Soviet Economic Thought and Economic Policy in the 1940s.

Influence on 1950s-1960s Reforms.

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History

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List of abbreviations

ARAN — Archive of the Russian Academy of Sciences

CC — Central Committee (of the Communist Party)

Chekist — member of the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution and Sabotage

COMECON — Council for Mutual Economic Assistance

Comintern — Communist International / Third International

GARF — State Archive of the Russian Federation

GKO — State Defence Committee

GOELRO — State Commission for the Electrification of Russia

Gorkom — City Party Committee

Gosbank — State Bank

Gosekonomkommissiya — State Economic Commission

Gosekonomsovet — State Scientific-Economic Council

Gosplan — State Planning Committee / State Planning Commission

Gossnab — State Supply Committee

Gostekhnika — State Committee on Science and Technology

KGB — Committee for State Security

Khozraschet — Economic cost-accounting, an economic-organisational method implying self-sufficiency, profitability and equivalency of an economic unit

Kolkhoz — collective farm

KPSS — Communist Party of the Soviet Union

LenSovet — Leningrad City Party Committee

MGB — Ministry of State Security

MVD — Ministry of Internal Affairs

NEP — New Economic Policy

NKVD — People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs

Obkom — Oblast Party Committee

Orgburo — Organisational Bureau of the Central Committee

Politburo — Political Bureau of the Central Committee

RGAE — Russian State Archive of the Economy

RGASPI — Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History

RKP(b) — Russian Communist Party (bolsheviks)

SMERSH — (*Smert' Shpionam*, "Death to Spies"), Chief Directorate of Counterintelligence

Sovkhoz —state collective farm

SovMin — Council of Ministers

Sovnarkhoz — Council of the National Economy

Sovnarkom — Council of People's Commissars

TsEMI — Central Economic Mathematical Institute

TzSU — Central Statistical Administration

VKP(b) — All-Union Communist Party (bolsheviks)

Vozhd — leader (referred to Stalin)

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Abstract

The present thesis looks at the Soviet economy in the 1940s-1960s period. It specifically focuses on the influence of economic policy and thought developed in the late 1940s on the post-Stalinist era. The thesis' aim is to prove that several key elements of 1950s-1960s economic reforms had already been conceptualised, proposed or implemented during the Stalinist period.

The pillars of this 1940s-1960s reforming continuity which the research deals with are *khozraschet*, economic levers (profit, value, market, prices, credit, bonuses), perspective planning, the balance of the national economy method, as well as the debates concerning the law of value and the repeated attempts at drawing up a General Plan and at drafting a new Party Programme.

The key figure this thesis focuses on is N.A. Voznesensky, top Soviet planner in 1939-1949. In the late 1930s he revived practices and methods discontinued after 1928, while under his aegis, policies and debates that later influenced post-Stalinist reforms were developed in the late 1940s.

The thesis relies on primary evidence gathered at four Russian state archives (RGAE, GARF, ARAN, RGASPI) and on research carried out at British, Russian, Italian and German libraries.

History Faculty Abstract

The present Doctoral research focuses on the Soviet command economic system. Following on an introductory discussion of Soviet economics and economic theory in the 1920s and 1930s, it covers the period between the late 1930s and the late 1960s — starting with the appointment of N.A. Voznesensky as Chairman of Gosplan and ending with the failure of the 1965 economic reform.

The research, drawing inspiration from the recent shift in historical analysis towards the post-war period in the Soviet Union, specifically looks at the economic as well as political realities of the late 1940s and postulates one core hypothesis: several economic theories, policies and proposals conceptualised and/or implemented in the late 1940s had a clear influence on post-Stalinist 1950s-1960s economic policy and reforms.

The specific economic theories, policies and proposals the research focuses on are those related to economic levers (profit, price, value, credit, market), the balance of the national economy method, material incentives and perspective planning. Of primary importance in the thesis are also the debates concerning the role of the law of value in the Soviet economy, as well as the repeated attempts at drawing up a General Economic Plan for communist construction and at drafting a new Party Programme.

A key figure in the present study is N.A. Voznesensky, the important but neglected Gosplan Chairman, GKO, SovMin Bureau and Politburo member. As top Soviet planner between 1938 and 1949 he played a key role in reviving, conceptualising and initiating several of the policies, theories and proposals which the research focuses on. A second key figure in the present thesis

is economist E.G. Liberman, the official inspirer of the 1965 reform, whose works in late 1940s the research carefully analyses.

The thesis has been developed on the basis of archival research carried out in person in Moscow at four Russian institutions: the Archive of the Russian Academy of Sciences (ARAN), the State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF), the Russian State Archive of the Economy (RGAE), the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (RGASPI). In addition, more than forty electronic archives and primary sources readers have been consulted.

Several library collections have also been consulted in order to gain access to Soviet press, political, economic and cultural magazines and journals, including more than forty titles, and secondary literature. Specifically, research has been carried out in person at the Russian State Library, Russian State Public Historical Library, St Antony's College RESC Library, Oxford Bodleian Library, Berlin State Library and Gramsci Institute Foundation library in Rome.

The thesis' key and broader finding is the validation of the core hypothesis on the existence of a 1940s-1960s reforming continuity. Said continuity existed both in terms of how tools and ideas were discussed (the role and theory of economic levers under socialism and the rationalising effort they were part of) and of how certain policies were practically implemented (monetary and pricing policy, perspective planning, reliance on the balance method and further attempts at enhancing efficiency). They thesis has also proved how Voznesensky's take on economic levers, and even the specific wording he used, was almost literally quoted for decades to come as a key principle of economic reform. Further key findings include proof that the 1961 Third CPSU Programme was unmistakably influenced by the 1947 never-approved draft prepared under the aegis of Voznesensky and Zhdanov as well as new evidence on Voznesensky's little-known 1947-49 attempt at drawing up a General Plan. The previously neglected role played by Liberman in the late 1940s debate is also fully presented, alongside systematised evidence on

Voznesensky's figure, his downfall and the ramifications they had in Soviet economic thinking and policy.

Specifically, the research argues that Voznesensky's arrival at Gosplan in 1938 was instrumental in resuscitating the balance method in economic analysis, which became a key element of Soviet economics thereafter, as well as in establishing new operational institutions at Gosplan. All of this was a clear signal of his rationalising mindset. Voznesensky had realised that, notwithstanding its socialist and planned character, the Soviet economy could not be run from the centre only, that more attention to economic units, to their operation and interrelations was needed. He clearly focused on enhancing the efficiency of productive processes, on the correct consideration of economic relations and proportions, in order to ensure the proportionality of development and the most economical and most rational utilisation. Voznesensky also attempted to functionalise the Stalinist command economy relying on economic experts, who had been relegated to the role of pure apologists in previous years.

Voznesensky's approach to planning initiated two consecutive and unprecedented attempts (1940-41 and 1947-49) at drawing up a 15-20 years General Economic Plan meant to ferry the USSR into communism. The revival of perspective planning and of the General Plan represented a rationalisation attempt at better balancing economic growth and at adopting scientifically determined goals, whose attainment was to very much rely on technological progress and enhancement of efficiency. The post-war version of the General Plan represented the blueprint for its revival in 1959, when Khrushchev called for the preparation of the "General Perspectives for the Development of the National Economy". It furthermore served as basis for perspective planning proposals made in the 1960s, as well as for Brezhnev's 1972 "long-term plan" for 1976-1990. Moreover, the methodology of perspective planning, together with scientific forecasting, became a key aspect of economic policy proposals suggested by Soviet reforming economists in the 1970s. In this respect one of the thesis key contributions to scholarship comes

in the form of a detailed description of the 1947-49 General Plan through new sources uncovered at RGAE. Documents describing the process through which the plan was drawn up are complemented by two highly informative summaries of the Plan's rationale, methods and structure.

The post-war work on the General Plan was carried out by Voznesensky's Gosplan right when increasing reliance on economic levers had become a key topic in planning, economic debates, as well as Party politics. At that time, the Chairman of Gosplan was demanding the "strengthening of the role of economic levers in the organisation of production and distribution, which are: prices, money, credit, profit and bonuses". [1] A further innovative point contained in the thesis concerns the fact that precisely strong reference to economic levers was added to the draft text prepared under the aegis of Voznesensky and A.A. Zhdanov for the revision of the Party Programme. The present research has traced the lengthy process of the Programme's revision through RGASPI's documents from the 1930s on, providing evidence on the economic section of each draft. A further innovative point relates to how several elements of the economic section contained in the never adopted 1947 draft, *in primis* strong focus on economic levers, were integrated with an only slightly modified phrasing in the new Third Party Programme of 1961.

Debates on economic levers ranged in the 1940s from proposals for further reforms of the recently enhanced mechanisms regulating material incentives, to calls for more determined reliance on economic concepts such as profit and pricing. Economic levers, monetary policy and pricing had all become key elements of Voznesensky's war-time economic policy. Therefore, after the end of the hostilities, the Gosplan Chairman, recently defined the "strategist of the economic victory", [2] clearly realised the need for a more coherent and systematic approach to

[1] GARF, f. P7523, op. 35, d. 28, l. 6.

[2] *Voznesensky Nikolai Alekseevich. Strateg Ekonomicheskoy Pobedi* (Moscow, 2013).

pricing. Consequently, Voznesensky played a crucial role between 1947 and 1949 in working out and implementing both a monetary and a price reform, which the thesis discussed as key exampled of how Voznesensky's rationalising mindset was concretised into actual policies. Specifically the price reform, barely implemented in the 1940s and soon reversed, was revived by Kosygin in 1967 as part of the reform program launched in 1965, which represents a further key validation of the 1940s-1960s reforming continuity.

Core aspect of said continuity proved by the thesis is the fact that by 1950, several key aspects of Khrushchev's 1959-1964 "economic levers"-oriented economics and of the 1965 reform launched by Kosygin had already been conceptualised. Moreover, the thesis also provides strong evidence that Liberman himself openly endorsed Voznesensky's ideas and already in the 1940s actively participated to debates, voicing almost two decades before the 1965 reform proposals on the reshuffling of material incentives and on the enhancement of efficiency.

"Money, price, profit, credit and trade" became one of the key elements of 1950s-1970s Soviet economics and the thesis proves how Voznesensky's innovative 1946 wording on the "strengthening of the role of economic levers" was repeated word for word as one of the cornerstones of economic reform throughout the 1950s-1970s. [3] Blueprints set in the late 1940s served as basis for the further development of reforming ideas, which several documents from ARAN prove were as early as 1957 integrated by Soviet economists in reform programmes in all similar to the one launched in 1965. A further significant aspect of the 1940s-1960s reforming continuity which the thesis emphasises is the role played by Liberman and Kosygin both in the 1940s and in the 1960s, respectively in economic debates and policymaking.

On the basis of little-known published primary evidence, the thesis also proves that Voznesensky and his brother Alexander Alekseevich were directly involved in the first

[3] GARF, f. P7523, op. 35, d. 28, l. 6.

unsuccessful attempt by future Nobel Laureate L.V. Kantorovich to have his early optimal planning intuitions accepted by the two key Soviet economic institutions, Gosplan and the Academy of Sciences' Economic Institute. Voznesensky seems to have expressed interest for such heterodox theories, which were allowed for publication only in 1959 and immediately met with a barrage of criticism from most doyens of Soviet economics.

Finally, relying on an extensive study of the memoirs left by Voznesensky's contemporaries and of primary evidence, the thesis systematises previous discordant descriptions of the Gosplan Chairman into a coherent portrait, accounting for his rationalism, but also for his orthodoxy and self-interest.

The findings outlined above contribute to a number of specific and broader historical debates, specifically those on the roots of post-Stalinist economics in the 1920s-1930s and on continuities and discontinuities in Soviet history as well as the general debate on the role of economics during late Stalinism and the one specifically concerning Voznesensky's figure.

Concerning the debate on the roots of the Khrushchev and the Brezhnev-Kosygin economic reforms, the link between 1920s Bukharinist economics and post-Stalinist one has already been the subject of scholarly analysis. The thesis proves that interest in 1920s economics was publicly expressed by several Soviet scholars in the 1960s-1970s, specifically in relation to economic levers and money-commodity relations, while it also discusses the birth of the balance method and of perspective planning methodology in the 1920s. However, the present research focuses on how, after Stalin's theoretical modifications of 1934-1936, economic levers and money-commodity relations were deployed in the post-war period by Voznesensky to rationalise the command economy and not to challenge its core. The whole architecture of NEP and key elements of Bukharin's theory (i.e. his equilibrium theory) did not inspire any policies implemented or proposed in the 1950s-1960s period, whereas other key elements of this latter

period's economics were not connected with any aspect of NEP. A more focused appraisal of late 1940s economic policy and economic debates therefore represents a contribution to existing scholarship on cross-period economic influences. The study of said influences also contributes to the debate on de-Stalinisation, by claiming that on the backdrop of continuity in the authoritarian fundamentals of the system, there also existed one in the realm of reforming economics.

As for the debate on post-war economics and on the crucial role played by Voznesensky, the thesis expands on the evidence proving that the "transformed law of value" concept was Stalin's, but also focuses on how Voznesensky went beyond what had been officially sanctioned by the dictator. The thesis therefore discusses in detail how his personal interpretation, alongside the prices reform as well as the General Plan and Party Programme revision projects were all liquidated in the aftermath of his demise between 1949 and 1952. The evidence gathered in the present research contributes to further our understanding of late Stalinism, of the forces that were at play and of the reasons behind the demise of individuals and policies.

In doing so, the research also contributes to scholarship with a coherent appraisal of Voznesensky's figure, by presenting a portrait of the Gosplan Chairman based on a careful analysis of his thought, policies and of their relevance in subsequent periods.

Introduction

"Human relations are becoming transparently natural, the fog of money fetishism, of commodity fetishism, is dissipating before our very eyes". [4] Or so thought the Bolsheviks, after they raised the red flag atop the Winter Palace and fixed their bayonets, poised to spread the revolution right into the heart of capitalist Europe.

By the mid-1920s, orphaned of their leader, bogged down in internal Party disputes and firmly contained within the borders of the newborn USSR, the Bolsheviks had come to think otherwise. Indeed, N. Kovalevsky wrote the above quoted words in 1926 not to celebrate their coming true, but to criticise his own naïveté at the time of War Communism. In those years, Gosplan Chairman I.T. Smilga harshly remarked, "we tried to plan everything, but in fact [planned] nothing". [5]

Therefore, several Bolsheviks like disillusioned Left Communist N.I. Bukharin fully endorsed plan-market combination plus gradualism as the "road to socialism", [6] whilst others argued that such policies were conceding too much to capitalist elements. [7] Yet, the two top Bolshevik economists, Ye. Preobrazhensky and Bukharin, both thought that law of value and economic levers would have ceased to operate after the recovery and transition periods would have given way to socialism. [8]

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[4] N.A. Kovalevsky, 'Devyat' let ekonomicheskoy politiki proletaryata', *Planovoe khozyaistvo*, 10 (1926), pp. 20-21.

[5] I.T. Smilga, 'Pyat' let novoy ekonomicheskoy politiki', *Planovoe khozyaistvo*, 3 (1926), p. 49.

[6] N.I. Bukharin, 'Put' k sotsializmu i raboche-krest'yanskiy soyuz', in N.I. Bukharin, *Izbrannye Proizvedeniya* (Moscow, 1988).

[7] Ye. Preobrazhenskiy. 'Osnovnoy zakon sotsialisticheskogo nakopleniya', *Vestnik Kommunisticheskoy Akademii,* 8 (1924).

[8] A. Nove, *Political Economy and Soviet Socialism* (London, 1979), p. 97.

Shortly after, as the Great Break was launched to the cry of “there are no fortresses that the working people, the Bolsheviks, cannot capture”, [9] both arch-critics and defenders of NEP fell under the axe of the man who emigre Mensheviks compared to Tamerlane and Bolshevik oppositionists described as “Genghis Khan with a telephone”. [10] Emboldened Bolsheviks like D.Z. Manuilski soon commented on the results of the socialist offensive by triumphantly affirming that “the years will pass, not a stone will remain unturned of the cursed capitalistic structure, of its wars, its reactionary [sic], its vileness, its bestiality and its progressive savagery; people will think back on the days of capitalism as on a bad dream”. [11] Less than two years later, in 1936, Stalin declared socialism built. [12]

However, in the meantime Stalin himself had also called for the strengthening of *khozraschet*, reintroduced State and limited local free trade in foodstuff and eventually officially sanctioned commercial and monetary elements in the economics of socialism.

For the following half a century Soviet leaders and economists would reassert that direct exchange, the withering away of market, money and State would indeed materialise, but only in the “higher” phase of communism, whilst reliance on tools inherited from capitalism continued. Eventually however it was such reassertions that withered away, as the USSR’s reawakening from stagnation and ideological apathy in the late 1980s culminated in the giving up of the communist horizon.

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[9] J.V. Stalin, ‘The Work of the April Joint Plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission’, in J.V. Stalin, *Works*, (14 vols, Moscow, 1946-1954), xii, p. 124.

[10] N. Valentinov quoted in A. Nove, *Was Stalin Really Necessary? Some Problems of Soviet Economic Policy* (London, 1964), p. 24.
The second quotation is attributed to both Trotsky [S.S. Montefiore, *Stalin. The Court of the Red Tsar* (London, 2004), p. 74] and Bukharin [A.L. Litvin, J.L.H. Keep, *Stalinism. Russian and Western Views at the Turn of the Millennium* (Abingdon, 2005), p. 38].

[11] Department of Rare Books and Special Collections, Princeton University Library — Public Policy Papers — George F. Kennan Papers, Notes, 1944, Box 163, Folder 27, p. 1.

[12] J.V. Stalin, ‘On the Draft Constitution of the U.S.S.R.’, in J.V. Stalin, *Works*, xiv, pp. 164-165.

The present research looks at the use made in the USSR of economic tools initially considered alien to socialism and at their role in subsequent attempts at reform. It focuses on the 1940s-1960s period and looks at the influence of economic policy and thought developed in the late 1940s on the post-Stalinist era. The basic aim of the thesis to prove how several key elements of 1950s-1960s economic reforms had already been conceptualised, proposed or implemented during the Stalinist period under the aegis of N.A. Voznesensky, top Soviet planner in 1939-1949. In essence, the thesis postulates the existence of a 1940s-1960s reforming continuity.

The key pillars of this continuity which the research focuses on are *khozraschet*, "economic levers" (profit, value, market, prices, credit, bonuses), perspective planning, the "balance of the national economy" method, as well as the debates concerning the law of value and the repeated attempts at drawing up a General Plan and drafting a new Party Programme.

The Soviet command economy, which P.R. Gregory's defined as "the most important experiment of the twentieth century" and "the most complex organisation ever constructed by mankind", is the research's broader object of analysis. [13]

Particularly relevant to the conceptualisation of the thesis' argument has been the understanding developed by Western scholars in the 1950s-1960s that the Soviet "command" system was "less-than-absolute" and that "behind the totalitarian façade" realities were marked more by complexity than uniformity. Plan inconsistency was a structural feature of the system, household choice was relatively autonomous, free and State markets played a key role in commodity

[13] P.R. Gregory, A. Markevich, 'Creating Soviet Industry. The House That Stalin Built', *Slavic Review*, 61/4 (2002), p. 787 — P.R. Gregory, 'An Introduction to the Economics of the Gulag', in P.R. Gregory, V.V. Lazarev (ed.) *The economics of forced labor: the Soviet Gulag* (Stanford, 2003), p. 3 — P.R. Gregory, *The Political Economy of Stalinism. Evidence from Soviet Secret Archives* (Cambridge, 2004), pp. 4, 72.

exchange and labour apportioning, while a pervasive “second economy” relied on black and grey markets and enterprise managers successfully circumvented State regulations. [14]

A further notion linked to that of an economic system never truly moneyless or market-less, [15] which also played a key role in informing the research’s development, has been that of said system’s inseparable link with Marxism and, at the same time, its failure to concretise its very essence. As the Soviet leadership tried to conform to Marxist cornerstones, such as the labour theory of value, an inextricable contradiction developed between such attempts and the necessity to operationalise economic policymaking, [16] which led to reform attempts as early as in the 1930s. [17]

A broader reflection on the Soviet system has instead contributed to appraising the historical significance of economic reform: given its distinctive features, interlocking Party-State directorate, centralism, ideological orthodoxy and authoritarianism, any serious change in

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[14] M. Fainsod, *Smolensk under Soviet Ruled* (Cambridge, 1953) — D. Granick, *Management of the Industrial Firm in the USSR* (New York, 1954) — R.A. Bauer, A. Inkeles, C. Kluckhohn, *How the Soviet System Works: Cultural Psychological and Social Themes* (Cambridge, 1956) — J.S. Berliner, *Factory and Manager in the USSR* (Cambridge, 1957) — A. Inkeles, R.A. Bauer, *The Soviet Citizen. Daily life in a totalitarian society* (Cambridge, 1959) — E. Zaleski, *Planning for Economic Growth in the Soviet Union 1918-1931* (Chapel Hill, 1971)— A. Nove, ‘Prospects for Economic Growth in the U.S.S.R.’, *The American Economic Review. Papers and Proceedings of the Seventy-Fifth Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association*, 53/2 (1963) — G. Grossman, ‘Notes for a Theory of the Command Economy’, *Soviet Studies*, 15/2 (1963), p. 105 — M. Fainsod, *How Russia in Ruled* (Cambridge, 1963), p. 118 — A. Bergson, *The Economics of Soviet Planning* (New Haven, 1964) — L. Smolinski, ‘Planning Without Theory, 1917-1967’, *Survey*, 64 (1967) — M. Lewin, ‘The Disappearance of Planning in the Plan’, *Slavic Review*, 32/2 (1973) — G. Grossman, ‘The Second Economy of the USSR’, *Problems of Communism*, 26 (1977).

[15] F. Haffner, ‘Pricing’, in H.-H. Hönmann, M. Kaser and K.C. Thalheim (eds) *The new Economic Systems of Eastern Europe* (London, 1975), p. 278 — A. Szymanski, *Is the Red Flag Flying? The political economy of the Soviet Union today* (London, 1979), pp. 36-61— R.W. Devis, ‘Stalinizm i ekonomicheskiye reformy’, in E.Iu. Kandrashina (ed), Istoriya stalinizma. Itogi i problemy izucheniya: materialy mezhdunarodnoi nauchnoi konferenzii. Moskva, 5-7 dekabrya 2008 g. (Moscow, 2011), p. 464.

[16] J. Berliner, ‘Marxism and the Soviet Economy’, *Problems of Communism*, 18/5 (1964) — M. Bornstein, ‘Ideology and the Soviet Economy’, *Soviet Studies*, 18/1 (1966), pp. 75-76.

[17] R.W. Davies, ‘The Socialist Market. A Debate in Soviet Industry, 1932-33’, *Slavic Review*, 43/2 (1984).

economic policy, management or theory would carry with itself meaningful political consequences. [18]

The research's focus on the late 1940s has been stimulated by the general trend in historical research towards late-Stalinism, [19] by R.W. Davies' recent remark that "there has been little archival research on the post-war economy", [20] as well as by A. Tikhonov and P.R. Gregory's characterisation of said period as one which offered the Soviet leadership an "opportunity" to reevaluate its strategy. [21]

The 1945-1953 years have been alternatively defined "high" or "late" Stalinism. The first definition, often quoted in recent research, [22] has however also been also used to define other

[18] G.W. Nutter, A. Nove and N. Spulber, 'Discussion', *The American Economic Review. Papers and Proceedings of the Seventy-Fifth Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association*, 53/2 (1963), pp. 574-575 — Bornstein, 'Ideology and the Soviet Economy', pp. 74, 79 — R.W. Campbell, 'Economic Reform in the U.S.S.R.', *The American Economic Review. Papers and Proceedings of the Eightieth Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association*, 58/2 (1968), pp. 553-554, 557-558 — R. Campbell, *Soviet-Type Economies. Performance and Evolution* (London, 1974), pp. 229, 236 — H. Dahm, 'The Role of Economics in Soviet Ideology', in A. Nove and H.-H. Höhmann (eds) *Economics and Politics in the USSR. Problems of interdependence* (Boulder, London, 1986), p. 18 — A. Markevich, 'Economics and the Establishment of Stalinism', *Kritika*, 15/1, (2014), p. 132.

[19] O.V. Khlevnyuk, 'Stalinism and the Stalin Period after the "Archival Revolution"', *Kritika*, 2/2 (2001), p. 326 — S. Fitzpatrick, 'Conclusion - Late Stalinism in historical perspective', in J. Fürst (ed), *Late Stalinist Russia. Society between reconstruction and reinvention* (Abingdon, New York, 2006), p. 270.

[20] R.W. Davies, 'The Economic History of the Soviet Union Reconsidered', *Kritika*, 11/1 (2010), p. 155.

[21] A. Tikhonov, P. R. Gregory, 'Stalin's Last Plan', in P.R. Gregory (ed), *Behind the Facade of Stalin's Command Economy* (Stanford, 2001), p. 159.

[22] J. Fürst, *Stalin's Last Generation: Soviet Post-War Youth and the Emergence of Mature Socialism* (Oxford, 2010), p. 21 — D. Brandenberger, 'Stalin, the Leningrad Affair, and the Limits of Post-war Russocentrism', *Russian Review*, 63/2 (2004), p. 246 — B. Tromly, 'The Leningrad Affair and Soviet Patronage Politics, 1949-1950', *Europe-Asia Studies*, 56/5 (2004), p. 720 — S. Davies, J. Harris, 'Joseph Stalin. Power and ideas', in S. Davies, J. Harris (eds), *Stalin: A New History* (Cambridge, 2005), p. 10.

periods — 1934-1953, [23] 1937-1953, [24] the Great Terror [25] — and therefore the present research adopts the term “late Stalinism”.

“Late Stalinism”, still defined as late as 1982 an “oddly shapeless period” by A. Nove, [26] appeared to early Sovietologists as “the stuff of totalitarian nightmares”, [27] when, Jasny stated, Stalin had “everything his own way”. [28] In the coming decades these assumptions were challenged by scholars who thought that a Zhdanov faction, which W.O. McCagg defined “insurrectionist”, [29] while R. Raanan called pro-Yugoslav and “leftist”, [30] had compromised Stalin’s position. W.H. Hahn instead linked Zhdanov with a temporary resurgence of “moderation”, [31] while Dunmore emphasised chaos and resistance in late-Stalinist economic policymaking. [32]

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[23] M. Lewin, ‘Russia/USSR in Historical Motion. An Essay in Interpretation’, *The Russian Review*, 50/3 (Jul., 1991), p. 262.

[24] E. A. Rees, ‘Stalin as Leader, 1937-1953. From Dictator to Despot’, in E. A. Rees (ed) *The Nature of Stalin’s Dictatorship The Politburo, 1924-1953* (Basingstoke, 2004), p. 207.

[25] A. D’Agostino, *The Russian Revolution, 1917-1945* (Sant Barbara, 2011), p. 88 — A. Brown, ‘The Soviet Union: Reform of the System or Systemic Transformation?’, *Slavic Review*, 63/3 (2004), p. 489.

[26] A. Nove, *An Economic History of the USSR. 1917-1991*, 3rd ed (London, 1992), p. 289.

[27] Fürst, *Stalin’s Last Generation*, p. 20.

[28] N. Jasny, *Soviet Industrialisation, 1928-1952* (Chicago, 1961), p. 235.

[29] W.O. McCagg, *Stalin embattled, 1943-1948* (Detroit, 1978), pp. 249-254, 304-305.

[30] G.D. Raanan, *International Policy Formation in the USSR. Factional “Debates” during the Zhdanovshchina* (Hamden 1983), p. 8, 51-53, 152.

[31] W.G. Hahn, *Post-war Soviet Politics. The Fall of Zhdanov and the Defeat of Moderation, 1946-1953* (London, 1982), pp. 12, 114, 152, 162.

[32] T. Dunmore, *The Stalinist command economy. The Soviet state apparatus and economic policy, 1945-53* (London, 1980), pp. 1-5.

Recent studies in social history painted a picture of resentment and broken dreams of missed liberalisation, [33] while further recent scholarship identified pressure on an at times insecure leadership, which however was not unarmed. [34] Instead, markedly veering towards rationalism, it opted for more technocratic forms of political and economic management, combining educational efforts with targeted repression, and successfully reimposed order. [35]

Post-1991 studies of the late Stalinist political system described instead the tightening of Stalin's personal rule, the further weakening of official practices and the dictator's retreat from day-to-day economic affairs. Lieutenants empowered with operative decision-making did not plot to dethrone the *vozhd*, but manoeuvred against each other, battling for his favour. Bureaucratic rivalry and long-established factional hostility, not programmatic differences shaped Party struggles, [36] while their resulting settlement laid the foundations of the post-Stalinist collective leadership, which would revive policies and institutional changes introduced in the late 1940s-early 1950s. [37]

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[33] Fürst, *Stalin's Last Generation* — Y. Gorlizki, 'Rules, Incentives and Soviet Campaign Justice after World War II', *Europe-Asia Studies*, 51/7 (Nov., 1999) — A. Weiner, *Making Sense of War: The Second World War and the Fate of the Bolshevik Revolution* (Princeton, 2001) — J. Fürst (ed), *Late Stalinist Russia. Society between reconstruction and reinvention* (Abingdon, New York, 2006) — D.A. Filtzer, *The hazards of urban life in late Stalinist Russia: health, hygiene, and living standards, 1943-1953* (Cambridge, 2010).

[34] C. Ward, 'What is History? The Case of Late Stalinism', *Rethinking History*, 8/3 (2004), pp. 446-447.

[35] J.E. Duskin, *Stalinist reconstruction and the confirmation of a new elite, 1945-1953* (London, 2001), p. 8-10, 50-55, 82-85 — S. Morcom, 'Enforcing Stalinist Discipline in the Early Years of Post-war Reconstruction in the USSR, 1945-1948', *Europe-Asia Studies*, 68/2 (2016).

[36] Y. Gorlizki, 'Stalin's Cabinet. The Politburo and Decision Making in the Post-war Years', *Europe-Asia Studies*, 53/2 (2001) — Y. Gorlizki, 'Ordinary Stalinism. The Council of Ministers and the Soviet Neopatrimonial State,1946–1953', *The Journal of Modern History*, 74/4 (2002) — Y. Gorlizki, O.V. Khlevnyuk, *Cold Peace. Stalin and the Soviet Ruling Circle, 1945-1953* (Oxford, New York, 2004) — Tikhonov, Gregory, 'Stalin's Last Plan' — E.A. Rees (ed), *The Nature of Stalin's Dictatorship. The Politburo, 1928-1953*.

[37] M.D. Schulman, *Stalin's Foreign Policy Reappraised* (Cambridge MA, 1963) — A. Titov, 'The 1961 Party Programme and the fate of Khrushchev's reforms', in J. Smith, M. Ilic (eds), *Soviet State and Society under Nikita Khrushchev* (Abingdon and New York, 2009), pp. 8-9, 11-14 — A. Titov, 'The Central Committee apparatus under Khrushchev', in J. Smith, M. Ilic (eds), *Khrushchev in The Kremlin. Policy and government in the Soviet Union, 1953-1964* (Abingdon and New York, 2011), pp. 41-45.

By that time the key figure in the present study, N.A. Voznesensky, had fully emerged as one of Stalin's most senior lieutenant and his top economic advisor. The thesis' focus on Voznesensky is owed to the scholarship of M. Harrison, who has shed much light on the economics of post-Stalinism, [38] and on his figure. [39]

Voznesensky has remained a comparatively little-known figure in Western academia. His downfall during the Leningrad Affair has remained for decades one of the most obscure events in Soviet history. Instead, his leading role in the Varga controversy cost him early characterisations as standard apparatchik, [40] or "adventurist". [41] Yet, already in 1953 P.J.D. Wiles took note of Voznesensky's interest in prices and, [42] in the aftermath of his late-1950s rehabilitation, [43] R. Conquest and M. Schulman's studies clearly characterised him as a

[38] M. Harrison, 'The USSR State Budget under Late Stalinism (1945-55). Capital Formation, Government Borrowing and Monetary Growth', *Economics of Planning*, 20/3 (1986) — M. Harrison, 'Macroeconomic Efficiency of Capital Formation in Soviet Industry under Late Stalinism,1945-1955', *Soviet Studies*, 39/2 (1987) — M. Harrison, 'Soviet Industrial Expansion Under Late Stalinism (1945-1955). The Short-Run Dynamic of Civilian Output from Demobilisation to Rearmament', *Journal of European Economic History*, 17/2 (1988) — M. Harrison, 'Post-war Russian Economic Growth. Not a Riddle', *Europe-Asia Studies*, 55/8 (2003) — J. Crowfoot, M. Harrison, 'The USSR Council of Ministers under Late Stalinism, 1945-1954. Its Production Branch Composition and the Requirements of National Economy and Policy', *Soviet Studies*, 42/1 (1990) — M. Harrison, 'The Soviet Union after 1945. Economic recovery and political repression', *Past & Present*, 210/6 (2011), pp. 103-120.

[39] M. Harrison, 'N.A. Voznesensky (1 December 1903 - 30 September 1950). A Soviet Commander of the Economic Front', *Warwick Economic Research Papers*, 242 (1983) — M. Harrison, *Soviet Economic Planning in War and Peace, 1938-1945* (Cambridge, 1985).

[40] A. Zauberman, 'Economic Thought in the Soviet Union', *The Review of Economic Studies*, 3 (1949 - 1950), p. 199

[41] J. Miller, 'A Political Economy of Socialism in the Making', *Soviet Studies*, 4/4 (1953), pp. 424-425 — I. Deutscher, 'Dogma and Reality in Stalin's 'Economic Problems'', *Soviet Studies*, 4/4 (1953), p. 354.

[42] P.J.D. Wiles, 'Scarcity, Marxism and Gosplan', *Oxford Economic Papers*, 5/3 (1953), p. 295.

[43] 'O Kul'te Lichnosti i Yego Posledstviyakh. Doklad Pervogo sekretariya Tsk KPSS tov. Khrushcheva N.S. XX s"yezdomu Kommunisticheskoy Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza, 25 fevralya 1956', *Izvestiya Tsk KPSS*, 3 (1989), p. 152-153 — *Pravda*, October 28, 1961, p. 3.

rationalist. [44] Shortly after, Wiles and M.C. Kaser argued Voznesensky might have contested Stalin's views on the law of value and pricing theory. [45]

In the same period, B.J. McFarlane researched Voznesensky's rehabilitation, [46] while in 1965 S.I. Ploss wrote of his interest for *khozraschet* and economic levers. [47] Shortly after again Kaser more clearly identified Voznesensky's pre and post-war activities as reform-linked, [48] while A. Katz stressed his key role in initiating economic change. [49] In the 1970s Voznesensky was also markedly characterised as a radical reformer by Western Stalinists, who however denounced him as a perpetrator of the Soviet "restoration of capitalism". [50]

In 1979 it was instead S.F. Cohen who included Voznesensky in his "friends and foes of change" theory, viewing him and Kirov as the main forces behind two supposed failed attempts at reform between the NEP and Khrushchev eras. [51]

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[44] R. Conquest, *Power and Policy in the USSR* (London, 1961), pp. 108, 110-111 — Schulman, *Stalin's Foreign Policy Reappraised*, pp. 44-46.

[45] P.J.D. Wiles, *The Political Economy of Communism* (Oxford, 1964), pp. 104-106, 119 — J.L. Felker, *Soviet Economic Controversies. The Emerging Marketing Concept and Changes in Planning, 1960-1965* (Cambridge MA, London, 1966), p. 39 — M.C. Kaser, *Comecon. Integration problems of the planned economies* (London, New York, 1967), pp. 21-23, 32-35 — M.C. Kaser, 'The Debate on the Law of Value in the USSR, 1941-53', in V. Barnett, J. Zweynert (eds), *Economics in Russia: Studies in Intellectual History* (Aldershot, Burlington, 2008), p. 141.

[46] B.J. McFarlane, 'The Soviet rehabilitation of N. A.Voznesensky—economist and planner', *Australian Outlook*, 18/2 (1964).

[47] S.I. Ploss, *Conflict and Decision-Making in Soviet Russia. A Case Study of Agricultural Policy, 1953-1963* (Princeton, 1965), pp. 28, 43-44.

[48] M.C. Kaser, *Soviet Economics* (London, 1970), pp. 114,120.

[49] A. Katz, *The politics of economic reform in the Soviet Union* (New York, 1972), p. 26.

[50] British and Irish Communist Organisation, *Marxism and "Market Socialism". On Stalin's "Economic Problems" Part Two* (Belfast, 1971), pp. 69-70 — M. Nicolaus, *Restoration fo Capitalism in the USSR* (Chicago, 1975), pp. 55-56 — W.B. Bland, *The Restoration of Capitalism in the Soviet Union* (Self-Published, 1980), pp. 332-356.

[51] S.F. Cohen, 'The Friends and Foes of Change. Reformism and Conservatism in the Soviet Union', *Slavic Review*, 38/2 (1979), p. 196

In the following years, as Western scholars sought traces of factional struggles challenging Stalin in the late 1940s, Voznesensky was characterised as a leader of the "insurrectionist" or "leftist" Zhdanov group. [52] If this latter scholarship ignored Voznesensky's rationalising mindset, Hahn's study of post-war "moderation" contained much reflections on the Gosplan Chairman's rationalism, while blaming his downfall on political intrigue. [53] The following year, M. Harrison produced first a detailed paper on him which he later integrated into his seminal 1985 study of the Soviet war-time economy. He described Voznesensky's pre-war policies as clearly aimed at rationalising the planned economy, adding that the Gosplan Chairman "stood for moderation" during the hostilities, [54] while in the post-war period he furthered his rationalising mindset. [55]

Voznesensky was instead characterised as a political reformer by Roy and Zhores Medvedev who, starting with the former's *Let History Judge*, [56] commended his erudition, [57] compared him to Bukharin, [58] arguing that he would have undoubtedly "aimed for reform" after Stalin's death, and even lamented how Kosygin missed the opportunity to become "a new Voznesensky". [59]

After Roy and Zhores Medvedev's interpretation was carried into the new millennium by A.V. Pizhikov, [60] Voznesensky has been openly praised in Russia for his role as "strategist of the

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[52] McCagg, *Stalin embattled,* pp. 249-254, 304-305 — Raanan, *International Policy Formation in the USSR*, p. 8, 52-53.

[53] Hahn, *Post-war Soviet Politics*, pp. 30, 40-41, 122-134

[54] Harrison, 'N.A. Voznesensky. A Soviet Commander of the Economic Front', pp. 23, 36.

[55] Harrison, *Soviet Economic Planning in War and Peace*, pp. 234-235.

[56] R.A. Medvedev, *Let History Judge. The Origins and Consequences of Stalinism* (Oxford, 1989), pp. 783-785.

[57] R.A. Medvedev and Z.A. Medvedev, *Khrushchev. The Years in Power* (New York, 1976), pp. 17-18.

[58] Z.A. Medvedev, *Gorbachev* (Oxford, 1987), p. 61

[59] R.A. Medvedev, Z.A. Medvedev, *Neizvestny Stalin* (Moscow, 2007), pp. 68-71

[60] A.V. Pyzhikov, 'Leningradskaya Gruppa. Put' vo Vlast'' (1946-1949)', *Svobodnaya mysl'*, 21/3 (2001).

economic victory" during the Second World War, [61] whilst in the scholarly community he has simultaneously been characterised as a skilful, [62] rationalising-oriented Gosplan Chairman, [63] but also as a "typical administrator of the Stalinist type", [64] with a distinctively bad temper. [65]

The present research adopts in the main, and expands on, the general interpretation of Voznesensky given by Harrison in the 1980s, namely that of a rationalising economic administrator, and wishes to further develop the understanding of both Voznesensky himself and of his role in the Stalinist system.

Owing to scholarship that debunked the myths of "moderate" factions motivated by fundamental programmatic differences with Stalin, [66] first and foremost the supposed 1934 Kirov-Orzhonikidze group, this interpretation of Voznesensky has been refused. [67]

The politics of Stalinism has instead been understood as articulated in a more extreme variant as well as in a "softer" one, a more moderate variation of the same genus which Khlevnyuk

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[61] N.K. Baybakov, 'Iz vospominaniy o N.A. Voznesenskom', *Voprosy ekonomiki*, 11 (2003), pp. 141-145 — L. Volodarskiy, 'Ya pomnyu Voznesenskogo', *Voprosy ekonomiki*, 11 (2003), pp. 145-146 — *Voznesensky Nikolai Alekseevich*.

[62] M. Harrison, 'N.A. Voznesensky', in *The Encyclopedia of Russian History* (4 vols, New York, 2003), iv, p. 1652. — E.A. Rees, 'Stalin as Leader, 1937–1953. From Dictator to Despot', pp. 222-223 — P.R. Gregory, M. Harrison, 'Allocation under Dictatorship. Research in Stalin's Archives', *Journal of Economic Literature*, 43 (2005), p. 782 — E. Belova, P.R. Gregory, 'Dictator, loyal, and opportunistic agents. The Soviet archives on creating the Soviet economic system', *Public Choice*, 113 (2002), p. 280.

[63] M.C. Kaser, 'Nikolai Alekseevich Voznesensky', in J. Eatwell, M. Milgate, P. Newman (eds), *Problems of the Planned Economy* (London, New York, 1990), p. 263 — P. Sutela, *Economic Thought and Economic Reform in the Soviet Union* (1991), pp. 14, 16

[64] O.V. Khlevnyuk, 'Sovetskaya ekonomicheskaya politika na rubezhe 1940-1950-kh gg. i «delo Gosplana»', *Otechestvennaya istoriya*, 3 (2001), pp. 81-83 — Harrison, 'The Soviet Union after 1945', p. 110.

[65] O.V. Khlevnyuk, *Khozyain. Stalin i utverzhdeniye stalinskoy diktatury* (Moscow, 2010), pp. 425-426

[66] Harrison, 'N.A. Voznesensky', p. 1652.

[67] J.A. Getty, *Origins of the Great Purges. The Soviet Communist Party reconsidered, 1933-1938* (Cambridge, 1987), pp. 207-220 — J.A. Getty, O.V. Naumov, *The Road to Terror. Stalin and the Self-Destruction of the Bolsheviks, 1932-1939* (New Haven, London, 1999), p. 102 — M.E. Lenoe, M. Prozumenshchikov, *The Kirov Murder and Soviet History* (New Haven, London, 2010), pp. 672-676 — O.V. Khlevnyuk, 'Sovetskaya ekonomicheskaya politika', pp. 81-83.

called precisely “soft Stalinism”. [68] Similarly, in the realm of economics the research recognises two main “ideological variants” of the standard planning mindset, “voluntarism” and “rationalism”, which respectively regarded plan targets as the bare minimum or as directives to be set realistically, strictly followed and implemented by professionals to prevent imbalances and enhance efficiency. [69]

Rationalism inspired figures as different as G.K. Ordzhonikidze, who attempted to curtail the powers of the secret police and actively tried to protect economic managers, [70] and G.M. Malenkov, who took active part in the Great Terror as well as of course in the Leningrad Affair. [71] It was during said affair that Voznesensky, who Hahn and J.E. Duskin believed was “the man who came closest to filling Ordzhonikidze’s shoes”, was killed. This proves how rationalising-oriented Soviet leaders were not natural allies, nor necessarily inclined towards political moderation. [72]

As for the actual 1940s-1960s reforming continuity framework, its conceptualisation has been aided by reflections on several scholarly debates. The first broad set of debates concerns the issue of whether Soviet history is to be considered a unique period predominantly marked by continuity or a sequence of different phases, mostly characterised by discontinuity.

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[68] O.V. Khlevnyuk, *Master of the House. Stalin and his inner circle* (New Haven, London, 2009), p. 126.

[69] Duskin, *Stalinist reconstruction and the confirmation of a new elite, 1945-1953*, pp. 8-10.

[70] O.V. Khlevnyuk, *In Stalin’s shadow. The Career of “Sergo” Ordzhonikidze* (Armonk, London, 1995), pp. 175-176 — J. Harris, *The Great Fear. Stalin’s Terror of the 1930s* (Oxford, 2017), p. 103 — O.V. Khlevnyuk, *Politburo. Mekhanizmy politicheskoy vlasti v 1930-ye gody* (Moscow, 1996), p. 174 — R.W. Davies, S.G. Wheatcroft, O.V. Khlevnyuk, *The Years of Progress. The Soviet Economy, 1934-1936* (London, 2014), p. 305.

[71] Getty, *Origins of the Great Purges*, pp. 173, 200-201 — V.Z. Rogovin (trans F.S. Choate), *Stalin’s Terror of 1937-1938. Political Genocide in the USSR* (Oak Park, 2009), pp. 163-166.

[72] Hahn, *Post-war Soviet Politics*, p. 152 — Duskin, *Stalinist reconstruction and the confirmation of a new elite, 1945-1953*, pp. 8-10.

In this respect, the research has been influenced by the flexibility originally lent to totalitarianism by H. Arendt, [73] by the early criticism of its most static and unwieldy variations, [74] by "revisionist" reflections on the alternation reforms and counter-reforms, [75] and by reinterpretations of totalitarianism. Such reconceptualisations presented totalitarianism as accounting for both structural continuities and change as well as for the coexistence of authoritarianism and attempts at scientific planning with factional infighting and inefficiency. [76]

In looking at Soviet economic reforms, the present study acknowledges meaningful discontinuities between Soviet historical phases, but concentrates on how, as the system's authoritarian fundamentals endured on the backdrop of partial change, there also existed a continuity in the realm of reforming economics.

A further crucial role in the development of the thesis' framework has been played by scholarly debates on the influence of the 1920s and 1930s on subsequent periods.

As stated by Cohen, NEP was initially considered little by both Soviet and Western academia, [77] as E.H. Carr declared it incompatible with planning, [78] joining I. Deutscher in regarding Trotsky

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[73] H. Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, 2d enl ed (Cleveland, New York, 1962), pp. 318-319 — H. Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, New ed (New York, 1966), p. ix-xxi.

[74] R.C. Tucker, 'The Dictator and Totalitarianism', *World Politics*, 17/4 (1965) — R.C. Tucker, 'The Politics of Soviet De-Stalinization', *World Politics*, 9/4 (1957) — R.C. Tucker, 'The Question of Totalitarianism', *Slavic Review*, 20/3 (1961) — R.C. Tucker, *The Soviet political mind. Studies in Stalinism and post-Stalin change* (London, 1963), pp. 6, 9-10.

[75] M. Lewin, *Political Undercurrents in Soviet Economic Debates. From Bukharin to the Modern Reformers* (London, 1975), pp. 123-124, 355 — Cohen, 'The Friends and Foes of Change'.

[76] F. Benvenuti, S. Pons, *Il Sistema di potere dello stalinismo: partito e Stato in Urss, 1933-1953* (Milano, 1988), p. 11 — G. Hosking, *The First Socialist Society. A History of the Soviet Union from Within*, 2nd enl. ed. (Cambridge, 1993), p. 205 — R. Service, *The Penguin History of Modern Russia. From Tsarism to the Twenty-first Century* (London, 2009), p. xxviii, xxxii-xxxiii.

[77] S.F. Cohen, 'Stalin's Revolution Reconsidered', *Slavic Review*, 32/2 (1973), p. 264.

[78] E.H. Carr, R.W. Davies, *Foundations of a Planned Economy, 1926-1929* (3 vols, London, 1978), i, pp. 278-279.

as the only credible alternative to Stalin, [79] whilst M. Dobb assigned NEP little relevance. [80] In the 1950s NEP was only sporadically mentioned, [81] but figured prominently in revisionist *avant la lettre* R.V Daniels' research on Bolshevik opposition, [82] before becoming one of revisionism's main themes in the 1970s. [83] At that point, M. Lewin sought Bukharinist traces in the 1960s, [84] while M. Ellmann focused on mathematical economics. [85] Scholars discussed further the similarities between 1920s and 1960s economics, [86] but, ever more clearly after 1991, it appeared to most that in the 1960s there had been little reference to NEP in both policy and debates. [87]

Lewin's 1973 book on Soviet economic debates remains one of the most prominent studies of the 1920s-1960s reforming continuity and the present study wishes to integrate its framework by affirming that several assumptions it postulated fit also, if not better, the 1940s-1960s continuity.

Equally influential for the development of the thesis' 1940s-1960s reforming continuity argument has been Davies' scholarship on the "bold reform proposals" set forth in the 1930s by several

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[79] E.H. Carr, 'The Legend of Bukharin', *The Times Literary Supplement*, 3785 (1974), p. 989.

[80] M. Dobb, *Soviet Economic Development Since 1917*, 3rd ed (London, 1953), pp. 203-207.

[81] L. Volin, 'The Malenkov-Khrushchev New Economic Policy', *Journal of Political Economy*, 62/3 (1954), p. 204 — N. Jasny, 'A Soviet Planner-V. G. Groman', *Russian Review*, 13/1 (1954) — L. Volin, 'Khrushchev's Economic Neo-Stalinism', *American Slavic and East European Review*, 14/4 (1955), pp. 445, 451-452.

[82] R.V. Daniels, *The Conscience of the Revolution. Communist Opposition in Soviet Russia* (Boulder and London, 1988).

[83] S.F. Cohen, 'Marxist Theory and Bolshevik Policy. The Case of Bukharin's Historical Materialism', *Political Science Quarterly*, 85/1 (1970) — S.F. Cohen, 'Bukharin, Lenin and the Theoretical Foundations of Bolshevism', *Soviet Studies*, 21/4 (1970) — M. Lewin, 'N.I. Boukharine. Ses idées sur la planification économique et leur actualité', *Cahiers du Monde russe et soviétique*, 13/4 (1972) — S.F. Cohen, *Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution. a Political Biography, 1888-1938* (London, 1973).

[84] Lewin, *Political Undercurrents in Soviet Economic Debates*, p. 53.

[85] M. Ellman, *Planning Problems in the USSR. The Contribution of Mathematical Economics to Their Solution 1960-1971* (Cambridge, 1973), pp. 1-3, 58, 188.

[86] Sutela, *Economic Thought and Economic Reform in the Soviet Union*, p. 12.

[87] R.W. Davies, 'Soviet economic reform in historical perspective', in J.K. Kovacs, M. Tardos, *Reform and Transformation in Eastern Europe. Soviet-type economics on the threshold of change* (London, 1992), p. 140.

Heavy Industry officials, headed by Ordzhonikidze. [88] Such attempts, albeit unsuccessful, proved according to Davies the existence of a "strong impetus to reform within the system, which passed on from generation to generation of Soviet officials". [89]

Finally, the research's core argument has also been crucially influenced by several authors who in the 1960s hinted at traces of said impetus in Voznesensky's policies and thinking, pointing to their similarity with Liberman's proposals, but never developed this argument. [90]

Sources

Research for the present thesis has been conducted on a large amount of primary evidence which includes first and foremost archival material as well as primary sources readers and memoirs.

The holdings of four Russian State archives have been personally consulted: State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF), the Russian State Archive of the Economy (RGAE), the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (RGASPI) and the Archive of the Russian Academy of Sciences (ARAN). At GARF research has been carried out on the Council of Ministers and Supreme Soviet *fondy*, whilst at RGAE on the Gosplan files. The Central

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[88] Davies, ''The Socialist Market', pp. 204-205, 221-223 — R.W. Davies, 'Making economic Policy', in Gregory (ed), *Behind the Facade of Stalin's Command Economy*, pp. 79-80 — Davies, 'Stalinizm i ekonomicheskiye reformy', p. 464 — Davies, Wheatcroft, Khlevnyuk, *The Years of Progress. The Soviet Economy, 1934-1936*, p. 305.

[89] Davies, 'Making economic Policy', pp. 79-80.

[90] Schulman, *Stalin's Foreign Policy Reappraised*, p. 44 — R. Conquest, *The Soviet Succession Problem* (London, 1964), p. 81 — McFarlane, 'The Soviet rehabilitation of N. Voznesensky', pp. 163-164 — R. Conquest, *Russia after Khrushchev* (London, 1965), p. 139 — Felker, *Soviet Economic Controversies*, p. 59 — J.G. Eriksen, R.Farrell, *The Development of Soviet Society. Plan and Performance* (Munich, 1970), p. 220 — Katz, *The politics of economic reform in the Soviet Union*, p. 30 — Kaser, 'The Debate on the Law of Value in the USSR', p. 141.

Committee, Zhdanov, Malenkov and Stalin *fondy* have been consulted at RGASPI, whilst at ARAN research focused on the K.V. Ostrovityanov and Institute of Economics ones.

The files consulted at GARF are in the main Council of Ministers and Supreme Soviet draft decrees, decrees, speeches and correspondence, specifically Voznesensky's one at the Council of Ministers. At RGAE several thematic files on perspective planning and pricing have been consulted as well as internal correspondence, agendas, materials and resolutions of Gosplan's meetings. Research at RGASPI has focused on Politburo resolutions and especially on the pre and post-war work on drafting a new Party Programme. The materials consulted at ARAN range instead from the 1941 meeting between economists and Stalin to conferences and internal meetings on the law of value, the balance method and perspective planning as well as memoranda and analyses of the 1965 reform.

Archival research in Moscow has provided evidence on the nature and significance of each economic concept, practice and policy analysed by the thesis and on their operationalisation through reforms as well as on the clear links between 1940s and 1960s. The archives have also provided interesting evidence on Voznesensky, his role in the leadership and his personality.

If archival material constitutes the backbone of the thesis' sources, further primary evidence has been collected through several electronic archives and primary sources readers. The online archives consulted are the "Elektronny Arkhiv Nauchno-Informatsionnogo Tsentra 'Fond Iofe'", the "Arkhiv Aleksandra N. Yakovleva", the "CIA Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room" and the "Secret Files from World Wars to Cold Wars". Primary sources readers include sixteen volumes published by the Demokratiya/Yakovlev Fond, ROSPEN and the Central Bank of the Russian Federation.

Finally, Soviet leaders' memoirs and those of several high-ranking Sovnarkom and Gosplan officials have also been relied upon and proved particularly useful to characterise Voznesensky's personality and dynamics within the top leadership.

Through the collections of the Russian State Library, the Russian State Public Historical Library, the St Antony's College RESC Library, the Oxford Bodleian Library, the Berlin State Library and the Gramsci Institute Foundation library ample use has been made of Soviet press as well as political, economic and cultural magazines and journals, including *Pravda*, *Izvestiya*, *Sotsialisticheskiy Vestnik, Bol'shevik*, *Kommunist*, *Problemi* e*konomiki*, *Voprosy* e*konomiki*, *Planovoe khozyaistvo*, *Vestnik AN SSSR, Ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, *Izvestiya Akademiya Nauk SSSR-Seriya Ekonomicheskaya, Literaturnaya gazeta*, *Novy Mir*, *Voprosy istori, Pod Znamenem Marksizma*, *Kommunisticheskiy Internatsional, Istorik-Marksist, Voprosy statistiki*.

Further sources which have played a key role in the development of the thesis' argument are the early publications of Liberman as well as the contributions of several other young economists on economic levers, *khozraschet* and material stimulation, which date back to the 1946-1949 period and are held at the Russian State Library.

Thesis structure

The thesis is organised in five chapters, each subdivided into several chronological and thematic subsections, plus the present introduction and a conclusion.

Chapter one is of an introductory nature and, relying on secondary materials as well as Lenin's writings, it covers the 1920s-1930s period. Of particular importance is the presentation of 1920s debates on perspective planning and the balance method, since both would be revived by

Voznesensky. Equally crucial is the discussion of the role and significance of economic levers during both NEP and neo-NEP as well as of their theoretical systematisation within the economics of socialism. The first chapter also briefly introduces the figure of Voznesensky.

The second chapter opens with Voznesensky's promotion as Gosplan Chairman in 1938 and covers the pre-war and war periods. Relying on GARF, RGAE and RGASPI materials, the chapter sets the first terms of the 1940s-1960s reforming continuity by discussing the pre-war attempt at drawing up a General Plan and at drafting a new Party Programme, as well as the revived debates on the balance method and the introduction of new bodies at Gosplan. The chapter characterises Voznesensky as a rationaliser and further analyses his role during the war-time economic effort as well as the conceptualisation of a new truth on the operation of the law of value in 1941-1943.

The third chapter focuses on the 1945-1949 years and represents the core of the thesis, revolving around Voznesensky's economic thought and policy, the debates they stimulated as well as his downfall and its significance in relation to economics. Heavily relying on primary material from all four archives consulted, the chapter expands on to previously available knowledge on the post-war General Plan, on the revision of the Party Programme, the price reform and on the Gosplan Affair. The chapter also presents the embryonic debates on economic levers, *khozraschet* and material stimulation, which would inspire the 1950s-1960s reforms. In doing so, the chapter links up with the previous one and comprehensively presents those policies, ideas and proposals that constitute the core element of the 1940s-1960s reforming continuity and whose revival in the post-Stalinist era is the subject of the following chapters.

The fourth chapter covers the post-Stalinist era until Khrushchev's downfall. Relying on RGAE, RGASPI and ARAN materials, it discusses the broadening of debates on blueprints set in

1946-1949 and the first operationalisations of economic levers as well as the revival of General Plan drafting and Party Programme revision. Primary evidence included in the fourth chapter proves that the 1947 Programme draft provided clear inspiration for its eventual revision in 1961 and that comprehensive 1965-like reform programmes were presented as early as in the late 1950s. The chapter further analyses the political and economic rationale behind Voznesensky's official rehabilitation in the late 1950s-early 1960s.

The fifth chapter focuses on the 1965 reform and covers the implementation and eventual curtailment of its measures. Relying on materials collected at all four Moscow archives, the chapter concludes the thesis' reflections on the 1940s-1960s reforming continuity by presenting how reflections developed in the late 1940s came to be reflected in mid-1960s reforms. The chapter further discusses the conflicting way in which the figure of Voznesensky was remembered in those years and closes with the metaphorical stepping of Soviet reforms onto the "treadmill". [91]

[91] G.E. Schroeder, 'The Soviet Economy on a Treadmill of "reforms"', in (ed), *Soviet Economy In a Time of Change. A Compendium of Papers Submitted to the Joint Economic Committee. Congress of the United States. Volume 1. October 10, 1979* (Washington, 1979), pp. 312-340.

Chapter 1. — NEP and the Great Break, 1920s-1930s

The first chapter presents the first twenty years of Bolshevik power, focusing on 1920s economic policies and concepts (*khozraschet*, the balance method, perspective planning, reliance on economic levers) and on their partial revival in the early/mid-1930s. The chapter includes four chronological subsections devoted to NEP, Great Break (*Velikiy Perelom*), neo-NEP and Great Terror. Two additional thematic subsections address economic debates and the results of the first two Five-Year Plans.

1.1. — Civil War and NEP

Four days after the Bolsheviks took over the Winter Palace, A. Gramsci had already recognised that the revolution unfolding in Russia was "the revolution against Karl Marx's *Capital*", since "*Capital* of Marx was in Russia the book of the bourgeoisie more than of the proletariat". [92]

Recent research on the late Imperial Russian economy has falsified the assumption that on top of endemic backwardness no viable path to modernisation existed for the Empire, [93] but Marx's

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[92] *Avanti!*, 11 November 1917, p. 1.

[93] P.R. Gregory, *Russian National Income, 1885-1913* (Cambridge, 1983) — P.R. Gregory, *Before Command: An Economic History of Russia from Emancipation to the First Five-Year* (Princeton, 1994) — A. Markevich, M. Harrison, 'Great War, Civil War, and Recovery. Russia's National Income, 1913 to 1928', *The Journal of Economic History*, 71/3 (Sept. 2011), pp. 672-703 — A. Cheremukhin et. al., *Was Stalin necessary for Russia's economic development?* (London, 2013), pp. 34-39 — A. Markevich, Economic Development of the Late Russian Empire in a Regional Perspective (25 December 2014), https://ssrn.-com/abstract=2555273 (16 September 2017).

key precondition for a socialist revolution, i.e. that capitalist relations of production hinder the growth of productive forces, remains far from having been satisfied in 1917 Russia.

Notwithstanding *Capital*'s teaching, Lenin's militant and unorthodox revolutionary spirit brought the Bolsheviks from wait-and-see to power in a matter of months. And yet, as Engels wrote, "the worst thing that can befall a leader of an extreme party is to be compelled to take over a government in an epoch when the movement is not yet ripe for the domination of the class which he represents and for the realisation of the measures which that domination would imply". [94]

By mid-1918 the Bolsheviks had established the authoritarian pillars of the Soviet system. [95] The newly founded state should have guided Marx's "period of the revolutionary transformation" and "wither away" under socialism, [96] when a central administration would only manage the "superintendence of production". [97] On the economic front the Bolsheviks also launched a campaign of nationalisations and land distribution, [98] which however quickly gave way to an "uneasy truce" with capitalists. [99] A further retreat to "state capitalism" was soon called, [100] reviving what had been the "revolutionary-democratic" demands Lenin made to the Provisional Government in 1917. [101]

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[94] F. Engels, *The Peasant War in Germany* (Moscow, 1956), p. 138.

[95] T.H. Rigby, *Lenin's Government. Sovnarkom 1917-1922* (Cambridge, 1979) pp. 182-184.

[96] K. Marx, 'Critique of the Gotha Programme', in *Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. Selected Works, Volume Three*, (Moscow, 1970), p. 26 — V.I. Lenin, 'The State and Revolution', in V.I. Lenin, *Collected Works* (45 vols, Moscow and London, 1960-1970), xxv, pp. 401-402.

[97] K. Marx, F. Engels, *Manifesto of the Communist Party* (Moscow, 1954), p. 98

[98] Nove, *An Economic History of the USSR*, p. 39.

[99] P.R. Gregory, *Before Command*, p. 85.

[100] R.W. Davies, *Soviet Economic Development from Lenin to Khrushchev* (New York, 1998), p. 18.

[101] V.I. Lenin, 'The Impending Catastrophe and How to Combat It', in Lenin, *Collected Works*, xv, pp. 332-333.

Industry was nationalised, [102] while agricultural production and supply were to be organised along voluntary and cooperative lines, [103] as Lenin called for a "tax in kind, in grain, on the rich peasants", [104] who were to be "taxed equitably [but] heavily". [105]

However, as Bolshevik-controlled territories shrank to the size of the old *Rus'*, a mixture of necessity, ideological fervour and optimism ushered War Communism. [106] Enthusiasm amongst many Bolsheviks ran high, as Kritsman spoke of "the first great experiment at natural proletarian economy", [107] Bukharin wished for the "immediate attainment of the planned economy", [108] while N.A. Kovalevsky thought he was witnessing how "money circulation gradually dies away, supplanted by natural exchange […] by the direct allocation of products". [109]

The brutal wars the Bolsheviks fought against a myriad of internal and external enemies in 1918-1921 saw several times Soviet Russia on the brink of destruction, while practical experiments at socialist economics failed. [110] As Trotsky would later comment, "the collapse of the productive forces surpassed anything of the kind that history had ever seen". [111]

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[102] Daniels, *The Conscience of the Revolution*, p. 92.

[103] V.M. Andreev, *Rossiyskoe Krest'yanstvo. Navstrechu Sud'be 1917-1920* (Moscow, 1997), pp. 45-49 — S. Malle, *The Economic Organization of War Communism, 1918-1921* (Cambridge, 1985), pp. 372-373.

[104] V.I. Lenin, 'Theses on the Food Question', in Lenin, *Collected Works*, xxviii, p. 46.

[105] V.I. Lenin, 'Re the Decree on the Imposition of a Tax in Kind on Farmers', in Lenin, *Collected Works*, xxxxii, p. 108.

[106] M. Heller, A. Nekrich, *Utopia in Power. The history of the Soviet Union from 1917 to the present* (London, 1986), pp. 50-110 — P. Boettke, 'The Political Economy of Utopia. Communism in Soviet Russia, 1918-1921', *Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines*, 1/2 (1990).

[107] L. Kritsman, *Geroicheskiy period velikoy russkoy revolyutsii*, 2nd ed (Moscow, 1926), p. 75.

[108] N.I. Bukharin, 'O novoy ekonomicheskoy politike i nashikh zadachakh', in Bukharin, *Izbrannye Proizvedeniya*, p. 128.

[109] Kovalevsky, 'Devyat' let', pp. 20-21.

[110] A. Salomoni, '"War Communism'. A Reassessment', in S. Pons, A. Romano (eds), *Russia in the age of wars* (Milano, 2000), pp. 53-56 — L. Szamuely, *First models of the socialist economic systems. Principles and theories* (Budapest, 1974), pp. 7-9.

[111] L. Trotsky, *The Revolution Betrayed* (Mineola, NY, 2004), 18.

A wave of peasant revolts, strikes and uprisings hit the RSFSR. [112] Therefore, Lenin opened the 10th Party Congress in March 1921 stating that "in respect to the economic plan […] we have made quite a few mistakes". [113] Lenin stated that since Bolsheviks overdid nationalisation and clamped down excessively on peasant trade, [114] which "intensified the crisis", they now had to "retreat". [115]

If at the 10th Congress Lenin stated that "it will take generations to remould the small farmer, and recast his mentality and habits", [116] he also initially tried to present the reintroduction of the tax in kind and of State as well as co-operative trade as a "breathing space". [117]

Yet, if heavy industry, the banking system and foreign trade remained under strict State control, already in May 1921 nationalisation of small-scale industries was revoked, while in the following months small-scale private entrepreneurship and leasing of State-owned enterprises were legalised, while wages were again paid in cash and the transfer of factories to *khozraschet* started. [118]

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[112] P. Avrich, *Kronstadt 1921* (Princeton, 1970), pp. 220-228.

[113] V.I. Lenin, 'Tenth Congress of the RCP(b). Speech at the Opening of the Congress', in V.I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, xxxii, p. 168.

[114] V.I. Lenin, 'Report on the Substitution of a Tax in Kind for the Surplus Grain Appropriation System', in Lenin, *Collected Works*, xxxiii, p. 219.

[115] V.I. Lenin, 'Tenth Congress of the RCP(b). Report on the Political Work of the Central Committee of the RCP(b)', in V.I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, xxxii, pp. 172-173.

[116] Lenin, *Report on the Substitution*, p. 217.

[117] Ibid., p. 214, 224.

[118] N.Ya. Petrakov et. al., *NEP i khozraschet* (Moscow, 1991), p. 6.

In October 1921 Lenin openly admitted that “the private market proved too strong for us”, [119] now speaking of the “need for a ‘reformist’, gradual, cautious and round-about approach to the solution of the fundamental problems of economic development”. [120]

It was in this atmosphere of retreat however that the foundations of planning were laid, as in December the Electrification Plan set forth by GOELRO (State Commission for the Electrification of Russia) was approved by Sovnarkom. [121] This plan, the first attempt to “proceed with more systematic economic construction, to scientifically develop and consistently implement a state plan for the entire national economy”, [122] albeit inspired by non-Bolshevik and non-socialist proposals, [123] the did represent a key confirmation of the Bolshevik’s Marxist creed.

The NEP retreat, officially called off at the 11th Congress of March 1922, [124] actually intensified a year later at the 12th Congress. Indeed, every peasant was allowed “to dispose freely of the product of his labour”, monetary payments were reintroduced and it was officially stated that industrialisation would be “closely dependent on the development of agriculture”. [125] At this point Lenin spoke of NEP as having achieved “degree of combination” between private and State interests, envisioning it to last for “one or two decades”. [126] The “mere growth of cooperation”,

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[119] V.I. Lenin, ‘Report on the New Economic Policy’, in Lenin, *Collected Works*, xxxiii, pp. 95-96.

[120] V.I. Lenin, ‘The Importance of Gold now and after the complete Victory of Socialism’, in Lenin, *Collected Works*, xxxiii, p 109.

[121] V.L. Gvozdetskiy, “Plan GOELRO — strategicheskaya programma sotsial'no-ekonomicheskogo i nauchno-tekhnicheskogo razvitiya sovetskogo gosudarstva (k 80-letiyu so dnya prinyatiya plana GOELRO)” in Federal'ny spravochnik. Toplivno-energeticheskiy kompleks Rossii (Moscow, 2010), xi, pp. 363-380.

[122] Nauchno-Tekhnicheskiy Otdel VSNKh, *Plan Elektrifikatsii RSFSR. Vvedeniye k dokladu 8-mu s"yezdu Sovetom* (Moscow, 1920), p. 7.

[123] Smolinski, ‘Planning Without Theory, 1917-1967’, pp. 109-110 — L. Smolinski, ‘Soviet Planning. How it Really Began’, *Survey*, 67 (1968), pp. 100-115.

[124] RKP(b), *Protokoly Odinnadtsatogo s”yezda RKP(v)* (Moscow, 1936), p. 553.

[125] RKP(b), *Dvenadtsatyy s"yezd RKP(v). Stenograficheskiy otchet* (Moscow, 1968), pp. 688, 811.

[126] V.I. Lenin, ‘On Cooperation’, in Lenin, *Collected Works*, xxxiii, p 470.

stated the man who regarded it as essentially "petty-bourgeois" only two years earlier, [127] "is identical with the growth of socialism". [128]

Yet, in 1923 the economy was hit by the "scissors crisis", when low foodstuff prices, falling peasant income and high producer goods prices caused a near-retreat of the peasants from the market. [129] However, these latter ones were appeased and NEP also survived Lenin's death and Trotsky's opposition. [130] The following year, as the rouble was strengthened and the USSR re-entered the world market thanks to the gold-backed *chervonets*, the agricultural tax became a monetary one. [131]

At that point, while the so called "1920s debate" ensued with Preobrazhensky's argument for "primitive socialist accumulation", [132] former Left communist Bukharin became the most open supporter of NEP. [133]

A disillusioned Left Communist, [134] Bukharin fully endorsed Lenin's gradualism, [135] proposing a combination of social and economic equilibrium. [136] Bukharin believed that "we shall reach

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[127] V.I. Lenin, 'The Tax in Kind. Tax in Kind, Freedom to Trade and Concessions', in Lenin, *Collected Works*, xxxii, p. 347.

[128] V.I. Lenin, 'On Cooperation', in Lenin, *Collected Works*, xxxiii, p 474.

[129] R.W. Davies, *The Socialist Offensive. The Collectivisation of Soviet Agriculture, 1929-1930* (London, 1980), pp. 28-29.

[130] Daniels, *The Conscience of the Revolution*, pp. 174-175.

[131] MoskKom RKP(b), *Denezhnaya reforma. Sbornik* (Moscow, 1924).

[132] Preobrazhenskiy, 'Osnovnoy zakon sotsialisticheskogo nakopleniya', pp. 90-95.

[133] A. Erlich, *The Soviet Industrialization Debate. 1924-1928* (Cambridge MS, 1967), pp. 24-59.

[134] R. Schlesinger, 'A Note on Bukharin's Ideas', *Soviet Studies*, 11/4 (1960).

[135] S.F. Cohen, 'Bucharin e il bucharinismo', in S. Bertolissi (ed), *Bucharin. Tra Rivoluzione e Riforme* (Roma, 1982), p. 26 — F. Benvenuti, 'Bucharin nella storia sovietica degli anni '20', in Bertolissi (ed), *Bucharin. Tra Rivoluzione e Riforme*, p. 30 — S. Pons, 'Bukharin's political thought in the late 1920s', in T. Bergmann, G. Schaefer, M. Selden (eds), Mark *Bukharin in Retrospect* (Armonk, 1994), p. 196.

[136] J. Salter, 'On the Interpretation of Bukharin's Economic Ideas', *Soviet Studies* 44/4 (1992), p. 570.

socialism […] through the process of circulation, not directly through the process of production, we shall reach it through cooperation". [137] Therefore since, as he stated, "we are approaching socialism precisely through market relations", [138] Bukharin also affirmed that in this transition "market relations, money, the stock exchange, banks etc. play a very great role". [139] Bukharin envisioned "growing into socialism": [140] advancing at "a snail's pace", [141] relying on "completely voluntary cooperation", [142] while rising peasants' demand would stimulate the development of consumer goods' industries, which would only later lead to heavy industrial growth. [143]

Bukharin's social equilibrium was instead embodied in the "worker-peasant alliance", which he defined as the reason "why we […] won", [144] as well as the founding element of the new "party of civil peace" which would operate under conditions of softening class struggle. [145]

However, Bukharin linked reliance on economic levers inherited from capitalism to a pre-socialist time, believing that "through market relations, through competition, state enterprises and cooperation will drive out their competitor, that is, private capital". Later, he further argued, "market relations will destroy themselves" and socialism will be characterised by "state-cooperative distribution of products". [146]

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[137] N.I. Bukharin, 'Novoe otkrovenie o sovetskoy ekonomike ili kak mozhno pogubit' raboche-krest'yanskiy blok', in Bukharin, *Izbrannye Proizvedeniya*, p. 94.

[138] Bukharin, 'Put' k sotsializmu', p. 196.

[139] N.I. Bukharin, 'O novoy ekonomicheskoy politike', p. 128.

[140] Komintern, *Protokoll des vierten Kongresses der Kommunistischen Internationale. Petrograd-Moskau vom 5. November bis 5. Dezember 1922* (Hamburg, 1923), pp. 415-416.

[141] VKP(b), *XIV s"yezd Vsesoyuznoy Kommunisticheskoy Partii(b). Stenograficheskiy otchet* (Moscow, 1926), p. 135.

[142] Bukharin, 'Put' k sotsializmu', p. 223.

[143] Daniels, *The Conscience of the Revolution*, p. 357.

[144] Bukharin, 'Put' k sotsializmu', p. 153.

[145] Ibid., p. 186.

[146] Bukharin, 'Put' k sotsializmu', p. 197.

A similar view in regards to the law of value issue was also dominant in Soviet economics at that time. Preobrazhensky postulated that in the transition period the “law of primitive socialist accumulation” operated in the State sector while the “law of value” in the private one. Bukharin counterposed his theory that a “law of proportional labour expenditures” would develop from, not act simultaneously with the “law of value”. [147] Yet, both Bolshevik economists believed that the law of value would have no space under socialism. [148]

As debates ensued, in 1925 land leasing and labour hiring were reintroduced and the agricultural tax reduced. [149] A bewildered Trotsky would later comment that a “profound defeat and retreat […] was presented as a victorious step of the *smychka*”, [150] while Menshevik émigrés believed Bolsheviks were “strengthening of capitalist economy in Russia” with a “neo-NEP”. [151] Zinoviev and Kamenev instead went into opposition, while Stalin remained faithful to NEP, fully endorsing the “new course in the countryside” and the “elimination of the remnants of war communism”. [152]

Simultaneously however, metals production was increased by 26%, [153] while a resolution on industry was accused by Trotsky of blatantly plagiarising Leftist positions. [154] This strife between the maintenance of NEP and the drive to industrialise was manifested by a goods shortage caused by increased demand, while the threat of a peasant retreat from the market forced the

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[147] *Pravda*, 3 July 1926, p. 2 — Cohen, *Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution*, p. 249.

[148] Nove, *Political Economy and Soviet Socialism*, p. 97.

[149] RKP(b), *Chetyrdnadtsataya Konferentsiya Rossiyskoy Kommunisticheskoy Partii (Bol'shevikov). Stenograficheskiy Otchet* (Moscow, 1925), pp. 301-304.

[150] L. Trotsky, *The Third International after Lenin* (New York, 2002), p. 276.

[151] *Sotsialisticheskiy Vestnik*, 29 May 1925, p. 1.

[152] J.V. Stalin, ‘Political Report of the Central Committee, December 18’, in J.V. Stalin, *Works*, vii, p. 331.

[153] RKP(b), *Chetyrdnadtsataya Konferentsiya*, pp. 304-305.

[154] Trotsky, *The Third International*, p. 278.

Party to raise grain prices again. [155] At this point, the Mensheviks ironically affirmed that "the ruling party of the 'Soviet Socialist Federative Republic' is arguing about - who would have thought? - whether there is socialism in our 'socialist' republic, or whether it is dominated by capitalism". [156]

By early 1926 agricultural recovery was finally achieved, [157] but the gap between Soviet and Western growth rates was just as wide as it had been in 1913. [158] Therefore, the April 1926 CC Plenum and the October 15th Conference starkly increased capital investment for heavy industry. [159] The following year the United Opposition of Zinoviev, Kamenev and Trotsky was definitively crushed and, as 98,3% of agriculture still laid in private hands, [160] vague strategies for industrialisation and collectivisation were approved. [161]

Again in 1927, several decrees legally sanctioned a degree of autonomy for enterprises comprised in trusts, within the limits and norms set by their industrial financial plan, fully transferring them to *khozraschet*. Yet, reduction of the cost of production remained the core criterion for efficiency, with no mention of profitability or of the role played by markets. What is more, albeit legally approved these new set of regulations were never fully implemented. [162]

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[155] Davies, *The Socialist Offensive*, p. 30.

[156] *Sotsialisticheskiy Vestnik*, 21 December 1925, p. 1.

[157] S.G. Wheatcroft, 'Agriculture', in R.W. Davies (ed), *From Tsarism to the New Economic Policy. Continuity and Change in the Economy of the USSR* (London, 1990), p. 103.

[158] P. Gatrell, R.W. Davies, 'The Industrial Economy', in Davies (ed), *From Tsarism to the New Economic Policy*, p. 158.

[159] C.M. Davis, 'Russia. A Comparative Economic Systems Interpretation', in J. Foreman-Peck, G. Federico (eds), *European Industrial Policy. The Twentieth Century Experience* (Oxford, 1999), p, 335.

[160] Nove, *An Economic History of the USSR*, pp. 98-101.

[161] R.W. Davies, *The Soviet Economy in Turmoil, 1929-1930* (Cambridge MA, 1989), pp. 46-48.

[162] N.Ya. Petrakov et. al., *NEP i khozraschet*, p. 26.

As Bukharin himself more openly accepted the necessity of “pumping over” resources from the peasantry, which in fact he had already endorsed in 1924, [163] the perfect storm that would cause NEP’s downfall materialised when in 1927-1928 the so called “procurement crisis” was coupled by a sudden “war scare”. [164] The peasants retreated from the State market, as private traders were offering higher buying prices for grain, [165] in a condition of excess demand for industrial goods, [166] rising inflation and unemployment. [167] Stalin denounced a kulak boycott of grain sales to the State and launched a procurement campaign in the Urals and Siberia. [168] This return to forcible requisitioning, [169] aimed a forcibly imposing low State prices, [170] shocked Bukharin who now spoke of a resurgent “Trostkyist danger”. [171]

Pravda presented the new line on 15 February 1928, proclaiming the need for rapid industrialisation, [172] while Trotsky, once again, denounced how this was “an almost literal reproduction” of the Left’s 1927 platform. [173]

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[163] L. Foa (ed), *L’accumulazione Socialista* (Milano, 1969), p. 84, 187, 305-310.

[164] J. Hughes, *Stalin, Siberia and the Crisis of the New Economic Policy* (Cambridge, 2003), p. 209 — N.S Simonov, ‘The ‘war scare’ of 1927 and the birth of the defence-industry complex’, in J. Barber, M. Harrison (eds), *The Soviet Defence-Industry Complex from Stalin to Khrushchev* (Basingstoke, 2000), pp. 35-38.

[165] Davies, *The Socialist Offensive* — Gregory, *The Political Economy of Stalinism*, 34.

[166] M. Harrison, ‘Prices in the Politburo, 1927. Market Equilibrium versus the Use of Force’, in P.R. Gregory, N.M. Naimark (eds), *Lost Politburo Transcripts. From collective rule to Stalin's dictatorship* (New Haven, London, 2008), pp. 227-228.

[167] P.R. Gregory, R.C. Stuart, *Russian and Soviet Economic Performance and Structur*e, 7th ed (Boston, London, 2001), pp. 48-49.

[168] Hughes, *Stalin, Siberia and the Crisis of the New Economic Policy*.

[169] M. Harrison, ‘Soviet Agriculture and Industrialisation’, in J.A. Davis, P. Mathias (eds), *Agriculture and Industrialization. From the Eighteenth Century to the Present Day* (Oxford, 1996), pp. 195-196.

[170] Gregory, *The Political Economy of Stalinism*, pp. 36-40.

