

> ZAPU pulled out from ZIPA after the clashes (Mgagao and Morogoro), and only ZANLA forces remained. Those are the forces that are fighting now and belong to ZANU. ZIPA is synonymous with ZANLA, a ZANU wing, so it must be under ZANU leadership. ZIPA is not an entity, a military organ that has autonomy.[272]

The appearance of unity between ZANU and ZAPU was, however, crucial in the search for military assistance worldwide: a political stance with a determined purpose, but nonetheless performed for external consumption. For example, when Mugabe visited Bulgaria (ZAPU's ally) in 1978, he met Todor Zhivkov and requested assistance on weapons to deal with air attacks by Rhodesian forces. The issue of unity was also brought

[271] For more details on Machel and Nyerere in regarding to ZIPA as a "Third Force" that could reduce internal conflict between members of the old guard, see: Timothy Scarnecchia, *Race and Diplomacy in Zimbabwe: The Cold War and Decolonization, 1960-1984* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2023),p. 66-114; on the ways junior soldiers and military commanders of both ZANU and ZAPU distrusted each other see: Miles Tendi, *The Army*, p.75-81.

[272]"Interview with Robert Mugabe", *Revolutionary Zimbabwe*, 6, January 1977, cited by Robert Shamuyarira, "Letters to Editors: Sworn enemies of ZANU Puzzled and Baffled", *Zimbabwe News*, 9, n.5-6, July -Dec-1977.

to the table. Todor Zhivkov showed some discomfort in providing military assistance to ZAPU (which already benefited from Bulgaria's military aid) and ZANU separately but manifested interest in giving this assistance within the ambit of the Patriotic Front.[273]

Though Mozambique limited the functions of ZANU within its territory, it also offered ZANU sovereign space from which it could exercise its power. The refugee camps and the military bases were the centres ZANU and ZANLA power. From the refugee camps where ZANLA recruited its cadres, relying on a flow of refugees, and in the military bases, where ZANLA cadets underwent military training, ZANU could apply its policies. Here, ZANLA and ZANU were responsible for supervising daily duties such as political mobilization, organizing domestic work, caring for the sick, setting up education programs, managing logistics and personnel, and administering military training.[274] Although Machel forbade the presence of weapons in the refugee camps, on some occasions, ZANU leaders allowed the presence of armed soldiers coming from the battlefield in Rhodesia to report to the refugees their successes and military tactics on the front, in clear disobedience of FRELIMO's orders.[275] The objective of such encounters with refugees was mobilization, to "re-ignite the desire to be trained quickly and be a participant, rather than a listener", as well as to raise morale.[276] At the refugee and military camps, ZANLA was also responsible for security screening to prevent the infiltration of Rhodesian spies. However, with the increased influx of people coming to join ZANLA at the refugee and military camps in Mozambique from 1976, the scrutiny became less efficient, and ZANU faced constant air raids on its military bases and refugee camps.[277] I will discuss further the effects of the growing Zimbabwean exodus to Mozambique in a later chapter.

ZANU's socialist rhetoric was crucial to impressing its host, Mozambique. It simultaneously guaranteed legitimacy and showed loyalty towards Machel and FRELIMO. After the Chimoio Central Committee meeting held from 31 August to 8 September 1977, in which Robert Mugabe was officially proclaimed ZANU's President, ZANU became even more firmly committed to what it called a 'Marxist-Leninism Mao

[273]Ibid.
[274]Mutambara, *The Rebel in Me, p.50*.
[275]Ibid, p.59.
[276]Ibid, p. 59-60.
[277]Tendi, *The Army and Politics in Zimbabwe*, p.100-101.

Zedong ideology', which meant that its policy would be influenced, if not defined, by a hybrid aggregation of both Soviet and Chinese lines.[278] Although socialist ideology was already adopted in 1973 and radicalized by ZIPA leaders in 1977, ZANU now reaffirmed its ideology by integrating both lines.[279] ZANU argued that this firm commitment to socialist ideology was learned from FRELIMO, which officially adopted Marxism-Leninism in 1977. ZANU's ideology was thus in line with FRELIMO's: as expressed in *Zimbabwe News*, "Mozambique's shining example in implementing socialism had made an indelible impression on ZANU".[280]

However, by November 1978, in a conversation with the American Ambassador in Mozambique, Mugabe himself seemed not to be impressed by the Mozambican model of socialism. Mugabe stated that he did not appreciate the way FRELIMO was ruling the country; he preferred aspects of the Tanzanian model, which was democratic, along with those of the Zambian mixed economy: "I have been living in Mozambique long enough to know that problems arise from attempting to transform society and the economy too quickly," Mugabe claimed.[281] It is impossible to verify whether Mugabe's affirmation represented his real view on how Mozambique was governed, or was a performance to impress the US. However, such a divergence from ZANU's official line suggests that changing the discourse according to the audience was a manoeuvre needed by ZANU and ZANLA to retain and gain support for their struggle.

As all liberation movements to some extent did, ZANU used this flexible ideological strategy, informed by the Cold War and Sino-Soviet conflict, to garner support worldwide actively from 1977. For example, on a visit to China, its longstanding ally, to request more weapons in June 1977, the ZANU leader denounced the Soviet Union for using its arms donations to promote a hegemonic sphere of influence and even create puppet liberation movements, arguing that the imperialism rendered by the

[278]"Sworn enemies of ZANU Puzzled and Baffled", *Zimbabwe News*, 9, 5-6, (June-December 1977). For more on ZIPA and ZANU ideology see Mhanda, *Dzino*, and David Moore, "The Zimbabwean People's Army in Zimbabwean History, 1975-1977: Mugabe's rise and Democracy's demise", *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* (2014).
[279] This was defined by ZANU's political program in 1973, see "ZANU Carries the Burden of History", *Zimbabwe News*, 10,3, May-June 1978.
[280]"Sworn enemies of ZANU Puzzled and Baffled".
[281] "Assessment of Mugabe's current position", *WikiLeaks*, November 1978.

socialist regimes "is even more insidious and dangerous" than Western imperialism.[282] Besides criticising the Soviet Union, he also took the opportunity to praise China "for genuinely aiding and supporting" the ZANU struggle.[283] If FRELIMO prohibited ZANU from criticising the Soviet Union through *The Voice of Zimbabwe* radio broadcasts from Maputo, it did not prevent ZANU's leaders from doing so when they travelled around the world to get support for their struggle.

However, when Mugabe visited Bulgaria in 1978 (as mentioned above), Mugabe avoided mentioning China and Maoism "genuinely aiding" ZANU. Instead, he stated that ZANU's ideology was based on scientific socialism and Marxism-Leninism but not Maoism as he had told the Chinese and FRELIMO. According to Mugabe, ZANU's victory would allow the establishment of a socialist zone in Southern Africa, created within the borders of Angola, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe.[284] He thus made clear that his liberation movement shared the same ideological camp with Bulgaria and its allies in the southern African region, which would facilitate assistance to ZANU.[285]

Thus, to gain and retain the support of China, its longstanding ally, and to win over new supporters like the Soviet Union and its partners, ZANU focused its rhetoric on socialism and associated elements of both Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong's ideologies as a strategy. As Fay Chung argues, during the Cold War, this rhetoric brought guns, military training, and food assistance from these superpowers.[286] This would be done opportunistically and with forethought, since it was impossible to talk about Maoism if you wanted Soviet support – or to praise the Soviet policy if you wished for Chinese support, thus putting into question the sincerity of political belief. As Yousuf stated, to navigate the complexities and divisions of the Cold War and the Sino-Soviet rift and try to gain both Chinese and Soviet support, one could adopt FRELIMO's own strategy of non-alignment and neutrality.[287]

Like FRELIMO, ZANU and ZANLA were forced to adapt their strategy to obtain the additional military support for they need from diverse foreign backers. To achieve

[282]ZANU's leader declaration was published by Peking's official press. See "Mugabe visit Peking, denounces the Soviets", *WikiLeaks*, 21 June 1977.
[283]Ibid.
[284]Ibid.
[285]Ibid.
[286]Chung, *Re-living Chimurenga*, p. 175.
[287] Yousuf, "The OAU and the African Liberation Committee", p. 58.

this, they used socialist rhetoric to convince their audiences and attract support. For the liberation movements of southern Africa to garner military support to wage their struggle, military necessity was much more critical than the ideological lines, revealing, thus, the nature of solidarity developed by the liberation movements to mobilise their advance.

To help ZANU and ZANLA acquire new kinds of weapons and advanced military technical skills as demanded by needs on the battlefield, FRELIMO backed them among its own, as I will explore next.

FRELIMO's influence on ZANU's Alliances

As we have seen above, ZANU and the Mozambican political leadership's rhetoric and propaganda were informed by the geopolitical influence of the Cold War era, which was essential to garner military support. However, the compatibility of their military interest was powerful enough for both FRELIMO and ZANU to counter the divided Cold War spheres of influence and the Sino-Soviet conflict to the extent that Mozambique backed ZANU to get support from its own allies. Mozambique's support for ZANU took a new turn when FRELIMO decided to implement UN sanctions against Rhodesia and close its borders with Rhodesia on 3 March 1976, as mentioned above. Mozambique then started pressing for ZANU alliances within its own allies.[288] According to Vieira the decision to support ZANU's armed struggle, and to leave ZAPU aside, was very laborious and costly because the Soviet Union and Zambia, as well as Great Britain, and the United States, all for different reasons, preferred ZAPU over ZANU.[289]

In 1978, Machel attempted to bring ZANU closer to the Soviet Union by sending Marcelino dos Santos to Moscow to request weapons for ZANU. President Leonid Brezhnev refused to receive Dos Santos.[290] According to Vieira the Soviet "hatred" of ZANU for being an ally of China was so strong that it transferred its first Ambassador in

[288]Two months after this decision, at an interview to *Southern Africa* magazine, Samora Machel explained that the border was closed to Rhodesians and not for the Zimbabwean Freedom fighters see "Mozambique, FRELIMO explains December Uprising", *Southern Africa*, 9, 5, May 1976.
[289]Vieira, *Participei*, p. 426.
[290]Keith Somerville, "The Soviet Union, and Zimbabwe: Liberation Struggle and After", in Craig Nation and Mark Kauppi (eds), *The Soviet Impact in Africa* (Lexington: Lexington books, 1984), pp.200-201.

Mozambique, Piotr Yevsukov, because he had allegedly sent reports to Moscow that did not match the "official truth" that the Soviet Union had on ZANU, and for having met Mugabe in Maputo.[291]

Within the Frontline States, Machel also faced some backlash for backing ZANU. In January 1978, a Soviet delegation led by L.F. Ilyichev was sent to visit Tanzania, Zambia, Mozambique, and Angola. This visit aimed to discuss the contours of the Patriotic Front unification, and in a meeting with Ilyichev, the Zambian president, Kenneth Kaunda, reacted negatively to the idea defended by Nyerere and Machel of rendering assistance for both ZAPU and ZANU. He said it would aggravate the stormy relationships between the two Zimbabwean liberation movements on the battlefield. Kaunda expressed his commitment to continuing to support only ZAPU and urged the Soviets to remove what he called "Nyerere's negative influence on Machel" of insisting on extending the Soviet assistance already given to ZAPU to ZANU.[292]

In 1979, the General Secretary of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED), Erich Honecker, accompanied by the chairman of the State Council, Willi Stoph, and Chief of International Relations, Herman Axen, visited Mozambique.[293] President Machel tried one more time to bring ZANU closer to the socialist countries of Europe. He set up a meeting between Mugabe and the GDR entourage. However, before the meeting Herman Axen submitted a proposal for a joint statement condemning Chinese politics. ZANU saw this as a threat and declined to sign the proposal; consequently the meeting with the GDR's top delegation was cancelled.[294] Vieira remembers receiving a phone call from Klaus Willerding later that night, explaining that before the Axen and Mugabe meeting, the GDR delegation contacted Peter Ilitchev, the Soviet Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, who imposed the condition that for ZANU to receive support from the European socialist countries, it must first condemn and abandon Chinese support.[295] Mutambara substantiated Vieira's report on Soviet and GDR conditionality. However, he adds that the Soviet Union, through the GDR, had approached ZANU because they

[291] Vieira, *Participei*, p.591.
[292] "Report on Soviet Delegation to Tanzania, Zambia, Mozambique and Angola", *Digital Archive*, February 1978.
[293]Erich Honecker visited Mozambique from 22-24 February 1979 under the invitation of President Samora Machel. See "O Tratado", *Tempo*, 438, 25 February 1979.
[294]Vieira, *Participei*, p. 596-597.
[295]Ibid.

realized "that ZANU was the Party that bore the main brunt of the armed struggle in Zimbabwe."[296] This claim may seem unlikely to be true since ZIPRA forces, besides being trained by the Cubans and Angolans, were also trained by the USSR in semi-conventional warfare and equipped with sophisticated weaponry to deal with the Rhodesian forces in the operational front.[297] ZANLA commanders complained that, although they deployed many soldiers in the active areas (around 3000), their military forces were not as well trained and equipped as those with sophisticated Soviet training.[298] As explored above, the only way ZANU got access to Soviet weaponry was through its existing recipients in the region. For ZANU, it would be more convenient to get the arms directly from the source rather than through intermediaries like Ethiopia, Mozambique, and the other Frontline States, who acted as funnels of Soviet arms and training to ZANLA.

Mozambique's support of ZANU was also shaped by fears of attracting international military action against Mozambican territory from Rhodesian and South Africa. Although Machel assumed the ongoing presence of ZANU in Mozambique, he took some time to admit that ZANLA had established military bases inside Mozambique. In an interview with *Southern Africa* in January 1977, Machel stated that Mozambique was only hosting refugees in Mozambique and not a permanent ZANLA presence: "ZANLA is only using Mozambique as a transit point to Rhodesia", he affirmed.[299] Machel only admitted the existence of ZANLA's training camps in Mozambique after Rhodesian spies discovered the presence of these bases and Rhodesian forces started to attack Mozambique.[300] The devastating bombing raids against Mozambique and ZANLA bases show that the Rhodesians knew about them, even if Machel tried to hide them.

Machel was also uncomfortable with the idea proposed by the Cuban Minister of Foreign Affairs, Raul Valdez, when he visited Mozambique in 1978, of creating a Zimbabwean government in exile in Mozambique. Fearing a military backlash from Rhodesia and its hostile neighbour South Africa, Machel was reluctant to accept the

[296] Mutambara, *The Rebel,* p. 217.
[297] Alexander, McGregor, "Adelante", pp. 647-648. See also, "Rhodesia: The parties to the disputes", 16 September 1977. In intelligence Memorandum prepared to the Central Intelligence agency, available at Office of The Historian, US Department of State.
[298] Ibid.
[299] "Interview with President Machel", *Southern Africa*, 10,9,11 January 1977.
[300] "Rhodesian attacks Escalated in Mozambique", *Southern Africa*,10,2. March 1977.

proposal.[301] According to Matsinha and Vieira, such a proposal was discussed earlier by the Frontline States, but it had not materialised for many reasons. First was Machel's discomfort at hosting a Zimbabwean government from Mozambique because of the danger of provoking a Rhodesian attack. Secondly, there was a lack of agreement between ZAPU and ZANU leaders, with Nkomo demanding that to be the President, while Mugabe would keep the Foreign Affairs portfolio. The leaders could not reach an agreement. Moreover, the Frontline leaders were worried about losing support from Britain, which had shown an interest in supporting Zimbabwean independence by implementing sanctions against Rhodesia.[302]

Military self-interest shaped and moulded the nature of solidarity between Mozambique as a host country and the ZANU liberation movement. FRELIMO even pushed for ZANU and ZANLA alliances among its allies to get Soviet heavier weapons and advanced military skills. However, this had to be done carefully so as not to attract international hostility which could undermine FRELIMO's relations with its allies. Even though the ZANU's diplomatic flexibility of discourse sometimes failed, FRELIMO (and other ZANU allies like Ethiopia) managed to alleviate the ZANU's need for powerful Soviet weapons and military training. These processes reveal again the strategies and stances used by liberation movements and host states to overcome ideological divisions and conflicts and satisfy their military goals – demonstrating the nature of solidarity forged between liberation movements and their hosts; the military imperative to overthrow colonial regimes was much more important than the ideological conflicts of Cold War.

Conclusion

This chapter explored how ZANU and FRELIMO managed to garner military aid from a constellation of supporters, revealing how far the ideological differences of the Cold War

[301] Interview, Matsinha; Vieira, *Participei*, p.632.
[302] Ibid.

era and the Sino-Soviet rift were significant in the search for international and regional aid. The method of non-alignment adopted by FRELIMO, and the lack of a credible competing Mozambican liberation movement along with diplomatic skill, permitted it, exceptionally among liberation movements, to navigate between the different powers and consequently to gain support from countries that were antagonistic to each other. ZANU, in contrast, was an outcast movement whose status had made survival difficult. It was regarded by the 'authentic' Southern African liberation movements (including, at first, FRELIMO) as a splinter movement, earning it condemnation not only from those Southern African liberation movements who were allied to its 'authentic' rival ZAPU but also from the Soviet Union and its eastern bloc allies.

FRELIMO and ZANU had not initially been allies. FRELIMO was forced by circumstance to work with ZANU because it needed guerrilla action inside Rhodesia as a way of pushing back against the Rhodesian strategy of joining forces with the Portuguese and bombing FRELIMO during its armed struggle. The relationship was at first opportunistic and instrumental. Though FRELIMO and ZANU were caught up in significant Cold War divisions and the Sino-Soviet split, which put them on antagonistic sides, their developing cooperation demonstrated that the liberation movements themselves could adopt means of achieving solidarity independent from these geopolitical competitions – mainly because of shared military interests based on furthering the movements' armed struggles.

After Mozambique's independence, FRELIMO strengthened its alliance with ZANU and hosted it in Mozambique, allowing the coordination of military operations from its territory. Machel also started to advocate the ZANU alliance among FRELIMO's allies. Both FRELIMO and ZANU made political and military decisions opportunistically. Both tried to win additional foreign backers from a different ideological camp as their respective wars changed and needed new military support. ZANU and FRELIMO need heavier weaponry and tech skills only available via the USSR and its allies, forcing them to change their strategy.

FRELIMO established a 'framework' in which ZANU had to operate in Mozambique so as not to offend its international supporters; ZANU accepted these controls and conditions while finding ways to evade them and exercise independence,

circumventing the rules imposed by its host without, however, affecting its survival. ZANU's diplomatic political discourse and posture reveals the critical stances and manoeuvres that the liberation movements operating in exile used to manage their internal affairs while avoiding undermining the solidarity between them and their hosts. In so doing, ZANU strengthened its alliance with FRELIMO to the extent that Machel put FPLM soldiers to fight alongside ZANLA in Mozambique and inside Rhodesia, as we will explore in the next chapter.

Chapter II

Liberation Movements and Military Solidarities: The Establishment of Refugee Camps, ZANLA Training Camps, and the Battlefield Solidarities between FRELIMO and ZANU

> *The enemy came to attack us at our house, claiming that he was coming after the Zimbabwean fighters. We said: Let's chase the thief who breaks into our home; Ian Smith invited us to join the fight in Zimbabwe. So, we accepted the invitation.*
>
> Samora Machel, 23 December 1979.[303]

Introduction

This chapter explores the contexts and the mechanisms through which FRELIMO militarily supported ZANU's armed liberation struggle after it formed the government of newly independent Mozambique in June 1975. Soon after the proclamation of Mozambique's independence, the new government strengthened the relationship it had developed with ZANU during the liberation struggle on the Tete Front. FRELIMO and ZANU's relationship started during the late '60s and early '70s while they were still liberation movements. As explored in Chapter I, this relationship was built on the military self-interests of the two liberation movements. After independence, the nature of the solidarity changed from that of liberation movement to liberation movement to that of host state to liberation movement. However, even though military demands still motivated the relationship, it now functioned within a "Politics Machine", meaning that FRELIMO, now a party that was governing an independent country, had state power to define and control the ZANU framework of operations in Mozambique.

Mozambique's independence started a process of much more direct and powerful support of the Zimbabwean liberation struggle by allowing the transfer of ZANU headquarters from Zambia to Mozambique and allowing the establishment of Zimbabwean refugee camps and military camps for the Zimbabwean African National

[303]Samora Machel, *A Victória do Povo do Zimbabwe é Fruto da Luta Armada, da Unidade, e do Internacionalismo*, (Maputo: Partido FRELIMO, 1979). P.14.

Liberation Army (ZANLA) on Mozambican soil. FRELIMO's military solidarity with ZANU reached its high point when the Mozambican authorities sent FRELIMO soldiers to fight side by side with ZANLA inside Rhodesia. This high point was reached in three phases. First, in 1976 the *Forças Populares de Liberatação de Moçambique* (Mozambican People's Liberation Forces, FPLM) soldiers entered Zimbabwe to undertake sabotage missions against economic targets. The second phase was from 1977 to 1978, when FPLM soldiers were sent to accompany ZANLA soldiers inside Rhodesia and participated in battles for short periods. The final step came in 1979, when larger numbers of FPLM soldiers were sent for longer periods to Rhodesia to fight alongside ZANLA. In a speech on 21 December 1979, celebrating the Lancaster House agreement signed in London that brought an end to the war, Samora Machel stated that some 500 FPLM soldiers had been sent to Rhodesia in different phases of the war. As he pointed out, the deaths of 24 of these FPLM soldiers on Zimbabwean soil meant that "the blood of Zimbabweans was mixed with Mozambican blood".[304]

Existing literature on the creation of military cooperation between liberation movements, explored in the introduction, suggests that shared interests and common identity drove military alliance and collaboration between liberation movements. Vilho Shigwedha, for example, explores how a similar political perspective and the similar ethics of the Southwest Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO) and the *União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola* (National Union for Total Independence of Angola, UNITA) were vital in the shaping of military cooperation. According to him, the fact that the majority of the leadership and soldiers of SWAPO and UNITA came from the Imbundu and Aawambo ethnic groups in Angola and Namibia, which share common clans, similar languages and cultural traditions, facilitated the alliance between the two movements.[305] Indeed, both movements shared the a focus on liberating and providing a better life for rural people.[306] The same aspect was argued by Rendani Moses Ralinala, Jabulani Sithole, Gregory Houston and Bernard Magubane, who analysed how facing the same enemy on the battlefield and sharing the same nationalist project was significant in

[304] Ibid. See also "Comício na Praça da Independência em Apoio a Frente Patriótica pela Assinatura dos Acordos de Lancaster House", *Rádio Moçambique Archive*, 23 November 1979.
[305] Vilho Shigwedha, "The relation between Unita and SWAPO: Allies and Adversaries", *Journal of Southern African Studies* 4,6, (2014).
[306] Shigwedha, "The relation between Unita and SWAPO: Allies and Adversaries".

the alliance between uMkhonto weSizwe (MK), and Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) during the Sipolilo and Wankie campaigns that took place in the later 1960s.[307]

This chapter aims to explore the joint military alliance of liberation movements by looking at FRELIMO-ZANU military cooperation. Specifically, it seeks to understand what happened when the ideological influence of the Cold War, military cooperation and the tensions created in exile, as well as the different "military cultures" produced in training camps in other parts of the world (as explored in Chapter I), were taken to the battlefield. In particular, the chapter investigates the form and characteristics of solidarity acquired at the grassroots level by the rank-and-file soldiers. I contend that the multitude of military training processes and ideologies, battlefield differences and historical experiences of war, such as the different terrain, infrastructure, and military strength of the enemy in Mozambique in comparison to Rhodesia, as well as the source and supply of food, were central to the frictions between FPLM soldiers and ZANLA. However, these had a minimal impact on the development of the war itself because rank-and-file soldiers worked out their differences and learned from each other, creating solidarity while fighting and making adaptations to the demands of war.

Building on oral testimonies and political memoirs of Zimbabwean and Mozambican war veterans, the chapter begins by exploring how the Zimbabwean refugee camps and guerrilla bases were established inside Mozambique. It is essential to examine the creation of these sites to understand how the nature of solidarity between FRELIMO and ZANU began to work after Mozambique’s independence when the new Mozambican state needed to control the presence of Zimbabweans inside its territory and delimit the spaces from which ZANU and ZANLA could operate. This control and delimitation was vital to FRELIMO in protecting and consolidating its nascent administration and guaranteeing its territory and sovereignty. It was also essential to ZANU because it gained space to control sites where it could establish its particular political project and military culture. The chapter then looks at how Mozambique protected its border against Rhodesian military incursions while covering the entry and exit of ZANLA fighters.

[307] Rendani Moses Ralinala, Jabulani Sithole, Gregory Houston and Bernard Magubane, “The Wankie and Sipolilo Campaigns”, Chapter 12, in SADET (eds), *The Road to Democracy in South Africa*, vol.1, 1960-1970 (Zebra Press: Cape Town, 2004).

Finally, it analyses the sending of Mozambican soldiers to fight alongside ZANLA inside Rhodesia. It discusses precisely how the differences in military training of ZANU and FRELIMO soldiers played out in joint military operations.

The independence of Mozambique and the exodus of Zimbabweans

Solidarity between FRELIMO and ZANU initially emerged while both were still liberation movements in the late 1960s. From 1971, FRELIMO hosted ZANU guerrillas on the Tete Front, enabling them to cross the border into Rhodesia to mobilise support from civilians and to transport weapons. ZANLA soldiers also participated alongside FRELIMO soldiers in the military operations against Portuguese and Rhodesian forces in the Tete Front. With Mozambique's independence, the nature of the solidarity changed from that among liberation movements to that between a liberation movement in power and a liberation movement it hosts. In this new phase, FRELIMO, as the governing party of a new country, controlled a national space where it could host ZANU and allow it to undertake operations from its territory. Although the shared military interests of trying to get rid of the Rhodesian military played out in this relationship, the nature of solidarity between FRELIMO and ZANU evolved with caution and contingency from 1975. FRELIMO needed to control its territory's sovereignty, guard its territorial integrity, and avoid hostile international condemnation. This new turn in the nature of solidarity is relevant to our understanding of military solidarities and cultures and reveals how it changed according to the circumstances and the interests of the moment.

Mozambique's independence in 1975 and its position as Rhodesia's neighbour were vital to ZANU's liberation struggle. Independence opened up 800 miles of frontier, allowing ZANU to launch new offensives in Rhodesia's eastern and southern areas.[308] It also facilitated the exodus of Zimbabweans to join the liberation struggle, mainly young people who dropped out of schools. However, the influx of Zimbabwean refugees caught the Mozambican authorities by surprise; the country was still dealing with urgent issues relating to the birth of the new nation, notably establishing its authority over the territory.

[308] "The War is here, everywhere: an interview with Josiah Tongogara", *Zimbabwe News*, 10,3 (May-June 1978).

As a result, Zimbabwean arrivals received little information about where to go, what to do, or where to find logistical supplies.[309] Mateus Kida, a FRELIMO soldier who was sent to Manica Province in May 1975 as Vice-Commander (in 1976, he rose to Commander) of the FPLM's third battalion and simultaneously as Political Commissar, states that before the proclamation of independence on 25 June 1975, FRELIMO had no plan to cope with the increasing number of Zimbabweans crossing into Mozambique.[310]

To guarantee its integrity and fearing Rhodesian attacks on its territory, the Mozambican authorities established a military border force in 1975 as a defensive measure in the border provinces of Gaza, Manica, and Tete. Initially, most of this force comprised FRELIMO cadres known as *Nova-Vida*, who were trained in conventional warfare in Zambia in 1974 by Zambian instructors with the intention that they would make up a regular army after independence.[311] Kida points out that FRELIMO was aware that, sooner or later, the Rhodesians would attack Mozambique — after all, they had joined forces with the Portuguese during FRELIMO's liberation struggle.[312] Suspicions increased when Rhodesian forces circulated in Penhalonga, Rutanda, Chionde, and Espungabera in Manicaland Province across the border in Rhodesia.[313] Suspicions turned into reality on 9 October 1975 when a Rhodesian unit carrying out a patrol in the border areas clashed with Mozambican soldiers, resulting in the death of one Rhodesian, according to the Rhodesian government report on the incident.[314]

The influx of Zimbabweans intensified the fear of Rhodesian attacks. As a result, the Mozambican authorities took security measures to prevent Rhodesian spies infiltrating the country disguised as refugees. The military force stationed at the border areas began to screen those crossing the border. FRELIMO authorised the military to search the luggage of people in convoys and cars coming from Rhodesia to Mozambique,

[309]Zyakanyorwa Sadomba, *War Veterans in Zimbabwe's Revolution: Challenging Neo-colonialism and Settler and International Capital* (Harare: Weaver Press, 2011), p.26.
[310] Interview, Mateus Kida, Maputo, 22 March 2022.
[311] Interview, Alexandre Jonasse (Matucurai), Maputo, 25 November 2020. See also João Paulo Borges Coelho, Adriano Malache and Paulino Macaringue, "Profound Transformations and Conflagrations: The History of Mozambique's Armed Forces from 1975-2005" in Martin Rupiya (ed), *Evolutions and Revolutions: A Contemporary History of Militaries in Southern Africa* (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2005), p.162.
[312] Ibid.
[313] Ibid.
[314] "First Rhodesian-FRELIMO clash reported", *WikiLeaks*, 15 October 1975.

looking for weapons.[315] With the closure of international trade through the frontier from March 1976, people from Rhodesia crossed only on foot. They were taken to holding camps established in the border areas where FRELIMO officials registered them, screened and then allocated them to newly established refugee camps at Junta Quarters in Chimoio (Manica) and Machazi (Chibabava in Sofala), a process overseen by the Ministry of the Interior.[316] The scrutiny usually took the form of questions relating to identity (name, age, area of origin), motivation for crossing the border, educational level and professional qualifications, reasons for joining the guerrillas, and who recruited them or told them that Mozambique was taking people for guerrilla training.[317] Agrippah Mutambara crossed the border into Mozambique in March 1975 before Mozambique's proclamation of independence. He recalls being imprisoned by Mozambican authorities and sent back to Rhodesia twice as a suspected spy before succeeding in joining the ZANLA guerrillas.[318] He joined a holding camp in July 1975 at Espungabera, a month after Mozambique proclaimed independence and was sent to the Machazi refugee camp in Chibabava. Mutambara narrated the process of his intensive interrogation by FRELIMO's intelligence soldiers:

> For three days, we underwent intensive interrogation to determine whether we had genuinely come to join the armed struggle or were agents sent by the Smith regime to infiltrate the liberation movement…we spent the days and nights in the huts, not as prisoners, but not free to go out of our own volition. Even to go to the toilet, we had to be escorted.[319]

Brain Mafondokozi crossed the border into Mozambique with seven friends in 1976, after dropping out of secondary school in Nyanga, Manica province. He was also subjected to intensive security vetting:

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[315] Berta Mungau was one of FRELIMO's soldiers who performed these duties in Manica Province: interview, Berta Mungau, Chimoio, 24 May 2021.
[316]Ministério do Interior, "Experiência de Organização dos Campos dos Refugiados", February 1978.
[317] Agrippa Mutambara, *The Rebel in Me: A ZANLA Guerrilla Commander in the Rhodesian Bush War, 1974-1980* (Solihull, UK: Helion, 2014), p. 48; Interviews: Brain Mafondokozi, Harare, 19 September 2022; Fastmove, Harare, 17 September 2022; Ruramai Maraire, Harare, 17 September 2022; Chimurenga I, Harare, 18 September 2022; Chimurenga II, Harare, 18 September 2022.
[318] Mutambara, *The Rebel in Me,* p. 28-60.
[319] Ibid.

> After crossing the border, we stopped to eat the bread and meat we had brought from Zimbabwe. After some time, the *Guarda Fronteira* [Border Security] approached and took us to the FRELIMO garrison near the border. We were well received; they gave us food. It was the first time I ate *macaroni* and *sardinha* (pasta and tiny sardines). I enjoyed it so much. After being fed, we were questioned by Mozambican soldiers who were suspicious that we were Rhodesian spies as we were travelling with money in our pockets. The interrogation took two days, with threats of being killed if we did not confess our mission in Mozambique. I argued that we ran away from Rhodesia with the money to pay school fees. Then, the soldier investigating us concluded that we were refugees and sent us to Catandica, where Zimbabweans crossing the border to Mozambique were concentrated before being sent to the refugee camps.[320]

The increasing number of refugees and the security threat they brought led the Mozambican authorities to establish refugee camps to control their movement and channel them into militarized spaces over which ZANLA had authority. It was essential to avoid military attacks from the Rhodesians and to delimit the places where ZANU and ZANLA were operating inside Mozambique territory.

When the Zimbabweans started crossing the border in large numbers in 1975, they were housed in the Junta area of Chimoio city. However, because of the threat they posed to the city as a target for Rhodesian bombing, in early 1976 the refugees were relocated to the newly created Nyadzonia refugee camp in a rural area far from densely populated areas.[321] Two other refugee camps, Mavudzi in Tete province and Machazi in Sofala Province, were set up in late 1975. As the number of Zimbabweans increased, along with frequent bombing attacks from the Rhodesian forces, further refugee camps were created. One was built in Sofala province, named Toronga. ZANU sources stated that this camp accommodated around 12,000 by 1977.[322] Another, Matenje, was set up in Tete province in 1978 and housed 1,500. This camp was created for those formerly held at the Chindunduma camp in Gondola, which was bombed by Rhodesian forces in 1978.[323] Other camps were also closed, and people relocated after Rhodesian bombing. Nyadzonia was bombed on 9 August 1976 killing some 600 people. The survivors were moved to Doroi, Mozambique's largest such camp.[324]

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[320]Interview, Brain Mafondokozi.
[321]Interview, Kida.
[322] "Comrade Mugabe Appeal to all Progressive Mankind", *Zimbabwe News*, 9, 5/6, (July-December 1977).
[323] Fay Chung, *Re-living the Second Chimurenga: Memories from Zimbabwe's Liberation Struggle* (Harare: Weaver Press, 2007).
[324] "Conferência de Imprensa com Hugo Idoyoga sobre o massacre de Inhazonia", *Rádio Moçambique*, 21 August 1976. I will discuss the Zimbabwean refugee camps' features in detail in Chapter IV.

The following map illustrates the sites where the Zimbabwean refugee camps were settled inside Mozambique territory:



Figure 2: Map of Zimbabwean Refugee camps
Credits: Filoca Fondo Bila, IESE, 2024

From 1975 to 1980, the influx of Zimbabweans into Mozambique grew exponentially according to UNHCR data. Mozambique hosted the largest number of refugees in the region.[325] The number of Zimbabwean refugees doubled from 14,500 in 1975 to 30,000 in 1976. Two years later, the number reached 80,000, and by the end of the war in 1979 the number had grown to 120,000.[326] The United Nations Refugee Agency, UNHCR, reported that by 1980, during the repatriation period, the number of

[325]Nathaniel Powell, "The UNHCR and the Zimbabwean Refugees in Mozambique: 1975-1980," *Refugee Survey Quarterly*, 32,4, (2013), p.50.
[326] Ibid.

Zimbabwean refugees in Mozambique was 160,000.[327] These numbers included refugees hosted in the principal refugee camps and those accommodated at transit camps near the border with Rhodesia in Gaza, Tete and Manica provinces. The numbers need to be treated with some caution in the sense that ZANU exaggerated the numbers to increase the flow of aid from international donors and hide the military aspects of refugee camps.

Due to political obstacles and legal limitations, the UNHCR did not take direct responsibility for Zimbabwean refugees in Mozambique. Because the UN and other international organisations did not recognise Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence, Great Britain was still legally responsible for Rhodesian citizens.[328] Since the refugees were outside the direct mandate of the UN, ZANU established itself in the refugee camps and administered them in collaboration with Mozambican authorities. Thus, ZANU functioned as the main channel between UNHCR and other donors that provided humanitarian assistance to the refugees.[329] It gave ZANU power to administer the camps, control the movement of people, and manipulate the status of Zimbabweans living in Mozambique. In an appeal for aid to international donors in 1977, Robert Mugabe divided the Zimbabweans living in Mozambique into two categories. He stated that one group was constituted mainly of young people who crossed the border, "motivated by the desire of liberating Zimbabwe from the oppressive and inhuman conditions in Rhodesia, which constituted the liberation fighters, who were catered separately from other Zimbabweans". The second group were refugees hosted in refugee camps and small holding camps.[330] Mugabe claimed that this second group required the humanitarian assistance of UNHCR and other international organisations.[331] Besides being supplied with food, clothes, and other primary necessities, the refugees were also assisted with building materials, medicine, and books, since in addition to being equipped with dormitories the refugee camps offered essential social services such as schools and health clinics.[332]

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[327] Ibid. On the presence of refugees in Mozambique, see “Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees”, *UNHCR*, A/32/12, 02 September 1977; “Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees”, *UNHCR*, A/34/12, 24 September 1980.
[328] Powell, p. 42-47.
[329] Ibid.
[330] “Comrade Mugabe Appeal to all Progressive Mankind”.
[331]Ibid.
[332]Details on Refugee camps organisations see Chung, *Re-living the Second Chimurenga*, and Mutambara, *The Rebel in Me.*

This humanitarian support, channelled through ZANU, was also used to aid the war effort. To get support for its military needs, ZANU adapted its claims about refugees with deception and flexibility. Though ZANU leaders argued that the Zimbabweans living in the refugee camps were indeed refugees, these camps were used by ZANLA as its primary source of recruits, and ZANU ran the refugee camps on military lines.[333] The term 'refugee' was used to mislead the international community so that it would provide humanitarian assistance to this pool of potential recruits, showing the kind of manoeuvre that the liberation movement used to gain support for its armed struggle, even from organisations and institutions that did not support military actions.

ZANU also used its sites to develop its military culture. Everyone in refugee camps was required to undergo political classes and basic military training, though they used wooden guns so as not to compromise their status as refugees.[334] Special attention was given to young people under 17 who were sent to school until adulthood (when they reached 18), after which they would undergo military training.[335] However, some went at a younger age. Stanford Kavumbura crossed into Mozambique in September 1976 at the age of 15. He, along with 26 other young men all aged between 15 and 17, was recruited by ZANLA guerrillas. Most of these teenagers were sent to the Mavudzi refugee camp to pursue their studies but, because the ZANLA commanders considered Kavumbura to have "a bright mind in politics", he was sent to undergo political classes and military training at Tembwe I.[336] There, during the day, he did four months basic military training alongside female recruits, while at night he attended political classes. Then he was sent to Tembwe II for specialized training in field engineering and ballistic (high altitude) missiles. The specialized course took almost three months. Kavumbura was then deployed to Rhodesia in April 1977 at 16, where he was appointed assistant to the provincial commander of the ZANLA's Tete front, Chando Guvanizi.[337]

Zvakanyorwa Sadomba claimed that he and some friends under 17 refused to attend school and insisted on military training instead.[338] Although ZANU tried to control

[333] Sadomba, *War Veterans in Zimbabwe's Revolution*, p.23.
[334] See Sadomba, *War Veterans in Zimbabwe's Revolution*, p.1*;* Mutambara, *The Rebel in Me*, p.66.
[335]Ibid.
[336] Interview, Stanford Kavumbura, Harare, 19 September 2022.
[337] Ibid.
[338] Sadomba, *War Veterans in Zimbabwe's Revolution,* p.1.

the movement of people in the refugee camps and saw all residents in refugee camps as potential recruits to ZANLA, it had some limits. Not everyone was willing to take up arms. Chimurenga II, a woman who joined the ZANLA female detachment in 1978 after undergoing military training at Tembwe I, had fled Rhodesia due to the spreading war. She did not want to be a soldier but had no choice.[339] Chimurenga IV, who fled Rhodesia to avoid being recruited to the Rhodesian forces, claims to have also escaped from the Doroi refugee camp in 1977, in fear of hunger and the possibility of undergoing military training: "I did not want to fight because I knew that being a soldier meant being put in a dangerous situation every day. That was why I deserted from ZANU and stayed in the Mozambican community", he explained.[340] These reports demonstrate that despite ZANU's authority in the camps, some refugees escaped its control.

