

# **POWER TO THE PARENTS?**

PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE, CIVIL SOCIETY, AND THE  
QUALITY OF DEMOCRACY IN RURAL HONDURAS AND  
GUATEMALA

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## ABSTRACT

This thesis examines whether and how participatory governance (PG), a model for incorporating citizen participation in designing and/or implementing strategies to solve public problems, can strengthen civil society and improve the quality of democracy. The study focuses on community-managed schools (CMS) in Honduras and Guatemala, arguably each country's largest PG initiative, in which parents managed rural schools.

This thesis advances a "political capabilities" framework to explore state efforts to strengthen civil society and improve the quality of democracy. I use a mixed-methods approach, centering on surveys of over 2,000 parents and eight community case studies.

My research first shows how different long-standing political legacies—"controlled inclusion" in Honduras and "coerced marginalization" in Guatemala—impinged on CMS. In Honduras, patronage networks captured CMS. In Guatemala, community- and national-level polarization contributed to CMS's reversal. Both undermined the CMS model and reduced the likelihood that participants would develop political capabilities.

Despite these obstacles to stimulating civil society, I find surprising evidence of important individual-level "spillover" effects—such as gaining skills and increasing participation in other organizations—among a non-trivial minority of participating parents. Moreover, regressions and case study analysis indicate that state support, parents' level of involvement, and parents' perceptions of council effectiveness and democraticness can increase the likelihood of certain spillovers.

Still, prior organizational experience remains the best predictor of subsequent participation and leadership. And qualitative analysis further demonstrates the limits of CMS's impacts on rural civil society. For the most part, individuals have not used newly acquired skills to build new types of groups and organize autonomously. Instead, community organizations remain very limited in their scope of action and heavily circumscribed by the state.

In sum, this thesis demonstrates how, through one type of PG initiative, states can stimulate participation and produce changes in individuals' civic and political behavior. But CMS was not a "game-changer" for rural civil society—the link from incremental changes in individual behavior to how rural communities organize themselves and engage with the state remains tenuous.

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## ABBREVIATIONS

AECO	Asociación Educativa Comunitaria (Community Education Association)
ANACH	Asociación Nacional de Campesinos de Honduras (National Association of Honduran Peasants)
ANM	Asamblea Nacional del Magisterio (National Teachers' Assembly)
APF	Asociación de Padres de Familia (Parents' Association)
ASC	Asamblea de Sociedad Civil (Civil Society Assembly)
CACIF	Comité Coordinador de Asociaciones Agrícolas, Comerciales, Industriales y Financieras (Coordinating Committee for Agricultural, Commercial, Industrial, and Financial Associations)
CERJ	Consejo de Comunidades Etnicas Runujel Junam (Runujel Junam Council of Ethnic Communities)
CGTG	Confederación General de Trabajadores de Guatemala (General Workers' Confederation of Guatemala)
CMS	Community-Managed Schools
CNCG	Confederación Nacional Campesina de Guatemala (National Peasant Confederation of Guatemala)
CNT	Confederación Nacional de Trabajadores (National Confederation of Workers)
COCODE	Consejo Comunitario de Desarrollo (Community Development Council)
COEDUCA	Comité Educativo (Education Committee)
COLPROSUMAH	Colegio Profesional Superación Magisterial de Honduras (Professional Association for Teacher Betterment of Honduras)
COMUDE	Consejo Municipal de Desarrollo (Municipal Development Council)
CONAVIGUA	Coordinadora Nacional de Viudas de Guatemala (National Coordination of Guatemalan Widows)
CONIC	Coordinadora Nacional Indígena y Campesina (National Indigenous and Peasant Coordination)
COPMAGUA	La Coordinación de Organizaciones del Pueblo Maya de Guatemala (Coordination of Mayan Peoples' Organizations of Guatemala)
CPF	Consejo de Padres de Familia (Parent Council, Guatemala)

CPM	Comité pro mejoramiento (Community Improvement Committee)
CSO	Civil society organization
CUC	Comité de Unidad Campesina (Peasant Unity Committee)
EDUCO	Educación con Participación de la Comunidad (Education with Community Participation, El Salvador)
EGP	Ejército Guerrillero de los Pobres (Guerrilla Army of the Poor)
EPG	Empowered Participatory Governance
FENACH	Federación Nacional de Campesinos Hondureños (National Federation of Honduran Peasants)
FESITRANH	Federación Sindical de Trabajadores Nacionales de Honduras (Syndical Federation of the National Workers of Honduras)
FOH	Federación Obrera Hondureña (Honduran Workers Federation)
FONAC	Foro Nacional de Convergencia (National Convergence Forum)
FONAPAZ	Fondo Nacional para la Paz (National Fund for Peace)
FSH	Federación Sindical Hondureña (Honduran Sindical Federation)
GAM	Grupo de Apoyo Mutuo (Mutual Support Group)
ISE	Institución de Servicios Educativos (Education Service Institution)
MFA	Mi Familia Aprende (My Family Learns)
MINEDUC	Ministerio de Educación (Ministry of Education, Guatemala)
NGO	Non-governmental organization
ORPA	Organización Revolucionario del Pueblo en Armas (Revolutionary Organization of the People in Arms)
PAC	Patrulla de Autodefensa Civil (Civil Defense Patrol)
PB	Participatory Budgeting
PD	Participatory Development
PG	Participatory Governance
PL	Partido Liberal de Honduras (Liberal Party)
PN	Partido Nacional de Honduras (National Party)
PRICHMA	Primer Colegio Profesional Hondureño de Maestros (First Professional Teachers' Association of Honduras)
PRODESSA	Proyecto de Desarrollo Santiago (Santiago Development Project)

PROHECO	Programa Hondureño de Educación Comunitaria (Honduran Community Education Program)
PRONADE	Programa Nacional de Autogestión para el Desarrollo Educativo (National Program of Educational Self-Management)
SE	Secretaría de Educación (Secretariat of Education, Honduras)
SITRATERCO	Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Tela Railroad Company (Workers' Syndicate of the Tela Railroad Company)
STEG	Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Educación de Guatemala (Guatemalan Education Workers' Union)
UCD	Unión Cívica Democrática (Civic Democratic Union)
UCG	Unión Campesina de Guatemala (Guatemalan Peasant Union)
UNDP	United Nations Development Program (PNUD in Spanish)
UNICAN	Asociación Unidad Indígena Campesina del Norte (United Association of Northern Indigenous Farmers)
URNG	Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity)
WB	World Bank

## 1. INTRODUCTION

As Honduras and Guatemala made the transition to democratic competition in the 1990s,<sup>1</sup> social, economic, and political marginalization was the order of the day in rural areas. For decades, peasants had remained excluded from most state services, including education, health care, and access to justice. And, whether because of geographic isolation, a lack of education, or the specter of state repression, these rural citizens rarely organized themselves to address these problems or engage with the state. Things were, however, beginning to change, as both governments sought to address some of this rampant exclusion. In the late 1990s, both governments encouraged parents in these rural communities to form school councils. Each government promised remote communities their first ever schools, as well as the opportunity for parents to participate in making decisions about the services they would receive from the state.

Over ten years after the creation of such community-managed schools (CMS) in Guatemala and Honduras, this thesis examines these schools as critical sites for understanding the prospects and challenges of citizen participation in the countryside. This study explores these school councils' impacts on parents' civic and political behavior, and, more broadly, on their communities' organizational life. I explore this case to shed light on whether participatory governance initiatives—of which CMS may be the largest case in both countries—can stimulate rural civil society. Reversing the pervasive disengagement and exclusion from civic and political life in these rural areas would mark an important step toward improving the quality of democracy.

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<sup>1</sup> While the 1980s brought political liberalization, neither country met the minimal conditions for democracy until well into the 1990s (see below and Chapter Three).

## I. The Context and The Research Question

By the late 1990s, Honduras and Guatemala were both democracies. Each state had slashed the size, budget, and political influence of its military, allowed leftist political parties to compete, and reduced state repression of civilians and oppositional civic and political organizations. Electoral reforms also increased political competition. In Guatemala, for instance, the introduction of micro-regional voting stations began to address very low rural voter turnout; notably, the 2007 election was the first time that a presidential candidate won the election while *losing* in the capital, demonstrating that rural areas were a decisive factor (Azpuru and Blanco 2008). In Honduras, meanwhile, a switch to open-list proportional representation in Honduras expanded voter choice (Taylor-Robinson 2007; Taylor-Robinson 2003).

Despite these and other important changes, both countries remained “low-quality” democracies.<sup>2</sup> Pervasive impunity and rampant crime revealed the weakness of the rule of law, and access to justice and state institutions remained a privilege of the few. Clientelism and corruption also remained rife, contributing to unprecedented numbers of citizens who were unhappy with politics, distrustful of democratic institutions, and who no longer saw the benefits of democracy over authoritarian rule (Azpuru 2008; Coleman and Argueta 2008). Even before Honduras’s 2009 coup, scholars warned that the country had reached a dangerous political precipice, where dissatisfaction with political institutions, coupled with human and economic uncertainty, reduced citizens’ commitment to democracy (Coleman and Argueta 2008; Seligson and Booth 2010; Ruhl 2010). The picture was similar in Guatemala, leaving these two democracies arguably as fragile as any in Latin American (Azpuru 2008; Seligson and Booth 2010).

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<sup>2</sup> On the “quality of democracy,” I follow O’Donnell et al. (2004) and Diamond and Morlino (2005). See Chapter Two for more on specification of all major concepts introduced here.

Scholars of democratization have long considered civil society<sup>3</sup> a key factor for reversing this type of trend and increasing the quality of democracy. Citizens' capacity to organize themselves and engage with the state—sometimes cooperatively, sometimes contentiously—constitutes a crucial ingredient of liberal democracy.<sup>4</sup> Civil society can increase the quality of democracy by enabling citizens to engage with the state and articulate their needs, fight for rights and combat injustice, and promote transparency and the rule of law (see Chapter Two).

Scholars of nascent democracies have particularly emphasized the importance of ensuring the right and ability of previously-excluded citizens to participate in civic and political life. As Diamond and Morlino (2005, xl) have argued:

For those who lack effective political skills and resources—be it because of poverty, illiteracy, discrimination, or other forms of marginalization—democracy is always liable to be seen as lacking quality. Leveling such inequalities, giving voice to the voiceless, and bringing all citizens more fully into the arenas of civic participation and political competition remain the most enduring and difficult challenges for the deepening of democracy.

Put simply, the civic and political incorporation of marginalized people—especially the granting of rights and the promotion of the exercise of those rights—is a critical component of enriching the quality of democracy.

In Honduras and Guatemala, each with pervasive legacies of political, social, and economic exclusion, "bringing in" the voiceless responds to concerns of liberty and equity, but could also help achieve other democratic goals, such as the protection of minority rights and the mitigation of abuses of state power. But civil society has

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<sup>3</sup> This thesis adopts Linz and Stepan's (1996a, 17) definition of civil society as "that arena of the polity where self-organizing and relatively autonomous groups, movements, and individuals attempt to articulate values, to create associations and solidarities, and to advance their interests."

<sup>4</sup> This thesis adopts Schmitter and Karl's (1991) expanded version of Dahl's procedural definition of democracy. Schmitter and Karl add two conditions to Dahl's standard seven: that elected officials not be subject to veto powers by unelected ones (e.g., the military), and that a state be self-governing.

remained weak since each democracy's dawn, especially among historically-excluded communities. In both countries, authoritarian regimes dominated the political landscape for the vast majority of the 180 years since independence, stifling citizens' efforts to organize themselves. With political liberalization and transitions to democracy in the 1980s and 1990s, much political space has opened for civil society organizations (CSOs), but these groups still confront pervasive (albeit different) authoritarian legacies—especially co-optation and patronage in Honduras and overt exclusion in Guatemala.

Civil society is particularly weak in rural areas, where most poor peasants eke out subsistence livings (PNUD 2006). In Honduras and Guatemala, remote rural areas constitute democracy's most obvious "brown areas" (O'Donnell 1993)—areas that lack not only basic services but also access to state institutions. Though intra-community trust and informal cooperation often remain high in these communities, formal organizational life lags far behind (PNUD 2006; Anderson 1994). With pressing material needs, low levels of education, and often prohibitive communication and transportation problems, Central American peasants face considerable collective action problems. Where present, CSOs remain severely limited in their scope of action, and citizens enjoy only minimal access to state institutions. In Guatemala, indigenous peasants (there are far fewer in Honduras) face additional ethno-linguistic barriers.

These rural sites, then, present one of the greatest challenges to these countries' goal of becoming inclusive liberal democracies. They present analysts and policy-makers with the question of how to foster a rural civil society capable of expressing citizens' needs and demands and engaging effectively with political institutions.

One answer in both countries has been decentralization, which promised to increase citizen involvement in government affairs by expanding channels for demands for state

services and mechanisms to oversee government. These efforts demonstrate an increased nominal government commitment to opening up democracy in these countries since the mid-1990s.<sup>5</sup> Still, decentralization has typically stopped at the level of local governments, and often been weakened by the central government (Programa Estado de la Nación 2008).<sup>6</sup> Moreover, though transferring some resources and authority to local offices may have made it easier for citizens to visit government offices with the capacity to help them, decentralization has often failed to foster new spaces for citizen participation.<sup>7</sup>

In the context of decentralization, both governments have also sought to address rural disengagement through participatory governance (PG) initiatives.<sup>8</sup> I follow Fung and Wright (2003, 23-25) in defining PG as government-led initiatives to solve practical, public problems (e.g., education provision) by facilitating the participation of ordinary citizens in local deliberative fora with decision-making authority. Through PG, states can try to meet critical development goals (such as expanding education), while simultaneously creating new spaces for citizens to engage in democratic life—forming community organizations, establishing community priorities, and making decisions about important matters that affect them. Contrary to prior, top-down policies and programs, proponents argue that PG initiatives can create “schools of democracy,” where people learn to work together, identify and advocate for their needs, and engage with other communities and the state.

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<sup>5</sup> On decentralization in Latin America, see Cabrero 2007; Brinkerhoff, Brinkerhoff, and McNulty 2007; Oxhorn, Tulchin, and Selee 2004.

<sup>6</sup> On weak decentralization in the Honduran and Guatemalan education systems, see Programa de Promoción de la Reforma Educativa en América Latina y el Caribe 2003; Rápalo 2003; MERECE (OEI-GTZ and SE-SEFIN 2009).

<sup>7</sup> The COCODE system in Guatemala is an important exception, discussed in Chapter Six.

<sup>8</sup> I follow the 1990 United Nations definition of governance as “the exercise of political, economic and administrative authority in the management of a country’s affairs” (cited by Cheema and Rondinelli 2007, 6).

This study focuses on one such PG initiative, community-managed schools (CMS). I focus on CMS because they were the largest such initiatives in both countries in the first full decade of democracy. And, whereas PG initiatives studied elsewhere in Latin America tend to focus on urban areas, CMS offers a case of the state targeting its rural “brown areas” (see below for more on case selection). I use this case to explore whether PG initiatives can realize one of their avowed goals—changing participants' civic and political behavior—in areas where democracy is arguably weakest. In particular, I examine whether one PG initiative has increased participants' "political capabilities,” defined as “the institutional and organizational resources as well as collective ideas available for effective political action” (Whitehead and Gray-Molina 2003, 32). Widespread evidence of increased political capabilities would suggest the strengthening of rural civil society. This, as I argue in Chapter Two, can in turn improve the quality of democracy. I discuss the political capabilities framework in detail below and in Chapter Two, but for now it will suffice to present this study's central question: *Can the state increase participants' political capabilities through participatory governance initiatives? And, if so, how?*

## II. Existing Literature and Open Questions

Studies in other parts of the world demonstrate that PG initiatives can become critical sites for examining this state – civil society relationship. Other studies have already reported certain "spillover effects"—i.e., impacts on the civic and political behavior of participants *outside* the arena of the original initiative (Fox 1996; Corrales 2006). For instance, various scholars find that Brazilian participatory budgeting (PB) enhances political learning, deliberation, oversight and mobilization, and saves communities from elite capture (Baiocchi 2001; Avritzer 2002; Souza 2001). Others have shown how Kerala's People's Campaign for Decentralised Planning fosters local associational life and

a democratic ethos (Heller, Harilal, and Chaudhuri 2007). Similarly, a group of researchers finds that participation in Indonesia's Kecamatan Development Program promotes conflict avoidance and resolution (Barron, Diprose, and Woolcock 2006).<sup>9</sup>

But this literature, explored further in Chapter Two, also cautions against assuming that 1) the state is committed to strengthening civil society or 2) even with state commitment, that these programs will play a positive role in civil society development. Some note that participatory initiatives can fall prey to patronage politics and co-optation by local officials (Souza 2001; Heller, Harilal, and Chaudhuri 2007). Others find that groups stop participating once their demands are met (Grindle 2007). And Nylen (2002) concludes that PB has far less impact on the civic and political behavior of previously-disengaged participants, suggesting that certain participatory initiatives fail to shift intra-community dynamics of participation and power relationships.

These accounts present an unsettled debate, in which the question of whether and how PG can stimulate civil society remains largely unanswered. It remains particularly so in rural areas, on which studies of PG have focused less. These previous studies also raise important secondary questions for this study.

First, the potential for patronage capture and/or co-optation forces one to consider the state's role in fostering civil society. This thesis begins from the premise that the state can play a critical role in supporting civil society development, especially in marginalized communities where civil society will not likely emerge unaided (Corrales 2006; Walzer 1999; Houtzager 2003). That said, state involvement in civil society raises a critical question about the autonomy of citizen efforts to organize themselves (Fox 1994): At what point does state support become state encroachment, and is there a way to have the

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<sup>9</sup> For consideration of spillover effects with a Central American example, see Seligson 2006.

former without the latter in countries where the state has long dominated civic life through co-optation and/or repression?

Second, Nylén's finding, in addition to casting doubt about any automatic positive effects of PG, prompts a further question: assuming that PG can increase civic and political engagement in marginalized communities, which types of individuals and communities does it impact? Will the seeds of participation bear fruit only in fertile ground—e.g., people with relatively greater income, education, and prior organizational experiences? Or can state support—e.g., through training and technical assistance—help create new local leaders and open up participation to newly-active adults? Nylén partially addresses these questions for one urban initiative in two Brazilian cities, but it remains unclear whether his results will hold in contexts as different as rural Central America.

To shed light on these secondary questions, as well as the primary question presented above, this thesis will scrutinize the impact of one type of PG initiative on rural civil society. To my knowledge, this thesis is the first attempt to undertake this challenge in Central America. It will also address critical questions left unanswered by studies of PG in other parts of the world. Furthermore, the study will address these questions at a scale unmatched by prior studies, incorporating survey data covering the entire country of Honduras and department of Alta Verapaz, Guatemala, as well as four case studies from each country. This body of quantitative and qualitative data will enable me to explore PG from several different angles: 1) the incidence and broader implications of changes in the civic and political behavior of participants; 2) the factors accounting for why some participants and communities change, while others do not; and 3) the bi-directional relationship between political context and a PG initiative—that is, how each political context shapes the practice of PG, and how PG influences each political context.

I will examine these issues by focusing on community-managed schools. This thesis focuses on CMS for various reasons. First, in both countries, these programs were the most sweeping government efforts to spur civic participation at the dawn of democracy. Second, they explicitly targetted the most remote rural communities, where democracy was weakest. Third, CMS focuses on education, a universal issue for developing countries, unlike studies of more *sui generis* governance and development initiatives. Results may thus be used to consider how such initiatives might (or already do) operate in other contexts. Finally, because CMS was virtually identical in both countries, it enables a cross-national analysis that can untangle the impact of each country's political context and history on the outcomes of interest.<sup>10</sup> The two-country comparison pushes one to consider how civil society has emerged in each country, and how differences in that historical development may impact contemporary efforts to shape civil society in rural areas.

### **III. Community-Managed School Initiatives**

What, then, are community-managed schools?

In the 1990s, Central America became a hotbed for experimenting with education decentralization. Where the traditional education system had faltered in rural education provision, donors and governments argued, decentralized models could deliver (World Bank 2003). In some of the world's most radical instances of education decentralization, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Honduras, and Guatemala each implemented some form of

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<sup>10</sup> Central America offers an ideal region for most-similar systems political research. Honduras and Guatemala share similar colonial histories, geography, economic structures, and levels of human development (Seligson and Booth 2010, 123, 133 fn. 1). But the two countries reveal crucial differences in 20th century political history, such as different types of authoritarian rule and distinct patterns of civil society development and party system. This two-country analysis enables scrutiny of the impact of these political, as well as demographic, differences on PG initiatives.

CMS program in the 1990s (Di Gropello and World Bank 2006; Barrera-Osorio et al. 2009).<sup>11</sup> In countries plagued by teacher absenteeism in rural areas, these initiatives gave parent organizations the ability to oversee, hire, and fire teachers, in addition to other administrative responsibilities. The Guatemalan government named its CMS program PRONADE (*Programa Nacional de Autogestión para el Desarrollo Educativo*, National Community-Managed Program for Educational Development), while Honduras created PROHECO (*Programa Hondureño de Educación Comunitaria*, Honduran Community Education Program).

Honduras and Guatemala implemented CMS as a strategy for meeting a key government objective in the 1990s: expanding education coverage. CMS reflected increased government spending on education to address this problem. In Honduras, as a percentage of the national budget, education spending increased from 15.9 percent in 1989 to 16.5 percent in 1995 and 32.5 percent in 2007 (Posas 2003; World Bank 2009). As a percentage of Gross Domestic Product, education spending grew from roughly 5 percent in 1990 to 8.6 percent in 2007 (Posas 2003; World Bank 2009). This funding boom fed a rise in teachers and pre-school enrolment, with a concomitant decline in student-teacher ratios (Posas 2003).

In Guatemala, spending on education as a percentage of GDP similarly increased—from 1.6 percent in 1990 to 2.5 percent in 2000 and 2.7 percent in 2007—though it still remained paltry compared to international standards (PREAL 2003; PREAL and CIEN 2008). By the late 1990s, meeting the needs of marginal communities became a more important political priority for Honduran and Guatemalan officials.

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<sup>11</sup> I chose not to study El Salvador and Nicaragua because their CMS reforms were less comparable. El Salvador's program emerged when the government expanded a model that parents had developed on their own during the armed conflict. Nicaragua's program, meanwhile, targeted urban areas and converted existing schools to the CMS model.

International development aid, more forthcoming once each country took a democratic turn, also enabled both governments to increase attention to expanding education coverage. In Guatemala, the Peace Accords brought an increased international willingness to support government initiatives, including PRONADE (Jonas 2000, Ch. 5; Palencia Prado 1997). In Honduras, PROHECO's expansion closely followed Hurricane Mitch. Both the Peace Accords and Hurricane Mitch led to increased international financial commitments, which enabled PROHECO and PRONADE to expand far beyond initial plans. Increased political competition in these incipient democracies provided the impetus to meet societal demands for primary education expansion,<sup>12</sup> while international funding made the two governments much more able to take these projects to scale.

CMS offered a way to undo one legacy of prior authoritarian governments—CMS became the cornerstone of primary education expansion in rural areas that lacked schools. In Honduras and Guatemala, 25 and 40 percent of rural school-age children, respectively, lacked primary education access in the late 1990s, and literacy rates were similarly dire (PREAL 2003; PREAL 2002). CMS programs expanded rapidly to fill these voids. By the mid 2000s, PROHECO and PRONADE covered roughly 8 percent and 20 percent, respectively, of Honduran and Guatemalan national primary school enrolment (World Bank 2009, Ch. 4; PREAL and CIEN 2008; PREAL 2005).

In Guatemala, PRONADE began in 1993, but remained negligible until the signing of the Peace Accords in 1996. PRONADE then became a centerpiece of Guatemala's first democratic government's attempt to address the gaping social inequalities inherited from the country's brutal past. The primary education system faced a huge rural coverage shortfall, larger than in neighboring Honduras (PREAL 2002). Furthermore, the

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<sup>12</sup> See Chapter Five for more on this point.

government encountered huge bureaucratic hurdles to opening new schools. The program's designers circumvented the ministry's labyrinthine bureaucracy with a parallel administrative structure that devolved local administrative responsibilities to local NGOs and parents. As a former technical consultant to PRONADE explained, the program "changed the rules of the game...[T]his permitted a very rapid expansion, and the process to open a school was reduced from 18 to 24 months to two months..."<sup>13</sup> According to one report, PRONADE accounted for half of the country's 26 percent enrolment increase from 1996 to 2000 (Schuh Moore 2007, 106).

In Honduras, the government devised a similar program, PROHECO, in the late 1990s after Hurricane Mitch ravaged the rural landscape. Like PRONADE, PROHECO expanded education coverage by creating schools for remote rural communities that previously lacked them. Given the government's insufficient resources to expand traditional public schooling to all of these areas, it created PROHECO as an alternative program that would rely on voluntary parents councils (AECOs) to administer new primary schools.

In both countries, CMS relied heavily on financial support from the World Bank (WB). CMS fit well with the WB's agenda, which focused on trimming inefficient bureaucracies and increasing accountability between governments, service providers, and poor communities (World Bank 2003).<sup>14</sup> CMS reforms met these criteria, as newly-formed parent councils would use state resources to establish schools, hire and fire teachers, and serve a dual administrative and oversight role. By holding teachers and school directors accountable, CMS would reduce the information asymmetries and principal-agent problems in social service provision, while trimming per-student education costs (Di

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<sup>13</sup> Fernando Rubio. June 23, 2009. Personal Interview with author. Guatemala City, Guatemala.

<sup>14</sup> Other aid agencies—including the UNDP and KfW—also played a role in these countries, but the WB was by far the largest financial contributor (Ganimian 2010).

Gropello 2006).<sup>15</sup> In addition, CMS reforms also promised to counter teachers' unions' perceived stranglehold on the region's education systems. Unions proved unable to prevent these reforms, which often began as small programs to avoid overt political battles.<sup>16</sup>

CMS proponents asserted that the model would make educators more accountable to communities by giving parents greater voice and direct control over teacher selection. Barrera-Osorio et al. (2009) adapt the World Bank's (2003) broader accountability framework to clarify this argument (see Figure 1). The justification for CMS programs has been that: "[T]he management mechanisms change under reforms—the clients themselves become part of the management, along with the front-line providers. Thus, the short route of accountability becomes shorter as representatives of the clients—either parents or community members—get the authority to make certain decisions and have a voice in decisions that directly affect the students who attend the school" (Barrera et al. 2009, 32). Parents can thus hold service providers (teachers) directly accountable for their performance. Organized parents may also attain greater "voice" vis-a-vis state officials to ensure accountability from above, referred to in this model as the "compact."


CMS programs in Central America have expanded coverage and generated schools of similar—albeit dismal—quality to traditional state-run schools in comparable rural areas. Assessments indicate that these programs effectively expand coverage to poor, rural areas, and may increase educators' accountability to parents, e.g., regarding teacher

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<sup>15</sup> See the citations in parentheses for more on the following issues: principal-agent problems in education provision (Wolff, Navarro, and Gonzalez 2005); teachers' unions' strength as a collective action problem (Birdsall, de la Torre, and Menezes 2006, 130-1); "education policy borrowing" (Halpin and Troyna 1995; Phillips 1989; Phillips and Ochs 2003).

<sup>16</sup> For more on this political context and the programs' expansion, see Chapter Four and Ganimian 2010.

attendance.<sup>17</sup> But methodological problems—e.g., selection bias, the absence of time-series data and randomized trials, and exogenous shocks (e.g., teachers' union strikes)—have plagued studies of CMS (Di Gropello 2006; Barrera-Osorio et al. 2009). Outside of El Salvador, no conclusive evidence has emerged to show that CMS has a positive impact on student achievement. That said, these reforms were initially designed more to expand coverage than to improve quality, so it appears that CMS in Central America has proved successful in producing schools in marginal areas that produced comparable education results with fewer resources.



**Figure 1: CMS Proponents' Accountability Framework**

*Source: Adapted from Barrera-Osorio et al. 2009*

<sup>17</sup> See Di Gropello and World Bank 2006; Barrera-Osorio et al. 2009; World Bank 2003; Jimenez and Sawada 1999; Rojas, Valerio, and Demas 2005; Gershberg 1999; Kaestner and Gershberg 2002; King and Ozler 2003; King, Ozler, and Rawlings 1999.

Though CMS' designers in Honduras and Guatemala primarily hoped to increase rural education coverage, they also envisioned the programs serving a democratic function. In Guatemala, PRONADE proponents invoked the discourse of "participation" and argued that parent management would expand parent action and consciousness outside the school (Castañeda and Méndez 1998). The Minister of Education during PRONADE's initial expansion elaborated on this:

the second reason that we became excited to define PRONADE was that—still concluding a war, with a people that had been subjected for life—we wanted them to have a voice, even if it was just in the education of their children. We knew that organizations for water, committees, organizations for obtaining electricity, or for a health post had begun to reemerge. The people began to speak in that sense. But one thing is to ask, and another is to exercise rights. So, we had our philosophy, or understanding, of what was also an education for the country. [PRONADE] was a way to make people exercise their rights and exercise their obligations.<sup>18</sup>

In Honduras, CMS proponents similarly argued that PROHECO would strengthen civil society in rural areas so that communities could better contribute to meeting development challenges and reinforce Honduran democracy. PROHECO would not just “externalize” these services from centralized state authority, but also create “state-civil society” synergy to improve development outcomes and strengthen rural civil society (Reyes and Meza 2000). Parent councils would become springs of civic engagement to hold the state more accountable for service provision and forge a relationship of “co-production” (*ibid.*).

One CMS proponent, John Durston (1999), explained how this effect would ostensibly take place. He argued—and program designers repeatedly used his argument to justify

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<sup>18</sup> Arabella Castro. July 23, 2009. Personal interview with author and Alejandro Ganimian. Guatemala City, Guatemala.

the program—that PROHECO created a forum in rural communities that built on existing norms of trust and reciprocity. As parent councils became solidified, communities would gain formal organizations with constructive relationships with state actors. This would strengthen civil society, and community leaders could come together to form regional alliances (*ibid.*, 15-17). Durston asserted that:

Social capital is transferable...to the strengthening of democracy and base-level civil society. In other words, one of PROHECO's indirect impacts is the empowerment of community organizations in general...This yields positive impacts on other social development programs via the social capital created in PROHECO. It also contributes to the strengthening of democracy through the empowerment of the community. (*ibid.*, 24)

CMS proponents in both countries believed that parent councils would strengthen communities' organizational life and, in turn, hold government more accountable for meeting rural community's needs, reinforcing the accountability framework described above.

Virtually no empirical evidence, however, supported these early program justifications. Furthermore, proponents provided only vague pronouncements of how PROHECO might strengthen democracy, without clarifying the causal mechanisms that might connect parental participation to democracy.

In the absence of empirical evidence supporting these proponents' claims, CMS in Honduras and (especially) Guatemala also drew critics, who saw the model as a step towards privatization and an imposition of the World Bank's neoliberal agenda. In Guatemala, for instance, the principal teachers' union and a number of other NGOs argued that CMS reduced the state's role in education provision, rolled back teachers' rights, and transferred the burden for education provision to poor parents. They also argued that community participation in CMS remained limited and would thus have no

positive impacts on schooling or on parental participation (CNPRE and COPMAGUA 2000; Acevedo Ayala and Fuentes 2004; Cabrera 2007; Colectivo de Educación para Todas y Todos (EPT) and Action Aid 2006). As one of PRONADE's principal critics argued, "that was the second myth of PRONADE, that it was a program that facilitated the participation of parents."<sup>19</sup>

Some critiques appear spurious, while others raise important questions. First, CMS is not privatization but simply another model of public school administration, as the state maintains the responsibility to fund and oversee these schools. Second, teachers' union opposition to CMS was somewhat disingenuous, being clearly motivated by opposition to the expansion of the education system without a concomitant increasing in the number of members in—and dues to—the unions. Still, some of the critiques of CMS may have merit. In particular, concerns about teachers' labor rights proved warranted. Moreover, the concerns over off-loading administrative burdens on poor parents and only providing parents with a marginal role require attention, as they mirror many academic critiques of efforts to increase participation in governance and development initiatives elsewhere (see Chapter Two).

Like CMS proponents, however, detractors have not presented solid empirical evidence to support their assertions about CMS' impact on parents and rural civil society. A rigorous analysis of CMS' impact on democracy requires two critical components: 1) a theoretical framework that identifies potential mechanisms that link participation in governance to democracy and 2) a methodological strategy to empirically test whether CMS can trigger these links. I briefly introduce the present study's theoretical framework and methodological strategy here, before doing so in greater depth in Chapter Two.

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<sup>19</sup> Francisco Cabrera. July 20, 2009. Personal interview with author. Guatemala City, Guatemala.

#### IV. A Political Capabilities Approach

Taking critiques of participation and the literature on civil society into consideration, this thesis follows Williams (2004a) in identifying “political capabilities”—rather than “social capital”<sup>20</sup>—as the best way to gauge PG initiatives’ potential for improving the quality of democracy. Williams, following Whitehead and Gray-Molina (2003), argues that participatory initiatives must center on people’s ability to advocate for their rights and needs. PG initiatives should thus be judged by whether they contribute to expanding poor people’s abilities to advance their interests politically. Adopting this political capabilities approach, Williams (2004a, 568) poses three questions for evaluating PG initiatives:

To what extent do participatory development programs<sup>21</sup> contribute to processes of political learning among the poor?...To what degree do participatory programs reshape political networks?...How do participatory programs affect existing patterns of political representation, including changes to the language of political claims and competition?

The combination of skills, experience, and knowledge (*political learning*), the ways in which people engage and come together in their communities and politically (*political networks*), and represent others or are represented (*political representation*), provides a scaled framework for evaluating an initiative’s impact on political capabilities.

This study adopts Williams' framework to analyze CMS in Honduras and Guatemala, conceiving of increases in political capabilities as a specific type of “spillover” effect. Throughout the thesis, “spillovers” refer to those changes in participants’ behavior consistent with this political capabilities framework. Such analysis must also identify a

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<sup>20</sup> For more on this distinction and the political capabilities approach in general, see Chapter Two.

<sup>21</sup> Williams focuses on participatory development (PD), while Whitehead and Gray-Molina focus on a case of PG. I discuss this distinction more in Chapter Two, but for now it bears mention that Williams’ insights appear to apply to both PG and PD. Of course, PG initiatives like participatory budgeting or CMS have development objectives, as well.

context-specific set of outcomes associated with learning, networks, and patterns of representation. Chapters Two and Three will thus discuss in greater detail how to operationalize a political capabilities approach in Honduras and Guatemala.

For now, however, it bears mention that this approach offers the advantage of seeing state - civil society relations both from the "top-down" and from the "bottom-up." A political capabilities analysis must be top-down insofar as it traces how national political context affects dynamics of community participation. It must also be bottom-up by highlighting how experiences within communities can change how individuals and communities engage with themselves, other communities, and the state. This thesis will offer both of these perspectives in its exploration of PROHECO and PRONADE.

To undertake this type of political capabilities analysis, this study follows a mixed-methods strategy, combining analysis of elite interviews, survey data, and community case studies. Elite interviews enabled an analysis of the macro-level dynamics of CMS programs, including the origins, aims, and political obstacles to their functioning at the national level. For quantitative analysis, I rely on surveys of over 2,000 parents in PROHECO (n=1252) schools across the country and PRONADE schools (n=819) in Alta Verapaz to examine the incidence of individual-level changes on a broad scale. I combine this with qualitative analysis based on eight community case studies, four in each country. Case studies permitted me to examine variables absent from the surveys, as well as the community-level effects of CMS. The case studies also allowed me to explore the meanings of these changes within and between communities, which are best measured qualitatively. Including elite interviews, the study uses data from 320 (mostly one-on-one) interviews, conducted over 10 months from 2007-2010. I also used additional methods (e.g., community mapping exercises and group discussions) for each

case study. (Chapter Two will provide greater detail on the methods used for this thesis, including case selection and control groups.)

## **V. Key Arguments and Structure**

Having introduced the principal questions, framework, and methods, the introduction concludes by presenting the four central arguments of this thesis.

First, in Chapter Two, I will examine academic debates on the relationship between PG, civil society, and the quality of democracy. I advance the "political capabilities" framework—rather than "social capital" or "empowerment"—as the best way to explore state efforts to strengthen civil society in marginal areas of Central America. I then show various mechanisms through which stronger civil society can enhance the quality of democracy. I conclude the chapter by presenting a mixed-methods strategy of surveys and community case studies to operationalize the "political capabilities" framework.

Second, I argue that national political context forcefully impacts the operation of CMS and its ability to increase parents' political capabilities. Chapter Three provides a historical analysis of civil society development in both countries and contrasts the patronage and co-optation that characterized state - civil society relations in Honduras with the radical exclusion—and the resulting polarization—in Guatemala. Then, in Chapter Four, I demonstrate how these different political legacies impinged on CMS reform, leading, in Honduras, to PROHECO's capture by patronage networks and, in Guatemala, to greater conflict at the community and national levels surrounding PRONADE. I argue that these dynamics—though quite different themselves—similarly reduced the programs' ability to deliver on their promises of impacting parents' civic and political behavior.

Third, I demonstrate that CMS can produce important individual-level impacts—such as gaining skills and confidence and increasing participation in other organizations—on a minority of participating parents, but they are not a “game-changer” for rural civil society. Chapter Five presents evidence of individual-level spillover effects that is significant and surprising given the many constraints confronting parents in remote rural communities. Qualitative evidence presented in Chapter Six through Eight, however, demonstrates the limits of these impacts. Instead of using newly acquired skills and confidence to build new types of groups and organize autonomously, communities with CMS remain comprised of small organizations formed only to access benefits from specific government programs. Certain communities may contain incipient new leadership and additional community organizations, but individual and collective efforts remain heavily circumscribed by state dominance of these organizations. Top-down state involvement impinges on CSOs’ autonomy and stifles political capabilities development. Furthermore, the trend of communities fragmenting to acquire schools may impair rural citizens’ capacity for collective action. Finally, CMS appears to reproduce gender inequalities in rural communities in both Honduras and Guatemala, reducing the likelihood of spillovers among women.

Fourth, Chapter Nine explores which factors contribute to individual-level changes among parents. Quantitative and qualitative analysis examines the impact of four clusters of independent variables—individuals’ initial characteristics, state support for participation, individuals’ level of participation in school councils, and the effectiveness and democraticness of the councils—on spillovers. I present evidence that all four variables have a direct impact on learning outcomes, while prior organizational experience proves to be the best predictor of subsequent participation and leadership in other organizations. CMS does produce new community participants, but they are less

likely to reveal spillovers. Still, the evidence indicates that the greater the state support and responsibilities given to parents, the more likely parents will learn civic and political skills and participate in subsequent organizations.

In sum, this thesis demonstrates how, through one type of PG initiative, states can stimulate participation and produce changes in individuals' civic and political behavior. But the link from incremental changes in individual behavior to how rural communities organize themselves and engage with the state remains tenuous. For these latter effects, constraints abound—including legacies of state and party dominance over civil society, radical exclusion of rural people, and the lack of technical support from state programs. All of these factors would necessitate a more concerted effort by CMS initiatives to achieve more than incremental changes to individuals' civic and political behavior.

## 2. POLITICAL CAPABILITIES: AN APPROACH TO STUDYING THE IMPACT OF PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE ON CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE QUALITY OF DEMOCRACY

Advocates of participation often espouse its democratic possibilities. By participating in water users' associations, budget councils, and school committees, they argue, people will learn the basic tools of democratic citizenship: articulating their interests, deliberating respectfully, and considering the common good. If they value this experience, the argument continues, these citizens also become more likely to participate in other organizations, ultimately strengthening civil society, and, by extension, democracy.<sup>22</sup>


This type of account, however, suffers from two shortcomings. First, there is a “black-box” problem: these accounts provide little information on the causal mechanisms connecting new participatory fora to democracy. Instead, many advocates' calls for participation amount to a leap of faith—namely, that people coming together in one small sphere will somehow have a broader political impact. Second, this type of argument often ignores the constraints on participation. In particular, factors such as entrenched clientelistic networks, massive economic, social, and political inequalities, and the often questionable commitment and limited resources from political leaders to participation all exert a critical impact on the outcomes of participatory initiatives.

This chapter seeks to address both problems. First, it addresses the “black box” problem by tying together three critical concepts: participatory governance (PG), civil society, and the quality of democracy. Figure 2 presents the “black box” problem visually. The sections below explore first the literature on how civil society can improve

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<sup>22</sup> I include a more complete literature review below, but for now the following citations will be useful: Avritzer 2002; Pateman 1970; Benello and Roussopoulos 1971; Barber 1984; Mansbridge 1999; Baiocchi 2005.

the quality of democracy, and then how participatory governance can bolster civil society. These sections will help fill in the mechanisms connecting these critical concepts. Second, I present the warnings emanating from prior scholarship on the obstacles to spillover effects. In each section, I explore the conditions that appear critical for triggering the causal chain through which PG can, indeed, improve the quality of democracy. I will use the answers to this question to fill in the “obstacles” and mechanisms sections of Figure 2.



**Figure 2: The “Black Box” Problem in Connecting PG to the Quality of Democracy**

In this chapter, I argue that a political capabilities approach provides the best avenue for exploring participation's impact on democratic life. I present this model as the key element in the causal chain connecting participation to civil society, because it incorporates different levels of analysis and calls attention to the connections between these participatory spaces and the polity. At the end of the chapter, I present a mixed-methods approach for operationalizing the political capabilities framework, explaining how I chose to conduct my research.

### **I. Civil Society and the Quality of Democracy**

At least since Tocqueville, scholars have deemed civil society essential for democracy (Whitehead 1999; Merkel 2004; Forment 2003). In transitions to democracy, for example, scholars have highlighted the centrality of civil society actors in unseating authoritarian governments (Collier 1999; O'Donnell and Schmitter 1993; Foweraker and Landman 1997; Linz and Stepan 1996a). And, whether under democracy or dictatorship, many others identify voluntary organizations as the embodiment of individual and group freedom, a realm of protection against the state, and potential "schools for democracy." Such arguments, however, often fail to define civil society and demonstrate the mechanism(s) through which it has these theorized effects on democratic life. In this section, I aim to specify these relationships.

Myriad definitions of civil society exist,<sup>23</sup> but this thesis adopts Linz and Stepan's (1996a, 17) designation of civil society as "that arena of the polity where self-organizing and relatively autonomous groups, movements, and individuals attempt to articulate values, to create associations and solidarities, and to advance their interests." This definition has

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<sup>23</sup> See, for instance, Schmitter 1993; Oxhorn 1995; White 1994.

the advantage of defining civil society without conflating it with the outcome—namely, democracy—one hopes it will generate (Newton 1997, 575). Linz and Stepan's definition also avoids specifying too closely civil society organizations' (CSOs) chosen means and ends, a flaw in Schmitter (1993) and Whitehead's (1999) work.<sup>24</sup> Linz and Stepan's definition provides scope for recognizing that civil society is not an end in itself; civil society may reproduce power inequalities, discrimination, and exclusion, just as any other realm of social life (Foweraker and Landman 1997; Phillips 1999). One must thus evaluate—but not define—civil society by its contribution to desirable societal outcomes.

The outcomes one seeks from the concept also require specification. All too often, authors conflate democracy with the performance of institutions (Tarrow 2000). This again raises the problem of defining a concept by its consequences. Furthermore, we know that democracies, like authoritarian systems, can vary radically in the outcomes (e.g., economic growth or life expectancy) they produce, so performance writ large is a poor measure (Schmitter and Karl 1991).

In Chapter One, I made the case for focusing on improving the “quality of democracy” (O'Donnell, Vargas Cullel, and Iazzetta 2004). This approach transcends narrow performance indicators like economic growth by focusing on several dimensions of democratic life, including: fair and institutionalized elections, the nature of elected government, rule of law and access to fair state institutions, social context (including social and minority rights), human development, and human rights. All of these factors should be fair game for discussions of how civil society can improve the quality of

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<sup>24</sup> They argue that CSOs must be “civil” and/or abide by the law. Schmitter's version of “civility” raises the question of whether groups that break undemocratic laws—such as civil rights organizations in the southern United States organizing sit-ins at segregated lunch counters—form part of civil society. Whitehead (1999) goes further, suggesting that “civility” involves not disrespecting or shocking another person. By this standard, virtually any form of protest could become “uncivil.”

democracy in countries such as Honduras and Guatemala. What remains, then, is to identify the mechanisms through which civil society can affect these dimensions of democratic life. Before describing these mechanisms, however, the deeply contextual and contingent nature of civil society warrants discussion.

By not conflating civil society with any particular outcome, Linz and Stepan's definition also enables one to appreciate how the role and impact of civil society will differ by context, remain uneven across space and time, and sometimes have negative consequences. Edwards and Foley (1998) describe the great variation among different countries' civil societies and their relationship to democracy. In certain countries, labor unions become the dominant civil society actor, while, in other countries, CSOs may emerge to counter corporatist arrangements between unions and the states. In other contexts, human rights organizations may take precedence and lead the fight against dictatorship (*ibid.*). The list, of course, goes on, but the point remains: civil society differs across space and time.

Differences also separate CSOs within a particular country. Distinct groups have diverse missions, goals, and methods; they thus also have different impacts. Newton (1997), for instance, distinguishes between formal voluntary associations, "checkbook organizations," and loose networks, and argues that they have different impacts on participants' civic and political behavior. And, while Newton cites evidence that informal groups can contribute to such behavior as much as more formal groups in Britain and Denmark, Booth and Richard (1998) present evidence that less formal community associations in Central America actually tend to produce uncivic norms among members (see below). Moreover, Amber Seligson (1999) finds that, of all types of CSOs in Central America, only community development groups consistently generate increases in making demands on government. These analyses, which sometimes reach contradictory

conclusions in different locations and time periods, reinforce the proposition that the role and impact of different types of groups differ by context.

There are other ways in which one must see civil society as contextual. First, civil society tends to be uneven within a given society. Where citizens are more affluent and have higher education levels, for instance, there may also appear more organizations. Conversely, collective action may occur less frequently where obstacles such as geographical remoteness, high crime levels, and material poverty persist (Whitehead 1999; Oxhorn 2001). This suggests that the concept of democracies' "brown areas" (O'Donnell 1993) may apply to civil society as much as it does to state institutions' varied reach, though the spatial distributions of state and civil society presence may differ.

Second, "uncivil" society can rear its head. Just as CSOs can use their rights as citizens to form groups to pursue public goods, so too can these organizations endeavor to secure private benefits and public "bads" (Whitehead 1999). As Jackman and Miller note: "one person's group can be another's cartel" (1998, 59).<sup>25</sup> Finally—and related to context in temporal terms—civil society can change over relatively short periods of time. The literature on social movements captures these changes with such terms as "cycles of contention" and "waves of protest" (Foweraker and Landman 1997; Tarrow 2004; Brockett 2005). These terms indicate how CSOs' membership, strategy, actions, and goals can shift rapidly, often in response to changing political climates and "configurations of political opportunity" (Brockett 2005). This provides an important corrective to the idea that nations are simply endowed with civil society, as if it were a fixed stock or "factor endowment"; instead, one must conceive of civil society as evolving and dynamic.

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<sup>25</sup> See also Phillips' (1999) discussion of exclusion and discrimination within civil society and Berman's (1997) discussion of Nazi infiltration of Weimar civil society.

Linz and Stepan's specification of civil society's *relative* autonomy also avoids the oversimplification that civil society exists apart from the state. As Edwards and Foley (1998, 124) argue, the suggestion that civil society, the state, and the market are easily separable and operate on different guiding principles and motivations—the state by hierarchical authority, the market by profit, and civil society by voluntarism—does not pass muster. Oxhorn (2001), for instance, conceives of the intersection of civil society and state in the public sphere. This formulation, discussed further below, suggests repeated interaction between the two realms. Descriptions of social movement activity, also discussed below, reinforce this point. Both literatures indicate that CSOs frequently make demands on, cooperate with, and contest the state (see also Heller 2001). While CSOs must maintain sufficient autonomy to retain their integrity and separateness in these interactions, over-emphasizing “autonomy” can lead to a mistaken conception of the degree of separateness between civil society and the state. This critique is also consistent with the finding that civil society can be both complementary to (Linz and Stepan 1996a) and “externally embedded” in (Merkel 2004) political society and democratic institutions.<sup>26</sup>

State-civil society interaction also produces bi-directional impacts. The state can both foster and repress civil society. Of course, the state—especially through repression—can radically undermine civil society (Foweraker and Landman 1997; Brockett 2005). But repression does not operate deterministically. It occurs to different extents in distinct contexts, and its effects therefore vary. Sometimes repression can even prompt further mobilization (Fox 1996; Foweraker and Landman 1997; Brockett 2005).

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<sup>26</sup> See Berman 1997 for an illustration of how civil and political society (which includes political parties, though the distinction can become blurred) will not necessarily complement each other.

Moreover, particularly where resource scarcity prevails, the state will likely need to play a supporting role for civil society to emerge (Corrales 2006; Walzer 1999; Houtzager 2003). Evans (1996), for instance, summarizes cases in which state support proved essential for forming and supporting community organizations in various countries. And Seligson (2006) demonstrates how a Costa Rican health program required communities to organize committees to benefit from the service; local state structures, long-standing conduits for citizen demand-making, facilitated the strengthening of civil society.

In sum, the state and civil society are far more inter-connected than scholars typically assume, and the relationship between these two spheres should not be seen as necessarily negative nor positive, but deeply contingent. The basic insight here is that the state both shapes, and is shaped by, civil society. Civil society's autonomy will never be total autonomy—thus the “relative” modifier in Linz and Stepan's definition.

Having noted the complexity of state — civil society interactions, I now explore the relationship between civil society and democratic quality. Merkel (2004, 47) lays out various theoretical links between civil society and democracy, summarizing different theorists' observations of civil society's capacity to:

protect the individual from the arbitrary use of state power (Locke), support the rule of law and the balance of powers (Montesquieu), educate citizens and recruit political elites (Tocqueville), and institutionalize the public sphere as a medium of democratic self-reflection (Habermas). If civil society fulfils these functions, it generates and enables checks of power, responsibility, societal inclusion, tolerance, fairness, trust, cooperation, and often also the efficient implementation of accepted political programs. Civil society thereby not only enhances the democratization, pacification and self-organization of society, but also controls, democratizes and provides support for the state, making it more democratic and effective.

Given this study's focus on two Latin American cases, it will be useful to explore the relevance of these particular mechanisms to the region. I will present four different

conceptions of civil society's potential positive impact on democracy in Latin America and highlight the commonalities.

First, perhaps the most oft-repeated claim about the connection between civil society and democracy is that civil society itself offers participants a “school for democracy.” Beginning with Tocqueville—and percolating down through advocates of participatory democracy and analysts of civil society more recently—has been the idea that CSOs can nurture the civic-mindedness and skills necessary to participate in democratic life. In Latin America, Forment (2003), for instance, argues that civil society has been critical for nurturing democratic practices since the 19<sup>th</sup> Century. For Forment, even before the Mexican and Peruvian polities became democratic, CSOs created the precursors to democratic participation and public deliberation. While political society was largely a space for authoritarian practices, civil society provided a place for democratic civic learning, which occurred as citizens organized themselves, held meetings and events, and debated ideas. I will discuss the precise nature of the “educative effects” of participation more below, but suffice it to say for now that theorists have long held that, through participation in CSOs, people can acquire the values, skills, and experience required for a fuller exercise of democratic citizenship.

Second, Latin American history suggests the importance of civil society for generating a public sphere in which groups can advance diverse interests and foster debate on pressing issues, which can range from rights demands to economic policy to state abuses. Oxhorn (2001) suggests that civil society is a key element in forging the public sphere, which he defines as the arena for negotiating the terms of social and political life.<sup>27</sup>

Oxhorn conceives of the public sphere as the intersection between civil society and the

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<sup>27</sup> See also Avritzer 2002, who is more optimistic about the public sphere in contemporary Latin America, while Oxhorn points out its exclusionary nature. See Sábato 2001 for a more historical treatment of the public sphere's importance for Latin American democracy.

state, though civil society can exist without a vibrant public sphere. To generate a strong public sphere, CSOs must retain their autonomy and ability to contest the state, both of which enable organizations to translate the will of their members (especially those marginalized by other institutions) into a coherent national policy agenda. If CSOs can maintain their autonomy and relevance, Latin American history has shown that they can play a critical role in increasing access to political institutions, forging civic norms, and identifying solutions to society's pressing problems. Going back as far as the 19th Century, these organizations' "presence has been considered fundamental to the creation of a space of mediation with the state, to the formation of a public sphere" (Sabato 2001, 1308). This "space of mediation with the state" speaks to the centrality of a civil society that engages with and impinges on the state to push for greater rights and representation.<sup>28</sup>

Third, social movement literature complements the public sphere literature by emphasizing that relatively apolitical associational life does little to strengthen democracy. Unlike those like Putnam (1993) who laud all manner of organizations—from church choirs to bowling leagues—for their contribution to democracy, this literature identifies the fight for rights as the key contribution to democracy offered by organizations and movements (Foweraker and Landman 1997; Berman 1997). It is in this light that one can understand the role of civil society in protesting authoritarian rule and mobilizing for transitions to democracy (Collier 1999; Yashar 1997). "Bad behavior" becomes important in social movement accounts, as groups use protest and diverse "repertoires of contention" (Tarrow 1994) to fight oppression and injustice and contest power asymmetries. As Foweraker and Landman (1997, 242-3) conclude:

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<sup>28</sup> See also Avritzer 2002 and Oxhorn 2001 for treatment of the public sphere in contemporary Latin America.

the relationship between the associational capacity of civil society, or 'civicness', and democracy is indeterminate, since it must depend, *inter alia*, on the variable success of social movements in achieving citizenship rights. There is thus no possible linear relationship between 'civicness' and democracy. Partial struggles meet with partial and reversible success in winning universal rights...[T]he democratic qualities of civil society do not have to do with 'civicness' but with the associationalism which supports social mobilization and political contestation; that democracy is not the comfortable result of righteous conduct but the result of prolonged struggle in often difficult and dangerous circumstances; and that this struggle is not ultimately motivated by goods but by the individual rights which compose the popular substance of democracy.

Considered together, the Latin American public sphere and social movement literature illustrate that interaction with the state—in the form of articulating economic and social needs, demanding political rights, and asserting policy platforms—constitutes the key mechanism through which civil society can foster and strengthen democracy.

Fourth, in addition to an arena for negotiating the terms of social and political life and demanding rights, civil society in Latin America can also serve the functions Merkel identifies with Locke and Montesquieu: confronting state arbitrariness, enforcing the rule of law, and increasing accountability. CSOs have played significant roles in opposing tyranny and repression under both dictatorships and electoral democracies, as suggested in the discussion of social movements. And whether under these trying circumstances or not, CSOs have articulated needs and demanded better performance by electoral officials. More recently in Latin America, with widespread decentralization since the 1980s (Cabrero 2007; Brinkerhoff, Brinkerhoff, and McNulty 2007), CSOs have engaged with the state by assuming larger roles in development efforts and governance (Cabrero 2007; Brinkerhoff, Brinkerhoff, and McNulty 2007; Cheema and Rondinelli 2007; Oxhorn, Tulchin, and Selee 2004).<sup>29</sup> Scholarship on certain cases of PG has shown that, as citizens become more engaged with government and involved in both oversight and

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<sup>29</sup> I adopt the 1990 United Nations definition of governance as “the exercise of political, economic and administrative authority in the management of a country’s affairs” (cited by Cheema and Rondinelli 2007, 6).

decision making, they can achieve notable reductions in corruption and more equitable resource distribution (Baiocchi 2001; Avritzer 2002; Souza 2001).<sup>30</sup> Like the other branches of research described above, research on PG and accountability underscores how civil society can strengthen democracy where it engages with the political process and asserts rights claims, economic and social needs, and policy platforms.<sup>31</sup>

Similar insights have led scholars using a quality of democracy framework to agree on the importance of civil society for democracy. O'Donnell (2004, 43), for instance, has emphasized the importance of a "diverse social context" for assuring the quality of democracy. For O'Donnell, associational rights, and the exercise of those rights in civil society, are a critical ingredient for democratic life. Diamond and Morlino (2004, 23-24) have gone further, emphasizing the importance of bringing people "into arenas of civic participation and political competition":

With regard to participation, democratic quality is high when we in fact observe extensive citizen participation not only through voting but in the life of political parties and civil society organizations, in the discussion of public policy issues, in communicating with and demanding accountability from elected representatives, in monitoring official conduct, and in direct engagement with public issues at the local level. Participation in these respects is intimately related to political equality. Even if everyone's formal rights of participation are upheld, inequalities in political resources can make it harder for lower-status individuals to exercise those rights.

Here, Diamond and Morlino refer to all of the civil society – democracy mechanisms described by Merkel and others above, though through a quality of democracy framework. In addition to political equality, Diamond and Morlino emphasize the importance of civil society for protecting against potential authoritarian turns by the state, demanding rights, and creating a vibrant public sphere. Moreover, they emphasize

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<sup>30</sup> I discuss the literature on PG in much greater depth below.

<sup>31</sup> In fact, often these analytical lenses can serve to describe different parts of the same phenomenon—social movement organizations, for instance, can simultaneously resist tyranny, demand accountability, fight for individual rights, and serve as "schools of democracy" for participants.

that civil society can offer a critical space for marginalized people to articulate needs and demand inclusion into the political process, a potential avenue to addressing injustice and inequality. As in the broader literature on civil society and democracy, the quality of democracy approach centers on how individuals and CSOs engage with the state and politics more broadly. The mechanisms mentioned above, then, apply beyond the regime and large institutional change that democratization scholars tend to examine. These mechanisms also relate to the many additional facets of democracy with which those using a quality of democracy approach concern themselves, such as access to state institutions and protection of minority rights.

## **II. Strengthening Civil Society Through Participation**

The importance of civil society for improving the quality of democracy and the finding that state action can be critical for civil society's emergence raises the question of how the state can promote civil society. One answer for developing country governments and international development institutions has been "participation," a concept applied first to democracy writ large, then to development practice, and subsequently to governance. In this section, I first review the initial justifications for participatory democracy and development, before introducing the critical literature on participatory development (PD). I explore critiques of PD in some depth, because 1) they partly explain the scholarly shift towards PG and 2) many such critiques remain relevant to PG. Formalized calls for participatory democracy first emerged in the 1960s. This idea was first popularized in the United States by the Students for a Democratic Society, but scholars then drew on classical political theorists to formalize broader theories of

participatory democracy (Pateman 1970; Benello and Roussopoulos 1971; Barber 1984).<sup>32</sup> Advocates of participatory democracy argued that the representative institutions of liberal democracies were failing their citizens. On this view, liberal democracies needed to renew themselves with innovative participatory fora through which citizens could express their views, demand more inclusion by the state, and participate in solving their own problems. Supporters of participatory democracy argued that these new participatory fora would improve public decision-making, increase the legitimacy of government, and foster active and responsible citizenship among participants (Pateman 1970; Barber 1984).

By the 1980s, participatory democratic theory had declined in developed countries—especially in comparison to theorizing on deliberative democracy (Hilmer 2010). Theories of participation, though, also took root in the developing world. In developing countries, calls for greater agency for ordinary citizens in policy and development programs became both crystallized and inspired by the work of people like Paulo Freire (1996 [1970]) and Robert Chambers (1983).<sup>33</sup> Works like these, which focused on pedagogy, critical consciousness, local knowledge, and community participation began to seep into development rhetoric and practice (Ben-Meir 2009). By the 1990s, following widespread critiques of top-down development failures, participation became a cornerstone of mainstream development work at institutions like the World Bank, often coupled with a push towards decentralization (Cheema and Rondinelli 2007; Ben-Meir 2009). As Cornwall and Pratt (2003) have argued, PD shifted from “being a marginal, innovative practice to a globally familiar way to think about and practice mainstream development” (178, cited in Ben-Meir 2009).

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<sup>32</sup> For more on this history, see Hilmer 2010 and Mansbridge 1999.

<sup>33</sup> This is inevitably an oversimplification. Ben-Meir (2009), for instance, identifies 77 different roots of participatory development practice.

Participatory development rests on the idea that development institutions' lack of self-critical awareness has long prevented them from exploring doubt and learning from errors (Chambers 1997). Critics argue that development efforts are typically top-down, ethnocentric attempts to transfer knowledge and technology to the poor. Interventions fail because they ignore poor rural people's epistemologies and experiences and disregard communities' intricacies. Development practitioners' power and geographical separation blind them to these realities and leave intact unquestioning faith in standardized interventions, while overlooking rural poor people's complex livelihoods and capacity to provide constructive input to improve their communities (*ibid.*).

PD aimed to reverse these trends. As Ben-Meir (2009, 183) summarizes, "The fundamental premise of participatory development...is that local communities – the beneficiaries – plan, manage, and are the decision-makers in matters related to development."<sup>34</sup> Participatory methodologies rest on the assumption that the poor can identify and address the problems facing their communities.

But various factors can undermine PD. Foremost among these risks, identified primarily by ethnographers, has been "elite capture." Aspiring towards consensual community goals, PD projects often ignore who actually participates, why people participate, and whose interests community "consensus" serves. In many cases, community elites (mostly men) dominate participatory fora, while vulnerable community members remain excluded (Crewe and Harrison 1998; Mansuri and Rao 2004; Mosse 2005). While proponents of participation may argue that "all people are included" (Chambers 1983, 124), consensus, when seemingly achieved, often reflects exclusion and power

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<sup>34</sup> I adopt Ben-Meir's (2009, 237) definition of participatory development as: "a community development that is as inclusive as possible, so that through methods of group dialogue and consensus-building, construction of visual and accessible diagramming, and planning and decision-making, projects develop that address priority local socio-economic and environmental goals."

inequalities (Chhotray 2004; Olivier de Sardan 2005; Mohan 2001; Kothari 2001; Cornwall 2004).<sup>35</sup>

“Participation” can also become a veil of legitimacy that conceals broader injustice. Government development programs often use “participation” to co-opt local residents who might otherwise resist initiatives that may threaten their livelihoods (Hildyard et al. 2001). Ultimately, “participation” can reinforce existing policy and rein in protest, providing the legitimacy of local involvement while serving as a mechanism of control over local people who still lack a voice in the policy decisions that affect them (Hildyard et al. 2001; Brin Hyatt 1997).<sup>36</sup>

Finally, PD may undermine prospects for broader societal change. Especially in large development agencies’ projects, participatory efforts shy away from contention and political questions such as economic inequality or caste divisions (Crewe and Harrison 1998; Hildyard et al. 2001; Nelson and Wright 1995; White 1996; Ferguson 1994). Participatory initiatives can further “depoliticize” participation by limiting the reach of possible outcomes to the “community” level (Mohan 2001; Francis 2001). Often, issues that extend beyond village boundaries remain off-limits in participatory initiatives; advocating broader societal change in such arenas becomes senseless. At best, such participation may lead people to consider the relationship between certain inequalities and injustices and the broader structures that they reflect. At worst, however, PD focused on effecting “community” change risks ignoring larger power structures and norms that virtually guarantee poor people's continued impoverishment and *de facto*

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<sup>35</sup> Certain attacks on participatory development as a whole prove problematic. Chambers, for instance, has long focused on a particular participatory methodology, Participatory Research Appraisal (PRA) and acknowledged the problems in scaling-up PRA and the rampant bad practices in participatory initiatives (Chambers 2004; Chambers 2008). Still, the critiques enumerated extend beyond problems of scale and technique and thus raise concerns that could apply to all participatory development initiatives.

<sup>36</sup> See also Nelson and Wright 1995, 225; Cooke and Kothari 2001.

disenfranchisement. In such cases, participation detracts from citizens' ability to focus on addressing glaring macro-level injustice.

The principal lesson from these critiques is that participatory initiatives often fail to recognize the limits imposed by—or create the prospects of change for—political structures. Often, participatory initiatives divert attention from politics, focusing people on solving a “local” development problem without connecting it to larger political processes or structural causes. Furthermore, participation often remains detached from broader institutional change, leaving people unable to leverage skills and experience gained inside participatory arenas to make other demands on the state. As with the literatures on civil society more broadly, these ethnographic critiques indicate that participation does not automatically foster or strengthen democratic life.

Given such criticism, practitioners and academics across disciplines have begun considering innovations that address PD's fundamental pitfalls. Many proponents of participation's transformative potential have shifted their attention toward participatory governance. Though scholars remain aware that PD-derived critiques may still apply PG, these governance initiatives offer the prospect of connecting participation to local and national political spheres. Gaventa (2004, 27) affirms: “In both South and North, there is growing consensus that the way forward is found in a focus on *both* a more active and engaged civil society which can express the demands of the citizenry, *and* a more responsive and effective state which can deliver needed public services.” Gaventa asserts the need to “[work] both sides of the equation,” connecting extra-governmental participatory initiatives with initiatives to “deepen democratic governance” by reforming existing political structures (*ibid.*).

Applying the mantra of participation to governance, Fung and Wright (2003) argue for a model of "empowered participatory governance" (EPG). EPG initiatives are state-centered enterprises that devolve responsibility to local units while retaining centralized supervision and coordination. Most importantly, they emphasize bottom-up participation to solving practical problems through deliberative solution generation (*ibid.*, 23-25). In short, EPG initiatives are government initiatives to solving problems like education, health care, or security, which devolve authority to local units and participation to ordinary citizens. The state creates these units as arenas for widespread participation, in which citizens come together to identify and implement solutions. Fung and Wright provide several examples, ranging from parental participation in Chicago's school boards to participatory budgeting in Brazil. These cases vary with regard to the sector on which they focus and the degree of authority that they confer on participants. They prove similar, however, in "adding important channels for participation to the conventional avenues of political voice" and encouraging participation by offering citizens "the real prospect of exercising state power" (*ibid.*, 27). In each case, a state body initiates PG to enshrine citizen participation in deliberation and decision-making related to a matter for which citizens typically hold the state responsible—most often, local public goods provision.

For this study, I will adopt much of Fung and Wright's framework—widely accepted by scholars studying similar initiatives—to explore CMS. CMS fits within Fung and Wright's definition of empowered participatory governance because, like the school councils they describe in Chicago, it meets six key criteria: CMS is a 1) state-centered governance measure with 2) centralized supervision and coordination and 3) devolution to local units, which encourages 4) bottom-up participation and 5) deliberative problem-solving in 6) addressing practical local issues. It bears mention that, while I accept most

of Fung and Wright's framework, I will drop the adjective "empowered." The specification of "empowerment" conflates the model with the outcome that advocates and sympathetic authors seek (empowerment), itself a slippery concept (see below). I will instead simply use participatory governance (PG), as other scholars have done, which provides a more value-neutral concept that is also more amenable to unbiased assessment.

Though conceptions of participation have shifted from the early calls for participatory democracy and PD to recent theorizing on PG, these frameworks share common features. First, theorists across both camps have consistently held that liberal democracies need participatory institutions to complement, not replace, existing liberal democratic institutions that enable only "thin" democratic participation (Benello and Roussopoulos 1971; Barber 1984; Fung and Wright 2003). Second, scholars of participatory democracy and PG share the view that participation will produce better government by expanding innovation and policy options and making government decisions more legitimate to the public (Pateman 1970; Barber 1984).

Most importantly for the present study, theorists of participation have long argued that participation will also have transformative or "educative" effects on participants and communities. Scholars from Pateman to Fung and Wright have consistently argued that participation will create better citizens, with qualities such as being more public-minded, accepting of collective decisions, more informed about community affairs, and more able to advocate for individual and community needs in the political arena (Pateman 1970; Barber 1984; Hilmer 2010; Mansbridge 1999; Gaventa 1999). In her 1970 work, Pateman argues that: "The major function of participation in the theory of participatory democracy is therefore an educative one, educative in the very widest sense, including both the psychological aspect and the gaining of practice in democratic skills and

procedures” (42). Similarly, in the EPG frame, Fung and Wright (2003, 28) assert that these experiments “also encourage the development of political wisdom in ordinary citizens by grounding competency upon everyday, situated experience...”

Writers from these different periods also appear to accept that even participation in relatively small associations can generate these effects. Pateman, for instance, concludes that even small workplace experiments can produce educative effects on the individual. Fung and Wright similarly find that Chicago community school boards can produce similar effects to councils focused on Porto Alegre’s entire capital budget. Advocates of participation have also consistently argued that, beyond scale, greater democraticness of the participatory arena—in decision-making (Pateman 1970; Barber 1984; Fung and Wright 2003) and in rotation of leadership (see Barber 1984)—is often a critical factor in generating a greater transformative impact on individuals.

### **III. Assessing Participation’s Transformative Effects: the Political Capabilities Framework**

Scholars have increasingly recognized the importance of critical political analysis in assessing the potential transformations and “educative effects” associated with participation. Whereas early theorists of participation expressed vague hopes of attitudinal shifts (e.g., more appreciation of the common good / public interest), I will follow a more recent academic shift towards explicitly political analysis of participation’s impacts.

The present study will explore whether CMS in Honduras and Guatemala—whose proponents, as described in Chapter One, purported to strengthen democracy by increasing civic participation—transform participants in the ways that theorists of

participation have long held. This study will therefore focus beyond interactions within CMS councils to highlight whether and how school council participation holds any promise for improving parents' ability to engage politically. In this regard, the investigation heeds the warning of Williams (2004a, 572) that participation may simply be a convenient way for governments to "devolve development responsibility to the grassroots." Applying this insight to CMS, simply shifting the governments' rural education burden onto parents by creating new parent councils would not likely strengthen civic life and enrich democracy. These programs will only achieve this goal if parent council members develop the capacity for political engagement through their experience.

Williams provides a theoretical framework for evaluating these outcomes. He identifies "political capabilities" as the best way to gauge participatory initiatives' progressive possibilities. As explained in Chapter One, Williams draws from Whitehead and Gray-Molina (2003) who argue that "pro-poor policy-making" must center on people's ability to advocate for their rights and needs. According to this view, initiatives can only be truly "pro-poor" insofar as they contribute to expanding poor people's abilities to advance their interests politically. Williams (2004a, 568) adopts and expands on their approach, posing three questions to assess participatory initiatives.<sup>37</sup>

*To what extent do participatory development programmes contribute to processes of political learning among the poor?* Equally important here are knowledge of formal political rights (which can provide potential bases for struggle) and increased awareness of the *de facto* local rules of the game (which can sharpen understanding of appropriate strategies and allies).

*To what degree do participatory programmes reshape political networks?* It is often the reshaping of linkages beyond the local that will be a key determinant of success or failure for poor participants. The ways in which the existing roles of brokers and patrons are challenged or reinforced is of importance here—

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<sup>37</sup> Williams focuses on PD, but this framework applies equally to PG, as illustrated by Whitehead and Gray-Molina's (2003) use of "political capabilities" to analyze of governance initiatives like Bolivia's Popular Participation Law.

and these political intermediaries should not be assumed to be always and everywhere a negative force.

*How do participatory programmes affect existing patterns of political representation, including changes to the language of political claims and competition?* Challenging repressive or exclusionary political norms is crucial to the longer-term success of participatory practice—and here an analysis of local cultures of leadership and governance may be important in understanding both the potentials and limits to this change.

The combination of skills, experience, and knowledge (*political learning*), the ways in which people engage and come together politically (*political networks*), and represent others or are represented (*political representation*), provides a scaled framework for evaluating a reform's impact on political capabilities. While one program may not significantly influence all three components, political learning alone, for instance, could prefigure—or occur concurrently with—changes in political networks and/or representational structures over the longer term. Conversely, patterns of political representation could remain so exclusionary, inequitable, and/or repressive that political learning could have very little subsequent impact.<sup>38</sup>

Four points outlined earlier vis-à-vis civil society also apply to political capabilities. First, clear definition and disaggregation remain important. The definition and three-question framework from Whitehead and Gray-Molina and Williams meet this standard. Second, context matters for political capabilities because history (and especially local history) matters. As Gray-Molina (2000) illustrates in case studies of the Bolivian Popular Participation Law, participation becomes part of a long process of “political layering” and interacts with previous layers of state-society relations (including clientelist networks, political fragmentation, social movements, and long-standing relationships with the

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<sup>38</sup> Such a multi-level approach to assessing particular state initiatives would heed Houtzager's (2003) call for a “polity” approach. In particular, one can look at an initiative like CMS as a “structural linkage” through which subordinated groups engage with the state, with the experience shaped by national political history and the nature of political institutions. See Chapter Eight for more on this concept.

state).<sup>39</sup> Discussing the same case, Whitehead and Gray-Molina (1999, 7) note: “As observed by Albert Hirschman, long-term memories of effective opposition, contestation or participation provide a continuous resource for collective mobilization in the future.” History influences whether and how political capabilities may emerge and manifest themselves. A political capabilities analysis must not, therefore, consider one government program in isolation, but instead situate it within the broader political context. Previous government programs and historical state-citizen relationships in a particular area all become critically important in understanding a particular participatory initiative. This thesis will heed this imperative by specifying the political contexts—and particularly the historical relationship between citizens and the state—predating CMS in Honduras and Guatemala (Chapter Three), as well as how CMS interacted with those political realities (Chapter Four). Studying two otherwise similar countries should bring historical particularities into sharper relief.

Third, the power of context may dictate that political capabilities—like civil society—have negative and/or exclusionary consequences. Again following Whitehead and Gray-Molina (1999, 8):

Political capabilities, as described above, need not be empowering. In relatively closed and non-competitive political arenas, capabilities are likely to be highly excludable by virtue of pre-existing rules of political participation. Participation in a clientele network rewards reciprocity within, but sanctions defection without.