[171] Daniels, *The Conscience of the Revolution*, p. 328.

[172] *Pravda*, 15 February 1928, p. 1.

[173] Trotsky, *The Third International*, p. 282.

At this point, the Party majority broke again, as the moderates now fully constituted a Rightist fraction, and Bukharin published his anti-Stalinist manifesto *Notes of an Economist*, renewing his call for equilibrium, balance and worker-peasant alliance speaking of plans as "consciously drawn-up" and "at the same time a prediction (prognosis) and a directive". [174]

Yet, Bukharin's nominally broad front collapsed within months and, as his Italian estimator Tasca noted in his diary, Bukharin "[bore] a great responsibility for his defeat". [175] Attempts at a Right-Left alliance failed, [176] Rightists refused to radicalise the struggle and, suffering from a hint of defeatism, [177] they quickly succumbed to what Wheatcroft defined "team Stalin", which as of late 1928 had secured undisputed dominance over Party and country. [178]

A Rightist political victory, seen by several scholars as a concrete possibility, [179] is disputed by others who instead point to the lack of concrete alternative moderate plans, [180] to the Stalin-Bukharin alliance, [181] to Bukharin's own inconsistency, [182] itself a disputed element. [183] The

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[174] N.I. Bukharin, 'Zametki Ekonomista', in Bukharin, *Izbrannye Proizvedeniya*, p. 396.

[175] Tasca, 895.

[176] Cohen, *Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution*, p. 31.

[177] W. Reswick, *I dreamt Revolution* (Chicago, 1952), p. 254.

[178] S.G. Wheatcroft, 'From Team-Stalin to Degenerate Tyranny', in E.A. Rees (ed), *The Nature of Stalin's Dictatorship. The Politburo, 1928-1953*, p. 79.

[179] Cohen, *Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution* — Lewin, *Political Undercurrents in Soviet Economic Debates* — V.P. Danilov, S.A. Krasil'nikov (eds), *Bukharin N.I. Put' k sotsializmu. Izbrannye proizvedeniya* (Moscow, 1990) — V.V. Zhuravlev (ed), *Bukharin. Chelovek, politik, uchenyy* (Moscow, 1990).

[180] A. Nove, 'Bukharin as an economist', in A. Kemp-Welch (ed), *The Ideas of Nikolai Bukharin* (Oxford, 1992), p. 38 — M. Haynes, *Nikolai Bukharin & the Transformation from Capitalism to Socialism* (London, 1985), p. 115.

[181] Haynes, *Nikolai Bukharin & the Transformation from Capitalism to Socialism*, p. 118 — S. Pons, 'Bukharin's political thought in the late 1920s', p. 196.

[182] Cohen, *Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution*, pp. 212-215, 277 — Lewin, *Political Undercurrents in Soviet Economic Debates*, 49.

[183] Salter, 'On the Interpretation of Bukharin's Economic Ideas', p. 576 — D. Gluckstein, *The Tragedy of Bukharin* (London, 1994), pp. 235-244.

perception of mounting international threats also penalised Rightist positions , [184] which Gregory claimed were in general “out of line” with the Bolsheviks’ “core values”: stronger and more centralised planning and one-Party state. [185] We are also left to wonder how Lenin himself would have reacted to late 1920s realities, since already in 1923 he wondered “shall we be able to hold on with our small and very small peasant production, and in our present state of ruin, until the West-European capitalist countries consummate their development towards socialism?”. [186] In all, the tragedy of Bukharin’s Right is encapsulated in Haynes’ observation that “a critique, no matter how perceptive, does not automatically become an historically viable alternative”. [187]

Although economic recovery was not yet complete in 1928, [188] Wester scholars still defined it “remarkable”, a “resounding success [and] one of history’ s most rapid”. [189] Yet, NEP’s struggle to sustain the comparatively modest 1926-1927 increase in investments, [190] brought many to believe it could survive only under conditions of moderate expansion and, [191] quoting Jasny, “planning without force”. [192] On the other side, several studies argued that the same growth levels achieved with the Great Break could have been attained following more moderate policies. [193]

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[184] R.W. Davies, S.G. Wheatcroft, ‘Stalin and the Soviet Famine of 1932-33. A Reply to Ellman’, *Europe-Asia Studies*, 58/4 (2006), p. 626.

[185] Gregory, *The Political Economy of Stalinism*, pp. 45-46.

[186] V.I. Lenin, ‘Better Fewer, but Better’, in V.I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, xxxiii, p. 499.

[187] Haynes, *Nikolai Bukharin & the Transformation from Capitalism to Socialism*, p. 115.

[188] P.R. Gregory, ‘National Income’, in Davies (ed), *From Tsarism to the New Economic Policy*, p. 247 — A. Markevich, M. Harrison, *Great War, Civil War, and Recovery*, pp. 682-683.

[189] Gregory, Stuart,*Russian and Soviet Economic Performance and Structur*e, p. 46 — Gregory, *The Political Economy of Stalinism*, 24 — Davies, *The Socialist Offensive*,, p. 4.

[190] Nove, ’Bukharin as an economist’, p. 38 — Haynes, *Nikolai Bukharin & the Transformation from Capitalism to Socialism*, p. 91.

[191] R.W. Davies, ‘From Tsarism to the New Economic Policy’, in Davies (ed), *From Tsarism to the New Economic Policy*, 24.

[192] Jasny, ‘A Soviet Planner’, p. 57.

[193] H. Hunter, J. Szyrmer, *Faulty foundations. Soviet economic policies, 1928-1940* (Princeton, 1992), p. 258 — Cheremukhin et. al., *Was Stalin necessary for Russia's economic development?*), pp. 43-46.

In all, NEP was no command economy, as agriculture laid in private hands while State and private markets played a key role at the expense of still only partially operating centralised production, allocation and planning. [194] In this "mixed" system, *khozraschet* granted enterprises autonomy to design their strategy for self-subsistence and dispose of income above fixed payments to the State, [195] while markets, whose supposed mutual exclusivity with the plan was according to Gosplan Chairman Smilga "refuted by life", [196] regulated State-peasantry money-commodity exchange. Credit also played an extensive role, both in the sale of goods and in the provision of investment loans. This, as V.G. Groman stated, meant to go about the "organised application of the methods developed in the highest monopolistic stage of capitalism (money, banks, credit), in order to use these organisational forms as a methods of building a socialised economy". [197]

1.2. — Balance of the national economy and perspective planning

During NEP, debates also flourished between planners and economists adhering to the "teleological" and "genetic" schools of thought. "Geneticists", often former Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, thought economic laws applied to Soviet realities, that planning ought to be based on scientific analysis and set feasible goals. [198] "Teleologists" instead pointed to the

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[194] S.F. Cohen, *Soviet Fates and Lost Alternatives. From Stalinism to the New Cold War* (New York, Cichester, 2011), p. 93 — Nove, *An Economic History of the Soviet Union*, pp. 101-117 — Gregory, Stuart, *Russian and Soviet Economic Performance and Structur*e, p. 45.

[195] Davis, *Russia. A Comparative Economic Systems Interpretation*, p. 323 — Davies, *Soviet Economic Development from Lenin to Khrushchev*, p. 24.

[196] Smilga, 'Pyat' let', p. 49.

[197] V.G. Groman, 'O nekotorykh zakonomernostyakh, empiricheski obnaruzhivayemykh v nashem narodnom khozyaystve', *Planovoe khozyaistvo*, 1 (1925), p. 88.

[198] A. Yugow (trans N.I. Stone, M. Stone), *Russia's Economic Front for War and Peace. An Appraisal of the Three Five-Year Plans* (London, 1941), pp. 5-6.

transformative power of the October Revolution, refused the boundaries of economic laws and declared that “our task is not to study economics but to change it”. [199]

Debates between the two schools were often very harsh, but realities proved more complex than a simple zero-sum-game between the two groups. [200]

A key development in Soviet 1920s economics was the introduction of the balance of the national economy method and the working out of sectoral and national balances. Leading geneticist Groman defined it as a “statistical operation intended to show how the social economy is reproduced in specific conditions”, representing the “organic unity” between production, consumption, distribution and exchange. [201] In essence, V. Leont'yev thought, the balance ought to “represent in numbers the total turnover of economic life”. [202]

A first tentative balance was worked out for 1923-1924 under the supervision of P.I. Popov at TzSU (Statistical Administration), [203] who regarded the “branches of the national economy as parts of a unified whole”. [204] He traced the ideological origins of the balance method back to Marx’s schemes of simple and enlarged reproduction, [205] while Groman stated that actually the method “already existed for over 150 years”. [206]

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[199] S.G. Strumilin, ‘Industrializatsiya SSSR’, *Planovoe khozyaistvo*, 7 (1927), p. 10.

[200] I. Guelfat, *Economic Thought in the Soviet Union. Concepts and aspects. A comparative outline* (Liege, 1969), p. 10.

[201] V.G. Groman, ‘Balans Narodnogo Khozyaistva’, *Planovoe khozyaistvo*, 11 (1926), p. 68.

[202] V. Leont'yev, ‘Balans Narodnogo Khozyaistva SSSR’, *Planovoe khozyaistvo*, 12 (1925), pp. 254-258.

[203] Yu.N. Ivanov, B.T. Ryabushkin, ‘Stranitsy Istorii. K 90-letiyu pervogo balansa narodnogo khozyaystva: istoki i evolyutsiya makroekonomicheskoy statistiki Rossii’, *Voprosy statistiki*, 4 (2016), p. 71.

[204] P.I. Popov, ‘Balans narodnogo khozyaystva v tselom’, in P.I. Popov (ed), *Balans Narodnogo khozyaystva Soyuza SSR 1923/24 goda. Trudy Tsentral'nogo Statisticheskogo Upravleniya* (Moscow, 1926), p. 282.

[205] P.I. Popov ‘Vvedeniye k izucheniyu balansa narodnogo khozyaystva’, in P.I. Popov (ed), *Balans Narodnogo khozyaystva Soyuza SSR 1923/24 goda. Trudy Tsentral'nogo Statisticheskogo Upravleniya* (Moscow, 1926), p. 1-5.

[206] V.G. Groman, ‘Balans Narodnogo Khozyaystva’, *Planovoe khozyaistvo*, 11 (1926), p. 62.

One of the most advanced pre-war attempts at drawing up a balance of the national economy materialised little time before the whole methodology was largely set aside. A series of tables which referred to 1928-1930 described flows of resources between the economic sectors at current and constant prices, utilising sector of origin, product-group, economic end-use and social ownership as framework for classification in the tables. [207]

Alongside the balance method, another key topic planners and economists debated in the 1920s was long-term planning and specifically General Plans. [208] Both geneticists and teleologists assigned great importance to General Plans. Yet, geneticists emphasised plan-drafting as a process independent from the planner and stressed the importance of scientific analysis and realism. [209] Instead, teleologists like S. Sharov spoke of "teleological maximalism", stating that planners' subjective will and the force unleashed by the "colossal power" of the October Revolution originated the plan. [210]

Geneticist V.A. Bazarov attempted to bridge differences in 1926. He stated that a long-term plan was "not only a forecast, but also a directive, not only genetic research, but also a teleological construct, not only the consideration of objective possibilities, but also a system of measures, necessary for the optimal use of these opportunities". Core to Bazarov's conceptions became "correspondence with reality" and the pursue of an "optimum course of development". This *avant la lettre* use of the term "optimal" relied on an understanding of the economy as an "harmonious,

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[207] S.G. Wheatcroft, R.W. Davies, *Materials for a Balance of the Soviet National Economy, 1928-1930*, (Cambridge, 1985), pp. 4-6.

[208] G.M. Krzhizhanovskiy, 'Pyat' let bor'ba za plan', *Planovoe khozyaistvo*, 3 (1926), pp. 7-47 — G.M. Krzhizhanovskiy, 'Tekushchiye problemy planirovaniya', *Planovoe khozyaistvo*, 4 (1926), pp. 10-30.

[209] A.L. Weinstein, 'O Kontrol'nykh Tsifrakh narodnogo Khozyaystva SSSR na 1926/27 god', *Sotsialisticheskoye khozyaistvo*, 4 (1926), p. 6.

[210] S. Sharov, 'Tsel' v plane i zadachi nashego khozyaystva', *Planovoe khozyaistvo*, 7 (1926), pp. 60-63.

organic whole" and implementing the most efficient plan, drawn-up observing "proportionality and internal consistency", in a "smooth [way], without interruptions". [211]

In fact, Sharov had already stated that plan-drafting was to draw on a careful "academic" study of resources and economic conditions. [212] Yet, barely six months after Bazarov's article, it was leading teleologist S.G. Strumilin who recognised that "every plan represents a certain combination of elements of prediction of what is objectively inevitable and projection of what is advisable from the standpoint of our subjective social and class aspirations". "Assignments must, of course be […] sufficiently realistic", added Strumilin. [213] These views were appreciated by another notorious geneticist, N.D. Kondratev, who however retorted that plan assignments could be realistic only if they were "organically bound up with elements of forecast, and presuppose them". [214]

In early 1928, as the downfall of NEP was approaching, Bazarov attempted again to bridge the differences between "teleologists" and "geneticists". Perspective planning, he said, "must be a synthesis of the directive and the forecast, that is, it must have a specific target and a genetic scientific justification for its feasibility". He once again repeated that "teleology and genetics are not antagonists competing with each other, but the moments of a single organic whole which are dialectically connected with each other". Their juxtaposition had been "a complete misunderstanding". [215]

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[211] V.A. Bazarov, 'O metodologii postroyeniya perspektivnykh planov', *Planovoe khozyaistvo*, 7 (1926), pp. 9-14.

[212] S. Sharov, 'Tsel' v plane i zadachi nashego khozyaistva', *Planovoe khozyaistvo*, 7 (1926), pp. 60-63.

[213] S.G. Strumilin, 'K perspektivnoy pyatiletke Gosplana na 1926/27 - 1930/31 gg.', *Planovoe khozyaistvo*, 3 (1927), pp. 21-22.

[214] N.D. Kondratev, 'Kriticheskiye zametki o plane razvitiya narodnogo khozyaistva', *Planovoe khozyaistvo*, 4 (1927), pp. 2-3.

[215] V.A. Bazarov, 'Printsipy postroeniya perspektivnogo plana', *Planovoe khozyaistvo*, 2 (1928), pp. 38, 40.

On the practical front, building on earlier reflections on the territorial dimension of perspective planning, [216] "detailed elaborations" for several economic regions were drawn up. In March 1928 it was therefore proposed to use the fifteen-year plan for Central Asia as blueprint for the all-Union one, combined with plans of the same length for electrification, transport as well as fuel, textile and metallurgy industries. [217]

This was also the time when Kovalevsky, having little interest in geneticists v.s. teleologists disputes, sought to make right the near-absence of debate on General Plan methodology. [218] He envisioned the General Plan as relying "on an energy base, with the optimal use of the achievements of world technology and the application of the principle of the social division of labor between economic regions", as well as "the optimal use of its productive forces and natural resources". Kovalevsy suggested to work out "optimal lines of development" for branches, regions and the national economy as a whole, based on the accounting of productive forces and resources.

This method focused on the interconnectedness of the economy, postulating that no optimum could be identified in a specific branch without considering it as part of the whole system. Therefore, "synthetical a priori judgments [based on all the previous experience]" on the development of the economy and of its branches were to be used as criteria to determine the optimality of plans, while each industry ought to work out its optimal use of resources and workforce, relying on the balance method.

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[216] S.I. Sharov, 'K voprosu o guberniyakh khozyaistvennykh planakh. V poryadke postanovki voprosa', *Planovoe khozyaistvo*, 1 (1925), pp. 232, 234, 239.

[217] N.A. Kovalevsky, 'Metodologiya plana rekonstruktsii', *Planovoe khozyaistvo*, 4 (1928), p. 7.

[218] The following presentation of General Plans methodology relies on: Kovalevsky, 'Metodologiya', pp. 7, 10-11, 14, 16, 33, 40 — N.A. Kovalevsky, 'Metologii General'nogo Plana', *Planovoe khozyaistvo*, 6 (1928), pp. 134, 140 — N.A. Kovalevsky, 'Predislovie', in L.M. Sabsovich (ed), *SSSR cherez 15 let. Gipoteza general'nogo plana kak plana postroyeniya sotsializma v SSSR* (Moscow, 1929), p. 5 — N.A. Kovalevsky, 'K postroeniyu general'nogo plana', *Planovoe khozyaistvo*, 3 (1930), pp. 120-121.

At that point several “teleologists” declared little interest in a General Plan or criticised how “economic and political regulatory ideas” played too little a role in their prospected drafting. [219] Instead, Bazarov defended achievements in the realm of perspective planning and Groman defiantly reaffirmed that “primacy always belongs to the genetic point of view”, a dam against the “inclination for fantastic constructions”. [220]

As these debates were already starting to succumb, S. Essen proposed an interesting synthesis of General Plan methodology: after accounting for natural resources, capital costs, energy needs and labour, expressed in physical terms and in prices of the plan’s initial year, the optimum would be calculated for each industry, bearing in mind local specificities, and then for each economic region, without the preemptive application of a single all-Union-wide “scale”. [221]

1.3. — The Great Break

After the Right’s defeat, changes of momentous proportion took place in the USSR. In the realm of politics, a new “unconsolidated oligarchic rule” was born, with Stalin as *primus inter pares* surrounded by old allies and newly promoted associates. [222]

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[219] R.E. Vaisberg, *Problemy pyatiletnego perspektivnogo plana* (Moscow, Leningrad, 1928), pp. 8-9.

[220] P.P. Maslov, ‘Rech' P.P. Maslova’, *Planovoe khozyaistvo*, 6 (1928), pp. 149, 145-148 — R.Ye. Vaysberg, ‘Rech' R.Ye. Vaysberga’, *Planovoe khozyaistvo*, 6 (1928), pp. 166-169 — V.A. Bazarov, ‘Rech' V.A . Bazarova’, *Planovoe khozyaistvo*, 6 (1928), pp. 149, 152-154 — V.G. Groman, ‘Rech' V. G. Gromana’, *Planovoe khozyaistvo*, 6 (1928), pp. 159-162.

[221] S. Essen, *Osnovi General'nogo Plana Narodnogo Khozyaystva SSSR* (Moscow, Leningrad, 1930), pp. 15-17.

[222] P.R. Gregory, ‘The Politburo’ Role in the Lost Transcripts’, in P.R. Gregory, N.M. Naimark (eds), *Lost Politburo Transcripts*, pp. 16-18.

In the countryside, as agriculture's share of national income stood at 48.3%, [223] but still lagged behind 1913 levels in many respects, [224] the sweeping "Ural-Siberian method", [225] although still not applied Union-wide, represented the resurgence of procurement. [226] Further ominous signs were the "economic counter-revolution" denounced in Shakhty, [227] where five managers of the coal industry were shot, [228] and the kulak "infiltration" in the Party supposedly uncovered in Smolensk. [229]

At this point Bazarov still argued that "the guiding principle" of industrialisation should have been "attainment of maximum efficiency […] while a minimum is spent on capital construction". [230] Yet, the First Five-Year Plan, which was being drawn up at that time, bore no trace of his approach. Instead it set quotas such as +130% industrial production, +161% producers' goods output and +151% overall investment. [231] Moreover, after a first upward revision generated the "optimum variant" in early 1929, [232] claims from industry kept on growing and a second overall revision was approved in the summer. [233] The defence plan was no less ambitious and it envisioned

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[223] R.W Davies, M. Harrison, S.G. Wheatcroft (eds), *The Economic Transformation of the Soviet Union, 1913-1945* (Cambridge, 1994), pp. 269, 272.

[224] Wheatcroft, 'Agriculture', p. 103.

[225] L. Viola, *The War Against the Peasantry, 1927-1930. The Tragedy of the Soviet Countryside* (New Heaves, 2005), pp. 119-120 — Davies, *The Socialist Offensive*, p. 57 — J. Hughes, *Stalinism in a Russian Province. Collectivization and Dekulakization in Siberia* (Basingstoke, New York, 1996), pp. 73-75.

[226] Harrison, 'Soviet Agriculture and Industrialisation', p. 194.

[227] Stalin, 'The Work of the April Joint Plenum', p. 124.

[228] L.P. Belyakov, 'Shakhtinskoe delo', in V.P. Orlov (ed), *Repressirovannye Geologi* (Moscow, Saint Petersburg, 1999), pp. 395-398.

[229] D.R. Brower, 'The Smolensk Scandal and the End of NEP', *Slavic Review*, 45/4 (1986), pp. 689-690.

[230] V.A. Bazarov, 'Printsipy postroeniya perspektivnogo plana', *Planovoe khozyaistvo*, 2 (1928), pp.46.

[231] Nove, *An Economic History of the USSR*, p. 145.

[232] Davies, *The Soviet Economy in Turmoil*, pp. 67, 179.
To be noted is that between 1927-1928 and 1928-1929 planned capital investment in industry had already increased by nearly 50% — Ibid., p. 55.

[233] A. Nove, 'The USSR. The Reform that Never Was', in L.A.D. Dellin, H. Gross, *Reforms in the Soviet and Eastern European Economies* (Lexington, 1972), p. 19 — Davies, *The Soviet Economy in Turmoil*, p. 187.

quintupling the number of artillery units, doubling that of shells, triplicating aircraft production and going from 340 to 7.000 tanks. [234]

Meanwhile, L.M. Sabsovich put forward a twenty-years Plan proposal which setting a 99,4% gross production growth, with heavy industry growing 184,2% and light industry 39,1%. [235] Kovalevsky, whose methodology was still officially standing, [236] alongside most Soviet planners, defined Sabsovich's plan as “only a bold forward look […] not backed up in its economical construction by the concrete calculations of an engineer”. [237] Kovalevsky’s own proposed General Plan, foreseeing about half of Sabsovich’s prospected growth, was however equally badly received at Gosplan. [238]

On 7 November 1929 Stalin officially called off the NEP “retreat”, vowing “to launch a successful offensive against the capitalist elements”. [239] Being Russia “fifty or a hundred years behind the advanced countries”, Stalin claimed, it could only “make good this distance in ten years [or] go under”. [240] Kaganovich would defiantly stand by this logic as late as in 1990, arguing that in the late 1920s the choice was between Great Break or being “crushed for five hundred years”. [241]

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[234] Simonov, ‘The ‘war scare’ of 1927 and the birth of the defence-industry complex, p. 42.

[235] Sabsovich, *SSSR cherez 15 let*, pp. 32-33, 38-39, 42-43.

[236] Essen, *Osnovi Generalnogo Plana*, pp. 15-17.

[237] Sabsovich, *SSSR cherez 15 let*, p. 5.

[238] G. M. Krzhizhanovsky, ‘K diskussii o genplane’, *Planovoe khozyaistvo*, 2 (1930), p. 9, 15 — E.I. Kviring, ‘Problemy general'nogo plana’, *Planovoe khozyaistvo*, 4 (1930), pp. 7-8.

[239] J.V. Stalin, ‘A Year of Great Change. On the Occasion of the Twelfth Anniversary of the October Revolution’, in Stalin, *Works*, xii, p. 124.

[240] J.V. Stalin, ‘The Tasks of Business Executives’, in Stalin, *Works*, xiii, p. 41.

[241] *la Repubblica*, 5 October 1990, p. 32.

By 1930 maximalism was sweeping away the remnants of geneticism, [242] as its followers were accused of trying to "subordinate our plan to the peasants' plough", [243] as well as of "bourgeois and petty-bourgeois attitudes in planning". [244] The call for "the Five-Year Plan in four years", which left even teleologist Strumilin extremely skeptical, [245] was launched and endorsed by Stalin himself at the 16th Congress of June-July 1930. [246] Yet, Stalin was "no economic illiterate", and in endorsing over-ambitiousness he wished his combination of Left economics and violence to amass as much cheap grain as possible, which the State could then re-sell at higher retail prices, [247] forever preventing a peasant retreat from the market. [248]

As a result, even if the Five-Year Plan asked that only a fifth of farms and a seventh of sown area be collectivised by 1933, forcing peasants in *kolkhozy* and, [249] as Stalin himself stated, "eliminating the kulaks as a class", [250] emboldened Bolsheviks on the offensive. [251] As a result, the mid-1929 average 5% of collectivised households multiplied five-fold in a matter of few

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[242] Kviring, 'Problemy general'nogo plana', pp. 7-8.

[243] R.E. Weisberg, 'Burzhuaznye Izvrashcheniya v Oblasti Planirovaniya', *Planovoe khozyaistvo*, 1 (1930), p. 21.

[244] L.M. Gatovskiy, 'Zaklyuchitel'noye slovo L.M. Gatovskogo, *Planovoe khozyaistvo*, 4 (1930), pp. 177, 191.

[245] Davies, *The Soviet Economy in Turmoil*, p. 191.

[246] J.V. Stalin, 'Political Report of the Central Committee to the Sixteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(b)', in Stalin, *Works*, xii, pp. 277-278.

[247] Gregory, *The Political Economy of Stalinism*, pp. 34-36, 43-45.

[248] M. Harrison, 'Stalinism and the Economics of War-time', 9 December 2008, pp. 5-6, https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/staff/mharrison/public/stalinism_en_2011.pdf (27 November 2016).

[249] Harrison, 'Soviet Agriculture and Industrialisation', pp. 195-196.

[250] J.V. Stalin, 'Concerning Questions of Agrarian Policy in the USSR', in Stalin, *Works*, xii, p. 173.

[251] RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 8, ll. 64-69, in N.N. Pokrovsky (ed), *Politburo i krest'yanstvo. Vysylka, spetsposeleniye. 1930-1940 gg.* (2 vols, Moscow, 2005), i, pp. 70-76.

months, [252] reaching 60% by early 1930, [253] and the Party set out to complete collectivisation by 1932. [254]

Yet, resent scholarship, [255] validating an early intuition of Millar, [256] proved how collectivisation produced no "enhanced tribute" for industrialisation, contributing to it mainly by forcing millions of peasants into industrial workforce. [257]

At this point, the Stalinist leadership tried to direct in detail the titanic industrialisation effort. [258] Yet, recent research has proved that top officials and Gosplan could actually make only a fraction of the decisions required, passing on the rest to actors down the hierarchy. [259] As a result, a "project bacchanalia" engulfed the USSR, [260] while "petty fiefdoms" of bureaucratic and regional networks, [261] headed by "little Stalins", emerged at all levels of the administrative structure. [262]

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[252] Davies, *The Socialist Offensive*, pp. 109, 441.

[253] Ibid., pp. 203, 441.

[254] KPSS v resolyuziyah… T. 5 (Moscow, 1984), pp. 72-75, in V. Danilov (ed), *Tragediya sovetskoy derevni. Kollektivizatsiya i raskulachivaniye. Dokumenty i materialy. 1927-1939* (5 vols, Moscow, 2000), ii, pp. 85-86.

[255] Harrison, 'Soviet Agriculture and Industrialisation', pp. 193-194 — R.C. Allen, *Farm and Factory. A Reinterpretation of the Soviet Industrial Revolution* (Princeton and Oxford, 2003), p. 171 — P.R. Gregory, 'The Soviet Agricultural Surplus. A Retrospective', *Europe-Asia Studies*, 61/4 (2009).

[256] J.R. Millar, 'Soviet Rapid Development and the Agricultural Surplus Hypothesis', *Soviet Studies*, 22/1 (1970) — J.R. Millar, C.A. Guntzel, 'The Economics and Politics of Mass Collectivization Reconsidered: A Review Article, *Explorations in Economic History*, 8/1 (1970) — J.R. Millar, 'Mass Collectivization and the Contribution of Soviet Agriculture to the First Five-YearPlan: A Review Article', *Slavic Review*, 33/4 (1974).

[257] Allen, *Farm and Factory*, p. 110 — Gregory, 'The Soviet Agricultural Surplus. A Retrospective', p. 682.

[258] Khlevnyuk, *Politburo. Mekhanizmy politicheskoy vlasti,* pp. 17-30.

[259] Gregory, *The Political Economy of Stalinism*, p. 270.

[260] Davies, *The Soviet Economy in Turmoil*, p. 215.

[261] Y. Gorlizki, O.V. Khlevnyuk, 'Stalin and his circle', in R.G. Suny (ed), *The Cambridge History of Russia* (3 vols, Cambridge, 2006), iii, p. 249.

[262] Khlevnyuk, *In Stalin's shadow*, p. 176.

American diplomatic dispatches sent in the early 1930s prove how Army personnel, working people and the youth of industrial centres seemed “reasonably satisfied with the present conditions, if not absolutely enthusiastic”. [263] Modern scholarship has also confirmed that upward mobility resulted in degrees of consensus amongst the urban population, especially before the 1932-1933 crisis. [264]

These were also the formative years for a generation of young economic officials, who would rise to the very top of the Stalinist leadership. One of them was N.A. Voznesensky, who in 1928 enrolled at the Institute of Red Professors to study economics. Aged only twenty-four, youngest amongst his peers, he quickly emerged as leading figure of his group, which elected him Party organiser. It also seems that Voznesensky found the readings he was assigned at the Institute “inadequate”. On top of classics of European and Russian Marxism, he therefore devoted much attention also to Hegel and Feuerbach as well as to “the writings of Western bourgeois economists and representatives of utopian socialism”. This should however not be interpreted as a sign of Voznesensky’s lack of enthusiasm for socialist construction. Indeed, the young economist was instead under the spell of dreams of Soviet grandeur and, profoundly inspired by the GOELRO plan, impressed his classmates with visionary plans for the construction of a giant Union-wide energy grid. [265]

Voznesensky left the Institute of Red Professors in 1931 and immediately caught Ya.E. Rudzutak’s attention, who offered him a job at the Central Control Commission’s planning group and at the Commissariat of Worker-Peasant Inspection. [266]

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[263] Department of Rare Books and Special Collections, Princeton University Library — Public Policy Papers — George F. Kennan Papers, U.S. State Department, 1913-1999, Box 162, Folder 5, p. 1-3.

[264] H. Kuromiya, *Stalin’s Industrial Revolution. Politics and Workers, 1928-1932* (Cambridge, 1988) — S. Fitzpatrick, *Everyday Stalinism. Ordinary Life in Extraordinary Times: Soviet Russia in the 1930s* (New York, Oxford, 1999).

[265] *Voznesensky Nikolai Alekseevich*, pp. 52, 55.

[266] V.V. Kolotov, *Nikolay Alekseevich Voznesensky. Biograficheskiy povest* (Moscow, 1974), p. 140.

In the meantime however, notwithstanding the existing support for Stalin's policy, resistance to collectivisation was claiming the lives of tens of thousands, including several thousands Bolsheviks, [267] whilst the whole country was, as Khlevnyuk stated, "in a state of civil war". [268]

As the rupture point seemed increasingly close, a temporary halt to the assault on the countryside was called by Stalin himself. [269] In March 1930 he accused the "overzealous 'socialiser'" of having over-fulfilled the collectivisation plan "by more than 100 per cent", believing "we can achieve anything!", that "there is nothing we can't do!". [270] This in fact, was exactly what Stalin himself had stated in April 1928, when he said that "there are no fortresses that the working people, the Bolsheviks, cannot capture". [271] This, as Nove stated was, even by Stalin's standards, "rare effrontery". [272]

Therefore, as collectivised households fell from 60% to 20%, [273] Trotsky openly condemned the Party, [274] while Leftist C. Rakovsky drafted a detailed criticism of its economic policy. [275] Yet, by late 1930, collectivised households reached again pre-March numbers, [276] prompting two

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[267] T. Martin, *The affirmative action empire: nations and nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939* (Ithaca, London, 2001), pp. 293-295.

[268] Khlevnyuk, *Politburo. Mekhanizmy politicheskoy vlasti,* p. 17.

[269] R.W. Davies, M. Ilic, O.V. Khlevnyuk, 'The Politburo and Economic Policy-making', in E.A. Rees (ed), *The Nature of Stalin's Dictatorship. The Politburo, 1928-1953*, p. 109.

[270] *Pravda,* March 2, 1930, p. 1.

[271] Stalin, 'The Work of the April Joint Plenum', p. 62.

[272] Nove, *An Economic History of the USSR*, p. 170.

[273] Davies, *The Socialist Offensive*, p. 441 — R.W. Davies, S.G. Wheatcroft, *The Years of Hunger: Soviet Agriculture, 1931-1933* (London, 2004), p. 1.

[274] L. Trotsky, 'Open Letter to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The State of the Party and the Tasks of the Left Opposition, March 23, 1930, in G. Breitman, S. Lovell (eds), *Writings of Leon Trotsky* (New York, 1975), p. 135.

[275] C. Rakovsky, 'The five year plan in crisis', *Critique*, 13/1 (1982), p. 48.

[276] Davies, Wheatcroft, *The Years of Hunger*, pp. 1-2, 5.

disaffected Stalinists, Lominadze and Syrtsov to adopt a Right-wing platform, [277] denounced by the Party as “anti-Party Left-Right Bloc”. [278]

In the meantime, despite the military production being only achieved in half, [279] industrial investment expanded in 1929-1930 of an “astonishing” 90%, [280] while in all the First Five-Year Plan for industrial output was declared fulfilled. [281]

1.4. — The return to moderation

In August 1931 collectivisation was declared achieved, but Soviet authorities also began recurring to tax levers to incentivise peasants. [282] As the remnants of the Rightist Opposition were fully eradicated from power, [283] little less than a decade after the launch of NEP, an umpteenth U-turn was performed by the Soviet leadership. This shift, which Harris defined as “both radical and extremely short-lived”, [284] became known as “neo-NEP”. [285]

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[277] Davies, *Soviet Economy in Turmoil*, pp. 412-413 — Daniels, *The Conscience of the Revolution*, p. 378.

[278] O.V. Khlevnyuk, ‘Stalin, Syrtsov, Lominadze. Preparations for the “Second Great Breakthrough”’, in P.R. Gregory, N.M. Naimark (eds), *Lost Politburo Transcripts*, p. 81.

[279] Simonov, ‘The ‘war scare’ of 1927 and the birth of the defence-industry complex’, pp. 42-45.

[280] Davies, *The Soviet Economy in Turmoil*, p. 486.

[281] Gregory, Stuart, *Russian and Soviet Economic Performance and Structur*e, p. 70.
Western estimates instead argue that planned industrial output was only fulfilled by 60-70%.

[282] D.R. Shearer, ‘Stalinism, 1928-1940’, in Suny (ed), *The Cambridge History of Russia*, p. 196 — Davies, Wheatcroft, *The Years of Hunger*, pp. 8-10, 14, 20-25.

[283] Daniels, *The Conscience of the Revolution*, p. 378.

[284] Harris, *The Great Fear*, pp. 104-105.

[285] The term neo-NEP has been used to refer also to a supposed Bukharinist right-wing departures from the original Leninist NEP in the mid-1920s [M. Mirski (trans R.A. Clarke), *The Mixed Economy NEP and Its Lot* (Copenhagen, 1984), pp. 70, 108, 113] as well as to Gorbachev’s policies [“Z” [M. Malia], ‘To the Stalin Mausoleum’, *Daedalus*, 119/1 (1990), p. 331]. The term seems to have been introduced by *Sozialistiche-skii Vestnik* in 1924, which later used it also to discuss also the 1932 relaxation. This latter use of the term has been broadly adopted by both Western and Russian scholars [V.Z. Rogovin, *Stalinskii neonep* (Moscow, 1994), p. 21 — Davies, Ilic, Khlevnyuk, ‘The Politburo and Economic Policy-making’, p. 109].

Just like in 1921, this retreat was forced on the leadership, [286] as resistance to collectivisation declining living standards, mounting inflation, growing inefficiency in capital investment and productivity of labour were coupled by goods shortages. [287]

On 6 May 1932, Sovnarkom and CC affirmed that given the Great Break's successes "selling grain by the collective and collective farmers themselves" should become standard practice. Soon after, on 7 May 1932, kolkhozes were granted "the full possibility of unimpeded sale of their surplus grain at their own discretion both in bazaars and markets and in their collective-farm shops". [288] These rights were further extended on 10 May 1932. Collective farms that "accurately fulfil the centralised plan for stock-breeding", were now also granted "the full possibility of unimpeded sale" of livestock and meat products. [289] Ten days after, a further decree "abolish[ed] all existing […] taxes and fees" on collective trade, "minimise[d] the rent rates for premises", made market sales' income "not subject to agricultural tax" and formally sanctioned trade "carried out at prices that are formed in the market". [290]

This retreat towards NEP practices meant no reconsideration of collectivisation, [291] as Kaganovich called to simultaneously "strengthen the kolkhozes, reinforce the struggle against the kulaks" and "promote in every possible way the delivery of products to the markets". [292]

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[286] Davies, Ilic, Khlevnyuk, 'The Politburo and Economic Policy-making', p. 109.

[287] O.V. Khlevnyuk, 'Stalin, Syrtsov, Lominadze. Preparations for the "Second Great Breakthrough"', p. 114.

[288] *Pravda*, 7 May 1932, p. 1.

[289] *Pravda*, 11 May 1932, p. 1.

[290] *Pravda*, 21 May 1932, p. 1.

[291] D. Priestland, *Stalinism and the Politics of Mobilization. Ideas, Power, and Terror in Inter-war Russia* (Oxford, 2007), p. 272 — Harris, *The Great Fear*, p. 104.

[292] *Pravda*, 8 August 1932, p. 2.

For what concerns industry, the attempt to return to more rational practices predated “neo-NEP”. Indeed, a December 1929 decree had brought all State industry enterprises under regime of *khozraschet*, even stating that this was “quite justified” by the fact that *khozraschet* “contributes to the rationalisation of production [and to] the correct organisation of sales and supply”. [293] More concrete efforts were also made to implement *khozraschet* at the industrial brigade level. [294]

Yet, how little the 1929 decree had effectively achieved is proved by Stalin’s famous speech of June 1931. The dictator criticised “inefficient” industrial management stating that “the principles of *khozraschet* are grossly violated in a large number of our factories [since] concepts as ‘regime of economy’, ‘cutting down unproductive expenditure’, ‘rationalisation of production’ have long gone out of fashion”. Stalin wanted to “put an end to inefficiency” as well as to “introduce and reinforce *khozraschet*, to increase accumulation within industry”. [295] As a result, *khozraschet* was strengthened in industry and came to operate in transport. [296]

It was precisely in the aftermath of the rebirth of *khozraschet*, that Voznesensky, who had already started lecturing on political economy, [297] published one of his first articles on *Bolshevik*. There he convincingly argued that “not only we cannot destroy *khozraschet*, but actually must strengthen it” and that it should have been applied “in every workshop, every brigade”. [298]

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[293] VKP(b), ‘O reorganizatsii upravleniya promyshlennost’yu’, in M.A. Savel'yev, A. Pokrebyshev (ed), *Direktivy VKP(b) po khozyaystvennym voprosam* (Moscow, 1931), p. 641.

[294] V.N. Paramonov, ‘Khozyaistvenniy raschet promishlennykh predpriyatiyakh SSSR v nachale 1930-kh gg.’, *Voprosy ekonomiki i prava*, 6 (2012), pp. 27-30.

[295] J.V. Stalin, ‘New Conditions - New Tasks in Economic Construction Speech Delivered at a Conference of Business Executives, June 23, 1931’, in Stalin, *Works*, xiii, pp. 76, 78.

[296] V.P. D'yachenko, *Istoriya finansov SSSR (1917-1950 gg.)* (Moscow, 1978), p. 233.

[297] *Voznesensky Nikolai Alekseevich*, p. 56.

[298] N.A. Voznesensky, ‘Khozraschet i planirovaniye na sovremennom etape’, *Bol'shevik*, 9 (1931), pp. 29-30, 33-35.

Voznesensky also reaffirmed the law-governed nature of the socialist economy, attacking the "liquidationist" trend, but at this point lent this theory little substance and still saw *khozraschet* as a merely auxiliary and temporary tool that would disappear under socialism. [299] He also condemned Kovalevsky and Bukharin's models, in full adherence with Stalinist maximalism, even openly attacking economist I.I. Rubin, [300] after he had already been arrested. [301]

Reforming tendencies however became evident in 1932-33 also amongst "leading officials" of Ordzonikidze's Commissariat of Heavy Industry, who proposed bold price reforms, the introduction of "a kind of market" for materials and machinery and replacing grants with "long-term interest-bearing loans". [302]

The archival revolution revealed that it was not only isolated officials who voiced such proposals, but also high-ranking figures. Davies affirmed that, although it is hard to determine if reform proponents had a common grand view that encompassed the whole economy, what appears clear is that such proposals were meant to "strengthen the role of costs, profits, and prices". [303]

All of this however, despite *Sotzialisticheskii Vestnik* laconically commenting Soviet developments as "free market triumphs", [304] was no return to the 1920s. [305] Indeed, what the 1932 decrees also demanded was to "eradicate private traders and speculators", [306] while political repression actually intensified. [307] Indeed, already in August 1932 theft of public property

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[299] N.A. Voznesensky, 'K voprosu ob ekonomike sotsializma', *Bol'shevik*, 23-24 (1931), pp. 34-35.

[300] N.A. Voznesensky, 'Marksizm i kontrrevolyutsionnyy idealizm Rubina', *Bol'shevik*, 1 (1931), pp. 66-68.

[301] Medvedev, *Let History Judge*, pp. 281-284.

[302] Davies, 'The Socialist Market', pp. 204-205, 221-223 — Davies, 'Making economic Policy', pp. 62-63.

[303] Davies, 'Making economic Policy' , pp. 74-75.

[304] *Sotsialisticheskiy Vestnik*, 25 June 1932, p. 8.

[305] Nove, *An Economic History of the USSR*, p. 185.

[306] *Pravda*, 9 May 1932, p. 1.

[307] Rogovin, *Stalinskii neonep*, p. 29.

was made punishable by death, [308] OGPU discretionary rights were increased, [309] while all leading geneticists were condemned to lengthy prison terms in fabricated show trials. [310]

On the industrial front, while the reforms proposed by Ordzonikidze's officials failed to materialise, problems with the pricing system were openly admitted and Gosplan was instructed to work out a plan to functionalise the standing system. [311]

As for the project of a new General Plan, at the February 1932 17th Conference Molotov justified its incompleteness by saying that its "main issues" had been addressed by the first two Five-Year Plans". [312] And yet, a "second GOELRO plan", which Zaleski called a "valuable contribution", [313] was proposed in May 1932. [314]

On the whole however, "neo-NEP" proved bankrupt both economically and politically. [315] Reduced collection plans were still unrealistic and this, combined with bad harvest and local officials' maximalism, [316] left peasants little or nothing to trade. [317] Market prices exceeded

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[308] *Pravda*, 9 August 1932, p. 1.

[309] O.V. Khlevnyuk, A.V. Kvashonkin (eds), *Stalinskoe Politbyuro v 30-ye gody. Sbornik dokumentov* (Moscow, 1995), pp. 59-65.

[310] Jasny. 'A Soviet Planner'.

[311] M. Harrison, 'Prices, Planners, and Producers. An Agency Problem in Soviet Industry, 1928-1950', *The Journal of Economic History*, 58/4 (1998), pp. 1047-1048.

[312] VKP(b), *XVII Konferentsiya Vsesoyuznoy Kommunisticheskoy Partii (v). Stenograficheskiy otchet* (Moscow, 1932), p. 140.

[313] E. Zaleski, *Stalinist Planning for Economic Growth, 1933-1952* (Chapel Hill, 1980), p. 120.

[314] 'Rezolyutsiya Vsesoyuznoy konferentsiy po sostavleniyu genplana elektrifikatsii SSSR (7-14 maya 1932 g.)', in G.I. Lomov (ed), *General'nyy plan elektrifikatsii SSSR. Svodnyy plan elektrifikatsii* (8 vols, Moscow, Leningrad, 1932), viii, p. 57.

[315] Davies, Ilic, Khlevnyuk, 'The Politburo and Economic Policy-making', p. 112 — Harris, *The Great Fear*, p. 105.

[316] Davies, Wheatcroft, *The Years of Hunger*, p. 79, 104.

[317] R.W. Davies, M. Ilic, O.V. Khlevnyuk, 'The Politburo and Economic Policy-making', p. 112.

rationing ones by 8 to 15 times, [318] as neo-NEP also had negligible effects on the actual situation in the localities. [319]

As a result, economic failure turned into calamity and a disastrous famine engulfed the whole USSR. [320] At this point, mass hardship was coupled with the uncovering of several anti-Stalinist groups — one headed by Ryutin, [321] one comprising Smirnov, Eismont and Tolmachev, [322] one organised by Smirnov — [323] and the fear of massing foreign enemies to the West and East. [324] Stalin and his lieutenants were left in a constant state of anxiety, [325] as they truly came to believe that any form of criticism hid a terrorist threat. [326]

Yet, by late 1932 the maximalism still marking early proposals for the Second Five-Year Plan was toned down. [327] Industrial growth rates now stood at 13-14%, as opposed to the 21-22% of the First Five-Year Plan, and eventually plan targets were reduced for agriculture too. [328]

Soon after, on 1 December 1932, Sovnarkom and CC decreed that kolkhozes of the Tatar and Moscow regions, which had fulfilled their plan and secured seeds for the coming sowing, were

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[318] Rogovin, *Stalinskii neonep*, p. 21.

[319] Ye.D. Tverdyukova, "Kolkhoznaya torgovlya Leningrada 1930-kh gg.", V*estnik Sankt-Peterburgskogo universiteta*, 2/4 (2007), pp. 126-133 — A.V. Antoshkin, 'Prodovol'stvennoe snabzhenie rabochikh i sluzhashchikh Bashkirii v 1930-1934 gg.', *Obshchestvo: filosofiya, istoriya, kul'tura*, 9 (2016).

[320] Davies, Wheatcroft, *The Years of Hunger,* pp. 123, 136, 434-439, 441.

[321] Daniels, *The Conscience of the Revolution*, p. 379 — N.M. Naimark, 'Findings and Perspectives', in P.R. Gregory, N.M. Naimark (eds), *Lost Politburo Transcripts*, p. 11.

[322] C. Wynn, 'The "Right Opposition" and the "Smirnov-Eismont-Tolmachev Affair"', in P.R. Gregory, N.M. Naimark (eds), *Lost Politburo Transcripts*, p. 97 — V.Z. Rogovin, *Vlast' i oppozitsii* (Moscow, 1993), p. 711.

[323] Rogovin, *Vlast' i oppozitsii*, p. 84 — Getty, *Origins of the Great Purges*, pp. 119-123.

[324] Harris, *The Great Fear*, p. 107.

[325] Getty, Naumov, *The Road to Terror,* pp. 15, 53.

[326] Wynn, The "Right Opposition" and the Smirnov-Eismont-Tolmachev Affair", 102-103.

[327] Davies, Ilic, Khlevnyuk, 'The Politburo and Economic Policy-making', p. 114.

[328] Davies, Wheatcroft, Khlevnyuk, *The Years of Progress. The Soviet Economy, 1934-1936*, pp. 1-2 — Harris, *The Great Fear*, pp. 116-117.

allowed to “carry out free sale of bread to State and cooperative organisations”. [329] Local newspapers followed suit and advertised that “kolkhoz trade in bread” would have been allowed only upon fulfilment of grain harvest and seeding. [330]

As of mid-1933, a year marked by a good harvest, [331] the Stalinist leadership seemed to have consistently taken the path of economic and political relaxation. [332] This trend fully manifested itself at the 17th Congress of 1934, dubbed of “victors” and regarded by Khlevnyuk as high watermark of what he called “‘soft’ Stalinism”. [333]

This mid-1930s relaxation was initially attributed to a supposed group of “moderates” headed by Kirov which would have curtailed Stalin’s power, [334] stripped him of the general secretaryship and even presented a “great plan of reforms” and a new constitutional act. [335] Archival research has however discredited claims that Stalin directly ordered Kirov’s assassination, [336] while no trace was also found of programmatic conflicts in the leadership. [337]

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[329] *Pravda*, 2 December 1932, p. 1.

[330] *Krasnoe Znamya*, 4 December 1932, p. 1.

[331] Davies, Wheatcroft, *The Years of Hunger*, pp. 248-249, 326.

[332] Harris, *The Great Fear*, p. 120.

[333] Khlevnyuk, *Master of the House*, p. 126.

[334] On this point, there exists evidence, first organically presented by Tucker, that Stalin received an unusually high number of negative votes at the Congress, probably ranging between 150 and 200 over a total of 1225 and that this was concealed — R. Tucker, *Stalin in Power. The Revolution from Above, 1928-1941* (New York, 1990), p. 260.

[335] B. Nicolaevsky, J.D. Zagoria, *Power and the Soviet Elite. “The letter of an old Bolshevik” and other essays* (New York, 1965), pp. 74-75, 91-93, 95-96 — G. Katkov, *The Trial of Bukharin* (London, 1969), p. 88.

[336] Getty, *Origins of the Great Purges*, pp. 207-220 — Lenoe, Prozumenshchikov, *The Kirov Murder and Soviet History*, pp. 672-676.

[337] Getty, Naumov, *The Road to Terror*, p. 102 — Khlevnyuk, *Master of the House*, p. 83-84 — G.M. Easter, *Reconstructing the State. Personal Networks and Elite Identity in Soviet Russia* (Cambridge, 2009), p. 94.

At the Congress Kuibyshev described as one of the Second Five-Year Plan's key priorities to "quickly transmit to the consumer the growing volume of commodities and to guarantee maximum satisfaction of his demands". In this respect trading organisations were to "diligently study consumers' demands, to attend more carefully to the service of the consumer and not to compel him to take any stale goods". [338]

Stalin himself criticised the "Leftist chatter […] to the effect that Soviet trade is a superseded stage; that it is necessary to organise the direct exchange of products; that money will soon be abolished, because it has become mere tokens". Those who believed that were "ridiculous and funny […] Don Quixotes". [339] Instead, Stalin stated "we shall use money for a long time to come, right up to the time when […] the socialist stage of development has been completed", an instrument of capitalism which had "adapted to the interests of socialism". [340]

This represented an unprecedented revision of Marxism, since the validity of economic levers such as money, trade and credit was extended beyond the "period of the revolutionary transformation". [341] Indeed, according to Marx, socialism would have been characterised by common ownership of the means of production, [342] "settled" or "preconceived" economic plans drawn up on the basis of "book-keeping", [343] but also by the abolition of the market, [344] as well as

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[338] V.V. Kuibyshev, *Seventeenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The Second Five-Year Plan* (Moscow-Leningrad, 1934), pp. 15-17, 39, 57.

[339] J.V. Stalin, 'Report to the Seventeenth Party Congress on the Work of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.)', in Stalin, *Works*, xiii, pp. 349.

[340] Ibid.

[341] Marx, 'Critique of the Gotha Programme', p. 26.

[342] Ibid,, p. 20.

[343] K. Marx, *Capital* (3 vols, Moscow, 1961), i, p. 80 — K. Marx, *Capital* (3 vols, Moscow, 1959), iii, pp. 184, 256

[344] Marx, Engels, *Manifesto*, pp. 72-73.

of money. [345] Allocation of goods would have taken place on the basis of each individual's "needs". [346]

The 1934 Congress, as it reduced yearly industrial growth targets from 19% to 16.5%, [347] triumphantly announced that the First-Five Year Plan had "laid the foundations of the socialist economy". [348] And even if the countryside was hardly pacified, [349] the resolution had a point: 83% of 25 million peasant households had been collectivised into 250.000 kholkhozes. [350] The unspoken human cost of this triumphalism ranged between 5.5 and 8.5 million deaths (with the highest estimates including victims of both famine and repression in 1930-33), [351] numbers in the main backed even by the Russian Duma. [352]

Finally, the 1934 Congress was also an important event for Voznesensky, who was elected member of the Commission for Soviet Control. As a result of this promotion, he started collaborating with Gosplan departments, [353] joining also a special commission, mostly composed of Gosplan members, tasked with drawing up "uniform planning indicators". [354]

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[345] Marx,*Capital*, iii, pp. 830.

[346] Marx, 'Critique of the Gotha Programme', p. 21.

[347] Davies, Wheatcroft, Khlevnyuk, *The Years of Progress. The Soviet Economy, 1934-1936*, pp. 12-13.

[348] VKP(b), *Resolyutsii XVII s"yezda VKP(b)* (Moscow, 1934), p. 5.

[349] S. Fitzpatrick, *Stalin's Peasants: Resistance and Survival in the Russian Village after Collectivization* (Oxford, 1994).

[350] R.W. Davies, 'Changing Economic Systems. An overview', in Davies, Harrison, Weatcroft (eds) *The Economic Transformation of the Soviet Union, 1913-1945*, pp. 18-21 — Davies, *Soviet Economic Development from Lenin to Khrushchev*, pp. 73-76 — Shearer, 'Stalinism, 1928–1940', p. 196.

[351] Davies, Wheatcroft, *The Years of Hunger*, p. 401 — R. Conquest, *The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-Famine* (Oxford, 1986), p. 306 — M. Ellman, 'The Role of Leadership Perceptions and of Intent in the Soviet Famine of 1931–1934', *Europe-Asia Studies*, 57/6 (2005), p. 828.

[352] Postanovleniye GD FS RF ot 02.04.2008 N 262-5 gd. 'O Zayavlenii Gosudarstvennoy Dumy Federal'nogo Sobraniya Rossiskoy Federatsii Pamyati Zhertv Goloda 30-kh godov na Territorii SSSR"', http://duma.consultant.ru/documents/955838 (17 July 2016).

[353] V.V. Kondrashin, *Golod v SSSR 1929-1934. Leto 1933 - 1934 gg.* (3 vols, Moscow, 2011), iii, pp. 613-622.

[354] Zaleski, *Stalinist Planning*, p. 58.

Shortly after, at the November CC Plenum, Molotov proudly announced that whereas in 1928 trade accounted for 15.6 bn of roubles, it had by then reached 61 bn roubles, as “private trade” which accounted for 22.5% of the total, had shrunk to “almost zero”. [355] Stalin himself reaffirmed the need “to strengthen monetary economy under Soviet conditions and trade in all its aspects” as well as to “expand commodity circulation”. Indeed, “without commodity circulation, without buying and selling”, Soviet trade would have been “unthinkable”, concluded Stalin. [356]

A further issue discussed at the November 1934 CC Plenum was rationing, whose abolition was discussed since 1932 and linked with the intention to make fuller use of wage incentives. [357] Stalin himself defined rationing a “mechanical, blind, bureaucratic [*kantselyarskomu*]” system where “the consumer is not considered”. Previously justified by economic hardship, such system now ought to be replaced by the new imperative, “approaching the consumer”. [358]

As a whole, 1934 was a year of moderation and successes. OGPU powers were curtailed, [359] unbalancing increases in industrial investment prevented, [360] while a poor harvest was counterbalanced by a robust, albeit uneven, 17.4% growth in industrial production. [361] Yet, Menshevik emigre Yugov saw no “neo-NEP” in 1934 and predicted a Soviet “Thermidorian degeneration”. [362]

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[355] *Pravda*, 30 November 1934, p. 2.

[356] I.V. Stalin, ‘Ob otmene kartochnoy sistemy. Iz rechi na Plenume TsK VKP(b), 26 noyabrya 1934 goda’, in I.V. Stalin, *Sochineniya* (18 vols, Tver, 1946-2006), xiix, pp. 74-81.

[357] R.W. Davies, O.V. Khlevnyuk, ‘The End of Rationing in the Soviet Union, 1934-1935’, *Europe-Asia Studies*, 54/6 (2002), p. 561.

[358] I.V. Stalin, ‘Ob otmene’, pp. 74-81.

[359] Harris, *The Great Fear*, pp. 120-121.

[360] R.W. Davies, M. Ilic, O.V. Khlevnyuk, ‘The Politburo and Economic Policy-making’, p. 114 — R.W. Davies, O.V. Khlevnyuk, ‘Stakhanovism and the Soviet Economy’, *Europe-Asia Studies*, 54/6 (2002), pp. 897-898.

[361] Davies, Wheatcroft, Khlevnyuk, *The Years of Progress. The Soviet Economy, 1934-1936*, pp., 68-70, 73, 75, 82-83.

[362] *Sotsialisticheskiy Vestnik*, 10 April 1934, p. 10.

The 1934 Congress and Plenum decrees on Soviet trade and money had a strong impact young economists and planners. Some merely adapted their thinking to the new course, while others enthusiastically endorsed it; Voznesensky belonged to the latter group. In an early display of rationalism, fresh of his Doctorate in economics, thirty-two years old Voznesensky strongly supported in 1935 the idea of de-bourgeoisied role money and trade as vital economic levers. [363] As argued by Harrison, soon Voznesensky would become one of the "most articulate theoretical exponents" of this new truth. [364]

On that same year, Voznesensky was noted by Zhdanov and brought to Leningrad, where he became head of the city Gosplan as well as Deputy Chairman of the LenSovet Executive Committee. [365] Although a local assignment, the chairmanship of Leningrad's Gosplan was actually a post of great importance, given the former capital's preeminent heavy and defence industries, [366] the only ones as of mid-1941 producing KV-1 heavy tanks. [367]

V.V. Kolotov, Voznesensky's biographer, reported an interesting conversation the newly elected Leningrad Gosplan Chairman had with his colleagues, which further proves his developing rationalising mindset. Voznesensky reminded them that "plan compilation is only the beginning of our work. Practice has shown that life itself will compel correction of any plan, even the most complete one". [368] This was, as Harrison noted, a clear quotation from Stalin's famous speech at

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[363] Voznesensky, 'O sovetskikh den'gakh, *Bol'shevik*, 2 (1935), pp. 36-45.

[364] Harrison, 'N.A. Voznesensky. A Soviet Commander of the Economic Front', p. 10-11.

[365] Kolotov, *Voznesensky. Biograficheskiy povest*, p. 154 — A.S. Orlov, *Istoricheskiy slovar'*, 2nd edn (Moscow, 2012), p. 91.

[366] A. Loisk, A. Shcherba, 'The Defence-Industry Complex in Leningrad (1): the Interwar Period', in Barber, Harrison (eds), *The Soviet Defence-Industry Complex from Stalin to Khrushchev*, pp.173-182.

[367] W.S. Dunn, Jr., *Stalin's Keys to Victory. The Rebirth of the Red Army* (Mechanicsburg, 2007), p. 36.

[368] Kolotov, *Voznesensky. Biograficheskiy povest*, p. 166.

the 16th Congress in 1930. [369] Yet, if at that time these words were a call for maximalism, Harrison stated that in 1935 they were used by Voznesensky to argue for "the accumulation of evidence of plan failure" aiming at "scaling down […] excessive demand". [370]

When his colleagues answered Voznesensky that there were other organisations charged with such duties, Voznesensky answered "why think of other organisations' responsibilities? We will think of ours". "Correcting the plan by means of studying the real conditions for its fulfilment on the ground is our job, and no one else's. We will think about what we need to do", enigmatically concluded Voznesensky. When asked by one of his colleagues what that meant, he said with a smile "[it means] that one of the key and most valuable human reflexes is the reflex of initiative, which subordinates all others", a quotation of Academician I. Pavlov, a Russian psychologist Nobel laureate of 1904. [371]

Another future leading Soviet official started his career in the same years in Leningrad, A.N. Kosygin, whose rise into the top leadership followed a path very similar to Voznesensky's. Upon graduating from the Leningrad Textile Institute, the future Soviet Premier became the head of a local factory and was noted by Zhdanov. [372] Kosygin therefore entered in close contact and collaborated with Voznesensky, A.A. Kuznetsov, P.S. Popkov and M.I. Rodionov, all key members of what would become Zhdanov's "Leningraders" faction. [373] As confirmed by A.

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[369] The full quotation reads as follows: "for us, for the Bolsheviks, the five-year plan does not represent something finished and once and for all given. For us, the five-year plan, like any plan, is barely a plan, adopted in the order [to gain] a first approximation, which must be specified, changed and improved on the basis of the experience of the territories, on the basis of experience in implementing the plan […] Only bureaucrats can think that the planned work ends with the drawing up of a plan. Drawing up a plan is only the beginning of planning. Actual planning direction is deployed only after the plan is drawn up, after verification on the ground, during implementation, correction and refinement of the plan" — VKP(b), *XVI s"yezd Vsesoyuznoy Kommunisticheskoy Partii(b). Stenograficheskiy otchet* (Moscow, Leningrad 1930), p. 49.

[370] Harrison, *Soviet Planning in Peace and War*, pp. 13-14.

[371] Kolotov, *Voznesensky. Biograficheskiy povest*, p. 166.

[372] G.Kh. Popov et. al., *100 let so dnya rozhdeniya A. N. Kosygina : stenogr. kruglogo stola, 18 fevr. 2004 g.* (Moscow, 2004), p. 12.

[373] A. Gvishiani, *Fenomen Kosygina. Zapiski Vnuka. Mneniya sovremennikov* (Moscow, 2004), pp. 39-40 — V.I. Andrianov, *Kosygin* (Moscow, 2003), p. 129.

Gvishiani, Kosygin and Voznesensky "knew [each other] well since Leningrad", [374] while the former's daughter noted how her father "deeply respected" Voznesensky. [375] Kosygin himself told D.A. Granin during a conversation in 1978 that he and Voznesensky "were friends since the Leningrad times". [376]

The mid 1930s was also the period when, after the 1934 decrees and with Stalin's strong support, rationing did come to an end — on bread starting from 1 January 1935, on all remaining foodstuff from 1 October 1935 and on all industrial consumer goods from 1 January 1936. Broadly similar ration, commercial and kolkhoz prices, a relatively healthy economy and a "stringent" financial policy allowed the leadership to avoid a currency reform and to steadily increase both food and industrial consumer goods supply. [377]

"Life has improved, comrades, life has become more joyous", proclaimed Stalin in November 1935, adding that "equalisation of people's material conditions, based on a poor man's standard of living" was "petty-bourgeois conception of socialism", since true socialism meant "abundance of products" and "a prosperous and cultured life for all members of society". [378]

If a currency reform was successfully avoided in the wake of the abolition of rationing, a reshuffling of prices became instead unavoidable. Both retail prices and raw materials wholesale prices for intra-industry trade had risen, which in turn caused the cost of wages, materials and in general of industrial production to rise too. [379]

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[374] Gvishiani, *Fenomen Kosygina*, p. 63.

[375] L. Gvishiani-Kosygina, 'Ob Ottse', in T.I. Fetisov (ed), *Prem'yer Izvestnyy i Neizvestnyy, Vospominaniya o A. N. Kosygine* (Moscow, 1997), p. 176.

[376] D.A. Granin, *Prichudy moyey pamyati* (Moscow, 2009), p. 411.

[377] Davies, Khlevnyuk, 'The End of Rationing in the Soviet Union', pp. 592-594.

[378] J.V. Stalin, 'Speech at the First All-Union Conference of Stakhanovites. November 17, 1935', in Stalin, *Works*, xiv, p. 91.

[379] Ibid.

Sine 1928, Soviet production was planned and accounted for in the so-called “unchanged prices of 1926-1927”. Yet, as commodities and products had multiplied, so did their prices, which were simply “invented retrospectively”. Unchanged prices functioned as account unit and formed the basis for the calculation of national income and production aggregates, but were not used in actual sale or transfer transactions. Prevailing prices, both retail and wholesale, greatly differed from them and formed both factor incomes and allocated purchasing power. [380]

The centre used the unchanged prices system to tackle enterprises’ opportunism, hoarding, concealment of productive capacities and inflated requests for inputs and since the leadership thought such system was fundamentally sound, a “conservative reform” was launched in 1935-1936. These measures further centralised price-setting, introduced the *tsenniki* (i.e. unified unchanged price schedules) for existing products, which were mandatory for enterprises, deflated new prices for existing products to the 1926-1927 prices basis, strengthened control over the correspondence between output calculations in old and new prices. [381]

In all, 1935 and 1936 were years of economic success, as industrial output went above plan and, after an initial disappointing performance of defence production, a massive spending increase caused an “unprecedented” 53.3% growth. [382] Yet, dark clouds were thickening as key confessions were extracted from former Leftists by the NKVD. [383]

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[380] Harrison, ‘Prices, Planners, and Producers’, pp. 1032-1033.

[381] Ibid., pp. 1035-1045, 1048-1050 — M.C. Kaser, ‘Soviet Planning and the Price Mechanism’, *The Economic Journal*, 60/237 (1950), pp. 87-88.

[382] Davies, Wheatcroft, Khlevnyuk, *The Years of Progress. The Soviet Economy, 1934-1936*, pp. 38, 76, 90, 95-96, 193, 203, 254, 268-269, 274-280-283, 296, 310-313, 321-323, 326, 385.

[383] Harris, *The Great Fear*, p. 141.

1.5. — The descent into mass repression

By the mid-late 1930s, the Politburo was being emptied of effective powers, [384] as the "collegial oligarchic approach", according to Wheatcroft, gave way to "degenerate tyranny", [385] to Stalin's "personal dictatorship". [386]

Yet, uneasiness amongst some of Stalin's the most senior lieutenants was mounting. In June 1936, the second plenum of the Heavy Industry Commissariat's Council took place. There Ordzonikidze suggested to utilise as main planning indicator "how much of the finished product we release", although the main topic at issue soon became the rising coercion applied against managers. [387] According to A.M. Khachaturianz of the Trust "Stalin" managers "do not work intensively due to accusations that are indiscriminately pressed on them". [388] Ordzhonikidze himself clearly stated that "these are not saboteurs, but good people, our sons, our brothers and our comrades, wholly and fully in favour of Soviet power". [389]

Khlevnyuk proved how Ordzhonikidze had come to consider "real Stalinism [as] 'excessively' terroristic", which prompted "serious disagreements" between him and Stalin. He endorsed a "softer" approach, the likes of 1934's "soft Stalinism". [390] However, the late 1930s were no time

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[384] Davies, Wheatcroft, Khlevnyuk, *The Years of Progress. The Soviet Economy, 1934-1936*, p. 113 — Harris, *The Great Fear*, p. 114.

[385] Wheatcroft, 'From Team-Stalin to Degenerate Tyranny, pp. 79, 90-91.

[386] O.V. Khlevnyuk, 'Stalin as dictator. The personalisation of power', in S. Davies, J. Harris (eds), *Stalin. A New History* (Cambridge, 2005), p. 108 — Khlevnyuk, *Master of the House*, p. xxi.

[387] M.A. Fel'dman, 'Mesto stakhanovskogo dvizheniya v predvoyennoy sovetskoy istorii', *Voprosy istorii*, 8 (2015), p. 13.

[388] Khlevnyuk, *Politburo. Mekhanizmy politicheskoy vlasti,* p. 174.

[389] Davies, Wheatcroft, Khlevnyuk, *The Years of Progress. The Soviet Economy, 1934-1936*, p. 305.

[390] Khlevnyuk, *In Stalin's shadow*, pp. 175-176.

for moderation and the Great Terror represented both the apex of repression in the USSR and "the high water mark of Stalin's dictatorship". [391]

Stalin had come to increasingly fear the resentment generated by the Great Break and was not appeased by the stabilisation achieved, nor by his partnership with the nomenklatura. [392] He was also suspicious of what had become widespread patronage networks and, [393] moving against them, Stalin generated disquiet even amongst his closest collaborators. [394]

By late 1936, Stalin thought his leadership was in mortal danger, [395] as he prefigured foreign aggression working in concert with former oppositionists, aided by corrupt officials and hostile sections of the population. [396] Therefore, the *vozhd* launched and attempted to direct an unprecedented campaign of terror. Yet, just as with planning, if the administrative establishment of practices and structures was successful, [397] their functioning was imperfect and prone to chaos and abuses of power, as mass repression became affected by local and bureaucratic dynamics too. [398]

Terror destroyed the remnants of the collective leadership and wiped out the Old Bolsheviks, cementing Stalin's personal rule and empowering a new generation of lieutenants. [399] Alongside

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[391] Ibid., p. 252-253 — Rogovin, *Stalin's Terror of 1937-1938*, p. 130.

[392] Getty, Naumov, *The Road to Terror*, pp. 571-572.

[393] Khlevnyuk, *Master of the House*, p. 170.

[394] Getty, Naumov, *The Road to Terror*, p. 579.

[395] J. Harris, 'Intelligence and Threat Perception. Defending the Revolution, 1917-1937', in J. Harris (ed), *The Anatomy of Terror. Political Violence under Stalin* (Oxford, 2013), p. 31.

[396] J.V. Stalin, 'Report and Speech in Reply to Debate at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.', in Stalin, *Works*, xiv, p. 241.

[397] P.R. Gregory, *Terror by Quota. State security from Lenin to Stalin (an archival study)* (New Haven, 2009), pp. 252-281.

[398] Getty, Naumov, *The Road to Terror*, pp. 571-572, 578.

[399] Gorlizki, Khlevnyuk, *Stalin and his circle*, pp. 249-253.

scores of former Oppositionists perished dozens of high-ranking Stalinists: the ferocious anti-Trotskyst Postyshev was even accused of Trotskysm, [400] while Chubar was arrested while supervising the construction of a Gulag in Solikamsk. [401] Political suicides also returned a common phenomenon and after Ordzhonikidze took his own like, even “Iron” Lazar Kaganovich broke into tears. [402]

1.6. — Stalin’s first decade

The 1930s witnessed the birth of the command system, whose cornerstones became central planning committees and Commissariat, collectivised agriculture, prioritised heavy industry and sidelined light one, mandatory plan targets, physical control of production, fixed prices, capital and material allocation. [403] In real terms, during the first two Five-Year Plans, industrial production and investment increased yearly of 11% and 14% respectively, while if heavy manufacturing produce jumping from 31 to 63% of the total, [404] agricultural production barely equalled 1913 levels. [405] In all, the Stalinist leadership decided to concentrate material and human resources on large-scale projects and, although strategic goals were achieved in the main, largely disregarding economic and human costs, planned targets were not. [406]

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[400] AP RF, f. 3. op. 24. d. 489. ll. 23-91, in A. Artizov (ed), *Reabilitatsiya. Kak Eto Bylo. Dokumenty Prezidiuma Tsk KPSS i Drugiye Materialy, Mart 1953 - fevral' 1956* (3 vols, Moscow 2000-2004), i, p. 328.

[401] Khlevnyuk, *Politburo. Mekhanizmy politicheskoy vlasti,* p. 229

[402] Khlevnyuk, *In Stalin’s shadow*, p. 160.

[403] R.W. Davies, ‘Changing Economic Systems. An overview’, pp. 18-21 — Davies, *Soviet Economic Development from Lenin to Khrushchev*, pp. 73-76 — Shearer, ‘Stalinism, 1928-1940, p. 196.

[404] Gregory, Stuart, *Russian and Soviet Economic Performance and Structure*, pp. 79-80.

[405] Davies, Harrison, Wheatcroft (eds), *The Economic Transformation of the Soviet Union, 1913-1945*, p. 285.

[406] G.W. Nutter, A. Nove, N. Spulber, ‘Discussion’, p. 574 — R.E. Ericson, ‘Command Economy and its Legacy’, in M. Alexeev, S. Weber (eds),*The Oxford Handbook of the Russian Economy* (New York, 2013), p. 4 — M. Harrison, ‘Stalinism in post-communist perspective’, *Europe-Asia Studies*, 49/3 (1997), p. 501 — Davies, *The Soviet Economy in Turmoil*, p. 486 — Gregory, Stuart, *Russian and Soviet Economic Performance and Structure*, p. 70.

This strategy was by no rational means a success, [407] nor however a total failure. [408] It instead not only achieved the leaders' strategic goals, but also provided a degree economic and social benefits to sections of the population, [409] whilst however simultaneously ingraining in the economic system inefficiency, resistance to innovation and opportunism. [410]

The construction of the command economy proceeded alongside that of Stalin's personal rule, who as of 1937 weakened official agencies to the point of starting to form his own wieldy decision-making groups, such as that tasked on 13 April 1937 to address secret and foreign policy affairs urgent issues, which included Molotov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov and Ezhov. [411]

Yet, for as much as the politics and economics of Stalinism represented a radical departure from pre-1928 realities, continuities and revivals also marked the 1930s. After all, it was "comrade Stalin [who] directly connect[ed] the necessity of money in the first phase of communism with its role in the deployment of commodity circulation". [412] Precisely having systematised in socialist economics the role of the "monetary system in the transition to communism", [413] as well as having "pointed to the enormous importance of people's material interest as an incentive to

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[407] C.K. Wilber, *The Soviet Model and Underdeveloped Countries* (Chapel Hill, 1968), pp. 500-501.

[408] S. Rosefielde, 'Stalinism in Post-Communist Perspective. New Evidence on Killings, Forced Labour and Economic Growth in the 1930s', *Europe-Asia Studies*, 48/6 (1996), p. 980.

[409] Davies, *Soviet Economic Development from Lenin to Khrushchev*, p. 77.

[410] P.R. Gregory, A. Markevich, 'Creating Soviet Industry. The House That Stalin Built', *Slavic Review*, 61/4 (2002), p. 813.

[411] D. Watson, 'The Politburo and Foreign Policy in the 1930s', in E. A. Rees (ed), *The Nature of Stalin's Dictatorship*, p. 151 — Rogovin, *Stalin's Terror of 1937-1938*, pp. 130-131.

[412] V. Batirev, 'K voprosu o roli deneg i kredita v rasshirennom sotsialisticheskom vosproizvodstve', *Problemi ekonomiki*, 5 (1939), p. 64.

[413] G. Kozlov, 'Stalinskaya teoriya sovetskikh deneg', *Problemi ekonomiki*, 1 (1940) p. 116, 123.

work", [414] were merits that Stalin would be credited for even after de-Stalinisation and as late as in 1988. [415]

[414] A.I. Pashkov, 'Politicheskaya Ekonomiya Sotsializma v Rabote I.V. Stalina "Istoriya VKP(v). Kratkiy Kurs"', in A.I. Pashkov (ed), *Voprosy sotsialisticheskoy ekonomiki* (Moscow, 1951), p. 25.

[415] KPSS, *XXII s"yezd KPSS i voprosy ideologicheskoy raboty: materialy Vsesoyuznogo soveshchaniya po voprosam ideologicheskoy raboty, 25-28 dekabrya 1961 goda* (Moscow, 1962), p. 443 — Bukharin, 'Put' k sotsializmu', p. 198.

Chapter 2. — The Third Five-Year Plan and the War, 1938-1945

The second chapter focuses on Voznesensky's pre-war tenure as Gosplan Chairman, describing the resurrection of the balance method, the creation of new Gosplan committees as well as the first attempt at drawing up a General Plan and at drafting a revised Party Programme. The chapter also covers the Second World War and specifically focuses on Voznesensky's political fortunes and contribution to the economic victory. The chapter includes six subsections, two chronological ones detailing the post-terror reorganisation of the Soviet leadership and the war period, as well as four thematic ones focusing on economic policy and debates, his contact with Kantorovich during the war and the early 1940s revision of the Soviet truth on the law of value.

2.1. — The end of terror and the rise of a new leadership

As a result of the Great Terror, the Soviet elites suffered near-destruction: out of all members of the 1917 Politburo and Sovnarkom, only Stalin, Kollontai and Trotsky were alive in 1938, while half of the delegates at the 17th Congress of "victors" were arrested and 70% of its elected CC shot. [416] The Army officers corps was wiped out and even state security was wrecked by the repression it waged, as two Internal Affairs Commissars, dozens of Old *Chekists* first and Ezhov men then were purged. [417] Economic administration was also severely hit as "a whole generation

[416] '80 let nazad v Moskve otkrylsya XVII s"yezd VKP(b), voshedshiy v istoriyu kak «S"yezd rasstrelyannykh»', http://www.istpravda.ru/artifacts/7404/ (14 September 2017) — M. Voslenskiy, *Nomenklatura. gospodstvuyushchiy klass Sovetskogo Soyuza* (Moscow, 1990), p. 100.

[417] L.A. Naumov, *Bor'ba v rukovodstve NKVD 1936-1938 gg.* (Moscow, 2006) — M.I Tumshis, A. Papchinskiy, *1937. Bol'shaya chistka. NKVD protiv ChK* (Moscow, 2009).

of managers" was wiped out and if Gosplan was even left orphan of its standing and previous Chairmen, all major Commissariats and Gosbank were beheaded too. [418]

The economy's performance and administration were also disrupted by the Great Terror, [419] as well as by ramping up defence investment, since troops and ammunition supply doubled in 1938-1940. [420]

A further effect of this bacchanalia of death was however the opening up of unprecedented opportunities for upward social mobility. Indeed, as the terror was called off, to restore basic functioning mechanisms, young and eager officials like Voznesensky and Kosygin were promoted.

As previously noted (pp. 63-65), both of them had started their respective careers in Leningrad in the mid-1930s, sponsored by Zhdanov. Yet, positions of much greater responsibility were awaiting them. Voznesensky became Gosplan Deputy Chairman in September 1937 and soon after, on 19 January 1938 he received a call from Molotov, who asked him to address Sovnarkom about the 1938 economic plan the following day. When Voznesensky noted how "this speech should be delivered by the Chairman [of Gosplan]", Molotov answered "yes, by the Chairman; you, Nikolai Alekseevich, shall deliver the report as Gosplan Chairman". [421]

As a matter of fact, the Chairman of Gosplan could not possibly address anybody, given he was in jail since December 1937. As a result of the Great Terror, Voznesensky inherited an agency

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[418] O.V. Khlevnyuk, 'Economic Officials in the Great Terror, 1936-38', in M. Ilic (ed), *Stalin's Terror Revisited* (Basingstoke, 2006).

[419] R.W. Davies, M. Harrison, 'The Soviet Military-economic Effort during the Second Five-year Plan (1933-1937)', *Europe-Asia Studies*, 49/3 (1997), p. 369.

[420] Davies, Harrison, 'The Soviet Military-Economic Effort under the Second Five-Year Plan', pp. 373-374 — R.W. Davies, 'Planning for Mobilization: the 1930s', in M. Harrison (ed), *Guns and Rubles. The Defense Industry in the Stalinist State* (New Haven, 2008), pp. 119-121.

[421] *Voznesensky Nikolai Alekseevich*, p. 76

whose leadership had been almost entirely annihilated: of the five previous Chairmen, V.I. Mehrulak and G.I. Smirnov had disappeared in the terror, A.D. Tzyurupa and V.V. Kuibyshev had died of natural causes, while G.M. Krzhizhanovsky had moved to scientific-technical institutions. Out of the twenty-one present and past Gosplan Deputy and First Deputy Chairmen, only five survived the terror and only one, A.A. Troyanovskii, had briefly served in the 1930s, with all other survivors having first joined and later left Gosplan between 1921 and 1930. [422]

Kosygin instead became head of the Leningrad Party Obkom industrial-transport department in July 1938 and Chairman of the LenSovet Executive Committee the following October. [423] At this point, it was Voznesensky who recommended Kosygin to Mikoyan. The Commissar of Light Industry therefore proposed Kosygin to head the Main Department of Textile Industry, but Kosygin explained he wanted to finish his job as Mayor of Leningrad. At that point Mikoyan "friendlily bid Kosygin goodbye", [424] but the future Soviet Premier nevertheless became Commissar of Textile Industries in a matter of months. [425]

Shortly after Voznesensky and Kosygin's promotions, Molotov presented the Third Five-Year Plan at the 18th Congress in 1939, announcing that 98.7% of the means of production had been nationalised and that the country was entering "the era of the completion of the building of classless, socialist society, and of the gradual transition from socialism to communism". [426] Bolsheviks had much to rejoice: GNP had almost doubled between 1913 and 1940, reaching 223.6 billion roubles (at 1937 factor cost), [427] growing in 1928-1940 of 5-6% yearly (10% at 1928

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[422] Khlevnyuk, 'Economic Officials in the Great Terror, 1936-38', pp. 39-40.

[423] A.M. Prohorov et. al. (ed), *Bol'shaya Sovetskaya Enzikolopediya*, 3rd ed (30 vols, Moscow 1970-1978), xiii, p. 282.

[424] Gvishiani, *Fenomen Kosygin*a, p. 63.

[425] A.M. Prohorov et. al. (ed), *Bol'shaya Sovetskaya Enzikolopediya*, xiii, p. 282.

