LISTENING TO TRYPHO:
JUSTIN MARTYR'S
DIALOGUE RECONSIDERED

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My children – Elka, Frieda, Augustine, and Magnus – are as much as part of this thesis as anyone. Their love and enthusiasm fueled me on and their mere presence imposed a disciplined work regime that was vital to the completion of this project. And finally, to my long-suffering and patient wife. It is not easy to be married to a doctoral student, but you have carried it off with your characteristic grace and style. My parents, though they are far from me, have managed to stay supportive and enthusiastic despite long stretches of silence from their wayward son. I have dedicated this work to my grandmother, Madge Acker Horner, who did not live to see the completion of this work, but who was my most enthusiastic and generous supporter. A schoolteacher turned farmer’s wife, she lived out her days on a farm in southwest Iowa. She combated this hard life by painting, writing poetry, and reading copious amounts of fiction. Despite her humble existence, her dreams for her children, and their children, were higher than corn in August.
ABSTRACT:
LISTENING TO TRYPHO:
Justin Martyr's Dialogue Reconsidered

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The primary focus of this thesis is the figure of Trypho in Justin Martyr's Dialogue with Trypho, A Jew (mid-second century C.E.). The substance of the thesis is an analysis of Trypho's depiction and function within the text. Focusing exclusively on Trypho provides a new lens through which to view the Dialogue. This approach has revealed instances where Justin's apologetic breaks down and gives an unintended glimpse behind the text. Lifting Trypho out of the text reveals a consistent figure who does not appear to be based on any Jewish stereotype or Christian invention. He is neither Justin's puppet nor is he blindly obdurate. Instead he is depicted as a pre-rabbinic Diaspora Jew whose argumentation style is philosophical, even Socratic. The depiction reveals a voice with its own sensibility, style, and agenda. It is a voice which defies fiction.

This process has also caused a reconsideration of the entire text of the Dialogue and its development. This thesis puts forward the hypothesis that within the text of the Dialogue there is a core-text comprised almost exclusively of dialogue material. I have named this hypothetical text the Trypho Text. This reconstructed Trypho Text forms a more cohesive and understandable document than our extant Dialogue and is less than half the size. This thesis provides evidence to support the idea that the Trypho Text comprised what appears to be the core of the original Dialogue (ca. 135 C.E.) with large amounts of LXX and Christian material inserted at a later date (ca.157 C.E.).

In establishing an authentic Jewish figure within this second-century Christian document, this thesis hopes to enhance our understanding of Jewish/Christian relations during this formative period. The investigation of Trypho is an important and significant work for our understanding of early Christianity, Greco-Roman Judaism, and the relationship between them.
LONG ABSTRACT
LISTENING TO TRYPHO:
JUSTIN MARTYR'S DIALOGUE RECONSIDERED

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This thesis is the first thorough analysis of Trypho as he is depicted in Justin Martyr's *Dialogue with Trypho, A Jew*. More than just a reconsideration of the figure of Trypho, this thesis calls into question the integrity of the *Dialogue* as a whole and proposes a new way to read it. These new questions have led to the discovery of what appears to be an autonomous text within the *Dialogue*. I have named it the Trypho Text because it is characterized by the presence of Trypho.

My goal in this thesis is four-fold: 1) to test the scholarly assumptions about Trypho, 2) to present my reconstruction of the Trypho Text, 3) to present a profile of Trypho based on his depiction in the *Dialogue* (which is contained in the Trypho Text), 4) and to compare Trypho to second-century Diaspora Judaism in Asia Minor. My hope is that a full examination of the figure of Trypho will add a new dimension to his character and that his voice will be heard, not as a stereotype, but as an authentic Jewish voice.

There have been many conclusions made about the figure of Trypho and the overall literary style of the document. Chapter 1 is a brief overview of the
scholarly opinion of Trypho. Opinions vary greatly and this chapter attempts to
categorize the scholarly opinions based on the level of authenticity granted to the
figure of Trypho. This is not an easy task because, in many instances, opinions
about Trypho are often subsumed within larger hypotheses. Instead of being
considered in his own right, he is often used to support theories about Adversus
Judaeos literature, Justin’s attitude to Judaism, or the literary form of the
Dialogue.

Chapter 2 examines the existence of the Trypho Text which is less than
half the size of the full Dialogue. The aim of this chapter is to try to recover what
appears to be the original dialogue. It is my opinion that this sub-text is the core
of the Dialogue and predates the full text by almost two decades. The Trypho
Text is established using very simple criteria: the presence of dialogue in the
Trypho blocks and the connecting text which sometimes links the blocks together.
In addition, LXX passages within the Trypho blocks are assessed for their
argumentative value and partitioned off if deemed to be unnecessary or repetitive.
On its own, the Trypho Text is a remarkably more consistent document than the
full Dialogue. It should be stated from the outset that the Trypho Text is a
hypothetical text which has been formed by simply collating all the chapters
which contain words attributed to Trypho (Appendix I is a list of all the sayings
attributed to Trypho in the Dialogue). Nevertheless, it is a hypothetical text which
appears to be quite plausible, given its internal consistency and way the Trypho
material hangs together. Once the shape of the Trypho Text is outlined then the
thesis will focus on the literary form and the larger contexts from which the
Dialogue arose.
Chapter 3 will focus on the literary genre of the dialogue. It is an almost universally accepted assumption that the *Dialogue* was styled after the Platonic dialogues and that Justin sought to emulate this form, both in structure, cast, and content. This chapter will challenge the assertion and demonstrate that there is virtually no literary similarity between Plato and Justin. It is not possible to show that Justin was well acquainted with the Socratic dialogues. However, the *Dialogue* can be seen in the literary and social context of the second century C.E.

Justin, as a Christian philosopher and teacher, stood between the world of the Second Sophistic – with its elitist claim on pure Hellenism expressed in Attic Greek – and the world of Christianity – with its elitist claim on pure truth expressed in koine Greek. This section will attempt to explain how the *Dialogue* manifests both of these models simultaneously and how these traditions can help us to understand the hypothesis of a two-stage composition of *Dialogue* (first the Trypho Text then the full *Dialogue*).

Chapter 4 is an examination of the final chapter of the *Dialogue*. Trypho’s exit with his Jewish belief intact has puzzled some scholars and currently there is no consensus on the meaning of this ending. Given his depiction in the *Dialogue*, it is not out of character for Trypho to walk away and reject Justin’s argument for Christianity, but it is not immediately evident why Justin would have left such an ending intact. This chapter is an attempt to read the ending in its larger literary setting. It will also examine Justin’s ideas about conversion, the Jewish people, and his own conversion, in order to better understand his motivations.

Once these issues concerning composition and literary form have been discussed, the thesis will focus on the depiction of Trypho in the text. Chapter 5
addresses issues pertaining to his character: his style of argumentation, use of wit and humour, his function within the text, and his relationship to Jewish teaching. There are also several instances within the Dialogue where Trypho clearly undermines Justin's argument, yet they remain in the body of the text probably because Justin is convinced that he has refuted them successfully. This character profile, based solely on the sayings of Trypho shows a Jewish figure who defies stereotype or literary invention. This methodology is distinctive because it concentrates on what Trypho says, not how Justin interpreted his words. This is a critical distinction which has unlocked new evidence on Trypho's character.

Chapter 6 focuses exclusively on Trypho use of scripture and his underlying attitude toward Justin's exegetical argument. Often Trypho appears to make significant concessions to Justin's exegetical assertions about the messiah. But an understanding of Trypho's question about Jesus reveals his own priorities, which are distinctly different from Justin's. Justin is primarily concerned with the amassing of messianic proof texts from the LXX which confirm that Jesus is the messiah described in the Scriptures. Conversely, Trypho is relatively indifferent to exegetical matters and messianic speculation. He does have concerns about the impact that Justin's messianic and christological assertions have on his understanding of God, but Trypho is also willing to modify his thinking in the face of solid argumentation based on Scripture.

Lifting Trypho out of the text reveals a consistent figure who does not appear to be based on any Jewish stereotype or Christian invention. He is neither Justin's puppet nor is he blindly obdurate. This research reveals an individual voice with its own sensibility, style, and agenda. It is a voice which defies fiction.
His personality is unique, consistent, and idiosyncratic. It is implausible and inappropriate to imagine Justin crafting his Jewish disputant in such a way as to undermine some of the basic tenets of the Christian argument. Chapters 5 and 6 attempt to show that the figure of Trypho is authentic and should not be defined as a literary invention or a conglomerate Jewish figure. Such intricacies could not be due entirely to Justin’s literary skill.

Chapter 7 compares the overall picture of Trypho with the evidence of Jews in Asia Minor in the second century C.E. We know so little about non-rabbinic Jewry in the Diaspora during this century that I have included material from the surrounding centuries as a way of sketching a tentative trajectory of Jewish experience in this region. I have restricted the evidence to Asia Minor. There are several reasons for this. It would not be reasonable to expect that a single chapter could begin to cover all the evidence for Judaism in the Diaspora. Such a chapter would either become unwieldy or too general. I am also wary of conflating evidence from different parts of the empire into a single amalgam called Diaspora Judaism. While it is nearly impossible to make anything more than the most general distinctions within Judaism based on region, these distinctions will become apparent only if scholarship continues to be sensitive to the provenance of evidence. Therefore, I have made the choice to look at Judaism in Asia Minor. I do not wish to eliminate the possibility that the figure of Trypho might have been drawn from another region within the empire, but the evidence from Asia Minor provides the most fruitful comparison. Trypho will be compared in three ways: 1) How he fits into what we already know about Asian Jewry, 2) how he sharpens our picture of Jews in this region and 3) how Trypho might
redefine our conception of Jews in Asia Minor.

The conclusions of this thesis have implications for how we read the Dialogue and proposes a new hypothesis about its original composition and development. The hypothesis of the Trypho Text is also supported by the depiction of Trypho. Justin’s depiction of Trypho shows him to be a subtle, skilled, and philosophically-minded interlocutor who sometimes undermines Justin’s arguments and is often misunderstood by Justin. These instances do not appear to be deliberate attempts by Justin to weaken his argument or appear unwitting. This singular Jewish voice also has implications for our understanding of Judaism in the non-rabbinic Diaspora of the second century C.E. If the figure of Trypho is seen to be an authentic voice, then this will greatly expand our knowledge of non-rabbinic Judaism of the second century C.E.
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INTRODUCTION

One of the most puzzling and frustrating phenomena in the study of early Christian/Jewish relations is the scarcity of Jewish sources which mention Christians and Christianity. This is especially frustrating for the historian because this silence occurs during the very centuries when Christianity was developing from a Jewish sectarian movement - which moved and spoke within its Jewish environment - into a self-contained and autonomous religious faith that claimed independence from its Jewish roots. Christians certainly wrote about Jews and Judaism, yet the extant Jewish sources available to us say precious little about Christians. If we did not consider Christian literature and were dependent solely on the Jewish sources for our information on Christianity, it would be reasonable to suspect that the Nazarenes (Notzrim) or those who followed Jesus ben Pantera were nothing more than a small but deluded group of Jews who thought that the illegitimate son of a Roman soldier (Pantera) and a young Jewish girl was actually the messiah, even though he was crucified by the Romans. This distorted form of Judaism would have been seen as an aberration, almost ridiculous in its scope and assertions. Not even warranting the heat of polemic, Christians would have been seen as a blip on the screen and the least of Jewish worries.

But the sheer volume of Christian literature has drowned out this perspective. The combination of abundant Christian writing and nearly silent
Jewish opinion has created a one-sided picture of Jewish/Christian relations. This imbalance may represent a Christian preoccupation with Judaism, or a lack of interest in Christianity within the Jewish sources which happen to have come down to us. It is probably an equal measure of both. Despite this imbalance, the study of early Jewish/Christian relations has proved to be a fruitful area of scholarly inquiry.

In the last few decades, corroboration of and challenges to the Christian portrayal of Jews and Judaism in antiquity have come from a more nuanced understanding of Judaism outside Roman Palestine. Synagogue excavations, epigraphic analysis, and other archeological data have demanded an increasingly open and broad interpretation of Jews and their religious values during these centuries. Scholars in this field must now be geographically sensitive and careful not to use categories that are no longer defensible. Literary scholarship on the Mishnah and the Talmudim has also made it difficult for scholars simply to cover all varieties of Judaism in the cloak of rabbinic authority and dominance. As the picture of Judaism has become more complex, so has the field of early Christian/Jewish relations, for we can no longer assume that all the Jews in Christian writings are either rabbinic, biblical, or fictional. This is especially pertinent for the study of Trypho in Justin’s Dialogue with Trypho because at various times and for assorted reasons, Trypho has been put in each of these categories by scholars. The fact that he can fit in each of these categories may indicate that there is more to the figure of Trypho than previous scholarship has recognised.
On the surface, Justin’s *Dialogue* seems a fairly straightforward text: It is a record of a discussion that he had with a Jew named Trypho. His goal is to convert Trypho to Christianity. He does this by appealing to the Scriptures (LXX) for proof that a messiah would come and that that messiah is, in fact, Jesus of Nazareth. In this scenario, the text functions as a conversionary text which was intended to convert those Jews who might have read the *Dialogue*, educate existing Christians on how to convert a person from Judaism, or strengthen those Christians who were drifting away from their faith.

This superficial reading of the text, however, is problematic. In part, this is due to the textual and logical problems the *Dialogue* raises. While the *Dialogue* is considered one of the most important documents we have in the study of early Jewish/Christian relations, it is a difficult document to analyze. Part of the problem may be that we are unable to trace the MS tradition of Justin’s work. The earliest manuscript we possess is a collection of Justin’s works: *Parisinus gr 450 = A* dated 1364. There are two known copies of A: *Codex Clarmontanus 82* dated 1541 and *Iustini Opera omina*, Paris 1551. The former MS is an apograph of little value compared to the copy prepared by Robert Estienne (*Iustini Opera omina*) ten years later in Paris.² In effect there is at least a thousand year gap which cannot be accounted for and besides the few attestations of Justin’s works in other patristic authors (Irenaeus *Ad. Her. 4.6* and Photius in his ⁹th century *Bibilotheca (cod. 125)*), most of our information comes from Eusebius (*H.E. 4.18; 4.11.8*).³ Nevertheless, scholars are fairly confident in attributing the *Apologies* and the *Dialogue* to Justin.
The *Dialogue* is a long and rambling text. It is far and away the longest Christian document we have from the second century. Much of its length is due to the many excursus and LXX which are preserved in the text. Previous scholars have been able to discern only the most basic outline and structure. There are points in the *Dialogue* which show the discussion to be quite irenic, while at other points, Justin delivers vitriolic polemic. There are also times when Justin and Trypho appear to be interacting in an authentic fashion and others when Trypho is absent for many chapters leaving nothing but monologue. Justin's style is also problematic. He often takes the reader into detailed and tangential arguments. He lays out substantial tracts of LXX which are designed to support the main argument but which, in fact, distract the reader and detract from the overall flow. There are references made to earlier comments which do not actually appear in the *Dialogue*. There is also a lacuna in middle of the text of an undetermined length (*Dial. 74.4*).

The dating of the composition of the *Dialogue* is also problematic. There is a reference to a war (presumably the Bar Kokhba Revolt of 133-135 C.E.) (*Dial. 1.3*), but there is an indication that the text could not be earlier than 155 C.E. (the date of the *First Apology*) which the *Dialogue* refers to at *Dial. 120.6*. The *terminus post quem* for the *Dialogue* must then range between the composition of the *First Apology* which is dated 153-155 C.E. and Justin's death (circa 165 C.E.) which is attested in Tatian (*Orat. c. Gr. 19.1*), Irenaeus (*Adv. Haer. I.26.1*), and Eusebius (*H.E. 4.16.1ff*). Given these factors, it is difficult to be sure of the date of composition of the complete *Dialogue*. My hypothesis about the existence of a
separate and earlier text (the Trypho Text) allows for two dates of composition: one for the Trypho Text (circa 135 C.E.) and the other for the full Dialogue (circa 160 C.E.). The issue of dating and composition will be discussed in more detail in the subsequent chapters, especially chapters 2 and 3.

In the light of these difficulties, many scholars have reasonably concluded that the Dialogue could not be an actual account as Eusebius thought; it is simply beyond the pale of believability (see chapter 1). Most scholarship has instead focused either on Justin’s ideas within the text (Christian or philosophical) or, more recently, what the document can tell us about Christian attitudes regarding Jews and Judaism. Recent scholarship has cast serious doubt on the reliability of the Dialogue as an actual account of a discussion. Because of its external literary form, many scholars have found it impossible to put any trust in Justin’s claim of authenticity or Eusebius’ confirmation of the historicity of the Dialogue.

This uncertainty has also been shared by those scholars who have assessed Trypho’s knowledge of Judaism in the second century C.E. In the light of both hellenistic and Palestinian categories, Trypho has been seen to be an ideal, fabricated in Justin’s mind in order to provide a springboard for his own theological ideas. Trypho has been viewed as a pawn and a straw man who is only a tool in Justin’s hands. This view asks how the Dialogue could have a foot in reality when the person of Trypho is so one-dimensional and inconsistent with any form of Judaism known to us.

Moreover, the figure of Trypho has not fared well when placed against scholarly views of Diaspora Judaism. When Trypho is not considered a complete
scholarly views of Diaspora Judaism. When Trypho is not considered a complete
fiction he is viewed as either an ideal figure or a confused hybrid. He has both
‘hellenistic’ and ‘Palestinian’ traits and is therefore an impossibility. He is
portrayed as a straw-man who walks right into Justin’s traps and provides no real
discussion or dialogue. For Harnack the Dialogue was “ein von kurzen Einwurfen
durchsetzter Monolog”.

Yet despite these problems and unanswered questions, the Dialogue
continues to stand at a crucial time in Christianity’s relationship with Judaism. It
is one of the earliest texts which reflects a self-consciously independent
Christianity. Justin’s Dialogue is an excellent example of a Christian writing
whose author saw himself as distinct and separate from Judaism. Yet, at the same
time, Justin was grappling with how Christians might read the Hebrew Scriptures
in the wake of Marcion and other competing critiques, mainly Jewish. This
tension is palpable in the Dialogue and is expressed in the depiction of Trypho,
although in some cases this is expressed in ways which have not been noted in
previous scholarship.

This thesis is the first thorough analysis of Trypho as he is depicted in
Justin Martyr’s Dialogue with Trypho the Jew. More than just a reconsideration
of the figure of Trypho, this thesis also calls into question the integrity of the
Dialogue as a whole document and proposes a new way to read it. These new
questions have led to the hypothesis of an autonomous text within the Dialogue. I
have named it the Trypho Text because it is characterized by words or sayings
attributed directly to Trypho. I have not included allusions by Justin to Trypho
(Dial. 18.1,3; 23.3; 122.5; 126.1) or instances where Trypho is about to reply but does not (Dial. 20.2; 115.3; 121.1; 124.1; 130.1; 137.3), deliberately to avoid treating Justin’s commentary as Trypho’s words. Because of the apologetic nature of the text, I am mistrustful of Justin and his perception of events (especially his ability to read Trypho’s mind at Dial. 20.2). The only way to minimize Justin’s apologetic agenda is to adhere to this tight criterion. There is always the possibility that this method of selection may not encompass some helpful material, but this is a necessary risk which is unavoidable with such an undertaking. We are moving in the realms of probability. I believe that this criterion for determining the Trypho Text can reap substantive and interesting results as well as advancing the study of this important document and its Jewish disputant.

My goal in this thesis is four-fold: 1) to test the scholarly assumptions about Trypho, 2) present my reconstruction of the Trypho Text, 3) outline the character of Trypho based on his depiction in the Dialogue (which is, in effect, the Trypho Text), and 4) compare Trypho to second-century Diaspora Judaism in Asia Minor. My hope is that a full examination of the figure of Trypho will add a new dimension to his character and that his voice will be heard, not as a stereotype, but as an authentic Jewish voice.

There have been many conclusions about the figure of Trypho and the overall literary style of the document. Chapter 1 is a brief overview of the scholarly opinion of Trypho. Opinions vary greatly and this chapter attempts to categorize the scholarly opinions based on the level of authenticity they grant him. This is not an easy task because, in many instances, opinions about Trypho are
often subsumed within larger hypotheses. Instead of being considered in his own right, he is often used to support theories about *Adversus Judaeos* literature, Justin's attitude toward Judaism, or the literary form of the *Dialogue*.

Chapter 2 examines the existence of the Trypho Text which is less than half the size of the full *Dialogue*. The aim of this chapter is to try to recover what appears to be the original dialogue. It is my opinion that this sub-text is the core of the *Dialogue* and predates the full text by almost two decades. The Trypho Text is established using very simple criteria: the presence of dialogue and the connecting text which sometimes links the blocks together. LXX passages within the Trypho Blocks are assessed for their argumentative value and partitioned off if deemed to be unnecessary. On its own, the Trypho Text is a remarkably consistent document. It appears to be a free-standing dialogue that is not dependent on the surrounding material. In fact, the Trypho Text is a more coherent and consistent document. It should be stated from the outset that the Trypho Text is a hypothetical text which has been formed by collating all the chapters which contain words attributed to Trypho (Appendix I is a list of all the sayings attributed to Trypho in the *Dialogue* and Appendix III is a summary of the reconstructed text). This hypothetical text appears to be quite plausible, given its internal consistency and way the Trypho material hangs together. Once the shape of the Trypho Text is outlined then the thesis will focus on the literary form and the larger contexts out of which the *Dialogue* arose.

Chapter 3 will focus exclusively on the literary form of the dialogue. It is an almost universally accepted assumption that the *Dialogue* was, to a greater or
lesser degree, styled after the Platonic dialogues and that Justin sought to emulate
this form, both in structure, cast, and content. This chapter will challenge this
assertion and demonstrate that there is very little similarity between Plato and
Justin. Whereas, it is not possible to show that Justin was well acquainted with
the Socratic dialogues, the *Dialogue* does show connections to the literary and
social context of the second century C.E. Justin, as a Christian philosopher and
teacher, stood between the world of the Second Sophistic – with its elitist claim on
pure Hellenism expressed in Attic Greek – and the world of Christianity – with its
elitist claim on pure truth expressed in koine Greek. This section will attempt to
explain how the *Dialogue* manifested both of these models simultaneously and
how these traditions can help us to understand my hypothesis of a two-stage
composition of *Dialogue* – first the Trypho Text then the full *Dialogue*.

Chapter 4 is an examination of the final chapter of the *Dialogue*. Trypho’s
exit with his Jewish belief intact has puzzled some scholars and currently there is
no consensus on the meaning of this ending. Given his depiction in the *Dialogue*,
it is not out of character for Trypho to walk away and reject Justin’s argument for
Christianity, but it is not immediately evident why Justin would have left such an
ending intact. This chapter is an attempt to read the ending in its larger literary
setting. It will also examine Justin’s ideas about conversion, the Jewish people,
and his own conversion, in order to better understand his motivations.

Once these issues concerning composition and literary form have been
discussed, the thesis will focus on the depiction of Trypho in the text. Chapter 5
addresses issues pertaining to his character, philosophical style of argumentation,
use of wit, sarcasm, reason, and logic as well as his relationship to the teaching of
the Jewish teachers. This character profile, based solely on the sayings of Trypho
shows a Jewish figure who defies stereotype or literary invention. This
methodology is distinctive because it concentrates on what Trypho says, not how
Justin interprets his words. This is a critical distinction which has unlocked new
evidence on Trypho’s character and his role in the text.

Chapter 6 focuses exclusively on Trypho’s use of scripture as an
argumentative tool and his attitude toward questions of exegesis, especially
regarding Justin’s expositions on the messiah. Often Trypho appears to make
significant concessions to Justin's exegetical assertions about the messiah. But an
understanding of Trypho’s question about Jesus reveals his own priorities, which
are distinctly different from Justin's. Justin is primarily concerned with the
amassing of messianic proof texts from the LXX. Conversely, Trypho is
relatively indifferent to these exegetical matters. Trypho’s concessions to Justin's
interpretation of Old Testament passages serve to advance his own demand which
can be summarized: "I will grant you this interpretation of the scriptures. But you
must prove that Jesus is the messiah you just described." There are also many
instances within the Dialogue where Trypho is clearly undermining Justin's
argument (e.g. Abraham’s circumcision and the crucifixion of Jesus), yet they
remain in the body of the text probably because Justin is convinced that he has
refuted them successfully.

Lifting Trypho out of the text reveals a consistent figure who does not
appear to be based on any Jewish stereotype or Christian invention. He is neither
Justin's puppet nor is he blindly obdurate. This examination reveals an individual voice with its own sensibility, style, and agenda. It is a voice which defies fiction. His personality is unique, consistent, and idiosyncratic. Perhaps more surprisingly, his function in the text actually weakens Justin's argument in some cases. These chapters attempt to show that the figure of Trypho is authentic and should not be defined as a literary invention or a conglomerate Jewish figure. Once this picture is presented, it is clear that the intricacies of Trypho's depiction could not be due entirely to Justin’s literary skill. It is implausible and inappropriate to imagine Justin crafting his Jewish disputant in such a way as to erode some of the basic tenets of his Christian argument.

Chapter 7 moves on to compare the overall picture of Trypho with the evidence of Jews in Asia Minor in the second century C.E. We know so little about non-rabbinic Jewry in the Diaspora during this century that I have included material from the surrounding centuries as a way of sketching a tentative trajectory of Jewish experience in this region. It would not be reasonable to expect that a single chapter could begin to cover all the evidence for Judaism in the Diaspora. Such a chapter would either become unwieldy or too general to be of use. I am also wary of conflating evidence from different parts of the empire into a single amalgam called Diaspora Judaism. While it is nearly impossible to make anything more than the most general distinctions within Judaism based on region, these distinctions will become apparent only if scholarship continues to be sensitive to the provenance of evidence. I do not wish to eliminate the possibility that the figure of Trypho might have come from another region within the empire,
but the evidence from Asia Minor provides the most fruitful comparison. Trypho will be compared in three ways: 1) How he fits into what we already know about Asian Jewry, 2) how he sharpens our picture of this region and 3) how Trypho might redefine our conception of Jews in the Asian Diaspora.

Throughout this study I quote the words attributed to Trypho in a way which may lead some to believe that I am assuming too much of this figure – ‘Trypho said…’, ‘Trypho answered…’, ‘Trypho responds…’, etc. I have done this simply to avoid clumsy circumlocutions and wordiness, not to sway the reader by subtleties. I trust readers will not be manipulated by such terminology and be free to make their own conclusions based on the strength of the evidence alone.

Moreover, there are areas and questions which are not addressed in the thesis, such as the supposed audience of the Dialogue. Was it intended to function as a philosophical treatise, meant to establish Christianity as the true and only real philosophy? Did it function as an apologetic text, meant to encourage Christians locked in a battle with Judaism for the pagan heart? Or was it a evangelistic text, meant to convert Jews to Christianity? The question of function brings up the unsettled issue of audience. Was it targeted at pagans alone? Pagans and Christians? Christians alone? Jews alone? Jews and Christians? Gentiles on the verge of converting to Judaism? Or Christians on the edge of losing their faith in the Hebrew Scriptures because of the rise of Marcionism? How one views the relationship between Christians and Jews during this period, Judaism in the Diaspora, and Justin himself, influences the conclusions of audience and function.

In some respects, I have avoided these questions by design. Instead, I have
tried to focus the thesis on the subjects and questions which are most pertinent to
the figure of Trypho and the Trypho Text. This thesis will doubtlessly not be the
last word on Trypho. It is enough to hope that it will stimulate more questions
about this intriguing document and help to deepen and broaden our understanding
of Christian/Jewish relations in the second century C.E. I also hope to provide
new insights into the figure of the Dialogue's Jewish interlocutor and to
demonstrate that the picture of Trypho and his particular sensibilities will put a
noticeable mark on the canvas of Greco-Roman Jewry in second-century Asia
Minor.
In examining the person of Trypho problems are rife and opinions varied. There is no consistent opinion about Trypho or his function in the Dialogue. Scholarly assessment of Trypho, however, has not been based on a complete examination of the Dialogue. Rather, the reality of Trypho has been assessed according to larger theories about early Christian/Jewish relationships in the second century of the common era. There are scholars who affirm the historicity of Trypho as a real Jew but who deny the existence of any active dialogue or conflict between Christians and Jews, and those who do the reverse. The classic example is Harnack. While he does dispute the now abandoned claim by T. Zahn (see below) that Trypho was the rabbi Tarphon, he assumes the reality of Trypho as a historical figure, even a rabbi. Yet Harnack did not believe in the existence of a conflict between Christians and Jews. Trypho is often mentioned by scholars, but he has been left basically unexamined and thus marginalized. Many questions have been asked of the Dialogue concerning Justin’s view of philosophy, his knowledge of Judaism, the authenticity of his conversion account, and his use of Scripture. But very few questions have been asked about his depiction of Trypho in the text.

There are several reasons which might account for this hesitancy to examine Trypho seriously. At the turn of the century the claim that Trypho was rabbi Tarphon was an academic mismatch of the highest order. This simplistic
assumption was rejected by Harnack in a footnote. Yet modern scholarship has not forgotten this mistake. Harnack's rebuttal of Zahn's conclusion has stood as a deterrent to addressing the figure of Trypho and the possibility of his existence. Many scholars seem to have thrown the baby out with the bathwater.

Other obstacles stand between the reader and Trypho. The first is the lack of any external corroborating evidence. Trypho is not a Jew who appears in any Jewish writing nor does he make it into the extant writings of any other Christian author. As far as we know, he did not produce a text of any kind. Justin gives the reader almost no historical information about Trypho. The text is not about Trypho; it is about Christianity and Justin's apology for it. We should not, therefore, expect Justin to provide us with any insider information about this figure. Whatever information can be gleaned from the document will be obtained through literary and thematic analysis of the text in spite of Justin's apologetic agenda.

A survey of scholarly opinion on Trypho may seem tedious to the reader. But opinions about the Dialogue and the figure of Trypho have become encrusted over the years. It is important to try to find the roots of the opinions which have limited scholarship. This survey will also serve to show the variation of opinion on this subject and the lack of scholarly engagement with the figure of Trypho.

**SCHOLARLY OPINION ABOUT TRYPHO**

In sorting through the scholarly assumptions about Trypho it is necessary to make a distinction between the historicity of Trypho and the function of Trypho
within the *Dialogue*. These are not the same things and sometimes do not coincide. There are differing degrees of reality granted to Trypho and different functions assigned to him. When discussing the reality of Trypho as a historical figure, his function in the text will also be given to show if there are points of consistency or confusion. I have tried to divide the scholarship on Trypho into five categories. The categories range from those who see the *Dialogue* as a verbatim account to those who see no reality in Trypho at all. The fifth category deals with those scholars who see Trypho as irrelevant to the text. This is an admittedly artificial procedure, but it is the only way to sort out the differing opinions of Trypho. In the vast majority of cases, the authors' opinions about Trypho are given in a sentence or two and are rarely supported by direct evidence.

a) VERBATIM ACCOUNTS

There are some scholars who have taken Justin at his word and have attributed a high level of reality to the person of Trypho and the event of the *Dialogue* itself. Foremost in this group is Eusebius who is unambiguous in his assessment:

> And he [Justin] also composed a *Dialogue against the Jews*, which he had held in the city of the Ephesians with Trypho, a most distinguished Hebrew of that day. In it he shows the way in which the divine grace impelled him towards the word of faith, as well as the great zeal which in former days he had bestowed upon the study of philosophy, and the whole-hearted search for the truth which he pursued. (*HE* 4.18.1-10)

Eusebius not only believes the information in the *Dialogue*, he also adds the place of the event. It is impossible to know whether this was personal
speculation, or if Eusebius had access to a missing prologue, or whether there was
an independent piece of evidence which supplied this information. While there is
no way to corroborate Eusebius' account, there is no reason to dismiss the claim
that the provenance of the Dialogue is Asia Minor, if not Ephesus.

When Christian history began to be studied analytically, many scholars of
the early twentieth century took Eusebius' word as authoritative.12 This position
has, by and large, fallen out of fashion, but there has been a re-emergence of the
notion that the Dialogue represents something real and authentic. Gager seems to
take the Dialogue at its face value and attributes a high level of authenticity to the
words of the debate.13 This is done to support the idea that there existed between
Christians and Jews an active and vigorous debate. The Dialogue is then a living
eexample of such a debate. Gager accepts the reality of the Dialogue as a piece of
evidence with no comment.

The other modern scholar who has granted a very high level of reality to
the text and the person of Trypho is Marcel Simon in his seminal work Verus
Israel, (Paris, 1948). I am somewhat hesitant to place Simon in the same category
as these other scholars because Simon does not necessarily think that the Dialogue
is a verbatim account of an actual debate. Rather, it is his claim that Trypho is
based on a real Jew that puts him in this category. Early in his book Simon states
that "Trypho is generally recognized as having been modeled on an actual
Pharisaic Jew and as fairly representing Pharisaic attitudes".14 Simon goes on to
grant credibility and believability to the Dialogue by referring to the introduction:
"The way in which he introduces his Dialogue seems to indicate that he is taking
as his point of departure from some real conversations with a rabbi. Attempts have been made, though without any definite result, to identify this rabbi." Simon leaves the door open to the possibility that Trypho is a rabbi but leaves the question of identity unanswered. It is not that finding the rabbi is a futile endeavour, it is simply that the right rabbi has eluded scholarship.

Simon's claim that Trypho is based on a real debate with a real Pharisaic rabbi is close to the Eusebian claim, but for Simon it is necessary in order to support his larger, more significant assertion of an active and vigorous competition between Christians and Jews. He takes additional steps to define the nature of this debate by identifying Trypho with a rabbinic Pharisaic Jew. The Christian/Jewish debate existed, for Simon, at all levels of religious life, involving the rabbinate as well as the laity. This is one of the pinions of Simon's argument. The figure of Trypho must therefore be Jewish and Pharisaic. This is a difficult claim to maintain in the face of some of Trypho's less rabbinic traits (he, along with Justin, does not appear to know Hebrew) but Simon displaces his Hellenism with the weight of his Palestinian tendencies. He does this, however, in a perfunctory manner which does not thoroughly address the many problems that Trypho's person and opinions present to scholars.

Simon does not completely accept that the Dialogue was a real event. He admits that: "both Trypho and Celsus' Jew are literary artifacts. They are doubtless modeled on real figures, but both Celsus and Justin have been able to adapt them to their own needs." This statement mediates somewhat his previous statements about Trypho and his reality, but compared with other scholars of the
Dialogue, Simon grants a good deal more reality.

H. Chadwick states that, "the Dialogue is probably the latest of Justin’s writings and is a literary dramatization of a controversial disputation held at Ephesus soon after A.D. 135". On the one hand, there is the affirmation that a debate did in fact happen, thus lending a certain degree of reality to the person of Trypho. But on the other hand, the terminology is couched in the phrase ‘literary dramatization’. This has the effect of distancing the Dialogue from actuality but the distance is not significant. J. Pelikan expresses this phenomenon with characteristic economy: "The form of the Dialogue is literary, the debate a fact."20

b) CORE WITH EXPANSIONS

There are also those who assert that Justin did engage in an actual debate around 135 C.E. but at a later date he decided to record the Dialogue with significant revisions and expansions. These scholars do not believe that the whole of the Dialogue is a verbatim account, but affirming a core is virtually equivalent to asserting a verbatim account, even if only for certain parts. Williams’ opinion of the Dialogue is close to the previous category, except that he shies away from a total acceptance of the contents of the Dialogue and forwards the idea of later additions.

It is improbable that Justin would have remembered all that was said, or would have refrained from introducing other points which occurred to him afterwards. It is therefore reasonable to suppose that, while making a discussion with a Jew on the basis of this book, he made additions. He may also have used notes of his own lectures, or even of his homiletic discourses to his Christian friends.21
Williams distances himself from the claim of a verbatim account by refusing to identify the disputant in the *Dialogue* with Trypho and assuming the name to be fictitious. In fact, he believes the name to be representative of a typical antagonist, thus he calls on the name of a rabbi, Tarphon, who was associated with a strong anti-Christian stance. Williams, however is not totally consistent in his assessment of the *Dialogue* and Trypho. Against the image of the *Dialogue* as a conglomeration of all debates that Justin had engaged in, he sees an internal consistency that makes the *Dialogue* real. “The details of the meeting of Justin and Trypho, and of the emotions with which from time to time both they and Trypho’s friends are moved, are related too naturally to be fictitious.” The reader is to assume that the *Dialogue* represents both a literary work encompassing many debates and an actual debate between Justin and Trypho.

Trakatellis devotes an entire article to Trypho. He is quite positive in his view of Trypho and the *Dialogue*. He is inclined to see in the *Dialogue* personal nuances which lend a believable quality to the account. One example of this personal detail comes at the outset of the treatise (Dial. 1.6) where Justin states that Trypho, “smiling gently” (άστειον ὑπομείναιος), asks Justin to tell him about his understanding of God. This description, says Trakatellis, reveals Trypho to be a man of noble character. His is a “refined nature” and he is “a man of noble mind and manners.” He exercises “mild force in order to keep Justin there and to keep the discussion alive by any means.” Trypho is “in his essence a formidable opponent, who in the end of the *Dialogue* raises hard questions and returns to difficult points, proving that his limited and concrete agreements do not
imply that he accepts the thesis proposed by Justin.” 29 Trakatellis catalogues every occurrence where Trypho seems to concede Justin’s point and then shows that in each of these cases there is a larger issue that is not conceded by Trypho. 30 He believes that because the work is framed in the form of a Dialogue it represents the presence of “contact and communication between the two sides”. 31 Trakatellis does not go on to detail the nature of the contact, but it can be assumed that he thinks the Dialogue is of a higher and more cultured order. He sees the nobility and strength of character of Trypho and Justin as cancelling out the few explosions of polemic. But he is not willing to push this thinking too far and falls back to a mediating position.

For Trakatellis, Trypho might have been a real person, or a fictional character, but was most likely a mixture of both. He assumes that Justin could not have created Trypho ex nihilo and that there must have been a guiding image in Justin’s mind that was based on a real person and event. But this is not his main argument. He is more concerned to show the irenic and even-handed nature of Justin’s account. After all, asks Trakatellis, “what if the Dialogue is purely a literary fiction? In that case, certainly an unlikely and extreme one, we would have Justin’s Dialogue and his Trypho as a noble vision of a refined thinker.” 32 In the end, Trakatellis is more interested in maintaining the noble character of the debate than the question of whether it really took place or not.

In many ways Trakatellis is a helpful corrective to the assumptions made about Trypho. But his conclusions are just that – corrective – and they tend to overstate Trypho’s character and Justin’s depiction of the debate. He simply
ignores the presence of polemic in the document without offering any way of understanding its presence. Trakatellis does not go into detail about the person Trypho, except to garland him with assorted virtues. ³³

L.W. Barnard is also careful about granting too much historicity to the event of the *Dialogue*. He adopts Williams' stance of an original debate behind the text which was later elaborated by Justin. ³⁴ In his treatment of Justin's knowledge of Judaism and his use of the Old Testament, Barnard assumes that Trypho is a legitimate Jewish disputant: "It is the personal touches [which] preclude, I believe, the view that the figure of Trypho is an ideal construction which Justin has created to embody the best of both schools of Judaism." ³⁵ It is implied that he feels Trypho is a genuine figure who defies the classical categories of Palestinian and hellenistic Judaism. "Trypho represents a mediating Judaism, perhaps having Palestinian roots, which cannot be strictly classified. Judaism even after 70 AD was not a monolithic structure and had a number of facets, as recent discoveries have shown. Trypho represents one of these facets. He warns us against identifying the linguistic frontier between Greek and Semitic worlds with the culture frontiers between Hellenism and Judaism." ³⁶ Another interesting point about Trypho is the fact that he "was a layman [so] his conception of Judaism will represent a position different from the strict Palestinian orthodoxy which was being enforced following on the reconstruction at Jamnia after 70." ³⁷

J. Lieu does not make an explicit statement about a core of *Dialogue* which was later expanded, but this scenario can be deduced from her words. Her comments focus more on the figure of Trypho. Generally she sees Trypho as a
hybrid of hellenistic and Palestinian traits, but she is quite prepared to assert that this perception is modern and probably would not have been seen as such in the second-century C.E.\textsuperscript{38} The \textit{Dialogue} itself is seen to be generally authentic: “There is little reason to deny that Justin engaged in such a debate with many a Jew.”\textsuperscript{39} The \textit{Dialogue} should not be read as a “single, or rather two-day, debate.” Nevertheless, we should not suppose that Justin is simply writing an idealized account “of what he would have liked to have said and conveniently muzzled his opponent.”\textsuperscript{40} Scholars in this category are difficult to categorize. Lieu’s stance on Trypho and the possible reality of the text is a good example of the complexity of the issue. It shows how scholars in this category, not only Lieu, have tried to convey a sense of authenticity without committing themselves too deeply. On one hand they sense that there is an element of authenticity to the \textit{Dialogue}, but they are restrained from a Eusebian attitude by the many literary problems raised by the text. The opinion of these scholars is not so much based on empirical evidence as on an intuition that something real is in the text. While I am most sympathetic to the conclusions of these scholars, I am seeking to advance the discussion beyond intuition.

c) TRYPHO AS AN IDEAL

Included in this category are those scholars who see Trypho as an ideal figure of Judaism. Trypho and the \textit{Dialogue} are reflections of Justin’s understanding of Jews and Judaism. These scholars neither deny Trypho’s personhood nor affirm it. Within this category there are two ways which Trypho is seen. In some cases, Trypho is seen as an idealized form of a single type of
Judaism which may have existed at that time. Friemann viewed Trypho as a
hellenistic-type Jew, common in the second century C.E.\textsuperscript{41} Cohn took the logic
one step further and claimed that the Hellenistic elements of Trypho’s character
put him in the unusual category of a ‘Judaistic Hellene’.\textsuperscript{42} H. Remus sees Trypho
as a representative of a Judaism that was strong and assertive. He is not surprised
that the \textit{Dialogue} ends at an impasse.\textsuperscript{43} S.G. Wilson can also be put in this
category since issues surrounding Trypho’s historicity are, for Wilson; “of far less
interest than a judgement on whether Trypho is a plausible representation of at
least one strain of Judaism and whether the \textit{Dialogue} gives a proper sense of the
issues and arguments that would have concerned Jews and Christians engaged in
debate in the mid-second century.”\textsuperscript{44} Wilson holds virtually the same opinion as
G. Stanton who thinks that Trypho is important only insofar as he informs us
about what Christians and Jews were thinking and what kinds of criticisms Jews
laid and Christians fended off. Stanton and Wilson are both careful in their
assessment of the \textit{Dialogue} not to dismiss the possibility of an actual encounter.
Stanton addresses the problem by admitting that “it is probably impossible to
assess to what extent Justin reproduces an actual debate which took place shortly
after 135 C.E. That may not be the important question. The issues Trypho raises
are clearly felt by Justin to be important.”\textsuperscript{45} More recently, Stanton has stated that
while he thinks there are points where Trypho is little more than a puppet, “many
of the arguments and responses of both Justin and Trypho are found in other
writings from this period. In several key passages Trypho echoes widely held
Jewish objections to Christian claims and sets out basic Jewish convictions or
interpretations of Scripture which are well attested elsewhere". The question is left open with this statement, but it is implied that the content of Trypho’s remarks are representational and this is the most important aspect of the interchange.

The second way to describe Trypho as an ideal is to say that he is a combination of more than one kind of Judaism. This amalgam is not connected to any one community, but is an ideal made from different forms of Judaism. First and foremost in this category is E.R. Goodenough. He was the first to call a halt to the search for Trypho’s identity:

Justin has created in Trypho a Jew who embodies the best of both schools of Judaism, one who knows Scripture and the rabbinic interpretations, and yet who has all the open-mindedness and cosmic sense of the hellenistic Jew. As combining both elements, Trypho may well claim to be an honest attempt on the part of Justin to delineate a character of the ideal Jew. It is useless in such a case to scatter energy in an attempt to class Trypho as either Palestinian or hellenistic.

Goodenough’s evaluation of Trypho is inextricably linked to his evaluation of Judaism in the second century. His categories are sharply delineated between hellenistic and Palestinian categories. Goodenough sees two distinct groups with very little overlap except their common claim to be Jews. It is therefore impossible to see Trypho as having any kind of internal consistency because he exhibits both mutually exclusive traits of ‘Palestinian’ and ‘hellenistic’ Judaism. This dichotomy within Judaism drove Goodenough to conclude that the Dialogue could not have been an actual account of a debate. Oddly enough, this does not disqualify Justin from teaching us about Judaism. In fact, “Trypho represents with extraordinary accuracy the attitudes of Jews at the time”. Goodenough believed
extraordinary accuracy the attitudes of Jews at the time." 50 Goodenough believed that it is "because Justin used different sources of different kinds that his completed portrait of Trypho is a composite of Palestinian and hellenistic elements. The composite nature of the material makes it more valuable as a picture of Judaism and of the struggle between the two faiths." 51 Justin is then a window into both strains of Judaism, rather than simply one group. This only works under the assumption that one can discern and extract Palestinian and hellenistic parts of Trypho. It also assumes that Justin is completely reliable in delivering a true picture of Judaistic traits. Ultimately, Trypho is judged by Goodenough's preset criteria for what constitutes Palestinian and hellenistic Judaism. Trypho does not shape Goodenough's conception of Greco-Roman Judaism, rather Trypho is determined to be a fictional ideal based on these categories. Goodenough also concludes that the Dialogue itself is not addressed to Jews at all, therefore Trypho is simply a vehicle for addressing Justin's pagan and Christian audience. Goodenough is sure of the Dialogue's function: "Certainly Justin is not creating a refutation of Judaism." 52 There is no sense that Trypho has any reality at all. Goodenough assumes that the composition of Trypho and his Judaistic beliefs came from written sources, in Greek, such as a written account of the teachings of the rabbis from a converted rabbi or an anti-Christian tract compiled by a rabbi. 53 Therefore there is no oral root to the Dialogue; it is simply a massive compilation of all possible arguments against Judaism.

Trypho as an ideal figure is pervasive and a significant amount of
scholarship has been devoted to outlining Justin’s knowledge of Judaism based on
the categories ‘hellenistic’ and ‘Palestinian’. Trypho has not fared well against
this standard as many of the following opinions will show. Goodenough did not
invent the categories of hellenistic and Palestinian Judaism, but he went a long
way, at least in non-Jewish scholarship, toward solidifying them.54

d) THE UNREAL TRYPHO

This group of scholars sees Trypho as a completely fictional character,
invented and styled by Justin for apologetic purposes. These scholars conclude
that the literary aspects of the Dialogue override any possibility of actuality in the
figure of Trypho. Hyldahl believes the Dialogue is addressed to pagans alone.55
Trypho did not need to be connected to any real Jewish expression because it was
not intended for Jews. Instead, it was a literary work that sought to show the
superiority of Christianity over Judaism. The philosophical language that Trypho
speaks existed only for the sake of the pagan audience. Hyldahl is another scholar
who sees Trypho as inconceivable and is unable to imagine a Jew who might be
able to carry on a conversation sprinkled with philosophic terminology. It is even
more unthinkable for Hyldahl that there might be other Jews who would be able to
follow the Dialogue’s line of reasoning. Goodman also thinks that the
inconsistencies within Trypho’s character militate against his authenticity:
“Justin’s Jew is not very consistent in his attitudes. It is very evident that he was
to some extent an imaginary foil required for the Dialogue form.”56 Goodman
does not reject the possibility of a real Trypho completely, but he does not give
the idea much credence either.
The idea that Trypho is a straw man is a prevalent stance in scholarship. In this view, it is Justin’s apologetic agenda which fuels the entire treatise. All is servant to the apologetic, or in some cases polemical, course of the treatise. Hulen represents the earliest stance. In his effort to bring the Christian *Adversus Judaeos* tradition under the light of scholarship, he claimed that Trypho’s composite nature represents nothing of Judaism at all. Assuming a vigorous combative Judaism he complains that “even Josephus represents his people as second to none in antiquity with its glorious traditions, literature and civilization; and possessed a vigor which this speaker lacks. For a faithful representation of the Judaism of the second century we can hardly therefore look to figures such as Trypho.”57 Hulen did not appear to understand that he was dealing with two apologists: Justin and Josephus. Why would Justin present Trypho in a favourable light? And why would Josephus present Judaism to an outside audience as anything less than glorious? Hulen reflects a phenomenon that is all too common: Either the apologetic genre is not taken into account and the treatise is dismissed, along with Trypho; or the genre takes precedence over everything and Trypho is thrown out as well. It would be striking if, in the case of Trypho, there appeared signs of consistency and humanity, despite the presence of Justin’s apologetic agenda.

This viewpoint is expressed by Nilson in no uncertain terms. “It is hard to see him as anything more than a straw man. He as well as his companions are such poor spokesmen for Judaism that using them to present the Jewish position could hardly be expected to win a neutral, much less sympathetic hearing among the intended Jewish audience. Trypho never throws Justin off stride. Justin
dominates the *Dialogue* to the point that it would not be inappropriate to name it *Monologue with Trypho*. Nilson, like Hulen, sees Trypho as a very poor representative of Judaism. He is, therefore, disqualified. Donahue also makes the claim that Trypho is a pawn in Justin’s hands and has no place in the real world.

G.F. Moore affirms this view: “The Jewish disputant [Moore refuses to call him Trypho] is a man of straw, but reflects the vigorous debate between Christians and Jews.” It appears that in this opinion there is a hesitancy to affirm the *Dialogue* as real - probably due to modern sensibilities and literary theory - yet this does not stand in the way of asserting the *Dialogue* as an example, albeit a fictional one, of a real and vigorous conflict. Setzer holds the view that Trypho “is primarily a straw man for Justin to promote his views”, while keeping the door open to the possibility of a real debate, if only in a perfunctory way. Like Donahue, Setzer sees in the *Dialogue* a “window into the second century debates between Jews and Christians, whether or not he [Trypho] ever existed.”

M. Taylor takes this thinking one step further by asserting that the *Dialogue* is not reflective of any debate at all. She has attempted to dismantle the assumptions of those scholars who see conflict and a vigorous debate between Christians and Jews during the first centuries of the common era. Her basic stance is that the entire *Adversus Judaeos* genre is theological and intended exclusively for Christian use. In contrast of this strict assessment of the entire genre, Taylor concludes that “the Judaism opposed in the Christian writings is somehow devoid of life and substance, and the Jewish disputant in the text lacks credibility as a real opponent.” This template is laid over the figure of Trypho and turns the
Dialogue into a theological text. It reduces Trypho to a symbol of the problems which Judaism posed to Christianity. Ironically, her stance is similar to Harnack’s since she believes that by the second century, Jews and Christians had nothing to say to one another. T. Rajak, while not taking a definitive stance on the figure of Trypho is sympathetic with Taylor’s assessment of of the Dialogue. Her stance that the Dialogue is characterized by “sustained and intense” Christian polemic would naturally lead one to believe that the figure of Trypho is as crafted as the polemic. 66

e) TRYPHO AS IRRELEVANT

The last group is comprised of those scholars who see Trypho as an irrelevant figure who does not have any role in the Dialogue as a single disputant. He is neither real nor is he based on any type of Jew. Generally, this group concludes that the function of the text had nothing to do with Judaism. They make no effort to explain Trypho’s presence in the text. For example, Pringent sees underneath the text of the Dialogue the existence of the lost work of Justin’s Syntagma Against Heresies. 67 Pringent does not make any mention of Trypho or of the fact that it seems to be focused on Jewish issues. Granted, his task is textual, so he is not concerned with issues of function or audience, but he does represent a scholar who sees Trypho as an irrelevant factor. 68 Osborn proposes the idea of an “all-purpose” treatise claiming that Justin “has a variety of questions to answer. The questions come from different people in different circumstances and have no necessary connection.” 69 The inference is that it is for Christian purposes only. Stylianopoulos explores the invisible foe of Marcionism in the
Dialogue and reaches the conclusion that Justin did have a concern about the issue of Marcionism which he expressed in the Dialogue, especially in terms of the Mosaic Law. Stylianopoulos also recognizes the possibility of the Syntagma lying underneath the Dialogue and postulates that it did have an effect on the function of the text and its assembly. “Justin is seriously concerned with the various heretical groups which he mentions.” While Stylianopoulos does not allow this argument to eliminate his emphasis on the Law as it pertains to Judaism, he advocates other factors which are thought to have a direct bearing on the Dialogue.

Efroymson also sees the Marcionite issues addressed in the Dialogue as definitive. He interprets Dial 11 – where Justin argues for the singularity of God, rather than a Christian god and a Jewish god – as a refutation of Marcionite doctrine. If Trypho were a real Jew, he reasons, then this point would not need arguing. The presence of a Marcionite agenda thus diminishes the importance of Trypho and even the Jewish element and makes the treatise more generally apologetic.

The last group of scholars within this category see Trypho as an insignificant figure because they see in the Dialogue, not an explication of Christian and Jewish issues, but a purely philosophical debate about Christianity and its place in the philosophic milieu. Pringent has already been mentioned but his work could just as well be placed in this category. Voss emphasizes the literary quality of the Dialogue and states that this would only have been understandable and palatable for a cultured heathen audience. Trypho is
therefore an accoutrement of the genre, needed to fulfil the literary requirement and never intended to be a believable Jew. Van Winden makes a symbolic judgement of the *Dialogue* by treating only the first nine chapters of the work and attempting to show that Justin’s philosophic understanding was sound and consistent. His work was an answer to those who saw Justin as a confused second-class philosopher. Hyldahl also shares a space in this group because of his effort to settle the question of audience in favour of the pagans. In all these cases, Trypho serves no purpose whatsoever. None of these authors speaks about Trypho or about the *Dialogue* after chapter 9. It is immaterial who Trypho is because the main point of the *Dialogue* is philosophical and the audience pagan.

**CONCLUSION**

Over thirty scholars have been dealt with in this chapter and yet a consensus or even a pattern of opinion is elusive. Five categories of opinion can be discerned, yet even within each of these categories there is very little consensus between more than two scholars. What is seen by this survey is the broad scope of opinion on Trypho and, in a larger sense, the *Dialogue* itself. More often than not, Trypho is a tool for supporting different opinions about the audience of the *Dialogue* – whether it be Christian and Jews, Christians and pagans, or Christians alone – and the relationship between Jews and Christians. The only consistent theme which arises from this review is the fact that Trypho has not been analyzed on his own terms in a substantive way. Neither has the *Dialogue* been assessed on the basis of Trypho and his particular personality. The range of opinion has not
been based upon detailed examinations of his character. Instead, Trypho has been the servant of larger scholarly opinions about Jewish/Christian relations, Diaspora Judaism, and Christianity. The language used to describe Trypho has not been carefully worked out, and often there is confusion as to whether Trypho or the Dialogue is considered to be real or not. W. Horbury’s assessment of Trypho is a good example of this kind of confusion. Horbury’s stance is quite unique and difficult to place. On one hand he seems to affirm the reality of the figures. “The interchanges of the speakers are marked by a striking and life-like contrast between the personal courtesy for the most part maintained by Justin (and especially by Trypho), and the bitterly harsh remarks of Justin (and occasionally of Trypho too) when they are speaking as representatives of their communities.” But in the next sentence he seems to discount any hope of reality: “The Dialogue is an artistically contrived literary work, and one which has not survived in its entirety.” Horbury tries to bring these two conflicting ideas together with the assurance that “behind it there are genuine Jewish-Christian communal contacts, and the author had his own experience of them.” For Horbury, it is possible to say that real dialogues took place between Christians and Jews and that Justin had many such dialogues, but the Dialogue with Trypho is not an example of one of them. If anything, this review of scholarship has shown that there has not been an indepth examination on the character of Trypho.

In the course of my research on Trypho, however, I isolated every saying attributed to Trypho, as opposed to the many statements made by Justin about Trypho or Jews in general (see Appendix). I did this to see if any consistent
characteristics would emerge in the depiction (chapter 5). But in the process of
culling Trypho from the text an unexpected pattern began to emerge. This pattern
has very little to do with the figure of Trypho per se but it led me into a new
understanding about the Dialogue and its composition. This is the subject of the
following chapter.

I hope to demonstrate that within the Dialogue there exists an independent
text which is less than half the size of the larger Dialogue. My hypothesis is that
the core text was at one time an independent document which was written by
Justin shortly after the supposed dialogue took place and at the beginning of his
career (circa 135 C.E.). Then toward the end of his life (155-160 C.E.) he
published the Dialogue in a greatly expanded form. The many additions of
testimonia, repetition of arguments, Christian exegesis, and polemic were added to
the document to as a act of erudition and reflects Justin’s accumulated experience
as a Christian teacher. I hope to support this scenario through the elucidation of
this hypothetical document, which I have named the Trypho Text, as well as
placing Justin and the Dialogue in their second-century context.
CHAPTER 2

THE DIALOGUE WITHIN

This chapter focuses on the text of the *Dialogue* and outlines the boundaries of what I have named the Trypho Text. My aim in this chapter is two-fold: First, I will outline the Trypho Text through the examination of the Trypho material and show the connections between them. After this, I will demonstrate how the Trypho Text can stand as an autonomous document with its own internal logic, balance, and flow. The first section will outline where the Trypho material occurs. I will then show how they fit together to form the Trypho Text. The section following will impose several tests to determine the extent to which the Trypho Text is free-standing and autonomous. And the last part of the chapter will demonstrate how the new text dissolves many of the long-standing enigmas of the *Dialogue*.

