APRA 1968-1988: From Evolution to Government -
The Elusive Search for Political Integration in Peru

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Peru has long had to contend with a lack of national and political integration. Yet its APRA party is the oldest mass-based reformist party in the region, and its mission has historically been to integrate the nation. The APRA, since its inception, aroused more political hostility than any other force in Peru, and consequently was repressed, even outlawed, for decades. Years of repression and clandestinity contributed to a lack of doctrinal clarity and undemocratic tendencies within the party, which were to affect its capacity to govern. The nature of the party, and the difficulty of its task, are the subject of this thesis.

Despite the existence of democratic institutions, large sectors of the population exist outside of formal legal, political, and economic systems; there is a gap between state and society. Successful democratic reform would incorporate these marginalized sectors. When the APRA came to power in 1985, it proposed to do so by focusing on the needs of the poorest. Expectations were high for the new government, in part because of its popular young leader, Alan García, and in part because a decade of economic and social crisis had discredited both the military and the right as alternatives, resulting in unprecedented consensus for reform.

Once it attained power, the APRA managed, for the first two years, to maintain support that was unique to reformist efforts in Peru. A sudden shift in strategy to confrontational rhetoric and authoritarian tactics destroyed the fragile consensus necessary for democratic reform. The politics of reform became the politics of polarization: a "winner take all" style debate in which cooperation and compromise were impossible. The outcome was policy stagnation, a surge of reaction from extremes of the left and the right, and severe strain on the political system. The APRA party, rather than playing the role of the strong centre acted as a catalyst to the polarization process. In large part due to decades of sectarian and authoritarian strains that the party's 1980's renovation had not eliminated, it was virtually powerless in the face of increasingly erratic behaviour on the part of its leader.

This thesis examines the evolution of the APRA from the time of the 1968 military "revolution" through the party's first three years in power. It explores the formulation and initial success of the consensus it built, the reasons for its breakdown, and the fate of the poor during that process. The difficult context in which the party had to operate will also be addressed. Finally, it attempts to contribute to the understanding of the challenges faced by reformers in Peru in particular and more generally by developing democracies.
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List of Abbreviations

AD - Acción Democratica (Venezuela)
AP - Acción Popular
ARE - Alianza Revolucionaria Estudiantil
APRA - Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana
APV - Asociacion Pro-Vivienda
CAEM - Centro de Altos Estudios Militares
CEN - Comité Ejecutivo Nacional (of the APRA)
CGTP - Confederación General de Trabajadores Peruanos
CHAP - Chicos Apristas Peruanos
COOPOP - Cooperación Popular
COOPVIV - Cooperación Pro-Vivienda
CTP - Confederación de Trabajadores del Peru
CUA - Comando Universitario Aprista
DIRECOTE - Dirección Contra Terrorismo
FREDEMO - Frente Democratico
FRENATRACA - Frente Nacional de Trabajadores y Campesinos
IDE - Izquierda Democratica Estudiantil
IDESI - Instituto para Desarrollo del Sector Informal
INP - Instituto Nacional de Planificación
IU - Izquierda Unida
JAP - Juventud Aprista Peruana
JUA - Juventud Universitaria Aprista
ONDEPJOV - Oficina Nacional de Pueblos Jóvenes
MIR - Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria
MOTC - Movimiento de Trabajadores Clasistas
MRTA - Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru
PAD - Programa de Apoyo Directo
PAIT - Programa de Apoyo de Ingreso Temporal
PC - Partido Comunista (del Prado's party)
PCP-SL - Partido Comunista del Peru, Sendero Luminoso
PEM - Programa de Empleo Minimo
PLN - Partido de Liberación Nacional (Costa Rica)
PPC - Partido Popular Cristiano
PROEM - Programa de Empleo
PSR - Partido Socialista Revolucionario
PUM - Partido Unido Mariateguista
SINAMOS - Sistema Nacional de Apoyo a la Movilización Social
SUTEP - Sindicato Unico de Trabajadores en la Educación Peruana
UNIR - Unión Nacional de la Izquierda Revolucionaria
UNO - Unión Nacional Odriista
Introduction
APRA: From Opposition to Government - The Elusive Search for Political Integration in Peru

Introduction

The APRA - American Popular Revolutionary Alliance - in Peru is one of the oldest mass-based reform-oriented party in Latin America, a region where the record of both democracy and reform is checkered. Most democracies in Latin America have evolved from formal electoral systems dominated by powerful oligarchies - the "vieja democracia verbal" as APRA's Haya de la Torre labelled them - into electoral systems which incorporate, at least at election time, large percentages of the population. In many cases, suffrage now includes illiterates. Marxist parties, which were often banned in the past, now have representation in some legislatures. Yet in some countries, and particularly prevalent in Peru, there also exist a host of loosely organized popular organizations which function outside the realm of government or political parties, concurrent with large segments of the population who earn their living outside the formal economy. This phenomenon, in conjunction with the sectors of the population involved in armed insurrection, demonstrates very vividly the breach between state and society, and thus the lack of national integration, in Peru. As long as it prevails, democratic government cannot adequately fulfil its representative functions. It is the goal of the reformer to narrow this gap by incorporating the marginalized sectors of the population - extending beyond their votes - into the formal political and economic systems. It is
the goal of the successful reformist party to act as the bridge to narrowing that gap.

While reformist parties cannot be neatly categorized, certain criteria can be applied which distinguish those which are authoritarian, exclusive, and cooptative in nature from those which succeed in implementing economic and social policies that ameliorate existing injustices and in integrating the population as active participants. In Latin America there has been an abundance of the first type and a coinciding shortage of the latter. As both national integration and basic consensus on societal values - Dahrendorf's homeostatic equilibrium - are often lacking, more often than not, the politics of reform become the politics of polarization. Polarized polities are characterized by, among other traits, the relevance of anti-system parties, the existence of opposition from both sides of the political spectrum, and a lack of agreement on the legitimacy of the system itself.[1] In such scenarios, competing political forces are involved in a "winner take all" style debate where any sort of cooperation or compromise is impossible, and the outcome is usually policy stagnation, a surge of reaction from extremes of the right or the left, and at times the collapse of the entire political system, as in Chile in 1973. The prospects for development in a democratic context are forfeited while the losers are in all cases the poor, who benefit from neither democracy nor reform.

The APRA Party
The APRA, since its inception, aroused more emotions and animosities than any other political force in Peru, and consequently was prevented from power for decades. Once it attained power, the APRA managed - at least initially - to build a consensus that was unique to reformist efforts in Peru, yet that consensus broke down into extreme polarization and a dramatic increase of insurgent violence. This thesis will explore the formulation and initial success of that consensus, the reasons for its breakdown, and the fate of the poor - supposedly the principal concern of reformist parties - during that process. The context in which that consensus had to be built: an underdeveloped and crisis-ridden economy, a vast employment problem, and growing insurgent violence, will also be discussed. It will attempt to contribute to the understanding of the challenges faced by reformers in Peru in particular and, more generally, by developing democracies.

After sixty years of exclusion from national power by the entrenched opposition of both the military and the conservative elites, the APRA finally achieved it in 1985. The party which took power in July 1985 was virtually an unknown entity. It was not the radical and violence-prone group of revolutionaries of the 1930's and 1940's; nor was it the ideologically compromised party of the 1950's and the 1960's "convivencia" with the conservative elites; and finally it was distinct from the nascent and increasingly strong forces of the Marxist left. The party maintained several characteristics - many
of them undemocratic in nature - that were to prove barriers to its ability to govern effectively.

The APRA maintained a unique position in Peruvian politics, and its own form of political culture: "mistica". This culture was an outgrowth of the mystique of the personality of Haya de la Torre, and of the years spent in persecution by many Apristas. The personality of Haya and the emotional bonds that were formed by a shared willingness to suffer for the cause of social reform forged ties that took on a familial or religious nature rather than a political one. This cultural Aprismo was concurrently linked with and independent of the APRA in government. It served to provide a sense of hope based in the legacy of a leader and an eclectic ideology which were both distinctly Peruvian. The APRA culture also entailed a pervasive opposition mentality, which was not to enhance its ability to govern. As Sartori notes, the less likely a party is to get into power, the less responsible a role it plays as opposition, and the less likely it is to have realistic proposals.[2] These traits were to become evident when the party faced the difficult task of governing.

In July 1985 despite Peru's difficulties and traditional fears about the party, there were high hopes, as the APRA had renovated its image, had an unprecedented popular mandate, and had a strong and charismatic leader, Alan Garcia. By mid-1988, it was clear, after a positive start which raised expectations both within and outside Peru, that the APRA could not fulfil its reformist
mission; that Peru was more polarized than when the party took power; that insurgency had made substantial headway; and that the poor, after receiving brief attention from a variety of government programs which faded out or were discontinued, were even worse off than before. The APRA's long-sought attainment of power yielded, in Alan García's own words, an "impossible revolution."

The party had taken power in the face of formidable challenges, but also at a time when the consensus on the need for reform in Peru was unprecedented. At the same time, the military's revolution had made elites in Peru highly suspicious of state expropriation of property, and most observers highly sceptical about its utility. The APRA initially avoided debate on the structure of property relations and focused instead on innovative reform, with a particular focus on the informal sector. A clear turning point was the July 1987 surprise nationalization of the nation's banks, which also included a shift to confrontational rhetoric. The implicit rules of the game were broken; the right cried "foul", the left cried "bluff", and the APRA's lack of agreement on what the rules actually were was rapidly exposed. Consensus gave way to polarization, government initiative faded, and economic crisis rapidly set in. The speed and the severity of the deterioration can be explained in part by the traits of the party and its authoritarian and erratic leader García; and in part by the extent to which Peruvian society could be described as praetorian: a society in which social forces confront
each other directly, with no institutions accepted as legitimate mediaries, and, more important, no agreement exists among the groups as to an authoritative means for conflict resolution.[3]

The Reformist Debate

Crucial to the success of reform in Latin America is the manner in which the reformist debate is presented - particularly in countries such as Peru where consensus does not exist, not only on policies but on principles and fundamentals, such as the legitimacy of the political system. The doctrine and attitude of the leaders and party in power usually have a great deal of influence over this presentation. Many reformist or revolutionary parties are sectarian in nature, and often have a utopian philosophy - which implies that they alone are capable of saving their nation. These exclusionary tendencies make such parties less capable of generating the cooperation among diverse interests that is necessary for successful reform; the debate is phrased in confrontational terms and becomes polarized. Communist parties in their militant stages typically display these tendencies, but so also can such ideologically diverse parties as the Christian Democrats in Chile and the APRA in Peru.

In addition to these sectarian traits, in the APRA's case, is a lack of ideological coherence. Ideological coherence does not imply rigid attachment to doctrine, rather it implies agreement on basic principles, such as whether the party is going to use reformist tactics - working within the existing system - or revolutionary
ones - circumventing the system. Reformist tactics can achieve revolutionary objectives; providing a reassuring atmosphere is often critical. For reform to succeed in an electoral democracy with a private enterprise economy, the rules of the game - i.e. the extent of the reformist intent - must be made clear in order to maintain confidence and consensus. The party's doctrine or platform is the primary means to establishing such rules.

When the APRA attained power, doctrinal clarity did not exist, and this was reflected in contradictory policies and a sudden shift to radical confrontational rhetoric after initial success with consensus building and a reformist approach. The APRA's inability to choose between the tactics and rhetoric of reformers versus revolutionaries quickly alienated its support bases in the private sector and middle class, yet won it no sympathy from the more radical left, to whom it was trying to appeal. Rhetoric took on much more importance than the actual nature of reform, and policymaking coherence rapidly deteriorated into polarization and economic collapse. This thesis argues that by failing to establish and abide by certain rules of the game and attempting to play two instead - reform and revolution - the APRA forfeited its opportunity to implement successful democratic reform.

Conclusion

The thesis will attempt to determine, using the party's record after three years in power, why the APRA was unable to fulfil its mandate to implement
substantive reform. It can be explained to some extent by the party's lack of doctrinal clarity and by the authoritarian and populist strains which are evident throughout the party's history and in the leadership style of Alan García. It is necessary to look at the current regime in the context of the party's origins and evolution. The precarious social situation in which the APRA government had to operate is also relevant. Chapter I examines the origins of the party in the 1920's and its performance until the 1968 military revolution. The thesis examines the party's development from 1968 to the present: a period during which the country underwent substantial social, economic, and political change. The interaction of the APRA with this change is crucial to the understanding of the current party and its program, and the regime that evolved. Chapter II examines the APRA's reaction to the military's implementing a revolutionary program, and the party's subsequent central role in the transition to democracy. Chapter III looks at APRA in the post-Haya years, the rise of Alan García, and the renovation the party underwent for the 1985 presidential campaign. Part II - Chapters IV through VI - evaluates the APRA in power: its economic performance; the state of the party and its relations with its leader and the government; and its relations with the opposition - both parliamentary and insurrectionary. This section will highlight the difficulty of implementing democratic reform in an ideologically and politically polarized atmosphere.
Finally, one of the criteria - and perhaps the most important - used to determine the nature of the APRA is the examination of the reforms it introduced, which were primarily targeted at the informal sector. This thesis will focus in particular on the most publicized one: the PAIT, an employment program in the urban slums - pueblos jovenes. Chapter VII will analyze the APRA's initially innovative approach towards reforms for the poor by briefly describing all of them, and then Chapter VIII will examine the implementation of the PAIT in detail in one Lima pueblo joven - Huascar. The Huascar analysis will also shed light on how the APRA operates at the municipal level. The analysis of these programs will serve to provide insight into how, if at all, APRA meets its commitment to making the needs of the "marginalized mass" of Peruvians a priority.

The analysis of the evolution of the APRA party from 1968 to the present, of its performance in government, and of the record of its key policies directed at the poor will help determine what sort of party the APRA is, and provide insight into why the party was not able to maintain the consensus that it initially constructed. The performance of the APRA in power, and its failure to maintain the consensus that was so necessary to reform in Peru, not only adds to the understanding of the APRA, but also of the barriers to democratic reformist government in Peru.
PART I:
The APRA as Opposition
Chapter I
APRA 1931-1968:
Confrontation, Compromise, and Counter-Reform

Introduction

The formation of Peru's APRA, one of Latin America's oldest, mass-based political parties, fundamentally changed the nature of politics in a nation where the system had consistently been monopolized by caudillo-like dictators and by a small but powerful elite. The bulk of the population had very little access to and virtually no influence on the nation's politics.

Unlike previous efforts to reform the country... no well-organized, mass political party had, prior to 1931 dared to directly challenge and confront the traditional power structure. The year 1931, then, was in many aspects a true watershed in Peruvian history, for from that date forward the possibility of translating individual or group dissatisfaction into political channels increasingly became a part of everyday...life.[1]

The APRA brought the issues of social justice, structural change, and national integration to the fore of the nation's politics. The bulk of the population had, for the first time, a vehicle through which to directly challenge the existing system. APRA was to remain the majority political force until the 1960's when it faced competition for the first time; even then it was still considered the major force in Peruvian politics. Power was to constantly elude the APRA, however, due both to its own flawed tactics and to the entrenched opposition of the Peruvian elites, aided intermittently by direct military intervention. Despite the existence for three decades of the APRA, and the widespread support that it maintained, Peru was to remain strikingly
backward in terms of political development, economic structure, and social welfare. As late as 1977, Peru was described as a country "which has been 'underdeveloping' rather than 'developing' over the long run."[2]

Several questions are raised by the paradox of the dismal record of reform in Peru in the face of a lasting and popular reform-oriented movement: what makes the implementation of reform so difficult in Peru and why did APRA in particular fail; why at the same time was APRA able, despite its failure to attain power and implement reform, to maintain a substantial support base and mass appeal. In order to broach these issues, it is first and foremost necessary to examine APRA's origins and ideology, its organizational structure, its bases of support and the nature of its almost "messianic" appeal. The personality of APRA's charismatic leader and founder, Victor Raúl Haya de la Torre, and the socio-economic context in which the party originated both played a major role in the evolution of its unique character. It is also important to understand the context in which APRA, or any reformist elements in Peru, had to operate. The party's origins and its nature, and the context in which it operated, are crucial to the analysis and evaluation of APRA's political performance in the periods in which it was allowed, in some form or other, to participate.

APRA: Origins and Ideology

The APRA party, the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance, was formed in 1924 by a Peruvian student leader from Trujillo, Victor Raúl Haya de la Torre, while he was in
exile in Mexico during the Leguia dictatorship. The APRA was conceived as a mass-based, reform-oriented, anti-oligarchic, and anti-imperialist party. The party had a "maximum" program, which was based on the ideal of a Pan-American and not solely Peruvian party. Coining the term "Indo-America", Haya de la Torre called for the unity of Indo-Latin-America against U.S. imperialism; for the political unity of Indo-America; for the nationalization of the Panama Canal; and for the solidarity of all oppressed peoples and classes, particularly the Indians of the New World.[3] The "minimum" program applied specifically to Peru, and focused on the need to end the traditional exploitation of the Peruvian indigenous population by the oligarchy, which had dominated Peru's polity, society, and economy since colonial times. APRA also stressed the need to develop a dynamic national economic capacity to free Peru from its extreme dependence on external trade and foreign capital. The state had a vital role to play in national economic planning, which included the regulation of foreign capital and increasing the purchasing power of the working class, thus creating a dynamic internal market. While the APRA professed to be revolutionary, their official program implied that they would come to power through "peaceful, constitutional means."[4]

The tension between reformist, and for Peru at the time, revolutionary goals and the attempt to achieve power through a constitutional system which was manipulated, if not totally controlled, by the oligarchy became evident early on. There were several violent uprisings either
instigated or supported by the APRA, including one in 1932 in Trujillo which culminated in the military's massacre of approximately 1000 Apristas; the details of this affair remain obscure. The result was a deeply entrenched and enduring hatred between APRA and the military. The armed forces feared APRA's mass appeal and organizational capacity. The party, meanwhile, gained a reputation for violence with which it must still contend today. APRA's sporadic involvement in insurgencies served to "legitimate", in the eyes of the repressors, violent and extra-legal means to curb the party's activities. APRA's last involvement in such an insurgency was in October 1948, and the effects of subsequent repression and the leadership's response were to last for decades. In the fifties the party tempered its rhetoric and colluded with the oligarchy, losing whatever ideological clarity it had, as well as much popular appeal; it was not rejuvenated until the 1980's.

The origins and ideology of the APRA party must be seen in light of the economic transformation that Peru underwent in the early twentieth century, and the social tensions that the transformation created. A great many of the farms on the Peruvian north coast, the region where APRA originated, were transformed from prosperous small and medium-sized sugar farms and vibrant urban centers created by their commerce, into two giant and self-sufficient sugar plantations. One was owned by the American W.R. Grace and Company and the other by the Gildemeister family, which was of German origin. The increase in land concentration took place as downturns in the world economy bankrupted smaller exporters,
and they were bought out largely by foreign interests. The result was the dislocation of the small farmers and the rise of a sugar estate proletariat in their place, and the virtual obsolescence of the towns and ports which had served the farmers. In addition to the dislocation that they caused, the foreign nature of both was deeply resented. Also fueling this resentment was the well-known fact that the Gildemeister family wielded a great deal of power with the hated Leguia dictatorship. While most dramatic in the northern sugar economy, the transformation to large-scale export agriculture affected most regions of the country with the exception of the southern sierra, where to a large extent feudal-type land-tenant relations had survived since colonial times.

In fact the social and economic dislocations in the sugar belt that fueled the rise of APRA in the north were also being repeated at the same time in other areas of the country where economic modernization was likewise transforming and dislocating the traditional caste of society. The changes in the national economy, in turn, were part of a much wider process of economic transformation that saw the Peruvian economy, a potentially lucrative source of raw materials, pulled increasingly into the broader economic structure of the industrializing nations of Europe and the United States...Foreign capital quickly became the motor for converting the Peruvian economy into a modern, export-oriented capability.[5]

APRA's very creation was a function of the socio-economic changes affecting the country, and the party's regional patterns of support to some extent have mirrored the economic trends of the country. The party's electoral success over the years has been tied to the process of agricultural extension and capitalization and the marginalization of the small farmer. APRA was able to
organize and appeal among the new proletariat that arose. The party was traditionally weaker in Lima, which is the most industrialized region of the country and in relative terms was able to provide opportunity and mobility. APRA's support base consists primarily of the middle classes, workers, and certain groups of campesinos: all those who could not compete with the intrusion of big foreign capital. [6] Because the dislocation caused by the intrusion of big capital in the Peruvian society affected a large and multi-class sector of the population, APRA was able to cross both class and rural-urban boundaries, and emerged as "un partido populista-policlasista." [7]

The party had its roots in Haya de la Torre's organizational activities among students and labor groups in the early twenties; Haya and his APRA entered the national limelight almost overnight, through a speech he gave in the Plaza San Martin in Lima in 1931. Haya undoubtedly capitalized on opposition to Leguía in the early twenties, which had been substantially increased by Leguía's unilateral decision to consecrate the nation to the Sacred Heart of Jesus. Haya's speech outlined the APRA program and goals; due to his oratorical prowess and the novelty in Peru of his revolutionary and confrontational rhetoric, he was able to elicit a great deal of favorable popular opinion.

Haya de la Torre's personality had significant effects on the success of the party. The other major Peruvian political thinker of the time, José Carlos Mariategui, whose followers formed the Peruvian Communist Party, was perhaps a
superior intellectual, theoretician, and writer. Haya de la
Torre, however, possessed unique oratorical skills and a
strong penchant for organization and action.[8] While
Mariategui was concerned with theoretical clarity and
consistency, Haya was willing to bend and adapt theory to
justify immediate action.

Haya's oft-criticised manipulation of ideology led to a
pragmatically oriented, uniquely Peruvian party. Mariategui's more careful respect for doctrine led to his
break with Haya. Mariategui died prematurely in 1930, and
after his death his followers, left leaderless, turned to
the directives of the Comintern. While both Haya and
Mariategui were influenced by Marxist thought, Haya was much
more willing to mold the ideas to fit Latin American
realities and his own needs. Haya's approach proved to be
more suited to Peruvian realities and to popular appeal. His
approach was inclusionary in nature and avoided class
conflict terms. "The important thing in this comedy is that
each man feels himself a member of the cast...Each poor
devil must feel that he is somebody...The rest doesn't
matter...the ideas, the programs, the systems."[9] Even in
his most radical work, *El Antimperialismo y el APRA*, he made
a point of the need to include the middle classes: because
in Latin America the proletariat was still in feudal
conditions, the middle classes, who were displaced by
imperialist penetration, should lead the revolutionary
struggle.[10]

While Haya wrote and spoke prolifically, the appeal of
APRA was not confined to its ideology. To some extent it was
the personality of Haya himself, who had a mystique which gave him "a stature in national politics not shared by anyone."[11] This mystique began with his 1931 Plaza San Martin speech and ended only with his death in 1979. Haya was ambitious, impatient, and opportunistic. His eclectic ideology mirrored these traits. His theory of historic time space justified almost any stance taken by the party, whether it be armed insurrection or counter-reform. According to the theory, each "historic time space" formed a complete system of cultural coordination, a geographic scenario, and an interpretation of history which determined the relation of theory and action. Thus Latin America was separate from Europe and the APRA would act in accordance with its own historical time and space.[12] His "intellectual baggage was dazzling in its variety. His complex and layered view of the world combined biblical, Gnostic, Catalist, Cabalist, pantheist, alchemist, and Romantic concepts with nationalist-deist ideas...as well as pragmatic reformism based on British laborite and Scandinavian social democratic principles."[13]

Haya had travelled extensively, including trips to Germany at the time of the rise of the National Socialists, and to the Soviet Union shortly after the revolution. While rejecting any foreign ideology as applicable to Peru, he was deeply affected by the potential power that he saw in these mass movements. He was also attuned to how to mobilize the discomfited and discontented of Peruvian society at a time of economic and social dislocation. Most important, he and his followers followed up on rhetoric with organizational
and political action. "Esa urgencia de acción ha sido el imperativo fundador del Apra. La acción eficaz supone organización y disciplina, dos condiciones elementales para la existencia y progreso de un partido moderno..."[14] The combination of charisma and impatience which characterized Haya himself also applied to the image of the party as a whole; his followers responded with an almost blind loyalty.

The loyalty that APRA aroused among its followers was matched by an intense fear or hatred on the part of its opponents. The party's almost messianic appeal stemmed in part from the persona of Haya, in part from its message of social revolution, and in part from the mystique of total dedication and of the persecution suffered by its members. A neutral view of the party seemed virtually impossible. "From the time APRA became a relevant force in Peruvian politics, it had a divisive influence not only among Peruvians but among foreigners as well, scholars included...the overwhelming majority of individuals are either strongly for or against it..."[15]

APRA was more than a political party and Aprismo more than party loyalty: it was analogous to a religion.

Aprismo offered a total solution, and it demanded total commitment...First it was a party of integration for all classes outside of the most retrograde elements of the oligarchy -- thus it was offering unity and nationhood to a country only too conscious of being divided...Second, it conceived of itself in total terms. An aprista was not merely a party member, he was in all senses a secular convert to a new religion...APRA offered a world view, an identity...The loyalties and hatred which it has produced may perhaps be attributable to that fact.[16]

The APRA offered, or threatened, Peruvians with the fundamental transformation of their society: it directly
addressed issues of cultural integration, economic dualism, foreign domination, inequitable structures of wealth and power. Even more frightening than APRA's rhetoric was APRA's capacity to organize and to act. Haya's personality and experiences, and the many years of repression, clandestine activity, and exile suffered by the party resulted in a very hierarchical structure which was in part responsible for the party's exceptional capacity to organize. It was this capacity to organize and to mobilize, rivalling that of the army, coupled with its emotional appeal, which reinforced the dominant classes' fear of the APRA.[17]

The shared experiences of persecution, imprisonment, and social isolation that the Apristas suffered created a clan-like mentality - an "us versus them" attitude in the party in general - which affected not only its politics but its interpretation of history and society.

De esta forma, un sistema de verosimilitud socialmente producido, deviene realidad...tanto en medio aprista, como en medio anti-aprista...para los apristas implica algo bíblico 'quien no esta conmigo está contra mí', y para los anti-apristas un sistema de conocimiento por oposición.[18]

The hatred of the APRA was not restricted to the elite and the military. The Peruvian left, from the time of the 1929 split between Haya and Mariategui and Mariategui's death faced a crisis of identity of sorts. The Communist party was never able to approach the degree of popular appeal and support attained by the APRA. A prominent leftist leader of the 1960's, Hugo Blanco, explained the left's constant dilemma with APRA:

'it [APRA] is the oldest party in Peru, and the best organized. It has the longest tradition of struggle and has suffered the most murders, the most deportations and
the most torture victims...The Communist party has always called the APRA fascist and has always had a very sectarian attitude. But on many occasions the Communist party has actually stood to the right of APRA... So this has something to do with the Communist party's great hatred towards the APRA...' [19]

The vitality of the APRA and its willingness early on to launch into action, although often ill-prepared, gave it a certain aura and appeal which could not be matched by the externally dependent form of Communism that Mariategui's movement had adopted.

The ideological rift between Haya and Mariategui became unbreachable when Haya translated ideology into action. Haya and Mariategui shared the same basic conception: they were concurrently the first to use a Marxist base to analyze realities unique to Latin America. Yet, they diverged widely as each further developed his ideology. Mariategui, in part influenced by anarchist thought, based his vision on the autonomous development of the vibrant campesino and other base organizations which he felt would form the basis of the nation. [20] Haya, with his penchant for action and with his experience with the organizational potential of fascist movements, felt that the state had to impose a vision of organization and unity on its society. This was reflected in the design of the APRA:

Un movimiento descendente y autoritario que le permite al Estado construir la nación...funda en el comportamiento de Haya una línea político-militar insurreccional para la captura del poder, expresada inicialmente en el 28, en un primer intento que condiciona su ruptura con Mariategui, y luego en...numerosas conspiraciones. [21]

The direct challenge posed by APRA and its 1931 introduction into Peruvian politics very soon led to the repression of the party. Haya de la Torre lost the 1931
presidential elections to the caudillo-like Sanchez Cerro by a small and disputed margin.[22] [See Table IV] In August 1932, a military revolt in Trujillo instigated by local Apristas resulted in the brutal repression of the nascent party by the military and in the exile of its leadership. The appeal of the party was strong enough, however, that it was able to survive the many years of exile. In fact, its tradition of suffering increased its appeal and decreased the legitimacy of the regimes which repressed it. "We are the exemplary citizens of an exemplary party. And if we are so it is because we have suffered and we have known how to suffer."[23]

In a short period of time the APRA was able to rise to national renown, arouse and organize a great many Peruvians, and sufficiently threaten the dominant classes' political monopoly that the fears behind the "anti-Aprismo" movement became almost as strong and certainly more violent than the movement itself. The road to power, however, was hardly as easy. The constant and often violent resistance to APRA's inroads into the political scene raised tensions within the APRA between its commitments to a revolutionary program and to its achievement by constitutional means. Repression of legitimate political gains resulted in an increased willingness by many Apristas to resort to violent revolt as a means - a tendency which still exists. This merely increased the cycle of violence and repression, as the revolts of Trujillo in 1932 and Callao in 1948 demonstrate. The oligarchy in Peru in the mid-twentieth century were clearly unwilling to accept APRA's reformist program,
Despite the popular mandate that it had. In terms of Peru's oligarchical and backward social structure, APRA's ideology was revolutionary. Haya's call for the replacement of the "vieja democracia verbal"[24] was definitely unacceptable to the dominant members of Peruvian society, and exposed their democracy as exactly what Haya called it. From the time of the party's formation, whether legal or in exile, whether radical or modified in its stance, the presence of the APRA as a challenge to the existing social and political structures permanently changed the nature of politics in Peru.

Peru: The Context

By the mid-twentieth century, when many Latin American countries had made a great deal of progress towards industrialization and economic diversification, Peru lagged far behind. "Peru ranked as an acutely underdeveloped component of the capitalist world economy. By this we imply a country not only poor but also characterized by serious rigidities which inhibit a process of structural change."[25] Peru entered the 1960's with an extremely dependent economy, an extraordinarily high level of foreign penetration, a lack of domestic technological capability, and an export dominated growth pattern. Even after the military's "revolution" of the 1970's, Peru's social indicators displayed preposterously poor conditions for the many at the bottom of the income ladder and an income distribution which was extremely skewed, even in relation to its Latin neighbors.[See Table III]
The nation's economic underdevelopment was matched by a political system based on manipulation and cooptation of the majority of the population by a small elite with the frequent aid of the military. The elite's control of the political system was not total, however, and was eroding with the increase of urbanization and popular mobilization that accompanied industrialization. "The failure or inability of the elite to concern itself with the generation of popular support is shown by the rise of the APRA party. There was little attempt to mobilize that important stratum of society which found its political home in the APRA."[26]

While the elite did not have total control, it did have a de facto monopoly due to the fragmentation of the new upwardly mobile sectors. "By themselves neither the industrial sector, the middle class, the working class nor the peasantry could have devised and implemented a strategy commanding the majority support of the population."[27] This fragmentation was due to the diversity of economic base, level of income, and regional affiliation which characterize Peruvian society. These fragmented social sectors, when juxtaposed against the centralized control of government in Lima, were relatively powerless. The APRA, which had mobilized the support of some of these sectors, was fundamentally weakened by its lack of substantive peasant backing, by its inability to dominate in Lima, and by the virulent opposition of the military.[28] Thus the political "game" in Peru was one of default and of manipulation and cooptation: a game which was most skilfully played by an elite whose primary objective was to maintain its status
free of state interference. The resulting situation was one of relatively high levels of economic growth yielding benefits for a small and privileged stratum of the population.

In light of the relatively weak hold the elite had on the political system, the worsening relative position of the masses, and the existence of a potentially strong reformist or radical political movement in the APRA, it is puzzling that there was an absence of widespread movement for change. To explain how this inequitable distribution of wealth and power arose and was maintained without substantial instability, it is important to clarify, to the extent that it is possible, the nature of the actors: the elites, the middle class, the "marginalized masses", and the labor movement.

Despite the erosion in the relative position of a large part of the population, it is important to note that the rapid growth of the Peruvian economy between 1950 and 1966 probably prevented any dramatic fall in absolute term...although the lowest 22% of the labor force experienced complete stagnation of their real income....Many observers of Peruvian society have viewed it as imminently threatened by mass revolt...In fact, the system has been noteworthy for its stability...In terms of national politics, this meant that the standpoint from which the majority of the population viewed "structural reforms" was not that of a desperate and impoverished mass seeking a savior. Rather it was from groups who had been excluded from full participation in the modern sector, but who hoped for more advantageous incorporation into the system.[29]

Key to the "success" of the Peruvian elite was their ability to perceive this phenomenon and to use it to their advantage. This "elite" or oligarchy cannot easily be defined or categorized, as it is composed of a conglomerate of diverse groups and interests. The elites
of the 1931 to 1968 period can trace their "power" back to the 1895 to 1919 República Aristocrática, the era when the last trappings of colonial Peru were shed and the nation entered its "modern" political era. The ruling elite has, since that time, been connected with the export economy and is based primarily on the coast. There were - and are - however, other groups which played an important role and had considerable influence on the nation's politics, at least until 1968.

The early twentieth century marked the rapid growth of agricultural and mining exports; the concurrent growth of banks, insurance companies, and the like, particularly in Lima; and the development of the industrial sector.[30] The coastal "oligarchy" or elite was a conglomeration of landowners, real estate developers, financiers, owners of small mining corporations, guano profiteers, fishmeal producers, and other upwardly mobile groups such as lawyers. This class was flexible enough to coopt every group or individual who could threaten its power, including ambitious military officers and enterprising foreigners.[31] This group also had to share its power with the remnants of old regional elites, nineteenth century guano oligarchs, as well as maverick figures who were able to capture popular sentiment and political power, such as the dictator Leguía and the populist Sanchez Cerro. Congress was very much dominated by a "compadrazgo" system through which the traditional regional "hacienda" elites were able to have an influence on national politics which was disproportionate to their impact on the modern economy.[32] While the
composition of the elite may have varied in its proportionate influence from 1920 to 1968, its basic nature remained very much the same. The co-existing groups - the coastal, modern export economy elites, the traditional agricultural oligarchy, the upwardly mobile - continued to dominate the political arena. The diversity of their composition, however, prevented them from taking "total" power through a coherent political strategy. Their failure to dominate is demonstrated by the success of the various "mavericks" such as Leguia. "His coup also signified the failure of the coastal elite...to develop a political system which would allow them to overcome the conflicts and jealousies within their own ranks."[33]

While the elite was unable to dominate absolutely, it did manage to maintain a certain degree of control over the political system. The Peruvian oligarchy has been noted for its flexibility and its subtlety. Its power rested on its virtual domination of the ownership of the means of economic production, and on the fragmentation of its political rivals. The extent of its control over both means of production and the administration of the economy was extensive, as is demonstrated by the striking repetition of names across economic, political, and administrative sectors. The functions of saving, investment, and administration were mingled, and the same families were often involved in various stages of diverse industries. The elite acted as a powerful speculator in the economy, aware of both national and international trends, particularly with the vast influx of foreign capital after World War II.[34]
Success of the Peruvian oligarchy can be attributed to its capacity to employ modern technology, its success in legitimizing itself as the only agent able to guarantee expansion of economic production, and its acceptance of wealth as a measure of power while still maintaining other traditional values.[35]

With economic growth and industrialization came a whole new set of actors. Managers, engineers, technicians, and other skilled individuals were vital to economic expansion. This new "middle class" joined the traditional middle class of professionals and white collar workers: doctors, lawyers, and teachers. The middle class has been described as an appendage of the elite rather than as an independent actor, due to its dependence on the elite's ownership of the means of production and to its desire to become either part of the elite or at least to share in the rewards of the economy it controlled. Rather than challenging the existing structure, the middle sectors sought "more advantageous incorporation" into that structure.

"The major challenge to the domination of export capital in Peruvian politics came initially through the formation of APRA."[36] Yet the bulk of APRA's supporters, who initially were those of the middle class who were disaffected with the system, increasingly came to have a stake in the system, whether through the ownership of a small farm, union membership, or a stake in a small business. APRA's base expanded from its initial focus on the sugar workers of the north both socially and territorially to include the mining centers and factory workers and employees, particularly in the textile industry, in Lima and provincial towns. APRA also gained support among small traders and entrepreneurs. Many of these supporters fit into
the ambiguous category of the middle class, but they were not necessarily united in their interests; different groups had varied stakes within the system. In part as a response to the divergence of interests and stakes in the system, Haya's ideology was inclusive and eclectic rather than confrontational, preventing the party's taking a coherent stance against the "system" in favor of the "masses".

Peru's "marginalized masses" is perhaps the most nebulous category. In general terms it refers to the Indian population of the sierra and selva, and to the increasingly large groups of migrants from the sierra who inhabit the shanty-towns in and around Lima. There was, and still is, within this group a great deal of differentiation. In the highlands, for example, pre-capitalist subsistence agriculture coexists alongside large-scale capitalist mining communities, peasant and commercial farms, small industries of various kinds, and a plethora of trading and transport enterprises. A great deal of these enterprises are inextricably linked with the export economy; others are totally isolated. There is a difference of five to one in income levels between the medium sized agricultural holders and paid laborers versus the small farmers. Analogous differences exist among the migrant population. Upon closer examination, the term "masses" becomes virtually irrelevant.

While APRA's base among the peasants has never been particularly strong, its composition reflects the diversity that exists within the socio-economic structure of Peru's highland peasants. In the sierra APRA was primarily a class party, representing the interests of the richer,
smallholding peasants and of the miners, shopkeepers, transport, and textile workers. The eclectic nature of its commitments prevented the party from becoming committed to particular forms of either urban industrial or rural agricultural development. It made it possible for the party to dominate the politics of many regions in the sierra and also to play a key role in the politics of migrants, but not to take a coherent stance "against the system". While the party had no ties with the business class in the region, and periodically supported peasants in their clashes with "hacendados" [38], it was unable to represent the interests of all the peasantry, as those interests were extremely diverse and often tied to the existing economic structure. APRA never, for example, was able to take a coherent stance on the agrarian reform issue.[39]

The labor movement in Peru has traditionally been weak, and its fate, until 1968, was inextricably linked to that of the APRA. The CTP, Confederacion de Trabajadores Peruanos, originating in 1944 and officially recognized in 1964, was founded by and dominated by the APRA. The major labor dispute has traditionally been between the CTP and the military governments; there is a direct correlation between union activity and the legality or illegality of APRA, which was usually banned by military governments, such as the Odria regime.[40] After 1968, the Communist labor movement, the CGTP, was legalized and began to erode the APRA monopoly on union support, due in part to APRA's relinquishing its radical stance. The characteristics that were held typical of APRA support: marginal, socially ambitious, socially
frustrated, began to be typical of the Maoist left in the 1970's. Until 1968, however, organized labor and APRA were virtually synonymous in Peru, and the APRA was more concerned with using the labor movement for its own political ends than with enhancing the objectives of organized labor. APRA curtailed strike activity, for example, during its years of collaboration with the Prado government and strongly promoted a collective bargaining strategy to avoid confrontation. Labor was weak and fragmented; its nature reflected that of Peru's economic development in general: it was very much affected by the enclave nature of enterprises and of the rural or community background of many of its members. Consequently, labor suffered from the same problem that classes in general had in articulating a coherent set of interests.

There were sectors where labor had some influence, but that influence was local and often channeled through...the APRA, that at least from the 1940's intended to use what little power labor had in a game of opportunist icus politics without any real commitment to social reform.

While APRA did not improve substantially the fate of the labor movement, the party's organizational capacity and popular following did appeal to the movement, and served as a mobilizational force, particularly in the absence of other alternatives.

The context in which APRA or any reformist element had to operate was not one conducive to the implementation of coherent policy. Neither the forces in power, nor those in opposition seemed capable of undertaking a unified political strategy, and in light of this general fragmentation, the status quo was preserved. The elite sought to preserve the
status quo through leaders either from their own ranks, such as Manuel Prado, or through caudillo-like protectors of their interests, such as Manuel Odria; and to prevent the APRA from taking power through cooptation of the party or its outright banning. The diverse groups in Peru which had an interest in structural reform, while lending support to the APRA, were unable to develop a successful strategy, as is demonstrated by APRA's constant shifting of tactics and ideological stances. Finally, intermittent periods of persecution also diminished Apristas' ability to construct a consistent strategy and led to splits within the party between those who sought more radical, violent action against their oppressors, and those who chose to compromise with the elites in power in order to have legal status and some influence in national policymaking.

By the 1950's, relatively consistent economic growth and gradual industrialization were both providing new opportunities and creating new social strata - such as the vast increase of migrants to Lima - that the system of de facto power and cooptation was incapable of incorporating. The result was an increase of people with a stake in the system, which is partially reflected by APRA's shift to a more moderate stance and compromise with the oligarchy in the mid-fifties, as well as an increase in those who were aware of their marginalization. In the face of economic stagnation, increasing rural unrest, and the vast and visible growth of urban poverty, the political system was unable to respond and was beset with constant stalemate. This culminated in the military's total frustration with
civilian politics and the "revolution" of 1968. During this period the APRA clearly failed to provide the impetus or strategy for reform, yet it was still able to maintain a great deal of popular following and remain the primary party in Peruvian politics.

APRA retained considerable political influence by the size of its parliamentary representation and through its control over Peru's major unions...On the other hand, APRA was unable to maximize on this situation [of political malaise]. Its fundamental weakness, apart from the hostility of the military was its lack of solid support from the peasant population...The party became identified with the small and medium scale enterprenuers of rural and urban society. It was committed to the Peruvianization of the economy but less committed to structural reform.[46]

The APRA failed in that it was unable to gain control of the executive or to implement through legislative action the reforms that its original party platform called for. It failed to do so because the Peruvian population at the time was neither unified nor mobilized enough to launch a full-scale attack on the existing system; because the bulk of the labor force was by no means a mobilized proletariat; because of the extent to which a small group of elites controlled the national economy;[47] and because of the party's own often flawed and heavy-handed tactics. Its survival can be explained in part by its monopoly on ideology, the lack of other alternatives for radicalized youth, and the weakness of other leftist movements during that period: in essence there were no viable alternative forces for change. The Communist party - in part due to the premature death of Mariategui - was never able to compete with the bold tactics and strong organizational activity of the APRA.
With this context as a basis, APRA's political behavior and evolution from 1931 to 1968 can be evaluated more justly. In 1931 the APRA was a radical party with a confrontational approach. By 1968 the party had made several alliances with conservative forces, including one with the very dictator who had outlawed and persecuted the party from 1948 to 1956. Its ideology and reformist platform lost coherence, and it had acted as a counterforce to reform due to its refusal to cooperate with other emerging reformist forces. Its leadership was divided, and many of its younger and more radical members had splintered off, disillusioned with the party's evolution. There was still enough coherence and popular support for the party, however, to ensure its survival during the military years, its predominance in the transition back to civilian rule in the late seventies, and the rejuvenation of the party and its eventual rise to national power in the eighties. An examination of the politics of the period from 1931 to 1968 will serve to explain the party's behaviour, as well as to demonstrate the way in which the socio-economic context was gradually changing and leading to the "revolution" of 1968.

APRA's Rise to Power: 1931-1945

Soon after the populist army officer Sanchez Cerro emerged victorious over Haya de la Torre in the disputed 1931 election, he began to clamp down on the APRA. The headquarters of the party were closed in December 1931 and the 20 Aprista deputies in Congress were deported in February of 1932. On March 5 the government ordered the arrest of Haya and the executive committee of the party. The
next day an Aprista student made an assassination attempt on the President's life. Haya was arrested in May, and in August 1932 there was the revolt and bloody army massacre in Trujillo. The violence culminated in the assassination of Sanchez Cerro on April 30, 1933 by an alleged Aprista.[48] The presidency was seized by Oscar Benavides, who despite staged elections in 1936, remained a virtual dictator until 1939.

APRA was allowed to resume legal status in August 1933, and Haya de la Torre was greeted by 50,000 people upon his release from jail. Organizational activity flourished for approximately a year, but by 1934 the party was forced back underground as the government abolished all civil liberties in the name of national order. In 1939, Manuel Prado received the presidency in a government-rigged election. Prado was less repressive than Benavides and the APRA was able to distribute leaflets and clandestinely publish a newspaper, although the party's leadership remained in jail or in exile.[49]

Political opening came in 1945. Influenced by the defeat of fascism and Nazism and by a new international emphasis, particularly on the part of the United States, on democratic government, the government allowed renewed political activity prior to the June 1945 elections. The National Democratic Front was organized in 1944 to unite the forces in Peru desiring constitutional government, and nominated José Luis Bustamante y Rivero, a university professor, as presidential candidate. In May of 1945 the APRA party was legalized.[50] The party was allowed to field
candidates for the Congressional elections under the name of Partido del Pueblo, and entered into an electoral pact for the Presidential elections with Bustamante and the Front.
1945-1948: APRA in Power?

"The Presidency of José Luis Bustamante y Rivero, elected in 1945 on the basis of an alliance with APRA, was in a sense the culminating political expression of the new social and economic forces which had emerged during the 1930's and 1940's."[51] The government of Bustamante was ill-fated from its inception. It was the product of contradictory forces: the continuous strength of the entrenched Peruvian oligarchy, and the emergence on the political scene of the APRA, which was vociferously expressing the concerns of the rapidly increasing middle and working class sectors. The Bustamante y Rivero government was a compromise of sorts: Bustamante, a moderate, had won the Presidency largely due to the support of APRA, which was not allowed to field its own candidate for the Presidency. APRA, meanwhile, had garnered a majority in both Chambers of Congress. What resulted was an increasingly bitter and intractable struggle between the Apristas, who were determined to implement at least some of their reformist program, the alliance of right-wing military officers and the elites, in particular the powerful exporters, who were determined to prevent the implementation of APRA reforms; and President Bustamante, who attempted to play a moderating role between the APRA and oligarchy.

In keeping with Peru's history, the outcome was a right-wing military coup in 1948, which resulted in the exile or repression of the APRA leadership, and in a resurgence of an economic policy of strict orthodoxy and export-led growth. The orthodox focus in economic policy was
maintained until the late sixties, severely retarding the development of local entrepreneurial capacity, as the economy was dominated by foreign capital. The repression of the APRA led to the party's dropping the more progressive aspects of its program in the 1950's in exchange for regaining legal status.

The 1945 to 1948 period, the only time in Peruvian politics prior to 1985 that the APRA was permitted to wield political power, demonstrates that the forces of counter-reform and reaction remained dominant despite the initial move towards political liberalization, and that the fear of the APRA and the socioeconomic reforms that it stood for was a good deal stronger than the desire for democracy. The distribution of power resulting from the 1948 coup remained prevalent until the 1968 revolution - and the forces that it stimulated - altered the face of Peruvian politics. The APRA's lack of experience in government and with the consensus building necessary for democratic reform, as well as its tacit support for armed insurrection were major factors in this breakdown. Ironically the same flaws were factors in the APRA's poor performance forty years later.

Bustamante was elected with a large margin over the candidate backed by the oligarchy, General Eloy Ureta. [See Table IV] In the Senate 35 of the 46 seats were Democratic Front ones, and 18 of those were Apristas. In the Chamber of Deputies 73 of 101 members were Democratic Front, and 48 of those were Apristas. The APRA had a plurality in a constitutional system which combined parliamentary and presidential government styles: the President chose the
Cabinet, but Congress could force the resignation of the Ministers.[52] The Apristas' view was that Haya had given up the presidency for Bustamante, and thus they were entitled to implement their program;[53] the military/oligarchy alliance was fundamentally opposed. The stage was set for conflict.

Bustamante and the Democratic Front owed a major part of their victory to the APRA. Despite its short term of legal status in 1945, the party had mustered a great deal of support. Almost 200,000 people, or one-fifth the population of Lima, attended the May 20 march celebrating APRA's legalization. APRA also had the support of the newly arrived migrants in the "barriadas" or shanty-towns surrounding Lima. APRA saw the new migrants as a potential support base and had begun activity in the barriadas in 1944. As an anti-establishment party, APRA sympathized with the migrants' cause. The migrants or "pobladores" gained from the APRA a sense of common interest and the possibilities of tangible benefits through electoral channels. Aprista cells were crucial in organizing the violent land invasions of 1945 in Lima, the first significant wave of politically organized invasions, which opened the door for a significant political role for the urban poor, particularly as other groups of the left began to follow APRA's example.[54] At the time the APRA also made significant efforts to organize and politicize university and labor organizations.[55] On a national scale, APRA could deliver its regional strongholds, such as Trujillo and Chiclayo, which an unknown Arequipa
university professor could not have attracted easily. APRA's name was crucial to the unknown Bustamante's victory.

Due to the Apristas' determination to implement their program through the legislature and their often heavy-handed tactics in the face of entrenched opposition, the years 1945 to 1948 were characterized by record levels of political mudslinging rather than by coherent government. The battle between APRA and the opposition, which consisted primarily of the conservative coalition which was defeated in 1945, stalemated when the opposition Senators refused to meet in Congress; Congress could not convene due to lack of a quorum as of July 1947. In its absence Bustamante was forced to govern by decree. He was so determined to play the role of impartial moderator that he called on the nation, in a radio address, to form a new party; a proposal that, needless to say, was met with little support. The stalemate continued and tension rose drastically. Virulent battles were fought in the press between the APRA newspaper La Tribuna and the right-wing dailies La Prensa and El Comercio. A navy mutiny in Callao on October 3, 1948, which was tacitly supported, but not planned, by Haya de la Torre, resulted in the immediate banning of the APRA and ultimately in a right-wing coup on October 27 by General Manuel Odria. Odria remained in power until 1956, and the 1945-48 experiments in both political liberalization and in a semblance of a state economic strategy were rapidly reversed. The record of the Bustamante regime, both politically and economically, had been disastrous and served to so strengthen the forces of conservative reaction that they were able to dominate until
the late sixties. The Bustamante years exposed the fundamental weaknesses of the political arrangement of the time, of the economic structure and strategy, and finally of the inexperienced APRA's confrontational approach to politics. These forces combined to ensure the failure of the 1945-48 "democratic" experiment in Peru.

In 1945 Peru, where state intervention in either the economy or structuring the benefits of society was unheard of, the program that APRA proposed, while hardly revolutionary, was perceived as radical and threatening. The fact that the party was heavy-handed in its reform-mongering added to this perception. APRA was constantly accused, even by Bustamante himself, of wanting to impose a totalitarian state.[56] APRA's proposals were a first attempt to involve the Peruvian government in developing a sorely backward economy and society through measures as "radical" as conducting a national census. APRA had, after its years of exile, modified its approach and program; Haya's well-publicized statement of May 1945 was aimed at assuaging the fears of the oligarchy: "no se trata de quitar riqueza a quien la tiene, sino crearla para quien no la tiene."[57]

APRA's proposals included extending the right of suffrage to women, the creation of a National Economic Congress to develop a national industrialization strategy, and several plans to extend resources and autonomy to the municipalities throughout the country. All of these proposals were blocked by either Congress or the executive. The Apristas were able to pass some progressive legislation, however, such as the allotment of resources for local
governments and the creation of a small-scale Credit Bank for low-interest loans for the poor. The APRA's only attempt to deal with the sensitive land reform issue was an irrigation scheme: finally, after 250 interventions by the opposition in Congress, a National Irrigation Service was created. After much controversy, APRA passed a law giving workers the right to a set salary and Sundays and holidays off. They also passed a social security law and created a Corporacion de Vivienda that emitted bonds to fund home building in the "barriadas." A plan for free secondary education, to be implemented over five years, was passed.[58] The party's overall strategy was to improve the living standards of the bulk of the population, and therefore create a dynamic domestic market, in keeping with their doctrine. All talk of anti-imperialism and any mention of income redistribution had been dropped in the moderating strategy of the exile years.

The closing of Congress needless to say resulted in an end to APRA's attempts at reforms through legislative means. Their first response was to stage a general strike, through the Union Sindical de Trabajadores, in August 1947, which virtually paralyzed Lima and Callao. The President's response was to declare a state of siege and suspend civil liberties. In February 1948 he appointed a cabinet composed primarily of military men and issued a radio address to the nation blaming the APRA and its goals of a one-party dictatorship for the national crisis.[59] From that point on the situation degenerated into chaos and resulted in riots
in July, the October 3 Callao revolt, and finally the October 27 coup.

The state of the nation's economy, buffeted by post-war depression and half-hearted attempts at state intervention in the economy added to the chaos. APRA attempts at economic change were a convenient target, and the poor performance of the economy served to discredit state intervention in Peru for two decades. The 1930's worldwide depression had affected Peru less than most of her Latin neighbors, and therefore there was less support for the income-substitution industrialization strategy that much of the rest of the continent adopted. There was, however, in the late thirties and forties, with the growth of the middle class and of the APRA, pressure for economic change and a broadening of opportunities for domestic entrepreneurs.

The Aprista economics minister, Manuel Vasquez Diaz, continued the policies established in large part under Prado: the expansion of the government payroll; exchange rate controls despite a burgeoning black market in dollars; legislated wage rises for organized labor; and a strong rhetorical commitment to economic growth.[60] There was no coherent strategy, however, and the economy was soon a shambles. Price controls on food had a negative impact on agricultural production, and food shortages and queues became the norm. Import licensing was maintained without selective criteria for license granting and the number of licenses granted soon outran the availability of foreign exchange. At the same time, "severe and increasing labor unrest sparked by the increasing power of APRA and the
The rising cost of living led to reduced production and an atmosphere of uncertainty and political tension."[61]

The lack of a coherent development strategy, given the political climate of the time, was no surprise; it was incompatible, however, with the APRA's goal of an increased state role in the economy. The economic chaos that resulted served to discredit the concept of any strategy at all, and to fuel the political fire. In the face of entrenched opposition, the APRA resorted to ad hoc measures, which added to the chaos. The resulting negative performance served to discredit the concept of any role for the state. Ironically, under the Garcia regime forty years later, the lack of a coherent strategy again led to disastrous economic performance and entrenched political opposition.

The lack of whole-hearted commitment to an interventionist policy implied by pro-foreign sympathies and a corresponding sensitivity to foreign pressure, added to the lack of experience with such policies, and the difficulties presented by the ongoing inflation when the Government took office, suffice to explain the total chaos which soon prevailed. In summary, the Bustamante period threw into sharp focus a problem...namely the absence in Peru, despite the 'rise of the middle classes' and the development of organized labor, of any single class or coalition of classes whose clearly-perceived interests could provide strategic guidelines for unorthodox policy.[62]

October 3, 1948

The Congressional boycott and other means through which the right attempted to block reform led to a great deal of frustration on the part of APRA with the political process. The frustration led to disagreement among the ranks of the APRA and exposed the fundamental tension between their revolutionary ends and their commitment to constitutional government. Consequently several members of the APRA
leadership were involved with certain sectors of the army, led by General Juan Marin, in plotting a "revolution" to overthrow the government. Haya de la Torre fluctuated constantly in his support for the movement. By mid-1948 Haya and most Apristas withdrew their official support for the movement, although some remained enthusiastic about it.[63]

The movement instigated the October 3 navy revolt in Callao. While Haya was clearly not directly responsible, his vacillation of support for such measures clearly justified participation in the eyes of many Apristas, and thus made APRA a major participant in the process of disintegration of civilian government. The mutual lack of trust and the extent to which the coalition between Bustamante and the APRA was ruptured is demonstrated by the President's response to the revolt: he outlawed the APRA party the moment he heard of the Callao uprising, prior to confirming the rumours of its origins.[64]

Bustamante's fear of APRA was also due to the leadership challenge he had felt throughout his Presidency from Haya de la Torre. Haya was not only the "jefe maximo" of APRA, whose word was law among the party's ranks; he was a national hero of sorts, with a great deal of popular support and who could arouse the sentiments of huge crowds in an unparalleled manner. Despite Haya's popularity, or perhaps because of it, he had not been allowed to run for the presidency in 1945.

In effect there were two presidents of Peru. José Luis Bustamante y Rivero may have resided in the presidential palace and had the constitutional responsibilities of chief executive, but he was unable to govern effectively, according to constitutional prescription, without the support
of Victor Raúl Haya de la Torre...whose word was virtually law for the Aprista deputees, senators, and other public office holders.[65]

In the 1945-48 period the Peruvian nation, in the midst of socio-economic transformation, took one step towards political liberalization and economic independence; was held captive by a stalemate between the reactive forces of the right and over-eager and inexperienced Aprista reformers; and then took two steps back to political dictatorship and increased foreign economic dependence. The APRA party and its reformist ideology were victims of the period; the party did not re-emerge as a strong force for reform until the 1980's. Along with APRA, the forces that it had stimulated, such as organized labor, campesinos, and the urban poor, were temporarily retrenched. The APRA party's coalition with Bustamante y Rivero was plagued by political incompatibility, economic incoherence, and mutual mistrust. The APRA did not again attempt to implement its reformist program of the 1930's until 1985, when the party was finally allowed to take power.

The 1945 to 1948 period demonstrates that the elites in Peru were not yet willing to go beyond a "democracia verbal", and that they had the power to enforce that will. While APRA had an electoral mandate, it was unacceptable to the elites, who used all means in their power to block the functioning of constitutional government. The APRA's heavy-handed tactics, meanwhile, served to fuel the opposition's fire. The entrenched opposition to reform, which lasted until it was undermined by the military's revolution, served to stall Peru's development and make the challenges for
future reformers more intractable. It also stalled a crucial learning process for the reformist forces, which was reflected in the APRA's next tenure in power forty years later.

The outcome of the period was a sorry one for democracy and for socio-economic progress in Peru. In Venezuela at the same time, three years of attempted political, economic, and social reforms led to ten years of dictatorship and retrenchment. In Peru, less audacious reform-mongering led to almost two decades of retrenchment. Peru had further to go in terms of reform, and the forces against change were relatively stronger. Ironically the next attempt at reform in Peru, led by Fernando Belaúnde in 1963-68, was thwarted by a thorny alliance between the oligarchy and an embittered APRA. As did Peru, the APRA after 1948 took several steps back.