[426] K Vosemnadtsatomu S"yezdu VKP(v). Tretiy Pyatiletniy Plan Razvitiya Narodnogo Khozyaystva SSSR (1938-1942 gg.), *Problemi ekonomiki*, 1 (1939), pp. 4-7.

[427] Davies, Harrison, Wheatcroft (eds), *The Economic Transformation of the Soviet Union, 1913-1945*, p. 269.

prices). [428] Yearly heavy industrial growth rates reached unprecedented levels: energy kilowatt hours had gone from 3.2 billion to 31 billion, coal production from 10 to 73 million tons, iron ore from 1 to 5 million tons, steel from 2 to 9 million tons. [429] Yet, household consumption had fallen from 80.5% of national product to 52.2%, while as of 1939 gross agricultural production stood at 11.092 million roubles (at 1926/1927 unchanged prices), barely surpassing 1913's and was still below 1929 levels. [430]

It was in this atmosphere that, upon his promotion, Voznesensky set about reviving economic practices and debates which had flourished before the Great Break. [431] Kolotov wrote that the new Chairman's top priorities were "perspective planning […], ensuring the proportionality of the development of the national economy [and] the systematic verification of the implementation of the national-economic plan". [432] This was a scientific and rationalising approach to planning, which stood in open contrast with voluntarism. Voznesensky would substantiate these priorities with a General Plan project, the resurrection of the balance of the national economy method and the establishment of new Gosplan agencies. These early elements of Voznesensky's economic thought and practical approach would remain amongst his top priorities throughout the following decade.

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[428] Davies, *Soviet Economic Development from Lenin to Khrushchev*, p. 42.

[429] Iu.A. Poliakov et al., *Naseleniye Rossii v XX veke. Istoricheskiye ocherki. 1900–1939* (3 vols, Moscow, 2000), i, p. 220.

[430] Davies, Harrison, Wheatcroft (eds), *The Economic Transformation of the Soviet Union, 1913-1945*, pp. 272, 285.

[431] Katz, *The politics of economic reform in the Soviet Union*, p. 26.

[432] Kolotov, *Voznesensky. Biograficheskiy povest*, p. 184.

2.2. — The 18th Congress, revision of the Party Programme and General Plan

As discussed above, perspective planning became one of Voznesensky's key interests. His contribution to its development ought however to be framed within the broader context of communist construction. [433]

As of the late 1930s, the VKP(b) Programme was still the one adopted in 1917. Throughout the 1920s great emphasis had been put on adopting a Comintern one, [434] to replace the 1919 Manifesto. [435] Yet, this latter one's the first drafts, factional struggles within the VKP(b) appeared too, [436] while Stalin's growing interest into the matter, Bukharin affirmed, "spoiled" the Programme "in many places". [437]

Said Programme was finally adopted in 1928 when, [438] despite pronouncements to the contrary, [439] internationalism was actually waning, [440] and was clearly marked by the idea of a gradual and cooperative path towards socialism. [441] It affirmed that "money form of accounting, payment for

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[433] Kolotov, *Voznesensky. Biograficheskiy povest*, p. 184.

[434] Komintern, *Protokoll des III. Kongress der Kommunistischen Internationale (Moskau, 22. Juni bis 12. Juli 1921)* (Hamburg, 1921), p. 472 — Komintern, *Protokoll des Vierten Kongresses der Kommunistischen Internationale*, pp. 54-543 — Komintern, *Protokoll der Konferenz der Erweiterten Exekutive der Kommunistischen Internationale, Moskau, 12.-23. Juni 1923* (Milano, 1967), pp. 250-251.

[435] *Manifesto and Governing Rules of the Communist International* (Chicago, 1919).

[436] A. Vatlin, *Komintern. Idei, resheniya sud'by* (Moscow, 2009), pp. 209-213.

[437] RGASPI, f. 84, op. 2, d. 40, ll. 2-11, in A.Yu. Vatlin, V.P. Danilov, O.V. Khlevnyuk (eds), *Kak lomali NEP. Ob"yedinennyy plenum TSK i TSKK VKP(b) 6–11 aprelya 1928 g. Stenograficheskiy otchet* (5 vols, Moscow, 2000), iv, p. 562.

[438] Komintern, *Protokoll Funfter Kongress der Kommunistischen Internationale. Band I* (Milano, 1967), sp. 1008.

[439] Komintern, *Protokoll des 6. Weltkongress der Kommunistische Internationale, Juli-September 1928, Dritter Band* (Milano, 1967), p. 622.

[440] Vatlin, *Komintern*, p. 224.

[441] Comintern, *Program of the Communist International* (New York, 1929), pp. 5, 30-31, 41-43, 49-52.

labour in money, buying and selling, credit and banks […] serve as levers for the socialist transformation". [442] Despite the downfall of NEP, it was this Programme that the VKP(b) referred to when its 16th Congress of 1930 first instructed the CC to "to revise the Party Programme on the basis of the Programme of the Communist International". [443]

However, no concrete steps were taken in the following five years while the Party progressed in its quest to build socialism. At the 1930 Congress itself Stalin had spoken of the "colossal possibilities that our system gives us in the struggle for the complete victory of socialism", specifying that "[this] possibility is not yet a reality". [444] The 17th Conference of 1932 instead defined the First Five-Year Plan as a key example of the "victory of the construction of socialism in the USSR", which represented the "basis for [its] further still more powerful growth". [445]

The 17th Congress of 1934 instead opened with Molotov affirming that "socialism in the USSR has won" and that "the programme of the Second Five-Year Plan gives impetus to the building of a classless socialist society" since, Kuibyshev added, the First Five-Year Plan had already "achieved decisive successes in building socialism". Stalin himself even more emphatically stated that "among raging waves of economic shocks and military-political catastrophes, the USSR stands alone as a cliff, continuing its work of socialist construction and the struggle to preserve peace". [446]

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[442] Ibid., pp. 48, 63.

[443] VKP(b), *XVI s"yezd*, p. 723

[444] Ibid., p. 47.

[445] VKP(b), *XVII Konferentsiya Vsesoyuznoy Kommunisticheskoy Partii(b).Stenograficheskiy otchet* (Moscow, Leningrad, 1932), p. 277

[446] VKP(b), *XVII s"yezd Vsesoyuznoy Kommunisticheskoy Partii(b). Stenograficheskiy otchet* (Moscow, 1934), pp. 5, 8, 380.

The revision of the Programme became however unavoidable two years after, given that the 1917 Programme revolved around the "replacement of capitalism by socialism", [447] while the new 1936 Constitution declared socialism achieved. Indeed, addressing the Congress of Soviets in 1936, Stalin affirmed that "our Soviet society has already, in the main, succeeded in achieving socialism". [448]

As of the mid-1930s communist construction was still understood as comprising Marx and Engels' "first" and "higher" phases, [449] which later Lenin called "socialism" and "communism". [450] Stalin, at that time called "Lenin today", [451] contributed to to said theory with something that, praised to the utmost in the USSR, [452] in fact resonated more with what Lenin called "prostitution of Marxism". [453] Marx had spoken of the proletarian society as being regulated by the principle "from each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs". [454] Yet, whereas the first 1919 Constitution only mentioned that "he who does not work, neither shall he eat!", [455] the reformed 1936 one coupled such principle with a slightly, but meaningfully modified version of the original battlecry: "from each according to his abilities, to each according to his labor". [456]

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[447] V.I. Lenin, 'Revision of the Party Programme', in Lenin, *Collected Works*, xxvi, p. 155.

[448] J.V. Stalin, 'On the Draft Constitution of the U.S.S.R.', pp. 164-165.

[449] K. Marx, 'Critique of the Gotha Programme', in K. Marx, F. Engels, *Marx/Engels Selected Works* (3 vols, Moscow, 1970), iii, p. 3.

[450] V.I. Lenin, 'The State and Revolution', in V.I. Lenin, *Collected Works* (45 vols, Moscow and London, 1960-1970), xxv, pp. 416-418.

[451] H. Barbusse, *Staline. Un monde nouveau vu à travers un homme* (Paris, 1935), p. 312.

[452] D. Manuilski, 'Velikii Teoretik Kommunizma', *Kommunisticheskiy Internatsional*, 11-12 (1939), p. 78 — O. Gluhareva, 'Khronika - Istoricheskaya Nauka v SSSR', *Istorik-Marksist*, 3 (1940), pp. 153-158.

[453] V.I. Lenin, 'The Collapse of the Second International', in Lenin, *Collected Works*, xxi, pp. 210, 231, 234, 255

[454] Marx, 'Critique of the Gotha Programme', in Marx, Engels, *Marx/Engels Selected Works*, iii, p. 6.

[455] Yu.S. Kukushkin, O.I. Chistyakov, *Ocherk istorii Sovetskoy Konstitutsii* (Moscow, 1987), p. 245.

[456] *Konstitutsiya (Osnovnoy Zakon) Soyuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik* (Moscow, 1937), p. 11.

In essence, Stalin “downgraded” Marx’s “first phase”, whose regulator presupposed, albeit not a not fully developed way, abundance, a money-less economy as well as classless and stateless society. Stalin’s remuneration according to labour meant instead lack of abundance and reliance on a wages system based on monetary value, given the impossibility to practically deploy Marx’s labour theory of value. This was coupled three years later with the admittance that the State would actually not wither away as long as capitalist encirclement persisted. [457]

Trotsky openly defined Stalin’s revision “inwardly contradictory” and “nonsensical”, [458] but in the USSR attention focused on a basic objective truth, which Molotov presented at the 18th Congress in 1939. Indeed, if “socialism - the first phase of communism - has already been built in the main in our country”, this meant that the “gradual transition from socialism to communism” had become an immediate priority. [459]

Precisely in the run-up to the Congress, the first concrete steps in the revision of the Party Programme were taken. Academician M.B. Mitin and Director of the Academy’s Institute of Philosophy P.F. Yudin on one side and Manuilsky, Secretary of Comintern’s Executive Committee, on the other, were tasked with drafting two proposals. In both drafts, submitted in October 1938, the incoming transition to communism figured prominently and Manuilski even wrote of a “classless socialist society” before a communist one. [460]

In both drafts, reflections on economics were entirely overshadowed by crude ideology. Mitin and Yudin powerfully reaffirmed the primacy of heavy industry, referring to “electrification […],

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[457] J.V. Stalin, ‘Report on the Work of the Central Committee to the Eighteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U. (B) March 10, 1939’, in Stalin, *Works*, xiv, pp. 415-416.

[458] L. Trotsky, *The Revolution Betrayed. What is the Soviet Union and where is it Going?* (Detroit, 1991), p. 220.

[459] VKP(b), *XVIII s"yezd Vsesoyuznoy Kommunisticheskiy Partii(b). 10-21 Marta 1939 g. Stenograficheskiy otchet* (Moscow, 1939), pp. 282-283

[460] RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 476, l. 65.

mechanisation, automatisation and chemicalisation of productive processes". Yet, improvements in housing were assigned a whole section and "liquidating housing need [i.e. shortage]" was listed as a priority. Also "monetary circulation, banking issues and finance" were assigned a separate section, where the relevance under socialism of money and wages was reaffirmed. [461]

Manuilski's draft was even more infused with ideology and he title of the main economics section, "Socialist conquests of the Soviet society", is telling of its content. Brief reference to "electrification […] mechanisation and automatisation" was overshadowed by apologetic praising of the panning and of its successes. [462]

Yet, it was only five months after the drafts were received that the 18th Congress of 1939 elected an official commission tasked with overseeing the revision of the Programme, which included Voznesensky. [463]

The Gosplan Chairman however used the 18th Congress as stage to propose his contribution to communist construction which resuscitated a device that had been left dormant since years. A decade earlier, as a student, Voznesensky had fallen under the spell of GOELRO and dreamt of seven giant interconnected energy rings, unified into a single Union-wide power transmission network. [464] Now, as Gosplan Chairman, he intended to scientifically plan a broader roadmap for all-economy development. Voznesensky therefore presented to his colleagues at Gosplan his proposal for a 15-20 years General Plan, meeting more concern than enthusiasm. "I don't know, really.. its it time for this?" answered one of Voznesensky's deputies. The Chairman therefore

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[461] RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 476, ll. 36-40, 45-46.

[462] Ibid., ll. 60-65, 94-96.

[463] VKP(b), *XVIII s"yezd*, pp. 7, 687.
The commission's membership was the following: I.V. Stalin (chairman), A.A. Andreev, M.D. Bagirov, I.A. Benediktov, L.P. Beria, N.A. Voznesensky, K.E. Voroshilov, A.Ya. Vyshinsky, V.A. Donskoy, A.A. Zhdanov, L.M. Kaganovich, M.I. Kalinin, D.S. Korotchenko, S.A. Lozovsky, G.M. Malenkov, D.Z. Manuilsky, L.Z. Mehlis, A.I. Mikoyan, M.B. Mitin, V.M. Molotov, P.N. Pospelov, N.A. Skvortsov, N.S. Khrushchev, N.M. Shvernik, A.S. Shcherbakov, U. Yusupov, E.M. Yaroslavsky.

[464] *Voznesensky Nikolai Alekseevich*, p. 55.

retorted, “do you think that Gosplan is not ready for such tasks?” and his deputy answered “no, I don’t think that. But..”. That “but..” possibly meant “but what does Stalin think about this?”. Indeed, there is no evidence Voznesensky gained any official approval to propose or begin drafting a General Plan. [465]

Notwithstanding his colleagues’ doubts, Voznesensky addressed the 18th Congress as follows:

> the historical period of completion of the construction of a socialist society and the transition to communism, the task to catch up and overtake the advanced capitalist countries in economic terms goes beyond the scope of the third Five-Year Plan. The correct consideration of all national economic relations and proportions connected with the solution of these historical problems raises the question of the development of a general economic plan, calculated for several five-year plans, calculated for the transition from socialism to communism. [466]

Even more emphatically, the young Gosplan Chairman concluded that “the time will come when Stalin will say: communism is no longer tomorrow, communism is today”. [467]

Kolotov reported that this announcement was met by the audience with a deafening silence, which he claimed was due to the fact that delegates realised Voznesensky’s proposal had yet to receive official blessing. [468] The official stenographic report of the Congress does confirm that silence was the answer to Voznesensky’s statement on the General Plan, but also demonstrates that, as opposed to most other speakers, Voznesensky only received the ritualistic concluding applauses and was never interrupted by any clapping delegate. [469] The lack of “applauses”,

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[465] Kolotov, *Voznesensky. Biograficheskiy povest*, p. 240.

[466] VKP(b), *XVIII s”yezd*, p. 340.

[467] Ibid.

[468] V.V. Kolotov, ‘Predsedatel' Gosplana’, *Literaturnaya gazeta*, 30 November 1963, p. 3.

[469] VKP(b), *XVIII s”yezd*, pp. 334-340.

"ovations" and "hurrahs", which for example characterised the delegates' reaction to the speech that preceded Voznesensky's, might however have more to do with the nature of his speech, rather than its content. I.D. Papanin, Head of the Main Directorate for the Northern Sea Passage, spoke before Voznesensky and had much to proudly announce, referring only sporadically to kilometres and tons of cargos. [470] Voznesensky's speech was instead an almost never-ending economic statistic and to better present it graphically the stenographic report included several tables. Delegates might therefore have been more bored than scared by Voznesensky's words and the ritualistic "prolonged ovations" at the end of his speech prove that the audience treated it just as any other one. [471] Moreover, precisely at the 18th Congress Voznesensky entered the CC, [472] whilst less than a month later, on 4 April 1939, he became Sovnarkom Deputy Chairman, [473] both unmistakable signs of Stalin's approval of the young Chairman of Gosplan. Nevertheless, that Voznesensky's General Plan proposal had not been officially approved prior to his Congress speech is certified by the fact that Gosplan unanimously approved requesting such approval in September 1940. [474]

Voznesensky's request was approved on 7 February 1941, just two weeks before the 20th anniversary of the decree with which Sovnarkom established Gosplan's first incarnation. On that same day, 22 February, *Pravda* officially announced on its first page that CC and Sovnarkom, "instructed Gospan to begin the drawing up of a general economic plan of the USSR for 15 years". That was a day of dazzling triumph for Voznesensky and Gosplan: on top of this announcement, the Chairman's photo was right on the front page, celebrating his election to candidate Politburo member alongside Scherbakov and Malenkov. And again, the original decree Lenin had approved in 1921 was published in full as well as an eulogy of planning and a

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[470] Ibid., pp. 330-334.

[471] Ibid., p. 340.

[472] Ibid., pp. 687-688.

[473] G.M. Adibekov, K.M.Anderson, L.A. Rogovaya (eds), *Politbyuro TsK RKP(b)-VKP(b). Povestki dnya zasedaniy. 1919-1952. Katalog 1930-1939* (3 vols, Moscow 2000-2001), ii, p. 1040.

[474] Kolotov, *Voznesensky. Biograficheskiy povest*, p. 249.

list of Gosplan officials who had been decorated. First was Voznesensky himself, who was awarded the highest Soviet decoration, the Order of Lenin. [475]

What is striking about the General Plan is that, even though authorisation for its drawing up was received only in February 1941, a very substantial amount of work was realised before the outbreak of the war in June. On top of preparatory work already carried out, as affirmed by A. Igolkin, the compilation the new plan proceeded at a "super-intense pace". [476]

Indeed, the whole of Gosplan was involved in the task and several working groups were formed up. Above all others, V.N. Starovskii was tasked with analysing the "results of socialist construction" in the 1917-1942 period, [477] in which he emphasised the "tremendous" economic and political successes of Soviet power, [478] while Voznesensky and G.M. Sorokin dealt with conceptualising the "main tasks" of the General Plan itself. [479]

In collecting the materials needed to draw up the estimates and in carrying out the analysis, Voznesensky heavily relied on experts. For example, a team of twenty-three Academicians, Corresponding Members and Commissariats' officials was brought together to work on the plan for electrification and many other industrial branches. [480]

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[475] *Pravda*, 22 February 1941, p. 1

[476] A.A. Igolkin, 'O proyekte General'nogo plana razvitiya narodnogo khozyaystva SSSR na 1943-1957 gg.', *Trudy Instituta rossiyskoy istorii*, 10 (2012), p. 205.

[477] RGAE, f. 4372, op. 41, d. 182, l. 3.

[478] RGAE, f. 4372. op. 43. d. 125-b. ll. 1-5.

[479] RGAE, f. 4372, op. 41, d. 182, l. 2.

[480] RGAE, f. 4372, op. 41, d. 182, ll. 63-64, 64-110.

Alongside the analysis of the Soviet economy in domestic and international perspective, a very careful study of the American, British and German economies was carried out. Upon these data, the necessary growth in each sector needed to catch up and overtake them was calculated. [481]

As of April 1941, Gosplan had prepared a memorandum on the General Plan, which was said to politically rely on the "victory of socialism in the USSR" and methodologically on the GOELRO plan. [482] Precisely the further implementation of "Leninist instructions on the electrification of the whole country" was defined as crucial not only for the necessary increase production, but also for a "sharp increase in the carrying capacity and in the economy of railways". [483]

Planned production quotas were carefully drawn up for each sector and branch and the plan highlighted the necessity to outperform capitalism in the production per capita of "pig iron, steel, fuel, electricity, machinery and other means of production and consumption". Targets like 65-79 mil. t. of pig iron and 85-90 mil. t. of steel were set for 1957. [484] Yet, in their final version, yearly industrial output growth was set at 8.2%, almost exactly half of what had been the initial predictions for the first two Five-Year Plans period. [485] It was nevertheless candidly admitted, as Kovalevsky had done while discussing the General Plan in 1930, [486] that certain "sacrifices" on the part of workers were to be made in the initial phases of the plan. [487]

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[481] RGAE, f. 4372, op. 41, d. 196-197.

[482] RGAE, f. 4372, op. 41, d. 199b, ll. 1, 5, 9-10.

[483] RGAE, f. 4372, op. 41, d. 199b, ll. 21, 153.

[484] RGAE, f. 4372, op. 41, d. 199b, l. 19.

[485] RGAE, f. 4372, op. 43, d. 125-g, l. 2.

[486] Kovalevsky, *K postroeniyu*, pp. 120-121.

[487] RGAE, f. 4372, op. 43. d. 125-b, l. 21.

The plan also highlighted the importance of reserves, particularly in the realm of scarce materials, [488] while technological advancement also played a key role in the 1941 memorandum, in particular "chemicalisation […] mechanisation and electrification". [489] Specifically "electrophysics" was defined as "the main technical basis for the long-range development of technology, the further increase of production, culture and the organisation of labor in all branches of the national economy". [490] Technological progress was to come about through "new machinery" and "new more intensive [productive] processes", "new high-quality and effective materials" as well as a general process of "full mechanisation of labour-intensive processes [and] automation of management and control in all industries". [491]

Much attention was also devoted to the drafting of the General Plan in the economic regions and for each locality, as specific quotas for each branch and major industry were worked out. [492]

In the materials sent by Gosplan to Sovnarkom, the General Plan was presented as a "gigantic programme of capital construction, mobilisation of savings [and] electrification", [493] the fulfilment of which would bring the country closer to communism. Yet, as opposed to Voznesensky's initial pronouncements, "the complete transformation of socialism into communism" was defined as a task extending beyond the Plan. [494]

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[488] RGAE, f. 4372, op. 41, d. 199b, l. 20.

[489] RGAE, f. 4372, op. 41, d. 199b, ll. 22-26.

[490] RGAE, f. 4372, op. 41, d. 199b, l. 39.

[491] RGAE, f. 4372, op. 41, d. 199b, ll. 60-67.

[492] RGAE, f. 4372, op. 41, d. 199b, ll. 216-470.

[493] RGAE, f. 4372, op. 41, d. 199b, ll. 30-32, 40, 66.

[494] RGAE, f. 4372. op. 43. d. 125-b. l. 18.

Igolkin stated that the Plan was generally speaking well drafted, especially in respect of heavy industry, [495] while Zaleski and Kaser pointed to its similarity with the Second Five-Year Plan and the short-lived second GOELRO Plan. [496] The General Plan's goals and strategy, continued Zaleski, resonated with classical Soviet planning, setting a 300% increase in investment to be brought about through "technical progress, tightening labor discipline, improving the organisation of production". [497]

Yet, the significance of Voznesensky's General Plan is to be found in the broader meaning that resurrecting this planning device had, which clearly transpired from the ambitious, but not wildly unrealistic goals it set. This was a rationalisation attempt, aimed at balancing economic growth and at adopting more realistic goals, to be achieved through technological progress and enhancement of efficiency. It was no rejection of Stalinist objectives, but of extreme voluntarism, aimed at combining said objectives with more scientific and rational practices. In a way, Voznesensky's intentions mirrored the original character assigned to General Plans in the 1920s, which according to geneticist Bazarov "must be a synthesis of the directive and the forecast, that is, it must have a specific target and a genetic scientific justification for its feasibility". [498]

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[495] Igolkin, 'O proyekte', p. 218.

[496] Zaleski, *Stalinist Planning*, p. 208 — Kaser, 'The Debate on the Law of Value in the USSR', p. 142.

[497] Zaleski, *Stalinist Planning*, pp. 208-209.

[498] Bazarov, 'Printsipy postroeniya', pp. 38, 40.

2.3. — Voznesensky's pre-war economic activities: balance of the national economy method and Gosplan committees

Simultaneously to his work on the General Plan, Voznesensky also brought about meaningful organisational changes at Gosplan, establishing new bodies which further proved his rationalising mindset and his willingness to operationalise it.

The first such bodies was the Institute of Commissioners, established in February 1938, through Gosplan's new regulations. [499] Voznesensky wished with it to operationalise his emphatic claim that "it is a matter of honour for planners […] to turn the socialist economic planning agencies into combat headquarters to check the fulfilment of national economic plans". [500] The new regulations' as a whole remarked Gosplan's role in ensuring "correct relations in the development of various industries and the necessary measures to prevent disproportions in the national economy". The new Institute would therefore send its representatives in the localities to check that "correct proportions" were maintained, to verify plan fulfilment and to "eliminate the inconsistencies arising in the course of their implementation". [501]

As highlighted by Baibakov, Commissioners did not answer to local authorities, but instead reported directly to Moscow. [502] On the ground, such officials dealt with "the combination, coordination, connection of sectoral and territorial planning", with the uncovering and utilisation of reserves as well as the drawing up of economic balances. They relied on monthly plans

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[499] M.F Zaloga (ed), *Upravleniye narodnym khozyaystvom SSSR 1917-1940 gg. Sbornik dokumentov* (Moscow, 1968), p. 216-217.

[500] N.A. Voznesensky, 'K Itogam Sotsialisticheskogo Vosproizvodstva vo Vtoroy Pyatiletke', *Bol'shevik*, 2 (1938), p. 16.

[501] V.A. Vinogradov, I.A. Gladkov (eds), *Istoriya sotsialisticheskoy ekonomiki SSSR. Sovetskaya ekonomika nakanune i v period Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny* (7 vols, Moscow, 1976-1980), v, p. 36 — A.V Mitrofanova, Z.K. Zvezdin, *Istoriya industrializatsii SSSR 1938-1941 gg.: dokumenty i materialy* (Moscow, 1973), p. 385.

[502] N. Baibakov, 'Iz vospominaniy', p. 142.

assigned by Gosplan and reported also to Sovnarkom, individual Commissariats and later to war-time agencies. [503]

The memoirs of commissioners, such as G.S. Bykov and B.N. Sebelnikova prove how before, during and after the hostilities, the Institute was perceived as a functional and much needed addition to the planning structure. [504] Baibakov even defined its creation as "one of the great merits of Voznesensky". [505]

With the Institute of Commissioners, Voznesensky succeeded in establishing a planning agency officially tasked with what his comrades in Leningrad disputed was Gosplan's duty, namely "correcting the plan by means of studying the real conditions for its fulfilment on the ground". [506] Throughout the following years, Voznesensky would continuously repeat that "critical condition for the execution of the tasks set by the plan is control and verification of the performance prescribed by the plan in every enterprise, in every kolkhoz, in every party organisation". [507] Such talk was an implicit admission that the economy, notwithstanding its socialist and planned character, could not be run only from the centre. This did not mean that enterprises should be empowered or centralism weakened, but that a combination of factors, including more attention to economic units, their operation and interrelations, was necessary.

Planovoe khozyaistvo lent even further validation to Voznesensky's actions by quoting in early 1941 the 17th Congress resolution, which read that "the central task of the reorganisation of the

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[503] N.P. Paletskikh, 'Institut Upolmochennykh Gosplana SSSR na Urale v Gody Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voyny (po materialam Chelyabinskoy Oblasti)', in M.V. Verbina, S.A. Medvedeva, A.O. Novikova (eds), *Materialy XLIX mezhdunarodnoy nauchno-tekhnicheskoy konferentsii «Dostizheniya nauki – agropromyshlennomu proizvodstvu»* (Chelyabinsk, 2010), pp. 58-59.

[504] *Voznesensky Nikolai Alekseevich*, p. 96 — V.I. Sabel'nikov, *Zhizn' v statistike. Vospominaniya o Kurgane i moyey materi, Varvare Nikiforovne Sabel'nikovoy* (Kurgan, 2015), p. 29.

[505] N. Baibakov, 'Iz vospominaniy', p. 142.

[506] Kolotov, *Voznesensky. Biograficheskiy povest*, p. 166.

[507] N.A. Voznesensky, 'Khozyaystvennye itogi 1940 goda i plan razvitiya narodnogo khozyaystva SSSR na 1941 god', *Planovoe khozyaistvo*, 3 (1941), p. 47.

planning work is to arrange for the verification of plan execution, in order to to prevent the emergence of imbalances in the economy, to reveal new resources for the implementation of the plans and in accordance with the results of the actual implementation of the plans to make adjustments for individual sectors and regions". [508]

The second institution established by Voznesensky at Gosplan was the Council of Scientific-Technical Expertise, officially sanctioned by Sovarkom on 27 January 1940. This new institution was tasked with examining technical projects and monitor the "introduction of new technology in the national economy". To do so, the Council, as much as the Institute of Commissioners, was granted "the right to involve specialists and scientific workers" and its initial membership included twelve Academicians, headed by V.P. Nikitin, V.P. Bushinskii and V.N. Obraszov. [509]

Emphasis on technological modernisation was yet another clear sign of Voznesensky's rationalising mindset, linked to his efforts to enhance the efficiency of productive processes. Reliance on economic experts also represented a meaningful novelty, which stood at variance with earlier realities, when such figures were essentially left to perform an apologetic role and economic policy was strictly regarded as a political matter of the Party.

The introduction of new bodies at Gosplan was coupled with the resurrection of the the Balance Department, [510] which opened the way for the widespread use of balances, now considered a crucial tool to establish and maintain proportionality. [511]

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[508] Dvadtsat' let Gosplana', *Planovoe khozyaistvo*, 2 (1941), p. 16.

[509] GARF, f. P5446, op. 1, d. 162, l. 270.

[510] M.Z. Bor stated that after the coordinate efforts at drawing up a balance of the national economy in 1928-1930, work on individual labour and financial balances continued throughout the 1930s — M.Z. Bor, *Voprosy Metodologii Planovogo Balansa Narodnogo Khozyaystva SSSR* (Moscow, 1960), pp. 30-31.

[511] G.A. Ivanov, A.Sh. Pribluda, *Planovye organy v SSSR* (Moscow, 1967), p. 38 — Harrison, *Soviet Planning in War and Peace*, pp. 23-24.

Therefore, as *Planovoe khozyaistvo* was calling for the analysis of economic proportions and interrelations between branches, the balance method powerfully reappeared on Soviet economic literature, [512] where naturally Stalin was credited with having "anticipated" the need for a balance of the national economy in 1929. [513]

Planners went on arguing that the balance helped to deal with "proportions and relations" and represented "everything that is needed to identify imbalances", [514] being a crucial tool for "planning the most rational use of resources on a national economic scale" and to "improve operative planning". [515]

A. Kurskii offered a more detailed analysis of the balance's role in "the establishment of the correct proportions". He described it as a union between "balance of production, distribution, consumption and accumulation of the social product", "balance of the labour forces" and "financial balance […] of income and expenditure of the socialist state, monetary income and expenses". However, Kurskii was also careful to condemn "Gromanovists, Bazarovists, Trotskyists, Bukharinites", who "repeatedly tried to use the balance method in their counter-revolutionary restorative purposes". [516]

Speaking of the work carried out on the balance under Voznesensky's tenure, Sh.Ya. Turetskiy stated that in 1939 "Gosplan began to develop for the first time the balance of the national economy as an independent section and an organic part of the national economic plan [which]

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[512] 'Bol'sheye Vnimaniya Ekonomike i Ekonomicheskoy Teorii', *Planovoe khozyaistvo*, 9 (1940), pp. 3-5.

[513] Effectively Stalin had stated in 1929 that "we must examine the question of the structure of the balance sheet of our national economy", stating however also that the 1926 attempt was just "a juggling with figures" and openly criticising Bazarov and Groman, affirming that "the structure of the balance sheet of the national economy of the USSR must be worked out by the revolutionary Marxists if they desire at all to devote themselves to the questions of the economy of the transition period" — J.V. Stalin, 'Concerning Questions of Agrarian Policy in the USSR', in Stalin, *Works*, xii, p. 178.

[514] V. Sobol, 'O skheme balansa narodnogo khozyaystva', *Planovoe khozyaistvo*, 6 (1940), p. 4.

[515] P. Pozdeev, 'Balans truda v kolkhozakh', *Planovoe khozyaistvo*, 8 (1940), p. 38.

[516] A. Kurskii, 'Plan i balans narodnogo khozyaystva', *Planovoe khozyaistvo*, 2 (1941), pp. 60-61, 73-77.

showed all the basic proportions of the plan and thereby contributed to it provisions". [517] M.Z. Bor and M. Eidelman added that 1937-1939 were also the years in which coordinated financial balances were drawn up. [518]

Voznesensky's pre-war attempt was rudimentary, but it nevertheless had "a great positive value", continued Turetskiy, since it facilitated a "systematisation of a large amount of factual material" as well as the analysis and correction of plan "inconsistencies". Moreover, Voznesensky's key aim of "linking material balances with the balance of the national economy in a single balance sheet that reflects the process of expanded socialist reproduction as a whole" made of his balance a "major step forward in the history of the development of the balance plan". [519]

A further key element of Voznesensky's pre-war thought and policy became that of reserves, once again informed by his understanding that Soviet power was not limitless and that unexpected events could wreck even the most carefully drawn-up plan. [520] Voznesensky soon became renowned amongst economic officials for his staunch defence of rare materials reserves and of their rational utilisation, which especially during the war would have brought him to cross swords with anybody who advanced supply requests he thought were irrational. [521]

As of early 1941, *Planovoe khozyaistvo* summarised in an authoritative unsigned article the pathway to "solve the main economic problems of the USSR": "the most economical and most rational utilisation of all material, labour and financial reserves", "further growth of technology", the "use [of] all the levers to stimulate the material interest of the workers in the growth of labor

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[517] Sh.Ya. Turetskiy, *Rasshirennoye sotsialisticheskoye vosproizvodstvo i balans narodnogo khozyaystva* (Moscow, 1964), pp. 349-350.

[518] Bor, *Voprosy Metodologii Planovogo*, pp. 30-31 — M. Eidelman, 'Iz istorii balansa narodnogo khozyaystva SSSR', *Vestnik statistiki*, 8 (1958), p. 48.

[519] Turetskiy, *Rasshirennoye*, pp. 361-362.

[520] G.A. Kumanev, *Govaryat Stalinskie Narkomi* (Smolensk, 2005), p. 446.

[521] Kumanev, *Govaryat Stalinskie Narkomi*, pp. 502-503 — N. Baibakov, 'Iz vospominaniy', pp. 141, 145.

productivity [and] in increasing the quality of products", "socialist principles of labour remuneration for its quantity and quality" and the building of large state reserves. [522]

Voznesensky's preoccupation with reserves, with the "correct consideration of all national economic relations and proportions", [523] his attempts at "ensuring the proportionality of the development of the national economy", [524] the increasing reference to "the most economical and most rational utilisation" — [525] all of this did indeed have a touch of geneticism. Voznesensky's rationalising mindset had turned to pre-Great Break economics in search of instruments and although this was no overt or covert criticism of the command system, but rather an attempt at functionalising it, Voznesensky's choices were nevertheless meaningful.

Indeed, ideas and practices deployed by Voznesensky did remind of Bazarov's reflections on proportionality and elimination of disproportions, [526] on the "concrete knowledge of the current economy" as well as on "[plan implementation] with the least expenditure of time and effort". [527] Just a decade before Voznesensky's revival of debates on the balance method, Bukharin had even written that a "national economic plan" ought to be one that "more and more resembles the balance of all the national economy". [528]

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[522] 'Dvadtsat' let Gosplana', pp. 12-15.

[523] VKP(b), *XVIII s"yezd*, p. 340.

[524] Kolotov, *Voznesensky. Biograficheskiy povest*, p. p. 184.

[525] 'Dvadtsat' let Gosplana', pp. 12-15.

[526] Bazarov, 'O metodologii', pp. 14-17, 19.

[527] Bazarov, 'Printsipy postroeniya', pp. 40, 46.

[528] Bukharin, 'Zametki Ekonomista', p. 396.

2.4. — Voznesensky as “strategist of the economic victory” [529]

Voznesensky is renowned for the role he played as “commander of the economic front” during the Second World War, [530] but he actually found himself deeply involved in defence issues already since 1939, in the aftermath of the disastrous Winter War. The USSR had laid claims to Finnish borderlands since early 1938, citing defensive necessities. In the aftermath of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, eastern Poland the Baltic states and eventually Bessarabia would all be annexed to the USSR. Gaining Finnish lands proved however far more difficult.

In March 1940 after four months of war Finland did surrender to Moscow the territories it sought, but a Soviet commander remarked that “we have won just about enough ground to bury our dead”, approximately 350.000, fivefold Finnish casualties. [531] Moreover, although Moscow’s frontline troops had showed their worth at Khalkhin Gol, the conscripts’ debacle in Finland crucially strengthened Hitler’s belief that one powerful blow could suffice to crush the Red Army and subdue the European regions of the USSR. [532] Moreover, the Finnish campaign had also seriously disrupted transport and supply in the northern RSFSR, causing drops in production and shortages. [533]

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[529] *Voznesensky Nikolai Alekseevich* (Moscow, 2013).

[530] Harrison, ’N.A. Voznesensky. A Soviet Commander of the Economic Front’.

[531] W.R. Trotter, *The Winter War. The Russo-Finnish War of 1939-1940* (London, 2002), p. 263.

[532] S. Goldman, *Nomonhan, 1939. The Red Army's Victory That Shaped World War II* (Annapolis, 2012).

[533] K. Boterbloem, *The Life and times of Andrei Zhdanov, 1896-1948* (Montreal, Ithaca, 2004), pp. 184-185 — Harrison, *Soviet Planning in Peace and War*, pp. 30-31.

Soviet Army officers recounted in their memoirs the many shortcomings that had hampered the offensive, [534] while the Party convened a military conference in December 1940 and a CC Plenum in April 1941 to address the Army's failures. [535]

Voroshilov was removed as Commissar of Defence in May 1940, after a commission comprising Zhdanov, Voznesensky and Malenkov laid bare all the Army and Commissariat's shortcomings, hardly sparing a single aspect from severe criticism. [536] Multiple flaws in the organisational structure of the central apparatus were identified, operational preparation was defined as poor and the absence of operative war plans was denounced. The Commissariat of Defence did not even seem to know the exact strength of the Army and mobilisation capacities were at a minimum, lacking up-to-date plans and suffering from serious shortage of cadres. Combat preparation was described as hampered by all sorts of shortcomings at multiple levels and a ruthless branch-by-branch list of unresolved problems followed. Reconnaissance and intelligence came in also for much criticism and were even defined "one of the weakest spots", while "total neglect" was said to characterise the situation of Air Defence Forces. Logistics and supply were also defined as largely inadequate and political training as inefficient, while even shortcomings in relation to the the Army's publishing house were denounced. [537]

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[534] N.N. Voronov, 'At the Karelian Isthmus', in S. Bialer (ed), *Stalin and His General. Soviet Military Memoirs of World War II* (Boulder, 1984), pp. 132-133 — N.G. Kuznetsov, 'The Lesson That Was Not Learned', in Bialer (ed), *Stalin and His General*, p. 134 — S.S. Biriuzov, 'The Lesson Learned Too Well', in Bialer (ed), *Stalin and His General*, p. 137.

[535] O.A. Rzheshevskii, E.N. Kul′kov, H. Shukman, T. Sokokina (eds), *Stalin and the Soviet-Finnish War 1939-1940* (London, 2002), p. xii-xviii.

[536] A.J. Rieber, 'Zhdanov in Finland', *The Carl Beck Papers in Russian & East European Studies*, 1107 (1995), pp. 8-10.

[537] 'Akt o Priyeme Narkomata Oborony Soyuza SSSR tov. Timoshenko S.K. ot tov. Voroshilova K.Ye.', *Izvestiya Tsk KPSS*, 1 (1990), pp. 193-208.

Timoshenko, promoted Commissar of Defence and Marshal, launched a far-reaching reorganisation and re-equipment of the Army. [538] Yet, attempts at fortifying the new frontiers proved too little, too late, [539] while the shock caused by the Nazi *Blitzkrieg* in France eventually prompted a drive towards mechanisation. [540] Tank corps, misguidedly abolished in November 1939, [541] were hurriedly re-established as large and unwieldy Mechanised Corps, staffed with unexperienced officers and lacking modern equipment. [542]

As the Red Army was undergoing belated reform, Soviet defence institutions were frantically reorganised too, providing further opportunities for upward mobility. In September 1939 the Defence Committee was entrusted to supervise the Army's military supply, while the Economic Council, previously Council for Labour and Defence, all other supply duties. Voznesensky had become a member of the Defence Committee in June 1937 and its Deputy Chairman the following month, while in April 1940 he also gained membership in the Economic Council. [543] Ten months later, as discussed earlier (pp. 82-83), Voznesensky became Politburo candidate member, while on 10 March 1941 he swapped Gosplan's chairmanship for the post of Sovnarkom's First Deputy Chairman. Shortly after, Sovnarkom was given a Bureau, vested with all its powers, while on 4 May 1941 Stalin coupled Party secretaryship with the chairmanship of Sovnarkom, becoming a "fully fledged dictator". [544]

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[538] O.A. Rzheshevskii, E.N. Kul′kov, H. Shukman, T. Sokokina (eds), *Stalin and the Soviet-Finnish War 1939-1940* (London, 2002), p. xii — J. Erickson, *The Soviet High Command. A Military-Political History 1918-1941* (London, 1962), pp. 554-555.

[539] Boterbloem, *The Life and times of Andrei Zhdanov*, p. 185 — S.S. Biriuzov, 'The Lesson Learned Too Well', p. 137.

[540] M.I. Kazakov, 'The Government Draws Conclusions', in Bialer (ed), *Stalin and His General*, p. 145.

[541] S.J. Zaloga, J. Grandsen, Soviet Tanks and Combat Vehicles of World War Two (London, 1984), pp. 107-109 — Erickson, *The Soviet High Command*, p. 521.

[542] Zaloga, Grandsen, *Soviet Tanks and Combat Vehicles of World War Two*, p. 109 — A.A. Kokoshin, 'The German Blitzkrieg Against the USSR, 1941', *Belfer Center Paper* (2016), p. 30 — D.M. Glantz, 'The Motor-Mechanisation Program of the Red Army during the Interwar Years', *Soviet Army Studies Office* (1990), pp. 46-50.

[543] RGASPI f. 17, op. 3, d. 1026, l. 15, in A. Kokurin, N.V. Petrov (eds), *Lubyanka. Stalin i NKVD-NKGB-GUKR "Smersh". 1939 - mart 1946* (Moscow, 2006), p. 180

[544] Khlevnyuk, *Khozyain*, pp. 435-437, 438.

There is ample evidence that while Malenkov was increasingly taking over Zhdanov's Party duties in Moscow, Stalin was also increasingly and confidently relying on Voznesensky. [545] Baibakov even stated that at a meeting where Voznesensky was as usual, "standing on guard about extremely scarce, rare materials", Stalin favoured his and not Voznesensky's opinion. Yet, the dictator still "turned towards [Voznesensky] with a soft smile, apparently sparing his self-esteem and knowing the firm, principled nature of his deputy" and proposed a compromise that satisfied both. [546]

Obviously, Voznesensky's meteoric rise had not gone unnoticed and if Mikoyan commended him, he also noted that "some Politburo members were unhappy" and openly resented the scope of Voznesensky's authority in the realm of economics. [547] Beria's son Sergo would have us believe that his father was "pleased" with Voznesensky's promotion, [548] but the contrary is much more plausible, [549] as evidence points to the fact that Beria "loathed" Voznesensky. [550] Indeed, this latter one was not only a new, young and bold contender for Stalin's favour, but also an eager Gosplan Chairman, bound to clash with Beria over the NKVD's pervasive role in the economy. [551]

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[545] Khlevnyuk, *Master of the House*, pp. 228, 243.

[546] Baibakov, 'Iz vospominaniy', p. 141.

[547] A. Mikoyan, *Tak Bylo. Razmeshcheniya o Minuvshem* (Moscow, 1999), pp. 422-423.

[548] S.L. Beria, *Beria, my father. Life inside Stalin's Kremlin* (London, 2001), p. 45.

[549] Medvedev, Medvedev, *Khrushchev. The Years in Power*, pp. 17-18.

[550] Montefiore, *Stalin. The Court of the Red Tsar*, p. 415.

[551] A.V . Zakharchenko, '«Anarkhiya» Planirovaniya ili Samoregulirovaniye Sovetskoy Ekonomiki. MVD i Gosplan v Mezhvedomstvennykh Konfliktah (1940-1950-e gg.)', *Samarskiy nauchnyy vestnik*, 3/16 (2016) — A.V. Zakharchenko, 'Ekonomicheskaya Deyatel'nost' NKVD SSSR Nakaune i v Gody Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voyny. Struktura, Proizvodstvennye Parametry, Mobilizatsionnye Vozhmozhnosti', *Izvestiya Samarskogo nauchnogo tsentra Rossiyskoy akademii nauk*, 12/6 (2010) — A.M. Demidov, 'Deyatel'nost' Organov Gosbezopastnosti SSSR v Preodolenii Voyenno-Ekonomicheskogo Krizisa. Iyun' 1941 – Aprel' 1943 gg.', *Vestnik Chuvashskogo universiteta*, 4 (2008).

On 22 June 1941, it was Voznesensky who, active since the late night, [552] held a "gloomy, but quite confident" Sovnarkom meeting, [553] ordering the drawing up of mobilisation plans. [554] He then joined the newly established Supreme Headquarter's Institute of Permanent Advisers, [555] while the following day he was also tasked with heading the Sovnarkom Bureau Commission on Current Affairs, established to swiftly deal with the increasing volume of operational issues. [556]

Yet, precisely on 23 June, Voznesensky also suffered a setback, as he, Mikoyan, Molotov, Beria, Malenkov and Voroshilov agreed to establish the GKO (State Defence Committee) and proceeded, uninvited, to see Stalin. [557] "Why are you here?", asked the *vozhd*, as for the first time his leadership was hanging by a thread. Stalin quickly realised his Lieutenants wanted him to chair the GKO, regained confidence, but still chose not oppose a remodelling of his unofficial ruling circle. [558] Against Voznesensky's disagreements he and Mikoyan were excluded from GKO, supposedly to respectively better manage Gosplan and Sovnarkom. [559]

According to Mikoyan's memoirs however, an event that would have played a fateful role in Voznesensky's future also took place on that day. As the leaders had agreed to establish GKO, Molotov apparently lamented Stali's unprecedented passivity and nervous breakdown. Therefore, a "very agitated" Voznesensky, "scandalising all those present", apparently said "Vyacheslav, lead forward, we will follow you!". [560] This clearly implied that if Stalin was not up to

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[552] Kumanev, *Govaryat Stalinskiye Narkomy*, p. 255.

[553] Ibid., p. 480.

[554] Ibid., p. 199.

[555] RGASPI f. 17, op. 162, d. 36, ch. 1, l. 22, in Kokurin et. al. (ed), *Lubyanka. Stalin i NKVD-NKGB-GUKR "Smersh"*, p. 289.

[556] S.K. Shoygu et. al. (eds), *Velikaya Otechestvennaya Voyna 1941-1945 Godov* (12 vols, Moscow, 2013), xi, p. 130.

[557] Mikoyan, *Tak Bylo*, pp. 390-391.

[558] Gorlizki, Khlevnyuk, *Stalin and his circle*, pp. 255-256.

[559] Mikoyan, *Tak Bylo*, p. 391.

[560] Mikoyan, *Tak Bylo*, pp. 390-391.

the task, he should be swiftly replaced by Molotov. None of this happened and no word of this was apparently made to Stalin himself. [561]

Indeed, on 3 July Voznesensky was approved as GKO's plenipotentiary for arms and ammunition industries, which prompted him to return to his established practice of relying on experts. [562] Indeed, he asked A.S. Aleksandrov, Major-General of the Engineering-Technical corps, to assemble a team of military experts and entrust them to verify plan implementation in factories. [563] Voznesensky was also nominated Chairman of a commission entrusted with drawing up a "military-economic plan" focused on the industries redeployed in the Volga and Urals, [564] whose evacuation, supervised by Kosygin, [565] was a key component of the Soviet economic victory. [566]

Voznesensky lost supervision of arms production on 20 August 1941, [567] but when the administrative evacuation of Moscow took place in October 1941, he was asked to "represent Sovnarkom in Kuibyshev" and arrange for the return of evacuated enterprises to full productive capacity. [568] According to Yu. Zhukov, Voznesensky had been given "almost unchallenged

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[561] This anecdote is surrounded by mystery. Sergo Beria recounted his father telling him it was Shcherbakov who stated "Vyacheslav, be our leader!", while Mikoyan also reported that upon Voznesensky's suggestion, Molotov headed the delegation to Stalin, which may be regarded as partially conflicting with his account of an "agitated" and "scandalising" Voznesensky — Beria, *Beria, My father*, pp. 70-71; Mikoyan, *Tak Bylo*, pp. 390-391.

[562] RGASPI, f. 664, op. 1, d. 1, l. 75 — RGASPI, f. 664, op. 2, d. 1, ll. 115-117.

[563] Shoygu, *Velikaya Otechestvennaya Voyna 1941-1945 Godov*, xi, pp. 130-131.

[564] RGASPI, f. 644, op. 1, d. 1, l. 82 — RGASPI, f. 644, op. 2, d. 1, ll. 123-124.

[565] Shoygu, *Velikaya Otechestvennaya Voyna 1941-1945 Godov*, vii, pp. 130-131.

[566] F. Kagan, 'The evacuation of Soviet industry in the wake of 'Barbarossa': A key to the Soviet Victory', *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, 8/2 (1995), pp. 397, 410.

[567] RGASPI, f. 644, op. 2, d. 8, l. 82 — RGASPI, f. 644, op. 2, d. 14, l. 49.

[568] Shoygu, *Velikaya Otechestvennaya Voyna 1941-1945 Godov*, xi, pp. 131-132.

control of the main war industries". [569] At this stage, it was Voznesensky who on 16 January 1942 asked that Gosplan be transferred back to Moscow, not its actual Chairman Saburov. [570]

In the first six months of the war, the Soviet leadership mobilised every available resource to meet the Nazi onslaught, which meant that as of 1942 more than 60% of Soviet GDP was invested into defence. [571] Titanic Soviet efforts in the face of monumental losses saved Leningrad and Moscow and Operation Barbarossa failed. Yet, this level of mobilisation, combined with catastrophic territorial and material losses, caused a collapse of Soviet civilian production. [572] As Soviet soldiers and civilians were dying at a daily rate of 9.000 and 2.000 respectively, [573] it became clear that depleting material and human stocks together with excessive mobilisation could cause a catastrophic collapse. [574] Despite stiff resistance at the front, the economy was "tilting over into an abyss". [575]

In the meantime, intra-leadership struggle hardly ceased and each leader always sought to advance his position. In particular Beria and Voznesensky often openly clashed. [576] For example, on 11 November 1941 Beria wrote to Stalin harshly denouncing a decree approved

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[569] Yu. Zhukov, *Taynyi Vlasti* (Moscow, 2007), p. 134.

[570] RGASPI, f. 644, op. 1, d. 21, l. 12.

[571] M. Harrison, 'Industry and Economy', in D.R. Stone (ed), *The Soviet Union at Wars, 1941-1945* (Barnsley, 2002), p. 19

[572] M. Harrison, 'Barbarossa: the Soviet Response, 1941', in B. Wegner (ed), *From Peace to War: Germany, Soviet Russia and the World*, 1939-1941 (Providence, 1997), p. 10.

[573] M. Harrison, 'Industry and Economy', pp. 19-20.

[574] M. Harrison, 'Resource mobilization for World War II. The U.S.A., U.K., U.S.S.R., and Germany, 1938-1945', *Economic History Review, 2nd ser*, 41/2 (1988), p. 190 — M. Harrison, 'The Soviet Union. The defeated victor', in M. Harrison (ed), *The Economics of World War II. Six Great Powers in International Comparison* (New York, 1998), p. 272 — M. Harrison, 'Stalinism and the Economics of War-time', pp. 3-4.

[575] M. Harrison, 'Stalinism and the Economics of War-time', pp. 3-4.

[576] For example, after Party and state organs were evacuated from Moscow in October 1941, upon Beria's order, a scorching letter was sent by NKVD Major Shadrin to Malenkov, head of the CC Secretariat, detailing how at the vacated CC building secret and top secret correspondence was left behind, together with a wide range of equipment which laid abandoned — RGASPI, f. 83, op. 1, d. 5, l. 13.

upon Voznesensky's suggestion which assigned the NKVD certain duties in Omsk although "no one enquired about the possibilities for the NKVD to carry out these tasks". [577] More serious clashes were also not infrequent. Ya.E. Chadaev, who worked at Sovnarkom, recounted how during the war he brought Voznesensky a draft decree coming from Beria. "So that's it!", said Voznesensky and ordered it to be put on the agenda of the next Commission on Current Affairs meeting. Chadaev however replied that Beria wanted it immediately approved. Voznesensky, explaining the NKVD was requesting scarce materials in excess of state reserves for the Commissariat of Coal Industry, categorically refused. [578] A terrorised Chadaev proceeded back to Beria's office "as if towards execution", meeting his "indescribable fury" and leaving "overwhelmed with a flood of threats". Chadaev, in a state of confusion, reached Molotov, who took over the issue. An amended version of the draft was later approved with Voznesensky's agreement. [579]

Not all relations amongst top Soviet officials were this stormy though. For example, as Kosygin's collaboration with the Leningraders expanded, his personal friendship with Voznesensky continued too. [580] The two spent together the new year's eve of 1941, when alongside Popkov and Granin they tried to lighten the dark atmosphere of those days watching comedies at the Kremlin. [581]

Between late 1941 and early 1942, Voznesensky witnessed his duties multiply, [582] lost and regained the chairmanship of the Commission on Current Affairs, while on 3 February 1942 he

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[577] RGASPI, f. 644, op. 2, d. 25, ll. 1, 13, 15-16.

[578] This details allows to date the event to late 1942-early 1943, when Voznesensky was no longer in charge of the coal industries.

[579] Kumanev, *Govaryat Stalinskiye Narkomy*, pp. 502-503.

[580] A. Bolbirev, 'Voyna, Blokada, Poslevoyennyye Budni', in Fetisov, *Prem'yer Izvestny i Neizvestny*, p. 93.

[581] Andrianov, *Kosygin*, p. 129.

[582] Shoygu, *Velikaya Otechestvennaya Voyna 1941-1945 Godov*, xi, pp. 102, 132.

finally accessed GKO. [583] There he initially supervised ammunitions production and ferrous metallurgy, [584] but little more than a week after, Beria gained the former and Voznesensky was instead assigned oil, coal and chemical industries. [585] This happened after a minor incident, which however bears resemblance to a much more serious one that would hit Voznesensky in 1949. Mikoyan reported that as GKO plenipotentiary for ammunitions, Voznesensky compiled plans which on paper showed a production increase, while actual one decreased. Such decrease was symptomatic of recent territory losses, but Voznesensky supposedly "felt uncomfortable with reducing the plan during the war". However, Beria found out, reported the fact to Stalin and had Voznesensky removed. [586]

Soon after, Voznesensky suffered further setbacks: on 16 August 1942 he lost the post of Sovnarkom First Deputy Chairman, [587] while on 8 December two separate GKO and Politburo resolutions relieved him of his supervision duties over coal and metallurgy industries and, although he regained Gosplan's chairmanship, excluded him from the newly established GKO Operational Bureau. [588]

Precisely said exclusion has been quoted by some as key proof of Voznesensky's sidelining, but reality is more complex. [589] Voznesensky was indeed not made member of the Operational Bureau, an ever narrower group within the GKO initially tasked with supervision the defence Commissariats as well as most of heavy industry. Yet, it would have arguably been hard for

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[583] Y. Gor'kov, *Gosudarstvenny Komitet Oborony Postanovlyayet (1941-1945). Tsifry Dokumenty* (Moscow, 2002), p. 27 — Alongside Voznesesky, Mikoyan joined too, Voroshilov was removed, while Kaganovich added shortly after.

[584] RGASPI, f. 644, op. 1, d. 21, ll. 32-33.

[585] RGASPI, f. 644, op. 2, d. 36, l. 150.

[586] Mikoyan, *Tak Bylo*, pp. 423-424.

[587] Khlevnyuk, *Master of the House*, p. 259.

[588] RGASPI, f. 644, op. 1, d. 72, ll. 165-166 — RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 1046, ll. 20-21.

[589] Zhukov, *Tayny Vlasti*, pp. 160-161

Molotov, Beria, Mikoyan and Malenkov, who were Bureau members, to deal with such issues without Gosplan's Chairman. The first sessions of the Bureau opened on 23 February 1943 with strictly only its members attending and accepted a proposal by Voznesensky and Shvernik on the betterment of labour organisation and increases in wages for miners. [590]

Yet, on 2 March 1943 Voznesensky was already attending the Bureau's meeting, where Gosplan's proposed March plans for coal, petroleum products and energy were accepted. [591] From then on, he attended every single Operational Bureau meeting until he became full member on 10 May 1944. Between 2 March 1943 and this latter date, out of thirty-six such meetings, Voznesensky attended thirty-five, more than Beria and Malenkov, who attended thirty-three each, and as many as Molotov, who usually chaired the meetings, but was absent on 2 February 1944. Mikoyan was the only Bureau member who attended all meetings. [592]

Voznesensky's first Operational Bureau meeting as full member was on 19 May 1944 and was attended also by Shirokov, head of the Fuel Supply Commission. [593] Yet, on that very day, the Bureau's responsibilities were further broadened as it came to oversee twenty-one industrial departments as well as water and railway transport, even taking over the functions of the GKO Transport Committee. [594] This resulted in Operational Bureau meetings being always attended by as many as twelve other officials in advisory capacity. [595]

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[590] RGASPI, f. 644, op. 3, d. 1, l. 1.

[591] RGASPI, f. 644, op. 3, d. 1, ll. 4-6.

[592] RGASPI, f. 644, op. 3, d. 1, ll. 1-53 — RGASPI, f. 644, op. 3, d. 2, ll. 1-36.

[593] RGASPI, f. 644, op. 3, d. 2, l. 37.

[594] Gor'kov, *Gosudarstvenny Komitet Oborony*, pp. 30-31.

[595] RGASPI, f. 644, op. 3, d. 2, ll. 39-229 — RGASPI, f. 644, op. 3, d. 3, ll. 1-139 — RGASPI, f. 644, op. 3, d. 4, ll. 1-139 — RGASPI, f. 644, op. 3, d. 5, ll. 1-169 — RGASPI, f. 644, op. 3, d. 6, ll. 1-160 — RGASPI, f. 644, op. 3, d. 7, ll. 1-161.

As of December 1944, Voznesensky combined Gosplan's chairmanship with membership in the GKO and deputy chairmanship of its Operational Bureau as well as of Sovnarkom Bureau, [596] returning one of the foremost members of the Soviet top leadership. [597]

In the meantime, as the great Soviet victories at Stalingrad and Kursk put the Wehrmacht firmly on the defensive and Lend-Lease aid steadily reached the USSR, the economy was stabilised. As both military and civilian branches were now growing, further unbalancing mobilisations were avoided. [598]

From the opening up of the Eastern Front until January 1944, the Red Army met around 90% of all Wehrmacht frontline forces and about half of those of Germany's allies. [599] In single engagements, like Operation Bagration in early 1944, the Soviets destroyed the equivalent of all German forces deployed on the Western front. [600] One of the keys to the USSR's resounding victories was a true economic "miracle". [601] The country had entered the war with roughly twice the Third Reich's population, but the same GDP. [602] Yet, its remarkable level of production standardisation, [603] as well as its leadership's "superior institutional capacity", [604] allowed the

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[596] Adibekov, Anderson, Rogovaya (eds), *Politbyuro TsK RKP(b)-VKP(b)*, iii, p. 1040.

[597] Shoygu, *Velikaya Otechestvennaya Voyna 1941-1945 Godov*, xi, p. 134.

[598] M. Harrison, 'Stalinism and the Economics of War-time', pp. 3-4.

[599] M. Harrison, 'Resource mobilization for World War II', p. 191.

[600] N. Davies, *Europe East and West*, 2nd ed (London, 2011), p. 245.

[601] M. Harrison, 'Stalinism and the Economics of War-time', p.10.

[602] M. Harrison, 'The economics of World War II. An overview', in Harrison (ed), *The Economics of World War II. Six Great Powers in International Comparison*. pp. 4-5.

[603] D.Stone, "Hammer and Rifle: The Militarization of the Soviet Union, 1926-1933" (Lawrence, 2000), pp. 182-184, 214-216.

[604] M. Harrison, 'The Soviet Union. The defeated victor', p. 271.

USSR to outproduce, out-supply and out-field Germany, [605] even in 1942, [606] while as of 1943 overall Soviet economic advantage over Germany had been reestablished. [607]

The Soviet leadership also demonstrated mastery in managing financial, fiscal and budgetary policy, preventing inflation and the loss of the defence budget's purchasing power as well as extracting resources through taxation and borrowings. Through price management and the reduction of subsidies the authorities also managed to reduce civilian spending and armaments' cost of production. Monetary policy necessarily comprised increased cash emissions, as circulating roubles triplicated, which however were planned with great care. [608]

Voznesensky has been recently quite emphatically defined the "strategist of the economic victory [during the Second World War]" and indeed, his contribution to the Soviet war-time effort can hardly be underestimated. [609] Not only Voznesensky served on all top Soviet power agencies and directed Gosplan for most of the war, but he also supervised of up to five economic branches at the same time. [610] He played a crucial role during both the mobilisation and rebalancing periods and also directed after late August 1943 the first attempts at planning the restoration of the liberated territories. [611]

As a result, Voznesensky commanded great respect amongst many Soviet leaders and Army officers. Baibakov stated that he "followed closely the practical activity of Nikolai, especially

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[605] Harrison, 'The economics of World War II. An overview', pp. 14-16 — M. Harrison, 'Communism and Economic Modernization', in S.A. Smith (ed), *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Communism* (Oxford, 2014), p. 390.

[606] M. Harrison, 'Stalinism and the Economics of War-time', p.1.

[607] Harrison, 'The economics of World War II. An overview', p. 5.

[608] M. Harrison, 'Industry and Economy', pp. 31-32.

[609] *Voznesensky Nikolai Alekseevich* (Moscow, 2013).

[610] Gor'kov, *Gosudarstvenny Komitet Oborony*, p. 96.

[611] N.A. Voznesensky, *Voyennaya Ekonomika SSSR v Period Otechestvennoy Voyny* (Moscow, 1947), pp. 48-55.

during the war, when he with the utmost precision and efficiency led the major economic processes", [612] while several Commissars also highly spoke of Voznesensky. [613] Yet, his relations with his subordinates were hardly always cloudless. For example, Baibakov recalled how he was "taken aback" when Voznesensky and Commissar for Coal Industry V.V. Vahrushev grabbed one another by the lapels in a fit of fierce rage over a supply request which Voznesensky, as usual extremely careful about reserves, was refusing. Baibakov and Gosplan Deputy Chairman Panov "barely managed to separate […] the 'fighters'". Yet, Baibakov noted with satisfaction how Vahrushev did not incur in any of the "most unpleasant consequences" he was expecting, since Voznesensky had decided to forget about the incident. [614]

Amongst Army officers, Voznesensky earned the respect of figures the likes of G.K. Zhukov, whom he sided with at a mid-1942 Stavka meeting, opposing Stalin's overambitious general offensive plans, which indeed strained Soviet supply capabilities and failed. [615] Zhukov himself stated that Stalin "highly valued [Voznesensky] as an intelligent, prudent and capable organiser of all economic activities". [616] A.M. Vasilevskiy went even further in praising Voznesensky:

> clearly, there were various opinions within the Politburo on production possibilities in order to satisfy the General Staff requirements, and a variety of proposals were made. But the most authoritative voice remained that of N.A. Voznesensky […]. He frequently disagreed with Stalin and other members of the Politburo, and would accurately provide the figure of material and technical resources that industry could provide for the coming operation. His opinion was decisive. N.A. Voznesensky had a deep understanding of the economy, accurate information on its functioning and he was almost never wrong in his

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[612] Baibakov, 'Iz vospominaniy', p. 141.

[613] See section 3.7.3. — Voznesensky, opinions of his contemporaries, pp. 179-188 — B.L. Vannikov, 'In the People's Commissariat of Armaments', in Bialer (ed) *Stalin and his Generals*, p. 154.

[614] Baibakov, 'Iz vospominaniy', p. 145.

[615] RGVA, f. 4107, op. 2, d. 2, ll. 9-31, in V. Naumov, M. Prozumeshnikov. Yu. Sigachev. N Tomilina, I. Shevzhuk (eds), *Georgii Zhukov. Dokumenti* (Moscow, 2001), pp. 503-504.

[616] Ibid.

opinions and estimates. I have the best recollections of Voznesensky. He not only knew the economy very well, but in his work he also had persistent purposefulness and commitment. He enjoyed hard work and never got tired of it. Nikolai Alekseevich possessed a colossal energy. Whenever you would call him, he was invariably at his work post. N.A. Voznesensky was also a great organiser: if you gave him a task, it was sure it would be fulfilled. I also remember him as affable, approachable and genial. He had a wholehearted and vivid nature, and was a splendid representative of the Leninist school of government leaders and economic officials. [617]

2.5. — Voznesensky and Kantorovich

It is little known that in 1943 Voznesensky also entered in direct contact with the heterodox theories of Leningrad economist and mathematician L.V. Kantorovich. This latter one actually knew N.A. Voznesensky's brother, Rector of the Leningrad State University Alexander Voznesensky, whose classes he "listened with great interest to", [618] adding that he "often went to him after the lecture with questions". [619] There even is unsubstantiated speculation that Kantorovich's work on the optimisation of production processes at the Leningrad plywood trust in

[617] A.M. Vasilevskiy, *Delo vsey zhizni* (Moscow, 1978), pp. 365-366.

[618] Alexander Voznesensky had the reputation of a fiercely independent and bright man. He was an inspiration for W. Brus, would shield in 1946 Leningrad University Professors accused of negligence, while in 1947 he would overturn the RSFSR Minister of Education's decision to refuse the applications of disgraced Grodno student Leo Klejn A.A. Voznesensky himself would replace said Minister soon after. M. Djilas instead recounted his encounter with A.A. Voznesensky at the 1946 pan-Slavic Congress in Belgrade, where the two profusely discussed "the narrowness and bias of the prevailing theories of 'socialist realism', but also […] the appearance of new phenomena in socialism […] with the creation of the new socialist countries". Djilas openly mourned A.Voznesensky's disappearance, lamenting the loss of his "beautiful" mind — W. Brus, 'The Bane of Reforming the Socialist Economic System', *Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review*, 187 (1993), p. 369 — C.J. Any, *Boris Eikhenbaum. Voices of a Russian Formalist* (Stanford, 1994), p. 180 — T. Taylor, 'Conversations with Leo Klejn', *Current Anthropology*, 5 (1993), pp. 724-725 — M. Djilas, *Conversations with Stalin* (Harmondsworth, 1963), p. 150.

[619] L.V. Kantorovich, 'Moy put' v nauke', in V.L. Kantorovich, S.S. Kutateladze, Ya.I. Fet (eds), *Leonid Vitalevich Kantorovich. Chelovek i ucheny* (2 vols, Novosibirsk, 2002), i, pp. 49-50.

the late 1930s was carried out “under the aegis of”, [620] or had even been “commissioned” by, Voznesensky. [621]

After Kantorovich was evacuated to Kazan in 1942, he unsuccessfully tried to spread his findings amongst his colleagues. [622] He then sent a paper to Gosplan, which Sorokin ridiculed as a “search for a kind of philosopher’s stone”, [623] and another to the Academy’s Institute of Economics, where B.S. Yastremsky accused Kantorovich of quoting “Pareto, a favourite of Mussolini”. [624] Kantorovich eventually got in touch with A.A. Voznesensky, who seems to have strongly supported him, [625] until he realised no headways could be made. [626]

However, Kantorovich’s personal archive also holds an unsigned and undated letter addressed to N. Voznesensky, which might have been sent alongside a paper. [627] In his letter Kantorovich crucially linked his research to “Stalin's directive that the law of value operates in a socialist society”. He spoke of his “approximate estimates”, which “make it possible to approach the correct determination of the numerical value of cost”. The fact that such calculations take into consideration “ratio of labor intensity, cost price, operating and constant prices”, according to Kantorovich, “expand[ed] the scope of their application” and made them “more correct and objective”. [628]

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[620] Felker, *Soviet Economic Controversies*, p. 124.

[621] Katz, *The politics of economic reform in the Soviet Union*, p. 30.

[622] Kantorovich, ‘Moy put' v nauke’, pp. 59-60.

[623] ‘Pismo G.M. Sorokina’, in V.L. Kantorovich et. al. , *Leonid Vitalevich Kantorovich*, i, pp. 315-316.

[624] Kantorovich, ‘Moy put' v nauke’, p. 60.

[625] A.A. Voznesensky and other Leningrad professors wrote on 11 May 1943 a very strong letter of recommendation for Kantorovich’s unsuccessful application to the Academy of Sciences, where they defined the mathematician as “one of the most brilliant representatives of the galaxy of young and talented Soviet mathematicians” — ‘Kharakteristika professora L.V. Kantorovicha’, in V.L. Kantorovich et. al., *Leonid Vitalevich Kantorovich*, ii, p. 266.

[626] Kantorovich, ‘Moi put v nauke’, p. 60.

[627] V.L. Kantorovich et. al., *Leonid Vitalevich Kantorovich*, i, p. 330.

[628] ‘Pismo N.A. Voznesenskomu’, in V.L. Kantorovich et. al., *Leonid Vitalevich Kantorovich*, i, pp. 331-332.

Kantorovich also mentioned that he wrote to Gosplan in October 1942, proceeding then to flatter Voznesensky, by saying “I ask you to give your opinion on the essence of the work, being sure that your suggestions, thanks to your exceptional experience, erudition and command in this field, will bring me great benefit”. [629]

No answer from Voznesensky is recorded and even if Kantorovich sent his letter, there is plenty of evidence that during the war, overburdened Gosplan ignored much correspondence. [630]

Yet, Kantorovich’s late 1943 attempt, once again entirely unsuccessful, has a behind-the-scenes component. The paper he submitted to Gosplan received the vitriolic review of his arch-critic B.S. Yastremsky, [631] but was also discussed nowhere else than in Voznesensky’s office, at the presence of the Chairman himself. Economist S.M. Menshikov affirmed that “this was the highest level at which Kantorovich was ever listened to” in the USSR, [632] while I.L. Lahman also confirmed that the meeting took place, enigmatically stating that he knew of these events “not from rumours or the press, but because I was to some extent involved in them”. [633]

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[629] Ibid.

[630] I.P. Nikolaev from the Research Institute for Refining Oil (VNIINP), lamented in a letter to Malenkov dated 18 May 1948, later sent also to Voznesensky, that Gosplan repeatedly ignored a text of his, which he submitted on 25 November 1942 to Voznesensky through his secretary Kosyachenko. Nikolaev was told by this latter one to refer to Turetskiy, who however never got back to him. In April 1944 Nikolaev managed to send his text to Gosplan’s publishing house through the CC, at which point it took a full other year for it to be included in 1948’s publishing plan, with a co-authorship that Nikolaev contested — RGAE, f. 4372, op. 48, d. 349, ll. 66-74.

[631] ‘Oprinzipah ekonomicheskogo rascheta’, in V.L. Kantorovich et. al., *Leonid Vitalevich Kantorovich*, i, p. 335, 336, 340.

[632] S.M. Menshikov, ‘Aktual'nost' ekonomicheskoy modeli L.V. Kantorovicha v nashe vremya’, *Zap. nauch. sem. POMI*, 312 (2004), pp. 35-36.

[633] I.L. Lahman, ‘Leonid Vitalevich Kantorovich’, *Vtoroye Dykhaniye*, 31 (2015), p. 2.

Kantorovich's theories were of course not endorsed, but Voznesensky seems to have opposed taking any punitive measures against him, [634] something that was hardly taken for granted, as many wondered indeed about "what saved Kantorovich". [635]

Voznesensky's interest for Kantorovich's theories may be linked to their common fascination for what V. Belkin and I. Birman would critically describe as "a system where everything, down to the last nail, is planned and managed from a single centre". [636] It is quite telling that Soviet emigre economist A. Katsenelinboigen confidently stated that Turetskiy had told him Voznesensky thought that "everything, down to the last bolt, should be planned". [637] Voznesensky might very well have spotted in Kantorovich's theories a possible way to combine rationalism and his deep devotion to planning.

2.6. — The new Soviet truth on the law of value, 1941-1943

In the previous section it has been hinted that the crucial discussion of the long-standing issues concerning the role of economic laws, commodity-money relations and profit in the USSR, took place in the early 1940s (p. 107).

These issues should have been addressed by a "short course" for political economy, whose drafting was sanctioned in 1936. Although two drafts were prepared in 1938 and 1939, on 29 January 1941 a meeting was convened to address several still unresolved issues. In attendance were Stalin, Zhdanov, Moltov, Voznesensky, G.F. Aleksandrov (AgitProp) as well as economists

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[634] Menshikov, 'Aktual'nost'', pp. 35-36.

[635] A. Katsenelinboigen, 'L.V. Kantorovich. The political dilemma in scientific creativity', *Journal of Post Keynesian Economics*, 1/2 (1978-1979), p. 139.

[636] *Izvestiya*, 3 December 1964, p. 5.

[637] A. Katsenelinboigen, 'Conflicting Trends in Soviet Economics in the Post-Stalin Era', *The Russian Review*, 35/4 (1976), p. 375.

B.L Markus, G.P. Kosiachenko, I.A. Trakhtenberg, L.A. Leont'yev, A.I. Pashkov and Ostrovityanov. [638]

Stalin had already edited in December 1940 a copy of the existing textbook on political economy, questioning the standing truth of the law of value, [639] which, as Voznesensky wrote earlier on, was that said law had been "abolished" and the plan "has taken on the force of a law". Yet, in that same article he also reaffirmed his rationalising opinion that "it is impossible to draw up a plan […] correctly without starting from the balance of the national economy". [640]

At the January 1941 meeting, Stalin openly stated that "the law of value has not been overcome". Without the concept of "value", he continued, "cost of production" would lose its meaning, while there could also be no distribution or income calculation, nor it would be possible to set prices — prices the State was still "far from able to set" for every commodity, since market prices still existed.

Stalin therefore spoke of a "transformed" surplus product, of how the law of value's character "changes, adopts a new content, and new form", just as "money" and "commodity". "All categories stay", concluded Stalin, "but they adopt a different character" and become tools for communist construction. At this point, Stalin was asked whether the law of value should be described as "determining also the spontaneous distribution of the labor force", which he openly negated.

Stalin then warned economists they ought not to "paste together quotations" of Marx, but study concrete Soviet realities. He even spoke of the need to "prevent disproportions" by amassing

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[638] Quotations in the following paragraphs come from the original document held at ARAN, which has also been translated and analysed by E. Pollock in 2001 — E. Pollock, 'Conversations with Stalin on Questions of Political Economy', *CWIHP Working Paper*, 33 (2001), pp. 14-27.

[639] RGASPI, f. 558, op.3, d. 263, ll. 357-358, 396, 417, 424, 439.

[640] N.A. Voznesensky, 'Tri stalinskiye pyatiletki stroitel'stva sotsializma', *Bol'shevik*, 1 (1940), pp. 81, 85.

reserves and had commending words for the bonus system, since “the people recognise what is in their best interest”. [641]

A theoretical precedent for the “transformed” formula was actually sketched by Bukharin, who in the mid 1920s spoke of “profit”, “accounting” and “calculations” as “levers of development [which] work differently for us”, becoming tools for socialist construction. [642]

Stalin’s “transformed law of value” remained known only to a handful of people until in 1943 the journal *Pod Znamenem Marksizma* openly characterised the idea that economic laws disappeared alongside the capitalist system as “an utterly erroneous approach” which would mean to “slip into the most vulgar voluntarism […] arbitrariness, accident and chaos”.

Indeed, since “the labour of the citizens of a socialist society is not qualitatively uniform”, accounting for it in “hours or days” was impossible. Therefore, “on the basis of the law of value”, calculations and comparisons were to be realised “by means of accounting and comparison of the products of labor, of ‘commodities’”, which were “use values”, but also “ha[d] value”. Commodities as “objects of purchase and sale”, it was further argued, “have prices which are money expressions of their value”, although both surviving pockets of free market and State needs at times caused certain commodities’ prices not to coincide with their actual value.

As a result of this, “trade, money, etc., [were] tools of a planned socialist economy”, as much as *khozraschet* which “based on the conscious use of the law of value”, was “an indispensable method for the planned leadership of economy under socialism”.

Crucially, three further elements of the new “transformed law of value” theory were openly codified: it would be eventually “overcome only in the highly developed stage of communism”; it

[641] ARAN, f. 1705, op. 1, d. 166, ll. 20-24.

[642] Bukharin, ‘Novoe otkrovenie’, pp. 105-106.

caused no “chaotic distribution” of social labour and means of production amongst branches, which instead was centrally planned; “labor power, land and the most important means of production” were “no longer commodities”. [643]

This new truth was quickly interpreted in the Western as an implicit departure from Marx’s labour theory of value. [644] In the USSR it initially generated confusion and heterodox opinions such as Sazonov’s, who was castigated by Aleksandrov for having affirmed that basically the law of value functioned under socialism just as it did under capitalism. [645] Senior economists like Ostrovityanov instead had to endure the embarrassment of being approached by confused students. Lev Voznesensky, A.A. Voznesensky’s son, did so enquired about two articles Ostrovityanov had published one year apart on commodity circulation, expressing entirely contradictory positions. Asked “which one of the two is to be considered correct?”, Ostrovityanov could only answer “you know, take the latest one…”. [646]

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[643] ‘Nekotorye voprosy prepodavaniya politicheskoy ekonomii’, *Pod Znamenem Marksizma*, 7-8 (1943), pp. 57-68.

[644] C. Landauer, ‘From Marx to Menger. The Recent Development of Soviet Economics’, *The American Economic Review*, 34/2 (1944), p. 342 — R. Dunayevskaya, ‘A New Revision of Marxian Economics’, *The American Economic Review*, 34/3 (1944), pp. 531-533.

[645] G. Alexandrov, ‘O Nekotorykh Zadachakh Obshchestvennykh Nauk v Sovremennykh Usloviyakh’, *Bol'shevik*, 14 (1945), p. 20.

[646] L.A. Voznesensky, *Istiny Radi* (Moscow, 2004), p. 91.

Chapter 3. — Post-war economic reforms, 1945-1953

The third chapter focuses on late-Stalinism and specifically on the 1945-1949 period. It looks at economic policy and at the debates which developed under Voznesensky's tenure, at his economic thought and also details his rise and subsequent downfall, discussing its relationship with economics. The chapter is articulated in several subsections: two chronological ones describe the state of the USSR as of 1945 and the remodelling of the State-Party directorate, while the following five specifically focus on economic levers, the price reform and the General Plan. Voznesensky's downfall and its ramification is presented as a subsection further divided in four parts, while the final section describes Soviet realities as of the early 1950s

3.1. — Coming to terms with the end of the war

When the red flag was hoisted on the Reichstag, the Soviet Union emerged as the sole victor whose economy would be significantly set back by the war. [647] Indeed, the level of human and material destruction brought upon the USSR by the Wehrmacht reached the unimaginable, as the country lost 18% of its human assets, roughly 26 million people, and 25% of its physical ones. [648]

[647] M. Harrison, *Accounting for War: Soviet Production, Employment, and the Defence Burden, 1940-1945* (New York, 1996), pp. 157-9 — M. Harrison, 'The Soviet Union. The defeated victor', p. 19.

[648] L.L. Rybakovskiy, *Lyudskiye Poteri SSSR v Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voyne* (Moscow, 2000), p. 110, 115 — M. Ellman, S. Maksudov, 'Soviet Deaths in the Great Patriotic War. A Note', *Europe-Asia Studies*, 46/4 (1994), pp. 673-674 — Davies, *Soviet Economic Development from Lenin to Khrushchev*, p. 64.