TRYPHO BLOCKS AND TRYPHO CHAPTERS

I have reconstructed this document in two stages. The first stage is the examination of the Trypho blocks and the Trypho chapters. A Trypho block is defined simply as two or more chapters which contain any continuous discourse between Justin and Trypho. A Trypho chapter is a single chapter containing words attributed to Trypho. The method for determining the Trypho material is admittedly simple, yet to my knowledge, this is the first time that the *Dialogue* has been examined in this way. The extraction of these Trypho blocks (six) and Trypho chapters (seven) naturally leads to the second stage of the experiment: the
connecting of this material into a continuous text.

There are six distinct blocks where dialogue between the disputants is recorded (Dial. 1-10; 25-28; 32-39; 45-68; 71-74.4 (lacuna); 87-90;) and six single chapters where Trypho is credited with one remark or question (Dial. 19, 77, 79, 80, 118, 123, 142). 77

The Trypho blocks comprise the bulk of the Trypho Text since they contain the vast majority of the words attributed to Trypho. But before examining the links between these blocks, I will briefly outline their contents so that the reader will be able to get a sense of the argument as it proceeds.

1 (Dial. 1-10) It might be difficult to consider chapters 1-10 as a cohesive block from Trypho’s point of view. So much of it is taken up with Justin’s description of his past encounters with philosophy and his own conversion story; Trypho is silent from Dial. 2 - 8.3. Nevertheless, there is an internal consistency in this block which is unavoidable and convincing. The Dialogue begins with Trypho stopping Justin to ask if he would like to have a philosophical discussion (Dial. 1.3). This starts Justin’s conversion account/lifestory/apology which culminates in his profession of Christianity. Toward the end of this block, when Trypho expresses his interest in finding out more about Justin’s beliefs, the discussion moves to a more private venue (Dial. 9.3). In a similar way, the discussion turns away from philosophy and toward Christianity at least for Justin.

Chapter 10 begins with a long statement from Trypho where he voices several concerns about what he perceives to be crucial inconsistencies in Christian practice; mainly, that Christians do not observe the Laws of the Covenant yet
practice; mainly, that Christians do not observe the Laws of the Covenant yet
assert that they honour God. Instead of obeying the commands Christians pin
their hopes on a man who was crucified (Dial. 10.3-4). At this prompting, Justin
takes the stage and except for chapter 19, Trypho is silent until Dial. 25.

(Dial. 25-28) This block begins with a question by Trypho (Dial. 25.6)
which asks Justin whether he thinks all Jews have been cut off from their
inheritance. It is followed by a lengthy quotation from Isaiah 63:15-65:12 which
ends the chapter. In Dial. 27.1 Trypho makes a methodological critique of
Justin’s argumentation concerning the Law by pointing out his selective use of
Scripture regarding Sabbath observance. Trypho’s next comment is also along
methodological lines. He does not approve of those who explain difficult
Scriptural passages merely by saying that it is God’s will (Dial. 28.1). Justin does
not address the question directly, but states that he is drawing his conclusions
from Scripture. Justin then spends several chapters on the use of Scripture (28.2-
30) and a general chapter on the Second Coming and the Dispensation of God
(Dial. 31 using Daniel 7:9-28). During this exposition (Dial. 28.2-31.7) Trypho is
absent. These chapters are not, therefore, considered part of a Trypho Block,
although later they will be included as connecting material.

(Dial. 32-39) Trypho ushers in the next block by agreeing to the idea of
a great and glorious messiah, but he objects that Jesus is not this messiah because
he is without honour and glory (ἀτιμος καὶ ἄδόξος) having been crucified
(Dial. 32.1). This is a new topic and changes the course of the previous chapters.
There is nothing beforehand which would predispose Trypho to bring up the
There is nothing beforehand which would predispose Trypho to bring up the crucifixion, unless we return to Trypho’s comment in the first Trypho Block (Dial. 10.3). This critique leads Justin back to his argument that since all messianic attributes come from the prophetic writings they must be accepted. It should be noted that Justin does not address crucifixion per se, only the idea of a suffering messiah (Dial. 32.2) (see chapter 6). Justin then sets out to refute the Hezekiah/Solomon interpretations of Psalm 110 (Dial. 33).

The remaining statements of Trypho in this block are related to the argument at hand. Dial 35.1 challenges Justin’s assertion (Dial. 34.8) that Christians do not eat foods offered to idols. Trypho uses rhetorical concessions at Dial 36.1 and Dial. 38.1, responding to Justin’s assertion that the same Jesus who was crucified also spoke to Aaron and Moses in the pillar of cloud. Trypho has two comments in chapter 39. The first accuses Justin of being out of his mind to imply that God is holding his judgement until he has a Jewish remnant numbering seven thousand. The second is his demand that Justin connect these messianic definitions to the person of Jesus. The chapters which follow (40-43) are a typological discussion of various Jewish symbols and their christological significance. Trypho has no voice during this Christian midrash. Because of this, these chapters cannot be included in the block.

(Dial. 45-68) Trypho begins this block by asking: “Even though I may appear to hinder (ἐγκοπεῖν) these subjects, which you say must be examined, the question which I wish to ask is pressing, allow me to go first” (Dial. 45.1). Trypho’s question concerns the relationship between observance of the Jewish
Trypho's question concerns the relationship between observance of the Jewish Law and Christian belief.

A variety of topics are covered in this particular block. It is the most active and lively block of dialogue in the text. At the risk of falling into atomism, it is useful to divide this block into three sub-sections (45-51; 55-60; 63-68). Distinguishing these inner blocks will help to illustrate the way Trypho's rhetorical technique functions to move the dialogue forward. After the initial shift at 45, which begins the block, two internal shifts occur at chapters 55 and 63. At Dial. 55.1 Trypho tells Justin that he will consider Justin's answer regarding Jesus' birth if he supports it with additional arguments. But instead of allowing Justin to provide this additional material, Trypho pre-empts Justin and changes the subject to whether there can be another God. At Dial. 63.1 Trypho moves Justin onto the issues of the virgin birth, the crucifixion, and ascension by conceding the concept which posits the existence of some kind of offspring from God before creation. These two instances could be said to demarcate independent blocks because they allow Justin's smaller arguments to be accepted. (Dial. 52-54 on the advents of the messiah and 61-62 on the offspring of God.) But they do not constitute autonomous sections because they are linked together. The entire block begins with an abrupt change in subject by Trypho followed by linking comments and pertinent questions throughout the whole of this block. These distinct shifts toward Trypho's area of interest (Dial. 55 and 63) could be viewed as lesser breaks, but they are best understood in the light of his rhetorical technique (see chapter 6) not as breaks within the block.
Besides these two rhetorical concessions, Trypho pursues his own particular points of contention in relation to Justin’s preceding remarks. At Dial. 46.3 Trypho challenges Justin’s assertion that Abraham can be counted among those who were righteous without observing the Law. Trypho’s comment fits the flow of the argument and is based on Justin’s comments from the previous chapter. Trypho’s vote for a more human messiah (Dial. 49.1) is also linked to Justin’s previous admission (Dial. 48.4) that there are some Christians who believe in a totally human origin of Jesus. All of Trypho’s comments at Dial. 56. 5,9,10,12,16 respond to the immediate argument. Dial. 57.1 links to the previous chapter’s account of the angels at Mamre. Dial. 67.1 reports Trypho’s hesitation with the possibility of a virgin birth. And it is connected to what Justin said in the chapter immediately before (Dial. 66.3). This is also the case at Dial. 68.1 where Trypho answers the comment made by Justin at 67.11. All of these examples illustrate the intricate and interwoven nature of this section of discourse. After chapter 68 there is an abrupt interruption in the text. Chapters 69 and 70 discuss the relationship between the Greek myths and Christian symbolism. Trypho has no words in these chapters and this signals a break between this block and the next.

(Dial. 71- the lacuna at 74.4) This block is more difficult to organize than the previous examples. Unlike the other blocks it does not begin with Trypho interrupting the flow of Justin’s argument. Trypho does not open the chapter, as he does in the previous blocks. Justin has just spent two chapters (Dial. 69-70) refuting the claim that Christianity is similar to the Greek myths. He then turns
his attention to the Jewish teachers whom he accuses of rejecting the translation of
the LXX and deliberately removing those passages which Justin believes prove
the Christian case. (Dial. 71.2). Justin promises to show that Isaiah 7:14 refers to
Christ, not Hezekiah. At this point, Trypho stops Justin and asks him to list these
disputed texts (Dial. 71.4). At Dial. 73.5 Trypho thinks it unlikely that these
Jewish teachers would take out biblical passages for their own protection and
Dial. 74.1 opens with the request for Justin to explain a passage of Scripture –
Psalm 95 (LXX) – because it conflicts with a previous statement Justin made
about Christ (Dial. 56). This block is interrupted by the presence of a lacuna at
74.4. This lacuna will be given more attention in the next section when the
connections between them are examined and tested.

6 (Dial. 87-90) In this block we have a return to the earlier models
(12&9) where the flow is more natural. Within this block there are linking
comments in Trypho’s rhetorical mode. Dial. 87 begins with a prefacing
comment from Trypho which changes the topic of discussion. “Do not suppose
from now on that I am trying to upset your argument by making a fresh inquiry. I
only wish to learn about the questions I put to you.” (Dial. 87.1). Trypho is
bringing up an issue which, in his mind, is a problem with Justin’s logic. It is
based on his reading of Isaiah 11:1-3 and points to the issue of Jesus’ baptism.
“But how can he be proved to have already existed seeing that he is filled through
the powers of the Holy Spirit [at his baptism] as though he lacked something
which the word by Isaiah recounts” (Dial. 87.2)? It is slightly unusual for Trypho
to make inquiries about the meaning of Scriptural passages, but the motivation
behind the question is based on logic not exegesis. How does one proclaim a pre-existent Christ who is called God yet is in need of the purification of baptism?

This is similar to Trypho’s observations about Christians who say they follow the Law yet do not obey any of the commandments which order the Sabbath to be observed (Dial. 10.3). This observation is in line with Trypho’s criteria logic and reason and is consistent with the kinds of problems Trypho sees with Justin’s argument.

The second half of this small block (Dial. 89-90) contains a pocket of dialogue between Justin and Trypho. It begins with Trypho introducing another topic which was discussed earlier – crucifixion. He does this by conceding the convincing quality of Justin’s argument thus far.

You are aware that all our race expects the messiah and we agree that all the passages of scripture which you have quoted are related (ἐξηγηταξαί) to him. And I must say that the idea that the name of Jesus was given to the son of Nun has disconcerted me to yield to it. However, we seriously doubt if the messiah should be crucified with such dishonor. For, it is written in the law that whoever is crucified is very accursed (ἐπικατὰρατος). On this point I am firmly sceptical (δυσπείστως ἔχω). It is apparent that the scriptures teach that the Christ is susceptible to suffering (παθητών). We wish to learn if it is to be of a form accursed in the law and if you have any proof of this (Dial. 89.1-2)

This objection to the crucifixion is the last statement attributed to Trypho until the singular comments at Dial. 118.1, 123.7, and the closing chapter (Dial. 142). Once we get beyond the last Trypho block, Justin gives the reader three sections of Christian exegesis and apology. Chapters 91-97 deal exclusively with the crucifixion and the many ways such a death is prefigured in the Scriptures.
And chapters 98-106 offer an extended homily on Psalm 22 and how it relates to the life of Jesus. The subjects are quite varied in the last section (Dial. 107-141) and often repeat earlier arguments. Justin broadly covers the issue of gentile believers with special reference to Jonah in Dial. 107-109. He also deals with a variety of assorted topics containing some of the fiercest polemic in the Dialogue during chapters 110-119. The remaining chapters comprise a menagerie of arguments and reiterations: the existence of two Israels and the Jewish remnant (Dial. 120), the return of Jesus in glory (Dial. 121-122), more polemic (Dial. 123), more information about the many names of Jesus and additional Logos material (Dial. 124-129), comments about the disobedience of Israel in the desert and in general (Dial. 130-133), a more detailed discussion of the importance of Jacob, culminating in a plea for conversion (Dial. 134-137), and finally a repeat of the flood narrative ending with an anticlimactic and convoluted argument stating that it was acceptable for the patriarchs to have had multiple wives because “mysteries of all kinds (μυστήρια πάντα) were being performed by them”, but this did not, however, apply to David (Dial. 141.4). At this point, Justin pulls up abruptly and tells the reader that “when I had said this, I stopped” (Dial. 141.5). Dial. 142 begins with the long-absent voice of Trypho and the Dialogue ends with Trypho’s friendly exit, unconverted.

**RECONSTRUCTING THE TRYPHO TEXT**

(Dial. 1-10, 18.2b-19, 25-39 (80 following 36), 44-77, 79, 87-90, 118, 123, 142) See APPENDIX III
The natural question to ask once this material is isolated is whether it fits together? The answer is yes; some parts better than others, but overall, the fit is good, notably before chapter 78. This is significant because if the Trypho material can be shown to be interconnected, then this increases the plausibility that non-Trypho material was added later. Moreover, if it can be shown that this hypothetical Trypho Text is a more cohesive document than the full Dialogue, this increases the possibility even more. Overall, I find it implausible to assume that the connections between the blocks, once the non-Trypho material is removed, are merely coincidental.

The first part of this section will deal with the possible connections between the Trypho blocks. The Trypho chapters, however, present different sorts of problems. Three of the Trypho chapters are free-floating and do not appear to have any connection to the larger Trypho blocks (79, 118, and 123). But the other four chapters (19, 77, 80, 142) can be joined to larger blocks. Dial. 19 along with 18 are connecting chapters that act as a bridge between the first and second Trypho blocks. I have linked chapter 77 to a Trypho block because Dial. 74.4-76 are connecting text which are joined to Trypho block 71-74.4. In my reconstruction, Chapter 80 has been moved into an existing block (32-39 after 36) and chapter 142 is considered non-floating because its place at the end of the Dialogue is obvious.

Each of these connections will be dealt with in turn, but the emphasis here is on the connections between the larger blocks. It is the Trypho blocks which comprise the bulk of the Trypho material. Out of the 87 statements attributed to
Trypho in the *Dialogue*, 81 (93%) of them occur within the Trypho blocks. While this is a high proportion of Trypho’s words, it is not that remarkable – after all, this is the criterion for establishing the Trypho blocks in the first place. But what is striking is that they occur in discernible, distinct blocks and that there are only six of them.

But before exploring this sub-text in more detail, two points of methodology should be explained. The first is regarding the use of connecting material which does not include any statements of Trypho. If we simply join together the Trypho material as it stands we are left with a few problems: 1) We might exclude pertinent chapters simply because they do not contain dialogue. 2) We are left with a document which is artificially choppy and disjointed. 3) We are also left with long LXX passages which interrupt the flow of argumentation in the text. Therefore, I have adopted two simple ways to discern what LXX passages and non-Trypho material can be included in the Trypho Text and what cannot.

One of the reasons the *Dialogue* is a difficult document to read is because of the long tracts of LXX which inhabit the text. Some of the biblical passages quoted in the *Dialogue* are used only to reinforce or rehearse arguments made by Justin. Many times, these passages are not particularly pertinent and can distract from the flow. In order to provide a more readable document, I have applied a simple criterion to test whether passages from the LXX should be left in the Trypho Text. Each LXX quote must prove itself integral on the following bases: Is the biblical passage quoted verbatim from the LXX and uninterrupted by commentary? Does the quote simply echo another scriptural passage already...
given by Justin? In other words, is the passage superfluous to the argument?

Does the removal of the passage improve the flow of the argument? If the answer to these questions is yes, then there is reason to suspect that the passage is not a part of the Trypho Text and can be provisionally removed. While most of the LXX passages are integral and cannot be removed without damage to Justin’s argument, this criterion does eliminate some large chunks of repetitive and unessential passages of LXX. In all cases, the suspension of these LXX passages improves the movement and balance of the Trypho Text without distorting its arguments. I am not making the claim that all of these passages were not present in the Trypho Text. There is every possibility that they were included in the Trypho Text and later expanded or copied verbatim. For instance, at Dial. 37.2 Justin gives a verbatim quote from the LXX of Psalm 99:1-9. By my criteria this quote can be suspended. In the following chapter, however, Trypho makes a reference to ‘the Pillar of Cloud’. This can only be linked to Psalm 99. This does not necessarily mean that Trypho’s comments were added after the quote. It is possible that a reference to the pillar of cloud was made in the initial Trypho Text and the full Psalm was laid over the reference at a later stage. It is also possible that Trypho knew this text and that the reference to the Pillar of Cloud came from his own acquaintance with Scripture. Perhaps it was Trypho’s comment which prompted Justin to add this quote at a later time. In the end, there is no way to be certain which came first. The same argument could be made for the citation of Daniel 7: 9-28 at Dial. 31. 2-7. This is an extensive quote which might be suspended, but in the next chapter Trypho recaps Justin’s argument and uses the
phrase (τοῦ παλαιοῦ τῶν ἡμερῶν) which refers back to the Daniel passage. This may be another case where the larger verbatim quote may have been laid over a more paraphrastic reference. Again, it is also possible that the reference to ‘Ancient of Days’ came from Trypho. Trypho is, after all, a literate, inquisitive, faithful, and philosophically-minded Jew. Trypho’s relationship to Scripture and exegesis will be discussed in chapter 6, but for our purposes it is important to acknowledge that the cross-referencing of LXX passages between the Trypho and non-Trypho material can be explained in a number of ways. The suspensions of these LXX quotes are to be held lightly and are only valuable insofar as they help the reader to see the overall flow of the argument. The inclusion or exclusion of LXX quotes is not crucial to my argument for a hypothetical text. In a few instances, however, the temporary suspension of LXX tracts allows us to see connections that are otherwise obscured by their presence. This is especially true in my analysis of the lacuna at Dial. 74.4 (see below).

The main criterion for determining the Trypho material is the presence of Trypho. But, when trying to reconstruct the text that strict criterion is artificial because it may eliminate Justin’s response to one of Trypho’s challenges. If Trypho ends a block or chapter with a demand for Justin to address a certain issue, Justin needs to be given enough freedom either to answer Trypho or, as is more common, to avoid his demand and pursue his own agenda. In the Trypho Text I have made allowances for this kind of natural exchange. Justin usually signals the end of his response either by moving to a completely different topic or bringing in supporting reiterative LXX passages.
These two methodological procedures link Trypho blocks 25-28 and 32-39 because chapters 29 and 30 contain Justin’s answer to Trypho’s demand at the end of chapter 28. Virtually all of chapter 31 is comprised of supporting LXX proof texts and can be lifted from the text according to the criterion concerning passages of LXX. Thematically, Trypho’s comment which begins the next Trypho block at 32, depends on Justin’s comment made at the end of chapter 31. In this way the two Trypho blocks can be joined together and the length between them is significantly shortened. This is the only instance in my reconstruction where two Trypho blocks are linked by a combination of these two methods.

When these blocks are placed end to end a surprisingly coherent document emerges which is clearer and more understandable than the much longer Dialogue. The most striking feature of this reading is the way the material fits together when it is not separated by non-Trypho material as defined above. The connection between the first Trypho block (1-10) and chapters 18-19 is a good illustration of how the Trypho material can be read as continuous. Dialogue 10 ends with Trypho’s critique of Christianity and his challenge for Justin to put forward a defense against the charge of hypocrisy regarding the Christian understanding of the Mosaic Law.

But we are especially at a loss about this: that you, saying that you worship God and thinking yourselves superior to other people, separate from them in no respect, and do not make your life different from the heathen: you keep neither feasts nor Sabbaths, nor have circumcision and, moreover, though you set your hopes on a man that was crucified, you still hope to obtain some good from God, though you do not do his commandments. Now have you not read that souls shall be cut off from his people which are not circumcised on
the eighth day? The charge refers also to strangers and to purchased slaves. It follows that when you have directly despised this covenant you neglect the commands that come afterwards, and as people who know God you attempt to persuade us though you practise none of the these things which are done by those who fear God (ὅσοι ἡμεῖς ἀγαθοὶ ἐστίν). Therefore, if you have any defense to make with reference to these points, and can show how you could have any hope at all, even though you do not keep the law, we will gladly hear from you. Afterwards let us examine the other points in the same way. (Dial. 10.4)

Chapter 11 does address the theme of the Law, but in a roundabout fashion. Justin responds to this charge by first stating that:

There will be no other God, O Trypho, nor was there from eternity any other existing, but he who made and created this universe. We do not think that there is one God for us, another for you, but that He alone is God who led your fathers out from Egypt with a strong hand and a high arm. Nor have we trusted in any other for there is no other, but in Him in whom you also have trusted, the God of Abraham, and of Isaac, and of Jacob. (Dial. 11.1)

Justin goes on to discuss the abrogation of the old Law and covenant and the replacement with the new Law of Christ, which has no ordinances. This chapter can be seen as an appropriate introduction to the following chapters where Justin expounds a distinctly Christian description of the Mosaic Law (Dial. 11-17). Moreover, there is nothing in the chapters leading up to Dial. 11 that could prompt such a response. If, however, we move to the next Trypho chapter, it is possible to see a better connection.

Chapter 19 has been included as a Trypho chapter (APPENDIX II), but it is clear that some of chapter 18 must also come with it as connected material. Trypho's comment in 19.1 makes reference to the kinds of suffering which are
mentioned by Justin at 18.3. This is an instance where the chapter divisions are misleading. Dial. 18.2 contains a plea for conversion that certainly must be attached to chapter 17. At 17.3, Trypho quotes some sayings of Jesus and in 18.1 (the following sentence) he refers unambiguously to these references. In this case, the break does not come at the chapter heading or even at a verse. It seems to come in the middle of 18.2 where Justin has ended his plea for conversion and seems to start over again by saying:

We would also observe circumcision of the flesh, Sabbaths, and in short all the feasts, if we did not know the reason they were enjoined you, namely, on account of your lawlessness and your hardness of heart. After all, if we patiently endure all the things contrived against us by wicked people and demons, so that even in the midst of unspeakable cruelties, death and torture, we pray for mercy for those who do these things to us. And even if we do not even wish to repay any of this to any one – as the new Lawgiver urges us – how is it, Trypho, that we do not observe those harmless rites – I am speaking of circumcision of the flesh, Sabbaths, and feasts? (Dial. 18.2b-3)

If we recall Trypho’s question at the end of chapter 10 – why Christians don’t observe the Law – then this statement seems to fit well. Justin’s two-pronged answer is 1) The Law was given because of your lawlessness and does not apply to us, and 2) Christians do not ignore the Law out of any kind of fear of social exclusion of punishment, as Trypho implies in chapter 10. Christians suffer greatly because of their beliefs. Therefore, concludes Justin, how can you imply that we are scared of observing the Law when it does not bring anyone any harm, at least not compared to the suffering incurred by simply being a Christian.

Therefore, the suggestion that Christians do not differentiate themselves from their
The statement quoted above ends chapter 18 and Dial. 19 begins with Trypho attempting to refocus the question to his original point which was made at the end of chapter 10: “This is the very point: that while suffering all these things, you do not keep all the practices which are now under discussion” (Dial. 19.1). The rest of chapter 19 is taken up with Justin’s continued condemnation of the Mosaic ordinances, with special attention given to circumcision. Justin uses the argument that if circumcision was truly necessary, why were the patriarchs – Adam, Abel, Enoch, Lot, Noah, and Melchizedek – considered righteous without circumcision (Dial. 19.2-6)? At chapter 20, however, Justin begins a different argument against the Law by turning his attention to the food laws. Chapters 21-22 are virtually all quotations from the LXX and Trypho does not say anything until the end of Dial. 25.

The second Trypho block (Dial 25-28) begins with Justin changing the topic from typology to accusations: "Those who justify themselves (ὁι δικαιούντες ἐκατονταῖς), saying they are children of Abraham, will only hope to inherit even a small place together with us.”(Dial 25.1). While in its current form the shift is quite abrupt, the progression does flow from the end of chapter 19 where Justin is pointing out all those righteous Jews who lived before the Law. The basic message is: Jews cannot rely on adherence to the Law for salvation.
Chapter 25 continues the same theme with a slightly different tack: Not only is the Law useless, you cannot rely on your lineage from Abraham to secure your inheritance. In this way it is possible to see how chapter 19 moves into chapter 25. The connection is not unambiguous, but the thematic flow is consistent and it works better than the existing connection.

The transition between this block (25-28) and the next block (32-39) is not immediately apparent in its current form. Trypho block (25-28) ends on the topic of circumcision and the next block (32-39) begins with a rhetorical concession by Trypho (Dial. 32.1) in which he affirms that the scriptures describe a great and glorious messiah, but he adds that Jesus' life and death were less than glorious because he was crucified. The topics cannot be linked if they are put together as separate Trypho blocks. However, if the intervening chapters (29-31) are allowed to stand according to the previously mentioned criteria, then its thematic consistency is maintained. Chapter 29 continues the theme of circumcision from chapter 28 and is included because it contains Justin's response to Trypho. Chapter 30 contains polemical material against Jews who have not received grace to understand the scriptures. Chapter 31 moves smoothly from 30 and introduces the idea of an advent in glory and Trypho's remarks in Dial. 32 respond to Justin's statement at the beginning of chapter 31. Thus, these three chapters provide a bridge between the surrounding Trypho blocks even if they do not contain any dialogue material. Moreover, the length between these two blocks is greatly reduced if the long passage from Daniel is removed from Dial. 31, since it only re-states and reinforces what Justin says in the first sentence of the chapter.
Therefore, the cost of maintaining the flow of the argument is the inclusion of two chapters (Dial. 29 and 30) and a sentence (Dial. 31.1).

Chapter 80 of the *Dialogue* appears to be out of place in its present location (as noted above) and follows chapter 36 in my reconstructed text. Chapter 80 appears to fit after chapter 36 for thematic reasons. It discusses the rebuilding of Jerusalem and the gathering of all Christians along with the patriarchs, prophets, Christian saints, and all other proselytes from Judaism (Dial. 80.1). If we look at the chapters leading up to and including chapter 36, it is possible to see how Trypho could have made the comment in chapter 80. There are several references which foreshadow the topic of the rebuilding of Jerusalem. *Dial. 34.2* mentions that Jesus will come again and have an eternal kingdom, *Dial. 34.7* mentions the First Temple of Solomon in Jerusalem (Justin discounts this achievement because it is not necessarily part of Psalm 72). The mention of Solomon's Temple, however, may have prompted Trypho to challenge the Christian belief that Jesus will rebuild the Temple and the city (Dial. 80.1). This is reinforced by the reference in *Dial. 35.8* which expressed the belief that the second advent of Jesus will include a kingdom. This cluster of references to the second coming, the Temple, and the eternal kingdom all foreshadow the subject matter in *Dial. 80.*

There also appears to be a rhetorical and thematic connection based on Trypho's observation about variant Christian beliefs. *Dial. 35.6* contains Justin's list of the 'so-called' Christians (Χριστιανοὺς ἐκυπτούς λέγουσιν) whom he compares to those who worship idols inscribed by human hands. Trypho began
compares to those who worship idols inscribed by human hands. Trypho began this chapter (35) by accusing some Christians of eating meat sacrificed to idols. Justin is quick to partition these groups off from his ideal of Christianity. Therefore, he says that they are Christians only in name. Chapter 80 parallels this style of argumentation. It begins with a comment by Trypho which challenges the Christian belief in a millennium. Justin refutes the charge in the same way:

I did say to you earlier [Dial. 35.1-6] that I and many others hold this opinion, even you know this to be the case. But I also told you that some well meaning and devout Christians do not believe it. For I made it clear that those who are Christian by name (λεγομένοις Χριστιανοῖς), but in reality are godless and impious heretics, teach everything that is blasphemous, godless, and foolish (Dial. 80.2-3).

In the Trypho Text, these two chapters (35 and 80 which are separated only by chapter 36) show Trypho’s attempt to challenge two Christian claims. Justin uses the same technique of diminishing and separating the deviant groups from what he believed was true Christianity. At this stage of the dialogue it appears that Trypho is pursuing a particular line of critique about divisions within Christianity. This does not prove that these chapters belong together, but these connections strengthen the possibility that chapter 80 was moved from what appears to have been its original position in the Trypho Text.

In addition to the affinities mentioned above it is also possible to see why it might have been pulled from its original position. There is no connection between the opening passage of chapter 80 and chapter 79 (which is anomalous in its own right). A.L. Williams, in his translation of the Dialogue, thinks that the reference to the rebuilding of Jerusalem refers to a lost section of the Dialogue.
reference to the rebuilding of Jerusalem refers to a lost section of the Dialogue. He also asks if the entire chapter might not be an interpolation. But, in the full extant Dialogue, Chapter 80 begins a line of argument that continues until chapter 87, when the next Trypho block begins. These chapters (80-86) are concerned with prophecy and the correct interpretation of it. Chapter 81 provides the link to chapter 80 with the association between the thousand year reign of Jesus (Is. 65: 17-25) and the prophecy in Revelation 20: 4,6 (Dial. 81.4). Chapter 80 may have served as an introductory chapter for this non-Trypho material. This is speculation, of course, but it might explain why chapter 80 was moved.

Most of chapter 37 is not included in the Trypho Text because it comprises redundant passages of LXX. The block continues with chapters 38 and 39, which are the continuation of Justin’s argument for the validity of his messianic exegesis and the blindness of the Jews.

The connection with the next Trypho block (45-77) shows another example of how these sections may have been continuous at one time. As mentioned earlier, there are times when additional material must be incorporated into the reconstructed text because it is linked with Trypho chapters. Chapter 45, which has Trypho in it, must be preceded by chapter 44 because in that chapter Justin quotes Ezekiel 14 and then a few sentences later (Dial. 45.3), he refers back to back to that passage saying: Εἰπόντος μου, ὦ ἀνθρωπε, τὰ λελεγμένα ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἰερουσαλήμ... He then gives a direct rephrasing of the passage as a reminder to Trypho. For this reason, 44 must be attached to 45 as connecting.
material. Therefore, we must look at the connection between the end of 39 and the beginning of 44. As mentioned earlier, the tone and content of chapter 39 is condemnatory. At Dial. 38.1 Trypho puts in the sarcastic remark that he should have listened to his teachers when they advised Jews not to converse with Christians. To this, Justin says that Trypho should give up on the Jewish teachers (Dial. 38.2). At 39.1 Justin goes on to make another accusation that the Jews hate the Christians because Jews are hard-hearted and cannot understand the Scriptures. Trypho then tells Justin that he sounds ridiculous when he says such things (Dial. 39.3). In these chapters, the tone is quite harsh and combative and Justin appears to be frustrated with Trypho’s sustained skepticism. Justin even accuses Trypho of not becoming a Christian because he is scared of being persecuted (Dial. 39.6), which is an interesting reversal of Trypho’s comment in Dial. 10. At this point, Trypho tries to divert the subject into his own areas of interest. He does this by offering a rhetorical concession which is designed to move Justin into a new area.84

Now then give us good reasons why he, who you say was crucified and ascended into heaven, is the messiah of God. It is said in the scriptures that he is liable to suffering and will come again in glory (μετὰ δόξης) and receive (ληστεύσωσι) the eternal kingdom over all the nations – every kingdom being placed under subjection to him. This you have shown sufficiently by means of the Scriptures you mentioned earlier: now show us that this man is he. (Dial. 39.7).85

But instead of addressing this question, Justin puts Trypho off so that he can continue his argument about the Jews and their understanding of the Scriptures:
Gentlemen, it has already been shown to those with ears, and from the facts which have been agreed upon ( gióλογούμενων) by you. But so that you might not think I am at a loss and unable to prove (αποδείξεις ποιείσθαι) what you ask, as I promised, I shall do so at the right moment. For now, I am still working toward the nexus of the argument I was making (ἐπὶ τὴν συνάφειαν ὅν ἐπιούσιμην λόγων ἀποτρέχω”) (Dial. 39.8)

Chapter 40 then switches into typological exegesis which does not have any connection to Justin’s previous argument, unless we go back to the typological chapters 20-24, which do not contain Trypho material. There is no dialogue in Dial. 40-43 and the entire tone changes from heated engagement to cool, considered, if at times fanciful, exegesis. But if we move directly to chapter 44, however, then it is possible to see a more consistent exchange.

Chapter 44 begins:

For in every way I [Justin] shall be found guiltless [αθωος] in your case, if, in making my argument, I work hard [ἀγωνίζομαι] to persuade you. But if you remain hard-hearted [σκληροκαρδιοι], or weak in your resolution because of [the threat of] death – which is inevitable for Christians – and do not wish to perceive the truth (τῷ ἀληθείᾳ συντίθεσθαι μὴ βουλησθε), you will only reveal your own guilt (ἐαυτοῖς ἀληθίνοι φανησεσθε) (Dial. 44.1).

He goes on to warn Trypho that his Abrahamic lineage is of no use; only those who are “assimilated into the faith of Abraham” (Dial. 44.2) have any hope at all. This, in fact, is the continuation of the argument at the end of chapter 39. Throughout 44 Justin continues this theme of Jewish blindness and misguidedness until Trypho makes another attempt to change the subject at Dial. 45.1: “Even
though I may appear to hinder (ἐγκόπτειν) these subjects, which you say must be examined, the question which I wish to ask is pressing, allow me to go first” (πρῶτον).

Trypho then asks whether those who followed the Mosaic Law will be treated like those who were righteous before the Law. In this case, Trypho is able to change Justin’s direction. Looking back over the transition, however, we can see that what is choppy in the full Dialogue has a smoother and more understandable flow in the reconstructed Trypho Text. Without the typological chapters (40-43) Justin’s subject and tone are maintained.

There are only a few chapters separating chapter 68 from the next block (71-74.4). Toward the end of Dial. 68 Justin promises to address the criticism that although the Jewish teachers may agree that certain passages refer to the messiah, “they dare to say that he whom we worship is not the messiah who will come and suffer and reign and be worshipped as God” (Dial 68.9). But instead of addressing this critique Justin decides to back up and address a comment Trypho made a chapter earlier (Dial. 67.1-2): that Jesus’ life mirrors the pagan myths. He spends the next two chapters (69-70) describing how the devil has corrupted the prophecies and spread them among the Greeks. During these chapters, there is no dialogue. At chapter 71 Justin returns to the subject of the Jewish teachers and their alleged rejection of the LXX. Trypho also returns in chapter 71. This is exactly where Justin left off a few chapters earlier at the end of chapter 68.

This excursus (69-70) detracts from the flow of the larger argument. The
chapters are abrupt and lack any dialogue. Not surprisingly, without these chapters, the flow and sense of the text is maintained. Chapter 71 resumes the theme left hanging in Dial. 68.9 (Jewish teachers) and continues until the lacuna at Dial. 74.4.

But, a case could also be made for including these two chapters as linking material, despite the lack of dialogue and difference in style. Justin does say that he will address the argument, even if his comments come later. And it could be said that he addresses them in the order Trypho asks them: Greek myths first, Jewish teachers second. If Justin had not said that he would deal with this issue it would be tempting to treat this small section as additional. But under the circumstances, I have decided to include these chapters as possible linking material. Their inclusion or exclusion have no impact on the larger argument, but their inclusion seems to be more in line with the flow of the argument in the Trypho Text.

The lacuna, which comes almost exactly in middle of the Dialogue, is difficult to explain. Some scholars have tried to reconstruct the line of thinking lost in the gap, making it quite short, others see it as representing the transition from day one to day two. In contrast, my reconstruction of the Trypho Text shows a thematic connection which links the two sides, making the lacuna much shorter in length. But, in order to see this connection, it is necessary to suspend the LXX passage which emerges from the lacuna and finishes chapter 74. This passage from Deuteronomy (31:16-18) can be suspended from the text because it has no connection to the following argument in Dial. 75 and it can only be
tortuously connected to the argument which begins in *Dial. 74*. Moreover, it is not related to any other argument in the vicinity and is of a harshly polemical nature which is out of place in this section. Previous scholarship has sought to connect the two parts with the inclusion of the Deuteronomy text, 88 but with this quote excised as unessential, the two sides of the lacuna fit sensibly together.

But first we need to back up just a few chapters and pick up the thread of the argument in order to see how the two sides might fit together. After Justin records those pieces of Scripture he believes were deleted from the LXX by the Jewish teachers (*Dial 72-73*), Trypho notices a shift in Justin’s language and he brings it to his attention. Earlier, Justin had gone to great lengths to show that there is one who is distinct from God – only in number – and yet is called both God and Angel in the account of Abraham’s visitation (Gen. 18 at *Dial 55-56* especially 56.10). At *Dial 60.2* he chastises Trypho for even supposing that “the maker and Father of the universe left all that is above heaven and appeared on a little section of earth.” At this point, Justin is far from equating Christ with God. The intent of his comment is to belittle Trypho for even supposing such an idea. His goal here is to assert the idea that there is a special divine being who is called both names (Angel and God) because of his special pre-existent status and mission to announce the commandments of God (*Dial 60.3*). At chapter 73 Justin quotes the whole of Psalm 96 (LXX 95) as a prophetic pointer to Christ. Trypho responds to the christological aspects of this Psalm by pointing out an inconsistency in Justin’s thinking, namely that this passages refers to God.

Trypho opens chapter 74 with his observation:

- 60 -
But about this Psalm [96 (95)] which you stated last from the words of David. It does not seem to me to have been spoken about any other than the Father, who made both the heavens and the earth. But you affirm that it was spoken of him who suffered, who you are anxious to prove is the messiah (*Dial* 74.1).

Trypho has noticed a legitimate problem in Justin’s argument. Is Jesus called God but separate from God, as Justin previously argued, or is he God, which is the implication of this Psalm? Justin responds by quoting more scripture to temper what Trypho thinks is implicit in Psalm 96 [95]. Justin says that Jesus, because of his great acts and his death, “was deemed worthy by God the Father to reign over all the earth as also by…” (*Dial*. 74.4). This is the point where the lacuna occurs. With this background, the subject of *Dial* 75 becomes clear and the connection between them is almost immediate. *Dial* 75 begins by Justin recounting “a mystery in the book of Exodus” (*Dial* 75.1). The concept which Justin now tries to convey is the idea that a name can carry the power and authority of the one who grants the name. Justin quotes Ex. 23:21: “Take heed of him and listen to him. Do not disobey him, for he will not give way to you. For my name is on him.” Justin seems to suggest that this reference to God’s angel is analogous to Jesus. Jesus carries the power and authority of God because he carries God’s name. This is how Justin moves away from the implication that Christ is God to the idea that he carries God’s name, as reflected in the terminology of Psalm 96. Justin is treading a fine line here because on one hand he would never unreservedly equate Jesus with God – this is the accusation he is trying to get out from under – yet he does assert a special relationship and unity between God and Jesus. This reading of the text provides a logical and realistic
between God and Jesus. This reading of the text provides a logical and realistic flow of argumentation which bridges the lacuna and connects the two Trypho blocks. With this reading, the lacuna is not large and the link between the two blocks is much more apparent than in previous reconstructions and there is no need to reconstruct a hypothetical bridge or separate the document into two parts. Even though this reading does not explain why there is a break in the MS (although this is likely due to a copyist), it does provide a an alternative to separating the document.

Moving beyond the lacuna, we can see that chapter 75 dwells on Justin’s argument for the power of a name. *Dial.* 76 is loosely connected by Justin’s comments on the necessity for the suffering of the ‘Son of Man’. I have included these chapters as a connecting material because it is Justin’s answer to Trypho’s observation in the previous block (71-74.4). Trypho makes a brief appearance at the beginning of chapter 77 to ask for Justin to prove that a passage of scripture refers to Jesus and not Hezekiah. It is not clear exactly how this chapter fits in with the previous discourse. It may refer to the discussion about Hezekiah in *Dial.* 33, but this is not certain. It is more likely that Trypho is referring to the Is. 7:14 passage which was discussed at *Dial.* 66.1 and 43. Nevertheless, this short cluster of chapters does not hang together well even in the full *Dialogue*. Chapter 77 is followed by what appears to be additional material. Chapter 78 restates the argument about Jesus and Herod and is followed by the isolated Trypho chapters (*Dial.* 79-80). Overall, the transitions at this point are rough, but this is true for all the Trypho material after chapter 77. There is only one Trypho block after chapter
77 (Dial. 87-90), but even that is difficult to attach to the previous blocks. The other singular chapters (79, 118, 123) have no apparent connection, that I can see, to the larger body of the Trypho material. Eliminating these floating chapters would be a convenient way to make the Trypho text tighter and more coherent, but this would require special pleading. Their detached status may, instead, serve as an illustration of the coherence of the rest of the Trypho Text. It may also be related to the fact that they occur in the second half of the Dialogue. After Dial. 77, the Dialogue is in its second hypothetical day where many of Justin’s arguments are repeated and there is very little dialogue. I have left Dial. 79 in its present location, but this is only because it does not appear to go anywhere else.

The next Trypho block (Dial. 87-90) begins suddenly. The intervening chapters (Dial. 81-86) comprise Justin’s messianic arguments based on the Psalms, but there is no dialogue. Justin ends this section with a catalogue of references to wood in the Scriptures (Dial. 86). After this, Trypho brings up a logical problem which is created by the baptism of Jesus. Trypho asks how Jesus can be considered to be in need of baptism when “you maintain that he was pre-existent, and that he became incarnate by God’s will and became human by the virgin?” (Dial. 87.2). Even if his chapter is abrupt, Trypho’s observation is in line with his previous concerns. One would expect such a question based on Justin’s assertion of Jesus’ pre-existent status as a semi-divine being. Moreover, Justin made an earlier reference to baptism and its fortifying effect on the person (Dial. 29.1). Moreover, Trypho’s acquaintance with the Gospel sources would make his question completely within the realm of his knowledge and concerns, since it
is mainly focused on the person of Jesus and whether Justin can prove that Jesus matches any of Justin’s messianic characteristics. There is a sense in which Trypho’s questions about Jesus could be said to be exegetical: His questions are sometimes based on Justin’s use of Scripture – this is certainly true in this case. But Trypho’s concern revolves around the logic of Justin’s argument. Trypho does not engage in an exchange of scriptural passages, neither does he question how Justin arrived at such conclusions, he simply asks how a pre-existent being can be in need of baptism. Trypho’s particular attitude toward scripture is taken up in more detail in chapter 6.

Moreover, this line of thinking is consistent with Trypho’s own adoptionistic opinion about Jesus (Dial. 67.2 and 49.1). Trypho’s reasoning has less to do with a particular theological view than with the fact that he believes this scenario to be more believable, more reasonable. Trypho is willing to see Jesus as an authoritative observant teacher, but not as God. The connection is strengthened by the fact that Jesus’ divine status had just been asserted by Justin in Dial. 76, where this status was used to bolster the argument for a virgin birth. Justin takes up this argument for the rest of Chapter 87 and the whole of chapter 88.

The concession made by Trypho at the beginning of chapter 89 does have a linking function to it, but it is not to the preceding chapter. Instead, it appears to refer back fourteen chapters to Dial 75.2 where Justin makes a connection between Jesus and Joshua based on the similarity of their names. It is likely that this reference to crucifixion is connected to Dial. 76.6-7. This links the concessions as well as the topic of crucifixion to a previous section of the
Dialogue (75-76). The connection is much stronger if this passage is read in the light of these two chapters, which are included as Trypho material. Trypho continues to pursue the obstacle of a crucified messiah through the rest of this block. It ends with Justin relating the story of Moses and the Amalekites as an example of the significance of the cross (Dial. 90).

Chapter 91, however, begins “Further, God pointed out in another way [or type] the strength of the mystery of the cross (μυστηρίου τοῦ σταυροῦ)” (Dial. 91.1). This chapter contains the fanciful comparison of the cross with the horn of the unicorn (Dial. 91.2-3) which signifies the nations being pushed to God. This is also where Trypho disappears from the Dialogue almost completely until the final chapter.

After this short block, there are three Trypho chapters, two of which are difficult to place. Dial. 118 contains a comment (118.5) which portrays Trypho as the pliant, appreciative opponent. Justin explains: “I am endeavoring as far as possible to make the same statements over again for the sake of those who have come with you today, but briefly and concisely.” And then he [Trypho] said, “You do well. But even though you were to repeat the same statements at greater length be sure that both I and those that are present with me would rejoice to hear them.” (Dial. 118.4-5). At this late stage in the Dialogue, this would be an improbable statement for a Christian to make, let alone Trypho. Moreover, this comment is completely out of keeping with the rest of his sayings and almost ridiculous in its content and implication. Not only is the saying out of place, but the whole chapter has no connection to any Trypho material. Moreover, the words
the whole chapter has no connection to any Trypho material. Moreover, the words attributed to Trypho are not in keeping with the tone of Trypho’s other comments. Nevertheless, it is counted as a part of the reconstructed Trypho Text because the words are attributed to Trypho.

In contrast, Trypho’s response to the question at Dial.123.7 reflects the concerns he has over Justin’s claim that Christians are the true Israel (see chapter 6 for the discussion of Trypho’s ethnic concern). Even though this comment is in keeping with his other statements, the surrounding material cannot be connected to any other Trypho material. It is included in the Trypho Text, but it is of the same suspicious nature as the other Trypho chapters which cannot be attached to the larger Trypho blocks.

The final chapter of the Dialogue (142) is different in that this chapter has a definite and indisputable place in the document. The chapters leading up to it have nothing in them that might connect them. Chapter 141 is one of the more obscure chapters of the Dialogue which discusses David, the patriarchs, and the justification of multiple wives. The only signal comes suddenly at the very end of chapter 141. After making his short point about David, Justin makes the announcement to his alleged reader – Marcus Pompeius – that: “after I had said all this, I came to an end” (Dial. 141.5). Thematically, chapter 142 could just as likely follow chapter 90 as chapter 141. It must also be remembered that the final chapter does not deal with any particular theme, so it would be unreasonable to ask for a thematic connection. Chapter 90 may be a better choice because there is dialogue in both of these chapters. This is not the case in the 52 chapters which
stand between them.\textsuperscript{92}

From our examination of the connections which exist within the Trypho material, it can be seen that while the connections in the latter half of the \textit{Dialogue} are rough (e.g. 75-77 to 87-90 to 142) and sometimes non-existent (79, 118, and 123), the connections in the main body of the Trypho Text, to wit before \textit{Dial. 78}, reveal a thematic consistency that speaks well for the possibility that at one time they were contiguous (1-10 to 18-19 to 25-39 to 44-74.4 (lacuna) to 75-77).

**THE INTERNAL CONSISTENCY OF THE TRYPHO TEXT**

Thematic or rhetorical connections between the blocks are only the first step (albeit a major one) in establishing the Trypho Text as a free-standing document. It is also important to assess the internal thematic consistency of the Trypho Text if it is to be considered a free-standing document. In this section I am more concerned with the statements attributed to Trypho than those of Justin. I am assuming that Justin had much more control of the text and his ideas were more solidly formed. Trypho is the disputant who reacts to Justin’s arguments. He rarely puts forward his own argument. Tracking the cross-references within Justin’s comments is a task fraught with pitfalls. For instance, in chapter 18 Justin mentions Jewish circumcision. He goes on in \textit{Dial. 19} to develop the idea that circumcision is not a necessity for righteousness because the patriarchs were not circumcised. Therefore, circumcision functions as a sign against the Jews. Both of these passages are considered here as a part of the hypothetical Trypho Text, but the idea of circumcision as a mark for punishment is also mentioned earlier in
chapter 16. This is not treated by me to be a part of the Trypho Text. Does this cross-reference weaken the Trypho Text? Not necessarily. Justin could simply be restating and developing in the later material what he mentioned in the earlier material. If one of Justin’s arguments occurs both in the Trypho Text and outside of it, this is not sufficient reason to become suspicious. If, however, Justin had said in a Trypho chapter “Trypho, I just told you why Jews are circumcised” and this occurred two chapters earlier in non-Trypho material, then there would be an obvious problem. If, however, the later non-Trypho material makes reference to the earlier Trypho material, this is not so difficult to explain. For instance, in chapter 10 Trypho mentions that he has read the so-called gospel (λεγομένω εἰςαγγελίας). This fact is later referred to by Justin at 18.1 in the non-Trypho material. Justin could easily have include such a statement in the expanded text, because he had access to the earlier version. It is difficult to explain how earlier material could refer to later material but not vice versa.

It is more effective to focus on Trypho’s cross-references because presumably he was not present at the time of expansion. Certainly there would be a problem if the Trypho Text made reference to non-Trypho material in its arguments. For example, if Trypho said ‘Earlier you made a reference to a passage in Ezekiel that....’, but this reference to Ezekiel only occurred outside the Trypho material, how would Trypho have known about this passage or that Justin used it in his argument?

When we track every thematic or scriptural reference made by Trypho then
it becomes evident that there is virtually no cross-over between the full *Dialogue* and the Trypho Text. I have examined the topics raised by Trypho to determine whether the ideas refer to previous material in the Trypho Text, the non-Trypho material, or neither. I have made a list of the ideas contained in each chapter of the Trypho Text and a cross-reference for the chapters after *Dial.* 10. (Chapters 8 and 10 cannot be expected to refer back to anything in the text.)

*Chapter 8*) Trypho: The messiah, if he has come, is unknown because Elijah has not yet ushered him in. Christians believe in worthless rumours.

*Chapter 10*) Trypho: Christians are not separate from the pagans and do not observe feasts. They set their hopes on a crucified man. They despise the covenant by snubbing the commandments.

*Chapter 19*) Restates objection that Christians do not follow the Law (from *Dial.* 10)

*Chapter 27*) Trypho: Justin is selective and ignores passages which command the Law to be observed; e.g. Sabbath (from *Dial.* 10).

*Chapter 28*) Trypho mentions that Justin had earlier made an argument against circumcision (from *Dial.* 19)

*Chapter 32.1*) Justin: Gives Trypho a synopsis of a quote from Isaiah which describes the form of the messiah as inglorious (from *Dial.* 13 (Is. 52.10-54.6) non-Trypho material).

*Chapter 32*) Trypho: Does not accept Jesus as the messiah because he was crucified. (from *Dial.* 10).
Chapter 36) Trypho: You [Justin] say that the messiah was called a stone (from Dial. 34.2), he was to come in glory and further, as judge of all (from Dial.31-32), and would be king and Priest (from Dial. 33.2 on Melchizedek).

Chapter 80 (which follows 36 in the Trypho Text) Trypho: Will Jerusalem be built up again? This may be a combination of Dial. 34.2 (Jesus will have an eternal Kingdom), Dial. 34.7 (Jerusalem and Temple for Solomon but not part of Psalm 72), Dial. 36.2 (mentions that Jewish teachers believe Psalm 24 refers to Solomon and Temple), Dial. 35.8 (second advent has a kingdom). At 80.1 Trypho says that he has already commented on Justin’s attention to scripture, but this reference comes at 56.16. This is discussed below.

Chapter 38) Trypho: Jesus was with Moses and Aaron in the pillar of cloud (from Dial 37.2), he ascended into heaven (from Dial. 34.2; 36.5), comes again to earth (from Dial 34.2), and should be worshipped (from Dial. 35.5).

Chapter 39) Trypho: You have already proved that the messiah would suffer (from Dial. 32)

Chapter 45) Trypho: Asks if those who lived according to the Law will live like Jacob, Enoch, and Noah in the resurrection of the dead (from Dial. 19.2 which gives the list of patriarchs in question. cf. Dial 27.5 and 11.5 for references to the patriarchs).

Chapter 45) Justin: Said he quoted words from Ezekiel (from Dial. 44.2).

Chapter 46) Justin says he has already talked about why Abraham and his descendants were circumcised. He restates the hardness of heart theory. (from
Dial. 18.2, 19.5-6, & 27.5).\textsuperscript{93}

*Chapter 48) Trypho: Refers to Justin's statement that Christ existed before the ages (from Dial. 11.1), submitted to be born as a human (from Dial. 38.1).

*Chapter 49) Trypho: Elijah must come before the messiah (from Dial. 8.4).

*Chapter 50) Trypho: Doubts the existence of another God besides Maker of all things (from Dial.48.2).

*Chapter 55) Trypho: Wants Justin to show that there is another God besides the maker of all things (from Dial.50.1).

*Chapter 56) Justin: Answers the question put to him by Trypho at Dial. 50.

*Chapter 60) Trypho: Rhetorical concession to the argument Justin has made in Dial. 56-57.

*Chapter 63) Trypho: concedes all arguments to focus on Virgin birth (from Dial.50.1; 48.1), crucifixion (from Dial. 10.3), Jesus' resurrection (not previously mentioned), and ascension (from Dial. 38.1; 36.5; 34.2).

*Chapter 67) Trypho: Isaiah 7:14 is not 'virgin', but 'young woman' "as you quoted earlier" (quoted at Dial. 43.8; virgin mentioned at Dial. 63.2).

*Chapter 77) Trypho: Asserts that the previous passage refers to Hezekiah not Jesus (from Dial. 33.1).
*Chapter 79) It is blasphemy that angels have sinned and revolted. (no previous mention in the Dialogue. See my earlier comments about this particular chapter).

*Chapter 87) Trypho: Refers to Isaiah 11:1-3 (from Dial. 86.4 and 39.2)

*Chapter 89) Trypho: Favours the comparison of Jesus and Joshua’s names (from Dial. 75.2).

*Chapter 90) Trypho: Concedes the image of the suffering sheep (from Dial. 32.2; especially Dial. 40)

From this examination it can be seen that all but one topic raised by Trypho is first mentioned by Justin in the Trypho Text and Justin refers to a quote (Is. 53) which only occurs in the non-Trypho material (Dial. 13). The reference to Jesus’ resurrection at Dial. 63 is attributed to Trypho and is without precedent anywhere in the extant Dialogue. Justin makes no defense of the resurrection in the Trypho Text, although he offers several arguments outside the Trypho Text (Dial. 106-108). It is not unreasonable to assume that Trypho would have known of this independently of Justin, especially if he had read the gospels as he said he did (Dial. 10.2). Moreover, this theme is one of the classic sticking points from a non-Christian point of view. Otherwise, all the references which Trypho makes to Justin’s arguments can be cross-referenced within the Trypho Text. There are, however, two passages which pose problems. They occur in two places within the Trypho material where Justin states that he has already quoted a passage of scripture, but these passages occur outside my Trypho Text.
The first instance comes at 32 when Justin's refers to his use of Is. 53. This scriptural passage is not used anywhere else but chapter 13. It is worth noting that the exchange at 32 is quite strange and difficult to follow. Trypho says that Jews await a messiah, but not one who was so dishonoured as to be crucified and thus cursed. Justin answers by saying that he has already quoted scripture in support of a suffering messiah, but he will go on to provide further proof. But instead he proceeds to use Daniel to warn those who are not in the Christian fold of what will happen to them on the day of judgement. There is nothing about messianic suffering, nothing to support the Isaiah passage, as Justin proposes. It is not unusual for Justin to totally disregard Trypho's requests or indulge in an excursus, but this does not take away from the problem of an earlier text referring to a later quote. The other instance comes at Dial. 66.1. Justin gives a partial quotes of Isaiah 7 (10-16a) and this was quoted at Dial. 43 which is not included in the Trypho Text. Here Justin tells the reader that “resuming the discourse where I had left off at a previous stage, when proving that he was born of a virgin, and that his birth by a virgin had been predicted by Isaiah, I quoted again the same prophecy. It is as follows…” Justin goes on to argue for the uniqueness of a virgin birth. This prompts Trypho to point out that a virgin birth is not unique and that one of the problems with Christians is that they resemble the Greeks in their foolish beliefs (Dial. 67. 1-2). There are a few aspects of chapter 66 which must be understood. Most notable, is the absence of dialogue in this short chapter. It acts as a segue to the next topic which focuses on who the Isaiah passage refers to: Hezekiah or Jesus. In this chapter, Justin does not even address Trypho as he does
in other places. He simply tells the reader that he has quoted this passage and
gives it again. Dial. 67 begins in characteristic fashion with Trypho making the
assertion that this passage refers to a young woman and that the person described
is Hezekiah.

We might explain or resolve these inconsistencies in four ways: 1) We
might include chapter 13 and 43 as Trypho chapters, but this would require special
pleading. Chapter 13 contains virtually nothing but LXX quotes. Chapter 43 is
also predominately LXX, but it also cannot be attached to 44 in any way. It
simply does not fit. Even though they are both linked to typological blocks, it
does not seem sensible to try and include them. 2) We might say that these
references to biblical passages refer to quotations that have been lost in
transmission. We know that later copyists cut down some long passages, perhaps
the Isaiah passages were left out as well. 3) One might go so far as to conclude
that these two inconsistencies are evidence against the existence of a Trypho Text
since they raise the possibility that Trypho material was created at the same time
as non-Trypho material. In light of the other evidence, this would be a rash
conclusion. 4) In light of the other internal cross references, however, the most
likely possibility is that these references indicate slight modifications or additions
which refer back to the quotes from Isaiah at chapters 13 and 43. Chapter 32
begins a three chapter string of monologue. For example, Trypho’s comment at
35.1 is linked to Justin’s last statement of chapter 34, but this Trypho statement is
followed by three chapters where there is no dialogue. This opens the possibility
that there might have been some expansion within the Trypho Text and that the
reference back to Isaiah might have been added later. The same could be said for chapter 66. Because there is a notable shift in the text, Dial. 66 may have been added later to link two Trypho sections.