Progress did not halt altogether, however. By the mid-fifties the nascent groups of the forties - the urban working class, mobilized highland peasants, union movements - were beginning to assert themselves with new vigor. The oligarchy in power realized that coercion and clientelism would no longer suffice to contain them. New political channels were necessary to deliver and process popular demands at the state level so that the state could assume a new form of political control. Thus it was convenient for the dominant class to incorporate APRA into the state in 1956 in an arrangement between the party and the Prado government called "la convivencia".

APRA 1956-1968: Compromise and Counter-Reform
The 1948 coup brought to power the military dictator Manuel Odria and a resurgence of "creole liberalism" in economic policy which made Peru the "freest economy in South America."[66] The maintenance of this orthodox economic policy was made possible by an export boom which peaked in 1962, and resulted in an average GNP growth rate of almost 6% from 1950 to 1962. This high growth rate, coupled with an authoritarian government and the repression of the APRA from 1948 to 1956 resulted in a period of social and political stability. Labor unrest decreased drastically due to the banning of APRA activity and the exile or jailing of the key union leaders. Haya de la Torre spent the Odria years in exile - in the Colombian embassy in Lima. Most other key Apristas spent the period abroad or in prison.

Odria moved quickly to destroy its [APRA's] power and the union and party groups which it had formed...However, Odria's campaign was not based solely on repression, but equally on a strong appeal to the lower class in which he tried to offer an alternative to the kind of popular mobilization that the APRA was promoting...in which benefits from the government came in response to mobilization and articulation of political interests.[67]

In addition to repression, Odria's means of stemming social pressure was cooptation. One of his main tactics was his paternalistic policy towards the growing number of "barriada" or shanty-town dwellers in and around Lima. The Odria government actively promoted settlement formation for the vastly increasing number of migrants, and made promises of land titles in the future. In some settlements, membership in the party that Odria formed was required for moving in; at the same time, evidence of association with APRA made it difficult to get a lot. [68] The government
issued very few actual titles, keeping the "pobladores" or settlers in a position of ambiguity and dependence. Odria remained very popular among the urban poor of Lima, however, as his was the first government to lend their situation any attention.

Odria's activities in the settlements had...the purpose of undermining...forceful demand making...by groups organized to a considerable degree along class lines in parties and unions. This feature of settlement policy would appear again under the military government which came to power in 1968.[69]

The combination of social repression or cooptation and high growth rates guaranteed temporary stability, but merely postponed the crisis that was to surface the subsequent decade. In the 1960's the export boom came to an end, primarily because of a decline in the investment rate encountered by the major export sectors as they encountered structural bottlenecks. In the meantime non-export agriculture stagnated due to adverse policy bias and increasing rural unrest. Industrial growth became more and more dominated by competition among foreign firms. The result was a steadily worsening income distribution, increasing dualism between the modern and traditional sectors, fiscal crisis, and in response, reviving nationalism.[70] The political system was unable to cope with the combination of economic crisis and the growing social mobilization which had accompanied post-1945 industrialization and the 1950's economic growth. By the late sixties, "the basic problem was that no class in Peru was strongly enough organized...to impose its will politically. At the same time, the economic difficulties meant less opportunities for work in the expanding cities,
while peasant farmers found it more difficult to extract a living from diminishing land resources."[71]

The culmination of these trends was the breakdown of the civilian political system and the ushering in of twelve years of military government. The military, frustrated by the civilian politicians' ineptitude at implementing reforms in the face of impending crisis, stepped in and implemented their own revolution from above. During the 1967-68 breakdown period, the APRA acted as one of the major forces against reform and was one of the contributors to the breakdown.

APRA's shift in ideology in the 1950's was undoubtedly influenced by its period of exile during Odria's rule. By 1956 there was a rift in its ranks, with the younger members more concerned with the fate of the eventual program, and the older leadership's concern with returning to parliamentary procedures and obtaining some influence in the political system. "The APRA leadership feared that the interruption of parliamentary procedures would bring on, once again, long periods of military dictatorship..."[72]

The APRA convivencia with Prado must be judged in light of the party's predicament at the time. Odria's aim had been to divide and conquer the APRA. He not only exiled or jailed its primary political leaders, as well as its most influential labor leaders, but was also interested in coopting APRA's support base. "Trato de decapitar al aprismo, pero quiso halagar a sus masas."[73] The APRA's pact with Prado was an informal agreement, in which the APRA leaders would publicly announce their support for Prado, and
in return Prado would legalize the party upon his inauguration. Prado's victory could be attributed in part to APRA support, and true to his word, he legalized the APRA on July 28, 1956.[74]

The APRA, meanwhile, remained in a dubious situation. Most of the party's leaders were still in exile up to the middle of 1956; the party's organizational and political activities had been disrupted and the leadership scattered for eight years. They were still second class citizens politically with the convivencia, as they could sponsor electoral support, but they could not put forth their own candidates. Finally, they had been primary supporters of a President and a Congress which were clearly not Aprista. Their rewards for the pact were quite slim. The only two government posts held by Apristas during Prado's time were two external ambassadorships. Their influence on policy was minimal. The Apristas were considered enemy and suspect by their conservative "allies", as was demonstrated by the editorial pages of the influential newspapers, *La Prensa* and *La Crónica*. Despite the convivencia, membership in the APRA remained a social stigma, which precluded prestigious jobs in the government or private industry.[75] This had longterm costs, as the result was a chronic shortage of skilled and experienced people in the party. Haya de la Torre remained in exile for the first year of the Prado government, due to the animosity of Prado himself, as Haya had denounced the Prado family in a recent book. While Haya and Prado did finally establish cordial relations, it can hardly be said that he wielded any influence or power, and he continued to
spend much time abroad during the convivencia years. Finally, at the end of the period, the APRA's relations with the military were no better.[76]

It can be argued, however, that if APRA had not allied with Prado and had remained illegal for another six years, that the party might have slowly disappeared from the political scene. The "convivencia" was a way of insuring the party's survival, albeit compromised. The decision to enter the convivencia did cause rifts within the APRA, however, and may have cost them a whole generation of leaders, as many of those crucial to its student movement were disillusioned and splintered off. Two key student leaders broke away from APRA in 1958 and formed APRA Rebelde, which later became the MIR - Movimiento Izquierdista Revolucionario - and was primarily responsible for leading the guerrilla uprisings in the sierra in the mid-sixties and in the eighties had links to the MRTA.

The elites at this time were aware of the growth of middle class strength, and of their decreased ability to coopt these new social forces.

[Prado's] presidential term from 1956 to 1962 was marked by a "convivencia" which...was based on an agreement between APRA and certain conservative elements...who had gradually come to believe that the stability of power depended on reaching an understanding with a large popular party, reformist but not revolutionary..."[77]

The growing strength of the middle class was reflected in the establishment and initial success of Fernando Belaúnde's Acción Popular party, which first ran in the 1956 elections. The urban middle class, which provides the demand necessary for import substitution industrialization, had
increased both in size and in self-consciousness. It remained fragmented, however, and first and foremost wanted to retain its newfound status, and if possible, move upwards. Belaúnde's platform and his technical, rather than confrontational approach to reform captured those sentiments. He called for land reform based on the need to increase agricultural productivity, for the recuperation of key oil fields from foreign ownership, for tax and administrative reforms, and for a government infrastructure program.[78] Belaúnde was careful not to be confrontational nor directly challenge elite interests in his rhetoric, however. He "avoided making the frontal attack on coastal culture which had been the fatal mistake of APRA."[79]

Despite the challenge from Belaúnde, the Prado-APRA alliance dominated in the 1956 elections [See Table IV], and the subsequent administration was one of piecemeal reform. The labor movement, for example, which was rejuvenated with the legality of APRA, remained subservient to the APRA goals within the convivencia. Some unionized workers did make substantial improvements in wage levels, but direct confrontations were in general avoided, as it was management strategy to avoid strikes by agreeing to worker demands on wages and working conditions. Unions affiliated with the APRA fared better materially during this period than others, in part because of APRA collaboration with the government.[80] Organized labor remained weak overall as a result of the APRA's strategy decisions, which focused on the avoidance of confrontation between labor and industry, and as only a small percentage of the population was
unionized. The bargaining system was characterized by government interference and arbitrated settlements, and thus a paternalistic mode of relations dominated in the potentially most advanced and most "conscious" sector of non-elite society.[81] In the face of an increase in union activity, teachers' strikes, and rural violence, the major labor confederation, APRA's CTP, refrained from involvement, undermining the coherence of the labor movement and APRA's future support base.[82]

The APRA did act as a progressive force in some arenas. The party was instrumental in pushing for new settlement legislation aimed at legalizing existing settlements and providing a legal basis for the formation of new ones. APRA, unlike Odria, did not rely on a dependency relationship with the urban poor, and thus had no desire to perpetuate the ambiguous legal situation of the squatters.[83] In general, however, no major structural reforms were attempted and the APRA, limited by the terms within the "convivencia", did not push for any. The Prado regime is perhaps best described as a "do-nothing"[84] administration. For the APRA it yielded few gains and substantive erosion in its bases of support.

APRA's traditionally strong backbone in the student movement was severely hurt by the 1958 break and formation of APRA Rebelde. Its strength in white collar trade unions and teachers' organizations was eroded with the entrance of competitors such as Acción Popular and the Christian Democrats. The CTP did not support the teachers in their successful 1960 strike, organized by the Federación Nacional de Educadores del Perú. In the same way the party failed to
support strike calls by the civil servants and by the National Union of Bank Clerks, which then turned to extremist control in 1958. The Lima Union of Trolley Workers transferred their support to the Odriistas in 1962, and the bulk of new professional associations, traditionally dominated by APRA, went over to either Acción Popular or the Christian Democrats.[85]

The Apristas did make concrete efforts, with little success, to organize the rural masses politically with the 1959 formation of FENCAP - Federación Nacional de Campesinos del Perú. Its support reflected APRA regional ties: it was strongest among the well-organized sugar workers of the north and weakest in the southern sierra. Like the guerrilla movement of the mid-sixties, the FENCAP failed to incorporate the complex and diverse interests of the Andean peasants.[86]

It was apparent by 1962 that APRA had lost popular support from its former standing as the reputed majority party...Its losses appear to have been less the result of an oppressive, unyielding conspiracy, however, than of the evolution of society and the political system. APRA either failed to recognize changes that were occurring or was unable to cope with them. [87]

Belaúnde was able to capitalize on these changes and APRA's failure to adapt by the early sixties. In the 1962 elections, Haya edged over Belaúnde with a plurality of votes, with Odria as a close third.[See Table IV] Odria's strength was primarily in the pueblos jovenes; APRA's advantage was in its traditional "solido norte" and it was very weak in Lima; Belaúnde took the South and sierra and was second in Lima.[88] The army vetoed the elections, however, as they were unwilling to allow Haya to take power.
Haya de la Torre's response was ambiguous, due to both disillusionment and to few alternative options.[89] When Belaúnde refuted an APRA proposal to compromise, Haya then entered into an agreement with Odria, the very dictator who had severely persecuted the party, in an attempt to share power. Amidst the chaos, the army instigated a coup against President Prado. The new junta, led by General Ricardo Pérez Godoy, had few intentions of longterm power and did not outlaw the APRA. It did, however, reflect the new developmentalist strains among the armed forces and their frustration with civilian "ineptitude."

During this period the military was gradually developing reformist strains, for a variety of reasons. It was primarily middle class in composition and thus a part of the newly mobilized, socially ambitious sectors. Meanwhile, the 1958 founding of CAEM – the Center for Higher Military Studies – focused the military's attention on internal national security problems and on the need for social reform to address them. Finally, the collusion of the APRA with its oligarchic enemies left the military rather than the APRA as the outsider for the first time, and with no Aprista or external security threats, it was an institution without a purpose.[90] The junta embarked, in its short term in power, on a series of reforms such as the establishment of a National Planning Institute, and also sponsored elections for June 1963. Belaúnde, aided by his alliance with the Christian Democrats and by expectations that the military would again veto an APRA victory, narrowly defeated Haya in the election.[91] [See Table IV]
The Belaúnde Years

Despite many failures in implementation, Belaúnde did have many laudable, and for the time, progressive goals. Popular participation was revived by the 1963 municipal elections, the first in forty years in Peru. Belaúnde was particularly concerned with the marginalized in the isolated sierra and selva regions, and emphasized communication and transportation improvements in these areas, as well as education in general. He established a rural self-help program, Cooperación Popular,[92] and proposed land and tax reforms.[93]

Belaúnde's initial support was quite strong, as is demonstrated by the results of the 1963 municipal elections. However, his regime soon fell prey to its own mistakes; to the economic stagnation that had been in the making since the late 50's; and to a Congressional stalemate, as the coalition between APRA and Odria's UNO attempted to block almost all reformist legislation proposed by Acción Popular. The APRA's electoral strategy for 1969 was based on the failure of Belaúnde reformism. A prime example was the fate of the 1964 agrarian reform bill which, although extremely similar to the APRA's own, was virulently opposed by the APRA, and as a result was severely watered down. The APRA was also a major opponent of the regime's proposed tax reform, aimed at raising the number of individuals paying income tax, which was less than 5% of the white collar labor force.[94] The government's failure to generate necessary revenues in the face of increased infrastructural expenditures was a major cause of a severe balance of
payments crisis of 1967. The regime was also plagued by the president's own taste for grandiose infrastructure projects.

The Belaúnde government met its nemesis in the balance of payments crisis of 1967, which resulted in a necessary but politically damaging devaluation, and in the IPC case, in which the government negotiated a contract with the International Petroleum Company that was perceived as a "sell-out" to foreign interests. Both devaluation and foreign repatriation of profits were politically salient issues which heightened nationalist sentiments among all members of the opposition. After several cabinet upheavals in 1967 and 1968, the government was increasingly perceived as inept and the situation as chaos.

The signing of the IPC contract proved to be the last straw. The military, long impatient with the political chaos and economic crisis and clearly unhappy with the terms of the contract, took power in a coup on October 3, 1968. The coup ushered in a "revolution" which would drastically alter the structure of Peru's society and economy, and would close down its political institutions for twelve years. In many ways the civilian politicians had sealed their own fate. The APRA, by refusing to cooperate in any way with AP reforms, dealt a severe blow to congressional politics and to its credibility as a reformist force. The Belaúnde regime, perhaps well-intentioned, proved lacking in commitment to substantial reform, and inept at implementation. The nation's economy, meanwhile, plunged more deeply into crisis; social unrest was on the rise in rural areas; and urban poverty was a rapidly increasing phenomenon,
particularly in Lima. In the face of these formidable and pressing issues, the primary response of the nation's politicians was political infighting.

The unsuitability of traditional political machinery to the task of development, the resulting heavy dependence of the fortunes of the nation on the strengths and weaknesses of a few central figures, and the concentration of decision-making upon issues of short-term importance while policies on basic areas—such as industrialization, taxation, income distribution, and employment—[were]...the result of circumstances rather than of clear direction.[95]

In many ways the problem was that experience with democracy was limited and the tenure in power of reformists was a complete novelty. Irresponsibility was the order of the day. The APRA's opportunistic electoral strategy resulted in its acting as a regressive force, a sad statement for the nation's oldest party and supposedly most powerful force for reform. In terms of the party's political future, the impetus for change caused by the military coup was in some ways a blessing.

Despite the growth of the middle class, the upsurge in reformist rhetoric, and the entrance of new reformers into the political scene, the majority of Peru's citizens fared little better from 1956 to 1968, and in relative terms fared worse. The context for the implementation of reform had improved by the sixties, but the ability of a coalition or class to unite and implement it had not. Although even the conservative forces which had supported Prado recognized the need to incorporate broader segments of the population into the political system; and development policy, land reform, and tax reform had become key items of the political debate; the political system remained characterized by
fragmentation, the dominance of particularistic interests over longterm goals, and the same subtle dominance by the elites opposed to structural change. The ability of the elites, even when fragmented, to maintain control by keeping their foes divided, prevailed until 1968. Despite the fact that together APRA and AP represented almost 70% of Peru's electorate, signifying a substantial mandate for change, no substantial reform was implemented from 1963 to 1968. The ensuing military revolution was to provide the nation's political parties with a period to reflect and mature, although progress was limited, as the post-military era demonstrates.

The Belaúnde government did make some inroads in improving the conditions of the "marginalized" in Peru, particularly in the education and health arenas. But in the face of the deplorable conditions of the poor, the huge increases in rural-urban migration - a function of those conditions; skewed income distribution; increased awareness due to improved communication; and growing social unrest, the changes were far from adequate.

Although neither the nation nor its capital would have wealthy populaces were the incomes equitably distributed, the maldistribution of income obviously intensifies and maintains the poverty so common in Peru...[the]poor do not simply lack money; the whole physical and social environment - the need for public services, public education, health standards, welfare services - promotes a structural, dynamic and self-maintaining process.[96]

It is not surprising, then, that the military officer corps, whose awareness of developmental issues and Peru's relative backwardness had been heightened by CAEM, and who had recently directly experienced the conditions of the
peasants in the sierra while combatting the guerrilla movements, lost patience with the ineptitude of the nation's politicians. In a nation where military intervention was common and respect for civilian political institutions low, the 1968 coup did not come as a major surprise. What did prove unexpected was the reformist orientation of the Velasco government, and its rapid moves to implement structural change.

The APRA's rhetorical compromises and counter-reformist stance during the period can be explained, yet these tactics were not without costs, as the party suffered losses in its support bases and its leadership ranks. In 1956-1962 its actions were to a large extent dictated by the terms within the convivencia, in which it paid a high price for legality in terms of ideological coherence and legitimacy. In 1963 to 1968, after being deprived of long-sought national power by the military in 1962, the APRA's actions are attributable to both its 1969 electoral strategy and to substantial and somewhat comprehensible resentment. There were at the time splits among the upper echelons of the leadership. Haya's longtime right-hand man, Manuel Seoane, departed the country in 1963 after a dispute over the party's tactics and coalition with the Odriistas.[97] Haya's favorite among the younger generation, Carlos Delgado, also left the party at this time. Ironically, he later became one of the key strategists in the Velasco regime and was responsible for its attempts to discredit the APRA.

Another major problem was that the party, which during its early years had been highly innovative in the
development of new political methods, continued to use the same out-dated tactics, although they had become so ritualistic that they served only to maintain the exclusiveness and solidarity of existing party ranks. The party newspaper, La Tribuna, sold only 20,000 copies versus the 60-100,000 sold by each of its competitors. The paper was not designed to appeal to the casual reader and instead was used as a medium of party communication from the upper echelons down. The "coloquios" in the Casa del Pueblo, the party headquarters in Lima, continued in the same format without any attempt to appeal to outsiders. The popular universities - adult evening schools - were held only in party establishments, and thus seemed exclusive. There was no attempt to extend the party's educational institutions into the rural areas. Belaúnde, with Cooperación Popular and the extension of communication and educational services, did much more in this field. The existence of other options and the failure of APRA to adapt and compete with its competitors eroded its support base. In 1963, for example, while there were 700,000 APRA members on the rolls, Haya received only 623,000 votes.[98]

Whether through conventional activities to gain quick results in the cities, or through unconventional ways of promoting cultural change in the sierra, APRA has not succeeded in using organization and method to maximum advantage in expanding its bases of popular support. The paradox is that the party that was historically the most innovative and expansive was unable to apply its genius to the opportunities created by accelerated social change.[99]

Conclusion

Reform is clearly not easy to implement in Peru. The fate of the country's first reform-oriented party
demonstrates this. Even survival proved difficult at times for the APRA, resulting in its compromised stance and position. The persecution and exile suffered by the APRA leadership, coupled with Haya de la Torre's dominance and his ideological ambiguity led to the party's compromises and tactics in 1956 to 1968. The party's hierarchical and tight organization may have served to decrease its capacity to adapt to new social realities and use different tactics to take advantage of new political opportunities. The opposition of the military also proved an unconquerable obstacle for the APRA, and probably fed the resentment that lay behind the party's disruptive political behaviour from 1963 to 1968. What remains ironic, however, is that at the time that Peruvian society was clearly in the process of change, when the debate over social issues and development had finally become central to the political debate, and finally there was no longer a party in existence that overtly resisted change, the APRA was unable to adapt outdated tactics and rejuvenate its compromised ideological position in order to capitalize on the situation. Since the APRA's inception, the entrenched elites' had constantly blocked its mandate for reform. Among other results was a party that was woefully inexperienced with both reform mongering and with democratic government, a problem which surfaced in 1945, in 1963, and would again during its term in the 1980's.

The inability of civilian reformers led to the breakdown of the political system, and the military's bypassing it with the forcible implementation of a reformist
program. The military's program was flawed fundamentally in its inherent lack of responsiveness to popular demand, a flaw which surfaced after its initial years of popularity. Yet, there is very little likelihood that the APRA, in its 1968 condition, or Acción Popular, with the split in its ranks and its loss of credibility, could have, at the time, provided a better alternative. In 1968 the left in Peru was too weak to be even considered an option. Thus despite its many flaws, the gravest among them being its authoritarian nature, the military "docenio" served to set the country on the course towards structural change and to challenge the reformist politicians in Peru by performing the tasks that they had proved incapable of. In the case of APRA, the military years instigated the party's revamping and rejuvenation, a process which was not completed until the mid-1980's, but culminated in its electoral victory.

In the face of the failures of the APRA from 1931 to 1968, the party did still manage to survive and maintain its traditional third of the electorate, no small achievement. Despite its compromises and mistakes, the APRA was able to maintain its core basis of support and the mystique which was key to its appeal. By the time of the 1979 transition to civilian rule, the APRA was able to play a leading role and demonstrate that it was still a major, if not the major, force in Peruvian politics.

The APRA also had international impact. Haya's writings and the party's struggles attracted the attention of other Latin leaders, and had a formative impact on movements ranging from Betancourt's AD and Figueres' PLN to Sandino's
rebellion in Nicaragua.[100] The APRA was the first political party to call not only for the transformation of its own society, but for a united and uniquely Latin approach to the continent's problems.

Finally, and most difficult to define in concrete terms, one of the main reasons for APRA's survival was the sense of exceptionality and mission, which grew out of the APRA's history of suffering, that the core members of the party maintained. In many ways, this elusive sense of mission is responsible for the party's survival through the 1956-1968 periods and during the docenio, and for its eventual rejuvenation.

How to explain such resistance. The courage, the determination of clandestine Apristas all have their part. But to appreciate more exactly these qualities, a hypothesis is necessary: if the APRA was able to stay alive between 1933 and 1945, and again between 1948 and 1956, it is because at that time, for an Aprista, by which I mean an active militant, there was no road conceivable other than the APRA.[101]
Chapter II
The APRA and the Military "Docenio":
The Stolen Revolution

A propósito, yo no acepto aquello que la revolución comienza el 3 de octubre de 1968; hay que distinguir proceso revolucionario y gobierno. El proceso revolucionario comenzó hace más de 50 años, con la generación que encarnan Haya de la Torre y Mariategui. [Armando Villanueva, Member of Collegial Secretariat, APRA Party, 1974] [1]

También por inspiración oligárquica habíamos sido formados dentro de una tónica decidamente antiaprista...El factor ideológico sí, aparece en 1968 cuando desde una perspectiva revolucionaria rechazamos al APRA y a sus viejas y caducas dirigencias responsables de toda una trayectoria sinuosa de pactos y claudicaciones...arriando por lo tanto las banderas revolucionarias. [General Jorge Fernández Maldonado, Cabinet Member, 1968-1976] [2]

When the armed forces took power on October 3, 1968, it was not immediately clear that it was not yet another typical military coup, and that the APRA would not once again be the subject of persecution. It soon became evident, however, that the regime was progressive rather than reactionary in nature, and that there would be no widespread repression. As the regime took concrete actions - the expropriation of IPC, the Agrarian Reform Law, the formation of Industrial Communities - the APRA party was left as a stunned onlooker as the military, the age-old persecutors of the party, implemented what the Apristas considered "their" revolution. As Apristas were neither the proponents of reform nor the martyrs of repression, the party faced what Luis Alberto Sanchez - one of the original and highest ranking party members - called its most critical moment.[3]

The military, while not openly repressing political parties - and in fact not even outlawing them - had no respect for the existing parties and saw them as part of the
traditional societal structure that they were trying to overthrow. They were aware of the need to incorporate popular demands, and particularly of the challenge posed by the well-organized and extensive party machinery that was controlled by the APRA. They also aimed to undermine the APRA's long-term domination of organized labor with the sponsoring of alternate union movements to the APRA's CTP: the Communist controlled CGTP and the government affiliated CTRP. Until 1968, "the working class [had] been insulated from more radical mobilization by its loyalty to APRA."[4]

The Velasco regime, advised by a dissident Aprista, Carlos Delgado, set up an elaborate mechanism - SINAMOS - to channel popular demands. SINAMOS was designed to cope with public demands which in part were fueled by the military government's own rhetoric, and also to undermine the virtual monopoly that the APRA had had for forty years on grass roots political organization and activity. "SINAMOS is of particular importance...because there are striking parallels and contrasts between the tactics which Odria used to undermine APRA and the approach taken by SINAMOS to weaken political opposition."[5]

While there was no overt conflict between the military and the APRA, there was clearly rivalry, at both the ideological and practical levels. The military, having taken both the revolutionary initiative and control of the state, clearly had an advantage in the early stages of the game. As the regime met greater obstacles, however, and eventually had to return the nation's control to civilian hands, the tables turned to some extent, as was demonstrated by the
pivotal role played by Haya de la Torre in the Constituent Assembly. The military's revolution indeed caused an internal crisis in the APRA, and resulted in a renovation of ideology and leadership - sponsored by Haya - within the APRA. It is from this renovation that the current APRA leaders, and Alan Garcia in particular, emerged.

The military's borrowing of Aprista ideas and doctrines and putting them in practice forced the party leadership to come to terms with the vacillations and compromises which had caused the disaffection of a great deal of its youth in the fifties and sixties. In the past, electoral losses and paucity of new leaders were always blamed on persecution or the "veto militar":

"Nadie miraba al interior del APRA en busca de las equivocaciones cometidas. Echaban la culpa a los militares, a la oligarquía, a la ignorancia...se activaba la lógica de los perseguidos: todos contra mí y yo contra el mundo. Solo el aprismo salvará al Perú. Más nos ganan, más fuerza tenemos. Disciplina compañeros, a la próxima triunfamos."[6]

In the absence of outward repression, the party was forced to look inward and revamp. There was some subtle harassment of APRA leaders, and the theory that the coup had occurred to prevent Haya's victory in the 1969 elections may have had partial validity. However, the military were careful not to make martyrs of the Apristas as they had in the past. Thus rather than being persecuted for attempting to implement its revolution, the APRA was a non-participatory bystander while the revolution took place - ironically under the auspices of the very institution that had persecuted the party in the past. As Haya himself said, "why did they do what they tortured the APRA for trying to do?"[7]
Most observers agree that despite their intent, the military's revolution was not successful, and that many of the reforms, such as the land and industrial reforms, reached a privileged group of workers rather than addressing the more serious underlying problems of the landless and the unemployed. The attempt to use SINAMOS and the government controlled labor federation, the CTRP, to control popular participation was a total failure, as was exemplified by the 1975 looting and burning of SINAMOS headquarters in the 5th February protests and the 1977 and 1978 general strikes. The main criticism is that the very nature of the military regime, which excluded genuine popular participation and attempted to impose a "revolution from above", doomed it to failure. It is relevant that not only did the military's Plan Inca draw strongly from Haya's early writings, but the model implemented strongly resembled that envisioned by Haya in his early writings. The early Haya was impatient and lacked faith in the individual's ability to function as a political subject. The political movement that he envisioned was hierarchical and authoritarian - assigning the state the role of building the nation,[8] and he favored taking power by insurrection. This same choice of strategy led Haya to break with Mariategui in 1928, and also led to the APRA's history of conflict with the military. "El APRA empleo equivocadamente la violencia. Parece que tenia la idea de formar su propio Ejército. Consideraban que la oficialidad era hechura de la oligarquía y que junto con ella debia desaparecer. Esto es el pecado capital del APRA contra el Ejército."[9]
Haya never succeeded in attaining power through insurrection, and by the mid-forties abandoned insurrection as a strategy. Instead, ironically, he engineered political arrangements with the very groups whose power he had sought to overthrow. The military, meanwhile, which had been the traditional "watchdog" of the oligarchy, virtually switched roles with the APRA and challenged the existing power structures. Upon taking power by insurrection, the military tried and failed to impose a hierarchical vision of popular organization through SINAMOS. As their failure became evident, they turned, ironically, to Haya and the APRA as the bridge with civil society.

When the Peruvian military seized power in October 1968, one of the guiding motives was to deny Haya de la Torre the possibility of gaining the presidency...By the mid-1970's, Haya was coming to be recognized as the military's shrewdest and perhaps most constructive critic, as the kind of patient statesman who could be most effective in facilitating the return of the officers to the barracks...with dignity...After fifty years Haya completed the cure of what had originally been a serious case of extremist exclusivism, whose initiating germ was the conviction that through some sort of Armageddon, Apristas must definitively crush their foes.[10]

Haya had clearly evolved from the radical revolutionary of the 1920's to the crafty politician and statesman of international stature in the 1970's. The Constituent Assembly of 1979 was in many ways his finest hour, as he played the critical role of mediator and conciliator between the divergent forces of the right, the military, and the nascent and fragmented left. Haya's death prior to the 1980 elections left the party leaderless and divided. The ensuing debacle of the APRA in the 1980 elections as well as the re-election of Fernando Belaúnde temporarily obscured the
extent to which both Peru and the APRA had changed during the military docenio. A brief analysis of the military's major reforms; of the initial reaction of the APRA and of the ensuing change in attitude and strategy of Haya himself; and of the role played by the APRA during the transition to civilian rule will shed some light on those changes, and also demonstrate how they were critical in the renovation and rise to power of the APRA in 1985.

The Velasco Years: Revolution From Above

The October 1968 coup in Peru was largely a result of the military's frustration with civilian politics - hardly a novelty in Peruvian history. What was different, however, was that this time the military's frustration was with the slow progress towards what they saw as urgently needed reforms. The military announced that they were going to implement a "revolution from above." The officer corps had in the mid-sixties experienced the poverty of the sierra, while combatting a guerrilla uprising led primarily by ex-Apristas. This was coupled with the military's vision of national security, expanded in the fifties and sixties to incorporate the need for social reform. This vision was expounded by both CAEM - the Center for Higher Military Studies - and the National Intelligence Service - from where Velasco emerged. The disintegration of the Belaunde regime, coupled with the likelihood of an APRA victory in 1969, spurred a group of officers, led by Juan Velasco Alvarado, to take power.

The junta had no coherent government plan prior to takeover, however. A written plan, the Inca Plan, did not
appear until 1974. In the words of a key participant, General Fernandez Maldonado: "Fíjese, la Revolución nuestra en realidad no nace con un programa. Es un grupo de buena fe y de buena intención, con puntos fijos que señalan una transformación...pero cuya aplicación práctica tiene que estudiarse."[11] The different nature of the regime was indicated early on, however, by the immediate takeover of IPC operations in Peru. At this point the true nature of the regime was still not totally clear, as there had in the past been populist nationalist dictators, such as Sanchez Cerro. The turning point for most observers, and certainly the most impacting for the APRA, was the June 1969 announcement of DL 17716, the Agrarian Reform Law.

The law had its basis in the law that had been proposed and debated during the Belaúnde administration, and, according to Luis Alberto Sanchez, the text was similar to that of a law proposed by the Apristas in the Congress.[12] There were crucial differences, however. The first was that the military boldly and swiftly implemented the law, without any public debate. The second was that the first properties expropriated were the prosperous sugar haciendas of the north coast, a region which the APRA proposal had placed as a low priority, due both to the high productivity of the lands, and to the high degree of organization and standard of living - among the best in the country - of the hacienda workers. The reform was much less effective in the sierra region, where the plight of the landless was far worse.

"The reforms begun in 1969 have continued to the present, but there is a general consensus that the takeover of the north coast sugar haciendas has been a failure. Sugar workers...who prior to 1969 were the
highest paid agricultural workers in Peru, have seen a severe decline in their pay since."[13]

The most plausible explanation for the regime's focus on the sugar plantations was the extent of support that the APRA had among the coastal workers. The APRA's initial political activity began among these workers, and until the time of the coup, the party was virtually guaranteed at least 75% of their votes.[14] At the same time, the owners of the sugar haciendas: Grace and Company, the Gildemeisters, the Larcos, for example, were the agroindustrial export elites that had for a long time controlled the economy and polity of Peru. Thus, regardless of its effectiveness in terms of redistribution, the reform struck at the backbone of both the oligarchy and the APRA. During the reform debates from 1963-1968, the coalition of Apristas and Odriistas had always prevented the reform from taking that tack, and there was even collaboration between the Apristas and the land-owners, as they both had a stake in upstaging Communist and other influences in the sugar unions. Interestingly enough, even after the agrarian reform, the Aprista union leaders maintained their influence, as the leaders of the former sugar workers confederation (FTAP) became the leaders of the cooperative system, including the National Center of Sugar Cooperatives.[15] This occurred largely because the APRA put pressure on the government to allow the cooperatives to choose their own leaders through elections. Given the government's commitment to cooperatives, they could hardly refuse. However, "in several cases, government administrators simply voided elections in which anti-Velasco
workers were named to the new administrative committees."[16]

The implementation of the Agrarian Reform Law thus did not benefit the poorest peasants, but rather affected a privileged few. About one-fifth of the country's rural population was to receive three-fourths of the land, leaving little land for the rest.[17] Crucial credit and technical support was also lacking. The 1970 General Industries Law followed a similar pattern: it affected the privileged 5% of the labor force that worked in the manufacturing sector.[18] In part because of the structural dualism that exists in the Peruvian economy, and in part because of the ad hoc manner in which the military's "revolution" was carried out, the reforms barely scratched the surface of Peru's problems, and in some senses exacerbated existing inequalities.[19]

Due to the enclave nature of Peruvian economic development and extensive repression, the labor movement remained weak and fragmented prior to the 1968 coup. Until that time, the movement had been virtually dominated by the APRA. At least three-fourths of all union members - between 200,000 and 400,000 members - belonged to the APRA dominated CTP. As Andres Townsend, a prominent party leader stated, this was the party's most effective weapon in times of crisis. In fact, the party's strategy of defending particularistic union interests may have been a factor in its loss of "mass" and youth appeal.[20] At the same time, the party did not use the labor movement to push for broader social reform, but rather as a tool of opportunistic politics.[21] The Communist-led CGTP labor confederation
achieved recognition from the military government in 1971. The CGTP was much more active in supporting labor unrest than was the CTP. Unlike the CTP, whose power was dependent on the APRA party, the CGTP was a force in its own right, with links with, but without dependence on the Communist party, whose political influence was far more limited than the APRA's. As the APRA had been gradually discredited among emerging and more radical labor groups, the CGTP rapidly gained support and labor was, for the first time, given a choice. The CTP remained strongest in those sectors of the economy that developed early in Peru: sugar, copper mines, textiles, banks, teachers, and "choferes". [22]

The military clearly wanted to draw labor away from the APRA, and the rise of the CGTP was, at least initially, not totally to their detriment. As the CGTP became more active in labor unrest, particularly after 1972, and as the military government's CTRP was unable to compete for support with the CGTP, it became a major rival, and ultimately one of the most active opponents of the military regime. The undermining of control of the APRA, on the other hand, may have occurred on the labor front, but this did not directly transfer to political support, as eventually the 1978 elections demonstrated.

Although many unions have deserted Apra, this does not mean...that the populist or paternalistic attractions of APRA are irrelevant. On the contrary, the move of Apra back into the center of the political stage might well coincide with a revival of the fortunes of the party in the union movement...Apra remains the most popular single party in Peru. It is quite possible that in union elections workers vote for the left wing candidates while in national political elections they will cast their vote for Apra. Apra's strength does not, therefore, lie in its union base as is the case with the Communist party. Its popular following and
powerful machine do provide resources, however, that the party can mobilize to maximize its appeal to the labor movement.[23]

The issue of union support became a crucial one in the latter phase of the military regime, as the CGTP was responsible for the sponsorship of two highly successful general strikes which were extremely damaging to the regime. The strikes were the spark for a great deal of pent up popular frustration. "Strikes in Peru show a high degree of communal solidarity; popular protest movements involve trade unions...as the cause of strikes reflect issues of deep concern to the urban and rural poor."[24] In keeping with the thesis that union support does not necessarily translate into electoral support, it is interesting to note that the APRA's CTP did not participate in the general strikes, yet the APRA still obtained a plurality in the Constituent Assembly elections. While the military were able to undermine the APRA's support in the unions, they were not able to on the political front. A relevant factor in this development was the failure of SINAMOS - the National System to Support Social Mobilization.

SINAMOS was a response to the need to incorporate popular participation and, in part, an attempt to duplicate or undermine the APRA's "popular following and political machine". The military began by placing a strong emphasis on building a support base in the pueblos jovenes. The Velasco government coined the term young town or "pueblo joven" for what had before been called barriadas or slums. Only one week after taking office, President Velasco announced the founding of ONDEPJOV - Organismo Nacional de Desarrollo de
Pueblos Jóvenes - to sponsor self-help efforts and deal with new settlements.[25] Very involved in early settlement policy was Carlos Delgado, an ex-Aprista, who was to be key in the design and direction of SINAMOS. Delgado, who had been an ardent Aprista and extremely close to Haya, had very negative feelings towards the APRA. His experience in the party, and his animosity towards it, were crucial in both the designs of these programs, and the attitude that the Velasco regime in general had towards APRA.

An April 29, 1971 land invasion in the Pamplona section of Lima, involving tens of thousands of people, coupled with a rise in strike activity in the sugar cooperatives and in the southern sierra mines: "made it clear that the government needed to increase its ability to deal with the sectors of society capable of mass political action."[26] The government founded SINAMOS in June of 1971 to serve as a link between the government and the people, and purportedly was to make the bureaucracy more responsive to the people. SINAMOS incorporated ONDEPJOV, and also dealt with cooperatives, agrarian reform, and other activities, although the settlements were its main focus. The combination of the strikes and the massive Pamplona invasion had left the government without a mechanism of social control and communication; one that political activity would normally have filled, and that SINAMOS was supposed to fill. A thesis of Carlos Delgado's - that of the "non-party" - was crucial to this design.

These strikes, and...the Pamplona invasion, had support from opposition parties, including the left as well as APRA. The government is naturally interested in limiting the power of these parties and in competing
with them for support at the local level... the overall purpose is to create alternative organizations in all sectors of Peruvian society that will fill political space that...might be occupied by these parties. The concern with the role of political opposition in squatter settlements...[was] particularly intense.[27]

SINAMOS was designed to guarantee local participation in the planning of development actions and created a complex system of state-run offices which were to be responsible for the distribution of land-titles, water, electricity, and other such services. SINAMOS could only promote, not enact, these projects, however - which gave it no more of a function than an ordinary political party, except that it had ties to the government. Under SINAMOS applications for land titles were made subordinate to the organization's approval and therefore extended the government's domination to the internal neighborhood structures.[28] The poor usually agreed to use SINAMOS' organizational structure, as it was their only means to obtain necessary services. They saw SINAMOS as a threat, however, as it attempted to close their informal but highly useful avenues of demand-making, deprive them of their separate identities, and rob them of effective, independent leadership.[29] Finally, because SINAMOS was unable to actually provide the services, making participation an empty exercise - a means without ends - SINAMOS was a failure. "The poor, of course, were aware of the cooptative nature of SINAMOS." [30] In some cases it aroused violent opposition, such as the 1972 storming and burning of SINAMOS headquarters along the Rimac river. After 1975, as public funds ran short, SINAMOS became increasingly a system to repress these demands. Ironically, SINAMOS was one of the many factors that served to politicize the urban
poor - in opposition to the government - after 1975. It is of particular importance, however, not only because of the high degree of publicity that it achieved, but because of its origins in the desire to replace political parties in general and the APRA in particular. The personality of Carlos Delgado and his relation to the APRA are critical to this analysis.

Carlos Delgado had been very active in the APRA youth movement, and came from an Aprista family. He was elected National Youth Secretary in 1948, and served in Haya's secretariat at age twenty. Delgado even served two years in prison during the Odria years, due to his affiliation with the party. Despite disillusion and serving as witness to the disaffection of a whole generation of APRA youth, Delgado remained with the party until the early sixties. He then left Peru disillusioned with the party's conservative bent after a decisive conversation with party leader Ramiro Priale. He still returned to work for the party's 1962 campaign, but finally broke with the party in 1963, after a conversation with Haya in Cologne revealed unbreachable differences.[31] The breach with the party was clearly something that affected Delgado deeply, and both his experiences within the APRA and his later strong feelings against its leaders, Haya in particular, were to affect not only his own behaviour, but the policies of the Velasco regime.

Yo no sé en que momento dejé de ser y de sentirme aprista...pienso que ocurrió algo muy similar a lo que experimenta un católico, un comunista, o cualquier hombre poseído por una fe total, cuando esa fe deja de alentar en su conciencia y su corazón....Aun cuando mis ojos no escapaban algunas de las tendencias
conservadoras de la dirección aprista, esta percepción era claramente neutralizada por los elementos de filiación sentimental que los apristas siempre tuvieron para su partido...algo más que una simple organización política, una suerte de religión laica...el ejercicio de una entrega verdadera a un ideal de lucha por la justicia social...que explique el hecho de que el Apra fuera el único movimiento político de este siglo que caló profundamente el alma de nuestro pueblo.[32]

Delgado was well aware of the strength of the APRA as a phenomena in Peru, regardless of its electoral fate. His disaffection resulted in very strong feelings about the party, which were soon to translate into government policy. Delgado returned to Peru in 1968, and worked in the government planning office Plandemét, where an article of his on self-help in the pueblos jovenes attracted the attention of members of the junta.[33]

Delgado was an important member of the ONDEPJOV efforts, and then was the principal designer and organizer of SINAMOS.[34] Delgado had a thesis of the "non-partido". He criticised the existing parties for their oligarchic nature, and redefined political parties during the military years as a new social form. He blamed the existing parties, primarily the APRA, for being counter-revolutionary forces. He described society prior to the revolution as being "bajo el férreo control de un ominoso poder partidario que desde el Estado aplasta la libertad del hombre".[35] He explained that the need for a revolution from above stemmed from the inability of the old parties, with their links to the traditional structure of power, to participate in the ideals and activities of the Revolution.

Porque la bancarrota política y moral de los grupos y partidos tradicionales...su total caducidad e ineficacia, hizo imperativa la intervención militar de
1968 que abrió la posibilidad real de emprender una auténtica y viable acción revolucionaria...[36]

At the same time, Delgado noted that no Marxist-Leninist regime had effectively solved the problem of popular participation with a party. Thus emerged his non-party thesis and the design of SINAMOS as an instrument to incorporate popular participation. On the second anniversary of the Agrarian Reform, the time that SINAMOS was announced, Delgado stated: "la Revolución impulsa decidivamente su ya iniciada política de participación popular en el proceso de cambios estructurales."[37]

SINAMOS grew out of the military's obvious need to deal with growing popular mobilization and politicization. Delgado, who had become "el asesor civil mas importante del Gobierno Revolucionario"[38], and who had a great deal of experience with party organizational work and in the pueblos jovenes through ONDEPJOV and Plandemet, was the main force behind SINAMOS. Velasco personally was extremely supportive of both Delgado and SINAMOS, and the agency lost a great deal of support from within the regime with the transition to the Morales Bermudez leadership.[39] Many of the leaders of the second phase disapproved of the infiltration of Communists in the agency, and as the organization had become extremely unpopular among the urban poor, exemplified by the 1975 storming and burning of SINAMOS headquarters, its dissolution was made certain.

SINAMOS clearly had impact and also symbolic importance. With the fall of SINAMOS came the re-incorporation of political parties into the system, and the reliance on their participation, particularly the APRA's, in
the transition to civilian rule. The idea behind SINAMOS' original formation had been an attempt to takeover the role traditionally played, if not always effectively, by the APRA in mobilizing and channeling social mobilization. SINAMOS's failure, interestingly enough, is often attributed to its hierarchical structure and unresponsive nature. The APRA is clearly a hierarchical organization; its survival and effectiveness must thus be attributed to other qualities that SINAMOS did not have. Firstly, the APRA was not imposed by a dictatorial regime as an order on top of existing ones. Secondly, the APRA had years worth of experience in political organization, unlike the military officers who often headed SINAMOS offices. Finally, the APRA had its age-old and unquantifiable "mística", which had always managed to maintain loyal supporters even when the party lost its revolutionary vigor; Delgado's persistent support throughout the fifties is a good example.

The failure of SINAMOS and the eventual return to the party system in Peru is also relevant as one of the major criticisms of the military regime was its authoritarian and exclusionary nature; this nature made it impossible for SINAMOS, or any other such organization, to bridge the gap between the regime and the population, and exposed the inherent flaws in Delgado's no-party thesis. He could not replace the role played by the APRA with an organization imposed from above; although the APRA was hierarchically structured, participation in its ranks was voluntary. SINAMOS, on the other hand, was seen as a requirement and a
bureaucratic barrier to desired ends rather than an effective means.

The Second Phase

The August 29, 1975 overthrow of Velasco by Francisco Morales Bermudez not only signified the end of SINAMOS, but a new phase of the military regime which was to emphasize economic austerity and an end to reforms. The huge and largely unaccounted debt piled up by the Velasco regime had become an issue of concern, as had rising inflation and growing labor unrest.[40] The private investment that the Velasco regime had hoped for never occurred, largely due to the regime's anti-imperialist and revolutionary rhetoric. While claiming that the revolution would continue its course, the Morales regime was clearly committed to a change of tack, in part due to the need for foreign credit and the conditions imposed by the IMF and the desire for a rapprochement with the domestic business sector. Yet even with its switch to pro-capitalist policies, the military was not able to appeal to parties on either end of the spectrum; it had alienated all parties through its vision of society without them. In the meantime, the switch to a pro-business, austerity oriented approach unleashed a flood of labor unrest.[41]

The military government was discredited among all sectors of society, to some extent due to the increase of repressive activities at the end of the Velasco years as the regime lost coherence in the face of rising opposition and Velasco's illness. The military were aware of this, and in Morales' first speech - where he indicated that the course
of the revolution would not change ideologically but that its political management must[42] - it became clear that the military were thinking about returning to the barracks. In 1977 the government announced that there would be elections for a constituent assembly. The new regime's attitude towards the parties was a much more conciliatory one, in part due to the government's failure at channeling popular participation through SINAMOS, and in part to their need for the parties' cooperation for the transition. Finally,

"it seems not unlikely that the government calculated that the 30 month transition period would help diffuse political opposition to unpopular economic policies by absorbing the political parties in the process of designing the country's future constitutional parameters."[43]

The role of the APRA was to be crucial in this transition process, as the first contacts with civilians were made with APRA leaders, and the party, particularly Haya, served as a mediator between the military and political parties of the right and left. The party's central role in the transition process is ironic in light of the extent to which it was perceived to be, and actually was, in a state of crisis and disarray when the Velasco government implemented "their" revolution. The Velasco revolution did indeed create an internal crisis within the APRA, but that crisis led to the eventual re-vamping of the party's platform and of the training of a new generation of leaders by Haya de la Torre. This generation is that of Alan García and of his contemporaries in power. The relationship between García and Haya at the time also points to the extent to which Haya, although refusing to make a public choice, had found his hand-picked successor. The APRA's reaction to the
Velasco reforms, and their public stance as well as the internal changes of the party, were critical to both the transition to civilian rule and to their final attainment of power in 1985.
The Velasco Years:  
Crisis in the APRA

The irony of the APRA's traditional rivals - the military - taking power and then implementing what was deemed to be the APRA's revolution created shock, surprise, and finally great bitterness in the APRA party. The Velasco regime's anti-imperialist and reformist rhetoric virtually mirrored the APRA's original doctrine, both in terms of ideology and in terms of the reforms that were implemented. In the words of one of the highest ranking party members at the time: "quieren hacer en cinco o seis anos...lo que impidieron realizar en cuarenta. Primero, atrasaron el reloj. Ahora le dan cuerda con furia capaz de romper cronómetro."[44] There was the feeling that the military had stolen the very soul of the APRA. The APRA had been the first party in Peru to call for social reform, for land reform, for an anti-imperialist stance, for the nationalization of key industries, for rights for the Indian; now the very institution that had persecuted them for forty years had once again pre-empted them from taking power, and had taken their program to boot. Even more damaging was that the APRA was seen as more conservative than the military, and was even accused by them of being counter-revolutionary.

The effect of the military's revolution on the behavior and the doctrine of the party was far reaching, and as late as 1987, when Alan García was contemplating the nationalization of the nation's banks - in his attack on the famous "circuitos de poder" - the perception that APRA had been upstaged by the military may have been a factor. "La
gente dice que Velasco nos quitó la gran bandera, la reforma agraria. El mundo agrario era expresión concreta de algo mucho más importante...Voy a terminar con los latifundios de la moneda."[45] The land reform, for all its failures in implementation was symbolically extremely important: the Velasco regime had challenged - and broken - the power of the export oligarchy in Peru. This was something that the APRA, from its very origins, had proposed doing.

The psychological and symbolic impact of the first "revolution" in Peru being implemented by a group other than the APRA, and even worse, by their traditional enemies, was tremendous. Although the party had clearly undergone hard times, and had lost a great deal of youth during and after the compromises of the "convivencia", there had never been such an ideological challenge. While APRA was challenged to some extent by the reformist rhetoric of AP, it could always blame its 1963 defeat on the 1962 coup. AP was clearly not the institution that the APRA was, and was based more on the personality of Fernando Belaúnde. APRA depended on Haya, but the APRA was in and of itself much much more; it was one of the three principal institutions - the church, the armed forces, and the APRA - in Peru, a status that AP could not attain when fundamentally it was an imitator of the APRA. The left meanwhile, was not a unified force. Thus the most formidable challenges to the APRA had always come from reactionary forces: the oligarchy and the army, and the party could always justify defeat with the actions of its persecutors. There had not been a need for internal criticism.
The fact that there was no outright persecution, that the APRA was not outlawed, that the APRA was indeed not even directly mentioned by the military government placed the party in a tenuous position. They were not being persecuted, yet their revolution was being implemented by their former persecutors. Yet how could they criticise their main rivals when they had adopted the APRA’s own ideology. Both parties played a delicate game. Velasco – most likely aided by Carlos Delgado – knew that persecuting the APRA would harm the regime more than the APRA, and Haya knew that criticizing the military would harm the APRA more than it would the military.

The day after the coup, the party issued a protest which called for the restoration of civil liberties; at the time it was not immediately clear what sort of regime would emerge. There had clearly been nationalist and populist military leaders, such as Sanchez Cerro, who had also persecuted the APRA. The day of the coup there was some student unrest and a clash with the police in the center of Lima, in which one APRA student was killed; there were also some clashes and unrest between APRA and Communist student factions at the APRA-affiliated Villareál university in November,[46] but there was no military-inspired persecution campaign.

The military seemed to want to avoid a repressive image. On October 5, Andres Townsend, a party leader and President of the Senate until the coup, received a direct message from Velasco, via Townsend’s own military attaché – Chamber Presidents had attachés – that the coup was not
against either the APRA or its leaders.[47] There were other contacts between party leaders and the military; Luis Alberto Sanchez, for example, early on met with the Economics Minister, General Valdivia Morriboron.[48] The members of AP were actually treated far less well by the military, and most of them spent the entire period in forced or self-imposed exile.

At the time of the coup, a small group of Aprista youth, led by Armando Villanueva and Luis Felipe de las Casas - older generation leaders both of whom had been imprisoned during the Odria years - organized what they thought would be a clandestine action group. Originally the group numbered 200 university students, including Alan García; after the military's nationalization of IPC installations six days after the coup, the group's numbers diminished by one half; as the government was institutionalized, the group diminished to fifty, then twenty, and eventually dissolved.[49] Ironically, de las Casas eventually served as Ambassador to Colombia for the military government. While Apristas did not necessarily participate in the military government on a widespread scale, there was some desertion from the APRA to its ranks, which was hardly appreciated by the party leaders. While the rank and file in large part remained loyal to the party, the disaffection occurred more on the "dirigente" level,[50] thus depriving the party of some of its more talented members.

As the reformist nature of the Velasco government became more clear, the APRA's own position became more
tenuous. Haya de la Torre was abroad at the time and did not return until February of 1969. Prior to his return the party leaders recognized the need to come to grips with the situation of the party in light of the different nature of the military regime, and to determine what the party's approach towards the regime should be. At that time, Armando Villanueva contacted Cesar Atala - a loyal Aprista and the representative of the Inter-American Development Bank in the English-speaking Caribbean - in Trinidad and asked him to explore with Haya the possibility of a meeting of APRA leaders in Trinidad in order to plan a strategy prior to Haya's return to Peru. Haya - in Paris - agreed, and the initial plans were made. Plans were subsequently changed, and Haya entered Peru via Iquitos, where he met with the APRA leaders prior to arriving in Lima.[51] A few days later, at the APRA's traditional Dia de Fraternidad rally - which was permitted by the regime - Haya limited his criticisms to the lack of civil liberties and electoral rights, and did not address the nature of the regime, except to agree with its anti-imperialist stance. As the reforms progressed, the party maintained a position of constructive criticism, always praising the direction of the reforms, and always criticizing the lack of electoral freedom. At times specific criticisms yielded results, such as Haya's calling for internal elections in the sugar cooperatives in February 1972; elections were held and Apristas on the whole were the victors, although in many cases results were annulled.[52] The military was not opposed to retaliation if criticism appeared to be going too far. In May of the same year, Haya
alluded in a discourse to the success he had had with the sugar elections, and urged the government to convolve municipal elections. A few weeks later, Haya's secretary, Jorge Idiáquez, disappeared when he went out to the pharmacy; he was deported by the military a few days later.[53] This seems to have been a warning to Haya not to overstep the unspoken behavioral bounds.

While there was no overt persecution, there was subtle harassment of the APRA leadership as well as attempts to discredit the party. The military wanted to create the impression that the APRA was "deshaciendose" or falling apart, as the existence of a strong party organization would clearly challenge their support base. Subtle harassment began in 1969. The government allowed the party to hold their traditional yearly rallies, but used a variety of tactics to discourage attendance. In February 1969, Interior Minister Artola told Armando Villanueva that there was a plot to kill Haya, obviously hoping that the Apristas would cancel their rally. The rally was held anyway, and the APRA leaders avoided publicizing the rumour; no attempt on Haya was made. The person who was rumoured to be after Haya, a so-called Compadre Silvio, turned out to be a hairdresser rather than a shady character, and the plot was afterwards nicknamed "el complot de peluqueros".[54] In 1974, there was a supposed attempt on Haya's life - this one by the PIP, the military intelligence police, whose truck crashed into Haya's car as it was entering his home at Villa Mercedes. Haya suffered a fractured rib.[55]
Every year on the day of the rally, the official Comité de Deportes contracted 2 football matches at the same time that the rally was to be held. In 1972, the government did not authorize the rally in its traditional place, the party locale, but instead authorized the party's holding it at the huge Campo de Marte fairground, which holds 300,000 people. This was probably an attempt to ridicule the size of the rally - an attempt to demonstrate the demise of the party. The grounds mysteriously flooded at five p.m.; meanwhile the government contracted the usual football matches, prohibited any pre-concentrations, and said that the meeting had to end by midnight, the traditional time that Haya spoke. Finally, the meeting was closed down with gunshots from a state security patrol. Despite this, the meeting was the best attended in years, according to Apristas; the official press said there were 60,000 people, and the APRA claimed that there were 150,000.[56]

Some individual party leaders were also the subject of substantial harassment. Luis Alberto Sanchez, one of the oldest and most respected party members, had charges pressed against him and his building invaded by the Judicial Police. According to Sanchez, a lengthy process, in which the charges were never justified, was initiated against him in February 1969. The Fiscal Police attempted to implicate Sanchez in a crime committed in the 1940's by an Aprista youth who was later the head of the Senate information office during the Belaúnde years under an alias. He also was charged with 120 fraud counts - in relation to his position as rector of the University of San Marcos - from the
Tribunal de Cuentas, which all turned out to be false. The Tribunal also tried - and failed - consistently to prove that Sanchez was receiving income from his training as a lawyer, although he maintains that he never practiced for profit.[57] Armando Villanueva and Luis Negreiros were both deported in 1974, and Jorge Idiáquez was deported twice during the military years - clearly an indirect stab at Haya; other party leaders were subject to different kinds of harassment.[58] This subtle harassment, however, was very different from the persecution that the party had suffered in the past, as it was aimed to discredit rather than make martyrs of party members. The attempts to discredit Sanchez financially and professionally, for example, were designed more to harm the image of the party than to hurt Sanchez himself.

For the first few years of the military docenio, with the exception of some student unrest, the party did not present any active opposition to the regime[59], nor was there a particular strength of anti-aprismo among the military leaders. There was clearly a resentment against all parties in general, as they were seen as an integral part of the traditional power structure, and there did exist some of the traditional rivalry between the army and the APRA. This had clearly mellowed with time, and also with the changes within the military's ideology and its sympathy and leaning on the APRA's doctrine. General Tantalean, the influential Fisheries Minister, for example, was known for his pro-APRA sympathies. Velasco clearly had sympathies for APRA's ideology, and no particular personal resentment of the
APRA. [60] His reliance on Carlos Delgado was seen by some as a way of obtaining "Aprismo without the APRA." [61] At one point in a speech, Velasco used the phrase "nos hemos levantado contra el pasado vergonzante", which is directly from the APRA marseillese. Andres Townsend's response to this was "Delgado hasta le hace cantar la marseillesa a Velasco sin que lo sepa!" [62] Velasco's response to these attacks was indirect - in fact he rarely directly mentioned the party by name, another way of decreasing its influence. While he accepted that his program was influenced by APRA doctrine, he also faulted the APRA for failing to implement it: "no se trataba de tener buenas ideas solamente sino...llevarlas a la práctica y no se puede negar que la Revolución hizo muchas de las obras y cambios que el APRA considero en su política." [63]

Military harassment of the APRA grew as a response to a perceived increase in belligerency on the part of the party. By 1971 there was an increase in strike activity, and more aggressive statements on the part of the leaders, such as that which provoked the Idiáquez deportation. The decision to deport Idiáquez was spurred by the ex-apristas in the government, who were clearly aware of how indispensable Idiáquez was to Haya, and knew that it would be an effective stab. Carlos Delgado in particular was particularly resentful of Haya [64], and was behind many of the attempts to discredit the party. Thus, ironically, the perceived anti-aprismo of the military was more a product of former APRA ranks than from the military themselves.
anti-aprismo of the military was more a product of former APRA ranks than from the military themselves.