Soviet industry had absorbed reasonably well the impact of the war thanks to the impressive growth of armaments production, which caused 1945's total industrial production to stand between 70% (Western estimates) and 90% (Soviet estimates) of 1940's level, although fixed capital investment was a mere two-thirds of the pre-war level. However, agriculture was lying in ruins and 1945's harvest was only 47 mln tonnes, less than half than 1940's and, per head, even lower than 1921's. [649]

As production, distribution and transport were reworked to serve the purposes of a peace-time economy, [650] the Soviet domestic order was clearly "frayed". [651] A multifaceted degree of ideological and economic relaxation had proved necessary during the war and while military orders celebrating Tsarist Generals were introduced and Commissars demoted, control over State property and socialist production was decreased, as infringements with the kolkhoz system were tolerated. [652] Expectations that victory over Nazi Germany would bring about some form of change became widespread. [653]

Yet, after Moscow's skies were brightened to daylight by fireworks celebrating Germany's unconditional surrender, euphoric Soviet citizens were left struggling with their expectations. Peasants kept on leaving kolkhozes, workers were expressing their dissatisfaction with factory conditions, while intellectuals and youth groups voiced their grievances relatively openly. All the

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[649] Davies, *Soviet Economic Development from Lenin to Khrushchev*, pp. 65-66 — Nove, *An Economic History of the USSR*, pp. 303-304.

[650] Harrison, 'Soviet Industrial Expansion Under Late Stalinism', pp. 360-361.

[651] Gorlizki, 'Rules, Incentives and Soviet Campaign Justice after World War II', p. 1249.

[652] Ibid.

[653] E.Iu. Zubkova, *Obshchestvo i reformy, 1945-1964* (Moscow, 1993).

while, as millions of soldiers and workers were demobilising from the Army and the defence industries, an amnesty freed hundreds of thousands of inmates. [654]

Soviet farmers and workers were however hardly the only ones that would be left disappointed by Stalin's post-war policy. If Churchill, Roosevelt and Truman all thought at some point that, essentially, Stalin could be trusted, [655] several Menshevik émigrés went even further. [656] Both Yugow and Dan came to think that the USSR would start moving towards a democratic model of socialism. [657]

None of these expectations materialised. Not long after Soviet soldiers shook their American counterparts' hands on the Elbe, fragile war-time alliances fractured and although the post-war settlement prevented a new war in Europe, it did not avert its division. [658]

In the USSR popular expectations gave way to resentment and disillusionment, while problems worsened. Corruption and theft had increased during the war and were compounded by the indifference and opportunism of many Party workers, especially in rural areas. Peasants kept on breaking away from kolkhozes and steal, many kolkhoz heads systematically abused their powers and the 1946 harvest was again poor. [659] Theft had become a chronic problem in

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[654] Morcom, 'Enforcing Stalinist Discipline in the Early Years of Post-war Reconstruction in the USSR', pp. 316-318 — Zubkova, *Obshchestvo i reformy*, pp. 94-95 — J. Fürst, 'Introduction - late Stalinist society: history, policies and people', in J. Fürst (ed), *Late Stalinist Russia*, pp. 1-11 — Gorlizki, 'Rules, Incentives and Soviet Campaign Justice after World War II', pp. 1249-1250.

[655] R. Dallek, *Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945* (new York, 1995), pp. 438-440— D.W. Larson, *Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation* (Princeton, Chichester, 1985), pp. 195-196.

[656] Here reference is made to the minority Menshevik fraction which remained anchored to the "Martov position" and by 1939 had split with the main *Sotsialisticheskiy vestnik* group, briefly publishing *Novy Put'*.

[657] Yugow, *Russia's Economic Front for War and Peace*, pp. 264, 269, 270-271 — T. Dan (ed and trans J. Carmichael), *The Origins of Bolshevism* (London, 1964), p. 438

[658] N.M. Naimark, 'Stalin and Europe in the Post-war Period, 1945-53. Issues and Problems', *Journal of Modern European History*, 2/1, Communist Regimes and Parties after the Second World War (2004), p. 31.

[659] Morcom, 'Enforcing Stalinist Discipline in the Early Years of Post-war Reconstruction in the USSR', p. 329 — Davies, *Soviet Economic Development from Lenin to Khrushchev*, p. 64.

industry too, since rising prices and wages had made the re-selling of stolen goods extremely profitable, [660] while as human and material resources were freed from the defence sector, 1946 industrial output fell below 1945's levels. [661]

The "late Stalinist" years were indeed marked by popular resentment, chaos, bureaucratic self-interest as well as by leadership indecision and infighting. [662] Yet, popular attitudes were multifaceted and not uniformly anti-Soviet, while no serious challenges to Stalin's rule originated from the Party or society. [663] Soon, a shift towards more rational and technocratic forms of political and economic management concretised itself in stronger focus on state and labour discipline, reviving post-Great Terror trends, while ideological training of cadres, managers and of the broader population was combined with targeted and sophisticated repression, moving away from indiscriminate terror. [664]

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[660] Morcom, 'Enforcing Stalinist Discipline in the Early Years of Post-war Reconstruction in the USSR', p. 335.

[661] Davies, Harrison, Wheatcroft (eds), *The Economic Transformation of the Soviet Union, 1913-1945*, p. 241 — Davies, *Soviet Economic Development from Lenin to Khrushchev*, p. 65.

[662] Fürst, *Stalin's Last Generation*, pp. 22-23 — Ward, 'What is History? The Case of Late Stalinism', pp. 446-447.

[663] Morcom, 'Enforcing Stalinist Discipline in the Early Years of Post-war Reconstruction in the USSR', pp. 312, 316.

[664] V. Dunham, *In Stalin's Time. Middleclass Values in Soviet Fiction* (Cambridge, 1976) — Morcom, 'Enforcing Stalinist Discipline in the Early Years of Post-war Reconstruction in the USSR', pp. 313-314, 317-320, 342-343 — Duskin, *Stalinist reconstruction and the confirmation of a new elite, 1945-1953*, pp. 8-10 — Hahn, *Post-war Soviet Politics*, pp. 17-21 — M. Nakachi, 'Population, politics and reproduction: late Stalinism and its legacy', in J. Fürst (ed), *Late Stalinist Russia*, pp. 23-24 — Harrison, 'The Soviet Union after 1945', pp. 9-13 — Gorlizki, Khlevnyuk, *Stalin and his circle*, p. 266.

3.2. — Voznesensky's rise and the remodelling of the Party-State directorate, 1945-1949

One of Stalin's top priorities in the immediate aftermath of the war became the remodelling of the power structure. A week after the launch of Operation Barbarossa, Stalin's lieutenants had forced upon him the GKO, together with the demotion of Voznesensky and Molotov's re-empowerment. The most centralised official power agency in Soviet history, the GKO did away with the careful balancing between State and Party that characterised the pre-war period. [665]

As of 1945, Stalin's priorities therefore were strengthening his institutional power and ideological uniformity within the leadership, reconfirming himself as the sole unchallenged arbiter of promotions and demotions. Furthermore, as the GKO would give way to the return of pre-war institutions, the *vozhd* was well aware he needed to rebalance once again the equilibriums in the State-Party directorate. [666]

The GKO was therefore dissolved on 4 September 1945, [667] but two days after its Operational Bureau was revived and, together with the Special Committee on the atomic bomb, it was assigned to Sovnarkom. [668] Said Bureau, chaired by Beria, supervised thirty-two industrial and transport Commissariats and bore the exact same name as Molotov's Bureau, which existed since 1941 and now dealt with the remaining thirty-three Commissariats. Voznesensky served as Deputy Chairman in Molotov's Bureau and was the only official alongside Mikoyan to sit on both bureaus. [669]

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[665] O.V. Khlevnyuk, *Stalin. New Biography of a Dictator* (New Haven, 2015), p. 206.

[666] Gorlizki, 'Ordinary Stalinism', p. 701 — Gorlizki, Khlevnyuk, *Stalin and his circle*, pp. 258-260.

[667] RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 1053, l. 50, in O.V. Khlevnyuk, *Politburo TsK VKP(b) i Sovet Ministrov SSSR, 1945-1953* (Moscow, 2002), p. 21

[668] Shoygu S.K., et. al. (eds), *Velikaya Otechestvennaya Voyna 1941-1945 Godov,* xi, pp. 109-110.

[669] RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 1053, l. 53, 430-432, in Khlevnyuk, *Politburo i Sovet Ministrov*, pp. 21-23

Stalin's favours were also changing and again in late 1945, Molotov was harshly criticised, while Beria lost control over the NKVD. In early 1946 it was Malenkov who lost his Secretariat seat, as Beria witnessed his former dominion split into two ministries, both assigned to his rivals. [670] On the contrary, Stalin returned to promote the Leningraders, [671] while Voznesensky maintained his usual swashbuckling attitude, ridiculing Beria in front of his subordinates at a late 1945 meeting on the Saratov-Moscow pipeline, where Voznesensky cut short his "shrill shouts". [672]

On 20 March 1946 the two former Sovnarkom bureaus were unified in the SovMin Bureau, chaired by Beria and with Voznesensky and Kosygin as deputies, [673] while a week after Voznesensky was assigned supervision over ten departments, including Gosbank and the Ministry of Finance. [674]

All of this took place on the background of the simultaneous weakening of the Politburo and strengthening of SovMin. [675] As a matter of fact, at that point several "politburos" coexisted: the official one, Stalin's original "quintet" (formalised as Politburo Commission on External Affairs in December 1945, now including the *vozhd*, Molotov, Mikoyan, Malenkov, Beria and Zhdanov), the "surrogate Politburo" represented by Zhdanov's Orgburo and unofficial meetings bestowed with official Politburo powers, often convening without Stalin. [676] All such "politburos" necessitated of Stalin's approval to take any decision and yet, although Stalin's lieutenants worked "towards the *vozhd*", he was careful in approaching them. [677]

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[670] Khlevnyuk, *Stalin. New Biography of a Dictator*, pp. 268-273 — Gorlizki, Khlevnyuk. *Cold Peace*, p. 28

[671] E.A. Rees, 'Stalin as Leader, 1937–1953: From Dictator to Despot', pp. 222.223 — Gorlitski, 'Ordinary Stalinism', p. 712-713.

[672] N. Baybakov, *Iz vospominaniy*, pp. 142-143.

[673] GARF, f. P-5446, op. 1, d. 275, l. 35, in Khlevnyuk, *Politburo i Sovet Ministrov*, p. 30

[674] GARF, f. P-5446, op. 1, d. 275, ll. 121-124, in Khlevnyuk, *Politburo i Sovet Ministrov*, pp. 30-32.

[675] Gorlizki, Khlevnyuk, *Stalin and his circle*, p. 260.

[676] Gorlizki, Stalin's Cabinet', pp. 291-295, 301

[677] Khlevnyuk, 'Stalin as dictator. The personalisation of power', p. 112.

Eventually, on 8 February 1947, a division of labour between Politburo and SovMin was approved: the first, headed by Stalin, was assigned supervision over political issues, while SovMin, which Stalin was almost always absent from, was given authority over almost all economic processes, [678] further empowering the SovMin Bureau and its sectoral bureaus. [679]

In the meantime, Voznesensky's star kept on rising. He was added on 3 October 1946 to what became known as Stalin's "septet", [680] while on 26 February 1947, in a clear blow to Beria, [681] he became full Politburo member. [682] Wheatcroft's research on the amount of contact hours between top leaders and Stalin proves how Voznesensky was second only to Molotov in 1947, while he was seventh in 1946 and fifth in 1948. [683]

Voznesensky also maintained the chairmanship of Gosplan, which on 15 December 1947 was reformed into a more agile Committee tasked only with "planning the national economy, accounting and control in the implementation of national economic plans". Gossnab (State Supply Committee), headed by Kaganovich, was assigned "material and technical supply" and Gostehnika (State Committee on Science and Technology), headed by Malshev, supervision over the "introduction of new technology". [684] Voznesensky was also entrusted to head a commission tasked with working out "the composition, regulations and structure" of all three agencies. [685]

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[678] Gorlizki, Khlevnyuk, *Stalin and his circle*, pp. 260-263.

[679] Gorlizki, 'Ordinary Stalinism', pp. 706, 711-713.

[680] APRF, f. 3, op. 22, d. 9, l. 147, in Khlevnyuk, *Politburo i Sovet Ministrov*, p. 38.

[681] Gorlitski, 'Ordinary Stalinism', p. 712-713.

[682] RGANI, f. 2, op. 1, d. 9, l. 3, in Khlevnyuk, *Politburo i Sovet Ministrov*, p. 45.

[683] S.G. Wheatcroft, 'From Team-Stalin to Degenerate Tyranny', p. 97.

[684] RGAE, f. 4372, op. 48, d. 13, ll. 304-306.

[685] RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 1069, ll. 2-4, in Khlevnyuk, *Politburo i Sovet Ministrov*, pp. 52-53.

This was the high watermark of Voznesensky's career, as he combined chairmanship of Gosplan, SovMin deputy chairmanship, membership in its Bureau, in the Politburo and in this latter one's Commission on External Affairs.

Background to all these changes was the intensifying factional struggle which opposed the Leningraders to the Malenkov-Beria group which, as ageing Stalin was retreating from day-to-day affairs, squared off in the ensuing succession struggle. [686]

3.3. — Voznesensky's economic thought presented: the Development and Reconstruction Plan and *War Economy*, 1946-1947

In the post-war period Voznesensky remained true to his pre-war priorities, perspective planning, proportionality and plan verification, now enriched by the experience he gained during the war. All of this further increased his interest in economic levers, while he even felt bold enough to take up the role of economic theoretician, proposing a slightly, but meaningfully modified version of the standing truth on the transformed law of value.

Voznesensky's focus on economic levers played a key part in the new plan launched in 1946, not called Fourth Five-Year Plan, but rather First Plan for the Restoration and Development of the National Economy of the USSR, adopted by the Supreme Soviet, not the Party. At the Soviet's First Session, on 15 March, [687] the plan was presented by Voznesensky and discussed, while the "Law on the Five Year Plan" was adopted on 20 March 1946. [688]

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[686] Tikhonov, Gregory, 'Stalin's Last Plan', p. 163.

[687] *Pravda*, 16 March 1946, pp. 1-4.

[688] *Pravda*, 21 March 1946, pp. 2-8.

In his speech, Voznesensky spoke of how “the victory of the USSR means that the Soviet state system has won” and its “leading force”, the party of “Lenin and Stalin”. [689] As Stalin had already announced, the Plan was meant to “increase the level of our industry […] threefold as compared to the pre-war level”, which meant annual production of 50 million tons of pig iron, 60 million tons of steel, 500 million tons of coal, 60 million tons of oil. [690]

Consumer goods did not figure prominently during Plan discussion, [691] but did so in the final “Law”. By 1950 the USSR was to produce 500 thousand cars, specifically described as “mass production of new models”, to “restore and improve” textile and light industries, bring about “rapid recovery and development” of the food industry. Improvements in “product quality” as well as “the restoration and further construction of towns and villages” were also demanded, while the necessity to “expand the mass production of consumer goods, multiply kolkhoz incomes, increase trade” and end rationing were also mentioned. [692]

However, in his March 15 speech, Voznesensky did not only present the planned strategy for economic reconstruction, but also broadly discussed the pillars of post-war economic policy, stating the following:

> the post-war reorganisation of the national economy demands the strengthening of the role of economic levers in the organisation of production and distribution, which are: prices, money, credit, profit and bonuses. State planning of the national economy of the USSR employs in the interests of the strengthening and development of socialist production the law of value with the peculiarity that in the Soviet economy the transformation of value into capital exploiting labor is excluded. [693]

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[689] GARF, f. P7523, op. 35, d. 28, l. 6.

[690] I.V. Stalin, ‘Rech' na predvybornom sobranii izbirateley Stalinskogo izbiratel'nogo okruga goroda Moskvy, ya fevralya 1946 goda’, in Stalin, *Sochineniya*, xvi, p. 16.

[691] Hahn, *Post-war Soviet Politics*, p. 21.

[692] GARF, f. P7523, op. 35, d. 55g, ll. 3-7.

[693] GARF, f. P7523, op. 35, d. 28, l. 6.

The final text of the “Law on the Five-Year Plan” instead carried the following set of demands:

> strengthen monetary circulation and credit relations in the national economy; raise the importance of profit and economic calculation in the national economy as an additional stimulus to the growth of production; increase the profitability of all industries by reducing the cost of production; increase the attention of economic organisations to the mobilisation of domestic resources, to a regime of thrift and resolute elimination of losses from mismanagement and unproductive expenditures; increase the share of the premium for the fulfilment and over-fulfilment of production tasks in the earnings of workers and employees. [694]

As stated, economic levers already appeared in Voznesensky’s pre-war thought, but it was definitely war-time experience which solidified his interest in their deployment and further strengthening. Indeed, in his book *War Economy of the USSR in the period of the Patriotic War* (thereafter *War Economy*), which would be released in early 1947, Voznesensky devoted an entire chapter to “budget, credit and money”. There he stated that such levers performed a number of key roles: “redistribution of the national income for the purpose of financing war expenditures” drawing on the population’s income and pre-war savings, “redistribution of material stocks and reserves” and “control though monetary allocations over production and the distribution of the social product”.

“Profits”, and their maintenance at a high level, were defined by Voznesensky as a “very important element of the USSR’s war economy”. State credit was also said to have played “an exceptionally important role”, after in the early war period budget expenditures exceeded revenues and only the employment of reserves covered defence expenses. After a curtailment of Gosbank credit, this trend was checked in 1943 and credit was once again expanded so to

[694] GARF, f. P7523, op. 35, d. 55g, l. 8.

guarantee “the process of extended reproduction”. In parallel, also material stocks started to grow again.

Voznesensky therefore defined “state monetary circulation” as the key to “the stability of the war budget”. He admitted that as currency emission increased, cash steadily flowed into peasants’ hands through kolkhoz markets, but reminded that monetary circulation was nevertheless kept stable, thanks to fixed prices, and became a “very important feature of the Soviet war economy”. Money, concluded Voznesensky, was a crucial “economic lever”, as it had allowed authorities to: control production and distribution, measure “costs of production and circulation” for the purpose of “calculating and controlling cost price, the cost of production and prices”, “maintain stable retail prices” and “mobilise savings”.

Voznesensky’s *War Economy* also performed the role of broader theoretical manifesto, where he openly stated that “scientific socialism does not deny the importance in the socialist economy of the law of value, market prices, the accounting of profits and losses” and “bonuses”.

“The victory of socialism in the USSR”, continued Voznesensky “does not deny, but presupposes the personal ownership of income from labour, of one’s dwelling house, of household goods and articles of personal use”, which function as “an additional stimulus to the development of the Soviet economy”. Similarly, according to Voznesensky, market prices formed “under the influence of the law of value and its mechanism of supply and demand” did not “override” the fact that the overwhelming majority of prices were centrally set. [695]

“Accounting of profits and losses” was in turn described as “a crucial stimulus” for the “increase of profits” and production, [696] just as much as “compliance with *khozraschet*”. [697] Voznesensky

[695] Voznesensky, *Voennaya Ekonomika*, pp. 131-140.

[696] Voznesensky, *Voennaya Ekonomika*, pp. 174-175.

[697] Ibid., p. 153.

also added that “the all-round development of personal incentives to increase output through a system of bonuses […] is a very important source of increasing production”. [698] He clearly stated that during the war the broadening of the bonus system to “engineers and technicians” and “additional material encouragements to workers” was a crucial factor in the “improvement of labour organisation”. [699]

Voznesensky particularly dwelled on the functioning of the law of value under socialism. He stated that “unquestionably” certain economic laws operated in the USSR and that “only knowledge of economic laws makes it possible to have them serve socialism”, describing the “transformed law of value” as the “most elementary law governing the cost of production and distribution”.

Through the law of value, calculations could be made in physical and monetary terms. This was of extreme importance since “value, determined by socially necessary labour” was the only “denominator” which could serve the purpose of distributing goods according to labour, as differences between skilled and unskilled labour remained. Therefore, “price and value do not and cannot coincide for of each commodity taken separately”, but the “sum of total prices [must] equal the cost of production”, i.e. the sum of socially necessary labour.

According to Voznesensky however, the law of value’s scope was broader. Indeed, he added that “the state plan […] deploys the law of value to set the necessary proportions in the production and distribution of social labour and the social product, proportions subordinated to the task of consolidating and developing the socialist system”. Such proportions, “change along with changes in economic and political tasks, but to accomplish a set task the established proportions must be observed with the utmost persistence”.

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[698] Voznesensky, *Voennaya Ekonomika*, p. 153.

[699] Ibid., p. 116.

Crucially, the Gosplan Chairman reiterated that “the law of value operates not only in the distribution of products, but also in the distribution of labor itself among the various branches”. Its deployment ensured “the proper apportioning of social labour among the different branches”, because it was “essential to observe definite proportions between industry and agriculture, the production of mens of production and [of] consumption, the growth of output and the development of transportation, between accumulation and consumption”.

Voznesensky also blatantly admitted that “new formerly unknown problems have arisen - problems of planning”, which brought him to state that “the political economy of socialism […] studies the economic laws of the planning and organisation of production”. He therefore added a reflection of momentous importance: “socialist planning, based on the rational utilisation and application of the economic laws of production and distribution, is itself a social law of development and as such a subject of political economy”. [700]

Voznesensky further discussed the issue of preventing disproportions, stressing once again the “utmost importance” of “perspective plans” and “reserves”, cautioning that it would be “naive” to imagine the state could prevent any disproportion from materialising. [701]

The balance method also prominently featured once again in Voznesensky’s analysis, as he deployed it to compare Soviet war and peace-time economies, through balances of production and distribution of “social product […] fixed capital funds, […] labour force […], national income”, as well as balances of “the population’s monetary incomes and expenditures” and of “supply and distribution of material funds”. [702]

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[700] Voznesensky, *Voennaya Ekonomika*, pp. 145-150.

[701] Ibid., pp. 180-181.

[702] Ibid., pp. 64-65

Finally, Voznesensky also spoke of mechanisation, electrification and advanced technology the likes of “transmission of high-tension direct current”, the use of “oxygen and electricity”, “radio location and television”, “infra-red technique” and the production of “synthetics”. [703]

Voznesensky’s *War Economy* received unanimous praise in the USSR and became also extremely popular abroad (further details of the books’s foreign popularity will be discussed at pp. 199-201).

Ostrovityanov immediately became one of the most outspoken supporters of Voznesensky’s book. Having become head of the Academy’s Institute of Economics in 1947, Ostrovityanov presided on 27-28 March 1948 over a discussion on the book and reported how the Institute thought there was “every reason [to] recommend the work of Academician Nikolai Voznesensky […] for the awarding of the Stalin Prize for 1947”. [704]

During said meeting and in a review written a month earlier Ostrovityanov praised *War Economy* as a “valuable contribution [of] great theoretical and practical interest”, an “original research”. The book was a “significant step forward in the creative development of problems of the political economy of socialism” and in the “further development and concretisation of the economic theory of Marxism-Leninism”. *War Economy*, further argued Ostrovityanov, “has great significance for the practices of socialist construction” and “will greatly assist our numerous Party, Soviet and economic cadres in mastering the economic laws of socialism and their application in the practice of socialist construction”. [705] Voznesensky was celebrated as nothing less than a leading theoretician of socialist economics.

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[703] Ibid., pp. 182-183.

[704] ARAN, f. 1877, op. 1, d. 200, l. 7.

[705] ARAN, f. 1877, op. 1, d. 200, ll. 7-10 — K. Ostrvityanov, ‘Voennaya ekonomika strany sotsializma. N. Voznesenskiy, “Voennaya Ekonomika SSSR v Period Otechestvennoy Voyny”, Gospolizdat, 1947 g.’, *Planovoe khozyaistvo*, 1 (1948), pp. 71-80.

As discussed earlier (pp. 109-112), Voznesensky does not appear to be the father of the "transformed law of value" concept. Yet, with his *War Economy*, he did indeed venture in unknown terrain, going beyond what was at that moment official Soviet economic theory.

Stalin would powerfully remark in 1952 that the political economy of socialism was to study economic laws, whilst "economic planning" concerned "directing bodies". [706] Yet, according to Voznesensky, if the plan was an economic law, planning was "itself a social law of development and as such a subject of political economy". [707] This did not simply mean shifting the boundaries of an abstract demarcation, but making of planning the economists' object of study. Voznesensky had started entrusting experts to check plan fulfilment in the localities in the late 1930s, but now he implicitly stated he wanted them to be much more intimately involved in the complex process of planning. Stalin's interest in making sure that this instead remained a prerogative of the "directing bodies" was linked to the preoccupation with maintaining economic policy's subjugation to the leadership's political priorities, which implied a whole array of uneconomic practices. Actual economic scrutiny of such processes, aimed at enhancing efficiency, coupled with increase reliance on economic levers, was therefore a potential threat to said political priorities.

Precisely the topic of experts was one Voznesensky paid very much attention to in the post-war period as well. Indeed, he openly supported Minister for Higher Education S. Kaftanov, who since the pre-war years had pushed for the bettering the training of industrial specialists. [708] A.A. Voznesensky was also involved in similar processes, as he was tasked with others to oversee the restructuring of the Sovnarkom Committee for Higher Education's Lecture Bureau. [709]

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[706] I. Stalin, *Ekonomicheskiye Problemy Sotsializma v SSSR* (Moscow, 1952), pp. 72-73.

[707] Voznesensky, *Voennaya Ekonomika*, pp. 145-150.

[708] Duskin, *Stalinist reconstruction and the confirmation of a new elite, 1945-1953*, p. 50.

[709] V.P. Korzun, M.A. Mamontova, '«Na Mestakh u Lektsionnogo Buro Dolzhny Byt' Tak Nazyvayemye Shchupal'tsy». Istoriya Sozdaniya Lektsionnogo Buro pri Komitete po Delam Vysshey Shkoly', *Uchenye Zapiski Kazanskogo Universiteta*, 158/3 (2016), pp. 747-749.

Gosplan instead organised three months-long “Higher Economic Courses” which were organised “for the development of qualifications of Gosplan plenipotentiaries in the Republics, territories and regions, their deputies and heads of Republican, territorial and regional statistical offices”. The courses focused on Marxism, the political economy of socialism (with double the hours of any other class), Soviet economic development, Party history as well as international relations and foreign policy. [710] Right up until the last days of Voznesensky’s tenure, these courses were given a great deal of attention at Gosplan and involved dozens of planners, plenipotentiaries and Academicians. [711]

Again in relation to the law of value, Voznesensky also openly affirmed that in the USSR it not only operated in the distribution of products, but “also in the distribution of labor itself among the various branches”, which was essential to “ensure the proper apportioning of social labour” and to “to observe definite proportions”. [712] We can only speculate on what the deeper meaning of these sentences might have been. Yet, it does not seem unreasonable to imagine that Voznesensky might have wanted cost of production and enterprises’ profitability to play a broader role on relation to investment and the allocation of inputs. The forcefulness with which Stalin would reaffirm in 1952 if in the USSR the law of value did not regulate the “‘proportions’ of labour distributed among the various branches of production”, seems to indicate that he indeed interpreted Voznesensky’s theories as a possible attempt at mitigating the priority principle for heavy industry. [713]

Another view contained in *War Economy* was Voznesensky’s strident condemnation of “some theorists who consider themselves Marxists”, who believed state planning had made headways

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[710] RGAE, f. 4372, op. 48, d. 1, ll. 138-140

[711] RGAE, f. 4372, op. 49, d. 2, ll. 33-53.

[712] Voznesensky, *Voennaya Ekonomika*, p. 148.

[713] Stalin, *Ekonomicheskiye Problemy Sotsializma*, pp. 22-24.

in capitalist war economies. [714] These views were expressed by Ye. Varga, Director of the Academy's Institute of World Economy and World Politics since 1927, in his 1946 study of Western economies in the Second World War. There Varga also suggested a possible gradualist way to proletarian power in the West and predicted a softening of East-West tensions. [715]

By May 1947 the book was already subjected to fierce criticism and, [716] although Varga initially fought back, [717] criticism continued, often relying on Voznesensky's above quoted attack, although Voznesensky himself took no active part in this process. [718]

By September 1947 Varga's institute was merged into that of Economics, under the Ostrovityanov's directorship and Voznesensky's control, since Gosplan oversaw the Institute's activities, [719] while after mounting criticism in 1948, [720] Varga eventually refuted his theories in early 1949. [721] Yet, said criticism softened after Voznesensky's dismissal and ironically Varga even took part in a ritualistic post-mortem condemnation of this latter one's views. [722]

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[714] Voznesensky, *Voennaya Ekonomika*, p. 31.

[715] Ye.S. Varga, *Izmeneniya v ekonomike kapitalizma v itoge vtoroy mirovoy voyny* (Moscow, 1946), pp. 317-320.

[716] M. Arzhanov, 'Vystupleniye na diskussii po knige Ye. Varga «Izmeneniya o ekonomike kapitalizma v itoge vtoroy mirovoy voyny» 14 maya 1947 g.', *Mirovoye khozyaystvo i mirovaya politika*, 11 (1947), pp. 31-34.

[717] L. Gruliow, *Soviet Views on the Post-war World Economy. An Official Critique of Evgeny Varga's "Changes in the Economy of Capitalism resulting from the Second World War*" (Washington, 1948), p. 2-3.

[718] Hahn, *Post-war Soviet Politics*, pp. 90-93 — A. Mommen, *Stalin's Economist. The Economic Contributions of Jenö Varga* (Abingdon and Oxford, 2011), pp. 184-185.

[719] P.P. Cherkasov, *IMEMO. Portret na fone epokhi* (Moscow, 2004), p. 23.

[720] 'O nedostatkakh i zadachakh nauchno-issledovatel'skoy raboty v oblasti ekonomiki', *Voprosy ekonomiki*, 8 (1948), pp. 66-110 — 'O nedostatkakh i zadachakh nauchno-issledovatel'skoy raboty v oblasti ekonomiki', *Voprosy ekonomiki*, 9 (1948), pp. 52-116 — 'V Otdelenii Ekonomiki i Prava', *Vestnik AN SSSR*, 7 (1949), pp. 133-134.

[721] *Pravda*, 15 March 1949, p. 6 — Ye.S. Varga, 'Protiv reformistskogo napravleniya v rabotakh po imperializmu', *Voprosy ekonomiki*, 3 (1949).

[722] 'Nauchnaya Sessiya, Posvyashchennaya Proizvedeniyu I.V. Stalina "Ekonomicheskie Problemi Sozializma v SSR"', *Voprosy ekonomiki*, 4 (1953), p. 94.

Some early Western interpretations of Voznesensky described him as a dogmatist precisely because his role in the Varga controversy, [723] while the erroneous assumption that he was the main force behind the demise of Varga's institute survived until the 1990s. [724] However, recent archival research blamed the attack against Varga not specifically on Voznesensky, but on either Stalin himself, [725] or on Zhdanov and his faction, who supposedly targeted Varga and his cohort due to "personal, ethnic and generational hatreds, not theoretical and ideological differences". [726]

Moreover, already in 1961 Schulman argued that Varga's assumptions on the stabilisation of capitalism and peaceful competition were not incompatible, but complementary with Voznesensky's proposals on balanced growth and rationalisation. He further stated that the post-Stalin leadership accepted in the main both these assumptions and proposals. [727] More recently Pollock instead argued that both Varga and Voznesensky had both dangerously prioritised the role of economics over that of politics. [728]

3.4. — The debate on economic levers

The new economic policy directions approved through the Law on the Five-Year Plan were however not intended to be only the matter of speeches and resolutions. Indeed, already on 27 March 1946, the CC asked to "broadly develop mass-political work on making all workers well-acquainted with the Law on the Five-Year plan […] explaining the workers the tasks of the post-

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[723] Zauberman, 'Economic Thought in the Soviet Union', p. 199.
Said interpretation is particularly unfair given that Varga himself and economists of the calibre of Nemchinov and D'yachenko, participated in compulsory fulsome celebrations of Stalin's *Economic Problems* — 'Nauchnaya Sessiya, Posvyashchennaya Proizvedeniyu I.V. Stalina "Ekonomicheskie Problemi Sozializma v SSR"', 83-84, 89, 94-95.

[724] G.A. Arbatov, 'Mesto i Rol' SSSR v Mirovom Tsivilizatsionnom Protsesse. Materialy nauchnoy diskussii', *Vestnik RAN*, 3 (1991), p. 5.

[725] Cherkasov, *IMEMO*, pp. 47-50.

[726] K.D. Roh, 'Rethinking the Varga Controversy, 1941-1953', *Europe-Asia Studies*, 63/5 (2011), p. 852.

[727] Schulman, *Stalin's Foreign Policy Reappraised*, pp. 44-46.

[728] E. Pollock, *Stalin and the Soviet Science War* (Princeton, Oxford, 2006), pp. 208-209.

war Five-Year Plan and the mobilisation of the Soviet people in the struggle for the implementation of and over-fulfilment of the new Five-Year plan". This "work", the resolution continued, was "not a short-term campaign, and will represent an essential part of the agitprop work of the Party in the coming period". [729]

At the same time, the new economic policy directions were also not meant to be confined to theoretical works like *War Economy*. Indeed, with the Party and Gosplan's full blessing, an economic debate opened on the necessity to strengthen economic levers and *khozraschet*.

Six months after Voznesensky's March 1946 speech, an authoritative unsigned *Planovoe Khzoaistvo* article discussed the pillars of post-war economics, profusely quoting Voznesensky. Reference was made to the necessity to further develop "work on the balance of the national economy", without which one "cannot wisely compile a development plan". "Proportionality between branches", continued the article, was of the utmost importance and ought to be set "not only in kind, but also in the value form". "Strengthening the role of economic levers", the "planning of commodity production", the "strengthening of *khozraschet*" and "reserves" were also named as key to post-war economics. [730]

The article also proposed one of Voznesensky's favourite quotations of Stalin, which reminded how "compiling the plan is only the beginning of planning". The Gosplan Chairman had addressed with these words his colleagues in Leningrad in 1935, turning what Stalin said at the 16th Congress in 1930 to incite upward revisions of the plan, into a call for rationalisation and for the study of shortcomings (pp. 63-64). In 1946, *Planovoe khozyaistvo* quoted Stalin exactly in

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[729] KPSS, 'Postanovleniye TSK VKP(v) ob agitatsionnoy-propagandistskoy rabote partiynykh organizatsiy v svyazi s prinyatiyem zakona o pyatiletnem plane vosstanovleniya i razvitiya narodnogo khoaizystva SSSR na 1946-1950 gody', in KPSS, *Kommunisticheskaya partiya Sovetskogo Soyuza v rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh s"yezdov, konferentsiy i plenumov TsK, 1898-1971. 1941-1954* (9 vols, Moscow, 1970-1982), vi, pp. 149-153

[730] 'Planirovaniye v poslevoyennyy period i novaya struktura Gosplana', *Planovoe khozyaistvo* 5 (1946), pp. 16, 21-22.

the same fashion, as it reminded the importance of “verifying plan compliance”. This was the necessary precondition to “reveal additional resources for increasing the production of consumer goods [and] indicate the path of the most economical and productive use of natural resources in the fields of light and food industries”. [731]

Several Soviet economic doyens opened the debate. Turetskiy focused on *khozraschet*, whose strengthening meant “to exercise creative initiative in mobilising internal production resources”, for the purpose of “rationalisation”. He further described as crucial in this process “control of the rouble”, “commodity-money relations between State enterprises and organisations”, compliance with “Soviet principles of credit” as well as “the strict and consistent implementation of the principle of material incentives”. [732]

Kosyachenko instead focused on the necessity to “prevent disproportions”, which he named as planning’s third cardinal principle, after ensuring the country’s economic independence and the primacy of the socialist sector. In order to achieve this, he called for more attention to the drawing up of balances and to the work of Gosplan Commissioners. Statistics, concluded Kosyachenko, ought to “become an even more effective instrument”, not only to “fix the implementation of the plan” but also to “reveal the causes of failure, analyse […] the development of individual sectors […] and prevent possible disproportions”. [733]
Moreover, almost as a further justification of the new economic policy directions, in mid-1946 *Planovoe khozyaistvo* released a number of unpublished Lenin documents, several of which

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[731] Ibid., pp. 22-24.

[732] Sh.Ya. Turetskiy, ‘Ukrepleniye khozyaystvennogo rascheta v novoy pyatiletke’, *Planovoe khozyaistvo*, 4 (1946), pp. 56, 59-60, 65, 69.

[733] G. Kosyachenko, ‘Preduprezhdeniye disproportsii v narodnom khozyaystve - odna ikh vazhneyshikh zadach planirovaniya’, *Planovoe khozyaistvo*, 4 (1946), pp. 3-4, 17.

were related to “questions of accounting and the proper organisation of the distribution of products and commodities”. [734]

It was however hardly only Soviet economic doyens who contributed to late 1940s debates, as many young economists took an active part in them. One such economist was the future inspirer of the 1965 reform programme, E.G. Liberman.

As a reaction to Liberman’s open celebration in the 1960s, many Western scholars would understandably, although at times rather too harshly, point to theoretically stronger Soviet reforming economists, discounting Liberman as an unsophisticated frontman. [735] Yet, little or nothing was known at that time of Liberman’s own *cursus honorum* in the profession.

A graduate of Kiev (1920) and Kharkov (1935), Liberman headed the Laboratory for Organisational Analysis at the All-Ukrainian Institute of Labour. There he directed a group of young economists tasked with studying methods to improve labour productivity through the experimentation of mechanised accounting models. The Great Break threw Liberman’s work into shambles and he was investigated twice in the early 1930’s for heterodox economic views. In 1935 he was publicly criticised for “praising the capitalist system”, while in 1938 he was arrested in April, released and arrested once again in November. This time Liberman was sentenced to fifteen years of hard labour, but after six months in prison he was fully rehabilitated. [736]

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[734] I.A. Gladkov, ‘Novyye dokumenty V.I. Lenina o sotsialisticheskom stroitel'stve. XXXV Leninskiy sbornik”’, *Planovoe khozyaistvo*, 4 (1946), pp. 72, 77.

[735] V.G. Treml, ‘The Politics of ‘Libermanism’’, *Soviet Studies*, 19/4 (1968), pp. 567-572

[736] G.V. Kovalevskiy, *Idei*, *Poiski, Resheniya Khar'kovskaya Ekonomicheskaya Shkola (1804-2004)* (Kharkhov, 2005), pp. 37-38 — D.Yu. Mihailchenko, “‘Sprava’ O. G. Libermana: 1938–1939’, *Hileya: naukovyy visnyk*, 75 (2013), pp. 88-90 — D.Yu. Mihailchenko, ‘Nedostigayemaya Effektivnost': Raboty Issledovatel'skoy Gruppy Ye.G. Libermana na Khar'kovskom Mashinostroitel'nom Zavode “Serp i Molot” (1925-1931)’, *Seriya Istoriya. Politologiya. Ekonomika. Informatika*, 179/8 (2014), pp. 123-129.

After the war, Liberman participated to the unfolding economic debates since 1946, a decade before he obtained his Doctorate, publishing pamphlets for two All-Union Scientific Engineering and Technical Societies of Mechanical Engineers, *Monitomash* and *Vintomash*.

In the series *Seminars on Economic Production* he discussed at length *khozraschet* and "economic levers", strongly referring to the new Plan and especially to its provision in terms of "strengthening of the role of economic levers", often quoting in full the Law's passage on this issue. [737]

Liberman defined money as crucial tool for the "comparison of the cost of labor and material resources with the results of production", which itself was the basis of *khozraschet*. However, he also pointed to how the role of money under socialism was much more pervasive, since it served also "as planned measure of value, as an instrument for circulation and payments, as a means of socialist accumulation, distribution and redistribution of economic resources between different sectors". [738]

In his further discussion of economic levers, Liberman named "cost of production, wholesale prices, profitability" as the "three key indicators, closely related to each other, to ensure the implementation of *khozraschet* in enterprises". [739] Referring specifically to prices, Liberman added that the "regulation of prices is an instrument of redistribution of profits between individual enterprises and to ensure the planned proportion in the national economy". [740]

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[737] E.G. Liberman, *Khozraschet zavoda* (Moscow, 1948), p. 10 — E.G. Liberman, *Vnutrizavodskiy khozraschet* (Moscow, 1950), p. 7.

[738] E.G. Liberman, *Finansy predpriyatiya i planirovaniye oborotnykh sredstv* (Moscow, 1947), p. 3.

[739] E.G. Liberman, *Osnovy bukhgalterskogo ucheta i kal'kulyatsii* (Moscow, 1947), pp. 1-2 — Liberman, *Khozraschet zavoda*, p. 23.

[740] Ibid., pp. 24-25.

Another topic Liberman discussed at length was the "industrial enterprise balance", yet again intimately linked with "economic levers". After linking the balance method's significance to the fact that "in the socialist society the commodity-money form of economy is maintained", [741] Liberman defined "balance and account" as "the most important tools for the management of the enterprise's economy". Such tools allowed to "judge the availability and change of fixed and circulating assets, the use of working capital in accordance with the plan, the cumulative financial results of the enterprise, the use of amortisation funds, compliance with financial and payment-accounting discipline and, finally, the implementation of financial plans". [742] Moreover, precisely "balance and account", affirmed Liberman, "take on special significance in modern conditions [of] struggle for profitability, as an additional source of production growth, strengthening of monetary circulation and of credit relations". [743]

Liberman also spoke at length of profit. This "important and effective cost indicator of the enterprise" was "a real expression of the technical and organisational rationality of economic management" as well as "the result of a real measure of cost and revenue, which is the basis of *khozraschet*". Liberman also clearly stated how the deployment of the concept of Soviet profit could only be possible in connection with the acceptance of monetary value and of an operating, albeit "transformed", law of value. He therefore stressed that cost, revenue and labour measurements "can only be made in value form, in which qualitatively heterogeneous socially necessary labor is quantitatively showed". This in turn meant that only "money as a measure of value and profit expressed in monetary terms provide a measure of the financial performance of an enterprise operating under *khozraschet*". [744]

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[741] E.G. Liberman, *Postroyeniye balansa promyshlennogo predpriyatiya* (Moscow, 1948), pp. 4-5.

[742] Liberman, *Postroyeniye balansa*, p. 3.

[743] E.G. Liberman, *Chteniye i analiz balansa promyshlennogo predpriyatiya* (Moscow, 1948), pp. 3-4.

[744] E.G. Liberman, *O planirovanii pribyli v promyshlennosti* (Moscow, 1950), pp. 5-7.

The Ukrainian economist also closely linked the issue of profit under conditions of *khozraschet* to personal responsibility, stating that this latter one "should be organised in such a way that the the manager sees a direct connection between the fulfilment of the production plan and the increase in accumulation". Not only that, "the entire collective of the enterprise should know to what extent the fulfilment of the production plan affects the growth of profit", as "the best and most advanced plants include profitability indicators in their socialist commitments". [745]

However, Liberman argued that also personal responsibility actually had a broader scope, suggesting that calculations should be made for the planned cost reduction to be achieved by plants, workshops and even single workers. [746] Indeed, "personal account of [cost of production] savings" were introduced in the late 1940s and many economists regarded them a key tool for the further implementation of *khozraschet*. [747]

In turn, broader scope for personal responsibility was itself intimately linked to an issue which many young economists demonstrated great interest for: the strengthening of the role of material stimulation and of the bonus system. Liberman, in one of his first books, discussed such issues as linked first and foremost to the concept of profit, itself "an important additional stimulus for the growth of production and for the implementation of economic plans [since] economic plans are worked out of profit and because allocations to bonus funds are made from profit". [748]

Moving on to the actual issue of bonuses, Liberman recognised that "in our society labour is stimulated both morally and materially", but focused on how "material stimulation of workers is widely used". He the presented the standing system, based on incentive "through cost — a

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[745] Liberman, *O planirovanii pribyli*, p. 31.

[746] Liberman, *O planirovanii pribyli*, p. 31.

[747] S. Tatur, 'Lichnyye Scheta Ekonomii - Novaya Forma Sotsialisticheskogo Sorevnovaniya i Khozyaystvennogo Rascheta', *Voprosy ekonomiki*, 10 (1949), p. 16, 26.

[748] Liberman, *O planirovanii pribyli*, p. 4.

progressive bonus salary, the source of which is the planned wages fund [and] through profit — the director's fund, as well as bonuses on the basis of the All-Union Socialist Competition and the awarding of bonuses from the profits related to the production of consumer goods". [749]

Yet, almost two decades before the reform he contributed to inspire was launched, Liberman expressed some telling doubts: "the absence of a direct link between the amount of the premium and the size of the cost savings, in our opinion, weakens the relevance of cost as an index". Therefore, he continued, "factories have no incentive to fulfil the plan for production costs at the workshops, since according to the existing provisions, the workshop staff is awarded in compliance with basic qualitative indicators (no over-expenditure of wages etc.) regardless of the implementation of the plans for production cost". The result was that enterprises continued engaging in wasteful practices, while not applying *khozraschet*. Moreover, "personnel of workshops which transferred to *khozraschet* and reduced the cost of production, receive the same (and sometimes even lower) bonuses compared with the staff of those workshops which do not reduce the cost and even no plan at cost". [750]

Therefore, concluded Liberman, "a great role in the struggle to increase socialist accumulation should be played by the practice of financial planning, which excludes the possibility of adopting understated plans and norms and encourages further opening up and use of reserves to increase profitability". [751]

The criticism offered by Liberman was echoed by several other economists, such as S.A. Prozerov, who carried out a study of the incentive mechanism at the automobile factory *Stalin*. He stated that "the current system of awarding engineering and technical workers of enterprises for the fulfilment and overfulfillment of the output plan, provided that the task is performed at

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[749] Liberman, *O planirovanii pribyli*, p. 57

[750] Ibid., p. 58.

[751] Ibid., p. 71.

cost, does not stimulate the economic cadres in [achieving] above-plan reduction of production costs". Also Prozerov noted that as a result of this "executives who are getting above-plan cost reduction are [materially] encouraged as much as those who only fulfil the plan". Prozerov further noted that "the positive value of the current system is reduced by the fact that the [assignment of the] bonus does not take place at the time the work is carried out, but much later", leaving open the possibility of bonus reduction or devaluation. [752]

Another study of the same factory by I. Lihachev revealed that "in a number of cases, micromanagement of the director is not conducive to improving the profitability of the enterprise, and often even reduces the responsibility and initiative of business executives and creates complications in their work". [753]

Others, such as N.T Tihomirov, who carried out a study at the Leningrad Shipbuilding Factory for his Doctoral dissertation, set forth sectoral proposals. [754] He started from the rather un-Marxist premise that "the material interest of people in improving the domestic, cultural and legal conditions of life" was the "driving force […] in the process of the historical development of human society". He however also provided a quotation of Lenin to justify his words: "not directly relying on enthusiasm, but aided by the enthusiasm engendered by the great revolution, and on the basis of personal interest, personal incentive and business principles, we must first set to work in this smallpeasant country to build solid gangways to socialism by way of state capitalism". [755]

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[752] S.A. Prozerov, *Vnutrizavodskiy khozraschet. Opyt avtozavoda im. Stalina* (Moscow, 1949), p. 77.

[753] I. Lihachev, 'Khozraschet na avtozavode imeni Stalina', *Planovoe khozyaistvo*, 5 (1948), p. 50.

[754] N.T. Tihomirov, *Material'noye Stimulirovaniye Truda v Sudostroitel'noy Promyshlennosti po Materialam Leningradskikh Sudostroitel'nykh Zavodov). K zashchite dissertatsii nasoiskaniye uchenoy stepeni kandidata ekonomicheskikh nauk. Voyenno-Morskaya Akademiya Korabelstroyeniya i Vooruzheniya Imeni A.N. Krylova* (Leningrad, 1946), pp. 1-4.

[755] V.I. Lenin, 'Fourth Anniversary of the October Revolution', in Lenin, *Collected Works*, xxxiii, p. 58.

To address the existing “shortcoming”, Tihomirov proposed the following scheme: “the foreman/ member of the brigade [*brigadir*] should receive a certain percentage of his salary […] from the earnings received by the brigade in excess of the established tariff; b) the master/head of the brigade [*master*] should receive half the difference between the tariff rate and the amount paid to the worker according to the bonus provision for this work; c) the head of the workshop [*nachalnik zeha*] will receive the rest of this difference, but he must pay out of it the premiums to the engineering-technical workers of the department in accordance with the received sum of earnings”. This system, concluded the young Soviet economist, “will lead not only to an increase in labor productivity, but also to a reduction in the number of employees in the workshop and in the workshop engineering-technical personnel, since with fewer people each will have the possibility to get more”. [756]

Revived economic debates in the USSR did not go unnoticed in the West and Nove affirmed that as of the mid-late 1940s “there was for some time a relatively freer atmosphere”. [757] Nevertheless, boundaries were still strict and arbitrary. The debates’ ideological basis was Stalin’s 1934 introduction of commercial and monetary elements into socialism (pp. 60-61) and no reference to NEP was made. Yet, Voznesensky’s call for enhanced reliance on “prices, money, credit, profit and bonuses” was not all that different from Bukharin’s claim that “market relations, money, the stock exchange, banks etc. play a very great role”, [758] or Groman’s reference to “money, banks, credit […] as a methods of building a socialised economy”. [759] However, the threat posed by the agricultural side of NEP, its gradualism and market mechanism were still perceived as very vivid, as Professor I.E. Ilinskii discovered in march 1947, when

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[756] Tihomirov, *Material'noye Stimulirovaniye Truda v Sudostroitel'noy Promyshlennosti po Materialam Leningradskikh Sudostroitel'nykh Zavodov)*, pp. 6-8.

[757] A. Nove, ‘Economists in the USSR’, in D. Footman, M.C. Kaser (eds), *Soviet affairs* (London, 1956), p. 63.

[758] GARF, f. P7523, op. 35, d. 28, l. 6 — Bukharin, ‘O novoy ekonomicheskoy politike’, in Bukharin, *Izbrannye Proizvedeniya*, p. 128.

[759] Groman, ‘O nekotorykh zakonomernostyakh’, p. 88.

Abakumov sent a detailed report on his anti-Soviet pro-NEP thought to Stalin, and NEP remained a taboo. [760]

3.5. — Theory in practice: Party Programme and General Plan

In 1947 some of the the most urgent domestic problems facing the Soviet leadership were resolved: industrial growth had climbed back to 1945 levels, while grain harvest was the highest since the beginning of the war and allowed to avert a potentially devastating famine. [761] Even if budgetary tension and the consequent financial strains were a persisting problem, [762] economic recovery appeared attainable in a matter of months, not years. [763]

Yet, as Truman announced his commitment to the containment of communism and the Marshall Plan was being drafted, Soviet domination over eastern Europe was asserted more aggressively, while discipline in the forming-up socialist bloc was tightened with the establishment of Cominform. [764] At its founding conference Zhdanov's landmark "two camps" speech set the terms for the new East-West confrontation, [765] sidelining the idea of "democracies of a new type". [766]

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[760] AP RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 208, ll. 1-7, in V.N. Khaustov, V.P. Naumov, N.S Plotnikova (eds), *Lubyanka. Stalin i MGB SSSR. Mart 1946 - mart 1953* (Moscow, 2007), pp. 44-47.

[761] The 65,9 million tonnes were still far from 1940s 95,6 and around a million people did starve to death in 1946-1947, yet, this was not comparable to the catastrophic famine that had caused almost seven million deaths in 1921-1922.

[762] Harrison, 'The USSR State Budget under Late Stalinism', pp. 196-197.

[763] Davies, *Soviet Economic Development from Lenin to Khrushchev*, p. 65.

[764] R. Crampton, *Eastern Europe in the twentieth century - and after* (London, New York, 1997), p. 211-212.

[765] G. Procacci, G.M. Adibekov (ed,), *The Cominform. Minutes of the three conferences 1947/1948/1949*. (Milano, 1994), pp. 225-231.

[766] E. Varga, 'Democracy of a new type', in R.V. Daniels (ed), *Documentary History of Communism. Communism and the world. From evolution to Collapse* (Hannover, London, 1994), pp. 142-144.

Again Zhdanov, described as a key proponent of Stalin's post-war "educational" policies, [767] but also as a moderate, [768] had already launched a domestic campaign for the strict observance of socialist realism and was now moving against "rootless cosmopolitanism". State control was further tightened as punishment for state property theft was increased from three months to ten years. [769]

These were however also the years in which Voznesensky's rationalising activity reached its high watermark, as his economic thought was not only shaping Soviet debates but was also substantiated in both Soviet economics and Party politics. Indeed, as of 1947 work on two processes that had to be sidelined in 1941-1945 returned a priority: drafting a revised Party Programme and drawing up a General Plan, which would set the political and economic pathway to communism.

Communist construction had indeed returned a recurrent topic already since late 1945. Shortly after Germany's surrender, *Bolshevik* stated that "after the victorious end of the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet people continue to implement the greatest task of the completion of the construction of the classless socialist society and the preparation of the transition from socialism to communism". [770] Voznesensky himself repeated almost the exact same words during his Supreme Soviet speech on the Plan. [771]

Little more than a year after that, on 21 June 1947, Zhdanov, Kuznetsov and Suslov wrote to Stalin that they had discussed at the Secretariat the issue of the revised Party Statute. To take

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[767] Morcom, 'Enforcing Stalinist Discipline in the Early Years of Post-war Reconstruction in the USSR', p. 339.

[768] Hahn, *Post-war Soviet Politics*, p. 20, 113-114.

[769] Gorlizki, 'Rules, Incentives and Soviet Campaign Justice after World War II', pp. 1251-1254.

[770] 'Ob ideynoy-politicheskoy rabote pratiinykh organizatsii v sovremennykh usloviyakh', *Bol'shevik*, 17-18 (1945), p. 3.

[771] *Pravda*, 16 March 1946, p. 1.

care of this, two commissions had been established and membership was given to almost all top Leningraders, Zhdanov, Kuznetsov and Rodionov. [772] As a preliminary draft of the new Party regulations was sent by Zhdanov to Stalin on 5 July 1947, the main focus shifted to the revision of the Party Programme. [773] On 15 July the Politburo established a further commission composed by Zhdanov (Chairman), Voznesensky, M.A. Suslov, Aleksandrov, O.V. Kuusinen, Mitin, Yudin, Ya. Poslelov, D.T. Shepilov, Ostrovityanov, Leont'yev, P.N. Fedoseyev and M.T. Iovchuk, tasked with "preparing and presenting to the Politburo a draft of new Programme of the VKP(b)" within two weeks. Said draft was to include a "general section" and a "practical-political section", formulating the "main task of the Party from the standpoint of developing the Soviet society to communism in a period of 20-30 years". [774]

Four sub-commissions were therefore created, the first including Pospelov, Shepilov and Novchuk, the second Aleksandrov, Fedoseyev and Ostrovityanov, the third Mitin and Yudin while the fourth Kuusinen and Leont'yev. Voznesensky and Zhdanov were instead assigned a coordinating and supervising role. [775]

By 29 July all subgroups submitted their full drafts and it is noteworthy that in two of the four, strong reference was made to "economic levers". [776]

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[772] RGASPI, f. 83, op. 1, d. 6, ll. 1-2.

[773] RGASPI, f. 83, op. 1, d. 6, l. 4.

[774] RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 1066, l.13.

[775] RGASPI, f. 83, op. 1, d. 6, l. 67.

[776] RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 476, l. 1.

Aleksandrov's group sent its draft first on 25 July, [777] which duly affirmed that the "classless communist society" was "2-3 decades" away. [778] Crucial in the economic section of their draft was the following set of recommendations:

> the creation of the economic basis of communism requires: a) all-around improvement of the methods and strengthening of the role of socialist planning of the national economy; b) the creation of powerful material reserves; c) the strengthening of the role of economic levers of socialist production and reproduction (piecework wages, payment for workdays on collective farms, premium payment, khozraschet, the lowering of the cost of production, money, prices and credit). [779]

Mitin and Yudin sent their draft on 26 July and on top of much reference to "electrification", "automatisation" and "mechanisation", they also listed as key priorities the "comprehensive development of Soviet trade" and the "strengthening of the monetary system". [780] Instead, Pospelov, Iovchuk and Shepilov, who submitted their materials the day after, paid once again more detailed attention to "economic levers". [781]

They set 15-20 years away the overcoming capitalism, while "a truly communist abundance of consumer goods" was planned to be achieved in 20-30 years. [782] Later, the three economists wrote that "the instruments of the bourgeois economy (money, credit, prices, profit etc.) radically changed their nature and became in the hands of the socialist state powerful levers for the development of the socialist mode of production". [783] They further argued that "the Party sets as

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[777] RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 124, ll. 124-175 — also in RGASPI, f. 77, op. 4, d. 17, ll. 1-53.

[778] RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 124, l. 157.

[779] RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 124, l. 167.

[780] RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 123, ll. 3, 35-36, 40.

[781] RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 123, ll. 44-123 — also in RGASPI, f. 77, op. 4, d. 17, ll. 94-174.

[782] RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 123, l. 44.

[783] Ibid., ll. 73-74

its goal the all-around strengthening of the economic levers of socialism - *khozraschet*, money, credit, prices, profits, the development of Soviet trade and the use of a transformed law of value for the development of the socialist economy along the road to communism". [784]

Leont'yev and Kuusinen, who submitted their proposal on an unknown date before 29 July, put the "higher phase of communism" 20-30 years away. Curiously, they mentioned that "specific ways and methods for solving the [country's] basic economic problems are outlined by the general plan of economic development of the USSR", whose drafting was however officially sanctioned by the Politburo only on 6 August. [785]

Once the subgroups' drafts were received, Zhdanov proceeded on 29 July 1947 to circulate them amongst Stalin, Beria Malenkov, Voznesensky and the other members of the Programme Commission. [786]

Therefore, a further working group composed of Shepilov, Fedoseyev, Leont'yev and Mitin was formed to harmonise the proposals and come up with a unified draft. [787] Already on 6 September, Shepilov sent Zhdanov a first version of the abridged text. [788]

The draft clearly expressed the need to "provide for continuous technical progress, the all-round development of invention and rationalisation in all branches of the national economy" as well as to "ensure the most rational deployment of the country's productive forces, bringing industry

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[784] RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 123, ll. 90-91, 99.

[785] RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 124, ll. 176, 194-195.

[786] RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 123, l. 2.

[787] RGASPI, f. 83, op. 1, d. 6, l. 67.

[788] RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 476, ll. 111-158 — also in RGASPI, f. 77, op. 4, d. 18, ll. 55-114.

closer to sources of raw materials and eliminating unsustainable and excessively long-distance transportations". [789]

The text further focused on the necessity of "correctly and flexibly combining strict centralisation with the production initiative and independent activity of the broad mass of workers". Furthermore, the draft remarked the need to "steadily increase the role and importance of *khozraschet*, money, state budget, credit, prices, profits, Soviet trade as most important economic levers for the transformation of the socialist society into a communist one". [790]

After the Szklarska Poręba conference of communist parties was held in September 1947, the working group of Shepilov, Fedoseyev, Leont'yev and Mitin was asked to take stock of the discussion there in relation to their task of providing a draft of the new Programme. [791] A second version of the 6 September text was prepared and marked "latest edition", but the section on the role of economic levers was left unchanged. [792] Work on this final text was completed by 1 December and submitted by Shepilov to Suslov. [793]

Shepilov himself sent this text to Malenkov, alongside a summary and chronology of the work he and his comrades had carried out on it, on 14 September 1948, exactly two weeks after Zhdanov's death and two months after Malenkov had regained control over the Secretariat. [794] The Programme draft therefore still planned the resolution of the USSR's "basic economic issues" to be achieved in 15-20 years and full communism to be attained in 20-30 years, [795]

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[789] RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 476, ll. 143, 146.

[790] RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 476, l. 149.

[791] RGASPI, f. 83, op. 1, d. 6, l. 67.

[792] RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 476, l. 197.

[793] Ibid.

[794] Ibid.

[795] RGASPI, f. 83, op. 1, d. 6, ll. 100-101.

while the section on economics still displayed both its rationalising character and strong reference to economic levers. [796]

Shortly after work on drafting a new Party Programme was revived in 1947, the Politburo also sanctioned the drawing up of what according to Lenin's words on the GOELRO Plan was to be "the second Party Programme": [797] a new General Plan. At that point, the immediateness of the task to plan the advancement to communism had been broadly discussed also on economic literature. [798]

Therefore, Gosplan collectively worked out a proposal, which Voznesensky sent to Stalin on 2 August 1947. [799] Voznesensky opened his letter referring to the 1941 attempt, then peremptorily affirming that "Gosplan deems it necessary" to resume work on the General Plan, given this had "a direct bearing on the design of the new programme of the VKP(b)" and would be its "necessary complement and specific implementation plan". Voznesensky also referred to the fact that construction of railways, hydro-electric power plants and steelworks needed planning for a "longer period" than the standard five years. The General Plan, concluded Voznesensky, should be worked out for a twenty-year period and strive to "solve the main economic tasks of the USSR — overtake the main capitalist countries [and] build a communist society in the USSR". [800] Voznesensky's exact wording was included in a 6 August Politburo resolution which approved his proposal, demanding that Gosplan present a "preliminary draft" to CC and SovMin by 15 January 1949. [801]

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[796] Ibid., l. 107.

[797] V.I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, xxxii, p. 528.

[798] A. Zelenovskiy, 'Dvadtsat' Pyat' let Gosplana', *Planovoe khozyaistvo*, 1 (1946), p. 31.

[799] RGAE, f. 4372, op. 47, d. 1, l. 78.

[800] RGASPI, f. 17, op. 163, d. 1502, l. 182, in Khlevnyuk, *Politburo i Sovet Ministrov,* pp. 243-244.

[801] RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 1066, l. 26.

Gosplan wasted no time. Already at its meeting of 9 August, the Perspective Planning Department headed by Sorokin was assigned the task to “prepare and submit to Gosplan proposals on the procedure and terms of work on the preliminary draft of the General Plan” and a commission composed of Voznesensky, Poanov, Sorokin and Kosyachenko and Sukharevsky was formed. [802]

On 22 August, a first deadline was assigned: by 1 October working groups were to be designed and assigned the task to calculate plan indicators which were to be submitted to Voznesensky and Sorokin. Work on the plan’s “basic political-economic tasks” was to be carried out by a first group, headed by Voznesensky, focusing on “main tasks of the General Economic Plan” and another whose task was to detail the results achieved in the thirty years of “socialist construction”. Other groups were to start organising work on “electrification”, “development of new technologies”, construction and development of industrial forces and transport. Further groups focused on “monetary circulation, balance of monetary income and expenditures of the population, credit, budget, financial plan”, on the balance of workforce, on the “development and technical re-equipment” and on the “development of the economic regions”. [803]

A first draft of the CC and SovMin report was ready by early September 1947. It included sections on the “main results of socialist construction in the USSR since thirty years”, the “basic tasks of the General Economic Plan”, the “level of production necessary for the fulfilment of the country’s basic economic tasks” and many more — namely, electrification, new technology, Soviet science, construction and allocation of productive forces, use of natural resources, development of transport and machine-building, balance of workforce and technical-engineering cadres, indices of production, indices of state wholesale, retail and collective farm market prices, monetary circulation, balance of the population’s monetary income and expenditures, credit, budget, financial plan, balance of the national economy and material balance. On 12 September,

[802] RGAE, f. 4372, op. 47, d. 1, l. 84

[803] RGAE, f. 4372, op. 47, d. 1, l. 96-97, 101-103.

a second draft assigned a “scientific group” to deal with each envisioned section of the report. The duties assigned to Voznesensky’s group were redefined as “basic tasks of the general economic plan, first and second phase of communism”, while a further group on “reserves in the national economy of the USSR” was added to the list previously approved. At this point, branch and region-focused groups numbered in the dozens. [804]

On 10 January 1948, Sorokin, Starovskii and Kurotchenko sent Voznesensky a letter detailing the data required to draw up the General Plan. Data was required for Soviet national income, capital investment, gross industrial production (with data for each main producer good), freight turnover for land and water transport, trade turnover, workforce, wages and labor productivity in industry. Instead, data on number of students in primary, lower secondary and secondary schools, per capita production of cast iron, steel, coal, electric energy, cotton fabrics, footwear and grain were required not only for the USSR, but also for US and UK. Actual and prospected data were required for specific years in the 1931-1965 period. [805]

Charts and schemes were also requested to outline the massive construction projects envisioned by the plan, which included new towns, railways, pipelines, canals, enterprises, electric and hydroelectric plants as well as the “Baikal-Amur Railway, the Angarsk industrial hub, the North-Pechora railway, the Volga-Don canal, the use of hydro resources of the Volga”. [806]

An estimate of the wages and bonuses for those involved in drafting the General Plan reveals that as many as 400 economists and planners had come to work on it. [807]

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[804] RGAE, f. 4372, op. 47, d. 3, ll. 200-214.

[805] RGAE, f. 4372, op. 48 d. 343, ll. 43-46 — Soviet data was required for 1931, 1940, 1945, 1950, 1955, 1960, 1965, while US and UK data also for 1929 and 1937.

[806] RGAE, f. 4372, op. 48 d. 343, l. 47.

[807] RGAE, f. 4372 op. 48 d. 343, l. 48.

On 30 January 1948, Papov, Siluyanov and Lavrizev sent Voznesensky a draft plan for the work on the General Plan in the first half of 1948. Scientific groups were now assigned strict deadlines for the submission of preliminary materials: March for the groups on technologies, metallurgy, fuel, energy, chemical industry, machine building, light and food industries, agriculture, transport; April for the groups dealing with the development of economic regions and for those tasked with hydroelectric plants and water resources. By May a "synoptic report on the General Plan" was to be submitted to CC and SovMin, a deadline remarked several times at subsequent Gosplan meetings. [808]

At this point, the Soviet press started using the present tense when talking about communist construction and G. Kozlov stated in March 1948 that "under the leadership of Stalin the transition period in the USSR was completed, socialist society was built and communism is being built". [809]

At Gosplan, the composition of the working groups, of the directing commission and "progress on the working-out of the General Plan" were repeatedly discussed throughout 1948. [810] On 18 October it was decided to commence the work on a "general plan for the continuous electrification of villages and localities", which was to include electrification of machine-tractor stations, *kolkhozes*, *sovkhozes*, of "everyday life" and of "labor-intensive industries in agriculture". Gospan Commissioners were to play a key role, as they were to provide a detailed map of electric and hydroelectric infrastructures in Union-Republic, Oblasts and territories. [811]

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[808] RGAE, f. 4372, op. 48, d. 3, ll. 53-56 — RGAE, f. 4372, op. 48, d. 4, l. 109.

[809] G. Kozlov, 'Lenin i Stalin - Sozdateli Politicheskoy Ekonomii Sotsializma', *Voprosy ekonomiki*, 1 (1948), p. 6.

[810] RGAE, f. 4372, op. 48, d. 1, ll. 2-3 — RGAE, f. 4372, op. 48, d. 2, l. 26.

[811] RGAE, f. 4372, op. 48, d. 2, ll. 59-60.

Shortly after, on 26 November, a draft resolution titled “On the preparation of the general electrification plan for 15 years” was worked out and planners were given until 1 March 1949 to fulfil the task. This was to include drawing up a “balance of electric energy in the national economy” and “special attention” was to be paid to “the construction of hydroelectric power stations” as well as to water resources in general. “Thermal power plants” and fuel balances were also key part of the projected plan. Rational employment of energy and of enterprises construction was a foremost preoccupation and planners were asked to draw-up a list of “enterprises subject to construction in 1950-1965” in all major economic branches. Key assignments were given to the Council of Technical and Economic Expertise, which was asked to “conduct an examination of design materials on the Kuibysheskaya and Kamyshinskaya hydroelectric power stations on the Volga”. [812]

Throughout October and November 1948, as Gosplan was gearing up to submit the General Plan preliminary draft, Sorokin was frantically reporting to Voznesensky which groups had not submitted their materials. [813]

On 11 November however, Sorokin sent Voznesensly a crucial document, the draft CC and SovMin resolution “on the preliminary draft of the general economic plan of the USSR”. He also however pointed out how “work on the preparation of the report on the General Plan […] is to be subjected to considerable clarification”. [814]

However, towards late 1948 record on the General Plan becomes extremely fragmentary. Out of the seventy-eight pages contained in the 1948 RGAE file devoted to “Memorandum to the Chairman of Gosplan of the USSR on the preliminary draft of the general economic plan”, very little is actually to be found on the General Plan. Amongst the few documents dealing with it,

[812] RGAE, f. 4372, op. 48, d. 12, ll. 52-59.

[813] RGAE, f. 4372, op. 48 d. 343, ll. 49-57.

[814] RGAE, f. 4372, op. 49, d. 161, l. 55.

there was one page of the “Agenda of the meeting of the Gosplan Commission on the Preliminary Draft of the General Plan for the USSR”, marked “ ... November 1948”. This latter one included two points, “the level and structure of production in the general economic plan of the USSR (comrades Sorokin, Ivanov)” and “the volume and structure of capital works (comrades Sorokin, Korobov)”. [815]

The last mentions of the General Plan and other long-term plans under Voznesensky are dated to January 1949. On 14 January 1949, Sorokin sent a letter to Voznesensky concerning the draft SovMin and CC resolution on the 15-years plan on mechanisation of labour. [816] Two weeks after he instead sent Voznesensky the “draft decree” on the “preliminary General Economic Plan of the USSR for 1951-1970”, which had been the subject of much work at Gosplan, presumably after the first draft had been reviewed and criticised in November 1948. [817] Instead, the Politburo is recorded having discussed last the General Plan on 8 February 1949, when it was decided to give Gosplan time until 5 April 1949 for the submission of the plan’s “preliminary draft”. [818]

Following Voznesensky’s removal on 5 March 1949, mention of the General Plan became scant. On 29 April 1949, Sorokin sent Saburov, the new Gosplan Chairman, the draft programme for the discussion of the General Plan’s main issues, meant to be tabled at Gosplan’s 3 May meeting. [819] Said draft was slightly amended upon Saburov’s suggestions and the result was a list of General Plan’s themes in the main identical with those drafted under Voznesensky, including also a balance of the national economy for the 1951-1970 period. [820] Yet, the archival file containing the protocols of April-June Gosplan meetings shows that no further debate on the

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[815] RGAE, f. 4372, op. 48 d. 343, l. 58.

[816] RGAE, f. 4372, op. 49, d. 161, l. 1

[817] RGAE, f. 4372, op. 49, d. 161, l. 4.

[818] RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 1074, l. 26 — RGASPI, f. 17, op. 163, d. 1520, l. 65.

[819] RGAE, f. 4372, op. 49, d. 6, ll. 37-41 — RGAE, f. 4372, op. 49, d. 161, l. 23.

[820] RGAE, f. 4372, op. 49, d. 6, ll. 42-46.

General Plan took place. Specifically on 3 May, Gosplan discussed wholesale prices. [821] All of this may indicate that, as a result of the removals at Gosplan and specifically of Voznesensky, the 15 April deadline was once again not met.

A further undated letter from Sorokin to Saburov reports the new Chairman was sent materials on Soviet capital goods production, US growth data and on comparative per capita production of capital goods in the USSR and US. [822]

In the main, Gosplan documents seem to show that after Voznesensky's downfall, focus at the committee strongly shifted towards the new plan set to run in 1950-1955. [823] In the draft decrees sent by Gosplan in late 1949 an early 1950 to SovMin and CC on the "Second post-war Five-Year Plan for the Development of the National Economy", no mention was made of the General Plan, nor of any date beyond 1955. [824]

Yet, two undated, unsigned and incomplete typewritten documents shade much light on how the General Plan had been compiled up to mid-1949. These documents are included in the RGAE file containing memoranda for Gosplan's Chairman on issues related to perspective planning. They come right after the very last document addressed to Voznesensky, discussed above and dated 28 January. These documents were probably internal Gosplan memoranda prepared for Saburov. Whether Saburov was their ultimate recipient or these were intended to be sent further up to State and Party organs is not clear. [825]

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[821] RGAE, f. 4372, op. 49, d. 6, ll. 18-22.

[822] RGAE, f. 4372, op. 49, d. 161, ll. 94-96.

[823] RGAE, f. 4372, op. 49, d. 5, l. 52 — RGAE, f. 4372, op. 49, d. 8, l. 107.

[824] RGAE, f. 4372, op. 50, d. 127, ll. 3, 10.

[825] RGAE, f. 4372, op. 49, d. 161, l. 4.

The first document is a three-pages report titled “stages of the work on drafting the preliminary project of General Economic Plan” and lists three such stages. The first one opened in August 1947, when the 22 August and 12 September Gosplan resolutions established a “Central Commission”, “special groups”, tasked with drafting the Plan’s draft report and including “305 people”, and worked out “an outline of the report on the preliminary draft of the general plan”. The special groups prepared in the following two-two and a half months the materials on the preliminary General Plan project and submitted them to Gosplan. Specifically, the department on perspective planning edited a draft report on the General Plan as well as charts, including a report on the “stages of solving the task of catching up and overtaking the main capitalist countries in economic terms” as well as “material balances”, and submitted them to Gosplan on 27 November 1947.

The second phase encompassed the December 1947-May 1948 period. In those months the General Plan Commission discussed the materials submitted by the special groups, “worked out a number of important instructions and proposals for the further development of the report on the preliminary draft of the General Economic Plan and also developed the scheme of the draft resolution on the preliminary draft of the General Plan”. Then, Gosplan “instructed the department on perspective planning, with the involvement of a group of Gosplan employees numbering 48 people, to prepare a draft resolution on the preliminary draft of the General Plan”.

As of 11 November 1948 the perspective planning department had submitted to the General Plan Commission the “draft resolution on the preliminary draft of the General Plan”, and, on 15 December, a “clarification” on said draft, alongside “charts”, “material balances”, “maps and diagrams”.

The third stage opened on 19 November 1948, when a Gosplan resolution “instructed a group of senior Gosplan officials to discuss with Ministries, departments and Union-Republics and edit

the draft resolution and draft report on the preliminary draft of the General Plan". Therefore, the perspective planning department edited by 25 December the "draft resolution on the preliminary General Plan project", "charts" by 10 January 1949 and a "draft report on the preliminary General Plan project" by 25 January. The following pages of the report are missing. [826]

A second unsigned, undated and incomplete typewritten document is two-pages long and titled "Information report on the state of work at Gosplan on the preliminary draft of the general economic plan". In this document the sentence "as of March 1949" allows to tentatively date it to March-April 1949.

The document details how the 6 August 1947 CC and SovMin resolution assigned Gosplan 15 January 1949 as deadline "to submit for preliminary consideration to the CC VKP(b) and SovMin the preliminary draft of the general plan". Yet, in February 1949, "the presentation of the preliminary draft general plan was postponed until 15 April 1949".

The document stated that "as of March 1949" there had been two phases in the drawing-up of the General Plan: in August-September 1947, 105 special groups composed by around 350 "Gosplan members, Gosplan specialists, Ministers, Ministries' specialists, representatives of Union-Republics and plenipotentiaries" had been formed. Within the following two to two-and-a-half months said groups worked out the "first variant of the report on the General Plan" which was sent to Gosplan's Perspective Planning Department on 27 November 1947. Such materials were studied by a "special commission, established at Gosplan, which developed guidelines for further work on the General Plan". Following such phase, Gosplan's resolutions of 20-21 September 1948 instructed Gosplan's departments to "check and finalise the submission to the special groups […] of materials on the project of the General Plan". Planners as well as Department heads were instead to "draft a resolution on the General Plan". The "draft resolution

[826] RGAE, f. 4372, op. 49, d. 161, ll. 10-12.

and charts of the plan were discussed by the Gosplan commission and were amended; the term of the plan was also amended, 1970 and not 1965 was taken as the final year".

At that time, Gosplan had submitted "three parts of the CC and SovMin draft report on the preliminary General Economic plan of the USSR for 1946-1965", a "draft resolution on the preliminary General Economic plan of the USSR for 1951-1970" and "two volumes of charts" related to the 1951-1970 project.

Gosplan's draft General Plan was as of that date structured as follows: "a) Results of socialist construction and tasks of the General Economic Plan; b) Plan of transformation for the transition from a socialist society into a communist one; c) Plan for the development and further technical armament of the national economy; d) Plan for the development of economic regions and Union-Republics; e) For the victory of communism in the USSR".

The "main tasks" were defined as: "1) On the basis of the further rapid development of the country's productive forces in the next 15-20 years to solve the basic economic problem of the USSR, i.e. to overtake the level of production per capita in the main capitalist countries, including in the US; 2) On the basis of the resolution of the USSR's main economic tasks, to implement a programme for the transition of the USSR from the socialist society into a communist one; 3) On the basis of the construction of a communist society, further strengthen the technical-economic independence of the USSR, ensure a further increase in its defence capability and fully safeguard the Soviet country from all kinds of threats, deriving from the capitalist encirclement".

After the sentence “the development of the national economy of the USSR for the period of the General Plan is characterised by the following basic indicators”, the document is however interrupted. [827]

How and if Gosplan further discussed the General Plan in 1949 is not clear, as a large number of the meetings protocols for 1949 and 1950 were classified, while the topic does not seem to have been considered by the Politburo after February 1949. [828]

3.6. — Theory in practice: the monetary and price reforms, 1947-1949

As previously stated, by 1947 the issue of strengthening the role of economic levers was much debated and had become key element of the revised Party Programme draft. Yet, this necessity was also made an actual element of policymaking as a monetary and a price reform were implemented. Voznesensky, once again, to played a leading role in relation to both.

It was initially thought that preparation for a monetary reform started only after the end of the war. [829] In fact, archival evidence proved that discussion on the issue began already in early 1943, when a Commissariat of Finance “Group for Monetary Circulation” discussed the “need to solve the problem of the amount of money [circulating]”. [830] By November 1943, as in the

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[827] RGAE, f. 4372, op. 49, d. 161, ll. 38-39.

[828] As for 1949, one February protocol, two July and August as well as almost all those dating September, October, November and December are classified. As for 1950, forty-three out of fifty-nine protocols are classified, almost all those of April, May June, October, November and December — RGAE, f. 4372, op. 49, d. 1, ll. 4, 9-11; RGAE, f. 4372, op. 50, d. 1, ll. 1-5.

[829] I.A. Chudnov, *Denezhnaya reforma 1947 g. v kontekste sovetskoy denezhno-kreditnoy politiki 1930-1950-kh godov* (Kemerovo, 2002), p. 74.

[830] RGAE, f. 7733, op. 36, d. 1236, ll. 30-42, in Tsentral’nyy Bank Rossiyskoy Federatsii, *Po Stranitsam Arkhivnykh Fondov Tsentral'nogo Banka Rossiyskoy Federatsii. Denezhnaya Reforma 1947 Goda v Dokumentakh: Podgotovka, Provedeniye i Otsenka Rezul'tatov* (17 vols, Mosow, 2006-2016), iii, p. 17.

aftermath of the great victory at Kursk the Red Army was firmly on the offensive, a discussion on the drawing up of an actual reform started. Already a month later, the first proposals were drafted and the reform's rationale was described as: "to achieve a correspondence between the amount of money in circulation and the needs of economic turnover in monetary form; to create conditions that eliminate the possibility and necessity of excessive release of money into circulation and the associated rise in prices in post-reform times". [831]

By 1947, the reform was long overdue, since Soviet authorities promised the abolition of rationing would have happened in 1946. Yet, on 29 August 1946 *Pravda* had announced that due to the "drought […] and the reduction of state food supplies", the abolition had to be postponed of a year. [832]

Archival documents from early 1947 clearly show that Voznesensky played a key part in discussing and working out the reform. Amongst his closest collaborators in this endeavour were Kosyachenko from Gosplan, Minister of Finance A.G. Zverev and Kosygin. at the time Minister of Light Industry, [833] who in these crucially formative years was working in "close contact" with Voznesensky. [834]

On 27 May 1947 a "Commission for the Monetary Reform" was set up comprising Molotov (Chairman), Voznesensky, Beria, Zhdanov, Mikoyan, Malenkov, Kosygin, Zverev, Golev and Kosyachenko. [835] Aa further commission, chaired by Mikoyan and including Voznesensky,

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[831] RGAE, f. 7733, op. 36, d. 1577, ll. 21-48, in Tsentral'nyy Bank Rossiyskoy Federatsii, *Po Stranitsam Arkhivnykh Fondov Tsentral'nogo Banka Rossiyskoy Federatsii*, iii, p. 37.

[832] *Pravda*, 29 August, 1946, p. 1.

[833] RGASPI, f. 82, op. 2, d. 788, ll. 14-29, in L.N. Dobrokhotov et. al. (eds) *Denezhnaya reforma v SSSR 1947 goda: dokumenty i materialy* (Moscow, 2010), pp. 209-220.