These are the only instances where we might have evidence of visible editing of the Trypho Text. There are times within the Trypho Text where Justin speaks for extended periods, but in those instances, there is no supporting evidence of expansion. Length alone is not a suitable criterion. In a reconstruction such as this, the possibility of later, more subtle, expansions within the Trypho Text cannot be dismissed. While these two instances are suspect, I do not believe that there are sufficient grounds for eliminating them from the Trypho Text. I can only note the possibility that Justin may have added to chapters 32 and 66 and included references to scriptural passages that were included in the expanded text. The possibility of modification may also explain how in chapter 80 – which comes after 36 in the Trypho Text – Trypho makes a reference back to a statement made at 56.17 which comes after chapter 80. But it is also equally possible that chapter was modified after it was moved so that it made sense in its position after chapter 79. It is important to note that these references involve Justin’s references not Trypho’s. It is much more likely for Justin to have modified his earlier references to be in line with his later additions. Trypho could not have made additions to the text and, in fact, the Trypho Text has a high level of consistency if we look at the comments made by Trypho.

Extracting a hypothetical text is an inexact science. Not all the connections are perfect, and there are a few anomalies within the Trypho material.
Nevertheless, the majority of evidence – Trypho’s internal consistency and the overall connectedness of the Trypho material – supports the hypothesis that the Trypho Text was once a free-standing document with its own internal consistency and logic.

**RESOLVING ENIGMAS**

Reconstructing this hypothetical text also helps to make sense of some of more difficult aspects of the *Dialogue* which have been consistently seen as barriers to the reliability of the text. The most obvious is its length. Virtually all scholars, save Eusebius, have been rightly suspicious of the length of the *Dialogue*. How could such a document be a record of any debate? There is no way Justin could ever have remembered such an event, and even if he could who could have endured it? The Trypho Text, however, is 42% of the size of the *Dialogue*. To get a rough idea, the ANF English translation is 71,000 words. The Trypho Text is 30,000 words.

Dating the *Dialogue* has also not been straightforward. The consensus has been that the *Dialogue* is Justin’s last work and could not have been written before Justin’s *I Apology*, due to a reference to that work at *Dial.*120.5. This would make the *terminus post quem* sometime around 155 C.E. This is quite different from the reference made by Trypho early on that he has recently come from the war in Roman Palestine (*Dial.* 1.3) which puts the date somewhere around 132 C.E. This temporal span has been a problem leading some to ask how Justin could remember such a discussion after almost twenty years. Or perhaps it just
shows that the discussion is fictional, the historical references polemical, and Justin confused. But the reference to the *I Apology* and thus to the later date is not in the Trypho Text. This allows for an earlier date, with the additional material coming some twenty years later; thus the reference to the *I Apology*.

Perhaps this temporal distance helps to explain how the additions could be so clumsily inserted. It appears that the full *Dialogue* was prepared with little regard for matching the tone or the *Dialogue* form. If they had been blended skillfully, they would not be so readily apparent. Justin also seems to be aware of its taxing length because he employs the guise of a second day to justify the additions. He also creates a new audience to legitimize the many repetitions in the second half of the *Dialogue*. Not surprisingly, none of the references to a second day are in the Trypho Text (*Dial.* 78.6; 85.4; 92.5; 94.4; 122.4; 137.4), except the comment at 118.4. But as discussed earlier, Trypho’s comment here is extremely suspect due to its lack of content and false enthusiasm. Moreover, there is no blatant repetition of arguments in the Trypho Text. These occur in the second half of the document.

The polemical edge to the *Dialogue* has also been difficult to explain. Not only is it unsightly and coarse, it is not consistent with the more irenic sections. Here again, the reconstructed Trypho Text appears to dissolve this conflict. The harshest polemical tracts are not in the Trypho Text (*Dial.* 16-17; 110-119; 123; 130-133). Compare the harsh polemical venom in these chapters - where Justin refers to the Jewish people as hard-hearted, blind (123), idolaters (130) who are responsible for Jesus’ death (16) - to the relatively mild accusations in 30 and 35
— where he urges Trypho to make amends with Christians (35) and blames the Jews for giving the Law a bad reputation (30). In the Trypho Text there is a more even exchange of criticism. This balance is completely lost in the harsh light of Justin’s polemical outbursts in the *Dialogue*. If the tone of the Trypho Text is considered independently of these additions then a very different kind of exchange can be seen. Justin does become frustrated with Trypho, the Jewish teachers, and what he describes as the bovine nature of the Jewish people. But his frustration is not expressed polemically, and many times it stems from Trypho’s ability to divert Justin and waylay him with his criticisms and challenges. As the full *Dialogue* stands, discussion and polemic are nearly impossible to reconcile and the polemic usually drowns out the dialogue. This is not such a problem with the Trypho Text.

Looking back over the entire Trypho Text we can see that there are times when the connections are virtually seamless and others where this is less so. But granting the overall quality of the *Dialogue* with its lacunae, superfluous references, and generally confused nature, the Trypho Text appears to be a much more coherent text. The *Apologies* show Justin to be capable of relatively tight argumentation and consistency, and the Trypho Text is closer to Justin’s *Apologies* in this respect. Overall, the Trypho Text presents a coherent text with more logical integrity and internal consistency than the full *Dialogue*. But even if one accepts the possibility that the Trypho Text was once the core of what is now the *Dialogue*, there are still several important issues to address, especially in regards to the literary form of the document. I must also take account of the possible development of the *Dialogue* from a core dialogue (my reconstructed
Trypho Text) to much larger, more ponderous text we know as the *Dialogue*. The next chapter will deal with the issues of literary and social setting to assess whether this scenario would have been acceptable, or even preferable, in the second century C.E.
CHAPTER 3

THE LITERARY ASPECTS OF THE DIALOGUE

Judging the historicity of an ancient text is extremely problematic. Nevertheless, my hypothesis that the Dialogue – more specifically the Trypho Text – reflects the words and arguments of a non-rabbinic diaspora Jew, rests, to a certain extent, on the ability to see the text as a reliable depiction of an actual dialogue. This chapter aims to establish a literary context for the Dialogue which will allow us to see how this document may have developed into its extant form. Even if the hypothetical Trypho Text is seen as a viable reading of the Dialogue, it leaves, even creates, a few crucial questions: Why did Justin write in the dialogue form at all? How, why, and when was the Trypho Text expanded into what we know as the Dialogue? From the outset, it is important to say that the use of a literary form does not necessarily compromise the contents therein. Some scholars, as we shall see, have attempted to draw a direct line of connection between the contents of the Dialogue and the Platonic tradition. The implication of such a connection has been that the Dialogue does not reflect an actual discussion. This conclusion is unwarranted and fails to understand the weakness of the connections to the Platonic tradition or the role of literary form which is merely the structure onto which all writing is hung. Showing how the Dialogue may have fit into Justin’s social context and what literary forms he seems to have drawn from does not lead directly to a conclusion about the figure of Trypho. The depiction of Trypho as an authentic interlocutor is dealt with in chapters 5 and 6.

This chapter will attempt to show how the Dialogue may have fitted into
the literary landscape of the second century C.E. But first, we must first deal with
the scholarly claim that Justin was copying from the Platonic corpus and also
attempting to put himself in the role of the philosopher and Trypho into the role of
sophist. The first half of this chapter will deal with these claims. A close look at
the claim of literary mimicry provides little reason to suppose that Justin was
attempting a Platonic pastiche. It is important to clear away the presumption that
Justin was trying to write a Platonic-style dialogue because this has distracted
attention away from Justin’s more immediate context: The Second Sophistic. I
will do this by comparing Justin’s argumentative style and the sophistic ideal of
the second century C.E. This shows that Justin is much closer to a sophist than
previously thought.95 The remainder of the chapter will attempt to understand
Justin’s use of dialogue in the context of the two literary traditions which appear
to have influenced Justin: the Second Sophistic and Christianity. When the
Dialogue is seen in these contexts it is possible to gain a greater understanding of
why Justin may have chosen to write such a document in the form of a dialogue
and why he may have expanded it later. Seen in its context, the plausibility of the
Trypho Text and its later expansion becomes more plausible.

THE LITERARY ARGUMENT

There are many arguments against the authenticity of the figure of Trypho,
but the one which has never been challenged is the assertion that Justin styled this
treatise after the dialogue form most clearly defined in Plato’s Socratic
dialogues.96 Given this generally accepted literary connection, it would be unwise
to move into a detailed examination of Trypho until the literary theory is
scrutinized. It is also the ubiquity of this theory which makes an investigation
necessary. If it can be shown that Justin did not copy the Platonic model and that
he appears to have been ignorant of many of its substantive ingredients, or that the
scholarly understanding of the dialogue form has neglected the second century
C.E. then this will force the Dialogue to be considered in its more immediate
context.

The assertion that the Dialogue is a literary creation, modelled on the
Platonic dialogue form, has been used by some scholars to discount the reliability
of Trypho and the text as a whole. The assumption is that this form governed not
only the literary style, but the overall shape of Justin’s argument as well as the
figure of Trypho. There are some obvious similarities within the text: the use the
dialogue at certain points throughout the text, the philosophic nature of the first
nine chapters, the question and answer format, Trypho’s apparent interest in the
topic, Justin’s role as a teacher, and the enigmatic ending of the Dialogue (which
will be covered separately in the next chapter). The first section will test if these
elements are, in fact, literary similarities which are designed to emulate the
Platonic corpus.

M. Hoffmann and B.R. Voss are the two scholars who have become best
known for their literary analysis of the Dialogue.97 Their scholarship on this
matter is not extensive – two surveys in which the Dialogue comprises a chapter
in each – yet they are often used whenever the genre of the Dialogue is
discussed.98 Their literary argument is widespread and their findings have been
used to add weight to the argument that the *Dialogue* is dependent on a distinct literary genre (Platonic dialogues). Despite the fact that their conclusions do not necessarily equate the dialogue genre with fiction, many scholars have used their work to conclude that the *Dialogue* should be considered a work of literary fiction. Subsequent scholarship has also condensed Voss and Hoffmann under one heading, even though their works differ quite significantly. Few scholars have understood their respective theories concerning the relationship between the prologue (*Dial.* 1-9) and the remaining chapters, but these differences are crucial for understanding their work. 99

Hoffmann’s overall goal is to demonstrate that a change in the form of Socratic dialogue corresponds to Justin’s change in message.

Evidently, the Socratic method necessitates the dialogue form. Justin is led by the questions of the old man to the limits of the Platonic concept, the criticism of which is inserted at *Dial.* 4.2. The movement from philosophical truth to prophetic revelation corresponds to a formal change of dialogic form. 100

At this point the dialogue form is transformed and Socratic roles are abandoned in favour of a more pedagogic approach. 101 Hoffmann maintains that a kind of dialogue form is kept but it no longer adheres to Socratic standards. The literary is now servant to the proclamatory. Because Justin has proved that he can write in the Socratic form, the shift indicates “an intentional expressive literary goal to characterise the Jews. The correlation of content and form suggests this conclusion.” 102 Therefore, it is not accurate to use Hoffmann’s work to forward any conclusions about the Socratic style of the *Dialogue* without acknowledging
this shift in form. Far from affirming Justin's use of the Socratic method, he is more concerned to show the way in which Justin abandons the Socratic method in favor of a more Christian style of dialogue, although he offers no parallels.

Voss also sees chapters 1-9 as standing firmly within the Socratic tradition. But more than Hoffmann, he seeks to draw out parallels between the Dialogue and the Platonic literary form. He also notes that Christian proclamation does not fall within the Socratic tradition of inquiry and logical investigation. This phenomenon does not, however, appear to effect the literary form of the Dialogue. Contrary to Hoffmann, Voss does not see a shift in the literary form. Instead, he sees the Platonic dialogue form running throughout. Voss concludes that the content of the Dialogue does not have enough transformative power to alter the literary tradition. This, according to Voss, is a deliberate result of an attempt on Justin's part to maintain the literary shell of the dialogue form.

It is the outer form, the accoutrement, which corresponds to the tradition, not the debate itself. Because Justin thought he would remain a philosopher he expressed this through his clothes [the pallium], so also in the area of literary expression he stays willingly within the transmitted forms and does not try to develop new ones.

Voss concludes that, "From a literary perspective, his work belongs in the tradition of the philosophical dialogues."

Voss compares the beginning of the Dialogue to the openings of the spurious dialogues, Axiochos and Eryxias, where Socrates is hailed by those eager to be taught by him. The ending of the Dialogue (142.3), is also seen as a parallel to the Protagoras (361D-E) in that the discussion is left open and there is a hint of
the need for a future meeting. Chapter 79 of the *Dialogue* holds two parallels for Voss: *Dial.* 79.1 matching *Prot.* 348C and *Dial.* 79.2 matching *Prot.* 333E. In the first pairing, Trypho is angry where Protagoras is ashamed. The second pairing shows Justin taking a more gentle tone in the face of this agitation (*Dial.* 79.2), as does Socrates in *Prot.* 333E. It is these two connections which Voss uses to make his conclusion about the literary form of the *Dialogue*.

Both Voss and Hoffmann make the connection with the Platonic corpus and depend on the existence of a distinct dialogue genre in which to place Justin. Yet despite their affirmation that Justin stands in the philosophical literary tradition, they both affirm (Voss more than Hoffmann) that this does not necessarily have an impact on the content of the *Dialogue*.

J.C.M. van Winden also made a connection between the Platonic dialogues and the *Dialogue with Trypho*. In his translation of *Dialogue 1-9*, he countered the opinion of Niels Hyldahl who set out to prove that Justin's knowledge of philosophy came from a patchwork of influences, none of which were assimilated into Justin's understanding. Van Winden is clear that his work, “intends to show that Justin's introduction to the *Dialogue* has its own proper nature, revealing a well-balanced and organized mind.” He is not concerned with Trypho or the possible parallels between him and Protagoras, as with Voss, but he does embrace the conclusion of Voss, calling it a “striking observation”. Although van Winden admits that other influences, mainly Christian, may play a role, “that of the Platonic dialogues must certainly stand”. The single parallel which provides the bulk of van Winden's assertion is between *Prot.* 335 C8-D2 and *Dial.* 9.2.
After Socrates feigns the inability to compete with the long speeches of Protagoras—ironically, it is Socrates who is supposedly relating this entire event—he gets up to leave for another appointment, but is detained by Callias who grabs his cloak:

καὶ ἀμα ταῦτ' εἶπον ἀνιστάμην ὡς ἀπιών· καὶ μου ἀνισταμένου ἐπιλαμβάνεται ὁ Καλλίας τῆς χειρὸς τῇ δεξιᾷ, τῇ δ' ἀριστερᾷ ἀντελάβετο τρίβωνος τούτου.\(^{114}\) This scene is paralleled, observes van Winden, by Justin's actions in Dial. 9.2. Here Justin is laughed at for his Christian beliefs and this appears to be too much for him: ἐγὼ δὲ ἀναστάς σίδος τ' ἡμὴν ἀπέρχεσθαι· ὅ δὲ μου τοῦ ματίου λαβόμενος σὺ πρὶν ἀνήσειν ἐφι, πρὶν δ' ὑπεσχόμην ἐκτελέσαι.\(^{115}\) Van Winden focuses his parallel on the use of the verb ἀναστῆμι. In order to portray Justin as an organized and knowledgeable student of philosophy he attempts to link Justin to the Socratic tradition by showing that he copied from the text itself.

The obvious meaning of ἀναστάς is 'after standing up', but we know that Justin and Trypho were walking until then (Dial.1.1)...If this is correct, the only explanation of this anomaly in the scenery must be that Justin followed, so to speak, blindly [sic] Plato's text. This similarity is enough to establish Justin's familiarity with the Protagoras and therefore prohibits one from dismissing the other philosophical similarities as 'fortuitous'.\(^{116}\)

**PROBLEMS WITH THE LITERARY THEORY**

There are some basic problems with the parallels offered by Voss. In the first instance, Justin goes out of his way to explain Trypho's anger. Protagoras becomes embarrassed (ἀναστάς) because of Socrates aggressive questioning.
(Prot. 348C). In contrast, Justin tells us that Trypho’s anger is due to his respect for the scriptures (αἰδούμενος δὲ τὰς γραφὰς) (Dial. 79.1). The only similarity is that they both exhibit anger, but Justin’s commentary differentiates the motivation behind the anger. The second parallel occurs when Justin tells his reader that “I spoke my answer in a more gentle tone (ἐνδοτικῶτερον)” (Dial. 79.2). This looks similar to Socrates’ change of approach. Seeing that Protagoras was provoked and becoming unwilling to answer, Socrates “became cautious and went gently (ἐνλαμβούμενος ἥρεμα ἡπομην)” (Prot. 333E). The different motivations behind this strategic modulation is indicative of the difference between their individual agendas. Justin becomes more demure “because I wanted him [Trypho] to be ready to listen to me” (Dial. 79.2). Socrates changes his approach because he sensed that Protagoras might not answer his questions. Justin wants to be heard, Socrates wants to hear. If there is a parallel here, it has been significantly altered.

Moreover, the parallels are drawn from two different places in the Protagoras and connected to a single event in the Dialogue. In the Dialogue, the two events are intertwined and interdependent, while in the Protagoras they are separate events which happened under different circumstances. This does not cancel out the possibility that Justin drew these disparate events together in Dial. 79, but it does make the argument for direct borrowing more difficult to support. At best, the parallel is dramatic, but it is difficult to see the significance of Justin’s choice of language and motivation, which are significantly different from Plato’s. But this effort might serve well as the exception that proves the rule. The
But this effort might serve well as the exception that proves the rule. The similarities found in chapter 79 show how little Justin tried to emulate the language and genre of the Socratic dialogues in the rest of the *Dialogue*. Or if he did make this attempt, his effort was secondary to his overriding concerns for his argument.

Moreover, in the *Protagoras* the implication is that Socrates had no intention of really leaving: "I stood up as if I were leaving" (ὡς ἄπλησων) (*Prot.* 335C). Socrates was simply playing what appears to have been a rhetorical bluff that worked. Justin, on the other hand, was ridiculed by the laughter of the others and appears, in the text, to be set on leaving: "I stood up and prepared to leave (ἀπερχομενός σε). *(Dial.* 79.1)" There is nothing to indicate that Justin was bluffing or making a point about Trypho's style of discourse, as with Socrates. Additionally, it is Trypho - not one of the bystanders - who brings him back. The overall scenario is similar, but the details do not indicate that Justin was working 'blindly' from the text of the *Protagoras*, as van Winden asserts. After all, how uncommon is it to touch someone's clothing or arm in order to keep them from leaving? One must weigh this common human gesture against the shadowy similarities with the Platonic texts.

Moreover, van Winden's attention to the verb ἀνικτημένοι is insignificant and does not indicate anything particularly Platonic, Socratic, or even philosophical. The alleged logical tangle about standing up when they were already walking is weak. The reference to walking comes at the very beginning of
the Dialogue (1.1). Should we hold Justin accountable to report every time he sat down, or can we assume that since he said he stood up, he was already sitting? Moreover, if Justin was blindly following the Platonic text, why does he use the term παρducer for his outer garment and not τρίβων as in Plato? The garb of the philosopher, especially the tattered old cloak of Socrates, would be a more reliable indicator of dependence, yet the term is never used in the Dialogue.¹¹⁷

One would naturally imagine that, if Justin had genuinely wanted to connect himself to the Socratic tradition, he would have used jargon which would have triggered this vivid association. But this is apparently not the image he is trying to convey of himself. Certainly Justin styled himself a teacher, but that is very different from identifying directly with Socrates.

There is very little to compare between the Dialogue and other philosophical dialogues. There is certainly not enough material to claim direct literary borrowing. Moreover, there is insufficient textual evidence to assert anything other than the vaguest similarity between the Dialogue and the Platonic dialogues. Even if these parallels are allowed, they are not sufficient to draw the conclusion that the Dialogue is literary pastiche. It is likely that Justin was somewhat familiar with the Platonic corpus but, as I mentioned earlier, Justin does not appear to be portraying himself as a Socratic philosopher.¹¹⁸ In fact, Justin is more easily compared to a sophist than a philosopher.

JUSTIN AS A CHRISTIAN SOPHIST

Because Socrates is held up as the ideal in the Platonic corpus, it was
naturally thought that Justin must play the role of the philosopher, with Trypho as the undesirable sophist. But if we turn the comparison around and put it in the context of the Second Sophistic, then a very different picture of Justin emerges. It is a picture that may not have fit with Plato’s opinion of sophists, but does fit with the ideals of the Second Sophistic.

Despite his outward appearance, and his respect and reverence for Socrates, Justin does not appear to portray himself as the philosopher in the text, at least not a philosopher who utilized Socratic techniques of argumentation. In this section, I will compare Justin to Protagoras. Despite the fact that Protagoras is a Platonic Sophist and I have gone to some length to show Justin’s distance from the Platonic tradition, Protagoras was one of the Philostratus’ favourite sophists and served as a founding father of second century sophistry in his Lives. If Philostratus saw Protagoras as a sophist worth imitation then we might assume, at least generally, that Protagoras embodied traits that the Second Sophistic found admirable. It is important to remember that in the second century C.E., the term sophist did not carry the negative connotation often assumed. We must be careful not to import Socrates’, or rather Plato’s, particular and historical opinion of Sophists and Socrates. It is difficult to track the cultural shift that would have naturally occurred over time. The Second Sophistic (discussed in more detail below) can be seen in either general cultural terms or in specific elitist terms, depending on the literary and/or social criteria one applies to the movement. A sign of this distance may be found in Justin himself. Justin holds Socrates in high esteem and refers to him as a Christian before Christ, yet, as we shall see, Justin’s
rhetorical style is akin to the Sophists which Socrates opposed. Despite this apparent conflict, these aspects stand together and do not appear to be a problem. Refering to Justin as a sophist may be a slight exageration, but he certainly considered himself a Christian teacher and his writings reflect the literary tendencies of many other dialogues – Christian and Greco-Roman – in the second century C.E. It is helpful, therefore, to compare Justin to Protagoras because it makes the point clearly. From the beginning of the Dialogue, Justin portrays himself as a person of evident authority. Trypho recognizes his dress and approaches him (Dia. 1.1). This is similar to how sophists were approached by curious students wishing to find something edifying and useful (Dia. 1.2). The Socratic style utilizes the well-placed staccato thrust designed to upset a fixed line of thinking. Justin, however, engages in lengthy expositions of Scripture and Christian exegesis. Many times he sees Trypho’s questions as mere interruptions (e.g. Dia. 36.1-2; 39.8; 50.10; 57.4). Unlike Socrates, Justin can become upset even to the point of abandoning the discussion, as in Dia. 9.2. At other points, Justin is noticeably frustrated and sometimes this triggers off polemic about the Jewish people.119 Bursts of emotion and polemic are not typically associated with Socratic dispassion.

In the Protagoras, Alcibiades intervenes in their discussion of whether they should proceed by the exchange of long speeches or by the shorter ‘question and answer’ format.

For Socrates here confesses he is no hand at long discourses and yields therein to Protagoras; but I should be surprised if he yields to any man in ability to argue, or in understanding
the interchange of reason. Now if Protagoras confesses himself inferior to Socrates in argumentation, Socrates has no more to ask: but if he challenges him, let him discuss by Question and Answer; not spinning out a lecture on each question – beating off arguments, refusing to give a reason, and so dilating until most of his hearers have forgotten the point at issue (Prot. 336C trans. W. Lamb).

This advice could just as well have come from Trypho. Often he must wait for Justin to answer his questions before he can bring Justin back to his own areas of concern (see chapter 6). Chapters 58 and 67 of the Dialogue show signs of a more rapid socratic exchange. But these chapters only serve to show that Justin is capable of this kind of exchange. His impatience with inquiry and direct challenges from Trypho demonstrates that Justin avoided this kind of dialectic because it did not suit his rhetorical style. Even in the prologue of the Dialogue, it is the Old Man who asks the questions, not Justin. Conversely, Justin shows very little interest in Trypho’s beliefs or opinions. He only asks Trypho about his Judaism on a few occasions. When Justin does ask questions it is not to trip him up on a point of logic, but of exegesis or practice. Justin’s argument with Judaism is not based on the logic or reason behind Judaism. It is based on exegesis and the correct way in which to read certain crucial passages pertinent to Christian belief and the Mosaic Law. The reason Justin is not interested in Trypho’s understanding of God or Judaism is because Justin already believes that he knows how Jews think and how they read the Scriptures. The search has ended for Justin and now all that is left is the delivery of the truth he has found. The truth is absolute and the way to understand and accept that truth is through the correct understanding of the Scriptures combined with grace (Dial. 30.1 and 58.2).
Individuality has no part in this process. If it did, Justin would have to have known much more about Trypho – who he was and what he believed – before leading him into the truth. Justin assumes that he knows Trypho and his beliefs. This assumption probably accounts for many of the problems and the friction that exist between them and why Trypho is often misunderstood by Justin. (This idea is more fully explored in chapters 5 and 6.)

In exploring the extent to which Justin resembles Socrates in Plato’s Protagoras, it is the similarities with the figure of Protagoras that become quite plain. Justin avoids answering questions which get in his way (Dial. 36.1-2; 39.8; 50.1; 57.4). This is similar to the ending (Prot. 361D) when Socrates is finally seeking to advance his own argument. Protagoras is courteous and affirms the idea in principle, but is unwilling to advance any further and the Dialogue is ended.121 There are many times when Justin refuses to answer the questioning of Trypho because he is not finished with his own exposition. Either Justin is not interested in Trypho’s questions, or he is unable to answer them.

Rutherford offers a short and helpful definition of the sophist in Plato as an “itinerant professional practitioner of a wide range of intellectual skills, including rhetorical techniques, which he taught for pay and which he advertised as guaranteeing advancement in public life”.122 It is this class of professionals which made wide targets for Socrates’ queries. One of the claims of the sophists was to have answers to a set of pre-defined issues. Different sophists might have been experts in different areas. The strength of a Sophist was thus judged on the number of answers he had and the quality of thinking involved in each issue.
Success in civic life was somehow linked to the knowledge which sophists claimed to have, as Protagoras asserts (*Prot*. 319A). This is one of the chief elements in Protagoras’ sales pitch. On the contrary, Socrates believes that the function of having these skills only equips one to be a Sophist (*Prot*. 312A). In this way, Protagoras is the quintessential business-school dean, appealing to youths and their desire to succeed in life.

The role of the sophist in the second century C.E. was also linked to public advancement. Philostratus (see below) depicts sophists as a kind of elite literati who moved in the upper classes. These men had access to the best education and distinguished themselves by the quality and quantity of their set arguments. And while we do not know Justin’s financial status, it could be inferred that he thought himself to be part of the educated class. If the account of his conversion is to be believed, it is necessary to account for the funds which he would need to undertake such a philosophical journey. Justin appears to have had a fair amount of exegetical arguments and testamonia at his disposal. As we have seen, the *Dialogue* contains a few examples of what appear to be pre-fabricated arguments. It would be crass to portray Justin as a salesman of Christianity, but certainly Justin appeared to be offering Trypho something tangible. Whereas a sophist might claim to hold the secret of success in this life, Justin is offering Trypho success in the next life. I do not wish to push the parallel too far, but there are enough similarities to draw the conclusion that Justin appeared to be portraying himself in ways that sophists and rhetors might find familiar in the second century C.E.
Even though there are a few situations which seem to shadow the 

*Protagoras*, the details of Justin’s character and function in the text make any 

connection to Socrates unwarranted. In the context of the Second Sophistic, it is 

the parallels with sophistic practice which provide insight into Justin’s character 

and the demands of his agenda. Even though Justin saw Socrates as a model of 

virtue and even Christian faith, this does not appear to apply to the socratic style 

of inquiry or teaching. The figure of Protagoras and sophists in general provide a 

much more fruitful comparison. The fact that Justin describes himself in such 

terms points to the conclusions that Justin sought to emulate this learned style of 

discourse.\(^{124}\) If Justin deliberately intended to portray himself as a Socratic figure, 

he was not entirely successful. Justin the sophist is a much more appropriate and 

historically sensitive way to think of him.

In light of the comparison to the Platonic corpus, the conclusion is 

negative; the *Dialogue* is not similar to Platonic writings. This may seem a 

simplistic conclusion, but it is important to dispense with the comparison to the 

Platonic dialogues, because it has been used to dismiss the *Dialogue* without 

reading it in its proper historical context as a dialogue of the second century C.E. 

In the light of Second Sophistic, the comparison is much more positive; Justin 

not only appears to have utilized some of the literary practices used in the Second 

Sophistic, he appears to have used them in similar ways and has, perhaps 

unwittingly, portrayed himself as a kind of Christian sophist.
But while the claim of literary dependence cannot stand, there is still the question of the dialogue form and its role in the second century C.E. Theoretically, he could have framed his information in statements such as: ‘All Jews believe’... ‘I once heard from a Jew that’... ‘Someone told me that Jews’... ‘Jews say that’...etc. It meant something to name the dialogue the Dialogue; it is now a matter of determining the possible extent of that meaning in the context of the second century and Justin’s Christian agenda.

As a self-proclaimed Christian teacher, Justin put himself between two emerging worlds in the second century C.E.: Christianity and the Second Sophistic. In some ways, both of these movements stood in contrast to each other. The Second Sophistic proclaimed a revival of the Hellenistic ideal through the appropriation of pure Attic Greek that harkened back to the golden era of Greek culture. Christianity had emerged from a Jewish context and had used Koine Greek to proclaim the Jewish messiah. Even though Christianity and the Second Sophistic came from different sectors of Greco-Roman life and pursued different ends, Justin appears to embody a confluence of traditions which may help to explain why he wrote in the dialogue form and how the document may have developed. This relationship might also explain what Justin was trying to achieve in the writing of the Dialogue.

THE SECOND SOPHISTIC

While the Platonic dialogues appear to be anachronistic in relation to the
Dialogue, there are points of contact with the Second Sophistic which are more contemporary and pertinent. The height of the Second Sophistic movement occurred in the second and third century C.E. It was a self-consciously intellectual movement to recapture all that was deemed to be Hellenic. The predominant manifestation of this renaissance was the use of Attic Greek and the veneration of those authors which were thought to manifest a particular Attic style, e.g. Xenophon, Plato, and Demosthenes. This attention to language and rhetorical style placed a certain distance between the user and the listener.

“Atticism was a label to be worn on certain literary and rhetorical occasions which advertised the elite’s ability to demonstrate its proximity to the classics.”¹²⁵ Such talent was the result of years of privileged study toward a unique end. For those rhetors or orators who could create or re-create the golden era of Hellenism there might be students to teach and public acclaim to receive. Philostratus’ Lives of the Sophists, is the prime example of the exhaltation of the ideal of the sophist. This third century C.E. work which begins with the sophists Protagoras and Gorgias seeks to make a clear connection to contemporary sophists. Despite Plato’s sometimes derogatory treatment of the sophists, they were revered by Philostratus and were the standard for Sophistic movement in general. Philostratus has been accused by some scholars of exaggerating or even inventing the Second Sophistic,¹²⁶ but it is widely accepted that even if Philostratus was engaging in apologetic it is clear that ‘Sophist’ was a title of some esteem.¹²⁷

Despite the celebration and emulation of Hellenism, participation in the Second Sophistic, especially as it pertains to high rhetorical skill and the use of
Attic Greek, was not based exclusively on ethnicity or being Greek. Swain's argument asserts that there was not a sense of nationalism in the Second Sophistic because within the Greek ideal it was the polis which took the role of nationalism. Using Attic Greek and deliberately connecting oneself to the literature of the past was enough to be considered Greek. Lucian is an example of one who was of Syrian provenance, yet held the proper use of Greek in the highest esteem. "Lucian was worried about making mistakes in Greek to an extent that verges on paranoia and he was intensely aware of the rules which guaranteed respect in Second Sophistic society." Perhaps Lucian's biting satire stemmed from a feeling of ethnic distance from others around him, but it is true nonetheless, that he aspired to equal, if not surpass, the style and erudition of those he satirized. The Second Sophistic was elitist in its educational requirements, but it also appears to have been a multi-ethnic movement which used language and Hellenism as its social/intellectual boundaries.

But even these linguistic boundaries were not as strict as they might first appear. There were writers who stood in the Second Sophistic tradition, not necessarily as sophists, who did not necessarily have to use high Attic Greek to be considered part of the movement. Plutarch, who wrote during the height of the Second Sophistic, does not appear to have used a particularly Attic style, yet he is considered to one of major figures of this tradition. Galen also wrote in a more common style, but Swain thinks this is because, "there were no prestige models from classical Athens to form a point of reference; whereas Ionic had still to be mastered in order to read Hippocrates." Other writers such as Marcus Aurelius
(Meditations) and Epictetus (Discourses) could be said to write in a non-Attic style, yet they are still considered an part of the movement and show signs of its influence. We should not, therefore, discount Justin’s efforts simply because he did not, or could not, emulate Attic Greek.

There are two ways of looking at the Second Sophistic. On one hand, it can be described in very elitist terms: Following Philostratus, it is possible to see the Second Sophistic as rarefied; cut off from the rest of society. In its purest form – strict Attic Greek, high rhetorical style, emulation and even obvious imitation of the classics – these requirements would have kept the inner circle quite small. But seen in a more general sense, the Second Sophistic effected a flourishing of certain forms of writing and speaking. It valued the use of rhetoric and those who employed these techniques with skill: rhetors, philosophers, and sophists. It held up Attic Greek as the ideal, but it was not the only way to express one’s philhellenism. In this light, it is possible to see a few ways in which Justin fits into this movement.

The Second Sophistic also saw growth in the use of the dialogue form. Whereas the Platonic dialogues are mainly restricted to topics of philosophy and politics, during the Second Sophistic the dialogue form was used for a variety of purposes.

Cicero’s use of the dialogue form is straightforward in its purpose. He shows great skill in maintaining verbal balance and adding touches of realism which give his dialogues a sense of authenticity and intimacy. On the whole, Cicero uses the dialogue form for philosophical ends, similar to the Platonic
Cicero uses the dialogue form for philosophical ends, similar to the Platonic dialogues, and exploits the advantages of a dialogue with its ability to show progression of thought and persuasiveness. This is most clearly seen in *De Republica* and *De Legibus*. Speakers are allowed a certain freedom to expound and the dialogue is bound together by long speeches. It is a more formal style than the Platonic dialogues and shows Cicero’s penchant for oratory and rhetoric. His use of the protracted dialogue shows his attraction to the style of Aristotle and Plato, more than Socrates’ short, rapid-fire style of inquiry. But while it is more common to meet philosophical topics in Cicero’s work, philosophy did not define his use of dialogue. He also used the dialogue form pedagogically in *Partitiones Oratoriae* where the reader is invited to listen in as Cicero, the father, instructs his son in the art of speaking.

Plutarch offers a different use of the dialogue form. He wrote several dialogues similar in style and tone to Cicero. But in Plutarch’s dialogues, especially *Socrates’ Daimonion*, there is a melding of philosophical speculation and narrative. He also utilized dialogue in the writing of his most famous work, *Lives*. Small pockets of dialogue are incorporated into the text and punctuate the much longer tracts of historical prose. This kind of dialogue serves to keep the reader engaged and maintains a human element in the midst of Plutarch’s detailed erudition. Here, dialogue is used within the historical genre as a literary tool, not as a competing or conflicting genre.

Athenaeus provides quite a different picture of the dialogue form. His sprawling *Deipnosophistae (The Sophists at Dinner)* is loosely structured and
excursive in style. There is a host of characters – some historical and some not. The subject is only vaguely philosophical and is more concerned with the consumption of food, descriptions of banquets, and references to a myriad of classical works. Within this dialogue form Athenaeus compacts huge amounts of information. The framing of this dialogue is simple: a single banquet 30 volumes long. This makes it a difficult, if not tedious, text to read. But it is a helpful example of the flexibility of the dialogue form and its ability to incorporate various styles.

Lucian is the writer who most vividly illustrates the satirical and theatrical use of the dialogue form showing obvious debts to Menippus and Aristophanes. Sometimes he uses this form for philosophical discourse, but he also utilizes its open structure for non-philosophical settings (e.g. *The Dialogues of the Courtesans, Dialogues of the Gods, Dialogues of the Dead, and Dialogues of the Sea-Gods*). He also uses the dialogue form in his allegorical autobiography *Bis Accusatus*. Here Lucian gives a dramatic and exaggerated account of his mid-life shift from rhetoric to dialogue. Oratory, Lucian claims, “was no longer modest and did not continue to clothe herself in a respectful way” (*Bis Accusatus* 31). But his shift over to dialogue was not without its problems. The feminized character of Dialogue is not happy in the hands of Lucian. She reflects: “I was formerly dignified, and pondered upon the gods and nature and the cycle of the universe, treading the air high above the clouds...” Then he [Lucian] unceremoniously penned me up with Jest and Satire and Cynicism and Eupolis and Aristophanes, terrible men for mocking all that is holy and scoffing at all that
is right." Here Lucian portrays Dialogue as the once dignified medium of philosophical discourse and divine speculation; but now she has been dragged down by Lucian. Here he draws on the association between philosophy and the dialogue form, but he also points to something significant for the understanding of dialogue as a flexible literary form which could be used for philosophical discourse, satire, drama, or pedagogy. While the predominant association would have been with philosophy, this does not mean that dialogue was only used in this way.

Justin’s use of the dialogue form would have been appropriate during this time of experimentation and variety. As we saw above, writers of the second century C.E. used the dialogue model as a platform for various topics. Justin’s appropriation of this form as an apologetic tool may be his effort to participate in this literary experimentation. In this context, the Dialogue could be seen as a wedding of the philosophical tradition of dialogue with the more rhetorical tools of argumentation and sophistic practice. Justin’s use of dialogue also fits with his vocation as a Christian teacher.

Moreover, Justin’s use of different literary forms would not have been an unusual practice for him. Regardless of how we judge the quality of his work, this experimentation with literary forms probably put Justin well within the bounds of the larger movement. Like other writers during this time, he wrote in a variety of formats. Publius Aelius Aristides is a prime example of a sophistic writer who experimented with many different forms of literature: Public addresses (To Rome), historical orations (Panathenaic Oration), polemical works (On Rhetoric), and
even an unusual record of revelations from the healing god Aesclepius (*Sacred Discourses*). In similar fashion, Justin used different genres. His *Apologies* aspire to a kind of argumentation and rhetoric appropriate to the Second Sophistic. And the *Dialogue* sought to prove the Christian case through dialogue and proof-texts. Justin’s lost *Syntagma*, which is thought to have been a refutation of all heresies (*I Apol.* 26), was perhaps in a different literary style.

It is also possible to see the many additions and the protracted form of the *Dialogue* in the context of the Second Sophistic. As we saw in the last chapter, there are several sections in the *Dialogue* which appear to be separate smaller treatises on certain Christian subjects: typological arguments (*Dial.* 12-24, 40-44) exegesis (*Dial.* 96-108), and polemic (*Dial.* 16-17; 110-119; 123; 130-133). Expansions seem to have been acceptable practice in the Second Sophistic. Dio’s *31st Discourse* appears to be an example of a highly developed speech which was probably not delivered in its current form. Dio’s *3rd Discourse* has two parts: a Socratic style dialogue (29-41) and a long theoretical section (42-138). Pliny’s *Panegyric* appears to engage in a similar type of expansion, and many of the speeches of Aristides appear to have been expanded after their public appearance. Even Plato’s dialogues shows signs of of additions and expansions. This practice may be older than the Second Sophistic, but it appears to have been acceptable practice during this time. Simply put, it was not unusual to expand works with the addition of speeches and supplemental material.

This practice may help to illuminate the development of the *Dialogue*.

One of the central hypotheses about the *Dialogue* is the existence of a smaller core
of dialogue material which I have provisionally named the Trypho Text. The
Trypho Text is relatively easy to detect using the presence of dialogue. But to a
modern reader it may appear nonsensical to make wholesale insertions of sermon
material, exegesis, and polemic, thus making the text extremely long and difficult
to follow. But seen in the context of the Second Sophistic, this kind of practice
does not seem at all strange. While the more homogenous Trypho Text may have
been produced for a wider audience at its conception, the larger Dialogue, with its
extensive LXX quotes and various additions and repetitions, would have been
more appropriate in an educational setting. This fits with Justin’s sensibilities as a
Christian teacher/sophist. Justin may even have thought it preferable to publish
the Dialogue in an expanded and pedagogic form. If the additions occurred later
in Justin’s life, it is reasonable to assume that he would have added various
arguments and and proof-texts which he had accumulated over the years as a
Christian teacher. From this comparison, it is possible to see that the creation of
the Dialogue – both the Trypho Text and the expansions – would have been
appropriate to Justin’s Greco-Roman setting. He appears to show signs of
influence from the Second Sophistic, particularly in his use of various literary
forms and the expansions which appear to have been added, presumably by
Justin’s’ hand, some twenty years later.

CHRISTIAN DIALOGUE

An examination of Justin’s debt to the Christian tradition may initially
seem obvious; If Justin was anything he was a Christian. But following the
model of the previous sections, I will restrict the scope of the inquiry to the use of
the dialogue form in order ask how this might have effected Justin’s use of or
attitude toward the dialogue form. In some ways, second-century Christian
literature could be said to follow the general wave of literary and rhetorical
techniques of the Second Sophistic. The Christian apologists of the second
century utilized many of the same literary techniques. Writers, such as Minucius
Felix, Tatian, and Aristides, sought to create tight well-structured arguments for
the legitimacy, even preferability, of Christianity. This appears to be the raison
d’Atre behind much of Christian apologetics. The Apology of Aristides (attributed
to the middle of the second century C.E.) is almost child-like in its naïve polemic
against polytheism and provides only a short last-minute endorsement of
Christianity. The same could be said of the anonymous Letter to Diognetus (late
second/early third century C.E.? ) in that it appears to aspire to a high rhetorical
style. Nevertheless, some Christian apologists seem to have achieved a level of
rhetorical argumentation that rivaled their non-Christian counterparts. Tertullian,
Clement of Alexandria, and Origen are the best examples.135

We also have Christian documents from this period which appear to have
been greatly expanded in the course of their development. For example, the
psuedo-Clementine Recognitions and Homilies present us with the complicated
task of sorting out a Grundschrift which appears to lie beneath them.136 It is
thought by many scholars to be a compilation of several independent documents
which were brought together by a single author, or a single document which was
greatly expanded. Van Voorst has recently asserted the hypothesis that beneath
the \textit{Grundschrift} lies the source of \textit{The Ascents of James} (1.33-71), which he thinks is the document referred to in Epiphanius' \textit{Panarion} (30.16.6-9).\footnote{137} Hilgenfeld sees a patchwork of sources which are embedded in these works.\footnote{138} Of course, the discussion of \textit{Grundschrift} is hypothetical, but it is helpful to note that other early Christian documents show signs of embellishment.

We can also see a corresponding trend within the Christian tradition toward the use of dialogue in Christian literature. The \textit{Octavius} of Minucius Felix (late second – early third century C.E.) is a dialogue which draws on the Ciceronian style of courtroom speeches. \textit{The Dialogue between Jason and Papiscus} (ca. 140 C.E.) is not extant, but fragments are preserved in Origen’s \textit{Contra Celsum} (4.52). Origen counters Celsus’ dismissal of the book saying that it is useful for explaining how the Jewish prophecies apply to Christ. It is the connection between prophecy and dialogue which may provide a some insight into Justin’s use of the dialogue form. There are other works of early Christian literature which used dialogue in a very different way than simple apologetic. Looking at this type of Christian dialogue may help us move beyond a purely literary context to explore the ways in which written dialogue functioned in early Christian communities.

\textbf{PROPHECY AND DIALOGUE}

In contrast to the diversity of dialogues of the Second Sophistic, some Christian dialogues, including the \textit{Dialogue}, appear to share a common theme: prophecy and prophetic teaching. This section will discuss how prophecy appears
to have been tested in the early church and how later Christian dialogues appear to have followed a similar procedure in written form. Prophetic texts are usually thought to be future-orientated, but for this examination I will consider texts which either purport to be prophetic in nature, deal with prophetic texts, or reveal some kind of secret knowledge, not necessarily of a mystical nature. The Dialogue can be considered here alongside other more directly prophetic texts (e.g. The Shepherd of Hermas) not because Justin saw himself as a prophet, but because, in the Dialogue, he was involved in the process of reading, interpreting, collating, and proclaiming those prophetic passages most pertinent to the Christian message. The pairing of prophetic themes and dialogue may have been a recognizable format to Justin.

In early Christian communities, prophecy maintained continuity with the Jewish tradition. Paul places prophecy above the more mysterious manifestations of the Spirit (glossolalia) because “those who prophesy speak to other people and for their upbuilding and encouragement and consolation...One who prophesies is greater than one who speaks in tongues, unless someone interprets, so that the church may be built up” (I Cor. 14:3,5 NRSV). The problem, in Paul’s opinion, with speaking in tongues seems to be that it shuts out others; it is between God and the speaker (I Cor. 14:2). It does not always include the community.

Prophecy, on the other hand, was done in dialogue with the community. “Let two or three prophets speak and let others weigh (διακρίνετωσαν) what is said. If a revelation is made to someone else sitting nearby, let the first person be silent. For you can all prophesy one by one, so that all may learn and all be encouraged.
And the spirits of the prophets are subject to the prophets, for God is a God not of disorder, but of peace. (I Cor. 14:29-33)” To prophesy may have implied drawing out certain passages of scripture which confirmed Jesus as the messiah. Certainly, other non-Pauline groups used prophecy – this is part of the conflict with the Corinthians in the first place – but here Paul draws a picture of prophecy which is confirmed in the context of the community. It was a living process which took place within the community. Dialogue within a community appears to be the way in which the spirits were tested and either accepted or rejected.

The 11th Commandment of the Shepherd of Hermas describes a scenario where a false prophet will be “struck dumb” in the presence of those who have the Spirit of Divinity. The false prophet will be unable to speak, unable to be in dialogue. The Didache assumes that prophets (both true and false) are not an unusual feature of the Christian community. Communities should have an open door policy to those “who come in the name of the Lord” (Didache 12.1), but they must first be tested by the community. Thus, several chapters of the Didache are devoted to discerning true prophets from false ones. A true prophet was valuable and “worthy of his food” (Didache 13.1). In fact, they are to receive a tithe because “they are your high priests” (Didache 13.3). But being recognized as a true prophets took time and was proven in the context of community.

The Apostolic Constitutions urged communities to judge Christian prophets by more strict criteria. If a prophet asks for money when they leave, they are a false prophet (Ap. Con. 11.6). Prophets must teach what is edifying and must practise what they preach (Ap. Con. 11.8-10). There is no mention of
treat true prophets as high priests nor is there any allowance for prophets to set up in a community, as in the Didache. Later tradition may have backed away from the practice of tithing to these peripatetic prophets and allowing them to integrate fully into the community, but the same process of testing is in place. Moving on into the second century C.E. we can see how this same process might have been played out in situations quite different from those in the first century C.E.

Papias, the early second century apostolic father is a good example of Christianity moving away from oral/apostolic teaching to the necessity of written documents. Papias found it necessary, for some reason, to provide a written testimony of the apostolic teaching passed down to him orally (H.E. 3.36.3). This is in spite of the fact that Papias is said to have preferred oral teaching over any written accounts (H.E. 3.39). He must have realized that he was one of last remaining people to have had a direct link to the apostles. Even if this account is not totally accurate is still may reflect the transition from an oral tradition to the reliance on the authority of written teaching and instruction which Christianity was undergoing in the second century C.E.

It appears that as Christianity moved from an oral tradition to written texts, communities were faced with a problem of authority. If one was presented with a text which claimed to be prophetic or contain prophetic teaching, how could the community test the prophecy without the prophet there? As the Christian community came to rely more on Christian texts which were thought to contain prophetic material, the issue of the integrity of the speaker would have become an
issue. The relationship between prophecy and dialogue may help to illuminate its early Christian use. It may not be a coincidence that in many places where dialogue is used, the discussion revolves around prophecy and teaching. Stewart-Sykes makes the connection this way:

In the earliest church the usual means of divine communication was prophecy. But when a prophet was present, delivering inspired speech, it was possible to question her or him, to discuss the prophecy, to expand it in table-talk, to check out its veracity (conformity with the Old Testament, already functioning as canonical in some communities, being one means of doing so) and so to reach an opinion on it. This was “testing the spirits”. For this reason, I suspect, prophetic books such as the Shepherd of Hermas and Epistula Apostolorum are in dialogue form. 141

The Shepherd of Hermas, which is listed on the Muratorian Canon (c.200 C.E.), presents us with a prophetic writing which was thought by some early writers to have prophetic qualities, even if it emerged too late to be considered canonical. 142

In this dialogue, there is a clear distinction between the visions given to Hermas and the interpretations of those visions by the feminine figure. Receiving a vision is not the same as knowing what it meant. Revelation of these prophetic visions is worked out in dialogue within the text. In the third vision, Hermas is shown a castle, but its meaning is revealed in dialogue with the Old Woman, who is at this point a symbol of the church and was perhaps intended to be seen as the prophetic figure of the Sybil (cf. Hermas Vis. 2.4). 143 The Shepherd uses dialogue with the Old Woman to clarify the teaching Hermas is given by her (Hermas Vis. 5.1-7). This appears to be the same kind of process that might have taken place
with a live prophet, although here it is in written form. In fact, Hermas is
instructed to write all these things down so he can remember them and tell them to
the saints (*Hermas* 5.1 and 3.8). While this injunction to write may have served to
connect Hermas to the Hebrew prophets, the use of dialogue could also be a
written simulation of how prophecy was confirmed within the Christian
community.

The process of testing prophecy in the context of dialogue is also evident
in the *Epistula Apostolorum*. This document is thought to come from the latter
half of the second century C.E. Its provenance is not clear, but Asia Minor or
Egypt are possibilities. The document deals with apocalyptic themes, but there
is a strong undercurrent of polemic against gnostic teachers, specifically Simon
Magus and Cerinthus. The dramatic setting takes place after the resurrection of
Jesus and ends with him being lifted up into the clouds and granting the apostles
peace. The form of the document is a dialogue where the apostles ask questions
and Jesus answers them. This is, in effect, the last chance for the apostles to ask
any questions they may have about the nature of the resurrection and the day of
judgement. In this text, the apostles take full advantage of this opportunity. The
document has a strong pedagogic theme to it. Principally, its intent seems to be
education. But, the document is also prophetic in that it speaks about the future
events surrounding the second coming. Jesus begins by telling them prophetic
information about the judgment and resurrection. The first question they ask is:

And we said to him, 'O Lord, after how many years yet?' He
said to us, ‘When the hundred and fiftieth year is completed, between Pentecost and Passover will the coming of my Father take place.’ And we said to him, ‘O Lord, now you said to us, “I will come [earlier in the chapter], and then you said, “he who sent me will come.”’ And he said to us, ‘I am wholly in the Father and the Father in me.” (John 10:38; 14:10, 11-20; 17:21,22,23) Then we said to him, ‘Will you really leave us until your coming? Where will we find a teacher?’ And he answered and said to us, ‘Do you not know that until now I am both here and there with him who sent me?’ And we said to him, ‘O Lord, is it possible that you should be both here and there’ And he said to us, ‘I am wholly in the Father and the Father in me after his image and likeness and after his power and after his perfection and after his light, and I am his perfect word (John 1:1).’” (Epist. Apost. 17)

The nature of the dialogue is quite natural and concerned with pragmatic matters like being in two places at the same time and wondering who will teach them the things they need to know. This theme comes up later as well when the apostles ask how they will be able to go out into the world and be believed. Jesus tells them that he will be with them and in heaven at the same time (Epist. Apost. 19). Questions, which precipitate dialogue, run throughout this document. Jesus provides prophetic visions which are then clarified in dialogue. Although the character of Jesus is beyond reproach they still engage in a process of clarification because it is the apostles’ own authority they are concerned about. In this way, it is very similar to the process of testing of the spirits which also takes place in dialogue. There is no question that what Jesus is saying is authoritative, it is rather that the disciples are concerned that when they turn around and try to explain these issues they will need to have answers to the questions they might hear from their listeners (both Christian and non-Christian). The apostles seem to expect that they will meet resistance and testing, or at least questions. At the end
expect that they will meet resistance and testing, or at least questions. At the end of the document, after Jesus has explained what will happen at the final judgement and the apostles have asked all their questions, the issue of acceptance is still a concern:

‘Who will believe us and who will listen to us and how can we do and teach and tell the wonders and signs and mighty deeds as you have done?’ And he answered...‘As my Father has done through me, so I will do through you in that I am with you and give my peace and my spirit and my power that they might believe’ (Epist. Apost. 29).

It is understood in this text that prophets and teachers must exhibit some form of spiritual power. Jesus assures them that he will be with them and provide the proof needed. This confirmation will presumably come when the authority of the apostles and their teaching is tested by other Christians. The document itself appears to be a confirmation of the authority of the apostles and their teaching.

This document shows the apostles to be inquisitive, if not bold, in their questioning of Jesus’ prophecy. At 22-23 they continue to ask for clarification about the judgement – who will be punished and who will avoid it. Jesus returns their question with his own:

‘How long do you ask and inquire?, And we said to him, ‘O Lord, but it is necessary, since you have commanded us to preach, prophesy, and teach, that we, having heard accurately from you, may be good preachers and may teach them, that they may believe in you. Therefore we question you.”

This answer seems to suffice and Jesus proceeds. But the issue of questioning and dialogue comes up immediately after this. Jesus tells them that
there will be a bodily resurrection, but he does not tell them how this will come about. The apostles seem to balk at this idea and ask if dead flesh can really regenerate. This pushes Jesus beyond his patience and in Matthean style he reprimands them for asking too many questions “You of little faith, (Matt 6:30; 8:26; 14:31; 16:8) how long yet do you ask me” (Epist. Apost. 24). The apostles then regret overstepping their bounds: “And we said again to him, ‘O Lord, look; we are mocking you with so many questions” (Epist. Apost. 24). At this point, Jesus does an about-face and praises their persistent questioning.

I know that in faith and your whole heart you question me. Therefore I am glad because of you. Truly I say unto you, I am pleased and the Father in me rejoices, that you thus inquire and ask. Your boldness makes me rejoice, and it affords yourselves life.’ And when he had said this to us, we were glad, for he had spoken to us in gentleness (Epist. Apost. 25).

This document is a good example of the way in which dialogue is used by one Christian writer to illustrate how prophecy might have been examined, clarified, and eventually accepted through the use of dialogue. It seems to be implicitly accepted that the nature of prophecy requires questionings and clarification. This is especially true for apocalyptic material and visions but the same process might also be applied when prophecy, or the fulfillment of prophecy, is expounded. This is where the use of dialogue and questioning might have been a factor in Justin’s use of dialogue.

There is little question that the overall goal of the Dialogue is to show that Jesus is the messiah. Justin pursues this end through the use of prophetic texts. Justin goes even further by using non-prophetic texts as though they were
Justin goes even further by using non-prophetic texts as though they were prophetic. His teaching about the presence of Jesus at Mamre with Abraham (Dial. 56-57) and in the burning bush with Moses (Dial. 59) are all used as witnesses to the pre-existence of Jesus. The Psalms, especially Ps. 22, are used as prophetic texts which testify and outline the character of the messiah, fulfilled in Jesus. Given that the discussion of prophecy and dialogue appear to have been linked in early Christianity, and that testing and questioning of prophecy was not only expected but encouraged by Christian writers and leaders, it is not unusual that Justin would have chosen the dialogue form when discussing the prophetic argument for Jesus as the messiah.

The Dialogue is lacking the fantastical elements found in The Shepherd of Hermas, neither does Justin profess to deliver the teaching of Jesus or even the apostles as with the Epistula Apostolorum. Justin does not profess to be the special carrier of prophetic revelation or preternatural visions. He is merely passing on the teaching first given to him by the Old Man, yet he uses the vehicle of dialogue to provide confirmation of this teaching. But even if Justin does not claim that his words are prophetic, Justin is dealing with issues of prophecy and its confirmation. It appears that the dialogue form was appropriated for writings that were considered prophetic (Shepherd) as well as those texts which dealt with prophetic material, yet were more pedagogic in nature (Epist. Apost. and the Dialogue). Even without the prophetic element, the dialogue form lends itself well to pedagogy, as saw in examples from the Second Sophistic. While it may be difficult, even misleading, to assert a firm literary link within the Christian
tradition between Justin’s use of dialogue and the prophetic content of the Dialogue, it appears that when Christian texts discussed prophecy or prophetic events, they tended to use the dialogue format. In very practical terms, dialogue allowed the writer to pose questions and provide teaching or illumination. In this way, the reader would be persuaded as to the truth of the teaching. This connection between Christian dialogue and prophetic matters can help to add a Christian dimension to Justin’s use of the dialogue form.

It is possible, I think, to see Justin’s use of dialogue in both the Christian and Greco-Roman contexts. Indeed, it may also indicate Christianity’s close relationship to Greco-Roman culture. In the world of the Second Sophistic, Justin uses dialogue and rhetoric in a way similar to the literary experimentation of the second century. We are restrained from saying that Justin attained a high level of success in this area, but it is probably true that Justin sought to write in a style designed to appeal to an educated, literate audience, which would have included non-Christians (as with his Apologies). In this way, Justin stands within the broad bounds of the Second Sophistic and Christianity.

