Agrarian change in Zimbabwe: politics, production and accumulation

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ABSTRACT

The analysis of agrarian change presented in this thesis integrates state practices and wider politics to the study of rural differentiation, using a case study of Zimbabwe. Most studies of agrarian change in the 21st century have tried to come to grips with rural differentiation in Africa, its causes and effects, by using particular models such as those of neo-classical economics, livelihood approaches, Marxist analysis of accumulation and social and cultural networks, or a combination of variables from the four approaches. However, these theoretical approaches fail to comprehensively integrate the role of the state and politics into the analysis of rural differentiation. My study explains differentiation by exploring beneficiary selection, production and accumulation processes on Zimbabwe's Fast Track land reform resettlement schemes. Fast Track involved a series of partisan and violent invasions of largely white owned commercial farms from 2000, which constituted the largest land redistribution in post-colonial Africa. Scholars exploring politics and the Zimbabwean state have not applied their insights to an analysis of field based data on production and accumulation on Zimbabwe's resettlement farms. I argue that the restructuring of the state and politics as an instrument of violence and as a site of accumulation dominated by patronage-both justified through ideology-was central to agrarian change after 2000. I find the three concepts of violence, patronage and ideology more useful in capturing the nuances and modalities of empirical realities on resettlement schemes than neo-patrimonial theories that provide generalised accounts of the African state. Though still acknowledging the role of other differentiating factors such as social networks, hard work by resettled farmers and economic factors, it is through the integration of political processes into the analysis of agrarian change that, I argue, one can understand better the dynamics shaping rural differentiation in post-2000 Zimbabwe.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AIAS	Africa Institute of Agrarian Studies
ARDA	Agricultural Rural Development Authority
ASPEF	Agriculture Sector Productivity Enhancement Facility
BSAC	British South African Company
CFU	Commercial Farmers Union
CIO	Central Intelligence Organization
COTTCO	Cotton Company of Zimbabwe
CSC	Cold Storage Commission
DLC	District Land Committee
ESAP	Economic Structural Adjustment Programme
GAPWUZ	General Agriculture and Plantation Workers Union of Zimbabwe
GoZ	Government of Zimbabwe
JPS	Journal of Peasant Studies
UDI	Unilateral Declaration of Independence
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
MDC	Movement for Democratic Change
MP	Member of Parliament
NCA	National Constitutional Assembly
NLHA	Native Land Husbandry Act
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NFAZ	National Farmers' Association of Zimbabwe
PSF	Productive Sector Facility
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SAMA	Southern Africa Macadamia Association
VIDCOs	Village Development Committees
WADCOs	Ward Development Committees
PYD	Platform for Youth Development
ZANU	Zimbabwe African National Union
ZANU PF	Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front
ZAPU	Zimbabwe African People's Union
ZCTU	Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Union
ZRHDS	Zimbabwe Rural Household Dynamic Study
ZNA	Zimbabwe National Army
ZRP	Zimbabwe Republic Police
ZINASU	Zimbabwe National Students Union
ZNLWVA	Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association
ZUM	Zimbabwe Unity Movement

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Introduction

The analysis of agrarian change presented in this thesis integrates state practices and wider politics to the study of rural differentiation, using a case study of Zimbabwe. Most studies of agrarian change in the 21st century have tried to come to grips with rural differentiation, its causes and effects, by using particular models such as those of neo-classical economics, livelihood approaches, Marxist analysis of accumulation and social and cultural networks, or a combination of variables from the four approaches (Bernstein 2010, Berry 1993, Cliffe 1988, Cousins and Scoones 2010, Cousins *et al.* 1992, Dekker and Kinsey 2011, Kinsey 1999, 2004, Matondi 2011, Moyo *et al*. 2009, Peters 2004, Scoones *et al.* 2010). The combination of variables from different paradigms makes it difficult to classify individual authors in one paradigm. It is nonetheless important to highlight the central concepts from each analytical paradigm as they offer different explanations for processes of differentiation and agrarian change more broadly. However, none of these theoretical approaches effectively integrates the role of the state and politics in studying rural differentiation. The choice of analytical lens also has implications for the methodological approachas some theoretical paradigmsfocus more on outcomesrather than the processes that lead to rural inequalities. Understanding the effects of adopting differentapproaches is important because rural differentiation studies have both practical and political consequences. For example, rural differentiation studies shape how scholars, politicians and policy makers interpret the outcomes of land reform programs. They also shape agrarian debates about whether land reform can be the vehicle for rural development or the solution to unequal ownership of land inherited from colonial rule in post-colonial African states(see Bernstein 2004, Bush and Cliffe 1984, Cousins and Scoones 2010, Cousins *et al*. 1992, Dekker and Kinsey2011, Gunning*et al*. 2000, Hoogeven and Kinsey 2001, Kinsey 1999, 2004, Moyo *et al.*2009, Scoones *et al.* 2010).

The thesis focuses on Zimbabwe because the country provides a case of dramatic land reform,which is the largest in post-colonial Africa. The role of land reform in development is much debated both in academic and policy circles (Hall *et al*. 2009, World Development Report 2008). Zimbabwe's Fast Track Land Reform Programme (Fast Track) reconfigured the rural landscape and the political, economic and social relations in ways that need detailed empirical research to fully comprehend. Fast Track involved a series of partisan and violent 'invasions' of largely white-owned commercial farms from 2000. It transformed the agrarian structure of rural Zimbabwe from one dominated by white owned large-scale farms to one dominated by a large group of small-scale farmers as will be detailed later. Zimbabwe's land reform has generated debates in Southern Africa and in the world about whether radical redistributive land reform based on small-scale agriculture provides a route to rural development and an answer to unequal ownership of land inherited from colonialism or whether it was a recipe for economic and political disaster (Cousins 2006). Yet the story is often told from particular analytical perspectives of which distort our understanding. Zimbabwe's land reform suggests the need to rethink analytical approaches used to understand the dynamics of agrarian change. This rethink can be enhanced by focusing on an empirically grounded study.

My thesis is based on a field study of small-scale farmers, known as A1 farmers,on three resettlement schemes, who benefited from the highly politicized Fast Track in Chipinge district, south eastern Zimbabwe. The thesis aims to shift academic debates from narrow and compartmentalized paradigms, toward a more comprehensive view that integrates wider politics and the role of state institutions.The case study is not exhaustive but it can provide useful insights into the outcomes and processes of Zimbabwe's contested Fast Track land reform program. If we are to grasp why some benefited from Fast Track whereas others were excluded, or why some beneficiaries are doing well in terms of production and accumulation whilst others are not, we

must examine the decision making processes of stateinstitutions and the political interests thereof. The dynamics of the day to day functioning of the state and political parties are crucial in shaping rural differentiation. Yet these practices are usually obscured in analyses that limit agrarian change to social networks, livelihoods and economic imperatives as analysed below.

A neo-classical economics perspective ignores the role of non-agrarian livelihoods, social and political networks and state practices in driving rural differentiation. It focuses on farm efficiency, productivity and economic returns (Berry and Cline 1979, Lipton 1993, 2009). It emphasizes the functionality of markets and criticizes the role of state actions (Lipton 1993:641) in shaping rural differentiation. As Cousins and Scoones(2010:39) argue, 'efficiency is evaluated by assessing factor productivity (i.e. the relative productivity of land, labour and capital)' on the farm.In a historical sense, too, this model has its roots in the analysis of how large-scale commercial farms operate and this limits its applicability to diverse small-scale farmers. As we shall see below, the Zimbabwean colonial state in some periods promoted agricultural development based on commercial production rather than subsistence production (Alexander 2006) in order to create 'progressive African farmers' (Duggan 1980). The commercial models of agricultural production used by agricultural extension officers during the colonial rule were extrapolated from America's neo-classical economics textbooks (Cousins and Scoones 2010*)*. This approach meant agricultural success was narrowly defined by 'efficiency' in production. The neo-classical economics approach is important in bringing out variables of production. However, it focuses narrowly on a quantitative methodology, as it is concerned with quantifiable outcomes such as crop yields per hectare, application rate of fertiliser, utility of labour and household incomes (Dekker and Kinsey 2011, Owens *et al.* 2003, Zikhali 2008). Such an approach glosses over the processes involved in acquiring the factors of production and hence it lacks explanatory power.

Due to the inadequacies of neo-classical economics some scholars have emphasized multiple and diverse livelihoods as both drivers and outcomes of agrarian change. Some household members of farming families migrate to work in urban areas (Potts and Mutambirwa1997) or other countries like South Africa (Rutherford and Addison2007, Zamchiya 2008) or even further afield to Britain (McGregor 2009). Wages earned are sometimes sent back home as remittances either in cash or in kind (Potts and Mutambirwa1997). These wages are important in rural production as they are often invested in farming inputs, livestock and farming equipment (Maphosa 2007). As Bernstein (2003) argues, wage labour is not delinked from agricultural production and accumulation on the farm. In Cliffe's (1988) study, for example, income levels were highest on farms where members of households engaged in teaching and re-invested wages in the farming cycle. Some farmers engage in other livelihood activities like gold panning, informal businesses, seasonal work, piecework, formal employment, cross border trading, beer brewing and craftwork (Kinsey 2002, Matondi 2011, Mutopo 2011, Scoones *et al.*2010). Some of these activities are illegal such as growing cannabis (Scoones *et al.*2010). Different households have different capacities to combine agricultural and non-agricultural activities which lead to social differentiation. The methodological approach associated with this paradigm is important as it captures non-farm economic activities that shape differentiation. Important as the combination of variables from both agricultural and non-agricultural activities have been, the livelihoods approach pays little attention to local politics.Farmers also invest in political relations and interact with state institutions and that also has an impact on agricultural production and accumulation on the farm. If we were to explain the local political processes then just focusing on the nature of multiple and diverse livelihoods cannot provide us with much analytic leverage.

Some agrarian scholars use a Marxist approach that focuses on the patterns of accumulation and the classes that emerge from such processes. This approach also focuses on the contribution of

agriculture to wider economic growth and it can shed light on the economic sustainability of land reforms (Byres 2004). It is of use in that regard, but the narrow focus on class dynamics comes at the expense of social and political factors. Accumulation can be a function of wider politics grounded in state practices. Whereas this paradigm acknowledges both accumulation from below and accumulation from above, the former has been emphasized in southern Africa (Bernstein 2010, Cousins *et al.*1992, Cousins 1995, 2007, 2010, Moyo 1995, Moyo *et al.* 2009, Neocosmos 1993, Scoones *et al.* 2010). Accumulation from below refers to the emergence of a class of small-scale capitalist farmers as a result of their productive use of land. This class produces surplus and contribute to wider economic growth (Cousins 2010:16-17). In contrast, accumulation from above is a process 'where accumulation derives from oppressive, exploitative and extractive political and market relations, de-linked from local-level commodity production' (Scoones *et al.* 2010:215). The methodological approach investigates emerging class structures in relation to patterns of investment and accumulation. Understanding investment and accumulation is important but the approach does not tell us in detail how and why farmers accumulate and class may not be the central axis of rural differentiation. The role of social networks and political capital in shaping dynamics of agrarian change cannot be ignored as I explore in the next model.

The final dominant model places the role of social networks at the centre of rural differentiation. This approach is of great value in analysing non-economic factors. According to Berry (1989:41), farmers have 'gained access to land, labour and capital for agricultural production both through…market transactions and participation in a variety of social institutions'. Differential access to productive resources depends on one's social status which can come through marriage, seniority, chieftaincy and descent groups and farmers are compelled to invest in social relations (Berry 1985). As Berry (1989:46) argues, 'strategies of production and accumulation are directed towards establishing or strengthening social relations, which in turn, affect the terms on which

people gain access to resources'. Berry (1989:48) emphasizes the inclusive nature of these social networks: 'such social groups rests not on excluding people from membership or access' but on 'recruiting additional members'. Berry (1993:298) exposes the inadequacy of neo-classical economics by showing that gaining access to land and labour is negotiated through dynamic social and cultural networks and not just market relations.However, the argument that access to land and its use in Africa is based on an endlessly flexible negotiability glosses over processes and situations that limit or end negotiation or flexibility for some social groups. In the case of Zimbabwe's Fast Track these include political affiliation (Alexander 2006,Marongwe 2008,Zamchiya 2011). Scholars have challenged the simplistic neo-classical economic models but in the process they have fallen into a trap of romanticising social networks. This has led to studies focusing on the agency of communities. For example, Chambati's (2011) work celebrates the agency of farm workers excluded by Fast Track in Zimbabwe rather than the significance of inequalities and exclusion.

As Peters (2004) argues, usually it is the wealthy and the powerful that benefit most from investing in such social, political and cultural networks. In such circumstances, not everyone is a winner. This power to exclude or include can be regulated in different ways through state institutions by different political interests. Of interest here is that the approach of Berry (1985) focuses on the economic productive value of investing in social networks and the emerging class formation thereof. However, as Alexander (2006) argues, there are different claims to land that are political, historical, ancestral and cultural; some of them are disconnected from agriculture in different spaces and times. Consequently, non-material factors can help shed light on processes of rural differentiation as people are not just driven by economic needs, that is women and men shall not live by bread alone. The qualitative approach associated with this paradigm is of use as one

can investigate the nature of social relations and how they impact on agricultural production and accumulation.

Depending on the analytic paradigm and the political positioning associated with the analysis, different ways emerge to the understanding of rural differentiation. I might risk oversimplification but fleshing out the distinctive features of the analytical models and their articulation with debates about rural differentiation is the way we can contrast these frameworks and advance an alternative and more useful framework. As discussed earlier, rural differentiation needs to be understood within a framework that acknowledges the role of the state and the unfolding political processes.

1.2Is Zimbabwe a neo-patrimonial state?

The first challenge with my proposed approach is to conceptualise the Zimbabwean state before integrating the framework into the study of rural differentiation. A corpus of literature offers competing grand theories meant to understand the nature of post-colonial African states (Bratton and van de Walle1997, Bayart 1993, Chabal and Daloz1999, Olivier de Sardan 2008, Rosberg and Jackson1982). Some scholars have applied these theories to the post-colonial Zimbabwe state (Bratton and Masunungure 2011, Brett 2012, Dawson and Kelsall 2012, Marongwe 2008). They draw the characterization of the Zimbabwe state from the neo-patrimonial theory, a term with its genealogy in Max Weber's patrimonial authority. In the patrimonial state there are no formal institutions or laws and authority is personalized and vested in the ruler (Bratton and van de Walle1997). Weber argued that patrimonial authority is distinguished from a rational legal system where institutions and laws regulate the authority of leaders and public service is separated from private interests. Contemporary African political systems have bureaucratic institutions and formal laws to regulate public authorities but some nations nonetheless 'retain in modified form many of

the characteristics of patrimonial rule' (Bratton and van de Walle1997:62). The political systems thus stand in contrast to theideal Weberian state or often idealized Western systems of governance.

This 'hybrid political system in which the customs and patterns of patrimonialism co-exist with, and suffuse, rational legal institutions' (Bratton and van de Walle1997:62) is characterized as neo-patrimonial by political scientists. As Olivier de Sardan (2008:5) argues, 'in neo-patrimonial models official norms are based upon a clear distinction between public and private property, which is nevertheless not observed in practice'. Officials use bureaucratic positions to acquire personal wealth rather than serve the public and relationships are shaped by loyalty rather than law. Neo-patrimonial regimes are characterized by patronage with corruption and clientalism being the key features. Patronage refers to the distribution of public resources to selected individuals based on favouritism rather than official norms in exchange for political support. As Brattonand van de Walle (1997) argue, neo-patrimonial rulers use state resources for 'political legitimation' and for personal wealth acquisition. In a sweeping statement, Bratton and van de Walle(1997:62) conclude that neo-patrimonial practices are the '*core* feature of politics in Africa'. Many political scientists elaborated on this model to coin descriptive models such as instrumentalisation of disorder (Chabal and Daloz1999), politics of the belly (Bayart 1989), personalism (Rosberg and Jackson 1982) and predatory states (Bratton and Masunungure2011, Brett 2012).

As Alexander (2006:180) argues,

> Zimbabwe did not easily fit these models. Violence, corruption and economic collapse were accompanied by a massive redistribution of land; nationalist history-and specifically race and colonialism-played a central role in political discourse. The state did not 'collapse' or 'fail': instead a closely orchestrated process of remaking the state took place in which land took centre stage.

However, some of the elements highlighted by the neo-patrimonial paradigm-patronage, clientelism and corruption-are significant currency used by new farmers to gain access to land, production inputs and resources for accumulation (see Marongwe 2008). The term describes reality in some ways. As Olivier de Sardan (2008:6) writes, 'the problem lies elsewhere, in the manner in which they [neo-patrimonial advocates] summarize and characterize the reality; in other words in the inadequate comprehension that they convey.' The disjuncture between official norms and practices is too complex, diverse and sometimes ambiguous to be captured by a single concept. In order to understand the practices of the state, we need grounded empirical research that captures the day to day functions of the state, the modalities and nuances rather than a catch-all phrase. As Booth (2008:9) argues, big questions need to be crystallized into smaller questions to allow for an investigation of more specific processes and conceptualization grounded in fieldwork. Moreover, the neo-patrimonial theory largely fails to interrogate the diversity of state institutions and lump them as ineffective across Africa. Yet even in the same country, one Ministry can be effective in one region and ineffective in another. Empirical reality can demonstrate that there is variation in the effectiveness of institutions across countries, within countries and even within the same institution. Some neo-patrimonial theorists fail to recognize professionalism in some sectors of public service as corruption is said to be a culture, a mind-set that is pervasive, affecting all sectors of society (see Chabal and Daloz 1999). Finally, the role of the political party in decision making within the state needs to be more closely examined in post-colonial Africa. As Herbst (1990:7) observed,

> The western concept of party puts it outside the state: parties are at most, groups of people who occupy the state for certain periods of time. However, in Africa, and elsewhere in the Third World, some parties have evolved to such an extent that they must be considered part of the resource-allocation process.

It is therefore more useful to look at what the state and political party is actually doing and the politics thereof. The need for empirically grounded propositions is especially compelling owing to the dramatic political events that Zimbabwe has witnessed since 2000. Following Fast Track, Zimbabwe experienced an immense socio-economic and political crisis between 2000 and 2008, commonly defined as the 'Zimbabwe crisis' (Raftopoulos 2006:203), which shaped processes of rural differentiation.The Zimbabwe crisis intertwined with inconclusive and highly contested national elections on March 29, 2008 and June 27, 2008 (Tendi and Alexander 2008). This development eventually paved way for a Southern African Development Community (SADC) brokered 'inclusive government' which was consummated on 13 February 2009 composed of three political parties. The parties are Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) led by President Mugabe and which has been in power since 1980, Movement for Democratic Change (MDC T) led by Morgan Tsvangirai and formed in 1999 and a splinter Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) under the contested leadership of Arthur Mutambara and Welshman Ncube.

A review of a corpus of literature on the Zimbabwean state and wider politics shows that the key features of the Zimbabwe crisis that reconfigured society include the restructuring of the state and politics as an instrument of *violence* and as a site of accumulation dominated by *patronage* and the use of *ideology* to justify the two state practices (Alexander 2003, 2006, Davies 2004, Hammar 2005, Hammar and Raftopoulos2003, Marongwe 2008, McGregor 2002, Moore 2004, Raftopolous 2006, Raftopolous and Phimister 2004, Ranger 2003, Richardson 2005, Sachikonye 2011,Tendi 2010). The state used this three pronged approach prior to 2000 (see Alexander *et al.* 2000) but it is the increased extent of how authoritarian practices became closely intertwined with land reform from 2000 that helps us to understand the politicised nature of Zimbabwe's agrarian change. The scholars who have tried to understand politics and the state have not applied their

insights to an analysis of field based data on production and accumulation on the farms. I find the three concepts, violence, ideology and patronage as identified in the literature, useful in trying to understand the dynamics of land acquisition, production and accumulation during and after Fast Track as I will detail later.

In the section that follows I start by providing the historical context through analysing the relationship between the state and small-scale farmers in the colonial era, indicating some shifts in state practices and their impact on social differentiation. After the historical context, I trace the restructuring of the state from a bureaucratic state in 1980 to a partisan state characterised by violence, ideology and patronage. I then demonstrate how the three concepts became intertwined with agrarian change. The section that follows provides a more detailed justification of the choice of case study including land and agrarian dynamics in the district and empirical, political, geographical, and biographical reasons. Finally, the chapter sets out how data for the thesis was gathered and gives an outline of the entire study.

1.3. The colonial state and social differentiation: 1890-1980

History is important to provide the context that helps us to understand that state practices and political interests were central in shaping rural differentiation during the colonial era. At a theoretical level, we will also be able to understand the form that rural differentiation took in different periods. In 1890, Cecil John Rhodes' British South African Company (BSAC) invaded the territory that is Zimbabwe today, primarily in search of large deposits of gold which resulted in the subsequent establishment of white settler colonial rule in ways that affected indigenous farmers. Some historical works have sought to provide a picture of the disappearance of African farmers due to colonial state policies that favoured white farmers (see Palmer 1977a, Saul and Woods 1971) but other works paint a picture of resilient small-scale producers in the colonial era (African

Studies Centre 1960). However, there are studies that go beyond the decline or survival of the African farmers and avoid exclusive positions through pointing to the existence of social differentiation (Phimister 1986, 1987, 1988, 1993, Ranger 1978, 1985). Let me qualify that I briefly introduce the theoretical debates and illustrate them historically,but this summary cannot unravel the complexities, contradictions, specificities, changes and continuities that span over a century. I use historic periods to illustrate major changes.

With these qualifications I argue that colonialism increased social differentiation among African farmers through an expansion in commodity production rather than inventing it. Saul and Woods (1971) confuse the integration of African farmers into the colonial market economy as having resulted in 'the creation of an African Peasantry, as well as the creation of the present differentiation amongst the African peasantries'. This view is a misunderstanding of pre-colonial farmers in Zimbabwe because they were engaged in commodity production and produced surplus for trade. Some African farmers accumulated capital before BSAC's invasion. Mtetwa (1975) graphically demonstrated that commodity production and rural differentiation were features of pre-colonial Zimbabwe.In a study of the Duma society in south eastern Zimbabwe, Mtetwa (1975) showed social differentiation between *wapfumi* (the rich) who produced surplus and engaged in local and regional trade and the poor (*arombo*). The Duma society was divided into the highveld and the lowveld and the pattern of rural differentiation reflected these geographic differences. The highveld farmers due to good agro-ecological conditions produced surplus crops for sale and traded grains with those in the lowveld for cattle, labour, girls, goats, and sheep, salt and ivory tusks. In this way farmers in the highveld, the *wapfumi*, accumulated wealth from the sale of grain surplus. The trade was also international as the highveldfarmers traded ivory obtained from the lowveld for cloth, beads and guns with the Portuguese. The guns were important because there were local wars fought to control the most productive land in the highveld. As Mtetwa (1975)

writes, ‘poor men yet became poorer’ in this situation.In the Duma society, as in most pre-colonial African societies, a cultural practice called *nhimbe*, whereby people would communally work in the fields of a neighbouralso promoted differentiation. This cultural practice favoured the rich as observed by Mtetwa (1975), because in order to invite the neighbour to work in the fields, one had to brew beer and prepare food for feasting during work. This collectively allowed people to plough larger areas and those with little grain worked individually and cultivated smaller pieces of land. In this way, cultural practices and social networks accentuated social differentiation. Those who were wealthier with surplus grain in a season had the chance of becoming richer in the next season through*nhimbe*.

Given pre-colonial rural differentiation not every farmer could respond at the same pace to the demands of the new colonial economy. The politically powerful and economically rich families werebetter placed to respond to colonial market opportunities after 1890 compared to the poor. As Ranger (1978:113) argues, ‘it is clear that the new market at first co-existed with the old and gave great advantage to the wealthier entrepreneurs’. Traditional leaders and members of the ruling lineage could easily adapt to colonial market demands through ownership of cattle accumulated before colonialism (Palmer and Parsons 1977). For example, in the 1890s, ‘loyal Induna Faku’ had over 200 cattle (see Phimister 1986:247). In Matabeleland the Native Commissioner in 1902 (*ibid*) observed patterns of rural differentiation predicated on livestock ownership. Those with cattle would sell some to buy ox-drawn ploughs; they planted on time, cultivated on time, cultivated larger areas of land and hired out their cattle for cash or labour to those without cattle.

Market access had a differentiation effect on African farmers and it was linked toother variables like geographical location. For example, farmers in climatologically favourable areas and living

closer to transport networks did better in terms of agricultural production and marketing their produce. Most districts that were located far from mining and urban markets had limited expansion of commodity relations (Ranger 1978). In contrast, areas such as those near Salisbury, around Mrewa and near Selukwe district did well in marketing of their agricultural produce and Africans increased their area of production annually until 1910 (Phimister 1986:256). This is because they were located closer to towns where demand for food was high, or nearer mines where migrant mine workers provided a market. Most of the Africans were able to pay their taxes and levies without working in mines and this trade flourished mainly in the first two decades of occupation when the BSAC still expected to find large deposits of gold. Phimister (1986:246) quotes the Native Commissioner of Gwelo district saying, 'all the natives living within twenty miles of the mines [in Gwelo district] were able to make sufficient use of the trade to cover their liabilities to the government and private individuals'.

In other cases, the emergence of successful black farmers depended on investments of money from labour migrants. For example, young men in Makoni district in the 1920s used the money from wage labour to invest in cattle and ploughs for their families (Ranger 1985:54). This led Phimister (1986:254) to conclude that by the 1920s 'a class of small farmers had emerged', but there was to be no permanent large land holding class (Ranger 1985:68) as the interests of the state constantly changed as I show next.

The interventions of the colonial state shaped the form that rural differentiation took in particular periods. In general,the years 1896-1908 were characterized by an agricultural boom by African farmers defying a trajectory towards proletarianisation. At a national level, the number of cattle owned by the African population rose from 43, 926 in 1901 to 195, 830 in 1908 and in 1903 agricultural sales made for 70% of African cash earnings (Palmer 1977b:70-72). After the

colonialists discovered that mining in Rhodesia was not as lucrative as in South Africa, BSAC intensified the promotion of white farming under subsidies in the early 1900s. According to Amin (1992:114), 1908 marked the beginning of the 'white agricultural policy' and the number of white farmers surged from 545 in 1904 to 1, 424 in 1911. Agricultural production by African farmers which was first welcomed was now seen as creating competition and stifling labour supply from the Africans. The period 1915-1925 in general saw the increase of European agricultural production which improved the economic, political and social position of the white settlers (see Selby 2006). From the 1920s to the 1930s the impact of colonial policies began to stifle agricultural production by the African farmers. The Great Depression in the 1930s; the post second world war boom;direct state interventions in African agricultural production in the 1950s to early 1960s; the sanctions period from 1965 and the rise in African nationalism to independence shaped agricultural production by African farmers differently as I explore below.

Most of the historiography acknowledges that the Great Depression of the 1930s negatively affected African farmers but very few have explored the differentiation effect. As Ranger (1985:54) writes, 'there is one dominant account of the effect of the 1930s which insists on the collapse of the peasant agricultural economy'. This is a reference to the work of Palmer (1977b). The narrative is based on the fact that the Depression negatively affected European farmers and they reacted by attacking competition from African farmers. This is because there was decline in the demand for export crops as prices fell on the global market. As Palmer (1977b:239:240) writes,

> The overseas market was saturated [for tobacco], vast unsalable stocks accumulated in British warehouses, the order books were closed and a great many tobacco farms were abandoned…with…three quarters of the total [white settler tobacco growers in Rhodesia] eliminated.

European farmers responded by lobbying for segregationist policies and lobbied for laws to undermine African production and promote white production through subsidies (Alexander

2006:24). An important discriminatory law was the Land Apportionment Act of 1930 which set aside 50% of land for whites, amounting to 48.5 million hectares. Palmer's (1977:b186-252) seminal study showed that Europeans got an average of 1, 000 acres per head whereas Africans had 29 acres of mainly marginal land per head. The other laws that had an impact on African production were the Cattle Levy Act of 1931, which set low prices for African stock and increased slaughter fees from 2s6d to 10s. The Maize Control Act of 1934 discriminated against African growers. This had a detrimental effect on African agricultural production. For example, in the Belingwe district African farmers who used to sell 10, 000 bags of maize annually, 'after the Act were able to sell none at all' (*ibid*). Prices plummeted from as much as 7s per bag to 2 s per bag. The proportion of cash earnings that came from agriculture in the countryplummeted from 70% in 1903 to about 20% by 1932 (*ibid*).

Due to the devastating effect of colonial discriminatory policies like taxes, rents, dipping and grazing fees which were compounded by the Depression, Palmer (1977b) argues that by the end of the 1930s rural proletarianisation was taking place. He theorized social differentiation at the end of 1930s as rural proletarianisation:

> By the end of the 1930s, the agricultural economy of the Shona and the Ndebele…had been destroyed. The struggle between the European farmers seeking to reduce the African to a proletarian and the African seeking to retain the maximum amount of economic independence had been won conclusively by the Europeans (Palmer 1977:243).

This is consistent with Saul and Woods' (1971) theorization that colonialism stimulated and then strangled the African farmer due to the need for labour. In their understanding, peasantisation was followed by de-peasantisation marked by proletarianisation. They make an assumption that African farmers moved from one category to another in a linear trajectory until they became proletarianised.

The idea of a trajectory from farmers to workers helps very little to understand African farmers and processes of social differentiation for three reasons. First, Palmer (1990) shifted from his previous 1930 'death of the peasantry' thesis and acknowledged geographical differentiation: 'In some more favoured areas at least, peasant farmers had remained resilient' (Palmer 1990:167). However, as Ranger (1985:59) argues, geographic differentiation can obscure 'the growing differentiation within districts, which was especially marked, and remarked upon, during the 1930s'. Second, even where proletarianisation succeeded, earnings were re-invested in farming, showing the interaction of wage-labour and agriculture in Rhodesia. Some farmers purchased ploughs by the end of the 1920s and could cultivate more land because they were able to 'invest their savings from teachers or Native messengers or police salaries at a moment when most other peasants had little or no cash' (Ranger 1985:62). So the depression did not affect everyone in the same way as an entrepreneurial class was advantaged by it. As a result, Ranger (1985:64) talks of the rise of the 'reserves entrepreneurs' in the 1930s. Third, as Ranger (1985:85) demonstrates, African agricultural production recovered from the end of the 1930s. For example, in Makoni district 'in 1929 some 31 500 bags of grain were sold; in 1930 only some 20 500 bags; sales hardly went above these figures in the first half of the 1930s and in 1935 only some 19 500 bags were marketed, but in 1937 and again in 1938 more than 88 000 bags were sold' (Ranger 1985:58). There was at least some revival of agricultural production by even the hard hit African farmers between the 1930s and 1960s. Ranger (1978) cited the Rhodesian Question Survey of 1959/1960 which showed that in 1960, 'African peasant agriculture had had some 1,158,000 hectares under maize, cultivated 932 000 hectares with small grains…and owned 2 359 00 head of cattle'. The recovery trend differed from district to district and within districts.

In the mid-20thcentury the colonial state designed a range of interventionist strategies in the life of African farmers.State interventions in agricultural production in the late 1940s and 1950s

wereloathed by most African farmers (Alexander 2006) but not everyone lost out. The colonial state embraced an authoritarian high modernism ideology that placed faith in the 'merits of state planning and in the possibility of increasing agricultural productivity through technical innovation' (Alexander 2006:44). As Scott (1988:88-89) writes, high modernism envisages a 'sweeping…engineering of all aspects of social life in order to improve the human condition' based on 'unrestrained use of power of the modern state as an instrument for achieving these designs'. It is thus a belief or faith in technical and scientific progress as a means to production which must not be questioned. The modernizing plan in Rhodesia was underpinned by the Native Land Husbandry Act (NLHA), promulgated in 1951 (Alexander 2003). The NLHA came against the background of a boom in white tobacco production, the post-World War 2 economic boom, labour shortages in European areas, and overpopulation and conservation problems in the reserves.

According to Cousins and Scoones (2010:34) the NLHA was promulgated in order to 'modernise and transform Africa agriculture and create a class of progressive farmers operating viable economic units'. In contrast, Duggan (1980:229-230) argues that the NLHA period did not promote 'an African middle class in the reserves' because it was meant to grant 'a standard [egalitarian] area of land'. The standard area was meant to support a family of five and to provide surplus for the market. 'Men could buy the titles of others, but no one could hold more than three times the standard area' (Duggan 1980:231). Duggan (1980:235) further argues that, 'reserve master farmers still had difficulty acquiring enough lands; few had holdings larger than 15 acres'. Ranger (1985:230) also seems to suggest that state intervention in the form of NLHA was used to reduce differentiation in ownership of cattle by destocking to designated maximums.

However, these studies underestimated the extent of rural differentiation. As Phimister (1993) argues, the NLHA which was meant to reduce differentiation (Duggan 1980, Ranger 1985) was not

fully implemented as cultivation was allowed in grazing areas and overstocking of about 30% was accepted. A significant number of African farmers continued to accumulate more than others despite the NLHA:

> So much so, in fact, that in the 1959/60 season [only] 30 per cent of reserve producers was now working 63 per cent of all cultivated land. Cattle ownership had also become more unequal as with crops: two types of cattle owners had developed by 1960. One was a small-scale owner with a subsistence herd; the other was a large-scale owner who supplied the beef market. Over the same period, the real incomes of this upper 30 per cent of African producers were consistently higher than those of the lowest paid urban workers, and expanded faster than those of the majority of reserve cultivators (Phimister 1993:237-238).

If the intention of the NLHA was to eliminate rural inequalities as Duggan (1980) would like us to believe it failed as inequalities were reproduced. Despite the fact that state interventions were meant to undercut the well-to-do farmers 'they actually withstood the onslaught of the Land Husbandry Act with remarkable success' (Phimister 1987:51).

The technical officials who spearheaded the implementation of the modernization policies foisted scientific agricultural practices on African farmers to assist in modernizing the 'backward' African farming system. The emphasis was on the shift from subsistence to commercial farming. The advice suited a group of producers with capital and labour, who regularly generated a marketed surplus (the so called master-farmers) who withstood the effects of the NLHA (Drinkwater 1989). Initially the white settlers conceived Africans as capable of modernization but when Africans rejected the type of modernization on offer, the NLHA, their resistance was explained by reference to their traditional and 'irrational' custom. As Alexander (2006:4) writes,

> Technocrats were brusquely side-lined in the 1960s and 1970s by a shift in emphasis, from the agricultural and economic to the human sciences. Faced with fierce resistance, the Native Affairs Department sought solace in building rule on the basis of assumed cultural differences, differences which handily explained African resistance to the reputed benefits of science. The African relationship to the land, African authority and African society were

> reconceived as traditional, spiritual, and unready for the strict discipline and rationality of high modernism.

In the last two decades before independence the colonial state legitimized customary authority as a way to contain rising African nationalism and resistance to its developmental programs. The state's relationship with traditional leaders as legitimizing institutions remains central in understanding Zimbabwe's post-colonial land politics.

In the 1950s and 1960s the state had other economic and political interests that shaped its relationship with the black farmers. In the 1950s, the state encouraged commodity production by African farmers to meet the demands of the post-second world war boom. Following World War 2 there was a global increase in demand for agricultural produce. However, state support for African farmers was short lived following the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in 1965 from the British government when Rhodesia was slapped with international sanctions that affected trade in cash crops. Export crops such as tobacco were hardest hit by the sanctions. The white farmers diversified into commodities produced by the African farmers with heavy subsidies from the state to the detriment of African producers. For example, the Rhodesian Survey (cited by Ranger 1978:119-120) showed that the UDI in 1965 and the subsequent international sanctions limited the growth of African agricultural production. The colonial government provided support for white settler diversification to maize, sugar and beef. For example, the government gave the white farmers 72.23 million dollars in 1968/69-1972/73 compared to 2.8 million to Tribal Trust Lands Development Corporation (Ranger 1978:119). Between the periods 1965-1970 income from agricultural production fell: 'the share of sales of total African production was 18.4 per cent on average for the 1966-70 period, compared with 32 per cent for the 1955-1960 period (Ranger 1978:120).In the 1970s, the poor African famers' level of poverty was worsening. As Phimister (1987:53) writes, 'thousands of poor peasants abandoned efforts to scratch a living from their few

miserable acres'.By 1978, the proportion of people without land in the reserves was about 50%, a rise from 30% at the end of the 1950s (Riddel 1978:50). In contrast, a significant number of the better-off African farmers managed to increase acreage under their control as poor black farmers rendered their land holdings. UDI adversely affected 'poor peasants whose absolute poverty was greatly exacerbated' but the well-to do farmers 'survived comparatively unscathed' (Phimister 1988:9).The colonial state's interventions in favour of white farmers impoverished the bulk of African farmers but a few benefited and accumulated.

Given the differences in civic, land and economic rights within colonial society, alongside autocratic practices the liberation movements unequivocally promised that a post-colonial Zimbabwe would embark on radical land reform to right historical wrongs against African farmers and would promote democratic practices. As Alexander (1994) argues, this articulation contributed to political support for both the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) by the dispossessed black population. Increased insurgency by liberation movements complemented by international pressure in the early 1970s forced colonial Rhodesia to engage in the Lancaster House negotiations in 1979 that culminated in Zimbabwe's independence in 1980. The negotiating parties agreed that land was going to be transacted through a willing seller-willing buyer model. That is, the new government could only buy land from willing sellers at full market value in foreign currency if demanded for the initial ten years of independence (Palmer 1990). The agreement was good for white commercial farmers because it largely meant continuity in structural inequalities in ownership of land whereas it was bad for landless Africans who had anticipated radical change specifically restitution.However, the practices of the Zimbabwean state were not static since independence. For now, it is important to first understand the restructuring of the state as a context to understand why integrating state practices and politics is important to understand today's differentiation patterns.

1.4. Post-colonial developments: a contextual briefing

In 1980, the policy imperatives and political priorities of the new ZANU PF led government promoted opportunities to address social inequalities in the war-ravaged communal areas. About 4 500 whites (0.03 per cent of the Zimbabwean population) owned about 42 % of the agricultural land much of it prime land (Moyo 2007). On the other hand, about 800 000 black families lived in poor communal areas. Given this situation, the new government embarked on a redistributive land reform that targeted the less well-off as explained in chapter 2. The ZANU PF national leadership rhetorically preached a Marxist-Leninist ideology laced with radical threats of redistribution of land in order to ensure social justice (Alexander 1994). However, in practice the government pursued the 'moderation and reconciliation' (Alexander 1991) policy which resulted in cooperating with white farmers who were considered central to the economy (Palmer 1990) and 'untouchable' (Selby 2006).There were competing visionsto land reform. One that promoted a livelihoods approach to land reform and another that emphasized 'a technical version of agricultural viability to be secured through farm planning and technical models' rooted in neo-classical economics (Cousins and Scoones 2010:52). The government wanted to ensure that land reform catered for the poor, landless and some war veterans who bore the brunt of the war and suffered from the unequal colonial economy. According to the Government of Zimbabwe (GoZ) (1982:2) land resettlement had to be a priority to sustain the unity and political stability of the nation. The government also intended to promote commercial agricultural production both in the resettlement and communal areas (GoZ 1982:61) because resettlement alone was limited in addressing rural poverty and population pressure.

The institutions that promoted agricultural production in the communal areas favoured commercially oriented agriculture. As Alexander (2006) argues, the institutions advocated a

commercial version of agricultural production rooted in the rural development ethos of the NLHA. In a revitalization of colonial era programmes, the agricultural extension officers became promoters of modernization (Drinkwater 1989). The advice was about agricultural efficiency rooted in neo-classical economics (Drinkwater 1989, Moore 2005). In the 1980s, the technocratic role of bureaucratic institutions was important as vehicles for rural development. These technocratic institutions were to be side-lined in 2000 as we shall see later. Some scholars, in retrospect argue that ZANU PF took the opportunity to accommodate its African political supporters in the bureaucracy in the 1980s (Brett 2012). However, the ruling party and the state were still fairly distinct and even Afro-pessimists argue that Zimbabwe did not fit in the model of state failure in the 1980s (see Lodge 1998). A more nuanced understanding is articulated by Alexander (2006:106):

> Africanisation did not necessarily mean the introduction of the new attitudes and practices, as many blacks promoted in the post-independence received their training within the Rhodesian state. Newly trained civil servants were imbued with a powerful strain of bureaucratic professionalism, founded in high levels of education, and technical and legal expertise.

Traditional institutions in the communal areas were to be democratizedand act as mediums of development. A number of local government reforms were instituted in the context of decentralisation in order to promote the democratic participation of communities in designing and implementing sub-national development programs and to ensure accountability. The Chiefs and Headmen Act [Chapter 29:01] of 1982 removed most powers traditional authorities had prior to 1980 (Chakaipa 2010:48) and placed them in ex-officio positions in elected democratic structures such as district councils. Planning and development powers were transferred to elected officials in the district council and in Village Development Committees (VIDCOs) and Ward Development Committees (WADCOs) established in 1984 by Prime Minister Mugabe. Some elected presiding officers replaced the chiefs and headmen in courts in 1981 through the Customary Law and

Primary Courts Act (Alexander 2006:108) eroding their judicial powers. However, in reality some villagers would still report to traditional leaders. Fontein (2009:8) argued that, '[t]his value system is like a religion or a way of life, the chief as custodian of peoples' heritage'. Some locals respected traditional leaders and there was tension and conflict between the elected members and the traditional authorities. Some government bureaucrats were not happy with the side-lining of chiefs and they thought that would spell political disaster (Alexander 2006*).* The chiefs had to operate side by side with the party committees on the one hand and elected ward and village development committees and councils on the other (*ibid*). These three institutions made different claims to land but the technical ministries were still intent on implementing the scientific recommendations reminiscent of the NLHA in order to promote commercial farming in line with the state's development ideology.

On the macro-economic front government opened new opportunities to black farmers as discriminatory legislation or market disincentives were lifted but the racialised dual agrarian structure was largely maintained. It became evident that black farmers' response to these opportunities was not homogeneous. Cliffe (1988:5) observed that there was general impoverishment amid plenty in the communal areas characterised by 'significant social differentiation between strata and the better off…reaped the advantages of the 1980s' as will be detailed in chapter 2. Other scholars argue that, 'the government, in conjunction with ZANU PF provided agricultural subsidies to its key rural support base, the peasantry…to secure political hegemony in the rural areas...A hegemony that was not challenged until March 2008 (in ZANU PF's strongholds of the three Mashonaland provinces)' (Dawson and Kelsall2012a:7-8). This is less convincing because the government's legitimacy in the 1980s was not one of patronage but developmental increments. The government provided schools, health facilities, agricultural support; well-payingjobs and the economy was managed relatively well (Herbst 1990). Outside

Matabeleland and the Midlands where the state used violence and coercion to crush ZAPU between 1982 and 1987 (see Alexander *et al.* 2000); most of the electorate viewed it as a developmental state.

State development interventions are crucial to the production of land, labour and rural livelihoods (Moore 2005:21). In the early 1990s, the government adopted the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) from the Bretton Woods institutions which meant a reduction in state expenditure, market deregulation and need to restore macro-economic stability. This was meant to solve problems of foreign exchange shortages, government excessive spending, fiscal deficits, declining industrial outputs and increasing debt. ESAP did not have the intended results. Whereas there are debates on why it failed the negative consequences of ESAP on the poor were hardly disputed. As observed by Moyo (2007:32), the macro-economic policies influenced the government to focus on 'creating efficient and capable agrarian capitalists' as opposed to pro-poor redistributive land reform. Agriculture was supposed to be export oriented in order to bring foreign currency to the country. As Dawson and Kelsall (2012a:11) write, there was growth in sectors like horticulture and floriculture meant for export. Pro-poor redistributive land reform was pushed to the margins of state priority programs (Alexander 2006, Cliffe 2000, Moyo 2007, Scoones *et al*. 2010, Yeros 2002). In this era the approach was to deracialise the ownership of land rather than undertake the radical redistribution of land. This deracialisation policy under ESAP worsened the conditions of the landless poor but benefited the elite who could afford to buy land put on the market by white commercial farmers (see Yeros 2002). The elite and large-scale farmers did well under ESAP as the macro-economic policies favoured them such that by 1997 about 800 black commercial farmers had acquired large-scale commercial farms (Moyo 2001:307). ESAP affected poor farmers who were meant to swim or sink on their own without state support and widened the 'gulf between the haves and have nots' (Dawson and Kelsall2012a:11).

The effect of adopting some free market principles was that small-scale farmers were left with little government support and agricultural productivity decreased with many diversifying their livelihoods. For example, in Yeros' (2002) Shamva study the crisis of production was evident in squatter settlements where small-scale farmers resorted to gold panning. Bryceson (2000:30) argues that in general under SAPs, the small-scale farmers were disappearing as farm incomes declined and they became 'multi-occupational…flooding labour markets'. Yet in Zimbabwe alongside seeking wage labour the small-scale farmers also resorted to seek productive land through squatting and made different claims to land (see Alexander 2006). As Yeros (2002) argues, even workers retrenched during ESAP joined the bandwagon of squatting in Shamva to eke livelihoods out of the land. Land shortages in the communal areas,government refusal to grant claims to historical restitution, a wider situation of declining services, the loss of formal sector jobs and additional pressure on land as a safety net for migrants threatened the legitimacy of the ruling party (Alexander 2003).

On the macro-economic front, annual growth rates slowed, averaging about 1 % between 1991 and 1995, formal employment declined, wages dropped, foreign exchange earnings slipped and inflation escalated (Bond and Manyanya 2002). The economic hardships exacerbated general discontent among the populace. There was an increase in the number of civil society organizations that challenged the government; trade union resistance also surged (Raftopolous 2010). It was evident in the 1996 Presidential election that ZANU PF's political support was dwindling (Bratton and Masunungure 2011). As Brett (2012:24) argues, 'the regime's political support was now under threat so it adopted a series of populist policies designed to buy political support from its key constituencies.' First, the government paid unbudgeted pay outs to war veterans in late 1997. As Dawson and Kelsall (2012a:15) write, war veterans were 'able to extract significant rents from the state in exchange for political support'. Second, the government proposed a massive land

redistribution program. The government designated 1, 471 farms for compulsory acquisition in 1997.

This designation was followed by intermittent land occupations led by the disgruntled rural communities (Marongwe 2003). As Alexander (2006:184) writes, 'occupiers justified their actions in terms of their exclusion from resettlement, and their historical claims to land, that is, in terms of restitution and broken nationalist promises'. The occupiers were brutally evicted by the police but the ZANU PF national leadership used them as justifications for the need for a land reform programme (Alexander 2006, Marongwe 2003). In June 1998, the government introduced a new land resettlement policy, where it aimed to acquire 5 million hectares and target 91,000 families for resettlement, mainly small-scale farmers. In order to secure funding for the programme the government hosted the land donor conference in September 1998 where multilateral institutions and international donors endorsed a two year inception period. This was, however, interrupted by farm invasions in early 2000 as reported by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (2002). The state or at least particular technical ministries still had some input at this time, but they were already being marginalized.

Alongside land reform initiatives there were other political initiatives like the lobby for a new constitution by the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) and the formation of an opposition political party the MDC. In September 1999, the NCA, the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Union (ZCTU), a labour movement, and the Zimbabwe National Students Union (ZINASU), other civil organizations and ordinary people formed the MDC. The government gave in to political pressure and set a constitutional commission that gathered people's views and drafted a constitution which was presented for a referendum in February 2000. Theconstitution includedclause 57 that made it mandatory for Britain to pay for land confiscated for land reform (Cliffe *et al*. 2011). The

constitution was rejected by the people in theFebruary 2000, plebiscite. However, land reform was not the only issue as there were other issues around political governance. The then new and united opposition, the MDC, had campaigned for a No vote. As Brett (2012:25) argues, the MDC demonstrated a serious threat to ZANU PF hegemony by winning the referendum. Yeros (2002) shows that, the MDC organizers in early 2000 tried to penetrate and capture the rural electorate on the basis of overall economic hardships, corruption and abuse of executive powers by the ZANU PF leadership. In the context of a pending general election in the same year the referendum was a portent for the national election results to come (Sachikonye 2003) and threatened President Mugabe's ability to win the 2002 Presidential election (Brett 2012).

Within this matrix, Zimbabwe witnessed disorderly and violent processes of occupations of white-owned commercial farms on a scale unprecedented in post-colonial Africa. The war veterans were central in the initial invasions. The state owned Herald newspaper reported that, 'in the quiet night of February 16, 2000, seven war veterans moved to occupy Yothum farm in Masvingo east commercial farming area' an event hailed by the state media as having given 'birth to the fast-track resettlement programme-The Third Chimurenga…' (Herald, August 8, 2002). In the next few weeks the invasions spread to Mashonaland, Manicaland and Matabeleland came later into the fray (Alexander 2006). By March 2000, 400 white owned farms had been occupied (FCTZ 2003:36). Unlike in 1998, the government gave the green light to the land invasions as a means to galvanise rural support and punish political opponents (Alexander 2006, Sachikonye 2011). Land invasions intensified in April, and May and by the time the late Vice-President, Joseph Msika, gazetted 804 farms to officially mark the start of Fast Track on 15 July 2000 after the June 2000 parliamentary election (GoZ 2000) about 1000 white farms had already been occupied in invasions led by war veterans (Marongwe 2008, Sachikonye 2011). Chipinge was no exception, as shown later. The role of the state security operatives and ZANU PF actors in implementing Fast Track became apparent.

The police, CIO and war veterans, army, the Ministry of Information and ZANU PF headquarters coordinated Fast Track (Alexander 2006:186, Chaumba *et al*. 2003, FCTZ 2003:38, Marongwe 2003, Meredith 2002, Rutherford 2001). As FCTZ (2003:38) observed, 'this group met for regular briefings to discuss the direction of opposition zones and communities, with the ultimate aim of converting rural areas into politically liberated pro-ZANU PF zones. The loyal zones were rewarded, and the opposition zones punished'. The reformulation of the land question needs to be understood in terms of the need of ZANU PF to revitalize its legitimacy and re-establish its political hegemony.

1.5. Violence, patronage and ideology:reconstruction of the state

From 2000, the modernizing narratives about land and agricultural production were set aside as other political visions took center stage with land reform now viewed as a political programme. In these circumstances the land question became intertwined with violence, patronage and ideology as a ZANU PF strategy to maintain state power. Violence entailed the use of physical force or threats against ZANU PF political opponents, real or perceived, and resulted in physical or psychological harm. The violence that characterized Fast Track was mainly state sponsored and insitutionalised (see Alexander and McGregor 2001, Marongwe 2008, Raftopolous 2003, Sachikonye 2003). The use of physical force was more rampant at the height of land invasions from 2000-2003 and during elections in 2005 and 2008 (Sachikonye 2011). However, in the period of study, particularly on resettlement schemes, physical violence was not prevalent but due to intimidation, threats and memories of past violence communities were entrenched in fear as we shall see in subsequent empirical chapters.

Violence was used for both political and material reasons. As Sachikonye (2011:33) argues, 'it [violence] was used to seize land from 4, 500 white farmers…and to destroy the political base of

MDC amongst farm workers whose households had a population of about two million'. In addition, violence was meant to instill fear in the communities directly affected and those informed of the political developments. The intended effect was to cow opposition supporters and silence critical voices in order for ZANU PF to maintain its political hegemony.

Farm workers who worked for the white commercial farmers were perceived to be MDC supporters and were subjected to torture, rape and murder, death threats, physical assaults and displacements among other violations (Rutherford 2003, Sachikonye 2003). For example, a farm worker survey by the General Agriculture and Plantation Workers Union of Zimbabwe (GAPWUZ) found that one in ten of the 167 respondents reported 'at least one murder amongst fellow farm workers' and 38% of respondents reported that 'children on the farms were forced to watch public beatings or torture' (GAPWUZ 2009:1). In the GAPWUZ (2009:10-11) report, 67% of respondents were forced to join ZANU PF, 54% had received death threats and 65% experienced torture.

During land invasions white farmers were also victims of state sponsored and state sanctioned violence, some were beaten, tortured, had their property burnt and more than a dozen were killed (Sachikonye 2011). White farmers who were killed include David Stevens who was shot dead on his farm in Macheke and Martin Olds who was also shot dead in Nyamandhlovu area (ZNGO Human Rights Forum 2010:10). By June 2000 more than 30 opposition supporters were killed by state security agents, war veterans, youth militias and ZANU PF supporters (Sachikonye 2003: 31).

Pungwes or all night political education meetings that were used to mobilise support during the liberation war were revived during Fast Track land invasions (Sadomba 2008). People were forced to dance, sing and pledge their loyalty to ZANU PF whilst those perceived to be opposition were beaten at the *pungwes* (Meredith 2002). As Sachikonye (2011:33) writes, 'state organized violence against opponents of ZANU PF has been a central instrument in the perpetuation of its

tenure…'State institutions such as the police, army and CIO perpetrated violence alongside youth militias and war veterans with impunity.

In order to legitimise the use of violence against political opponents and for material benefit ZANU PF articulated a calculated supportive ideology. The land invasions were built on the symbolic appeal to war and metaphor of war. To ZANU PF, it became the third phase of the war of liberation, the Third *Chimurenga*, but this time the enemy was colonialism's economic injustice as represented in the dual agrarian structure which ZANU PF had maintained and even defended for two decades. The state used ideology to cast Fast Track as anti-colonial and anti-imperial. 'Nationalism was recast in violent and intolerant mode as the foundation of the Third *Chimurenga*' (Alexander 2006:194). In particular, ZANU PF articulated an exclusive, adversarial and racial nationalism to justify material accumulation and acts of state violence during Fast Track land reform. The state's ideology of exclusive nationalism created outsiders and insiders. The former were usually opponents of the government programme and were denigrated as sell-outs, traitors and stooges of western imperialism and neo-colonialism (Tendi 2010). As Hammar *et al.* (2003:11-12) write, 'such traitors are being systematically denied the right to citizenship, freedom of expression, protection under the law, access to land, or even in some cases access to food'. The ideology was also used to justify the exclusion of non-ZANU PF supporters in gaining access to land and to justify the exclusion of loyal supporters as we shall see in the empirical chapters.

The state's exclusive and adversarial nationalism sought to legitimise entitlement to land, farming inputs, assets and protection under the law based on loyalty to ZANU PF. Hence patronage became a central strategy used by the regime to retain state power. In most cases land and farming assets were used as a source of patronage to reward loyal ZANU PF supporters, traditional leaders and bureaucrats, members of the army, Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) and police

as we shall see later (also see Marongwe 2011, Zamchiya 2011). In return, the beneficiaries of state patronage mobilised political and electoral support for ZANU PF as demonstrated throughout the empirical chapters.

Fast Track land reform is thus an instance where state engineered violence, ideology and patronage intersect in ways that enhances our understanding of agrarian change. For this three pronged approach to work there was need for reconstruction of the state as I explore next.

ZANU PF co-opted traditional leaders, war veterans and later youth militias in their ideological, patronage and violent mobilisation campaign for political hegemony. By 'war veterans', I refer to those who have been 'collaborators', (those who provided logistical support to trained guerrillas at the battlefront during the liberation war), detainees and liberation war fighters at the battlefront during Zimbabwe's liberation war for independence. This is a broader definition than ZANU PF uses but it should be noted that the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association (ZNLWA), a representative group of war veterans aligned to ZANU PF, is only open to people who were trained and carried guns, and they are resolute about enforcing that definition. However, during land invasions, war veterans established a marriage of convenience with detainees and collaborators on the ground in order to strengthen their numbers and effectively mobilise (Marongwe 2008) in ways that cannot be separated from the story of differentiation. Sadomba (2011:157) argues that there were signs of co-option of some war veterans by the ZANU PF national leadership in early 2000. Sadomba (2011:194) reveals that President Mugabe invited Chenjerai Hunzvi, then chairman of ZNLWVA, to a central committee meeting on 18 February 2000 and asked him to lead the ZANU PF election campaign and offered him a special position in the central committee of ZANU PF. President Mugabe encouraged the war veterans to collaborate with state security institutions to suppress the MDC.

Alongside the co-option of war veterans the co-option of traditional authorities intensified in the late 1990s as ZANU PF perfected its strategy of closing off the rural areas to opposition supporters. The ruling party restored the powers of traditional authorities in order to regain control in the rural areas. The traditional leaders had their powers restored through the Traditional Leaders Act [Chapter 29:17] in 1998. This Act increased functions of a chief from 3 to 22; a headman from 3 to 11 and village heads were allocated 16 functions but it does not specify the number of functions for messengers. The role of traditional leaders in allocation of communal land is contentious. As Chakaipa (2010:53) writes,

> Section 26 (1) of the Traditional Leaders Act states: 'No land shall be allocated in terms of this Act except with the approval of the appropriate rural district council.' Section 26 (4) states: 'no inhabitant shall dispose of communal land used by him, or subdivide such land for any purpose, without the approval of the village head.' Section 5 (19) and section 9 (19) provide for chiefs and headmen to have a role in land allocation.