ZANU sought to control the tens of thousands of people in refugee camps to mould its future soldiers, start the process of creating a shared military culture and reinforce its authority using political education. ZANU required that all refugees undertake political classes in their camps. This constituted the first step toward military training. In the words of a ZANLA veteran, it was meant to "purify the mind before arming the body,"[341] introducing refugees to the reasons ZANU was fighting, ZANU's rules and discipline, and respect for the military and political hierarchies.[342] It included theory classes explaining the nature of Rhodesian colonisation and ZANU's military option, and included songs and slogans.[343] Basic military training in the refugee camps covered "individual tactics, surprise attacks, and the theory of guerrilla warfare",[344] using wooden guns to maintain the illusion of a refugee camp.[345] This was important because the UNHCR explicitly states that "refugee camps, sites and settlements must be protected from militarisation and the presence of combatants and fighters may not enter or stay in such sites even for short periods." ZANU was able to militarise in this fashion (with the

[339] Interview, Chimurenga II.
[340] After fleeing the refugee camp, Chimurenga IV stayed in Mozambique's local population, and constituted a family with a Mozambican woman from the Manica district. Interview, Chimurenga IV, Manica, 20 May 2021.
[341] Mutambara, *The Rebel in Me,* p.81.
[342] Ibid.
[343] Ibid.
[344] Sadomba, *War Veterans in Zimbabwe's Revolution*, p.28.
[345] Ibid.

exception of training with real guns) because of its direct control over the camps and FRELIMO's complicity in these practices.[346]

The new FRELIMO government sought to control the rapidly escalating movement of Zimbabweans into Mozambique after 1975 due to its fears of Rhodesian spies and attacks, alongside its desire to support ZANU's armed struggle. It established holding and refugee camps that concentrated people in particular places that ZANU could govern. The creation of holding camps and refugee camps reveals the relationship between FRELIMO and ZANU and international agencies in controlling Zimbabwean movements living in Mozambique. ZANU was able to use its direct control over these camps to establish its political authority over camp residents and to begin a process of militarizing them and creating a specific political and military culture. This nexus of institutional control fed into the establishment of ZANLA's military training camps.

The creation of ZANU military training bases in Mozambique

After the creation of the Zimbabwe People's Army, ZIPA, in November 1975, a merger of ZANU and ZAPU's armies in a military alliance (explored in Chapter I), the new FRELIMO government authorised new sites for guerrilla training inside Mozambique which would be at the heart of ZANLA's expanded war. If the creation of holding and refugees' camps permitted ZANU to set up a political project and military culture, the expansion of military training camps in Mozambique allowed it to develop a specific military identity and traditions as well as establish its political views of the war. This is critical to our understanding of how solidarity between ZANU and FRELIMO was fundamental in the creation of ZANLA's military culture. For this purpose, I first describe the location of the training camp sites and their capacity and physical conditions before turning to the conditions of the journey and the syllabus taught at the military camps. This enables us to explore the characteristics of the camps and their capacity as well as the kind of political views and military traditions created by ZANLA in these sites.

[346] Ibid.

The majority of ZANLA's military training camps were set up inside Mozambique and proved far more efficient than previous camps in Tanzania because of their geographical proximity to Rhodesia, which facilitated the recruitment of soldiers and their deployment to the operational front.[347] Mateus Kida functioned as the liaison between ZANLA Commander Rex Nhongo (who also served as ZIPA's Commander in 1975), and the FPLM Headquarters Chief, Marcos Mabote. Kida was also responsible for identifying the routes for ZANLA infiltration into and out of Rhodesia, organising the sites where ZANLA stored war material, as well as the areas designated for the settlement of Zimbabwean refugees and military training bases. Kida stated that seven ZANLA training camps were created inside Mozambique.[348] Two military bases were set up at the Chimoio headquarters, where ZANLA managed all operations. Takawira Base I had a capacity of around two hundred recruits. It was first named Mapinduzi Base after the ship transporting ZANLA-trained soldiers from Tanzania to Mozambique.[349] Until 1977 Takawira Base I functioned as the principal military training camp, and it was there that ZANLA recruits did basic military training and specialised courses. From 1977, when another base, Takawira Base II, was opened on the same site, Takawira I was used only for specialised courses. Cadres sent to Takawira I had already experienced fighting in operational areas or had undergone basic guerrilla training. The specialised courses covered engineering, anti-aircraft guns, heavy machine guns, 60mm infantry mortars, and recoilless anti-tank rocket launchers known as bazookas. Takawira Base II, in turn, held thousands of recruits at a time, particularly those undergoing basic training in guerrilla warfare usually with light weapons.[350]

There were also two military bases in Tete province: Tembwe I and Tembwe II. In 1976, Tembwe I functioned as the primary training camp. After finishing training, soldiers were transferred to Sabondo Base, 15 km away in the middle of a game reserve,

[347] On PAC sharing military camp with ZANU see Gregory Houston, Thami Ka Plaatje and Thozama April, "Military Training and camps of the Pan Africanist Congress of South Africa, 1961-1981", *Historia*, 60, 2, (2015).
[348] Interview, Mateus Kida. On Kida's duties see: Renato Matusse, *Mateus Óscar Kida: Na Sua voz e na dos Seus Camaradas* (Maputo: Ceidima, 2018), p.156. Mateus Kida states that Rex Nhongo had to go to his office daily to brief him on all the operations of the guerrillas inside Rhodesia and the situation of those staying and training in Mozambique. Kida, in turn, passed all this information on to Sebastião Mabote, the FPLM headquarters chief, every day before 8 am.
[349]Mutambara, *The Rebel in Me*, p.70.
[350] Sadomba, *War Veterans in Zimbabwe's Revolution*, p. 75-128.

where they were sent to strengthen their bodies. This process of 'building up the body' of the recruits was considered fundamental to engaging Rhodesian forces. Food shortages were common in refugee camps and at Tembwe I recruits were submitted to starvation rations. In contrast, according to ZANLA veteran Mutambara, Sabondo military camp was intended to increase the rations, especially animal protein, so that the skeletal bodies of the recruits would gain endurance and muscle mass.[351] From 1977 onwards, according to ZANLA veterans I interviewed, the main Tembwe camp was renamed Tembwe I and used for women recruits. Sabondo was renamed Tembwe II and started functioning as the men's military base.[352]

Besides the two military training bases at Chimoio Headquarters, there were three other military bases in Manica provinces: Pungwe III, Ossibissa and Chindunduma. Pungwe III hosted thousands of recruits and, like other ZANLA camps, was far from populated areas.[353] Ossibissa base, named after the Ghanaian pop music group, was designed to train women, who underwent arduous military training and physical hardship, according to Fay Chung.[354] Unlike training camps placed in remote and densely forested areas, Chindunduma Base was in Gondola, just 3.5 km from Chimoio headquarters. As Zuma points out, because of its proximity to the city of Chimoio, it was possible to meet local people while recruits were doing 10 km running exercises.[355]

As with refugee camps, devastating Rhodesian bombing raids on ZANLA military bases meant some were closed and the recruits relocated over time. Tembwe I and II closed after being bombed on 23 November 1977; the recruits were allocated to Maroro camp, opened by the Mozambican government in January 1978.[356] Chimoio Headquarters was bombed from 26 to 28 November 1977; my sources are silent about the headquarters military bases. Owing to the lack of access to ZANU archives, it is also impossible to say whether the military bases of Pungwe III and Ossibissa were attacked by the Rhodesians.[357] Although Rhodesian Forces considered their attacks on ZANLA's sites as

[351] Mutambara, *The Rebel in Me* p.71.
[352] Interviews: Chivaradze Delicious, Harare, 19 September 2022; Tabitha, Harare, 23 September 2022.
[353] Chung, *Re-living the Second Chimurenga*, p.194.
[354] Chung, *Re-living the Second Chimurenga*, p.192.
[355] Interview, Zuma, Harare, 20 September 2022.
[356] Interview, Brian Mafondokodzi, 19 September 2022.
[357] ZANU sources, such as its official magazine *Zimbabwe News*, edited during the armed struggle, denied the existence of military bases in Mozambique. In an article published in *Zimbabwe News* in reaction to the Rhodesian Forces bombing raids at Tembwe camp and Chimoio Headquarters on 23 and 26 November

successful, this did not prevent ZANLA from restarting their operation against targets in Rhodesia.[358]

In addition to military camps, FRELIMO established small garrisons at transit camps in Mapai, Chingondzi, and Espungabera to support expanded ZANLA military operations. From these camps, ZANLA soldiers received war material and waited to be deployed to the operational front.[359]The Mozambican government also opened clandestine corridors to facilitate the movement of soldiers from the military bases to the interior of Zimbabwe, and sent trucks to transport the ZANLA fighters from the training bases to the transit camps in the border areas.[360] It also established main entrance and exit points in Gaza province, in Massegena district (Mavué and Chitanga) and Chicualacuala in Pafuri (Muenze River). The exit and entrance points in Manica were at Catandica, Mavonde, Machipanda, Changuro, Rotanda, Guro and Espungabera. In Tete, they were at Zumbo, Mucumbura, Luia and Chioca.[361]At the same time, they supplied Zimbabwean fighters with weapons and other military materials.[362] Carlos Macacho, a Mozambican soldier, remembers transporting war material donated by FRELIMO from the Chingondzi quarter in Tete to the ZANLA military camps at Tembwe.[363] The material consisted mainly of AKMs, explosives, mines, and mortars.[364] Between 1976 and 1977, he transported ZANLA war materials that came from overseas from the port at Beira to Mapai.[365] There were also places in the border areas called *matize*, where ZANLA hid weapons so that a guerrilla operating in Rhodesia could get weapons quickly in an emergency.[366]

1977, respectively, Robert Mugabe claimed that those sites were civilian centres where people were "engaging in self-reliance projects such as education, agriculture, poultry, piggery and health". He went on to say that “there were no military training camps in Mozambique territory whatsoever; they were established in Zimbabwe territory where ZANLA fighters were engaging the Rhodesian forces in the operational areas”. Mozambican authorities also hid the existence of ZANLA military training camps. See Robert Mugabe, “Smith’s Massacre Primitive and Savage”, *Zimbabwe News*, 9, 5, July-Dec 1977

[358] Henrik Ellert, *Rhodesian Front War: Counter- insurgency and guerrilla warfare, 1962-1980* (Harare: Mambo Press, 1989), p.47. The Rhodesian raids on Chimoio and Tembwe are detailed in: Barbara Cole, *The Elite: the story of the Rhodesian Special Air Service* (Amanzimtoti: Three Knights,1985).

[359]Interview, Kida.

[360] Mutambara, *The Rebel in Me*, p. 110.

[361] Estado Maior General das Forças Armadas de Moçambique, ‘Pontos Fundamentais sobre a Situação Inimiga e das Nossas Forças’, official report, 4 March 1977, cited in Omar Saranga, ‘Internacionalismo Militante de Moçambique: Estudo de Caso Contribuição das FPLM para a Libertação do Zimbabwe (1975–1980), Licenciatura dissertation, Universidade Eduardo Mondlane, 2005, p. 61.

[362]Ibid.

[363]Ibid.

[364] Interview, Castro Macacho, Changara, 1 June 2021

[365] Ibid.

[366] Interviews: Chimurenga I; Wilson Tope, Tete, 28 May 2021.

The following map illustrating the places where the Military training camps and garrisons were set up in Mozambique:



Map. 3: ZANLA military training camps and small garrisons established inside Mozambique

Credit: Filoca Fondo Bila, IESE, 2024

The movement of material and soldiers, supported by FRELIMO, was important. Transport of material to the front was also made by ZANLA women's detachments.[367] Esther Matsiwo, a Zimbabwean war veteran who crossed the border to Mozambique in May 1975 to stay with her aunt and then decided to join the struggle, recalls how the carrying war material from Mapai to the Gaza front inside Rhodesia worked. As she states, in Gaza sector the assignment was given to two platoons of women, composed of 25-30 soldiers. They carried material to the Gonarezhou area on a trip that could take a week travelling by foot. While one group performed this duty, the other rested.[368] Mozambique also functioned as the rear base for ZANLA soldiers fighting inside Rhodesia, who might cross the border to relax or fetch more military material. All these strategies fed the logistics of war, making ZANLA far more effective than it had been before Mozambican independence. The new government's support and control over territory allowed ZANLA to fight a new kind of war and create a new military culture, which we will discuss in the next section.

ZANLA's military training and the production of the army culture

The first encounter with the idea of being soldier was made in the journey to the training camps. Zimbabwean refugees waited in the Mozambican refugee camps until being selected to go to military training. The day of the selection was a surprise; nor did the recruit know the name of the base at which training would done. The process started with the abrupt, shrill sound of a whistle and the concentration of refugees on the parade ground. Then, the camp commander would call out names and tell them to climb into FRELIMO's trucks without explanation. The journey to the base was an unnerving process shrouded in secrecy and looms large in the memories of the ZANLA veterans I interviewed. At that stage, they still did not know whether they were being transferred to another refugee camp or going to engage in military training in Mozambique or elsewhere.[369]

[367] Josephine Nhongo-Simbanegavi, *For better or worse? Women and ZANLA in Zimbabwe's Liberation Struggle* (Harare: Weaver Press, 2000).
[368] Interviews: Esther Matsiwo, Harare, 20 September 202; Chimurenga II.
[369] Interviews: Chimurenga III, Samora Machel; Bandza.

Such journeys were often completed at night and over long distances through dense forests. Agrippah Mutambara remembers his feeling of anxiety as he was transferred from Nyadzonia refugee camp to Tembwe military training camp in 1976. He described the journey as long and frightening.[370] They had two stops before getting to Tembwe. The first break took one and a half hours to have lunch at a FRELIMO garrison. He recalls that each of the recruits was given three "*pau*" (meaning *pão* or bread rolls) and juice. The second stop occurred some hours later at a FRELIMO garrison in Tete. Here, the truck refueled. Then they drove for two more hours in the middle of the night through dense forests, in silence and without a sign of life, until they were stopped at a roadblock by soldiers holding machine guns, who scanned the whole convoy. They also stopped at booms that restricted their passage, where armed guards checked the trucks and asked for papers from the driver. Mutambara recalled:

> The engine and the lights of all our vehicles were turned off, and my eyes began to adjust to the new light conditions; I was surprised to see we were in the middle of a camp … I started wondering whether we had come to [a] FRELIMO camp. But when the officials, all armed with automatic rifles and not wooden replicas used in the refugee camps, addressed us in Shona with a distinct Zimbabwean accent, my doubts were put to rest, and so were the anxieties I had that we were being moved to yet another refugee camp.[371]

This is the scene described by almost all Zimbabwean war veterans I interviewed. They vividly remember their transfer from refugee camps to military training camps as a crucial moment in their lives; it is marked in their memories and memoirs as the ritual passage from recruit to soldier. They also highlighted the secrecy and surveillance of the journey, the scrutiny they were subjected to, and the stops required while entering the training grounds so that guards could scan the convoy of trucks transporting them. The secrecy of the journeys was intended to prevent the recruits from knowing their whereabouts. ZANU believed that secret transportation at night would prevent spies disguised as recruits from informing the Rhodesians about travel dates and routes.[372]

While the journey to the military training bases was veiled in secrecy, the training the recruits had was described by the ZANLA veterans I interviewed as wretched and

[370] Mutambara, *The Rebel in Me,* p.81-91.
[371] Mutambara, *The Rebel in Me,* p.81-91.
[372] Interview, Christopher Mutsvangwa, Harare, 22 September 2022.

harsh. On their arrival, the recruits were distributed in garrisons and started engaging in military drill. Life in ZANU's military base started early, around 4am, with the sound of whistles and the assembly of the recruits in the parade, and ended late, at about 10pm. The recruits underwent military drilling and exercise in harsh conditions in the morning. The day started with the *Toyi Toyi*, which could be done over 10 or 15 km.[373] ZANLA veterans I interviewed held that during the first week, when the soldiers participated in the drills for the first time, running 10 km was exhausting. Some would fall along the way, they would be shouted at and beaten by the instructors. Corporal punishment was used to instil a system of subordination and discipline.[374] There was also bullying from peers, who began to laugh and make fun of the weak.[375]

In a normal day, after the *Toyi Toyi*, soldiers would carry out domestic duties, such as collecting firewood, cleaning the camp, cooking, and cleaning their weapons. Then, after breakfast (if they had access to it), recruits usually performed marching drills and learned military strategies and techniques.[376] The latter began with lying on the ground with the whole body, using the left arm and the right foot while moving from one position to another, and crawling. Mutambara says that repeating this process "for a long-distance and time on rough terrain was a harrowing and punishing experience".[377]

The training syllabus used in ZANLA military bases encompassed political orientation that focused on the people's grievances, ZANU philosophy and the purpose of the armed struggle, a course which lasted four weeks. For seven weeks, the trainees were introduced to the use of weaponry. Then, the recruits had almost four weeks of field craft in which they learned individual and group actions and section formation. Eight weeks were devoted to specialised courses like engineering, demining, anti-aircraft artillery, recoilless rifles, and radio communication. There were also classes in the theory of guerrilla warfare with a Maoist orientation, which could last around three weeks. Then, the recruits were required to put theory into practice in the field. This took up the

[373] This jogging style was introduced by Algerians during the 60s and consisted of high-kneed runs accompanied by songs punctuated by exhale chants and calls and responses. See Jocelyn Alexander and JoAnn McGregor, "The travelling Toyi-Toyi: Soldiers and the Politics of Drill", *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 46,5 (2020).
[374] Interview, Chimurenga I. He used to be a ZANLA instructor at ZANU military training camps.
[375]See Mutambara, *The Rebel in Me,* p.63; Interviews: Augusto Muqueza, Moatize, 3 June 2021; Acácio Zerobay, Chimoio, 25 May 2021; Wilson Tope.
[376] Interviews: Chimurenga I; Chimurenga III; Zuma. See also Mutambara, *The Rebel in Me,* p.63-65.
[377]Ibid.

weekdays; weekends were reserved for resting; soldiers would perform cultural activities like singing *chimurenga* songs, dancing and theatre.[378] My interviewees held that all activities required strict obedience to the authorities, subordination, and discipline. People found breaking military order would be severely punished.[379] On average, the military training in Mozambican training camps lasted around six months and was labelled by the men I interviewed as training in guerrilla warfare, in the so-called Maoist idiom. There is some debate about the quality of ZANLA's military training. Luise White, for example, argues that the ZANLA soldiers' claim that they had been trained in guerrilla warfare was more theory than practice owing to the shortage of weapons. Weapons practice was restricted to reciting the components of guns instead of learning to use them.[380] In his memoir, Rhodesian soldier Keith Nell suggests he and his army mates realised that most of the ZANLA soldiers captured by them had no idea how to manage and use weapons.[381]

However, Zimbabwean War Veterans I interviewed denied that real weapons were missing from their training. According to them, after the first weeks, each recruit was issued with a real AK-47, which caused them a lot of excitement as, finally, wooden guns were replaced with real weapons. However, the management of these firearms required training. The first lesson was to master the weapons. Learning first of all the weapon's components, their characteristics, how to do maintenance, disassemble and reassemble, and how to handle the weapons so as not to cause accidental injuries and death.[382] Only after this were shooting skills introduced. According to Mutambara, who trained at Tembwe and worked as a military instructor at ZANU headquarters in Chimoio, ZANLA instructors dealt in detail with two particular shooting techniques. One was to shoot at stationary targets from a prone, kneeling or standing position, and the other was to shoot at a moving target.[383] Besides shooting practice and the management of firearms, recruits had to crawl with a gun in their arm, rolling on the ground from one position to another with the "butt of the gun tucked between the legs and the barrel held to the stomach and

[378]Mutambara, *The Rebel in Me*, p.62-64
[379] On ZANLA modules and time frame, see "ZANLA training Syllabus" in Mutambara, *The Rebel in Me,* p. 270.
[380] Luise White, *Fighting and Writing: The Rhodesian Army at war and Postwar* (London: Duke University Press, 2021), p. 132.
[381] Keith Nell, *Viscount Down: The complete story of the Rhodesian Viscount Disasters as told by a SAS Operator* (Johannesburg: Keith Nell, 2011), p.7-8.
[382] Mutambara, *The Rebel in Me,* p.86-87.
[383] Ibid.

chest."[384] In addition to mastering AK 47s, the recruits also learned the basics of other weapons like bazookas, sub-machine guns, pistols, and hand grenades. After the basic of military training regime, some cadres were chosen to engage in specialisation courses to learn more advanced details about specific weapons.[385]

If the days at the training base were filled with a shared set of military drills and training according to the ZANU syllabus, life in ZANLA's bases also brought some challenges and divisions. The first wave of soldiers to undergo military training in Mozambique in 1976-77 complained about food shortages in the camps. Mutambara states that due to the small portions served at Tembwe camp, he and other recruits developed a system of surviving in which they lay ambushes when the cooking drums were taken to the river for washing: they "would knock these drums down and dive inside them and scrape food particles stuck to the inside walls of the drums."[386] The food shortage was much more severe in military camps like Pungwe III. Fay Chung, who stayed five months at the base, reports that despite the strenuous military training, the recruits only had one meal daily. The diet was made of *mangai*, boiled, dried maize.[387] Engaging with the local population from Pungwe III was impossible since one could walk for weeks without finding a single person.[388] However, with the increase in humanitarian aid supplied by UNHCR and other international organisations from 1978, the shortage of food was alleviated, as ZANU leaders diverted food officially destined for refugees to feed recruits.[389] Chimurenga III and Samora Machel (*chimurenga* name), who trained in Tembwe II, state that the decision to place Tembwe II (before it was renamed Sabondo) as the men's main military camp also contributed to an increase in their daily diet. Because the camp was built in the game reserve, the recruits could hunt animals for consumption.[390] ZANLA leaders' decision to feed the recruits a good diet in the camps was intended to make soldiers' bodies strong enough to walk on foot carrying heavy weaponry and ammunition in the operational areas.[391]

[384] Ibid.
[385] Ibid.
[386] Mutambara, *The Rebel in Me*, p.90.
[387] Chung, *Re-living the Second Chimurenga*, p.194.
[388] Ibid.
[389] Interview, Mutsvangwa.
[390] Interviews: Chimurenga III; Samora Machel (ZANLA chimurenga name), Harare, 21 September 2022.
[391] Chimurenga I, a ZANLA war veteran who worked as a military instructor, highlighted how the recruit's diet was crucial to building up the body. For more details on the ZANU process of building up the recruits'

According to Fastmove, food was essential not only to build up the soldier's endurance but also to prepare the soldier at military training camps for battlefield hardship such as the scarcity of food.[392] Although ZANLA adopted the Maoist approach in which food was to be provided by the "masses", during training guerrillas were left unaware of the uncertainty of being fed on the battle front, where they could spend days in transit or during action without eating or with little access to food. Getting used to periods of starvation would only in practice prepare the soldiers to cope with hunger in the operational areas.[393]

As its military capacity escalated and the war spread, ZANU felt the necessity of changing its approach in its confrontation with Rhodesian forces. According to Tungamirai, ZANLA later developed its military strategies using a specifically semi-conventional approach.[394] It was argued that ZANU needed to have its soldiers trained in semi-conventional warfare because the movement would need to develop regular forces in the long term.[395] This was a process which created a distinctive military culture that contrasts with that generally attributed to ZANLA.

The changes began with training in a combination of guerrilla warfare and some elements of semi-conventional warfare. Those trained in Nachingwea and Mgagao in Tanzania related having this type of military training. Chimurenga I, who oversaw making the list of recruits going to Tanzania, reported that the first two groups went in mid-1975, and that after the creation of ZIPA in November 1975 to early 1976, two airplanes a day would transport ZANLA recruits would leave Dondo for Dar es Salaam carrying ZANLA recruits. The number of such trainees would eventually reach about 3000; they were called *Songa Mbele* (Push the Enemy Further).[396] Their guerrilla warfare training was administered by Chinese instructors, the semi-conventional military component by the Tanzanian People's Defence Forces (TPDF).[397] Although Zvakanyorwa Sadomba suggests that the Songa Mbele group was significant during the battle at

bodies, see Mutambara, *The Rebel in Me*, p.70-71.

[392] Interview, Fastmove.

[393] Ibid.

[394] "Towards a Conventional War: Smith's Ides of March, Comrade Josiah Tungamirai", *Zimbabwe News*, 10, 2, March (1978).

[395] Ibid.

[396] Interview, Chimurenga I; Douglas Mahiya suggested that the number of Songa Mbele group was about 5000, Douglas Mahiya, Harare, 20-21September 2022.

[397] Ibid.

Mavodzi refugee camp in 1979, in fighting that the Rhodesian General Peter Walls called "man to man", this group was not the only force present at this battle.[398] Other ZANLA fighters trained as regular forces in Ethiopia, Libya, and Romania, by ZANU in Mozambique, and FPLM forces supporting ZANLA with Russian-made anti-craft guns and heavy artillery were also in action at the battle of Mavodzi.[399] Instances where the FPLM gave urgent support to ZANLA were frequent. According to Henrik Ellert, the Rhodesian raid on the Tembwe military training camps in November 1977 was not as devastating as the Chimoio attack, not only because ZANLA had been blocked in the Chimoio attack, but also because at Tembwe the FPLM adroitly reinforced ZANLA, deploying RTR-60PA APC personnel carriers, thus forcing the Rhodesian Forces to beat a hasty retreat.[400]

As mentioned in Chapter I, ZANU sent cadres to various countries to be trained in conventional warfare and the management of heavy weapons. From 1976, ZANLA recruits were trained in ground-to-ground missiles in Romania, and Yugoslavia trained ZANLA cadres in heavy weapons.[401] From 1978, Soviet instructors trained around 1,000 ZANLA cadres in infantry in Ethiopia alongside ZIPRA. Ethiopia also trained pilots, maintenance technicians, and ground crew. A group of ZANLA were trained in using Soviet-made weapons by Cuban instructors at the Mgagao training camp in Tanzania.[402] ZANU also sent two groups of recruits to train in conventional warfare in Libya in 1978. According to Bandza, the first group trained in Libya comprised 500 recruits, the second around 1000.[403] From 1978, North Korea offered conventional firearms and training facilities to ZANLA.[404]

The training in conventional warfare added new weight to ZANLA's armed struggle. The introduction of semi-conventional elements in ZANLA military operations meant that it produced, to some degree, a sense of superiority for those who had first

[398] Sadomba, *War Veterans in Zimbabwe's Revolution,* p. 30
[399] Interviews: Bandza, Harare, 22 September 2022; Chimurenga III, Harare, 21 September 2022; and Samora Machel (Chimurenga name), Harare, 21 September 2022; Esther Matsiwo; Fernando Dezanove, Chimoio, 25 May 2021; Enes Luis, Chimoio, 24 May 2021.
[400] Ellert, *Rhodesian Front War: Counter-insurgency and Guerrilla Warfare,* p.135.
[401]Mazarire, "ZANU's External Relation", p. 104.
[402] see Reeds, "International Politics and national Liberation", p.46.
[403] Interview, Bandza.
[404]Lyong Choi and II Young Jeong, "North Korea and Zimbabwe 1978-1982: From the Strategic Alliance to the Symbolic Comradeship between Kim II Sung and Robert Mugabe", *Cold War History,* 17,4, (2017).

trained in guerrilla warfare and then went to train in conventional warfare and heavy weapons. It is important to underline that not all cadres trained in conventional warfare were deployed to the operational front because ZANU's leadership decided to hold the majority of them at Inhaminga in Mozambique, with the idea of sending them to Rhodesia when the situation required the engagement regular force. However, a small number of these cadres were sent to the operational areas and introduced on the battlefield as the number of soldiers and the use of heavier weapons increased.

The accounts of the ZANLA war veterans I interviewed about their training in Maoist guerrilla warfare do not emphasise the quality of their training and army skills; instead, for them, the training signified the introduction to military life. The political element of this training regime, characterised by military drills, physical hardship, and disciplinary elements alongside political instruction, transformed their mentality and produced a new military culture that prepared them to engage their enemy in Rhodesia.

The mixing of diverse military training and different war approaches added new dimensions to ZANU’s attempts to build new military capacity to engage Rhodesian forces and shaped a military culture characterised by a unique combination technical capacity and experience. If the guerrilla warfare training produced soldiers attached to Maoist marching and military drilling, discipline and subordination elements, the semi-conventional and conventional training emphasised mastery of heavy weapons, including Soviet-made weapons, and the engagement of regular force units. This combination of different military traditions and skills produced a specific political and military identity of ZANLA fighters. It allowed the development of aptitudes and capabilities but also brought some challenges in incorporating and combining the forces on the battlefield.

However, these changes in ZANLA did not go unperceived by the Rhodesians, who located the sites and undertook devastating bombing raids on ZANU's targets and Mozambican infrastructure, as I will explore in the next section.

Rhodesian bombing raids inside Mozambique

The escalation of the Zimbabwean armed struggle in January 1976 increased active hostility between Rhodesia and Mozambique. Although ZANLA acted with caution in its activities in Mozambique, and its paranoia about the infiltration of spies meant that secrecy and coerciveness came to pervade ZANLA culture, Rhodesian forces reacted aggressively, attacking ZANLA and ZANU targets inside Mozambique as well as Mozambican economic infrastructures.

In response to ZANU's establishment and operational development as a guerrilla movement, Rhodesian troops began to enter Mozambique for reconnaissance of Zimbabwean refugee camps and the sites where ZANLA was training, to see the kind of training they were undergoing, the weapons they used, FPLM positions, and the places where ZANLA entered Rhodesia.[405] Rhodesian military forces dressed in FPLM uniforms and used armoured vehicles or air drops to sabotage bridges, railways, and roads.[406] They also recruited soldiers who had deserted from the FPLM: black soldiers who had served in the Portuguese colonial army and who had been humiliated and harassed by FRELIMO after independence, and white settlers who fled to Rhodesia after Mozambican independence. They were sent for military training in Rhodesia and in Malawi where they learned, among other skills, how to use grenades and the Hecker and Kocher G3 automatic rifle issued to every Rhodesian fighter, and how to perform sabotage missions.[407] Spies like Namu Chigonde, who disguised himself as a Zimbabwean refugee and entered Mozambique via Espungabera in Manica, travelled to the Rhodesian garrisons at the border to provide reports on the functioning of the refugee camps.[408]

Based on the information their spies delivered, the Rhodesian Security Forces started a campaign of bombing ZANLA bases, refugee camps and Mozambican

[405]"Três capturados pelas Forças das FPLM", *Tempo*, 432, January 1979. On the details of the Rhodesian forces operating in Mozambique, see "Mozambique appearance of enemy's agent", *Summary Broadcast*, 24 February 1979. See also Paul French, *Shadows of a Forgotten Past: to the Edge with the Rhodesian SAS and Selous Scouts* (Solihull, UK: Helion, 2012); A. J. Ballam, *Bush war Operator: Memoirs of the Rhodesian Light Infantry, Selous Scouts and Beyond* (Solihull: Helion, 2014); Chris Cocks, *Fireforce: One Man's War in The Rhodesian Light Infantry* (Roodepoort, SA: Covos Books, 1997).
[406]"Punir o Inimigo: Declaração do Comité Político Permanente", *Tempo*, 432, 14 January 1977.
[407]"Três Capturados pelas Forças das FPLM." About the use of the G3 weapon by the Rhodesian forces see: Leroy Thompson, *The G3 Battle rifle* (UK: Osprey Publishing, 2019); Peter Moorcraft & Paul Maclaughlin, *The Rhodesian War: a Military History* (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball Publishers, 2008), see also Paul Moorcraft and Peter McLaughlin, *Chimurenga! The war in Rhodesia, 1965-1980* (Marshalltown: Sygma/Collins, 1982).
[408] Ibid.

infrastructure. Mozambican and international other press media of the time were full of reports describing Rhodesian raids into Mozambique territory.

In some cases, the Rhodesians attacked and occupied sites for days, as at Mapai, Pafuri, and Mavunde in Gaza Province.[409] The Rhodesian attacks on Mozambique ended in 1979 after the signing of the Lancaster House agreement. Although the Rhodesians claimed that its attacks were against ZANU targets in Mozambique, the Mozambican press only reported attacks carried out against Mozambican infrastructure and avoided mentioning attacks made on Zimbabwean bases or Zimbabwean casualties.[410]

Rhodesian forces also carried out attacks against Mozambican soldiers and infrastructure. Chicualacuala, a transit point for ZANLA guerrillas deployed to its Southern Front in Rhodesia, was a site which frequently suffered Rhodesian raids. Francisco Cossa who was a member of the FPLM described these attacks:

> The Rhodesians used to cut *the railway line that connected Chicualacuala to other areas of the country and sabotaged the water supply. They habitually played music in the early morning and then dropped mortar bombs on Chicualacuala for hours. Although we used to react to them, we would soon back off because, at the beginning in 1976, our military response capacity was weak. The combat would last the whole day, and we and ZANLA soldiers in transit would take refuge in the trenches to escape death. These intense Rhodesian raids forced the local government to move to another region, Combomune*, far from the Rhodesian border.[411]

According to Mozambican official sources, from March 1976 to June 1977, Rhodesian forces launched 143 raids — 54 in Gaza, 33 in Manica, and 56 in Tete.[412] At a rally held by Samora Machel at *Praça da Independência* on 23 December 1979 to celebrate the signing of the Lancaster House agreement, Machel stated that around 1,338 Mozambicans lost their lives due to the Rhodesian raids, of whom 567 belonged to the Army and Security sector.[413] Rhodesians termed the attacks inside Mozambique "hot

[409]"FPLM controlam base the Mávue: Combantes na Zona de Pafuri", *Tempo*, 28 November 1976; "Conferência de Imprensa com Hugo Idoyoga sobre o massacre de Inhazonia", Maputo, *Rádio Moçambique Archive*, 21 August 1976.
[410]"Rhodesian raid on Mozambique", *US Department of State Systematic Review,* 4 November 1976, available at WikiLeaks.
[411]Interview with Francisco Cossa, Chicualacuala, July 2016.
[412]"Representative to the UN", UN/SA collection, 27 June 1977.
[413]Samora Machel, *A Victória do Povo do Zimbabwe é Fruto da Luta Armada, da Unidade e do Internacionalismo*, (Maputo: Partido FRELIMO, 1980), p.16.

pursuit" of ZANLA guerrillas. They also described them as preventive actions taken against the Mozambique government, which they claimed had been fighting battles on Rhodesian soil since July 1976.[414]

The Rhodesian attacks deep inside Mozambique changed the nature of the war. They shaped the relationship between FRELIMO and ZANLA regarding solidarity and rules of engagement in the war, but also stimulated further international military solidarity in reaction to Rhodesian aggression. Mozambique turned to Cuba and the Soviet Union for military support to deal with the Rhodesian attacks. Cuba and the Soviet Union provided Mozambique with military advisors and more sophisticated military equipment, including aircraft and surface-to-air missiles.[415] In 1978, for example, according to US intelligence, the USSR delivered military aircraft, MI-8 helicopters equipped with heavy weapons and used for reconnaissance, and the ballistic missile S3. They also sent a radar system and anti-aircraft guns installed in the two principal cities, Maputo and Beira. They continued to supply weapons like the Strella 2M, a gun equipped with high explosive used to destroy aircraft flying at low altitudes; a surface-to-air missile, the SAM-7, designed to target low-flowing aircraft; a Rocket Propelled Grenade-RPG7, used as an anti-tank weapon; and the infantry mortar 82 mm. They also began providing T-34 tanks which protected the anti-tank weapons and armoured personnel carriers.[416] This supply allowed the creation of a conventional army with particular new characteristics, at the same time as it created new international tensions.

Fearing the direct involvement of Cuban and Soviet soldiers in the war, the United States and British governments publicly condemned the Rhodesian raids in Mozambique. They met with Mozambican authorities to discuss possible solutions to stop Rhodesian aggression.[417] In a meeting with US Congressman Charles Diggs in 1978, Mozambican

[414]Rhodesians claimed that FRELIMO's first battle inside Rhodesia was on 27 July 1976 in Umatali and had carried out unprovocative attacks at Tea Estates areas, see "Rhodesians claimed that FRELIMO fought its first Battle inside Rhodesia", *Southern Africa*, 9,11, January 1976; "Clash with FRELIMO", *ARB*, 13,7, August 1978; "FRELIMO again attacks Tea Estates", *R. M*, April 1978.

[415]Cuban worked as Military advisors to FPLM in Chimoio and Manica, and Russians worked in Boane and Nacala Porto, interview with Mateus Kida and Mariano Mapilele, Xai-Xai, 10 May 2016; see also "Cuban Presence in Mozambique", *US Department of State Systematic Review*, 3 May 1977; "Communist activity in Mozambique", *US Department of State Systematic Review*, 16 May 1979, all available at WikiLeaks.

[416] "Communist Activity in Mozambique." For more US reports about the presence of the Soviet in Mozambique from 1975 until 1988 see CIA, The Soviets in Mozambique, is the Payoff Worth the price? An Intelligence assessment, (1988).

[417] "Meeting with Machel", 3 Dec 1977, *US Department of State Systematic Review*; "Presidential Message for Machel", *US Department of State Systematic Review*, 4 Dec 1977; see also "Rhodesia: Codel Diggs

Foreign Minister Joaquim Chissano made it clear that Mozambique did not want to escalate the war: it did not want to react too strongly to Rhodesian attacks or call for outside military participation to avoid what he called, an "Angolan type situation", a destructive civil war with the involvement of Cold War powers on both sides.[418]

While trying to probe Mozambique's relations with the Cubans and Soviets, the US and Britain tried to persuade Ian Smith to stop the raids against its neighbouring country. Smith answered that Mozambique was facing the consequences of backing ZANU and permitting it to establish military training camps in its territory, as well as facilitating its "terrorist" actions inside Rhodesia. Smith claimed that they were participating in what he called the "massacre of helpless black tribesmen and white Rhodesians".[419] Apart from the justification of revenge against Mozambique, the Rhodesians also tried to redefine their relationship with FRELIMO and its support of the ZANLA liberation struggle by emphasising the influence of the Soviet Union on the war.[420] In response to the letter of US ambassador Matthew Hawkins, which stated that Rhodesians must withdraw their forces from Mozambique by 1 June 1977, Ian Smith asked the US and British leaders if "the life of black and white Rhodesians" was less precious than the ambition of "Russian backed terrorist minorities and the interference of Frontline Presidents."[421] The claim of Soviet support to the FRELIMO government and ZANLA soldiers was in part based on the confessions made by soldiers who deserted from the FPLM and joined Rhodesia's forces. In an interview for the *Voice of Free Africa*, Daniel Caetano, a former FPLM soldier who operated in Chicualacula in the anti-aircraft artillery, stated that Zimbabwean fighters had military training inside Mozambique and attended "the Soviet communist indoctrination" classes. He added that they also received many weapons from the Soviet Union, mainly anti-aircraft weapons, tanks, and missiles.[422] However, it is essential to note that the claims of former FPLM soldiers who

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Meeting with Mozambican Foreign Minister", *US Department of State Systematic Review*, 25 March 1978, all available at WikiLeaks.

[418] "Rhodesia: Codel Diggs Meeting with Mozambican Foreign Minister."

[419]The Rhodesians claimed that the blacks were so far from the most people killed by the "Terrorists", reaching around 1200 death against less than 100 white Rhodesians. "Rhodesia Raids into Mozambique", *US Department of State Systematic Review*, 2 June 197, available at WikiLeaks.

[420]"Rhodesian raids Provocation for Foreign Help?" *Washington Star*, 6 December 1976; see also "Rhodesian attacks escalated in Mozambique", *Southern Africa*, 10,2, March 1977.

[421]"Rhodesian Raids to Mozambique".

[422]"Confession of a Former Mozambican Soldier who joined MNR", *The Point*, January 1979

joined the Rhodesian forces, like that of Daniel Caetano, could also be used as propaganda by Rhodesia, whose claims of Soviet support for Mozambique and ZANU suited their Cold War definition of allies and enemies, and legitimised their "hot pursuit" raids in Mozambique. They implied that the war in Rhodesia would also follow the tensions and alliances produced by the bipolarity of Cold War conflict.