CONCLUSION

There is no way of knowing the exact degree to which Justin was intentionally drawing on either the sophistic literary trends or the expanding corpus of Christian documents during this time. It is fairly clear to me that Justin was not writing a pastiche of a Socratic dialogue. The process of elenchus is a distant second to the proclamatory impact of the Logos. While understanding the
possible relationship between dialogues and prophetic material in early Christianity may speak to the question of why Justin chose this form in the first place, understanding the role of the sophist and rhetor during the Second Sophistic and their literary habits may help to explain why Justin expanded the dialogue with lengthy passages of Christian exegesis and LXX and why he portrays himself as a kind of sophist/teacher. An examination of these influences may also provide a plausible explanation for the creation of the Trypho Text as well as its development into the full Dialogue. This chapter has hopefully laid out how these influences might have manifested themselves in the Dialogue and where Justin stands in relation to these literary movements. The next chapter will focus on the ending of the Dialogue where Trypho walks away unconverted. An examination of its literary context along with Justin’s own attitude toward conversion seems to indicate that Trypho’s exit may appear more striking to modern readers than it did to those readers in the second century C.E.
"After this they departed, praying for my future safety [σωτηρίαν] both from the sea and from all evil" (Dial. 142.3). In this, the penultimate sentence of the Dialogue, Justin raises a question which has baffled many readers: Why did Trypho leave without being converted? Massive tracts of LXX proof-texts had been marshalled and repeated, Jewish law and teachings had been dismissed. All possible, and even some impossible, arguments had been mustered to prove the certainty and truth of the Christian message. Requests to reject the Jewish teachers and accept Christianity's claim that Jesus is the messiah had been made. Yet at the end of the Dialogue, Trypho walked away as he came: A Jew, unconverted.

Perhaps the more significant question is: Why did Justin write such an ending in the first place? What could have been in Justin's mind when he let Trypho depart unconverted after two alleged days of gruelling dialogue? What did he expect his readers to think of this anti-climax? Would such an ending have been perceived to be anti-climactic to Justin or other second-century readers?

Throughout this chapter I am assuming that Justin would not have written anything, including the conclusion, unless he felt it aided his apologetic aims and fit into some literary context. Some attempts to explain this enigmatic ending have been put forward but there are many more scholars who might have been expected to comment, but either make no mention of it or do not attempt to
explain it in any depth. There are, however, a few scholars who have sought to understand this ending with varying degrees of success. One of the more popular theories of why Justin presented this ending is that he wished to convey to his readers the obduracy of the Jews. "Doch dient dieser ergebnislose Ausgang Justin andererseits zur Charakterisierung der Juden in ihrer Verstockheit." E.R. Goodenough can probably be credited with establishing this idea and subsequent scholars have generally followed suit. The thinking goes like this: If Justin is unable to convert a Jew, then we should not feel bad if we fail. In this way, Justin was attempting to gird his fellow Christians against disappointment. Other scholars have read the ending as an indication of Justin’s noble character, while others interpret it as a symbol of hope for further discussion, based either on Justin’s strong remnant theology, or on the literary affinities with a few of Plato’s Socratic dialogues.

My contention in this chapter is that Justin did not wish to be perceived as the loser in the discussion, neither did he wish to portray the Christian message as ineffective, even on resistant Jews. These scenarios would have made the entire Dialogue an extended foray into frustration. Moreover, Justin’s engaged approach and his enthusiasm for the topic do not fit the mould of an embittered apologist airing his past failures ‘in print’. Rather, the final chapter is better understood in the context of Justin’s thinking on conversion, the nature of his own mission, and the parallels with his own conversion experience. The ending of the Dialogue also shows a general affinity to other dialogues from the Second Sophistic. In the previous chapter, the literary context of the Second Sophistic and Christianity
were used to help understand how the document may have developed from a core
dialogue (Trypho Text) into its greatly expanded form (Dialogue). The first
section of this chapter will compare the ending of the Dialogue to other
contemporary non-Christian dialogues to assess if there are any points of contact.
The second section will look at Justin's particular Christian beliefs to see how the
ending would have fit into his Christian context.

**DIALOGUE ENDINGS IN THE SECOND CENTURY C.E.**

There two elements in the ending of the Dialogue which appear to have
been used by other writers during this time. The first is not so much a literary
technique as a lack of any kind of summary. A brief review of Dio's *Orationes*
shows that for the vast majority of his discourses, there is an attempt to sum up the
argument and bring closure to it. This appears to be have been the desired
technique. Nevertheless, abrupt endings appear in some of his dialogues. Dio's
32nd and 34th Discourses show Dio commenting on the length of the argument
and ending the discourse without summation (Or. 32.101; 34.52; and perhaps
35.25). Other writers appear to use this technique. Plutarch's *Beasts are Rational*
ends unexpectedly with an enigmatic comment by Gryllus concerning fathers
(992E). There is no obvious reason to suppose that the MS is incomplete other
than the fact that it does not make a great deal of sense in its present form.
Moreover, this kind of cropped ending can be seen in several of his other works,
such as *Dialogue on Love, Dinner of the Seven Wise Men*, and the *Divine
Vengeance*. Cicero's *De Finibus* has a similar quality: "But as our time is up, if
you please, let us make straight for my quarters.' At these words, as it was felt that there had been enough discussion, we all proceeded to the town of Pomponinus' house." (De finibus 5.32.96). Even Lucian, who often provides satisfying, if not humorous endings, brings The Solecist to a sudden halt: "Let's postpone the rest for another time and break off our discussion" (Solecist 12). This is similar to Justin's abrupt ending at 141 where the argument he is making about multiple wives is quickly ended without any summation. One could argue that the end of the document is Dial. 141.5 which acts as a closing statement. There would be no reason to expect anything after Justin's closing remark: "Having said these things, my dear friend Marcus Pompeius, I stopped (Ταύτα ἐπιών, ὦ φίλτατε Μᾶρκε Πομπήιε, ἐπαυσάμην)" (Dial 141.5). Justin does not offer any kind of summation or even an indication that the document is drawing near the end. But Justin may not have considered this unacceptable because sudden endings do not appear to have been exceptional during this period.

Another similarity can be seen in the circumstances by which some dialogues ended. In the Dialogue, Trypho states that he would love to stay and talk, but since Justin is scheduled to leave in the morning, they had better break off the discussion (Dial. 142.3). The impression is that it is getting late and is time to go. Plutarch uses the same ploy in his Dinner of the Seven Wise Men. Solon stops the discourse with a quote from Homer about the advancing hour and the party ends. (164D). Cicero's Tusculan Disputations ends in like fashion: "But as we have to part in the morning, let us fix in our recollections the discussions of the last five days" (5.41.121). Lucian modified the ploy slightly and used the end
the last five days” (5.41.121). Lucian modified the ploy slightly and used the end of a journey as an excuse for his character (Lycinus) to escape being put on the defensive by his disgruntled interlocutor (The Ship or the Wishes, 46). The ending of Anthenaeus’ Deipnosophistae is very difficult to discern; it simply fades away. But the impression is that darkness is closing in on the party – there is a reference to the lighting of candles in order to read out a passage – and some have already started to leave (15.702). Plutarch’s Dialogue on Love is suddenly interrupted by an approaching friend who immediately ends the dialogue (771D).

Thus, it appears that it was fairly common practice to end dialogues, either by simply stopping them or by means of some interruption, nightfall being the most popular. The Dialogue fits well with these examples. Trypho uses the occasion of Justin’s journey to precipitate the end of the discussion. The effect of these interruptions served to end the dialogues without indicating any clear winner in the discussion. They make a promise to talk again, but this may express social politeness more than genuine desire. Dialogues which end this way leave readers to make up their own minds about who carried the day, if that happened to be their concern. The few exceptions to this might be the Christian dialogue The Octavius (ca. 160 C.E.) where Minucius Felix grants Octavius the clear victory over his interlocutor (40-41). Here, there is a dramatic concession, a conversion of sorts, and a happy ending for all. A more humorous conversion can be found in Lucian’s Hermotimus where Lycinus is given an unmediated, if not ridiculous, victory over the hapless Hermotimus. But, against the larger backdrop of other dialogues, Lucian’s attraction to extremes and Caecilius’ apparent conversion to
Christianity in *The Octavius* appear to be the exceptions, rather than the rule. The ending of the *Dialogue* is better classed with those dialogue which ended unresolved.

But even if the ending of the *Dialogue* is similar to other second-century documents, this does not mean that Justin used this ending simply because other people were doing it. The ending had to fit into his own apologetic agenda. In the previous chapter, we saw how Justin probably appropriated the form of the dialogue from his surrounding culture, but used it in a way appropriate for his Christian discussion on the fulfillment of prophecy. The same process may apply here. If we assume that Justin would not have recorded such an ending unless it served his apologetic purpose, then we are still left with the question of how this ending might have reflected his Christian beliefs. The next section will attempt to understand this ending in the light of his own beliefs and apologetic agenda.

It is useful first to look briefly at Justin’s impulse to witness. What was the driving force behind his repeated attempts to convert or persuade? Often this impulse is simply assumed to be part and parcel of Justin’s character and is not fully investigated. Henry Chadwick’s assessment of Justin’s temperament and motivation is probably the most enduring and eloquent. Chadwick puts a shiny gloss on Justin’s attitude toward his role as an apologist: “Justin writes with a sunny open-heartedness and innocent optimism which is engagingly attractive, even when it leads him into naiveté. Nothing could be less haunted than Justin’s mind and conscience.” Against this positive assessment, Justin’s understanding of the final judgment reveals him to be less than sunny and more than haunted.
However, let us first consider Justin’s conception of free will.

**FREE WILL**

Justin firmly believed that every person was individually responsible for their actions. This was one of Justin’s reasons for the argument, in *I Apology*, that Christians are such good citizens. “Of all people, we are your best helpers and allies in making peace, since we are of the opinion [δοξάζομεν] that neither the wicked, nor the covetous, nor the conspirator escape God’s notice [λαθείν θεόν], and everyone goes either to eternal punishment [ἀωνίαν κόλασιν] or salvation [σωτηρίαν] according to the nature of their actions” (*I Ap.* 12.1, also 43). This belief in the freedom of the human will is not unusual or unique to Justin. In this case, however, it allows Justin to avoid the onus of bringing about someone’s conversion. His only responsibility is to proclaim the gospel.159 After that it is the individual’s responsibility whether to accept or reject it. This is why he can say: “If you do not pay attention [ἀφροντιστήσετε] to our prayers and our openness in everything it will not harm us [βλαβησόμεθα]. For we believe, or rather are firmly convinced [μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ πεπεισμένοι], that every person will be punished in eternal fire [πυρὸς ἀωνίαν] according to the nature of their actions” (*I Ap.* 17.4). This idea is carried over into the *Dialogue* as well when he responds to Trypho’s repeated challenges: For in every way I [Justin] shall be found guiltless [ἄθως] in your case, if, in making my argument, I work hard [ἀγωνίζομαι] to persuade you. But if you remain hard-hearted
[σκληροκάρδιον], or weak in your resolution because of [the threat of] death – which is inevitable for Christians – and do not wish to perceive the truth (τῷ ἄληθεὶς συντίθεσθαι μὴ βούλησθε), you will only reveal your own guilt (ἐαυτοῖς αὐτοὶ φανήσεσθε) (Dial.44.1).

**JUSTIN’S SALVATION**

Justin does, however, have a strong sense of responsibility for speaking the gospel, but this desire does not appear to stem primarily from altruism. In the Dialogue, it is clear that he is conveying the gospel so that he himself might avoid eternal punishment. Justin’s eschatology and his image of the final judgment have been well treated by scholars. Regardless of the particulars of Justin’s thinking, it is safe to say that he was very aware of this event and felt that it was inevitable and imminent. This awareness of the final judgment is, I believe, the primary motivator in Justin’s urge to convert. As the dialogue wears on, Justin becomes aware that Trypho is not an easy sell. In an apparent act of good will Justin empathizes with Trypho: “I sympathize with you. For this reason I work and struggle so that you might understand these strange ideas [παράδοξα] of ours.” This is a reasonable response, but then Justin moves on to the real reason he is labouring so: “and if not, then I myself will be guiltless [ἁθώσοι] on the day of judgement” (Dial.38.2). We should assume that the best case scenario for Justin was a conversion, but if that failed then Justin could fall back on the notion that he had fulfilled his duty and would not be held responsible at the judgment.
A few chapters later Justin is involved in proving that Isaiah 7 refers not to Hezekiah, but to Christ. He exonerates himself from having to convince Trypho of this by saying: “For in every way I shall be found guiltless [ἀθῶος] in your case, if, in making my argument, I work hard [ἀγωνίζομαι] to persuade you” (Dial. 44.1). Toward the end of the Dialogue Justin compares himself to the sower when he paraphrases Matt. 13:1-8. He follows this up with a additional comparison which reinforces the motivation for his endeavor.

One must speak in the hope that somewhere there is good ground. Since in my case, when my Lord, who is strong and powerful, comes he will demand [ἀπαίτησε] of everyone the repayment of his own property. But he will not pass judgement against [καταδίκασε] his own steward if he knows that because the steward believed [ἐπιστάσθη] that his Lord is powerful and would come and demand repayment of his own, he was setting it out on every table, and did not dig a hole and hide it [his lord's property] for any reason. (Dial.125.2)

Justin’s use of the parable of the talents (Matt. 25:14-30) is transposed onto his own life and gives us a clear picture of how Justin perceived himself and his responsibility to proclaim the Christian message. Justin may have had a desire to fill the earth with Christians, but ultimately he is more concerned that he not be filled with brimstone for lack of a return on the resources put in his care. Justin’s actions are geared to avoid being the worthless slave in verse 30 who is thrown “into the outer darkness, where there will be weeping and gnashing of teeth”. The analogy works well for Justin because he did see himself as an apologist who had God-given gifts. As Justin reminds his readers in the I Apology, “an equal amount (ἀναλόγιον) will be demanded for the abilities the person has received from
God, as Christ told us when he said, To whom God has given much, from him much will be demanded (ἀπαίτητησεται)" (I Ap. 17.4, a loose paraphrase of Luke 28:14). Justin is indeed a man with a mission, but it did not necessarily include the making of converts. It did, as his words reveal, focus on using the gifts he felt were God-given so that he would not be found wanting at the final judgment. For Justin this meant speaking the Christian case to all who would listen and allowing them to decide. It also rationalized the occasional failure of the Christian message to persuade its listener. Justin uses this belief to distance himself from Trypho’s free will which was not moving in Justin’s direction.

**JUSTIN’S CONVERSION**

This analysis of Justin’s motivation for his Christian witness shows that while conversion was certainly important and highly desirable for Justin, it was not necessary in terms of his salvation, about which he seems to be fairly concerned. So far, I have attempted to focus on Justin’s possible motivation rather than his technique. But does this explain the fact that Justin lets Trypho leave unconverted? Only partly, for even if conversion was not central to Justin’s motivations it would certainly have been the icing on the cake if Trypho had converted. The final step toward understanding Justin’s motivation is to examine the parallels which exist between Justin’s own conversion and his conversionary effort. There is no shortage of scholarship on Justin’s own conversion experience and whether his stylized version contains any kernel of historical truth. Justin’s conversion, however, has never been used to try to understand his attempt to
convert Trypho. There are several striking similarities between Justin’s conversion and his attempt to convince Trypho. They are as follows:

§ Justin was the one who stopped the Old Man (*Dial.* 3.1). Trypho hailed Justin (*Dial.* 1.1), although there is subtle difference here: The Old Man caught Justin staring at him, Justin did not see Trypho coming.

§ The Old Man asked Justin why he had looked at him so keenly (*Dial.* 3.1). Justin asked Trypho why he stopped him (*Dial.* 1.1).

§ Both Justin and Trypho began by expressing a deep respect for Philosophy (Trypho *Dial.* 1.2; Justin *Dial.* 1-8 recounts his erstwhile interest in philosophy).

† Justin was converted by being introduced to the prophetic message found in the prophets (*Dial.* 7) just as Justin attempted to do to Trypho (e.g. *Dial.* 30-34; 36-39; 43; 52-53; 63; 66-68; 76-78; 84-85; 109-111; 137-141).

† Justin was shown the errors of his philosophic teachers by the Old Man (*Dial.* 7:2-3). Justin, in turn, tried to discredit Trypho’s Jewish teachers (*Dial.* 9.1; 43.8; 68.8; 71.1-2; 103.3; 110.1; 112.4-5; 113.1-2; 120.5; 137.1-2) along with philosophers in general.

‡ Justin was unconverted when he took leave of the Old Man (*Dial.* 8.1), as was Trypho when he took leave of Justin (*Dial.* 142.3).

‡ Justin was converted after the Old Man left him (*Dial.* 8.1) Trypho, it is
assumed, will perhaps do the same.

It is this final uncompleted parallel which is the key to understanding the ending of the *Dialogue*. The *Dialogue with Trypho* could be a mirroring of Justin’s own conversion experience. In *Dial.* 8.1 Justin states that the Old Man said “many other things besides, which are not appropriate to tell right now”. Justin, like the Old Man before him, was handing down the tradition which he believed was first expounded by Christ. Perhaps the remainder of the *Dialogue*, or at least large chunks of it, is the transmission of that initial message. Justin might have felt confident recording Trypho’s unconverted exit because he believed that Trypho had to decide for himself. Presumably, Justin underwent his conversion in private even if it did not take him long to decide (παρακηρύξα). Why then should Trypho not have the same experience? Justin may have expected that as soon as he took his leave, Trypho would also have a fire kindled in his soul (πῦρ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἀνηφόθη) (*Dial.* 8.1), but as far as Justin was concerned he had fulfilled his responsibility. It is possible that Justin intended his readers to see this parallel and assume that Trypho would soon abandon his Judaism in favour of the “true philosophy”. But intention is very difficult to prove without asking Justin himself and the connection is not immediately obvious. What we can assert with more confidence is that the ending is consistent with Justin’s opinion of personal freewill and the certainty of, even preference for, a delayed private conversion. Justin’s distinction between the Jewish teachers whom he does believe to be stubborn and the rest of the Jewish people including Trypho, makes it difficult to see Justin’s motivation in the light of pure polemic.
Trypho, makes it difficult to see Justin’s motivation in the light of pure polemic. It casts doubt on the explanation that Justin is trying to portray all Jews as stubborn. Far from illustrating the obduracy of the Jews, or showing that the door is still open to them, or simply following a Socratic literary convention, Justin is interpreting Trypho’s attitude in the light of his own conversion at the hands of the Old Man. Justin’s view of conversion did not make it necessary for him to pressure Trypho or cover up a rejection. Neither is the ending a sign of openness for future talks. If this were the case then it would imply that Justin had more to say about Christianity (which seems unlikely given the amount of material he repeats) or that there was a need for Justin to finish with Trypho (i.e. convert him). In my reading of the ending there is nothing more to be done by Justin. He has delivered his message and fulfilled his mandate; the rest is up to Trypho and, by implication, an infusion of grace. In fact, it is Trypho who leaves the door open to future talks with Justin, not vice versa. At the end of the Dialogue (141) Justin says he is finished (ἐρχόμενος ἀρχήν). The final words of the Dialogue (142.3) also indicate that Trypho is now on his own; Justin prays for the future conversion of Trypho and his companions.

Skarsaune, when examining Justin’s own conversion, makes the statement: “The way a man describes his own conversion in general, may tell us something important about his concept of Christianity.” Even though Skarsaune does not make the connection between Justin’s conversion and the enigmatic ending of the Dialogue, he is right to point out that there is a mirroring. But in this case, the mirror can be turned to view Trypho’s departure in the light of Justin’s own
expectations for Trypho’s future. Additionally, his motivation in presenting the Christian message to others had more to do with self-preservation and avoidance of punishment than an altruistic impulse to add converts to the Christian fold.

I am not implying that somehow Justin was unique in thinking this. Quite the reverse, Paul exhibits a comparable attitude (e.g. Acts 18:6 and I Cor.). This sense of responsibility can also be seen in Justin’s hero figures, the prophets (e.g. Ezekiel 3:18). What is unusual about Justin is the way in which he utilizes this thinking. For Justin, his responsibility could be fulfilled without obtaining a conversion on the spot.

Whether this thinking was particular to Justin or more general in the Christian community of his day is a matter of speculation. It can be said that for Justin, at least, the nature of the final judgment would have motivated him to witness to others while his understanding of personal free will and the possibility of a private conversion would have insulated him from failure and rejection. Understanding these factors sheds more light on the parallels to his own conversion and the possible reasons why Justin felt confident in allowing the reader to see Trypho walk away as a Jew. If Justin had, throughout the Dialogue, shown a pattern of distorting Trypho to fit into his mould, or if he had simply invented the character, I believe Justin would have had Trypho convert. This would have meshed perfectly with his thinking on the Jewish remnant – a prominent theme in the Dialogue. Trypho would have been the model Jewish convert, showing how a Jew can become a part of the Jewish remnant which embraces Jesus as the messiah. Justin gave Trypho many opportunities to take
this step yet they were consistently ignored. If there really had been some kind of
dialogue and Trypho had walked away, then, based on my reading of the ending,
there would have been no reason for Justin to alter the outcome. If Trypho did
convert, it is difficult to imagine that he would have changed the ending just to
make an obscure parallel with his own conversion. Certainly a conversion is
better than a rejection, no matter how confident Justin was in Trypho’s future.

In the light of these parallels and Justin’s attitudes toward conversion, the
ending of the *Dialogue* can be seen to be consistent with Justin’s thinking. The
ending is also in line with other endings during this period. Later Adversus
Judaeos literature would make conversion or condemnation stock elements, but
this does not seem to be present in the *Dialogue*. Moreover, second-century
readers may not have found the ending unusual in light of its broad literary context
and Justin’s particular ideas. It is not a literary flourish intended to bring
ambiguity and Platonic uncertainty to the *Dialogue*, nor is it necessarily an open
invitation for future talks. It is not designed to show Trypho as intransigent or
hard-hearted. Rather, I propose that this ending was recorded because Justin
interpreted Trypho’s end as his beginning. Justin supposed that Trypho’s exit was
actually the first step in his conversion. The ending is also consistent with the
depiction of Trypho as someone who is curious about Christinaity, but ultimately
unconvinced by Justin’s argument. When we understand Trypho’s use of
rhetorical concessions, his consistent and unanswered challenge about the person
of Jesus, and his loyalty to Judaism, any other ending might have been seen to be
inconsistent, suspicious, or even fictional.
So far, this thesis has sought to clear away the anachronistic conclusions about the *Dialogue* (chapters 1 and 3). It has also laid out the structure of the hypothetical Trypho Text and has tried to understand its development in the context of the second century (chapters 2, 3, and 4). Now that the literary context for the development of the *Dialogue* has been outlined we can begin to get an idea how the *Dialogue* may have fitted into both its Greco-Roman and Christian contexts. We are now able to enter the world of the text to explore Justin’s depiction of Trypho. It is in this investigation where we will be able to judge whether Justin portrayed Trypho – intentionally or not – as a stereotypical Jew, an amalgam of all Jews, or as an individual interlocutor with characteristics which defy fiction.
CHAPTER 5

TRYPHO IN THE TEXT

Chapter 2 sought to show that the figure of Trypho is contained within distinct areas of the Dialogue and that if these blocks are placed together they can be read as a single text – The Trypho Text. Chapter 3 addressed the issues of social and literary context to try to assess the extent to which Justin can be seen to be drawing from his second-century context, if only in general. In this context, Justin’s choice of the dialogue form and the development of the Dialogue are in line with practices of the Second Sophistic as well as Christianity. We can now explore how Trypho is depicted within the world of this text. I fully acknowledge the difficulties in such a task. Justin’s apologetic agenda is strong and we should not depend on Justin to provide accurate information for the sake of historical integrity. But we should also not assume that Justin will skew everything simply out of malice. We can assume, however, that Justin only included material which he deemed to be helpful to his overall argument. In this way, Justin’s apologetic agenda can be used as a hermeneutic tool because there are times when Justin appears to misunderstand Trypho’s words or intentions, or offers commentary which attempts to paint Trypho’s comment or rhetorical tactic in less than favourable colours. But if one reads the words attributed to Trypho and not Justin’s interpretation of Trypho then a new image emerges. For example, time and time again Justin tells the reader that Trypho’s questions are redundant, regressive, and obstructive. But an understanding of exactly what Trypho is asking shows that Justin does not fully understand the line of Trypho’s
questioning. Justin tells us, the readers, that Trypho is being gratuitously argumentative, but that only means that Justin thinks this is true, it does not mean that it is true. The same applies to the many concessions made by Trypho. These are interpreted by Justin, and other scholars, as a sign of his weakness and his lack of support for Judaism. But a close examination of each concession reveals a predictable and effective argumentative technique which appears to be an effort to steer Justin into the areas of greatest interest to Trypho. Moreover, the concessions made by Trypho do not damage the core of his beliefs. Part of the problem is that past scholarship has listened to Justin’s commentary rather than Trypho’s words in the text. Therefore, this chapter will deliberately focus on Trypho’s words (the only exception is the section on Justin and the Jewish Teachers). The profile that emerges is not only more detailed, but differs significantly from previous depictions of Trypho. Trypho is not depicted as a conglomeration of all Jews. He is depicted as a Jew from the diaspora. He is proud and unapologetic (in both the classical and modern sense of the word) of his distinctive practice and identity. And he employs rhetorical strategies in ways most closely associated with philosophy. If we are able to see Trypho trying to undermine Justin’s argument – sometimes successfully – this might be used as evidence that the Dialogue contains an actual dialogue, at least in part, with a singular Jewish disputant.

**TRYPHO’S PHILOSOPHY**

The philosophical aspect of Trypho is seldom recognized in the Dialogue
but, initially, it is the raison d’être for the entire exchange. It is an important consideration which begins in the first chapter and continues to be a prominent characteristic of Trypho throughout the Dialogue. Presumably, if Justin had not been dressed as a philosopher Trypho would not have stopped him. Trypho explains:

I was instructed by Corinthus the Socratic in Argos that I should not despise or treat with indifference those who array themselves in this manner (σχήμα), but instead show kindness and associate with them because perhaps some advantage (δϕελος) may spring from the intercourse either to the other person or to myself. It is good for both even if only one benefits. On this account, therefore, whenever I see any one in such dress, I gladly approach him. This is the reason I now have the pleasure of speaking to you. These are my companions and followers of mine (συνέφέπουσι), and they hope to hear something profitable (χρηστον) from you. (Dial. 1.2)

In this opening statement Trypho reveals his interest in philosophy as well as the history of his training. But Trypho’s education does not appear to be over. His first impulse upon seeing Justin is to engage in philosophical discourse, not investigate the Christian claim. Presumably, Trypho did not even know that Justin was a Christian. It is not until Dial. 7.3 that the name of Christ is even mentioned. Justin first relates his own experiences with different philosophical schools before he finally reveals that he is a Christian (Dial. 8.2). It is only after this that Trypho gives his assessment of Justin’s judgment. At this point, the course of the discussion turns to Christianity, but Trypho’s desire to discuss matters on a philosophical level never fully disappears. Although Justin’s style changes from philosophy to Christian kerygma after Dial. 9, this does not mean that Trypho
shifts his approach. In fact, he maintains philosophical methods of inquiry throughout.

When Trypho relates the advice of his Socratic teacher Corinthus (*Dial.* 1.2) Justin is slightly taken aback and asks if this is becoming for a Jew who might "be profited as much by philosophy as by your own lawgiver and the prophets" (*Dial.* 1.3)? Trypho’s response to this question reveals his opinion of the relationship between the prophets and philosophy. He sees them as having identical aims and goals. Like the prophets, whom it is assumed concentrate on God and his providence: "Do not the philosophers turn every discourse on God (περὶ θεοῦ)? And do not questions continually arise to them about His unity and providence? Is not this truly the work (ἐργὸν) of philosophy, to make an investigation (ἐξετάζειν) into the nature of the deity (περὶ τοῦ θείου)?" (*Dial.* 1.3)? Trypho does not necessarily equate the prophets with philosophers. Instead, he links philosophers, who he assumes are in the business of investigating God, with prophets. His argument could be read as an endorsement for studying philosophy, even if one is Jewish. In Trypho’s opinion, philosophy is doing the same thing as the prophets who are the standard bearers of divine investigation. Given these attitudes, it is reasonable to conclude that Trypho expected the conversation to proceed down philosophical lines. This did not mean that the prophets could not be discussed. On the contrary, they appear to be the standard by which philosophy is judged (*Dial.* 1.6). The relationship is more one of equals than a clear hierarchy which has the prophets at the pinnacle. At one point, when discussing the possibility of other gods, Trypho comments on the prophets’ take
discussing the possibility of other gods, Trypho comments on the prophets’ take on this idea. He says:

The prophets, misappropriating (παραχρόμενοι), as it were, this passage, often said: Your God is God of gods and Lord of lords – often adding [the epithets] Great, Mighty, and Fearsome. These words are not said as though they really were gods. Instead, the word is teaching us that the true God, who made all things, is the only Lord over those that are simply recognized (νομιζόμενοι) as gods and lords. So that the Holy Spirit might refute this as well, he said by holy David: The gods of the gentiles – though considered gods – are images of demons, but are not gods (Dial. 55.1-2).

This quote will also be discussed in light of Trypho’s loyalties, but here it shows that the prophets are not untouchable or above a mild critique of their exegesis. In the strict sense, the verb παραχρόματι carries a negative connotation: to misuse. In this passage, however, the meaning is probably meant to convey the idea that the prophets use this passage for purposes other than those originally intended by the text. It is not as though Trypho is saying that the prophets misread or misinterpreted this passage, it is that they used it for a different, and in this case, apologetic purpose. Overall, Trypho does not appear to be particularly interested in talking about the prophets, especially in terms of Justin’s argument from prophecy. This is especially striking next to Justin’s preoccupation with the prophetic writings and the lives of the prophets. At the end of Dial. 1, after Justin gives his opinion on whether there are one or more gods, Trypho tries to shift the conversation back to philosophy by renewing his request for Justin to tell him his opinion about God and his stance as a philosopher (γνώμην περὶ θεοῦ ἔχεις καὶ τίς ἡ σῆ φιλοσοφία (emphasis added))
Justin does not immediately oblige Trypho. Instead, he moves into his philosophical travelogue (Dial. 2.1 - 8.4) which was devised to show how misguided most philosophy really was. As the Dialogue unfolds it becomes clear that Justin is not particularly concerned with philosophical insights on the nature of God, especially from the prophets. Trypho considers the prophets to be important precisely because of their philosophical pursuit of God, whereas Justin uses their writings for very different purposes. For Justin, the prophets perform a specific task: they describe and confirm the Christian messiah.

When it comes to asking what Trypho believed about the nature of God, the Logos, or some other markers which might help to place him on the philosophical landscape, there is simply not enough information to locate him within a distinctive school, except in general terms. Nevertheless, it is evident that Trypho saw philosophy and its pursuits as worthy endeavours. When Trypho finally finds out that Justin is a Christian he jokes that “it would be better if you continued to abide in the philosophy of Plato, or some other man, cultivating endurance, self-control, and moderation, rather than be deceived by false arguments (λόγοι ἐξαιτηθήναι ψευδέσι)” (Dial. 8.3). In other words, any philosophical school is better than Justin’s lot. In this light it is understandable that the onlookers laughed and Trypho grinned at this joke (Dial. 8.3). Christianity was simply a step in the wrong direction. This remark by Trypho should not be interpreted as an indication of his loyalty to philosophy over the prophets or even Judaism. Trypho’s comment is rhetorical and intended to show where Christianity stands in the order of things: any kind of philosophy is better than Christianity.
If there is any philosophical trait which is consistent in the character of Trypho it is his utilization of reason in judging Justin’s assertions. Throughout the Dialogue, Trypho uses reason and logic to question the claims Justin makes about Jesus (see chapter 6). This is similar in some ways to Socrates whose acumen lay in the ability to find and exploit the logic of his interlocutor’s argument. Instead of taking the whole argument he would choose a strategic brick in the foundation of an argument and bring down the wall by his relentlessly meticulous examination. To this end, Socrates’ use of elenchus was his most powerful tool. Instead of contending with the larger argument of his opponent, Socrates often tried to lead his interlocutor away from the macroscopic to the microscopic. By questioning the assumptions which form the basis of a given argument, Socrates could sometimes erode the foundations of an assertion or even an apparently self-evident truth. At its worst, elenchus was a tool of distraction. At its best, it was the beginning of the journey toward self-understanding. Socrates came into these discussions not as an overt contestant. Instead he presented himself as a kind of student and asks these wise men to teach him; although inevitably, they are taught by him. In some striking ways, the depiction of Trypho matches these characteristics and techniques.

When discussing Christ and his possible role as messiah, Trypho favours an adoptionistic line based on reason, not christology (Dial. 49.1). This same criterion of plausibility is repeated by Trypho in the context of Justin’s christological argument: “You are trying to prove an unbelievable and nearly impossible thing (Ἀπιστον καί γὰρ ἄδυνατον σχεδὸν πράγμα); that God
endured to be born and became a person" (*Dial.* 68.1). Trypho’s curious nature serves to keep the *Dialogue* going when Justin turns to leave after being laughed at by Trypho’s companions. Trypho took hold of my robe, Justin recounts, and “said that I must not leave before I had fulfilled my promise” (*Dial.* 9.2).

Moreover, Trypho does not show any unreasonable bias against Christianity. He could have tried to perpetuate the accusation that Christians were engaged in child sacrifices, imbibing their blood, and then engaging in promiscuous, incestuous sexual activity. If Trypho is not already aware of these accusations, Justin lists them for him (*Dial.* 10.1). But Trypho is not disposed to believe such stories: “What the masses say concerning them [the Christians] are not worth believing (οὐ πιστεύσαι ἡξιον). They are far too unlike human nature (τὴς ἀνθρώπινης φύσεως)” (*Dial.* 10.2). This is not necessarily a vote of confidence. Instead, it reflects Trypho’s sensibilities concerning the human race. Christian, pagan, or Jew, Trypho thinks that human nature is not prone to such abhorrent behaviour.

In chapter 27, Justin discusses Jewish ritual instruction and the supposed contradictions within the structure of the Mosaic Law: circumcision on the Sabbath and the lack of Mosaic Law for the patriarchs. He then asks Trypho to explain these problems. Trypho replies:

> We have already heard you put this forward, and we paid special attention to what you said, for to tell the truth, it deserves attention. But it does not seem good to me, as it does to most, merely to say that it seemed good to him (ὅτι ἔδοξεν αὐτῷ) [God], for this is always the pretense of those who are unable to give an answer (ἀποκρίνομαι) to the
who are unable to give an answer (ἀποκρίνασθαι) to the subject under discussion. (Dial. 28.1)

Trypho admits that this is a legitimate question but instead of responding to the issue directly, he lays down some of his own guidelines for addressing these areas. Justin does not pressure Trypho for a firmer answer on this point. Instead, he proceeds with his own explanation of circumcision and the relationship of the Law to the patriarchs (Dial. 28.2 - 29.3). Trypho’s manoeuvre around this thorny issue is less important than the guidelines for argumentation which he tries to establish. It is clear that Trypho is not content to skirt such difficult questions. His criterion is an attempt to keep the discussion within the realm of the reasonable and not resort to holy deference. Later, despite this warning, Justin exceeds the bounds of reason in his attempt to explain the virgin birth. At Dial. 75.4 he asserts that because God was manifest at Mamre, it should not seem impossible to bring about a virgin birth simply through his will (τῇ τοῦ πατρός βουλή). What is clear is that Trypho has different criteria for explaining such phenomena. Trypho gives greater authority to those arguments answered through reason and logic than those answered only in terms of divine will. This stands in contradistinction to Justin’s proofs based on the will of God. Of course, Justin would never admit that he is not adhering to the boundaries of reason. He professes to be the one who is offering a reasoned ‘proof’ of Christianity. Yet Trypho’s words and his demands for a believable proof reveal philosophical traits which run counter to Justin’s apologetic agenda. These philosophical traits not only govern Trypho’s initial attraction to Justin, they also provide him with
criteria for judging the merit of a given argument. At one point, Justin appears to be very frustrated with Trypho’s continual questioning. Justin tells Trypho, and all Jews, that they are being hard-hearted (σκληροκάρδιοι) because they do not respond to the sheer volume of scripture that Justin lays out and accuses him (now in the second person) of reneging on those points which he previously conceded (Dial. 68.1). Trypho then explains why he has this attitude:

Consider, dear Sir, that you have been able to acquire this with much trouble and toil. So we too must try and test all these matters (βασανίσαντας παντα τα ἐπιτρέχοντα) and thus assent to what the Scriptures compel us (ἀναγκαζομαι)" (Dial. 68.2 trans. A.L. Williams).

Trypho is not easily impressed and is committed to testing the strength of Justin’s argument for two possible reasons. This could be a reflection of his philosophical training and it could also be because these are matters of great importance because they claim to be founded on scripture. These reasons are not mutually exclusive and could easily coexist.

There are times when Trypho becomes irritated – these are significant points which will be discussed later – but overall he shows himself to be a tough, even-keeled partner in the discussion. In spite of Justin’s unexplained and selective use of Scripture, Trypho also exhibits a certain dispassion in the midst of Justin’s polemical statements and still focuses on Justin’s methodology. In the midst of hearing the prophets used to diminish and slur his own people (Jer. 4:22), Trypho is still able to stand outside the polemic and voice his critique against Justin (Dial. 30-33) based on Justin’s or Christianity’s particular method for
drawing conclusions. In all these cases, the goal of Trypho’s observations or criticisms is not necessarily to deride, they are aimed at challenging Justin to use methods of discussion which are seen by Trypho to be worthy of a philosophical discussion. In this way he shows the traits of a good philosopher - focused, persistent, calm, and indulgent to his disputant. This picture of Trypho as a philosopher is should not be considered anomalous. It similar to a Jew found in Josephus’ *Contra Apionem*. Josephus quotes from Clearchus who is, in turn, reporting an account given by Aristotle about an encounter he had with a Jew from Asia Minor.

Now this man, who was entertained by a large circle of friends and was on his way from the interior to the coast, not only spoke Greek, but had the soul of a Greek. During my stay in Asia, he visited the same places as I did, and came to converse with me and some other scholars, to test our learning. But as one who had been intimate with many cultivated persons, it was rather he who imparted to us something of his own. (*Contra Apionem* 1.180-81)

Despite the temporal distance, there is a striking similarity with the depiction of Trypho. Trypho’s philosophic interests did not exist in a vacuum, nor can they be said to be a Christian fabrication suited to Justin’s task. The philosophic techniques employed by Trypho may very well be in-line with a Jewish philosophical tradition that stretched back centuries and was supported throughout Greco-Roman Jewry.

**TRYPHO’S ROLE**

The analysis in chapter 3 sought to show the distance between Justin and the literary tradition of the Platonic dialogue. Clearly, Justin does not exhibit a
the literary tradition of the Platonic dialogue. Clearly, Justin does not exhibit a
literary dependence on this form. It was shown that the parallels which do exist
are too few and coincidental to be of any help in determining a discernible literary
link. Despite this lack of dependence, Socratic literature can be of some use when
examining Trypho’s particular role in the text. Just as Justin resembles a sophist,
Trypho resembles a philosophical figure, namely Socrates. Perhaps, it is the case
that Justin’s similarity to a Sophist has more to do with Trypho’s socratic
techniques of intellectual inquiry than it does to any direct correlation between
Justin and a literary tradition. The mere fact that Trypho is the one challenging
the tenets of Christianity puts Justin in a position often inhabited by those sitting
across from Socrates. He is on the defence, at least in the Trypho Text, because
Trypho is trying to pursue his own ends.

The Socratic or philosophical approach reflected in the Platonic literature
is used only to show the cultural similarity between the Socratic ideal and
Trypho’s depiction in the text, not a literary link. For our purposes, such a
reversal of roles serves two purposes: it reinforces the distance between Justin and
Plato and illustrates Trypho’s philosophical style. In the last chapter, I compared
Justin to the sophist Protagoras as a way of illustrating, in general terms, Justin’s
similarity with this famous sophist. This section will attempt the same kind of
comparison except that Trypho will be compared to Socrates. For the sake of
consistency, I will use Plato’s Protagoras as the main representative case for
Socratic practice. This obviously limits the extent to which this parallel can be
advanced and admittedly constrains our image of Socrates. But the aim of this
section is not to make a direct link between the two. It is only to make a general, but notable, comparison between Trypho and the Socratic style of inquiry which is markedly different from Justin’s.

From the opening scene we see that Trypho stops Justin and asks him for some philosophical insight. He is attracted to his dress and is trained to talk with those who “dress in such clothes in the hope that some gain (δεξιός) might be obtained from such interaction either to him or to myself. After all, it is well for both if either is benefited” (Dial. 1.2). Similarly, Socrates goes to the Sophist with the hope, perhaps, of gaining or imparting wisdom (Gorgias 447B; Prot. 311A; Symp. 175C; Parm. 127C). At the end of Dial. 1.2 Trypho tells Justin that those who accompany him are expecting to hear something valuable (χρηστόν). This term occurs at only one other place in the Dialogue (96.3) but it is within a gospel paraphrase based on Luke 6:35-36. More telling perhaps is a cluster of this word at Prot. 313. Here Socrates is warning his companion about the snares of the sophists by encouraging him to step carefully. “There may well be some of these too, my good sir, who are ignorant which of their wares is good or bad for the soul (χρηστόν ἢ ποιητόν πρὸς τὴν ψυχήν) (Prot. 313E cf. 313A; 313D.2; 313E & Gorgias 517E). This may shed some light on Trypho’s request for something of value. Justin never refers to Christianity as χρηστός, nor does he make the connection with the messianic title χριστός. The word is attributed to Trypho and Socrates. It is fitting that Trypho would use this kind of word when speaking to a supposed philosopher.
Trypho is the one who asks Justin to tell him his views on philosophy and soon discovers that he is a Christian, at which point many of the others laugh at Justin. It is Trypho who asks Justin to stay and talk more about his beliefs (*Dial.* 9.2). It becomes apparent that Trypho has read some gospel material (*Dial.* 10.2) and has particular questions about certain aspects of Christianity. This is similar to Socrates who first inquires into what his interlocutor knows or believes and then asks questions based on their beliefs.

Trypho does not launch into a speech about Judaism. Socrates does not openly defend his own beliefs. Trypho, like Socrates, consistently asks for proof of Justin’s claim about Jesus (*Dial.* 9.2; 36.1; 39.7; 50.1; 57.4; 77.1; 89.2; 90.1). In the Trypho Text, Trypho makes more demands and asks more questions than Justin (37 to 24). His questions sometimes act as a lubricant for Justin’s argument, but more frequently they disrupt the argument. He asks about certain aspects which are not directly related to Justin’s immediate argument. This is similar to the Socratic approach which is designed to pick at the details and underlying assumptions of an opponent’s argument rather than treating the argument as a whole. One could not go so far as to say that Trypho practised the technique of *elenchus* on Justin. He does not ask Justin seemingly easy questions which are designed to undermine his assumptions and begin a process of self-examination. Nevertheless, it is evident that he engages in a persistent examination of Justin’s claims.

These parallels point toward Trypho as a philosophic figure who judges the merit of an assertion, in this case Christianity, based on philosophical
standards of reason and logic. It is probably true that Justin knew something about the Platonic dialogue tradition. The first nine chapters are a testament to that knowledge. Ironically, however, the Socratic figures in the Dialogue are Trypho and the Old Man, not Justin. If Justin wished, he could have put himself in the place of the Old Man, asking questions of Trypho and slowly bringing him to the Truth. Instead, he chose to skip the examination of Trypho’s philosophical beliefs and proceed directly to proclamation and teaching.

Far from the category of Sophist, Trypho shows far more affinity to a Socratic figure, or at least someone trained in the Socratic approach. It would be nonsense to assert that these characteristics were deliberately drawn by Justin to make Trypho resemble Socrates. In the Apologies it is Socrates who provides the model for the philosopher who, because of his piety and natural goodness, could be considered a Christian before Christ (I Apol. 46.3; 5.3). If Trypho does have Socratic characteristics it appears to be in spite of Justin, not because of him. The picture of Trypho as a person trained in the Socratic tradition, as he says he is (Dial. 1.2), is sharpened and strengthened by this evidence.

TRYPHO AND HIS COMPANIONS

In a recently published article, G. Stanton examined the possible identity of those who ‘watched’ the dialogue between Trypho and Justin. Stanton sees this shadowy group as the real target of the Dialogue. It was not to convert the Jews like Trypho that Justin composed the Dialogue, instead it was focused on that group which was wavering between Judaism and Christianity. He cites five
passages from the text (*Dial.* 8.3; 9.1; 23.3; 47.1-3, and 122-3) to support the idea that this group was gentile in origin and can be identified with the group known as ‘God-fearers’. Stanton is surely right to see the group accompanying Trypho as non-Jewish and non-Christian, but this is not tantamount to concluding that they were God-fearers. Justin might have seen them as possible converts to Christianity, but this does not mean that their identity must follow religious lines. Justin’s comments would lead us to believe that these friends have a certain religious investment in their association with Trypho. But this connection only comes from Justin, and those scholars who are predisposed to see religious associations pervading all social interactions. However, if we follow the methodology of listening only to Trypho, then the identity of his friends is fairly straightforward.

In the opening chapter Trypho says: “These are my companions and followers along with me (οὗτοι τε συνεφέπωντοι μου), and they hope to hear some profitable discourse (χρηστόν) from you (*Dial.* 1.2). This verb usually takes the dative μου denoting resemblance – followers with me – rather than possession – my followers. Nevertheless, it is true that throughout the *Dialogue*, Trypho is the spokesperson for the group. Members of the group are mostly held to the occasional laugh or outburst. Yet how could they be like Trypho if they have not been circumcised as Justin clearly implies (*Dial.* 23.3)? The bond need not come not from their religious allegiance. There is no need to impose a religious grid onto the followers or Trypho when it is possible to identify another unifying feature of the group. The bond between them appears to be
The bond between them appears to be philosophical. Instead of concluding that the group was comprised of one full-blooded Jew (Trypho) accompanied by a group of gentile sympathizers who were on their way to converting to Judaism – whatever that may have entailed – it may be more helpful to see the common denominator as philosophy or the possibility that they were students of philosophy. This would make sense of the reason they were together in the first place. It is not that his religious identity was unimportant, but this does not mean that his friends shared his religious enthusiasm. After all, two of his companions left when it became apparent that the discussion would center on Christianity (Dial. 9.3). Apparently, not all of Trypho’s companions were interested in this religious topic. This reading removes the necessity of assigning the other members of the group to a religiously defined group.

Trypho’s attitude toward the Greek myths, is interesting in light of this connection. Trypho is quite harsh on them:

Furthermore, among the tales of those whom we call Greeks it is said that Perseus was been born of Danae, still a virgin, by him that they entitle Zeus flowing down upon her in the form of gold. And in fact you [Christians] ought to be ashamed of saying the same sort of things as they, and should rather say that this Jesus was a man of human origin (ἐκ ἐνθρωπον Ἐξ ἐνθρώπων) and, if you can prove from the Scriptures that He is the Christ, that because of His perfect life under the Law He was deemed worthy to be chosen (πολιτείας ἄντων κατηξιὸσθαι) to be Christ. And do not dare to assert marvel (τερατολογεῖν), that you not be convicted of talking folly (μωροίνειν) like the Greeks. (Dial. 67.2 trans. Williams)
While this kind of talk would not have been out of place in the presence of God-fearers or sympathizers, it is just as likely to have been heard in the company of philosophers. Philosophers in particular were noted for their disdain for the Greek myths. In particular, this may be an echo of Trypho's Socratic training, since Socrates is said to have spurned the Homeric myths. This harsh view of the Greek myths could also be seen as a particularly Jewish trait. It is impossible to say where this attitude might have originated in Trypho's words, but it is certainly true that such an attitude would have been shared between Jewish and philosophical circles. This is only one instance where such a parallel can be seen, but it may be indicative of other affinities that existed between Jewish and philosophical thinking and attitudes.

In many respects Stanton is correct about the character of this group: They are more cantankerous than Trypho, they do not appear to be Jewish, and Justin thinks that they are more likely to become proselytes to Judaism than Christianity. But Stanton restricts his conclusions by allowing Justin's assumptions to shape his options. Stanton does not take the philosophical character of Trypho — and thus his companions — into account. The character of Trypho as a student of philosophy who is firmly Jewish broadens the options available to us when investigating the identity of these companions.

This group may be the target of the Dialogue, but we cannot claim that they are God-fearers or even sympathizers. Trypho certainly does not have a missionary verve woven though his religious belief on a par with Justin's. In the text, Trypho is far more interested in questions of philosophy, reason, and logic.
The companions do not contribute to the discussion in the Trypho Text (except Dial. 56.13), but they are certainly a presence (Dial. 1.2; 8.3; 9.1; 23.3; 47.1-3; 56.3; & 90.2) and should be considered an inextricable part of the entire Dialogue. Nevertheless, it might be helpful to point out that there are two groups of listeners; the ones on the second day (post Dial. 77) hear much less of Trypho and much more of Justin. As discussed in chapter 2, it appears as though Justin may have created new companions in order to justify the many repeated arguments used in the second day (comprised mainly of non-Trypho material). Justin even goes so far at 85.6 as to grant one of the new listeners the name Μυκασκέκς. This anomalous naming of an enthusiastic and thankful by-stander may signal a more deliberate attempt to maintain the pretence of dialogue in the non-Trypho material. But overall, this is a shadowy group which stands in the background throughout the dialogue. My aim in this section is to broaden the vocabulary we use to describe their possible relationship with Trypho and/or Justin. The one thing that they have in common is that they are companions of Trypho and they share an interest in philosophical matters; at least this is true for those who arrived with Trypho. They do not have any substantive impact on the integrity of the Trypho Text, but they can help us to understand a little better the kind of people Trypho chose to be with.

TRYPHO’S USE OF ABRAHAM

Besides Trypho’s critique of Justin’s method, there are two issues which Trypho raises consistently through the Dialogue. They do not facilitate the
discussion, instead they confuse Justin’s argument. These are important because they appear to show Trypho working against Justin’s purpose and undermining his argument. In chapter 46 Trypho asks whether one can keep the Law, be a Christian, and be saved. Justin answers this question with a question: does he think that those patriarchs who lived before the Mosaic Law are considered saved, since they did not observe any of the Law? Trypho immediately finds a fault in Justin’s argument. He answers Justin and continues with yet another question: “Wasn’t Abraham and those who came after him circumcised?” Justin responds to Trypho’s question by altering his initial question to allow for Trypho’s critique, i.e. he excludes circumcision from the list of those things which are most closely associated with the Mosaic Law (Dial. 46.4). This small exchange has no bearing on Justin’s larger argument on why the Law was created or even his treatment of circumcision, but it damages his immediate argument. The fact that this is a minor exchange makes it more valuable for our purposes. Justin quickly moves off the point and proceeds with his line of thinking, but he is not able to escape the issue of Abraham’s circumcision. This is a topic which Justin has trouble handling because of Trypho’s persistence. Abraham is, in fact, a real problem for Justin in the Dialogue. Time and time again Justin is confronted with the glaring truth that Abraham, while he was justified by faith, was also circumcised by divine ordinance. In chapter 46 we have an exchange that embodies well the frustration that Abraham’s circumcision held for Justin. At Dial. 46, the force of having to deal with Abraham’s circumcision actually moves Justin from his original point. He starts out to show that salvation is not associated with the Law
since the patriarchs are considered saved by Jews even if they were not observant of the Mosaic Law, but somehow the issue of circumcision shifts the topic from salvation to possible reasons why the Law was created in the first place.

Moreover, at various points in the Dialogue Justin seems to hold different attitudes about circumcision. At one point it appears that he is unaware of other cultures which practised male circumcision.

For circumcision according to the flesh, which is from Abraham, was given for a sign that you may be separated from other nations, and from us...For you are not recognized among the rest of men by any other mark than your fleshly circumcision. (*Dial.* 16.3)

A short time later he acknowledges that circumcision is practised by other peoples. “For it [circumcision] is of no use to the Egyptians, or the sons of Moab, or the sons of Edom” (*Dial.* 28.5). In the latter case, Justin is seeking to dilute the uniqueness of circumcision and thus undermine any divine stamp. In the former, he highlights the opinion that circumcision is a mark of separation. Circumcision was an apologetic tool which, for Justin, cut both ways. Sometimes he was able to use it to his advantage and at other times it weakened his arguments, especially when it came to Abraham and his circumcision. Justin concedes the flaw and quickly moves on to discuss Mosaic Law and its function (*Dial.* 46.6).

Justin sees circumcision as a sign given to Jews to mark them off from the rest of humanity (*Dial.* 16.2). Thus, circumcision is linked to the plight of the Jewish people. It has a punitive aspect so that the Jews because of their circumcision “may suffer that which you are justly suffering, and that your land
should be desolate, and your cities burned with fire, and that strangers may eat
your fruit in your presence, and not one of you may go up to Jerusalem” (Dialogue
16.3). This idea finds a parallel in Justin’s First Apology 47 where he sees the
Jewish ban from Jerusalem as foretold and appropriate punishment. It is also a
mark which prohibits them from nationhood. “Therefore to you alone this
circumcision was necessary, in order that the people may be no people and the
nation, no nation; as also Hosea 177, one of the twelve prophets declares” (Dial.
19.2).

In one instance, Justin makes a reference to divine foreknowledge as a
possible reason for circumcision: “God, who foreknew, was aware that your
nation would deserve expulsion from Jerusalem and no one would be allowed to
enter into it” (Dial. 92.4 an echo of 16.2). Justin’s explanation of circumcision as
having a punitive aspect is unprecedented. Stylianopoulos points out that Justin
could not easily relate the purpose of circumcision to the sinfulness of the Jews as
he does in the case of the remainder of the ritual Law. The legislation of the
Mosaic Law as a whole occurs according to Justin, after Israel’s worship of the
golden calf and in order to check the Jews’ proclivity to sin (Dialogue, 19.5ff).178

There is probably a connection in Justin’s thinking between the mark of
circumcision and the Hadrianic banishment of Jews from Jerusalem. Jewish
circumcision as a distinguishing mark was not only assumed by Justin, but by
Tacitus as well.179 “Whether or not the Romans conducted such searches to find
who was circumcised is difficult to know, although it is not an improbable matter.
However, Justin apparently was convinced that they did. It seems that from this
supposition he drew his curious explanation of the purpose of circumcision."

It is worth noting that this punitive aspect is confined to the present for Justin. All of the consequences of circumcision have found their realization in the destruction of the temple and the exclusion from Jerusalem. It is important to stress that circumcision did not have a timeless effect on Jews. The punishment is temporal and has no bearing on Justin’s idea of salvation or Christian faith.

According to J. Siker, the challenge for Justin is to denigrate circumcision without denigrating Abraham. He manages to do this by presenting Abraham, the very founder of circumcision, in such a way as to divorce him from circumcision (the parallel with Paul is obvious here). Abraham’s significance lies, rather, in his faith while uncircumcised. For Justin, Abraham is not really a Jew at all but a gentile when it came to circumcision.

Siker goes even further in his separation of Abraham from carnal circumcision to infer that Justin envisioned Abraham as receiving the spiritual circumcision of the gentiles. Since Justin has made explicit his view that Christians share a like faith with Abraham, and since faith means being circumcised in one’s heart, we may reasonably infer that, for Justin, Abraham would qualify for the circumcision of the heart. Despite this inference, nowhere does Justin attempt to deny or even reframe Abraham’s circumcision. Instead, he concedes his circumcision without qualification or alteration. It is true that Justin believed Abraham had a personal relationship with Christ, but it is dubious to infer that he had a spiritual circumcision of the heart and therefore was a gentile in his circumcision. Justin could have made this spiritual argument, but he does not.
his circumcision. Justin could have made this spiritual argument, but he does not.

As a way of illustrating the function of the second circumcision, Justin draws heavily on the typological relationship of Joshua coming into the promised land of Palestine and Jesus leading Christians into the promised land of salvation.

The former [Joshua] is said to have circumcised the people a second time with knives of stone (πετροχ) (which was a sign of this circumcision with which Jesus Christ has circumcised us from stones and all other idols), and [Joshua is said] to have made heaps of them from the uncircumcised (that is from the errors of the world), in every place they were circumcised using knives of stone, to wit, the words of Jesus Christ (Dial. 113.6).184

In the same way that Joshua led Israel into the promised land with circumcision, so Christ leads his followers to the promised land by a second circumcision. It is difficult to push Justin much further than this. He does not answer questions about whether Abraham received a second circumcision of the heart. Within this particular quote Justin thinks that the second circumcision was not ushered in until Jesus’ ministry on earth. This is a logical necessity with the analogy between the knives of stone which Joshua used and the words of Jesus which were stones. “Accordingly, the knives of stone [are what] we take to mean his words” (Dial. 113.6). With respect to Abraham, this would make second circumcision a technical impossibility. Ultimately, it is more helpful to note that circumcision is not a central issue here. The focus in this typological correlation is emphasizing Joshua as a type of Christ, rather than explaining the nature of Christian circumcision.