In practice the traditional leaders continued to allocate land (Goebels 2005, Fontein 2006). The VIDCOS were now to be chaired by the village head and the headmen also sat in the WADCOs (Chakaipa 2010). The role of traditional leaders contributed to gendered differentiation. As Goebels (2005:6) argues, 'local state institutions {VIDCOs] marginalize women as political actors, while traditional institutions operate within a cultural logic that is deeply patriarchal and patrilocal, having the effect of distancing women from land rights'.

ZANU PF also used patronage to win the support of traditional leaders. Consequently, some traditional leaders discriminated against opposition supporters and ZANU PF critics. As Makumbe (2010:92) writes,

> Sensingimminent defeat in the last parliamentary election [June 2000], the party [ZANU PF] suddenly remembered the chiefs. Byawarding them allowances, by subsequently installing electricity in their homes, by periodically increasing their allowances without them having lifted a finger, history began repeating itself. Again grateful of this generosity,

> chiefs have since helped in making rural areas a no go area for the opposition. The rural areas have become places for political purges and retribution, flashpoints for those considered not loyal to the 'revolution'. In a recent bizarre case, Chief Chiweshe allegedly barred the burial of a National Constitutional Assembly member from his home area.

State security agents threatened the withdrawal of government perks to traditional leaders who were sympathetic to the MDC (see Makumbe 2010).

Such co-option of war veterans and traditional leaders would lend 'legitimacy to the government's on-going anti-colonial rhetoric' and 'appeal to a rural constituency' (Fontein 2006:238) as 'part of a continuing struggle of liberation against the forces of imperialism' (McGregor 2002:10) 'at a time of political discontent' (Chaumba *et al.* 2003:599). Youth militias, trained in the partisan national youth training service programme were recruited to further advance a partisan agenda through terror campaign around 2001 (Alexander 2006:187). These co-options changed the political and administrative terrain in ways that deeply divided society. Formal state institutions were disrupted and were in most cases superseded by ad-hoc arrangements as the bureaucratic approach of early independence was set aside for a partisan and authoritarian mode of domination as detailed in subsequent chapters.

ZANU PF's strategy to ideologically defend Fast Track through the co-option of chiefs and liberation war fighters was not its only strategy. The ZANU PF national leadership co-opted the security forces so that they could continue to play a coercive role and support the auxiliary forces (war veterans and youth militias) in the mobilization and consolidation of the party-state, either behind the scenes or overtly depending on the magnitude of the political threat to ZANU PF. The strategy of maintaining the loyalty of the coercive arms of the state in enforcing party dominance was built on ideology and dishing out patronage to state security officers as I highlight later. In a situation of dwindling economic opportunities land became a key resource. According to Rupiya (2011:20), 'of the 200 army officers from the rank of Major to Lieutenant General of the Zimbabwe

National Army, at least 90% benefited from farm invasions and have farms in [the] most fertile parts of the country'.

Paradzai Zimondi, the head of the Zimbabwe Prison Services was clear that, 'If the opposition wins the election, I will be the first one to resign from my job and go back to defend my piece of land. I will not let it go…I am giving you an order to vote for the President [Mugabe]' (Zimondi cited in Rupiya 2011). Even though there might be contradictions within the security services, common material interests are most likely to ensure they unite when faced with a perceived external threat. I am inclined to share Bratton and Masunungure's (2008:42) view that it is 'the interpenetration of two key organs of authority: the ruling party and the security services that is keeping the regime in power'.

It is important to note that the involvement of the military wing (ZANLA) in political mobilization for ZANU dates back to the liberation struggle (see Alexander *et al*. 2000). However, as Bratton and Masungure(2008:48) argue,

> The year 2000 was a turning point in civil-military relations. With the emergence of the MDC challenge, the military's involvement in political life became increasingly open… in May 2001, army commander Constantine Chiwenga toured the barracks to mobilise electoral support for Mugabe.

This is contrary to what was a covert strategy just a year before when Chiwenga (cited in PANA 2000) said, 'we do not do slogans. We are here to protect you but you have to do whatever you want to do peacefully. We want peace' after being asked to chant a slogan at a ZANU PF political rally in Rudhaka stadium, Marondera. The opposition became a real threat for ZANU PF in post-2000 after winning the referendum and 57 out of the 120 contested parliamentary seats. It was

important for the clients to become more overt and for the patron to strengthen the loyalty of the security forces through giving them patronage which included pieces of land during Fast Track.

The security wings became an important part of the process; they became conflated with the party structures, the war veterans and the traditional authorities in the mobilization strategy. More recently, the Army Chief of Staff Major General Martin Chedondo summed up this symbiotic relationship, 'we have signed and agreed to fight and protect the ruling party's principles of defending the revolution. If you have other thoughts, then you should remove that uniform' (Chedondo cited in McVeigh 2008). As Hammar (2003:31) writes, there is 'politicisation and co-optation of the army, police and intelligence agencies …for partisan ends'.

As already argued, some scholars apply the neo-patrimonial theory in their analysis of the authoritative restructuring of the Zimbabwean state. However, what seems to be clear is that Fast Track land reform situation entrenched the possibility to write 'specifically about land [in Zimbabwe], without reference to the high modernism or customary projects of previous decades' (Alexander 2006:180). This heralds a new era where one has to integrate partisan and coercive politics in the analysis of beneficiary selection, agricultural production and accumulation on Fast Track resettlement farms. This is because the state's authority was to be 'grounded in political loyalty and patronage, not expert knowledge and bureaucracy, a transformation that set in train a series of struggles that deeply divided the state [and society]' (Alexander 2006:187). Within this shift patronage took centre stage, signified by coercive accumulation by those showing loyalty to the ruling regime (Sachikonye 2011) and justified by ideology (Tendi 2010). Fast Track is an example where agrarian change, political considerations and state interests intersect in ways that need empirical studies to unfold. In the next section we revisit the analytical frameworks that scholars have used to understand in particular the Fast Track land occupation and post-settlement

patterns of production and accumulation and relate them to our theoretical and methodological approach.

1.6 Competing Fast Track analytic frameworks

Due to this complexity, Zimbabwe land scholars have advanced competing analytic frameworks to understand land occupations and subsequent production and accumulation on the resettlement farms. One argument is over whether land invasions were centrally planned or the war veterans took the initiative and forced the state into supporting them (Cliffe *et al.*2011). Moyo and Yeros (2005, 2007) consistently argue that the invasions were spontaneous and signify a revolution from below initiated and led by war veterans. However, as most work now shows, the invasions had a different character in different places. As my empirical data will corroborate, there were different processes of land acquisition. What is significant here is how ZANU PF restructured state institutions to implement Fast Track and other state programs (McGregor 2002, Alexander 2006). Through the restructuring of the state, the land reform process became partisan rather than inclusive (Worby 2003) and it is this trajectory that 'reflects a…state's scramble to maintain hegemony through strategic identification of certain groups as included among those entitled to land' (Goebels 2005:146). The state sought to appease its largely rural support base in return for political support as demonstrated in Chapter 3, and therefore supported land occupiers. Some scholars have neglected the process that led to the exclusion of others, the agents involved in this and the use of state violence. Moyo and Yeros (2005) understand the land occupations from a structuralist political economypoint of view and argue simply that 'violence…is endemic in the neo-colonial situation and cannot be extirpated in any permanent way unless neo-colonialism itself is' (Yeros 2002). From that positioning they reiterate that Fast Track was 'the most important

challenge to the neo-colonial state in Africa' (Moyo and Yeros 2005:165)and ignore the state's consolidation of authoritarianism to keep itself in power.

Another contested arena is how to understand production on the Fast Track resettlement farms. As I have already stated, scholars like Cousins and Scoones (2010) rightly criticize analytical frameworks that ignore farm based livelihoods and narrowly focus on farm productivity and economic returns. However, they still apply an economic rationale of redistributive land reform based on farm productivity in their analyses of agricultural production on Fast Track farms (Cousins 2010, Cousins and Scoones 2010, Moyo 2011, Moyo *et al*. 2009, Scoones *et al*. 2010). They argue that agricultural production is more efficient on small-scale resettlement schemes than on large-scale farms and is contributing to agricultural growth, accelerating economic growth and securing livelihoods (*ibid*).This argument is rigorously constructed and forcefully articulated. These debates about production seem to have been framed within the economies of scale argument that is the 'existence of an inverse relationship between land productivity and land size' (Byres 2004:1). This means productivity decreases with an increase in farm sizes or that smaller farms are more technically efficient compared to larger farms (Griffin *et al*.2002). This resonates with these scholars' long established argument for redistributive land reform that targets small-scale farmers (see Cousins *et al.* 1992, 1995, Moyo 1995, Scoones 1995) as a more detailed review of their works will show in chapter 2. Even if we were to accept that there is an inverse relationship on Fast Track farms what is more important is to investigate the processes that limit or enhance small-scale agricultural production by some households. On Fast Track resettlement schemes such processes include not only economic and livelihoods factors but wider politics and the role of state institutions in post-settlement support. The 'economies of scale' approach is guilty of missing the real politics of Fast Track processes that shape agricultural production. A central driver of differentiation is party bias in post-settlement support as we shall see in chapter 4. Party bias

discriminates against those who do not belong to a particular political group whether they are poor or rich in the allocation of resources. Other scholars like Hammar (2003) and Richardson (2005) who have questioned low productivity on resettlement schemes, have been misinterpreted as proponents of white large-scale commercial farming (see Mkodzongi 2011). For example, Mkodzongi (2011:1-2) polemically criticizes Richardson (2005), Hammar (2003) and Worby (2003)'s interpretations as 'based on colonial era stereotypes' that blame black small-scale farmers in favour of white large-scale commercial farms. A correct argument is simply that what is at stake is how Zimbabwe's post-2000 disorder, violence, economic collapse, and politicization of formal state institutions constrains agricultural production for many on the resettlement schemes. This does not imply that small-scale farmers are destined to fail.

Related to production is the theorisation of accumulation whose genealogy was in the contribution of agriculture to wider economic growth and capitalisation of industry in the classic debate. Moore (2001, 2003, 2004) has consistently argued that the dynamics of Fast Track can be understood as primitive accumulation. Primitive accumulation encompasses the 'alteration of pre-capitalist (communal and or feudal) agrarian relations of production to capitalist ones, and the formation of a capitalist class' (Moore 2003:1). Moore (2001, 2003, 2004) argues that the framework of primitive accumulation is important because more than half of the Zimbabwean population live in pre-capitalist forms of tenure which consist of elements of feudalism. Therefore the Zimbabwean small-scale farmers are not land holders in the capitalist sense. He draws parallels to contemporary capitalist societies who used state violence to instigate processes of primitive accumulation, and argues that if Zimbabwe's crisis is one of stalled primitive accumulationit was bound to be accompanied by violence (Moore 2004). Raftopoulos and Phimister (2004) acknowledge that if the Zimbabwean crisis revolves around the issue of primitive accumulation then 'violence to some degree was bound to accompany the land occupations' but

the major question, however, revolves around 'the major actors involved in this violence, and in particular the role of the state and whom it hit hardest'.

Even though the role of the state is important it is a mistake to frame Zimbabwe's agrarian change within primitive accumulation for five reasons. First, what is being accumulated is largely personal wealth, a situation where the state has become a vehicle for private wealth accumulation (Davies 2004:5). Fast Track has arguably been a vehicle for amassing private wealth by those politically connected to the ruling elite. According to Davies (2004:10), this wealth is not being systematically invested in production or productive assets but rather in consumption. Therefore it might be too early to substantively conclude whether the acquired wealth has turned into capital in ways that brings about the formation of a new indigenous capitalist class. Second, indigenous people were forced into the colonial money economy during the establishment of white settler colonial rule and in the contemporary era they are integrated into commodity circuits (Mtetwa 1975, Phimister 1987, 1988, 1993,Ranger 1978) as already argued, so one cannot convincingly talk of pre-capitalist producers in Zimbabwe on the eve of Fast Track. Third, as Sachikonye (2011) argues, capital has been destroyed in some commercial farms rather than accumulated. There is rapid informalisation of the economy, some capital investments on the commercial large-scale farms have been destroyed (see Marongwe 2008). Fourth, the Fast Track farms were used as a justification for individual accumulation outside the resettlement farms. For example, some new farmers had preferential access to state fuel and agricultural inputs and traded them on the parallel market, a situation that fuelled acquisition and investment of wealth outside the agrarian sector. The breakdown of the formal economy and formal institutions provided an opportunity for accumulation by those who were loyal to ZANU PF. Fifth, the state's land reform idea following Fast Track was not to extract surplus, unlike in other land reforms. At the centre of this debate the focus should be on the politics of those involved.

Scoones *et al.* (2010) and Moyo *et al.* (2009) seem to be convinced by the classic mode of differentiation whereby the new farmers on Fast Track resettlement schemes become internally differentiated, and some of them gradually emerge as rural capitalist farmers. They conceptualise this as accumulation from below. Where accumulation by new farmers deviates from their conceptualization of accumulation from below it is envisaged as temporary with no or little significance to their theoretical understanding. However, rural differentiation in Zimbabwe cannot be adequately studied in isolation from the political developments of the post-2000 period: onecannot be understood without the other. As Raikes (1982:350) writes regarding Tanzania, my study 'does not rest upon a static analysis which considers only the level of differentiation in terms of measurable material wealth and ignores the processes involved'. I argue that the social and economic processes of differentiation in Zimbabwe partly take the form of preferential access to state resources by those who are politically connected to ZANU PF. But this is not the entire story as the processes of differentiation also involve accumulation through hard work. Rather, empirical data reveals accumulation from above that is from corrupt activities in gaining access to state farm inputs and other resources. In this context, being ahead of others does not only refer to the fruits of one's labour, as Ploeg (2009) suggests. Evident is also accumulation from outside agriculture due to diversification of livelihoods (Maphosa 2007). Some farmers are not reinvesting in crop and livestock production, which is not productive for the agrarian sector as I demonstrate in Chapter 5. In the next section I try to conceptualise the small-scale farmers who are the subject of my empirical investigation.

1.7 Who, then, are the small-scale farmers?

The weak integration of economic and political theories in the analysis of agrarian change presents a problem in conceptualizing small-scale farmers in Zimbabwe today. The economic, livelihoods

and social networks propositions are not outright wrong: the point is that they overemphasize one side of the story. In Zimbabwe, the conceptualization of small-scale farmers is complicated by the intersection of wage labour and farming. As Cousins (1995) writes, 'the centrality of the articulation of wage labour with rural subsistence and petty commodity production' conceptualised as 'hoe and wage' or 'wage and hoe' (Bernstein 2003:215) in the context of migration practices makes it difficult to apply the classic understanding of small-scale farmers to Zimbabwe or other migrant labour contexts. As already argued, wages from employment were often reinvested in agricultural production (Bernstein 2004, Cliffe 1988, Cooper 1981, Potts and Mutambirwa 1997, Maphosa 2007, Yeros 2002). Due to this complexity other scholars have opted to use the terms worker-farmer (Cooper 1981), semi-proletariat (Yeros 2002) whereas Cousins (1995, 2010) prefers to define small-scale farmers as petty commodity producers. What is central to this understanding is that small-scale farmers in Zimbabwe do not constitute a distinct class but exhibit both characteristics of worker and farmer. They have access to land but they also sell their labour, hire workers and still use their own family labour. Within this matrix members of the household on the farm may be employed and, as Raikes (2000:68) argues, one household may include migrant labourers, professionals and even politicians, which illuminate the differentiated nature of households. It is therefore difficult to reduce small-scale farmers to a single concept or binary concepts. From the economic viewpoint it is also difficult to conceptualise small-scale farmers as operating within pre-capitalist relations as Moore (2001, 2003, 2004) would like us to believe. Even if family labour is to be used and production is mainly for own consumption 'smallholder farmers in the contemporary world cannot produce themselves outside of commodity circuits, i.e. of markets for agricultural inputs, outputs and consumer goods' (Cousins 2010:10) hence they operate within capitalist relations of exchange. Who then are the small-scale farmers?

The government definition is important as a starting point but more needs to be done to understand Fast Track's new farmers. In Zimbabwe's Fast Track policy framework, the term small-scale refers to beneficiaries of the A1 model. The A1 model can be of two small-scale types: either 'village' or 'self-contained' with farm sizes ranging between 12-70 hectares (GoZ 2001). In A1 self-contained plots, households are allocated plots in one consolidated unit for residential, arable and grazing land (*ibid* 2001). In A1 villagised farms households are allocated individual plots for cropping and for residential purposes with communal grazing land. In contrast to the A1 model, the A2 model refers to medium and large-scale farms ranging from 20 to 2000 hectares (GoZ 2001). However, party politics dominated farm allocations on the ground in my study sites and what happened is far from the government designed framework as elsewhere (Chaumba *et al*. 2003, Marongwe 2008). Beyond the land size definition my proposition is that small-scale farmers in Zimbabwe are heterogeneous households who have access to a piece of land (ranging between 3-70 hectares), engage in agricultural production in combination with other diverse livelihood activities to meet consumption and market needs. The farmers mobilise resources through social networks, formal markets and state and party institutions using financial, social and political capital, albeit to different degrees. This is a time and space bound definition that helps to illuminate empirical specificities but first let us concretize the rationale of this study through the prisms of land and agrarian change in Chipinge district.

1.8 Land and agrarian change in Chipinge district

As already hinted in the theoretical debates above, the disorderly and violent occupations of white owned commercial farms on a scale unprecedented in post-colonial Africa resulted in the reconfiguration of Zimbabwe's countryside in ways that need empirical studies of this nature to determine the varied outcomes on the ground. The government policy that was supposed to

determine beneficiary selection and forms of agricultural production in different regions was not followed (Marongwe 2011). However, what is clear is that, through this radical process, large-scale commercial farms have been reduced from 11,700,000 hectares in 1999 to 3, 400,000 hectares in 2009 (Moyo *et al.*2009). The majority of the land was assigned to small-scale farmers who hold about 4, 100,000 hectares of land (*ibid* 2009). In Manicaland, the focus study area, 317, 642 hectares were allocated to 13, 541 households by 2009 (Rukuni *et al*. 2009). Apart from their race, we know very little about the types of families on the acquired farms. The table below shows the changes in Zimbabwe's emerging agrarian structure between 1980 and 2010.

Table 1:Zimbabwe's national land distribution: 1980-2010

Land category	Hectares in 1980	Hectares in 1999	Hectares in 2010
Communal areas	16.4[1]	16.4	16.4
Old resettlement	-	3.5	3.5
New resettlement A1	-	-	4.1
New resettlement A2	-	-	3.5
Small-scale commercial farms	1.4	1.4	1.4
Large-scale commercial farms	15.5	11.7	3.4
State farms	0.5	0.7	0.7
Urban land	0.2	0.3	0.3
National parks and forest land	5.1	5.1	5.1
Unallocated land	0.0	0.0	0.7
Total	39.1	39.1	39.1

Computed from Moyo *et al*. (2009), Rukuni *et al*. 2009, and Scoones *et al.* (2010)

Chipinge district, the focus of this study, is located in the province of Manicaland, with a significant population of 283,671 people (CSO 2002) covering a total of 539,303 hectares. Chipinge is divided into five broad natural regions depending on annual patterns of rainfall and this regional variation

[1]Hectares in millions

is related to social and economic differentiation. Region 1 receives over 1000 mm rainfall; region 2 about 750–1000mm; region 3 between 500–700mm; region 4 receives 450– 600 mm and region 5 less than 500mm (GoZ 1986). These rainfall levels coincide with the highveld covering region 1 and 2 (which can be subdivided into A and B) and the lowveld covering regions 3 to 5. My three A1 resettlement schemes are situated in the highveld where mostwhite farmers and capital intensive farms with high value export crops were concentrated.

According to Government recommendations agriculture varies from region to region. As detailed in the map above, region 1 is designated for specialised and diversified farming; region 2 for intensive farming; region 3 for semi-intensive farming and region 4 and 5 for semi-extensive and extensive farming respectively. Chipinge is the only district that covers all five natural regions so it provides an opportunity to capture regional variation and the underlying dynamics between households resettled in the highveld and those left out in the lowveld regions.

In the past decade, Chipinge experienced sweeping land reform as elsewhere. In June 2000, the government gazetted 13 white-owned commercial farms in the district for seizure (GoZ 2000). The names of the gazetted farms were: Chipinga West Annexe; YPRES A; Hartebeest Nek; Flenters Estates; Green Valley; Lot 1 of SD/A of Pendragon; Dzorora farms P/L, Dzorora farm P/L; Stilfontein; R/E of Holland; Lot 1 of Smithfield; Lot 2 of Smithfield and Drie Span Berg (GoZ 2000). As is typical of Fast Track, the land invasions were characterised by violence and disorder in such a way that land occupations on the ground did not reflect the gazetted list. The Commercial Farmers Union (CFU), an interest group which represents large-scale mostly white farmers, reported invasions on Watershed Farm, Reitvlei Farm and Skyline Estate in May 2000 before any farms were gazetted (CFU 2000). By June 2000, a number of black families had settled on large-scale farms formerly owned by white commercial farmers *(ibid* 2000). However, we know very little about who

got land, how and why, what the occupiers produced on the land and the processes of accumulation that followed.

Based on my field data, prior to Fast Track, Chipinge district had individual, family owned large-scale commercial farms and corporate estates owned by private companies covering in total 179, 479 hectares of land with 141, 230 hectares in the highveld, which is a high potential agro-ecological zone. Given the history of colonial displacement most of the black households subsisted in poor communal areas of Musikavanhu, Mutema and Ndowoyo in 1980. Following the first phase of land resettlement in the 1980s, black small-scale farmers acquired 19, 699 hectares in the whole district and within this reconfiguration some black households were resettled on 17, 903 hectares alongside white farmers in the highveld. The table below shows the land classification and distribution in Chipinge district prior to the year 2000.

Table 2: Chipinge district pre-2000 agrarian structure

Region	LSCFA[2]	SSCFA[3]	Communal Land	ORA[4]	Forest Land	Safari Area	Others	Total
1	138 621	4 822	7 962	9 837	2 598		1 790	148 447
2	2 609	815	11 787	8 066				22 339
3	6 286	2 578	27 125	1 796		1 250		46 194
4	7 626	1 015	112 863			6 641		130 172
5	24 337	2 942	134 720			18 209	2 843	192 151
Totals	179 479	12 172	294 457	19 699	2 598	26 100	4 633	539 303

Source: data compiled by author from documents and interviews granted by Chipinge district departments of agricultural technical and extension services (Agritex)[5]; lands and rural resettlement[6]; local government and urban development[7]; and police internal security and intelligence (PISI)[8].

[2]Large Scale Commercial Farming Area, historically the white commercial farms

[3]Small Scale Commercial Farming Area, formerly the African purchase areas

[4]Old Resettlement Areas

[5] Agritex is a department within the Ministry of Agriculture, Mechanisation and Irrigation Development. Its main mission is to provide administrative, technical and advisory support to farmers.

[6] Its mission is to acquire, redistribute and manage land designated for agriculture.

[7] The department is responsible for local government affairs including land planning.

[8] PISI is responsible for matters of national security. Since land has become so politicised, they gather information on developments in the sector.

Between 2000 and 2011, 107, 741 hectares belonging to white commercial farmers in the district were redistributed mostly to small-scale farmers and medium to large-scale black commercial farmers. Black farmers now occupy 96, 944 hectares of land in the highveld, a significant increase from 17, 903 hectares before 2000. The table below shows the new agrarian structure in Chipinge district.

Table 3: Chipinge district post-2000 agrarian structure as of 2010

Region	LSCFA	SSCFA	Communal Land [9]	Resettlement A1 and A2/ Informal	ORA	Forest Land	Safari Area	Others	Total
1	42 615	4 822	7 962	96 006	9 837	2 598		1 790	148 447
2	1 671	815	11 787	938	8 066				22 339
3	5 432	2 578	27 125	854	1 796		1 250		46 194
4	6 845	1 015	112 863	781			6 641		130 172
5	15 175	2 942	134 720	9 162			18 209	2 843	192 151
Totals	71 738	12 172	294 457	107 741	19 699	2 598	26 100	4 633	539 303

Source: data compiled by author from documents and interviews granted by Chipinge district departments of agricultural technical and extension services; lands and rural resettlement; local government and urban development; and police internal security and intelligence (PISI).

Privately owned corporate estates such as Tanganda, Southdowns and Makande which produced tea, coffee and bananas for export retained large tracts of land and maintained a similar system of production but the same cannot be said of the former family owned white-owned large-scale commercial farms. Moyo (2011:259) aptly argues that the 'Zimbabwean state made concessions to some sections of domesticand international capital at the height of…confrontation'. In Chipinge, some people led by war veterans invaded Makande and Southdowns estates which produced bananas, coffee and tea but they were driven out by the anti-riot police in late 2000. One respondent working in the government district department of social welfare recalled, 'the war veterans wanted to resist but they were beaten by the riot police and no one ever returned to that place' (Mr BD, Chipinge, 2010). This was after Zimbabwe's Vice President, Mrs Joice Mujuru,

[9]The land configuration of region 5 under communal areas is bound to change with ongoing land grabs by Macdom Pvt (Ltd) and Ratings Investment

visited Chipinge town in 2000 and told government officials that agro-estates were not going to be occupied in Chipinge because they provided fair employment, schools for the local children and also subsidised electricity costs for the town residents (Mr BD, Chipinge, 2010). This resonated with broader local concerns even though some war veterans concluded that the Vice President had shares in the estates (*ibid*). Such evictions of land invaders who were led by war veterans echo Sadomba's (2011:150) argument that the relationship between ZANU PF and war veterans 'involved complicity as well as contradictions, alliances as well as antagonisms, authority as well as subordination'. However, the relationship is uneven because the ZANU PF national leadership has access to coercive state apparatus and strategically used such to silence and control war veterans and occupiers as in this case.

In a recent development, some communal farmers from Chisumbanje in the lowveld of Chipinge district lost their agricultural land to Macdom Pvt (Ltd) and Ratings Investment, a corporation involved in bio-fuel production owned by Billy Rautenbach who has links with the ZANU PF ruling elite (see Mawowa 2008). According to an interview with a Platform for Youth Development (PYD) member, a local Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) doing development work in Chipinge, about 40, 000 hectares of land was identified by the company for sugar cane production affecting over 80 villages that used the land for livestock grazing, maize and cotton production. The on-going contestations between the villagers and the company including effective lobby by PYD prompted the Prime Minister, Morgan Richard Tsvangirai, to visit the villagers on 3 July, 2011.He promised to take the issue to cabinet (Mr PY, Chisumbanje, 2011).This development requires further investigation beyond the focus and scope of this thesis as it shows other complex agrarian developments in the lowveld.

By 2011, a total of 4, 881 households had been resettled on A1 farms in the highveld where most of the land reform occurred. The table below shows the distribution of new A1 farmers in the highveld.

Table 4: Distribution of A1 small scale farmers across natural regions 1 and 2 in Chipinge district as of 2010

Ward	Natural region	Number of farmers	Acquired land
6	1&2	728	5 915
7	1	172	3 305
8	1&2	633	3 565
10	1	698	5 373
11	1	723	3 973
12	1	783	3 874
13	1	614	2 596
17	2	130	3 670
19	1	4 00	3 861
Total		**4, 881**	**36, 132**

Source: data compiled by author from diaries, documents and interviews granted by Chipinge district departments of; Agricultural technical and extension services; lands and rural resettlement; local government and urban development; and police internal security and intelligence (PISI).

On the other hand, a significant number of black farmers, that is 922, acquired A2 farms in the highveld and their distribution is shown below.

Table 5: Distribution of A2 farmers across natural regions 1 and 2 in Chipinge district as of 2010

Ward	Natural region	Number of farmers
6	1&2	2
7	1	77
8	1&2	33
11	1	52
12	1	723
13	1	35
Total		**922**

Source: data compiled by author from diaries, documents and interviews granted by Chipinge district departments of; Agricultural technical and extension services; lands and rural resettlement; local government and urban development; and police internal security and intelligence (PISI).

There are other land occupiers that have not been officially recognised by the government and are called squatters, such as those who invaded Mahlasela farm about 5 kilometres (kms) west of

Chipinge town. At the beginning of 2011 there were only 7 white farmers left in the district out of 132 farmers before Fast Track. The remaining white farmers remain targets of evictions. For example, various media reports indicated that Noah Taguta, a ZANU PF supporter, mobilised youth militias to invade Spillemeer dairy farm owned by Francois Kotze on June 1, 2011 (see Saxon 2011).

Following Fast Track, agriculture was transformed in Chipinge district. The suitable farming activities for the highveld as stipulated by the GoZ (1986) were tea, coffee, dairy, sheep, forestry, tobacco, beef cattle and fruits and this is what was farmed in Chipinge. However, maize is the dominant crop grown partly because it is used to produce *sadza* [thick porridge] which is the staple food. Farmers also grow vegetables and beans. Even goat rearing, which was dominant in natural region 5, in the lowveld areas of Chisumbanje, Chibuwe, Mutema and Manesa*et cetera,* is now a common practice in the highveld. There is a new trajectory from cash crops to food crops due to three primary reasons: the need for household food consumption; inadequate knowledge of production of cash crops; lack of production equipment much of which was destroyed during the invasions as I detail later. Scoones *et al.'*s(2010) findings in Masvingo typify this trajectory where former cattle ranches have been turned into crop fields by new farmers. With the advent of Fast Track there is a shift from the policy considerations and agricultural recommendations of the past because of the politics of land invasions. In the next section we explore further why Chipinge is an interesting case study to integrate state practices and politics in the analysis of agrarian change.

1.9. The rationale

In terms of Fast Track dynamics, Chipinge is under researched so this will be one of the first detailed studies following the event and the study is important in many ways. A study of Chipinge

will shed light on how land was used as a source of patronage in return for political support and the state's willingness to use violence against opposition supporters. Most studies indicate how supporters of the MDC were excluded and pay little regard to other political parties who were also marginalized during Fast Track. However, the work of Alexander and McGregor (2001) on the politics of Fast Track in Matabeleland where ZAPU was a factor is an exception. Since Zimbabwe's independence Chipinge was a stronghold of an opposition party called Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), popularly known as *Ndonga*, which was led by Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole, a nationalist and founder President of the original ZANU in 1963. Reverend Sithole was deposed from the original ZANU leadership in internal party squabbles for denouncing the struggle under political pressurein the mid-1970s and was replaced by Robert Mugabe. ZANU developed into ZANU PF but Ndabaningi continued to lead a splinter ZANU (*Ndonga*). In post-independence Zimbabwe, Reverend Sithole perceived his life to be in danger from Robert Mugabe's state security agents and he went into exile from 1983 to 1992 (Sithole 1993). Many people from Chipinge, Ndabaningi's home area, felt that his persecution was ethnically motivated and were inclined to support Ndonga politically among other things (Sithole 1993, Sithole 2006). During Ndabaningi's absence in exile, ZANU Ndonga won the Chipinge constituency in the 1985 parliamentary elections. Constituency boundaries changed regularly in Zimbabwe. In Chipinge, there was one constituency in 1985, increasing to 2 in 1990 and 4 for the lower house parliamentary seats in 2008.

In 1990, ZANU PF wanted to promote a one party state and managed to win 117 out of 120 contested parliamentary seats. Two of the three parliamentary seats it lost were in Chipinge district, namely Chipinge North and Chipinge South.Upon Reverend Ndabaningi's return from exile he contested on a*Ndonga* party ticket and won the Chipinge South parliamentary seat in 1995. However, he was charged with treason for trying to topple Mugabe's government and was

convicted and barred from representing his constituency. In the June 24-25, 2000 parliamentary election, for the first time ZANU PF won Chipinge North, at the height of Fast Track. ZANU PF's new constituency covered the highveld where Fast Track occurred. In the March 29, 2008 general election ZANU PF managed to win one parliamentary seat in the district, Chipinge central, which covers most of the Fast Track resettlement schemes and lost other three seats namely Musikavanhu, Chipinge East and Chipinge West in the lowveld to theMDC. The voting patterns give us an insight on how ZANU PF managed to consolidate its support base in resettlement schemes as land was used as a source of patronage. However, voters have other needs like decent employment, a free and democratic environment and basic social services (see Masunungure 2008). In addition this is not meant to downplay the role of political violence and electoral manipulation by ZANU PF.

Chipinge was also not exempt from state sanctioned violence especially during the land invasions, in the 2002 presidential election and in the run-up to the June 27, 2008 presidential run-off election (Freedom House 2011). Some opposition supporters or those deemed to be supporting the opposition were killed, maimed and tortured in various ways and others had their homesteads burnt as punishment for having voted for the MDC (Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum 2008). As I have already argued patronage and violence were key state practices that shaped agrarian change in post-2000 Zimbabwe.

The study will contribute to the growing body of empirical work and provide a comparative basis, in some aspects, that helps to illuminate the national picture of Fast Track. A special issue of the Journal of Peasant Studies (JPS) on Fast Track land reform in Zimbabwe provides data from 14 different districts (see Cliffe *et al*. 2011:922). Seven of the districts covered in the special issue are in the Mashonaland provinces (Chambati 2011, Marongwe 2011, Moyo 2011, Murisa 2011)and

there is no study on Matabeleland provinces. Only one study, Zamchiya (2011), an extract from this thesis, provides a picture from Manicaland. However, Cliffe *et al*. (2011:922)criticize the Zamchiya (2011) article for having 'only limited data on post-settlement economic and social outcomes'. This thesis extends the study to cover that broad spectrum. As Cliffe *et al*. (2011:922) observe, 'the underplaying of these areas [Matabeleland provinces] is to be regretted, especially for political reasons as they are generally seen along with Manicaland as the rural core of the opposition MDC, but will be hopefully covered by future research'. I do not claim that my study will be representative of Manicaland but it provides local cases that are helpful for comparative purposes. The next map shows districts where scholars have conducted major studies on Fast Track.




Figure 1: Map showing districts where scholars have carried out major Fast Track studies

There is one other study of Chipinge. The Africa Institute of Agrarian Studies (AIAS) carried out a study that covered six districts including Chipinge. The study is based on quantitative surveys and the data is presented in aggregate terms but some tables provide production and accumulation figures on the farms studied in Chipinge. However, we are not told what areas were studied in Chipinge or farm background information. They identify beneficiaries using class analysis and we do not know whether they are war veterans, civil servants, traditional leaders, members of the army or police or how they got the land. In addition, the survey lacks qualitative data which can help to explain the figures on production and accumulation outcomes they observed. Most of the explanations offered border on speculation and a study of this nature will add the new farmers' voices to an explanation of the outcomes.

My study comes at a juncture when there is renewed interest in Fast Track studies. Except for Moyo and Yeros (2005, 2007) the dominant academic narrative prior to 2010 was that Fast Track was a highly partisan and politicized project (Alexander 2006, Davies 2004, Hammer 2003, Marongwe 2008, Raftopolous 2006, Rutherford 2003). As already noted, most scholars argued that there were many political and economic constraints that threatened agricultural production and accumulation prospects. The western media in particular painted a picture of undifferentiated 'disaster and failure' (Cousins 2010) on the Fast Track farms. However, in a seminal study, Scoones *et al*. (2010:8) argue that academic debates on Fast Track have not been informed by the situation on the ground but rather by the media, ideological persuasion and political affiliation. They stress that commentators '…have rarely been to the rural areas and if so only on flying visits and almost certainly never to the new resettlement areas' (*ibid*). Ironically the failure to gain access to resettlement farms and communal areas by some prominent land scholars (see Alexander 2006, Rutherford 2012) is due to the hostile political context.Based on empirical data from Masvingo province Scoones *et al* (2010) dismiss what they call the dominant five 'myths' in the western

media related to Fast Track: that Zimbabwean land reform has been a total failure; that beneficiaries of Zimbabwean land reform have been largely political cronies; that there is no investment in the new resettlements; that agriculture is in complete ruins, creating chronic food insecurity; and that the rural economy has collapsed. Even a former critic of Fast Track (Cousins 2006) recently argued that it is time to ditch the 'disaster and failure' (Cousins 2010) stereotypes following the evidence from Masvingo(Rutherford 2012). As Rutherford (2012:147) writes, 'since 2010, there has been a significant shift in the academic terrain concerning the characterization of the wide-scale transfer of land that has occurred in Zimbabwe since 2000' due to the Masvingo study. This has brought renewed academic interest in the analyses of Fast Track.

The Masvingo book paints a positive picture of Fast Track but in so doing underplays the political processes and wider state practices. The book's claim to authority is that it offers a depoliticized analysis of Fast Track. Ironically the book appears to be apolitical but in fact the story is told from a particular political positioning that will be reviewed in the next Chapter. Even some of Scoones *et al*.'s (2010) 'myths' are not a mere construction of the western media but are corroborated by empirically informed research. For example, Marongwe's (2008) thesis on Goromonzi district points to politicisation of beneficiary selection and shows that political cronies were a major beneficiary group on A2 farms. Sachikonye (2003) and Rutherford (2003) have shown how farm workers were excluded during Fast Track land reform. Matondi *etal.'*s (2008) Mangwe study found low levels of agricultural production and persistent chronic food shortages in the district. Another award winning study has shown how war veterans and chiefs became beneficiaries of Fast Track (Fontein 2006). Even though the media has exaggerated, different studies show a degree of variation and given that detailed attention remains thin in Manicaland province and Chipinge district in particular, my study shows that 'myths' may differ from place to place.

This is one of the few studies that will tell the story of land and agrarian change in Zimbabwe from a vantage point of having empirical data from the field like Moyo *et al.* (2009) and Scoones *et al*. (2010), without divorcing the story from local political processes and wider state practices. It bridges the gap between 'empirical realities' of production, accumulation and investments (Moyo*et al.* 2009 and Scoones *et al.* 2010) and political processes (Alexander 2006, Hammar 2003, Raftopolous 2003, Rutherford 2012). As I have argued, scholars who have widely studied politics and the state are yet to extend their analysis to social differentiation on resettlement schemes. Let me now introduce the research sites and detail the methodology.

1.10 Research sites and methodology

As indicated my study focuses on three A1 schemes, namely Glen View Lot 1, Wedgehill and Wolfscrag farms as shown on the Chipinge district map below.




Figure 2: Map showing Chipinge district and commercial farms studied

I studied the three farms for five different reasons. First, the farms provide an opportunity to capture the diversity in terms of how people got land as they depict three different methods of acquisition. Land was acquired through a highly politicised land invasion on Wolfscrag farm where a group of war veterans led the occupation. On Wedgehill farm land was initially occupied by farm workers after the white owner fled to Australia. The farm workers were later displaced by state officials. On Glen View Lot 1 land was allocated through state administrative procedures after the owner offered a portion of his farm to the Ministry of Lands for resettlement at the height of *jambanja,* a term used to describe the violent, chaotic invasion of farms. All three ways were open to manipulation in ways that resulted in patronage-based land acquisition as detailed in chapter 3. Second, the three farms provide an opportunity to show how both the A1 models of villagised and self-contained variants were implemented. As already argued, politics dominated farm allocations on the ground and what happened is far from the government designed framework. For example, land sizes range between 3 and 15 hectares on my study sites. Glen View Lot 1 is villagised and Wedgehill farm consists of both villagised and self-contained farms separated by the main road. On Wolfscrag farm, land occupiers pegged self-contained style farms but there was communal grazing land within the resettlement scheme. This shows the chaotic nature of Fast Track and how its outcomes do not entirely relate to the plans in government offices. Third, to the best of my knowledge and according to government officials in Chipinge and beneficiaries no empirical study on Fast Track has been carried out on these three farms so they bring a new case study to the understanding of Fast Track. Fourth, the three farms were fairly accessible. Efforts to gain access to other farmswere met with resistance by government officials as they alleged that on some of these farms there were belligerent state security operatives who were inclined to react violently to the slightest provocation (Mr AD, Chipinge, 2010). Fifth, there are different kinds of production

with some farms producing macadamia, gum trees, maize *et cetera* in ways that help us to understand social differentiation both within and across farms.

After identifying my study sites I randomly administered a questionnaire to 76 households in order to capture both sociological and material indicators of inequality but I only used 70 questionnaires for data analysis because some were of low quality. Random sampling ensured that each household on the farm had an equal opportunity of being selected or included. The questionnaire helped me to identify statistical differences in land holdings, production, investment and accumulation across the three schemes. The questionnaire was organised into ten broad categories. These are (1) Household demographics, assets and investments (2) Farm production information that is types of crops, livestock, production outputs, labour and the category included tenure and security issues (3) Access to state institutions, political parties and others (4) Household income (5) Household food security i.e. consumption patterns and dietary diversity (6) Political and social networks (7) Household vulnerability (8) Origins and motivation for seeking land (9) Social services i.e. education and health (10) Future prospects for the resettled farmers. See appendix 1 for the full questionnaire.

I administered the questionnaire to the head of the household because the household was the unit of allocation in the redistribution or confirmation of land allocations under Fast Track. The data collected was for the period from June 2009 to June 2010. Results cannot be definite about the evolution of income as I capture data for a period of twelve months but life histories as shown below helped to cover the gap. Cousins (1995) noted that the problem of using a household as a unit of analysis is that it overlooks relationships within households such as gender relations but open-ended interviews and life histories captured possible different views on what explains

inequalities across gender. The questionnaire was randomly administered in the 3 schemes as tabulated below.

Table 6: Study sample

Name of Farm	Farm Size (ha)	Land acquisition method	Number of resettled households	Number of household surveys
Glen View Lot 1	165	State administration	17	11
Wolfscrag	810	Land invasion	44	28
Wedgehill	826	Land invasion and administration	54	31
Total	**1 801**		**115**	**70**

Source: study sample (N=70)

After collecting the survey data, analysis in the form of descriptive statistics and cross tabulations of different variables showed a pattern of inequalities that related to land sizes as further explored in Chapter 4. I then used stratified sampling that grouped the sample of new farmers into discrete categories with land size as the differentiating basis. Three categories emerged, that is those with A1 (1-5) hectares, A1 (6-10) hectares and A1 (11-15) hectares as explained in chapter 4. As Abrahamson (1983:231) observed, one primary reason for creating stratified clusters is when 'the characteristics of each stratum are of interest to an investigator who would like to contrast strata as well as describe a population'. This was important to establish the socio-economic differences among the different groups.

In order to explain the identified differences among the resettled households, I then purposively selected households with different socio-economic and political and social status across the three clusters. Sometimes respondents would lead me to key informants outside my survey data and this helped to enrich my explanations. I carried out 87 household interviews in the form of open-ended interviews and life histories on the farms. This enabled me to capture how the farmers got

land and to explain certain social and political processes that account for differences in production and accumulation difficult to capture quantitatively. As with the questionnaire survey I targeted women and men, in order to capture different views across strata and gender in different periods during the research.

Some of the new farmers came from lowveld areas of Mutema, Musikavanhu and Ndowoyo within the district, so I went to do interviews in those areas to have a general understanding of the origins of farmers. The next Chipinge district map shows the communal areas I studied.




Figure 3: Map showing chipinge district and communal areas studied

This approach sharpened my analysis and also allowed me to hear why some could not get land and to explore contemporary communal area linkages. This is a different methodology from an approach that is exclusively concerned with the people who succeeded in getting land under Fast Track (see Scoones *et al*. 2010; Moyo *et al*. 2009; Matondi *et al*. 2008) and it illuminates the political dynamics as to why some were excluded during Fast Track. However, a more detailed study linking communal areas and resettlement schemes would bring out the full implications for those excluded.

The story of rural differentiation in Chipinge involved institutional linkages. Consequently, I interviewed officials from the Ministries of Lands and Rural Resettlement, Local Government and Urban Development and Agriculture and Mechanisation and Irrigation Development. Other interviewees included members of the security sector, social welfare department officers, local NGO workers and other key informants who had been residing in Chipinge before and after Fast Track. This revealed a range of interpretations which were important in providing explanations for the nature of agrarian change in the district. I also used triangulation, which means asking the same question to different actors so as to verify some of the information (Neuman 2003) and to expose any different perceptions.

In addition to field data, diaries of new farmers and agricultural extension workers, farmers' union reports and government documents like local, provincial and national land allocation and progress reports helped to shed light into processes of agrarian change. I also relied on media articles, both private and public. As Alexander (2006:180) writes, 'independent press and the state-controlled media offered distinctively different views, but a careful reading of both revealed many first-hand accounts of developments on the ground, and of the political rhetoric that surrounded them'.

During fieldwork I consistently used observation to record my impressions of the study area, the nature of production, the daily activities of resettled farmers, types of investments and other unexpected activities. This brought out differences that may occur between what people say are their operative norms and their actual practices (Bentzon *et al*. 1998:156). As Neuman (2003) suggested, I used all the senses, what I saw (wilting macadamia trees), smelled (from the pig sties), heard (perceptions of the political situation), tasted (meals on the farm) or touched (hoes,axes and ploughs). I would observe, listen carefully and write field notes as the next two pictures depict.



Figure 1: Photograph of researcher listening during fieldwork (photo by respondent, 2010)



Figure 2: Photograph of researcher writing notes during fieldwork (photo by respondent, 2010)

Observation, listening carefullyand field notes provided a background context to help me understand the responses I received from in-depth interviews.

Fast track land reform was carried out in a violent manner and open access to farms has been limited. One has to negotiate the various layers of authority to gain access to resettlement farms and to official statistical data. Family, historical, social, bureaucratic and traditional networks aided my negotiation. These included family links to one of the chiefs in the district who helped to appoint the headmen and village heads responsible for administering the farms together with war veterans. My late father and brother's networks in the local government bureaucracy as well as my mother's reputation as a good neighbour,local business woman and Red Cross nurse in

Mutema area, lying in the lowveld region 5 of Chipinge made negotiations easier. My family comes from Chipinge and I was born in the same district where I did my primary and upper secondary education. My late father was an agricultural extension worker and my late brother was a crop scientist with Agricultural Rural Development Authority (ARDA), both in Chipinge district. Some of my former primary, secondary and university mates were working in the local bureaucracy and facilitated my access to field data. My status as a student and non-partisan researcher also strengthened my case for access. A combination of the social networks was helpful in different but complementary ways to gain access.

For quantitative data analysis I used the Microsoft Word Excel and Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) to show levels of differences and correlations between variables. I then used the narrative approach for qualitative data so as to provide concrete details on why there are differences among small-scale farmers, what some scholars call the 'realist tale approach' (Neuman 2003). For safety and security of respondents I minimised risks by adopting the ethical principles of voluntary and informed consent, anonymity and confidentiality and I was flexible, adaptable and careful.

1.11 Thesis outline

The primary and secondary data is organised into six chapters inclusive of this chapter 1. In chapter 2 I review the literature on land reform from 1980-2012. I argue that studies of the first phase of land reform (1980-1997) focused on outcomes such as the statistical levels of production and accumulation on the farms and paid little attention to the processes involved.We also know very little from this literature about differentiation among the resettled households because it compares resettled farmers with communal farmers (see Gunning *et al*. 2000, Harts-Broekhuis and Huisman 2001,Hoogeveen and Kinsey 2001, Kinsey 2004). The chapter then critiques Fast Track

literature (2000-2012) for its methodological limitations, conceptual shortcomings and for underplaying the role of political patronage on A1 schemes (Matondi 2011, Moyo *et al.* 2009, Scoones *et al*. 2010). From chapter 3 I draw on empirical data to demonstrate that even if we accept that elite cronies were a minority, and concentrated in A2 farms it is still the case that some A1 beneficiaries are clients of patronage networks linked very directly to a partisan state and ruling party and willing to use coercion to exclude other ordinary people. Chapter 4 turns to production and explores how agricultural production has fared on the three A1 resettlement schemes. It relates different levels of agricultural production among resettled households to labour, tillage, and extension services and social and political networks. The key point of the chapter is how differential access to state patronage is related to agricultural production. Chapter 5 then explores the levels of investment and accumulation on the 3 A1 resettlement schemes. My findings show that there are diverse sources of income ranging from agricultural and non-agricultural activities and the farmers invest in farming inputs, housing, education *et cetera* as observed by other scholars (see Matondi 2011, Moyo *et al.* 2009, Scoones *et al*. 2010). However, one cannot conceptualise the investments as accumulation from below. In Chipinge sources of investment includedstate-sponsored patronage and criminal activities. I conclude that some of the sources of investment are not sustainable, a situation exacerbated by the new famers' failure to reinvest in some of the 'inherited' plantations. In chapter 6 I conclude the study by revisiting the empirical findings. I argue for a methodological and theoretical approach that integrates the role of state institutions and politics in the analysis of agrarian change to adequately explain rural differentiation in post-2000 Zimbabwe. The next chapter revisits Zimbabwe's land reform literature in detail before delving further into my field data.

Chapter 2: Zimbabwe's land reform: then (1980-1997) and now (2000-2012)

2.1 Introduction

This chapter gives an overview of land resettlement from 1980-2012 focusing on beneficiary selection, production and investment. I argue that in the first phase (1980-1997) land reform benefited the disadvantaged groups and was largely done in a technocratic and transparent manner outside Matabeleland province. Crop production and household incomes were higher in old resettlement areas as compared to communal areas. This is accounted for by reasons which included better agro-ecological conditions, government support and more arable land for resettled farmers. However, from 2000 land reform was carried out in a partisan manner and beneficiary selection was not determined by technical considerations but by political loyalty to ZANU PF. In this Fast Track process, many lost out particularly farm workers, women, white farmers and opposition supporters. Consequently, many beneficiaries of land reform are clients of Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) patronage. However, empirical data on production and accumulation are mixed, with different studies showing huge differentiation within farms and across regions and farm sites. I try to explain the complex differences and at the same time point out that, unlike in the first phase of resettlement, partisan politics is central to processes driving rural differentiation.

2.2 First Phase: 1980-1997

2.2.1 Beneficiary selection

Who got land, how and why in Zimbabwe's first phase of land reform (1980-1997)? The bureaucratic process of land acquisition and allocation largely determined beneficiary selection

and outcomes. Redistributive land reform largely followed defined policy criterion. In general, the state did not use land as a source of patronage to create and reward its clients and exclude opponents as a way to mobilise electoral support. Even in Matabeleland where some local politicians used land as a source of accumulation it was neither planned nor supported by the central state. Between 1980 and 1982 the new government pursued welfarist and political objectives so that the programme could contribute to 'post war reconstruction and stability' (Cusworth 2000:26). As Alexander (2006:137) explains, 'in the early 1980s, land redistribution was cast as a political imperative above all else, necessary to control popular expectations, and to create stability.' This political goal required demobilization of the party at local levels, accomplished in part by taking party politics out of resettlement. As Herbst (1990:62) argues, ZANU PF did not play a central role in the decision making processes about the distribution of land in the 1980s. The ZANU PF's highest decision making body, the politburo, would set major goals but it was the government, the bureaucracy that made technical plans and implemented them. As a result of the bureaucratic process most of the beneficiaries of the first phase of resettlement were the needy, landless, unemployed and refugees, mostly from adjacent communal areas that is those targeted by government policy (Alexander 2003, 2006, Cusworth 2000, Kinsey 2004, Palmer 1990).

The criterion for beneficiary selection was laid out in Zimbabwe's Resettlement Policies and Procedures (Goz 1980). Aspiring land reform beneficiaries had to register their names on a government waiting list and the district selection committee composed of bureaucrats would carry out interviews to ensure people met the criteria. Beneficiaries had to be unemployed that is not in formal employment, aged between 25 and 55 years, married or widowed (Alexander 1991, Deininger *et al*. 2004, Kinsey 2004). One had to fit in the following three categories:

1) Refugees or those who had been displaced during the war

2) Landless villagers in communal areas

3) Smallholder farmers without adequate land

Land reform was carefully planned, orderly and based on technocratic models of resettlement. Initially there were two schemes, Model A and Model B and later on Model C and Model D (to mainly cater for Matabeleland). Model A beneficiaries were resettled in cluster villages, and each household was allocated 0.4 hectares for residential purposes, 5 hectares of land for arable purposes and common grazing land which varied between 20-200 hectares depending on agro-ecological zone. Beneficiaries were given three permits for arable, residential and grazing land. The government intended to create full time farmers as 'until the drought of 1992, head of households were not permitted to work off their farms, nor could they migrate to cities and leave their spouses to work their plots' (Deininger *et al*. 2004). Model Bscheme beneficiaries were supposed to form cooperatives to manage resettlement farms on a collective basis. Despite government efforts to encourage Model B this was unpopular (Palmer 1990). Model C beneficiaries had to provide labour to a central commercial estate and proceeds were shared according to one's labour input. These are sometimes known as out-grower schemes. Model Dschemes entailed gaining access to ranches for communal grazing in the low rainfall natural regions 4 and 5. It was meant to reduce pressure on communal grazing areas and to cater for Matabeleland where crop-based models failed (Alexander 1991, Robins 1998).

In some few cases beneficiaries were selected through communal participation in the early 1980s. The community members voted in village meetings convened by traditional leaders and members of Village Development Committees (VIDCOs) and Ward Development Committees (WADCOs).

Villagers would agree on those who met the required criteria (Kinsey 2004). According to Kinsey (2004), not all the selected beneficiaries were in need as some were selected because they were village drunkards or believed to be witches and thieves. Not all the process of getting land was through formal channels as 'squatters' from communal areas occupied deserted farms after independence particularly in Manicaland and parts of Mashonaland and in a lot of cases the Government recognized them (see Alexander 2003, 2006, Herbst 1990). As Alexander (2006:153) argues, 'the squatters rejected the state's claims to technocratic authority over the land in favour of local versions of nationalism, histories of eviction, chiefly claims and need'. Some Members of Parliament, ZANU PF party members and provincial governors were frustrated by the bureaucratic process. For example, 'Senator Joshua Dhube of Manicaland was advocating-seemingly against government regulations-that resettlement be for squatters' (Herbst 1990:72-73). ZANU PF leaders provided support to 'squatters' and they constantly clashed with government bureaucrats who wanted to remove the squatters. At times the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) had to arrest local ZANU PF party officials in order to enable the bureaucrats to remove the squatters (see Herbst 1990:73). The ZANU PF local leaders did not understand why the government was not backing them as the ZANU PF Vumba district chairman complained in 1981:

> We were waiting hungrily for this day. I am sure that when farmers came to destroy our properties they had the backing of their government and I don't see why our government should not back us. Now that we have come back to settle in our land they decide to call us squatters (Vumba district ZANU PF Chairman cited in Herbst 1990:73).

ZANU PF MPs like Mombeshora who was Member of Parliament for Makonde north supported 'squatters' to get land because they had promised to vote for him (*ibid*). This was an attempt at party patronage. Some squatters in Manicaland donated for the building of the new ZANU PF headquarters (Alexander 2006:155). However,

> The effectiveness of squatting as a means of claiming resettlement land declined as…state bureaucracies [became] stronger [in the mid-1980s]. The early 1980s marked a transitional period at the end of which the demands of outspoken local party leaders, chiefs and others were increasingly rejected in favour of central state control.

This was enforced through the squatters control committees established in 1985 by the Ministry of Local Government to remove squatters. Officials in the Ministry of Local Government who were in charge of rural development were clear that land invaders were going to be forcefully evicted (Alexander 2006, Herbst 1990).The squatters control committees also played a role in resettling squatters, moving them to state owned and communal land. As Alexander (2006:155) argues, 'nationalism was not to be about the popularly controlled restitution of the lost lands but about productivity, delivered through a technocratic bureaucracy for the benefit of a disciplined citizenry'.

Government feared that the poor farmers belonging to the initial three beneficiary categories stated earlier would not increase agricultural productivity so it incorporated the better off communal farmers in 1982 (Alexander 1994:333). The Ministry of Lands' 1985 resettlement procedure was explicit that on top of meeting the defined criteria beneficiaries had to be experienced master farmers 'and make productive use of the land allocated' (GoZ 1985). One explanation is that African small-scale commercial farmers lobbied the government to prioritise the economic rationale of land reform and argued that they were more suited to use the land productively (Cliffe 2000:41). The black commercial farmers were represented by the National Farmers' Association of Zimbabwe (NFAZ).The argument found ready recipients in the technocratic ministries of agriculture, lands and local government whose doubt about the productive capacity of poor communal farmers was shaped and influenced by colonial practices. Alexander (2006:24) notes that key policy issues must be viewed in historical context. The dominant narratives of

agricultural success by government technocrats were based on the historical constructs of modernization and rooted in neo-classical economism as elaborated in chapter 1.