In parallel with its cross-border raids, in 1976 Rhodesia established the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR – later called Renamo), a military movement that that helped inflict damage on the Zimbabwean liberation movements and the FPLM, and sabotage the Mozambican economy by blowing up bridges and electricity transmission pylons, performing ambushes on roads, and cutting communication systems.[423] MNR propaganda against the government, its Marxist ideology and its eastern bloc allies was spread through the *Voice of Free Africa* radio station, which started its transmissions in July 1976.[424] Although it was initially created as a rebel movement by Rhodesian intelligence, on Zimbabwe's independence in 1980, the movement was taken over by South Africa and, with its backing it grew exponentially, and undertook destructive missions in Mozambique contributing to widespread economic and social destabilisation, favouring a civil war lasting a further 12 years. This was a lasting consequence faced by Mozambique due to its support for ZANU's liberation struggle.

The strategy of "hot pursuit" of ZANLA and ZANU sites inside Mozambican territory and sabotaging economic infrastructures adopted by the Rhodesian forces posed a severe material threat to ZANU and the Mozambican authorities. From the mid-1970s, FRELIMO was forced to change the nature of its solidarity with ZANU by strengthening its military capacity engagement while trying to protect its sovereignty and territory. Mozambique produced a new conventional contingent with the involvement of Cuban and Soviet instructors, giving this war greater international significance in the context of Cold War tensions. Military demands forged and changed the nature of solidarity between ZANU and FRELIMO, while FRELIMO used superpower aid to improve its military capability and help guarantee its sovereignty and independence as well as to support ZANU's armed struggle. Enhancing military capacity also produced a new military

[423]"Accounts of Mozambique Resistance Movements Claims", *Voice of Free Africa broadcast*, 8 January 1979.
[424]William Minter, *Apartheid's Contras: An Inquiry into the Roots of War in Angola and Mozambiqu*e, (London: Zed Books, 1994).

culture in FRELIMO's army. Mozambique's independence and Zimbabwe's liberation war meant that the "periphery actors" (to use Tony Smith's words) projected their interactions with geopolitical superpowers to boost their military objectives and achieve independence.[425]

The following section discusses the creation of these conventional units, their characteristics, capacity, type of military training, the culture it produced, and its effects on their interaction with ZANLA fighters.

FPLM military culture and its interaction with ZANLA

In addition to creating new conventional units to defend itself and ZANLA's installations, Mozambique sent its soldiers to fight side by side with ZANLA fighters on the border areas and inside Rhodesia. This meant that soldiers from diverse military training regimes and different military and political cultures joined to fight the same battles. Though the framework of cooperation was defined by the Mozambican state, which materialised the self-interest of the country by hosting ZANU, rank-and-file soldiers managed to produce their own form of solidarity and cooperation at the grass roots level.

I contend that though the rank-and-file soldiers were informed by the "politics machine" and soldiers were products of different military training and different military cultures shaped by Cold War conflicts of interests, FPLM and ZANLA's rank-and-file soldiers were able to overcome the differences that caused tensions and friction on the battlefield and develop their own forms of solidarity. This was shaped by their historical experience, military strategy and technique, the engagement of semi-conventional units on the battlefield, and the specificity of the day-to-day experience. However, before I turn to the effects produced by the military interactions between FRELIMO and ZANLA soldiers, I first explore the characteristics of the new conventional units created by FRELIMO, the nature of FPLM training, and soldiers' different experiences, so as to understand the creation of FRELIMO's military culture and the effects its produced.

[425] Smith, "New Bottles for New Wine", p. 568-570.

The nature of Rhodesian attacks demanded a response which changed the military culture of the FPLM. The response required emphasised more conventional elements and deployed different weaponry, such as heavier guns, anti-aircraft artillery and missiles. However, FRELIMO's first reaction to Rhodesian "hot pursuit" operations into Mozambique was to fortify its defences along the border areas.

This started by sending soldiers into Rhodesia to lay mines near roads and rivers to block Rhodesian entry points into Mozambique. Lopes Pontes recalls that after returning from the Soviet Union, where he underwent military training in surveillance and sabotage engineering in 1976, he was sent to plant mines in areas such as Susumba, and Roni inside Rhodesia.[426] This mission aimed to block Rhodesians from crossing into Mozambique.[427] In addition to these sabotage missions, FPLM soldiers went to Rhodesia from 1975 to 1976 to mobilise the population to join Zimbabwean guerrillas in Mozambique. Mouzinho Sande was one of those who went to Rhodesia to mobilise the people. He went with ZANLA soldiers disguised as a Mozambican migrant who worked in a plantation company in areas like Mutoko, Buhera, Hurungwe and Chinhoyi, and brought recruits to refugee camps in Mozambique.[428] Rhodesian security discovered one such FPLM soldier's activity in the Chipinga area in 1977, when the FPLM were mobilising plantation workers to cross the border to Mozambique.[429]

Besides the contingent of *Nova Vida* that was used to defend the border areas, Mozambique sent two battalions to be trained in Tanzania as a regular force and deployed defensively.[430] Felisberto Chakoka, a *Nova Vida* soldier who in 1975 served protecting the border in Chicualacuala, Mavué and Mapai, stated the difference between his Zambian military training and that he had at FRELIMO's base in late 1973, which was essentially guerrilla warfare. Chakoka reports that there was a difference in drilling, saluting, and marching at the parade formation. He recalls vividly that, in Zambia, the marching rhythm was relatively slow, and they marched with the rifle in their left arm while the

[426] Interview, Lopes Tembe, Maputo, 9 March 2015.
[427] Ibid.
[428] Interview, Mouzinho Sande, Chimoio, 17 May 2021.
[429] "FRELIMO Troops operating in Rhodesia", *US Department of State Systematic Review*, 18 October 1977, available at WikiLeaks.
[430] Interview, Felisberto Chakoka, Moatize, 3 June 2021. On the conventional military training in Tanzania, interviews: Onésio Sande, Chimoio, 25 May 2021; Antonio Bapichino, Chimoio, 21 May 2021. See also Borges Coelho, Malache and Macaringue, "Profound Transformations and Conflagrations: The History of Mozambique's Armed Forces from 1975-2005".

right arm was swinging, different from those of the guerrilla military training, which was faster and high-stepping.[431] Another *Nova Vida* cadre, Alexandre Jonasse (known by his fellow as Matucurai), states that this army training took almost a year, starting in May 1974 and ending in May 1975.[432]

FPLM contingents operated heavy weapons and anti-aircraft artillery, largely of Soviet origin, at the principal points of entry and exit of ZANLA soldiers while also sending Mozambican soldiers to fight alongside ZANLA inside Zimbabwe.

In addition to protecting the border, sending soldiers to engage in sabotage, and creating military logistics for ZANLA's operations, Mozambique intensively trained its soldiers to strengthen its regular units. It formed the FPLM in July 1975 to make up a regular force. FRELIMO's initial idea was to develop a new national army, based on the 10,000 guerrillas who had fought in the liberation struggle, to safeguard military control and political loyalty.[433] The acronym FPLM (Popular Forces of Mozambique Liberation) was strategically used to "acknowledge the role played by the former guerrillas during the national liberation war".[434] These guerrilla forces come from a diverse military culture. As discussed in the previous chapter, some started military training in Algeria, Tanzania, the Soviet Union, China, Ghana, and elsewhere. Others had their first military training inside Mozambique at FRELIMO bases. They underwent basic training with wooden guns and were then sent to FRELIMO's military camps or other countries for specialized military courses. With an extensive background in fighting the Portuguese, FRELIMO realized that their need to form a regular force based on the former guerrilla soldiers would prove impossible if it were to rely only on those with poorer educational qualifications and training, and who were unlikely to have the technical knowledge and experience of advanced weaponry needed to meet the demands of a conventional army. To overcome this problem, the Ministry of Defence started recruiting young people from secondary schools to be trained in conventional warfare in Mozambique and elsewhere.[435] The

[431]Felisberto Chakoka states that FRELIMO's soldiers had the same ZAPU military instructors, although they were trained separately. He also recalls playing football with ZAPU cadres during their leisure time. Interview, Felisberto Chakoka.
[432] Interview, Alexandre Jonasse (Matucurai).
[433] Borges Coelho, Malache and Macaringue, "Profound Transformations and Conflagrations: The History of Mozambique's Armed Forces from 1975-2005", p.162.
[434] Ibid.
[435] Ibid.

government publicised the recruitment campaign through the radio broadcast *A Pátria Chama por Si* (The Country Calls for You).[436] Although compulsory military service became law only in 1978, the authorities began recruiting young people compulsorily in 1976, in reaction to Rhodesian attacks.[437] Young boys and girls were recruited from schools, offices, on the street, and in the neighbourhood. The *Grupos Dinamizadores* (Dynamising Groups) and *Chefes de Quarteirão* (Heads of Residential Units), which functioned as FRELIMO's party structure at neighbourhood level, oversaw the recruitment process.[438] (see Chapter IV).

These various groups of soldiers were brought together to be trained as the new regular force. The signature of 20-year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation signed between the Soviet Union and the Mozambican government in 1976, confirmed that the training of Mozambicans as regular troops was vital to the formation of the new forces.[439] In 1976, 150 men were trained in conventional warfare in Boane, Maputo. After completing the course, they would be added to the *Nova Vida* and the platoon contingents trained in conventional warfare in Tanzania.[440] The course was termed *Konzia-Kwanza*, and the troops trained were called the *Grupo 25 de Setembro*.[441] This course was interrupted in May 1976 owing to the escalation of Rhodesian attacks on Mozambique, and the cadres were deployed to defend the Gaza Province border with Rhodesia.[442]

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[436] In 1976 the Chinese instructors transferred from Nachingwea, former FRELIMO military camp in Tanzania, had trained former FRELIMO's Guerrilla Commander into the first officers of the new regular troops. See: 'A Tarefa das FPLM é defender os explorados', *Notícias*, 10 May 1976; and Borges Coelho, Malache and Macaringue and Borges Coelho, "Profound Transformations and Conflagrations: The History of Mozambique's Armed Forces from 1975-2005", p. 164.

[437]"Lei de Serviço Militar Obrigatório", *Boletim da República*, I, 35, March 1978. Young boys and girls were recruited from schools, offices, on the street, in the neighbourhood, and so on. The *Grupos Dinamizadores* (Dynamising Groups) and *Chefes de Quarteirão* (Head of residential units) oversaw the recruitment process. They functioned as FRELIMO's party structure on the grassroots level.

[438] "A Pátria Chama por si", *Radio Mozambique Broadcast*, 1976. Interview with Enes Luís, Chimoio, 24 May 2021; Abdul Karim and Estevão Nhancale, Xai-Xai, 15 March 2015.

[439] Ibid.

[440] Ibid.

[441] Matusse, *Mateus Óscar Kida*, p.166.

[442] Francisco Cossa, an FPLM soldier trained in the Konzia-Kwanza group, states that the government interrupted the course to attend to emergency needs in Chicualacuala. It was believed that they would return to military training in Boane after some time, which never happened. Interview, Francisco Cossa, Chicualacuala, 20 July 2017. On the course offered in Boane, see also: "A Tarefa da FPLM é Defender os Explorados: Presidente Samora Machel na Cerimónia de Encerramento do Curso de Preparação Político-Miltar de Boane", *Notícias*, 10 May 1976. Available at: https://www.mozambiquehistory.net/smm_discursos_1976.php.

By 1977, Soviet instructors were training another military contingent of the FPLM in Boane, Maputo province, which then constituted the force that was to defend the border, reinforcing the *Nova-Vida* forces, which were, according to Mateus Zegueni proving ineffective, because of the quality of their training.[443] Other contingents were trained in conventional war by Soviet instructors in Nacala Porto, Nampula.[444] Antonio Sulo, an FPLM soldier who was responsible for logistics and then worked as head of instruction in Nacala Porto training camp, remembers that the Soviet instructors trained around 130 men from February to July 1977, in different areas including motorised infantry, reactive artillery, missiles (Strella 2M), mortars like the BM 21, Tank T34, the anti-aircraft twin-barrelled autocannon ZUS-23-4 used to attack aircraft and helicopters, diverse anti-aircraft defence weapons, communication and telegraphy.[445] These were the same specialised courses administered in Boane and Dondo. Other groups were sent to train as regular troops in the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Cuba, Hungary, and GDR.[446]

Cuban military advisers worked alongside Soviet advisers in Dondo, Nacala and Boane. They also formed a contingent of conventional training in 1978, focusing on infantry and anti-aircraft courses in Inhambane.[447]

The shift of emphasis from a guerrilla force toward a regular, more technically modern army was associated with a shift in external military relations from China to the USSR and eastern Europe. In 1976, Chinese instructors who had trained FRELIMO soldiers in Nachingwea during FRELIMO's armed struggle were moved to Boane to transform another contingent of guerrilla commanders into the first regular force officers.[448] Responding to the demand for greater military capability to counter Rhodesian attacks, the Ministry of Defence felt that Chinese instructors lacked the military capacity

[443]According to my interviewees, the military capacity of the Nova-Vida troops was so weak in engaging the Rhodesian force in a conventional war that they suffered many setbacks. Due to this weakness, the Mozambique government decided to form four brigades to operate in the border areas. Interview with Adolfo Kandiquita, Chicualacuala, 16 July 2017; Mariano Mapilele.
[444] Interviews: Antonio Sulo, Chimoio, 18 May 2021; Kida.
[445] Later FRELIMO discovered that the Strella 2M did not react with the South African mirages. Interview, Sulo. For more details on the military training offered by the Soviets instructors, see also Matusse, *Mateus Óscar Kida*, p.167.
[446] Borges Coelho, Malache and Macaringue, "Profound Transformations and Conflagrations: The History of Mozambique's Armed Forces from 1975-2005", p.164.
[447] Interview, Lino Cinco Reis, Maputo, 17 November 2020.
[448] Borges Coelho, Malache and Macaringue, "Profound Transformations and Conflagrations", p.164-5.

and weaponry to run courses in conventional war, resulting in a deepening of the reliance on the Soviet Union that had begun in 1971.[449]

Although FRELIMO retained its relationship with China, shaped during the liberation struggle, its military presence in Mozambique after independence was numerically small in comparison to that of Soviet and Cuban advisors, reaching only 10 to 15 Chinese as against 60 Soviet instructors.[450] The total number of Soviet personnel in Mozambique probably reached about 350-400 in the 1970s.[451] In addition to work as military instructors, they also worked as agricultural experts, doctors, and university teachers.[452] It seems that the number of Cubans present in Mozambique was about 200 by 1977; they also worked as doctors, agricultural specialists, and teachers.[453] It is not clear from my sources how many worked as military advisors, but clearly a substantial number did.

The Chinese military instructors were confined to Boane, while Soviet instructors trained cadres in Nampula and Dondo and worked as military advisors at FRELIMO quarters in Mapai, Dondo and Nacala.[454] The relationship between Chinese and Soviet cadres was tense. Mateus Kida, the chief of the Boane military camp from the end of 1977 to 1979, said that whenever a Soviet official entered his office to discuss any matter, the Chinese immediately requested a meeting to persuade FRELIMO to stop cooperating with the USSR, arguing that it had a revisionist ideology despite having sophisticated weapons. The Soviet officials also did not like to see Kida with the Chinese, pointing out that they had military and technological weaknesses.[455] For Kida, it was essential to work with both; while the Soviets worked as technical advisers and had knowledge of conventional warfare and powerful military weapons, the Chinese functioned as advisers in forming men – teaching soldiers how they would engage a powerful enemy, relying on the population and how to turn their weaknesses, such as in weaponry, to their advantage.[456]

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[449] Ibid.
[450] "Communist Military activity in Mozambique".
[451] "Communist Military activity in Mozambique."
[452] "Mozambique assessment", *US Department of State Systematic Review,* 3 August 1977, available at WikiLeaks.
[453] "Cuban presence in Mozambique."
[454] Interview, Mariano Mapilele.
[455] Interview, Kida.
[456]Ibid.

Fernando Chinganhance, who joined FRELIMO in 1972 and was trained in guerrilla warfare by the Chinese, compared the new training by the Soviet military in Dondo with that in Nachingwea during FRELIMO's liberation struggle. According to him, the guerrilla warfare learned from the Chinese had a different marching and drilling style, making them march forward while holding AK-47s on the left arm and waving the right arm while turning to left and right; in Soviet training, they marched with the neck locked and looked forward, while lifting the legs very high and waving both arms.[457] Besides the different marching styles, the approach to war was different. The Chinese in Nachingwea taught the recruits how to hide themselves and take advantage of the target, how to dodge and deceive the enemy, and how to run from the enemy to avoid man-to-man confrontation. Soviet military training, instead, required uniforms, the mastery of weapons and target practice, an advanced approach and man-to-man confrontation.[458] Matucarai also reported that this was the same type of drill he had with Cuban instructors in Inhambane.[459]

This training resulted in the formation of five infantry brigades and one brigade specialized in heavy artillery and tanks.[460] The first brigade stayed in Boane, Maputo; the second, with about 1,554 men, was stationed in Mapai, Gaza Province;[461] the third brigade was sent to Chimoio; the fourth was based in Tete; and the fifth was placed in Beira.[462] In contrast to the first four brigades, which were trained by Soviet instructors in Boane, Dondo and Nacala (with the support of the Cubans and Chinese), the fifth brigade was trained exclusively by Cuban instructors in Inhambane in 1978.[463] It is not possible to gather from my sources the exact number of other military units formed. However, at the time of Mozambique's independence, there were also about 30,000 soldiers who had

[457] Interview, Fungai Chinganhace, Changara 1 June 2021.
[458] Ibid.
[459] Interview, Matucurai.
[460] Borges Coelho, Malache and Macaringue, "Profound Transformations and Conflagrations", p. 165.
[461] Estado Maior General das Forças de Armadas de Moçambique, "Relatório do Chefe do Estado Maior General sobre Estados das Forças Armadas da RPM", 9 Abril 1978.
[462] Interviews: Sulo; Kida. Later, in 1979-80, with the support of the Soviets, the government also formed the Sixth, Seventh and Eighth brigades, which were stationed in Matola-gare, Cuamba, and Chokwe, respectively. The ninth brigade was trained in North -Korea and sent to defend Gorongosa in Sofala. On the discussion around the allocation of the brigades, see, Borges Coelho, Malache and Macaringue and Borges Coelho, "Profound Transformations and Conflagrations", p.173.
[463] Interview, Lino Cinco Reis, Maputo, 17 November 2020.

served in the Portuguese army, but were now marginalized and harassed by the new government, considering them as part of the "colonial machinery."[464]

In summary, this means that for the demands of post-independence defence and the fulfilment of regional liberation, FRELIMO began developing a new military culture in the FPLM, focusing on conventional elements, using a new set of strategies and weapons with Soviet and Cuban marching drills and shooting styles, which shaped the interactions of the FPLM and ZANLA.

FPLM and ZANLA soldiers inside Rhodesia

From these groups a number of FPLM soldiers were selected to fight with ZANLA inside Rhodesia; they came to be known as known as *internationalistas* (internationalists) as a result. In comparison to most guerrillas of the Mozambican liberation war, they brought different backgrounds in military training and different experiences to the operational front. The entrance of the FPLM into Rhodesia was carried out in different phases.

[464] Borges Coelho, Malache and Macaringue and Borges Coelho, "Profound Transformations and Conflagrations: The History of Mozambique's Armed Forces from 1975-2005", p. 164.



Map. 4: ZANLA Operational areas in Rhodesia

Source: *Zimbabwe News*, Vol.10, n.2, March 1978

The first phase began with the resumption of armed struggle in January 1976, following the end of regional détente and the launch of the Zimbabwe People's Army, ZIPA, an army that was meant to combine ZANLA and the Zimbabwe African People's Union's (ZAPU's) armed wing, ZIPRA (the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army).[465] Conventionally trained FPLM soldiers stationed in the border areas entered Rhodesia to carry out sporadic attacks against Rhodesian economic infrastructure and to plant mines. They also offered cover to ZANLA guerrillas entering Rhodesia, and sporadically participated alongside ZANLA in battles with Rhodesian forces who attacked border areas in pursuit of ZANLA guerrillas. Fernando Joia, a former FRELIMO fighter and FPLM soldier who specialised in heavy and anti-aircraft weapons, stated that in 1976, after completing his military training under Soviet instructors in Arusha, Tanzania, he was sent to Mukumbura (in Tete province) with another group of FPLM soldiers with the mission of protecting the Mozambican frontier from Rhodesian air attacks. This contingent stayed at this site until 1978, operating Soviet-made long-range Mortars B10

[465]"News in Brief", *Zimbabwe News*, 9, 2, January -February 1977.

and B11 and the anti-aircraft weapon Strella 2M.[466] The group remembers also going into Rhodesia as far as Chipinga where they attacked Rhodesian targets with the B11, which was more potent than the Chinese-made 60 mm mortar used by ZANLA.[467] Adelino Joaquim, who was deployed to Penhalonga, entered Rhodesia with B10 weapons to attack static targets, and military columns between Mbeza and Mujihinzikwa.[468] Protecting the border area, covering ZANLA guerrillas in transit, and some limited participation alongside ZANLA guerrillas in Rhodesia was thus the main role of the FPLM forces in 1976.

In the second phase, from 1977-1978, FPLM troops entered Rhodesia in small numbers of four to ten and joined larger groups of ZANLA guerrillas.[469] They stayed in Rhodesia for a period from one to six months, after which another group replaced them.[470] The 'internationalists' were selected for this role based on their place of birth, usually those who were native to the border areas with Zimbabwe, meaning that they spoke languages similar to those used by the Zimbabweans. This was important in concealing the presence of Mozambican fighters inside Rhodesia. Combat experience was also a determinant in selecting who was sent to Rhodesia. Most internationalists sent to Rhodesia had experience as guerrillas in the liberation struggle in Mozambique and had then retrained in conventional warfare.[471] Moreover, it was from the soldiers that had fought in the armed struggle that the commanders of the group were chosen. According to Ajape, this was important because they had already experienced guerrilla warfare, the approach that was being used by ZANLA inside Rhodesia. The conventional training would help them to combine both guerrilla and semi-conventional warfare.[472] These fighters participated in joint military operations coordinated by Mozambican and ZANLA commanders. The attacks were undertaken during the night to avoid Rhodesian detection, and targeted mainly farms, Rhodesian garrisons, police stations, roads, and railways.[473] In addition to planned attacks, the soldiers also participated in unexpected battles with

[466]Interview, Fernando Joia, Changara, 1 June 2021.
[467]Interviews, Fernando Joia, Changara, 1 June 2021; Antonio Bapichino.
[468]Interview, Adelino Joaquim, Chimoio,17 May 2021
[469] Interview, Mouzinho Sande.
[470] Interview, Mouzinho Sande, Chimoio, 17 May 2021.
[471] Interviews: Kida and Mouzinho Sande.
[472] Interview, José Ajape, Maputo 10 September 2021
[473] Interview, Peter Mauatsi, Chimoio, 24 May 2021.

Rhodesian forces. The internationalist Mouzinho Sande recounted one such battle in Chinhoyi in 1977:

> Owing to logistical delays, dawn came while we were still marching into a populated zone where we could hide. A farm owner discovered our presence and communicated with the Rhodesian forces, which immediately came with helicopters and started bombing us. The operation began in the early morning hours and lasted until sunset. We tried to fight back, but their fire capacity was heavier than ours, so we retreated. After the bombing ceased, their infantry came on foot and continued their attack on us. Many comrades, Mozambicans, and Zimbabweans, died in this combat.[474]

With the intensification of the war, the Rhodesian regime constructed a security system to protect large farms and created special units to carry out patrols. In the less densely populated rural areas, white farmers were provided with radios linked to a central warning system called AgricAlert. These farmers often reported guerrillas to the Rhodesian security force.[475]

In 1978, Samora Machel sent a group of FPLM soldiers to Rhodesia to confirm that ZANLA was fighting, a measure that would result in a new level of intervention. Machel was doubtful about ZANLA due to reports from the FPLM of acts of indiscipline inside Rhodesia, and after both ZIPRA and ZANLA claimed to have attacked the same target, such as the oil depot outside Salisbury in late 1978.[476] Considering ZANLA to have low political consciousness, José Ajape, a Mozambican commander responsible for organising and coordinating the sending of internationalists to Rhodesia, stressed that Machel barely trusted ZANLA fighters' military capacity because he thought that they lacked personal commitment to the war.[477] Mateus Zegueni and Carlos Macacho were the FPLM soldiers sent to Rhodesia for this secret mission. Zengueni entered Rhodesia with four Mozambican soldiers through Chicualacuala, and Macacho crossed from Manica with two journalists and two intelligence officials. They spent one month on a secret reconnaissance mission, fighting alongside ZANLA.[478] Their report stressed that ZANLA

[474] Interview, Mouzinho Sande.
[475]"French Mercenary says: Smith's Troops are Murders", *Zimbabwe News*, 10,4, July-August 1978.
[476] Interview, José Ajape. On ZAPU and ZANU claim of attacking the Salisbury Oil Depot see: Bhebhe and Mazarire, "Zimbabwe's War of Liberation", p. 125. See also "Patriotic Front: Battlefield Victories but intense Tensions", *Southern Africa Magazine*, 12, 3,1 March 1979.
[477]Interview, Ajape. On Machel's assumption of ZANU's low political Consciousness, see 'Rhodesian Raids Provocation for Foreign Help?'; Sérgio Vieira, *Participeip por isso Testemunho* (Maputo: Ndjira, 2011).
[478]Interviews: Mateus Zegueni, Maputo, November 2015; Carlos Macacho,Changara, 1 June 2021.

was inflicting considerable losses on the enemy. However, the Rhodesian forces were better equipped and prepared than ZANLA.[479] The report also stressed that ZIPRA forces were much better trained and more robust than those of ZANLA.[480] Most Mozambican war veterans I interviewed reinforced this view of ZIPRA's military superiority.[481] As Matucari and Lino Cinco Reis who operated in ZANLA sectors of the Gaza Front state that whenever they encountered ZIPRA forces, ZANLA and Mozambican forces preferred actively to avoid direct confrontation with the enemy's superior firepower.[482] This view may be explained by the fact that ZIPRA had started deploying semi-conventional forces trained in Angola by Cuban forces and the Zambian army at the end of 1977, and they began to have an impact in 1978 in Mashonaland West where they came into contact with ZANLA, seeming to help them expand the areas in which they dominated the battlefield.[483] However, it is difficult to see whether or not such FPLM views on ZIPRA are accurate. The War Veterans' memories from the recent past are shaped by the politics of memory and other interests in the past and present. More than being an accurate description of the war, the testimonies of the FPLM soldiers reflect how certain FRELIMO soldiers saw ZANLA.

Based on the information provided by these secret missions, Mozambique decided to reinforce the Mozambican military presence and increase the length of their stay in Rhodesia so that they could accelerate the end of the war.[484] While the groups sent to Rhodesia in 1977-1978 stayed for short periods, those who entered in 1979 were sent to stay indefinitely. This constituted the third phase of Mozambican army presence inside Rhodesia. Fungani Chinganhace, a soldier assigned to the frontier at Caraborra (now

[479]Interview, Macacho.
[480] Interviews: Zengueni; Macacho.
[481] Interviews: Cinco Reis; Matucurai; Fernado Dezanove, Chimoio, 25 May 2021; Enoque Nwadzangazi, Chimoio, 20 May 2021.
[482] Interviews: Cinco Reis; Matucurai. Officially, ZANLA's top leader denied that ZANLA and ZIPRA were fighting each other on the operational Front. In an interview with sister Janice McLaughlin, Josiah Tongogara stated that the report of fighting between ZANLA and ZIPRA was Smith Fabrications based on the "old tactic of dividing and rule". See "Tongogara: Mobilization Necessary for Victory", *Southern Africa*, XII, I, January 1979. However, Justin Nyoka, a BBC journalist who spent three months with ZANLA guerrilla inside Rhodesia held that "there were so many clashes between ZANLA and ZIPRA troops inside Rhodesia". See: "Three Months with the Guerrilla of ZANU", *Southern Africa Magazine,* 12, 2, February 1979. Henrik Ellert also suggests frequent armed conflicts between ZANLA and ZIPRA forces when they encounter each other in the Midlands province: Ellert, *Rhodesian Front War,* p.52.
[483] Jocelyn Alexander and JoAnn McGregor, "Adelante! Military Imaginaries: The Cold War and Southern Africa Liberation Armies", *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 62, 3, (2020) p. 647-648.
[484]Ibid.

Mangwe) operating a Mortar B11, confirms that the group of internationalists was sent secretly to Rhodesia without being previously informed about the decision. When they got to the frontier, they were told they would return to Mozambique only after Zimbabwe became independent.[485] The decision to send Mozambican soldiers to fight alongside ZANLA had to do with the need to accelerate the fighting so that independence would come as soon as possible, freeing Mozambique from attack by its hostile neighbour.[486] Mozambican leaders believed that the presence of the hostile Rhodesian regime was the main obstacle to successfully implementing their post-independence policies, though it would later emerge that there were many other obstacles. In their conception, the independence of Mozambique would be complete only when Zimbabwe became independent.[487]

The number of FPLM soldiers entering Rhodesia in 1979 grew substantially. They usually crossed the border in groups of 30 to 60 soldiers, then divided into small numbers to operate alongside ZANLA.[488] A Mozambican commander led the Mozambican group and usually requested two or three ZANLA fighters to help them with reconnaissance since they did not know the terrain. The Zimbabwean commander led the ZANLA troops. FPLM and ZANLA guerrillas were separated to avoid dispersion of soldiers and confusion in command and drills.[489] ZANLA and Mozambican commanders coordinated joint military operations on the battlefield.[490] Mozambique sent military contingents with different specialisations. Some soldiers had trained in the infantry (managing AKM, Bazookas, and Mortars 60mm and 82mm); others specialised in heavy artillery (using weapons like the recoilless rifle B10 (82mm) and B11(107 mm) used to engage infantry and as anti-tank weapons; others were specialists in sabotage and communications[491] In

[485]Interview, Fungai Chinganhace.
[486]Interview, Antonio Hama Thai, 27 October 2021. On the Government's assumption that the Independence of Zimbabwe would complete Mozambique's Independence, see Partido FRELIMO, “A Victória do Povo do Zimbabwe é Fruto da Luta Armada, da Unidade, e do Internacionalismo”.
[487] The pressure by Machel (and other Frontline leaders) on ZANU PF to sign the Lancaster House agreement in 1979 was prompted by the military and economic hardship that Mozambique faced due to the closure of the borders with Rhodesia and its support of Zimbabwe’s liberation. It was suggested that Machel “eloquently and unequivocally stated that [ZANU PF] had to reach an agreement at all costs since the burden of supporting the armed struggle had become insupportable for the Frontline States, especially Mozambique and Zambia.” See Mutambara, *The Rebel in Me,* p. 238.
[488]Interview, Cinco Reis.
[489] Interview, José Ajape.
[490]Interview, Chinganhace.
[491]Interview, Peter Mauatsi.

1979, Fernando Honwana, Machel's personal assistant and official English translator, acknowledged that ZANLA and FPLM fighters had used the Soviet-made SAM 7 ground-to-air missile against Rhodesian Canberra, Hawker Hunter and Vampire aircraft as well as helicopters.[492]

The operations were challenging despite the solid military coordination between FPLM and ZANLA on the battlefield. Alexander Jonasse, an engineer who says he entered Rhodesia in 1979 via Chicualacuala on his way to Gweru (where they intended to open a new front), in the company of a group of 110 ZANLA guerrillas conventionally trained in Ethiopia and Libya, reports that roads in the border areas were heavily mined by the Rhodesians and the wells and ponds poisoned, forcing them to walk for days until they found a populated area where they could be fed and safely drink the water.[493] The Rhodesians constantly harassed them by helicopter and on horseback.[494]

The deployment of FPLM soldiers to fight alongside ZANLA on the battlefield inside Rhodesia meant that soldiers who were products of different military cultures and that, in some instances, had divergent perceptions about the ways in which the war would be fought now worked together. I will explore the implications of this in the next section.

The Challenge of Coordinating Troops Trained in Different modes of warfare and Weapons

[492] "Demarches on possible guerrilla use of Soviet SAM7 missiles against Civil Aviation", *US Department of State Systematic Review,* 12 February 1979, available at WikiLeaks. Rhodesian intelligence accused ZANLA guerrilla of using the weapon against civilians and claims that ZANLA soldiers were trained in the management of this weapon in Arusha, Tanzania by the Cubans. On the claim of Tanzania donating SAM 7 to ZANU see: "Communist Support and Assistance to Nationalist Political groups in Rhodesia", appendix XVI, in *Hearings on H.R. 1287: To Amend the UN Participation Act of 1945 to Halt the importation of Rhodesia Chrome*. (Washington: US Government Printer Office, 1975), p.261-263.

[493]Interview, Matucurai. These groups of Libyan and Ethiopians were trained in conventional and infantry tactics between 1978/9. However, not all fighters trained in conventional warfare were deployed to Rhodesia. According to Bandza, a cadre that trained in Libya in 1978 in the first group sent to this country in several 500 ZANLA recruits and specialised in the Soviet-made weapon mortar 82 mm, ZANU's leadership decided to hold the majority of forces trained in conventional war at Inhaminga in Mozambique; the idea was to send them to Rhodesia when the situation got worst and required a regular force engagement. Interviews: Samora Machel (Chimurenga Name), Bandza and Chimurenga III. In Ethiopia, ZANLA guerrillas were trained alongside ZIPRA forces, in several 1000 fighters and were armed with Soviet weapons. For more details, see Mutambara, *The Rebel in Me*, p. 216-217.

[494]Ibid.

Despite this diversity, it seems that ZANLA and FPLM came to share the same view of the war, based on their training and experience of guerrilla warfare; most FPLM soldiers who fought in joint operations with ZANLA had already experienced guerrilla warfare against the Portuguese during FRELIMO's liberation struggle before their training in conventional warfare after independence.

Like FRELIMO, ZANU developed guerrilla warfare during the first years of its struggle, and subscribed to Mao Zedong's idea of "fish in water", which determined that soldiers (fish) must cultivate a good relationship with local inhabitants (the water) to succeed in war.[495] This fish-and-water relationship was upheld through Codes of Conduct, composed of three rules and eight points of attention. Mao Zedong's Three Rules of Conduct comprehend 1) Obey orders in all actions; 2) Do not take a single needle or piece of thread from the masses; 3) Turn in everything captured. These rules are sustained by Eight Points of Attention, which state that: a) Speak politely; b) Pay fairly for what you buy; c) Return everything you borrow; d) Pay for anything you damage; e) Do not hit or swear at people; f) Do not damage crops; g) Do not take liberties with women; and h) Do not ill-treat captives.[496] Although, as mentioned before, from 1978, with the deployment of soldiers who had trained in conventional warfare, ZANU tried to add some elements of conventional war practice, the basis of its response to Rhodesian forces was mass mobilization and a hit-and-retreat strategy.[497]

ZANU's decision to use the 'masses' as the primary support of the war facilitated their interactions with FPLM soldiers who fought alongside them inside Rhodesia. Like ZANU, FRELIMO decided during its liberation war that the basis of the struggle on the operational front would be Maoist guerrilla warfare because it underlined the importance of peasant support in the operational front, which fit its assessment of Mozambican reality.[498] Since most Mozambican fighters who fought alongside ZANLA had experience of guerrilla warfare, a common strategy for liberation was not difficult.

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[495] Interviews: Zuma; Fastmove; Ruramai Maraire, Harare, 17 September 2022.
[496] "On the Reissue of the Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points for Attention -Instruction of the General Headquarters of the Chinese People's Liberation Army", in Tung, Mao Tse. *Selected Military Works of Mao Zedong, vol 4* (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1963). See also transcription of these rules of discipline in "A Brief History of the Formation of ZANU", *Zimbabwe News*, 10,5, September-October 1978.
[497] Ibid.
[498] Interviews: Joia; Chinganhace.

In the Mozambican liberation war, guerrilla recruits experienced military training in various countries and were exposed to diverse philosophies of war. When they returned to Tanzania, they were required to go to FRELIMO camps to harmonise their training.[499] Beginning at Kongwa even before the beginning of the armed struggle in 1964, soldiers who had undergone military training in Israel, Algeria and China harmonised the different army training they had acquired in these countries.[500] Called *Marcha da Ordem Unida* (March in Unity), this harmonisation was administered by Chinese instructors and aimed to formalise the military 'march', focusing on tactics and strategy of guerrilla warfare, discipline, and mainly the role of 'the masses' in the war.[501] After independence, the Mozambican authorities tried to carry out a *Marcha da Ordem Unida* whenever it selected the soldiers to join ZANLA on the battlefield. However, the need to send military reinforcements as quickly as possible due the intensity of the Rhodesian attacks did not always allow this to be carried out. To avoid dispersal and confuse Rhodesian forces, it was decided that the Mozambican troop commanders should always be soldiers who had operated during FRELIMO's liberation struggle and had experience in guerrilla warfare.[502]

Both ZANLA and FPLM soldiers were deployed to Rhodesia to engage in acts of sabotage and terrorism, attacking military and police targets, making surprise attacks, ambushing columns on the roads as well as laying mines. To carry out ambushes, the guerrillas blocked the road or made holes in the tarmac so that when a column of cars stopped to remove the obstacles, the guerrillas attacked.[503] Mateus Zengueni recalls that FRELIMO and ZANLA carried out many such ambushes on columns of vehicles travelling in convoys from South Africa to Bulawayo and from Bulawayo to Harare in order to destabilise the Rhodesian economy. As he explained:

> The columns used to pass through this road during the morning, escorted by helicopters, tanks, armoured cars, and Mirages. Even with this extensive security apparatus, we managed to attack the column by applying the hit-and-run strategy, which created the illusion of having many soldiers shooting. The fighters were camouflaged in the bush,

[499]Interview, Kida.
[500]João Pelembe, *Lutei pela Pátria: Memórias de um Combatente da Luta de Libertação Nacional* (Maputo: João Pelembe Edition, 2012), p.64.
[501]Interview, Kida.
[502] Interviews: Zengueni; Tope; Pontes; Chinganhance.
[503]Interviews: Zengueni; Pontes.

> covering themselves with grass or tree leaves and applying the strategy of firing from one position and then rolling to another and shooting again.[504]

Lemos Pontes remembers carrying out similar attacks in areas like Tsetsera, Botcha and Buhera. In a joint operation between small groups of FRELIMO soldiers and ZANLA fighters, they attacked Rhodesian garrisons, ambushed cars, sabotaged railways, and planted mines.[505]

In understanding the nature of these operations, it is important to stress that ZANLA leaders carefully chose where to send Mozambican fighters. Due to the desire not to displease their host and thereby lose Mozambican government support for its military actions, ZANLA commanders avoided sending FPLM soldiers into areas strongly controlled by Rhodesian forces, preferring to keep them in 'semi-liberated' areas or areas where the Rhodesian force's counter attacks were weak.[506] This was intended to give an impression to the Mozambican soldiers that ZANLA was achieving significant progress on the battlefield.

Although ZANLA wanted to keep FPLM soldiers in a safe area, it seems they failed. Brian Mafodonkodzi, a ZANLA soldier who operated in the Buhera area near the Manica border in 1978, after receiving military training at Tembwe II and Marore camps in guerrilla warfare, narrated his encounter with Mozambican soldiers inside Rhodesia:

> Our commander, Josiah Tongogara, wrote a letter telling us to incorporate FRELIMO comrades coming to fight with us in our operational area. They were accompanied by comrade Light… Our first thought was that they were going to investigate the area where the Renamo radio station was located [this was a Rhodesian-Renamo radio station called a *Voz da Africa Livre*, used to spread propaganda against the Mozambican government]. Days later, the population of the place where we were operating told us that there were groups of people with different accents and suspected they were sellouts. We then met them and realised they were FRELIMO's comrades whom our commander talked about in his letter. At first sight, I saw they were carrying different war materials from those we had. They had Soviet-made weaponry and radio communication. It was the first time I saw radio communication in my life. In ZANLA, we used letters to communicate; we did not have radios. Following the order of our commander-in-chief, we advised them not to go further in the interior but to fight with us in the border area. However, the Mozambican commander said they were coming to Rhodesia to fight against Rhodesians

[504]Interview, Mateus Zegueni, 2 November 2015
[505]Interview, Lemos Pontes.
[506]Interviews: Fastmove; Mafodonkodzi.