Despite Justin’s desire to distance Abraham from the observance of the
Law, Justin allows Trypho to claim the reality of Abraham’s circumcision. In the end it appears that Justin tried to partition off Abraham’s circumcision as an anomaly so that he might deal with Mosaic Law unencumbered by the contradiction of a circumcised Abraham. Jewish Law without circumcision would have been a far easier topic for Justin to address. The historical lines are more clearly delineated. Were it not for Abraham's circumcision, his argument would have had a sharper bite. This is shown by the fact that, when dealing with Jewish rites, Justin attempts to steer the dialogue toward Moses and the Law and away from circumcision. The previous quote (Dial. 46.3-5), where Justin is not allowed to group Abraham in with those Patriarchs who were justified without the Law, illustrates how Justin tried to homogenize Jewish history into the Christian categories of pre- and post-Law. He is prevented from doing so by Trypho’s objection.

It is striking that circumcision prevents Justin from separating Abraham and the Mosaic Law. It would have served Justin’s argument much better had he silenced Trypho’s observation. His question about the righteousness of the patriarchs would have been much more successful if Trypho had not brought up this inconsistency in Justin’s approach. Even if Justin wished to talk about the fact that Abraham was circumcised and yet still counted as righteous, why let Trypho be the one who shows up his error? Why not pre-empt the objection in the text and thus appear to be flawless in the presentation? In those places where Justin combats Jewish exegetical arguments he does pre-empt objections by voicing them first: “you (pl) say that...” or “Your teachers say that...”. In this way
he can tailor the objection to fit his answer. This is not the case with Abraham’s circumcision. The fact that much of the discussion of circumcision happens outside of the Trypho Text, suggests that Justin knew this was a difficult issue and therefore included more information on the subject. Justin says very little about circumcision in the Trypho Text, whereas much of Justin’s exegetical warfare and argumentation on the subject of circumcision occurs outside the Trypho Text. The argument at Dial. 16 is not included in the Trypho Text whereas Dial. 28 and 19 are considered part of the hypothetical text. This may be another instance where an addition was made without regard to its internal consistency within the text. The overall impression Justin conveys about circumcision is not consistent. It is a unique and special problem for Justin. He does attempt to play down Abraham’s circumcision by highlighting the patriarchs before Abraham (Dial. 19), but despite his efforts Abraham’s standing is made more complicated by Trypho’s observation and his own subsequent admission. Therefore, Justin is less likely to dwell on Abraham when there are other patriarchs who are less controversial. Justin swings the argument away from Abraham onto Jacob, who was a much more useful and uncomplicated patriarch for Justin.

There is a way in which Abraham’s circumcision may have been intended to function in a positive way for Justin. Within Justin’s conversionary agenda he appears to present Abraham as a model for Jewish conversion. This model is based on the meeting of Abraham and Melchizedek, the uncircumcised priest (Gen. 14:18). This enigmatic and mysterious priest provides Justin with evidence of Judaism’s place in relation to Christianity. At chapter 19 of the Dialogue,
Justin lists for Trypho those scriptural figures who were without fleshly circumcision yet deemed worthy of God: Adam, Abel, Enoch, Lot, and Noah. Melchizedek is also listed in relation to his meeting with Abraham.

“Melchizedek, the priest of the Most High, was uncircumcised. Abraham, the first who received circumcision after the flesh, also gave him tithes, and he [Melchizedek] blessed him” (Dial. 19.4). In this instance, Melchizedek illustrates the superiority of an uncircumcised priest as well as the posture the circumcised should take to this uncircumcised holy man. In this case, Abraham’s circumcision is a crucial and necessary element. And it appears to be the only instance where Justin is able to use Abraham’s troublesome circumcision to his advantage.

Trypho consistently prevents Justin from conflating circumcision with the Sinai event, even though Justin tries to pass Abraham off as one who was without the Law, which for Justin and Trypho included circumcision. Here, there is no allusion to Abraham as the father of the Christian nation. In fact, Abraham’s faith or his attachment to Christian faith is not mentioned in this context at all. The reason for Abraham’s inclusion in this list of uncircumcised patriarchs is to show the status of the circumcised (i.e. the Jews) when compared with uncircumcised holiness (i.e. Melchizedek) and the Christian faith. 186

Even Abraham, who is revered by the Jews as their forefather and honoured by Justin as the father of many nations, is subject to Melchizedek.

Melchizedek was described by Moses as the priest of the Most High...A priest to those who were in uncircumcision. And because he blessed the circumcised Abraham who brought him tithes, so God has shown that His everlasting priest [Jesus], called also by the Holy Spirit Lord, would be
Priest to those who are uncircumcised. Therefore, if those who are circumcised [Jews] approach him [Jesus] by believing and seeking his blessing from him, he [Jesus] will both receive and bless them. (*Dial.* 33.3)

The analogy suggests that in the same way Abraham supplicated Melchizedek and was blessed by him, so Jews should do the same and receive a similar blessing. The analogy is not drawn to show the inherent rejection of the Jews on the basis of their race, rather it serves as a model for Jewish conversion. Here Abraham plays a strikingly significant role. It is to be the circumcised Jew who teaches the way in which the Jews may come into the blessings of God - through obeisance and faith in Christ. Abraham functions as a Jew, not a Christian, especially in his deference to the uncircumcised priest Melchizedek. This runs counter to the idea that Abraham only functioned as a Christian in Justin’s thinking and supports Justin’s desire to make Jewish conversion acceptable. After all, Jews would simply be following in the footsteps of their forefather Abraham.

Trypho’s tactical use of Abraham’s circumcision, and the way the *Dialogue* records this exchange, reinforces the image of Trypho as an engaged, logically minded disputant. Justin has differing views of circumcision and does not appear to have a clear line of argumentation about the significance of, or reason for, Abraham’s circumcision. The hint that Abraham could be a model of Jewish conversion may be a step toward understanding Justin’s thinking on this topic.
TRYPHO'S WIT

This section will examine the way Trypho uses sarcasm, understatement, and wit to show his scepticism concerning some of Justin's beliefs. This is an aspect of Trypho's figure that is not often noticed or acknowledged, yet at times Trypho's statements exude wry sarcasm and argumentative insight. As mentioned above, my assumption is not that Justin recorded such comments in the name of fair play or in an effort to give a verbatim account. Rather, these comments are not always seen by Justin to be sarcastic. Justin treats the words of Trypho at their face value. As we have seen, Justin often misunderstands Trypho's questions or the central point of his comments. It is also apparent that Justin is confident that his arguments carry the day, so there is no need to alter or modulate Trypho's words. If Justin was truly threatened by Trypho, then we might expect Trypho to be depicted as wholly passive and naïve (some scholars have drawn just this conclusion about Trypho's character), without any wit or significant insight. If we step back from past scholarship, which mostly follows Justin's opinion of Trypho, then we can begin to see instances where Trypho's comments are not so passive, nor so unintelligent.

That said, it must also be acknowledged that not everything Trypho says is astute and incisive. There are those times when Trypho's comments seem to be based on stock criticisms against Christians. For example, in Dial. 35.1 Trypho accuses Christians of eating meat offered to idols. Elsewhere, he points out the contradiction of not observing cultic practices while holding the Hebrew Scriptures to be sacred (Dial. 10.2). These general criticisms are not as helpful
Scriptures to be sacred (*Dial.* 10.2). These general criticisms are not as helpful because they tell us very little about Trypho’s particular rhetorical technique or critique of Justin’s immediate argument. Fortunately, there are other statements which appear to be distinct to Trypho’s character. They deal with Justin’s particular argument and are bound up with the situation in the *Dialogue* and can only be understood in their respective contexts. Because they are woven into the argument they can be used as a more reliable tool for examining Trypho’s style.

Trypho is aware of the way Justin sometimes uses Scripture to meet the requirements of his argument. Early in the *Dialogue* Justin records a string of passages from Isaiah which point away from the practice of the Law, particularly the Sabbath. Trypho follows this up by asking Justin: "Why do you select only the parts of the prophetic writings which you wish (βούλεται) and do not bring to mind (οὐ μέμνησατε) those things which expressly command us to keep the Sabbath?" (*Dial.* 27.1). Justin’s answer to this accusation is short and explains that the Law was enjoined on the Jews because of their forgetfulness and propensity to idol worship (*Dial.* 27.2). But the methodological question is left open. Justin does not answer why he is selective in his choice of scriptural passages. Justin’s hermeneutic principle appears to be this: Whatever refers to Israel in positive terms refers to Christians and whatever speaks of Israel as disobedient belongs to Jews.

In addition to such insights, there are also several comments which reveal sarcasm and rhetorical jabbing. At beginning of chapter 65 makes a sarcastic
remark regarding Justin’s use of Scripture. Trypho introduces a piece of scripture which is intended to contradict Justin. But instead of simply saying something equivalent to “Well what about this!”, he feigns a kind of confusion and ignorance by saying: “I am so astounded by the many passages of scripture [just adduced] that I do not know what to say about the passage in Isaiah where God states that he gives his glory to no one. It goes as follows: ‘I am Lord God. This is my name. I will not give my glory to another, nor my praise.’ (Isaiah 42:8)”. This could be read as a genuine appeal for Justin to clear up Trypho’s confusion, but Justin’s response seems to suggest that he sensed something other than sincere curiosity. “If you spoke these words, Trypho, and then kept silence in simplicity and with no ill intent, neither repeating what goes before nor adding what comes after, you must be forgiven; but if [you have done so] because you imagined that you could throw doubt on the passage, in order that I might say that the Scriptures contradicted each other, you have erred. But I shall not venture to suppose or to say such a thing (Dial. 65.2). Justin’s response strengthens the notion that this was a sarcastic remark designed to catch Justin out.

In an earlier chapter Justin finishes a christological point and Trypho says: It would be good for us if we trusted in our teachers (καλὸν πεισθέντας ήμᾶς τοῖς διδάσκαλοις), who laid down a Law that we should have no dealings with any of you, and that we should not even have any communication with you on any questions. For you utter many blasphemies (βλασφημα πολλα), in that you seek to persuade (πείθειν) us that this crucified man was with Moses and Aaron,
and spoke to them in the pillar of the cloud; then that he became man, was

crucified, and ascended up to heaven, and comes again to earth, and is to be

worshipped (Dial. 38.1).

Ironically, Trypho does not take this prohibition against talking to

Christians seriously enough to follow it. In this case it serves only as rhetorical

fodder for a sarcastic remark.

Earlier, after Justin’s declaration that he was a Christian, Trypho had told

him that it would have been better for him had he stuck with any branch of

philosophy rather than letting himself be “completely deceived (ἐξαπατηθημένη) by false words and follow worthless and contemptible men (ἀνθώποις

οὐδενός ἤξιοι)” (Dial. 8.3). This has the same rhetorical structure as the

previous comment about his teachers: One would be better off doing X than

believing in the Christian claim. The similar structure of these two remarks may

reflect Trypho’s ironic rhetorical style. It is certainly not a style which Justin uses

in any of his arguments. He never says, ‘It would be better for you to believe in

philosophy rather than your Jewish teachers.’ Rather, this particular construction

is unique to Trypho. For Trypho, there is a hierarchy of knowledge and the

understanding of God. Some are better than others. Based on these comments,

we can assume that Christianity did not rank high on the intellectual scale in

Trypho’s opinion. Conversely, Justin exhibits no graduated scale; Christianity is

the only choice. Unlike Trypho, his goal is not to scrutinize Judaism or reduce it
to nonsense through the use of logic or close examination. Justin’s style is much
more straightforward and devoid of rhetorical argumentation.

Trypho also employs sarcasm in ways which sometimes appear to slip past Justin.

‘If anyone, having seen the things you say, believed like you – that clearly he is the messiah – and believed and obeyed him but also wished to keep these precepts [food laws, circumcision, Jewish feasts, etc] would they be saved?’ I said: ‘In my opinion, Trypho, I say that the person will be saved if they do not try and persuade anyone else to keep these things. I am referring to those gentiles circumcised by Christ from their wanderings who say that people cannot be saved if they do not keep them. This is what you did (ἐπραττες) earlier at the beginning of the talk declaring that I would not be saved (σωθησομαι) if I did not keep them.’ (Dial. 47.1)

Justin refers back to this earlier statement (Dial. 8.4) as though Trypho had tried to convert Justin to Judaism by telling him that he would not be saved unless he was a Jew. Trypho was not, however, speaking about salvation in this statement. Instead, he suggested that by following the Jewish laws “perhaps then you will receive pity (ἐλεος) from God” (Dial. 8.4). For Justin, salvation came at the end of one’s life. In contrast, even if slight, Trypho’s comment does not carry this sense. From Justin’s interpretation, it can be concluded that he did not understand, or perhaps twisted, the content of Trypho’s initial statement. Perhaps Justin was deliberately misreading Trypho for apologetic purposes. There would be some value to depicting Trypho as the one who is in competition with Justin. But even with this assumption, why did Justin not change the initial comment to be more in line with the later one? The comment at 8.4 retains its rhetorical value even though it is recast by Justin in a different light.
There is another example, in what appears to be an example of ironic flattery, where Justin does not appear to understand Trypho completely. At one point Justin is preparing to offer some proof texts in support of his Logos theory. Before he does so he prefaces his comments by saying:

> I am going to cite Scripture to you not merely to erect a kind of fanciful display of arguments (οὕτως σκέψεως λόγων ἐν μόνη τέχνῃ ἐπιδείκνυσθαι σπεύδω), I have no ability in this kind of thing. Only by the grace given to me by God am I able to understand the Scriptures. Trypho answered: You do this [defer to God] in a pious manner. But you seem to feign ignorance (εἰπεῖς ἀγνώστα) when you say that you have no ability in the art of disputation (λόγων τεχνικῶν). Well, I replied, if you think so, all right, but I am sure it is otherwise (Dial. 58.2).

The exchange ends and the argument continues. It is unclear whether Trypho is genuine in his compliment about Justin’s abilities or whether he is accusing Justin of presenting an overly-polished argument, perhaps like a sophist would. An exchange such as this does not appear to have any literary value, except to show Trypho offering a double-edged comment which Justin does not, or cannot, rebut. If the comment is in the text to provide local color, then it only shows Trypho to be the wittier of the two. The use of Jewish wit and humour has recently been highlighted by E. Gruen. He examines second temple documents and finds that “they reflect the creative energies and imaginative powers that characterize much of Jewish-Hellenistic literature. They also exhibit other features generally overlooked by solemn scholars: a sardonic wit, mischievous sense of humor, and a pointed irony that not only poked fun at Gentiles but could also expose the foibles of Jews themselves.”

Trypho’s comments are
particularly noticeable against Justin’s stern seriousness. Perhaps Trypho’s intellectual banter could be considered a Jewish trait, or at least a part of the Jewish-Hellenistic tradition.

**TRYPHO’S TEACHERS**

It is clear that the figure of Trypho is not interested in exegesis, at least not as interested as Justin. Yet the bulk of the *Dialogue* is taken up with exactly that topic. This phenomenon can be explained by understanding the role of the Jewish teachers and what they represented to Justin and by making a clear distinction between Trypho and the Jewish teachers familiar to Justin. Even if the teachers were not *in situ* for the debate, Justin acutely sensed their presence. In contrast, Trypho makes little more than a passing reference to them (*Dial.* 38.1) and then only to highlight the fact that he is not following their advice to stay away from Christians. It might seem out of place to talk about Justin’s perception of the Jewish teachers in a chapter dealing with Trypho’s depiction in the *Dialogue*, yet this section is necessary because it establishes a crucial distance between Trypho and the Jewish teachers. Trypho cannot be considered a Jewish teacher by Justin’s definition nor does he appear to be particularly knowledgeable of or interested in their teachings. He certainly does not appear to have based his Jewishness on their midrash. This may be why he is not affected or moved by Justin’s argument for Christianity; it is based on exegesis and a particular reading of Scripture.

* A great deal of misunderstanding and confusion about Trypho has been based on the assumption that Trypho is synonymous with the Jewish teachers
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LISTENING TO TRYPHO
CHAPTER 5

referred to by Justin throughout the *Dialogue*.\(^{188}\) Eusebius is the first writer who failed to make this distinction. Because of the abundance of exegetical material, he concluded that Trypho was one of the most learned rabbis of the day (*HE* 4.18.6). The idea that Trypho was a rabbi, even Rabbi Tarphon, has long been abandoned but unfortunately Trypho has been thrown out along with this naive theory. Some of the reasons why Trypho is rejected as Tarphon are used to dismiss him as a viable Jew: Trypho does not appear to know Hebrew (along with Justin), he makes concessions to Justin (R. Tarphon is thought to have held an aggressively anti-Christian stance), and is not a good representative for rabbinic Judaism. Even though we have seen how Trypho can disrupt the flow of the argument and muddy Justin’s agenda, it is the Jewish teachers and their perceived authority who present Justin with his greatest challenge.\(^{189}\) Their rejection of the LXX as an acceptable translation (*Dial.* 71.1), their supposed alteration of key Christian passages (*Dial.* 84.3, see also 71.3), their particular understanding of the Scriptures (e.g. *Dial.* 110.1 & 112.4), and the influence Justin feels they exert over the Jewish people (*Dial.* 103.3) – even Trypho (*Dial.* 9.1 & 137.1) – are all factors which threaten Justin.\(^{190}\) That the teachers are Justin’s true foes can be clearly seen in a later chapter of the *Dialogue*. In chapter 103, he makes the accusation that Jews were corporately responsible for the death of Jesus, but with a twist. Justin makes a differentiation within Judaism, implying that some were more guilty than others: “As therefore, bulls are the begetters of calves, so your teachers were the cause of why their children went out to the Mount of Olives to take him and bring him to them” (*Dial.* 103.3). The image portrays the Jewish
people as gullible children. The teachers can and do exert power over the young and vulnerable. This image is consistent throughout the Dialogue. Toward the end of the Dialogue, Justin makes one of his final calls for conversion. But before Jews can ‘cross over’ Justin must turn them away from the teachers. “For it would be good if, persuaded by the Scriptures, you were circumcised from hardness of heart [Christian baptism] and did not have the opinions which have been bred into you (ξυγυνομένην γυμώμην)” (Dial. 137.1). The Jewish teachers clearly stand behind this statement. Justin believes that they have implanted these obstacles in the hearts of the Jewish people. The picture Justin paints is one of corruption, deceit, and power. It is almost as if the Jewish people are being held against their will and the only barrier between them and conversion is their teachers. It must be kept in mind that this is Justin’s assessment of the situation. As we have seen, there is nothing in Trypho’s words or actions to confirm this alleged control by the Jewish teachers. Contrary to Justin’s assumptions about all Jews, Trypho does not appear to be under the influence of these teachers.

Among other things, Justin accuses the teachers of rejecting crucial passages of the LXX (Dial. 71.1). Justin then proceeds to assure Trypho that he will prove his point without the aid of these rejected texts (Dial. 71.2). The rejection of these passages by the Jewish teachers was, for Justin, deliberately made to eliminate those texts which proved the validity of Christianity. This was especially true when it came to the prophet Isaiah. Justin claimed that: “In these matters you venture to change/amend (παραγράφειν) the interpretations which your elders (πρεσβύτεροι ὑμῶν) who were with King Ptolemy gave forth, since
your elders (πρεσβύτεροι ὑμῶν) who were with King Ptolemy gave forth, since you assert that the Scripture is not as they have expounded it, but, ‘Behold a young woman (ἡ νεᾶνις) will conceive’” ( Dial. 84.3, see also 71.3). Justin gives the Jewish elders who translated the LXX a different name (πρεσβύτεροι).

Evidently, they are not to be confused with those Jewish teachers who are now present. Justin becomes more cryptic when he accuses Jews of eliminating a portion of Esdras which is apparently not extant (Dial. 72.1). Jeremiah 11:19 is also said to have been cut by Jews (Dial. 72.4, see also 120.5 for a repetition of this accusation concerning passages in Esdras and Jeremiah). In addition to this, “in the ninety-fifth psalm [LXX] they have taken away this short saying from the words of David: ‘from the wood’” (Dial. 73.1).191 Justin sees Trypho as one of those who is under the ‘spell’ of the teachers. Immediately after Justin finished the prologue and declared his Christianity, Trypho accuses Justin and Christians in general of moulding a kind of Messiah for themselves (Χριστὸν ἐαυτοῖς τινα ἀναπλάσσετε) (Dial. 8.4). These are strong words which come in the wake of Justin’s conversion story. Justin’s response, however, is calm and even. This is due, I think, to his perception that Trypho is not responsible for what he is saying. “May you be pardoned sir, and forgiven, for you know not what you say, but being persuaded by your teachers who do not understand the Scriptures and by the act of portending (ἀπομαύτευμένος) you say (λέγεις) whatever comes into your mind/soul (θυμῶν)” (Dial. 9.1). Trypho is not thought to be personally responsible for his scepticism because the source of all resistance to the Christian
message emanates from this mysterious group of Jewish teachers. There is only
one thing for Trypho to do in order to be able to see Christ as the messiah:
abandon his connection to the teachers:

If you [the Jewish people] will not reject the teaching of
those who exalt themselves and wish to be called rabbi,
rabbi, [ref. to Matt. 23:7] and will not come with earnestness
and intelligence to the words of prophecy, so suffering the
same punishments which the prophets suffered from your
own people, you cannot receive any advantage whatsoever
from the prophetic writings. (Dial. 112.5)

Several chapters later, in what looks like a plea for conversion, Justin is
again urging his listeners to jettison the influence of the teachers. “Give your
assent (συμφάμενοι), do not rail (λοιδορήτε) on the son of God. Do not ever
be persuaded by the pharisaic teachers (Παρισαϊοίς διδασκάλοις) and
ridicule (ἐπισκόψητε) the king of Israel, especially like the rulers of your
synagogues (ἄρχων τῶν ἱερεῶν) teach you after the prayer” (Dial. 137.2). 192

In the passage which precedes this we also hear of the vulnerability of the
Jewish laity (Dial. 137.1 quoted above). The truth of the Gospel is so evident and
plain to Justin that there must be some other reason for Jewish rejection of the
Christian faith. For Justin, the teachers provide part of that reason.

The influence of the teachers does not just hold Jews away from
Christianity. According to Justin, there is an active campaign to destroy
Christianity. Justin sees the teachers behind a deliberate programme of sabotage.
In one passage the accusation is a general one. It is all Jews who are out to
discredit Jesus, “whose name you profane, and labor hard to get profaned over all

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the earth" (Dial. 120.4). Three chapters earlier, however, he is more specific about who is pulling the strings of this conspiracy: "The chief priests (ἀρχιερεῖς)\(^{193}\) and teachers of your people have caused his name to be profaned throughout the whole earth" (Dial. 117.3).\(^{194}\)

It is difficult, however, to know who these teachers were. The second century C.E. is too early to assume any significant rabbinic influence outside of Palestine. The references in Justin do not, by themselves, constitute proof of a rabbinic presence in Asia Minor or the larger Diaspora. In fact, it might be misleading to assume that the teachers to which Justin refers are even rabbinic. At this time, it would have been conceivable to have had local teachers who expounded Torah and taught through private and public means. It should not be concluded from this that they were, therefore, tannaim. There is a sense in Justin that the influence of the teachers is large and effective. But in fact, Trypho’s words and actions point away from a pervasive influence. Trypho probably knew that such teachers existed and there is evidence that he had knowledge of some Jewish teachings, but it is scant (see next section). Overall, Trypho is not as concerned with contemporary Jewish exegesis as he is about the quality of Justin’s messianic claims. This is probably the simplest explanation for Trypho’s silence and lack of serious engagement on exegetical issues. Conversely, Justin is preoccupied with the teachers and their perceived power over the Jewish people. For Justin, the teachers provide a way to explain why Trypho and Jews in general are not embracing Christianity in greater numbers.\(^{195}\)

Justin assumed that if he could refute the Jewish teachers, then the barrier
Justin assumed that if he could refute the Jewish teachers, then the barrier would be broken, but this assumption is misguided. The barrier between Trypho and the Christian faith was based on his own reasoning and judgement. It was not based on the mesmeric power of the teachers. This is illustrated at Dial. 94.4 in an unusual departure where one of the bystanders speaks. Up to this point the bystanders have been mostly silent, except for the occasional laugh or nod of assent. But when Justin asks for the reason why Moses held up the brazen serpent and offered healing when idolatry had been strictly forbidden (Num. 21:8) it is not Trypho who speaks, but one of the others who had been listening: “You are right. We have no explanation to give. I have asked our teachers about these issues and they gave me no answer” (Dial. 94.4). It would have served Justin’s argument well to have had Trypho admit this in public, but he is silent. The fact that Justin did not choose to put these words in the mouth of Trypho not only supports the depiction of Trypho as uninterested in and unaware of this kind of teaching, it speaks to the integrity of the consistency of Trypho’s character.

To discern the difference between Trypho and the Jewish teachers in the Dialogue is also to clarify Trypho’s concessions and his lack of interest in matters involving Scriptural exegesis. The illusion of Trypho’s knowledge and their exegetical disputation has been created by the many times Justin says, “you (pl) say that...” but it is only an illusion. There is no evidence that Trypho was a student of any Jewish teacher who would have had access to the traditions which may have come down through rabbinic Judaism. The only education we can safely ascribe to him is philosophical. Nevertheless, Trypho does have some
knowledge of Jewish teachings. The next section will examine the breadth of this knowledge and explore how he could have attained the information he had.

**TRYPHO AND JEWISH TEACHING**

The question of Trypho’s familiarity with contemporary Jewish teaching has not yet been investigated, but it is helpful in establishing a possible relationship to this kind of Jewish teaching. It also speaks to the question of whether Justin attempted to put Trypho into a stereotypically Jewish mould or whether the picture is more similar to the previous section, where Trypho is seen as separate from the Jewish teachers. Such an examination shows that Trypho knew very little which can be linked to extant Aggadic material. Trypho’s knowledge is general and does not reflect an intimate familiarity with the emerging rabbinic tradition, which is not surprising in the middle of the second century C.E.\(^\text{196}\) This section does not contain any information or teaching which Justin says Trypho knows. I will consider only what is attributed directly to Trypho’s voice. This is consistent with the methodology outlined at the outset. I am suspicious of what Justin says Trypho believes. Justin makes general statements about what Jews believe or what the teachers teach. For our discussions, such statements are too general to be helpful. Moreover, Justin’s assumptions about Trypho’s beliefs would distort the picture of Trypho this study is seeking to draw.

Trypho makes ten references to aspects of Judaism which might be linked to Aggadic material (*Dial.* 8.4; 10.4; 46.2 49.1; 56.5,10; 60.2-3; 77.1; & 89.1),
while Justin makes at least nineteen references to Jewish teachings. Hirshman points out that, “it is essential and extremely instructive to note that the purportedly Jewish traditions are almost exclusively contained in Justin’s remarks and are almost never raised by Trypho the Jew.” Nevertheless, an examination of these few references helps to better understand the relationship between Trypho and the emerging rabbinic teaching.

Trypho’s first statement about what it means to be considered Jewish comes early in the Dialogue: “First be circumcised, then observe the Sabbath, all the feasts, and the new moons of God. In a word, do all things which have been written in the Law” (Dial. 8.4). This is a fairly straightforward description that indicates nothing beyond a strictly biblical origin (Isaiah 56:6 and 66:23) and could not be said to be rabbinic. One might even venture to say that the reference to new moons of God is distinctly non-rabbinic.

Trypho’s statement in Dial. 10.4 that Christians do not obey the Mosaic Law because they have despised the Covenant from the beginning (τῆς διωθήκης εὐθέως καταφρονήσαντες) is of a very general nature and does not reveal any insider information. The link between the Covenant and observance of the Mosaic Law is a basic Jewish tenet. It is so central to all known varieties of Judaism that it would not indicate any special knowledge of a particular teaching. We could expect all religious Jews to hold this belief.

There are a few references which deal with the form of God’s earthly appearances. In these references, Trypho appears to have knowledge of angels
and their role in the visitations at Mamre (Dial. 56.5). Trypho affirms the idea that the three visitors at Mamre were angelic beings and that God had preceded them. This is the interpretation Justin aims to refute. He says in Dial. 56.10 that if he cannot prove that one of the three was more than just a angel – being called both God and angel – then Trypho would be justified in holding this belief which seems to be fairly common. In the first place, Justin does not ascribe it to the teachers even though it can be found in Jewish teaching (admittedly, the dating and provenance of such material is extremely problematic). Justin thinks this understanding is widespread and common to “all of your people (πάν ἔθνος Ἰουδαίοι)” (Dial. 56.10). It is impossible to know for certain if this interpretation was widely accepted by Jews. In many other cases, Justin does ascribe certain teachings to Jewish teachers, but that is not the case here. Given Justin's intense rivalry with the Jewish teachers, if Justin thought this teaching was particular to them he probably would have said so, especially since this argument is so vital to his assertion that Christ is proclaimed in the Hebrew Scriptures. Additionally, the fact that Josephus corroborates the idea of three angels (Ant. 1. 198) increases the probability that it was generally known.

Another possible reference occurs later in the same argument when Trypho asserts the presence of both an angel and God (ἂγγελον καὶ θεὸν, δύο ὄμοιον ὄντας) (Dial. 60.1) at the burning bush. There might have been a link between the angel of God and the Shekinah. In later rabbinic tradition this connection is made in Shemot R. on Ex. 23.20: “Wherever the angel appears the Shekinah
appears also, for it is said, 'And the angel of the Lord appeared unto him in a flame of fire', and immediately after, 'And the Lord called unto him'.” If Trypho had been familiar with this link between the angel and the Shekinah this would help to explain why he agrees so easily with Justin in the next paragraph, that even if the passage refers to God it is not God, but rather an intermediary who is called the angel of God (Dial. 60.3). Trypho’s response is lost under the weight of Justin’s logos theory, but if Trypho had been referring to the Shekinah, then his concession would have been appropriate and this could be counted as another of Justin’s misunderstandings. Trypho could have agreed to an intermediary figure who is not God without accepting that the figure was Jesus was the actual incarnation of that figure. But this is a very difficult scenario to prove. It is very difficult to know how widespread this understanding of the Shekinah or mediating power was in Jewish circles. It is possible that the idea of the Shekinah circulated in philosophical circles and that Trypho is referring to a kind of philosophical/Jewish Logos, but this is only speculation. It is certainly not a strong enough connection to link Trypho with any rabbinic tradition. It might indicate, however, that Trypho thought of the Shekinah as a mediating figure, or at least a holy presence.

It is more helpful to look at this concession in the light of Trypho’s agenda and his technique throughout the rest of the Dialogue it is most likely that he is making a rhetorical concession. Granted, it is quite a large concession which does seem to give quite a lot of ground to Justin’s argument, and it is not followed by a demand for proof, but it still does not dilute Trypho’s basic challenge to Justin. It
is difficult to know where this information about God and an angel may have come from, but it is not crucial to Trypho’s argument.

Trypho also makes a few references regarding the expected coming of the messiah. According to Dial. 49.1 “All of us expect (προσδοκᾶμεν) the messiah to be a man born of human parents.” In another of Trypho’s larger rhetorical concessions, he opens by saying: “You are quite aware that all of our people wait (ἐκδέχεται) for the messiah” (Dial. 89.1). Earlier in the Dialogue Trypho spoke about the arrival of the messiah as if it is only a matter of time. “But if the messiah has been born and is somewhere right now, he is unknown and does not even understand (ἐπιστατεῖ) who he is” (Dial. 8.4). Is this belief in the coming of the messiah a stereotype, fabricated or perpetuated by Justin for his apologetic purposes? Is this a reasonable belief for Trypho to hold? There is no question that Christianity was founded on the premise of a messiah. The shape of that messiah may have been debatable, but the assertion of Jesus’ messianic status was crucial.

Can we overlay this same preoccupation onto Jews? Certainly not. But that does not deny that Jews might have held some kind of messianic expectations even in the wake of Bar Kochba. The question standing between Trypho and Justin is not about whether or not there will be a messiah. Both assume this to be true. Justin is concerned with the shape of the messiah described in the Hebrew Scriptures and Trypho is interested to hear how Justin squares this definition with the person of Jesus. In the light of these comments and the way they function in the text, it is inappropriate to ask if this belief is representative. Instead, it is more important to look at the function and context of these comments. Trypho’s references to this
look at the function and context of these comments. Trypho’s references to this expectation are in passing and not central to his argument. He uses them as a springboard to get the discussion back on track or to make a larger point. In Dial. 8.4 there is a tentative quality to the statement. It is hypothetical and used to point out that: “you shape a kind of messiah for yourselves” (Dial. 8.4). Dial. 49.1 also assumes the presence of a messiah, but Trypho’s main point in this passage is to discredit Jesus as the messiah because Elijah has not come back to precede and anoint him. Dial. 89.1 is clearer in its intent, but again, messianic expectation is not the main focus of Trypho’s argument. Trypho is concerned with messianic descriptions but only insofar as Jesus may or may not match them. In contrast, Justin has already assumed that Jesus is the messiah and is seeking to reinforce this through his many references from Scripture. In this passage, as with others, Trypho chooses to avoid the exegetical argument through a rhetorical concession. He then moves on to the issue of crucifixion and its accompanying curse. As noted above, this statement begins one of his most comprehensive concessions, but Trypho’s rhetorical strategy is transparent. He does not want to dwell on whether a messiah is expected, nor does he wish to debate the connection between Jesus and Joshua. He makes these concessions in order to get to the topic of crucifixion. All this is to say that messianic expectation was not much of an issue. Trypho may also be generalizing in order to redirect Justin. Moreover, Trypho’s use of messianic expectation is an effective argumentative tool: assume your opponent’s point to be so obvious that it does not warrant discussion, then rephrase the question and assert your own point in its place. For example, ‘Of
course all of this is true. That is obvious. The real question is whether…’

One of the more puzzling statements made by Trypho comes in chapter 46. Justin is in the midst of his theory of salvation and the Mosaic Law. Trypho asks him if it is possible to be saved if one believes that Jesus is the Christ and observes the ordinances of the Law as well. This triggers a question from Justin about how many ordinances can be followed without the Temple. “For you will then be convinced that a person can certainly be saved without keeping or observing these eternal commandments” (Dial. 46.2) Trypho’s answer is often translated in such a way as to make the meaning difficult to discern. A.L. Williams translates Trypho’s response thus: “I mean, the observance of Sabbath, and being circumcised, and keeping the monthly feasts, and washing, if one has touched anything forbidden by Moses, or after sexual intercourse (τὸ σαββατιζεῖν λέγω καὶ τὸ περιτέμνεσθαι καὶ τὸ τὰ ἐμμενα φυλάσσειν καὶ τὸ βαπτίζεσθαι ἄψωμενον τινὸς οὖν ἀπηγόρευται ὑπὸ Μωσέως ἢ ἐν συνοισία γενόμενον)” (Dial 46.2).

The idea of monthly Jewish feasts creates something of a problem in this rendering because there were and are no ‘monthly feasts’ in Judaism. A better reading of τὸ τὰ ἐμμενα φυλάσσειν might be “the keeping of monthly things”, or “keeping those things reckoned by the months.” If this reference to monthly things is connected to the reckoning of months, to wit, when a month begins, then we are in the world of the Jewish calendar and the importance of establishing the date of the new moons. Correct and accurate dating of the
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Jewish feasts and festivals was important to those Jews who wished to maintain a sense of synchronicity with the other Jews around the empire and even with heaven. It protected their ancient traditions and perhaps it even put them in harmony with the heavenly court. This reference may be an echo of Trypho’s initial suggestion to Justin in *Dial.* 8.4 where he urges Justin “to keep the Sabbath, the feasts and the New Moons of God, as it is written (φύλαξον, ώς νενόμισται, τὸ σάββατον καὶ ἐορτὰς καὶ τὰς νουμηνίας τοῦ θεοῦ).” In this context, the suggestion is for Justin to observe the feasts and follow the Jewish calendar (τὰς νουμηνίας τοῦ θεοῦ). In the light of this connection, the later reference (*Dial* 46.2) to monthly things most likely refers to the observance and proper reckoning of the major feast days of the Jewish calendar. This reading makes better sense of the text and also fits with Trypho’s concern for the observance of feasts and Jewish practice in general. A more laborious translation might also read: “to maintain those practices which determine the reckoning of months”. This reading might also imply that Jews in the Diaspora had their own system for establishing the Jewish calendar. We cannot assume that this sort of reckoning was valued only by the tannaim, but it is likely that their calendrical expertise aided in their rise. Whether this was being done in the second century C.E. Diaspora is a matter of speculation. Regardless of who decided the Jewish calendar in the Diaspora, this reference points to the importance of calendrical reckoning.

M. Hirshman sees the reference to washing as “another pin for Justin to knock down”. He argues that this reference is inserted for rhetorical purposes.
knock down". He argues that this reference is inserted for rhetorical purposes.

Two chapters earlier (Dial. 44) Justin made a reference to Christian baptism and several chapters later Justin bolsters his argument for Christian baptism. Therefore, this reference by Trypho is an insertion intended to show how Jewish immersion has been redefined in Christian terms. However, his conclusion must be counter-balanced by three factors. 1) Ritual washing and cleansing was certainly practised by Jews during this time. Life in the Diaspora among non-Jews would have certainly provided occasions for ritual cleansing from various impurities. This would have been a daily and mundane part of life in a Diaspora community. 207 2) Washing is also paired with sexual activity. There does not appear to be any apologetic value for including this addendum. The reference to sexual impurity is puzzling and allows no immediate explanation. 208 3) Baptism is not a major theme in these sections. Justin does not devote any chapters in the Trypho Text to explaining or redefining Christian baptism in terms of Jewish practice. The mention of Jewish immersion is not used rhetorically by Justin and does not have an argumentative function in the text.

Hirshman notes that the list is “surprising because of what it contains as much as what it omits”. 209 He believes that the omission of food laws is striking because of the centrality and distinctiveness of Jewish dietary restrictions. It is not immediately apparent why this would have been excluded from Trypho’s list, but its absence need not cause alarm. If we return to Justin’s original question we see that he only asked what cultic practices can still be followed now that the Temple has been destroyed. This makes the parallel even more striking because this
appears to be exactly what is happening in this list.

A second omission relates to the verbal nature of early rabbinic teaching. Hirshman believes that Torah study, at least in its rabbinic form, would have been a central commandment to Jews who had access to Torah scrolls and teaching. Almost one hundred years after the destruction of the temple, rabbinic Torah study would have been on the rise within tannaitic circles, yet this does not appear to be the case with Trypho. Instead of assuming that this is just another example of Justin clipping the wings of his interlocutor, we could say that it would have been out of place for a Jew like Trypho to include such a commandment as a way to identify Temple practices still in effect. What might initially appear to be a glaring omission is understandable for a Diaspora Jew who was culturally and geographically removed from the learning and teaching of a specialized rabbinic class. Certainly, Trypho would have been exposed to Torah teaching and preaching at the local level. It is, however, different to say that he would have perceived the study of Torah to be a commandment enjoined on all Jews. It is important, when dealing with a figure like Trypho, not to use a rabbinic template as the normative guide to values and practice within second-century Judaism, regardless of geography. In the light of these considerations, this list of practices may not be as strange as it initially appears.

Moreover, Trypho’s list has some striking parallels to a passage found in the Mekhilta:

And so we find that anything to which the Israelites were devoted with their whole souls has been preserved among them. But anything to which the Israelites were not devoted
them. But anything to which the Israelites were not devoted with their whole souls has not been retained. Thus the Sabbath, circumcision, the study of Torah, and the ritual immersion, for which the Israelites laid down their lives, have been retained by them. But such institutions as the temple, civil courts, the Sabbatical and Jubilee years, to which the Israelites were not wholeheartedly devoted, have not been preserved among them (*Mekhila*, *Shabbat 1*).211

Hirshman believes that the *Mekhila* is a polemical response to the *Dialogue*. But it may be too simplistic to set up a straight line of action and reaction. One could back up and ask why Justin included this list – if it was purely rhetorical – in the first place. This kind of relationship is far more complex than Hirshman believes it to be. The similarities are general, but there is not enough evidence to make a direct link to Justin. Regardless of the exact line of influence or whether the *Mekhila* is a reaction to Christian assertions, this was a topic which held importance for Christians and Jews, for very different reasons. All we can safely say is that Trypho’s comments about what constitutes being a Jew does not appear to be out of step with Judaism in the second or third century, broadly defined.

When we look at the substance of Trypho’s knowledge of Aggadic material there is very little to record. His distance from rabbinic teaching is confirmed by his lack of attention to and interest in this area. Perhaps, Justin could not imbue Trypho with rabbinic characteristics because he was unfamiliar with this body of teaching. Nevertheless, he does seem to know something about the teachings of the Jewish teachers. Justin could have increased his apologetic effectiveness with such a disputant. But it appears that he did not even try to do
this. Moreover, it is anachronistic to expect Trypho to know more than he does about rabbinic teaching.\textsuperscript{212}

Judging from the \textit{Dialogue}, there is certainly not enough evidence to support the conclusion that Trypho was rabbinic, or even that he was acquainted with that particular body of knowledge. Justin certainly appears to know more about these teachers than Trypho. However, this is no strike against his authenticity. In fact, it is a vote of support for his authenticity. Showing that Trypho did not participate in the rabbinic milieu does not mean that he was less Jewish. The next section will explore those particular areas where Trypho shows himself to be a loyal adherent of Judaism.

\textbf{CONCLUSION}

In each of the preceding sections different aspects of Trypho’s character and his arguments have been examined. There is not a wealth of evidence with which to build a full picture and what information we have comes through Justin and his apologetic agenda. Yet despite these barriers a surprisingly unified character of Trypho emerges. By focusing only on Trypho, it is possible to see at least an outline of his character in spite of Justin’s apologetic agenda. The first three sections showed that Trypho displays a sensitivity and commitment to philosophical styles of debate and intellectual investigation. The depiction of Trypho’s companions as fellow philosophers and students also supports the philosophical tone of the group. Moreover, Trypho’s style is not placid and there are a few moments where there is a hint of sarcasm which probably survived
because the sarcasm was misinterpreted or left in to show the 'unappealing' character of Trypho. Trypho also actively engages with Justin. This is most clearly seen in Trypho’s objection to Abraham’s inclusion as one of the righteous before the Law based on his circumcision forces which forces Justin to remove this central patriarchal figure from his scheme.

Trypho’s connection to Judaism does not show a strong attachment to the rabbinic written tradition as we know it. But during the second century C.E. this is not a surprising phenomenon and it should not compromise Trypho’s standing as a legitimate Jew. In fact, if he were to display an insider’s knowledge alongside his other characteristics, this might compromise our belief in his authenticity because it would be possible to assume that Justin imposed this knowledge onto the character.

His distance from Jewish academic circles is reinforced by Justin’s depiction of the Jewish teachers. This group of learned Jews is probably the true foe behind the Dialogue and Justin does not count Trypho as one of them. His tactic is to try to drive a wedge between these teachers and Trypho. It is the Jewish teachers, Justin thinks, who are standing between Trypho and conversion to Christianity. His reasoning is that if he can discredit these teachers then the path will be cleared for Trypho and other Jews. Justin does appear, however, to have anticipated Trypho’s loose attachment to the teachers. This might account for the confusion that exists between them and why Trypho can make so many exegetical concessions to Justin’s argument and yet leave unconvinced and unconverted.
At this point, it will be useful to take Justin's depiction of Trypho and compare it to what we know of Judaism during this time. It is in this comparison that we can begin to make judgements about whether Trypho fits with what we know of Jews during this time or if Justin's depiction is either an amalgam or a stereotype. Hopefully, the previous chapter has shown that Trypho's depiction points away from such a conclusion, but if we can see this figure in his Jewish context, his authenticity and verisimilitude will be increased. Indeed, the following chapter hopes to show that there are a few striking points of contact between Trypho and Judaism in Asia Minor which do not appear to have been fabricated by Justin.
CHAPTER 6

TRYPHO AND SCRIPTURE

This chapter is an attempt to evaluate Trypho’s attitude toward scripture and exegesis. It is similar to the previous chapter in its effort to examine Justin’s depiction of Trypho, but I am treating this particular topic in a separate chapter because of its complexity and importance. This issue, however, is not easy to assess because the premise of the Dialogue is not an examination of Trypho’s religious value system. It is not even an examination of Judaism per se. Yet, despite these barriers, it is possible to look at how Trypho uses scriptural quotes and references in the course of the debate. This can, I believe, give us some additional insight into Trypho’s character. In chapter four, Trypho’s style of argumentation and his criticism of Justin’s methods were highlighted. His proximity to Socratic modes of argumentation and his own training and attraction to philosophy were established. It is also evident that Trypho does not exhibit any in-depth knowledge of early rabbinic teaching. This does not necessarily mean that Trypho had no contact or knowledge of this body of teaching, but this particular depiction provides no support that he did. But does this mean that Trypho is portrayed as indifferent to Judaism or neglectful of it? Does Trypho’s attention to logic, reason, and methodology mean that he is unconcerned with scripture or exegetical matters? It would be misleading to draw a dichotomous line between reason and exegesis. There are different aspects to Trypho’s attitudes toward scripture that are expressed in various ways under different circumstances. I have found it productive to assess Trypho on a continuum of
priorities regarding scripture. Scripture is important to Trypho, but not in the way it is important to Justin. Following my methodology, I will not deal with what Justin says about Trypho’s beliefs and loyalties. Instead, I will use Trypho’s reported words and questions in order to get one step closer to this figure and avoid Justin’s commentary. In this first section, these questions are explored from two angles: 1) Trypho’s use of scripture is examined for what it can tell us about his attitude toward the precepts of the Mosaic Law and the authority of scripture in general. Even though Trypho’s predominant style of argumentation is the application of reason and logic, there are times when Trypho uses scriptural quotes and allusions in a competitive manner. It becomes evident that Trypho uses scripture mainly to assert the importance of the Mosaic Law. Beyond that, Trypho sometimes uses scripture to contend with Justin’s messianic assertion. 2) The next step is to explore how Trypho reacts to the more detailed exegetical arguments put forward by Justin. This helps us judge more precisely how Trypho responds when there are exegetical issues at stake, as well as how he uses scripture to combat or refute Justin’s messianic claims. While there are some instances where Trypho uses exegesis to counter Justin’s assertions, they are relatively few compared to Trypho’s use of reason and logic. But on a more complex level, Trypho’s religious assumptions about the shape of the messiah and the very nature of God are probably based on a complex combination of scripture, teaching, and inherited tradition. It is this Jewish Grundlage which allows him to assert his logic at all. This interplay between reason and religious belief can be seen in other instances as well, especially in the discussion of messiah (Dial. 49-68), but a
simple example can be seen early in the *Dialogue*. Here, Trypho imposes a simple logical argument against the messiahship of Jesus: Elijah must come before the messiah, but since Elijah has not come, Jesus cannot be the messiah (*Dial. 8.4*). Trypho’s belief that Elijah must come before the messiah is perhaps based on scripture (*Mal. 4.4*), but Trypho does not make any reference to a particular passage. Instead, this belief is probably one part of his overall understanding of how the messiah will be revealed and become the anointed one. Trypho starts with this working assumption and then uses this base of understanding to assert that Justin’s messianic assertion is illogical. This kind of interplay is complex and difficult to map, but it adds an element of authenticity to Trypho’s character.

**TRYPHO’S QUOTES AND ALLUSIONS TO SCRIPTURE**

There are a few places where Trypho expresses a deep respect for scripture. At one point, Trypho tells Justin that “We would not tolerate your words if you did not refer everything to scripture” (*Dial. 56.16*). After one of Justin’s expositions on the coming of the messiah, Trypho affirms that “these and similar passages of scripture [perhaps not mentioned by Justin] compel us to wait for one who is…” (*Dial. 32.1*). At another point, Trypho accuses Justin of blasphemy, while he affirms that God’s words are holy (*Dial. 79.1*). For Trypho, scripture should not be taken lightly. After Justin accuses him again of asking too many questions or making gratuitous challenges, Trypho responds: “Consider, dear Sir, that you have been able to acquire this with much trouble and toil. So we too must try and test all these matters (*βασανισάντας παντα τὰ*...”
καὶ ἀκούεις) and thus assent to what the Scriptures compel us
(ἀναγκάζοντας) (Dial. 68.2 trans. A.L. Williams).

Even if the volume of his scriptural references is relatively small, Trypho
uses scripture throughout the Dialogue for a variety of purposes. The following
table shows where Trypho refers to scripture.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIRECT QUOTES OF SCRIPTURE</th>
<th>ALLUSIONS TO SCRIPTURE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Dial. 27.1 quotes Is. 58:13-14 on the importance of the Sabbath</td>
<td>1) Dial. 8.4 You are better off doing everything written in the Law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Dial. 65 quotes Is. 42:8 against the possibility of another God</td>
<td>2) Dial. 10.2 allusion to Gen 17:14? stresses importance of circumcision</td>
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<tr>
<td>3) Dial. 67.1 quotes Is. 7:14 against virgin birth and for Hezekiah</td>
<td>3) Dial. 49.1 possible allusion to Mal. 4:4 that Elijah must proceed the messiah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Dial. 87. 1-2 quotes Is. 11:1-3a on the problem of Jesus’ baptism</td>
<td>4) Dial. 57.1 alludes to Gen. 18:8 that the messengers ate with Abraham</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Dial. 89. alludes to Deut. 21:23 and the curse of crucifixion</td>
<td>5) Dial. 89. alludes to Deut. 21:23 and the curse of crucifixion</td>
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<tr>
<td>6) Dial. 90.1 alludes to the same curse because Justin did not address it in 89</td>
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I have divided them into quotes – where he recites a brief passage of
scripture – and references – where an allusion is made to a particular piece of
scripture even if it is not quoted. I have restricted this only to those instances
where he alludes to a particular passage. I have not, therefore, included those
possible references to Jewish teaching (see above) which may be based on
scripture, but are better classed with teaching. I have also left out those statements or beliefs made by Trypho which appear to be foundational beliefs about God and the messiah. These beliefs may ultimately be based on scripture but it is impossible to know the exact source. Because this issue is more complex, Trypho’s theological suppositions – especially in regard to the question of the messiah – will be addressed in the latter half of this chapter.

It is interesting to note that whenever Trypho quotes scripture, it comes from Isaiah. This might be because Trypho knows Isaiah, but it should be remembered that only two of the passages (Dial. 27 and 65) come from Trypho first. The other passages are quoted by Justin before Trypho repeats them (see chapter 2). If these quotes are discounted because of this possibility, then we are left with only two direct quotes in which Trypho counters Justin’s interpretation of scripture with an opposing quote. At Dial 27, he uses Is. 58:13-14 to reinforce the importance of adhering to the Law. And at Dial. 65 Trypho offers Is. 42:8 as proof that God will not share his glory.

Chapter 65 of the Dialogue is an interesting illustration of Trypho using scripture to refute Justin’s argument. The main argument of chapter 65 serves no other purpose than to show Trypho caught out in his attempt to defeat Justin with scripture. Trypho quotes Scripture against Justin – I am the Lord God; this is my name; my glory will I not give to another, nor my virtues (Is. 42:8) – only to be caught out because Trypho gives his interpretation based only on that part of the verse. Justin counters by quoting a larger portion of the passage (Is. 42: 5-13), giving it a particularly Christian reading. Trypho does not respond to Justin and
ends the chapter by asking him to get on with the rest of the argument and the theme of the preceding chapter is picked up again. It is reasonable to expect Justin to report every mistake Trypho makes; it would serve his apologetic aims well. It is striking, therefore, that there is only one recorded episode of Trypho making such an obvious mistake. By and large Trypho’s technique of argumentation does not rely on exegesis. At least in this instance, Trypho does not have much success quoting scripture, but this need not worry us. Trypho’s goal is not to prove the Jewish case or even defend Judaism against Justin’s interpretation. He is not attempting to make an argument at all. The Dialogue is not, as is sometimes assumed, a battle of ideologies. It is one person’s vigorous defense of his Christian beliefs against another person’s critique. Judaism, at least from Trypho’s perspective, is not competing with Christianity.

In proportion to the other tactics used to refute Justin’s argument, the use of direct quotes does not occur often. Trypho uses allusions to scriptural passages much more often. And in fact, this kind of occurrence would appear to be more natural under such circumstances, especially since Trypho did not have the luxury of later editing.

Overall, the majority of biblical allusions refer to the practice of the Law (Dial. 8.1 and 10.2) or the curse of crucifixion (Dial. 32.1; 89.1; and 90.1). In several places Trypho refers to the fact that Jesus was crucified (Dial. 10.2; 38.1; 39.7). But in a few passages, he emphasizes the curse that falls on those who are crucified: “But your so-called Christ is without honour and glory, because he has fallen into the worst possible curse (ἐσχάτη κατάρα) in the Law of God (Deut.
fallen into the worst possible curse (ἐσχάτη κατάρα) in the Law of God (Deut. 21:23), for he was crucified” (Dial. 32.1). But instead of addressing this issue, Justin tries to refute the charge by providing Scriptural support for a suffering messiah. He does not address the problem of curse. Later in the Dialogue however, it becomes apparent – to the reader at least – that for Trypho suffering is one thing, crucifixion quite another. Justin did not understand this at chapter 32 and continues the confusion at chapter 89 where the problem is raised again. Trypho grants almost all of Justin's messianic descriptions, but at the crucifixion he stands firm and unconvinced.

We are in doubt about whether Christ should be shamefully crucified. For whoever is crucified is said in the Law to be accursed, so I am still incredulous (δυσπείστως) of this assertion. It is quite clear indeed that Christ had to suffer, but we wish to learn if you can prove that it was by the suffering cursed in the Law. (Dial. 89.2)

Even after this clear request for clarification, Justin only speaks to the prophetic necessity of the messiah's suffering, not crucifixion. Trypho reiterates his concern in the next chapter. “We know that he should suffer and be led as a sheep. But prove to us whether he must be crucified and die so disgracefully and so dishonorably by the death cursed in the Law. We are not able even to suppose such an idea as this" (Dial. 90.1). It is at this point that Justin launches into one of his more creative exegetical blocks on the symbolism of the cross in the Hebrew Scriptures, mainly relying on his explanation of the healing powers of the serpent raised on a standard by Moses. Here, Justin gives an extended Christian midrash (Dial. 91-97) on wood and the shape of the cross. This precedes the inserted
homily on Psalm 22 (*Dial.* 98-106) discussed earlier. These two sets of chapters (*Dial.* 91-97 and 98-106) are not included in the reconstructed Trypho Text. This is a particularly telling interpolation since Justin, more than once, misses Trypho’s point about the curse of the Law. After this confusion, he unleashes a stream of proof texts on the symbolism of the cross. This kind of exposition comes abruptly and the shift in tone, style, and form is striking. It is an unnatural shift from confusion to clarity and uninterrupted explanation. If Justin knew so much about the significance of the cross and could address the curse of the crucifixion at the time of the exchange, why does he appear to misunderstand Trypho’s comment? Why allow Trypho to make him appear mistaken or caught in his own confusion? This kind of phenomenon forces us to look outside Justin’s apologetic agenda for reasons why this exchange is in the text at all. These sections were probably later additions by Justin intended to address the questions raised by Trypho, but not adequately addressed in the Trypho Text.

The crux of Trypho’s objection is that crucifixion is accursed by the Law. That the messiah should be in any way contrary to the Law is unthinkable to him. It is the authority of the Law and its unambiguous stance on crucifixion that holds Trypho from conceding this point. Other points, such as suffering and glory are not really an issue for Trypho and he never brings this up as a problem, but crucifixion is out the question. Although we can assume that Justin thought his audience would have seen the connection between crucifixion and suffering, Trypho does not. After Justin’s unsatisfying answer, Trypho does not pursue it further but neither does he accept Justin’s explanation. Since chapters 91-97
(which form a detailed exposition of the symbolism of the cross) are not included in the hypothetical Trypho Text the question is left open and unresolved.

Trypho’s immovability on the issue of the crucifixion is understandable in this light and stands in stark contrast to his flexibility on other issues, especially surrounding the more speculative elements of Justin’s argument.

This concern for the Law is supported by other comments and questions which have less to do with direct quotes of scripture and more to do with his underlying commitment to the Law. His loyalty to the Law is apparent from the beginning of the Dialogue. Immediately after Justin shows his cards and reveals himself to be a Christian, Trypho offers his opinion of the matter. “If you are willing to listen to me – for I have already counted you as a friend – first be circumcised then observe the Sabbath, all the feasts, and the new moons of God. In a word, do all things which have been written in the law and then perhaps you will gain mercy (ἐξεος) from God” (Dial.8.4). This passage has already been used as an illustration of Trypho’s use of rhetoric, but it is also appropriate to use it to illustrate Trypho’s belief in the efficacy of the Law. It is not necessarily a call to conversion, but it is an affirmation that, for Trypho, mercy from God is directly linked to the adherence to the Law. It is not a cultural option that can be adopted or rejected without consequence. Two chapters later, Trypho again makes this connection over and against the paradoxical claims of Christians.

But this is what we are most at a loss about: Professing to be pious and supposing yourselves better than others, you are not in any way separated from them. You do not alter your way of life from that of the nations because you observe no festivals or Sabbaths, and do not have the rite of
festivals or Sabbaths, and do not have the rite of circumcision. Furthermore, resting your hopes on a man who was crucified, you still expect to obtain something good from God, even though you do not obey His commandments... But rashly despising the covenant you reject the consequent duties and attempt to persuade yourselves that you know God when you perform none of those things which are done by those who fear God (φοβούμενοι τον θεόν). (Dial. 10.3.4)

To Justin’s assertion that Jewish practices have been replaced by Christian rituals, Trypho asks: “Why do you select and quote whatever you wish from the prophetic writings, but do not refer to those which expressly command the Sabbath to be observed?” (Dial. 27.1). Justin does not answer Trypho’s question about his neglect of these Jewish passages. Instead, he moves into a discourse on the reason the Law was given in the first place (Dial. 27.4). The Law is not simply a matter of harmless custom as Justin portrays it. It is central in Trypho’s thought.