As of September 1996, the government had resettled 91,000 households. In terms of proportions, 66, 000 households were resettled on Model A, 4,200 on Model B and 800 households on Model C (Chitsike 2003:5). Model D catered for 20,000 households who could access grazing land (Palmer 1990). In 1980, the government had aimed to resettle 18,000 households on 1.1 million hectares but a year later the figure was increased to 54,000 households (Alexander 1994:333). In 1982, the government's Transitional National Development Plan set the target at 162,000 households over the 1982-85 period on 7.2 million hectares (GoZ 1982, Goebel 2005:147). In the subsequent First Five Year Development Plan (1986-1990) the government intended to settle a total of 75,000 families (Ami 1992:126), which meant 15,000 families a year (Alexander 1994:333). The new government failed to meet its target of resettling 162,000 households due to willing-buyer willing-seller constraints, budgetary cuts, opposition from state and black capitalists and in Matabeleland acquired land remained unsettled due to political repression and popular resistance to the Models (see Alexander 1991, Robins 1998). It is important to underline that the outcome was not even across the country. For example, 'in 1989, only 1,878 families had been resettled on 44% of the then 503,671 hectares purchased for resettlement [in Matabeleland South]' (Alexander 1991:594). Next I unpack the nature of the beneficiaries to understand whether the first phase of land reform met its welfarist and pro-poor objectives.

Zimbabwe's 1995 Review of the land resettlement programme (GoZ 1995) showed that 80% of the resettled farmers met the criterion that is they had been displaced by war; they were aged between 18 and 55 years; had inadequate land and were married or widowed with dependents. The government's figures seem to be an exaggeration. Using a case study of one of the largest old

resettlement schemes, Chinyika in Rusape, Kinsey (2004:1677) concluded that 820 out of 1,231 households were from local communal areas. Based on a review of 400 households who benefited, Kinsey (*ibid*) found that 43% did not meet at least one of the criteria defined but 'no household would be disqualified on all four criteria considered'. This is probably because in a real life situation households might not fit into neat categories designed by bureaucrats in offices. Another explanation is that the scale of the programme made it difficult for new bureaucrats to cope. In addition, Kinsey (2004) observed that it was difficult for young bureaucrats to turn away aspiring beneficiaries because they were above 55 years, because of the social context of rural Zimbabwe where one is expected to respect the elders.

Even though many disadvantaged people benefited from land reform, alongside them there was a small emerging group of political and business elites who purchased land on the market and leased it from the government. This was enabled by a shift in the way government acquired land. Following the 1985 Land Acquisition Act willing sellers were legally bound to offer their farms to government first, which could issue a certificate of 'no present interest' (Palmer 1990:170). Most of the land that the government failed to buy ended up on the private market and was acquired by the black ruling elite or leased from the government. In the mid-1980s estimations put the number of black elite commercial farmers at 300 (Alexander 1994:337). About ten were government Ministers who also doubled as members of the Commercial Farmers Union (CFU) (Palmer 1990:175). Accumulation of land by 'senior members of government and the new black ruling elite' (Palmer 1990:170) was accentuated by access to state power. Land that was meant for the poor communal farmers was captured by the emerging black political elite. This is more pronounced in Matabeleland where 'unresettled' land was leased to parastatals [Cold Storage Commission (CSC) and Agricultural Rural Development Authority (ARDA)], ZANU PF party officials and civil servants who used the resettlement farms to accumulate wealth through fattening their

large herds of cattle for sale to the CSC. For example, in Insiza district the farms were leased by 'the provincial administrator, the former district administrator who had then assumed the post of non-constituency MP, local business men and teachers, several local commercial farmers and a large number of Bulawayo residents' (Alexander 1991:595). The scandal was publicized and the leases were cancelled in 1988 but many had become wealthy because of these cattle ranches and the cattle remained on the farms.

Even though there was a trend of elite capture it is clear that most of the land was resettled under Model A and most of the beneficiaries were drawn from the most deprived sector of the rural population. Even in Matabeleland, Alexander (1991:583) observed that, 'on the whole the district's [Insiza] abandoned farm workers and unemployed miners monopolised the resettlement schemes that were available…in line with government policy to resettle the landless, unemployed and displaced…'. In general it is fair to conclude that, 'the existing evidence points to a selection process for land reform beneficiaries that appears to have been remarkably equitable, and also efficient in targeting those who were government's and donors' priorities at the time' (Kinsey 2004:1681). A strict bureaucratic procedure resulted in equitable distribution of land as land was not a major source of rewarding political clients and punishing opponents. The next section reviews comparative literature on production dynamics.

2.2.2 Production

Most of the research on production was conducted in the context of policy shift in the emphasis of agrarian policy to communal area reorganization rather than resettlement. This was promoted by technical ministries dusting off the Native Land Husbandry Act (NLHA) and the CFU which was critical of land reform and emphasised the 'unproductive character of African small-holders as givens' (Cliffe 2000:40). The CFU's position was ideological rather than based on empirical

evidence. Most of the academic literature on Fast Track compared agricultural production between small-scale farmers in the communal areas and those on resettlement farms which glosses over internal differentiation among the resettled farmers. One of the major databases used for analyses of old resettlement areas is a 30 year longitudinal survey by the Zimbabwe Rural Household Dynamic Study (ZRHDS). The field data is based on a survey of 400 households resettled in three natural regions: Mupfurudzi in natural region 2, Sengezi in natural region 3 and Mutanda in natural region 4. The number of surveyed households is distributed as follows: 230 households in Mupfurudzi, 100 households in Sengezi and 70 households in Mutanda. For comparative basis, 150 households were selected from the communal areas in villages where most of the resettled beneficiaries originally came from. In particular two villages were selected in Mupfudzi, Sengezi and Mutandi and in each of the six villages 25 households were interviewed (Deininger *et al*. 2004, Dekker and Kinsey 2010, Gunning *et al*. 2000, Hoogeveen and Kinsey 2001, Kinsey 1999, Kinsey 2002, Kinsey 2004, Kinsey *et al*. 1998).

The general observation is that crop production was higher in resettlement areas as compared to communal areas (Chigwenya 2001, Deininger *et al*. 2004, Gunning *et al*. 2000, Kinsey *et al*. 1998). For example, Chigwenya (2001) in a comparative study of Gutu south resettlement area and the adjacent Ndawi communal area, observed that in the latter only 13% of surveyed households produced more than a tonne of maize per season compared to 48.8% in the former. The statistical data showed marked differences in maize production among the resettled households but the reasons for are not explained. Kinsey (1999:183) observed that 'the crop output of the average [resettled] family is worth over four and a half times that of the average communal area household'. The difference in household outcomes is attributable to land reform yet land reform *per se* does not adequately explain why some households did better. Kinsey (1999)'s analysis is based on the average of household-level crop yields between the communal and the resettled

farmers and does not give due consideration to agro-ecological differences or inter-household differences. Land reform beneficiaries in natural region 2 are overrepresented in his sample compared to those in natural region 3 and 4 as disaggregated earlier. This overrepresentation is important because the farmers in favourable agro-climatic zones are likely to be more productive. For example, Cutsworth (1990) argued that farmers resettled in high potential agro-climatic zones performed better in terms of crop production and that there were no major differences between farmers resettled in the communal areas and those in resettlement areas if this factor is considered. This position is supported by empirical evidence from communal areas. In the context of Zimbabwe's post-independent agricultural boom, small-scale farmers in communal accounted for 35% of marketed grain in 1989 up from 7% in 1980 (Amin 1992:112). Cliffe (1988) observed that small-scale production was concentrated in the fertile agro-ecological zones of two Mashonaland provinces which accounted for 75% of the small-scale farmers' marketed surplus (Cliffe 1988:5).

In a sequel to Kinsey's (1999) article, Hoogeveen and Kinsey (2001) tried to correct the overrepresentation in the sample by comparing beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries in the same natural regions. Their results show that small-scale farmers in natural region 2 do better than those in natural region 3 and 4 irrespective of whether or not they are beneficiaries of land reform. Based on this approach Hoogeveen and Kinsey (2001:131) argue that, 'If resettled and communal households are compared on the basis of a natural region, then one cannot conclude that those who benefited from land reform do substantially better than those who did not'. However, they still come to the conclusion that 'land reform was successful at least from the perspective of the beneficiary households' (Hoogeveen and Kinsey 2001:132) as they 'cultivate[d] nearly 50% more land than non-beneficiaries…' (*Ibid*).

According to Kinsey (2002:616), resettled households had much more land compared to what they formerly had in the communal areas as well as more productive soils and better grazing land. This explains why they did better than those in communal areas in terms of crop production. Most studies echo this pattern. For example, Chigwenya (2001) observed that production level is high by almost 5 times following resettlement but productivity increases twofold. Among the resettled farmers Chigwenya (2001) found that only 2% had produced more than 2 tonnes in the communal areas but after resettlement 61% did. Harts-Broekhuis and Huisman (2001) in a study of Insiza district concluded that resettled households did not register significant improvements in agricultural productivity per hectare though they had higher levels of production as compared to those in the communal areas. The difference is partly explained because resettled households had more access to arable land and increased areas of cultivation (see Kinsey 2004:1684).

The differences in land sizes and agro-ecological location do explain differences in crop production but these must not be overemphasised. Differences in agricultural production were more than a geographic accident. The resettled farmers in the 1980s received government support in the form of free tillage, fertiliser, seed, financial credit, water, '100% extension services' (see Dekker and Kinsey 2011:996, Orwell *et al*. 2003) and marketing infrastructure. They got more government support compared to farmers in the communal areas. In addition to government support, Harts-Broekhuis and Huisman (2001) concluded that resettled farmers produced more crops because they had labour, farm equipment and livestock in a study of Insiza district.

The studies of resettlement farms (Deininger *et al*. 2004, Dekker and Kinsey 2010, Gunning *et al*. 2000, Kinsey 1999, Harts-Broekhuis and Huisman 2001, Hoogeveen and Kinsey 2001, Kinsey *et al*. 1998, Kinsey 2002, Kinsey 2004) do not explore how local political processes contributed to social differentiation among the resettled farmers as argued in chapter 1. In the Masvingo communal

areas, Cousins *et al*. (1992:16) observed that, 'access to resources are skewed by political capture at the local level and this contributes to social differentiation'. The traditional leaders in the communal areas favoured their kith and kin by providing them with more land (see Goebels 2005). Leaders in the district councils, VIDCOs, grazing scheme committees and farmers' groups had preferential access to resources (Cousins *et al.* 1992). Those in political positions benefited more from various development resources and their families were better off. These resources helped to generate other resources, for example seeds and fertilisers would result in good crops for sale.

Households with strong social networks can do better in terms of production than those with weaker ones as stated in chapter 1 (see Peters 2004, Murisa 2011). Unlike in the communal areas, many of the new farmers were not related and did not belong to the same lineage. In order to solve issues related to management of natural resources, sourcing agricultural inputs *et cetera*, resettled farmers set up community based organisations (Barr 2004). According to a study by Barr (2004) farmers in the old resettlement areas belonged to 5.43 groups as compared to 2.84 in the communal areas which is almost double. Barr (2004)argue that community based organisations were inclusive and there is no evidence of the poor being excluded. This is consistent with Berry's (1993) romanticisation of social networks as argued in the previous chapter. The story of differentiation can be enriched through an approach that recognizes that some people are excluded from social networks and suffer as a result of that.

Other sources of income for small-scale farmers include off-farm activities. Resettlement areas had less remittances; off-farm employment income and income from non-farm enterprises as compared to communal areas (Kinsey 2002:628). These three incomes are major drivers of differentiation among households. However, the impact the non-farm incomes had on different production outputs between resettled farmers and those in communal areas is not given due

attention in the literature. I have already indicated that until the drought of 1992 the government wanted the resettled farmers to earn their income exclusively from farming. The old resettlement areas were designed to match minimum wages in urban areas and lessen the motivation to look for employment in the urban sector (Bush and Cliffe 1984), a policy which ignored urban-rural linkages (Potts and Mutambirwa 1997). On the other hand, labour migration was well established in the communal areas (Cliffe 1988, Cousins *et al.* 1992). This partly explains why communal farmers received more non-farm income and those who did among them had better production as argued later.

In a detailed study of the 1996/97 season, Kinsey (1999) found that remittances in the old resettlement schemes averaged Z$ 1,288 per household in 1997 as compared to Z$ 1,942 in communal areas in the same year. On average a household in the communal areas received Z$ 2,335 a year in 1996/7 from off-farm employment as compared to Z$ 649 in the old resettlement schemes (Kinsey 2002:619). Income from non-farm enterprises such as carpentry, craft work, trading, building *et cetera* was 50% higher in communal areas as compared to resettlement schemes. In short, there is more diversification of livelihoods in communal areas and Kinsey (2002:620) attributes this to two reasons. First, the communal areas were more densely populated than old resettlement areas and that meant that markets worked better for other non-farm products. Second, 'the inability on the part of many CA [Communal Areas] households to support themselves from agriculture alone' (*ibid*) meant they needed more sources of income. Even though the incomes varied in year to year the trend is that non-farm incomes constituted 14.5% of total household incomes in old resettlement areas in 1992-95 as compared to over 50% in the communal areas (Kinsey 2002:628). It is important to examine sources of income from diverse livelihood activities in the analysis of agricultural production by the small-scale farmers.

Within the communal areas income from non-farm employment and remittances was much higher than income combined from both livestock and crop production. Even though remittances were less in old resettlement schemes it would have been useful to interrogate the impact they had on post-settlement production outputs among the resettled farmers. In a major study of communal farmers, Cliffe (1988) concluded that the conjunction of on and off-farm income in production was the main driver of rural differentiation as civil servants constituted the bulk of the well-to-do farmers. This is because they invested the money in agricultural production. Households with capital to buy farming inputs, hire wage labour and invest in farm equipments and livestock are advantaged (also see Cousins *et al.* 1992). This is also demonstrated in my discussion of African small-scale farmers in Rhodesia (Phimister 1987, 1993, Ranger 1978, 1985) in chapter 1.

Since 2000, migrant labour has become a common feature in old resettlement areas. According to Dekker and Kinsey (2011) agriculture production declined due to the economic crisis and people sought to look for alternative livelihoods. The problem is not only economic as some of the old resettled farmers were running away from political violence and intimidation that characterised post-2000 Zimbabwe. Dekker and Kinsey (2011:1000) only mention this in a footnote: 'a number of farmers who had been resettled in the ORAs [Old Resettlement Areas] 26 years earlier lost some or all of their land in the political intimidation that surrounded the 2008 elections', and they consequently fail to explore further how this political crisis affected small-scale producers given a corpus of literature that suggest how the post-2000 political crisis affected production (Hammar 2003, Marongwe 2008, Raftopoulos and Phimister 2004, Richardson 2005, Sachikonye 2003). According to Dekker and Kinsey (2011:1004) some resettled farmers left to seek new farming opportunities presented by Fast Track, but most went to seek work in urban areas within

Zimbabwe or outside Zimbabwe. The impact of this migration on crop production is not explored. Migration of household members could have benefited those remaining through remittances in both cash and kind. There is need for research in the old resettlement schemes to establish how migration contributed to household incomes after 1999. On the other hand, given that most of the migrants who left in Dekker and Kinsey's (2011:1003) study were young, with the average age of migrants being 25 years after 1999, this may have affected labour supplies on the resettlement farms. There is a need for a systematic study that can help to paint a comprehensive picture of the linkages between migration and crop production on old resettlement schemes in comparison to the data on the communal areas, if one is to adequately explain the trajectory of agrarian change.

The literature discussed above focuses on differences in levels of crop production between the resettled small-scale farmers and those in the communal areas and mentions important drivers of rural differentiation such as farm productivity, non-farm income and social networks. However, the studies do not adequately explore how these factors account for the differential levels of production among the resettled households. Though the literature focuses on variables related to productivity, livelihoods and partly social networks but it does not pay close attention to the role of state institutions and local political processes in shaping on-farm agricultural production. For example, we are told there was government support for the resettled farmers (Dekker and Kinsey 2011) but how this was distributed is not explained. In the next section, we explore how crop yields and other broader processes relate to accumulation dynamics in the first phase of land reform.

2.2.3 Accumulation

As a result of high crop yields households on old resettlement schemes had more aggregate financial income compared to those in the communal areas. According to Kinsey (1999) the major

sources of income in the 1995-1996 season were crop revenue, livestock revenue, transfer income, remittance income, non-farm employment and non-farm enterprise. Incomes from non-farm activities and other diversified livelihood activities increased significantly in the 1990s. As noted above, the government had relaxed the regulation that barred resettled household heads from seeing work elsewhere in 1992 (Gunning *et al*. 2004). However, crop revenues remained the major source of income in the old resettlement areas and 'resettlement farmers earned from crop sales 6.8 times what CA [Communal Area] farmers earned' (Kinsey 1999:183). The proportion of resettled households selling maize to formal markets on resettlement schemes studied by Kinsey (1999, 2004) was 32% in 1999. Parastatals were the major buyers of produce mainly the Grain Marketing Board (GMB), Cotton Company of Zimbabwe (COTTCO) and Tobacco sales floor (Moyo 1995).

In general there was an impressive accumulation of assets by the resettled households. As Gunning *et al*. (2000:133) write, 'returns to these assets have been especially important in generating the dramatic increase in crop incomes observed in these households'. Farmers acquired farm equipment, household goods and other items including vehicles, bicycles and scotch carts. Of salience is that for farm equipment among the resettled farmers the median change in farming assets was only 8% and the average was 240% (Kinsey 2004:1686). For household goods, the median change was 41% whereas the average was 321% (*ibid*). The differences show the uneven rate of accumulation of assets and this is attributed to econometric concerns such as the marketing of crop surpluses. Another important investment in old resettlement schemes was in livestock accumulation. Ownership of livestock has historically been an important axis of social differentiation as noted in Chapter 1 (see Palmer 1977, Phimister 1988, 1993, Ranger 1978, 1985). Households with livestock plough on time, plant on time and large herds also produce plenty of manure to enrich the soils. Cattle ownership was higher in the old resettlement areas compared to

communal areas. However, gains in livestock accumulation on old resettlement areas were short lived as explored later. In the early resettlement schemes cattle ownership increased to 10 head per household by 1995 from less than three in 1983 (Kinsey 1999, 2004:1686). Only 10% of households had no cattle in the mid-1990s as compared to 42% at the time of resettlement. Unfortunately, Kinsey (1999, 2004) does not explore the reasons as to why some (the 10%) had no cattle. Kinsey (1999, 2004) seems more seized with the debates on aggregate outcome in comparison with communal areas rather than the process of accumulation among the resettled farmers which can improve our understanding of agrarian change.

Interestingly, the increase in income on old resettlement schemes did not translate into improvements in welfare and nutrition. The total household expenditures in the 1996/7 season were higher for resettled households but if the expenditure is expressed in per capita terms (per individual or per person) the communal households actually spent more (Hoogeven and Kinsey 2001). The communal area households spent Z$ 2,609 as compared to Z$ 2,247 for land reform beneficiaries (Hoogeveen and Kinsey 2001:132). According to Kinsey (1999) this is because households on resettled farms are significantly larger than those in communal areas but this should provide labour yet most of the household members were children under 10 years and elders over 50 years which confirms Deininger *et al*.'s (2000) view that resettlement areas became social safety nets. The success in crop and livestock production on resettlement farms attracted relatives who were young and old. The larger households therefore did not lead to additional labour and did not translate into nutritional and welfare gains. The levels of under nutrition are actually higher than expected in both old resettlement areas and communal areas but the former have higher levels of chronic or long term under nutrition (Kinsey 1999:190) with children being the most affected. It is important to investigate whether some of the improvements on old

resettlement schemes in crop production, investments and accumulation are sustainable in Zimbabwe's post-2000 crisis.

The general trend from recent studies is that of agricultural decline in old resettlement areas in post-2000 albeit variations across seasons. Dekker and Kinsey (2011) attribute this decline to the economic crisis. Hectares under cultivation have decreased and volumes of crops produced have gone down. Maize went down from an average production of 2.98 tonnes to 1.45 tonnes in 2009; tobacco and cotton production also went down and farmers were selling much less (Dekker and Kinsey 2011:1006-1011). The gains of the first two decades on old resettlement schemes have been lost. Dekker and Kinsey (2011:1012) cite the shortage of inputs ,for example, the average application rate of fertiliser was never less than 200kg/ha from 1985 to 1999 among resettled farmers but it was only 16.5 kg/ha in 2000. Again there are fluctuations between seasons in use of farming inputs but the trajectory is a significant decline (Dekker and Kinsey 2011:1005). In summary, Dekker and Kinsey (2011:1005) blame,

> The multiple dimensions of the economic collapse that Zimbabwe experienced in the decade following 2000 [which] had profound effects on the smallholder farmers studied in the ZRHDS research areas. Most notably, the production and distribution of inputs were hampered and hyperinflation, combined with delayed payments and shortages of money, made the income from agricultural production worthless, especially during 2007 and 2008. Although most input-providing companies are still active in the study areas, and some new ones have arrived, they have not been able to guarantee a sufficient supply of inputs to maintain production levels. They were also unable to cope with hyperinflation, and the supply chain was broken by the consequences of economy-wide failures.

The researchers are conspicuously silent about how the economic crisis was intertwined with the politics of violence in ways that affected production and accumulation as we shall see later.

In terms of livestock production in post-2000 Zimbabwe there is a marked trend of disinvestment. After 2001, the average herd per household was about 5 which is the same as in 1984 in the initial stages of resettlement (Dekker and Kinsey 2011:1014). The proportion of households without

cattle increased to 25% from 10% (*ibid*). Dekker and Kinsey (2011) attribute this disinvestment to the economic crisis without referring to its causes. They found that cattle were used to finance daily expenditures and a cow could be traded for just 20kgs of maize during the economic crisis. Another reason Dekker and Kinsey (2011) proffer is that some migrants took cattle with them when they went to settle elsewhere. Nevertheless farmers responded differently to the prevailing economic and political crises. For example, 15% of resettled farmers accumulated cattle from 2000 (Dekker and Kinsey 2011:1014). Because they do not qualitatively explore the process of accumulation the authors acknowledge that 'the processes leading to this differentiation are at present not entirely clear and cannot be unilaterally linked to cash crop markets, migration processes or livestock endowments in the late 1990s' (Dekker and Kinsey 2011: 1014).

My review shows that resettled farmers accumulated more than communal farmers showing a similar trend to production patterns. The major explanatory factor is linked to revenues from agricultural production (Deininger *et al*. 2000, Dekker and Kinsey 2011, Hoogeven and Kinsey 2001) which can be conceptualised as accumulation from below as explained in chapter 1. The authors also acknowledge accumulation from diverse livelihood activities by the small-scale farmers. However, accumulation dynamics are narrowly explained from an economic and livelihoods approach and fail to explore in-depth the effect of state practices. Even in post-2000 Zimbabwe, the authors (Dekker and Kinsey 2011) downplay political processes in their explanation of rural differentiation in an environment characterised by violence and disorder as the following Fast Track literature hints.

2.3 Fast Track: 2000-2012

2.3.1 Beneficiary selection

Beneficiary selection in Fast Track land reform has been influenced by institutional, political and social processes of land acquisition that are quite different to those pertaining to the old resettlement schemes. Beneficiaries of Fast Track are a diverse group that includes civil servants, cabinet Ministers, members of the army, central intelligence officers from the President's office, war veterans, business people, and traditional leaders (Alexander 2006, Marongwe 2008, Marongwe 2011, Moyo 2011, Scoones *etal.* 2010, Zamchiya 2011). Even though the findings differ in terms of proportions and at times in terms of conceptualising categories (see Zamchiya 2011 and Scoones *et al*. 2010) it is evident that the processes of beneficiary selection have produced a different outcome from that of the first phase of resettlement. During Fast Track most of the land was occupied through land invasions unlike the largely orderly, technocratic and bureaucratic process of the first phase. Though the government put in place policy procedures regarding how people were to be allocated land after *jambanja* (see Chambati *et al*. 2003) what happened in practice was different. On the A2 farms policy stipulated that aspiring beneficiaries had to fill in an application form where one had to prove experience in farming, ownership of property, proof of financial capital and develop a comprehensive business model for the farm (Marongwe 2008). The applications were supposed to be assessed by a provincial assessment committee comprised of a number of technocrats from different government departments. Instead the government set up parallel land identification committees at provincial and district level. As Alexander (2006) argues, this was because the ZANU PF leadership did not entirely entrust the technocrats or civil servants alleged to sympathise with the opposition or simply because they wanted to enforce the policies and laws of government professionally. These land identification committees were in most cases

dominated by ZANU PF members, members from the security forces, war veterans and traditional leaders (Marongwe 2011, Matondi 2011, Zamchiya 2011). As Marongwe (2011) argues, politicians subverted the policy process and political and social dynamics rather than rule bound technocratic procedures took centre stage in terms of who got land.

Given these political circumstances it is important to find out who got what. It helps very little to frame debates from an aggregate point of view and argue against a 'myth' that 'the beneficiaries of Zimbabwean land reform have been largely political cronies' (Scoones *et al*. 2010). Political cronies by their very definition are few: they are 'those in the immediate power circles at the core of the regime' (Cliffe 2010:10), and there is no way given the large scale of Fast Track, that beneficiaries could have 'largely' been political cronies. This does not, however, mean that beneficiaries and the process of their selection were non-partisan. There is a slight variation in terms of the total number of beneficiaries from the A2 farms. Moyo (2011) estimates the figure to be 22,373 whereas Matondi (2011) argues that only 16,386 benefited.It is more helpful to disaggregate the beneficiaries into the different categories that emerged from the literature: on A2 farms they are 'political cronies', 'land grabbers' and the contested category of 'ordinary' beneficiaries.

Some political elites and cronies received whole farms that is entire farms once owned by the displaced white owners, and sometimes more. According to Moyo (2011:259), white settlers had an average farm size of 2,000 hectares. In Masvingo Province a disaggregation of the data shows that there were a minimum of 58 individuals who acquired 111,330 hectares which means on average each beneficiary got about 1,920 hectares of land during Fast Track (see Scoones *et al*. 2010:35). Government audit reports for Masvingo showed similar findings (Goz 2006) and the Utete (2003) report confirmed this trend earlier on. In Goromonzi, Marongwe (2011) records

whole farms being allocated to the ruling elite such as chairpersons of ZANU PF, officials in the state security sector and cabinet ministers. Moyo (2007) acknowledges that under Fast Track up to 178 elites got more than one farm accounting for more than 150,000 hectares (Moyo 2007). Matondi (2011:90) notes that there are about 400 individuals who received a total of 2 million hectares. He nonetheless argues that Fast Track cannot be delegitimized because of the 'few bad apples in the basket'. What he fails to note is that it was the very principle of a privileged elite (white farmers) owning the majority of the prime large-scale farmers at the expense of others that made the 2000 land ownership patterns unjustified. Secondly, Matondi (2011) does not factor in the potential cost of such land grabbing by the political elite and others who benefited because of family, social and political connections to this group. For example, Marongwe (2010:10-11) demonstrates with a sample of 10 farms, that if the ban on multiple ownership and the stipulated farm sizes of 350 hectares for Goromonzi had been followed, 17 households would have benefited instead of 10. Those who got whole farm units and consolidated farms were largely 'political cronies', in the sense of those in the immediate power circles at the core of the regime (Cliffe 2010:10). The Utete (2003) report cited above confirms that nationally ZANU PF political elites have accumulated more than one farm especially under the A2 model in defiance of the ZANU PF 'slogan' of 'one [wo] man one farm'.

In addition to those who got whole and consolidated farms there is a significant group that acquired large farms. Moyo (2011) argues that this group consists of 2,400 black commercial farmers who got between 500-1000 hectares. Following Moyo (2011:261), I call these 'land grabbers'. Moyo (2011:261) defines this group vaguely as 'urban and rural-based professionals, public and private sector executives, other petty bourgeoisie elements and black capitalists'. How this group managed to acquire huge farms is left to anyone's guess. In Goromonzi, Marongwe (2008) observed that the majority of beneficiaries who got large farms were politically connected.

As Marongwe (2010:7) writes, 'less than 5% of A2 beneficiaries in Goromonzi had their names on the List of Screened Applicants for Mashonaland East'. This means that 95% of beneficiaries were not selected on the basis of policy prescriptions and 'it was left in the hands of the politically biased land committees and powerful individuals, to decide the outcome of settler selection' (Marongwe 2010:8). Interrogating the allocation process helps to reveal who the beneficiaries were beyond the multi-class character given by Moyo (2011:261). There is huge variation in farm sizes within A2 farms. Even though land 'ownership' has been deracialised, it remains unequal, as it has produced a small number of political elites with large holdings of prime land especially the A2 model.

Among the 'land grabbers' were security services who are deemed central in defending the ZANU PF ruling elite's power (Rupiya 2011). Marongwe (2008) argues that on A2 farms 18% were from the Zimbabwe National Army and 6 % from the ZRP and state intelligence officers from the national President's office, giving a total of 24%. However, Scoones *et al*. (2010:53) found that only 1.8% of total beneficiaries on A2 schemes were from the security services. Relying on government data, Matondi (2011:72) argues that only 1.52% were security officers in Shamva district. However, the government data is not reliable as 56.2% of the households in Shamva were not identified in anyway. Unfortunately, Matondi (2011) does not tell us what his own sample of 251 found. In Mazowe district a similar trend of unidentified beneficiaries is observable. The data revealed that 'of the 4,963, some 68% were not categorised, while of those categorised the…Security (ZRP, ZNA, President's Office) were 2.65% (Matondi 2011:68). According to the researcher, 'there was no clear explanation of this extraordinary high percentage who were not classified as others, bring[ing] in suspicion of corruption, hiding multiple ownership, cronyism, nepotism, etc' (Matondi 2011:69). Given the politicization found in other regions this is insightful and needs to be explored further. However, it is fair to indicate that it is difficult for researchers to

disentangle who works for the state security services, particularly the President's office. One needs the kind of bureaucratic networks a researcher such as Marongwe (2008) had in Goromonzi district, which gave him access even to important minutes of ministerial meetings. Otherwise it is not unusual for members of the security services to identify themselves as ordinary people or as other members of the civil service.

From a review of the literature one can deduce that the new form of inequality in ownership of land is no longer defined by race but by political loyalty to ZANU PF. Inequality is less, however, in comparison to the pre-Fast Track ownership trend. For example, at a national level, Cliffe (2010:9) indicates that beneficiaries of A2 farms were less than 10% of total beneficiaries (A1 and A2) but they received 25% of the land. In Masvingo, Scoones *et al*.'s (2010:33) data indicates that 3% of beneficiaries received 23.7% of the redistributed Fast Track land. Where the stakes were higher in the high-potential agro-ecological zone of Mazowe district A2 farmers received 211 farms (65% of the redistributed land) whereas the rest were left to subsist on 113 farms (35% of the redistributed land). In Shamva district, A2 farmers received 13 farms out of 26 (Matondi 2011:277). The politics of beneficiary selection need to be explored if one is to understand the new forms of inequalities produced by Fast Track and the implications for agrarian change.

The number of beneficiaries that can be categorised as 'ordinary' on A2 farms varies in ways that need to be explained to get a clearer picture. Most Fast Track authors define the 'ordinary' as the income and asset poor, the 'unemployed' who relied on agriculture for survival and those who came from adjacent communal and urban areas (Marongwe 2008, Matondi 2011, Moyo *et al*. 2009, Scoones *et al*. 2010). The defining variables are problematic as I explore later. From this flawed understanding, Matondi (2011:72) argues that the 'ordinary' constituted 29.03% on A2 farms. Scoones *et al*. (2010:53) found that 56% of A2 beneficiaries were 'ordinary' people.

Marongwe (2008, 2010:11) argues that only 12% of beneficiaries on A2 farms (based on his Goromonzi survey) were 'ordinary'. In fact, on farms such as Danah B, there was no single ordinary person who benefited as all beneficiaries were war veterans, civil servants and state intelligence officers from the President's office. The difference can in part be explained by geography, as Goromonzi is a high potential agro-ecological zone located near the capital city of Harare and had highly capitalized farms and the political elites preferred to grab more farms in such areas (see Marongwe 2008). The other reason for Marongwe's (2008) finding is that he uses a small sample of 65 on the A2 farms, which makes it much easier to interrogate the identity of beneficiaries than does the large sample of 376 used by Scoones *et al*. (2010). Marongwe (2011:120), who researched in both Goromonzi and in Masvingo, alludes to the practical difficulties of breaking down the number and identity of beneficiaries in Masvingo but does not hint further. He only confirms those small samples are easier in establishing the identity of the beneficiaries as compared to large samples.

In summary, the allocation process was manipulated by those closely linked to the ZANU PF ruling elite. On the A2 farms 'political cronies' 'land grabbers' composed of civil servants, members of the military, ZANU PF leaders and cabinet ministers who can loosely be defined as the ZANU PF ruling elite were the major beneficiaries . Land became a source of party patronage. Was this trend similar on the A1 small-scale farms?

2.3.1.1 Ordinary on A1 farms?

Regarding the A1 farms the literature has emphasised the scale of redistribution. Independent research indicates that around 145,000 households benefited from Fast Track land reform with hectares on average ranging between 0.2 and 30 (Cliffe *et al*. 2011, Matondi 2011, Scoones *et al*. 2010, Moyo 2011, Moyo *et al*. 2009). However, the Ministry of Lands and ZANU PF national

leadership puts the figure twice as high at 300,000 households for political reasons. The ZANU PF national leadership celebrates the huge numbers because they vindicate their view that Fast Track was a success in terms of the scale of redistribution of land and that the majority of Zimbabweans benefited. Some scholars who have been long opposed to market-based acquisition of land and advocates of radical land reform also seem to glorify the scale of land acquisition (Cousins 2010, Moyo *et al*. 2009, Scoones*et al*. 2010). The challenge is to understand who got what how and why among the 145,000 households who benefited? The story is usually presented as a contrast to the politics of corruption and patronage which characterised the A2 schemes. As a result the forms and nuances of patronage on these farms are lost. Important questions such as why some aspiring beneficiaries were left out are ignored yet it is through understanding some of these processes that one can be able to understand the beneficiary selection process. It is the process of how beneficiaries came from the communal areas that sheds light on the importance of political patronage or not. Even differentiation among those who benefited is not adequately explored. Not everyone got the same size of farms on A1 resettlement farms. For example, from the Mazowe study Matondi (2011:68) found from a survey of 251 households 'that 84.3% of the beneficiaries in the A1 obtained between 3 and 10 ha and 11.6% got between 11 and 30 ha'. Why a minority of these farmers got more land is never pursued, let alone the how. Matondi's (2011) explanation is that for the A1 model it was difficult to understand how beneficiaries were selected and he alludes to the fact that in some cases it was through a raffle draw. Even if we accept that, there is still an unexplored process in terms of how some came to be selected for the raffle draw.

The overarching assumption on most A1 work is that most beneficiaries were 'ordinary' people. Most scholars agree that political patronage was rampant on A2 farms but downplay the same on A1 farms. In Scoones *et al*.'s study (2010:53) 63.7% of beneficiaries on A1 schemes are presented as 'ordinary'. In Mangwe district about 50.8 % of the resettled A1 beneficiaries were categorised

as 'ordinary' that is they are unemployed and rely on agriculture for their livelihoods (Matondi *et al*. 2008:36). Marongwe (2008) in his study of Goromonzi classified 42% of beneficiaries as 'ordinary', meaning those who are from the adjacent communal areas and or who are asset and income poor and 'unemployed'. As noted earlier the scholars argue from this problematic conceptualisation that it was largely the 'ordinary' people who benefited from Fast Track. As Zamchiya (2011:1108) writes,

> While there can be debates around what ordinary really means ...classifying land reform beneficiaries according to their previous professions and describing them as ordinary based on not having "formal employment" (Matondi *et al*. 2008) or of "low income and assets" (Scoones *et al*. 2010) or simply from adjacent communal areas (Moyo *et al*. 2009) is inadequate if one is to explore the nuances of political patronage in gaining access to land. The ordinary can still be rich in political capital and be clients of patronage networks and beneficiaries of patronage relations linked to the ruling elite.

This definition of the ordinary has limited investigations into the role of patronage on A1 land allocations or more broadly the extent to which beneficiary selection was biased towards ruling party supporters. Most of the Zimbabweans were classified in government surveys as poor in terms of income and assets at the commencement of Fast Track (Bond and Manyanya 2002). So who amongst this large pool benefited and who did not and why? The violent and partisan political dynamics (McGregor 2002, Raftopoulos 2006, Sachikonye 2003, 2011) has to be integrated in the analysis of who got what and why. The extent to which political patronage operated among A1 farmers is overlooked. This becomes clearer if we focus on why some distinct social categories (women and farm workers) were excluded.

2.3.1.2 Gender

Fast-track land reform has reproduced the historical marginalisation of women. The ZANU PF ruling elite were more concerned with benefiting strategic powerful groups that could enhance their grip on political power as demonstrated in the next chapter. I am inclined to share Sender *et*

al.'s (2004) argument that 'gender concerns have been largely ignored' in land reform initiatives yet women are often the backbone of African agriculture. Fast Track studies have shown that the allocation of land between men and women was highly unequal. The proportion of women who got land in their own right, which is with their names on the offer letter, is very small. The Utete (2003) report shows that only 16% of those resettled nationally are female-headed households (also see Sachikonye 2003:237). Other recent empirical studies show a trend towards women's marginalization but more women benefiting from the A1 farms compared to A2 farms. In Scoones *et al*.'s (2010:54-55) study only 12% of beneficiaries were women who received land in their own right, with 8% on A2 farms and 13.5% on A1 farms. Moyo *et al*. (2009:26) showed that women constituted 19% of beneficiaries with 14.2% of A2 beneficiaries being women compared to 20.72% on A1 farms. The same trend is observed by Murisa (2011) in Zvimba, he found that 25% of beneficiaries on A1 farms were women compared to 22% on A2 farms. As Goebel (2005) argues, land reform did not close the gender gap as it failed to cater for this previously disadvantaged group.

Most women failed to gain access to land due to the violent nature of Fast Tack (Matondi 2011), 'lack of access to male-dominated patronage networks on A2 farms' (Scoones *et al*. 2010:55), the role of headmen and chiefs in recommending beneficiaries to land committees (Goebels 2005). The latter operated within the customary systems that favour the allocation of land to men. Some women preferred to manage their homes in the communal areas whereas their husbands preferred Fast Track farms (Mutopo 2011). In addition, as noted in chapter 1, the household was used as a unit of allocation in the redistribution of land. As a result land was allocated to the head of the household, who often appeared to be male in the patriarchal nature of Zimbabwean society. This marginalisation of an important social group from a resource that empowers them undermines the outcomes of Fast Track in Zimbabwe. Land reform was supposed to result in

greater gender parity given the historic inequalities in ownership of land across gender (Goebels 2005, Jacobs 2000).

However, some women gained access to land by using social and political networks that capitalized on ZANU PF party affiliation. As Matondi (2011:143) writes, in Mazowe 'women who were ex-combatants or were civil servants accessed land in both the A1 and A2 schemes. Many of them confirmed that they used their privileged positions to gain access to land, and would not have been successful as ordinary women'. Mutopo (2011) challenges this view without elaborating yet some of her detailed case studies on livelihoods actually show the same trend of powerful women getting access to land. Mutopo (2011), in a study of Mwenezi district in Masvingo, further argues that even though women did not get land in their own right they employed a number of strategies to use the land. Fast Track opened opportunities for women due to the availability of land. According to Mutopo (2011), the bargaining and negotiations included even sexual relationships. For example, she cites the case of Mrs Chimbari who was married to a member of the Village Development Community who negotiated for three fields to grow crops of her own. Mrs Chimbari stated that 'the bedroom is the place to discuss such issues which are important such as land' (Mutopo 2011:1030). Through bargaining with men, women in Mwenezi managed to produce surplus crops and engage in cross border activities, selling goods in South Africa thus breaking the traditional pattern of women staying at home whilst men migrated. The major problem with this analysis is that women remain dependent on their relationship with men to gain access to land. They are in effect treated as minors. The access is tied to a man's mood which may reproduce the marginalization of women. In addition, at the death of husband or on divorce the lease states that inheritance is governed by the inheritance laws of Zimbabwe that favour men (Goebels 2005). Even Mrs Chimbari is worried about losing her access to land in the event of losing her husband: 'The land still belongs to my husband, though it would be good for me to have

ownership too. Especially if he dies, I am afraid of being chased away and losing everything during asset distribution, yet I have been putting all my effort into this plot' (Mrs Chimbari quoted in Mutopo 2011:1030-1031).

Women are still vulnerable and insecure and the gendered outcome of Fast Track requires an analytic lens beyond Mutopo's (2011) world of bargaining and negotiations (also see Berry 1989) which can show how women and other groups like farm workers were marginalized as patronage politics took centre stage as we explore further below.

2.3.1.3 Farm workers

Farm workers were excluded during Fast Track yet they are a disadvantaged group because of their history of marginalisation during the colonial and post-colonial era (Rutherford 2001). Even though Zimbabwe introduced a minimum wage and allowed farm worker trade unionism after independence labour relations remained exploitative and living conditions were appalling on many large-scale commercial farms for farm workers (see Magaramombe 2010, Rutherford 2001, 2004, Sachikonye 2003, Vhurumuku *et al*. 1998). Land reform proponents expected that farm workers would be major beneficiaries of any such program but they were not even recognized as a distinct category of beneficiaries in the first phase of resettlement (see Alexander 2006). Following Fast Track about 200,000 farm workers were displaced nationally (GAPWUZ 2003, Magaramombe 2010, Sachikonye 2003) translating to about a million farm dwellers (Sachikonye 2003:237). In an early study, Sachikonye (2003) observed that less than 5 % of the original farm workforce of 314,879 was allocated land under Fast Track land reform. This finding is replicated in subsequent studies. In Moyo *et al*.'s (2009:1032) survey only 8.1% of the land reform beneficiaries who gained access to land under Fast Track were farm workers. Scoones *et al*. (2010) also observed that many farm workers did not benefit. On average, in Masvingo, only 6.7% of beneficiaries were former

farm workers and the bulk of the farm worker beneficiaries were on low value A1 villagised farms where they constituted 11.5%. In Marongwe's (2008) Goromonzi study they constituted 1.1% and in Matondi's (2011) study in Mazowe only 0.05% of beneficiaries were farm workers. The majority of farm workers were thus excluded in contrast to other social categories.

The few farm workers who benefited joined the war veterans in land occupations so they were considered for land when the government officials came to confirm the occupations (Sadomba 2008); others applied through the chiefs and headmen in the communal areas and some are said to have launched official applications with the district land committee (Chambati 2011:1053). Yet Chambati (2011:1053) brings out an important point noting that most farm workers did not 'reveal their status as former farm workers…only 38 of the 70 former farm workers [in the Moyo *et al*. 2009 survey] who got land disclosed their status when they registered for land [with the DLC]'. Chambati (2011:1053) acknowledges that 'they did this [concealing their identity as former farm workers] in fear of victimisation and being left out of the resettlement exercise as perceived anti-land reform reactionaries and Movement for Democratic Change supporters'. He does not, however, explore further the implications of political party affiliation in getting land.

At a national level farm workers were denounced as foreigners and accused of sympathizing with the MDC and white commercial farmers, which made them targets of the violent occupations as stated in chapter 1 (see Rutherford 2004, Sachikonye 2011). Farm workers who were displaced by violence triggered a humanitarian crisis as many were reported in need of food aid. This discrimination against farm workers because they were descendants of migrant workers from Malawi, Zambia, and Mozambique (denigrated as *makarushi*) is a clear case of state xenophobia. This was meant to cast the farm workers ideologically as outsiders hence a non-deserving category for land reform. Exclusive nationalism was used to justify the marginalization of farm workers.

Some farm workers are second or third generation Zimbabweans though most do not possess identity or citizenship documents either from Zimbabwe or from the purported country of origin (Chambati 2006:4). Most of these farm workers consider themselves *de-facto* Zimbabweans as evidenced by the fact that none has requested repatriation from the government despite such an offer from the government.

Chambati (2011) however sees it differently. He focuses on those farm workers who returned to the resettlement farms and argues that Fast Track has restructured the agrarian relations in a way that benefited the farm workers. Both Moyo *et al*. (2009) and Chambati (2011:1052) argue that about 75% of farm workers were displaced *in situ* or that they returned to their former farms of employment after some time. Chambati (2011:1052) advances the argument that 'overall there has been a net gain in livelihoods, as 45,000 farm workers…have been replaced by 170,000 farm households'. This statistical interpretation is problematic because it appears as if the 125,000 households had no livelihoods before resettlement. It is important to highlight that even when the farm workers returned they did not return as beneficiaries of Fast Track that is as plot holders in their own right. Chambati (2011) argues that analyses of agrarian labour have narrowly focused on wage labour at the exclusion of other non-farm based livelihoods. To him a focus on job losses and displacement is 'a conservative orientation towards implicitly defending the poorly remunerated wage labour in the former LSCF' (Chambati 2011:1048). Yet this is not my argument for it is due to exploitative labour conditions that Fast Track should have benefited the bulk of farm workers.

Chambati (2011) elaborates that Fast Track has created self-employment for farm workers on the farms, non-farm livelihood activities such as gold panning and diamonds and on-farm wage labour. Even though these activities are observable it is difficult to establish a causal relationship with Fast

Track nor is it a new phenomenon. The engagements of farm workers in non-farm livelihood income generating activities are well documented before Fast Track and across the southern Africa region (see Zamchiya 2008). Vhurumuku *et al*. (1998) detail how farm workers engaged in diverse livelihood activities such as gold panning, gardening, crafts work, petty trade, beer brewing, tuck shops and shebeens. Farm workers transcended the wage-labour relationship by keeping their own livestock and engaging in own crop production in gardens across their compounds. Farm wage labour on Fast Track farms also did not bring much financial gain to the returning farm workers as Chambati (2011) would like us to believe. Given the capital constraints of the new farmers most of the farm workers earned as little as Z$32,000 in March 2007, which covered 2.2 % of the monthly food basket set by the consumer council of Zimbabwe (Zamchiya 2007). The labour shortages observed by Moyo *et al*. (2009) on Fast Track farms are also linked to the poor financial remuneration on the new farms. It is also important to discover what happened to the displaced farm workers as an excluded group even if we are to accept they are 45,000.

My review shows that though there are variations in terms of the actual numbers of the displaced farm workers the trend is one of huge displacement. As I have argued, the farm workers were not removed with the goal to create 'net gains in livelihoods' (Chambati 2011) but because they were alleged to support the opposition MDC. The farm worker constituency was a political threat to ZANU PF. As Chambati (2011) subtly admitted some farm workers who benefited had to hide their identity in case they were considered to be disloyal to ZANU PF. The exclusion of farm workers was ideologically justified by ZANU PF leaders as argued in chapter 1. Amongst those who benefited how has agricultural production fared?

2.3.2 Production

Following Fast Track agriculture production has been very low at a national level (Richardson 2005, 2007) but such an assertion does not capture the differences in regional outputs, variations in types of crops and differentiation among farmers. The picture of variations in agricultural production presented by some major scholars carries a particular agrarian politics (Cousins 2010a, 2010b, Cousins and Scoones *et al.* 2010, Moyo 2011, Moyo *et al.* 2009, Scoones *et al.* 2010). There is a subtle promotion of and preference for small-scale production. For instance,

> The study finds that crop yields and output on the redistributed farms, *and particularly on the A1 schemes*, have increased steadily over the past few years…Trends vary considerably by crop type, showing significant decreases in yields and total output for maize, tobacco and wheat, but *increases in…total output for smallholder crops* like small grains, groundnuts and dry beans… Cotton production, *dominated by smallholders* since the mid-1980s, *has seen increases* in area planted, yields and total output...' (Cousins 2010a, emphasis added).

Interpretations of variations in agricultural production can be open to political bias as highlighted in chapter 1. Moyo (2011:949) argues from the same position of promoting small-scale farming, 'in 2004 tobacco output had fallen…but over 50,000 farmers, including *30,000 peasants*, are now producing tobacco *on smaller cropped areas'*. This serves to underlie that small-scale farmers are doing comparatively well. Even the inverse relationship argument is brought in without substantial evidence. Moyo *et al.* (2009:54) argue that small-scale (A1) farmers utilised more land in comparison to A2 farmers, '*suggesting that landunderutilization increases with the size of the landholding'*. In Masvingo, '*yields levels were highest in the A1 farms, supporting the broad argument of the inverse relationship'* (Scoones *et al*. 2010:107). Moyo, Scoones and Cousins are long term proponents of small-scale farming. In the pre-Fast Track era they correctly argued against the view that large-scale commercial farming was more efficient as some neo-classical economists, white farmers and black capitalists argued. It seems they have fallen in the same trap

of supporting the efficiency of small-scale farms without rigorous comparative evidence. As Rutherford (2012) argues, there is nothing wrong with political positioning 'as long as people do not mask their politics'. I argue that 'their empirical focus carries with it a particular political story of its own, namely that of yeomen effort on the part of (many of) the resettlement farmers, a story-line they regularly repeat' (Rutherford 2012:151).

Politically, Cousins (2010a), Moyo (2011) and Scoones *et al.* (2010) try to detach the A1 beneficiaries from the violence and patronage that characterized Fast Track. For example, Cousins (2010a) argues that, 'it seems hard for anyone who is critical of Mugabe to admit that anything good can come out of fast-track land reform. But it is possible to identify positive outcomes without endorsing the violence and abuses that accompanied the seizure of farms'. The only good here are the small-scale farmers. It is not just an issue of endorsing or not endorsing violence but of weaving in the analyses of agrarian change political issues. They are not detached from the contemporary dynamics of agricultural production on the Fast Track farms. As Rutherford (2012:147) writes, 'the authors [Scoones *et al*. 2010] ignore the context and politics of the state-which they later invoke to develop adequate supportive policy and stability for the new farms'. Here Scoones *et al*. (2010) make an appeal to the same policy makers within the violent state characterized by partisan state practices in agriculture. Off course the state is not homogeneous but they just choose to see the remnants of the 'good state' like Agritex. The fear about integrating politics in the analysis is that the narrative will 'dirty' the small-scale farmers or appear to be attacking their preferred smallholder production system.

From this political positioning, the Masvingo team locates 'their analysis in the materiality of farming and showing the gains in terms of access to the means of production and increased productivity for many of the new [A1] resettlement farmers surveyed [and] the book achieves its

goal of disputing doomsdays portrayals of rural Zimbabwe' (Rutherford 2012:150). Rutherford's (2012) legitimate concerns are the book's failure to pay due attention to the wider state practices, politics and past events as argued in the previous chapter.

In addition to these concerns, a careful scrutiny of the narrative shows that they forcefully provide comparative explanations to advance their political goal of presenting Fast Track as a success in terms of agricultural production. For example,

> Average levels of annual household production on the new resettlements are higher than in comparable communal area settings. Between 1988 and 1990, for example, households in Chivi communal area averaged around 800kg of maize output…By contrast, in the old resettlements, significant numbers produced more than a tonne…However, increases in output were to a large part due to expansions of the area, as yield levels remained around a tonne per hectare. Our findings echo this pattern (Scoones *et al*. 2010:111).

Scoones *et al*. (2010) want to make the point that Fast Track farms are doing better than communal areas in terms of productivity but they simply do not have recent data from Chivi. The problem is that the authors are comparing productivity with old communal data collected in the 1988/1990 seasons. As hinted in the previous chapter, a comparative study of production and accumulation between the communal areas and Fast Track farms is needed before such substantive conclusions. Even if we agree that Fast Track farmers are doing better in terms of productivity we still need to explore why beyond the 'expansions of the [cultivated] area' (Scoones *et al.* 2010:111) especially in post-2000 Zimbabwe where state patronage is prevalent as we shall see in chapter 4.

I posit that a careful juxtaposition of the narrative and the quantitative tables opens the book for further scrutiny on its interpretation of agricultural production outcomes or 'solid evidence'. Where the figures seem to distract from the story of an agricultural boom, Scoones *et al.* (2010) skirt around them and are quick to provide explanations.

For example,

> The data from Mwenezi shows a very limited number of people across the years achieving more than a tonne of maize. This is because the major grain crop in these areas is in fact not maize, but sorghum. If the same yardstick is taken, combining maize and sorghum for the A1 villagised and informal sites in the Mwenezi cluster, 57.1% and 72.7% households exceeded one tonne threshold in 2009 (Scoones *et al*. 2010:107).

Missing in the construction of the narrative is that no farmer in Mwenezi harvested more than a tonne of maize in 2004-05, 2006-07, 2007-08 and 2008-09 agricultural seasons (see table 5.5. in Scoones *et al*. 2010:108). The aggregate percentages of households that produced more than a tonne in the narrative are selectively based on the 2009 season which was a good rain season. A careful scan of the data on marketing shows that in Mwenezi district no single A1 farmer managed to sell maize to GMB or local markets in the 2006-7, 2007-8 and 2008-9 seasons (see table 5.6. in Scoones *et al.* 2010:109). From their statistics couched in tables only 9.5% of A1 farmers in Mwenezi managed to sell maize locally and that was only in the 2005-6 season. The qualification is that they grow sorghum but we are not told how much sorghum was sold both in the tables and in the narrative. The disaster from Mwenezi is underplayed in the presentation of the narrative.

This pattern of presenting the data is consistent. For example, 'fertiliser purchase varied significantly, with very little occurring in the drier sites of Mwenezi' (Scoones *et al*. 2010:101). Yet a scan of the statistical tables shows that none of the households in Mwenezi purchased fertiliser in 6 consecutive agricultural seasons from 2003-04 to 2008-09 (see table 5.2. in Scoones *et al.* 2010:102). Only 3.7% of households managed to purchase fertiliser in only one season. All this is missing in the narrative yet when the statistics confirm the story of success they become well used currency in the text. The authors are in effect trying to hide their politics behind the numbers. It complicates the book's argument in favour of ditching what Cousins (2010) calls 'stereotypes of disaster and failure' of Fast Track especially in Mwenezi.

One response might be for the reader to search for the data in the vast numeric tables, yet even the figures are not presented in a manner that shows production per hectare per crop (see table 5.3 in Scoones *et al*. (2010: 104-105). The figures make it virtually impossible to disentangle crop production per hectare. The area planted is given for all the crops grown. Take, for example, the data in Mwenezi, where an average 6.5 hectares was planted and the harvests were 0.2 tonnes for maize, 0.8 tonnes for sorghum and 0.06 tonnes for groundnuts so we can hardly calculate productivity for each crop. Some of the authors are experts like Sukume but it seems a deliberate political presentation that does not distract from the story of success and give room to the 'myths'. The narrative presentation reveals as much as it hides. Some of the empirical realities are ignored yet the book's stated aim is its 'focus on ground-level, field realities…through solid evidence'. Rutherford (2012) is right therefore to raise questions about political positioning. The narrative can distract the reader from some of the quantitative tables marshalled to support the book's story and analysis but which do not actually do so.

The conclusion I draw from this in relation to wider literature is that production patterns vary across agro-ecological zones and maize productivity is low in Masvingo generally but evidently less than 0.3 tonnes on some sites especially in Mwenezi. In Mangwe district with similar agro-ecological zones, the same pattern can be observed: maize production is in ruins. The highest recorded maize yield per hectare since 2003 is 0.6 tonnes and that was once in the 2004-2005 season (Matondi *et al*. 2008:44). The Mangwe survey shows that most of the small-scale farmers have not sold anything since the 2003 agricultural season. Most of the new farmers relied on food aid from NGOs (Matondi *et al*. 2008). The hectarage under crop production is low because crop production is difficult due to lack of reliable rainfall. As a result most people cultivate less than 2 hectares of land with maize (Matondi *et al*. 2008:43). The average maize yield per hectare is less

than 1 tonne yet the potential yield is 1.0 to 1.5 tonne in the area (Agritex 2007 in Matondi *et al*. 2008). Below is the table showing crop productivity on the A1 resettled farms in Mangwe district.

Table 6: Crop productivity in Mangwe district

CROP	2002/03	2003/4	2004/05	2005/06	2006/07
	YIELD/HA	YIELD/HA	YIELD/HA	YIELD/HA	YIELD/HA
Maize	0.1t	0.2t	0.001t	0.6t	0.1t
Sorghum	0.025t	0.01t	0.001t	0.2t	0.04t

Source: (Agritex, 2007 in Matondi *et al.* 2008)

One would expect sorghum to do better because it is a drought resistant crop yet the yields are lower than maize in this case. This means that while climatic factors are important there are other factors. According to Matondi *et al*. (2008:44), 'the low yields in Mangwe are attributed to the poor agronomic practices especially late planting, poor soils and…lack of fertilizers both compound D and ammonium nitrate'. Also evident in Mangwe is the breakdown of the input supply chain related to the economic crisis which was triggered by the violent nature of Fast Track.