> and not stay at the border areas. Then, the group advanced into the interior and fought there for almost two months. I was then appointed to accompany them back to Mozambique.[507]

Similar experiences in guerrilla warfare facilitated interactions between FPLM and ZANLA soldiers on the battlefield. There were nonetheless significant challenges that resulted from divergent military cultures and experiences, as I explore in the next section.

Managing Differences and Tensions on the Battlefield

Although ZANLA and FRELIMO fighters shared the same broad philosophy of guerrilla warfare on the battlefield, the experience of diverse military training and weaponry also created tensions between the fighters. I explore these here before turning to the ways in which these differences were overcome in practice.

Some of the differences FPLM soldiers found were due to the contrasts between FRELIMO's liberation struggle and ZANLA's, rooted in different terrain and differences in the strengths of the enemy. One of these was the absence of static bases like those FRELIMO had during its liberation struggle. The geography of northern Mozambique where FRELIMO operated for the longest period is constituted by dense forest, which permitted the establishment of permanent military bases. Zimbabwe's areas of plateau savana were more open and exposed. The strengths of the Rhodesian Forces – its close links to the extensively spread white farming community, the infrastructure that allowed excellent mobility of troops, its airpower that could quickly spot and attack bases – meant that neither ZAPU nor ZANU managed to create liberated areas inside Rhodesia, and were limited only to establishing semi-liberated areas. The contrast with Mozambique was striking. Due to the geography of Mozambique, the lack of infrastructure, and, perhaps, Portuguese military weakness compared to that of the Rhodesian security forces, FRELIMO's soldiers operated in permanent bases. Jorge Dick, a soldier who served with the ZANLA cadres in the Tete Front in 1972-1974, described FRELIMO's liberation struggle headquarters in the following terms:

[507] Interview, Mafodonkodzi

> FRELIMO's military bases were established in the forest, with a clearly developed structure. The houses were built with local materials, such as sticks, grass, and mud. There was housing for the commanders and women, dormitories for the guerrillas, healthcare units, schools, and military training camps, where recruits underwent basic military training. There was also a shelter for the fleeing population joining FRELIMO. Every 5 km from the base, there was a checkpoint with scouts to inform about enemy movements. These kinds of bases always allowed the guerrillas to return to the same rear base after attacking enemy targets.[508]

FRELIMO's rear guerrilla bases were self-sustaining, operating over long periods and developing substantial economic and military structures.[509] In contrast, in Rhodesia, guerrillas stayed at civilian homes or hid in the mountains during the days and then met at a mobile base during the night to coordinate military operations.[510] All Mozambican war veterans I interviewed noted the difficulty of mobile bases, as they were constantly shifting from base to base to avoid enemy attacks and never managed to create developed structures. ZANLA soldiers agreed that FPLM soldiers who had experience of FRELIMO's liberation struggle found it difficult to operate in what they called 'bush offices', as they had been used to returning to substantial rear bases.[511]

Access to food was another difference the internationalists noted in Rhodesia, and which created friction between them and their ZANLA counterparts. Even though FPLM soldiers had relied on civilians to feed them during their liberation struggle, they had experienced periods of starvation due to drought or famine caused by the burning of fields with Napalm and other chemicals by the Portuguese, or because civilians were evacuated from the guerrilla operational areas and held by the Portuguese in protected villages, or even because the population had fled places where they lived to avoid Portuguese raids.[512] Antonio Chicussa recalls that in some regions on the Cabo Delgado front, due to intense enemy bombing, which would start at 8 am and end by 4 pm, the local population was forced to cook at night and hide in the bush during the day.[513] Candido Mondlane suggests that in some areas, the number of guerrillas would be higher than the population, which made the food supply insufficient to feed the military

[508]Interview, Jorge Dick, Maputo, 20 January 2020.
[509] For more understanding about self-sustaining bases see: US Marine Corps**,** *Mao Zedong on Guerrilla Warfare*, (Washington: Department of The Navy, 1989), p.161.
[510] Interviews: Mouzinho Sande; Enes Luís.
[511] Interview, Fastmove.
[512]Antonio Chicussa, in Mussanhane (ed), *Protagonistas da Luta de Libertação Nacional*, p. 169.
[513]Ibid.

contingent.[514] Gabriel Maulate, a former soldier who operated in Cabo Delgado Front during FRELIMO's liberation war, recalled that, because of starvation, the guerrillas used to eat a tuber called *Yangade*, which was highly poisonous. To make it edible, they would clean and cook it several times. Sometimes, the poison did not disappear entirely and caused problems like heart palpitations.[515]

In contrast, FPLM soldiers held that in Rhodesia, guerrillas rarely faced the absence of food. My interviewees said that 'the masses' provided three meals daily to guerrillas, consisting of sadza and different types of meat and vegetables. In some areas, civilians could even show the guerrillas the tails or feathers of an animal to ask the fighters if they ate that kind of meat.[516] Fungani Chinganhace recalled his experience:

> The abundance of food surprised us because, during FRELIMO's struggle or even post-independence, we had never eaten as well as in Rhodesia. During the FRELIMO war, we faced moments of hunger, making us eat terrible things like snakes and rats or have just one meal a day. However, if hunger could compromise military performance on the battlefield, the excess of it would also disturb the performance of the guerrilla towards their engagement on the operational front. We realised that our comrades would avoid going to fight without eating, and even after eating, they could prefer to relax rather than fight. Our frictions started there, with us pressuring them to carry out operations rather than relax and enjoy themselves.[517]

FPLM soldiers also believed that the system of supplying food to the guerrillas in Rhodesia was much more efficient than in the FRELIMO liberation struggle, particularly in the so-called Tribal Trust Lands, where civilians organised a system of collecting money and food door to door and even storing food so that if the guerrillas showed up they encountered the food supply ready.[518] The supply of food to ZANLA fighters brought some embarrassment to the civilians. Mukusha Jouere, a civilian who used to be a *Mujibha*, the young boys who, alongside the girls called *Chimbwidos*, worked with ZANLA soldiers, providing them intelligence on the movement of the Rhodesian Forces, doing reconnaissance duties and helping to feed guerrillas in the Masvingo area, recalls the challenge they faced in providing the guerrillas in his area, particularly in sustaining

[514]Candido Mondlane, in Mussanhane (ed), *Protagonistas da Luta de Libertação Nacional*, p. 269.
[515] Interview, Gabriel Maulate, Quelimane, 10 June 2022.
[516]Interviews: Joia; Macacho; Chinganhance; Joaquim.
[517]Interview, Chinganhance.
[518] Norma Kriger, *Zimbabwe's Guerrilla War: Peasant Voices* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p.118.

their demand for meat to the point where the supply of chickens and goats raised by the population ran out. Consequently, they were forced to buy meat in other areas to feed the guerrillas.[519] Literature on the Zimbabwe liberation struggle notes that guerrilla demand for meat not only diminished civilians' meat production and forced them to use their money to buy meat in other areas or even engage in cattle raids on white farms, but also created a feeling of resentment among civilians who looked on this demand for meat as a form of exploitation.[520] Nathienel Chimhete suggests that although civilian dissatisfaction with the guerrilla demand for meat was not voiced openly, it appeared in the war discourse, and challenged guerrilla coercion in songs, jokes and nicknames.[521]

However, not every soldier experienced a glut of food inside Rhodesia, especially when they were outside the Tribal Trust Lands. Some soldiers like Matucarai recall having faced periods of hunger when they entered Rhodesia through Chicualacuala, at the Gaza front, suggesting they spent around three days without eating or drinking water since they did not find civilians.[522] The guerrillas also suffered from hunger when they entered areas where the Rhodesians imprisoned the population in Protected Villages, on the same model as the Portuguese.[523]

Another source of tension concerned military tactics. As we have seen, FRELIMO had sought to overcome differences in the training of its own liberation army and in the FPLM by adopting the *Marcha Unida* (March in Unity). One important tenet of this was that shots would be fired from a crawling position in a burst as the fighter moved from one place to another. ZANLA, in contrast, did not harmonise its military tactics, instead applying the training in shooting that they had learned in different countries mentioned previously. Thus, it was possible to find ZANLA troops shooting targets from prone,

[519] Interview, Mukusha Jouere, Harare, 23 September 2022.

[520] On the disruption of meat supply to the guerrillas and cattle raids on white farms, see Kriger, *Zimbabwe's Guerrilla War: Peasant Voices*, p.148-149. On the civilian dissatisfaction about guerrilla demand for meat see also: Nathaniel Chimhete, "Pasi. Nemakomoredzi; II![Down with Comrades]: ZANLA guerrilla fighters-Civilian relations in Gudyanga, Melsetter, Rhodesia, 1975-1980", *Critical African Studies*, 11,2 (2019), p.156; Darlington Mutanda, "Insights into the Impacts of Guerrilla Violence in shaping war-time relationship in the Rural Zimbabwe, 1966-1979", *War In History* (2024); Sharleene Mutanga, "The Rhodesian Security Forces, *Mujbhas* and *Chimbwido* in the Liberation Struggle of Zimbabwe,1960-1980", (BA Hons Dissertation, Midlands State University, 2018), p. 42.

[521] Chimhete, "Pasi. Nemakomoredzi; II! [Down with Comrades]", 156.

[522]Interview, Jonasse (Matucurai).

[523] In trying to liberate the civilians from these places, guerrillas broke down the Protected Villages' fences, burned the houses, and then released the population. See Kriger, *Zimbabwe's Guerrilla War: Peasant Voices*, p.108.

kneeling or standing positions using a single shot.[524] Mutambara explains that shooting accurately at the targets functioned as an economic strategy so that guerrillas could engage the enemy by expending the minimum number of bullets possible.[525] All my Mozambican interviewees pointed out this difference in shooting positions as the major contrast with ZANLA on the operational front.

This difference in shooting stance and technique created friction. Mozambicans tried to insist that the Zimbabweans must also shoot in a burst and from crawling positions since this was much more secure than the way ZANLA was shooting, a position they maintained, based on their greater experience of fighting in their own liberation struggle.[526] But ZANLA refused, claiming that this was the ZANLA way of shooting. Onésio Sandes held that his Mozambican commander heatedly argued with his Zimbabwean counterpart over shooting methods. The Zimbabweans did not accept the Mozambican way, arguing that they trained in that way and that there was no reason to change. Fastmove, a former ZANLA soldier reports that sometimes it was very challenging to operate with FPLM soldiers because of their need to dictate how the war would be fought: “This used to upset us”, he says.[527] The friction over shooting stemmed from FRELIMO’s wish to impose its vision of war, derived from its own experience of a successful liberation struggle, on the Zimbabweans. My Zimbabwean interviewees claimed that, because the Mozambican soldiers had experience fighting the Portuguese, they insisted on telling ZANLA fighters what to do and how to proceed. Sometimes, ZANLA fighters tried to follow the advice of their Mozambican comrades. At other times, it would lead to an argument. Fastmove narrated what he saw as the root of the conflicts:

> During our military training in guerrilla warfare, we were instructed that our war needed to be a protracted war. Because our enemy was so strong and more powerful than us, we had to reject the idea of a quick victory and engage the enemy carefully and one step at a time, being more defensive, accepting loss, and using the strategy of retreating when we saw our force in a weak position. Because the Portuguese were not as strong as the

[524]Mutambara, *The Rebel in Me*, p.67.
[525]Ibid.
[526] Interviews: Onésio Sande,Chimoio, 12 May 2021; Inoque Nwandzangaze, Chimoio, 20 May 2021; Mouzinho Sande.
[527] Interview, Fastmove.

> Rhodesians, our Mozambican comrades had the misunderstanding that we would engage our enemy at the same level as they did with the Portuguese, which was wrong.[528]

In addition to these tensions, FPLM soldiers also complained about the noise made by ZANLA during ‘the march’, the soldiers’ walking step on the battlefield. For security reasons, ZANLA only marched during the night to avoid Rhodesian attacks, but they did not do so silently. Fernando Joia, an FPLM soldier, said that their rule was that fighters must march in line and in silence, with a distance of a few meters between one soldier and another, but some ZANLA soldiers marched in pairs and talked on the way.[529] This was from the conventional training they had with Soviet instructors.[530] Another FPLM soldier, Chinganhance, stated that this ZANLA behaviour could attract enemy attacks.[531] The difference in routine marching and walking resulted in some open clashes between ZANLA and FPLM soldiers. FPLM soldiers interpreted ZANLA’s form of marching as a lack of commitment, discipline, and unity among its fighters, who "wanted to do things in the ways they wanted, even if it meant prejudice to the whole group".[532] ZANLA fighters, in turn, seem to have understood this FPLM complaint as arrogance and a lack of openness in dealing with differences on the battlefield. Former ZANLA veterans held that the FPLM soldiers' need to base the war on their experience in Mozambique clashed with ZANLA views of the war since their experience differed with the Rhodesian reality.[533]

The nature of military training also played out in these clashes. FPLM soldiers trained by Soviet instructors before and after independence thought their training emphasised disciplined marching because it functioned as part of their military engagement, an indicator of the fighters' strength, discipline, respect of hierarchies, and cohesion to work as a team.[534] The ZANLA soldiers I interviewed said they had learned from the Maoist guerrilla warfare instructors they had in Mozambique and Tanzania that they had to look like peasants and act like them. Chimurenga I recalls that "walking in

[528] Interview, Fastmove. On the protracted war, see Mao Zedong, *Selected Military Works of Mao Zedong,* p. 210-219.
[529]Interviews: Joia; Chinganhance; Macacho; Santos.
[530] Ibid.
[531] Interview, Chinganhance.
[532] Interviews: Joia; Chinganhance; Macacho; Santos.
[533] Interviews: Fastmove; Chimurenga III, Harare, 21 September 2022.
[534] Interviwes: Manuel Dzimba Faria, Manica, 21 May 2021; Mariano Mapilele, Xai-Xai, 10 May 2016.

pairs and having a conversation with a colleague was also a strategy to make the enemy think they were just civilian peasants walking around." With a laugh, he added that this also made soldiers relaxed in the face of the toughness of the long walk because they were "still human beings, not machines".[535]

Differences were also expressed in day-to-day interactions with local people, with FPLM soldiers considering that greater distance needed to be maintained than their ZANLA counterparts, and that ZANLA lacked discipline and professionalism. According to the Mozambican war veterans I interviewed, the posture they adopted on the battlefield did not come so much from their military training but mostly from their previous battle experience.

My Mozambican interviewees also complained that ZANLA soldiers would withdraw from the operational front in order to visit their relatives, abuse alcohol and marijuana, and have sexual relations with local women. They would disappear for days and even forget where their weapons were hidden.[536] They recounted episodes in which ZANLA fighters alienated civilians by beating them up or by raping women, under the threat of killing them if they did not accept.[537] Fastmove, a ZANLA fighter who operated in Manicaland province, states that the first time he and other commanders had contact with alcohol, cigarettes and *dagga* (marijuana) was in operational areas inside Rhodesia. He argues that drinking, smoking and engaging with women was how soldiers dealt with the war's hardships and the fear of imminent death at the front.[538] However, such guerrilla behaviour led the guerrillas to sexually abuse powerless young girls, particularly the Chimbwido who used to support them.[539]As Mike Kesby points out, due to the fear of being labelled as uncollaborative in the guerrilla struggle, these girls and parents avoided speaking out against the abuse.[540] According to Chimhete, the fear of being punished by

[535] Interview, Chimurenga I.
[536] Interview, Cinco Reis.
[537] Interview, Antonio Bapictino, Chimoio, 21 May 2022. On ZANU's discipline, see Gerald Mazarire, "Discipline and Punishment in ZANLA, 1964-1979", *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 37,2, (2011).
[538] Interview, Fastmove.
[539] On the sexual abuse of women see: Mutanga, "The Rhodesian Security Forces, *Mujibhas* and *Chimbwido* in the Liberation Struggle of Zimbabwe (1960-1980)"; Chimhete, "Pasi Nemakomoredzi; II! [Down with Comrades]"; Mutanda, "Insights into the Impacts of Guerrilla Violence in shaping war-time relationship in the Rural Zimbabwe, 1966-1979". Enock Ndawana and Mediel Hove, "Traditional Leaders and Zimbabwe's Liberation Struggle in Buhera District, 1976-1980", *Journal of African Military History*, 2 (2018).
[540] Mike Kesby, "Terrains of Gender Contestation: Guerrilla Struggle and Counter-insurgency warfare in Zimbabwe, 1972-1980", *Journal of Southern Africa Studies*, 22,4 (1996), p.57.

the guerrillas was overcome in some instances in a discursive way. Civilians would use songs and nicknames as public censure for wrong guerrilla behaviour.[541] Yet, as Mazarire and Bhebe point out, episodes of guerrilla drunkenness would also provoke tragic events. For example, on 14 May 1978, a group of drunk soldiers failed to abort a planned military operation, which resulted in the killing of 105 civilians in the Gutu area.[542]

My FPLM interviewees felt that ZANLAs' relationships with women compromised military secrecy in operational areas since the fighters would tell women they had relationships with about active war plans. The internationalist Peter Mauatsi reported that on one occasion the enemy attacked the guerrillas after a woman with whom a ZANLA fighter used to engage told the Rhodesians about their presence.[543]

The breaking of war secrecy on the operational front by ZANLA guerrillas extended to their relatives, according to their FPLM counterparts. ZANLA soldiers would abandon the guerrilla group to see their relatives and warn them about planned attacks. Mutambara recalls an experience of aborting a planned operation in Umtali (now Mutare) after guerrillas who visited their relatives warned them about the attack.[544] ZANLA fighters also alerted contacts about where guerrillas had laid mines.[545] Chinganhace, a FPLM soldier, recalls having heated arguments with ZANLA commanders about this:

> Once we had laid mines, you would see that Rhodesian forces came with a machine to demine the areas. I once asked the Comrades why they were sabotaging their struggle. If someone from the masses had the misfortune of stepping on a mine, we could not do anything; war is war, *Wafa Wafa, Wasara Wasara [Who dies is erased and who lives endures]*. Comrades had difficulties respecting the secrecy of war.[546]

ZANLA tried to adopted strategies to avoid friction with the FPLM soldiers. For example, due to the different approach in the engagement of women in military operations, ZANLA decided not to send Mozambican fighters to war in areas where ZANLA's women soldiers were fighting. Fastmove and Brain Mafondokoto claimed that ZANLA were aware of FRELIMO's objections to deploying women to operate in

[541]Chimhete. "Pasi Nemakomoredzi".
[542]Ngwabi Bhebe and Gerald Mazarire, *Zimbabwe's War of Liberation, Hashim Mbita Project,* 5 (Dar es Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota, 2014), p.128.
[543]Ibid.
[544]Mutambara, *The Rebel in Me,* p.114.
[545]Ibid.
[546]Interviews: Joia; Chinganhace.

combat. For them, women should serve as auxiliaries to the men, transporting material, nursing and teaching, not confronting the enemy.[547] ZANLA sought to avoid conflict in this way.[548]

Another source of tension between the two armies on the battlefield related to the method of punishment of those breaking rules during operations. FRELIMO advocated execution for serious rule-breaking (like withdrawal from the front, abusing women, drinking alcohol and smoking marijuana, and not respecting the military hierarchies), while ZANU preferred corporal punishment and re-education. The question of execution caused much debate between ZANLA and the FPLM fighters in Rhodesia, according to Fastmove, a ZANLA war veteran.[549] Zimbabweans argued that ZANLA's prohibition on killing soldiers at the front was to avoid depleting the number of soldiers and undermining the army's capacity.[550] Although the methods of punishment between the two liberation movements differed, it seems that both applied the politics of punishment within their liberation armies. Exploring these different approaches allows us to understand the kind of negotiation both armies had on the battlefield over differences in military strategies. It also demonstrates the effect that different training histories and military cultures had on the battlefield and how they shaped the military solidarity between rank-and-file soldiers. Yet the War Veterans' testimonies from Zimbabwe and Mozambique revealed the cliches, stereotypes, prejudices and myths that shaped how those armies saw each other and interacted.

Battlefield Solidarities

While differences in military training and historical experience created some friction between FRELIMO and ZANLA fighters at the front in terms of military strategies and techniques, it permitted soldiers of the two liberation movements to exchange ideas about

[547] Interview, Fastmove. The Mozambican war veterans who fought in the FRELIMO armed struggle against the Portuguese in Mozambique stated that the commander rarely deployed women to the battlefield. They were destined to transport war material and stayed at the bases while the men went to the war front. However, they would confront the Portuguese when attacked by surprise at FRELIMO bases. Interviews: Augusto Maqueza; Ndequiasse Chelene, Moatize, 3 June 2021.
[548] See Josephine Nhongo-Simbanegavi, *For better or Worse?*
[549] Interview, Fastmove.
[550] Interview, Douglas Mahiya.

their experiences and methods, providing a path to shape military solidarities and legacies on the battlefield.

Some of these exchanges resulted in the combination of different military strategy and tactics. For example, ZANLA's use of the hit-and-run strategy, based on its Chinese guerrilla training, was combined with FPLM soldiers' strategy of hit, advance and assault, which came from their Soviet military training and heavier weapons.[551] Fernando Nhantumbo, an FPLM soldier, detailed this experience:

> ZANLA never changed its way of engaging the enemy; whenever we went to the operations, they would quickly withdraw from the battles, arguing that the enemy was in a better weaponry position than us. Even if there was a large number of soldiers deployed to a specific combat, they would always retreat. We learned from Soviet instructors that if we had more soldiers and greater weapon capacity, we should move from hit-and-run to hit, advance, and, if possible, assault the enemy target.[552]

FRELIMO had started to combine hit-and-run and hit, advance and assault strategies in the early 1970s when the Portuguese implemented their 'Gordian Knot' strategy and started building garrisons 25 km from each other, particularly on the border between Tanzania and Mozambique.[553] The strategy of increasing the number of military contingents deployed at the operational front and the addition of new Russian made weapons such as B10, B11, Strella 2M was used to implement the hit-and-advance strategy.[554] Inoque Nwandangaze, a Mozambican fighter in Zimbabwe, recalls the guerrillas' attack at Ruga, a Rhodesian garrison, where they applied the hit, advance and assault. As he detailed:

> The operation was carried out with a combination of troops. At the advanced position, the infantry was armed with AKM, Bazookas, and Mortar 60; this group was composed mainly of the Comrades [Meaning ZANLA]. In the middle came the group with artillery with B10, Mortar 82 mm and RPG-2 and RPG-7. At the rear, there was a military force operating the B11. Communication was essential for this operation. After the Comrades

[551] On ZANLA's strategy of hit and retreat, see Sadomba, *War Veterans in Zimbabwe's Revolution*, p.55.
[552]Interview, Fernando Nhantumbo, Chimoio, 20 May 2021.
[553]Atanásio M'tumuke, *O Fim da Luta de Libertação Nacional em Moçambique: Operação Omar* (Maputo: Atanásio M'tumuke, 2019).
[554]Ibid. For more details on FRELIMO's hit-and-advance strategy, see António Chalalangache, in Mussanhane (ed), *Protagonistas da Luta de Libertação Nacional;* Joel das Neves Tembe, *História da Luta de Libertação Nacional* (Maputo: Ministério dos Combatente, 2014).

> withdrew, we kept fighting and assaulted the Ruga garrison, where we stayed for a short time to collect food and medicine, then left.[555]

Mateus Zegueni argues that operations on this scale were only possible because of the sophisticated Soviet-made weapons operated by FPLM soldiers.[556] As he stressed, besides the B10, B11, and Mortar 82mm, Mozambican fighters entered Rhodesia with the rocket-fired missiles RPG-7, as well as a rocket launcher called the Bazooka M90, weapons that ZANLA did not have access to, but which the FPLM had been supplied with and trained to operate by Soviet instructors. However, it was suggested by Rhodesian intelligence that both FPLM and ZANLA operated the Soviet SAM 7 during battles from 1979.[557]

At the same time as FPLM soldiers incorporated these semi-conventional strategies at the front in Rhodesia, ZANU was trying to develop conventional capacity by sending its cadres for training in Ethiopia, Libya, Romania, and Yugoslavia. From 1978, ZANU began to deploy these soldiers to carry out attacks against Rhodesian targets using heavy Soviet-made weapons like the Mortar 82 mm and SAM 7, which were donated by Libya, Tanzania and Ethiopia.[558] Nevertheless, only a small number of cadres trained in conventional warfare were deployed to the battlefield because many of them completed their training near the end of the war, or because ZANU preferred to hold them in Mozambique. Strategically, ZANU believed that these forces would be needed in the final phase of the war in case they were needed to fight for control of the country with ZAPU forces.[559] Ruramai Maraire, a female ZANLA fighter who operated in Takawira Sector in the Tete front as a Political Commissar, states that from 1978-9, ZANLA started moving from operating in sections of 7 and platoons of 21 soldiers, to fighting in companies and battalions formed of 150 fighters and 500 soldiers, respectively.[560] Josiah Tungamirai, ZANLA's Political Commissar, argued that moving towards conventional tactics meant that ZANLA was entering the final phase of the revolutionary war, in which

[555]Interview, Inoque Nwandangaze, Chimoio, 20 May 2021.
[556]Interview, Zegueni.
[557] See "Demarches on the possible use of Soviet SAM7 missiles against Civil aviation".
[558] Ibid; 'Towards a Conventional War: Smiths' ides of March, Comrade Josiah Tungamirai', *Zimbabwe News*, 10, 2, (March) 1978.
[559]Interviews: with Bandza, Samora Machel and Chimurenga III.
[560] Interviews: Ruramai Maraire; Fastmove.

instead of hit and retreat tactics ZANLA would confront the enemy directly and increase the number of soldiers deployed to the battlefield.[561]

ZANLA and FPLM fighters also developed military strategies and tactics that came from their day-to-day interactions rather than their military training. One of these local strategies concerned the planting of mines to restrict the mobility of Rhodesian forces. In response to Rhodesian capacity to detect and neutralise mines,[562] ZANLA and FRELIMO fighters put maize porridge on the top of the mines while laying them. They claim that porridge prevented Rhodesian metal detectors operating effectively.[563] The guerrillas also came up with the strategy of joining in one hole anti-personal and anti-tank mines so that the capacity of explosives was more effective.[564] Strategies to breach Rhodesian minefields drew on local innovations, forcing the Rhodesian regime to frequently review the effectiveness of the mines by reducing the areas where the mines were laid as well as the density of the mining.[565]

Mozambican soldiers also learned about the structures that mediated between ZANLA and civilians, which Mozambicans did not have during their liberation struggle. My interviewees recalled how essential and efficient the role played by young people, Mujibas (boys) and Chimbwidos (girls) was.[566] ZANLA's organisation of the *Pungwe*, a night-time meeting scheduled by the guerrillas, in which the 'masses' would be politically educated about the revolutionary war of ZANU, sing Chimurenga songs and shout slogans, was another practice that Mozambicans learned from their Zimbabwean counterparts, which according to my interviewees brought an effective dynamic to the war.[567]

The sharing of military experiences allowed soldiers to join together in implementing new semi-conventional strategies and weapons brought by the FPLM (and ZANLA soldiers trained in conventional warfare) in the confrontation with Rhodesian forces, as well as the use of local methods and civilian collaboration with guerrillas. This

[561]'Towards a Conventional War: Smiths's ides of March.'
[562]Martin Rupiah, 'A Historical Study of Landmines in Zimbabwe, 1963-1995', *Zambezia*, XXII (i), (1995), p.67.
[563]Interviews: Fernando Dezanove, Manica, 25 May 2021; August Muqueza.
[564]Interviews: Mario Francisco, Chimoio 20 May 2022; Chinganhance.
[565] Rupiah, 'A Historical Study of Landmines in Zimbabwe', p.72.
[566] Interviews: Cinco Reis; Arnando Dembela.
[567] Interviews: Matucarai; Cinco Reis.

sharpened the capacities and strengths of the two armies, as they found common ground on the battlefield. It also seems that the battlefield was a unique space for the creation of shared military cultures and solidarities between the two liberation forces.

Conclusion

The joint operations between ZANLA and FRELIMO on the battlefield offer us a new perspective on the solidarity developed between the liberation movements of Southern Africa, regarding both the links created in the military camps in exile and the application of different military training and weaponry on the battlefield, thereby allowing us to understand how Cold War geopolitics influenced the methods and strategies of warfare, as well as the personal experience of soldiers.

The independence of Mozambique in 1975, which marked the end of the Portuguese colonial empire in Southern Africa, meant the end of FRELIMO's armed struggle and the birth of a new nation. However, FRELIMO felt its independence would not be complete if the country was still surrounded by hostile regimes in Rhodesia and South Africa. To support the Zimbabweans who were trying to overthrow the Rhodesian government, FRELIMO decided to involve itself actively in the process of liberating Zimbabwe, in political-diplomatic terms and militarily, by establishing a relationship with ZANU (and ZAPU earlier on, as discussed in the previous chapter). Mozambican involvement in the Zimbabwean liberation struggle was vital to ZANU's expansion of armed struggle, allowing it to carry out military operations from Mozambican territory. Opening access on its 800-mile-long border with Rhodesia allowed the exodus of tens of thousands of Zimbabweans who crossed the border in search of refuge or to join the armed struggle; Mozambique's decision to allow ZANU to manage Zimbabwe's refugee camps enabled it to use these sites to mobilise cadres politically and recruit fighters for its struggle.

The FRELIMO government also authorised active participation in military operations headed by ZANLA against Rhodesian forces. This process had several phases and began with the establishment of FRELIMO soldiers in the border areas to prevent

incursions of Rhodesian troops into Mozambique, and to cover the entry and exit of ZANLA guerrillas undertaking military operations inside Rhodesia. It ended with the dispatch of FPLM soldiers to fight side by side alongside ZANLA inside Rhodesia. This military solidarity meant that soldiers from different liberation movements, with diverse military training, were brought together to fight in the same battles. At some points, this created differences and friction in the operational areas.

Although FPLM and ZANLA's military interactions resulted in differences, it also allowed military exchanges on the battlefield that made an impact on the nature and course of the war, permitting soldiers to adopt new military strategies, tactics and different types of weaponry, mixing Maoist hit-and-run guerrilla warfare and the army training learned from Soviet instructors, which involved hit-and-advance tactics and sophisticated weaponry. At the same time, soldiers developed new strategies in the day-to-day course of the war. These soldiers were not restricted to different war philosophies or military cultures: the joint operations between FPLM and ZANLA soldiers encouraged the sharing of military experience and the harmonisation of procedures necessary to deal with the attacks of Rhodesian forces. Exploring these exchanges between ZANLA and FRELIMO soldiers allows us to understand the development of rank-and-file military solidarities in the liberation battlefield.

Chapter III

Soldiers and the Ancestors' Spirits: FRELIMO, ZANLA, and the Use of Traditional Religion on the Battlefield

Introduction

The joint operations of Mozambican and ZANLA soldiers on the battlefield, which led to clashes but also innovation in the application of the military strategies and weaponry, as explored in Chapter II, played an important role in shaping the prosecution of the war and soldiers' experience of it. Despite many differences between these two armies in terms of their 'military culture', soldiers found common ground on the battlefield, and in effect created a new military culture through solidarity in military practice. This seems to have been possible because, first, the differences in the level of the soldiers who fought together was not as great as they might at first appear for several reasons: ordinary FPLM soldiers were not as ideologically driven as FRELIMO's leaders and military commanders; ZANLA was in part conventionally trained, like the FPLM; there was a common language about guerrilla war; FPLM and ZANLA soldiers came from culturally similar backgrounds. Second, the battlefield itself required interaction, sharing, compromise and innovation to further the joint desire for military efficacy and personal survival. These interactions and innovations were in part possible because this was a guerrilla war fought from external bases; soldiers were required to rely on their own resources and initiative, far from their senior commanders and political leaders, to cope with local conditions affecting their immediate chances of survival and success.

This chapter explores another aspect of the differences between these militaries and how they worked out on the battlefield, particularly with reference to religion, a theme already broached in chapter 2. In addition to military techniques, strategies and weapons, traditional religion was important in the liberation war. I focus on it here because it seemed to be viewed sceptically by the leaderships of FRELIMO and the FPLM and ZANU and ZANLA, yet it would be intensely engaged in innovative ways on

the battlefield by soldiers of both armies. This underlines the importance of exploring through oral history and memoirs soldiers' points of view on solidarity and military culture made in the heat of battle, if we are to understand the liberation struggle.

Many African societies have held beliefs in the power that the spirits of their ancestors have over the living, and most soldiers who joined the ZANU and FRELIMO liberation movements came from these religious backgrounds. There is a widespread belief in much of Zimbabwe and Mozambique that the spirits of the dead guide and protect the living. Spirit mediums known as *svikiros* in Shona are believed to communicate between the dead and the living, providing explanations and solutions to living beings' problems. They had an active role in ceremonies linked to the invocation of rain for agricultural production, cured the sick, and functioned as spiritual guides.[568] However, with the arrival of European missionaries and the colonisation of southern Africa, many African societies were introduced to Christianity, which often opposed their traditional religion. Nonetheless, as Peter Fry argues, although Zimbabwean peasants were incorporated into, for example, Anglican, Catholic and Methodist churches, not only did African traditional beliefs survive this exposure, but they also were important in the rise of nationalism in the 1950s and 1960s, and subsequently in armed liberation movements.[569]

Scholars of Zimbabwe have explored the vital role of traditional religion in ZANU's guerrilla war of the 1970s. David Lan was a pioneer in exploring how spirit mediums in Shona societies of northeastern Zimbabwe helped ZANLA guerrillas to mobilise and recruit people to join the struggle, guiding the guerrillas inside Zimbabwe, protecting soldiers in battle, and healing the wounded.[570] He argues that it was possible to incorporate spirit mediums into the war because they were "part of a wider pattern of beliefs and rituals that had existed for some hundreds of years".[571] In his comparative study of peasant consciousness during ZANU's armed struggle, Terence Ranger argued that spirit mediums participated in the liberation war after ZANLA guerrillas learned of

[568] See Carlos Serra (ed), *História de Moçambique*, Vol.1 (Maputo: Imprensa Universitária, 2000), p.35-50; David Lan, *Guns and Rain: Guerrillas and Spirit Mediums in Zimbabwe* (Oxford: James Currey, 1985), p.40.
[569] Peter Fry, *Spirits of Protests: Spirit Mediums and the Articulations of Consensus amongst the Zezuru of Southern Rhodesia* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976), p.19.
[570] Lan, *Guns and Rain*, p.5-6.
[571] Ibid, p.XVIII.

their importance in shaping peasants' consciousness, and understood the role they could play in legitimation and mobilisation of civilians.[572] More recently, scholars have explored how traditional leaders were also at times used to support the Rhodesian Forces against the liberation movements.[573]

Compared with the Zimbabwean literature, very little has been written on the role of traditional beliefs during FRELIMO's liberation war against the Portuguese. Harry West argues that while FRELIMO's leaders showed disdain for traditional beliefs and were much more influenced by socialist ideology that was hostile to religion, most of the guerrillas, including commanders born and raised in the countryside, believed in and used medicinal charms on the battlefield.[574] Although FRELIMO leaders showed some disinclination toward religious belief and particularly traditional religion, believing that the use of charms and bullet-proofing medicines was ineffective in combat, Liazzat Bonate demonstrated how Islam was crucial to FRELIMO in the early stage of the liberation war. As she argues, in the northern regions of Cabo Delgado Province, FRELIMO associated with Sufi leaders and Muslim chiefs to mobilise people to join the struggle.[575] Luis Serapião analyses the relationship between Mozambican religious groups and FRELIMO during FRELIMO's liberation struggle and after Mozambique's independence, excluding, however, traditional religious groups in his study. He concluded that while religious groups supported FRELIMO's liberation struggle, the relationship between them and FRELIMO became hostile after independence due to FRELIMO's Marxist-Leninism.[576] Stephen Weigart explored the use of traditional religion and mythology in guerrilla warfare in what he calls modern Africa, analysing the Madagascar Rebellion, Mau Mau Insurgence, the UPC Insurrection in Cameroun, the Kwilu Rebellion in Zaire and Renamo's war in Mozambique. He shows the profound and robust influence

[572] Terence Ranger, *Peasant Consciousness and Guerrilla War in Zimbabwe: A Comparative Study* (Oxford: James Currey, 1985), p.189.
[573] Enock Ndawana and Mediel Hove, "Traditional Leaders and Zimbabwe's Liberation Struggle in Buhera District, 1976-1980", *Journal of African Military History*, 2,2 (2018), p. 119-160
[574] Harry West, *Kupilikula*: *Governance and the Invisible Realm in Mozambique* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1992), p.157-159.
[575] Liazzat Bonate, "Muslims of Northern Mozambique and the Liberation Movements", *Social Dynamics*, 35 (2009), p. 288.
[576] Luís Serapião, "Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) and Religion in Mozambique, 1962-1988", *Africa: Rivista trimestrale di studi e documentazione dell'Istituto italiano per l'Africa e l'Oriente,* 48,1 (1993).

of the widespread beliefs in spirit mediums and traditional rites on warfare.[577] Ken Wilson explored how the traditional religion used by the *Napharama* was crucial in counter-violence against Renamo during the civil war in Mozambique. These groups, armed with spears and machetes, believed that their ritual cults and vaccination with special remedies made them immune from their enemy's bullets.[578] These strands of literature indicate the importance of the belief systems of soldiers and the civilians who supported them and the commanders' or political leaders' strategy of using these beliefs for political legitimation.

Few of these authors delve in depth into the viewpoints of soldiers themselves or how the mix of soldiers coming from armies with different approaches to traditional beliefs in military operations might work in practice on the battlefield, which is my focus here. On the one hand, ZANLA's commanders accepted traditional religion at least as an opportunistic strategy to gain popular support. On the other hand, during its armed struggle, FRELIMO military leaders had come to regard local beliefs and culture as creating the potential for dissent in its mobilisation, training, and action. ZANLA's position was driven by a semi-official policy of associating with spirit mediums, which was contested but which was also regularly organised and endorsed at an institutional level by ZANLA commanders in camps and on the battlefield, as both a means of political legitimation and in operational military decision-making. Mozambican soldiers who interacted with ZANLA guerrillas after independence in 1975 came from an institutional context which regarded resurgent local beliefs as potential obstacles to the modernising plans of the new state. However, rank-and-file ZANLA and FPLM soldiers saw traditional religious beliefs as a mean to enhance their acceptance and legitimacy among civilians, their personal safety in the terrifying context of war and, sometimes, their military efficacy, leading them to find common ground on the battlefield.

Building on interviews with Zimbabwean and Mozambican war veterans and political memoirs, this chapter explores these practices and beliefs. It expands the discussion introduced in Chapter II and analyses how the ideological influence of the Cold War and the exposure to different military training in various parts of the world were incorporated with the social and cultural beliefs of the fighters on the battlefield

[577] Stephen Weigart, *Traditional Religion and Guerrilla Warfare in Modern Africa* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), p.103.
[578] Ken Wilson, "Cult of Violence and counter Violence in Mozambique", *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 18,3 (1992).

inside Rhodesia. It argues that, despite their differences, FPLM and ZANLA soldiers found common ground. The ideologies and strategies politically espoused by ZANLA and FRELIMO were in practice mingled with the rural belief systems of the soldiers and their civilian supporters. Soldiers on the battlefield did not always understand the ways the war should be fought in the same terms as their commanders and military instructors. Operational practices and beliefs, in the end, converged across FPLM and ZANLA because they shared the same needs of guerrilla warfare – integration with, and the support of, local populations.

The chapter starts by exploring ZANU's strategy of approaching spirit mediums and the place they were given in the liberation movement structure. Then, it explores the extent to which the Marxist-Leninism taught by ZANU at Chitepo College and studied elsewhere in socialist countries influenced the use of traditional religion on the battlefield as part of operational strategy. The chapter then explores FRELIMO's approach towards religion on the operational fronts during its liberation struggle against the Portuguese, and how it shaped FRELIMO's rank-and-file soldiers over the use of traditional religion. The last section analyses religious differences and similarities that influenced the day-to-day interactions between ZANLA and Mozambican fighters at the war front and the kind of war that these political and social connections produced on the battlefield.