[834] A. Gvishiani, 'Fenomen Kosygina' , p. 70.

[835] RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 1065, l. 26, in Dobrokhotov et. al. (eds) *Denezhnaya reforma* p. 221.

Zverev, Kosygin and others was also established to deal with the abolition of rationing. [836] Shortly after, on 3 June, a commission "on the issue of trade and the strengthening of the trading network" was established, once again including Voznesensky. [837] Three days later, Voznesensky's office sent to the members of the Monetary Reform Commission the draft of the resolution "On the implementation of the monetary reform and the cancellation of cards [system] for food and manufactured goods". [838]

On 13 December 1947, a day before the reform's official launch, a further commission including Zhdanov, Voznesensky and Poskrebishev was set up. [839] This was to dispatch details about it the day after to all Union-Republic Party CCs and SovMins, as well as to all Party committees so that maximum publicity could be given to the reform on all press. [840]

Voznesensky, in his function of SovMin Vice-Chairman, even received much correspondence from Zverev concerning very specific cases, like that of seventy-eight Red Army officers in Germany who received their pay on 12-13 December, a day before the monetary reform came into effect. [841]

Throughout 1948, Voznesensky, alongside Mikoyan and Kosygin, also monitored the effects of the reform, reporting to Stalin about the rise in the rouble's purchasing power and real wages. [842]

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[836] Yu.P. Bokarov, 'Denezhnaya Reforma 1947 g. v SSSR i Konfiskatsionnye Denezhnye Reformy v Yevrope 1944 -1948 gg." in M.M. Al'tman (ed) *Denezhnye reformy v Rossii. Istoriya i sovremennost'. Sbornik statey* (Moscow 2004), p. 172.

[837] RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 1065, l. 27, in Dobrokhotov et. al. (eds) *Denezhnaya reforma*, p. 222.

[838] RGASPI, f. 82, op. 2, d. 788, l. 30, in Dobrokhotov et. al. (eds) *Denezhnaya reforma*, p. 227.

[839] *Pravda*, 15 December 1947, pp. 1-5.

[840] RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 1067, l. 3, in Dobrokhotov et. al. (eds) *Denezhnaya reforma*, p. 329.

[841] RGASPI, f. 7733, op. 36, d. 2282, l. 26, in Dobrokhotov et. al. (eds) *Denezhnaya reforma*, p. 675.

[842] RGAE, f. 4372, op. 48, d. 13, l. 192.

All the while, a series of articles, amongst which Ostrovityanov's, affirmed that monetary reform and abolition of rationing "created the necessary premises for the strengthening of the role of economic levers and, in particular, of the law of value as a tool of the planned management of the socialist economy". [843] Kosiachenko echoed this view and praised both the country's "financial organs" and "Soviet credit", [844] while Moskvin presented the transition to "Soviet trade" as the return to normal economic standards, characterising it through Stalin's definition of "trade without capitalists", but further describing it by profusely quoting from Voznesensky's *War Economy*. [845]

The reform increased retail prices, brought supply in line with wages, in order to do away with the high volume of circulating cash, prevent purchasing power from exceeding available supplies and rebalance the consumer goods and foodstuff markets. [846] This would also allow the Soviet leadership to more markedly focus on funding reconstruction, without worrying too much about rising inflation. [847]

Voznesensky however played an even more important role in relation to the price reform, which was worked out precisely in 1948, when economic recovery was finally achieved. [848] Said reform was actually based on an evaluation of the standing system's shortcomings that was shared both by Western scholars and Soviet planners. [849]

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[843] K. Ostrovityanov, 'Sotsialisticheskoe Planirovaniye i Zakon Stoimosti', *Voprosy ekonomiki*, no. 1 (Mar., 1948), pp. 39-41.

[844] G. Kosyachenko, 'Sovetskaya denezhnaya reforma', *Planovoe khozyaistvo*, 1 (1948), p. 24-28, 38-40.

[845] V. Moskvin, 'Ot kartochnoy sisteme snabzheniya k razvernutoy sovetskoy torgovle', *Planovoe khozyaistvo*, 1 (1948), pp. 41, 43, 53.

[846] Kaser, *Comecon*, p. 32 — Harrison, Harrison, *Soviet Economic Planning in War and Peace*, pp. 230-231 — Morcom, 'Enforcing Stalinist Discipline in the Early Years of Post-war Reconstruction in the USSR', pp. 334-335.

[847] Khlevnyuk, *Stalin. New Biography of a Dictator*, p. 274-279.

[848] Gorlizki, Khlevnyuk, *Cold Peace*, p. 69

[849] Kaser, 'Soviet Planning and the Price Mechanism', pp. 81-87 — Wiles, 'Scarcity, Marxism and Gosplan', p. 295.

Essentially, as of 1947, *tsenniki* (i.e. unified unchanged price schedules), alongside the mechanisms for the setting and approval of new prices, had almost stopped operating. As a result in several branches prevailing prices were as much as thirty-five times higher than 1926-27 "unchanged prices", [850] while subsidies to heavy industry had grown nine-fold between 1940 and 1948. [851]

This situation was presented in an early 1948 Gosplan memo signed by Pautii, Ivanov and Pisarev, who argued that the unchanged prices of 1936-1937 had "ceased to discover real value relationships [and] to correspond to actual selling prices". [852]

This was caused by "the emergence and development of new branches […], the radical change in production techniques, in the nature and types of industrial products, and the change of the actual wholesale prices for various types of products". The deleterious effects were instead that as of 1946, actual wholesale prices were on average 3.5 times higher than unchanged prices of 1936-1937 (1.8 times higher in capital goods industries and 6.8 in those consumer goods' one). Moreover, in 1947 "the ratio of current wholesale prices to unchanged prices in 1936-37 [went] from 1-1 in the shipbuilding industry, to 35-1 in individual light and food industries".

The report therefore concluded that the standing unchanged prices: "do not stimulate the production of many scarce types of products, which are subject to low unchanged prices"; "make it difficult to plan the number of workers and the distribution of labor in the branches of the national economy"; "hinder the strengthening of economic calculation and the implementation of control over the ruble".

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[850] Harrison, 'Prices, Planners, and Producers', pp. 1058-1060.

[851] N.T. Glushkov, '60 let planovogo tsenoobrazovaniya v SSSR i osovnyye zadachi sovershenstvovaniya sistemy tsen v svete resheniy XXV s"yezda KPSS', in A.N. Komin (ed) *60 let planovogo tsenoobrazovaniya v SSSR. Materialy sessii. Shest'desyat let planovogo tsenoobrazovaniya v Soyuze SSR* (Moscow, 1979), p. 12.

[852] RGAE, f. 4371, op. 48, d. 3, ll. 170-174.

The memo therefore suggested to: “abolish from 1 January 1949 planning and accounting for production in unchanged prices and to switch to […] current wholesale prices”; introduce an “index of changes in wholesale prices both for the national economy as a whole and for individual branches”; resolve the “sharply unprofitable” state of heavy industry by abolishing subsidies; introduce “new higher wholesale prices for fuel, electricity, metals, cement and timber”.

Gosplan was therefore to issue by July 1948 instructions on how to operate with current wholesale prices, while new prices were to be presented by 1 August. Earlier deadlines were assigned for the working out on the part of Ministries of “draft price-lists [i.e. *tsenniki*] for new wholesale prices and tariffs”. [853]

A further document even more vividly described the effects of existing pricing problems onto the actual functioning of enterprises. This document is a memo sent by Sorokin to Voznesensky on 13 May 1948 on the activities of the Gosplan “Commission on Constant Prices”. Established on 12 February 1944 the commission was meant to “establish a uniform procedure for working with constant prices at Ministries […], ensure the publication of price lists [i.e. *tsenniki*] of constant prices for all Ministries […], timely approve constant prices for new products […], test the accuracy of the calculation of constant prices”. [854]

Sorokin denounced “a complete disorder in the establishment and application of constant prices”. “Some products”, he denounced, “are valued at the enterprises not according to approved constant prices, but [according to prices] established by the Ministries themselves, by

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[853] As noted by Harrison in his study of Soviet price reforms [Harrison, ‘Prices, Planners, and Producers’, pp. 1058-1059], the memo included reference to “the dissenting opinion of Comrade Pisarev”, who instead proposed to “keep parallel accounting of industrial products, both at wholesale prices and at constant prices” and to “keep the 1936/37 prices as unchanged prices until 1951, and since 1951 to adopt the prices of 1950 as [new] unchanged prices” — RGAE, f. 4371, op. 48, d. 3, l. 177.

[854] RGAE, f. 4372 op. 48 d. 343, l. 29-31.

glavki and even by individual enterprises, often exceeding the constant prices approved for similar products".

Moreover, "Ministries and departments do not supply enterprises with price lists [i.e. *tsenniki*] of constant prices. Of the Union Ministries, only one issued a list of constant prices after the war", namely the Commissariat for Coal in 1945. In addition to that, "if Ministries prepare drafts of fixed prices, these are not approved by the Gosplan commission for a long time". For example, "the project of constant prices for the products of the vitamin industry developed by the Ministry of Food Industry in 1946 and submitted to Gosplan in November 1946 has not been considered yet".

More broadly, continued Sorokin, "systematic verification of the correctness of fixed prices is not carried out; only in January of this year, the TzSU conducted a similar check on twenty-five industrial Ministries". Instead, "the Gosplan commission on constant prices did not take any decisions and no minutes of its meetings exist".

This situation of "disorder and organisational confusion in establishing and applying constant prices" lead to a whole series of problems. The most immediate ones included "the overstatement of constant prices for certain types of products, which are not usually included in the nomenclature of the national economic plan, which allows enterprises to show a successful fulfilment of the plan for gross output, even if it is not fulfilled by basic products".

Sorokin therefore provided a number of practical examples: "when checking accounts at the bakeries of the Kirghiz SSR in August 1946, it was revealed that 98% of pastries were baked by bakeries from rye flour at a constant price of patisserie cakes, i.e. at 2600 rubles per ton, with an overestimation of ten times. Thanks to this, the bakeries had the opportunity, if the plan for baking bread was not fulfilled, to exceed the plan for gross output". Another example was the

“Riga plywood factory [which] according to the annual report, fulfilled the gross output plan of 1947 by 193%, having achieved this due to the production of radio boxes unrequested by the plan, which were assigned an inflated constant price of 40 rubles per box”.

A second crucial problem resulting from the disarray in Soviet prices was “violation of the planned assortment, which occurs as the result of an overestimation of the constant prices of 1926-27 [and] hinders the correct determination of labor productivity, the number of workers, the wage fund, bonuses”. Practically, this mean that “by applying an inflated constant price for toothpaste, the Krasnokhimik (Leningrad) plant brought to 50% the share of this product on the plant’s gross value output, although only 5% of the plant’s workers were employed in the production of toothpaste”.

Sorokin peremptorily concluded that “the overestimation of the approved constant prices and incorrect correspondence of the levels of unchanged prices for old and new products, influencing the overall assessment of gross output, gives a distorted representation of the ratio of individual industries’ output, of rates and proportions in the national economy, of labor productivity in industries”.

This “chaotic situation”, according to Sorokin, “stresse[d] the urgent need to switch to calculating gross output at current wholesale prices”. The planner further suggested that before this switch it was necessary: “1. to compel the commission on constant prices to publish an instruction on the procedure for calculating and approving constant prices for new products of the Union, Republican, local and cooperative industry within a month; 2. to compel the Union, Union-Republican and Republican Ministries to submit to Gosplan in two months the draft of constant prices for new types of products […], for which there are no fixed constant prices; 3. to form a group of three people in the price and cost section to work on constant prices”.

Proceeding in accordance with such plans, Voznesensky sent to Stalin on 5 June 1948 a draft decree containing instructions on the rise of heavy industry wholesale prices and transportation tariffs, the “liquidation” of subsidies and the price reform. [855]

The decree was approved on 18 July and two days later Gosplan was already busy discussing the “measures to implement” said decree: supervising the drawing up new wholesale prices and indexes; “establishing unified wholesale prices for homogeneous products produced by enterprises of different Ministries”; “establishing the right value relations between different types of products”; “stimulating prices to increase production and economical consumption of metallurgical coal”; “stimulating the transport of goods by the river fleet in parallel with the railways”. Specific mention was also made of the need for coordination between Gosplan, the Council of Technical-Economic Expertise, TzSU and branch Ministries. [856]

Planned state subsidies were therefore reduced from 45.2 billion in 1948 to 8.5 billion in 1949 and profitability in heavy industry averaged over 8%. [857]

Debate on the reform was also carried out on economic journals and clearly linked to the broader economic levers one. Indeed, P. Vladimirov wrote in August 1948 that “in connection with the tasks of strengthening economic levers and consolidating *khozraschet* under post-war conditions, great importance must be attached to changes implemented in the sphere of planning and accounting”. He therefore concluded his article, which pointed to Leninist roots of the struggle for “profitability”, officially stating the necessity to “transition from planning gross output and the productivity of labour in 1926/27 prices to planning in prevailing wholesale

[855] RGAE, f. 4372, op. 48, d. 13, l. 312.

[856] RGAE, f. 4372, op. 48, d. 1, l. 131-134.

[857] Glushkov, ’60 let planovogo tsenoobrazovaniya’, in Komin (ed) *60 let planovogo tsenoobrazovaniya v SSSR*, pp. 12-13.

prices". [858] In December Sorokin broadly discussed post-war Soviet economics and the "deployment of the law of value" in an article were quotations from Voznesensky's *War Economy* by far surpassed reference to both Stalin and Molotov's works. [859]

Meanwhile, Kaser already argued in 1950 how the new reform brought about for the first time a "positive mechanism", based on the understanding of prices as reflecting "the order of priorities laid down in the quantitative plan, and thus contribute actively to the working of the economy". He therefore observed how it seemed that a decision was taken in the USSR to "make a fuller use of the price mechanism as an integral feature of their economic planning". [860]

Harrison later noted that whereby a "conservative rationalisation of the existing system", like that of the mid 1930s, was perfectly possible in 1947, Voznesensky's "advocacy of the role of 'economic levers'" ought indeed to be considered a key factor that pushed instead for reform. [861]

Harrison argued that Voznesensky wanted prices to be "neutral with respect to allocation while accurately accounting for real growth", [862] while Duskin thought he wished new prices to approximate scarcity value. [863] In all, the 1947-1948 reform aimed at bringing prices in line with wages and other costs, which had risen since 1941, and at making of them and of price accounting tools to determine plan fulfilment and efficiency as well as to increase the financial self-reliance of enterprises.

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[858] P. Vladimirov, 'Za Rentabel'nuyu Rabotu Predpriyatiy', *Voprosy ekonomiki*, 8 (1948), pp. 30, 32.

[859] G.M. Sorokin, 'Sotsialisticheskoe planirovaniye - zakon razvitiya sovetskoy ekonomiki', *Bol'shevik*, 24 (1948), pp. 12, 16-17, 19, 20-27.

[860] Kaser, 'Soviet Planning and the Price Mechanism', pp. 84, 91.

[861] Harrison, 'Prices, Planners, and Producers', p. 1058.

[862] Harrison, *Soviet Economic Planning in War and Peace*, p. 231 — Harrison, 'Prices, Planners, and Producers', p. 1060.

[863] Duskin, *Stalinist reconstruction and the confirmation of a new elite, 1945-1953*, p. 83.

3.7. — Voznesensky's dream of leadership and his downfall

3.7.1. — Zhdanov's death and Voznesensky as successor, 1948

As previously argued (pp. 119-120, 141), mid-1948 represented the high watermark of Voznesensky's influence. Yet, there exists also evidence that Stalin had not only highly empowered Voznesensky, but even considered him as his potential successor at SovMin. Already in 1958, Khrushchev mentioned to the LenSovet that Stalin had been sidelining Berian and Malenkov in favour of Kuznetsov and Voznesensky. [864] Mikoyan stated that in 1948, during a meeting of the leadership at Stalin's dacha on the Georgian lake Ritsa, the *vozhd* first lamented to the Politburo's ageing, then "pointing to Kuznetsov, […] said that future leaders should be young" and finally "made a bid for Voznesensky in the SovMin". [865]

Khrushchev reconfirmed in his memoirs that "Stalin had been preparing [Voznesensky and Kuznetsov] as successors", something he stated was confirmed by "remarks which I overheard in conversations between Malenkov and Beria". [866]

G.A. Egnatashvili, N.M. Shvernik head of security and friend of Stalin's son Jacob, stated that on the evening of 21 December of a year comprised between 1946 and 1949 he overheard a conversation between Shvernik and M.F. Shkiryatov. [867] He was escorting them home and the two started to "share their impressions of the evening spent with Stalin". Shkiryatov mentioned how Stalin suddenly stated that someone to replace him as SovMin Chairman was to be found.

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[864] RGANI, f. 52, op. 1, d. 401, ll. 26-29, 32-34, in A. Artizov, N.G. Tomilina, NA. Artizov (eds), *Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev. Dva Tsveta Vremeni, dokumenty iz lichnogo fonda N.S. Khrushcheva* (2 vols, Moscow, 2009), i, p. 601.

[865] Mikoyan, *Tak Bylo*, p. 565.

[866] N.S. Khrushchev, T. Strobe, E. Crankshaw, *Khrushchev Remembers* (Boston, Toronto, 1970), p. 251.

[867] The conversation could not have possibly taken place in 1949, since Voznesensky's disgrace befell on him already in March.

Malenkov, who spoke first, was supposedly not even considered by Stalin, while Molotov's age prompted the Soviet dictator to exclude him as well. Egnatashvili stated that "from the conversation in the car, I realised that after [Malenkov and Molotov spoke] all were silent and no one else dared to put himself forward". Therefore, Stalin said: "Good. Now I propose you a man who can and should lead the nation after me. Keep in mind that this person should come out of our circle, should be well aware of our school of administration and should not need to learn anything new. He should be well trained in all State affairs. And therefore I think this man is Voznesensky. He's a brilliant economist, knows perfectly the State economy as well as administration. I believe that we don't have anything better than his candidature". "Deathly silence" followed. "Maybe someone wants to say something against it? Or does anyone have any objections?", asked Stalin and again nobody dared to speak. Egnatashvili further recorded that both Shvernik and Shkiryatov did not object Stalin's decision during their conversation in the car. [868]

These accounts may be relied upon only to a certain point and Stalin had at different times endorsed others amongst his lieutenants. Yet, there is ample evidence that Stalin placed a great trust in Voznesensky, whose foothold at SovMin was strong and stable.

Voznesensky's position seemed further strengthened as in March 1948 he, Beria and Malenkov, took over on a rotational basis Molotov's chairmanship of the SovMin Bureau. [869] Yet, the Leningraders also suffered a setback in July, as Malenkov returned to the CC Secretariat. [870] There he furthered his plan to reorganise the CC on a "production-branch structure" mirroring the existing SovMin committees, [871] at the detriment of Zhdanov's focus on political and

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[868] V. Loginov, *Teni Stalina* (Moscow, 2000), p. 49-50.

[869] RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 1070, l. 2, in Khlevnyuk, *Politburo i Sovet Ministrov*, p. 57.

[870] Gorlizki, 'Ordinary Stalinism', pp. 715-716.

[871] Gorlizki, 'Ordinary Stalinism', pp. 715-716.

ideological factors. [872] Therefore, in August 1948 the Cadres Administration was abolished and its responsibilities split into several new economic departments. [873]

The Leningraders' fatal setback was came however shortly after when Zhdanov, their leader, succumbed to illness. Prominent pre-war lieutenant, defender of Leningrad and Stalin's post-war second in command, he died on 31 August 1948. Brent and Naumov argued Zhdanov was assassinated on Stalin's orders and that the *vozhd* even had Voznesensky convey him the news of his supposed removal from the top leadership. [874] Yet, this interpretation is disputed by most scholars. Zhdanov was never officially demoted and no hard evidence supports the claims that he was assassinated or that Voznesensky was "turned" into his gravedigger. [875] In fact, all sources point to Voznesensky having remained Zhdanov's closest associate, the only official who visited the ill leader in August 1948, probably realising how his passing could represent a serious weakening of his position. [876]

3.7.2. — The "Leningrad", "Gosplan" and "Voznesensky" affairs

The moment Voznesensky's rise was abruptly interrupted came in early 1949, as he found himself engulfed in an accelerating stream of "affairs" which ultimately lead to his arrest and execution.

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[872] Y. Gorlizki, 'Party Revivalism and the Death of Stalin', *Slavic Review*, 54/1 (1995), p. 15.

[873] Titov, 'The Central Committee apparatus under Khrushchev', p. 43.

[874] J. Brent, V.P. Naumov, *Stalin's Last Crime. The Doctors' Plot* (London, 2003), p. 63.

[875] D. Brandenberger, 'Stalin's Last Crime? Recent Scholarship on Post-war Soviet Antisemitism and the Doctor's Plot', *Kritika*, 6/1 (2005), pp. 190-194.

[876] C.N. Boterbloem, 'The Death of Andrei Zhdanov', *The Slavonic and East European Review*, 80/ 2 (2002), p. 275, 279, 285 — Boterbloem, *The Life and Times of Andrei Zhdanov*, pp. 286, 333.

It all started in 1948, when Popkov, First Secretary of Leningrad Party Obkom and Gorkom, suggested Voznesensky he should "patronise Leningrad". [877] Later, at the joint Leningrad Obkom and Gorkom Conference on 22-25 December, a small number of negative votes against Popkov, Y.A. Kapustin and C.F. Badayev were not reported to the delegates by the Chairman of the Counting Commission. Shortly after, between 10-20 January 1949, an All-Russia Wholesale Fair was held in Leningrad. Kuznetsov informed Malenkov on 13 January, who retorted, circulating the answer to Voznesensky, Beria and Mikoyan, that "I consider projects of this kind must be carried out with permission from SovMin". Yet, the SovMin Bureau, chaired by Malenkov himself, had already sanctioned on 11 November 1948 the possibility to "organise inter-regional wholesale trade fairs in November and December 1948 for sales of surplus goods, and to permit the goods bought at the fairs to be taken from one region to another". [878]

The situation for the Leningraders worsened on 15 February 1949, when the Politburo adopted a resolution calling the Fair a "squandering of state commodity funds", which "caused damage to the state due to the large and unjustified costs of public funds for the organisation of the Fair and for the transport of its participants from remote areas to Leningrad and back". [879] Kuznetsov, Rodionov and Popkov tried to "present themselves as some special defenders of Leningrad's interests" and for doing so were compared to Zinoviev. This was also the time when what Molotov would later define the "touch of Russian nationalism" [880] in the Leningrad Affair became

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[877] Evidence actually exists that Voznesensky had indeed patronised Leningrad in previous occasions. Anthropologist L. Klejn claimed that when he studied at Leningrad State University, whose rector became Voznesensky's brother, the Gosplan Chairman was commonly referred to by students as "our uncle", through whom "the University could usually get what it needed". There exists also evidence that when in May 1941 Kuznetsov needed to address oil shortage in the city, he appealed directly to Voznesensky — T. Taylor, 'Conversations with Leo Klejn', *Current Anthropology*, 5 (1993), p. 725 — R. Bidlack, N. Lomagin, *The Leningrad Blockade, 1941–1944. A New Documentary History from the Soviet Archives* (New Haven, London, 2012), p. 28.

[878] TsK KPSS, *Political Archives of the Soviet Union*, 1/2 (Commack, 1990) p. 153.

[879] Ibid., pp. 153-154.

[880] F.I. Chuev, V.M. Molotov, A. Resis, *Molotov remembers. Inside Kremlin politics. Conversations with Felix Chuev* (Chicago,1993), p. 291.

apparent. [881] The three Leningraders were all dismissed, while Voznesensky, was reprimanded for not having reported to the Politburo of Popkov's suggestion he patronised Leningrad. Yet, it was noted Voznesensky had turned this suggestion down. [882]

At this point, Voznesensky's position had only been slightly damaged, but in fact the worst was still to come. In late 1948, Mikoyan recounted, Stalin asked Voznesensky to eliminate the downturn in production experienced in the first quarter of each year for 1949. Voznesensky agreed, even though Mikoyan thought he knew this was an irrational task, [883] which Stalin had decided to assign his head planner as he felt emboldened by the overfulfillment of the industrial plan in 1948. [884]

Voznesensky gave instructions so that the required 5% growth would be achieved, but in fact, the plan for the first quarter was not modified. Deputy Chairman of Gossnab M. Pomaznev noted the mistake and reported it to Stalin in February 1949, who in turn asked the SovMin Bureau to look into the matter. The investigation confirmed what Pomaznev had told Stalin, but the report received by the *vozhd* was not strongly-worded against Voznesensky and did not recommend anything beyond amending the other quarterly plans for 1949. [885]

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[881] Issues with Leningrad's resurgent pride in the aftermath of its heroic war-time resistance already emerged in early 1948 when the Yugoslav delegation headed by Djilas expressed the wish to visit the city. Djilas recounted that "until my visit to Leningrad I would not have believed that anything could outdo the efforts of the natives of rebel regions and the Partisans of Yugoslavia in sacrifice and heroism. But Leningrad surpassed the reality of the Yugoslav revolution, if not in heroism then certainly in collective sacrifice". He even went on stating that "our encounter with Leningrad's officials added human warmth to our admiration". This "special relationship" established by the Yugoslav delegation with the Leningraders did not go unnoticed and during the correspondence that would lead to the Tito-Stalin split, the Soviets asked "comrade Djilas has abstained from collecting data from officials of the USSR, but he did so with local officials in Leningrad organisations. What did Comrade Djilas do there, what data did he collect?" — Djilas, *Conversations with Stalin*, p. 168 — 'Central Committee, All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks): Letter to CC, CPY, 4 May 1948', in *Correspondence of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)* (Belgrade, 1948), p. 52.

[882] RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 1074, ll. 35-36, in Khlevnyuk, *Politburo i Sovet Ministrov*, pp. 66-67.

[883] Mikoyan, *Tak Bylo*, pp. 559-561.

[884] Gorlizki, Khlevnyuk, *Cold Peace*, p. 69

[885] Ibid., p. 84.

Mikoyan argued that Beria's agents at Gosplan had obtained a memo where Voznesensky stated it was unrealistic to even out the downturn of the first quarter. [886] However, Khlevnyuk suggested Mikoyan mistook this for an earlier internal Gosplan message sent to Voznesensky on 15 December 1948 which suggested that the required 5% growth could only be met by rising gross industrial output of another 1,7 billion rubles. [887] Nevertheless, Gorlitski and Khlevnyuk thought that Pomaznev's denunciation carried the mark of Beria and Malenkov, although at that point the "Gosplan Affair" still seemed a "standard administrative investigation". [888]

Yet, the SovMin Bureau memo played according to Mikoyan a key role in the destruction of Stalin's trust in Voznesensky. Supposedly, upon reading it the *vozhd* exploded: "this means that Voznesensky has deceived us and the Politburo like fools and inflated [the real growth]? How is it possible that a Politburo member deceives the Politburo? Such person cannot be member of the Politburo and Gosplan head!". At that point Beria seems to have played his ace card, recalling the fateful sentence supposedly spoken by Voznesensky right before the creation of the GKO, "Vyacheslav, lead forward, we will follow you!", with further devastating effects on Stalin's confidence in his head planner. [889]

A further case was opened personally against Voznesensky, in itself not too dissimilar from a similar episode discussed earlier (pp. 99-100). On 3 March 1949 Stalin received a memo from MVD head S. Kruglov titled "About the mistakes of Voznesensky". There, Voznesensky was said to have issued as SovMin Deputy Chairman a decree asking the MVD to build and put into operation a 43-km long highway in Murmansk Oblast and overhaul another tract in the third quarter of 1949, at the cost of approximately 55 million roubles. The MVD objected that work on the Moscow-Khar'kov-Simferopol highway should be given priority but, Voznesensky refused to

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[886] Mikoyan, *Tak Bylo*, pp. 560-561.

[887] Khlevnyuk, 'Sovetskaya ekonomicheskaya politika na rubezhe', p. 84.

[888] Gorlitski, Khlevnyuk, *Cold Peace*, pp. 87, 201.

[889] Mikoyan, *Tak Bylo*, pp. 423-424.

change his mind and Kruglov therefore asked Stalin to intervene. It may be safely assumed that Beria was responsible for this new front opened against Gosplan's Chairman, [890] a new "Voznesensky Affair". [891]

Immediately after, a storm engulfed the Soviet leadership: on 4 March Molotov and Mikoyan lost their posts as ministers of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, [892] while two days later Kuznetsov and Rodionov were expelled from the Orgburo. Voznesensky, still a full member of the Politburo approved both decisions. [893]

Immediately afterwards, things precipitated for Voznesensky too. On 5 March he lost the chairmanship of Gosplan, while the agency was accused of a "biased and devious approach to planning and to the evaluation of the implementation of plans, which expresses itself in the manipulation of figures with the goal of manipulating reality". [894] Yet, on the same day the Politburo also approved the formation of a Commission on the Issue of Rouble Circulation, which Voznesensky was made part of, seemingly tempering the seriousness of his demotion. [895]

Instead, two days later Voznesensky simultaneously lost his Politburo and SovMin Bureau seats, the deputy chairmanship of SovMin, the chairmanship of the SovMin Bureau for Metallurgy and Chemical Industries and was even "granted" an unrequested month of leave for treatment in Barviha, Moscow Oblast. [896] Although the chronology of the resolutions firing Voznesensky from

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[890] GARF, f. P-5446, op. 51a, d. 4950, ll. 66-69, in Khlevnyuk, *Politburo i Sovet Ministrov*, pp. 280-285.

[891] Mikoyan, *Tak Bylo*, p. 561 — Khlevnyuk, 'Sovetskaya ekonomicheskaya politika na rubezhe', p. p. 81

[892] RGASPI, f. 17, op. 163, d. 1521, l. 77.

[893] RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 1074, l. 60, in Khlevnyuk, *Politburo i Sovet Ministrov*, p. 69.

[894] RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 1074, ll. 59, 107-116, in Khlevnyuk, *Politburo i Sovet Ministrov*, pp. 280-285.

[895] RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 40, l. 8, in Dobrokhotov et. al. (eds) *Denezhnaya reforma v SSSR 1947 goda*, p. 506.

[896] RGASPI f. 17, op. 163, d. 1521, ll. 88-91.

his top posts is not entirely clear, [897] the reaction of Voznesensky's collaborators was unanimous: Vinogradov, who worked at SovMin, "froze with a half-open mouth" upon hearing the news, while Kolotov stated this was "unexpected, incredible" and that Voznesensky "did not reply to my greeting (it was the first time)", laconically telling him instead "take all the documents from the desk and safe, I don't work here anymore". [898] From that moment on, Vinogradov stated that "a tacit law reigned in our circle: not a word about Voznesensky". [899] Khrushchev reported that after being removed from his posts Voznesensky "wasn't the same bright, self-assured, tough-minded [man] I'd known earlier". [900] And yet, much worse was to come.

On 13 August, Kuznetsov, Popkov and Rodionov were summoned by Melankov in his Moscow office and arrested, alongside Lazutin and Solovyvov, two further standing and former Leningrad officials. Voznesensky must have suspected his situation was becoming desperate and four days later he wrote to the CC, addressing his desperate plea directly to Stalin:

> I appeal to you with a great request - to give me work, whichever you find possible, so that I can invest my share of labor for the benefit of the Party and the Motherland. It is very difficult to stay away from the work of the Party and the comrades.

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[897] Three separate Politburo decisions appear chronologically in RGASPI f. 17, op. 163, d. 1521, ll. 88-91: one relieving Voznesensky of SovMin's deputy chairmanship, a second one granting him leave and third expelling him from the Politburo. The first two are handwritten, while the third is type-written, and includes a sentence which is crossed out by pen: "and relieve him [i.e. Voznesensky] from the duties of Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR".
Khlevnyuk argued that that the resolution on Voznesensky might have been adopted in Stalin's office at a meeting during the 7-8 March night [Khlevnyuk, *Politburo i Sovet Ministrov*, p. 69].
Vinogradov instead suggested that Voznesensky had become aware of his expulsion at a Politburo meeting on the evening of 9 March and had communicated that to him and Kolotov at 10.45pm [K.F. Vinogradov, 'V Apparate N.A. Voznesenskogo', in V.I. Demidov, V.A. Kutuzov (eds) *Leningradskoe Delo* (Leningrad, 1990), p. 301].
Kolotov in his 1963 edition of Voznesensky's memoir mistakenly stated that his boss was relieved of all his duties on 5 March [*Izvestiya*, 30 November 1963, p. 6]. In the 1974 edition however, he only referred to "March 1949" [Kolotov, *Voznesensky. Biograficheskiy povest*, p. 346].
What is sure is that the Politburo agenda shows all three decisions related to Voznesensky were tabled at the 7 march meeting [G.M. Adibekov et. al. (eds), *Politbyuro TsK RKP(b)-VKP(b). Povestki dnya zasedaniy*, iii, p. 557.], while incoming correspondence at Voznesensky's SovMin secretariat was marked SovMin Deputy Chairman until 9 March and later simply as "Member of the Supreme Soviet", or of the "Ukrainian Supreme Soviet" and "RSFSR Supreme Soviet" [GARF, f. P5446, op. 53, d. 15, ll. 89, 210, 253-292].

[898] *Izvestiya*, 30 November 1963, p. 6

[899] K.F. Vinogradov, 'V Apparate N.A. Voznesenskogo', p. 301.

[900] Khrushchev, Strobe, Crankshaw, *Khrushchev Remembers*, p. 251.

> From the reports of the TzSU in the press I, of course, see that the colossal successes of our Party are even multiplied by the fact that the CC and the Government are correcting their previous plans and uncovering new reserves. I assure you that I have unconditionally learned the lesson of Party spirit [partiinosti] from my case and ask that I am given an opportunity to participate actively in the general work and life of the Party. I ask you to have confidence in me: in order to justify this, I will give all my strength and work in any job that you will assign me.
>
> Your truly,
>
> Voznesensky. [901]

The letter was to no avail, as Voznesensky's situation became in fact even more desperate. On 22 August, Andreev, who the CC had tasked to supervise Gosplan staff, informed CC Secretary P.K. Ponomarenko, long-term adversary of Voznesensky, [902] that since 1945 Gosplan had lost 236 "secret" and "top secret" documents. This was the core of the "Gosplan Affair". [903]

And yet, Voznesensky still fought back: on 1 September 1949, he wrote to the CC and Stalin once again. Specifying he was unaware of several facts, Voznesensky admitted that there was "serious disorganisation in the storage of secret documents", that "those responsible for the loss of the documents were not brought to justice" and that having only issued administrative penalties, without informing CC or SovMin was a mistake. Voznesensky tried to appeal directly to Stalin: "I appeal to the CC of the VKP(b), and to you, Comrade Stalin, and I ask you to forgive me for my mistakes. […] The punishment which I have already received, finding myself for a long time without a job, has shaken and transformed me so much that I dare to ask you about

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[901] RGASPI, f. 83, op. 1, d. 5, l. 96.

[902] AP RF, f. 3, op. 24, d. 499, ll. 52-69, in A. Andrei (ed) *Reabilitatsiya. Kak eto bylo. Dokumenty Prezidiuma TSK KPSS i drugiye materialy. Fevral' 1956 - nachalo 80-kh godov* (3 vols, Moscow, 2000-2004), ii, p. 322.

[903] RGASPI, f. 17, op. 135, d. 16, ll. 83-89, in Khlevnyuk, *Politburo i Sovet Ministrov*, pp. 293-297.

this and believe that you are dealing with a man who has learned his lesson and knows how to comply with Party and Soviet laws". [904]

Once again, this letter second letter was once again to no avail. On 7 September 1949, the Bureau of the Party Control Commission recommended to "bring to trial" Voznesensky, former Gosplan Deputy Chairman A.D. Panov and the head of the Fifth Department S. Belous. The Resolution was adopted by the Politburo on 11 September and Voznesensky was expelled form the CC. [905]

A previously unknown letter sent by Belous to Saburov on 13 September shades light onto the internal dynamics at Gosplan prior to the Affair. In said communication, the head of the Fifth Department confirmed that he himself had become aware of twenty-three documents lost in 1947, twenty-one in 1948 and four in 1949 (forty-eight out of a total of 239). [906] As for 1947, Belous stated that "according to the rules of the secret procedure [he] reported to the leadership of Gosplan" on 5 May 1948 and in the same letter "wrote what punishments the relevant Gosplan officer deserved, depending on the degree of secrecy of the [lost] document, up to being brought in front of a court of justice". Yet, Voznesensky personally intervened: with a "resolution", which "allowed for not judicial, but rather administrative action against the perpetrators". Belous further noted that he was "not even included in the membership of the commission" that decided on this matter. As for the documents lost in 1948, Belous said he wrote to Gosplan Deputy Chairman Kuptsov and, as a result, Z.P. Petropavlovsky was put under MGB investigation, two "administrative fines" were given to V.A. Volkov (head of the Water Transportation Department) and I.M. Merzlneko (senior engineer at the Department for

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[904] APRF, f. 3, op. 54, d. 26, ll. 78-91, in Khlevnyuk, *Politburo i Sovet Ministrov*, pp. 297-298.

[905] RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 1078, ll. 20, 166-169, in Khlevnyuk, *Politburo i Sovet Ministrov*, pp. 299-300.

[906] Andreev recorded on August 22, 236 lost documents. It is not clear whether Belous simply quoted the number wrong or whether further loss of documents was uncovered.

Shipbuilding Industry), while “with respect to other staff […] no measures were taken”. As for the documents lost in 1949, Belous affirmed he had reported both to Saburov and to the MGB. [907]

In his letter, Belous essentially begged to be spared. He pointed to the fact he was “not a legal persona at Gosplan” and therefore could not be held accountable, remarking his attempts at punishing those responsible for the loss of some documents as well as the fact he did not “write off” a single document. He repeated how he understood that his “grave” mistake was not reporting about the loss documents to the MGB immediately. Belous then swore he had understood his shortcomings, thanks to the “sincere advice” of Shkiryatov, who behaved to him “like a father and a teacher”. He even came to mention that he had a “large family” and since he had been “at the front” and later worked at Gosplan’s Fifth Department he found himself “removed from the economic tasks of concrete planning”, therefore affirming that “it will be difficult for me to be included in a new branch of work”.

In his letter, Belous openly accused Voznesensky of being responsible for the fact that the MGB had not been informed of the lost documents, repeatedly stating he “assumed” Voznesensky and Kupzov had done so. He even openly smeared his predecessor at the Fifth Department, Plokhotnikov, who he stated “personally wrote off a large number of secret documents”.

Belous’ fate is unclear, but it is known that Panov, the third official accused alongside him and Voznesensky, was sentenced to four years of hard labour, but was instead assigned training duties during his conviction, later released and resumed his otherwise successful career. [908]

Shortly after, on 27 October, Voznesensky was arrested. Shepilov and Petrovichev have two similar descriptions of the event. The first stated that in late 1949 Voznesensky “after a whole

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[907] RGAE, f. 4372, op. 49, d. 8, ll. 166-168.

[908] A.D. Ignat’yev, R.A. Biryukov, N.F. Kusov, ‘Gornyy general'nyy direktor I ranga Andrey Dmitriyevich Panov (k 100-letiyu so dnya rozhdeniya)’, *Ugol*, 10 (2004), pp. 68-69.

day of work was lying on the sofa. The front bell rang, then some unknown voices were heard. People in MGB uniforms entered. The search began. The senior amongst them sat down at his desk and began to remove his drawers. He looked at and threw on the floor personal letters, book pages of the manuscript, medals..". [909] Petrovichev added that those pages which he confirmed were carelessly thrown on the floor belonged to the draft of Voznesensky's *Political Economy of Communism*. [910]

At this point, anybody who was or had served in any senior position in Leningrad feared he would be awoke in the middle of the night by the sound of MGB knocks on his door. According to V.I. Andrianov it was Kosygin's wife, K. Andreevna, who told him of the "terrible thing" that had happened, namely Voznesensky's arrest, [911] which prompted Kosygin to always remind her before leaving home that he might not have returned. [912] Kosygin's son-in-law, D. Gvishiani, even recounted how a rumour that Voznesensky had been arrested for illegal gun possession spread. He and Kosygin were so scared they might fall victims to similar accusations that with the pretext of fishing went to the Moskva River and disposed of all their weapons. [913] Khrushchev later stated that Kosygin's life was indeed "hanging by a thread" and that the future Soviet Premier "must have drawn a lucky lottery ticket". [914]

Shepilov, considered a "supporter of Voznesensky", recounted what it meant to "live with a noose around your neck". "We listened to the tramping footsteps on the stairs", he continued,

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[909] D.T. Shepilov, 'Vospominaniya', *Voprosy istorii*, 6 (1998), p. 17

[910] *Izvestiya*, 30 November 1963, p. 6.

[911] Andrianov, *Kosygin*, p. 129.

[912] G. Elliott, M. Lewin, *The Soviet Century* (London, New York, 2005), p. 96.

[913] Andrianov, *Kosygin*, pp. 123-124.

[914] Khrushchev, Strobe, Crankshaw, *Khrushchev Remembers*, p. 257.

“the doorbell ringing in the evening was like a lightning through the brain: who is this? [Are they here] for me?”. [915]

Yet, it seems that, as Khrushchev argued, Stalin still “felt a certain residual respect” for Voznesensky throughout 1949 and perhaps 1950. Indeed, Khrushchev stated in his memoirs that Stalin asked several times to Malenkov and Beria “isn’t it a waste not letting Voznesenky work while we’re deciding what to do with him?” and also “maybe we should put Voznesensky in charge of Gosbank. He’s an economist, a real financial wizard”. It appears that, after all, Voznesensky’s desperate pleas might have succeeded in attracting Stalin’s attention. This was however not enough and, as Khrushchev further commented, “no one objected, but nothing happened. Voznesensky was still left hanging”. [916]

A year passed before on 26 September 1950 Voznesensky, Kuznetsov, Rodionov, Popkov and other Leningraders were all indicted of separatism, nationalism, sabotage, subversion. The trial took place on 29-30 September and Khrushchev reported that once the sentence was read Voznesensky “stood up, shouted and cursed at Leningrad, showing he had “lost his sanity”. [917] On 1 October 1950 Voznesensky was shot and, as if his name had not been subjected to enough vituperation, on 17 October he was accused post-mortem of having issued an order that misappropriated State funds to cover the “cultural and household expenses of playwrights and composers”. [918]

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[915] Shepilov, ‘Vospominaniya’, p. 20.

[916] Khrushchev, Strobe, Crankshaw, *Khrushchev Remembers*, p. 251.

[917] Khrushchev, Strobe, Crankshaw, *Khrushchev Remembers*, p. 257.

[918] RGASPI, f. 82, op. 2, d. 949, ll. 133-146 — Arkhiv Aleksandra N. Yakovleva, http://www.alexanderya-kovlev.org/fond/issues-doc/1016290 (24 March 2017).
On 4 February 1948 a SovMin decree had condemned the “vicious practice” that theatres should rely not on ticket sales, but on State subsidies and set out their progressive “transfer […] to self-sufficiency”, which may have served as basis for the condemnation of Voznesensky’s attitude towards actors and theatres — GARF, f. P5446, op. 1, d. 324, ll. 255-257.

In 1949-52 in Leningrad and in its Oblast, more than 2.000 people were dismissed from their posts and 214 arrested, of whom 23 were executed. [919] Yet, the Leningraders demotion went alongside attacks against Malenkov and Mikoyan, while Molotov had already been forced to divorce his Jewish wife, accused of participation in an anti-Soviet plot, expelled from the Party, arrested and exiled. [920] At the same time, officials in Moscow, Gorki, Murmansk, Ryazan, Simferopol, Sevastopol, Novgorod, Pskov, Petrozavodsk, Tallin and other southern regions were purged. Zubkova affirmed that this almost Union-wide set of "affairs" served the double purpose of repressing key senior figures and keeping local elites in check. [921] This new purge was clearly linked with the drive towards uniformity launched with the Zhdanovshchina and the "two camps" policy as well as with the deployment of Stalin's "anti-oligarchic" campaign in the localities and with the ramifications of the "Leningrad Affair" itself. [922]

3.7.3. — Voznesensky, opinions of his contemporaries

There exists an almost unanimous agreement amongst Voznesensky's subordinates, colleagues and fellow leaders that he was extremely hard-working, possessed a great talent for economics and administration, but also a very bad temper.

S.Z. Ginzborg, Commissar for Construction, defined Voznesensky an "able young man, educated, thoughtful, energetic, with plenty of deep knowledge", while D.G. Zhimerin,

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[919] 'O tak nazyvayemom "Leningradskom dele"', *Izvestiya TsK KPSS*, 2 (1989), 124-37.

[920] Khlevnyuk, *Stalin. New Biography of a Dictator*, pp. 282-285.

[921] J. Subkowa, 'Kaderpolitik und Säuberungen in der KPdSU (1945-1953)', in H. Weber, U. Mählert (eds), *Terror. Stalinistische Parteisäuberungen 1936-1953* (Paderborn, München, Wien, Zürich 1998), pp. 214-216, 235.

[922] E.Iu. Zubkova, 'Moskva i Baltiskii region: mehanizmi sovetizazii Latvii, Litvi i Estonii v pervie posle-voennie godi, 1944-1953 gg.', *Virtus* (2000), pp. 25-26 — A.N. Fedorov, 'O prichinakh kadrovoy chistki 1949-1950 gg. v Molotovskoy oblasti (po materialam chastnoy perepiski)', *Vestnik YUUrGU*, 10/269 (2012), p. 82 — Tromly , 'The Leningrad Affair and Soviet Patronage Politics, 1949-1950', pp. 711-712, 716-718.

Commissar for Electric Power Stations, thought he was “complex, intelligent, systematic” and again “a very capable man, perhaps even extraordinary”. [923]

Benediktov, Commissar and Minister of Agriculture, stated that he “highly appreciated” Voznesensky, “a distinguished business executive, a talented economist”, a “strong-willed, energetic, purposeful” man, who “had the most valuable quality - loyalty to his word”. [924] Ya.E. Chadaev, long-term Sovnarkom official, echoed him stating that “his words never diverged from his deeds”. To him Voznesensky was a “principled and competent leader […] broad-minded, energetic, thoughtful, combining the analytical mind and vision of a major political figure with the promptness and efficiency of an economic worker. He always looked into the distance, into the future”. [925] L. Abalkin agreed with him that Voznesensky possessed this “rare gift”, which contributed to make of him a “great statesmen” and one “among the most prominent Soviet economists”. [926]

Mikoyan also defined Voznesensky “an educated economist, a good worker” and again “a competent person who spoke sensibly, thoughtfully”. Yet, he recalled how soon after his pre-war promotions Voznesensky “began to show arrogance toward the rest of his comrades”. His “ambition, arrogance” as well as “chauvinism” were supposedly “clear to everybody” in the top leadership. [927] Mikoyan’s vitriolic comments find confirmation in Chadaev’s statement that Voznesensky behaved arrogantly even in front of “his equals in rank”. [928]

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[923] Kumanev, *Govaryat Stalinskie Narkomi*, pp. 414, 445.

[924] V.N. Dobrov, ‘Melkoburzhuaznyye Kadry Reshayut Vse’, *Duel*, 3 July 2003, 22 (319), p. 6 — The interview was originally published in 1989, V.N. Dobrov, ‘Y.A. Benediktov o Staline i Khrushcheve’, *Molodaya Gvardiya*, 4 (1989).

[925] Kumanev, *Govaryat Stalinskie Narkomi*, p. 495.

[926] L. Abalkin, ‘Istoricheskaya pamyat' kak element poznaniya’, *Voprosy ekonomiki,* 11 (2003), pp. 133–140.

[927] Mikoyan, *Tak Bylo*, p. 559.

[928] Kumanev, *Govaryat Stalinskie Narkomi*, pp. 495-497.

Ginzborg noted Voznesensky's "very bad temper", [929] Zimerin his "rudeness", [930] while again Chadaev that he was "too quick-tempered" and prone to "extreme irritability, disdain and arrogance". [931] P.L. Kapitsa, a scientist who sat in the atomic bomb committee, even complained to Stalin that "comrades Beria, Malenkov and Voznesensky conduct themselves in the Special Committee like supermen", specifying however, "in particular comrade Beria". [932]

However, if Ginzborg stated that Voznesensky "did not smile, did not joke [and] had no sense of humour", [933] Chadaev noted how "when Voznesensky was in a good mood, he was brilliant, merry, cheerful, kind [displaying] education, erudition, high culture […]; unfortunately, such moments were rare; they slipped like a spark, and then Voznesensky became gloomy again, unrestrained, rough and prickly". [934] Egnatashvili, Shvernik's head of security, having witnessed one of Voznesensky's outbursts of rage against two Ministers, admitted the following: "I would not have withstood such brutality […] although I was quite seasoned". [935]

Voznesensky even managed to infuriate Kolotov, the loyal head of his secretariat, who in 1940 reached the point of asking his boss to transfer him to another assignment. Kolotov made this later withdrawn request, when in the very dead of night, Voznesensky had exploded in a fit of rage against him because one document over fifty he had brought did not satisfy the Chairman's perfectionism. [936]

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[929] Kumanev, *Govaryat Stalinskie Narkomi*, p. 445.

[930] Ibid., p. 414.

[931] Ibid., p. 495

[932] P.L. Kapitsa, *Pis'ma o Nauke* (Moscow, 1989), pp. 239-245.

[933] Kumanev, *Govaryat Stalinskie Narkomi*, p. 445.

[934] Kumanev, *Govaryat Stalinskie Narkomi*, p. 495

[935] Loginov, *Teni Stalina*, pp. 49-50.

[936] *Voznesensky Nikolai Alekseevich*, pp. 96-97.

Others however had only words of praise for Voznesensky. K.F. Vinogradov, who worked with him at SovMin, defined his boss as “one of the cleverest at SovMin (and not only there)” and a stakhanovist, who demanded self sacrifice from himself and all his employers alike. For Vinogradov, Voznesensky remained “a man and a political figure of the Stalinist epoch, but the smartest and most talented; this was his undoing”. [937]

N.K. Baibakov, long-term official in the at the Ministry for Oil Industry and later Gosplan head, spoke of Voznesensky as “strict and consistent in his actions”, for which he was “remembered, appreciated and loved” at Gosplan. Voznesensky, a “calm, inwardly focused person” could “sometimes be harsh in his judgments […] not out of personal ambition, but strictly for the cause”. [938]

L.M. Volodarsky, Gosplan official and plenipotentiary in Leningrad and its Oblast, echoed Baibakov stating that “all who knew and worked with N.A. Voznesensky will forever keep in their memory the image of a dedicated man of the people, a persistent communist, a man of great knowledge and great indomitable will”. Voznesensky, continued Volodarsky, was “extremely demanding towards himself and the staff of Gosplan”, a “high-principled man” who “gave all his knowledge and experience to his beloved motherland”. [939]

Moreover, Zimerin confirmed that Voznesensky recognised when his subordinates were in need of help and, not necessarily quitting verbal harassment, would offer such help. [940] Chadaev recalled instead Voznesensky’s strictness towards himself by saying that he “did not consider himself an infallible leader; he often listened to the criticisms of subordinates and, incidentally,

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[937] Vinogradov, ‘V Apparate N.A. Voznesenskogo’, pp. 299-301, 303.

[938] Baybakov, ‘Iz vospominaniy’, pp. 141-145.

[939] Volodarskiy, ‘Ya pomnyu Voznesenskogo’.

[940] Kumanev, *Govaryat Stalinskie Narkomi*, pp. 412-413.

never settled scores with them for criticism". [941] This is also confirmed by I.V. Kovalev, who recalled an August 1941 Chief Artillery Directorate (GAU) meeting, where Voznesensky revealed sensible information in front of a large audience. After upon Kovalev's suggestion the meeting had become a closed session between few officials, Voznesensky apologised for his carelessness. [942]

Shepilov, Pravda and CC AgitProp official who Voznesensky often courted with Gosplan job proposals, also praised him as an "authority" on economic matters as well as one of "the most influential Marxist educated and enlightened people in the Politburo". [943]

Khrushchev on his part said he knew Voznesensky "very well" and defined him a "bright, self-assured, tough-minded". [944] Even Molotov had mostly words of praise: Voznesensky was "unquestionably a highly educated, experienced broad-gauge worker", a man who "had his weak spots, but I would say he was more outstanding than the others". [945] Kosygin on his part always spoke very little of those involved in the Leningrad Affair, but Gvishani reported that he told V.N. Novikov, SovMin Deputy Chairman, how "tragically and unjustly" his friends and comrades were killed, clearly stating that he "could have been in their place". [946]

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[941] Kumanev, *Govaryat Stalinskie Narkomi*, p. 495

[942] Ibid., p. 318.

[943] Shepilov, 'Vospominaniya', p. 4.

[944] Khrushchev, Strobe, Crankshaw, *Khrushchev Remembers*, pp. 250-251.

[945] Chuev, Molotov, Resis, *Molotov remembers*, pp. 292-293.

[946] Gvishiani, *Fenomen Kosygina*, pp. 75-76.

Finally, we supposedly even possess the opinion of Voznesensky's *Prometheus*, Stalin himself. Reported by artist K. Simonov, such opinion seems to have been expressed by the *vozhd* to Kovalev, at that time Minister of Railways, and reads as follows:

> [Voznesensky] differs in a positive way from other leaders. Other leaders, if they have disagreements among themselves, they first try to reconcile these differences privately among themselves, and then, after they reached an agreement, they bring [the matter] to my attention. Even when differences persist, they come to some sort of agreement on paper and present the matter to me in that form. Voznesensky, if he does not agree, will stand his ground and simply refuse to have the matter agreed for form's sake. He will come to me with his objections, with his disagreements. They [i.e. the other leaders] know that I cannot know everything; all they want from me is a stamp [faksimile]. I cannot know everything. I pay particular attention to disagreements, objections, why they started, to find out what is the matter. They [i.e.the other leaders] do their best to conceal them from me. [They] go along with the votes but they conceal the differences, all so that they can obtain a stamp [faksimile]. What they want out of me is my stamp [faksimile]. That is why to their consensus, I prefer the objections of a Voznesensky. [947]

Voznesensky's inclination towards open criticism even in front of Stalin seems proved by his previously mentioned support for Zhukov's minority opinion in 1942 in relation to Stalin's misguided offensive plans (p. 105). [948] K. Simonov also refers to another meaningful event, which took place at meeting tasked with assigning State prices for arts, science and technology in June 1947. There Voznesensky vehemently disagreed with Stalin's opinion and the difference between the way he and the other attendees approached Stalin impressed Simonov. He clearly

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[947] K. Simonov, *Glazami cheloveka moyego pokoleniya* (Moscow, 1989), pp. 160-161.

[948] 'Pis'mo G.K. Zhukova V.D. Sokolovu' (RGVA, f. 4107, op. 2, d. 2, ll. 9-31), http://www.alexanderyakovlev.org/fond/issues-doc/1004782 (27 March 2017).

recalled “how brusquely and willingly [Voznesensky] spoke”, “with what sort of hardness” he addressed Stalin and “how several times he strongly insisted on his point of view”. [949]

Little more is known on Voznesensky. An interesting and rather peculiar feature of his was described by Baibakov as follows: Voznesensky was a “psychologist of the economy”. [950] According to L. Volodarsky he not only possessed “some inner ability to detect a dishonest approach to business” on the part of his subordinates, but also “the ability to rapidly penetrate into the most complex issues and deal with them properly”. [951]

These extrasensory qualities of Voznesensky were confirmed to Harrison by a “Soviet historian” in 1981: “[Voznesensky] could feel the disproportions in the economy through his fingertips”. [952]

That Voznesensky possessed, or thought he possessed, some inner ability to “feel the economy” is confirmed by an event recalled by his nephew, Lev Voznesensky. At some point in 1944-45, during a phone call, Voznesensky simply said “one in the Donbass, the other to Leningrad!”. With those few words he had ordered to send two special trains that were approaching Moscow to, as Voznesensky said, “where there is now the most urgent need”. [953]

Only sparse information is available on Voznesensky’s actual political beliefs. Although his loyalty to the Soviet Party-State, Stalin himself and Marxism-Leninism seems indisputable, some evidence points to his fascination with Great Russian nationalism. A. Katsenelinboigen for example stated that Turetskii “told me that Voznesensky’s political ideal, as the latter assured him in private conversation, was Catherine the Great. Voznesensky thought that Russia must be

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[949] *Voznesensky Nikolai Alekseevich. Strateg Ekonomicheskoy Pobedi* (Moscow, 2013), p. 216.

[950] Baybakov, ‘Iz vospominaniy’, pp. 141-145.

[951] Volodarskiy, ‘Ya pomnyu Voznesenskogo’.

[952] Gregory, Harrison, ‘Allocation under Dictatorship’, p. 751.

[953] *Voznesensky Nikolai Alekseevich*, p. 164.

a rigidly centralised state with an enlightened monarch". [954] Supposedly, once Stalin even told Mikoyan that for Voznesensky "not only Georgians and Armenians, but even the Ukrainians are not people". [955]

Evidence also exists that Voznesensky refused to take direct part in State repression. Lev Voznesensky stated he "carefully studied every single list of executions, preserved in the archive of the former Politburo and made sure that none of them carried the signature of Nikolai Alekseevich". He therefore confidently stated that Voznesensky "died without having stained his conscience with the participation in the bloody Stalinist crimes against humanity or, as they delicately called them, repression". [956]

There is no reason to doubt Lev Voznesensky's scrupulous research. In fact, this latter one would confirm an event which Kolotov unsuccessfully tried to mention in his biography of Voznesensky. Such event was later referred to by Medvedev, Harrison and eventually confirmed by Lev Voznesensky. [957] Precisely this latter one discussed it with Kolotov himself, when the two were collaborating on N.A. Voznesensky's biographies and stated that by publishing the content of said conversation he was "fulfilling [his] promise" to Kolotov himself. Lev Voznesensky and Medvedev's accounts however differ: the first dated the event to "soon after he [Voznesensky] took over Gosplan", i.e. sometime around mid-1938, the second instead made no clear reference to any date. [958]

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[954] A. Katsenelinboigen, *Soviet Economic Thought and Political Power in the USSR* (New York, 1980), p. 170.

[955] Mikoyan, *Tak Bylo*, p. 559.

[956] L.A. Voznesensky, *Istiny Radi*, pp. 86-87.

[957] The passage never included in any of Kolotov's biographies of Voznesensky seems to have been part of the unpublished "Ustremlenny v budushchee" — Medvedev, *Let History Judge*, p. 784 — Harrison, 'N.A. Voznesensky. A Soviet Commander of the Economic Front', p. 42 — L.A. Voznesensky, *Istiny Radi*, pp. 84-85.

[958] Another minor difference between the two versions is that in Medvedev's Voznesensky reads through the document quickly, while in Lev Voznesensky's he ponders over it for hours.

Essentially, the story reads as follows: Kolotov received a parcel from State Security containing a list of several people to be shot, without any further detail about their supposed crimes, which Voznesensky was to approve. Yet, and here both versions are essentially identical, Voznesensky would have told Kolotov: “Bring this list back where you got it, and say there, that I am not a prosecutor and do not know any of these people or their crimes nor penalties that apply in such cases, and let them never, under any circumstances, send me such documents again”.

Once again Lev Voznesensky’s account also includes further details on the part of Kolotov, who seems to have stated: “I, of course, did this immediately, and since then for all subsequent years, we never received such a list again. I think, however, that this attitude has cost him [Voznesensky] dearly when he was arrested”. [959]

Further evidence seems to exist of Voznesensky’s reticence to comply with standard repressive measures. For example, Zhukov spoke of another event at the July 1957 CC Plenum during which Malenkov was harshly criticised by Khrushchev for his involvement in Voznesensky’s downfall. He referred to a document that approved stripping of their military ranks approximately one thousand Red Army officers freed from German captivity, who were to be confined into Gulags for six years. This proposal, which Zhukov noted was “against the existing law” was passed by Bulganin to Voznesensky and Molotov. Voznesensky “considered it impossible to sign the document”, while Molotov “without reading it, signed it”. [960]

Lev Voznesensky also reported how, according to Turetskiy and Y. Shamai, Voznesensky protected Gosplan employees and never had anybody arrested. [961] The Belous letter discussed earlier in this chapter (pp. 175-176) in relation to the “Gosplan Affair” clearly lends much support

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[959] L.A. Voznesensky, *Istiny Radi*, pp. 85-86.

[960] APRF, f. 3, op. 76, d. 24, in Yu. Sigachev, A. Stepanov (ed), *Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich. 1957. ZK KPSS i drugie dokumenti* (Moscow, 1998), p. 120.

[961] L.A. Voznesensky, *Istiny Radi*, p. 86.

to such thesis, since it proves how Voznesensky personally prevented the involvement of the MGB in internal Gosplan affairs. [962]

Yet, as V.I. Demidov and V.A. Kutuzov stated, membership in Stalin's leadership unavoidably implied direct complicity in at least some form of crime. [963] In Voznesensky's case, there exists ample evidence that in 1940-1945 he approved several Sovnarkom and GKO resolutions on the mass deportation and forcible mobilisation into labour armies of "anti-Soviet elements" and of entire ethnicities from Ukraine, Belarus and the Caucasus. [964] Voznesensky was specifically entrusted with the economic side of several such deportations. [965] The Gosplan Chairman was also aware of the fact that in early 1943, in newly liberated territories, the NKVD arrested 30.750 "German agents" and "anti-Soviet elements", including hundreds of Party and Komsomol members as well as former State and Soviet officials. [966] In the post-war period Voznesensky was also sent the minutes of several questionings carried out by the MGB, as for example that of former Deputy Commissar of Communications A.D Fortushenko, [967] arrested upon return from a conference in the US in 1947 amid the secrecy campaign and later tortured. [968]

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[962] RGAE, f. 4372, op. 49, d. 8, ll. 166-168.

[963] Demidov, Kutuzov (ed) *Leningradskoe Delo*, pp. 170-171.

[964] GARF, f. P-5446, op. 1b, d. 513, ll. 124-124, RGASPI, f. 644, op. 1, d. 146, ll. 108-109, GARF, f. P-9479, op. 1, d. 136, ll. 3-6, RGASPI, f. 664, op. 1, d. 215, ll. 119-121, RGASPI, f. 664, op. 1, d. 252, ll. 237-241, RGASPI, f. 664, op. 1, d. 261, ll. 64-66, RGASPI, f. 664, op. 1, d. 285, APRF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 500, ll. 108-110, APRF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 500, ll. 111-114, APRF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 500, ll. 130-133, in T.D. Pobol', P.M Polyan, A.N. Yakovlev (eds), *Stalinskiye Deportatsii, 1928-1953* (Moscow, 2005), pp. 145-146, 383, 413-414, 484-485, 497-499, 510-511, 525- 528, 588-589, 590-591, 602-604.

[965] GARF, f. P-9479, op. 1, d. 136, ll. 3-6 and APRF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 500, ll. 130-133 , in Pobol' et. al. (eds), *Stalinskiye Deportatsii*, pp. 413-414, 602-604.

[966] AP RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 207, ll. 159-175, in Kokurin et. al. (eds), *Lubyanka. Stalin i NKVD-NKGB-GUKR "Smersh"*, pp. 361-371.

[967] AP RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 257, ll. 5-47, in V.N. Khaustov et. al. (ed), *Lubyanka. Stalin i MGB SSSR. Mart 1946 - mart 1953*, p. 77.

[968] *Federal'nyy spravochnik. Svyaz' i massovyye kommunikatsii v Rossii* (Moscow, 2011), x, pp. 369-370.

3.7.4. — Voznesensky's downfall and economics

The Leningrad Affair remained until very recent times one of the most obscure events in Soviet history. Already in 1949, after noting Voznesenky's removal from Gosplan, [969] the Western press quickly grasped that the Leningraders had fallen in disgrace, [970] but the Affair was still dubbed a "mystery" in 1954. [971]

Early interpretations of the causes behind the purge pointed to economic disputes, as well as Russian nationalism. [972] After Khrushchev defined it in his Secret Speech as "fabricated", [973] Schapiro pointed to how Varga's economic heterodoxy had not culminated in his liquidation, therefore suggesting the Affair owed more to political intrigue. [974]

In the following decades, Khrushchev accused Beria of having masterminded the Affair, [975] an accusation confirmed also by Molotov and Mikoyan, who however added that Stalin must have sanctioned it. [976] Several scholars pointed, and still point, to the Leningraders' supposed covert and overt "programmatic differences" with Stalin, [977] although already since the 1970s others focused instead on political intrigue as explanation for the Affair. [978] In 1990 the first serious Soviet academic study on the topic largely debunked the myth of the Leningraders' opposition to

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[969] *New York Times*, 15 March 1949, p. 1.

[970] New York Times, 19 June 1949, p. 1.

[971] *New York Times*, 25 December 1954, p. 3.

[972] C.L. Sulzberger, *The Big Thaw* (New York, 1956), pp. 47-48.

[973] 'O Kul'te Lichnosti, p. 152-153.

[974] L. Schapiro, *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union* (London, 1960), p. 532.

[975] Khrushchev, Strobe, Crankshaw, *Khrushchev Remembers*, pp. 251-252.

[976] Chuev, Molotov, Resis, *Molotov remembers*, pp. 291-292 — Mikoyan, Tak Bylo, p. 561.

[977] Medvedev, *Let History Judge*, p. 784 — J. Elleinstein, *Storia del Fenomeno Staliniano* (Roma, 1975), p. 185 — Medvedev and Medvedev, *Khrushchev*, pp. 17-18 — Pyzhikov, 'Leningradskaya Gruppa'.

[978] A. Guerra, *Gli Anni del Cominform* (Milano, 1977), p. 224 — Hahn, *Post-war Soviet Politics*, pp. 122-134.

Stalin. [979] Recent Western scholarship has instead looked at the threats posed by Russoncentrism to Bolshevik power and Union's stability, [980] at the Leningraders' multifaceted attempts at furthering their careers, [981] at the Leningrad patronage network. [982]

Particularly relevant to the present research is naturally Voznesensky's own demise and theories of its relationship with economics. The downfall of what the Western press had defined one of "fourteen men who run Russia" and a "power", [983] generated much interest in the West since the Affair was still unfolding. [984] As of early 1949, the CIA interpreted Molotov, Mikoyan and Voznesensky's removals not as a purge, but as a "relief […] from operational responsibility". [985] Yet, already in mind-April the CIA speculated that in fact factional rivalry was at play and specifically the rise of Malenkov's faction. [986]

Just as in regards to the Leningrad Affair, also Voznesensky's demise was alternatively linked to "economic disagreements", as suggested by the British Foreign Office in 1950, [987] or to

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[979] Demidov, Kutuzov (ed) *Leningradskoe Delo*, pp. 170-171.

[980] Brandenberger, 'Stalin, the Leningrad Affair, and the Limits of Post-war Russocentrism', pp. 254-255.

[981] R. Bidlack, 'Ideological or Political Origins of the Leningrad Affair? A Response to David Brandenberger', *Russian Review*, 1 (2005), p. 91.
For Brandenberger's reply which points to the key importance of the Russian nationalist ideological factor: D. Brandenberger, 'Ideology and Politics (or Vice Versa)', *Russian Review*, 1 (2005).

[982] Tromly, 'The Leningrad Affair and Soviet Patronage Politics, 1949-1950', pp. 711-712, 716-718.

[983] *New York Times*, 2 February 1947, p. 7 — *New York Times*, 15 March 1949, p. 13.

[984] *New York Times*, 15 March 1949, p. 1 — *New York Times*, 3 May 1949, p. 3 — *New York Times*, 19 June, 1949, p. 1.

[985] Estimate of the Significance of Soviet Personnel Changes, Weekly Summary, No. 42, 18 March 1949 (p. 5) — CIA Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia-rdp78-01617a000400040001-9 (27 November 2016).

[986] Weekly Summary Number 45, 8 April 1949 (p. 4) — CIA Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia-rdp78-01617a002100240001-1 (27 November 2016).

[987] FO 1093/583 — Russia Committee (RC): Papers 2-57 (With Gaps), 1 January 1950 - 31 March 1950 (p. 6)— Secret Files from World Wars to Cold Wars, http://www.secretintelligencefiles.com/Content/swwf.-fo1093/0583/002?t0=0&q0=FO%201093/583&o0=and&pf=1873&pt=2015&pfrr=False&cnf=1873&cnt=1953&cnrr=False&cvf=1873&cvt=1953&cvrr=False&sid=1879589689&st=False&sy=False&rc=true (21 November 2016).

leadership infighting, as argued by the CIA in 1953. [988] Western and émigré scholars instead initially pointed to Voznesensky's responsibilities in the supposed post-war Plan failure, [989] but soon also endorsed the idea of major disagreements between Voznesensky and Stalin — some thought on prices, [990] some specifically on agricultural ones, [991] but most pointed to the law of value. [992]

Yet, specifically in relation to Voznesensky's position on the "transformed law of value", two incorrect views were held for some time in the West. The first defined Voznesensky's idea of the plan as law "adventurist", [993] "over-optimistic" and even postulated that Stalin's *Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR* (thereafter *Economic Problems*) was a moderating influence. [994] The second more substantiated view essentially relied on the understanding that Voznesensky's views represented a departure from Stalin's ideas, which contributed to his downfall and were therefore reversed. [995]

In fact, Voznesensky was not a voluntarist, nor had he opposed Stalin. Already in 1961 Conquest contradicted the first view, defining Stalin's condemnation of Voznesensky's

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[988] Report - The Balance of Power: August 1948 to October 1950, 5 August 1953 (pp. 1, 10-11) — CIA Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/5077054e993247d4d82b6acd (27 November 2016).

[989] *New York Times*, 27 March 1949, p. 16 — N. Jasny, 'A Close-up of the Soviet Fourth Five-Year Plan', *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 66/2 (1952), p. 139.

[990] Wiles, *The Political Economy of Communism*, pp. 104-106 — Nove, *An Economic History of the USSR*, pp. 302-303.

[991] J.F. Hough, 'Debates About the Post-war World', in S.J. Linz (ed), *The Impact of World War II on the Soviet Unio*n (Totowa, 1985), pp. 265-266.

[992] Kaser, *Comecon*, p. 34 — Kaser, *Soviet Economics*, p. 107.

[993] Miller, 'A Political Economy of Socialism in the Making, pp. 424-425 — Deutscher, 'Dogma and Reality in Stalin's 'Economic Problems'', p. 354.

[994] R.L. Meek, *Studies in the Labor Theory of Value* (New York and London, 1956), p. 273

[995] Felker, *Soviet Economic Controversies*, p. 39 — J. Giffen, 'The Allocation of Investment in the Soviet Union: Criteria for the Efficiency of Investment', *Soviet Studies*, 33/4 (1981), p. 56 — P.J.D. Wiles, 'Soviet Investment Criteria. A Prefatory Note', in P.J.D. Wiles (ed), *The Soviet Economy on the Brink of Reform. Essays in honour of Alec Nove* (Boston, 1988), p. 40 — Kaser, 'The Debate on the Law of Value in the USSR', p. 141.

"voluntarism" as a "farcical set of truisms", while he also contested the second. Indeed, he argued that Voznesensky might have wished to broaden the market's scope, but hardly would have thought of challenging the primacy of planning and that this was anyway unlikely the be the reason behind his downfall. [996]

A decade later Katz argued that Voznesensky's "adventurism" was in fact a covered-up attempt at further rationalisation. That plans set by the State were laws could have meant that any plan was possible, including a "consumptionist" one. [997] Recently Van Ree added that Voznesensky's formulations may have been a theoretical justification for breaking the "law of proportional development", which meant relinquishing the priority principle in favour of heavy industry. [998]

The archives have proved how the idea of a "transformed law of value" was, if not entirely introduced by Stalin in 1941, at least clearly endorsed by him already at that time (pp. 109-112). Yet, the post-Voznesensky truth on how the "law of value" actually operated in the USSR was presented only in 1952, when Stalin not only condemned his former head planner's views, but also meaningfully modified the 1941 stance. It can therefore be observed how since Voznesensky was removed and his *War Economy* banished with no official clarification on whether its content was heresy or not, Stalin actually became solely praised for introducing theories he would indeed call heresy in 1952.

To be sure, Stalin's works had been uninterruptedly praised as having worked out "the laws of the development of socialism are developed and the economic theory of socialism". [999] Less than two months before Voznesensky's disgrace, on 17 January 1949, a theoretical discussion

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[996] Conquest, *Power and Policy in the USSR*, pp. 108, 110-111.

[997] Katz, *The politics of economic reform in the Soviet Union*, pp. 36-37.

[998] E. Van Ree, *The Political Thought of Joseph Stalin* (London, 2002), pp. 11-12.

[999] G. Kozlov, Lenin i Stalin - Sozdateli Politicheskoy Ekonomii Sotsializma, *Voprosy ekonomiki*, 1 (1948), p. 6, 19.

of the “transformed law of value” was held at the Academy’s Economic Institute. There, I.A. Anchishkin opened his reflections by stating that “comrade Stalin said that the law of value in a transformed fashion operates in the socialist society”. Without the “law of value”, whose operation under socialism “now no one disputes” added Strumilin, it would have been “impossible” to “carry out scientifically based planning” and “create a coherent system of categories of the political economy of socialism”. [1000]

Anchishkin further remarked that without “proper understanding” of the law of value “it is impossible to scientifically explain such important economic levers of influence on production and distribution such as Soviet money, prices, cost accounting, cost, credit, etc.”. Instead, he added, “the Soviet state uses the law of value in all its concrete manifestations as an economic lever of influence on production and distribution, determining the development of the socialist economy on a planned basis”. [1001]

The concept of “transformation” was itself a key subjects of the conference, where reference to the “plan as law” concept also clearly emerged. Indeed, again Anchishkin argued that “the revolutionary transformation of old production relations, carried out by the Soviet state, means at the same time the transformation of some economic laws into others”. The Soviet state, which “has the main role” in such process, “not only directs and accelerates the economic development of the country, but also in the end changes the nature of the economy itself”. [1002]

The pre-capitalist origin of commodities, value and cost were also at the core of the conference’s debates. Ostrovityanov characterised them as “transitory categories that act in different socio-economic formations”, adding that “the statements of Marx and Engels on the dual nature of capitalist credit, joint-stock companies, monetary circulation during the transition period from

[1000] ARAN, f. 1877, op. 1, d. 328, ll. 1-2.

[1001] Ibid., l. 16.

[1002] Ibid., l. 9.

capitalism to socialism, indicate that they considered it necessary to use the commodity-money categories as levers for the socialist transformation of the economy". [1003]

At a further conference on 23 May 1949, after Voznesensky's downfall, the main themes discussed were the "necessity of commodity-money relations and value" and their "nature", which required defining "value in the USSR, value under capitalism [and] in what consists its transformation". [1004]

Clear reference to the fact that Stalin had ideated the "transformed law of value" concept was repeatedly made well after Voznesensky's disgrace. [1005] Indeed, at the Academy's celebration for Stalin's seventieth birthday in December 1949, he was praised for having "developed the basic provisions of the political economy of socialism [as well as] pointed out how the law of value undergoes changes in the conditions of a socialist economy […] acting under socialism, as Comrade Stalin teaches, in a transformed form". And once again, "Stalin showed that in the first phase of communism the law of value operates in a transformed form, money and trade remain as the most important levers of the economy in the hands of the Soviet state". [1006]

As late as 1951, Pashkov even mentioned Stalin himself had come up with the formula in 1941: "of great importance for economic science is the instruction of Comrade Stalin, made in a conversation with economists in 1941, that in the socialist society the effect of the law of value is preserved in a transformed form". [1007]

[1003] Ibid., l. 135.

[1004] ARAN, f. 1877, op. 1, d. 329, ll. 25-26.

[1005] 'Zasedaniya otdelenii Akademii Nauke SSSR, posvyashchennye 70-letiyu so dnya rozhdeniya I.V. Stalina, 26-27 deyabrya 1949 goda (Kratkiye otchety)', *Vestnik AN SSSR*, 1 (1950), p. 123.

[1006] Ibid., pp. 35, 43, 67.

[1007] A.I. Pashkov, 'Politicheskaya Ekonomika Sotsializma v Rabote I.V. Stalina "Istoriya VKP(v) Kratkiy Kurs"', in Pashkov (ed) *Voprosy Sotsialisticheskoy Ekonomiki*, p. 25.

All of this was brought to an end in 1952. In December *Pravda* carried Suslov's vicious post-mortem attack on Voznesensky, where he condemned "the un-Marxist work of N. Voznesensky" which, full of "arbitrary opinions", had "fetishised the law of value as the regulator of the distribution of labour between individual branches of the Soviet economy". [1008] However, the full rebuttal of Voznesensky's opinions on the "transformed law of value" and "plan as law" had come earlier that year with Stalin's *Economic Problems*.

There, Stalin denounced those who believed it was possible to "abolish" certain laws or "form" and "create" new ones. Now the dictator stated that laws operated independently of man's will and could therefore not be "transformed". [1009]

Yet, Stalin reaffirmed that commodity-money exchange existed in the USSR, limited to the agricultural sector and to "items of personal consumption". The law of value, he added, operated "strictly limited" as a "regulator" in the circulation of these latter items and in the production of consumer goods given their nature of "commodities". Therefore, "*khozraschet* and profitableness, production costs, prices" retained their importance, although the law of value had no role in the sphere of means of production, since these were not commodities, but allocated goods. [1010]

Stalin also added that if in the USSR the law of value "regulate[d] the 'proportions' of labour distributed among the various branches of production", then the more profitable light industry should have been "developed to the utmost", at the detriment of heavy industry. The dictator also added that "the rational organisation of the productive forces, economic planning [were] not problems of political economy, but problems of the economic policy of the directing bodies".

[1008] *Pravda*, 24 December, 1952, p. 2.

[1009] Stalin, *Ekonomicheskiye Problemy Sotsializma*, pp. 3-5, 9-10.

[1010] Ibid.,, pp. 20-22.

Political economy instead “investigates the laws of development of men's relations of production”. [1011]

This represented a complete rebuttal of Voznesensky’s views on the plan as law, and therefore as object of political economy, as well as on the law of value as regulating the apportioning of labour among branches. Yet, for all Stalin’s fumbling, even at a closed meeting shortly before the publication of *Economic Problems*, all he could tell his top economists to justify the new truth was that “laws must be considered, controlled, and used […] we do not limit laws, the existence of objective conditions limits laws”. [1012]

The fact that an official condemnation of Voznesensky’s economic views only came three years after his demise further proves how supposed differences between him and Stalin, of which there is no actual trace, played no role in the Leningrad and Gosplan affairs. However, the aggressive way in which Stalin fought back against Voznesensky’s innovations and their implicit rationalising character seems to nevertheless suggest as earlier argued (pp. 127-128), that the dictator had indeed come to consider them a dangerous deviation.

A further element intimately connected with Voznesensky which did not survive him was the General Plan, sidelined as focus shifted towards the second post-war Five-Year Plan. It is also significant that not only the General Plan, but also the project to revise the Party Programme was abandoned, even though a final draft was ready by December 1947. New Party Programme and Statute were actually to constitute the main items on the agenda of the 19th Congress, which in January 1947 the Politburo had decided to convene in late 1947-early 1948. Zhdanov was assigned key organisational responsibilities and the August CC Plenum officially approved

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[1011] Ibid.,, pp. 22-24, 72-73.

[1012] RGASPI, f. 17, op. 133, d. 215, ll. 2-13, in E. Pollock, ‘Conversations with Stalin on Questions of Political Economy’, *CWIHP Working Paper*, 33 (2001), pp. 45-56.

the resolution. [1013] Zhdanov's death naturally played a key role in upsetting these plans, but Malenkov's return to the CC Secretariat in July might be seen as the structural reason why perhaps, even if Zhdanov was alive, he might not have convened the 19th Congress anyways.

Yet, when the Congress was eventually called by now stably second-in-command Malenkov, not Voznesensky's General Plan, nor the Zhdanov-Voznesensky-led revision of the Party Programme were revived. We can only speculate on whether they were abandoned because intimately linked to disgraced officials or because of the rationalising elements they contained.