In higher rainfall areas productivity is higher than in Masvingo and Mangwe. In the 2003-4 season the average yield per hectare was 2.45 tonnes for A1 resettled farmers in Mazowe district (Matondi 2011:109). For Shamva district maize production averages 1 tonne per hectare which means for both areas it is better than the usual national average. Moyo *et al*'s (2009) findings correspond to this agro-ecological trend as farmers are doing much better in Goromonzi and Zvimba compared to the dry lowveld areas of Mangwe and Chiredzi. In Marongwe's (2008) study of Goromonzi district a climatologically favourable area for crop production, small-scale farmers seem to have done well in contrast to A2 farmers who are struggling. He gives detailed description of three A1 farmers which show trajectories of positive agrarian change. However, he fails to analyse the underlying cause. He uses the experiences of *Chapoto*, Thompson and Kennedy. These are a former resident of Mabvuku Township, an employee of Circle Cement, and a war veteran

respectively. These selected stories show that some small-scale farmers are producing surplus, for example, Marongwe (2008:408) details the story of *Chapoto*: 'In 2003-2004 seasons he got 4 tonnes of maize and 1 tonne soyabeans, for 2005/06 he harvested 10 tonnes of maize, 3 tonnes of soyabeans and three bales of tobacco. He managed to purchase 4 more head of cattle'.

How *Chapoto* made the gains is anyone's guess. Marongwe (2008) also alludes in passing to some households who have left the A1 resettlement areas without elaborating on their difficulties. It is fair to say his particular focus is not on social differentiation as he admits that it was not possible in the context of his study to 'articulate the sub-classes and other characteristics of these groups' (Marongwe 2008:357). It is possible that the absence of a social differentiation focus resulted in Marongwe (2008) randomly picking A1 respondents to describe agricultural production as if they were homogeneous. His understanding of significant differentiation appears to be between A1 and A2 farmers only. It is only on A2 farms that Marongwe (2008:128) has a representation of different categories of farmers as large, medium and small-scale, which follows the government framework (see GoZ 2001). He thus does not adequately capture possible diverse experiences of small-scale farmers (A1), or explain the dynamics behind that diversity.

For Mazowe and Shamva, Matondi (2011) observed that farmers faced challenges of input supply and labour, shortage of draught power, inadequate farming skills, and failure to listen to technical advice from extension officers. Some farmers in Mazowe's ward 14 planted wheat in August, instead of the traditional May/June planting seasons. According to Matondi (2011:113):

> The new farmers due to 'ignorance', would go against the grain, and at times overrule the advice of the extension officers or the adopted farm workers. Many did not differentiate between the power of taking over land versus the knowledge and power to run farms on a professional basis, where specific technical knowledge was required to produce crops.

It is not just that farmers fail to listen to the extension officers or that they do not want the technical advice. There is a need to explore why farmers shun the advice before making substantive conclusions. In this case it is possibly due to the delay in the supply of wheat seed or other experiences, as the case of Chipinge will show.

Some small-scale farmers are doing better than others because of entry level socio-economic characteristics and remittances. For example, in Masvingo some farmers had cattle, scotch carts, ploughs, hoes, axes and other farming equipment that made it easier to clear the land and start farming. On the other hand, families that are struggling had limited farming assets and capital when they were resettled. In addition to farming assets some successful families have children who worked mainly in South Africa but also in Botswana and locally who regularly send remittances in cash and kind (Scoones *et al*. 2010). These remittances are used to buy inputs, fertilisers and hire labour, among other socio-economic needs as highlighted in chapter 1. Scoones *et al*. (2010:65) also observed that large households with labour produce more than small families. They also tend to combine agriculture with other activities such as off-season jobs in Masvingo and Botswana.

Other sources of differentiation include social networks and differential access to state sponsored inputs. In a study of 4 A1 schemes in Goromonzi and Zvimba, Murisa (2011) notes that a key focus of local farmer groups has been to gain access to inputs, enable collective production of market crops such as tobacco, mobilise labour and savings and credit, share farming assets and market as a group. Members of the local farmer group had a comparative advantage in gaining access to inputs. In Murisa's (2011:1149) study 40% of A1 beneficiaries belong to a local farmer group. Farm groups at Dunstan farm were established as a way to access government inputs and loans under the government's strategic grain reserve facility (Murisa 2011). Murisa (2011:1163) observed that

in some cases, such as that of the leadership of the Zvimba groups, the received inputs were not allocated fairly and transparently as they favoured their kith and kin. Allegations of corruption and patronage were rampant in his area of study though Murisa (2011) does not elaborate on how this happened. As Murisa (2011:1163) writes, 'the groups engage in a variety of, at times costly, discreet lobbying activities to be prioritized in the allocation of the inputs'. This is not a focus of his study but such 'discreet lobbying activities' potentially explain different levels of crop production on the resettlement farms.

It is important to note that government introduced a number of agricultural schemes in a way which played a key role in expanding patronage politics. The RBZ introduced the Productive Sector Facility (PSF) for agriculture in 2004, side stepping the Ministry of Agriculture in post-settlement support. Under the PSF, farmers were eligible for loans from the central bank at an interest rate of 25% compared to the then prevailing market rates of up to 400%. Another initiative, the Agriculture Sector Productivity Enhancement Facility (ASPEF) was introduced in 2005 to help finance food production and rebuild the national herd. New farmers also received heavily subsidised fuel (SPT 2006). In addition, the RBZ also introduced the Farm Mechanisation Programmes meant to distribute farm equipment to both resettled and communal farmers. The RBZ used US$200 million to finance the farm mechanization programmes and it still faced law suits from private companies that supplied the equipment in 2012 (Chifamba 2012).

The schemes included; Operation *Maguta/ Sithuthi*, or 'Operation we are full' launched in November 2005. This was a command agriculture program that placed food production under the control of the Zimbabwe National Army (Solidarity Peace Trust (SPT) 2006). Under this program small-scale farmers in the communal areas and on the resettlement schemes were given fertilisers and seed to boost food production in the country. The army would then take the grain harvests for

'submission' to the GMB to build strategic grain reserves and would leave farmers with what they (the soldiers) deemed was enough for consumption. Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe Governor, Gideon Gono, who funded the program, articulated the program from an economic viewpoint: 'Under this programme [*Maguta/Sisuthi*]; no doubt a huge food gap will be closed, effectively saving foreign exchange to go towards other priority sectors of the economy' (Chronicle, 2006). Scoones *et al*. (2010:98) also understand the aim of maguta as 'to ensure that trapped acreages of grains were planted to the key food security crops through provision of land preparation, seeds and fertilisers to selected farmers'. As Mudzonga and Chigwada (2009:5) argue, distribution of farming inputs was 'dependent on the political party supported by the recipients'. Partisan traditional leaders and the politicised army played a role in the selection of beneficiaries. As Mudzonga and Chigwada (2009:5) write,

> The selection of the recipients [of Maguta/Sisuthi] is done firstly at the village level by the kraal heads. The list of beneficiaries from the village is taken to the ward level, where it is finalized by the village heads together with the ward councillors. The list is then passed on to members of the army, who then approve the release of the inputs, which are usually kept at GMB depots.

The control of food production and distribution also served patronage politics for the military. As the SPT (2006:6) observed,

> Placing the army increasingly in control of food production…is the…logical step for government in the militarization of the state, and is a furtherance of the patronage of the army. Giving the army effective control over large aspects of agriculture is keeping soldiers who might otherwise get bored and angry at their poor conditions, active and fed.

In some cases, *Maguta/Sisuthi* was characterized by violence. Livelihoods of people were destroyed as the villagers who grew market or export crops 'instead' of planting maize were beaten (SPT 2006:5). As Ndlovu (2006) reports,

> Soldiers placed under Operation Maguta/Sisuthi have been accused of beating; ill-treating and denying villagers and plot holders food despite forcing them to work for long hours

> without rest…Some of the villagers who reportedly suffered severe body injuries include Elvis Nyoni, Stephen Ndlovu [and] Lawrence Mdlongwa.

This happened at Fatima farm, located about 40kms south of Lupane in Matabeleland North (Ndlovu 2006). Such stories were similar across the nation as some villagers were beaten and displaced at Kondozi farm in Manicaland by the army (Sithole 2011). Under *Maguta/ Sisuthi* rural areas became no go areas for known opposition supporters as the army was not only concerned with food production but strengthening the ZANU PF support base. However, like many command agriculture schemes operation *Maguta/Sisuthi* failed to reach its economic target of increasing maize production. Bureaucrats in the Ministries of Land and Agriculture became increasingly side-lined as agricultural production became politicized.

Some farm implements were distributed a few weeks before the harmonized council, parliamentary and presidential elections of March 29, 2008, prompting Tendai Laxton Biti, the Secretary General of the MDC, to say, '…now two weeks before the election, he [Reserve Bank Governor, Gideon Gono] is aiding ZANU PF to buy votes through the distribution of tractors and farm implements' (Biti cited in Chimashu 2008). Tendai Biti went further to describe Gideon Gono as 'an economic saboteur, terrorist and number one Alqaeda who deserves to be shot by a firing squad' (Biti cited in Chimashu 2008). A week before the national election, on March 23 2008, Gideon Gono in his response admitted that ZANU PF was using state resources to shore up its waning political fortunes, 'should I therefore be put before a firing squad because the ruling party, therefore government has sent me to do so now? If the ruling ZANU PF party chooses to ride on these modest positive pursuits, is it the Governor to account for that?' (Gono cited in Huni 2008:3).

The Governor lobbied for support for President Mugabe in the same interview:

> President Mugabe deserves to be rewarded by the voters if they, on their own, judge that the farm mechanisation programme is a good one and that it is succeeding because the President is behind it. That cannot be said to be a March 29, 2008 campaign strategy, but if it is, then surely there is nothing wrong with it because it is part and parcel of the democratic process (Gono cited in Huni 2008:4).

At a national level by September 2008, 3,000 tractors, 105 combine harvesters, 1,733 disc harrows, 100, 000 ploughs, 78,000 scotch carts, 200,000 chains and 2,000 planters were redistributed to farmers across the country (African Agriculture 2008). For the sub-program called strategic food programme, Minister of Agriculture, Joseph Made, said the government had distributed 20 combine harvesters, 100 tractors, 400 generators, 750 motorbikes, 7,000 scotch carts, 4,000 animal drawn harrows, 50 fertiliser spreaders and 150 grinding mills in 2008 across the country (African Agriculture 2008).

At a Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Agriculture on July 17 2012, Gono refused to divulge the names of the beneficiaries and to explain why others ended up with more implements (Chifamba 2012) which might possibly reveal levels of patronage. However, Gono (cited in Chifamba 2012) gave a legal explanation: 'Section 60 (1) of the RBZ Act [Chapter 22:15] forbids bank staff from disclosing information relating to the affairs of the bank or a customer unless lawfully required to do so by any court or under an enactment'. This prompted the ZANU PF Goromonzi North legislator, Paddington Zhanda, a member of the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Agriculture to walk out of the meeting in protest (Chifamba 2012). The fact that the ZANU PF MP was infuriated by Gono's refusal to disclose the beneficiaries shows that even within ZANU PF there was internal differentiation as we shall see in chapter 4. However, according to the Ministry of Agricultural Engineering, Mechanisation and Irrigation Development (2008) report, the major beneficiaries were cabinet Ministers, ZANU PF MPs and civil servants who received tractors and other farm equipment.

ZANU PF MPs, Ministers and state security officials were also implicated in using their power and influence to acquire huge amounts of fuel, 'supposedly for agriculture, but then selling it on the black market' (SPT 2006:11). According to Chimhete and Mokwetsi (2006), many ZANU PF officials benefited from the fuel in Manicaland. For example, the then ZANU PF Manicaland Province chairman, Shadreck Chipanga, received 66,576 litres on 15 November 2005. He suspiciously claimed to have used all the fuel for 'farming activities' (Chipanga cited in Chimhete and Mokwetsi 2006). The then Manicaland Governor, Tinaye Chigudu received 10,000 litres and other ZANU PF MPs and cabinet ministers in the province also benefited (see Chimhete and Mokwetsi 2006).

This is evidence of ZANU PF-sponsored partisan distribution of resources in order to gain electoral votes. It is such processes that agrarian scholars cannot ignore in their study of social differentiation on Fast Track farms. However, most of the studies largely focus on outcomes of production levels as we further review.

In contrast to poor crop production, livestock production in Mangwe and Masvingo is doing better due to the favourable climatic and other conditions for its production. In Matondi's (2011:116) study of Mangwe, 24.6% (n= 795) own between 1 and 5 cattle and a few, that is 13.3%, own over 21 cattle. Close to 50% of beneficiaries did not have cattle in Mangwe. Average cattle ownership is 8 head per household. One household owned 126 head of cattle, which shows huge differentiation. There are many processes that are helping farmers to acquire livestock in Mangwe such as the assistance from NGOs and government schemes to restock under the RBZ's ASPEF program. The Reserve Bank gave farmers breeding cows or money to buy breeding cows. Under the NGO scheme, a household was given a breeding cow and if a heifer is born they pass it on to another household. Matondi's (2011) data does not probe who benefited from these schemes so

it is difficult to determine how some benefited while others did not. How these households were selected requires further investigation.

In the low lying regions of Masvingo which has the same climatic conditions, livestock production has also done well as 71% of respondents owned cattle (Scoones *et al*. 2010:177) with a similar average herd size of about 8 per household for A1 resettled farmers. The Masvingo study emphasises two patterns of livestock accumulation. The first is illustrated by the case of Mrs C of Uswaushava who had four head of cattle at resettlement but had 16 cattle by 2008. Mrs C used proceeds from the sale of cotton and maize to buy more cattle (Scoones *et al*. 2010:121).The second case is that of Mrs M from the same farm who had five cattle at resettlement but through natural births and further acquisitions she now had 28 cattle. The sources of acquisition are not identified hence the approach lacks explanatory power.

Other differential factors include support from government departments, migrant remittances, financial capital and skill. For example, Mr. Moyo, a successful farmer at Summerton farm in Izimnyama ward in Mangwe district owned 30 cattle (Matondi *et al*. 2008). He got assistance from the Agritex officials and Veterinary department officials and from relatives in the diaspora who bought him some scarce and expensive drugs to treat the animals (Matondi *et al*. 2008:65). Another Mr Moyo, an A2 farmer, grew up as a herd boy and acquired experience in livestock production. He worked in South Africa for eight years and saved some money and he has other income generating projects like a grinding mill, a wielding workshop and market gardening. In addition to cattle, farmers also keep donkeys, sheep, hens and goats for mainly draught power, transport and domestic use.

In summary the review presented here, shows that it is important not to narrowly focus on outcomes in terms of crop production as these can be told from a particular political position.

Agro-ecological factors, economic environment and social networks and non-farm sources of income dominate the explanations of differential production. Unfortunately, the Fast Track scholars understate the role of patronage in the distribution of farming inputs and the politics behind such developments. The restructuring of the state and the side-lining of technical ministries makes it important to integrate state practices and wider politics in the analysis of agricultural production as I show in chapter 4. We now review the theme of accumulation based on the Fast Track literature.

2.3.3Accumulation

The general pattern is that of low investment on new resettlement farms. For example, the number of farmers buying small implements after Fast Track resettlement such as shovels, picks, mattocks and wheel barrows is very low in Mangwe district. The most investment was in axes and Matondi *et al.* (2008) attribute this to hunting and the selling of firewood. However, one may also link this to the need to clear the land for agriculture just after resettlement. Only 10% of surveyed households had bought farm implements (Matondi *et al*. 2008:71). Only three farmers bought tractors after resettlement and two have a tractor drawn plough (*ibid*). Matondi *et al*. (2008:73) argue that, 'most people who got resettled did not have resources to undertake commercial farming. It is expecting too much, from these resource poor people to be producing on the farms'. Mangwe district is located in dry regions 4 and 5 therefore the importance of irrigation to boost crop productivity cannot be overemphasized, what is striking is that none of the new settlers has purchased any irrigation equipment since resettlement. Only 1% indicated that they found irrigation pipes on the farms. Some of the centre pivoting irrigation and canals were vandalised and are not working. This means that most of the farmers rely on rain fed crop production which explains the persistence of chronic food shortages in the district (Matondi *et al*. 2008:69).

In Mazowe, Matondi (2011) reports that there is substantial disinvestment on resettlement farms and new farmers are not making any meaningful investments particularly A1 farmers. This is attributed to the violent nature of Fast Track that resulted in destruction of properties and 'asset stripping' on the farms. Matondi (2011:177) argues that 'the agricultural communities have largely been at a very minimum, and perhaps insignificant to drive the sector to meet the food, product, employment and foreign currency requirements'. Most farmers invested in small equipment like axes, shovels and hoes. Only a few own cultivators, harrows and scotch carts, and even a smaller proportion own motorised tractors and water pumps. The accumulation trajectory documented by Matondi (2011) does not show who owned what farm implements at resettlement compared to the present and how people acquired such assets. We also do not know how a few households managed to acquire tractors, whether it was through the government's farm mechanization program, political connections or sale of crops. Through explaining these processes of differentiation we can get a clearer picture of agrarian dynamics of Fast Track. This picture of disinvestment and low investment resonates with Marongwe's (2008) Goromonzi district where evidence pointed to low ownership of farming assets with dominant tools being a hoe here and an axe there. Marongwe (2008) argues that the land occupiers had vandalized irrigation equipment and other productive infrastructure, destroying the foundation of agricultural growth.

However, in some areas such as Masvingo, there has been a significant amount of investment, particularly by the A1 farmers that depict a trajectory of accumulation from below. A substantial number of small-scale farmers have cleared land for cultivation and invested in houses, 41% made of bricks (Scoones *et al*. 2008:3). The resettled households have also accumulated properties: 75% of households own ploughs; 40% own bicycles; 39% own ox drawn carts; 15% own private cars (*ibid*). The intersection of off-farm income and agricultural production explains the agrarian dynamics in Masvingo. There are diverse sources of off-farm income such as investments in shops,

bottle stores, transport operators, slaughter outlets and small butcheries established on and around resettlement farms, and this has generated new economic linkages creating rural employment that has multiplier effects (Scoones *et al*. 2010). Farmers also engaged in unlicensed gold panning and illegal cannabis production. Remittances further account for Masvingo's 'success' due to the history of migration and the region's proximity to South Africa. The remittances made a greater difference between 2003 and 2008 because they were in South African Rands at a time when the Zimbabwean dollar had lost its value due to inflation making remittances in local currency irrelevant.

Scoones *et al.* (2010) do not analyse investments in the broad sense and the quality of investment required to form a sustainable base for future investment. Investment is not just about 'agricultural hardware' (Matondi 2011) but about people with better living standards and a solid human capital base. Matondi (2011) argues that, prior to Fast Track, there was investment in agricultural research stations, dams, telecommunications and infrastructure. Despite the increased population in the resettlement schemes there is insignificant investment in schools, health facilities, energy and housing. Even government subtly acknowledged that there was substantial investment in infrastructure on the resettlement farms by agreeing to pay an average of US$ 1 million per farm though it never did (see Matondi 2011:180).

Another problem with Scoones *et al*.'s (2010) investment analysis is that it is meant to dismiss the myth in the western media that there is no investment in the Fast Track resettlement farms. To them 'this [myth] is coming from sources often not acknowledged or recognised' (Scoones *et al*. 2010:86). The effect of their political framing is that they gloss over other scholarly findings like Marongwe (2008) and Matondi *et al*. (2008) who found disinvestment on the farms as elaborated. The kind of investment in Masvingo seems limited on closer inspection. Accumulation from below

requires broader investment in infrastructure, state institutions, and education and health facilities for human development. During a field visit with the Masvingo team in 2008 this researcher did not see any clinics or hospitals. Also some of the investment in Masvingo was affected by Operation Murambatsvina [Drive out the Filth] in 2005. Operation Murambatsvina was 'the state's politicized programme of mass urban demolitions…through which 700,000 people lost their homes and or their informal urban livelihoods' (McGregor 2010:7). Some market stalls of the new farmers in Masvingo were destroyed during Operation Murambatsvina, a point Scoones *et al.* (2010) acknowledge but understate. The extent to which a sustainable future is built depends on a number of factors which include political stability and state institutions that are accountable.

In addition, the Masvingo study does not tell us what kind of investment was on the farms before Fast Track. Even if we accept that there was low capital investment as is usually associated with cattle ranches in the low rainfall regions there was still some kind of investment before Fast Track. Scoones *et al.* (2010) do point that the white farmers used to sell beef to supermarkets and the CSC. The conditions for doing so are usually associated with some investments. One is left asking what could have happened to the paddocks, cold rooms, irrigation systems, paddock fences, external fences used to separate cattle from wild animals, water pumping engines *et cetera*. Other media and government reports also reported theft on resettlement farms. For example, Karimakwenda (2005) reported that soldiers and armed police took 'tractors, trailers, water bowsers, road graders, irrigation pipes and various implements' in Mwenezi, a story corroborated by Gerry Whitehead, one of the white farmers in Masvingo. The Masvingo study, given its longitudinal nature, could have investigated further the disinvestment that occurred in Masvingo for a more complete understanding of agrarian change.

In general Fast Track land reform has not been part of a comprehensive rural development. Government continues to neglect investment in other rural sectors that support land reform such as transport, electricity and social services. There was no investment in technical institutions to back Fast Track. The Agritex department officials cited challenges such as poor remuneration, poor training, lack of motivation and large distances they have to travel to discharge their duties in Mangwe (Matondi *et al*. 2008:86). The same problems were observed by Marongwe (2008:404-405). Agritex in Goromonzi district had 6 motorbikes with only three working (*ibid*). This exacerbated differentiation in gaining access to extension services as A1 beneficiaries competed for scarce resources. In Goromonzi, access to social and other services such as health, education, water and sanitation, energy and transport has also declined.

In short, analyses of accumulation and sustainability should not narrowly focus on agricultural production and its linkages downstream and upstream of industry but must include the conditions of social services, nature of state institutions and also the security of tenure as we examine next.

2.3.2.1 Tenure and Investment

Most scholars (Adams 2000, Benjaminisen 2002, Bruce 1986, Cousins *et al*. 2005, De Soto 2000, Okoth-Ogendo 1982, Matondi 2011, Migot-Adholla *et al*. 1991, Moyo *et al*. 2009, Quan 2000) agree that land tenure reform underpins successful land and agrarian reform programmes. However, scholars and policy makers disagree over what type of tenure reform is well suited for Africa? Following Fast track, the government of Zimbabwe introduced offer letters which gave some form of entitlement to the new land occupiers and the offer letters should be followed by 25 year permits on A1 resettlement farms and 99 year leaseholds on A2 farms. In practice about 20% of beneficiaries nationally do not have offer letters (ZI 2007). Only 125 A2 farmers were issued with the 99 year leasehold in 2006 yet there are about 20,000 A2 plots (*ibid*). Most new farmers

rely on offer letters that are highly insecure as between 2003-2006 about 115 offer letters were withdrawn in Manicaland province alone (ZI 2007).

Given this context, Marongwe (2008, 2010, 2011) argues that insecurity of tenure generate political conflicts in ways that negatively affect agricultural production. He argues that A1 farmers could not make significant investments as they were being constantly relocated in Goromonzi district. For example, 60 A1 farmers were relocated from Colga farm as the farm was designated by the government as an A2 farm which 'meant that such beneficiaries did not engage in meaningful agricultural activities' (Marongwe 2011:1086). 118 A1 beneficiaries faced relocation from Balkiza farm following its reallocation to the Zimbabwe National Army (Marongwe 2011:1086-1087). He stresses that such tenure uncertainty inconvenienced small-scale farmers who wanted to invest. Murisa (2011) observed a similar trend in Zvimba where Fast Track beneficiaries formed local farmer groups to defend their land rights against incursions by political elites. On the other hand, Moyo *et al*. (2009) argue that new farmers are not deterred from producing or investing in the land because they do not have an official permit for the land. From Moyo *et al*.'s (2009) survey only 18% of respondents cited tenure as limiting production. Most of the respondents attributed limited production to shortages of farming inputs.

Matondi (2011) specifically argues that the lack of private titling on Fast Track farms affects investment in land and productivity. His views are consistent with free market theoretical positions on tenure. Neo-classical theorists have argued that low agricultural productivity is due to lack of individual titling. Free market theories predict that agricultural growth will follow formalisation of land rights (De Soto 2000). According to them, land titling will 'unlock the hidden assets of the poor' (De Soto 2000) on the grounds that this can offer secure tenure rights, enhance borrowing from banks and result in increased agricultural production and accumulation. Matondi

et al.'s (2008) proposition is that resettled A1 farmers in Mangwe had difficulties in gaining access to loans from Agribank because they did not have offer letters hence they could not use land as collateral. Matondi *et al*.'s (2008) argument is consistent with complaints raised by new farmers in March 2007. Some A2 farmers told the joint parliamentary portfolio committees on Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement and Agriculture and Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare that they had inadequate capital to venture into serious commercial farming because of difficulties in accessing bank loans. The parliamentary portfolio committees were informed that most commercial banks were not accepting the 99-year leases as collateral security as they felt that the leases had legal loopholes hence they did not provide adequate security (Herald, 2007). But will commercial banks open up credit for the poor farmers?

As Cousins *et al*. (2005) argue, commercial banks often do not lend to the poor because of the risks of non-payment. Families earning less than US$ 500 per month are unlikely to get access to formal credit from commercial banks using land as collateral, whether or not they have private title (Cousins *et al*. 2005). Even if commercial banks lend to the asset and income poor A1 farmers, with their land as collateral for the loans, foreclosure of bank loans would result in the loss of the land. In addition, there is no clear empirical evidence to show that land titling has led to more efficient use of land or greater agricultural production and accumulation (Bruce 1986; Migot-Adholla *et al.* 1991; Okoth-Ogendo 1982, Quan 2000). In Kenya, the Swynnerton plan aimed to provide private titling. However, the result was increased concentration of land ownership amongst those who were in a position to manipulate the tenure registration system (Quan 2000). In contrast, tenure insecurity for non-title-holders who relied on social practices to gain access to land has been exacerbated (Quan 2000). There is now diminished security of tenure for non-title-holders who relied on social practices to get access to land (Migot-Adholla *et al.* 1991). Kenya's experiences with private titling show results of increased rural differentiation. Landlessness

amongst the vulnerable groups has increased through sales of land resulting in growing trends of rural-urban migration.

In Mali where land was converted into private title, the process has widened inequality in land ownership especially in the cotton growing zones. This is because the market value of one hectare of land after titling is now about US$15,000, whereas untitled land costs between US$200-250 (Benjamnisen 2002). As Benjamnisen (2002) argues, speculators are winners because they buy the land from poor farmers and sell the land at 60-80 times more. Private titling can widen inequality between the rich and the poor, and eventually, as trends in the Malian cotton zones show, the prices of land may be out of reach to the poorer farmers. Nevertheless, free market theorists have influenced policy makers to such an extent that the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) established a commission on the tenure empowerment of the poor people in 2005 and De Soto was the co-chair. However, as Rukuni and Jensen (2003:255) argue, 'there is no reason to expect that private enterprise will automatically function in the public interest in a system lacking political institutions'.

I agree with Matondi (2011) and Marongwe (2011) that tenure affected investment and production on resettlement farms. However, I do not agree that the insecurity could have been addressed through private titling as Matondi (2011) suggests. That is because private titling can be a driver of rural differentiation as discussed earlier. My emphasis is that tenure in post-2000 Zimbabwe is administered politically and is determined by the political context hence is inherently insecure. Even the white farmers with private title deeds were evicted during Fast Track because they had ceased to be a politically salient group to the ZANU PF ruling elite (see Selby 2006). From the ZI (2007) survey about 40% of the respondents also indicated that they thought tenure security on Fast Track farms was linked to the existence of a political order: 'we live in fear once a

new government takes over' (Land reform beneficiary cited in ZI 2007). This brings an important dimension. Tenure conditions are neither static nor do they solely rely on a piece of paper but depend on the prevailing political context as chapter 5 shall demonstrate.

2.4. Conclusion

In this chapter, I examined the literature on land reform from 1980 to 2012. I focused on three themes of beneficiary selection, production and accumulation. There is evidence that in the first phase of land reform (1980-1997), the bureaucrats in the Ministries of Lands, Agriculture and Local government designed and implemented land reform programmes. Though some ZANU PF party leaders tried to use land as a source of patronage through supporting 'squatters' their efforts were foiled by the technocrats. As a result, ZANU PF played an insignificant part in the first phase of land reform in beneficiary selection. In contrast during Fast Track, state institutions were restructured and ZANU PF became more involved in processes of land reform such as the DLC. Bureaucrats were side-lined as ZANU PF now used land as a source of patronage to win political and electoral support. The unanswered question in the literature is: can the asset and income poor, that is small-scale farmers, become clients of patronage and how this affects differentiation specifically and agrarian change more generally. I argue that the ZANU PF ruling elite also finds it efficacious to rope in the poor to patronage networks.

In regard to production and accumulation the literature identifies a composite of factors that drive rural differentiation. These can be loosely categorized into three broad areas. First, climatic and economic factors shape social differentiation. Households with access to land in high potential agro-ecologicalzones with fertile soils and rainfall patterns tend to produce more than those in the lowveld and this is more defined when they have capital to invest. Second, differentiation is taking place because of diversified livelihood activities. Different households have different capacities to

mobiles off-farm income and on-farm income. Third, the role of social networks in promoting social differentiation such as local farmer organisations is interrogated. However, most of the scholars (Kinsey 1999, Dekker and Kinsey 2011, Moyo *et al*. 2009) focus more on the post-settlement statistical outcomes rather than the processes leading to rural differentiation. As a result the role played by state and party institutions in accentuating differentiation among resettled farmers is understated. As I have argued in chapter 1, at the centre of analyses of agrarian change in post-2000 Zimbabwe should be the integration of state practices. In particular, the use of violence, patronage and ideology during Fast Track land reform. We now turn to chapter 3 for more empirical evidence from Chipinge.

Chapter 3: The new politics of beneficiary selection

3.1 Introduction

As I argued in the previous chapters, most scholarly work, media and advocacy reports acknowledge the role of political patronage in the acquisition of A2 farms but they underplay this on A1 resettlement schemes. This chapter narrows down the analysis of beneficiary selection in Zimbabwe's Fast Track land reform to the district of Chipinge, where particular agro-ecological, political and social dynamics are important. Who are the beneficiaries? How and why did they get land whereas others did not? In the three A1 resettlement schemes studied, political loyalty to the Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) and patronage largely explain how the new beneficiaries acquired land. This sets a political landscape where land reform beneficiaries have to continuously reassert their legitimacy through performing political loyalty to guarantee their tenure. The new A1 farmers have other legitimate claims to land but they are being subordinated to a partisan state and authoritarian ruling party that is willing to exclude other 'ordinary' people with 'wrong' or weak political ties in a highly politicised landscape. The chapter further argues that in these cases ZANU PF's governing elite manipulated autochthonous, historical, political, social reproduction and livelihoods grievances among different groups of people to set in motion a partisan Fast Track Land Reform (Fast Track) project meant to reassert its political hegemony.

3.2 Land acquisition

As Matondi (2011) argues, there is no single story about the way land was taken and my study sites provide no exception. The institutional framework put in place to oversee Fast Track was the District Land Committee (DLC) and, in most cases, it had the final say in confirmation of land occupations or allocation of land to applicants. In Chipinge it was composed of the Zimbabwe

National Liberation War Veterans Association's (ZNLWVA) district chairperson, ZANU PF district chairperson, Head of the Department of Agritex, Head of the Department of Lands, Chiefs' representative, District Administrator (DA), and a Security Sector representative. In the Goromonzi study Marongwe (2008), observed a similar pattern. In Chipinge, the DLC sat every Tuesday from the year 2000 to allocate land, confirm applications and deal with boundary disputes. This committee was still functioning in early 2011. My study sites show three trajectories of land acquisition namely land invasions, replacement by original occupiers with new occupiers and allocation through a formal process by the DLC. Any generalisation can be misleading. Therefore I focus on the empirical specificities.

3.2.1 Land Invasion: Wolfscrag

In 2000, a group of war veterans led the occupation of Wolfscrag farm. The former owner had specialised in timber production, mainly growing gum trees, but also produced coffee and macadamia. The leading group of war veterans attempted to mobilise fellow veterans, particularly in the lowveld, but they were reluctant citing their allegiance to ZANU Ndonga, rather than the ruling party, ZANU PF. However, the war veterans made an alliance with ZANU PF local leaders and invited other war veterans loyal to the ZANU PF ruling elite from the adjacent Buhera district[10] to join in the land invasion. Apart from the ZANU PF structures, the war veterans also invited the traditional leaders from the *Mwandeka* clan who had been displaced from the same farm in 1974. So a nexus of local war veterans, mobilised war veterans from Buhera and traditional leaders mobilised some local people to join the occupation of the farm. A few farm workers also joined the invasion. Whereas some 'ordinary' people without particular social and political status joined the invasion the composition of beneficiaries was dominated by war veterans and members of the

[10]Buhera district is 100% communal area. It had no white-owned large-scale commercial farms and thus no Fast Track could take place within this district. Aspiring beneficiaries had to acquire land from other districts.

traditional ruling lineage. One would expect beneficiaries on this farm to be more diverse because it was acquired through a land invasion but this was not the case. The highly politicised process and the involvement of traditional leaders in a way limited possibilities for a more diverse composition of beneficiaries.

The occupiers were divided into sub-groups with each led by a war veteran who then pegged plots for them. Mr X, the former white farm owner, reported to the police but no action was taken. War veterans and the identified traditional leaders allocated themselves land on the side of the farm with gum trees and macadamia that had survived fire outbreaks whereas others were given smaller pieces of land across the hill. The war veterans established a 'committee of seven' to govern the farm. In early 2000, the committee of seven were the main organisational structures on occupied farms. The committee of seven differed in composition on farms across the country. In Masvingo it involved 'a base commander, treasurer, women's and youth representatives alongside ordinary members' (Scoones *et al*. 2010:192). On this particular farm it was chaired by a war veteran and composed of other veterans, ZANU PF local leaders and traditional leaders.

In 2003, Agritex officers came to 'confirm' the plots. About 32 households were allocated between 3 and 15 hectares each under the A1 model. The Agritex move was largely an exercise in legitimising the pre-existing allocations rather than a radical change of the land allocations. Some of the war veterans and other ZANU PF leading members had left the farm because they had acquired A2 farms elsewhere or had moved to invade more lucrative farms. A few farm workers confronted the District Administrator (DA) at an entrance to the farm and forced him to allocate plots to them. The DA put cards in his Agritex sun hat and the farm workers had to randomly pick, with the number picked being the number of the plot. A new group of occupiers was chosen by the DLC and joined the original invaders. At this stage there are a few civil servants who convinced

the DA to give them land. The war veterans and traditional authorities' actions were sanctioned by the ZANU PF leadership for reasons explored further latter. In 2004, farmers started receiving official offer letters from the DA's office. By 2011 there were 44 households resettled officially. Those who were related to the traditional leaders and war veterans got an opportunity to get land and slightly bigger farms as Mr BT, a land reform beneficiary who joined the land invasion from Mutema communal area explained:

> Some of us who had just joined the invasion were given small pieces of land on the margins of the farm near the forests. I got only 3 hectares but those who were related to war veterans and Chief *Mwandeka* [displaced from the farm in 1974] got bigger land. It was difficult to complain because the whole atmosphere was terrifying. The war veterans were vicious and did not hesitate to beat people who were against them (Mr BT, Wolfscrag, 2010).

3.2.2 Formal allocation: Glen View Lot 1

Noting the escalation of farm invasions in 2002, the former white owner of Glen View Lot 1 offered a portion of his farm to the Ministry of Lands for resettlement. The farmer used to specialise in cattle breeding with milking equipment on the farm. Much of the land offered was meant for grazing. The Agritex officials subdivided the farm into A1 farms ranging from 3-10 hectares and demarcated common grazing land. Even though Glen View Lot 1 was acquired through state administrative procedures open to patronage abuse, there were fewer civil servants who benefited because there was little investment and infrastructure on the farm as part of the land offered was previously grazing land. The DLC selected 17 households to settle on the farm. From 2004, farmers started receiving offer letters from the DA. They allocated bigger farms to a few civil servants and others who were politically connected whereas those with weaker political ties within ZANU PF got the smaller farms with fields between 3 and 5 hectares. The latter were not entirely excluded like those in the communal areas but were incorporated on less advantageous terms. Political authority was not just used to gain access to land but to get larger

farms than other clients of patronage. However, conflicts ensued between those excluded in the land allocation process and the new farmers. A group of about 200 people invaded the land meant for grazing and started erecting shacks and cultivating the land. Those officially allocated land complained relentlessly to the traditional leaders and DLC but to no avail. One of the formal beneficiaries at Glen View Lot farm 1 complained:

> I am in the committee of seven here, and have been sent to the DA's office on many occasions on the issue of squatters occupying our grazing land. The DA has promised to address our issue but to no avail. At least the Agritex officers understand us on this one because they know our farming plans which are being interrupted by these squatters (Mr AB, Glen View Lot 1 Farm, 2011).

One of the squatters, a former communal farmer from Manesa, complained: 'How can they peg land for goats and donkeys when we the people do not have land? That is an expression of callousness. It is similar to the white farmers' mentality of prioritising the life of a goat to that of a human being'. (Squatter, Glen View Lot 1, 2011). The local police said they had an instruction from their senior police officers at the national level not to evict the 'squatters'. I observed some ZANU PF local campaign managers registering the names of the squatters in some A4 exercise books for purposes of forwarding the names to the DA who was supposed to ensure they were registered to vote in a 2011 anticipated national election that never took place. This is consistent with Herbst (1990) and Alexander (2006)'s observation in the first phase of land reform where ZANU PF leaders were determined to protect 'squatters' in return for political support as noted in chapter 2. However, unlike in the 1980s, the 'squatters' were not removed and the bureaucrats had no power as the Agritex officer articulated:

> We understand the problems being caused by the squatters. They frustrate our [land use] plans and with the new farmers but there is nothing much we can do. We cannot evict them because there is nothing we can do. We cannot evict them because they are supported by the political leaders. The only thing we have done is not to register them as formal land owners. We do not issue permits to them but you can't evict them. That will be starting a war with the [ZANU PF] politicians. What we can only do is not to give them

> offer letters because it means we will be encouraging their bad habits [of squatting]' (Mr AD, Agritex officer, Chipinge, 2011).

The registration of 'squatters' by local ZANU PF campaign managers shows that the party view the 'squatters' as potential supporters in the event of an election. Not only formal land is used as a source of patronage.

3.2.3 Displacement: Wedgehill

The previous owner of Wedgehill specialised in production of macadamia for marketing to the Southern African Macadamia Association (SAMA) and had ventured into coffee production at the time of the invasion as well as having gum tree plantations that acted as firebreaks. The farm was highly mechanised with macadamia shelling machines, irrigation equipment and other high-technology machinery. There were also good houses for farm workers. However, at the height of *jambanja*, a term used to describe the violent, chaotic invasion of farms from 2000, the farm owner fled to Australia taking with him what he could and allegedly entered into a lease agreement with Southdowns estate. Former Wedgehill farm workers and those from adjacent Southdowns estate invaded and started clearing the land for cultivation of maize, uprooting the young coffee plants and cutting some gum trees for firewood and for sale. However, the farm worker 'honeymoon' was short lived as the Ministry of Lands designated the farm as vacant and sub-divided it into A1 farms ranging between 3 and 15 hectares. The farm was then allocated by the DLC mainly to war veterans, former prison officers and army officers resulting in the eviction of farm workers. The composition of beneficiaries on this farm shows that what was at stake was not just the mode of acquisition but the nature of investment on the farms such as macadamia trees, plantations and other infrastructure which resulted in civil servants and war veterans manipulating the administrative structure in their favour in order to gain access.

3.3. Who got the land?

I did not ask directly about people's political party affiliation but some of my respondents from communal areas freely told that they were excluded from Fast Track because they were opposition supporters and castigated the partisan nature of the programme, as detailed later. On the other hand, some war veterans overtly declared their allegiance to ZANU Ndonga, ZANU PF and other parties. My biographical connection in the district, like family links and social networks, made some respondents comfortable to talk about sensitive political topics. It is still difficult to deduce everyone's political party affiliation except those in high ranking positions and willing to do so. Moreover, political party affiliation can shift over time. Many scholars correctly argue that people were compelled by circumstances and would pretend to belong to ZANU PF to get land, hence it is difficult to pin down beneficiaries' political party affiliation (see Matondi 2011) and some see this as indicating a lack of partisan politics (Mkodzongi 2011). My emphasis is that this cannot be celebrated as it does not reflect a vibrant political society where individuals can freely exercise their constitutional right to freedom of assembly, association and expression without jeopardising their access to land. One may never be able to deduce the political affiliation of every beneficiary but voting patterns alluded to earlier help to show that ZANU PF has substantial electoral support in the resettlement schemes. Nevertheless, my argument is not that new beneficiaries were necessarily ZANU PF but that Fast Track was a highly partisan process where political loyalty to and patronage of the ZANU PF ruling elite largely explain how new beneficiaries acquired land across my study sites.

For both government officials and scholars it is difficult to categories settlers, in order to come up with a summary that best represents who got what. Any summary of categories of settlers that gives precedence to occupation or social status is bound to overlap as people have multiple

identities. Abstractions are unavoidable in this case. The argument is which categories are more useful for a particular context. For example, chiefs as a singular category may be important in Mashonaland central province where chiefs in some areas claimed a 5% quota on every farm (Matondi 2011:61) based on their traditional status rather than their other multiple identities. A business person can double up as a civil servant and civil servants might be employed in the security services. Scholars are unlikely to agree on a single template that best represents who got what as it has implications on interpreting both the Fast Track beneficiary selection process and its outcome, which remains contested as we have seen. If such a template is not carefully informed by empirical data in terms of how people got land in a particular context it can lead to misleading interpretations.

In the seminal Masvingo study, Scoones *et al*'.s (2010:52-53) summation of categories of settlers that got land is based on the occupation of the household head prior to getting land. Most scholars take a similar approach. Based on this criterion Scoones *et al*. (2010:238) argue that in total '68.2% of new settlers were… a diverse ordinary group, with about half of all new settlers coming from nearby communal areas'. It might have been useful to reproduce the categories used by Scoones *et al*. (2010) for direct comparison but emphasis should be determined by local dynamics at least until such a time scholars have gathered empirical data district by district to give a clearer national picture. The table below shows the singular settler categories that take precedence in summarising the Masvingo data.

Table 7: Settler profile across resettlement schemes in Masvingo

Category	Percentage
'Ordinary'	68.2
Civil servant	16.5
Security services	3.7
Business person	4.8
Former farm worker	6.7
Total	99.9

Adapted from Scoones *et al.* (2010:53)

Due to the problems of multiple identities as discussed above Scoones *et al*. (2010:54) spread war veterans across all categories and in the process argue that all war veterans on A1 villagised farms in their study sites were 'ordinary' beneficiaries. This is because they were unemployed and 'many had long dropped their war veteran identity' and were just small-scale farmers in the communal areas' (Scoones *et al.* 2010:54). Classifying war veterans under those without formal employment, a definition Scoones *et al*. (2010) use to define the ordinary, would suggest that war veterans got land just like ordinary people during Fast Track. Yet in Chipinge some war veterans reinvented their identity as it became a powerful political currency in gaining access to land through mobilisation, land invasions and the informal and formal allocation processes during Fast Track. As Mr KB, a war veteran who got a farm at Wolfscrag farm explained when I asked him about his multiple identities and the status he used to gain access to land:

> I can say I am a war veteran and a farmer. I used to grow tomatoes in Mutema [at Mutema irrigation scheme]. When I heard about *jambanja* I was compelled to join…You cannot join a war saying you are a farmer. You have to be a soldier. As a war veteran I had to be at the forefront, it was like going back to the bush to fight for our land. I can now concentrate on farming but if there is a threat I can drop my plough and carry my gun to defend the land. (Mr KB, Wedgehill, 2012).

The explanations show that while people have multiple identities they can use the identity with more leverage to achieve their goal at different times. It is therefore difficult to place unemployed

war veterans in the ordinary category. Their status as war veterans was the most significant factor during Fast Track and to a large extent determined 'who got what, when and how' rather than their other multiple identities hence it takes precedence in my summary of categories. Even the government recognised war veterans as a special interest group and reserved a 20% quota for them on A1 resettlement schemes (GoZ 2001), a privilege not accorded other ordinary people. Consequently, official land audits identify war veterans as a special interest group in summarising who got what during Fast Track (see Utete 2003).

Traditional authorities in Chipinge played a crucial role and were dominant in what appear to be clear cases of restitution based on local histories of eviction and hence I single them out. Even though restitution was ignored as a formal government policy it is evident that 'Fast Track' 'provided traditional authorities with the opportunity to pursue an agenda akin to land restitution as they have been making a number of claims both substantiated and unsubstantiated over the new resettlements which they view as their *matongo* (old homes)' (Mujere 2011:1128). Given that claims to land included the discourse of 'old homes' (also see Fontein 2006, 2009) as a result being a family member of ruling lineages was an important currency in gaining access to land. This was a privilege by birth that many 'ordinary' people did not have. It is therefore imperative to conceptualize the category of traditional authorities as including their extended families if one is to understand the nuances of how some were included where others were not. A focus on the ruling lineage head alone risks limiting the analysis of those who benefited or gained access to land on the basis of their social and family relations. The analysis should go beyond the narrow category of officially recognised traditional authorities. Even messengers appointed by chiefs and headmen as part of the traditional hierarchy played a significant role on my study sites. Messengers' duties overlapped with those of village heads and included work such as collecting fines and other charges and coordinating the village assembly known as *bandla* in the local lexicon.

I also recognise special advisors to the *bandla* who are not recognised in policy but are incorporated in the traditional hierarchy and are usually from the ruling lineage. They helped deal with issues relating to residential, grazing and agricultural land disputes among other social problems which give them a special social status and access to privileges that ordinary people cannot easily get.

On the other hand, business persons were insignificant in the process and outcome of beneficiary selection in my study sample. On the merits of treating farm workers and security services as categories I agree with Scoones *et al.* (2010). Former farm workers can be categorised as ordinary but due to contested views on whether they benefited during Fast Track they are worth singling out (see Rutherford 2003, Sachikonye 2003). Security services are civil servants but given the militarisation of state institutions in Zimbabwe (see Raftopolous 2003) they are worth mentioning as a separate category. The security sector is composed of members of the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP), Zimbabwe Narional Army (ZNA), Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) and Zimbabwe Prison services (ZPS). Consequently, I adopt the categories in the table below in summarising my data on who got what and my results show three dominant types of beneficiaries: war veterans, traditional authorities, civil servants and security services. The ordinary should not include members of these distinct groups.

Table 8: Profile of beneficiaries as of 2010

Category	Percentage of beneficiaries
Civil servants	35.0
Traditional authorities	22.2
War veterans	16.7
Security Services	15.0
Other 'Ordinary'	6.9
Former Farm workers	4.2
Total	100.0

Source: compiled by author from survey data (N=70).


Overall, those that dominate among beneficiaries are civil servants some from the Ministries of Lands, Agriculture and Local Government. How did they come to dominate and why? Those working for the government had easy access to information regarding the Fast Track process. Civil servants in Chipinge district submitted their applications to their respective head of department who would not only forward the application but recommend beneficiaries to the DLC. As indicated above, the Agritex and Lands representatives sat in the district committee, which was an added advantage to employees in their department. Civil servants are usually the agents through which state programmes are implemented and their loyalty is important in maintaining state power. Following the disorderly onset of Fast Track civil servants also had an opportunity to serve themselves.

In addition, civil servants benefited because they were no longer considered an overt political threat and some were rewarded for partisan service as we shall see later. The appointment of people to head government departments at district level had become highly politicised and partisan after 2000 as the thin line between ZANU PF and the state was eroded (McGregor 2002). One had to be vetted by the security services before being appointed to such a post to ensure s/he was not a risk to state 'security', which usually means not a risk to ZANU PF. One of the employees in the Agritex department emphasised:

> Our District Agricultural Extension officer has a diploma from an unknown institution yet most of his subordinates have degrees from universities [mainly Zimbabwe Open University]. There was a human resources audit that recommended that he be demoted but ZANU PF district leadership came to back him up because he is a strong party cadre. So he is hanging in there on a party ticket not on the basis of competence (Mr AD, Chipinge, 2011).

Within this context, personal, state and party interests became conflated. For example, the late Mr Samuel Zuze, a magistrate deemed to be politically loyal to ZANU PF by most war veterans I spoke to, presided over the case of a white farmer, Mr Mike Jahme, and convicted him in January

2010 under the Gazetted Land (Consequential Provisions) Act because he was refusing to vacate his Newcastle farm. The Chipinge magistrate is the one who had been allocated Jahme's farm but he did not recuse himself. I reproduce Samuel Zuze's offer letter below.



All correspondence should be addressed to
"THE SECRETARY"
TELEPHONE:
797325-30794242-9/701166
FAX: 797335

ZIMBABWE

MINISTRY OF LANDS AND RURAL RESETTLEMENT
Block 2, Makombe Building
Private Bag 7779
Causeway
Harare

Ref:LLRR 704
To: S ZUZE
75-068565Q-Q-49
CHIPINGE MAGISTRATE COURT CHIPINGE

DATE 13-Nov-09

Dear Sir/Madam

Re: OFFER OF LAND HOLDING UNDER THE LAND REFORM AND RESETTLEMENT PROGRAMME, (MODEL A2 PHASE II)

1. The Minister of Lands and Rural Resettlement has the pleasure in informing you that your application for land under Model A2 Scheme has been successful.

2. You are offered Subdivision 8 of LOT 8 OF NEWCASTLE for agricultural purposes. The farm is approximately 80.00 hectares in extent.
in CHIPINGE District of MANICALAND PROVINCE

3. The offer is made in terms of the Agricultural Land Settlement Act [Chapter 20:01] whose provisions you are advised to acquaint yourself with. Conditions that go with the offer are attached.

4. You are requested to indicate on the attached form whether you accept this offer or not, within 30 days of receipt of this offer.

5. If you accept this offer, you are required to declare any state land you maybe leasing for agricultural purposes or whether you have been allocated agricultural land under any Government scheme.

6. A lease agreement will only be entered into once the Minister is satisfied that all conditions have been met.

7. The Minister reserves the right to withdraw or change this offer if he deems it necessary, or if you are found in breach of any of the set conditions. In the event of a withdrawal or change of this offer, no compensation arising from this offer shall be claimable or payable whatsoever.

Hon. H.M.Murerwa (MP)
Minister of Lands and Rural Resettlement

Figure 3: Magistrate Zuze's offer letter (obtained by author, 2010)

The above is an A2 offer letter and my point here is that government workers had become so compromised to an extent that personal, state and party interests became intertwined. Also note that the Minister in the offer letter above reserved the right to withdraw the offer anytime which effectively means the beneficiary is obliged to reassert his legitimacy on the land by continuing to act in ZANU PF's interests as discussed in chapter 2. The A1 offer letter is similar in indicating that the government can withdraw the offer anytime without compensation for any improvements made on the resettlement farms. On the ground, war veterans continuously demonstrated that civil servants should exhibit 'correct' political behaviour which meant acting in the interest of the ZANU PF ruling elite.

Civil servants perceived to be colluding with the opposition were in many cases subjected to violence by the local war veterans in a tactical manner that served to terrify other civil servants. The civil servants could be land reform beneficiaries but were also going to be kept in check through the use of brutal force. For example, Walter Chikwanha, a Chipinge magistrate, was assaulted in August 2002 by war veterans for passing a judgment in favour of MDC supporters. As one of my key informants, a teacher, who has spent the past four decades in Chipinge recalled:

> They took him [Walter Chikwanha] from the court [Chipinge magistrate court] to our government offices [Government district departments are located in one complex in Chipinge town] and started beating him with open and closed fists, some with a log and it was so barbaric, he started screaming in pain until he was just bleeding. They accused him of supporting the MDC because he had given bail to some MDC people. It was a lesson to all of us government workers of what it would mean to act against ZANU PF and we were all scared. They [war veterans] were so inhumane…they started walking with him around town toward Chipinge hotel singing ZANU PF songs and shouting *pashi nema sell-outs*! (Down with sell-outs!). From there people were terrified at work and knew these guys meant business (Mr GA, Chipinge, 2010).

More recently, war veterans invaded the magistrate court in April 2010, singing songs in praise of ZANU PF and threatening to assault magistrate Thomas Masendeke who had ordered an eviction of war veterans and other settlers from a farm they had invaded. Thomas was later transferred to

another city, Mutare, as was Walter Chikwanha, for personal safety. The war veterans led crowd also went on to sing at the DA's office giving him a warning against keeping such 'MDC-oriented' people in the district (also see Chimhete 2010). This typifies McGregor's (2002:9) observation that the state had already politicised the bureaucracy thereby largely undermining 'the scope of professionalism within the public service through physical and psychological harassment' led by war veterans in her study of Matabeleland and Midlands as discussed in chapter 1. After 2000, some civil servants were now engaged in promoting personal and ruling elite interests using state institutions.

The civil servants who got land in Chipinge attend ZANU PF political meetings and rallies in order to show continuous loyalty as a way to safeguard their land. It became increasingly difficult for the civil servants who got land to act outside the interests of ZANU PF. Some civil servants were a potentially active constituency for the opposition but land distribution transformed them into a potential constituency for ZANU PF thereby laying the foundation for an alliance based on patron-client relations.

Apart from civil servants, traditional authorities and war veterans were major beneficiaries of land reform. Why? I have argued in Chapter 1 that the two groups were co-opted by the ZANU PF national leadership as a salient group in their ideological and political mobilisation to reclaim lost political ground. In my case study, war veterans worked with traditional leaders to invade Wolfscrag farm because they knew that they would buy into the project given their history of ancestral claims to the land. It is important to note traditional leaders were not just passive beneficiaries. As Fontein (2009:1) argues in Masvingo, some local clans 'often made very specific claims to land which appealed to autochthonous knowledge of the land, invoking memories of past occupations and the burial of ancestors in the land' in order to gain legitimacy. This is the

case with the ruling clan on Wolfscrag who had been displaced in 1974 and now made autochthonous claims, as I show below. Let me point out, however, that the autochthonous imaginations on Wolfscrag are not as historically rooted as in Fontein's (2009:5-6) study in Lake Mutirikwi. His study area, as he confirms, is made up 'of the variety of historically different landscapes' and also contains 'Zimbabwe's most important national heritage site, Great Zimbabwe, and several even older rock art sites' (*Ibid*).

In Chipinge traditional authorities were represented in the DLC and, together with ZANU PF representatives and war veterans, played a major role in deciding who got what. Such co-option of war veterans and traditional leaders accorded legitimacy to the government's anti-colonial and anti-imperial rhetoric as noted in chapter 1. In Chipinge a partisan discourse of '*Pamberi na Mugabe'* (Forward with President Mugabe) also formed part of claims to land by war veterans and traditional leaders. Historical and traditional claims were not enough to ensure one's tenure but political loyalty could be used to reassert legitimacy in on-going contestations over resettlement land. Failure to do so may result in one being threatened or actually losing the land. Mr Z, the village head at Glen View Lot 1, was visited by his cousin from Harare, the capital city of Zimbabwe where the MDC party enjoys significant support, in the run up to the June 27, 2008 Presidential run-off election and was questioned by the war veterans for hosting people from Harare who were assumed to be MDC supporters. As he elaborates:

> They questioned me about my cousin who came to see me…everyone from the town was said to be MDC. They threatened to evict me but I explained to them. In any case it is difficult to evict the owners of the land but if I was another person I could have been chased. However, for safety of my cousin I told him to return to Harare. My father started ZANU PF with the likes of [Ndabaningi] Sithole in Mt Selinda so there is no way I can be evicted. I have also been working closely with the [ZANU PF] Chipinge central Member of Parliament (Mr Z, Glen View Lot 1, 2010).

The village head cited both traditional and political authority to safeguard his land, but a beneficiary with weaker traditional or political ties was not as lucky as the village head explained,

> Another young man who was looking after the Headmaster's farm survived by a whisker… There were rumours that he was an MDC supporter because the young man was not attending the party [ZANU PF] meetings. The security guys were looking for him but someone tipped him and he left. The owner of the farm, Headmaster X, had to apologise to the comrades and the security guy at the next farm. Now the Headmaster brought a new person to look after the farm. I never saw the young man since then (Mr Z, Glen View Lot 1, 2010).

I was advised by an Agritex official not to set foot on the adjacent farm because the security officer was judged to be temperamental. This further demonstrates that staying on the land required continuous demonstration of loyalty to ZANU PF and the party and its allies were ready to use coercion.