Delgado's influence is key here. He had been Haya's "delfín" - favored one - and his estrangement from the party was a bitter one - analogous to the anti-Communism of former Communists. He was seen as a traitor by the APRA leaders, and his writings clearly displayed a bitterness towards the party leadership and Haya in particular.

La evidente y profunda crisis política que afecta al más antiguo partido peruano es, fundamentalmente, una crisis de liderazgo...la crisis que vive el APRA se acentúa por la incapacidad de su dirigencia para aceptar...su responsabilidad por el inmenso desastre político que hoy puede exhibir al cabo de muchísimos años de control absoluto de su partido. Quien ejerce un poder así tiene el imperativo ético de asumir la total responsabilidad de victorias y derrotas.

Delgado was the leader of the Aprista dissidents in the government, and his bitter feelings towards the party clearly had effects on various kinds of policy, SINAMOS clearly being an outgrowth of this. "Carlos Delgado, quizás como secuela de su disidencia aprista, levanta la 'tesis del no partido.'" As the influence of Delgado and other dissident Apristas was spread throughout the government, it is not surprising that anti-APRA sentiment pervaded different policy levels.

Not all Apristas who participated in the government left the party - de las Casas, for example eventually re-aligned himself with the party. However, the loss of more young talent at the dirigente level, after the dissension of the fifties and sixties, was clearly not a welcome one. This, coupled with the irony of the military implementing the APRA's own revolution caused a crisis within the party.
The party, and Haya in particular, had to cope with "his" revolution being implemented by another leader. The party could not lash out at its oppressors the way it had in the past, and Haya was not a martyr. Haya had no personal animosity towards Velasco, however, and in fact regarded him with a sort of tenuous respect. When Velasco fell ill in early 1973, Haya softened the APRA's criticisms - his and those of Sanchez - at the yearly Dia de Fraternidad rally.

Pero Haya no odio a Velasco...Era un hombre apasionado, vehemente, autoritario, y socialmente rencoroso; a cambio de tales fallas tuvo el coraje de enfrentarse a la oligarquía, y aunque incurriendo en crueldad e injusticia, atacarla en sus valores representativos.[70]

Haya's Response

Victor Raul Haya de la Torre had to rethink his strategy for the last years of his life. For the first time in many years, Haya de la Torre looked inward at his party and noted the lack of qualified leaders, the lack of ability within the party to challenge the revolution that was being swept from under their feet. He returned to Peru in February of 1969 at age 74; his long-held ambitions for attaining the presidency were shattered for the last time on October 3, 1968. At that point he decided to dedicate the last years of his life to the youth of the party, in order to train new leaders for when the party was ready to take power. "Decidio que habia llegado el momento de quedarse en el Perú...a dedicar lo que le quedaba de vida a traspasar conocimientos y experiencia a la juventud del partido."[71]

Throughout the sixties, Haya had spent only six months per year in Peru, and the rest of the time travelling abroad. At that time he had regularly held, when in the
country, Tuesday colloquiums which dealt with all aspects of APRA doctrine. Among the regular attendees was a young Alan Garcia. As of 1969, Haya remained in the country full-time and began to select approximately 100 university-age youths whom he felt were particularly bright or active in the party to form a leadership training school, or Buro de Conjunciones. By June of 1969 he had chosen his group and activities - debates, speeches, lectures several evenings a week - began. At this point there was a debate going on within the party, and particularly the youth, who were very much affected by the revolution going on without them, about whether Haya's *Antimperialismo y el APRA* or *Treinta Anos de Aprismo* were the legitimate summation of APRA doctrine. The debate began in the Villareal and San Marcos universities, where a new interest and investigation of Aprista doctrine was gradually beginning. In 1962, the much more radical *Antimperialismo*, the original 1930's APRA doctrine, had been excluded from Haya's collected works. Antimperialismo's conclusion refutes the claim that the APRA is a reformist rather than a revolutionary party. As if to tilt the debate, and clearly in a change of ideological strategy, Haya ordered a new edition - the third - printed of *Antimperialismo y el APRA* in 1970. This edition was sold out by 1972, and a new one had to be issued.[72] At the same time, apparently shaken by the printing of documents by one Aprista current at Villareal University, in which their polemics totally ignored Aprista doctrine as a basis for debate and focused on Marxism-Leninism, Haya called for a university parliament. Its president was none other than
Alan García. In the meantime, the Buro de Conjunciones was whittled down to about fifty youths, and even among these, a more intense group, the Escuela de Dirigentes, was chosen. Haya began to speak of his own death in his discourses and to speak of the future of the party. He calculated that the military regime would last ten or fifteen years, and he spoke of training leaders for the future. He placed an emphasis on the need for party unity. This sort of discourse was clearly a novelty; for the first time the party was re- thinking its future, its ideological place in the country's political spectrum, and contemplating its direction without Haya.

The idea behind both the Buro and the Escuela was to create a sort of shadow cabinet of the party leadership, with each secretariat having a youth representative who was supposed to take responsibility in the absence of the respective secretary. Carlos Roca - a prominent party leader in the eighties - for example, was under Armando Villanueva as Secretary for Exterior Relations, and Alan García was at the Secretariat for Organization. In reality the youth were not allowed the designed responsibility, however, and in the absence of the secretaries, decisions were usually made by the sub-secretaries. Middle generation leaders who still maintained political ambitions clearly felt threatened by this group of youth in their early twenties who were receiving so much of Haya's attention, and being given responsibility to boot. A remarkable amount of Haya's time during this period went to training this group. The Buro met with Haya Tuesday nights for the parlamento universitario,
Wednesday nights they attended the CEN meetings, Thursday nights they attended the general colloquium at the party locale, Saturdays the Escuela de Dirigentes met, and Sundays Haya hosted a weekly reunion of youth at his home, Villa Mercedes. One reason that Haya may have chosen to focus on the youngest generation of dirigentes for new leadership development was that they were still too young to challenge him in any way. Haya clearly wanted to remain the unquestioned "jefe" of the party until his death.

From the Buro emerged many of the members of today's government, Alan García in particular. During the early years of the Buro, and in particular before García went to study in Spain and France, he was paid particular attention by Haya, and accompanied him during his normal weekly duties. According to François Bourricaud - a personal friend of Haya's who was to be García's professor at the Sorbonne - Haya contacted him and told him that he was sending him "one of our best." This promotion continued when García returned, as he was appointed by Haya for the post of Secretary of Organization during the transition years. He was also chosen, along with Sanchez, to speak at the welcoming rally on January 6, 1978 when Haya returned from Europe to launch the Constituent Assembly electoral campaign.

In addition to the attention that Haya gave to the new leadership, he was insistent that there be constant activity at the party locale, and that the lights be on late into the evenings, clearly attempting to revamp the party's image. Haya had a sort of popular history - a Historia Gráfica - of
the party written, under the direction of Andres Townsend. These facsimiles or pamphlets were an official version of the party's history, but were evidently intended for popular consumption; the graphic illustrations, which pre-dominated the text and included close-up photographs of bullet-ridden Apristas, gave the publications a kitsch-like quality. The facsimiles were designed to glorify the APRA's history of suffering and the central role that Haya de la Torre had played in the country's political history. The facsimiles also tried to build Haya into a character of more international renown than he was in actuality.

The publications were an attempt to re-focus the attention of the masses on the APRA's role as a martyr in the struggle for social justice, and also of the animosity of the military during this struggle. The theme in the Historia Gráfica is the celebration of the APRA as the hero in the nation's history. The hero is a victim as well, however: Apristas are persecuted; Haya does not get to be president as he deserves. Thus the revolution in the Historia Gráfica is not the taking of power, but the celebration of the hero.[77] Haya's death is not mentioned in the history; rather he is immortalized through the 1979 granting of the Orden del Sol and the signing of the Constitution. "No hay relato ni gráfico relativo a la muerte, ni al entierro: el héroes vive siempre, gloria eterna!"[78] The facsimiles demonstrate Haya's strategy in renovating the party by focusing on its finest hours and its history of heroism, rather than on the compromised moments and loss of revolutionary fervor. This seems to complement
the revival of the original Aprista doctrine, but was probably targeted at a less sophisticated audience.

Haya also sponsored the founding of a student magazine, Claridad, in 1977 as a venue for university students to expound alternative views. The magazine was purposely named after a magazine founded by Victor Raul thirty years earlier. The original Claridad was designed as an arm of the Universidades Populares - to reach the masses who were "marginalized" from culture and education. "Además, la jefatura buscaría promocionar y apoyar a los grupos juveniles preocupados por el estudio de la realidad social."[79] Again Haya was trying to renovate the party by focusing on the youth and on the original concepts and doctrines of the APRA.

The party renovation was not occurring in a vacuum, however. There was a flurry of activity, as concurrent with the emergence of the political left was an increase in the number of left-affiliated think tanks and research institutes that focused on the economic and social sciences. Some of these received funds from Velasquistas in the government, as well as external funds. The APRA, with its single-handed dominance by Haya and exclusive focus on his works, in many ways prepared a less capable and educated leadership base than did the left. While Haya's chosen few, such as Alan García and Carlos Roca, may have flourished under this strategy, the renovation did not necessarily affect the party rank and file. Throughout the Velasco years, there were only two functioning APRA locales in the country.[80] Members of the Marxist left were usually
educated at the more prestigious Universidad Católica, and on the whole had more funds available for training.[81] The lack of talent at the lower echelons of leadership, while not evident when the most talented of the party functioned as drafters of the Constituent Assembly or as leaders of the opposition, was later to be exposed when the party was in power. While Haya was able to renovate the party enough to act once again as a powerful electoral machine, and to train a few capable leaders, he was not able to repair the damage that decades of persecution, sectarianism, and ideological vacillation had done to the party's image nor the resulting defections of talented youth. Finally, there were splits within the APRA - between the more conservative older wing and established local "bosses" and union leaders on the one hand, and the increasingly radical youth on the other - which deepened at this time.

Once new life was injected into the student movement - both by the attention paid by Haya and by the general political trends in the nation, particularly the rise of the left - it took on a momentum of its own, which was in many ways beyond the control of the aging Haya. Haya's focus on a select few in the Buro did not guarantee him total control over the youth of the party, and particularly of the more radicalized elements. Perhaps the most extreme case was that of Victor Polay Campos, an active member of the Buro, who broke with the party in the late seventies while studying in Europe, and returned to Peru to become one of the founders and leaders of the MRTA guerrilla movement, which in its calls for armed struggle describes the APRA of Alan García
as "fascist." The student movement split between the traditional JUA - Juventud Universitaria Aprista - and the ARE - Alianza Revolucionaria Estudiantil, a more radical movement whose legitimacy was at first denied by Haya, although eventually tacitly supported, as the movement became a key actor in the opposition to the military government.

The ARE movement cooperated with numerous other forces in opposing the regime, such as during the police strike of the 5th February 1975 and the Sutep teachers' strike. The movement actively competed with Maoist groups for the control of the Secondary Students Federation, and in the process suffered the death of one of its members. Also extremely important, the movement became very critical of the CTP's lack of participation in popular protests, and in its 1974 Youth Congress voted to censure its "pro-patron" and "yellow" leadership and change the CTP's traditional slogan from "el sindicalismo libre y democrático" to "sindicalismo del frente unico de clases explotadas."[82] In part due to Haya's new focus - both in terms of party personnel and doctrine - and in part to the general political trends in the country - in particular the rise of the left - the APRA youth grew more radical and more influential simultaneously. Ultimately, they were to be an important force in the rise of the new party leadership in the early eighties. The growth in strength of the student movement, as it was a function of a party renovation based on its more radical doctrine, was ultimately related to a democratizing trend in the general party organization.
Con Victor Raul comienza...la vuelta a las 'fuentes primigenias'. Consecuencia...es el surgimiento de dos tendencias...los sectores tradicionales apristas y los sectores juveniles...Haya tendra un rol muy importante en este contexto, pues, al fin y al cabo, el permitió que estos sectores juveniles tomaron poco a poco mayor presencia en los puestos dirigentes del partido....El PAP va a ser totalmente redinamizado y movilizado después de varios años de verdadera hibernación. Se permitirá una mayor participación de las bases y esto redundará en una mayor democratización...se buscará mejorar las relaciones con las bases provinciales y sectoriales, especialmente de Lima y el Callao.[83]

The Velasco years - both due to the military's reforms and the growth of the left - clearly caused a crisis within the APRA; a crisis that spurred the party into a process of self-examination for the first time. This was caused, in part, by Haya's realization that the military regime would be in power for an extended period of time and that Haya would most likely not attain the Presidency during his lifetime. He was thus forced to think, for the first time, of the party's future, and of an APRA not dominated solely by Haya. He - wisely - refused to choose his successor. "Quienquiera que decidiese llegar a su sitio, tendría que tomarlo."[84] He established the Euro de Conjunciones as the pool from which his successor would be chosen, and most likely saw Alan García as a likely candidate, but he by no means openly made the choice, nor did he dictate the overthrowing of the older generation of leaders by the younger. He did, however, attempt to pave their way. In this manner he also avoided a leadership challenge from those in the older generations who were his logical - at least by chronological criteria - successors. Finally, given the history of animosity between the armed forces and the APRA, it is an ironic twist that the military's "revolution" was
the initiating factor in the APRA's preparation for being a
governing party rather than its perennial role as the
"impotent giant" of the opposition.

5 February 1975

One of the turning points of the military years, and
one of President Velasco's most critical moments, was the
police strike of February 1975, and the uprisings that
followed. During these events, approximately one hundred
striking Civil Guards were shot by army troops, the entire
city of Lima was without any police protection for over
twenty four hours, and student protesters looted and burned
the offices of the government controlled newspapers Correo
and Ojo, the SINAMOS offices in the Centro Civivo, and the
Lima Sheraton. There was considerable damage throughout the
city, as both looting and rioting were uncurbed the day of
the fifth. The extent of the chaos and the strength of the
protest movement - in particular the direct attack on
SINAMOS - was a clear expression of the growing discontent
with the Velasco regime. APRA student leaders were clearly
involved in the planning and leading of the protests, but
were by no means the only participants. The APRA - along
with the CIA - was directly blamed for the protests by
Velasco - in fact the only time that he directly attacked
the party in a public speech.[85] The events of 5 February
re-opened the old APRA versus military debate, albeit
temporarily. Haya, meanwhile, while not publicly endorsing
the destructive actions of the APRA activists, clearly gave
tacit approval to their protests.
The police strike of 1975 took place in an atmosphere of growing discontent with the military government. While economic growth was still high - 6.9% for 1974 - a balance of payments crisis was becoming evident and both inflation and labor unrest were on the rise, as were criticisms of the regime's policies. Velasco had already become ill - having had his leg amputated in 1973 - and the lack of coherent leadership was coupled with an increase in repression. On July 24, 1974, the nation's private newspapers had been expropriated by the government, which stated that the press was leading the "counter-revolutionary campaign" and several members of the Law College were deported for criticizing the nation's oil contracts. "El clima laboral se complica más...el número de huelgas crece. Es el punto crítico del 'proceso velasquista', quedan al desnudo sus limitaciones inherentes.'"[86]

The student movement, meanwhile, was increasingly mobilized. There were clashes between the APRA and the growing Marxist student movement, and increased animosity towards the regime on the part of both. SINAMOS was viewed as an authoritarian threat. "Fortalecimiento del SINAMOS marca el inicio de una nueva etapa en el régimen militar. Las iniciales disposiciones de cambio ceden paso a los intentos de control vertical, de manipulación."[87]

The police strike of February 1975 primarily involved low ranking members of the Guardia Civil, who were the worst paid of the armed forces. By the second half of 1974, the lower ranks not only agreed on the need to improve their situation, but more important, had a directorate. They
staged an unsuccessful strike on 12 December; the military's response was that it was an internal problem. In early January, there was student unrest in a campaign against corruption in the Law Faculty at Villareal, led by Apristas. Involved in this unrest was a Guardia Civil captain who was studying law at the university, who also was the head of the Guardia Civil's Comando Revolucionario at Villareal. This captain began to coordinate with a group of Aprista student leaders who were led by Carlos Belapátino, Manuel García, Justo Costello, and Tito Landerer. Belapátino became the students' main contact with the Guardia Civil leaders. This group formed a joint command, called TUPAC, and the students held a passive strike in support of the Guardia Civil on January 18. On the morning of February 3, 1975, Lima mobilized normally, but with no police protection. By the next day it was obvious that the bulk of the Guardia Civil was on strike. Support for the striking policemen among the students grew. In the early hours of the morning of the fifth, the government - through the authorization of General Leonidas Rodríguez, the military commander for the region, ordered army tanks and troops into the barracks at Radio Patrulla where the striking police were waiting for a response from the Interior Ministry. An undetermined number - nearly one hundred - police officers were killed. Some Guardia Civil members and their families made contact with the APRA youth leaders - García and Belapátino - and revealed that there had been a massacre in the police barracks, and some of the wounded Guardias Civiles went to Villareal University. Approximately 4000 students took to
the streets. They marched through downtown Lima and held a rally at the Plaza San Martin. Their slogan was "Pueblo - Fuerza Armada - Unidos Venceremos." When they reached the Plaza Manco Capac, there were some shots, and on the Avenida 28 de Julio, four or five APTL buses were burned and the violence began. The students burned an army Jeep, a truck, threw stones at the U.S. embassy; they then entered and burned the offices of Ojo and Correo, government controlled newspapers. There were more shots, and the coherence of the TUPAC movement was lost as they joined other rioting students, most of these Marxist. At this point they burned the SINAMOS offices in the Centro Civico; on the way the group ransacked the Sheraton Hotel.[88] In the center of Lima, in the meantime, robberies and lootings were unrestrained. "No solamente delincuentes robaron, lo hicieron de toda clase social, la cosa era fácil."[89] Eventually order was re-established by army troops.

While the direction of the 5 February revolts was clearly not from the upper echelons of the APRA leadership, it did have roots in the ARE - the more radical wing of APRA's student movement, whose legitimacy had originally been disputed by Haya. While Haya, in an Argentine newspaper, did not condone the looting and also did not concede that the events were the party's responsibility, he did acknowledge that APRA youth had participated.[90] His tacit approval for the participation of the youth was in keeping with his desire to be more responsive to more radical ideology in general, as was demonstrated by his return to the early APRA doctrine, and to youth in
particular, in an effort to foster new leadership. According to Pedro Richter Prada, who served in both posts of Interior and Prime Minister during the military government, the opposition of the APRA to the regime grew substantially after 1974, primarily as a response to pressures from the student movement. Carlos Roca, one of Haya's favored members of the Buro, was instrumental in imposing this pressure.[91] The party's opposition to the Velasco regime also grew as the government's behaviour grew more dictatorial, such as the June 1974 takeover of the nation's press.

The events of the fifth of February are important here for two reasons. First of all they signified the Velasco regime's loss of control - the beginning of the end for the first phase of military government. Secondly, they placed the APRA once again at the center of active opposition and radical action against the armed forces. The APRA was using its traditional strategy of trying to build support among the lower ranks of the armed forces - those which were most likely to be sympathetic - to spur an anti-regime movement - a tactic very much resented by the army. In a manner analogous to the uprising of October 3, 1948, Haya gave tacit support to APRA involvement in such a movement. Also analogous to that date, the uprising spurred a reaction within the military leadership, and was a factor leading to a coup by more conservative elements. However, unlike the Odria coup, the Morales Bermudez coup resulted in a lengthy transition process to civilian rule rather than a period of persecution of the APRA. Almost all members of the military cabinet blamed the APRA for the leadership of the fifth
February events. There was increased repression of political opposition during Velasco's final months, such as the August 5 deportations of several journalists, the head of SUTEP, of the MIR (Movimiento Izquierdista Revolucionario), and a large group of APRA leaders - Negreiros, Roca, Villanueva, and Carlos Enrique Fereyros - an APRA CEN (National Executive Committee) member and the head of the Law College; and the closing that same day of the left-wing newspaper Marka [92]. However, as soon as the Morales coup occurred, the APRA was treated much better, and constitutional guarantees were maintained - at least in the case of Apristas.[93] This was probably in part a function of the regime's realization, once it decided that it would devolve the military of government, that it very much needed the party: both to implement the transition as sort of a middle voice between the military and the more radical opposition, and to absorb increasingly hostile and powerful popular pressure.
The August 29, 1975 "tacnazo", as the Morales Bermudez coup was called, was clearly a surprise both within and outside the military, especially as there was an implicit agreement between Velasco and Morales, that Morales would be the successor. While Morales had the support of a key group within the leadership, he was clearly opposed by several of the key Velasquistas in the junta, most of whom - including Generals Tantalean, Rodriguez Figueroa, de la Flor, and Fernandez Maldonado - resigned by mid-1976. In their stead rose to predominance a more conservative group of generals: Arbulu, Bobbio, and Cisneros Vizquerra.[94] Early on it was clear that there was to be a change in tactics, beginning with Morales' 29 August speech in which he stated:

Nada de esto va a cambiar un solo milímetro...Pero este proceso tendrá que tener necesariamente cambios importantes no en sus programas ni en sus bases ideopolíticas, sino en sus procedimientos políticos; en el manejo y la conducción política de proceso revolucionario...[95]

The Morales government christened its regime the second phase, stating that no new reforms would be undertaken, rather the existing ones would be institutionalized. It soon became clear that the Morales government had two goals: to cope with the nation's ensuing economic crisis and burgeoning external debt - the exact amount of which had not even been recorded by the Velasco government[96] - and slowly to devolve the armed forces from responsibility for government in order to preserve their unity as an institution. Not immediately willing to call direct elections, the military reached out to the political
parties, through the Constituent Assembly, as the mechanism through which to deal with the civilian population. One of the Morales government's first acts, for example, was to revise the independent status of the government expropriated newspapers.[97]

The Constituent Assembly played a unique role in the nation's politics and altered the traditional role played by parties. Because the political parties became involved in the Constituent process, the widespread popular opposition to the regime and its austere economic policies had to be channeled through other venues, primarily organized labor. The labor movement reached the height of its strength during the second phase, staging two successful general strikes in 1977 and 1978. The union movement in some ways took over the traditional party role of opposition to the regime. The overall current of discontent with the military government - which was particularly strong among the low income sectors who were hardest hit by the regime's austerity policies - latched on to the activities of the unions in order to express itself. The political parties, while in opposition to the regime, were thrown into a position of collaborating with it in order to be allowed eventually to attain power through elections. The unions, meanwhile, provided an effective enough opposition to act as a catalyst for the transition to government.[98] The APRA was to be the leader in the parties' role in the process, associating it most closely with the Morales regime. The APRA's dominance was due to its electoral mandate in the Constituent Assembly; to its ability to survive the military years - despite its
ideological crisis - as an organized party machine which continued its non-electoral activities throughout the docenio; and finally to the legacy of the persona of Haya de la Torre.

The launching of the party back into the center stage of political activity had both positive and negative consequences: although Haya received credit for the successful conduct of the Constituent Assembly, by playing the role of mediator between the military and the other elements of the population the APRA also was associated with the regime in a way that Belaúnde and the AP - who abstained from the Assembly process - managed to avoid. The process which culminated in the military's bestowing upon Haya the Orden del Sol, the nation's highest honor - seemed to put to an end, once and for all, the traditional animosity between the APRA and the armed forces, clearly a positive result. This honor, however, was soon followed by Haya's death, and the party was left with a leadership vacuum that, at least in the short term, no one could fill.

APRA and the Military: Initial Contacts

It was not obvious in the beginning that the Morales regime would signify a total shift in strategy, both in its attitude towards reform and towards political parties. There was concern among some Apristas that Morales Bermudez was an adamant anti-aprista, as his father had been killed by an Aprista in 1939, and that he would launch an anti-APRA or anti-Haya campaign. There were several rumours to that effect in the France Presse news agency. This did not occur, however, as Morales seemed to have lost any resentment he
might have initially had early on. He served, for example, along with Apristas as Minister of Hacienda in one of the final Belaúnde cabinets. Morales seemed to have a mercurial nature: he went from being one of the most ardent supporters of Velasco and the initial reforms to the staging of a coup against him and the virtual dismantling of them. In the same way, he dropped the strong anti-aprismo of his younger years, and by early 1976, the Morales regime had made the initial contacts with the APRA.

The earliest contact with the APRA actually occurred much earlier during the regime, and it involved Morales himself. In June of 1969 Morales - then Economics Minister - was in Trinidad. On the 17th he approached Cesar Atala - also in Trinidad - to invite him to Lima to initiate a dialogue with the APRA. The possibilities of such a dialogue - had they indeed existed - were soon cut off. The government decreed the Agrarian Reform on June 24, and the unrest among APRA-led unions on the sugar haciendas resulted in a poor climate for relations between the APRA and the government.[99] Several years then passed before the idea was pursued further.

In his memoirs Luis Alberto Sanchez accounts what he considers to be the first contacts between the APRA and the Morales regime. In early 1976, Sanchez received word through Carlos Olivera - an ex-captain and current customs agent at the Lima airport and an intimate friend of General Cisneros' - that Cisneros was interested in meeting with him. Thus Sanchez, Cisneros, his brother Jaime who had been appointed head of La Prensa, and Olivera all dined together at
Sanchez's son-in-law's house. At the time, the France Presse agent who wrote for La Prensa was reporting that there could be no positive discussion between the military and the APRA, and that the military old guard would never forgive the Apristas' assault in Trujillo. Cisneros and Sanchez, meanwhile, did have a productive discussion during which, among other things, Cisneros revealed to Sanchez that Morales was to announce the next day - in Trujillo, no less - that the army and the pueblo must drop their mutual animosity. True to his word, on April 30, 1976 in Trujillo, Morales Bermudez made a speech along those very lines.

Presidente Morales Bermudez manifestó hoy que ya es tiempo de olvidar encuentros que se produjeron hace 45 años en Trujillo, "pues ésta Revolución lucha de acuerdo con sus principios por la unidad y fraternidad de todos los peruanos."[100]

In the same speech, he declared amnesty for political exiles and political prisoners. Cisneros and Sanchez had also spoken about the military's plans to cancel their traditional ceremony honoring those killed in Trujillo, and Sanchez said that the APRA would reconsider holding their annual commemoration of the July 7 revolution.[101] Haya was apparently very pleased at the results of the Sanchez-Cisneros meeting. A few days later, the first meeting between Haya and members of the military junta was held at Sanchez's son-in-law's, this time entailing the original group with the addition of Haya, his secretary Idiáquez, and Armando Villanueva. The conversation lasted six hours, and was purportedly relatively frank and animated.[102] When it came to publicly responding to Morales's peace proposition, however, Haya was much less certain, and in his discourse on
the May 7 anniversary of the founding of the party, Haya's response was lukewarm. Among other things he affirmed: "No queremos nosotros ni dictadura de un proletariado que no existe prácticamente con capacidad política de dirección, todavía...ni una dictadura de los oligarcas o de los militares."[103]

Cisneros in particular was upset at this response, and publicly blamed it on Haya's advanced age. Haya was outraged at the public stab, and even refused to speak of Cisneros for several months. Not all sectors of the military were totally content with the process either, as was demonstrated by the attempts of some of the Velasquista wing - purportedly led by General Maldonado - to hold the traditional 9 July ceremony for the Trujillo dead. The reconciliation process continued, however. Other meetings between Apristas and the military were also held at the home of Cesar Garrido Lecca, a former army officer who had joined the APRA in the fifties.[104] Morales Bermudez made a public invitation for conversations with party leaders, and called for the formation, through elections, of a Constituent Assembly on July 28, 1977. This coincided with Haya's consistent calls for dialogue between the armed forces and the civilians, and for a Constituent Assembly to serve as a bridge between the dictatorship and civil society. The members of Acción Popular - although some of them had discussed the idea with Apristas in Spain the year before - rejected this mechanism totally. The APRA, however, while not all agreeing on the need for a new constitution, saw the Assembly as the best way out of the dictatorship, as the
military clearly would not accept immediate direct elections.[105]

Conversations began with all political parties, and, according to Sanchez, the APRA was not the first party to be convened. Their official delegation, which was comprised of Sanchez, Ramiro Priale, Andres Townsend, Carlos Enrique Melgar, Luis Negreiros, Carlos Roca, and Alfonso Ramos Alva - the latter two of the new generation - met with Morales on the same day and immediately after the delegation from the PPC. Morales had also met with the head of the CGTP - which was responsible for most of the labor unrest - and with the Communist party directorate.[106]

Despite military contacts with other actors, the APRA was to maintain a central role. Working conversations on how to run the transition were carried out between the new prime minister Molina Palocchia and APRA leaders - usually Villanueva, Townsend, Priale, Julio Cruzado of the CTP, and León de Vivero. After the APRA dominated in the elections, the relations between the government and the APRA improved and took on a more central role.[107] As the Assembly proceeded, it became evident that Haya was acting as the nation's pre-eminent politician, and as a mediator between all the political forces and the military. He inspired the respect of those on the left and the right, as was demonstrated by Hugo Blanco, one of the leaders of the extreme left who had most severely criticized Haya in the sixties, purportedly calling him "Don Victor."[108]

Haya grew increasingly ill, however, and was finally unable carry out his charge as President of the Assembly.
Symbolic of the extent to which the relationship of the APRA and the military had changed, however, was the visit of the President and the then Prime Minister, Pedro Richter Prada, paid on Haya, at Armando Villanueva's house, the evening prior to his departure for cancer treatment in Houston on March 11, 1979.[109] Finally, just days before his death in August 1979, the Morales Regime bestowed the Orden del Sol on Haya. Relations between the APRA and the military clearly had made a full circle since the early years of the "revolution" and clearly since the 1932 Trujillo revolt. The Constituent Assembly may have been Haya's finest hour; yet after he signed the constitution - virtually on his deathbed - the party was left with a vacuum in leadership and strategy.

After almost twelve years of military rule, which had combined initial revolutionary rhetoric and institutional reforms, raised expectations and higher wage levels, with a period of harsh economic austerity and real wage repression, the Peruvian population was much more politicized than it had been in 1968. This was reflected by the growth in strength of leftist parties. In the same way that the APRA had been ill equipped in 1968 to deal with the challenge from the Velasco government, the party, now without Haya, was left divided and without a coherent strategy for the 1980 elections. The school of leaders that Haya had trained were still too young to take over, and the older generations were split by both ideology and personality.

The Constituent Assembly

Although it can be argued that the 1978 election is not comparable to the others...and that the writing of the
The Morales Bermudez government made a calculated and cautious decision to re-open the political process in 1978 in an atmosphere of growing economic crisis and social unrest, as well as persistent demands for political participation. The decision to hold elections clearly served as a tool to diffuse criticism and opposition by occupying the political opposition without letting them wield any real power. Haya, as President of the Assembly called the Assembly the "primer poder del Estado", yet he was unwilling, as some of his fellow constituents demanded, to call for immediate resignation of the military government. Indeed, it would be difficult to speculate as to which political party: the fragmented left, an APRA led by an increasingly unwell Haya, or the beleaguered right, would have had the strength to cope with the unrest created by the economic stabilization and adjustment measures that were required at the time. In some ways the Assembly not only bought the Morales government time, but the political parties as well. Regardless of the benefits that the decision to hold elections provided the military by containing social unrest, the opening of the political process offered benefits to society as a whole.
The fact that during the "docenio" political parties had not been repressed, although they were not allowed to perform their representative functions, meant that they were at least able to survive intact. Those parties that were best able to survive in the non-electoral game were those with good organization; with a significant popular base that rested on non-electoral activities such as unions, adult education, and the like; and or those with strong and charismatic leaders. The APRA was in the best position in this sense. Instead of damaging the pre-revolutionary parties, the atmosphere created by revolutionary change and retrenchment served to stimulate political activism, whether in support of or in opposition to the military. As is demonstrated in the case of the APRA, the "revolutionary" atmosphere resulted in the party renovating its ideology and leadership structure.

The union movement had increased in size and audacity, stimulated by both the military's reforms and the emergence of other confederations to compete with the APRA's CTP. Their role also took on an increased significance as the political parties, absorbed in the transition process, did not actively incorporate popular opinion in opposition to the government. The urban and rural poor, in part as a function of this movement, had become politicized to an unprecedented extent. The general strikes of July 1977 and May 1978 showed the extent of the union movement's strength. The CTP did not participate in either strike, in part due to the APRA's desire to cooperate with the Morales regime. This was damaging to the party's image at a time that both the
labor movement and the political spectrum were shifting to the left, and further tainted it as a collaborator with the regime, although Haya purportedly gave tacit support to the participation of the student movement[112] - analogous to the 5 February.

The changes in the Peruvian political spectrum were reflected in the results of the 1978 elections. The number of political parties which registered for the 1978 elections increased dramatically since the last election in 1963 [see Table V]. Non-electoral participation in social and economic activities at local and regional levels provided greater participatory experience for groups such as peasants and illiterates, through the workplace and neighborhood organizations. These groups had been marginal in previous elections. Their heightened awareness served to increase politicization and resulted in an expanded electorate with regard to age, as well as increased pressure for the inclusion of illiterates in national suffrage.[113] Finally, perhaps as an outgrowth of these trends, the ideological center of the political system shifted substantially to the left.

The three most salient features of the 1978 assembly elections, which were to affect future trends, were the absence of former president Belaunde's Acción Popular, the prominence of the APRA, and the size of the left. The elections gave APRA 35.3% of the vote, diverse groups of the left together 36.2%, and the center-right Partido Popular Cristiano 23.7% [See Table V] Belaúnde's abstention from the elections proved to be an extremely well-calculated move.
"By keeping aloof from the military's shows, AP retained the status of democratic opposition to the revolution, a role that the APRA had now relinquished."[114] The APRA's prominent role in the Assembly had the effect of tainting the party's image as a collaborator with the military regime, ironic in light of the party's traditional animosity with the Peruvian armed forces. It was to play directly into the hands of Belaúnde in 1980.

The APRA had clearly suffered a loss of support during the Velasco years. By 1974, the military's policy of undermining traditional party support had affected APRA in terms of membership in labor confederations, student involvement, and migration of talented Apristas into the "revolutionary" camp. Although Haya did indeed make a major attempt to revamp the party ideology and structure, and established the Buro as a training school for new leaders, there was still a flight of youth, at least in the early years when the Velasco regime was at the height of its popularity. During the unpopular Morales Bermudez government, although the APRA student movement was active in opposition to the regime, the upper echelons of leadership were not. By the mid-seventies, the leadership was divided, with a majority favoring a co-existence with the military. Ironically, this coincided with the military's shift to the right. The emergence of the left as a force, meanwhile, made the APRA all the more acceptable to the military. "The party offered the new leadership support from the only non-communist political entity with mass organizations acceptable to the patron sector."[115] The approval of the
military was to help the APRA during the Constituent elections and Assembly, but was to play into the hands of the opposition in the 1980 elections.

While many elements of the left suffered repression or exile, the APRA was allowed relative freedom prior to the 1978 elections. This coincided with the absence of AP and the inability of the left to form a coherent front. The APRA's historical role as a major player in Peruvian politics also was a factor. The APRA, meanwhile, did conduct a significant effort to renovate the bases prior to the 1978 elections. Haya appointed Alan García, just returned from five years of studies in Europe, as secretary of organization – a post he had experience with through the Buro de Conjunciones – in order to renovate the party's bases. Haya was well aware of the need for energetic younger elements to participate in the campaign. At the time of the initiation of the campaign, Haya's illness began, and he even temporarily considered not participating in the Assembly. Upon his return from a trip to Venezuela and then to a Houston hospital, Haya arranged a rally on the 6 February 1978 and had García as one of the speakers along with him. The press began to mention Alan García as the new "cachorro" – "little pup" – of the APRA, the nickname of the deceased right-hand man to Haya, Manuel Seóane. In his post as secretary of organization, García was one of the Apristas closest to the bases, and the first to experience the growth of the bases of the left.[116]

"La campaña electoral para la Asamblea Constituyente lo hizo practicamente Victor Raúl."[117] At age 83 and in the
early stages of his cancer, Haya de la Torre managed an impressive electoral campaign. He travelled - tirelessly - over a great part of the country. He even broke with tradition and held the yearly Día de Fraternidad rally in Arequipa rather than in Trujillo that year. Each party was to present a list of 100 candidates in preferential order. There were to be no provincial or departmental elections - all were elected nationally. People were to vote for a party, and then mark one preferred candidate, in order to break the monopoly on choice held by the party lists. For the APRA, Haya was the number one candidate, Priale was second, Sanchez third, Carlos Manuel Cox fourth, and Andres Townsend fifth. Villanueva did not participate in the elections and remained in the post of general secretary. The APRA campaign focused on marking Haya as the preferential vote, in order to attain presidency of the Assembly. This was a practice copied by Bedoya of the PPC and del Prado of the Communists. As a result Haya won the most votes nationwide, followed by Luis Bedoya. The APRA won the majority in the elections. Thirty-seven of the one hundred Assembly delegates were Apristas, and twenty-five went to the PPC; the rest to diverse groups of the left, with the FOCEP front reflecting the most strength. Within the APRA, Sanchez replaced Priale as number two candidate, given the results of the preferential voting and subsequently became vice-president of the Assembly. Most of the Aprista old-guard was elected to the assembly as well. Of the members of the young generation promoted by Haya, Carlos Roca Cáceres and Alan García were elected to the Assembly and thus
initiated their political careers there. Carlos Roca was number eighteen by preferential voting and García number twenty-eight.[118]

After APRA easily attained a plurality in the 1978 elections, it seemed that the party was finally positioned for a rise to national power. Instead a variety of factors - its role as leader of the Constituent Assembly included - interacted to prevent it, resulting in the victory of the same man the military had overthrown in 1968. The APRA's role as leader in the Assembly placed it in a position of responsibility for the solution of several touchy issues. The leaders of the Assembly had to establish a relationship between the Assembly and the military, create an alliance to draft the constitution, and establish the bases of electoral competition for 1980. There was an inherent tension between maintaining the military's support and gaining that of a population increasingly adamant in its opposition to the military, as was demonstrated by the APRA's position vis-a-vis the general strikes. The left, meanwhile, pressed consistently for the Constituent Assembly to declare itself sovereign, thus declaring the military regime null and void. While Haya declared the Assembly the "`main power of the state,' thus proclaiming its autonomous existence, separate and equal to the military regime,'"[119], he was not willing to call for the regime's resignation and for the Assembly's sovereignty. His main goal was to guarantee the writing of a constitution and the 1980 elections. He was also reluctant to take control and therefore responsibility for the nation's deepening economic crisis and to give up the free
rein to organize and campaign given the APRA by the military. Thus the APRA often broke with the left and allied with the PPC in the Assembly.[120]

Haya's role in the Assembly was clearly a pivotal one, and after years of involvement in antagonistic political activity, displayed a concern for national unity. He did manage to play very well the moderate role between left and right, a role which rarely yields political rewards. However, Haya was nearly debilitated by lung cancer at the time, a condition that was not ignored by the opposition. Once when Haya called for an early close to one session due to his illness, for example, Luis Bedoya tried to play up the issue in the press.[121] The party meanwhile, refused to acknowledge publicly that Haya was sick, and up to his death proclaimed him as presidential candidate. Haya spent the last few months of the Assembly in the hospital in Houston, and was replaced in the Constituency by Sanchez. He signed the Constitution virtually on his death bed; he was so ill that he had to practice his signature several times prior to signing.

Due to Haya's illness, those closest to Haya began to play more prominent leadership roles: of the older generation, Sanchez and Townsend in the Congress and Villanueva in party activities; of the younger generation, García and Carlos Roca in the Assembly and Luis Alva Castro in party activities. Luis Alva Castro was given the job of organizing the Twelth Party Congress of 1979 by Haya from his hospital bed in Houston. While the old guard and the Sanchez-Prialé-Townsend wing of the party prevailed in the
Assembly, the more left-wing Villanueva wing prevailed at the party Congress, where there was more contact with the party bases.[122] This split was to become an increasingly debilitating factor, however, and was largely responsible for the party's debacle in the 1980 elections, and resulted in a formal split in 1981.

Haya was able to provide the Assembly with enough initial leadership - and Sanchez after him - to merge the divergent forces of right and left and draft a Constitution: a remarkable deed in an Assembly composed of both free-wheeling capitalists and Maoists and Trotskyites. The Constitution ushered in a much more presidential style of government, which gave the Executive a great deal of policymaking freedom, particularly in the economic arena. AP's Ulloa's charge that the APRA designed the Constitution with an eye on the Presidency is probably at least partly true. The left had more influence in provisions for constitutional rights and guarantees - a reflection of the Villanueva wing's desire to cooperate with the left. The private sector was favored by the Constitution's economic provisions which accepted freedom of industry and commerce, a market economy, and a plural business system with the emphasis on the private sector.[123]

The APRA's image, tainted by perceived and actual collaboration with the military and the right, was devastated by the passing away of its charismatic founder and leader on August 2, 1979. The eventual result was an irreconcilable split between the younger, more progressive wing of the party led by Armando Villanueva and the older
wing, associated with the party's drift right, led by Andres Townsend Escurra. The compromise which resulted - Villanueva as Presidential candidate and Townsend as Vice-Presidential candidate - neither ended the internal division nor provided a unified, organized party image, which was the party's traditional strength. Finally, not only was the APRA divided and without leadership, but also without a coherent program. The Velasco regime had already implemented the key points of APRA's traditional program. APRA, meanwhile, had vacillated all too often: after its initially strong anti-oligarchic stance, its "domestication" of the fifties and sixties cost it a great deal of credibility; finally it then attempted to ally with both the military and the right in the late seventies, neither of which ever fully trusted the party.

The Villanueva wing did manage to have enough influence on the party's program to incorporate some progressive elements: support for turning the newspapers over to worker's organizations; support for the SUTEP-led teacher's strike; a change in union leadership; ratification of the antiimperialist doctrine; rejection of transnational influence, totalitarian communism, and the reactionary right.[124] The party remained associated with the conservative old guard, however, an old guard which, without the charisma and stature of Haya de la Torre, had little popular appeal. In the same manner that the Velasco revolution spurred Haya in the seventies to change his strategy and focus on a new generation of leaders and the future of the party, the debacle of the 1980 election was to
spur the young leadership, primarily through the personality of Alan García in the eighties to rise up and take control.

Conclusion

The military years were clearly difficult ones for the APRA. Even the eventual recognition that Haya attained after the Constituent Assembly was marred by his illness and death, and the final acceptance of defeat: that the great Haya de la Torre would never become president. The old guard of leadership was too close to and too tied to these emotions to forge a new strategy that was attuned to Peru's new realities. Too long dominated by the single hand of Haya, they were neither emotionally prepared nor capable of adapting the party to the challenges facing it. It was to take a virtual revolution within the party ranks to do this, something that was carried out, at least superficially, by Alan García. Even García, however, would never attain the acceptance and stature held by Haya - both within and outside the party. The death of Haya, in many ways, marked the opening of a new era in Peruvian politics. The Belaúnde regime may have been a step back and temporary pause, but even that regime was marked by breaks with the past, such as the election of Alfonso Barrantes, a Marxist, as mayor of Lima. The left had entered Peruvian politics, and this, more than any other political issue, was something the APRA would have to contend with. The APRA no longer had a monopoly on a revolutionary platform and the political space it now had to share with the left. The social pressures and economic problems of the next decade were to be much more daunting than any that past generations of civilian politicians had
had to deal with. It would take a new generation of APRA leaders to adapt to these changes and challenges, and to be open to new ideas and strategies. After the military's "revolution", it seemed less and less likely that "solo el APRA salvará el Perú."
Chapter III
APRA 1980-1985: Renovation and Results

Part I

[Nor] would Peruvianists in 1979 or 1980 have expected that Belaunde would hand over power to an Aprista leader in 1985. Few commentators had any confidence that civilian government would persist into the second half of the decade. Nobody...forecast the resurgence of APRA...one well-known observer dismissed the APRA as 'a collection of tired old men and their memories.'[1]

Peru in 1979 was poised for transition to civilian rule after twelve years of military dictatorship. The Constituent Assembly had been, in many ways, Haya de la Torre's, and his party's, finest hour. Yet in 1980 the APRA was proven an "impotent giant" by its electoral debacle.[2] The party was debilitated by the death of its founder and leader: racked by internecine rifts, it was clearly unable to cope with the complex political, social, and economic challenges facing the nation as it made its transition to civilian rule. Peru had undergone substantive socio-economic change during the military docenio, and required innovative and coherent leadership. The APRA in 1980 was led by an old guard which was ill fit to govern the nation: they were both inexperienced due to Haya's singlehanded dominance for almost fifty years, and obsessed with internal power struggles rather than with issues of national concern. The inadequacy of the Apristas coupled with the fragmentation of the left led to the electorate's opting for the known persona of its past, Fernando Belaúnde.

Peruvian society, due to the military's "revolutionary" rhetoric and the politicization that it caused; to economic structural and demographic changes; and to the crucial role
that popular opposition - led by the unions - played in toppling the military government, had changed substantially since 1968. By late 1978, the number of trade unions, for example, had doubled. The unions were also able to tap the massive force of the unorganized workers in the pueblos jovenes,[3] whose numbers had increased dramatically during that decade, in their launching of three successive and highly successful national strikes. The success of spontaneous protest movements demonstrated a crucial characteristic of Peru in the late seventies - which persists today: the breach between state and society. This was a challenge facing all political parties, and one which the APRA, for a variety of reasons, was not in the least prepared to face, nor was the nascent and fragmented left. Belaunde, in part due to the advantage of having been the last civilian president, was temporarily able to fill a leadership vacuum, but failed in any way to narrow the gap between state and society.

The Belaúnde government's inability to steer the country away from the deep socioeconomic crisis that it was heading for was to the nation's detriment, but it did serve to provide the Peruvian Aprista Party with a historic opportunity to implement its decades old reformist platform. What the APRA was not prepared to do in 1980, it clearly seemed to be in 1985. The evolution that occurred within the party is crucial to explaining this change. In some ways, the APRA was a totally different party in 1985, due to a new leadership rank - led by Alan García - and a renovated platform. Other aspects of the party remained unchanged,
however, and the party was unable to shake off many of its regional, sectarian, and cult-like characteristics, as well as its tradition of incontrovertible faith in the party leader. These aspects were to re-surface and present obstacles to the APRA's ability to function as a governing party. The party's initial blind faith in García was to the severe detriment of both the party and the nation. The examination of the changes that occurred within the APRA from 1980 to 1985 and of the traits that remain is critical to the analysis of the APRA in power. The context in which these changes occurred - the second Belaúnde regime - must first be discussed, as the failures of that regime provided the APRA with both unique opportunities and formidable obstacles.

The Second Belaúnde Regime: The Context

Due to the virtual disintegration of the opposition, Fernando Belaúnde Terry won the 1980 presidential election riding on his old - and perhaps questionable - laurels. It was immediately evident, however, that they could not carry him through the challenges he was to face in his second term. Peru had undergone dramatic demographic, political, and economic changes since Belaúnde's first tenure of power. There were highly visible manifestations of these changes, such as the huge growth of squatter settlements in and around Lima; there was clearly a need for a government capable of responding to the growth of popular pressure in the face of half a decade of dramatically decreasing living standards. This need was demonstrated by the speed with which the Morales Bermudez regime was discredited by
widespread strike activity in the late seventies. By 1980
the Peruvian population was mobilized and politicized in a
way that it had never been before; at the same time it was
weary of the sharp and steady standard of living decrease it
had experienced during the Morales Bermudez years of
recession and austerity. Belaúde's electoral platform may
have been vague, but there was certainly a mandate for
change and initiative - a mandate that Belaunde proved
unable to fulfil.

The surge in popular mobilization that took place in
Peru was in part a function of the opening to civilian
politics, and in part a function of the socioeconomic trends
which had been a cause of the military's "revolution" in the
late sixties, and were then accelerated by its rhetoric.
Accompanying this surge was an economic base which was ill-
equipped to provide for the rapidly growing population and
the vast influx of migrants that sought opportunity and
employment. Until the late sixties the economy had suffered
from excess dependence on exports and foreign capital and a
concurrent lack of domestic entrepreneurial capacity. The
economy then was almost crippled by the military's
mismanaged attempts at industrial and agrarian reform, which
resulted in widespread capital flight, decreased
agricultural productivity, and excessive growth of the state
bureaucracy and of public sector debt. The second phase of
the military "docenio" was an attempt to stabilize the
inflation-ridden and debt-burdened economy with an IMF
inspired austerity program, which aimed to dismantle many of
the policies implemented in the first phase. The reforms and
the expectations raised by the reformist rhetoric, and then
the drastic shift to austerity measures, with their very
negative impact on real wage levels, had significant effects
in terms of popular mobilization.

The union movement's strength had grown substantially
with the attempts at state-led industrialization and the
failure of industrial reform to create harmonious worker-
management communities, and it grew increasingly willing to
wield that strength with the dramatic deterioration in real
wage levels that occurred in the mid and late seventies.
There had been a demographic explosion in Peru in the
sixties and seventies. The population had tripled from 1941
to 1981 and had become increasingly urban: 47% lived in
cities in 1961 as opposed to 65% in 1981. By the eighties
over 30% of the nation's population lived in Lima. The
industrial and agrarian reforms of the early seventies had,
in general, primarily affected privileged sectors of urban
labor and of the peasantry, leaving large sectors of the
population with raised expectations but in the same state of
poverty and marginalization. Meanwhile, although the reforms
had undermined the power of the old hacienda and mining
elites, a new "dominant" class had emerged, composed
primarily of private capital associated with the state and
transnational capital. In addition was the increasing
influence of "narco-traficantes" or drug traffickers.[4]
Control of the key economic sectors was concentrated either
in the hands of a small number of private interests or in
state monopolies or associated industries. The burgeoning
informal sector was the visible manifestation of the
economic structure's inadequacy. Political power, on the other hand, had become more disperse, as was demonstrated by the growth of the left and the election of Alfonso Barrantes - a Marxist - as mayor of Lima in 1983.

Peru in 1980 was by no means a stable society. The coalition that had supported Belaúnde was an uncertain one and the vote that had elected him one of desperation rather than of positive choice. Increasingly evident was the "desborde popular" - the overflow of demands created by demographic, political, and economic changes - that the state was incapable of addressing. The result was the broadening of the already existing gap between state and society,[5] which was demonstrated on the economic front by the vast growth of the informal sector, and on the social front in its most extreme form by the emergence in 1980 of Sendero Luminoso.

The government of Fernando Belaúnde Terry and his Acción Popular party was to prove incapable of bridging this gap between Peruvian society and its state. Instead the government increasingly projected an image of detachment and, unintentionally, of grandiose and irrelevant vision in the face of deepening social and economic crisis. The Belaúnde government lacked a concept of national development. Its economic strategy was an attempt to return to the nation's pre-1968 model of economic liberalism. On the political front, the government's approach was paternalistic and devoid of grass roots organization and activity - a void which was gradually filled up by the left and the APRA - at a time when political mobilization was
clearly on the rise. The result of the lack of government attention to and contact with the masses, particularly the urban poor, as the country entered the worst economic crisis in its modern history, was the widespread radicalization of the working class and the inhabitants of the pueblos jóvenes. This was demonstrated in November 1983 by the victory of Izquierda Unida in Lima, and by the emergence of support for Sendero Luminoso and the MRTA in some pueblos jóvenes. The government's continued inability to respond to popular sentiments led to the disastrous electoral performance of Acción Popular in the 1985 elections.

The Belaúnde government did inherit substantial constraints. In addition to the fragile economy and the demands of the newly mobilized sectors of the population, the government had to cope with the age-old yet ever present threat of military intervention and the very new and complex threat posed by the rise of Sendero. In 1980 the military left power discredited, yet they had a desire to maintain some control over the political process. This was evidenced by a warning that Morales Bermúdez privately made to a group of APRA leaders, as their internal struggles came increasingly into the public eye prior to the 1980 elections. "Una de las condiciones para volver a la vida civil dentro del criterio del ejército era que surgiése un partido fuerte y unido como había sido el APRA."[6] It is significant that despite the fact that the APRA's image was tainted as a collaborator with the armed forces, the military's tacit support prior to the elections seems to have shifted to Belaúnde.[7]
The military's strength vis-a-vis the new government was increased with the passing of a Mobilization Law nineteen days before the surrender of power to the Belaunde regime. The law was passed with no publicity in order to avoid civilian reaction. It enabled the military to expropriate or requisition companies, services, labor, and materials from all Peruvians or foreigners in the country at times of national emergency. These times included cases of "internal subversion and internal disasters."[8] The military maintained autonomy over its budget and arms transfers. Interventionist tendencies continued to exist among many officers and the military maintained a constant influence in all matters of national security and domestic order.[9] This influence was primarily evident in the counter-terrorism arena, where the government had no coherent policy in the face of an increasingly potent challenge from Sendero, and left no alternative other than default to the military, with the consequence of continuous and un-constrained human rights violations in the emergency zones.

Economic Policy - Crisis and Controversy

The government's economic strategy was an issue which generated increasing opposition among the population, in Congress, and within Acción Popular itself. Congressional opposition, despite the impressive gains made in November 1983 by opposition parties in the municipal elections, had very little effect on government policy as the executive had a great deal of freedom, especially in the economics sphere. The 1979 Constitution significantly strengthened the power
of the executive, and in particular allowed it to enact legislation without recourse to Congress on all decisions involving changes in government expenditure. "At a stroke this gave the executive almost complete autonomy in the enacting of government policy."[10] Belaúnde and his Cabinet were able to, largely by decree, impose an extremely controversial economic model for five years, causing a great deal of popular unrest and deteriorating standards of living as well as rifts within his own party and the Congress. The split within Acción Popular over economic policy mirrored the dispute that factionalized Congress between hardline Acción Popular personnel and PPC conservatives on the one hand, and the progressive wing of AP, Apristas, and Izquierda Unida deputees on the other. Belaúnde's drop in popularity was reflected in the results of the 1983 municipal elections. AP came in fifth place nationwide, with 15% of the vote, as opposed to the 35% it obtained in the 1980 municipal elections.[11] The opposition to Belaúnde's policies, at least as of 1983, was led in large part by none other than Alan García.

The neoliberal, export-based strategy met its nemesis in 1982 as the world prices for Peru's revenue producing mineral exports fell dramatically due to world recession, and the dreaded El Niño current prevented the success of another of Peru's main exports - the anchovy. The current also produced a series of devastating disasters in 1983; floods in the north of the country and severe drought in the south combined to severely curtail Peru's food production, necessitating substantial funds for food imports and
disaster relief. Meeting conditions for foreign creditors assumed a more crucial importance. At the same time, successive devaluations fueled an inflation rate in the triple digits from 1982-1985. As the adverse economic trends continued through 1983, the real growth rate fell to negative 12%. While there was a slight recovery in 1984, with 4% growth, by the middle of the next year the economy remained in deep crisis. In a developing nation such as Peru, with its desperate need for social infrastructure and its annual population growth rate of 2.6%,[12] the effects of such poor economic performance on per capita income and welfare were particularly damaging. The high inflation rate, coupled with the phasing out of most food subsidies in order to reduce the public sector deficit understandably created havoc for consumers, as even the prices of the cheapest available staple goods soared out of reach of the lowest-income groups. A promised food stamp program was never implemented, and the government's policies towards the urban poor were based on a self-help philosophy. Given the economic conditions at the time, their potential was remote at best.

The executive branch remained adamant in its adherence to its strategy and seemed virtually blind to criticism, even that which came from within its own ranks, such as from Central Bank president Richard Webb. This intransigent adherence to an obviously flawed economic policy fueled the support that Alan García and the APRA were to elicit for a heterodox economic model and a strong stance on the foreign debt issue.
The Belaúnde government did, to its credit, achieve some positive results in the social welfare arena, in education in particular. In both his terms Belaúnde placed a great deal of emphasis on education, and in the years 1980-1983 increased school enrollment by one million.[13] Yet this also led to an increase in social mobilization at a time that economic crisis was closing off opportunities.

Conclusion

The policies of the Belaúnde administration could be described by the Latin expression "mucho ruido y pocas nueces." There was no effort to buffer low-income groups from the impact of the unprecedented economic crisis. As the prices of basic commodities led the inflationary surge and there was an absence or cutting of social welfare policies, low-income groups - particularly the urban poor, who spend the highest proportion of their budgets on food - fared the worst of all. The skyrocketing food prices, meanwhile, did not serve to stimulate peasant agriculture. There was no attempt to guide pricing policy in favor of the products traditionally grown in the sierra; instead the market was dominated by imported food, which substantially increased with the administration's trade liberalization. When the bulk of the peasantry of the southern sierra, who were already living at the bare subsistence level, were faced with the devastating drought caused by the Niño current, many were threatened with near or total starvation, and conditions in the area were compared by observers as nearer to Fourth World than to Third World levels.[14] It is hardly surprising that Sendero, which launched its activity in the
southern sierra region, increased its violent activities significantly by the middle of Belaúnde's term.