Fourth, like civil society, political capabilities are often endogenous to state action and state formation; states can both foster and diminish citizens’ political capabilities (Whitehead and Gray-Molina 2003). While long-standing limitations on political expression and assembly could diminish political capabilities, state action (e.g., by

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<sup>39</sup> See also Grindle 2007 and Williams 2004b.

creating spaces for participation and political engagement) can foster political capabilities. But, as with civil society, these effects will not be automatic, so one must specify the mechanisms connecting political capabilities to democratic quality. Again, Williams' three-question framework meets this threshold. By distinguishing between learning, networks, and patterns of representation, Williams identifies both individual- and community-level impacts that would open up local political life, especially to marginalized people. By unpacking Whitehead and Gray-Molina's definition, Williams offers an accessible framework amenable to empirical testing.

Finally, a clarification on my use of "political capabilities" bears mention. Williams' framework specifies that relevant "learning" and "networks" outcomes should be explicitly "political." This may set the bar too high, however, as it will likely miss incremental changes in civic and political behavior among individuals and within communities. For instance, Williams' specification runs the risk of not recognizing when a substantial group of previously-excluded people learn to hold and organize meetings, likely a necessary pre-cursor to learning the rules of the game for engagement with the state. Moreover, "thickening" of organizational life in a community—even if not explicitly political—bears scrutiny as a measure of that community's capacity for collective action. Thus, while I maintain a political focus throughout this thesis, I also include civic learning and civic networks in my analysis of outcomes.

#### **IV. Paths Not Chosen: Social Capital and Empowerment**

Before proceeding with the argument, it bears mention why I have chosen a political capabilities framework rather than "social capital" or "empowerment," both frequently used in the literature on PD and PG. My analyses of civil society and participation have

shown how critical political knowledge and engagement are to improving the quality of democracy. Meanwhile, social capital and empowerment as concepts typically remain divorced from the political realm and from precise mechanisms that might link them to democracy.

The political science literature on Central America indicates the need to move beyond social capital to understand the link between associational life and democracy.<sup>40</sup> In the region's most extensive such analysis, Booth and Richard (1998) suggest that social capital does not strengthen democracy at all. These authors assess the relationship between associational activity and levels of democratisation in Central America and show that formal CSO participation yields both social capital and political capital. For Booth and Richard, political capital differs from Putnam's social capital by embodying behaviours and attitudes towards the state. Analyzing survey data from six Central American countries, they conclude that CSOs strengthen democracy only when they foster political capital. By disaggregating social and political capital, they illustrate how "state-impinging activities and attitudes" (*ibid.*, 782)—e.g., contacting public officials and commitment to democratic norms—link civil society development to democratization. Furthermore, the same authors (Richard and Booth 2000) identify a correlation between political capital and regime type in the region, while they find no such relationship between social capital and regime type. Coupled with the earlier assertion that CSOs strengthen democracy only when they engage in political action, this finding suggests that both organizations and intra-network norms support democracy only when they have some bearing on the state and/or how the polity is governed.

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<sup>40</sup> Perhaps the most commonly used definition of social capital comes from Putnam, who defines the term as "features of social organizations, such as networks, norms, and trust, that facilitate action and cooperation for mutual benefit" (cited in Portes 1998, 18).

For similar reasons, I also choose not to use the term "empowerment" to capture the impacts of participation. Like social capital, "empowerment" has become a development buzzword whose definition and connection to democratic life often remains unspecified and dubious (Luttrell and Quiroz 2009). At first glance, "empowerment" is attractive because the root "power" suggests a political dimension. But efforts to specify the concept have fallen short. In what may be the broadest effort to elaborate "empowerment," Alsop et al. (2006) develop a theoretical framework focused on actors' agency and opportunity structure. They define "empowerment" as "the process of enhancing an individual's or group's capacity to make purposive choices and to transform those choices into desired actions and outcomes." But when they apply the concept to one of the present study's cases, PROHECO, the model reveals its shortcomings. In measuring the empowerment produced by PROHECO, they consider only who participated and whether parents were able to meet council objectives (*ibid.*, Chapter 9). In short, they deem a program to have "empowered" participants as soon as A) otherwise marginalized participants are elected to the council and B) the council achieves administrative functionality. This conception of empowerment ignores how the participatory arena may operate—such as how decisions are taken and where power lies—and does not capture any transformative effects on individuals and groups that theorists have long associated with participation.

Instead of gauging how participation impacts participants, this conception of empowerment suggests that transformation has happened as soon as one begins participating. Moreover, despite Alsop et al.'s theorizing about broader power constraints and multi-level analysis, their application of the concept to CMS remains entirely depoliticized. This is similar to one of the only other assessments of CMS's impact on parents, done through a social capital lens. In that paper, Durston (1999)

lauds PROHECO as a model that builds community and strengthens democracy with virtually no empirical evidence, consideration of causal mechanisms, or analysis of the program's connection to the national political context. In short, empowerment and social capital all too often appear in depoliticized forms that do not help us pry open the "black boxes" presented in Figure 2. Ultimately these concepts remain inferior to political capabilities for capturing the effects of PG on the quality of democracy.

## **V. Review of Participatory Governance Literature**

Thus far, this chapter has specified this study's guiding proposition: namely, that PG may create political capabilities among citizens, which, in turn, can strengthen civil society and improve the quality of democracy. Before proceeding with this study's methodological approach to testing this proposition, I will provide a brief review of the existing literature on the impacts of other PG initiatives on participants' civic and political behavior. Much of this literature focuses on Latin America, particularly on participatory budgeting in Brazil (and now elsewhere, as well) and the Popular Participation Law in Bolivia. The citations below, however, also cover cases from elsewhere in Latin America, as well as sites as far afield as Tanzania, Indonesia, the United States, and Canada.

Scholars studying these various cases have uncovered much heartening evidence regarding PG's impacts on democratic life. First, several have shown that PG initiatives have bred inclusion and "thickened" civil society. Certain PG cases have involved previously excluded groups (e.g., women or ethnic minorities), who subsequently impact policy-making (Baiocchi 2001; Souza 2001; Heller, Harilal, and Chaudhuri 2007; Baiocchi 2005; Wampler and Avritzer 2004). Moreover, studies have shown that PG can "thicken" civil society, both by increasing the number of CSOs (and, in some cases,

coalitions) and increasing individual participants' subsequent levels of organizational involvement (Baiocchi 2001; Souza 2001; Heller, Harilal, and Chaudhuri 2007; Baiocchi 2005; Wampler and Avritzer 2004; Nylén 2003; Wampler 2007).

Second, scholars have also shown how PG initiatives (and/or the organizations that emerge to participate in these fora) can serve as "schools of democracy." Scholars have documented political learning, such as improved individual and collective dialogue and deliberation, as well as reductions in conflict (Barron, Diprose, and Woolcock 2006; Cornwall, Romano, and Shankland 2008; Lang 2007).

Third, successful cases of PG have increased accountability in service provision and citizens' bargaining leverage. Citizen participation in, and oversight of, public decision-making has reduced the exclusive power of technocrats and local officials, increased popular satisfaction with service delivery, and reduced corruption and clientelism in budget allocation (Souza 2001; Heller, Harilal, and Chaudhuri 2007; Baierle 1998; Abers 2000). Moreover, participation in PG has prompted increased citizen demands on, and engagement with, the state, enabling previously marginalized communities to influence government decisions more than ever before (Souza 2001; Heller, Harilal, and Chaudhuri 2007; Wampler 2007; Lang 2007; Wampler 2004; Gonçalves 2009).

And, finally, PG has also contributed to "mobilizing" or building the state in areas and sectors where it was previously weak (Abers and Keck 2009). Not only has PG impacted citizen participation and civil society, but it also often involves an element of "co-production" or "synergy," in which NGOs, community organizations, and social movements help increase state functioning (Evans 1996). While some critics note the propensity for "participation" to be used as part of a broader conservative agenda of trimming the state apparatus (Williams 2004a), others note that, in certain sectors and

geographical areas, the state has never, or barely, been present (Abers and Keck 2009). Thus, while PG can off-load responsibilities onto citizens to shrink state institutions, it can also enlist citizens to build these institutions up where they were previously absent.

Of course, the outcomes of PG initiatives have varied, as in the divergent results of participatory budgeting in different Brazilian cities (Wampler and Avritzer 2004; Goldfrank 2006). While scholars have identified various PG “success stories” (most prominently, participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre and decentralization in Kerala, India), many have also noted failures.

The first set of problems has to do with how initiatives are designed and implemented. First, scholars have noted that certain infrastructure projects devised in PG settings fail due to participants’ lack of technical knowledge and capacity (Heller, Harilal, and Chaudhuri 2007; Echeverri-Gent 1992). Second, critics have highlighted the regressive impact of PG initiatives that require non-remunerated labor from poor participants, while better-off citizens have received similar services with no such contribution (Vincent 2010). Third, PG’s design and rules are often top-down and rigid—leaving little space for participants to opine about the appropriate format for participation—which can contribute to alienation and apathy among participants (Vincent 2010; Goudsmit and Blackburn 2001).

Other concerns emerge with respect to who participates in, controls, and benefits from PG. First, PG spaces can become controlled by economic and/or political elites. Where economic elites dominate deliberation, they may capture disproportionate resources; where political brokers take over, patronage politics and authoritarian “political cultures” can supercede democratic deliberation as the basis for resource distribution (Gray-

Molina 2000; Cornwall, Romano, and Shankland 2008; Echeverri-Gent 1992; Hiskey and Seligson 2003; Cornwall 2008; Dill 2009).

Second, PG can (either intentionally or unintentionally) exclude the poorest members of a community, as where registration requirements for participating organizations remain high (Souza 2001; Dill 2009). And even where previously marginalized citizens participate in PG, spillover effects may accrue primarily to those with high levels of prior participation, who remain the principal leaders (Nylen 2002; Vincent 2010). Moreover, with respect to political learning and subsequent engagement, men have benefited from certain participatory spaces and training more than women (Houtzager, Acharya, and Lavalley 2007; Finkel 2008).

Finally, while PG may increase citizens' interaction with, and demands on, state institutions, new participatory venues may not change the nature of these interactions. Where engagement with the state follows the same logic that characterized authoritarian or semi-authoritarian rule, Houtzager et al. (2007) cast doubt on whether even PG "success stories" increase direct, democratic citizen-state engagement. Whether a country has only recently emerged from authoritarianism or not, broader political dynamics (e.g., pervasive clientelism, *caudillismo*, and power asymmetries between collective actors) can subsume participatory spaces, as well as CSOs' broader efforts to organize autonomously (Fung and Wright 2003; Houtzager, Acharya, and Lavalley 2007).

What, then, accounts for such divergence in outcomes? Scholars have offered two groups of explanations: those focused on political and associational context and those focused on program design.

Scholars have first noted that certain background political conditions appear important for PG to thrive, with regards to both the degree of civic participation and impact on

democracy. They have noted the following key factors: First, PG can best thrive where it enjoys a strong, supportive mayor and/or ruling party with an ideological commitment to augmenting participation (Heller, Harilal, and Chaudhuri 2007; Heller 2001; Nylen 2003; Wampler 2004; Goldfrank 2006). Second, PG is bolstered by national constitutions and / or specific laws promulgating participation in governance (Cornwall, Romano, and Shankland 2008; Goldfrank 2006). Third, vibrant political competition (that is, the ruling party facing a legitimate contender) can prove important for PG success, especially where there is no opposition party determined to sabotage the initiative (Echeverri-Gent 1992; Heller 1996; Goldfrank 2001). And, finally, PG has a better chance of achieving high levels of participation, accountability, and shared governance where there is already strong civil society, capable of both cooperation and contention (Heller 2001; Baiocchi 2005; Wampler and Avritzer 2004; Wampler 2007; Cornwall, Romano, and Shankland 2008; Wampler 2004; Goldfrank 2006; Cornwall 2008; Heller 1996).

On program design, I mentioned above that non-consultative, “closed” program designs can dissuade people from participating. But PG also varies in the quantity of resources that states put up for grabs—in participatory budgeting, for instance, certain cities place the entire capital budget on the table, while others offer only a small fraction—and whether citizen input produces only input for elected officials or binding decisions. The literature suggests that PG initiatives with more flexible designs, sufficient resources for citizens to feel that participation is worthwhile, and opportunities for greater citizen participation in decision-making will yield greater participation, accountability, and impacts on citizens’ political skills and networks (Wampler and Avritzer 2004; Lang 2007; Goldfrank 2006).

Moreover, PG initiatives have a greater chance to ensure non-elite participation and learning where they offer training and technical support to citizens (Barron, Diprose, and Woolcock 2006; Lang 2007; Wampler 2002). This finding is reinforced by studies that have shown that PG may be more likely to attract participants and spur subsequent participation where citizens boast higher socio-economic levels, especially education levels (Fung and Wright 2003, 23; Lang 2007; Houtzager, Acharya, and Lavallo 2007). Starting points matter: Where PG seeks to engage non-elite participants with little prior experience in organizations, the responsible state and/or development institutions need to devote resources to address the capacity gap.

Having reviewed the literature on civil society and democracy, political capabilities, and PG, I can now present Figure 3, which fills in the “black boxes” presented earlier (Figure 2) and depicts the comprehensive theoretical model that this thesis adopts. The present study examines whether CMS, as a case of PG, strengthens civil society—itsself measurable by the density of CSOs, their relative autonomy, and their ability to articulate their interests individually and collectively<sup>41</sup>—by increasing participants’ political capabilities. In particular, I will examine whether participation in CMS impacts individuals’ civic and political knowledge, enhances their civic and political networks, and affects the prevailing patterns of political representation.

The literature on PG suggests the types of outcomes that are possible, but it also indicates potential obstacles to realizing these outcomes. In Figure 3, I record the key variables associated with political and associational context and program design. Where PG strengthens civil society, it can increase the quality of democracy through the mechanisms described at the beginning of this chapter—opening avenues for citizens to

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<sup>41</sup> This is consistent with Oxhorn’s (1995) claim that the strength of civil society hinges on its ability to “resist subordination” by and “demand inclusion” from the state.

articulate needs and have input in policy decisions that affect them, increasing accountability of elected officials, and consolidating the rule of law.<sup>42</sup> But here, too, there are obstacles: namely, repression by the state, co-optation or domination by the state or a party, and divisions within civil society itself. Figure 3 shows that the road from PG to a higher quality democracy is a long one. The rest of this thesis will explore whether CMS in Honduras and Guatemala has been able to transcend the many obstacles along the way.

## **VI. A Mixed Methods Strategy for Operationalizing Political Capabilities**

The review of the literature on PG thus far suggests that scholars have come a long way in charting PG's potential impacts on citizens and the political process, as well as the predictors of "success." But lacunae remain, both with respect to the geographic distribution of the examined cases and these studies' approach.

Regarding geography, most examinations of PG (especially among political scientists) remain urban. Given that many of the "brown areas" in nascent Latin American democracies are rural, PG initiatives in rural areas offer excellent sites from which to understand how citizens interact with the state and how "the state asserts authority, extends its reach and ultimately, changes" (Gray-Molina 2000, 245). Moreover, in the literature on PG in Latin America, virtually no work has been done in Central America, likely Latin America's most "brown" sub-region. Notably, in the Central American context, no one has rigorously examined the political impact of CMS. This absence is remarkable because, at least in Honduras and Guatemala, these rural initiatives are likely the largest cases of PG in their respective countries.

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<sup>42</sup> Of course, I am not arguing that PG provides the only path to stronger civil society and/or improved quality of democracy. I am simply showing how one type of government initiative may produce these outcomes.




Figure 3: Overarching Theoretical Framework

With respect to scholars' approach to studying PG's impacts on democratic life, much prior research has lacked a clear theoretical framework. Many rely on vague notions of "empowerment" or "social capital," without specifying mechanisms or connecting these outcomes back to the broader polity. And, to my knowledge, only Whitehead and Gray-Molina (2003) have explicitly examined PG through a political capabilities framework.

Moreover, where scholars focus primarily on the frequency of participation and the number of organizations involved in, and emerging from, PG, they often miss the qualitative aspects of participation, such as inter-group dynamics and citizen-state interactions (e.g., Nylen 2002).<sup>43</sup> Individual case studies capture the qualitative dimension, but render generalizability difficult. While some structured comparisons have emerged in studies of PG (Wampler and Avritzer 2004; Goldfrank 2007), they remain few and far between. Those that rely on surveys (e.g., Nylen 2002; Wampler 2007) often fail to probe the citizen-citizen and citizen-state interactions that their instruments record, leaving readers with notions of diminishing, sustained, or increased participation in civic and political organizations, but little sense of what such participation implies for the quality of democracy. Moreover, where survey exercises lack an extensive qualitative accompaniment, they may ignore community-level effects of participation. Charting individual impacts is itself an important and difficult enterprise, but, if one is trying to assess the quality of democracy, surely one must also consider how these experiments affect communities more broadly.

And, finally, as Mansbridge (1999) notes, efforts to document participation's "educative" effects have often amounted to laudatory accounts by sympathizers who ignore selection problems, the lack of available panel data for cross-country studies, and the lack of control groups. Where panel data and control groups prove impossible to obtain, studies

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<sup>43</sup> Houtzager et al. (2007) offer an important exception.

should supplement their quantitative work with a heavy dose of qualitative analysis before making any claims about causality.

My study seeks to address these lacunae. In particular, I offer a structured, cross-country comparison in rural areas in oft-neglected Central America. I operationalize the political capabilities framework introduced above with a mixed-methods approach that captures both quantitative findings about changing patterns of civic and political participation and qualitative examination of how such participation impacts the quality of democracy.

Mixed methods approaches have recently attracted more attention in political science. Methodologists have increasingly criticized over-reliance on quantitative research designs and methods (Tarrow 2004; Mahoney and Goertz 2006; Brady and Collier 2004; George and Bennett 2005). They have noted that, while quantitative studies can provide generalizable findings about the incidence of outcomes of interest and correlations between variables, qualitative research remains indispensable for identifying causal mechanisms and understanding how causes have impacts in individual cases (Mahoney and Goertz 2006; Bennett and Braumoeller 2006). Moreover, quantitative analysis often focuses primarily on measurement and indicators, while qualitative analysis is more focused on the concept guiding the research (Mahoney and Goertz 2006). Qualitative analysis can both ensure that quantitative indicators actually measure the concept in question and gather data on issues that quantitative surveys, for instance, may simply be unable to reveal (Lieberman 2005). As a result, many scholars now argue for more attention to qualitative and mixed-methods approaches.

The political capabilities approach to studying PG described above offers an ideal site for a mixed-methods approach for several reasons. The political capabilities framework implies different levels of analysis—individual learning and involvement, civic and

political networks, and patterns of political representation. While the acquisition of skills and frequency of participation could likely be reasonably captured with survey data, features of civic and political networks and patterns of political representation would be much harder to uncover quantitatively. Put differently, a political capabilities analysis requires addressing both questions of “how much” (e.g. number of participants and frequency of demands on government) and “how” (e.g. how do citizens perceive and interact with the state, how does CMS relate to existing patronage networks). Moreover, because CMS in Central America remains virtually unstudied by political scientists, qualitative research was necessary to understand the research context, ensure that indicators matched the concepts in use, and probe the potential causal mechanisms between variables.

Given this imperative for mixing methods, I opted for “nested analysis” (Lieberman 2005). My engagement with the topic began with participating in survey pilots and conducting preliminary fieldwork, what methodologists colloquially refer to as “soaking and poaking.” Causal analysis, however, began by analyzing large-N survey data to capture the frequency of the outcomes related to political capabilities and the impact of independent variables of interest on these outcomes. This survey data was made available to me by the primary researchers of a broader research project on CMS with which I collaborated. After initial pilots to test and revise the survey instruments, the surveys were conducted nationally in Honduras in fall 2007—with 1,252 surveyed parents from 275 schools—and in the Guatemalan department of Alta Verapaz in spring 2008—with 819 respondents from 150 schools.

The survey focused on the impact of CMS participation on parents’ levels of participation in community affairs. I concentrated my quantitative analysis on a series of before / after questions related to respondents’ skills for participating in organizations,

the number of organizations in which they participated, and the frequency of their interactions with state actors. These data enabled me to assess the frequency of particular outcomes of interest, as well as to test correlations with key independent variables like socio-economic level, training, and respondents' sex. They were insufficient to prove causation, however, given the lack of baseline data or a control group, limitations that I discuss further before presenting the data in Chapter Five.

After analyzing the survey data, I conducted four case studies in each country. These case studies corrected for two shortcomings in the survey data. First, they enabled me to explore key variables omitted from (or simply not measurable by) the survey. This included data about the council as a group—such as decision-making and rotation—for which individual responses could not provide a sound measure, as well as items that were simply better measured through semi-structured interviews and informal discussions, such as a community's historical relationship with the state, the nature of interactions with state actors, and prevailing gender dynamics in a community. By facilitating data collection on omitted individual-level variables and community-level effects, these case studies also enabled me to probe the meaning of particular outcomes in greater depth (Chapter Six explores this further).

Second, as mentioned above, qualitative analysis allowed me to examine correlations identified in the quantitative analysis to corroborate whether evidence supported these links being causal. I used both within-case and cross-case analysis to parse out which independent variables helped explain whether parents had learned and if networks and patterns of representation had changed as a result of CMS (Munck 2004).

I discuss case selection and case study methodology in greater detail before presenting the cases in Chapter Six, so for now an overview will suffice. I chose the cases

purposively from the survey dataset, a practice common for mixed-methods research and “nested analysis” (Lieberman 2005; Munck 2004; Collier, Mahoney, and Seawright 2004). I used the descriptive statistics from the survey data to choose “diverse” cases vis-à-vis spillovers on parents, a useful approach for researching under-studied topics (Seawright and Gerring 2008; Goertz 2009).

Within each case, I conducted introductory meetings with community leaders, critical for developing rapport and reducing researcher bias (Cammatt 2006). I then conducted community mapping exercises to learn the layout of communities, introduce myself to residents, and obtain demographic data for a community census. The heart of each case study involved interviews with all former and current council members and teachers still residing in the community. I also interviewed a random sample of non-participating parents, or, in the smallest communities, simply interviewed at least one adult from every household in the community. To observe group dynamics and decision-making processes, I also observed different groups’ meetings (especially those related to the school) in each community and held discussion groups with residents about the history of the school and of all the organizations in the community. I discuss these methods in greater detail before presenting the case studies in Chapter Six.

I also interviewed parents in two communities in each country that were located near the CMS communities but had official public schools. This enabled me to explore “control” cases qualitatively and to determine whether parental participation in CMS differed significantly from parental participation in traditional schools. I discuss this comparison further in Chapters Six and Eight.

My qualitative work had one other dimension: reviewing CMS records and reports and conducting elite interviews in both countries. These activities occurred primarily before

the case studies, but in certain cases were only possible later on. This qualitative work proved critical for understanding the broader political context of CMS. This data thus proved critical for my analysis in Chapter Four, which centers on how CMS interacted with each country's political system and history.

In total, I conducted my qualitative fieldwork for 10 months in 2007, 2009, and 2010. In addition to the group activities, direct observation, informal discussions, and records reviews, my qualitative research consisted of a total of 320 interviews, the vast majority of which were one-on-one. A total of 245 of these interviews took place with residents and teachers in the eight case study communities, while the remaining 75 took place with program staff in local and national offices, other government and development agency officials, and other experts on the CMS programs.

Having laid out this study's theoretical framework and methodology, one final point bears mention. Much of the literature on participatory democracy, development, and governance has focused on whether it influences citizens' attitudes—e.g., does it increase their sense of the public good? The political capabilities approach, meanwhile, emphasizes skills, networks, and resources, which are more behavioral than attitudinal. While the case studies will examine certain attitudinal issues—e.g., parents' self-confidence in participating and prevailing norms on issues of gender and political representation—I follow the political capabilities approach in placing greater emphasis on behavioral dimensions. Of course, individuals could possess certain capabilities—such as knowing how to petition a state actor—without exercising them. But, given that this study focuses on the impact of capabilities on civil society—the strength of which can be assessed by the manner, frequency, and impact of citizens' efforts to organize themselves—it makes sense to focus more on the behavioral manifestations of these capabilities.

This behavioral focus is also appropriate given the study's methodology: surveys and structured case-study comparisons seem better suited for capturing behavioral changes than attitudinal changes. Changes in individuals' attitudes over time would probably be best explored through long-term or repeat-visit ethnographic work. The downside of the latter, of course, is that it renders structured comparison and generalizability much more difficult.

## **VII. Conclusion**

This chapter has honed in on the relationship between PG, civil society, and the quality of democracy. Contrary to overly optimistic advocates of states' efforts to spur civic participation, I have highlighted many potential pitfalls of participation. Previous initiatives have generated such unintended outcomes as elite control of deliberation and capture of resources, exclusion of marginalized groups, and co-optation by governments and ruling parties. Meanwhile, critics of participation have often gone too far, using these "negative" cases to suggest that all efforts to incorporate "participation" are necessarily doomed. Evidence from the PG literature suggests that well-designed initiatives can strengthen civil society, incorporate marginalized people and their interests, and hold elected officials to account. Under the right set of circumstances, PG may bolster civil society, which, in turn, may improve the quality of democracy.

This chapter differs from many previous accounts of the impact of participatory initiatives on democracy in wresting open the "black box" connecting PG to democracy. While PG can improve the quality of democracy, these effects are not automatic. Constraints abound, and scholars must thus adopt a theoretical framework that acknowledges both the possibilities and the barriers to participation and its spillover

effects. I have argued that the political capabilities framework heeds this imperative by focusing on both changes in individuals and the networks and patterns of political representation that circumscribe them. Whereas notions of social capital and empowerment are typically invoked in anodyne and sloppy fashion—with individual-level changes presumed to have macro-level effects—the political capabilities approach forces one never to lose sight of the broader polity in which a particular initiative comes into being. It also enables one to register potential contradictions in participation, where certain desirable outcomes can be overtaken by broader political dynamics. For instance, with this framework one could observe how a particular PG initiative could involve previously excluded citizens and produce political learning, while ultimately reinforcing exclusive clientelistic networks and the state’s “tokenistic” approach to civil society involvement. A political capabilities approach forces one to take a longer view of these processes—situating particular government initiatives in the history of citizen-state interactions—which inform everything that follows.

Because of this imperative to appreciate the impact of political history on PG initiatives, in this chapter I have opted not to introduce the indicators that I ultimately chose to measure the dimensions of political capabilities. Choosing indicators requires sensitivity to each country’s broader political context. The following two chapters present the most relevant parts of each country’s political history and how these interact with CMS. The discussion of which indicators I selected will come after those two chapters, which will enable the reader to more fully appreciate why I chose to examine certain features of civic and political life in Honduras and Guatemala.

### 3. THE DIFFERENT HISTORICAL PATTERNS OF CIVIL SOCIETY DEVELOPMENT IN HONDURAS AND GUATEMALA

Over a century ago, citizens in Honduras and Guatemala began coming together to organize their communities, negotiate with employers, and demand rights and benefits from the state. The story of how civil society developed in these countries, however, has remained largely untold. Given that authoritarianism dominated Central America for most of that period and armed conflict engulfed the isthmus during the second half of the twentieth Century, it is no surprise that much of the historiography on Guatemala and Honduras has focused on imperialists, dictators, militaries, and guerrillas, to the relative exclusion of civil society. But to explore contemporary efforts to foster civil society—the aim of this thesis—it is essential to understand these groups' predecessors and how they both shaped and were shaped by the state. In this chapter, I examine how Hondurans and Guatemalans—despite being mostly illiterate, oppressed, and impoverished—formed civic organizations since the late 19<sup>th</sup> Century, and how these groups' activities affected the region's political history and the prospects for democracy. These organizations lost more frequently than they won, but their emergence, and the obstacles they faced, remain central to understanding both countries' histories.

This chapter thus recounts the formation of Honduran and Guatemalan civil society, how CSOs faced and reacted to subjugation, and the manner in which they interacted with their respective governments. Such an inquiry will prove useful in three ways. First, it will show how Hondurans and Guatemalans contested undemocratic systems of power (whether governments or foreign corporations that dominated domestic politics) and interacted with dominant political actors and institutions. Whereas scholars studying either country have focused on civil society formation over shorter periods and

episodes—e.g., Guatemala’s October Revolution and Honduras’s 1954 banana strikes—my review of the secondary literature will trace the key historical legacies that connect these periods to one another. Second, understanding the historical development of civil society will prove indispensable for understanding the contemporary relationships between organized groups of citizens and the state in these countries—the objective of subsequent chapters. Third, juxtaposing the histories of Honduras and Guatemala allows one to appreciate critical political differences in what many assume to be similar countries. Exploring the distinct legacies shaping civil society in each country will lay the groundwork for Chapter Four, which explains how their respective heritages influenced similar CMS initiatives that sought to stimulate civil society.

This chapter will proceed as follows. The first four sections focus on consecutive historical periods—Independence through 1870, 1870 through 1944, 1944 through 1980, and 1980 through 2009. This periodization reflects critical events in Honduran and Guatemalan history, most notably the Liberal Reforms (1870s), Guatemala’s October Revolution (1944), and the onset of political liberalization (early 1980s). In each period, I discuss the broader political context and the relationships between major political events and civil society development. After exploring each of these periods, I conclude by analyzing the broader legacies of each country’s political history on contemporary civil society and the nature of citizens’ engagement with the state. This will lay important groundwork for Chapter Four, in which I explore how similar CMS programs interacted with these different political legacies.

This chapter’s central argument is that a legacy of “controlled inclusion”—through patronage politics, co-optation, and intermittent repression—looms large over Honduran civil society. Meanwhile “coerced marginalization”—where a repressive apparatus shut down space for citizens to organize themselves—in Guatemala produced higher residual

polarization and conflict in civil society. These terms come from Oxhorn (1995), who has described “controlled inclusion” and “coerced marginalization” as the key modes of state – society interaction in Latin America from roughly the 1930s through 1980. By focusing on two neighboring countries with myriad demographic, economic, and political similarities, the present analysis brings into relief how the balance of—and transition between—these modes differed by country. I then illustrate how these countries’ respective legacies have influenced civil society’s re-emergence and interactions with political society since political liberalization began in the 1980s. This will establish the political context in which CMS emerged and with which it interacted.

Before proceeding, the types of CSOs on which the chapter focuses also bear mention. This chapter does not provide a comprehensive account of all Honduran and Guatemalan civil society. Instead, it describes the history of the organizations most relevant to political life. In the sections covering Independence through the middle of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century, I primarily focus on artisans’ organizations, labor unions, and peasant organizations. The chapter focuses on these types of organizations because, as throughout much of Latin America, labor and peasant organizations had the greatest impact on Guatemalan and Honduran political life during this period (Collier 1999; Foweraker and Landman 1997; Brockett 2005; Forster 1998). In both countries, student, teacher, professional, and indigenous organizations all engaged politically in important ways, but these became much more relevant in the second half of the twentieth century (Brockett 2005; Yagenova 2008, Ch. 1-2; Vilas 1995).<sup>44</sup> The Catholic Church also played an important role in fostering organizational life, but its impact on citizens’ political engagement was much more significant after 1960 (Brockett 2005, Ch. 5; Vilas 1995).

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<sup>44</sup> Certain organizations—such as Guatemalan student groups in the 1940s—did play significant roles in resisting authoritarian rule (Yashar 1997). Also, for a starting point on Guatemalan teachers’ unions’ roles, see Handy (1994, 28, 71-2).

The latter part of this chapter will thus present a greater variety of CSOs, including teachers' organizations and indigenous movements. This reflects the more diverse social context that developed in Honduras and Guatemala in the second half of the twentieth century. Of course, this progress was far from linear: Periods of extreme repression almost completely shut down civil society, especially in Guatemala, before political openings brought new opportunities.

### **I. Independence through 1870: No "Stateness," No Democracy or Civil Society**

This section explores the obstacles to democracy and civil society development in Honduras and Guatemala before 1870. Quite simply, I find negligible evidence of civil society activity during this period, which I attribute to the fact that these states were fragmented and incipient—what might be deemed “proto-states.”

Exploring state- and nation-building, Linz and Stepan (1996b, Ch. 2) make the point—perhaps intuitive, but often overlooked—that democracies cannot exist in the absence of functioning states. For Linz and Stepan, having a sovereign state—meaning a clearly defined system of authority (following Weber, with monopoly on the legitimate use of force) over a discrete geographical area—is a necessary but not sufficient condition for democratization. Nondemocratic regimes, which simply impose their will without the principles of competition, constitutionalism, and inclusion, can rule without popular consensus on the geographic unit of the state or the nation to which all citizens belong. But a democracy must first be a functional state to engage with questions of belonging, citizenship, and political competition. As Linz and Stepan assert:

[A]greements about stateness are logically *prior to the creation of* democratic institutions...[T]he very definition of a democracy involves agreement by the citizens of a territory, however specified, on the procedures to be used to generate a government that can make legitimate claims on their obedience. Therefore, if a significant group of people does not accept claims on its obedience as legitimate, because the people do not want to be a part of the political unit, however democratically it is constituted, this presents a serious problem for democratic transition and even more serious problems for democratic consolidation...This brings us back to our basic affirmation: modern democratic governance is inevitably linked to stateness. Without a state, there can be no citizenship; without citizenship, there can be no democracy (*ibid.*, 26-28, emphasis in the original).

Linz and Stepan make clear that democracy is impossible where borders are ill-defined, areas remain uncontrolled, and a polity's legitimacy among residents in a territory remains partial. While certain democratic practices may obtain in sub-state entities, the minimal procedures necessary for democracy cannot obtain without "stateness."

This proves relevant to Central American history because of the general instability and flux in the region through 1870. Several factors impeded state formation during this period. First, the question of regional union remained unresolved. Liberals and Conservatives—especially Morazán in Honduras and Carrera in Guatemala—fought for decades about whether union was feasible and desirable, and what the borders and limits of authority would be (Woodward 1985). A dizzying array of coups and transfers of power took place, leading Torres-Rivas (1993, 193) to describe this period as “anarchy.”<sup>45</sup>

Second, conflict between competing city-states (e.g., Tegucigalpa and Comayagua in Honduras) exacerbated this instability. Dominant caudillos led small militias that played disproportionately large roles in politics (*ibid.*; Dunkerley 1988). As Woodward (1985, 136) explains: "The meddling of strong leaders in the affairs of neighboring states and

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<sup>45</sup> See also Woodward 1991, 1-36.

the sponsoring of exile forces in revolutions became commonplace following independence." In such a situation, "stateness" remained elusive because borders remained unsettled and *caudillos* refused to accept the sovereignty of rival city-states.

In part, these unstable rivalries owed themselves to a third key factor—the weak political structures inherited from colonialism. The Spanish empire's collapse left a power vacuum in which certain Liberals sought regional unity and centralized authority while various powerful forces (especially the Church and the landed elites in particular city-states) fought to maintain and consolidate their own local dominance (Torres-Rivas 1993).

Colonial rule also left behind a weak administrative and economic structure. With weak exports, inherited debts, and no real tax base, Central America's fledgling states were not economically viable and could thus not afford to significantly expand the zone of their authority (Torres-Rivas 1993; Dunkerley 1988; Euraque 1996). A fifth factor, difficult geography, exacerbated this problem; colonial regimes had installed minimal physical infrastructure (e.g., roads), and much of the region's treacherous mountain terrain remained virtually unreachable (and thus uncontrollable) for governing elites (Pérez Brignoli 1985).

Added to this was a final factor, ethnic fragmentation. Honduras and, to a far greater extent, Guatemala had sizeable indigenous and/or Afro-Caribbean populations that complicated attempts to inscribe a particular nationhood throughout these fledgling states. Two points bear mention here. First, many of these communities were located in remote areas, suggesting an additional ethnic dimension to these incipient states' limited geographic reach. Second, consistent with Linz and Stepan's (1996b, Ch. 2) discussion of the potentially undemocratic process of nation-building (not to be confused with

state-building), dominant authorities excluded non-white and -Ladino groups from the "nations" they sought to create. This exclusion reinforced the obstacles to democracy in the region, which were large enough already given the absence of clearly-defined political authorities.

All of these factors contributed to the fragmentation and weakness of the Honduran and Guatemalan states through 1870. Instead of stable political authorities, localist feuds dominated the political and geographic landscape. Without a defined political community and stable political structures, democracy remained absent in Honduras and Guatemala.

Similarly, civil society was almost entirely absent before 1870. While CSOs were present immediately before and after Independence in other parts of Latin America (Forment 2003), there is little evidence of a similar phenomenon for Honduras and Guatemala before 1870. Artisans' organizations, typically the first type of CSO to emerge in Latin American countries, formed only in the 1870s, later than in most of the region (Acuña Ortega 1993; Murga Frassinetti 1984). As in other parts of Latin America (Forment 2003, Preface), dictatorship and censorship appear also to have reduced civil society's potential to flourish in Honduras and Guatemala. Yet, Honduras and Guatemala's distinct economic and political histories—including weak and delayed proletarianization—slowed civil society development when compared with other countries like Mexico and Peru.

In short, where structures of state authority and the bounds of citizenship remained relatively unarticulated and proletarianization had not yet occurred, Hondurans and Guatemalans rarely formed civic organizations to make demands on the state. This historical reading appears consistent with Tilly's (1992) idea that the process of informal

bargaining over rights between a state and its citizens follows the expansion of that state's administrative apparatus.

This reading based on the lack of "stateness" appears useful in explaining the absence of organizations such as unions. But it may explain less in the countryside, especially in indigenous Guatemalan communities in the mid-19<sup>th</sup> Century. There, early coffee expansion—which involved entrepreneurs with state support appropriating communally-owned land—prompted stiff resistance from indigenous communities. During Carrera's Conservative rule (1838-1865, with brief interregna), indigenous communities petitioned local and national officials, including Carrera himself. When it was clear this would fail, many resorted to violence to prevent newcomers' encroachment—including direct assaults and destruction of coffee plantations (Cambranes 1985; McCreery 1990). Because of this threat, Carrera granted indigenous communities a fairly wide berth, essentially re-creating their second-class colonial status without imposing rapid economic change or a strong push for cultural and economic assimilation (Woodward 1990; Carmack 1990). In sum, the indigenous example shows the possibility for rural collective action directed at the state, though only when communities felt that their livelihoods were under attack. With the personal stakes very high, indigenous groups won some important victories.

Only under Barrios, the determined Liberal President from 1873-1885, did Guatemala forcefully shift to an agro-export model that laid the foundations for a modern state and more direct confrontation with indigenous communities and others in the countryside. During the Liberal Reform period, the Guatemalan state clamped down on overt resistance in the countryside (McCreery 1990), making this type of collective action less relevant than others through at least 1944, while other types of organizing (particularly of labor) would take off.

## II. Liberal Reforms Through 1944

Throughout Latin America and as far afield as India, Liberal Reforms radically transformed agricultural economies and, in the process, dramatically altered states' relationship to their citizens. In Central America, Liberal Reform centered on a modernizing vision of the capacity of entrepreneurship (especially primary commodities) to transform the economy, the imperative to curb “traditional” institutions like the Church and communal (especially indigenous) land-holding arrangements, and the willingness to centralize political authority and limit political space in the name of economic progress. Three key factors of Liberal Reform—land tenure, taxes, and railroads—disrupted existing social patterns and institutions and influenced future social arrangements (Migdal 1982). In Central America, this took place with the transition around 1870 from subsistence agriculture and the export of dyes to economies centered on exporting coffee, minerals, and bananas (Cambranes 1985; Winson 1978; Mahoney 2001).<sup>46 47</sup>

The predominant features of Central America's Liberal Reforms were 1) dramatic but uneven changes in land tenure, 2) radical shifts in labor patterns, migration, and urbanization around new enclave economies, and 3) a sweeping expansion of the size and reach of each state. During the Liberal period, new leaders centralized authority to pursue primary export-oriented growth strategies. In much of Central America, the

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<sup>46</sup> Subsistence agriculture—despite having its viability threatened by Liberal Reforms in much of the region (especially Guatemala and El Salvador)—still remained a significant part of the domestic economies (Dunkerley 1988; McCreery 1990; Mahoney 2001).

<sup>47</sup> For certain authors, the coffee boom was the key for the region's political development (Paige 1997; Williams 1994; Schlewitz 2008). Such analyses, however, miss some of the texture of Central American economic and political history, especially in regions where coffee was less relevant during that period, such as most of Honduras. For this reason, it will prove better to focus on the Liberal Reforms more broadly to understand the impact on civil society in Honduras and Guatemala.

focus became consolidating large tracts of land for coffee plantations (Torres-Rivas 1993). Where coffee remained less viable, as in most of Honduras, Liberal leaders focused on developing mines (many of which preceded the Liberal Reforms) and banana plantations as the means to modernize their economies (Euraque 1996). Creating agricultural export economies, however, required significant planning, including extensive land re-distribution. In particular, these reforms focused on granting land title to enterprising individuals (including foreigners, such as the Germans who were given large land concessions for coffee production in Costa Rica and Guatemala) by breaking up and reallocating land held communally and by smallholders who lacked formal title (Dunkerley 1988).

Though Liberal Reforms varied in degree and intensity across the isthmus, nowhere did they engender democracy (Yashar 1997; Dunkerley 1988; Mahoney 2001). Instead, power became further concentrated in the military and agro-exporters, and political rights remained limited in the name of economic progress. The franchise remained severely restricted, with most men and all women still unable to vote at the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century (Smith 2005).

Anyone familiar with Central American history also knows that foreign (especially United States) intervention played an enormous role in Honduras and Guatemala, including military incursions. Nonetheless, explanations of political outcomes based on international intervention are insufficient on their own because countries with similar exports generated divergent outcomes and susceptibility to foreign intervention (Yashar 1997; Mahoney 2001; Paige 1997). Thus, one must understand factors like foreign invasions in light of the Liberal Reforms and the configuration of domestic alliances, interests, and ideologies that both preceded and resulted from these state-building exercises. By the early 20th Century, none of these Liberal Reforms had ushered in

democracy, but the undemocratic regimes differed in type. Radical liberalism in Guatemala and El Salvador had strengthened the military and established coercion as the principal means of control. Equally undemocratic was the aborted liberalism in Honduras and Nicaragua, which resulted in neo-colonialism at the respective hands of US economic and political actors (Mahoney 2001). Only in Costa Rica did reformist liberalism hold fast, maintaining a relatively marginal enclave banana economy (compared to coffee cultivation) and a weak military incapable of dominating the state by force, albeit in a country that remained undemocratic through the end of the Liberal Reform period.

Guatemala underwent the most radical of Central America's Liberal Reforms, resulting in extreme land concentration and a robust military. Rural classes became increasingly polarized, requiring a constant military presence to implement forced labor provisions (Mahoney 2001). In Guatemala, Liberal Reforms also involved generating a new workforce for agricultural plantations through forced labor provisions that converted poor rural-dwellers and indigenous people into indebted peons and conscripts (Mahoney 2001; McCreery 1986; McCreery 1983; McCreery 1976). These transformations of rural society and economy required a stronger and more wide-reaching state, and especially military, authority than had existed earlier in the 19<sup>th</sup> Century. Furthermore, repression disproportionately affected indigenous communities, whose identities fell outside the state's conception of a unitary, Ladino "nation." In Paige's (1997) terms, Guatemala was virtually a feudal system based on the premise of racist coercion to support a small minority landholding population.

Meanwhile, change was far less dramatic in Honduras. As the prototypical banana republic, Honduras extended the reign of foreign investment in mining to the cultivation of bananas. Banana plantations on the North Coast and mines lent themselves to some

rural proletarianization, while the relative abundance of agricultural small landholdings and communal lands maintained a lower level of class polarization (Dunkerley 1988, Ch. 10; Euraque 1996; Argueta 1992). Honduras' military remained smaller, in part because the economy did not require the same level of coercion. This has significant implications for the relationship between rural communities and the state in the two countries. Whereas Guatemalan peasants (especially those of indigenous extraction) experienced continued subjugation and coercion at the hands of the state, Honduran peasants had a less confrontational experience (Mahoney 2001). Furthermore, while Honduras' dictators hailed principally from the military, rural Hondurans did not experience the military as a permanent, repressive force in the way that rural Guatemalans did.

In what follows, I will discuss the profound effects of Liberal Reforms on civil society development in both countries. Urban areas and banana and mining enclaves generally differed from other rural agricultural and coffee-producing areas. Thus, when I refer to “rural areas” below, I mean the agricultural and coffee-producing areas, not banana enclaves, which the year-round concentration of workers made more similar to mines and urban factories. Moreover, the varied intensity of Liberal reform made each country's civil society development different. This section will begin with the first distinction before illustrating the second by comparing Guatemala with Honduras.

*a. Urban Areas and Enclaves*

Though Central America never experienced its own Industrial Revolution,<sup>48</sup> Liberal reforms fed urban expansion and proletarianization. After 1870, urban tradesmen

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<sup>48</sup> The closest the region came probably began with the Central American Common Market around 1960.

formed artisans' organizations throughout the isthmus.<sup>49</sup> These organizations were predominantly mutual aid associations, focused on education and support for their members. For the most part, artisans' organizations (which included plumbers, tailors, carpenters, and other similar trades) remained formally apolitical and enjoyed political elites' tolerance.<sup>50</sup> Some even received state support for social services, with certain politicians incorporating these organizations into their clientelist networks (Acuña Ortega 1993; Murga Frassinetti 1984). By World War I, however, artisans' organizations declined in significance as labor unions formed.

Unions emerged in the 1910s. These formed for several reasons. First, the agro-export system had proletarianized a substantial subset of workers, especially on banana plantations and mines, but also in the limited factories that sprouted up in urban areas. Unlike seasonal laborers on coffee plantations, these workers were employed year-round, and they often lived in close proximity to one another.<sup>51</sup> Unions were primarily based in capital cities,<sup>52</sup> while the outlying enclaves required outside organizers to form an organization (Acuña Ortega 1993). Organizing and strikes, which began from 1907-1920,<sup>53</sup> initially focused on improved salaries and benefits. Strikes appeared first in the enclaves (for example, Honduras' first strike occurred in the mines in 1907), and then spread to urban artisans and factory workers (*ibid.*). Second, with the economic contraction caused by World War I, the infusion of revolutionary ideology given the notable examples of Mexico and Russia, and limited political openings for union organizing, radical organizations also began to spread in the 1920s (Woodward 1985;

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<sup>49</sup> 1872 in El Salvador, 1874 in Costa Rica, 1877 in Guatemala, 1884 in Honduras, and 1904 in Nicaragua (Acuña Ortega 1993). Nicaragua's tardiness makes sense given that its Liberal Reform did not begin until 1890.

<sup>50</sup> Guatemala's Estrada Cabrera was less tolerant and reverted to repression.

<sup>51</sup> Workers lived in closer proximity and density on banana plantations than in mines.

<sup>52</sup> This was more true for a country like Guatemala than Honduras, where the capital remained fairly small and marginal to much of the Liberal economy.

<sup>53</sup> Always precocious, Costa Rica experienced its first strike in 1874.

Murga Frassinetti 1984; Mahoney 2001; Murphy 1970). Small Marxist reading groups, political parties, and unions began to sprout up throughout the region in the 1920s (Murga Frassinetti 1984, Ch. 2). For example, Honduras' Marxist FSH (*Federación Sindical Hondureña*, Honduran Sindical Federation) came to challenge the moderate FOH (*Federación Obrera Hondureña*, Honduran Workers Federation) (Meza 1980).

As the 1920s progressed, strikes became more frequent and more radical throughout the isthmus, and violent repression became the typical state response (Murga Frassinetti 1984). In Honduras, strikes—mostly on banana plantations—occurred virtually every year from 1916 to 1932 and, in Guatemala, banana employees, railroad workers and dockworkers (primarily in the north), struck in 1920 and 1924, with female coffee workers and clothes makers striking in 1925 and urban workers striking in 1926 (*ibid.*; Argueta 1992; Meza 1980). This came to a head after the Great Depression, when workers' grievances grew and major strikes occurred across the region, including in Honduras in 1932 (Murga Frassinetti 1984; Meza 1980).

The expansion and radicalization of union activity, however, prompted further alliances between agro-exporters and potential despots, giving way to an extended return to overt dictatorship (*ibid.*). In El Salvador, the government massacred as many as 30,000 people in 1932, while in Nicaragua the Somozas' repressive reign began in earnest with the assassination of Sandino in 1934. Meanwhile, Ubico assumed power in Guatemala in 1931, violently repressing—and closing off all legal avenues for—union organizing. In Honduras, Carías clamped down, as well (Acuña Ortega 1993; Murga Frassinetti 1984). Significant space for union organizing would not re-emerge until well into World War II.

*b. Rural Areas*

While the Liberal reforms generated a proletarianized workforce on enclaves and in urban areas, they affected rural areas differently. Most directly, Liberal reforms involved land expropriation, forced labor, and conscription (Torres-Rivas 1993, 79-96; McCreery 1986; McCreery 1983, 735-6; McCreery 1976). This oppressive system reached its apogee with Guatemala's "radical" Liberal Reform, particularly in prime coffee areas like Alta Verapaz, where the state appropriated expansive tracts of communally-held land for German entrepreneurs (Cambranes 1985; Mahoney 2001, Ch. 5; McCreery 1986).

In addition to the specter of repression during the Liberal Reform period, forced labor and dispossession in Guatemala bred landlessness (from expropriation and debt), indebtedness, migrant labor to plantations (both seasonal and semi-permanent), and catastrophic health effects (McCreery 1986). These factors proved detrimental to the formation of civil society in rural areas in various ways. First, Liberal reforms undermined individual and collective livelihoods, both attacking the rural subsistence economy and forcing people to struggle to make ends meet. Second, communities became less settled due to increased migration, as well as evasion of forced labor (Dunkerley 1988). Third, communal support mechanisms likely became weaker. The declines in overall community welfare and households' self-sufficiency almost certainly placed great strains on informal mutual aid and insurance arrangements that often characterized rural communities.<sup>54</sup>

Threats to collective livelihoods and community welfare might have produced increased grievances that, in turn, could have inspired subsequent rural organizing. The expanded reach of the military, however, prevented such expressions of collective displeasure. In

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<sup>54</sup> See Anderson's (1994) discussion of more contemporary forms of these arrangements. See Fafchamps (1992) for how reduced individual and collective livelihoods undermine community insurance mechanisms.

Guatemala, indigenous uprisings diminished from the Liberal reforms' inception, as the military gained greater control of the countryside both by brute force and by co-opting indigenous leaders (McCreery 1990; Carmack 1990). With respect to Oxnorth's (1995) aforementioned framework, Liberal Reforms brought an early onset of "coerced marginalization" in rural Guatemala. The government's economic development strategy rested squarely on the backs of indigenous peasants, while the military apparatus stood ready to stamp out any peasant efforts to contest their subjugation.

For this period, there remains little evidence of rural organizing and rebellion (Acuña Ortega 1993). Given the repressive nature of Liberal reform and the lack of efforts by urban and enclave worker organizations to reach out to rural society, this seems unsurprising (*ibid.*; Yashar 1997).<sup>55</sup> Still, there were traces of rural organizing. As discussed above, Guatemalan indigenous communities continued a tradition of anti-state mobilization with roots in the colonial period. Radical Liberal reforms weakened these efforts, but these communities undoubtedly maintained community structures to regulate behavior, support one another, and engage with the state (Acuña Ortega 1993). Furthermore, as workers organized on banana enclaves in Honduras, so too did some peasants in the 1920s begin to form organizations in the countryside to assert rights and articulate economic needs (Posas 1981). These efforts, however, remained small in scale and quickly disappeared under Carías' repressive hand.

Examining the Guatemalan and Honduran cases, Liberal reforms produced weak rural civil societies in two distinct ways. In Guatemala, radical Liberal reform uprooted and coerced indigenous communities. In Honduras, conversely, less military might was

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<sup>55</sup> There is also a data availability problem, due to the difficulty of obtaining such rural data for the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> Century (Acuña Ortega 1993, 308). For more on the lack of research on Central America's social and popular history, see Lauria-Santiago and Chomsky (1998, 5), who also conclude that Honduras and El Salvador have the region's "least-developed national historiographies."

necessary, as the Liberal reforms were far weaker—in fact, by 1950, private owners controlled only 48 percent of Honduran national territory, while the rest remained *ejidal* or state-owned land (*ibid.*, 3-4).<sup>56</sup> According to Mahoney (2001, 180):

Honduran campesino families continued to function largely independently from one another, mitigating the likelihood of sustained collective action. Furthermore, because the Honduran elite was not a traditional landed oligarchy and the national state was not deeply embedded within society, there was no clear target for peasant farmers to direct their grievances against; if they perceived exploitation, their exploiters were not easily identifiable.

In Honduras, where subsistence agriculture remained more feasible, classes remained less polarized, and the state remained weaker. Rural civil society was more underdeveloped than repressed.

As iron-fisted dictators then came to dominate the region from the early 1930s through the early 1940s, civil society in rural and urban areas had little space to grow. Violent suppressions of organized protest took place, most significantly in El Salvador and Guatemala (Pérez Brignoli 1985, Ch. 4; Mahoney 2001, Ch. 8). Furthermore, a rabid anti-communism spread throughout the isthmus. In Honduras, Carías exemplified this trend, clamping down on dissent and creating a national network of informants (d'Ans 2007, Ch. 7). Meanwhile, in Guatemala, Ubico centralized power over the countryside by replacing debt-peonage with a vagrancy law, increasing the state's control over the peasantry (Adams 1990). “Coerced marginalization” remained the order of the day in Guatemala, but this repressive mode of governing also came to characterize urban areas and enclaves in Guatemala and Honduras. Repressive dictators in both countries undercut citizens’ emerging efforts to organize themselves.

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<sup>56</sup> El Salvador would be an intermediate case in which peasant uprising did occur, but was then met with massacre (Mahoney 2001).

### III. 1944-1980: Civil Society Expansion Gives Way to Coercion and Control

The region's relative quiescence began to change in the 1940s. At that point, several factors contributed to democratic openings. World War II and the spread of news through radio brought about an ideological shift towards the language of freedom from tyranny (d'Ans 2007, Ch. 7; Barahona 2005).<sup>57</sup> Certain domestic political openings also presented themselves, as when Ubico's orthodox economic policies alienated Guatemala's middle class (Yashar 1997, Ch. 3). This, combined with declining economic well-being for the lower and middle classes, generated better prospects for protest and labor organizing.<sup>58</sup> Finally, regional diffusion occurred, where protest in El Salvador inspired Guatemalan students to mobilize (Yashar 1997). A few years later, the Guatemalan protests and October Revolution, in turn, influenced Honduran dissidents (Barahona 2005), when "students, professionals, and the wives of prominent liberal dissidents" took to the streets (Euraque 1996, 69).

Formal organizations grew as well. They first emerged in urban areas and proletarianized enclaves. In Guatemala, the formal political transition brought by Arevalo's assumption of power led to increased political space and rights for labor organizing—Guatemala's union membership rose to 100,000 by 1954 (Dunkerley 1988, 436). Between 1944 and 1950, Guatemalan railroad workers, for example, struck every year except one (Handy 1994). As in the 1920s, Guatemalan formal organizing before 1950 again became concentrated in urban areas and banana plantations. Arévalo's 1947 Labor Code enshrined labor organizing rights for urban workers, while limiting the rights of rural workers, especially on coffee estates (Forster 1998).

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<sup>57</sup> For more on this period throughout Latin America, see Roxborough and Bethell 1992.

<sup>58</sup> Yashar (1997, 77-8) records declining GDP per capita in Guatemala, Costa Rica, and Honduras for 1940-1943.

In Honduras, ideological opposition to Carías began to mount around 1945, and Carías' replacement (the milder, but still repressive, Gálvez) granted certain labor rights. Organized labor rose steadily from 1948, culminating in the historic 1954 strikes—two months long and 40,000 strikers strong—on the North Coast (Meza 1980, 49-77; Barahona 2005, 154-162). This strike, universally recognized as the watershed moment for Honduran labor, firmly established the right to organize and strike and prompted the speedy proliferation of unions through the 1960s, marked especially by the creation of SITRATERCO (*Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Tela Railroad Company*, Workers' Syndicate of the Tela Railroad Company) in 1954 and FESITRANH (*Federación Sindical de Trabajadores Nacionales de Honduras*, Syndical Federation of the National Workers of Honduras) in 1957 (Meza 1980; Posas 1980). Unionization extended far beyond the banana plantations to other sectors of the diversifying post-war economy (Meza 1980, 99-117).

Other types of urban-based organizations grew in the isthmus, as well. In addition to students who protested vocally in the 1940s, women's organizations proliferated. No Central American country granted women suffrage until 1939, and the last to do so was Honduras in 1955 (Smith 2005, Ch. 7).<sup>59</sup> This victory required struggle—Honduran women, for instance, formed organizations in the 1940s (e.g., *Comité Femenino Hondureño* and the *Federación de Asociaciones Femeninas de Honduras*) and rallied supporters, with their success spilling over from their central role in the anti-Carías protests (Barahona 2005, 163-166).

This period also proved important for peasant organizing, which began to challenge the rural area vs. proletarian enclave dichotomy that previously characterized the region. During the October Revolution, Guatemala experienced significant organized peasant mobilization. A number of organizations emerged from labor unions' concerted

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<sup>59</sup> Guatemalan women won the right to vote in 1950 (*ibid.*).

organizing efforts after Arévalo's electoral victory (Yashar 1997, Ch. 5), but others were prompted by peasants' own initiative (Forster 1998). In San Marcos, for instance, Forster (1998; 1994) describes peasants' mobilization before Arévalo assumed the Presidency (when Ponce was installed after Ubico's ouster),<sup>60</sup> their refusal to comply with Ubico's vagrancy law (before Arévalo eliminated it) in 1945, their struggle against the Arévalo government's repression, and their fight for better wages.<sup>61</sup> All of this predated the land reform under President Arbenz after 1950. Indigenous peasants thus pushed the October Revolution forward, forcing concessions from recalcitrant coffee landlords and Arévalo's government and demonstrating a largely uncoordinated complementarity between the banana and coffee workers. In this sense, the October Revolution produced a brief window of what Oxford's (1995; see also Evans 1996) framework describes as "state-society synergy"—CSOs capable of both contention and cooperation pushed the state towards implementing redistributive policy.

Peasant organizing then flourished under Arbenz's government, but the urban and banana vs. rural divide did not entirely disappear. With the removal of restrictions on rural organizing, rural and fruit plantation workers became increasingly organized. Together, the two largest organizations, CNCG (*Confederación Nacional Campesina de Guatemala*, National Peasant Confederation of Guatemala) and the smaller CGTG (*Confederación General de Trabajadores de Guatemala*, General Workers' Confederation of Guatemala), organized at least 200,000 people (Yashar 1997, Ch. 5; Handy 1994, Ch. 2-

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<sup>60</sup> San Marcos workers actually began organizing underground in the 1930s, due in part to ideological influences from just across the border in Mexico, where many people worked on plantations (*ibid.*).

<sup>61</sup> Guatemalan peasants' organizing at the dawn of the October Revolution also pre-empted political culture arguments. With no previous experience of formal political democracy, Guatemalan peasants often needed no external actors to organize and demand their rights for political representation, better wages, and more land. For more on problematizing hegemonic conceptions of the passive, backward peasantry in Central America and beyond, see Anderson 1994; Booth and Seligson 1979, 29; Brown 1971; Hill 1968)

3). Still, a tension remained in urban and banana plantation organizers' approaches to rural areas. Handy (1994) aptly summarizes this view by relating one Guatemalan observer's depiction of the peasants as "cattle waiting to pounce." Urban and banana plantation organizers, like many others in their society, recognized the potential power of a movement in the countryside, but they also looked down on what they perceived as peasants' economic and ideological backwardness, especially when they were dealing with indigenous people (see below). This contributed to the lack of a truly national popular movement under Arbenz.

Before Arbenz managed to address these divisions, Carlos Castillo Armas led a successful, CIA-supported coup. The 1954 coup unleashed another extended period of "coerced marginalization" that decimated both urban and rural organizing. Immediately afterwards, "the registration of 533 rural *sindicatos* and *uniones* [was] cancelled (85 per cent of those established under Arévalo and Arbenz), those left intact being resolutely apolitical organizations often dominated by the Church, local landlords or conservative Indian hierarchs" (Dunkerley 1988, 435-6). Furthermore, union membership dropped from 100,000 to 27,000 in the first year after the coup (*ibid.*) Just as Honduras' incipient popular movements were seemingly taking flight, Guatemala's urban and rural organizations were shattered into oblivion.

In Guatemala, 1954 marked a dramatic rejection and reversal of the moderate policies of the preceding ten years: "it halted and turned back a ten-year experience of innovation that had already become codified and deeply embedded in the popular consciousness. In sum, it positively *reversed* history" (Dunkerley 1988, 429, emphasis in the original). With the coup, government repression became simply overwhelming. And while some efforts at unionization and peasant organization re-appeared a decade later, these remained

minimal (Brockett 2005, Ch. 9; Murphy 1970; Adams 1970, Ch. 3). Reflecting on this period, Adams (1970, 200) concludes:

those who had been most active during the revolutionary period had suffered enough and simply had little stomach for further organizing activity. The ten years since the end of the revolutionary period had provided no mechanism for the development or emergence of new rural leaders. The result was that few were experienced or willing to guide syndicate organization.

Peasant organizations, which reached 665 at their zenith between 1947 and 1954, numbered fewer than 100 in the late 1960s (Adams 1970, 452). Even under the civilian President Méndez Montenegro, the military retained a firm grasp that undermined the prospect of CSOs drawing on the positive organizational experiences of the October Revolution. Sadly, the violence would only get worse, especially in the countryside (Dunkerley 1988, Ch. 9). With unions and peasant organizations heavily repressed and membership declining dramatically, the coup and its aftermath convinced a generation of those inclined to challenge military rule that armed struggle was the only option.

In the early 1960s, students, teachers, and political parties protested against the Ydígoras regime (Dunkerley 1988, Ch. 9; Luján Muñoz 2008, 306). Efforts by students continued into the 1970s, and certain unions—such as the CNT (*Confederación Nacional de Trabajadores*, National Confederation of Workers, which formed in 1968) and peasant organizations tried to bounce back, often with the support of Catholic priests through *Acción Católica*. Still, the state's coercive apparatus ensured that civil society remained quite weak, lacking the ability to press for political liberalization (Brockett 2005, Ch. 4; Vilas 1995, Ch. 2; Torres-Rivas 1993, Ch. 3).

A greater challenge to the political system emerged in the form of guerrilla groups—MR-13 and FAR—founded in the 1960s (Dunkerley 1988, Ch. 9). With channels for non-violent action closed, Guatemala became more polarized, and these organizations

managed to recruit university students and others on the Left. With their *foquista* strategy, however, these early guerrilla groups attracted few rural supporters (Dunkerley 1988, Ch. 9; Woodward 1999, 246). These initial guerrilla groups' rise prompted a sharp government backlash that decimated them. As the military beat back this first phase of the insurgency, Guatemala's increasing militarization shut virtually all space for CSOs until roughly 1973 (Brockett 2005, Ch. 7; Luján Muñoz 2008, 312).

With the guerrilla threat neutralized, repression then subsided. The unions had been hit hard, but managed to begin strike activity again—teachers struck in 1973, and other unions became more active over the following two years (Brockett 2005, Ch. 7; Dunkerley 1988, Ch. 9; Alvarez 2009). The economic troubles of the mid- and late-1970s—precipitated by oil price hikes—brought further popular discontent and prompted mobilization (Weeks 1985; Barry and Preusch 1986). The 1976 earthquake reinforced the surge in civil society, with major unions, peasant organizations, and student organizations either forming or reviving themselves to provide emergency relief (Luján Muñoz 2008, 336). By 1977-1978, strikes of miners, sugar plantation workers, and public sector employees amassed tens of thousands of supporters (Dunkerley 1988, 471). Students joined in, too, leading strikes against price hikes in the capital (Luján Muñoz 2008, 338). Moreover, the mid-1970s brought the proliferation of women's organizations and large-scale union activity against companies like Coca-Cola, despite the continued threat of assassination and state violence (Vilas 1995; Barry and Preusch 1986, 244-5).

This period also proved important for rural civil society. By the late 1970s, rural cooperatives had well over 100,000 members. But only in 1978 did a peasant movement organization begin, with the formation of the formidable CUC (*Comité de Unidad Campesina*, Peasant Unity Committee), arguably the first non-violent, large-scale effort to link indigenous peasants to an explicit class struggle (Flora and Torres-Rivas 1989, 41).

This was the precursor to much broader peasant mobilization in the 1980s, but peasant radicalization—coupled with fear of “another Nicaragua” and a resurgent guerrilla movement bolstered by the newer ORPA (*Organización Revolucionario del Pueblo en Armas*, Revolutionary Organization of the People in Arms) and EGP (*Ejército Guerrillero de los Pobres*, Guerrilla Army of the Poor)—soon prompted brutal repression. This next repressive phase began in Panzós, Alta Verapaz, where the military massacred dozens of peasants contesting their dispossession (Barry and Preusch 1986, 233). By 1980, the state had almost completely shut down space for civil society (Brockett 2005, Ch. 7).

Among Guatemala’s regions, Alta Verapaz (on which this study focuses) perhaps best exemplifies the history of radical exclusion and “coerced marginalization.”<sup>62</sup> Alta Verapaz’s early dependence on coffee cultivation hinged on forced labor of indigenous people, which required a vast military presence to enforce. After German land-owners were expelled during World War II, most of the department’s land passed into military hands (Dunkerley 1988, 467). The military as an institution—and as individual officials with vast landholdings—maintained a firm political and economic grip on the department through the 1980s, while the majority of inhabitants (Q’eqchi’ peasants) remained destitute and politically impotent. Where suspicion of guerrilla sympathies emerged, the military responded with massacres of entire communities and assassinations of community leaders. Of all provinces, Alta Verapaz recorded the third highest number of massacres, human rights violations, and acts of violence during the armed conflict (see Appendix A for maps and tables providing regional breakdowns on social exclusion and violence during the armed conflict tables). This number might have been relatively higher, but for the military’s pre-existing strong physical presence (e.g., multiple key

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<sup>62</sup> The other obvious example would be Quiché, where the largest share of political violence in the 1980s occurred (see Appendix A).

bases) in Alta Verapaz and social movements' and guerrillas' failures to reach out to monolingual Q'eqchi' speakers, who comprised the department's super-majority.

1954 also proved historic in Honduras, but for very different reasons. 1954 marked an inflection point in the comparison of civil society and state – society relations in Honduras and Guatemala. While Guatemalan CSOs faced the beginning of a prolonged period of “coerced marginalization,” Honduran groups won critical victories that were followed by a process of “controlled inclusion.” The same year as the Guatemalan coup, Honduras experienced the 40,000-worker strike in the North Coast, which marked a significant victory and a spark for further momentum for the labor movement. Honduran unions were taking off again just as Guatemalan labor experienced a precipitous decline. Whereas Guatemala had once had over 300,000 union members, it had only 29,000 by 1973. Conversely, Honduran unions expanded rapidly during the Villeda Morales administration (1957-1963) (Flora and Torres-Rivas 1989, 46). Unions faced repression in the mid-1960s, but far less than in Guatemala. By 1973, Honduras led Central American countries in unionization with 68,000 members (Yashar 1997; Euraque 1996). New types of unions also began to sprout up—for instance, the first teacher's union, COLPROSUMAH (*Colegio Profesional Superación Magisterial de Honduras*, Professional Association for Teacher Betterment of Honduras), formed in 1963, with several other teachers' organizations emerging in the next two decades (Posas 2003; Barahona 2005, 214-5).

The second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century also brought increased peasant organizing to Honduras. Lacking its neighbor's large and polarized coffee sector, Honduras experienced virtually no peasant organizing until 1954. In part, this follows the pattern observed in Guatemala, where urban-based unions established themselves before peasant organizations. Honduran peasant organizations' emergence, however, was tied much

more closely—albeit unintentionally—to organized labor. Peasant organizations emerged first in the North Coast when laid-off banana workers returned to subsistence agriculture in the countryside. Increasing land scarcity, due to population growth and appropriation of land for expansion of other agricultural activities (coffee, sugar, and beef production), prompted these organizers to initiate peasant organizations throughout the North Coast (Posas 1981; Pearson 1980). By the early 1960s, peasants had organized into two national federations, the more radical FENACH (*Federación Nacional de Campesinos Hondureños*, National Federation of Honduran Peasants) and the anti-Communist ANACH (*Asociación Nacional de Campesinos de Honduras*, National Association of Honduran Peasants). FENACH became particularly instrumental in pushing for land reform—approved by President Villeda Morales in 1962—before the 1963 military coup shut down the space for peasant organizing (Posas 1981, 12-15).

Peasant organizations grew again in the 1970s, often with explicit support from the Catholic Church. In the early 1970s as in the early 1960s, peasant mobilization played a critical role in pushing the government to approve (albeit limited) land reform. But, as in the 1960s, hard-liners used this reformist state gesture as a pretext for another coup (Vilas 1995, Ch. 3; Euraque 1996, Ch. 7; Barahona 2005, 210-215). Though the 1975 coup reduced the space for contentious action and more radical demands on government, peasant organizations did not disappear. According to Vilas (1995, 106-7), Honduras boasted a

degree of peasant organization unparalleled in Central America. It developed a dynamic relationship with the state; attempts by the latter to control peasant organizations encountered an uneven capacity for response and resistance. By 1982, some 142,000 families belonged to the peasant organizations.

Despite the increased union and peasant organizing in Honduras, 1954 did not usher in a new democratic period. In Honduras as throughout Central America (excluding Costa Rica), the doors to democracy remained shut through 1980. The military became increasingly professionalized from the 1950s onward, relying on US support (Torres-Rivas 1991; Morris and Ropp 1977). Unions and peasant organizations did take advantage of space to organize and won limited land reform legislation in 1963 and 1972, but coups and repression followed each reformist political experiment. The military reformist period in the early 1970s, for instance, ended under the coup-installed Presidents Melgar and Paz, with the former winding down land redistribution and the latter ramping up repression, including death squads.

Honduras did, however, have a distinctive form of authoritarianism and state-society interaction, fitting neatly with Oxhorn's (1995) description of "controlled inclusion." Reflecting on the 1960s through the 1980s, Dunkerley (1988, 527) describes "the establishment [of a] system of government based upon negotiation and co-optation allied with intermittent repression rather than one organized around constant persecution." Throughout this period, Honduras' military leaders deployed selective repression, limited incorporation and co-optation of organized labor and peasant organizations, and limited land reform to mollify peasants (Dunkerley 1988; Euraque 1996; Mahoney 2001; Sieder 1995). There were multiple groups within critical sectors like organized labor and the peasantry—rendering Honduras not a strict case of corporatism—but these various groups remained manipulable by the state and the two dominant parties, with which they often had close links (Morris and Ropp 1977, 27-68). The military regimes used the parties to buy off different sectors of the population (Mahoney 2001, Ch. 9). In the education sector, for instance, the largest teachers union, COLPROSUMAH, maintained close ties to the Liberal Party (PL), while the country's second teachers' union to form,

PRICHMA (*Primer Colegio Profesional Hondureño de Maestros*, First Professional Teachers' Association of Honduras), allied itself with the National Party (PN) (Posas 2003).

Even when space opened up, civil society's autonomy remained limited, as groups had to hold fast to the government's anti-communist line and avoid direct challenges to the political power structure (e.g., the military's dominance over politics) to avoid being persecuted by the state. Sieder (1995, 114), for instance, found that: "Between 1972 and 1978, patron-client relationships were restructured, recreated and selectively extended in an attempt to incorporate emergent social actors on the terms of those controlling the balance of power within the reformist state, providing the latter with a limited but nonetheless significant degree of legitimacy." Whereas Guatemala was principally characterized by polarization and combative contestation in the 20<sup>th</sup> Century, Honduras experienced a combination of incorporation and selective repression.

Table 1 summarizes the discussion thus far by showing the principal features of each country's civil society development through 1980. The growth in CSOs after the Liberal Reforms (especially after 1900) marked a change from the post-Independence period, during which civil society was virtually non-existent. From 1910 through the early 1930s, civil society formation gained momentum in both countries, particularly with the formation of unions. Collective action and strikes picked up, and civil society was clearly emergent. Rural Honduran civil society, however, remained absent—in no small part due to the state's underdevelopment—while the Guatemalan state's repressive apparatus stamped out any potential for rural Guatemalans to act collectively to oppose the policies that hurt them. Repression during the 1930s and 1940s then curtailed organizing by labor and other groups in urban areas and enclaves in both countries. In Guatemala, the October Revolution then produced an unprecedented proliferation of urban and rural CSOs. But the threats to elite economic interests (both in Guatemala and in the United

States) embodied by Arbenz's extensive land reform prompted the coup, which began another prolonged period of "coerced marginalization."

Meanwhile, in Honduras—where no push for such widespread land reform occurred during this period—no similar political threat emerged in the countryside. Dealing only with urban and enclave dissent in the 1950s, the government responded with "controlled inclusion," relying heavily on patronage and co-optation. This model legitimized organized labor and, later, peasant organizing, while constraining CSOs' autonomy and scope of action.