Even though this particular village head almost became a victim, the role of traditional authorities and war veterans was not bifurcated into traditional and political as Fontein (2006:241,2009:13) seems to suggest in his study of Masvingo. Rather the village heads and headmen played a political role alongside war veterans on the farms. They belonged to the ZANU PF political party committees and helped to mobilise new farmers to go and cast their vote in the 2000, 2002 and 2005 elections, urging and sometimes intimidating them to vote for President Mugabe's party. On each farm, every head of household was allocated a political post in ZANU PF's ward committee that would meet every Tuesday when the ideology of the ruling party was drilled into them. Political support was more overt in the June 27, 2008 run-off election when the traditional leaders gave a directive to the resettled farmers to assemble at the village head's homestead then proceed from there to go and vote as a group. This was another way to legitimate their stay on resettled land through continuously showing political loyalty. This was not just a farming landscape but a heavily politicised and Zanu-ised landscape with campaign posters of President

Mugabe, for the June 27, 2008 run-off election, still visible on some rocks in 2010 and homesteads. In early 2011, a military base was set up at Wolfscrag farm to carry out political intimidation campaigns in the form of *pungwes* (all night political education meetings) where neighbouring communities were forced to attend and threatened with death if they were to vote for the opposition in an election local ZANU PF structures anticipated in 2011. I was advised by a security agent to wind up my fieldwork because of the anticipated election. The ZANU PF national leadership was aware of the political capital of war veterans, traditional and local party leaders in terms of both legitimising the land reform project and in terms of on-going political mobilisation beyond the 2000 and 2002 elections.

As my survey data shows, 15% of beneficiaries were members of the security services. A similar trend is observed by Marongwe (2011) in Goromonzi district as shown in Chapter 2. In other studies security services might be statistically fewer (see Matondi 2011, Scoones *et al*. 2010) but their presence still needs to be explained. In the First phase of resettlement members of the security services were not beneficiaries of land reform and did not fit the criteria.

It was difficult to have open discussions with security officers about the political role they played on my three A1 resettlement farms. However, a retired soldier who served in the Democratic Republic of Congo war and was allocated an A2 farm in Chipinge district noted that he addressed and mobilised the masses in times of political need. He ambiguously said it was for the purpose of instilling 'discipline', 'even if we are retired we still help to instil discipline. It is our national duty to ensure that everyone is disciplined and to defend the land to the last drop [of blood] if need be' (Mr DX, Chipinge, 2011). The idea of disciplining may be ambiguous but one can reasonably conclude that this meant the use of coercive force as indicated by other respondents.

For example, An Agritex officer who regularly attended ZANU PF meetings as a way to show his loyalty recalled,

> Some members from the army and Border Gezi youths are part of the group that addresses the resettled farmers. In the run up to the June 27, 2008 election they said the MDC was going to give back land to the white farmers if they were going to win, so everyone was supposed to work hard to defend the land from the enemy. On one occasion they beat up a perceived opposition supporter with branches from the tree whilst he was lying on the ground with his stomach. They sang '*chenjera chenjera vana mukoma vanorova'* (be on the guard the comrades physically discipline) (Mr A1, Chipinge, 2012).

The reference to defending the land by the resettled army officer and other youth militias mentioned by the Agritex officer is not isolated from broader national processes as I explained in chapter 1.

In the run up to the June 27, 2008 Presidential run-off election Security agents allegedly killed an MDC activist and his body was found at Clear Water in the resettlement zones near Wedgehill farm. Human rights organisations had given an alert on coordinated terror by the state security agents in the district (ZNGO Human Rights Forum 2008). No one was arrested. The partiality of the security forces is linked to fear of being targeted themselves and also the desire to protect their material possessions through maintaining the status quo. My findings stand in contrast to Matondi's (2011). In his study of Mazowe district he asserts that the area was attractive to beneficiaries because of high levels of security personnel who guaranteed peace and safety. However, not all security details play a safe-keeping role as some people are threatened by them. In as much as the security personnel are now farmers they maintain constant surveillance, doubling up as the safeguards of ZANU PF and enforcing 'discipline'. We cannot discuss beneficiary selection and outcomes without looking at the politics of coercion. Fast Track was not just about transferring land but also about entrenching a waning regime in power. The fear of the

security services and allegations of atrocities are not unfounded. As Solidarity Peace Trust (2008:6) reports,

> The Joint Operational Command (JOC) composed of representatives from the army; the police, the CIO and the prison service have been implicated in 56% of the post-election [post March 29, 2008] violations, with the perpetrators acting on the assumption of total Immunity. The police are under instructions not to arrest perpetrators, even when they file cases and victims know their assailants as they often do.

The use of violence was enabled by complicity of the ruling party state officials.

Members of the security sector had an advantage in acquiring Fast Track land because they had a representative in the DLC to represent their interests. However, not all members of the security sector got their land through the DLC. As Mr DX, who served in the DRC war confided,

> The height of the land invasions took place when we were in the DRC. We heard from news and from new soldiers arriving that the government was taking back the land. The land invasions were topical news when we were at battle. Everyone in the DRC was talking about it. We were scared that by the time we would return home we would find all the farms taken by those on the ground yet we are also veterans. Our seniors became conscious of our fears and asked us to fill in forms that were to be processed at KG6 [the head office of the military barrack] in Harare so that we would be given land. When I returned in 2002 on top of my gratuity I also collected my letter from the KG6 to give to the [Chipinge] DA as a directive and my farm was immediately availed. I then chose to retire.' (Mr DX, Chipinge, 2011).

Though other studies show that security officers benefited from Fast Track (see Matondi 2011, Scoones *et al*. 2010) they do not explore this aspect of centralized allocation. A program of centralized land allocations that is sanctioned by the ZANU PF ruling elite is at odds with Moyo and Yeros' (2005) revolution from below. It is only possible because of a symbiotic relationship between the army and the ruling elite as Bratton and Masunungure (2008) argue. It also marks a significant shift from the 1980s where the security forces were not co-opted as formal beneficiaries or involved in allocation in the DLC.

I have discussed why war veterans, the third most dominant group, civil servants, traditional leaders and security services managed to get land but how did they do so? War veterans mobilised villagers in the communal areas to invade white-owned farms and as a result were in the forefront and became first line of beneficiaries. War veterans also played a significant role in the initial unofficial pegging and allocation of land to occupiers as illustrated in my Wolfscrag example. However, not all war veterans got land through occupation in Chipinge. Some formally submitted their applications to the ZNLWVA at district level. The district leadership would vet and submit the names to the Chipinge district ZNLWA chairperson who sat in the DLC. The government also had a quota system for the war veterans as highlighted earlier. This process was impossible for the ordinary people to penetrate.

However, not all war veterans endorsed the ruling party's political project of mobilising rural support. Some war veterans who paid allegiance to ZANU Ndonga had grievances about land but they did not share the same violent and partisan approach in realising their claims to land; in fact some refused to join the invasions because they say they did not want to give legitimacy to the ZANU PF project. This is consistent with Alexander and McGregor's (2001) findings about the behaviour of war veterans aligned to ZAPU in the initial stages of Fast Track as highlighted earlier. A ZANU Ndonga member queried, 'If ZANU PF cared about land reform they should not have destroyed Churu farm' (Mr CK, Mutema, 2011). This is in reference to the early 1990s when Ndabaningi Sithole had offered his Churu farm located in the outskirts of Harare, to poor households. By 1993, close to 20,000 people had been resettled on the land (Sithole 2006). The ZANU PF ruling elite was not happy to have land beneficiaries under the benevolence of an opposition party leader. They used the Ministry of Lands to acquire the farm in April 1993 on grounds that it was being underutilised for agricultural production. The beneficiaries were dispersed violently by anti-riot police. At the national level, some war veterans refused to be part

of the ZANU PF governing elite agenda and formed the Zimbabwe Liberators' Platform (ZLP) in 2000. Its objective was to 'refocus on the original aims and objectives of the liberation' and to assist war veterans so that they would not become 'vulnerable to manipulation by unscrupulous politicians' among other things (Kubatana 17 December, 2007, also see Mhanda 2011).

Some war veterans who supported opposition parties, notably the MDC and ZANU Ndonga in Chipinge, alleged victimisation in the land allocation process as an ardent MDC supporter and war veteran illustrated:

> The ZNLWVA district chair dogmatically supports ZANU PF and when he sits in the land committee his primary duty is to ensure that those real veterans who do not overtly carry out ZANU PF's sting operations [meaning occupations, political violence] are excluded from the process. So even if you were saying war veterans benefited they are ZANU PF-aligned war veterans (Mr AE, Mutema, 2011).

A member of the ZNLWA unapologetically defended the association's partisan position: 'Those who were supporting the MDC must go and get their land in Britain. The land is for sons of the soil not sell outs' (Mr GC, Mutema, 2011). At a national level ZANU PF politicians openly castigated opposition supporters and denounced them as unfit to get land under Fast Track (see Marongwe 2008).

Those who were to be excluded included farm workers and women and let us explore the reasons, in detail. As the composition of the DLC shows, there was no particular person to represent the interests of the farm workers. The DA and war veterans perceived traditional authorities and their families as having strong claims to Wolfscrag farm because they had autochthonous claims and nationally the governing elite seeking to co-opt the chiefs. This political support had an important influence as a former farm worker displaced from Wolfscrag explained,

> It was difficult to join the farm invasion because the invaders were saying the farm is theirs. I know I was going to suffer for nothing because they used to come and visit their

> ancestor's graves and do some rituals. And they were working with the war veterans. As a worker I had little power and it was going to be difficult to get my own piece of land though I deserved because I had worked on the farm for the rest of my life and it was home for me. They said we were foreigners and we were supposed to cross the border back into Mozambique (Mr DC, Chipinge, 2012).

Another displaced farm worker from Wedgehill farm gave a more political analysis as to why they were excluded. She now stays in Musikavanhu communal lands. Both her parents were from Mozambique. She reflected,

> The war veterans rounded people on the farms to a *pungwe* where we were told in no uncertain terms that farm workers were traitors like their bosses who had voted with the MDC in the referendum and were not going to get land. At the *pungwe* they made slogans like down with [Ian] Smith, down with the MDC. So the atmosphere was not conducive… They stressed that farm workers were working with the white man who was funding the MDC to derail the land reform. I did not even vote for the MDC because I did not have a national identity card…It was terrifying so I left to come and stay permanently with my husband who stays here [in Musikavanhu] (Mrs DD, Musikavanhu, 2012).

This is consistent with Hammar *et al.*'s (2003:11) view that Fast Track was beyond redressing colonial inequalities in land ownership as it was also a 'means of punishing and/or eliminating a constituency of white commercial farmers and "their" farm workers widely viewed to have voted "no" in the referendum, and, by implication to support the opposition more generally' (also see Rutherford 2003, 2004). The consequences were exclusion. To be called a traitor was synonymous with being denied the right to land. The ruling elite excluded the farm workers based on their putative membership of the MDC thereby infringing their freedom of association and political choice as indicated in chapter 2.

I interrogated further why Mrs DD did not join the land invasions apart from the political intimidation and she explained that she was not in support of Fast Track because it did not address her needs:

> You cannot bite the hand that feeds you. In as much as I wanted land I also wanted to keep my job. These people [invaders] had their own livelihoods, their own homes and they

> left to come and destroy our own on the farms… They are cruel. I also did not know whether it was sustainable. I thought the government would stop the madness as they did to people who tried to invade the black owned farms [Formerly NPAs] but it stood by as our livelihoods were being destroyed… I am lucky to be married; others are living at the border with landmines… You can go and see (Mrs DD, Musikavanhu, 2012).

This challenges Chambati's (2011) view that it is 'conservative' scholars who impose their views about former farm workers' need for formal wage labour. It is clear that Mrs DD preferred a program that preserved her job but at the same time allowed her to own her own plot like most farm workers (see GAPWUZ 2003). Such issues were not taken into consideration during Fast Track, it was the politics that counted and farm workers were seen as a threat to the ZANU PF ruling elite's hold on power and hence they were excluded.

However, a small number of farm workers joined the invasion and ended up getting land in Chipinge, an observation similar to Sadomba (2008). As Mr ED explained, 'no one knew I was a farm worker. I just joined when the comrades arrived and when they pegged the land I got a plot' (Mr ED, Wolfscarg, 2010). On why he had to hide his identity he said, 'I know war veterans did not like farm workers because we worked for the white man' (*ibid*). So some farm workers hid their identity in order to gain access to land. As already noted, another farm worker persuaded the DA to allow her to participate in a raffle and she was fortunate to get the land.

What happened to farm workers who were displaced? My fieldwork shows that some ended up in the communal areas as the case of Mrs DD illustrates but this was limited to those with social and family networks in the communal areas. Not everyone had these networks. Others left to join other 'squatters' on land surrounding Fast Track farms and some went to Chipinge town. Others returned to the compounds where they made new labour arrangements with the land occupiers. Some displaced farm workers from Chipinge district crossed the border into Mozambique. Using a dung-beetle method I followed up on Mrs DD's hint about displaced farm workers. I discovered a

bizarre case in which some displaced farm workers were living at a place on the Mozambique border where they had cleared some fields to plant some crops and earn a living. The area is called Chimbuwe and it is a place where the Rhodesia security forces used to plant land mines to deter liberation war recruits from crossing over into Mozambique in the 1970s. This makes it a dangerous place. I was advised against driving in the area as the new inhabitants have special ways of detecting safe places which I could be ignorant of. The area is a no man's land. Whereas not belonging to a nation is used theoretically to understand the processes of exclusion in Zimbabwe (Worby 2003), in this instance it typifies the physical displacement of people outside the national zones of belonging. The Zimbabwe's politics of exclusion and inclusion use words such as 'sell-out'. Alexander *et al*. (2000) argue that sell outs during the liberation war were beaten, tortured or even murdered and that the word instils fear. When I asked a war veteran what would happen to such displaced farm workers he unequivocally said, 'that is the price of selling out and Zimbabwe has no place for sell-outs'. As Raftopolous (2003:236) writes, 'the dehumanizing effects of this strategy [of exclusion] on the citizenry have been considered part of the modality for maintaining state power'. In some cases these exclusions are trivialised as unavoidable in a radical land reform (see Moyo and Yeros 2005). Yet the effect is one of silencing dissent to ZANU PF power. The situation in Chimbuwe depicts a violation of people's rights that in fact contrasts the liberation struggle which was also a 'human rights movement and a movement for the restoration of dignity' (Bhebe and Ranger 2001).

As explained in the previous chapter, much recent work shows that women constituted a smaller proportion of beneficiaries. There were only 9 female headed households (12.9%) from my sample that got land in their own right that is they had their names on the offer letter. As Jacobs (2000:180) writes on the old resettlement schemes, 'women should not be seen as an undifferentiated category; benefits of resettlement appear to accrue more to some groupings of

women than others'. I found that it was the well-connected women who had an advantage in gaining access to land, similar to the findings of Matondi (2011) in Mazowe district. Two of the female beneficiaries had familial and kinship ties to the war veterans and ruling lineage that invaded Wolfscrag, one identified herself as a war veteran who joined the invasion. Three were state employees: one worked as a ZRP officer in Chipinge, another was an Agritex officer at the district office, and one was employed in the rural district council. Another female beneficiary was a former farm worker who joined the invasions and pushed the DA to allocate her land and two others were known ZANU PF supporters from the communal areas and applied through their local party structures which were difficult to penetrate if you were a known 'sell-out'. Women constitute one of the largest excluded groups in Fast Track (Utete 2003). At the time of Fast Track the exclusion of women came with little political costs for the ZANU PF though the long term effect might be otherwise.

As observed by Mutopo (2011) in Mwenezi, in some cases women in Chipinge were able to use land without owning the land. Despite women's situation of legal and patriarchal dependence they managed to use land to benefit their families. For example, Mrs D.G, a widow, who was married to the village head's son, was given access to 5 hectares of land for her own use. However, as per the patriarchal system the name on the offer letter was of her son who worked in Mutare. Mrs D.G. preferred her own piece of land because she did not know what would happen the day her son would retire. As Goebels (2005:153) argues, 'patriarchal and patrilineal institutions, traditional authorities are not likely to entertain women's interests if they contradict their views of traditional practices. Moreover, the traditional authorities had been given power in a renewed relationship with ZANU PF for reasons explored earlier. The state did not intervene in such local practices because it benefited politically from the relationship with traditional authorities. This is in stark contrast to the 1980s and 1990s where traditional authorities played no role on the old

resettlement schemes. It was difficult for most women to gain land in 'a highly masculinised social field of war veterans, traditional authorities and state agents' (Goebels 2005:164).

Some of the 'ordinary' people farming the land can be mistaken as 'owners' of the land based on quantitative surveys. The following cases based on qualitative interrogations reveal how some of the 'ordinary' people became an extension of the patronage system.

Case A

Mr T comes from Ngaone in Chipinge district and occupies 10 hectares of fertile land on Glen View Lot 1. He used to work as a storekeeper and tailor at the Wattle Company in Chipinge town. Mr T resigned from his job and settled on the farm in 2002. Is this not an ordinary person who benefited from Fast Track? Further interrogation revealed that he stays on the farm under an informal arrangement with his son to safeguard the property. Mr T's son is a soldier currently stationed at KG 6, a military barrack in Harare, and he applied for land through the army. As I have already indicated, the military was represented in the committee that made allocation decisions. Though Mr T is tilling the land, the offer letter is in the name of his son who serves at the headquarters of the army.

Case B

Mr Y occupies 15 hectares of land at Wedgehill farm and he has no formal employment and he has low income and poor assets. Yet Mr Y is a village head in the communal areas who got land because he is a traditional leader. When the farm was allocated the DLC prioritised those in the ruling lineage, civil servants and war veterans. Some traditional authorities were prioritised over other 'ordinary' families.

Case C

A former farm worker got 5 hectares of land at Wolfscrag farm. She is 76 years old and all her life she has worked at a farm near to her new home. How did she get the land? First, she joined land invaders but was excluded from the official confirmation of land. She got the land not because she was a priority of the DLC or as a way to show the impartiality of the committee but because she and a few others confronted the District Administrator and forced him to formalise their occupation. It may appear as an exceptional case but it shows the determination of the war veterans and DLC to push out ordinary people.

Not all beneficiaries who can arguably be classified as 'ordinary' people are exempt from the politics of patronage with ZANU PF as the vehicle. Why? For some ordinary families in the communal areas of Chipinge to get land, they had to apply to the chairperson of ZANU PF in their respective ward who would submit the names to the ZANU PF district chair who would then forward the names to the DLC where he had a seat. Materially, as Scoones *et al*. (2010:53) observed, they can be defined as 'largely asset and income poor' but that does not mean that they cannot be clients within the ruling party's patronage networks. Some of these people benefited using local political networks and others were close companions of the local ZANU PF leadership, so it is incorrect to dismiss the political patronage thesis in this sense. Those ordinary people who did not have access to political patronage struggled to get land.

An aspiring beneficiary explained:

> I also wanted a piece of land because this area [Mutema] is dry but I could not submit my name to the ZANU PF [ward] chairperson because I am a known opposition supporter since the days of the great Ndaba [former president of ZANU Ndonga Ndabaningi Sithole]. The chairperson was saying the land is for ZANU PF people only. Others encouraged me to submit my application directly to the Ministry of Lands but without any connection I

> realised it was a futile exercise. So I have decided to wait because our day will come (Mr AE, Mutema, 2011).

Another MDC supporter who was excluded from land reform stated:

> I am a known MDC supporter; I was busy putting posters for the MDC campaign in this whole area. When Fast Track started I was caught by surprise. Everyone wants land but the same war veterans who were intimidating us, are the ones who were dishing land so it was impossible to break through (Mr AF, Manesa, 2011).

This account resonates with a separate study by ZHR NGO Forum (2010) which concluded that it was ZANU PF oriented war veterans and youth militias who dictated the allocation of land yet they were also involved in violence and intimidation against non-ZANU PF supporters.

A communal farmer still subsisting in the poor sandy soils in the lowveld area of Tanganda similarly expressed disgruntlement with the overall process:

> I am a communal farmer who was on the waiting list for land reform, but when this thing started, the waiting list was subverted and it was these guys who were in control, who got the land. If they had followed the list and not prioritised the new people registered in year 2000 by the party [ZANU PF] then it could have been better (Mrs AG, Tanganda, 2011).

The exclusionary process powerfully shaped people's reactions to the partisan land redistribution programme as indicated by the communal farmer in Manesa area:

> Because we were left out in this process we are still suffering from food shortages. It is very difficult to produce on this sandy soil and it rarely rains in this lowveld. We just hear stories that those who were resettled are enjoying having three meals a day and lots of money. But we know how we will punish the politicians as we did in the previous election (Mr AF, Manesa, 2011).

As noted before, it is important to note that ZANU PF lost elections in the communal areas in the lowveld but won elections in the highveld where the resettlement schemes were concentrated. An MDC Chipinge central election agent told me that in the 29th of March, 2008 election 'the resettlement farms cost us [the MDC to lose Chipinge central]'. The posting of results outside the polling stations helped people to know where each party had support. Most scholars have

confused the ZANU PF March 29, 2008 loss of support in communal areas with a reversal of ZANU PF's electoral support in resettlement schemes (see Scarnecchia *et al.* 2009). Ranger (2009:1) argues that the peasantry did not support Mugabe 'despite land re-distribution' in the March 29, 2008 election. However, a careful scan of results by each polling station in Chipinge show that ZANU PF's substantive rural support was concentrated in the resettlement schemes among the 'peasantry'.

It is evident that some of the Fast Track land in Chipinge went to A2 farmers as highlighted in Chapter 1. I did not interrogate the A2 land allocation process in detail for reasons explored earlier but I have enough empirical data to substantiate my argument that the ordinary people were largely excluded to the benefit of a few political elites. Chipinge is no exception to the trend of elite capture of A2 farmers observed to different degrees by Marongwe (2008), Matondi (2011), Moyo (2007) and Scoones *et al*. (2010). As elsewhere the formal procedure was for the aspiring beneficiaries to prepare a business model (as detailed in chapter 2) and submit an application to the DLC. However, the DLC in Chipinge had no jurisdiction to make decisions on A2 applications. Its role was to make recommendations to the Provincial Land Committee (PLC) in Mutare, which would confirm the applications and make other substantive decisions on who got land then relay the decisions to the DLC for implementation. According to a lands officer, 'the composition format of the PLC followed a similar pattern to that of the DLC' (Mr LA, Chipinge, 2012) which means war veterans, security services, traditional leaders and ZANU PF officials had representatives in the PLC. Thus the PLC was politicized and open to partisan manipulation. Other methods used by A2 farmers to acquire land in Chipinge included the displacement of A1 farmers, land invasions and directives to the PLC. In all this social and political power was essential. Consequently, it is not surprising that the outcome was that the upper echelons of the party-state and their clients benefited. I intend to make two arguments regarding how the politics of exclusion worked. First,

the composition of beneficiaries on A2 farms reflect a combination of civil servants, security services, war veterans, traditional leaders and politicians for the same reasons as they did on A1 farms. Second, the political elite own multiple farms. Social, political and family relations were very important. As Marongwe (2011:1084) writes, 'this issue of multiple farm ownership by members of the governing elite is often camouflaged with such relations'. I demonstrate the pattern in my selected 25 cases from Chipinge district in the table below.

Table 9: Selected A2 land allocation to political cronies and land grabbers in Chipinge district as of 2010

Case number	Name of beneficiary	Occupation and social status	Farm(s) acquired
1	Bandama, E	Zimbabwe National Army Senior Officer	Newcastle Lot 3:1
2	Chibaya, 1	Central Intelligence Officer	Clearwater Extension
3	Chiminya, J	Central Intelligence Officer	Leliesvlei Lot 2 of De Rust
4	Chinzou, P	Manicaland Provincial Lands Officer	Newcastle Lot 8& Laughing waters Lot 2
5	Chitema	ZANU PF Women's League	Newcastle Lot 10
6	Dube , B	Civil servant	Middle Sabi. Lot 35 AB (Farm 31):4
7	Gata ,G	Related to President Mugabe and brother of Gata Sydney	Middle Sabi Lot 20 AB; Deelfontein&Farm 23 Middle Sabi
8	Gata, S	Former Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority (ZESA) Chief Executive Officer (CEO) &married to President Mugabe's sister	Rupisi Hot Springs 4, Rupisi Hot Springs 5, Middle Sabi Lot 45 AB and Middle Sabi Lot 68 AB
9	Gurai, M	Chief Education Officer, Chipinge district	Wolvedraai A of Wolvedraai Lot 1
10	Kutamahufa, T	Former Deputy D.A. (Chipinge) and now D.A. in Mutasa district, Manicaland.	De Rust of Avontuur, Newcastle Lot 4, Reitvlei Lot 1 of Kenilworth & Wolvehampton:15

11	Mabika Mrs	Daughter to Chitima Alice , current ZANU PF MP for Chipinge central	Chiriga& Newcastle Lot 1
12	Mabunda, N	Zimbabwe Republic Police senior officer	Middle Sabi (Lot 18AB (Farm 21)
13	Makota	Zimbabwe Republic Police officer in charge, Chipinge rural	Morgenson& Newcastle Lot 4
14	Mapungwana	Traditional leader (Chief)	Gungunyana Lot 1
15	Mapungwana L,	Son to Chief Mapungwana	Chipinga Lot 1& Newcastle Lot 5.
16	Matuvhunye, N	Serving Zimbabwe National Army colonel	Avontuur
17	Mundeta, N	District Administrator (DA) Chipinge district	Preston Coffee Estate
18	Mutema	Traditional leader (Chief)	Middle Sabi Estate Lot 60AB (Farm 38); Middle Sabi Estate (Lot 58 AB (Farm 36)& Middle Sabi Estate . Lot 59 AB (Farm 39).
19	Mutema, P	Chief Mutema's nephew	Landsowne
20	Mutizhe, F.R.	Serving Zimbabwe National Army Officer (stationed at 3 Brigade Headquarters in Mutare)	Vermont
21	Muyambo, K	Serving Zimbabwe National Army Officer (stationed at 3 Brigade Headquarters in Mutare)	Mirror Rem
22	Muzire, S	Zimbabwe National Army Lieutenant Colonel	Woodstock&WolfscargRem Extension 2
23	Porusungazi, E	ZANU PF MP candidate for Chipinge South in 2000, 2005&2008 and Youth League member	Farm 29 and Farm 40 Middle Sabi Estate
24	Sakabuya,M	Former Deputy Minister, Ministry of Local government	Newcastle Lot 9
25	Shamido, S	Chief Immigration Officer	Middle Sabi Estate Lot 43AB, Farm 32 (1) and (2)

Source: Chipinge department of Lands and rural resettlement, interviews from key informant

An investigation of the detailed process of land allocation on A2 farms in Chipinge is beyond the scope of this thesis but I demonstrate the two trajectories empirically because they help to show how some were included and why others were excluded. Some of the A2 beneficiaries like Porusungazi, the ZANU PF Chipinge South parliamentary candidate in 2000, 2005 and 2008 and ZANU PF youth league member were implicated in perpetrating violence against MDC supporters and ZANU Ndonga supporters in the communal areas. As The Standard (2005) reported:

> At least 16 villagers from Chipinge South fled their homes last week [16-20 January 2005] into Mozambique afterthey were brutally attacked by suspected ZANU PF supporters and youth militia for supporting the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC),…The villagers, mostly from Mariya and Zamchiya areas, are surviving on wild fruits, mangoes, bananas and the generosity of Mozambicans, who are also providing them with shelter. The villagers said the youth militia, who were allegedly travelling in a truck belonging to the ZANU PF candidate for Chipinge South in the [2005] March parliamentary elections, Enock Porusingazi, raided the homes of suspected MDC supporters - beating everyone in sight - even children and elderly people.

During the anticipated 2011 general election, a displaced farm worker, Mrs DD, who was lucky to find a place to live in Musikavanhu as I mentioned earlier, still felt insecure:

> Sometimes I am scared because the village head writes down names of those who support ZANU PF. The aspiring ZANU PF MP [Porusingazi] is holding rallies and telling people that all ZANU PF supporters have to register their names to the 'owners of the land' [traditional leaders]. People do not know what the list is going to be used for. But we are scared because the list can be used to deny those who do not support ZANU PF some food aid and government farming inputs. You just have to buy the ZANU PF party card because if you do not maybe they will use the list to track *machicha* [those who support MDC] and beat them up or chase them from the village. I would not want to be chased again since I have already lost my home at the farm (Mrs DD, Musikavanhu, 2012).

The ZANU PF intimidation tactics were reported by some sections of the media and Porusingazi (2011 cited in Murimwa 2011) acknowledged the practice but gave a flimsy justification: 'Those who do not belong to our party do not know why we are doing this. We are in the process of restructuring our party in the Musikavanhu area. Why should we write down names of members who do not belong to our political party?'. Porusingazi did not explain why traditional leaders

became central in the restructuring of ZANU PF. Some beneficiaries of land reform coordinated terror campaigns in Chipinge meant to keep ZANU PF in power.

Why do my results differ to a certain degree from those of Scoones *et al*.'s (2010) landmark study? There are four possible explanations. First, my findings on who got what during Fast Track differ because of different contexts. Whereas much of Masvingo province lies in agro-ecological zone 3 and 4, designated for extensive and semi-intensive farming, land reform dynamics in Chipinge were key in natural region 1 and 2 meant for specialised, diversified and intensive agricultural production. There were high value crops in Chipinge like macadamia, coffee, gums and wattle with good investments in infrastructure on farms. Politically connected people were attracted to high value farms. So much was at stake, as one official from the Agritex department highlighted:

> They [ZANU PF politically connected] could not let others come and feast...there was so much at stake, for example a macadamia plantation can sustain a family for 25 years by simply harvesting and selling. That is a fortune for a generation. So there is no way they could have let communal farmers and others just enjoy (Mr A1, Chipinge, 2011).

Second, local dynamics like the superimposition of processes from above by the DLC such as the displacement of farm workers at Wedgehill farm affected the composition of beneficiaries. The state administrative procedures that were put in place to redistribute land on Wedgehill farm were open to patronage affecting the composition of beneficiaries on the farm, a situation which could have been different if the farm workers had been allowed to stay. Third, in their summary of settler categories Scoones *et al*. (2010) do not single out the category of traditional authorities and their families and spread war veterans across other categories. Fourth, a slightly different methodology that focuses on those excluded from Fast Track brings out different dynamics. Based on my three study sites it will be an act of myth creation to say that there was no substantial patronage in the administrative allocation of land and in the highly politicised farm invasion given the evident role of war veterans, civil servants and traditional authorities in land acquisition and

the composition of beneficiaries thereof. Myths and realities may differ from place to place, which makes generalisation a poor way of understanding what is happening in resettlement areas in post-2000 Zimbabwe.

3.4 What was the motivation of seeking land?

Claims to land are multiple and over-lapping and thus difficult to disentangle. For some, land provides an opportunity to expand production and accumulation; for others it is a process of reclaiming ancestral land in clear cases of restitution; for some land has political and historical significance; for others it is a source of livelihood in an era of crisis of livelihoods and for some it is a source of food security for their households, or all of the above. Though motivations are diverse, in many cases, the vehicle to fulfil such motivations was patronage connections. I illustrate these different claims, and the means by which they were claimed, using voices from fieldwork in the cases below.

3.4.1 Case A: Food security

> I used to live in Musani communal area in the lowveld where we subsisted on poor sandy soils. My family could hardly produce 50 bags of maize per hectare and we could only afford one decent meal a day. So when we heard the comrades encouraging people to join the land invasions as [ZANU PF] loyal party members we quickly joined so that we could get land that is highly productive. Now we can produce about 2 tonnes of maize a hectare and enjoy three decent meals a day with our children even having more meals. So the main driving force was to eradicate hunger in our household and that was what we have achieved (Mrs AJ, Wedgehill farm, 2010).

3.4.2 Case B: Restitution

> Our ancestors were the original traditional leaders in this area. So in 1974 our family [*Mwandeka* clan] was evicted by the white farm owner because we were laying claims to some parts of the farm for rain making ceremonies and other rituals yet the owner wanted to utilise all the land. So when our grandfather was chased he left to the mountainous areas of Samutsa where you can hardly produce anything. So when we heard of independence in 1980 we thought we would return to our land but we were let down. But when the second independence came in 2000, we seized the opportunity to return to our land. We had a traditional ceremony where we confirmed our headmen. So

> for us it is rather de-occupation than occupation. We have always wanted to come back home and we thank Gushungo [President Mugabe] for allowing this (Mr AK, Wolfscrag farm, 2010).

3.4.3 Case C: Straddling of livelihoods

> I am formally employed in the Chipinge Rural District Council as an internal auditor but my salary is of no value. The money I was getting was not enough to fend for my family. So I decided to seek land as a way to supplement my meagre earnings through producing our own food. I was in good books with the Chief [Head of Department]. Now I do not have to buy everything from the market and my family is much better. I combine my formal wage and what I get from the farm in order to eke a better livelihood. If my salary was enough maybe I would not have thought of seeking land but the life nowadays you need to be dexterous in order to survive. It is a tough economy (Mr LD, Wedgehill farm, 2010).

3.4.4Case D: Political and historical

> To me this is the completion of the liberation war. I joined the war to fight for land which had been stolen by the British imperialists. We were educated in the camps about the need to use the gun in order to reclaim our soil. When independence came, us guerrillas [war veterans] never really felt the independence because the land was still in the hands of the enemy [white farmers] and the elite politicians were dining and wining with them. Do not think that was exciting for us because we felt we had wasted our time fighting for nothing. Every time I would pass through this area my heart would ache seeing a white man still in charge. In 2000, we felt politically triumphant and whatever we do with the land it is now ours. We have completed the war through the Third Chimurenga (Third liberation war) (Mr AF, Wolfscrag, 2011).

3.4.5CASE E: Social safety net

> I was nearing retirement and I saw Fast Track as an opportunity to get a retirement home. In fact, this is my second pension. The first pension was not of much value. Now my children and grandchildren have a place to call home where they can fend for themselves. As a pensioner without a home I really needed this land that is why I applied to my head of department [Agritex] and thank God I got the land (Mr TC, Chipinge, 2011).

The above voices point to the fact that not all claims to land in Chipinge district were political. However, what is clear is that some beneficiaries used patronage networks embedded in ZANU PF and the state to realise their different aspirations. In case A, the beneficiary utilised her ZANU PF party membership; in case B the beneficiary with autochthonousclaims pays his allegiance to President Mugabe; in case C the motive to diversify livelihoods was realised through connections with the head of department who sat in the land committee a similar phenomenon with case E. As

for case D, I have explored how ZANU PF manipulated anti-white settler concerns by war veterans to legitimise Fast Track as an on-going liberation struggle.

The manipulation of local grievances that war veterans and chiefs had, has led some scholars to say the process was wrong but the goals were right (see Mamdani 2008), but this underplays the impact of the state's authoritarian, repressive and exclusionary politics in the past and present. There were some claims that were not based on or realised through party politics but this does not underrate the importance of how ZANU PF manipulated such to further a political agenda to stay in power. By realising their claims through Fast Track the above beneficiaries became embroiled in a web of patronage networks almost by definition.

3.5 Conclusion

Whereas the land redistribution program started as a pro-poor policy in the 1980s and drifted toward pro-elite in the 1990s, neither is adequate to describe Fast Track. The fact that beneficiaries are dominated by civil servants, war veterans, traditional authorities and security officers, all of whom must continuously demonstrate their loyalty to ZANU PF, show that there is more to the process than meets the eye. Fast Track in this context was a pro-ruling party process with the majority of beneficiaries having access to political networks and partisan state networks. I therefore conclude that, on my three A1 study sites, due to corrupt administrative practices in land allocation and the politicised and autochthonous nature of the land invasion, civil servants, war veterans and traditional authorities were the major beneficiaries of Fast Track. Though some of these beneficiaries had diverse claims to land that were not entirely political the vehicle to realise those claims was almost inevitably linked to political loyalty, connection and patronage under the ZANU PF umbrella. Political patronage extended beyond gaining access to land as land reform beneficiaries have to continuously show political loyalty through 'correct' political

allegiance in the highly politicised landscapes of resettlement. The authoritarian and partisan nature of the state excluded many farm workers, women, white commercial farmers, ZANU Ndonga and MDC supporters and some 'ordinary' people in the communal areas in Chipinge who never had a chance due to the lack of patronage links.A new agrarian structure has emerged, but one shaped mainly by socio-political dynamics rooted in the ZANU PF system of patronage. Now we turn the focus on those who benefited from Fast Track and explore what they are doing with the land.

Chapter 4: Politics and social differentiation in production

4.1 Introduction

As we have seen, diverse beneficiaries of Fast Track resettlement are largely a product of patronage-based land acquisition. How, then, has agricultural production fared across the study sites and between households? What explains the differences between the new farmers? As most scholars argue (Cousins 2010, Dekker and Kinsey 2011, Scoones *et al*. 2010, Matondi *et al*. 2008, Moyo *et al*. 2009, Murisa 2011), my data shows that different levels of crop production are partly related to differential access to land holdings, farming inputs, labour, tillage, extension services, assets, income and social networks. However, it is the process of gaining access to such resources that is emphasised from a 'skill, effort, hard work and economic viewpoint' (Scoones *et al.* 2010) that I find incomplete to explain social differentiation in the highly politicised case of Chipinge district. I argue that differential access to state patronage cannot be downplayed through mentioning it in passing or in footnotes as some authors do (Cousins 2010, Dekker and Kinsey 2011, Scoones *et al*. 2010, Matondi *et al*. 2008, Moyo2011, Murisa 2011).

4.2 Unequal land holdings

Early in my study, I showed that not all households got access to equal holdings of land.Many scholars ignore this among Fast Track A1 farmers. Differences in land sizes correlate with crop production on the three A1 resettlement farms. New farmers with large arable fields benefited from increased cultivation. This is consistent with most studies of small-scale farmers that indicate that differences in crop production among small- scale farmers are partly due to gaining access to larger arable fields area in agricultural fertile areas (see Cousins *et al*. 1992, Chigwenya 2001, Hart –Broekhuis *et al.* 2001, Kinsey 2004). However, the issue of productivity in relation to fertile soils did not apply in my study sites since I compare resettled farmers in the same agro-ecological

zones. Land sizes correlate with agricultural production primarily because of five interrelated factors. First, it was not by mere coincidence that beneficiaries got farms with different land sizes in Chipinge. The partisan process in which land was acquired resulted in those with strong political ties getting larger farms on my three A1 resettlement schemes, as noted in Chapter 3. I have indicated, for example, how the war veterans invaded Wolfscrag farm and how the invaders were subdivided into groups with each being led by a war veteran who demarcated plots. In this process these war veterans, in articulation with the traditional leaders and those who were politically connected to ZANU PF, got themselves big farms, some with gum tree and macadamia plantations. Others who had been mobilised by the war veterans were allocated smaller portions of land. As detailed in the previous chapter, when government officials went to confirm and record land taken through invasions they confirmed the existing distribution rather than makingany radical changes.When the partisan state administrative structures subdivided the land on Glen View Lot 1 they allocated bigger farms ranging between 10 and 15 hectares to senior civil servants and others who were politically connected whereas those with weaker political ties within ZANU PF got the smaller farms ranging between 3 and 5 hectares. Political authority was thus not used only to gain access to land but to get larger farms. Second, those who acquired large farms did not only acquire bare land but land with export crops, macadamia and gum trees, as I explore in the next section. Third, those who occupied large areas of land did not only use political influence to gain access to land but also used their political influence to mobilise farming inputs and other state resources. Fourth, the beneficiaries who took large pieces of land, security officers, civil servants, traditional leaders and war veterans tend to have more diverse sources of income. Fifth, some of those with larger farms rent out some of the land in exchange for labour.

As a result of the factors, land size correlates with types of crops, yields, land utilisation, labour, assets, household food security, and livestock holdings. Consequently, for a more nuanced

understanding of production on A1 farms. I adopt a tri-modal approach where I differentiate A1 farmers on the three resettlement schemes into three categories, which help to illuminate differences among farmers. The three categories are: A1 (1-5) hectares, A1 (6-10) hectares and A1 (11-15) hectares. I use the three categories as guiding frameworks to explain differences among households within schemes. However, some factors that shape social differentiation like family size are not directly related to these categories and hence in some cases the analysis refers to specific cases as we shall see later. The table below shows the number of households in each category.

Table 10: Number of households by land size as of 2010

Scheme type	**Number of Households**
A1 (1-5)	29
A1 (6-10)	23
A1 (11-15)	18
Total	**70**

Source: compiled by author from survey data (N=70)

Below, I give an overview of the different household production characteristics in each category.

Table 11: Household production characteristics across land holdings categories as of 2010

A1 (1-5)	A1 (6-10)	A1 (11-15)
Produce food crops and small grains	Produce food crops, small grains and export crops 9gum tree and macadamia)	Produce food crops, small grains and export crops (gum trees and macadamia)
Low crop yields	Medium yields	High yields
Hire in less labour	Hire in significant labour	Hire in significant labour
Low land utilisation	High land utilisation	High land utilisation
Highly food insecure	Food insecure	Relatively food secure

This categorization is only meant to give a general picture because it is difficult to categorise households owing to the diversification of livelihoods within and across households. This diversification includes seasonal work, permanent work and petty trade. Within one household you can find asset rich and asset poor individuals, healthy and unhealthy people, politicians,

professionals, seasonal workers and traders as argued in chapter 1. The unstable political and economic environment in Zimbabwe makes the environment subject to rapid change. For example, the stabilisation of the economy under the inclusive government in 2009 meant some newly resettled farmers who relied on corruption and disorder experienced a dip in their fortunes, as I elaborate in chapter 5. In addition, a change in political allegiance of a household member may result in a change of fortune overnight. Social differentiation dynamics depend greatly on the changing nature of politics and the state in post-2000 Zimbabwe. Cousins (2010:13) rightly points out that given the degree of fluidity and variability of households 'analytical abstractions are unavoidable in this context'. My purpose is to depict the general correlations and characteristics and yet acknowledge that some contrasts and exceptions exist within households and across schemes. Life histories captured the unique nature of some households.

4.3 Crop inheritance

Pre-Fast Track land use partly accounts for the different types of crop production among the resettled farmers in Chipinge. This is a point other seminal studies ignore (see Moyo *et al.*2009 and Scoones *et al*. 2010) as they focus on what the new farmers are doing without tracing their inheritance from white farmers. In my study, the major difference is that those on the A1 (6-10) and A1 (11-15) farms produced macadamia and gum trees whereas no household produced either on A1 (1-5) farms (n=29). Five households had macadamia trees and 6 gum tree plantations on the A1 (6-10) (n=23) whereas 6 households produced macadamia and 3 had gum trees on the A1 (11-15) farms (n=18). The new farmers occupied the land when macadamia and gum trees were ready for harvest. The former white farmers were the ones who grew and tended the market crops only to be displaced when they were ready for harvest. It is those individuals with most political influence who gained access to land with export crops.Those with the export crops earned more

money had wood for shelter and access to plant medicine among other things compared to those without, as I explore below.

At Wedgehill farm, the beneficiaries of macadamia farms included the chairman of the committee of seven, originally from Mutema, a former prison officer, a former army officer and some war veterans. When I asked how they justified being on land with macadamia trees that they themselves had not grown some were evasive. However, the chairman of the committee of seven unequivocally stated:

> I suffered for this country…those white farmers when they came they brutally dispossessed us from our land and they took everything that was on the land. They took even our graves, our lions, our baboons and some fenced them and started making money. But those were our God given things as the President always says and even the Bible says so. Those oppressors were reaping our land and do you know whose labour they were using? You were not yet born… They forced our ancestors to be slaves working for them, clearing the land for them, planting, weeding and harvesting for them for free and the only prize they could get was a sjambok. Now it is our turn, in fact it was our turn to take and reap where we did not sow (Mr AR, Wedgehill, 2010).

A war veteran who also benefitted from the macadamia and gum tree windfall and who originally comes from Mutema area as well, chronicled how they came to know about the value of macadamia:

> Our grandfathers used to tell us stories about what happened on these farms and you are lucky young man we are also telling you the story and we hope your research will tell the true story… Long ago during colonialism if you would steal the white man's sheep you would be punished with a few days' free labour. However, if you would steal just one bucket of macadamia from the farm you were sjamboked, then reported to the police and automatically fired from work. We were anxious to discover what was in the macadamia and now we know that it is the money (Resettled farmer, Wedgehill, 2010).

Here, the war veterans give an ideological justification for acquiring macadamia plantations. The history of colonialism and the injustices associated with the colonial era is reinvigorated as a way to cast Fast Track as the correct way of redressing the injustices. This resonates with the ideological narrative of ZANU PF local leaders in Chipinge. For example, Ernst Porusingazi

harvested 30 tonnes of maize left by an evicted white farmer Mr Dawie Jourbet on 400 hectares of land in Chipinge. His father, Mr Enock Porusingazi, the ZANU PF aspiring MP and current ZANU PF Youth league member, ideologically justified such practices:

> He {Dawie Jourbet} left the farm in January [2010] upon legal eviction through the courts because my son had an offer letter to that farm…When he {Dawie Jourbet} left [Stilfontein farm], he had a maize crop that was still to mature but then he must understand that the new farmer also planted his own crop of maize. My son also looked after the maize crop left by the Boer and he has a right to it.We do not know where he gets that confidence from. He actually believes he is going to return but we will resist that. The man is a Boer from South Africa; a real Boer, the likes of Eugene Terre' Blanche. He was cruel to the people of this area and everyone is celebrating his eviction (Porusingazi cited in Chipangura 2010).

Magistrate Samuel Zuze, deemed to be loyal to ZANU PF by party members and war veterans as noted in chapter 3 presided over Dawie Jourbet's case and ordered the eviction. Ideology is used to justify private wealthy acquisition. As Dawie Jourbet explained, 'these people are stripping the farm naked. This is outright theft by people taking advantage of an embattled white farmer...Five 30-tonne trucks have left the farm laden with my maize in the past five days' (Dawie cited in Chipangura 2010).

Given that Fast Track was not only highly politicised locally but also regionally and internationally, the dream of making a quick buck from macadamia did not immediately materialise because buyers boycotted production from these farms.

There were challenges for the new farmers on the resettlement schemes I studied in terms of discovering markets for the macadamia as testified to by the former prison officer who claimed to have a degree in Marketing from the Zimbabwe Open University (ZOU):

> We were excited to bulldoze our way onto these lucrative farms. I even thought macadamia would make me and my family rich… I even never thought of using my degree. This is because when we came here the macadamia were already bearing fruits but we had nowhere to sell the nuts in bulk so naturally we started neglecting the trees and some

> died. We were only harvesting few buckets which we would sell to residents in Gaza Township in Chipinge town who used them for peanut butter and cooking oil. Those who used to buy from the former farmers refused to buy the macadamia from us. It was complicated and they were protecting each other these whites…its politics. They were saying we could not reach the standards and they could not buy stolen things (Mr AT, Wedgehill, 2010).

The respondent was aware that the politics of Fast Track land reform had affected his fortunes. Some globally established companies such as Nestle, the multinational food company, and Southern Africa Macadamia Association (SAMA) condemned the violent, chaotic and disorderly nature of Fast Track. It is partly this lawlessness which compromised the legitimacy of the programme and so the ability of farmers to engage.

In trying to understand the complexities of market access for those who got land, I tracked down a former macadamia farm manager who now worked for aNon-GovernmentalOrganisation (NGO) in Birchenough Bridge about 60 kilometres West of Chipinge town. The former manager explained to me that:

> White farmers used to sell their produce to SAMA. It was a laborious process because first they had to register with SAMA before planting the trees. Then once they got approval SAMA would advise on the types of seed to be used, fertilisers, and chemicals to control diseases, harvesting way and even expected certain labour standards though the latter were not strictly adhered to. The SAMA officials would occasionally come to the farm to do an evaluation in terms of whether we had patterned our production systems to their standards. So apart from the politics the standards are difficult to reach for the new farmers… Yah you can't rule out the politics because some new farmers in the first season sold the macadamia to SAMA but the money reflected in the accounts of former white farmers (Mr AU, Birchenough Bridge, 2011).

The new farmers confirmed that the money for the first batch of macadamia in 2004 was paid to the bank accounts of the former white farmers. After beneficiaries were put off by the absence of a market and what they felt was short changing by SAMA working in cahoots with the displaced farmers, they neglected the macadamia trees in early 2004. However, from 2009, the new farmers started to tend the macadamia trees due to the emergence of a new market. This included

weeding, pruning and using fertiliser. The emergence of the new market was explained by the chairman of the committee of seven at Wedgehill farm:

> It was in 2009 when we were approached by some people who said they were working for the Chinese companies and were there to complement the President's Look East idea [A ZANU PF sponsored idea to link Zimbabwe politically and economically to China and other Asian countries. This is in light of the view that Zimbabwe's future interests can best be served by the Eastern countries after a standoff with Western countries after 2000]. We did not panic because we know the Chinese are our friends from the days of the liberation war. They are the ones who gave us guns and now they had come to give us life again. They offered to buy our macadamia without any conditions attached. The agents set up a marketing centre at the shed on this farm, but there was another market at Mashco centre, in Chipinge town. They were buying one tonne at US$800.00 which is a lot of money in this economy (Mr AR, Wedgehill, 2010).

In 2010, there were three macadamia agents resident in Chipinge town, namely Redon investments, Mohammed and Revy. They all described themselves as commodity brokers. Revy, a University of Zimbabwe graduate in Agricultureexplained:

> We have been of immense use to the new farmers in this area… Yes we have our centre at Mashco, the new farmers sell to us and we give them cash that is US$800 a tonne. From there we transport the macadamia using heavy trucks by road to Beira. We just transport the macadamia unshelled. When the macadamia get to Beira, in Mozambique, they are shipped to China. I am not sure what the Chinese use the macadamia shells for but I hear it's for rich peoples' carpets and of course the nut is for the chocolates you eat in Oxford…they export to Europe the chocolates (Macadamia agent, Chipinge town, 2011).

When I asked whether they were not ripping off the farmers he responded:

> Not at all, remember these farmers did not invest a single cent in the production of these macadamia. Their cost is only to harvest. So there are no costs all the money they get is profit. Off course the white farmers used to get between US$3,200 and US$4,000 a tonne from SAMA but if you look at the costs they incurred yes its reasonable, but for these farmers this is a bonanza. No deal can be better. Also look at how better they are now compared to other farmers who do not produce macadamia. We now drink with them here [in Chipinge town] every day (Mr AV, Chipinge town, 2011).

What is striking is that the new farmers did not complain at all about the low price of $800 a tonne. In fact, they earned a new social status in the farming community as they earn much more than their counterparts. Differentiation here is not explained by the decisions that farmers made,

that is 'the way of perceiving, calculating, planning and ordering the process of production' (see Ploeg 2009:117). This decision was made by the displaced white farmers and the new farmers are simply making money out of the harvest owing to their political connections. In Chipinge district, unlike in other production systems, market dependency by the small-scale farmers has not resulted in the re-patterning of production whereby global agencies such as SAMA dictate the labour relations, types of seeds, production and harvesting processes. The small-scale farmers are not directly integrated in the conventional model of global agri-business and market relations as a former macadamia farm manager clarifies:

> The Chinese agents just buy the macadamia nuts; they are not concerned at all where one gets the macadamia. People like Mohammed [Chinese agent] do not care even if the macadamia are stolen they just buy. They are interested in making a quickie buck (Mr AU, Birchenough Bridge, 2011).

The new beneficiaries benefited from macadamia farms because they were clients of a partisan state, as argued earlier. A new kind of market integration is emerging in Chipinge district but one that accentuates differentiation among small-scale farmers. The new farmers integrated in the new macadamia market and are doing better than their counterparts who had weaker political ties.

Ironically, the former prison officer, now macadamia farmer, complained about the unregulated marketing:

> It is good that we can now sell our macadamia without any conditions from the West. We have this Look East Policy which is good but the agents [macadamia] must come and take the peg number of each farm so when you sell they can relate the peg number [plot number] to the seller. At the moment as more and more people know we are making money our macadamia will be stolen, in fact some stole my macadamia last year but just a few buckets (Mr AT, Wedgehill, 2010).

For new farmers to re-open to the order of world markets may have an adverse impact on their short term livelihoods. Apart from the benefits of the market, macadamia farmers use the nuts to

produce an alternative to peanut butter and cooking oil which increases dietary diversity and makes the households healthier.

A few farmers have inherited gum tree plantations on both Wedgehill and Wolfscrag. However, at Wolfscrag, a civil servant who worked in Chipinge Rural District Council and who used his political networks with the head of department to obtain the land, had a portion of his farm with gum tree plantations taken over by the war veterans working with the committee of seven. They argued that:

> We have taken over the management of gum trees on this farm because people were randomly cutting trees and destroying the environment without using the money for farm development. They were using the money for personal needs…we decided to take the plantations and we are now responsible for their maintenance and for cutting and selling them. When we get the money it comes to me as treasurer of the committee of seven and we then decide what to use the money for the benefit of the community…the things on our plan include building roads, drilling boreholes, building a clinic and a school, things which will benefit all of us not a few (Mr AW, Wolfscrag, 2010).

At first farm workers were displaced at Wedgehill farm because of weak political ties and the civil servants benefited. This case shows a further process of superimposition among the beneficiaries with the war veterans gaining an upper hand in this particular case by arguing that they would use the trees for the greater good. Environmentalism is also used to mask corrupt intentions.

However, I observed little development on the farm and other farmers alleged that the gum trees had been sold but the war veterans used the money for their own personal benefit. The resettled civil servant who was stopped from harvesting gum trees on his plot alleged:

> These war veterans say they collect the money but they do not have a bank account. The money comes as cash and just squander it…As you can see they lie about constructing roads, you can see this road is inaccessible once the rains start.They talk about boreholes but we still drink from streams and rivers. They are just lying. They discovered there is money from gum trees as I used to get US$300 per load and they are doing it for their own benefit so that they can be rich alone. But you cannot say these things… I see you talk to them a lot because once you tell them we can be displaced. They are so powerful and we

> think the headmen is also 'eating' [spending the money] with them (Mr AL, Wolfscrag, 2010).

The households producing gum trees did not have a problem with marketing. This is because they market to local traders who then sell to local furniture manufacturing companies, some as far away as Mutare and Harare. There are also local saw mills in Chipinge town where the gum trees are sold at Mabumbo shopping centre. The buyers cut the poles, treat them and transport them to the market. The new farmers incur little or no costs: 'The revolution has made us rich; we just need to tender the gum trees. Otherwise the buyers do their own cutting and transporting. Our duty is to enjoy the money…' (Mrs AX, Wedgehill, 2010). Below is a picture of gum tree poles treated at the farm and ready to be transported.



Figure 4: Photograph of Treated Gum tree poles ready to be transported, Wedgehill farm (taken by author, 2010)

Gum trees are economically important and those who own plantations have more income than those without. Apart from monetary income the gum trees are used as medicine, building material and firewood which provides better health, houses and warmth to the beneficiaries of state patronage. A new farmer explained on the uses of the gum tree:

> We get money from selling the gum trees, about US$300 dollars a truckload. During winter when most people have coughs we also strip the bark of the tree, take the leaves, mix with guava trees and boil then drink as cough medicine[11]. It can heal just like Woods [cough medicine]. Another thing we do is that we cut the gum trees for firewood purposes because there is no electricity yet in these farms. Some people from town also come to buy the gum tree for firewood, in case there are blackouts. In some cases it became easier

[11]With the reassurance of my mother, Virginia Chinoera Zamchiya, I used the concoction when I had a bad cough in December 2010 and I was healed.

> for us to build our house because we could just cut the trees and use them as building material. So that's what we use the gum trees for but mainly we sell to the guys who come with trucks (Mrs AY, Wedgehill, 2010).

Just like the production of macadamia the farmers were not involved in the decision-making process of what to grow, they simply acquired farms with plantations ready to harvest. This enrichment process differs with observations in other regions where farmers are making money out of their own production (see Moyo *et al*. 2009, Scoones *et al*. 2010).