The fact that the economic crisis was brought on by world recession and the El Niño current cannot serve as a total excuse for the poor record of the Belaúnde government; nor can the burden of external debt payments, as the regime, more often than not, was out of compliance with its creditors. There was both Congressional and popular support for change and for policies to buffer the poorest groups from bearing the brunt of the effects of the economic debacle. This was demonstrated by the results of the 1983 municipal elections. The government remained stubbornly locked into an export-oriented, liberal economic model, despite the severity of Peru's depression; the persistence of world recession and poor prospects for any short-term recovery.

Perhaps the most positive aspect about the Belaúnde era was that it created the political conditions for a reformist consensus. By thoroughly discrediting the center-right as a political option and neoliberalism as an economic one, the Belaúnde regime gave the García campaign the opportunity to propose a relatively radical reformist program virtually unopposed. It also placed the APRA in the position of being for the center and right the "mal menor", as the only other option was the more radical Izquierda Unida. In the short term, the APRA had much to gain politically from the failures of the Acción Popular government. The APRA's task in government, however, was made much more difficult by the extent to which economic degradation had created crisis in
Peruvian society. In economic terms, although the APRA inherited a depressed economy, it also received some advantages. It inherited a stabilized economy with acceptable levels of international reserves and a great deal of existing excess capacity. This facilitated the economic reactivation that the APRA implemented. Thus many aspects of the Belaúnde record placed the APRA party in the position of having no way to lead the nation but up. Finally, there is one major point to Belaúnde's credit: he was able, despite the severity of the crisis and the challenges confronting him, to hand over the reins of government to an elected successor; a phenomenon which had not occurred in Peru for over forty years.
Part II
The Evolution of the APRA: and the Rise of Alan García

It is impossible to separate the 1985 victory of the APRA party from the role played by its charismatic leader, Alan García Pérez. Under the leadership of García the party attained the presidency for the first time in its sixty year history, and a working majority in the Congress as well. This outcome was the result of a decade of political, economic, and social trends, but was also inextricably linked to the emergence of García as the party's leader in late 1982. García's rise to power reflected changes both within the APRA party, and in Peru's socioeconomic and political structure in general. García's rapid rise demonstrates the increased strength of the social and political forces that supported him. At the same time, the success of yet another charismatic leader with a populist orientation also exposed age-old continuities in the nation's political culture. The thirty-six year old president's meteoric progression from virtual anonymity in 1982 to overwhelming victory on a national scale in 1985 - in which he won more votes than all the other candidates together - was indeed astounding. This victory was a function of García's own personality, of the renewed image that the APRA was able to present, and of the absence of political alternatives acceptable to the center and right.

The evolution that the APRA party underwent in the early eighties had its roots in the ideological challenges posed by the military's "revolution", and the ensuing renovation process that resulted in the party. While the
APRA old guard squandered the party's political opportunities in 1980 with its obsession with internecine struggles, the generation of young leaders that had been fostered by Haya during the docenio began to plan its rise to power and the revamping of the party's image. The 1980 electoral debacle provided this generation with the impetus to assert itself in the leadership of the party.

The phenomenon of Velasquismo: the reformist rhetoric, the institutional change, and most important the increased politicization and raised expectations, posed an ideological challenge to all parties. In the face of this challenge and Haya's death in 1979, the weaknesses of the APRA became evident. By 1980, despite their prominent role in the Constituent Assembly, and in part because of it - their cooperation with the military and perceived collusion with the right - the APRA had a jaded image. The party's image had been damaged in the fifties and sixties due to the "convivencia", which had cost it a generation of leaders. The party was forced to acknowledge its internal crisis when the military implemented a program virtually identical to the original APRA one. At the time the party lost some key young technocrats who either became disillusioned, or perceived better opportunities and left the party to join the planning staff of the military government. Finally Haya's illness and the leadership's involvement in the Constituent Assembly resulted in the neglect of the party's program and its relation to changed political, economic, and social realities. In the interim, Haya's efforts to renovate the party had focused on a select group of young leaders,
but had done little to forge the party's links with the rest of society. These trends led to the party's loss of influence in unions and universities. The party functioned in the 1980 elections as an electoral machine that was devoid of substance.[15]

At the XII Party Congress in August 1979, just weeks after Haya's death, there was no debate about the party's program. The party was totally involved in deciding on a candidate, as Haya had remained the official choice until his death.[16] The two obvious choices were Andres Townsend and Armando Villanueva, the party leaders who had received the most publicity other than Haya in the past three years.[17] Townsend was the superior intellectual and orator, but his conservative bent made him less attractive to the party youth. Villanueva, who had been in charge of party affairs during the Constituent Assembly, leaned more towards the left, but his violent, "búfalo" reputation made him less acceptable to those outside the party. The contest between the two - who had been intimate [18] - was a highly personalistic one, and was acerbic, bitter, and often violent. In part this was a function of Haya's failure to prepare for his successor, or at least establish procedural rules. As Townsend admitted, the rules were not clear and neither side paid them much attention.[19] After much controversy, Villanueva emerged as presidential candidate and Townsend - after initially refusing the post - as vice-presidential candidate. The party had little to offer the electorate other than the campaign song "El APRA es el Camino" and an obvious leadership void.
After the elections the party split irreconcilably into an "armandista wing", which was younger and more progressive, and was led by León de Vivero, Carlos Enrique Melgar, and Luis Negreiros; and an "andresista" wing, supported by the key old guard members: Luis Alberto Sanchez and Ramiro Prialé. Symbolic of APRA's predicament at the time was that the traditional celebration of Haya's birthday in February of 1981, the Día de Fraternidad, was celebrated in two competing rallies - Townsend's in the Plaza San Martin and Villanueva's in the party headquarters - and dubbed the "Noche del Fratricídio". Townsend had been expelled from the party in January 1981. This split was so deep that it continues to play a role among the provincial militants today. When Townsend formed his Bases Hayistas party, he lost key supporters such as Sanchez, for whom an alternative to the APRA was unthinkable.

The split had two results. The first was to disrupt the party from top to bottom and expose the absence of leadership since Haya's death. The party leaders were more concerned with internecine struggles than with the social and economic crisis the nation was facing. The second result was to open a space for the rise of the young generation that was determined to renovate the party's image and focus its attention on issues of national importance. Although the subsequent meteoric rise of Alan García to party and national prominence seemed unexpected, the basis had been laid by Haya in the seventies, as Chapter II demonstrates.

Due to the exodus of young militants and leaders during the convivencia, there was practically an entire generation
missing in the APRA leadership. There was a split with the first and generally more conservative being in their mid-fifties or older, and the next group being in their twenties and early thirties.[23] It was this group that was sympathetic to the reformist attempts of the Velasco government and to whom Haya turned to build a foundation for new leadership, in part as a means to avoid a challenge to his own predominance from the older group.

Haya had hand-picked proteges in this generation, as is demonstrated by his choosing Garcia to speak at the January 1978 rally and appointing him Secretary of Organization, a post key to power in the party.[24] He gave Luis Alva Castro responsibility in party matters, such as organizing the XII Party Congress in Trujillo. [25] Competition for Haya's attention may have been one of the roots of the intense rivalry which later surfaced between Garcia and Alva Castro.

Thus the new generation of APRA leadership did not rise out of nowhere, and the Andres/Armando split, although it temporarily debilitated the party, gave the youth the opportunity to assert themselves. The split eliminated the older generation of leaders: after Villanueva's electoral debacle, he was tainted politically, and Townsend would have been the logical candidate for 1985.[26] Prior to the 1982 XIV Party Congress, in which a new secretary general was to be elected, there was a bit of subversive planning. Several meetings were held at the home of Cesar Garrido Lecca which involved Sanchez, Garcia, and Alva Castro, and from which Villanueva was explicitly excluded. At these meetings the plans for Garcia, then a deputy from Lima, to vie for the
post of general secretary and then as candidate for the presidency purportedly were cemented.[27] This was resented by Villanueva, who spent several months in Europe in a sort of self-imposed exile, although he did grudgingly support Garcia once he was chosen.[28] At the time of the Congress these plans came to fruition through the combined support of a few key old guard members and of the rank and file, who had been influenced by the reformist rhetoric of the Velasco years, and were tired of an inactive CEN and internal squabbles still smoldering after the Villanueva-Townsend split. Garcia's rise was also facilitated by the commitment of Fernando Leon de Vivero, the secretary general at the time, to the party's emerging intact from the transition process.[29]

While these trends seem more clear with the benefit of hindsight, at the time of the Congress the likely victor was thought to be either Guillermo Larco Cox or Carlos Enrique Melgar, younger members of the old guard. Both were of the forties and fifties generation which was logically the next phase of APRA leadership. Larco Cox fell ill and thus Carlos Melgar had been heavily favored at the start of the congress. He had the backing of many of the key "dirigentes" of the party: the Celula Parlamentaria Aprista in private had lent their support, as had the Secretary General, Leon de Vivero; the bulk of the Villanueva wing and the left-wing or "izquierda aprista" of Luis Negreiros, Carlos Roca, and Javier Villa Riestra also backed him. Alan Garcia was not considered a major challenge by the bulk of the Melgar supporters.[30]
García, meanwhile, had two formidable factors in his favor which led to his attaining the post. The first was a product of his background and of negotiating skill. He had the support of one of the oldest and most respected Apristas, Luis Alberto Sanchez, who also happened to be his godfather. He was able to elicit the support of the influential mayor of Trujillo, Jorge Torres Vallejo, and of Luis Felipe de las Casas, a renowned party member who had constantly questioned Haya's dubious pacts and alliances. Garcia also had the guarded support of Luis Alva Castro, who had united the party's public administration technicians and the non-leftist progressives around a lengthy and well-accepted project: a Commission for the Government Plan of APRA. Alva Castro was well-respected as a "tecnico" within the party. García promised, and delivered, prestigious posts: de las Casas the secretariat of organization, Torres Vallejo the sub-secretary general, Sanchez a powerful post as president of a new political commission which was to wield a great deal of weight in the party's future planning.[31]

Finally, García had excellent credentials. His career had been totally devoted to APRA. He was born into the party in May 1949. Both his parents were Apristas and his father, who had worked with de las Casas in clandestine organizational activities, was imprisoned for political reasons for the first five years of Alan's life. Alan García joined the APRA youth at age 11. In 1972 he went to Europe to study in Spain with, among others, Franco's former minister Fraga, whose neocorporatist theory of society
apparently impressed García. Haya had arranged for him to study with a prominent "Peruvianist" at the Sorbonne, Francois Bourricaud. His former professor described him as not an intellectual, but clever and very astute, and determined to succeed in politics.[32] He came back to work for the party in 1977. Haya appointed him secretary of organization and second-hand man during the Constituent Assembly years and pushed him into the public eye. He supported Villanueva's candidacy in 1980, and had remained aloof from internal party squabbles since then. He was also, unlike many other high level Apristas at the time, who had been implicated in the highly publicized "Caso Langberg", totally free of links to the drug traffic. Garcia developed, from the late seventies onwards, from an "introvert"[33] and "cualquier joven del APRA"[34] into a gifted orator and skilled politician. He was determined early on to be president.[35]

Garcia's own record, and the support that he had from the best and the brightest of the Aprista leadership - those whose backgrounds were free of corruption or violence - led to the second and most important factor in his favor: the wide degree of support he had among the aprista delegates - the bases of the party - the majority of whom were younger and much more progressive than the Melgar and Cox generation. This "masa aprista" and the weight of its vote was overlooked by many of the dirigentes of the party. This younger generation sought a united party, without links to external forces or parties. They resented much of the older leadership's record of collusion and alliances with the
right as well as the Villanueva and Roca wing's courting of the left, and in particular the implications of some of the leadership's links with the drug traffic.[36] They were interested in starting anew and breaking with the party's past history of violence and fanaticism - its reputation as "matones' or instigators of 'golpes'."[37]

Alan García fit in well with this new generation. Since the Villanueva-Townsend split, he had strategically refrained from taking sides in internal party politics; an alternative to "andresismo" or "armandismo" was emerging: "alanismo"[38]. García made a definitive effort to distance himself from the left as well as the right. The creation of a new party image was central to the aims and campaign of García, as it was to the new generation that he represented. Soon after his election at the Congress as Secretary General, García was elected presidential candidate with 96% of internal votes[39], and announced his candidacy in Ayacucho in August of 1983.[40]

Campaign and Elections: 1983-1985

The emergence of a new generation of Aprista leaders was necessary before the party could shed its decades-old image of violence and fanaticism. García's talent was to exorcise this past.[41]

García's and the party's strategy was to open up the party to new sectors and regions. Their primary focus was the non-aprista middle class sectors: those who wanted social change but feared the Marxist left in general. On the economic front they focused on pragmatism and technical capacity to dispel their image of mediocrity, while still presenting an image of social conscience. Alva Castro's group was instrumental in this arena. The party recognized
and attempted to capitalize on the emergence of a new young working class which had a higher level of education, and was primarily concentrated in the dynamic industrial sectors — those which were not a part of the traditional Aprista trade unions.[42]

García had learned from the failures of Villanueva and from the effective campaign style of Belaúnde.[43] His opening up of the party even involved public criticism of the old guard and the dropping of traditional APRA symbolism. The left-handed salute — which was labelled by opponents as reminiscent of fascism — was dropped, and the Aprista "marsellaise" was replaced as a campaign song with the nationally known waltz "Mi Peru". For the first time the party was not insisting that "solo el APRA salvará el Peru"[44] and instead promising that García's "compromiso es con todos los peruanos." Yet the removal of traditional symbols was not without substantial resentment by many in the party.[45]

The strategy was highly successful. The November 1983 municipal elections proved a major turnaround for the APRA, which was the overwhelming winner nationwide [see Table VI], followed by Izquierda Unida, which won the mayoralty of Lima. The governing Acción Popular party suffered a resounding defeat. The November 1983 results were first and foremost an overwhelming rejection of the AP's economic policies. The left and the APRA together took 63% of Lima's vote versus the 31% obtained by the AP together with its coalition partner the PPC. This contrasts sharply with the 40% won by AP alone in 1980. The AP won only one provincial
city: Tarma, while the APRA dominated nationwide. Alfonso Barrantes of the Izquierda Unida, meanwhile, with 35% of the vote became the first elected Marxist mayor in a South American capital.[46]

García quickly cultivated the role of leader of the opposition. When Barrantes defeated the APRA's 1983 Lima candidate Alfredo Barnechea, García re-took the initiative the next month with a highly publicized "open letter" to Belaúnde, protesting the social costs of his economic policies.[47] In April of that year, García had personally delivered CONAPLAN's criticisms of the regime's political economy to the presidential palace.[48] García easily captured the party's presidential nomination and by 1984 the thirty-five year old whose experience was limited to only one term in Congress had become by far the most favored candidate. [49] García's performance in Congress had not been particularly noteworthy;[50] in 1984 he took a leave of absence in order to pursue the campaign.[51]

While APRA no doubt capitalized on the misfortune and ineptitude of the second Belaúnde administration, its appeal to non-traditional bases of support was also clearly working. The party made substantive efforts in non-traditional regions, which was reflected in the 1983 and 1985 electoral results. García and his team placed special emphasis on getting the support of non-party sympathisers, particularly from the middle class. They aimed to dispel the APRA's image as a closed, sectarian, and violent organization. Key to the party's strategy of "opening up" was the recruiting of non-apristas in forming the party's
government plan and in the setting up, outside the traditional party structure, of Civic Communities to support the García candidacy.[52] This included what Alva Castro called a "national consensus" with other political forces, including the armed forces and the Church,[53] to confront such pressing national problems as Sendero. As early as March of 1982, CONAPLAN held meetings with representatives of the armed forces, including former Velasquistas such as Mercado Jarrin, and other outside experts like Central Bank President Webb.[54]

On the economic front, García's team tried to display a pragmatic and technical capacity. They called for cuts in defense spending and a halt to the giant investment projects of the Belaúnde government and instead suggested smaller, short-term, labor-intensive projects. The focus on the technical was intended to dispel a reputation for mediocrity among the APRA ranks due to Haya's single-handed dominance of the party's ideology and program, and the further detriment to leadership development caused by past persecution of apristas. They were not able to overcome that image totally. Yet at the same time: "They do have a certain social consciousness that Ulloa's intellectually much more brilliant team didn't have.'"[55]

Alan García's personality and beliefs had a definite influence on his campaign and its successful outcome. He seemed to be, above and beyond his charisma, a pragmatist. As early as 1980 he was determined to solve the leadership crisis afflicting his party, and soon began tactically planning for 1985. His book Un Futuro Diferente, published
in 1982, combined the influence of Haya de la Torre and Aprismo with a pragmatic appeal to the emerging middle sectors whose support he and the younger aprista generation were trying to garner. His focus was clearly on maintaining a serious and capable image without losing ties to APRA's traditional revolutionary vision.

'La revolución es por eso una ciencia colectiva. El aprismo, como todo pensamiento, encontró en sus inicios la misma alternativa. O la utopía conjunto las ideas; o la esencia de lo concreto, la realidad de lo posible. Escogió lo segundo sin abandonar lo primero...'[56]

The cultivation of image was critical to García's political behaviour. According to Francois Bourricaud, a former university professor of García's who has consulted with him regularly since 1985, García believed that in Peru people have difficulty differentiating between good and bad governments - they are easily swayed by the image projected.[57] García's future behaviour in office, such as at the time of the bank nationalizations, was to lend support to this interpretation. His training, which was rich in philosophy and theory, and devoid of practical economics, accentuated that perspective. During the campaign he stated: "Hegel dijo que la apariencia es también una realidad, que no hay distinción entre la forma y el fondo pues toda forma parte de una sola entidad."[58] His campaign relied heavily on the professional packaging of the personality - the image - of Alan García.[59]

Like Haya de la Torre, García stretched various ideologies to fit his needs. Politically he professed to be a democratic socialist, based on the model of Spain's Felipe Gonzalez. He began his campaign copying Haya's gestures, and
then cautiously moved towards his own style and message to "all Peruvians" and redefinition of Aprismo in modern social democratic terms: offering change without radicalism. On the economic front, he dismissed the debate over the difference between the state-capitalist and socialist stages of Peru's development that Haya had written about in 1931. He also dismissed an early claim of Haya's that anti-imperialism was anti-capitalism. At least initially, Garcia was aware of the costs of alienating the nation's entrepreneurial sectors and the large part of the middle class whose fortunes were tied in with those sectors, and he was trying to dispel their traditional fear of the APRA. He insisted that the party was not "statist" and would not nationalize private banks or operations of foreign oil companies and that it would sell off any superfluous state industries. Finally, he spoke of a social pact with private industry. "The history of Latin America is filled with the blood of those who tried to alter the system too energetically and too quickly." His pragmatic approach, his dismissal of politically dangerous polemic debates, and his vocal commitment to change through electoral and legislative rather than radical means were of great appeal to the new aprista generation which was tired of debates over "which of Haya's books was right" and were much more interested on rebuilding their party's bases of support: "primero ganemos, después discutimos."

Although García's campaign made a point of building support outside the party, he also clearly benefited from being affiliated with the APRA. His rapid rise to national
renown was in part due to his heading Peru's longest lasting and most famous political party. He also benefitted from his legacy as right-hand man to Haya, and it was no accident that he began his campaign imitating Haya's style. Finally, despite his own distinct beliefs and the strategy of opening up the party, the crux of the campaign theme still rested on the traditional APRA ideology and legacy.

He struck a number of responsive themes in the presidential campaign—integration of the Indian population, an emphasis on agricultural development, decentralization of the size and scope of the national government, and an offer of hope to the country's poor. The campaign promises were part and parcel of APRA's program since the 1920's.[65]

The success of the APRA campaign is attributable to García's and the "new" Apristas' ability to perceive the changes which had occurred in Peruvian society and to provide a coherent political response. The rise of the electoral left in Peru since 1978, following a series of strikes led by Communist unions which were a major force in toppling the military government, pointed to an increasing radicalization of the working class in Peru. The traditional Aprista union base alone could clearly not capture this momentum. The radicalization was in part a function of the prevalence on a national level of reformist ideology, and then the subsequent retrenchment of reforms. It was also a function of demographic changes. While the working class of the fifties and sixties was composed to a large extent of recent migrants, in the seventies and eighties it was increasingly composed of the children of migrants who had been exposed to higher levels of education and to a stronger union movement, and consequently had greater expectations.
The heightening of expectations in the face of retrenchment of reforms in the late seventies and the economic debacle of the eighties, led to increased radicalization. These groups, particularly the youth of the working class, by the eighties began to play an increasingly important role in society: their presence became more prevalent in unions, parties, and neighborhood organizations,[66] and was reflected in the plethora of Marxist parties that sprang up with the political opening.

This might explain, for example, the establishment in the Partido Aprista...of a new set of leaders who...reformulated the party's policies and its relations with society and succeeded in creating a new image which produced the popular support and decisive triumph of April 1985.[67]

Alan Garcia recognized the need to appeal to these radicalized sectors without alienating his primary support base in the middle class. His confrontational rhetoric on the debt issue, for example, was intended for internal consumption. His rhetoric was deliberately vague. In retrospect the government's actual policies were much more radical than its campaign rhetoric. On the debt issue, an uncertain 20 to 25% limit was spoken of, and not until the inauguration did the more radical 10% figure emerge. Garcia could afford to be vague because of his favored status among the candidates in the race, because of his position as the head of APRA, and because of a traditional focus in Peruvian politics on personality and leadership rather than specific policy. It is striking that the APRA put forth no concrete policy proposals until after Garcia's April 1985 election. Their strategy of "primero ganemos, depues discutimos", which focused on a pragmatic, non-dogmatic approach; on the
extension of grass-roots organization; and on García's charisma, was extraordinarily successful.

It was the left and not the APRA that was to suffer from an image problem. Izquierda Unida's campaign platform was much more specific, and unlike both AP and APRA, it spelled out a detailed program with specific policy proposals. IU's proposals included the nationalization of Southern Peru Copper, the reversing of oil contracts with Occidental and Belco, a selective moratorium on debt, and nationalization of the nation's banks.[68] IU's candidate, Alfonso Barrantes, a former apriista, represented the more moderate aspects of the coalition, and in the minority, opposed bank nationalization and condemned Sendero Luminoso. While he supported a policy of national consensus with whomever attained power, many IU members deemed this an electorally risky strategy. They felt that while business leaders might be responsive to such rhetoric coming from the APRA, they never would accept it from the left. "If the left stops being the left, it risks losing its own base of support."[69] IU continued to suffer from internal divisions due to the diversity of its coalition, which extends from Maoists and Trotskyites to non-Marxists, yet it was still able to appeal to substantial portions of the population, in particular the Lima pueblos jóvenes and the sierra. Its bases in those areas were unchallenged until 1985. The party was able to hold a firm second place in almost every department. Given that the front was formed only in 1981, and the traditional military and elite opposition to any
form of Marxism, its electoral success was indeed remarkable.

It could not, however, overcome the challenge posed by a highly organized and pragmatically oriented APRA and the charismatic persona of Alan García. APRA's victory in 1985 seemed to prove that the left was not yet strong enough to obtain national power, and that the Peruvian political spectrum still leaned toward the center. The APRA was very careful in its campaign rhetoric not to diverge too far from the center, a tactic which paid off handsomely.
The 1985 Elections

In the May 1985 elections, APRA's García won more votes than all the other candidates together. He captured over 47% of the national vote, but for the first time the figure requiring a run-off election was raised from 35 to 50%. Therefore, despite the fact that Belaúnde was elected by 28.4% of the electorate versus García's 43.9% - including null and blank votes - a run-off was required by the Constitution.[70] The run-off was avoided as Barrantes, the second-place candidate with 22% of the votes, declined to run. He declined as he felt that the IU had no chance of winning and because he feared further violence between IU and APRA militants, as clashes had occurred prior to the election.[71] In short, he felt that neither his party nor Peruvian democracy had anything to gain from a second round of voting, as the results were already clear. The left was to continue to play a vital role in the nation's politics, however.

There were no other significant challenges to García in the 1985 elections. AP's Alva obtained only 6.4% of the vote and the PPC's Bedoya only 12.2%. [See Table VI] APRA won on a platform which emphasized party and national unity. In the last two weeks of the campaign the party reigned in the campaigns of individual congressmen to add to the image of unity behind García. This contrasted sharply with the "cacophonic scores of names, symbols, and numbers from the other parties."[72]

APRA also made great headway in non-APRA regions: the Lima pueblos jóvenes, Cuzco and Puno, and the selva. This
reflected García's decision to devote much of his campaigning time to these regions and to create a much more open image for the party. Also reflecting this is the unprecedented 91% of the electorate which voted in the elections: a stark contrast with 1980. [73] Of particular interest is the Ayacucho region, where null and blank voting was 50% in 1980, possibly to some extent due to Sendero's efforts to disrupt voting. In 1985 this rate fell drastically, and García took the region with 62% of the vote. [74] While APRA under Haya was a very regional party, primarily northern based, "with Alan it has penetrated the mysterious heart of the Andes." [75] The election results of 1983-1985 demonstrate the step "back" that the country took by re-electing Belaúnde and Acción Popular; and the lessons learned and implemented by the other parties during that time, resulting in the 1983 successes of APRA and IU, and finally in the 1985 APRA victory. The results point to a substantial decline in the power of the right, and to the institutionalization of the left as a force to be reckoned with in Peruvian politics. However they also pointed to a preference among voters for parties closer to the center rather than for the Marxist left. The explanations for this are indeed varied and complex. There was most likely a perception, as was expressed by Barrantes, that the Peruvian military and probably most business interests, would not tolerate a Marxist government. There was also the traditional appeal of the APRA: one of a united, organized, uniquely Peruvian party with a strong leader, which most likely inspires voter
sentiment more than IU's conglomerate of blocs with competing ideologies, united only by the persona of Barrantes. These factors were to the APRA's advantage.

The image of strength and activism was key to APRA's success. García's focus on the pragmatic and possible and his following through on words with rapid action comprised a welcome change from the grandiose visions and inactivity in the face of disaster of the second Belaúnde administration. The contrast that García was able to provide to Belaúnde was also a factor in his success, both in the campaign and his first years in office.

En Palacio de Gobierno hemos pasado del estado versallesco de Fernando Belaúnde, a otro muy propio a Lima 1985. Las puertas de Palacio han sido abiertas a los dirigentes de los sectores populares; el presidente suele asomar el balcón o a la puerta; conversa con la gente, que ha empezado a esperarlo a las calles...[76]

García's bold direct contact with the people during the campaign continued through frequent "balconazos" after his inauguration; his initial avoidance of polemical debates yet willingness to challenge politically dangerous issues - such as his calling organized labor privileged, his stance on the debt, and his cutting of the military budget; and finally his base in the legacy of the revolutionary image of APRA, were all fundamental to his initial success. García, through the balconazos, was also able to continue a practice of Haya de la Torre's: that of using the tradition of street protests to organize mass demonstrations in his favor. This tradition in Peru was perhaps more prevalent and effective than that of organized labor, at least until the late seventies, for instigating popular sentiment and involvement.[77] Most important, perhaps, was his ability to
take on a seemingly desperate political and economic situation using new ideas which sprang from a young generation of both apristas and non-apristas. García's basis in this generation was responsible for his ability to perceive the nation's desire for change and action. "In the end it was his self-assured enthusiasm, drumming in the message that Peru was not condemned to failure, that made the difference."

From Campaign to Government: The Obstacles

While García's rapid rise to power can be explained with relative ease, there were some fundamental issues which it did not resolve, and which increasingly became obstacles in government, particularly after García's initial popularity was eroded. While the APRA machinery was well suited for running an effective political campaign, it was evident early on that it was not as suited for the tasks of democratic government. The relationship between García and the APRA leadership and party mechanism was a changing one and often the source of controversy. The eclectic campaign rhetoric used by García and the party that was able to appeal across diverse social sectors became much more controversial when it was developed into actual policies directed at specific interest groups. These tensions were exacerbated by the incompetent manner in which policies were often implemented. Two traditional characteristics of Peruvian politics were still evident: the APRA's lack of experience with democratic government and record of violence; and the dominance of a populist leader whose personal ambitions preclude the development of lasting,
competitive political parties which work to integrate the population into a participatory system. The APRA's lack of skill and experience, and García's own behaviour were to demonstrate that these traits predominated, and that the renovation that the APRA party had undergone was one of image rather than substance. Such a renovation was to prove much more effective for a political campaign than for the task of governing.

García aroused a great deal of animosity within the party by approaching the government with his own personal team of técnicos and intellectuals - which had been part and parcel of his campaign - and not extending government posts to party militants. The approach is in part due to García's autocratic, exclusionary approach to decisionmaking and in part to the prevalent mediocrity within the ranks of APRA. Militants of the party had no practical experience with issues of national significance, and there was a shortage of talent within their ranks. The Aprista minister of Energy and Mines, Wilfred Huaita stated: "los técnicos no se encuentran en el APRA. Seamos sinceros con nosotros mismos: no nos hemos preparado para gobernar."[79] The party remained much more an electoral machine than a resource base for government. Thus García surrounded himself with his own team: Luis Gonzales Posada, who became justice minister; Javier Tantalean, who became chief of the National Planning Institute; and Hector Delgado Parker.[80] Alva Castro, who had his own team of técnicos, was to play a key role as premier. The most important of the old guard were to be awarded attractive parliamentary posts. Meanwhile the rank
and file "compañeros" were to become increasingly bitter as they waited for a "convocatoria" which never arrived.

More than anything else, the transition from campaign to government exposed the complex and heterogeneous nature of the "renovated" APRA.

Yo compare un día al APRA con la procesión del Señor de los Milagros, donde ciertamente hay de todo: beatos y sirverguenzas, liberales y totalitarios, búfalos y palomas. El APRA es el Perú ...El verdadero liberal no es aquel que no siente el impulso de avasallar a su contrincante sino quien sabe dominar ese impulso en función de un ideal superior. Conozco muchos apristas democráticos y presumo que hay otros sin muchas ganas de serlo.[81]

The image of unity and capability that succeeded in the electoral contest, did not hold up in the much more difficult test of being in government. García's own image was soon tarnished, as his tendency to attribute image more importance than action - "el imagen mas que el hecho" - was to prove disastrous when translated into policy. Meanwhile, the diversity which characterizes the modern APRA, as well as an overall shortage of skilled personnel, was also to have effects on the party's performance. At the macro level, party influence was initially minimal, yet it increased precisely at the time that political and economic crisis was most acute. The absence of trained and capable leaders was to prove disastrous. At the micro level - in the implementation of programs such as the PAIT and the Rimanacuy - the party's authoritarian and sectarian nature were frighteningly evident. The party youth, meanwhile, frustrated with the pace of reforms, grew increasingly radicalized. In part as a response to radical sentiments, and in part to inconsistencies of his own, García - after an
initial period of remarkably successful consensus building - attempted to project two images: one of the confrontational revolutionary and the other of the pragmatic reformer, a strategy which cost him credibility in all political camps.

The issue of García's own ambitions and the nature of his leadership was to prove critical for the fate of the APRA and for Peru. García's commitment to democratic reform was to prove a shallow one. While Haya was often accused of using the APRA as a vehicle for his own personal ambitions, García's tendency to attempt to govern singlehandedly, his failure to delegate responsibility, and his lack of tolerance for dissent among his close circle of advisors were all evident from the start. García was indeed a "populist" of sorts, and made no attempts to improve administrative capacity, nor to solidify the APRA's political base. While the APRA initially took advantage of García's popularity to build up its bases of support, this strategy was inherently limited. The prevalence of García's personal political ambitions was to expose the extent to which the party's renovation had been one of image alone - effective for the political campaign, but not for the difficult tasks of government. Ultimately it was disastrous for both his nation and his party.

His youth and energy captured the country's imagination during his long months of campaigning. But he also exuded the paternalism of a natural populist and projected the strong leadership - some would even say the authoritarian streak - that many Peruvians are seeking. At times the candidate seemed more important than his party, his personality more important than his platform.[82]

Conclusion
When the APRA took over in July 1985, Peru - its economy, its society, and its polity - were in deep crisis. The living standards of the population had deteriorated substantially since 1973. Capital flight was on the rise; criminal kidnappings and urban and rural terrorism had become daily occurrences; and finally Sendero Luminoso had become a genuine threat to national security and stability, with thousands victimized in the "dirty war" between the military and Sendero. Peru was a country on the brink of disaster. APRA, under the charismatic leadership of Alan García and through good grass-roots organization, pragmatic campaigning, and an effort to involve the entire nation in the political process - especially regions neglected in the past - capitalized on both the sense of crisis and the desperate search for an alternative to the status quo.

The APRA thus had both a historic opportunity and a daunting challenge. The party had a very strong political mandate and base of support and an extremely popular leader. Yet the APRA government still had to contend with the age-old characteristics of its own party which were particularly prevalent among the rank and file and at the regional levels. The party's renovation and new progressive bent had by no means permeated all levels. The party had an impressive challenge in terms of governing the country. Peru's society, polity, and economy had been buffeted by years of military dictatorship and then severe economic crisis. Its political institutions were very young and its state concurrently underdeveloped and over-bureaucratized. Yet with the absence of a genuine renovation of party
leadership and doctrine, the party's - and the nation's - fates were to a large extent to be determined by the whims of the popular - and inexperienced - Alan García. An analysis of APRA's ability, in the face of these obstacles, to translate its strong mandate and message of hope into performance and its capacity to act as a genuine reformist force in the nation is the subject of the next section.
PART II:
The APRA in Power
Chapter IV
From Unprecedented Consensus
to Policy Collapse

Hay un camino de solución al problema histórico de nuestra sociedad. Hay un medio por el que superará la pobreza y la injusticia...el futuro diferente...Es el Aprismo que se ratifica en las verdades permanentes que anunciaron en 1924 la necesidad de una gran transformación. [Alan García Perez, El Futuro Diferente]

Alan García comenzó su tarea presidencial a los 36 años, sin mucha práctica administrativa. Había sido un activista tenaz y lucido, lo cual enseña a manejar masas pero no oficinas ni talleres...Era natural su impetu inicial, inspirado fundamentalmente en un largo ejercicio ideológico... [Luis Alberto Sánchez, Testimonio Personal, Tomo VI]

Introduction

Alan García and the APRA took power in July of 1985 amidst high expectations and a great deal of uncertainty. The nation's oldest political party - more than any other political force the subject of intense animosities and loyalties - had finally reached its goal after sixty years in opposition. At its helm was an eloquent and charismatic leader - the youngest President in the nation's history - and supporting him was the largest electoral margin of any elected president of Peru. For the past decade the nation had been buffeted by the most acute economic crisis in its modern history, and since the transition to democracy in 1980, by the brutal insurgent activities of Sendero Luminoso. Peru's population was on average younger, less well off, more urban, and far more politicized than it had been a decade before. This population was the poorest in South America - with the exception of Bolivia's and Paraguay's - and at the same time one of the most
politicized. Since 1980 the left in Peru had the strongest electoral performance on the continent, and the Izquierda Unida, a coalition of Marxist, Maoist, and Trotskyite parties was to be the APRA's main opposition in Congress. The expectations facing the new government were great; the challenges, formidable.

Alan García's boldness and energy were evident from the day he took office, declaring that he would transform Peru and challenge international imperialism at the same time. He was - both within and outside Peru - something of a phenomenon. How the García "phenomenon" would govern, and what role his party would play in that government was not clear at the outset. The APRA was not a monolithic entity; rather it was a complex, multi-generational, ideologically disparate, and culturally diverse movement that was able to inspire a loyalty among its members that was analagous to religious faith rather than to political allegiance. What became increasingly clear as time went on was that the party had very little to do with García's program or decisionmaking. It was able, however, to infiltrate the state bureaucracy, staking claims on all positions that entailed authority. Positions were mostly filled according to political rather than technical criteria - in part because the party was extremely short of trained personnel. The party was well aware that while its victory was made possible by Alan García's popularity, his election was also made possible by the well-oiled electoral machinery that the APRA possessed. After so many years of persecution and being blocked from power, the desire to enjoy the fruits of
government was quite strong among party members. Control of the state bureaucracy, however, did not translate into the ability to make an underdeveloped and inefficient state sector responsive to the pressing demands upon it.

With the challenges of governing the country, both García's relations with the party, and the party's with society in general deteriorated. The party had no coherent program for governing, and decisions were soon concentrated solely in the hands of Alan García, due to his own character and to the party tradition of not questioning the "jefe maximo". This resulted in a great deal of party resentment, especially as policies became more controversial. García's own interpretation of Aprista doctrine had a mercurial nature and reflected different currents within the party - one day calling for cooperation with the private sector and the next for revolution and a war on the middle class. The government's initial coherence in policymaking soon fell prey to contradictory goals and ideologies on the part of Garcia and his close circle of advisors, and to the inability of the party to supersede personal and ideological rivalries and govern efficaciously.

While the party had been able to unite as an effective electoral force behind the goal of attaining power, they were not prepared for the challenges of government. The rifts that had emerged after Haya's death - which were a function of conflicting interpretations of party doctrine stemming from generational and ideological differences - soon resurfaced. At the same time, the sectarian nature and history of the party precluded any potential cooperation
with the political opposition. The result was an extremely polarized atmosphere and an economic crisis on the one hand, and the age-old divide - now accentuated by the party's control of the state - between APRA and society on the other. This was reflected by both a resurgence of the right and by a dramatic increase in insurgent activity.

Alan García llega al gobierno sin haber organizado previamente a los sectores que desea buscar, sin confiar en el APRA en su conjunto como partido, sin haber formado cuadros técnicos en los peculiaridades de su proyecto, sin haber construido un poder popular que lo sustente. Lograr todo esto desde el gobierno y en tiempo de crisis económica es particularmente difícil...[1]

Initially, the APRA government projected a bold and coherent image and succeeded in an effective economic reactivation, in implementing several innovative policies towards the poor, and in fostering a strong support base in the private sector. By mid-1987, however, the economy began to falter as the government failed to respond to the exhaustion of short-term reactivation policies, and the President himself caused a political crisis with disastrous consequences. The speed and the extent of the deterioration of policymaking coherence was shocking, and as the crisis deepened, the inability of the APRA as a party to deal with it became increasingly evident.
Strategy and Economic Program

Alan García and the Apra were able to achieve victory by a large margin in April 1985 without publicizing any sort of detailed program or strategy. This was in part possible because of García's popularity and oratorical skills and in part due to his generation's success in renovating the party's image and opening it up to new social sectors and regions. It was also possible because of the discrediting of previous options on the right and the widely perceived opposition of the army to a Marxist government. In contrast to the APRA, Izquierda Unida's program - much of which was later adopted by the APRA once in power - was well publicized. The APRA was deliberately vague in order to maintain its traditional middle class support and to appeal to the emerging "technocratic" working class as well. Apristas were extremely cautious about confronting the entrepreneurial sector, and there was no talk of nationalizations. The more radical aspects of the program were not presented until after García's inauguration.

No specific policy proposals or overall strategy were announced during the time between García's election in April and inauguration in July; there was an aura of suspense, and among the business community, an attitude of cautious watching and waiting. García finally announced his strategy in his July 28 inaugural address. In a subsequent series of announcements, culminating in the October "package" of economic measures, the government's economic reactivation scheme - which was the pivotal part of what García had in his address labelled "productive social reactivation"[2] -
was gradually released. The government's strategy was to address the deepening crisis in Peru's economy and society through an internally based economic reactivation scheme which would benefit, first and foremost, the "marginalized" sectors: the impoverished peasants of the Andes and the burgeoning population of the pueblos jóvenes in the cities—primarily Lima. Reactivation depended to a large extent on the cooperation of domestic entrepreneurial sectors, as even prior to García's stance on the debt issue, it was evident that no new foreign credit was heading in Peru's direction. The government had to appeal to two audiences and relay two messages: first to the poor that the state was actively going to change the structure of the economy and society by "democratizing" it; and, second, to the entrepreneurial classes, that despite these proposed "revolutionary" changes, their interests and assets would not be threatened.

García's strategy was reminiscent of the original APRA program of the thirties; yet he also added his own themes: focus on ethical behaviour among state employees, a crackdown on the drug traffic, and the idea of a social pyramid. In García's pyramid, organized labor and state workers fit into the privileged category at the top—those who were protected by a "bureaucratic cushion"[3]—and attention was to focus on the 70% of the population which was at the bottom: the unemployed, street vendors, and shantytown dwellers. The social pyramid, while revolutionary in some senses, did not focus the issues of reform on a labor—presumably backed by state—versus capital confrontation, and in this sense was much more palatable to
the entrepreneurial class than a more classical Marxist strategy. While García did call for a role for the "nationalist state", that role was to provide education and health services, and to protect the economy from monopoly and excess profits. That was immediately followed by a clause which stated that private property and free initiative were linked to the common good and which rejected dogmatic egalitarianism and sterile statism. García also devoted a section of his speech to the importance of security for investment by foreign and national capital. Nor did he forget to appeal to the traditional support base of his party: "I do not ignore the industrialists, nor the laborers, nor the employees, nor the professionals. Faithful to the ideology of my party, I believe...the small and medium proprietors classes have a great responsibility."

Many of the government's themes were also reminiscent of those of the Velasco era. This was in part due to the presence of several former "Velasquistas" in García's circle of advisors, in particular Carlos Franco, who had been a close companion of Carlos Delgado's in SINAMOS. The APRA was in a much better position than the military officers - who were neither trusted by the civilians nor politically astute - to play the delicate game of offering prospects of radical change to the poor without alienating powerful entrepreneurial interests. The new APRA government, with an innovative approach and the benefit of the lessons of past APRA failures and Velasco's errors, was able to produce a viable strategy which did not lead to an immediate confrontation with the elites. The government was clearly
bolstered by the business community's willingness to try a reformist strategy after the economic debacle of the Belaúnde years and the fears of more radical alternatives raised by the growth of terrorist activity: "The 'new' elite is very aware that Peru could be on the brink of civil war, and like the military officers, they know that their economic interests would be devastated in such strife."[5] However, to the new APRA leadership's credit, it was able to do what heretofore had been impossible in Peru: to propose substantive social change openly without automatically alienating the powerful elites.

In contrast, García challenged the international financial community and the armed forces early on. He unilaterally declared a cap on interest payments of 10% of export earnings. In October after the discovery of an army massacre of seventy-five civilian "suspects" he fired three top generals; and in a blow to traditional army budgetary autonomy, he halved an order for French Mirage jets.[6]

The Economic Program

The whole policy approach ... comes out of the long and hard experience of Peru with orthodox approaches to inflation and balance of payments problems. By 1985 it was at last possible for many academics and policymakers to conclude that... recession-inducing policies were inappropriate as measures to deal with inflation, and exceedingly inefficient in dealing with balance of payments equilibrium... By July 1985 it was abundantly clear that inflation did not come from excess demand... The balance of payments disequilibrium had its roots in long run supply problems on the export side... and in the capital flight induced by the very recession itself and the resulting lack of confidence and "desmoralización."[7]

Support bases for a heterodox policy grew with the drastic failures of orthodox adjustment policies under Belaúnde. In May 1986, the former president of the Central
Bank, Richard Webb wrote: "despite the limitation of the 10% rule, Peru will remit $500 million more in interest and debt payments than it will receive from lenders in 1986. On the other hand, Peru stands to gain a degree of self-reliance that would be healthy from both economic and political points of view."[8] Peru's recovery had to be internally generated, as past dependence on foreign capital and on the international markets had led to unstable poor growth rates, a huge debt, and a dualistic economic structure.

The García government inherited a depressed economy; growth was a negative 12% in 1983, and made only a partial recovery in 1984. With ample reserves and excess productive capacity, it was ripe for reactivation. The first stage was primarily anti-inflationary, with an initial rise and then the freezing of key prices, coupled with a rise of the minimum wage, and cutting of interest rates. Luxury imports were curtailed; employment and agriculture were stressed.[9] By 1986 inflation had been substantially reduced and growth became the priority, with incentives introduced for the manufacturing sector.[10] Employment creation was a major priority - over 50% of the population of 18.7 million was under or unemployed. Companies which operated extra shifts were allowed to take on staff without guaranteed job security. One of the main policies towards the urban poor, the PAIT, was created to provide jobs and improve living conditions in the pueblos jovenes and poor rural regions. The program was highly successful in urban areas, and the government hired thousands of workers on a temporary basis.
The government also sponsored IDESI, an associated agency to provide credit to informal sector entrepreneurs.

By the end of 1985, most business sectors were lending the government and its plan their confidence. After almost a decade of "decisionmaking paralysis" in which economic policy was caught in a web of intense confrontation between business and labor into which the state sometimes intervened, and in which the conditionality imposed by external creditors had played an increasingly restrictive part, an active government role in economic policymaking was welcomed.[11] In addition, IMF sanctioned austerity and stabilization measures had not only negatively affected standards of living, but the business sectors and the internal market as well. Business and labor leaders seemed willing to cooperate for the "reactivation" solution. In practice, however, the government's policy of "concertacion" or cooperation with the private sector consisted primarily of García's meeting with the so-called twelve apostles - the most powerful businessmen in the country.

The government's decision to rely on the private sector...was perfectly consistent with the APRA's historical position and Garcia's own earlier writings...Many industrialists...had supported the APRA in the 1985 election. The unexpected aspect was the particular form that concertacion assumed -- primarily negotiations with the largest business conglomerates in the country, popularly known as the 'twelve apostles'. CONFIEP, the umbrella business association formed in 1984, was bypassed in favor of...large businesses in the hopes that smaller entrepreneurs would follow suit.[12]

Despite dire predictions and condemnations from international agencies and critics, Peru's economic performance for 1986 and 1987 was remarkable. Real GDP growth was 8.5 and 7% respectively, compared with 1.5% for
1985, and inflation was 64% compared with the previous year's 163.4%. Manufacturing production rose and real wage levels increased. [see Tables II, VII] While a full-scale renovation of agriculture was hardly likely, given the constraints and the backwardness of Andean agriculture, a growth rate of 3% was still attained. Reserves rose dramatically by mid-1986 due to the restrictions on debt payments and profit remittances, although the trend was reversed by capital flight at the end of the year. Inflation was clearly cost-induced and thus the price controls policy was on the mark, although inflation reduction was also achieved at the price of an overvalued exchange rate. Terms of trade turned towards agriculture, a trend for which the government quickly took credit. [13]

International agencies and creditors neither welcomed nor supported Peru's economic strategy and its stance on the debt. In October 1985, the World Bank re-iterated its past prescription that inflation in Peru was demand-induced. The IMF, which had been unduly harsh during the Belaúnde years - calling for extremely restrictive adjustment measures in the face of El Niño disasters and severe deterioration in terms of trade, and pressing for import liberalization at a time of severe balance of payments crisis - rejected price controls as a support to an anti-inflation program, at least in Peru's case. The Fund may have feared that García's radical stance on debt would start a worldwide trend. Despite the few attempts at goodwill payments made by Peru in 1986, [14] the Fund declared Peru ineligible for credits.
One key aspect of the economic recovery was its concentration in the informal sector. Because the informal sector pays no taxes, this exacerbated the government budget deficit. Price controls favored the informal sector, as certain key prices, particularly gasoline, fell significantly in real terms, while informal sector enterprises were not affected by controls. Some firms shifted their activities into the informal sector to restore profitability and there were resulting shortages of inputs and labor in the formal sector.[15] The labor shortage could in part be explained by the 75,000 jobs created by the PAIT, but overall was due to the unprecedented boom of activity in the informal sector.[16] The informal sector plays a critical role in generating desperately needed employment.

A growing disparity between the official and parallel exchange rates, a resurgence of inflation in early 1987, and a general strike in May of that year, signalled that the first so-called "honeymoon" stage of the government's reactivation policy had come to a close. There are a variety of reasons for this. The recovery was based to a large extent on existing idle capacity. Supply bottlenecks began to appear in some key inputs and raw materials, such as cement. State enterprises, after years of mismanagement, were unable to respond to necessary production increases. Reserve levels fell to dangerously low levels. Accompanying these trends was increasing skepticism in the business community about the government's credibility and economic management. This was exacerbated in April 1987 by the government's announcement - and then subsequent withdrawal -
of compulsory bond purchases for certain industrial sectors.[17] While this does not signify that the overall reactivation approach was flawed, it does point to the difficulty of managing an unorthodox and interventionist set of policies[18], and to the limitations to their profitable duration. The government's failure to adjust promptly - and in fact it delayed implementing any policy at all until March of 1988 – created disastrous supply problems and inflation due to uncertainty and expectations.

Along with the end of the "honeymoon" phase came an end to the overall consensus over reactivation policy in general, and over the future course of the economy among García and his advisors. As early as July 1986, many of his advisors had a plan for the nationalization of certain key firms, including banks and financial houses. García at that point opted for a "concertacion" strategy instead[19], and included in his July 28 speech an explanation of why the government should not nationalize the nation's banks.

In the meantime, rifts within the government, in part a function of the party's exclusion from it, became increasingly blatant and public. Luis Alva Castro, who had wanted to resign for several months, did so in June. Alva Castro, with an eye on the APRA's 1990 presidential nomination, wanted to distance himself from the government before the honeymoon phase ended. There were also disagreements within the cabinet and economic team over the future course of economic policy. The most powerful group, known as "los audaces" or the "bold ones", primarily made up of the Velasquistas and Daniel Carbonetto, an Argentine
economist who had the most influence on García's economic policy, supported the President's determination to maintain growth as a priority and favored increased state intervention in the economy. Only two of the "audaces" were Apristas: the Finance Minister, Gustavo Saberbein, and Javier Tantalean, the head of the influential National Planning Institute. The split was clear by April 1987, with the "audaces" wanting to implement another heterodox shock plan by July if inflation had not been curbed by then.[20]

Pressure for change from the audaces contributed to García's decision to announce the nationalization of all domestically owned banks and insurance companies and the closing of all private foreign exchange houses on July 28, 1987.[21] These measures were extremely unpopular among the business community and disrupted the entire strategy of "concertación". García used highly confrontational tones when he presented the measures to the public, a tactic which hardly served to foster private sector cooperation.

The business community, which had accepted the transitional and stimulating role which the APRA government assigned to the state, with these measures grew extremely suspicious of the government's motives and fearful that: "el APRA parece volver a sus veléidades estatistas."[22] The traditional antagonism between the nation's powerful entrepreneurs and the APRA quickly resurfaced when the threat of a genuine transition to a socialist economy was perceived. The expropriation of the banks also sparked a political polarization and a crisis which was clearly not foreseen by García, which will be discussed in the next
section. Relevant here is the effects the measure had on the economic program.

The end of the honeymoon phase of unprecedented growth, low inflation, and almost unchallenged consensus would not have meant instant collapse for the heterodox strategy, however, had the government acted in a flexible and cooperative manner rather than a desperate and confrontational one. There was much more potential for a policy of concertacion to work in a small business community like Peru's than in larger ones such as Brazil's, for example. Also, there was more consensus in the Peruvian community for rejecting the IMF route, as Peru had so little hope of receiving any new credit.[23]

There were limitations to heterodoxy in Peru's case. The economy and state sector are severely underdeveloped. Not only did bottlenecks exist, but the state's capacity to ameliorate them was limited. This underdevelopment was a serious drawback to the "audaces" strategy of expanding the role of the state in the economy. The expropriations forfeited the sorely needed cooperation of the business community. Labor, meanwhile, already resentful of García's calling them "privileged", became increasingly anti-regime as inflation heated up. They resented the way concertacion excluded labor unions and business organizations.[24]

A general strike, led by the Communist-run CGTP, proved relatively successful on May 19, 1987. Besides opposition to the concertacion strategy, they sought to preserve the economic gains made in 1986, and to extend union coverage to workers in industries that received exceptional legal
treatment: non-traditional export companies and industries eligible to hire PROEM workers were both exempted from the labor stability law. The erosion of wage gains was a legitimate concern, as average salaries reached their peak in October of 1986, and then began a steady decline; by March of 1987 the minimum wage was only 4% in real terms above the lowest level in its history — which was during the second Belaunde term. [25] Finally, after several years of eroding power, the unions sought to re-assert themselves as a political force. The number of strikers was only one-third of what it was in 1977; yet given the extremely different context of the unpopular Morales regime, this number was indicative of a noticeable amount of support for organized labor. It is also significant that Garcia met with the directorate of the CGTP after the strike.[26]

The labor relations scene continued to heat up into 1988 as inflation began to rise and the government postponed economic adjustment. The CGTP sponsored relatively successful general strikes — disrupting the economy if not totally paralyzing it — on January 28, June 19 and 20, October 14, and December 1 of that year. The APRA was in a poor position to deal with organized labor for a variety of reasons. First of all, the government had provoked the ire of the unions even at the height of the growth boom by excluding them from its "concertacion" efforts. Its strategy in the PAIT and the PROEM showed disdain for organized labor, and García had launched several tirades attacking labor as privileged. Finally, the APRA affiliated union confederation, the CTP, was on the margin of labor disputes.
The CTP only controlled 15% of the labor movement; its influence was strong in a few sectors such as textiles and sugar, but even in these traditional strongholds it had diminished in favor of the CGTP.[27] The CTP's actions were limited both by the conservative views of its leader Julio Cruzado, and by its ties to the government. Cruzado was strongly opposed by the APRA youth, which had demanded his resignation for several years. During the Belaúnde years, Cruzado failed to support one of the major strikes, drawing severe criticism from many sectors of the party.[28] The CTP was also limited by its affiliation with the government, and did not participate in any of the general strikes. When some CTP factions participated in a transport workers' general strike on July 4, 1988, the Aprista Minister of Transportation accused them of being "infraternal".[29]

The APRA was never able to regain the dominant position that it held in the labor unions prior to 1968. Given its position as affiliated to a government that had expressed disdain for organized labor, and at a time of increasing economic crisis; and given the increased participation of the insurgent left in the movement, its influence was likely to deteriorate. Finally, because the CTP never had full independence from the party and its goals were always subordinate to the party's, its potential as a major force in labor was limited. "Siempre hubo una contradicción vitanda entre el concepto del sindicalismo puro no partidiario y el sindicalismo político, partidiario."[30]

In the aftermath of the banks move and the political crisis that it caused, there was a policymaking paralysis
that was devastating. The government failed to implement any policies, with the exception of a 40% devaluation – not accompanied by any of the necessary adjustment measures – in December. In the meantime, rumours abounded for months over what the upcoming measures would be. With price increases expected, there was hoarding by store owners on the one hand, and severe shortages of basic inputs – such as tires and cement – due to the balance of payments crisis on the other. The fiscal deficit reached 16% of GDP. There was clearly a need to replace the short-term reactivation model with a long-term growth one, and there was no government consensus on how to do it. García called in a host of outside external advisors, several of them from the political opposition. He was apparently finally convinced of the need for adjustment, and in particular of raising the heavily subsidized price of gasoline – a politically sensitive issue. The afternoon before he was to announce adjustment measures, in a characteristic display of concern for his image, he had opinion polls taken; upon finding public opinion negative, he cancelled his speech and re-wrote the entire package himself. The following evening he announced a watered down adjustment package which was neither adequate to correct the economic imbalances, nor to assuage negative public opinion, which had already been prepared for the worst by abounding rumours. García announced a focus on basic goods – and imposed what he called an "economía de guerra", declaring immoral anyone who owned an electric blender or a car. Prices of most basic goods were raised 40% and then frozen; minimum wage was
raised 60%. Gas prices were raised 50% rather than the original 100%. A necessary devaluation was not implemented.[33] Public opinion in general was negative, as the package pleased neither the left nor the right.[34] Inflation for 1988 was projected at over 1000%,[35] caused to a large extent by the uncertainty and sudden policy shifts. García may not have been aware of the severity of the ensuing crisis, but "at a less precise level he is totally aware that he decided to go for broke with an inflationary program."[36] While firm in his refusal to turn to orthodoxy, neither he nor his advisors had a longterm strategy.

"They...appear to have taken the gamble that their reserves, and perhaps some ingenuity, could get them by. Interview evidence suggests no serious long-term planning had been done when the decision to challenge the international system was taken." [37]

By foregoing gradual adjustment early on, García had left himself few options. Because he destroyed the fragile consensus with the private sector that was key to the heterodox growth strategy, and at the same time allowed inflation to spiral out of control, a heterodox adjustment strategy became increasingly less viable. Both radicals and the IMF agree that the only way to break the hyperinflationary spiral is with a shock program such as the one Bolivia recently took, cutting both the deficit and inflation through sharply recessionary policy. The political capital required for such a program is enormous. Instead García opted to accept chaos, Allende style, with the hopes of being remembered as an "hombre del pueblo".[38]
Mid-1988 yielded several cabinet reshuffles which involved the re-assertion of the APRA leadership, particularly Villanueva, the prime minister, in an attempt to save the party from the political costs of economic collapse as hyper-inflation set in. Most of García's key economic advisors - Carbonetto, Tantalean, and other "audaces" - were forced to resign or did so by choice. A shock package was announced in September, tripling the prices of basic goods and devaluing by 100%.[39] In keeping with the record of inconsistent policy, it was announced that all prices would be frozen in ten days time; the freeze was subsequently cancelled. Prices soared in anticipation of a freeze that did not occur, and inflation was over 100% for September.[40] Abel Salinas, the new economics minister, was sent to negotiate with the IMF, yet García continued to denounce such negotiations as impossible. This was not the first time that García had authorized and then undermined such efforts: preliminary agreements had before been initiated with both the Paris Club and the IMF, and then cancelled at the last minute.[41] According to François Bourricaud, García's perception of the IMF as the great Satan, and his belief that "los malos capitalistas" - the industrialists - had betrayed him, stemmed from the importance he placed on image and of his lack of understanding of basic business behaviour: that firms operate to maximize profits.[42] He shared these perceptions with many colleagues in the APRA: a result of training rich in doctrine and short on practical skills.
Ironically, the end result was a default into an IMF style policy of the worst kind - austerity induced recession - without the IMF and the credit relief that it provides. By mid-1988, it was virtually impossible to run a functioning business in Peru. On top of input shortages and spiralling inflation, there was an incoherent morass of state interference in the daily conduct of business, with the rules changing constantly. While interference existed before the APRA government, the vast growth of regulations and permits required led to a pervasive increase in corruption. While the extent of such corruption is difficult to quantify, there were enough public episodes to make it obvious that corruption was widespread. Such episodes included the allegations of extensive misappropriation of funds that accompanied the resignation of the Agriculture Minister, Romigio Morales Bermudez, in mid-1988; the rebellion of APRA youth in the north in protest of the stealing of public funds by the Aprista head of Cooperación Popular in Lambayeque; the resignation of the first head of the PAIT, Victor Lopez, amidst corruption charges; and a highly publicized scandal at the Aprista-directed Instituto Peruano de Seguridad Social.[43] While corruption is hardly a novelty in Peru, the APRA was also blatant in its use of partisan criteria to infiltrate the public sector. "Militantes del partido aprista sin capacidad profesional ni criterios éticos de servicio invadieron de abajo hacia arriba la estructura burocrática paralizando lo que aun seguía en movimiento."[44] The combination of sectarianism
and shortage of skill, not surprisingly, had negative effects on an already inefficient public sector.