Table 1's final column notes certain critical factors for civil society formation. In particular, I have argued that the lack of "stateness," the Liberal Reforms, and limited political openings proved critical for whether and how civil society emerged. I have further shown how racial and ethnic exclusion, enforced by brutal repression, proved key for subjugating Guatemala's majority of oppressed indigenous peasants, while the Honduran government controlled its less polarized masses with a combination of more limited repression and co-optation.

The two countries, then, differed a great deal in civil society's development and relationship to the state. Neither history, however, included political opportunities for multi-class coalitions strong enough to make democratization relevant again until the 1980s. Political liberalization would only become possible after guerrilla movements, economic crises, and a changing international climate altered the domestic and regional political context (Euraque 1996; Paige 1997). Even once such political opening had begun, the divergent patterns of state-society relations entrenched over the hundred years since the Liberal Reforms continued to influence the composition, strategy, and relative autonomy of each country's civil society.

<b>Table 1: Periodization of Civil Society in Honduras and Guatemala, with Key Factors for Civil Society Development</b>			
	<b>Guatemala</b>	<b>Honduras</b>	<b>Key Proximate Factors</b>
<b>Independence – 1870</b>			
	Absent		Fragmented, incipient states.
<b>1870 – 1910</b>			
<i>Urban / Enclaves</i>	Incipient	Incipient	Liberal Reforms bring some proletarianization.
<i>Rural</i>	Absent (repressed)	Absent (unformed)	Liberal Reforms: radical in Guatemala brings <i>coerced marginalization</i> ; reformist in Honduras, with relatively weak state.
<b>1910 – 1930</b>			
<i>Urban / Enclaves</i>	Emergent	Emergent	Expansion of proletarianization and limited political opening.
<i>Rural</i>	Absent (repressed)	Absent (unformed)	Liberal Reforms: radical in Guatemala brings <i>coerced marginalization</i> ; reformist in Honduras, with relatively weak state.
<b>1930-1944</b>			
<i>Urban</i>	Repressed	Repressed	Repressive dictators check civil society growth.
<i>Rural</i>	Absent (repressed)	Absent (unformed)	Repressive dictators check civil society in both countries, but much more extensive <i>coerced marginalization</i> in Guatemala.
<b>1944-1954</b>			
<i>Urban / Enclaves</i>	Robust	Emergent	Political openings in both countries, though much broader in Guatemala. October Revolution brings “ <i>state-society synergy</i> .”
<i>Rural</i>	Emergent	Absent (unformed)	Guatemalan peasants take advantage of—and demand more—space from October Revolution. Quiescence in rural Honduras.
<b>1954-1980</b>			
<i>Urban / Enclaves and Rural</i>	Absent (repressed), then periodically resurgent	Emergent, then controlled	Guatemala: coup reverses gains. <i>Coerced marginalization</i> . Honduras: labor and peasant advances, but co-opted through <i>controlled inclusion</i> .

#### **IV. 1980 – 2009: State Violence and Slow Progress Towards Democracy**

This section will devote greater space to each country's broader political dynamics. It expands on what I mean by "low democratic quality" in each country, before discussing recent civil society development and the continued relevance of the historical legacies identified in the preceding sections.

The 1980s brought unprecedented violence to each country. The decade began with genocide in Guatemala and, on a much smaller scale, political violence in Honduras. In Guatemala, military offensives and "scorched earth" policies killed approximately 200,000—mostly rural and indigenous—people and uprooted as many as three times that number (Brockett 2005, Ch. 7; Dunkerley 1993, 46-51). The number of Honduran victims of state violence, approximately 150, paled in comparison, but represented the most brutal expression of state power in Honduran history (Dunkerley and Sieder 1996, 70-77).

Surprisingly, the same decade also brought political liberalization; after years of revolutionary turmoil, by 1986 elected civilian presidents held power throughout Central America. Given each country's strong authoritarian tradition, it may seem surprising that any political liberalization occurred at all. But many factors contributed to political change during the 1970s and 1980s, including 1) United States support for elections (while continuing to support repressive militaries),<sup>63</sup> 2) new, less reactionary middle- and upper-class groups that sympathized with democracy,<sup>64</sup> 3) the oil and debt crises of the

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<sup>63</sup> See Dunkerley and Sieder 1996; Rosenberg 1989; Peeler 1989.

<sup>64</sup> See Vilas 1995; Di Palma and Whitehead 1986.

1970s and 1980s, which spurred popular protest,<sup>65</sup> and 4) increased pressure for political opening from segments of the Catholic Church.<sup>66</sup>

Both military-dominated states conceded to these pressures by expanding democratic institutions. These openings included constitutional reforms, presidential elections with civilian candidates, the creation of other institutions such as Guatemala's Constitutional Court and Human Rights Ombudsman, and the proliferation of new political parties (Trudeau 1989).

Despite these liberalizing steps, both Honduras and Guatemala remained heavily militarized and authoritarian through the early 1990s. Major questions of policy and reform remained subject to military veto. Even by 1993, the military quashed President Callejas' proposed commission on military reform by rolling tanks into the streets (Rosenberg 1995). Similarly, Guatemala's President Cerezo never even hinted at taming military might, and he faced two coup attempts before Serrano, his successor, attempted a self-coup. Well into the 1990s, human rights abuses remained too sensitive for serious investigation (Paiz-Andrade 1997).

Political activity also remained limited. Leftist parties and organizations were excluded from political activity in both countries, and groups with ideological opposition to the government could not obtain state sanction and meet freely (Jonas 1995; Sieder 1996). In Guatemala, the counter-insurgency state remained in place, with a mix of brutal repression (though less than in the early 1980s) and surveillance and control. The 1980s and early 1990s, then, brought constrained political liberalization during what Dunkerley (1993) has deemed the "pacification of Central America."

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<sup>65</sup> See Brockett 2005, Ch. 2; Dunkerley 1993, 12-18; Maira 1986.

<sup>66</sup> See Vilas 1995; Barry 1987, Ch. 1; Crahan 1986.

But change did come, albeit slowly. By the year 2000, both states had slashed the size, budget, and political influence of their militaries; state repression then subsided (Jonas 2000; Rosenberg and Ruhl 1996; Ruhl 2004; Sanahuja 1998; Thorpe and Cameron 2000). Change was most remarkable in Guatemala, where the Peace Accords marked the end of 36 years of armed conflict and established negotiated settlements on crucial issues like human rights, historical memory, indigenous peoples' rights, resettlement of displaced people, socio-economic and land issues, and the role of the military (Jonas 2000, Ch. 2).

Largely free and fair elections also became the norm for political competition. By the year 2000, both countries met certain standard minimal benchmarks for democratic consolidation—they had at least two civilian governments in succession (Linz), and power switched between parties at least twice (Huntington's double alternation test) (Torres-Rivas 1998; Casas and Zovatto 2004; Domínguez and Lowenthal 1996). Electoral reforms (e.g. shifting to an open party list system in Honduras and creating micro-regional polling stations in Guatemala) also increased competition and, in Guatemala, turnout (Taylor-Robinson 2007; Taylor-Robinson 2003; Azpuru 2008, Ch. 7; Ruhl 2010). Leftist parties (UD in Honduras, FDNG in Guatemala) also finally gained the right to stand for elections in the 1990s (Allison 2006; Crespo Martinez 1998). And, in 2007, Guatemala voted into power the first president to have run on a left-of-center platform since the country's October Revolution.

Still, democratic institutions remained weak. Congressional oversight remained minimal,<sup>67</sup> the militaries retained significant roles in internal security while resisting civilian supervision, and courts did not hold militaries accountable for state-sponsored violence.<sup>68</sup> In short, there was a lack of both full "democratic control" over both

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<sup>67</sup> See Domínguez and Lowenthal 1996; Colburn and Sánchez 2001.

<sup>68</sup> See Jonas 2000; Ruhl 2004; Ruhl 2000; Wilson 1997; Wilson 1997; Schirmer 1998.

militaries and horizontal accountability throughout these political systems (Ruhl 2004; Domínguez and Lowenthal 1996).

Nor did electoral reforms change the *modus operandi* of politics. In Honduras, campaigns remained largely unchanged—i.e., based on promises and provision of direct services and largely devoid of regional and national policy platforms. Despite declining popular identification with the PN and PL, these parties have retained a stranglehold on politics with their clientelistic machines (Ruhl 2010). In Guatemala, political fragmentation remains the order of the day; since 1986, no party has held the presidency more than once. Sixteen national political parties competed in the 2007 elections—in addition to roughly 150 civic committees participating in municipal elections—and inter-party coalitions break down frequently (ASIES 2008).

Finally, political change took longer in Guatemala. Implementation of the Peace Accords proved very difficult, with the defeat of the 1999 referendum to incorporate the Peace Accords into the Constitution dealing a massive blow to democratization (Jonas 2000; Palencia Prado 1997; Azpuru 1999; Azpuru and Arnson 1999; Cojti Cuxil 1999; Rios de Rodriguez 1999). Following this setback, reform would require alternative political paths, but not until Berger's presidency (2004-8) did Guatemala further dismantle its military (Ruhl 2004; Torres-Rivas 1999). Moreover, political violence has persisted in Guatemala, with 56 murders related to the 2007 campaign (Jasper and Cook 2008).

In both countries, low democratic quality has bred popular disillusionment with the political process. Politicians have failed to reform democratic institutions, reverse impunity, and solve pressing development problems. Despite moderate gains in health care and education provision since 1990, both countries still exhibit some of Latin

America's lowest levels of taxation, social spending, and human development (as measured by per capita income, health, and education—see Table 2).<sup>69</sup> Pervasive poverty and inequality—as well as politics dominated by patronage and corruption—have also fostered disenchantment, contributing to low voter turnout and low support for democratic institutions (Azpuru 2008; Coleman and Argueta 2008; Armony 2000). To make matters worse, gang- and drug-related crime surged in both countries from the mid-1990s, contributing to citizen insecurity and increasing citizen dissatisfaction (Seligson and Booth 2010). The AmericasBarometer studies have shown this disillusionment to be correlated with an erosion of democratic values, such as declining support for the Churchillian conception of democracy and political tolerance (Azpuru 2008; Coleman and Argueta 2008).

**Table 2: Honduras, Guatemala, and Selected Neighboring Countries' Human Development Index Indicators (2010)**

Country	Human Development Index (HDI) Value	Life Expectancy (years)	Mean Years of Schooling	Expected Years of Schooling	GNI per capita (2008 US Dollars)
Honduras	.604	72.6	6.5	11.4	3,750
Guatemala	.560	70.0	4.1	10.6	4,694
Nicaragua	.565	73.8	5.7	10.8	2,567
El Salvador	.659	72.0	7.7	12.1	6,498
Costa Rica	.725	79.1	8.4	11.7	10,870
<i>Latin America and the Caribbean Average</i>	.704	74.0	7.9	13.7	10,642
<i>OECD Average</i>	.879	80.3	11.4	15.9	37,077

*Source: UNDP 2010, 143-6.*

<sup>69</sup> For data on development successes and failures in the two countries, see: PREAL 2003; PREAL 2008; PNUD 2008; Estado de la Nación 2008; PNUD 2006; PREAL 2005; PREAL 2002, 10; Reyes and Meza, 6-7.

In Honduras, political dissatisfaction has manifested itself in sharply declining voter turnout—from over 80 percent in 1985 to under 50 percent in both 2005 and 2009 (Taylor-Robinson 2007; Tribunal Supremo Electoral de Honduras 2009). Interestingly, poor people and those living outside major cities vote in greater numbers, a reflection of the two dominant party machines' capacity to mobilize voters in rural areas (Cruz and Macías 2004). Meanwhile, in Guatemala, only approximately 20 percent of registered voters cast ballots in the 1994 legislative elections and the 1999 referendum (Jonas 2000, 199; Torres-Rivas 1996). While electoral reforms did manage to increase voter turnout to over 50 percent of registered voters in 2007, detachment from the electoral process remains especially high among rural indigenous citizens, who bore the brunt of the armed conflict (Tribuno Supremo Electoral de Guatemala 2007; Boneo and Torres-Rivas 2000).

In sum, following political liberalization in the 1980s, both Honduras and Guatemala became democracies in the 1990s, but both political systems still remain exclusionary, with weak institutions. Unresponsive government, low accountability and transparency, pervasive human insecurity, the absence of the rule of law, and widespread poverty—all markers of low democratic quality—have disillusioned many Honduran and Guatemalan citizens with their respective political processes. The result has been what O'Donnell (2004) has characterized as "low-intensity" citizenship, where violence, impunity, material poverty, and uneven civil and social rights weaken the social and political fabric.<sup>70</sup>

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<sup>70</sup> Low-intensity citizenship can also carry with it the dangerous prospect of undoing democratic institutions. Seligson and Booth (2010) show that Honduras and Guatemala lead Latin America in the percentage of "triplely dissatisfied" citizens—i.e., who lack support for the Churchillian notion of democracy, national political institutions, and the state of the economy. Where politicians who are "weak democrats" see broad popular frustration and a willingness to go along with extra-institutional solutions, they may resort to plots like the 2009 Honduran coup (*ibid.*, 132). In short, the failures of Guatemalan and Honduran democracy have not only detracted

In Honduras, the two dominant parties behave as "competing patronage pyramids," while the legislature makes little substantive policy to address massive poverty and inequality (Taylor 1996). The two dominant parties have an extensive rural reach, but interact with peasants as clients rather than active, rights-bearing citizens. In Guatemala, the Left has entered mainstream politics, but this arena remains deeply fragmented and dysfunctional. Nor has the state fully lived up to the promises of the 1996 Peace Accords and reversed the social, economic, and political exclusion of rural indigenous communities.

## V. Civil Society Development Since 1980

Having introduced the broad political dynamics and challenges to active citizenship since 1980, this penultimate section describes the evolution of civil society, its impact on political life, and the relevant historical legacies shaping state-society interactions during the last three decades. Political liberalization since 1980 proved critical for civil society's re-emergence in both Honduras and Guatemala. After heavy repression stifled non-violent organizing and protest in the early 1980s, civil society recaptured space in the middle of the decade. New actors proliferated, particularly in Guatemala, where they played a significant role in the peace process. Throughout these last three decades, however, CSOs in both countries encountered many of the same obstacles that restricted their scope of action and influence in previous decades.

In Guatemala, state repression beginning in the late-1970s quelled the nonviolent contentious action that had emerged in the preceding years. By 1980, protest had all but

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from the quality of democracy, but also the viability of the foundational institutions of democracy. Democratic disruptions, in turn, force civil society into the unenviable position of having to *re-conquer* the rights that citizens gained in preceding decades.

disappeared, as the rural massacres and assassinations of urban and rural opposition leaders during the genocide temporarily cowed civil society (Brockett 2005; Dunkerley 1988, Ch. 9).

But when the military's devastating rural offensives waned in the mid-1980s, organizations of indigenous people, families of the disappeared, war widows, and displaced people emerged to put further pressure on the military regime to liberalize (Brockett 2005, Ch. 7). Organizations like GAM (*Grupo de Apoyo Mutuo*, Mutual Support Group, founded in 1984), CONAVIGUA (*Coordinadora Nacional de Viudas de Guatemala*, National Coordinating Group of Guatemalan Widows, 1988), and CERJ (*Consejo de Comunidades Etnicas Runujel Junam*, Runujel Junam Council of Ethnic Communities, 1988) played a major political role in the ensuing decade. These organizations developed a human rights discourse that expanded from individual to collective rights and an indigenous discourse that became increasingly salient domestically and internationally (Brockett 2005; Peeler 1989; Brett 2006).

These and other CSOs further raised their profile in Guatemala's peace negotiations. Though denied direct representation at the negotiating table, CSOs formed the Asamblea de Sociedad Civil (Civil Society Assembly, ASC) in the wake of Jorge Serrano's self-coup (Jonas 2000, Ch. 2). The ASC obtained a consultative role in the negotiations. Human rights and indigenous organizations, in particular, used the ASC to push for indigenous people's social, political, and cultural rights, socio-economic provisions (e.g., for land redistribution), and a strong truth commission.

But civil society was not just about human rights and indigenous people. Organized labor and students joined the fray, as well. Ríos Montt actually allowed moderate labor organizations to nearly triple during his reign (1982-3), though repression remained

rampant (Brockett 2005, Ch. 9). Under President Cerezo (1986-1991), space for labor and other types of organizing then continued to increase (Jonas 1995).

Over the following decade, public sector unions—especially teachers and health care workers—also formed strong movements of their own (Yagenova 2008). These latter groups focused their actions primarily on the state’s role in service provision. As in Honduras, Guatemala’s public sector unions have emerged as arguably the most powerful political players in labor following the weakening of private sector unions.<sup>71</sup> In the mid-1990s, women’s and environmental organizations emerged, as well (Instituto Interuniversitario de Estudios de Iberoamérica y Portugal (IIEIP) 2005).

The political impact of most CSOs on the political center and left, however, has remained modest since the early 1990s. While these groups gained inclusion in the peace process and influence on certain agreements, they never gained more than a consultative role. Moreover, they proved unable to win strong socio-economic provisions (such as land redistribution) in the Accords, while efforts to reverse impunity fell short (Brett 2006).

Moreover, there appeared to be “two civil societies”—popular organizations like CONIC (*Coordinadora Nacional Indígena y Campesina*, National Indigenous and Peasant Coordination), CERJ, and Defensoría Maya (with tens of thousands of individual members, most of whom were poor and indigenous) and organizations representing elite

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<sup>71</sup> In the education sector, the STEG (*Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Educación de Guatemala*, Guatemalan Education Workers' Union) re-emerged as a significant political actor from 1989 onwards, with steadily increasing membership and capacity for mobilization. STEG would continue to build on this after the Peace Accords, when reduced repression emboldened the union. Since 2000, STEG has arguably generated the highest visibility of any Guatemalan union, with a wide repertoire of protest and the ability to consistently mobilize thousands of its members (Yagenova 2008). By 2007, STEG had developed enough political power to win important concessions (including the reversal of PRONADE, see chapter Five) from then-candidate Alvaro Colom in exchange for its endorsement (Alvarez 2009).

business interests (Brett 2006). Certain entrepreneurial elites were important for pushing for political liberalization and peace, but became strong opponents of popular organizations' agendas for more structural transformation, such as land reform and increased and progressive taxation (Jonas 2000; Brett 2006, Ch. 3). The country's foremost business organization, CACIF (*Comité Coordinador de Asociaciones Agrícolas, Comerciales, Industriales y Financieras*, the Coordinating Committee for Agricultural, Commercial, Industrial, and Financial Associations), refused to join popular organizations at critical moments in the Peace Accords, and ultimately played an obstructionist role in the 1999 referendum to ratify the Peace Accords (Jonas 2000, Ch. 6). Meanwhile, progressive CSOs and supportive political parties proved unable to mobilize enough of their supporters, and ultimately lost. While popular organizations and movements emerged to counter arbitrary uses of state power and to fight for rights, significant continuity from the period of overt state coercion has remained vis-a-vis which segment of Guatemala society exercises the most control over the polity.

There has also been continuity from the period when coerced marginalization was most overt to the present in civil society's composition at the micro level, especially in rural communities. Even after the Peace Accords, certain community organizations that were created as part of the government's counter-insurgency "beans and bullets" strategy live on, though with new names (Schirmer 1998, Ch. 3). For instance, the community development council remains, though now renamed *Consejo Comunitario de Desarrollo* (Community Development Council, COCODE) instead of *comité pro mejoramiento* (Community Improvement Committee, CPM) (Ochoa et al. 2008). More troublingly, *patrulla de autodefensa civil* (civil defense patrols, PAC) structures loomed well into the 2000s at the local and national levels (Schirmer 1998, Ch. 4; Remijnse 2003). PACs began in 1983, but remained organized (albeit informally) in many areas after the Peace

Accords officially dissolved them (Remijnse 2003, Ch. 6). Groups of ex-PAC members mobilized in the early 2000s to get compensation, creating persistent tension between indigenous and human rights organizations and PACs (IIEIP, 35-52; Sáenz de Tejada 2004).

Historical legacies have profoundly shaped contemporary Guatemalan civil society and its relationship with the state. The first key inheritance has been the distrust and polarization between the state and civil society following decades of “coerced marginalization.” The armed conflict firmly entrenched this, but it goes back further (especially in rural areas) to state-led dispossession, forced labor, and fierce expressions of state violence (in urban areas, as well) against those who protested military authority since at least the 19<sup>th</sup> Century. State violence and exclusion have also remained at the center of civil society demands, whether for reparations, justice, or to address the pervasive social exclusion inherited from generations of oppression and neglect.

In addition, civil society continues to encounter a fragmented and unstable political society. No party has won two presidential elections since the return to civilian elections in 1985; CSOs seeking to engage with political society encounter a veritable alphabet soup of parties and civic committees, many of which disappear from one election to the next. With long-standing state-society tension, a history of extreme political violence, and a lack of political intermediaries, it is unsurprising that CSOs remain highly oppositional in their tactics, which include blocking highways, occupying buildings, and sometimes even holding public officials hostage until demands are met (Palencia Prado 1997; Isaacs 2010).<sup>72</sup>

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<sup>72</sup> Agrarian transformation has also created a new wave of dispossession and land scarcity, fueling resurgent land conflict in some rural areas (IIEIP 2005, 35-52). In Alta Verapaz, for instance, large estate owners have converted coffee lands into areas for agro-fuel production, expelling

In Honduras, CSOs engage in contentious behavior, but to a lesser degree. This reflects distinct political legacies. While coercion and exclusion formed the core of Guatemalan politics well into the 1990s (Mahoney 2001; Barry 1987; Brockett 2002),<sup>73</sup> Honduras's more equal land distribution and greater peasant incorporation left the country less polarized. The state controlled a less polarized civil society through co-optation, patronage, and selective repression, which quelled more radical unions and peasant organizations and prevented any serious revolutionary challenge. This ensured greater continuity from the mid-1950s among labor and peasant organizations, who tacitly agreed to a) focus on economic matters above political demands and b) not threaten the stability of the existing regime (MacCameron 1983, 124).

By 1980, however, the military—fearing “another Nicaragua” and observing the rise of small guerrilla groups—in Honduras clamped down on civil society (Barry and Preusch 1986, 262). Leftist leaders were killed by death squads, and peasant organizations faced repression and intimidation (Barry and Preusch 1986). Human rights organizations soon sprung up to protest the country's increased militarization and the death squads (Sanahuja 1998). The Catholic Church also voiced opposition to repression. Meanwhile, other types of organizing remained minimal until the climate of fear subsided in the mid-1980s. In 1984, many of the country's unions marched against unemployment and the country's failed economic policy. The teachers participated in these early protests and subsequently launched their own opposition to President Callejas' (1990-1994) economic reforms (Posas 2003).

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workers who previously lived on the farms with access to small parcels. This has increased land conflict in the area, as expressed through frequent territorial disputes, land occupations, and large-scale evictions of peasants (Hurtado 2008). Peasants often organize informally or through groups like CUC and CONIC, but—especially given resource constraints and geographic separation—they still face formidable collective action problems. I will further explore these barriers to rural participation below, as they apply in both Honduras and Guatemala.

<sup>73</sup> Another fitting description of the Guatemalan state is Baloyra-Herp's (1983) "reactionary despotism."

Other types of organizations emerged later in the decade, but expanded further in the 1990s. The 1990s brought a large increase in registered CSOs, including women's, ethnic and/or indigenous, environmental, and human rights organizations. The proliferation of new groups continued into the 2000s, especially with the rise of development-related organizations focused on local education and health issues. These organizations expanded further after Hurricane Mitch (Cruz and Espinoza 2004).

Despite the increased number of organizations, co-optation and patronage remain key tools for the state and two dominant parties to control civil society. Barahona (2005) finds that political actors now neutralize CSOs by passing laws that they have no intention of implementing, such as gender quotas on party lists. He concludes: "the most effective means used by the state to co-opt political and social protest has been the approval of laws that reflect specific demands, but have no effective compliance in the social reality" (*ibid.*, 311). Cruz and Espinoza (2004), meanwhile, find that governments in the 2000s consistently resorted to divide-and-conquer tactics and co-optation of CSO leaders, including by creating powerless government forums for CSO participation. D'Ans (2007, 430) offers an even sharper indictment of state-society relations in Honduras, noting that the

surprising vacuousness of political debate in Honduras stems from the fact that, at every level of the social structure, each person is convinced that intra- and inter-family favoritism constitutes the safest means to gain access to social redistributions. The concern to enter a familial or clientelistic network takes absolute precedence over the affirmation of individual autonomy and his becoming a citizen....

Events after the 2009 coup demonstrated the strength of Honduras's legacy of "controlled inclusion." Immediately after the coup, the *de facto* government and the country's principal media outlets (all pro-Micheletti) continually referred to civil society's support for what they deemed a "constitutional succession." The *de facto* government

held up organizations like the *Unión Cívica Democrática* (Civic Democratic Union, UCD)—a group led by wealthy Micheletti supporters—as being the “genuine” civil society, while marginalizing and repressing protests and organizations against the coup and denouncing the opposition as “terrorists.” Even the director of FONAC (Foro Nacional de Convergencia), the para-statal organization charged with bringing together national CSOs, used this “terrorist” language.<sup>74</sup> Coup-supporting officials’ discursive strategy proved eerily similar to Honduran governments’ Cold War strategy of dubbing oppositional civil society as “communists,” while opening channels to the highest levels of power to favored groups within civil society (Altschuler 2010).

Education politics proved illustrative of these tensions. Soon after the coup, the teachers’ unions established themselves as the core of the pro-Zelaya *Resistencia*. These public sector unions, by far the country’s strongest, managed to shut down the school system for much of 2009. But PRICHMA, the country’s second-oldest teachers’ union, had long-standing ties to the National Party, and predictably abandoned the other five unions. After the 2009 elections gave the National Party a victory, PRICHMA’s president became the new Secretary of Education (Altschuler 2010). Meanwhile, several new parent organizations emerged after the coup, largely to protest teacher union strikes. Though none of these groups could demonstrate wide geographic coverage, Micheletti’s *de facto* government and the pro-Micheletti media hailed these actors as key new players. FONAC hosted a presidential forum with various parent organizations and all four pro-Micheletti presidential candidates, where the participants signed a National Education Pact that established various common education goals. The event gave the parents significant media attention and political legitimacy, while the politicians celebrated the arrival of new, more manipulable, actors in education politics (*ibid.*).

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<sup>74</sup> Leonardo Villeda. Personal interview with author. November 10, 2010. Tegucigalpa, Honduras.

This episode provides a glimpse into how Honduran governments can still rely on their ability to control segments of civil society—in this case, the defecting PRICHMA and the incipient parent groups—to neutralize strong public sector union opposition.<sup>75</sup> These dynamics have, unsurprisingly, continued during President Lobo’s term.

## **VI. Common Obstacles to Citizen Participation in Civil Society**

The preceding sections demonstrate the impacts of Honduras’ and Guatemala’s distinct historical legacies—“coerced marginalization” and “controlled inclusion”—on contemporary state-society relations. But this contrast should not be over-stated. Having noted the historically-rooted differences between civil society in Honduras and Guatemala, certain similarities do bear mention. In both countries, civil society participation remains highly uneven by geography, socio-economic status, and gender.

Though rural communities frequently maintain productive organizations and community councils, the highest concentration of organizations—particularly those with political muscle—remains in and around the major cities (Cruz and Espinoza 2004). Since the 1980s, community-level organizations, such as development councils and water associations, have emerged all over rural Honduran and Guatemala. Rural communities in both countries now typically offer peasants opportunities to participate in local groups, but these groups’ scope for action—and capacity to autonomously engage with

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<sup>75</sup> I limit further discussion of the 2009 coup in this chapter, because it followed most of my research period and because its impacts on civil society development remain unclear. On one hand, events after the coup suggest the continuity of a mix of repression, co-optation, and clientelism as means to control civil society. On the other, some observers argue that the resistance movement that sprung up to oppose the coup marks a new dawn for Honduran civil society in terms of its capacity for left-wing popular mobilization. If this were so, 2009 might mark a critical juncture for Honduran civil society. But the jury remains out on this latter point. Here, I follow Ruhl (2010, 106), who finds that: “The role that the FNR [Frente Nacional de Resistencia Contra el Golpe de Estado, National Resistance Front Against the Coup] will play in the future remains unknown.”

political actors—typically remains quite limited. Moreover, as subsequent chapters illustrate, these groups often exist on paper only. Where they are functional, resource constraints and coordination problems (e.g., transportation and communications difficulties) have long made collaboration and broader collective action an uphill battle.

Official channels for communities to cooperate with one another and prioritize needs on a municipal and regional level also rarely function in practice. In Guatemala, the 2002 Law of Development Councils mandated the formation of community councils, second-level community councils, and municipal councils to channel demands from communities. But, in most municipalities, the municipal councils (and often the second-level community councils) are dysfunctional and/or produce an urban bias (Ochoa et al. 2008).<sup>76</sup> In Honduras, the notion of a *patronato central*—as a municipal agglomeration of community *patronatos comunales*—follows a similar pattern, though the system remains even less formalized.

Socioeconomic factors also affect civil society participation. In Honduras, survey data has shown that lower-income citizens are the least likely to visit government offices, contact the media, denounce corruption, participate in human rights, anti-poverty, or environment campaigns, and participate in a protest or a strike (PNUD 2006; Posas 2009). In Guatemala, levels of participation in CSOs have risen above those in Honduras (Cruz and Argueta 2007, 69), but poorer citizens remain less likely to make demands on the state and participate in collective action than those with greater resources.<sup>77</sup>

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<sup>76</sup> Guillermo García, of PROMUDEL in Guatemala City. Personal interview with author. January 12, 2010. Guatemala City. Also, Dilia Co, of PROMUDEL, Alta Verapaz. Personal interview with author. January 14, 2010. Cobán, Guatemala.

<sup>77</sup> On-line data analysis by author of 2008 Guatemala AmericasBarometer data. Site accessed on November 9, 2010. <http://lapop.ccp.ucr.ac.cr/cgi-bin/LapopDummiesFile.pl>

Finally, participation in CSOs is particularly challenging for women, as men still typically monopolize the organizations' leadership positions (Cruz and Espinoza 2004). In the Guatemalan development council system, rural women in areas like Alta Verapaz frequently struggle even more, since many men do not allow their wives to travel to town (García 2006). This has led municipalities to mandate the formation of separate women's commissions to balance community mandates. All too often, however, these female commissions remain little more than rubber stamps for the male-dominated councils. In both countries, rural people and women in particular remain largely excluded from (and, where included, disadvantaged within) the country's organizational life.

## **VII. Conclusion: Legacies of Civil Society Development and State – Civil Society Relations**

This chapter has illustrated both the importance of civil society for democracy and the strong weight of non-democratic rule on civil society. This is consistent with the previous chapter, which described how civil society both acts on and is acted upon by the state.

The preceding sections first demonstrate the importance of civil society for ensuring the existence and improving the quality of democracy in Honduras and Guatemala. Under authoritarian rule, CSOs mobilized to contest state abuses and the lack of opportunities for political participation. Consistent with the literature on democratic transitions (e.g., Collier 1999; O'Donnell and Schmitter 1993), civil society mobilization was not sufficient to achieve political liberalization—and elites often marginalized civil society groups during the transition period—but it played an important role in advancing the process, particularly in Guatemala.

After political liberalization began in the 1980s (and from 1944-1954 in Guatemala), CSOs pushed the state to guarantee political, social, economic, and cultural rights, as well as other public goods. Women's organizations demanded inclusion; dispossessed peasants mobilized for access to land; teachers and university students organized to obtain equal access to education; human rights groups called for an end to impunity; and, particularly in Guatemala, indigenous organizations demanded political, cultural, and linguistic recognition from the state. These groups often met fierce state resistance, but their individual and collective efforts have undoubtedly improved the quality of democracy through such victories as increased opportunities for political participation and more equitable provision of public goods.

In sum, CSOs in Honduras and Guatemala have embodied most of the mechanisms linking civil society to the quality of democracy that I identified in Chapter Two. CSOs have fought for rights, resisted state arbitrariness, and articulated a wide array of views and interests. On the question of accountability, however, they have had less success. While public policy is undoubtedly more transparent and equitable now than it was in the early 1980s, Oxhorn's "state-society synergy" remains an elusive goal.

In Honduras, too often the two dominant parties capture CSOs and distort their agendas. The legacy of "controlled inclusion" remains strong. Meanwhile, in Guatemala, political society remains less stable, and there thus remains a shortage of credible intermediaries. Political fragmentation and the legacy of "coerced marginalization" still shape state-society interactions. And, in both cases, citizens have felt increasingly alienated by political institutions in the last decade. Because groups lack confidence in formal democratic channels, those in both countries (though more so in

Guatemala) rely heavily on disruptive and contentious strategies.<sup>78</sup> These strategies may help win specific concessions, but they do not facilitate the improvement of representative democratic channels, where the accountability deficit remains large.

The similarities in groups' repertoires of action and/or contention and popular discontent with political institutions and demonstrate a convergence in post-1980 civil society in the two countries. But important differences remain. In Guatemala, "coerced marginalization" of the majority of the population for generations has produced a legacy of exclusion, polarization, and conflict. Exclusion continues to play an important role. As recently as 1999, only 18 percent of eligible voters cast ballots in the referendum to ratify the Peace Accords; despite arguably having the most to gain, indigenous people mostly stayed away from the polls, due to a combination of lack of access, lack of information, and lack of trust in government (Remijnse 2003, Ch. 6). Electoral reforms have subsequently increased voter turnout, but participation remains low and distrust high. The nature of contentious action in Guatemala also reflects the high distrust that the official channels of government will serve the people: groups resort to confrontational direct action (e.g., occupying government buildings and holding officials hostage) because they feel that otherwise government will not heed them.

Meanwhile, the Honduran government's more reformist path has, for much of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century, made patronage and co-optation—mixed with selective repression—the defining features of state-civil society interactions. While Guatemala (often violently) enforced ethnic exclusion, in Honduras ethnicity has remained less salient (though not absent—see Euraque 1996). For generations, the state and the two dominant parties have brought rural Hondurans into the political arena, at least nominally. This has both

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<sup>78</sup> Houtzager et al. (2007) would deem this the difference between "contentious" and "direct" relations with government, with the latter more closely approximating the democratic ideal of interest mediation.

fostered and undercut CSOs; the numbers of organizations have remained relatively high since 1954, while their autonomy from the state and the dominant parties has remained in question.

Thus, while the Honduran and Guatemalan political systems are perhaps more similar now than they have been at any point in the 20<sup>th</sup> Century, important differences remain in civil society and state-society relations. In the next chapter, I argue that these different political legacies have affected the initiatives on which this study focuses. In Honduras, CMS became captured by the patronage networks that have long dominated Honduran political life. Meanwhile, in Guatemala, the program was reversed because it fell prey to the polarization and conflict that have dominated state-society relations since the Liberal Reforms and throughout the 20th century.

#### **4. HOW POLITICAL LEGACIES IMPINGE ON PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE AND UNDERMINE PARENTAL PARTICIPATION**

The previous chapter illustrated how strong political legacies—“coerced marginalization” in Guatemala and “controlled inclusion” in Honduras—shaped civil society formation and CSOs’ interactions with the state. In this chapter, I explore how these long-standing patterns of state – society relations impacted similar efforts to stimulate civil society through participatory governance.

The guiding insight here is that context matters. These two simple words capture one of the most consistent findings in critical studies of international development and governance initiatives. When governments and international aid agencies devise and implement initiatives to achieve goals such as improving development indicators, increasing citizen participation, and making government more transparent, they invariably encounter powerful political legacies. Thus, gauging PG’s impacts on civil society and democratic quality requires understanding how political context shapes and constrains these initiatives.

This chapter explores how these contexts impinged on one type of PG initiative’s ability to produce spillovers among rural parents. Of course, parental participation in schools does not encapsulate all potential civil society activity in rural Honduras and Guatemala. But, as explained in Chapter One, CMS was arguably the largest PG initiative in either country, and CMS’s designers claimed that these programs would strengthen rural civil society. These CMS initiatives thus offer the best case to understand the impacts of one type of citizen involvement in PG (parental participation) on other forms of civic and political engagement in Honduras and Guatemala.

This chapter's overarching argument is that distinct political legacies in Honduras and Guatemala—patronage in Honduras and polarization in Guatemala—heavily circumscribed CMS. These legacies diverted these PG initiatives in different ways, but ultimately had similar effects: reducing parental participation and the likelihood of spillovers.

The chapter begins by showing how, in Honduras, patronage politics has over-run the CMS model, dictating the hiring of program staff, influencing where PROHECO creates new schools, and undermining parents' authority to hire and fire teachers. This discussion contributes to the political science literatures on Honduras and patronage politics by providing a "downstream" look at Honduran patronage and demonstrating the variety of its uses within even one government program.

This examination of PROHECO also demonstrates one danger of establishing political competition at the regime level without competition in implementing PG. In the traditional Honduran education system, collusion between parties and unions in teacher selection undermines teacher accountability but protects teachers from partisan pressures once hired. Meanwhile, monopolistic control of hiring processes in PROHECO has converted the program into an additional avenue for the ruling party to deal in patronage, leaving all teachers vulnerable to partisan incursions. This detracts from PROHECO's avowed goal of promoting parental participation.

The Honduras - Guatemala comparison also shows how—contrary to the misconception that patronage operates similarly throughout the developing world—two otherwise “most similar” country cases differ significantly in the nature and reach of patronage. The chapter shows that patronage politics spread far less in Guatemala's PRONADE. Instead, a different political legacy affected CMS in Guatemala. There, greater

polarization at the national and community levels—in the form of stiff teachers’ union opposition to PRONADE and conflicts between parents and teachers—contributed to PRONADE’s reversal and subsequent declines in parental participation.

Finally, this chapter uncovers the impacts of patronage capture<sup>79</sup> in Honduras and the reversal following polarization in Guatemala. In Honduras, pervasive patronage undermines the program’s central justification: increased accountability. Patronage blocks the “voice” and direct management of services that CMS promised. It also negatively affects PROHECO’s ability to deliver on its secondary objective of strengthening rural civil society. Where PROHECO employees answer to party bosses instead of following the program’s mandate, they undermine parent council’s roles and autonomy. The reversal of PRONADE has similarly reduced parents’ roles. Following PRONADE’s demise, parents can no longer hold teachers accountable for service provision, and state support for parental participation has disappeared.<sup>80</sup>

By reducing parents’ roles and autonomy, this chapter concludes, these *different* legacies of patronage and polarization have *similarly* reduced the likelihood of spillover effects on poor, rural parents and their communities.

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<sup>79</sup> By patronage capture, I mean that, in a particular initiative, officials determine resource allocation (especially public employment) based on partisan electoral agendas, rather than that initiative’s official protocols and/or stated objectives. Following Stokes (2007), I understand patronage as a subclass of political clientelism, and, specifically, “the proffering of public resources (most typically, public employment) by office-holders in return for electoral support.” Stokes defines clientelism as the “proffering of material goods in return for electoral support, where the criterion of distribution that the patron uses is simply: did you (will you) support me?” Patronage is a subclass requiring the patron to have access to public resources. Vote-buying, a different sub-class, does not require already being in power.

<sup>80</sup> This chapter devotes more space to the Honduran than the Guatemalan case. I chose this approach because the over-turning of CMS in Guatemala has received other scholarly attention (Ganimian 2010). Moreover, PRONADE’s reversal is an undisputable fact easily corroborated by casual observers, while demonstrating PROHECO’S patronage capture requires meeting a higher burden of proof.

## I. Patronage in Honduras

For decades, patronage has been the currency of Honduran party politics. One scholar has gone so far as to describe the two dominant political parties as “competing patronage pyramids” (Taylor 1996). Academic work on Honduras, however, has not explained how party politics interacts with specific governance or development initiatives. In this chapter, I show how a particular program, PROHECO, has become an additional vehicle for Honduran patronage.

Honduras is ripe for clientelism for various reasons. First, clientelism is much more likely to dominate societies with high levels of poverty and inequality, because 1) the poor are more risk-averse and have shorter time-horizons, 2) poorer people value handouts more than others, and/or 3) clientelistic strategies like vote-buying become too expensive in more equal and economically developed societies (Stokes 2007). Honduras is one of the poorest and most unequal societies in Latin America, making it fertile ground for clientelism.

Second, clientelism requires extensive networks. To ensure that clients provide electoral support in exchange for a pay-off, patrons rely on myriad local activists and supporters to provide information and ensure that the investment bears fruit (Stokes 2007). In Honduras, the longevity and dominance of the Liberal and National parties has enabled the entrenchment of vast clientelistic networks. For roughly a century, these two parties have developed networks that extend even to remote rural communities. In each community, the parties aim to establish a “sub-council” (*subconsejo*) responsible for making sure that party supporters register, arrive at the polls, and vote for the party on Election Day. Honduras utilizes a secret ballot, but local party networks provide each party with greater confidence in the fruits of their pay-offs and promises. Where parties

maintain dominance over time, as in Honduras, shirking becomes riskier for both patrons and clients due to the potential loss of benefits of future interactions, facilitating greater compliance (*ibid.*). This feature of the political system is crucial for understanding why clientelism has become more entrenched in Honduras—and capable of subverting social policy (see below)—than in Guatemala.

Third, clientelism will be more likely where parties are less ideologically distinguishable (Stokes 2007; Stokes 2005; Kopecký and Mair 2006). Where parties are similar ideologically, programmatic and ideological appeals may be less successful, so parties will rely more heavily on clientelism to ensure electoral success. In this regard, as well, Honduras is ripe for clientelism, long distinguishing itself in Latin America by having two dominant right-of-center parties (Crespo Martinez 1998).

Given these underlying conditions, it is unsurprising that analysts of Honduran politics identify widespread patronage, among other types of clientelistic behavior (Ruhl 2010; Taylor 1996). As Taylor-Robinson (1996) explains, in a system dominated by two factionalized parties and fused elections, legislators maintain support once in office by remaining in the good graces of party leaders and local party militants, ensuring the support of the latter with a mix of vote-buying and clientelistic promises among constituencies. Meanwhile, the President focuses on maintaining a coherent party by distributing pork, buying votes, and promising patronage (especially jobs) in sufficient amounts across the country. Taylor-Robinson describes Honduras's two dominant parties as “competing patronage pyramids” that control Honduran politics and conspire against effective policy-making. Both the president and legislators spend most of their time thinking about patronage and little time thinking about crafting national policy.

Honduras has recently undergone certain electoral reforms and political changes. Ballots are no longer fused, congressional elections switched from closed-list to open-list, and the level of voter identification with the PL and PN has dropped significantly (Taylor-Robinson 2007; Taylor-Robinson 2003; Ruhl 2010). Nonetheless, these two parties continue to dominate presidential, congressional, and municipal elections (Taylor-Robinson 2007; Coleman and Argueta 2008).<sup>81</sup> Moreover, declining party identification does not necessarily spell clientelism's end. Even parties with diminishing sympathies from the electorate can maintain power through clientelistic practices (Kopecký and Mair 2006). While observers hoped that the electoral reforms would encourage congressional candidates to prioritize effective policy-making over clientelism, this change was far from clear in the 2005 and 2009 elections (Ruhl 2010; Taylor 1996).<sup>82</sup> The sections below suggest that, as in many other Latin American countries (Kopecký and Mair 2006; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007), clientelism continues to dominate Honduran politics.

This chapter provides a “downstream” view of the various uses and consequences of patronage in one Honduran PG initiative. Interviews with government employees and teachers revealed how the recipients of patronage at the lower rungs of government experience and deal in patronage. Aggregate data showed how patronage affected where new schools were built. Community case studies, centered on interviews with parents, also enabled me to follow this particular government reform from the recipients of patronage jobs to the communities where partisan incursions affected service provision. My research thus fills in some of the lower sections of the “pyramids” that Taylor-Robinson describes from lawmakers’ perspectives.

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<sup>81</sup> Honduras may be moving towards a two-and-a-half party system (Coleman and Argueta 2008; Cruz and Argueta 2007), but it is still a *de facto* two-party system. In the 2009 elections, no other party obtained even two percent of the vote (Tribunal Supremo Electoral de Honduras 2009).

<sup>82</sup> Honduras may resemble Brazil, where the transition to open-list PR increased clientelism because of heightened intra-party competition (Chang 2008).

## II. Patronage in the Honduran Education System

Before discussing PROHECO, I introduce how patronage operates in the traditional Honduran education system. This will provide a sense of the pervasiveness of patronage politics and a yardstick against which to compare PROHECO.

Throughout the traditional education system, party politics dictates hiring, beginning with the hiring of Secretariat of Education (SE) supervisory staff, including departmental and district directors (World Bank 2009). Though candidates first take exams for their positions in Tegucigalpa, political recommendations often determine who gets hired. According to an SE district director and former union leader: “The politicians have always wanted to get their hands on education. I thought this was going to change...[but] they keep using the education system to attract their followers. They send letters to the departmental office for their people.”<sup>83 84</sup>

Teachers' unions, too, have long been able to influence the selection of SE staff. A World Bank (2009, 156) report on obstacles to education reform complained that teachers associations play a decisive “role in the appointments of key personnel” within the SE.

Simply put, the two dominant parties and the teachers' unions have captured the departmental and municipal offices. It seems intuitively obvious that this reduces service quality when compared to the counter-factual of a transparent, merit-based hiring

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<sup>83</sup> Personal interview with author. October 21, 2009. Department of El Paraíso, Honduras. For all interviews with SE and PROHECO program staff, given the sensitive nature of the material, I do not identify the names of respondents.

<sup>84</sup> In dozens of interviews as well as presentations of preliminary findings, no teacher, education official, or education expert disagreed with my claim about the *juntas de selección* or the other findings presented below about patronage in PROHECO. I thus feel confident about these assertions. I use quotations to express ideas and themes that were present *throughout my interviews*, not to use one interview as grounds for generalizing to a broader population.

system. Officials reject certain more qualified candidates who lack party and/or union connections, and SE officials' longevity becomes determined by election results, not performance. De-concentrated SE offices become receptacles for the ruling party and the unions to deposit their supporters and activists.

Patronage dynamics also affect teacher selection. Teachers looking for jobs in the traditional system in Honduras must take an exam before having their application judged by the *junta de selección* in the relevant department. The *junta* consists of 12 members—six named by the SE (and thus partial to the ruling party), and six named by the *colegios magisteriales* (*de facto* teachers' unions). Then, as all of my interviews with teachers and SE staff corroborated, the SE and union appointees take turns choosing teachers, often disregarding applicants' credentials and choosing those with the strongest party or union connections. As Marlon Brevé, President Zelaya's Secretary of Education, confirmed: “they divide up the positions”—one selection for the government side, one for the unions.<sup>85</sup>

This arrangement reflects continuity with hiring practices prior to democracy's arrival, when the two dominant parties and the unions—often with close ties to parties—had broad scope for influencing teacher selection through patronage appointments. Even major education legislation has not fundamentally altered this collusive arrangement.

Honduras passed the *Estatuto del Docente* (Teacher's Statute), the center of teachers' union's efforts since the 1980s, in 1997 (Posas 2003; The World Bank 2009). This law brought major changes to the government's education budget—principally by raising teachers' salaries—but it did not significantly change the teacher selection process. Before the *Estatuto*, the *Ley de Escalafón del Magisterio* (1968) dictated that national and

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<sup>85</sup> Personal interview with author. December 9, 2009. Tegucigalpa, Honduras.

departmental commissions conduct teacher hiring. Political party co-optation of the principal unions (e.g., COLPROSUMAH with the PL and PRICPHMA with the PN) ensured union influence over SE administration and teacher appointments (Posas 2003; The World Bank 2009). By transferring greater responsibilities to departmental offices, the *Estatuto* reflected the country's broader education decentralization in the 1990s (Rápalo 2003). Still, the *Estatuto* remained similar to the *Ley de Escalafón* in leaving space for union-party collusion in teacher selection. Under both pieces of legislation, selection commissions balance SE representatives, through whom the ruling party influences hiring, and teachers' union representatives. The *Estatuto* has produced similar union - ruling party collusion, in which both sides alternate in selecting teachers, often disregarding applicants' credentials.

### III. The Uses of Clientelism in PROHECO

More than employees in the traditional school system, PROHECO employees have to exhibit strong loyalties to the ruling party.<sup>86</sup> These ties often take precedence over these employees' connections to the communities they serve. The importance of party affiliation manifests itself in various ways, capturing both promoters and PROHECO teachers and reducing parents' roles.

In political science, scholarship on the uses of clientelism has flourished. Scholars have, for instance, focused recently on whether politicians use clientelism to target core supporters or swing voters (Stokes 2005; Nazareno, Stokes, and Brusco 2006; Diaz-Cayeros and Magaloni 2004). The answer appears to depend on context—distinctive party systems, patterns of political competition, and party-society relationships produce

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<sup>86</sup> This is not just a Liberal or National Party phenomenon; I uncovered similar patterns during the Maduro (PN), Zelaya (PL), and Lobo (PN) presidencies.

different outcomes (Nazareno, Stokes, and Brusco 2006). The waters become further muddied by evidence that clientelistic practices are not used solely to win votes, but also to build up parties' organizational networks and increase the odds of adopting particular policies (Kopecký and Mair 2006). For instance, Fox (1994) demonstrates how Mexican president Carlos Salinas used staff of his clientelism-dominated flagship social program, PRONASOL, to mobilize beneficiaries in support of a controversial constitutional reform.

The analysis below suggests that the diversity of uses of clientelism applies to even the functioning of one particular initiative. In contrast to arguments that clientelism has one primary use in a given country or policy domain (does clientelism, for example, reward core voters or target swing voters?), the evidence from PROHECO reveals how clientelism in one program can serve to reward party activists with jobs, use staff as “brokers” to build up party networks and support the ruling party's agenda in other sectors, and favor certain areas with new schools.

*a. Rewarding Party Activists*

The most obvious use of patronage in PROHECO entails hiring ruling party activists to work in departmental and local posts. The ruling party provides party activists with PROHECO jobs to A) reward them for prior activism, B) incentivize subsequent activism to remain employed, and C) collect campaign contributions.

As former Secretary Brevé explained, “The promoters are activists. And there’s no need to deny it—in both governments, from one party to another, they will be activists. It’s someone who has worked on the campaign of a *diputado* or the president and is looking

for a job.”<sup>87</sup> Unlike for local SE positions, though, no examination or competition (*concurso*) exists for these positions.

As party militants, promoters must donate time and money to their political party. Their financial contributions take the form of automatic salary deductions—not as a codified rule of PROHECO, of course, but as an unofficial requirement to keep their jobs.<sup>88</sup> In effect, staffing PROHECO with party militants allows the ruling party to assure that state funds—a portion of PROHECO employees’ salaries—end up in party coffers.

PROHECO's politicization also produces massive staff turnover every four years. With the change of government and ruling party (no party has won back-to-back presidential terms since PROHECO's inception), the program replaces virtually all departmental coordinators, promoters, and administrative staff. PROHECO personnel records reveal that only one of 190 departmental staff members in 2009 held his job in 2006, when the previous government was in power.<sup>89</sup> These records also list the political backer (*aval político*) that enabled each departmental coordinator to get his job—in most cases, the contacts were *diputados* (including then-President of Congress, Roberto Micheletti), but President Zelaya, the head of the Liberal Party, and a municipal party council also each named one person.

In 2009, politics provoked turnover even without elections. After the June 28<sup>th</sup> coup unseated President Zelaya, the *de facto* government replaced PROHECO's national coordinator and at least five departmental coordinators, all of whom had supported

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<sup>87</sup> Personal interview with author. December 9, 2009. Tegucigalpa, Honduras.

<sup>88</sup> PROHECO promoters. Personal interviews with author. October 13 and October 14, 2009. Department of El Paraíso, Honduras.

<sup>89</sup> These personnel records cover all the departments except Francisco Morazán. The ideal comparison would have been 2006 and 2007 staff records (immediately after the election), but PROHECO staff could not provide me with 2007 or 2008 data. Some turnover over three years may be due to non-patronage reasons, but the 99-plus percent turnover rate reported here is consistent with PROHECO staff members’ acknowledgements in interviews that departmental staff all changes when the ruling party changes.

Zelaya's controversial *Cuarta Urna*. Then, in 2010, soon after President Lobo's inauguration, the program replaced all of its field staff and over 90 percent of its central office staff.<sup>90 91</sup> In the national office, the only staff with job security are SE-hired technical staff—all staff directly hired by PROHECO remain subject to partisan meddling.

The evidence of near-complete staff turnover in PROHECO at least every four years suggests mutually reinforcing effects of patronage and government turnover. Both pervasive patronage and government turnover can hurt the stability of government policies or programs. But the Honduran case shows that the combination of the two produces even less stability in program implementation. Unlike a one-party-dominated state that relies on patronage (e.g., Mexico under the PRI)—where party loyalists might retain public offices over longer periods—the dominant parties in Honduras have taken the opportunity to maximize clientelistic gains each time they take office. Where PROHECO staff have gained skills and expertise during their term, this turnover means that the program starts virtually from scratch every four years. One might expect the National Party (under Presidents Maduro and Lobo) to have tried to undo PROHECO because of its Liberal origins, but the lack of ideological difference between the parties and PROHECO's status as a patronage prize made this a non-issue (see below for more). Instead of reversing PROHECO, politicians from both parties have remained content to use PROHECO jobs to reward supporters, at the considerable cost of continuity and professionalization in service provision.

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<sup>90</sup> PROHECO technical assistant. Personal (electronic) communications with author. February 15 and April 21, 2010.

<sup>91</sup> For discussion of similar turnover in 2010 in another parallel education program, EDUCATODOS, see "Despidos masivos y clientelismo político ponen en peligro programa EDUCATODOS." *Revista360.com*. March 15, 2010.

b. “Brokerage” and Building Party Networks

After being hired on partisan lines, promoters and departmental coordinators are also expected to build up and/or sustain a loyal base for the party by hiring teachers who support—or have connections to—the ruling party. Contrary to the program’s official design, parents do not select teachers in most PROHECO schools. Instead, promoters hire teachers with political recommendations. Virtually every teacher, promoter, and parent leader with whom I discussed staff hiring acknowledged this. As one teacher explained, “They ask you for a political recommendation. I got [the signatures of two *diputados*] through my brother-in-law, because he works for PROHECO, he’s a promoter...[To get hired, you have to take] the paper to the PROHECO office to show that you’re Liberal or have worked for the party.”<sup>92</sup>

Promoters explained that the pressure for partisan hiring came from *diputados* and local party leaders. As one explained, they “recommend people to the district education office and PROHECO, they propose a teacher. If one doesn’t accept that person, they can remove you [from your job]. We’re puppets of the politicians.”<sup>93</sup> A municipal PL council leader was even clearer about his role vis-à-vis the recommendations.

My signature goes there [alongside the *diputado*'s]. Those people [promoters] work on the campaign, and then we give them a job. It’s their compensation...Not just the promoters. The teachers, too...yes, we name them. If we lose [in the elections], those people go, too. So, those people [teachers] are obligated to work for the party. And to take their whole family to vote.<sup>94</sup>

Of course, teacher hiring in traditional schools also usually requires a political party or union recommendation. But, while regular schoolteachers need political help to get

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<sup>92</sup> Personal interviews with author. September 21, 2009. Department of El Paraíso, Honduras. All translations from interviews were completed by the author.

<sup>93</sup> Personal interview with author. October 14, 2009. Department of El Paraíso, Honduras.

<sup>94</sup> Personal interview with author. November 19, 2009. Department of El Paraíso, Honduras.

hired initially, they are then virtually guaranteed tenure until retirement. Meanwhile, PROHECO teachers remain subject to partisan pressures year after year. Receiving only annual contracts—theoretically an enforcement mechanism for parents to ensure good performance—teachers lack job security and often remain most concerned with satisfying the ruling party and/or the partisan promoter.

Because of teachers' vulnerability to political firing, many feel obligated to contribute from their salary to the ruling party. One promoter explained that he tells teachers: "They're asking for the contribution at the local party council. You arrived here through the party, so you [have to collaborate]."<sup>95</sup> Not contributing to the party can reduce job stability. This explains why various teachers I interviewed in 2009 regularly contributed to the PL, despite belonging to another party. These teachers got their jobs by obtaining PL recommendation letters and contributed to the party in order to hold on to their jobs. In the community of Perales (introduced in Chapter Six), the school director was a PN member and refused to contribute to the PL herself. Her husband, fearing his wife would lose her job, contributed to the PL in his wife's name.<sup>96</sup>

The ruling party, then, fills teacher positions along partisan lines to 1) reward party supporters and encourage subsequent activism, 2) provide campaign financing, and 3) ensure logistical support in rural areas for partisan initiatives (described below). Teachers' roles confirm the versatility of patronage in PROHECO. For a party leader, hiring along party lines can serve several functions at once. None of these functions, however, involve improving education provision. Meanwhile, promoters become

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<sup>95</sup> Personal interview with author. October 14, 2009. Department of El Paraíso, Honduras.

<sup>96</sup> These fears have proven justified, with partisan pressures on parent councils to fire teachers from the incoming National Party government. See, for instance: "Denuncian despido irregular de maestros." *El Heraldo*, June 1, 2010. "Maestros de escuelas PROHECO temen despidos por politica." *La Prensa*, May 4, 2010. Because these concerns are ongoing, I use pseudonyms for all names for communities and individuals covered by my case studies.

“brokers” through teacher selection, operating as intermediaries between ruling party politicians (patrons) and job-seekers (clients).

Promoters’ brokerage role also extends to promoting other partisan initiatives. During campaign years, promoters organize party events and mobilize voters. Furthermore, they mobilize teachers to support the ruling party in advance of the election. The ruling party may also call on them to support other initiatives.

PROHECO staff’s role in the *Cuarta Urna*, the trigger for the 2009 coup, provides the clearest case. Like other partisan SE hires, PROHECO promoters organized voter lists, formed groups to conduct the preliminary “surveys,” and coordinated teachers to conduct “surveys” in the community and monitor polling sites. PROHECO staff in various departments devoted as much as three to four working weeks to these political activities before the date of the scheduled poll, June 28<sup>th</sup>.<sup>97</sup> This reduced the frequency with which many promoters visited PROHECO communities, diminishing technical assistance to schools. Promoters also diverted teachers’ time from educational purposes to partisan political aims.

According to former Secretary Brevé, PROHECO employees were among the most eager to help in the *Cuarta Urna* because of their solidarity with the country’s poor.<sup>98</sup> Some PROHECO staff may have sympathized with Zelaya’s project, but many respondents insisted that they were forced to participate or risked losing their jobs. Whereas the traditional SE system provided teachers with political insulation from partisan pressures, PROHECO staff’s precarious, patronage-based positions made it much harder to say no to partisan imperatives.

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<sup>97</sup> PROHECO promoters. Personal interviews with author. October 13 and October 14, 2009. Department of El Paraíso, Honduras.

<sup>98</sup> Personal interview with author. December 9, 2009. Tegucigalpa, Honduras.

*c. School Openings: Geographic and Partisan Favoritism*

The diversion of program resources through patronage also took another form during President Zelaya's term—geographic favoritism affected where PROHECO placed new schools and teachers. This had the greatest impact in Olancho, the home department of President Zelaya, Secretary Brevé, and PROHECO coordinator, Marissela Figueroa. During Zelaya's presidency, more new PROHECO schools (over 170) opened in Olancho than in any other department (PROHECO 2009). Over 20 percent of the PROHECO schools created during Zelaya's term were created in Olancho, and Olancho's share of the nation's PROHECO schools increased from 11 percent to 14 percent.<sup>99</sup> Figueroa and Brevé explicitly acknowledged their concerted efforts to focus on opening schools in Olancho.<sup>100</sup> Brevé recalled:

The President told me, "Marlon, let's give something to our department."....If we [had] want[ed] to leave a legacy for Honduras, that's good. But if we wanted to leave a legacy for our land, where we left the womb, [even better]. The President and I shared that [vision]....It was the *diputados*, the coordinator, the secretary, and it was the president.

Brevé justified this with reference to Olancho's high poverty level. But standard development indicators (PNUD 2006) reveal that Honduras has other poorer departments; it was not a given that Olancho should receive a disproportionate number of new PROHECO schools.

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<sup>99</sup> Data sources for these calculations are PROHECO 2009, PROHECO 2008, PROHECO and SE 2007, as well as unpublished internal statistical documentation, provided by PROHECO staff.

<sup>100</sup> Personal interviews with author. September 3, 2009 (Marissela Figueroa) and December 9, 2009 (Marlon Brevé). Tegucigalpa, Honduras.

Local politicians in Olancho, connected to the president, also opened schools and hired teachers outside of the national budget.<sup>101</sup> Promoters then often artificially raised the number of students in other schools to justify additional teachers, who were actually directed to work in unregistered schools. This unplanned expansion created an administrative nightmare for PROHECO's national staff. In 2009, the program decided to halt expansion for at least 18 months, as the staff needed to ensure that all existing schools were registered, budgeted, and operating properly.<sup>102</sup> Thus, expansion in Olancho has come at the expense of other departments—some poorer than Olancho—which will likely be unable to create new schools for the foreseeable future.

Regression analysis corroborates that geographic favoritism affects school openings. I compiled a data set of the 298 Honduran municipalities, including variables that one would expect to dictate school openings—population, literacy rate (as a proxy for socioeconomic level),<sup>103</sup> and the initial number of PROHECO schools. *Ceteris paribus*, municipalities with higher population should be more likely to acquire new schools. In addition, I expected that new school openings between 2005 and 2009 were more likely in municipalities where PROHECO was already more established, as program expansion relies on local promoters (i.e., a community is more likely to get a school if it can contact a local promoter) and opening a PROHECO office in a new municipality would imply higher administrative costs.

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<sup>101</sup> PROHECO technical assistants. Personal interviews with author. September 7, 2009. Tegucigalpa, Honduras.

<sup>102</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>103</sup> I initially included each municipality's human development index rating, as well, but this proved highly correlated with literacy and had virtually no impact on the regression. Given concerns about multi-collinearity, I dropped this variable for the final regression. I also examined bivariate correlations between the other independent variables to rule out all other potential multi-collinearity.

Controlling for these variables, I then used OLS regression to test whether 1) the geographic region and 2) 2005 presidential election results in the department to which a municipality belonged impacted PROHECO school openings during President Zelaya's term.<sup>104</sup> I expected that municipalities in the East region—of which Olancho constitutes over 50 percent of the population—would be more likely to have obtained PROHECO schools than other departments between 2006 and 2009. I further hypothesized that municipalities in departments where the Liberal Party won would have a higher likelihood of obtaining PROHECO schools in the same period.

Regressions results, reported in Table 3, corroborate geographic and partisan favoritism. First, the results support my hypotheses for the control variables—namely, that municipalities with higher population and higher initial presence of PROHECO schools were more likely to acquire new schools between 2005 and 2009. Second, compared to municipalities in the East, only municipalities in the North had a greater likelihood of getting new PROHECO schools during Zelaya's term. Municipalities in the Central, Western, and Southern regions were all less likely to get PROHECO schools than those in the East, *ceteris paribus*. I used the East as the baseline category for region in this regression, but this finding held irrespective of the region used as the baseline.

This result provides further evidence of geographic favoritism in PROHECO school openings, particularly given that indicators for education—which one would expect to influence education policy—were not correlated with school openings from mid-2005 to mid-2009. PROHECO favored the East—Zelaya's homeland—and the North over

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<sup>104</sup> For coding regions, I followed the convention for Honduran development research (e.g., UNDP 2006), which distributes the departments as follows: Central includes Comayagua, Francisco Morazán, and La Paz; North includes Colón, Cortés, Yoro, and Atlántida; West includes Intibucá, Santa Barbara, Ocotepeque, Copán, and Lempira; East includes El Paraíso and Olancho; and South includes Valle and Choluteca. I have also grouped Gracias a Dios and Islas de la Bahía, the least populated departments, which often remain excluded from studies of Honduras.

other departments, with low regard for the development needs of the areas in question. The evidence from Olancho suggests a geographic dimension to Honduran patronage, where President Zelaya used his close ties to a particular department to disproportionately distribute PROHECO's benefits.<sup>105</sup> Honduras remains relatively ethnically homogeneous—and certainly nowhere near neighboring Guatemala in terms of ethno-linguistic diversity—but the pattern during Zelaya's term in office actually resembles cases of patronage in ethnically-divided societies, where ruling parties divide the spoils of rule along ethnic lines that usually coincide with geographic boundaries (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007).

Table 3 also suggests that new PROHECO schools went disproportionately to municipalities in departments where the PL won a small or moderate victory in 2005. This suggests that the ruling party legislators rewarded *competitive* loyal departments, as opposed to those where the party had lost or won a landslide.<sup>106</sup> This correlational evidence corroborates that the ruling party uses PROHECO to reward supporters and consolidate its bases of support. During Zelaya's term, the PL did this strategically, favoring competitive districts over those where support was virtually guaranteed.

In sum, contrary to a reductive attempt to identify the sole, or even primary, use of patronage in PROHECO, my research identifies how the ruling party can use patronage from one PG initiative to serve several functions. This variety suggests just how useful patronage can be. The ruling party can use it simultaneously to reward and sustain party

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<sup>105</sup> My qualitative research did not, however, provide answers as to why PROHECO delivered more schools to the North, a task for further research.

<sup>106</sup> The election results for each municipality did not generate statistically-significant results. This makes sense given that PROHECO emanates from the legislature, for which the department constitutes the relevant unit of analysis. Furthermore, legislative election results would have proven unwieldy and very difficult to interpret given the complexity of Honduras's open-list, proportional representation system. Instead, presidential results at the departmental level served as a proxy for ruling party support.

activism, reward reliable party supporters, strengthen the party's network, and reward particular constituencies with new schools.

**Table 3: Impact of Region and Election Results on PROHECO School Openings, 2005 to 2009**

Independent Variable	Coefficient
Number of PROHECO Schools in 2005 <sup>107</sup>	0.201***
Region 1: Central <sup>108</sup>	-3.039***
Region 2: North	2.699**
Region 3: West	-1.648**
Region 5: South	-3.380***
Region 6: Islas de la Bahia and Gracias a Dios	0.081
PL departmental loss by .01-5% <sup>109</sup>	0.576
PL departmental win by .01-5%	1.548*
PL departmental win by 5.01%-10%	2.123***
PL departmental win by >10%	-0.213
Population (thousands) <sup>110</sup>	0.006**
Literacy Rate (percentage) <sup>111</sup>	-3.23
Constant	3.732
<i>Observations (Municipalities)</i>	298
<i>Adjusted r-squared</i>	0.366
Completed using OLS regressions, with robust standard errors. The symbology, which is used consistently through the thesis, is: * $p \leq 0.1$ ** $p \leq 0.05$ *** $p \leq 0.01$	

<sup>107</sup> Source: PROHECO education statistics provided by staff to author. Reviewed on July 6, 2005. Source for 2009 schools is "Reporte de Escuelas PROHECO." May 11, 2009. These lists were temporally closer to the beginning and end of Zelaya's term (January 2006 - June 2009) than any other available data.

<sup>108</sup> Baseline category: Region Four (East), which includes Olancho.

<sup>109</sup> Baseline category: PL loss by 5.01-10 percent; there were no ties or cases of loss of greater than 10 percent.

<sup>110</sup> Source: Honduras's most recent census (INE 2001).

<sup>111</sup> Source: PNUD 2006.

#### IV. Political Competition at Regime and Policy Implementation Levels

Over the last fifteen years, political scientists have focused on how political competition (e.g., inter-union, intra-union, and union-party relationships) affects market and social service reform adoption (Murillo and Martínez-Gallardo 2007; Burgess 1999; Murillo 1999; Levitsky 2007), but they focused far less on how such competition affects policies *once reforms have been passed*.<sup>112</sup> The present analysis considers the latter, revealing how different types of political competition affect policy implementation. In Honduras, PROHECO shows how, even under democracy, monopolistic ruling party power can easily subsume PG implementation, with serious negative consequences.

Democracies, in Latin America and beyond, tend to provide more public goods, like health care and education, than their authoritarian predecessors (Díaz-Cayeros and Magaloni 2004; Díaz-Cayeros and Magaloni 2004). In education, while political competition may not guarantee a higher quality or more efficient education system, it does appear to increase government provision of resources for education, and especially primary education (Corrales 2006; Di John 2007; Brown 2002). Honduras and Guatemala exemplify this trend: As illustrated in Chapter One, government education funding, number of teachers, and school enrolment all rapidly increased as these countries became democracies. Put simply, the education needs of marginal communities became a higher government priority under democracy than under authoritarian rule.

But increasing education spending is only one part of the equation; using increased resources to implement sound policy is the other. Consistent with other Latin American

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<sup>112</sup> For a synopsis of political economy analyses of Latin American education reforms, see Ganimian 2010, 8-9.

countries' experiences (Corrales 2006; Di John 2007), increased education spending has not raised education quality in Honduras and Guatemala. While coverage has increased, student completion and performance on standardized tests remains dismal. (World Bank 2009; PREAL and CIEN 2008; PREAL 2002; PREAL 2005).

Two key pieces to this governance and development problem are transparency and accountability in program implementation (World Bank 2003). In the Honduran education system, patronage undercuts competition at the policy implementation level, undermining accountability. The traditional education and PROHECO systems, respectively, demonstrate union-party collusion and ruling party monopoly, neither of which serves the country's educational needs.

While increased political competition at the regime level has certainly brought greater government attention to education, it has not made the Honduran state more adept at solving other critical education problems, in this case teacher selection and evaluation. As described above, in the traditional system, union-party collusion determines teacher hiring. This likely reduces teacher quality and the SE's ability to sanction low-performing teachers, suggesting efficiency losses (Corrales 2006). According to a World Bank report on Honduran education, the union-SE relationship produces a "mutual veto" that blocks the path to education reform that could address quality issues (World Bank 2009).

Still, in political terms, the traditional system has an advantage over PROHECO: By giving the teachers' unions an equal number of seats at the table for teacher selection and evaluation, the *junta de selección* system insulates teachers from arbitrary removal. In a country long-dominated by two clientelistic parties and local political strongmen, this amounts to a significant protection. For decades, teachers' unions have positioned themselves as a counter-weight to "the meddling of external agents in the education

process” (World Bank 2009, 63) and demanded protection from arbitrary hiring and firing (Posas 2003; World Bank 2009). Union efforts—culminating in the *Estatuto*—have not eliminated patronage hiring, but instead ensured that the unions get some of the spoils of non-merit-based teacher selection. The *junta de selección* process, though, limits the parties' influence on hiring. Since teacher positions are lifetime appointments, the government cannot remove them for partisan reasons, unlike other SE employees. While lifetime appointments make it very difficult to hold teachers accountable for performance and attendance, this collusive arrangement provides political insulation for teachers from clientelistic practices once they are hired.

Meanwhile, PROHECO, like other CMS reforms in Central America, circumvented the unions. This effort responded to government concerns over increasing union power, as well as the belief that the unions' role in selecting and protecting teachers reduced the education system's efficiency (World Bank 2009). PROHECO bypassed the collusive arrangement embodied in the *Estatuto* and, in theory, stripped the parties and unions of any role in teacher selection by granting it to parents. But, whereas hiring in the traditional system follows a *collusive* pattern between the ruling party and the teachers' unions, hiring in PROHECO has become a *monopolistic* process dictated solely by the ruling party's clientelistic machine.

Table 4 uses the Honduran education system as an example to summarize the benefits and drawbacks of different combinations of regime level and policy implementation level competition. In Honduran public education, the existing combinations are: A) the traditional system under authoritarian rule, B) the traditional system under democracy, and C) PROHECO under democracy. Moving rightward from “low” to “high” regime-level competition represents the shift from authoritarianism to democracy. Cell A

reveals features of education policy prior to democracy, while Cells B and C describe education policy ever since.

Compared to the education system under authoritarian rule, the traditional system and PROHECO under democracy reflect that political competition at the regime level brought increased government attention to societal demands by the government. The aforementioned data on primary education expansion since the mid-1990s provide the best evidence of this. And PROHECO, of course, constituted a critical piece of the democratic government's efforts to expand education provision.

But the major disadvantage of PROHECO has become partisan encroachment. Initially, competition existed for promoter roles, which limited the impact of patronage in teacher hiring, as well. But, as described below, this competitive system eroded over time. Now, unchecked by other actors—whether the opposition party, the teachers' unions, or parents' organizations—the ruling party enjoys a monopoly over policy implementation, generating all the forms of patronage described above and the negative consequences outlined below.

Still, for CMS supporters, this monopolistic arrangement may produce one positive effect. While governments have overturned CMS programs in all three neighboring Central American countries, the Honduran government has never considered this step. Consistent with Corrales' (2006) finding that clientelism can provide incentives for creating or maintaining programs that increase education—albeit inefficiently—PROHECO's longevity seems partly due to politicians' interests in this clientelistic system, a point which I explore comparatively below.