4.4. Crop production and marketing

I have singled out export crops to help show that pre-Fast Track land uses contributed to differences in agricultural production, but the farmers across the three schemes produced avariety of crops, as illustrated in chapter 1. Farmers who combined export crops and other crops were at an advantage. What explains the differences in market integration across the three categories of farmers? Marketing of maize is differentiated across the three categories due to socio-economic reasons that compel farmers to sell, different levels of production yields, and different production systems on the farms. In the 2009-2010 agricultural seasons my survey data showed that 11 households in the A1 (1-5) (n=29), 8 households in the A1 (A6-10) (N=18) and 16 households in the A1 (11-15) (N=23) sold their maize through the market. Overall, 40.9% of the maize farming population sold produce via the GMB, local markets, neighbours in Mozambique, private traders and others from the dry lowveld of Chipinge such as Makwehe. This resonates with Scoones *et al*.'s (2010:123) aggregate data where the top 40% of households are producing for the market. Largely my findings confirm those of Matondi (2011), Moyo *et al*. (2009) and Scoones *et al.* (2010) that integration in the market is an indicator of success because it shows that farmers are producing surplus, as neo-classical economists argue, but this is not always the case. It is useful to use marketing as an indicator of successful households but there is also a need for careful consideration so as not to conceal the pressures that lead farmers to market their crops which, if

unpacked, can show vulnerability. It is the reasons for selling that are important if one is to gauge the vulnerability of farming communities. More farmers selling may not actually indicate an egalitarian society with successful farmers but may be an indicator of more vulnerable households with limited sources of livelihoods as shown in the difference between A1 (1-5) and A1 (6-10). Farmers in the A1 (1-5) had more compelling reasons to sell because they had limited sources of alternative income. They sold to meet transport, health and education costs. Land size and farming thus do not exist in isolation to other multiple livelihood dynamics that determine why some sell whereas others do not. Those in A1 (6-10) had diversified sources of income and someused the maize to feed their livestock, whereas some farmers in the A1 (11-15) were motivated by the need to expand production and invest in ways that I detail later.

Some scholars have analysed the production patterns of A1 farmers as if they are a homogeneous group, yet maize production is differentiated across the schemes revealing unequal land holdings, differential access to state farming inputs, labour mobilisation and off-farm sources of income. Let me first demonstrate from my survey data what the maize yield differences were in the 2009-2010 agricultural season before explaining such. The A1 (1-5) group harvested 40.9 tonnes on 46.1 hectares, A1 (6-10) produced 83.1 tonnes on 68.1 hectares and the A1 (11-15) category produced 158.7 tonnes on 80.8 hectares. Consequently, the average maize yield per hectare is 0.9, 1.2 and 2.0 tonnes respectively for the A (1-5), A1 (6-10) and A 1 (11-15) categories. The maize yields were below the potential productivity for the region. As Mr A1, the Agritex officer, explained:

> This is a rich fertile area for crop production. The soils and the amount of rainfall are very good. If a farmer has good farming skills, good advice, appropriate seed, labour and chemicals [s]he can produce between 4.5 and 6.0 tonnes of maize per hectare. This is the maximum you can produce in the area. But the [maize] yields we record from the new farmers we can consider to be doing well are half the yield potential of this region. It is in the lowveld with sandy soils and erratic rainfall that we expect below 2 tonnes per hectare (Mr A1, Chipinge, 2011).

Land utilisation in general also differs across my categories of A1beneficiaries which is partly linked to yield levels. The net utilisation index is calculated as the percentage of the total cropped area over the total farm size for the 2009/2010 season. This excludes land used for housing and grazing livestock. The average land utilisation for the A1 (1-5) category is 38.3%; farmers in this group cropped 51.1 hectares out of the 133.4 hectares of their demarcated fields for cropping. The average land utilisation index increases to 42% for the A1 (6-10) group. The total number of demarcated fields is 230 hectares and the new farmers cropped 96.6 hectares. The land utilisation index decreases to 41% for the A 1(11-15). The new farmers in this category cropped 110.7 hectares out of 270 hectares. In terms of the overall land utilisation index my findings echo those of Moyo *et al*'.s (2009) study. The difference in interpretation is that Moyo *et al*. (2009:54) conclude that, 'land underutilisation increases with scale of landholding' in line with their political positioning in favour of smallholder production. The relationship between land sizes and utilization does not follow a simple linear trajectory in my case. Though land utilisation decreases in the A1 (11-15) category, the smallest farms A1 (1-5) have the lowest utilisation index. The differentiating factor on land utilization is not just land size but a combination of a number of economic, social and political reasons cited above and explored below.

Most farmers mentioned differential access to farming inputs, in particular fertiliser and seed, as one of the issues that account for different levels of crop production on resettlement farms. The shortages of farming inputs in post-2000 Zimbabwe is a major constraint to agricultural production on resettlement farms (also see Dekker and Kinsey 2011, Matondi 2011, Moyo *et al.* 2009, and Scoones *et al*. 2010, Zikhali 2008). In this vacuum as explained in Chapter 2, the government introduced schemes to support new farmers. As Handley (2008) writes, the ruling elite promoted schemes that furthered its own interest. Unequal power, social status and political standing explain how those within ZANU PF patronage networks were included or excluded from gaining

access to subsidised farming inputs. For example, Mr AT, a retired prison officer and war veteran who is 52 years old and resettled on a 15 hectare plot at Wedgehill produced 20 tonnes of maize on 7 hectares, which is an average of 2.9 tonnes per hectare. How did he do it? Mr AT benefitted from the Grain Marketing Board (GMB) subsidised fertiliser and seeds. He did not wait in the long queue, but upon arrival, like many war veterans and chiefs he would produce his war veteran card and then jump the queue and be served first. According to a GMB worker, 'it was difficult to control the amount of seed and fertiliser war veterans would get because they were very aggressive. But we would ration the amount on other new farmers' (Mrs FB, Chipinge, 2011). Mr AT is said to have bought five 50kg bags of fertilisers, Ammonium Nitrate (AN) and Compound D, and three bags of maize seed. According to Mrs FB two households were supposed to get one 10kg bag of fertiliser each and two bags of Ammonium Nitrate and Compound D to share. He explained to me that, 'I got my seed and fertiliser from the GMB and that assisted me a lot to increase my yield per hectare especially the fertiliser' (Mr AT, Wedgehill, 2011).

Mr AT used his political standing to gain preferential access to maize and seed. His granary is packed with fertilisers and seed amassed from different agricultural schemes. This means that he is able to plant in a timely manner and to apply fertiliser at the appropriate stages without being inconvenienced by market shortages or late disbursement like other farmers. This finding is consistent with an ongoing study in Athlone area where one of the respondents in explaining the source of fertiliser bags said: 'This heap is from AREX, this one from GMB and we are waiting for the delivery from Maguta' (Mandizadza 2010:31). Stateofficials administering these schemes take no action in the context of disorder. Mr AT calls this 'crude agricultural planning' but the abuse of the authority that stems from his status as a war veteran with the explicit approval of the party-state officials, is crude corruption. The advantages of hoarding fertiliser and seed are multiple for crop production. Some of the fertiliser is exchanged for labour. As a former farm worker displaced

in situ explained, ' I help some new farmers with planting and weeding in exchange for a tin (20kgs) of fertiliser , which I can use in my own field I was allocated by another farmer in a special labour arrangement' (Mr HT, Wedgehill farm, 2010). The capture of state subsidised farming inputs helps to explain the differences in crop production on my A1 farms. For some scholars what is more fascinating is the outcome, that Mr AT is producing an amazing 2.9 tonnes per hectare, well above national average. In dwelling on a narrative that focuses on the outcome only, the story of patronage-based acquisition of resources with all its implications for interpreting the sustainability of this kind of production and differentiation is missed out. Not to mention the consequences in the political sphere.

Even the technocrats were side-lined as the distribution of government farm inputs became highly politicised in ways that allowed the politics of connections to prevail. For example, the ZANU PF MP for Chipinge central and other local party leaders gave a directive that Mr Z, a village head and resettled farmer at Glen View Lot 1 Farm, lead the identification of farmers to benefit from the Champions Farmers Programme beneficiaries in 2009. There were shortages of inputs so the government through the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe had to choose what they called successful farmers (champions) and support them to boost national production. The traditional leader, Mr Z, had to identify farmers who were producing high yields so that they could benefit from the Champions Farmers Programme. Unlike in the first phase of resettlement where master farmers, those who regularly produce surplus, were selected by the relevant technocrats from the Ministry of agriculture in this politicised context , agricultural production was determined by the key clients within ZANU PF. According to a resettled farmer at Glen View Lot 1,

> Mr Z identified a number of his relatives and friends, some of them who had never produced a tonne of maize in their lifetime on the farm and made sure they were given the seeds and fertilisers at the farm... because they had fertiliser which is important some

> of them produced better than us whereas others sold to better-off farmers. (Mr L, Glen View Lot 1, 2011).

Mr Z, who also benefitted directly from the scheme, planted 2 hectares of land with maize and produced 4 tonnes of maize in 2010, which is above the district average and qualifies him as one of the successful farmers in terms of yields per hectare.

The Agritex officials were not happy with such politicised identification of Champion Farmers as they felt their technical roles had been usurped and that such a process resulted in bad harvests. As one official explained, 'We are the ones who should identify the master farmers because this is what we were trained to do. The chiefs know little about farming and this is causing the poor low yield harvest' (Mr BF, Chipinge, 2011). However, the ZANU PF ruling elite was more interested in empowering the chiefs in ways that allowed the traditional leaders to have their own sources of patronage than in the narrow sense of increasing productivity. This practice is common in Chipinge district. As TM an Agritex officer in Chief Mahenye's area in Chipinge, explained this phenomenon:

> Fair distribution of inputs became a challenge as the system was politicised …our roles were systematically transferred to partisan traditional leadership and war veterans [which]resulted in tested farming methods compromised [being compromised]. Agritex officials as farming experts were supposed to distribute inputs according [to] requirements of individual farmers, type of soil and hectarage. Directives came from top ZANU PF officials on how to distribute the inputs…Our expertise was insulted. Traditional leadership such as chiefs and headmen, were automatically classified as suitable candidates to benefit from the Champions Farmers Programme…This contributed towards poor harvest in the country (TM, Chipinge, 2012).

The practice also contributed towards accentuating social differentiation on the farms. Some did well but others re-sold the inputs as highlighted earlier. The ZANU PF leadership sanctioned and condoned the contentious practice notwithstanding some of the negative effects of these patron-client relations to agriculture. It is a way to gain and maintain political support. As Alexander (2006) aptly argues, technical institutions were side-lined as politics took centre stage after 2000.

As Magure (2012:68) writes, 'In Zimbabwe, a complex network of patrons and clients mediate the allocation of scarce resources' to the benefit of those willing to show continuous loyalty to ZANU PF. Such practices in Chipinge are not separated from agricultural production but are inherently linked to production. Some studies of agriculture informed by neo-classical economics assume the mobilisation of resources is mediated by the market, but post-2000 Chipinge provides a very different context. In January 2011, I witnessed traditional leaders receiving seeds and fertiliser from the Presidential input scheme at the GMB depot in Chipinge town for redistribution to their 'subjects'. Prior to the allocation of the Presidential inputs ZANU PF slogans were chanted with fists punching in the air, '*Pamberi naComrade President Mugabe*!' (Forward with the President!). As we have seen, chiefs acted as local agents of ZANU PF in a newly defined post-2000 relationship. They could mediate the farmers' access to inputs personalized as President Mugabe's scheme. This shows ZANU PF's strategy of re-investing power in traditional leaders to the delight of chiefs who are expected to pay back by showing loyalty. The picture below shows President Mugabe at the launch of the scheme surrounded by chiefs and handing over the farming inputs to Fortune Charumbira, the President of the Chiefs' council.Other chiefs including Musikavanhu from Chipinge look on.



Figure 5: Photograph of President Mugabe handing farming inputs to traditional leaders

Source: Herald, 12 November 2010.

Chief Musikavanhu was grateful,

> We were there when the President [Robert Mugabe] launched the scheme in Harare last year and I am grateful that the inputs have finally reached us here just 2 months after. I am grateful to the President he understands that real politics is about people's livelihoods. You cannot then say Mugabe is bad…*tiri kutonga mupfana* (we are ruling young man)…I will make sure I distribute the inputs equally to each deserving household. A bag of 5kgs of groundnuts, 5 kgs of sorghum, 5 kgs of millet and 10kgs of maize seed to everyone (Mr BB, January, 2011).

In reality the inputs were redistributed disproportionately to relatives of the chief and ZANU PF supporting members. As one of the local MDC MPs in Chipinge explained,

> The Chiefs were assisted by the soldiers and local ZANU PF structures to distribute the seeds. In the process some ZANU PF members who want to stand on the ZANU PF ticket in the next parliamentary election were at the centre of distribution as a launch to their campaign. People had to buy a new ZANU PF card which cost US$1 to be eligible for the inputs. Our [MDC] supporters did not receive the input. In some cases they were using the ZANU PF list of supporters which is kept by the village heads and verified by ZANU PF local leaders and aspiring ZANU PF councillors and MPs…Some of the war veterans re-sold the inputs and squandered the money on beer (MDC MP, pers.comm, 2012).

Given the shortages of inputs and limited financial capital among the beneficiaries the access to inputs became an important source of patronage. This access was an important marker of differentiation in crop production. The farmers who put these inputs to full use on their farms harvested more than those who did not. Others sold inputs which meant they were able to access scarce foreign currency, as will be demonstrated in Chapter 5.

One's position in the government bureaucracy also determined the way some resettled farmers gained access to resources. I have indicated how the local bureaucracy had become politicised. For example, Mr BC is 59 years old, has a 15 hectare plot at Wedgehill farm and produced 22 tonnes of maize on a planted area of 8 hectares. How did he manage to get the seed and fertiliser? Mr BC

works at the Agritex department in the office that disburses inputs meant for disadvantaged people, that is the sick and elderly. Mr BC is alleged to have looted some of the inputs vouchers by Mr BD who is working in the social welfare department and has a Bachelor of Arts degree from the University of Zimbabwe. He is fairly young at 27 years and critical of the system. He said,

> If you went to the farm and saw that he is doing well it could be true, it means that at least he did not sell the seed and maize he looted but planted it… It never benefited people on our welfare programme. Maybe that is positive but these guys are corrupt and should be investigated and be arrested. The problem is the whole system is rotten…something is rotten in the state of Denmark (Mr BD, Chipinge, 2011).

The inputs vouchers had to be redeemed at the GMB so the 'looting' of vouchers required complicity from the GMB officials.Corruptionin parastatals is documented (see Magure 2012). The police are also implicated in the web of patronage as Mr BD further indicated, 'If they loot 3 bags of fertiliser they give one to the investigating officer…some of these [police officers] have got farms and it is part of their strategy to gain access to the scarce resources…the people who are supposed to arrest are also corrupt' (Mr BD, 2011, Chipinge town). When I asked Mr BD whether everyone in the local bureaucracy was now corrupt? Mr BD clarified:

> No, you cannot say everyone is corrupt. Some of us are still committed to see things being done in the right way for the development of our country. However, we are frustrated by these corrupt officials with protection from the party. If it was possible we could just weed out the rotten [corrupt] officials (Mr BD, Chipinge, 2011).

Mr BC noted that he earned little money but was evasive in mentioning the source of his agricultural inputs that had resulted in such a bumper harvest by comparison to other farmers in the district in the year 2009-2010.

Whereas patronage and corruption are axes of differentiation in Chipinge district they do not tell the whole Fast Track story.Other factors are also important. Access to tillage is a major factor that accounts for differences in agricultural production. Shortage of tillage was a major problem that

featured constantly in interviews with respondents. The government had tillage programs under the Chipinge District Development Fund (DDF) where new farmers could rent the tractors for use on their farms. I checked with the Chipinge District Development Fund, and the prices as of 2010 were US$45.00 per hectare for ploughing only and the farmer had to bring his or her own diesel, that is 40 litres which cost US$58 at the time of fieldwork. Fuel was available in most parts of the district but the problem was access because it was expensive. It was common to see people with cars buying 2 litres at petrol stations, what they called '*katsaona*' (emergency rescue). New farmers were not immune to this prevailing economic environment. To hire a Tractor for discing cost US$35.00 and 20 litres of fuel which cost US$29.00. For the actual planting a farmer needed US$25 per hectare and 20 litres of fuel as well. In total, a farmer needed US$105.00 for ploughing, discing and planting and US$116.00 for fuel for just one hectare. Such a service was accessed by very few given that the civil servants were earning US$150.00 monthly by December 2010. A female beneficiary, at Glen View Lot 1 Farm, who owns 3 hectares of land, said that the prices were too exorbitant and she did not even dream of renting a tractor. Consequently, most of the income and asset poor farmers relied on hoes for ploughing and planting whereas those with livestock had an added advantage. I pay particular attention to livestock accumulation and its implications for social differentiation in Chapter 5. It is also the case that farmers who do not have tillage find it difficult to implement recommendations from the extension officers. We now pay special attention to the role of extension services.

4.5 Extension services

From my narratives, gaining access to extension services and being able to implement appropriate technical advice had a positive impact on agricultural production. As Orwel *et al*. (2003:338) argue, in a study of old resettlement schemes in rural Zimbabwe , 'access to agricultural extension

services, defined as receiving one or two visits per agricultural year, raises the value of crop production by about 15%'. Why is it that some farmers seemed not to embrace and implement the advice? When I asked an extension officer on certain farmers seem to realize more crop yields per hectare than others he was quick to respond:

> A number of farmers are not cooperating. They do not come for meetings and they do not take advice. In fact they do not want to change their attitudes. They are bringing communal ways of farming [subsistence agriculture] to the commercial sector and that is retrogressive. These guys suffer from two things, number one laziness and number two lack of education. They do not want to work hard that is why they produce very little. Successful farmers are willing to learn and are hard working. They adopt new hybrids of maize seed, they use tractors and the lazy farmers, the dunces, do not want that, they use granary seed, manure ...how much can you produce with that? It is a dangerous combination of laziness and lack of education. The country cannot develop. That's why I like this thing you are doing because going to school is good. Even the Bible says our people shall perish because of lack of knowledge (Mr BF, Chipinge, 2011).

There is a large literature on how agricultural expertise is contested especially if it is difficult to implement or can be damaging (see Alexander 2006). As Robins (1998:1677) writes, state officials and planners blame 'communal farmers for their adherence to outmoded traditional values and practices…' when their modernising programs fail. Yet the new farmers who resist state plans 'are far from being trapped within…a pristine traditional world' (Robins 1998:1678) as enunciated by Mr C, the headman at Wolfscrag:

> We are the ones who sent these kids to school. They are too young and what can they tell me about farming. I started farming before they were even born. Those seeds (Pannar) don't work here because this area receives too much rainfall and you cannot start using basal fertiliser now on this rich soil otherwise in a few years' time the soil would have lost its fertility…Also if they start this politics [At the height of political instability, violence and tensions there was a massive shortage of basic goods in shops] where are we going to get the fertilisers? Yet our soils would have been used to them (Mr C, Wolfscrag, 2010).

From Mr C's statement one can see that this is not an outright rejection of the recommendations. The farmer here is willing to use Ammonium Nitrate. Most respondents concur with Mr C's view that compound D does not make much difference because of the fertile highveld soils. So poor

new farmers would rather save money to buy Ammonium Nitrate than both because fertiliser is expensive.I am inclined to share Robins' (1998:1677) theorisation that the villagers are 'enmeshed within modern discourses and practices…even though they draw on such discourse to challenge [impractical] state interventions'. A bag of 50kgs Ammonium Nitrate fertiliser cost US$35 and US$30 for compound D in 2009-2010. What explains differentiation is mainly gaining access to Ammonium Nitrate rather than Compound D. What is also clear is that Mr C is rejecting the Pannar seed in particular because it matures early when the season is still on which is not an outright rejection of the entire idea of hybrid seeds. As Robins (1998:1678) writes, 'responses are often selective appropriation of components and elements of development packages rather than an either or outright embrace or wholesale rejection of modernization '. Farmers are also informed by prosaic experiences of market failure but that does not entail a total rejection of the market. It is a contextual response and this is what the extension officer has failed to grasp. Mr C's reservations on the sustainability of fertiliser regimes is informed by experiences of declining levels of soil fertiliser in the communal areas, economic instability and political uncertainty. The reservations of Mr C cannot just be ignored as cultural conservatism bordering on ignorance and lack of education. As Drinkwater (1987:2) argues, the research that informs Agritex officers rarely looks at local experiences or what Scott (1998) calls métis (local knowledge) as it is moulded on a transfer-of–technology basis.

Some farmers who received advice and were able to implement it on fertiliser regimes, hybrids of seeds, timely planting and animal husbandry had higher yields and healthier breeds of livestock that fetch more on the market. Farmers who stick to granary seeds, less fertiliser and livestock manure like Mr C produced lower yields per hectare. Given the prevailing political and economic condition not all the new farmers who embraced new techniques had the wherewithal to adopt the hybrid seeds, fertilisers and animal feeds because the resource poor without strong patronage

networks needed money to buy these expensive recommended inputs on the market. I have shown how expensive tillage was. Most of the households did not have the money, as shown in chapter 5.

Agricultural extension officers also blamed political claims to land for undermining agricultural production by some new farmers. The extension officer is of the view that some new farmers legitimate their stay on the land through politics rather than through agricultural production. This is exacerbated by the state's unwillingness to enforce stern measures like eviction of non-commercially oriented farmers. To Mr BG, it is wider state practices and politics that allow some farmers to lag behind and not to take farming seriously:

> The problem is some of the new farmers think farming is politics. They cannot distinguish between farming and politics. They spend most of their time organising people for political meetings. They do not know farming is a business. If they can leave politics to the politicians and then concentrate on farming then they can do wonders. Their only claim to land is political activity not produce per hectares. The government must put strict rules. If one cannot produce one tonne per hectare they must be chased from the farm, better they go to the lowveld where such practices are acceptable (Mr BG, Wolfscrag, 2011).

The statement echoes the early phase of resettlement where the 'imperative of productivity ' dominated as state officials 'stressed that the measure of the programme's success lay in its ability to produce marketed surplus' (Alexander 2006:113). The extension officer's view is that political claims should not displace the state officials' technocratic view of resettlement schemes as commercially oriented. However, unlike in the colonial era and in the first phase of land reform when state officials threatened to evict those who refused to listen to their advice(Moore 1998:344), this is no longer possible. Even though state bureaucrats faced resistance they had a modicum of authority. Even in the colonial era the centralized state was determined to enforce its decisions in the face of resistance or non-cooperation to its technocratic regulations on crop production in the reserves (see Alexander 2006:36-55). The views of the extension officer cannot

be enforced in post-2000 Zimbabwe however, because the ZANU PF national leaders are not as concerned with the technocratic debate as they were in the mid-1980s and 1990s, as shown in chapter 2. What remains are vestiges of technocratic elements without central state support or crucial political support. The state is seized with patronage politics rather than the technocratic debate. After 2000 land became a political imperative for ZANU PF and the legacy of technical development weighed thinly as the political narrative seemed to outweigh the technocratic one.

Due to politicization of the program, which cannot be divorced from the analysis of Zimbabwe's agrarian change more broadly the technocrats were not in a position to enforce their views. As Alexander (2006:187) argues,

> The ministries charged with agrarian policy were marginalised, in favour of an alliance led by ZANU PF and veterans-technocrats were left to lament that their painstaking plans, produced by the "serious scientific analysis of Zimbabwe's agricultural needs" were "dead". The ZANU PF leadership had set in motion processes that promised a new politics of land and a remaking of the state.

The political interests of ZANU PF have reduced the technical influence of Agritex officers. Differentiation is now more politically based and can no longer be narrowly interpreted by the impact of technical advice (Zikhali 2008) or the number of visits by extension officers (Orwel *et al*. 2003). In addition to the politics of extension officers there are other factors that shape differentiation such as labour dynamics as explored next.

4.6 Labour dynamics

A broader pattern identified in most literature is that labour dynamics are an important driver of rural differentiation (see Chambati 2007, Matondi 2011, Moyo *et al*. 2009, Scoones*et al*. 2010) and on my study sites are no exception. Some households relied on family labour, others hired in labour, and some hired out labour or a combination of the above. Farmers used five different

means of labour mobilization namely, the market, the family, communal ways, church membership and patron-client relationships, in different ways that shaped patterns of differentiation as I now explore in detail.

All households from my survey used family labour. However, those with larger families,sometimes up to 12, supplied more labour on the farm. This points to a general finding in the literature that family size correlates with production levels (Kinsey 2004, Moyo *et al*. 2009). However, from my study site the correlation cannot be generalized to all families. In some households family size on its own did not matter in a context of diversified livelihoods where families combined on-farm and off-farm activities for social reproduction. Rather the key question is how families allocated labour to different livelihood activities, including social and political activities. There is also a pattern in which households that have few family members manage to produce high yields because they have capital to either hire in labour or use technology. For example, Mrs BE at Glen View Plot 1 owns 5 hectares of land and her big household is composed of eight adults, three women and five men, but she only managed to produce 0.3 tonnes of maize in the 2009-2010 season. Some members of her household were engaged in other economic activities. Three members of her household, 1 woman and 2 men, hired out their labour for piece meal jobs on an adjacent company-owned estate and in other sectors. Another male member is formerly employed as a mechanic at Tanganda Tea Estate. The family is big but it is not contributing to big yields as labour is spread across other activities. In another case, Mr and Mrs JD's household with nine people; 5 women and 4 men but only produced 0.8 tonnes per hectare which is less than the 2009-2010 average on the three resettlement schemes. Three women in the household were cross-border traders, and sometimes during the planting season they were in South Africa and Mozambique trading products like hand woven baskets, mats and table cloths *et cetera*. They also did piecemeal jobs like cleaning, washing laundry and baby sitting in South Africa and other things I could not

verify. Two of the male adults got a temporary job at Chipinge rural district council in 2009 during the rainy season. They maintained roads in Chipinge that were damaged by the rains and cut roadside grass and were paid more than civil servants. The other two adults were roughly in their 70s and were not able to do the hard work of tilling the land, planting, weeding and harvesting. In fact they needed special care from other members of the family.

On the other end of the scale, Mr AM, who sought land for social safety net purposes and is 52 years old, heads a small family of 3 adults and employs a modest workforce of 2 seasonal labourers, (one male and one female) and one permanent male worker. He produced 20 tonnes of maize in the 2009-2010 season. Even though his family size is small he produced more than other households because he is a retired civil servant with two houses in Mutare town that he rents out. He used the money to hire a tractor from Chipinge DDF to help him with ploughing, discing and planting. Family size as part of the differentiation story thus has to be understood in the context of a variety of other factors. The diversification of livelihoods shows that it is the distribution of family labour that matters within a household. Let me emphasise that the broad pattern is that larger households are able to produce more crops. I have singled out these two patterns because most scholars gloss over them and only explain the broader picture.

The case of Mr AM above indicates a pattern of hiring in labour which is well established in Chipinge. The majority of those who hire in labour do better in crop production yields as compared to those who do not. From my study sites, 55.6% of A1 (6-10) and 50% of A1 (11-15) hired in permanent labour for farm management, cropping and animal husbandry, while 88.9% of A1 (6-10) hire in casual labour and 50% of A1 (11-15) hire seasonal labour. This is different with A1 (1-5) households where just 9.1% of surveyed households hire permanent workers and 36.4% hire in seasonal workers. From my data, most households who hire in labour produce more yields than

those who do not. This is because it allowed good farm management practices and animal husbandry practices and timely planting, weeding and harvesting. For example, Mr BH, who is 51 years old, resettled on Glen View Lot 1 on 10 hectares, hired 25 female and 15 male casual workers at different points for different numbers of days in the period 2009-2010. On top of that he employs 4 permanent workers, 2 males and 2 females. On the other hand, Mrs BI, who is 36 years old and has a bigger 15 hectare plot on Wedgehill farm, did not hire any labour. Mr BH managed to harvest an amazing 18 tonnes of maize whereas Mrs BI only managed to harvest 0.25 tonnes of maize, which is the lowest from inmy survey. Labour hiring is only part of the story as it is enabled by a host of other factors. As other studies show, it is correlated to farm income, assets, and off-farm income as I detail in the subsequent chapter.

Households that hire out labour (mostly casual) are drawn from the less well off in the A1 (1-5) category. 90.9% of households in the A1 (1-5) category hire out labour, 77.8% in the A1 (6-10) and 66.7% in the A1 (11-15) category. Those in the A1 (1-5) usually provideagricultural labour for the well-to-do farmers in the other two categories. They hire out labour to meet households needs like medical fees, school fees, as detailed in chapter 5. Theoretically, the selling of labour cannot be interpreted as a marked transition to landlessness. The form that social differentiation takes cannot be conflated with rural proletarianisation as discussed in chapter 1. One cannot define those who sell labour as not farmers at all. It should also not be confused with depeasantisation (Bryceson 2000). As already noted all the households produced maize. The striking feature is the combination of non-agricultural activities and off-farm income. Some of the beneficiaries in the A1 (6-10) and A1 (11-15) are employed as civil servants and in the security sector and war veterans receive monthly allowances from the government. As some of the agrarian scholars have found (Cousins *et al*. 1992, Cliffe 1998, Phimister 1993, Ranger 1978, Scoones *et al*. 2010) some of the

money earned is reinvested in crop production on the resettlement farms and those who are able to re-invest produce more.

In addition to sourcing labour on the open market the resettled farmers mobilise labour through reciprocal family arrangements. I have highlighted in Chapter 1 how communal mobilization of labour is a historical feature of Zimbabwe's communal areas and its impact on promoting social differentiation. This practice was less prevalent on the old resettlement schemes. This is because in the communal areas ties of kinship and lineage relations were much strong than in old resettlement areas because 'the existing tenure system results in a clustering of kin-related families within the same village under the authority of a ruling lineage' (Cousins *et al*. 1992:18). However, social networks are not entirely absent on resettlement farms. Consistent with this observation, Moyo *et al.* (2009:104) found that in their sample data, reciprocal labour arrangements were limited. As they observed, 'only 0.19 percent of the beneficiary households are involved in reciprocal labour exchanges and all of them are located in the A1 sector'. This practice is limited to households that can provide food and drinks and so communal labour mobilization relies on having the necessary wealth to gain access to these resources as illustrated historically in chapter 1 (see Mtetwa 1975). In contrast to Moyo *et al*. (2009), the Masvingo study shows that,

> Collective work has become an important facet of production in the new resettlements. This is perhaps surprising given the lack of strong social ties binding communities together. However, the experiences of the *jambanja* period combined with the hardships of recent times, have acted to increase the sense of community, and friends, neighbours, church members and kin often work together on a range of activities…'(Scoones *et al.* 2010:143).

As social bonds develop over time and inter-household marriages occur these exchange relationships may develop further. In Chipinge, family collective work was important on Wolfscrag farm due to different reasons. Some resettled farmers had close social ties and kin relations,

because they belonged to the same traditional ruling clan as the beneficiary selection chapter demonstrated. Chief *Mwandeka* usually brewed traditional beer known locally as Chingoto, prepared goat meat and *sadza* (the staple food) at the onset of the farming season. He invited members of his extended family on the farm and other relatives from the communal areas who would help him till the land. Other neighbours were free to join. During harvest time the ceremony was repeated. This is a self-reinforcing cycle, farmers with enough grain mobilise labour and are able to produce more and repeat the same practice in the subsequent years, accentuating differentiation with the poor.

Other social networks such as church membership are important, though they are limited. For example, Mrs D is a 76 year old widow, with 5 hectares of land. She lives with a grandchild whose mother died after a long illness in 2007 at Chipinge hospital in the Zamchiya ward. She recalled, 'church members surprised me one day, they came here in the morning and said they had come to help me with weeding my field. They spent the whole afternoon here and covered a huge place' (Mrs D, Wedgehill, 2010). That was not the end as members of ZMC (Zion Methodist Church), this time the youth group, joined hands to help her harvest her maize crop which Mrs D worried could have rotted in the field due to lack of labour.



Figure 6: Photograph of Mrs D uprooting weeds (taken by author, 2010)

Mrs D invests in these social networks through maintaining a good reputation as a role model in the community. She is a likeable character and she gave me some bananas during field work.

In addition to the market and social networks there are patronage based ways of mobilising labour. Even though the above cited cases of labour mobilisation suggest that social differentiation cannot be solely understood through a mere focus on political patronage, it is a variant one cannot ignore in what Mr BD has described as 'the state of Denmark'. I have already noted the case of former farm workers who had to renegotiate with the base commander and members of his committee to regain access to the farm compounds. With some of them, negotiations allowed them to live in the compounds and they were allowed to use small pieces of land within the larger

plots whilst they occasionally provided labour to the base commander and mostly his influential committee members. This is illegal as the entire infrastructure in A1 resettlement schemes belongs to the state. The former farm workers living in the commander's houses are called when it is necessary, particularly during planting, weeding time and harvesting time, to assist on the plots of the politically influential committee members. This practice results in more maize yields for the committee members thereby fuelling differences in production among the resettled farmers. In return the former farm workers are assured of staying in the compound without paying rental in cash. Processes that enable farmers to hire labour whereas others struggle are thus diverse with some rooted in patronage networks created by a partisan state. Most of the time, the former farm workers did other things, which I could not establish in depth as this is not the primary focus of my thesis. A separate study could investigate how former farm workers, turned into farm 'dwellers' are surviving *in situ* displacement in Chipinge district.

Based on my findings, I have argued that large family sizesand hiring in labour correlate with higher crop production associated with well-off families. However, labour dynamics do not follow a linear flow; it is not one way traffic. I have also shown that labour is also mobilised through extended family networks and social networks, though they are limited. Labour is part of other social, economic and political factors that shape social differentiation.

4.7 Food security

Agricultural production outputs partly had an impact on different patterns of household food security on the A1 resettlement schemes. Families source most of their food from their farm and what they produced shaped food consumption patterns. Some families who had higher maize yields and better consumption patterns had acquired their land, farming inputs and labour using their political authority.

I have already alluded to how beneficiaries of land reform in Chipinge engaged in patronage networks and this had a bearing on production and therefore indirect implications for food availability and consumption. For example, Mrs BK is aged 54 years and a former clerk at Destiny Company. She is resettled at Glen View Lot 1 farm and eats on average one meal a day. She got the plot because her father in law was connected to a chief, *ari mupurisa wamambo* (chief's messenger). Because of marriage relations she gained access to land, but she produced only 5 bags of maize and experienced hunger in 6 out of the 12 months. She had no adequate farming resources. There are many cases like this where patronage links in gaining access to land did not turn into leverage to gain access to other resources such as seeds, fertilisers, tillage and labour among other things and crop production yields have been disastrous, affecting the availability of food. In contrast, the village head who got maize seeds and fertiliser from the Champions Farmers Programme, harvested enough (2 tonnes) to afford 3 meals a day most of the month in the year 2009-2010. So in some cases, new farmers with stronger political links have managed to leverage their power and connectedness in order to ensure food self-sufficiency.

The Masvingo study looks at household food dynamics on Fast Track resettlement farms but the findings are carefully framed to indicate food self-sufficiency rather than food security. Food self-sufficiency is defined as when a household is able to 'meet consumption needs (particularly for staple food crops) from own production rather than by buying or importing' (Nidup and Minot 2010) whereas food security is achieved 'when all the people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life' (Nidup and Minot 2010). Scoones *et al.* (2010) usefully note variations in grain production depending on the nature of seasons and in a good season they conclude that 75% of households were food self-sufficient in Masvingo. The scholarly understanding of food self-sufficiency is based on the estimate that a family of 6 needs 990kgs of

maize for consumption a year. Based on that methodology my own findings reflect the same result as 74.3% of farmers in my survey produced more than a tonne of maize in the 2009-2010 season. This, however, does not tell us whether households are food secure. Some farmers may meet consumption needs but fail to meet the dietary or nutritional requirements. Consequently, I start from where Scoones *et al*. (2010) left off in order to determinewhether and why the resettled farmers were food secure in the 2009-2010 season.

Across the three A1 resettlement schemes, an average of 4 tonnes of maize per family was produced but the story is highly differentiated as 24.7% of families produced less than a tonne in the 2009-2010 season which means they failed to meet the food self-sufficiency level. Only 3 households in the A1 (6-10) category and 5 households in the A1 (11-15) did not meet food self-sufficiency, while 11 households in the A1 (1-5) (n=29) produced less than a tonne of maize. Beyond this analysis as Swindale and Punam (2005) argue, proxy indicators for household food security include number of meals a day and diversity in food intake, which I will now pursue. From my survey data only 19 families managed three meals a day, which are customary in Zimbabwe. Those who have one meal a day usually have a mid-day meal. Households who eat two times a day usually have a morning meal and an evening meal. The few households who afford three meals a day have a morning meal, midday meal and an evening meal. The A1 (1-5) category is the most food insecure category with extremely vulnerable households. 21 of the resettled households (n=29) could not afford three meals a day and 3 households had only one meal a day. In the A1 (6-10) 18 households (n=23) did not have three meals a day showing similar trends with the A1 (1-5) but every family had at least two meals a day in the A1 (6-10) category. On the other hand, the A1 (11-15) category has a slightly larger percentage, 6 households (n=18) ate three meals a day making it the most food secure in terms of frequency of meals.

Interviews with families that had two meals a day show that they preferred three meals a day. However, most people in the survey indicate that they eat more than before resettlement even if they are having two meals a day. What does that entail? 'Even before resettlement we used to have two meals a day but the reason why I say my family is eating more is because the volume of the food has increased' (Mrs AO, Wedgehill, 2010). Yet neither the volume nor frequency of meals is adequate in determining household food security as explained by beneficiaries: 'We have a meal in the morning and evening and its all sadza. We cannot afford bread so we eat sadza in the morning'(Mr BL, Wolfscrag farm, 2010). When I further probed what the relish was since he did not grow enough vegetables he indicated, 'Sometimes we eat Sadza with *mukakashango (*wild edible vegetable)' (Mr BL, Wolfscrag farm, 2010). Another family at Glen View Lot 1 produced a tonne of maize and managed to have three meals a day but the mother complained: 'My child has been diagnosed with kwashiorkor at the clinic, that's why the stomach appears big, but I explained to them [the nurses] that the child enjoys three meals a day, but they said the child must eat more proteins and other things.' (Mrs BM, Glen View Lot 1, 2011). This is consistent with Kinsey's (1999, 2004) observations that even though food production increased in the old resettlement areas households still suffered from malnutrition and children were the most affected. Below is a picture of Munashe.



Figure 7: Photograph of Munashe (taken by author, 2010)

This brings under the microscope the nutritional value of the three customary meals. It is necessary to explore further the differentiated patterns of dietary diversity on the three A1 resettlement schemes. I consider dietary diversity in terms of variety of food intakes, such as 'meats, milk, fruit and vegetables' (Swindale and Punam 2005) beyond the frequency of meals. I post another picture with Munashe his sibling and his mother with a bag of maize in the background.



Figure 8: Photograph of Munashe and family showing a bag of maize (taken by author, 2010)

The dominant meal in all three categories is sadza and vegetables, 100% of households in each category ate sadza everyday. There is an evident lack of dietary diversity in both A 1 (1-5) and A1 (6-10) categories as very few households can afford fruits and milk in a week. The only substantial difference is that a good number of households, 10, enjoy meat (for protein) 4-5 times a week in the A1 (6-10) category which can be attributed to livestock production among other things. In contrast, the A1 (11-15) category shows an improvement in dietary diversity as more households had fruits, milk and vegetables as part of their diet. Those who have poultry and goats eat more meat than those without, particularly small stock such as poultry. This is evident in the dietary diversity data which shown that 43.5% of households in the A1 (6-10), who own the highest

number of poultry, have meat 4-5 times a week. This is more than the 33.3% of households in the A1 (11-15) who eat meat the same number of times, despite owning more cattle. On the other end, 66.7% of households in the A1 (11-15) category enjoy milk everyday of the week as they own more cattle. In short, ownership of different kinds of livestock has a differentiating factor in the everyday life of resettled farmers. The tables below show in detail the differentiated patterns of dietary diversity across the categories.

Table 12: Dietary diversity: A1 (1-5), 2009-2010

	Once a week		4-5 times a week		0 times a week		Everyday	
	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%
Meat	8	27.6			21	72.4		
Milk	18	62.1			11	37.9		
Fruits	9	31.0	8	27.6	6	20.7	6	20.7
Vegetables	3	10.3	3	10.3	4	13.8	19	65.5
Sadza							29	100.0

Source: compiled by author from survey data (N=29).

Table 13: Dietary diversity: A1 (6-10), 2009-2010

	Once a week		4-5 times a week		0 times a week		Everyday	
	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%
Meat	13	56.5	10	43.5				
Milk	5	21.7	3	13.0	13	56.5	1	4.3
Fruits	7	30.4	3	13.0	13	56.5		

Vegetables	5	21.7	10	43.5			8	34.8
Sadza							23	100.0

Source: compiled by author from survey data (N=23).

Table 14: Dietary diversity: A1 (11-15), 2009-2010

	Once a week		4-5 times a week		0 times a week		Everyday	
	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%
Meat	6	33.3	6	33.3	6	33.3		
Milk					6	33.3	12	66.7
Fruits	6	33.3	3	33.3	6	33.3	3	33.3
Vegetables	3	16.7					15	83.3
Sadza							18	100.0

Source: compiled by author from survey data (N=18).

Mrs BK's hint that she did not have food uniformly throughout the year indicates that food availability is not evenly distributed throughout the year. A significant number of households, in October (16), November (18) and December (18) had little to eat because the rains usually come in mid-October and this is when families' food intakes from the previous year run low. However, the number reduces to 11 in January and 8 in February as households start harvesting some crops. March, April, May, June, July and August are the months of plenty as households start to harvest maize. Below I show the seasonality of hunger on my three A1 resettlement schemes.




Figure 9: Seasonality of hunger on the 3 schemes, 2009-2010

Source: compiled by author from survey data (N=70).

In this section I have demonstrated that household food security is differentiated across the three categories of A1 farmers. The well-off households in the A1 (11-15) category who produced more food had more frequency of meals and dietary diversity compared to the less well-off categories in the A1 (6-10) and A1 (1-5). This is explained by differences in agricultural production which is itself enabled by different strategies of gaining access to farm inputs and labour. However, I have also highlighted that income from agricultural and non-agricultural activities and levels of accumulation in general also determine the kinds of food people can source from the market.

4.8 Conclusion

Material factors that explained inequalities in crop production in the first phase of resettlement are evidently inadequate to describe Fast Track. The fact that beneficiaries did not only gain access to barren land but land with high value crops show the importance of politics in explaining the different production systems on the A1 resettlement schemes. In addition, a significant number of

the well-to-do farmers used political influence to gain access to essential farming inputs and labour. My argument is possible because I have used a methodological approach that interrogates the political process and its links to agricultural production on the farms. Partly I confirmed findings one would expect that is differentiation is linked to factors like land size, availability of labour, gaining access to inputs but I have explained why some people have better land, inputs and labour which relies on an integration of politics in my analysis of production. The chapter has also added nuance to our understanding of how labour is used and distributed, the nature of food security and the declining role of technocrats in Agritex. Differences in agricultural production are not just shaped by the economic and policy environment but by the political context. What farmers are able to do with the land partly explains what they invest in it and what they get out of it as the next chapter demonstrates.

Chapter 5: Revisiting the 'accumulation from below' thesis

5.1 Introduction

What are the levels of investment and accumulation on the 3 A1 resettlement schemes? Consistent with other findings in this study, the patterns of accumulation are highly differentiated. The question is what explains the differences between households? Following various scholars, I demonstrate that wealth and income levels are very important determinants of investments and accumulation on both the old resettlement schemes and Fast Track resettlement farms (see Cliffe 1988, Cousins *et al*. 1992, Kinsey 1999, Moyo *et al*. 2009, Scoones *et al*. 2010). However, I explore the processes of accumulation and further argue that the distribution of state resources as patronage and rampant illegal activities supported by the action of the state are central explanatory factors that complete the story. Some of the sources of investment are proving difficult to sustain in an uncertain political environment, a situation exacerbated by the new famers' failure to reinvest in some of the income generating assets 'inherited' from the white owners.

5.2 Livestock

As argued earlier, small-scale farmers in Zimbabwe invested in livestock production and it is an important axis of differentiation (see Bush and Cliffe 1984, Cousins *et al*. 1992, Kinsey 1999, 2004, Phimister 1988, Ranger 1985, Moyo *et al*. 2009). Chipinge is no exception as new farmers invested in livestock, ranging from small stock such as poultry to large stock such as cattle. I have already argued that households with livestock, in particular cattle, are relatively better-off. The reasons are numerous. Cattle provide draught power to till the land, transport inputs and harvests, milk in the breeding season and occasionally meat and financial income. Cattle are also an important determinant of social status and have significant cultural significance. In this section I intend to

investigate the ownership patterns and analyse how some households accumulated livestock in line with the objective of analysing the differentiated patterns of investment and accumulation.

The dominant types of livestock on my three A1 study sites are poultry, cattle, goats and pigs as disaggregated in the table below. These findings are similar to those of Moyo *et al'*.s (2009:66) study.

Table 12: Average ownership of livestock on the study sites as of 2010

Type of livestock	Number of livestock by 2010
Poultry	897
Cattle	462
Goats	367
Pigs	254

Source: compiled by author from survey data

Ownership of cattle is differentiated across the categories and between households. The holdings of cattle in my survey show that 43.8% of resettled households owned cattle at the time of resettlement and there was a marginal increase to 50% of households in 2010. The table below shows the changes in cattle holdings on my study sites.

Table 13: Ownership and changes in holdings of cattle by 2010

Category	% of households with cattle at resettlement	% of households with cattle in 2010	% of increase in households owning cattle
A1 (1-5)	37.9	37.9	0
A1 (6-10)	43.5	56.5	13
A 1(11-15)	50.0	55.6	5.6
Average	**43.8**	**50.0**	**6.2**

Source: compiled by author from survey data (N=70).

Disaggregation of the data shows that the proportion of households owning cattle in the A1 (1-5) category remained static at 37.9% (11 households), showing no signs of broad-based accumulation. Households owned an average herd of 1.1 per family in the A1 (1-5) category. Some

households lost their cattle whereas others acquired cattle but this data only looks at the net gain. The most significant increase in cattle holdings is within the A1 (6-10) category where three households managed to acquire livestock. The average herd of cattle ownership is 5.9 per family in the A1 (6-10). The net gain of cattle holdings in the A1 (11-15) is insignificant as only one household managed to acquire cattle over a decade. However, the herd size was big with households together owning 228 cattle, giving an average herd of 12.7 per household. Within this A1 (11-15) category, one household, that of Mr AT, owned *55* cattle, showing great differentiation within categories.

The average herd of cattle for all my three study sites was 6.6 per household in 2010. This shows an increase in the average herd size which was 5.7 at resettlement. From my survey (n=70), the households owned a total of 399 cattle at resettlement and this had increased to 462 cattle in 2010. This is less than in the early resettlement schemes studied by Kinsey (1998, 2004) where there was an average of 10 head per family in 1995 from three at resettlement. The average for Masvingo A1 resettlement schemes is 8 head per household (Scoones *et al*. 2010) which is similar to Mangwe district (Matondi 2011). Unfortunately they do not tell us what the average land size was at resettlement. These figures are lower than in the 1980s resettlement schemes but higher than in Chipinge. Why? As Moyo *et al*. (2009) write, the areas [Mangwe and Masvingo] were 'dominant cattle zones prior to implementation of FTLRP [Fast Track]' in line with government policy that recommended region 4 and 5 for livestock production.

Not only ownership but also marketing of cattle is differentiated across the categories and between households. The well-to-do farmers with larger herds sell more compared to those with fewer. However, an Agritex officer attempted to explain the difference in marketing:

> The resettlement farms should be for those with proper mentality [commercially oriented]. Most do not want to sell…They still use cattle *pachindau* [in line with local custom]. They keep the cattle for pride and refuse to sell. It is a source of wealth and status...Sometimes the cattle get old and the only reasonable thing to do is to sell and fetch money but they do not want to sell…Not much is being sold. Only a few who understand farming are secure. Others need education (Mr BF, Chipinge, 2011).

The Agritex officer assumes irrationality and tradition as explaining why some farmers do not sell their cattle. This is reminiscent of the history of Rhodesian technocratic views that blamed resistance to selling cattle on antiquated values. Holding on to cattle was not just an issue of cultural pride, however. It had economic significance as one new farmer explained, 'If cattle were able to cover the cost of my ploughing for a number of seasons I would sell. I keep my cow for milk especially in the breeding season…I have one ox so if I borrow another one I can be able to plough' (Mr AP, Glen View Lot 1, 2010). It is evident that there is no wholesale rejection of trading and marketing cattle as Mr BF would like us to believe.

As I explained in chapter 4, some Agritex officers advocate commercial-oriented production on Fast Track farms but they have no power to enforce their thinking. This differs in some aspects to the first phase of resettlement where the state replaced the all-encompassing Model D and replaced it with Model D1 to cater for cattle farmers that were commercially-oriented and side-linedthose that were viewed as immersed in subsistence values (see Robins 1988). By then the locus of decision making was still located in the technocratic ministries as Herbst (1990) argue.

The ownership and changing patterns of cattle holdings on the study sites can be explained through five vignettes. The most dominant explanation is that most cattle were acquired in the pre-fast track era. As I have shown there was a 6.2% rise on average in the number of households owning cattle by 2010 across all sites. Among those who already had cattle at resettlement 9 households managed to increase their herd after Fast Track. How and why? Some people bought their stock through diversion of state resources; others increased their herds through natural

breeding and some acquired through migrant remittances. Income from agricultural production was also important as I will detail later. For now I illustrate the three cases below.

Case Q- Diversion of State Resources

Mr AZ, a war veteran and former army official who is also a commissar in the ZANU PF local structures, is feared by some government officials because of his record of dealing with the MDC members ruthlessly. Mr AZ demanded a lot of diesel from the DDF on 'loan', more than the prescribed allocation, as a DDF official explained: 'some A1 farmers demanded diesel like the A2 farmers, as if they are A2 farmers. They were using fuel for other things' (Mr ES, Chipinge, 2012). What this statement means is that this was a wider practice especially among A2 farmers and that Mr AZ demanded more fuel than what could be used on an A1 farm limited in size. As his worker explained:

> We were often sent to collect diesel at the government complex…he directed us to sell the diesel at the parallel market in town where we made a lot of profit…he said there was no sense to use it for tillage when there was a chance to make serious profit .This was during the period of shortages of fuel and there was a ready market (Mr NG, Wedgehill, 2011).

This kind of accumulation is not through crop production or hard work. It is typical of accumulating from above as I have suggested in chapter 1.This is consistent with reports noted in chapter 2 that implicated ZANU PF officials abused the RBZ sponsored fuel facility with impunity. However, unlike other farmers who invested in consumption after making such a quick profit, Mr AZ bought a herd of 20 cattle, mainly from the fuel proceeds. Mr AZ was evasive in revealing the source of his investment but he was comfortable to say he acquired the cattle through buying and breeding and that he also brought some livestock from his former communal home area. Mr AZ was however pleased about his investment: 'it was a wise decision to buy cattle during the hyperinflationary

environment. Cattle was a hedge against inflation and we were also not sure whether we would be moved from here and if so then we could go with our cattle' (Mr AZ, Wedgehill Farm, 2010).

Acquiring livestock as a hedge against inflation was also prevalent in Scoones et al.'s study. However, Mr AZ brings an important point on how investments are related to tenure insecurity as we shall detail later. This is a clear case of huge investment on a resettlement farm, but the sources of investment include income gained through corrupt activities rooted in state patronage.

Case G – Natural births and access to grazing land

Mr CA arrived at the farm with 2 cattle, an ox and a cow. In 2010 the cattle had increased to 6 due to natural births. He explained that there was good grazing because the farm had paddocks as the previous owner produced cattle. But gaining access to grazing land was conflict ridden:

> When I was allocated the land it was at the periphery of the farm and there are good natural grazing areas. Howeverthe white farmer was using better paddocks for grazing. He [the white farmer] was not happy to have our indigenous breeds mix with his hybrid cows. Sometimes we would cut the fence and herd our cattle there. He threatened to shoot the cattle and report us to the police…the police was not going to do anything because the [ZANU PF] chefs were saying it is a revolution. He [the white farmer] lied that we stole his cattle but the police were much clever (Mr CA, Wolfscrag, 2011).

The CFU reported a number of similar cases in Chipinge district at the height of invasions. For example, on Lushoff farm there were numerous farmers' reports of cattle theft with 67 reported to be missing by May 2002 (CFU 2002). In January 2001 some war veterans forced their cattle onto Devon commercial farm; the police did not react to reports from the white farmer (CFU 2001). On Glenree Estate three cattle were stolen and slaughtered. This was reported to the police but again no action was taken (CFU 2001).This is consistent with the argument that state security institutions had become politicized after 2000 (Hammer *et al*. 2003, Raftopolous 2010, Rupiya

2010) as argued in chapter 1. Access to grazing land was thus obtained through the use of force in some cases.

Case H – Migrant remittances

Mr CC received money from his son who works in the construction industry in Harare to buy cattle. He started with 2 cattle but as of 2010 the herd had increased to 5. He used the money he received from his son and from his granddaughter who worked in a factory in South Africa. This is reminiscent of the argument advanced by Pots and Mutambirwa (1997) and Maposa (2007) on the investment linkages between urban areas and rural areas. Mr CC combined the remittances to buy a cow which gave birth to the other two. Mr CC also gets chemicals and medicine for his herd from South Africa through his granddaughter. Not all remittances were invested in agriculture as we shall see later.

As stated earlier, farmers also keep small stock such as poultry, goats and pigs. In 2010, there were 64 poultry, 37 goats and 9 pigs, which means average family ownership was 2.2, 1.3 and 0.3 respectively, in the A1 (1-5) category. The dominant types of livestock remain the same in the A1 (6-10) category with the main difference being that of scale. The researcher recorded 593 poultry, 273 goats and 212 pigs among the surveyed households in this category. This gives an average household ownership of 25.8, 11.9 and 9.2 for poultry, goats and pigs respectively. The distribution of small stock is as follows: 240 poultry, 57 goats and 33 pigs giving an average ownership per household of 13.3, 3.2 and 1.4 respectively. Goats and poultry are usually kept for consumption purposes though the frequency is low as evident in the lack of dietary diversity. There is an emerging pig economy as most households indicate that the pigs were for selling and some farmers sold at Afro foods supermarket in Chipinge town to generate income for the

household. The small stock is usually acquired through the same mechanisms as cattle but an additional pattern is one of exchange for labour as case I below illustrates.

Case I – hiring out labour

Mrs AQ resettled at Glen View Lot 1. She arrived on the farm with 1 goat but she has accumulated 6 goats and 5 poultry. How? Mrs AQ like many households on the farm works on other peoples' farms and she gets paid in maize, goats or hens. As a result she has managed to add to her small stock and her wish is to sell the goats and buy an ox that will help her with ploughing her fields. Barter trade is another important way in which households on resettlement farms managed to get livestock, especially because there is a liquidity crisis in most rural areas due to the introduction of a foreign multi-currency system in 2009. However, barter trade also surfaced during the hyperinflationary environment as Mrs AQ explains:

> It [barter trade] became prominent during the days when the Zimbabwe dollar became useless. It was better to get a bag of maize [in exchange for labour] because the same money could not buy a bag of maize after a few days. These days money is a problem, the US dollar is difficult to come by so when the employee has no cash you negotiate payment in stock (Mrs AQ, Glen View Lot 1, 2010).

Livestock accumulation is not just about on-farm production but there ids conjunction with off-farm production. The livelihoods lens managed to show diverse sources of accumulation. However, the integration of politics in the analysis showed how some new farmers acquired cattle through preferential access to state resources.

5.3 Farm equipment

In addition to investment in livestock assets I found that the new farmers invested in basic farm equipment such as hoes, shovels and axes. A few acquired scotch carts and ox-drawn ploughs. This

is consistent with findings from Goromonzi, Mangwe, Mazowe and Shamva but is in contrast to the findings from Masvingo. I attempt to explain the difference and go further to explain how the few farmers who managed to acquire the medium level farm equipment did so. First I show the differentiated pattern in ownership of scotch carts and ox-drawn ploughs.

There was no household with a scotch cart in the A1 (1-5) category before or after Fast Track. In the A1 (6-10) category one household had an old scotch cart before resettlement but two more households acquired a scotch cart each after resettlement which gives a marginal increase in the number of households that now own scotch carts. No household had a scotch cart at resettlement in the A1 (11-15) category but one household now had a scotch cart. On average, 1.4% of households owned a scotch cart at resettlement on my 3 study sites (n=70) but now 5.7% have scotch carts showing a marginal increase of 4.3%. In Scoones *et al*.'s (2010) study a greater proportion of households, 29.25%, owned scotch carts at resettlement and this increased to 44.35% of households which shows significant investment. There is one possible explanation for this variance. There is a well-developed road infrastructure in Chipinge as both the government and the former white farmers invested in a good road network before Fast Track, so it is easier for new farmers to walk to the highway and get public transport to ferry their goods. Consequently, investment in scotch carts would not have been a priority. In Masvingo, 'at *Sanangwe*, for example, people had to travel 15kms to the nearest bus stop. At *Wondedzo* extension, all public transport passing through the area was withdrawn, and people were walking 4km to the Masvingo-Mutare highway' (Scoones *et al.* 2010:83). I observed commuter omnibuses constantly serving the highways near to the resettlement schemes in Chipinge during field work and transport was easily available though people complained about the cost.