Later, Trypho asks for clarification from Justin concerning adherence to the Mosaic Law and the resurrection of the dead. Justin explains two out of his three categories of the Law. To this Trypho asks, “Tell me then, will those who lived according to the Law given by Moses live in the same manner with Jacob, Enoch, and Noah, in the resurrection of the dead or not? (Dial. 45.2)” This question reflects a concern for the ultimate function of the Mosaic Law. He is pushing Justin to state whether he thinks the Mosaic Law is ungodly or useless. Instead, Justin shows himself to be accommodating toward the practice of the Law. After all, Justin believed that the Law contained those things which were by nature “good and pious, and righteous (φύσει καλὰ καὶ εὐσεβὴ καὶ ...
nature "good and pious, and righteous (φύσει καλὰ καὶ ἔθεσθη καὶ δικαίως") (Dial. 45.3), as well as the mysteries of Christ (Dial. 44.2). Therefore, Jews who followed the Law could be likened to those gentiles whom Justin sees as Christian – Socrates and Heraclitus (I Ap. 46.1-4). Like these pre-Christian Christians, Justin assures Trypho that those law-abiding Jews who lived before Jesus and performed acts that were "universally, naturally, and eternally good and are pleasing to God...through this Christ they will be saved (σωθῆσονται) at the resurrection just like those righteous men who came before them" (Dial. 45.4). Justin seems to be referring to Jews of the past, not contemporary Jews like Trypho. He is trying to strike a delicate balance between affirming the inherent goodness of the Law and asserting that salvation is totally dependent on Christ. He does this by weaving Christ into the Mosaic Law. Those Jews who followed the Law before Christ were not aware that they were performing these mysteries or universally righteous acts, yet in the end they will be saved because of them. Those Jews, however, who live after Christ do not have this option. In the next chapter (Dial. 46) Justin goes on to affirm the practice of the Law as long as it is not central to faith and for salvation. What is noteworthy in this case is not so much Justin’s view of the Law as much as Trypho’s apparent concern for the practice of the Law and where it stands in the economy of God’s plan, or at least Justin’s explanation of God’s plan. We can also see this concern for the Law in Trypho’s opening statements at Dial. 8.3-4 and 10.2 where Trypho urges Justin to follow the precepts of the Law. The Law is better than what Christians do now which seems nonsensical to Trypho (also Dial. 19.1).
Justin’s accommodating stance toward the practice of the Law would have been irrelevant for a Diaspora Jew who did not revere the Law. Why would Justin allow something which had already been marginalized? If Justin thought that Trypho was not observant of the Law his argument for the spiritual interpretation of the Law would have been easier and he could have pointed to Trypho’s – or any other Jew’s – desertion of the Law. This is not the case. Justin’s lenient stance on the practice of the Law only makes sense if he thought he was speaking to a person who saw adherence to Jewish practice as important and vital for his self-identity. Justin says that Trypho can be a Christian and continue to obey the Jewish Law as long as it does not become the central focus of his hope for the future and has no role in salvation (Dial. 46.2). It could be that Justin, as in other places, is misjudging Trypho and his allegiance to the Law. But even after Justin makes allowances for Jews to maintain their practices within Christianity, Trypho is not convinced. He will not accept the premise that the Law is an empty ritual that could be kept despite a change in faith. The offer is left untouched and when Justin is finished with his answer, Trypho asks him to “pick up your argument where it stopped and finish it (περατω)” (Dial. 48.1). The subject is not brought up again.

This does not appear to be the voice of an eager listener who is walking down the path of Justin’s argument. Trypho is nearly half-way through the Dialogue and he is already expressing discontent and impatience with Justin’s agenda. If Trypho thought it was a possibility to adhere to the Law as a mere cultural convention and if he expressed further interest, it would have served
Justin well to record this. The silence, however, speaks more to Trypho’s rejection of Justin’s offer, not his acceptance of it. Trypho does not share Justin’s opinion about the mutually exclusive relationship between the Law and Christ. He also does not think that adherence to the Law is a cultic accoutrement; it was a matter of allegiance and ethnic integrity based on his understanding of the Mosaic Law and its place within Judaism.

**THE QUESTIONABLE MESSIAH**

The thread which keeps Trypho in the dialogue once he discovers that Justin is a Christian is a question which embodies his chief reservation about the Christian claim. Simply put: Trypho is not convinced that Jesus is the messiah. This is not immediately apparent from the text because on the surface it appears that the difference between them revolves around the shape of the messiah. Justin and Trypho do discuss the characteristics of the messiah, but this is not as important to Trypho as it is to Justin. For Justin, the weight of the argument swings on this definition. Trypho is less concerned with particular messianic definitions and more interested in whether Jesus matches any of the criteria, whether Justin’s or his own.

This basic difference stems from Trypho’s request for proof that Jesus can be considered a messiah (*Dial.* 8.4; 36.1; 39.7; 57.4; 63.1; 77.1; 89.2; 90.1). What is the function of these instances where Trypho asks to have this proved to him? It could be argued that Justin put these questions into his mouth to keep the dialogue moving along and that Trypho’s question merely aided Justin’s argument and was
vital to it. But this line of thinking ignores the fact that Trypho asks the same basic question not because it functioned to move the discussion through Justin’s argument, but because Justin did not give him an answer to his question about Jesus. The wording and angle of the question changes as the dialogue progresses, but it does not go away.

What Trypho wants from Justin is proof that the person of Jesus matches the profile of a messiah. Early on Trypho states, amid the laughter of his friends, that he thinks Christians have invented a messiah for themselves and are suffering needlessly because of it. As Justin develops his argument, the subject matter shifts but the basic objection stays unchanged (See Appendix IV).

There are several examples in the Dialogue where Trypho appears to concede Justin’s concept of the messiah (Dial. 36.1; 39.7; 57.1; 63.1; 65.7) It is these instances which are sometimes used to discount Trypho and minimize his involvement in the Dialogue. But if Trypho’s question is understood, then his concessions are no longer concessionary. Instead, they are rhetorical and strategic. In two of the cases, there is no concession at all.

While Justin appears frustrated with Trypho’s persistence, many times he agrees that Trypho’s question has been unanswered and promises to deal with it at a later point. Trypho tells Justin:

Granted, let all these things be just as you say: that the messiah was prophesied to be liable to suffering, that he had been called a stone, and that after his first advent (in which it had been announced that he was to appear in suffering) he would return and act as judge of everything and be an everlasting priest and king. If this man [Jesus] is the one
about whom these prophecies were made, prove it (αποδείξων) (Dial. 36.1).

Justin replies:

As you wish Trypho, I shall come (ἐλεύσομαι) to these proofs which you seek at the proper place (ἐν τῷ ἄρμόζοντι τόπῳ). But now you will allow me first to recall (ἐπιμνησθήσατι) the prophecies, which I wish to do in order to show (ἐπιδείξων) that Christ is called both God and Lord of hosts, and Jacob in the parable by the Holy Spirit. (Dial. 36.2)

It is understandable that Justin would ask for patience so early in the Dialogue, but as mentioned above, Justin has misunderstood Trypho’s initial question at 32.1 where he asks how the messiah could have been crucified. Justin does not address the issue of crucifixion, instead he discusses whether the messiah would suffer. In light of this, Trypho’s statement at chapter 36 is technically not a concession because Trypho has not raised an objection to a suffering messiah. His problem is with a crucified and therefore cursed messiah, not a suffering one.

Nevertheless, Justin continues his argument by showing that there will be a return in glory (Dial. 36-39). After this barrage of scripture, Trypho tries to get back to his initial point:

Now then give us good reasons why he, who you say was crucified and ascended into heaven, is the messiah of God. It is said in the scriptures that he is liable to suffering and will come again in glory (μετὰ δόξης) and receive (λήψεσθαι) the eternal kingdom over all the nations – every kingdom being placed under subjection to him. This you have shown sufficiently by means of the Scriptures you mentioned earlier: now show us that this man is he (Dial. 39.7).

Even though Justin says that he has already proven this point, it is not until
chapters 91-97 (non-Trypho material) where the crucifixion is addressed. Justin has conflated suffering and crucifixion and cannot understand Trypho’s persistence on this issue. One begins to get a sense of Justin’s budding, if not misplaced, frustration with Trypho when he replies:

"Gentlemen, it has already been shown to those with ears, and from the facts which have been agreed upon (ὁμολογούμενων) by you. But so that you might not think I am at a loss and unable to prove (ἀποδείξεις ποιεῖσθαι) what you ask as I promised, I shall do so at the right moment. For now, I am still working toward the nexus of the argument I was making (ἐπὶ τὴν συνάφειαν ὃν ἐποιούμην λόγων ἀποτρέχω) (Dial. 39.8)."

At this point, Justin seems to be confused as to whether he has already proved his point or whether he will prove it later. Trypho’s question is again put off – both with promise of future attention and the assurance that his argument has already been proved. Nevertheless, Justin goes back to his typological discussion of the Mosaic Law and we pass out of the Trypho Text.

There is a shift in the focus of the discussion at Dial. 48.1. Here, Justin and Trypho begin a more rigorous exchange concerning the nature of the messiah. This exchange lasts through Dial. 68. And although crucifixion is linked to Trypho’s suspicion surrounding Jesus, it is not mentioned in this group of chapters. Nevertheless, Trypho brings up several other objections in the course of this section. In three instances, he uses scripture to contend with Justin’s assertions.

The absence of Elijah, which was one of Trypho’s first criticisms, is brought up again at Dial. 49. Trypho himself is clear about his criteria for the
brought up again at Dial. 49. Trypho himself is clear about his criteria for the
messiah: “For all Jews accept that the Christ will be of merely human origin and
that Elijah will come and anoint him” (Dial. 49.1 see also 8.4 quoted earlier). For
Trypho, the issue is simple and logical: “from the circumstance that Elijah has not
yet come, I infer (ἀποφαίνωμαι) that this man is not he [the messiah]” (Dial.
49.2). To this, Justin asserts that there are two advents of Christ. The first was
announced by Elijah’s spirit through John the Baptist (Matt. 17:11-13). It is the
second advent that will be announced by Elijah in the flesh. John the Baptist is
not Elijah, he only carried his spirit. When Elijah does come in the flesh he will
trigger a series of apocalyptic events including the second coming of Christ and
the New Jerusalem.

For Justin, a movable spirit is essential and brings continuity to the Christ
event. He builds on the biblical account of the passing of the mantle from Moses
to Joshua: “Therefore while Moses was still among men, God drew from the
spirit that was in Moses and put it on Joshua. In the same way God was able to
cause [the spirit] of Elijah to come upon John” (Dial. 49.6). A christological
connection between Joshua and Jesus is made by Justin, but the main function of
this passage is to show that it is not the person of Elijah who will come to
announce the messiah’s first advent but rather the prophetic spirit that rested on
Elijah. For Justin, the movement of the Spirit of Prophecy works on several
levels. It allows him to assert that prophecy ceased in Israel from the moment of
Jesus’ baptism. For Justin, this coincided perfectly with John and his voice crying
in the wilderness (Dial. 51 using Isa. 40:1-17). It is this same Spirit that has now
come to rest on Christians (*Dial*. 8.2). But Justin’s idea of a movable spirit is problematic for Trypho: “This statement also seems to me paradoxical; namely, that the prophetic Spirit of God, who was in Elijah, was also in John [the baptist]” (*Dial*. 49.5). Even after Justin’s explanation Trypho is unmoved: “But all the words of prophecy you repeat are ambiguous (* ámbíβoλoś*), and have no force in proving what you wish to prove” (*Dial*. 51.1).

Later, Trypho picks up on another logical problem with Justin’s argument. Here Trypho detects the problem of baptizing a pre-existent Christ. How could the Spirit of God come to rest on Jesus if he was already equivalent with God? Even Justin must admit to Trypho that he has “inquired most discreetly and prudently. To be honest (* ámbíβoλoś* ἔχει), there does seem to be a difficulty” (*Dial*. 87.3). Justin asserts that “even at his birth he was in possession of his power” (*Dial*. 88.2) but the motivation for submitting to baptism was “not because he needed such things but for the sake of the human race” (*Dial*. 88.3). The exact reasons why the human race needed Jesus to receive this baptism is left unclear, but it can be assumed that it is linked with the passing of the Prophetic Spirit from Elijah to John to Christ and finally to Christians. Trypho seems to accept Justin’s messianic argument although nothing is said about the movable spirit. Predictably, his concession is made to allude to an earlier problem: the crucifixion (*Dial*. 89.2).

For Trypho, the assertion of a virgin birth is foolish, unoriginal, and unbiblical. At *Dial*. 67.1 he clusters together three arguments against Jesus as the
The passage is not ‘Behold the virgin (παρθένος) shall conceive and bear a son’, but ‘Behold the young woman (νεανίς) shall conceive and bear a son, and so on as you said. Further, the whole prophecy stands spoken of Hezekiah with respect to whom events [of his reign] are proved to have taken place in accordance with this prophecy. Furthermore, among the tales of those whom we call Greeks (Marcovich amends to: fables handed down from the Greeks) it is said that Perseus was born of Danae, still a virgin, by him that they entitle Zeus flowing down upon her in the form of gold. And in fact you [Christians] ought to be ashamed of saying the same sort of things as they, and should rather say that this Jesus was a man of human origin (ἄνθρωπον ἐξ ἄνθρωπων) and, if you can prove from the Scriptures that He is the Christ, that because of His perfect life under the Law He was deemed worthy to be chosen (πολιτείασθαι αὐτῶν κατηχοῦσθαι) to be Christ. And do not dare to assert marvel (τερατολογεῖν), that you not be convicted of talking folly (μωροίνειν) like the Greeks. (Dial. 67.2 trans. A.L.Williams)

This passage gives us some insight into exactly what Trypho finds so disagreeable with Justin’s argument. It is not the idea of a messiah that is repugnant, rather it is a messiah who is similar to the Greek myths. Trypho’s parallel elicits laughter from the others. Justin then delivers a rebuttal in which he scolds them for laughing or jeering (γελοιάζωντες ἢ ἐπιτιθάζωντες) (Dial. 67.3) at his assertion. Justin then promises to turn their ridicule on its head.216

Earlier it was mentioned that Trypho is far more open to an adoptionistic understanding of Jesus. It made more sense to Trypho and did not disturb his monotheism. Trypho even seems to know Christians who follow such a line of thinking. “Those who affirm him to have been a man and to have been anointed
by election, and then to have become Christ, appear to speak more convincingly
\(\textit{πιθανότερον}\) than you who hold these opinions you express” (\textit{Dial. 49.1}).

This appears to indicate that Trypho could have a positive understanding of Jesus and his teaching, as long as he is not called God. He could be comfortable viewing Jesus as a holy man who was vigilant and dedicated to the practice of the Law, but not as a divine messiah.

It is the issue of a divine messiah that makes up the core of these chapters. It is the one section of the dialogue which is concerned with exegesis, yet it is also the section of the \textit{Dialogue} where Trypho makes his most concessions. There are several examples where Trypho offers his understanding of a certain issue only to modify his opinion in the light of Justin’s exegetical interpretation. Trypho admits, in \textit{Dial. 56.9}, that he was wrong to believe that three angels visited Abraham at Mamre, but he is not convinced that one of them is other than God. In \textit{Dial. 56.10} Justin asserts that if he is unable to convince Trypho that one of the three is called both God and angel and that he “was God even before the world, then it would be fair for you to entertain the very same belief that is entertained by all of your people. ‘Certainly,’ Trypho said, ‘to this day we believe it. (\textit{εἴχομεν})” (\textit{Dial. 56.10}). Later, Trypho grants Justin’s argument that one of the three at Mamre was called God (\textit{Dial. 57.1-4}), but continues to ask how this God was born of a virgin and became man.

Yet despite these concessions or allowances Trypho maintains his reservations and doubt that there can be another God, or that a messiah referred to
as God could ever be born as a human, immaculate or not. At one point, Trypho appears to make a nearly total concession to all of Justin’s exegetical argument:

Now it has already been shown that he who was seen by Abraham and was named ‘God’ and ‘Lord’ was the one who brought down onto Sodom the punishment given by the Lord in the heavens. But even if an angel happened to be with God when he appeared to Moses, we will not thus conclude that the same God who conversed with Moses from the bush is God the creator of all things (τὸν ποιητὴν τῶν ὀλίγων). Rather it is he who appeared to Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob and who is called an angel of God the creator of all things (τὸν τῶν ὀλίγων ποιητοῦ) and is known as such because he gives people messages (διαγγέλλειν) received from the Father and maker of everything (ποιητοῦ τῶν ἀπάντων) (Dial. 60.3).

But later, Trypho returns to his question of whether this God or Christ can become human (Dial. 68.1 and 87.1) and is still sceptical of the virgin birth and the crucifixion. Even with Justin’s argument proved, or at least admitted, Trypho continues to pursue his demand (Dial. 60.3). He is willing to abandon his idea that God was in the burning bush, at least for the moment, as long as Justin concerns himself with the issues of the virgin birth, crucifixion, and ascension (Dial. 63.1).

In a more general sense, Justin seems reluctant to discuss how the events of Jesus’ life coincide with the prophetic testimony. At one point, Trypho asks for proof that there could be another God and that this God could be born of a virgin. Justin replies: “Allow me first of all to quote certain passages from the prophecy of Isaiah, which speak of the office of the forerunner as discharged by John the Baptist and prophet before our Lord Jesus Christ (Dial. 50.2)”. Justin tries to
draw Trypho back into the prophetic texts. This is, however, the one place Trypho has little interest in going. By chapter 57, one begins to question whether Justin has any intention of answering Trypho’s question at all. Trypho again asks him to explain how “this God appeared to Abraham, and is minister to God the Maker of all things, being born of a virgin, and how he became a man with the same passions as ours, as you said previously (Dial. 57.3)”. Not surprisingly, Justin replies: “Permit me first, Trypho, to collect some other proofs on this topic for a while, so that you might be persuaded (πεπεμενόν) about this, then I will explain (προδώσω) what you are asking about” (Dial. 57.4).

In response to Justin’s assertion that Psalm 96 refers to Christ, Trypho maintains his scepticism but acknowledges that: “You, however, said that it is he who suffers, the one you are so zealously endeavoring (σπουδάζεις) to prove to be Christ” (Dial. 74.1). Viewing this comment through the eyes of one who has been put off so many times – 12 by this point – it takes on an understandably impatient quality. In these examples, we see Trypho interrupting the flow of the argument in a way that serves no literary end. His questions about Jesus have very little to do with Justin’s argument from prophecy. It simply gets in the way and slows things down. Justin promises to answer Trypho’s inquiry because he does not want Trypho and his friends to think that he cannot do it.

This confusion is due in large part to Justin’s pre-suppositions about the person of Jesus. They are presuppositions not shared by Trypho. Justin has entered the discussion assuming that Jesus is the messiah. For Justin it is only a
matter of finding those passages which define a messiah that resembles Jesus. The events and circumstances of Jesus' life — his birth, death, and resurrection — do not trouble him and do not need to be proved because he is already convinced he is the messiah. Trypho has not entered the discussion with that assumption, so Justin's LXX proof texts ring hollow in Trypho's ears and Justin is repeatedly confused by Trypho's persistent requests to have this proved to him. He simply cannot understand why Trypho is asking for information about the person of Jesus when he has not first been convinced by the exegetical argument. Trypho does not allow Justin to beg the question of Jesus' status and this creates disturbances in the text. Justin seems to believe that he has already dealt with this issue and he so interprets Trypho's challenges as proof that Trypho is either not paying attention, is thick-headed, or simply quarrelsome.

In fact, the few references to Jesus in the Trypho Text are sometimes problematic for Justin. It is not until chapter 67 that Justin allows the discussion to turn to the life of Christ. It is a turn that puts Justin in a corner and sends him back into the Hebrew Scriptures and the patriarchs. Trypho is inquiring into Jesus' relationship to the Law. Justin is not interested in such speculation, but Trypho insists that

you admitted that he was both circumcised and observed the other precepts of the law appointed by Moses (διότι Μωυσέως διακατήχετα εφύλαξε). I replied, I have admitted it (Ωμολογησά) and I do admit it (Ωμολογώ). But I did not admit that in enduring these things he was made righteous because of them, rather he was completing the dispensation which his Father, the Maker of all things, Lord and God, wished him to complete. (Dial. 67.5-6)
After this comment Justin asks Trypho about the patriarchs and their relationship to the Law. Justin again defers to the will of God which is much safer ground for Justin and nothing more is said on the subject of Jesus and the Law.

This is not to say that Justin completely ignored material dealing with Christ or that he makes no reference to his life in the *Dialogue*. He does, but the references are scarce and concentrated in areas outside the Trypho Text. This may also help to explain why Trypho brings up the topic repeatedly. Chapters 98-106 encompass an extensive exegetical treatment of Psalm 22. In this section, Justin goes into detail about the life of Jesus and how it coincides with this Psalm. It is likely, therefore, to be an inserted Christian exposition dealing precisely with Trypho’s question.

It is clear that the amassing of prophetic texts about the nature of the messiah is of little interest to Trypho. This is not to say that Trypho is unconcerned with Justin’s exegesis. Rather, he is asking for Justin to make a connection between the person of Jesus and Justin’s description of the Christ. Justin’s description of the messiah is based on a series of scriptural texts, but this is not the center of Trypho’s concern. Trypho does have some exegetical concerns revolving around the Law and crucifixion (as outlined above) but when they are compared to his other concerns about reason, logic, and sound methodology they are secondary.

The analyses of Trypho’s rhetorical concessions reveal a distinct and strategic pattern of argumentation. There are many cases where he makes clear concessions to Justin’s argument, but all of these concessions are concerned with
concessions to Justin’s argument, but all of these concessions are concerned with the interpretation of prophecy and biblical events not Jewish practice or the basic beliefs in the Covenant and the centrality of the Mosaic Law. There is only one instance (Dial. 67) where Trypho seems to concede an important point to Justin without a follow-up question designed to redirect. In a rapid exchange between Justin and Trypho, Justin appears to be closing in on Trypho by asking him to admit a number of points that he has been arguing. Trypho is following his line and assenting to Justin’s assertions about the nature of the messiah and the righteousness of the patriarchs. He then asks; “Likewise I ask you again: Did God enjoin your fathers to present the offerings and sacrifices because He needed them, or because of the hardness of their hearts and their tendency to idolatry? The latter, he said, is what the scriptures compel us to agree.” (Dial. 67. 7-8).

In this apparent concession to one of Justin’s central themes about the Law, several factors should be taken into account. Firstly, it must be understood that Trypho was given only one viable choice. Certainly, Trypho would have not said that God was in need of sacrifices; that would have been a direct denial of Scripture, as he says. His only other choice is the latter. The admission may have been forced because of the choice that Trypho was given. But, it is equally possible that Trypho did in fact believe this to be true. Certainly, that is not the sole reason for the giving of the Law, but the relationship between sinfulness and the Law is not a completely Christian construction even though Christianity expanded and exploited the idea. For Christians, Jewish sinfulness provided a convenient way of explaining why God gave the Law when he ultimately intended
to reject it. But saying that the Law was intended to curb idolatry and increase righteousness may not have carried the anti-Judaic connotations it soon came to hold. It may not have been such a ‘Christian’ idea to Trypho (e.g. Amos 2:25 and Ezekiel 20:8) and we should not necessarily assume a defensive or protective attitude on his part. Nothing in his character shows him to be defensive or overly-protective of Judaism even if he is seen to be completely loyal to his faith.

Moreover, it may be important to make a distinction between the Jews at Sinai and Jews throughout history. We do not know whether Trypho believed that the Mosaic Law was meant to curb idolatrous tendencies in all Jews. He is certainly not depicted as having any of these tendencies. In the end it is difficult to know exactly what Trypho intended with this concession, but in this context, it does not appear to be far-reaching or damning.

**CONCLUSION**

All of these examples reveal a hierarchy of values. More than prophetic material or exegetical speculations on the messiah, Trypho sees reason and the Law as his central areas of concern. When given a choice, Trypho will usually take issue with Justin based on reason or the practice of the Law. *Dial* 35.1 is a good example of this hierarchy at work. In the two preceding chapters, Justin presents Trypho with a host of scriptural references which, Justin says, proves that Christ is spoken of, not Hezekiah or David (*Dial*. 33-34). He ends the argument with the claim that Christians do not practise idolatry, like the wives of Solomon (I Kings 11). Trypho has a choice at this stage. He could take up the bulk of the
last two chapters and contest Justin on his exegesis, offering alternative interpretations of the same passage, which would fit better into Justin's style of argumentation. Instead, he focuses on something much less scriptural and more practical; he points out that some Christians act like idol worshipers because "many of those who say they acknowledge Jesus and are called Christians eat things offered to idols and say they receive no harm in doing so" (Dial. 35.1).

This comment pulls Justin away from his exegetical offensive into a defense of what he considers to be normative Christianity. In this instance, Trypho, through his argumentation, steers the discussion away from exegesis to the practical side of Christianity. Here as elsewhere, Trypho is concerned to show the hypocrisy, inconsistency, and variation within Christianity. In this case, the effort is successful and Justin is temporarily put on the defensive and halts his exegetical progress. He returns to the topic at Dial. 36.2, but only by side-stepping another of Trypho's demands to prove that Jesus matches up with his messianic definition (Dial. 36.1).

At the beginning of this chapter, I first outlined Trypho's attitude to the Law by examining his use of scriptural quotes and indirect scriptural references. When we look back over those instances, it becomes apparent that when Trypho supports one of his arguments with a reference to or quote of scripture, he rarely concedes (Dial. 65 may be the silent exception). This is true for the curse of the crucifixion (ref. to Deut. 21:23), the virgin birth (Is. 7:14), the absence of Elijah (ref. to Mal. 4:4), the problem of baptizing a pre-existent messiah who is called God (Is. 11:1-3), and the necessity of observing the Sabbath (Is 58:13-14).
Trypho is not swayed from any of these objections. At those points where he appears to concede, his concessions function rhetorically to move Justin toward Trypho’s central concern. Moreover, Trypho’s acceptance of Justin’s argument may have been made easier because they were peripheral points. For example, in the case of Justin’s argument for a pre-existent one who is distinct from the ‘Maker of All Things’ and is called both Angel and Lord, perhaps Trypho is genuine in his acceptance of Justin’s argument (Dial. 60.3, 63.1, and 64.1) because Justin’s argument is based on scripture. At one point, Trypho tells Justin that the only reason he is putting up with these fanciful conclusions is because they are based on scripture (Dial. 56.16).

Looking back over Trypho’s attitude toward scripture, we do not see a two-dimensional picture. There are a number of dynamics and practices working simultaneously. This complexity may well be authentic and adds an interesting dimension to our picture of Trypho. Trypho’s respect for the words of scripture appear to be immovable. He is more flexible on issues of exegesis, especially when they are not central. Trypho, like anyone, carries religious assumptions that are more inherited than examined. He objects when these beliefs are disturbed, but he appears to be willing to allow for modification if he is satisfied by the substance of the argument. On other issues directly related to the words of scripture, especially the Law, there is no evidence that Trypho is persuaded by Justin’s arguments. If we measure Trypho’s interest and commitment to scripture and exegesis by his flexibility, then we can say that he is firmly committed to the authority of scripture, but he holds the more speculative world of exegesis and
messianic definitions more lightly. Like a good philosopher, he is open to explore
the nature of the divine and even modify his views in the face of sound
argumentation based on an authoritative text. For Trypho, scripture plays an
important part in this process, even if he does not use scripture as vociferously as
Justin. It must also be remembered that these more speculative issues are minor
ones for Trypho. The main issue concerning Jesus is never really discussed in the
Trypho Text.
CHAPTER 7

TRYPHO IN CONTEXT

The problem in describing a possible context for the figure of Trypho is complicated by the variety of evidence pertaining to Jewry throughout the empire. It would not be prudent or wise to try to describe Diaspora Judaism as if it were a single entity. The evidence is too broad and varied, and inevitably I would have to be extremely selective about what evidence to present. This composite profile would create a hybridized and ultimately skewed picture. Moreover, I am devoting only one chapter to examining Trypho’s context, therefore space is an issue. Under these circumstances, I have decided to limit my scope to the Jews of Asia Minor. My wish is not to pre-empt my conclusions by the choice of this region, but, at this point in scholarship, the Jews of Asia Minor Diaspora seems to present the most cohesive and detailed picture available of Diaspora Judaism in the second century C.E. Put simply, the comparison to this region is the most fruitful. Jewry in Egypt and Cyrenaica was all but wiped out by the revolts in 115 and 117 C.E. We know very little about Judaism in North Africa and Gaul during this time. Moreover there is nothing in the text that would link Trypho or Justin to either of these regions. By contrast, at least according to the tradition of the Dialogue, Trypho was in Ephesus at the time when the Dialogue took place.

My intention in this chapter is not to duplicate or attempt to exceed the thoroughness of scholars who specialize in this field. Instead, my aim is to touch on the salient aspects of Jewry in Asia Minor from the surrounding centuries which will help us interpret the second century C.E., since information about Jews
during this time is particularly scant compared to the adjacent centuries (which are themselves shadowy). This process of contextualization will ask: Does the image of Trypho in the Dialogue contradict any evidence we have? Does he fit with the picture of Asian Jews, does he advance it, or does his depiction in the Dialogue allow us to broaden our understanding of Asian Jews? In general, the depiction of Trypho does not conflict with our evidence of Judaism in Asia Minor. But Trypho is not confined by this evidence either. In some significant ways, the picture of Trypho brings greater clarity to our understanding of Asian Jewry. I have organized these characteristics into three categories: 1) how the picture of Trypho fits into the overall landscape, 2) how this picture may help define and sharpen some areas, and 3) how it may expand our knowledge of Judaism in this region.

ASIAN JEWRY BEFORE THE SECOND CENTURY C.E.

Before the second century C.E., our information comes almost exclusively from Josephus who wrote his Antiquities in the 80/90 C.E.. But even this information is general and could be read almost entirely within Josephus’ apologetic agenda. But this is simply the reality of reading history and should not distract us from the usefulness of Josephus’ account. The first mention of Asian Jewry in Josephus is his reproduction of a letter from Antiochus (223-187 BCE) asking his father to organize the relocation of two thousand Jewish families from Babylon and Mesopotamia to Phrygia and Lydia. (Ant. 12.148-153). Antiochus hopes that this group of faithful and obedient Jews will quell the unrest in that region. These obliged homesteaders are to be granted tax exemption for ten years
and allowed to practise their 'own laws'. This is touted by Josephus as proof positive that Antiochus was a friend of the Jews. As far as a forced exodus goes, the terms were quite favourable for the families who were to be moved.

Josephus focused his documentary evidence for Asian Jews in *Antiquities* Books 14 and 16 which refer to the 1st century B.C.E. These documents should be read with the understanding that Josephus was either very selective with these texts or that they were altered and improved in transmission.²¹⁸ Regardless of the details of these texts, it is clear that Josephus did not know – or did not record – very much about the Asian community on the ground. Josephus’ use of official documents does not appear to stem from a desire to inform his readers about the everyday life of Asian Jewry. Rather, he is concerned to show by these documents that Jews in this region have had friendly relations with the Romans. “Now there are many such decrees of the senate and imperators of the Romans… I cannot suppose anyone so perverse as to not believe the friendship we have had with the Romans…And thus we have sufficiently explained the friendship and confederacy we at those times had with the Romans” (*Ant.* 14.265,267). The accord is not, however, in effect with the entire population of the Roman world. Jews in this region appear to have had some difficulty on the local level.

Josephus’ material consistently touches on the financial difficulties of Jews in Asia. It appears that they continued to collect and transport significant sums of money (significant at least to non-Jews) to the Temple. It is easy to imagine that this loyalty may have been resented by non-Jews and that these Temple funds appeared to have been a ready target for theft. Cicero’s account of the trial of the
governor of Asia, in *Pro Flacco*, is a defence of Flaccus' decision to divert Temple funds into Roman coffers. While this account reflects what we might call white-collar crime, other evidence in Josephus points to the local vulnerability of the Jewish community in storing and delivering its Temple tax (*Ant.* 16.167-173, cf. Philo *Legatio* 311-15). This relationship is the subject of the speech by Nicholas of Damascus before Agrippa in Ionia in 14 BCE (*Ant.* 16.31-57). Nicholas argued that Jews have been insulted by their 'adversaries' who have forced tribute from them, taken their sacred money intended for the Temple, and called them to tribunals on holy days. Agrippa did, according to Josephus, intercede on their behalf. These instances could be read as indicators that local Jews struggled with their gentile neighbours, unsuccessfully. But, ironically, their appeals to Rome might have caused quite the opposite effect, further exacerbating the relationship on the local level by calling on the help of Rome. Outside the land of Israel, problems with non-Jews seem to have revolved around the freedom to observe Jewish customs in peace and have safe passage of the Temple tax to Jerusalem. These kinds of issues are completely reasonable for a diaspora community committed to the support of the Jewish Temple and its own particular religious expression.

For the first century C.E. we do not have the benefit of further information from Josephus. The main literary source is equally, if not exceedingly, problematic. *The Acts of the Apostles*’ theological agenda makes this a difficult document to interpret, but in general the message was that Jews did have a working relationship with the governing authorities and could pull political strings.
when necessary. It was a relationship which early Christians certainly did not enjoy.²¹⁹

During the first century, the institution of the fiscus Judaicus of 70 C.E. appears to be a watershed for how Jews and Judaism were defined, both from without and within.²²⁰ Barclay sees the two-fold criteria of the tax as an effort to flush out both those groups of non-Jews who dabbled in Jewish custom, for whatever reason, and those of Jewish descent regardless of their practice.²²¹ The Jewish tax probably had a significant impact on the perception of Judaism. Now all had to declare loyalties and stand behind their convictions; they had to put their money where their mouth was. It also meant that if someone paid the tax, they could be considered Jewish, as far as the empire was concerned. Ethnicity was an important element in the determination of the tax, but M. Goodman is correct to point out that it was the declaration of practice and loyalty after 96 C.E. which probably effected more change within Judaism.²²² While the destruction of the Temple may have been a devastating blow to the confidence of Jews, the rigorous and aggressive collection of the Jewish tax by Domitian probably did more to change the shape of Judaism from within.²²³ After all, this was not the first time that the Temple had been destroyed and there was every reason to believe that it would be rebuilt by the Roman government as part of war reparations. Part of Josephus’ apologetic aim can be seen in the light of this expectation.²²⁴ The Bar Kochba Revolt (133-135 C.E.), may have had a more devastating effect because it strained relations with Rome perhaps more than the revolt of 69-70 C.E.²²⁵

The education of Jews during this time is an area of increased interest in
recent scholarship. Scholars who have looked outside the boundaries of rabbinic ideals have opened up the issue of Jewish education and the larger question of the relationship between Hellenism and Judaism. Jewish literature during this time shows a breadth of knowledge of Greek myth and philosophy. Philo, Artapanus, Aristobulus, Ps. Aristeas, and Ezekiel the tragedian are all examples of learned Jews who wrote in Greek and dealt with Jewish themes. Barclay (1996, 125-180), sees this group as an example of 'cultural convergence' because they used Greek history and ideas to enhance their portrayal of Jewish history and philosophy. In essence, the message was: Greek philosophy, legislation, and education are the standard simply because their foundations are based on Jewish tradition. The distinctive nature of Judaism was always maintained, but it hung in a framework where Hellenism and Judaism were intimately intertwined. Gruen moves away from the idea of two converging cultures toward an environment where dissolves the boundaries between Hellenism and Jewishness completely. "'Judaism' and 'Hellenism' were neither competing systems nor incompatible concepts. It would be erroneous to assume that Hellenism entailed encroachment upon Jewish traditions and erosions of Jewish beliefs. Jews did not face a choice of either assimilation or resistance to Greek culture." These Jewish writers would have been important to other Jews who were interested in their intellectual and historical relationship to Hellenism. Perhaps this kind of intellectual investigation – History and Philosophy – was part of Jewish education. As we will see below, this picture of self-confident, learned Jewry expressing its Jewish identity in a Hellenistic fashion is embodied in the depiction of Trypho.
If one passes over into the third century C.E. one finds a significant increase in the amount of information, mostly archeological, on Judaism in this region. There appears to have been a considerable amount of integration and local co-operation between Jews and non-Jews. By the third century C.E. Jews were working in their local communities and bringing aspects of their culture into the public realm. The best example of this participation is a series of coins minted at Apamea. They appear to be an artistic effort to integrate two independent flood traditions into a single marketing strategy, intended to bring attention and acclaim to the town. As it was the supposed site of a great flood in ancient local legend it was hoped that the figure of Noah would bring attention and revenue to the city. Noah and his wife were chosen as the artistic logo for the coins. The series of five coins bearing the profile and inscription of five emperors – Septimus Severus (193-211), Macrinus (217-218), Severus Alexander (222-235), Phillip the Arab (244-249) and Trebonianus Gallus (251-253) – contain an amalgam of both Jewish and non-Jewish traditions. Quite literally, they are two sides of the same coin.

This interweaving of culture and tradition can be seen in the imagery of the coins. The second name of Apamea was Kibotos. Trebilco observes that Kibotos (κιβωτός) served to bridge the two traditions – both as a chest signifying wealth and commerce and Noah’s ark. On the coins, the chest is rectangular and square. Noah is depicted standing in the box as he approaches land. This single image serves to unite the two traditions quite creatively. Noah’s wife also figures
image serves to unite the two traditions quite creatively. Noah's wife also figures
prominently on the coin as a bridge to the parallel accounts in non-Jewish religion,
which had male and female characters.229 This kind of cooperation is an example
of Jewish integration into the community and Jewish pride in their own traditions.
Jews as much as non-Jews had a vested interest in the well-being of the city. If a
unique and artistic coin such as this could bring attention to the region and helped
to create an atmosphere of prosperity and tradition, then it was seen as positive.
If nothing else, non-Jews in Apamea and the surrounding areas did not think that
this link with Jewish symbols and legend was 'bad for business'. The fact that the
coins issued enjoyed a fairly long run supports the conclusion that even if this
kind of association was not duplicated in any other local mints we know of, it was
at least acceptable in this part of Asia Minor. Moreover, coins during this period
were not minted to honour or commemorate particular people or groups.
Therefore the Jewish imagery on the coins probably reflects a long-standing
amalgam that was recognized long before the coins appeared. They were probably
not even considered particularly Jewish by those in the region; they were simply
part of the local heritage. This points toward an assimilated Jewish community
whose imagery and traditions had worked themselves fully into its culture. This
process would have begun long before the 3rd century C.E.

The community and synagogue at Sardis also presents us with some
tantalizing information. Despite the claims made in the initial flush of scholarship
on this important find, it is now clear that the synagogue was probably not
revamped and converted for synagogue use until the fourth century C.E. Prior to
this it appears to have been used as a civic basilica. There is no distinct evidence that this space was used for Jewish worship until the fourth stage of remodelling (fourth century C.E.), but there is also nothing to prohibit the interpretation that it began its life as a synagogue in the late third century. The fact that the building was connected, via a doorway, to the palestra of the adjacent gymnasium points away from its suitability for a Jewish place of prayer. Somewhere around 270 C.E. this internal access was blocked and a remodelling took place. It still abutted the gymnasium, but access was no longer possible.

Early in the fourth century a fourth stage of alteration makes it clear that the building was then used as a synagogue. It was a building which maintained public space in the forecourt with a fountain in its centre. In the last stages of development there were shops built onto the south wall of the synagogue. This would have made the area even more public. From the position and type of shops found, there is reason to believe that Jews worked closely with their non-Jewish neighbors. But at this point we are quite a distance from the second century C.E. It is not appropriate to read this kind of interaction back into a period where the evidence is, at best, scarce. Nevertheless, Sardis does illustrate a local Jewish community in late antiquity which had a significant presence and progressed to the point of acquiring a centrally located building which they converted into a synagogue. Trebilco sees in Sardis an example of an influential, prominent, and flourishing community of Jews who had not lost their distinctiveness or self-identity as Jews. This is probably an overly-rosy picture of the Jews. But at least Trebilco is ready to admit that the Jews at Sardis are not representative of all
Jewish communities.

He contrasts Sardis to the Jewish community at Priene, which he characterizes as a struggling community in the shadow of Miletus. The extant synagogue was small and initially mistaken as a house church.\textsuperscript{232} The existence of a small Torah niche, a marble basin (perhaps for ablutions), and engravings of the menorah, lulab, ethrog, and shofar are the signs that establish this as a synagogue.\textsuperscript{233} But to infer from this scant archeological evidence that the Jewish community at Priene was struggling is suspect. The Jewish community may have been wealthy and well-established, we simply cannot know without more evidence. What it does show is that synagogues came in different sizes.

Integration between Jews and non-Jews is most strikingly apparent on the commemorative stele at Aphrodisias.\textsuperscript{234} This find has caused much excitement because of its seemingly clear language and implication. It lists the names of those involved in the funding and building of some kind of public institution in Aphrodisias, perhaps akin to a charity. It is not, however, the list of Jewish names and leaders which has caught the imagination of scholars. Most of the attention has focused on the group headings on the stele. There is a small group of proselytes, presumably of non-Jewish origin, but listed together with Jews, and there is also a separate and distinct group of around 52 men under the heading ‘such as are the God-fearers’.\textsuperscript{235} This group is somehow distinct from the rest of the group who appear to be members of some kind of Jewish association. It has been assumed by many scholars that this group of God-fearers are non-Jews. The God-fearers debate has served as a winnower’s fan for some, but the clarity of the
stele is not supported by other uses of this term in antiquity.\textsuperscript{236} It is impossible to know the exact relationship that these non-Jews had with the synagogue, but the stele does show that there existed a group of non-Jews who were honoured within the Jewish community for some reason. It is apparent that such relationships did exist. In this case they undertook to make this relationship public. While I am hesitant to over-emphasize the importance of these relationships, it is significant that in certain locations in Asia Minor, there were Jewish communities which appear to have established a \textit{modus vivendi} with the surrounding culture.

The reputation of Yahweh among non-Jews may also be an unusual aspect of Judaism in Asia Minor. There is a unique collection of grave formulae in Acmonia, some of which are not Jewish, which threaten any intruders with the "the curses which are written in Deuteronomy" (οἱ ἄροι ἡ γεγραμμέναι ἐν τῷ Δευτερονομίῳ).\textsuperscript{237} In addition to these explicit references to the text of Deuteronomy, there is another curse formula which occurs with significant regularity. There are eight inscriptions from Acmonia which contain a curse formula which was intended to be effective long after the recipient's death. It calls down the curse which will last until your children's children (τέκνων).\textsuperscript{238} The children's children formulae can be found in several places in the Hebrew Scriptures (Ex. 10:2; Joel 1:3; Jos. 22:24,27; Prov. 17:6), but it is in Exodus where the passage is used to curse someone else. There is some debate as to whether Jews used this curse as a form of magic\textsuperscript{239} or whether Jews using this formulae were aware of its meaning to them as Jews living in the Diaspora.\textsuperscript{240} If
Trebilco is right to read this curse as relating to Jewish life in the Diaspora, then the curse is an ironic twist back onto their present state of ‘exile’ or curse, which they are presumably living under at the moment. Trebilco sees a hortatory motivation behind the use of this curse, but it is a strange kind of moral exhortation because the curse has already befallen them. Trebilco’s interpretation of these curses is strained by the very medium in which they are delivered and does not take their function into account. Nor does he account for the non-Jewish usage which he thinks was simply because it was copied from Jewish graves. These curses, however, had a very practical purpose; to scare people from desecrating the graves they protected. Kraabel thinks that they are closer to the realm of magic than moral exhortation. Curses are not theological except insofar as they carry the fear and power of the deity, in this case Yahweh. This is the most striking phenomenon of these Acmonian curses. They were thought to be efficacious and were well enough known to be abbreviated. Abbreviations are only possible where there is common understanding. Thus, if a curse was familiar to many people – especially grave-robbers – then the entire passage from Deuteronomy did not need to be written out in full. Every letter on a gravestone cost money. The closest modern example of this kind of shorthand is R.I.P (Requiescat In Pace). Even more interesting is the fact that these curses appear to have been utilized by non-Jews. In the face of this cultural interaction, Strubbe questions the Jewish nature of the phrase [έις] τέκνα τέκνων itself. Strubbe sees these curses as independent of the LXX and concludes that they have a clear meaning on their own and could have been used by non-Jews with no reference to
the LXX. He points to occurrences of this phrase in ancient Greek epitaphs where 'children's children' simply connotes one's posterity. Strubbe's reading of this formula casts doubt on the conclusions we can draw about cultural interaction. Or it points to a level of interaction so distant and embedded that it has lost its explicitly Jewish meaning.

A stronger example of cultural interaction and non-Jewish respect for Jewish curses comes from a second century C.E. inscription by T. Flavius Amphilikes – an educated pagan known through his association with the Second Sophistic. It is derived from two Deuteronomic passages (Deut. 28:22,28): "God will strike [the person who tampers with this tomb] with poverty, with fever and cold shivers, irritation, blight, derangement, blindness, and distraction of mind (Τούτον τε θεός πατάξαι ἀπορία καὶ ρίγει καὶ ἐρεθισμῷ καὶ ἀναμοφθορία καὶ παραπληξία καὶ ἀσπασία καὶ ἐκστάσει διανοίας)."

In these examples, it is probable that Jewish curses were thought to be powerful both by Jews and non-Jews. It would have been nonsensical for Jews to use these curses if they thought they applied only to other Jews, or if they were not known to be respected by non-Jews. There is no compelling evidence to show that Jews were buried in separate graveyards. The fact that an educated Roman citizen considered the Deuteronomic curse to be powerful enough to place on a gravestone might point to an acceptance of these curses as effective and threatening outside the Jewish community. More importantly, we might conclude that the
God who stood behind these curses was thought to be powerful and sufficiently threatening. If the Jewish God was considered to be intimidating and vengeful by non-Jews it would be another example of Jewish symbols and ideas being accepted by non-Jews in Asia Minor. It also stands apart in the frequency of the Deuteronomic curses in Acmonia. The reputation of these curses seems to have been positive in this area, so much so that non-Jews felt confident using this formula on their own gravestones.

While there are certainly gaps in the centuries leading up to the third and fourth centuries of the common era, it is possible to draw a tentative line of trajectory from the pre-common era to at least the late third century C.E. This trajectory only helps to provide a framework for the sparse data available to us. But if we assess the strength of Judaism based on political involvement, incorporation into the wider culture, influence on non-Jews, land development, and size of worship space, then we can make a tentative trajectory in an upward direction. In general terms, which are almost all that can be used given the sources, the Jewish community in the Asian Diaspora was not an area which received a great deal of attention from the Romans. It was never involved in a major revolt of any kind as far as we know. Even during the revolts of 66-70 C.E. and 133-135 C.E. in Judea, and the 115-117 C.E. revolts in Egypt and Cyrenaica, Asian Jews do not appear to have felt any direct reverberations. There are not many ways to differentiate Diaspora Judaism within each region, but the absence of unrest and conflict may have been one way that the Asian Diaspora stood apart.

There is little reason to believe that the influence of the tannaim extended
much beyond the land of Israel in the second and third centuries C.E.. The Jews of Asia Minor have been sometimes been discounted by the criteria of rabbinic standards. Feldman is quite dismissive of Jewish learning in this region.

“Judaism of Asia Minor was hardly learned and the Jews there, like those in Egypt, had relatively few contacts with Palestinian Judaism.” Feldman reaches this conclusion from the following factors: 1) There was no Torah Academy in Asia Minor, 2) not a single student [presumably a ‘rabbinic student’] is known to have come from Asia Minor to the academies in either Palestine or Babylonia, and 3) when Rabbi Meir traveled to this region, it is said that there was not a copy of Esther in Hebrew to be found, so he copied it out from memory. Feldman’s conclusion that Jews in Asia Minor were unlearned, reveals a very narrow definition of learned. While all three of his factors may be true, it is only possible to conclude that Jews in Asia Minor were not learned in rabbinic teaching. This fact should not lead to any conclusions regarding the quality or purity of their Jewish belief.

Within this trajectory it is possible to compare the depiction of Trypho and his particular characteristics with our understanding of Diaspora Judaism in Asia Minor. This comparison is organized into three levels of impact: 1) Those aspects of Trypho’s character that do not conflict with the other evidence for second-century Jewry in Asia Minor 2) Those areas where the picture of Trypho sharpens or clarifies what we know of Jews in the Diaspora and 3) Those areas where the picture of Trypho expands what we know of Jews in the second century C.E.
In a very general sense it can be said that there is nothing in Justin’s portrayal of Trypho’s character which contradicts the picture we have of second-century Jews in Asia. Trypho is a Jew who is obviously part of the empire. He is not portrayed as an outcast or a marginalized member of society. In fact, Justin does not even know Trypho is Jewish until he tells him so. Cohen asserts that there would be no way to know if someone was a Jew unless that person told you or if you were to meet him in a Roman bath, which could happen. Trypho fits with this image of the nondescript Jew. We are not told what he was wearing and we can assume that nothing in his manner or dress would have indicated anything distinctly Jewish to Justin. Likewise, the friends accompanying Trypho are also difficult to place. There has been a fair amount of speculation about who they were. This is partly because Justin seems to be unclear as to their loyalties. At times he warns the onlookers not to be circumcised (Dial.23.3) and at other times the friends seem to be Jewish in that they seem to have had interaction with the Jewish teachers (Dial. 94.4). One of those present may even have a Jewish name (Dial. 85.6). This ambiguity is probably because Justin did not know exactly who they were. Trypho’s friends could have been gentiles or Jews or both.

This kind of social interaction would not have been unusual at all.

Regardless of whether we read the inscription at the theatre at Miletus - Τόπος Ευωδέων τῶν κωφθεσθίου - as “The place of the Jews and those who are called God-worshippers” or “The Place of the Jews who are also God-
worshippers” we still could conclude that Jews mixed with non-Jews in social settings. There is no evidence to suggest that Jews kept themselves separate from non-Jews and very many reasons to believe that they saw no insurmountable threat living among non-Jews. This applies to Trypho as well. Trypho appears to be comfortable in his society. He is depicted as a student of philosophy, yet still committed to the observance of the Mosaic Law. There is no evidence that this combination caused any discord with Trypho or Justin. Although initially Justin does wonder what business a Jew has with philosophers when he has the prophets, this might reflect more on Justin’s reverence for the prophets and his suspicion of philosophy. Obviously, Trypho’s experience with philosophy was less disappointing than Justin’s.

This general agreement is not necessarily significant. If Justin invented the figure of Trypho we can assume that he would have modeled his figure on his understanding of Jews at that time. If Justin had shaped Trypho from the Gospel accounts or other Christian writings, that similarity would have been apparent. But this is not the case. Trypho shows no similarity to the depiction of Jews in the writings of the New Testament, or even to other depictions of Jews (see below for a comparison to Celsus’ Jew). The next two sections will serve to show how Trypho can sharpen and even expand our understanding.

**HOW TRYPHO SHARPENS THE IMAGE OF ASIAN JEWRY**

Trypho’s education helps us better to understand the possibilities which might have been available to Jews who desired a secular Greco-Roman education.
Trypho’s ongoing relationship with philosophy adds weight to the idea that some Jews were involved in this kind of education. There is also some evidence which points to the existence of Jewish ephebes. The most reliable is an inscription which documents a Jewish association: \( \text{Ἰωάννης} \text{ Ἰσραήλ} \) \( \text{Ἀθηναῖος} \).\(^{249}\) There is some speculation as to whether this group is directly related to the ephebate class. Krauss thought that this concerned the seating of younger members of the synagogue.\(^{250}\) Reynolds and Tannenbaum doubt this conclusion because there is nothing to corroborate such a practice within the synagogue.\(^{251}\) Safrai and Stern see the formation of a discrete and uniquely Jewish gymnasium.\(^{252}\) Trebilco favours integration into the gymnasium system.\(^{253}\) He thinks the weight of supporting evidence for Jewish ephebes tips the balance toward such a class. In the latter two readings it is assumed that there was a desire for some Jews either to emulate or to join the Greco-Roman system. In either case, the non-Jewish curriculum would have been accepted or modified slightly to conform to Jewish needs. This is in line with the earlier comments about the Hellenistic Jewish intellectual tradition.

It may be that Trypho represents the continuation of that elite tradition of Jewish participation in and modification of Greco-Roman education. The provenance of writers such as Ezekiel the tragedian and Artapanus are not restricted to Ptolemaic Alexandria. Moreover, Gruen supposes that these texts were available throughout the diaspora because of their broad appeal and their intellectual value for Jewish self-definition.\(^{254}\) Even if it is impossible to prove definitively that the Jews of Asia Minor read and valued these texts, nevertheless,
it may be helpful to note only that receiving a Hellenistic education and being familiar with the Greek myths would not have been an unusual, undesirable, or dangerous choice for a Jew with sufficient means and motivation.

The depiction of Trypho also indicates that such a combination would not have been outside the realm of Jewish experience. It is apparent in the Dialogue that Trypho is familiar with the pagan myths, enough so as to criticize Christianity for being too much like them (Dial. 67.2 quoted in the previous chapter). One would expect Trypho to have some skepticism about the Greek myths based on the level of his education and his philosophical training. Moreover, Trypho is depicted as a very inquisitive person. He has studied philosophy, knows the Greek myths, and has looked into Christianity, both through the written sources available to him - presumably some form of gospel material - and through verbal means - his talk with Justin.

What is most striking is Trypho's non-defensive stance toward Justin, which is somewhat akin to academic/philosophic dispassion. Trypho's attitude toward Justin's assertions and criticisms might be a window into the way some Jews may have handled these kinds of interactions. Even though many of the polemical outbursts are not contained within the Trypho Text, there are times when Justin disdains Judaism, its past, its teachers, its biblical interpretations, its malicious attitude to Christians, etc. Yet Trypho does not engage at that level. He does not respond in kind, nor does he defend Judaism, except perhaps in his denial of Christianity. He does have some critical things to say about Christian belief, but he never derides Christians. Christianity may be misguided and Justin may
seem ridiculous sometimes, but Trypho never slips into polemic. Trypho has
sometimes been dismissed by scholars because he does not defend Judaism, but
in the light of Trypho’s training and his education, a descent into polemic would
have diverted the conversation away from Trypho’s critique of Justin’s argument
and into a battle of ideologies. Trypho stays focused on the pursuit of his question
even though Justin presents many opportunities for Trypho to defend Judaism and
its beliefs. Trypho’s philosophical training would have equipped him with the
ability to advance his argument even in the midst of Justin’s declamatory
outbursts.

As noted earlier, there is little reason to believe that rabbinic influence was
present in Asia Minor during the second century C.E. Yet scholars have
discounted Justin’s depiction of Trypho because his knowledge of rabbinic
Judaism was sparse. The figure of Trypho certainly confirms this. He does know
something about the Jewish teachers (see chapter 5), but for the most part he is not
nearly as concerned about issues of exegesis and scriptural analysis. What Trypho
does appear to know about Jewish teachings on Scripture could have come
through his local synagogue and the non-rabbinic teachers therein. This ignorance
of early tannaitic teaching is not a strike against the verisimilitude of the depiction
of Trypho. In fact, it is one of his most authentic qualities, especially in the light
of Justin’s familiarity with Jewish teaching. Justin’s argument is with the Jewish
teachers and their teaching. It is telling that he does not depict Trypho as one of
them. This would have been an effective tactic for Justin to show the supremacy
of Christian teaching over the Jewish teachers, yet Trypho comes across as a Jew
who is distant from this body of teaching.

**HOW TRYPHO EXPANDS THE IMAGE OF ASIAN JEWRY**

This relationship to the Jewish teachers brings us into those aspects of Trypho’s character which expand our understanding of the scope of Asian Jewry during this time. In Trypho, we may have an example of a Jewish character who has only a very general knowledge of the kind of biblical exegesis which is familiar to Justin, yet considers himself fully Jewish. He did not see his philosophical training or his particular attitudes about exegesis or messianic speculation as obstacles to his self-identity as a Jew. Neither does Justin. As we saw in chapter 5, Trypho does seem to have some independent information which he did not pick up from Justin, although much of his exegetical knowledge could have been picked up in the course of the *Dialogue*. However, this is not the point upon which Trypho wishes to dwell. His real curiosity lies in the person of Jesus and the kind of assertions made about him by some Christians. In Trypho, we see a Jew who is willing to look at Jesus as a wise man who followed the Law with such perfection that he was honoured by God for his accomplishment. Trypho’s understanding of the gospels did not correspond with what he heard Christians saying. This is the essence of Trypho’s demand: he wants to know if Justin can reconcile his assertions about the messiahship of Jesus with the account of Jesus’ life in the gospels. What is important is Trypho’s attraction to Jesus as a wise teacher and keeper of the Mosaic Law (perhaps a good combination for a philosophically trained person like Trypho). It is the messianic assertions, the
faith statements which equate him with God, the crucifixion, and the virgin birth which seem nonsensical and groundless to Trypho. This does not mean that Trypho was close to conversion were it not for Justin’s confessional approach. It simply means that Trypho saw some merit in an adoptionistic Christology (although he would never have phrased it this way).