**Table 4: Political Competition at Regime and Policy Implementation Levels in Honduran Education**

		<i>Regime Level Competition</i>	
		Low (Authoritarianism)	High (Democracy)
<i>Policy Implementation Level Competition</i>	Low	N/A <sup>113</sup>	<p><i>(C) PROHECO (Monopoly)</i></p> <p><i>Benefits</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Higher education spending, and expansion of education system to remote rural areas.</li> <li>• Patronage capture may protect the reform.</li> </ul> <p><i>Drawbacks</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Patronage capture—significant political and governance consequences (see below).</li> </ul>
	Moderate	<p><i>(A) Traditional education system under Ley de Escalafón (Collusion)</i></p> <p><i>Drawbacks</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Low education spending.</li> <li>• Collusive hiring practices, low teacher accountability.</li> </ul>	<p><i>(B) Traditional education system under Estatuto del Docente (Collusion)</i></p> <p><i>Benefits</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Higher education spending.</li> <li>• Political insulation of teachers once hired.</li> </ul> <p><i>Drawbacks</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Collusive hiring practices and low teacher accountability persist.</li> </ul>
	High	N/A	N/A

<sup>113</sup> I mark cells “n/a” when such a combination has not existed since 1968. To understand this empty top-left cell, see Sieder (1995) on co-optation as critical to Honduras’ form of authoritarianism and my earlier discussion of “controlled inclusion.”

Put simply, the extent of patronage in PROHECO has increased *diputados*' incentives to maintain the program as it is.<sup>114</sup> As former Secretary Brevé noted, because of the number of full-time staff, PROHECO has become more attractive for politicians as a site for patronage than other education programs: “Educatodos and PRALEBA [two other education programs], their coverage is small. That’s why you see more politicization [in PROHECO].”<sup>115</sup>

The patronage capture of PROHECO provides incentives for politicians not to formalize hiring practices in the program, but also for them not to allow PROHECO's reversal. Absorbing PROHECO into the traditional education system (reversal) would reduce the spoils of office—in particular, ruling party politicians’ ability to fill roughly 200 regional and national staff jobs and thousands of teaching positions along partisan lines. Thus, the very patronage-based system that prevents politicians from incorporating transparent, merit-based hiring practices into PROHECO may also partly explain the program’s survival. For proponents of PROHECO, this implies that undoing the patronage-based hiring system could require creating another mechanism afterwards, such as enshrining the program in a new law that protects PROHECO from reversal. Proposing a new law would likely trigger teacher union opposition, which could further threaten PROHECO. This suggests how difficult the road ahead for reformers could be—undoing this type of patronage-based system can be extremely difficult anywhere (Díaz-Cayeros and Magaloni 2004), but having to pass an additional legislative hurdle would be even more onerous.

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<sup>114</sup> One former *diputada*, Marta Lorena Alvarado, with connections to education reformers, has proposed a reform to institutionalize PROHECO. This proposal has not yet moved forward, however, and the present analysis suggests that it will meet resistance (or at least foot-dragging) among legislators.

<sup>115</sup> Personal interview with author. December 9, 2009. Tegucigalpa, Honduras.

Checks on ruling party power, however, could take many forms. For PROHECO, it could entail reinstating competitive hiring processes—which would not necessarily require new legislation—that were present at the program’s outset (see below). But such reform would likely require a concerted campaign by a powerful actor outside the ruling party. The two most likely potential actors—the opposition party and international donors—have not made such efforts.

One might think that opposition legislators would decry the ruling party's use of patronage-based hiring. But PROHECO may offer a case where political competition at the regime level *undermines* competition and transparency at the policy implementation level. Since the PL and PN have alternated in power for the last four presidential terms, whichever party is in the opposition has reason to believe it will assume power in the next election.<sup>116</sup> Once in power again, the then-opposition party will be able to distribute program spoils in the same ways as the sitting government. It is thus unsurprising that neither party has mounted a serious challenge to PROHECO's status quo.<sup>117</sup> This contrasts sharply with Guatemala, where party turnover is high, and opposition parties across the political spectrum have protested loudly against President Colom’s *Mi Familia Progresá* for fear that it will help consolidate a new electoral machine.

Beyond Honduran political actors, donors arguably had the most leverage to impact PROHECO's hiring procedures. After all, the World Bank was a major driver and

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<sup>116</sup> Here, Honduras may challenge Di John's (2007) assertion that the lack of stability and institutionalization of parties may detract from education reform efforts. Honduras demonstrates how clientelism can persist and damage prospects for education reform even with a stable, two-party system.

<sup>117</sup> In 2010, patronage hiring in PROHECO did become an issue, as major media outlets publicized widespread firing of teachers along partisan lines. Liberal Party congress members took up the rallying cry, as did indigenous organizations in the western region (Altschuler 2010a). The PL, however, did not lead this effort, but instead appeared to respond to a *sui generis* political opportunity brought by increased media attention to partisan turnover after the 2009 coup. It is also telling that none of this increased media and PL attention has generated concrete proposals for professionalizing hiring practices.

program funder. But macro-level interviews suggest that the World Bank maintained a political blindspot with respect to clientelistic dynamics. With PROHECO, donor vigilance and oversight appear to have declined over time. At the beginning of PROHECO, donors worked with technical staff to devise merit-based hiring systems. For the initial round of hiring during President Flores' term, PROHECO publicized a national competition, which involved training and a competitive examination, from which the program selected the best candidates for promoter and departmental coordinator positions.<sup>118</sup> But then, as oversight declined during President Maduro's term, the hiring system gave way to a partisan-based *terna*—ruling party *diputados* typically submitted several applications for each available position, from which an employee was hired.<sup>119</sup> Finally, when Manuel Zelaya came to power, any semblance of merit-based hiring had disappeared.<sup>120</sup>

Meanwhile, official program and donor reports rarely, if ever, mentioned the program's capture by partisan politics. In fact, in 2009 the World Bank celebrated its success with its most recent loan to PROHECO by giving the project an award for "program design, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation that contributes to positive development outcomes."<sup>121</sup> In the 2008 evaluation on which the award is based, the reviewers recognize certain political constraints to education delivery—conflictual teachers' unions and weak administrative capacity and decentralization of the SE—but never mention the

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<sup>118</sup> Raúl Turcios, former administrative coordinator of PROHECO. Personal Interview with author. December 8, 2009. Tegucigalpa, Honduras. Also: PROHECO national technical assistants. Personal communication with author. December 8, 2009.

<sup>119</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>120</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>121</sup> The announcement of this award is available at <http://web.worldbank.org/external/default/main?noSURL=Y&theSitePK=1324361&piPK=64252979&pagePK=64253958&contentMDK=22327796>

program's overt politicization.<sup>122</sup> And, while the WB's 2009 Institutional and Governance Review of Honduras (2009) emphasizes the need to professionalize hiring practices in the state bureaucracy, it then presents PROHECO as a beacon of accountability in the education sector. The Bank continues to promote PROHECO's expansion and integration into the SE, while ignoring how patronage has undermined PROHECO's accountability framework. Put simply, the Bank has not worked to hold itself, PROHECO leaders, or meddling politicians accountable for the program's politicization.<sup>123</sup> With neither donors nor opposition legislators advocating undoing PROHECO's patronage capture, it remains unsurprising that the system has not changed.

## V. Less Prevalent Patronage in Guatemala's Education System

Patronage in the Guatemalan education system pales in comparison with that in Honduras. From 1954-1991, arbitrariness ruled the day in teacher selection (Álvarez 2009), though this differed from Honduras due to the instability of parties and the greater influence of military officials. Until 1991, then, unions had little influence—and teachers less protection—in hiring and firing. In 1991, however, the General Education Law enshrined job stability for teachers, while President Arzú later signed legislation enshrining a competitive selection process (*jurado de oposición*), in which subsequent teachers would be chosen along strict, non-partisan guidelines (*ibid.*, 25). These two legislative changes dramatically reduced arbitrariness in teacher selection. And, while

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<sup>122</sup> A personal contact at the WB made this evaluation available to the author. See also World Bank 2009.

<sup>123</sup> For discussion of the blind spot of international donors and the “good governance” literature regarding key political economy factors, see Di John 2007. For a more strident critique of the World Bank's “depolicitizing” role in development, see Ferguson 1994.

concerns remain that politicians and unions sometimes manipulate the new process and certain national and departmental MINEDUC appointments still fall along partisan lines, the current situation involves less partisan meddling than its Honduran counterpart.

Similarly, CMS in Guatemala did not fall prey to patronage to nearly the same degree as in Honduras. Former PRONADE and MINEDUC officials agree that the greatest site of patronage was the selection of *Instituciones de Servicios Educativos* (Education Service Institutions, ISEs), the organizations responsible for providing training and technical support to communities. Particularly during President Portillo's term, many ISEs were selected due to ruling party connections, flouting the official ISE qualifications.<sup>124</sup> When President Berger came to power, however, these abuses declined again, and the ISE evaluation and selection process became further formalized, with auditing and publication of results in PRONADE's final period (MINEDUC and PRONADE 2007).<sup>125</sup> Moreover, unlike in Honduras, interviews with national offices, local field staff, teachers, and community members revealed no evidence of patronage in teacher hiring. Even where ISEs got contracts through political connections, I found no reported cases of these ISEs promoting a party line in hiring or any other activity. Instead, while the quality of technical assistance certainly varied, ISEs almost always respected the PRONADE regulation that parents hire and fire teachers. Finally, I found no evidence of geographic or political favoritism in PRONADE school placement.

The lower prevalence of patronage in CMS implementation in Guatemala than Honduras is consistent with broader structural political differences between the countries. Though

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<sup>124</sup> René Linares, former national director of PRONADE. Personal interview with author and Alejandro Ganimian. July 21, 2009. Guatemala City, Guatemala. Miriam Castañeda, former national director of PRONADE. Personal interview with author and Alejandro Ganimian. July 28, 2009. Guatemala City, Guatemala.

<sup>125</sup> René Linares. *Op cit.* Miriam Castañeda. *Op cit.* Various other sources confirmed these issues in ISE selection, but asked not to have the information attributed to them.

both countries possess two key, aforementioned conditions for clientelism—widespread poverty and inequality and declining ideological differences between parties—their party systems differ radically. Whereas Honduras remains controlled by two long-standing parties, Guatemala's party system remains highly fragmented, with no party winning the presidency more than once since political liberalization began in 1985. Unlike in Honduras, where the same two parties dominate in each election, new parties and alliances emerge before each Guatemalan election.

Whereas the Honduran parties spent decades developing well-oiled clientelistic machines to ensure rural voter turnout and party loyalty, rural (especially indigenous) voter participation remained very low in Guatemala until recently. Because of Guatemala's high party fragmentation and turnover, Guatemalan parties lack the national penetration of the Honduran parties and likely encounter difficulties ensuring compliance by clients, who could shirk with no negative consequence in the next election.<sup>126</sup> Moreover, with so many opposition parties and no stable alternation pattern, opposition parties are more likely to decry the strong majoritarianism that the PL and PN tacitly accept in Honduras.

Of course, clientelism is still present in Guatemala, especially in candidates' appeals to communities. Most recently, President Colom's flagship social program, *Mi Familia Progresista*, has generated criticism from both Right and Left that the government is distributing resources along partisan lines to build an electoral machine (Isaacs 2010). But neither Colom's UNE nor any other party has built the type of national infrastructure to penetrate remote rural areas that the dominant Honduran parties have.

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<sup>126</sup> See Stokes 2007 on why compliance requires an infinitely-repeated game scenario, which the Guatemalan context would not provide.

## VI. Polarization in Guatemala

Whereas patronage has been the salient political factor overshadowing CMS in Honduras, polarization has been the more relevant political legacy impacting CMS in Guatemala. Polarization at both the national and community levels undermined PRONADE's efforts to increase parental participation.

### *a. National Level Polarization*

Guatemala's principal teachers' union, STEG, and the ANM (*Asamblea Nacional del Magisterio*, National Teachers' Assembly) vehemently opposed PRONADE on ideological grounds. The teachers' organizations saw PRONADE as part of the post-Peace Accord governments' neoliberal agenda; they accused PRONADE, *inter alia*, of reducing the state's direct role in education provision, violating teachers' labor rights, and exposing teachers to arbitrary parent behavior (Acevedo and Fuentes 2004). National teacher protests specifically focused on achieving PRONADE's reversal.<sup>127</sup> While salary demands for teachers nationwide remained the union's principal focus, overturning CMS was very important to Guatemala's STEG and ANM.

Meanwhile, in Honduras, union opposition to CMS existed, but remained passive.<sup>128</sup> Unions raised concerns that PROHECO was a first step towards education privatization and complained when PROHECO opened schools less than the stipulated three kilometers from traditional schools. But leaders of the principal primary school teachers'

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<sup>127</sup> Joviel Acevedo, Secretary General of the STEG and ANM. Personal interview with Alejandro Ganimian and author. July 17, 2009.

<sup>128</sup> Honduras's *colegios magisteriales* are technically not unions, but professional associations that require membership from all licensed Honduran teachers. In practice, these organizations operate as *de facto* unions, collecting dues, providing benefits to teachers, and frequently pressuring government (usually through strikes) on matters of education policy (Posas 2003; Altschuler 2010).

unions agreed that they had never fought for PROHECO's reversal. As Alejandro Ventura, then-President of PRICPHMA, explained, "We haven't rejected PROHECO. It just needs to be regulated...All that we have insisted is that they not open PROHECO schools in urban areas."<sup>129</sup> The President of COLPROSUMAH, the nation's largest union and other principal player in primary education issues, echoed this position.<sup>130</sup> The Honduran unions remained as strong—with vast national membership, economic resources, and disruptive capacity—as their Guatemalan counterparts in organizing around teachers' salaries and benefits, but their ideological opposition to CMS remained low.

The stronger anti-CMS union position in Guatemala reflects a different teacher union structure and ideological background. In Honduras, the organizations of primary schoolteachers, COLPROSUMAH and PRICPHMA, have maintained relatively moderate agendas compared with the more radical organizations of secondary schoolteachers (Posas 2003). In part, these different positions reflect Honduras' legacy of co-optation by conservative political parties; COLPROSUMAH and PRICPHMA have long maintained alliances, respectively, with the right-of-center PL and PN.

Meanwhile, in Guatemala, the principal teachers' union has long maintained a left-wing stance. Various ally with the Communist Party and guerrilla groups, Guatemalan teachers' unions—when the military regimes allowed them to exist—maintained a vociferous left-of-center ideology since 1944. The STEG, the dominant teachers' union player in Guatemala since at least 1989 (Álvarez 2009), is a direct product of this lineage. While formal union-alliances with overtly leftist organizations have declined over the last

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<sup>129</sup> Personal interview with author. November 10, 2009. Tegucigalpa, Honduras.

<sup>130</sup> Personal interview with author. September 17, 2009. Tegucigalpa, Honduras. Lexy Salgado, a former Secretary General of SINPRODOH (*Sindicato Profesional de Docentes Hondureños*, Professional Union of Honduran Teachers) corroborated this account of union responses to PROHECO. Personal interview with author. October 21, 2009. Department of El Paraíso.

decade, the STEG has maintained a fierce "anti-neoliberalism" agenda since the Peace Accords (*ibid.*). Moreover, the STEG and ANM's vocal leader, Joviel Acevedo, developed his political consciousness as a member of the EGP, which later became part of the URNG. He and his colleagues see PRONADE, along with general education policy since 1996, as a continuation of efforts by Guatemalan oligarchs to oppress indigenous people and workers.<sup>131</sup> Because the STEG consists predominantly of primary schoolteachers, PRONADE (which only affected primary education) became a natural target for its ire, ultimately drawing union protests against the program.

The union's anti-PRONADE campaign, compared with Honduran unions' tacit acceptance of PROHECO, mirrors the greater political and ideological polarization in Guatemala throughout the 20th Century that I described in Chapter Three. Since the early 1900s, Honduras remained a relatively peaceful bastion of conservative power (dominated by the military and two right-wing parties), with intermittent social reforms to mitigate social tensions. Meanwhile, following radical Liberal Reform in the 19th Century, polarization and social upheaval defined Guatemala in the 20th Century, particularly with the October Revolution, the 1954 coup, the 36-year armed conflict, and the genocide in the 1980s. In this polarized context, more radical civil society organizations emerged in Guatemala than in Honduras, where co-optation remained the order of the day. While organizations did challenge authoritarian rule in Honduras in the 1980s, they paled in comparison to the human rights, indigenous, and labor organizations that decried military rule and genocide in Guatemala. Because Guatemala's history had been so much more brutal and violent than Honduras's, the debate remained deeply polarized, focusing on centuries-long dispossession and state-sponsored racism and genocide.

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<sup>131</sup> Interview with Joviel Acevedo. *Op. cit.* Also Enrique Torres, legal advisor to the STEG and ANM. Personal interview with Alejandro Ganimian and author. July 28, 2009.

Moreover, in Guatemala, a greater diversity of actors emerged to assert a left-of-center agenda. The greater strength of, and diversity of actors among, the Guatemalan Left becomes evident in the CMS context. In Honduras, no non-union actor entered the CMS debate. Meanwhile, in Guatemala, prominent NGOs with roots in defending indigenous people's rights (e.g., COPMAGUA<sup>132</sup> and PRODESSA<sup>133</sup>) joined the teachers' union in opposing PRONADE. These organizations echoed teachers' union accusations of privatization and labor rights infringement, describing PRONADE as a neoliberal imposition that would damage Guatemala's public education system. These groups also expressed concern about the administrative burden on parents and the insufficient decision-making power delegated to communities (CNPRE and COPMAGUA 2000). These organizations gave further momentum to the push to overturn CMS, which could not be dismissed as solely a union demand.

*b. Community Level Polarization*

Polarization also undermined PRONADE at the community level. In particular, widespread reports emerged of conflicts between teachers and parents. PRONADE's critics began to report cases of parents behaving as the boss (*patrón*) of teachers, who were treated as laborers (*obreros*) with limited labor rights (EPT and Action Aid 2006). A report from COPMAGUA (CNPRE and COPMAGUA Undated, 24) asserted:

If we make a comparison with the regular system, we will see that in this [traditional system] the teacher is overly protected and the parents and students at a disadvantage....On the contrary, the PRONADE model inverts these relations and completely exposes the teachers, giving the parents rights over them. It is passing from one extreme to the other, from over-protection to a total lack of protection.

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<sup>132</sup> *La Coordinación de Organizaciones del Pueblo Maya de Guatemala* (Coordination of Mayan Peoples' Organizations of Guatemala).

<sup>133</sup> Proyecto de Desarrollo Santiago (Santiago Development Project)

Whereas traditional public schools erred on the side of giving too much power to teachers and not enough to parents, PRONADE appeared to create the inverse problem. As Nery Barrientos, the leader of the organized PRONADE teachers in Alta Verapaz, argued, PRONADE created an “antagonism between teachers and parents” that contributed to the violations of teachers’ rights.<sup>134</sup>

My interviews for the case studies presented in subsequent chapters confirmed this *patrón* – *obrero* stance as a prevalent attitude among parents. Whereas no critic, teacher, or parent interviewed in Honduras described PROHECO as creating a *patrón* – *obrero* relationship, this frame became common in Guatemala. In part, this may have reflected a difference in training. As one parent leader in Yaab explained, “the *técnico*, when he came, told us that the teacher was our employee.”

But, particularly in Alta Verapaz, the difference appears more to reflect a distinctive *finca* mentality. As one former ISE leader explained about parents’ reactions to obtaining a teacher through PRONADE: “upon getting an employee, they say that ‘it’s *our* employee.’” As Francisco Cabrera, a former ISE leader and subsequent PRONADE critic, argued, PRONADE enabled parents to flip on its head the class-based hierarchy of the farms in which they had grown up.<sup>135</sup> Parents, most of whom had lived their entire lives as laborers for farm bosses, had never possessed formal authority over others in a work setting. It is thus unsurprising that many PRONADE council (*Comité Educativo*, Education Committee, COEDUCA) leaders used the same language—*patrón* – *obrero*—to describe the parent-teacher relationship as they had always used in a farm context. Parents appeared to internalize this hierarchical labor relationship—which

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<sup>134</sup> Personal interview with author. February 26, 2010. Cobán, Guatemala.

<sup>135</sup> Personal interview with author. July 20, 2010. Guatemala City, Guatemala.

clearly delineated the powerful versus the powerless, having historically revolved around dispossession and forced labor—and apply it the school reality.

Many teachers became resentful of this attitude, which they felt deprived them of the respect and understanding they deserved. As one teacher explained to me in one of the present study's case study communities, the parents were “given a freedom that they took as if it were to harass.” This did not mean that parents and teachers always clashed—in fact, as in Honduras, teachers often played important roles in taking minutes at meetings and drafting proposals for government support to the school. But it did mean that distrust and antagonism often seeped into parent-teacher relations, in a way that differed markedly from the dynamics in Honduras.

Nor was this difference in parent-teacher relations simply rhetorical. Over the years, widespread reports of COEDUCA corruption emerged. The typical account was that teachers offered parents one month's salary to hire them. Accounts differ on whether teachers or parents initiated this pay-off, but even PRONADE's defenders acknowledged that it occurred frequently.<sup>136</sup> This did not likely occur in a majority of PRONADE schools—and in none of my four case studies—but it was widespread enough for the PRONADE training manual in the program's later years to explicitly warn parents against accepting payment from teachers (MINEDUC and PRONADE 2005). Coupled with the general arguments about the weakening of labor rights with PRONADE's *patrón – obrero* relationship, these cases of COEDUCA corruption provided additional fodder for critics seeking PRONADE's reversal.

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<sup>136</sup> Francisco Cabrera. Personal interview with author. July 20, 2010. Guatemala City, Guatemala.

Fernando Rubio. Personal interview with author. July 23, 2010. Guatemala City, Guatemala.

Horacio Álvarez. Personal interview with author. July 20, 2010. Guatemala City, Guatemala. (See also Colectivo EPT and Action Aid 2006).

## VII. The Impacts of Patronage Capture in Honduras and Reversal in Guatemala

Having described how Honduras and Guatemala's different political contexts affected the implementation of CMS, I now present the impacts of patronage capture in Honduras and program reversal in Guatemala.

Where political scientists have focused on the impacts of patronage, they have found political consequences and governance consequences—i.e., consequences on a program's ability to meet stated governance objectives. According to Remmer (2007, 363), "the political consequences of patronage....include politicized bureaucracies, corruption, electoral manipulation, ethnic voting, incohesive political parties, political inequality, the consolidation of incumbency advantage, fragmented civil societies, attenuated forms of citizenship, and fragile political institutions." Meanwhile, analyses of governance consequences tend to focus on the inefficiencies in politicized service provision (Díaz-Cayeros and Magaloni 2004). In the education sector, for instance, clientelism can provide incentives for increasing education coverage, while also creating inefficient school systems bogged down by disproportionate spending on salaries, lack of program continuity, and obstacles to effective education reform (Corrales 2006; Di John 2007).

PROHECO's patronage capture has both kinds of consequences. Politically, PROHECO provides a new channel for the two dominant parties to reinforce their clientelist networks in remote rural areas. PROHECO offers more valuable resources—jobs and schools—than the handouts (such as small bags of food) that candidates often offer to secure rural votes (Taylor 1996). These increased stakes demonstrate to residents that party activism remains a *sine qua non* for obtaining valuable state support.

PROHECO's patronage capture also feeds resigned discontent with how the parties operate. National staff, promoters, and teachers frequently repeated their concerns and resentment at having their livelihoods subject to partisanship. National staff members recounted failed attempts to encourage more professionalism in hiring practices. Their bosses, political appointees all, made it clear that proposing such changes was a non-starter because PROHECO's current structure was too convenient for politicians "as a place to put their people."<sup>137</sup> Certain promoters also complained of political meddling in their work and their resulting lack of job security. Moreover, in every community I studied, teachers expressed exasperation with this hiring process, concern with losing their jobs for partisan political reasons, and feelings of powerlessness to change this system.

Parent leaders, too, shared frustration with the encroachment on their autonomy and their perception that patronage politics reduces service quality. As Fátima, former parent leader from Cafetales, explained, "Politics damages PROHECO. Through politics they put in anybody. Now one gets disillusioned, because they don't comply with the manuals, so one doesn't want to do as much."<sup>138</sup> Many parents echoed these feelings of having been deceived and disillusioned. To them, PROHECO's patronage capture further undermines the government's credibility when claiming to address Honduras's governance challenges. Though patronage remains analytically different from corruption, this finding appears consistent with the recent AmericasBarometer study (Coleman and Argueta 2008, 41-42) that found that either perceiving or being a victim of corruption reduced Honduran respondents' belief in the legitimacy of political institutions. In these communities, patronage, like corruption, consistently provoked

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<sup>137</sup> PROHECO national technical assistant. Personal communication with author. September 8, 2009. Tegucigalpa, Honduras.

<sup>138</sup> Personal interview with author. December 7, 2009. Department of El Paraíso, Honduras.

reactions from parents that the biggest problem in Honduras was *la política*—politics writ large, by which people meant the manner in which politicians and parties placed personal and partisan interests above the public interest.

Partisan encroachment prevents parents from trying to find teachers who will better respond to their children and community's needs. In the case studies presented in Chapters 6-8, parent leaders described efforts to remove teachers they felt were mediocre—either due to frequent absences or poor relationships with students and/or parents. PROHECO staff, however, rebuffed them because of those teachers' political connections. A PROHECO staff member in the capital recounted a series of embarrassing situations consistent with these accounts. On several occasions, frustrated parents contacted her, trying to circumvent local PROHECO staff to fire teachers with poor attendance and/or performance. After the promoters explained to her which politician was protecting each teacher, however, she felt powerless to act.<sup>139</sup>

Patronage makes teachers more accountable to promoters and the party than to parents, undermining a central tenet of PROHECO. One parent leader bemoaned that politicized hiring reduced his ability to sanction teachers for absences: “when a teacher is put in through political meddling, he pays less attention to parent leaders...When we hire, we're the real bosses.”<sup>140</sup> Parent hiring and oversight of teachers was supposed to be the defining characteristic of PROHECO, but patronage curtails the scope of parental action. Case studies showed how certain parents have resisted partisan attempts to remove teachers (see Chapters 6-8), but selecting new teachers remains the task of promoters and politicians.

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<sup>139</sup> PROHECO national technical assistant. Personal communication with author. November 6, 2009. Tegucigalpa, Honduras.


<sup>140</sup> Personal communication with author. October 2, 2009. Department of El Paraíso, Honduras.

Because promoters handle teacher selection as a partisan affair, they are also frequently satisfied with a parent council capable of only signing checks and forms. National staff members, for instance, reported their frustrations in trainings throughout the country, where many promoters simply filled in parents' learning materials, instead of teaching parents to perform tasks themselves. Training has also become less frequent—whereas they occurred annually in the program's early years, only one national training cycle occurred between 2006 and 2009. With fewer opportunities to learn their responsibilities and reinforce their knowledge, parents are less aware of how the program should operate.

The decline in parental responsibilities and autonomy has clear implications for the accountability framework promoted by CMS proponents. CMS advocates argue that these programs enhance parents' ability to hold service providers accountable for providing better services. PROHECO, though, shows how a country's political context can intervene in a program's actual operation, undermining the CMS accountability model. In PROHECO, patronage obstructs both the “long route” and the “short route” of accountability (see Figure 4). Regarding the “long route,” partisan hiring and protection of under-performing teachers prevents citizens from successfully appealing to higher authorities to honor their responsibility to communities. Here, patronage blocks the “compact” of the state to ensure effective service delivery from providers.

Regarding the “short route”—one of CMS' avowed principal benefits—the obstruction is even clearer: Where partisan politics dictates hiring decisions, parents and their school committees no longer have the degree of “client power” that CMS promised. Teachers may worry more about satisfying partisan demands than responding to parent leaders. In sum, pervasive patronage blocks the mechanisms through which advocates claimed that PROHECO would increase accountability in rural Honduran schools.

The reduction of parents' roles also makes spillovers on parents less likely. In his study of Mexican rural development programs, Fox (1994) argues that state actors can help foster autonomous civil society development in poor, remote areas. Where clientelism captures local program implementation, however, Fox finds that spillover effects on peasants became less likely. Evidence presented in subsequent chapters suggests that the same is true for PROHECO. While PROHECO's designers claimed the program would empower parents and strengthen civil society, patronage capture has reduced parents' roles and lessened PROHECO's impact on their civic and political engagement.



**Figure 4: Patronage Undermines CMS Advocates' Accountability Framework**

*Source: Compiled by author, based on diagram presented in Chapter One.*

This does not mean that PROHECO has not produced any positive impacts on parents. Survey research presented in Chapter Five shows that skills development and increases in participation do accrue to a non-trivial minority of parents. But the present analysis suggests that patronage politics has reduced the probability that PROHECO would achieve its secondary goal of fomenting greater civic participation among parents. This impact ultimately becomes a political consequence as much as a governance consequence. By encroaching on the autonomy of rural civil society organizations, PROHECO reduces the likelihood that parents in these communities will be able to scale up collective action to express their demands in a radically unequal society.

PRONADE, meanwhile, was reversed rather than captured. In Guatemala, the greater degree of polarization at the national and community levels proved critical to reform reversal. While Ganimian (2010) rightly notes that the greater scope and share of domestic funding in Guatemala made CMS more vulnerable to reversal than in Honduras, stronger union opposition in Guatemala—bolstered by accounts, echoed by non-labor actors, of infringement of labor rights and parent abuses—proved critical for overturning PRONADE. When Alvaro Colom signed an agreement with the teachers' union in exchange for campaign support, one union condition was that he assert his support for converting PRONADE schools to traditional public schools (Azpuru and Blanco 2008, 220).<sup>141</sup>

Moreover, unlike in PROHECO, the clientelistic benefits of PRONADE for legislators—limited to the selection of certain ISEs, which was minimized by President Berger's term—remained insufficient to create vested interests in the Congress. With a stronger push for reversal and fewer hurdles within Congress, it is unsurprising that PRONADE came to an end.

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<sup>141</sup> Also confirmed in interviews with Enrique Torres and Joviel Acevedo. *Op. cit.*

I have argued thus far that different political legacies circumscribed CMS implementation. But patronage capture and program reversal have ultimately produced similar results—namely, the decline of parental participation. In Honduras, PROHECO has survived, but patronage capture reduced parental autonomy and undermined accountability. Meanwhile, parents' responsibilities and training in PRONADE surpassed that in PROHECO, but PRONADE's disappearance undercut parent organizations. COEDUCAs became *Consejos de Padres de Familia* (Parent Councils, CPF) in mid-2009, with no more role in teacher selection or monitoring attendance. PRONADE's reversal, like PROHECO's patronage capture, has diminished the ability of community members—in the absence of supervision by education officials—to hold service providers (especially teachers) accountable for their performance. As subsequent chapters show, PRONADE's reversal has dramatically reduced parental involvement in the schools; teacher attendance in case study communities has already started to decline.

Meanwhile, President Colom's government continued to nominally support the notion of parental participation. Once PRONADE ended, then-Minister Ana de Molina created a new program, *Mi Familia Aprende* (My Family Learns, MFA), that provided training on values, nutrition, and community participation. But, in late 2009, the minister was replaced, and her successor, Bienvenido Argueta, discontinued MFA.<sup>142</sup> Parents in rural Guatemala then received no training, and virtually no school supervision, in 2010.

As in Honduras, Guatemalan parents have seen their roles decline dramatically, and they express frustration. Rogelio, a parent in one case study community, explained: "we don't have much participation in the school anymore, because the teacher decides on his own what to do." Across the case study communities presented in Chapters 6-8, parent

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<sup>142</sup> Liliana Aldana, former national director of MFA. Personal interview with author. March 26, 2010. Guatemala City, Guatemala. Frida Stwolinsky, former coordinator of MFA in Alta Verapaz. Personal interview with author. January 15, 2010. Cobán, Guatemala.

leaders repeatedly expressed dismay with their diminished capacity to make school-related decisions. In particular, where teacher attendance appears to be declining and ministry supervision has dwindled, parents lamented their loss of a sanctioning role. Whereas teachers previously needed parents' permission to miss work, as parents could deduct from their salaries for unexcused absences, parents now have no control. In a statement typical of my visits to communities in Alta Verapaz, one father lamented: "Today, the teachers didn't come, and we don't know why."

Moreover, even parents who complained that PRONADE imposed a heavy administrative burden on them preferred PRONADE to the current situation. In particular, these parents lamented that they no longer received training, and thus felt abandoned by the state. As Josué, a Guatemalan parent, explained: "It's true that it was hard, but we also learned. Now, we're resting more, but things have gone a bit downhill." As documented in Chapters Seven and Nine, as parent responsibilities have declined, so too have the frequency of meetings and broader level of activity. The time required to participate in the school council exhausted some parents, but many more expressed their current frustration.

With more limited roles, less training, and no other support from the state for parental participation, spillovers from parental participation since PRONADE's reversal became less likely. In Chapter Eight, I discuss the similarities between parental participation in ex-PRONADE schools and that in traditional Guatemalan schools. This discussion will illustrate how, as in most of these traditional schools, parental participation after PRONADE's reversal does not produce the learning- and networks-related impacts that I explore quantitatively and qualitatively in the remainder of the thesis. Reversal, then, like patronage capture, has reduced accountability in rural education provision, fueled

citizens' disenchantment with public institutions, and made spillovers from parental participation in rural schools less likely.

### **VIII. Conclusion**

Governments and international aid organizations usually present proposed governance and development initiatives without reference to politics. But these programs interact with strong political legacies, with downstream effects on how programs function. Thus, while CMS clearly reflects the increased attention to societal demands with each country's transition to democracy, the history behind each of these nascent democracies strongly impinged on CMS' ability to achieve its goals.

In Honduras, despite declining party identification and significant electoral reforms to increase political competition, the dominant parties still use patronage for a variety of ends, with serious consequences for CMS implementation and social policy more generally. In Guatemala, patronage has long been a less salient political factor, a trend that continued in CMS implementation. But, in the absence of pervasive patronage, polarization at the national and community levels in Guatemala played a major role in CMS's ultimate reversal. Patronage capture in Honduras and polarization in Guatemala have both reduced parents' roles and reduced the likelihood of the spillover effects on which this study focuses.

In PROHECO, the ruling party uses patronage to reward party activists with jobs and then relies on these state employees to strengthen party networks and support other partisan political initiatives. Moreover, PROHECO has become a site of geographic favoritism and partisan influence in new school allocation. The consequences are clear: Patronage in PROHECO protects and may even help expand the program, but it

simultaneously undermines the program's accountability framework. In most cases, then, PROHECO schools become a mechanism to strengthen the grip of Honduras' two ruling parties, which can undermine these schools' efforts to impart education and promote parental participation. By encroaching on parent councils' autonomy, patronage reduces the likelihood that these councils will have spillover effects on rural civil society.

PROHECO also reveals the limitations of political competition at the regime level for delivering sound governance. Democratization provided no guarantees of increased accountability or transparent program implementation. In the traditional education system, unions won a collusive arrangement that insulates teachers from partisan meddling once they have been selected. Meanwhile, in PROHECO—without a role for the unions and with diminished donor oversight—there now exists no check on the ruling party's monopolistic control of PROHECO hiring. This monopoly in program implementation is bad for governance and bad for democracy. Without better mechanisms for competition at the implementation level, PROHECO will continue to underperform.

In Guatemala, greater controversy surrounded CMS. Greater polarization, both at the national and community levels, fed the drive for PRONADE's reversal. At the national level, a more polarized ideological climate led to more spirited opposition from teachers' unions and NGOs defending the rights of teachers and poor, indigenous communities. At the community level, legacies of *finca* life contributed to teacher-parent conflict and widespread allegations of COEDUCA corruption. This latter form of polarization ultimately strengthened PRONADE's critics' hand and contributed to PRONADE's reversal.

Parental participation has thus now declined even more in Guatemala than in Honduras. The decline, however, came earlier in Honduras. Because of the timing, as well as the greater responsibilities and training given to parents in PRONADE (discussed in later chapters), I hypothesize that survey data presented in the next chapter—which was gathered before PRONADE's reversal—will reflect greater spillovers from parental participation in Guatemala than Honduras. Subsequent chapters will then consider qualitative data, including a discussion in Chapter Eight of the comparison between communities before and after PRONADE's reversal.

## 5. SURVEY EVIDENCE OF SPILLOVERS FROM COMMUNITY-MANAGED SCHOOLS

The previous chapter demonstrated how political context shaped the implementation of CMS in Honduras and Guatemala. I showed that patronage capture in Honduras and polarization leading to program reversal in Guatemala reduced parent councils' roles. I then argued that these phenomena made the types of spillover effects I described in Chapter Two less likely. To determine the strength of these obstacles, however, requires assessing the frequency with which spillovers actually occur. Below, I provide the first source of data—descriptive statistics from surveys of participants in CMS throughout rural Honduras and Alta Verapaz, Guatemala—to answer this question. This data supports my descriptions of the various obstacles to spillovers, as most participants do not reveal spillovers. But my research does reveal spillovers among a non-trivial minority of participating parents, suggesting that these obstacles to participation can be overcome.

Political scientists have long wondered whether civic participation can have spillover effects—that is, whether civic participation in one domain of public life can lead to more participation in other domains (Fox 1996; Pateman 1970; Barber 1984; Hilmer 2010; Mansbridge 1999). This chapter presents evidence from both countries that suggests that such spillover effects do occur. No doubt, context-based factors such as poverty, patronage dynamics, and low state support hinder participation and, by extension, spillover effects. But these surveys—rare in studies of participatory governance due to their broad coverage—indicate that these obstacles are not insurmountable. Once initiated, participation can lead to more participation. Not only do some participants

acquire skills necessary to participate in other group activities, but some actually apply such skills to other civic organizations and even join new organizations. This suggests that the supply of participation can be stimulated: PG can yield limited but nonetheless new forms of civic engagement, even where one least expects it.

In this chapter, I present descriptive statistics from a survey of CMS participants in Honduras and Guatemala. Among surveys of PG, this is one of the most comprehensive surveys of participants on record. Most previous studies of the impacts of participation on participants—introduced in Chapter Two—are based on relatively few cases, anecdotal evidence, or statistical analysis using data from relatively few locales (Mansbridge 1999; Wampler 2008). This survey marks an important departure because it provides data that cover all of rural Honduras and the entire Guatemalan department of Alta Verapaz, which had the greatest share—roughly 20 percent—of all CMS schools in the country. To my knowledge, no such national and cross-country survey of PG has been done before.

Furthermore, whereas many surveys limit themselves to urban and semi-urban regions, the data that I will be using targeted truly remote communities. Both rural Honduras and Alta Verapaz, Guatemala, are arguably the poorest areas in each country, and possibly among the poorest in the Americas. They are excellent examples of “brown areas” (O’Donnell 1993), where the state’s reach is minimal. Political scientists have long noted that “brown areas” suffer from democratic deficits, but few, if any, have explored scientifically the spillover impacts of PG in such zones. This survey study is one of the first to do so.

## I. Survey Design and Methodological Problems

The data I analyze come from surveys of members of parent councils at 285 schools across Honduras (n=1252 parents surveyed) and 150 schools in Alta Verapaz, Guatemala (n=819 parents surveyed). I was not the principal investigator for these surveys, but the principal investigators have allowed me access to the raw data because of my role in helping to coordinate the survey design and implementation process.

A few points about the survey sampling bear mention. First, the principal investigators initially envisioned national samples in both countries, but financial limitations dictated that the survey only cover one Guatemalan department. Alta Verapaz was selected because it had the highest number of PRONADE schools in Guatemala (see Figure 19 in Appendix B). Still, by choosing a Guatemalan department with such a high presence of CMS—in 2007, Alta Verapaz's 1,000 PRONADE schools were almost half the number of PROHECO schools in all of Honduras (Ganimian 2010, 23; MINEDUC and PRONADE 2007)—the survey data enables a cross-country comparison.

Second, because of its almost entirely indigenous population in rural areas, Alta Verapaz also served as a useful case to contrast with Honduras, where the percentage of indigenous respondents in the sample is much lower. Of course, it remains unfortunate that the Guatemalan data was limited to one department. Inter-regional comparisons—particularly between the Western Highlands and the Verapaces and the rest of the country—would be particularly interesting given the marked differences in demography (especially, indigenous population), the evolution of the state's presence, and the impact of the armed conflict. Chapter Three introduced the Alta Verapaz context in greater detail, but it bears consideration throughout this chapter that the Guatemala data come from a department with rural communities of predominantly indigenous (Q'eqchi', and

often monolingual) extraction, which have experienced repeated dispossession of land and domination by large farms. These communities have also suffered historical neglect by the state (except for conscription and military presence, which was historically high to ensure coffee production), and relatively low penetration by most social and charitable organizations (including guerrilla groups and their non-violent affiliates).

Third, in each country, the survey team used cluster sampling—typical for surveys covering remote rural areas, where randomization would render costs prohibitive—to select the schools where surveys took place. Table 5 (and Figures 20 and 21 in Appendix B) demonstrates that the regional distribution of schools in the Honduran sample mirrors the regional distribution of all PROHECO schools, with the sample-population disparity amounting to no greater than two percent.

**Table 5: Regional Distribution of PROHECO Schools, Sample and Population (Percentage)<sup>143</sup>**

	Population—Regional Distribution of PROHECO schools in 2005	Sample—Regional Distribution of Surveyed PROHECO schools
Central	19%	18%
North	19%	18%
West	35%	35%
East	21%	23%
South	5%	7%

*Source: Compiled by author from PROHECO internal statistics, "Estadísticas Educativas del PROHECO," dated June 7, 2005*

<sup>143</sup> This division of departments follows standard development reporting practice in Honduras used in Chapter Four (again, see UNDP 2006). Gracias a Dios and the Bay Islands remained excluded from the sample due to extreme remoteness and the very few PROHECO schools (less than one percent of the national total) located there.

Having dealt with these sampling issues, I now turn to how I used the survey data to seek evidence of spillovers. To measure the impact of school participation on civic and political behavior, ideally the surveys would have compared the treatment groups (participating parents in CMS communities) with a control group (either parents in otherwise comparable communities or randomly selected non-participating parents within the same communities). Given the lack of a clear sampling frame to identify comparable communities and the difficulty of identifying non-participating groups, the survey team opted for a second-best approach—to ask parents about their participation in community life before and after joining the school councils. Given that the reforms were well underway by the time the survey was conceived, the team lacked baseline data. Instead, the survey relied on establishing retrospective assessments—piloted in each country to ensure data reliability—to establish how the subject had changed (behaviorally and attitudinally) since he or she started participating in the school council. Thus, while the principal investigators did not devise the survey with a political capabilities framework in mind, many survey questions were useful for my analysis.

Of course, assessment of the causal impacts of state actions on the rise of civil society is complicated by many factors, including the likelihood that state policies respond to conditions in the communities. For example, the state might intervene in villages with greater rather than less civic involvement. Nonetheless, this type of endogeneity problem is less relevant for this survey, given that both governments explicitly targeted the most marginalized rural communities.

In the absence of randomly assigned experiments, the estimation of causal effects of a specific initiative relies upon the identification of valid comparison groups. Parental activities in the participating villages prior to the intervention provide the most

promising, albeit imperfect, baseline. Before/after comparisons thus form the survey's core.

Still, the recall-based survey data alone remains insufficient to prove causation.<sup>144</sup> In particular, while the survey measured differences in civic and political participation before and after joining the school council, the data provide no way to determine whether other stimuli account for changes within communities. To account for this potential "omitted variable bias," my study uses the survey data to provide evidence of the frequency of spillovers (this chapter) and correlational evidence regarding the explanatory factors that account for divergent outcomes (Chapter Nine). Following scholars like Brady and Collier (2004) and George and Bennett (2005), I then use qualitative evidence, presented in the remaining chapters, to check and solidify quantitatively-derived claims, in this case about the incidence of spillovers and the factors that account for them. Where, for instance, quantitative and case study findings suggest similar spillover outcomes or relationships between variables, this would provide a strong empirical foundation for causal claims.

## **II. Dependent variables**

I was primarily interested in capturing changes in participants' civic and political behavior after their participation in school councils. Broadly, I wanted to know to what degree participation in the school council led to more participation in other domains of civic life.

Chapter Two explained the political capabilities approach adopted in this thesis and this study's strategy to operationalize it. I will thus not cover that ground here. I will,

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<sup>144</sup> On potential problems with recall data, see Hill 1984.

however, briefly enumerate the outcomes of interest for this study justified in those earlier chapters. As I have argued in previous chapters, any political capabilities analysis must focus on the specific country context(s) in question. In Honduras, in Chapter Three I have shown the historical weakness of rural civil society, with organizations frequently co-opted by the country's two dominant political parties (Sieder 1995). Meanwhile, in Guatemala (and particularly in Alta Verapaz), the state and economic elites often repressed rural Guatemalans, making it very difficult for them to organize themselves. Centuries of radical economic, social, and political exclusion led to most rural (primarily indigenous) Guatemalans—even more than their Honduran counterparts—lacking the formal education, skills, and opportunities to engage in civic life. Even after democratic transitions in both countries, these rural citizens' efforts at such engagement confront them with a system of political competition (controlled mostly by men) in which they remain deeply disadvantaged and with which they have become increasingly disillusioned (see Chapters Three and Four).

Rural citizens, then, face sharp constraints on their individual capacity to participate in, lead, and/or form community organizations. Conservative gender norms also restrict female participation. Furthermore, on a community level, where organizations do exist, they face domination by the state or party networks. Finally, because of classic collective action problems (such as barriers to communication and transportation, as well as free-rider problems), inter-community alliances are quite rare.

In this context, my political capabilities analysis centers on the following individual-level outcomes, summarized in Table 6. Regarding political learning and changes in political networks, I will focus on whether CMS provides citizens with transferrable organizational and political skills, as well as confidence to participate in civic organizations. I also focus on whether 1) CMS attracts previous non-participants in

community organizations, and, since joining the school council, whether council members 2) participate in more organizations, 3) have increased the intensity of their participation, and/or 4) have become leaders or founders of new organizations.

At the community level, my analysis will center on whether the capacity and scope of existing organizations have changed and whether more organizations have emerged in these communities since CMS's inception. I will then determine whether new organizations' creation was attributable to the CMS experience before analyzing their role, relative autonomy, and impact. Finally, regarding patterns of political representation, I will parse out how CMS councils and subsequently-formed organizations interact with a broader pattern of state-created and -dominated community organizations in both countries, as well as the particularities of patronage politics in Honduras. I will also discuss whether CMS facilitates alliances with other organizations and communities and challenges gender inequality in these communities.

In this chapter, I use survey data to explore individual learning and networks outcomes. Table 7 summarizes the key survey data that I used to capture changes in parents' civic and political behavior since joining the school council: 1) gaining skills for participating in civic organizations within communities (what I deem "organizational skills," such as how to organize a meeting) and for linking these organizations with external actors (what I deem "political skills," such as how to submit a proposal to government), 2) applying these skills in other organizations, 3) increasing participation and leadership in organizations outside the school council, 4) increasing the frequency of engaging in certain types of political behavior, and 5) councils forming alliances with other organizations.

**Table 6: Indicators for Political Capabilities Development**

<b>Category</b>	<b>Measurement: Changes Since Joining the School Council</b>
<i>Learning</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Organizational learning—e.g., learning to organize meetings and make a budget</li> <li>• Gaining confidence in one's ability to participate in and/or lead an organization</li> <li>• Political learning—learning about one's rights and/or the rules of the game for interacting with the state</li> <li>• Applying administrative or political learning to another organization</li> </ul>
<i>Networks</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Attracting new participants—members with no previous involvement in community organizations</li> <li>• Achieving more active participation—greater intensity or greater number of organizations</li> <li>• Leading other organization(s)</li> <li>• Creating other organization(s)</li> <li>• Forming inter-organizational alliances</li> </ul>
<i>Patterns of Political Representation</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Building inter-community alliances</li> <li>• Challenging clientelistic patterns</li> <li>• Challenging male domination</li> </ul>

**Table 7: Dependent Variables of Interest From Survey Data**

<b>Category</b>	<b>Measurement: Changes Since Joining the School Council</b>
<i>Learning</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Gaining organizational skills: 1) knowing how to participate in a meeting, 2) calling a meeting, and 3) making a budget</li> <li>• Gaining political skills: 1) managing and attracting support for a project and 2) complain to or petition the state</li> <li>• Applying skills to another organization</li> </ul>
<i>Networks</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Participating actively in more organizations</li> <li>• Increasing frequency of organizing community meetings</li> <li>• Increasing frequency of petitioning or visiting government offices to make a request</li> <li>• Becoming a leader of other organizations after joining the school council</li> <li>• Creating another organization after joining the school council</li> <li>• Councils forming alliances with other civic organizations</li> </ul>


With respect to the political capabilities framework, these outcomes remain incomplete. In particular, they do not provide evidence regarding community-level networks outcomes and patterns of political representation. These limitations exist because the survey's creators did not design it with a political capabilities framework in mind and because certain issues (such as patterns of political representation) would be very difficult to explore using individual surveys. Qualitative evidence, presented in subsequent chapters, will speak to the full range of issues raised by the political capabilities framework and provide a stronger foundation for interpretation. Still, the dataset provides useful evidence regarding learning and networks, two critical components of the political capabilities framework, across statistically representative samples for Honduras and Alta Verapaz. The following sections thus provide an important starting point for an empirical discussion of CMS and its impacts on parents' civic and political behavior.

### **III. Obstacles to Spillovers**

Consistent with the theoretical literature, my research confirms the existence of acute obstacles to civic and political engagement in most CMS communities: geographical remoteness, material resource scarcity, low levels of education, and human insecurity. Furthermore, in Alta Verapaz—one of the departments hardest hit by Guatemala's armed conflict and genocide in the 1960s-1980s—levels of civic and political engagement (especially the propensity to vote) were low (see Chapter Three).

To gauge individual/household socio-economic levels—one of the most serious impediments to civic and political engagement (Brady, Verba, and Schlozman 1995)—the survey asked respondents to report whether their households possessed any of the

following assets: 1) refrigerator, 2) stove, 3) television, 4) radio/sound system, 5) landline telephone, 6) cellular telephone, 7) car, 8) bicycle, 9) computer, 10) internet, 11) cattle, 12) horses/mules, and 13) chickens. I created a simple additive assets index, with ownership of each type of asset adding a value of one (see Figure 5 and Table 8 for the country distributions and a comparison of the medians).<sup>145</sup> I found widespread material poverty in both samples, especially in Alta Verapaz.<sup>146</sup> Respondents' median number of assets was just over three in Honduras and two in Guatemala. Chickens, radios, and cellular phones were the most commonly held assets in both samples. Virtually no one surveyed in either country owned costly items such as cars or computers.



**Figure 5: Distribution of Assets Per Household, Both Countries**

<sup>145</sup> One might be concerned about the equal weighting of these assets. For instance, someone with only a car, computer, and cattle would rank the same as someone with chickens, a cellular phone, and a bicycle. Both data sets, however, revealed much higher median asset levels among those with more costly items, including refrigerators, televisions, cars, and cattle. Respondents with the expensive items virtually all had the principal lower-value items, as chickens and cellular phones. Correlations between the uncommon, high-value items and the low-cost items were virtually all low (between  $-.2$  and  $.2$ ) and positive in sign, suggesting that the concern about substitution between goods proves unwarranted.

<sup>146</sup> Except where otherwise noted, all differences between country means and proportions are statistically significant at a  $.05$  significance level. Most are significant at the  $.01$ , as well. See Table 12 for more detail.


**Table 8: Difference in Asset Index Medians by Country (non-parametric k-sample test)**

Country	Greater than the median?		Yes	Percentage	Total	Percentage
	No	Percentage				
Honduras	711	57	541	43	1252	100
Guatemala	727	89	92	11	819	100
Observations	1438		633		2,071	100

Pearson chi-squared (continuity corrected) = 237.06  $p < 0.001$

To gauge community socio-economic levels, the survey recorded whether the visited communities had any of the following local services: 1) potable water, 2) electricity, 3) sewage system, 4) latrines, 5) access to public transportation, 6) postal service, 7) public library, 8) police, and 9) nursery. Figure 6 shows the comparative distribution of local services in both samples. As with the data on assets, data on local services convey high levels of deprivation. Virtually none of the sampled communities had a postal service, police, or a public library. Many, though, had latrines and potable water. Also, as with assets, I found more services for the Honduran sample, though only the differences in the first two services displayed below are statistically significant.<sup>147</sup>

<sup>147</sup> The Honduran socioeconomic data also revealed inter-regional variation, with the Eastern and Western region showing the greater socioeconomic disadvantages. Parents in the West and East demonstrated lower assets than the national average, parents in the West showed lower education levels, and communities in the East possessed the lowest community services. Meanwhile, the sub-samples from the other three regions were all roughly equal to, or greater than, the overall averages for these indicators. Respondents in the East and West, then, appear to be the most materially deprived (which is consistent with the data from UNDP 2006) and the most comparable to Alta Verapaz.



**Figure 6: Community Services Means, by Type of Service and Country, with Confidence Intervals (95%)**

Literacy and education levels were also low, especially in Alta Verapaz: 16 percent of Honduran respondents and 43 percent of Guatemalan respondents self-identified as illiterate. Moreover, the median years of schooling was four in Honduras and three in Guatemala (Figure 7 and Table 9). Interestingly, education levels were not strongly correlated with economic level (as measured by the assets index) in either country. This suggests that these components of socioeconomic level merit individual attention—an important point for case study and regression analysis in subsequent chapters. Overall, however, these data suggest lower socioeconomic status among the respondents in Alta Verapaz than in Honduras.




Figure 7: Distribution of Years of Schooling for Respondents in Both Countries

Table 9: Difference in Country Medians for Years of Schooling (non-parametric k-sample test)

Country	Greater than the median?				Total	Percentage
	No	Percentage	Yes	Percentage		
Honduras	585	47	653	53	1238	100
Guatemala	481	60	322	40	803	100
Observations	1066		975		2,041	100

Pearson chi-squared (continuity corrected) = 30.7182  $p < 0.001$

In addition to low socioeconomic status, multiple pilots and subsequent qualitative research revealed that participants face high transportation costs: distances are long, roads are in disrepair or nonexistent, and vehicles remain scarce. The survey evidence bore out this remoteness. In the Honduran sample, the median distance to the schools from the municipal center was 45 minutes, though the dataset likely underestimated this result due to missing data on school location for 55 schools. In Alta Verapaz, the median distance was 80 minutes. Remoteness increased during rainy season, when the

medians were, respectively, 60 and 110 minutes. Moreover, these times were for those with cars or motorcycles, while most members of these communities have neither. Transportation costs further hinder collective action; case studies indicate the high cost and time burden for parents to come together to create other organizations or form networks with other communities.

This section has thus far focused on material obstacles to spillovers. But significant program-related factors also pose obstacles to participation spillovers.<sup>148</sup> I discuss these in greater detail in Chapters Four and Seven, so for now I will simply list them:

- Insufficient project resources, as manifested by insufficient training for parent council members and a high turnover rate of local project administrators (“promoters”);
- CMS’ administrative focus: in both countries, the programs’ aimed to create a functional administrative unit, with less focus on generating greater civic and political participation among parents;
- Weak Decentralization—very limited role for the municipalities and minimal supervision from departmental and district level; and
- Patronage in Honduras and polarization and reversal in Guatemala.

Given these obstacles at the individual level (low schooling), household level (asset scarcity), community level (local services shortage, geographical remoteness), and program level (CMS’ institutional deficiencies), the survey was clearly testing whether spillovers were possible in “least likely” environments. These were very poor and isolated communities inhabited by people with rudimentary supplies of physical and

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<sup>148</sup> One might be concerned about a possible endogeneity problem in the assertion that these deficiencies in the programs explain the lack of spillovers. My research, however, suggests that these factors are temporally antecedent to, and exogenous of (rather than being the results of), the outcomes whose frequencies I describe in the following sections.

human capital, participating in often poorly-run PG initiatives and facing serious communication barriers. By most theoretical accounts, the probability of finding vibrant civic life emanating from these cases is low.

#### IV. Evidence of Expanding Capabilities

Despite all these obstacles, the survey produced evidence of increased civic and political engagement among some participating parents. Naturally, I did not expect to find evidence of rising civic and political engagement among *all* participants, not even a majority. In addition, I hypothesized that more onerous types of new participation, such as forming alliances with members of other organizations, would occur less frequently than less onerous types like learning how to run a meeting. These two expectations were confirmed. Spillover effects occur among a minority of participants, and the incidence of spillovers varies according to type of activity. I begin by presenting data from the least onerous to the most onerous form of spillover effect.

##### *A. Learning*

The most prevalent spillover outcome was the acquisition of new skills—how to make a budget, to organize and conduct a meeting, to propose and manage a project, and to contact the government. This set of skills is important because it attests to individuals' capacity to participate effectively in community organizations and interact with external actors.<sup>149</sup>

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
<sup>149</sup> The skills I capture bear some resemblance to the “civic skills” explored by Brady, Verba, and Schlozman (1995), but their definition is primarily geared towards participation in electoral politics. I distinguish between organizational learning (related to transferable skills for participation in civic organizations of various kinds) and political learning (primarily related to skills for engaging with state actors).

Seventy-seven percent of Guatemalan respondents and 53 percent of Honduran respondents reported learning at least one skill (Figure 8). In addition, 34 percent of Guatemalan respondents and 26 percent of Honduran respondents reported applying learned skills to participation in other organizations (see Figure 9).<sup>150</sup>

Training provides the most obvious explanation for the higher figures for learning and skills application in Guatemala. Whereas less than 50 percent of the Honduran sample received training, over 60 percent of the Guatemalan sample did. Furthermore, as I will discuss in subsequent chapters, PRONADE trainings were much more regular and in-depth than PROHECO trainings. My review of PRONADE manuals and interviews with program staff and parent leaders revealed that PRONADE mandated six to nine full days of annual training for the three principal COEDUCA leaders, while, during many years, PROHECO did not offer parents any training whatsoever. The cross-country disparity may also reflect a "ceiling effect"—since the Honduran sample mean for initial skills was higher than the Guatemalan mean (2.6 vs. 1.3 out of 5, with a statistically significant difference), more room for increases existed in the Guatemalan sample.


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<sup>150</sup> One could argue that certain respondents' responses that they learned skills—without a follow-up question or activity to demonstrate these new skills—may generate some false positives. The datasets provided few ways to conduct this check, but qualitative analysis will help check these findings.



**Figure 8: Proportion of Respondents Reporting Increased Skills, Both Countries, with Confidence Intervals (95%)**

*Source: author's tabulation of whether respondent had an aggregate gain in at least one of five listed skills since joining the school council (from Survey Questions 24a-e and 41a-e).<sup>151</sup>*




**Figure 9: Proportion of Respondents Reporting Skills Application, Both Countries, with Confidence Intervals (95%)**

*Source: Responses to Survey Question 42: Have you tried to use anything that you have learned in the school council to contribute to another social or political organization?*

<sup>151</sup> See Appendix C for precise wording of survey questions.


The prevalence and changes in skills also differed by type. Figures 10 and 11 summarize these results. The less taxing organizational skills—knowing how to participate in a meeting and call a meeting—had higher baseline levels in both samples, and virtually all surveyed parents reported possessing these skills by the time of the survey. Far fewer parents in each country initially possessed the more technical skill of making a budget, though the Guatemalan sample overcame its initial deficit in this skill to reveal a higher present rate. In these three organizational skills, the Guatemalan sample's baseline levels were significantly lower than the Honduran sample's. By the time of the survey, however, Guatemalan parents had caught up to, or exceeded, the organizational skills possessed by their Honduran counterparts.

Political skills—i.e., those involving engaging external actors—generally revealed lower initial prevalence than the organizational skills. This was especially true in Guatemala, where roughly one-tenth of the sample knew how to either 1) manage or seek support for a project or 2) complain to or petition for help from government. These lower baselines are unsurprising, given the greater barriers to participation beyond one's community. The Guatemala data, in particular, appear to reflect the historical exclusion of Q'eqchi' peasants by the government—external support was not forthcoming to these areas, and Q'eqchi' peasants felt (and often continue to feel) that government offices were run by Ladinos, for Ladinos. By the time of the survey, roughly half of both country samples reported possessing these political skills, with the most significant improvement in Guatemala. As with organizational skills, the data for political learning reflect greater dynamism in Guatemala. Still, the political skills figure continue to lag behind the organizational skills in both countries, revealing a greater deficit among these parents in building links between community organizations and external actors. This likely reinforces the collective action problems faced by peasants in remote areas.



**Figure 10: Organizational Skills, Past and Present, Both Countries, with Confidence Intervals (95%)**

*Source: author's tabulation of whether respondent had an aggregate gain in each listed skill since joining the school council (Survey Questions 24a-c and 41a-c).*



**Figure 11: Political Skills, Past and Present, Both Countries, with Confidence Intervals (95%)**

*Source: author's tabulation of whether respondent had an aggregate gain in each listed skill since joining the school council (Survey Questions 24d-e and 41d-e).*

### B. *Joining, Leading, and Founding Other Organizations*

The evidence for joining other organizations is more complicated to assess. On the positive side, over 25 percent of respondents in both countries reported actively participating in at least one more non-school-related group than they did before joining the school council. Nonetheless, roughly similar numbers of respondents reported declines in their overall group participation and governance organization participation (see Figure 12). In addition, there were more declines than increases for various group types in both countries. The findings revealed more increases for Guatemala than in Honduras.

Finally, the greatest increases occurred in community council participation (*patronato comunal* in Honduras, COCODE in Guatemala)—13 percent of all respondents in Honduras and 18 percent in Guatemala. This suggests that a large proportion of CMS spillovers went into these community councils. Decreases were also highest among these community councils (12 percent in Honduras, 13 percent in Guatemala), suggesting that many CMS participants had prior, formative experiences in the community councils. I corroborate both of these findings in the case studies presented in Chapters Six through Eight.

The key difficulty in identifying the effect on participation in other organizations is the lack of a valid comparison group that could provide a counterfactual estimate of how participation would have evolved in the absence of the parent councils. Consequently, I look deeper into the patterns of participation by a number of factors, including the timing of parent council involvement. One possible explanation for the incidence of declining civic participation among some respondents may be the time and resource burden—namely, the possibility that the time and energy required of participants in


school councils leaves less time, energy, and resources to participate in other organizations. If this were the case, one would expect current council members to show fewer increases than former members. Figure 13 bears this out for Guatemala—comparing former members with current members, approximately 10 percent more former members report an increase in participation in other organizations; this difference is statistically significant at the .01 level. Among former council members, the ratio of respondents with increased group participation to those with decreased group participation is roughly two to one. Among current council members, the ratio is roughly one to one. This provides evidence that the time and resource burden of parent council involvement reduce civic participation in other spheres, a hypothesis I will probe further in Chapter Nine.<sup>152</sup>



**Figure 12: Changes in Participation in Other Organizations, by Country, with Confidence Intervals (95%)**

*Source: author's tabulation of changes in the number of organizations in which parents participated since joining the school council (Survey Questions 29 and 30).*

<sup>152</sup> I could not perform this test for the Honduran data set, as the survey team was not able to survey a sufficient number of previous council members. Survey teams reported that many of the communities visited had either very few or no former members, often because of low council turnover. See Chapters Seven and Nine for more on this.



**Figure 13: Change in Group Participation in Guatemala, by School Council Status, Confidence Intervals (95%)**

*Source: author's tabulation of changes in the number of organizations in which parents participated since joining the council, separated by current and former members (Survey Questions 29 and 30, separated by Question 14).*

Moreover, data in each country support the notion of a "ceiling effect" on participation. In the small, rural communities in which CMS created schools, an upper bound (or ceiling) likely exists for how many organizations can co-exist at any given time. Limited time and resources of poor peasants also constrain the number of organizations in which they can participate, suggesting that those who participate in more groups initially are less likely to increase—and more likely to decrease—their participation in other groups.<sup>153</sup> This is even more true because the survey asked about all the past groups in which a person had *ever* participated, while the figure for the present marks the number of groups in which she participated at one moment in time.

<sup>153</sup> This "ceiling effect" is similar to the concept of diminishing returns, but perhaps more specific because it considers the possibility of negative returns—i.e., cases where individuals reduce their participation in other organizations to become active in the school council.

I tested the “ceiling effect” proposition by plotting prior group participation against changes in group participation. Table 10 shows that council members who had participated in more organizations before joining the council were more likely to reduce subsequent participation and less likely to increase it. In Honduras, the data fully bears out this hypothesis, with the greatest increases among prior non-participants, and the greatest declines among those who had participated in three or more groups beforehand. In Guatemala (see Table 11), the trend held when comparing those who had participated in zero, one, or two groups—those who participated in zero groups proved far more likely to increase post-school-council participation than those who had participated in one or two groups. Those who had participated in three or more groups, however, showed a similar likelihood of reporting increased participation in other groups as those with no prior participation. Thus, in Guatemala, a group of high prior participants increased their participation in other organizations, a finding that merits exploration in qualitative case studies.

**Table 10: Changes in Group Participation in Honduras, by Initial Group Participation**

	Decrease	No Change	Increase	Total
No Past Group	0%	60%	40%	100% (329)
1 Past Group	20%	49%	31%	100% (322)
2 Past Groups	35%	46%	20%	100% (230)
3+ Past Groups	59%	29%	11%	100% (214)
Total	25%	48%	27%	100% (1095)

Pearson chi-squared = 269.87  $p < .0001$

*Source: author's tabulation of changes in the number of organizations in which Honduran respondents participated since joining the school council, separated by the initial number of groups in which the parent participated (Survey Questions 29 and 30).*

**Table 11: Changes in Group Participation in Guatemala, by Initial Group Participation**

	Decrease	No Change	Increase	Total
No Past Group	0%	65%	35%	100% (221)
1 Past Group	26%	46%	29%	100% (237)
2 Past Groups	45%	34%	20%	100% (143)
3+ Past Groups	32%	29%	38%	100% (143)
Total	23%	46%	31%	100% (744)
Pearson chi-squared = 127.56 p < .0001				

*Source: author's tabulation of changes in the number of organizations in which Guatemalan respondents participated since joining the school council, separated by the initial number of groups in which the parent participated (Survey Questions 29 and 30).*

The survey also asked about the type of new participation in other organizations. Did parents become ordinary members of other organizations, or did they assume leadership positions? Consistent with my hypothesis, the incidence of more taxing forms of civic and political behavior was lower than the incidence of less taxing activities. For instance, when the survey asked parents whether they were currently leaders of other organizations, 58 percent in Honduras responded affirmatively (for Guatemala, the data for this question were incomplete). Nonetheless, only 17 percent of all respondents reported becoming leaders in other organizations *after* joining the school councils. Most respondents reporting leadership positions elsewhere assumed those positions either before or in the same year they joined the school council. Thus, most contemporaneous leadership roles in other organizations could not be attributed to school council participation.

Furthermore, among Honduran respondents who had never previously participated actively in another organization (30 percent of the entire Honduran sample), only nine percent reported becoming leaders of another organization after joining the school council. This suggests that, while school councils may involve substantial numbers of new participants in a community's organizational life, these structures rarely transformed people with no leadership experience into new leaders. Consistent with Nylen's (2002) analysis of Brazilian participatory budgeting, school council leaders with prior organizational experience appear more likely to increase or sustain their previous levels of engagement outside the school council. I further explore this hypothesis in the remaining chapters.

Founding a new organization after joining the school council and forging alliances with other organizations—two of the most burdensome forms of spillover effects—occurred even less frequently. Roughly five percent of respondents in each country reported creating another organization, and roughly ten percent reported an inter-organizational alliance. Neither difference was statistically significant (see Table 12).

Incidence of demand-making on the state is also low. Individuals report a median of one school council proposal to local government on behalf of the school in the past two years and the same figure for community council proposals on behalf of the community.<sup>154</sup> Given both the lack of explicit state promotion of demand-making and the low probability of successful response from the state in these areas, these low numbers are not surprising.

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<sup>154</sup> The data reveal significant variation within schools in reported number of proposals, suggesting differing levels of involvement and information among council members. I explore demand-making qualitatively in subsequent sections.

### *C. Political activity*


The survey also included data on changes in both electoral and non-electoral political behavior, though these measures were only available for the Honduran survey.<sup>155</sup> In Figure 14, I report the findings for two non-electoral measures: organizing meetings in the community and petitioning or visiting government offices to make a request. Here, similar to the data for joining other organizations, the results suggest an increased frequency of organizing community meetings and petitioning government among roughly a quarter of respondents, while a smaller percentage indicated a decline. While the vast majority of respondents reported “no change” in their frequency of these types of behavior, it remains notable that a non-trivial minority increased their involvement in these activities and that a greater percentage reported an increase than a decrease. Among those who organized community meetings or petitioned government less after participating in the school council, one possible hypothesis is fatigue, a hypothesis I explore further in Chapter Nine.

Regarding electoral political participation, results showed few positive changes. If anything, parents in both countries reported declining interest in politics and declining frequency of voting. Given the generally apolitical nature of CMS in these countries—neither program sought to, or created a mechanism for, affecting such behaviors—entrenched political abstentionism in Guatemala, and strong party alignments in

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<sup>155</sup> In each country, the survey exercise was preceded by training the enumerators to ensure consistency and followed up by a debriefing exercise with the country survey team. The latter enabled the researchers to identify any questions for which the data might be problematic. This was the case for the political behavior questions in Guatemala (questions 25 and 35), where a combination of factors (e.g., sensitivity of certain parts of the question and inconsistencies in translating the terms being used) seemed to produce non-credible responses. I thus report only the Honduran data for these questions, for which no similar problems came to light during the debriefing exercise.

Honduras, I neither expected nor found parental involvement yielding major changes in electoral political participation.



**Figure 14: Change in Frequency of Organizing Meetings and Visiting or Petitioning Government, Honduras Only, with Confidence Intervals (95%)**

*Source: author's tabulation of changes in the frequency of organizing community meetings (Survey Questions 25a and 35a) and visiting or petitioning government offices (Survey Questions 25b and 35b)*

## V. Recap: Changes in Outcomes

As hypothesized, the relative frequency of spillovers to parental participation differs by type of behavior: the more burdensome the new type of participation, the more infrequent its occurrence. Skills acquisition proved the most widespread spillover effect. Substantially fewer respondents in both countries reported substantial changes in building civic organizations and networks and changing political behavior. Table 12 provides a summary of the data presented above.


**Table 12: Frequency of Increases in Dependent Variables**

Dependent Variables	Guatemala (percent)	Honduras (percent)
<i>Learning</i>		
Skills Change	77*** <sup>156</sup>	53
Skills Application in Other Organization	34***	26
<i>Networks</i>		
Becoming an Active Participant in Another Organization After Joining School Council <i>(declines in parentheses)</i>	31** (23) <sup>157</sup>	27 (25)
Being a Member of Another Leadership Group After Joining	-	17
Creating a New Organization After Joining School Council	3	4
Alliances with Other Organizations	10	11
Increased Frequency of Organizing Community Meetings <i>(declines in parentheses)</i>	-	27 (17)
Increased Frequency of Petition or Visit Government Offices to Make a Request <i>(declines in parentheses)</i>	-	22 (15)

Figure 15 then depicts this relationship between type of new participation and frequency. It ranks different types of civic and political engagement from the most onerous or taxing on a given individual (at the top) to the least onerous or taxing (at the bottom). The triangle in the background captures the likely frequency: incidence of engagement declines as one moves up the list of spillover effects. The pyramid figure captures an inverse relationship between frequency and likely impact—the most onerous and potentially significant changes occur least frequently.

<sup>156</sup> \* indicates  $p \leq 0.1$  in the difference between country sample means or proportions. \*\* indicates  $p \leq 0.05$ . \*\*\* indicates  $p \leq 0.01$ .

<sup>157</sup> Differences for decreases and no change were not statistically significant.



**Figure 15: Relative Likelihood of Behavioral Spillovers to Participation<sup>158</sup>**

## **VI. Gender: Does CMS Change or Reflect Gender Roles?**

Finally, gender participation differs between the two samples. In the Guatemala sample, only 4.5 percent of the respondents were women, which is consistent with the finding that at least 81 percent of school councils had no active female participants.<sup>159</sup> This

<sup>158</sup> This figure focuses on spillover effects that could strengthen civil society, following the argument in Chapter Two. As mentioned, it does not include potential impacts on electoral political behavior, however, as the survey data provides little evidence on which to assess this. For CMS, it was certainly an unlikely outcome (it would be near the top of the pyramid), but other PG initiatives—more tied to electoral politics—could have a greater electoral impact.

<sup>159</sup> The number may be moderately skewed, as the dataset lacked data for this question for approximately 10 percent of the Alta Verapaz schools. Case studies, though, confirm gender-based exclusion (see Chapter Seven).

contrasts with Honduras, where 39 percent of respondents were female, with only 13 percent of councils reporting male-only membership.

The lower female participation in Alta Verapaz reflects the more pervasive *machismo*/patriarchy in Q'eqchi' communities, which is reinforced by the lower levels of education and proficiency in Spanish among women. I discuss these issues further in Chapters Seven and Nine, but for now it bears mention that CMS in Guatemala appears to have little short-term impact on gender roles in its host communities—CMS there simply reflect or reinforce, rather than alter, prevailing levels of patriarchy. Meanwhile, evidence presented in subsequent chapters suggests that, while CMS in Honduras has generated greater space for female participation, this participation remains nominal. In most cases, men retain decision-making power, while women remain marginal to these organizations' leadership structures. In subsequent chapters, I will assess whether the frequency and type of spillovers from participation differ for male and female participants.

## **VII. Conclusion**

Overall, the results for spillovers in both countries followed similar patterns, though the frequencies of certain outcomes (especially learning) were higher in the Guatemalan sample. In both countries, a non-trivial minority reported becoming more engaged in other forms of participation after joining school councils. These spillover effects occur despite daunting obstacles for participation at the individual, household and community levels. I also find, in both countries, that less onerous forms of participation such as acquiring and applying new skills or joining other organizations are more frequent than more onerous activities such as demand-making to government, creating new

organizations, or forming ties with other groups. Frequencies of this latter type of engagement are equally low for both countries.