ZANU and ZANLA's approach to religious belief

When ZANU relaunched the war in the early 1970s claiming to be applying Mao Zedong's guerrilla strategy of mobilising the "masses" to get civilian support, ZANLA began a mobilisation campaign in northeastern Rhodesia. The spirit mediums of this area supported this activity. Drawing on their belief in their power to mediate between ancestral spirits and the living and influence among local people, spirit mediums helped ZANLA guerrillas recruit young people to join the struggle and to mobilise peasants' support.[579] Paul Moorcraft and Peter McLaughlin argued that the assistance of the spirit mediums in politicising people in the northeastern areas was also possible because

[579] Fay Chung, *Re-living the Second Chimurenga: Memories from Zimbabwe's Liberation Struggle* (Harare: Weaver Press, 2007), p.197.

government administration was weak in this remote and poor area, which had a tradition of being uncooperative with colonial authorities.[580]

ZANLA fighters approached traditional beliefs by stressing the role played by Mbuya Nehanda and other spiritual leaders in the so-called First Chimurenga, after which Nehanda was hanged by the British in 1898.[581] It was claimed by ZANU that, before her death, Nehanda had promised to come back and lead the fight for independence in Zimbabwe by saying that "her bones will rise again". ZANU used this as political propaganda by picturing themselves and their armed struggle as the result of Nehanda's bones rising years after her death.[582] In a creative leap of imagination, the ZANU leadership even claimed that Nehanda and other spirit mediums, such as Kaguvi, belonged to ZANU's First High Command.[583]

The land issue was crucial in establishing the relationship between the guerrillas and the spirit mediums. David Lan argues that when the guerrillas entered the northeastern areas in the 1970s, they approached the spirit mediums and introduced themselves as the sons of Zimbabwean ancestors who would bring back the land taken from them by the colonial regime.[584] Following the failure of the first Chimurenga in 1896/7 the colonial administration evicted many from their ancestral lands and gave them to whites. The enforcement of land alienation and segregation developed over the course of colonial rule – the first major land segregation legislation being the Land Apportionment Act of 1930, which was only partially enforced until after WW II, when there were further massive evictions in the 1940s and 1950s. Zimbabwe's land was ultimately divided more or less in half between white and black, with much of the better land going to whites, despite their very much smaller number. This process was central to the emergence of mass nationalism in the late 1950s. Evicting black people from their lands continued to be reinforced by the Land Tenure Act of 1969.[585]

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[580]Paul Moorcraft and Peter McLaughlin, *The Rhodesian War: A Military History* (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball Publishers, 2008).
[581] Kapya Kaoma, "African Religion and Colonial Rebellion: The Contestation of Power in Colonial Zimbabwe's Chimurenga of 1896-1897", *Journal for the Study of Religion*, 29,1 (2016), p. 57-84.
[582] See Lan, *Guns and Rain*, p.147.
[583] "Nehanda died for Zimbabwe, will you?" *Zimbabwe News*, 10, 3, March-April 1978.
[584] Lan, *Guns and Rain*, p.136-137.
[585] Ibid.

Although ZANU's leadership endorsed the use of traditional religion on the battlefield, not all ZANLA fighters believed in and accepted the engagement of spirit mediums in the war. Some guerrillas came from a Christian background that disapproved of African traditional religion. Many young soldiers recruited in the 1960s were raised in Zambia and had no contact with traditional Zimbabwean religion. David Lan suggested that Evangelical and Apostolic churches aggressively opposed traditional religion and the role of spirit mediums, regarding them as backward, devilish, and satanic.[586] Fighters from these religious backgrounds objected to the role of spirit mediums on the war front. Those who attended political and military training in socialist countries in Eastern Europe and elsewhere often did not believe that spirit mediums could play a role in the war, preferring their secular military training and skills to the efficacy of magical forces.[587]

However, soldiers who were not sympathetic to spirit mediums might end up believing in them in the long run, while some who did not believe in their powers saw the utility of using them.[588] ZANU accepted using spirit mediums, Lan argues, due to its "Two-line-Policy" which combined long and short-term goals. The long-term aim was the revolution transforming political and economic practices; the short-term aim was to win a nationalist victory and take control of the country. By accepting spirit mediums, ZANU aided the short-term goal of speeding success.[589] However, according to Miles Tendi, even in the short term, the role of spirit mediums in the war front was highly contested and created division among ZANLA soldiers. Some commanders, such as Rex Nhongo, the ZANLA Chief of Operations and Tongogara's Deputy, remained opposed to the use of supernatural beliefs on the battlefield and refused to give space to spirit mediums in the execution of the war.[590]

In a few areas, Christian beliefs and missions were significant for ZANLA guerrillas' mobilisation strategies, especially in rural areas where Mission Christianity

[586] See Ibid, p.41-49; see also David Maxwell "Christianity in Eastern Zimbabwe", in Ngwabi Bhebe and Terence Ranger (eds), *Society in Zimbabwe's Liberation War* (Oxford: James Currey, 1996).
[587] Lan, *Guns and Rain*, p.203. See also David Moore, "The Zimbabwean People's Army Moment in Zimbabwean History,1975-1977: Mugabe's rise and Democracy demise", *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 32, 3 (2014), p. 302-18.
[588] Lan, *Guns and Rain*, p.147. On the relations between Guerrilla and Spirit Mediums, see also Norma Kriger, "The Zimbabwean War of Liberation: Struggles within the Struggle", *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 14, 2 (1988), p. 304-22.
[589] Lan, *Guns and Rain*, p. 208.
[590] Blessing-Miles Tendi, *The Army and Politics in Zimbabwe: Mujuru, the Liberation Fighter and Kingmaker* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020).

had a widespread influence, and missionaries were sympathetic to the struggle. In an interview with the *Voice of Zimbabwe* published by *Zimbabwe News* in 1978, Janice McLaughlin, a Catholic Sister who worked as Secretary to the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Rhodesia during the 1970s, underlined the importance of some Catholic Church members in supporting the Zimbabwean liberation movement and its armed struggle and denouncing the Rhodesian Forces abuses of rural people inside Rhodesia.[591] David Maxwell has also argued for the significance of Christian beliefs in ZANLA guerrillas' mobilisation strategies in rural areas where Mission Christianity was widespread.[592] The influence of Christian religious practices and African indigenous belief systems on ZANLA was variable but always important. For example, although Robert Mugabe held that that ZANU accepted the practice of all kinds of religion within its ranks, some ZANLA guerrillas tried to persuade people from Christian areas to have recourse to traditional religion instead of their belief in Christianity.[593] Terence Ranger suggested that the guerrillas were obligated to respect Christian beliefs where they existed among civilians rather than coerce them to believe in spirit mediums.[594]

ZANU thus used the issue of religion as a tool to gather support from the civilian population and to aid the war effort in variable ways. However, even though the literature based on civilian points of view refers to the influence of Christianity among soldiers, the issue of traditional religion is the only one that comes up when talking about the relationship between ZANLA and FPLM on the battlefield itself. My interviewees talked only about traditional religion, which could indicate what generation they identified with, what backgrounds they came from, and could also reflect that ZANLA veterans now want to claim this heritage because it is very much part of ZANU politics of the present (while mission Christianity is not). My focus on traditional religion here explores how politicians and military commanders regarded the use of spirit mediums and traditional religion as an essential tool for political mobilisation. The rank-and-file guerrillas saw it

[591] "Rhodesian whites are closed from the Truth: Sister McLaughlin Tells the Voice of Zimbabwe in an exclusive interview", *Zimbabwe News*, 10, 4, July-August 1978.
[592] Janice McLaughlin, "Avila Mission-Turning Point in Church Relations with State and the Liberation Forces", in Ngwabi Bhebe and Terence Ranger (eds), *Society in Zimbabwe's Liberation War* (Oxford: James Currey, 1996); David Maxwell, "Christianity in Eastern Zimbabwe", in Bhebe and Ranger, *Society in Zimbabwe's Liberation War.*
[593] "Smith's Selous Scouts Assassinate Missionaries": Janice McLaughlin interview with Robert Mugabe, *Zimbabwe News,* 10, 4 July-August 1978.
[594] Ranger, *Peasant Consciousness*, p.215.

as part of the operational strategy in war and as a mean to ensure personal safety and survival. The institutionalisation of spirit mediums was even present in ZANLA camps in Mozambique, as I will explore in the next section.

Zimbabwean Spirit Mediums Inside Mozambique

The relationship between ZANU and FRELIMO, which developed in the late 1960s and strengthened after Mozambique's independence not only allowed ZANU and ZANLA to set up a political project and military culture, as explored in the previous chapter, but also to institutionalise the role of spirit mediums in the camps in Mozambique. I argue that the use of traditional religion in the military camps in Mozambique functioned as a tool for establishing security, raising the rank-and-file soldiers' morale and the legitimisation of ZANU and ZANLA military identity and culture.

When ZANLA guerrillas were working undercover in 1972, preparing the ground for the resumption of armed struggle, spirit mediums worked as ZANLA fighters' spiritual advisers, warning them about imminent attacks by the enemy. Using their intimate knowledge of the dense forests and terrain, spirit mediums guided the guerrillas through dangerous areas inhabited by wild animals. They introduced them to Shona sacred sites, like burial caves and holy mountains, where rituals were performed.[595] According to Wilfred Mhanda, ZANLA and ZIPA Political Commissar from 1974-1977, some of the spirit mediums who helped in 1972 were taken to ZANLA's camps in Zambia and Mozambique. One of mediums, believed to be the reincarnation of Mbuya Nehanda, was moved by the guerrillas from the Dande area in 1972 to FRELIMO's Tete Front in Mozambique. After the Portuguese bombed the site, the medium was moved to Chifombo in Zambia.[596] Hama Thai, a FRELIMO soldier who lived with the ZANLA guerrillas on the Tete Front, recalls a blind woman who appeared to be over 90 years old, who was presented to the FRELIMO soldiers as the reincarnation of the spirit of Mbuya Nehanda by ZANLA fighters.[597] Despite scepticism from FRELIMO fighters, including Hama Thai, who did not believe in spirit mediums' role in the war front and were suspicious of

[595] Ibid, p.197; Ndawana and Hove, "Traditional Leaders and Zimbabwe's Liberation Struggle", p.119-160.
[596] Wilfred Mhanda, *Dzino: Memories of a Freedom Fighter* (Harare: Weaver Press, 2011), p.102.
[597] Interview, Hama Thai, Maputo, 27 October 2021.

their presence at Mozambique's Tete Front, spirit mediums from Rhodesia with ZANLA were given land to build their homesteads on the Mozambique side, in the style of their original homes.[598]

After Mozambican independence in 1975 and the move of ZANLA headquarters from Zambia to Mozambique, spirit mediums were given space in every ZANU refugee and military camp inside Mozambique. They had huts separated from the others, dressed in traditional black tongas, since they considered the black colour holy, and never wore shoes or Western-style trousers, which showed their disdain for colonial influences.[599] At Chimoio Headquarters, which was the "nerve centre of all ZANLA operations", as described in Chapter II, there was a base allocated to the spirit mediums, named Kaguvi base after *Sekuru* Kaguvi, who was believed to have participated in the First Chimurenga alongside Mbuya Nehanda.[600] Edgar Tekere states that as early as 1975, even before the post-détente resumption of the armed struggle, at Junta Barracks, the refugee camp where FRELIMO located ZANLA recruits, spirit mediums used to conduct prayers to guide the war. He explains that, from time to time, the soldiers would be called to the spirit mediums' huts for rituals and advice and guidance. ZANLA fighters in refugee and military camps prayed for victory using traditional but never the Christian religion: "Our traditional religion was what sustained us", he says.[601] For Tekere, the exclusion of Christianity and appropriation of traditional religion was to do with the question of land and its centrality to the goals of the struggle, as discussed above.[602]

Spirit mediums played other roles too. During Rhodesian bombing raids on refugee and military camps, spirit mediums gave warnings about imminent attacks. As a preventive measure, the base commander would remove everyone from the camps and hide them in a safe place far away from the camp.[603] However, as Fay Chung argues, sometimes these warnings were false alarms.[604] Mutambara reports that some pretenders

[598] Ibid. However, with the intensification of the war and the consequent destruction of the homestead by the Portuguese, the elderly lady was moved to Chifombo in Zambia, where she died in 1974. More details about the presence of Spirit mediums in FRELIMO Tete Front see Munyaradzi Huni interview with Jimmy Mangwende, "Mbuya Nehanda's second Chimurenga Prophecy", *Sunday Mail*, (Nov 2015).
[599] Chung, *Re-living the Second Chimurenga*, p.197.
[600]Interview, Ruramai Maraire, Harare, 17 September 2022. See also Mutambara, *The Rebel in Me*, p.273.
[601] Edgar Tekere, *A Lifetime of Struggle* (Harare: Sapes Books, 2007), p.77. On the spirit medium's role in the interaction between FRELIMO and ZANU at FRELIMO's Tete Front, see Mhanda, *Dzino*, p.101-103.
[602]Tekere, *A Lifetime of Struggle*, p.90.
[603] Chung, *Re-living the Second Chimurenga*, p.201.
[604] Ibid.

among the spirit mediums made false prophecies foretelling the future to gain influence within the liberation movement.[605]

When ZIPA was formed late in 1975 and prepared to resume the armed struggle in January 1976, spiritual leaders advised Wilfred Mhanda, as ZIPA's Political Commissar, not to start the war before transferring the remains of the representative of Mbuya Nehanda's spirit from Chifombo, where she had died in 1974, to Rhodesia. He thought that acceding to this would cause unnecessary delays to the resumption of the war. But after his ZANLA colleagues' insistence, he decided to comply with their wish so that they would go to the front without protesting.[606] This demonstrates the spirit mediums' sway over some guerrilla fighters, and it shows the need of senior figures like Mhanda to gain the confidence of rank-and-file guerrillas and to raise morale, even if he did not believe in the power of the mediums.

Due to this influence within ZANU and ZANLA, the spirit mediums enjoyed close access to top leaders, such as ZANLA commander Josiah Tongogara and ZANU's president Robert Mugabe. In ZANU's refugee and military training camps in Mozambique, spirit mediums also had a vital role in paving the way for acceptance of visitors. Janice McLaughlin describes a particular episode during her stay at Mavudzi camp in Mozambique in 1978:

> The first night I was in Mavudzi, I heard singing and dancing at a distance. The next day, I was told that the spirit mediums who lived on the edges of the camp had held a service to consult the spirit ancestries, *Vanasekuru*, about my presence there. They told me the spirit mediums had said I was a friend and welcomed me at Mavudzi camp.[607]

Night-time performances of the medium possessed by the ancestral spirits were frequent at ZANU's camps in Mozambique. The possessed medium might ask to speak to a particular person. People would be awakened in the middle of the night to appear in the presence of a possessed spirit medium. During these sessions, the mediums would speak about different issues and criticise anything that had displeased them during the day.[608]

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[605] Mutambara, *The Rebel in Me*, p.112.
[606] Mhanda, *Dzino*, p.102.
[607] Janice McLaughlin, *The Color of Skin Doesn't matter: A Missioner's Tale of Faith and Politic* (Harare: Weaver, 2012), p.148.
[608] Chung, *Re-living the Second Chimurenga*, p.198-199.

Fay Chung, for example, remembers being invited by a medium to discuss ZANU's international relations. The mediums invited her in order to ask why the Soviet Union, the United States and the Chinese were participating in the liberation of Zimbabwe,[609] thus showing their desire to understand all the dynamics of the war.

These accounts demonstrate how ZANU and ZANLA institutionalised the role of spirit mediums in the camps in Mozambique from 1972, and the variety of different purposes doing so served, from security to morale to legitimation.

ZANU, Socialist ideology and African religion

ZANLA commanders and ZANU's political leadership accepted the use of traditional religion and gave space to spirit mediums in their camps and military bases despite their endorsement of a socialist ideology, and their training by Chinese and Eastern European and other instructors who did not accept the efficacy of religion in war or who were actively hostile to it.

The reason for this choice was in part that most guerrilla fighters recruited in the 1970s came from rural areas, and they and the civilians among whom they fought shared cultural and traditional religious beliefs. ZANLA commanders and ZANU politicians endorsed and institutionalised traditional religion in the war because peasant fighters were crucial to the armed struggle and constituted more than 70% of the rank-and-file of the liberation movement.[610] According to Terence Ranger, ZANU political leaders only decided to build a relationship with spirit mediums after discovering the influence they had over peasants.[611] Christopher Mutsvangwa and Zuma, two Zimbabwean War Veterans state that on occasion Chinese trainers and those trained in the Eastern bloc prohibited the use of religion as 'superstition' associated with backward irrationality that would expose the guerrillas to unnecessary risks.[612] Nonetheless it would play a central role in the war they fought.

[609] Ibid, p.202.
[610] Chung, p.194.
[611] Ranger, *Peasant Consciousness*, p.189.
[612] Interviews: Christopher Mutsvangwa, Harare, 22 September 2022; Zuma, Harare, 20 September 2022.

The majority of the ZANLA rank-and-file, notably those trained in Mozambique and by the Chinese in Tanzania, also lacked extended exposure to the socialist ideology promoted by ZANU's leaders. This could also explain the continued belief in traditional religion. The superficial treatment of ideology had to do with the fact that most ZANLA recruits from the mid-1970s (though not those of the 1960s) came from a rural background with low education levels. To facilitate their understanding, ideological education was limited to the basic explanation of people's grievances, the political history of Zimbabwe, which included the first Chimurenga, and the concepts of people's war in Maoist education.[613] As Sadomba argues, ideological instruction at that time was limited to reciting Mao's Red Book, without deep engagement with Marxism-Leninist and Maoist ideology.[614] Even though Chinese instructors had trained ZANLA cadres at Mgagao in Tanzania from 1965-1975, they hardly taught lessons about socialist ideology, limiting their political induction to the grievances of the Zimbabwean people and the value of armed struggle.[615] During the ZIPA period, when ZANLA soldiers mixed with ZIPRA fighters, ZANLA's so-called *Vashandi* (people or workers) group took the lead in the armed struggle and strengthened the political education of cadres. The Wampoa Political Academy (later called Chitepo College) was created as an ideological training academy. But it had little effect on rank-and-file soldiers' exposure to ideology as it was designed for a small group of highly qualified military personnel with secondary education and university degrees, thus excluding the majority of ZANLA recruits.[616]

The active participation of spirit mediums and the appeal to traditional religion in ZANLA's struggle is clear: it was pervasive and institutionalised, as I have shown. But the role of religion and the position of mediums on the war front itself was nonetheless highly contested and created divisions among ZANLA soldiers. Some chiefs of operations refused to give space to spirit mediums in the execution of the war, preferring instead to trust in secular military training and strategy.[617] There was also tension between

[613] Zvakangorwa Sadomba, *War Veterans in Zimbabwe's Revolution: Challenging Neo-colonialism and Settlers and International Capital* (London: James Currey, 2011), p.15-16.
[614] Ibid.
[615] Mhanda, *Dzino*, p.18-20.
[616] Sadomba, *War Veterans in Zimbabwe's Revolution*, p.32.
[617] Tendi, *The Army and Politics in Zimbabwe*, p.105-107.

commanders, politicians and the spirit mediums, and the contrast with FRELIMO's approach and especially the views of its leaders was striking, as I explore below.

FRELIMO, Samorismo and Religion

Mozambicans who joined FRELIMO and its liberation struggle came from different religious backgrounds. However, although important in the context of mobilisation to join the liberation movements, religious beliefs came under close scrutiny by FRELIMO's military leaders as the guerrilla struggle evolved, particularly where such beliefs affected the development of political and combat unity or the adoption and rationale of weaponry. Intolerance towards religion – "superstition and obscurantism" in simplified socialist ideology – was motivated by the need to control the soldiers. I first turn to the FRELIMO approach towards religion before discussing the use of traditional religion in the interaction between ZANLA and the FPLM soldiers on the battlefield and how it shaped solidarity between the two armies inside Rhodesia.

In colonial Mozambique, as in Zimbabwe, the establishment of churches by Christian missionaries brought tension with African religious beliefs, but so did a much longer standing interaction with Islam. During the colonial period, three official religious groups were dominant in Mozambique: Protestant, Muslim, and Catholic. The two later religious groups (Muslim and Catholic), alongside African traditional religions, were the most prevalent.

Under the Concordat of 1940 between the Vatican and Portugal, the education of blacks was left largely in the hands of the Catholic Church. Supported by state authority and resources not available to other denominations, the Church expanded basic primary education to tens of thousands of Mozambicans in the following decades. Protestant churches, particularly Presbyterian, Methodist, and Anglican, had already established themselves in the education of Mozambicans mainly in southern Mozambique, forming a small elite open to non-Portuguese cultural influences regarded as subversive by colonial authorities.[618]

[618] See Serapião, p.110-124. See also Eric Morier-Genoud, *Catholicism and making of Politics in Central Mozambique, 1940-2019* (New York: University of Rochester Press, 2019).

Muslim and Christian religious personnel were essential to the recruitment and mobilisation of the people to join the liberation movement during FRELIMO's liberation struggle. Muslim practitioners from Cabo Delgado and Niassa constituted the majority of the military recruits who joined this liberation movement's ranks. Because of kinship and religious ties with Tanganyika, which aroused a nationalist feeling and the desire for independence, Muslims from northern Mozambique were very active in mobilising and recruiting people to join FRELIMO during the beginning of the armed struggle.[619] Hélder Martins, a FRELIMO war veteran, recalled that when FRELIMO opened Nachingwea military camp in 1965, most recruits came from the *Ajawa* (Yao) ethnicity and were Muslims.[620]

Recruits coming from protestant churches swelled the ranks of FRELIMO's leadership, owing to the higher quality of the education they offered compared to their Catholic counterparts. Eduardo Mondlane, who became the first President of FRELIMO, and its Vice-President Rev. Uria Simango, came from a Presbyterian background and enjoyed access to advanced studies through this church. Mondlane pursued studies at university and completed a PhD in Social Anthropology in 1958 at Northwestern University in the United States. Uria Simango graduated from the Swiss Mission in December 1955 in Lourenco Marques (Maputo), and from 1959 until he joined the FRELIMO liberation movement in 1962, he worked as a Pastor of the Presbyterian Church of Central Africa in Salisbury, Rhodesia.[621]

Future FRELIMO leaders educated by the Catholic Church often became teachers in Mozambique. These men included Alberto Chipande, Salésio Nalyambipano, and Henrique Madebe, who were very active in recruiting young students for FRELIMO.

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[619] Liazzat Bonatte, "Traditions and Transitions Islam and Chiefship in Northern Mozambique ca. 1850-1974", (PhD Thesis: University of Cape Town, 2007), p. 220-240.

[620]Hélder Martins, "Samora na Luta Armada (1965-1968)", in António Sopa, ed. *Samora Homem do Povo* (Maputo: Meguezo, 2001), p.84. Hélder Martins acted as Machel's physician between 1965-1968.

[621] For more details on Mondlane's life see his autobiography, written in collaboration with André Clerc: Eduardo Mondlane and Daniel Clerc, *Chitlango, Filho de Chefe* (Maputo: Cadernos Tempo, 1990). See also: Pedro Borges Graça, *O projecto de Eduardo Mondlane* (Lisboa: Instituto Português de Conjuntura Estratégica. 2000); Teresa Cruz e Silva, "A Missão Suiça em Moçambique e a Formação da Juventude: A experiência de Eduardo Mondlane 1930-1961". *Estudos Moçambicanos* 16, (1999); José Duarte de Jesus, *Eduardo Mondlane: Um Homem a Abater (*Coimbra: Almedina, 2010); Livio Sansone, "Eduardo Mondlane and the Social Sciences", *Vibrant*, 2, 10 (2013). On Uria Simango see: Bernabé Ncomo, *Uria Simango, um Homem, uma Causa* (Maputo: Edições NovaAfrica, 2003); Colin Darch and Amélia Souto, *A Dictionary of Mozambican History and Society* (Cape Town: HRSC Press, 2022).

Catholic seminarists trained as priests also joined the movement. Eduardo Koloma, for example, studied in the schools run by the Catholic Church and deserted from the *Seminário Maior de Cristo Rei da Namaacha* (Major Seminary) in 1964, where he undertook training to become a priest. Kaloma recalls that when he decided to join FRELIMO in 1967, he was helped by the church's institutional links, which used to help Mozambicans to cross into Malawi to join FRELIMO. He described his journey:

> I caught the train from Beira [Sofala] to Malawi. A black priest who worked at Muraça Mission, Father Mateus Gwenjere, was supposed to give me directions for the route. He had been my colleague at the São João Baptista junior seminary at Zóbuè and the Christ the King senior seminary at Namaacha. He helped many compatriots to cross into Malawi bound for Tanzania. When I arrived in Vila Sena, I decided to spend the night at Muraça mission to get his instructions. ... However, when I asked about him, a white priest replied that he was no longer at the mission…So, I decided to open up to him about my intentions to join the liberation movement. This white priest gave me the necessary instructions and the name of the person I should contact on the other side of the border, in Nsanje, Malawi. This contact was a collaborator whom Mozambican nationalists could trust for further instructions to cross Malawi to Tanzania. [622]

Teachers from the Anglican Mission in Messumba, located on Lake Niassa, were also active in mobilizing their students to join the guerrilla army. Many of the first leaders of FRELIMO's military, such as Osvaldo Tazama, instructor and Chief of Military Operations on the Niassa front, and Paulo Samuel Khankomba, Provincial Head of Operations on the Cabo Delgado Front, came from the Messumba Mission.[623] Antonio Ibrahim, a former student at Messumba, recalls that the first time he heard about FRELIMO was in 1964 when FRELIMO guerrillas attacked the Mission and destroyed the flagpole. Ibrahim and his colleagues were curious as to what this attack meant. Their teachers explained about FRELIMO and the beginning of the armed struggle. Months later, in early 1965, Ibrahim and twelve other colleagues from the mission were recruited to join FRELIMO by some of its guerrillas.[624]

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[622] Eduardo Koloma, *Os Padres também vão a Guerra* in Raimundo Pachinuapa and Pedro Gemo, *Sacrificados para Criar uma Nação: Entrevistas com os Combatentes da Luta de Libertação Nacional*, vol 2 (Maputo: Nachingwea Editores, 2016), p. 121-122.

[623] For more details see the testimonies reported in Ana Mussanhane (ed), *Protagonistas da Luta de Libertação Nacional* (Maputo: Marimbique, 2011).

[624] Interview, António Ibrahimo, Maputo, 12 October 2021. Contrary to the schools run by the Catholic church, which used Portuguese as the only medium of instruction, Anglican and Protestant missions used both local languages and Portuguese, which according to my interviewees in many instances facilitated comprehension in their teaching.

Although the first President of FRELIMO, Eduardo Mondlane, and his Vice-President were tolerant of people's religious beliefs, the FRELIMO military wing, led by Samora Machel, who was the Chief of Defence within the movement from 1965-1970, and then became the President of FRELIMO after Mondlane's death, developed a less tolerant attitude in guerrilla training and discipline. Machel was not always hostile to traditional religion. In his autobiography, Mateus Mboa, who left Maputo for Tanzania with Samora Machel to join FRELIMO in early 1963, recounts that before their departure, Machel suggested they consult a *Curandeiro* (spirit medium) to get their ancestors' blessing to protect them on the journey. The *Curandeiro* assured them that the trip would be challenging, but they would make it safely to Tanzania without being imprisoned by PIDE.[625] Mboa says that the spirit medium even predicted that Machel would return to Mozambique as a prominent leader.[626] It seems that Machel's turn against religion came subsequently, a result of his military experience, which started as a trainee in Algeria and culminated during his contact with the Chinese instructors at Nachingwea.[627]

After this, his views would spread through the movement as a whole, owing to his own training and his methods of building military authority and a disciplined army. When he opened the Nachingwea Military Camp in 1965, Machel prohibited overt religious manifestation or cults there and in FRELIMO's bases in the operational areas. Hélder Martins described the means used by Machel to convince the group of Muslim recruits to modify their religious beliefs, causing them to abandon the practice of fasting during Ramadan, and to eat pork. This was important for Machel since a staple food in the camp was cornmeal, beans, and canned pork. If Muslims obeyed their religious beliefs, it would affect the diet of these recruits and, consequently, it was believed, the process of hardening their physical capacity needed for them to engage the Portuguese on the

[625] Matias Mboa, *Memórias da Luta Clandestina* (Maputo: Marimbique, 2009), pp. 83-86. According to Matias Mboa, their (himself and Machel) motivation in joining FRELIMO in Tanzania was to obtain scholarships to pursue their studies elsewhere, not to get military training.
[626] Ibid.
[627] On Machel's training in Algeria see Allen Isaacman and Barbara Isaacman, *Samora Machel - Uma Vida Interrompida: A Life cut short* (Maputo: Alcançe Editora, 2022).

battlefield.[628] Malimuse Saide, a FRELIMO trainee from a Muslim religious background, remembers eating pork at Nachingwea while receiving military training.[629]

Machel's attempts to eliminate overt religious practices among the guerrillas were both practical and ideological, and were rigorous. Martins recalls a quarrel between Machel and Father Mateus Gwenjere at Nachingwea camp. He states that Mondlane was tolerant towards religion and accepted Gwenjere's request to visit the Nachingwea military camp. In his letter to Machel, who was by this time the Chief of Defence and responsible for Nachingwea and all military logistics within FRELIMO, Mondlane stated that it would be good for the recruits' morale to have a priest blessing the troops. When the priest arrived, he asked Machel for permission to celebrate a religious service for the Catholic recruits; Machel denied the request. Not happy with the answer, Gwenjere surreptitiously began circulating in the military training camp, asking recruits about their religion, and distributing blessings. Furious with the priest's attitude, Machel sent him back to Dar es Salaam. "I don't want this priest to spoil my work of conscientizing the recruits," Machel wrote to Eduardo Mondlane justifying the priest's expulsion from Nachingwea.[630] Although I did not find confirmation of this letter, the hostile relationship that Machel (an others) had with Father Gwenjere was widely known, particularly after Gwenjere was blamed for student riots at the Mozambique Institute in Dar es Salaam. It is also widely believed that FRELIMO executed Father Gwenjere after Mozambique's independence.[631] Though Machel's clash with Gwenjere was about the religion and ideology of the recruits, it was also about Machel's authority: Gwenjere posed a threat to Machel's control over the guerrillas. This episode also reflected differences between Mondlane (civilian leader) and Machel (a military leader). Machel also refused a request of an Italian Catholic Priest, Father Guisseppe Frizzi, to work as a religious teacher in a zone liberated by FRELIMO. As Machel explained in his response, FRELIMO did not

[628] Martins, "Samora na Luta Armada (1965-1968)", p. 84.
[629] Interview, Malimuse Saide, Maputo, 12 November 2022.
[630] Ibid.
[631] Mateus Gwenjere joined FRELIMO in 1967 and worked as a teacher at the Mozambique Institute, FRELIMO's Secondary School in Tanzania, from 1967 to 1972, the year he left FRELIMO and took refuge in Kenya, accused of being the agitator for the student convulsions at the Mozambique Institute. It is believed that Gwenjere was executed by FRELIMO in 1975. For more details, see: Lawe Laweki, *Mateus Pinho Gwenjere, a Revolutionary Priest* (Wandsbeck: Reach, 2019). On the conflicts at the Mozambique Institute, see Michael Panzer, *A Nation in Name, a State in Exile: The FRELIMO Proto-State, Youth, Gender, and the Liberation of Mozambique, 1962-1975*, PhD thesis, (New York: State University, 2013).

permit the teaching or the exercise of any religion in military, academic or health sectors for security reasons and because of FRELIMO policy of not using religion in war.[632]

Machel's views may also have been shaped by socialist ideological objections to religion. The Chinese military instructors, with whom Machel worked closely at Nachingwea, seem to have influenced him against using religion in guerrilla warfare. Martins says that the Chinese instructors suggested Machel read all of Mao Zedong's works, which contributed to the formation of his socialist ideology.[633]

The nomination of Samora Machel as President of FRELIMO in 1970 went hand in hand with the consolidation of the political-military line of Marxist inspiration in FRELIMO.[634] Marxist-Leninist ideas started circulating in FRELIMO sphere at its formation. Prominent figures like Sérgio Vieira, who was initiated in Marxist ideology while studying in Portugal, and Marcelino dos Santos, who had much contact with Marxist intellectuals from eastern bloc countries, as well as soldiers who learned about Marxism-Leninism via military training, were influential in FRELIMO's assimilation of Marxism-Leninism.[635] These ideas mixed with other socialist views. Aquino de Bragança argues that FRELIMO combined Marxist-Leninist principles and Maoism, a mix he calls *Samorismo*, owing to Mozambique having a tiny working class and a peasantry forming about 90% of its total active population.[636]

After Machel became FRELIMO's President he continued to stand vigorously against religious beliefs opposed to FRELIMO. Machel began an uphill struggle against what he considered 'obscurantism', including what he thought of as superstitious traditions that FRELIMO's recruits brought from their rural homes. He sought to instil confidence in scientific principles instead of supernatural predictions. This opposition to religion was inculcated into FRELIMO recruits, particularly during military training. In 1970, Samora Machel wrote a manual designed to be used by military instructors in

[632] See Colin Darch and David Hedges, *Samora Machel, Leader and Liberator in Southern Africa: Selected Speeches and Writing of Samora Machel* (Cape Town: HSRC Press, 2024), p.117-120.
[633] Helder Martins, *Porquê Sakrani? Memórias dum médico duma guerrilha esquecida* (Maputo: Editorial Terceiro Milénio, 2001), p.313.
[634] Luís de Brito, "O Poder entre a utopia e a Realidade", in António Sopa, ed. *Samora Homem do Povo* (Maputo: Maguezo, 2001), p.32.
[635] See Sérgio Vieira, *Lutei, por Isso Testemunho* (Maputo: Njira, 2011). On Marcelino dos Santos's links with the eastern bloc see: Natalia Telepneva, *Cold War Liberation: The Soviet Union and the Collapse of the Portuguese Empire in Africa* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2022).
[636] Aquino de Bragança, "O Marxismo de Samora. Comunicação ao Congresso de Sociologia, Uppsala", *Três Continentes*, 3, (Sept 1980).

military training camps. He clarified the prohibition on using religion and traditional spirits within the guerrilla ranks in the operational areas. As he remarked:

> The destruction of superstition in the army is necessary since it can lead us to useless defeats and sacrifices. The fighter who believes in divine superpower and despises camouflage serves as a target for enemy bullets. The combatant must understand that his life and victory depend solely on his intelligence, terrain, and weapon. It is not in the spirits that the enemy's destruction is found but in our strength.[637]

Various documents and Machel's speeches underlined the prohibition of 'obscurantism' in FRELIMO. In the opening speech for a new FRELIMO nursing course in November 1971, published by the *Departamento de Ideologia e Propaganda da FRELIMO* (FRELIMO's Department of Ideology and Propaganda), for example, Machel argued against religious beliefs in the liberation movement, stating that "the ignorance, superstition, religious fanaticism took people's beliefs in non-existent supernatural forces, amulets and stones, despising science". He went on to say that people "looked to the sky for answers when the secret was found on the ground": the primary role of FRELIMO members was to push back obscurantism and destroy superstition.[638]

Machel's personality and ideas were crucial owing the growing weight of the military branch within FRELIMO as the war advanced against the Portuguese, and Machel's dominant role in that branch. According to Candido Mondlane, who worked under Machel at Nachingwea as the Head of Recruitment, Training and Staff Development, FRELIMO's life began to be dominated by its military wing at Nachingwea during the late 1960s. Machel, being the Chief of Defence and then FRELIMO's President, oversaw all military and political aspects of the liberation struggle within FRELIMO.[639] Under Machel's influence, FRELIMO began to present an ideology that combined the evangelical and moralistic essence of mission education, which was clear in his speeches and doctrinal pamphlets, with a hybrid of Marxist-Leninism and Maoism.[640] Moreover, as Benedito Machava argues, although Machel was the leader who

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[637] Samora Machel, "Nota de Estudos para Instructores: Compreender a nossa tarefa", *Coleção Estudos e Orientação*, 13, Departamento de Informação e Propaganda, (1979).
[638] Samora Machel, "No Trabalho Sanitário, Materializemos o Princípio de que a Revolução Liberta o Homem: O Papel dos Serviços de Saúde", *Coleção Estudos e Orientação*,3, Departamento de Informação e Propaganda, (1973). The text was republished by FRELIMO in 1979.
[639] Candido Mondlane in Mussanhane (ed), *Protagonistas da Luta de Libertação Nacional*, p.264-265.

represented FRELIMO's radical voice and its military institutions, his views were shared by all on FRELIMO's Central Committee.[641]

In contrast to ZANU/ZANLA, FRELIMO's political and military leadership was firmly committed to an anti-religious socialist ideology centred on Samorismo and hostile to 'obscurantism'. The idea of officially or institutionally incorporating figures such as spirit mediums into FRELIMO's war strategies was unthinkable. But its soldiers who fought alongside ZANLA looked a lot like ZANLA's in terms of their rural backgrounds and traditional religious beliefs, as I discuss in the next section. However, in the account of battlefield beliefs and interactions between the FPLM and ZANLA soldiers, the Christian and Muslim beliefs do not come into the discussion because, as I explored chapter II, the soldiers who fought with ZANLA were deliberately recruited from central Mozambique.