It is however necessary to clearly state that, if already in 1956 Nove identified the downfall of Voznesensky as the end of a "relatively freer atmosphere", it would be mistaken to believe that his demise uniformly affected all he had done or expressed interest for. [1014]

The educational focus on professionalising elites and intelligentsia continued, [1015] alongside debates on economic levers. "Socialist profit", with its role as "important additional incentive to production" and "money", as a "measure of value and profit [which] provide a measure of the financial performance of an enterprise under *khozraschet*", were still discussed. [1016]

Debates on *khozraschet* also nominally continued, as planners spoke of its "further strengthening and development" and of "its closest combination with the development of socialist competition" — all "on the basis of the brilliant instructions of the great Stalin". [1017] As late as in

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[1013] Tikhonov, Gregory, 'Stalin's Last Plan', pp. 161-162.

[1014] Nove, 'Economists in the USSR', p. 63.

[1015] Duskin, *Stalinist reconstruction and the confirmation of a new elite, 1945-1953*, p. 83.

[1016] *O planirovanii pribyli v promyshlennosti* (Moscow, 1950), pp. 3-4, 7, 57, 71.

[1017] V.P. D'yachenko, 'Khozraschet kak Sotsialisticheskii Metod Khozyaistvovaniya', *Voprosy ekonomiki*, 2 (1951), p. 23 — N.S. Spiridonova, 'Nekotorye Voprosy Khozyaystvennogo Rascheta', in A.I. Pashkov (ed), *Voprosy sotsialisticheskoy ekonomiki*, p. 54.

1952, conferences on *khozraschet* were organised, where its “strengthening”, alongside that of “material stimulation of workers in the socialist enterprises” were discussed. [1018]

The balance method was also still debated. In late 1951 Kurskii defined it “a major element of socialist reproduction and economic planning”. Yet, he added that its “the practical significance” consisted “primarily in the fact that only on the basis of a comprehensive analysis of the balance relations between the branches of production the correct proportion in the national economy, corresponding to those economic and political objectives, set by the Party and Government for the planning period, can be set”. It was Party policy unavoidably dictating proportions, rather than proportions informing Party policy. [1019]

Nevertheless, notwithstanding the nominal survival of debates, as the Director of the Institute of Economics V.P. D'yachenko would say in 1955, arguably at this point “dogmatism and arbitrariness” as well as “quotationism” had fully taken over. [1020] As Nove harshly commented, “at no time, before or since, were Soviet publications more empty of real matter”. [1021]

A further explanation for the downfall of Voznesensky linked to economics was initially suggested by L.F. Ilicev, head of CC AgitProp, in 1961. [1022] Later picked up by Voznesensky’s biographer Kolotov, it essentially claimed that Stalin had become jealous of Voznesensky’s

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[1018] V.P. D’yachenko, (ed) *Vnutrizavodskiy khozraschet: Materialy. Nauch.-proizv. konferentsiya* (Moscow, 1952), pp. 93-95, 97, 253-254, 258-259.

[1019] A. Kurskii, ‘Voprosy Balansa Narodnogo Khozyaystva’, *Planovoe khozyaistvo*, 5 (1951), pp. 10-11.

[1020] V.P. D’yachenko, ‘O zadachakh nauchno-issledovatel'skoy rebot v oblasti ekonomiki’, *Voprosy ekonomiki*, 10 (1955), pp. 3-4.

[1021] Nove, *An Economic History of the USSR*, p. 294.

[1022] KPSS, *XXII s”yezd Kommunisticheskoy Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza. 17-31 oktyabrya 1961 goda. Stenograficheskiy otchet* (2 vols, Moscow, 1961), i, p. 184.

unanimously praised *War Economy*. [1023] Stalin's preoccupations with being credited as leading Marxist-Leninist theoretician are a proved factor, [1024] while Shepilov further argued that in the realm of political economy Stalin felt overshadowed by Voznesensky. [1025] The theory of Stalin's jealousy has been also quoted by several Western and Soviet scholars. [1026]

That Stalin developed jealousy for Voznesensky's book, praised to the utmost in the USSR and very popular on both sides of the Iron Curtain, appears quite possible. The book was openly celebrated as a major theoretical work by Soviet economic doyens like Ostrovityanov, who strongly recommended it for the "Stalin Prize" and as basic textbook for Party and economic cadres. [1027] Ostrovityanov himself even wrote articles where quotations from Voznesensky on issues like economic laws preceded not only Stalin's, but even Lenin's, [1028] while the text became a standard reference for analyses of the Soviet economy in all its aspects. [1029]

Translated versions of *War Economy* were strongly publicised abroad in both socialist and capitalist countries. In 1948, Yugoslav publishing house "Kultura" printed 20.000 copies of it, while French publishing house "Medisis" another 5.000. [1030] New editions of the book were being printed and sold well into 1949, even after Voznesensky's secretive removal. So for example, two German editions, one printed in the USSR and one in the soon to be German Democratic

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[1023] *Izvestiya*, 30 November 1963, p. 9 — *Pravda*, 1 December 1963, p. 4 — 'Vydayushchiysya organizator sotsialisticheskogo planirovaniya. K. 60-letiyu so dnya rozhdeniya N.A. Voznesenskogo', *Planovoe khozyaistvo*, 10 (1963), pp. 90-91 — V.V. Kolotov, G. Petrovichev, *N.A. Voznesensky. Biograficheskiy ocher*k (Moscow, 1963), pp. 38-39.

[1024] RGASPI, f. 84, op. 2, d. 40, ll. 2-11, in A.Yu. Vatlin et. al. (eds), *Kak lomali NEP*, iv, p. 562.

[1025] Shepilov, 'Vospominaniya', pp. 4, 15.

[1026] Medvedev, *Let History Judge*, p. 785 — Medvedev and Medvedev, *Khrushchev*, pp. 17-18 — Hahn, *Post-war Soviet Politics*, pp. 131-132 — Boterbloem, *The Life and Times of Andrei Zhdanov*, pp. 310-311.

[1027] ARAN, f. 1877, op. 1, d. 200, ll. 7-10 — Ostrvityanov, 'Voennaya ekonomika strany sotsializma', pp. 71-80.

[1028] Ostrovityanov, 'Sotsialisticheskoe Planirovaniye i Zakon Stoimosti', pp. 24-25.

[1029] Moskvin, 'Ot kartochnoy sisteme', pp. 41, 43, 53 — L.M. Gatovskiy, 'Planirovaniye Sotsialisticheskoye Gosudarstvo - istochnik razvitiya Sovetskoy Ekonomiki', *Planovoe khozyaistvo*, 2 (1948).

[1030] GARF, f. P5546, op. 53, d. 11, ll. 31, 37.

Republic, were released in 1949. [1031] An English edition published in Moscow had already appeared in 1948, [1032] but Voznesensky's book had also been published in an American version, translated by US experts. [1033] This was deemed to be an inadequate work of translation, [1034] and the *New York Times* argued that the second official Soviet translation published in 1949 aimed at correcting the inaccuracies present in the American one. [1035]

Western analysts were quick in picking up on the book's theoretical significance, perhaps also due to the fact that since 1943 Voznesensky had been described in the West as "most brilliant" and, in essence, as the top Soviet authority in economics. [1036] *War Economy* was therefore defined, even after Voznesensky's dismissal, "sensational", [1037] "in essence […] the official Soviet economic history of the past war", [1038] "the most informative single volume issued by the Soviet Government on this subject", [1039] a "treatise [that] will probably remain for some time the leading official textbook on the political economy of the Soviet system" and even "far and away

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[1031] N.A. Voznesensky, *Die Kriegswirtschaft der UdSSR während des Vaterländischen Krieges* (Moscow, 1949) — N.A. Voznesensky, *Die Kriegswirtschaft der Sowjetunion während des vaterländischen Krieges* (Berlin, 1949).

[1032] N.A. Voznesensky, *War Economy of the U.S.S.R. in the period of the Patriotic War* (Moscow, 1948).

[1033] N.A. Voznesensky, *Economy of the USSR during World War II. Issued in cooperation with the Russian Translation Program of the American Council of Learned Societies* (Washington, 1948).

[1034] J. Miller, "Voyennaya Ekonomika S.S.S.R. v Period Otechestvennoi Voini (The WarEconomy of the U.S.S.R. in the Period of the Patriotic War by N. Voznesensky", *Soviet Studies*, 1/ 1 (1949), p. 65.

[1035] *New York Times*, 27 March 1949, p. 16 — N.A. Voznesensky, *Soviet economy during the Second World War* (New York, 1949).

[1036] 'Red Leaders', *Life, Special Issue USSR*, 29 March 1943, p. 41— New York Times, 02 Feb 1947 — New York Times, 04 Apr 1948.

[1037] *New York Times*, 27 March, 1949, p. 16.

[1038] H. Schwartz, "The Economy of the USSR during World War II by Nikolai A. Voznesensky", *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 263 (1949), p. 215.

[1039] S. Ratner, "Review: The Economic History of the Second World War. British War Economy by W. K. Hancock and M. M. Gowing; Problemsof Social Policy by Richard M. Titmuss", *The Journal of Economic History*, 12/3 (1952), p. 266.

[…] the most important statement of policy that has come out of the Kremlin since the last Communist Party Congress held in Moscow in March 1939". [1040]

War Economy even created two controversies on the American press — one related to its bellicose tone towards the West and its understatement of "Lend-Lease" significance, [1041] the other concerning Voznesensky's perceived admission that the Soviet economy was subject to crises similar to those characteristic of capitalism. [1042] Both triggered a vitriolic response from Leont'yev, who wrote to the *New York Times* and staunchly defended Voznesensky's book. [1043]

As of June 1952, Voznesensky's *War Economy* was even listed as "official statement of the Russian war effort, both plans and execution, and the program for Soviet post-war economy" in the reading list assigned to students at the US Army Engineer School. [1044]

Western observers also did not miss the significance of Voznesensky's reflections on the law of value, [1045] while several data included in his volume served as basic source for pioneering analyses of the Soviet economy in the post-war period. [1046]

In the aftermath of Voznesensky's disgrace, precisely having praised his *War Economy* became a serious mistake which cost several Soviet officials reprimand and dismissal. If Ostrovityanov

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[1040] C. Prince, "Voyennaya Ekonomika SSSR... Otechestvennoi Voiny ["The War Economy of the USSR in thePeriod of the Patriotic War"] by N. Voznesensky", *The American Political Science Review*, 42/4 (1948), pp. 794, 796.

[1041] *New York Times*, 23 September 1948, p. 11 — *New York Times*, 24 September 1948, p. 13.

[1042] *New York Times*, 25 September 1948.

[1043] *New York Times*, 20 December 1948.

[1044] Letter to Colonel Henning Linden from (Sanitized) (p. 24) — CIA Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80r01731r003100070014-0 (27 November 2016).

[1045] Miller, 'Voyennaya Ekonomika S.S.S.R', p. 68 — Prince, 'Voyennaya Ekonomika SSSR', p. 797.

[1046] A. Bergson, J.H. Blackman, A. Erlich, 'Post-war Economic Reconstruction and Development in the U.S.S.R.', *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 263 (1949).

was severely criticised, Fedoseyev, chief editor of *Bolshevik*, which had published celebratory reviews of the book, was fired in July 1949. [1047] A celebratory session for Stalin's *Economic Problems* held at the Academy of Sciences in January 1953 contained almost more criticism of Voznesensky's work than celebration of Stalin's. Directed by repented Ostrovityanov, and with the participation of V.S. Nemchinov, Varga and D'yachenko, [1048] the three days seminar witnessed scores of Soviet economists vituperating Voznesensky's work and openly criticising those who had praised it, including L.M. Gatovskiy, Leont'yev and Kurski. [1049]

Shepilov reported a curious episode which took place in 1949, when Stalin seemed to have forgotten Voznesensky's name, but not his book. While contemplating awarding the Stalin Prize to P.I. Lyashenko for his *History of the National Economy*, Shepilov recounted how Stalin said "I agree his book is much richer, more interesting than that book of… what's his... (Stalin repeatedly clicked thumb and middle finger, then shouted: "of Voznesensky") Yes, yes, of Voznesensky…". [1050]

Finally, a further argument concerning Voznesensky's demise related to economics has been recently proposed by Gorlitski and Khlevnyuk, who argued that Voznesensky's doom was spelled by the pressure Stalin put on Gosplan after reconstruction was achieved in 1948. In their opinion it was the failure at levelling out the downturn of 1949's first quarter which forever broke the *vozhd*'s confidence in Voznesensky, whose function was that of "chief truth tellers" in the realm of economics. [1051]

[1047] RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 1077, ll. 36-37, in Khlevnyuk, *Politburo i Sovet Ministrov*, pp. 291-292.

[1048] 'Nauchnaya Sessiya, Posvyashchennaya Proizvedeniyu I.V. Stalina "Ekonomicheskie Problemi Sozializma v SSR"', pp. 83-84, 89, 94.

[1049] Ibid., pp. 81, 87.

[1050] Shepilov, 'Vospominaniya', p. 15.

[1051] Gorlizki, Khlevnyuk, *Cold Peace*, pp. 69, 82-83.

This argument surely has much merit and Stalin's reaction to the perception he had been fooled could not have been mild. Yet, this was not the first time Voznesensky's function as "truth-teller" had received a serious blow. Already in February 1942, he had been unmasked as having doctored plans so they would give the graphic perception of growth, hiding actual slowdown (p. 101). Voznesensky's word had also been doubted again in the post-war period, when on 15 November 1946, Minister for Ferrous Metallurgy I. Tevosyan accused him of having misinformed the SovMin Bureau about the industrial plan for the 3rd quarter. Voznesensky answered that he had discussed with Tevosyan their differing opinions twice for four hours, while Tevosyan retorted they never had any discussion. [1052]

Stalin's reaction in 1942 was to fire Voznesensky as plenipotentiary of the ammunitions industry, but after further demotions, Voznesensky had resurged even more prominently. The incredibly harsher treatment he suffered in 1949 may be explained by the offensive on multiple fronts Malenkov and Beria had mounted against Voznesensky. As Khrushchev told Malenkov in 1957, "stuff kept swirling round and round against [Voznesensky]", [1053] with Malenkov and Beria perhaps not even expecting Stalin would decide not to demote, but liquidate his head planner. [1054] This, combined with the unanimously recognised deterioration of Stalin's pathologies in the mid-late 1940s, probably spelled Voznesensky's doom. [1055]

[1052] GARF, f. P5546, op. 53, d. 10, ll. 41-42.

[1053] APRF, f. 3, op. 76, d. 24, in Yu. Sigachev, A. Stepanov (ed), *Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich. 1957. ZK KPSS i drugie dokumenti* (Moscow, 1998), pp. 490-491.

[1054] Khlevnyuk, *Stalin. New Biography of a Dictator*, p. 282.

[1055] Mikoyan spoke of senility and suspiciousness, Molotov stated Stalin "suffered from a persecution mania", while Shepilov affirmed that in the post-war period the vozhd's "long-standing suspiciousness acquired an ultra-pathologic form" — Mikoyan, *Tak Bylo*, p. 513-521 — Chuev, Molotov, Resis, *Molotov remembers*, p. 324 — Shepilov, 'Vospominaniya', p. 15

3.8. — The early 1950s

The Development and Reconstruction Plan came to an end orphan of the man who had so enthusiastically launched it in 1946. During the five years it covered, investment in fixed capital grew by more than 21% a year, reaching by 1950 +70% in respect to 1940. [1056] Yet, workforce growth and not capital formation contributed the most to recovery, while investment completion, under reduced investment mobilisation, was hardly improving and input productivity was still well below the pre-war trend. [1057] Armaments production contributed little to recovery, as it increased at half of the average industrial growth. Nevertheless, planned industrial targets for producer goods were generally over-fulfilled, while the contrary was true for agriculture and most consumer goods. And yet, the production of tractors had by 1950 gone more than 100% above plan, while the quotas planned for consumer durables were over-fulfilled by 250%. [1058] Moreover, as rearmament picked up pace with the outbreak of the Korean War, the leadership decided to sacrifice investment and not consumption to meet its requirements. [1059]

In all, Soviet recovery had been fast, but far less impressive that that of countries like the Netherlands and France. The war had projected their growth levels back in time of over fifty years, far more than the USSR's ten years, and yet both Netherlands and France recovered by the late 1940s too. [1060] Moreover, post-war Soviet economic reconstruction was concomitant to a "prolonged industrial boom", [1061] which allowed for recovery from pre-war losses, [1062] aided by "a

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[1056] Davies, *Soviet Economic Development from Lenin to Khrushchev*, pp. 65-66.

[1057] Harrison, 'Macroeconomic Efficiency of Capital Formation in Soviet Industry under Late Stalinism', p. d275.

[1058] Davies, *Soviet Economic Development from Lenin to Khrushchev*, p. 66.

[1059] Harrison, 'Soviet Industrial Expansion Under Late Stalinism', pp. 371-372.

[1060] Harrison, 'The Soviet Union after 1945', p. 105.

[1061] Harrison, 'Soviet Industrial Expansion Under Late Stalinism', p. 361.

[1062] M. Harrison, 'Trends in Soviet labour productivity, 1928-85. War, post-war recovery, and slowdown', *European Review of Economic History,* 2/2 (1998), p. 195.

large backlog of unexploited economic potential", [1063] as well as by the Soviet system's mobilisation capacities. [1064]

In broader terms, the completion of the post-war Plan coincided with the successful reassertion of Soviet power and Stalinist dictatorship. No return to indiscriminate terror had proved necessary and the persisting degree of chaos, indiscipline and self-interest were regarded as manageable with the tested mix of repressive, mobilisation and educational-technocratic measures. [1065]

On the institutional front, on 7 April 1950 the SovMin Bureau, which had been renamed Presidium on 30 July 1949, [1066] was itself given a Bureau, where Stalin grouped his top lieutenants, who met weekly without him in what became the "executive ruling committee of the country". [1067]

However, from 1952 on Stalin launched a campaign that reversed the balance between SovMin and Party. As low morale and apathy had spread not only amongst workers and collective farmers, but also Party members, Stalin opted for an "anti-oligarchic strategy", targeting both leaders as well as low and middle officials throughout the Party-State and economic apparatuses. [1068]

[1063] Harrison, 'The Soviet Union after 1945', pp. 103-104.

[1064] Harrison, 'Post-war Russian Economic Growth. Not a Riddle', p. 1327.

[1065] Morcom, 'Enforcing Stalinist Discipline in the Early Years of Post-war Reconstruction in the USSR', pp. 342.343.

[1066] Gorlizki, Khlevnyuk, *Stalin and his circle*, p. 263.

[1067] Gorlizki, 'Ordinary Stalinism', pp. 727-729.

[1068] Gorlizki, 'Party Revivalism and the Death of Stalin', pp. 15-23 — Gorlizki, 'Stalin's Cabinet', pp. 301-302 — Gorlizki, 'Ordinary Stalinism', pp. 732-736.

This strategy culminated in the 19th Congress, convened in October 1952. [1069] Politburo and Orgburo were unified in a Presidium, which was given commissions and a Bureau where Stalin regrouped senior leaders, with the exception of disgraced Molotov and Mikoyan. [1070] The CC was also given a General Department, which for many years was assumed to have been established only after Stalin's death, and an Industrial-Transport Department. [1071] More frequent meetings of Party rank-and-file bodies were also demanded, alongside careful reporting and "protest votes" against officials.

The core Congress report was delivered by Malenkov and was a key part of Stalin's anti-oligarchic strategy, openly exposing shortcomings in the economy, in the Party and in both Soviets and Government. Burlatsky claimed that amongst delegates "bewilderment was mingled with dismay, dismay with fright and fright with indignation". [1072]

Malenkov's report however contained reference to"peaceful coexistence", itself not a novelty, given it had initially been used by Trotsky and later developed by G.V. Chicherin under NEP conditions. [1073] While speaking of the international situation, Malenkov said:

> we are sure that in the peaceful competition with capitalism, the socialist economic system will every year more and more clearly demonstrate its superiority over the capitalist economic system. But we are not going to impose our ideology or our economic system on anyone. "Exporting the revolution is nonsense. Each country, if it wants, will

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[1069] Tikhonov, Gregory, 'Stalin's Last Plan', pp. 161-162.

[1070] Gorlizki, 'Stalin's Cabinet', pp. 264, 300-301 — Gorlizki, 'Ordinary Stalinism', pp. 732-736.

[1071] Gorlizki, 'Party Revivalism and the Death of Stalin', p. 15.

[1072] F. Burlatsky (trans by Daphne Skillen), *Khrushchev and the First Russian Spring* (London, 1991), p. 14.

[1073] F. Griffiths, 'Origins of Peaceful Coexistence. A Historical Note', *Survey*, 50 (1964), pp. 194-201.

make its own revolution, and if it does not want, there will not be a revolution", says Comrade Stalin. [1074]

Stalin had already affirmed in April that "peaceful coexistence between capitalism and communism is entirely possible if there is a mutual desire to cooperate, readiness to fulfil obligations agreed upon, while observing the principle of equality and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states". [1075]

This statement was Stalin's answer to Western journalists who had the rare opportunity to submit him questions the day before the International Economic Conference opened in Moscow. The Conference in itself was a practical and concrete attempt at "peaceful coexistence". The event, which brought to Moscow "four hundred seventy-one industrialists, traders, economists, trade unionists and cooperators from forty-nine countries", was characterised by "businesslike character". Indeed, as O. Lange stated "the initiators of the Conference have acted in the belief that differences in economic and social systems do not constitute an obstacle to peaceful and mutually advantageous exchange of goods and services and to economic cooperation to the benefit of all". [1076]

Celebrated by the Soviet press, [1077] initially shrugged off by the Western one, [1078] the conference went on actually achieving substantial results: Britain alone signed deals "roughly estimated at

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[1074] G.M. Malenkov, *Otchetnyy doklad XIX S"yezdu Partii" o rabote Tsentral'nogo Komiteta VKP(v). 5 oktyabrya 1952 g.* (Moscow, 1952), p. 32.

[1075] *Pravda*, 2 April 1952, p. 1.

[1076] Committee for the Promotion of International Trade, *International Economic Conference in Moscow: April 3-12, 1952* (Moscow, 1952), pp. 9-10, 24.

[1077] *Pravda*, 3 April 1952, p 3.

[1078] *New York Times,* 3 April 1952, p. 11.

200 mln dollars" with USSR, China, East Germany and Romania, as its Treasury spokesman cheerfully commented that "nothing could please us more". [1079]

The 19th Congress is of great relevance in relation to post-Stalinism, since several decisions there adopted and its overarching themes would resonate powerfully during the Malenkov and Khrushchev eras. The concept of "peaceful coexistence" was solidified by Khrushchev in 1955-1956, not invented, while his very position within the Party and subsequent strategy for its further empowerment fell in line with the "anti-oligarchic" and revivalist trends of 1952. Moreover, also the reorganisation at the CC would follow the strategy adopted at the 19th Congress, while the seeds of the 1953-1955 Malenkov-Khrushchev duumvirate were planted with the division of labour between the two established during Stalin's last years. [1080]

[1079] *The Manchester Guardian*, 8 April 1952, p. 7 — *New York Times*, 12 April 1952, p. 3 — *New York Times*, 13 April 1952, p. 13.

[1080] Gorlizki, 'Party Revivalism and the Death of Stalin', pp. 15-18.

Chapter 4. — The Soviet economy and economic reforms under Malenkov and Khrushchev

The fourth chapter opens with Stalin's death and reaches up to mid-1965. It discusses post-Stalinist reforms, specifically focusing on the similarities between economic policy and debates in the 1950s-early 1960s and those presented in chapter 3. The present chapter includes chronological subsections on the Beria interlude and Malenkov period, Khrushchev's de-Stalinisation and regionalisation as well as thematic ones on specific reform policies and debates and on the failure of Khrushchev's reforms. The chapter also describes the political rehabilitation of Voznesensky.

4.1. — Stalin's death, Beria interlude and Malenkov

On 1 March 1953, after prologued health deterioration, Stalin was found semi-unconscious lying on the floor of his Kuntsevo dacha. [1081] He died four days later, after *Pravda* had made the Soviet public aware of the *vozhd*'s condition in a not particularly reassuring way. [1082] Rumours that Stalin had been assassinated, hinted by Molotov in his memoirs, [1083] remain a topic of debate to the present day, [1084] but are refuted by the vast majority of historians. [1085]

[1081] Montefiore, *Stalin. The Court of the Red Tsar*, pp. 652-658.

[1082] *Pravda*, 4 March 1953, p. 1.

[1083] Chuev, Molotov, Resis, *Molotov remembers*, pp. 236-237.

[1084] M. Faria. 'Stalin's mysterious death', *Surgical Neurology International*, 1/161 (2011).

[1085] Khlevnyuk, 'Stalin as dictator', pp. 116-117.

Yet, procedures had been put in place to deal with the passing of the *vozhd*. Malenkov's speech as new SovMin Chairman was closely followed and defined by the CIA as "non-belligerent", [1086] as it reaffirmed "the policy of international cooperation" and the "possibility of long-term coexistence and peaceful competition between the two different systems". [1087]

Administrative changes followed suit, as between 5-10 March forty ministries were amalgamated into fourteen, [1088] while, within a month, the Doctors' Plot was officially called off, [1089] the USSR renounced to its territorial claims in relation to Turkey and Moscow contributed to ending the war in Korea.

On the eve of Stalin's death, the economic system was still structured on Ministries and central planning bodies, raining down on subordinate units compulsory plan targets, [1090] while centralised resource allocation and administrative methods were deployed by the leadership to pursue its political priorities. [1091]

Structural problems affecting the Soviet economy dated back to the 1930s - little actual forward planning, continuous plan-amendment, [1092] ineffective supply, [1093] coordination problems, [1094]

[1086] Report - Death of Stalin, 16 July 1953 (p. 13) — CIA Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/5077054e993247d4d82b6ad9 (27 November 2016).

[1087] *Pravda*, 10 March 1953, p. 1.

[1088] N. Kibita, *Soviet Economic Management Under Khrushchev. The Sovnarkhoz reform* (London, 2013), p. 11.

[1089] *Pravda*, 4 April 1953, p. 1.

[1090] Nove, *Political Economy and Soviet Socialism*, p. 155.

[1091] Ibid. — Ellmann, *Economic Reform in the Soviet Union* (London, 1969), p. 284, 320-325.

[1092] Ellmann, *Economic Reform in the Soviet Union*, pp. 285-286, 324-327.

[1093] Nove, *Political Economy and Soviet Socialism*, p. 155.

[1094] Sutela, *Economic Thought and Economic Reform in the Soviet Union*, p. 52 — Nove, *Political Economy and Soviet Socialism*, p. 155.

distortions caused by gross output plan indicator, [1095] amplified by too much and too little detailed information on economic processes. [1096] So did the wide range of semi-legal and illegal practices enterprises engaged in to secure materials and workforce as well as the downplaying of productive capacity, resistance to innovation, "storming" and hoarding practices. [1097] Therefore, for example, if chandeliers' production targets were set in tons, enterprises would manufacture unnecessarily heavy ones, since, provided planned gross output targets were met, quality standards, production efficiency and rational utilisation of materials were largely neglected. [1098]

Moreover, capital stock taken over from Imperial Russia needed replacing and opportunities for technology imports from the West had significantly narrowed, [1099] while, as the economy was modernising and expanding, resource claimants multiplied. [1100] The Soviet economy was "growing bigger but not better". [1101]

In mid-1953, as it had been in late 1945, the leadership's priority became to maintain stability and assert its power without recurring to mass violence. [1102] "Soft Stalinism" resurged, [1103] but a

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[1095] G. Grossman, 'Economic Reforms. A Balance Sheet', *Problems of Communism*, 15/ 6 (1966), p. 44.

[1096] Nove, *Political Economy and Soviet Socialism*, p. 155 — Grossman, 'Economic Reforms. A Balance Sheet', p. 44.

[1097] Ellmann, *Economic Reform in the Soviet Union*, pp. 285-286, 324-327.

[1098] Sutela, *Economic Thought and Economic Reform in the Soviet Union*, pp. 50-52.

[1099] J.P. Hardt, D.M. Gallik, V.G. Treml, 'Institutional Stagnation and Changing Economic Strategy in the Soviet Union', in (ed.) *New Directions in the Soviet Economy, Studies Prepared for the Subcommittee on Foreign Economic Policy of the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, Part I, Economic Policy* (Washington, 1966), pp. 21-22.

[1100] Hardt, Gallik, Treml, 'Institutional Stagnation and Changing Economic Strategy in the Soviet Union', pp. 21, 38..

[1101] *Current Economic Indicators for the USSR. Materials Prepared for the Joint Economic Committee. Congress of the United States* (Washington, 1965), p. 7.

[1102] A. Knight, *Beria. Stalin's First Lieutenant* (Princeton, 1993), pp. 184-185.

[1103] Khlevnyuk, *In Stalin's shadow*, pp. 175-176.

showdown between top leaders, as Khrushchev took over Malenkov's interim Party first secretaryship on 14 March, was scarcely avoidable. [1104]

To the surprise of many, in the aftermath of Stalin's death, Beria emerged as more of a radical reformer than both Malenkov and Khrushchev, having supposedly sponsored the 28 March amnesty and pushed for peace in Korea. [1105] Beria did reabsorb the MGB into his MVD, but also handed over most responsibilities related to the Gulags to the Ministry of Justice, openly asking in the Presidium to curtail the powers of police tribunals. [1106]

The content of what could have become Beria's "new course", discounting the seemingly rather imaginary account of his son, [1107] was revealed by the charges moved against him. The MVD head supposedly wanted to halt several expensive construction projects, further collectivisation measures and pressure on non-Russian nationalities. He also seems to have supported German reunification and rapprochement with Yugoslavia. [1108]

Beria's arrest was made public at the July 1953 CC Plenum, where Georgian Presidium member V. Bakradze called him an "adventurer of international scale, a notorious troublemakers and intriguer, a unscrupulous careerist and, definitely, a hardened spy". [1109] Yet, many of Beria's ideas, condemned in July 1953, soon became policy under Malenkov and Khrushchev.

[1104] J. Richter, 'Re-Examining Soviet Policy towards Germany in 1953', *Europe-Asia Studies*, 45/4 (1993), pp. 672-674.

[1105] R. Service, 'De-Stalinisation in the USSR before Khrushchev's secret speech', in F. Gori (ed), *Il XX Congresso del PCUS* (Milano, 1988), pp. 296-297.

[1106] Knight, *Beria. Stalin's First Lieutenant*, pp. 184-185.

[1107] Beria, Beria, *My father*, pp. 186, 194-196, 19, 204-206, 215-216, 262-264.

[1108] 'Delo Beriya. Plenum Tsk KPSS, 2-7- iyulya 1953 g. Stenograficheskiy otchet (nachalo)', in *Izvestiya TsK KPSS*, 1 (1991), pp. 143, 200-206 — Service, 'De-Stalinisation in the USSR before Khrushchev's secret speech', p. 299 — Richter, 'Re-Examining Soviet Policy towards Germany in 1953', pp. 680-681.

[1109] 'Delo Beriya', p. 183.

Shortly after the Plenum, Italian communist P. Secchia even openly asked Soviet leaders why they had accused Beria of leniency towards Yugoslavia, as they themselves were taking that road. He was rather disingenuously told that the USSR "did not wish to re-examine its political relations with Tito", but that since it had diplomatic relations with Tito's "masters (the Americans) […] why shouldn't we have then with him?". [1110] Already in June 1954 Khrushchev would initiate a correspondence with Tito openly aimed at re-establishing political contacts, [1111] triumphantly flying to Belgrade eleven months later. [1112]

Beria was even accused of attempting to forbid the use of Stalin's portraits at the 9 May victory celebrations and within three years, Khrushchev would have become the grave-digger of the Stalin myth. [1113] Much sooner than that, Khrushchev might even have used materials actually drafted by Beria himself for a Presidium memorandum on Latvia which he proposed before Beria's fall. [1114]

Yet, Malenkov and Khrushchev understood too that the economic and political situation in the country had deteriorated enough to require reform. [1115] Therefore, at the July Plenum, alongside ritualistic vows of allegiance to Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism, [1116] frank admissions were also made: "whole industries are backward" and "several kolkhozes of entire rural regions lay abandoned", while "agricultural output and the production of livestock are weak". "Deficiencies

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[1110] G. Seniga, *Togliatti e Stalin* (Milano, 1961), p. 62.

[1111] 'Letter from Nikita S. Khrushchev, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, to Josip Broz Tito and the Central Committee of the League of Communists Of Yugoslavia, 22 June 1954', in C.F. Ostermann, et. al. (ed), *Cold War International History Project. Bulletin*, 12/13 (2001), p. 319.

[1112] *Pravda*, 30 May 1955, p. 3.

[1113] 'Delo Beriya', p. 185.

[1114] E.Iu. Zubkova, 'The Rivalry with Malenkov, in W. Taubman, S. Khrushchev, A Gleason (eds), *Nikita Khrushchev* (New Haven, 2000), p. 73.

[1115] R. Service, 'The Road to the Twentieth Party Congress', *Soviet Studies*, 33/2 (1981), p. 239.

[1116] 'Delo Beriya', pp. 139-214.

[…] in the activity of our Party" were also denounced, as well as a "deviation in the Marxist-Leninist conception of the individual's role in history". [1117] Meanwhile, as Khrushchev was solidifying his grip on the Party, processes were set in motion to strengthen the authority of Union-Republic and local organs. [1118]

Soon after, on 9 August 1953, Malenkov announced his "New Course": [1119] marked focus on consumer goods, housing and services, cuts in foodstuff and consumer goods retail prices and to agricultural taxes, increases in wages and agricultural procurement prices. [1120] Such policies were in line with Malenkov's rationalising mindset, [1121] representing a clear return to what Khlevnyuk called "soft Stalinism". [1122] Indeed, by 1954 Western scholars defined the "New Course" as a "return to the policy of Stalin during the middle 1930's", [1123] already at that time defined a "softer" variation of traditional Stalinism. [1124]

In the meantime, Party leaders were assigned key Ministries, Gosplan absorbed Gossnab, and state security was split from the MVD and reorganised into a SovMin committee, the KGB. [1125] The Malenkov-Khrushchev "duumvirate" was also settled when at the September 1953 CC

[1117] Seniga, *Togliatti e Stalin*, pp. 56-59.

[1118] Kibita, *Soviet Economic Management Under Khrushchev*, p. 11.

[1119] *Pravda*, 9 August 1953, pp. 1-4.

[1120] Davis, '*Russia. A Comparative Economic Systems Interpretation*'.

[1121] Hahn, *Post-war Soviet Politics*, p. 10.

[1122] Khlevnyuk, *In Stalin's shadow*, pp. 175-176.

[1123] Volin, 'The Malenkov-Khrushchev New Economic Policy', p. 204.

[1124] *Soviet Bloc Economic Activities in the Free World. Mutual Defence Assistance Control Act of 1951. Sixth Report to Congress. Second half of 1954* (Washington, 1954), pp. 37-38.

[1125] Nove, *An Economic History of the USSR*, pp. 331-333.

Plenum the second officially became First Secretary. [1126] Khrushchev soon started to focus on agriculture, launching the Virgin Lands extensification campaign. [1127]

The year 1954 witnessed the showdown between Khrushchev and Malenkov. As the Virgin Land's harvest increased of a staggering 10.1 mln tons, [1128] the gap between purchasing power and available goods as well as between State and *kolkhoz* market prices widened, causing shortages and straining the trade system. [1129]

As of 1955, planned targets for the consumer goods industry were not met, with the exception of that for motorcycles, while heavy industry outperformed it targets. The harvest had suffered from a draught in the Virgin Lands, but had only fallen back to 1953 standards. [1130]

On 25 January 1955, *Pravda*'s editor D. Shepilov called Malenkov's policies "a crude distortion of Marxist-Leninist economic theory". [1131] At a CC Plenum held the day after, Khrushchev defended the "all-round development of heavy industry", while without naming Malenkov he defined his policies a Right Deviation. [1132]

Yet, just as defining trends of the post-1953 period were set under Stalinism, similarly what Davis called "step-by-step" decentralisation, started already under Malenkov as the number of planned indicators was reduced and Ministries devolved some authority to their departments and

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[1126] U. Ra'anan, *Flawed Succession. Russia's Power Transfer Crises* (Lenham, 2006), pp. 57-58.

[1127] D. Granick, 'Economic Aspects of the Soviet "New Course"', *World Politics*, 8/3 (1956), p. 345.

[1128] Nove, *An Economic History of the USSR*, p. 343.

[1129] Nove, *An Economic History of the USSR*, pp. 332-335. — N. Jasny, 'The New Economic Course in the USSR', *Problems of Communism*, 3/1 (1954), pp. 1-7.

[1130] Nove, *An Economic History of the USSR*, p. 343.

[1131] *Pravda*, 24 January 1955, p. 2.

[1132] *Pravda*, 3 February 1955, p. 1.

individual enterprises. [1133] Even the transfer of enterprises under Union-Republic control started already in 1954 and as of 1955 involved 11.000 such enterprises, bringing their share from 1950s' 33% to 47%. [1134]

4.2. — Economic debates and reforms under Khrushchev, 1955-1960

Upon Malenkov's removal, many Western scholars feared a "victory of the old Stalinist approach" of "concentrating upon heavy industry" and, on the basis of its "absolute supremacy", a "branding [of] all dissent as 'Right Opposition deviation'". [1135]

Yet, already in April-July 1955, an All-Union Conference of Industrial Workers was held and, at a concluding CC Plenum, Bulganin detailed a whole array of shortcomings. These included aversion to technological progress, Ministerial autarky, coordination problems at all levels, insufficient production in key sectors as well as unacceptably low levels of specialisation and automation. [1136]

Concomitantly, Union-Republics were requested to send proposals for the enhancement of their decision-making powers. [1137] A central commissions set up to evaluate such proposals therefore

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[1133] Davies, *Soviet Economic Development from Lenin to Khrushchev*, p. 78.

[1134] Kibita, *Soviet Economic Management Under Khrushchev*, p. 36.

[1135] Volin,, 'Khrushchev's Economic Neo-Stalinism', pp. 445-449 — *Soviet Bloc Economic Activities in the Free World*, pp. 37-38.

[1136] J.M., 'The Industrial Conference', *Soviet Studies*, 7/2 (1955), pp. 202-203. — R.W. Davies, 'The Reappraisal of Industry', *Soviet Studies*, 7/3 (1956), p. 309.

[1137] Kibita, *Soviet Economic Management Under Khrushchev*, pp. 15-16.

started discussing ways to increase enterprise's authority over supply, investment and labour distribution and to enhance the effectiveness of plan indicators and of the bonus system. [1138] Gosplan was therefore instructed to draft only gross output targets, while Union-Republics were assigned broader authority over goods distribution, construction and housing. Yet, central Ministries retained control over credit, supply and prices as well as oversight of Union-Republic ones. [1139]

These early steps of Khrushchev signalled an attempt at linking up reliance on economic levers and on the kind of reforming economics that had been developing since the 1940s, with a radically new set of measures. The new First Secretary was becoming more and more convinced that the mother of all evils was Ministerial centralism and would have moved in against one of the pillars of the Soviet economic system with unprecedented force.

In the meantime, the mid 1950s also witnessed a rebirth of economic debates that bore clear similarities with late 1940s ones. At that point V.P. D'yachenko, Director of the Academy's Institute of Economics, openly denounced the "dogmatism and arbitrariness [which] showed themselves quite openly in quotationism" and which had replaced "independent and in depth economic research". [1140] An immediate effect of this new atmosphere was the rehabilitation of cybernetics. [1141]

Liberman became an active participant to mid 1950s debates and his articles clearly displayed persisting interest for the themes developed in late 1940s ones under Voznesensky.

[1138] Davies, 'The Reappraisal of Industry', pp. 318-120.

[1139] Kibita, *Soviet Economic Management Under Khrushchev*, p. 19.

[1140] D'yachenko, 'O zadachakh nauchno-issledovatel'skoy', pp. 3-4.

[1141] S. Gerovitch, *From Newspeak to Cyberspeak: A History of Soviet Cybernetics* (Cambridge, 2004), pp. 4-5 — B. Peters, 'Normalizing Soviet Cybernetics', *Information & Culture*, 47/2 (2012), p. 146.

In August 1955 he stressed the link between *khozraschet*, commodity-money relations and the law of value. Precisely said law was for him a key tool in "checking that the output of each enterprise corresponds to the needs of society in relation to quantity, quality and assortment, and that the goods are released on time". In essence, argued Liberman, "*khozraschet* must serve as a means for finding the best ways of fulfilling centralised directives", combining both "broader initiative" for the enterprises and "strict control" from the centre. [1142]

Liberman further suggested setting "stable […] long-term" profitability norms "for a similar group of enterprises" and using them as criterion for bonus size, upon plan fulfilment". He echoed his 1940s criticism of bonuses' irregularity, revocability as well as failure in incentivising technological progress and efficiency, arguing they ought to "reflect a combination of the personal and public interests" and be assigned at least also on the basis on production costs reduction. [1143]

As debates reminiscent of the late 1940s were flourishing again, other elements proper of those years were revived. Khrushchev adopted the "anti-oligarchic" strategy of the 1952 19th Congress and even openly credited Stalin for the "democratisation of the Party" in front of a group of Italian communists. [1144] Khrushchev also furthering organisational changes initiated in 1948-1952, [1145] intensified attacks against "ministerialism", [1146] and carefully assigned to his allies crucial Party posts. [1147]

[1142] E.G. Liberman, 'Khozyaystvenny raschet i material'noye pooshchreniye rabotnikov promyshlennosti', *Voprosy ekonomiki*, 6 (1955), pp. 36-37.

[1143] Ibid., pp. 6-7, 10, 12-13.

[1144] N.S. Khrushchev, '"U Stalina byli momenty prosvetleniya"'. Zapis' besedy s delegatsiyey Ital'yanskoy kompartii', *Istochnik*, 2 (1994), p. 89.

[1145] Gorlizki, 'Party Revivalism and the Death of Stalin', pp. 15-23.

[1146] D. Filtzer, *The Khrushchev Era. De-Stalinisation and the Limits of Reform in the USSR, 1953-1964* (Basingstoke, 1993), p. 77.

[1147] Gorlizki, 'Party Revivalism and the Death of Stalin', p. 22.

At the 20th Congress in 1956, Khrushchev revived a further key element of the 19th Congress, by openly stating “either peaceful coexistence or the most destructive war in history”, [1148] whilst simultaneously launching a scorching condemnation of Stalin’s “cult of personality”. [1149] What the Western press dubbed “de-Stalinisation”, [1150] witnessed acts of iconoclasm, [1151] fierce popular opposition to Khrushchev in Georgia, [1152] and open revolt in Hungary and Poland. [1153] Therefore, between July and December 1956, de-Stalinisation was checked, as now the leadership's priority became staunchly defending the political and economic foundations of the Soviet system. [1154]

By late 1956, more and more coordinated and internally consistent reform plans were being proposed, as Liberman openly argued that “the potential of our socialist economy is far from being fully utilised”. [1155]

To emphasise the current shortcomings, Liberman suggested his famous “ladder” metaphor. With it, he demonstrated that if enterprises knew in advance how many steps they ought to go

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[1148] KPSS, *XX s"yezd Kommunisticheskoy Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza. 14-25 fevral' 1956 goda. Stenograficheskiy otchet* (2 vols, Moscow, 1956), i, p. 36.

[1149] ‘O Kul'te Lichnosti’, pp. 128-170.

[1150] P. Jones, ‘Introduction. The dilemmas of de-Stalinization’, in P. Jones (ed), *The Dilemmas of De-Stalinization. Negotiating cultural and social change in the Khrushchev era* (London, New York, 2006), p. 2.

[1151] P. Jones, ‘From the Secret Speech to the burial of Stalin Real and ideal responses to de-Stalinization’, in Jones, *The Dilemmas of De-Stalinization*, pp. 48-49.

[1152] L. Dominique, *C’era Una Volta l’URSS* (Milano, 2005), pp. 98-99.

[1153] P. Jones, ‘From stalinism to post-stalinism: De-mythologising Stalin, 1953-56’, *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions*, 4/1 (2003), p. 128.

[1154] M.Iu. Chulanov, ‘Postanovleniye Tsk KPSS ot 30 Iyunya 1956 g. “O preodolenii kul’ta lichnosti i yego posledstviy” v kontekste svoyego vremeni’, in T. Islamov, A. Sytalkin (eds), *Avtoritarnyye rezhimy v tsentral'noy i vostochnoy Yevrope (1917–1990-ye gody)* (Moscow, 1999) — Jones, ‘From stalinism to post-stalinism’, p. 136 — Loewenstein, ‘Re-Emergence of Public Opinion in the Soviet Union’, pp. 1330, 1341.

[1155] E.G. Liberman, ‘O planirovanii promyshlennogo proizvodstva i material'nykh stimulakh yego razvitiya’, *Kommunist*, 10 (1956), p. 75.

up and how much they would be rewarded if they did so more efficiently, they would stop trying to slow down their progression or pretend to be on a lower starting step. [1156]

To do so, Liberman proposed that centrally assigned targets should be “limited in number and not be too detailed”, while switching to primarily express “the effectiveness of labour expenditures”. This, he thought, should be achieved by adopting “profitability of production [as] generalised qualitative norm for costs of production”. [1157]

Western scholars reacted to these public displays of revived economic debates by noting how few concrete proposals were voiced and how not much was done to present “a solution compatible with the ‘official' conceptions”. [1158]

As debates progressed, so did Khrushchev’s plan to move directly against the Ministerial structure. He had already used the 20th Congress also as launchpad for his plans of administrative restructuring, as all top Party leaders who also served as Ministers spoke in favour of decentralisation. [1159] At that point Ministries were already coming in for increasing criticism, some were abolished or scaled down, while Gosplan lost current planning and material-technical supply to the newly established Gosekonomkommissiya (State Economic Commission). [1160] Khrushchev also mobilised the Party as well as the population and nearly forty-one million citizens attended more than half a million meetings on regionalisation. [1161]

[1156] Ibid. pp. 40-41.

[1157] Ibid. pp. 24-26, 31.

[1158] R.W. Davies, ’Industrial Planning Reconsidered’, *Soviet Studies*, 8/4 (1957), pp. 426-427.

[1159] R.W. Davies, ‘Economic Aspects of the XX Congress’, *Soviet Studies*, 8/2 (1956), pp. 173-184.

[1160] V.I. Ivkin (ed), *Gosudarstvennaya vlast' SSSR. Vysshiye organy vlasti i upravleniya i ikh rukovoditeli. 1923-1991. Istoriko-biograficheskiy spravochnik*, (Moscow, 1999), pp. 143-150.

[1161] Y. Gorlizki, ‘Anti-Ministerialism and the USSR Ministry of Justice, 1953-56. A Study in Organisational Decline’, *Europe-Asia Studies*, 48/8 (1996), p. 1308.

After a first unsuccessful bid in December 1956, Khrushchev had regionalisation approved by July 1957. [1162] Over 140 Ministries were abolished, [1163] while 105 economic regions were created and assigned each a *Sovnarkhoz* (Council of the National Economy) now governing large industries, while local ones remained under the Soviets' control. [1164] Yet, central sales organisations were never abolished, the *Sovnarkhozy* had no authority over agriculture, transport and retail trade, [1165] while already in May 1957 Gosplan had re-absorbed Gosekonomkommissiya. [1166] Furthermore, the administrative relationship between *Sovnarkhozy*, local Soviets and Gosplan was never fully codified, prompting for much strain and rivalry. [1167]

In June 1957, the fragile political equilibrium within the Party broke. Malenkov aligned with Molotov and Kaganovich who, alongside Voroshilov, Saburov, Bulganin and M.G. Pervukhin outvoted Khrushchev in the Presidium, whom they accused of disregard for the collective leadership principle and of adventurism. Yet, the First Secretary, aided by Zhukov, convened a CC Plenum and defeated what became known as the "anti-Party Group". None of the plotters were physically harmed, but all besides Bulganin were demoted. Malenkov, Molotov and Kaganovich even lost Party membership. [1168]

[1162] Kibita, *Soviet Economic Management Under Khrushchev*, pp. 28-29 — A. Nove, *The Soviet Economy*, 3rd rev ed (London, 1970), p. 73.

[1163] W.B. Ballis, 'Political Implications of Recent Soviet Economic Reorganizations', *The Review of Politics*, 23/2 (1961), p. 160.

[1164] Quoted in Kibita, *Soviet Economic Management Under Khrushchev*, p. 37.

[1165] H.R. Swearer, 'Khrushchev's Revolution in Industrial Management', *World Politics*, 12/1 (1959), p. 54 — Ballis, 'Political Implications of Recent Soviet Economic Reorganizations', p. 163 — Kibita, *Soviet Economic Management Under Khrushchev*, p. 157.

[1166] Ivkin (ed), *Gosudarstvennaya vlast' SSSR*, pp. 143-150.

[1167] Swearer, 'Khrushchev's Revolution in Industrial Management', pp. 52-54 — D.T. Cattell, 'Local Government and the Sovnarkhoz in the USSR, 1957-1962', *Soviet Studies*, 15/4 (1964), p. 430 — R.W. Davies, 'Economic Planning in the USSR', in M. Bornstein (ed), The Soviet Economy. Continuity and Change (Boulder, 1981), p. 31.

[1168] V. Zubok, *A Failed Empire. The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev* (Chapel Hill, 2007), pp. 119-121.

Further emboldened by the successful launch of the Sputnik on 4 October 1957, Khrushchev combined Party first secretaryship with SovMin chairmanship on 27 March 1958, just like Stalin had done seventeen years earlier. [1169]

In the meantime, reform debates on themes and issues initially developed in the late 1940s continued. Yet, proposals which increasingly began to resemble what would become Kosygin's 1965 reform plan were not only discussed on journals, but also at experts' meeting, which the Academy of Sciences began organising with increasing frequency. One such meeting, organised on 20 May 1957 at the Institute of Economics, discussed the "law of value and its utilisation". [1170]

There Gatovskiy based his reflections on the understanding that "commodity production of a special kind is an integral feature of the economy of socialism". Therefore, the law of value was an unavoidable instrument for the "active planned use of value levers in the interest of developing and strengthening socialist production". These words, stressing the idea of a former capitalist lever having become one "of a special kind" and the insistence on the relevance of the law of value in the Soviet economy, could have been spoken by Voznesensky himself a decade earlier.

Gatovskiy therefore moved on to suggest how to "more broadly and effectively use the law of value". He proposed the "further streamlining and improving [of] prices on the basis of their greater approximation to cost [and] strengthening the role of prices as an economic lever to strengthen *khozraschet* and stimulate production in accordance with the public need stances". Gatovskiy also suggested "speeding up the process of eliminating subsidies [since] the prices should compensate the planned cost price and provide the necessary profitability to enterprises". Both better approximation of prices to cost and the elimination of subsidies were key components of the 1948-1949 price reform.

[1169] *Pravda*, 28 March 1958, p. 1.

[1170] ARAN, f. 1877, op. 1, d. 1160, l. 1.

The Soviet economist then suggested the "expansion of the basis of *khozraschet* and of material stimulation of production through a significant increase in the amount of profit remaining at the disposal of enterprises". This would be coupled with the "strengthening [of] financial incentives for enterprise managers and [of] their financial responsibility for the work of enterprises".

Gatovskiy further considered a key priority "eliminating the shortcomings associated with planned gross output, raising the value of profitability indicators and the use of productive funds". In addition, he proposed"increasing the role of economic contracts for supply, especially direct contracts between enterprises [and] material sanctions and personal liability for non-compliance with the terms of contracts".

Gatovskiy's conclusive broader corollary was that the "ongoing restructuring […] urgently requires the strengthening of the role of economic levers in the planned management of the economy". [1171] This was an exact quotation of Voznesensky's March 1946 speech.

The conference Gatovskiy expressed his proposals at also witnessed Ostrovityanov's strong criticism of Stalin's *Economic Problems*. Positive mention of the text was made, but only in relation to its expounding of long-established truths, like the fact that "without value, there would be no profitability, no currency". Yet, Ostrovityanov openly branded as "mistaken" Stalin's assertions that "the means of production are not goods", that "the law of value affects production only through wages" and that "commodity circulation begins to contradict the task of building communism and must gradually pass to product exchange". [1172] Voznesensky's name was never mentioned, but the open criticism of the text which had official refuted his theories implicitly vindicated him.

[1171] ARAN, f. 1877, op. 1, d. 1160, ll. 80-82.

[1172] Ibid., ll. 10-12.

By the late 1950s however, the broadening of debates for the search of economic remedies received further impetus as, almost unexpectedly, Soviet growth rates started declining. [1173] The main visible culprits were administrative instability and imbalances caused by over-ambitious investment plans, but a marked decrease in investment rate as well as structural decline in labour, capital and investment productivity were the underlying key factors. [1174]

One of Khrushchev's first counter-measures was transforming the seventh Five-Year Plan into the first and only Seven-Year Plan, set to run until 1965. The original one had already been upwardly revised in 1957 and as of 1959 envisioned an output growth of 85-8% as well as a 62-65% and 60-63% rise in income and consumption respectively. [1175] These targets would be even further increased at the 22nd Congress in 1961. [1176]

The Party also started to pay increasing attention to the proposals of Liberman and Gatovskiy's. Yet, there existed a chronic time dilation between the moment when a proposal was voiced, further debated, regarded as of interest and experimented. Therefore, if in 1959 Liberman was arguing that "the enterprise should actually become the basic organ of planning from below" and centralised supply should be dismantled, authorities only began to tackle the broadly perceived shortcomings of the gross output plan indicator. [1177]

Therefore, at the 21st Congress, Khrushchev called for a "truly nationwide campaign against all manifestations of mismanagement [and] wastefulness". The goal was to "increase the

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[1173] W.L. Thorp, "Statement of Willard L. Thorp", in (ed), *Comparison of the United States and Soviet Economies. Hearings before the Joint Economic Committee. Congress of the United States. Eighty-Sixth Congress. First Session. Pursuant to Sec. 5(a) of Public Law 304 (79th Congress). November 13, 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20 1959* (Washington, 1960), p. 248.

[1174] Nove, *An Economic History of the USSR*, p. 371.

[1175] KPSS, *Vneocherednoy XXI s"yezd Kommunisticheskoy Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza. Stenograficheskiy otchet* (2 vols, Moscow, 1959), ii, pp. 434-435.

[1176] KPSS, *XXII s"yezd*, i, p. 59.

[1177] E.G. Liberman, 'Ob ekonomicheskikh rychagakh vypolneniya plana promyshlennost'yu SSSR', *Kommunist*, 1 (1959), p. 89.

responsibility of managers towards the improvement of all qualitative indicators […], especially for reducing the cost of production and improving the quality of products", as well as to "further strengthen *khozraschet* in industry, construction, transport and agriculture". [1178]

As a result, building on previous attempts at tinkering with the gross output indicator, [1179] a Gosplan commission was established in 1959 "to address the issue of improving planning indicators for industrial production in enterprises" and the criticism became starker. [1180] Liberman himself referred to Khrushchev's "radical measures" stating that one should have been "the strengthening of economic levers in influencing production, which would give enterprises an interest in changing outdated and inefficient forms of management". Once again, this is clearly reminiscent of Voznesensky's 1946 speech [1181]

Soon after, the July 1959 CC Plenum approved a decree stating that "the practice of awarding bonuses mainly for the fulfilment and overfulfillment of production plans does not help mobilise the efforts of managers and engineers in the struggle for a more complete use of production reserves and for the improvement of quality indicators - higher labor productivity, lower production costs and higher profitability of enterprises". On the contrary, "some managers […] seek to reduce production plans and thereby ensure the receipt of high premiums", since "the size of the funds spent for the bonus […] are not linked to the amount of savings obtained from the reduction in the cost of production". [1182] A decade earlier, Liberman and others had already identified these as the most serious shortcomings affecting the standing bonus system (p. 137).

[1178] KPSS, *Vneocherednoy XXI s"yezd*, p. 46.

[1179] N. Lyubimov, A. Petrov, 'O pokazatelyakh i ucheta promyshlennoy produktsii', *Planovoe khozyaistvo*, 1 (1957) — G. Baklanov, 'Primireniye proizvoditel'nosti truda na promyshlennom predpriyatii', *Voprosy Ekonomiki*, 7 (1957).

[1180] A. Zholkevich, M. Petrushin, 'Puti Povysheniya pokazateley planirovaniya ob"yema promyshlennoy produktsii', *Planovoe khozyaistvo*, 7 (1960), p. 36.

[1181] Liberman, 'Ob ekonomicheskikh rychagakh', p. 94.

[1182] KPSS, *Materialy iyun'skogo (1958 goda) Plenuma TSK KPSS* (Moscow, 1958), pp. 26-28.

The solution seemed obvious, awarding of bonuses should be “carried out for the fulfilment and overfulfillment of the plan to reduce production costs”. [1183] In addition, the fulfilment of technology plans was made a criteria for bonus payments towards “managers of enterprises, as well as engineering and technical personnel directly responsible for the implementation and development of new techniques and technology”. [1184] Yet, the decree carried within itself a hint of the reasons why its provisions failed to revert growth slowdown, as it added that only “in certain industries” bonuses would be awarded “also for improving the quality of products”. [1185] Indeed, faced with the necessity to cut production costs, the majority of enterprises simply started cutting on the quality of goods.

By 1960, economists openly argued that the gross output indicator “as a whole satisfies the planning and accounting requirements in industry [but] in some cases it is not sufficient”. [1186] Moreover, after the repeated post-1949 reduction of industrial prices under both Stalin and Khrushchev, it was also openly recognised that their reform had become a key necessity too. [1187]

Broad debates opened amongst Soviet economists on how to tackle the fact that prices did not reflect real values, did not provide adequate guidance for planners nor functioned as evaluation tools. Traditionalists proposed tinkering, while other economists suggested to add a markup and more radical proposals essentially pointed to efficiency “shadow” prices. The Party itself

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[1183] The decree also listed several exceptions: for example, awarding of bonuses in the “coal, oil, mining, metallurgy, chemical, cement, gas, electrical engineering and cable production, timber, non-metallic materials, sugar, fish, textile and footwear” industries, as well as in “chemical, oil, metallurgical and ore-dressing engineering [горнообогатительног] machine-building”, awarding “is also carried out for overfulfillment of the production plan” — Ibid.

[1184] V. Markov, ‘Novoye v organizatsii material'nogo stimulirovaniya tekhnicheskogo progressa’, *Planovoe khozyaistvo*, 6 (1960), p. 30.

[1185] Ibid.

[1186] Zholkevich, Petrushin, ‘Puti Povysheniya’, p. 36.

[1187] R.M Gumerov, A.S. Gusarov (eds), *Istoriya Tsenoobrazovaniya v SSSR. Dokumenty i materialy. Iyul' 1941 - 1955* (3 vols, Moscow, 1970-1975), iii, pp. 86-93, 96-98, 112-114, 124-127.

recognised some form of change was necessary and the July 1960 Plenum approved the revision of producer goods' prices. [1188]

Yet, at that time there existed a clearly perceivable tension between the opening up of more opportunities for franker discussion and the authorities' need to set limits. For example, Strumilin wrote on *Voprosy ekonomiki* that the law of value operated under socialism, acquired "the force of mandatory legal laws" and, if broken, delivered a "punishment" in the form of imbalances. He even stated that it was "no wonder that the law of value […] becomes at this stage increasingly important in the Soviet economy, penetrating wider and deeper and rooting in all sectors and in all areas of our economy and especially in the crucial area where the production-labour ratio is set up in the plan". [1189] Yet, a month after, a group of junior Soviet economists was criticised precisely by *Voprosy ekonomiki* for believing that "for the resolution of all problems related to improving *khozraschet*, bettering the price system, etc., one single thing is necessary - to give 'broad' or even to give 'full scope' to the operation of the law of value". [1190]

The late 1950s were however also marked by the broadening of economic debates: cybernetics was increasingly promoted as a key component of reforming economics, [1191] the Scientific Research Institute of Economics (NIEI) became the home of scientific forecasting, [1192] while mathematical economists Kantorovich and V.V. Novozhilov were eventually allowed to published their groundbreaking work. [1193]

[1188] KPSS, *Plenum Tsentral'nogo Komiteta Kommunisticheskoy Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza, 13-16 Iyuliya 1960 g. Stenograficheskiy otchet* (Moscow, 1960), pp. 305-334.

[1189] S.G. Strumilin, 'Zakon stoimosti i planirovaniye', *Vorposy ekonomiki,* 7 (1959), pp. 130-133.

[1190] 'O Zakone Stoimosti i Voprosakh Tsenoobrazovaniya v SSSR', *Voprosy Ekonomiki*, 3 (1958), p. 104.

[1191] Gerovitch, *From Newspeak to Cyberspeak. A History of Soviet Cybernetics*, pp. 4-5 — Peters, 'Normalizing Soviet Cybernetics', p. 146.

[1192] E. Rindzevičiūtė, 'A Struggle for the Soviet Future: The Birth of Scientific Forecasting in the Soviet Union', *Slavic Review*, 75/1 (2016), p. 60.

[1193] L.V. Kantorovich, *Ekonomicheskiy raschet nailuchshego ispol'zovaniya resursov* (Moscow, 1960) — V.S. Nemchinov, *Primeneniye matematiki v ekonomicheskikh issledovaniyakh* (Moscow, 1959).

As calls in the USSR for strengthening the role of mathematics in economics multiplied, Western economists quickly realised that the most radical amongst the proposed theories entered into direct conflict with Marx's labour theory of value. [1194] Kantorovich had essentially worked out marginal value products, which opened immense possibilities for the study of scarcity, marginal contribution, optimality and technological effectiveness [1195] Novozhilov instead, relying on the concept of opportunity cost, wanted to use it to maximise labour effectiveness in a way that would not simultaneously positively affect a productive process, while damaging another. [1196] The 1959 breakthrough for mathematical economics materialised just three years after Sorokin had condemned "abstract mathematical formulas" and "arbitrary" mathematical assumptions quoting Kuibyshev's words on the "'statistical-arithmetic deviation' in planning". [1197] Mathematical economics had gone a long way in those three years, but still Kantorovich and Novozhilov's theories came under heavy fire in the early 1960s, [1198] while mathematical economists, equally prone to disagreements amongst themselves, [1199] swiftly counterattacked. [1200]

Nove had already identified Liberman's proposals in 1963 as "perhaps a necessary supplement" to mathematical economics. [1201] Yet, what Greenslade defined a "nearly disastrous split", loomed over Soviet reforming economics, given mathematical economists' dreams of an omniscient

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[1194] R.W. Campbell, 'Marx, Kantorovich, and Novozhilov: Stoimost' versus Reality', *Slavic Review*, 20/3 (1961), pp. 402.

[1195] R. Dorfman, 'Economic Systems; Planning and Reform, Cooperation. Review of The Best Use of Economic Resources', *The American Economic Review*, 56/ 3 (1966), p. 594.

[1196] Campbell, 'Marx, Kantorovich, and Novozhilov', p. 412.

[1197] G.M. Sorokin, 'Perspektivnoye planirovaniye narodnogo khozyaystva', *Planovoe khozyaistvo*, 1 (1956), pp. 42-43.

[1198] A.Ya. Boyarskiy, 'O matematicheskikh metodakh i trebovaniyakh ekonomicheskoy nauki', *Planovoe khozyaistvo*, 1 (1960) — V.I. Kats, 'Ekonomicheskaya teoriya i primeneniye matematiki v ekonomike', *Voprosy ekonomiki*, 11 (1960).

[1199] P. Zheleznyak, 'Nauchnoye soveshchaniye po primeneniyu matematicheskikh metodov v ekonomicheskikh issledovaniyakh i planirovanii', *Planovoe khozyaistvo*, 5 (1960), pp. 88-90.

[1200] V.S. Nemchinov, 'Primeneniye Matematicheskikh Metodov v Ekonomicheskikh Issledovaniyakh i Planirovanii', *Planovoe khozyaistvo*, 2 (1960), p. 66 — V.S. Nemchinov, 'Matematiku i elektroniku - na sluzhbu planirovaniyu"' Planovoe khozyaistvo, 3 (1961), pp. 30-35.

[1201] A. Nove, 'The Liberman Proposals', *Survey*, 47 (1963), p. 17.

centre brought about by computers plus “optimal planning”. [1202] However, points of convergence between the two schools were established by Nemchinov who, as he was calling for the conceptualisation of “Soviet econometrics”, [1203] once again quoted the key ideas discussed by Voznesensky in the 1940s: “economic categories such as price, money, value, cost, commodity and *khozraschet* are taking on an increased importance [since] it is more and more evident that commodity production and money will survive as social necessities throughout the transition to communism”. [1204]

However, it was not only Soviets who thought that computers plus “optimal planning” could bring about “infallible centralism”. Indeed, Nove recounted attending in 1958 a lecture by G. Dantzig on linear programming with Lord L.C. Robbins, who stood by Hayek’s criticism of socialism, but at that point had become “worried”. Since the USSR “had a political authority which could define and determine an objective function, which could then be realised through a computerised programme […] socialism then could be efficient, a prospect which alarmed him”. [1205]

4.3. — General Plan, 1959

Simultaneously to the broadening of economic debates along lines set in the late 1940s, another core priority of Voznesensky was resurrected: the General Plan. Reference to long-term planning had never ceased on economic literature, but it was Khrushchev’s political programme

[1202] R.V. Greenslade, ‘The Soviet Economic System in Transition’, in (ed), *New Directions in the Soviet Economy*, p. 10.

[1203] Nemchinov, ‘Primeneniye Matematicheskikh Metodov’, p. 20.

[1204] V.S. Nemchinov, ‘Stoimost' i Tsena pri Sotsializme’, *Voprosy ekonomiki*, 12 (1960), p. 85.

[1205] A. Nove,‘Soviet reforms and western neo-classical economics’, in Kovacs, Tardos, *Reform and Transformation in Eastern Europe,* p. 107.

that played a key role in its revival. [1206] Indeed, as the announcement that communism was two decades away neared, the First Secretary made an announcement at the All-Union Meeting on Energy Construction in late 1959: “the perspective plan for the electrification of the country of 15-20 years and the perspective plan of development of the national economy for the same period should become the backbone of our programme of communist construction”. [1207]

As a result of the authorities’ renewed interest for perspective planning beyond five years, its methodology and history gained even more prominence on economic literature. [1208] Sorokin himself commented Khrushchev’s words in April 1960 stating that “the working out of a General Plan for 15-20 years is the economic programme for the building of a communist society in the USSR [and] the realisation of the Leninist testament about the electrification of the whole country”. [1209]

In the meantime, following Khrushchev’s directives, on 17 September 1959 Gosplan’s collegium approved a resolution on the “General Perspectives for the Development of the National Economy for 1959-1975”, described as “long-term plan for communist construction, for the development of economy and culture of the Soviet Union”.

The plan envisioned “the further priority growth in the production of means of production as the foundation for the comprehensive development of all branches of the people’s economy on the basis of the latest achievements of science and technology”. Yet, it also focused on “improving the location of productive forces [and] the most effective use of natural and labor resources”, while the “full electrification” and “all-scale chemicalisation” of the economy were also deemed

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[1206] I.A. Gladkov, ‘Planovoye Razvitiye Sovetskoy Ekonomiki’, in L.M. Gatovskiy et. al. (eds), *Sovetskaya Sotsialisticheskaya Ekonomika, 1917-1957* (Moscow, 1957), pp, 47-49, 57.

[1207] *Pravda*, 13 December 1959, pp. 1-2.

[1208] P. Krylov, ‘Nekotorye voprosy metodologii perspektivnogo planirovaniya povysheniya urovnya zhizni naroda’, *Planovoe khozyaistvo*, 8 (1960) — G.M. Sorokin, ‘Pervy General'ny Plan razvitiya narodnogo khozyaystva’, *Planovoe khozyaistvo*, 2 (1961).

[1209] G.M. Sorokin, ‘V.I. Lenin - sozdatel' nauchnykh osnov planirovaniya narodnogo khozyaystva’, *Planovoe khozyaistvo*, 4 (1960), p. 13.

crucial priorities. The plan was further meant to provide for "a significant expansion of the system of communist education" as well as the "further rapid development in the USSR of all branches of science, especially scientific research in mathematics, modern physics, chemistry, technology, biology and medicine". [1210]

About a month later, on 23 October 1959, the Academy of Sciences sent Gosplan a memorandum on the General Perspectives. The importance attached to it was certified by the fact that the Academy decided to "exempt from current work the employees of the branches involved in the elaboration of the General Perspectives of Development for the time of the execution of this latter task". In all, more than eighty Academy members joined the various working groups established to develop the plan. [1211]

Naturally, the chief institution involved in the process was the Institute of Economics. Its own working groups focused on several issues: "determining the rate and basic national-economic proportions of reproduction in general perspective"; the "general layout of the distribution of productive forces which ensures the most effective use of natural and manpower resources"; reserves, workforce, *khozraschet*, monetary circulation, price and pricing, efficiency of capital investment. [1212]

Economic levers played a primary role in the prospected development of the General Perspectives plan, which was to rely on the "strengthening the entire system of economic levers and the method of socialist management/*khozraschet*, commodity-money relations, prices, profits, finances". In the planners' mind "improving the use of economic levers" meant

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[1210] RGAE, f. 4372, op. 58, d. 377, ll. 2-3.

[1211] ARAN, f. 1877, op. 1, d. 1380, ll. 1, 5-6, 8.

[1212] ARAN, f. 1877, op. 1, d. 1380, ll. 11-15.

"streamlining prices, increasing the role of profit, improving planning and *khozraschet*, strengthening the control of the ruble through the financial and credit system". [1213]

Material stimulation was also a major topic. Indeed, a "significant increase in the personal material interest of the whole collective of enterprise employees in the results of work" as well as "new methods of material incentives for managers and engineers and workers" were deemed vital. [1214]

In the section on "profitability and the use of the incentivising role of profit", the importance of its broader use as indicator and its key importance to "strengthen *khozraschet*" were emphasised. Credit was instead assigned the "organisation of current assets and financial resources as to increase the interest of industrial enterprises in using them more effectively". [1215]

The section on "problems of the economic efficiency of investment in general perspective" instead affirmed that "the calculation of the national economic effectiveness of planned measures should be drafted with the presentation, if necessary, of various options for capital investments". Key methodological criteria in this process were to be "the balance method [and] the economic efficiency of capital investments". [1216]

Therefore, it does not surprise that when discussing the "proposals for the prospects of the development of science for 1959-1975", three issues were listed for in-depth study: "the role of commodity-money relations in the building of communism"; "socialist expanded reproduction and the balance of the national economy"; "commodity production, law of value and *khozraschet*". In

[1213] ARAN, f. 1877, op. 1, d. 1380, ll. 61-62.

[1214] ARAN, f. 1877, op. 1, d. 1380, l. 62.

[1215] ARAN, f. 1877, op. 1, d. 1380, ll. 63-64.

[1216] ARAN, f. 1877, op. 1, d. 1380, l. 87.

this respect, several Academy members remarked the importance of focusing on "the more effective use of value categories for the development of the socialist economy". [1217]

Not only the idea of a General Plan powerfully resonated with Voznesensky, but the core issues listed in 1959, such as strengthening economic levers, *khozraschet*, the balance method, rational and efficient utilisation of resources and material incentives, had become key elements of Soviet economic policy and debates precisely under Voznesensky's tenure more than a decade earlier.

Specifically the balance method, which Strumilin lamented had suffered neglect in the previous years, [1218] returned not only a key element in Soviet debates, [1219] but also in Warsaw Pact-wide ones. [1220] M.Z. Bor further remarked that it "assume[d] particular importance at our time in connection with […] the drawing up of a perspective plan of development". [1221]

[1217] ARAN, f. 1877, op. 1, d. 1380, ll. 103-105, 108-109.

[1218] S.G. Strumilin, 'Balans Narodnogo Khozyaystva kak Orudiye Sotsialisticheskogo Planirovaniya', *Voprosy ekonomiki*, 11 (1954), p. 22.

[1219] V.S. Nemchinov, 'Nekotorye Voprosy Primeneniya Balansogo Metoda v Statistike Vzaimosvyazannykh Dinamicheskikh Ekonomicheskikh sistem', in V.S. Nemchinov (ed), *Uchenye Zapiski po Statistike. Balans Narodnogo Khozyaystva. Statisticheskiye Metody Izucheniya Proizvodstva* (56 vols, Moscow, 1955-1992), v, pp. 8-15.

[1220] T. Ryabushkin, 'Voprosy razrabotki balansa narodnogo khozyaystva v sotsialisticheskikh stranakh (po materialam Varshavskoy konferentsii)', *Planovoe khozyaistvo*, 5 (1960), pp. 92-96.

[1221] Bor, *Voprosy Metodologii Planovogo*, p. 3.

4.4. — The 22nd Congress of 1961 and the new Party Programme

As of the early 1960s, Khrushchev's domestic position was strong and although the USSR had lost its Chinese ally, it successfully rallied almost the whole international communist movement behind its position and would radically resolve the Berlin crisis by building the Wall. [1222]

Therefore, at the 22nd Congress of October 1961 the tone was triumphalist. A new Party Programme finally replaced the 1917 one, finally that "socialism won in the Soviet Union in full and definitely". Yet, the Programme also added that "the dictatorship of the proletariat fulfilled its historic mission and has ceased to be indispensable". The USSR had become a "state of the entire people", where "proletarian democracy [was] increasingly turning into a socialist democracy of the entire people". Finally, the Programme emphatically added that "the present generation of Soviet people shall live in communism". [1223]

As for economics, at the Congress Khrushchev delivered a markedly rationalising speech, referring to the need for "the most precise calculations", speaking of "adherence to scientifically based proportions" and of "making the most effective use of national resources, industrial capacity and new technology". This meant, he summarised, "maximum of output per unit of production capacity at the minimum expenditure". The First Secretary also openly stated that "our task [is] to make still greater use of and to improve financial and credit levers, financial control, prices and profits", concluding that "we must elevate the importance of profit and profitability". [1224]

The Programme itself remarked the cruciality of the "rational and effective use of resources" and the "elimination of excessive expenditure and losses". This meant "achieving the maximum

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[1222] *Statement of 81 Communist and Workers Parties Meeting in Moscow, 1960* (New York, 1961).

[1223] KPSS, *XXII s"yezd*, iii, pp. 230, 303, 335.

[1224] Ibid., pp. 22-23, 203-204.

growth of output for every invested rouble", maintaining the economy's "proportionate basis", enhancing "local bodies' responsibility in economic management" and extending "operative independence" and "coordination" between economic bodies. [1225]

Another crucial issue considered by the Programme was that of economic levers, as it affirmed that "full use of commodity-money relations" ought to be made in communist construction, in which "levers as *khozraschet*, money, price, production cost, profit, trade, credit and finance play a great role". [1226] That the new Programme, as well as economic doyens, [1227] so openly remarked that economic levers would have remained crucial tools until communism was reached, was immediately noted by Western scholars as an element of major significance. [1228]

In fact however, the new Programme's phrasing represented an almost word-by-word quotation of the 1947 Zhdanov-Voznesensky revised Programme. Indeed, its final draft included a call to "increase the role and importance of *khozraschet*, money, state budget, credit, prices, profits, Soviet trade as the most important economic levers for the transformation of the socialist society into a communist one". [1229]

A further passage from the 1947 draft which the 1961 Programme took obvious inspiration from is that on the necessity of "correctly and flexibly combining strict centralisation with the production initiative and independent activity of the broad mass of workers". [1230] In the new Programme this became "ensuring the correct combination of centralised leadership with the

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[1225] KPSS, *XXII s"yezd*, iii, pp. 292-294.

[1226] Ibid., pp. 294-295.

[1227] Sh.Ya. Turetskiy, 'Razvitiye Proizvoditel'nykh Sil i Tovarno-Denezhnye Otnosheniya', *Voprosy ekonomiki*, 12 (1961), p. 106.

[1228] A. Zauberman, 'The Economics of "1980"', in L. Shapiro, A. Boiter (ed), *The USSR and the Future. An Analysis of the New Programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union* (Munich, 1962), pp. 111-112.

[1229] RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 476, l. 149.

[1230] RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 476, l. 149.

maximum development of the initiative of local organs, the expansion of the rights of the Union republics, and the increase in the creative activity of the masses". [1231] The novel elements added in 1961 were an obvious validation of Khrushchev's 1957 economic regionalisation.

Moreover, on top of the striking similarities between the 1947 and 1961 texts, a blue pen note written in 1960 on the cover page of the communication sent by Shepilov's to Suslov in 1947 is very telling. Attached to said letter came precisely a copy of the draft from which the 1961 Programme took obvious inspiration and said note, reading "[send] to the archive, [of] Suslov, 28 VI 60", proves that the document was accessed in 1960, probably by Suslov himself, who played a key role in drafting the Third Programme. [1232]

4.5. — Economic debates, 1962-1964

Less than a year after the closing day of the 22nd Congress, the debate on reforming economics met with further impulse, reaching the pages of *Pravda*.

Liberman, who openly praised the new Programme's promises regarding the "economic independence and the rights of local organs and of enterprises", [1233] published on 9 September 1962 his notorious "Plan, Profits, Bonuses" article. In it, the Soviet economist affirmed that the key issue was to "develop a system of planning and assessing the enterprises' work so that they will be vitally interested in the highest possible plan targets, in introducing new machinery and improving the quality of output, in a word, in the highest efficiency of production". [1234]

[1231] KPSS, *XXII s"yezd*, iii, p. 304.

[1232] RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 476, l. 159.

[1233] E. Liberman, 'Planirovaniye proizvodstva i normativy dlitel'nogo deystviya', *Voprosy economiki,* 8 (1962). p. 104.

[1234] *Pravda*, 9 September 1962, p. 3.

For that purpose, enterprises should “receive bonuses on the basis of their share of participation in the income created: the greater the profitability in the plan […] the greater will the bonus be”. This would take place on the basis of centrally approved long-term norms defining profitability standards and scale of rewards for branches or groups of enterprises “in approximately the same natural and technical conditions”. [1235]

As for the planning process, enterprises would draw up their plans on the basis of contracts signed with costumers, while the output plan would be negotiated with the centre. Enterprises, once assigned planned targets, could take autonomous decisions over wages fund as well as draw up its profit, cost and productivity plans. [1236]

The article’s appearance on *Pravda* was in itself a clear stimulus on the part of the leadership to further the debate, but to make that even clearer, the newspaper carried the following sentence under Liberman's article: “the editorial staff of *Pravda*, giving great importance to these issues, invites academic-economists, industrial workers, planning and economic agencies to express their opinion on the specific proposals of the author”. [1237]

At this point Liberman was to most Western analysis an “obscure Kharkov Professor”, [1238] but attentive commentators noticed how his *Pravda* article actually retreated from his previous more radical stance in regards to the abolition of centralised material allocation. [1239] Its reorganisation “along the lines of state trade” was instead proposed by Nemchinov, [1240] who also noted how

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[1235] *Pravda*, 9 September 1962, p. 3.

[1236] Ibid.

[1237] Ibid.

[1238] *Current Economic Indicators for the USSR*, p. 8.

[1239] Nove, *The Soviet Economy*, p. 263 — Sutela, *Economic Thought and Economic Reform in the Soviet Union*, p. 54.

[1240] *Pravda*, September 21, 1962.