There are also important cross-country differences that prove difficult to explain through the quantitative data alone. Regarding learning, the greater gains reported in Guatemala partly reflect the lower baseline skills levels and the more constricted scale in the Honduran data (four valid data points, as opposed to five in Guatemala) for several key questions. But the greater frequency and duration of parent training, as well as the greater responsibilities given to PRONADE parents, provides another likely explanation for the greater learning and skills application in Guatemala. Chapter Nine will explore hypotheses related to training and the degree of parental involvement in greater detail.

Overall, the survey data demonstrate that participation can have spillover effects. Participating in one domain of civic life can awaken the desire and capacity to participate in other realms, even among individuals with scarce history of participation, and in communities where participation is costly. This is not, however, an automatic outcome; only a minority of participants report spillover effects. Subsequent chapters will probe these outcomes with qualitative analysis.

It bears reiterating that the survey data presented in this chapter alone cannot fully allay concerns about a possible “omitted variable bias,” where some other unobserved variable could be causing the before/after changes recorded in the surveys. Here, the qualitative analysis presented in subsequent chapters will prove especially helpful, as the heterogeneous types of data collected for each case study will help to better understand 1) how parents’ civic and political behaviors have changed over time and 2) whether such changes are, indeed, attributable to CMS participation. Because the case studies are based on close examination of each community—including the other organizations and

government initiatives that could have also generated spillovers—they will prove useful for weighing alternative explanations for the outcomes identified in the survey data.

Mixing methods will also help to specify and corroborate the determinants of these behavioral changes, both within and between countries. Chapter Nine will thus combine case study and multivariate regression analysis to assess the relative weight of four key possible explanations—baseline individual characteristics, state support, levels of individual participation, and how effective and democratic councils are. I will also assess the time- and resource-burden factors—namely, the extent to which participation in the school council may crowd out participation in other groups in the short term.

In short, the evidence in this chapter indicates that participation is not always a dead-end affair, but rather can be the start of new forms of civic engagement for some individuals. My task in the chapters that follow will be to interpret these outcomes, rule out alternative explanations, and identify the factors that explain when spillovers occur, and when they do not.

## 6. INTRODUCTION TO THE CASE STUDIES

This chapter introduces the case studies I conducted to address whether and how CMS affects participating parents' civic and political behavior. The qualitative discussion here and in the following two chapters begins from the same point of departure as Chapter Five—analyzing the incidence of certain behavioral changes among parents as a result of parent council participation. But these chapters go beyond quantitative analysis by exploring 1) additional factors omitted from the survey, 2) the specific ways in which CMS participation affected individuals in particular communities, and 3) community-level, rather than individual-level, effects. These are all critical features of the broader political capabilities analysis that this thesis aims to provide. Qualitative analysis will enable me to explore in greater depth whether and how CMS may provide parents with skills, experiences, and a forum for participation that strengthen their ability to engage with state actors and organize themselves for collective ends. Qualitative analysis will thus help address my central—essentially qualitative—research question: does CMS strengthen civil society and improve the quality of democracy in remote rural communities?

This chapter introduces the following two chapters, which present the case studies in detail. First, however, I expand on the methodological discussion in Chapter Two by providing greater detail on why a qualitative approach proved so crucial for this investigation. Then, in Chapter Seven, I present the results of four case studies. These cases confirm the many obstacles to behavioral spillovers from CMS in Honduras. Initial justifications and descriptions of PROHECO and PRONADE waxed poetic regarding how the programs would strengthen civil society and democracy, overlooking several constraints on the programs' ability to deliver these outcomes.

Still, while these constraints are considerable, four other cases in this study suggest that they can be overcome. In these cases, presented in Chapter Eight, parent councils served as incubators for certain parents' further civic and political engagement outside the school council. In particular, several parent leaders in these communities used their experience of parental participation as a basis for joining and leading other organizations, and making further demands on the state.

Overall, however, these case studies suggest the need for more sober reflection on the prospects of CMS reform to strengthen democracy. Even the cases with individual spillovers do not indicate substantial changes in how rural citizens organize or engage with the state. Certain communities may contain incipient new leadership and additional community organizations, but individual and collective efforts remain heavily circumscribed by state dominance of these organizations. Moreover, in Honduras, PROHECO reinforces rather than challenges the clientelistic dynamics that have dominated the country's politics. Both PROHECO and PRONADE also reveal their respective country's deeply entrenched gender inequalities.

## **I. Methods**

### *a. Qualitative Methods and Community Case Studies*

Chapters Seven and Eight complement the descriptive statistics analysis in Chapter Five by presenting case studies of the impacts of CMS in particular communities, organized along the outcomes of interest presented in Chapter Five, and the causal processes at work in these contexts.<sup>160</sup>

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<sup>160</sup> See George and Bennett 2005 on the complementarity of probabilistically measuring effects of causes (through quantitative work) and looking at the causal mechanisms that connect variables (through qualitative work).

Broadly speaking, I chose to conduct case studies because of their ability to develop and test theories in complex realms of social interaction that often defy singularly quantitative analysis (George and Bennett 2005). My research began with survey results from over 2000 parent participants on several indicators (discussed in Chapter Five). I used qualitative methods, however, to probe these indicators further and understand what each one meant in particular communities. Furthermore, case studies allowed me to explore inconsistencies between surveys in the same community. For instance, while the survey included questions on the effectiveness and decision-making of school councils, responses often varied within the same communities. By spending weeks interviewing parents, observing meetings, reviewing school council and other community organizations' minutes from previous years, and leading discussion groups in each community, I could triangulate between different data sources and probe divergent initial responses, ultimately enabling better estimation of school council effectiveness and democraticness. Trust also proved critical to obtaining this information, particularly given my clear "outsider" status, as a tall, white foreign male visiting Q'eqchi' communities that rarely, if ever, received visits from foreigners. Whereas parents were often uncomfortable with initial visits from outsiders, my prolonged presence in the communities created familiarity and openness over time, often leading to important admissions and clarifications near the end of my stay.

Individual interviews, group discussions, reviewing local records, and direct observation of meetings also facilitated the exploration of variables omitted from the survey. In particular, these methods enabled a close examination of broader patterns of participation within communities, power and leadership dynamics within organizations, and the relationship between individuals, organizations, and the state in these rural areas. Probing these questions through interviews and group discussions—including creating

timelines of each community's organizational history with residents—also enabled me to analyze changes over time within and between communities. Local records also provided evidence of sensitive events that community members would not have shared, but were willing to discuss once I had uncovered them through other means.

Moreover, while my descriptive statistics analysis provided very suggestive evidence of CMS' impact on certain parents, the dataset lacked baseline data or control groups. Interviews enabled me to establish whether before/after changes noted in my descriptive statistics chapter were attributable to CMS or other factors not captured by the surveys.

But perhaps the most important reason for conducting case studies for this research is that gauging the strength of civil society and the quality of democracy ultimately requires answering qualitative questions with qualitative evidence. Diamond and Morlino (2004, 23-24), for instance, argue that “With regard to participation, democratic quality is high when we in fact observe extensive citizen participation not only through voting but in the life of political parties and civil society organizations, in the discussion of public policy issues, in communicating with and demanding accountability from elected representatives, in monitoring official conduct, and in direct engagement with public issues at the local level.” These more subtle features of participation require, at the very least, mixing whatever quantitative data is available with qualitative analysis. This is particularly important in rural areas, with relatively uneducated respondents, where the “concepts and categories used for the identification of rural realities” in surveys often do not capture complex behavioral patterns and can generate misunderstandings or “communication gaps” (Jodha 1989).<sup>161</sup>

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<sup>161</sup> On other sources of sampling and non-sampling errors in rural surveys in developing countries, see: Bulmer and Warwick 1983; Hill 1984; Bardhan 1989a; Vaidyanathan 1989; Harriss 1989.

My research similarly presented fundamentally qualitative questions. The political capabilities framework I adopted requires understanding questions such as: How do community leaders engage with leaders in other communities? How autonomous is rural civil society from the state? To what degree can rural citizens and organizations channel their demands to government officials? Quantitative data helped me address particular sections of my research puzzle—such as individuals' skills, the frequency of their participation, and the changes in individual participation over time—but ultimately proved insufficient to understand whether and how CMS affected civic and political life more broadly.

Ultimately, case studies enabled me to more closely approximate an ideal that Vargas Cullell (2004, 122) presents for a quality of democracy approach—seeing things “from the citizens' perspective.” Rather than relying solely on responses to closed questions aggregated from thousands of respondents across several hundred communities, case studies opened the door for understanding the civic and political context of particular communities and how a particular state-led initiative shaped and was shaped by that context. This opened up my inquiry to new questions and unexpected findings that the survey's more “closed” format rendered impossible (Bulmer and Warwick 1983); qualitative research allowed my inquiry to be “data driven,” rather than simply “hypothesis driven” (Hill 1984).

In short, when compared with my quantitative analysis, my qualitative research involved a different, but complementary, form of inference. Instead of trying to track “significant” patterns or differences between individuals, qualitative analysis enabled me to probe the nature and meaning of these patterns—for instance, by understanding whether and how communities evolved in their organizational life and their relationships with state actors.

Of course, case study research confronts the tension between generalizability and specificity (Bardhan 1989, 8). But, whereas isolated ethnographic accounts might struggle to generalize findings beyond individual communities, a comparative case study approach enabled me to explore variation along independent and dependent variables between cases while maintaining a focus on each case's minutia (George 1979; Smelser 1976). To achieve this, case selection proved critical.

*b. Case Selection*

Given the lack of empirical investigation of this research topic in Honduras and elsewhere, I selected cases purposively<sup>162</sup> using a “diverse case method” (Seawright and Gerring 2008). This method involves selecting cases from the data set across a range of values for the principal variable of interest. Because one chooses across the spectrum of possible outcomes, the “diverse” method is arguably the most effective case selection strategy for achieving representativeness (*ibid.*). This method can also be used as exploratory or confirmatory, making it particularly useful for an under-studied topic such as mine. In addition, by selecting different types of cases, one can probe whether the same causal mechanisms operate through a wide range of the sample (*ibid.*).<sup>163</sup>

I chose my community cases from the dataset I presented in Chapter Five. I operationalized the “diverse” method by 1) ordering all sampled communities in each country according to their mean values for key dependent variables of interest and then

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<sup>162</sup> See Seawright and Gerring 2008 on why purposive case selection is better than random selection when choosing a small number of cases.

<sup>163</sup> For discussions of causal homogeneity and qualitative research, see Collier, Seawright, and Munck 2004; Munck and Verkuilen 2002.

2) selecting cases across the spectrum of possible outcomes.<sup>164</sup> In particular, I focused on values for key dependent variables of interest in the “networks” category listed in Table 13. I constructed a four-point index, which assigned one point to each community where at least half of survey respondents reported 1) participating actively in more organizations after joining the council, 2) becoming leaders of another organizations after joining the council, 3) creating another organization after joining the council.<sup>165</sup> Consistent with my descriptive statistics chapter, the distribution of cases in Honduras along this index was skewed toward values of zero and one (see Table 14).

In Guatemala, the survey data did not allow me to create the same index. Because the available data lacked temporal specificity for whether parents who led other organizations did so *after* joining the school council, I replaced this with another question (which, in turn, was not available for the Honduran data): namely, whether parents felt that their overall participation in community life had increased *after* joining the school council. This question lacked a clear behavioral indicator, so it likely generated more affirmative answers than a more specific question (such as the one used in the Honduran survey) would have. The replacement of these questions should be at least partially responsible—in addition to the generally more abundant learning discussed in Chapter Five—for the greater incidence of non-zero values in the Guatemalan sample observable in Table 15. Therefore, the two index variables are not directly comparable to each other. To account for this difference, my discussions of the case studies will, in addition to comparing the broader set of eight cases, discuss the results from each country separately.

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<sup>164</sup> See Collier, Mahoney, and Seawright 2004 and Goertz 2009 for discussions of purposive case selection based on descriptive statistics and why it can make sense to choose cases on the dependent variable.

<sup>165</sup> Initially, I planned to use principal components analysis to construct this index. Given the difficulties of using these methods to construct indices for categorical variables, however, I abandoned this pursuit.

**Table 13: Dependent Variables Used To Create Four-Point Index for Case Selection**

Honduras	Guatemala
1) Participating actively in more organizations after joining the council;	1) Participating actively in more organizations after joining the council;
2) Becoming a leader of another organization after joining the council; and	2) Increased participation in community life after joining the school council; and
3) Creating another organization after joining the council.	3) Creating another organization after joining the council.

**Table 14: Distribution of Cases Along Four-Point Index in Honduras**

Networks Index Score	Frequency (number of communities)	Percentage	Cumulative Percentage
0	163	58.01	58.01
1	85	30.25	88.26
2	28	9.96	98.22
3	5	1.78	100.00
Total	281	100.00	

**Table 15: Distribution of Cases Along Four-Point Index in Guatemala**

Networks Index Score	Frequency (number of communities)	Percentage	Cumulative Percentage
0	13	8.67	8.67
1	58	38.67	47.33
2	64	42.67	90.00
3	15	10.00	100.00
Total	150	100.00	

Despite the difference in the indices, I used similar methods to select "diverse" cases in both countries. In Honduras, I selected one case for each index score. In Guatemala, I initially tried to mirror this. Because greater safety concerns and the relative inaccessibility of certain communities constrained case selection, however, I ultimately selected two cases with index scores of three and two cases with scores of one.

Given the overall distribution of cases on the indices in the survey sample, my case selection in both countries was biased towards "positive" cases—that is, I selected a disproportionate number of cases with values of two or three. This was intentional. Based on my descriptive statistics analysis and earlier abbreviated case studies, I decided that it was easier, but less interesting, to explain why most communities revealed few or no spillovers.<sup>166</sup> I thus focused disproportionately on positive cases to shed light on the more interesting question—namely, whether and how this type of PG initiative can lead to increased civic and political engagement. Still, I included "negative" cases—with index scores of zero or one—to further explore the structural constraints on the program and check for causal heterogeneity.

In addition, I got greater leverage out of each case study by exploring intertemporal comparisons within each case. Case studies with data from different time periods can effectively increase the number of cases in question (Lynch 2005). I achieved this by comparing the different parent council leadership groups that had managed the schools at different periods of time within the same community. The eight communities had a combined total of 39 elected school councils; this number was sufficient for conducting statistical analysis on selected data from the case studies in Chapter Nine.

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<sup>166</sup> For an explanation of how abbreviated case studies can be useful for corroborating an obvious or over-determined causal mechanism, see George and Bennett 2005.

Finally, I selected all four communities within the same department in each country. Choosing one department enabled me to control for certain variables and examine the interaction between these remote communities and local state officials. And, though most of my cases in each country sit in one municipality, I also chose a case in a nearby municipality. In Honduras, I undertook shorter visits to communities and trainings in other parts of the country, and in both countries I conducted interviews in the capital and with program staff who had worked outside of the department in question to ensure that the dynamics I observed were not quirks of a particular locale.

I chose the Honduran department of El Paraíso, first, because it had a high concentration of PROHECO schools,<sup>167</sup> ensuring a wide range of potential cases. This high concentration is due to El Paraíso's relatively sizeable population (seventh-largest in the country, and fifth-largest excluding the mostly urban Francisco Morazán and Cortés), extensive geographical area, and predominantly rural nature. Human Development Index data (see Table 16) also show that El Paraíso is not only large and rural, but also characterized by low levels of human development. In short, El Paraíso provided a natural target area for PROHECO.

Meanwhile, I chose Alta Verapaz because it was the only Guatemalan department for which survey data was available. As mentioned in Chapter Five, the research team in charge of the survey chose Alta Verapaz because it was the department with the greatest concentration of PRONADE schools in Guatemala; roughly 20 percent of PRONADE schools were located in Alta Verapaz. This was not a product of political favoritism or other idiosyncratic local characteristics, but simply the fact that Alta Verapaz is arguably

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<sup>167</sup> I disqualified two other departments with higher concentrations because of safety concerns and *sui generis* local political dynamics in Olancho that emerged during the survey exercise and potentially different dynamics in Lempira, which—unlike most of rural Honduras—has a significant indigenous population with potentially different social structures.

Guatemala's most neglected department. It is extremely rural, geographically expansive, predominantly Q'eqchi' Mayan, and most of it has remained a social and political backwater since the colonial period. In terms of human development, Alta Verapaz had the lowest human development index rating of any Guatemalan department in 1994, around the time of PRONADE's inception (see Table 17). By 2002, it remained second-from-the-bottom, and improved to fourth-from-last by 2006 PNUD 2008, Annex 10, 141). Education has been paltry, and even with the addition of more than 1,000 PRONADE schools, in 2007 Alta Verapaz still had the lowest net and gross primary enrollment rates in Guatemala (PNUD 2008, Annex 7, 115-6). In short, Alta Verapaz was the perfect target site for rapid PRONADE expansion.

**Table 16: Development Statistics from El Paraíso, Compared to National Averages**

Area	Human Development Index (HDI) Value	Adult Illiteracy Rate (%)	Life Expectancy (years)	GDP per capita (US dollars)	Population Living Without Access to Clean Water (%)	Under-five Malnourishment Rate (%)
El Paraíso	.619	27.8	66.9	1786	43.6	73.4
<i>Honduras Average</i>	.664	20.4	68.6	2665	29.1	67.2

*Source: PNUD 2006*

**Table 17: Development Statistics from Alta Verapaz, Compared to National Averages<sup>168</sup>**

Area	Human Development Index (HDI) Value	Health Index	Education Index	Income Index
Alta Verapaz	.623	.755	.568	.545
<i>Guatemala Average</i>	.702	.763	.700	.642

*Source: PNUD 2008*

<sup>168</sup> The Honduran and Guatemalan UNDP offices reported data differently, so it was not possible to get entirely comparable pieces of data for the two country tables.

*c. Control Groups*

The case study chapters, like the descriptive statistics chapter, are based on before-after comparisons of participating parents' civic and political behavior. In the surveys, because of the difficulty in identifying a statistically-justifiable control group in each community, questions about parent behaviors before joining the school council served as the best available, albeit imperfect, control. In the qualitative analysis, I improved on this by interviewing the following non-school-council participants in each community, as well as all council members:

- Five to eight randomly-selected non-council-participating parents to record baseline levels of civic and political participation and assess potential differences between council members and non-members.<sup>169</sup>
- In Honduras, all available members of the auxiliary parents' association (*Asociación de Padres de Familia*, APF). In Guatemala, no such organization existed, so I interviewed all available members of the parent group that replaced the COEDUCA after PRONADE's demise.
- Parents' association members and teachers at two traditional public schools located near two case study communities in each country. This facilitated comparison of the nature and impact of parental participation in CMS and traditional schools.<sup>170</sup>

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<sup>169</sup> In each community, I conducted a participatory mapping exercise that produced a community census. I then used simple randomization to select a list of between eight and ten non-council participants, depending on information from key informants regarding the accessibility of those selected (certain residents work outside of the community for weeks or entire seasons). I interviewed as many people from this group as possible, and never fewer than five.

<sup>170</sup> For the most part, APFs in PROHECO schools function as they do in traditional schools (see Chapter Eight). Thus, looking at APFs in PROHECO schools also strengthened the comparison between PROHECO and the traditional system.

Comparisons with these groups (see Chapter Eight) enabled me to determine which observed outcomes were attributable to CMS participation—that is, these comparisons facilitated the isolation of the causal effects of CMS participation.<sup>171</sup>

## II. Case Study Introductions

All eight communities selected for case studies share similar backgrounds that, given the data from the surveys and my visits to many other communities and interviews with program staff, are similar to most PROHECO schools throughout Honduras and most PRONADE schools throughout Alta Verapaz. All eight cases are rural agricultural villages. The communities mostly contain 20 to 45 households—with one slightly smaller and one substantially larger community chosen in Guatemala—and primarily consist of one to three extended families. Residents' lives revolve around corn and bean production, mostly for family subsistence. Coffee is the principal cash crop for the Honduran communities; better-off residents own coffee land, while others sell their labor to pick coffee during the harvest season.<sup>172</sup> In the Alta Verapaz cases, cardamom has largely replaced coffee as the principal cash crop.

Until recently, all of these cases also lacked most basic services—running water, latrines, electricity, roads, and public transportation. Most still do not possess the majority of them. These communities also lacked their own schools; before CMS' inception,

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<sup>171</sup> A fourth possible control group would have been parents in similar communities without their own school. Identifying such communities, though, proved too difficult because the Honduran and Guatemalan education systems have virtually guaranteed universal primary school coverage through CMS and because of a lack of available data on communities that remain without a school. Furthermore, communities remaining without schools would likely have proven so remote that different key characteristics would have obscured the comparison with the case study communities.

<sup>172</sup> While El Paraíso may produce more coffee than most other Honduran departments, these agricultural patterns are fairly typical for Honduras, where corn and beans are the staple, and 13 of the country's 18 departments produce coffee.

children had to walk several kilometers, often crossing streams that swelled dangerously during the rainy season, to get to the nearest school.

Parents then learned through well-connected community leaders or local program staff that PROHECO or PRONADE was building new schools in underserved areas. With the help of program staff, parents formed councils to acquire a school. In most of the eight cases, this process effectively required parents to separate from the other communities that had previously subsumed them and form their own community, which gave them separate state recognition.

Acquiring a school and becoming an independent community required significant effort from community leaders—they held frequent meetings and repeatedly visited government offices. At first, the schools began with no classroom, operating out of someone's house, a church, or an improvised wooden structure. After acquiring a teacher, parents did additional work—holding meetings, submitting proposals to government, and later contributing materials and physical labor—to obtain a classroom.

Following a similar process, these communities acquired a teacher between 1999 and 2002 and, later (with one exception), a brick classroom. Each community subsequently held at least three elections for the school council, resulting in at least one change of key school council leadership.

Organizational life in these communities is also similar. These rural communities have all created a local council (*patronato comunal* in Honduras; COCODE in Guatemala), which is responsible for overseeing the community and making proposals to the mayor's office. Residents feel that these councils have a much higher chance of success when their leaders have political connections. Aside from the local council, these communities

have both a Catholic and Protestant prayer group.<sup>173</sup> In only one of the communities has a progressive church organization arrived to encourage social and political mobilization.

Production groups (e.g., microcredit organizations) have emerged, usually owing to either government or international development programs. Finally, committees also spring up periodically for particular needs, such as potable water, latrines, and electricity. While this list may suggest a significant number of organizations over the past decade, most of these organizations exist on paper only. Often, communities form organizations in response to requirements of the municipality or an aid program to obtain a particular material benefit; the group disappears once it obtains support or determines that help will not be forthcoming. Furthermore, most adults, and especially women, have not participated actively in any organizations. Instead, a few men hold the key positions within each existing group. Women, when included, tend to remain as marginal placeholders.

Three cross-country differences bear mention. First, most residents of the Honduran communities in question have owned land for several decades, while the Guatemalan communities have mostly only recently gained land after decades of working as landless, hired labor in Alta Verapaz's "semi-feudal" farm system. The farm (*finca*) experience remains critical to understanding these communities' organizational histories. For as long as community elders can remember, the landlord, having granted their families the right to live on and cultivate a small bit of land in exchange for their work, had complete control over their lives. For decades, residents would not dare form organizations, fearing they would anger the estate owner and potentially risk expulsion. Landlords also

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<sup>173</sup> Because these groups focus exclusively on prayer and church maintenance, I will focus less on them. This approach is consistent with Seligson's (1999) finding that church group participation in Central America has little impact on democracy. See also Houtzager et al. (2007) for similar findings about the negligible impact of religious associations on the quality of democracy in Mexico and Brazil.

named the "community mayor" (*alcalde auxiliar*), who functioned as the landlord-tenant liaison. Finally, residents' extremely long work hours—often over 12 per day—also reduced the time during which they could have met to discuss community matters.

Moreover, because indigenous Guatemalan peasants often lacked land title and recognition as a community independent of their landlord, they could not seek state support for a school or any other state services, which were scarce, anyway. Local authorities also remained beholden to landlords—who were themselves often closely tied to the military (Dunkerley 1988)—stacking the odds even further against peasant efforts to organize. Thus, whereas peasants in these Honduran communities could organize more freely in the past, those in Alta Verapaz could not.

Still, residents in the Guatemalan case study communities were mostly quite conservative, and for the most part not guerrilla sympathizers. Unlike in other parts of Guatemala, penetration by the social arm of guerrilla groups and other progressive organizations in these parts of Alta Verapaz remained low, while the military retained a heavy presence (Huet 2008).<sup>174</sup> Three of the four cases described below also fell under the jurisdiction of a conservative wing of the Catholic Church, which made political consciousness-raising efforts less likely.<sup>175</sup> With no progressive voices to counter the vicious rumors about the guerrillas spread by soldiers and the *comisionado militar*, residents often feared the guerrillas more than soldiers.

Second, while the Honduran *patronato* system has existed, largely informally, for decades, Guatemala's local council system is newer. Following many decades when repressive

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<sup>174</sup> This observation speaks to the enormous regional and micro-regional variation in Guatemala. Alta Verapaz, long a large estate and military stronghold, was much more closed off from outside organizations than other parts of the country. But, even within Alta Verapaz, there were certain areas—such as those bordering the department of Quiché—where guerrillas and progressive ideas penetrated further (Huet 2008).

<sup>175</sup> I thank Alfonso Huet, an expert in local church-community affairs, for pointing this out.

landlords and state policies prevented Q'eqchi peasants from organizing themselves, the most violent stage of the armed conflict—which forced members in all these communities to flee temporarily—also brought state efforts to organize communities. These efforts, predominantly aimed at controlling rural areas, led to civil defense patrols (PACs) and community improvement committees (*comité pro mejoramiento*, CPM). These structures dominated community life from the early 1980s through the 1990s, before the PACs were dismantled and the Portillo government converted the CPMs into community development committees (*Consejo Comunitario de Desarrollo*, COCODE). Like the CPMs, COCODEs function as the closest thing to state presence in these communities—potentially providing a site to air grievances, prioritize community needs, and present proposals for external support. The organizational continuity becomes clearer given that many PAC and CPM leaders remain key figures in their communities' COCODEs.

Third, though communities in both areas had a mix of Catholic and Protestant religious groups, Catholicism was more syncretic in Alta Verapaz. Q'eqchi' people had long felt a spiritual connection to the land. According to Wilson (1999), indigenous rights and cosmology were reinforced by the Catholic Church's training of catequists in recent decades as part of an "ethnic revivalism." Several communities also had a *curandero*, a healer versed in traditional medicine and indigenous deities. Still, the Q'eqchi' communities I visited were similar to those in Honduras insofar as the one or two people most involved with the church often established themselves as community leaders. Meanwhile, most people's church participation amounted to attending services and/or rotating in Church positions (e.g., caretaker of the altar), which was not a good predictor of participation in other organizations. Furthermore, in both Alta Verapaz and El Paraíso, the community council leadership exercised much greater authority over

community decision-making and interactions with external (especially state) actors than religious group leaders.

### **III. The Following Chapters**

The following two chapters will present the data gathered from the eight cases. In each chapter, I present the various impacts of CMS on parents' political capabilities, grouped into impacts on learning, networks, and patterns of representation. In lieu of grouping the cases by country, I have chosen to group them by their index scores and outcomes. In Chapter Seven, I present the two cases from each country with lower survey evidence of spillovers. These cases demonstrate the general obstacles to participation in these communities and the CMS-specific obstacles to spillovers.

In Chapter Eight, I then examine the two cases from each country with greater survey evidence of political capabilities development. I contrast these with the comparison groups discussed above to demonstrate that these spillovers are, indeed, attributable to CMS participation. After presenting this evidence, I discuss the relationship between individual- and community-level spillovers, ultimately questioning whether even cases with abundant individual spillovers experience significant shifts in how residents organize themselves and engage with other communities and state actors.

My choice to group cases by outcomes reflects an additional, surprising finding discussed in these chapters—namely, that similarities between these two cases of CMS appear to outweigh the country-specific differences. In Chapter Four, I found that, although different political legacies impinged on CMS, both ended up detracting from parent council autonomy and the likelihood of spillovers. The following chapters further

suggest that the Honduran and Guatemalan communities function in remarkably similar ways: they have the same types of local organizations, groups form for the same reasons, and the patterns of—and obstacles to—participation are markedly alike. Patterns of CMS participation have also proved comparable, with correspondingly similar types of outcomes in communities in both countries. Of course, national, regional, and cultural contexts do influence each community's history, but the side-by-side presentation of Honduran and Guatemalan cases should bring these differences into sharper relief, facilitating a richer cross-country analysis.

## 7. CASE STUDIES REVEALING THE OBSTACLES TO SPILLOVERS

This chapter presents two case studies in each country for which survey evidence indicated low spillovers among participating parents. The chapter first introduces the cases, then describes the individual- and community-level outcomes in each. I then use these cases to illustrate the obstacles to civic participation in these communities, as well as the obstacles to spillovers from CMS. These obstacles were also present in the cases of higher spillovers discussed in the following chapter, though these other cases indicate that barriers to participation do not operate deterministically. In discussing the obstacles to participation and spillovers, this chapter will also explore which obstacles hold across both countries and which are country-specific.

### I. The First Four Cases

I now introduce the four cases and present the outcomes thematically. This will allow side-by-side comparison of the four cases along the qualitative indicators of interest. I include case selection and background data—compiled from surveys and community mapping exercises—in Table 18 to aid this comparison.

**Frutales** sits in a low-lying, relatively dry area of El Paraíso, Honduras. In the late 1990s, parents became frustrated that the nearest school was 45 minutes away and forced students to cross a swelling stream during the rainy season. Two community leaders, Manuel and Carlos, sought help from a municipal councilman to apply for a PROHECO school. Since they acquired the school, Manuel and Carlos have alternated as AECO president. Aside from these two men, few parents have participated actively in the AECO.

Several AECO members had never participated in a community organization before, but none of these new participants assumed significant council roles. Nor have they learned or gained enough experience to apply it elsewhere. For years, the AECO has been an administrative shell for check-signing, nothing more, with an average of one AECO meeting per year. Nor has there been either rotation in leadership or group decision-making. Instead, power and decision-making remain concentrated among the two initial leaders. As the teacher, Janet, says, “there’s little collaboration from parents...the people are turned off.”<sup>176</sup> After the school’s founding, there was an initial increase in organizations, but these all quickly became inactive.

**Perales** lies next to an expansive lagoon in the adjacent municipality. Many residents produce enough coffee for household consumption, but, like in Frutales, they pick coffee elsewhere during harvest season. In 2001, the current AECO president and a local pastor successfully lobbied for a PROHECO school. After expansion, the school now has two classrooms and a wooden structure (*galera*) used as a third, with four teachers covering six grades. The expansion has been led by the school director’s husband, David, an established community leader with extensive political contacts.

The school’s creation led to an increase in demands on the state to fuel school expansion. Two AECO leaders also increased their involvement in other organizations, which helped the community obtain a road. But, as in Frutales, new participants remained marginal to council decision-making. In addition, partisan meddling thwarted leadership rotation, as PROHECO’s departmental coordinator sought a more pliant AECO leader so that he could install a teacher of his liking. The community responded

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<sup>176</sup> All quotations come from personal interviews conducted—and translated—by the author. For interviews in Q’eqchi’ in Guatemala, I relied on translation from my research assistant, with whom I double-checked direct quotations immediately after the interview. As mentioned earlier, all individual and community names in the case studies are pseudonyms.

by electing David, a strong, pre-established leader interested in protecting his wife's job as school director. David has persisted as the leader ever since. The community's choice brought stability to the school, but also kept new leaders from gaining experience. As in Frutales, for years the AECO has been a purely administrative unit dominated by the president and the school director. Nor have other strong organizations emerged to build off of the AECO's experience.

**Saq'e** is located roughly 90 minutes by car from the municipal center of Fray Bartolomé de las Casas, Alta Verapaz. This community—comprised of one extended family—had the exceptional fortune of obtaining several hundred acres of unclaimed land because the community's founder was son-in-law of a Guatemalan president who pulled strings for his family. Saq'e enjoys the highest socio-economic level of any community in this study. Still, more than ten years after securing land title, the community lacked a school, so the community requested help from a local church organization, Don Bosco, which provided a teenage student who could come teach basic literacy to children.<sup>177</sup>

Saq'e has had the least rotation in COEDUCA participation of the Guatemalan cases. In part, this is due to emigration (not a salient factor in the other cases, though more relevant in certain other Guatemalan regions); at least 10 young men have gone to the United States for work, reducing the pool of available participants. And, though the school has provided a first site for engagement for various people in the community, this experience has had a very limited impact beyond the school arena. If anything, the number of organizations has declined over time. The school has expanded the base of men who can comfortably lead the COCODE, but no one has taken the initiative to seek out other outlets for participation.

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<sup>177</sup> Don Bosco created a network of hundreds of such impromptu schools in Alta Verapaz by the mid-1990s; when the government created PRONADE, Don Bosco transferred its schools into the program.

**Yaab** is located approximately two hours from Cobán, Alta Verapaz, overlooking an expansive valley. This community formed after residents learned that a large area of land near the farm where they worked remained unclaimed (*baldío*). Those men who had worked this land claimed it and established their community. They became independent of the community to which they had previously belonged to apply for a separate school for their children. This community is the smallest of those in this study (17 households), and its size appears to have worked against leaders' efforts to obtain a brick classroom from the government.

Yaab's parents responded to the shortage of potential participants by including women as at-large members (*vocal*). As in all my case studies, most at-large and female members participated in name only. The COEDUCA did, however, provide an important first organizational experience for several community members, several of whom learned organizational skills and how to make proposals to government. In subsequent years, new organizations have also emerged in the community. Their creation, however, reflects government requirements of new communities rather than local leaders' initiative. The community continues to rely on the men from one family, who have long led the community due to their higher education, Spanish speaking abilities, and prior organizational experiences.

Table 18: Selected Features of First Four Case Study Communities

Community	Networks Index Score for Case Selection (0 - 3)	Number of Households	Population	Median Adult Education (grades completed, data by sex where available)	Principal Crops	Services in the Community
<i>Frutales</i>	1	24	125	3	Corn and beans (minimal coffee for consumption)	Brick latrines; running water; no electricity; no public transportation
<i>Perales</i>	0	42	221	2	Corn and beans (minimal coffee for consumption)	Brick latrines; running water; no electricity; no public transportation
<i>Yaab</i>	1	17	82	0 (2 for men; 0 for women)	Corn; beans; minimal cardamom	No brick latrines; communal water pump; no electricity; no access to public transport
<i>Saq'e</i>	1	27	171	5 (6 for men; 3 for women)	Corn (enough for sale—have silo); beans (enough for sale); Chile; Cardamom; minimal cacao.	No brick latrines; no running water; no electricity; access to public transport (not when school started)

*Source: Survey data from 2007 provided networks index scores. I conducted community mapping exercises in each community to gather the remaining data reported here.*

## II. Case Study Results

### *a. Organizational and political learning*

In all four communities, certain council members reported learning how to complete administrative tasks, organize themselves, and interact with state officials. New organizational skills ranged from basic financial skills (such as signing a check, making a deposit in a bank) to how to run meetings (for example, making and following an agenda and taking minutes).<sup>178</sup> With respect to the “rules of the game” of local organizations and state-society interactions, some parents also learned through CMS participation which government offices to visit and how to articulate demands and complaints to state actors. In no case did parents gain awareness of their rights (part of political learning).

As predicted by the survey evidence, most school council members did not report any learning. In all four cases, parents who occupied the three council positions of greatest responsibility (president, treasurer, secretary) were more likely to report learning. The concentration of training among these members reinforced this trend. Furthermore, as shown for the broader survey sample in Chapter Five, substantially fewer parents reported applying learning to other organizations. (To systematize the qualitative results and provide a visual aid for the reader, I summarize the comparative results from the four communities in Table 37 in Appendix D.)

In Frutales, two members reported learning: One explained that he learned to write checks and participate in meetings with government officials, while the other member insisted she had learned but could not recall what skills she had gained. No one in

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<sup>178</sup> I focus on skills that are transferable to other organizations; this would not include learning a simple administrative task that could not improve one’s ability to participate in another organization.

Frutales reported applying learning to other organizations, which makes sense given the lack of other functional organizations in the community.

In Perales, three parents—the AECO’s initial leaders, Félix and Salvador, and the current treasurer, Francisco—reported gaining skills and comfort in visiting government offices. All three parents learned skills that made them more comfortable with participating in other organizations and undertaking applications for other projects. Félix reported learning “a lot, because before I didn’t know what a check was. I didn’t know what the signature meant.” With this new knowledge, he felt more confident when he applied for a road to the community as the new *patronato* president. He and Francisco both report applying their learning to other organizations. Meanwhile, another former AECO president, Denis, reported that he began to learn new skills after receiving training. He was then ousted for political reasons by PROHECO’s departmental coordinator, however, which prevented him from reinforcing this learning.

Saq’è had both the lowest rotation and learning among COEDUCA members of all the Guatemalan cases. Most COEDUCA members participated in name only, being elected, attending meetings when called, but assuming virtually no responsibility and receiving no training. The only members to demonstrate learning transferable skills were the two presidents, Gonzalo and Feliciano, and the long-time treasurer and secretary, Adán, and Mateo. The two presidents learned organization skills such as running meetings, but did not reveal any type of political learning. The COEDUCA did, however, provide the treasurer and secretary with their first experience submitting a proposal to the government. Both have subsequently applied these skills to their participation in the COCODE.

Meanwhile, Yaab's school council became an important site for (male) leaders to learn organizational and demand-making skills. Before Yaab became an independent community, few current residents had ever participated in community organizations outside of religious groups, which met exclusively for prayers. As COEDUCA members, several men gained transferable skills such as how to use checks and manage organizational finances (including financial reporting), and how to organize and lead meetings. Participation also contributed to greater confidence among several members, including one former president, Reinaldo, who explained that becoming the COEDUCA president "took away from me the shame that I had of speaking in front of everyone."

Situated in a new community, the COEDUCA also provided seven of its leaders (four presidents, two secretaries, and a vice-president) with their first experience of drafting and submitting petitions for state support. As another former president, Abel, explained, he learned to "move more" in search of external support for the community. Given their lack of experience, support from teachers—themselves interested in attracting material support to improve teaching conditions—proved critical. With this support, the first two COEDUCAs submitted the initial request for a teacher and legal standing as a PRONADE school, followed by a proposal for a temporary classroom, and then subsequent applications for desks and a permanent classroom. The desks arrived during the next COEDUCA's term, but the council has never obtained support for a brick classroom, likely due to the community's small size and geographical remoteness. Of the seven first-time demand-makers, five subsequently applied their organizational and political learning to their work in the COCODE.

In sum, whereas Chapter Five revealed the likelihood of learning from CMS participation, these cases reveal the limitations of such learning. Two points bear reiterating. First, multiple parents in each case did learn how to participate in an

organization (e.g., to call a meeting, make a budget), but subsequent use of these skills remained quite limited. Various parents indicated how they had learned skills several years ago, but, without reinforcement, now they no longer felt that they still had them. Moreover, learning remained concentrated among the principal leaders, who were more likely to receive training and guidance from PROHECO field staff. And, since more experienced men were typically elected for these higher positions, learning appears to have widened the skills gap between those leaders and other parents.

Second, political learning was quite restricted. At least two council participants in each community did learn how to draw up a proposal for government support. Yaab, in particular, showed a substantial amount of this type of learning. But, in most instances in these four cases, “political learning” simply amounted to learning where the mayor’s office was, so that they could go wait there for hours, receive vague promises of support, and be told to come back after a certain period of time. In none of these cases—nor in those in Chapter Eight—did CMS prompt more effective collective action between community organizations or communities. Nor did it increase parents’ awareness of their rights. These findings should prompt reasonable suspicion about the impact of CMS on civil society and the quality of democracy, a discussion on which I expand below.

*b. Civic and political networks*

Whether the CMS schools’ arrival impacted community organizational life is a more difficult question. It requires examining various factors: whether parent leaders have become more actively involved in other organizations, whether the number of organizations in the community has changed, these organizations’ viability and strength,

and whether changes at the individual and group level are attributable to school council participation. A first quantitative pass at this question—presented in Chapter Five—suggested that most communities will not exhibit significant changes in these regards. The communities described in this chapter reveal the obstacles to participation in these communities.

In all four communities, residents formed new organizations after the CMS school began operating. These organizations all relied on outsiders' initiative, however, and most quickly became inoperative.

In Frutales, the community formed a *patronato*, a security committee, a housewives' group, and an environment group. The first two were requirements of the municipality for all *caseríos*, the third was the teacher's initiative, and the fourth came via an NGO that identified the community as a recipient for a project. None of these groups now meets regularly, nor have they accomplished anything. As the pastor, Nery, an older man who helped found the school, noted about the *patronato* led by his son: "there's no initiative, it's turned off. It's not working as it should." Frutales's most notable finding is that five AECO members had no prior experience in organizations. Only one current or former AECO member, however, has become more active in community organizations than he was before.<sup>179</sup> Overall, Frutales demonstrates negligible changes in individual or collective abilities to organize community members or make demands on the state.<sup>180</sup>

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<sup>179</sup> In a telling example of the pervasiveness of Honduran clientelism, he has done the latter because he realizes that partisan connections are the only way to get resources for the community.

<sup>180</sup> This case also reveals the superiority of qualitative methods for measuring certain variables of interest. In case selection, Frutales scored one of three on my four-point index—registering over half of respondents reporting increase in number of organizations in which they participate since joining the council—because the survey did not uncover that these other organizations were empty shells. Meanwhile, Perales scored a zero on this crude index, but revealed greater (albeit still minimal) spillovers through qualitative research.

(As a visual aid for readers, I summarize the “networks” outcomes from these cases in Table 38 in Appendix D.)

In Perales, spillovers have been slightly more frequent, but still minimal. Two AECO members had no prior experience, and one of these, Francisco the treasurer, is now a leader in other groups. As noted above, Francisco, Félix, and Santiago have become more able and confident in visiting and making demands on government offices. Finally, two members report that their participation in community organizations has increased since joining the AECO—Francisco joined multiple other groups and Félix has become the *patronato* president.

Overall, however, changes have been minimal. The PROHECO school brought the community together as an independent entity, and various new organizations formed—a *patronato*, an FAO-supported agricultural group, and a peasant group to register for formalizing their land title. But this increased organization was fleeting. The peasant group is now inactive, and anyway was led by David, the *patronato* president from the adjacent community, who became AECO president to protect his wife’s job. The same leader brought the FAO project to the community. It continues to operate, but as a purely production-oriented group.<sup>181</sup> Perhaps the *patronato* is the clearest case of a new organization, as the community has used it to get certain benefits (such as a road). Most community members agree, however, that the *patronato* remains weak, meeting infrequently and relying on David to bring benefits to the area.

Of the ten people to serve on Saq’e’s COEDUCA, half had never participated in a community organization outside the church before. Aside from the treasurer and secretary described above, however, all of these first-time participants remained marginal

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<sup>181</sup> See discussion of productive groups in Chapter Eight.

to the COEDUCA, named only to satisfy program requirements that the committee should have the full complement of seven members. Meanwhile, these two young leaders have subsequently become new leaders in the COCODE. The two presidents—who had prior organizational experience—have sustained their leadership in the community, leading the COCODE and other organizations in the community. Gonzalo has been a COCODE treasurer and health representative, while Feliciano has become more involved with electoral politics, leading a community effort to get the URNG mayoral candidate elected. But the COEDUCA experience did not motivate this sustained leadership; both men indicate that they would have taken on these roles whether or not they had been school council leaders.

These limited individual spillovers have not translated to changes in the community's organizational life. The only new organization in the community since PRONADE's arrival has been the COCODE, which simply replaced the pre-existing CPM. Nor has the community's collective capacity to solve local problems increased. Using connections with Pastoral Social, community leaders also obtained support for a cardamom processing structure (*secadora*). Allegations of free-riding, however, plagued this project; residents chose to abandon this lucrative business because they could not figure out how to work together, despite mostly belonging to the same extended family.

Meanwhile, several of Yaab's COEDUCA leaders used their school council experience as the foundation for subsequent participation in other organizations—almost exclusively in the COCODE. Yaab has also increased the number of organizations in the community since PRONADE's arrival: Table 19 lists all the organizations in the community's history according to their year of founding, which demonstrates that three new organizations

have emerged after the COEDUCA—the COCODE, women’s committee, and a credit group.<sup>182</sup>

**Table 19: Summary of Yaab’s Organizational History, Sorted by Founding Year<sup>183</sup>**

Organization	Founding Year	Number of Female Leaders	Strength	Support from external actors
<i>PAC (civil defense patrols)</i>	Early 1980s	0	Only patrolled	Contact with ex-PAC network and government for compensation.
<i>CPM (community improvement committee)</i>	1998	0	Moderate	Sought school from PRONADE
<i>COEDUCA</i>	1999	0 (6 served as at-large members in the final years)	Strong	Temporary Classroom; Desks; Solid Classroom (unsuccessful). From municipality, PRONADE, and FONAPAZ
<i>COCODE (community development council)</i>	2004	0	Strong	Legalizing independent community; water tank; roof sheeting; brick school (unsuccessful). From municipality, FONAPAZ, UCG (peasant organization).
<i>Credit Group</i>	2005	0	Weak	Initially got loans through local NGO, now through local bank
<i>Women's Committee</i>	2007	All (7)	Weak	None

*Source: group discussion with community leaders, review of community records*

<sup>182</sup> I do not include tables for the other three communities in this chapter because they experienced virtually no changes in organizational life. In all eight case study communities, however, I conducted similar exercises to arrive at a summary of the community’s organizational history. After interviews and informal conversations with community leaders, I led discussions (using a timeline activity) to determine the dates of formation and the features of each organization. I also reviewed all available minutes for the respective organizations.

<sup>183</sup> Note that no churches are listed because residents attend worship services in adjacent communities.

Of these organizations, however, residents agree that only the COCODE and the credit group remain operational. The women's committee initially formed because of government requirements and the corresponding hope among residents that forming the group would increase material benefits, but then quickly fell into inactivity. The COCODE, meanwhile, has emerged as the strongest organization in the community. COEDUCA leadership appears to have become a gateway for COCODE leadership, and the experiences in the COEDUCA proved valuable for leaders who, in the COCODE, created and submitted proposals for state support for a community water pump, zinc for residents' roofs, alongside new requests for a brick classroom.

Though the COEDUCA proved important for developing individual competency in participating in and leading organizations, the council did not spark the creation of the COCODE and the other weaker organizations. Instead, the process of founding a new community led to the replication of the organizations that existed in their prior community—a school council and a community council (first, CPM, then converted to a COCODE)—and then organizations required by the state—the women's committee and the health committee. The creation of new organizations created after the COEDUCA reflects the steps that new communities had to take to be recognized by the state and be able to request material support.

Moreover, while the COEDUCA experience diversified this small community's leadership base, Yaab remains dominated by the Ch'ool family. Unlike most of their neighbors, the men of this family all completed sixth grade and speak Spanish, making it easier for them to lead organizations and interact with (often monolingual) state actors. Two of the three COCODE presidents have been Ch'ool men, suggesting significant continuity in community power relations.

Yaab, then, reinforces the central finding from the other cases that spillovers from CMS do not account for the formation of other organizations. There was an indirect effect in several communities, through which communities were pressured by the state to form certain organizations in order to acquire a school after becoming independent (I discuss this further below). But the experience of CMS participation in these four councils did not lead parents to form new types of organizations. Instead, in the case with the most spillovers, Yaab, I found evidence of parents using their parent council experience to strengthen the community council's capacity, while in the other three cases gains were more minimal and concentrated. In Frutales, Perales, and Saq'e, CMS sustained the leadership of particular men. And even in Yaab, CMS reinforced the dominance of the Ch'ool family. These pre-established leaders did not necessarily hoard power or represent private interests over the community's good. Nonetheless, neither their leadership nor the programs' structure enabled most new participants (especially those outside the three principal council positions) to take on responsibility and learn sufficiently to feel comfortable assuming leadership roles in other organizations.

Moreover, one would be hard-pressed to describe the new organizations that did emerge after CMS's arrival as the strengthening of civil society. First, most of these groups formed to respond to state mandates, raising questions about their autonomy from the state. Second, these organizations were often ephemeral—either because residents formed them in name only to be able to access state resources or because they quickly became discouraged about the prospects of achieving their goals. Third, these organizations exhibited no ability to “scale up” their activity. Instead, they remained isolated community groups whose principal means of addressing community needs was to submit individual requests to the municipal office.

*c. Patterns of Political Representation*

Given the limited "learning" and "networks" spillovers reported in the preceding sections, as well as the evidence in Chapter Five, it should not surprise the reader that CMS did not alter the patterns of political representation in these communities. In Honduras, PROHECO reinforced the strength of patronage dynamics in remote rural communities, though communities tried to resist certain partisan incursions. Patronage pressures did not appear in Guatemala's PRONADE, but nor did the program change or provide new channels for communities to represent themselves or be represented by others. Instead, recent changes in these patterns emerged due to the introduction of local polling stations and the restructuring of the COCODE system in both communities, and mobilization by a progressive arm of the Catholic Church in Saq'e. Still, in all four cases, communities remain weakly organized, primarily to obtain local benefits from outsiders, usually state actors. In both countries, this trend reinforced clientelistic ties with elected officials, who principally court voters with promises of public works. Moreover, collective action between communities, which could increase pressure on elected officials for broader political changes and accountability, remained absent.

As I have demonstrated in Chapter Four, PROHECO reproduces Honduran patronage politics. PROHECO hires virtually all employees along party lines, the ruling party names activists to almost all national, departmental, and municipal positions. Municipal-level promoters, pressured by party leaders, then undermine parental autonomy and hire teachers based on partisan loyalties.

Across the four Honduran case study communities described here and in Chapter Eight, promoters selected nearly every PROHECO teacher since the schools' inception, in

violation of program rules. Furthermore, promoters chose teachers along party lines. An illustrative example occurred in Perales, where the former President, Félix, recalled: “The law says that the AECO makes the decisions. If you don’t like a teacher, you get rid of her. I didn’t sign the contract [of the teacher, Cándida] at first, because we had the decision-making authority and we wanted a licensed teacher. She was just a *perito mercantil* [a lesser, non-teaching degree, but she had connections in the National Party]...She came and said they’d already named her and said, ‘If you don’t sign the contract, the school will be closed.’”

These communities struggled both to keep teachers who lacked political connections and to get rid of teachers whose performance—e.g., in attendance and/or treatment of children—parents judged to be lacking, but who had party contacts. And yet, the AECOs in question have each resisted patronage dynamics at least once.

In Frutales, after very high teacher turnover early on, the patronage-based selection process first produced high teacher turnover. One year, however, the process provided the community with a teacher that everyone—including SE supervisors—agreed was excellent. Over the years, multiple promoters tried to fire her to install a teacher with better party connections, but the two principal AECO leaders, Manuel and Carlos, stood firm, both times at the expense of their own position as president. As Carlos explained,

They changed [removed] me because I didn’t want to change the teacher—she’s been a good teacher, with high [performance] indices,<sup>184</sup> and that’s why we wanted to support her. And for that reason they removed me...They brought a blank contract and wanted me to sign. They wanted to change the teacher. I told them that they couldn’t do it that way.

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<sup>184</sup> School records confirmed positive performance appraisals of the teacher by SE and PROHECO staff.

Still, these leaders' stands had their limits. First, they were the actions of individuals, not a collective response. The tenuousness of individual resistance is clear from the Frutales leaders' inability to prevent promoters from changing the recalcitrant leaders. In addition, the Frutales AECO was too weak to prevent a promoter from absconding with a blank check and stealing from its bank account.

Perales has similarly had virtually all teachers named through party networks. As in Frutales, however, the two dominant leaders, David and Cándida (the AECO president and the school director, who are married) have used their own political connections to prevent promoters from politicized firing. In one case, the departmental coordinator tried to fire Cándida for reprimanding a fellow teacher—the departmental coordinator's relative—who only came to work three days a week. Cándida took her case to PROHECO's national office, but still had to obtain a parliamentarian's support to keep her job. In addition, when multiple teachers were being hired at the school, David used his own political clout to convince promoters to let him hire a local woman for one of the positions. David made this recommendation as a favor to his neighbor, however, rather than selecting a more qualified teacher. This shows the pitfalls of the AECO relying on one leader, who can use political or personal connections in much the same way as PROHECO staff.

In sum, patronage encroached upon parental involvement in PROHECO, reducing the autonomy promised to school councils. PROHECO reinforced the lesson to parents that, as one teacher working near Perales told me: "In our country, without politics, you can't get anything."

Meanwhile, my Guatemalan case studies—including those in Chapter Eight—confirmed one conclusion from Chapter Four: PRONADE did not become captured by patronage

dynamics. Teacher selection was not determined by partisan connections; parents exercised autonomy in choosing teachers from the candidates who presented themselves. Still, as in the Honduran cases, CMS did not change the relationship between the Guatemalan communities and elected officials or broader structures of power. Some changes did occur in these communities in recent years, but they were not attributable to the CMS experience.

In both Saq'e and Yaab, residents indicated two recent reforms that have impacted their political lives. First, the introduction of micro-regional polling stations has enabled many residents (including many women) to vote for the first time. Whereas before residents had to travel to the municipal center—often a full day's travel away, particularly when no road yet existed—to vote, now residents can travel much shorter distances to vote in nearby communities. These communities now command greater attention from campaigning politicians, who realize that residents are much more likely to vote than in prior decades.

Second, the restructuring of the community council system (from CPM to COCODE) has created a structure to connect the COCODEs to municipal decision-making. Each community's COCODE can now vote for representatives of a micro-regional COCODE (*COCODE de segundo nivel*), which channel demands to the municipality through the municipal development council (*Consejo Municipal de Desarrollo*, COMUDE). This system aims to increase civic participation and transparency in how the municipality makes decision about public works projects. But, as described in Chapter Three, this governance system remains in its infancy, with particular problems of forming these councils in rural areas, getting women involved, and getting mayors to respect this process for filtering demands from communities. Unlike many other similar communities, however, COCODE leaders in Yaab and Saq'e have participated in

second-level COCODE meetings. Though the community has not yet acquired any benefits from this participation, this body could provide a vehicle for scaling up collective action and increasing accountability in local government.

Saq'e's residents have also become more involved in electoral politics for a third reason; in the past three elections, Saq'e's former COEDUCA president, Feliciano, has joined several other nearby community leaders in mobilizing his entire community to support the URNG (*Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca*, Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity) mayoral candidate. These efforts overcame initial skepticism among residents that the URNG, the party of the former guerrilla umbrella organization, could win. This effort marked an important reversal of Saq'e's prior political passivity.

But this did not reflect a PRONADE-inspired change. Instead, Feliciano attributes his efforts to training he received from Pastoral Social, a progressive branch of the Catholic Church, which encouraged local leaders to become more involved in politics and assertive as citizens. Pastoral Social also held local mock elections, where many residents learned how to vote; the coming together of people from various communities also gave residents a sense that the URNG could win. Pastoral Social was not promoting a particular political party, but their role in Saq'e's increased political activity is consistent with accounts of how the Church's progressive branch has impacted social and political life in Alta Verapaz (Wilson 1995; Huet 2008). Whereas many parts of the Church (and this applies to the churches in every other community discussed in this study) avoid anything resembling political issues, for decades Pastoral Social has encouraged residents in different parts of Alta Verapaz to organize themselves and advocate for their needs. Pastoral Social has promoted collective organization and advocacy more forcefully than a

program like PRONADE, which emphasized ensuring administrative functionality above all else.<sup>185</sup>

Meanwhile, the spillovers reported above for Yaab have increased residents' capacity to engage with state actors, and they have certainly submitted more demands than before the school's creation, when residents were subsumed under the adjacent community's unresponsive council. But it appears that Yaab's leaders became discouraged after their repeated failure to attract support for the community's top priority, a brick classroom. Over time, they may be able to reverse this through the COCODE system, but this remains far from guaranteed. Success in acquiring state support would likely require effective cooperation with other communities, something this community has not yet managed.

Ideally, by promoting community organization and granting parent groups legal standing to engage with state and non-state actors, CMS would place remote communities in a stronger position to make demands on elected officials and hold them accountable for governing transparently and delivering high-quality services. One way to achieve this would be for councils in nearby communities to form alliances, as Durston (1999) suggested would happen. This "scaling up" could compensate for each community's individual vulnerability.<sup>186</sup> But the two Guatemalan cases described in this chapter—like the Honduran cases—offer no evidence of CMS-related collective action.

In fact, Yaab's very formation, necessary to obtain a CMS school, constituted an act of "scaling down," not scaling up; the community separated from a larger community

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<sup>185</sup> I discuss another key type of organization in these communities, peasant organizations, in Chapter Eight. Peasant organizations, like progressive church groups, were almost completely absent from these first four cases.

<sup>186</sup> On the importance of "scaling up" through networks or federations, see Karl 2004 and Mitlin 2004.

because the larger community's leaders were not paying sufficient attention to Yaab's needs. The other three communities also became independent to acquire a school, a trend discussed further in Chapter Eight. Furthermore, Yaab's residents have had other problems with neighbors—namely, landless peasants nearby who illegally seized land adjacent to the community. Far from class or ethnic solidarity with other poor Q'eqchi' farmers, Yaab residents worried that the land invasion would reduce day-labor opportunities on local farms. When dozens of police and military trucks came to evict the landless peasants, Yaab residents happily accommodated the officers and soldiers and took advantage of a one-time business opportunity by selling them breakfast.<sup>187</sup> There was no evidence that the COEDUCA experience increased the community's capacity to ally itself with other communities.

Finally, in Yaab as in the other three communities, CMS has reinforced gender inequalities in participation. Women in Yaab have also participated in the COEDUCA for the first time, subsequently joining the women's committee. This surpasses the zero women elected to Saq'e's COEDUCA, but all of the six women included in Yaab's COEDUCA were at-large members, and none reported any spillovers. Two, in fact, had no memory of serving on the council, though records showed their names as previously elected members. Furthermore, the women's committee does not meet regularly, nor has it ever organized any activity or formulated a proposal. On paper, female participation in Yaab's organizations has increased; in truth, however, they—like the women in the other three communities discussed above—remain marginal to the community's organizational life.

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<sup>187</sup> This story of inter-community conflict is consistent with García 2006, who provides an overview of inter- and intra-community sources of conflict—with land featuring heavily—in Alta Verapaz.

### III. Common Obstacles to Participation in Communities

Having shown that certain changes in parents' civic and political engagement are attributable to their experience in CMS schools, the discussion now turns to analyzing why spillovers were so limited. This section will present common barriers to participation in these communities, while the following section discusses CMS-specific constraints on changing initially low levels of participation. Moreover, I observed the same obstacles in all eight communities I visited. This discussion will thus prove useful for understanding the dynamics of participation in the communities with higher evidence of spillovers, discussed in the following chapter. I begin with the factors common to both countries, before concluding with the additional obstacles observed in Alta Verapaz.

Consistent with other scholarly work (Ibáñez, Lindert, and Woolcock 2002), material poverty is the first common obstacle to civic and political engagement. As Manuel in Frutales explained, "The community is poor, and [one who participates] loses a day of work, and no one pays you for it." Parents in all eight communities mentioned their reluctance to lose days of work for meetings and trips to the municipal center—the latter involves paying for transportation, food, and sometimes lodging costs. Many organizations in these communities raise money to pay the expenses of the delegation (*comisión*) to the town that submits paperwork and expresses community needs, but leaders invariably explain that these funds never covered their full expenses nor compensated them for a lost day's work. For this reason, most school council presidents

in my case studies enjoyed a socio-economic level above the community's median level.<sup>188</sup> There is thus a rational economic explanation for most adults' non-participation.

Education proved to be a second, and related, obstacle to civic participation.<sup>189</sup> Government and NGO programs invariably require or encourage communities to form committees and select leaders who can read and write. Both PRONADE and PROHECO manuals encourage participation from all parents, but emphasize a preference for literate members, especially for the key members. Staff members in Honduras often present the recommendation as a requirement. In a PROHECO training for parent leaders that I attended in the department of Copán, for instance, the promoter told parents that literacy was a requirement, saying, "Having a president, treasurer, or secretary who is illiterate won't work." In addition, within communities, parents without education marginalize themselves, believing that they cannot participate as leaders because of their illiteracy. As one parent in Frutales explained, participating in organizations "is for people who know how to read. And I don't." In communities with median adult education levels of no higher than Fourth Grade, this *de facto* literacy requirement for participation excludes a large plurality of adults from joining civic organizations.<sup>190</sup>

The education barrier also has a gender component. Women in both countries have long received less education than their male counterparts. Though this trend has begun to change (PREAL 2003; PREAL 2005), this gender inequity has had a lasting impact on rural communities, where many women received no education whatsoever. This

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<sup>188</sup> This calculation comes from community mapping exercises that gathered community census data on the size of individuals landholdings.

<sup>189</sup> See Ibáñez, Lindert, and Woolcock 2002.

<sup>190</sup> An exception is church groups, from which illiterate people do not feel excluded given extensive, inclusive evangelization efforts.

particularly applies to older women—very few female interviewees over 45 years of age had completed more than Second Grade, and the vast majority was illiterate.<sup>191</sup>

Partly because of the literacy gap, men have long dominated organizational life in rural Honduras. These communities are no exception.<sup>192</sup> No woman in any of these communities has ever led the *patronato* (Honduras) or COCODE (Guatemala). Men also dominate all organizations except explicitly female groups (weak in all four cases) and the APFs in Honduras, which embrace female participation because their main function is preparing school lunch.<sup>193</sup>

Even where communities had one or two female leaders participating because of their relatively higher education, gender dynamics still obstruct participation. One community discussed in Chapter Eight, Cafetales, for instance, had two female high school graduates who became active in the AECO. But the prevailing expectation that these women play second fiddle to their husbands stymied both participation in the AECO and other organizations. The husband of the first woman, Karolina, often works until the middle of the afternoon and neither she nor her husband feels comfortable leaving the house unattended, so she has stopped participating in organizations. This is consistent with many female interviewees who explain that they cannot participate because they must take care of their home and children while their husbands work and attend community meetings. Meanwhile, the other educated woman, Fátima, moved to a new community with her husband when he found a new job. Fátima's case is similar to many others across my case studies, where women follow their husband to wherever he can find

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<sup>191</sup> Having observed this trend impressionistically in my first three Honduran case studies, I separated male and female education levels in the community mapping exercise in Huertos (see Chapter Eight) and the Guatemalan cases. These exercise confirmed my impressions in the previous communities: female residents consistently had a lower median education level than men.

<sup>192</sup> See also Ibáñez, Lindert, and Woolcock 2002.

<sup>193</sup> Tables 19 and 22-25 further demonstrate how few organizations have included female leaders.

work. Now living far from Cafetales, she explained that she loves being a community leader, saying, “I carry it in my blood.” She has thus felt “tied down” without being able to be involved in her community.

While the factors described above obstructed adult participation in cases in both communities, there were also country-specific differences. The most salient difference was the particular cultural and linguistic background of Q'eqchi' communities. Alta Verapaz is a prime example of the social, political, and economic exclusion perpetrated against indigenous Guatemalan communities. Since independence, Q'eqchi' communities have faced repeated dispossession, forced labor, and repression by wealthy landlords and the state, culminating in genocide in the 1980s. These communities maintain considerable distrust for outsiders, including development workers and state officials who do not present themselves convincingly. Parents in the Guatemalan cases also acknowledged how recent waves of child theft for adoption rings and fraudulent visitors posing as development workers to steal money from communities reinforced distrust. This all contributes to a pervasive "defensive posture" (Handy 1994) among indigenous communities in the area—having been oppressed by outsiders for so long, there often remains a reluctance to work with other communities and state organizations, particularly if a material benefit is not readily apparent.

Moreover, the literacy and language barriers remain higher in Alta Verapaz. Unlike the residents of El Paraíso and most Honduran communities that obtained CMS schools, most Q'eqchi' people in my four cases did not understand or speak Spanish. Since most state business is still conducted in Spanish (even in COMUDE meetings in the municipal centers, translation remains quite limited), residents often cede leadership positions to those who at least understand Spanish.

Given a more powerful legacy of exclusion, illiteracy also remains higher in the Guatemalan cases. Illiteracy is particularly prevalent among women, and it is one reason given by both men and women for the frequency of all-male leadership committees. As one resident of Nima expressed, "Since the work is hard now, those in a committee should be able to read and write." Further probing in community discussions also suggested that men's jealousy made them uneasy about their wives joining organizations that could involve leaving the community, including the COEDUCA. This confirms other accounts of the extreme gender-related conservatism in Q'eqchi' communities.<sup>194</sup>

Finally, the one additional obstacle I observed in the Honduran communities was the presence of residents who worked as caretakers for large estates (especially those on coffee estates). In these communities, caretakers—who rarely had land or a home of their own in the community—almost never participated actively in community organizations. These individuals had less of a stake in the community, often identifying more with the community where they had grown up. One clear example of this occurred in Cafetales (a case analyzed in Chapter Eight), where caretakers were less interested in participating in a community water project that would bring potable water to all of the houses. Some caretakers reported that they were disinterested, because the house it would benefit was not their own. Meanwhile, others reported that estate owners, who did not themselves live in the house on the property, had no interest in home improvement for their caretakers that would require the caretakers diverting their labor to help build the system. This difference, however, is likely regional; large coffee estates would be less prevalent in other regions of Honduras. Furthermore, the absence of this

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<sup>194</sup> See García 2006. See also the UNDP's (2008) gender empowerment index rankings for Guatemala, which rates the north of Guatemala—which includes Alta Verapaz—lowest in the country.

dynamic in the Guatemalan cases may reflect the shift away from coffee production in Alta Verapaz and towards other types of crops, which require different labor patterns.

#### **IV. Obstacles to CMS Producing Spillovers and Impacting the Quality of Democracy**

In addition to general obstacles to civic and political participation, my case studies also revealed CMS-specific obstacles to individual- and community-level spillovers, and, by extension, any impact on the quality of democracy. These largely confirm the “obstacles” section of the theoretical framework outlined in Figure 3 of Chapter Two.

The first such obstacle was the program’s administrative focus. After reviewing PROHECO and PRONADE training materials since the programs' inception, observing trainings of PROHECO members (trainings ceased in Guatemala following PRONADE’s reversal), and interviewing program staff and parents, it became abundantly clear that both programs principally sought to ensure only parent councils’ basic administrative functionality: particularly parents’ ability to sign checks and contracts. Field staff made sure parents could sign documents and checks, but little else.

In both countries, CMS focused on ensuring that the principal leaders could perform basic administrative functions. In Guatemala, PRONADE devolved more administrative functions (including the purchase of more supplies and the setting of the school calendar), which required greater training. But, in both countries the reduced scope of parental participation often left the president and the treasurer, and the secretary in Guatemala, as the only active parent members. As one promoter in El Paraíso, Orlando, explained: “The AECOs are poorly structured. The president and treasurer take the community as their own, the secretary [remains] apart, the vice-president doesn’t function. The *fiscal* [oversight officer] is apathetic, and the *vocal* [at-

large member] does nothing.” This explanation is consistent with all eight cases, as well as shorter visits to other schools, where no more than four (and in most cases only two or three) school council members participated actively at any one time. Where most council members do so little, it is no surprise that CMS participation has little impact on their lives.

In short, the programs fell far short of their own lofty claims—outlined in Chapter One<sup>195</sup>—to be working toward increasing civic participation and serving as an incubator for democracy in remote communities. As even one of PRONADE’s most ardent defenders, former Education Minister Arabella Castro, acknowledged:

One of the biggest flaws in PRONADE was that there was not sufficient emphasis in the philosophy of making sure that the parents participated in the schools...The error was not assuring that the assemblies were *assemblies*—listening to the challenges for the upcoming academic year, listening to the school’s problems, and making decisions about how to resolve those problems. That didn’t happen...The program created the formality of the assemblies, but never assured that those assemblies were made in the way that democracy is understood.<sup>196</sup>

In Honduras, CMS’s predominantly administrative focus increased as schools aged. Intertemporal comparisons of each case study community reveal that parent councils had a broader sphere of action in the program’s early years. In the beginning, parents lobbied at government offices for a PROHECO teacher, recognition as a council, and later a formal classroom. Moreover, parent leaders in the program’s earlier periods received more training than subsequent leaders. My case studies consistently showed greater spillovers among members of the first (and, where there have been three

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<sup>195</sup> Recall, for instance, Durston’s (1999) assertions—copied verbatim in other PROHECO documents justifying the program—that the program contributed to the “strengthening of democracy and base-level civil society.”

<sup>196</sup> Personal interview with author and Alejandro Ganimian. July 23, 2009. Guatemala City, Guatemala.

AECOs, second) AECO than in the most recent AECO. Earlier leaders received more training, assumed greater responsibilities, and developed more experience in engaging with different state actors. Unsurprisingly, these parents revealed greater spillovers than subsequent leaders, whose AECO roles were far more limited. This was true even in the communities with higher signs of spillovers described in Chapter Eight, Huertos and Cafetales, where there was much more activity, much more training, and many more spillovers in initial periods. After two elections in all of these communities, the AECO became a mere check-signing entity, and the only people actively involved were the president and the treasurer (co-signers), and, less frequently, the secretary, who took minutes if there were ever meetings. As Anselmo of Huertos explained, “Now, these years, we’ve worked less.” (See Table 20 for data on declining meeting activity in these two communities, the only Honduran cases for which complete data were available.)<sup>197</sup>

Meanwhile, regular training and meetings remained a part of PRONADE until the program's demise, but Guatemalan and Honduran case studies alike indicate more demands on government in the early years. In Saq'e, for instance, the first two COEDUCAs applied to different government offices for a temporary classroom, desks, supplies, and a brick classroom. The subsequent COEDUCAs continued to meet regularly and attend trainings, but they never made another petition for external support. Similarly, in the Honduran community of Huertos, the first two AECOs visited various government offices to secure a teacher, government funds for a classroom, desks and a chalkboard, and a fence. They also secured a land donation from the peasant

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<sup>197</sup> Declining activity over time may be a feature of non-PROHECO schools, as well. After the initial work of acquiring a teacher and a school building and learning the program's basics, councils may settle into a less demanding role. But there is also a PROHECO-specific piece of the story. Over the years, training declined and promoters became content with more passive AECOs. The changing dynamics of state support provided a disincentive for parent rotation that could have stimulated further activity.

organization. The subsequent AECOs reported far fewer visits to government offices and proposals for smaller items.

**Table 20: Declining Meeting Frequency over Time in Huertos and Cafetales**

Year	Huertos	Cafetales
1999	6 (in five months, started in August)	N/A (council not yet formed)
2000	2	3 (in two months, started in November)
2001	5	1
2002	6	1
2003	2	7
2004	9	11
2005	7	2
2006	4	5
2007	1	3
2008	0	2
2009 (through September/October)	0	1

*Source: AECO meeting minutes.*

In part, later councils became victims of their predecessors' success. Initial leaders had already acquired the most significant items—a teacher and a classroom. As Vicente from Huertos explained, once the school was being built, “from there, since the work had begun, we started to rest more. At the beginning, it was a lot more work.” Declining activity over time also appears to reflect both PROHECO and PRONADE’s greater allocation of resources, particularly in the early years, to focus on expanding coverage as much as possible. Both PROHECO and PRONADE placed a premium on creating new schools by placing teachers, rather than further developing infrastructure in existing schools. One early PRONADE slogan, recalled by a number of former officials, exemplified this focus: “*primero el servicio, luego el edificio*” (first the service, then the

building). From the perspective of state officials trying to demonstrate expanded education coverage, it made sense that PRONADE and PROHECO sought first to place a teacher in each community before focusing on infrastructure development and school improvement.

Still, declining parent activity and spillovers was also related to another factor—low turnover. Where parent councils re-elected the same leaders, they tended to stagnate. In some cases, parent leaders clung to positions of power. But, in others, different parents kept insisting that the same leaders maintain their position, due to their greater skills and experience. Where human capital was scarce—and particularly in Honduras, where training was limited—this response made perfect sense. But, in both cases, leaders who had served for many years, such as Manuel and Carlos in Frutales and Feliciano and Gonzalo in Saq'e, became worn out. The marginal benefit of their leadership, both for themselves and for the community, diminished over time.

It remains difficult, however, to parse out the impact of declining activity and low rotation in leadership. This analysis suggests that both factors reduce the likelihood of spillovers, but I explore these competing hypotheses in greater detail in Chapter Nine.

In addition to the administrative focus, resource scarcity also plagued both CMS programs. In Honduras, interviews with PROHECO staff at all levels demonstrated that resource shortages had, since at least 2005, led to irregular payments of program staff. Promoters who had not been paid for months often refused to visit communities because such visits implied out-of-pocket expenses. Resource shortages also reduced training provision. El Paraíso promoters report that there has only been one training for AECOs in their department since the beginning of 2006. In 2009, budget problems related to the political crisis caused scheduled trainings to be cut in most of the country.

Meanwhile, in Guatemala, parents reported consistent delayed and cancelled financial transfers in recent years. This began near PRONADE's end, and it has now continued after the conversion of these schools into traditional public schools. Parents are still responsible for administering the funds for food and supplies for the school, but the funds have not been forthcoming. Two months into the 2010 school year, for instance, the first transfer had not come. Parents were disgruntled and disillusioned that the government was failing them. The council also found itself unable to exercise one of its sole remaining functions.