FRELIMO's Fighters and the Belief in Supernatural Forces on the Battlefield

Soldiers who fought alongside side ZANLA and had already experienced the armed struggle during FRELIMO war against the Portuguese, state that they learned from their military training and from their leaders' discourse that FRELIMO opposed the use of any religion at the war front. Nonetheless, some FRELIMO fighters relied upon their traditional faith in operational areas. Many FRELIMO fighters, including commanders, came from a peasant and rural background and believed in and used medicinal charms and spiritual protection, drawing on beliefs that had existed before colonisation.[642] The veterans I interviewed, who largely came from the central region of Mozambique, pointed out that FRELIMO's commanders and soldiers secretly appealed to traditional leaders and consulted them to obtain anti-bullet substances and other medicines for their protection. Harry West, writing about the liberation struggle in Cabo Delgado, argues that while FRELIMO leaders disdained traditional beliefs, most guerrillas, including the

[640] Benedito Machava, *The Morality of Revolution: Urban Cleanup Campaigns, Reeducation Camps, and Citizenship in Socialist Mozambique (1974-1988)***,** PhD Thesis (Michigan: University of Michigan, 2018), p.71.
[641] Ibid.
[642] Harry West, *Kupilikula*: *Governance and the Invisible Realm in Mozambique* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1992), p.83-85.

commanders born and raised in the countryside, believed in and used medicinal charms.[643]

The role of traditional religion in war was often recounted with great enthusiasm and vivid detail by FRELIMO veterans. Fabião Chigole, a veteran who operated on the Niassa Front during the liberation struggle and then fought alongside ZANLA inside Rhodesia, stated that engaging on the battlefield would be impossible without the protection of spirit mediums and ancestral spirits. As he explained:

> I come from the Ngoma tradition, and when I was born, I was given the spirit of a Lion to protect me. Before joining the guerrillas, I consulted a N'yanga from the same family spirit pantheon as mine in Malawi. He gave me medicine and amulets to defend my body against enemy bullets. When I finished military training and was then deployed to the war front, I returned to him, and he predicted everything that would happen on the battlefield. Sometimes, we would leave the front zone and cross the border to Malawi to ask for his advice on our military operations.[644]

Jemusse Saide claims that during FRELIMO's liberation struggle on the Niassa front, his father, a FRELIMO fighter, and a Muslim sheikh, had a vital role in the struggle against the Portuguese. He stated that his father used his knowledge of the Koran and of African traditional beliefs to find out if, on a specific day, he could go to combat or not. According to the answers he got in his spiritual consultations, he would know the exact moment to go to fight. The guerrillas would also seek his advice before going into action. They asked him the best time for launching the attacks and the direction they should go to avoid clashes with the enemy.[645] In a similar fashion, Henrique Madebe, a veteran who had operated on the Niassa Front during the liberation struggle, recalled his experience with spirit mediums when his group entered the Mataca area:

> Chief Mataca immediately ordered his subjects to accompany us to the tomb of the first Mataca in the Ntelela area. But first, he called us to buy eight metres of white fabric. Before the start of our military operations in that area, there were still some Portuguese stores, and as the platoon commander had some money to support logistics, we bought the fabric. And then, we were ordered to take one bullet out of each weapon we brought and deposit them at the tomb of King Mataca. We left shells from the AKM, Bazookas, rockets, and grenades at the Mataka tomb. The following day we took them and delivered

[643] Ibid, p.83-85.
[644] Interview, Fabião Chigole, Moatize, 3 June 2021.
[645] IPHLLN, "Depoimento de Jemusse Malimusse Saíde", Unpublished text

> them to the traditional authorities according to the traditional guidelines and procedures followed by King Mataca, the emperor of the Ajaua.[646]

Madebe described the guerrillas' delivery of the white fabrics with bullets to the Mataca, and how the experience had shaped his own beliefs:

> On the day the material was handed over to the spirits of the area, there was an unprecedented show, something I had never seen anywhere else. In the middle of Comrade Commissioner Armando Panguene's intervention, a flock of birds called "Wanda" [in ChiShona, Chapungu], in the local language, covered the entire hut where the first Mataca's tomb was located and where we were sitting. They surrounded us and landed on our heads and shoulders while singing their beautiful, unique, happy songs, typical of birds. The women who went with us to participate in that traditional ceremony and reception of the deceased shouted the "mkulunguana" [ululation] from their mouths, the highest expression of joy for Africans. That was the sign of spiritual welcome, praying for significant successes in our combat operations… I must say that during the entire period that we stayed in the Mataca area, confronting the enemy on the battlefield, none of us was killed or injured by the enemy's bullet, meaning that we had the spiritual protection of the Matacas.[647]

As is clear in these accounts, some guerrillas gained support from traditional religion on the battlefield through of their beliefs, but the collaboration between guerrillas and spirit mediums was also based on their concern for local political mobilisation and legitimacy. Fighters from outside the areas where they were deployed, or who did not believe in the role of spirit mediums, accepted them as part of popular integration and support. Mariano Matsinha states that during the first years of the armed struggle, some FRELIMO commanders who had trained in socialist countries told the local population that God did not exist, thereby creating conflict between guerrillas and civilians, who started denying them support for their military operations; the FRELIMO leadership had to order that guerrillas should not speak to the population in such terms.[648] Moreover, not all guerrillas were convinced that traditional beliefs were effective. Hama Thai was a FRELIMO military commander who viewed local religion as dangerous in the execution of the war. He stated that in the Tete Front, he saw comrades being killed for believing

[646] IPHLLN, "Depoimento de Herinque Madebe", Unpublished text.
[647] Ibid.
[648] Mariano Matsinha in Mussanhane (ed), *Protagonistas da Luta de Libertação Nacional*, p.568.

that the amulets they were using had the power to deflect Portuguese bullets.[649] According to him, it was difficult to instil in the population and the combatants the idea that the war had nothing to gain from 'superstition' but to rely on strategic and military skills.[650]

Religious beliefs were also at the root of liberation war-era disagreements that some FRELIMO cadres had with ZANLA guerrillas working in joint operations in FRELIMO's Tete Front in 1972-4. FRELIMO allowed ZANLA soldiers to bring spirit mediums from Rhodesia to Mozambique, as explored earlier, but ZANLA's reliance on spirit mediums to predict the course of the war irritated some FRELIMO guerrillas.[651] Wilfred Mhanda recounted that he had to lie to FRELIMO's "Comrade Dimaka" about his mission to collect the remains of the Nehanda medium who had died in Chifombo, Zambia, in 1974. Knowing that FRELIMO's area commander was against recourse to spirit mediums, Mhanda told him that ZANLA soldiers were crossing to Zambia to bring weapons. FRELIMO soldiers who escorted the Zimbabwean cortege discovered the reason for the trip and told their commander. Mhanda was then obliged to confess. Dimaka apparently showed appreciation for Mhanda's reasons for lying but admitted that he had executed five spirit mediums during FRELIMO's liberation war because they had tried to interfere with his work.[652]

It was with this controversial, highly contested, and variable attitude towards the role of spirit mediums, and religion more widely, that FPLM and ZANLA undertook joint military operations in Rhodesia. The differences reflected the views of commanders and political leaders, but also the contexts of training, exposure to ideology, soldiers' social origins, interactions with civilians, as well as local commanders' strategy in seeking to gain the support of both soldiers and civilians in military operations. I will discuss in the next section how this worked in practice in the day-to-day interactions on the battlefield and argue that the outcome was a practice of military solidarity that was both pragmatic and innovative, and forged by the soldiers themselves.

[649] Interview, Hama Thai.
[650] Ibid.
[651] Interview, Lopes Tembe, Maputo, 18 April 2020.
[652] Mhanda, *Dzino*, p.103.

Mozambican FPLM soldiers who joined ZANLA in Rhodesia encountered ZANLA's strategy of collaborating with spirit mediums and using traditional religion on the battlefield. As mentioned before, although the soldiers who fought with ZANLA were conventionally trained after Mozambique independence, they had experience of their liberation struggle and had been deliberately recruited for these missions from the central region, so that they would share a common language. They also shared a broad set of cultural attributes, as much of Manica and Sofala had formed part of the Mutapa empire along with much of central and eastern Zimbabwe. There were many more recent connections through trade, migration and marriage between those living in Mozambique and Zimbabwe. In this larger zone, beliefs in the power of spirit mediums as the link between the dead and living were widespread. Similar rituals, such as asking for rain during planting and thanking the spirits for the crops produced at harvest time were practised.[653]

As explored in the previous chapter, FPLM soldiers began entering Rhodesia in 1975/6 to plant mines and, while escorting their counterparts to Rhodesia, participated in combat with Rhodesian Forces. From 1978, they entered Zimbabwe to fight alongside ZANLA. Engaged in the fraught process of military innovation on the battlefield, they also debated the role of religion. The nature of the battlefield, with its life and death pressures and need for civilian support proved fundamental.

The veterans I interviewed from Zimbabwe and Mozambique emphasised that the first thing they did on the battlefield, before engaging in operations against Rhodesian Forces, was to approach the spirit mediums of the area so as to present themselves as the men who intended to liberate the country from the colonial regime to the *VanaSekuru*, (the older men who spiritually protect the living). After the introductions, the guerrillas asked for support and advice, and the spirit medium would perform a ceremony to introduce the guerrillas to the ancestral spirits so that they could protect them during their operations. Diverse rituals were used to connect the guerrillas with the ancestors. One of them involved taking snuff made from a mixture of tobacco and leaves. In areas where tobacco was hard to find, the guerrillas would use the leaves of a sacred tree as snuff.[654]

[653] Serra (ed), *História de Moçambique*, Vol.1, p. 35.
[654]Interview, Maraire.

In many cases the snuff was spilled on the ground as an offering to the ancestors, usually under a specific tree. All those present, including the guerrillas, who put their weapons down, would kneel. Then the senior spirit medium of the area, who led the ceremony, talked to the ancestors about the presence of the guerrilla fighters and requested their support. The participants would then clap their hands to show respect to their ancestors.[655] In some areas, like Gwezane, the guerrillas would spread white maize flour on the ground as an offering to the spirit.[656] Others cooked sadza and meat and left them under a tree for the ancestral spirits.[657]

Cinco Reis, an FPLM fighter deployed to Rhodesia to fight alongside ZANLA in 1978, remembered his surprise on learning that ZANLA soldiers openly used traditional religion on the battlefield and reported these rituals in official communication with their commanders and ZANU's political leaders. He stated that when operating on the Manica and Sofala front during FRELIMO's liberation struggle, his commander had not allowed them to engage with traditional religion. Fighters had approached the spirit mediums on their own initiative, often hidden from commanders. Although Cinco Reis was surprised by the ZANU and ZANLA leader's tolerance of traditional religion on the battlefield, the ceremonies themselves were familiar to him, as he explained:

> I grew up in Manica (and) Maringue, and we had the same traditions as the Shonas from Zimbabwe. After the harvest, my grandfather made a traditional beer and invited the whole family to go to a specific tree we had at home. He would spill the beer on the ground, cook sadza and chicken without salt and put them under the tree as an offering to our ancestors to thank them for the food. The rest of the food was given to the children; adults were prohibited from eating it. It was believed that the spirit would drink beer and eat food at night.[658]

Even the FPLM fighters I interviewed who did not belong to the Shona cultural sphere had beliefs and traditional rituals similar to those in Zimbabwe. Most Mozambican soldiers who constituted the new army after 1975 and did not experience FRELIMO's liberation struggle had similar beliefs in the spirit world. Alexandre Jonasse, an FPLM soldier who trained as a Nova Vida in 1974 (see chapter II) and was then trained by

[655]Interviews: Maraire; Lino Cinco Reis, Maputo,17 November 2020.
[656] Interview, Alexander Jonassane (Matucurai), Maputo, 25 November 2020.
[657] Interviews: Fastmove, Harare, 17 September 2022; Maraire.
[658] Interview, Cinco Reis.

Soviet instructors in Boane and by Cubans in Inhambane, stated that their trainers never touched on the issue of religion. He only learned that it would be relevant in the front after being deployed to Rhodesia. However, because he was born in Manica province and was raised believing and practising traditional religion, it did not create any confusion in his mind.[659] Their familiarity with the ceremonies and rituals held in Rhodesia meant Mozambican soldiers were willing to accept the use of traditional religion on the battlefield, allowing some degree of agreement in the relationship between the rank-and-file of ZANLA and Mozambican fighters, despite the progressive ideology of their political leaders.

The uses of traditional religion on the battlefield were diverse. One vital role was in shaping and demarcating hierarchy among guerrillas. The Commanders' and Political Commissars' power was emphasized in this process. They had the power to decide whether to contact spirit mediums or not and knelt next to them during the ritual ceremonies.[660] In areas where guerrillas could not find civilian populations and spirit mediums to collaborate, the ZANLA Political Commissar performed the ritual ceremonies of asking for protection from the ancestral spirits. When crossing a river, for example, the ZANLA Political Commissar would take a pinch of snuff and ask for protection and guidance.[661] Peter Mauatsi, a FRELIMO soldier who entered Rhodesia to operate alongside ZANLA soldiers in 1978 in the Botcha area, claims that sometimes the guerrilla group as a whole did not participate in the ceremonies for security reasons. Only the ZANLA Commander, his Political Commissar, and some ZANLA guerrillas went to a particular place to perform the rituals, thus avoiding moving a large group of fighters from one place to another, which might draw the attention of Rhodesian troops to the presence of the guerrillas.[662] Lino Cinco Reis said that in his group of fighters, the ZANLA Political Commissar used to carry snuff and white flour with him so that if they wanted to open a new operational front, he would, in the absence of the spirit medium of the area, perform the ceremony of talking to the spirits.[663] The ZANLA Political

[659] Interview, Alexandre Jonasse (Matucurai).
[660] Interviews: Fungani Chinganhance, Changara, 1 June 2021; Maraire; Fastmove; Matucurai.
[661] Interviews: Maraire; Fastmove; Tabitha, Harare, 23 September 2022; Peter Mauatsi, Chimoio, 25 May 2021. See also Mutambara, *The Rebel in Me,* p. 113.
[662]Interview, Peter Mauatsi.
[663] Interview, Cinco Reis.

Commissar in effect acted as a spiritual advisor and intermediary, ensuring the safety of the group.

Traditional religion on the battlefield also functioned to delimit belonging. It defined the place of Mozambican combatants in Rhodesia as outsiders, making them less active in the rituals. My Mozambican interviewees recount that they were not allowed to perform the rites of spilling snuff on Zimbabwean soil and talking with the spirits of the ancestors of Zimbabwe because they were guests. Fungani Chinganhance asserted that, "the spirit did not know us": "if we requested something from them, they would either ignore us or even punish us for disobeying the spiritual hierarchy code".[664] ZANLA veterans' accounts corroborated this view, stating that due to the fear of having their "comrade" punished or killed, ZANLA guerrillas felt the necessity of introducing them to the spirits of their Zimbabwean ancestors so that they could look at them as welcome guests rather than intruders.[665] It was only after this spiritual introduction that Mozambicans were allowed to pray and speak to their Mozambican ancestors and ask them for protection, though without performing the ritual of spilling of snuff or other substances on the ground as the ZANLA soldiers were doing because the land did not belong to them.[666] In some areas, like Gweru, the spirits would also tell the Zimbabweans to be the first to drink water, and to use water gourds as a sign of welcoming the Mozambican fighters.[667] It seems that rank-and-file fighters of both FPLM and ZANLA were largely in agreement on these kinds of appeals to the spirits. For them, these rituals enhanced the safety of the guerrillas themselves by making them known to the ancestral spirits of particular places.

The benefits of appealing to the ancestors extended to their influence on the battlefield. Many guerrillas believed that spirit mediums had a pivotal role in predicting the course of battles and saving guerrilla lives in action. Mouzinho Sandes remembers that when he and his platoon entered Masvingo in 1978, the guerrillas consulted a spirit medium of the area to seek Mbuya Nehanda's advice and predictions about the planned attack the guerrillas would carry out. According to him, Nehanda told the guerrillas that

[664] Interviews: Chinganhance; Fernando Nhatumbo, Chimoio; 20 May 2021; António Jessinão, 24 May 2021; and Wilson Tope, Tete, 28 May 2021.
[665] Interview, Fastmove.
[666] Interview: Chinganhance, Castro Macacho, Changara, 1 june 2021.
[667] Interview, Wilson Tope, Chimoio, 28 May 2021.

the attack against a Rhodesian target would be successful but warned them to return to the spirit medium before moving on to other operational areas. After the ZANLA attack, the Rhodesians – unusually – failed to pursue the guerrillas. It was believed that Nehanda's spirit darkened the sky and caused the weather to deteriorate to the point where Rhodesian airplanes and helicopters could not take off.[668] Faith in the power of the spirit of Mbuya Nehanda to use the weather to protect guerrillas is echoed in the accounts of ZANLA veterans. Ruramai Maraire, a ZANLA woman who operated in Takawira Sector in Tete front as a Detachment Political Commissar from 1978-1980, recalled a time when her group of fighters was surrounded by surprise by Rhodesian forces. They bombed the guerrillas from planes and helicopters, while the infantry moved on the ground. Tactically, staying in the crossfire of the enemy would be difficult without taking many casualties. As she detailed, "It was daytime, with sun and lots of light, but suddenly the temperature began to change, the sky darkened, and the Rhodesians could not attack, which allowed us to escape".[669] The guerrillas assumed that this unexpected change of weather in such a dangerous situation was caused by the spirits of their ancestors using their supernatural powers to protect them from the enemy.

My interviewees' accounts also highlighted the ancestral spirits' role in protecting them in the form of animals. Veterans said that the bateleur eagle, known as *Chapungu* in ChiShona, was a messenger from the ancestors, and had a vital role on the battlefield. Veterans from both ZANLA and FPLM stated that this bird might appear to the guerrillas to save them from dangerous situations. It might fly above to warn them about the presence of the enemy in the direction that the guerrillas were going or even to help them escape the bullets in crossfire by indicating the paths to escape.[670] Matucarai, an FPLM soldier, recounted an episode in which the bird helped his group in Gweru in 1979:

> Because of the intensity of the enemy attacks, we hid in an area where there were no people, meaning there was no one to feed or water us. We stayed in this area for about seven days without food or water, and our bodies began to weaken. Meanwhile, a bird appeared, and the ZANLA comrades started putting snuff on the ground and asking the spirits to save us from the situation of hunger and thirst that we were in. Then we

[668] Interview, Mouzinho Sande, 17 May 2021.
[669] Interview, Maraire.
[670] Interviews: Fastmove; Maraire; Matucarai; Chimurenga I; Harare, 18 September 2022; Stanford Kavhumbura, Harare, 19 September 2022; Mouzinho Sande, Chimoio, 17 May 2022.

> followed the bird's direction and saw it stopped in a creek and was drinking water. That made us feel excited because we did finally drink water.[671]

There is a common belief in Shona society that animals can act as intermediaries between spirits and the living and bring messages in specific situations.[672] In addition to the Chapungu, veterans recounted that wild animals, such as the lion, which the Shona regarded as a sacred animal representing the spirit of a *Mhondoro*, a deceased chief who had ruled a specific area, could also show the routes through which the guerrillas could circulate.[673] According to Luise White, the relationship between Rhodesian forces and wild animals was about being trained in bushcraft to learn as much to understand the landscape and track guerrillas as it was to poach animals for fun or economic purposes; while the relationship between ZANLA and FPLM guerrillas was about the ways in which these wild animals could help them successfully escape the tracking of Rhodesian forces. Her argument shows how the two war belligerents (Rhodesian forces and guerrillas) understood the battlefield and their similar – though divergent – understandings of the same fauna.[674]

Guerrillas' dreams could also play a role in the war front. Many ZANLA guerrillas reported that ancestral spirits had appeared in their dreams while at military training and refugee camps in Mozambique and at the front in Rhodesia. The spirits warned them about the presence of the enemy near places where they were hidden and told them of strategies they could apply in battles; they could also appear in dreams to prevent guerrillas from aborting a planned attack or even changing targets.[675] FPLM soldiers fighting alongside ZANLA also reported the appearance of spirits in their dreams. Sandes recalls that the night before the Nyadzonia attacks in August 1976, at the refugee camp where he was posted as a guard, he dreamed of a tortoise eating people. Because, according to his cultural beliefs, dreaming of tortoises or other animals means a

[671] Interview, Matucarai.
[672] For more details about the role of animals in Shona's culture see Diana Auret, "The Mhondoro spirits of supra tribal significance in the culture of the Shona", *African Studies*, 41:2, (1982); Nisbert Taringa, "The Sacred Duty of Animals in African Traditional Religion and Culture", Paper presented at the Conference "Future Africa: Appropriating Natures for the Future: Africa and Beyond" in 2017, available at www.uni-Bayreuth-academy-futureafrica,
[673] Interview, Fastmove; see also Lan, *Guns and Rain*.
[674] Luise White, *Fighting and Writing: The Rhodesian Army at war and Postwar* (London: Duke University Press, 2021).
[675]Interviews: Fastmove; Maraire; and Kavhumbura.

warning from the spirits about imminent danger, he shared the dream's content with his commander. While trying to decipher the dream's meaning, the Rhodesians arrived and started slaughtering people. According to him, that is when he understood what the spirits were trying to warn him about.[676] Manuel Faria, another FPLM soldier and a veteran of the liberation struggle was also a guard at Nyadzonia at the time the massacre. He also related having a dream the day before the attack in which he was shooting monkeys that died and piled on top of each other.[677] António Jessinão, an FPLM soldier recruited after Mozambique independence who participated in joint combat with ZANLA in Rhodesia in 1976-77, remembered dreaming that on returning to Mozambique, his platoon, constituted by FPLM and ZANLA fighters, would be chased and attacked by Rhodesian forces in Espungabera. This attack then took place as he had foreseen. Despite alerting his commander about the dream, he could not prevent some of his comrades from being captured by Rhodesian Forces.[678]

Some veterans described how they might themselves be possessed by spirits in the midst of war. Some acted hysterically during fighting with the enemy or after battles at the front or in military bases. In Mutambara's account of the Rhodesian attacks at ZANLA Headquarters in Chimoio in 1977 he noted that, on the first day of attacks, some of the guerrillas started acting oddly as if they were possessed by spirits, speaking meaningless words, tearing at their clothes, and breaking the weapons they were carrying.[679] Spirit possession also extended to children living in the refugee camps and attending schools. Fay Chung states that, after bombing episodes, spirits possessed many children during the night. The children would act hysterically and protest against suffering and oppression in their trances.[680] War veterans also recounted episodes in which a soldier or a group of soldiers from FPLM and ZANLA would be possessed by spirits and enter into a trance to tell them about specific aspects of their operations.[681]

The fact of hysteria and trances being manifested by both ZANLA and FPLM soldiers led soldiers to believe that not only were Mozambican soldiers helping ZANLA

[676] Interview, Sande.
[677] Interview, Manuel Faria, Chimoio, 21 May 2021.
[678] Interview, António Jessinão, Chimoio, 24 May 2021.
[679] Mutambara, *The Rebel in Me,* p.192.
[680] Chung, *Re-living Chimurenga,* p. 208.
[681] Interviews: Fastmove; Maraire; Sandes; Adelino; Cinco Reis; Matucurai.

in its military operations against Rhodesian forces, but also that the spirits of the Mozambican soldiers' ancestors used their supernatural presence to cooperate with Zimbabweans' spirits in the struggle for Zimbabwe. These Mozambican spiritual passages and presence underline another layer of solidarity between Zimbabweans and Mozambicans, which the combatants were confident transcended the terrestrial plane and extended to the spiritual sphere.

Spirit Mediums' Codes of Conduct and Friction over Traditional Beliefs and Rituals at the Front

The use of traditional religion on the battlefield influenced how guerrillas fought the war and helped ZANLA and FPLM soldiers to find common ground at the war front. It also brought friction among fighters and between them and religious leaders. One source of friction came from the transgression of the spirit mediums' code of conduct. In their cooperation with the guerrillas, the spirit mediums sought to establish rules such as prohibitions on killing wild animals in the forest, eating particular foods, killing people indiscriminately including political opponents, and sexual intercourse on the battlefield. Spirit mediums threatened that if the guerrillas disobeyed these rules, they would be punished by the ancestors and compromise their victory.[682]

Despite widespread belief in the power of ancestral spirits, not every fighter stuck to the spirit mediums' code. As explored in Chapter II, guerrillas in the operational areas engaged sexually with local women, a practice that created security concerns. It also disregarded the spiritual code of conduct. Some ZANLA and FPLM soldiers condemned these relationships, believing that their ancestral spirits would punish them. For example, Armando Dembele, a FPLM fighter who entered Rhodesia in 1979 to fight alongside ZANLA in Buhera, thought that many of the casualties they suffered were due to the

[682] See Lan, *Guns and Rain*; Ranger, *Peasant Consciousness*; Chung, *Re-living Chimurenga*. Mukusha Jouere, a civilian from Masvigo who acted as Mudjiba during the Zimbabwean liberation struggle, recalls that the guerrillas did not eat pork in their area, considering it impure. Interview, Harare, 22 September 2022.

transgression of this spiritual rule.[683] Fastmove, who was a ZANLA Platoon Commander, was resigned to these transgressions. He argued that "it is like in a family, it is impossible to control everybody's behaviour even if you had the same parents. Fighters were finding ways of coping with the hardships of the war, even if that meant disrespecting the spirit of the ancestors".[684]

Spirit mediums also tried to establish rules regarding what they considered colonial styles and attitudes. Some of these rules caused conflicts with guerrillas, such as prohibitions on wearing shoes. Wilson Tope, an FPLM soldier who fought in Rhodesia, states that when his group of 20 Mozambican fighters and 50 ZANLA guerrillas entered Tsetsera in 1978, they first consulted the spirit medium. The medium warned them that the ancestors did not want them to enter the area wearing shoes; they had to fight barefoot.[685] Matucurai states that a spirit medium from Gweru, where he was deployed, made a similar request not to enter certain areas wearing shoes. The prohibition on shoes may be explained by the liberation war being waged to bring the land back to the African people and restore African traditions disrupted by contact with European habits and customs. As Fay Chung puts it, the spirit mediums that cooperated with ZANU did not wear trousers or shoes because this was a sign of being alienated by colonial culture.[686] It was a longstanding part of nationalism, too, which had involved wearing fur hats and carrying knobkerries, showing up in court in traditional regalia, or rejecting clear beer. It was part of an assertion of ‘Africanism’ or ‘cultural nationalism’.[687]

Disagreements were not limited to those between ZANLA and FPLM soldiers. The Zimbabweans also argued over mediums’ rules of conduct. Mutambara, for example, holds that it was taboo to denigrate the role of spirit mediums, and even those who did not believe in them would not openly argue about them. In contrast, Christopher Mutsvangwa, a ZANLA commander in the Mutoko area in 1977, said that accepting spirit mediums code of conduct in the operational area was a strategic choice for him as commander. If the situation required him to challenge these beliefs, he would do so: "I

[683] Interview, Armando Dembela, Chimoio, 20 May 2021; Fernando Dezanove also seems to believe in this theory. Interview, Fernando Dezanove, 25 May 2021.
[684] Interview, Fastmove.
[685] Interview, Wilson Tope.
[686] Chung, *Re-living Chimurenga*, p.197.
[687] See Ngwabi Bhebe, “The Nationalist Struggle, 1957-1962” in Canaan Banana (ed), *Turmoil and Tenacity: Zimbabwe 1890-1990* (Harare: The College Press,1989).

wanted people to support the war and the guerrillas to fight, so I would let them think I believed in their beliefs. But if the situation required the science of the war, I would ignore their nonsense and use military strategy. You do not need a spirit medium if you have an AK-47 weapon in your hand."[688]

Accepting and following the code of conduct of the spirit mediums and having disagreements with others who did not allows us to understand the power of cultural beliefs on the soldiers' perceptions about the war they were fighting. The respect of traditional religion's rules and code of conduct on the battlefield, which the believers thought would protect them and guide the ways they fought, was inspired by the joint interest of winning the war and trying to survive the hardship of the battlefield. The desire to fight overcame the diversity of military culture and views acquired in FPLM and ZANLA military training, and enabled guerrillas to incorporate beliefs in spirit mediums and ancestral power to that end. The soldier's accounts of the ways their ancestors guided them allow us to explore the different types of solidarities that allowed FPLM and ZANLA soldiers to collaborate, and demonstrate how, in practice, innovations produced on the battlefield were shaped by the common need of fighting and survival in the war.

Conclusion

This chapter allows us to understand how belief systems were incorporated into the war and the way they shaped the interaction between soldiers of different liberation movements on the battlefield. The chapter offers new perspectives on how the making of solidarities at a political level and among different armies on the battlefield can be understood.

Mozambican soldiers, some veterans of FRELIMO's liberation struggle and some new recruits to the FPLM, who fought in joint operations with ZANLA fighters came from a political and military culture that was antagonistic to traditional religion, or what many FRELIMO leaders denigrated as ‘obscurantism and superstition’. ZANU's leadership and many ZANLA commanders officially accepted and allowed the use of

[688] Interview, Mutsvangwa.

spirit mediums as agents of mobilisation, recruitment, and guidance for guerrillas, giving them a pivotal space in the operational front and in the military bases and refugee camps in exile. Although FRELIMO's leaders officially opposed traditional or any religion on the battlefield, FPLM soldiers themselves held traditional religious beliefs and used them in the course of the war. They shared many cultural and religious beliefs with ZANLA soldiers, and this facilitated their battlefield relationship, notably where FPLM soldiers' origins were in central Mozambique.

Relations with spirit mediums were used to demarcate hierarchical structures within the military on the battlefield and shaped cooperation between ZANLA and FPLM soldiers by drawing up the boundaries of hosts (ZANLA) and guests (FPLM soldiers) in invoking ancestral spirits. Having ancestral spirits participating in the struggle also produced a shared perception among veterans that Mozambican military support for the Zimbabwean liberation war extended to Mozambicans' ancestors, who like their Zimbabwean counterparts, also predicted, guided, and sent premonitions through dreams and visions to the Mozambican soldiers about the course of the war. In the veterans' accounts, Mozambican support for the Zimbabwean struggle transcended the earthly plane to the spiritual sphere, revealing another layer of solidarity, understood and used by soldiers who fought together at the war front.

Although different ideologies and beliefs played out in the war, with some of the political leadership agreeing with the doctrinal strictures of Marxism and Maoism, these differences and beliefs did not stop the rank-and-file guerrillas from appealing to the spirits to find guidance for their military operations. The fact that the ZANLA and FPLM soldiers were mainly from rural backgrounds, where African traditions and rituals were widely sustained, allowed soldiers to meld their cultural and social beliefs into their military tactics, strategies and uses of weaponry. Although the soldiers were trained and acquired military skills from their Cold War backers, they applied their culture and beliefs as an army resource to fight their enemies on the ground.

By exploring how the cultural and social aspects of war like religion influenced the day-to-day interactions between ZANLA and FPLM fighters in their joint military operations, this chapter permits us to understand better the kind of military strategies used by the guerrillas on the battlefield. It also reveals different types of solidarity forged

during liberation movements' armed struggle on the battlefield by paying close attention to the accounts of soldiers themselves.

Chapter IV

The People and the Revolution: Mozambican civilians' support for the Zimbabwean liberation struggle

The bodies of the fallen
Enrich and fertilize our Revolution
Their blood irrigates
and makes it germinate
New ideas among the people

Another cry comes to us
The cry calls for unity
For unity in the progress of struggle
on all fronts
Of the oppressed peoples of Africa
Zimbabwe! Mozambique!
Names that exist for the blood spilt
By the heroes of two African peoples
Names that at this moment
Constitute the agenda of popular justice
Of all true sons and defenders of Africa
Juvenal Bucuane[689]

Introduction

The military interactions and innovations developed between ZANLA and FPLM soldiers on the battlefield explored in Chapters II and III were also extended to the solidarity relationship between ZANLA and Mozambican civilians, expressed in both cities and countryside. I have argued in this thesis that military solidarity was shaped by the "politics machine", which was defined and controlled by the Mozambican government. FRELIMO's political determination required also that every Mozambican participate in solidarity with the Zimbabwean liberation struggle. Civilian support in the mainly distant coastal cities was promoted by FRELIMO ideology and propaganda, and through political and disciplinary action. Rural support in border areas was also framed by FRELIMO by these means, but was much more complex and substantial due to the direct

[689] Extract from Juvenal Bucuane's poem "O grito veio do Zimbabwe", published in *Tempo*, 304 (1 August 1976), p.4-5.

relations between Mozambicans and Zimbabwean refugees and guerrillas. Such support demonstrates that although a "politics machine" regulated the framework in which the solidarity with ZANU's liberation struggle would operate, it acquired its form at the grass roots level. Thus, solidarity was also shaped by cultural ties and historical identification with the cause of Mozambican civilians and refugees who circulated and inhabited the rural border areas of Mozambique.

Much of the government control of the solidarity with Zimbabwe was established through President Machel's speeches, like that given on 3 March 1976, where the presence of members of the council of ministers, government officials, diplomatic corps accredited in Mozambique, and Zimbabwean nationalist fighters, made a statement to the Mozambican nation, broadcast live by *Rádio Moçambique*.[690] This communication announced the government's decision to close the borders with Rhodesia (in line with UN sanctions against Rhodesia) and outlined the guidelines by which Mozambicans would be expected to support ZANLA fighters in their struggle for independence.

In his address, Machel argued that Mozambicans should support the Zimbabwean struggle because it was their internationalist duty to a "brother people". He said:

> We need the invincible strength of our unity and organisation. Our freedom is defended by the immense creative energy of the organised Mozambican people, led by FRELIMO. That is why we must apply our innovative strength to protect our independence and the struggle of our Zimbabwean brothers… in so doing, we will remove the enemy from our borders and consolidate our independence.

For Machel, it was FRELIMO that would direct support for the Zimbabwean liberation struggle. He also seized the moment to describe the people's duties in the following words:

[690] "Discurso de Encerramento das Fronteiras com a Rodésia do Sul", *Rádio Moçambique Archive*, 3 March 1976. Machel's speech announcing the closure of the frontiers with Rhodesia was transcribed and published by *Notícias* and *Tempo*. See: "De Novo a FRELIMO chama o Povo para defender a Pátria Atacada: Presidente da República em Comunicação ao País Sobre as Agressões a Moçambique das Tropas Racistas da Rodésia", *Notícias*, 4 March 1976 and "Devemos Defender a Nossa Pátria Atacada, Devemos Apoiar o Combate Justo do Povo do Zimbabwe", *Tempo*, 283, 7 March 1976. These speeches are available online at Mozambique History.net. (MHN)

> We will support the Zimbabwean struggle morally, politically, and materially. We must live the struggle of Zimbabwe in our flesh and nerves. We will support the struggle by singing about it, we will help by explaining and discussing the struggle, we will support accepting sacrifices… and we will support it by producing to feed and clothe our Zimbabwean brothers.

Machel's speeches demonstrated the central role that solidarity with the Zimbabwean liberation struggle occupied in the governance program of FRELIMO soon after Mozambique's independence. As I have already argued, moved by the Pan-Africanist spirit of supporting each other's independence, the new Mozambican government assumed the Zimbabwean struggle as its own. In addition to Pan-African philosophy, Machel had a particular interest in Zimbabwe's independence since the presence of hostile regimes (Rhodesia and South Africa) on its borders represented a significant threat to its peace and sovereignty. To address this threat, the party-state sought to involve all in supporting the Zimbabwean liberation struggle. Whenever FRELIMO launched a program of support, it was expected that civilians would not only back it but also fend off challenges posed by the government's opponents.[691]

Much has been written on the solidarity between host citizens and cadres of exile liberation movements in southern Africa. The literature has explored how cadres inhabiting military camps developed complex everyday social relationships among themselves and with host communities, and the tensions created between them.[692] It also analyses how romantic relationships and marriage were vital aspects of everyday life between exiled soldiers and local women.[693] An essential element of this romantic relationship has been explored by focusing on urban space and its "convivial transnational solidarity."[694] which was expressed by the "ephemeral and long-lasting"[695] affective relationship developed between host and exiles, as well as by the inter-racial

[691] For comparison, see: Wen-Hui Tsai, "Mass Mobilization Campaigns in Mao's China", *American Journal of Chinese Studies*, 6,10, (1999), p. 24.
[692] Christian Williams, "Practicing Pan-Africanism: An Anthropological Perspective on Exile-Host Relations at Kongwa, Tanzania", *Anthropology Southern Africa*, 37, 3 (2014**);** Christian Williams, *National Liberation in Postcolonial Southern Africa, A Historical Ethnography of Swapo's Exile Camp* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
[693] Maria Suriano and Ariane Lissoni, "Married to the ANC: Tanzanian Women's Entanglement in South Africa's Liberation Struggle", *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 40, 1 (2014).
[694] Maria Suriano, "Transnational Music Collaborations, affective Networks and Everyday Practices of Convivial Solidarity in Ujamaa Dar es Salaam," *Journal of Southern African Studies,* 46,5 (2020).
[695] Suriano, "Transnational Music Collaborations", p.988.

romantic relationship between some leaders of the liberation movements and women.[696] Maria Suriano has demonstrated how "convivial solidarity" was shaped by daily interaction networks that are part of the solidarity circuits informed by politics.[697]

On the other hand, Andrew Ivaska examines how such relationships influenced political mobilisation and support for the liberation movements but also provoked criticism from rank-and-file soldiers concerning the dangers of political contacts evolving into interracial romantic relationships.[698] The dynamics of the interconnection between host countries and grassroots solidarity with the liberation movements has also been explored. Eric Burton argues that the transnational solidarity expressed between liberation movements and host civilians in socialist Tanzania was not essentially state-backed; he suggests rather that there was a juxtaposition between state, community, and transnational communities of pan African countries exiled in Tanzania.[699]

The picture of Mozambican popular support for ZANU's liberation struggle that emerges from this chapter parallels the literature above. It shows how the complex solidarity relationship forged between civilians and Zimbabwean refugees and soldiers worked. It contributes to the growing literature exploring transnational civilian solidarity between hosts and those exiled during the liberation struggle in southern Africa; in particular how closely geographical proximity, and shared enemies, history, language, and ethnicity were linked. This chapter demonstrates how FRELIMO set out to control civilian support for Zimbabwean refugees and guerrillas and how civilians transcended the framework delineated by the state, and built their own characteristic solidarity at the grassroots level.

The chapter builds on previous chapters' discussion of relations among ZANLA and FPLM soldiers. It gives us a comprehensive picture of the kind of exchanges that took place in the military and social cooperation between Zimbabwean fighters and

[696] Suriano, "Transnational Music Collaborations; Andrew Ivaska, "Romancing the Frontline: A view from Dar es Salaam on intimacy and political attachment", *The Global Sixties*, 15,2 (2022).
[697] Suriano, "Transnational Music Collaborations".
[698] Ivaska, "Romancing the Frontline".
[699] Eric Burton, "Frontline Citizens: Liberation Movements, Transnational Solidarity and the making of Anti-imperialist citizenship in Tanzania", *International Review of Social History*, 69,232 (2024).

refugees and Mozambican civilians, thus allowing us to explore how "fluid, contingent and strategic" these relationships were.[700]

I argue that Mozambican civilians were strongly influenced by FRELIMO's political propaganda and institutional interventions, which sought to persuade and coerce civilian support. This was most clear in urban areas far from the war zones. In rural areas bordering Zimbabwe, cross-border kinship and historical ties contributed diversity and strength to the relationship between Mozambican civilians and Zimbabwean soldiers and refugees, particularly where refugee camps were set up, and where ZANLA guerrillas constantly circulated. In some instances, Mozambican popular support extended much further than FRELIMO leaders prescribed, and was motivated by a much more diverse set of conditions and connections than officially envisaged.

The chapter starts by exploring how FRELIMO's policies were implemented through mass mobilisation, political propaganda, rallies, and the institutional and legal mechanisms created by the government to shape Mozambican civilian support for Zimbabweans. Then, it looks at how rural Mozambicans supported ZANLA fighters and Zimbabwean refugees in border areas.

FRELIMO's political propaganda and civilian support for the ZANU liberation struggle

In previous chapters, we saw how FRELIMO sought to fulfil its internationalist duty by deploying elements of its army to collaborate with ZANLA guerrillas in the border areas and by fighting side by side with ZANLA soldiers inside Rhodesia. Here, we explore how the FRELIMO government also sought to ensure that every Mozambican participated in solidarity work with Zimbabwe. The new FRELIMO government used different means to achieve its goal and shape civilian consciousness. One of the forms was political propaganda disseminated through mass mobilisation campaigns, a tool used by the leaders to promote active mass participation in supporting specific policies or

[700] Justin Pearce. *Political Identity and Conflict in Central Angola:1975-2002* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

programs.[701] Speeches as a means of mass mobilisation were vital to increasing political consciousness, changing people's thinking and acting, and mobilizing people for specific efforts.[702] Besides political propaganda and mass mobilisation, the government created the Solidarity Bank to which every Mozambican had to contribute one day's salary to support the Zimbabwean liberation struggle, and used legal instruments and institutions to mobilize, coerce, and carry out surveillance to ensure support for the Zimbabwean liberation struggle. I argue that although Mozambican civilian solidarity was framed by government control, specific forms of solidarity differed between border and non-border areas. In the cities, solidarity with ZANU and their struggle functioned under laws and institutions that controlled and disciplined people's support. In the rural areas, geographical proximity, and cross border socio-economic and cultural links meant that citizens could develop their own forms of solidarity with Zimbabwean refugees and guerrilla fighters.

Machel's discourse on supporting the Zimbabwean liberation struggle was disseminated as early as 1975 after FRELIMO assumed power. However, the resumption of ZANU's armed struggle, in the context of ZIPA, in January 1976 compelled Samora Machel to escalate popular mobilisation. The President used mass rallies and long speeches, both to reach into the minds of civilians and to display the legal instruments FRELIMO had to enforce support for ZANU. The rally held by Machel at the *Praça dos Heróis* (Heroes' Square) in Maputo, the country's capital, on 3 February 1976 was attended by 50,000 people. It was the first of four rallies held to instil the idea and obligation of popular support. Besides announcing the creation of Mozambican Heroes' Day, and changing the name of Mozambique's capital from Lourenço Marques to Maputo on that day, the rally aimed to set out how civilians were expected to support Zimbabwe's armed struggle by contributing one day of their salary to the Solidarity Bank, a bank the government created to support both the liberation struggle and the victims of natural

[701] For comparison, see: Tsai, "Mass Mobilization campaigns in Mao's China", p.23.
[702] Charles Cell, *Revolution at Work: Mobilization Campaigns in China* (New York: Academic Press, 1977), p.97-104.

disasters in Mozambique.[703] Those who did not earn a salary were expected to contribute food supplies such as maize, peanuts, and potatoes.[704]

Machel's second rally, held on 13 March 1976, was preceded by a massive march through the streets of Maputo ending at the *Sporting* football stadium. It was attended by thousands of people. The objective of the rally was to celebrate the FRELIMO party-state's decision to close the border of Mozambique with Rhodesia, announced by Machel ten days before.[705] The third rally occurred four months later at *Praça dos Heróis* (Heroes Square) on 3 July 1976. It aimed to condemn recent Rhodesian raids into Mozambican territory and set out how people should react to them. As Machel asserted:

> This demonstration of revolt shows the people's decision that Smith contracted a blood debt with Mozambique, that the people are convinced that only Zimbabwe's freedom would consolidate our independence and the affirmation that our people are willing to accept and cope with all hardships and sacrifices to fulfil its duty of liberating Zimbabwe… So, Mozambicans would help and get to die alongside Zimbabweans for African dignity, revolution, and respect.[706]

The last rally took place on 23 December 1979 at Independence Square to celebrate the Lancaster House agreement, which brought the war to a close, and where the President announce the reopening of the border with Rhodesia.