Policymaking coherence was severely limited by the inadequate and inefficient nature of the state machinery. The technical and administrative skills necessary to implement a heterodox policy were in short supply, placing limitations on García's ability to implement a coherent strategy. "In Peru there is good evidence to suggest that policy execution is by no means a straightforward process."[45] García's autocratic style further undermined the state by continually bypassing it. Nevertheless, his constant changing of strategies and priorities, more than anything else, led to the collapse of the consensus he had created into political and economic chaos.

Economic crisis had particularly negative effects on the informal sector. The sharp reversal of positive trends put new pressure on an already precarious situation. The poor - who do not have a guaranteed minimum wage and who spend over 70% of their income on food - are the most hurt by hyper-inflation. Economic collapse at this point is an unaffordable setback to Peru's development, and sounded the death knell for the APRA's policies for the poor.

Key to explaining the economic deterioration were the political events at the time: García's relationship with his advisors, his party, the left, and the private sector, as well as inconsistencies within his own ideology. The 1987 banks expropriation, which marked an end to the consensus which had been so crucial to the successes of the first years, was clearly a turning point for the APRA regime.
The Banks Expropriation - A Turning Point

No other episode during the García government's tenure so demonstrates the importance of the manner in which the reformist debate is presented as well as the July 1987 bank expropriations. President García's expropriation of the nation's ten private banks, six finance and seventeen insurance companies, announced on the second anniversary of his inauguration, came as a major surprise not only to the public, but to many high ranking members of his party as well. The announcement of the measure caused a widespread public reaction and a severe political crisis. The President was apparently surprised by the extent and intensity of political opposition. However, he must have been aware that the expropriations would signify for the public a definitive change of political and economic strategy: a change that would result in the alienation of the economic actors he had been cooperating closely with for two years. The measure caused a resurgence of the political center and right. For almost two months, the topic was the sole focus of political and legislative activity; there was a plethora of demonstrations and protests; precluding all attention to the other pressing items on the national agenda - in particular an ensuing economic crisis and the marked increase in strength of insurgent movements. The controversy dragged on for well over a year due to the poor planning behind the measure, and a host of legal flaws which bungled attempts to implement it.

The measure came as a total surprise for several reasons. First and foremost, it was a direct contradiction to all of García's previous campaign and inaugural addresses, in which
he had explicitly rejected state expropriation of private industry and had emphasized the goals of reducing state bureaucracy and pursuing economic reactivation based on cooperation or concertación with the private sector. Second, the measure neither originated in the high level ranks of the APRA, nor was it strongly supported by them. At the time it was announced, most of them refrained from substantive comment. Finally, while the expropriations only affected 20% of the nation's banks, as the rest were already state-owned, and omitted foreign banks - quite a paradox coming from the nationalistic García - the measure was the opening to a great deal of controversy. García seemed willing to forfeit his entire economic strategy at high cost for very little benefit. In presenting the measure, García used confrontational rich versus poor rhetoric, pitting the "hardworking pueblo" against the "lazy and exploitative bankers" - a tactic he had in the past avoided - and claimed the move would "democratize" credit. Ironically, the APRA's slogan in opposition to Velasco had been "estatizar no es socializar."

García and a few close advisors came up with the plan less than two weeks before its announcement; the lack of preparation was blatantly obvious. García first attempted to take over direction of the banks prior to the congressional approval of the law required by the constitution. After a rash of protests and an intervention by a Lima Civil Court judge, Eduardo Raffo Otero, García backed down on August 10 and agreed to wait for the measure to pass in Congress and for court ruling on its constitutional validity.
The argument that nationalizing the banks would democratize credit lacked credibility. There is a definite need for the reform of the credit system in Peru, as credit is allotted primarily due to personal guarantees and a "compadrazgo" system rather than by market or profitability criteria. With interest rates at an artificially low level — as is demonstrated by the much higher rates in the informal sector — resulting in a credit shortage, the system of personal ties and guarantees takes on an increased importance. The losers are the new entrants to the system who, though they might have very profitable proposed schemes, have no major personal assets to guarantee their loans[46]. Ironically, the "compadrazgo" system is even more prevalent in the state banks, with their extended bureaucracy, than in the private banks. State banks here refers to non-commercial state banks, rather than the associated banks: Popular, Continental, and Interbank, which function like private banks and lend a similar percentage of their funds to large-scale enterprises as do the private banks.[47] Since the Velasco years, the state has controlled 80% of the nation's credit. The non-commercial state banks - the Banco de la Nación and the Bancos de Fomento - control two-thirds of the nation's credit and should in theory already have been serving to "democratize" credit. Most programs extending credit to the informal sector relied on private rather than state bank support. Finally, the productive structure of the country was oriented around large-scale enterprises - many of them state-owned - and the concentration of credit in state hands would only exacerbate
this trend. While the case for credit reform was clear, nationalization hardly seemed the solution.

"Si uno no cambia la estructura productiva del país...donde una parte importante de la producción se da en empresas muy grandes, incluyendo estatales, entonces es muy difícil y quizás no tiene sentido cambiar radicalmente la orientación del crédito."[48]

The economic power of the private banking groups in the country was indeed extensive. A web of credit and ownership links between the five largest banks and several entrepreneurial groups controlled, by some estimates, over 50% of private industrial production and services.[49] Four of the five most powerful bankers, Romero, Raffo, Wiese, and Brescia, also belonged to the group of twelve "apostles" upon whom García had based his concertacion strategy. By expropriating the banks, there was no doubt that García was going to destroy this relationship as well as undermine overall business confidence in the government. From the industrialists' perspective, if García was willing to expropriate the holdings of those with whom he worked most closely, then he would probably have fewer qualms about doing so in the case of less powerful industries.[50]

García's logic is baffling. If he sincerely sought credit reform, there existed a host of more effective and less controversial ways to pursue it. If he sought increased investment, the total destruction of business confidence was contradictory. He clearly sought to curb the power of the bankers, particularly Dionisio Romero - with whom it was rumoured that he had a personal rivalry. This rivalry cannot be totally dismissed as a factor in the decisionmaking process, given Alan García's volatile temper and autocratic
style. While he seemed determined to continue to pursue an economic model based on private investment, he also was making a definite move towards an increased state role in the economy and a confrontational government stance against big business. In Peru's business community, which is relatively small and has highly concentrated entrepreneurial interests, García's two positions were hardly compatible. Finally, ironic in light of García's anti-imperialist stance, foreign bank branches were exempted.[51]

The measure was not a product of the APRA ranks, and the exclusion of the party from such a major and controversial decision fueled existing party resentment. Luis Alberto Sanchez, Vice-President of the Republic and by most criteria the highest ranking Aprista after García, was informed of the decision only one hour prior to its announcement; he was told by none other than ex-President Belaúnde! The cabinet ministers were informed only the day before. Both Premier Larco Cox and Foreign Minister Wagner privately expressed reservations, while Economics Minister Saberbein - one of the "bold" ones - supported the measure. The Minister of Industry, Romero Caro, resigned in protest a week later. He was followed, in the next ten days, by twenty-two other high level functionaries, vice-ministers, and agency directors.[52] The surprise and opposition - although muted - of many Apristas was blatant.

The expropriations measure was thus not a direct form of credit reform nor was it backed by the party, and it was extremely disruptive to the overall economic strategy. The move had primarily political objectives: to distract attention
from a faltering economic strategy; to reassert García's leadership after several defeats within his own party; and to strengthen his relationship with the left. An important reason underlying García's change of strategy was the obvious exhaustion by early 1987 of the heterodox reactivation model. The logical next step was an increase in productive investment, conceivably by the private sector, as the state had neither the resources nor the capacity to provide it.

Economic strategy was one of the key points of the García-Alva Castro rift, which stemmed from Alva's ambitions for the APRA's nomination for the 1990 elections. Alva had let it be known for almost a year that he wanted to resign, a move that indicated his desire to disassociate himself from the government before economic performance declined. The rift culminated in a major political defeat for García: Alva was elected President of the Chamber of Deputies, an outcome that García had campaigned actively against. Sanchez, Prialé, and León de Vivero all opposed García's tactics to prevent Alva's election. Prialé was involved with Alva in a project to modernize Parliament and strengthen its role - a move that would assert party control over García. Of the top old guard Apristas, only Villanueva stood by García.[53] The Alva/Alan rift was an old and bitter one, and the election of Alva Castro on top of the impending economic crisis marked the lowest point yet in García's presidency. The decision to expropriate the banks grew out of a need to revitalize the President politically.

García's key supporters and advisors were not Apristas, the most important ones being, Daniel Carbonetto and Carlos
Franco. Franco, a sociologist, had been active in SINAMOS. He was particularly persuasive in convincing García that he had to curb the power of the economic elites, more specifically, the bankers.

Nos enfrentamos a una crisis de la economía, de la sociedad, del Estado. Pero es una crisis también de la dependencia y la dominación interna. Los diferentes ciclos de la dependencia histórica del Perú de alguna manera permitieron siempre que ciertos grupos nacionales pudieran encontrar...formas para ejercer su dominio.[54]

Carbonetto, the most influential advisor in economic matters, later admitted that the banks measure was primarily politically motivated, and stated that the goal was: "to create the stable political environment necessary for development when you have kidnappings, an active Sendero Luminoso guerrilla problem and a government party representing not the business community but the middle and poor sectors of society."[55] These goals, although laudable ones, were hardly rendered achievable by the banks expropriations, which totally destabilized both economic and political climates.

The move was also a function of the drifting apart of García and the "twelve apostles". García claimed that industrialists had not invested sufficiently and that they were putting their money into "narcodollars" that were leaving the country. While figures differ, there is no doubt that business investment was far greater in 1986 than in the previous year, and even Finance Minister Saberbein's figures indicated a 32% increase in the first semester 1987 over the same period for 1986.[56] Meanwhile "concertación" had resulted in an unprecedented $400 million in letters of intent through the newly founded National Private Investment Board. A great many of these were cancelled following the
expropriations.[57] Finally, not in Peru nor in any country does most capital flight occur through the banks.[58]

The debate should perhaps have centered on the nature of future investment, as it is not clear to what extent entrepreneurs were willing to continue to invest in the face of bottlenecks and the absence of a longer term economic strategy. This uncertainty might have been a factor in García's decision to totally change his approach. Yet as the true figures for 1987 investment were not available at the time of the expropriations, and the numbers being quoted were subjective estimates, the "concertacion" strategy was disrupted before it had the chance to fulfill its potential and be fairly evaluated. Meanwhile, if García planned, as he consistently stated after the expropriations announcement, to continue to rely on private investment, taking over the nation's banks was neither a wise nor a productive decision. His lack of understanding of how the private sector functions led to misconstrued accusations. At a certain level, it seemed as though he believed his own rhetoric about "los malos capitalistas".

Political factors were prevalent in the decisionmaking process. Besides upstaging Alva, García decided to retake the political initiative from his main political rival, Izquierda Unida and at the same time to reforge the link with the left that he lost with Barrantes' resignation from the leadership of the coalition. In order to generate popular support for the banks measure, he undertook a strenuous schedule of speechmaking in the pueblos jovenes which was reminiscent of his campaigning days. There was talk of a new "populismo"
which would merge the more radical wing of APRA and the moderate factions of Izquierda Unida. Carlos Roca, a radical Aprista, referred to this potential merger as "el abrazo historico".[59] Carlos Franco was also a major proponent of expropriation of the banks as a way of forging the link between APRA and IU.[60] This new populismo, however, has two fundamental problems. The first was that with the government's alienation of investors as a resource base, to distribute more the state would have to expropriate more, not necessarily a viable solution, and one which was increasingly being rejected as inefficient in a wide range of nations by governments on all sides of the political spectrum. The second was that most members of both groups were not very willing to cooperate with their main political rivals.

The members of Izquierda Unida, mindful of maintaining the coalition's political identity and many of whom had deeply resented Barrantes' support of the APRA government, were quick to criticize the banks expropriation as insufficient to reform the credit structure and for its failure to affect foreign banks. Alfonso Barrantes, while praising the project for its breaking with the oligopolistic power of the bankers, warned that this power and wealth could as easily be concentrated in the state.[61] While the law passed in the APRA dominated Chamber of Deputies, it was held up in the Senate where the government needed the support of IU for passage. The left demanded that the government pass an amnesty law for imprisoned terrorist suspects and backed their demands with a hunger strike in the Congress by six IU deputies and two senators. This placed the government in an awkward position,
as Sendero's primary targets since 1985 had been APRA party and government officials. In August 1987, the time that the hunger strike was occurring in the halls of Congress, Rodrigo Franco, the thirty year old Aprista head of ENCI - the government food distribution agency - was brutally assassinated by Senderistas in front of his wife and children. Not surprisingly, this incident precipitated the cancellation of the proposed amnesty deal. García clearly made no gains in his relations with IU.

The banks proposal caused disruptions within the APRA. García's autocratic style and frequent bypassing of the party apparatus was deeply resented by many Apristas, particularly those high ranking officials who pertained to the generation bypassed by García. Other key actors from García's own generation, such as a previously influential advisor Hector Delgado Parker, and Chairman of the External Debt Committee Hernan Garrido Lecca, also resigned coincidentally at that time, if not publicly in protest. Those Apristas who had been the proponents of an economic model hinged on cooperation with industry could hardly be in favor of the model's disruption, nor were many Apristas pleased with the increasing pre-eminence of non-Aprista advisors to the President. A rift of sorts between the President and his party was apparent. One prominent Aprista noted that the actions of the President were resulting in a loss of contact with the APRA's main support base, the middle classes.[62] Meanwhile the party youth, presumably those to whom García was trying to appeal, were becoming increasingly radical and violent, and their actions during the political rallies at the time served to confirm the
APRA's reputation for non-democratic tendencies. Their links with the old guard Apristas were virtually non-existent.

Most notable, however, and also indicative of the still dominant hierarchical structure and messianic rather than rational political tradition of the APRA, was the lack of public opposition to the measure by party members. Initially one Aprista spoke out publicly against it: Alfredo Barnechea, a deputy from Lima and a supporter of García prior to the measure. As a result he was threatened with party disciplinary measures; he resigned prior to his pending expulsion. Jorge Torres Vallejo, one of García's main supporters during his rise to power, subsequently spoke out against the measure; he too was threatened with expulsion from the party. All other APRA senators and deputies voted for the project, despite their misgivings or disagreements. The lack of public criticism of the party leader stems from the history and hierarchical nature of the party, both of which were a function of forty years of unquestioned dominance by Haya de la Torre. As Barnechea stated: "There just is no dissent in the APRA...This is what is difficult for an outsider to understand."[63]

It is indeed difficult to understand how an entire political party in a time of supposed democratic freedom could silently watch its leader in a surprise shift threaten to destroy what had proven to be one of the few potentially viable solutions to Peru's economic development; and at the same time subsume the party's prestige to the demands of its main political rival. The lack of public dissent from the party stems in part from a tradition of obeying without
question the jefe maximo, Haya de la Torre. While Garcia by no means had the god-like stature that Haya had in the party, an in-bred tradition of hierarchical order and behaviour remained. This hierarchical structure and personal domination of the party is distinct from party discipline, which is strong in many parties, such as AD in Venezuela. Such parties are usually more democratic internally, however, than is the APRA.[64] At the same time, non-APRA opposition to the measure was such that for several months there was little other debate or legislative activity. This was in part due to IU's attempted "sabotage", but primarily to the extent of the opposition and support the nation's beleaguered center and right were able to rally.[65]

A series of opposition rallies was organized by an independent front headed by Mario Vargas Llosa, the nation's best known writer; Miguel Cruchaga, an architect and organizer of past political rallies; and Hernando de Soto, author of *El Otro Sendero*, a widely read study of the informal sector which attributes the marginalization of that sector to a discriminatory and inefficient state bureaucracy and regulatory system. Vargas Llosa - who in the past had refused to enter politics - when offered the post of premier during the second Belaúnde regime - launched a campaign based on the threat to liberty posed by the expropriations. The author's main concern, presumably a sincere one, was that the state monopoly of all credit and savings would result in authoritarian control, particularly in light of the indebted status of much of the press. He interpreted the lack of
respect for constitutional guarantees as forewarning of a return to the Velasco era style of dictatorship.

The movement was supported by many members of Belaúnde's Acción Popular, the Partido Popular Cristiano, and a variety of independents, including the Frente Nacional de Trabajadores y Campesinos (FRENATRACA). While the political right was involved in the movement, it was not alone, as many of the middle sectors who voted for the APRA in 1985 latched on to the movement. The first of the movement's demonstrations attracted unprecedented numbers of people - approximately 30,000 - to Lima's Plaza San Martin. The attendance was far greater than at similar rallies held by each of the particular political parties that same week. At the second demonstration in Arequipa the participants were violently attacked by IU and APRA militants and national television coverage, run by the state-owned channel, was cut off due to "mechanical difficulties" a few seconds after Vargas Llosa began to speak. The APRA launched a defamation campaign against Vargas Llosa in the newspapers and on television, accusing him of having been a strong supporter of the Velasco regime. While Vargas Llosa had supported some of Velasco's reforms, such as the land reform, he also had been a constant critic of the absence of civil liberties. The fact that the APRA government felt threatened enough to launch such a campaign - and presumably even censor the coverage of Vargas Llosa's speech - was indicative of a lack of confidence and a worrisome disintegration of the political climate. The movement behind Vargas Llosa actually developed into a political front, the Frente Democratico, which launched the candidacy of Vargas
Llosa for 1990. This renovation of the right as a formidable opponent was clearly not foreseen by García and his advisors.

The haphazard manner in which the measure was presented added fuel to the opposition's fire. There were two lawyers in the advisory team, but neither was particularly astute at constitutional law. A host of legal loopholes were left open for the opposition. At the same time, no attempt was made to build prior support for the measure among the left, which resulted in García's failure to gain any political capital, while providing a rallying point for the opposition of the right. An example of the incongruities in the measure's planning and presentation was García's calling for, in the very same speech, the privatisation of the nation's social security system. These failures are a result of García's authoritarian style of leadership and decisionmaking strategy, and the reliance on a very small and select group of advisors. A comment by one was telling: "there aren't many of us in the team, and we overlooked the legal aspect."[66] It is surprising that García did not foresee the negative reaction to the measure, despite his previous relations with the private sector. In light of the effects of the banks measure, it is interesting to note the example of Mexico's 1982 largely unsuccessful bank nationalizations; and to ponder what sort of conclusions García's advisers drew from this case, if they studied it at all.[67]

Unfortunately, the political debate over the banks issue was turned into a crisis by proponents of both sides. Both García's calls to battle pitting the exploited pueblo against the lazy bankers and the right's threats of impending
totalitarian doom are attempts to generate crisis and benefit politically from it. The controversy dragged on, involving several extraordinary legislatures and the illegal and violent takeover of the banks by the government on two separate occasions. While the situation was resolved in part by a solution proposed by the Banco de Credito - the devolution of 51% of the bank's shares to its workers - it was not applicable to all the banks, and an entire year after the measure had been announced, the status of some was still pending. The government's handling of the controversy was viewed negatively both at home and abroad. Ultimately the government created a plethora of new and unnecessary problems for itself at a time when it already faced a faltering economy and a growing insurgent threat.

The banks issue revealed a great deal about García's government and party. It was evident that it was García and whichever advisors he fancied at the time that made policy, not individual ministers or the party. His underestimation of the opposition was in part due to his intolerance of dissent among his advisers. The amazing fact that discussion and dissent by its members on issues of public importance is to this day not tolerated by the APRA portrays it as an organization incapable of functioning as a democratic party. With the banks move García - nicknamed "Caballo Loco" or "Crazy Horse" by the opposition - shot himself and his party in the foot, and the party barely uttered a whimper, despite the fact that many high-level ministers and party members disagreed fundamentally with the measure. Despite the renovated image that the APRA was able to project for the 1985
elections, the old strains of hierarchical order and intolerance were frighteningly evident.

Another old strain was also evident: the party's self-perception as a martyr: victim of oppression from all sides. Within this interpretation there was no room for analysis of the party's own errors. At the time of the expropriation and Sendero's murder of Rodrigo Franco, the APRA could once again play this role: its efforts at reform were being sabotaged by the resurgent oligarchic forces that it had once again challenged, and at the same time it was a victim of the terrorists. In the words of Luis Alberto Sanchez:

Los apristas estábamos frente al terrorismo ciego y destructor por un lado y por el otro frente al ataque revoroso y también cobarde de diversos enemigos que pretendieron sacar provecho político general de una situación particular: la Banca. Yo creo que la tragedia de Rodrigo y la torva comedia del súbito amor a la libertad de quienes tradicionalmente la conculcaron, ha sido el mejor 'reapello a ordre' para el pueblo peruano y en especial para el APRA.[70]

The nature of decisionmaking underlying the banks expropriations brings to the fore the issue of Garcia's leadership style and personal ambitions. His typical style is to launch a harsh attack and then retreat, such as taking over the banks and then supporting modifications of the law or ordering the police into the banks with tanks and then agreeing to wait for the courts' ruling. This is a function of his grandiose ambitions and bold approach coupled with a volatile character. García aims for center stage. He seemed indispensable for the APRA in 1983 and for Peru in 1985, and most likely wants to maintain that image.[71] In the event of a military coup, García would be thrown out for attacking the oligarchy and would still be an "hombre del pueblo." In the
same vein was his rumoured threat to resign, in protest of the September 1988 economic shock program that his own mismanagement had necessitated.

Conclusion

The political and legal controversy after the banks measure was extremely damaging to both the president and his party. García's popularity fell from an almost 70% approval rating in June to as low as 30% after the violent takeover of the banks in October.[72] The fact that the other members of his party were unable to generate any substantive dissent when their own political future was clearly being jeopardized, is indeed "difficult for an outsider to understand."

The controversy over the banks expropriation exposed the fundamental weaknesses of Peru's political institutions. The political and legal debates reached almost ludicrous heights, and the lack of respect of the government for the judicial system was blatantly obvious. The extent to which proponents on all sides were willing to generate a crisis over the issue threatened the viability of democratic government and suggested that the desires of the diverse political forces in Peru to destroy each other are stronger than their concern for democratic government.

Finally, the banks controversy demonstrated the importance of the manner in which the reformist debate is framed. García was able to create a sense of unity for the first two years he was in office, largely because he provided a reformist platform while avoiding the politically divisive property relations issue. While the reformist debate had for the past two decades - particularly during the Velasco years -
focused on the structure of property relations, causing much controversy and at the expense of an approach which directly addressed the needs of the poor, the APRA government had avoided the long prevalent belief of the Peruvian left that state takeover of the economy would solve the nation's problems. It is surprising indeed that García chose to forsake this unity by once again framing the reformist debate in controversial terms. At a time when the solution of state control is increasingly being challenged by leftist movements throughout Latin America, it is ironic that García and his advisers chose this path. It is even more surprising given the weak and inefficient nature of the Peruvian state machinery, and thus the obvious barriers to extending its control. This may have been a function of the prevalence of Velasquistas among the advisers, who instead of learning from the failures of the military "revolution", may still cling to their faith in reform from above and their disdain for political parties and autonomous popular participation. This might explain the lack of concern for building support for the measure prior to its implementation, an oversight which was prevalent in the Velasco years as well.

Unfortunately, the reform from above approach is incompatible with democratic government, as the banks issue has shown, and instead pitted the various actors against each other at the expense of much needed political consensus. A well-known Peruvian scholar, initially enthusiastic about the APRA government noted:

El problema es que ni la estatización va a significar la solución del Perú ni tampoco vamos a llegar al totalitarismo...Las reformas de la propiedad en sí mismas no tienen porque asegurar un cambio en las relaciones
The desire to reform from above and to take a confrontational rather than consensus building approach is also a function of the sectarian history of the APRA. Reforms always entailed confrontation, and only the APRA could implement them correctly - "solo el APRA salvara al Perú". This sort of sectarianism tends to lead to polarized politics. A comparison with Allende's Chile and the animosity between the Christian Democrats and the Socialists is relevant here.

The two major parties in Chile had strong utopian elements, had programmes that offered a complete transformation of Chilean society, that saw the key to change in changing property relations, that saw compromise as betrayal, and that saw politics as polarization.

The utopian vision, the calls for a total transformation, and the focus on changing property relations all fit in with the APRA's original doctrine, as well as with Alan García's own personal vision, although it contradicted all the claims made in his inaugural address. In his book El Futuro Diferente he wrote at length about the "circuitos financieros de poder" as the current form of imperialist domination that had to be overthrown. The nationalization of key lands and industries was a fundamental part of Aprista doctrine, but had been toned down by Haya in his later, more conservative years. The debate within the APRA was not over whether the banks expropriations were right in the context of present day Peru, but over whether or not the measure was sanctioned by Haya's writing. This exposed the lack of doctrinal clarity in the party, as well as a tendency to value dogma and utopian vision before reality, leading to the polarization that is above referred to
in the context of Allende's Chile. Unfortunately, the polarization that resulted after the banks expropriation shattered the opportunity that the APRA had, at least for the near future, to implement democratic reform in Peru.

The total loss of consensus and the extent of political infighting that occurred after the banks, both within and outside the APRA, diverted attention from all other issues, regardless of their importance. Insurgent activity in particular increased dramatically. An examination of the nature of the APRA party as well as its relation with the left, both parliamentary and insurrectionary, is crucial to the evaluation of the APRA in power. The party's behaviour in government was clearly affected by its own lack of ideological coherence and by the substantial challenge from more radical political forces - both within and outside its ranks.
Partido de Gobierno o Partido del Gobierno?

Pero, habiéndose producido en el Perú, desde entonces, un importante proceso de modernización e industrialización...ubicada la propia IU al margen derecho del joven Haya, apostamos hoy por la evidente inaplicabilidad de los planteamientos hayistas de 1928. Esto nos ayudaría a comprender, en cuanta forma, el actual vacío doctrinal en el partido gobernante.[1]

Siempre hemos vivido perseguidos. De ahí viene nuestro hábito de recibir la consigna y obedecer ciegamente los planteamientos, porque las circunstancias realmente lo justificaban. Cuando hemos tenido esta primavera democrática no hemos estado preparados para ello. Los que hemos querido actuar hemos sido interpretados como indisciplinados e infraternos.[2]

The APRA came to power in part riding on the wave of popularity of its popular young presidential candidate and in part on its age-old party apparatus, and the complex baggage of party loyalties, intense personal experiences, and diverse interpretations of ideology that it carried with it. The APRA was not the homogeneous and unified organization that most outsiders saw it as. The party came to power with a shortage of skilled personnel and a plethora of internal discrepancies, coupled with a tradition of unquestioned loyalty to the party leader. There was a lack of consensus over party doctrine, which the re-printing of El Antimperialismo y el APRA in the seventies had not solved, nor had it addressed many of the questions that the party would face once in power.

These discrepancies became evident early on. The shortage of talent within the ranks of the party was one reason that García surrounded himself primarily with non-Aprista advisers, which led to a great deal of resentment in the party. It also led, at the bureaucratic and municipal levels, to mismanagement and poor execution of policy. The
tradition of unquestioned loyalty to the "jefe maximo", coupled with García's own autocratic tendencies, led to the concentration of all decisionmaking at the executive level, with the President personally making all decisions. Although "Alan" was not "el Jefe", as Haya was referred to, and many of the party resented such dominance by someone so young, the party, due to lack of experience, lacked the ability to deal with dissent either with García or within its own ranks. Meanwhile, the differences in interpretation of aprista doctrine led to major discrepancies in reaction to actual policies. There were elements within the party who could be labelled as center right politically, and based their view of "Aprismo" on Haya's later works. At the same time there were also those who felt that the early works of Haya should be implemented to the letter, which clearly placed them to the left of the moderates in the IU coalition. These elements in the party leadership were supported by the bulk of the party youth.

García's own ideology did not seem to be clear, as one day he would speak in confrontational revolutionary terms to placate the radicals and youth, and the next of the need to cooperate with other political parties and the private sector. The effects of this inconsistency on both economic and counter-insurgency policy are discussed in other chapters in this section; it also had an effect on the party as an institution. These discrepancies, coupled with the lack of attention to party matters that inevitably came with the responsibilities of being in government, resulted in a disintegration of the unity and loyalty that had in the past
held the APRA together. This was exacerbated by new tendencies in the party - the opportunists who had joined the party at the last minute to reap the benefits of being in power, and old, antiquated strains such as the existence of paramilitary squads - "búfalos" - that confirmed the view of many outsiders that the party had not lost its violent and sectarian tendencies. The lack of consensus, coupled with the shortage of skilled people at the rank and file level and the party's tradition of sectarianism, led to an inability of the party to integrate effectively with existing social organizations, unions, and the private sector. Thus the APRA government became increasingly García's government, and García's government had all the characteristics of a classic populist regime.

At the same time, there continued to exist a different APRA phenomenon: the cultural APRA. There was an "Aprismo" which occurred at the popular rather than leadership level, and to a large extent had more to do with family ties, a shared history of persecution, and with a religious faith based on Haya de la Torre than with the issues and conflicts facing the García government. The APRA "mística" continued to exist, but like the party and the government, it existed as a piece of an incomplete puzzle, rather than as a cog in an efficiently operating machine. The APRA was a complex and constantly changing entity, changes which were in large part a result of the challenges that it faced and was ill-equipped to handle as a party of government.

The García Phenomenon and the APRA
The personality of Alan García was without a doubt the most important dynamic affecting the APRA party during its tenure in government. At first this was due to the APRA's winning the 1985 elections due to García's opening up of the party during the political campaign and to the appeal that he had as a presidential candidate. There were several results. During the "honeymoon" phase of the government, the party members felt completely indebted to García, and he at the same time took them for granted. He acted unilaterally and expected that they would follow. Despite the claims of the opposition, the party, while it did fill many posts with those of the APRA ranks, was not able to "Apristizar" the government.[3] What did occur was an "Alanizacion" of the government. Policies such as the PAIT and the Rimanacuy were not presented as gifts from the APRA, although all positions within the programs were given to Apristas, rather they were gifts from "Alan". Slogans such as "Alan - Peru" and "Alan contigo" followed the campaign slogan of "mi compromiso es con todos los peruanos."

Along with this was the dominance of non-Apristas, or younger rather than old-guard high ranking Apristas, among García's advisors or close confidants. His closest colleagues were either non-Apristas and often former Velasquistas such as Carlos Franco and Guillermo Thorndike, or Apristas of his own generation: Luis Gonzales Posada, Romulo León Alegria, Carlos Blancas, Hugo Otero, and Jorge del Castillo.[4] The old guard Apristas such as Sanchez, Prialé, Villanueva, and Negreiros had posts in the Senate or in the party, but were not included in the close circle that
advised García. There are several reasons for this. First of all it was well known that the most talented economists and sociologists were not within the ranks of the APRA. Secondly, García was not Haya, the founder and "companero jefe" of the APRA, and thus was probably much more comfortable with advisors of his own age rather than those who were two generations older. With the younger generation, García could build up a circle of advisors that was dependent on him rather than established in their own right, something that someone with his autocratic tendencies would clearly prefer. García trusted no one and was intolerant of dissent. He purportedly once stated: "yo quiero ministros enmudecidos."[6]

This older generation was tolerant of García as they were indebted to him for achieving power, and as in most cases their aspirations for the Presidency had already come and gone. It was the middle generation of leaders, the generation that García skipped, that was most resentful. Resentment of García's exclusion of the party grew substantially as the honeymoon period came to a close and the party, rather than reaping benefits from García's presidency, was getting the blame for failed policies. They were unable, however, to express this resentment in the form of effective opposition to García's controversial measures.

This became particularly evident at the time of the banks expropriations. There was little public dissent from the party, despite significant opposition to the measure from significant sectors of the APRA leadership. The party's lack of tolerance for publicly expressed dissent gave García
even freer rein and fueled latent resentment. The absence of open party debate of a measure that so negatively affected the overall political and economic situation, and broached the touchy issue of state versus private sector ownership of industry - a measure which a large number of Apristas were fundamentally opposed to - demonstrated the party's dependence on its "jefe" maximo for any sort of substantive initiative. At the same time, the sharp divisions over the measure exposed ideological discrepancies within the party.

The extent of the resentment of many members of the party not only to the banks measure but also to García's overall style and to his perceived disregard for fundamental Aprista values, as was demonstrated by his shelving many of the APRA's traditional symbols during the campaign, became evident at this time, albeit in subtle ways. As García's popularity deteriorated, and it was perceived that he then needed the party, dissent became more open, rifts became more evident, and the old APRA symbols, such as the five-pointed star instead of the dove of peace, and the APRA marseillaise, began to reappear. The conservative sectors within the party blamed the "socialistas" who were advising the President for the mismanaged banks measure.

Por eso, al poner en marcha el gobierno aprista, me sorprendió que al principio se tomaron decisiones no siempre consultadas al organismo partidario adecuado. Los asesores que en ello intervinieron al parecer eran ajenos al partido. Serían ellos quienes propusieron el cambio de la estrella de cinco puntas, por esa paloma...de olvidar la beligerante Marsellesa aprista? Serían ellos los que quisieron usar el vocabulario "socialista" en vez de "aprista"? Hubo, sin duda, el propósito de sustituir al APRA por algo diferente.[7]

At the same time the more radical sectors of the party, in particular the youth, who also felt excluded from the
government, felt that the government was not revolutionary enough. They felt that García should never have backed down on the banks issue and accepted judicial intervention, and that Haya's true doctrine, El Antimperialismo y el APRA, was not being implemented. Their reading of APRA doctrine was marxist and revolutionary, and the García government clearly was not. For these sectors, "el aprismo en tanto doctrina, programa y línea directriz no gobierna. Por el contrario, plantea que el poder político en el país es detenido por una esteril variante del populismo latinoamericano."[8] These ideologically opposed criticisms from the conservatives on one hand and the youth on the other stemmed from the same causes: the lack of doctrinal clarity in the APRA, and García's exclusion of the party from matters of government.

The critique of the García regime as a populist one, coming from within his own party, is a forceful one. The basic characteristics of a populist regime are nationalism, a vertical decision making structure, and emphasis on a dominant personality.[9] In addition there was García's penchant for grand gestures. Besides being presented as the grand giver of programs such as the PAIT, he had a penchant for personally "fixing" things. After a land invasion at Garagay in June of 1986 was repressed by orders of the Interior Ministry, García rushed to the area and declared in a grandiose manner that he would expropriate the land for the settlers.[10] After the prison massacres, for which his executive order was ultimately responsible, García rushed to the prisons in the middle of the night to see what had
actually happened. It was clear to the public that the government was García's and not the APRA's, and he was clearly in control. This had the effect of undermining the party, which was already in a weak position. The party's ability to integrate into society was hardly bettered by García's methods. In terms of the breach between state and society that exists in Peru, García eliminated the "weak executive" factor. However the ability of the government - through its party - to incorporate the participation of the marginalized sectors was not enhanced at all.[11] The APRA party's connections with these sectors were very shallow, and they were made even more so by the populist methods of García. The way in which programs such as the PAIT and the Rimanacuy were implemented - always from above and with no respect for existing organizations - limited their potential. Because they failed to incorporate the participation of the poor in the process of reform, the programs were ill-suited to stimulating the popular initiative necessary for meaningful and lasting reform.

Populist style and methods were key to the APRA's victory in the 1986 municipal elections, where APRA was able to make substantial headway in Lima and in the sierra, where it had traditionally been weak. The party made the most of the mechanisms available: the PAIT and the Rimanacuy. In the 1986 elections, eight IU mayors were defeated by APRA candidates. APRA made great headway in Cusco and Puno. In Cusco APRA's margin rose from 27% in 1983 to 57% in 1986. The party also made headway in the Lima pueblos jovenes, and even narrowed the left's margin in its stronghold Villa El
salvador from 55 to 10%.[12] Yet the reformist impetus proved to be short lived, with the Rimanacuy fading out after 1986 and the PAIT being discontinued in early 1988.

The APRA's approach has been vertical and manipulative rather than genuinely reformist. It seems that the APRA did not adopt the logic of the horizontal and democratic style which characterized the spontaneous social movements of the seventies, a style which the left was able to adopt in its municipal administration, such as in the highly successful Vaso de Leche program. The party instead maintained its vertical style, which was partially responsible, along with its sectarianism, for its failure to give continuity to the viable experience in democratic municipal government that occurred from 1983 to 1986.[13]

García had questionable respect for the democratic system as well. His autocratic style and his impatience often led him to step well beyond constitutional norms, such as sending army tanks to break down bank doors. His impatience with a Congress that could spend months disputing dogmatic points while the nation disintegrated into chaos may have been warranted, yet his own practice of unilaterally decreeing "surprise" measures often left the opposition in Congress with no choice but to use legal and technical criteria to stall major legislation after the fact. García's statement to the APRA youth, in which he was apologizing for the slow pace of revolutionary transformation, is telling:

Es que arrastramos la secuela democratoide, parlamentarista, burguesa, de hacer las cosas de la manera más fácil...Desde 1956 convivimos con la democracia, aprovechamos sus facilidades. Nos hemos
These are hardly the words of a leader fully committed to democratic government, and they demonstrate the unresolved dilemma in García's own mind: whether or not revolutionary change is possible in democratic context. García's increasingly confrontational behaviour after 1987 and his framing the debate in terms of class conflict demonstrate his impatience and perhaps his loss of faith in such a possibility. The name of the semi-official biography of García, written in 1988 by one of his advisors, Guillermo Thorndike: *La Revolución Imposible*, is also demonstrative of this frustration.

García's autocratic behaviour could be ascribed to his frustration with an institutional system which was heavily bureaucratized but had absolutely no procedural structure. Indeed, García had very few people he could rely on within the system to actually get things done. [15] His shift to a confrontational rhetoric and his statements to the APRA youth, meanwhile, could be ascribed to the need to respond to radical sectors within and outside his party. The emotional baggage surrounding Alan García is by no means simple, however, and while rationale does play a role in explaining his erratic and autocratic behaviour, the fact that he has not made a clear choice between a commitment to the democratic process and the alternative: a revolution either from above or from below, poses a threat to the viability of the democratic system. This dilemma is one that exists within the party ranks as well. A concrete example of
this dilemma in process was the debate over changing the Constitution to allow García to run for re-election.

Early on in the García government's administration, the proposal to alter the constitution to permit García to run for re-election began to circulate among the APRA ranks. The proposal was debated in Congress, and its sole supporters were the "Alanistas" in Congress - the Apristas who were strong supporters of Alan García, led by Alfonso Ramos Alva. The opposition and those Apristas whose concern for the future of the constitutional system in Peru was greater than for the short-term political goals were strongly opposed. The altering of the Constitution to suit the political fancies of the leader in power would obviously undermine its legitimacy. García was evidently interested in seeing how much potential the proposal had, and let the debate continue without taking a stance on the issue. His own political ambitions were paramount to the fate of the constitutional system. Only when the political and economic situation was in severe deterioration, and his political future would clearly benefit from an absence from power, did he, in an open letter to the APRA in July of 1988, denounce the re-election proposal as offensive to him. García had enough control and influence over the behavior of the Apristas in Congress that he could have put a halt to the re-election speculations immediately, had he so desired.

Interestingly enough, at the same time he renounced the post that had been created for him of President of the party. His explanation was the conflicting responsibilities of government and party. Clearly the responsibilities of
being President had preempted attention to the party since García took office, but his renouncing of this post two months prior to the party Congress scheduled for October 1988 - the first to be held since August 1985 - definitely had political connotations.

It is not clear why García chose to distance himself from the party at the time, nor was his resignation accepted at that point. He may have wanted to distance himself from the party at a time when the most likely candidate for Secretary General was his main rival in the party, Luis Alva Castro - an outcome which did occur when the Congress was finally held in December. The results of the December Congress were a sound rejection of García's wishes, as the party reasserted itself in the face of the President's increasingly erratic behavior and plummeting popularity rating. After Alva's election the president again submitted his resignation as party president, and this time it was accepted. As is aforementioned, the Alva/Alan rivalry was a deep-seated one. Alva clearly had his own support base within the party, a base which he had built up by taking the time to listen to the concerns of regional party leaders and directors, something that García, due to both his style and to time constraints, could not do. García also probably felt that he would be better off disassociated from an Alva-led party in 1990, as Alva had very little appeal as a candidate outside the APRA. As an external observer, García would have
much less to lose were the APRA defeated, and then would be free to lead the party in 1995. Perhaps most important, if García could not be the unquestioned "jefe maximo" of the party, which he would not be if Alva had a high post, then he would rather be nothing at all. Alan García did not play second fiddle to anyone. His concern for his political image became even more evident at the time of the September 1988 economic shock plan. García did not appear in public for thirty days,[17] in an attempt to distance himself from the economic crisis that was of his own making. There were also highly credible rumours that he threatened to resign at the time. García seemed more concerned with his political image than with commitments to the party,[18] or even - when crisis set in - to the presidency.

 It is interesting to note that García called for the October Congress - which was finally held in December 1988 - to be the congress of unity and for a revamping of party doctrine and mistica.[19] After three years in government, García was publicly recognizing that the party had no real program, and that being in power had had negative effects on it. His chances of uniting the APRA, however, were not very good, as his own position was to be substantially weakened by the election of Alva to Secretary General, and the fundamental disagreements within the party over doctrine and ideology would not be easily resolved.

The Doctrinal Debate

Muy grande es la responsabilidad que todos tenemos ahora que el partido esta comprometido en tareas de gobierno. Y esa responsabilidad no podemos evadirnos fácilmente diciendo que deberían haber más apristas en cargos burocráticos. El aprismo debe ser el promotor y controlador ideológico y programático del gobierno y no
In this message to the APRA party, the same letter in which he resigned as President of the party, García was publicly recognizing that the APRA as a unified party had virtually ceased to function, and that there was no agreement among the party leadership on doctrine or government program. On one side of the party, leaders of several generations such as Jose Barba, Alfredo Barnechea, Jorge Torres Vallejo, Guillermo Larco Cox, and Luis Alberto Sanchez are opposed to increased state control of industry on principle, favor a tougher stance on terrorism, and hold constitutional principles in high esteem. They are pragmatists of the political center. Barba has even suggested reforming APRA doctrine, as he asserts that Haya's 1928 writings were ill-equipped to deal with Peruvian realities. There is then a center left group which corresponds to the García supporters and to such personalities as Javier Valle Riestra, who had been in the MIR and is an active proponent of the human rights of suspected terrorists. This group supports the nationalizations in particular and García in general, and behaved according to the President's wishes in Congress. There is also a more radical wing of the leadership ranks, led by Carlos Roca - one of Haya's favorites in the Buro de Conjunciones. Roca espouses the most radical of Haya's writings, and feels that not enough is being done to put Peru on a revolutionary path of a decidedly Marxist bent. He
has little concern for constitutional government. Most of the party youth favor the Roca route, if not a more radical one, and have a great deal of sympathy for those groups involved in armed struggle. At the same time, the Director of the party's Commission for Ideology, Alfonso Ramos Alva, asserts that Aprismo is not socialism, and that the radical publications that are emanating from the party youth must be receiving funds from an outside source. [20] APRA doctrine does not even have a definition of private property and a clear stance towards it. [21]

There is a plethora of movements within the APRA. One, called Generación en Marcha, was the last generation of the party, the one that followed García's, to know Haya. Most of its seven leaders have government or municipal posts. This group feels that Haya's and APRA's platform is anachronistic and incomplete, and that the party needs a political platform. The party is more of a front, with diverse views such as Barba and Barnechea at one extreme, and the ex-Aprista head of the MRTA at the other. The APRA party, they feel, needs to define its position on issues such as private property, and distance its doctrine from the IU's. At the same time, the group wants to revive the "mística" and dedication of the Haya-led APRA, and is attempting to stress the importance of the traditional APRA symbols. They feel that the trappings of power and the domination by Alan García have harmed the traditional unity of the party. [22] They want to democratize the party by expanding the links of the leadership to the party youth - the JAP, the students, the CUA - and to the adult militants. [23]
The number of currents and personalities is clearly more complicated than this brief analysis permits; the point is that there are a diversity of views within the party that stretch from a constitutional reformist view to a radical Marxist vision. Haya de la Torre's writings were so extensive, so varied, and so elusive that all of these groups could justify their views using his works. His theory of "Espacio Tiempo Historico" is so all encompassing that it justifies both the calling of immediate insurrection in the name of revolution and the postponing of revolutionary change for decades. Without the jefe maximo to determine what the party's ideology would be at the moment - whether it be the convivencia with conservative elites or the participation in the 1948 uprising against Bustamante - there is an absence of doctrinal clarity which has led to great deal of confusion. While Alan García is President of the nation, he is not Haya, the "jefe maximo", and he himself also does not seem to have a set view of the party's doctrine. Thus there is a genuine lack of consensus in the party, not just over how to govern, but over what the party's official doctrine really is. Since Haya's death, the rifts between the conservative "Treinta Anos de Aprismo" wing led by Townsend and the "Antimperialismo" wing led by Villanueva have never really been solved, rather they were set aside in order to win the 1985 election. As disagreement over key decisions followed, however, the rifts once again became clear.

It can easily be argued that Peruvian politics would be greatly enhanced by much less attention to doctrine and more
to the nation's realities. Yet because there is no consensus in Peru over basic political tenets, such as respect for constitutional guarantees, a market versus a state run economy, and the type of society that Peru should aspire to have, dogma and doctrine take on an increased importance. There is an absence of consensus on basic societal values[24] - an equilibrium that is missing in revolutionary societies. In absence of agreement over basic values, debates over daily policy measures carry an additional and often overblown ideological baggage.

Another problem which surfaced from the party's lack of clarity on certain critical principles was a tacitly condoned re-emergence of APRA paramilitary squads, the infamous "búfalos" named after the 1932 insurrectionary Búfalo Barreto. The APRA's attitude towards armed insurrection has always been an ambiguous one, as was demonstrated by Haya's tacit support for the student uprisings of 1975 and the 1948 participation in military revolts, and more recently for the appeal that the MRTA has had among youth ranks. One high level Aprista government functionary remarked: "no good Aprista hasn't at least once thought of picking up arms."[25] There were several isolated cases of violence involving these squadrons. Most publicized were a supposedly Aprista instigated bombing of the headquarters of the pro-terrorist newspaper El Diario; the discovery of large caches of weapons and the assault on a Caretas journalist trying to investigate at the IPSS;[26] the Social Security administration, and the discovery of large quantities of unregistered weapons being imported from
North Korea - where the APRA had links - by the Vice Minister of the Interior, Mantilla, who was known for his entourage of "búfalos".[27] Javier Valle Riestra, a high ranking senator with a strong interest in human rights issues admitted that "of course, everyone knew that the party had búfalos"[28] and that the party had a right to protect itself. As Senderista violence grew more rampant by 1988, there was supposedly an intra-party campaign, led by Jorge Idiaquez, to train more paramilitary types.[29] Idiaquez, Haya's secretary, apparently had a major role in the past in training these squadrons. In addition, in 1988, a paramilitary group surfaced called the Comando Rodrigo Franco, and was widely believed to have links with the APRA party. The group vowed to revenge all Aprista victims of Sendero, and was allegedly responsible for the murders of Manuel Febres, the defence lawyer for Sendero's supposed number two, Osman Morote, and Saul Cantoral, the head of the powerful miners' union, among others.

The problems that plagued the party at the leadership level also were evident at the rank and file level. There were many cases of party youth clashing with conservative regional directors; most extreme perhaps was the case of an avidly anti-communist director in Cusco, Julio Lara, who was involved in violent attacks against radical youth.[30] The discrepancies at the leadership level were far greater at the rank and file level. Particularly since the party had taken power, party activities were relegated to secondary priority, and most party leaders opted for government-
related posts. The party mechanism as such virtually ceased to function.

Party activity at the rank and file level was greatly reduced, and there were even cases of Aprista ranks who had not seen a director in forty years. Disillusion at the rank and file level showed up in the widespread failure to pay party dues. The party's funding depended much more on the 5% of salaries that was required from Aprista public functionaries. The existence of a Federation of Forgotten Apristas is telling. There remained two strong and relatively independent currents in the party that were not directly active in the government, but had more of a sense of loyalty to the party in many ways than did its leadership: the Juventud Aprista Peruana and the many Apristas for whom the APRA signified family ties, national identity, and almost substituted for religion: APRA culture.

The Party Youth

Este es el partido que tiene como título de legitimidad como verdadera y sublime expresión de su poder moral un martirologo ilustre glorioso...que significa la ofrenda voluntaria de un pueblo, listo a dar su sangre porque los ideas apristas se mantengan en su egregia aspiración de justicia y libertad. [Victor Raúl Haya de la Torre, as quoted on the party program at February 1988 Día de Fraternidad]

More than any other sector of the party, the party's youth looked for inspiration to its history of martyrdom and insurrection. For the first time in the party's history,
however, it was the holder of power, and thus the force that other insurrectionist movements were rebelling against. This created a fundamental dilemma for the party's youth, and they became disassociated to a large extent from both party leadership and government.

The APRA began almost as a youth movement, with the activities of the 1920's generation. Until the convivencia era, the APRA dominated the youth movement in the universities. After that time, its dominance was substantially eroded by groups to the left, which had more appeal to young sectors than the aging and increasingly conservative APRA leadership. The defections of the youth were primarily a function of their ideological disillusion: at the time that the events of the Cuban revolution were inciting revolutionary activity among the left throughout Latin America, the APRA was making alliances with the conservative forces that had been its persecutors. The APRA maintained the organizational bases of its youth sectors, however, throughout this period, and among other things the organization of the party's youth is what gives it the distinct characteristics of a mass party.[35]

The JAP - Juventud Aprista Peruana - was made up of youth aged 14 to 24 whose goal was to inscribe into the party. The JAP has a national directorate and within it are the Comando Universitario Aprista(CUA) and the Comando Escolar Aprista. There are different currents within this national youth movement, as was demonstrated by the existence of the IDE and the more radical ARE in the seventies, and by groups such as Vanguardia Aprista, Nueva
Izquierda, and the ARE in the eighties. The youth was the focus of Haya's attention during the military years, and that generation of youth are the leaders that are currently in power today. The generations that followed, however, had a very different training experience. Rather than knowing the APRA as a binding family led by the paternal guiding hand of Haya, these youth never met Haya and instead experienced the divided party of the early eighties and then the governing party of 1985 hence. Thus there is within the youth a strong current which is searching for the "lost" values that they have been told about but not seen, of the mistica experienced by the older generations that were persecuted. The youth of today's APRA want to return to the doctrine of the early twenties, and also to the experience of belonging to a party that was actually fighting for its revolution. Thus their political views are much more radical than those of the government, and the appeal for them of the MRTA and its guns is greater than that of ineffective parliamentary debate.

The majority of the APRA youth on average want a much more radical, Marxist oriented approach on the part of the government. They also are searching for a 'mística,' a devotion to revolutionary values. They have consistently revolted against corrupt regional officials. The established regional directors are in many cases of the conservative strain as well as corrupt, which has fueled rebellion. On several occasions high ranking party leaders were sent to JAP Congresses to attempt to quell rebellious APRA youth. Luis Negreiros, the General Secretary of the party, for
example, had to travel to the north of the country in October of 1987 to deal with a rebellion in the youth movement which stretched across four traditional APRA strongholds: Chimbote, Trujillo, Chiclayo, and Lambayeque. The youth were accusing their regional directorates of having split up their charges irregularly. They accused one official, the head of Cooperación Popular in Lambayeque, of robbing the PAIT of 200,000 intis, and called for his resignation. In February of that same year Carlos Roca was sent to temper the rhetoric of a national convention of APRA university leaders. Roca, the leader of the most radical wing of the APRA, disassociated the radical rhetoric of the youth congress from the party. Roca's stance was denounced by the majority of the youth and the event went on, with only a minority allying with the party's CEN.

The party's youth is frustrated by the corruption and bureaucratic bickering of the party leaders at the regional level, and at the central level with the government's failure to take a more radical stance. The party youth want an APRA that is "una doctrina y una repuesta completa". Their respect is greatest for those who are willing to die for their ideals, as is demonstrated by their naming their 1983 CUA Congress "Edith Lagos" after a well known Senderista who was killed by the military; and by the movement to name the 1988 JAP Congress "Luis de la Puente Uceda" - the name "Mártires del Aprismo" was finally chosen. This has had an effect at all levels of the party, as was demonstrated by García's controversial address at the 1988 Congress in which he said that he too admired
the dedication of Senderistas. The image that the party youth has of their party does not fit that of a party in power in a democratic government. The government cannot be constitutionally elected on the one hand and sanctioning armed struggle on the other. The party youth also deplore the fact that prior to the 1985 closing of new inscriptions into the party many non-idealistic technicians, such as INF head Javier Tantalean joined the party. The youth see these new Apristas who are not products of the JAP ranks as "opportunists."[41] The party leadership, meanwhile, involved in the tasks of government, has failed to respond to the increasing isolation and radicalization of the youth movement.

In early 1986, Garcia himself instructed the national secretary of organization, Walter Cuestas, to organize a series of coloquia for party youth which was based on the ideas behind Haya's colloquia. Seminars were given by prominent party leaders and several of the youth were sent to observe the Rimanacuy.[42] This effort seems to have been short-lived and concentrated primarily in Lima. The increasing divergence between the bulk of the party youth and the party line was demonstrated by a 1988 APRA youth meeting where the speakers included a Agustín Haya and Javier Diez Canseco of the PUM, and a representative of the Nicaraguan embassy, but not one APRA leader.[43] The lack of communication between the youth and the top levels of the party is accentuated by fact that most of the recently "graduated" JAP leaders, the 24 to 27 generation that was organized and trained by García and Carlos Roca in the late
seventies and early eighties, which might have served as the natural link between the JAP and the older party leaders, took positions in the government rather than dedicating their time to party activity.[44] As the party took on the responsibilities of government the youth's traditionally strong influence in party decisionmaking diminished.[45]

The main divergence of the youth wing is their clear definition of society along a class struggle line. They see the APRA as "un movimiento marxista, que cree en la revolucion conducida y ejecutada principalmente por los obreros y campesinos."[46] This sector apparently is supported by the more radical elements of the labor movement, those elements of the CTP that broke with Cruzado and participated in the 1988 national strike.[47]

The moving to the left of the student movement had its roots as early as the mid seventies, with the division of the APRA youth into the IDE - Izquierda Democrática Estudiantil - and the more radical ARE - Alianza Revolucionaria Estudiantil. The ARE was initially disavowed by Haya, but eventually he granted it recognition, such as his tacit approval of its participation in the events of 5 February 1975. The Comando Universitario Aprista was formed by Haya to avoid such splits and problems, but it was unable to solve the factional disputes over ideology. In 1980, one of the key party issues was the student movement's harsh criticism of Julio Cruzado and the failure of the CTP to support the national strikes of the late seventies. In the split between Townsend and Villanueva, the IDE supported Townsend and Cruzado, while the ARE went with
The ARE remains one of the APRA's main representatives in the universities today, along with Vanguardia Aprista and Nueva Izquierda. The ARE's support in universities does not compare to that for the more extreme left, however. In 1988 elections at San Marcos, the ARE came in a poor fourth place after a Sendero and MRTA aligned group, the FDR; the Frente Amplio San Marquino, aligned with IU; and the PCP-Bandera Roja. The radicalization of the APRA youth must be seen in the context of the overall radicalization of youth in Peru.

Co-existing with the leftist elements of the APRA youth are a small group - primarily from age-old APRA families - that has unquestioning loyalty to the party and retain the age-old animosity for the Marxist left. This group very much resents the APRA being labelled as similar to IU or other elements of the left, and has been, on several occasions, involved in violent clashes with IU militants. The most notable was the October 1987 assault by Jaime Bedon, then national secretary of the JAP, on an IU Congressman. This sort of violence, which has also contributed to the speculations about a resurgence of the "bufalos" or paramilitary squads, was justified by one staunchly loyal APRA militant:

Es que cuando a los compañeros se les dice que es la izquierda la que boicotea al gobierno y cuando se cree realmente que el APRA puede y debe llevar a cabo la gran transformación...muchos de ellos están dispuestos a todo y harán todo lo que se les diga para no traicionar el gran proyecto histórico.

This group of youth is a product of the Aprismo that continues to exist apart from and independent of the government. The blind loyalty to the APRA as an ideal is
"Aprismo popular" and it has what the radical and disillusioned sectors of the youth are seeking: "mística". Due to the changes that occurred as the party sought power and then to the challenges of government, the party has behaved more as an electoral front than as an organized mass party. The APRA 'mística' is clearly less prevalent and of a different nature than it was during Haya's time. It has by no means, however, disappeared.