Soviet economists had come to agree that “while preserving the principle of centralised planning it is necessary to create opportunities for the display of local initiative”. [1241]

A broad debate therefore opened and although support for Liberman was strong, many economists lamented the absence of the “practical side for the implementation of such measures”. [1242] Nevertheless, doyens of Soviet economics like Gatovskiy endorsed Liberman, while launching scorching attacks: “an overt belittling and at times complete ignoring of the importance of profit and value categories in general were a characteristic of the period of Stalin’s personality cult”. [1243] Liberman himself compared on the Soviet radio those who opposed his proposals to “local czarist administrators who had fought against the introduction of the automobile”. This further strengthened Western perception that the Kremlin had taken an increasingly positive stance towards reform. [1244]

This was actually the case, as on 18 November *Pravda* published Khrushchev’s CC Plenum speech where, without ever naming Liberman, the First Secretary positively mentioned the debate opened by his article and encouraged its widening. [1245]

I. Birman and V. Belkin stated that the plenum “created the organisational preconditions for the improvement of economic activity”, [1246] but the lack of formal endorsement for “Libermanism” in Khrushchev’s speech was seized upon by conservatives within the economic apparatus to stop the first trials of his proposals. [1247]

[1241] V.S. Nemchinov, ’Problemy Ekonomicheskogo Stimulirovaniya Predpriyatiy. Zainteresovat' Predpriyatiye v Boleye Napryazhennom Plane’, *Voprosy ekonomiki*, 11, (1962), p. 100.

[1242] *Pravda*, 14 September 1962, p. 3 — *Pravda*, 26 september 1962, p. 3.

[1243] L.M. Gatovskiy, ‘Rol' pribyli v sotsialisticheskoy ekonomike’, *Kommunist*, 18 (1962), pp. 64-65.

[1244] *New York Times*, 20 October 1962. p. 4.

[1245] *Pravda*, 20 November 1962, pp. 1-8.

[1246] *Izvestiya*, 29 November 1962, p. 4.

[1247] New York Times, 21 December 1962. p. 4.

Nevertheless, as attempts at drafting a new price list ran aground, bogged down in the bureaucratic nightmare of revising several millions of prices, [1248] the discussion of reforming ideas intensified. For example, at an Institute of Economics meeting in January 1963, Rakitzki defined communist construction as "based on the principle of material interest", the "form of the manifestation of a historically determined relationship between production, distribution and consumption". [1249] E. Ivanov instead affirmed that "the actions of the law of value compel and motivate self-supporting enterprises to accurately account and compare their expenses and incomes, account in order to ensure self-sufficiency, achieve the strictest savings and thrift in the use of funds, increase labor productivity and reduce production costs, and thereby achieve an increase in profitability of production". [1250]

Yet, resistance to reform was still stiff. For example, in February 1964 N. Ilyina wrote that after a Stavropol glassworks factory over-fulfilled the plan solely using left-over materials and a Moscow slaughterhouse managed to purchase cheaper utensils, State Arbitration fined both. [1251] A fierce debate ensued, as Ilyina's views were dubbed "simplifications" by conservative economists, while Nemchinov backed her, arguing for "serious reforms" of material-technical supply on the basis of "direct contractual relations between consumers and suppliers". [1252]

As of 1964, Gatovskiy was repeating what Nemchinov had argued years earlier, namely that a general agreement existed on "combining centralised planning with the unleashing of the initiative of enterprises". Yet, just how much initiative and how to unleash it remained a chimerical issue. [1253] Nemchinov himself proposed his "*khozraschet* system of planning",

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[1248] 'Soviet Price Theory and Policy', in (ed), *New Directions in the Soviet Economy*, p. pp. 73-74.

[1249] ARAN, f. 1877, op. 8, d. 324, l. 3.

[1250] ARAN, f. 1877, op. 8, d. 324, ll. 20, 23.

[1251] N. Ilina, 'Chto-to Tut ne Kleitsya', *Literaturnaya gazeta*, 18 February 1964, p. 5.

[1252] V.S. Nemchinov, 'A Problema Yest'!', *Literaturnaya gazeta*, 12 March 1964, p. 6 — V.S. Nemchinov, 'Ob OdnoiyPolemike', *Literaturnaya gazeta*, 13 June 1964, p. 4.

[1253] L.M. Gatovskiy, 'Podvedeniye itogov ekonomicheskoy diskussii', *Voprosy ekonomiki*, 2 (1964), p. 144.

combining a reduced number plan indicators with the negotiation of “sufficiently profitable” orders between central agencies and enterprises. These would be transformed in long-term contractual plan orders, new prices would be fixed by enterprises, while long-term norms on enterprise profitability and on the share of profits they could retain would also be introduced. Such system, Nemchinov stated, would have had “the entire system of economic levers […] regulated through long-term norms and prices in such a way as to make it advantageous for enterprises to fulfil the directives and control figures of the national economic plan”. [1254]

At this point, mathematical economics had been openly debated, [1255] assigned the Central Economic Mathematical Institute (TsEMI) at theAcademy in May 1963, [1256] and fiercely debated by its very proponents. [1257] Yet, “optimal planners” like Aganbegyan admitted that progress with the introduction of mathematics and cybernetics in planning had so far been “insignificant, simply insignificant”. [1258] Therefore, economists like L.V. Starodubsky ironically spoke of “a system of equations with millions of millions of unknowns!”, [1259] while V. Belkin and I. Birman of “an illusion”, since “regardless of how advanced computers can be, a system where everything, down to the last nail, is planned and managed from a single centre is impossible”. [1260]

As a result, while efforts to speed up computerisation continued, the divides between “optimal planning” and Libermanism were repeatedly bridged. Kantorovich argued himself in 1964 for the “replacement of compulsory indications with the utilisation of more flexible and sometimes more

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[1254] V.S. Nemchinov, ‘Sotsialisticheskoye khozyaystvovaniye i planirovaniye proizvodstva’, *Kommunist*, 5 (1964), p. 85.

[1255] ‘Koordinatsionnoye soveshchaniye po voprosam ispol'zovaniya matematiki i vychislitel'noy tekhniki v ekonomike’, *Voprosy ekonomiki*, 4 (1962), pp. 66-85. pp. 67-71.

[1256] *Tzentralnii Ekonomiko-Matematicheskii Institut Rossiskoi Akadenii Nauk* (Moscow, 2013), p. 3.

[1257] *Ekonomisti i matematiki za kruglim stolom* (Moscow, 1965), pp. 83-87.

[1258] A. Smirnov-Cherkezov, ‘Khimera Li Eto? Vopros kandidatu ekonomicheskikh nauk L.V. Starodubskomu’, *Literaturnaya gazeta,* 14 May 1964, p. 12.

[1259] Ibid.

[1260] *Izvestiya*, 3 December 1964, p. 5.

effective economic levers of regulation". This, together with the "the help of mathematical optimisation", would have made it possible for "efficient decentralised decisions to be made alongside the achievement of coordination between the profitableness of enterprises and that of the national economy". [1261]

It was again in 1964 that reforming economics won a major victory, as on 1 July two clothing factories, *Bolshevichka* in Moscow and *Mayak* in Gorki were put under a new system. They would receive only sales and profitability mandatory indices, while self-organising production on the basis of orders from shops, which they would directly sell their product to. [1262] The experiments received strong backing and calls for expanding them to more firms multiplied. [1263]

Shortly after, Trapeznikov suggested to group the best reforming economists in a temporary commission entrusted with assisting SovMin with the reform, [1264] while Liberman even proposed to establish a "permanent supra-agency organ […] that would direct all verifications and calculations and prepare the stage for a system of legislative acts in a definite, firmly established direction". [1265]

[1261] L.V. Kantorovich, 'Konferentsiya po primeneniyu matematiki v ekonomike', *Voprosy ekonomiki*, 9 (1964), pp. 63-110, 81-82.

[1262] G.R. Feiwel, *The Soviet Quest for Economic Efficiency. Issues, Controversies, and Reforms* (New York, London, 1972), pp. 237-238.

[1263] *Pravda*, 1 August 1964, p. 2 — *Pravda*, 16 August 1964, p. 2.

[1264] *Pravda*, 17 August 1964, pp. 3-4.

[1265] *Pravda*, 20 September 1964, p. 3.

4.6. — Voznesensky's rehabilitation, political and economic motives

As a result of de-Stalinisation a broad campaign of rehabilitation was launched and Voznesensky's was amongst the many cases overturned. Yet, he was not only cleared of any wrongdoing, but also openly celebrated with both typically Soviet panegyrics as well as with rather detailed accounts of his thought and policies. This was the case because Voznesensky's rehabilitation offered several advantages to Khrushchev.

Despite the fact that all top post-Stalinist leaders had been involved into various purges, the First Secretary did manage to use rehabilitations as a political weapon. [1266] Initially, out of 1920s oppositionists, whose cases were reviewed by the "Molotov commission", [1267] only Tukhachevsky was rehabilitated. [1268] Yet, soon after, Khrushchev found in post-war purges a perfect weapon against the "anti-Party group" and one of the key cases he used in his relentless attacks on Malenkov was precisely Voznesensky's. [1269] Khrushchev did so simultaneously relying on Bulganin's support, despite this latter one having sided with the "anti-Party group" and having played a key part in the brutal interrogation of A.A. Voznesensky alongside Malenkov and Beria in 1950. [1270]

Voznesensky's rehabilitation had however already started much earlier on. The cases of those implicated in the Leningrad Affair were already reexamined in late 1953 by the MVD, [1271] while

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[1266] J.P. Shapiro, 'Rehabilitation Policy under the Post-Khrushchev Leadership', *Soviet Studies*, 20/4 (1969), pp. 491-492, 495.

[1267] RGANI, f. 3, op. 14, d. 14, l. 6, in Artizov (ed) *Reabilitatsiya. Kak Eto Bylo*, ii, p. 70.

[1268] RGANI, f. 3, op. 14, d. 121, l. 14, in Artizov (ed) *Reabilitatsiya. Kak Eto Bylo*, ii, p. 271.

[1269] N.V. Kovaleva (ed), *Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich. 1957. Stenogramma iyun'skogo plenuma TsK KPSS i drugiye dokumenty* (Moscow, 1998), pp. 490-491.

[1270] L.A. Voznesensky, 'Bezzakoniye… «po zakonu». K 60-letiyu nachala «Leningradskogo Dela»', *Svobodnaya Misl*, 1 (2009), pp. 151-152.

[1271] GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 3289, ll. 63-64, in Artizov (ed) *Reabilitatsiya. Kak Eto Bylo*, i, pp. 74-75.

on 3 May 1954 a Presidium decree called the whole case “fabricated”, accusing Abakumov. [1272] On 6-8 May 1954, Prosecutor General Rudenko first, [1273] and Khrushchev later, addressed the Leningrad Party ObKom and GorKom on the rehabilitations, accusing Beria, Abakumov and Merkulov. [1274] Before the 20th Congress, Khrushchev spoke of Voznesensky’s rehabilitation both to the KGB on 7 July 1954 and to the CC of the Ukrainian CP on 18 February 1955. [1275]

It was exactly in early 1955 that communist G. Boffa, the first Italian journalist to enter the USSR in the post-war period, stated that “the Soviets’ spirit was lightened up and at the same time disturbed, but perhaps more disturbed than lightened up, by hesitant and still isolated news of ‘rehabilitations’”. He added that “the first [name] I knew […] was that of Voznesensky [who] had suddenly disappeared in the end of 1948 [and] his name had always remained a worrying mystery”. [1276] In late 1955, Voznesensky’s name also quietly reappeared on *Voprosy Istorii*, which published a positive review of his *War Economy*. [1277] Shortly after, in January 1956, Voznesensky’s speech on the Reconstruction and Development Plan was rather oddly openly celebrated in another *Voprosyi Istorii* article on socialist competition in the machine-building industry. [1278]

Voznesensky was therefore mentioned by Khrushchev during his 20th Congress “Secret Speech” in 1956, as he openly stated that the Leningraders “innocently lost their lives”. [1279] The

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[1272] RGANI, f. 3, op. 10, d. 108, l. 113, in Artizov (ed) *Reabilitatsiya. Kak Eto Bylo*, i, pp. 115-116.

[1273] TzGAIPD Sankt-Peterburga, f. 24, op. 83, d. 438, ll. 6-24, in Artizov (ed) *Reabilitatsiya. Kak Eto Bylo*, i, pp.117-129.

[1274] AP RF, f. 52, op. 1, d. 398, ll. 63-114, in Artizov (ed) *Reabilitatsiya. Kak Eto Bylo*, i, pp. 129-142.

[1275] RGANI, f. 52, op. 1, d. 297, l. 105-143 and RGANI, f. 52, op. 1, d. 427, l. 46-79, 96-97, in A. Artizov et. al. (eds) *Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev. Dva Tsveta Vremeni*, i, pp. 516, 528.

[1276] G. Boffa, *La Grande Svolta* (Roma, 1959), p. 26

[1277] E.G. Ramensky, ‘Ob istorikakh i literature po istorii Sovetskogo tyla v Gody Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voyni’, *Voprosy istorii*, 12 (1955), p. 142.

[1278] A.F. Trutneva, “Kommunisty Moskvy - Organizatory Sotsialisticheskogo Sorevnovaniya NA Mashino-stroitel'nykh Predpriyatiyakh (1946-1947 gg.)”, *Voprosy istorii*, 1 (1956), p. 45.

[1279] ‘O Kul’te Lichnosti’, p. 152-153.

First Secretary also used both him and Kuznetsov to attack Malenkov in April 1957 at the Presidium, [1280] as well as in June at the CC. [1281] Shortly after, Khrushchev defined Voznesensky and Kuznetsov the “most honest people in the Party” while addressing writers in 1957, [1282] and “outstanding Party leaders and statesmen” at the 21st Congress in 1959. [1283] From 1956 on, a series of articles made positive mention of Voznesensky's *War Economy* and of his role during the Great Patriotic War, [1284] while in 1961 Ilicev even mentioned the book at the 22nd Congress, stating it included “important conclusions”. [1285] In the aftermath of said Congress, Voznesensky’s name eventually reappeared on *Pravda*, as part of Khrushchev's speech, for the first time since Suslov’s scorching attack in 1952. [1286]

At this point, Voznesensky had been rehabilitated and his name had been prominently mentioned, which served concrete political purposes in Khrushchev’s attacks against the “anti-Patry Group”. Voznesensky’s fulsome celebration in 1963, which powerfully revived his memory, instead served more markedly economic purposes.

[1280] RGANI, f. 3, op. 12, d. 1007, ll. 49-51, in A.A. Fursenko (ed), *Prezidium TsK KPSS. 1954-1964. Chernovye protokol'nye zapisi zasedaniy. Stenogrammy. Postanovleniya* (3 vols, Moscow, 2015), i, p. 254 — Kovaleva (ed), *Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich*, pp. 490-491.

[1281] APRF, f. 3, op. 76, d. 24, in Yu. Sigachev, A. Stepanov (ed), *Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich. 1957. ZK KPSS i drugie dokumenti* (Moscow, 1998), pp. 490-491.

[1282] RGANI, f. 52, op. 1, d. 255, l. 47-86, in *Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev. Dva Tsveta Vremeni,* ii, pp. 48.

[1283] KPSS, *XXII s"yezd*, iii, p. 587

[1284] I.S. Smirnov, OB Istochnikovedeniye Istorii KPSS’, *Voprosy istorii*, 4 (1956), p. 198 — I.V. Stavitskiy, “Ukrepleniye Armeyskikh Partiynykh Organizatsiy v Gody Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voyny”, *Voprosy istorii*, 8 (1958), p. 5 — V.V. Tel’pukhovskiy, ‘Obespecheniye Promyshlennosti Rabochimi Kadrami v Pervy Period Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voyny’, *Voprosy istorii*, 11 (1958), p. 24 — N.M. Kiryayev, I.V. Stavitskiy, ‘Rost i Ukrepleniye Ryadov KPSS v Period Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voyny’, *Voprosy istorii*, 9 (1959), p. 10 — A.F. Vasil’ev, ‘Bor'ba Partiynykh Organizatsiy Urala ZA Ukrepleniye Energeticheskoy Bazy V Pervy Period Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voyny (1941 - 1942 gg.)’, *Voprosy istorii*, 12 (1959), p. 116 — D.A. Bayevskiy, S.R. Gershberg, A.V. Mitrofanova, ‘Ob Izuchenii Istorii Sovetskogo Rabochego Klassa”, *Voprosy istorii*, 12 (1959), p. 15 — G.A. Kumanev, "Sovetskiye Zheleznodorozhniki v Gody Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voyny”, *Voprosy istorii*, 6 (1960), p. 43 — G.A. Deborin, ‘Osnovye Problemy Pervogo Toma “Istorii Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voyny Sovetskogo Soyuza”’, *Voprosy istorii,* 1 (1961), p. 39 — V.V. Karasev, ‘Kratiy Obzor Literatury po Istorii Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voyny, *Voprosy istorii,* 6 (1961), p. 117.

[1285] KPSS, *XXII s"yezd*, i, p. 184.

[1286] *Pravda*, 28 October 1961, p. 3.

It all started with an extremely detailed *Voprosyi Istorii KPSS* article in June 1963 which called Voznesensky a "prominent Party and State figure", made reference to archival documents and openly affirmed that he "perished becoming a victim of the tyranny that prevailed during the period of the personality cult of Stalin". [1287] Shortly after, as a first edition of his biography was released, [1288] articles celebrating Voznesensky were published on *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, *Izvestiya, Pravda*, *Planovoe khozyaistvo* and *Voprosy ekonomiki* on the eve of his sixtieth birth anniversary. [1289] All depicted Voznesensky as a hero of his time: an experienced an inventive peace-time planner as well as a competent and a steadfast commander on the war's economic front. He was praised for his pre-war innovations at Gosplan, for having revived the balance method, for his theorisations on the "role of the law of value in the socialist economy and financial incentives". His discipline was repeatedly mentioned, as much as his erudition. All articles strongly condemned Stalin's "cult of personality" for having hindered Voznesensky's work and stated that he "died as a result of arbitrariness and lawlessness". [1290]

In particular, Sorokin's *Voprosy ekonomiki* article discussed in detail Voznesensky's many merits as an economist and theoretician. Much attention was paid to his work on perspective planning, on the balance method and on the political economy of socialism. It is to be noted that several paragraphs also detailed Voznesensky's actions in relation to territorial planning, specifically the working out of a grid of economic regions, as well as of territorial plans and balances for production, consumption and transport - mention of which is also made both in the *Pravda* and *Izvestiya* articles. [1291] Yet, no mention was instead made of Voznesensky's Institute of

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[1287] V.V. Kolotov, 'Vidny partiyny i gosudarstvennyy deyatel'', *Voprosy istorii KPSS*, 6 (1963), p. 98.

[1288] Kolotov, Petrovichev, *Voznesensky. Biograficheskiy ocherk.*

[1289] Kolotov, 'Predsedatel' Gosplana' — *Izvestiya*, 30 November 1963, p. 4. — *Pravda*, 1 December 1963, p. 4 — 'Vydayushchiysya organizator sotsialisticheskogo planirovaniya', pp. 90-91 — G.M. Sorokin, 'Vydayushchiysya Deyatel' Kommunisticheskoy Partii Ekonomicheskoy Nauki. K-60 letiyu so dnya roshdeniya N. A. Voznesenskogo', *Voprosy ekonomiki*, 12 (1963).

[1290] Ibid.

[1291] *Izvestiya*, 30 November 1963, p. 4 — *Pravda*, 1 December 1963, p. 4 — Sorokin, 'Vydayushchiysya Deyatel' Kommunisticheskoy Partii', pp. 150-151.

Commissioners, Gosplan's new instrument for checking plan fulfilment in the localities and for further rationalisation of the planning process. On the contrary, the Council of Scientific-Technical Expertise was praised. Sorokin's words seemingly attempted to portray Voznesensky as somehow having supported a degree of regionalisation, which in fact finds no backing in his work, nor in the archives. [1292]

Voznesensky's 1963 celebration clearly signalled his name could and perhaps even should be openly referred to on economic literature. So if in 1960 Bor wrote that "since 1939 in the practice of Gosplan appeared the first planning balance of the national economy", praising Nemchinov's contribution, but mentioning Voznesensky only once, [1293] by 1964, discussion of the balance method saw widespread mention of Voznesensky's contribution as "major step forward in the history of the development of the plan balance". [1294]

At the time of Voznesensky's rehabilitation, Western researchers noted its relevance in relation to political infighting, specifically between Khrushchev and Suslov, [1295] while Voznesensky's public celebration was even described as part of a Soviet campaign against China's economic policy. [1296] Harrison later noted how Voznesensky's figure became "an important source of 'invented tradition' for the movement for reform of Stalinism after Stalin's death". [1297]

Voznesensky's rehabilitation served obvious political purposes, just as much as that of many other Party members. Yet, the reason why Voznesensky and not Chubar, Kosior or Rudzutak, was so prominently celebrated, after Khrushchev referred to all four together at the 22nd

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[1292] Sorokin, 'Vydayushchiysya Deyatel' Kommunisticheskoy Partii', p. 151.

[1293] Bor, *Voprosy Metodologii Planovogo*, pp. 31, 44, 49, 341.

[1294] Turetskiy, *Rasshirennoye sotsialisticheskoye vosproizvodstvo*, pp. 361-362.

[1295] C.A. Linden, *Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership, 1957-1964* (Baltimore, 1966), pp. 134-135.

[1296] McFarlane, 'The Soviet rehabilitation of N. Voznesensky', pp. 162-163.

[1297] Harrison, 'N.A. Voznesensky. A Soviet Commander of the Economic Front', p. 48.

Congress of 1961, is to be found in Voznesensky's specific relevance in relation to 1960s economic realities. [1298]

At a time when the First Secretary had started the the countdown to communism, Voznesensky's General Plan for communist construction powerfully resonated as an authoritative precedent. The former Gosplan Chairman's focus on the balance method and on economic levers were equally meaningful at a time when the gross output indicator was being criticised and economic levers-oriented reforming economics was broadly debated. Moreover, as the most untenable pillars of late-Stalinist political economy of socialism were being discarded, Voznesensky offered once again useful reflections, in relation both to the law of value and to proportionality. Finally, as discussed above (p. 246), an attempt was even made to present Voznesensky as an *ante litteram* regionaliser.

4.7. — The failure of reform, Khrushchev ousted and the run-up to the 1965 reform

Khrushchev's 1957 regionalisation had been since its onset only a partial attack against centralism, as the core of the command economy was left intact. Soon enough, as agencies kept on multiplying, a trend which has been more markedly associated with Brezhnev materialised: recentralisation. In 1959 Gosekonomsovet (State Scientific-Economic Council) was assigned long-range planning, [1299] in 1960 RSFSR, Ukraine and Kazakhstan were given Republican *Sovnarkhozy*, while in 1961 seventeen macro-economic regions were created alongside Councils for Coordination and Planning and eleven State Committees for industrial and

[1298] KPSS, *XXII s"yezd*, iii, p. 587.

[1299] Kibita, *Soviet Economic Management Under Khrushchev*, p. 92.

construction branches. [1300] From 1962 on, local *Sovanrkhozy* were reduced from 105 to 47, Gosekonomsovet was re-merged into Gosplan and "camouflaged ministries" in the form of State Production Committees were established. Two central supervision agencies, the USSR *Sovnarkhoz* and the Supreme Council of the National Economy, were also introduced. [1301]

Khrushchev also tried to re-imagine Party control, as separate "industrial" and "agricultural" sections for committees up to the Oblast level were established, [1302] while discontent in the Party was already mounting since the 22nd Congress adopted Rule 25, which provided for "systematic renewal" of Party officials at every election. [1303]

As administrative multiplication continued, [1304] recentralising tendencies were having real effects onto economic processes, so for example an Estonian official openly complained that the seventeen commodities planned by the local *Sovnarkhoz* represented barely 0.2% of the Republic's industrial output. [1305] In the meantime, already by 1960 the Gulag population had started growing again and by 1962 had doubled that year's number. [1306]

In all, much of the 1950s had been relatively good years for Soviet citizens. Farmers' incomes more than doubled in just five years, the minimum wage was also raised and so were pensions while investment in housing and consumer goods greatly improved the standard of living,

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[1300] A. Nove, 'The Industrial Planning System: Reforms in Prospect', *Soviet Studies*, 14/1 (1962), pp. 1-2 — G. Grossman, 'The Structure and Organization of the Soviet Economy', *Slavic Review*, 21/2 (1962), p. 217 — R.W. Davies, 'Economic Planning in the USSR', p. 31.

[1301] Cattell, 'Local Government and the Sovnarkhoz in the USSR, 1957-1962', p. 441 — Z. Mieczkowski, 'The 1962-1963 Reforms in Soviet Economic Regionalization', *Slavic Review*, 24/ 3 (1965), pp. 492-493.

[1302] J.A. Armstrong, 'Party Bifurcation and Elite Interests', *Soviet Studies*, 17/4 (1966), p. 421.

[1303] KPSS, *XXII s"yezd*, iii, p. 344.

[1304] V.S. Pronina, 'O prirode gosudarstvennykh komitetov v SSSR', *Sovetskoye gosudarstvo i pravo*, 11 (1963), p. 41.

[1305] Nove, 'Prospects for Economic Growth in the U.S.S.R.', p. 546.

[1306] M. Dobson, 'Contesting the Paradigms of De-Stalinization. Readers' Responses to "One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich"', *Slavic Review*, 64/3 (2005), p. 600.

alongside health and educational provisions. [1307] Moreover, notwithstanding a vicious anti-religious campaign, [1308] there was no return to mass violence, as the broader public was simultaneously neither hit by indiscriminate campaigns, nor granted any substantial additional freedoms and rights. [1309]

Yet, Khrushchev's regionalisation failed. Nove had already argued in 1957 that since mandatory indicators, gross output as key plan-fulfilment indicator and the information system were left unchanged, the reform was "a step in the wrong direction, or at best a step sideways. [1310] What it did was substitute the central Ministries' departmentalism with the Sovnarchozy's localism. [1311] Khrushchev took concrete steps in the broader deployment of economic levers as indicators of enterprises' efficiency, but the criticism of the gross output indicator remained only partial, while attempts at drafting new prices were discontinuous and ultimately inconclusive. Debates on reforming economics did flourish and concrete albeit limited experiments were attempted, but both Soviet and Western economists realised by the early 1960s that what was needed was a more coordinated and less erratic attempt at economic reform.

Khrushchev's Virgin Lands extensification campaign, whose goals he optimistically expanded from 13 mln hectares of new farmed land to 28-30, was also unsuccessful. The same was true for his broader agricultural policy, which put additional economic pressure on the kolkhozes, unmatched by procurement prices, and caused the dispersion and mismanagement of machinery. [1312]

[1307] Davies, *Soviet Economic Development from Lenin to Khrushchev*, pp. 68-71.

[1308] T.A. Chumachenko (ed and trans by E.E. Roslof), *Church and State in Soviet Russia: Russian Orthodoxy from World War II to the Khrushchev years* (New York, 2002), Chp. 3.

[1309] R. Hornsby, *Protest, Reform and Repression in Khrushchev's Soviet Union* (Cambridge, 2013), pp. 284-285.

[1310] Nove, *An Economic History of the USSR*, p. 368.

[1311] D.A. Dyker, *Restructuring the Soviet Economy* (London, 1992), pp. 45-46.

[1312] M. McCauley, *Khrushchev and the Development of Soviet Agriculture. The Virgin Land Programme 1953-1964* (London, Basingstoke, 1976), p. 217-220.

In all, despite the continuous growth of Soviet agricultural output, production efficiency remained a crucial problem, as increase in the capital intensity of production proceeded slowly, whilst levels of output per worker remained low. [1313] Economic growth also slowed down between 1950-1960 and 1960-1970, from 6.0% to 5.1% according to US estimates and from 10.1% to 7% according to Soviet ones, together with labour and capital productivity. [1314]

As of 1964, the grievances against Khrushchev were countless: administrative chaos angered both Moscow officials and local cadres, while the First Secretary's foreign policy and leadership style were condemned as adventurism and personalism by a growing fraction within the leadership. On 13-14 October, after Suslov's careful preparatory work, the CC voted Khrushchev out.

Two days later, *Pravda* announced the instalment of what became known as the "Brezhnev-Kosygin" leadership, who were elected respectively as Party and State heads, while N.V. Podgorny would replace Mikoyan as Chairman of the Supreme Soviet in December. This group of three, plus Politburo and Secretariat members Suslov, Kirilenko and Shelepin became the new Soviet collective leadership. Crucially, the same *Pravda* edition also carried the statement that said leadership intended to firmly proceed in conformity with the decisions taken at the 20th, 21st and 22nd Party Congresses. [1315] This, as the *New York Times* noted, appeared to indicate a continuation of peaceful coexistence and economic reform, with "no return to Stalin's dictatorial policies". [1316]

[1313] Harrison, 'Soviet Agriculture and Industrialisation', pp. 200-201, 207-208.

[1314] Gregory, Stuart, '*Russian and Soviet Economic Performance and Structure*', pp. 210, 213

[1315] *Pravda*, 16 October 1964, p. 1.

[1316] *New York Times*, 16 October 1964, pp. 1-14.

As die-hard Stalinists around the world were celebrating the fall of Khrushchev, [1317] on 1 November an authoritative *Pravda* editorial reconfirmed in a stronger fashion the backing for economic reform. [1318] An even clearer sign came from the *Izvestiya*'s Sunday supplement, which revealed that a decree to extend the *Bolshevichka* and *Mayak* experiment to a third of Soviet clothing and shoe enterprises was being worked out. [1319] Shortly after, *Pravda* reported on the successes at the two firms and on 18 November it ran a first-page article on the evils of over-centralisation. [1320]

On 6 December *Pravda* carried yet another authoritative editorial, which strongly supported not only economic reform, modern science-based management and experiments at self-management, but also focusing the Party specifically on political leadership, furthering detente as well as the USSR's entrance in the world market to obtain advanced technology. [1321] According to F. Burlatsky, then at the CC International Relations Department, this article contained the general lines of a more detailed proposal submitted by Secretariat member Y.V. Andropov to both Kosygin and Brezhnev. [1322]

This proposal was supposedly entirely at odds with one put forward by Shelepin, regarded as the most prominent figure of the Stalinist faction in the Party. [1323] Both plans were however turned down by the new leadership. [1324]

[1317] K. Gossweiler, *Contro il Revisionismo. Da Chruščëv a Gorbačëv: saggi, diari e documenti* (Milano, 2009), pp. 485, 511, 530.

[1318] *Pravda*, 1 November 1964, p. 1

[1319] *Izvestiya*, 1 November 1964, p. 2

[1320] *Pravda*, 15 November 1964, p. 1 — *Pravda*, 18 November 1964, p. 1.

[1321] *Pravda*, 6 December 1964, p. 1.

[1322] F. Burlatsky, 'Brezhnev i Krusheniye Ottepeli. Razmyshleniya o prirode politicheskogo liderstva', *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, 14 September 1988, p. 13.

[1323] W.J. Tompson, *The Soviet Union Under Brezhnev* (Oxford, New York, 2014), p. 151.

[1324] Burlatsky, 'Brezhnev i Krusheniye Ottepeli. Razmyshleniya o prirode politicheskogo liderstva', *Literaturnaya Gazeta* — A. Knight, 'The Party, The KGB, and Soviet Policy-Making', *Washington Quarterly*, 11/2 (1988).

In the meantime, as Khrushchev's Party bifurcation was done away with, [1325] calls to broaden economic reform continued. [1326] In early 1965, *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta* reconfirmed that a "substantial number of enterprises of light industry" was soon to adopt the *Bolshevichka* and *Mayak* system. [1327]

At this point, the "nearly disastrous split" between "optimal planning" and Libermanism had been definitely averted. [1328] As Fedorenko clearly affirmed that "the utilisation of economic levers and incentive methods, on the one hand, and the organisation of optimal planning, on the other […] are intimately and indissolubly linked". [1329]

In March 1965, after 300 economists agreed on the necessity of "more sophisticated indicators" and on "enhancing the role" of profitability, [1330] a CC Plenum approved the transfer of 400 consumer goods industries to the new system. [1331] In the same month, Kosygin delivered a landmark speech at Gosplan, vowing to "free the planning process from antiquated principles and plan in accordance with the true interests of the economy". The plan, Kosygin continued "should be the creative combination of initiatives and proposals of local authorities with the rational economic projections of central planning bodies" and should strive for "the greatest result at the lowest cost". [1332]

[1325] Armstrong, 'Party Bifurcation and Elite Interests', pp. 427-428.

[1326] *Pravda*, 15 November 1964, p. 1 — *Pravda*, 21 December 1964, p. 21.

[1327] 'Pryamyye Dogovory Rasshiryayutsya', *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, 3 (1965), p. 1.

[1328] Greenslade, 'The Soviet Economic System in Transition', pp. 1-17.

[1329] *Pravda*, 17 January 1965, pp. 2-3.

[1330] 'Sovershenstvovaniye pokazateli planirovaniya predpriyatiy', *Voprosy ekonomiki*, 3 (1965), p. 139.

[1331] *Pravda*, 27 March 1965, pp. 1-4.

[1332] A.N. Kosygin, 'Povysheniye nation obosnovannosti plan - vazhneyshaya zadachi planovykh organich. Vystupleniye Predsedatel' Soveta Ministrov SSSR A. N. Kosygin na zasedanii Gosplana SSSR 19 marta 1965 goda', *Planovoe khozyaistvo*, 4 (1965), pp. 1-4.

The Soviet Premier openly stated that “we must have a scientific forecast on the development of each industry […] to know in what direction to develop the plan”, adding that the planners’ task was to “analyse the established proportions in the national economy, to discover the causes of nonconformities”. Kosygin also paid much attention to “perspective planning” and pointed to the importance of observing economic laws and relying on material stimulation. [1333] Once again, many of such statements powerfully resonated with Voznesensky’s 1940s proposals.

In June, *Pravda* reported from a conference at the Moscow State University, titling its article “Plan, Profits, Bonuses”, just as Liberman’s 1962 one. One of the key issues discussed was the “internal market” and participants agreed that “you can not solve the problems of the structure of industry, the organisation of production, determine the direction of industrial development, not knowing the capacity and needs of the market, the laws and prospects for its development”. [1334]

As Western public interest for Soviet economic debates was mounting, commentators continuously referred to their “capitalist overtones”, [1335] while *Time Magazine* dedicated Liberman its front cover on 12 February, portraying him right in front of a Soviet coat of arms, which however belonged not to a flag, but to a giant rouble coin. “The Communist Flirtation with Profits” was the main story. [1336]

Yet, if the breakthrough of Libermanism appeared more than ever an undeniable reality, further controversies surrounded the headways made by “optimal planning”. Indeed, in early 1965 the proposal to assign the Lenin Prize to Kantorovich, Nemchinov and Novozhilov caused a general outcry amongst Soviet economists. First mention that the three economists would be considered

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[1333] Ibid., pp. 4-5.

[1334] *Pravda*, 23 June 1965, p. 2.

[1335] *New York Times*, 28 March 1965, p. 10.

[1336] *Time Magazine*, 12 February, 1965.

for the Prize was made by *Pravda* on 18 February, [1337] while the announcement that they had actually received it followed on 22 April. [1338]

The *New York Times* correctly predicted in March a resulting “clash between Soviet economists”, which as a matter of fact had already materialised inFebruary. [1339] Indeed, two dozens of Soviet economists, headed by Ostrovityanov and Strumilin wrote to Suslov and denounced what they called “a very serious situation” and “the possibility of a mistaken act - the awarding of the Lenin Prize for works containing anti-Marxist, revisionist concepts in political economy, against which Lenin fought”. [1340] A second letter was sent to Ilicev and there the economists reassured that “the work on the application of mathematics in the economy is being implemented and will be carried out, based on the basis of Marxist-Leninist political economy, and not against it, as Kantorovich strives for”. [1341] In a third letter, an annex to the first communication to the CC, several articles published on Western press celebrating Kantorovich and Novozhilov were even attached as further proof of their anti-Marxism. [1342]

[1337] *Pravda*, 18 February 1965, p. 2.

[1338] *Pravda*, 22 April 1965, p. 2.

[1339] *New York Times*, 21 March 1965, p. 5.

[1340] ARAN, f. 1877, op. 8, d. 454, ll. 2-8.

[1341] ARAN, f. 1877, op. 8, d. 454, ll. 9, 11-12.

[1342] ARAN, f. 1877, op. 8, d. 454, ll. 13, 19-27.

Chapter 5. - The 1965 economic Kosygin reform, 1965-1971

The fifth and final chapter entirely focuses on the 1965 economic reform, reaching up to its reversal in the early 1970s. Four subsections detail economic realities as of the reform's launch, its content, the debates that unfolded during its implementation and its failure. A final subsection further divided into four parts presents in detail the similarities between the 1965 reform and policies conceptualised, debated and implemented in the late 1940s under Voznesensky as well as the way he himself was remembered in the era of the "treadmill of reforms". [1343]

5.1. — Political and economic realities on the eve of the 1965 reform

As of the mid-1960s, the Soviet economy was still on a catching-up path with capitalism, [1344] with six times as many workers employed in industry and twenty times as many graduates as it had in 1928. [1345] Yet, quoting Greenslade's metaphor, the horse had suddenly gone lame in the late 1950s, [1346] which the Soviets blamed on over-centralisation and ineffectiveness of plan indicators, [1347] coupled by the administrative chaos and localism. [1348] Western analyses instead

[1343] Schroeder, 'The Soviet Economy on a Treadmill of "reforms"', pp. 312-340.

[1344] M. Harrison, 'Economic Growth and Slowdown', in E. Bacon, M. Sandel (eds), *Brezhnev Reconsidered* (London, 2002), p. 45.

[1345] Davies, *Soviet Economic Development from Lenin to Khrushchev*, p. 78.

[1346] Greenslade, 'The Soviet Economic System in Transition', pp. 1-17.

[1347] Nove, *Political Economy and Soviet Socialism*, pp. 155-165.

[1348] P.O. Aven, 'Economic reform in a bargaining economy', in Kovacs, Tardos, *Reform and Transformation in Eastern Europe.*, p. 115.

pointed ever more markedly to worsening efficiency problems, [1349] with V.V. Leont'yev ironically characterising the Soviet economy as an “input-input system”. [1350] A clear statistical representation of such problems was that whereas in 1950-58 each additional ruble invested yielded half a ruble of product, in the following eight years that decrease markedly to only one third of a rouble. [1351]

Several Western economists had been prefiguring since the onset of the Liberman debate in 1962 the possibility of a coordinated reform of prices, bonuses and planning, yielding, as Nove stated, “much-needed genuine decentralisation”. [1352] Yet, a conservative reaction was considered an equally credible outcome since 1963 already. [1353]

Brezhnev, who Burlatsky said “embodied the exact opposite of Khrushchev’s boldness, willingness to take risks, adventurous spirit, and hunger for novelty and change”, did indeed not seem prone to reform. He instead displayed the attitude of an “oblast-level *apparatchik*” and “arrived [to power] without his own programme for the country’s development”. [1354]

The main political force behind reform therefore became Kosygin, described by his personal assistant Y. Firsov as “the most experienced [leader] in the management of the economy”. [1355] V.V. Grishin, Moscow Party boss and Politburo member, spoke of him as “an attentive and

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[1349] Hardt, Gallik, Treml, 'Institutional Stagnation and Changing Economic Strategy in the Soviet Union’, pp. 33-40.

[1350] A. Bergson, A. Erlich, H.S. Levine, G.W. Nutter, S. Wellisz and H.L. Roberts, ‘Soviet Economic Performance and Reform. Some Problems of Analysis and Prognosis (A Round-Table Discussion)’, *Slavic Review*, 25/ 2 (1966), pp. 233-234.

[1351] G.E. Schroeder, 'Soviet Economic ‘Reforms'. A Study in Contradictions’, *Soviet Studies*, 20/1 (1968), pp. 1-21. p. 2.

[1352] Nove, 'The Industrial Planning System’, p. 14.

[1353] Nove, ‘Prospects for Economic Growth in the U.S.S.R.’, pp. 552-553.

[1354] Burlatsky, ‘Brezhnev i Krusheniye Ottepeli. Razmyshleniya o prirode politicheskogo liderstva’, *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, p. 13.

[1355] Y. Firsov, ‘Kosygin i yego vremya’, in Gvishiani (ed), *Fenomen Kosygina*, p. 165.

sensitive person […] distinguished by high culture, cordiality, decency, sociability" and again as "a great statesman [who] had a deep knowledge economy of the Soviet Union and skilfully guided it". [1356] Kosygin's personal qualities were also confirmed by B.E. Paton, President of the Ukrainian National Academy. [1357] Recent scholarship mirrors such opinions, [1358] whilst Kosygin is portrayed as more of a standard Soviet bureaucrat, albeit less so if compared to Brezhnev, by sources more sympathetic to Khrushchev. [1359]

Quoting his own words, Kosygin's basic thought was that "our economic system has to be taken serious care of, but it is and will remain the foundation. We can not, of course, chase with the police every grandmother who knitted a hat or socks for sale. The initiative of the people has to throw out of the plans all indicators of secondary importance - this will not undermine the foundations of socialism". [1360] The Soviet Premier supposedly used to say of himself "I'm not a politician. I am an engineer, the chief engineer if you like". [1361]

According to Grishin, Kosygin had a "working and comradely relationship" with the other top leaders. Yet, although Brezhnev supposedly "appreciated [Kosygin's] experience and ability to lead the Government […] did not want to put up with his independence and pronounced sense of self-esteem". [1362]

[1356] V.V. Grishin, *Ot Khrushcheva do Gorbacheva. Politicheskiye Portrety. Memuary* (Moscow, 1996), pp. 72-73.

[1357] Popov et. al., *100 let so dnya rozhdeniya*, p. 12.

[1358] N. Chernyshova, *Soviet Consumer Culture in the Brezhnev Era* (London, 2013), p. 23.

[1359] S. Khrushchev, *Nikita Khrushchev. Reformator* (Moscow, 2010), pp. 710-712, 910-911.

[1360] Quoted in V. Novikov, 'Kak Tovarishchi, Yedinomyshlenniki', in Fetisov, *Prem'yer Izvestny i Neizvestny*, p. 118.

[1361] Quoted in T. Oizerman, 'Glavny khozyaystvennik i ekonomist strany', in Fetisov, *Prem'yer Izvestny i Neizvestny*, p. 221.

[1362] V.V. Grishin, 'On ne zaigryval s lyud'mi', in Gvishiani, *Fenomen Kosygina*, p. 243.

5.2. — The September 1965 CC Plenum

The September 1965 CC Plenum seemed to indicate that the Soviet leadership had uncompromisingly chosen the path of reform. Viewed in retrospect, Kosygin's report there was the starting point of an interminable list of partial and failed reforms. Yet, in the mid-1960s it was an event of momentous importance which generated much interest worldwide. Western press defined the Soviet Premier's plans as "sweeping", [1363] a "revolution", [1364] "the first structural recasting of the house that Stalin began to build in 1928". [1365] Kosygin's report was already linked straight away with "the so-called Liberman 'profit' proposals" when only its title was known. [1366]

At the Plenum, Kosygin affirmed the reform rested on a "new approach", deriving from Khrushchev's removal and readily admitted that, as reforming economists repeated since years, "the advantages and potentialities offered by the socialist system of economy are still far from being utilised in full". [1367]

The concrete aims of the reform were to "abolish the improperly excessive regulation of enterprises' economic activities", even establishing "firm legal guarantees" for their autonomy. To do so, Kosygin spoke of the necessity to move towards "optimum utilisation" and of "rising the technical standards of production and its efficiency" as well as of the importance of profit and cost indicators. [1368]

[1363] New York Times, 28 September 1965, p. 1 — *South China Morning Post*, 29 September, 1965, p. 1

[1364] M. Goldman. 'Economic Revolution in the Soviet Union', *Foreign Affairs*, 45/2 (1965), p. 194 — J.P. Hardt, 'Choices facing the Soviet planner', in Footman, Kaser (eds), *Soviet affairs*, pp. 38-39.

[1365] *The Washington Post*, 29 September 1965, p. 13.

[1366] *The Washington Post*, 28 September 1965, p. 1.

[1367] *Pravda*, 28 September 1965, pp. 1-4.

[1368] Ibid.

One of the key elements of the reform was institutional recentralisation: all *Sovnarchozy* and the Supreme Council of the National Economy were abolished, while Gossnab, and Ministries at all levels re-established. [1369]

Enhanced autonomy for enterprises was another core policy. Compulsory indices were reduced from thirty to nine: sales — replacing gross production and expressing "actually marketed production" — , wages, profits, rate of profit, State budget payments and grants, technological innovation as well as centralised investment, material-technical supply and production mix. These latter three ones represented the main continuation of centralism, but Kosygin himself stated that "the volume of profit to a considerable extent characterises the contribution of each enterprise to the net income of the country". [1370]

Enterprises' incentive funds system were also restructured, now comprising a "material incentive fund", a "socio-cultural fund" and a "production development fund", which would manage a substantial part of the enterprises' total profits upon fulfilment of profit and sales targets. Lower payment would have been made in case of under-fulfilment, while if targets were over fulfilled, additional payments were made, but reduced by 30% for above-plan output. This put an end to the previous system whereby larger payments, not exceeding 5.5% of the wages fund, were made to a single fund in case of over-fulfilment, therefore indirectly pushing enterprises to request lower plans and target production for the achievement of maximum payments.

[1369] *Pravda*, 3 October 1965, p. 1.

[1370] The description of the 1965 reform features in the coming page relies on the following sources: Ellmann, *Economic Reform in the Soviet Union*, pp. 289-292 — Sutela, *Economic Thought and Economic Reform in the Soviet Union*, pp. 70-74 — Dyker, *Restructuring the Soviet Economy*, pp. 48-52 — Davis, 'Economic Planning in the USSR', p. 15 — E.A. Hewett, *Reforming the Soviet Economy. Equality versus Efficiency* (Washington, 1988), p. 230-233 — E.G. Liberman, *Economic Methods and the Effectiveness of Production* (White Plains, 1971), pp. 15-17 — Chernyshova, *Soviet Consumer Culture in the Brezhnev Era*, pp. 20-29 — W. Keizer, *The Soviet quest for economic rationality. The conflict of economic and political aims in the Soviet economy, 1953-1968* (Rotterdam, 1971), pp. 128-132.

Furthermore, enterprises were now charged an interest rate on fixed and working capital (6% of their value), to be paid from profits and were allowed to establish direct connections for the trade of certain materials and equipment, although this was not further specified. Limited more radical marketisation measures and decentralisation were to be implemented in minor sub-sectors.

A wholesale prices reform was also announced, meant to eliminate enterprises running on planned losses. According to Liberman, new prices should "reflect socially necessary labour outlays […], assure the compensation of production costs and the accumulation of profit by every normally functioning enterprise […], stimulate an improvement in the quality of production and in the expected service life and reliability of products". [1371]

The CC resolution which approved Kosygin's report condemned "the prevalence of administrative methods to the detriment of economic ones" and vowed to "combine integrated state planning with full self-sufficiency of the enterprises". [1372]

Few days after Kosygin's report, the new *Statute on the Socialist State Production Enterprise* was published, naming the enterprise itself as "the basic unit of the national economy", whose operation was based on "a combination of central management and economic independence and initiative". [1373]

In all, according to Liberman, the reform was aimed at: "raising the scientific level of planning, the optimisation of planning, and the intensification of the role of long-term plans and norms; eliminating excessive regulation of the economic activity of enterprises and allocating the necessary means to develop their production; strengthening and developing *khozraschet* and

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[1371] Liberman, *Economic Methods and the Effectiveness of Production*, p. 17.

[1372] *Pravda*, 1 October 1965, pp. 1-2.

[1373] *Polozheniye o sotsialisticheskom gosudarstvennom proizvodstvennom predpriyatii* (Moscow, 1965), p. 4.

intensifying economic production incentives with the aid of prices, profits, bonuses, and credit; converting to the branch principle of industrial management". [1374]

Therefore, ideally, an enterprise was to function as follows: "the enterprise, engaging in planned production and economic activity under cost-accounting, will secure, in the interests of the national economy, maximum results at minimum expenditures of labour, material and financial resources, will make the best use of production capabilities, internal reserves, land and other natural resources at its disposal, will strictly observe a policy of thrift, will introduce the latest discoveries of science, technology […] and raise the profitability of production". [1375]

5.3. — The implementation of the reform and further debate

The 1965 reform was triumphantly celebrated by the Soviet press as "wise and balanced", "realistic" and "strictly scientific". [1376] Birman even called it together with NEP and Great Break "the third in terms of significance for the entire forty-eight years of the existence of the Soviet state". [1377]

Yet, if Kosygin further emerged as the reform's key sponsor, the attitude of the other two top leaders was lukewarm at best. Podgorny, soon to become Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium, commented in mid-1965: "why the hell do we need this reform? Did we develop poorly or what?". [1378] Brezhnev instead responded to Kosygin's Plenum report as follows: "what

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[1374] Liberman, *Economic Methods and the Effectiveness of Production*, pp. 10-11.

[1375] Ibid., pp. 7-8.

[1376] *Pravda*, 21 November, 1965, p. 3 — L.M. Gatovskiy, Yedinstvo plana i khozyaystvennogo rascheta, *Kommunist*, 15 (1965), p. 4 — *Pravda*, 29 October 1965, p. 2.

[1377] A.M. Birman, 'Mysli posle Plenuma', *Novyy mir*, 12 (1965), p. 194.

[1378] Quoted in N.K.Baybakov, *Sorok let v pravitel'stve* (Moscow, 1993). p. 111.

is he thinking of? Reform, reform. Who needs it, who can understand it? We need to work better, that is the only problem". [1379]

Meanwhile, as the reform moved its first steps, some Western scholars believed that its "extreme variant" could have led to a radical remodelling of the whole Soviet system. Yet, these same scholars immediately recognised that Soviet attitude towards reform was "cautions and equivocal", while changes introduced in 1965 were "minimal". [1380] Others more markedly affirmed that systemic change in the USSR as result of reform was a mirage, [1381] pointing to the likeliness of a conservative reaction. [1382] Already as of 1966 the reform was defined by a vast majority of Western scholars as too "timid", [1383] as it did not include the most radical proposals voiced in 1962-1964. [1384]

In the USSR, as economists more fully realised the sheer magnitude of the task, the first developments proved encouraging: out of the first forty-three enterprises transferred to the new mechanism, thirty-two increased 1966 planned sales by almost 25 mln roubles. [1385] Liberman himself reported that in 1965-66 enterprises "on their own initiative" increased planned sales and profits by 300 and 130 mln roubles respectively, which meant an additional 34 mln roubles paid

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[1379] Burlatsky, 'Brezhnev i Krusheniye Ottepeli. Razmyshleniya o prirode politicheskogo liderstva', *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, p. 13.

[1380] Goldman, 'Economic Revolution in the Soviet Union', p. 194 — M. Goldman, 'The Economy at the Crossroads', *Survey*, 57 (1965), p. 131 — Hardt, 'Choices facing the Soviet planner', pp. 38-39, 43 — Hardt, Gallik, Treml, 'Institutional Stagnation and Changing Economic Strategy in the Soviet Union', p. 58.

[1381] A. Bergson, et. al., 'Soviet Economic Performance and Reform', p. 222 — Felker, *Soviet Economic Controversies*, p. 159.

[1382] Grossman, 'Economic Reforms. A Balance Sheet', pp. 54-55.

[1383] E. Zaleski, *Planning Reforms in the Soviet Union. 1962-1966* (Chapel Hill, 1966), pp. 190-191 — Greenslade, 'The Soviet Economic System in Transition', pp. 8, 17.

[1384] A. Bergson, et. al., 'Soviet Economic Performance and Reform', pp. 223-224.

[1385] R. Krylov, L. Rotshtein, D. Tsarev, 'O Poryadke i usloviyakh perekhoda k novoy sisteme', *Planovoe Khoziastvo*, 4 (1966), p. 56.

into the enterprises' incentive funds. As a result, the material incentive fund grew of 80%, the housing and construction one of 60% and the production development one of 210%. [1386]

In general, 1966 saw an above-average performance of reformed enterprises, whose sales, profits and labour productivity increased respectively by 11%, 23.3% and 8%, while the industrial sector taken as a whole registered a growth in those same indicators of 8.6%, 10% and 5%. [1387] By 1967, 704 enterprises employing more than 2 million workers had been converted to the new system and they replicated almost exactly the performance of 1966. [1388] Western scholars were however quick to pick up on the fact that "uncovered hidden reserves", "sale of surplus equipment and reduction in inventories" played a key part in bringing about these results. [1389]

By late 1967 the enterprises operating under the new system became 5.500, accounting for roughly one-third of total industrial output and almost half of total profit, and this number grew to 7.000 by December 1967. [1390]

Yet, the gap between enterprises operating under the new and old system narrowed, [1391] while pressure from economists to radicalise the reform started mounting. Fedorenko demanded to "further enhance the effectiveness of reform", better regulating decentralised relations between centre and enterprises and reforming the information as well as the price system. [1392] Instead, conservatives promptly counterattacked stating that "economic reform is based on a further

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[1386] Liberman, *Economic Methods and the Effectiveness of Production*, pp. 19-20.

[1387] Schroeder, 'Soviet Economic 'Reforms'', pp. 1-21. p. 7.

[1388] *Soviet Economic Performance: 1966-67. Materials Prepared for the Subcommittee on Foreign Economic Policy of the Joint Economic Committee. Congress of the United States. May 1968* (Washington, 1968) — Schroeder, 'Soviet Economic 'Reforms'', pp. 7, 21.

[1389] Schroeder, 'Soviet Economic 'Reforms'', pp. 1-21. p. 9.

[1390] Ibid., p. 21.

[1391] *Soviet Economic Performance: 1966-67*.

[1392] N. Fedorenko, 'Reforma v promyshlennosti: pervye itogi, problemy povysheniya yeye deystvennosti', *Planovoe khozyaistvo*, 4 (1967), pp. 5, 8-9, 14, 17.

improvement of the most important principles of socialist management […] which stem from the essence of scientific socialism, the objective laws of the socialist mode of production". [1393]

As of 1968, criticism for the slow progress in reform implementation and calls to further it multiplied. [1394] Birman thought that the "essence of the reform" should have been to "expand independence, enhance interest, reinforce entrepreneurship" He powerfully noted how "bravery is not only indispensable to cosmonauts and divers, but, even if in a less evident form, is necessary also for Gosplan functionaries to refuse the satisfaction of orders, including the most valid and urgent ones, if there exist no real possibilities for their satisfaction or if their inclusion in the plan would cause disproportions". [1395]

However, while the frustration of several Soviet economists for the paucity of attained results became increasingly obvious to Western experts, [1396] Campbell wondered already in 1968 whether Soviet economic reforms were not "something of a hoax", replicating since over a decade while "problems do not seem to change much". [1397]

In the meantime however, at least nominally, the reform was still progressing: by April 1969, 32.000 enterprises producing 77% of all industrial output had been converted to the new system and the previous year the conversion of all administration to *khozraschet* was completed. [1398] In the consumer goods industry, "direct links" were established between factories and shops or wholesale firms on the basis of orders. In 1966-70 consumer goods output rose to 49%,

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[1393] A. Bachurin, 'K 50-letiyu Velikoy Oktyabr'skoy revolyutsii, *Planovoe khotiaistvo*, 10 (1967), p. 14.

[1394] Dyker, *Restructuring the Soviet Economy*, p. 66.

[1395] A.M. Birman, 'Sut' reformy', *Novyy mir*, 12 (1968), pp. 187, 199.

[1396] *Soviet Economic Performance: 1966-67*, p. 144 — M. Tatu, 'Economics and Politics-Soviet Reforms', *Problems of Communism*, 15/1 (1966), p. 28.

[1397] Campbell, 'Economic Reform in the U.S.S.R.', p. 547.

[1398] Ibid.

compared to 36% of 1961-65, for the first time faster than heavy industry's one. [1399] In 1969 Sorokin proudly announced that since the reform was launched, in comparison with the 1961-1965 period, industrial production had grown 38.6%, agricultural production 18%, net national income 31% and per capita income 25.9%. [1400]

Signs of persisting centralism were however clearly perceivable and as little was being done to organise of wholesale markets for capital goods, [1401] strict central oversight of construction was strengthened — investment schemes valued more than 2.5 ml roubles were to be approved by SovMin, while those between 1 and 2.5 ml roubles by related Ministries. [1402]

By late 1969, according to the original 1965 plans, time had almost come to consider concluded the reform's first "extensive" stage, focused on transferring enterprises to the new system, and to launch the second "intensive" stage. [1403]

Birman, although he affirmed that the reform was only in its "initial stages", considered the results achieved concrete enough to launch the "second phase", focusing on "the development of a complex and universal system of economic management, which incorporates all these spheres and echelons of economic activity". [1404]

[1399] Chernyshova, *Soviet Consumer Culture in the Brezhnev Era*, pp. 25, 27.

[1400] G.M. Sorokin, 'Economic Reform in the USSR. Improvement in Planning and Utilisation of Commodity-Money Relations', in M. Kaser, R. Portes (eds), *Planning and Market Relations. Proceedings of a Conference held by the International Economic Association at Liblice, Czechoslovakia* (London, 1971), p. 162.

[1401] Sutela, *Economic Thought and Economic Reform in the Soviet Union*, p. 70.

[1402] M.C. Kaser, 'The Economy. A General Assessment', in A. Brown, M.C. Kaser (eds), *The Soviet Union Since the Fall of Khrushchev* (London, 1975), p. 209.

[1403] G.E. Schroeder, 'Recent Developments in Soviet Planning' in (ed) *Soviet Economic Prospects for the Seventies. A Compendium of Papers Submitted to the Joint Economic Committee. Congress of the United States. June 27, 1973* (Washington, 1973), p. 12.

[1404] A.M. Birman, 'Samaya blagodarnaya zadacha', *Novyy mir,* 12 (1969), pp. 190.

Shortly after, Liberman reiterated that “reform has taken only its first successful steps”, frankly admitting that the problems were many. Ministries kept on sending additional compulsory indices and production was still often planned and evaluated according to gross output index. Supply was discontinuous and coordination flimsy, while at the enterprises sales were often rewarded rather than profitability and incentive funds were misused. [1405]

Although reforming economists were still hopeful, no “second phase” would ever be launched. [1406] Indeed, already since 1968, ominous signs that a shift towards conservatism was incoming multiplied. The Warsaw Pact crushed the Czechoslovak reforming leadership and Brezhnev expounded his notorious “doctrine”. [1407] At that point, even if fears of a rehabilitation of Stalin dated back to Khrushchev’s removal, [1408] when two articles openly praising the *vozhd* appeared on *Kommunist*, [1409] many feared the moment had come. [1410] Some even put their disdain in writing. [1411]

[1405] Liberman, *Economic Methods and the Effectiveness of Production*, pp. 30, 35-41.

[1406] V. Novozhilov, ‘O Probleme Razvitiya teorii optimalnogo planirovaniya na sovremennom etape’, *Voprosy ekonomiki*, 10 (1970), pp. 51-53, 60.

[1407] *Pravda*, 26 September 1968, pp. 1-2.

[1408] D. Pospielovsky, ‘Restalinization or Destalinization?’, *The Russian Review*, 27/3 (1968), pp. 307-308.

[1409] E. Boltin, ‘Kritika i bibliografiya’, *Kommunist*, 2 (1969) — V. Golikov, S. Murashov, I. Chhikvishvili, P. Shatagin, S. Maumyan, ‘Za leninskuyu partiynost' v osveshchenii istorii KPSS’, *Kommunist*, 3 (1969).

[1410] P. Ostellino, *Roy Medvedev. Intervista sul dissenso in Urss* (Bari, 1977), pp. 39-40.

[1411] L. Petrovskii, ‘Pis'mo v tsk KPSS o reabilitatsii Stalina. March 5, 1969’, in A. Poiter, P Dornan (eds), *Sobranie dokumentov samizdata* (2 vols, München, 1972-1978), ii, ACN°130 — R. Medvedev, ‘Vozmozhno li segodnya reabilitirovat' Stalina? Otkrytoye pis'mo k zhurnal “Kommunist”. April 3, 1969’, in Poiter, Dornan (eds), Sobraniye dokumentov samizdata, ii, ACN°131.

Therefore, by the early 1970s, while the Warsaw Pact-wide "second wave of reforms" was fading away, [1412] Western scholars almost unanimously defined the Soviet reform as "far too limited" or "conservative", [1413] retrospectively agreeing that its "cause" was lost by 1968-1970. [1414]

By 1971, although 83% of total enterprises had shifted to the new system, almost completing the "extensive phase", results in industrial growth and factor productivity were scant. [1415] On the economic press it was now more and more insistently repeated that "the point here is not to shift the centre of planning, not to strengthen the decentralisation [but] improving the entire system of planned economic management of the country with the necessary strengthening of the Leninist principle of democratic centralism". [1416]

5.4. — The failure of the 1965 reform

The 1965 reform failed to prevent further growth slowdown. According to Soviet statistics national income grew by 7.7% a year in 1965-1970, as opposed to 6.5% in 1960-1965, but fell to 5.7% in 1970-1975. Western analysts instead estimated Soviet national income growth in 1965-1970 as 4.9%, only 0.1% higher than in the previous five years, and that of 1970-1975 as 3%. Furthermore, capital productivity had fallen to -3% in 1960-1965 and, after climbing back to

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[1412] W. Brus, 'The East European Reforms. What Happened to Them?', *Soviet Studies*, 31/2 (1979), p. 262 — H.-H. Hönmann, 'Economic Reform in the 1970s - policy with no alternatives', in A. Nove, H.-H. Hönmann, G. Seidenstecher (eds) *The East European Economies in the 1970s* (London, 1982), p. 2 — K. Miklóssy, 'Competition as a Means of Systemic Modernisation in State Socialism', *Europe-Asia Studies*, 68/1 (2016), p. 67.

[1413] Ellmann, *Economic Reform in the Soviet Union*, p. 305 — Grossman, 'Economic Reforms. A Balance Sheet', p. 50 — Kaser, 'The Economy. A General Assessment', p. 209.

[1414] Schroeder, 'Soviet Economic 'Reforms'', pp. 18-19 — Dyker, *Restructuring the Soviet Economy*, p. 66-67 — Sutela, *Economic Thought and Economic Reform in the Soviet Union*, p. 72 — V. Kontorovich, 'Soviet economic reform', in SN. Durlauf, L. E. Blume (eds) *The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics*, 2nd ed, (Basingstoke, New York, 2008), p. 3.

[1415] Schroeder, 'Recent Developments in Soviet Planning', p. 12.

[1416] S. M. Yamtolskii et. al., *Ekonomicheskaya Nauka i Khozyaystvennaya Reforma* (Kiev, 1970), pp. 11-12.

-0.4% in the following five years, it plummeted to -2.7% in 1970-75. [1417] Kontorovich even argued that the 1965 reform "harmed the economy", negatively impacted economic performance and technological progress, also failing to address the issue of enterprises' self-interest. [1418] Harrison however countered this opinion arguing that no strong evidence supports the idea that economic reform damaged performance and that opposition to it or its discarding were "growth-promoting". [1419]

Of the original 1965 measures, only re-centralisation and partially the reformed bonus funds remained unaltered. Decentralisation of investment and reduction of mandatory targets were largely discarded, while wholesale trade and the operationalisation of Five-Year Plans were never attained. [1420]

During the Cold War, Western scholars debating reform failure pointed to "bureaucratic resistance", [1421] an opinion which remained dominant until the 1990s, [1422] as well as to weak support from the Soviet leadership, [1423] specifically from Brezhnev, [1424] an opinion shared by

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[1417] M. Harrison, 'Soviet Economic Growth Since 1928. The Alternative Statistics of G.I. Khanin', *Europe-Asia Studies*, 45/1 (1993), pp. 146, 151.

[1418] V. Kontorovich, 'Lessons of the 1965 Soviet Economic Reform', *Soviet Studies*, 40/2 (1988), pp. 309-311.

[1419] Harrison, 'Economic Growth and Slowdown', p. 58.

[1420] Kontorovich, 'Lessons of the 1965 Soviet Economic Reform', pp. 308-309.

[1421] Brus, 'The East European Reforms: What Happened to Them?', pp. 263-266 — *Soviet Economic Performance: 1966-67*, p. 131 — Schroeder, 'The Soviet Economy on a Treadmill of "reforms"', pp. 312-340.

[1422] J.F. Hough, 'The Gorbachev Reform. A Maximal Case', *Soviet Economy*, 2/4 (1986), p. 303.

[1423] D. Belkin, V. V. Ivanter, *Planovaya sbalansirovannost'. Ustanovleniye, podderzhaniye, effektivnost'* (Moscow 1983), p. 105 — E.G. Yasin, *Khozyaystvennye Sistemy i Radikal'naya Reforma* (Moscow, 1989), p. 100 — Sutela, *Economic Thought and Economic Reform in the Soviet Union*, p. 72 — P. Sutela, 'Reformability of the 'objective economic laws' of socialism', in Kovacs, Tadors (eds) *Reform and Transformation in Eastern Europe*, p. 161.

[1424] Dyker, *Restructuring the Soviet Economy*, pp. 66-67 — Yasin, *Khozyaystvennye Sistemy*, p. 101 — Kontorovich, 'Soviet economic reform', p. 6.

Gorbachev. [1425] Scholars also blamed the reform's internal inconsistency and complexity, [1426] the excessive speed at which umpteenth changes were introduced, [1427] the still unreformed information system, [1428] the contradictions between decentralisation and the re-establishment of highly empowered Ministries. [1429] Finally, Several scholars have argued since the 1960s that systemic incompatibility between reform policies and the command structure rendered any piecemeal change unworkable. [1430]

Retrospectively, the failure of the 1965 strategy spelled the broader failure of reform, which materialised alongside the strengthening of Brezhnev's power. In his rise as dominant leader, he had already resuscitated the Stalinist "Politburo" and "General Secretary" terminology and stabilised the nomenklatura with the "stability of cadres" policy. [1431] By the 1971 24th Congress, mention of the "collective leadership" had almost entirely faded away. [1432] Instead, the expression "Politburo led by Brezhnev" already entered common use, [1433] while Brezhnev himself and not Kosygin also announced several economic measures. [1434] Strong of his position,

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[1425] M.S. Gorbachev, Z. Mlynar, G. Shirver, *Conversation with Gorbachev. On perestroika, the Prague Spring, and the crossroads of socialism* (New York, Chichester, 2002) p. 32.

[1426] Davis, 'Economic Planning in the USSR', p. 15 — Yasin, *Khozyaystvennye Sistemy*, pp. 100, 105 — Schroeder, 'Soviet Economic 'Reforms'', p. 15.

[1427] Kaser, 'The Economy. A General Assessment', p. 196.

[1428] Hewett, *Reforming the Soviet Economy. Equality versus Efficiency*, pp. 240-242.

[1429] Sutela, *Economic Thought and Economic Reform in the Soviet Union*, p. 72 — Dyker, *Restructuring the Soviet Economy*, pp. 56-57, 59.

[1430] Grossman, 'Notes for a Theory of the Command Economy', pp. 118-119 — Greenslade, 'The Soviet Economic System in Transition', p. 17 — V. Kontorovich, 'Economists, Soviet economic reforms, and the collapse', *Europe-Asia Studies*, 53/5 (1999), p. 12 — Kontorovich, 'Lessons of the 1965 Soviet Economic Reform', p. 314.

[1431] Y. Gorlizki, 'Too Much Trust: Regional Party Leaders and Local Political Networks under Brezhnev', *Slavic Review*, 69/3 (2010), pp. 676, 697-698.

[1432] *Pravda*, 1 April 1971, pp. 2-4.

[1433] *Pravda*, 20 January 1971, pp. 1-2.

[1434] Y.-C. Ha, 'The Soviet Communist Party and Economic Reform. A Case Study', in S. Gomulka, Y.-C. Ha, C.-O. Kim (eds) *Economic Reforms in the Socialist World* (Basingstoke, 1989), p. 109.

Brezhnev strengthened the Party's one, [1435] as the 1977 Constitution called the CPSU "leading and guiding force of Soviet society". [1436]

The measures announced by Brezhnev in 1971 were launched only in 1973, with no mention of "reform". [1437] Scientific-production associations, not operating under *khozraschet,* became the intermediary echelon between enterprises and Ministries, [1438] adding to the level of endemic complexity, [1439] while simultaneously displeasing both Ministries and enterprises. [1440]

At the same time, the 1973 oil crisis and the increase in Soviet petroleum revenues convinced Brezhnev that imported Western technology could suffice to resolve economic problems. [1441] By 1979, when measures proposed in 1965 and never implemented were tabled again, [1442] economic reform had lost its meaning. [1443]

In the meantime, Brezhnev's cult of personality had become openly ridiculous. [1444] A Hero title and Marshal rank were bestowed on him as birthday presents in 1976, [1445] while he was even illegally assigned an Order of Victory in 1978. [1446] Although the Brezhnev era was not uniformly

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[1435] R.G. Wesson, *Lenin's Legacy. The Story of the CPSU* (Stanford, 1978), pp. 253-254.

[1436] *Konstitutsiya (Osnovnoy Zakon) Soyuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik* (Moscow, 1977), p. 15.

[1437] Y.-C. Ha, 'The Soviet Communist Party and Economic ReformThe Soviet Communist Party and Economic Reform. A Case Study', p. 109.

[1438] Hewett, *Reforming the Soviet Economy. Equality versus Efficiency*, pp. 245-247.

[1439] Schroeder, 'Recent Developments in Soviet Planning', pp. 12, 38.

[1440] Y.-C. Ha, 'The Soviet Communist Party and Economic ReformThe Soviet Communist Party and Economic Reform. A Case Study', pp. 108-111.

[1441] Dyker, *Restructuring the Soviet Economy*, pp. 68, 72.

[1442] Hewett, *Reforming the Soviet Economy. Equality versus Efficiency*, p. 250.

[1443] *Pravda*, 29 July 1979, pp. 1-2 — Nove, Alec. "Socialism, Economics and Development", pp. 142-143.

[1444] I.D. Thatcher, 'Brezhnev as Leader', in Bacon, Sandle (eds), *Brezhnev Reconsidered*, pp. 22-37.

[1445] *Pravda*, 19 December 1976, p. 1

[1446] *Pravda*, 21 February 1978, p. 1.

marked by immobilism and apathy, [1447] since 1973 the Soviet economy had indeed slid into what Gorbachev would call "stagnation" [1448] — a period marked by further economic slowdown, decreasing labour productivity and efficiency as well as structural problems with established extensification patterns. [1449]

It was at that point that Schroeder ironically noted how "the reforms have been continuously reformed" and coined the term "treadmill of reform". [1450] Scholars have further noted how Soviet reforms became "exhausting, never-ending, self-perpetuating and pointless", [1451] a "déjà vu all over again", [1452] or "last rites", [1453] which had taken "an almost routinised character". [1454]

However, while reforms progressively stepped onto the "treadmill" throughout the the 1970s, a little-known change in the official Soviet interpretation of NEP's significance took place. Essentially, Soviet publications came to accept the existence of a direct link between 1920s and 1960s, after NEP had figured little in 1960s debates, [1455] whilst Party literature had still largely described it along Stalinist lines. [1456]

[1447] S.E. Hanson, The Brezhnev era', in Suny (ed), *The Cambridge History of Russia,* iii, pp. 293-296, 305-306.

[1448] M.S. Gorbachev, *Politicheskiy doklad Tsentral'nogo komiteta KPSS XXVII s"yezdu Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza: 25 fevralya 1986 goda* (Moscow, 1987), p. 4.

[1449] Harrison, 'Economic Growth and Slowdown', pp. 45. 56-57 — P. Hanson, *The Rise and Fall of the Soviet economy: an Economic History of the USSR from 1945* (London, 2003), p. 98.

[1450] Schroeder, 'The Soviet Economy on a Treadmill of "reforms"', p. 313.

[1451] Harrison, 'Economic Growth and Slowdown', p. 58.

[1452] K.W. Ryavec, 'Gorbachev, Khrushchev, and Economic Reforms. Two Characters in Search of a Miracle', in D.R. Kelley, S.G. Davis (eds), *The Sons of Sergei. Khrushchev and Gorbachev as Reformers* (New York, London, 1992), p. 36.

[1453] J. Kramer, 'Letter from Europe', *New Yorker*, 12 March 1990, p. 80.

[1454] Hewett, *Reforming the Soviet Economy. Equality versus Efficiency*, p. 221.

[1455] Davies, 'Soviet economic reform in historical perspective', p. 140.

[1456] Yu. A Polyakov, *Perekhod k NEPu i Sovetskoye krest'yanstvo* (Moskva, 1967), pp. 16, 350, 501-502.

Already in 1971 the CPSU's official take on NEP put much emphasis on how Lenin had "scientifically substantiated the need for trade with its tools (commodity, money, credit, bank, market, *khozraschet* etc.)". During NEP "the skilful use by the proletarian state of commodity production, trade, money, credit, allowed to put them at the service of the socialist way of development […] to fully apply the principle of material interest in the development of production and to successfully combine personal interests of the workers and peasants with the public". The fact that such policies had become central to 1960s economic reforms was not yet openly mentioned, but implicitly acknowledged. [1457]

Three years later, this link was instead openly discussed and in doing so Yu A. Polyakov titled his chapter in a broader volume "NEP: the pathway to socialism", quoting one of Bukharin's most renowned pieces. There he affirmed that "characteristic and important feature of NEP was the widespread use of commodity-money relations". Polyakov added that "this element now retains its value [as] it is well known that the implementation of economic reforms […] intended to increase economic incentives in all sectors of the economy". He also directly linked his reflections to the fact that at the 24th Congress Brezhnev emphasised the importance of economic levers were, [1458] while the Congress also "reiterated the task of improving commodity-money relations, the skilful use of economic levers, such as *khozraschet*, price, profit, credit, and so on". [1459] In the same volume T.P. Pridvorov, speaking of African and Asian countries which Brezhnev envisioned developing along a "noncapitalist path", [1460] even stated that "the study of the true history of the Soviet New Economic Policy can greatly benefit them". [1461]

[1457] I.I. Katorgii, *Istoricheskiy Opyt KPSS po Osushchestvleniyu Novoy Ekonomicheskoy Politiki (1921-1925)*(Moscow, 1971), pp. 402-403, 406, 409-411.

[1458] KPSS, *Materialy XXIV s"yezd a KPSS* (Moscow, 1971), p. 69.

[1459] Yu. A. Polyakov, 'NEP. Put' k sotsializmu', in Yu. A. Polyakov et. al. (eds) *Istoriya Sotsialisticheskogo i Kommunisticheskogo Stroitel'stva v SSSR", Institut Istorii SSSR, "Novaya Ekonomicheskaya Politika. Voprosy, Teorii i Istorii* (Moscow, 1974), p. 19.

[1460] *Pravda*, 22 April 1970, pp. 5-6 — KPSS, *XXIV s"yezd*, p. 41

[1461] T.P. Pridvorova, 'Problemy Nepa v Burzhuaznoy Istoriografii', in Polyakov et. al. (eds) *Istoriya Sotsialisticheskogo i Kommunisticheskogo Stroitel'stva* p. 314.

5.5. — The influence of the 1940s on the 1965 reform

5.5.1. — Economic levers

A first core similarity between debates and policies developed in the 1940s and 1960s reforms was reliance on economic levers, whose strengthening Voznesensky had openly called for, mentioning prices, money, credit, profit and bonuses.

Starting from the early 1960s, as debates were intensifying, the discussion of economic levers in ways reminiscent of Voznesensky's 1940s contributed to bridge differences between "optimal planning" and Libermanism. In 1960 Nemchinov strongly argued that "economic categories such as price, money, value, cost, commodity and *khozraschet* are taking on an increased importance". [1462] Four years after, it was Kantorovich who argued that the combination of "economic levers of regulation" together with "mathematical optimisation" represented the way forward. [1463] Shortly after Fedorenko also clearly affirmed that "the utilisation of economic levers and incentive methods, on the one hand, and the organisation of optimal planning, on the other […] are intimately and indissolubly linked". [1464]

By 1965, what Voznesensky had defined in 1946 the "strengthening of the role of economic levers" was recognised by a majority of economists as an unavoidable priority. [1465] This is further proved by a report "on ways to increase the economic efficiency of social production", sent to Mikoyan on 16 March 1965 by the Director of the Academy's Institute of Economics, K.N. Plotnikov. [1466]

[1462] Nemchinov, 'Stoimost' i Tsena pri Sotsializme', p. 85.

[1463] "Konferentsiya po primeneniyu', pp. 63-110, 81-82.

[1464] *Pravda*, 17 January 1965, pp. 2-3.

[1465] GARF, f. P7523, op. 35, d. 28, l. 6.

[1466] ARAN, f. 1877, op. 8, d. 451 , l. 1.

The document was signed by more than thirty-five Academy members, including Fedorenko, Gatovskiy, Kaaz and Kurskii. It dealt with a broad range of issues, including: rational utilisation of natural resources; the expansion of consumer goods production; the issue of criterions for the growth of wages alongside labour productivity, so to award bonuses on the basis of "improvement of performance indicators"; the reform the enterprises' bonus funds; the "correct combination between principles of sectoral and territorial management and planning". [1467]

The issue on which the report dwelled in details was however that the economic system was "insufficiently based on the economic levers of production and distribution", since "profit still does not play a proper stimulating role in the development of production". As a result, "the price of products does not take into account supply and demand [and] the work of many enterprises is unprofitable, which hinders the introduction of *khozraschet*", while "the indicators and material stimulation system do not make the enterprises strive for higher 'progressive' production". [1468]

The report concluded that "it is necessary to solve cardinally the questions about the economic rights of the enterprise in the near future". This should have been done by reducing compulsory indicators, by increasing the directors' rights on use of "material resources, within the limits of the tasks of the State plan" and by introducing an "effective system of indicators for planning and evaluating the work of industrial enterprises". This latter element had to be achieved not only by adopting new indicators for specific types of product, but also by adding "indicators of quality, reliability and longevity of the most important products of industry". [1469]

Most reflections included in the memo had already been developed in the late 1940s, but as of 1965 they had eventually informed the necessity to adopt decentralisation, which was not or could not be fully developed before Stalin's death.

[1467] Ibid., ll. 12, 18, 45-50.

[1468] Ibid., ll. 52-53.

[1469] Ibid., ll. 58-59.

As the September 1965 CC Plenum neared, it was publicly remarked that whether "for a long time it was stated in the economic literature that there is no market problem under socialism […] life denied this dogmatic point of view" and that "a market problem exists not only for consumer goods, but also in relation to the means of production". [1470] Voznesensky had already written in his *War Economy* that "new formerly unknown problems have arisen - problems of planning", which was the basis for his statement that it was the economists' job to study laws and that planning itself was one such laws. [1471]

After the 1965 reform was launched, as Western commentators copiously wrote of the "communist flirtation with profits", [1472] Soviet economists were instead busy reaffirming economic levers' role as core elements of the socialist system. It was plainly false, argued Rakitskiy, that in the USSR was a "non-market economy". On the contrary, "commodity-money relations exist in all socialist countries and are used in socialist and communist construction in conformity with the new content inherent in them as a consequence of the social ownership of the means of production". Rakitskiy further stated that "the role of the market under socialism is to serve to attain the centrally planned targets of production". "Without employing the mechanism of the socialist market and its categories of market, price, demand and supply", he concluded, "it is impossible to ensure the operation of enterprises fully on a *khozraschet* basis". [1473]

Shortly after, just as Voznesensky had repeatedly argued in the mid-late 1940s, Birman publicly re-stated that "monetary and goods relationships are organically proper to the Socialist method of production". Further mirroring what Voznesensky wrote in his *War Economy*, Birman stated that "the law of value not only does not contradict other economic laws […] but, on the contrary,

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[1470] *Pravda*, 23 June 1965, p. 2

[1471] Voznesensky, *Voennaya Ekonomika*, pp. 145-150.

[1472] *Time Magazine*, 12 February 1965, p. 1

[1473] B. Rakitskiy, 'Protiv burzhuaznykh interpretatsii khozyaystvennoy reformy v SSSR', *Vorposy ekonomiki*, 10 (1965), pp. 71-72.

its use is a very important lever for intensification of the effect of other economic laws". [1474] Birman even described the ideal functioning of a reformed enterprise as having it operate "strictly and effectively in the interests of the socialist society, without any interference in its day-to-day operation, but with state co-ordination through such general levers as prices, finance, credit, buses". [1475]

The reaffirmation of the reform's socialist nature was however not only a tool of Soviet propagandists, but also a preoccupation of the top leadership. This is proved by a report "on the reception on the West and the bourgeois press of the 1965 reform" sent to SovMin on 31 January 1966 by B.V. Rakitskii.