An additional constraint on demand-making is the municipality's limited role in CMS. When members of these communities manage to express their needs, their natural first point of encounter is the municipality. Other government offices are farther away, more expensive to reach, and parents do not know how to access them. Initially, CMS proponents framed the program as part of a broader decentralization strategy. But, as critics point out, the municipalities have no formal role in these CMS systems, a symptom of generally weak decentralization in each country's education system (PREAL 2003; Rápalo 2003; MERECE and SE-SEFIN 2009). Parents can request support for small things like paint or cement, but these municipalities possess few resources to meet such needs. Ultimately, parents find themselves in a limited arena for local action. Moreover, my case studies made it clear that, once applications to the municipality were unsuccessful, parents were unlikely to find other sources of support.

The macro-political dynamics presented in Chapter Four—clientelism in Honduras and polarization and reversal in Guatemala—also obstructed spillovers. This follows the theoretical model in Chapter Two, as well.

As described above, the pattern of promoters hiring teachers, and doing so along party lines, undermines a basic tenet of the PROHECO model. These partisan incursions further reduced the scope of parent action—stripping councils of one of the key distinguishing features of PROHECO—and discouraged parents. As Fátima, a former parent leader in Cafetales explained, “Politics damages PROHECO. Through politics they put in anybody. Now one gets disillusioned, because they don’t comply with the manuals, so one doesn’t want to do as much.”

In Guatemala, rumors of parent-teacher conflict in PRONADE were rife. Parents and teachers in every community I visited had heard of teachers paying (or being obligated to pay) parents one month’s salary to sign their contracts. This problem was evidently widespread enough that parents recalled receiving trainings in PRONADE’s later years that emphasized that parents should never demand or accept payment from teachers to sign a contract, as this bribe would reduce parental autonomy. Meanwhile, teachers expressed resentment with being at the whim of sometimes abusive parents. Parents, meanwhile, frequently used language of “*patron-obrero*”—boss-worker, the same language that was used to describe the relationship of farm owners to them—to describe the power that PRONADE gave them over teachers. Thus, though my case study communities in Guatemalan revealed no cases of bribes-for-jobs, there was clearly a different power dynamic in the schools in Alta Verapaz than that in my Honduran cases—one that appeared congruent with an exploitative set of labor relations that long dominated the region.

In Saq’e, the former president recounted how one teacher—whose performance he had found sub-par—called a parents’ meeting behind his back to get “community approval” to re-hire him. In Yaab, meanwhile, parents came into conflict with a teacher who was an alcoholic, ultimately firing him. And, in one of the two cases described in the next

chapter—Chahim—parents came into conflict with a teacher who made sexual advances on a female student. After the local MINEDUC offices removed him, community meeting minutes show that he came back and threatened to impregnate the girl if they did not give him his job back. Even in the Guatemalan case with the most harmonious teacher-parent relationships—Nima—teachers reiterated their dissatisfaction with their vulnerability under PRONADE and parents commented that they had felt like the “patrón” of teachers.

Moreover, the reversal of PRONADE has, of course, removed the possibility of finding new spillovers from CMS participation. But more important than the end of PRONADE *per se* is what has replaced it. In terms of parental participation, the answer is: nothing. COEDUCAs have transformed into the parent councils in traditional public schools, with curtailed responsibilities—they no longer hire or pay the teacher, monitor teacher attendance, or have input into the school calendar. In all four Guatemalan cases, parents meet less than they ever did during PRONADE, and they mostly just show up at the school when the teacher needs something from them. Moreover, while the Colombian government created a program, Mi Familia Aprende, to continue training parents after PRONADE’s demise, this program was eliminated after little more than a year.<sup>198</sup> In short, the reversal of PRONADE has dramatically reduced parents’ roles, and parents have responded by retreating from participation in the school. Unsurprisingly, interviews with parents in the new councils indicate virtually no spillovers from their participation (see Chapter Eight for more on this comparison).

Finally, these cases suggest the importance of pre-existing organizational life for the incidence of spillovers from PG. As described in Chapter Two, scholars have

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<sup>198</sup> Liliana Aldana, former national director of MFA. Personal interview with author. March 26, 2010. Guatemala City, Guatemala. Frida Stwolinsky, former coordinator of MFA in Alta Verapaz. Personal interview with author. January 15, 2010. Cobán, Guatemala.

consistently found that PG initiatives are more likely to produce spillovers where there is strong existing civil society. These first four cases confirm that individuals' experiences in prior organizations proved very helpful to perform CMS tasks and forge functional organizations. These prior experiences also helped resist partisan incursions in Honduras, even if resistance was individual rather than collective. Prior experience aided the functionality and autonomy of parent councils, both of which increased the odds for spillovers. But, of course, most council members had little or no such previous experience, a further reason that only a minority of parents exhibited spillovers. I discuss the importance of prior organizational participation for spillovers further in Chapter Nine.

## **V. Conclusion**

Chapter Five presented an empirical puzzle. On the one hand, descriptive statistics from the cross-national survey demonstrated that most parents did not exhibit substantial spillovers. On the other hand, the data revealed a non-trivial minority of parents who did experience such spillovers. In that chapter, I concluded that CMS did produce spillovers, but that certain material and program-related obstacles prevented this from happening to most participating parents. The qualitative evidence presented in this chapter has supported part of this explanation. Namely, I have demonstrated how the following factors reduced spillovers in the case study communities: CMS' administrative focus, resource constraints and the related shortage of training (especially in Honduras), lack of turnover in leadership, the absence of a municipal role in the program, patronage capture in Honduras and reversal in Guatemala, and weak pre-existing rural civil society in both areas.

The evidence connecting these factors to lower levels of parental participation and spillovers supports the theoretical framework developed in Chapter Two to connect PG to stronger civil society. In particular, the cases in this chapter suggest that these obstacles prevent CMS participation from engendering sufficient political capabilities to strengthen civil society. Figure 3 summarized findings from the PG literature, which cautions one about how destructive factors like clientelism, resource constraints, and limited training can be. Analyses from PG initiatives from Brazil to Indonesia illustrated the potential damage wrought by unsupportive or predatory states actors, under-funding, and top-down program designs that pay only lip-service to ideas of “participation.”

The cases in this chapter have shown that, in CMS in Honduras and Guatemala, many of these factors “block” the step in the causal diagram from PG to stronger civil society. CMS shows how limited autonomy and resources (for training, for example) for participants can undermine a PG initiative’s efforts to produce spillover effects and strengthen civil society. In PRONADE and PROHECO, parents’ scope to shape the participatory forum and its decisions remained quite narrow. Moreover, state support remained inadequate to teach and support parents to strengthen organizations, expand their roles, and gain sufficient individual and collective skills and resources to strengthen organizational life in their communities.

The obstacles introduced above help explain the relative infrequency of spillovers presented in the quantitative data in Chapter Five. The case studies in this chapter have allowed me to go beyond this quantitative finding, however, to show that, even where a few parents per community learning basic skills for participating in organizations and submitting small requests for help to local authorities, the impact of this learning has remained minimal. After CMS’s creation, there has been little reinforcement of this learning, virtually no coordination between organizations and communities, and a

preponderance of shadow organizations. Moreover, CMS prompted no talk of rights and provided virtually no mechanisms to hold elected officials or program staff more accountable for delivering services to these communities. Where CMS introduced accountability measures over teachers, macro-political realities (patronage in Honduras, and reversal in Guatemala) overturned them, leaving the parents powerless to effect community change through the school councils.

In short, these first four cases illustrate how elements of program design and political context can hinder a particular PG initiative's capacity to have its desired effect on civic participation. These blockages mean that, despite the CMS intervention, these community case studies (and, based on the descriptive statistics, most CMS communities) reveal significant continuity in how rural communities organize themselves, which (male) figures lead them, and how they interact with the state. Where these obstacles crop up, CMS' impacts on rural civil society thus remain negligible.

And yet, these types of constraints are not entirely deterministic. As mentioned earlier, the evidence in Chapter Five suggests substantial spillovers among a non-trivial minority of participants, demonstrating that these obstacles can be overcome. Thus, having explored these first four cases to understand why and how parents in most communities *do not* exhibit spillovers, the following chapter turns to cases that uncover the dynamics of CMS participation in the minority of communities where spillovers *do* occur. Chapter Eight will present two cases in each country that illustrate how CMS can produce fairly widespread spillovers.

## 8. CASE STUDIES WITH CLEAR SPILLOVERS AND THE IMPACT ON RURAL CIVIL SOCIETY

The cases presented below suggest that, despite the obstacles outlined in Chapter Seven, political capabilities spillovers remain possible from CMS. These communities confirmed the obstacles described above, while providing more frequent cases of individuals learning to participate in organizations, engaging with external actors, and becoming more actively involved in their communities' organizational life. This chapter will proceed with a similar structure to Chapter Seven, first presenting introductions (see Table 21) and outlining individual- and community-level outcomes, before interpreting these results. I will also compare these outcomes with those from the best available control groups and discuss the methodological difficulties with such comparisons.

### I. The Second Four Cases

**Huertos** lies in the heart of Honduras's coffee-production land; its residents are smallholding coffee producers. In the 1980s, several community members joined a peasant organization. They subsequently occupied underutilized private land in the area and gained collective title with help from a national peasant organization. The peasant group leaders became the community's principal leaders. Fifteen years later, with the help of Vicente, the first AECO president, and a local education official, they acquired a school. In the school's early years, Vicente faced criticism for lack of consultation. He ceded power to Eric and Anselmo, two leaders of the land occupation, who have controlled AECO matters ever since.

Despite early problems with internal democracy in the AECO, certain initial members exhibited substantial spillovers: increased skills and confidence, both of which they then

applied by participating in other organizations. Several also had their first experiences making demands on state officials. In addition, this community offers the only case in this study of collective resistance to partisan meddling by PROHECO staff.

Nearby in coffee country lies the youngest case study community, **Cafetales**. For decades, the land belonged to one owner. When he died in the late 1990s, his heirs moved to the area to build a community. Acquiring the school was an important part of this process. Led by a group of men, Cafetales became independent to obtain the school and request that the state provide them with other services, such as a road and running water.

The first two groups of leaders of Cafetales' AECO offer the clearest Honduran case of spillovers. Several leaders learned basic organizational skills and became more confident in their ability to participate and lead. With rotation in the AECO leadership and information passed on to the new council members, new leaders emerged in the community. They have subsequently participated in the community's other new organizations.

**Chahim** sits in a hot, low-lying area approximately 90 minutes from Cobán, Guatemala. The community's land was owned by a wealthy farmer until the early 2000s, when he died and the residents—almost all members of one extended family—won the land as compensation for the decades they had served as workers with negligible salaries. In 1997, residents found out about PRONADE and went to the municipal office to request a school. With permission from the then-landlord to build a school on some of the land, they obtained a school. Since obtaining the school, the COEDUCA has had five presidents and a great deal of leadership rotation.

Over half of the former COEDUCA members gained organizational skills through their participation, and over a third learned limited political skills, such as how to submit proposals to government, while almost as many have applied new skills to other organizations. Moreover, the COEDUCA has opened up participation to newcomers, though women have only participated as marginal, at-large members. No at large members learned any new skills or gained important organizational experiences. Among the men, however, the COEDUCA has increased several participants' involvement and leadership of organizations.

**Nima** is this study's largest community, with nearly 80 households. The community formed in 1996 when the national Land Fund (*Fondo de Tierras*) helped peasants already working the land and others from nearby communities purchase the farm and form their new community. The existing (male) leaders then created the requisite organizations for their community—most importantly, the CPM. The CPM's first act was to seek a teacher; within a year, they had PRONADE's support. Since then, the community has developed a strong ethic of participation. As one teacher, comparing the community to various other PRONADE communities where she has worked, explained: “where people most participate, it's here.”

Being a larger community, Nima had a larger pool of potential participants for the COEDUCA; accordingly, Nima has had more COEDUCA members than any other community in this study. Almost half of these participants demonstrated organizational learning, while nearly as many showed political learning, and one-third applied learning to other organizations. Moreover, the COEDUCA has increased the active participation and leadership of various members, while also sustaining prior leaders' involvement. Since PRONADE's arrival, several new organizations also sprouted up.

Table 21: Selected Features of The Second Four Case Study Communities

Community	Networks Index Score for Case Selection (0 - 3)	Number of Households	Population	Median Adult Education (grades completed)	Principal Crops	Services in the Community
<i>Huertos</i>	2	34	159	4.5	Corn, beans, produce, coffee (enough for sale)	Solid latrines, no electricity, no running water (for most of community), public transportation
<i>Cafetales</i>	3	29	140	3	Corn, beans, produce, coffee (enough for sale)	Solid latrines, running water, no electricity, no public transportation
<i>Chabim</i>	3	30	144	0 (2 for men; 0 for women)	Crops: corn, beans, chiles, cardamom. (just a bit of coffee for self-consumption)	No electricity, no running water, no solid latrines. Access to public transport (not when school started)
<i>Nima</i>	3	77	443	0 (0 for men; .5 for women) <sup>199</sup>	Corn; Beans; Wood; Cattle (the latter two only possible because of Fondo de Tierras purchase). Substantial debt.	No electricity, no solid latrines, but, yes, running water. Also access to public transport (not when school started)

*Source: Survey data from 2007 provided networks index scores. I conducted community mapping exercises in each community to gather the remaining data reported here.*

<sup>199</sup> I did not do a map and census in Nima, because a map and community records already existed. Education data is based on 40 respondents. If anything, given that most of these people had some COEDUCA role, this should be higher than the overall average, as more educated people, if available, usually assume organizational leadership roles.

## II. Case Study Results

### *a. Organizational and Political Learning*

These pairs of cases demonstrate far more individual learning than the cases presented for each country in Chapter Seven. In each of these communities, several parents explained how they had, often for the first time, learned to participate in community organizations and engage with external actors. As predicted by the descriptive statistics analysis in Chapter Five and the obstacles to spillovers presented in Chapter Seven, these spillovers accrue only to a minority of parents. Their prevalence among substantial numbers of these parents, however, demonstrates that obstacles to participation and learning do not operate deterministically.

Huertos exhibits slightly more learning than the other Honduran cases presented in Chapter Seven. Four former AECO members report similar learning, and at least two applied this learning to participation in other organizations. The first AECO president, Vicente, explained: “First I learned to manage checks, to sign better at the bank, to manage the funds for supplies, and to know how to take care of the school.” The former vice-president, Fredy, added, “Our capacity increased, because the trainings helped us a lot...I didn’t know how to organize a meeting.” Furthermore, the former treasurer, Raúl, explained the impact PROHECO had on him: “You gain experience...It has helped me later to participate in other organizations...[Before participating], you feel shame, and now I can speak with people. Also, now I can work with numbers, with checks, now I have experience. Before, I didn’t know much about that, so it has helped me a lot.” Like the former treasurer, three other AECO members learned to visit and make demands of state offices, learning that they applied to subsequent participation in

other organizations.<sup>200</sup> And, in a clear sign of how PROHECO participation has facilitated increased visits to and demands on state officials, the former secretary, Ophelio, explained, “Now we know where the offices are.”

Cafetales revealed the most learning among the Honduran cases. Two more recent members—both women—reported learning basic organizational skills, but neither has applied them to other organizations like the community council (*patronato*) or water committee. Meanwhile, four of the initial council members—all men, three of whom received training—reported learning how to administer the program and become stronger leaders. Fernando, for instance, explained that he learned to pay the teachers and manage the financial account, while the initial oversight officer, Florencio, asserted, “Bit by bit one acquires experience, develops...Leaders are made.” Two of these four initial leaders also reported applying their learning to other organizations. These two leaders, however, were already the community’s strongest, so one should not overstate this gain.

Chahim's parents learned a great deal from participating in the school council. More than half of the community’s 20 COEDUCA members—rotation was quite high in this community—demonstrated that they had learned organizational skills, including organizing meetings and financial skills. Most of those who gained these skills also gained confidence in their ability to participate vocally in community meetings. Moreover, over half of these members also learned how to formulate community proposals and present them to local government officials, and five members applied their learning to participation in other organizations. Since PRONADE’s arrival in the community,

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<sup>200</sup> This number includes one member who already visited government offices to present community proposals, but gained significant experience as a school council leader.

proposals on behalf of the school and the community have increased in quantity and quality, as parents seeking support have learned the rules of the game.

More parents (twelve) reported learning organizational and political skills in Nima than in any other community in this study. Perhaps because it was much larger than other communities I visited (and most PRONADE communities), COEDUCA rotation was very high. The COEDUCA also engaged in frequent demand-making, applying to the municipality and other regional government offices for classrooms, desks, a basketball court, additional teachers, and a library. Parents learned about how organizations worked and how to petition government. The first president, Jacobo, recalled learning “how to wake up,” while the last treasurer recounted learning “how to organize the community, how to inculcate them to be participants in the community.” Another former president added that he learned to “work together and to allow yourself to be supported by your other companions.”

Eight COEDUCA members have also applied these skills to other organizations, especially the COCODE. As Moisés, former COEDUCA secretary and treasurer said of the benefits of his COEDUCA experience: “now things [in the COCODE] are easier for me.” The COCODE now has very regular meetings (roughly once a month in recent years), mostly to resolve interpersonal conflicts and, on various occasions, to plan to apply for government support. More than any other organization in the community’s history, the COEDUCA provided a structured organizational environment where parents gained important skills for participating in this type of organization.

Without question, the cases presented here display greater individual-level learning than those in Chapter Seven. More parents exhibited learning skills for participating in organizations and submitting demands to government and applying these skills to other

organizations (for a summary of these results, see Appendix D). Skills acquisition and application again appeared highest among those with positions of greater authority, but CMS in these communities also engendered skills development among newcomers to community organizations. Unlike the cases in Chapter Seven, these cases suggest that CMS helped develop a critical mass of parents with experience in, and skills pertaining to, fostering a civic organization.

*b. Civic and Political Networks*

As with learning, the four cases presented here demonstrate substantial evidence of individual spillovers related to networks. In each community, a substantial minority of participants in CMS councils were first-time participants, and several council members have subsequently increased their participation and leadership in other organizations. Moreover, while some parents expressed exhaustion or disillusionment after serving on the school council (more so in Guatemala—see Chapter Nine), the more common trend was for the councils to sustain prior participation and leadership. Each community also increased its organizational density subsequent to CMS' arrival.<sup>201</sup> Below, I describe these outcomes, before questioning whether they altered these communities' organizational landscapes.

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<sup>201</sup> One point about community size is worth noting. It seems reasonable to expect that spillovers to other organizations are more likely in larger communities with a greater number of (or potential for) other organizations. After all, it seems reasonable to expect an upper bound of organizations (and, by extension, leadership positions) for these small communities. Time and resource constraints would render it difficult, for instance, for a community of 30 households to have, say, a half-dozen thriving organizations. This may differ from other instances of PG in urban or peri-urban areas, where greater human and material resources exist to support CSOs. I discuss this point further below, but for now it bears mention that my cases suggest that, while a larger community such as Nima certainly had a broader pool of potential participants, a larger community appears to be neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for the occurrence of spillovers. Nor did quantitative analysis indicate statistically significant relationships between community size and spillovers in the survey dataset.

In Huertos, the AECO fostered greater civic engagement than in the first two Honduran communities. Three parents had their first organizational experience in the AECO and subsequently increased their participation in other organizations. In addition to feeling more confident in visiting government offices and submitting proposals, they have taken on stronger leadership roles in the community. Raúl reported that he organizes community meetings more frequently than he did before, and “now, I’ve even given talks to the community. Now, they’ve given training so that one can educate the people in the community.” Two of these leaders have also participated in creating new organizations, though they did not specifically attribute this to changes stemming from AECO participation. In addition, Eric and Anselmo, two of the community’s founding leaders, have created and led other organizations after the AECO. This was not attributable to the AECO, however, as they both explained that they had been “formed” as leaders well before joining the AECO. PROHECO has sustained, rather than engendered, their participation and leadership.<sup>202</sup>

In addition to certain individuals in the community strengthening their leadership, Huertos has developed a richer organizational life than it previously had. As Table 22 shows, four new organizations sprang up since the school was created: a *patronato*, a Caja Rural, a defense committee, and a Water Committee. While residents agreed with one mother’s assessment that “the *patronato* here doesn’t do anything” and that the defense committee never functioned, the other two organizations continued to meet frequently and residents felt they remained strong.

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<sup>202</sup> This is another case of qualitative work revealing more than quantitative work. From the survey data, one can only glean that these leaders created other organizations after joining the AECO, and might wrongly surmise this to be *caused by* AECO participation.

**Table 22: Summary of Huertos' Organizational History, Sorted by Founding Year<sup>203</sup>**

Organization	Founding Year	Number of Female Leaders?	Strength	Support from external actors
<i>Catholic Church</i>	1982	1	Only focused on spiritual ministry	None
<i>Peasant Organization (men's)</i>	1984	0	Weak (once strong)	Land; coffee project
<i>Peasant Organization (women's)</i>	1991	9	Weak	To get authorization to use land
<i>AHPROCAFE (coffee organization)</i>	pre-AECO; re-formed in 2003	0	Strong	Road
<i>AECO</i>	1999	0	Strong	Teacher, land, classroom, desks, blackboard, fence, cocina/bodega, paint, polish and plaster
<i>Defensa Ciudadana (security group)</i>	2001 or 2002	1	Weak	None
<i>Caja Rural (credit group)</i>	2003	1	Strong	Loans
<i>Patronato (community council)</i>	Approx. 2003	1	Weak	Plastering school
<i>Comité de Agua (water committee)</i>	2009	1	Strong	Water project

*Sources: group discussion with community leaders; review of community records*

Huertos, however, raises the question of whether one can attribute these changes to the PROHECO experience. Becoming an independent *caserío* to form the school

<sup>203</sup> As in Chapter Seven, I list organizations according to founding year to highlight which organizations emerged after the school council.

undoubtedly paved the way for further organizations, which created space for potentially greater participation by parents. But, while interviews revealed individual changes from AECO participation, these community changes reflected the process of becoming independent—and creating similar organizations to the ones that existed in the neighboring community that previously subsumed it—more than something particular about the PROHECO experience. In addition, in reviewing the community's prior organizational life, the peasant organization in the 1980s generated more spillovers among participants than the AECO. Residents involved (all men) in these early struggles learned skills, became more involved in community affairs, became popular educators in peasant literacy programs, made demands on various government offices, and protested to raise national peasant issues. They also became more discerning citizens—eschewing blind party loyalty and participating in the formation of a new political party. These men remain the community's principal leaders, a situation unchanged by the experience with PROHECO.

Meanwhile, in Cafetales organizational life strengthened after PROHECO's inception. As one former AECO president, Eduardo, declared: "Everything starts with the school." His uncle, Ángel, also a former AECO president, explained, "For a long time, [all the proposals from this community] began as AECO proposals...The AECO would manage whatever project came to the community." The four men most involved in the first two AECOs now feel more confident as community leaders. Two reported that their experience in PROHECO increased the frequency and quality of their proposals to government offices, and they both feel more confident leading community meetings. Eduardo also recounted how his AECO experience encouraged him to take leadership positions that he had previously rejected: "I think that you make yourself through participating in an organization—becoming able to express yourself in front of everyone

else...In Veredas [my previous community], they nominated me to be president of a group. I didn't know how to express myself, and I said, "What am I going to do?" After joining the AECO, Eduardo felt able to assume such positions, and he and another AECO leader have both done so. As in Huertos, the two strongest initial community leaders, Ángel and Fernando, have also led other organizations after their AECO participation, a sign of sustained, but not new, civic engagement.

Gains from this participation, however, have remained concentrated among already established, male leaders. While the AECO attracted four new participants to community organizations, all of whom were women, only one subsequently participated in other organizations. Moreover, her role remained minimal, a point to which I return below and in Chapter Nine.

Cafetales certainly experienced organizational thickening. After forming the school, these leaders formed a *patronato*, security committee, environment committee, a coffee producers' group, a microcredit group (*caja rural*), and water committee (see Table 23). The first three organizations, however, have become inactive. In the words of Ángel, "Now we have organizations that have *directivas* on paper, but in reality, no." As in other communities, the community formed these to fulfill demands of the municipality to exist independently.

Still, unlike in Frutales and Perales, three new organizations in Cafetales remain strong—the coffee producers' group, the *caja rural*, and the water committee. The first two are for private production, while the latter was busy beginning to build the infrastructure for a new water system during my visits. Comparing the table with Cafetales' organizational history with the table for Huertos, it also becomes clear that more new organizations emerged in Cafetales after the AECO. Moreover, Cafetales residents were convinced

that the school was essential to the flowering of the community's organizational life, whereas Huertos had prior organizational experiences (especially the peasant organization) that exerted a greater influence on the community's organizational life.

**Table 23: Summary of Cafetales' Organizational History, Sorted by Founding Year<sup>204</sup>**

Organization	Founding Year	Number of Female Leaders	Strength	Support from external actors
<i>AECO</i>	2001	2	Weak	Road, classroom, kitchen, fence
<i>Patronato</i>	2001	0	Weak	Road, classroom, kitchen, fence
<i>APF (parents' association)</i>	2002	0	Weak	None
<i>Defensa Ciudadana (defense group)</i>	2002	0	Weak	None
<i>Comité de Salud (health committee)</i>	2002	0	Weak	None
<i>Junta de Agua (water committee)</i>	2006	0	Strong	Water and sanitation Project
<i>Comité de medio ambiente (environment committee)</i>	2006	0	Weak	None
<i>Caja Rural (credit group)</i>	2007	1	Strong	Loan from FUNDER
<i>Junta Local Rural de Café (coffee group)</i>	2008	0	Strong	Road

*Sources: group discussion with community leaders; review of community records*

Chahim's COEDUCA offered an important channel for new participants in community affairs, as eight members had never before participated in an organization. Nonetheless, only presidents, treasurers, or secretaries—who had usually received at least some formal education, and none of whom were women—reported learning from their experience. Of this smaller group, two men, Alán and Camilo, have gone on to become COCODE leaders; both explained that their COEDUCA experience was critical for providing the

<sup>204</sup> No churches are listed because Cafetales residents attend churches in adjacent communities.

skills and confidence necessary to take on these community leadership positions. One other leader, the initial COEDUCA president, Aníbal, has also increased his participation in community organizations, now representing the community at a local indigenous conflict resolution organization (*alcaldía indígena*). In addition to these three, whose participation and leadership increased with COEDUCA participation, three COEDUCA leaders with prior organizational experience subsequently became leaders of other organizations—principally the COCODE and the CUC (peasant organization).

But, while the community diversified its (male) leadership base, the COEDUCA's impact on the community's organizational life remains questionable. As illustrated in Table 24, four new organizations have emerged since the COEDUCA formed—the COCODE, the women's committee, a secondary school support committee, and a *Comité de Unidad Campesina* (CUC) group. The women's committee here has been fairly active, repeatedly submitting proposals for zinc roofing sheets to the municipality. The CUC group has been even more active, obtaining a small building for a pigsty and applying for a henhouse, as well as participating in CUC protests in Alta Verapaz and other departments to advocate for peasants' rights. These activities mark significant changes from how the community operated in the 1980s and the 1990s. They do not, however, principally reflect the COEDUCA experience. While COEDUCA learning and confidence gains may have helped participants in these groups, the COCODE and women's committees—as well as the more recent secondary school committee—were government creations.

The community's organizational life remains dictated by local state actors, with the one exception being a land committee that resurrected one formed by peasants to protect their land claim in the 1980s. Land was the first thing that motivated Chahim residents to organize outside of the state's counter-insurgency PAC and CPM. Upon hearing

rumors that the landlord was planning to sell his land, peasants went to a peasant organization, *Asociación Unidad Indígena Campesina del Norte* (United Association of Northern Indigenous Farmers, UNICAN), in Cobán, which encouraged them to form a committee and go before the national land agency to establish their right to remain on the land and eventually purchase it. These otherwise deferential peasants went behind the landlord's back in the late 1980s to defend their right to the land, illustrating land issues' distinctive capacity to trigger community organization. Similarly, residents formed the CUC group after the landlord's death to force his heirs to honor his promise of granting Chahim's residents with land for time served. This organizational experience was not due to parents' experience on the COEDUCA.

Similar to Chahim, Nima's COEDUCA was only the third organization, following the CPM and the first land committee, in which residents could participate. Eight COEDUCA members in Nima were newcomers to community organizations. Five of these eight then went on to participate in other organizations. One of these five was a woman, Adriana, who served as COEDUCA treasurer. Consistent with the survey evidence on the scarcity of female participation in Chapter Five, Nima was my only Guatemalan case where women served in the principal COEDUCA roles (another woman, Mariana, served as secretary). Adriana went on to become the women's committee president, submitting proposals to the mayor's office and even introducing a large public gathering when the mayor visited the community. The initial COEDUCA leaders were men with prior organizational experience; they have sustained their leadership after leaving the COEDUCA. The COEDUCA also served as a formative leadership experience for three new participants—Adriana and former secretaries Ernesto and Vinicio—who have gone on to play leadership roles in other organizations.

**Table 24: Summary of Chahim's Organizational History, Sorted by Founding Year**

<b>Organization</b>	<b>Founding Year</b>	<b>Number of Female Leaders</b>	<b>Strength</b>	<b>Support from external actors</b>
<i>CPM (community improvement committee)</i>	Early 1980s	0	Weak	No
<i>PAC (civil defense patrols)</i>	Early 1980s	0	Only patrolled	No, though subsequent compensation
<i>Catholic Church</i>	1985 (prayer group existed before)	Cofrades are married couples	Only focused on spiritual ministry	No
<i>ADOC (legal entity for land)</i>	1985	0	Strong, but short-lived	UNICAN (peasant organization), Ministry of Labor
<i>Pentecostal Church</i>	1990	Leaders are married couples	Only focused on spiritual ministry	No
<i>COEDUCA</i>	1997	0 principal leaders; 5 at-large council members	Strong	Temporary classroom, solid classroom (municipality, PRONADE)
<i>COCODE (community development council)</i>	2005	0	Strong	Solid classroom; secondary school
<i>CUC (peasant group)</i>	2005	0	Strong	Securing land title, with help of CUC
<i>Women's Committee</i>	2006	all (7)	Moderate	Unsuccessful proposals to municipality
<i>Secondary School (Telesecundaria) committee</i>	2009	0	Weak	No, formed in response to COCODE obtaining this program

*Sources: group discussion with community leaders; review of community records*

As in Chahim, Nima's COEDUCA served as an incubator for individual organizational and demand-making skills, but did not alter how Nima organized itself and engaged with outside actors. Nima's foundational moment was its land purchase, which brought

several communities together into one. Prior to this, residents could not form organizations. As one elder explained, “he [the landlord] was the owner of the land, and so we couldn’t organize ourselves.” Jacobo, the first COEDUCA president, similarly insisted that “only communities that got away from the landlord organized themselves.”

Immediately upon obtaining land, the new community formed by creating a development council and, soon thereafter, a school council. Of the organizations that followed (see Table 25), the health committee, women’s committee, and secondary school (*Telesecundaria*) committee emerged through government imperatives. Another organization formed in response to the possibility of a community project with European Union funds.

The community has also flirted with joining three different peasant organizations. This did not reflect parents’ COEDUCA experience, but simply that the better-connected leaders heard that these organizations could help them with the community’s multi-million Quetzal land debt. Like Chahim’s residents, several men of Nima have joined protests in recent years, but they have more recently pulled back from peasant organizations because they have not perceived material benefits from their participation.

In sum, Nima’s increased organizational density has more to do with the community’s recent establishment than with the COEDUCA experience. The community formed organizations in response to offers of help, principally from government programs, rather than taking the initiative to form groups themselves. State support proved more forthcoming here than in any other community in this study for three apparent reasons: 1) the community’s size, 2) its relative proximity and accessibility from Cobán, and 3) the apparent tendency for *Fondo de Tierra* communities to receive follow-up support—uncommon in similar communities—to ensure that the land transfer will not fail.

**Table 25: Summary of Nima's Organizational History, Sorted by Founding Year**

<b>Organization</b>	<b>Founding Year</b>	<b>Number of Female Leaders</b>	<b>Strength</b>	<b>Support from external actors</b>
<i>Catholic Church</i>	1960s	Cofrades are married couples	Only focused on spiritual ministry	No
<i>PAC</i>	Early 1980s	0	Only patrolled	No, though subsequent compensation
<i>CPM</i>	1994	0	Was strong	Land Fund for land purchase, PRONADE for school
<i>COEDUCA</i>	1997	2 (1 treasurer and 1 secretary); 1 at-large member	Was strong	Desks, classrooms, teachers, library (from municipality, FIS, FONAPAZ, and PRONADE)
<i>Asociacion Integral (production group)</i>	2000	0	Weak	never
<i>COCODE</i>	2004	0	Strong	School improvement, road, soccer field (municipality, ministry of culture and sports)
<i>CONIC (peasant organization)</i>	2006	0	Weak	Sought help from peasant organization with land debt (unsuccessful)
<i>Protestant Church</i>	2006	Leaders are married couples	Only focused on spiritual ministry	No
<i>Health Council</i>	2006	0	Strong	Cafesano organizes them to have local health guardians, midwife, and council
<i>UWOC (peasant organization)</i>	2007	0	Weak	Sought help from peasant organization with land debt (unsuccessful)
<i>Women's Committee</i>	2007	all	Moderate	Stoves (FIS), zinc roofing (municipality). Applied with COCODE.
<i>UCG (peasant organization)</i>	2008	0	Weak	Sought help from peasant organization with land debt (unsuccessful)

*Sources: group discussion with community leaders; review of community records*

Considered together, these cases illustrate how CMS involvement can increase individuals' involvement in—and capacity for leadership of—community organizations. Substantial numbers of participants—especially in the Guatemalan cases, where rotation was higher—gained confidence in their ability to participate and lead and subsequently took on roles in other organizations. (For a visual aid, see Appendix D for comparative figures for these cases). Though new organizations often emerged in response to other external factors—e.g., state requirements—the CMS experience enabled individuals to assume new responsibilities and expand their participation in community affairs. Still, while there has been a “thickening” of civil society—i.e., more groups—after the arrival of CMS in these communities, CMS itself was not a “game-changer” for civic and political networks in these communities. Organizations' formation continued to be primarily determined by state requirements and land interests, as was true since at least the 1980s. Moreover, the only connections between organizations was either mandated by the state—through the COCODE system, for example—or as part of a peasant organization network, neither of which can be attributed to CMS participation.

*c. Patterns of Political Representation*

My case studies touched on patterns of political representation in different ways in each country. In Honduras, the patronage story was the most prevalent, and Huertos provides a striking case of collective resistance. Notably, this community had a history of participation in peasant organizations. In the Guatemalan cases, given the pervasiveness of land-based conflict, peasant organizing experiences proved to be even more salient. Peasant organizing first prompted community members to pursue collective goals (often at considerable personal risk) and to work together with members of other communities to pursue a peasant agenda.

With respect to the patronage capture and micro-resistance in PROHECO communities, Cafetales reveals an almost identical story to those in Perales and Frutales. Promoters have hired and changed all but one teacher along partisan lines. The exception occurred when the school's second AECO negotiated with promoters when two teachers were being named. After Eduardo, then AECO president, expressed his dismay with promoters naming teachers along party lines, the promoter compromised. As Eduardo explained, "He says to me, 'We're going to do something. You all name one teacher, and we'll name the other one.'" Here, a strong leader carved out space for autonomous decision-making, but it remained very small and did not carry over to the subsequent leadership, which remained subject to partisan pressures for hiring.

Huertos, conversely, demonstrated collective resistance. After promoters selected all teachers along partisan lines under the first AECO, the community elected its strongest leaders to the council. The new president, Anselmo, who led the earlier peasant organizing initiatives, would not tolerate their meddling. He explained: "I was a friend of the promoter and he started to ask me what party she [the teacher] was from...I told him that that didn't matter to us. We were only interested in her behavior in the classroom. Because of that, she stayed, with everyone's support." This AECO also showed a collective ability to resist partisan incursions. In 2006, to prevent the promoter from changing the teacher, leaders obtained 20 parent signatures on a petition (recorded in the AECO minutes) to demonstrate their support for the current teacher, with whom all the parents were satisfied. This offers a remarkable instance of resisting powerful patronage dynamics.

Still, PROHECO did not breed this spirit of resistance in parents. The principal leaders in Huertos had experience in confronting powerful outside actors—through land occupations and protests for legislation—from their previous experiences with peasant

organizations. The peasant organization experience proved far more formative for these parents, who later took advantage of the AECO's legal standing (which most other rural Honduran community organizations lack) to exercise limited autonomy.

Meanwhile, like the other Guatemalan cases, Chahim and Nima did not have to contend with patronage hiring. Like Huertos, though, both communities revealed the greater impact of peasant organizations on local civic and political life. Alongside the ethnic divide, land has always been the most salient political issue in Guatemala, and especially in Alta Verapaz, with greater land inequality than Honduras. As outlined in Chapter Three, land has sparked tremendous conflict in Guatemala—before Independence, during the Liberal Reforms, during Arbenz's rule, during the armed conflict, and most recently with the shift away from the large coffee estates. This contrasts markedly with Honduras, where the Liberal Reforms were less radical and the state subsequently implemented moderate reforms to release some pressure in the countryside.

Chahim and Nima illustrate the centrality of land to rural Q'eqchi communities. Throughout Chahim's history, the struggle for land—first, to prevent the landlord from selling, and then to make his heirs honor his promise to them—has defined the community. Having worked for generations as landless farm laborers, and with their livelihoods completely determined by agriculture, the community was moved to action by land more than any other issue. Even in a conservative community—with deference to a repressive landlord, fear of the guerrillas, and no presence of progressive church organizations—concerns about land proved sufficient to provoke risky collective action in the 1980s. Years later, when land issues resurfaced, Chahim joined the CUC. As mentioned above, joining the CUC strengthened the community's position in their land struggle, which they ultimately won. It also introduced them to other forms of collective action, such as local protest and national marches. Learning from the COEDUCA

experience may have increased parents' ability to participate in the CUC group, but it did not prompt the CUC group's creation, which would almost certainly have happened whether or not the school had ever arrived in Chahim.

Nima appears similar. Here, the desire to move off landlords' farms and acquire land motivated people from different communities to come together as never before. The grouping together of peasants from different communities to assert a land claim and organize themselves for purchase represents a remarkable instance of overcoming the barriers to collective action faced by rural communities in Alta Verapaz. And while subsequent affiliation with peasant organizations has been sporadic, land issues remain the only cause that has brought Nima residents to join other communities and protest after their community's formation.

Aside from peasant organizing, moderate changes have affected patterns of political representation in Chahim and Nima. Chahim has strengthened its position vis-à-vis outside actors in two ways. First, it has gained representation in micro-regional bodies, such as the micro-regional COCODE and the *alcaldía indígena*. While the COEDUCA has increased certain community leaders' capacity to participate in these institutions, PRONADE did not motivate parents to create these spaces for participation in local governance issues. Instead, as in Nima, broader national policy changes have increased Chahim's access to these institutions, and their geographical location (right next to a new road) has enabled them to remain informed about and attend micro-regional meetings.

In Nima, the community has developed a preponderance of local organizations, and the COCODE has increased its capacity to acquire support—for instance, acquiring a cattle project, a basketball court, and a small health post—from government programs and to address local issues, including various interpersonal conflicts. Certain critical leaders of

the COCODE and other organizations learned how to organize themselves and petition government from their time in the COEDUCA. That experience, however, did not alter how the community has organized or its relationships with external actors. Nima demonstrates greater individual spillovers from CMS participation than any other community I visited, but its organizational life was still more shaped by the experience of acquiring land, registering a new community, and then forming organizations according to the demands of external (principally state) actors. Over the years, these residents have become savvy in making demands, but have not played a bigger role in holding government accountable or participating in local policy discussions. As in Huertos and Chahim, their most formative experience with broader collective action seeking to impact policy came from participation in peasant organizations.

Still, it bears mention that the PRONADE experience did yield one critical experience of inter-community collective action among parents in Nima and various other communities. In 2008 and 2009, parents in Nima joined other school councils in supporting the incipient organization of PRONADE teachers. The teachers launched an aggressive campaign—including occupying government offices and taking over an oil refinery—to assure that they would keep their jobs once PRONADE ended.<sup>205</sup> They brought parents in to form a parallel organization to support them, under the premise that—as was the case in Nima—parents would want to keep the teachers with whom they had developed positive working relationships, instead of risking getting a new, potentially irresponsible teacher.

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<sup>205</sup> Nery Barrientos, leader of PRONADE teachers' organization in Alta Verapaz. Personal interview with author. February 26, 2010. Cobán, Guatemala. See also Hurtarte, F. 2008. Infructuoso diálogo entre maestros y ministra. *Diario de Centro America*, April 11, 2008. And Unda, M. 2008. Mineduc y maestros sin llegar a acuerdo. *Siglo XXI*, April 11, 2008.

With the teachers' support, parents from over 100 communities in Alta Verapaz (including Nima) formed an *ad hoc* organization to support the teachers' efforts and to pressure the government to pay overdue funds to the COEDUCAs, whom the delay had forced to purchase school supplies on credit.<sup>206</sup> This contrasts sharply with Honduras, where interviews with staff in various departments and PROHECO's national office made it clear that PROHECO parents have never sustained such an alliance.

PRONADE officials, of course, did not design or encourage this collective action, but the experience suggests that PRONADE provided a platform for parents to organize in this way, what Houtzager (2003) deems a "structural linkage" to engage the state. Moreover, the teacher-parent alliance proved potent, as both groups ultimately won their demands. The parent organization, however, proved fleeting; with the government payment of overdue funds and PRONADE's reversal, the organization disbanded.<sup>207</sup> And, while the ex-PRONADE teachers' organization that has emerged after PRONADE's conversion pledged its interest in continuing to promote parental participation, it remains small and lacks resources.<sup>208</sup> Moreover, many ex-PRONADE teachers have now joined Guatemala's principal teachers' union, which many parents resent for prioritizing teachers' salaries over children's education. Thus, the prospect for subsequent teacher-parent alliances dimmed. By early 2010, financial transfers for schools supplies were overdue, but there were no coordinated parent-teacher efforts to resolve this.

In sum, these four cases revealed how CMS did provide an opportunity—"structural linkage"—for communities to assert their autonomy vis-à-vis the state. In Honduras,

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<sup>206</sup> Baldomero Col, leader of now-defunct organization of PRONADE parents in Alta Verapaz. Personal interview with author. Cobán, Guatemala. March 24, 2010. See also "En inicio de ciclo escolar, maestros del pronade siguen en el limbo." *La Hora*, January 3, 2009.

<sup>207</sup> Personal interview with Baldomero Col. *Op. cit.*

<sup>208</sup> Personal interview with Nery Barrientos. *Op. cit.*

and especially in Huertos, parents used their legal status as an AEEO to resist partisan encroachment on teacher hiring. In the Guatemalan cases, parents banded together to assert demands to state actors and insist on a fairer distribution of resources. These cases illustrate how CMS has contributed to autonomous CSOs capable of resisting state arbitrariness and advocating to advance marginal communities' interests, both key elements in the quality of democracy framework introduced in earlier chapters. That said, CMS has not changed the defensive, disadvantaged position that these communities occupy. In Honduras, patronage hiring proceeded in the vast majority of cases; parent resistance was the exception, rather than the rule. And, in Guatemala, collective action and assertion of demands proved fleeting, and much more influenced by peasant organizing than by the CMS experience. As with the networks discussion above, CMS did not provide a "game-changer" for the patterns of political representation in these rural sites.

### **III. Comparison to controls**

Having identified the extent of changes among CMS participants, one must also account for the baseline against which to compare these changes. To do so, I considered three possible comparison groups, described in Chapters Two and Six. Compared with all three groups, CMS participants were more likely to reveal increased civic and political engagement. The comparisons with non-participants and Parent Association members reveal the very low baseline levels, and resistance to change, of civic and political engagement in the case study communities. The comparison with traditional schools suggest that active Parents Association in traditional schools can produce learning—akin to the limited spillovers observed in Frutales and Perales in Chapter Seven—but not the

changes in networks observed in the present four cases. This comparison also reinforces the difficulty, noted by other scholars studying CMS, of identifying appropriate control groups. Nearby communities with traditional schools obtained these schools well before CMS's inception. They appear to differ from CMS communities in multiple respects.

*a. Comparison with Non-participants*

In all eight communities, parents who did not participate in the AECOs showed very low levels of civic and political engagement. The vast majority had never participated in any community organization. Most said they were not interested, as participation would take up valuable time and resources. For this reason, several people in these communities repeated the same sentence: “people flee from leadership positions” (*la gente huye los cargos*). And if these parents were potentially interested in participating, they felt intimidated by the idea and more confident in established leaders' abilities. In Honduras, consistent with a long tradition of rural voter participation—mobilized by the National and Liberal parties' extensive clientelistic networks—most parents voted, but had no other contact with state actors. These parents did not visit government offices, sign petitions, or protest. They appreciated government handouts, but they relied on others to bring them such benefits. In Guatemala, participation in organizations was even less prevalent, and voting was less frequent in previous elections—the result of ethno-linguistic exclusion and harsh repression—but there was greater evidence of non-CMS participants having protested if they had belonged to peasants' organizations.

Virtually none of these respondents reported increased civic or political engagement since the CMS school's inception. This finding suggests that the limited spillovers in previously-inactive CMS participants were not simply due to changes over time—that is,

the potential impact of aging on civic and political engagement—but instead reflected changes caused by the “treatment” in this study, participating in the CMS school. That said, this non-participant group remains less useful for gauging the impact of CMS participation on council members. The latter group, CMS parents, often possessed other characteristics—especially literacy and greater previous activity in community affairs—that non-participants lacked. For this group, the experiences of those who participated in other school councils offer a better comparison.

*b. Comparison with Non-CMS Councils in CMS Communities*

In the Honduran cases, Parent Association (APF) members showed no spillovers. These communities' APFs take virtually no initiative. As one current APF member, Sara, explained: “We met and looked at the needs of the school...It wasn’t very fruitful. We haven’t been very active. The APF basically just organizes for Children’s Day, Mother’s Day, and to see what needs the teacher has. And that there’s enough food for school lunch.” This description held for all four Honduran case studies. And as one teacher, Belén, remarked: “it doesn’t function, it’s in name only. We [only have the APF] because the district office asks us to.” The profiles of almost all APF members was similar to those of parents who had never participated in any organizations. These parents felt obligated to accept an APF position because their children were in the school, but the experience did not increase their propensity to participate in civic organizations or engage with state actors.

Like the adults who have never participated in any organizations, these parents revealed a low baseline and no increases over time in civic and political engagement. They remain passive and distant from organizational life and political institutions, with few skills and

little confidence. Again, this reinforces the notion that spillovers observed among CMS participants can be attributed to their experience participating in the school.

Meanwhile, in Guatemala, no comparable organization to the APF existed alongside the COEDUCA. But with PRONADE's reversal, COEDUCAs disbanded and the government encouraged parents to form new parent councils (*Consejo de Padres*) with the same role as parents in the official education system. Since this conversion, parents no longer receive training or oversee the teacher. Meeting frequency and demands on the state have declined. This transition occurred less than a year before my fieldwork, but the evidence from the parent councils I studied suggests that diminished responsibilities and activity levels augur poorly for spillovers.

Still, the COEDUCA - *consejo de padre* comparison proves problematic. First, these *consejos* emerged after the COEDUCA and the changes that this experience already prompted in the community. Second, the prior obtaining of support by COEDUCAs may have diminished the need for subsequent demands to state actors. Third, the time horizons of both groups differ dramatically. The *consejos* thus do not offer a "clean" case. That said, since they mirror the long-standing dynamics I observed in traditional schools (*escuelas oficiales*), they prove illustrative in conjunction with the evidence presented in the subsequent section.

### *c. Comparison to Non-CMS Councils in Traditional Public Schools*

Education experts in Honduras and Guatemala have long bemoaned the lack of parental participation in schools. As one PROHECO promoter with 25 years of similar work experience explained, "The custom has been, 'Sign here.'" Teachers tell parents what to do for the school, and parents sign on the dotted line. This virtually non-existent role

for parents partly explains why many education experts responded with enthusiasm to CMS.

Evidence from the first traditional Honduran school I visited, in Azucenas (the town adjacent to Perales), and communities near Saq'e and Nima in Guatemala, supported the conventional wisdom regarding parental participation in traditional schools. Here, parent councils did very little. In Azucenas, for instance, the President had stopped attending meetings called by the director, and the APF did not meet independently. All the school's teachers expressed frustration with parent apathy. Interviews with parents in Azucenas revealed that only one previous APF member, a former President, had become more active in the community as a result of his participation. This man had been involved in submitting proposals to the government for a new classroom, and as a result felt more confident in his ability to present community needs to state actors. Overall, however, the APF in Azucenas has not served as an incubator for civic or political engagement.

The patterns I observed in the Guatemalan traditional schools, near Nima and Saq'e, proved markedly similar. The process for electing council leaders (bi-annual assembly), the recycling of leaders, and the type of decision-making (led by a few, typically male, leaders, whose decisions are sometimes sanctioned by a community assembly) in these two traditional schools was nearly identical to the process in the CMS schools. The difference lay in the additional responsibilities given to CMS parents. CMS parents oversaw teacher attendance, administered a bank account and paid teachers salaries, and enjoyed legal standing to engage with the state. They also received training and technical

assistance that helped them learn organizational skills and feel more confident going to town to visit the bank or submit a proposal to the mayor.<sup>209</sup>

In Honduras, I also visited Veredas, a school near Cafetales with what local teachers described as exceptional parent leaders. Two long-standing community leaders—themselves husband and wife—had led this school council in recent years, submitting various proposals to local government and working to replace a teacher who rarely showed up for work. In Veredas, the APF sustained the high participation levels of these members and their adult son, also an established community leader. With levels of activity that education officials described as atypically high, this APF also incorporated two previous non-participants who subsequently became more involved in community affairs, with one eventually leading the community's *patronato*. He explained that he had gained “a lot of experience. The first time in an organization, it seems very difficult. But with the support of friends, one goes about learning what needs to be done.” As a result of their APF experience, both parents described their increased confidence in engaging with state actors and expressing the community's needs.

This case suggests that some spillovers from APF participation in traditional rural schools are possible. But the case also raises the question of the comparability of rural communities with traditional schools to those with CMS schools. In most cases (and this is true of all four comparison communities), communities with traditional schools obtained these schools decades before CMS's inception. In Honduras, greater accessibility (via roads) facilitated earlier school openings. In both countries, the schools' earlier foundation reflected better connections to state (and, in Honduras, party) institutions. These communities have also long had the types of organizations that CMS

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<sup>209</sup> The case studies suggest that, in Honduras, the difference with APF parents would be greater if PROHECO staff respected parents' right to hire and fire teachers, which could generate more skills, autonomy, and other spillovers for members.

communities are only now beginning to build, which makes it difficult to use them as a comparison group, despite being in relative geographical proximity to this study's principal case study communities. Furthermore, the principal leaders in Veredas had a combination of formal education and organizational experience that surpassed that of parents in the any of the four PROHECO communities I visited. Thus, these communities seem less appropriate as control groups against which to measure changes in CMS parent participants.

The difficulty of identifying the appropriate control group has long plagued studies of CMS. As the World Bank's (Barrera-Osorio et al. 2009, 13) review of studies on these initiatives summarized: "Based on our review of SBM [school-based management, synonymous with CMS] impact studies, we believe that performing retrospective evaluations (or ones based on programs already being implemented and having limited data) is extremely difficult." Where possible, these authors recommend randomization or a regression discontinuity design. Data for these techniques were unavailable for the surveys and case studies. This reflects both 1) a lack of initial data collection and forethought by CMS programs and 2) the lack of institutional memory that program staff repeatedly described in personal interviews. A final alternative would have been identifying nearby communities that obtained official schools around the time that my case study communities obtained CMS schools. But because CMS was the principal government strategy for expanding rural education coverage in both countries since the mid-1990s, I could not identify any such appropriate communities. Faced with these constraints, I have chosen to rely on triangulation throughout my research, exemplified here by interviewing people in several different comparison groups.<sup>210</sup>

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<sup>210</sup> On triangulation, see Tarrow 2004.

#### IV. Discussion: CMS Spillovers and The Quality of Democracy

The second section of this chapter demonstrated that CMS participation in all four cases—though to different degrees—generated "learning" and "networks" changes among participating parents. Parents who reported these changes made clear that these had occurred subsequent to joining the school council, and they clarified how the experience had affected them—for instance, by going to the bank or organizing a meeting for the first time, or gaining confidence in being able to speak in public. The third section strengthened the attribution of causality to CMS—as opposed to some other unobserved variable—by indicating that changes in skills and organizational participation did not occur in non-participants or in participants in non-CMS parent organizations to nearly the same extent. Of course, given the obstacles to spillovers noted in earlier chapters, learning in most of my CMS cases was limited to organizational skills like basic financial procedures and how to participate in a meeting. But this chapter has shown cases where a substantial proportion of parents, *after joining the school council*, used the skills they learned via CMS to become more active participants and leaders of other organizations.

Furthermore, certain leaders reported that CMS participation taught them how to visit government offices, submit proposals, and advocate for government and other actors to help them meet their needs. These instances—more frequent in this chapter's cases than those discussed in Chapter Seven—suggest part of the political learning described by Williams. In particular, they indicate that CMS participation taught certain parent leaders the "rules of the game" of interacting with external actors and trying to get their needs met. Conversely, in no case did CMS participation contribute to the learning of formal political rights, another component mentioned by Williams as key to political learning. Thus, while even the "positive" cases suggest organizational skills gains and political

learning, this learning is partial vis-à-vis its potential impact on parents' political capabilities.

These four cases also revealed evidence of “thicker” civic networks (i.e., increased organizational density) in these communities. As demonstrated above, the number of community organizations in these cases increased after CMS participation provided skills and experience necessary for key parent leaders to lead other organizations in their communities. But, to explore whether CMS truly changed the nature of the civic and political networks in these communities, one must ask whether organizational density is enough.

In Chapter Two, I discussed how the composition of civil society and the relationship between civil society and democracy vary across countries (Edwards and Foley 1998). I further mentioned that, within a given country, the nature of CSOs and their impact on democracy will also vary. Different groups have different missions, goals, and methods; they thus also have different impacts on participants' civic and political behavior (Newton 1997). In Central America, for instance, some group types may produce uncivic norms among members, while others may increase demands on government (Booth and Richard 1998; Seligson 1999). The literature suggests that the latter type of group—that makes demands and engages with the state—possesses greater potential to improve democratic quality than those that do not.

These discussions of the relationship between civil society and democracy reinforced the basic insight of the political capabilities approach—to strengthen democracy, new groups must increase individuals' and groups' capacity to organize themselves, engage with the political system, and challenge exclusionary networks and norms. The question remains:

do the "positive" cases described in this chapter reach that bar of strengthening civil society (as those in Chapter Seven clearly do not)?

In these four cases, new groups were primarily community councils (*patronatos* in Honduras, *COCODEs* in Guatemala), water committees, women's committees, health committees, and productive groups (either groups of producers or microcredit organizations). The productive groups demonstrate that people have begun working together more to improve their economic situations. Credit groups (*cajas rurales*) in Honduras, for instance, can increase peasants' access to inexpensive credit and savings opportunities. But *caja* members acknowledged that they were primarily pursuing private economic benefits and had fewer interactions with other community organizations or state actors. Furthermore, people stopped participating once they stopped perceiving a private economic benefit. In general, then, participation in these groups seemed to contribute little to democratic life.

Meanwhile, the first few types of groups—e.g., community councils and water committees—have undoubtedly sparked engagement with the state. Members have sought local public goods (e.g., roads and water systems or tanks) from the state and NGOs—usually with community contributions of labor—to expand public goods provision. Following Booth and Richard (1998) and Seligson (1999), these groups, at first glance, augur well for stronger local democracy in these areas.

But another question emerges about these organizations—namely, are they really civil society organizations? As mentioned earlier, it is perfectly reasonable to expect the state to help foster civil society, but it is another thing altogether for state-sponsored organizations to be the only game in town. Definitions of civil society typically include a

provision that organizations remain at least “relatively autonomous” from the state.<sup>211</sup> In the rural communities I visited, such relative autonomy is in question. Most organizations described above (e.g., *patronato*, COCODE, water committee, security committee) form because state actors (usually the municipality) require the community to have these types of organizations to obtain certain benefits. In some cases, organizations (e.g., school councils, *patronatos*, and COCODEs) obtain legal standing to act autonomously of other organizations (e.g., to sign contracts), but they remain *de facto* community sub-units of state entities.

This suggests that most organizations in these case study communities—including those created after CMS’s inception—probably do not meet the “relative autonomy” condition. Instead, in Guatemala, this state control reflects strong continuity from its counter-insurgency development strategies, centered on the CPM. In Honduras, these organizations’ profiles fit into the longer-term historical pattern of the Honduran state co-opting existing or incipient CSOs described in Chapter Three. Despite radically different recent political histories, both Honduras and Guatemala have—in the context of international diffusion of decentralization and governance models—settled on a remarkably similar model, where rural communities must form organizations mandated by the state, effectively ceding their potential organizational autonomy, to enjoy the possibility of state benefits.<sup>212</sup>

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<sup>211</sup> This is an explicit part of the definition of civil society adopted by this thesis. See the Introduction and Chapter Two for more on this.

<sup>212</sup> Another lens for this would be Scott’s (1998) concept of “legibility.” As with the drawing of maps and redesigning urban areas, fomenting state-sponsored community organizations makes these communities more intelligible to the state. Unlike Scott’s analysis, however, my research found that parents were eager to become more legible to the state because of the promise of state benefits (so long as legibility did not also involve greater extraction or predation by the state, which was not relevant in the period of these case studies).

This observation brings the discussion back to patterns of political representation. There are two problems stemming from these organizations centering their activity on getting material benefits from the state. First, the present case studies mirror Grindle's (2007) finding in Mexico, where decentralization increased demand-making without strengthening groups' ability to hold local officials accountable. Material demands from marginal communities on the state signal progress, but remain insufficient for improving the quality of local democracy when unaccompanied by increased grassroots efforts to ensure public accountability.

A second point reinforces Grindle's conclusion: increased demands on government without public accountability seems to reinforce the clientelistic fashion in which the state and political actors distribute goods. Where community organizations do not work together to change how government distributes resources, state actors continue to distribute material support along partisan lines. Parents participating in CMS may become more able to express demands to state actors, but, in Honduras, even the clearest cases of these spillovers demonstrate parents' inability to challenge clientelistic politics. Instead, PROHECO further entrenches clientelism in remote rural areas. And though Guatemala's PRONADE did not operate via the same patronage-based logic, the program did not strengthen communities' position vis-a-vis local political figures who rely on clientelistic strategies to get elected.

It bears mention that members of all communities expressed satisfaction with making increased demands on government. For the most part, people in these communities have resigned themselves to their only function in politics being making material demands. First, this is because their needs are very serious, and they often cannot afford the time and resources required for additional participation (see Chapter Nine). But their reaction also reflects their own perceptions of powerlessness. Parents, facing resource,

education, and skills constraints to participation, repeatedly expressed feeling powerless to change a political system where the odds are so stacked against them. As with teacher hiring in PROHECO, parents in both countries feel impotent when it comes to influencing municipal decision-making, oversight of resource distribution, and other spheres of local politicians' power. In Guatemala, there is an added ethnic dimension, where many residents still feel that local authorities are racist and willfully exclude them. Thus, whereas some scholars might argue that I am wrong to label as "failure" something that participants might not deem failure (see, for instance, Mosse 2005), my interviews demonstrated that parents' lowered expectations reflect the attitude of weary citizens who simply cannot imagine taking on the larger structures that circumscribe their civic and political behavior.

Another concern emerges with respect to both PROHECO and PRONADE's *de facto* promotion of creating new communities. The pressure evident in most of my eight case studies for communities to separate from their prior villages to obtain a school likely undermined the capacity of these marginalized communities (weak to begin with) to act collectively, a crucial factor for increasing democratic quality (Karl 2004).

On one hand, previous suggestions to build a new school met resistance for two reasons: either 1) municipal officials said that they could not create another school in the same *caserío* or 2) the community council under whose jurisdiction the community initially fell argued that a school in their area was unnecessary. In the latter case, these communities may have reduced their dependence on adjacent communities whose power structures did not allow their needs to be expressed. In Cafetales, for instance, leaders in the surrounding communities ignored their desire for a school. As Eduardo explained, "Whatever help comes to Veredas or Valle, it wouldn't get to Cafetales because of the

distance. So we became independent to be able to apply for projects and so the help would reach us here.”

On the other hand, CMS ends up further fragmenting rural communities that were small to begin with. As Anselmo in Huertos explained, members of his former community “accused me of dividing the community.” His opponents resented the potential reduction in influence of their now-diminished communities. For instance, my research in Honduras identified no alliances between any two school councils; in Guatemala, only teacher intervention sparked a fleeting inter-community coalition. This makes sense given extensive collection action problems that poor peasants face. The inability to form alliances and scale up civic and political action, however, means that these increasingly-small communities may become more pliant in the face of partisan political actors who control state resources. While becoming independent may help communities escape unresponsive community councils and express their needs, these divisions breed fiercer competition between poor communities for scarce resources. This may further reinforce clientelistic dynamics, as politicians—in the absence of citizen oversight mechanisms—use the logic of clientelism to allocate scarce resources.

In addition to *inter*-community fragmentation—and connected to the earlier point about state-created organizations—CMS also appears to be part of a trend of *intra*-community organizational fragmentation. In new communities, such as Cafetales and Nima, seeking benefits from the state, leaders feel pressure to form a panoply of organizations—such as a community council, water committee, health committee, energy committee, and women's committee. But, in communities with 20 to 45 households, it seems unreasonable to expect all these organizations to function simultaneously. In Cafetales, for instance, the community was too small to sustain all the organizations required by the state and donors, so the community ended up developing a series of semi-functional

organizations that rarely met. Residents resuscitated these groups from dormancy only when they needed to use that particular group name to access something from the state.

In Guatemala, the COCODE provides a greater centripetal force, with issue-specific committees now subsumed below it. But communities still receive state pressure to form the women's, health, and school-related committees. And, where NGO support can be obtained, this usually entails forming a new committee, too. In Chahim, for instance, residents contemplated creating a Rotary International support committee that could bring more help from Rotarians in the future, while in Nima residents formed a separate committee to obtain an EU-funded computer project.

If one only used a measure of “organizational density” (e.g., number of organizations per capita) to capture civil society’s strength, this proliferation of groups would seem to be a positive development. Moreover, these increased groups suggest increased opportunities for people to participate in community affairs, potentially equalizing voice and decision-making power in the community. My cases, however, indicate that the same leaders often dominate various organizations. My research also suggests a back-bending curve, where there are diminishing (and possibly negative) gains in local civil society strength past a certain number of groups. Small rural communities cannot sustain more and more organizations *ad infinitum*. Furthermore, too often these organizations end up competing for people’s time and resources, rather than working together to maximize the scarce resources at their disposal.

Finally, patterns of political representation have a gender dimension. As described above, participation in community organizations and politics in these rural areas have long been male domains. This has recently begun to change, but, in the rural communities I visited, community leaders were still almost exclusively men. Moreover,

CMS mostly reproduces gender hierarchies in these communities. Men lead the school council meetings and are almost always the ones who leave the communities to go to the bank and visit the municipality. In Alta Verapaz, women rarely become COEDUCA members, due to conservative gender norms. And, in both sets of cases, where women have been elected to the parent councils—often their first time participating in organizations—they mostly retain only marginal positions. In only one of my Guatemalan cases did any females assume substantive roles (president, treasurer, or secretary). In the Honduran cases, female leaders were more common, but most often were the wives of male community leaders. These women were little more than placeholders for their husbands, who effectively ran the school council and other community organizations. In Cafetales, for instance, the AECO president, Irene, recognized that her husband remained the *de facto* president: “I give my functions to Ángel—he speaks for me.”<sup>213</sup>

## V. Conclusion: Divergence, Cross-Country Comparison, and Next Steps

This chapter has presented diverse cases that show a range of possible outcomes to address whether CMS produces spillover effects on parents' civic and political behavior. Qualitative analysis revealed that CMS can produce learning and increase individuals' participation in other organizations and organizational density within communities. Nonetheless, these cases raise doubts about the relative autonomy of parent councils and the organizations formed subsequently. The cases also suggest that CMS does not strengthen communities' position vis-a-vis clientelistic politics, especially in Honduras.

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<sup>213</sup> This mirrors a broader pattern in Guatemala, where the municipality now promotes the formation of women's committees alongside the COCODE. This policy reflects local officials' knowledge that men dominate COCODEs in virtually all Q'eqchi' communities. But the result in most communities are women's committees that simply exist to rubber stamp the COCODEs' decisions.

Meanwhile, CMS has further fragmented isolated communities (instead of promoting collective action) and ultimately reflected (rather than challenging) exclusive gender patterns of participation.

It would thus be difficult to argue that CMS has strengthened civil society in these rural areas enough to exert a significant impact on the quality of democracy. As suggested in Chapter Two (see Figure 3), the control of organizations by the state (and parties in Honduras) and the absence of functional mechanisms to connect micro-level organizing efforts to politics at the local and regional level present clear obstacles. By reducing autonomy and preventing the scaling up of community action, these factors prevent these participatory governance initiatives from going beyond increasing organizational density to having an impact on the quality of democracy.

Still, given the variation in individual spillover outcomes presented in Chapters Seven and Eight, an important follow-up question for this research will be: what explains the divergent intra- and inter-community outcomes? I will discuss this issue further in Chapter Nine, but I conclude this chapter with a brief discussion on provisional insights from the cross-country comparison.

While I have argued that CMS-related impacts on patterns of political representation and democratic quality remained similarly limited in both countries, the comparison of all eight cases reveals greater evidence of individual spillovers in the Guatemalan cases than the Honduran cases. (As a visual aid for readers, I summarize the learning and networks results from all eight cases in Appendix D.) Yaab, for instance, included in Chapter Seven as a "negative" case because of its value on the case-selection network index variable, revealed more parent learning than any Honduran case. This country difference still requires scrutiny.

The first question is how Yaab ended up being compared to Frutales and Perales, when the outcomes ended up being so different. The answer lies in the limitations of the survey data to which I had access, and upon which I based case selection. First, the networks index had to rely on one different question in Guatemala, due to problems in survey application mentioned in Chapter Five. Second, this survey was first implemented in Honduras, where the pilot stages revealed that very little rotation had occurred in many AECOs and many parent members migrated for work in specific seasons. Because of this, the survey team dropped the initial requirement of interviewing 8 to 10 parents per community to a more modest 4 to 6. This worked well in Honduras, and the researchers applied the same logic to Guatemala.

In Guatemala, however, my cases suggest more parents had participated in the school council. The greater rotation I observed in PRONADE schools appeared due to 1) the schools' earlier founding, 2) the creation of seven council positions (PROHECO had six), and 3) the greater ease with which communities rotated due to more prevalent training. I discuss these factors further in Chapter Nine, but for now it simply bears mentioning that higher rotation meant that surveying four to six council members in Guatemala covered a smaller proportion of the total council members in the community. Through interviews with *all* council members, Yaab represents a case of recording a greater number of spillovers than were apparent from surveys with less than one quarter of these parents.

The second question is why the individual spillovers proved greater in Guatemala than in Honduras, a finding confirmed by both the descriptive statistics analysis and the case studies. One answer, I will argue, has to do with the relative abundance of training and technical support and higher rotation among Guatemalan councils.

In the final empirical chapter, I will use quantitative and qualitative data to test these and other competing hypotheses about what accounts for divergent spillover outcomes. First, regression analysis will help establish correlations between variables.<sup>214</sup> But, given my inability to randomize or find an “as-if random” research design, regression analysis alone will prove insufficient to establish causality. In this regard, case study analysis will help a great deal. Further scrutinizing these cases will enable me to probe relationships between variables identified in regression analysis and avoid spurious causal claims. Moreover, qualitative analysis remains preferable for understanding certain independent variables, such as the characteristics of local leaders (e.g., whether they pursue private or public benefits), the nature of collective decision-making, and the relationships between parents and teachers. Qualitative analysis will thus prove indispensable for exploring causal relationships among a wider range of variables.

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<sup>214</sup> In this chapter, I have limited discussion of potentially important independent variables such as socio-economic status and democratic decision-making, as I will further explore these in subsequent quantitative and qualitative work.

## 9. WHAT EXPLAINS WHEN SPILLOVERS OCCUR?

The preceding chapters have explored the incidence of political capabilities spillovers on CMS participants with quantitative and qualitative data. Quantitative survey data proved useful for charting the incidence of learning and networks changes throughout Honduras and the Guatemalan department of Alta Verapaz. Case studies enabled the exploration of variables omitted from, or not suited for, survey analysis, such as: the meaning of individual behavioral outcomes in these rural contexts, the strength of organizations in a community after CMS' arrival, and the nature of the interactions between these organizations and state actors. This final empirical chapter will bring together the quantitative and qualitative data to uncover the key factors explaining when individual-level spillovers arise.

In particular, this chapter will assess four competing sets of hypotheses drawn from the literature on PG—discussed at greater length in Chapter Two—that might explain whether parents will exhibit learning and networks changes: participants' initial characteristics (socioeconomic level and baseline levels of participation), features of the PG initiative itself (state support for participation and the time and resource burden on participants), individuals' level of participation on the council (position on the council, years served, and reported level of involvement), and individuals' perceptions of council effectiveness and democraticness.

The chapter finds evidence to support all four hypotheses with respect to learning. Baseline levels of participation and socioeconomic status, state support through training, one's level of involvement in the council, and one's perception of council effectiveness and democraticness all appear positively associated with the acquisition of skills

stemming from CMS participation. That factors beyond initial characteristics produce correlations, which case study analysis suggests are causal, implies that CMS can expand the organizational and political skills of rural citizens who are *not* already the most engaged and/or well-off in their communities.

With respect to networks changes—namely, active participation and leadership in other organizations and the frequency of non-electoral political behavior—the results are somewhat more sobering. The greatest predictor of post-CMS participation in civic and political life, particularly for measures of leadership, remains the baseline level of involvement. This reinforces the finding presented in Chapter Five that “networks” outcomes—particularly leading organizations and making demands on the state—prove more difficult for CMS participation to produce than “learning” outcomes.

Still, there is evidence that state support and other features of the council experience have an effect on certain “networks” measures. Both quantitative and qualitative data suggest that those who acquire skills—an outcome that largely reflects state support and other factors of council participation—are much more likely to participate in other organizations. Moreover, training, level of involvement, and the democraticness of the council influence certain measures of non-electoral political behavior.

Overall, then, analysis of both learning and networks outcomes suggests that participation is neither a dead-end affair nor dictated solely by virtuous circles. Initial characteristics—socioeconomic level and baseline levels of participation chief among them—do matter a great deal, but state support for participation, parents’ level of involvement, and how councils are run also influence spillovers from participation. In short, there is something transformative, rather than simply reinforcing, about the experience of participating in these organizations.

## I. Four Broad Hypotheses

The first hypothesis, centered on initial individual characteristics, is perhaps the most commonly offered in social science assessments of participation and civic engagement. In particular, this hypothesis encompasses the expectation that, *ceteris paribus*, parents with higher socioeconomic level (including physical and human capital) and higher initial levels of participation in community affairs will be most likely to capture the benefits of participation. It can be stated formally as:

*H<sub>1</sub>: The higher parents' socioeconomic level and baseline levels of participation in community organizations, the higher the likelihood that they will exhibit spillovers from participation in CMS.*

Consistent with other studies, the expectation for socioeconomic level is that parents with greater initial endowments will have greater physical and intellectual resources to devote to participation, and thus the experience of participation is more likely to have an impact on them (Fung and Wright 2003, 23; Lang 2007; Houtzager, Acharya, and Lavalley 2007; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). Meanwhile, consistent with other studies such as Nylen's (2002),<sup>215</sup> the expectation regarding baseline levels of participation is that those with prior organizational experience and skills will have the motivation and savvy to take greater advantage of this new venue for participation. In short, these two components test whether spillovers from participation accrue principally to those who are best-off and/or most involved. These variables test the "virtuous circles" arguments that many theorists of participation and civic engagement have posited (Foweraker and Landman 1997; Newton 1997; Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti 1993).

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<sup>215</sup> On the related idea that PG will more likely produce spillovers where civil society is already strong, see Baiocchi 2005; Wampler 2007; Cornwall, Romano, and Shankland 2008; Wampler 2004; Goldfrank 2006; Cornwall 2008; Heller 1996; and Wampler 2008.

The second hypothesis focuses on state support for participation through CMS. This hypothesis stems from scholars like Joshi and Moore (2000), who posit that well-designed state programs can create “enabling environments” for citizens to become more engaged. I formally state this hypothesis as follows:

*H<sub>2</sub>: The higher the state support for parental participation—through training and technical assistance—the higher the likelihood that parents will exhibit spillovers from participation in CMS.*

In particular, I explore whether state support for participation—through training and technical assistance, which scholars have demonstrated as critical for impacting civic and political behavior (Barron, Diprose, and Woolcock 2006; Lang 2007; Wampler 2002)—affects the odds of parents learning and becoming more active participants in community life. Furthermore, I examine the impact of the time and resource burden that CMS imposed on parents. The examination of these factors suggests whether the nature of program design and implementation can determine these states’ ability to stimulate citizens’ learning and involvement in the community, or whether initial characteristics better (or even exclusively) explain the outcomes of participation.