Mistica: Aprismo as a Culture

Así como el aprismo tiende a confundir al pueblo consigo mismo, pasa igual con la izquierda...Sin embargo, es preciso definir lo popular, diremos entonces que lo popular es esa parte de la realidad acumulada, inorgánica y espontánea, pero activa, creativa y dinámica, que viven, expresan y comunican las masas populares. Lo popular es experiencia ancestral, vida, práctica social y simbólica, que traduce una visión del mundo y de la historia...[52]

There is clearly in existence an "Aprismo popular" which is relatively independent of the García phenomenon. For this group of people, APRA is the equivalent of a religious faith, and Haya de la Torre is their god. While this faith in Haya de la Torre and his ideas also exists at the leadership level, it involves ideological conviction, while at the popular level it is more of a spiritual one. At the popular level, Aprismo is something which is part of a family tradition, and is handed down from generation to generation. These families often have members who either died or were imprisoned during the persecution years, and the strength of the emotions that accompanies such experiences is pervasive. Persecution was felt by families as a whole, as wives were often left alone for years to support households. In one family interviewed, seven of the
eight male members of one generation were imprisoned at the same time. Faith in APRA - in Haya in particular - was the guiding principle throughout such experiences. When references were made to Haya - even in the present context - it was to a man with superhuman qualities, a leader, a "saviour".[53] The shared faith throughout these painful experiences became an integral part of "Aprismo." Alan García's own father was imprisoned for the first five years of García's life, and this "Aprismo Popular" was a part of García's own formative years and is one of the qualities that made him acceptable as a successor to Haya de la Torre. García and Haya are not referred to in the same way, however, and past times, particularly the era of persecution, are spoken about with an aura of mystery and awe. Aprismo popular seems to be based much more on the "then" than the "now". In the same way that faith in Haya got these families through persecution, now it will get them through whatever other problems they might face.

It is necessary to distinguish APRA at the leadership level from Aprismo Popular. From its initiation in 1924, the APRA had an institutionalized leadership ranks that formed the crux of the political and intellectual bases of the party. But beginning with the 1930 electoral campaign and with a basis in the popular movements of the times, there arose a popular movement that was also the APRA. Yet the two currents were distinct from each other intellectually and sociologically, with the leadership being primarily coastal, white, wealthier, and better educated, and the popular movement more likely to be of provincial origin, mestizo,
and less educated. Haya's genius allowed these two movements to form a political alliance, but they were not necessarily united on other levels.[54]

Although Haya was a "costeño" with European tastes, it was no coincidence that he chose symbols of Andean origin for his graphic representations, such as the famous "chavin" - the Andean bird which is one of the party's best known symbols. Thus he cultivated a political faith in the popular APRA movement which was not grounded in politics but in mistica: a complex combination of shared historical experiences, symbolism, and spiritual faith in the personality of Haya himself. This movement is now, to a large extent, cultivated independently rather than by the party leadership.

"Un pueblo que vive de una fe que se alimenta desde el interior de su cultura, no necesariamente a partir de elementos que vienen desde afuera, aunque estos tengan un valor especial dentro del proceso de reactivación simbólica."[55]

This movement thus functions in a cross between autonomy and submission, and its role in the reactivation of the party is significant but not totally clear. There were sectors of the APRA which had not seen a "dirigente" in forty years at the time of the 1981 split between Townsend and Villanueva. The conflict was viewed as distant by such sectors as a "pleito de hermanos mayores (blancos)"; although these sectors did go along with the ruling of the secretariat of discipline expelling Townsend. The party's vertical and authoritarian structure was thus able to maintain loyalty and obedience on matters of national political importance, but for the most part functioned as a
separate entity from the APRA as a culture. Once the party attained power, the control of the party mechanism over these sectors took on a clientelistic nature, in keeping with the approach of the García government.

"Estas formas verticales y paralelas de hacer política, han producido a su vez el fenómeno del clientelismo de unos y otros; pues el poder estatal se convierte en el pagador del favor popular, mercantilizando, cuando no corrompiendo, la función pública; despolitizando de esta manera las motivaciones participacionistas del pueblo."[56]

Aprismo popular is both independent of and linked to the party mechanism and the government. It clearly will always deliver its votes to the APRA in the way that the youth sectors will not. In 1983, for example, many of the youth purportedly voted for Barrantes over the more conservative Aprista candidate Alfredo Barnechea.[57] The popular movement that is Aprismo is an expression, however, of the world vision, the religion, the "razon de ser" that is Aprismo. It is, more than anything else, an expression of the need for cultural integration in Peru - of the need for agreement on fundamental values - and of the brilliance of Victor Raúl Haya de la Torre in perceiving that need. He may not have succeeded in founding the most capable group of leaders or the most socially integrated group of followers - indeed APRA's sectarianism has always been one of its downfalls - but he did succeed in giving Peru, through the APRA, a unique form of cultural and political identity.
Chapter VI
The APRA's Relations with the Opposition

In order to evaluate the APRA's performance, it is important to understand the forces of opposition - both parliamentary and insurrectionary - that it faced. The APRA, as the oldest "revolutionary" party and the starting point for many of the leaders of other movements, was in a unique, and often difficult, position to deal with opposition from the left. Alfonso Barrantes, leader of the Izquierda Unida, and Victor Polay Campos, leader of the MRTA, both began their political careers as members of the APRA. The defections to the left of the convivencia and Velasco had left a permanent scar. The criticism from much of the left: that the APRA was not genuinely revolutionary, was particularly difficult for the APRA to deflect, particularly since it often came from former members of the party's own ranks. The party's sectarian nature, meanwhile, made cooperation with the left virtually impossible, with the exception of the highest level. Alan García relied a great deal on advisors affiliated with the left, which was deeply resented by the members of his own party.

On the other end of the spectrum, the moribund right was revitalized after the banks nationalization. The Frente Democratico, led by Mario Vargas Llosa, not only incorporated the support of the Peruvian oligarchy, but much of the political center and middle class, as well as the private sector, which had supported Alan García and the APRA until that time. While the Frente had little chance of appealing to the nation's poor, it was able to erode the APRA's traditional support base in the middle class. In
addition, the resurgence of the new right in the midst of the banks controversy led to a rise in anti-Aprismo, which had been dormant during the first part of the García government.

Finally, and posing the greatest challenge, the existence of revolutionary groups actively opting for the insurrectionary route placed both the APRA and the left, as supporters of revolution, in difficult positions ideologically, particularly as members of the APRA youth and the largest faction of the Izquierda Unida supported armed struggle. The APRA's past as an insurrectionary movement played a factor. This issue was made more difficult by the brutal and fanatical nature of the Sendero Luminoso, and the fact that its main targets were APRA government officials. By the middle of the García government's term, both Sendero and the MRTA had made substantial headway, violence had become a daily event, the judicial system became subordinate to terrorist sabotage; armed APRA paramilitary groups or "búfalos" had reappeared; and there was overt support for a violent path among young Apristas and half of the parliamentary left. The APRA's relations with its opposition were no easy task, and were to have substantial impact on the party's ability to govern.

Izquierda Unida

Any convincing explanation of the weakness and even more so of the sectarianism of the Peruvian left would have to enter into a detailed examination of that country's political history and of its complex and fragmented social structure. Historically, one would have to examine the influence of APRA which monopolized the resistance to dictatorial government...The way that the Communist party supported the military government after 1968 helps to explain why many opponents of the government looked to more radical groups...Whatever the
reasons for these deep and sectarian differences, the fact that they exist and that so much time is spent on sterile debate about what Mao or Trotsky really meant... isolates would-be leaders from the mass of the people.[1]

The Izquierda Unida is an electoral front formed after the 1980 elections, which comprises the majority of the nation's socialist and Communist parties. The parties vary from Maoists and Trotskyites to Moscow-aligned Communists to independent socialists, and were originally united by the personality of Alfonso Barrantes. The moderate and likeable Barrantes, a former Aprista, was palatable to many outside the left as well. He was elected mayor of Lima from 1983 to 1986, and consistently remains one of the most popular leaders in Peru, according to most opinion polls. In the 1985 elections, the left was the only political force other than the APRA with any substantial backing.

After 1986 the Izquierda Unida grew increasingly divided, between the moderate Barrantes-led faction, which was comprised primarily of independents and socialists, and the more radical factions, led by the largest party within the Izquierda Unida, the Partido de Unificacion Mariateguista - PUM. The Moscow-linked Partido Comunista was not aligned with either faction. The PUM-led faction was openly sympathetic to groups engaged in or supporting armed struggle, and had formal links with three of them: UDP, Pueblo en Marcha and the MIR. The Barrantes faction, on the other hand, strongly condemned Sendero Luminoso and terrorism in general. Barrantes himself, in response to an accusation that he was "to the right" of García, stated that his primary goal was to preserve democracy.[2] Barrantes
takes this stance for several reasons. First of all, he is in his ideological convictions, first and foremost a pragmatist. Secondly, he is one of the top targets of Sendero, which condemns him as a revisionist. Finally, he is aware that the left in general would probably not fare well were there a military coup inspired by leftist guerrilla violence.

The more radical factions of IU, on the other hand, are extremely dogmatic and have little concern for democratic government. The militants and leaders of the PUM are sympathetic and have ties to the MRTA guerrillas. Before the MRTA launched its armed struggle, it was affiliated with the UDP, Pueblo en Marcha, and the MIR, all of which have ties to the PUM. When the MRTA began its violent route, part of the MIR joined it. The other groups remained proponents of armed struggle, while not actively engaged. The PUM's stance is that of using democracy as a stage of preparing the "consciousness" of the masses before going to war. This approach is unacceptable to Barrantes, who maintains that there is an explicit choice between reform in a democratic context and armed struggle. This fundamental difference created an unbreachable rift between the two factions. The other large party in the coalition, the Partido Comunista would be likely to negotiate a pact with Barrantes, were he to formally split the coalition. The PC has a history of negotiating[3] and it also controls the powerful CGTP; its position in such a split would be critical.

The PUM, meanwhile, would launch armed struggle rather than accepting the Barrantes approach. It is ironic that the
PUM is led by Javier Diez Canseco - a member of one of Peru's oldest aristocratic families and educated at the elitist Catholic University - and also by Agustín Haya de la Torre, a nephew of Haya's. The PUM is clearly a force to be reckoned with, as it has substantial party mechanisms at the grass roots level. Diez Canseco received more votes than any other IU senator in the 1985 elections.[4] While the IU coalition managed to retain its unity at election time, at the grassroots level the different parties function independently, and have different strongholds.[5] By end-1988 the rifts were such that were there to be a formal split in the coalition, the PUM-led wing would have little alternative than to opt for armed struggle in the short run in order to retain ideological clarity.

The radical wing of the IU accuses Barrantes of being a pseudo-Aprista due to his close relationship with García and his stance of "critical support" for the APRA government. His desire to cooperate with the APRA government probably stemmed from concern for Peruvian democracy and for reform within that context, rather than from ideological affinity for the APRA. Like most APRA dissidents, his distancing from the party, which occurred in 1958, entailed an ideological breach. He refers to his time in the APRA as his "edad de piedra" and maintains that the main benefit of the experience was getting to know the bases of the party. Haya's incoherent ideology in the face of Mariategui's pure vision was what spurred him to leave the party.[6] "For example I was anti-imperialist when I worked with APRA, and as a socialist, I still am. But it is unquestionable that
the aprista vision differs from a Marxist or a Mariateguista vision. The analytical tools are different, and therefore so is the analysis of Peruvian reality."[7]

Barrantes, probably the most capable and popular leader of the IU coalition, resigned from its presidency in 1987. While there remained the strong possibility that he would be the IU candidate in 1990, he was, as he himself admitted,[8] in a tenuous position. He had no leadership responsibility either in the front or in a party - he is an independent, although there is a move among the independents and moderates to unite as a force, as was demonstrated by the formation of the "Socialistas de IU" faction in May of 1988.[9] Barrantes would be the most likely candidate for this faction. The viability of the IU as a united coalition in 1990 containing both of the divergent factions is unlikely.

The future of the nation's left is as uncertain as Peru's. Barrantes maintains that the instability of the political situation is a function of the deteriorating condition of the governing party; however, he also admits that the left is not united enough to fill its place. While the animosity between the Mariateguista left and the Hayista APRA was reduced substantially after Haya's death, an intense rivalry remains as the two forces compete for the same social sectors: unions, universities, and pueblos jovenes.[10] This competition has taken various forms. In Puno, for example, there have been constant violent clashes between PUM controlled campesino organizations and APRA authorities.[11] In Lima, where Barrantes ran what most
observers agree was an efficient and non-partisan municipality, APRA control of the municipality has signified the creation of many parallel and competing organizations, such as mothers' clubs and Vaso de Leche program committees. Meanwhile, in a 1988 attempt to build up the non-party affiliated left, Barrantes chose Trujillo, the traditional APRA stronghold, as a base of operations.[12]

In general, while competition for social sectors has been intense on the part of both parties, the APRA's approach, due both to its sectarian nature and to the advantage of controlling the central government, has been far more exclusionary in nature than IU's. The IU's advantage seems to lie in its superior competence at the directorate level, as many IU functionaries are either from upper middle class "bourgeois" families and have the advantage of an education at "La Católica", or were able to take advantage of the increase in funding for left-affiliated think tanks during the Velasco years. This competence difference is such that García purportedly offered a host of government posts to several high level IU functionaries at a series of dinners early on in his administration; the IU functionaries declined.[13] There is definitely a presence of IU functionaries in the government, however. "Es la capacidad y el nivel de algunos técnicos de izquierda lo que los hace indispensables."[14]

Despite the competition, there is also ideological convergence between the younger, García-led wing of the APRA and the moderate Barrantes-led faction of the IU, which was made stronger by the friendship of Barrantes and García.
This is resented by both the old guard of the APRA and the radical wing of IU. There are similarities between the youth of the Izquierda Unida and those of the APRA, which are the most radicalized sector of the party. In the long run a convergence of these forces may end up being the central force supporting Peruvian democracy, acting as a counterforce to the more radical and violent groups further to the left, which are providing increasing competition for social support bases in unions and popular organizations, for example. The sectarianism of the APRA, particularly at the rank and file level, and the existence in the IU of a wing which supports armed struggle may, however, preclude such cooperation. The failure of such cooperation plays into the hands of the more radical faction of the IU, which spurns all cooperation with the APRA. The PUM's Augustín Haya noted satisfactorily: "El intento del grupo 'Socialismo y Participación' de ser un puente entre el APRA y la IU existe, efectivamente, desde los años previos a las elecciones de 1985. Pero con el tiempo tales intenciones de propiciar una alianza histórica se han ido diluyendo por el comportamiento del APRA."[15]

The future of democracy in Peru may indeed hinge on the "abrazo histórico" between these two forces, but the possibility of such an alliance will depend on the APRA's ability to rid itself of its sectarianism and dogmatism, and on the more moderate elements of the left to disassociate themselves from their colleagues who consider democracy a transient stage en route to civil war. The friendship between García and Barrantes could have been a positive
political force, and is interesting historically in light of the relationship between Haya and Mariategui. The potential of this relationship is limited, unfortunately, by the ideological differences of the parties and García's autocratic nature.

Fredemo

The resurgence of the right in Peru indeed had consequences for the APRA. In the same way that the left was competing with the party for support in unions and pueblos jóvenes, the new right provided the APRA with a major competitor among the middle class. By departing on a confrontational approach to politics, and framing the political debate in antagonistic class terms, something that he had previously avoided, García's rhetoric at the time of the banks expropriations opened the door for a resurgence of latent anti-aprismo among the conservative elites. Not necessarily to the Vargas Llosa movement's benefit, these groups also lent him their active support. Once again the APRA was embroiled in an "us" versus "them" type controversy, and the "them" - the conservative elites - had been given an excuse to participate by the APRA government.

While the banks controversy gave the new right impetus to organize, the idea of providing a political alternative had been discussed several times by Vargas Llosa and his campaign organizer Miguel Cruchaga.[16] The banks crisis opened a new political space which had until then been filled by the APRA after the demise of Acción Popular. First of all, it gave Vargas Llosa impetus to act in name of a cause that he felt deeply about. While critics contended
that the "Libertad" slogan was indeed a sham, the author truly seemed to believe that state control of the country's credit was a threat to freedom of the press, both because of the government's lack of respect for constitutional norms and because of the heavy financial dependence of the press on the banks. Secondly, the banks measure alienated not just large scale financial interests, but entrepreneurs of all sizes and a large segment of the middle class that had supported the APRA. The measure also alienated several members of the more conservative ranks within the APRA. Besides the highly publicized defections in Congress of Jorge Torres Vallejo and Alfredo Barnechea, there were also a few defections at the rank and file level, some of whom purportedly translated their support to the Vargas Llosa movement.[17]

The anti-banks movement grew from an informal alliance of protestors into a formal political front - the Frente Democratico - between Vargas Llosa, Fernando Belaunde, and Luis Bedoya, and their respective party mechanisms. Vargas Llosa formalized this alliance out of a perceived need for organization, particularly in remote areas[18], however, the alliance with Accion Popular and the PPC narrowed the movement's political space by placing it squarely in the right, rather than remaining as a new political alternative. Hernando de Soto, one of the Libertad movement's proponents, purportedly disassociated himself from the movement due to his opposition to the alliance.[19]

The Libertad movement formalized its organization in March 1988 by establishing a party headquarters and
political platform. Its general theme is the seeking of technical rather than political solutions to Peru's problems, with five main points: the transformation of the state from a large and weak one into a small and strong one; the reinsertion of Peru into the international financial system; the integration of the country beyond the existence of two co-existing — or more accurate, warring — cultures; the stimulation of the private sector so as to create wealth; and the need for civilian presence in anti-terrorism strategy. Poverty and terrorism are the most pressing issues.[20]

The fate of the Libertad movement will depend upon "the extent to which the leftist alternative in general" is discredited by economic crisis.[21] The Frente's links with the discredited political parties of the right, and the fact that all of the members of its nine member directorate are of the elite limit its appeal to the poor, as does Vargas Llosa's lack of ties to the poor and less educated population. However, the Frente's underlying theme: a rejection of dogma and the search for technical solutions, has attracted some of the nation's most talented economists and sociologists — José Matos Mar and Felipe Ortiz de Zevallos, among others.

Dogmatic politics, on all sides of the political spectrum — whether the right's intransigent adherence to liberal or neoliberal economics, or the APRA's belief that it was the only solution, or the left's endless debates and splits over Mao versus Trotsky, or García implementing his very "own" revolution by nationalizing the banks — have
consistently proven harmful to Peru. It is relevant at this point to turn to the most dogmatic and fanatical force in Peruvian politics, Sendero Luminoso. The death and destruction that Sendero has wreaked on Peru has not only retarded the development process, but has changed the entire nature of society to one where violence is an accepted norm. Ironically for the APRA, its most formidable challenge comes from those who claim to be following the path of Mariategui, one of Haya's first collaborators and ultimately his rival.
The Challenge From the Armed Left

El Aprismo es marxista por utilizar ampliamente el materialismo histórico; por aceptar el principio de la lucha de clases... por reconocer la posibilidad del uso revolucionario de la violencia... [22]

The existence of violent revolutionary movements in Peru poses a challenge to any government in terms of confrontation, but poses a more complex ideological challenge to a government - like the APRA's - that itself claims to be revolutionary. The APRA cannot claim to be a revolutionary party and pursue the same counterterrorism strategy as a right-wing government. This puts the party in a difficult position when faced with the threat from a movement as brutal and fanatical as Sendero Luminoso, whose primary targets are APRA government officials and functionaries. In addition, another insurrectionary movement, the MRTA, led by a former Aprista, launched armed struggle in the jungle region of the country in November of 1987. This movement, a more conventional and less ruthless one than Sendero, found a great deal of support in the youth of the APRA and the IU, as well as in IU's more radical wing. This posed a dilemma for the APRA government, which needed a support base among these radical groups. The existence of violent revolutionary movements in Peru poses a challenge to any government in terms of confrontation, but poses a more complex ideological challenge to a government - like the APRA's - that itself claims to be revolutionary. The APRA cannot claim to be a revolutionary party and pursue the same counterterrorism strategy as a right-wing government. This puts the party in a difficult position when faced with the threat from a movement as brutal and fanatical as Sendero Luminoso, whose primary targets are APRA government officials and functionaries. In addition, another insurrectionary movement, the MRTA, led by a former Aprista, launched armed struggle in the jungle region of the country in November of 1987. This movement, a more conventional and less ruthless one than Sendero, found a great deal of support in the youth of the APRA and the IU, as well as in IU's more radical wing. This posed a dilemma for the APRA government, which needed a support base among these radical groups. The Sendero Luminoso's attacks coupled with the military's repressive actions had taken over 5,000 lives. By 1988, that toll had more than doubled. Between 1980 and 1985, political violence...
took more lives in Peru than in any other Latin American nation save El Salvador, with official estimates at over 6,000 but others as high as 10,000.[23] In the meantime, the other guerrilla group, the Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru - MRTA - which at the start of the García government was responsible only for a few sporadic urban bombings, grew so in size and strength that by the fall of 1987 it had military control of an entire province in the nation's jungle region. Most government and external observers agreed that terrorism was the nation's most pressing problem.

The government came to power promising to take a different approach from the Belaúnde government's "letting loose" of the military. García both issued warnings to the military by firing three top generals after the massacre of seventy-five citizens[24] and launched several policies to improve living standards in the sierra - the stronghold of Sendero. For the first time in Peru's history, the terms of trade were turned in favor of Andean agriculture, and the Agrarian Bank launched a policy of providing favorable credit to Andean farmers; loans to campesinos in the Ayacucho region rose by 380% from 1985 to 1986.[25] The García government also launched a series of unprecedented public dialogues - called Rimanacuy - between campesino leaders and government officials. Due to the uncompromising nature of Sendero, and to the lack of follow up on the part of the government, these initiatives had little impact on the spread of terrorism and soon ran out of steam.

The military's frustration with the advance of the guerrillas, meanwhile, was demonstrated by the massacre of
over 250 imprisoned terrorists during a June 1986 uprising in Lima's prisons. While García's image suffered at the time, it suffered more as Sendero made continued advances and its victims included Rodrigo Franco, one of the brightest young Apristas - slated to be the head of the Central Bank - and almost a dozen APRA mayors. By 1988, the cycle of violence was clearly out of hand. The judicial system was also victim, as lawyers and judges who ruled against terrorists had become common assassination targets. García was forced to install a retired Navy admiral - known as a hawk - as Interior Minister. In his July 1988 inaugural address, the main measures announced by García - in contrast to the banks nationalizations of the previous year - were a toughening of anti-terrorist laws, which made it illegal to be associated or to apologize for terrorist groups, and made the holding of unlicensed weapons or explosives a major offense.[26] Indicative of the inconsistency of approach was that only a month before, in what was supposed to be an off the record speech to the APRA youth but soon made the front pages of the national press, García had lauded the revolutionary devotion of Sendero militants.

Equivocado o no, el senderista tiene lo que nosotros no tenemos: mistica y entrega...Esa es gente que merece nuestro respeto y mi personal admiración porque son, quírase o no, militantes. Fanáticos les dicen. Yo creo que tienen mística y es parte de nuestra autocritica, compañeros, saber reconocer que quien, subordinado o no, se entrega a la muerte, entrega la vida, tiene mística.[27]

The speech was, as could be expected, extremely controversial, and exposed the dilemma that APRA faced in trying to maintain its image as a "revolutionary" party
while actively involved in a war against leftist revolutionaries. Despite initial hopes that the APRA government would introduce the non-military component that was necessary to combat the growth of insurrectionary activity, the efforts were short-lived, much in the same way that innovation and initiative faded on the economic front. The strength and scope of the insurrectionary groups, on the other hand, particularly of Sendero, grew to a debilitating level.

Sendero Luminoso

Todo empezó como jugando, dicen las letras de una canción popular, que fueron más...acertadas para designar el movimiento armado...Sendero Luminoso...Algunas torres eléctricas por allá, algunas bombas por acá, no presagiaban ni prefiguraban las dimensiones geométricas que habrían de alcanzar las acciones, que de provincias ayacuchanas...llegando a tener en la actualidad una inquietud presencia a nivel nacional. Hoy, el nombre de Sendero Luminoso es mundialmente conocido.[28]

Sendero Luminoso - or Shining Path - derives its name from a statement made by Peru's first Communist ideologue and initially a collaborator of Haya de la Torre's, José Carlos Mariategui: "Marxism-Leninism will open the shining path to revolution."[29] Sendero's ideology takes both from Mariategui's interpretation of Peruvian realities and the need to incorporate Indians as equal citizens in all spheres, and from Mao's focus on the rural peasant as a basis for communist revolution and future society. The group professes to be the legitimate revolutionary representative of the Peruvian people. The violent tactics and secretive cell-like organizational structure they utilize to fulfill this responsibility do not permit neutrality among either its members or in communities where it has influence, making
it difficult to obtain valid information about the group. Sendero's ruthlessness, its willingness to commit atrocities against members of its own ethnic group and economic class, and its distortions of indigenous culture and ritual[30], coupled with its unique blend of Maoist and Mariateguist ideology and its looking back to a mythical Inca golden age, make it impossible to find a counterpart for the group in Latin America, and the comparison most often made is with Cambodia's Khmer Rouge. Sendero uses Maoist terms to explain the integral role of violence: "Sin violencia revolucionaria no se puede sustituir una clase por otra, no se puede derrumbar un viejo orden para crear un nuevo."[31]

Sendero Luminoso was founded by a Peruvian professor of philosophy, Abimael Guzman, in 1970. Guzman, a mestizo of middle class origins, had been a member of Bandera Roja, the Maoist faction of the Peruvian Communist party, but broke with Bandera Roja due to his persistent calls for immediate preparation for armed struggle. The other members of the party, pointing to the failures of guerrillas in the mid-sixties, felt that the country was not yet ready for armed struggle. At the V National Conference of the Communist Party in November 1965, there had become evident a party rift, with Guzman's faction determined to launch armed struggle and demanding the party commit itself to that approach. The rift culminated with the faction deciding, at the VI National Conference in January 1969, that it was the legitimate Communist Party of Peru: the Partido Comunista del Peru Sendero Luminoso. It assumed responsibility for the conduct of the party and also for the development of
Mariategui's work. Their strategy was to approach the cities from the country, led by a unified party. During the seventies they established the party bases; December 1979 marked the start of the period of violence and armed struggle. Sendero emulated Mao's Cultural Revolution as the finest hour of the Chinese revolution, and virulently denounced the counter-revolution.[32] The group's usage of dead dogs as a symbol stems from its condemnation of the post-Mao rulers as the "running dogs of imperialism."

Sendero Luminoso launched its first armed attack on May 17, 1980. This coincides with a sacrifice ritual made in May 1780 during an Indian insurrection led by Tupac Amaru in which one of his supporters urged him on by saying: "'Debes hacer brillar el sol, y si no lo consigues totalmente, deberan pasar doscientos años para que vuelva a brillar.'"[33] It is perhaps more than coincidence that Sendero launched its battle on the bicentennial of Tupac Amaru's statement. Another prominent Peruvian "revolutionary" - Haya de la Torre - also made reference to Tupac Amaru in his works.[34] While armed activity began with sporadic violence in the oft-ignored Ayacucho region and with the occasional blowing up of electric towers outside Lima, it was just three years before the group's reknown had reached the international scale and the number of victims of its struggle rose into the thousands.

The group's proposed stages of warfare since the launching of armed struggle are: 1981-82 the spreading of guerrilla warfare and the building of support bases - defined as the control of productive, political, and social
activities in a region; 1983-84, reestablishment after the armed forces' "reactionary" repression; and 1985-1987, the maintenance of support bases and the expansion of the popular war throughout the sierra.[35]

In early 1988, the group departed from its original strategy of focusing on the sierra as the center of operations, and reserving primarily sabotage and other propaganda activities for the city. Rather than being "secondary" to the guerrilla's rural strategy, the cities became "necessary."[36] The group expanded upon its rural selective assassination and forced cooperation strategies, aware that it would have to use more sophisticated tactics to compete for support with the plethora of urban political, labor, and neighborhood organizations. Sendero began to use a mixture which combined standard terrorist actions with recruiting, periodic public appearances, and armed intimidation.

Sendero Luminoso's threat has moved into the urban productive structure and towards more sophisticated tactics that mesh armed struggle and conventional politics...SL's newest development is a drive to disrupt Apra and Izquierda Unida's pre-eminence in the urban popular movement - unions and organizations like Mother's Clubs, soup kitchens, housing associations...a unique form of low intensity urban guerilla war very different from those elsewhere in Latin America.[37]

By 1988, Sendero was a force to be reckoned with, not only on its original rural turf, but on that of the political parties and the labor and popular organizations that they traditionally competed with each other for. Sendero had grown from a local, scarcely known guerrilla movement in the early eighties, to an internationally renowned revolutionary force, with an affiliated newspaper, El Diario, and
logistical support group - Socorro Popular, numbering as many as 500 - in Lima.

Sendero: Origins and Structure

A link can be made here between the predominantly serrano composition of Sendero Luminoso's cadres, their view of Peruvian society and Maoism as a political doctrine...In Maoism these students found simple and clear explanations for the social backwardness and misery that envelopes the highlands through references to concepts such as 'feudalism', 'dependency', and the like, Mao's easily readable tracts fitting in well with their limited horizons. Given the situation, it is no coincidence that Sendero Luminoso and its brand of politics took deepest root in some of the most backward zones of Peru.[38]

Abimael Guzman was ingenious both in his choice of regions for launching operations and in his method of doing so. The Ayacucho region was known for little more than its poverty and backwardness. Ayacucho's history was wrought with inter-community rivalries rather than revolution, in part due to the lack of haciendas as targets to unify against, to the divisive impact of mass migrations ordered by a 16th century Spanish viceroy; and to a preconquest defeat by the city of Cusco.[39]

This defeat seems to have been the start of Ayacucho's lasting status as a poor and marginal region. The first road from Lima to Ayacucho was not built until the mid-sixties, the same time that the region finally achieved minimal access to the national communications system. Ayacucho's poverty stemmed primarily from the department's dependence on agriculture in a region that was ill-suited to it. While over three-fourths of the population in the department was employed in agriculture as of 1961, it was estimated that only 4% of the total land area was arable. The rest of the sierra was more prosperous: the center due to mining and
commerce, and the north to access to the coast and the existence of a dairy industry. From the sixties to the eighties, absolute as well as relative living conditions of the Ayacucho peasantry declined, disastrous for a group already living at Fourth World levels. The department of Ayacucho, and its neighbors Apurimac and Huancavelica, were determined the nation's poorest by a 1972 Central Bank map of poverty. Cusco, while also in the southern sierra, fared much better during this time period, due in part to its access to tourism and to a more efficient land reform in the early seventies. As Cusco prospered, its political development did as well; an increasing number joined peasant confederations in the wake of the land reform and the Izquierda Unida became very active in the region. Ayacucho was largely bypassed by these activities, as it had been in the sixties when the APRA was extremely active in the central and northern sierra, but largely ignored the southern sierra. In addition to traditionally negative regional terms of trade and neglect by government policy, the sierra region was affected by poor external economic conditions and economic mismanagement in the seventies, and was subsequently hit by a devastating drought caused by the El Nino current in 1983. For the first time the peasants of the region were threatened with starvation in addition to their deplorable conditions of poverty.[40] This was to coincide with the spread of Sendero's influence.

For at least two decades, government policy only served to exacerbate conditions in Ayacucho. On the one hand there was continued neglect on the economic front, with the
exception of pricing policies which were continuously to the region's detriment, and on the other the introduction of improved communication and access to the media. Increased awareness coincided with worsening conditions. Ayacucho was largely bypassed by the benefits of the 1969 land reform. There were very few prosperous estates to expropriate in the department, and the average value transferred per family was $250, half of what it was in Cusco and one-quarter of what it was in Junin. The region was not, however, spared the politicization that affected much of Peru's population in the sixties and seventies. That process was exacerbated by the land reform, which, in Ayacucho as elsewhere, had more effect in breaking the power monopoly of the landed elites than in improving the access to land for the most poor. The "hacendados" had prohibited union organizers, Marxists, and other potential "trouble-makers", and had maintained feudal style relations with the peasantry. Improved communication and access to education, meanwhile, had been emphasized by Belaúnde regime in the sixties. The University of Huamanga, closed since 1885, was re-opened in 1959 and had a major influence on all levels of education in the region. By 1970 the university enrolled approximately 15,000 students, who were primarily of peasant origin. The university's existence played a major role in reducing the illiteracy rates in the region from 70% in 1961 to 56% in 1981. While expectations were raised by the land reform and new access to education and communication, opportunities clearly did not match them. At the same time the university had attracted a great many leftist scholars, which increased the politicization process
and the intensity of political debate.[41] Not only was the APRA's presence in the sierra region scarce, but in the seventies its influence in universities in general had been eroded by that of the Marxist left.

In this atmosphere Guzman began to build his bases of support, beginning with his active involvement at the University of Huamanga. Guzman was an influential professor at the university, and by the late sixties he became director of personnel. Senderistas competed with, and usually dominated, other leftist groups for control of the university.[42] Guzman's influence spread from the university to the region, as his students often returned to their remote home villages as the most educated persons, and were active in the provision of education and other services such as primary health care.

'Sendero utilized education as has never been done before in world revolutions...Sendero didn't send out cadres, it sent out teachers. They were sent back where they came from, teaching Marxism with the Sendero line. Sendero used the university...Lenin used the workers. Mao used the peasants.' [43]

Entire communities in the region were, if not indoctrinated, at least sympathetic to Sendero's ideology, as in many cases it was Senderistas who lent the first attention to the campesinos' destitute conditions. Sendero went underground in 1978, in final preparation for armed struggle, but they had first effectively ingrained themselves into the community. Those Senderistas who did not already speak Quechua learned it; many of them married into the communities which they worked in. The Indian origin of almost all of the Huamanga students made them ideal for Guzman's plan of building support bases in the region, as
the Senderistas were not seen as outsiders. This contrasts sharply with the sixties guerrillas, who were primarily dissident apristas from middle class backgrounds, were non-Indian and perceived as outsiders by the population, and easily identified in the military's counterinsurgency efforts. Sendero's strategy of allowing young, provincial militants to hold leadership positions[44] provided youth in the region with an opportunity.

Sendero's tight organization has also been key to its success. The group is organized in cells, with no one cell having more than five people, and only one member of each cell knowing who the superiors in the next cell up are. If one member of a cell is captured, the entire cell is disbanded. All members use aliases and wear woolen masks during terrorist operations.[45] Until this day, the whereabouts of Guzman are a secret: rumours vary from those which assert that he is dead to the publishing of a supposed interview with him in El Diario after the June 1988 capture of one of the movement's highest level directors, Osman Morote. El Diario asserted that Guzman had broken his silence to assert that he was still in control of the movement.[46] With the exception of a few sparsely circulated early statements, the ideology of the group was not publicized until 1986, when Sendero itself began to actively circulate statements. These developments may be a function of the new urban strategy which incorporates political propaganda methods, or may reflect some loss of cohesiveness with the group's growth in numbers and
location. The movement is estimated to have 5000 or more members, and over half of them are women.

The movement has no significant ties with external organizations, although it is not as hostile to external links as it was in its first years. At first its weapons were home-grown: primarily sticks of dynamite - plentiful in the mining areas of the sierra - or arms stolen from the police. In 1987, the group began to "cooperate" with drug traffickers in the Upper Huallaga valley, extending a sort of "immunity" from attack for money to purchase more sophisticated weapons. The refusal to associate with other revolutionary groups is part and parcel of Sendero's refusal to compromise its ideology and of its condemnations of China, Cuba, and the Soviet Union as "corrupt" forms of communism. The group's unwillingness to cooperate with other revolutionaries was demonstrated in 1987 by its driving MRTA members out of several areas of the jungle. Sendero believes that it is the sole legitimate revolutionary force in Peru.

The fanaticism and dedication demonstrated by Sendero's members is indeed remarkable. The group dubbed June 18, 1986 - when over two hundred Senderistas, were killed by the armed forces in an uprising in Lima's prisons - "El Día de Heroidad". Willingness to die for the revolution is a given: "un senderista=estoy dispuesto a cruzar el rio de sangre".[47] Guzman's view of society is not only devoid of the traditional dominant classes - the big capitalists - but all representatives of the State and of capitalism: thus government authorities such as mayors and police; campesino authorities, as they represent traditional power; and small
traders and bureaucrats, are all considered "reactionaries." [48] By virtue of being in control of the state mechanism, Apristas are at the top of this list. The Senderista vision is clearly one of a society by and for Indians, and will stop at nothing less than the elimination of all other elements. The racial aspect adds to the movement's extremism, although ironically the bulk of the victims have been Indians of peasant origin.

Sendero's killing of peasants can be explained by a philosophy which does not permit neutrality. Thus to the campesinos they offer one alternative:

"cooperate in silence or die, let their children enroll in the Ejército Guerrillero Popular or die. There is no other solution. For the PCP SL, to have them be neutral is impossible. To eliminate them is perhaps the most convenient alternative." [49]

Especially since the counterinsurgency campaign, the major emphasis became recruiting the young campesinos who could join the guerrilla army. Cases have been documented of Sendero indoctrinating children as young as five years. Adult campesinos - in particular due to their stake in the status quo and their "contamination" by the system - are not trustworthy. In Sendero's vision of society, the dominant white classes equate all those who are poor and of Indian origin with Senderistas. [50] How this vision will interact with its attempts to gain support in urban areas, where there is a prevalence of mestizos rather than Indians, is not yet clear.

Sendero and the APRA Government

El capitalismo burocrático había inadurado la revolución, se presentaba la difícil década del 80, la crisis, un gobierno por elecciones... los militares salían después de 12 años y fácilmente no podrían
Guzman had chosen his timing wisely. The longterm vision and willingness to sacrifice of the movement's members, meanwhile, were key to its building a strong support base in Ayacucho, where initially there was support for the movement.[52] Two factors undermined that support. The first was a massive counter-insurgency campaign launched by the Belaunde government in 1983. The brutal nature of the campaign made neutrality impossible. One of the military leaders of the campaign, General Cisneros, stated that if it were necessary to kill sixty peasants for every three Senderistas, then so be it. "El campesino tiene que decidir donde quiere morir; si con Sendero o con las fuerzas armadas."[53] Sendero's tactics, meanwhile became much more brutal. Their treatment of suspected informants was merciless, often assassinating them in gruesome fashions in front of entire villages, who were "forced" to attend the killings. At end 1987, over 11,000 people had died, with the military claiming to have killed 4,200 terrorists since 1983 and the figures for disappearances for that period as high as 3000.[54] The other factor which caused the erosion of Sendero's support was the rise of Alan García. In 1985 he took Ayacucho with 62% of the vote, and null and blank voting fell dramatically. His victory was a reflection of the APRA's grassroots campaigning and quite likely of the peasantry's rejection of Sendero for a perceived better option.

Sendero most likely saw the García government as a threat, and stepped up its activities, particularly in Lima,
as a response. The group is threatened more by democratic government - particularly a popular one - than by dictatorship; no revolutionary guerrilla group has ever overthrown a genuinely elected democracy. Belaúnde's neoconservatism created far less of a challenge for Sendero than did the populist García and his "false" revolution. Sendero seeks to precipitate a military coup, so as to polarize society further, a strategy which is frustrated by the success of democracy. Sendero labels the APRA corporatist and cooptative, and programs such as the PAIT as a means of popular control.[55]

Sendero is most threatened by any organization capable of attaining popular appeal, and thus APRA and IU functionaries, particularly in programs such as the PAIT, as well as popular organization leaders in Mother's Clubs, communal kitchens, and the like are thus targets in Sendero's urban strategy. Other targets are members of the Catholic clergy; the first clergy member was killed in Ayacucho in 1987, while saying mass on Guzman's birthday.[56] Clergy members working in Lima pueblos jóvenes have also received threats.[57] The attack on the few organizations esteemed highly by the poor may frustrate the group's attaining a popular support base.

As part of its urban strategy of broadening its support base, the group made substantial headway in Lima universities and developed an affiliated labor group, the MOTC. In elections at San Marcos in May of 1988, for example, the student group that sympathizes with Sendero attained the most votes, and the APRA organization, ARE, the
least.[58] Walls at most universities are covered with pro-Sendero slogans, and a February 1987 raid on several Lima universities uncovered caches of home-made bombs and other weapons.[59] Sendero's inroads in the union movement have also been notable. The MOTC virtually controls a whole region of Lima workers, those of the Carretera Central, and in April of 1988, when MOTC convened the first plenary meeting of the Carretera's Classist Workers, support for the "guerra popular" was guaranteed.[60] During the January 1988 general strike Senderistas clashed with members of the CGTP in Lima's Plaza Dos de Mayo.[61] The pro-Senderista newspaper, El Diario, meanwhile, sold approximately 5000 copies daily until mid-1988, when it could no longer find a publisher.[62]

The actors in the battle have grown steadily year by year, as has the territory that Sendero holds. This expansion creates an even greater administrative problem for the government. Sendero effectively sabotaged all development efforts in the Ayacucho region.[63] It has terrorized the judicial system with the assassination of judges who rule against its members in trials. The extent of this is such that at the trial of Osman Morote, the supposed number two of the movement, whose participation in several assassinations was well documented, the judge found insufficient evidence to convict him. The lawyer who represented Morote, meanwhile, was assassinated shortly after by the Comando Rodrigo Franco. The situation is increasingly one of unrestrained violence.[64]
While the government can clearly be blamed for inconsistency and lack of initiative in combatting the movement, its failures also stem from Sendero's brutal and uncompromising nature and its commitment to destroying existing society. It seems capable not only of killing its targets, but also of preempting any legal or administrative programs to combat it. Whatever the outcome of the civil war that the Peruvian scenario is developing into, it will involve substantial bloodshed. There is only the hope that, as one Izquierda Unida member posited: "the more Sendero succeeds, the more society will be opposed to it."[65]

The Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru

Sendero did not have the monopoly on insurrectionary activity. A major challenge to the government was posed by the launching of full-scale activities by the MRTA in late 1987. The MRTA, a more conventional guerrilla movement, had quite a bit of popular appeal to segments of the left and in particular to the youth of the APRA and IU. The leader of the movement was an ex-Aprista who had been in Haya's coveted Buro de Conjunciones with García. For the youth of the party who were convinced that the government was by no means revolutionary enough, the movement had a certain attraction and adventurous quality. No longer did the APRA youth have to look to the mid-sixties guerrillas for genuine revolutionaries who had emerged from their party; they now had the option of participating directly, and indeed several members deserted to join the MRTA.[66] As the movement is young, middle class, and urban-based, its members were the contemporaries of the IU and APRA youth. In the case of the
MRTA, the contradictions raised by the APRA's history of insurrection and revolutionary doctrine were felt more strongly than in that of Sendero. A statement of Alan García's in a 1988 speech to the APRA youth is telling:

Con Polay tuve una alianza. No tuvo la firmeza de mantenerse en el partido porque cayó en la impaciencia...Si él se hubiera mantenido dentro del partido sería un dirigente...[67]

The MRTA first initiated action in June of 1984 with an assault on a bank, and its official slogan is "la guerra contra el gobierno antipopular y el imperialismo yanqui."[68] From the beginning they projected a different image from Sendero. Their actions were primarily to attract attention, and they avoided the spilling of blood on principle. When one of their bombs killed a policeman in front of the Uruguayan embassy they sent an apology note. They held clandestine press conferences, took over radio stations to transmit messages, and focused on activities such as dynamite explosions and car bombs to attract attention. The ideology that the MRTA espouses is closer to the traditional Latin American guerrilla "foco" theory: the idea that a small group of guerrillas can act as the spark for revolution. Their heroes include Luis de la Puente Uceda, an ex-Aprista who joined the APRA Rebelde and fought with the guerrillas in the sierra in the mid-sixties. The movement's strategy and organization is comparable to that of the Sandinistas and the FMLN, and they purport to have affinity with the M-19 in Colombia and Alfaro Vive in Ecuador.[69] The MRTA's ideology has links with that of the APRA Rebelde of the sixties: Marxism Leninism with analysis based on Peru's realities. They assert that García is the
most demagogic and dishonest president in the nation's history.[70] Like the dissidence of Carlos Delgado, the APRA's most vociferous enemies are often the product of their own ranks.

The current leader of the MRTA, Victor Polay Campos - who was captured in early 1989 - fits into a Peruvian phenomenon of leftist politicians turned guerrilla, like de la Puente Uceda, or of guerrilla leaders turned politician, such as Hugo Blanco or Carlos Malpica of IU, both of whom were guerrillas in the mid-sixties. Polay Campos comes from an aprista family; his father was an APRA Congressional deputy in the sixties, and Polay himself was Secretary for External Relations for the CUA of the APRA, as well as being in the Buro de Conjunciones. His CUA group apparently was extremely militant. In 1973 Polay, along with seventeen others, was arrested for the possession of explosives; he was then sent by the party to Spain and France to study sociology - a path remarkably similar to Alan García's own. The two were rumoured to have encountered each other in Europe at one point. Polay returned to Peru in 1985, convinced that Marxism-Leninism and not APRA were the solution.[71]

Polay Campos launched the operation which put the MRTA into the public eye in October 1987. The MRTA was able to quickly take control of the city of Juanjui and some of its environs in the San Martin department. President García, who had dismissed initial reports of the campaign as unimportant, was forced to send in the army and declare the entire department in a state of emergency. Government
attempts to negotiate were thwarted by poor planning, and eventually the guerrillas were dispersed although not defeated by the military.[72] The group was bold and oriented towards the public eye, inviting members of the press to visit their operations when they took control of Juanjui.[73]

The Aprista youth movement has a great deal of sympathy for the MRTA if not direct ties. "Los jovenes Apristas son muy radicales. Si se rompe la disciplina, sea por golpe militar o por la desilusión, puede pasar fácilmente al terrorismo y a la guerrilla.... El APRA es la maestra de la guerrilla peruana contemporánea."[74] Javier Diez Canseco's PUM movement has direct links to the group, and supports it formally in parliament. This wing of the IU and the MRTA leaders both started as radicalized Velasquistas[75] with links to the part of the APRA Rebelde that became the MIR in 1961. Offshoots of this group formed both the PUM and the MIR of the early eighties, which is a substantial part of the MRTA. Among the APRA Rebelde/MIR group were two senators presently in Congress: Carlos Malpica of the IU, and Javier Valle Riestra, an Aprista.[76] The sympathy for the MRTA's cause demonstrates the radicalized political context within which the APRA must operate.

The MRTA's popular appeal contrasts sharply with public reaction to Sendero: after the prison massacres, García maintained a 75% popularity rating. Yet Sendero is much stronger militarily, and poses more of an immediate challenge to political stability. As was demonstrated by García's harsh 1988 anniversary address, and by the
appointing of Admiral Soria as Interior Minister, Garcia, faced with the increased terrorist challenge on the one hand and public opinion generally in favor of increased repression on the other, is likely to give the armed forces an even freer rein.

It is unlikely that the racially oriented, rigid solution proposed by Sendero will ever be acceptable on a broad scale in a society which is as complex culturally, racially, and ideologically as Peru's. Sendero's vision is alien even to former guerrillas, such as Hector Bejar. "Jamás me imaginé, sinceramente, que este tipo de terrorismo se iba a aplicar...en el Perú."[77] Sendero will cause a great deal of bloodshed on both sides before it is defeated, and the situation is increasingly one of unrestrained violence. "Es la profecía autocumplida. Se cree que el caos va a llegar, y todos contribuyeron a que llegue."[78]

The APRA and the Military

At least brief mention must be made of the APRA government's relationship with the armed forces. As has been discussed previously, at the beginning of his term Garcia challenged the military over human rights abuses - with the firing of three top generals - as well as their budgetary autonomy - by halving an order for French mirages.[79] García further challenged the armed forces' autonomy with the creation of a Defence Ministry, placing all three wings of the military under the command of a single state agency. Yet the armed forces were gradually to re-assert their autonomy. The military refrained - at least up to the end of 1988 - from direct intervention, partly because of their
bitter experience in power at the end of the 1970's and partly because of their perception of popular opposition to a military government. However, their de facto control increased as the government lost authority and control in the face of severe economic crisis and the escalation of insurgent violence.

The highly controversial proposal to create a Defence Ministry, which would maintain control over the three branches of the armed forces, was signed into law in April 1987 after a lengthy debate in Congress. It was strongly opposed by most high level officers, as it promised to curtail significantly the autonomy of the three branches and their rights to separate budgets, and promised to give the government more direct control over counterinsurgency policy.[80] The opposition of the air force was made clear in early April, when their jets "buzzed" the government palace amidst rumours of a possible coup. Although the leader of the air force rebellion was fired,[81] the government's control over the military through the defence ministry remained questionable, as a retired general rather than a civilian was appointed as minister.[82]

As political incoherence increased and economic crisis set in by 1988, the military attained de facto control over most regions of the country where there was an insurgent threat, even those which were not officially "emergency" zones. In the face of widespread assassination of APRA regional officials by Sendero in the Andean region, and the resignations in December 1988 of dozens of Andean mayors[83] who complained of lack of police protection from insurgents,
the exercise of local government was increasingly left to the armed forces. Incidents such as the dismissal in late 1988 of Carlos Enrique Escobar, a government attorney who demonstrated that the armed forces were responsible for a massacre of over a dozen civilians in Cayara [84] is a case in point. Also telling is that by July of 1988, a retired naval admiral, Juan Soria - known as a "hawk" - had been named Interior Minister.

The same contradictions that prevented the APRA from implementing a coherent counterinsurgency strategy also jeopardized their relations with the armed forces. Anti-aprismo had ceased to be a significant factor in civilian-military relations, as was shown by the aforementioned close collaboration of military officers with the APRA's "Plan de Gobierno" team in the early eighties. However, the APRA government's contradictory stances towards armed insurrection fueled the armed forces' resentment of civilian direction of the counterinsurgency war. An example of the APRA's contradictory behaviour occurred at the time of the capture of Victor Polay Campos in early 1989. Within hours of his arrival to the Dircote offices in Lima, Polay received a personal visit from Prime Minister Villanueva to ensure that he was not being mistreated. Villanueva was acting in response to a request from Polay's father, a former Aprista deputy and personal friend.[85] Villanueva's visit, and the public scandal that it created, hardly improved the government's relations with the armed forces.

By late 1988 and early 1989, rumours of a coup were rampant. In January 1989 there was a mass resignation of
over 2000 officers in protest of declining salary levels, a supposed movement in favor of a coup had been discovered, and the U.S. Ambassador had issued a public warning in which he stated that the United States was strongly opposed to any form of military intervention. Despite the rumours, there was no obvious leader of a coup movement within the upper ranks of the military,[86] in part a product of the military's bitter experience with power in the late 1970's, and also because there was little appetite to take power in a Peru so beset by economic and political problems. Perhaps most important was the widespread perception - both among the armed forces and among the civilian polity - that the population was adamantly opposed to a military government. According to a recent study of civilian and military attitudes by Cynthia McClintock: "by virtually all indications, every Peruvian social group now favors democratic political regime for Peru."[87] While 11% of those polled in 1982 favored a military government, only 6% did in April 1987.[88] While opinions may have altered slightly with the onset of severe economic crisis in 1988, it seems that the military option, unlike the "revolutionary" one, remained discredited among most Peruvians. This is in part a result of recent experience with the military's performance in power, the persistence of civilian government for almost a decade, and trends towards democratization in the region as a whole. Finally, there is the widespread perception that Sendero aims to provoke a coup with the aim of further polarizing society into civil war. It is widely believed that not only Sendero and the
MRTA, but also significant sectors of IU and APRA leadership and youth sectors, would join armed struggle against a military regime.[89] Yet, while there are significant factors weighing against direct military intervention, the incoherence of the government in the face of a growing insurgent threat and economic chaos could well lead to the military's extending its de facto control.

Conclusion

The need to cope with radical sentiments in part explains García's rationale in opting for a move such as the banks nationalization. The urgent need for social reform made it even more important that the government not waste its precious few political cards - as the APRA did - with lack of preparation, poor timing, and incoherent policy. In the meantime, the ideological challenge posed by APRA's revolutionary doctrine - particularly as interpreted by its more radical sectors - resulted in an inconsistent approach and an absence of policy in the face of insurrection. On the one hand García praised Sendero's dedication and willingness to die, and on the other increasingly gave the armed forces free rein. His predicament is also a function of its position of having to combat groups who have all the advantages of being in a democracy, but none of the responsibilities. The APRA's position of attempting peaceful "revolution" in a polarized political situation with armed insurrection may indeed be untenable. Sendero's assassination of Rodrigo Franco in the midst of the banks uproar - as if to assert who the "true" revolutionaries were
- is demonstrative of the irony and the difficulty of the APRA's position as a revolutionary party in today's Peru.

Revolución sin guillotina o guerrilleros, con partidos políticos de oposición, parlamento, disension y libertad de prensa. Revolución cuyo poder no previene del poder sino del voto...Tal es el aparente imposible...última opción de supervivencia en un país latinoamericano amenazado por un movimiento subversivo mesiánico y fundamentalista y, a la vez, por una vieja tentación autoritaria de suprimir libertad y derechos humanos. [90]

A true revolution in Peru would substantially improve the fate of the poor, something that none of the "revolutionary" alternatives seem capable of doing. The APRA's attempts are the subject of the next section.
PART III:

The APRA and the Urban Poor -
A Case Study
Chapter VII
APRA Policies Towards the Urban Poor: Theory and Policy

Part I: The Historical Context

A central aspect of the APRA government's role in Peru's precarious political and economic development process is its ability to address the needs of the nation's large and continuously growing poor and marginalized population. Marginalization implies the exclusion of certain sectors of the population from participation in the process of socioeconomic change that occurs as a developing country industrializes its economy. This "marginalized" part of the population - often called the informal sector due to its peripheral relation to the modern economy - spans both rural and urban spheres. The informal sector is by origin an economic term, yet it describes both social and political realities as well. In rural regions, the informal sector primarily refers to the peasants or campesinos who own little or no land, continue to use traditional agricultural methods, and exist at the bare subsistence level. In urban regions the term is a more comprehensive one, and tends to encompass the ever growing mass of urban poor, in large part migrants from rural areas, who primarily inhabit the pueblos jovenes and often survive on a day to day subsistence income derived from self-generated sales or service activities. Some of the self-employed, meanwhile, are able to earn incomes that are often quite a bit higher than the minimum wage. The terms marginalized, urban poor, and informal sector are often used interchangeably; all attempt, although none adequately, to describe the complex, heterogeneous, and
interacting phenomena which have resulted in Peru's having the largest informal economy in Latin America, and a correspondingly high percentage of the population living in deplorable conditions in the pueblos jóvenes. The "marginalized" population has attracted the attention of academics and politicians alike, and has been looked upon both as the potential force for social transformation and as a target for clientelistic manipulation.

The APRA in its campaign avoided using terms that implied class confrontation, and adopted the term "marginalized" for this vast and heterogeneous group—a tactic previously used by the Christian Democrats in Chile. Garcia, upon coming to office, repeatedly declared that the nation's marginalized—70% of the total population according to his social pyramid—were to be the priority of his administration. It is necessary to examine both the theoretical basis of his government's approach, as well as its policies, to evaluate how the APRA government translated that priority into action.

The García government implemented its policies in its first few months in power. In the rural arena, it attempted to shift the terms of trade in favor of traditional agrarian products. The government embarked on an active credit extension program and conducted a series of government-sponsored dialogues with campesino leaders around the country. To its credit, the García government was the first in the nation's history to concentrate on and improve the terms of trade for the farmers of the Andean region. The actual shift, however, was mainly the result of its overall
economic policy of freezing prices for many manufactured and basic goods, while floating those of Andean agricultural products;[1] thus the improvements were eroded with an end to the price freeze and the onset of hyperinflation. On the urban side, the government implemented a variety of programs directed at the marginalized, the most important of which were the Programa de Asistencia al Ingreso Temporal (PAIT), an emergency employment program; the Programa de Asistencia Directa (PAD), a program which attempted to organizational support to pueblos jóvenes; and the Instituto de Desarrollo del Sector Informal (IDESI), a semi-autonomous institute which was set up to provide credit to informal sector entrepreneurs.

For two reasons the focus here will be on the APRA's policies towards the urban poor. The first is a practical one that stems from the existence of numerous programs - both of the APRA government and of its predecessors - and the enhanced feasibility of research in urban areas. The second stems from the dynamic characteristic of urban poverty in Peru. In concurrence with a dramatic increase in the numbers of urban poor in the past few decades has been the emergence of an interest on the part of political leaders and parties - originating with the APRA in the 1940's - in building a support base in this group. This analysis will determine how the current APRA's focus on the urban informal sector as a part of its overall economic strategy and as the central aspect of its policy towards the urban poor differs - in conception at least - from those of its predecessors, which were cooptative in nature and not a
central point of economic strategy; and how that conception translated into policy.

Prior to examining the APRA government's policies, it is necessary to describe briefly Peru's urban informal sector and its relation to the pueblos jovenes, as well as the political behaviour of those pueblos. The recent history of government approaches to urban poverty, and the conceptual basis of the current government's policies must also be analyzed. The PAIT in particular will be examined in greater detail, and will be compared to a similar program implemented by the Pinochet regime in Chile, the Programa de Empleo Minimo (PEM). Finally the PAIT will be examined at the micro level, in one Lima pueblo joven, Huascar. A key underlying issue throughout the entire analysis will be whether the APRA made a genuine attempt to incorporate the marginalized population into the polity and economy; or whether it was, like previous attempts, populist and cooptative.

The Phenomenon of Urban Poverty and the Informal Sector

While poverty is an ambiguous term, a working definition is necessary. Absolute poverty is the condition of earning insufficient income to permit the consumption of adequate food and non-food items.[2] A 1971/72 household survey of Peru stated that an estimated 31% of the total population lived in conditions of absolute poverty, with 14% of them in Lima and 52% of them in the southern sierra. Adverse economic trends from 1975 to 1985 suggest a worsening of these conditions, with estimates ranging from one-half to two-thirds of all households. The bulk of the
deterioration was in urban areas and the Coastal region around Lima.[3] While rural poverty in many ways comprises worse conditions, it is a relatively stable phenomenon in terms of numbers and standards of living. Urban poverty, on the other hand, due to constant migration, is a rapidly growing phenomenon which is more directly affected by economic trends, as well as by its dynamic nature - an already inadequate urban infrastructure is unable to meet the increasing demands upon it for basic services and employment.