There, the Soviet economist stressed how "Marxist-Leninist political economy […] did not imply that socialism has no other methods of economic regulation [than] centralised planning". On the contrary "other methods are not only available, but they are not less objectively necessary, than central planning; these methods are associated with commodity production and the market". He stated that erroneous Western conceptions of the Soviet economy as a "non-market" one were to be blamed for the repeated claims that the USSR was "borrowing" from capitalism, while in fact "the socialist market has a new content". [1476]

In the mid-late 1960s, economic officials and reforming economists of any creed continued to repeatedly stress the importance of strengthening reliance on economic levers. V. Garbuzov, Minister of Finance, stated that "the role of credit levers will now rise considerably" which would have "ma[de] it possible to put into action the enormous reserves in the national economy for

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[1474] Birman, 'Mysli posle Plenuma', p. 198.

[1475] A. Birman, 'In which Direction? What Soviet Economists are Debating about', in E.G. Liberman, M. Dobb (eds), *Theory of Profit in Socialist Economy. A Discussion on the Recent Economic Reforms in the USSR* (New Delhi, 1966), p. 60.

[1476] ARAN, f. 1877, op. 8, d. 516, ll. 7-10.

accelerating the rates of development of our economy". [1477] Fedorenko repeatedly mentioned the importance of economic levers, stating that "each of these levers individually still cannot solve the problems of resource mobilisation, but together […] they can be arranged [to provide] the best way to direct the initiative of the masses in the implementation of the state plan". [1478] Throughout the 1960s and 1970s he would continue to mention the necessity to "strengthen economic methods to guide the national economy". [1479]

Reference to economic levers was also used to reaffirm "the validity and great vitality of Leninist ideas concerning *khozraschet*, material incentives for workers, planning and management through a combination of single centralised state planning with broad economic initiative and independence for socialist enterprises". [1480] Yet, others were simultaneously making reference to the same concepts to polemically note how "it is renowned that at the present time the utilisation of the law of value in the development of socialist economy is insufficiently taken into account", which still lead to the "underestimation of the profit indicator". [1481]

Precisely the idea that economic levers were not sufficiently relied on was however not only voiced in public debates, but also theoretically argued by economists advising Kosygin. A. Kurskii did so on 24 August 1967 in a report sent to SovMin titled "The results of the economic reform for 1966 in the first half of 1967 and the problems of its further implementation".[1482]

[1477] V. Garbuzov, 'Finansy i ekonomicheskiye stimuly', *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, 41 (1965), p. 2.

[1478] *Pravda*, 17 January 1965, pp. 2-3.

[1479] Fedorenko, "Reforma v promyshlennosti', p. 17.

[1480] G.O. Allakhverdyan, 'Ekonomicheskaya Reforma i Voprosy Khozrascheta', *Voprosy ekonomiki*, 11 (1968), p. 15.

[1481] N. Maslov, 'O pokazatele ekonomichnosti rezul'tatov deyatel'nosti predpriyatiya', *Voprosy ekonomiki*, 7 (1967), p. 63.

[1482] ARAN, f. 1877, op. 8, d. 623, l. 1.

There, Kurskii stated that the economic reform's three pillars were: "the deployment of democratic centralism in planning and management; strengthening the role of economic management methods in improving the scientific level of planning; the skilful use of commodity-money relations on a socialist basis and the economic categories associated with it — profit, price, and credit". [1483]

Kurskii positively noted how "under the conditions of economic reform, the role of the financial and credit levers of the state in the planned management and development of full *khozraschet* increases". Yet, although larger shares of profits were available to enterprises, also Kurskii stated that "the new financial mechanism has not yet been formed and does not have a sufficient impact on the production activity of enterprises". [1484]

Kurski therefore demanded "the introduction of full *khozraschet*", the deployment of "direct economic links between enterprises [and] supply-and-marketing organisations" and stronger reliance on economic balances. He further pointed to the relevance of "material and financial reserves" and of carefully observing "rates and proportions". Finally, Kurski stated, "improving the feasibility of plans" could only take place by taking advantage of "scientific and technological progress" and relying on perspective planning. [1485]

As of 1973, almost exactly quoting Voznesensky's 1946 speech, L.Ya. Berri still affirmed that "the most important financial indicators are cost price, profit, price - in the socialist economy they represent an instrument and at the same time the object of planning". [1486]

[1483] Ibid., ll. 3-4.

[1484] Ibid., l. 24.

[1485] Ibid., ll. 31, 37-38.

[1486] L.Ya. Berri, *Planirovaniye Narodnogo Khozyaystva SSSR* (Moscow, 1973), p. 418.

5.5.2. — Price reforms, 1947 and 1967

One of the key policies proposed by Kosygin in 1965 was a price reform, after the attempts at completing new price lists under Khrushchev were delayed until 1964, when his removal forced an umpteenth postponement. [1487]

It took therefore another two years for a reform to be launched along the lines presented in September 1965: greatest approximation of prices to socially necessary labour outlays, abolition of subsidies and enterprises' profitability, so that production and distribution costs could be covered by revenues and payments in the incentive funds could increase.

Yet, the harsh debates between economists of opposing views which took place under Khrushchev by no means ceased with his removal. [1488] A. Kähönen's recent research has discussed a memo sent to Kosygin in early 1965 which contained recommendations concerning the price reform. Half of it fully relied on Marx's labour theory of value, while the other half implicitly accepted demand-offer logics in price formation and was essentially an "optimal planning" proposal. [1489]

The memo, titled "The basis for further implementation of planned pricing", was sent on 23 January and denounced "lack of uniformity in prices, unreasonable deviations upwards and downwards from socially necessary outlays, insufficient account in prices of quality and other consumer properties of production". All such problems "weaken[ed] the significance of cost indicators of economic activity (cost of production, profit, profitability)", coming also to "hinder the

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[1487] 'Soviet Price Theory and Policy', p. 74.

[1488] S.G. Stoliarov, *O tsenakh i tsenoobrazovanii v SSSR* (Moscow, 1963), pp. 192-193.

[1489] A. Kähönen, 'Optimal planning, optimal economy, optimal life? The Kosygin reforms, 1965-1972', in K. Miklossy, M. Ilic (eds), *Competition in Socialist Society* (London, 2014), pp. 27-28.

identification of the economic efficiency of production, of capital investments, of the introduction of new technologies and the implementation of the principle of material incentives". [1490]

As noted by Kähönen though, the document openly recognised how no agreement could be found "on the issue of reflecting in the planned prices the capital intensity of production". Those who claimed that capital intensity of production was not "sufficiently reflected in the cost of production", claimed that this was so due to the fact that this latter one "ignores the time factor". They affirmed that "planned prices should perhaps reflect the economy of production and the use of different types of production methods". In their opinion, "the reflection in planned prices of capital intensity of production will orient economic, planning, project authorities and all consumers on the choice of more optimal types of production and directions of technical progress". [1491]

Although Kosygin's price reform was by no means a radical departure from traditional Soviet policies, Schroeder still defined it the "first comprehensive revision of industrial prices since 1955". [1492] The price level was raised to support the new norms on success indicators and incentives, guaranteeing enterprises' profitability and stimulating more efficient practices, more focus on quality and technological innovation. Bonuses and interest on loans were included and charged against profit, rather than counted as part of cost, while a charge on fixed and circulating capital was included in profit calculation. [1493]

Western scholars did note improvements in price formation and in the application of *khozraschet*, but in overall terms, the reform was largely ineffective. Ministerial structures still

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[1490] ARAN, f. 1877, op. 8, d. 455, ll. 6-7.

[1491] Ibid., ll. 15-16.

[1492] G.E. Schroeder, 'The 1966-67 Soviet Industrial Price Reform. A Study in Complications', *Soviet Studies*, 20/4 (1969), pp. 462-477. p. 462.

[1493] J.S. Prybyla, *Market and Plan Under Socialism. The Bird in the Cage* (Stanford, 1987), p. 136.

wielded much power and applied physical control, while gross value output was still very much relied upon. Lack of actual guidance for efficient allocation and multiplying number of prices actually increase bureaucratism. Moreover, reformed wholesale prices were “insulated” from retail prices and wages, which crucially hampered the attempt to use them as effective levers of control and coordination. The further goal of making wholesale prices more flexible and reactive to cost and demand dynamics was therefore entirely missed. [1494]

Yet, an element that makes the 1967 price reform particularly relevant for the present research is its striking similarity with the one attempted by Voznesensky in 1949 within the broader framework of increasing reliance on economic levers. Indeed, as Schroeder noted, the in 1967 Soviet planners intended to “use prices, together with a reform of incentives, as economic levers to promote efficiency in enterprises”. [1495]

Voznesensky’s 1949 reform, just as Kosygin’s one, aimed at more closely approximating prices to actual value, in order to functionalise *khozraschet*, at eliminating subsidies and rising heavy industry wholesale prices, so to end the practice of leaving it to operate on planned loss. In both cases, the intention was to make of prices and of price accounting tools to evaluate plan fulfilment and efficiency as well as to transmit economic information both to planners and managers. That evident similarities existed between the Voznesensky and Kosygin price reforms was already suggested by Soviet economists in the 1970s. [1496]

[1494] Schroeder, ‘The 1966-67 Soviet Industrial Price Reform. A Study in Complications’, pp. 462-463, 472 — Prybyla, Market and Plan Under Socialism’, pp. 137-141 — Harrison, ‘Economic Growth and Slowdown’, pp. 58-59.

[1495] Schroeder, ‘The 1966-67 Soviet Industrial Price Reform. A Study in Complications’, pp. 462-463, 464.

[1496] Glushkov, ’60 let planovogo tsenoobrazovaniya’, in Komin (ed) *60 let planovogo tsenoobrazovaniya v SSSR*, pp. 12-13, 15.

5.5.3. — Perspective planning

Another key element of Voznesensky's 1940s policy which played a prominent role in the 1960s was perspective planning and its deployment for the purpose of drawing up a long-term plan.

Already in August 1967, Kurskii suggested in a SovMin memo on the "further implementation" of the reform that for the working out of a "new system of planning and economic stimulation" a plan detailing the "general perspectives for the development of the Soviet economy for 15-20 years" ought to be drawn up. [1497]

Two years later, Gatovkii, discussed the prospects of drawing up such a perspective plan "Long-term prospective plans and forecasts", he said, had become "an indispensable prerequisite" for effective planning and for the "integrated implementation of the modern scientific and technological revolution". Further dwelling on the interconnection between planning and forecasting, he stated that "long-term plans can no longer be compiled without preliminary forecasts". If at that point forecasts had been targeted to 1990, Gatovskiy suggested they should be extended to the year 2000. Gatovskiy therefore argued that "long-term plans should outline for each five-year plan a perspective that goes 5-10 years beyond said five-year period". [1498]

Perspective planning gained more prominence at the 24th Congress of 1971. In his speech, Kosygin called for a "long-term plan for the development of the national economy of the USSR for 10-15 years", which he stated would have played "a key role in the planning system". [1499] Baibakov, Chairman of Gosplan, instead characterised perspective planning as an irreplaceable tool to "make well-founded decisions on the allocation of capital investments, the placement of

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[1497] ARAN, f. 1877, op. 8, d. 623, l. 41.

[1498] L.M. Gatovskiy, 'K 100-letiyu do dnya rozhdeniya V.I. Lenina. Idei Lenina i nekatoriye sovremennye ekonomcheskiye problemy nauchno-tekhnicheskogo progressa', *Vestnik AN SSSR*, 9 (1969), pp. 6-10.

[1499] KPSS, *XXIV s"yezd Kommunisticheskoy Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza. 30 Marta - 9 Aprelya 1971 goda. Stenograficheskiy otchet* (2 vols, Moscow 1971), ii, p. 46.

new large enterprises, the determination of directions of geological exploration, the utilisation of mineral resources, the carrying out scientific research and of design work". He therefore called the new "long-term plan" as "an essential element for a deeper scientific substantiation of five-year plans". [1500] Brezhnev himself started the economic section of his speech at the 24th Congress by referring to GOELRO's 50th anniversary. [1501]

As a result, the congress resolution on the Five-Year Plan demanded the "drawing-up of a long-term perspective plan […] using for this purpose forecasts of scientific and technological progress, of growth of the country's population, of natural resources, and others". [1502]

Shortly after the Congress, the Academy reflected on the Party's decisions, at a time which it said was characterised by "increase in the scale and complexity of the structure of social production", matched only by "the enormity of the tasks of economic, scientific and technological progress". As a result of this realities, it was stated, "the role and importance of long-term planning of economic development has dramatically increased" and "there is an objective need for the scientific development of long-term integrated planning methods based on long-term forecasts". [1503]

The article therefore listed the coordinated effort of Soviet economic institutions in the development of scientific forecasts, which had greatly benefited from a COMECON-wide conference on scientific forecasting held in April 1970. An Academy Commission and the Institute of Economics worked out forecasts until 1990, the Institute of World Economics one

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[1500] Ibid., pp. 170-171.

[1501] KPSS, *XXIV s"yezd*, i, p. 55.

[1502] *Pravda*, 11 April 1971, p. 7.

[1503] 'Problemy Prognozirovaniya v Otdelenii Ekonomiki AN SSSR', *Izvestiya Akademiya Nauk SSSR, Seriya Ekonomicheskaya*, 3 (1971), p. 137.

until 2000, Gosplan's Council on the Distribution of Productive Forces one until 1980, while TsEMI was developing on "social-economic" and "medium-term" forecasting. [1504]

Throughout the 1970s, work on scientific forecasting met with great impulse, [1505] which that E. Rindzevičiūtė argued entailed potential far-reaching implications in terms of freer horizontal circulation of information. These however would never materialise due to the system's engrained secretiveness. [1506]

In 1972, Brezhnev reiterated that the "long-term plan" remained a key priority and that work on it would have been completed by 1975, [1507] while the Academy stated the plan "will contribute in particular to a full and timely use of science and technology in economic practice". [1508]

The following year, the Academy listed the "issues of great scientific and economic importance" which it focused its research on, calling "crucial" that of "perspective planning and scientific forecasting". [1509] The long-term plan was therefore still referred to as something very much in development. Yet, in 1974 it was simply stated that "economists prepared scientific materials in

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[1504] Ibid., pp. 138-139.

[1505] A.I. Efimov, 'Metodologicheskiye Voprosy Ekonomicheskogo Prognozirovaniya', I*zvestiya Akademiya Nauk SSSR, Seriya Ekonomicheskyaya*, 4 (1971) — E.G. Chistyakov, N.V. Dolganeva, 'Voprosy Metodiki Prognozirovaniya Nauchno-Tekhnicheskogo Progressa v Mashinostroyenii', *Izvestiya Akademiya Nauk SSSR, Seriya Ekonomicheskyaya*, 2 (1972) — A.I. Demenev, 'Osobennosti Prognozirovaniya Proizvodstvenno-Territorial'nykh Kompleksov', *Izvestiya Akademiya Nauk SSSR, Seriya Ekonomicheskyaya*, 2 (1972) — Yu.P. Solovev, B.N. Mikhalevsky, 'Srednesrochny Prognoz Valovoy Produktsii Narodnogo Khozyaystva i Promyshlennosti', *Izvestiya Akademiya Nauk SSSR, Seriya Ekonomicheskyaya*, 4 (1973) — Yu.A. Zikov, 'O Nekotorykh Printsipakh Ekonomicheskogo Prognozirovaniya Nauchno-Tekhnicheskogo Progressa', *Izvestiya Akademiya Nauk SSSR, Seriya Ekonomicheskyaya*, 3 (1973).

[1506] Rindzevičiūtė, 'A Struggle for the Soviet Future', p. 64.

[1507] L.I. Brezhnev, *O Pyatidesyatiletii Soyuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik. Doklad*" (Moscow, 1972), p. 54.

[1508] 'O Deyatel'nosti Akademii Nauk SSSR v 1972 g. i. o. Doklad Glavnogo Uchenogo Sekretarya Prezidiuma Akademii Nauk SSSR chlena-korrespondenta AN SSSR G.K. Skryabina - Godichnoye Obshcheye sobraniye Akademii nauk SSSR', *Vestnik Akademii Nauk SSSR*, 5 (1973), p. 16.

[1509] Ibid.

connection with the development of the Tenth Five-Year Plan for 1976-1980 and long-term perspectives for the period up to 1990". [1510]

The following year the academy did once again refer to the importance of "long-term planning and forecasting", but no mention of the long-term perspective plan was made. [1511] "Long-term" itself became a term more often used to describe economic ties with socialist countries, [1512] as well as non-socialist ones, [1513] and COMECON-wide coordinating attempts. [1514] As of 1975, date by which the long-term plan should have been drawn up, there was little mention of it, [1515] while none was made by Brezhnev in his speech at the Academy on economic issues in 1977. [1516]

At that point, grand projects such as a General Plan implicitly clashed with the furthering of theoretical justifications for the lengthening socialist phase of communist development. Picking up the Khrushchevian concept of "mature socialism", Brezhnev had declared the USSR a "developed socialist society" in 1967, [1517] incorporating the definition in the preamble of the 1977 Constitution. [1518] At this point, communist construction became a four-phases process, including "building socialism" (1917-1936), a "basically socialist society" (achieved by 1936), "developed

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[1510] 'Vystupitel'noye slovo Prezidenta Akademii Nauk SSSR akademika M. V. Keldysha. O deyatel'nosti Akademii nauk SSSR v 1974 g. Doklad i. o. Glavnogo Uchenogo Sekretarya Prezidiuma Akademii Nauk SSSR chlena-korrespondenta AN SSSR G. K. Skryabina. Iz vystupleniy uchastnikov Sobraniya', *Vestnik Akademii Nauk SSSR*, 5 (1975), p. 15.

[1511] 'O Deyatel'nosti Akademii Nauk SSSR v 1975 g. i. o. Doklad Glavnogo Uchenogo Sekretarya Prezidiuma Akademii Nauk SSSR chlena-korrespondenta AN SSSR G.K. Skryabina', *Vestnik Akademii nauk SSSR*, 5 (1976), p. 34.

[1512] *Pravda*, 20 September 1974, p. 4

[1513] *Pravda*, 18 May 1974, p. 4

[1514] *Pravda*, 25 June 1974, p. 5.

[1515] *Pravda*, 5 April 1975 — *Pravda*, 1 March 1975.

[1516] 'Nauka sluzhit sotsializmu. Vstrecha General'nogo sekretarya TsK KPSS L.I. Brezhneva s rukovoditelyami akademiy nauk sotsialisticheskikh stran. Vystupleniye tovarishcha L.I. Brezhneva', *Vestnik Akademii nauk SSSR*, 5 (1977), p. 34.

[1517] L.I. Brezhnev, *Leninskim kursom* (3 vols, Moscow, 1973), ii, p. 92.

[1518] *Konstitutsiya (Osnovnoi Zakon)*, p. 7.

socialism" and "communism", which provided said theoretical justification for the lengthening socialist phase. [1519]

Yet, long-range planning remained also at the core of reforming economics. Fedorenko in particular repeatedly accused Gosplan of "paying insufficient attention to problems of perspective [planning]", reiterating how in his mind "general plans, developed on 15-20 years and even longer periods, will complement the current system of national economic plans". [1520] Once again Fedorenko linked these ideas with reserves, another key priority of Voznesensky. Indeed, the Soviet economist stressed how "national-economic plans need to be drawn up in such a way that any possible effect of casual factors does not produce disproportions in the development of the whole system but is prevented by means of a sufficiently flexible system of reserves". [1521] Through the years, Soviet economists who wanted to validate Fedorenko's statements and his "optimally functioning socialist economy" model actually repeatedly link them to Brezhnev's 1976-1990 plan. [1522]

5.5.4. — Voznesensky in the era of the "treadmill of reforms"

Soviet economist G. Yasin defined the 1970s as the "quiet" decade, when the goal became to "change something without changing anything". [1523] In these years, nominal reference to

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[1519] 'The Theory of "Developed Socialism"', in R.V. Daniels (ed) *A Documentary History of Communism in Russia. From Lenin to Gorbachev* (Hannover, London, 1993), p. 316 — A.B. Evans, Jr., 'Developed Socialism in Soviet Ideology', *Soviet Studies*, 29/3 (1977), p. 414.

[1520] N. Fedorenko, *Problemy optimal'nogo funktsionirovaniya sotsialisticheskoy ekonomiki* (Moscow 1972), pp. 32, 36.

[1521] N. Fedroenko, *Optimal Functioning System for a Socialist Economy* (Moscow, 1974), p. 51.

[1522] A. Zalkind, B. Miroshnichenko, 'Iz opyta Gosplana SSSR po podgotovke dolgosrochnykh planov', *Planovoe khozyaistvo*, 4 (1973), p. 38.

[1523] Yasin, *Khozyaystvennye Sistemy*, p. 101.

economic levers, perspective planning and decentralisation was maintained, [1524] but all gradually lost their reforming significance, as the system's structural problems worsened.

At this time, Voznesensky's figure became characterised by a conflicting set of attributes, which could be alternatively referred to in order to mould the image of a reform-oriented economist (evoked by those who wished to further changes introduced from 1965 on), or of a staunch defender of centralism (whose memory served well the purpose of those who wished to curtail reform).

For example, in 1971 G. Perov praised Voznesensky for re-introducing the balance method, for his focus on perspective planning and on the development of chemical industries. He went on to list the former Gosplan Chairman's merits: "restructuring of management on the basis of the deployment of money-commodity relations, in particular the abolition of rationing, the establishment of trade, the preparation and implementation of the monetary reform, the creation of unified state retail prices, the abolition of state subsidies to enterprises, the reform of wholesale prices, the strengthening of *khozraschet*, the development of credit relations". Perov also openly celebrated Voznesensky's interpretations relating to "the law of value, money-commodity relations under socialism [and] issues related to pricing", specifically noting his opinion that the law of value played "a great role" under socialism. [1525]

Only two years later G. Kosyachenko, albeit praising Voznesensky's "organisational talent and erudition", enlisted him as a supporter of his rather conservative views on economic reform. Indeed, Kosyachenko stated that "some economists are not always correct in explaining the need for economic reform", focusing solely on "administrative practices" and "often directing sharp criticism against central planning in itself". Instead, he continued "the strengthening of

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[1524] KPSS, *XXIV s"yezd*, i, p. 94.

[1525] G. Perov, 'Na perednem kraye ekonomicheskoy nauki i praktiki sotsialisticheskogo planirovaniya', *Planovoe khozyaistvo*, 7 (1971), pp. 65-66, 69-70.

central planning was one of the decisive victories of socialism" and the contributions to "enhancing the all-round role of central planning [was] a great personal achievement of Voznesensky". Kosyachenko's key argument was indeed that "the essence of economic reform is, as we know, not weakening, but fully strengthening and improving centralised economic management" and every mention he made of Voznesensky was followed by a reminder of how his main goal was "improving" centralism. [1526]

In 1974 Kolotov released his updated biography of Voznesensky, which strongly characterised him as an economic rationaliser, [1527] but in his *Pravda* review of the book Sorokin mentioned repeatedly Voznesensky's communist militancy and positions of responsibility, saying however almost nothing concerning his actual economic ideas. [1528]

In the following years, Voznesensky was repeatedly praised as one of the "brilliant scholars and Marxist-Leninists" who had worked out Soviet pricing theory, amongst which N.T. Glushkov listed also G.M. Krzhizhanovsky, S.G. Strumilin and V.S. Nemchinov". [1529] A.N. Malafeev instead quoted Voznesensky's *War Economy* as "essential for the development of the theory of planned pricing", especially its contributions to the study of monetary circulation, inflation and to the application of the law of value. [1530] An extract of Voznesensky's book dealing with pricing was even included in a documents reader on the "history of pricing in the USSR". [1531]

[1526] G. Kosyachenko, 'Krupnyy deyatel' sotsialisticheskogo planirovaniya', *Planovoe khozyaistvo*, 12 (1973), pp. 119, 123-125.

[1527] Kolotov, *Nikolay Alekseevich Voznesensky. Biograficheskiy povest*.

[1528] *Pravda*, 25 September 1974, p. 2.

[1529] N.T. Glushkov, '60 let planovogo tsenoobrazovaniya', in Komin (ed), *60 let planovogo tsenoobrazovaniya v SSSR*, p. 6.

[1530] A.N. Malafeev, 'Razvitiye Teorii Planovogo Tsenoobrazovaniya v SSSR', in A.N. Komin (ed), *60 let planovogo tsenoobrazovaniya v SSSR*, p. 148.

[1531] Gumerov, Gusarov (eds), *Istoriya Tsenoobrazovaniya v SSSR*, iii, pp. pp. 43-44.

In 1979, a volume of Voznesensky's selected works, sanitised of panegyrics for Stalin, [1532] was published. [1533] In it, it was reaffirmed that Voznesensky "did not deny the importance in socialist economics of the law of value, market price, accounting of profit and losses" and thought "that the law of value operates under socialist conditions [and] that value levers were means of bettering the planned direction of the national economy". Yet, by that time, the reforming appeal of such ideas had almost entirely waned. [1534] Four years later, upon celebrating his 80th birth anniversary, *Pravda* even omitted to mention in any way he had been a victim on Stalinist repression. [1535]

[1532] Harrison, 'N.A. Voznesensky. A Soviet Commander of the Economic Front', p. 4n.

[1533] N.A. Voznesensky, *Izbrannye Proizvedeniya (1931-1947)* (Moscow, 1979).

[1534] Voznesensky, *Izbrannye Proizvedeniya*, p. 7.

[1535] *Pravda*, 1 December 1983, p. 6.

Conclusions

Continuity in 1940s-1960s economic reforms

Berliner suggested that Soviet reforms should be tested against two major questions: “what were the governors seeking to accomplish by that particular change?” and “what does that change reveal about their conception of how their system works?”. [1536]

If one compares the aims and underlining understandings that inspired economic change during Voznesensky’s era and in the post-Stalin period, similarities are striking. Relying on the belief that planning was the only scientific and historically progressive basic principle of economic activity, Voznesensky, Kosygin and the overwhelming majority of Soviet economists regarded the Soviet economic system as healthy in its fundamentals, but in need of adjustments. [1537] The aim of reform remained improving the system without altering its fundamentals, functionalising certain processes and substituting others, introducing new methods and levers, without threatening its planned and centralised character. The further and crucial term of the reforming equation is understood by scholars as that of the Soviet political system, whose very nature bound partial reforms to almost inexorable futility. This problem was however alien to the mindset of most Soviet leaders and economists. They treated the one Party-State as an immanent reality, inextricably linked with the planned and centralised character of the economy, and therefore simply beyond the scope of any conceivable economic reform.

[1536] J.S. Berliner, ‘Planning and Management’, in A, Bergson, H.S. Levine (eds), *The Soviet Economy: Towards the Year 2000* (Boston, Sydney, 1983), p. 351.

[1537] G.E. Schroeder, ‘Gorbachev. “Radically” Implementing Brezhnev’s Reforms’, *Soviet Economy*, 2/4 (1986), pp. 289-290.

The process described in this thesis was one of the ways in which these crucial similarities of aims and underlining understandings took shape in Soviet economic realities. Economic ideas and policies reintroduced, conceptualised and implemented in the 1940s under the aegis of Voznesensky (the balance method, perspective planning, enhanced reliance on economic levers) exerted a clear influence on post-Stalinist economic reforms in the 1950s and 1960s. Bridging the Stalinism/post-Stalinism divide, practical and theoretical blueprints set during late 1940s were revived after the dictator's death, further debated and gradually incorporated into official policy-making. When the 1965 reform was launched, it ideally represented the high watermark of attempted change along "Voznesensky lines". Together with the Malenkov-Khrushchev division of labour, the "anti-oligarchic" strategy, "peaceful coexistence" and administrative changes at the CC (pp. 207-208), 1940s economic ideas and practices represent some of the less obvious and yet crucial continuities between the Stalinism and post-Stalinism.

Observing how economic reform was being understood in the USSR by senior planners and Brezhnev himself as of the late 1960s-early 1970s provides a clear representation of this process.

Sorokin, speaking in 1969 of the reform's main characteristics, still pointed to the fact that "profits, *khozraschet*, prices, credits, the premium (bonus) system and other instruments of managing production and exchange have become more significant". [1538] Brezhnev himself stated two years later at the 24th Congress that "[economic] levers — *khozraschet*, prices, profit, credit, forms of material stimulation and so on — are called upon to create such economic conditions that contribute to the successful operation of production collectives, of millions of workers, and to provide a reasonable estimate of the results of their work". [1539]

[1538] Sorokin, 'Economic Reform in the USSR. Improvement in Planning and Utilisation of Commodity-Money Relations', pp. 161-162.

[1539] KPSS, *Materialy XXIV s"yezd a KPSS* (Moscow, 1971), p. 69.

Sorokin also discussed the 1967 price reform, describing it as aiming at better approximating prices to production costs and socially necessary labour outlays. “Support for economic inefficiency” was removed, he added, by eliminating the practice of having heavy industry enterprises run on planned loss. After discussing the importance of “long-range planning”, Sorokin also dwelled on how “the net result of reform has been to expand commodity-money relations”. He further praised the “complete transition” to *khozraschet* as well as the decision to grant enterprises “free use of incentive funds [and] of credit”. In all, concluded Sorokin, the reform did not prompt Gosplan to “withdraw its oversight of all the complexity of economic problems and fail to ensure that production plans conform to expanding social requirements”. Rather, it “enhanced centralised planning” as it “put at the disposal of the state economic instruments by the application of which the exercise of authority becomes ‘softer’ and the state acts like a conductor with a well-trained orchestra”. [1540]

All these reflections had already been developed by Voznesensky and other Soviet economists in the late 1940s.

Indeed, it was Voznesensky himself who, for the first time in the Stalinist era, demanded in 1946 the “strengthening of the role of economic levers in the organisation of production and distribution […] prices, money, credit, profit and bonuses” (p. 121). Although similar ideas seem to have been at the basis of reform-oriented ideas developed at Ordzonikidze’s Commissariat for Heavy Industry in the 1930s, they were never fully expressed and articulated (pp. 56, 67). On the contrary, Voznesensky did experiment the deployment of economic levers during the war and detailed their crucial role in financing the military effort, redistributing stocks and reserves, allowing for control over production and distribution as well as over costs of production and prices (pp. 122-123).

[1540] Sorokin, ‘Economic Reform in the USSR. Improvement in Planning and Utilisation of Commodity-Money Relations’, pp. 164-165, 167-168, 171.

Voznesensky's expression "strengthening of economic levers" became one of the most referred to in Soviet reforming economics from the late 1940s on (pp. 132-133, 159, 164-165), when it also figured prominently in the revised Party Programme prepared under his and Zhdanov's supervision (pp. 143-144). The expression retained its popularity in reform debates throughout the 1950s, as the first attempts at functionalising plan indicators materialised (pp. 222, 225, 232). By 1961, the "strengthening of economic levers" was officially included in the Third Party Programme, whose economic section took inspiration from the 1947 draft. Shortly after, the deployment of this very concept became one of the 1965 reform's key pillars and later of proposals to further radicalise it (pp. 263-264, 276-278). Liberman, the "official" proponent of said reform's programme, had himself participated and strongly supported debates on economic levers in the late 1940s (pp. 134-135), still considering their strengthening a policy of paramount importance twenty years later (pp. 260-261). Once again Liberman, after Voznesensky had clearly remarked the importance of material stimulation (pp. 123-124.), already developed in the late 1940s several intuitions on the issue, which later inspired his famous 1962 *Pravda* article. Kosygin, the political initiator of the 1965 reform, had instead closely collaborated with Voznesensky himself in 1946-1949 on the working out and implementation of the monetary and price reforms. Specifically the price reform was, just like the 1967 one described by Sorokin, aimed at better approximating prices to cost and one of its cornerstones was the abolition of subsidies for heavy industry and the reworking of wholesale prices so to guarantee enterprises' profitability (pp. 163-164, 222-223).

In his 1969 reflections, Sorokin also clearly pointed to the fact that the reforms were not aimed at reducing, let alone discarding, centralism, but rather at functionalising it, so that its practical operation could be "softer". [1541]

[1541] Sorokin, 'Economic Reform in the USSR. Improvement in Planning and Utilisation of Commodity-Money Relations', p. 171.

This had been Voznesensky's aim since the late 1930s, when, as recently appointed Chairman of Gosplan, he combined the revival of economic practices whose usage had been discontinued after the Great Break with the introduction of new ones. Voznesensky therefore established new Gosplan commissions tasked with checking the productive process at the enterprises level and with stimulating the introduction of new technology. In addition, he also had the balance method reintroduced and further developed in planning, further prioritised the enhanced reliance on perspective planning and proposed the drafting of a General Plan, a tool that had been little-debated since the late 1920s.

Reviving these practices was key to Voznesensky's attempt at better analysing economic proportions and interrelations between branches, in order to prevent imbalances, ensure the proportionality of economic development, and at scientifically determining the most rational and economical utilisation of resources.

During the war years, Voznesensky even seems to have displayed interest for Kantorovich's early blueprints of "linear programming". The Chairman of Gosplan might have thought these could have in the future become a useful tool to, just as Kantorovich argued, strengthen functional centralism, as opposed to chaotic bureaucratic interference (pp. 108-109).

Just as much as late 1940s debates on economic levers resonated throughout the following three decades, so did Voznesensky's revival of the balance method and his contribution to the theory and practice of perspective planning. The first re-entered official planning practices, was used by Voznesensky himself as a key tool to analyse the Soviet war economy (p. 125) and would be further developed throughout the 1940s-1960s, when it stood at the heart of reforming economics (pp. 131-132, 135, 198, 232-233, 278). As for perspective planning, after Voznesensky's failed 1941 and 1947 attempts at drawing up a General Plan for 15-20 years, this project was powerfully revived under Khrushchev, (pp. 230-233) while economists kept on

debating its merits and proposing its deployment throughout the 1960s and 1970s (p. 282). Yet, in Voznesensky's mind the General Plan was inextricably linked with the task of ferrying the USSR into communism. However, if this idea had appealed to Khrushchev, it instead clashed with Brezhnev's furthering of theoretical justifications for the lengthening of the socialist phase (p. 285).

By the time plans for communist construction waned under Brezhnev, official Soviet declarations seemed to have gone back in time to the mid-1960s. At the 21st and 22nd congresses Kosygin had inaugurated "the stage of the intense building of the communist society", [1542] characterising it as an "immediate practical task", [1543] but at the September 1965 CC Plenum he instead admitted that the "material-technical basis of communism" was still to be built. [1544] Since the 24th Congress of 1971 "further perfecting" became instead the battlecry to which Soviet economic reforms stepped onto the "treadmill". [1545] This new conservative characterisation of reform was applied to almost all spheres of Soviet society: planning and administration, [1546] industrial organisation and methods, [1547] the country's social structure, [1548] law, [1549] party leadership. [1550]

[1542] KPSS, *Vneocherednoy XXI s"yezd*, i, p. 173.

[1543] KPSS, *XXII s"yezd*, ii, pp. 574-575.

[1544] *Pravda*, 3 October 1965, p. 1.

[1545] KPSS, *XXIV s"yezd, ii*, p. 64.

[1546] KPSS, *Materialy XXIV s"yezda*, p. 295.

[1547] A.S. Tolkachev, *Ekonomicheskiye problemy material'no-tekhnicheskoy bazy kommunizma v SSSR* (Moscow, 1971), pp. 4, 88.

[1548] A.N. Kosygin, *Osnovnyye napravleniya razvitiya narodnogo khozyaystva SSSR na 1976-1980 gody. Dokl. XXV s'yezdu KPSS. 1 marta 1976 g.* (Moscow, 1976), p. 68.

[1549] D.I. Fel'dman, *XXIV s"yezd KPSS i problemy povysheniya effektivnosti sovetskogo prava* (Moscow, 1973), pp. 127, 129.

[1550] S.V. Voronkova, I.D. Kabanova, *XXIII s"yezd KPSS* (Moscow, 1974), pp. 3, 71.

At the 25th Congress of 1976, eleven years after his landmark speech of 1965, Kosygin was still speaking of “further building the material and technical basis of communism”. [1551]

Already by the early 1970s it had become clear that enhanced reliance on economic levers and enterprises’ autonomy had failed to meaningfully alter the standing system, to resolve its chronic problems and to revert growth slowdown. Eventually, in 1977 the unreformed system fully subsumed those concepts which were meant to reform. Article 16 of the new Constitution argued that “economic management is carried out on the basis of state plans for economic and social development, taking into account the sectoral and territorial principles, with the combination of centralised management with economic independence and the initiative of enterprises [while] *khozraschet*, profit, cost, other economic levers and incentives are actively used”. [1552] At that point, reforming economics, officially recognised by Party Programme (p. 144) and Constitution, had in fact lost its “propulsive push”, as E. Berlinguer would say in 1981 of the whole socialist system in the East. [1553]

In parallel with the stepping of Soviet reforms onto the “treadmill” however, the existence of links between 1920s and 1960s economic policy was officially admitted in the USSR (pp. 271-272).

This confirms that, as many Western scholars argued in the 1960s-1970s, NEP policies played a certain role in informing post-Stalinist reforms. Yet, Lewin spoke of an “amazing parallelism, even similarity” between 1920s and 1960s, stating that post-Stalinist debates contained “hints, allusions, plagiarised quotations, unnamed authorities, and direct and indirect use of ideas of

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[1551] A.N. Kosyghin, ‘I principali orientamenti dello sviluppo dell’economia dell’URSS per gli anni 1976-1980. XXV congresso del PCUS. Mosca 1976’, in *URSS oggi, Bollettino dell’Ambasciata dell’URSS*, 6, (1976), pp. 4, 20, 33.

[1552] *Konstitutsiya (Osnovnoi Zakon)*, p. 22.

[1553] E. Berlinguer, ‘Si è esaurita la spinta propulsiva’, in P. Ciofo and G. Liguori (eds), *Un'altra idea del mondo. Antologia 1969-1984* (Roma, 2014), p. 279.

personalities of the 1920s". [1554] The present research has however demonstrated how not only several cardinal elements of post-Stalinist reforms were the product of revivals and reinterpretations which occurred more than a decade after NEP's downfall, but how even the language of post-Stalinist reforms owed much to that of the late 1940s.

Lewin further characterised 1960s reforming economics as relying on the idea that "market categories are not alien to socialism but inherent to it", a concept reaffirmed with almost identical phrasing by Voznesensky himself in 1947, as well as on "improving efficiency […] intensifying the use of resources" and correcting "major imbalances", all core elements of late 1940s economic debates and of Voznesensky's economics since the pre-war period. Lewin also argued that "the methods of fixing prices" were left unaltered between the 1930s and the 1967 reform, which however fails to account for the 1948-1949 price reform, whose core elements were revived precisely in 1967. [1555]

Furthermore, if Davies argued that after meaningful debates on *khozraschet* during NEP, these re-emerged only in the post-Stalinist era, [1556] Lewin even dated that to the 1960s. [1557] In fact, the present thesis showed that meaningful reflections on the topic figured prominently during the late 1940s, even after Voznesensky's dismissal. Crucially, one of the authors of said reflections was Liberman and if his 1955 contributions were noted by attentive Western scholars, those dating back to the late 1940s-early 1950s have received little attention. [1558]

Finally, as Lewin's 1973 book was re-edited with a new introduction in 1990, the author reiterated that "markets and prices, methods of planning, ways of motivating labor, ways of

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[1554] Lewin, *Political Undercurrents in Soviet Economic Debates*, p. x.

[1555] Ibid., pp. 140, 158, 164.

[1556] Davies, *Soviet Economic Development from Lenin to Khrushchev*, p. 68.

[1557] Lewin, *Political Undercurrents in Soviet Economic Debates*, p. 169.

[1558] S. Timofeyev, R.W. Davies, 'Economic Incentives. I', *Soviet Studies*, 7/4 (1956), pp. 454-457.

achieving balanced growth […] were clearly inspired by the experience of the New Economic Policy". [1559] This thesis has instead argued that, although official validation for the idea that there existed 1920s-1960s similarities was given in the USSR, the 1940s-1960s continuity is more meaningful in relation to post-Stalinist reforms. During NEP, reliance on economic levers and the use of monetary and commercial tools were widespread, but the economy was significantly different from what would become the command system. NEP policy and debates had less to offer than late 1940s ones to economists and planners who in the 1950s-1960s wanted to tinker, not abolish the standing system. It was under Stalin, not in the 1920s, that monetary and commercial elements were officially declared integral part of socialist economics. Similarly, it was 1940s reflections on the strengthening of economic levers and deployment of the law of value under command conditions that inspired the most reforming economists in the post-Stalin period.

Similarly, although the thesis has highlighted the similarities between certain ideas and practices revived or conceptualised by Voznesensky and 1920s economics (p. 92), it has done so while remarking that Voznesensky stood by the command system and wished to functionalise it, not to radically alter it. In this sense, comparisons between Voznesensky's post-war policies and NEP do not seem a particularly insightful. [1560] The historically meaningful consideration is instead that in the 1940s, as Stalin still sat in the Kremlin, ideas that would be proclaimed policy in 1965 were being discussed and practically implemented.

[1559] M. Lewin, *Stalinism and the Seeds of Soviet Reform. The Debates of the 1960s* (London, 1990), p. viii, xi.

[1560] A.V. Pyzhikov, 'Sovetskoye poslevoyennoye obshchestvo i predposylki khrushchevskikh reform', *Voprosy istorii*, 2 (2002), p. 24 — A.V. Pyzhikov, *Khrushchevskaya 'ottepel", 1953.1964 gg.* (Moscow, 2002), p. 18.

Notes on Voznesensky

The present research has confirmed and hopefully enriched the evidence that consistently portrays Voznesensky as a leading economic decision maker, [1561] an "independent Gosplan leader", [1562] whose "aptitude for economic administration", clearly inspired by rationalism, [1563] remade Gosplan into an "activist organisation". [1564] In doing so, the research has also confirmed recent scholarship in its understanding that no political disagreements appear to have existed between Stalin and Voznesensky at the time of the latter's dismissal. [1565]

However, this study's aim was also to integrate the most recent characterisations of Voznesensky, which described him as a "typical administrator of the Stalinist type", who "differed little from other [Gosplan] chairmen", [1566] and which defined his inclination for reform as supported by "thin" evidence. [1567]

The archives show that Voznesensky, in a fashion perhaps reminiscent of Ordzonikidze, actively tried to protect "his own people" at Gosplan (pp. 175-176), while there is also evidence that he refused to endorse repressive measures which instead his fellow leaders readily approved (pp. 186-188).

[1561] E.A. Rees, 'Stalin as Leader, 1937–1953. From Dictator to Despot', pp. 222-223.

[1562] Gregory, Harrison, 'Allocation under Dictatorship', p. 782.

[1563] Kaser, 'Nikolai Alekseevich Voznesensky', p. 263 — Sutela, *Economic Thought and Economic Reform in the Soviet Union*, pp. 14, 16 — Harrison, 'N.A. Voznesensky', p. 1652.

[1564] Nove, *An Economic History of the USSR*, p. 319 — Belova, Gregory, 'Dictator, loyal, and opportunistic agents', p. 280.

[1565] Harrison, 'N.A. Voznesensky', p. 1652.

[1566] Khlevnyuk, 'Sovetskaya ekonomicheskaya politika na rubezhe', pp. 81-83.

[1567] Harrison, 'The Soviet Union after 1945', p. 110.

Yet, as Harrison affirmed in 1985, “one can only speculate on where Voznesensky would have stood” after Stalin’s death. [1568] Indeed, Khrushchev, who did not shy away from mass purging during the Terror, [1569] who worryingly asked Kaganovich in the early 1950s “how will we, Lazar, live and work without Stalin?”, soon after became the gravedigger of Stalin’s cult. [1570] On the other hand Molotov, who in the post-war period witnessed the purge of his own wife and came close to a possibly dramatic demise, remained loyal to Stalin. [1571] Even Rokossovsky, who endured torture during the Great Terror and who Khrushchev praised by name at the 20th Congress, [1572] when asked to write a denunciation of the *vozhd* answered “comrade Stalin is a saint to me”. [1573] Long-term alliances such as the Malenkov-Beria one were instead shattered, as precisely Stalin’s top henchman surprisingly came forward with comparatively bold reform proposals. [1574]

Not much can therefore be conjectured in relation to Voznesensky’s political stance in the leadership after March 1953. Yet, on the basis of an appraisal of his career and of the significance of the late-1940s in relation to post-Stalinism, it is possible to formulate hypotheses on Voznesensky’s potential role in said era, without straying into unsubstantiated speculation.

In appraising Voznesensky’s decade at the top of Soviet economic policymaking, there is no contradiction in affirming, as Harrison already did in 1985, that he was “part and parcel of the

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[1568] Ibid.

[1569] Khrushchev seems to have harboured private doubts and to have suffered some disillusionment as a result of the unprecedented campaign of Terror. Yet, he presided over the purges, which actually intensified after he arrived in Ukraine — W. Tauberman, *Khrushchev. The Man and His Era* (London, 2003), pp. 114-117.

[1570] L. Kaganovich, “Pamyatnie Zapiski”, Moscow, Barnaul, 2003, p. 560.

[1571] Chuev, Molotov, Resis, *Molotov remembers*, pp. 291-292.

[1572] *Izvestiya*, 8 May 1992, p. 3 — ‘O Kul’te Lichnosti’, p. 148.

[1573] Chuev, Molotov, Resis, *Molotov remembers*, p. 291.

[1574] Knight, *Beria. Stalin's First Lieutenant*, pp. 197-199.

Stalin regime", [1575] while simultaneously remarking that, as Sutela wrote few years later, "not all Stalin's men were alike". [1576]

Voznesensky developed very early on an interest for economics and commitment to Party militancy. Smart, resourceful and boasting, he seems to have emerged from his years at the Academy of Red Professors as a natural leader. His political mindset was crucially influenced by the Great Break and his quick rise to the very top of the Soviet leadership was greatly facilitated by the destruction of managerial and political elites during the Great Terror. Voznesensky was therefore by no means an oppositionist and all evidence points towards his deep commitment to Soviet power and to Stalin's rule. Yet, he was not a "lustreless apparatchik" like many others. [1577]

In the 1930s, Voznesensky's economic mindset was clearly shaped by the reintroduction of *khozraschet* and by the official sanctioning of the monetary and commercial element into socialism. Voznesensky was never an extreme voluntarist of the purely maximalist and "liquidationist" type and he soon refined his initially rather crude understanding of Soviet economics, concretely endorsing and crucially shaping rationalising tendencies (pp. 55-56). Upon taking up Gosplan's chairmanship, Voznesensky clearly displayed his inclination for leadership and proved himself more imaginative than one could have anticipated. The rebirth of the balance method, the focus on perspective planning and the establishment of new committees at Gosplan were all proofs of his spirit of initiative and of his rationalism.

Voznesensky went on to play a leading role in the war-time economic effort, during which he experienced first hand both the benefits of a centralised system and its shortcomings, as well as the practical use that could be made of economic levers.

[1575] Harrison, *Soviet Planning in Peace and War*, p. 253.

[1576] Sutela, *Economic Thought and Economic Reform in the Soviet Union*, p. 14.

[1577] Nove, *An Economic History of the USSR*, p. 319.

By the war's end, Voznesensky had fully emerged as Stalin's most trusted advisor in matters of economic policy, at a time when the *vozhd* was concentrating on domestic and international political matters, entrusting SovMin and Voznesensky within it with authority over almost all economic affairs. The post-war focus on economic levers, the debates on these latter ones, on proportionality and rational utilisation, the monetary and price reforms, the new General Plan — all such ideas and policies were not means through which Voznesensky was pushing an alternative agenda, but rather proposals and policies he deployed to enhance the efficiency of the command economy.

Yet, such policies, the debates they inspired and several reflections contained in Voznesensky's book were not the simple reedition of known precedents — their innovative character is instead confirmed by their significance in relation to post-Stalinist reforms.

At this point the issue arises of whether this evidence can inform hypotheses on Voznesensky's potential role after Stalin's death. At that time, the Presidium collectively moved within hours to adopt rationalising measures such as ministerial amalgamation and within weeks to ease domestic repression and international tensions. Arguably, Voznesensky would have also been informed by the understanding that some form of change and relaxation was badly needed. Therefore, if it is impossible to predict how Voznesensky would have manoeuvred in the post-Stalinist leadership struggle, it seems plausible to affirm that he would have remained true to his rationalising mindset. Freed from Stalinist constraints, he would have further experimented with his 1946-1949 policies and ideas and could have become a powerful force behind a speedier move towards functionalising economic reforms and the opening up of the Liberman and "optimal planning" debates. To move any further with hypothesising would indeed mean to enter the realm of unsubstantiated speculation.

What is most important to remember is that Voznesensky was, as Benediktov stated, “a man and a political figure of the Stalinist epoch” and that consequently he cannot be understood as separated from said realities. [1578] Therefore, in presenting Voznesensky’s career, deeds and personal tragedy, the present study has stood by Smith’s suggestion to “avoid moralising condemnation on the one hand and credulous apologetics on the other”. [1579]

[1578] Vinogradov, ‘V Apparate N.A. Voznesenskogo’, p. 303.

[1579] S.A. Smith,’Introduction’, in S.A. Smith (ed), *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Communism*, pp. 32-33.

Appendices

Appendix One — Requiem for Voznesensky

There exist several discordant versions of Voznesensky's fate. Budu Svanidze, Stalin's nephew, even stated in the early 1950s that Voznesensky was "exiled to the Urals, where he still lives, in a small hamlet in the Molotov district". [1580] In fact, by that time the former Gosplan Chairman was already dead.

Essentially, the only version differing from the official truth that can be regarded as at least plausible is I.A. Benediktov's. According to the former Stalinist Minister of Agriculture, "Voznesensky was not shot. He froze on the road, in a prison wagon", adding that "on whether it was a coincidence or a conscious intent of protection, an order received from above, I will not speculate". Benediktov was adamant that "I know this from a close friend, then working in the security and well-informed about the case of "Leningrad group" [who] I trust like myself". [1581] Plausibility is lent to this story by an MVD-MGB report dated 10 December 1953 which clearly stated that out of 214 people arrested in relation to the Leningrad Affair, "two individuals died in prison before the trial". [1582]

Benediktov's story stands at variance with the abundant evidence collected by Lev Voznesensky, son of Alexander Voznesensky and nephew of Nikolay, on the fate of his father, uncle and aunt.

A handwritten report dated 1 October 1950, reproduced in full in one of his latest books, clearly stated that Voznesensky, Kapustin, Kuznetsov, Lazutin, Popkov and Rodionov were all shot at 2am that night in Leningrad, one hour after the directive from Moscow was received. Amongst

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[1580] B. Svanidze (trans V. Sheliga), *Georgy Malenkov. A Portrait Sketch from Life by Stalin's Nephew Budu Svanidze* (London, 1954), p. 74.

[1581] Dobrov, 'Melkoburzhuaznyye Kadry Reshayut Vse', p. 6.

[1582] GARF, f. 8131. op. 32. d. 3989. ll. 63-64, in Khlevnyuk, *Politburo i Sovet Ministrov*, pp. 306-307.

the three who signed the order was the infamous Chief of the MGB *Komendantura*, Major-General V.M. Blokhin. [1583] The most willing amongst Stalin's executioners, he might have added overseeing, or perhaps even carrying out, the execution of the last Politburo member purged under Stalin to the list of thousands he personally shot. [1584]

Nikolai's brother Alexander and sister Maria were left in a limbo for another month. Alexander even received a visit from Beria, Malenkov and Bulganin, with the latter personally beating him and all three reassuring Stalin that the man was indeed guilty. [1585] They both were shot in Moscow on 28 October 1950 at 2pm, [1586] while executions of other defendants continued until 31 October. [1587] Their mother, 84 years old, was exiled in October 1950 and died of illness just two months and a half after. Their younger sister Valentina was the only sibling to survive the ordeal; she was arrested in October 1950 too, exiled a year after and rehabilitated in 1954, just as Lev Voznesensky, Alexander's son. [1588]

There seems to be convincing evidence that Nikolay was buried at Levashovo, an area taken over by the NKVD already in 1937. [1589] This was initially revealed to *Memorial* activists by Leningrad's Soviet and KGB officers in 1989. [1590] Yet, it is telling that still today only ten out of

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[1583] *Strateg Ekonomicheskoy Pobedi*, p. 230.

[1584] Montefiore, *Stalin. The Court of the Red Tsar*, pp. 333-334 — D. Rayfield, *Stalin and His Hangmen. The Tyrant and Those Who Killed for Him* (New York, 2004), pp. 377-379.

[1585] L.A. Voznesensky, 'Bezzakoniye… «po zakonu»', pp. 151-152.

[1586] L.A. Voznesensky, *Istiny Radi*, p. 246.

[1587] *Strateg Ekonomicheskoy Pobedi*, p. 230.
The defendants shot in Moscow included G.F. Badayev, M.V. Basov, V.O. Belopolsky, P.T. Bondarenko, A. A. Bubnov, A.I. Burilin, A.D. Verbitsky, V.P. Galkin, V.N. Ivanov, P.N. Kubatkin, P.I. Levin, M.N. Nikitin, M.I. Petrovsky, M.I. Safonov, N.V. Solovyov, P.T. Talyush, I.S. Kharitonov, P.A. Chursin.

[1588] V.Yu. Gessen, *Semy'a Voznesenskih. Vysokaya i Tragicheskaya Sud'ba* (Saint Petersburg, 2013), pp. 6, 74, 76.

[1589] L. Shlosberg, 'Levashovskoye Yevangeliye ot naroda', *Pskovskaya Guberniya*, 26 September 2012, 37 (609), http://gubernia.pskovregion.org/number_609/03.php (27 June 2017).

[1590] Elektronny Arkhiv Nauchno-Informatsionnogo Tsentra "Fond Iofe" (Saint Petersburg), f. B-1, op. 1, delo Muravskiy Valentin Tikhonovich, l. 1, http://arch.iofe.center/imageViewer/img?url=kJ2VmpyLwsn-OyszMzsjI2Z6Li43Czs/Hx83ZjJqNlp6Tws7ZmI2Qio/Czg== (27 June 2017).

the thousands of people laid to rest there have been officially identified and that it even took years to approximately determine the actual number of bodies buried at Levashovo. [1591]

Further information on Levashovo was gained through a hand-drawn map dated 23 June 1965 was realised for the KGB by truck drivers who transferred corpses there. The mass graves are marked by year of use and number of corpses. According to this map, there are about half a dozen locations where Voznesensky's body could have been laid to rest. [1592] Lev Voznesensky believes the location to be "near the entrance, by the fence" and there in 1998 a memorial stone was erected in Nikolai's memory. [1593]

Due to a macabre irony of fate, Voznesensky might be resting not too far away from the body of his persecutor. Indeed, Abakumov and three members of the MGB's Investigative Unit for Especially Important Affairs were arrested in 1951 after M.D. Ryumin, Chief of said unit, accused Abakumov of having concealed evidence and mishandled investigations. Ryumin himself was later arrested during Beria's short interregnum and after this latter one's own imprisonment, all of them ended up in front of a firing squad between July and December 1954. None was ever rehabilitated and Abakumov was buried nowhere else than in Levashovo. [1594]

[1591] As of 1989 it was believed that as many as 46.771 people were buried at Levashovo [Ibid.], while *Memorial* put the number at 24.100 in 1998 [V.V. Iofe, 'Problema Levashovskogo mogil'nika', in V.V. Iofe (ed) *Granitsy smysla. Stat'i, vystupleniya, esse* (Sankt-Peterburg, 2002), pp. 79-80]. The whereabouts of the other victims in the Leningrad area, twenty thousand more during the Great Terror alone, are largely unknown and in 2010 the FSB conclusively told *Memorial* that the documents related to this issue "are in a dilapidated state and are not subject to recovery from the archive for inspection and copying" — Virtual'-nyy Muzey Gulaga, 'Eksponaty. Skhema "Dachi" [UKGB LO] so srokami i kolichestvom zakhoroneniy, http://www.gulagmuseum.org/showObject.do?object=1704385&language=1 (27 June 2017).

[1592] Virtual'nyy Muzey Gulaga, 'Eksponaty. Skhema "Dachi"'.

[1593] *Strateg ekonomicheskoy pobedy,* p. 230.
A memorial was also built at the Moscow cemetery of the Donskoy monastery for the Leningraders there buried, amongst which A.N Voznesensky and M.A. Voznesenskaya — Gessen, *Semy'a Voznesenskih*, p. 122.

[1594] *Komsomol'skaya Pravda*, 30 July 1989, p. 1.
The article has been republished in English in: *JPRS Report. Soviet Union. Political Affairs*, 27 September 1959, 56 (Arlington, 1987), pp. 25-26.

Yet, Abakumov and his associates' sentencing to death has been declared illegal by the Military Collegium and Presidium of the Russian Supreme Court, [1595] while in recent years a quiet political rehabilitation of Abakumov as head of SMERSH has taken place. [1596] Since 2013, mystery surrounds the actual whereabouts of his remains. [1597]

As for Voznesensky, in a few hidden corners of the former Soviet empire, his memory lives on. The Leningrad Institute of Economics and Finance was already named after him in 1954, [1598] but since 23 September 1991 it has been reorganised as Saint Petersburg State University of Economics and Finance. [1599]

[1595] O.S. Smyslov, *General Abakumov. Palach ili zhertva?* (Moscow, 2012), pp. 419-420.

[1596] Abakumov has several either neutral or mildly celebratory biographies on a variety of official FSB websites, where every major "*deyatel Gosbezopastnosty*", including Yezhov and Beria, has one — 'Abakumov Viktor Semenovich', http://www.fsb.ru/fsb/history/leaders/single.htm%21id%3D10309212%40fsb-Biography.html (27 June 2017); 'SMERSH. V.S. Abakumov', - http://vkr-veteran.com/Смерш/СМЕРШ._В.С._Абакумов._11 (27 June 2017).
Abakumov's role as SMERSH head has instead received outright celebration by both FSB sources ['Zagadka dlya Gimmlera. Ofitsery SMERSH v Abvere i SD', http://www.fsb.ru/fsb/history/book/single.htm%21id%3D10434123%40fsbBookdigest.html (27 June 2017); 'Pod grifom «Smersha»', http://osfsb.ru/materialy/k-100-letiyu-organov-bezopasnosti/pod-grifom-smertelno-0/ (27 June 2017)] and by the Army's official newspaper, *Krasnaya Zvezda* ['On Pobedil Abver', *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 16 June 2005 - http://old.redstar.ru/2005/06/16_06/4_01.html (27 June 2017)].
Yet, it ought to be reported that the FSB official website does carry also a source which critically mentions Abakumov's role in post-war repression ['Pyatidesyatye gody', http://www.fsb.ru/fsb/history/author/single.htm%21id%3D10317981%40fsbPublication.html (27 June 2017)].

[1597] In 2004 Abakumov and A.N. Smirnova's son, scientist I.V. Smirnov, passed away. He was buried at Moscow's Rakitki cemetery and his tombstone carried between parentheses his father's surname too. In 2013 on his grave appeared two large marble steles displaying the images of his mother and father, both in military uniform, the second fully adorned of his many and since 1955 officially revoked orders and medals. Rumours, which some claim were confirmed by the cemetery's administration, tell of "*kompetentnie organi*" [i.e. the FSB] reburying there Abakumov and his wife's bodies ['Vstrecha Obshchestva nekropolistov 7 noyabrya 2015 goda', http://necropolsociety.ru/vstrechi89.html (28 June 2017)], while others simply speak of a cenotaph ['Abakumov Viktor Semonovich (1908-1954)', http://www.m-necropol.ru/abakumov-vs.html (28 June 2017)]. The wish that Abakumov's remains could be reunited with his wife and son's was expressed by this latter one's widow in 2013 itself during a tv documentary titled "*Kremlevskiye pokhorony*", one episode of which was devoted to Abakumov. During said program this was defined impossible since, the voice-over claimed, the Minister of State Security's body could not be located at Levashovo ['Kremlevskiye pokhorony: Viktor Abakumov', http://www.ntv.ru/video/448560/ (28 June 2017)].

[1598] LFEI, *LFEI. Istoriya Leningradskogo finansovo-ekonomicheskogo instituta im N.A. Voznesenskogo* (Leningrad, 1989), p. 7.

[1599] 'Istoriya Sankt-Peterburgskogo gosudarstvennogo ekonomicheskogo universiteta', http://unecon.ru/ob-universitete/history (01 July 2017).

Several monuments of Voznesensky were also erected. Since 1973, a street in Tula bears his name and a bust still stands at the Russian Economic University "G.V. Plekhanov", in an internal yard called "Voznesensky Square", on the right side of its main building. [1600] A plaque on house number 3 in Moscow's Romanov lane, where Voznesensky lived, was also unveiled in 1973. [1601]

In 1979, the Institute of Marxism-Leninism published Voznesensky's selected works, [1602] while six years later a collection of his brother's economic writings was also released. [1603] In the meantime, on Nikolai's 80th birth anniversary (1 December 1983), their family home in Chern was transformed into a museum named after him, which operates to this day and whose front yard is still adorned by a bust of his. [1604] A second one greets train-travellers at Chern train Station, [1605] alongside another symbol of the "Victory over fascism", a memorial to the armoured train "Kozma Minin", unveiled in 2010. [1606] The combination of the two transformed the location in a place of re-enactment and celebration. [1607]

In the Donbass industrial town of Yenakiyevo, where Voznesensky worked in 1924 when only twenty-one years old, a "Park of Culture and Recreation" is still dedicated to him, alongside a monument which displays a bronze bass-relief of his face and a large block of coal. [1608]

[1600] Memorial, Tul'skoye oblastnoye otdeleniye, *Po Mestam Politicheskikh Repressiy v Gorode Tule (1918-1958 gg.). Gid-putevoditel'* (Tula, 2013), p. 21.

[1601] 'Memorial'naya doska na dome № 3 po ul.Granovskogo v Moskve. Ustanovlena v [1973 g.]', http://portal.rusarchives.ru/evants/conferences/vozn/44.shtml (01 July 2017).

[1602] Voznesensky, *Izbrannye proizvedeniya*.

[1603] A.A. Voznesensky, *Izbrannye ekonomicheskiye sochineniya (1923-1941 gg.)* (Moscow, 1985).

[1604] 'Chern', https://myslo.ru/club/blog/gulbarij/lmz9L6tSuEidtKJ3Z7tXXA (01 July 2017).

[1605] 'Chern. Tul'skaya Oblast', https://autotravel.ru/town.php/297 (01 July 2017).

[1606] 'Pod Tuloy otkryli memorial slavy «Bronepoyezd Pobedy»', https://www.tula.kp.ru/online/news/663193/ (01 July 2017).

[1607] 'Memorial Slavy «Bronepoyezd Pobedy»', http://doseng.org/foto/47607-memoriala-slavy-bronepoezd-pobedy-10-foto.html (01 July 2017).

[1608] 'Pamyatnik N.A.Voznesenskomu v g.Yenakiyevo', https://www.shukach.com/ru/node/57450 (01 July 2017) — 'Na Maloy Rodina Yanukovicha Poyavilsya Park-Pamyatnik «Dubovy Gay»', http://novosti.dn.ua/news/196531-na-maloy-rodyne-yanukovycha-poyavylsya-park-pamyatnyk-dubovyy-gay (01 July 2017).

Yenakiyevo still celebrates Voznesensky as a notorious “inhabitant” of the town, [1609] while Chern proudly refers to him as “for some time Stalin’s right hand”. [1610] In Tula, Voznesensky’s bust has become the location of many events organised by the University in remembrance of the Great Patriotic War’s start, [1611] of the defence of Tula, which is a Hero City of the Soviet Union, [1612] and of Voznesensky’s own contribution to the “economic victory over fascism”. [1613]

In 2001 Voznesensky was included in a list of Soviet “reformers”, alongside Sokolnikov, Khrushchev, Kosygin and Gorbachev, [1614] while in 2003, on his 100th birth anniversary, RGAE, the Ministry for Economic Development and Trade and the Russian Academy of Sciences organised the conference “N.A. Voznesensky: his era and contemporaneity”. [1615]

A decade later, on Voznesensky’s 110th anniversary birth anniversary, a volume collecting contributions from several authors was published and called him the “strategist of the economic victory”, [1616] while in a celebratory biography of his published in 2015 by the Free Economic Society of Russia, Voznesensky was defined a “statesman, scientist, humanist”. [1617]

[1609] '110 let so dnya rozhdeniya Nikolaya Alekseyevicha Voznesenskogo’, http://enakievets.info/news/110_let_so_dnja_rozhdenija_nikolaja_alekseevicha_voznesenskogo/2013-12-01-4935 (01 July 2017) — ‘Voznesensky Nikolay Alekseyevich’, http://enakievets.info/publ/enakievo_kak_na_ladoni/zhiteli_enakievo/nikolaj_alekseevich_voznesenskij/5-1-0-577 (28 June 2017).

[1610] ‘Chern’, https://myslo.ru/club/blog/gulbarij/lmz9L6tSuEidtKJ3Z7tXXA (01 July 2017).

[1611] ‘«Poklonimsya velikim tem godam…»’, http://www.rea.ru/ru/org/branches/tula/Pages/«Поклонимся-великим-тем-годам…».aspx (02 July 2017).

[1612] 'Etikh dney ne smolknet slava!..’, http://www.rea.ru/ru/org/branches/tula/Pages/Этих-дней-не-смолкнет-слава!-.aspx (02 July 2017).

[1613] 'Rektor REU im. G.V.Plekhanova V.I.Grishin posetil Tul'skiy filial’, http://www.rea.ru/ru/org/branches/tula/Pages/Ректор-РЭУ-им--Г--В--Плеханова-посетил-Тульский-филиал.aspx (02 July 2017).

[1614] ‘Reformatorskaya deyatel'nost' N.A. Voznesenskogo v oblasti ekonomicheskoy teorii i praktiki’, in F.M. Volkova, S.S. Ilina (eds), *Reformatory rossiyskoy ekonomiki (ikh zhizneopisaniye i osnovnyye deyaniya)”, Seriya “Rossiyskiye Reformy i Reformatory”* (5 vols, Moscow, 2001), v, pp. 45-47.

[1615] ‘Nauchnaya konferentsiya “N.A.Voznesenskiy: yego vremya i sovremennost”’, http://portal.rusarchives.ru/evants/conferences/vozn/1.shtml (02 July 2017).

[1616] *Strateg ekonomicheskoy Pobedy*.

[1617] Y.U. Yakutin, *Velikaya Rossiya: Potentsial i Strategiya Razvitiya. Revniteli Rossii. Portretnaya galereya mysliteley VEO, uchenykh, gosudarstvennykh i obshchestvennykh deyateley, predprinimateley* (Moscow, 2015), p. 426.

Appendix Two — Portrait of N.A. Voznesensky (1942)



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        I. d. 200 — Materialy o v dvizhenii raboty N.A. Voznesensky "Voennaya Ekonomika SSSR v period Otchestvennoy Voyny" na soiskaniye gosudarstvennoy premii; 27 - 28.02.48.
        II. d. 328 — Materialy (stenogrammy, tezisy, doklady) diskussii o zakone stoimosti v sotsialisticheskoy ekonomike. Tom 1; 17.01.49.
        III. d. 329 — Materialy (stenogrammy, tezisy, doklady) diskussii o zakone stoimosti v sotsialisticheskoy ekonomike. Tom 2; 23.05.49.

(continued: ARAN, Fond 1877 — Institut Ekonomiki)

IV. d. 1160 — Stenogramma soveshchaniya na temu" Zakon stoimosti i yego ispol'zovaniye v narodnom khozyaystve SSSR", Tom 1; 20.05.57.

V. d. 1380 — Dokladnye zapiski v Gosplan SSSR po proyektu general'noy perspektivy razvitiya narodnogo khozyaystva SSSR na 1959-1975 gg. i predlozheniy po razvitiyu nauki; 23 oktyabrya - 11.11.59.

II. Opis 8 — Upravlencheskaya dokumentatsiya Instituta ekonomiki // Nauchno-organizatsionnykh dokumentov Instituta Ekonomiki An SSSR za 1960-1972 gg. (postoyannoe khraneniye)

I. d. 324 — Nauchnoy Konferentsii “Zakonomernosti stroitel'stva kommunisticheskoy ekonomiki i ikh ispol'zovaniye v narodnom khozyaystve SSSR na sovremennom etape”, sektsii “Problemy sovershenstvovaniya planirovaniya khozrascheta i material'nogo stimulirovaniya”; 24.01.63

II. d. 454 — Dokladnaya zapiska v TSK KPSS o rabota Akademika L.V. Kantorovicha i V.V. Novozhilova; 11.02.65

III. d. 455 — Osnovnyye polozheniye po dal'neyshemu sovershenstvovaniyu planovogo tsenoobrazovaniya; 23.01.65

IV. d. 516 — Dokladnye zapiski v Sovet Ministrov SSSR o provedenii khozyaystvennoy reformy; 31.01.66

V. d. 623 — Dokladnaya zapiska v TSK KPSS "Itogi khozyaystvennoy reformy za 1966 g., pervoye polugodiye 1967 g. i problemy yeye dal'neyshego sovershenstvovaniya”; 01.09.67.

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    I. d. 162 — Originaly postanovleniy SNK SSSR №№ 2-248; 02.01.1940 - 20.02.1940.

    II. d. 324 — Originaly postanovleniy Soveta Ministrov SSSR №№ 436-545 - 21.02.1948 - 05.03.1948

  II. Opis 53 — Sekretariat Zamestitelya Predsedatelya Soveta Ministrov SSSR tovarishcha Voznesenskogo N.A. 1939-1949 gg.

    I. d. 10 — Perepiska Sekretariata tov. Voznesenskogo N.A. za 1946 god

    II. d. 11 — Perepiska Sekretariata tov. Voznesenskogo N.A. za 1947 god

    III. d. 15 — Zakonchennaya perepiska po pis'mam otdel'nykh grazhdan

II. Fond P7523 — Verkhovnyy Sovet SSSR

  I. Opis 35 — Dokumental’nye materialy, 1946-1949

    I. d. 28 — Stenogrammy pervogo i vtorogo sovmestnykh zasedaniy Soveta Soyuza i Soveta Natsional'nostey (1-y kontrol'nyy ekzemplyar); 15 - 19 marta 1946.

    II. d. 55g — Zakon o pyatiletnem plane vosstanovleniya i razvitiya narodnogo khozyaystva na 1946-50 g.g.; 1946.

Moscow, **РГАЭ** (RGAE, Russian State Archive of the Economy)

I. Fond 4372 — Gosplan

   I. Opis 41 — 1941

      I. d. 182 — Materialy po organizatsii rabot po sostavleniyu General'nogo plana razvitiya narodnogo khozyaystva SSSR na 15 let (1943-1957 gg.) (Tezisy, skhema, spiski list, postanovleniya Gosplana SSSR).

      II. d. 196 — Materialy k sostavleniyu General'nogo plana razvitiya narodnogo khozyaystva SSSR na 15 let (1943-1957 gg.) Doklady Instituta Mirovogo khozyaystva i Mirovoy politiki o potreblenii v kapitalisticheskikh stranakh (SSHA i Germaniya).

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      IV. 199b — Proyekt tezisov doklada Gosplana pri SNK SSSR Tsentral'nomu komitetu VKP(b) i SNK SSSR o General'nom plane razvitiya narodnogo khozyaystva SSSR na pyatnadtsat' let. Chasti 1 i 2.

   II. Opis 43 — 1943

      I. d. 125-b — Protokoly zasedaniy Gosudarstvennoy planovoy komissii Soveta Ministrov SSSR za №№ 1-50. Kopii.

      II. d. 125-g — Materialy k zasedaniyam Gosudarstvennoy planovoy komissii Soveta Ministrov SSSR.

III. Opis 47 — 1947

I. d. 1 — Protokoly zasedaniy Gosudarstvennoy planovoy komissii Soveta Ministrov SSSR za №№ 1-50. Kopii.

II. d. 3 — Materialy k zasedaniyam Gosudarstvennoy planovoy komissii Soveta Ministrov SSSR.

IV. Opis 48 — 1948

I. d. 1 — Protokoly №№ 1-30 zasedaniy Gosplana SSSR, kopii.

II. d. 2 — Protokoly №№ 31-50 zasedaniy Gosplana SSSR, kopii

III. d. 3 — Materialy k zasedaniyu Gosplana SSSR (k protokolam №№ 2, 3, 4, 5, 6).

IV. d. 4 — Materialy k zasedaniyu Gosplana SSSR (k protokolam №№ 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12)

V. d. 12 — Materialy k zasedaniyu Gosplana SSSR (k protokolam №№ 47, 48, 49, 50)

VI. d. 13 — Kopii zaklyucheniy po porucheniyam Pravitel'stva, otpravlennykh za podpis'yu Predsedatelya Gosplana SSSR.

VII. d. 343 — Dokladnye zapiski predsedatelyu Gosplana SSSR po predvaritel'nomu proyektu general'nogo khozyaystvennogo plana.

VIII. d. 349 — Dokladnye zapiski rukovodstvu Gosplana SSSR po voprosam planirovaniya narodnogo khozyaystva

V. Opis 49 — 1949

I. d. 1 — Protokoly zasedaniy Gosplana SSSR № № 1-8, 10-32, 35, 38, 45, 56. Kopii

II. d. 2 — Materialy k zasedaniyam Gosplana SSSR, tom I

III. d. 5 — Materialy k zasedaniyam Gosplana SSSR, tom IV

IV. d. 6 — Materialy k zasedaniyam Gosplana SSSR, tom V

V. d. 8 — Materialy k zasedaniyam Gosplana SSSR, tom VII

VI. d. 161 — Dokladnye zapiski otdela, predstavlennye Predsedatelyu Gosplana SSSR po perspektivnomu planirovaniyu (skhema etapov sostavleniya plana, dovedeniya planov do predpriyatiy).

VI. Opis 50 — 1950

I. d. 1 — Protokoly zasedaniy Gosplana SSSR

II. d. 127 — Materialy o sostavlenii vtorogo poslevoyennogo pyatiletnego plana razvitiya narodnogo khozyaystva SSSR na 1951-1955 gg. (proyekty postanovleniy, Dokladnye zapiski, tablitsy, raschety i dr.)

VII. Opis 58 — 1958

I. d. 377 — Zamechaniya otdelov po proyektu resheniya kollegii Gosplana SSSR "Ob organizatsii razrabotki v Gosplane SSSR general'noy perspektivy razvitiya narodnogo khozyaystva SSSR na 1959-1975 gg. i materialy k nim.

Moscow, **РГАСПИ** (RGASPI, Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History)

II. Fond 17 (Tsentral'nyy Komitet KPSS (TSK KPSS))

I. Opis 3 (Protokoly zasedaniy Politbyuro TSK RKP(b) i VKP(b) VII-XVIII sozyvov)

I. d. 1046 — Protokol PB № 39 ot 16 noyabrya 1942 g.-15 marta 1943 g.

II. d. 1066 — Protokol zasedaniya Politbyuro TzK VKP(b) № 59

III. d. 1074 — Protokol zasedaniya Politbyuro TzK VKP(b) № 67

II. Opis 125 — Protokoly zasedaniy Politbyuro TSK RKP(b) i TSK VKP(b) (podlinniki postanovleniy i materialy, stenogrammy nekotorykh zasedaniy Politbyuro)

I. d. 476 — Proyekty Programmy VKP(b) i proyekt skhemy Programmy , podgotovlennye Upravleniyem propagandy i agitatsii TsK VKP(b), s preprovoditel'nymi zapiskami na imya sekreterey TsK VKP(b)

III. Opis 163 — Protokoly zasedaniy Politbyuro TSK RKP(b) i TSK VKP b) (podlinniki postanovleniy i materialy, stenogrammy nekotorykh zasedaniy Politbyuro)

I. d. 1520 — Protokoly zasedaniy Politbyuro TSK RKP(b), yuliya-avgusta 1947

II. d. 1521 — Protokoly zasedaniy Politbyuro TSK RKP(b), sentyabrya 1947-aprelya 1948

III. Fond 77 — Zhdanov Andrey Aleksandrovich (1896-1948)

I. Opis 1 — Zhdanov A.A. Avtorskiye dokumenty

I. d. 5 — Materialy i zapiski.

II. d. 6 — Materialy i zapiski.

(continued: RGASPI — Fond 77 — Zhdanov Andrey Aleksandrovich (1896-1948))

II. Opis 4 — Zhdanov A.A.

I. d. 17 — Proyekty tezisov k sostavleniyu novoy Programmy VKP(v), predstavlennye A.A. Zhdanovu chlenam Komissii po sostavleniyu proyekta Programmy VKP(v). Kopii

II. d. 18 — Stenogramma protokola zasedaniya Komissii p o proyektu novoy Programmy VKP(b) , zamechaniya po preoktam novoy Programmy VKP(b), proyekt novoy Programmy VKP(b). Kopii

IV. Fond 83 (Malenkov)

I. Opis 1 (Malenkov)

I. d. 5 — Spravki, Zapiski, pis'ma i dr. dokumenty po voprosam organizatsionnoy i ideologicheskoy raboty partii, postupivshiye v TSK VKP (b) na imya Malenkova; 29.03.1937 – 1.08.1950

II. d. 6 — Materialy i zapiski.

V. Fond 558 — Stalin (nast. Dzhugashvili) Iosif Vissarionovich (1878-1953)

I. Opis 3 — Knigi iz biblioteki Stalina s yego pometkami

I. d. 263 — Politicheskaya ekonomiya. Kratkiy kurs

II. Opis 11 — Stalin I.V.

I. d. 123 — Zapiska Zhdanova A.A.

II. d. 124 — Prilozheniye k zapiske Zhdanova A.A. ot 29 iyulya 1947 g., s zamechaniyami Stalina I.V.

VI. Fond 644 — Gosudarstvennyy Komitet Oborony SSSR (GKO)

I. Opis 1 — Protokoly i rasporyazheniya GKO 1941

I. d. 1 — Postanovleniya i rasporyazheniya Gosudarstvennogo komiteta oborony (GKO) №№ 1 ss – 82 ss. Rassylochnye materialy

II. d. 21 — Postanovleniya i rasporyazheniya Gosudarstvennogo komiteta oborony (GKO) №№ 1246 ss – 1325 ss. Rassylochnye materialy

III. d. 72 — Postanovleniya i rasporyazheniya Gosudarstvennogo komiteta oborony (GKO) №№ 2575 ss – 2630 s. Rassylochnye materialy.

II. Opis 2 — Postanovleniya i rasporyazheniya GKO (podlinniki)

I. d. 1 — Postanovleniya i rasporyazheniya Gosudarstvennogo komiteta oborony (GKO) №№ 1 ss – 44 ss. Podlinniki i podgotovitel'nye materialy

II. d. 8 — Postanovleniya i rasporyazheniya Gosudarstvennogo komiteta oborony (GKO) №№ 286 ss – 328 ss. Podlinniki i podgotovitel'nye materialy

III. d. 14 — Postanovleniya i rasporyazheniya Gosudarstvennogo komiteta oborony (GKO) №№ 525 ss – 563 ss. Podlinniki i podgotovitel'nye materialy

IV. d. 25 — Postanovleniya i rasporyazheniya Gosudarstvennogo komiteta oborony (GKO) №№ 877 ss – 919 ss. Podlinniki i podgotovitel'nye materialy

V. d. 36 — Postanovleniya i rasporyazheniya Gosudarstvennogo komiteta oborony (GKO) №№ 1237 s – 1285 ss. Podlinniki i podgotovitel'nye materialy

III. Opis 3 — Protokoly zasedaniy Operativnogo byuro GKO (kopii)

I. d. 1 — Protokoly zasedaniy Operativnogo byuro Gosudarstvennogo komiteta oborony №№ 1–21. Kopii; 1943.

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IV. d. 4 — Protokoly zasedaniy Operativnogo byuro Gosudarstvennogo komiteta oborony №№ 47–61. Kopii; 1944.

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