The third hypothesis I will explore centers on individuals’ experiences on the council, and especially the level of parental involvement. Rather than looking at initial characteristics or program design, this hypothesis examines whether features of participation in the CMS forum dictate the incidence of spillovers (Lang 2007; Goldfrank 2006; Wampler 2008). In particular, I examine whether one’s level of involvement on the council matters for the spillovers I have identified: whether, for instance, holding a position of greater responsibility and commitment creates more spillovers. This hypothesis can be formally stated as follows:

*H<sub>3</sub>: The higher the degree of parents' involvement in the school council, the higher the likelihood of them exhibiting spillovers from participation in CMS.*

In this section, I also consider gender, given that qualitative analysis demonstrated how being a woman—irrespective of one's formal position—affected the nature of participation and its impacts on the participant. Overall, the question guiding this third hypothesis is whether parents who are more involved are more likely to reveal positive spillovers. If the results suggest that these variables have a positive impact on the odds of spillovers, this would support the prospects for developing country governments to promote subsequent civic involvement in rural areas by increasing the degree to which individual parents become involved in schools.

The fourth hypothesis also relates to one's experience on the council, but focuses on parents' perceptions of whether the council can handle its affairs effectively and democratically. This hypothesis examines an idea that goes as far back as the early literature on participatory democracy (see Pateman 1970)—namely, that even small participatory fora, if run effectively and democratically, can impact citizens' civic and political behavior. The fourth hypothesis can be stated as follows:

*H<sub>4</sub>: The more effective and democratic the school council in which parents participate, the higher the likelihood that they will exhibit spillovers from participation in CMS.*

Here, two caveats bears mention. First, the survey data available to me only provided parents' impressions of the efficacy and the nature of decision-making within the parent council, making these measures subjective. Second, one could imagine an endogeneity problem with taking council effectiveness and democraticness as an independent variable, as better-run councils could also be a product of the spillovers on parents. To address both concerns, I use case study data on council effectiveness and decision-making to develop a clearer, less subjective view of how councils functioned and to test

the assumption that these variables were exogenous of, and temporally antecedent to, the dependent variables. I also supplement the discussion of council democraticness by examining how rotation in leadership in my cases impacted the incidence of spillovers. The rotation data will prove particularly useful for illustrating the temporal antecedence of democraticness to spillovers.

## II. Regressions on Learning Outcomes in the Survey

The preceding chapters included evidence of parents' skills acquisition related to participating in organizations and engaging with the state. The dependent variable for this regression was based on a comparison of how many skills (the survey asked about five concrete items) parents had before and after joining the school council. The dependent variable was a simple binary recoding, where a value of zero was attached to those who reported no change in skills and a value of one was attached to those who gained new skills (there were no cases of parents losing skills). Because the dependent variable was dichotomous, I used a logistic regression.<sup>216</sup> In this regression, I include controls for age and country,<sup>217</sup> as well as variables for each socioeconomic level, baseline levels of participation, state support for participation, individuals' level of council involvement, and perceptions of council effectiveness and democraticness. Tables 26 and 27 present the dependent and independent variables from the survey data upon which the regressions in this chapter will focus. These tables provide a list and description of each variable, as well as the number of the survey question(s) used to construct it. (For the precise wording of each survey question, see Appendix C.)

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<sup>216</sup> I also tried to run this regression as an ordered logistic regression, differentiating between those who had experienced "moderate" skills gains and "large" skill gains. The distribution of this dependent variable, however, did not meet the more stringent assumptions necessary to run an ordered logistic regression—particularly because of concern about empty or small-count cells.

<sup>217</sup> I kept the same set of control variables—standard for studies of participation—for all regressions with this data set.

**Table 26: Dependent Variables Used for Regressions on Survey Data**

<b>Variables</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Survey Question(s)</b>
Skills Acquisition	Whether the respondent reported gaining new skills since joining the school council. Based on comparison of the number (of a total of five skills) that each respondent reported having before and after joining the school council (dichotomous)	Comparison of 24a-e and 41a-e
Skills Application	Dichotomous measure of whether the respondent reported having applied skills learned in the council to participation in another organization	42
Subsequent Participation in Other Organizations	Number of organizations in which respondent actively participated at the time when the survey was applied	30a-p
Subsequent Leadership of Other Organizations	Dichotomous measure of whether the respondent became a leader of another organization after joining the school council	32, cross-referenced with 16
Organizing Community Meetings	Five-point scale of the frequency with which the respondent organized community meetings at the time when the survey was applied	Comparison of 25a and 35a
Visiting or Petitioning Government Offices	Five-point scale of the frequency with which the respondent petitioned or requested help from a government office at the time when the survey was applied	Comparison of 25d and 35d

**Table 27: Independent Variables Used for Regressions on Survey Data**

<b>Variables</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Survey Question(s)</b>
Age	The respondent's age, grouped into ten-year intervals	3b
Country Dummy Variable	Whether the respondent was in Guatemala or Honduras (dichotomous, for pooled regressions only)	N/A
Assets	Index variable of assets held by the respondent (index explained in Chapter Five)	56
Schooling	Grades completed by respondent	6
Skills Baseline	Number of skills (possible set of five) that the respondent reported having <i>before</i> joining the council	24a-e
Group Participation Baseline	The number of organizations in which the respondent actively participated <i>before</i> joining the council	29a-p
Training	Whether the respondent received training (dichotomous)	21a-f
Years on Council	Number of years served on the school council	16
Council Leadership Position	Whether the respondent was ever the school council secretary, treasurer, or president (dichotomous)	16
Current Member	Whether the respondent was a school council member at the time of the survey (dichotomous)	14
Level of Participation	Five-category self-assessment measure of respondent's level of participation in the school council	20
Female	Whether the respondent is a female (dichotomous)	Prelim.
Council Effectiveness	Respondent's assessment of whether, during his/her tenure, the council effectively carried out one of its principal tasks, ensuring teacher attendance—re-coded as a dichotomous measure	48d
Council Democraticness	Respondent's assessment of whether the council, during his/her tenure, made decisions as a group. Four-option question—re-coded as a dichotomous measure	49

I present the results of the first regression, for skills acquisition, in Table 28. I report results for the regression run on the pooled sample alongside results for the Honduras and Alta Verapaz samples. The regression results corroborate the hypothesis that initial socioeconomic and baseline participation characteristics correlate with skills acquisition. On socioeconomic level, both individual assets (measured with the index introduced in Chapter Five) and years of schooling are positively correlated with skills acquisition. Similarly, the number of organizations in which parents had previously participated was also positively correlated with skills acquisition. Meanwhile, past skills are also a strong predictor, though the correlation is negative. This was expected, because of a “ceiling effect”—namely, that the survey only listed five skills, so those who already had most or all of those skills before joining the school council could show little or no skills acquisition. These results suggest that, for the skills in question, starting points matter a great deal.

But initial individual characteristics are not the whole story for skills acquisition. The regression yields a very strong correlation between skills gains and training, supporting the state-support hypothesis. Moreover, the regression indicates that parents who served in councils that they found effective or democratic were much more likely to report having learned the skills in question after joining. These findings suggest that organizational and political skills are not governed solely by virtuous circles. Instead, state support for participation through training and council effectiveness and democraticness can yield greater learning.

A statistically significant negative coefficient emerged for the dummy variable for being female. When controlling for other baseline characteristics and features of participation, women are less likely to acquire skills. Qualitative data presented in previous chapters,

and discussed further below, suggest that this result reflects how women remain marginalized from participation in these communities. Even when women have been formally elected to a council position, the council forum provides them with less voice and responsibility. Far from signalling some innate gender difference, this finding thus suggests that efforts to increase gender equity in school councils could enhance learning.

A cross-country comparison also bears mention.<sup>218</sup> When I ran the same regressions separately for the Honduran and Guatemala samples, the results proved quite similar. In both countries, the skills baseline, group participation baseline, and training were the strongest predictors of skills acquisition. In Honduras, however, the socioeconomic variables were not statistically significant, and nor were the variables for gender or council effectiveness. The variable for level of council participation, however, was positively correlated with skills acquisition. The regressions for Guatemala produced all the same signs and statistically significant variables as the pooled regressions, except for schooling, which was not statistically significant. Finally, in Guatemala as in the pooled sample, a negative coefficient appeared for being a current council member. This makes sense given the lower technical support offered in the period when the survey was administered, when PRONADE's fate was in jeopardy.

Despite these small differences, however, the broader pattern for this regression held in both separate country regressions. In sum, this first regression suggests that socioeconomic level and baseline levels of participation are important, but not solely determinant, predictors of learning. State support for participation, as well as participating in an effective and democratic council can play a critical role in producing

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<sup>218</sup> For all the pooled regressions, it bears mention that Honduran respondents account for approximately 60 percent of the pooled sample, giving the Honduran results a greater weight in the pooled estimations.

spillovers. This supports the notion that targeted state efforts can spur civic and political engagement, and not only among those who are already participating.

I next ran a similar regression for skills application. This logistic regression used as a dependent variable a binary (yes/no) question on whether the respondent had applied learning from the school council to another organization.

The results for skills application, also in Table 28, yielded very similar results to those for skills acquisition. On individual characteristics, material wealth (though not education level), initial skills,<sup>219</sup> and prior organizational participation were all positively correlated with the dependent variable. On state support, a strong correlation emerged between training and skills application for both the pooled and the Honduran data, though the correlation was not quite statistically significant for the Guatemalan data. In terms of council experience, the years that one had participated in the council and one's self-reported level of participation (though not position on the council, a variable discussed further below) also demonstrated positive correlations.

Moreover, subjective perceptions of council effectiveness and democraticness were also positively correlated with spillovers for the pooled data set, suggesting that parents who believe the council to be a functional and open forum will be more likely to take the next step with their CMS learning and apply it to another organization. Finally, a negative correlation also emerged for the current council status dummy variable in the pooled and Guatemala regressions, suggesting that current members may have less time and resources to apply learning to other organizations than those who no longer have the school council commitment.

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<sup>219</sup> Here, the expected sign for the skills baseline was positive, as there was no “ceiling effect” preventing those with high initial skills from achieving the outcome in question.

**Table 28: Logistic Regressions for Skills Acquisition and Application**<sup>220 221</sup>

	Skills Acquisition			Skills Application		
	Pooled	Honduras	Guatemala	Pooled	Honduras	Guatemala
Age	-0.007	-0.029	0.010	-0.063	-0.096	-0.013
Guatemala Dummy	0.258**	-	-	0.761***	-	-
Assets Index	0.108**	0.047	0.427**	0.155***	0.148***	0.192**
Schooling	0.067***	0.072	0.034	0.017	-0.007	0.045
<b>Skills Baseline</b>	-0.813***	-0.813***	-0.833***	0.148***	0.206***	0.060
Group Participation Baseline	0.202***	0.214***	0.147	0.251***	0.274***	0.233***
Training	0.759***	0.629***	0.997***	0.458***	0.599***	0.327
Years on Council	0.038	0.064	-0.024	0.103***	0.106**	0.072
Council Leadership Position	-0.015	-0.105	0.195	0.114	0.347	-0.072
Current Member	-0.425**	-0.32	-0.512*	-0.277*	-0.164	-0.352*
Level of Participation in Council	0.074	0.196**	-0.257*	0.139*	0.099	0.202*
Female	-0.430**	-0.288	-1.132*	-0.274	-0.241	0.096
Council Effectiveness	0.664**	0.489	0.921**	0.540*	0.767*	0.041
Council Democraticness	0.612***	0.688**	0.523*	0.486**	0.422	0.506*
Constant	-0.822	-0.933	-0.063	-4.768***	-5.352***	-3.147***
<i>Observations</i>	1344	762	582	1342	771	571
<i>Pseudo r-squared</i>	.242	.198	.248	.108	.135	.0738

<sup>220</sup> For all the regressions in this chapter, as in the rest of the thesis, I present coefficients for each independent variable and indicate statistical significance (or its absence) with asterisks. The p-values are symbolized by asterisks, where \* represents  $p \leq .1$ , \*\* represents  $p \leq .05$ , and \*\*\* represents  $p \leq .01$ . All regressions used robust standard errors and with clustering by school, as appropriate, to account for any possible heteroskedasticity and school-level effects.

<sup>221</sup> Reported coefficients for all logistic regressions indicate the impact of a one-unit increase in the independent variable on the odds of the outcome. A positive coefficient increases the odds; a negative coefficient decreases them. The precise effect of a coefficient  $B$  is given by  $e^B$ , the odds ratio. An odds ratio greater than one indicates an increase in the likelihood of the outcome. An odds ratio less than one indicates a decreased likelihood of the outcome. Put simply, a  $B > 0$  can be read as increasing the odds of a spillover.

The regressions for the individual country data produced statistically significant coefficients for most of the same variables, but some important differences remain. In Honduras, council democraticness and being a current member had no impact on skills application. In Guatemala, four variables—baseline skills, training, years on the council, and perceptions of council effectiveness—produced no statistically significant correlation. For this regression, fewer variables related to one’s council experience increased the odds of skills application in Guatemala.

Overall, however, for skills application as with skills acquisition, socioeconomic and participation baselines are important, but state support and other features of participation remain critical. This second regression reinforces the notion that PG initiatives like CMS can stimulate adults—across socioeconomic levels and prior levels of organizational participation—to learn organizational and political skills and to use those skills in other similar fora.

### **III. Causal Factors for Learning in the Case Studies**

As discussed in the preceding chapters, learning and applying organizational and political skills were the most frequent spillovers for the eight case studies. As a result of their CMS participation, parents learned to participate in and lead meetings, make budgets, and submit proposals to government and NGO officials. Moreover, the factors explaining learning in the case studies are largely consistent with those identified by the regression analysis presented above.

Supporting the state support and council experience hypotheses, the principal determinants of skills acquisition and application in the eight case studies were training and one’s level of involvement in the council. When parents received training, they

became familiar with the school council's functions, the program manual, and the requisite forms and contracts. They also learned how to organize community members to deliberate about community needs and subsequently express those needs to state actors.

In Guatemala, parents reported receiving frequent trainings, through which they learned financial skills, how to participate in meetings, and potential avenues for acquiring greater state support. Parents shared similar experiences of learning in both countries. In Huertos, for instance, parent leaders explained that training was the most important factor for their learning: Through training, Vicente affirmed, "First I learned to manage checks, to sign better at the bank, to manage the funds for materials, and to know how to care for the school." Fredy added that: "We increased our capacity, because the trainings helped us a lot...I didn't know how to organize a meeting, I didn't know [before joining the council and getting trained]."

Training remained less frequent in Honduras (where it did not occur even once a year) than in Guatemala (where it occurred three times a year), but even limited training strengthened certain parents' ability to resist partisan encroachment. In Cafetales, Eduardo recalled how the promoter tried to fool him to rehire a teacher. "I tell him, 'No, because [the contract] has a beginning and end date'... Education is necessary for parents. I had read the contract, and it gave me the ability to know our rights. You can corroborate that many AECOs haven't read the contract...But I know that I had the right to hire."

Council position was critical in both countries because of the greater likelihood of receiving training and assuming greater responsibility. Only two to three members—usually the president and treasurer in Honduras, and the president, treasurer, and

secretary in Guatemala—were invited to trainings. Information about the program thus became concentrated in these members. Moreover, as these positions entailed the greatest degree of responsibility (e.g., calling meetings, signing checks and financial forms, and taking minutes), they offered the opportunity to practice the new skills they had learned. Meanwhile, virtually all at-large members and vice-presidents in the eight cases remained at the margins of parent council activity. When I asked these members about the role of the council, many either admitted that they did not know or explained that the council's central activities were responsibilities of the principal two or three leaders. Meanwhile, the "secondary" members attended meetings when called and often helped with manual labor (e.g., helping to clean the school grounds), but were less likely to gain skills from council participation.

This pattern differed somewhat in the two countries. While the two or three principal members proved most likely to gain and apply skills in both countries, the other members were more likely to report learning in Guatemala than in Honduras due to broader state support for participation. First, because training occurred more frequently in Guatemala (up to three times a year), council leaders were more likely to ask at-large members to substitute for them—in the Guatemalan cases, many more vice-presidents and at-large members received training than their Honduran counterparts. Second, the Alta Verapaz communities I visited had established an ethic of holding community assemblies after trainings, during which those who had received training could share key points of their training. Information was shared more openly, and more community members had the opportunity to voice their opinions.

Third, the frequency of technical support differed. Program field staff in both countries were required to visit each community every one to two months. But those in Guatemala were required to hold a meeting with all the council members, whereas their

Honduran counterparts typically only visited the president and treasurer to obtain signatures. As Feliciano in Chahim explained, “There used to be a lot of supervision on the part of the *técnicos*.” Parents in Guatemala explained that they often learned from the field staff during these visits, whereas most council members in Honduras had rarely, if ever, met this support staff. Moreover, Honduran school council leaders reiterated their concerns about partisan encroachment through this field staff, which put parents and these state actors at odds with one another. Thus, more widespread state support, coupled with a community ethic of calling assemblies after trainings, enabled a wider distribution of learning and skills application from Guatemalan than Honduran CMS participation.

Qualitative data show less support for the impact of initial individual characteristics on learning. Regarding socioeconomic level, community mapping and census activities in each community revealed that the school council leaders did typically enjoy above-average wealth and education levels, but a pattern did not emerge from the data between socioeconomic status and the likelihood of learning. Moreover, in communities where the average landholdings were larger—such as Saq’e and Nima in Guatemala—men also worked longer hours because they had more land to cultivate. In these communities, the absolute opportunity cost of participation in community groups was higher than for their neighbors (higher absolute foregone earnings for any given amount of time), which depressed certain men’s propensity to participate. Furthermore, comparing community socioeconomic level, those with greater average landholdings were not necessarily those with the highest incidence of learning and other spillovers. In the Guatemalan cases, for instance, Chahim had the lowest average landholdings (1.5 *manzanas*) of the four cases, yet had among the highest incidence of learning and other spillovers. Saq’e, conversely,

had average landholdings of over 10 times the Chahim average, yet had the lowest incidence of learning and other spillovers of any Guatemalan case.

Prior organizational experience was a more important predictor of who would take on the most important council positions in all eight communities. Parents noted a high degree of continuity in participation and leadership—those who became the principal school council leaders often had prior organizational experience. In Cafetales, the former AECO president, Ángel, explained: “If you look at all the organizations, we’re the same [leaders]. Don Fernando, me, Florencio, and Bernardo—between the four of us, we’re in almost everything.” Unsurprisingly, three of these four men led the school council. Cafetales, like the other communities, suggests an indirect relationship between prior organizational participation and skills acquisition and application: Those with prior experience are more likely to take on significant roles from which they will learn, but the direct cause of learning and skills application remains the greater degree of involvement in the school council.

Still, it bears mention that various parent leaders with greater prior participation across the cases joined the school council with the skills they needed. In each community, I identified leaders who explained that they were already “formed as leaders” when they joined the COEDUCA. Here, qualitative analysis suggests a ceiling effect on learning: for those with extensive experience organizing their community and making demands on the state, CMS participation reinforced, rather than increased, their civic and political knowledge. CMS in both countries, which focused primarily on ensuring basic council functionality, had less to offer these “already formed” leaders.

Finally, the case studies help to make sense of the negative regression coefficients associated with female respondents. In Alta Verapaz, as noted in the preceding chapter,

women remained almost entirely excluded from the COEDUCA. When there were female COEDUCA members in the case study communities, male leaders nominated women as at-large members due to a lack of willing males. Whereas male at-large members sometimes attended training for other leaders unable to miss work, women almost never did. In part, this owed itself to pervasive conservative gender norms in these communities, where men expect their wives to remain in the communities. Often, men explain this posture with regard to the greater safety risks for women traveling to town, but male jealousy and pervasive patriarchy offer better explanations (García 2006).

Meanwhile, many more women participated in the Honduran councils and took on key council positions. But similarly conservative gender norms prevented women from taking active roles in council decision-making; instead, they remained mostly relegated to participating in the school lunch rotation. Cafetales offers perhaps the clearest case of this. On paper, women came to dominate the AECO, with a female president, treasurer, and secretary. But the president just signed checks when indicated by the promoter and her husband, the former president, who formally gave up the presidency but remained the *de facto* leader. According to the treasurer, the president now just “signs checks,” while her husband “is the one who collaborates in [doing] everything.” In Cafetales as in the other case study communities, male leaders retained the positions of responsibility and received state support for participation. They were thus more likely to learn from their participation and apply this learning to other organizations than their female counterparts.<sup>222</sup>

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<sup>222</sup> Exclusion of women suggests that gender dynamics could be considered as part of the hypothesis on council democraticness as well as the hypothesis focused on levels of participation. With regard to its impact on individual spillovers, however, my case studies suggest that the principal mechanism through which being female reduces spillovers is through the individual’s lower level of involvement in council affairs.

To confirm the qualitative findings on skills acquisition and application, I also coded responses from my interviews with 104 school council members across the eight communities. I then ran regressions to test these various hypotheses on organizational learning, political learning, and skills application. Table 29 lists and describes the variables coded from the case studies. Table 30 then documents the results from the regressions on skills acquisition and application. Of course, the samples are not representative of the broader population of CMS participants. Instead, these data reflect the responses of every parent who has ever participated in the school council in these eight communities and still lives in the community. These results are thus exhaustive for the cases in question and provide a means to systematize the qualitative case study findings. This exercise does not suggest greater validity of quantitative over qualitative analysis. Instead, coding and regressing the data provides an additional, systematic check of the patterns I observed qualitatively.

For organizational learning, the regression indicates that position on the council and training are two key determinants. Aside from this, being female again reveals a negative coefficient, consistent with the argument that fewer spillovers accrue to women due to their lower level of involvement. For explaining political learning, training again appears critical. As with organizational learning, the political learning regression corroborates the state support hypothesis.

**Table 29: Variables Used for Regressions Using Case Study Data  
(Coded Responses Based on Case Knowledge)**

Variables	Description
<i>Dependent Variables (all dichotomous)</i>	
Organizational Learning	Whether the respondent reported learning organizational skills since joining the school council
Political Learning	Whether the respondent reported learning political skills since joining the school council
Skills Application	Whether the respondent reported applying skills learned through school council participation in another organization
Subsequent Participation in Other Organizations	Whether the respondent reported actively participating in at least one other organization after joining the school council
Subsequent Leadership of Other Organizations	Whether the respondent reported leading at least one other organization after joining the school council
<i>Independent Variables</i>	
Schooling	Grades of school completed by respondent
Prior Group Participation	Whether respondent was an active participant in at least one other organization before joining the school council (dichotomous)
Prior Group Leadership	Whether respondent was a leader of least one other organization before joining the school council
Council Leadership Position	Dichotomous measure of whether the respondent ever occupied one of the principal positions on the council (secretary, treasurer, or president)
Years on Council	Number of years served on the school council
Training	Whether or not the respondent received training (dichotomous)
Female	Whether the respondent is female (dichotomous)

**Table 30: Logistic Regression for Learning Among Case Study Subjects**

	<b>Organizational Learning</b>	<b>Political Learning</b>	<b>Skills Application</b>
Schooling	-0.139	0.024	-0.060
Prior Group Participation	-0.759**	-1.257**	-0.999
Prior Group Leadership	-0.839	-0.922	-0.119
Council Leadership Position	1.468**	0.677	1.413
Years on Council	0.108	0.131	0.134
Training	0.999*	1.830**	1.440
Female	-1.290*	-0.688	-1.147
Constant	-0.409	-1.341*	-2.336**
<i>Observations</i>	92	91	90
<i>Pseudo r-squared</i>	0.231	0.258	0.248

Meanwhile, the group participation variable produced a negative coefficient for both types of learning, but case knowledge suggests that this reflects a “ceiling effect.” Whereas the survey data had a separate variable for baseline skills level, in the case study data set prior participation became the closest proxy for whether one already possessed organizational skills and knew the rules of the game for engaging with the state. This regression uses the interview question of whether parents had learned new skills as the dependent variables. Since it would be difficult to lose past skills, it makes sense that past skills correlate positively with present skills. But because learning from CMS participation was mostly limited to items such as knowing how to run meetings, make a budget, or submit a proposal to government, it also follows that those with prior skills are less likely to gain new ones: a ceiling effect. Those with that prior experience and skills were, understandably, less likely to acquire further skills.

Finally, a similar regression for skills application produced no statistically significant correlations. Training, however, produced a large coefficient whose p-value was .102, providing further suggestive evidence that state support for participation is critical to explaining spillovers—in this case, skills application.<sup>223</sup>

#### **IV. Regressions on Networks Outcomes in the Survey**

To examine impacts of CMS participation on civic and political networks, I next ran a linear regression on the number of organizations in which CMS participants actively participated after joining the school council.<sup>224</sup> The independent variables used were identical to those used for skills application. In addition, I ran these regressions again after adding one new variable: skills acquisition (explained below). Table 31 contains the results.

This regression produced statistically significant coefficients primarily for respondents' individual characteristics. The regression suggests that prior levels of participation (measured by the number of organizations in which a parent had participated prior to CMS participation) matter more than socioeconomic level. When run as a nested regression, it became clear that the prior group participation variable accounted for the vast majority of the r-squared value. The only other statistically significant correlation is with the current member variable in Honduras (positive correlation) and, in Guatemala, the assets (negative correlation). Aside from these variables, no explanatory variables

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<sup>223</sup> The lack of statistical significance may be due to the relatively small sample size.

<sup>224</sup> Strictly speaking, the dependent variable was a “count” variable, for which a poisson regression would typically be preferable. The dependent variable, however, did not fit a poisson distribution. I ran both OLS and poisson regressions to be safe, and both gave virtually identical results in terms of the direction and statistical significance of the independent variables. I have opted to report the OLS coefficients because the model is simpler and more common, and the results are easier to interpret.

from the previous regressions related to parents' individual experiences on the council or state support exhibit statistically significant correlations.

Further probing, however, suggests that state support and other features of the council experience can produce an indirect impact on subsequent participation. Case studies in both countries indicated that those who acquired skills within the school council were more likely to participate in other organizations afterwards. I thus included skills acquisition in the regressions, with the results listed in the column to the right of the original regression. The results reveal a positive, statistically significant correlation between skills acquisition and organizational participation after joining the school council for the pooled and Guatemalan samples, though not in the Honduran sample.<sup>225</sup>

Given that training and other features of the council experience were important determinants of skills acquisition, the correlation between skills acquisition and group participation suggests a two-step relationship: training and council participation increases the likelihood of skills acquisition, which in turn makes subsequent group participation more likely. The datasets provide no way to establish causality in this relationship, because one cannot determine the temporal antecedence of skills acquisition relative to subsequent participation from the surveys. But qualitative findings, discussed in greater depth below, suggest that skills gains do precede and increase the likelihood of subsequent organizational participation.

In sum, baseline levels of participation are the key determinant of subsequent participation, but the dataset also contains evidence of an indirect relationship of state support through the inclusion of skills acquisition as an independent variable.

Qualitative evidence, discussed below, supports this hypothesized causal relationship.

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<sup>225</sup> Introducing this additional independent variable had very little impact on the results for the other independent variables, allaying potential concerns about multi-collinearity.

Table 31: Linear Regressions for Post-School-Council Organizational Participation

	<b>Pooled</b>		<b>Honduras</b>		<b>Guatemala</b>	
	<i>Excluding skills acquisition</i>	<i>Including skills acquisition</i>	<i>Excluding skills acquisition</i>	<i>Including skills acquisition</i>	<i>Excluding skills acquisition</i>	<i>Including skills acquisition</i>
Age	-0.02	-0.018	-0.019	-0.011	-0.033	-0.043
Guatemala Dummy	0.482***	0.459***	-	-	-	-
Assets Index	-0.035	-0.041	-0.025	-0.029	-0.163**	-0.174**
Schooling	0.031	0.026	0.014	0.008	0.024	0.017
Skills Baseline	0.047	0.109***	0.050*	0.082**	0.037	0.143*
<b>Group Participation Baseline</b>	0.836***	0.819***	0.594***	0.583***	1.107***	1.089***
Training	-0.021	-0.054	0.109	0.114	-0.01	-0.143
Years on Council	0.004	0.001	0.023	0.020	-0.085	-0.092
Council Leadership Position	-0.014	-0.023	0.102	0.113	-0.139	-0.164
Current Member	0.149*	0.173*	0.472***	0.480***	0.003	0.033
Level of Participation in Council	0.01	-0.015	0.074**	0.057	-0.075	-0.101
Female	-0.013	0.018	-0.105	-0.086	-0.261	-0.191
Council Effectiveness	0.216	0.157	0.131	0.11	0.172	-0.039
Council Democraticness	0.059	0.022	-0.275	-0.206	0.281	0.215
Skill Change	-	0.113***	-	0.061	-	0.162**
constant	-0.469	-0.436	-0.258	-0.349	0.504	0.803
<i>Observations</i>	1348	1298	734	719	614	579
<i>Adjusted R-Squared</i>	0.447	0.447	0.399	0.400	0.525	0.523

Having examined the impact of initial individual characteristics, state support for participation, and individuals' experience on the school council on subsequent participation in other organizations, I next ran a logistic regression on whether parents reported occupying leadership positions in other organizations after being CMS members (dichotomous dependent variable). The regression only included cases from Honduras, as this data was not available for the Guatemala sample. The independent variables remained the same as they were for the previous regression from the survey data.

This regression, the results of which appear in Table 32, yielded few statistically significant coefficients. No measure of socioeconomic level produced a statistically significant correlation. Baseline skills and prior organizational participation revealed positive correlations. It bears mention that the dataset provided no indicator for prior *leadership*, as opposed to participation, which my qualitative evidence (discussed below) suggests would have shown a stronger correlation than either of these other baseline measures. As with aforementioned dependent variables, being female had a negative impact on the odds of subsequent leadership. This reinforces the qualitative finding of generally conservative gender norms vis-a-vis participation, as well as a lower level of female involvement in school council affairs.

Table 32 provides no evidence of an impact of state support or council decision-making on subsequent organizational leadership. The results do include a positive correlation between years on the council and subsequent leadership, but, given the lack of a baseline leadership measure, this could simply reflect the qualitative observation (from the case studies) that those who serve for many years on the school council were pre-established leaders who continue occupying leadership positions in other organizations. Thus, unlike

with subsequent organizational participation, there is relatively weak evidence that either state support or other features of council participation affect subsequent organizational leadership.

This reinforces the conclusion that spurring leadership in other organizations—as the clearest behavioral measure for more intense participation—through CMS is even harder than spurring participation in other organizations, which in turn is harder than engendering skills development. In addition to simply being the least frequent of these three outcomes, this measure proves to be the least sensitive to state support, the level of individual parental involvement, and how councils are run.

Finally, I ran regressions for measures of the frequency of two forms of non-electoral political behavior discussed in previous chapters: organizing community meetings and petitioning or visiting government offices to make a request. These one-to-five scale variables were recoded into “Infrequent or Never,” “Somewhat Frequent,” and “Frequent,” in order to make them suitable for ordered logistic regressions.<sup>226</sup> In addition, as in Chapter Five, I limited the analysis of these dependent variables to the Honduran data. I thus also included regional dummy variables for Honduras. Unlike with the leadership regression, I was also able to include a baseline measure for the relevant type of political behavior: respondents’ accounts of the frequency with which they engaged in that behavior prior to joining the school council. Table 32 reports the results of ordered logistic regressions on frequency of organizing community meetings

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<sup>226</sup> For a relatively small sample, a five-category dependent variable renders it difficult to meet one of the key conditions of ordered logistic regressions: that there be no empty or small-count cells. Collapsing the dependent variable into three categories risks losing some variation, but was necessary for these regressions to satisfy the assumptions of ordered logistic regressions.

and petitioning government after joining the school council.<sup>227</sup>

For both types of behavior, baseline levels of the specific behavior in question manifested the strongest correlation, which nested regressions revealed accounted for the bulk of the variance. Baseline skills were also positively correlated with the present frequency of petitioning government.

On the state support hypothesis, training proved positively correlated with present frequency of petitioning government, though not with organizing community meetings. For organizing community meetings, however, other features of the council experience exerted a positive impact. Occupying a leadership position, one's duration on the council, one's self-reported level of participation, and one's perception that the council makes decisions democratically all increased the likelihood of organizing community meetings since joining the school council. Finally, the regression for organizing community meetings revealed a negative, statistically significant correlation with being female—further corroborating the gender dimension of CMS participation.

These findings both suggest that state support, one's level of participation, and the nature of council decision-making can impact non-electoral political behavior. Still, it bears mention that petitioning or visiting government offices to make a request revealed no correlations with variables besides baseline characteristics and training. While this does suggest that state support is important, the lack of statistically significant relationships with other features of one's experience on the council reinforces the finding that CMS participation has a greater impact on learning and networks within

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<sup>227</sup> To check these ordered logistic regressions, I ran several checks of the models. First, I checked that there were no empty or small-count cells. I also conducted a likelihood-ratio test of the proportional odds assumption and a Brant Test of the parallel regression assumption, both of which indicated the appropriateness of the ordered logistic regression model. Finally, as an additional check, I ran OLS regressions on an interval variant of the dependent variable and the independent variables, and the results were broadly consistent.

communities, while it has less of an impact on behavior that reaches out beyond the community. Making demands, one component of interactions with state officials, appears less sensitive to features of the CMS experience than other spillovers.

**Table 32: Logistic Regression for Leading Another Organization and Non-Electoral Political Behavior (Honduran Sample Only)**

		<b>Leading Another Organization (logistic)</b>	<b>Organizing Meetings (ordered logistic)</b>	<b>Petitioning Government (ordered logistic)</b>
Age		-0.126	-0.037	-0.116
Region (baseline category: Central)	North	0.088	-0.333	-0.764**
	West	0.130	-0.043	-0.487*
	East	0.109	-0.088	0.148
	South	-0.567	-0.348	0.391
Assets Index		-0.054	-0.08	-0.033
Schooling		0.050	0.028	-0.005
Skills baseline		0.145*	0.049	0.210***
Group Participation Baseline		0.135*	0.075	0.114*
Training		0.330	-0.002	0.414**
Years on Council		0.318***	0.065**	-0.029
Council Leadership Position		0.194	0.726***	0.211
Current Member		-0.015	0.421	0.199
Level of Participation in Council		-0.114	0.213***	0.112
Female		-0.539*	-0.486**	-0.288
Council Effectiveness		0.510	0.45	0.066
Council Democraticness		-0.089	0.413*	-0.222
<b>Organizing Meetings Baseline</b>			0.540***	
<b>Petitioning Baseline</b>				0.702***
Constant		-3.524***		
<i>Observations</i>		719	768	758
<i>Pseudo r-squared</i>		.157	0.171	0.238

## V. Causal Factors for Networks Outcomes in the Case Studies

As with learning outcomes, qualitative analysis suggests that socioeconomic levels were not consistent predictors of networks changes in parents. In both countries, CMS programs expected parents to elect literate members when possible, and community members similarly preferred to name those with some formal schooling, particularly as secretary, treasurer, or president. At first glance, communities with more educated parents have a greater potential pool of leaders who could potentially become more involved as a result of their CMS experience. And, indeed, those parents who occupied the highest school council positions often had above-average education levels for their community. But, in comparing the case study communities, higher education was neither necessary nor sufficient for participating in and leading organizations or reaping the fruits of participation. In the Honduran communities, for instance, there were several people with sixth grade educations who never took on significant school council roles. Moreover, median education levels (calculated through community mapping exercises in each case study) were far lower in the Guatemalan cases than the Honduran cases, and yet many men with little or no formal schooling assumed leadership positions in the school council and other organizations. Finally, uneducated parents also often reported acquiring and applying skills, as well as participating actively in other organizations subsequently.

Prior group participation, meanwhile, was more clearly linked to people assuming school council leadership roles and subsequently participating in other organizations. Throughout these eight communities, those who participated in the past tended to keep participating. And, as noted above, long-established leaders often took control of the

school councils and remained the principal leaders in the communities. In the Honduran cases, the same leaders who took the initiative to make their communities independent were the leaders who led the school initiative. In every case, these (predominantly male) leaders remained central figures in the community's organizational life. In the Guatemalan cases, the communities' post-CMS organizational life remained largely dominated by the same men who led the CPM and, for the older communities, PAC. Continuity, then, characterized the leadership dynamics in these communities since the counter-insurgency period.

The same is true for the communities' connections to government offices. In almost every case, each community depended on one or two men with connections to the local political establishment. These communities relied heavily on these men to help attract state support for the school, and continued relying on them afterwards. Perales offers a typical case. There, the Reyes family had long maintained strong Liberal Party connections, such that Mario—former Liberal Party municipal councilmember—asserted: “If the Reyes family says the Liberal Party will lose in Azucenas, the Liberal Party will lose.” A local woman corroborated this enduring dependence on the Reyes men for political connections: “Here we have [David Reyes]. I can't sit there, close to the mayor, because she doesn't know me...But if we go with this man [David], we feel differently.” To get things for the community, another parent confirmed: “One goes to talk with David, and he asks for things for us...That's how we got this road [connecting the community to the main road]...and all this [the classrooms].” A local teacher, referring to this same pattern of reutilizing well-connected leaders, explains: “When the parent leaders are elected, people are smart, because they elect the people that have that capacity—that are political, that know how to manage and ask for things.” Of course, not every community has such politically-connected leaders (Frutales is a clear case of

this), and the Guatemalan communities tend to be less tied to a particular party than their Honduran counterparts, but in almost every case study community those with connections to either a party or people who work in government offices retain leadership positions before, during, and after CMS participation.

Still, new participants who learned from their participation (mostly through training) in CMS also joined other organizations after they had begun participating in the school council. In both countries, those who demonstrated more subsequent participation were those who had been more involved in the school council. Those who were at-large members, for instance, tended to remain uninvolved in other organizations, while presidents, treasurers, and secretaries who had learned from their council participation were far more likely to join other organizations afterwards.

Those who were on the council for longer also appeared to become more trusted members of the community, as other residents were more likely to nominate them to serve on other organizations' committees. In Saq'e, for instance, two at-large members remained on the school council for eight years. Though their school council role remained relatively minor, their neighbors became accustomed to having them on a community committee, and they felt more confident in their ability to serve on these committees.

Participating in the school councils did encourage a considerable number of parents in these communities to continue participating in other organizations. Many newcomers to community organizations who then participated in other organizations, however, retained only marginal roles—e.g., being at-large members for another organization. By and large, the intensity of that participation remained low; in neither the Honduran nor the Guatemalan cases did CMS create a sizable new class of community leaders.

Changes in leadership dynamics from CMS participation were far less frequent than the other outcomes discussed thus far, which is consistent with the finding (both in the regressions above and in Chapter Five) that CMS has less of an impact on these more onerous forms of participation. But, in almost every case study community, there was at least one newcomer—such as the former treasurers in Chahim and Nima, the former president in Cafetales, and the former secretary in Huertos—who acquired substantial skills and confidence from CMS participation and used these assets to increase subsequent participation and assume additional leadership roles in organizing the community.

Thus, while a focus on leadership positions over time reveals more continuity than change, CMS participation did prompt some incremental change in who led organizations, organized the community, and participated in demand-making. These outcomes were far more likely among the principal council positions—president, treasurer, and secretary—who received more training and assumed greater responsibilities.

To perform an additional check on these qualitative results, I also coded the case study data and ran logistic regressions for key independent variables and their impact on subsequent participation and leadership in organizations. The results, provided in Table 33, confirm that subsequent participation in the eight communities was sensitive to features of one's council experience and state support—i.e., receiving training and spending more years on the council. Moreover, the negative correlation between being female and subsequent participation provides further evidence to support my conclusion that fewer spillovers accrued to female participants.

Meanwhile, post-CMS leadership revealed a positive correlation with prior group leadership, suggesting the aforementioned inertia in who holds positions of authority. Still, those who served in the leading school council positions and those who served longer in the council also revealed a greater likelihood of heading organizations after joining the school council. Overall, these regressions suggest that 1) training (which gave many parents important skills) did have an effect on subsequent participation in other organizations and 2) the level of parents' participation in the council had an effect on both whether they subsequently participated in and led another organization.

**Table 33: Logistic Regression for Subsequent Organizational Participation and Leadership Among Case Study Subjects**

	<b>Subsequent Participation in Other Organizations<sup>228</sup></b>	<b>Subsequent Leadership of Other Organizations</b>
Schooling	0.043	0.126***
<b>Prior Group Participation</b>	-0.078	-0.905
<b>Prior Group Leadership</b>	0.233	1.360*
Council Leadership Position	0.126	1.508**
Years on Council	0.275**	0.264**
Training	2.051***	0.399
Female	-1.801***	-1.691
Constant	-1.801*	-2.869***
<i>Observations</i>	91	91
<i>Pseudo r-squared</i>	0.339	0.291

<sup>228</sup> For this regression, I planned to add learning as an independent variable, as I had for the regressions on the survey data. I opted to exclude it, however, after my preliminary review of the case study dataset—examining correlations between independent variables—suggested a multi-collinearity problem.

## **VI. Case Study Data for Two Additional Explanations: Time and Resource Burden and More on Council Democraticness**

Thus far, the discussion has focused on four clusters of independent variables, for which I had both survey and case study data. Qualitative analysis, however, allowed me to probe further with regard to the impact of the structure of the CMS experience and council democraticness. In this penultimate section, I thus present data on the effects on spillovers of: 1) the time and resource burden of participation and 2) the democraticness of school councils, and specifically rotation in leadership.

The former is important because CMS schools, like other PG initiatives, have proven controversial for passing administrative responsibilities on to parents, requiring them to contribute their own time and resources without remuneration (see Chapter One). With respect to spillovers, it is conceivable that too much time, energy, and money spent on school council participation could detract from parents' ability to participate in other organizations—both during and after serving on the school council. Meanwhile, if more democratic councils prove more likely to produce spillovers, this would provide an important result for the study of the quality of democracy. In particular, it would suggest that a state initiative that fosters democracy in small arenas like school councils could foster democratic behaviors and norms even in democracy's "brownest" areas. Particularly in Honduras and Guatemala, such a finding would suggest an incipient way to reverse the troubling recent trend of democratic disenchantment. Here, I will first examine the time and resource burden question, before proceeding to re-visit council democraticness.

*a) Time and Resource Burden*

Two options exist for addressing the impact of the time and resources burden of participation on spillovers: examining intra- and inter-country variation. I begin with the former.

Within each country and, indeed, each community, the amount of time and resources parents contributed to the council related directly to their positions on the council. All parents with children in the community had to contribute labor for preparing school lunch (always the women) and, periodically, for school improvements (mostly the men). Each council had the additional responsibility of visiting government offices when called, filling out forms and signing salary checks, and traveling to stores in the municipal center to buy provisions for which the CMS program gave them funds. In all eight communities, these responsibilities remained concentrated among the president, treasurer, and secretary. So too was training, which involved the loss of workdays.

In both countries, however, the within-community comparisons suggest that parents who devoted more time and resources to CMS participation experienced more learning and subsequent civic and political engagement. As the analysis above has shown, more involved council members proved more likely to exhibit several types of spillover effects than those parents in marginal positions. This runs counter to the idea that the time and resource burden depressed the incidence of spillovers.

Still, in communities in both countries, certain parents did suggest that all of the energy they devoted to participation had drained them. The former AECO president in Perales, for instance, indicated that he would stop participating in organizations after the current year, because he lost workdays and money participating: “One is poor, and to go out of

the community [to go to government offices], you have to go with money.” Similarly, in Huertos, the former AECO president explained that he had limited resources to participate in more than one organization at a time: “I dropped my other commitments when we formed the school.” Still, leaders like these exhibited greater learning and subsequent participation than more marginal council members, suggesting that the increases in skills and other participation associated with greater levels of involvement, responsibility, and state support compensate for any time or resource burden effect, as far as spillovers are concerned.

Differences between countries, however, suggest a somewhat greater time and resource burden effect. CMS leaders in Guatemala had to spend much more time and money on CMS participation than their Honduran counterparts. In particular, they took on greater responsibilities like setting the school calendar each year and purchasing food supplies, as well as giving up six to nine workdays per year for training. The quantitative analysis above suggests that this training proved critical for learning, and my case studies indicate that one of the reasons why spillovers were much more prevalent in Alta Verapaz than in Honduras was that the Guatemalan state offered greater support for these positions of greater responsibility. That said, Guatemalan parent leaders also reported greater exhaustion with participation, which at times demanded several workdays each month. In sum, for many parents, greater involvement led to greater training and responsibility, which led to greater subsequent organizational participation. For others, however, greater training and responsibility led to exhaustion, which reduced post-CMS participation.

Chapter Five illustrated that this greater time and resource burden dampened present members’ participation in other organizations. Simply put, parents leading the COEDUCA had less time and resources to contribute to other things. This also suggests

why the variable for being a current member produced a negative coefficient in the survey-based regression on skills acquisition and application in Guatemala. But both quantitative and qualitative data suggests that any short-term dampening effect does not necessarily depress subsequent participation; former council leaders may take a break from participation, but they are then likely to join other organizations.

The case studies suggested something similar: namely, that leading the COEDUCA had required a great deal of effort, but parents mostly feel that it was ultimately a valuable experience. Moreover, with the reversal of PRONADE in 2009, instead of celebrating the end of their responsibilities, the more prevailing sentiment among parents was resentment at what they perceived as abandonment by the state. As Josué, a former council president in Nima, explained: “It’s true that it was hard, but we also learned. Now, we’re resting more, but things have gone a bit downhill.” The time required to participate in the school council exhausted some parents, but many more expressed their current frustration with the lack of training and their inability to hold teachers accountable for attendance and punctuality.

Thus, the time and resources required of leading council participants may have depressed non-CMS participation in the short term, but it did not appear to have any lasting dampening effect on these parents’ participation once they were no longer school council members.

*b) Council Democraticness: Rotation*

I explored two ways of measuring the school councils’ democraticness: rotation among leadership and the nature of decision-making. The regressions of the survey data above suggest that skills acquisition and application occur more frequently among CMS

participants in councils that make decisions through either group consultation or group decision-making—rather than having a leader unilaterally decide. The survey data, however, did not provide any means to gauge council decision-making more objectively; teacher responses to similar questions provided one potential measure, but only for the period when they were interviewed, leaving no data for the school council's previous leadership groups. Case studies provided a much better account of how the group made decisions in the present, but, being conducted in only one period (as opposed to repeating visits over several years), it proved very difficult to determine how decision-making had changed over time. Individual interviewees provided many conflicting accounts about prior decision-making, and group discussions of this topic often yielded insufficient information to confirm one account over another.

I thus sought to bolster my exploration of council democraticness by examining rotation in leadership. The cross-national surveys provided no measure of this variable, either, but case studies generated a concrete, comparable measure with data available from each council's inception. Rotation in leadership could, of course, reflect internal conflicts, personal idiosyncracies, or goal-related failures. My case studies, however, suggested that rotation reflected a council where more community members were involved in collective decision-making. The analysis below further suggests how state support—especially broader training in Guatemala—was a significant determinant of higher rotation.

Within and between each country's case studies, my research uncovered substantial variation in council rotation. Despite program requirements of bi-annual council elections, certain communities retained the same leadership throughout the school's history. In Honduras, for instance, interviews in Frutales revealed two principal leaders who had controlled the council's affairs since the beginning, with a total of only 10

parents participating in the council since the school's inception. Meanwhile, in Cafetales, rotation proved higher, with a total of 15 parents having participated in the council in a similarly small community. Variation proved even greater in the Guatemalan cases: in Saq'e, only 10 parents ever participated in the council, while in Nima 25 parents did.

From interviews, it became apparent that communities with greater rotation in leadership—particularly in the three critical leadership positions—produced a greater number of individuals with increases in skills and participation in other organizations. To check this qualitative finding, I compiled a dataset to test the effect of rotation on spillovers. For each term of each council (in total, there were 39), I recorded the number of new council members, the number of new principal leaders (president, treasurer, and secretary), and the respective number of parents from this period who exhibited organizational learning, political learning, skills application, and increased subsequent organizational participation. Initial tabulations revealed strong correlations between overall turnover and turnover in principal leadership. Both measures were correlated with the occurrence of spillovers, but the correlation between turnover in principal leadership and these various spillovers proved stronger, as predicted. Because the two turnover measures were strongly correlated with one another, I chose to use only the variable for turnover in principal leadership.

Before regressing this turnover measure against spillover measures, I also had to consider alternative hypotheses. The most obvious one from my qualitative work was that spillovers would simply decline over time due to reduced school council activity, as described in Chapter Seven. In all eight communities where I worked, the council did more work during the early years than in later terms. As Sara in Huertos explained, “At the beginning, [it was] almost constant. We met every week. And sometimes we went

three times a week to ask for help [in the municipality]...Now it's less." Similarly, in Saq'e, Adán recalls how it was "very hard" at the beginning, but less so now. In all these communities, initial leaders had to formalize the school and seek funding for a solid classroom and additional materials. Community discussions revealed that the level of activity virtually always declined in subsequent years, and there existed a general perception that, in the words of one resident of Huertos: "when you achieve a project, [the level of activity] starts going down."

Thus, correlations between rotation and spillovers could easily have been spurious; the term during which parents participated could have explained far more. To test this, I thus included a variable for term—with a value of one for the first council, two for the second, and so forth—in the regressions, as well. Table 34 documents the results for linear regressions of these independent variables against several spillover measures for which my case studies provide comparable data for all present and former school council participants: organizational learning, political learning, skills application, and subsequent organizational participation.<sup>229</sup>

As predicted, the results indicate that greater turnover increases the odds of more widespread spillovers, with positive, statistically significant correlations with all of these spillover measures. The term number variable also produced the expected negative impact on skills application and subsequent organizational participation, though not the learning measures. Overall, the greater magnitude and statistical significance of the results for rotation suggest that a one-member increase in rotation among the principal

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<sup>229</sup> Strictly speaking, these dependent variables were count variables, which might make a poisson regression more appropriate. I ran both poisson and OLS regressions for these sets of variables, and both models produced virtually identical results, with no marked change in direction, magnitude, or statistical significance of the correlations. I report the OLS coefficients because they are easier to interpret.

council leaders had a stronger impact on these spillover measures than parents' participation occurring one term later. Furthermore, running the same regressions separately for the Honduran and Guatemalan cases indicated greater sensitivity to sample size for the term variable. Overall, then, these regressions suggest that greater activity in the early years of school councils may produce greater spillovers, but that rotation in council leadership can counteract the decline over time. Rotation, as one important dimension of council democraticness, can enhance changes in parents' civic and political behavior.

**Table 34: Linear Regressions for Effect of Rotation and Term Number on Spillovers**

	<b>Organizational Learning</b>	<b>Political Learning</b>	<b>Skills Application</b>	<b>Subsequent Organizational Participation</b>
Rotation	0.771***	0.490***	0.409***	0.307***
Term	-0.183	-0.095	-0.235**	-0.144*
Constant	0.604	0.296	0.757**	0.536*
Observations	39	39	39	39
Adjusted R-squared	0.544	0.359	0.403	0.274

Between-country comparisons also prove telling. In Table 35, I provide a comparison of the rotation rates for each community, standardized for the number of council terms in each community and the number of available council positions.<sup>230</sup> Overall, the Guatemalan cases demonstrated significantly higher rotation than the Honduras cases. Saq'e was the only Guatemalan community with lower rotation than a Honduran

<sup>230</sup> PRONADE required seven members, while PROHECO mandated six, though two Honduran case study communities maintained seven members.

community, and this likely reflects Saq'e's atypically high emigration rates. Far more men from this community have left the country for work than in any other case study community in either country, dramatically reducing the pool of eligible participants, particularly in a male-dominated community where female participation in organizations remains virtually taboo.

**Table 35: Comparative Rotation Rates Among Case Study Communities**

	New members after initial group	Open positions after initial group	Newcomers after initial group per open position
<i>Honduras</i>			
Frutales	4	21	0.19
Perales	7	21	0.33
Huertos	6	24	0.25
Cafetales	8	25	0.33
	<i>Mean for Honduran communities</i>		<b>0.28</b>
<i>Guatemala</i>			
Saq'e	3	28	0.11
Yaab	16	28	0.57
Chahim	12	28	0.43
Nima	18	35	0.51
	<i>Mean for Guatemalan Communities</i>		<b>0.41</b>

My interviews suggest that state support was a critical factor in these different rotation rates. As mentioned above, training and other forms of technical assistance in Guatemala outstripped similar efforts in Honduras in frequency and intensity. PRONADE provided training much more frequently and delivered technical assistance to the councils as a whole. In Honduras, meanwhile, PROHECO training remained

scarce, and technical assistance went only to the president and the treasurer. In the communities I visited, this increased the reliance on these two individuals, creating a sense of their indispensability while marginalizing others from council activities and responsibilities. Time and again, parents reflected on how the council's key responsibilities were "affairs of the President and the Treasurer." This also appeared to increase reluctance to change leadership, particularly as parents had little confidence that newcomers would receive subsequent training to learn their new positions. Meanwhile, in Guatemala, parents knew that training would occur three times per year, increasing even insecure residents' confidence that they could take on this new role if nominated.

The case study data, then, suggest that state support increased rotation in council leadership, and that this rotation, in turn, increased the odds of certain spillovers among members. The cross-national survey data does not include measures to test this measure definitively among statistically-representative samples in either country, but this analysis suggests another way in which greater state support may have enhanced spillovers in Guatemala relative to Honduras. In addition to the direct impacts of state support on learning and the impact of that learning on networks spillovers—documented earlier in this chapter—such support may have increased spillovers by encouraging at least one dimension of school council democraticness.

## **VII. Conclusion**

This chapter has used quantitative and qualitative data to demonstrate which factors prove most important for achieving the learning and networks outcomes that earlier chapters documented. For the most part, the quantitative and qualitative data produced consistent findings.

For learning outcomes, I found support for all four central hypotheses. Both quantitative and qualitative analyses suggest that participation-related baseline measures proved more important than socioeconomic status. Meanwhile, those who participated more beforehand tended to reveal more learning, but—even in the absence of prior participation—receiving training and perceiving the council as effective and democratic were strong predictors of acquiring new skills and applying them to work in other organizations. Moreover, those who participated in the school council with greater intensity, and those who perceived the council to be effective and democratic, were more likely to apply their skills elsewhere.

For the networks outcomes, both the regressions and case studies indicate that subsequent participation in organizations was largely, but not entirely, determined by baseline levels of participation. In these local dynamics of participation and leadership, there exists more continuity than change, but CMS participants who acquire skills also prove more likely to actively participate in other organizations.

The analysis suggests the following about the hypotheses with which this chapter began. First, initial individual characteristics are at least as important as any other explanatory factor, but not equally so. Initial participation-related characteristics matter more than socioeconomic status, which the regressions showed to have an impact on skills acquisition and application (not confirmed by the qualitative analysis), but not on networks variables. The lesser importance of socioeconomic variables in explaining outcomes makes sense given the nature of the communities, where the range of participants' socioeconomic level is relatively small when compared to a national or urban sample.

Second, state support is critical for skills acquisition and indirectly contributes to subsequent organizational participation through skills gains and increasing rotation. The good news for governments and analysts alike is that the data on state support implies that states can adopt measures to affect parents' level of civic and political skills and involvement in community organizations. The bad news in the CMS context, however, is that training has declined dramatically in both countries—PRONADE has ended without the Guatemalan government providing alternative support to parents, and PROHECO has delivered virtually no training to Honduran parents over the past several years. The findings about training and state support suggest that spillovers have likely declined in the years since the surveys were administered.

Third, regarding individuals' experience on school councils: levels of involvement and the way that councils function matter for both learning and subsequent participation. Parents who participated with greater intensity, over a more sustained period of time, or occupied the principal roles on the council proved more likely to reveal these spillovers. This finding reflects the structure of these school councils—for the most part, they operate with two or three leaders controlling matters, with everyone else on the sideline. Parent councils' leadership structure proves similar to how most organizations are run within these communities, but it also reflects program design. The comparison between PRONADE, which ensured greater levels of involvement from more members, and PROHECO indicates that a program that divides responsibilities and support more evenly will increase parents' organizational and political skills more and provide them with experiences that will more likely motivate them to participate in (and possibly even lead) other organizations. The impact of council effectiveness and democraticness (both decision-making and rotation) in increasing the incidence of learning only serves to reinforce the point.

Moreover, the data indicate a strong gender dimension to participation, where one's sex has an impact on one's level of involvement, responsibility, and the degree of state support that one receives. The results suggest that more attention to ensuring gender equity in participation in CMS councils could expand the pool of people who acquire skills and apply them through subsequent participation in other organizations.

Finally, this chapter has also reinforced the analysis in previous chapters of the relative sensitivity of certain spillovers to state support and council experience—that is, the factors that a CMS program can control. The survey and case study data have shown that the most frequently observed outcomes in Chapter Five are also, by and large, the factors for which variables aside from initial individual characteristics will have an impact. For those nearer to the bottom of this pyramidal figure (see Figure 15 in Chapter Five)—such as organizational learning—factors of CMS participation like training and technical support to foster effective and democratic councils, and changes in parents' level of involvement, could have a particularly important impact.

In short, this analysis reinforces the idea that, even in remote rural communities, participation is not a dead-end affair. Concerted state efforts can help break the inertia of participation in these areas by offering new spaces for engagement and supporting participants' efforts to learn new skills and assume new responsibilities. Initial characteristics are important for parent learning and subsequent participation, but they are not the sole determinants of these outcomes.

Meanwhile, more onerous spillover outcomes (nearer to the top of the pyramid diagram), like subsequent organizational leadership and demand-making, proved far more resistant to CMS-related experiences. Initial individual characteristics and community leadership dynamics were much better predictors of these more demanding forms of participation

in communities following CMS implementation. These findings suggest that it would take a far more concerted effort from programs like CMS to impact the types of civic and political participation near the top of the pyramid. Initiatives like PROHECO and PRONADE—focused primarily on ensuring administrative functionality—will not likely have a substantial impact in shaping these dynamics of participation in rural Honduran and Guatemalan villages.

## 10. CONCLUSION: PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE, CIVIL SOCIETY, AND THE QUALITY OF DEMOCRACY

Initiatives to stimulate participation in governance and development have often prompted arguments from two extremes: unquestioning advocates and dismissive critics. This thesis has mapped out a middle path. Contrary to naïve participation cheerleaders who assume that new venues for citizen participation will automatically strengthen civil society and democracy, I developed a systematic theoretical framework and rigorous methodological strategy and explored how political context and problems in program implementation impinge on PG initiatives. But, unlike those who dismiss flawed efforts to generate participation as “tyranny” (Cooke and Kothari 2001), I found evidence that one type of PG initiative can produce spillovers among a non-trivial minority of participants. Thus, while I highlighted the obstacles to—and limitations of—these initiatives’ ability to strengthen civil society, I explored the evidence that creating these participatory fora can—and has—changed the civic and political behavior of citizens in rural Honduras and Guatemala.

In this concluding chapter, I first discuss what the preponderance of the evidence suggests with regard to the literature on PG. Here, I provide a brief overview of my results before presenting six lessons from this study about the impact of PG on civil society and democratic life. I then conclude by reflecting on what the results of this study mean for the relationship between PG, civil society, and the quality of democracy in Honduras and Guatemala. In this section, I include three lessons for how PG initiatives in similar contexts could increase the likelihood of strengthening citizens’ capacity to organize autonomously and improve the quality of democracy.

## I. Lessons About Participatory Governance

The empirical chapters of this thesis have shown conclusively that individual spillovers from PG are possible, even in “least likely” cases. In rural Honduras and Alta Verapaz, Guatemala—some of the poorest areas in the Americas, where social scientists would predict inert, weak civil society—both survey and case study research demonstrated civic and political learning and increased subsequent CSO participation among a non-trivial minority of CMS participants. That said, certain spillovers occurred more frequently than others. Individual learning was much more prevalent than changes to civic and political networks and patterns of political representation. Both quantitative and qualitative analysis produced clear conclusions about the relative frequency of these different sorts of outcomes.

My analysis has also shown a series of factors that increase the likelihood of spillovers. As expected, I found strong evidence that those with prior skills and experiences were more likely to develop political capabilities as a result of their participation. But these were not the sole determinants of such spillovers. State support (especially through training), greater involvement in the council, and more effective and democratic councils increased the likelihood of learning. Moreover, whether directly or through the resulting skills acquisition and increased rotation on the councils, state support greater individual involvement, and participating in more democratic councils also raised the likelihood of subsequent participation in other groups and organizing community meetings.

Overall, however, it was clear that the CMS intervention had a lesser impact on more demanding forms of community participation and political behavior (e.g., leading organizations and submitting petitions to the state). Put differently, the least likely spillovers (as illustrated in the pyramidal figure in Chapter Five) were also the least

sensitive to factors other than individuals' initial characteristics. This correspondence makes sense: it is harder to change a community's organizational life than it is to change an individual's skills. But the relative frequency of these different outcomes also reflects two sets of obstacles laid out in the theoretical framework in Chapter Two: 1) features of program design and implementation and 2) how these programs interacted with different political contexts and histories.

Regarding program design, several points bear mention. First, both PROHECO and PRONADE were inflexible, top-down programs that emphasized administrative functionality over parents' civic and political engagement. Though CMS advocates often argued that these programs were good for both the education system and democracy more broadly, the latter component remained mostly an after-thought: Those devising and defending CMS seemed to assume that spillovers would come simply by creating new venues for parent participation. Meanwhile, state actors told parents what to do, and parents understandably relied on state actors' initiative to perform most of their responsibilities. Consistent with the literature on PG, these program-related constraints reduced the likelihood of spillovers.

But the cross-national comparison showed how more frequent and substantive training for leaders, broader technical support for the council, and heightened responsibility and autonomy helped compensate for the programs' imperfections. In Guatemala, parents had greater responsibilities than their Honduran counterparts, obtained training more frequently than in Honduras, and received visits from support staff that typically included meetings with the entire council (rather than just the president and treasurer). In Guatemala more than in Honduras, both quantitative and qualitative analysis suggested that this state support led parents to learn skills and gain experience and confidence that they could apply to participation in other organizations.

The two-country comparison also showed how different political contexts can alter virtually identical PG initiatives. In Honduras, pervasive patronage politics undermined parent council autonomy since PROHECO's early days. Meanwhile, in Guatemala, parent councils enjoyed greater decision-making power, and spillovers were more likely while PRONADE existed. But Guatemala's distinct political legacy—polarization and conflict—ultimately contributed to PRONADE's demise in 2008. Parents' roles have been dramatically reduced since then, virtually eliminating the possibility of spillovers from parental participation.

This account provides six lessons for the literature on the impact of PG initiatives in Latin America. I present them in turn, with the final lesson serving as a transition into the concluding discussion of the relationship between PG, civil society, and the quality of democracy in Honduras and Guatemala.

First, this thesis illustrates the imperative to disaggregate the different types of spillover outcomes scholars expect from PG. The study shows the utility of the political capabilities framework—which distinguishes between learning, networks, and patterns of political representation—for achieving disaggregation. To my knowledge, this thesis offers the first systematic effort to operationalize the political capabilities approach to examine PG. In so doing, I have also demonstrated the advantage of a mixed-methods strategy, which highlights not just frequencies and correlations, but also the meaning of particular outcomes, the potential links between individual- and community-level changes, and the processes through which change may occur. This approach enabled me to capture both incremental spillovers (such as individual learning) and broader stagnation (little change in inter-community networks and patterns of political representation). In short, the political capabilities approach proved flexible enough to identify some moderate changes while appreciating the lack of a “game-changer.”

Second, I have shown that spillovers to participants in PG initiatives are possible even in “least-likely” cases. CMS in Honduras and Guatemala are “least-likely” cases for spillovers because they focused on remote, rural areas where participants had very low socio-economic levels (both in material and educational terms), relatively low levels of prior participation, and weak existing civil society. Moreover, CMS programs were more top-down and focused on ensuring basic administrative functionality than the poster children of the PG literature (e.g., participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre). In short, PROHECO and PRONADE had various features that would lead scholars to predict no effect on parents’ civic and political behaviors. But the descriptive statistics presented in Chapter Five clearly demonstrated individual-level spillovers—particularly learning and skills application, but also subsequent participation in other organizations—among a non-trivial minority of participants. Meanwhile, my case study analysis confirmed that changes in participants in a diverse set of cases were often directly attributable to their participation in the school council.

Third, this thesis has demonstrated how crucial state support, the level of individual involvement, and the nature of council decision-making are for generating spillovers. This complicates Nylen’s (2002) conclusion that individual characteristics are the primary determinant of spillovers from PG. Prior participation levels did, indeed, exert a powerful effect on the impacts of participation, but receiving training and technical assistance could compensate among individuals with less organizational experience. This confirms various accounts of PG, which have noted that training is important (Lang 2007; Finkel 2008; Wampler 2002). It transcends these accounts, however, by exploring which outcomes are most sensitive to state support and the processes through which these changes happen.

I also showed how different levels of participation generate different degrees of spillovers. My research demonstrates that, regardless of prior participation in other organizations, CMS participants who maintained a higher level of involvement and responsibility were more likely to exhibit spillover effects. The nature and degree of participation in PG and the likelihood of spillovers can also differ by sex, either due to the exclusion of women or the reduction of their participation to tokenism. In Alta Verapaz, women remained almost entirely excluded from the school councils, reinforcing conservative gender norms. Meanwhile, more women in Honduras were able to take on these roles, but their participation often remained superficial. Even among those who technically occupied a primary role, prevailing norms of male dominance undercut their participation and led women to serve as rubber stamps. This, in turn, made spillovers among women—even when controlling for council position—less likely.

Fourth, the analysis demonstrates that granting greater autonomy is also essential for producing spillovers. My research illustrates that, as others have found principally in urban PG initiatives, the state can—and likely must—play a role in fostering civil society in rural “brown areas” (Houtzager 2003; Evans 1996). But these efforts will always exist in tension with incursions from existing political actors, whether from state entities or a particular party. To foster civil society, however, striking the right balance vis-à-vis new CSOs’ autonomy is critical. With no support, civil society will not likely emerge in these rural areas due to resource constraints and other obstacles. But capture by the state or parties, as in Honduras, undermines state efforts to stimulate participation and introduce accountability.

The specifics of how this tension will manifest itself, however, depend on context. The fifth key lesson from the present study is that political context affects both how PG is implemented and its likelihood of strengthening civil society. It will come as no surprise

to scholars of democracy and development that the history of state-society interactions will affect contemporary efforts to stimulate civil society. But, although certain scholars like Houtzager (2003) and Gray-Molina (2000) have moved in this direction, the PG literature—dominated by single-country, and often single-city or -town, accounts—has not focused sufficiently on this.

My research shows that PG is susceptible to more than just “elite capture,” but also to the impact of entrenched patterns of how people organize (or do not organize) themselves in civil society, how political society and the state are ordered (or fragmented), and how these elements interact. This is similar to what Houtzager (2003, 16-17) means when he discusses “the iterative nature of state-society interactions” and concludes that current dynamics are “to a substantial degree the product of previous episodes of state-society interaction.” It is also reminiscent of Gray-Molina’s (2000) approach to PG in Bolivia as one more stratum in a long-term process of “political layering” of state-society interactions.

Like the present study, neither of these formulations suggests that change is impossible, but simply that the past shapes potential outcomes. My thesis has shown this by studying two very similar PG initiatives in neighboring countries with distinct political histories. The comparison of these otherwise “most similar” cases brings into relief the influence that inherited patterns of state-society relations can have at both the community and national levels. The patronage capture of PROHECO can only be understood in terms of Honduras’s history of “controlled inclusion” (one part clientelism, one part co-optation, with a sprinkling of repression), while PRONADE’s demise reflects the polarization and conflict that have existed in Guatemala at least since Independence, but particularly since the “coerced marginalization” of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century.

Still, significant as these differences were, they produced similar results in each country: the erosion of parent council autonomy and the diminishing likelihood of spillovers.

## **II. The Limitations of Individual Spillovers and the Remaining Challenges for Civil Society and the Quality of Democracy**

Another similarity between these two cases is this study's sixth and final key contribution to the PG literature: individual spillovers alone do not necessarily signal a game-changer for civil society or the quality of democracy. In the case of CMS, the program design and political obstacles mentioned above limited how much PG could impact civil society in these rural areas. Even where organizational and political learning occurred and civil society appeared to become "thicker," or denser, this provided no guarantee of a stronger civil society. Put differently, an increase in skilled, motivated individuals and the formation of new groups within a community did not necessarily increase new or existing organizations' autonomy, capacity for acting collectively, and ability to engage with the state—all key dimensions of civil society strength. Instead, most new groups that proliferated were mere sub-units of state entities, prompting the question of whether they were CSOs at all.

Moreover, organizations that existed on paper often did not exist in practice. These "empty shells" responded to a new broader governance model in each country, where communities were asked to form a panoply of new groups by external actors (principally the state, but also development organizations) in exchange for development assistance. Communities in both countries responded by creating a façade of having many or all of these groups. In rural Honduras and Guatemala, groups proliferated, especially to take up issues like water, sanitation, health, and education. In practice, however, these groups either never really existed (never meeting regularly beyond an initial meeting to form and

get state recognition) or they lay dormant, with community leaders alternating which group name they used depending on the current opportunities for state assistance that they believed were available. This community response was perfectly sensible, but it belies the notion that the existence of more organizations translates directly into stronger civil society.

Overall, the good news from this study is that, even in remote areas, participating in PG can produce spillovers into other facets of civic and political life. But the bad news is that, even where moderate spillovers occur, the nature of group formation can still reinforce rather than challenge the constraints to the autonomy of organizations of the rural poor. As Fung and Wright (2003) conclude, all too often there remains an absence of “counter-vailing power” that enables those who engage in PG to address the power asymmetries that have shaped these areas for decades, and arguably centuries.

Moreover, in the case of CMS, residents’ sphere of action remained decidedly local, with little scope to influence policy and monitor officials’ behavior beyond their isolated communities. Individual spillovers in learning and group participation have had little demonstrable effect on intra- and inter-community networks and patterns of political representation. In certain Guatemalan cases, PRONADE provided a training ground for participation in the new community council (COCODE) system, which is now the key channel for articulating community demands to the state. But alliances between communities and/or organizations were weak or non-existent. In the absence of “scaling up,” the bargaining power of individual PRONADE and PROHECO communities remained quite small.

In Honduras, the most salient expression of this weakness is AECOs’ subservience to patronage networks, a product of decades of the “controlled inclusion” that I introduced

in Chapter Three. Meanwhile, in Alta Verapaz, Q'eqchi' citizens still perceive chasms separating them from the state, which, for much of its history, excluded, coerced, and repressed their communities. In short, even where CMS produces spillovers among some participants in rural Honduras and Alta Verapaz, it does not substantially change the nature of civil society in rural areas and CSOs' relationship to the state.

\* \* \*

This study began by describing how, despite the arrival of democracy in both Honduras and Guatemala, rural communities (particularly indigenous communities in Guatemala) remained excluded from the political process. While democracy brought with it the effective extension of the franchise in a more fair and competitive electoral arena, people in “brown areas” remained disconnected from public decision-making. Recent years brought correspondingly high levels of dissatisfaction with—and distrust of—government that reflects low democratic quality and could portend political instability.

Participatory governance was one proposed solution for reversing these troubling trends by creating a more direct link between marginalized citizens and the state in concrete matters of social and development policy. Such incorporation is critical not only for addressing basic concerns of equity, but also because of its potential to stimulate civil society. Civil society organizations can enhance the quality of democracy by participating in “discussion of public policy issues, in communicating with and demanding accountability from elected representatives, in monitoring official conduct, and in direct engagement with public issues at the local level” (Diamond and Morlino 2004, 23-24). This thesis has thus interrogated whether PG could foster the civic and political

incorporation of marginalized people as a means to strengthen civil society and, by extension, improve the quality of democracy in Honduras and Guatemala.

The evidence on these broader questions remains sobering. On one hand, I have demonstrated that CMS offered a clear case of both states expanding services to remote rural areas and “bringing in” peasants to play a larger role in how state services are provided and administered in their community. Moreover, CMS produced substantial individual spillovers among a non-trivial minority of parents—an important and surprising finding—including learning of organizational and political skills, applying them to other organizations, and subsequently joining other organizations.

On the other hand, while CMS certainly brought “direct engagement with public issues at the local level,” the other elements of the civil society – quality of democracy nexus remain mostly absent. In fact, the degree to which CMS has strengthened rural civil society remains quite limited. CMS has not produced substantial changes in whether and how citizens form organizations in these communities. Nor has it produced either alliances between organizations and/or communities or a greater capacity for collective action to cooperate and contend with the state. Moreover, spillovers from CMS have not fostered the development of new types of CSOs that might be more capable of such action. Instead of re-shaping civic and political networks and patterns of political representation, CMS has fit into a relatively new model of state-society relations in Guatemala and Honduras, where groups form either in response to—or anticipation of—state demands. Organizational density in these areas has increased and certain communities now express more demands to the state than before, but there does not appear to be a concomitant increase in the strength of civil society to demand accountability, participate in policy debates, and defend community interests vis-à-vis the state or powerful economic elites. Peasants who participate in these organizations

remain in a relatively weak position with regard to the mechanisms through which civil society can improve the quality of democracy.