The population of Peru has nearly doubled since 1960, reaching over 20 million in 1987. The rural population grew from five and a half to six and a half million. The urban population, on the other hand, grew from four and a half to over fourteen million. Lima's population in this period went from one to over six million.[4] While the overall population growth rate for Lima was 5.3% from 1955 to 1985, in the pueblos jovenes it was 9.6%.[5] Almost half of Lima's population and 25% of the country's population lived in pueblos jovenes in 1982, as opposed to 18% in 1972. Half of them were without running water, two-fifths without access to water supply, and one-third without electricity.[6] Other indicators, such as infant mortality, nutrition and health status, and education levels are also important factors in categorizing poverty. However, it suffices here to assume that the urban population that earns inadequate income levels also lacks other essential services and that the majority lives in the pueblos jovenes. In 1985, 33% of Lima's population had a per capita income of less than one
third of the minimum wage of 540 intis or $36 dollars per month. Of these, approximately 50% were in the pueblos jóvenes.[7] While some poor live in downtown slums - tugurios - most newcomers settle on the city's outskirts.

Due to their expansive nature and to the economic survival skills, organizational capacity, and communal orientation displayed by many of the "pobladores", they have, since the beginning of their influx to Lima, and particularly in recent decades, attracted the attention of political and economic analysts, as well as of the nation's politicians. The characteristics of the inhabitants of the pueblos jóvenes are particularly relevant - in particular in the case of today's APRA - to government policymaking and support seeking.

The informal sector has been called Peru's social security system.[8] With continual growth - due to migration and high birth rates - of the population, increasingly large segments are unable to find jobs in the modern or formal economy, and are forced to generate their own forms of employment, which range from a variety of often superfluous commercial and service activities to small-scale production enterprises to the provision of desperately needed transportation services from the marginal areas to the city centre. Peru has the largest informal economy in Latin America, with some estimates as high as 60% of the workforce.[9] In the absence of jobs or any sort of comprehensive welfare system, this population is forced to generate its own employment, which is often little more than a day to day survival activity, although some informal
sector enterprises do develop into efficient and profitable entities.

Most informal enterprises are characterized by a very low capital/labor ratio, low productivity, and small scale, with a prevalence of unipersonal enterprises. The existence of the informal sector in developing countries in general and in Peru in particular stems from both supply and demand side factors. On the supply side, in Peru there has been a traditional labor excess which stems from the decentralized primary product export structure of the economy. This excess increased dramatically in the 1950's with health improvements which lowered infant mortality without a consequent decrease in fertility rates; the population growth rate surged from its historical 1.7% to over 3%.[10] Import substitution industrialization depended largely on exogenously designed capital-intensive technology. Migrants who had come to Lima due to perceived opportunities provided by industrialization, had to resort to "autoempleo" or self-employment.[11] The concept of informality refers to the survival strategies used by the members of this excess labor force. Because survival involves more than a certain income level, and implies a quest for health, education, and public services, the concept extends beyond the economic sphere. Two essential characteristics of the informal sector are its necessary choice of methods, which use a small quantity of capital per worker - such as commerce and services - and which involve a division of labor; and its creation of capital-labor combinations which are lower than those which
dominate in the same strands of production in the modern sector.[12]

The characteristics of the informal sector have remained the same from the time of its formation up to the present, although with changes in the relative size of the sector. The exclusion from the modern economy has a self-generating capacity. The low capital-labor ratio - an average of less than $400 per worker in the informal sector versus $10,000-40,000 capital per man in the modern sector - is perpetuated by a scarcity of fixed capital and poor access to credit. The criteria for access to credit in the Peruvian financial system is a guarantee based on possession of property or capital; a poor migrant starting an enterprise has neither. With capital being the lynchpin of access to credit, a new small-scale entrepreneur has virtually no opportunity to obtain capital or credit.[13] This also results in an exclusion from investment in education and training, which concentrates on formal sector labor, widening the already existing gap. The majority of enterprises function at a precarious daily subsistence level.[14]

The two sectors are in many ways interdependent, however, which has serious implications during times of economic crisis. Various lower stages of production are subcontracted from the modern to the informal sector, and a high proportion of informal sector sales are to the modern sector. At times of recession, not only do those sales contract due to drop in modern sector demand, but laid off workers from the modern sector join the informal one. An
increased labor force coupled with a contraction in modern sector demand leads to an overall lowering of income levels in the informal sector.[15]

Two major challenges posed to any Peruvian government by the existence of this sector are a massive and growing excess labor force, and a variety of barriers to the incorporation of this force by the modern economy: insufficient demand on one side and restrictions to the access to productive factors on the other. How the APRA government approached these challenges served as the lynchpin of its policies towards the urban poor.

In a recent and highly publicized study of the informal sector, Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto describes the excess of government regulations for entrance to the formal economy as a legal and economic apartheid. De Soto makes a strong case; the amount of time and funds that he cites as necessary to obtain — without wielding some sort of influence or the ability to expedite the process with a hefty bribe — essential permits such as land titles, operating licenses, or legal credit are daunting for any entrepreneur, and prohibitive for those of small-scale.[16] De Soto has been active in lobbying the state to remove or simplify impediments for the informal sector's access to legality and credit.[17] He clearly opened new roads in his elaboration of the crippling and discriminatory state regulations. However, his thesis overlooks basic needs other than jobs and homes, such as health and education. While the Peruvian state has an absurdly overblown bureaucracy, it is also woefully underdeveloped in these critical areas.
Urban poverty and the informal sector are inter-related. They are not, however, synonymous terms. Not all informal sector workers are poor, and not all inhabitants of the pueblos jóvenes work in the informal sector. The most direct correlation between the pueblos jóvenes and the informal sector - besides the number of workers who live in the pueblos jóvenes - is the concurrent and analogous nature in which they developed and the strategies that both continue to use to survive. Like informal sector enterprises, pueblos jóvenes begin as spontaneous and extra-legal responses to a need to survive in the absence of existing alternatives.

What sets the pueblos jóvenes apart from the informal sector in general, however, is their high level of cohesiveness and community organization. The settlements are often the result of coordinated action to invade a piece of land. While there are pueblos jóvenes that are settled in an ad hoc fashion, as well as constant additional settlers who build on to existing settlements, the sense of cohesiveness seems to prevail in a great many pueblos, most of which maintain some sort of organizational structure. The very nature of their survival strategy: the occasional need to defend their invasion from dislocation efforts by the state; the need to provide criminal enforcement in the absence of municipal protection; the need to work collectively to obtain legal recognition and public services such as electricity and water service all serve to reinforce communal organizational capacity.[18]
The reliance on communal organization: in the form of neighborhood directorates, communal kitchens, and mothers' clubs, for example, are both a type of survival strategy and a response having a relationship with the economic and legal systems which is "un poco afuera, un poco adentro".[19] Community organization has had many and diverse effects, from an increased awareness and independence of women, who are the most active participants, to increased politicization in general. The importance of such organizations increased as a response to the heightened awareness which resulted from the Velasco "revolution" and to the steady deterioration in living standards since 1975. Attitudes towards community organization vary, as in some cases the resort to a strategy of joint survival is viewed as an acceptance of a degradation of economic level and loss of independence. The impulse to organize as a community often co-exists with the desire of the settlers for their individual, or at least their children's, progression to a more prosperous neighborhood: a desire which exists at many socioeconomic levels. The desire for independent progress is in part reflected in the lesser number of men who participate in such organizations - a study done in pueblos jovenes in Chile found that two-thirds of the participants in communal organizations were women.[20] Lipset asserts that when there is faith in the prospect of social mobility, there may be a corresponding reduction in collective efforts at social change.[21]

This sense of community and capacity to organize can be used to distinguish between the visible manifestation of
urban poverty, pueblos jóvenes, and the economically based concept of the informal sector. The organizational and communal practices of the "pobladores" are autonomous and democratic ones, and therefore any government which purports to be reformist and participatory should respect the existing communal organizations. In this sense, the record of various political forces, including the APRA's, has been checkered.

Political parties and leaders have been quick to note the organizational capacity of the pobladores and, since the existence of the first settlements, then called barriadas, have sought to tap the communal structure as a support base, or to convert and co-opt it entirely for political ends. The pobladores, on the other hand, have shown a remarkable capacity to use this political attention for their own pragmatic ends, as is demonstrated by their mercurial capacity to shift support to whatever political alternative offers them tangible benefits at the time. The political behaviour of the urban poor is characterized by pragmatism. They do not in general tend to be either revolutionary or pessimistic in their outlook and behaviour; rather they are primarily migrants who have left behind them even worse conditions in rural areas, and have minimal expectations of employment for themselves and education and better opportunities for their children.[22]

In the past decade the urban poor of Lima have become an increasingly important force in Peruvian politics due to the vast growth in their number and to their increased politicization. The emergence of the left as a viable
political force was vital to this politicization, and was reflected in the 1983 election of Alfonso Barrantes as mayor of Lima – the first elected Marxist mayor in any South American capital.

Entre pobreza y votación radical no hay una relación de causalidad, como es la experiencia de muchos países...[otros elementos] en el caso peruano fueron el movimiento social urbano y los partidos políticos de izquierda.[23]

In economic terms, the urban poor of Peru grew substantially poorer from 1978 to 1985. This deterioration concurrent with increased politicization resulted in increased awareness and scepticism among the poor voting population. The voting record during that period of time demonstrates pragmatism, adaptability, and opportunism in response to their deteriorating conditions rather than party or personality allegiance. Studies of the urban poor in Venezuela have shown that leadership juntas eventually fall apart unless they can deliver services, and patronage is key to party recruitment among the urban poor.[24] A survey of Lima's poorest districts found that in 1978 28.7% voted for APRA, and 55.2% for Izquierda Unida, significantly more to the left than the city as a whole. In the presidential election, 50% voted for Belaúnde, 20% for the APRA and 18% for the left. In 1983 50% voted for Barrantes versus 28% for APRA's Barnechea; in 1985 53% voted for García and 31% for Barrantes; and in 1986 44% continued to support Barrantes while 42% voted for APRA and del Castillo.[25] [See Table VIII] In 1983 and 1985 their voting was a rejection of the Belaúnde government's policies; the growth of support for the APRA at the municipal level in 1986 was a response to
both García's popularity and to the opportunities perceived from supporting the central government's programs in the pueblos jóvenes, particularly the highly publicized PAIT, although Barrantes and the IU remained very popular.

Aquellos sectores de la población que hoy respaldan a Alan García y a Alfonso Barrantes no lo hacen de la manera incondicional y exclusiva que caracterizó el populismo aprista de hace 50 años. El apoyo actual...es mucho más crítico.[26]

Demonstrative of the pragmatism of the urban poor is their performance in the face of attempts to use their support as a political stepping stone or to utilize their organizational structure as a means of political control. The urban poor have shown themselves to be willing to lend their support only when it yields tangible benefit, and to be quick to drop that support if it is perceived to have no ends. In this light it is important to note that most approaches to the problem of urban poverty were cooptative in nature with no genuine attempt to eliminate the barriers to entry into the formal economy or of access to housing and services. The APRA government initially addressed itself to the needs of the informal sector and in theory tried to eliminate the many barriers it faces; in practice efforts were less than successful.

A History of Politicization of the Urban Poor: From APRA in 1945 to APRA in 1985

La legislación del Estado en materia de barriadas...a comienzos de la década del 60, se confiaba en convertir a las barriadas en urbanizaciones populares...[con] la ayuda a la autoconstrucción y la provisión de servicios básicos...En 1968...se toman una serie de medidas que buscan regular la expansión de las ciudades, con previsiones donde, localizar los sectores populares...Por lo demás, desde hace años el gobierno se ha desinteresado.[27]
Post-World War II industrialization resulted in 70% of the nation's industries locating in the capital. There was a drop in mortality with overall health care improvements, but no subsequent drop in high fertility rates. At the same time, a communications expansion made people aware of the increased educational and employment opportunities in the capital. Meanwhile, Peru's traditionally open economy resulted in constantly negative terms of trade for Andean agriculture in the face of cheap food imports, and life in the sierra was extremely difficult, with few opportunities for advancement. Despite the resulting wave of migration to the capital, there was no coherent state policy to plan or provide for affordable housing for the mass of newcomers. The vast numbers of people in need of housing, in conjunction with the effects of government policy and the activities of private land speculators, led to the promotion of peripheral lands as areas for the poor to settle, with the closer and more profitable land reserved for wealthier proprietors.[28] Much of the peripheral land around the city - most of which was too arid to be cultivated - was bought up by land speculators and urbanization associations. By the late sixties, most of the undeveloped land around Lima and Callao was owned by 67 proprietors. Many of the owners were former hacienda owners who, expecting that the value of the land would rise dramatically, became involved in zoning, building, and financing projects on their own lands, and also bought up others.[29] The directorates of most of the urbanization groups were integrated by the land proprietors, who had links with the construction companies and banks.[30]
The state, meanwhile, had no coherent urbanization strategy. Governments' approaches varied, but all of them followed the strategy of promoting the poor's settling in peripheral areas, and none of them attempted to either address the causes of the migration or provide a coherent solution to the need for low-income housing. Gradual and unorganized land invasions began in the 1920's; the first significant wave of organized land invasions by squatters in Lima occurred at the time of the election of José Luis Bustamante y Rivero in 1945. The APRA, while a coalition partner in the Bustamante government, sought to maintain its activities as an anti-establishment party and hoped to represent the emerging urban groups.

The opening of democratic politics in 1945 provided the settlers with the opportunity to negotiate not just over the obtaining of legal land titles, but also for the provision of services. This, coupled with the consistent failure of dislocation attempts by the police - in part due to mediation by political organizations[32] - gave incentive to the settler's organizational initiative.

Manuel Odria's 1948 coup was clearly to the APRA's detriment, but not totally to the pobladores', as Odria's was the first Peruvian government to focus on the poor as a politically relevant force. Odria was anti-APRA, and he
moved quickly to destroy its power in the union and party groups which it had formed. The other element of Odria's campaign against the APRA was his emphasis on charity and gifts for the urban poor as an alternative to the APRA's promotion of mobilization and demand making.

Odria's only real policy, however, was the active promotion of squatter settlements through title granting. This was a relatively cost-free policy for the state and proved an effective political tool. Odria, for example, controlled the association which granted rights to move; evidence of APRA ties made it difficult to get a lot. He also avoided legalizing the title granting process, in order to maintain his paternalistic relationship with the pobladores.[33] The pobladores, meanwhile, obtained their primary goal: legal title to their land.

In another sense, Odria's policy also won him points with his primary supporter - the right. The promotion of squatter settlements kept the low-income population at the periphery and even resulted in some desertion of tugurios in the center, opening up room for new commercial centers. This coincided with the interests of the urbanization associations and land speculators, and also acted to spur migration, which eased tension in the rural sector as population growth increased, to the benefit of the traditional land-holding structure.[34]

Neither the Prado government nor the first Belaúnde regime were particularly active in policy towards the urban poor. The Prado government, once in power, attempted to prohibit new invasions. However, the practice of promoting
settlements as a means of political opposition resurfaced just prior to the Prado government's inception. In December 1954, for example, Pedro Beltran, who was to be prime minister under Prado, sponsored a huge invasion in Ciudad de Dios to compete with Odria. As prime minister, Beltran focused on a self-help strategy and cooperation with the private sector. He faced a defeat of sorts, however, with the passage of Law 13517 in 1961. This law, pushed by the newly legalized APRA, focused on a state role in promoting housing development and authorized government aid to the settlements. Prado, on the other hand, paid little attention to the issue and was not in the least bit concerned with promoting the dependency style relationship with the settlers that Odria had had.[35]

Finally, APRA...in an informal coalition with Prado ...was a major force in pushing for a new settlement legislation. APRA did not rely on dependency style relationships with the lower classes, and likewise had no desire to perpetuate the legally ambiguous situation of the settlements.[36]

The 1963 -1968 Belaúnde government focused primarily on rural issues, due in part to the 1965 guerrilla uprisings in the southern sierra. The government's main policy towards low-income sectors - Cooperación Popular - was self-help based and rural in orientation. The government was opposed to Law 13517; consequently the program was curtailed and its budget cut. Belaúnde believed in developing the rural areas, and "the issue was not what form of aid was most appropriate for the settlements. Rather it was whether to aid them at all."[37] Most government investment in urban housing was on expensive projects for middle class families. The Belaúnde government did, however, enact a few policies for the urban
poor. Perhaps the most important was the passage of the "Ley de Barriadas", which gave legal recognition to the pueblos jóvenes. Other than that the government's policy was one of sponsoring "autoconstrucción", or self-construction of houses by the settlers, and the sporadic implementation of a "lotes con servicios" policy.[38] The government provided lots in some areas, where services were to be extended after houses were built by the settlers; the process was not always completed.

The government had no clear policy towards the increasing number of urban poor, however, an oversight which was quickly noted by the opposition and then by the military government of 1968. Under the Belaúnde government there were at least four instances of invasion instigated by the opposition, particularly the APRA, which controlled the municipal governments. In 1968 the APRA went as far as sponsoring the invasion of the land of one of its main political rivals, León Velarde, the wealthy mayor of a district which supported Odria. The APRA was not to capitalize on these actions, however, due to the military coup that same year.

The Velasco regime, quickly addressed - very publicly - the issue of the squatter settlements. Only two months after the regime took power, it announced the creation of the Organismo Nacional de Desarrollo de Pueblos Jóvenes - ONDEPJOV. The regime also signalled a supposedly new approach by changing the traditional name of the settlements, barriadas, to young towns, pueblos jóvenes, which was a much more optimistic term. ONDEPJOV, influenced
by Carlos Delgado and by the work of a U.S. sponsored organization, Acción Comunitaria, stressed the self-help potential of the settlements. The only real departure from the Belaunde government's policy under ONDEPJOV, however, was an increased rate of title granting. "Yet even this activity cannot be seen as altering the status quo. Many of the poor looked upon these titles not as a privilege but as a right, and as something that had been promised for years."[39]

The government's policy met a definite challenge with the massive — involving tens of thousands — May 1971 Pamplona invasion in Lima. The squatters took a police commander hostage; subsequently they won their demand to remain on the land, which became a very large and highly organized pueblo joven, Villa El Salvador. The size of the invasion demonstrated the severity of the housing deficit and the need for a coherent government policy. The government sponsored the settlement's development, based on the idea of the self-generation of a cooperative city, which included the setting aside of land within the community for small industries. The Villa El Salvador invasion, coupled with an increase of strikes in coastal sugar cooperatives and mines spurred the government to develop a policy to control social mobilization.[40]

As is discussed in Chapter II, the Velasco regime established SINAMOS, which incorporated ONDEPJOV and other similar agencies in an elaborate, hierarchical national structure designed to penetrate as fully as possible into community life and the affairs of the pobladores. SINAMOS
created a complex system of state-run offices in various zones where the state was to take joint action with representatives of local neighborhoods. SINAMOS was made responsible for the distribution of land titles, the promotion of water, electricity, self-help housing, and other such services. The agency could only promote - not deliver - such services, however.[41] In due course, the agency proved to be a blatant attempt at social control which threatened existing organization in the settlements, yet SINAMOS field workers were unable to provide promised assistance and aid. The poor were quick to perceive the nature of SINAMOS, and although at times they attempted to use its channels to obtain services - usually to no avail - they rapidly rejected the agency.[42] While the military merely continued the past policies of land title granting without support services, they raised expectations with rhetoric and the creation of such agencies as ONDEPJOV and SINAMOS. Although the intent behind SINAMOS was to capture political support, in particular from the APRA, the cooptative nature of the military's policy was resented by the poor, and created substantial ill will among them towards the government.

In part as a result of the Velasco regime's policies, during the seventies there was a dramatic increase of cooperative land and housing groups: "APV's" and "COOPVIV's". These groups surfaced in the sixties and were permitted by the state as a means to deter invasions and channel access to home ownership through the buying of lands and "autoconstrucción", a persistent theme during both
Belaunde administrations. The influence of these groups grew a great deal as the insecurity caused by the Velasco land reform spurred urban land owners and urbanization groups to sell off their lands at low price. SINAMOS, meanwhile, was active in promoting the formation of cooperatives for housing and the installation of services. The sales of land by associations and cooperatives at times yielded benefits for the settlers, but were often rife with fraud and scandal. They rarely offered follow up services, or were mysteriously disbanded after land sales had been completed; they turned out to be no more than "una barriada cuyos terrenos se pagan."[43]

After 1975, with the austerity imposed by the Morales Bermudez regime, the needs of the pobladores lost their prominent position in government rhetoric. A highly publicized invasion on land along Lima's Huascar bridge in January 1976 temporarily focused public - and as a result, government - attention on the issue. After the government relocated the settlers to the San Juan de Lurigancho district, however, the settlers, and their pressing needs, were rapidly forgotten by the state and the press. That same settlement, which retained its original name, Huascar, will be the focus of Chapter VIII.

Despite the lack of attention they received from the government, the pobladores were crucial actors in the strikes and demonstrations of the late seventies which crippled the regime, and they were also active participants in the elections of 1978 and 1980, with a percentage of almost 90% voting in both elections.[44] The second Belaúnde
regime was not particularly responsive to their demands or concerns; its main policy was sponsoring of "autoconstrucción" through Cooperación Popular, this time with urban offices. Critics of the organization maintained that it was presented as a "favor" from Acción Popular, rather than as a state responsibility. The administration's only large-scale low-income housing project was built, although not completed, near Huascar, and will be discussed in the subsequent chapter. As is stated in Chapter III, the regime's overall approach was doomed to failure as economic austerity and inflation were putting even basic foods beyond the reach of the urban poor.

The failure of decades of government policy to address the needs of this rapidly growing population most likely provided incentive for the new APRA team to focus on the urban marginalized population as a major aspect of its policy.
APRA and the Urban Poor - Part II: Theory and Policy

One of the top priorities in the APRA's Plan de Gobierno was the improvement of the precarious situation of the marginalized population in the pueblos jóvenes and in poor rural areas. The APRA team's theoreticians concentrated on a policy designed to improve economic capacity and employment in the informal sector, rather than on any specific policy towards the pueblos. In this sense the team's approach was markedly different from previous ones. Despite the merits of this approach, the absence of a specific or comprehensive policy towards the pueblos jóvenes resulted in misuse of funds and poor performance in the extension of basic services.

APRA and the Informal Sector: Theory

The APRA team's approach towards urban poverty focused almost exclusively on the informal sector. It was formulated largely by Daniel Carbonetto - who was to become García's main economic policy advisor - and began with the basic tenet that policies designed to improve the quality of employment in the urban informal sector must be based on an understanding of the origins of that sector and the factors which restricted economic advancement by its workers. Thus the team focused on two main themes: the first - a function of the formal sector - was the gap between the demand for employment by the modern sector and the size of the economically active population, and the second was the plethora of restrictions within the informal sector strategy of "autogeneración" or self employment. Directed at the first problem, policies had to be designed in the short term
to absorb the excess labor. In the longer term, this needed to be sustained through the making a priority of employment in public expenditure and investment projects. In terms of informal sector structure, policies were needed to remove microeconomic restrictions, such as access to capital, credit, and training.[45]

On the demand side, the reactivation of the modern sector via the increase of demand through wage increases and price freezes would also affect informal sector sales and absorb excess informal sector labor, so overall income in the informal sector would increase. To complement this would be programs directed at structural informality: the use of public resources to create employment programs which would in the long run enable their workers to enter the modern sector. There also needed to be programs which aided the entry of informal entrepreneurs into the modern sector through the public sector's promotion of certain works and of guarantees which removed the uncertainty which often destroys productive dynamic. Legal restrictions on the exercise of informal sector occupations - such as the restriction of "ambulantes" or street salesmen from certain zones - had to be reduced. Finally, the commercial infrastructure of the urban informal sector needed to be developed, with the fostering of cooperative enterprises.[46]

The general focus was to provide employment opportunities for urban informal sector workers through the expansion of the modern sector, and at the same time to rely on the basic instinct of informal sector workers to increase
their level of sales, prices, and productivity in the face of modern sector expansion. Key to the second part of this strategy is the elimination of the inequality of access to capital coupled with increased training, material, and technical aid. The strategy was to work through existing informal sector enterprises by consolidating and bettering the most dynamic sectors. This would involve the fostering of associated enterprises rather than unipersonal ones, and the development of guarantee funds which would eliminate the restrictive criteria for access to credit.[47]

APRA and the Informal Sector: Policy

This rationale was, to some extent, translated directly into policy. In its overall economic strategy, the government clearly enacted a demand-induced modern sector reactivation, based on wage increases, price freezes, and incentives to manufacturers to spur the utilization of excess capacity, a policy which for the government's first two years was successful. The government implemented a variety of programs designed to increase employment, better income, and raise the consumption of the poorest sectors. The most publicized program, and the one in which the government invested the most money was the PAIT, which will be discussed in detail in the next section. Three others, PROEM, PAD, and IDESI, are also worthy of mention.

PROEM

The PROEM program, established in July 1986, allowed companies to hire employees for up to two years without adhering to normal job security or stability regulations. At its inception 2,290 workers were hired as PROEM labor in
Lima. At its height, in August 1987, PROEM labor accounted for 42,160 posts in Lima and over 50,000 nationwide. PROEM was primarily responsible for the 9% increase in textile industry employment.[48] The program's effects may not be longterm ones, but it does point to the extent to which the labor stability laws implemented during the Velasco years, due to their excessive nature, have acted as an impediment to employment and privileges those lucky enough to have formal sector jobs. It is virtually impossible for a Peruvian industry to fire a worker for any reason after he has been with the firm for three months. Few, if any, advanced industrial economies have such labor provisions.

IDESI

The government also established the IDESI with the end of bettering working conditions for the informal sector by providing small-scale credit to informal sector workers. The mayor of Villa El Salvador, Miguel D'Ascueta, estimated that less than 3% of small producers in pueblos jóvenes had access to credit, and that they were asked to pay interest rates as high as 800%.[49] The design of the IDESI was based in part on the experience of Acción Comunitaria in providing credit to informal sector workers based on group guarantees of repayment. [50] The IDESI is a semi-autonomous institution, working with credit lines from the Peruvian Central Bank, the Banco de Credito, and international corporations. Its objective was to eventually be self-financed. The IDESI's role is to act as an intermediary between the informal sector and the financial system. The institution authorizes credit to groups of five or more on a
revolving scale. The first loans are of approximately $20 for each member of the group. With completion of payment, an extra $10 is allotted to each additional credit until the borrower leaves the system; the maximum loan is $100. A training program is required with the first credit, and then becomes voluntary. The overall goal is that after a year or so in the IDESI, the borrowers should have sufficient guarantees to enter the formal financial system. The group orientation provides a method of accountability, as all members of the group hinge their individual credit ratings on the performance of the group. Producers, as opposed to salesmen, are eligible for larger scale loans of $1000 to $5000, but have to pass through the first credit stage as a prerequisite. As of August 1987, the program had had 30,000 beneficiaries and aimed for 70,000 by the year end. Seventy-five percent were salesmen and 25% producers.[51]

The initial efforts of the IDESI program have been largely successful. An evaluation of IDESI's operation in the province of Arequipa found that 98% of those who received credits had also received training courses in how to use the formal banking sector. "De esta manera está formalizando al microempresario en que, a través del crédito puede ir capitalizando su empresa y dotarse de algunas garantías reales."[52] The program's overall credit base was substantially increased in March of 1988 by the Central Bank's extension of approximately $150,000 in extra credits, and the Economics Ministry's promise that state banks would designate $300,000 to informal sector entrepreneurs.[53] In April 1988, a presidential decree - sponsored by de Soto -
obligated all banks to lend 10% of their credits to small businessmen, artisans, or groups of artisans.[54] IDESI even obtained external support - at a time when Peru was receiving virtually no external credit - as the United Nations Development Program (PNUD) announced plans to implement a program, costing over $1 million, to support informal sector employment, with the objectives of increasing the sector's access to credit and technology, and improve its productivity. The entire program was placed under IDESI auspices. Between February 1986 and August 1987, 37,800 received training courses and loans, and the program had a 98% repayment record.[55] Unfortunately IDESI's potential was largely undermined by the severity of the economic crisis that set in by 1988.

As an overall strategy, the program's focus on group cooperation to overcome the guarantee barrier and the gradual upscaling of loans both have the potential to serve as the step over the barriers to entry to the modern sector, at least for some workers. The IDESI has the added advantage that as a semi-autonomous institute, there is less potential for the loans to be politicized and presented as a "favor" from the APRA.

The IDESI was criticized by some observers as the bulk of its loans are too small to enhance the acquisition of capital, and most go to street vendors who merely use the loans to buy goods to sell, make a small profit, and then return the loans. Thus the program may merely be functioning as an income supplement - albeit a good in itself - but not to increase the skills or enhance the ability of the
recipients to join the formal economy.[56] However, IDESI's longterm strategy as an autonomously funded institution implied further development and increased private sector cooperation in the provision of credit to informal sector workers.

PAD

The government set up one agency to deal with the pueblos jóvenes: the PAD. The PAD has less potential than the IDESI, and early on had a checkered record. The program was designed to help equip communal kitchens, implement initial education programs for those not in school, provide primary health care, build child care centres and sports complexes, and organize local craft industries. The program, with an initial budget of $45,000,[57] was run from the government palace, as it was a pet project of the President's wife. This may have been modeled on the active role that Belaúnde's wife took in promoting communal kitchens, a role which made her extremely popular in many pueblos jóvenes. As it was run from palace the program often failed to coordinate efforts with municipalities and existing neighborhood organizations. A prime example is the government's spending, in conjunction with the PAD, 350 million intis - over $3 million[58] - on building two Olympic size pools in two pueblos jóvenes, one each north and south of the city. There is a need for recreation facilities in low income areas; however, the building of swimming pools, which require expensive imported machinery, and can only be used half of the year, seems a poor and ad hoc use of desperately needed funds, especially in areas
which lack water and sewage facilities. This demonstrates the lack of competence and planning within the APRA.

One of the dangers of any government establishing new programs to "help" the pueblos jóvenes or the informal sector is the tendency to disregard or override existing organizations' programs. The PAD was primarily an attempt to centralize these organizations, and quickly entered into conflict with existing organizations. There were several pre-existing forms of organization and programs functioning in the pueblos jóvenes: some autonomous and some related to the Izquierda Unida municipal government. Over 1,000 Communal kitchens and 7,500 committees of the "Vaso de Leche" program already existed.[59] Barrantes' highly successful "Vaso de Leche" program, instituted in 1983, distributed powdered milk, donated by international organizations, throughout the pueblos jóvenes. What proved to be one of the program's main assets was that it relied on existing and autonomous mother's clubs to distribute the milk. Thus not only was the program able to distribute one million glasses of milk per day, with relatively few Izquierda Unida functionaries[60], but it played the important role of strengthening rather than disrupting existing organizations. Since the APRA takeover of the municipal government, there has been a plethora of conflicts in the administration of the Vaso de Leche program - both between IU and APRA functionaries and between the mother's clubs and the new administration - hardly to the APRA's credit. Jorge del Castillo, the new mayor, initially tried
to end the program, as it was associated with IU, but met with substantial opposition.[61]

The mother's clubs, in a variety of pueblos jóvenes, often also are involved in sponsoring communal kitchens. There are two types of communal kitchens: autonomous and administered. While both are dependent on external sources for food, the latter are controlled or restricted in terms of their organization by external forces through a non-democratic structure. The kitchens are not only an effective survival strategy for their communities, but also promote the independence of women as organizers and community leaders. The record of autonomous versus administered kitchens in this light is much better.[62] With the severe 1988 economic crisis, these kitchens took on increasing importance as a survival strategy.

Different political organizations have often tried to promote these kitchens for political benefit. During the 1985 political campaign, the APRA and the AP competed with each other in sponsoring the kitchens; the poor's wizened response is well summed up by the slogan: "Comedores APRA-AP: facil aparecen, facil desaparecen."[63] Izquierda Unida, demonstrating either greater responsibility or a longer term political view, seems to have, in general, promoted autonomous kitchens.[64] The mothers involved supported the IU's effort because: "they provide the food and then leave us alone. The Municipality doesn't tell us what to do. This is important."[65]

The main criticism of the PAD is that it provides very little, if any, benefit in terms of services, and that its
main focus is to try and supersede existing organizations. Fifty three centres were established in Lima pueblos jóvenes and were to function with a General Assembly with community representatives from each ministry; the Assembly's task was to establish how and to what extent services and living conditions could be improved.[66] The PAD claimed to be supervising the "normal, institutional development of the Mother's Clubs."[67] Its aim in terms of communal kitchens was to turn the autonomous kitchens into administered ones and to dissolve the smaller ones. This attitude, coupled with certain new restrictions it imposed to make clubs eligible for its support made the PAD more of an affront to the autonomy of existing mother's clubs and the kitchens that they had organized than anything else. Comments of various mother's clubs members about the PAD ranged from: "el PAD esta marginando a algunos Comedores Populares y Clubes de Madres, porque a veces equivocadamente identifican como Izquierda Unida"; "también conocemos que no apoyan a las demás organizaciones como Comedores Populares, Comités de Vaso de Leche y Clubes de Madres independientes"; "que las tres dirigentes seán Apristas, y estan carnetizadas." [68] While in its inception the PAD may have had laudable goals in terms of advancing community organization, in practice its lack of tangible benefits and its imposition of organization from above made it little more than a blunt political instrument, which in many cases caused more resentment than support from the participants. The insertion of the PAD where autonomous organizations already existed had little positive effect, resulting in a lack of
coordination of the program's activities with those of the municipalities of the districts, as even members of APRA-run municipalities admit.\[69\] The concept of imposing external control on autonomous organizational capacity with the aim of channeling demand-making is strikingly similar to SINAMOS, and ran into similar barriers in terms of popular resistance.

The PAD does not seem to either have much potential for success, nor to provide any substantial benefits. The government's most publicized program - the PAIT - cannot be discounted as quickly, however. While in practice the PAIT also proved disruptive to existing organizations and was politicized as well, it was also an extremely popular program, as it served the role of providing an income supplement for those desperately in need.
APRA and the Urban Poor - Part III:
The PAIT

The PAIT was a crucial part of the government's strategy. In the Plan de Gobierno, the first priorities were to ameliorate precarious living conditions, to transform the productive structure, and to provide: "los recursos necesarios para reducir la concentración económica en los núcleos modernos del país y priorizando el desarrollo de la sierra y de los pueblos jóvenes."[70] The PAIT was to increase the consumption capacity of the poorest sectors of the country with the goal of increasing demand as a stimulus for the reactivation of the productive apparatus, and also was the government's main policy towards the pueblos jóvenes. The works were to be realized primarily in the pueblos jóvenes with the end of producing better conditions in the settlements and to guarantee that the opportunity for a set income provided by the program was directed at the inhabitants of the marginalized zones.

The PAIT was designed by those in charge of employment for the APRA's Plan de Gobierno: Victor Lopez and Susanna Pinilla, in conjunction with Jaime Mezzer and Daniel Carbonetto, then with the International Labor Organization - OIT. Lopez became the first director of the PAIT, and Pinilla went to head the IDESI. They determined that the National Planning Institute rather than the Labor Ministry should be in charge of policies for the urban informal sector, and thus Cooperación Popular was charged with the direction and execution of the PAIT. The program began with a budget of over $7 million - 100 million intis in a total
The PAIT was initiated with a great deal of propaganda and fanfare. By January 1986, the program had employed, for a three month basis, approximately 250,000 people countrywide and 160,000 in Lima. The budget for 1986 was $22 million. The program sought to use 70% of its resources for contracting labor. In reality, this percentage varied among the various types of works, as some—such as basic sanitation, which required the laying of water and sewage pipes—spent up to 60% of the budget on inputs. Besides Lima, the program was also implemented in Chiclayo, Trujillo, Chimbote, and Piura, as well as some Andean cities such as Puno. The works were designed to be labor-intensive, requiring low levels of, if any, technology, and requiring short completion times. They consisted of trash collection, reforestation, painting of walls and fences, the building of basic sanitation facilities, the building of access "roads", and the cleaning of beaches—the one project which occurred outside the actual pueblos jóvenes. It was expected that those who were selected for the program would be among the under and unemployed of the districts, and were to receive minimum wage for working 48 hour weeks—540 intis or $36 per month.[72]

The PAIT came in with a bang and went out with a whimper. In January 1988 Cooperación Popular was dissolved and the PAIT was quietly turned over to the municipalities. When President García announced the dissolution of the 147 Cooperación Offices nationwide, he assured that their
workers would have labor stability, and that the PAIT would continue. "Quién mejor que un alcalde para hacer el PAIT, seleccionando de verdad...a los más pobres y humildes para darles un empleo...sin criterio político?"[73] García's assurances were hardly credible, as in many regions municipalities were extremely weak and controlled by local party bosses or power brokers. Often the local PAIT office directors had had more power than the mayors themselves. Meanwhile, the PAIT has no official budget, but was merely an allocation in the central budget, which had to be renewed annually.[74] In light of the ensuing economic crisis and deficit of funds, it was highly unlikely that a large budget would be approved for a project corresponding to municipalities, which in poor areas were already short of funds for the most basic of services.

There were political explanations for the program's fate. The first director of the program, Victor Lopez, had been fired in mid-1987, as he was overtly using the program to build a political power base. This political power base in remote regions was most likely an issue of concern to García, particularly as Lopez, who was an Alva supporter, was filling posts not with "Alanistas" but with "Alvistas." The new director, Augusto Lannatta, was purportedly hired with the mission of purging the Alvistas from positions of power. This was more easily said than done, however, and Lannatta was not very successful. Government funds were running low and economic crisis was setting in; there were no elections in the shortterm; García decided to end the program, supposedly in order to curb the influence of the
"Alvistas". This was not easily accomplished, however. Alva had a much better record in terms of building a support base among and attending to the concerns of regional Apristas. As one consultant to the program said: "they may have been Alvistas, but they were also loyal to the government. Now they are in rebellion."[75] García could not have gained a great deal of political capital by alienating those regional directors, nor by dissolving the program that was the lynchpin of his policy towards the poor.

After the January announcement, the program continued to function on a very small scale, with the objective of maintaining existing works, and using primarily the labor of the permanent program staff. Officials at all different levels within the program assured people that it would continue, but none could specify how or with what funds. Those who had participated and hoped to continue were thus left in a state of flux and may have foregone other opportunities while waiting for the promised work. The main losers in the whole process were those that it had been designed to benefit: the poor and marginalized. The closing of Cooperación Popular offices also left a vacuum in most areas, which still do not have any sort of regional government structure and thus it will be very difficult for them to obtain and administer external development assistance, which Cooperación Popular handled.[76]

Despite the fading out of the PAIT, it had lasting implications. The PAIT functioned differently in rural and urban areas. This study will focus primarily on the urban PAIT, where the majority of the workers were women. It is
interesting to note that in rural areas, where "machismo" is more persistent, there was a much lower percentage of female workers: in Piura, for example, only 40% of the workers were women.[77] In rural regions the program was partially a response to seasonal unemployment. Its impact in Andean farming communities was also limited, as many campesinos have their own resources - their farms, which provide them with the potential for "autoconsumo" - and there are often already in place community improvement committees. The program had the greatest impact in Lima,[78] where the most PAIT workers were concentrated, and where a money income was a prerequisite for feeding a family.

The record of the PAIT in terms of implementation was mixed. It was highly popular, as is demonstrated by the long lists of people waiting to sign up for the lotteries which chose eligible workers. The program was aimed at those at the lowest end of the income strata - the poorest of the poor and the unemployed. Prior to the 1988 recession, 61% of the female economically active population was underemployed versus 33.5% of the male population. Youths of 14-24 years of age have the highest open unemployment rate of all groups and have a 57.9% underemployment rate. Of Lima's population, 33% has a per capita income of 1/3 of minimum wage; 43% of these are in the pueblos jóvenes.[79] Of the actual workers that participated, almost 90% had children and 33% were heads of household. Fifty-five percent of the workers' homes had no running water; 67% no sewage; 29% no electricity. This contrasts with a slightly better record for pueblos jóvenes as a whole, where 46% are without water and 47%
without sewage facilities. For 21.5% of the families, the PAIT wage was the sole source of income, while for another 66%, it provided at least half the income. PAIT workers were clearly among the poorest of the poor.[80]

A striking characteristic of the PAIT, but one which reflects unemployment levels as a whole, was that 76% of PAIT workers were women. Women comprised 57% of the heads of household working in the PAIT.[81] This implies that the PAIT provided women with new opportunities for both desperately needed income and relatively stable employment. Some of these women were previously domestic servants, and had to commute long hours to a job where hours were rarely fixed, or were housewives and had no income at all. The PAIT provided an opportunity to earn an income while working closer to home—often with the possibilities of going home at lunchtime and bringing young children to work—or to earn income for the first time. For those who were already working, the program was serving to, at least temporarily, ease their work/travel burden and at the same time yield more income. In many cases it provided the women for the first time with the independence which comes from being a wage earner. Lastly, unlike many other employment options, the PAIT did not discriminate between men and women. The high percentage of women participating in the PAIT reflects the complex and vital positions that women have in low-income Peruvian families, often acting as both principal wage earners and keepers of home and family. In addition, there was a notable presence of abandoned mothers; when there are separations in low-income families, the mothers,
who rarely have access to legal protection, are left with total responsibility for supporting the family.

The PAIT workers were predominantly young - 33% were between 16 and 25 years - primarily of migrant origin - with 84% having been born outside Lima. The level of education among the workers was quite low: 12% were illiterate, and educational levels were below the average for the urban informal sector as a whole.[82] This again reiterates the poverty of the PAIT workers, particularly when it is considered that over 30% of these workers were heads of households. Previous employment characteristics demonstrate that the PAIT was a better option than what the workers were doing before the program: 37% were working elsewhere, 28% were looking for work, and 30% were working at home - inclusive of housewives.[see Table XII] The majority had left their work due to poor income and better possibilities presented by the PAIT.[83] An advantage of the PAIT, cited by the workers themselves, was working close to home, rather than spending a great deal of time and valuable income commuting to the city. Also 30% of them took their children with them to the PAIT. While there were no fixed requirements for child care, in almost all cases some sort of facility was set up, with one or two workers caring for the children.[84]

In general the orientation of PAIT workers reproduced the traditional structure of family spending in urban low income families. The priority for most - 79% - was food, followed by clothes, and then home improvements and debt repayment. The main advantage that participants saw in PAIT
work was receiving a stable income, followed by not having to travel to work and working stable hours. Those whose sole salary was the PAIT were high among the 89% who wanted to remain in the PAIT forever, while those who had been looking for work a long time were the most negative about the PAIT. The desire to remain in the PAIT permanently can be seen as indicative of a high level of desperation. Others maintained their previous occupation by working at night or early in the morning.[85]

Another interesting feature of the PAIT - and also demonstrative of the low income level of its workers - is the fact that the majority - 51% - found out about the program through primary means of communication: neighbors and friends; 25% through the mass media; and only 3% through a political party. It demonstrates the low level of education of the workers involved, with some cases cited where illiterates were unable to understand what was said on the radio about the program.[86] It also indicates that the APRA's party machinery had quite a weak base among the poorest sectors of the population.

In sum, the PAIT clearly reached the designated population, and provided its workers with necessary, although temporary, income relief. In this sense it was definitely a positive influence. It also served to provide many of its female workers with a newfound sense of independence, and many young people with a first entry into the labor force. However, the extent to which the PAIT had the capacity to enhance the ability of its workers to join the modern sector labor force is another issue entirely, and
one in which the PAIT was far less successful. There are clearly problems with the PAIT - both in its potential to act as more than a temporary palliative, and in the way it was manipulated by partisan functionaries at all levels.

First and foremost, there were problems on the microlevel. The PAIT proved to be a benefit for many families, but also has acted as a disruptive force in some communities. The program chose workers by lottery, as there were usually more applicants than posts. The uncertainty proved disruptive both to families with hopes of joining the PAIT and to those with hopes of continuing to work there; a dependence on PAIT income clearly emerged in many cases.[87] The PAIT also disrupted many existing community organizations, such as the mother's clubs and communal kitchens, as responsibilities in these organizations were dropped when the opportunity to work for the PAIT arose. The often manipulative attitude of PAIT functionaries was criticised by many women in mother's clubs; others, not surprisingly among those who have been able to participate, express the overriding importance of the increase to family income. Others point to youth refusing to return to school when given the opportunity to earn PAIT income.[88] The PAIT also had effects on male-female relations, as many women discovered the independence that accompanies the earning of an independent salary for the first time. Finally, there were cases where the care of children at home was severely neglected due to the time demands on the mothers working in the PAIT[89]; and the quality of child care of the PAIT centres was criticised as very poor. There were many cases
where women worked in very unsanitary conditions - such as trash burning - or carrying heavy loads - such as in road access building - with their children on their backs.[90] These problems vary among districts and type of work, as also depend on the attitude of the regional functionaries.

The nature of the work itself also makes it difficult for the program to serve as skills training. Low productivity work such as painting fences and burning trash may indeed better the conditions of the pueblos jóvenes, but it will hardly provide workers with skills to enter the modern sector. The program served as a temporary income subsidy but little else. The way it was phased out in 1988 seems to have cut short any longterm potential it may have had. At the same time, the desperate level of income of the workers involved made it a highly popular program, despite the disruptive influence it may have at the community level, and would make them supportive of it were it to be conveniently re-instated prior to the 1990 elections. García's willingness to use the program for political ends was demonstrated by his announcing, in September 1988 when his cabinet was implementing an austerity plan, that 200,000 new PAIT posts were going to be created in the near future.[91] The desperate nature of the workers also increases the potential for the program to be used as a political tool, a phenomenon which occurred on a surprising scale among the middle level Aprista functionaries who are involved in the regional administration of the program. Misuse of PAIT funds was widespread; one case was so blatant
that it created a rebellion of the APRA youth against the director of Cooperación Popular in Lambayeque.

The program direction is highly centralized and was used for political benefit by the APRA government. There is little coordination with local government, particularly in Izquierda Unida regions. Instead the posts of zone directors are used as vehicles for young Apristas. Fortunately, most technical posts were excluded from this process. Victor Lopez, the first director, built a wide reputation for utilizing the program to build up his own - and the APRA's - political base.[92] There is a substantial bureaucracy in the directorate, which lends itself to politicization. For every thirty workers or "cuadrilla" there is a chief, and for each four cuadrillas there is a "brigada" chief. Then there is also a technical directorate and a district coordinator. In total there are 4000 functionaries who are bureaucrats, and of these all are either Apristas or Aprista sympathizers.[93] As has been aforementioned, these bureaucrats wield a great deal of political power in remote rural regions, and became cards in the intra-party power struggle between Alan García and Luis Alva.

Besides the politicization of the PAIT bureaucracy, there have been far more blatant cases of manipulation of PAIT workers. PAIT workers were used to disrupt strikes, in particular the 1986 doctors' and SUTEP teachers' strikes, arousing a great deal of animosity towards the PAIT from organized labor. In Villa El Salvador, the organizers of the PAIT got the workers to march against the Izquierda Unida mayor - Miguel d'Ascueta - by claiming that he was opposed
Aprista functionaries paid by the PAIT were used in the November 1986 election campaign and PAIT workers were often transported to APRA political rallies. There is also clearly a correlation between the number of workers hired and in which regions and the November 1986 election campaign. The number hired prior to the election escalated well beyond the number proposed by the OIT consultants team, which resulted in the using of an excess of the budget and thus a severely curtailed PAIT in early 1987, and the transfer of the program to the municipalities in 1988. [See Tables XI, XII: PAIT advertisement, projected enrollments at the central level] At the same time, there was a correlation between the allocation of PAIT workers going to regions where Izquierda Unida was strong in 1985. Finally, it was rumoured that in many cases an APRA "carnét" was required to register for the PAIT lottery. More believable were the rumours of cuadrilla chiefs having to be registered Apristas. Again, the extent of this depends to some extent on the individual district functionaries.

The PAIT's implementation involved the manipulation of a population desperately in need of resources. This exposes the nature of the APRA both at the central government and mid-bureaucratic levels. A more clear documentation of the actual relations between the workers and their "cuadrilla" and "brigada" chiefs will be a part of the study of the PAIT at the micro level. There is sufficient evidence to conclude at this point, however, that it served as a populist tool for the government rather than a serious effort at
employment and skills generation. The government's devolution of responsibility for the program halfway through its term is the most extreme example of this. There was, perhaps, potential for a program such as the PAIT to be implemented as a permanent institution which could serve as a valuable bridge between the modern and informal sectors - one of the roles that it was designed to play - and to provide infrastructural improvements for the pueblos jóvenes at the same time. Employment remains a critical problem, with an extremely young population and a deficit of 750,000 jobs projected for the next five years.[99] The program would have to be implemented in a different manner, however, avoiding the pervasive politicization which made promotion for non-apristas within its ranks virtually impossible. The examination of the PAIT, in particular its relation with existing organizations - its disruption of the mother's clubs and communal kitchens - demonstrates the authoritarian and clientelistic nature of the APRA government. The PAIT in practice was "redistribution without social reform".[100]

A brief comparison with a similar program - probably the most significant of its kind in Latin America[101] - the PEM, in Chile may serve to shed light on whether this is an inherent flaw in programs of this nature or whether it points to shared characteristics between the styles of the two governments, although one is in theory a democracy and the other a military dictatorship. The PEM arose as a potential solution to the same structural economic heterogeneity - the coexistence of formal and informal sectors - displayed by Chile as well as Peru, although on a
smaller scale. As in Peru, the program was designed to benefit the marginalized population. Unemployment in Chile at the time the PEM was introduced - 1974-1982 - was 18.1%. The PEM was also for its subscribers a survival solution to economic crisis.[102]

There are some crucial differences between the PEM and the PAIT, however. The PEM, unlike the PAIT, was not presented as an important part of an overall economic strategy, but rather as a response to the massive unemployment caused by the implementation in Chile in 1973 of a strict neoliberal economic model. The PEM was not a part of this model, but rather a response to the potential social unrest that economic deterioration caused for the working class sector in Chile.

El PEM como institución...aparece más bien como un mecanismo de la dominación social autoritaria, donde la negociación del derecho al trabajo y a una remuneración justa es impuesto por la amenaza del hambre y de la represión.[103]

This differs from the initial conception of the PAIT as a functional part of the economic strategy, both through its incorporation of the marginalized and the increase of their purchasing power as a demand-inducing mechanism. The PEM, in contrast, is seen as creating a permanent worker underclass, and thus to lower, rather than raise, the salaries of industrial level workers.[104] The PAIT, on the other hand, raised the salary levels of domestic servants in Lima. This reflects the different levels of education and skill of those who were employed by the two programs. While the PEM was part of a recessive strategy, the PAIT focused more on
the income designed to contribute to the economic reactivation.

The projects pursued by the PEM workers are similar to PAIT ones, and are also based in informal settlements. The PEM began as a temporary program, but has become a permanent institution, employing almost 300,000 workers or 7.8% of Chile's labor force in 1983. Men are 65% of PEM workers, a key difference with the PAIT. Since 1980, the proportion of women in the program rose - from 27% in 1975 to 35% in 1980 - as did the number of youth, as a response to economic crisis.[105] PEM workers have increasingly become people who are entering the labor force for the first time. The PEM began as a supplementary program, paying minimum wage for part-time work. It now employs most people on a full time basis and the wage paid is less than the minimum.[106]

Dissatisfaction with the PEM is much higher than with the PAIT. Sixty-three percent of PEM workers had recently looked for other jobs. This higher rate of dissatisfaction is no doubt in part a function of the higher level of education of PEM workers - only 5 to 10% were illiterate; 80% had a basic education; and over 4% had university degrees. The general opinion about working for the PEM was that it was a degradation and sign of desperation.[107] "Todos prefieren hacer cualquier cosa pero no meterse al famoso PEM...porque es como lo último que puede haber, como lo último de la burla del obrero."[108] This indicates the extent to which unemployment in Chile affects skilled labor, and the overall higher level of development than in Peru.
The PEM, like the PAIT, stressed training and skills as vital to the program, but only 6% of PEM workers were reported to have participated in training programs. The PEM was seen by critics as a tool of the state: creating a sort of economic apartheid by keeping the poor working in their slums, and providing public services at a very low cost through the exploitation of labor.[109]

While similar criticisms could be made about the PAIT, there are critical differences. The first is the higher overall level of development in Chile and the extent to which the workers participating in the PEM are not part of Carbonetto's "structural" informal sector, but were employed as semi-skilled labor in the modern sector prior to the neoliberal model. The PAIT workers are the poorest of those of the structural informal sector and thus the PAIT was viewed as a much more palatable and positive option by its participants. The different attitudes about the programs, reflect levels of education and skills, but also the nature of the respective governments. Many of the poor in Peru voted for and supported García - until the onset of economic crisis. This was hardly the case in Pinochet's Chile.

Conclusion

The PAIT in theory and the PAIT in practice have proven to be largely different and have exposed certain undemocratic traits of the APRA government and party. This should not totally discount the program's potential - despite all its faults - as a positive contribution to the conditions of the workers in Lima's pueblos jóvenes. For the first time in Peru's history, a program directed at the
pueblos jóvenes was - in theory at least - part of a coherent plan to make the poorest sectors active and central participants in the economic strategy. Even the "revolutionary" military regime failed to recognize the economic potential of the urban poor - focusing instead on building political support through SINAMOS - and basing its economic strategy largely on state investment in large scale infrastructural projects. While the APRA approach was conceptually distinct from those of its predecessors, there were serious flaws in implementation.

The apparent coherence in theory between the government's main programs - the PAIT, the PAD, and the IDESI - was lost in practice. The tendency to operate from the central level with no regard for or coordination with existing organizations, caused misallocation of funds and duplication of effort, as well as alienation of non-APRA directed organizations. Party favoritism was pervasive. The IDESI, a semi-autonomous agency, was the least affected by such traits and was the program with the most longterm potential. The PAIT's potential was undermined by the manner in which its fate was determined by political criteria. Indeed the manner in which the program was used as a tool for clientelism and cooptation was sadly reminiscent of SINAMOS.

Operando sobre la base de la tremenda necesidad de empleo e ingresos entre los sectores populares, la administración logró...la creación de mandos directas entre población y gobierno. En todos los casos, una característica explícita del program fue la marginalización de la organización barrial...e incluso la de los propios gobiernos locales.[110]
Sectarianism and populist style similarly characterized the APRA's governance of the Lima municipality, which lacked any coherent approach towards the pueblos jóvenes. A central office to attempt to coordinate the extension of services to the pueblos was set up, but in contrast to the highly publicized SINAMOS, the APRA's Casa Central de los Pueblos Jóvenes was neither funded nor run by the García government. It was founded and operated by an APRA deputy, Wilbert Bendezú Carpio, along with a group of young party volunteers. The Casa made some progress in aiding settlers in their search for services and in getting Banco de Materiales loans to build their homes. It also sponsored the building of low-cost libraries and communal stores that would pertain to Mothers' Clubs, and would be funded by the Banco de Materiales and external sources. The basis was the need in the pueblos for a local supply of basic goods and for a clean and lighted place for youth to study. The Casa Central was limited, however, by its lack of funds, and its operations remained on a small scale. The left criticized the Casa as a mixture of party and state apparatus that turned what were citizens' rights into a gift from the party. The government, meanwhile, made no attempt to address in any coherent manner the issues of pressing concern to the pobladores: land titles and basic services such as water and electricity. Instead the central government was extremely wasteful with funds for its own "white elephants", such as the PAD pools and an electric train, while the municipal one was hopelessly incompetent. The APRA's performance in
addressing the problems of the urban poor was remarkably poor in light of the party's control of both central and municipal administrations since the 1986 municipal elections.

The García government proposed as the solution to the city's desperate transportation shortage - inhabitants of many pueblos jóvenes spend up to four hours daily commuting to the city center - an electric train. The train, whose projected costs were $1,000 million, was to be funded in conjunction with the Italian government.[112] Construction was begun in 1986, but was soon halted, without the completion of one route, due to lack of funds. Due to the government's penchant for grandiose schemes, a great deal of money was spent, but the transportation problem was not addressed.

The problem of garbage collection is also a crucial one, particularly in the pueblos jóvenes, where usually there is no service at all. Since the APRA takeover of the municipality, however, the quantity of garbage collection has fallen by over fifty tons, and the number of operating trucks has been reduced.[113] The APRA's sectarian practice of reserving the majority, if not all, positions of authority for those of their own ranks has played a role in the poor record at the municipal services level. There is a shortage of skilled and trained people within the APRA ranks, which they themselves admit. Regardless, the directorates of most of the agencies responsible for basic services: electricity (Electrolima), water (Sedapal), and housing (Banco de Vivienda), among others, were all filled
with Apristas, regardless of their preparation or experience, and who often held more than one public office. This frustrated the already inadequate functioning of these crucial state enterprises: "dificultando un trabajo que...necesita dedicación exclusiva...el Apra no tiene cuadros. El PPC y la IU tienen doctrinas opuestas, pero con ellos pudimos llevar a cabo un trabajo de conjunto."[114]

The extension of basic services to the vast numbers of urban poor living without them hinges on the performance of these enterprises. A worsening of their already low performance levels, coupled with the aid of an inadequately funded and supported Casa Central de Pueblos Jóvenes implies that the pressing needs of the urban poor will be neglected once again, despite the García government's highly publicized focus on improving the situations of the pueblos jóvenes. Ironically, the government should have an advantage in coordinating the efforts of the central and municipal governments and the state service enterprises, given the control it has over all of them. It has not, however, used its control to that end, formulating no coherent policy.