This is the crux of the matter for Trypho and it is the challenge he poses to Justin over and over again. Trypho’s demand is not based on the exegesis of the Scriptures, as Justin thinks, but on the question of whether Justin can make sense of the distance between his definition of the messiah and the life of Jesus as reflected in the gospels. He is not threatened by Justin’s rich textual proofs because they do not advance the argument toward Trypho’s end. It holds no power of persuasion for him. One of the assumptions made about debates between Christians and Jews in late antiquity is that arguments are won or lost on the basis of Scripture; good midrash always wins the day. This is certainly the standpoint of Justin and it appears to have been the context in which Justin interacted with the Jewish teachers, but this is not the main criterion by which Trypho judges truth or merit. Trypho certainly reveres scripture and considers it authoritative, but for him, arguments — especially exegetical or messianic ones — must be judged in the light of reason and logic.

This is the foundation for Trypho’s rhetorical strategy in the Trypho Text. Only in a few places does he stray from this task. In the vast majority of cases he does not accept Justin’s invitations to defend or explain particular passages of Scripture. He does not engage in a defense of what Justin sees as ‘the Jewish
reading'. To stay his course, Trypho engages in rhetorical concessions in order to move Justin along. Trypho’s concessions have been used by past scholars either to show the fictional nature of Justin’s imaginary foil, or to prove that Trypho is not a good Jew. Neither of these conclusions takes Trypho’s philosophical training and his Socratic form of argumentation into account. They judge Trypho on Justin’s terms, as well as on their own understanding of Judaism. In like fashion, Justin’s argument could be equally diminished if it was judged on the purely philosophical criteria of reason, logic, and consistency. These are, in fact, the criteria which Trypho applies to Justin’s argument for Christianity.

The first critique he levels at Justin is that Christians do nothing to distinguish themselves from pagans. Yet it is also apparent that Trypho lived comfortably within the surrounding culture – his education appears to be purely Greek and he, along with Justin, appears to have no knowledge of the Hebrew language. Perhaps this kind of stance helps us to understand the theatre seats at Miletus where a few rich Jews held the equivalent to season tickets. Trypho certainly participates in his surrounding culture yet this has not affected his ethnic identity: εἷμι δὲ Ἑβραῖος ἐκ περιτομῆς (I am a circumcised Hebrew)” (Dial.1.3). The combination of Jewish and Philosopher seems strange to Justin at first because of the priority he gives the prophets, but for Trypho there is no contradiction at all, since philosophers, like the prophets, enquire after matters pertaining to God (Dial.1.4).

In this way, the figure of Trypho helps to decompartmentalize our understanding of Asian Jewry. Trypho’s commitment to Judaism cannot be
understanding of Asian Jewry. Trypho’s commitment to Judaism cannot be diminished by pointing to his involvement with Greek learning, his Socratic mode of argumentation, his curiosity about Christianity, his lack of awareness of rabbinic teaching, his avoidance of exegetical matters, or his non-defensive stance. He says he is Jewish, he is circumcised as such, he defends the observance of the festivals and the Mosaic Law, he does not sway from his critique of Christianity, and he remains a Jew throughout. There are no grounds for considering him anything less than a completely Jewish figure. Judgments on the quality of Trypho’s faith where later ideals are laid back over history are inevitably a reflection of the judge, not the judged.

This reading of Trypho in his second-century context also expands the perception of the nature of the Dialogue. The Dialogue has often been used to support the notion that Christians and Jews were not necessarily happy with each other. Christian self-identity would have been much easier if Judaism had simply been subsumed by Christianity. But this kind of animosity is not supported by the Trypho Text and the kind of interaction it contains. The dispute is certainly rigorous but not enough to claim a larger animosity between Christians and Jews.

Trypho defies the picture of the worried threatened Jew who is outraged at those Christians who have commandeered and distorted their Scripture into a new and radical movement. In fact, it is not Trypho who is troubled; it is Justin who engages in unrestrained polemic and accusation against the Jewish people. Two factors must be brought to bear in order to understand the mechanics behind Justin’s polemical statements. In the last chapter it was shown that Trypho and
the Jewish people are distinguished from the Jewish teachers. It is not the Jewish
people *per se* with whom Justin is in competition. Justin has very negative things
to say about Jewish teachers and their supposed warfare with Christian exegesis.
The Jewish people, in Justin’s mind, are the hapless victims. There are however,
several places where Justin’s polemics are not as carefully focused and he does
engage in general statements about the Jewish people. Justin accuses Jews of
not only hating Christians, but of actively cursing or condemning them (*Dial.*
16.14; 35.8; 93.4; 96.2; 108.3; 133.2). Justin accuses them of instigating
persecutions and even putting them to death when they are able (*Dial.* 95.4; 122.2;
133.6) even though Justin knows that Jews did not, in reality, have this power.
Justin even hints that the reason some people have discounted the God of the
Hebrew Scriptures (perhaps a shrouded reference to Marcionism or gnostics in
general) is because of the wickedness (*κακία* of ‘your people’) (*Dial.* 30.1). As
noted earlier, the most severe polemical sections are not included in the Trypho
Text (16.4; 93.4; 96.2; 108.3; 122.2 133.2,6). The polemic within the
Trypho Text is not nearly as severe. In *Dial.* 30, Justin does hold Jewish
wickedness responsible for misleading some Christians. But this accusation is
tempered in the next sentence where Justin states: “for they [those who discount
the God of the Scriptures] have not received grace (*μὴ λαβοῦσιν χάριν*) to
know that he called your people, when they acted poorly and were ill with
spiritual sickness, to conversion and repentance of the spirit” (*Dial.* 30.1). The
two sentences taken together imply that while Jewish actions have misled some to
false conclusions about God, the real reason is that they do not have the divine
grace to see the other side of the relationship between God and Israel. In contrast, misguided Christians are said to be out of their minds (Dial. 35.6). The accusation is tempered because grace is the key ingredient which these people lack. It is not solely the fault of Jewish disobedience. Justin says that “we pray both for you and for all others who hate us (ἐχθροποιόντων) that you may repent with us, and not blaspheme (blasphēμε) Christ Jesus” (Dial. 35.8). Here Jews are included with all people who do not accept Christianity. Moreover, the idea Justin wishes to convey is that Christians pray for those who hate them. For Justin, it is a noble Christian ideal. The only polemical aspect is that unbelievers blaspheme Jesus by their unbelief, but this is a general statement. Justin does not explain exactly how this process works but the implication is that to blaspheme is bad. And because unbelief equals blasphemy, unbelief is bad.

In these two references, the polemical content is relatively diffuse. The lack of sustained and severe polemic in the Trypho Text gives a very different character to the exchange. Justin has, on occasion, been thought to be one of the more irenic Adversus Judaeos writers, but the outbursts of polemic have always been problematic. While there is no reason to think that the polemical material does not comes from Justin, it appears that the original Trypho Text is far more irenic in nature, both in its style of discourse and its use of polemic. The character of the Trypho Text expands our understanding of Jews in the Diaspora because Trypho and Justin exchanged ideas and criticisms on a more equal footing. Justin does have moments when he is ready to walk away (Dial. 9.2), but by and large the exchanges proceed down civil lines. Being written early in Justin’s career
the exchanges proceed down civil lines. Being written early in Justin’s career 
(circa 135 C.E.) the Trypho-Text maintains a philosophical, even academic, tone.
Perhaps many years later, toward the end of his life, the text was revived by him, perhaps at the request of Marcus Pompeius (Dial. 141.3). Justin’s early irenic nature might have been worn down to a harder more acerbic attitude during the intervening years. This would account for the severity of polemic material encountered in the second half of the document along with the other additional material, if he is the author. The non-Trypho polemic material does not differentiate Jewish teachers from Jewish people. Here all Jews are held responsible for the death of Jesus and deserving of their punishment at the hands of God (esp. Dial. 133). This polemic should not be diminished by its separation from the Trypho Text, but it is significant that this attitude cannot be found in the Trypho Text, because it allows us to consider the possibility that the initial discussion took place without a cloud of polemic, and this is reflected in the reconstructed Trypho Text

This not only expands our understanding of Jews who may have had a confident, non-defensive stance toward Christianity, it also challenges the combative descriptions of Jewish/Christian debate. In the Trypho Text there is not a battle for supremacy between Christianity and Judaism. It is, as Trypho requests, a defence of the points raised by Trypho (Dial.10.4). The Trypho Text also presents us with a more evenly balanced exchange. This is not the monologue some have believed it to be (although such a conclusion is understandable for the Dialogue as a whole).
In Trypho we see a Jew of the Diaspora who was curious, astute, philosophically trained, and committed to Judaism. There is nothing in his character which contradicts our understanding of Jews in the Diaspora. Trypho does, however, help us to strengthen some of the evidence for Jews in Asia Minor. His relationship with the larger culture and especially his educational training help us to understand how an educated Jew may have looked and acted. Especially helpful is his attitude to philosophers in the light of the prophets, his freedom of movement on speculative issues (such as the shape of the messiah), and the way he employs reason, logic, and Socratic methods to judge the truth of an argument. Trypho expands our knowledge of Judaism in the diaspora because his is one of the few voices which can be identified as truly non-rabbinic. While his distance from rabbinic teaching and values is evident, this does not appear to be due to any form of rebellion or rejection. Trypho does make references to his teachers, but there is no indication that they are rabbinic. Trypho’s Jewish teachers could have lived and taught outside Roman Palestine in the second century C.E. with no formal connection to the tannaim. The few occasions where Trypho does appear to know Jewish teaching cannot be proven to have come from rabbinic circles (see Trypho and Jewish Teaching in chapter 5). The voice of Trypho is important for understanding Judaism in this region before rabbinical voices became dominant. This is not the first time that a non-rabbinic Jewish voice has been preserved in Christian tradition (Philo and Josephus being the most obvious examples of Jewish voices which were preserved by Christian tradition).
While it is useful to look at the way Trypho broadens our understanding of Judaism, it is also helpful to compare him to Jewish stereotypes, either Christian or pagan. This section will compare Trypho with Celsus' Jew as he is portrayed in *On the True Doctrine* as a means of comparison with a contemporary document (probably written in the second half of the second century C.E.) which also provides a depiction of a Jewish speaker. Recently, Stephen Wilson has concluded that although there are differences in particulars and emphasis, "on a number of matters...the arguments attributed to Celsus' Jew provide interesting parallels to those placed on the lips of Trypho." Wilson is certainly right to recognize the non-rabbinic qualities in Trypho and Celsus, but the similarities do not extend past this point. Wilson uses Celsus to support the idea that Trypho's critique of Christianity accurately reflected the Jewish critique. In the most general terms this is true for issues surrounding the observance of the Law and Christology, but when we examine the comparison in more detail, Trypho cannot stand in the same camp as Celsus' Jew.

There are, however, a few similarities which deserve mention in the light of Trypho's character. 1) Celsus' Jew is said to have quoted a passage from Euripides' *Bacchae* 498 (referring to Jesus' lack of power): "The god himself will set me free whenever I wish it" (*Cels.* 2.34). Origen thinks it highly unlikely that a Jew would be so well-read, but this is probably not as improbable as Origen thought. 2) Celsus' Jew also sees aspects of Christian teaching as similar to the Greek myths (*Cels.* 1.67; 2.55). This is similar to Trypho's critique of Christian
Greek myths (Cels. 1.67; 2.55). This is similar to Trypho’s critique of Christian teaching as well (Dial. 67.1-2).\textsuperscript{262} These two similarities support the notion that some Jews had access to modes of learning which have appeared to us, and to Origen, to be non-Jewish. 3) Both Trypho and Celsus’ Jew raise doubts about the form of Jesus’ death – crucifixion (Cels. 2.31 and Dial. 10.2; 38.1; 39.7). For Celsus’ Jew the idea of a crucified divinity is absurd and is mentioned only in passing. For Trypho it more closely connected to the Law and the impossibility of the messiah dying under a Mosaic curse. Crucifixion was a sticking point in both instances, but it was used in different ways and in different measures.

The two disputants are different both in their style of delivery and the content of their remarks concerning Christianity. Celsus’ Jew centers his critique on a deep scepticism about the gospel tradition. In Origen’s Contra Celsum (Book I), the comments of the nameless Jew are directed to Jesus himself and are delivered in the second person. Regarding the baptism of Jesus, Celsus records the speech as if the Jewish critic was directly confronting Jesus: “When you were bathing near John you say you saw what appeared to be a bird fly towards you out of the air. What trustworthy witness saw this apparition, or who heard a voice from heaven adopting you as son of God? There is no proof except your word and the evidence you may produce of one of the men who were being punished with you” (Cels. 1:41).\textsuperscript{263} This voice in the second person is consistent throughout the first book (Cels. 1:50, 57, 65 66, 67) where the accusations are delivered directly at Jesus (Cels. 1:71). This style of address is also indicative of the style of the polemic. It is focused almost entirely on the person of Jesus: his birth, his
ministry, and his death. Origen presents Celsus' summary of the Jewish critique.

He [Jesus] fabricated the story of his birth from a virgin; he reproaches him because he came from a Jewish village and from a poor country woman who earned her living by spinning. He says that she was driven out by her husband, who was a carpenter by trade, because she was convicted of adultery. Then he says that after she had been driven out by her husband and while she was wandering about in a disgraceful way she secretly gave birth to Jesus. And he says that because he was poor he hired himself out as a workman in Egypt and there tried his hand at certain magical powers on which the Egyptians pride themselves; he returned full of conceit because of these powers, and on account of them gave himself the title of God (Cels. 1:29).

These accusations against Jesus appear to represent polemical midrash on the Gospel birth narratives. Celsus' Jew is also said to have known and used the popular Jewish notion that Jesus' father was a Roman soldier named Pantera (Cels. 1:32). The level of polemic is fierce and is focused not on ideas or concepts but on the figure of Jesus. Celsus' Jew even goes so far as to state that even if God could have intercourse with a woman, he would not have done it with Mary because she was ugly and not of noble birth. After all, "nobody knew her, not even her neighbors" (Cels. 1.39). Jesus is said to have been on the run during his whole ministry (Cels. 1:65, 66) and is of suspect character (Cels. 2:79). He attracted poor people and he did not even convince all of them (Cels. 2:46); he didn’t even succeed with his disciples (Cels. 2:39). All of this makes him a poor example of a leader (Cels. 2:12). The picture is one of a back-woods medicine man who came back from the big city selling magical tonics to the ignorant and impressionable folk of meagre intelligence and low birth.

This is not at all the kind of approach taken by Trypho. He never
This is not at all the kind of approach taken by Trypho. He never questions the character of Jesus or the birth narrative or his ministry. His argument is with subsequent Christians – not the disciples, as with Celsus’ Jew – and their assumptions about Jesus. Trypho is not surprised or persuaded by the existence of such rumours, “for these popular tales are not worthy of belief (περὶ δὲ ὁνὶ πολλοὶ λέγουσιν, οἱ πιστεύσαι ἄξιον) (Dial. 10.2). As we have seen, he is relatively open to the idea that Jesus was a holy teacher who observed the Mosaic Law (Dial. 67.2) and taught difficult things. He sees that a case could be made for Jesus if he is seen in a purely human light (Dial. 10.2). Trypho has presumably read the same gospels (or at least similar ones) as Celsus’ Jew, yet he does not choose to focus on the same kind of polemic, or popular tales as he calls them. Celsus’ Jew – if there is a Jewish voice that can be discerned beneath many layers of transmission – conveys a very different attitude and focus than Trypho. Trypho is concerned with his own agenda and his own questions about Christianity’s claims. If he knew about the kinds of things Celsus’ Jew reflected, which is not inconceivable, he does not choose to conduct his inquiry on that level, even though early in the Dialogue Justin assumes that he will use this kind of material (Dial. 10.1). Instead, Trypho confines his critique to the realm of ideas and the argument at hand.

Celsus’ Jew did not limit his critique to the personality of New Testament figures. He also voices objection to some of the central tenets of Christianity. They are mainly Christological in nature. But close scrutiny reveals a significant distance. Celsus’ Jew objects to Jesus’ messianic status mainly because
significant distance. Celsus' Jew objects to Jesus' messianic status mainly because of his unusual character. But additional reasons also come into play: Jesus cannot be proved to have been resurrected (Cels. 2:77), he did not have a universal impact (Cels. 2:29), and the prophecies applied to him could be applied to a thousand others (Cels. 1:51,57; 2:28). Moreover, his life has not conformed to the common Jewish messianic expectation (Cels. 2.30). But this argument is not made from a knowledge of messianic expectations. Celsus simply asks: Why have Jews rejected him if he is so messiah-like (Cels. 2.8, 74-75)?

While Trypho does have questions about Jesus' status as messiah, he does not employ any of the arguments listed above. The examination of Trypho's demand (chapter 5) leaves the issue of messianic status an open one. Trypho does say that all Jews await a messiah (Dial. 89.1), but his avoidance of messianic speculation shows that this is not the most important aspect of his Judaism. His rhetorical concessions point us away from a fixed Jewish definition of the messiah. Instead, he focuses on the particulars of Justin's argument. As we have seen, this is misunderstood by Justin and he repeatedly avoids the topic thinking he has already proven it. Nevertheless, the later addition of the homily on Psalm 22 (Dial. 91-96) does indicate that Justin may have eventually understood what Trypho was demanding, but this realization does not come in the Trypho Text.

Celsus' Jew seems to believe that if Jesus were really the messiah, then he would have exhibited god-like qualities. It is the lack of these qualities which feeds the criticism of Jesus' messianic status. The issue of Jesus' divine status is a sensitive subject in the Dialogue. Justin is wary about equating Jesus with God.
As we saw in *Dial. 74* (chapter 2) Trypho catches him getting very close to affirming that Jesus is equal to God and Justin pulls back and rephrases his argument to put a comfortable distance between them. The function of Justin’s Logos doctrine is to affirm divine affinities without equating Jesus and God, except in will. Trypho rejects Jesus’ messianic status based on Justin’s lack of proof, not because Jesus did not jump down from the cross, as Celsus’ Jew might have imagined a powerful messiah might do (*Cels.2.9*).

Despite the few thematic comparisons, there is a significant distance between these two Jewish figures. Against the figure of Trypho, Celsus’ Jew appears to be a highly stylized voice, especially in the use of the second person when addressing Jesus directly. The hypothetical discussion with Jesus and his disciples, the mixture of pagan and Jewish criticisms, the intensity of the polemic, and Celsus’ own attitude toward and ignorance of Judaism, all add to the superficial quality of Celsus’ depiction of his Jewish informant. Trypho, on the other hand, seems more authentic by comparison. Seen against this rough contemporary, Trypho appears much more nuanced and idiosyncratic. His arguments are more focused and consistent. They are intimately bound up with the argument within the discussion and would be nonsensical without the surrounding text. The styles of the two figures are also dissimilar. Even though Celsus’ Jew and Trypho are both on the offensive, the approach is radically different. Celsus’ Jew’s comments are polemical and accusatory; they do not ask anything. Trypho’s comments inquire, demand, and challenge. They are in a context of *Dialogue* where a response is necessary. Some of this can be explained
by the difference in genre, but the tone can only be accounted for by the authors and/or the Jewish voices themselves.

This comparison with Celsus supports the notion that Trypho not only sharpens our picture of the second-century Jewish landscape he helps defines it. He is not a conglomerate figure who voices all Jewish critiques on Christianity, nor is he a fictional figure created by Justin for his particular apologetic purposes. He is like nothing we have seen before, yet he is familiar and fits into what we know of Jews and even advances some ideas which could previously only be hinted at. The findings in this chapter alone do not establish Trypho as an authentic Jewish voice, but this comparison does serve to strengthen and confirm what we know of Trypho from the text itself.
CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION

This thesis has pursued two ends. The first was to provide a comprehensive analysis of the figure of Trypho. In order to do this, the playing-field first had to be cleared. It is always tedious to catalogue secondary sources, but this was a necessary task so that the range of opinion could be appreciated. I hope that it can now be seen that, more often than not, the analysis of Trypho has been subordinate to larger scholarly agenda or simply neglected. It is hoped that this investigation will allow the figure of Trypho to be judged on evidence not prejudice. The second goal has been to outline a hypothetical text which I have named the Trypho Text and try to explain how the Dialogue may have developed and expanded. If my reconstruction is plausible, this will change the way the Dialogue is read and will require a reassessment of our assumptions about the text as a whole. The reconstructed text has eliminated many of the elements which have obscured this text, such as long tracks of LXX, repetitive arguments found mostly in the latter half of the Dialogue, sections of harsh polemic, and extended exegetical arguments. This paring away has allowed us to look at the figure of Trypho in more depth and to see Trypho’s style of argumentation and his particular concerns.

In its extant form, the Dialogue is loosely organized around general theological themes. However, the reconstructed Trypho Text has a clearer organization based on the interplay between Trypho and Justin. The Trypho Text is markedly more sound than the extant version we currently have. In my
reconstruction of the Trypho Text, Trypho’s characteristics and demands also come into sharper focus, especially his ability to detect and pursue fine variations in Justin’s argument (e.g. *Dial.* 73-75). With the Trypho Text there was no need for a second day in the original dialogue, and Justin appears to have used the premise of a second day to add material and reiterate arguments. The presence of different listeners allowed him to rehearse or rephrase many of the same arguments found in the first half of the *Dialogue*, which roughly corresponds to the Trypho Text.

One of the great stumbling blocks of the full *Dialogue* has been its length and its discursive, repetitive style. It is often thought that there would have been no way for Justin either to remember a dialogue of such length or, if the discussion actually occurred in its full form, be able to keep Trypho present the entire time, no matter how curious he was. These are legitimate objections if one is trying to make sense of the entire text. If one considers only those blocks where Trypho speaks, then the length of the *Dialogue* drops from 142 to 65 chapters – a 55% reduction. Moreover, Trypho’s style and his sensibilities are particular to him and generally they serve no apologetic agenda in the text. Looking at where Trypho occurs and how these blocks are related, or not related, to the surrounding text, helps to solve some of the problems with the *Dialogue*.

The core of the *Dialogue* is also brought into relief by this approach. It is not the non-Trypho material which has any kind of interconnectedness. The *Dialogue* appears to have been inflated by repeated arguments, exegetical forays, polemical tracts, typological expositions, and unnecessary passages of LXX (see
chapter 2). This non-Trypho material does not exhibit any strong connections either to the Trypho blocks or within itself. In fact, the absence of any linking statements between this material and the Trypho material is part of the reason why the Trypho blocks could be detected at all. In contrast, the material in the Trypho blocks is internally coherent and does not need the non-Trypho material to make sense. Had Justin been more careful in weaving his own material into the Trypho blocks, the shifts would not have been so clear and the Trypho Text would not have been discernible. This kind of careless assemblage compromises the literary quality of the full Dialogue, but it greatly increases its transparency, reliability, and its value as a window into Jewish/Christian relations during the second century.

If Trypho is seen to be an authentic Jewish voice from the Diaspora, then he has the potential to be a valuable non-rabbinic voice. Even though Judaism in Asia Minor holds a good deal more information than the other Diaspora regions, our picture is still sketchy. Establishing Trypho as an authentic Jewish voice could be an important contribution to the study of Greco-Roman Judaism. If the argument for the historicity of Trypho is accepted, then he is the first and only voice of Judaism from this region and time. He is made all the more valuable because he is non-rabbinic and may reflect the attitudes of non-rabbinic Judaism. Moreover, he provides valuable information about Jews and their relationship with Christianity. For Trypho it is not a relationship marked by animosity and competition, but neither does he exhibit a closed or ignorant attitude toward Christianity. Trypho is comfortable with his Judaism and does not appear to be
particularly troubled by the existence of Christians. Yes, he thinks many of them
– not all – are deluded, but this does not mean that he is threatened by them.
Understanding Trypho’s philosophical lens and his argumentative style may help
us to understand his dispassion and ability to stay calm in the midst of heated
exchanges. Attention to the philosophical, even academic, aspect of Trypho’s
color character also opens up the understanding of Greco-Roman Jews and the kinds of
characteristics which may not have caused any cognitive dissonance for them.
Justin seems to have a moment of dissonance when the person who just introduced
himself as a student of philosophy also turns out to be a circumcised Jew. But this
is no problem for Trypho or his followers – who presumably already know this
fact. Certainly, we cannot apply this combination of characteristics to all Jews,
but it is significant even if we find it in one figure. Justin could have recorded the
interaction because it was unique, but it is more plausible to assume that Justin
would not have written anything unless he felt that it would have fairly wide
appeal. Jews like Trypho may have been more common than we know. The fact
that Justin recorded the dialogue at all speaks to the resonance of Trypho’s voice
and approach.

During the writing of this thesis I was asked many times whether I

considered Trypho to be a real person. My answer was always an agnostic “I
don’t know.” Granted, it is a difficult, perhaps even impossible, task to establish
the historicity of a Jewish figure buried in a Christian apologetic text without any
external corroborating evidence. Modern scholarship has placed the burden of
proof on those scholars who would say that the Dialogue is a true reflection of a
single debate. Arguments have been made against Justin which have affected the way the *Dialogue* has been read. His polemical outbursts are too severe, the dialogue form is too contrived and artificial, it is too long, and Trypho is a stereotype. Trypho gives too many concessions, speaks too few words, and does not show enough knowledge of Scripture and Jewish teaching. This study has tried to shift the ground away from broad generalizations about the *Dialogue* and the figure of Trypho to a more indepth and historical investigation of this text and its Jewish interlocutor that is based on the larger culture of the second century – both Christian and Greco-Roman – and a close reading of the text.

It is my hope that this may serve to shift the burden of proof onto those who would discount the authenticity of the exchange. If subsequent scholarship does not agree with the conclusions in this thesis, the counter argument will have to show that Trypho made his concessions because he was a weak Jew or because they fitted into Justin’s agenda. It will have to show that Trypho’s questions are really Justin’s and that Justin deliberately avoided the topic of Jesus’s life and ministry for some strategic reason, and that the instances in the Trypho Text where Trypho undermines or challenges Justin’s arguments (as with circumcision, Abraham, the virgin birth, and his Christological critiques) were orchestrated by Justin to advance his argument in some way. This thesis has tried to bring together evidence which points toward an actual encounter and a cohesive balanced record of that exchange. This conclusion is made on the strength of the Trypho Text and the profile of Trypho’s singular characteristics.

Some scholars have sensed moments of real dialogue but they have not
pushed any further than their intuition, either because they thought it an
unimportant line of questioning or because the evidence against such an idea
seemed persuasive. Based on the findings in this study it is hoped that the
Trypho Text can be read as an authentic debate which took place with a second-
century Jew from the Diaspora. For lack of a better name for this interlocutor, we
can adopt the one given by Justin: Trypho.
APPENDIX I

TRYPHO’S WORDS:

SAYINGS ATTRIBUTED TO TRYPHO

IN THE DIALOGUE

1.1 Greetings philosopher.

1.2 I was instructed by Corinthus the Socratic in Argos that I should not despise or treat with indifference those who array themselves in this manner (σχήμα), but instead show kindness and associate with them because perhaps some advantage (δέλος) may spring from the intercourse either to the other person or to myself. It is good for both even if only one benefits. On this account, therefore, whenever I see any one in such dress, I gladly approach him. This is the reason I now have the pleasure of speaking to you. These are my companions and followers along with me (οὗτοι τε συνεφεπνικαί μοι), and they hope to hear some profitable discourse (χρηστών) from you.

1.3 I am called Trypho and I am a circumcised Hebrew (είμι δέ Ἑβραῖος εκ περιτομῆς) who has fled from the war which has recently broke out. Currently, I am spending much of my time in Greece and Corinth.

1.3 Do not the philosophers turn every discourse on God (περὶ θεοῦ)? And do not questions continually arise to them about His unity and providence? Is not this truly the work (ἐργον) of philosophy, to make an investigation
1.6 But please tell us your own thoughts about these things. What is your opinion about God and what is your own attitude as a philosopher (γνώμην περὶ θεοῦ ἔχεις καὶ τίς ἡ στὶ φιλοσοφία).

8.3 Your other remarks I accept and I admire your zeal for the divine, but it would be better if you continued to abide in the philosophy of Plato, or some other man, cultivating endurance, self-control, and moderation, rather than be deceived by false arguments (λόγοις ἐξαπατηθηκαί ψεύδεσι) and follow worthless and contemptible men (ἀνθρώποις οὐδενοὺς ἀξιῶς). For while you remained in the philosophical mode and lived a blameless life, a hope was left for a better fate. But since you have forsaken God and placed your hope on a man, what kind of salvation (σωτηρία) is left for you?

8.4 If you are willing to listen to me, for I have already counted you as a friend, first be circumcised then – as the law says – observe the Sabbath, all the feasts, and the new moons of God. In a word, do all things which have been written in the law and then perhaps you will gain mercy (ἔλεος) from God. But the messiah, if indeed he has ever been and now exists anywhere, is unknown and does not even know himself at all. He has no power until Elijah has come and anointed him and then he will be made manifest to all. But you people, by receiving a worthless rumor, shape a kind of messiah for yourselves and for his sake are now blindly perishing.

9.2 (taking hold of Justin’s robe) You must not leave until you fulfill your
promised.

10.2-4 Yes, this is what surprises us for the popular tales are not worthy of credence. They are far too unlike human nature. I know too that the commands given to you in what is called the gospel are so admirable and great that I suspect that no one can keep them. I took some trouble to read them. But we are especially at a loss about this, that you, saying that you worship God and thinking yourselves superior to other people, separate from them in no respect, and do not make your life different from the heathen: you keep neither feasts nor Sabbaths, nor have circumcision and, moreover, though you set your hopes on a man that was crucified, you still hope to obtain some good from God, though you do not do his commandments. Now have you not read that souls shall be cut off from his people which are not circumcised on the eighth day? The charge refers also to strangers and to purchased slaves. It follows that when you have directly despised this covenant you neglect the commands that come afterwards, and as persons who know God you attempt to persuade us, though you practise none of the these things which are done by those who fear God (φοβούμενοι). Therefore, if you have any defense to make with reference to these points, and can show how you could have any hope at all, even though you do not keep the law, we will gladly hear from you. Afterwards let us examine the other points in the same way.

19.1 This is the very point: that while suffering all these things, you do not keep all the practices which are now under discussion.

25.6 Do you really mean to say that none of us shall inherit anything in the holy mountain of God?
27.1 Why do you select for citation only such parts as you choose out of the saying of the Prophets, and make no mention of those that expressly bid us keep the Sabbath. For in Isaiah it says: If you turn your foot away from the Sabbath so as not to do your pleasure on the holy day, and call the Sabbaths the holy delights of your God; if you will not lift your foot to work, and will not speak a word from your own mouth; then you will trust in the Lord, and He shall cause you to go up to the good things of the land; and He shall feed you with the inheritance of Jacob your father: for the mouth of the Lord has spoken it. (Isaiah 58.13-14).

28.1 We have already heard you put this forward, and we paid special attention to what you said, because to tell the truth, it deserves attention. But it does not seem good to me, as it does to most, merely to say that it seemed good to him (δια ενοχεν αυτω) [God], for this is always the pretense of those who are unable to give an answer (αποκρινοσθε) to the subject under discussion.

32.1 Sir, these and similar passages of scripture compel us to wait for the one who is great and glorious, and takes over the everlasting kingdom of the ancient days as the Son of Man. But your so-called messiah is without honor and glory, because he has fallen into the worst possible curse (σχατη καταραξε) in the law of God (Deut. 21:23), for he was crucified.

35.1 Yet I have learned that many of those who say they acknowledge Jesus and are called Christians eat things offered to idols and say they receive no harm in doing so.

36.1 Granted, let all these things be just as you say: that the messiah was
36.1 Granted, let all these things be just as you say: that the messiah was prophesied to be liable to suffering, that he had been called a stone, and that after his first advent (in which it had been announced that he was to appear in suffering) he would return and act as judge of everything and be an everlasting priest and king. If this man [Jesus] is the one about whom these prophecies were made, prove it (ἀποδείξειν).

38.1 It would be good for us if we trusted in our teachers (καλὸν πειθέντας ὑμᾶς τοῖς διδασκάλοις), who laid down a law that we should have no dealings with any of you, and that we should not even have any communication with you on any questions. For you utter many blasphemies (βλάσφημον πολλὰ), in that you seek to persuade (πείθειν) us that this crucified man was with Moses and Aaron, and spoke to them in the pillar of the cloud, then that he became man, was crucified, and ascended up to heaven, and comes again to earth, and is to be worshipped.

39.3 I wish you knew how deranged (παραφροσύνης) you are when you say such things.

39.7 Now then give us good reasons why he, who you say was crucified and ascended into heaven, is the messiah of God. It is said in the scriptures that he is liable to suffering and will come again in glory (μετὰ δόξης) and receive (λήψεσθαι) the eternal kingdom over all the nations – every kingdom being placed under subjection to him. This you have shown sufficiently by means of the Scriptures you mentioned earlier: now show us that this man is he.
45.1 Even though I may appear to hinder (ἐγκόπτειν) these subjects, which you say must be examined, the question which I wish to ask is pressing, allow me to go first (πρῶτον).

45.2 Tell me then, will those who lived according to the law given by Moses live in the same manner with Jacob, Enoch, and Noah, in the resurrection of the dead (νεκρῶν ἀναστάσει) or not?

46.1 If some persons even now desire to live keeping the institutions of Moses, and also believe on this Jesus who was crucified – recognizing that he is the messiah of God, that he has been sent to judge absolutely everyone, and that the everlasting kingdom is his – can they be saved?

46.2 No, for as you pointed out it is not possible – as far as we are aware – to slay a Passover-sheep other than in Jerusalem, to offer the goats that were commanded at the fast, or, in short, any of the other offerings. This is what we are able to do: observe the Sabbath, become circumcised, keep to the monthly calendar (τὰ ἐμμενὰ φυλάσσειν) and its feasts (see chapter 2 for explanation of translation), and washing if one has touched anything forbidden by Moses or after sexual intercourse.

46.3 Was not Abraham and those who came after him circumcised?

46.4 We are aware of this and we acknowledge that they are saved.

47.1 If anyone, having seen the things you say, believed like you – that clearly he is the messiah – and believed and obeyed him but also wished to keep these precepts [food laws, circumcision, Jewish feasts, etc] would they be saved?
47.2 Why do you say 'In my opinion such a person shall be saved?' are there not those who say that such people will not be saved?

48.1 We have now heard your opinions on these subjects. Pick up your argument where it stopped and finish it (πέραντε), for it seems to me to be somewhat strange (παράδοξος) and wholly incapable of proof. Your assertions – that this Christ existed and was God before all ages, that he was even born, became human, and suffered, and that He is not man by origin – seem to me not only strange (παράδοξος), but even foolish (μωρόν).

49.1 To my mind, however, those who affirm him to have been a man and to have been anointed by election, and then to have become Christ, appear to speak more convincingly (πιθανότερον) than you who hold the opinions you express. For all of us Jews expect that the messiah will be a man of merely human origins and that Elijah will come and anoint him. But if this man seems to be the messiah, one must certainly conclude that he is man of human origin. But from the fact that Elijah has not yet come I can declare (ἀποφαίνωμαι) that he is not the messiah.

49.2 Most certainly (Μᾶλιστα).

49.3 Most certainly (Μᾶλιστα).

49.6 The argument that God's spirit of prophecy, which was in Elijah, has also been in John seems strange (παράδοξον) to me.

49.7 Most certainly (Μᾶλιστα).
50.1 It seems to me that you have had a lot of resistance \(\text{προστρίψεως}\) from a lot of people about the subject under discussion. Because of this, you are ready with an answer for every question you are asked. But first, answer how you can prove that there is another God besides the maker of all things \(\text{τὸν ποιητὸν τῶν δῶν}\) and then you will be able to prove that he submitted to be born of the virgin \(\text{τῆς παρθένου}\).

50.2 If you insist \(\text{Συγχωρῶ}\).

51.1 But all the words of prophecy you repeat are ambiguous \(\text{ἀμφίβολοι}\), and have no force in proving what you wish to prove.

55.1,2 We will remember this interpretation \(\text{ἐξηγησεός}\) of yours if you can strengthen \(\text{κρατώνης}\) this disputed point by other arguments. But for now take up the subject again and prove to us that the prophetic spirit admits \(\text{ὡμολογήτων}\) the existence of another God besides the creator of all things \(\text{τὸν ποιητὴν τῶν δῶν}\). Take care in your argument not to name the sun and moon which, as it is written, God has allowed the gentiles to worship as gods. The prophets, misappropriating \(\text{ποροχρώμενοι}\), as it were, this passage, often said: Your God is God of gods and Lord of lords – repeatedly adding the epithets, great, mighty, and terrible. These words are not said as though they really were gods. Instead, the word is teaching us that the true God, who made all things, is the only Lord over those that are simply recognized \(\text{νομιζομένου}\) as gods and lords. So that the Holy Spirit might refute this as well, he said by holy David: The Gods of
the gentiles — though considered gods — are images of demons, but are not gods.

He lays a curse on those who make and worship them.

56.3 We indeed understand, but the words quoted [in 56.2] do not prove that any other God or Lord besides the creator of all things (τῶν ποιητήν τῶν ὄλων) exists or is spoken of by the Holy Spirit.

56.4 Most certainly (Μάλιστα).

56.5 (Justin has asked if Trypho thinks one of the three was God) No, but God was seen by him before he saw the vision of the three. Those three, whom the scriptures call men, were angels. Two of them were sent for the destruction of Sodom, and one to bring good news to Sarah that she was to have a child; this was the reason he had been sent. When he finished this task he went on his way.

56.9 Most certainly, but by this you have not proved that there is another God besides the one who appeared to Abraham, and who also appeared to the other patriarchs and the prophets. But, you have proved that we were not correct in thinking that the three who were in the tent with Abraham were all angels.

56.10 Certainly, to this day we believe it.

56.12 Now, prove that he is this, so that we could come together (Συνθωμεθα) on this point. We assume that you are saying that he has not done or spoken anything contrary to the mind of the creator of all things (τοῦ ποιητοῦ τῶν ὄλων).

56.16 Then prove it! As you see the day is well under way and we are
simply not ready for such daring answers because we have not heard any one searching after such questions or proofs. We would not tolerate your words if you did not refer everything to scripture, for you are eager to make your proofs from them and you say that there is no other God above the creator of all things.

57.1 Even you would acknowledge that while it is clear that scripture compels us to agree with this, the information that he ate what was prepared by Abraham and set before him causes considerable doubt.

57.3 It is possible that the question about the manner of eating is settled this way: when it is written that they ate the food prepared by Abraham, they did this by dissolving it. So come now and deliver the argument of how it is that he who appeared to Abraham as God and as the attendant of God the creator of all things, was born by the virgin and has become a human of like passions with everyone, as you said before.

57.4 Do whatever you think is best. Certainly, you will do the very thing that I long for [i.e. address Trypho’s question].

58.2 You do this [defer to God] in a pious manner, but you seem to feign ignorance when you say that you have no ability in the art of disputation.
58.2 Tell me.

60.1 We do not make such a conclusion from these particular words. Instead, [we think that] the angel was the one who was seen in the blaze of fire and God was the one who conversed with Moses, so that the angel and God were together (Δημοσίος καὶ θεών, δύο διὸς δυνάς) in that vision.

60.3 Now it has already been shown that he who was seen by Abraham and was named ‘God’ and ‘Lord’ was the one who brought down onto Sodom the punishment given by the Lord in the heavens. But even if an angel happened to be with God when he appeared to Moses, we will not thus conclude that the same God who conversed with Moses from the bush is God the creator of all things (τὸν ποιητὴν τῶν ὄλων). Rather it is he who appeared to Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob and who is called an angel of God the creator of all things (τοῦ τῶν ὄλων ποιητοῦ) and is known as such because he gives people messages (διαγγέλλειν) received from the Father and maker of everything (ποιητοῦ τῶν ἀπαντῶν).

63.1 You have shown this, my friend, with great force (ἰσχυρῶς) and at considerable length. In the time left, prove that he submitted to be born from the virgin according to the purpose of his Father and that he was crucified and died. Moreover, prove that after this he rose up (ἀναστὰς) and ascended into heaven.

64.1 Seeing as all Christians have taken the name from him, let him be recognized (γνωριζόμενος) by you who are not Jews (τῶν ἐξ ἔθνων) as Lord, Messiah, and God as the scriptures signify (σημαίνοντι). But as for us, who
Messiah, and God as the scriptures signify (στημωνοσυνιστω). But as for us, who are servants (λατρευται) of the God who created him [Christ], we do not need (ου δεόμεθα) to agree with him or worship him.

65.1 I am so astounded by the many passages of scripture [just adduced] that I do not know what to say about the passage in Isaiah where God states that he gives his glory to no one. It goes as follows: ‘I am Lord God. This is my name. I will not give my glory to another, nor my praise. (Isaiah 42:8)’

65.7 Yes we have also noted this. Now please finish (περαινε
tοιγαροσυν) the rest of the argument.

67.1-2 The passage is not ‘Behold the virgin (παρθενος) shall conceive and bear a son’, but ‘Behold the young woman (νεανις) shall conceive and bear a son, and so on as you said. Further, the whole prophecy stands spoken of Hezekiah with respect to whom events [of his reign] are proved to have taken place in accordance with this prophecy. Furthermore, among the tales of those whom we call Greeks (Marcovich amends to: fables handed down from the Greeks) it is said that Perseus was been born of Danae, still a virgin, by him that they entitle Zeus flowing down upon her in the form of gold. And in fact you [Christians] ought to be ashamed of saying the same sort of things as they, and should rather say that this Jesus was a man of human origin (ανθρωπον καιξ
ανθρωπων) and, if you can prove from the Scriptures that He is the Christ, that because of His perfect life under the Law He was deemed worthy to be chosen (πολιτευσθαι αυτον κατηξιωσθαι) to be Christ. And do not dare to assert
marvel (τερατολογεῖν), that you not be convicted of talking folly (μωροκίνειν) like the Greeks. (Dial. 67.2 trans. A.L. Williams)

67.5 Yet you agreed with us that he was both circumcised and observed the other precepts of the law appointed by Moses (διὰ Μωϋσέως διαταχθέντα ἐφύλαξε).

67.8 The scriptures compel me to agree.

67.8 (Justin has given Trypho a choice about the reason behind the giving of the law: a) God needed them or b) the people had sinned.) The latter is what the scriptures compel us to agree.

67.9 This was predicted.

67.9 Granted.

67.11 Any lover of truth (φιλαλήθεις), not contention (φιλέριδας), would be forced to given total assent (συνθέσθαι ἐκ παντῶς) to this.

68.1 You are trying to prove the unbelievable and nearly impossible idea (Ἀπιστοῦ καὶ γὰρ ἀδύνατον σχεδὸν πράγμα) that God endured to be born and become a person.

68.2 Consider, dear Sir, that you have been able to acquire this with much trouble and toil. So we too must try and test all these matters (βασανίσαντας παντα τὰ ἐπιτρέχοντα) and thus assent to what the Scriptures compel us (ἀναγκάζωσιν)” (trans. A.L. Williams).

68.3 (Justin has asked Trypho not to be comabtive if he has nothing
68.3 (Justin has asked Trypho not to be combative if he has nothing constructive to say) We will try to do this.

68.3 (Justin has asked for permission to ask Trypho some more questions.) Ask the questions.

68.4 How is it possible to answer this when we have been making such a huge investigation into whether there is anyone other than the Father alone?

68.4 (Justin answered this retort by asking if Trypho has since changed his mind) No sir.

68.5 Then how does the word say to David that from his loins God will take a son for himself and establish a kingdom for him and he will set him on his throne of glory?

68.7 (Justin has asked if Trypho is aware that some scripture is obscure and mysterious.) Certainly.

71.4 First, we ask that you tell us some of the passages which you say have been completely put aside.

73.5 God knows whether the leaders of the people (οἱ ἄρχοντες τοῦ λαοῦ) added (παρεπραγμέναν) anything to the Scriptures, as you say, but such a thing seems unbelievable (ἀπιστῶ). 

74.1 We know that you inquired into these matters for our benefit (ημῶς ἄξιωσαντας). But about this Psalm which you just quoted from the words of David: It does not seem to me to have been spoken of anyone other than the
Father who made both the heavens and the earth (τοὺς οὐρανοὺς καὶ τὴν γῆν ποιήσαντα). You, however, said that it is he who suffers, the one you are so zealously endeavoring (σπουδάζεις) to prove to be messiah

77.1 That such an array of arguments is enough to disconcert one (δυσωπήσαι) I agree, but I want you to know that I demand (ἀπαιτῶ) to have the argument, which you have so many times put forward (δὲ πολλάκις προεβάλλοντο), proved. Make your point to us, so that we might see how that [passage] reveals that Christ of yours. We say that this prophecy refers to Hezekiah.

79.1 (Floating Chapter) God’s statements are indeed holy, but your explanations have been contrived (τετεχνοσύμεναι), even blasphemous, which is apparent to us from the things explained by you (ἐξηγημένων). You say that angels have acted maliciously and have fallen away from God.

80.1 I told you, sir, that you zealously try (σπουδάζεις) to be careful and keep close to Scripture. But tell me, do you really think that this place Jerusalem will be rebuilt (ἀνοικοδομηθηκαί)? Do you expect that your people will come together (συναχθηκέσθαι) and rejoice (εὐφρανθηκαί) with Christ, along with the patriarchs and the prophets and the other members of our house [Jews] - even with those who became proselytes [to Judaism] before your Christ came? Or have you held to these opinions only so that you might appear to get the better of us in these investigations (ζητήσεσί)?
87.1-2 Do not suppose from now on that I am trying to upset your argument by making a fresh inquiry. I only wish to learn about the questions I put to you. Tell me then about the passage by Isaiah: 'There will come forth a rod from the root of Jesse and a flower will grow up from the root of Jesse, and the Spirit of God will rest upon Him, the spirit of wisdom and understanding, the spirit of counsel and might, the spirit of knowledge and piety. And the spirit of the fear of God shall fill Him. (Isaiah. 11:1-3)' You agreed to me that this referred to the messiah. You said that he is God pre-existent (προϋπόρχων). You said that by the will of God he became flesh (σαρκομομιθεντω) by being born of the virgin. But how can he be proved to have already existed seeing that he is filled through the powers of the Holy Spirit as though he lacked something which the word by Isaiah recounts?

89.1-2 You are aware that all our race expects the messiah and we agree that all the passages of scripture which you have quoted are related (εἴρηντοι) to him. And I must say that the idea that the name of Jesus was given to the son of Nun has disconcerted me to yield to it. However, we back away (ἀπορούμεν) if the messiah is crucified with such dishonor. For, it is written in the law that whoever is crucified is very accursed (ἐπικατάρατος). On this point I am firmly sceptical (δυσπειστως ἔχω). It is apparent that the scriptures teach that the Christ is susceptible to suffering (παθητῶν). We wish to learn if it is to be of a form accursed in the law and if you have any proof of this.

90.1 (Justin has spent another chapter talking about the suffering of the
messiah.) Please move us forward out of the Scriptures so that we might be persuaded by you. We already know that he should suffer and be led like a sheep. Instead, prove to us that he must be crucified and die so shamefully (αὐσχρῶς) and dishonourably (ἀτίμως) by the death accursed in the law. We are not able to come to such a conclusion (εἰς ἐννοιαν τοῦτον).

118.5 (Floating Chapter) You are doing fine. Even if you were to repeat the same things at even greater length, rest assured that I and those with with me would rejoice to listen (ἀκροασαι).

123.7 (Floating Chapter) What then? Are you Israel and does he say these things about you?

142.1 You see that we did not intentionally come to discuss these particular matters, but I admit that I have been especially charmed (ἐξαιρετως ἡσθην) with the discourse, and I think that those with me are of the same opinion. We found more than we were looking for (προσδοκῶμεν) even more than we thought possible to find (προσδοκηθηκαν). If we could examine the very words of scripture more often we could receive more benefit, but you are going out to sea and since you expect to begin the voyage any day do not hesitate to remember (μεμνησθαι) us as friends if you leave (εὰν ἀπαλλαγῆς).
APPENDIX II

CHAPTER 19

I have included chapter 19 as a Trypho chapter, but this is not without some reservations. All critical editions from Maran (1842) onwards have attributed the quote at Dial. 19.1 to Trypho. Marcovich (1997) renders 19.1 as:

<Ka> ο Τρύφων Τούτο εστίν ο ἀπορεῖν αξίον ἔστιν, ὅτι τοιαύτα ὑπομένοντες σύχι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα, περὶ δὲν νῦν ζητοῦμεν, φυλάσσετε. Yet, this sentence in the earliest MS (A) reads: Τούτο εστίν ο ἀπορεῖν αξίον ἔστιν, ὅτι τοιαύτα ὑπομένοντες σύχι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα, περὶ δὲν νῦν ζητοῦμεν, φυλάσσομεν. (This is the very point: that while suffering all these things, we do not keep all the practices which are now under discussion.) In the latter sentence there is no indication that Trypho is speaking: the statement lacks any mention of Trypho and the main verb is in the 3rd plural. This could easily be interpreted as a rhetorical question which Justin poses to himself. But, because my hypothetical text is based on the presence of Trypho, the question of how this statement came to be attributed to Trypho is quite important. Initially, it may seem puzzling why later editors saw fit to change the main verb and add Καὶ ο Τρύφων to the beginning of the sentence. But, it is possible, I think, to reconstruct a scenario which can explain the thinking behind these changes. Thirlby (1722) made no modifications of A at Dial. 19.1.268 The main verb is in the first person (φυλάσσομεν) and there is no mention of Trypho, except in the previous sentence (18.3) where he appears at the end of the
sentence in the vocative Ὄ Τρύφων. Thirlby does not have chapter divisions and there is no reason to suspect that this is anyone other than Justin speaking. Otto (1877) appears to have been the first to modify the main verb into the 2nd plural φυλάσσετε. This change was not, however, without precedent. Maran (1742) is the first to suggest that the extant MSS may reflect a degree of error. Even though Maran follows Thirlby and (A) in his critical edition of the text, he adds the following note: Haec profecto non Iustinius disserit, sed Trypho, cujus similem sententiam jam vidimus [10.3].” Maran certainly thought that something was amiss in the text, even if he did not see fit to change it formally. This comment by Maran, however, seems to have urged Otto to take the next logical step of changing the main verb of 19.1 to φυλάσσετε to reflect Trypho’s voice. Otto left the vocative Ὄ Τρύφων with 18.3, but adds Κκι Ὄ Τρύφων to the beginning of 19.1. Once it was accepted that Trypho was speaking and the main verb had been restored, Κκι Ὄ Τρύφων was added to bring the statement into line with the other Trypho quotes which use this formula. Otto’s modifications make this an unambiguous saying of Trypho. Archambault (1909) endorsed these changes and took one step forward by striking the vocative Ὄ Τρύφων from 18.3. Archambault must have assumed that the vocative at the end of 18.3 had been moved and modified from its correct place at the beginning of 19.1 by earlier copyists and/or editors. For him, there could only be one reference to Trypho and he put it with 19.1. This is exactly the rendition given by Marcovich (quoted above).

Editors of the Dialogue made their changes without comment so it is
difficult to reconstruct their thinking. Nevertheless, it is possible to rebuild a chain of events. I propose that the changes may have taken place in the following manner: To begin, let us assume that the editor (in this case Otto) is convinced by Maran’s assertion that Trypho is speaking at this point. In an attempt to restore the text to its original form, Otto would have assumed that at an earlier time, there was a copyist error which changed the main verb in 19.1 from ϕυλάσσετε to ϕυλάσσομεν. After all, ϕυλάσσομεν occurs at the end of the previous sentence (18.3), so 19.1 may simply have been miscopied. When subsequent copyists come to reproduce the text, they would have seen Κοιν Τρόφων paired with ϕυλάσσομεν. This would have been nonsensical. So, thinking that the reference to Trypho was incorrect, it was moved to the previous sentence (18.3) and changed to the vocative. Ending a question or statement with a vocative is not unheard of in classical literature, but it does not occur elsewhere in the Dialogue and only once in the Apologies (II Apol. 2.16). This anomaly may indicate that the vocative did not come from Justin, but is the remnant of an editorial change which predates our earliest MSS. In this scenario, one mistake with the main verb triggered a series of adjustments which altered other parts of the surrounding text. As a way to reverse these ‘errors’, subsequent editors, mainly Otto, modified the text to reflect what they considered to be the original meaning of the passage. The reasons behind the changes are, of course, only speculation, but it may help us to understand how these editors justified their actions, even if they did not think it necessary them.

All this is to say that 19.1 is a questionable chapter. I have included it in
the Trypho Text, despite the caveats, because of the possibility that these editors may have been right in their emendations. Their thinking is not unreasonable, nor is it unlikely that φυλασσετε was mistakenly copied as φυλασσομεν.

Moreover, this chapter fits into the flow of the overall argument of the Trypho Text and later there are a few references back to chapter 19 (see chapter 2). I am usually inclined to follow the earliest MS, but in this case, there appear to be sufficient grounds for trusting the emendations of later editors.
APPENDIX III

THE RECONSTRUCTED TRYPHO TEXT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TRYPHO BLOCKS</th>
<th>TRYPHO CHAPTERS</th>
<th>CONNECTING MATERIAL</th>
<th>NON-TRYPHO MATERIAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-10: Introduction and basic objection that Christians neglect the Mosaic Law</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>11-18.2a: Spiritual circumcision, fasting, and baptism</td>
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<tr>
<td>19: Asks again why Christians don't follow Law</td>
<td>18.2b-18.3: Justin says that Law was because of Jewish hardness of heart</td>
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<td>25-28: Discussion about the function of the Law</td>
<td>20-24: Mosaic laws because of sinfulness</td>
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<tr>
<td>32-39: Questions about messiah and circumcision</td>
<td>80 follows 36: Asks about New Jerusalem</td>
<td>29-31: Transition to topic of messiah</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>44: Connected to 39 and 45</td>
<td>40-43: Christian typology of sacrificial cult</td>
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<td>TRYPHO BLOCKS</td>
<td>TRYPHO CHAPTERS</td>
<td>CONNECTING MATERIAL</td>
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<td>45-68 Discussion of the messiah, nature of God, and problems with consistency and logic</td>
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<td>69-70: Greeks myths invented to deceive</td>
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<tr>
<td>71-74.3: Deleted texts and problems with Jesus' relationship to God</td>
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<td>74.4-76: Power and authority are transferred through the name</td>
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<td>77: Proof of Isaiah 7:14</td>
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<td>78: Birth narrative</td>
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<td>79: Angels have fallen away?</td>
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<td>81-86: repeated messianic arguments</td>
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<td>87-90: Problems with baptism and crucifixion</td>
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<td>91-97: Crucifixion</td>
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<td>107-109: Jonah</td>
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<td>110-117: Various</td>
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<td>118: Enthusiastic listener</td>
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<tr>
<td>TRYPHO BLOCKS</td>
<td>TRYPHO CHAPTERS</td>
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<td>123: Are you Israel?</td>
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<td>142: Farewell</td>
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119-122: Jewish remnant and Second Coming

124-129: Disobedient Israel

130-133: Jacob

134-137: Conversion of Jews

138-141 Flood narrative and plea for conversion
APPENDIX IV

TRYPHO’S OBJECTIONS TO JESUS AS MESSIAH

Your messiah, Jesus, was crucified and thus cursed
*Dial. 32.1,

Isaiah 7:14 does not mean virgin
*Dial. 67.1

Hezekiah is the subject of prophecy, not Jesus.
*Dial. 67.1, 77.1

Cannot be another God.
*Dial. 50.1, 55.1, 65.1, 68.5

Trypho’s Central Concern regarding Justin’s Messianic argument: That Jesus meets the criteria for the messiah

Since Elijah has not come, neither has the messiah.
*Dial. 49.1

How can God or the pre-existent Christ become human.
*Dial. 48.1, 57.1,

Post messianic concessions: Prove that he is the one.
*Dial. 36,39,63

Jesus resembles the Greek myths too closely.
*Dial. 67.2
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ENDNOTES

1 A.T. Kraabel, “The Roman Diaspora: Six Questionable Assumptions” JJS 33 (1982) 445–64 is an excellent summary of the kinds of assumptions which have shaped the study of Judaism in the Diaspora.


5 One glaring problem which is dealt with at a later point is the 20–30 year period between the supposed Dialogue and its written form.


9 Harnack (1913) 53.

10 The exception is Trakatellis “Justin Martyr’s Trypho”, in Christians among Jews and Gentiles: Essays in Honour of Krister Stendahl on His Sixty-Fifth Birthday, edited by G.W.E Nickelsburg & G.W. MacRae (Philadelphia, 1986). Even though Trypho is the main subject of this article and his insights are helpful, it is a general and broad treatment of a detailed and intricate subject.