Even though there is a good transport service around the resettlement farms in Chipinge those households with scotch carts transport their produce in a cheaper way to the market as compared to those farmers who have to use public transport or hire private transport. In addition to cheaper transport, those who own scotch carts hire out their scotch carts to other farmers which bring in extra income with its roots in patronage acquisition.

In addition to scotch carts, resettled households owned ox-drawn ploughs across my three categories. In the A1 (1-5) category one household owned an ox-drawn plough before resettlement with one more household acquiring a plough after resettlement showing a slight increase. In the A1 (6-10) category five households owned an ox-drawn plough at resettlement whereas seven households (30.4%) now had ox-drawn ploughs. In the A1 (11-15) category two households (11.1%) had ox-drawn ploughs at resettlement but 10 more households (66.7%) had ox-drawn ploughs after resettlement showing a significant increase. On average, 12.1% of surveyed households owned ox-drawn ploughs at resettlement and now 34.7% of households do across the three categories. As in Scoones *et al*'s (2010:81) study, ownership in ox-drawn ploughs has increased but what differs is the scale of increase and how new farmers acquired such assets. The Masvingo data indicates that 52.9% of A1 resettled households had ox-drawn ploughs at resettlement whereas 59.75% of households had ploughs in 2009, which is far higher than in Chipinge. One possibility is that communal areas in Masvingo have a specific history in livestock ownership. Scoones (1992) study show that 100% of households in *Chivi* with draught power owned ox-drawn ploughs in the 1990s. This could be attributed to the fact that it was a major livestock producing area. The accumulation rate of ox-drawn ploughs in Masvingo is marginal which indicates pre-Fast Track accumulation. How did people acquire farm implements in Chipinge?

All the three new owners of scotch carts a war veteran, a retired army officer and a civil servant, benefited from the Farm Mechanisation programme under the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe as stated in chapter 2. The programme was meant to source and distribute farm implements in Zimbabwe for new farmers in order to increase agricultural production but there was an underlying political motive as I argued in chapter 2. The war veteran who benefited was in the local ZANU PF structure and the retired army officer had also joined the party structure as a commissar who mobilised people to join ZANU PF.

In my study, one of the farmers benefited from the farm mechanisation programme in the second phase in 2007. The other two households benefited from the third phase in March 2008. The Reserve Bank farm implements were distributed through the District Administrator's office with the help of local ZANU PF leaders who mobilised farmers to gather at the government complex in order to receive the farm implements. The government officials were shocked because the turnout was huge as Mr BD recalls:

> When they [government officials] noticed that there were many people outnumbering the implements by far they asked everyone to get into groups led by their ZANU PF ward chairperson and submit their names there. People were not asked to submit their names in advance but to submit their names to the local village head '*aifanirwa kukumirira chaizvo'* (who had to support you fully) on the very same day. The names were then compiled and consultations were done with the ZANU PF district and local leadership and this is where many lost out. The DA then called out the names of the people who were to get the farm implements and many were disappointed (Mr BD, Chipinge, 2011).

According to a resettled farmer who was excluded,

> We confronted our ZANU PF ward chairperson because he had failed to defend our case. After how many years working for the party and they just give each other. The President [Mugabe] is not happy about this. So many *chefs* [ZANU PF big wigs] got the implements and left with scotch carts, ploughs and cultivators (Mrs BH, Wolfscrag, 2010).

Another resettled farmer opined, 'we suspect they had already written each other's names before they told everyone to come to the D.A.'s offices to get the equipment. I think they just announced the program to appear as if they were transparent' (Mr AL, Wolfscrag, 2011).

Though it was a ZANU PF-driven process, only those with stronger political ties within the party benefited from the farm implements. The fact that a war veteran, a civil servant and a retired army officer who doubled up as local ZANU PF leaders benefited from the scotch-carts shows that it was the politically connected not the 'ordinary' people who benefited from the farm mechanisation programme. The understanding of an Agritex officer had no place in this politicised environment:

> The implements were supposed to benefit those who were producing; we suggested that we use the Grain Marketing Board (GMB) records but it did not work out that way. The provincial officials from the Ministry of Agriculture [Engineering and Mechanisation] were here when the implements were distributed but they did not do the selection, it was the DA and others [ZANU PF local leaders] who named deserved candidates (Mr BG, Chipinge, 2011).

A beneficiary of the equipment, Mr DZ,the retired army officer and ZANU PF local commissar, however, defended his acquisition of the farm implements by claiming that, 'farm implements were meant for master farmers and I have always been producing above 10 tonnes each season and I had the potential to repay'. Mr DZ acknowledged that he had not yet repaid the loan four years after and he alleged no one else had paid back the loan. As I have shown in chapter 2 , the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe faced lawsuits in 2012 from companies that had provided the farm equipment. My key informant, Mr BY, who has worked in Manicaland province and Chipinge district for the past 20 years in a department he revealed to me but in confidence, said the process was deeply flawed and was not going to boost agricultural production as people were not chosen according to their capacity to produce. Mr BY elaborated:

> To avoid the confusion when the Presidential Inputs Scheme came [in January 2011] they did not invite everyone but what they did was to invite the chiefs who then took the inputs to redistribute to their people because that caused less chaos. Many people were disappointed with the farm implements though a good number benefited particularly from the ox drawn ploughs, even those without cattle got them and in some areas the ploughs are just lying idle because no process was put in place to ensure eligible candidates with production potential were selected (Mr BY, Chipinge, 2010).

This statement shows once again that politics took centre stage rather than any laid down procedures.

In my survey four people received ox-drawn ploughs and these beneficiaries played a significant political role on the farms and in Chipinge. For example, Mr Z, a village head at Glen View Lot 1 got an ox-drawn plough. As I captured in chapter 3, he worked closely with the ZANU PF Member of Parliament for Chipinge central. Mr Z compiled and submitted the names of aspiring beneficiaries at Glen View Lot 1 to the District Administrator (DA), officials from the Ministry of Agriculture and the ZANU PF district leaders. However, he is the only one who benefited from Glen View Lot 1 because the farm implements were few and reserved for those who were not politically connected (Mrs AQ, Glen View Lot 1, 2011). Mr AT, the chairperson at Wedgehill committee of seven also acquired an ox-drawn plough in addition to the macadamia plot. He played a crucial role in ensuring that land reform beneficiaries attended ZANU PF party meetings which were held every Tuesday as I indicated in Chapter 3. Toward the anticipated 2011 election when I was advised to suspend field work by a security officer, Mr AI, an Agritex officer who regularly attended *pungwes* clarified:

> With the anticipated election, it will be advisable to stop your field work, as he [the security officer] advised. You will come back after the elections. Tempers rise during elections…War veterans like Mr AT, have started working with the security guys to organize *pungwes*. Once it is an election time, the committees of seven on the farms will be working for the [ZANU PF] party full time (Mr AI, January 25, 2011).

Mr AZ, the war veteran, retired army officer and local ZANU PF commissar got an ox-drawn plough. He played a political role in defending ZANU PF local interests. As Mr BY explained:

> War veterans who acquired farms are the problem in this district and this is a big problem in the whole [Manicaland] province. They defend ZANU PF at all costs so that they keep acquiring assets. Those war veterans like comrade AZ, who surprisingly must be having the discipline of a soldier, are well known. During the June 27 2008 run-up to the election, he was moving around in a pick up truck with the security officers. Together with other war veterans they were addressing and beating people. They in fact put a curfew in Chipinge; everyone had to be indoors by 6pm. In the lowveld some people had their houses burnt to ashes. Not all of us agreed with that [violent] approach. They always say they are defending the country but I think they were defending the wealth because we all love our country and we are working for the country. If ZANU PF goes they will become landless and poor overnight (Mr BY, Chipinge, 2012).

The fourth beneficiary was a civil servant whom I could not establish her political role. But as I have argued in the previous chapter, it was increasingly becoming difficult for civil servants to act outside ZANU PF. The ideology to 'defend the country' and violence are used to protect ZANU PF , which is the source of personal wealth acquisition. As I have argued in chapter 1, violence, patronage and ideology help us to understand the restructuring of the Zimbabwean state after 2000 and its role in shaping rural differentiation and agrarian change more broadly.

We can thus say those who got scotch carts did not do so through hard work but through access to state patronage. One of the beneficiaries sold the ox-drawn plough to a neighbour for cash. This is typical of personal wealth acquisition not being invested in the production cycle. The farm implements were used to further President Mugabe and ZANU PF's powers of political as shown by the timing, the process of distribution, and the subtle acknowledgement by the Reserve Bank Governor who is an appointee of President Mugabe as shown in chapter 2. The implements went to those with strong political ties but some were disappointed as Mr BY articulated: '*Zvanga zva zve akuru akuru* (this was now for the big-big fish). It could have cost them [ZANU PF] votes in the election because many were disappointed' (Mr BY, Chipinge, 2011).

While disaffection was caused, those who benefited ensured that the population was coerced into voting for ZANU PF. I have already detailed the role that the beneficiaries of farm implements played on the resettlement farms to campaign and intimidate people to vote for ZANU PF.

As I argued in chapter two, other studies (Matondi *et al*. 2008, Matondi 2011) show the ownership patterns of farm implements but do not explore the political imperatives in detail. Scoones *et al*. (2010) acknowledge that the distribution of farm implements was highly skewed. In their study only four farmers benefited from the Reserve Bank Farm Mechanisation programme but they underplay the importance of such skewed, political and partisan distribution and its impact on dividing society. Rather, they relegate to a footnote the important fact that the four who benefited in their study were a 'police officer, councillor, a provincial local government official and a senior government official' (See footnote number 5, Scoones *et al*. 2010:99) as I argued in chapter 2. It seems their interest is not to dwell on such corrupt malpractices but to show how new farmers went on to substantially invest and accumulate without external government support and thereby to project the successful component of Fast Track and its potential to regenerate the rural economy. I have already argued, following Alexander (2006), that the highly politicised nature of Fast Track makes writing about land without acknowledgement of the political factors inadequate. The fact that in the Masvingo study 100% of new farmers who benefited from farm implements were politically connected civil servants as noted in their footnote and that on my three study sites all households that own scotch carts got them through a ZANU PF driven project makes the nature of politics and political patronage an important axis of differentiation in terms of accumulation. This becomes even more important in Chipinge given that no other resettled farmer had managed to invest in scotch carts outside accumulating from above since resettlement. One may argue that this is a small number of accumulators but the historiography of agrarian change teaches us that the local elites are always few (Berry 1985,

Bernstein 2003, Cousins 1995, Cliffe 1988, Palmer 1977, Peters 2004, Phimister 1988, Moyo *et al*. 2009). This does not make understanding the process less important. The local elites have wider societal effects. According to Scoones *et al*. (2010) the local elites can transform the rural economy through a multiplier effect. It is not just the economic role that matter, they also play an important political role in Chipinge. I argue further argue that local elites, though by a few, havean insidious influence upon the national psyche (Davies 2004:10) on the basis that it legitimates gaining access to state resources on the basis of political party support. The distribution of farm implements as with many other resources in Chipinge shows a clear pattern in which people who support ZANU PF or work for it receive a disproportionate number of subsidies.

Apart from the big assets such as scotch carts, ox-drawn ploughs, the dominant farm implements were the low level type of investments namely hoes, axes and shovels on my three study sites in Chipinge. This resonates with Matondi's (2011) study of Mazowe where resettled farmers mainly invested in such small farm implements. The most investment in Matondi *et al*.'s (2008) study and Marongwe's (2008) study was in low level basic equipment as we saw in Chapter 2. The entire Masvingo book does not tell us investments in low level equipment such as hoes, axes and shovels. They dwell on middle level equipment which probably paints a better picture of the story of a yeoman farmer they intend to tell.

On my study sites, the rate of accumulation is such that 61.4% of resettled farmers owned axes at resettlement increasing to 68.6% in 2010, which is a marginal increase. 58.6% of households owned hoes at resettlement increasing to 68.6% in 2010. Shovels are owned by 64.3% of resettled households, an increase from 55.7% at resettlement. The three tables below disaggregate the ownership of axes, hoes and shovels across schemes.

Table 15: Ownership of axes by 2010

Category	Name of asset	At resettlement	At present (2010)
A1 (1-5)	Axes	13 households	15 households
A1 (6-10)	Axes	18 households	19 households
A1 (11-15)	Axes	12 households	14 households
Total		**43 households**	**48 households**

Source: compiled by author from survey data (N=70).

Table 16: Ownership of hoes by 2010

Category	Name of asset	At resettlement	At present (2010)
A1 (1-5)	Hoes	10 households	14 households
A1 (6-10)	Hoes	19 households	20 households
A1 (11-15)	Hoes	12 households	14 households
Total		**41 households**	**48 households**

Source: compiled by author from survey data (N=70).

Table 17: Ownership of shovels by 2010

Category	Name of asset	At resettlement	At present (2010)
A1 (1-5)	Shovels	10 households	13 households
A1 (6-10)	Shovels	18 households	19 households
A1 (11-15)	Shovels	11 households	13 households
Total		**39 households**	**45 households**

Source: compiled by author from survey data (N=70).

There are two major reasons why farmers in Chipinge are rich in hoes, axes and shovels. As the data above shows there was a marginal increase in the rate of accumulation which means the major explanation is that households brought small farm implements from their communal areas. Second, the majority of the resettled farmers are resource poor and hoes, axes and shovels are relatively affordable. Some of the households made them on their own. Third these tools are essential. Farmers need axes to cut down trees for poles to build their houses, fowl runs and for clearing land and shovels for loading sand for their homesteads*et cetera*. Hoe weeding and ridging

is a popular practice with most households unable to invest in expensive ox-drawn ploughs and tractors. The picture below shows the researcher joining in hoe-ridging.



Figure 10: Photograph of hoe-ridging (taken by respondent, 2010)

Unlike in Masvingo where scotch carts, ox-drawn ploughs and cars have been accumulated by Fast Track farmers are the emphasis the reality in Chipinge is that of hoes, shovels and axes as in Mangwe, Goromonzi and Mazowe districts. As Scoones *et al*. (2010:256) argue, 'if the myths continue to trump the realities…misguided policy and inappropriate support will result'. Whereas in Masvingo there may be no immediate need for government to support accumulation in ox-drawn ploughs and scotch carts which are already prevalent in Chipinge and Mangwe (see Matondi *et al*. 2008) the starting point for policy is to consider that the dominant assets and

implements are still hoes, axes and shovels and any support should factor in that reality. Myths and realities may differ from place to place (Zamchiya 2011), which makes generalisation a poor way of understanding what is happening in resettlement areas in after 2000.

5.4 Cell phone revolution

Social status on the three A1 resettlement schemes is not entirely rooted in the ownership of productive agricultural assets such as hoes, axes, ploughs, scotch carts and shovels. Farmers also invested in the acquisition of modern gadgets such as cell phones, especially after 2009 when they became cheap. There is a cell phone revolution in Chipinge. Farmers invested in cell phones whose use is not directly related to agriculture though it may, in future, provide an opportunity for that. This is not a society where agriculture is driven by Information Communication Technologies (ICTs). Cell phones are associated with high social status on the resettlement farms. Before resettlement one household in the A1 (1-5) category owned a cell phone, increasing to 8 households in 2010. The increase is more significant in the A1 (6-10) where 20 households (87%) owned a cell phone from zero at resettlement. In the A1 (11-15) category only one household had a cell phone at resettlement but 12 households (66.7%) owned a cell phone in 2010. On average, 57.1% of households owned cell phones on my three A1 resettlement farms a marked improvement from 2.9% at resettlement.

From my observation in informal shops and flea markets, a Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) card cost US$1 in 2011 and handsets cost between US$5 and US$20. Some of the handsets were ‘Nogia’ instead of Nokia. The cheap handsets were the popular ones among most resettled farmers because they were affordable. I bought a ‘Nokia’ for $10 at a flea market near Gabuza bottle store in Chipinge town after my cell phone fell into a ditch of water during the January 2011 heavy rains. What seems to be expensive is the airtime. Respondents said that the handsets are

shipped from the East via Beira and sold in flea markets. Those households without cell phones are called 'asina irombe' (Someone without a cell phone is a destitute) whereas those with cell phones are viewed as progressive and modern. Non-agricultural investments also determine the status for new farmers.

5.5 Household income

This leads me to a broader inquisition in terms of investigating the different annual household incomes on the three A1 resettlement farms. The ideal would have been to look at precisely how much comes from different sources but most asset rich farmers were not willing to divulge such information and in cases where they did the data is incoherent. However, households in the A1 (1-5) category cooperated and give us an indication of their sources of income as shown in the table below. Those in the A1 (1-5) category had weaker political ties and lesser opportunities to accumulate from patronage compared to the more politically influential on the A1 (6-10) and A1 (11-15) categories. It is therefore not surprising that they were more willing to openly talk about the sources of their incomes.

Table 18: A1 (1-5) Annual income, 2009-2010

Annual income total	Annual income from agric	Annual income from non-agric	Difference
9 496.18	**4763.91**	**4732.27**	$31.64

Source: compiled by author from survey data (N=29)

The average annual and monthly income per household is $327.45 and $27.29 respectively for the A1 (1-5) category where I have coherent data. On average, each resettled household survives on 90 cents a day which is below the poverty datum line of US$1 a day. The majority, 62.1%, subsist on less than a dollar a day.

From the data I have on sources of income I established 8 vignettes. The sources of income are diverse. They include rentals, informal activities, formal employment, unclear sources, theft, pension funds, remittances and agricultural production as substantiated in the cases below.

Rentals

Mrs AY, who owns a portion of land with gum trees as mentioned earlier, also gets rent from her two houses in Sakubva high density suburb in Mutare. She bought one of the houses in the 1980s from her savings and the other one she acquired through family inheritance. As Mrs AY explained:

> I was already working at the government offices here in Chipinge when resettlement started but my family had been staying in Mutare. After I got the farm there was enough space for me and my family to stay. After we finished building this house in 2005 I then thought it made business sense to bring my family here and rent out the other house in Mutare. I get US$190.00 monthly from the rentals in addition to US$180.00 from the other house (Mrs AY, Wedgehill, 2010).

Monthly, Mrs AY gets $370.00 from rental per month, that is US$4,440.00 per annum, which is a lot of money to supplement the income from farming and gum trees she got through patronage networks. Like other farmers she uses her income for school fees, household assets, medical expenses, transport and farming inputs and she enjoys a good life that other farmers without access to rentals from elsewhere and gum tree plantations acquired through a partisan process cannot achieve.

Informal activities

Mrs BE had been in the business of buying and selling before being resettled. She buys bales of clothes from Beira port locally known as ‘mazitye’ (low quality cheap clothes). She had an established market among the low income earning groups, especially in Gaza high density township:

> It is not an easy business, sometimes I have to sleep in Beira and get on a *gonyet* (huge truck). Some people think every woman who gets on these trucks is a prostitute…so they always harass you. I sometimes get there and wait for some days because the bales do not always arrive on time. At the port it can be windy and you catch flu…but I have to do this for my children. I used to have a bad day before I got the trick. Business was slow during the month and brisk at the end of the month. In the Zimbabwe dollar days it was no longer paying, the money will be wiped by inflation but now I am slowly recovering. The trick is to give people credit then at the end of the month they can pay (Mrs BE, Glen View Lot 1, 2010).

As I have already mentioned, Mrs BE's household only produced 0.3 tonnes of maize in a season. Mrs BE invested little in farming. Her household got the farm because they are connected to a traditional leader. Otherwise they have never had an interest in farming on their own as they prefer trade.

Formal employment

Mr LD, whose motivation for seeking land was to diversify livelihoods as fleshed out in Chapter 3, gets a monthly salary including perks of US$200 from his work. Mr LD was quick to point out that his salary was virtually worthless in the hyper-inflationary environment before the formation of the inclusive government. He complained that the salary was still very little but acknowledged from 2009 it had improved. The money augments his income from farming. He no longer buys much food from the market and this leaves him with disposable income to invest in other household needs such as health care. In total he gets US$2,400 dollars annually and a bonus of US$200. Those with access to formal employment can afford access to better education and health care as they have more disposable income. The annual availability of food is also spread out throughout the year for Mr AL's family who did not experience any month of hunger in the 2009-2010 season because 'when the maize from the farm is running out I use my salary to buy maize meal from the shop but sometimes I buy from the GMB where it is cheaper' (Mr LD, Wedgehill,

2010). The farm he got through what he has called 'good books with the chief' is helping him to eke a better livelihood in combination with his employment.

Unclear sources

Mr AR, whom I have indicated works at the Kariba Border Post between Zambia and Zimbabwe and hires 4 permanent workers at his farm, was evasive about the sources of his income. All he indicated was '*tinoita madhiri*' (we conduct business deals) (Mr AR, Glen View Lot 1, 2010). One is left wondering whether the nature of the deals is legal or illegal. In the local standard lexicon *madhiri* is usually associated with illegal practices. Media reports allege rife smuggling of stolen cars at the Kariba Border Post with the complicity of immigration officials. This typifies cases where new farmers were not comfortable to reveal their sources of income, which can be the case if the source is illegal. Due to income from his job and other sources he could not disclose Mr AR is doing better than the other new farmers. What can be said here is that there is a pattern of accumulation from above.

Theft

At the height of *jambanja*, when the Wedgehill farm owner fled his farm to Australia, many people stole the farm equipment he left. Mr BX took irrigation equipment, water sprinklers, valves, and vehicle parts and sold them at a local garage near Gaza Township in Chipinge. The local mechanics were happy to get cheap parts in an environment where they were difficult to get. However, looting and stealing was mainly a source of income in the early phase of *jambanja*.The equipment is no longer available. Looted equipment such as water engines became an important short term source of income in some cases such as when they were sold to local entrepreneurs in the former native purchase areas, called small-scale commercial farming areas after independence. Most of

the money from looting was said to have been squandered on beer and 'prostitutes'. This is a case of accumulation from above, through looting in a context of disorder where the rule of law has broken down and impunity is the order of the day. The story of asset stripping was equally rampant in Mazowe, Shamva and Goromonzi (see Marongwe 2008, Matondi 2011). This narrative is downplayed in Masvingo but government reports point to rampant asset stripping in Mwenezi as we saw in chapter 2.

Pension funds

Mr AT gets a war veterans pension fund of US$110.00 per month and a pension from government, as he is a former prison worker, of US$25.00 a month. Pension funds became valueless in the hyperinflationary period especially in 2007-08. They became useful after the consummation of the inclusive government because pensioners were now paid in US dollars which made a significant difference in the day to day livelihood of a household especially if combined with other sources. From his pension, Mr AT has accruedUS$ 1,620 a year from 2009. This is more than the total annual amount used for school fees by all the 29 households in the A1 (1-5) category. The war veteran uses his income for things such as school fees as he sends his children to anexpensive local school called *Mvurachena* [Clearwater]. He is proud of his new status:

> Long back *Mvurachena* was a school for the rich white farmers and business men [and women] and for black people the criterion [to get a child accepted at the school] was for a family to own a horse. It was racist, where could a black person own a horse?(Mr AT, Wedgehill, 2010).

The story of a horse might be a myth but what is real is that *Mvurachena* was an expensive school which only rich parents could afford and Mr AT has joined that status whereas other farmers send their children to poorer on farm-make shift schools. Mr AT is in an advantageous position because he combines the pension income with other sources such as livestock, income from macadamia

nuts and good crop income that he was able to accumulate owing to his preferential access to farming inputs and farming implements as a veteran as we have seen earlier.

Remittances

The son of Mr BK, resettled on Wolfscrag farm, works in South Africa.The parents do not know the exact job except that '*akaita zve business ku* university Harare' (he studied something related to business at the University of Zimbabwe). In 2003, at the height of the Zimbabwe crisis he left his job at Bata Shoe Company in Gweru and he joined the trek to South Africa. Mr BK indicated that his son started sending him some money from around 2005 and his family has been using most of the money to pay his siblings' school fees. As a way to thank his parents for investing in his education, he bought his father a Datsun old model car in 2007 which cost US$800. Whereas Mr BK's family now owns a car, the source of investment is not linked to agricultural production on the resettlement farm; it is a case of accumulation from outside that is from other non-agricultural activities.

Agricultural production

I have indicated how successful Mr AT has become on Wedgehill farm through his combination of a pension and political patronage. He produced 20 tonnes of maize and owns 55 cattle. He also owns a red and white van. He managed to buy the car in 2008. Mr AT said that he bought the car from sales he had made of grain, pigs and cattle and given the levels of production it is a credible claim. This then becomes a case of a farmer who is investing from agricultural production on his resettlement farm and vindicates the theorisation of accumulation from below during Fast Track. However, I have goneto great lengthto show how Mr AT has used his political influence to gain access to state subsidised inputs and how he was among the chosen few who got an ox-drawn

plough just before the March 29, 2008 election, giving him advantages in production. The sources of investment presented here, typify a conjunction of accumulation from below, from outside and from above which explains the complex story of social and economic differentiation among different small-scale farmers on my A1 resettlement schemes. What is happening on these farms cannot be explained by a single concept. The data shows how some combine production with illegal activities to acquire assets, a common thread in post-2000 Zimbabwe.

5.6 Household uses of income

I have outlined the sources of income and hinted at how difficult it was to obtain reliable and consistent data on the exact amounts farmers got from these diverse sources. However, it was possible to get good data in terms of what farmers use the income for across the three categories. This will help us to theorise what kind of accumulation and expenditure is taking place and conceptually understand the new farmers and agrarian change in Chipinge. The four dominant uses of income in the A1 (1-5) category are school fees, alcohol, farming inputs and medical expenses. In the A1 (6-10) and A1 (11-15) categories buying alcohol was not part of the major expenditure. It is important to note that there is huge differentiation within categories as farmers like Mr AT spend much more than other farmers. The three figures below show the dominant uses of income for each category.

Table 19: A1 (1-5) uses of income, 2009-2010

Uses of income	Total amount	Annual average/ HH
School fees	1 421.00	49.00
alcohol	653.82	22.55
Farming inputs	648.55	**22.36**
Medical expenses	508.82	17.55

Source: compiled by author from survey data N=29

Table 20: A1 (6-10) uses of income, 2009-2010

Uses of income	Total amount	Annual average/ HH
Farming inputs	22 130.22	962.18
School fees	21 798.89	947.78
Household assets	8 195.67	**356.33**
Medical expenses	3092.22	134.44

Source: compiled by author from survey data N=23

Table 21: A1 (11-15) uses of income, 2009-2010

Uses of income	Total amount	Annual average/ HH
Farming inputs	15 708	682.96
School fees	12 465	692.50
Household assets	3 180	**176.67**
Medical expenses	2 715	150.83

Source: compiled by author from survey data N=18

5.7 Social services: education and health

As the data above indicates new farmers invested substantially in education. However, the quality of education in the resettlement schemes is poor. 90% or 63 households (n=70) rated education facilities as poor and only 7 households considered the facilities as average with no respondent qualifying the services as excellent. Let me emphasise that the expenditure in school fees is uneven. Some rich households send their children to expensive schools with better education standards such as Mvurachena and Chipinge primary school as the case of Mr BD showed. This provides a firm foundation and better life chances for the privileged children. Other families are so poor that they sent their children to Tanganda Tea Estate for secondary school, where children do not pay fees but provide labour in exchange. Some families who still maintain their communal homes, left their children in the communal areas to attend better schools such as Mutema primary school whilst staying with relatives. The majority of the income-poor households send their children to make shift on-farm schools. At Wedgehill farm, one of the former foreman's houses was turned into a teacher's house. Children learn under the trees or inside the macadamia grading

sheds depending on the season. According to Mr Dhliwayo, the local teacher, the conditions are bad:

> There is a big problem of text books. I am the only one with the major textbooks. It is difficult to do your job out here, there is no chalk, there is no blackboard, and the children do not have exercise books…Sometimes I feel like resigning because I am just helping to destroy the future of these children. ..In the rainy season some do not come to school, the absence rate is bad…They will be helping in the fields (Dhliwayo, Chipinge, 2010).

Not all teachers were so passionate. Another teacher at a satellite school unequivocally stated, 'some parents are not serious…November when we are preparing for the end of year examinations this is when most students do not come to school. I used to care but with this paltry salary it gives me time to attend my piggery project so that I can survive' (Sithole, Chipinge, 2010). At Glen View Lot 1 children had to walk about 3 kilometres to the nearest satellite school. The primary schools do not qualify as examination centres for the Grade Seven examinations, which is the last primary school grade before secondary school. My findings echo those of Mazowe and Shamva district (see Matondi 2011). A mere consideration of the number of students who attend school suggests a community that is determined to invest in the education of their children as does the amount of money they are spending on education. Further qualitative probing indicates that we need to explore the quality of the investment to see whether it can build a firm foundation for the future. The future of the children looks bleak except for those who can afford to send their children to expensive schools. Some parents were optimistic that sending their children to school is investing in their old age and in the future of their children. As Mrs BM revealed, 'I want to send my child to school so that he can have a better future than I am currently having. I want my child to become a doctor and look after me in my old age as I will no longer be able to farm hard' (Mrs BM, Glen View Lot 1, 2011). But most parents were conscious of the poor quality of education and most respondents said the government must invest in 'proper schools' in the resettlement farms. In the morning one can observe children going to school with no

textbooks, no exercise books, no pencils and no school uniforms. Some of the kids are bare-footed. The picture below gives a glimpse of my observation. It shows children going to school on Glen View Lot 1 resettlement scheme. One could wrongly conclude that the children were going to play.



Figure 11: Photograph of children going to school (taken by author, 2011)

It is striking that despite the collapse of the formal sector and high unemployment rates, people still believe in and invest in education. The teacher at Wedgehill believed that valuing education was not just about economic opportunities, 'It is not about employment and money but people value education because it brings status and pride to the family. It is a culture with a long history

…If you do not send your children to school you can be seen as an outcast in society' (Dhliwayo, Chipinge, 2010).

A similar story is applicable to the health facilities in the resettlement schemes. Those with income from different sources can afford better health care. In the A1 (1-5) category, the majority of households sought help mainly from the resettlement farm clinics. Consulting the private surgery in town cost US$20 and a specialist cost up to US$40. These fees were not affordable to many on the resettlement farms. However, a few rich households in the A1 (6-10) and A1 (11-15) could afford the private surgery which probably explains why they were less prone to illness and death. Households that cannot afford proper medication are more prone to illness and deaths. Malaria is a huge problem in the resettlement schemes, especially in the rainy season yet it can both be prevented and cured. The pattern of visiting modern clinics and hospitals was not, however, always determined by the levels of income. Some households offered important insights on why others prefer different help when ill. Some households had different belief systems and preferred to seek help from traditional healers known as *N'anga* in the local lexicon. They were not necessarily cheaper than the clinic. One respondent actually raised a concern, 'Traditional leaders are now more expensive than the clinic. You are charged a hen and a goat and on top they demand cash…The government must do something' (Mr BN, Glen View Lot 1, 2011).

Households that were prone to illness and death faced challenges in the provision oflabour to the farm, which affected productivity and household income. 15 households from my survey had a member who had been sick for more than six months with 13 households referring to it as chronic illness. Health issues are sensitive and require a special study design to get detail but in some studies chronic illness is related to opportunistic infections associated with HIV-AIDS patients. For example, the relationship is demonstrated in Makonese's (2008) study of HIV-AIDS on Fast Track

farms. Households with chronically ill members had to invest more in medical expenses and less in the productive sectors of the farm. Most households wanted the government to invest in health care and 87.1% indicated that health services were very poor. The farm compounds that were turned into make shift clinics usually did not have medicine in stock and most of the time they were stocked with Asprin, a pain killer, and can best be understood as referral centres meaning they refer patients with serious ailments to Chipinge hospital.

Moyo *et al*. (2009) and Scoones *et al*. (2010) are overly concerned with on-farm investments as argued in chapter 2 but investments in health care provide a foundation for sustainable development. In terms of sanitation, there was little investment in boreholes and wells on my three A1 resettlement farms in Chipinge district. In the A1 (1-5) category twenty four households' main source of water is from a spring, three from a stream and two from the river. In the A1 (6-10) fifteen households rely mostly on the stream and two on the spring and one household mentioned the river. Most households in the A1 (11-15) indicated their main source of water as natural sources. The resettled farmers were of the view that government should invest in social services. However, the new farmers invested in other sectors like housing without government support as I demonstrate in the next section.

5.8 Housing

Farmers invested in different types of houses, namely round thatched huts, brick houses and wooden shacks. Households with more assets and income invested in more expensive houses. However, it is not only about assets and income as some used their political capital to occupy farm compounds and the former owner's house.

Most households that were asset and income poor built round thatched huts as their main house. They relied on natural products, using their own labour to make bricks from sand, cutting poles from Chipinge's highveld forest and using the natural grass for thatching. 100% of households in the A1 (1-5) category, 34.8% in the A1 (6-10) and 33.3% in the A1 (11-15) built round thatched huts. Some of the round thatched huts were beautifully decorated but others had cracked walls and were visibly not durable and waterproof (pers.observation). I have stated in chapter 1 that Region 1 of Chipinge district receives occasional thunderstorms and an annual precipitation of over 1, 000mm. During the rainy season, mid-November to mid-March, the intensity of rainfall and occasional winds can easily destroy houses that are not durable. Consequently, some families complained that their houses were washed away by rains and wind in the 2009 rain season and they had to rebuild. Mr CA, captured in the picture below, complained about the quality of his hut shown in the background.



Figure 12: Photograph of a pole and dagga hut (taken by author, 2010)

In these worst cases one could see inside the huts from outside through visible cracks as shown in the picture above.

On the other hand, households that had income saved in the pre-and post-Fast Track periods built brick houses. These were expensive because farmers had to buy cement, asbestos or corrugated iron roofing, sometimes window frames and door frames and also required more labour. 34.8% of surveyed households in the A1 (6-10) category lived in brick houses, which is slightly more than 33.3% in the A1 (11-15). On average, 20% of resettled households had houses made of bricks with asbestos or corrugated iron roof. In the Masvingo study, 31.95% of households on A1 resettlement schemes had brick and asbestos as a main house (Scoones *et al*. 2010:78). Scoones *et al*. (2010)

argue that housing investment in their study sites is significant given that new farmers are still establishing themselves. Find a picture of a brick house on Glen View Lot 1 below.



Figure 13: Photograph of main house made of brick and cement at Glen View Lot 1 farm (taken by author, 2010)

However, 28.6% of the brick and asbestos houses in Chipinge are not a result of material investment but were acquired through political influence. The rule of law was subverted as people acquired houses and building materials through theft, which is clearly not linked to the production sphere of the farm, or other productive activities. Four new farmers invaded three former farm worker houses and a former white farmer's house. I have indicated how some of the war veterans turned farm compounds into productive houses. Scoones *et al*.'s (2010:79) acknowledge that 'many of the farms across the province [Masvingo] were cattle ranches prior to land reform [so]

there was little housing infrastructure to inherit, and people had to largely start from scratch', which differs from Chipinge where there were farm worker compounds illegally acquired by some new farmers and yet the number of brick houses is significantly lower in Chipinge. In addition, there were cases of vandalism to the former farm worker compounds at Wedgehill and Wolfscrag as new settlers took advantage of the state of disorder and removed the windowpanes and doorframes sometimes for sale and other times to build their own houses.

The figures below show the distribution of the types of houses per category. As already mentioned all households in the A1 (1-5) category had a round thatched hut as the main house.

Table 22: A1 (6-10): House types, 2010

Category	Number of households	Type of main house	Form of ownership			Per cent of households
			Self-built	Farm worker compound	Farm owner house	
A1 (6-10)	8	Round thatched hut	8	0	0	34.8
	8	Brick house	6	2	0	34.8
	7	Wooden shack	7	0	0	30.4

Source: compiled by author from survey data (N=23).

Table 23: A1 (11-15): House types, 2010

Category	Number of households	Type of main house	Form of ownership			Per cent of households
			Self-built	Farm worker compound	Farm owner house	
A1 (6-10)	6	Round thatched hut	6	0	0	33.3
	6	Brick house	4	1	1	33.3
	6	Wooden shack	6	0	0	33.3

Source: compiled by author from survey data (N=18)

In addition to permanent structures, a significant number of households (13) built some wooden shacks that are temporary in nature as their main houses. This does not correlate to poor income and assets but to tenure security to which we now turn..

5.9 Tenure, investment and sustainability

Chapter 2 demonstrated that the nexus between tenure and investment is hotly disputed. On one side are scholars who debate that tenure insecurity affects investment (see Matondi 2011). On the other side of the spectrum Moyo *et al*. (2009) argue that tenure insecurity is an insignificant investment factor among the resettled farmers. What does the data from Chipinge add to this debate? I make three contributions. First, the tenure regimes being debated do not exist in a political vacuum. Tenure security among resettled farmers depends on the political context rather than just on the type of tenure. Second, significant investments on the farms can be a consequence of insecurity among the resettled farmers rather than security. Third, investments are not just in material assets but the new farmers invest in social and political relations to secure their tenure on the land.

All the farmers on my three A1 resettlement schemes had offer letters and were still to receive the 25 year permits. However, insecurity seems to have partly been shaped by political developments that occurred after 2008. Scoones *et al*. (2010:86) argue that farmers, 'trust in the state's commitment to the irreversibility of land reform'. This is based on the Global PoliticalAgreement (GPA) (2008) that states that, 'while differing on the methodology of acquisition and redistribution the parties [political parties in government] acknowledge that compulsory acquisition and redistribution of land has taken place under a land reform programme undertaken since 2000'. Article V of the GPA stresses 'the irreversibility of the said land acquisitions and redistribution'. Nevertheless, just after the March 29, 2008 election in Chipinge a few white

farmers came back and threatened the new settlers in anticipation of the MDC taking state power after its victory.This political development in Chipinge is confirmed by an intercepted police message: *'It has come to the attention of this [Police] headquarters that there has been an influx of former white farmers in the country. These former white farmers are visiting farms and challenging current farm owners to return their property which they allege was unlawfully taken away from them' (In CFU 2008:10).*

A new farmer had becomesceptical about the sustainability of the Fast Track programme as a result,

> After the March [March 29, 2008] election white farmers [3] came back in the area to threaten us and told us that [President] Mugabe had lost hence we were supposed to pack within 48 hours…I am no longer as secure as I was before that. However, we later mobilised and went to the farm where they were staying and we taught them a lesson making them to eat guavas and sit on the floor. What we learnt is that the MDC is a sell-out; if they win the white man will come back (Mr AS, Wedgehill, 2010).

This reinforces my argument that Fast Track was highly partisan and the beneficiaries consciously linked their security of tenure to changes in political parties governing Zimbabwe. In ZANU PF they know that they have a patron who will protect them as long as they show loyalty through voting and engaging in other political party activities whereas they are uncertain about the MDC.

The threat of the returning white farmer became a national political issue in 2008, taken up by ZANU PF and its allies. In March 2008, Bright Matonga, the then Deputy Minister of Information alleged that, 'those white farmers came back in their thousands' (Zimonline 2008).

The Zimbabwe National War Veterans Association (ZNWVA) chairman, Jabulani Sibanda, who threatened,

> We have received reports from villages and farms that there are white former farmers moving around the country threatening to invade the farms…Under these conditions, we

> do order those involved in sanctions, supporting and funding the invasion of our land to know that we have the capacity, strength and, far and foremost, willingness and determination to defend our revolution and sovereignty (Herald 2008).

The MDC gave an official response through its spokesperson, 'Land is a national heritage and asset which belongs to all Zimbabweans. No people-centred government would seek to undermine the desire and need for land reform. As the MDC, we have underscored that there is no going back to the pre-2000 era' (Herald 2008).However, President Mugabe took advantage and cast himself as the sole guarantor of land rights. He reassured the resettled following the reports:

> Land was acquired in the national interest following the amendment to the Constitution. Land acquired and legally resettled will never revert to the previous racist owner settlers. It is our land, our treasure. Inhaka yedu.Lilifa lethu. Let the colonialist know this is the final solution (Herald 2008).

As Davies (2004:24) argues, the ZANU PF ruling elite is able 'to appropriate the language of nationalism and anti-imperialism for self-aggrandisement'. What the war veterans and ZANU PF ruling elite exaggerated was the scale and the connection of the white farmers' return to the MDC but there were such political developments in Chipinge and the government used that to justify a new wave of elite farm invasions in the post-29 March, 2008 election phase.

When I asked Mr AS whether he still felt secure to invest substantially on the farm after threats from the white farmers and the general re-assurance from the ZANU PF leaders he said,

> It looked unlikely that ZANU PF would be defeated so I never thought anything would happen to my investments here…With ZANU PF we can invest because it is the people's government, it sees what we are doing…with the MDC we can be chased with our investments like the white farmers (Mr AS, Wedgehill, 2010).

Even though the government agreed to compensate the white farmers for their investments, in reality very few farmers were paid compensation. According to Matondi (2011:179), 'by 2009, only 297 out of the 2,721 farmers transferred into state-land have been paid compensation'. It is these political realities that shape the new farmers' views of tenure. As Cliffe *et al*. (2011:931) argue,

> All land tenure systems exist in a wider political-social-economic context, and the Zimbabwe experience clearly demonstrates that tenure security depends crucially on the wider political setting, land administration capacity and the ability to ensure the rule of law. Without these, no tenure regime can assure security.

The discourse of insecurity is not limited to the resettlement farms as Mrs AE, the wife of Mr AE, in Mutema, also believed that there was a possibility of new farmers being returned home when there is a change of government:

> Those people [resettled farmers] were very foolish to abandon their homes…mukadzi mukuru [a grown up and real responsible woman] cannot leave her homestead to go and stay at a farm that is not yours. What if the rulers change? If I had gotten a farm I was going to keep my homestead *ndizvo zvinoita mukadzi mukuru* [that's what a grown up and responsible lady does] (Mrs AE, Mutema, 2011).

Some resettled farmers did in fact keep their land in the communal areas due to the need for straddling of livelihoods, cultural practices and partly due to insecure tenure.

Some resettled farmers felt insecure due to the government's veiled talk on land use and tenure. President Mugabe said, 'those [new farmers] who cannot put their farms to good use should surrender them back to government' (Mugabe cited in CFU 2010). This view resonates with the discourse of the local Chipinge Agritex officers who advocate that households shun communal or subsistence ways of farming and adopt a commercial mode of production. Consequently, for some farmers, insecure tenure drives them to produce as one way to legitimise their stay on the farm in an environment of political uncertainty. I asked some resettled farmers why they kept records of their produce and marketing in small note books and Mrs AQ, who produced 20 bags of maize in the 2009-2010 season, captured the mood:

> I may be removed from the farm if I do not produce enough because the government may change their mind and start evicting farmers who are not producing. They sometimes say these are areas for production not like in the village where we would do what we want. In order to keep safe I keep these records and I also register my harvest with the Agritex officer (Mrs AQ, Glen View Lot 1, 2011).

An Agritex officer, obviously 'seeing like a state', hinted that, 'even if an opposition wins there is no government that will remove its best farmers [those producing high yields per hectare]…they will make a plan' (Mr BG, Wolfscrag, 2011). The issue of production is viewed as capital to legitimise one's stay on the farm in an uncertain environment. The paradox here is that tenure insecurity leads to investment by some farmers. Moyo *et al*. (2009) suggest that tenure insecurity has no bearing on production as even farmers on informal schemes are said to be investing. The study lacks the qualitative detail to capture the different narratives as it is based on quantitative data. As Sjaastad and Bromley (1996:10), land tenure theorists on African land rights, write, 'to the extent that land is the major source of income and subsistence, there would be little incentive not to use the land every year anyway, so security would in effect be ensured'.

The narrative about security of tenure was not limited to crop production but extended to investments in infrastructure. For example, Mr DY explained, 'You can be replaced if the government sees that you have not put a home. The government can think that you have another home. ..You have to show that you stay on the farm and make it difficult for the government to remove you.' This seems to be the opposite of Scott (1998) who argues that the state is determined to make people legible, yet in this case it is the people who make themselves legible as a way to strengthen their claims on land. Again Sjaastad and Bromley's (1996:10) view resonates,

> One way to establish claims to land…is to invest in land. To the extent that the investment represents a visible commitment to the long-term productivity of the land, continued use of the land is implied, and the common assertion that tenure security is necessary to promote investment may in many cases be reversed; investment is necessary to obtain security. Investments in … buildings, or other fixed structures may provide a litigant in a land dispute with an unassailable case. Thus, although insecurity of tenure is a disincentive to invest, it is paradoxically often also an incentive, because investment will itself increase security.

Ironically white farmers thought the same but they were evicted anyway (see Selby 2006).

In some cases, farmers wanted to be legible with minimum risks. Hence they invested in wooden shacks. Even those who do not reside on the land, like a Headmaster at Wedgehill farm, put up a wooden shack on the farm and ensured that someone stayed on the farm in order to secure and guarantee ownership. However, in post-2000 Zimbabwe these arguments need to be politically placed. As Mr BL, a wooden shack owner, clarified: 'When I first came, the government discouraged us to build permanent houses. They [government] said we should wait for a directive to start building. This made me uncertain at times about this program. At some time I thought all new settlers would be removed after the Presidential election [2002]' (Mr BL, Wolfscarag, 2010). That was almost a decade ago but he still stayed in a wooden shack so I explored further in this conversation:

Researcher: Do you still feel insecure give that no-one was evicted after the 2002 Presidential election?

> Mr BL: The future is somehow uncertain.
> Researcher: Can you explain a little bit more?
> Mr BL: I mean we can get a new [political] leadership in future.
> Researcher: Do you mean any MDC government or any other political party?
> Mr BL: No, MDC will never ever rule this country; I am scared of our comrades who might sell-out.
> Researcher: You mean comrades from ZANU PF?
> Mr BL: Yes, there are very few who can be as strong as President Mugabe.
> Researcher: Why do you think other comrades can reverse this program?
> Mr BL: They are not strong so they can make deals with the enemy and sell-us out, one thing. President Mugabe will never do.
> Researcher: Which enemies?
> Mr BL: They [some ZANU PF leaders] can make deals with the British.

So the new farmers clearly factor in political risks in relation to investments in complex ways.

The story of tenure in Chipinge in relation to investment is contested and one often gets contradictory views. Resettled farmers with autochthonous and political claims to land are

conscious of the production and investment narrative in relation to tenure but they view themselves as having stronger claims to land than others. The typologies below help to clarify their views.

The headman at Wolfscrag farm who favoured restitution explained:

> Our main business as traditional leaders in this area is to make sure our subjects live well and conduct rain making ceremonies so that everyone does not die from hunger. We also need to conduct rituals that cleanse this land…others do not have an ancestral connection to this land and the spirits expect nothing from them. For us we have to constantly make sure the ancestors are happy otherwise this land will go back to the white men *kana midzimu ikafuratira* (if the ancestors turn their back). Some people may say I am not farming much but I came back to my ancestral land and if I produce for my family to eat,its fine. I am not in the business of farming. I am home and you cannot ask someone who is at home why they are planting… so much and so much...These are misguided questions; maybe you can ask those who were resettled not us, the owners of the land (Mr AK, Wolfscrag, 2010).

The war veteran resettled at Wolfscrag farm expressed his views on tenure:

> I think farming is very important we did learn that at war, about economy issues that you need collective production. But our number one grievance was to take back our land, when we used to list our grievances everyone would talk of land and land... now we have the land it's up to us to see what we want to farm but I fought for this country and no one can tell me what to do on the land that I fought for. No one can evict me here … no-one asked the white farmers what they were farming because the land was theirs but now the land is ours… and it is up to us... as long as we got back our land we are very happy (Mr AF, Wolfscrag, 2011).

Apart from material investments, political and ancestral claims farmers invested in political activities in an environment where one needs to continuously legitimise his or her tenure on the farm as demonstrated in chapter 3. The trend is consistent at a national level. People have to show loyalty to the ZANU PF ruling elite as one way to maintain claims over land. For example, on 9 July, 2011, the farm of a former ZANU PF Member of Parliament for Marondera East, and Deputy Minister of Labour and Social Welfare Services Tracy Mutinhiri was invaded by war veterans who threatened to take over the farm because she had 'travelled to Manicaland with the Prime

Minister [Morgan Tsvangirai President of MDC] for the drought mitigation programme' (Mananavire 2011). Tracy Mutinhiri recalled, 'when I came back, I heard that Sekeremayi held a meeting to invade my farm' (Mutinhiri cited in Mananavire 2011). The invaders also accused her of voting for Lovemore Moyo, an MDC candidate for the post of Speaker of House of Assembly ,on 29 March, 2011, but she queried the accusation: 'Where is the evidence...It was a secret ballot. They are belittling the secret ballot box system by pointing fingers at me' (Mutinhiri 2011). This story indicates that land is a source of patronage where one has to continuously pay back through loyalty to the ZANU PF ruling elite otherwise one can easily become as landless as those in the communal areas of Chipinge who were adjudged to be ZANU Ndonga and MDC supporters resulting in their exclusion, as noted in chapter 3. 'Correct' political behaviour is essential to maintain one's tenure on the resettlement farms and deviations can result in possible eviction as in the case of Headman X's worker who had to flee from the farm as we have seen in chapter 3. As Boone and Kriger (2010:184) writes, 'the use of land patronage in intra-ZANU PF struggles demonstrated the vulnerability of land rights for all when the state holds the title to the land as 1, 449 farms were reclaimed in internal ZANU PF struggles in 2008'. Fast Track is irreversible as an entire programme but an individual's gains can be reversed if one overtly shifts political alliance or falls out of favour with the ZANU PF ruling elite. Now that I have looked at tenure and investment I now look at whether the kind of investment happening on the resettlement farms is sustainable.

This study has shown that there is a group of resettled farmers that are earning significant incomes and doing well. The question I address in this last section is: How sustainable is this investment in relation to sources of income and uses of income within the wider political environment.

I have demonstrated how some of the successful farmers relied on patronage and partisan connections to gain access to farming resources provided by government in numerous schemes before 2009 that were intended to promote the interests of the ZANU PF ruling elite. Following the consummation of the inclusive government in 2009, there was significant down-scaling of government input schemes. This is because of the financial constraints that the new government faced. This has reduced opportunities to accumulate from above. As Mr CC, complained,

> I have not made it; I produce about 2 tonnes in a season which is not enough to be a commercial farmer. My thinking was that the government could give us help once we got to the farms. Our experience in early resettlement was that the government provided support, inputs, fertiliser to everyone. Now the government support is erratic, especially after the inclusive government. This government does not like new farmers that is why we want elections. We used to have good schemes where we could get inputs but the MDC guy doing finances [Minister of Finance, Tendai Laxton Biti] does not want to support us because they support former commercial farmers. Now the only word you hear is that there is no money and there are no resources. MDC does not like new farmers, that is why my dream is not realised. Even the President had to come with his own scheme to support us this season. We need a government that supports farmers (Mr CC, Wolfscrag, 2011).

The situation was exacerbated by the introduction of the multi-currency system in 2009. Most farmers struggle to gain access to foreign currency. As Mr BW, another well-to-do farmer, who witnessed a change in his lifestyle since the formation of the inclusive government, highlighted:

> I used to send my three children to Chipinge School [a fairly elite primary school] but since the unity government brought the dollar [United States currency] life is now tough. During the Zim [Zimbabwe] dollar era at least you could run around get some fuel and do all sorts of things. There were lots of schemes that supported us and we were the priority of government. Now the government does not care…yet the old farmers benefited from the state supporting them. I have withdrawn two of my children from Chipinge [primary school] and they learn at the farm school. I have left one who is in grade seven [last grade before secondary] and this meant selling some of my goats. From there I will make sure he goes to Tanganda secondary school where we do not pay fees [Students pick tea as payment] (Mr BW, Wolfscrag, 2011).

The Zimbabwe crisis made the majority of citizens suffer but there were many who accumulated through patronage and they have been experiencing a dip in their fortunes since the formation of the unity government.

The new farmers' strategy of benefiting from state patronage, a case of accumulation from above is threatened because of the unity government which seems not to be promoting such input schemes. There is an emerging group of successful farmers on my A1 resettlement schemes such as Mr AT, Mr AR, Mr AS, Mr BX, Mr BW and Mrs AY and Mr AZ did not only use patronage to gain access to land but also use it to keep the farm going. These findings mirror those in A2 schemes in Masvingo. Scoones *et al*. (2010:221) aptly argue that on the A2 schemes 'patronage and accumulation from above, is not going to realise the benefits of land reform'. I argue the same is true for some A1 farmers in Chipinge. From my survey a significant number who benefited from state patronage are finding it hard to maintain the same levels of affluence as before the inclusive government. However, some were able to sustain their investments. In this case we have to agree with Rutherford (2012) that, householdswho were 'able to accumulate in part or whole through farming took place because of an authoritarian regime that does not hesitate in using violence to destroy its political opposition'.

Many new farmers who acquired land with macadamia and gum tree plantations have not bothered to re-invest in the cash crops that brought a fortune to their household. This accumulation is not reflective of what Bernstein (2010:124) understands as 'accumulation' which is 'the accumulation of capital, and its reinvestment in expanding the scale of production in order to make more profit'. Rather, on my three A1 resettlement schemes the number of macadamia trees is decreasing due to early neglect due to the failure to find a market quickly, fire out breaks, poor infrastructure and lack of knowledge. As Mr AU, the former manager, explained:

> Most of their [the new farmers] macadamia will fail the leaf sampling test… It is a technique where leaves are tested to establish the nutritious status of the macadamia tree in order to gauge whether the plant will produce a healthy nut. If you do the leaf sampling and a tree fails you then have to apply special types of fertiliser in specific measurements to the trees with formulas like 1.01.1 or 5.1.5. By looking at their macadamia trees none of them is doing that. This is how you keep the macadamia tree producing competitive nuts

> for many years. Otherwise very soon macadamia will be history. Kids will be reciting …once upon a time there was macadamia in Chipinge (Mr AU, Birchenough, 2011).

Moreover, on the resettlement farms there is no investment in the macadamia nursery as a way to replace some of the ageing plants ten years after Fast Track commenced. The former white owner of Wedgehill farm used to have a lath house to produce a macadamia nursery and he was registered with SAMA. The lath-houses were vandalised during invasions and I did not establish any person registered to produce a macadamia nursery. This may be a once off harvest by the new farmers. In addition to that, the destruction of sprinkler and irrigation equipment on Wedgehill makes it difficult to envisage how the new farmers will sustain the macadamia production as a source of income. The Agritex officers I interviewed had little knowledge about the technical requirements to keep macadamia trees in good shape, '[t]hat kind [of macadamia production] requires specialised training but we teach them about soil conservation…(Mr BG, Wolfscrag, 2011). Actually, the water needs of macadamia vary from month to month and there is need to calculate when and how much to irrigate factoring in natural rainfall. Du Plessis (1993) sheds light on the approximate water requirements for macadamia throughout the year as shown in the figure below.

Table 24: Mm/ month required for macadamia trees

Tree age	Aug	Sept	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June	July
5	16	20	24	27	29	29	24	21	14	9	9	9
10	46	57	69	77	81	81	67	59	38	26	26	26

Adapted from Du Plessis (1993)

Some of the new farmers accept that they do not have all the necessary knowledge and therefore are oriented toward short term gain, as Mr AS elaborates:

> We have them [macadamia] like indigenous orchards but we put fertiliser so that they can start flowering and produce the nuts. We also do pruning. There are a number of diseases that have been affecting my macadamia and some of the nuts rot and others have holes. The big problem is some of the trees are wilting. Unless the government is to assist us on how to tend these trees effectively we will just make hay whilst the sun shines (Mr AS, Wedgehill, 2011).

The problems described by Mr AS show a lack of proper irrigation and disease control. Internal differentiation based on patronage acquisition may prove to be temporary in the case of Mr AS and others. Mr AS has adopted an intercropping strategy to deal with the decreasing number of macadamia trees as shown in the picture below.



Figure 14: Photograph of scattered macadamia plants (taken by author, 2010)

The picture shows the shift from export macadamia to maize crops. At this rate, Mr AS will soon join the category of maize producers. It is difficult to classify the new farmers into particular

categories determined by assets or types of crops as these rapidly change. My observation during fieldwork is that the macadamia plants are wilting and dwindling in the district. Anyone driving through Chipinge can see that some of the macadamia trees are neglected and in some cases are being replaced with other grain crops.