[703] "Organizar a Democracia no Seio da Cidade. Liquidar o Racismo e a Discriminação Social: Discurso do Presidente Samora Machel no Dia dos Heróis Moçambicanos", *Notícias*, 4 February 1976.
[704] "Banco de Solidariedade", *Notícias*, 5 February 1976.
[705] "Discurso do Encerramento de Fronteiras com a Rhodesia do Sul", 3 March 1976; See also "Hoje de Novo a FRELIMO Chama o Povo para-Defender a Pátria Atacada", *Notícias*, 4 March 1976.
[706] "O Povo Aceita o Convite de Smith: O Inimigo Pode Imitar Tudo Menos a Vida do Povo", *Tempo*, 18 July 1976. This text was first published in *Tempo* (11 July 1976), but was republished because the speech was incomplete and had editing errors.

Figure 2: People carrying a banner with the words 'Zimbabwe will win' during a mass rally in Maputo.
Source: *Tempo,* 302, 18 July 1976.

Figure 3: Crowds at a rally carrying banners with words such as "Long live the just struggle of the people of Zimbabwe"; "Independence or death, we will win."
Source: *Tempo,* 385, 21 March 1976.

Common to the rallies was the content of Samora Machel's long speeches, which sought to persuade 'the masses' to align with the government's decision to support the Zimbabwean liberation struggle. For this purpose, Machel returned to the past and used FRELIMO's rhetoric of the victorious experience of its liberation struggle against the Portuguese, and the international support it had received, as a point of reference for supporting Zimbabwean guerrillas. As he stated in his speech on 3 February 1976, besides Tanzania and Zambia, FRELIMO had been supported by Scandinavian and Dutch groups and socialist countries which aided the movement with medicine, clothes, and weapons. Machel declared that "it was time for Mozambicans to do the same for our Zimbabwean brothers."[707] Machel's speeches also insisted that by supporting Zimbabwean fighters, Mozambicans "fulfilled their moral duty to oppressed people" and urged them to prioritise this goal. As he stated in a rally held during his visit to the peasants of Chokwe district in August 1976:

> "Our current task is to support Zimbabwe's struggle. Supporting fighters who have weapons in their hands and want their freedom is part of the struggle of oppressed peoples. We must accept the people of Zimbabwe's struggle as our own".[708]

An important aspect of Machel's rallies was the scale and degree of organisation in the mainly urban centres where they took place. Participation was in effect compulsory: the government authorised a day off work and free transport from residential areas to the site of the rallies. FPLM forces went from home to home to ensure that every adult attended the rallies.[709] Abandoning the rally while Machel was giving his speech was prevented by security forces.[710]

In parallel to the mass mobilisation through speeches, party-state decisions and policies supporting the Zimbabwean struggle were also disseminated in newspapers, radio, TV, and other publications. To ensure correct reportage of issues related to the

[707] "Discurso de Encerramento das Fronteiras com a Rodésia do Sul", 3 March 1976.
[708] "A Nossa Tarefa Actual é Apoiar a Luta do Zimbabwe: Visita do Presidente Samora Machel a Chokwe, Gaza, na Reunião com a População do Distrito," *Notícias*, 3 de August de 1976.
[709] The meetings were called days before, using the press and the *Jornal do Povo* displayed in residential areas and workplaces. See for example the announcements in *Notícias:* "Convocação de comício popular na cidade de Maputo", *Notícias*, 12 March 1976.
[710] Ibid.

Zimbabwean struggle, in 1978 the *Organização Nacional de Journalistas* (National Organisation of Journalists) gave classes to journalists on the history of the Zimbabwean liberation movement and ZANU's information and propaganda. In these classes, journalists were taught strategies to disseminate news on the Zimbabwean liberation struggle and how to counteract information propagated by the Western press.[711] Following these classes, Rádio Moçambique began broadcasting a *Jornal do Povo* (People's Newspaper) program, intended to mobilise 'the masses' to understand their role in supporting Zimbabwean guerrillas. The program explained why Zimbabweans were fighting, why Mozambicans were expected to support their struggle, which liberation movements were involved, how Mozambicans could help ZANLA, and how developing and consolidating Mozambique's independence would advance Zimbabwean independence.[712] This radio program supported party cells and the *Grupos Dinamizadores* (Dynamising Groups), the party structures installed at the grassroots (neighbourhood and workplace) level to ensure that everyone knew and understood FRELIMO's political line. The *Grupos Dinamizadores* prepared materials for the workplace and neighbourhood *Jornal do Povo*, written with chalk on blackboards, using capital letters and an easily comprehended language.[713]

These rallies and mass mobilisation demonstrate the importance of coordinated propaganda and its effective dissemination for the FRELIMO leadership. The messaging was replicated in cultural manifestation such as poetry, songs and letters, as we will see in the next section.

[711] "Organização Nacional de Jornalistas", *A Voz da Revolução*, 63, Nov-Dec 1978.
[712] "Mobilizar as Massas para a Construção do Socialismo: Objectivo do Programa Radiofónico, Jornal do Povo", A *Voz da Revolução*,64, Jan-Fev 1978.
[713] The *Jornal do Povo* was created to inform the masses about the problems of people in residential areas, places of work and communal villages (Aldeias Comunais).

Figure 4: Picture of the Jornal do Povo.
Source: *A Voz da Revolução*, 64, Jan-Fev 1978.

Popular solidarity in action

FRELIMO's propaganda and mass mobilisation shaped and controlled people's solidarity towards the Zimbabwean liberation struggle. The cultural expressions published in the press and by radio helped transform Machel's message and words about Zimbabwean liberation and contributing to the Solidarity Bank into mass mobilisation events and speeches, particularly in cities and towns.

In the days following one of Machel's speeches, the press reported the actions carried out by 'the masses' in response to government guidelines. In addition to the official contribution of a day's salary to the Solidarity Bank, people from all over the country started to contribute extra money to the Bank. On 13 July 1977, for example, *Notícias* reported from Palma District in Cabo Delgado that the people of Nangade handed 4,000 escudos in support of Zimbabwean fighters to the provincial governor, Raimundo Pachinuapa. He also received an amount of 2,600 escudos from the peasants of Chidwadwa Communal Village and 900 escudos from those who had returned from Tanzania for the same purpose.[714] On 28 March 1978, workers at the *Empresa Estatal da Unidade de Produção Agrícola* (State Agricultural Production Unit) on the Limpopo

[714] "População de Nangade Contribui para Apoiar a Luta do Povo do Zimbabwe", *Notícias*, 13 July de 1977.

delivered to the Gaza provincial Governor a cheque for some 83,000 escudos for supporting Zimbabwe through the Solidarity Bank.[715] This wave of donations to the Solidarity Bank followed the example of Samora Machel who, at the end of the rally of 3 July 1976, donated 600 escudos on behalf of the FRELIMO party to the Solidarity Bank in support of the "Zimbabwean fighters".[716] He also distributed weapons to the people, indicating they should use them to defend themselves against Rhodesian attacks.[717]

While the wave of contributions to the Solidarity Bank showed that Machel's discourse of supporting ZANU reached civilians across the country, due to the physical distance from Zimbabwean refugees, and fighters, civilians in the cities, where the most educated people lived, also turned to cultural expressions such as letters, songs and poetry to express their solidarity with ZANU. *Tempo* and *Notícias* published these letters and poetry in the section for readers' letters, while songs were recorded at *Rádio Moçambique*, and played nationwide. These cultural manifestations expressed moral and military support for Zimbabwe fighters through poems and songs, as in these examples.

Song: Povo Zimbabweano vai vencer	**The people of Zimbabwe will win**
Tiyisela Zimbabwe, u ta kota ku hlula	Hold on, Zimbabwe, so that you can beat
Nalaoo.	The enemy
A valala va helile ku tiko dza Africa.	The other enemies had ended in Africa.
Smith o salisela ku tiko dza Africa.[718]	Smith is saying goodbye to Africa
Poem: Irmão Zimbabweano venceremos	**Zimbabwean brother, we will win**
Olha mas não chores	Look, but don't cry
Para estes corpos indefesos	

[715] "Contribuição para o Povo do Zimbabwe", *Notícias*, 28 March 1978. For more details on the donations to the Solidarity Bank, see the article "Banco de Solidariedade: Praticar a Emulação Socialista", *Notícias*, 9 July 1977.
[716] "Comício Popular de Apoio à Luta do Zimbabwe", *Rádio Moçambique*, 3 July 1976. See also the transcription of Machel's speech on "O Povo Aceita o Convite de Smith: O Inimigo Pode Imitar Tudo Menos a Vida do Povo", *Tempo*, no. 302, 18 July 1976.
[717] Ibid.
[718] FPLM music, doc 396, *Rádio Moçambique*, 1977

Que caem metralhados	For those defenseless bodies
Por gritar a Liberdade	The machine guns shot down
	For screaming for freedom
Olha mas não chores	Look, but don't cry!
Para esta ponte deflagrada	At this blown-up bridge
Por este rio tornado sangue	For this river turned into blood
Por esses que dizem não a tua Liberdade	By those who refused your freedom
Venha meu irmão	Come, my brother
E olha para esses lacaio	And look at those lackeys
Que a soldo do imperialismo	Imperialism paid for that.
Destroem sem Piedade	Destroy without mercy
Mas com ansiedade	But anxiously
Recordam grandes fortunas	Remember big fortunes
Mas não chores	But don't cry
Porque a luta continua	Because the struggle continues
E a morte nunca trava	And death never stops
A determinação do povo	The determination of the people
Que lutam pela liberdade	Who struggle for freedom
Venceremos![719]	We will win!

As can be seen in the poetry and song shown above, Mozambicans were influenced by FRELIMO's victorious rhetoric. Borges Coelho considers FRELIMO's narrative a "triumphalist vision of the past", which "provides a picture full of the certainty of victory" based on FRELIMO's success in gaining independence.[720] These popular cultural manifestations used the same vocabulary as Machel, fitting into what Maria Benedita Bastos calls the 'vocabulary of ready-made ideas' that present FRELIMO's watchwords such as nationalist, victory, freedom, revolutionary, heroes, enemy, imperialism, 'the struggle continues', and 'traitors'.[721] The following letter, written by Augusto Fernandes Jone Nhanala, shows how people appropriated this triumphalist FRELIMO vision and reproduced Machel's narrative in support of the Zimbabwean struggle:

[719] Miguel Alberto Chissano's poem, *Tempo*, 334, 27 February 1977.
[720] João Paulo Borges Coelho, "Abrir a Fábula: Questões da Política do Passado em Moçambique", *Revista Crítica de Ciências Sociais*, 106, (2015), p.161.
[721] Maria Benedita Bastos, *A Guerra das Escritas: Literatura, Nação e Teorias Pós-colonial em Moçambique* (Lisboa: Edições Vendaval, 2006).

> For 500 years, the people of Mozambique were under foreign domination, facing years of massacres and oppression under the Portuguese colony. Then, young people decided to take weapons to become free from the colonial yoke, fight against the exploitation of man by man and erase the vestiges inherited from the fascist regime of Caetano and Salazar. Young people had an essential role in the struggle. They struggled to win the power of the workers and peasants and create a revolutionary mentality toward the popular masses. We must be in solidarity with people in other African countries still struggling for freedom. We must support the just struggle of Zimbabwe. We young people must be conscious and organised to defend our sovereignty and become vigilant to prevent enemy actions in our country. To finish, I would like to send my revolutionary greetings to all of you, from the Rovuma to the Maputo. The struggle continues.[722]

This historical narrative had roots in FRELIMO's *Narrativa de Sofrimento* (narrative of suffering), which referred to 500 years of colonial domination. The term *narrativa de sofrimento* was used during politico-military training at Nachingwea camp in Tanzania during FRELIMO's liberation struggle. Each recruit had an obligation to tell their own *narração de sofrimento*, describing the episodes of suffering they experienced under the colonial regime, which justified their adherence to the liberation struggle.[723] With the end of the armed struggle, the narrative of suffering was translated into a 'salvationist' and 'messianic' vision – in which the FRELIMO leadership saw themselves and their trajectory as having "saved" Mozambicans from Portuguese colonialism and as having the ongoing duty to save them from what they considered as the vicious colonial system – that dominated how FRELIMO presented itself to the people and legitimised its policies.[724] According to Borges Coelho, FRELIMO used the experience of the liberation struggle not only "as a past reverberating in the present but also as a beacon of reference for the future".[725] FRELIMO's argument that supporting the Zimbabwean struggle was fundamental to consolidating Mozambique's independence and sovereignty was dynamised by this vision, which itself helped justify the militarisation of the people, necessary to react to Rhodesian raids and support the overthrow of their regime. The appeal to Mozambicans to take up arms to join the Zimbabwean people shaped the poems

[722] Augusto Fernandes Jone Nhanala's letter, *Tempo*, 322, 12 May 1976.
[723] On the *Narrativa de Sofrimento* see: João Paulo Borges Coelho, 'Politics and Contemporary History in Mozambique: A set of Epistemological Notes", *Kronos*, 39 (2023), p. 23; José Cabaço, *Mozambique, Identidade, Colonialismo e Libertaçã*o (Maputo: Marimbique, 2010), p. 127; Joaquim Ribeiro de Carvalho in Ana Mussanhane, *Protagonistas da Luta de Libertação Nacional* (Maputo: Marimbique, 2012), p.405.
[724] For the terms 'salvationist' and 'messianic', see Benedito Machava, "The Morality of Revolution: Urban Cleanup Campaigns, Reeducation Camps, and Citizenship in Socialist Mozambique (1974-1988)" **(**PhD Thesis, Michigan: University of Michigan, 2018).
[725] Borges Coelho, "Abrir a Fábula: Questões da Política do Passado em Moçambique", p.155.

and letters published in the press. At the rally held on 3 July 1976, at *Praça dos Heróis*, Machel underlined that:

> To react to Rhodesian aggression against Mozambican territory, we appeal to the FPLM to be ready now to advance to Zimbabwe and fight alongside our Zimbabwean comrades...We must accept dying alongside the people of Zimbabwe for dignity, revolution, and respect...The FPLM (and ZANU) must strengthen their relationship with the people to combine modern and traditional weapons to reinforce our defensive capacity. During the war, we killed the enemy with arrows and traps. Those traps that kill rabbits and gazelles also serve to kill the enemy.[726]

This message and the narratives propounded by Machel were widely disseminated and influential; it is very likely that they shaped the letters received by the press, and that *Tempo* editors favoured these in the selection process. Avião Laquene dos Santos Vilanculos, a resident of Beira city, who wrote a letter to *Tempo* magazine entitled, "Let's do away with Smith", reiterated Machel's narrative:

> This is the first time I have taken the opportunity to launch ideas about Ian Smith for all Mozambicans. Ian Smith has been massacring us since the closure of our borders with Southern Rhodesia. I sometimes ask myself: why don't we liquidate this reactionary vagabond in 45 minutes? He has already killed enough of us; we must understand that when 20 Mozambicans die, we all feel a great loss. So, let's liquidate Smith. To my way of thinking, we don't need new weapons to get Ian Smith; with just bows, arrows, and knobkerries we can liquidate that tobacco farmer...; we only need a date for Mozambicans from the Rovuma to the Maputo to put an end to tobacco farmer Ian Smith.[727]

This letter elaborates on Machel's speech at the *Praça dos Heróis*: the writer expressed the view that joining the ZANLA fighters to 'liquidate' Smith was the most

[726] "Comício Popular de Apoio à Luta do Zimbabwe."
[727] Avião Laquene dos Santos Vilanculos, *Tempo*, 356, 31 July 1977, p.5.

patriotic thing to do. Machel had emphasised using arrows and traps to kill the Portuguese during FRELIMO's liberation struggle – the writer replicates the call for these weapons, now to be used against Rhodesian forces. As explored in Chapter II, Mozambican independence from the Portuguese gave FRELIMO a feeling of victory that translated into self-confidence. Their certainty of success seems to have led FRELIMO to try to instil in the people the idea that even with primitive weapons, people could win the war against Rhodesians, discounting their powerful military capacity.

Culturally charged manifestation of such certainty was contained in the insults aimed at Ian Smith. These expressions came from Machel, who referred to Smith with derogatory words such as "vagabond, insane, tobacco man, rabid dog, criminal, idiot, and irresponsible" in his speeches.[728] The repetition of Machel's words could also be explained by the high levels of illiteracy in Mozambique, about 90% at the time of independence, leading to people reproducing the official words.[729] Partly owing to low levels of literacy, along with many people's lack of familiarity with the liberation struggle, Machel assumed a pedagogical attitude towards his audiences, teaching them the way of thinking, acting, and speaking in the newly born nation "free of colonial attitudes and vices".[730]

These cultural manifestations published in the mass media demonstrated the successful spread of FRELIMO discourse through propaganda towards solidarity with the ZANU liberation struggle.

[728] At the rally held on 3 August 1976 in Chokwe, Gaza province, Samora Machel defined Ian Smith as a *mad and irresponsible man*. See: "A Nossa Tarefa Actual é Apoiar a Luta do Zimbabwe". On another occasion, during the rally held on 3 July 1976, Machel called Ian Smith *a crazy man with a rabid dog*. He used derogatory names whenever he talked about Smith; for example, in an interview with *Opção* Newspaper, published by *Tempo* on 12 July 1977, the journalist asked Machel, *who is Smith?* He answered that Smith was *a crazy tobacco man, a rabid dog, and we are looking for doctors to cure him.* See: "Aspectos da Luta Política e Económica para a Construção de Moçambique: Presidente Samora ao Director do Opção," *Notícias*, 12 July 1977.

[729] On the high level of illiteracy in Mozambique see: Peter Goodspeed, "Mozambican rulers inherited shell of a nation", *Toronto Star* (1987).

[730] For more details on FRELIMO's pedagogy of revolution and political education, see Machava, *The Morality of Revolution.*

FRELIMO's control over support for the Zimbabwean struggle and the politics of punishment

Samora's pedagogical duty was not only persuasive. It also used ideological and literal coercion to control people's attitudes and behaviours, including their cultural expressions. The policing of artistic expressions began in 1971, before Mozambique's independence, when FRELIMO held its first seminar on culture, in which it stated that poetry and songs would be inspired by revolutionary meaning and FRELIMO's ideology and would not invoke abstractions.[731] This helps explain why the popular songs and poetry supporting Zimbabwe's struggle fit in well with Machel's speeches. In their responses in meetings and in their cultural expression citizens indicated that they understood the specific political guidelines of the leadership, that they belonged to the new society FRELIMO was building, and comprehended and could use the vocabulary and ideas transmitted by the party-state leader. In the main rallies, the connection between the leadership and populace was underlined by Machel's practice of frequently asking the audience to repeat his mobilising words and slogans. As Darch and Hedges argue, this linguistic technique worked to persuade and coerce the audience by creating emotional impact.[732]

The cartoon figure of Xiconhoca also worked as an image to ideologically coerce Mozambicans to participate in liberating Zimbabwe. The Xiconhoca figure was created in 1976 in black and white by the *Departamento de Informação e Propaganda da FRELIMO* (FRELIMO's Department of Mass Communication), and purveyed through newspapers, magazines, murals (*Jornal do Povo)*, and radio messages.[733] This cartoon represented the negative behaviour held to be undermining the creation of the new nation. FRELIMO used it to show the behaviour and words used by those who supported or did not support the struggle of the ZANLA fighters. This practice echoes James Brennan's argument that to create a new nation free of 'impurities', societies with socialist ideology

[731] Paolo Israel, "Utopia Live: Singing the Mozambican Struggle for National Liberation", *Kronos,* 35 (2009), p.130.
[732] Colin Darch and David Hedges, "Political Rhetoric in the Transition to Mozambican Independence: Samora Machel in Beira", June 1975', *Kronos*, 39, 1 (2013), p.58.
[733] For a deeper understanding of the figure of Xiconhoca and his role in FRELIMO's revolutionary politics, see for example: Benedito Machava, "State Discourse on Internal Security and the Politics of Punishment in Post-independence Mozambique (1975-1983)", *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 37,3 (2011); Lars Buur, "Xiconhoca: Mozambique's Ubiquitous Post-independence Traitor", in Sharika Thiranagama and Tobias Kelly, *Traitors: Suspicion, Intimacy, and Ethics of State-Building* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009); Maria Paula Meneses, "Xiconhoca o Inimigo: Narrativas da Violência sobre a Construção da Nação em Moçambique', *Revista Critica de Ciências Sociais*, 106, (2015).

tend to use the politics of enmity, embodying the enemy's characteristics while simultaneously creating a figure representing the correct and pure categories.[734]

Soon after Machel's rally on 3 February 1976, in which he announced the creation of the Solidarity Bank, the media began publishing the image of 'Xiconhoca' refusing to contribute to the Solidarity Bank, as the picture in *Notícias* shows (Figure 1).



Figure 5: Xiconhoca against contributions to the Solidarity Bank
Source: *Notícias*, 4 February 1976

Dressed in bell bottoms, oversized trousers, a belt with a large buckle, large and attention-grabbing watches, high-heeled shoes, and ostentatiously spending money and drinking alcohol from bottles, Xiconhoca disseminated messages that showed his opposition to the government's decision to contribute to the Bank, even though he had much money in his pocket. In doing so, Xiconhoca positioned himself as someone who stood against the guidelines outlined by the government in support of the struggle in Zimbabwe, thus representing the behaviour that the party-state was trying to combat. As Maria Paula Meneses underlines, the ethical and political messages that the figure of

[734]James Brennan, "Blood Enemies: Exploitation and Urban Citizenship in the Nationalist Political thought in Tanzania, 1956-1957", *Journal of African History*, 47,3, (2006), p.389-91.

Xiconhoca conveyed represented the behaviour to be avoided in FRELIMO's political process of building a new revolutionary man.[735] This meant that every Mozambican who refused to contribute to the Solidarity Bank and to support the ZANLA struggle acted as a deviant and impure individual and was labelled Xiconhoca.

As the raids perpetrated by Rhodesian forces against ZANU targets and Mozambican infrastructure escalated, FRELIMO's Department of Propaganda published an image of Xiconhoca in conversation with a figure representing imperialism, in which he demonstrated his joy in Smith's attacks against Mozambique and in turn got comfort from imperialism, which promised not to abandon him and his desires, as the following image shows:

Figure 6:

Xiconhoca and "imperialism"
Source: Departamento do Trabalho ideológico do Partido FRELIMO

One of FRELIMO's primary concerns in building the new nation was to protect it against the imperialists who, in collaboration with Mozambican agents, the so-called internal enemy, attacked the country and sabotaged its economic and social order as well as its ideology.[736] It was assumed that those who were happy about Rhodesian attacks were supported by external agents represented by imperialism.

To prevent the proliferation of people considered "enemy agents and impure people" in society, FRELIMO took drastic measures and implemented a punishment

[735] Meneses, "Xiconhoca, O inimigo", p.31-32.
[736] Machava, "State Discourse", p. 601

system aimed at those identified as offenders and enemies of the revolution. These civilians were ideologically coerced to follow the framework established by the Government concerning the Zimbabwean liberation struggle. Besides the campaign of cleaning the cities and sending those considered vagrants and Xiconhocas to reeducation camps,[737] the party-state created mechanisms of surveillance and punishment. One of the instruments was the creation of the People's Vigilance Groups (*Grupos de Vigilância Popular*), which had the duty of identifying and neutralising individuals who acted against party-state directives.[738] These groups were created by SNASP, the *Serviço Nacional de Segurança Popular* (the National People's Security Services) in April 1978. It established a network for gathering intelligence about people's behaviour in factories and communities.[739] In November 1978, the government initiated a practice of auto-critique in which individuals considered to have displayed deviant behaviour had their biography and photographs posted in public eo make grassroots vigilance more effective.[740] In 1979, the government enacted the 2/79 *Lei dos Crime contra a Segurança do Povo e do Estado Popular* (Law for Crimes against the Security of The People and Popular State) that introduced the death penalty for a host of crimes.[741] The *Tribunal Militar Revolucionário* (Revolutionary Military Court) was created to judge these crimes.[742] The following image shows the moment when the people, through the *Vigilância Popular,* applied what the government called revolutionary justice against an individual accused of being Smith's agent:

[737] For details on the politics of cleanness in the city see Machava, *The Morality of Revolution.*
[738]"Implantada a Criação dos Grupos de Vigilância", *Tempo*, 404, 2 July 1978.
[739] Ibid. For more details on the People's Vigilance Groups, see Benedito Machava, "The Morality of Revolution," p.180-181.
[740] Joseph Hanlon, *Mozambique, the Revolution Under Fire* (London: Zed Book, 1984), p.171.
[741] According to the document of the 4th session of the *Assembleia Popular* (Popular Assembly), the death penalty appears as a punitive measure against enemy agents and a preventive measure for all those who would feel enticed by the enemy. See: Assembleia Popular, "Lei dos Crimes Contra a Segurança do Povo e do Estado Popular", *Documentos 4*, 3 January 1979. *Tempo* magazine published an explanatory article on this law, see: "Para Compreender a Lei dos Crimes Contra a Segurança do Povo e do Estado Popular", *Tempo*, 440,18 March 1979.
[742] The Tribunal Militar Revolucionário (TMR) was established by the popular assembly on 29 March and regulated by law 3/79. According to the party-state, this law arises from the need to defend the life and achievements of the Mozambican people. The primary function of the TMR was to judge the Law for Crimes Against the Security of the People and Popular State exclusively and apply the death penalty, executed by the firing squad.



Figure 7: Xiconhoca being punished by Popular Justice
Source: *Notícias*, 11 March 1979

Translating into images the consequences of people's behaviours and how people should act also showed the educational role of the Xiconhoca cartoons, which, by using simple and comprehensible words accompanied by images, clearly explained to people with low levels of literacy how to act within the FRELIMO revolutionary project. In the party-state discourse, no one would want to act like Xiconhoca, an impure and degraded figure, and much less be punished for it. This was one means by which popular support for the ZANLA fighters, and their struggle was produced.

The State strategies outlined above to control and define solidarity towards the Zimbabwean liberation struggle, established the framework in which Mozambicans civilian would support ZANU and ZANLA's armed struggle. FRELIMO was persuasive and coercive, setting the terms of the support framework, whether voluntary or not. Solidarity with Zimbabweans was shaped and limited by the "Politics Machine" established by the State. Even so, Mozambican civilians, particularly those in the border areas, created spontaneous forms of solidarity at the grassroots level, as I will explore in the next section.

Mozambican Civilians and ZANLA fighters on the Zimbabwean border

Unlike the population in the cities or areas far from the frontier, the rural population bordering Zimbabwe was directly involved with ZANLA fighters. ZANLA recruits barely had contact with civilians while in their military bases but communication between the ZANLA guerrillas and Mozambicans regularly occurred when guerrillas were deployed to the interior of Rhodesia or when they retreated to Mozambique, often bringing refugees with them. As a result, there were very different relations of solidarity, which were built on historically solid cross-border connections. This solidarity involved the offering of food, medical care, and intelligence on the movement of Rhodesian forces crossing into Mozambique in pursuit of ZANLA fighters.

From 1975 onwards, the border areas of Gaza, Manica and Tete, had a robust military presence constituted by FPLM garrisons which supported ZANLA guerrillas who were constantly entering and leaving Rhodesia. In these areas, local residents established solidarity relationships with ZANLA guerrillas without ZANU itself having undertaken political education and mobilisation. Political mobilisation set up by the FRELIMO government, only partly explains the widespread willingness to support ZANLA guerrillas.[743] There were other forces at work, including strong ties with Rhodesia. As Mrs Kandiquita explains:

> I am Mozambican, but I grew up and studied in Rhodesia, where my father went to work on a tobacco plantation. We returned to Mozambique after independence, hoping freedom would improve our lives. When we started receiving ZANU guerrillas in Mavué, the region where we had gone to live, we felt a moral obligation to support our brothers in achieving what we had already attained: independence.[744]

The spirit of mutual aid and history of cross-border interaction led those living near the frontier to support the Zimbabweans. Some even joined ZANLA. Jorge Dick, a FRELIMO war veteran who spent his childhood in Zimbabwe with his Mozambican family, says that while he joined FRELIMO in (the early 1970s) to fight against the

[743] Clinarete Munguambe, "Solidarity and the Struggle for Zimbabwe: the Zimbabwean National Union in Mozambique (1975-1980)", (MA Thesis, University of the Western Cape, 2017).
[744] Interview, Mrs Kandiquita, Chicualacuala, 16 July 2017. (She prefers to be cited as Senhora Kandiquitas- Mrs. Kandiquita, instead of her real name).

Portuguese, in the later 1970s his brother preferred to align himself with ZANU's forces.[745] Berta Mungau recounts that her sister aligned herself with ZANU in 1976 in the Mavonde area and fought alongside the ZANLA guerrillas.[746] This alignment was influenced by the fact that Mozambicans and Zimbabweans in the border areas shared the same ancestry, language, and culture.[747] The presence of Mozambicans migrating to work in Rhodesian tea, tobacco, and cotton plantations, especially since the 1950s, meant that communities near the border had multiple cross-frontier family ties.[748]

The widespread support for ZANLA fighters in the border areas took various forms. It was FRELIMO policy that Mozambican civilians would support ZANLA by providing food for guerrillas in transit. This was organized by local party structures like the Dynamising Group and party cells, who used local meetings to explain the reasons for and mechanisms of support for ZANLA. Obadias Sindelane, who lived in Chicualacuala, points out that the Zimbabweans came in two ways: those entering Rhodesia with weapons crossed the border in small groups. Those returning to Mozambique were larger because they used to come with civilians, including older people and children – part of the influx of refugees.[749]

Usually, when ZANLA fighters and refugees arrived in a specific area, they approached locals to ask for directions, food, and water.[750] According to Adelia Chaúque, they often said that they had not eaten for days. If it was a small group, they would eat in people's houses, but if it were a larger group, they would stay hidden in the bush, and people would take food to them.[751] Kandiquita recalls a structured system to support ZANLA fighters and refugees in Mauvé, where communities mobilised to collect food and cook for them. The food consisted of sadza, cassava, chicken, and other meat contributed by communities in their homes. Sometimes, the groups that came with refugees offered them clothes, but that was not necessary to obtain support.[752] My

[745] Interview, Jorge Dick, Maputo, 20 November 2021.
[746] Berta Mungau, Chimoio, 25 May 2021.
[747] See Clinarete Munguambe, "Nationalism and Exile in an Age of Solidarity: FRELIMO-ZANU relation in Mozambique (1975-1980)", *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 43, 1 (2017).
[748] Joel das Neves, "Economy, Society, and Labour Migration in Central Mozambique, 1930-1965: A case of study of Manica Province", (PhD thesis, University of London - SOAS, 1998).
[749] Interview, Obadias Sindelane, Chicualacuala, 18 July 2017.
[750] Ibid.
[751] Interview, Adélia Chauque, Chicualacuala, 17 July 2017
[752] Interview, Mrs Kandiquita.

Zimbabwean interviewees corroborated Mozambican interviews on the civilians' role in feeding ZANLA fighters. Esther Matsiwo, a ZANLA soldier who used to carry ammunition from Mapai to Rhodesia, underlined the role of the people of Chicualacuala, Mavué, Massegena and Mapai in feeding her female detachment group. As she explains, food provided by local people gave them the energy to cope with walking on foot for days.[753] Stanford Kavhumbura also underlined the role of Mozambicans in feeding guerrillas fleeing Rhodesian attacks. He says, "Whenever we withdrew from the operational areas inside Rhodesia, the Mozambican population on the other side of the border used to feed us." He adds, "sometimes this was the first meal we had after days without eating."[754]

Mozambican civilians on the border also accommodated soldiers in their homes when they fled Rhodesian forces, sometimes arriving injured. Mozambicans provided first aid to the war wounded using traditional herbal remedies to stop bleeding and reduce fever. The injured were then evacuated to ZANU bases, where they received advanced care. The war veteran Chimurenga II, a ZANLA female soldier who worked as a nurse, highlighted the importance of this first aid in saving lives. She states that they often received war wounded who could have lost their lives if they had not received the first aid provided by local people. João Miranda, a former Militia member from Chicualacuala whom I interviewed in 2016, also underscored the people's role in treating and carrying injured "Comrades".[755]

In addition to food, accommodation and first aid, Mozambican civilians alleviated the fatigue of the guerrillas who travelled long distances on foot by providing transport. Kavhumbura recalls that when he crossed the border from Chitima in Mozambique to the Mukumbura area inside Rhodesia in 1976, his ZANLA group was helped by Mozambicans who had motor vehicles to carry war materials to the border, thus reducing travel time.[756] My Mozambican interviewees echoed this narrative. Sindelane, a Mozambican civilian from Chicualacuala, recollected using traditional ox-drawn transportation to carry Zimbabweans' belongings, such as food and clothing, and children, elderly, and the injured. However, unlike the residents of Chitima, people from

[753] Esta Matsiwo, Harare, 20 September 2022.
[754] Interview, Stanford Kavhumbura, Harare, 19 September 2022.
[755] Interviews: Chimurenga II, Harare, 18 September 2022; João Miranda, Maputo, 16 June 2016.
[756] Interview, Kavhumbura.

Chicualacuala refused to carry weapons since they would be killed if they met Rhodesians patrolling the areas.[757] As explored before, Rhodesian forces and mercenaries frequently crossed into Mozambican border areas in hot pursuit of Zimbabwean guerrillas.

Civilians also gathered intelligence on the enemy's movements. Intelligence duties were done in collaboration with the FPLM. My interviewees from the border areas recalled that, frequently, while farming or doing other activities, they were interrupted by the "enemy" and asked if they had seen the Zimbabwean *gandangas,* referring to ZANLA soldiers.[758] After these encounters, they would inform FPLM and ZANLA forces about the enemy's movements.[759] Civilians also identified Rhodesian collaborators within the population. In Inhambane, for example, Radio Mozambique reported that civilians had identified an individual called Carlos Ouana as a collaborator because he was carrying a road map of Mozambique and two letters in which he said he was a FPLM soldier.[760] The most famous "enemy" capture was João Cotoi, a Mozambican denounced by the population of Mapai as one of Smith's agents.[761] Cotoi explained the way he was captured in a press conference in Maputo in the following terms:

> The helicopter would come from Rhodesia to pick me up the next day, so I thought of going to the people's houses to ask to sleep, claiming that I was coming from Maputo. They gave me a mat to sleep on; however, because they distrusted me, the population reported my presence to FRELIMO forces. After a while, I was awakened by the FPLM, who interrogated me. I confessed that I had come from Rhodesia and was an agent of Africa Livre.[762]

These kinds of reports were often made by the People's Vigilance groups, discussed earlier in this chapter, in which civilians watched out for spies and saboteurs.

[757] Interview, Sindelane.
[758] Interviews: Francisco Cossa, Chicualacuala 20 July 2017; Amélia Cossa, Chicualacuala 18 July 2017; Chauque; Sindelane.
[759] Interviews: Matsiwo; Chauque; Sindelane; Chivaradzi Delicious, Harare, 19 September 2022; Mahiya Douglas, Harare, 20 and 21 September 2022.
[760] "Rhodesian Collaborator in Mozambique", *Summary of World Broadcast*, 10 February 1977, available at MHN website.
[761] "Capturado Agente do Exército Rhodesiano", *Tempo,* 364, 25 September 1977.
[762]Ibid. The *Voz de Africa Livre* (Voice of Free Africa) was a Rhodesian-MNR propaganda radio station, broadcast from Rhodesia from 1976 until 1980. It was also called *A Voz da Quizumba* and *Radio Hyena* by Mozambican media. On the capture of João Cotoi, see also Shadrack Soko, "The Confession of a Mozambican Spy", *Zambia Daily Mail*, Lusaka, 29 September 1977, available at MHN. Cotoi was executed alongside nine others after being condemned for crimes of high treason against the Mozambican State on 31 March 1979. For a vivid account of the execution, see "Dez Assassinos do Nosso Povo Condenados à Morte e Executados", *Tempo,* 443, 8 April 1979.

The groups were officially created only in April 1978, but civilians in border areas had been engaged in intelligence gathering since 1976, when Rhodesian forces began to circulate in border areas.[763] This widespread surveillance sometimes led to innocent people being labelled as state agents because, according to Benedito Machava, requiring civilians inform on the suspicious behaviour of their neighbours and relatives left room for interpretations of suspicious behaviour that might be used by Dynamising Groups and Members of SNASP for personal gain.[764]

Although the FPLM had reports from informants in the border areas, a group of Rhodesian spies could meet the local population without being captured by Mozambican soldiers. Although the Rhodesians were armed, until 1978 they avoided attacking when they encountered groups of civilians in Mozambique unless they suspected the groups of accommodating ZANLA fighters.[765] Nevertheless, owing to the guerrilla strategy of staying in local homes, armed Rhodesian forces would sometimes enter homes to check for weapons. This happened to Amélia Cossa, whose husband was a member of the Militia (see below). She explains the episode in the following terms:

> A group of black forces entered our house, asking for water and to sell them chicken. We straightaway realised they were Smith men because of their dress and requests to buy things, given that we did not use money in our relationship with Mugabe's forces. Unfortunately, my husband was returning from patrol duty with his weapon since he belonged to the militia forces. They saw the gun, and later that night, returned to attack and burn our house. We escaped because, at night, we used to hide in the trenches.[766]

The Militia was another source of Mozambican support for ZANLA. In mid-1976 Rhodesian border raids intensified and, in August, in the aftermath of the Nyadzonia massacre in which more than 600 people were killed, the Mozambican authorities began to create Popular Militias. These were made up of local peasants who underwent basic military training, depending on their age.[767] The training took almost two months and

[763] Interviews: Fenias Runguane, Mapai, 16 June 2016; Sindelane; Chauque; A. Cossa.
[764] Machava, "State Discourse, p.185
[765] Interview, Sindelane.
[766] Interview, A. Cossa. Due to the constant aerial bombardment, people (including Zimbabwean refugees) were urged to build shelters in trenches to protect themselves from Rhodesian air attacks. President Machel announced this orientation in his communication on closing borders with Rhodesia on 3 March 1976: "Discurso do Encerramento de Fronteiras com a Rhodesia."
[767] "As Mílicias Populares em Mapai", *Tempo*, 330, 30 October 1977.

consisted of drilling, crawling, and using AKMs.[768] The Militias' role was to carry out patrols and check those who entered and left the area where they lived. They also acted as the link between civilians and the FPLM.[769] Although the Popular Militias were not trained as robustly as the main corpus of soldiers, they would sometimes participate in battle alongside FPLM and ZANLA soldiers.[770] Militias were led by a commander and his deputy, who coordinated activities with sections made up of 12 individuals.[771] In an interview with *Rádio Moçambique*, Chitimane Chaúque, the commander of the Militias in Chicualacuala, explained that the work of the Militias did not prevent people from carrying out their daily jobs. Every morning, the Militia Group would meet and choose six men to patrol while the others would perform their usual work. Patrol tasks were performed in shifts.[772]

Between 1978 and 1979, the military situation changed with the expansion of the Mozambican National Resistance (MNR – later Renamo), leading to abductions and deaths.[773] In response, the government increased recruitment and training for the national defence bodies. Including the measures taken in areas attacked by Rhodesian forces, FRELIMO was thus implicitly creating a highly militarised state, reinforcing official support for ZANLA.

