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Scandal, Protection, and Recovery in Political Cabinets.

Abstract:

Empirical evidence suggests that a Prime Minister can benefit from firing ministers who are involved in political scandals. We explore a model in which a minister's exposure to scandals is positvely related to his policy activism, so that a Prime Minister may wish to protect him from resignation calls. We find that protection can sometimes work against the objective of encouraging activism: it makes a minister's position more valuable to him and hence can encourage him to "sit tight" by moder...

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Volume:
237
Series:
Discussion paper series
Publication date:
2005-06-05
URN:
uuid:25a46df9-7dc8-4b97-bdd6-0bf02f0b3060
Local pid:
ora:1276
Language:
English

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