On Mrs AY's plot there is a random harvest of young gum trees to make quick profit. Mrs AY explained: 'It is better for me to harvest the gum trees as early as possible. If I wait there are people from the communal areas who come to steal the trees at night. They do not care how old the trees are because they use the gum trees to burn bricks. We also have a big problem of fires that sometimes burn the trees' (Mrs AY Wedgehill, 2010). When I asked why she did not invest in security and fire protection she said, ' I can not spend money on hiring security guards because there are other immediate things and we can not afford like white farmers…there are other issues to look at than investing in fire protection. We just make sure we cut the trees as soon as they become attractive *(ibid*). The plantations were evidently dwindling in 2011 as captured in the picture below.



Figure 15: Dwindling gum trees (taken by author, 2011)

5.10 Conclusion

Moyo *et al*. (2009) and Scoones *et al*. (2010) paint a picture of massive investment on resettlement farms with major sources of income being from crop and livestock production in conjunction with remittances and informal work. From this finding they argue that a class of middle farmers is emerging on resettlement farms that are internally differentiated by petty commodity production. They conceptualise this as accumulation from below. While they acknowledge the role of corruption and patronage they underplay its significance in the differentiation matrix. Yet, what distinguishes post-2000 Zimbabwe from earlier periods in my case study is how corrupt and criminal activities sanctioned and condoned by a partisan state became a central part of the story of accumulation. Whereas Moyo *et al*. (2009) and Scoones *et*

al.(2010) limit the story of patronage to A2 farmers, I argue that the same can be said of a significant part of an emerging group of 'successful farmers' on A1 schemes in Chipinge signifying a case of accumulation from above, that is from partisan relationships and corrupt activities, which is not sustainable in some cases. Yet I acknowledge that the above does not tell the entire complex story in Chipinge. I have already demonstrated how some new farmers make money from renting out homesteads elsewhere, seasonal work, remittances and selling other goods such as *mazitye* and how others are formally employed typifying accumulation from outside. In some cases the aggregate contribution to differentiation from sustainable sources is in conjunction with products from the land and from corrupt and criminal practices in a highly politicised environment sustained by a partisan state to maintain the ZANU PF ruling elite in power. Hence the story of patronage completes the picture of socio-economic differentiation among small scale farmers in Chipinge and also marks Fast Track's difference with Zimbabwe's land reform programmes in the 1980s and 1990s. The overall goal of Fast Track was not that of development but a way of creating sources of patronage using land as we reflect in the next chapter.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

6.1 Introduction

The thesis sought to integrate state practices and politics in the analysis of agrarian change, through a study of rural differentiation in Chipinge district, south-eastern Zimbabwe. The study explained differentiation through exploring three main themes. First, it examined who got land and went further to investigate how and why people got land while others did not. Second, it explained differences in crop production among the resettled small-scale farmers. Third, the study looked at what farmers have invested in and examined why some farmers invested and accumulated more than others. Finally, it looked at the sustainability of investments on Fast Track land. This concluding chapter revisits the empirical findings of the study and reflects on the methodological and theoretical approach in three parts. The first part summarises the empirical findings on land acquisition, production and accumulation. The second part reflects on the methodology and the final part revisits the theoretical debates.

6.2 Beneficiary selection

Chapter 3 provided empirical evidence that showed that land acquisition on the studied schemes was achieved through a partisan land invasion and corrupt state administrative practices. During the occupation of Wedgehill farm, beneficiaries were mobilised by war-veterans aligned to the Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) party. In contrast, some war veterans aligned to Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU *Ndonga*) resisted the lure to invade farms as they saw the process as meant to shore up ZANU PF's waning political support. This finding mirrors the behaviour of war veterans aligned to the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) in the initial

phases of Fast Track in Matabeleland. As Alexander (2006) argued, war veterans aligned to ZAPU were not willing to get involved in the farm invasions because they saw them as ZANU PF driven. Another observation that came out clearly in this study is how family and extended family members connected to land occupiers also benefited, such as traditional leaders' family members. Even though land occupations were the dominant method of acquiring land (Alexander 2006, Marongwe 2008, Moyo and Yeros 2005, Scoones *et al*. 2010) my study demonstrated that some white farmers offered their land for resettlement. As my case of Glen View Lot 1 showed, the white farmer offered part of his land for resettlement to the government. This is a strand that most studies have glossed over because of the pre-occupation with the land invasions. My study has also demonstrated that state administrative procedures were important in the allocation of land and confirmation of applications on A1 farms, which made understanding the nature of these institutions an important part of the study. Other new farmers got land through displacing farm workers who were the original occupiers but had weaker political capital, as argued in the case of Wedgehill farm. Who, then, were the beneficiaries?

On my study sites, civil servants, war veterans, traditional authorities and their families and security services were the major beneficiaries of Fast Track. Understanding who got the land is important but it is only through studying the process of how beneficiaries got the land that one can determine the role of patronage-based acquisition of land. Based on the findings presented in this thesis I conclude that the majority of beneficiaries in Chipinge had access to ZANU PF partisan networks such as in the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association (ZNLWVA) and local party structures. This marked a significant shift from the depoliticised resettlement process in the first phase, which largely followed a bureaucratic and orderly process except in Matabeleland (due to war, drought and the unpopularity of the resettlement models) (see Alexander 2006) to one heavily politicised and characterised by violence and disorder. The different processes help to

explain the differences in composition of beneficiaries in the first phase of resettlement and Fast Track. The orderly and bureaucratic process of the 1980s initially benefited the most deprived of society, the poor, unemployed and landless, whereas the politicisation of Fast Track resulted in a mix of beneficiaries including the military, civil servants, traditional leaders and political cronies as argued in chapter 3. Even the shift by the government in 1982 as observed by Alexander (1991,2006) to focus on well-to-do small-scale farmers was informed by the concern for productivity and production of marketed surplus rather than party political interests. In contrast, Fast Track was a calculated political strategy intended to keep a waning ZANU PF regime in power and not a resurgence of land reform revolutions in Africa as Moyo and Yeros (2005) would like us to believe. Even if we accept the claim that the largest beneficiaries of Fast Track were the ordinary people (Scoones *et al.* 2010) that does not mean that the ordinary cannot be a product of patronage-based acquisition of land as I have demonstrated in chapter 3. Fast Track land redistribution was a partisan process that excluded those with weak ZANU PF political ties. I illustrate this conclusion with the five points below.

First, the District Land Committee (DLC) in charge of allocating land to new beneficiaries or formalising occupations was composed of ZANU PF functionaries such as the district chairperson of the party, a state security representative from the President's office that is an intelligence officer, a war veteran and a traditional leader. In Chipinge, neither ZANU *Ndonga* nor the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) were part of the decision making process. The process was evidently exclusionary of all political parties save for ZANU PF. This is consistent with Marongwe (2010:8) who argues in reference to Goromonzi that, 'political considerations determined the outcome of beneficiary selection' because of the partisan and militarised composition of land committees. Marongwe (2010:8) singles out the 'heavy representation of ZANU PF party and the three main state security departments namely the army, police and the

central intelligence organisation' in the land committees. As argued in chapter 3, the civil servants in the DLC, being head of departments, were serving with the approval of the ZANU PF leadership or under the watchful eye of war veterans. I have demonstrated how the Head of Agritex kept his job despite his low qualifications because of support from the ZANU PF local leadership and how magistrates Walter Chikwana and Thomas Masendeke were threatened, beaten and forced to transfer in acts that terrified other government workers. McGregor (2002) and Hammar (2003) also reached the same conclusion on the politicisation of civil servants' appointments in post-2000 Zimbabwe. I will reflect further on the restructuring of the state institutions later.

Second, the replacement of farm workers by new occupiers on Wedgehill farm by the DLC indicated that Fast Track was far from targeting ordinary people who did not have strong political connections. The farm workers were replaced mostly by civil servants, security services, traditional authorities and war veterans who were politically well connected to the ruling ZANU PF party. Third, most ordinary families scattered across the 30 wards of Chipinge district had to apply to the ZANU PF chairperson or the party's representative of that ward where it had no clear structures. I have shown how difficult it was for overt opposition supporters to hand in their applications or be considered for land reform. The process was advantageous to most people connected to ZANU PF local leaders, who could easily hand in their applications, and get a favourable recommendation from the party's district chair, who played a central role in the weekly DLC meetings. Fourth, even during the land occupations my case of Wolfscrag shows that the involvement of the ZANU PF local leadership in the mobilisation of the masses to invade the farm gave an impression that land occupation was a ZANU PF-driven project. This was buttressed by the central role played by ZNLWVA members who were self-proclaimed allies of the ZANU PF party. This perception prompted some war veterans aligned to ZANU *Ndonga* to shun the process as I have indicated. Moreover, some traditional authorities became appendages of the ZANU PF party, given the

symbiotic relationship revived in the 1990s, and very notably so in a political alliance since 2000, signified by their role in advancing party interests. These partisan actors were dominant in the Fast Track process and had an effect on who eventually got land. Patronage was central in keeping their support since they were given salaries, cars, resources to distribute and other government perks. Fifth, the allocation of land to soldiers in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) was centralised and meant for a special group. I will revisit why these groups were dominant when I reflect on the nature of the state.

On the A2 farms in Chipinge, a number of political cronies and elites acquired entire and multiple farms at the expense of the farm workers, women and ordinary people from the communal areas. I emphasised that political cronies are usually few and to conclude as Matondi (2011) and Moyo (2011) do that they did not dominate Fast Track is to state the obvious. The political cronies who benefited from Fast Track in Chipinge included a Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) lieutenant colonel, Chief Mapungwana, Chief Mutema, a former Deputy Minister of Local Government and the incumbent ZANU PF Member of Parliament, Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) Chipinge district rural member in charge *et cetera,* as elaborated in chapter 3. Those with political, family and social ties to these political elites also benefited immensely. I have alluded to the case of the ZANU PF Member of Parliament for Chipinge central, who acquired two lucrative farms, and the son-in-law to President Mugabe who had three farms whereas his younger brother acquired four farms. The relatives of Chief Mutema and Mapungwana also acquired farms. All this does not paint a picture of a fair, just, transparent, democratic and equitable distribution of land that addresses rural inequalities and is far from the first phase of Zimbabwe's land reform. Hence, my conclusion that, though Fast Track has addressed racial inequalities, inequalities in ownership of land in the district remains evident albeit at a lower scale to that of pre-Fast Track and on the basis of political affiliation. As Byres (2004) argues, redistributive land reform entails taking land from those with

large holdings or multiple farms and giving it to those without land or with tiny holdings. In this case the consolidation of multiple farms defied this logic of pro-poor land reform. Fast Track in Chipinge had its own group of land grabbers, as observed in other studies (Marongwe 2008).

These observations are not intended to entirely dismiss the fact that some Fast Track beneficiaries were not motivated by the desire to shore up ZANU PF's waning political support. Claims to land were multiple and overlapping. Even though the government since 1980 had no restitution policy, my study has shown that some displaced families wanted to go back to land they had been evicted from in previous decades. As demonstrated in chapter 3, beneficiaries also wanted land for food security, straddling of livelihoods and as a social safety net. Though these beneficiaries had diverse claims to land that were not entirely political, the vehicle to realise such claims was political loyalty, connection and patronage under the ZANU PF umbrella. Political patronage extended beyond simply gaining access to land as land reform beneficiaries have to continue to show political loyalty to ZANU PF in highly politicised resettlement landscapes.

Fontein (2006:244) has argued that:

> The ruling party's far narrower nationalist imagination of recent years has not necessarily obliterated or limited the nationalist imagination of others. For…chiefs, war veterans who have felt themselves excluded since independence, the current politics of exclusion may seem more like a renewed opportunity for their inclusion.

My argument is that their inclusion was in fact necessitated byanauthoritarian ZANU PF governing elite, that used land as a source of patronage to remain in power. Within this matrix, the different actors could manipulate each other in order to shape each other's interests, but the ruling elite maintains coercive power and the legal right to expel Fast Track beneficiaries who fail to show political loyalty. The authoritarian and partisan nature of the state excluded women without strong social and political networks, many farm workers, white commercial farmers, ZANU Ndonga

and MDC supporters and some ordinary people in the communal areas in Chipinge who never had a chance because they lacked political connection to ZANU PF.A new agrarian structure has emerged that is shaped mainly by socio-political dynamics rooted in ZANU PF.

6.3 Production

My integration of politics in the analysis of agricultural production and social differentiation has been revealing. The fact that household crop production is constrained or promoted in important ways by differential access to state patronage in Chipinge shows that we need to look beyond neo-classical economics perspectives that look beyond farm efficiency, that is the relative productivity of land, labour and capital and the integration of farmers into functioning markets (see Zikhali 2008), to adequately understand and explain social differentiation. My findings also proved that it is important to look at other social factors such as family sizes and religious and social networks. My study showed that unequal land holdings, crop 'inheritance' from the white commercial farmers, access to farming inputs, labour availability and tillage are important axes of differentiation in agrarian communities. Political factors like the state practices and political interests enabled me to explain why there are differences in crop production among the small-scale farmers. I illustrate my argument with five observations from the field data.

First, the study found that the agrarian landscape of Chipinge has shifted from one dominated by dairy and export crops to one dominated by maize and small grains. The shift from export to mainly food crops is partly a result of the chaotic nature of Fast Track. At Wedgehill farm, for example, as the former owner fled to Australia some invaders destroyed the young coffee plants and high technology farm equipment was stolen and destroyed during the chaotic period of invasion. Moreover, the policy considerations of the past that prescribed what farmers should grow in natural regions 1 and 2 (see GoZ 1986) were set aside as politics took centre stage on Glen

View Lot 1, Wolfscrag and Wedgehill farms. Other factors such as the need for household food consumption influenced the shift to maize dominance, but the political environment also enabled new farmers to produce whatever they wanted. As a result the agrarian landscape of Chipinge was transformed to one dominated by maize. This is consistent with most studies that found a shift from land uses patterned on specialised crops suitable to agro-ecological zones to food production (see Matondi 2011, Moyo 2011, Scoones *et al.* 2010), though these studies skirt the political reasons behind the shift.

The point I intend to emphasise from my empirical findings is that the shift in land uses was not the result of a planned technocratic policy but a consequence of politics. On paper, the technocratic recommendations remained official government policy but the ruling elite was more concerned with political patronage so they did not enforce land uses. As I have already highlighted, the Agritex official explained that the government, in the early phase of Fast Track land reform, was not concerned with the types of crops but with the political statement that land had been acquired. Though there are contrasting voices and contradictions within the state, and a shift from *jambanja* to technocracy in other districts (Chaumba *et al*. 2003), In Chipinge it would require years of reinvestment to go back to the Pre- Fast Track land uses as well as a shift in the locus of authority within the state.

My research did not focus on the pros and cons of such a shift in land uses. This would require a further investigation of the implications for the local economy and wider national economy in relation to gains and losses in livelihoods. In Masvingo, the shift from cattle ranching to food crops is said to have generated more diverse livelihoods and to have boosted the local economy (Scoones *et al*. 2010). My findings suggest the need for more research in Chipinge given that most of the occupied farms were labour intensive and many farm workers lost out. The export farms

also generated foreign currency. Further scholarly investigations of the implications are required before substantive conclusions can be reached.

Second, my field data has shown that unequal land holdings accounted for differences in production due to differences in the size of cultivated areas. The partisan political process in which land was acquired resulted in those with political influence and social status, notably the war veterans and traditional leaders, disproportionately gaining access to more arable land compared to other beneficiaries. In addition the security services and civil servants also benefited. The findings mark a significant shift from the first phase of resettlement where unequal land holdings among beneficiaries of Model A were not a factor (see Kinsey 1999, 2004), as shown in chapter 2. The beneficiaries under Model A had equal access to land and the differences in production weremainly due to the agro-ecological location of farmers (Hart-Broekhuis and Huisman 2001). My study has shown that unequal land holdings are a factor of differentiation among Fast Track beneficiaries. Though many studies note this difference among A1 farmers (Matondi 2011), they do not explore why some gained larger plots and the implications for agricultural production.

Third, the different types of production systems that one can notice even when driving through Chipinge are not due to the 'planning of the process of production' (Ploeg 2009) by the new farmers and the state. My data has shown that the different types of crops on different fields can be explained by the politics of farm acquisition. I have shown how war veterans, security officers, traditional leaders and civil servants 'inherited' macadamia and gum tree plantations. Those with weaker political influence got bare land, particularly in the former grazing land offered by the evicted farmer, and resorted to less capital intensive maize and other small grain production as shown in chapter 1 and chapter 4. As the war veterans on Wedgehill farm explained they had a

historical and political justification to the acquisition since their ancestors had been displaced by the white settlers during the colonial era.

Fourth, my empirical findings have shown that preferential access to state disbursement of fertiliser and seed account for differences in crop production on the resettlement farms. As agrarian economists suggest, 'differences in the use of fertiliser could be driving the productivity differentials' (Zikhali 2008:18) on Fast Track farms. My data reveals that this is the case, but also explores how some managed to gain access to fertiliser outside the formal market. As demonstrated in chapter 4, the allocation of farming inputs was highly politicised and mediated by partisan traditional leaders and civil servants loyal to ZANU PF. In this case, many who were considered not to be loyal to ZANU PF and those with weaker political capital within ZANU PF were side-lined. It was through political influence and connections that farmers got access to subsidised input schemes from the Grain Marketing Board (GMB), the President's office, the social welfare department, Agritex, the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) and the District Development Fund (DDF). The input schemes were meant to further ZANU PF's interests by largely benefiting party members. They distributed the seeds to ZANU PF supporters and excluded MDC supporters as the MDC MP attested. Civil servants also manipulated local state institutions to self-serve as the case of Mr BC, a civil servant who looted seeds and fertiliser in the social welfare department showed. Farmers with access to state subsidised inputs had a comparative advantage in agricultural production. Other beneficiaries relied on cow dung manure which was not as rich in phosphates. I will elaborate on the reconstruction of state institutions and state actors when I reflect on my empirical findings in relation to theorisation of the post-2000 Zimbabwean state below.

Fifth, labour is an important driver of rural differentiation on the studied farms. The question is, how did people mobilise labour? I observed a new and politicised mode of labour mobilisation on

Chipinge resettlement schemes as detailed in chapter 4. I have illustrated how the committee of seven, responsible for running the farm, allowed former farm workers to live in the compounds and to cultivate small fields in exchange for labour especially in the productive season (November to April). This practice was illegal and yet ultimately contributed to accentuating differences in crop outputs among small-scale farmers on the three A1 resettlement schemes. As I demonstrated in chapter 3, the committee of seven was politically influential. As hiring in labour correlated with crop production, the ability of the politically influential to hire labour was an added advantage. As my survey of literature showed in chapter 2, this mode of labour mobilisation was a new phenomenon on resettlement schemes. Sixth, I posit that variations in household food security were part of a chain with its roots in the partisan acquisition of land and the preferential access to farming inputs and labour mobilisation of politically influential people. Such factors influenced the amount of food families produced for consumption.

However, not all processes of differentiation unfolding on the studied farms can be adequately explained by the politics of corruption and patronage. Poverty is a factor that shapes production on the resettlement schemes. Households without adequate financial capital faced significant constraints in buying farming inputs, hiring tillage and paying labour. Moreover, the availability of family labour shaped production. As discussed in chapter 4, larger families produced more crops even though there were exceptions as in the case of Mrs BE, a resettled farmer on Glen View Lot 1, whose family spread labour across non-farming activities off-farm. My conclusions regarding large families being able to utilise more labour in general are consistent with Kinsey's (2004) findings in the old resettlement schemes, as detailed in chapter 2. Other non-political factors affecting labour mobilisation included social networks such as church membership as illustrated in the case of Mrs D in chapter 4. A mix of factors explains social differentiation in crop production on the studied farms. However, to gain an adequate picture of the post-2000 era, a highly

politicised environment, it is essential to integrate politics in the analysis of agricultural production and social differentiation. This approach was also necessary to analyse accumulation, as discussed below.

6.4 Accumulation

My approach to integrate accumulation from above, i.e. from patronage networks, in the analysis of accumulation enhanced our understanding of processes of social differentiation on the studied schemes. As argued in chapter 2 and 5, Moyo *et al*. (2009) and Scoones *et al*. (2010) concluded that farmers were differentiated by petty commodity production, signifying a new trajectory of accumulation from below on the resettlement schemes. In their conclusions they also acknowledged the role of remittances and off-farm livelihoods. However, in line with their political positioning in support of small-scale farmers, they limit the story of accumulation from above to A2 farmers. However, the empirical data from Chipinge has demonstrated that a significant group of 'successful farmers' on A1 schemes are also accumulating from above.

I have shown in chapter 4 that the diversion of state resources was one of the sources of income for livestock accumulation on the resettlement farms. Farmers such as Mr AZ got preferential access to government subsidised fuel because of his status as a war veteran and a former army officer. Other civil servants in charge of distributing resources were afraid of him because of his record of beating up MDC supporters. The fuel was sold on the black market and the proceeds invested in livestock. The sources of income were thus not from on-farm agricultural production. In the case of farm-implements, all three households that acquired scotch-carts after Fast Track on my resettlement farms benefited from the partisan Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe Farm Mechanisation Programme. Two of the households got the scotch carts just before the historic March 29, 2008 election. State resources were used as a source of accumulation by those who

were politically connected to ZANU PF. Those with scotch-carts and ox-drawn ploughs acquired them not from livestock and crop production but through gaining access to state patronage. Regarding housing, my study demonstrated that four households were illegally living in durable former farm workers' houses and in a former farm owner's house. Some new farmers vandalised and stole window frames and door frames from compounds to build better houses than others whereas the plantations left by former white farmers were a good source of building material for some. Another significant source of income was theft and looting, especially during the chaotic period of farm invasions. As argued in chapter 5, some farmers stole irrigation equipment, machinery and vehicle parts in garages and sold them for quick profit. There were also cases where farmers did not disclose their sources of income, as in the case of Mr AR who worked at the border. One can reasonably conclude that such sources were linked to illegal activities linked to holding state office.

Yet my study showed that the politics of gaining access to state resources does not reveal the entire complex web of accumulation on the studied farms. I have demonstrated the importance of pre-Fast Track accumulation in ownership of livestock, farm equipment and assets. The study also showed that some new farmers hired out labour, made money through renting out their houses in town, received remittances from family members in town, and engaged in informal businesses. Some civil servants were still formally employed. Off-farm based livelihoods typified a process of accumulation from outside in combination with other sources. These are familiar observations from literature on the first phase of resettlement on accumulation (Kinsey 1999, 2002) and emerging literature on Fast Track (Chambati 2011, Moyo *et al*. 2009, Scoones *et al*. 2010). However, it is the integration of political processes in the analysis of accumulation that brings out the story of patronage as part of the puzzle that completes the picture of socio-economic differentiation among the small-scale farmers. This finding also marks Fast Track's

difference from Zimbabwe's land reform programmes in the 1980s and 1990s. My approach marks the departure from much of the Fast Track literature as it empirically demonstrates the importance of patronage on A1 farms and raises questions about the explanatory power of the accumulation from below proposition.

It is difficult to conceptualise the processes as signalling the emergence of a resilient class of indigenous black capitalist farmers. First, the curtailing of the RBZ's quasi-fiscal activities, the reduction in state subsidised inputs under the inclusive government since 2009 has adversely affected some new farmers who relied on patronage. Their livelihoods are in decline as signified by Mr BW's story of withdrawing children from an expensive school and selling goats to make ends meet. Second, the profit from macadamia and gum tree plantations is not being re-invested in the plantations, which defies the classic schema of expanded reproduction or capital accumulation as articulated by Bernstein (2010) and Cousins (2010). Rather, the trees are wilting and dying and the gains appear to be only short term. As Mr AU put it, there is a real possibility in future of saying that, 'once upon a time there was macadamia in Chipinge'. This also contrasts to Moore's (2001, 2003, 2004) primitive accumulation thesis: new farmers inherited highly capitalised farms but there is a process of de-accumulation nonetheless. It is certainly too early to conclude that a resilient indigenous class of black capitalist farmers has emerged on the farms.

As the study has shown, some resettled farmers are doing well in terms of production and accumulation as a result of violent acquisition of land, corruption, clientelism and patronage. In some cases, this kind of accumulation is difficult to sustain. Where such accumulation is sustainable it is in part aided by an exclusive and authoritarian state, ready to use land and resources to create clients for political support and to exclude those who belong to opposition political parties.

Because land is a source of partisan patronage, shifting political alliances may lead to loss of land and its produce overnight. The patron-client relationship is only sustainable if the farmer is loyal to ZANU PF and any suspicious behaviour may rock the relationship, as in the case of the headman, Mr Z, who was threatened for accepting a visitor from Harare and Headmaster X's son who had to flee the farm after being suspected by state security agents of supporting the MDC. Most farmers did not feel secure on the land. They were conscious that their tenure depended on the political context and the type of political leadership, as elaborated in chapter 5. Uncertainty shaped investment in different ways. My study has gone further than others (Moyo *et al*. 2009, Scoones *et al*. 2010) to look at social services beyond the farm to contextualise the debate on sustainable development in the Fast Track schemes. It is through such a broader approach that the study challenges views such as those of Scoones *et al.* (2010) that the rural areas in Zimbabwe are the future because of the boost to the rural economy brought by new farmers. The social services such as health and education in the resettlement schemes were in a deplorable state as attested to by respondents in chapter 5. Moreover, the politicisation of the local institutions did not augur well for national development because some people were excluded.

The study identified a group of farmers who were not doing well in terms of production and accumulation. Do they signify a process of proletarianisation? The historical and theoretical debates I have drawn on and substantiated with my empirical findings show that the form of social differentiation in Chipinge cannot be understood as proletarianisation. As we have seen, those not doing well cannot be characterised as workers only. Farmers produced maize and tried to hold on to their land through various political strategies. The scale of farming differed, but all the surveyed households grew maize on their plots in the 2009-2010 season. Even the involvement in non-agricultural activities, which brought considerable income for some households, does not suggest a move to proletarianisation or a movement out of agriculture. Rather, what is happening is

diversification into formal and informal activities. There is even an increase in the number of civil servants involved in crop production, eking out their livelihoods on the farms. This is consistent with the studies on social differentiation where wages were invested in the farming cycle in processes of straddling of livelihoods (Cliffe 1988, Cousins and Scoones 2010). We now reflect on the methodology used.

6.5 Methodological considerations

My methodological approach was important in bringing out state practices and politics. A narrow quantitative approach that brings out measurable variables (Kinsey 2004, Moyo *et al*. 2009, Zikhali 2008) would have obscured our understanding of social and political factors. As I argued in chapter 1, comparing farmers in the same agro-ecological zone made it possible to look beyond natural factors such as the type of soils, amount of rainfall and other ecological conditions in explaining social differentiation. The argument that the main source of differentiation among farmers is agro-ecological location has led to a neglect of sources of differentiation within the same agro-ecological zone (see Amin 1991, Cutsworth 1990, Dekker and Kinsey 2011, Hoogeven and Kinsey 2001). My methodological approach managed to bring out the role of political processes in shaping differentiation beyond the natural factors. My approach can be transferred to farmers in the same agro-climatic zones in other parts of the country and allow a comparative basis for considering factors that explain social differentiation beyond the agro-ecological conditions.

Conducting in-depth interviews after using a questionnaire survey establish the statistical differences in production and investments which enabled us to produce a first-hand account of why there are differences in production and accumulation among the resettled farmers. This enabled us to go beyond hypothesizing, as is often the case with methodological approaches that focus on the statistical differences in the ownership of assets. For example, I showed in chapter 2

how Dekker and Kinsey (2011) could not explain why a significant number of farmers on the resettlement schemes were able to accumulate cattle during the height of the economic crisis. This study has shown that in such cases, the answers can be obtained through life histories and in-depth interviews, as the vignettes on how farmers accumulated cattle demonstrated in chapter 5. Other scholarly works on differentiation ignore the voices of the farmers (Harts-Boekhuis and Huisman 2001, Kinsey 1999, 2002, 2004, Moyo *et al*. 2009) and fail to explore the processes involved. For example, Moyo *et al*.'s (2009) study on Fast Track, which solely relied on administering a questionnaire, does not have a single quote from the field that attempts to explain social differentiation. Such a methodological approach can only tell us what the differences were and provide possible indicators as to why there were such differences but cannot answer how such differences occurred as this study attempted to do. For example, as I have argued, Zikhali (2008), Dekker and Kinsey (2011) and Moyo *et al*. (2009) demonstrated that fertiliser was an important differential factor as detailed in chapter 2 because of the correlation between fertiliser application and maize yields but they failed to answer how the farmers actually got the fertiliser and also neglected the political and institutional context.

A similar methodological approach is that of Chambati (2011), who documented the return rates of farm workers to their former farms, the new forms of labour and their new diverse livelihood activities. My study showed that ignoring the accounts of respondents can lead to subjective conclusions regarding what scholars think is good or bad for the studied group. Chambati's (2011) analysis needed to be complemented by the accounts of the farm workers for us to understand better their own plight, as I demonstrated in chapter 3. It is through asking questions to the respondents and further probing that one can be able to see, as we have done, the importance of state institutions and politics in understanding agrarian change.

One critique of my approach might be that administering a questionnaire to more farms could have enhanced the generalisability of the study. However, the study can enrich the Fast Track national picture through comparison with other case studies like Masvingo, Goromonzi, Mangwe, Shamva and Mazowe. Moreover, there were trade-offs in my study because beyond the measurable variables I had to explain the process leading to social differentiation. As explained in chapter 1, such an approach required a research design which included in-depth interviews, life histories, repeated visits and probing on emerging themes. The methodology brought out social and political processes that led to the prevailing inequalities in land holdings, production and accumulation.

Another methodological lesson is that institutional linkages are important in understanding social differentiation. As I have demonstrated throughout the thesis, decisions that shaped differentiation on the farms were made by local state institutions. Therefore it was important to pursue the views of government officials, traditional leaders and other key informants outside the farm. This methodological approach is important because differentiation was not just about the efficiency of land, labour and capital on-farm. Other studies like that of Moyo *et al*. (2009) have not sought to include the views of these actors in their attempts to understand processes shaping social differentiation on resettlement schemes.

Another dimension of my methodology was interviewing residents of neighbouring communal areas who were excluded during Fast Track. This is a different methodology to those of recent Fast Track studies (Marongwe 2008, Matondi 2011, Moyo*et al*. 2009Scoones *et al*. 2010). Yet views and experiences of those who were excluded brought out the politics of patronage during Fast Track. It was clear from the interviews that some in the communal areas failed to get land because of the politicised and partisan nature of the program. For example, the cases of aspiring beneficiaries

who were side-lined in Mutema communal area as noted in chapter 3. In future, this methodological approach can also be used to compare production and accumulation between communal and Fast Track farmers.

6.6 Reflections on the state

My study has shown that Zimbabwe's state institutions have undergone tremendous change since independence. ZANU PF was able to shift the centre of decision making regarding land and agrarian policy from the bureaucracy to the party. ZANU PF extended its influence through circumventing, restructuring or coercing state institutions to further its goal of building a political constituency through patronage.

The research has shown that the key local state institution, (DLC), was invented by the ZANU PF national leadership. ZANU PF controlled the local land institution through its allies in the DLC as the bureaucracy was side-lined and technocratic considerations cast aside. Alexander (2006) and Marongwe (2008) made similar observations about the reconfiguration of the state institutions that allocated land during Fast Track. As my study has shown, the new land institution, the DLC, was trusted because it was created by the party and staffed with trusted lieutenants. The shift in state practices from the 1980s when land allocation committees were staffed with bureaucrats is striking (see Herbst 1990). This was a political strategy as it reinforced ZANU PF's control over the land allocation process. In this new setting ZANU PF occupied an important space in the decision making processes and exerted control over the DLC in ways that promoted patronage. For instance, the war veterans and the local ZANU PF leadership would not have been so central in the DLC if the central state and national ZANU PF leadership allowed them to do so as a way to ensure land was used as a source of patronage. Consistent with Alexander's (2006:188) conclusion, the DLC played an important role 'in entrenching the politicised state and in linking access to land and

land rights to newly elaborated ideas about loyalty and authority'. The creation of partisan institutions as the medium of resource allocation had a major effect on the nature of rural differentiation in the countryside.

Even institutions that were to have an oversight over the government and party politics were targeted by war veterans so that they could conform through the use of violence. My findings showed that the magistrate's court, which was supposed to be a key institution in the arbitration of disputes over land, was forced to serve the interests of ZANU PF. There was evident politicisation of the judiciary as magistrate Masendeke who ruled against Fast Track was physically assaulted and threatened by the war veterans. The war veterans who assaulted him were not arrested even though they committed the crime in public. Rather the central state saw an opportunity to transfer the magistrate and replace him with magistrate Samuel Zuze who was loyal to ZANU PF and willing to put his loyalty to the party before his enforcement of the law for which he was rewarded with land. It is clear that ZANU PF was determined to enforce its control over the institution of the judiciary as chapter 3 has shown. Magistrate Chikwanha, who granted bail to MDC supporters, was beaten and had to flee for dear life. Other civil servants also came under pressure to support ZANU PF actions and decisions. The message was that the state institutions were supposed to shore up ZANU PF's political agenda. For example, as I have shown, magistrate Zuze who was deemed to be politically correct as he supported ZANU PF was rewarded with a lucrative A2 farm. In such a situation, key institutions that were supposed to allocate land, enforce the laws, and provide checks and balances over ZANU PF, were politicised. Many civil servants took the opportunity to manipulate the institutions and pursue their own interests with impunity. The ZANU PF national leadership tolerated them as long as they supported their party.

The state also side-lined technical ministries. As chapter 2 and chapter 5 demonstrated, the Ministry of Agriculture was side-lined in the distribution of post-settlement support. The RBZ, headed by Gideon Gono, an appointee of President Mugabe, took over the agricultural functions. This enabled the ZANU PF national leadership to have direct control over the distribution of farming inputs. The technical plans in the Ministry of Agriculture to revive agriculture gathered dust as the central bank took charge of post-settlement support. As demonstrated in chapter 4, the post-settlement input schemes were meant to assist ZANU PF and President Mugabe to gain political and electoral support especially toward the March 29, 2008 election.

In some cases the bureaucratic institutions were simply circumvented. Chapter 4 demonstrated how President Mugabe used the traditional leaders' institution to distribute farming inputs much to the chagrin of the Agritex officers who thought their expertise was being insulted. I have shown at length in chapter 2 and 3 why the traditional leaders were incorporated by ZANU PF. The use of the traditional leaders resulted in the partisan distribution of resources as the MDC MP attested to. Even though there were contradictions within the state, as shown by the disgruntlement of the Agritex officers, it became clear that ZANU PF was in control as local bureaucrats could not enforce their decisions. Even decisions to identify master farmers became politicised and in some cases master politicians were selected. The side-lining of the bureaucrats in resource distribution was necessary as the process ensured that farming inputs were distributed to those who were loyal to ZANU PF. State institutions were thus side-lined, restructured or coerced in order to serve the interests of ZANU PF locally and nationally.

We have now seen that the central state and the party were instrumental in the decision-making processes about who got land and eventually post-settlement support. The question we finally reflect on is how do we characterise the Zimbabwean state under these conditions?

My study is of theoretical value because some of the field-based studies (Dekker and Kinsey 2011, Moyo *et al*. 2009, Scoones *et al*. 2010) have not theorised or conceptualised the nature of the state and how the operations of party and state institutions impact on rural differentiation. The approach used in my study is not to use grand theories of understanding agrarian change and the African state but to use detailed and localised investigations, which led to a better understanding of the complexities of actual state practices and politics in land allocation, production and accumulation. As the study has shown, it is difficult to characterise the actual government, state and party actions as a single model. This level of concrete analysis of what the state is actually doing is a better basis on which to theorise the Zimbabwean state.

The empirical conclusions suggest a significant influence of patronage, corruption and clientelism. It is because of this that neo-patrimonial state theories are of use. As I have argued, the ZANU PF national leadership used land and farming inputs to create and mobilise clients for both political and electoral support. The clientelistic relationship helped us to understand why illegal processes of accumulation were allowed, land invasions supported or not stopped and why farming inputs were provided through non-agricultural institutions such as traditional leaders. Nevertheless,as Herbst (1990:5) writes, 'careful scholars…are now reluctant to make any kind of generalisation' about African states because it obscures variations. Some scholars like Dawson and Kelsall (2012b) characterise the post-2000 Zimbabwe state as neo-patrimonial without detailed field-based investigations. The analysis of the Zimbabwean state requires long term ethnographic work rather than what Olivier de Sardan (2009) calls 'essayism'. We have seen the relevance of ZANU PF as a political party, which was instrumental in the decision-making rather than mere personal rules which make it difficult to apply a blanket neo-patrimonial state theory. There are also actors within state institutions that still adhere to a technocratic logic such as some of the Agritex officials. In addition, there were individuals like Mr BD who worked in the social welfare

department and were committed to public service rather than personal gain as he attacked corruption by fellow government workers. Even magistrate Chikwanha still ruled against ZANU PF interests, which shows the conflicts within the state institutions rather than a uniform turn to the logic of patronage as Chabal and Daloz (1999) would like us to believe. Not all civil servants responded in a similar way. Even the ZANU PF leadership had to side-step the Ministry of Agriculture in the distribution of post-settlement support. The ministry could not be trusted because some bureaucrats retained an element of technocratic and bureaucratic decision making. The study did not seek to characterise the African political system as a whole but to investigate state operations at a local level. Its value is that, in future with an analysis of different empirically grounded case studies, one will be able to understand better the nature of the Zimbabwean state.

One clear finding about the nature of the party and state from this study is that it used a three pronged approach to stay in power and this approach shaped rural differentiation. First, the state used land as a source of patronage, giving out land to politically salient groups that were instrumental in mobilising political and electoral support. The political dynamics of inclusion in gaining access to land are a reflection of the ZANU PF leadership's attempt to gain political support through strategically allocating land to the four key groups of beneficiaries as identified in chapter 3. The beneficiaries continued to play a political role in order to keep the ZANU PF ruling elite in government. Secondly, the state used ideology to cast Fast Track as anti-colonial, and anti-imperial and co-opted traditional leaders and war veterans (also see Alexander 2006, McGregor 2002, Sadomba 2011, Tendi 2010). This was done through ideological patriotic appeals. Farm workers perceived to be opposition members were called sell-outs. As Raftopolous (2003, 2006) argued, this was exclusive nationalism that created insiders (those loyal to ZANU PF) and outsiders (those perceived to be acting outside the interest of ZANU PF). The third interrelated aspect is the use of violence as 'nationalism was recast in violent and intolerant mode as the foundation of the Third

Chimurenga' (Alexander 2006:194). As my study has shown violence was used to silence opposition elements and critical individuals such as magistrate Masendeke and in some cases to accumulate during land invasions in what Sachikonye (2011) conceptualised as 'coercive accumulation'. Depending on the political threat to ZANU PF, the security services played a central role in orchestrating violence and were rewarded with land. The three propositions, violence, ideology and patronage, enabled us to understand how the state operated in post-2000 Zimbabwe and why. The value of this study is in integrating the party and state practices in the analysis of agrarian change, including beneficiary selection, production and accumulation.

Whilst my approach lacks the flamboyance of grand theories in trying to understand African politics such as predatory states (see Bratton and Masunungure 2011), instrumentalisation of disorder (Chabal and Daloz 1999, Marongwe 2008) or neo-patrimony (Clapham 1985, Brett 2012, Dawson and Kelsall 2012) the three propositions I have used are more likely to be useful than broad labels that tend to generalise about the nature of the Zimbabwean state. These three propositions can also be tested in other studies of state, politics and agrarian change in different parts of the country or in different countries and results may vary with specific circumstances. The three concepts have enabled us to understand better the variables that are important in understanding the post-2000 Zimbabwe politics. A grand approach is always going to be problematic because political developments in Zimbabwe are rapidly changing and it is difficult to capture a moving target and there are genuinely different logics of power at work. My approach avoids abstract, general conclusions and provides a more fine-grained picture of the Zimbabwean state. This enables us to integrate the state's role and wider politics in the analysis of production and accumulation by the new farmers.

6.7 Conclusion

The study has shown that partisan politics played a central role in how people gained access to land, farming inputs and farm implements on the studied farms. Studies on Fast Track must reflect more on the empirical reality of how state institutions and how political processes work in order to adequately understand rural differentiation. Only this kind of empirically grounded research can bring out the actions of the state, the use of violence, patronage and ideology, in ways that enhance our understanding of the Zimbabwean state. Though still acknowledging the role of other factors such as beneficiaries' different claims to land (Fontein 2006), hard work by the resettled farmers (Scoones *et al*. 2010) economic factors (Dekker and Kinsey 2011, Moyo *et al*. 2009) and social networks (Berry 1993, Murisa 2011), it is through the integration of political processes in the analysis of agrarian change that one can understand better the dynamics that shape rural differentiation in post-2000 Zimbabwe.

-The end!-

Appendix 1

Agrarian change in Zimbabwe: politics, production and accumulation

Research Questionnaire
July 2010

INTRODUCTION

Greetings! My name is Phillan Zamchiya. I come from Zamchiya village, here in Chipinge district. However, I am here as a DPhil student from the University of Oxford. My research is to find out how you got the land and what you have been doing with the land that is what your household has been producing and what you are getting out of the land including challenges you are facing.

I would like to interview you for this research. If you agree, I will take about two hours of your time. I can promise you that this will be anonymous. That means, I will not write down your name and nobody will know that the answers you give me came from you. I can also promise you that your answers will be used for the purposes of completion of my doctoral degree and may help government in making future decisions in your area. Will you agree to be interviewed?

Thank you very much!

BACKGROUND QUESTIONS
A.1. Name of farm:
A.2. Place:
A.3. Date:
A.4. Sex of respondent (male or female):
A.5. Age of respondent:
A.6. Home (first) language of respondent:

1) HOUSEHOLD DEMOGRAPHICS, ASSETS& INVESTMENTS

1. What type of house does the respondent live in? *Tick one only*

Brick house	1
Wooden shack	2
Zinc shack (corrugated iron)	3
Round thatched hut	4
Other (please specify what kind of house)	6

2. How many people live with you here? *(provide numbers for each category)*

Gender	Number
Women 18 and older	
Men 18 and older	
Girls under 18 years	
Boys under 18 years	

3. How many adults in this household have a regular or permanent job? *(provide numbers)*

Adults	Number
Women	
Men	

4. How many adults in this household have a seasonal or casual job?

Adults	Number
Women	
Men	

5. How many rooms do you have? *(do not include bathroom)*

1 –– 2	1
3 –– 4	2
5 –– 6	3
7 or more	4

5. Tell me about your house. Is it:

Self-built	1
Former farm workers' compound	2
Former farm owner's house	3
On arrangement with owner	4
Other (please specify)	5

6. Do you have electricity in your home? Tick one : Yes No

7. Where do you get drinking water most of the time? *(tick one)*_

River	1
Stream	2
Public tap	3
Hand tap at home	4
Borehole	6
Spring	7
Dam or pond	8
Rainwater tank	9
Other	10

8. Does your household have any of the following in working order? *Please ask all categories. If yes indicate date of accumulation*

Refrigerator (fridge)	Date of acquire	Yes	No
Radio		Yes	No
Television		Yes	No
Axes/ shovels		Yes	No
Bottle stores/shebeens		Yes	No
Shops such as tuck shops		Yes	No
Tractors		Yes	No
Ox drawn carts		Yes	No
Telephone (landline)		Yes	No
Cellular phone		Yes	No
Vehicle/ car		Yes	No
Ploughs		Yes	No
Hoes		Yes	No
Computer		Yes	No

List other assets:

9. What is the education level of the farm holder? Please tick one.

Primary	1
ZJC	2
O-Level	3
A-Level	4
Tertiary	5

10. What kind of agricultural training do you have? Please tick as many as possible

Master Farmer	1
Agricultural colleges	2
University	3
Knowledge from family	4
Nothing	5

2) FARM PRODUCTION INFORMATION

READ THIS: Because this research I am doing is about whether land can help people to get out of a particular social stratum, I want to know about the livestock you keep and the crops you grow.

11. How many of the following livestock does your household have? *Please indicate how many for each category and list the number and amount you have sold, consumed or given away in the last 12 months*

Livestock	Number	Consumed	Sold/ Given away	Cash Income	Income in kind (Barter)
Cattle					
Sheep					
Goats					
Horses					
Donkeys					
Pigs					
Poultry					
Other products, milk and eggs					

12. Did you acquire your livestock before settlement? Tick one: Yes	No

13. How did you acquire your livestock? If Yes, indicate how many in last blank column?

Barter trade	Yes	No	
Bought it	Yes	No	
Brought it from former home	Yes	No	
Breeding	Yes	No	
Took from former farm owner	Yes	No	
Other	Yes	No	

14. How and where do you market your livestock? Provide details.

15. Tell me about the processing of your livestock?

16. Can you tell me about undomesticated animals that have contributed to your household wellbeing? *Please indicate how many for each category and list the name and amount you have sold, consumed or given away in the last 12 months*

Animal	**Number**	**Consumed**	**Sold/ Given away**	**Cash Income**	**Income in kind (Barter)**

17. Does your household grow crops? Yes No

18. If yes, outline crops planted, harvested, sold, consumed and income in the past year. Indicate the exchange product if it's barter trade.

Crop	Area planted	Amount harvested	Volume sold	Volume consumed	Cash income or in kind (Barter)
Maize harvest 1 in a year					
Maize harvest 2 in a year					
Beans					
Cowpeas					
Vegetables					
Tobacco					
Coffee					
Fruit					
Other					

19. For what purpose do you grow crops? *Please ask each category*

Household use only	Yes	No
Household use and to sell some	Yes	No
Household use and barter trade some	Yes	No
Household use and to give some away		
Produce to sell only	Yes	No
Other	Yes	No

20. How did you access your farming inputs for the past year?

Inputs	Source
Labour	
Seed	
Fertilizer	
Chemicals	
Transport	
Ox (draft power)	
Tractor (draft power)	
Hoes	
Other (specify)	

Tell me about the processing of your crops before selling?

21. How and where do you market your crops?

Provide details

22. Does your household have individual or shared access to the following?

Land	Shared	Individual
Field for cultivation		
Grazing land		

23. Do you feel secure on this land? Tick one: Yes No

24. Why? Provide details

25. What rights do you have to this land? *Please provide just one answer.*

Do not have this	1
Offer letter	2
25 year permit to occupy	3
99 year leasehold	4
I paid for it	5
I inherited it	6
I just use it without permission from anyone	7
Land district committee gives permission	8
War veteran gives permission	9
Headman gives permission	10
Rent / lease (pay for it)	11
Other *(please specify)*	12

26. If you have land apart from this, what rights do you have to that land? *Please provide just one answer.*

I do not have this	1
Communal land	3
Title deed- bought it	4
Title deed- inherited it	5
Just occupies	6
Council gives permission	7
Farmer/Employer gives permission	8
Rent / lease (pay for it)	9
Other *(please specify*	10

27. Where is that land? Provide region or district

28. What do you do with that land? Provide detail

29. Do you and your household use all the land you occupy on this resettlement farm?

Yes	No

30. What do you use land for? *Ask each category*

Housing	Yes	No
Grazing livestock	Yes	No
Cultivation of food for my household	Yes	No
Cultivation of food for sale	Yes	No
Cultivation of other crops for sale	Yes	No
Other (specify)		

30a) How much of the land did you use for the following? Ask each category.

Category	Amount in hectares
Housing	
Grazing livestock	
Cultivation of food for my household	
Cultivation of food for sale	
Cultivation of other crops for sale	

31. How much land do you own? *(in hectares))* ……..

32. How did you access the land? *(be as specific as possible)*

……

……

33. Do you hire labour?

Yes	No	It depends

34. If yes, is it permanent or seasonal and how much do you spend on labour per year?

Labour	Amount
Seasonal	
Permanent	

35. Provide the gender of your labour?

Gender	Number
Male	
Female	

36. If payment is not in cash, specify……

……

.37. Do you use family labour?

Yes	No

38. Rank the type of labour you use most in the past year. With 1 being the dominant

Labour	Rank
Family	
Seasonal	
Permanent	

3) ACCESS TO STATE, SOCIAL AND PARTY INSTITUTIONS

39. Have you ever indicated to government that you and your household need farming assistance?

Yes	No

40. If yes, who did you approach? *(tick as many as you need to)*

Council	Yes	No
Ministry of Land& rural resettlement	Yes	No
Ministry of Agriculture, mechanization and irrigation	Yes	No
Headman/chief	Yes	No
Ministry of Water resource and development	Yes	No
Political party	Yes	No
War veterans committee	Yes	No
Ward councilor	Yes	No
Other *(please specify)*	Yes	No

41. Have you ever indicated to a non-governmental organisation that you and your household need farming assistance?

Yes	No

42. If yes, who did you approach? (tick as many as you need)

Local NGOs	Yes	No
International NGOs	Yes	No

43. Can you list the names of the NGOs?

44. What kind of support did you receive? Be as specific as possible

45. Did you already have resources that you could invest in farming, when you got land? What are these?

.....

.....

46. What support would you have needed before you got onto the land?

.....

.....

4) HOUSEHOLD INCOME

47. How much income did your household receive in the past year from these different sources? *Please indicate for each category either how many US dollars, or nothing, or don't know*

On farm agricultural activities	US	Nothing	Don't know
War veterans pension fund	US	Nothing	Don't know
Chiefs fund	US	Nothing	Don't know

Church fund	US	Nothing	Don't know
Maintenance (from child's father)	US	Nothing	Don't know
Rent	US	Nothing	Don't know
Permanent work	US	Nothing	Don't know
Seasonal work	US	Nothing	Don't know
Remittances from family members sending money	US	Nothing	Don't know
Pension fund from work	US	Nothing	Don't know
Money from your lover/ assistant	US	Nothing	Don't know
Other	US	Nothing	Don't know

48. Can you list the goods and quantity that your household received in kind in the past year?

Goods	Quantity	Source

49.Source (region) of remittances: (Tick as many as possible)

South Africa	1
Mozambique	2
United Kingdom	3
United States of America	4
Botswana	5
Zambia	6
Within Zimbabwe	7
Other specify	8

50. What is the source of remittances (Activities) (Tick as many as possible).

Diamonds	1
Gold panning	2
Border jumping	3
Cross-border trade	4
Circular migration	5
Long term migration	6
Formal employment within Zimbabwe	7
Other	

51. How much did you use your household income for? *Please indicate for each category either how many US dollars, or nothing, or don't know*

School fees	US	Nothing	Don't know
Medical expenses	US	Nothing	Don't know
Household Assets	US	Nothing	Don't know
Farming inputs	US	Nothing	Don't know
Farming labour	US	Nothing	Don't know
Savings	US	Nothing	Don't know
Livestock	US	Nothing	Don't know
Transport	US	Nothing	Don't know
Leisure	US	Nothing	Don't know
Alcoholic beverages	US	Nothing	Don't know
Other	US	Nothing	Don't know

52. What was the total household income last year?

US	Nothing	Don't know

53. What else would you want that you can not afford? List.

54. How do you think you can improve your sources of income?

55. Does your household have any debts? Tick one only.

Yes	No

56. If yes, where do you owe the debt? Tick as many as possible.

Family members	1
Friends	2
Banks	3

5) **HOUSEHOLD FOOD SECURITY**

57. Over the past year, was there a time when you and your household had very little to eat?

Yes	No

	January	Yes	No
	February	Yes	No
	March	Yes	No
	April	Yes	No
	May	Yes	No
	June	Yes	No
	July	Yes	No
	August	Yes	No
	September	Yes	No
	October	Yes	No
	November	Yes	No
	December	Yes	No

59. What did you do when household had very little to eat? *Please answer each category*

Received food from churches	Yes	No
Received food from extended family and friends	Yes	No
Borrowed food	Yes	No
Asked for credit at the store	Yes	No
Worked for another farmer for food	Yes	No
Received food aid from political party	Yes	No
Could not do anything	Yes	No
Received food aid from NGOs	Yes	No
Collected food from rubbish dump	Yes	No
Other	Yes	No

60. How many meals do the adults in your household usually have a day?

0	1	2	3	4	5

61. Is it the same between males and females?

Yes	No

62. How many meals do children (0-5 years) in your household usually have a day?

There are no children	0	1	2	3	4	5

63. In a week, how often do people in your household eat the following? *Please ask each category*

Meat	Once a week	4-5 times a week	Every day	Never	Don't know
Sugar	Once a week	4-5 times a week	Every day	Never	Don't know
Bread (from shops)	Once a week	4-5 times a week	Every day	Never	Don't know
Milk	Once a week	4-5 times a week	Every day	Never	Don't know
Fruits	Once a week	4-5 times a week	Every day	Never	Don't know
Vegetables	Once a week	4-5 times a week	Every day	Never	Don't know
Mieliemeal	Once a week	4-5 times a week	Every day	Never	Don't know
Snacks (cake, chips, etc)	Once a week	4-5 times a week	Every day	Never	Don't know

64. Overall, when you compare to years before resettlement, does your household now eat:

More	Less	The same

6) POLITICAL AND SOCIAL NETWORKS

65. Do any household members belong to these institutions? *Please ask all categories*

Traditional leaders institution	Yes	No
Family of traditional leaders	Yes	No
Bandla or local traditional leaders committee	Yes	No
Ward committee	Yes	No
Small-scale farmers' association	Yes	No
Ward committee	Yes	No
Livestock group	Yes	No
Vegetable garden group	Yes	No
Field/ cropping group	Yes	No

Zimbabwe National Liberation War veterans Association	Yes	No
Detainees and collaborators association	Yes	No
Committee of seven	Yes	No
Political party	Yes	No
Other on farm authorities committee	Yes	No
Church	Yes	No
Youth group	Yes	No
School committee	Yes	No
Health committee or HIV support group	Yes	No
Drinking / shebeen group	Yes	No
Other *(please specify)*		

7) HOUSEHOLD VULNERABILITY

66 Has your household suffered from disasters / big problems / shocks in the last year? *Please ask each category*

Natural disasters (fire, floods, damage, wind, etc.)	Yes	No
Death in the household	Yes	No
A serious illness in the household	Yes	No
Loss of a full-time job	Yes	No
Loss of a casual or temporary job	Yes	No
Loss of possession / theft	Yes	No
Assault of household member	Yes	No
Witchcraft	Yes	No
Violence in the household	Yes	No
A serious accident	Yes	No
Death of many livestock	Yes	No
Rape	Yes	No
Eviction from your home on a farm	Yes	No
Eviction from your home in communal areas	Yes	No
Violence in the community	Yes	No
Deserted by husband/ wife/ long-term partner	Yes	No

8) ORIGINS AND MOTIVATIONS FOR SEEKING LAND.

67. Did you live in Chipinge district before you came to this farm ?

Yes	No

68. Where did you live before you came? *Please indicate what district*
…….

69. When did you leave the area of origin? *Please give the year.* ……..

70. What work were you doing before you came to this farm?

Summarise.

71. What social status did you hold in society?

72. How would you identify yourself?

73. What status do you think was more crucial in helping you gain access to land? Provide details

74. What motivated you to seek land?

Provide details

75. Have you left your original area Tick one? Yes No

Why? Provide details

76. If you left would you consider going back? Tick one.

Yes	No

77. Why?

78. Did you vote in the last harmonised 2008 elections?

Yes	No	Don't remember

9) SOCIAL SERVICES, HEALTH AND EDUCATION

79. How would you rate the conditions of your health and education services ? Tick one only.

Excellent	Average	Poor

80. How many of your household members have been sick during the last year? *Number:*

81. How many of your household members have been sick for more than six months? *Number:*

82. Where do your household members seek help when ill?

Clinic	1
Hospital	2
Private surgery	3
Traditional healer	4
Spirit medium	5
Pastor- church	6
Other	7

83. Are any of your household members disabled? *Please write number, or indicate none or don't know.*

Blindness		None	Don't know
Deafness		None	Don't know
Physical disability		None	Don't know

Mental illness		None	Don't know
Chronically ill		None	Don't know
Other *(please specify)*		None	Don't know
Total number of disabled people		None	Don't know

10) HOUSEHOLD FUTURE PROSPECTS

84. How would you rate your household at the moment? Choose one only

We always have enough	1
We sometimes have enough	2
We often do not have enough	3
We never have enough	4

85. Over the last 10 years, how have things changed for your household? Have they *(choose one only)*:

Got a lot better	1
Got a bit better	2
Stayed about the same	3
Got a bit worse	4
Got a lot worse	5

86. What do you and your household need most at the moment? In other words, what could other people, the community, or the government, do to help you and your household to improve your life?

.....
.....
.....
.....

87. Do you think your household will be better or worse off in five years time?

Better off	Same as now	Worse off	Don't know

88. Can you tell me why?

.....
.....

89. How do you think this can be addressed?

.....
.....

.....
.....

.....
.....

THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR TIME AND FOR SHARING THIS INFORMATION WITH ME!

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