Over the medium and long term, individual spillovers from CMS may create a small new cadre of more engaged citizens and more skilled leaders. But this study suggests that the scale of these changes and their impact on broader state-society relations will likely remain a series of ripples rather than a sea change. Meanwhile, civil society in both countries remains weak and deeply unequal. In Honduras and Guatemala, economic elites retain an undue influence on politics, with recent examples including Honduran business magnates' apparent involvement in the coup that unseated President Zelaya (Ruhl 2010, 101), and the Guatemalan business lobby's continuing ability to block any efforts to increase the country's unsustainably low tax rate.<sup>231</sup> In recent years, public sector unions in both countries have flexed their muscles, but even they primarily protect middle-class interests rather than those of the less-advantaged majority. In sum, the poor—and especially those in rural “brown areas”—still, by and large, lack the capacity to influence policy-making and ensure that officials are monitored and held accountable.

This analysis does not mean that no state efforts—whether CMS or otherwise—can help reverse the inequities of whose voices and interests are (and are not) reflected in policy. But the results from this thesis do suggest that, to more broadly contribute to civil society development and improve the quality of democracy in Honduras and Guatemala, PG initiatives would need to differ from PRONADE and PROHECO in three key ways.

First, other PG initiatives would need an explicit focus on stimulating participation that extends beyond administrative functionality. Through CMS, the Honduran and Guatemalan governments decentralized decision-making in education provision, but they

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<sup>231</sup> For one instance of CACIF's position in this ongoing debate, see: “Cacif rechaza la reforma tributaria del ejecutivo.” *El Periódico*. March 18, 2010.

significantly limited parents' roles. For such PG arenas to function as "schools of democracy," the state must focus on working with parents to ensure their capacity to perform more than administrative functions such as monitoring teacher attendance and signing checks.

Second, to expand the scope and impact of spillovers from PG would require a concerted state effort that is both hands-on and hands-off. "Hands-on" would imply training and technical support that supports citizens' learning and organizing and encourages scaling up collective action. Meanwhile, "hands-off" would mean respecting new groups' autonomy. Both PROHECO and PRONADE granted legal standing to parent councils, a status that many rural groups lack. But, especially in PROHECO, parent councils lost that autonomy very quickly as local state officials pursued partisan agendas. This was consistent with longer-term patterns of state-society interactions, which had been characterized in Honduras by state control and co-optation, and in Guatemala by exclusion and polarization.

This suggests a third and final key consideration: To impact rural civil society and the quality of democracy more broadly, those who devise PG initiatives need to consider, from the beginning, the political dynamics that shape how programs are implemented and the type of state-citizen interactions they prompt. Otherwise, PG will not impact the nature and degree of marginalized people's civic and political incorporation. Of course, the barriers to overcoming entrenched political legacies remain high. But without acknowledging and exploring how to address them, those responsible for PG initiatives will likely fail to meet goals related to civil society development.

This study thus indicates that, without a more concerted effort to promote learning and autonomy among rural groups, efforts to incorporate citizens into governance from the

“bottom-up” will continue to fall short of strengthening civil society, and, in turn, improving the quality of democracy. “Participation,” as deployed by scholars and practitioners of development and governance, will remain susceptible to the critique that it is “mere window dressing” (Fung and Wright 2003, 265) that leaves unaltered the entrenched patterns of how citizens organize themselves and engage with the state.

In concrete terms, this means that, without better-conceived initiatives to spur citizen participation, policy-making processes will continue to exclude Hondurans and Guatemalans in rural “brown” areas. Opportunities for these citizens to organize themselves autonomously and advocate for their interests will remain limited, and policies will continue to reflect the interests of more powerful, affluent sectors of society.

In Honduras and Guatemala, inequalities of power and access have long been obstacles to democracy—first, to instituting democratic competition at all, and then to improving its quality. These barriers remain today. Participatory governance emerged as one important tool with which both governments sought to deepen their democratic roots by broadening participation. And, indeed, CMS showed how this instrument could expand participation inside and outside school councils, even in remote rural areas. But PG is a tool, not a panacea. Where advocates apply it uncritically—without recognizing weighty political legacies and obstacles to participation in these communities—they risk using valuable state resources to reinforce the status quo.

Developing countries like Honduras and Guatemala will likely continue experimenting with participatory governance to broaden citizen participation. As they do, they would do well to heed the experiences of PROHECO and PRONADE to appreciate both the potential and the pitfalls of how PG works in practice.

## APPENDIX A: MAPS, TABLES, AND FIGURES OF VIOLENCE AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION DURING THE ARMED CONFLICT IN GUATEMALA


**Table 36: Massacres, Human Rights Violations and Acts of Violence, and Population by Department**

Department	Percentage of Total Massacres	Percentage of Human Rights Violations and Acts of Violence	Percentage of Total Population
Alta Verapaz	9.21%	9.45%	6.91%
Baja Verapaz	4.23%	4.54%	1.92%
Chimaltenango	10.57%	6.72%	3.97%
Chiquimula	1.21%	0.45%	2.69%
El Progreso	0.00%	0.01%	1.24%
Escuintla	0.45%	1.30%	4.79%
Guatemala	0.45%	2.74%	22.62%
Huehuetenango	13.29%	15.60%	7.53%
Izabal	0.45%	1.45%	2.80%
Jalapa	0.00%	0.01%	2.16%
Jutiapa	0.00%	0.02%	3.46%
Petén	1.96%	3.09%	3.26%
Quetzaltenango	0.76%	1.92%	5.56%
Quiché	51.96%	45.52%	5.83%
Retalhuleu	0.15%	0.17%	2.15%
Sacatepéquez	0.00%	0.05%	2.21%
San Marcos	2.27%	2.89%	7.07%
Santa Rosa	0.00%	0.12%	2.68%
Sololá	2.42%	2.22%	2.74%
Suchitepéquez	0.30%	0.97%	3.59%
Totonicapán	0.15%	0.55%	3.02%
Zacapa	0.15%	0.47%	1.78%
<b>Total</b>	100	100	100

*Source: Compiled by author from CEH data (see below) and INE 2002 census data.<sup>232</sup>*

<sup>232</sup> I have used the 2002 census data because previous census data were unavailable. Moreover, given that previous censuses were conducted during the armed conflict—when data gathering was difficult and significant displacement occurred—there would be concerns about the completeness of previously-collected data.


### NUMBER OF MASSACRES BY DEPARTMENT



SOURCE: CEH Database; total number of massacres – 669 cases – perpetrated by all responsible forces.

**Figure 16: CEH Map of Massacres by Department during the Armed Conflict in Guatemala**

*Source: Reproduced from the Comisión de Esclarecimiento Histórico (CEH) Report*  
<http://shr.aaas.org/guatemala/ceh/report/english/graphics/charts/page83.gif>



NOTE: The lines of the vertical scales – number of violations – follow a progression of multiples of ten.





Figure 17: CEH Tables of Human Rights Violations and Acts of Violence by Year and Department during the Armed Conflict in Guatemala

Source: Reproduced from the CEH Report

<http://shr.aaas.org/guatemala/ceh/report/english/graphics/charts/page84.gif>

### MAP OF SOCIAL EXCLUSION, 1996




SOURCE: United Nations Development Programme, *Guatemala: the contrasts of human development*, Guatemala, 1998, p.16. The index of exclusion is calculated on the basis of the following indicators: deaths before the age of 40, adult illiteracy, malnutrition in children under 5 years of age and accessibility to certain basic services.

**Figure 18: CEH Map of Social Exclusion by Department during the Armed Conflict in Guatemala**

*Source: Reproduced from CEH Report, with data from UNDP 1998*

<http://shr.aaas.org/guatemala/ceh/report/english/graphics/charts/page81.gif>


## APPENDIX B: MAPS OF PRONADE AND PROHECO NATIONAL COVERAGE<sup>233</sup>



**Figure 19: Map of Number of PRONADE Schools per Department, 2007**


*Source: Compiled by author, with data from a PRONADE report entitled "Informe cuantitativo y cualitativo correspondiente al período del 1 de enero al 15 de junio 2007."*

<sup>233</sup> My thanks to Victoria Gauthier and Andy Anderson in compiling these maps.



**Figure 20: Map of Percentage of Total PROHECO Schools (Population) in Each Honduran Department, 2005**

*Source: Compiled by author from PROHECO internal statistics, "Estadísticas Educativas del PROHECO," dated June 7, 2005*



**Figure 21: Percentage of Sampled PROHECO Schools in Each Honduran Department**

*Source: Compiled by author from 2007 survey data.*

APPENDIX C: SURVEY INSTRUMENTS<sup>234</sup>

Entrevista a COEDUCA		No. Formulario [ ][ ][ ][ ]
Nombre de la comunidad: [ ][ ]		Municipio: [ ][ ][ ][ ]
Nombre de la escuela: [ ][ ][ ][ ][ ][ ]		
1. Nombre del entrevistado: (opcional) [ ][ ][ ]		
Fecha: [ ][ ] / [ ][ ] / [0][8]	Departamento: [ ][ ][ ][ ]	
Género: <input type="radio"/> Masculino <input type="radio"/> Femenino	Entrevista realizada por: [ ][ ][ ]	
<b>INFORMACIÓN DEL ENTREVISTADO</b>		
2. ¿Cuántos años ha vivido en esta comunidad? 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 <input type="checkbox"/> ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○	3a. ¿Fecha nacimiento? [ ][ ] / [ ][ ] / [ ][ ] mes día	3b. ¿Cuántos años tiene? 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 <input type="checkbox"/> ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
4. ¿Sabe leer y escribir? <input type="radio"/> S <input type="radio"/> Nb <i>Instrucción: Si dice que solo sabe hacer una de las dos cosas, marque la casilla 'Nb'</i>	5. ¿Tiene cónyuge? <input type="radio"/> S <input type="radio"/> Nb <i>Si responde si pregunte 7 y 9:</i> 7. ¿Cuál es el grado más alto completado por su cónyuge? 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 <input type="checkbox"/> ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ <input type="checkbox"/> ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ NRO NS	
6. ¿Cuál es el grado más alto completado por usted? 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 <input type="checkbox"/> ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ <input type="checkbox"/> ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ NRO NS <small>Grado: 00 para estudios de preprimaria, 01 a 06 para grados primero a sexto primaria, 07 a 09 para primero a tercero básicos, 10 a 12 para cuarto a sexto diversificado, 13 para más que diversificado, 14 si no estudió y 15 si tiene estudios universitarios. Si no ha completado ningún nivel poner 0.</small>		8. ¿Cuál es su ocupación actual? [ ][ ][ ]
9. ¿Cuál es la ocupación actual de su cónyuge? [ ][ ][ ]	10. ¿Cuánto fueron los ingresos de usted y de todos los miembros de su hogar en el último mes? incluir todos sus salarios, alquileres, pensiones, jubilaciones, y otros ingresos como renesas, bonos Q [ ][ ][ ] , [ ][ ][ ][ ] ○ NRO NS	
11. ¿Cuál es su religión? <input type="radio"/> Católico <input type="radio"/> Anglicano <input type="radio"/> Evangélico <input type="radio"/> Ateo <input type="radio"/> Presbiteriano <input type="radio"/> Ninguna <input type="radio"/> Mormón <input type="radio"/> No sabe <input type="radio"/> Pentecostal <input type="radio"/> No responde <input type="radio"/> Adventista del séptimo día <input type="radio"/> Otra [ ] <input type="radio"/> Luterano		
12. ¿Con qué frecuencia va usted a la iglesia? <input type="radio"/> Todos los días <input type="radio"/> Una vez al año <input type="radio"/> Una vez a la semana <input type="radio"/> Nunca <input type="radio"/> Cada dos semanas <input type="radio"/> No sabe <input type="radio"/> Una vez al mes <input type="radio"/> No responde <input type="radio"/> Varias veces al año		
<b>PARTICIPACIÓN EN LOS COMITÉS EDUCATIVOS</b> <i>Ahora le voy a hacer algunas preguntas acerca de su participación en los Comités Educativos (COEDUCA)</i>		
13. ¿Cuánto tiempo le toma llegar caminando de su casa a la escuela? <input type="radio"/> Menos de 15 minutos <input type="radio"/> Entre 1 y 2 horas <input type="radio"/> Entre 16 y 30 minutos <input type="radio"/> Más de 2 horas <input type="radio"/> Entre 31 y 45 minutos <input type="radio"/> No sabe <input type="radio"/> Entre 46 y 59 minutos <input type="radio"/> No responde		
14. ¿Es usted actualmente miembro del Comité Educativo (COEDUCA)? <input type="radio"/> S <input type="radio"/> Nb		

<sup>234</sup> This was the format used for the Guatemala survey. The Honduran survey was virtually identical, and I have noted any relevant deviations in the discussions in Chapters Five and Nine.

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15. ¿Me puede decir las dos razones más importantes por las cuales decidió unirse al Comité Educativo (COEDUCA)?  
 Instrucción: Haga la pregunta en forma abierta. Escriba exactamente lo que dice. Luego, marque el cuadro con los 1 y 2 correspondientes. 1 significa que es la más importante; 2 significa que es la segunda más importante.

- a. Para crear una escuela donde no había
- b. Para contribuir a que mis hijos obtengan una educación
- c. Para tener más influencia dentro de la comunidad
- d. Para influir en lo que los niños aprendan
- e. Para asegurar que los maestros cumplan con sus responsabilidades
- f. Para contribuir a la comunidad
- g. Por la seguridad de mis hijos
- h. Porque alguien pidió que participara
- i. Porque la otra escuela era más cara
- j. Otro:
- k. No sabe / No responde
- l. Ninguna de las anteriores

16. ¿Cuáles puestos ha desempeñado (o desempeña) en el COEDUCA y cuándo? (empiece desde el más reciente, si es posible)

	Presidente	Vicepresidente	Tesorero	Secretario	Vocal	Desde (año)	Hasta (año)
1er. puesto	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="text"/>	- <input type="text"/>
2do. puesto	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="text"/>	- <input type="text"/>
3er. puesto	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="text"/>	- <input type="text"/>
4to. puesto	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="text"/>	- <input type="text"/>

17. ¿Con qué frecuencia se reúne el Comité Educativo (COEDUCA)?

Instrucción: Haga la pregunta de forma abierta. Marque una sola vez. Si la respuesta queda entre dos categorías, coloque la 'marca' al lado de la opción de menor frecuencia. Por ejemplo, si se reúne cada diez días, coloque la 'X' al lado de "Una vez cada quince días".

- Una vez por semana
- Una vez cada quince días
- Una vez al mes
- Una vez cada dos meses
- Tres veces al año
- Dos veces al año
- Una vez al año
- No sabe
- No responde

18. ¿Con qué frecuencia asisten los demás miembros de la directiva del Comité Educativo (COEDUCA) a las reuniones?

- Casi siempre asisten a la reunión
- Faltan mucho a la reunión
- Algunos casi siempre asisten y otros faltan mucho
- No sabe
- No responde

19. ¿Cree usted que su participación ha influido en cambios positivos en la escuela?

- Nunca
- Casi nunca
- A veces sí, a veces no
- Casi siempre
- Siempre
- No sabe
- No responde

20. ¿Cuál es su nivel de participación dentro del Comité Educativo (COEDUCA)?

- Participa muchísimo
- Participa mucho
- Participa ni mucho ni poco
- Participa poco
- Nada / no participa
- No sabe
- No responde

Si responde participa muchísimo o participa mucho pregunte:  
 20a. ¿Se considera usted un líder dentro del COEDUCA?

- Sí
- No
- No sabe
- No responde

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**21. ¿Ha recibido capacitaciones para desempeñar su papel en el COEDUCA?  
¿Qué tan útiles han sido las capacitaciones que ha recibido?**  
*Instrucción: Indique si ha recibido capacitaciones sobre cada tema. Si dice sí, pregúntele cuántas y si fueron útiles, e indique su respuesta en cada columna. Si no ha recibido capacitación en ese tema, no hay que llenar preguntas 21a. - 21d. Siga a la próxima fila (tema). Además, si la persona entrevistada ha recibido tres capacitaciones de un tema por dos horas cada una deberá de poner en el cuadro de capacitación 6 (seis horas).*

	21a. ¿Ha recibido?	21b. Si dice sí, ¿Cuántas?	21c. Si responde sí en la 21a, ¿Qué tan útil fue?	21d. Duración horas
a. Contabilidad	<input type="radio"/> Sí <input type="radio"/> Nb	<input type="text"/>	<input type="radio"/> Nada útil <input type="radio"/> Poco útil <input type="radio"/> N poco ni muy útil <input type="radio"/> Algo útil <input type="radio"/> Muy útil <input type="radio"/> Nb responde	<input type="text"/>
b. Tener reuniones efectivas	<input type="radio"/> Sí <input type="radio"/> Nb	<input type="text"/>	<input type="radio"/> Nada útil <input type="radio"/> Poco útil <input type="radio"/> N poco ni muy útil <input type="radio"/> Algo útil <input type="radio"/> Muy útil <input type="radio"/> Nb responde	<input type="text"/>
c. Liderazgo	<input type="radio"/> Sí <input type="radio"/> Nb	<input type="text"/>	<input type="radio"/> Nada útil <input type="radio"/> Poco útil <input type="radio"/> N poco ni muy útil <input type="radio"/> Algo útil <input type="radio"/> Muy útil <input type="radio"/> Nb responde	<input type="text"/>
d. Gestión de proyectos	<input type="radio"/> Sí <input type="radio"/> Nb	<input type="text"/>	<input type="radio"/> Nada útil <input type="radio"/> Poco útil <input type="radio"/> N poco ni muy útil <input type="radio"/> Algo útil <input type="radio"/> Muy útil <input type="radio"/> Nb responde	<input type="text"/>
e. Gestión escolar	<input type="radio"/> Sí <input type="radio"/> Nb	<input type="text"/>	<input type="radio"/> Nada útil <input type="radio"/> Poco útil <input type="radio"/> N poco ni muy útil <input type="radio"/> Algo útil <input type="radio"/> Muy útil <input type="radio"/> Nb responde	<input type="text"/>
f. Otro, especifique:	<input type="radio"/> Sí <input type="radio"/> Nb	<input type="text"/>	<input type="radio"/> Nada útil <input type="radio"/> Poco útil <input type="radio"/> N poco ni muy útil <input type="radio"/> Algo útil <input type="radio"/> Muy útil <input type="radio"/> Nb responde	<input type="text"/>

**22. En los últimos DOS meses, ¿cuántas veces ha visitado el técnico del MINEDUC esta comunidad? (Instrucción: Si es que el promotor haya venido hoy día, no cuenta esta visita)**  0  1 vez  2 veces  3 veces  4 o más veces  Nb sabe  Nb responde

**23. En esta escuela, ¿ha habido algún problema que haya requerido la ayuda del técnico del Ministerio de Educación (MINEDUC)?**  
Por ejemplo, puede ser un problema con el presupuesto escolar o con algún/a maestro/a.  Sí  Nb  Nb sabe  Nb responde

**23a. ¿Qué tan efectivo ha sido el técnico del MINEDUC en ayudar al COEDUCA a resolver problemas que han ocurrido?**  
 Muy efectivo  Algo efectivo  N poco ni muy efectivo  Poco efectivo  Nada efectivo  Nb sabe  Nb responde

**ANTES DE PARTICIPAR EN EL COMITÉ EDUCATIVO (COEDUCA)**  
*Ahora le voy a hacer algunas preguntas acerca de su participación en la comunidad antes de su participación como miembro del Comité Educativo.*

**24. ANTES de ser integrante del Comité Educativo (COEDUCA), ¿Sabía usted hacer lo siguiente?**

a. Hacer o evaluar un presupuesto  Sí  Nb  Nb sabe  Nb responde

b. Convocar una reunión  Sí  Nb  Nb sabe  Nb responde

c. Comportarse en una reunión  Sí  Nb  Nb sabe  Nb responde

d. Gestionar un proyecto  Sí  Nb  Nb sabe  Nb responde

e. Entregar una solicitud o reclamo al gobierno  Sí  Nb  Nb sabe  Nb responde

**25. ANTES de ser integrante del Comité Educativo (COEDUCA), ¿qué tan frecuentemente realizaba usted las siguientes actividades?**

a. Organizar reuniones con toda la comunidad (no solo asistir, sino organizar)  
 Siempre  Casi siempre  A veces sí a veces no  Casi nunca  Nunca  Nb sabe  Nb responde  Nbcorresponde

b. Asistir a reuniones políticas  
 Siempre  Casi siempre  A veces sí a veces no  Casi nunca  Nunca  Nb sabe  Nb responde  Nbcorresponde

c. Votar en elecciones generales  
 Siempre  Casi siempre  A veces sí a veces no  Casi nunca  Nunca  Nb sabe  Nb responde  Nbcorresponde

d. Firmar una petición o visitar una oficina del gobierno para solicitar algo  
 Siempre  Casi siempre  A veces sí a veces no  Casi nunca  Nunca  Nb sabe  Nb responde  Nbcorresponde

e. Contactar a un medio de comunicación  
 Siempre  Casi siempre  A veces sí a veces no  Casi nunca  Nunca  Nb sabe  Nb responde  Nbcorresponde

f. Participar en alguna protesta o huelga  
 Siempre  Casi siempre  A veces sí a veces no  Casi nunca  Nunca  Nb sabe  Nb responde  Nbcorresponde

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26. ANTES de ser integrante del Comité Educativo (COEDUCA), ¿cuánto confiaba usted en las siguientes personas?

a. Gente de esta comunidad

Muchísimo  Mucho  N mucho ni poco  Poco  Nada  No sabe  No responde  No corresponde, no vivía en esta comunidad

b. Maestros

Muchísimo  Mucho  N mucho ni poco  Poco  Nada  No sabe  No responde  No corresponde, no vivía en esta comunidad

c. Otros padres

Muchísimo  Mucho  N mucho ni poco  Poco  Nada  No sabe  No responde  No corresponde, no vivía en esta comunidad

d. Políticos locales

Muchísimo  Mucho  N mucho ni poco  Poco  Nada  No sabe  No responde  No corresponde, no vivía en esta comunidad

27. ANTES de ser integrante del Comité Educativo (COEDUCA),

¿qué tan enterado/a se sentía usted de lo que sus niños estaban aprendiendo en la escuela?

Muchísimo  Mucho  N mucho ni poco  Poco  Nada  No sabe  No responde

28. A continuación se le presentará una serie de frases, ¿cuánto refleja cada frase sus sentimientos, opiniones, y preferencias?

a. Se sentía enterado/a de lo que pasaba en su comunidad

Muchísimo  Mucho  N mucho ni poco  Poco  Nada  No sabe  No responde  No corresponde

b. Le molestaba que sus niños no completaran la primaria

Muchísimo  Mucho  N mucho ni poco  Poco  Nada  No sabe  No responde  No corresponde

c. Prefería tomar decisiones usted sólo(a) en vez de preguntar qué pensaban los demás

Muchísimo  Mucho  N mucho ni poco  Poco  Nada  No sabe  No responde  No corresponde

d. Le gustaba participar en organizaciones y grupos sociales

Muchísimo  Mucho  N mucho ni poco  Poco  Nada  No sabe  No responde  No corresponde

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**ANTES DE PARTICIPAR EN EL COEDUCA**

29. De las siguientes organizaciones, indique cuáles existían y en cuál de ellas usted PARTICIPABA ACTIVAMENTE antes de su ingreso al Comité Educativo (COEDUCA). Participar activamente quiere decir que asiste regularmente a reuniones o actividades, o que aporta dinero o servicio voluntario. (Instrucción: Primero, pregúntele si la organización existía. Si existía, entonces pregúntele si participaba antes de participar en el comité educativo - COEDUCA. Si no existía, entonces pase a la próxima organización.)

	¿Existía la organización?	¿Cómo se llamaba? (si no tenía nombre ponga SN)	¿Participaba activamente antes de participar en COEDUCA?
a. Grupo deportivo	<input type="radio"/> S <input type="radio"/> Nb <input type="radio"/> NS <input type="radio"/> NR		<input type="radio"/> S <input type="radio"/> Nb <input type="radio"/> NS <input type="radio"/> NR
b. Grupo cultural o artístico	<input type="radio"/> S <input type="radio"/> Nb <input type="radio"/> NS <input type="radio"/> NR		<input type="radio"/> S <input type="radio"/> Nb <input type="radio"/> NS <input type="radio"/> NR
c. Comité de Desarrollo Comunitario (COCODE)	<input type="radio"/> S <input type="radio"/> Nb <input type="radio"/> NS <input type="radio"/> NR		<input type="radio"/> S <input type="radio"/> Nb <input type="radio"/> NS <input type="radio"/> NR
d. Grupos religiosos (aparte de asistir a la iglesia)	<input type="radio"/> S <input type="radio"/> Nb <input type="radio"/> NS <input type="radio"/> NR		<input type="radio"/> S <input type="radio"/> Nb <input type="radio"/> NS <input type="radio"/> NR
e. De salud	<input type="radio"/> S <input type="radio"/> Nb <input type="radio"/> NS <input type="radio"/> NR		<input type="radio"/> S <input type="radio"/> Nb <input type="radio"/> NS <input type="radio"/> NR
f. De defensa del medio ambiente	<input type="radio"/> S <input type="radio"/> Nb <input type="radio"/> NS <input type="radio"/> NR		<input type="radio"/> S <input type="radio"/> Nb <input type="radio"/> NS <input type="radio"/> NR
g. De defensa de los derechos humanos	<input type="radio"/> S <input type="radio"/> Nb <input type="radio"/> NS <input type="radio"/> NR		<input type="radio"/> S <input type="radio"/> Nb <input type="radio"/> NS <input type="radio"/> NR
h. De caridad y beneficencia	<input type="radio"/> S <input type="radio"/> Nb <input type="radio"/> NS <input type="radio"/> NR		<input type="radio"/> S <input type="radio"/> Nb <input type="radio"/> NS <input type="radio"/> NR
i. De desarrollo comunitario	<input type="radio"/> S <input type="radio"/> Nb <input type="radio"/> NS <input type="radio"/> NR		<input type="radio"/> S <input type="radio"/> Nb <input type="radio"/> NS <input type="radio"/> NR
j. De seguridad o vigilancia	<input type="radio"/> S <input type="radio"/> Nb <input type="radio"/> NS <input type="radio"/> NR		<input type="radio"/> S <input type="radio"/> Nb <input type="radio"/> NS <input type="radio"/> NR
k. Comité de agua	<input type="radio"/> S <input type="radio"/> Nb <input type="radio"/> NS <input type="radio"/> NR		<input type="radio"/> S <input type="radio"/> Nb <input type="radio"/> NS <input type="radio"/> NR
l. Sindicato	<input type="radio"/> S <input type="radio"/> Nb <input type="radio"/> NS <input type="radio"/> NR		<input type="radio"/> S <input type="radio"/> Nb <input type="radio"/> NS <input type="radio"/> NR
m. Cooperativa agrícola, ganadera, o de pescadores	<input type="radio"/> S <input type="radio"/> Nb <input type="radio"/> NS <input type="radio"/> NR		<input type="radio"/> S <input type="radio"/> Nb <input type="radio"/> NS <input type="radio"/> NR
n. Asociación financiera (ej., de crédito o ahorro)	<input type="radio"/> S <input type="radio"/> Nb <input type="radio"/> NS <input type="radio"/> NR		<input type="radio"/> S <input type="radio"/> Nb <input type="radio"/> NS <input type="radio"/> NR
o. Otro:	<input type="radio"/> S <input type="radio"/> Nb <input type="radio"/> NS <input type="radio"/> NR		<input type="radio"/> S <input type="radio"/> Nb <input type="radio"/> NS <input type="radio"/> NR
p. Otro:	<input type="radio"/> S <input type="radio"/> Nb <input type="radio"/> NS <input type="radio"/> NR		<input type="radio"/> S <input type="radio"/> Nb <input type="radio"/> NS <input type="radio"/> NR

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**SOBRE SU PARTICIPACIÓN EN EL COEDUCA HOY EN DÍA:** *Ahora le voy a hacer algunas preguntas acerca de su participación en la comunidad hoy en día*

30. De las organizaciones que existen en esta comunidad, indique si usted PARTICIPA ACTIVAMENTE hoy en día, en qué año empezó a participar en cada organización, y si está considerando PARTICIPAR ACTIVAMENTE en el futuro. Participar activamente quiere decir asistir regularmente a reuniones o actividades, o aportar dinero o servicio voluntario. (Instrucción: Por cada organización, solamente hay que llenar las columnas 2, 3, y 4 si la organización existe hoy en día. Si no existe, pase a la próxima fila.) - Si la organización no tiene nombre escriba SN

	¿Existe la organización?	¿Cómo se llama la organización?	¿Participa activamente usted actualmente?	Año que empezó a participar
a. Grupo deportivo	<input type="radio"/> S <input type="radio"/> Nb <input type="radio"/> NS <input type="radio"/> NR		<input type="radio"/> S <input type="radio"/> Nb <input type="radio"/> NS <input type="radio"/> NR	
b. Grupo cultural o artístico	<input type="radio"/> S <input type="radio"/> Nb <input type="radio"/> NS <input type="radio"/> NR		<input type="radio"/> S <input type="radio"/> Nb <input type="radio"/> NS <input type="radio"/> NR	
c. Comité de Desarrollo Comunitario (COCODE)	<input type="radio"/> S <input type="radio"/> Nb <input type="radio"/> NS <input type="radio"/> NR		<input type="radio"/> S <input type="radio"/> Nb <input type="radio"/> NS <input type="radio"/> NR	
d. Grupos religiosos (aparte de asistir a la iglesia)	<input type="radio"/> S <input type="radio"/> Nb <input type="radio"/> NS <input type="radio"/> NR		<input type="radio"/> S <input type="radio"/> Nb <input type="radio"/> NS <input type="radio"/> NR	
e. De salud	<input type="radio"/> S <input type="radio"/> Nb <input type="radio"/> NS <input type="radio"/> NR		<input type="radio"/> S <input type="radio"/> Nb <input type="radio"/> NS <input type="radio"/> NR	
f. De defensa del medio ambiente	<input type="radio"/> S <input type="radio"/> Nb <input type="radio"/> NS <input type="radio"/> NR		<input type="radio"/> S <input type="radio"/> Nb <input type="radio"/> NS <input type="radio"/> NR	
g. De defensa de los derechos humanos	<input type="radio"/> S <input type="radio"/> Nb <input type="radio"/> NS <input type="radio"/> NR		<input type="radio"/> S <input type="radio"/> Nb <input type="radio"/> NS <input type="radio"/> NR	
h. De caridad y beneficencia	<input type="radio"/> S <input type="radio"/> Nb <input type="radio"/> NS <input type="radio"/> NR		<input type="radio"/> S <input type="radio"/> Nb <input type="radio"/> NS <input type="radio"/> NR	
i. De desarrollo comunitario	<input type="radio"/> S <input type="radio"/> Nb <input type="radio"/> NS <input type="radio"/> NR		<input type="radio"/> S <input type="radio"/> Nb <input type="radio"/> NS <input type="radio"/> NR	
j. De seguridad o vigilancia	<input type="radio"/> S <input type="radio"/> Nb <input type="radio"/> NS <input type="radio"/> NR		<input type="radio"/> S <input type="radio"/> Nb <input type="radio"/> NS <input type="radio"/> NR	
k. Comité de agua	<input type="radio"/> S <input type="radio"/> Nb <input type="radio"/> NS <input type="radio"/> NR		<input type="radio"/> S <input type="radio"/> Nb <input type="radio"/> NS <input type="radio"/> NR	
l. Sindicato	<input type="radio"/> S <input type="radio"/> Nb <input type="radio"/> NS <input type="radio"/> NR		<input type="radio"/> S <input type="radio"/> Nb <input type="radio"/> NS <input type="radio"/> NR	
m. Cooperativa agrícola, ganadera, o de pescadores	<input type="radio"/> S <input type="radio"/> Nb <input type="radio"/> NS <input type="radio"/> NR		<input type="radio"/> S <input type="radio"/> Nb <input type="radio"/> NS <input type="radio"/> NR	
n. Asociación financiera (ej., de crédito o ahorro)	<input type="radio"/> S <input type="radio"/> Nb <input type="radio"/> NS <input type="radio"/> NR		<input type="radio"/> S <input type="radio"/> Nb <input type="radio"/> NS <input type="radio"/> NR	
o. Otro:	<input type="radio"/> S <input type="radio"/> Nb <input type="radio"/> NS <input type="radio"/> NR		<input type="radio"/> S <input type="radio"/> Nb <input type="radio"/> NS <input type="radio"/> NR	
p. Otro:	<input type="radio"/> S <input type="radio"/> Nb <input type="radio"/> NS <input type="radio"/> NR		<input type="radio"/> S <input type="radio"/> Nb <input type="radio"/> NS <input type="radio"/> NR	

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31. De todos los grupos a los que usted pertenece, ¿cuáles son LOS DOS más importantes para usted? En relación con estas dos organizaciones o grupos más importantes, en general, ¿Qué tan frecuentemente asiste usted a sus reuniones o actividades?

(Instrucción: Haga la pregunta en forma abierta y escriba los nombres de los grupos más importantes. El Comité Educativo (COEDUCA) cuenta como grupo. Luego, marque una sola vez en cada columna las frecuencias correspondientes. Si uno de los grupos más importantes es el COEDUCA, deje en blanco la columna correspondiente. Si la respuesta queda entre dos categorías, coloque la 'marca' al lado de la opción de menor frecuencia. Por ejemplo, si se reúne cada diez días, coloque la 'marca' al lado de "Una vez cada quince días".)

	Grupo más importante	Segundo grupo importante
1. Una vez por semana	<input type="radio"/> <span style="float: right;">[ ] [ ]</span>	<input type="radio"/> <span style="float: right;">[ ] [ ]</span>
2. Una vez cada quince días	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
3. Una vez al mes	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
4. Una vez cada dos meses	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
5. Tres veces al año	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
6. Dos veces al año	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
7. Una vez al año	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
8. No sabe	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
9. No responde	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

32. Participa usted en la directiva de algunas de esas organizaciones?  Si  No  Nsabe  No responde

(Instrucción: No cuenta si participa en la directiva del Comité Educativo - COEDUCA)

Especifique qué tipo de grupo y cargo

\_\_\_\_\_ [ ] [ ]

\_\_\_\_\_ [ ] [ ]

33. ¿Ha participado usted en la creación de alguna organización o grupo fuera del Comité Educativo (COEDUCA)?

Especifique qué tipo y en qué año

Si  No  Nsabe  No responde

\_\_\_\_\_ [ ] [ ]

\_\_\_\_\_

Año: [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

34. Desde que es usted integrante del Comité Educativo (COEDUCA), ¿Considera usted que PARTICIPA ACTIVAMENTE ahora más o menos de lo que participaba activamente antes en otras organizaciones DIFERENTES al COEDUCA? Participar activamente quiere decir asistir regularmente a reuniones o actividades, o aportar dinero o servicio voluntario.

Mucho más que antes  Un poco más que antes  Igual que antes  Un poco menos que antes  Mucho menos que antes  NS  NR

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**35. Desde que es usted miembro del Comité Educativo (COEDUCA), ¿qué tan frecuentemente realiza usted las siguientes actividades?**

**a. Organizar reuniones con toda la comunidad (no solo asistir sino organizar)**  
 Siempre  Casi siempre  A veces sí, a veces no  Casi nunca  Nunca  No sabe  No responde  No corresponde

**b. Asistir a reuniones y mítines políticos**  
 Siempre  Casi siempre  A veces sí, a veces no  Casi nunca  Nunca  No sabe  No responde  No corresponde

**c. Votar en elecciones generales**  
 Siempre  Casi siempre  A veces sí, a veces no  Casi nunca  Nunca  No sabe  No responde  No corresponde

**d. Firmar una petición o visitar una oficina del gobierno para solicitar algo**  
 Siempre  Casi siempre  A veces sí, a veces no  Casi nunca  Nunca  No sabe  No responde  No corresponde

**e. Contactar a un medio de comunicación**  
 Siempre  Casi siempre  A veces sí, a veces no  Casi nunca  Nunca  No sabe  No responde  No corresponde

**f. Participar en una protesta o huelga**  
 Siempre  Casi siempre  A veces sí, a veces no  Casi nunca  Nunca  No sabe  No responde  No corresponde

Ahora le voy a hacer algunas preguntas sobre la política. Acuértese que no vengo de parte de ningún partido político. Solamente estoy interesado en lo que opina usted. No tiene que contestar si no se siente cómodo/a.

**36. Desde que usted es miembro del COEDUCA, ¿ha cambiado su interés por la política nacional?**  
 Sí, ahora está más interesado/a en política  
 No, ahora está igualmente interesado/a en política  
 No, la política sigue sin interesarle mucho  
 Sí, le interesa menos la política  
 No sabe/ No responde

**37. ¿Cuál es su partido político preferido?**

<input type="radio"/> Alianza Nueva Nación (ANN)	<input type="radio"/> Partido de Avanzada Nacional (PAN)
<input type="radio"/> Bienestar Nacional (BIEN)	<input type="radio"/> Partido Libertador Progresista (FLP)
<input type="radio"/> Centro de Acción Social (CAS)	<input type="radio"/> Partido Patriota (PP)
<input type="radio"/> Democracia Cristiana Guatemalteca (DCG)	<input type="radio"/> Partido Socialdemócrata Guatemalteco (PSG)
<input type="radio"/> Desarrollo Integral Auténtico (DIA)	<input type="radio"/> Partido Unionista (PU)
<input type="radio"/> Encuentro por Guatemala (EG)	<input type="radio"/> Partido Visión con Valores (VVA)
<input type="radio"/> Frente por la Democracia (FD)	<input type="radio"/> Unión del Cambio Nacionalista (UCN)
<input type="radio"/> Frente Republicano Guatemalteco (FRG)	<input type="radio"/> Unión Democrática (UD)
<input type="radio"/> Gran Alianza Nacional (GAN)	<input type="radio"/> Unidad Nacional de la Esperanza (UNE)
<input type="radio"/> Los Verdes (LV)	<input type="radio"/> Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG)
<input type="radio"/> Movimiento Reformador (MR)	<input type="radio"/> Comité cívico
<input type="radio"/> Ninguno	<input type="radio"/> No sabe <input type="radio"/> No responde

**38. ¿HOY EN DÍA, cuánto confía usted en las siguientes personas?**

**a. Gente de esta comunidad**  
 Muchísimo  Mucho  N mucho ni poco  Poco  Nada  No sabe  No responde

**b. Maestros**  
 Muchísimo  Mucho  N mucho ni poco  Poco  Nada  No sabe  No responde

**c. Otros padres**  
 Muchísimo  Mucho  N mucho ni poco  Poco  Nada  No sabe  No responde

**d. Políticos locales**  
 Muchísimo  Mucho  N mucho ni poco  Poco  Nada  No sabe  No responde

**39. ¿HOY EN DÍA, qué tan enterado/a se siente usted de lo que sus niños están aprendiendo en la escuela?**  
 Muchísimo  Mucho  N mucho ni poco  Poco  Nada  No sabe  No responde

**40. A continuación se le presentará una serie de frases. Le agradecería que nos indique cuánto cada frase capta sus sentimientos, opiniones, y preferencias actuales.**

**a. Se siente enterado(a) de lo que pasa en su comunidad**  
 Muchísimo  Mucho  N mucho ni poco  Poco  Nada  No sabe  No responde  No corresponde

**b. Le molestaría que sus niños no completen la escuela primaria**  
 Muchísimo  Mucho  N mucho ni poco  Poco  Nada  No sabe  No responde  No corresponde

**c. Prefiere tomar decisiones usted sólo(a) que preguntar lo que piensan los demás**  
 Muchísimo  Mucho  N mucho ni poco  Poco  Nada  No sabe  No responde  No corresponde

**d. Le gusta participar en organizaciones y grupos sociales**  
 Muchísimo  Mucho  N mucho ni poco  Poco  Nada  No sabe  No responde  No corresponde

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41. ¿HOY EN DÍA, ¿Sabe usted hacer lo siguiente?

- a. Hacer o evaluar un presupuesto.....  S  Nb  No sabe  No responde  
 b. Convocar una reunión.....  S  Nb  No sabe  No responde  
 c. Comportarse en una reunión.....  S  Nb  No sabe  No responde  
 d. Gestionar un proyecto.....  S  Nb  No sabe  No responde  
 e. Entregar una solicitud o reclamo al gobierno.....  S  Nb  No sabe  No responde

42. ¿Ha tratado de utilizar algo que haya aprendido en el COEDUCA para contribuir a otra organización o grupo social o político (por ejemplo, un grupo deportivo, el patronato comunal, un sindicato)?  S  Nb  No sabe / no responde

Si responde sí, pregunte: ¿Qué ha sido utilizado?

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43. En los últimos DOS AÑOS, ¿Cuántas veces se ha unido la gente del COEDUCA para solicitar a los políticos locales algo para la escuela?

- 0 veces  1 vez  2 veces  3 veces  4 veces  5 veces  6 o más  No sabe  No responde

Si responde una vez o más, pregunte: 44. ¿Qué han solicitado?

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44b. ¿Cómo lo han solicitado?

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45. En los últimos DOS AÑOS, ¿Cuántas veces se ha unido la gente de esta comunidad para solicitar a los políticos algo para la comunidad en general (no para la escuela), sino para la comunidad en general?

- 0 veces  1 vez  2 veces  3 veces  4 veces  5 veces  6 o más  No sabe  No responde

Si responde una vez o más, pregunte: 46a. ¿Qué han solicitado?

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46b. ¿Cómo lo han solicitado?

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47. ¿Se ha aliado este Comité Educativo (COEDUCA) con otros Comités Educativos (COEDUCAS) o con otras organizaciones para solicitar o gestionar algo ante las autoridades locales o nacionales?  S  Nb

Si responde sí, pregunte: 47a. ¿Con qué tipo de organización?

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47b. ¿Qué hicieron?

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**EFFECTIVIDAD DE LOS COMITÉS EDUCATIVOS:**

Ahora le voy a hacer unas preguntas referentes a cómo funciona el Comité Educativo.

48. Por cada uno de los siguientes temas, indique si el Comité Educativo (COEDUCA) ha tratado ese tema. Luego, indique qué tan efectivo ha sido dicho tratamiento.

	48a. ¿El COEDUCA lo ha tratado?			48b. ¿Qué tan efectivo ha sido dicho tratamiento?						
A La asistencia de los estudiantes	<input type="radio"/> S	<input type="radio"/> Nb	<input type="radio"/> No sabe	<input type="radio"/> Muy mal	<input type="radio"/> Mal	<input type="radio"/> N bien ni mal	<input type="radio"/> Bien	<input type="radio"/> Muy bien	<input type="radio"/> NS	<input type="radio"/> NR
B Disciplina de los estudiantes	<input type="radio"/> S	<input type="radio"/> Nb	<input type="radio"/> No sabe	<input type="radio"/> Muy mal	<input type="radio"/> Mal	<input type="radio"/> N bien ni mal	<input type="radio"/> Bien	<input type="radio"/> Muy bien	<input type="radio"/> NS	<input type="radio"/> NR
C Rendimiento académico de los estudiantes	<input type="radio"/> S	<input type="radio"/> Nb	<input type="radio"/> No sabe	<input type="radio"/> Muy mal	<input type="radio"/> Mal	<input type="radio"/> N bien ni mal	<input type="radio"/> Bien	<input type="radio"/> Muy bien	<input type="radio"/> NS	<input type="radio"/> NR
D La asistencia del maestro/la maestra	<input type="radio"/> S	<input type="radio"/> Nb	<input type="radio"/> No sabe	<input type="radio"/> Muy mal	<input type="radio"/> Mal	<input type="radio"/> N bien ni mal	<input type="radio"/> Bien	<input type="radio"/> Muy bien	<input type="radio"/> NS	<input type="radio"/> NR
E Desempeño del maestro/la maestra	<input type="radio"/> S	<input type="radio"/> Nb	<input type="radio"/> No sabe	<input type="radio"/> Muy mal	<input type="radio"/> Mal	<input type="radio"/> N bien ni mal	<input type="radio"/> Bien	<input type="radio"/> Muy bien	<input type="radio"/> NS	<input type="radio"/> NR
F Mantenimiento de la escuela	<input type="radio"/> S	<input type="radio"/> Nb	<input type="radio"/> No sabe	<input type="radio"/> Muy mal	<input type="radio"/> Mal	<input type="radio"/> N bien ni mal	<input type="radio"/> Bien	<input type="radio"/> Muy bien	<input type="radio"/> NS	<input type="radio"/> NR
G Hacer el presupuesto de la escuela	<input type="radio"/> S	<input type="radio"/> Nb	<input type="radio"/> No sabe	<input type="radio"/> Muy mal	<input type="radio"/> Mal	<input type="radio"/> N bien ni mal	<input type="radio"/> Bien	<input type="radio"/> Muy bien	<input type="radio"/> NS	<input type="radio"/> NR
H Pagar el sueldo de el/la maestro/a	<input type="radio"/> S	<input type="radio"/> Nb	<input type="radio"/> No sabe	<input type="radio"/> Muy mal	<input type="radio"/> Mal	<input type="radio"/> N bien ni mal	<input type="radio"/> Bien	<input type="radio"/> Muy bien	<input type="radio"/> NS	<input type="radio"/> NR
I Mantener la seguridad en la escuela	<input type="radio"/> S	<input type="radio"/> Nb	<input type="radio"/> No sabe	<input type="radio"/> Muy mal	<input type="radio"/> Mal	<input type="radio"/> N bien ni mal	<input type="radio"/> Bien	<input type="radio"/> Muy bien	<input type="radio"/> NS	<input type="radio"/> NR
J Conseguir ayuda del gobierno	<input type="radio"/> S	<input type="radio"/> Nb	<input type="radio"/> No sabe	<input type="radio"/> Muy mal	<input type="radio"/> Mal	<input type="radio"/> N bien ni mal	<input type="radio"/> Bien	<input type="radio"/> Muy bien	<input type="radio"/> NS	<input type="radio"/> NR

49. ¿Cómo es la toma de decisiones en el Comité Educativo (COEDUCA)?

- El COEDUCA no es capaz de tomar decisiones
- El líder decide y comunica la decisión a los demás miembros
- El líder le pregunta a los demás miembros sus opiniones y después decide el/ella mismo(a)
- Los miembros tienen una discusión y deciden en grupo
- No sabe
- No responde
- Otro - Especifique: \_\_\_\_\_


50. ¿Cuánto cuenta su opinión en la toma de decisiones en el COEDUCA?  Muchísimo  Mucho  N mucho ni poco  Poco  Nada  NS/ NR

51. Suponga que los miembros del Comité Educativo (COEDUCA) se dan cuenta de que un maestro está faltando más que antes a la escuela. ¿Cuánto se demoraría el Comité Educativo (COEDUCA) en tomar medidas sobre este problema?

- El Comité Educativo (COEDUCA) no sería capaz de resolver el problema
- Se demoraría más de un mes en tomar medidas sobre el problema
- Se demoraría entre dos semanas y un mes en tomar medidas sobre el problema
- Se demoraría entre una y dos semanas en tomar medidas sobre el problema
- Se demoraría una semana o menos en tomar medidas sobre el problema
- No sabe
- No responde

52. En el Comité Educativo (COEDUCA), ¿qué tan frecuente pasa lo siguiente?

- a. Miembros del COEDUCA debaten ideas diferentes en las reuniones  
 Nunca  Casi nunca  A veces sí, a veces no  Casi siempre  Siempre  N sabe  No responde
- b. Miembros del Comité Educativo (COEDUCA) se preocupan más por sus propios intereses en vez del bien de todos  
 Nunca  Casi nunca  A veces sí, a veces no  Casi siempre  Siempre  N sabe  No responde
- c. Hay rotación de puestos dentro del Comité Educativo (COEDUCA)  
 Nunca  Casi nunca  A veces sí, a veces no  Casi siempre  Siempre  N sabe  No responde
- d. Participación está abierta a cualquier persona que quiera participar  
 Nunca  Casi nunca  A veces sí, a veces no  Casi siempre  Siempre  N sabe  No responde

53. ¿Fue alguno de sus padres participante activo en alguna organización o grupo social o político (por ejemplo, un grupo deportivo, el Comité de Desarrollo Comunitario, un sindicato)?  S  Nb  N sabe  No responde

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**DATOS SOBRE EL HOGAR**

Ahora, antes de terminar la entrevista, le voy a hacer unas preguntas acerca de su hogar y de las otras personas que comparten su hogar.

54. ¿La casa donde vive es propia?  S  Nb

55. ¿Tiene su vivienda o propiedad los siguientes servicios? (marque todos los que apliquen)

- Agua de pozo  Agua de río o quebrada  Agua potable  Alumbrado público  Electricidad  Baño / inodoro  Letrina  Ninguno

56. ¿Cuenta su hogar con algunos de los siguientes bienes?

- |   |   |
|---|---|
| <input type="radio"/> Refrigeradora                       | <input type="radio"/> Bicicleta             |
| <input type="radio"/> Estufa                              | <input type="radio"/> Computadora           |
| <input type="radio"/> Televisor                           | <input type="radio"/> Conexión a Internet   |
| <input type="radio"/> Radio, grabadora o equipo de sonido | <input type="radio"/> Ganado                |
| <input type="radio"/> Teléfono fijo                       | <input type="radio"/> Bestias mularas       |
| <input type="radio"/> Teléfono celular                    | <input type="radio"/> Pollos y gallinas     |
| <input type="radio"/> Carro                               | <input type="radio"/> Ninguno de los bienes |

57. Aparte de usted y su cónyuge ¿Cuál es la condición educativa de las personas entre 4 y 24 años que viven en su casa y que están bajo su cargo? (Instrucción: Empiece por la persona mayor con menos de 24 años y anote su edad. Luego marque una de las primeras seis columnas. Después, en la columna final, escriba el número del grado más alto completado. Si no ha completado ningún nivel, ponga '0'.)

	a. Edad	b. Nivel académico (inscrito en)	c. Último grado completado				
Persona 1	<table border="1"><tr><td style="width: 20px; height: 15px;"></td><td style="width: 20px; height: 15px;"></td></tr></table>			<input type="radio"/> Pre-escolar <input type="radio"/> Primaria <input type="radio"/> Básico <input type="radio"/> Diversificado <input type="radio"/> Universidad <input type="radio"/> No asiste	<table border="1"><tr><td style="width: 20px; height: 15px;"></td><td style="width: 20px; height: 15px;"></td></tr></table>		
Persona 2	<table border="1"><tr><td style="width: 20px; height: 15px;"></td><td style="width: 20px; height: 15px;"></td></tr></table>			<input type="radio"/> Pre-escolar <input type="radio"/> Primaria <input type="radio"/> Básico <input type="radio"/> Diversificado <input type="radio"/> Universidad <input type="radio"/> No asiste	<table border="1"><tr><td style="width: 20px; height: 15px;"></td><td style="width: 20px; height: 15px;"></td></tr></table>		
Persona 3	<table border="1"><tr><td style="width: 20px; height: 15px;"></td><td style="width: 20px; height: 15px;"></td></tr></table>			<input type="radio"/> Pre-escolar <input type="radio"/> Primaria <input type="radio"/> Básico <input type="radio"/> Diversificado <input type="radio"/> Universidad <input type="radio"/> No asiste	<table border="1"><tr><td style="width: 20px; height: 15px;"></td><td style="width: 20px; height: 15px;"></td></tr></table>		
Persona 4	<table border="1"><tr><td style="width: 20px; height: 15px;"></td><td style="width: 20px; height: 15px;"></td></tr></table>			<input type="radio"/> Pre-escolar <input type="radio"/> Primaria <input type="radio"/> Básico <input type="radio"/> Diversificado <input type="radio"/> Universidad <input type="radio"/> No asiste	<table border="1"><tr><td style="width: 20px; height: 15px;"></td><td style="width: 20px; height: 15px;"></td></tr></table>		
Persona 5	<table border="1"><tr><td style="width: 20px; height: 15px;"></td><td style="width: 20px; height: 15px;"></td></tr></table>			<input type="radio"/> Pre-escolar <input type="radio"/> Primaria <input type="radio"/> Básico <input type="radio"/> Diversificado <input type="radio"/> Universidad <input type="radio"/> No asiste	<table border="1"><tr><td style="width: 20px; height: 15px;"></td><td style="width: 20px; height: 15px;"></td></tr></table>		
Persona 6	<table border="1"><tr><td style="width: 20px; height: 15px;"></td><td style="width: 20px; height: 15px;"></td></tr></table>			<input type="radio"/> Pre-escolar <input type="radio"/> Primaria <input type="radio"/> Básico <input type="radio"/> Diversificado <input type="radio"/> Universidad <input type="radio"/> No asiste	<table border="1"><tr><td style="width: 20px; height: 15px;"></td><td style="width: 20px; height: 15px;"></td></tr></table>		
Persona 7	<table border="1"><tr><td style="width: 20px; height: 15px;"></td><td style="width: 20px; height: 15px;"></td></tr></table>			<input type="radio"/> Pre-escolar <input type="radio"/> Primaria <input type="radio"/> Básico <input type="radio"/> Diversificado <input type="radio"/> Universidad <input type="radio"/> No asiste	<table border="1"><tr><td style="width: 20px; height: 15px;"></td><td style="width: 20px; height: 15px;"></td></tr></table>		
Persona 8	<table border="1"><tr><td style="width: 20px; height: 15px;"></td><td style="width: 20px; height: 15px;"></td></tr></table>			<input type="radio"/> Pre-escolar <input type="radio"/> Primaria <input type="radio"/> Básico <input type="radio"/> Diversificado <input type="radio"/> Universidad <input type="radio"/> No asiste	<table border="1"><tr><td style="width: 20px; height: 15px;"></td><td style="width: 20px; height: 15px;"></td></tr></table>		

Grado: 00 para estudios de preprimaria, 01 a 06 para grados primero a sexto primaria, 07 a 09 para primero a tercero básicos, 10 a 12 para cuarto a sexto diversificado, 13 para más que diversificado, 14 si no estudió y 15 si tiene estudios universitarios.

58. Con relación a los niños que tiene en la escuela PRONAVE, ¿cuántas veces faltaron a clase en el último mes por razones que no tenían que ver con una enfermedad, el clima, o días feriados? (escriba un número por cada niño).

	a. # de veces		
Niño 1	<table border="1"><tr><td style="width: 20px; height: 15px;"></td><td style="width: 20px; height: 15px;"></td></tr></table>		
Niño 2	<table border="1"><tr><td style="width: 20px; height: 15px;"></td><td style="width: 20px; height: 15px;"></td></tr></table>		
Niño 3	<table border="1"><tr><td style="width: 20px; height: 15px;"></td><td style="width: 20px; height: 15px;"></td></tr></table>		
Niño 4	<table border="1"><tr><td style="width: 20px; height: 15px;"></td><td style="width: 20px; height: 15px;"></td></tr></table>		
Niño 5	<table border="1"><tr><td style="width: 20px; height: 15px;"></td><td style="width: 20px; height: 15px;"></td></tr></table>		
Niño 6	<table border="1"><tr><td style="width: 20px; height: 15px;"></td><td style="width: 20px; height: 15px;"></td></tr></table>		
Niño 7	<table border="1"><tr><td style="width: 20px; height: 15px;"></td><td style="width: 20px; height: 15px;"></td></tr></table>		
Niño 8	<table border="1"><tr><td style="width: 20px; height: 15px;"></td><td style="width: 20px; height: 15px;"></td></tr></table>		

59. Con relación a los niños que tiene en la escuela PRONAVE, ¿cuántas veces faltaron a clase en el último mes porque el/la maestro(a) faltó a clase? (escriba un número por cada niño).

	a. # de veces		
Niño 1	<table border="1"><tr><td style="width: 20px; height: 15px;"></td><td style="width: 20px; height: 15px;"></td></tr></table>		
Niño 2	<table border="1"><tr><td style="width: 20px; height: 15px;"></td><td style="width: 20px; height: 15px;"></td></tr></table>		
Niño 3	<table border="1"><tr><td style="width: 20px; height: 15px;"></td><td style="width: 20px; height: 15px;"></td></tr></table>		
Niño 4	<table border="1"><tr><td style="width: 20px; height: 15px;"></td><td style="width: 20px; height: 15px;"></td></tr></table>		
Niño 5	<table border="1"><tr><td style="width: 20px; height: 15px;"></td><td style="width: 20px; height: 15px;"></td></tr></table>		
Niño 6	<table border="1"><tr><td style="width: 20px; height: 15px;"></td><td style="width: 20px; height: 15px;"></td></tr></table>		
Niño 7	<table border="1"><tr><td style="width: 20px; height: 15px;"></td><td style="width: 20px; height: 15px;"></td></tr></table>		
Niño 8	<table border="1"><tr><td style="width: 20px; height: 15px;"></td><td style="width: 20px; height: 15px;"></td></tr></table>		

**¡MUCHAS GRACIAS POR SU COLABORACIÓN! ANTES DE QUE TERMINEMOS, ¿TIENE ALGUNAS PREGUNTAS PARA MI?**

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Si durante su visita a la comunidad el entrevistado le ha proporcionado información adicional que usted considera importante de compartir con el grupo investigador, sírvase utilizar esta área para hacer todas las anotaciones pertinentes.


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Estimado Sr(a) Director(a) de Escuela:  
 Este cuestionario forma parte de un estudio sobre escuelas auto-gestionadas que está realizando el Amherst College de Massachussets, E.E.U.U, con el permiso de PFDNADE y el Ministerio de Educación (MINEDUC). El propósito de este cuestionario es conocer algunas características de la escuela. Las respuestas serán utilizadas en forma estrictamente confidencial. Agradecemos su buena disposición para completar el cuestionario. Si le ocurre cualquier duda, no dude en preguntar al aplicador del estudio para aclararla. Si se siente incómodo con alguna pregunta, síntase en libertad de no contestarla, en estos casos le rogamos marcar la opción 'prefiero no contestar'.

Nombre de la comunidad:     Municipio:

Nombre de la escuela:

Nombre del entrevistado: (opcional)

Fecha:   /   /     Departamento:

**IDENTIFICACIÓN DE LA ESCUELA**

1. Año de fundación del COEDUCA:     2. Año de fundación de la escuela:

3. Número de profesores (as) en la escuela:   4. ¿Cuántos tienen título de maestro?

4a. Para el maestro de cada grado, indique el número de años que el docente ha trabajado en esta escuela  
 1ero   2ndo   3ero   4to   5to   6to

5. Habitualmente, ¿qué lengua hablan en casa, los habitantes de la localidad en que se ubica la escuela?  
 Español  
 Lengua maya, especifique:  Achi  Kekchi  Q'ra      
 Bilingüe

6. ¿Hay un aula para cada grado?  S  Nb 7. ¿Cuántas aulas hay en total?

8. ¿Hay talleres en la escuela?  S  Nb

9. Señale con qué servicios cuenta la escuela. *Marque todas las opciones que apliquen.*  
 Agua potable  Luz eléctrica  Planta eléctrica o paneles solares  Sanitarios  Letrinas  Teléfono fijo  Conexión a internet

10. Señale las pertenencias con las que cuenta la escuela  
 Oficina administrativa  Cocina  
 Aulas de usos múltiples  Computadora  
 Áreas deportivas o de recreo  Fax  
 Huerto  Fotocopiadora  
 Biblioteca  Mimeoógrafo

11. ¿Con qué servicios cuenta la comunidad en que se ubica la escuela?  
 Agua potable  Correo  
 Luz eléctrica  Biblioteca pública  
 Alcantarillado  Policía  
 Letrinas (en la mayoría de hogares)  Jardín de niños  
 Teléfono  Otros, especifique:    
 Transporte público

12. Grados y matrícula que atiende la escuela (Escriba 0 si no hay. Deje en blanco la casilla si no tiene información.)

	MATRÍCULA DEL AÑO 2008	
	Niños	Niñas
Pre-primaria	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
Primer grado	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
Segundo grado	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
Tercer grado	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
Cuarto grado	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
Quinto grado	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
Sexto grado	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>

	MATRÍCULA DEL AÑO 2007	
	13. REPITENTES	14. DESERTORES
Pre-primaria	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
Primer grado	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
Segundo grado	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
Tercer grado	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
Cuarto grado	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
Quinto grado	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
Sexto grado	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>

Añote el número de alumnos repitentes o que han desertado durante este año. Escriba 0 si no hubo casos. Deje en blanco la casilla si no tiene información.

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**III. El Comité Educativo (COEDUCA):**

15. ¿Cuántos miembros tiene el COEDUCA que PARTICIPAN ACTIVAMENTE? 

--	--

 Nb sé  Prefiero no contestar  
Participar activamente quiere decir que asisten regularmente a reuniones o actividades o que aportan dinero o servicio voluntario.

16. ¿Cuántas son mujeres? 

--	--

 Nb sé  Prefiero no contestar

17. Por cada uno de los siguientes temas, indique si el Comité Educativo (COEDUCA) trató ese tema. Luego, indique qué tan efectivo ha sido dicho tratamiento.

17a. ¿El Comité Educativo (COEDUCA) lo ha tratado? <input type="radio"/> S <input type="radio"/> Nb <input type="radio"/> No sabe	<i><b>Si contesta sí en la pregunta 17a pregunte:</b></i> 17b. ¿Qué tan efectivo ha sido dicho tratamiento?
<b>A La asistencia de los estudiantes</b>	<input type="radio"/> Muy mal <input type="radio"/> Muy bien <input type="radio"/> Mal <input type="radio"/> No sé <input type="radio"/> N bien ni mal <input type="radio"/> Prefiero no contestar <input type="radio"/> Ben
<b>B Disciplina de los estudiante</b>	<input type="radio"/> Muy mal <input type="radio"/> Muy bien <input type="radio"/> Mal <input type="radio"/> No sé <input type="radio"/> N bien ni mal <input type="radio"/> Prefiero no contestar <input type="radio"/> Ben
<b>C Rendimiento académico de los estudiantes</b>	<input type="radio"/> Muy mal <input type="radio"/> Muy bien <input type="radio"/> Mal <input type="radio"/> No sé <input type="radio"/> N bien ni mal <input type="radio"/> Prefiero no contestar <input type="radio"/> Ben
<b>D La asistencia del maestro/ la maestra</b>	<input type="radio"/> Muy mal <input type="radio"/> Muy bien <input type="radio"/> Mal <input type="radio"/> No sé <input type="radio"/> N bien ni mal <input type="radio"/> Prefiero no contestar <input type="radio"/> Ben
<b>E Desempeño del maestro/ la maestra</b>	<input type="radio"/> Muy mal <input type="radio"/> Muy bien <input type="radio"/> Mal <input type="radio"/> No sé <input type="radio"/> N bien ni mal <input type="radio"/> Prefiero no contestar <input type="radio"/> Ben
<b>F Mantenimiento de la escuela</b>	<input type="radio"/> Muy mal <input type="radio"/> Muy bien <input type="radio"/> Mal <input type="radio"/> No sé <input type="radio"/> N bien ni mal <input type="radio"/> Prefiero no contestar <input type="radio"/> Ben
<b>G Hacer el presupuesto de la escuela</b>	<input type="radio"/> Muy mal <input type="radio"/> Muy bien <input type="radio"/> Mal <input type="radio"/> No sé <input type="radio"/> N bien ni mal <input type="radio"/> Prefiero no contestar <input type="radio"/> Ben
<b>H Pagar el sueldo del maestro/ la maestra</b>	<input type="radio"/> Muy mal <input type="radio"/> Muy bien <input type="radio"/> Mal <input type="radio"/> No sé <input type="radio"/> N bien ni mal <input type="radio"/> Prefiero no contestar <input type="radio"/> Ben
<b>I Mantener la seguridad en la escuela</b>	<input type="radio"/> Muy mal <input type="radio"/> Muy bien <input type="radio"/> Mal <input type="radio"/> No sé <input type="radio"/> N bien ni mal <input type="radio"/> Prefiero no contestar <input type="radio"/> Ben
<b>J Conseguir ayuda del gobierno</b>	<input type="radio"/> Muy mal <input type="radio"/> Muy bien <input type="radio"/> Mal <input type="radio"/> No sé <input type="radio"/> N bien ni mal <input type="radio"/> Prefiero no contestar <input type="radio"/> Ben

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18. En su opinión, ¿Qué tan enterados están los miembros del COEDUCA de lo que los niños están aprendiendo en la escuela?  
 Muy enterados  Bastante enterados  N.poco ni muy enterados  Poco enterados  Nada enterados  No sé  Prefiero no contestar
19. En su opinión, ¿Qué tan efectivo es el Comité Educativo (COEDUCA) en administrar la escuela?  
 Muy efectivo  Bastante efectivo  N.poco ni muy efectivo  Poco efectivo  Nada efectivo  No sé  Prefiero no contestar
20. ¿Ha sido usted evaluado durante el último año por el Comité Educativo (COEDUCA)?  
 Si contesta sí, explique cómo ha sido evaluado (ej., por escrito, en reunión). 

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- Sí \_\_\_\_\_ 20a. ¿Cómo? \_\_\_\_\_  
 No \_\_\_\_\_ pase a pregunta 22  
 No me acuerdo \_\_\_\_\_ pase a pregunta 22
21. ¿Qué tan justa considera usted que fue la evaluación que recibió del Comité Educativo (COEDUCA)?  
 Muy justa  Bastante justa  N.mucho ni poco  Poco justa  Nada justa  No sé  Prefiero no contestar
22. Antes de haber sido contratado/a, ¿tuvo alguna entrevista con miembros del COEDUCA? \_\_\_\_\_  Sí  No  No me acuerdo
23. ¿Cómo es la toma de decisiones en el Comité Educativo (COEDUCA)?  
 El COEDUCA no es capaz de tomar decisiones  
 El líder decide y comunica la decisión a los demás miembros  
 El líder le pregunta a los demás miembros sus opiniones y después decide él/ella mismo(a)  
 Los miembros tienen una discusión y deciden en grupo  
 No sabe  
 Prefiero no contestar  
 Otro - Especifique: \_\_\_\_\_ 

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24. Suponga que los miembros del COEDUCA se dan cuenta de que los alumnos de la escuela están faltando más que antes a la escuela. ¿Cuánto se demoraría el COEDUCA en tomar medidas sobre este problema?  
 El COEDUCA no sería capaz de resolver problemas  
 Se demoraría más de un mes en tomar medidas sobre el problema  
 Se demoraría entre dos semanas y un mes en tomar medidas sobre el problema  
 Se demoraría entre una y dos semanas en tomar medidas sobre el problema  
 Se demoraría una semana o menos en tomar medidas sobre el problema  
 No sabe  
 Prefiero no contestar
25. En los últimos DOS meses, ¿cuántas veces ha visitado el promotor del Ministerio de Educación ésta comunidad?  
 0  1  2  3  4 o más  No sabe/ No responde
26. ¿En esta escuela, ¿ha habido algún problema que haya requerido la ayuda del promotor del MINEDUC? Por ejemplo, puede ser un problema con el presupuesto escolar o con algún/a maestro/a \_\_\_\_\_  Sí  No  No sé  Prefiero no contestar  
 Si responde sí, realice la pregunta 26a. De lo contrario, pase a la pregunta 27
- 26a. ¿Qué tan efectivo ha sido el técnico del MINEDUC en ayudar al COEDUCA a resolver problemas que han ocurrido?  
 Muy efectivo  Algo efectivo  N.poco ni muy efectivo  Poco efectivo  Nada efectivo  No sé  Prefiero no responder
27. En el año pasado, ¿cuántas veces fue visitada por el técnico de la ISE ésta comunidad?  
 0  1  2  3  4 o más  No sabe/ No responde
28. ¿Es el técnico actual del Ministerio de Educación el mismo técnico de la ISE del año pasado? \_\_\_\_\_  Sí  No  No sé
- 28b. Si responde sí, pregunte: ¿Cuántos años ha trabajado con esta escuela dicho técnico? \_\_\_\_\_ 

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29. ¿En esta escuela, ¿hubo algún problema que haya requerido la ayuda del técnico de la ISE el año pasado? Por ejemplo, puede ser un problema con el presupuesto escolar o con algún/a maestro/a \_\_\_\_\_  Sí  No  No sé  Prefiero no contestar  
 Si responde sí, realice la pregunta 29a. De lo contrario, termine este instrumento
- 29a. ¿Qué tan efectivo fue el técnico de la ISE en ayudar al COEDUCA a resolver problemas que han ocurrido en el 2007?  
 Muy efectivo  Algo efectivo  N.poco ni muy efectivo  Poco efectivo  Nada efectivo  No sé  Prefiero no responder

## APPENDIX D: TABLES FROM CASE STUDY CHAPTERS

The tables below provide visual aids for the qualitative analysis in Chapters Seven and Eight. This type of counting is no substitute for the fundamentally qualitative analysis in those chapters, through which I explore various factors that such tables cannot capture. Still, they may prove useful for readers interested in how I coded and compared responses in each community.

One point bears mention for all of these tables and those in the Appendix for Chapter Eight. The numbers reported below are gross numbers. One might be tempted to calculate both learning and networks outcomes as percentages of the total number of participants. Such a strategy, however, would obscure two important points. First, the number of total participants indicates the relative rotation in the council—a key variable in and of itself that reflects one component of council democraticness, as described in Chapter Nine. Calculating a ratio would actually increase the relative values for communities with low rotation, in some sense “rewarding” them for having fewer members. This is inconsistent with the idea that rotation signals a healthy democratic forum. Second, gross numbers are useful because they suggest whether, for each case, a critical mass of skilled participants and leaders emerged. This is useful in considering how individual spillovers affected changes at the community level.

**Table 37: Summary of Learning Since CMS's Inception (Chapter Seven Cases)**

Community	Number of CMS Participants Showing Organizational Learning	Number of CMS Participants Showing Political Learning (includes knowing how to make demands on local government)	Number of CMS Participants Showing Learning applied	Number of Total Participants
Frutales	2	3	1	8
Perales	4	3	2	11
Saq'e	4	2	2	10
Yaab	7	7	5	14

*Sources: Data from individual interviews and surveys, group interviews, and direct observation*

**Table 38: Summary of Networks Changes Since CMS's Inception (Chapter Seven Cases)**

Community	Number of CMS Participants Who are New Participants in non-Church Community Organizations	Number of CMS Participants Showing Greater Involvement in Other Organizations	Number of CMS Participants Who Have Subsequently Created or Led Other Organizations	Functional organizations created in the Community after the School Council's Creation	Number of Total Participants
Frutales	5	1	1 new; 1 sustained	0	8
Perales	2	2	0 new; 2 sustained	1	11
Saq'e	5	3	2 new; 2 sustained	1	10
Yaab	6	5	4 new and increased; 2 sustained	2	14

*Sources: Data from individual interviews and surveys, group interviews, and direct observation.*

**Table 39: Summary of Learning Since CMS's Inception (Chapter Eight Cases)**

Community	Number of CMS Participants Showing Organizational Learning	Number of CMS Participants Showing Political Learning (includes knowing how to make demands on local government)	Number of CMS Participants Showing Learning applied	Number of Total Participants
Huertos	5	4	3	10
Cafetales	6	4	3	11
Chahim	11	6	5	20
Nima	12	12	8	19

*Sources: Data from individual interviews and surveys; group interviews; and direct observation*

**Table 40: Summary of Networks Changes Since CMS's Inception (Chapter Eight Cases)**

Community	Number of CMS Participants Who are New Participants in non-Church Community Organizations	Number of CMS Participants Showing Greater Involvement in Other Organizations	Number of CMS Participants Who Have Subsequently Created or Led Other Organizations	Functional Organizations Created in the Community after the School Council's Creation	Number of Total Participants
Huertos	4	3	2 new; 5 sustained	2	10
Cafetales	4	4	1 new; 3 sustained	3	11
Chahim	7	3	2 increased; 6 sustained	4	20
Nima	8	5	3 increased; 3 sustained	4	19

*Sources: Data from individual interviews and surveys; group interviews; and direct observation*

**Table 41: Learning Outcomes for All Eight Cases**

<b>Community</b>	<b>Number of CMS Participants Showing Organizational Learning</b>	<b>Number of CMS Participants Showing Political Learning</b>	<b>Number of CMS Participants Showing Learning applied</b>	<b>Number of Total Participants</b>
Frutales (Honduras)	2	3	1	8
Perales (Honduras)	4	3	2	11
Huertos (Honduras)	5	4	3	10
Cafetales (Honduras)	6	4	3	11
Saq'e (Guatemala)	4	2	2	10
Yaab (Guatemala)	7	7	5	14
Chahim (Guatemala)	11	6	5	20
Nima (Guatemala)	12	12	8	19

Table 42: Networks Outcomes for All Eight Cases

Community	Number of CMS Participants Who are New Participants in non-Church Community Organizations	Number of CMS Participants Showing Greater Involvement in Other Organizations	Number of CMS Participants Who Have Subsequently Created or Led Other Organizations	Functional organizations created in the Community after the School Council's Creation	Number of Total Participants
Frutales (Honduras)	5	1	1 new; 1 sustained	0	8
Perales (Honduras)	2	2	0 new; 2 sustained	1	11
Huertos (Honduras)	4	3	2 new; 5 sustained	2	10
Cafetales (Honduras)	4	4	1 new; 3 sustained	3	11
Saq'e (Guatemala)	5	3	2 new; 2 sustained	1	10
Yaab (Guatemala)	6	5	4 new and increased; 2	2	14
Chahim (Guatemala)	7	3	2 increased; 6 sustained	4	20
Nima (Guatemala)	8	5	3 increased; 3 sustained	4	19

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