11 Harnack (1913) 51 fn 2.

12 Kidd, History of the Church, (Oxford, 1922) I, 90 “Trypho is a thin disguise, it may be, for Tarphon.” See also O. Zückler, Geschichte der Apologie
der Christentums, (Gütersloh, 1907) 44; W. von Christ, Geschichte der
griechischen Literatur, 5 (München, 1919) 1030. These scholars seem to have
rested their opinion on T. Zahn, “Studien zu Justinus Martyr”. ZKG 8 (1885-86)1–
84, who is most noted for his claim along with E. Schürer, Geschichte des
jüdischen Volkes im Zeitalter Jesu Christi, II (1885–1924) 378, 555ff. It is
interesting to note that the 1979 revision of Schürer's work corrects this view and
gives a reference to L. W. Barnard, Justin Martyr: His Life and Thought,
(Cambridge, 1967) 24–5 for a refutation of this idea. The tide of scholarship has
turned away from such an identification. The identification of Trypho with rabbi
Tarphon could be read as an implicit argument for the reality and authenticity of
the Dialogue. In all the writers mentioned above, there was no need to argue for
the reality of the event or the reliability of the text; it was assumed. Lest the
modern reader discount the opinions of these learned scholars it must be said that
the issues of literary technique and the modern mistrust of ancient texts were not
at the forefront of scholarship at this time. This is how Harnack could both deny
the presence of a Jewish/Christian relationship while affirming the authenticity of
the Dialogue without damaging his argument. See Harnack (1913) 53ff, esp. n.4
for this position.

13 J. Gager, Origins of Anti-Semitism: Attitudes Toward Judaism in Pagan

14 M. Simon, Verus Israel: A Study of the Relations between Christians and
Jews in the Roman Empire (135-425 C.E.), trans. by H. McKeating (Oxford,

15 Ibid., 173.

16 It is odd that Simon uses the introduction as proof of authenticity
because this claim flies in the face of competing scholarship which has used the
introduction as proof that the Dialogue could not have been focused on a Jewish
audience or that it could not have taken place with a Jew of any kind. This group
of scholars will be examined below.

17 Simon (1986) 174 n.122 “Trypho's Hellenism is less obvious, especially
as hypostases are concerned (as compared to Celsius' Jew)... As I have pointed
out, he explains the vision at Mamre by referring to angels.” See chapter 6 for a
profile of Trypho’s characteristics.

18 Ibid.,

19 H. Chadwick, “Justin Martyr's Defence of Christianity” BJRL 47 (1965)
280.

20 J. Pelikan, The Emergence of the Catholic Tradition (100–600) (Chicago:

21 A. L. Williams, translation with introduction, Justin Martyr: Dialogue
with Trypho (London: 1930) xxiv

22 Ibid., xxv. In a sense, this is a kind of rehabilitation of Zahn’s earlier
assertion, without the verbatim claim.

23Ibid., xxiv.

24Williams has a particular agenda in his depiction of Justin. For him, Justin is the epitome of the Christian who had the courage to confront Judaism with the argument for Christianity. Williams decries the modern clergy for neglecting this important task: “For it is a grievous blot upon the Christianity of our own day that hardly any effort has been made to set before the Jews of Western education such a defence of Christian truth as by its learning and philosophic mind may appeal to them. We have nothing in the twentieth century that corresponds to the second century Dialogue with Trypho” (p. viii).

25D. Trakatellis, "Justin Martyr's Trypho," HTR 79 (1986) 289–97 does affirm a similarity with the Platonic dialogic form, but counters it with the observation that the adverb ἀκτικην is not present in the Platonic parallels of Tim. 21C or Phaedo 86D as Hyldahl has shown in Philosophie und Christentum: eine Interpretation der Einleitung zum Dialog Justins (Copenhagen, 1966) 101. He does not note, however, the additional variance where ἐπομενήσκε is used to describe Trypho’s reaction to Justin’s profession of Christianity (Dial. 8.3) as compared to μετησκε in Phaedo and διακες in the Timaeus. Nevertheless, Trakatellis depends on Voss' conclusion (Der Dialog in der frühchristlichen Literatur, (Munich,1970) 38) that the form of the Dialogue does not ipso facto eliminate the possibility of reality. The question of literary dependence and the Dialogue will be explored fully in chapter 3.

26Trakatellis (1986) 293.

27Ibid., 290.

28Ibid., 291. This refers to the passage in Dial. 9.2 where Justin threatens to leave because of the laughter of Trypho's friends.

29Ibid., 294.

30The instances where Trakatellis notes this pattern are Dial. 63.1; 64.1; 68.1–2; 71–72; 77;89–90. In over half of these instances the issue which is conceded concerns Scriptural exegesis: 63.1; 64.1; 77; 89–90. The other instances show Trypho avoiding the baiting of Justin. See chapter 4 for discussion

31Ibid., 297.

32Ibid., 279.

33This is similar to the description of Trypho in Encyclopaedia Judaica vol 6 (83–86).


35Ibid., This judgement is in direct opposition to E.R.Goodenough, The Theology of Justin Martyr (Amsterdam, 1968) 90–3, whom he counters on so many other points, mainly the issues surrounding his dependence on Philo for his
Logos theory.

36Ibid., 398.

37Ibid., 396.


39Ibid, 104.

40Ibid.,


47Goodenough, *The Theology of Justin Martyr* (Jena, 1923) 95. He is certainly right to point out that it is useless to try and define Trypho by the categories of Hellenistic and Palestinian Judaism. Using only these categories forces one to disregard certain parts of Trypho's character that do not fit with that particular definition. Either case can be made when one is selective in one's choice of material on Trypho.

48Goodenough exposes this difference in the following quote: "The ordinary Palestinian Jew, in little contact with other religions, maintained his Judaism almost unchallenged. But the Jews of Alexandria, Tarsus, or Ephesus heard men talking metaphysics and describing cosmological schemes on all sides, and were attracted by many of the heathen conceptions in spite of themselves. It was not long that Jews were thus exposed before a gradual but persistent protest of syncretism had begun." Ibid., (40) The visual picture is propped up by many assumptions about Judaism and the rabbinic tradition that do not stand scrutiny.

49Goodenough (1923) 90.

50Ibid., 92.

51Ibid., 96.

52Ibid., 95.

53Ibid., 96.

54This process is especially seen in his books, *By Light, Light: The Mystic
ENDNOTES

Gospel of Hellenistic Judaism (New Haven, 1935) and Jewish Symbols of the Greco-Roman World, abr. edition (Princeton, 1988). Much of his life's scholarship was spent drawing this distinction and highlighting the presence of Hellenistic Jews. His work is seminal and should not be discounted, but it is based on a conception of Judaism that assumes that rabbinic writings were descriptive rather than prescriptive and that Jews had the same attitude about belief and doctrine as Christians. Goodenough implicitly assumes that because Jews used Hellenistic categories of thought or even utilized Hellenistic symbols to convey the truth of their own religion, they were syncretistic and sacrificed their Judaism in favour of more Hellenistic concepts. Some recent thinking on Greco-Roman Diaspora has moved to a more nuanced and interactive understanding of the relationship between Roman culture and religious expression.

55 N. Hyldahl (1966) 18–21 and 294–5, for his unbending view that pagans alone are the audience. He even goes so far as to chide Harnack for his allowance of a Christian and Jewish audience.


57 A. Hulen, “The ‘Dialogues with the Jews’ as Sources for the Early Jewish Argument Against Christianity” JBL 51 (1932) 63.

58 J. Nilson, “To Whom is the Justin’s Dialogue with Trypho Addressed?” TS 38 (1977) 540. This is reminiscent of the Harnackian view that the Dialogue is "ein von kurzen Einwurfen durchsetzter Monolog." A. Harnack (1913), 54. Ultimately, it is difficult to take Nilson's view seriously. His goal is to establish the Dialogue as a conversionary treatise addressed to a wavering gentile audience in Rome. He follows this comment with the confusing statement that; “there is no reason to believe that Trypho is a Jew who is, in his attitudes and practices, very close to being a Gentile without actually being one. Better, Trypho is the kind of Jew which a Gentile proselyte is likely to become. Thus, in the Dialogue, he represents the Jewish option to the potential Gentile convert” (541).


61 C. Sezter, Jewish Responses to Early Christianity (Minneapolis, 1994) 134.

62 “Thus while Trypho might have existed (as did Socrates) and the original impetus for the composition of the Dialogue with Trypho might have been an actual conversation, we can assume that Trypho's words are largely put in his mouth by Justin” (Ibid., 135). This is in essence a denial of the event. Even if it did happen, it is not contained in the Dialogue.

63 Ibid., 135.

65 Ibid., 23.

66 T. Rajak (1999) 64.


68 This same attitude was also previously argued by W. Bousset, *Jüdisch-christlicher Schulbetrieb in Alexandria und Rom* (Göttingen, 1915) 288–99.

69 Osborn (1973) 15.


71 Ibid., 29.

72 D.P. Efroymson, “The Patristic Connection”, in A.T. Davies (ed.) *Antisemitism and the Foundations of Christianity* (New York, 1979) 98-117. In this instance Efroymson is assuming that Jews would not know of the Marcionite teaching and not be able to use it against Christians. Justin is aware of the problems that internal Christian schism can cause to the outsider. In *Dial.* 35.6 and esp. 80.3 he mentions this internal Christian problem but also states that Judaism has the same problems. He then takes the opportunity to list various Jewish schismatic groups (*Dial.* 80.4) (This list presents several problems in itself, mainly the anachronistic mention of Pharisees and Sadducees. See M. Black, “Patristic Accounts of Jewish Sectarianism”, *BJRL* 41 (1959) 285–303). It is equally possible that Marcionism was a fairly common and embarrassing set of beliefs in the second century C.E. It is just the kind of internal strife that opponents or skeptics would relish. Therefore it is not impossible that well informed Jews would have known about this variation within Christianity. Some might have believed that this was, in fact, the teaching of Christianity. Long after Marcion, Marcionism would have to be addressed over and over again to audiences who would have only heard this version of Christianity.

73 Voss, *Der Dialog in der frühchristlichen Literatur*, 38.


76 The issue of chapter numbering may appear to pose something of a problem because chapter divisions were not introduced until Maran (1742), yet my criteria for determining Trypho material are not based on chapter divisions. They are founded on the presence of dialogue between Justin and Trypho. I have maintained the chapter numbers for the sake of convenience, but they have no bearing on the formation of the Trypho Text.
Chapter 19 poses a few special problems which are discussed at Appendix H. I have not included chapters 79 and 80 as Trypho blocks because while they are placed next to each other, they do not constitute continuous dialogue. Each of these chapters is isolated thematically and shows no connection to the other. I have therefore counted them as Trypho chapters.

Rhetorical concessions are defined and examined in chapter 6.

This has contextual parallel to the Elijah narrative in I Kings 19:10,14,18, but imports a Pauline notion of a remnant (Rom. 11:4-5). Justin has a strong and consistent theme of a Jewish remnant and it appears that this is another effort to encourage Trypho to make himself a part of that group.

Trypho stresses that he wishes to learn more about things which he asks about, not necessarily those things which Justin tells him.

See Skarsaune (1987) passim for the instances where Justin repeats or rephrases arguments in the Dialogue.

The reader is reminded that I am only dealing with LXX passages that occur in the Trypho material. Dia. 31.2 (Daniel 7: 9-28); 32.6 (Ps 110:1-7); 34.3-6 (Ps 72:1-20); 36.3-4 (Ps 24:1-10); 37.1 (Ps 47:5-9); 38.3 (Ps 45:2-8); 52.2 (Gen. 49:8-12); 56.2 (Gen 18:1-3) then a break “and so on until” then (Gen. 19:27-28); 56.7 (Gen 21:9-12); 56.17 (Gen 18: 13-14,16-17); 56.18 (Gen 18:20-23); 56.19 (Gen. 18:33, 19:1); 59.19-21 (Gen. 19, 16-25); 58.4-5 (Gen 31: 10-13); 58.6-7 (Gen. 32: 22-30); 58.8 (Gen 35:6-10); 61.3-5 (Prov. 8:22-36); 62.5 (Josh. 5:13 - 6:2); 63.4 (Ps. 45:6-11); 64.6 (Ps 72:1-19); 64.6 (Ps 19:1-6); 66.2 (Isa. 7:10-16); 74.4 (Deut 31:16-18) which proceeds from the lacuna.

Williams (1930) vii is correct in his intuition about this chapter. Ironically, he hints that this chapter is an interpolation when, in fact, everything around it may be additional, with chapter 80 being a part of the original Trypho Text.

See chapter 5.

It is ironic, but probably not deliberately so, that in this question, Trypho exhibits the characteristics which are exactly the opposite of the ones just listed by Justin. Trypho, unlike Justin’s accusation, is open-minded and prepared to grant Justin some of his arguments based on his reading of Scripture.

The word εγκοπτεω is usually translated as “to interrupt”, but this does not deliver the more obvious meaning of the word and the idea that Trypho is not just interrupting Justin but trying to stop him from going on with his argument. In this context, Trypho’s interruption is more understandable and ‘hinder’ may be the better choice of words. This also fits with the depiction of Trypho (chapter 5). As we shall see, there are other points where Trypho tries to distract Justin away from his argument from prophecy. Without the typological chapters which separate these two Trypho blocks, this tactic becomes more apparent in the light of his earlier attempt at 39.7. Translators have understandably tried to make sense of the
wording, but in the context of the Trypho Text where the typological chapters have been removed, the wording is straightforward and there is no reason to resort to alternative definitions.

The ANA translation attempts to patch up the hole while M. Marcovich (1997) 62-63 divides the document into two Logoi using the lacuna as the divider. Marcovich is following Thirlby (1772), Otto (1843), Trollope (1847), and Archambault (1909) in this stark division. All of these editors assume a very large lacuna.

A.L. Williams (1930) makes the following suggestion: “We suggest supplying ‘by all creation’ i.e., not only the Father but also creation deems Christ worthy to rule, the next words ‘of the land’ being wholly unconnected.” The Benedictine edition suggests ‘As also by the [the land into which He said He would bring your fathers. Now He said as follows: ‘This people go a whoring after strange gods] of the land, etc. Both of these reconstructions stretch the imagination of the readers to make sense, but the Benedictine emendation may give us a clue as to why this scripture is used at all. Later editors might have thought this was an appropriate piece of scripture to fill a gap. But then we must ask why the entire passage is not completely rendered in the MS. The use of this piece of scripture at this point is nonsensical and it is difficult to reconstruct a possible motive for its inclusion. As in other instances I have taken the stance that every LXX passage has to prove itself an integral part of the text. This passage has no connection to the text around it and, as will be shown below, if we remove this passage, if only temporarily, then the two sides can easily be bridged. Based on these two factors, it seems reasonable to conclude that this passage of Deuteronomy is not a part of the Trypho Text.

Skarsaune (1987) and Marcovich (1996) 23-63 provide the instances where Justin repeats his argument from the first half of the Dialogue. Marcovich sees the second day, and both days for that matter, as a literary device for repeating his arguments. My reading of the lacuna does not require a second day of debate. The size of the Trypho Text does not need to have a second day, nor is there any evidence in the Trypho Text that a second day occurred. All of the references to a second day (Dial. 78.6, 85.4, 92.5, 94.4, 118.4, 122.4, & 137.4) occur outside the Trypho material. Neither does Marcovich notice the most striking difference between the two parts: the presence of dialogue. Evidently, Justin used the pretence of a second day to provide a forum for his expansions and repetitions. The references to the second day are given to explain why things are being repeated and expanded. What scholars have thought to be a second day is probably the second stage of development of the Dialogue. There is no question that the second half of the Dialogue either repeats or supplements arguments made in the first half. The vast majority of Trypho chapters are in the first half of the Dialogue. While I agree with Marcovich that the second day is used as an excuse for repetition, I do not see the lacuna as the border between them. After this point, both the Dialogue and the Trypho Text are not easy to track. The Trypho material is isolated and without any sense of flow, but the same could be said for the full
Dialogue. Marcovich is certainly correct to sense a dramatic shift in the text during these chapters, but I do not draw such a thick black line through the middle of the document.

90 If anything, it relates to Justin’s II Apol. 5.2-5 where he makes reference to angels who have fallen away from God. This would make Trypho’s comment quite dubious and put the entire chapter under suspicion, but it is not my task to make judgements about whether any of the Trypho material is spurious. I am only trying to collate what is attributed to Trypho in the Dialogue. Nevertheless, this kind of comment does not mesh well with the overall character of the chapter, which is generally disconnected.

91 It must also be remembered that Dial. 29 is no longer distant in this reconstruction.

92 Except for the singular comments at Dial. 118.4 and 123.7 which, as I have just discussed, do not appear to have any connection to the rest of the argument.

93 Justin uses circumcision in several ways. In this instance, and the previous passages mentioned he includes circumcision with the Mosaic Law and makes the conclusion that circumcision was given because of hard-heartedness. This is different from Justin’s other argument given at Dial. 16, where circumcision is given as a sign or mark.

94 See T. Rajak (1999) who sees these polemical sections as definitive of the Dialogue as a whole and a major brick in the wall which separated Christianity and Judaism (80).

95 It is also true that Trypho is much more similar to a philosopher. See chapter 5.


98 See especially G. Vison< (1988); C. Setzer (1994); & J.C.M. van Winden, An Early Christian Philosopher: Justin’s Martyr’s Dialogue with Trypho chapters one to nine (Leiden, 1971).

99 Thanks to S.G. Wilson for help in clarifying and sharpening this point.

100 Hoffmann (1966) 23. “Offensichtlich bedingt hier die sokratische Methode die Dialogform: Justin wird mittels der Fragen des alten Mannes den
Erkenntnisweg bis an die Grenze des platonischen Apriorismus geführt, dessen Kritik bei 4.2 einsetzt. Dem Übergang von der philosophischen Wahrheit zur prophetischen Offenbarung entspricht dann formal eine Veränderung der Dialogischen Form."

101Ibid., "Nun fragt der Schüler, und der Lehrer gibt die Wahrheit aus seinem Wissen preis." (Now the pupil asks and the teacher imparts the truth as he knows it.)

102Ibid., 28. "sondern ein beabsichtigtes literarisches Ausdrucksmittel zur Charakterisierung der Juden. Das Korrelat von Inhalt und Form legt diesen Schluß."

103Voss (1970) 31 "Grundlage des Gesprächs ist nicht die zergliedernde, schließende, folgernde, menschliche Vernunft, sondern übermenschliche Offenbarung in Form eines verbindlichen Quellentextes." (The basis of the conversation is not the dissecting, closing, deducing of human reason, but superhuman revelation in the form of authoritative source texts.)

104Ibid., 35.

105Ibid., 37. "Die äußere Form, die Einkleidung entspricht also der tradition, nicht aber die Erörterung. Wie Justin Philosoph bleiben zu können meinte und das durch seine Kleidung zum Ausdruck brachte, so hat er auch im Bereich der literarischen Äußerung sich willig der überkommenen Formen bedient und nicht versucht, neue zu entwickeln."

106Ibid., 38 "Literarisch gehört sein Werk in die Tradition des philosophischen Dialogs."

107Ibid., 28 fn. 10. Plato's Protagoras has been the sole source for the theory of literary dependence. Voss uses the comparative work of P. Keseling, "Justins Dialog gegen Trypho (c 1-10) und Platons Protagoras", Rhein. Mus. 75 (1926) 222-226. In this work Keseling finds twenty-one literary parallels. Nine of them are single word matches which are not technical terms, two of the parallels involve the laughter of the crowds. Eight of the parallels actually work directly against Voss' contention that Justin casts himself as Socrates. Keseling points out seven instances where the tables are turned and it is actually Trypho who is cast as Socrates (Dial. 1.2 = Prot. 315A; 10.4 = 320B; 10.4 = 328E, 318A; 10.4 = 332A) and Justin is in the role of Protagoras (Dial. 1.1 = 314E, 315E; 1.2 = 315A) This kind of role reversal indicates how problematic it is to draw conclusions about literary borrowing and intentional role playing. If Justin really had it in his mind to imitate Socrates - as the thinking goes - how could he make such blundering mistakes? Voss uses the only parallel indicated by Keseling (9.2 = 335D and 338B) where Justin appears to be in the role of Socrates and, as we will see, this is a shallow comparison. Even Keseling admits that the structural parallels are faint, and that "occasionally even they become perforated" (224).

108Ibid., 28.

109J.C.M. van Winden (1971). See also S. Denning-Bolle (1987), who also
notes the Socratic parallels but without citing Hoffmann and Voss: “Trypho often seems to be a sort of straw man for Justin, the superficial similarity he shares with many characters who tangle with Socrates. (494)” J.T. Sanders (1993) is even more blunt in his assessment of the Dialogue’s form: “The Dialogue is obviously a fiction for several reasons. In the first place it follows the style of the literary Dialogue established by Plato, in which the primary speaker is the teacher who reveals the weakness of thinking of the interlocutor(s), who, for his part, speaks intermittently and at just great enough length to make his position understandable” (187).


111 van Winden, p.3. It should also be pointed out that the concern of van Winden, and Hyldahl for that matter, is only with the first nine chapters. Much of the debate over Justin's connection to philosophy treats only this section. This makes good sense for someone only interested in Justin's attachment to philosophy for there is very little to say philosophically after chapter nine.

112 Ibid., 27.

113 Ibid., 27.

114 “After I said these things, I stood up as if I was leaving. But as I was standing up, Callias held my arm with his right hand and with his left he grabbed my cloak.”

115 “So I stood up and got ready to leave, but he took hold of my outer garment and said that I must not leave until I keep my promise”


117 ἵματιον is certainly the more common term for clothes or a coat and is often used in the Platonic Dialogue in illustrations and common usage (Phaed. 73 D5, 87 C2, 87 D2, 273 B5; Charm. 155 D3, 161 E11, 165 E7; Theat. 165 C1, 197 B9; HpMt. 368 C4). But it is never associated with the attire of Socrates. Besides the reference mentioned above, there is a passage in the Symposium which reinforces the idea that Socrates’ dress was notably unique. During Alcibiades’ defence of Socrates he mentions an occasion when he switched his own coat (τὸ ἵματιον) for the cloak of Socrates (τὸν τρίβων) (Symp. 219B) as an act of sacrifice for this “truly spiritual and miraculous creature.” Also see Symp. 220B where Alcibiades again describes the dress of Socrates saying that he was “clad in just the sort of coat (ἱματιόν) he was always wont to wear.” While the particular word is not used here, there is a distinction made from just an ordinary coat.


119 Dial. 30 & 35 are the examples of Justin's polemical capabilities within
the Trypho Text. This is relatively mild compared to the more severe words in the non-Trypho material, esp. *Dial*. 119, 130–33, 16–17, & 123. See chapter 4.

120 E.G. *Dial*. 46.2. where Justin asks what can be observed now that the temple is destroyed, and *Dial*. 1.3 where Justin questions Trypho’s attitude to the prophets.

121 “Socrates’ acceptance is quite polite, but we cannot help feeling that Protagoras has failed a test.” R.B. Rutherford, *The Art of Plato* (London, 1995) 139.

122 Ibid., 13.

123 This is not true across the board for Socrates. Gorgias is respected by Socrates, while others are derided by Socrates especially in *The Sophist*. Protagoras seems to be a good middle-ground figure, because he is neither totally revered nor is he summarily dismissed as a crook. Regardless of Plato’s individual depictions of different sophists, it appears that Socrates did not make qualitative distinctions and tended to sweep aside sophists with a wide broom. The example of this is found in the beginning of the *Prot* (313-314) where Socrates warns his friend not to go to the Sophist, even when he knows it is Protagoras, a Sophist he respects. Regardless of who it was, going to a Sophist was just not a good idea.

124 M. Edwards. “On the Platonic Schooling of Justin Martyr” *JTS* 42 (1991) 17-34 has noted that Justin’s particular style may reflect a shift to the magisterial style of pedagogy and philosophical discourse, which was filtered through the writings of Numenius and passed on to Justin, at least as far as a the Spermatikos Logos is concerned. But this is may also have been the philosophical manifestation of the larger trend seen in the Second Sophistic.


127 Swain, 99 “The appearance of ‘sophist’ on honorary and funerary inscriptions for the first century (whatever the meaning of the term in each case) goes some way to supporting Philostratus’ contention (VS 511) that this period saw the emergence of public speakers who claimed to be heirs of the classical sophists.”

128 Swain (1996) 69. He offers the example of Favorinus; a second-century philosopher who attempted to cast himself as a Greek through his attisized language.

129 Ibid., 49. See Lucian’s *A Slip of the Tongue in Greeting*.


131 Swain (1996) 57.
132 This is probably a reference to Socrates as he is portrayed in Aristophanes' *Clouds*.

133 Kennedy (1972) 572.

134 R. Gilbert, *Plato's Progress*, (Bristol, 1994).

135 The comparison between the rhetorical style of Christian Apologists and the Second Sophistic writers is an area in need of further inquiry. To my knowledge this particular issue has not been addressed.


138 A. von Hilgenfeld, *Die Clementinischen Recognitionen und Homilien nach ihrem Ursprung und Inhalt dargestellt* (Jena, 1848) 1. He thinks that the original basis for the work was the εἰρηνικός Πέτρου and that there are three other parts besides: one against Basilides, the second on the travels of Peter, and the third the Recognitions. He also believes there are many other interpolated passages of a much later date than any of these.

139 I am following the Catholic Encyclopedia's definition of prophecy. “Understood in its strict sense, it means the foreknowledge of future events, though it may sometimes apply to past events of which there no memory, and to present hidden things which cannot be known by the natural light of reason.”

140 Paul's self-apologetic as the long-suffering apostle of Christ may be related to the authority of his prophetic message.

141 I am indebted to Alistair Stewart-Sykes who first made this connection for me. *Elenchus: Electronic Discussion Group of Religion in Late Antiquity* (21 July 1999).

142 Those who believed the apostolic Hermas to be the author thought the book was revelatory. A few important early Christian writers held the opinion that it was inspired. Irenaeus quotes it as scripture (*Adversus Haereses*, 4.20.2.) Clement of Alexandria speaks of it as making its statements “divinely” (*Strom.*, 1.21) and Origen, though a few of his expressions are regarded by some as implying doubt, unquestionably gives it as his opinion that it is “divinely inspired.” (*Comment. on Rom.* 16.4).


146 Whereas the Ethiopic MS provides a synopsis of Jesus’ life and miracles as a prologue (1-12), the Coptic version of the text begins with the condemnation of their teachings.

147 Translation of the Ethiopian text from J. K. Elliot (1993) 566.

148 E. Osborn, (1973) makes no mention of chapter 142 in this central text on the life of Justin. L.W. Barnard (1967) makes only three references to chapter 142 but makes no mention of the Dialogue’s ending. A.L. Williams (1930) i-xliti, also makes no mention of Trypho’s lack of conversion. His only reference to chapter 142 is to illustrate the cordiality of Trypho who said that he really enjoyed the discussion and would love to do it again sometime (142.2). O. Skarsaune, (1987) gives a detailed analysis of the entire Dialogue up through chapter 141, only mentioning 142.1 to note Justin’s departure. M. Hirshman (1996) deals extensively with the interactions between Justin and Trypho yet does not mention that Trypho is unconverted. C. Setzer (1994) 129, does take note of Trypho’s non-conversion, but immediately goes on to assert Justin’s complete control of the Dialogue and its contents. She does not address the question of why Justin choose to let Trypho appear unmoved. In a similar treatment, H. Remus (1986), highlights the impasse. He sees this clash as perfectly natural “given the rooting of Jews like Trypho in the vigorous Jewish communities”(74). He, like Setzer, does not attempt to address the question of why Justin would allow this to be the case, since he had complete control of the text and thus the outcome of the debate. S.G. Wilson (1995) 265, leans toward reading the ending as a “shoring up of Christian confidence in face of Jewish propaganda more than a genuine desire to convert the Jews”. J. Lieu (1996) 106 sees the ending as lending a touch of realism to the text, although overall she does believe that the reader is intended to walk away with a sense of Jewish obduracy (112).

149 M. Hoffmann (1966), 19,


151 Trakatellis (1986) 296, thinks that the ending to the Dialogue is perfectly consistent with Justin’s portrayal of Trypho as a “debater who combined personal warmth, independence of mind and faithfulness to his tradition, freedom to talk and to listen.” He goes on to write, however, that this picture reveals more of Justin’s noble character than it does Trypho. Trakatellis’ interpretation helps to balance to some of the more negative opinions of Justin and Trypho but it is all too rosy and passes over the more unsavory bits of the discourse.

152 Stylianopoulos (1975) explains that this is directly connected to Justin’s strong remnant theology (esp. 39-44). Trypho’s non-conversion is a symbol that “the fate of the Jews is not sealed. The door is left open for possible reconciliation. The ending of the Dialogue is a literary masterpiece which cannot
be attributed to Justin's literary talents alone, since they often fail him in the
Dialogue, nor to his irenic disposition, since it is broken by polemics, but also to
his assumption that the possibility of reaching Trypho and the Jews indeed exists”
(35). This explanation has some merit but draws too heavily on Justin's remnant
theory. If his goal in the Dialogue was to prove the existence of a remnant, why
not have Trypho convert to prove that Jews will and can be a part of the Christian
family? Trypho's lack of conversion cannot be sustained by Stylianopoulos's
explanation alone.

153 Voss (1970) 28 sees the ending as “ultimately, an expression of hope for
further fruitful talks.” (dem Ausdruck der Hoffnung auf weitere fruchtbare
Gesprächen). But the reasons for this are not based on any remnant theory, instead it
is due to a perceived similarity to the Platonic Dialogues.

154 How Trypho knew of Justin’s journey is a mystery. There may be other
parts of the original dialogue that were not included in the extant version. My
contention is not that the Trypho Text is complete – the floating chapters militate
such a conclusion – rather I am forwarding the hypothesis that the dialogue
material we have - The Trypho Text – is authentic.

155 Hermotimus speaks: “Your argument is true and I’m driven to this: I’m
in anguish at the time I have wasted like a fool” (83). He goes on to promise to
shave his beard, wear purple, even drink poison if it makes him vomit all the past
teaching he has received. “I think I might well shave my head like free men who
are saved from shipwreck, to give thanks for safety (σωτηρία) today, now that I
have had so heavy a mist shaken from my eyes. If in future I ever meet a
philosopher while I am walking on the road, even by chance, I will turn round and
get out of his way as if he were a mad dog”(86) Trans. by K. Kilburn. Loeb
Edition. The same kind of dramatic concessions can be seen in Lucian’s The
Dance and The Parasite.

156 Goodenough (1923) simply assumed the impulse to convert without
making any mention of his motivation at all. Barnard (1964) vii. describes
Justin’s actions as coming from a deep and powerful sense of mission and leaves it
at that. Williams (1940) ix simply notes that Justin felt a strong sense of duty and
responsibility to impart his knowledge of the Scriptures. Stylianopoulos (1975)
also assumes Justin’s impulse to convert to be a natural part of his Christian faith.

157 Ibid., 278.

158 I am in agreement with S.G. Wilson, who is also sceptical of Chadwick’s
sunny picture and suspects that Justin is subconsciously aware that his argument is
“not so obvious or persuasive” (Wilson, 1995) 294.

159 This may have a parallel with Paul and the boundaries of his mission. In
the case of the Corinthians, Paul expresses his wariness of baptizing members of
the Corinthian church because of the schism it caused (1 Cor. 1:17). He is not,
however, sorry that he taught them the gospel. It is his role as proclaimer and
preacher in which Paul finds the core of his motivation. We cannot therefore
assume that Paul’s preaching de facto included baptism or even a call for immediate conversion.

160 Perhaps this is also an echo of Paul: “and woe to me if I do not proclaim the gospel” (I Cor. 6:16).


162 This is Skarsaune's (1987) main theory on Justin’s proof-texts. I would depart only slightly from Skarsaune's idea that nearly everything Justin wrote came from a “source”. In Skarsaune's estimation, Justin is not much more than a collator of the many different Christian Old Testament proof-text traditions. While it would presumptuous to contend with Skarsaune's detailed analysis of Justin’s arguments in the Dialogue in this chapter, it is enough to say that Skarsaune assumes that external sources are directly behind almost every idea in Justin’s thinking. This is a difficult case to prove given the paucity of sources before Justin.

163 VisonB (1988) has also noted that Justin takes on the role of the Old Man, but he attributes this to the literary form of the Dialogue and thus discounts the ending as a literary flourish (54). He makes this assumption citing Voss and Hoffmann. His further assertion that Platonic models are similar to the Dialogue in that they are not designed to confound but predispose the listener to the truth appears to miss the genius of the Socratic method which is precisely to confound and disturb the listener’s sense of Truth.


165 Skarsaune (1987) 54. In this context Skarsaune is referring to Justin’s conception of Christianity as the true philosophy. But, it is also helpful in explaining Justin’s assumptions and motivations for his evangelistic impulse.

166 A few chapters later Justin is again involved in a defence of the virgin birth. Here Justin reminds Trypho of the unusual births by the mothers of Samuel, Isaac and Esau, John the Baptist, and others. “So you should not conclude that it is impossible for God to do whatever he wills (οὐ λείπει τὰ ὄντα)” (Dial. 84.4). It should be noted that this passage does not appear in the Trypho Text. But it can still stand as an example of Justin ignoring Trypho’s criteria for proof even in the non-Trypho material.

167 As we will see in a later section, this accusation is a misunderstanding of Trypho’s central demand. Justin believes Trypho is going back on his word when it is Justin who is not addressing Trypho’s question about Jesus.

168 Quote from L. Levine, Judaism and Hellenism in Antiquity: Conflict or Confluence? (Seattle, 1998) xi.

169 Gruen (1998) 296 sees the proliferation of Jewish-Hellenistic writing in broad terms and does not restrict the influence of these writings to their supposed provenance. This means that Jews throughout the empire would have had access
to Jewish-Hellenistic writings, even if they only supplemented Greco-Roman Jewish education.

170 Justin does use the term in I Apology 4.5. In this context it carries a philosophical meaning as it does in Trypho’s usage. It is also worth noting that this also draws the figure of Trypho and Socrates even closer because Justin used the word philosophically in another setting. The fact that he attributes the same word to Trypho is significant.

171 Trypho’s recommendation (Dial. 8.4) for Justin to follow the Jewish Law must be understood in the light of his earlier comment (Dial. 8.3) that Justin would have done better to have stayed with the philosophers than become a Christian.


173 See chapter 7 for a more detailed discussion on God-fearers.


175 Plato’s Republic 2.377D; 3.398A.

176 Along with Josephus, Contra Apionen 2.239-254.

177 Justin is making a general inference about Hosea’s meaning. It is assumed that he is referring to Hosea chapters 1 and 2: 1–13.


179 Circumcidere genitalia instituerunt ut diversitate noscantur. (In order to make themselves known as a different people, they instituted genital circumcision) Hist. 5.5. The reference is in Stylianopoulos (1975) 38.

180 Ibid., 140

181 J. Siker, Disinheriting the Jews: Abraham in Early Christian Controversy, (Westminster, 1994), holds that Abraham is the lynch-pin of Justin’s argument.

182 Ibid., 170.

183 Ibid., 169.

184 See Williams (1930) 234 for a discussion on the use of the imagery of stone in Dial.114.4. See also R. Murray, Symbols of Church and Kingdom: A Study in Early Syriac Tradition (Cambridge, 1975) for the significance of Christ as a stone, or rock in Christian metaphor during this period, especially in Syriac Christianity.

185 Stylianopoulos also notes Justin’s particular problem with circumcision. “In the case of circumcision, the purpose which Justin perceives in this commandment is so peculiar and so different from his general thesis [that the Mosaic Law is no longer functional] that it deserves separate attention” (p.133).
The footnote to this quote adds: “It may be noted that scholars who have written on Justin usually view what he has to say about circumcision as one example of his central thesis about the Law's purpose.” This is exactly what Siker as well as Paul Donahue (1973) have done.

186 Of course, the comparison to Hebrews comes to mind. But in Hebrews the concern with Melchizedek is priestly. The writer of Hebrews uses Melchizedek (Gen. 14:17–20) and the reference to Psalm 110:4 to circumvent the Second Temple priesthood and establish a non-levitic and therefore superior line for Jesus. Justin’s concern is not theological, priestly, or christological. It is bound up with his view of conversion, in this case Jewish conversion.


188 This is an unspoken assumption in much of the scholarship which analyses Justin’s argument with Judaism. Horbury (1998) makes the connection clearer when he is speaking about the possible presence of Jewish teachers in the Diaspora: “It is likely that diaspora teachers would have had some direct or indirect contact with rabbinic schools in Galilee and Judaea; Trypho is represented in Justin’s Dialogue, presumably not implausibly, as a refugee from Judaea in Greece and Corinth” (160).

189 This is Justin’s final exhortation in the Dialogue, for Trypho and his companions to reject the teachings of their teachers in favour of Christ (Dial. 142.2). Throughout the Dialogue Justin is aware of the Jewish teachers and focuses on them as the sole barrier to conversion (Dial 110.1; 112.4–5; 117.3; 137.1). See S.G. Wilson (1995) 282–284; J. Lieu, Image and Reality (1996) 129–132 for a helpful outline of this split. Marc Hirshman, A Rivalry of Genius: Jewish and Christian Biblical Interpretation in Late Antiquity, translated by Batya Stein (Albany: SUNY Press, 1996) 34 also sees this difference. He thinks that the raison d’être of the document is to ‘drive a wedge’ between Trypho, along with Jews like him, and the Jewish teachers. After all, the bulk of Justin’s argument combats Jewish critiques or competing Jewish interpretations of key Christian texts (see Skarsaune, 1987 passim). This is somewhat reminiscent of the Christian apocryphal work “The Acts of Pilate” in The Apocryphal New Testament, J. Eliott (ed.), (Oxford, 1993) 169–184. (esp. 5.2–8.1) which depicted a split between the Jewish leaders and the Jewish people. Even though the extant text dates from as late as the fifth century, some threads of the its narrative are possibly rooted in the second century C.E. Justin refers to a collection of Acta which occurred under Pilate (I Apol. 35, 48) and Epiphanius (Ad. Haer. 50.1) refers to details which we know from the Acts of Pilate. This evidence is not conclusive, but it does hint at the possibility that speculation about Pilate was active in the second-century.

190 This is somewhat reminiscent of Matt. 23:2 ff., but in the Matthew passage the Jewish teachers are to be respected and obeyed in their teaching but not in their hypocrisy. Justin makes no such division. In fact, Justin is far more concerned about what these teachers teach than what they practise.
Wood is a familiar theme in Justin and he explores this in most creative ways (esp. Dial. 84 & 138) even if the clause is spurious. This in fact was not deleted from the LXX but was added later by Christians. See J. Daniélou, Early Latin Christianity (Philadelphia, 1971) 118–123 for a full explication of this phenomenon. Ironically, when Justin gives the entire quote directly after this statement (Dial. 73.2) the phrase is left out. This could certainly be an error of the copyists, but it is a strange omission nonetheless.

193 There has been a fair amount of speculation as to whether this refers to the Birkath Ha–Minim. William Horbury (1998), 67–110 has made a detailed analysis of this prayer and the identity of the minim. While he interprets the phrase in very general terms and sees it used in a variety of ways in the rabbinic literature about a variety of people, he still concludes that the curse did refer to Christians. S.G. Wilson (1995) takes a more reserved approach to this issue. He provides a very good synopsis of the state of modern scholarship on this issue (179–183). He concludes that the curse on the minim was developed over a long period of time and should not be read through the Christian bias that Jews were threatened by the rise and growing prominence of Christianity. There is no evidence in the Dialogue that Trypho is threatened by Christianity and any of Justin’s arguments, even if he does at times find them offensive or inconsistent. As far as Dial. 137 is concerned, it is impossible to make any firm conclusions as to its meaning or purpose. Even if this is a reference to the Birkath Ha–Minim, it does not mean that the curse was in widespread use. Justin does not appear to know much about Judaism in the Diaspora, judging by his ignorance of Trypho and his expression of Judaism. It should also be remembered that this passage – along with many of the passages referring to the Jewish teachers – is not included in the Trypho Text. Justin certainly differentiated between teachers and everyone else, but this distinction does not play a major role in the Trypho Text. In the expanded Dialogue, Justin takes more time and liberty with his treatment of the Jewish teachers.

194 This is an odd use of the word by Justin. It occurs in two other places in Justin (Dial. 27.5 and 29.3) but in both the reference is historic. In this case he uses it as though there was still an active priesthood. It is likely that this is a word that is juxtapositioned against the more contemporary διδάσκαλοι in order to account for all Jewish leaders from the time of Jesus until his own time.

195 The extent to which Justin meant the ‘whole world’ should be viewed sceptically. In the next sentence Justin attempts to prove that Christianity is the religion that encompasses the whole world not Judaism. “Learn rather that you are speaking falsely and are trying to deceive yourselves in everything. For first, your race is not even now ‘from the rising of the sun to its setting’ [Mal. 1:10–12], for there are nations among which none of your race has ever dwelt” (Dial. 117.4). How the teachers could have the name of Jesus profaned throughout the whole world and yet not have Jews in every land is a logical contradiction of the first order. It points to Justin’s apologetic agenda more than any historical phenomenon. Again, these passages do not appear in the Trypho Text.
195 Contra R. Stark, *The Rise of Christianity: A Sociologist Reconsiders History* (Princeton, 1996) 49–72 who supports the idea of a successful mission to the Jews. His interesting sociological findings are unfortunately supported by a narrow understanding of Jews and Judaism in the Diaspora. He takes a traditional view that Jews outside Palestine were syncretistic and had been thoroughly ‘hellenized’ (57-59). He builds his premise of a successful mission to the Jews on the assumption that they would have been more susceptible to conversion while Jews within Palestine would have been more insulated. The assumption that Jews living outside Palestine felt disenfranchised and thus were more susceptible to conversion to Christianity is laden with faulty perceptions of Jews living in the Diaspora. Drawing a parallel between nineteenth-century Jews who were attracted to Reform Judaism and Diaspora Jews who were drawn to Christianity is equally unhelpful (52-54).


197 A.H. Goldfahn, “Justinus Martyr und die Agada”, MGWJ 22 (1873) 49-269 is the standard work which deals only with Justin’s accuracy concerning those teaching which he reports to be Jewish. Trypho is not considered by Goldfahn or subsequent scholarship. See also A. Harnack (1913); A.J. Higgins, “Jewish Messianic Belief in Justin Martyr’s Dialogue with Trypho” NT 9 (1967) 295-309; M. Hirshmann, “Polemic Literary Units in the Classical Midrashim and Justin Martyr’s Dialogue with Trypho” JQR (1992-3) 369-84; W.A. Shotwell, *The Biblical Exegesis of Justin Martyr* (London, 1965); & P. Sigal (1978-9).


199 Ibid., 378.

200 *Beresh. R.* on Gen 19.1. In 18.3. Michael is identified as the archangel. Michael is also identified in *Beresh. R. ha Gadol* (Schecter col. 266) on Gen. 18.2. There is a distinction made between the three angels and the Shekinah who is thought to have been present throughout.

201 E. Urbach, *The Sages – Their Concepts and Beliefs* (Jerusalem, 1979) is more confident that the Shekinah is a literary device that allowed God to be present with Israel without suggesting any duality. “In Tannaitic literature, the term Shekinah is used when the manifestation of the Lord and his nearness to man are spoken of” (p.43). The Mishna, however, has only two references to the Shekinah. Sanh. 6.5 mentions the Shekinah in passing, but Ab. 3.2 discusses the Shekinah in the context of study. “But if two sit together and the words of the Law [are spoken] between them, the Divine Presence [Shekinah] rests between them.” Later Talmudic tradition tended to stress the encounter the Shekinah in the study of Torah (*Pirkei Avot* 3.6). While early rabbinic examples do not address the presence of the Shekinah at Mamre or in the burning bush per se, the idea that the Shekinah was the presence of God on earth is not ruled out by the understanding of the Divine Presence as the emanation of God.

202 This was discussed in *Dial.* 75. However, it is only five chapters away
in the reconstructed Trypho Text.

203 Hirshman (1996) 56, thinks that this reference has more to do with Justin's theology, which has synthesized three passages from Isaiah (1:13, 56:6, & 66:23) and then filtered it through Colossians 2:16. He mentions the importance of fixing each month within the tannaitic tradition, but thinks that this is not applicable to Trypho, who does not mention the nasi of the Sanhedrin. The fact that Trypho does not mention the nasi does not lead to the conclusion that dating would not have been important to Jews outside this circle. If Justin put this list together for rhetorical purposes, his time was wasted because he does not use it for any obvious purpose.

204 This might be related to the cycle of the moon (mahazor ha–levanah) and the establishments of the first day of the month (rosh hodesh) (see Tosephta Sanh. 2.2 & 11b). The group at Qumran appear to represent a group of Jews who used their calendar (Solar) to bypass the priesthood in Jerusalem, resurrecting what they believed to be the calendar of the First Temple as an act of pious rebellion.

205 Cf. Josephus' Ant. 3.238 (τῇ νομηματι).

206 See M. Rosh Hashanah 2:9

207 See E.P. Sanders, Judaism, Practice and Belief (London, 1992) 223 who describes the proximity of some synagogues to water.

208 The list of prohibitions to the gentile congregants at Antioch (Acts 15:29) is similar in its pairing of impure blood and sexual activity, but Acts refers to fornication (πορνείας) and the list in the Dialogue has no such negative connotation (ἐν σκοντοσίᾳ γενόμενον). See also P. Veyne, A History of Private Life, trans. A. Goldhammer (Cambridge, 1987) 11 who notes that bathing after sexual intercourse was not uncommon in the Roman world.


210 Ibid., 59. He suggests that dietary laws were excluded because of the similarity with Christians, but this could not be the case. Early Christians, at least those who respected Paul, found part of their self–identity in jettisoning food restrictions. The comparison with the list in the Mekhila does provide support for Trypho's list, but there are problems with dating this document so early. The hurdles to establishing such a link are myriad.

211 When comparing this passage from the Mekhila – which is not found in Lauterbach's edition – we are confronted and ultimately stifled by the question of influence and dating. I have included this passage not in an attempt to date the Mekhila, but to use it as an example of the kinds of restructuring that may have been occurring within Judaism during the turbulence of the second and third centuries C.E.

212 See C. Hezser, The Social Structure of the Rabbinic Movement in Roman Palestine, (Tübingen, 1997) for an analysis of the limited scope of the
tannaitic circles during the Mishnaic period.

213 The debate about the identity of the ‘God–Fearers’ is far from settled. See chapter 6 for a more detailed discussion of this topic.

214 Justin’s tripartite division of the Mosaic Law into those commandments that either 1) produce true righteousness through the practice of those universally good precepts which have been folded into the Law, 2) keep Jews away from idolatry, or 3) anticipate the Christ event and prefigure institutions of the Church, e.g. Baptism and the Eucharist, is fully investigated in T. Stylianopoulos, (1975) 47–69.

215 This is reminiscent of Paul's assertion that observance of the Mosaic Law is made irrelevant by the Christ event, although Justin is more accepting of its practice as long as this Pauline distinction is maintained.

216 Justin had already developed the daimon theory in the I Apology. There he instructed his audience to believe the concept behind the Greek myths but not to be fooled by them, for they are the invention of the wicked daimones (φαύλους δειμόνων) (I Ap. 54-58). In an attempt to deflect the impact of Isaiah 7:14, the daimones propagated this myth as a smoke screen to make people think that Christianity is an imitation of Greek myths. Justin asserts that, in fact, the Greek myths are the imitations which came before Christ. Justin modifies the scenario slightly in the Dialogue making Satan (διάβολος) the trickster who imitated the Christian story among the Greeks (Dial. 69.1). Justin does not give as much attention to this theory in the Dialogue as in the Apologies. Instead, it is the adoptionistic comment which Justin chooses to address.


220 CPJ 2.160-229 for examples of payment. CPJ 421 is a good example of the kind of familial detail that was necessary to determine the exact amount of the tax, at least in Egypt.


224 Josephus describes the priesthood as if it is still in effect in Contra Apionem. Even as late as the latter part of the second century, the Mishnah describes the sacrificial cult as if it is still in operation. This seems to reflect the expectation that the Temple will be rebuilt. This kind of language is usually read figuratively, but it is just as likely that it expressed the language of expectation as well.

225 See also S.G. Wilson (1995) 285–301 and J.D.G. Dunn (1991) 230–243. This deterioration of relations with Rome was also exacerbated by the revolts in 115 and 117C.E. in Egypt and Cyrenaica.


229 See Trebilco (1991) 92–94 for a more detailed interpretation of these special coins. While I share with Trebilco the conclusion that these coins are a sign of Jewish integration and influence, it must also be remembered that they are uncommon and cannot be used to support broad conclusions about the vibrancy of Jewish/gentile interactions. Nevertheless, when they are taken together with other kinds of evidence they have a cumulative effect which points to a picture of Diaspora Judaism which was neither defensive nor reclusive.

230 Grounds for establishing a Jewish community come predictably from Josephus where he records a few degrees granting them freedom to practice their customs in safe areas (Ant. 14.235, 259–61; 16. 171).

231 Trebilco (1991) 57.


(Chico, Calif., 1981) 82.

234 This stele was found and published in J.M. Reynolds and R. Tannenbaum, Jews and Godfearers at Aphrodisias (Cambridge Philological Society Suppl. 12, 1987).


236 J. Lieu, ‘The Race of the God–Fearers’, JTS 45 (October 1995) 483–501 is an extremely helpful counterbalance to scholarly interpretations of this term which ignore its varied literary uses. She shows that the title was one which both Christian and Jewish groups used to describe themselves in a favourable light. Her interpretation of the Aphrodisias stele in the light of its literary usage is very helpful: “That the term could equally be used of, or claimed by, those non–Jews who put into action their attraction for or active patronage of Judaism is self–evident; the Aphrodisias inscription fits well here – the label is an appreciation of patronage and not an acknowledgment of obedience to certain practices” (498–99). Her conclusion is supported by those Jewish inscriptions which refer to Jews as God–fearers. The seats at Miletus (see discussion below) support this general usage. Additionally, we have a donor inscription – almost certainly Jewish – which states: ‘Aurelius Eulogies, God–fearing (θεοφόβος). I fulfilled a vow’ (Inscription in L. Robert, Nouvelle inscriptions de Sardes. (Paris, 1964) 39. The literary and epigraphic usage of this term should temper any hard and fast commitment to a theory of a separate group of God–fearing gentiles who worshiped the Jewish God without being fully converted. The Aphrodisias stele seems to confirm the presence of a group similar to the one described in Luke (contra A.T. Kraabel, ‘Synagoga Caeca: Systematic Distortion in Gentile Interpretations of the Evidence for Judaism in the Early Christian Period’, in J. Neusner and E.S. Frerichs (eds.), To See Ourselves as Others See Us: Jews, Christians, and ‘Others’ in Late Antiquity (Chico, California, 1985), 219–46). However, Lieu points out that words can take on different meanings over time. Later uses of the term should not be read back onto an earlier period. In other words, the use of the term at Aphrodisias should not be read in the light of Luke, nor should Luke be read in the light of the stele. The time between them is too great and the uses too varied.


238 Trebilco (1991) 70–1, cites four of the eight.

239 A.T. Kraabel (1968) 32.

241 Perhaps this is why Trypho thinks the curse associated with crucifixion is so intimidating. It is, after all, one of the Deuteronomic curses.


243 L. Robert, “Maledictions Funéraires Grecques”, CRAIBL (1978) 245–9. This use by a confirmed non-Jew opens up the question of whether it is appropriate to use the Deuteronomic passage alone to determine the ethnicity of the writer. Also see P.W. van der Horst, Ancient Jewish Epitaphs (Kampen:1991) 54-60 for more inscriptions using Jewish curses, but without much analysis or discussion of their possible meaning.


245 Ibid.,

246 S.J.D. Cohen, “‘Those Who Say They are Jews and Are Not’: How Do You Know a Jew in Antiquity When You See One?”, in S.J.D. Cohen and E.S. Frerichs (eds.), Diasporas in Antiquity (Atlanta, 1993) 17–35.

247 With E. Schürer (1973); T. Rajak (1985); B. Lifshitz, “Beiträge zur griechisch-jüdischen Epigraphik”, ZDPV 82 (1966) 57-63; and Trebilco (1991) who read this in the light of the Aphrodisias stele and must then assert a scribal error which reversed what should have read κός τῶν. This error thus changed the entire meaning of the inscription, shifting the piety away from Jews to a separate group of gentiles. This reading is then used as further support for a separate group of pious gentiles who worshipped in the synagogue.

248 This is the straightforward grammatical reading of this inscription with L. Feldman, “Jewish ‘Sympathizers’ in Classical Literature and Inscriptions”, TAPA 81 (1950) 204; CIJ 748; L. Robert (1964) 41; F. Siegert, “Gottesfürchtige und Sympathisanten”, JSJ 4 (1973) 159–60; M. Wilcox, “The “God-Fearers” in Acts – A Reconsideration”, JSNT 13 (1981) 112–13, and J. Lieu (1995) 496. This reading has the advantage of following the simple rendering of the text even if it does not necessarily fit neatly with the religious interpretation of the Aphrodisias material. I favour this reading because there are no underlying assumptions beneath it and it can be understood in its extant form. If it was the mason’s error, why did the Jews allow it? It would have been quite a glaring grammatical error. Because these seats were in a prominent position in the theatre, it is unthinkable that the patrons would have allowed such a mistake to stand. Moreover, the ‘two groups’ reading of this inscription rests its case on too many assumptions, some of which are based on suppositions about the pagan attitudes to Jews. Lifshitz (1966) 62-3 steers away from the simple reading of the text because it would have been an affront to the non-Jews to attach such a title to their seats. He also thinks that the theatre management would not have allowed such an inscription.
However, if the seats belonged to the Jews, then they presumably could put anything they wished on them. Apparently, the management did allow the inscription to stand in spite of the stone mason’s error. It is difficult to believe the scenario where Jews and the theatre management negotiate on the correct appellation for this group of gentile sympathizers. But after finally accepting the Jewish label for them, the stone mason ends up reversing two crucial words and undoing the entire intent. On top of this, we are expected to believe that the management allowed it to stand even though it was an affront to its pagan customers and simply incorrect. Rajak’s assertion (1985) that this kind of syntactical blunder is “not unusual” among provincial notices is difficult to support (258). She does not, however, consider their importance to those who purchased and occupied them. In light of these strained interpretations, Lieu’s observations are more measured. Such a title could act as a bridge between Jews and non-Jews, thus showing outsiders the strength of Jewish piety (Lieu (1997) 501–02). Moreover, there is no reason to maintain an a priori disdain for anything Jewish by the Romans, after all they allowed Jews to hold prominent seats in the amphitheatre in the first place, regardless of whether they attended with a separate group of gentiles.


256 A.B. Hulen expresses it thus: “Even Josephus represented his people as second to none in antiquity, glorious traditions, literature, and civilization; and he possessed a vigor which this speaker [Trypho] lacks. For a faithful representation of the Judaism of the Second Century we can therefore hardly look to figures like Trypho” (63).


258 *Dial.* 47.4 might be included in this list, but the reference is pointed more toward Jewish leaders in the synagogues than to Jews in general. It should therefore be included in those polemical statements aimed at Jewish authority figures.

259 See *Dial.* 96.2 which is a combined reference to Matt. 5:44 and Luke
6:35.


262 It is interesting to note that if Origen knew of Justin’s daimon theory, he chose not to use it here. Instead he says that the Christian story is different because it has caused people to improve themselves and has brought about the conversion from evil (*Cels.* 1.67). I find it hard to believe that if Origen had known Justin’s theory he would not even have mentioned it. It is an elaborate argument that may have appealed to Origen’s imagination.


265 S.G. Wilson (1995) sees this as the closest parallel between the two disputants (282).

266 W. Bousset (1915) 282–308 even went so far as to posit the idea of an original source which was split up into nine different topics. This was based on the assumption that Justin produced these tracts as a part of his scholarship. On the basis of Justin’s diction, he sensed that there was an original document which had spread throughout the chapters. But it was an idea which was not pursued. As far as I am aware, this is as close as any scholar has come to identifying something like the Trypho Text.

267 Marcovich (1999) amends 80.1 to read: ὅτι ἀσφαλὴς <ἐσῃ εἶ> ἐν πάσῃ... This makes the clause conditional. “I told you earlier, sir that if you cling to the Scriptures then you will be safe.” Apparently, Marcovich’s emendation is designed to fit with Trypho’s earlier statement at 56.16, but Trypho’s statement in chapter 56 does not have a future sense. He simply states that he would not have put up with Justin’s crazy ideas if he did not base them on scripture. Marcovich’s emendation does not change the basic meaning of the statement.

268 In his notes, Marcovich (1997) 100 indicates that he is following Thirlby in these changes and that Thirlby modified A by changing Trypho to the nominative, putting at the beginning of 19.1 and changing the verb the the 2nd
plural. Marcovich appears to be following a mistake first made by Maran.

"Restituenda ergo haec verba Tryphoni et pro φυλάσσομεν legendum
φυλάσσετε. Legit editor Londinensis [Thirlby] Καὶ ὁ Τρύφων, Τοῦτο...
φυλάσσετε." (P.G. vol. 6, 515) But this is simply not accurate. Thirlby follows
A exactly in this case.

269 Otto (1843) 515.

270 The Καὶ ὁ Τρύφων formula is very common in Dialogue. It occurs
25 times and was often used by Maran to mark chapters (27.1; 28.1; 32.1; 35.1;
39.7; 45.1; 48.1; 49.1,6; 50.1; 56.12,16; 57.3; 58.2; 60.1,3; 63.1; 64.1; 67.5;
68.1,2,4,5; 73.5; & 89.1). Even though Maran did not modify the text, he made a
chapter division at 19.1. This is further evidence that Maran was convinced that
this was Trypho speaking.

271 For instance, see Plato's Gorgias 5.275E and Philonikos 515E.