Support on the Zimbabwean border differed markedly from that in other parts of the country. This followed FRELIMO's edicts and institution building, which rested on historical cross-border connections. Support included joining ZANLA, offering food, transport, medical care, shelter, intelligence, and military backing, contrasting sharply with the cultural support and donations to the Solidarity Bank of other regions. FRELIMO initially did not fully control this support because it was personal and linked to historical connections. Nevertheless, it was eventually fully militarized and brought under government control.

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[768] Interviews: Adolfo Kandiquita, Chicualacuala, 16 July 2017; Sindelane.
[769] "As Mílicias Populares em Mapai."
[770] Interview, F. Cossa. On Militias role and military cooperation with the regular army see: Mao Tse-Tung, *Selected Military Writing of Mao Tse- Tung* (Peking: Foreigner Language Press, 1963), p.301.
[771] Ibid.
[772] "Apontamento Sobre o Incidente em Chicualacuala", *Rádio Moçambique*, 11 September 1976.
[773] Interviews: Sidelane, Chauque. In 1979, the MNR group attacked agriculture areas in the Limpopo district, killing around 50 Mozambican civilians. As William Minter points outs, the MNR force grew from some hundred men in 1976 to 2000 in 1979; see William Minter; *Os Contras do Apartheid: As Raízes da Guerra em Angola e Moçambique* (Maputo: Arquivo Histórico de Moçambique, 1998).

Escaping the Official Hand: The system of bartering between Zimbabwean refugees and Mozambicans.

Besides supporting ZANLA guerrillas, civilians in rural border areas also forged mutual-relationships with Zimbabweans in refugee camps. This relationship was built on the Zimbabweans' need for food and the Mozambicans for consumer goods. The relationship was forged through personal relations and sympathies – friendship, trust, and generosity. This was spontaneous solidarity between Mozambican civilians and Zimbabwean refugees, which acquired its forms outside the hand of state control.

As mentioned in Chapter II, these camps were run by ZANU in a military style since it was considered that every woman and man in refugee camps was a potential ZANLA recruit. Civilians engaged with ZANLA fighters in rural areas were coopted into official interventions to support ZANU, but Mozambican civilians also established independent forms of cooperation with Zimbabwean recruits and refugees. As noted in Chapter II, Mozambique received more refugees than any other country in the region – some 160,000 – and as numbers increased conditions in refugee camps deteriorated.[774] This context was fundamental to the relationships between Mozambicans and Zimbabwean refugees, but so was shared culture and history.

Owing to the series of bombings on ZANU targets in Mozambique by Rhodesia, Mozambican authorities were forced to constantly move the refugees and ZANLA cadres from one place to another. After the intense bombing of Chimoio Headquarters on 23 November and Tembwe 1 on 26 November 1977, the refugees and military cadres were moved to Mavudzi camp in Tete and Doroi camp in Manica. In 1977, the UNCHR assisted the moving of some 1,000 recruits from Tembwe 1, the refugee camp which also functioned as a military training camp for ZANLA female recruits and as a holding camp for those waiting to engage in military training drills at Tembwe 2, the main military training camp, to Mavudzi camp. They also moved about 1,000 training recruits from Tembwe 2 to the Chindunduma base in Gondola.[775] In January 1978, 6,000 recruits were

[774] Nathaniel Powell, "The UNHCR and the Zimbabwean Refugees in Mozambique: 1975-1980," *Refugee Survey Quarterly*, 32,4, December (2013), p. 60
[775] Interview, Zuma, Harare, 20 September 2022.

moved from Chimoio Headquarters to Doroi camp.[776] In 1978, after the bombing in the Manica area, where schools functioned, children and teachers were moved to Matenje, a few kilometres from Mavudzi in Tete.[777]

Housing conditions at the refugee camps were deficient. The camps consisted of clusters of rectangular barracks or round huts, constructed with rudimentary materials; they were built with bamboo and covered with grass and sand. Beds and tables were also made from local materials. Refugees were required to dig pits for latrines, and wells for water if the camp was far from a river.[778] Besides security and housing, hunger was one of the major problems faced by the refugees. To cope with this, refugees developed different survival strategies, including exchange with Mozambicans living nearby.

The rapidly increasing flow to refugee camps meant that for long periods food became a rarity. Although the government, along with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other organisations such as the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the World Food Programme (WFP), tried to supply the refugees with food and other necessities, more was always needed. According to Mutambara, in 1975, refugees had three meals a day. But as numbers grew, the number of meals turned into one meal in two or three days.[779] Brian Mafondokoto, a ZANLA fighter who withdrew from secondary school in Manica Province in September 1976 to join the guerrillas in Mozambique, recalled being frightened when he saw his brother and other refugees at Doroi Refugee camp. He says, "It was possible to study anatomy the people were so thin".[780] Food quality was also a big issue. Refugees were served a mixture of sadza (maize porridge) with milk that had to be eaten in 20 minutes, or it would become liquid. The diet also consisted of a meagre supply of canned sardines, beef and salmon, and small dried fish called *kapenta*.[781] The scarcity of food was exacerbated

[776] Powell, p. 57.
[777] Chung, *Re-living the Second Chimurenga,* p. 210.
[778] On the buildings in the refugee camps see: Janice McLaughlin, *The Color of Skin Doesn't Matter: A Missioner's Tale of Faith and Politics* (Harare: Weaver, 2012), p.17; Mutambara, *The Rebel in Me,* p.47-50; Carlos Cardoso, "Doroi: Anti-câmera de Zimbabwe Libertado", *Tempo*, 384, 12 February 1978. Interviews: Chimurenga III, Harare, 21 September 2022; Bandza, Harare, 22 September 2022; Ruramai Maraire, 17 September 2022.
[779] Mutambara, *The Rebel in Me,* p. 50.
[780] Interview, Brian Mafondokoto, Harare, 19 September 2022.
[781]Interview, Mahiya Douglas. See McLaughlin, *The Color of Skin Doesn't Matter,* p.143. On the food shortage at the refugee camps, see Chung, *Re-living the Second Chimurenga,* and Mutambara, *The Rebel in Me.*

because it was shared with ZANLA recruits undergoing military training. According to Christopher Mutsvangwa, ZANU secretly took a portion of the food intended for refugees to give the recruits since most organisations that donated food did not support military activity.[782]

Due to hunger, poor conditions and overcrowding in the refugee camps, people got diseases such as malaria, malnutrition, tuberculosis, flu, and diarrhoea, and suffered from lice and jigger fleas.[783] The refugees were also affected by strange diseases such as 'hurricanes', in which a person suffered from knee joint weakness and had difficulty walking.[784] Disease and hunger caused breaches of disciplinary in the camps, which were a central force in the interactions between Zimbabweans and Mozambicans. As a survival measure, refugees started to establish a system of barter with local people called *Chirenje*, in which they exchanged clothes, shoes, and blankets received from donors such as the Scandinavians, the US, and other international organisations for food. These were often second-hand items, but sometimes they were brand-new.[785] Mafondokoto states that:

> After we had finished bartering our clothes, other friends and I would steal the blankets at the women's garrison while they were sleeping and exchange them for food with the *povo* (people*)*. In exchange, the *povo* would cook us an entire meal with pão (bread), tea, roast chicken, beef and sadza. So, after we were full, we would return to the refugee camp. It would help us cope for two or three days without eating.[786]

Other refugees established a network of stealing that involved the girls and guards of the refugee camps. As Bandza explains:

> I was working in collaboration with four girls who used to steal clothes and blankets from the female garrison and give them to me. I already had contact from the *povo,* who used

[782] Interview, Mutsvangwa.
[783] Almost all my interviewees who passed through refugee camps in Mozambique still have plague scars. As Chimurenga III states, it is possible to confirm whether a Zimbabwean War Veteran has passed through Mozambique just by looking at the spots of the jigger fleas, mainly on the feet. Interview, Chimurenga III. Mouzinho Sande, an FPLM soldier who used to be a guard at Nyadzonia and Machazi (Chibabava) refugee camp, remembers helping the Zimbabwean refugees to cure the jigger fleas and lice pests (which he calls Matekenha) by removing the tiny insects using a needle and putting petrol on the affected areas. He describes the situation as worrying since one could have these insects all over the body, including the sexual organs. Interview, Mouzinho Sande, Chimoio, 18 May 2022.
[784] Mutambara, *The Rebel in me*, p. 51.
[785] Chung, *Re-living the Second Chimurenga*, p.209-210.
[786] Interview, Mafondokoto.

> to sell my clothes and give me food. I would escape the refugee camp at night and walk about 10 to 15 km to the village, where I would give my contact the supplies. In exchange, I would receive *pão*, Vondo (bush rat), roast chicken, sadza, condensed milk, cookies, and other things. However, because I agreed to share the goods with the girls who supplied me with clothes, I had to return to the refugee camp with food for them. They would eat at night under blankets so they would not be discovered. I also shared food with the guards on duty to return to the camps without punishment.[787]

Not everyone engaged in the practice of stealing. People like Samora Machel (war name) and Chimurenga III, who stayed at the Machazi refugee camp at Chibabava District, preferred to work at peasant farms in exchange for food, alcohol, and cigarettes. They used the two hours the camp administrators gave to collect firewood to work on peasant farms in exchange for food.[788]

Local people also sometimes offered food to refugees even when they had nothing to trade, based on friendship and trust relationships they had built over time.[789] Joana Afonso, a Mozambican civilian living near ZANU's headquarters in Chimoio, describes the relationship with a Zimbabwean 'brother', who used to sneak out from the refugee camps to the people's houses, as excellent. As she explains, although Zimbabwean refugees seemed to have a taste for fancy food like chicken, *pão*, and condensed milk, they never stole anything from the people. Instead, they preferred to ask for it or exchange it for their clothes.[790]

Although Mozambicans were willing to share their food with refugees, they were not always able to do so owing to their own needs.[791] Even if they had some farm products to eat and sometimes share with the refugees, their standard of living remained low. This also created a demand for the goods the refugees had to trade. Many Mozambicans could not afford to buy clothes, shoes, and other essential goods they could not get from farming.[792] So, the barter system with the refugees was also a means for

[787] Interview, Bandza.
[788] Interviews: Chimurenga III; Machel.
[789] Interviews: Chimurenga III; and Bandza.
[790] Interview, Joana Afonso, Chimoio 19 May 2021.
[791] My interviewees state that sometimes the population near the refugee camps had nothing to share with them, which made them walk more than 20 kilometres to find people with whom they could exchange things. Interviews: Bandza; Chimurenga III; Machel.
[792] On the modes of living in Mozambican rural areas see: Bridget O'Laughlim, "A Questão Agrária em Moçambique", *Estudos Moçambicanos*, 3, (1981), p. 9-32; Helena Dolny, *The Challenge of Agriculture*, in John Saul, *A Difficult Road: The Transition to Socialism in Mozambique* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1985), p. 212-213.

civilians to meet basic needs. This need was exacerbated in the first year of independence, when the country was plunged into an economic crisis due to the departure of the white population that had dominated the country's economy in the various sectors, particularly the rural traders called *cantineiros*, who used to buy peasants' agricultural surplus.[793] This trade had allowed peasants to buy products such as salt, oil, sugar, clothes, and shoes; its disruption meant that Mozambicans relied on *chirenje*, to get many of the essential products they needed.

In addition to helping with food, trade and escaping from camps, Mozambican civilians also helped in identifying spies at Zimbabwean refugee camps. Fay Chung reports that in 1978 Mozambicans discovered Rhodesian spies at Mavudzi school for Zimbabwean refugee children. As she says:

> One day, Mozambican peasants, whose mindset we lived in, reported that he [the student] behaved strangely and constantly wandered among them instead of attending class. He had a taste for luxury, in this case, meat… They found that he had a radio transmitter in the heel of his shoes.[794]

Although many people found ways to survive, others died in the refugee camps. My interviewees said that every day during the parade, where the refugees were counted and given the day's duties, there was always a report of people who could not join the parade because they were seriously ill or dead.[795] Mutsvangwa states that when he was responsible for the Doroi refugee camp in 1978, he buried many who had died due to disease and hunger.[796] The platoon leaders never explicitly said the person had died to avoid creating despair and panic. They just said, 'comrades x or y didn't make it today'.[797]

Hunger got worse during 1979 when the UNCHR assistance given to refugees was disrupted by Rhodesian bombing, floods that blocked road access for transportation, and the drought that affected refugees' agricultural production at the camps.[798] The conditions that led Zimbabwean refugees to enter into relations with Mozambicans

[793] Ibid.
[794] Fay Chung, *Re-living the Second Chimurenga: Memories from Zimbabwe's Liberation Struggle* (Harare: Weaver Press, 2007), p.209.
[795] Interviews: Chimurenga II; Bandza; Chimurenga I.
[796] Interview, Mutsvangwa.
[797] Interviews: Machel; Bandza.
[798] "Report of the United Nation High Commissioner for Refugees, Covering the period 1 April 1979 -31 March 1980". General Assembly, *UN doc*, A/35/12, 1980.

became worse over time, and this changed the nature of Mozambican support. When they did not have goods to exchange, Zimbabwean refugees began offering to work in Mozambican fields in exchange for food. My interviewees state that they would spend all day working in a field in return for a plate of food. As I will explore next, hunger also contributed to an affective relationship between the host and exiles.

Women and the price of food

The need for survival and the daily contact between Mozambican and Zimbabwean refugees helped shaped the solidarity of Mozambicans towards exiled Zimbabweans. This "convivial solidarity", as Mariano Suriano called it, functioned outside the framework structured by the state, and was characterised by a range of relations from the survival strategy of escaping starvation in exchange for sexual interaction to the development of natural affections based on friendship and marriage.[799]

Refugee camps were divided by sex and age. Women lived separately from the men; their basic needs tended to be better met owing to their smaller numbers, but austerity meant they also faced starvation, mainly when the rationed food brought to the refugees was delayed. Food quality was also poor, meaning that women faced malnutrition too.[800] To survive starvation and get better food, some women engaged in sexual relationships with Mozambican civilians and camp guards. In our conversation, Tabitha recalled that she and her friends had the privilege of enjoying *pão* (bread) and chicken occasionally because a friend of hers had a relationship with a local man who fed her in exchange for sex.[801] Adelino Joaquim, a Mozambican security guard in Nyadzonia camp, remembers that whenever he went to town during a change of the shift, he brought back a basket of products bread, sardines, biscuits, soft drinks, and roast chicken for his Zimbabwean girlfriend who lived in Nyadzonia.[802] Joaquim said the Zimbabwean refugees and girls loved *galinha assada* (roast chicken). In return, he could have sex with her whenever he wanted.[803] The need for food and starvation led women to engage in

[799] Suriano, "Transnational Music Collaborations".
[800] Interviews: Matsiwo. On the diet at the refugee camps see also: MacLaughlin, p. 184-189.
[801] Interview, Tabitha, Harare, 22 September 2022.
[802] Interview, Adelino Joaquim, Chimoio, May 2022.
[803] Ibid.

sexual relations as an involuntary choice. Because of the terrible conditions in the camps, some women deserted and stayed with local people, eventually marrying and forming a family with Mozambicans.[804] This reflects the kind of natural affection that develops between host and guest and ends in friendship and marriage, resulting in a substantive legacy of the "convivial solidarity" in which Mozambican and Zimbabwean refugees supported each other, and of the connections that came through this relationship.

Conclusion

Reviewing the role of Mozambican civilians in supporting Zimbabwe's liberation struggle gives us a comprehensive view of the exchanges between the civilians and Zimbabwean refugees and ZANLA fighters. It allows us to understand the ways in which and the reasons why Mozambican civilians supported the Zimbabwean liberation struggle. It gives us a new view on solidarity, in which historical and personnel connections were in the relationship between host and guest, even when the solidarity was framed and limited by state control. Commitment to solidarity with the Zimbabwean struggle occupied ample space in FRELIMO's official discourse and policy after independence.

FRELIMO's leaders believed that without Zimbabwe's independence, Mozambique's independence would be incomplete. FRELIMO's leaders set about trying to involve all Mozambicans in the achievement of its vision of solidarity, using various forms of persuasion and coercion. Machel's discourse, FRELIMO state propaganda and mass mobilisation played a central role. Machel's speeches at popular rallies set out how people should support the Zimbabwean struggle. Apart from contributing money to the Solidarity Bank, individuals and groups in the cities who did not interact directly with ZANLA guerrillas and Zimbabwean refugees expressed their support through letters, songs, and poetry published in the press. These cultural expressions replicated Machel's 'vocabulary of ready-made ideas', demonstrating that people in cities felt a moral obligation to support the Zimbabwean struggle. However, their physical distance from the

[804] Interview, Joana Afonso.

ZANLA guerrillas and robust state controls effectively limited independent forms of support. The FRELIMO party-state thus powerfully shaped the form and content of people's solidarity towards the Zimbabwean liberation struggle.

In the rural areas on the border with Rhodesia, where people engaged directly with ZANLA fighters and Zimbabwean refugees, the hand of state control was also felt. This was effected not only through official discourse and civilian mobilising institutions but also through the creation of popular Militias and the militarization of other institutions like the Dynamising Groups, party cells and People’s Vigilance Groups. Although these institutions existed everywhere, the difference in the war zones is that they were more militarized.

However, because of the physical proximity and cultural links between Zimbabweans and Mozambicans, rural people developed their own forms of solidarity with the guerrilla fighters and the Zimbabwean refugees under ZANU control. They took extraordinary risks supporting fighters with transport, food, medicine, and other forms of care. And they created a system of exchange and mutual help independent from the mechanisms established by FRELIMO’s leaders and which by-passed ZANU camp controls, demonstrating that, more than simply fulfilling orders coming from above, those at the grassroots had their own motivations and offered specific forms of support. This engagement allowed them to construct a form of solidarity that was material and socially built into survival strategies of both Mozambican and Zimbabweans, as well as personal relations like kinship, friendship, marriage, and sex.

Conclusion

During my research, I travelled to many sites looking for informants to answer my research questions. In Mozambique, besides interviewing war veterans in Maputo, where I was based, I travelled to other provinces to speak with the *internationalist* members of the FPLM. One thing that caught my attention was the surprise and excitement shown by these war veterans toward my interest in their stories of participating in the Zimbabwean liberation struggle alongside ZANLA fighters. More surprised were the war veterans living in the countryside. They were impressed because I did not interview only people who lived in the cities. I also went to rural areas where most people lived in economically precarious situations, engaging in subsistence agriculture to feed their families. In Changara District of Tete, Fungai Chinganhace, for example, asked me what motivated "a young person to travel from Maputo just to talk with soldiers that the state had forgotten?" Besides this surprise, war veterans also expressed a feeling of excitement because this was an opportunity to talk and share their experience about their role in the liberation of Zimbabwe. In their conception this history had been neglected by today's leadership, but it made them feel proud of themselves. I encountered the same disappointment in Zimbabwe with former ZANLA rank-and-file soldiers. They felt neglected by the current Zimbabwe government which, according to them, did not recognise their role in liberating Zimbabwe. As in Mozambique, I encountered the veterans' excitement: they were happy and willing to share their experiences of their relationship with Mozambican soldiers and civilians who supported their war.

Although my Mozambican interviewees – particularly those from rural areas – express excitement and pride in having contributed to the liberation of Zimbabwe, they feel that their legacies are not much acknowledged by both Mozambican and Zimbabweans. For them the reason for this lies in the leadership of FRELIMO and ZANU not transmitting to the people, particularly the young, how southern African civilians and soldiers were crucial in liberating each other's countries. More than the government of the two countries not addressing their historical role in the liberation of Zimbabwe and the kinds of solidarity forged between and among them, they also feel marginalised in respect of economic support. Most ordinary soldiers confessed to me that

they thought liberation benefitted only the political leadership who ran the movement far away from the battlefield and occupied high positions after independence. Indeed, most Mozambican soldiers dedicated much of their lives fighting first against the Portuguese during FRELIMO's liberation struggle, then alongside ZANLA inside Rhodesia, and, after Zimbabwe's independence, in the war against Renamo which ended only in 1992. Although the government created a system of pensions for them, most of war veterans did not receive it owing to the impenetrability of the required bureaucratic process. Those who have a pension complain about the amount of money they receive, which barely covers the cost of subsistence (about 64 dollars for those of the lowest rank). As Fernando Joia, one of my interviewees put it, "today the government has much more appreciation for the Renamo soldiers than for us. They have been spoiled by the government to the point where their pension is much higher than ours".

This thesis explores the stories behind these war veterans' excitement. It examines the dynamics of solidarity and military collaboration between Mozambican and ZANLA soldiers inside Rhodesia by exploring how cooperation worked on the battlefield. In so doing, the thesis contributes specifically to knowledge of transnational relationships developed between liberation movements in southern Africa during their anti-colonial struggle by exploring the soldiers' understanding of the war they fought together on the battlefield. It also explores how Mozambican civilians supported ZANLA guerrillas who undertook military training in Mozambique and used Mozambican territory as the rear base to launch military operations against Rhodesia, as well as with Zimbabwean refugees hosted in Mozambique. I argued that although the Cold War context influenced the relationship of solidarity between FRELIMO and ZANU, such top-down influences do not explain how the struggle evolved on the ground. While the political rhetoric and propaganda of both ZANU and FRELIMO was primed and enlightened by the geopolitical influence of the Cold War era, allowing them to garner military and financial aid essential to their armed struggle against the Portuguese and Rhodesian regimes, the rank-and-file soldiers of both liberation movements were able to develop forms of grassroots solidarity, independent of the leaders, which underpinned survival and advance of the struggle.

Specificities of the FRELIMO and ZANU Alliance

Military cooperation between ZANLA and FPLM had its roots in the early 1970s when FRELIMO and ZANU agreed on collaboration to exploit and develop the armed struggle against the Rhodesian and Portuguese colonial regimes in Mozambique's Tete province. With the independence of Mozambique in 1975, and the consequent rise of FRELIMO cadres as the rulers of Mozambique, the relationship between ZANU and FRELIMO was strengthened to the point that Mozambique allowed ZANU headquarters to be established in Mozambique. ZANU created military bases where its recruits were trained, as well as refugee camps where Zimbabwean civilians who were fleeing the war in Rhodesia were accommodated and from where ZANU recruited its soldiers. Mozambique closed its borders with Rhodesia and established military contingents to protect the exit and entry of ZANLA soldiers who were undertook incursions inside Rhodesia and tried to stop Rhodesian forces entering Mozambique. Eager to carry out the war against Rhodesian troops to rid itself of threat from its neighbouring country, FRELIMO sent its soldiers to fight side by side with ZANLA soldiers inside Zimbabwe. This step showed the political leaders' shared commitment to liberating their countries. They agreed on joint action to achieve their objectives as quickly as possible. The agreement shows how solidarity was an opportune and convenient means to fulfil national interests as established by the liberation movements' leaders. Building on Tony Weis's concept of solidarity, this thesis has shown how the notion of solidarity between the Mozambican and ZANU leadership functioned within the "politics machine", in which the Mozambican state controlled and framed solidarity towards ZANU and its liberation struggle.

Solidarity as a political instrument adopted by the Mozambican state means that the close political and military relationship that developed between FRELIMO and ZANU leaders, far from being obvious, natural, or easily achieved, developed in a specific liberation context. It emerged from the complex relationships established between liberation movements of southern Africa under the geopolitical influence of the Cold War and the Sino-Soviet conflict, as well as the stance of the Frontline States, which shaped diplomatic and military connections in the region as well as worldwide. The search for weapons and military training constrained liberation movements to find a

middle ground to garner the support of different and sometimes conflicting backers while competing for the same aid with rival liberation movements.[805] Coming from opposing sides, in which initially FRELIMO regarded ZANU as a "splinter" liberation movement and a rival of its 'natural' ally ZAPU, the relationship between the two liberation movements evolved over time. In contrast to FRELIMO, ZANU initially faced challenges to survive and get support not only from other southern African liberation movements but also from the outside supporters, most importantly the Soviet Union, which backed its rival ZAPU. ZANU's alliance with China was fundamental to its survival. FRELIMO adopted a non-alignment strategy, navigating the Sino-Soviet rift and gaining backing from the Soviet Union and the Chinese simultaneously. Although FRELIMO's non-alignment caused suspicions on all sides, this was not strong enough for either the USSR or the Chinese to cut off their support. After Mozambique's independence, and in the context of the Frontline States, FRELIMO used this non-alignment strategy to shape ZANU's relations with its allies worldwide. The relationship between ZANU and FRELIMO leaders shows that Southern African liberation movements' political and diplomatic relationships in the search for supporters was not static but adjustable and negotiable.

Although Mozambican solidarity with ZANU was defined in the political sphere by the leaderships' vision of national interest, I have argued that solidarity acquired specific forms at the grassroots level. Rank-and-file soldiers of FRELIMO and ZANLA built operational solidarity on personal contacts in day-to-day interactions on the battlefield, shaped by cultural ties and through shared historical backgrounds. Exploring the rank-and-file grasp of the war, their motivation to fight and their experience in battle allows us to improve understanding of both solidarity and the ways ZANLA and the FPLM fought in the Zimbabwean liberation struggle. It adds further insight into the military cooperation between soldiers who came from diverse military and political cultures.

The complex nature of international support had other effects on the solidarity created on the battlefield. Eastern European countries, the Soviet Union, China, North Korea, and various independent African countries all provided military training and

[805] Jocelyn Alexander and JoAnn McGregor, "African Soldiers in the USSR. Oral Histories of ZAPU Intelligence Cadres' Soviet Training, 1964-1979", *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 43, 1 (2017), p.3.

weapons to the guerrilla armies.[806] This meant that the fighters of these liberation movements were exposed to diverse military training, weapons, philosophies of war and ideology, which produced distinctive military cultures within and between liberation armies. Soldiers with these diverse military cultures and languages were deployed to the battlefield to fight together. In this case, joint military cooperation between FPLM and ZANLA meant that armies with diverse experiences and approaches fought on the same side, sometimes together on the battlefield. This cooperation between soldiers created a specific dynamic that shaped how the war was fought on the operational front. Joint operations brought together soldiers who had trained in guerrilla, semi-conventional and conventional warfare, had learned to manage different types of weapons; and had adopted various styles of combat. They also had different levels of exposure to socialist ideology and diverse approaches to the incorporation of social and cultural beliefs like the role of traditional religion on the battlefield. These differences produced tensions and frictions which resulted in interaction and exchanges in the war that shaped specific military solidarities and legacies.

In addition to the diversity of soldiers' training, other factors shaped the relationship between the FPLM and ZANLA soldiers on the battlefield. In particular, some FPLM soldiers, known as internationalists, had a vision of warfare strongly influenced by FRELIMO's liberation struggle, and Mozambican conditions and terrain, which had allowed the establishment of permanent or semi-permanent military bases. This contrasted starkly with Zimbabwe’s liberation war, where the much greater capacity of the Rhodesian defence apparatus made such bases impossible to defend. These historically forged views among the internationalists produced tensions and disagreements with ZANLA soldiers. The Mozambicans looked at the ZANLA fighters as having poor military capacity, weak execution, and poor engagement in the war due to their inexperience in fighting. The internationalist soldiers felt they should dictate how the battle should be fought. ZANLA, on the other hand, interpreted this as arrogance on the part of their *camaradas* (comrades). Such divergent, historically shaped views played

[806] Eric Burton, ‘Hubs of Decolonisation in Africa: Cairo, Accra and Dar Es Salaam’, in Dallywater et al. (eds), *Southern African Liberation Movements and the Global Cold War*, ((Berlin: De Gruyter Oldenburg, 2019) pp. 25-56.

out in the war, producing varied interpretations of the ways in which soldiers at the grassroots level understood the battles they were fighting.

Divergent views about traditional religion as an asset in the confrontation with Rhodesian forces also shaped interactions between FPLM and ZANLA soldiers. Both armies were influenced by their leaders' approach toward religion in the war. ZANU semi-officially allowed the incorporation of traditional religion into war and accepted using spirit mediums on the battlefield while also giving them homes in the military and refugee camps inside Mozambique. Although these policies were contested within ZANLA because soldiers had different religious backgrounds and ideological views, they were pervasive. ZANU leaders and ZANLA commanders strategically relied on traditional religion as a means of political legitimation and as a factor in operational decision-making.[807] FRELIMO's official position contrasted starkly: it prohibited the use of any kind of religion, including traditional religion in war. Mozambican soldiers who joined the ZANLA fighters in Rhodesia had been informed by their political and military leaders that they were not to use religion as a wartime tool. However, the collective decisions among rank-and-file ZANLA and FPLM soldiers did not reflect FRELIMO's official policy. Where traditional religion was seen to enhance the soldiers' acceptance (legitimacy) among civilians, their safety, and sometimes their military efficacy they embraced it on the battlefield. This process was facilitated by the shared cultural ties and religious beliefs of most Mozambicans and Zimbabweans of the region.

Many individual soldiers of both armies drew on their spiritual belief systems in the war. Many believed in the beneficial interventions of ancestral spirits that might help them fight their enemy by indicating the route to take, warning them of danger by using animals and through dreams and healing. The use of traditional religion in the war allowed the two liberation armies to find common ground in the use of social and cultural beliefs on the battlefield. This was evident in war veterans' perception of their relationship of solidarity. As they understood it, their solidarity extended beyond the armies themselves to their Zimbabwean and Mozambican ancestors: Mozambican support for the Zimbabwean struggle transcended the earthly plane and reached the

[807] See David Lan, *Guns, and Rain: Guerrillas and Spirit Mediums in Zimbabwe* (Oxford: James Currey, 1985); and Terence Ranger, *Peasant Consciousness and Guerrilla War in Zimbabwe: A Comparative Study* (Oxford: James Currey, 1985), p.189.

spiritual sphere. This was another layer of the solidarity that shaped Mozambican and ZANLA guerrilla' views of one another, as well as the ways in which they adapted and used resources on the battlefield that they did not learn in their military training and that contradicted official policy, in this case, of FPLM guerrillas. The common ground in soldiers' beliefs on the battlefield also demonstrated that the views of the political leadership did not always fit on-the-ground understating of the war. As a result, soldiers did not follow all their orders to the letter, instead creating their own military strategies based on their battlefield experience.[808]

The solidarity relationship built between the rank-and-file soldiers acquired its own form at the grassroots. It was also influenced by the political machine and the solidarity constructed from above. Most of the frictions and tensions between soldiers were a product of the solidarity established between the leadership themselves and the outside world. It was influenced by the Cold War context, which supported their war and permitted the creation of a different military culture and different approaches to warfare.

Civilian support

Mozambican authorities' support of ZANU and ZANLA was complemented by the support of Mozambican civilians. The new Mozambique government defined its involvement in the Zimbabwean armed struggle as one of its central post-independence policies. The leadership was convinced that Mozambique's independence and sovereignty would not be secure as long as the Ian Smith regime ruled Zimbabwe. FRELIMO's civilian mobilisation in support of ZANLA guerrillas was born of this view. FRELIMO leaders sought to instil in Mozambicans the idea that they should participate in the liberation of Zimbabwe, in the southern African spirit of solidarity, which had helped FRELIMO's own struggle. Using the people's solidarity towards the Zimbabwean struggle as a 'Politics Machine', the FRELIMO authorities applied persuasion and coercion through the propagation of political discourse and state propaganda and through mass mobilisation.

[808] The idea of soldiers at the operational front not following all orders given by the leadership also extends to Rhodesian forces opposed ZANLA and FPLM; see L. White, *Fighting and Writing.*

Although popular support for Zimbabwean refugees and ZANLA guerrillas was demanded by the party-state, the kind of support offered by Mozambican civilians differed between the urban areas and rural areas on the border with Zimbabwe. In the cities, people were physically distant from the guerrillas and demonstrated their support for the armed struggle through monetary contributions to the Solidarity Bank and cultural expressions such as songs, poems, and letters published in the Press, in which the message was circumscribed by the government's 'vocabulary of ready-made ideas'.[809] Civilians far from the warfront may have had genuine feelings of support for ZANLA's armed struggle, but that support was shaped by the party-state's interventions, which limited people's ideas and behaviour within the framework imposed and defined by FRELIMO's discourse and institutions.

In rural areas on the Zimbabwean border, support offered to ZANLA guerrillas also fell within the spectrum of FRELIMO's official discourse. As in the cities, the party-state created institutional structures such as the People's Militias, Dynamizing Groups, Party cells and the *Vigilância Popular* (People's Vigilant groups) to control the processes of supporting the soldiers. However, people from these rural areas developed their own forms of support, independent from the party-state's rubric. Geographical proximity and cultural links enabled civilians in border areas to create a system of exchange and mutual help separately from official mechanisms. They helped ZANLA soldiers who crossed the border to Mozambique with food, intelligence on the enemy's movements, transportation, shelter, and medicine. This support was also extended to Zimbabweans in refugee camps in Mozambique.

Rural Mozambicans established a system of *Cherinje* barter with refugees, in which they offered food in exchange for articles in short supply such as blankets, shoes, and clothes donated to the refugees by the Scandinavian and other countries and institutions. Mozambican civilians had little access to these products owing to the collapse of marketed agricultural production and rural trade associated with the departure of settler farmers and shop owners who had dominated these sectors, as well the other dislocation costs of Mozambican's liberation. Refugees were often extremely short of

[809] Maria Benedita Bastos, *A Guerra das Escritas: Literatura, Nação e Teorias Pós-colonial em Moçambique* (Lisboa: Edições Vendaval, 2006).

food, especially as their numbers increased and Rhodesia's bombing campaign intensified, disrupting supply lines. In this context, Mozambicans and refugees engaged in mutual help, exchanging consumer goods for food. They also forged friendships, sexual relationships, and lasting marriages. These kinds of links permit us to see that, beyond fulfilling FRELIMO's guidelines (or obeying the ZANU camp commanders), those at the grassroots had their own motivations and developed local forms of support to the ZANLA guerrillas and Zimbabwean refugees, influenced by kinship, identification with each other's causes and needs, and the long-established historical and cultural ties in the border zones of Zimbabwe and Mozambique.

The thesis significance and contribution

The thesis provides insights into the dynamic of solidarity between ZANLA and FPLM soldiers on the battlefield. First, it demonstrates that though the process of garnering support for the armed struggle against colonialism in Southern Africa was influenced by the geopolitics of the Cold War, battlefield solidarity was not determined by those politics. FRELIMO and ZANU show how flexible and changeable were these relationships. The political and military connections created worldwide in search of weaponry, military training, and financial aid were flexible, multi-polar, and opportunistic. By exploring Cold War influence and the ways in which it shaped FRELIMO and ZANU relations, this thesis contributes to a wider set of debates in the Global Cold War literature by adding a new layer of understanding about solidarity shaped on the battlefield between rank-and-file soldiers who benefited by this political and diplomatic relationship established by Southern Africa liberations movements in the powerful geopolitical sphere of the Cold War.

Second, joint military operations of ZANLA and the FPLM's internationalist soldiers allows us to see other facets of the battlefield experience, in which contesting a powerful enemy required solidarity between soldiers that was quite different from that among their leaders. These soldiers were products of different political and military cultures, which had diverse military training and ideologies. Although these differences played out on the battlefield, their daily, wartime interactions permitted them to create a

shared military language and culture. This offers us new insights into soldiers understanding of the war, their motivation to fight, and the remaking of strategies as soldiers found common ground and fought side by side.

Third, the soldiers' perception of the war was also powerfully shaped by their interaction with civilians who supported their day-to-day operations on the battlefront, which produced deep layers of solidarity not only in the material, military, and political realms but also in cultural and spiritual matters. By exploring the rank-and file understanding of the war they were fighting, and the civilian support to it, the thesis adds a new approach to the battlefield significance of the soldiers, the ways the war were shaped and the legacies that it produced.

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Interviews

In Mozambique

Name	Date	Place
Acácio Zerobay	25 May 2021	Chimoio, Manica Province
Adélia Jonas Chaúque	17 July 2017	Chicualacuala, Gaza Province
Adelino Estanho Joaquim	17 May 2021	Chimoio, Manica Province
Adolfo Abreu Kandiquita	16 July 2017	Chicualacuala, Gaza Province
Alexandre Leandro Jonassane (Matucurai)	25 November 2020	Maputo City
Amélia Josefa Cossa	18 July 2017	Chicualacuala, Gaza Province
Chimurenga IV	20 May 2021	Manica disctrict
António Bapchino	21 May 2021	Chimoio, Manica Province
António Fole	21 May 2021	Chimoio, Manica Province
António Ibrahimo	12 October 2020	Maputo City
António Sulo	18 May 2021	Chimoio, Manica Province
António Nunes	15 May 2021	Chimoio, Manica Province
Armando Fernando Ndelebe	20 May 2021	Chimoio, Manica Province
Berta Mugai	24 May 2021	Chimoio, Manica Province
Castro Macacho	1 June 2021	Changara, Tete Province
Enes Luís	24 May 2021	Chimoio, Manica Province
Enoque Nwadzangassi	20 May 2021	Chimoio, Manica Province
Estevao Nhancale	15 March 2015	Xai-Xai, Gaza Province
Fenias Runguane	16 June 2016	Xai-Xai, Gaza Province
Fernando Joia	1 June 2021	Changara, Tete Province

Fernando Maiba Dezanove	25 May 2021	Chimoio, Manica Province
Fernando Nhantumbo	20 May 2021	Chimoio, Manica Province
Filipe Jessinão	24 May 2021	Chimoio, Manica Province
Francisco Moisés Cossa	20 July 2017	Chicualacuala, Gaza Province
Fungai Chinganhace	1 June 2021	Changara, Tete Province
Gabriel Maulate	10 June 2022	Quelimane City
Hama Thai	27 October 2021	Maputo City
Hilário Muwanga	20 May 2021	Chimoio, Manica Province
Joana Afonso	19 May 2021	Chimoio, Manica Province
Jorge Dick	20 January 2020	Maputo City
José Ajape	10 September 2021	Maputo City
Júlio Fernando Mula	18 May 2021	Manica Province
Lino Cinco Reis	17 November 2020	Maputo City
Lopes Fontes	2 November 2015	Maputo City
Lopes Tembe	18 April 2020	Maputo City
Malimusse Saide	12 November 2022	Maputo City
Manuel Zimba Faria	21 May 2021	Chimoio, Manica Province
Mariano José Mapilele	10 May 2016	Xai-Xai, Gaza Province
Mariano Matsinha	9 October 2014	Maputo City
Mateus Kida	22 March 2022	Maputo City
Mateus Zengueni	2 November 2015	Maputo City
Mouzinho Sande	17 May 2021	Chimoio, Manica Province
Mrs Kandiquita	16 July 2017	Chicualacuala, Gaza Province
Obadias Uthui Sindelane	18 July 2017	Chicualacuala, Gaza Province
Onésio Sande	12May 2021	Chimoio, Manica Province
Peter Sousa Mauatsi	24 May 2021	Chimoio, Manica Province
Wilson Bocosse Tope	28 May 2021	Tete, Tete Province

In Zimbabwe

Name	Date	Place
Chimurenga I	18 September 2022	Harare
Chimurenga III	21 September 2022	Harare
Chimurenga II	18 September 2022	Harare
Bandza	22 September 2022	Harare
Brian Mafondokozi	19 September 2022	Harare
Chirstopher Mutsavangwa	22 September 2022	Harare
Chivaradze Delicious	19 September 2022	Harare
Esther Matsiwo	22 September 2022	Harare
Fastmove	17 September 2022	Harare
Mahiya Douglas	21 and 22 September 2022	Harare
Mukusha Jouere	23 September 2022	Harare
Sydney Sekeramayi	23 September 2022	Harare
Ruramai Maraire	17 September 2022	Harare
Samora Machel	21 September 2022	Harare
Stanford Kavumbura	19 September 2022	Harare
Tabitha	23 September 2022	Harare
Zuma	20 September 2022	Harare

Group Interview, Moatize, Tete Province, Mozambique
3 June 2021

Augusto Muqueza.
Bernadinho Macthi
Bernado Djemisse
Estevão Fabião Chigola
Felisberto Chakoka
Fernando Zacarias
José Arroz Lack
Ndequiasse Cheleni.
Piter Cofe
Sinário Santos