The García government also remained vague in its policy towards land invasions. A violent dislocation in September 1985 at Garagay, at the limits of the Lima district of San Martin de Porres, brought quickly to the surface the unresolved issues of the land ownership and housing.[115] Although the President visited the region shortly after to listen to the settlers' grievances, no policy measures were taken at the time. There were 282 invasions of private and public land in 1985, and only three legal adjudications of
land.[116] In July 1986 the government sponsored and passed a Ley de Reconocimiento y Titulación de Pueblos Jóvenes. In the year that followed, 222,285 Peruvians participated in land invasions, many of which involved violent dislocations, injuries and some deaths.[117] The volatile invasions issue had not been sufficiently addressed, and continued to be highly politicized. At the local level, the APRA continued its traditional policy of sponsoring invasions. For example, in early 1988, a large group of Chorillos settlers marched protesting the continuous invasions - which were being led by the APRA mayor Jorge Meneses - of their lands. The marchers were attacked by police with sticks and tear gas, as was the PPC locale where the marchers congregated. One of the march directors denounced the invasion of 600,000 square meters of land "por matones que portaban carnet aprista" [118]. The very same day, meanwhile, 2000 settlers of Casa Huertas in Surquillo, headed by their APRA mayor, marched - without police repression - to the center of town in protest of the lack of basic sanitation services in their settlement.[119] These incidents demonstrate the degree to which the land issue remains unsettled and the extent to which it is politicized. The politically sensitive issue of land distribution in Lima, where the increasing problems of overcrowding are exacerbated by speculative real estate practices which benefit the wealthy, has not been addressed. The results are at the expense of the poor, whose desperate state is used politically by forces such as the APRA. The government has not presented any coherent policy to deal with the land invasions, nor has it established an overall
approach to deal with the severe shortage of basic services that the inhabitants of the pueblos jóvenes face, as is demonstrated by its lack of support for the efforts of the Casa Central de Pueblos Jóvenes and the poor records and uncoordinated efforts of the municipality and the state service enterprises.

Conclusion

The APRA's record - both in its policies for the informal sector and in the incoherent approach towards the urban poor - demonstrates clientelistic and short-term populist goals rather than desire for genuine progress towards social reform. The disastrous effects that the 1988 economic crisis - largely of the government's own making - was to have on the urban poor rapidly eroded any marginal progress that some of the APRA's programs might have had. Redistribution without reform then became regression without reform. A telling example of the extreme short-sightedness and lack of responsibility was the discontinuation - at the time that the 1988 recession hit - of food distribution programs in impoverished sierra regions, such as Huaraz, in order to divert the resources to pueblos jóvenes in Lima.[120] Taking from the most marginalized to address the needs of the more politically salient marginalized was hardly in keeping with "priorizando el desarrollo de la sierra y de los pueblos jóvenes". The differences between the APRA's approach in theory and in performance were vast indeed.

The urban poor, meanwhile, had supported the APRA when it yielded tangible benefits, such as PAIT income, yet
became aware of the clientelistic and manipulative nature of the government, particularly as programs were discontinued precisely before economic crisis set in. Support for the government plummeted: García's approval rating, which was over 90% early on fell to 16% by September 1988. Traditionally the urban poor have turned to communal efforts at survival in times of crisis, and it is likely that the importance of communal kitchens and other such organizations—precisely those that were disrupted by some of the APRA's programs—will grow in importance. However, the role of radical alternatives, given the focus of Sendero on disrupting existing communal organization; and given the severity of the crisis and the extent to which the government was discredited, should not be discounted.

Este comportamiento de las élites ha tenido un fuerte impacto sobre la cultura política de los sectores populares...han sufrido...no solo un acelerada caída de sus niveles materiales de la vida sino también una suerte de revelación respecto de la verdadera naturaleza de las élites en relación su supuesto rol de liderazgo nacional.[121]

The APRA's record in the urban poverty realm was similar to those of its predecessors: attempts to coopt the political support of the urban poor, while disrupting their autonomous efforts and organizations and ignoring the fundamental causes of urban poverty. While expectations were at first heightened, the poor became increasingly aware of the nature of the government and the breach between state and society—Matos Mar's desborde popular—could only grow wider. The APRA's efforts to incorporate the "marginalized" thus yielded negative results. This was due to the severity of the constraints; to the shortsightedness and lack of
skill in the government - both at the macro and micro levels; and finally to the sectarian and authoritarian traits which made it extremely difficult for the APRA - as a party and as a government - to narrow the growing gap between state and society. The study in the following chapter of the implementation of the PAIT in one Lima pueblo joven will serve to, among other things, illustrate these traits.
Chapter VIII
APRA's PAIT in Practice:
A Study in Huascar of San Juan de Lurigancho

Located in Lima's most populous and most impoverished district, San Juan de Lurigancho, the pueblo joven Huascar is a good example of urban poverty in today's Peru, as well as of what is implied by the term "pueblo joven" or young town. Huascar has approximately 60,000 inhabitants. They share one paved road and most live in houses made of straw; none have running water or sewage services. Electric service was extended to the twelve year old town only in 1987. The "streets" are full of unattended children, bony dogs, and piles of garbage. The desert soil is devoid of any vegetation whatsoever; there is a pervasive odor of garbage and thousands upon thousands of back to back and woefully inadequate houses. Over 40% of Lima's population lives in such conditions, making the image all the more impressive.

Huascar typifies the Lima "pueblo joven", the most prevalent form of urban slum or shanty town. Pueblos jóvenes are formed by a process of "first living, in order to then build," as opposed to "tugurios" or urban slums, which are more accurately described as the "degeneration" of the city,[1] as existing buildings become increasingly overcrowded and deteriorated. Pueblos jóvenes are the response of the poor to the lack of available or affordable land and housing. The settlements, often the result of group invasions of idle private sector or state land, begin with no infrastructure other than the straw mats which the settlers have used to erect their houses. The slow progression to the status of legally recognized villages
with access to basic services such as water, electricity, and transportation can easily take up to twenty years and may involve several violent dislocations and relocations by state authorities.

The original inhabitants of Huascar, for example, have been forcibly relocated twice since their initial 1976 invasion and only obtained legal title to their land in 1986. Even basic water service seems unattainable in the near future. Continuous migration from the sierra of the country, which has recently increased due to Sendero Luminoso's presence in the Andean Trapezoid, has resulted in the creation of at least a dozen subsidiary settlements of Huascar. In one, named Huanta, virtually all the inhabitants are from the district of Huanta in Ayacucho, a district which has been virtually emptied due to Sendero violence. Huascar, as most of the district that it pertains to, is an amalgamation of rural and Andean peoples and culture. The presence of vast numbers of migrants from the Andes in the Lima of the 1980's is obvious to even the casual downtown observer. However, most reasonably well off Limenos have no familiarity with Huascar and its despicable conditions; conditions which typify the Lima where most recent migrants will live and raise their children.

Aun así, la población del distrito [San Juan de Lurigancho] es fundamentalmente provinciana, serrana, indígena...Las tradiciones, las costumbres, la herencia de la población pertenecen a un mundo hasta ahora despreciado por la gente limeña. El distrito de San Juan de Lurigancho pertenece, por su población, al mundo andino urbano.[2]

An analysis of the recent history and current socioeconomic status of Huascar, and the larger district it
pertains to, San Juan de Lurigancho - where an estimated 60% of the population lives in pueblos jóvenes such as Huascar - sheds light on the complex social, economic, and political factors that explain urban poverty in Peru. Due to the Andean origins and family ties of most of its original settlers, Huascar's development has been very much affected - perhaps more than other pueblos - by the increase in strength of Sendero Luminoso in the Andean trapezoid and the resulting increase in migration. A study in Huascar provides a unique insight into the complex and interacting forces which have resulted in the massive growth of urban poverty in Peru and which make it a continually dynamic and burgeoning problem. It is a problem which any government must address, particularly one led by a party with a rhetorical commitment to reform and social justice such as the APRA's.

Not surprisingly, Huascar was one of the primary focuses of the PAIT program in San Juan de Lurigancho. The following study of the program in San Juan de Lurigancho, and in closer detail in Huascar, sheds light on how the party machinery functions at the community service level, on the program's actual implementation, and on its effects on the district's municipality and communities. It will serve as a basis for the portrayal of how the APRA functions at the most basic, and in today's Peru, most pressing level: its policy towards and treatment of Alan García's so-called "marginalized" population. The study of the program in San Juan de Lurigancho involved interviews with the Apristas who set up and administered the PAIT in the district; with
municipal administrators of other community service programs; with the mayor of San Juan de Lurigancho; with church leaders in Huascar; and with twenty-three women who worked in the PAIT in Huascar. As a comparison, a small group of women who worked in the PAIT in another pueblo joven, Pamplona Alta, in a different district were also interviewed. Prior to analyzing the PAIT, however, it is necessary to briefly examine the history of Huascar, and of the district that it pertains to, in the context of past government policy in the area. An attempt will also be made to construct as accurately as possible, given the lack of official statistics, the socioeconomic and political profile of both district and town.

Huascar of San Juan de Lurigancho: Origins and History

La carencia o insuficiencia de servicios, la precariedad de la vivienda; que euflemismo!, la gravedad del problema del empleo - sería mejor decir desempleo y subempleo -, en una palabra: la pobreza, dibujan las condiciones de vida, tal como la aridez de esta tierra dibuja el paisaje.[3]

San Juan de Lurigancho is Lima's most populous district, and it is also its poorest, in terms of per capita income, number of inhabitants, and available public resources. Its current situation is a result of the rapid urbanization process that changed Lima in general, coupled with a drastic increase in migration to the district from the Ayacucho region in the early eighties.

Prior to these trends, however, San Juan de Lurigancho was a sparsely populated area and was part of the district known as Lurigancho-Chosica. As late as 1940 the district only had a few hundred inhabitants. In Inca and pre-Inca
times, the district was the site of agriculturally oriented communities. With the conquest of the Spaniards, the district maintained its pre-existing agricultural orientation. There were only three indigenous communities in addition to the haciendas, which were exploited for "mita" labor: free labor required of the Indians by the hacendados in exchange for "protection". The district's total population barely surpassed one thousand. Approximately one half the land - that closest to the Rimac river - was arable, while only a part of the other half closer to the desert hills could be used for grazing. The district maintained its rural characteristics until the 1940's.[4]

With the post-World War II trends in urbanization and migration the nature of the San Juan de Lurigancho district changed substantially. The population of the district grew from 1046 in 1940 to 86,173 in 1972 to 477,928 in 1986[5], with unofficial estimates for 1988 at 700,000. The last census, taken in 1981, did not account for the Sendero-inspired migration.[6]

As the "tugurios" or slums of Lima filled up in the early sixties, recent migrants had to look elsewhere for housing. At the time several major land proprietors in San Juan de Lurigancho formed urbanization associations. Ironically, in some cases these proprietors were the same families who have been the targets of President García's attacks on the "grupos de poder" such as the Nicolini and Wiese families. As the land was not of particularly high value they aimed for the middle strata of society, and sold urban lots with basic services, streets, and sidewalks in
the part of the district closest to the river. This resulted in the formation of the community of Zarate in 1961, which at present is the wealthiest part of the district. There was also a campaign in the sixties - which never materialized - to create a satellite city in the barren pampa of Cantogrande, the less arable zone of the district near the desert hills, [see map - Table I] in order to ease the congestion of Lima. San Juan de Lurigancho achieved the status of an independent district in 1967 due to persistent demands from its settlers, who tired of having to travel to the municipal base in Chosica for attention. [7]

The arrival of the Velasco regime had an impact on the development of the district, with a gradual withdrawal of private sector interests and a new involvement on the part of the state in response to a highly publicized invasion in 1976: Huascar. The response of the private holders in San Juan de Lurigancho to the threat to landholdings posed by the Velasco reforms was threefold. The first was to hold a limited amount of lands for agricultural uses. The second was to continue urbanizing, such as in the cases of the Nicolini family in Las Flores and the Wiese family in Canto Nuevo. [see map] The third was immediately to sell the lands for fear of expropriation. There was, at the time, a rise in the number of housing associations, mentioned in Chapter V: APV's and COOPVIV's, who were often the purchasers of the land being put up for sale. These associations came to the fore during the Velasco years, when private land owners were eager to sell their holdings. These groups grew in number
and influence in the district as a great deal of land was
made available for purchase at a relatively low price.

The most significant incident in promoting the San Juan
de Lurigancho district as a location for pueblos jóvenes was
the 1976 Huascar invasion and its aftermath. In January of
1976 a group of several thousand invaded land next to the
Puente Huascar, on the Rimac river. The settlers were recent
migrants from the southern sierra, who as yet had no homes
and had been staying in rented rooms or other temporary
arrangements. The settlers stayed on the banks of the river
for approximately three months before being re-located. The
location was unsafe due to the proximity to the river and an
ensuing infestation of insects, and to a nearby factory
which released a great deal of noxious fumes; there was
quite a bit of sickness and death among the settlers. The
authorities, citing the unhealthiness of the location,
offered to relocate the settlers to the pampas of
Cantogrande in San Juan de Lurigancho. The settlers,
organized into directorate committees or "comités" of
seventy or so families, consented. They and their few
belongings were relocated in Sinamos trucks to the barren
pampa of Cantogrande. There was an attempt to keep the
comité organization intact in the re-location, but several
were split up, and that organization was gradually replaced
by one by "manzana" or blocks, the organization which exists
today. The settlers insisted on keeping the original name of
their settlement, and therefore Huascar and Cantogrande
are often used interchangeably today, although Huascar is in
actuality only one part of Cantogrande. There was a scramble
for plots of land, a scramble in which getting ninety square metres was "like winning the lottery"[10] and most of the land which had been set aside for parks and schools was taken up. Eventually the state agency that had replaced the controversial SINAMOS, INADI, attempted to stop the settlers from taking over the school and park plots, and relocated the excess settlers to offspring settlements such as Bayovar and 10 de Febrer.[11]

The extensiveness of the Huascar invasion, approximately 35,000 people, attracted the attention of and an extensive debate in the media, and brought to the public eye the severe shortage of housing for the low-income sectors of the urban population. The publicity also forced the state to take some action; it resulted in its choosing Canto Grande as a location for resettlement, and it began to assume a role of promoting pueblos jóvenes in the area. The land had been expropriated from the Wiese family in 1973; the resulting court case has yet to be settled.[12] The Cantogrande location, far from the center of town, was in keeping with past policy, both public and private, of attempting to locate those sectors who could not afford to pay for land in the periphery of the city, and reserving closer locations for those who could pay for them. Having relocated the settlers well out of the public eye, the state quickly forgot them.

Luego de la reubicación las autoridades olvidaron poco a poco a la población reubicada, quedando prácticamente abandonada, debiendo buscar ella misma la solución de múltiples necesidades, varias de ellas responsabilidad directa del Estado...De esta manera, el Estado se convertía en un promotor de Pueblos Jóvenes, sin resolver realmente los problemas de vivienda.[13]
Nevertheless, the Huascar invasion and relocation led to numerous relocations and invasions in the region, such as Bayovar, Arriba Perú, 9 de Octubre, and Villa Hermosa, a phenomenon which is still occurring today, now at the very limits of the district, with the newest settlement, Montenégro, touching the limits of the province of Lima at the base of the desert hills. [See maps]

The population of Huascar by no means had its problems resolved at this point. The state clearly neglected the settlement after 1976, and the fight for any sort of legal recognition was long and hard. The settlers of Huascar only received legal title to their land at the end of 1986, with the election of the current APRA mayor, Victor Ortiz Pilco. [14] Prior to that date, according to Ortiz Pilco, the land title issue had been manipulated by a succession of mayors for patronage. [15] In 1980, approximately 10,000 settlers from Huascar marched to the Congress asking for water and sewage services. The Senate promised an emergency plan for Cantogrande. Nothing materialized. In February of the next year 20,000 marched to the Plaza de Armas; that time they were prevented from entering the Plaza by the police, resulting in the injury and detention of several settlers. [16] To this day, the settlement does not have running water or sewage facilities; electricity was only obtained in 1987. Water is bought from private trucks, who often double their official price due to the remoteness of the location and the lack of other alternatives. Public transport only services the lower parts of the town. [17]
In their quest for legal title to their land or for various kinds of services, the settlers were often subject to various kinds of manipulation and fraud. The perpetrators were often the very cooperatives designed to help settlers find land and housing and sold plots, the APV's, or the government agency officials who were supposed to conduct the inspection required prior to the land titling process. One of the original Huascar settlers recounted her experiences with fraudulent practices. The woman relocated to El Pórvemir, a Huascar offshoot, in order to get a plot large enough for her extended family, who fled Huanta, Ayacucho in March of 1983. Her mother had refused to allow members of Sendero to use her home as a meeting place and had subsequently received death threats. The Huascar woman had given her entire savings to a supposed "Asociación", along with twenty other families. The settlers had responded to propaganda put out by the association. The group relocated to the "legal" land that they had purchased, only to discover, when they were violently dislocated by assault police eight days later, that the association had been a total farce, run out of a rented office in Lima which disappeared after completing the "sale". The settlers again relocated and lived on an invaded industrial plot for six months, in constant fear of and keeping nightly watch for the authorities. Finally, with the change in municipal government from AP to IU in November of 1983, the new mayor supported the invasion and promised that the settlers would not be dislocated. This woman also tells of having to bribe ENACE (the agency that replaced INADI) in order for them to
conduct the land inspection that is necessary to apply for a land title. The practice of extorting bribes from people who have so little exposes the extent to which corruption pervades the government bureaucracy in Peru. The settlers of El Porvenir still do not have land titles, which makes it impossible for them to apply for other services such as electricity; water is even further out of reach. Some of the settlers now connect illegally to electric outlets at night, and disconnect each morning.[18]

Those who remained in Huascar proper have also had their share of problems with a legal system which is prone to manipulation, rather than support, of the most needy, and unfortunately usually least educated, of the citizenry. Another of the original settlers of Huascar recounted her experiences. This woman was the family member who invaded the land; applied and fought for the title; and built the house that she lives in. When the bulk of Huascar residents finally got titles in late 1986, she was unable to obtain the title in her own name because she had married since the invasion. Her husband, meanwhile, was co-habitating with another woman outside of Lima and was rarely at home. The authorities insist that the law prohibits this woman, because she is married, to be the legal head of the household. Thus she is, after over ten years of waiting for legal title and the security that it represents, without proper title to her house and property.[19] There are thousands of similar cases of manipulation by legal or extra-legal organizations or individuals, and demonstrate how the authorities are often another obstacle in the
difficult struggle for survival faced by the settlers. Recent migrants, desperately poor and usually naive about city life, are prime targets for exploitation.

As is described in the previous chapter, the state's role throughout the urbanization process has more often been incoherent or detrimental than helpful. During the district's most rapid phases of growth, the state had virtually no role, such as in the sixties, when land speculators were the primary urbanizing force. The only state-constructed project in the entire district is one built in 1961, Caja de Agua, with a loan from the Inter-American Development Bank. The project offered 2,700 lots with roofs and basic services on lands expropriated for that purpose from the Haciendas Otero. People moved in by 1965, and obtained basic services by 1970.[20] This is clearly an isolated project. During the military years, with the exception of the Huascar invasion, the district received little government attention.

The second Belaúnde regime followed the military's policy of sponsoring the foundation of pueblos jóvenes without the provision of further support, as in the case of Huascar. In San Juan de Lurigancho, the government sponsored one large-scale popular housing project, the "Ciudad de Constructores". Beyond Huascar, on state land expropriated in 1973, they built, with World Bank credits, "lotes con servicios" designed to locate 100,000 people. The government allocated less resources to this project than to any of the housing projects it built for middle income families in the city proper. The project was never totally completed; lots
were set aside, but the settlers had to build their own houses and obtain their own services. Meanwhile an acceleration of sales of adjacent idle lands to cooperatives occurred, and there were a series of conflicts over the occupation of these lands. The severely depressed economy of the Belaúnde years, meanwhile, made "autoconstrucción" virtually unaffordable for most inhabitants of the district, as will be demonstrated later by the large percentage of Huascar residents whose houses are still of straw rather than of cement or other materials.

San Juan de Lurigancho and Huascar: Socioeconomic Profiles

The process of land invasions, private sector land sales to cooperatives, and the state promotion of settlements in the district all led to a complete change in the structure of the district, particularly after the acceleration of the process since the 1976 Huascar invasion. The population of San Juan de Lurigancho grew 22.2% from 1972 to 1981 [See Table IX], and nearly 60% of that population lived in pueblos jóvenes. Official estimates, based on the 1981 census, place the population of the district at 347,000. These figures do not take into account the increase in migration due to terrorism and also to disastrous droughts in the southern sierra in 1983; the actual migration rate was much higher than the projected one, and the current municipality estimates the population at 690,000. The population of Cantogrande alone is between 300,000 and 350,000 inhabitants. The lack of accurate statistics creates a problem in terms of municipal planning at the most basic level; meanwhile the district is allocated
a disproportionately low share of funds from the central government budget.[23] At the same time, as the bulk of the population in pueblos jóvenes does not pay taxes due to both their lack of legal title and to their inability to pay, the district is short of funds on that front as well. This shortage coupled with a burgeoning population that is severely in need of even the most basic services such as running water and sewage facilities, results in a mass of people living in inconceivable conditions of filth and scarcity.

Not surprisingly the district is characterized by large family sizes: over 50% of the families have four to six children. The population of the district is also very young: those under twenty make up over half of the population, creating an immediate demand for education and a for jobs on a mass scale in the very near future. The bulk of these youths are children of migrants. Illiteracy has dropped substantially: from 20% in 1961 to 9% in 1981, primarily a result of the Belaúnde government's emphasis on education, one which was disproportionate in terms of its lack of attention to other services. Illiteracy is still proportionately higher among women, indicative of the "machismo" that pervades Peruvian society. Complementing this is the much lower proportion of women who are considered economically active - although most of them do some form of work, usually out of their homes. A 1983 survey found that only 22% of San Juan de Lurigancho residents earned more than one monthly minimum wage, and of the district residents that live in pueblos jóvenes only 16%
earned that amount. Forty percent of this latter group earned an income of less than one-third of the monthly minimum.[24][See Table IX] Given that one monthly minimum wage is by no means adequate to feed and clothe a family, these figures are particularly striking. Unemployment in the district, at 4.7% in 1961, was 12.6% in 1981, versus a rate of 6.7% for Lima. When coupled with underemployment, this rate is much higher. In such districts, those workers who describe themselves as independent are mainly street vendors, small scale producers, or domestic servants and are often underemployed. Independent workers constituted 65% of the economically active population in the district towns of Bayovar, 62% in 10 de Febrero, and 52% in Arriba Perú.[25] The district has a poor record in terms of basic services as well. Only 53.6% of the population had access to running water in 1982, a figure which has fallen since 1972, demonstrating the increase of demand that has accompanied the district's population growth. Thirty-three percent bought their water from trucks, and the rest used communal spigots; 58% of the population was without sewage facilities, 33% without electricity.[26]

This lack of services acts almost as a regressive "tax" on income. A 1972 study conducted by the independent Nutrition Research Institute - a private group which has conducted studies in the pueblos jóvenes for over twenty-five years - found that those who have to light their houses with candles and kerosene pay the same amount as those who have electricity; given that those without connected service are on average at a lower income level, it was estimated
that they were paying up to 2% of their incomes for inferior service, versus an average of .9 to 1.4% of income paid at higher levels. The results are much more dramatic with water service, as water purchased from private trucks is much more expensive than running water, and often the further from the city center the trucks must go, the higher is the price: therefore it is most expensive for the poorest and most remote settlements. The poorest families spent 2.6 to 2.7% of their income on water, while those with private service or common spigots spent 0.4 to 0.7%. When taken into account that the actual amount paid by poor families was two to six times as much as those with running water, and that the volume dispersed to the recipients of truck water is 1/7 that of the other services, the unit cost for water for poor families was 16.7 times greater.[27][See Table X] In the context of a nation with one of the worst income distribution records in Latin America, and with a large percentage of the urban population without access to basic services and thus subject to this regressive "tax", the drastic shortage of services takes on even more significance.

The following analysis of the results of a 1987-88 socioeconomic survey of the population of Huascar and its offshoot, Bayovar, will help place the Huascar population in the context of the overall socioeconomic profile of the district. The survey, conducted by the Nutrition Research Institute, covered 326 families; using the municipality's figures of 12,000 lots or households in Huascar, this is 2.5% of all households - given that the sample was randomly
selected and the margin for error low - a statistically relevant sample. [see Table XIV] Over 90% of those surveyed owned their own homes; only 5% of those had more than one story. This is relevant, as a two story house is a definite indicator of relative wealth in the pueblos jóvenes. Approximately half had cement houses, another indicator of economic advancement, while the other half still lived in houses made of straw. As Huascar has been in existence for over twelve years, this is a high proportion of the population that has not progressed from the most rudimentary form of housing, and can signify both a lack of economic progress and an influx of recent immigrants. All but 1% of those surveyed bought water from trucks; water was bought in different quantities and frequencies, depending on need and income level. None had sewage services. Ninety-five percent of the residents had electric light, [28] due to the extension of electricity to Huascar in 1987. The 1986 granting of land titles was a prerequisite for the extension of this service. Only 22% had refrigerators, which is the most basic form of prevention of malnutrition and other diseases which result from contaminated food. This is no small concern in the pueblos jóvenes: diarrhoea is responsible for more deaths among children worldwide than any other disease, and the Huascar section of Cantogrande has been documented as having the highest incidence of diarrhoea in the world. [29] Eighty-four percent had stoves, and all cooked with kerosene; the dependence on kerosene for cooking explains in part why the issue of rising fuel prices is such a salient one for the poor.
Seventy-five percent of those surveyed had radios and 77% had televisions, and for the majority - 46% - the news was the most frequently watched program. Despite the extreme poverty of the town, the community seems relatively well informed. A surprisingly high 25% had participated in some sort of community directorate, indicating a high level of political activity. Seventy-one percent said that the community's first problem was getting water service; the majority said sewage service was the second major problem, while another 12% said that public sanitation was. Approximately 30% had participated in Mother's Clubs, while 68% had participated in the Vaso de Leche program. Only 10% had participated in a Comedor Popular.[30] The survey did not cover the PAIT. Huascar's population is quite politicized, as a description of the Vaso de Leche program in the town will demonstrate later in this chapter.

From its inception to its 1988 dissolution, the PAIT employed approximately 2,100 people in Huascar,[31][see Table XII] and thus affected 17.5% of all households. Although there was some repetition, as many worked more than one "temporada" or round, there were also many workers who wanted to enter the PAIT but could not as there were not enough spaces. Thus despite the lower percentage of actual participation in the PAIT than in other programs such as the Vaso de Leche program, the program clearly affected a substantial part of the Huascar community and its effects merit attention. The time commitment for those that did participate in the PAIT was greater than for other existing programs, and its implementation clearly affected those
programs. Essential to the understanding of the relation of
the PAIT program to existing community programs is a brief
examination of the political record of the district that
Hauscar pertains to.

The Political Behaviour of the Residents
of San Juan de Lurigancho

In the late seventies, the left worked actively in low
income districts, and this coupled with the economic crisis
of that time led to a victory for the left block in the 1978
Constituent Assembly elections. While the left obtained 35%
of the total Lima vote, it received 47% of the San Juan de
Lurigancho vote. APRA received 25% for Lima and 27% in the
district. The PPC received only 17% of the district's vote,
as compared with its 30% for all of Lima. In 1980, Belaúnde
took the district with 44% versus his 40% for Lima. Support
for AP in the district fell in the 1980 municipal elections
to 35% and then drastically to 7% in 1983. APRA in 1980
attained only 20% and 16% respectively in the presidential
and municipal elections in the district, demonstrating its
lack of work in Lima low income sectors. In 1983, its
support was up to 23%, but this was still far short of IU's
43% for the district.[see Table VIII][32]. In 1985, Alan
García took the district with 49%. In November 1986, in part
due to Alan García's popularity and in part due to a major
campaign effort in the district on the part of the party,
the APRA took the district. The APRA had a visible presence
for the first time in the history of the district. The vote
for the APRA in 1985 and in 1986 fits in with general trends
in voting among the poor: a tendency, but by no means a
definitive one, to vote for the left. This tendency is
easily swayed by a strong or charismatic personality, as in
the case of 1978 versus 1980, or by perceived opportunities,
such as the case of the 1986 municipal elections. Both
Alfonso Barrantes - the 1983-86 Marxist mayor of Lima and,
according to opinions across the political spectrum, one of
the best mayors the city has had - and Alan García
maintained very high approval ratings among the poor in
general,[33] and thus in the victories of IU in 1983 and of
APRA in 1985 personality may have played a major role. The
1986 APRA victory in the district was swayed by García's
popularity, but it was a factor of perceived opportunities
as well. Alfonso Barrantes himself admitted that the IU
mayor of San Juan de Lurigancho during those same years had
an extremely poor record.[34] The APRA, meanwhile, offered
voters a candidate backed by the government in power, and
produced a high level of propaganda and enrollments in the
PAIT program in the district prior to the election.[see
Tables XI,XII] It was a pragmatic choice on the part of the
district's population, and a choice which yielded, at least
in the short term, immediate results. The record to date and
the plans of the current APRA municipality must be analyzed
more in detail to evaluate its record and future potential.
Given the poor record of its predecessors, both military and
civilian, and the extent of the challenges presented by the
district, the APRA municipality has ample ground upon which
to prove itself.

The Municipality of San Juan de Lurigancho:
APRA in Power

With its November 1986 overall victory in the
municipal elections, the APRA party became a more pervasive
force in Peruvian politics, as it entered the arena of municipal government. In San Juan de Lurigancho, the challenges posed for any municipality were formidable, and the record of past administrations was not a particularly good one. Their performance in areas such as promoting land titles and basic services and most community organization occurred at the neighborhood level. Although at the Lima level the new APRA mayor, Jorge del Castillo, is mainly a party man and is neither the administrator nor the leader that Barrantes was, the APRA mayor of San Juan de Lurigancho, Victor Raúl Ortiz Pilco, seems to be a dedicated and committed leader, and assumed an active role in the district from the outset.

Ortiz Pilco set out to address the basic and longterm problems of the district, of which there are many. He felt that one of the fundamental problems of the district was its lack of organization and unity, which had resulted in a duplication of authority - with many towns having two or three competing directorates - on the one hand, and a lack of identity on the other: people were much more likely to feel affiliated to their particular town: such as Zarate, Huascar, or Bayovar, than to San Juan de Lurigancho. This contrasts sharply with districts such as Villa El Salvador, which have a great deal of unity, and have used their 'mistica' to spur development efforts in the district.[35] This has been largely due to the efforts of the district's twice elected mayor, Miguel d'Ascueta. The district is also highly politicized, having had alternatively AP, IU, and now APRA leadership. Thus there was duplication of effort and
aid programs in some neighborhoods: such as CARITAS, a Catholic Relief Services food program, and ONAA, a government run food program, both operating in the same neighborhood, and neither in others. The same occurs with Mother's Clubs and Communal Kitchens, with most being sponsored by IU, some by the central government's PAD, and some independent ones all competing in the same area. In a district with such a lack of services, this was clearly a waste of effort and funds. PAD, for example, communicates with but is not run by the municipality, rather it is run from the government palace. A major criticism of the PAD, however, has been its tendency to attempt to supersede existing organizations, resulting in the disruption of independent grass roots organizations, which have often been proven to be more effective than those imposed from above. The same sort of duplication occurs with independent and government health, education, and other service efforts: in one pueblo joven there may be two or even three of the same or related type of program, while in others there are none.

The mayor began to organize at the most basic level. A census was planned for May 1988, an absolute necessity for municipal government, since the last census was taken in 1981, prior to the major influx of migration in 1983 from the Andes to the district. The municipality attempted, in most cases successfully, to mediate and de-politicize the competing directorates in several neighborhoods, such as Huascar and its offshoot Bayovar. In these two towns, land titles had been held as a political ploy since 1976. One of the mayor's first acts was to pressure the Provincial
Council to invoke an expropriations law, and immediately grant titles to the residents. The land titles issue had become extremely politicized. There was a feud between the owner of the land and the "dirigentes" - neighborhood directors - over the value of the land, a dispute that was used by both the owner and various dirigentes as a political issue. Some dirigentes had been forcing the settlers to go to political marches, charging a fine of 500 intis to those who did not attend. Considering that the real value of a lot in Huascar and Bayovar was 350 intis, there is a clear case of exploitation. The settling of the land titles issue also took the floor out from under the feuding "dirigentes." A major effort was made, however - admittedly with less than complete success - to support and not impose upon existing neighborhood organization and authority, and all existing directorates, mother's clubs, and Vaso de Leche Program "comités" were recognized by the municipality.[36]

The municipality sponsored a major organizational effort in February 1988 to coordinate the efforts of the Health Ministry and all of the independent health and medical teams operating in the district, and focus health efforts on preventive medicine.[37] The mayor claimed that an effort was made to reorganize the municipality to reduce the amount of time that people must spend to conduct transactions for municipal services was conducted in 1987. The tax system was purportedly revamped so that at least forty percent of the population was reached, an effort which was at least partly successful, as proven by the doubling of income received by the municipality in property taxes in
1987. Finally, the municipality created an agency, SERVIMUNI - Empresa Municipal de Servicios Multiples - to attempt to support the diverse public and private urban transport, waste collection, water distribution, basic food sales, and sales of construction materials. The efforts of at least ten neighborhood organizations or associations - including Huascar's - to get water, sewage, and electric services were supported by the municipality.[38]

In light of the limited resources of the municipality, Ortix Pilco attempted to set a list of priorities in terms of services to be provided. He set the population's immediate priorities as transport, public waste removal, potable water, employment, food supply, health, education, and housing. The first four were to be the focus of the municipality, in conjunction with public works programs - the PAIT in particular.[39]

Ortiz Pilco planned as a long-term project, possibly with external funding, to alleviate the increasingly pressing problem of the uneducated and unemployed youth. Over half the district's population is under age twenty, and a vast percent of those age 15 to 20 are not enrolled in school and are not employed; clearly their future prospects are not good. Referring to Haya de la Torre's original idea of a manual and intellectual workers' front, the mayor believes that the manual workers are being ignored. The APRA is full of university educated sociologists, he noted, but very few manual workers. Ortiz Pilco's plan is to build occupational training workshops, with very simple and inexpensive construction materials and designed to train men
in four skills: plumbing, electronics, welding, and carpentry; and women in baking, knitting, leather work, and cooking, all of which are occupational fields for which there is demand inside and outside the district. The workshops would be designed to train 240 students in 90 days - 30 in each field - and therefore 960 per year. Each workshop is to have a donation from its respective government enterprise, such as Electrolima, SiderPeru, etc., or from a respective private enterprise, such as a construction company. Each workshop would cost approximately $17,000. The administration of the program would be undertaken by a non-profit organization, such as the Lions' Club, the Church, or the Municipality. Supplementing the workshops would be recuperation centers for youths with tuberculosis, a disease which is pervasive and kills thousands of youth in low-income areas. These centers would also focus on providing some sort of education to the patients, who are from the same population that the workshops are designed for.[40]

Ortiz Pilco suggested this idea to the President at a meeting of district mayors. Instead of following the mayor's low-cost, basic skills-oriented model, the central government, with its penchant for grandiose gestures, built a huge, expensive, high-technology "Institute" in the district, which has yet to open.[41] Not only is this an absurd waste of desperately needed funds, but there is no demand for high technology experts in the district, nor would youths with the education necessary to enter the technology institutes be the target population. The target
population is clearly the uneducated and unemployed group which, due to lack of skills, has no potential. It is this frustrated youth which is increasingly turning to the crime and subversive activities which are riveting the nation. Rather than aiming for basic training and employable skills in workshops, the President apparently was attracted to a more glamorous - although abstract - project.

In keeping with the taste for the grandiose on the part of the central government was the building of the giant pool facilities, mentioned in the previous chapter. One of these was built in San Juan de Lurigancho. The initial cost, which does not account for maintenance of the imported machinery, was over $100,000, which could easily have built several of the employment workshops and addressed some of the priorities on the municipality's list, of which recreation was not one. The central government clearly demonstrated its lack of touch with the realities facing the urban poor when it built grossly expensive swimming pools in an area where most residents lack basics such as running water, sewage, and garbage collection. In the case of San Juan de Lurigancho, APRA at the top level has proven to be much more out of touch with the poor than are its functionaries at the municipal level. The case also demonstrates a lack of coordination between municipal and central levels of party officials.

This may also be a function of traits of municipalities in much of Latin America: they function with scarce resources in a system where power and money are centrally concentrated. Municipal officials in Chile, for example,
even during democratic governments, functioned much more as brokers between their electorate and the central government, rather than as the executors of significant projects within their districts.[42]

The IU's Vaso de Leche program has had a major impact in low-income communities, as is demonstrated by the 70% participation rate in Huascar. With the turnover of the Lima municipal government to the APRA, there were controversies in several districts. The initial implementation of the Vaso de Leche program prompted a great deal of communal organization, with almost every neighborhood in the district having both a coordinator of the program for the neighborhood and for each block. The program was an extremely popular one, and thus was maintained in operation by the new APRA mayor, Jorge del Castillo. While the program is funded and directed from the central municipality, each district municipality is responsible for delivery of the milk and for insuring that the neighborhood coordinators fulfill their functions of preparing and dispensing the milk to the children each day. The new municipality of San Juan de Lurigancho, however, has managed to continue to implement the program purportedly with minimal controversy. The existing neighborhood comités and coordinators were maintained, although an Aprista was placed in charge of distribution at the municipal level. As most of the coordinators are IU sympathizers, there has still been some animosity. The Aprista central coordinator has weekly meetings with the various neighborhood groups, and at the meetings political sentiments do get involved in the
discussion of routine distribution or other program issues. At a meeting of block coordinators in a primarily IU part of Huascar, for example, the resentment of some coordinators of the new authority in charge of the program was such that it totally disrupted the meeting. The fact that the new authority was an Aprista, young, and female seemed in particular to be resented by the male members of the coordinating committee, although the resentment could as easily be attributed to the APRA director's youth and sex as to her party affiliation. [43] In any case, there was clearly animosity towards the APRA authorities in charge of the program. However, unlike other districts where there have purportedly been cases of milk being withheld for political reasons [44], it is important to note that the functions of the program have been maintained intact, along with its original neighborhood organization.

The APRA's record in the municipality of San Juan de Lurigancho can clearly be given a positive rating, and its mayor seems to be aware of the realities of the district rather than enamoured of grandiose political schemes as is the central government. In light of the immense challenges that the municipality faces, it is taking a concrete, positive, and forward looking approach. The officials in the municipality are very open and available to people in the district, and in general seem dedicated to solving the problems of the district. There are some definite flaws, however. The fact that all the top officials are Apristas clearly closes off access to other available talent and approaches, and creates resentment among other political
groups. The approach under Alfonso Barrantes and IU was different; offices were open to members of other parties, and there was more collaboration with other groups.[45] This politicization may be a factor in preventing Ortiz Pilco, "who had the chance to make Cantogrande another Villa El Salvador",[46] from achieving more unity and coherence in his district. The comparison may not be a fair one, as Villa was settled with one massive invasion, an experience very different from the spontaneity and heterogeneity which characterize the formation of San Juan de Lurigancho. Villa El Salvador was the subject of a great deal of government attention at the time of its formation and throughout the military years. Ascueta's long tenure as mayor has also played a role.

San Juan de Lurigancho, meanwhile, has a different history and a record of less able municipal governments than Villa El Salvador. In addition, it now has had a disproportionately high rate of population growth due to migration from the Sierra. The municipality is attempting to build a sense of unity in the district, is respecting all other existing organizations, and is making a realistic attempt to deal with the severe services deficit in the area. What acts as a hindrance to the municipality's efforts is the party's practice of filling all authoritative posts with party members. This narrows the municipality's own options in a region where human skills are extremely short. Apristas themselves admit that there is a severe lack of capable people within their party ranks; it makes little sense to try and solve problems as complex as those posed by
widespread urban poverty with the exclusion of the efforts of other political parties. This practice also causes resentment among the non-APRA population and community leaders. This was demonstrated in the administration of the Vaso de Leche program and also was a prevailing theme in the implementation of the PAIT program. The following analysis of the PAIT, which was administered by the central government, will among other things demonstrate how the flaws in the program stem from sectarian behaviour and from implementation from above without taking into account the effects on existing community organization or customs, a flaw that the APRA at the municipal level in San Juan de Lurigancho has to a large extent managed to avoid.
The PAIT in Practice: San Juan de Lurigancho and Huascar

The PAIT program was the García government's primary response to the problem of massive unemployment in the pueblos jóvenes and its only significant innovation in policy towards the pueblos. The Casa Central de Pueblos Jóvenes gets no financial support from the central government; IDESI is a semi-autonomous agency, and the PAD has very limited effect. The PAIT was therefore the lynchpin of the García government's policies towards the urban poor.

San Juan de Lurigancho was a logical place to launch a PAIT effort, and was one of the initial areas where the program was started. The PAIT was set up in San Juan de Lurigancho in November 1985, but was at that point run from the central office of Cooperación Popular. The program established a central office in the district in October 1986, coinciding with the expansion of the program that occurred prior to the November election. When APRA won the municipal elections, it seems that the most talented people went to work in the municipality, including the young Aprista sociologist who launched the program in the district - and in Puno - who went to head the Municipality's Office of Communal Services. The PAIT program was then handed over to party rank and file[47] - who were from the more affluent sections of the district or from outside, and neither group displayed any particular talent - which may in part be the explanation for the many flaws in its implementation. The PAIT offices will most likely be closed with the 1988 transfer of the program to the municipalities; during the transition period, it continued to function only at a
reduced level: maintenance of existing works using the labor of PAIT program functionaries only. In its short time in operation, however, the PAIT had a substantial impact on the communities of San Juan de Lurigancho, and in particular in Huascar, which was one of the target areas.

To inform people about the PAIT, cars were driven through the communities announcing that there would be inscriptions for the program in a rented office in Zarate; there were also advertisements on the radio and in the newspapers. The socioeconomic survey of Huascar found that 75% of residents had radios and 77% had televisions, so that it is likely that through these means of communication, the public announcements, and neighborhood hearsay, the PAIT was made known throughout the pueblo. Huascar was one of the first places where the administrators of the program focused, as it was an area where a great deal needed to be done and which had a very concentrated population.[48] The first campaign offered 2,500 posts; when 4,000 applicants arrived, a lottery was done to determine who could enter the program. Forty percent of these were initially employed in Huascar.[49] In the second PAIT campaign, which was in September to December 1986, there were 4,526 places offered in the district and 423 in Huascar.[see Table XII] A third occurred in April through June 1987, employing 2,450 in the district and 554 in Huascar; and a final one occurred in November-December 1987, employing 584 people in the district and 122 in Huascar, a total of 2,100 posts created. Whenever an excess of applicants occurred, which was the case in almost all instances, a lottery was held to determine who
could get in. Since the final campaign, the program has been operating at a substantially reduced level, primarily as maintenance or completion of existing projects, or occasional emergency ones, such as the damming of the overflowing Rimac river near Zarate, a project which employed 42 people, 95% of them women.[50] In theory and in practice, the program employed people regardless of their political affiliation. All positions above that of temporary squadron leader, however, were reserved for Apristas.

Since January 1988, during its transition stage, the program was operating primarily with permanent program workers, and hiring very little outside labor.[51] There were some workshops being held, where women learn to weave baskets, knit sweaters, and make handicrafts, but these were very small in scale - only about fifteen women at a time attended - and are on a voluntary labor basis. The future of the program, once it has been turned over to the municipality, is uncertain.

The program in San Juan de Lurigancho was implemented according to its original design: the execution of public works by the low-income population in their own zones. There were five types of projects: waste collection; rehabilitation of irrigation canals and reforestation; the opening of access roads; the painting of school walls; and the building of basic sanitation infrastructure. Almost all of the projects in Huascar were in basic sanitation, with a concentration on digging ditches and laying pipes for sewerage. This is the most expensive of the programs, due to the cost of the materials and the need for technically
qualified supervisors. A high relative investment was made in Huascar as almost all the works in basic sanitation in the district were concentrated there.

The program had a definite effect on the district in terms of infrastructural improvement, as in almost every pueblo joven in the district there is some evidence of PAIT labor, whether it be ditches and pipes, painted walls, a medical post, or a rudimentary road. In Montenegro, the newest pueblo joven, which is located at the extreme border of the district and had its first year anniversary in February 1988, the PAIT built most of the infrastructure - classrooms, sanitary facilities, floors - for a local school. This is clearly a vital need for a pueblo joven which is a substantial distance from paved roads and the center of the district and is serviced by only one occasional bus line, making it difficult for its children to attend school elsewhere. The works are not always in a finished state, however. Many of the ditches and pipelines in Huascar, for example, were incomplete, and were soon rendered useless by the garbage and other waste that quickly began to fill them. This was clearly a waste of funds and effort. Hopefully, but by no means certainly, the maintenance stage that the program was reduced to sought to redress this problem. Regardless, and very much to its credit, the program did provide community improvements as well as employment.

The effects of the program have been far more substantial than the actual works executed. The program was originally designed with more male workers in mind, and as
ninety percent of the workers have been women, many of them were forced to do extremely hard work; there were many cases cited of women who developed back problems from carrying loads that were too heavy. In other cases, the women who took their babies - who were too small to be left in the rudimentary PAIT child care facilities - to work with them often were burning trash and other such unsanitary tasks with their babies on their backs.[52] The women, desperate for the income, continued to work despite the effects on their health.

As the PAIT workers proved to be primarily women, in many cases they were earning a salary for the first time, and thus also experienced the independence that comes with it. While in most cases the income was used to buy bread to feed the family, this new independence clearly had a more profound impact; one indication was an increase noted by community church leaders in separations and even divorces. In these cases often the husband was unhappy with the wives' newfound freedom, a freedom which they were not willing to give up after the program was discontinued. There were comments such as "ya le vi a mi esposa diferente"[53], which came from a husband who wanted a divorce, claiming that his wife had now gotten used to being away from the house, and even after ending her term in the PAIT continued to seek work and contact outside the home.

Another form of instability that resulted from the program was a form of unemployment that resulted from those who left previous jobs in Lima for the convenience and stability of a job near home in the PAIT, only to be unable
to get into another round of the program in the lottery, or to have the program discontinued. As the communities were not informed of the status of the program after the transfer to the municipalities was announced, many continued to wait for a new round of work. Officials of the program promised that there would be more PAIT work even after the transfer to the municipalities, although they would not specify when, maintaining the state of uncertainty. This is a function of the temporary nature of the program, and the uncertain results of its transfer to the municipalities.

General reactions to the PAIT among members of the community ranged from "por la primera vez a los pobres le dan una mano, por parte del Sr. García"[54] to "no hay ningún trabajo del PAIT que vale nada"[55]. In almost all cases, the income supplement provided by the PAIT was cited as its primary asset, and the fact that it improved the community proper as another. Among those who had worked in the program, there was a definite desire for the program to be continued. Opinions among those who did not work in the program were more diverse. Some saw it as humiliating "make-work", and complained that it duplicated community efforts already in execution. One observer cited cases of the PAIT painting school walls in the community of El Porvenir, where the fathers of the school children of the community had already pooled their resources and bought paint. The same thing had occurred with the painting of local market walls.[56] In another case, a woman who worked in the PAIT who had children of working age said that her children refused to work in the PAIT, even though they were
Another woman whose mother worked in the PAIT said that she questioned her mother's working in the program when the work was so hard and dirty, and the workers so poorly treated.

The PAIT also clearly had an influence on existing organizations. As all of those were based on voluntary labor for community benefit, such as the Vaso de Leche program or the Comedores Populares - many of which were sponsored by the church groups, the prospect of a desperately needed income drew people from participating in these programs to participate in the PAIT. A church leader who helped run one such communal kitchen noted the sentiment among those who had not entered the PAIT - either because they did not wish to or because they could not. Those who remained working in the comedores populares were resentful when some of their fellow workers came to the kitchens too tired after PAIT work to contribute to the kitchen tasks. The fall in participation of the women working in the kitchens also reduced the effectiveness of the kitchens. The same church leader felt that the imposition of a program from the outside clearly resulted in a loss of intensity in the community's consolidation from the base.

This is by no means an isolated observation, and the results of the survey which follows confirm this. Without a doubt the program, on top of whatever positive effects it may have had, has caused substantial disruption of the San Juan de Lurigancho community. Whether through raised expectations, competition with existing organizations, or newly discovered independence on the part of women, the
program has, for good or for bad, changed the communities where it has been implemented.

A survey conducted by the author of 23 Huascar women who worked in the PAIT - a sample which represents slightly over 5% of the average of 400 Huascar workers per round of PAIT work - gives an insight into the way the PAIT functioned. A small number of interviews in Pamplona Alta, a pueblo joven in a Lima district with a two term IU mayor, serve as a point of contrast.

The Huascar women were randomly selected, but were primarily from the Huascar A section of the town [see map, also Table XV]. First and foremost, the survey revealed the low level of education and income of the majority of the PAIT workers: almost all of them worked out of desperate need for income; only one of the women surveyed was working for extra income, which was to finance her studies. This woman, incidentally, was the only one of those surveyed who had heard of, and had also received, an IDESI loan, which indicates that the IDESI program is affecting a part of the population with a higher level of income and education, not usually coinciding with those who participated in the PAIT.

At least one of the women surveyed was illiterate, and another had recently arrived from Ayacucho and could not speak Spanish. Almost all had worked in more than one round of the PAIT; they had gotten in by lottery and also by signing up, depending on the situation. Those who had not worked at certain times usually had wanted to and had not gotten in. Only two of the twenty three - 8% - had left the program voluntarily because they no longer desperately
needed income. The majority used the income to buy more food; a few to save up to purchase other goods. About 50% had their first paid work experiences in the PAIT; of those who had worked, most had had small "negocios" - usually the selling of food or wares on the street - or had worked as domestic servants or washer women in Lima. Proximity to home was an advantage often cited by the women as an advantage of working in the PAIT, as was its improvement of the community and paying a fixed salary. For a little less than half of the women the PAIT salary was the only income for the household; thus when there was no PAIT work, income was most likely less than the already low minimum wage level. A surprisingly high 13% were abandoned mothers.[60] This points to a pervasive problem in the urban slums: men who cannot or do not want to cope with the responsibilities of supporting their family in difficult conditions often abandon it. In a society such as Peru's, where machismo still plays an important role, the woman being left responsible for the children somehow seems acceptable.

When asked if they had felt party pressure or favoritism when joining the program, almost all said that it was easier to get in if one was an Aprista or was a friend of the Aprista functionaries. To become a capataz - a permanent squadron leader - one had to be of the party. The one Aprista interviewed who had worked in the PAIT was no longer in the program, as she had been promoted to a job in the municipality. There were also complaints from many of the women that while they, who were the poorest, did not get in to the program every time, there were some who were
wealthier and owned two story homes or stores and got to work every round: "tienen tiendas, tienen casas grandes con dos pisos"[61]. They also complained that often more than one person from certain households got to work, which is prohibited by the program rules. All of this indicates party favoritism of some form. While the lottery system may have been in general fair in terms of inscription, any sort of promotion in the program was clearly based on party affiliation. The highest that a non-Aprista worker could get was to be a temporary squadron leader when the capataz was absent.[62]

The party also clearly used the PAIT workers for political benefit by obligating them to go to the government palace to cheer for Alan García or to political marches. Only one of all the women surveyed had not been obligated as part of her PAIT work to go to a march or rally.[63] Apparently, there were some program directors who were less political than others, and only suggested that the workers go to marches. Others, however, threatened that the workers would lose a day of salary plus their "dominical", the traditional part of the salary which is attributed as pay for Sunday, the day of rest. Marches took place both during the week and on the week-ends, at times creating problems for women who had to take their children with them when they had no one to take care of them.[64] There was not a great deal of resentment among most of the women who went to the marches, citing them as either an opportunity to see the President or to see the Plaza de Armas. Resentment was evident among the two women who clearly were the more
educated of those interviewed, one in Huascar and one in Pamplona. Señora Suarez in Huascar cited the inconvenience of having to drag her three year old son along with her; the other, Señora Filomina in Pamplona, resented being "put on a bus like cattle." [65] The forced political participation of PAIT workers is a contemptible form of political manipulation, as it takes advantage of the worker's desperate poverty and fear of losing their jobs. This hardly gives credibility to a party which purports to represent the most disadvantaged of society.

Of the women surveyed, about 50% had participated in a Mother's Club, Vaso de Leche program, or a Comedor Popular. Of those, about half had remained in their programs, going to the kitchens after the PAIT work, or to the Vaso de Leche before work. The other half had left their respective programs, and had not returned, even after the PAIT had ended. Thus at least half had ended their participation with communal programs. Others continued to participate, but were exhausted after eight hours of heavy physical labor in the PAIT.[66] This disruption would be more acceptable if the PAIT program had not been a temporary one.

Of the women's criticisms, the most common was the uncertainty of the program and the lottery system. The work was criticized by some as being too difficult. The majority had dug ditches; others had painted walls or burned trash. Several perceived that only party people or the more wealthy members of the community got into the program.[67] Opinions were in general split about whether or not the people's
situation was better, but almost all wanted the PAIT to be re-instated. A few complimented the work of the mayor.

It is interesting to compare the interviews of three Pamplona Alta women, as Pamplona is in a district - San Juan de Miraflores - that has traditionally sympathized with IU, and APRA was not able to win there in the 1986 municipal elections. Of the Pamplona women, all three worked for need of income and it was the first fixed job. However, one was clearly better off, and owned a house with brick walls and a cement floor, as opposed to the others, who had houses of straw mats and had come to Lima much more recently. One of these two was an abandoned mother. Both of the latter two had been in the Vaso de Leche program and remained in the program while in the PAIT. Both had not been able to get into the PAIT as many times as they wanted, and both complained that many wealthier people who did not need to got in because they were the friends of the party chiefs. The wealthier woman, meanwhile, Señora Filomina, only worked in the program one round and then stopped. She complained that the work was much too hard for women, and said that the women from the sierra did not complain about this because they were used to a harder life.[68] This is in keeping with comments made by those who have worked with women in the sierra and note that they are used to an extremely difficult life[69]. The same Aprista who set up the PAIT in San Juan de Lurigancho also set it up in the sierra province of Puno, and said that the community leaders in these areas wield a great deal of influence and had a great deal of authority in determining who would work in the PAIT and how.[70]
Resignation to hardship and authority seems more prevalent among the workers that had recently come from the sierra. Señora Filomina of Lima clearly resented being bussed to APRA meetings and also complained that it had been very difficult to collect the PAIT salaries, as it entailed waiting for hours in lines at the Banco de la Nación. She felt that the community had been much better off with the ONAA program, which had been closed with the coming of the PAIT. It had paid food for work, required work in the afternoons only. She said that it had not been as "exigente" and there had been no party favoritism: "todo fue repartido igual."[71] This contrasts with the opinion of some of the Huascar women who had also worked for ONAA but preferred the PAIT as it yielded income rather than food. This difference indicates a condition of greater deprivation rather than anything else. Señora Filomina, who clearly had a higher level of wealth and education, was much more aware of how she was being treated and was resentful of any attempts at manipulation. The other women, who were much more desperate, were willing to tolerate much harder work as well as political manipulation in order to earn desperately needed income. They were also probably more likely to have voted for APRA in November 1986 than the Pamplona women were, as all of these clearly seemed resentful of APRA politicization efforts.

Conclusion
The results of the survey in Huascar and of the PAIT's operation in San Juan de Lurigancho in general seem to complement the overall conclusions that can be drawn about
the PAIT. It was clearly a program which employed the poorest of the poor, and unfortunately that poverty was often exploited by party functionaries for political purposes. The program's temporary nature was a drawback. The system of inscription by lottery precipitated a sense of instability and made the acquisition of a job a function of luck and government patronage. The program raised expectations and caused disruption in some communities and then was ended without warning. People were not forewarned and did not know what to expect, as the government announced the termination of its funding for the program in a roundabout manner: the dissolution of Cooperación Popular and the transfer of its programs to the municipalities. It is highly unlikely that most poor would associate the PAIT with Cooperación Popular. The government's Cooperación Popular announcement was made in January; as late as March many Huascar residents were still waiting for another round of PAIT work. Officials in the San Juan de Lurigancho municipality and the central PAIT office in La Molina both insisted that the PAIT would continue, but no one could specify how or with what funds.[72] This kept many poor in a position of uncertainty: not looking for other work or participating in programs that they had dropped for the PAIT, in hopes that there would soon be another round. Thus a sense of dependency on the government was created while existing autonomous community organization was disrupted. This is clearly a flaw in the PAIT and any sort of similar program of this nature. In this sense the PEM in Chile is less harmful - although it does create dependence on the
government - it does not function in fits and starts. The PAIT's provision of income was clearly temporary, but because the chance to earn income was available and the need is so pressing, many women joined despite other community responsibilities or previous jobs, or even ill effects on their health. Because of the way it was implemented, the PAIT was an expensive - each PAIT worker cost the government an average of 5,377 intis - approximately $55 - per trimestre[73] - and disruptive way to temporarily supplement income. At least in Huascar, the PAIT work did not provide any tangible skills. In many ways the current skill-building workshops, conducted on a voluntary basis, are a better longterm option.

On the other hand, the program did provide many women with a first employment experience and a newfound independence. It also contributed - with the labor of members of the very communities - to the development of several of the district communities' sorely inadequate infrastructure. These positive aspects, however, are undermined by the sudden termination of the program, which leaves the heightened expectations unfulfilled and public works unfinished in many parts of the district. In Huascar, the ditches that have been dug for water and sewage pipes lie empty and open; they are gradually filling with garbage.

The study of the PAIT clearly exposed several things about the APRA. First of all, it demonstrated its tendency to use political manipulation in a very blunt manner. Party patronage is nothing new, and is pervasive in similar parties such as the AD in Venezuela. However patronage in
Venezuela occurs primarily among party leaders vying for posts in the government[74] rather than through the manipulation of programs for the extremely poor, who have little interest or stake in party affairs. The latter form of manipulation seems more characteristic of authoritarian governments such as the Odria and Velasco regimes than of reformist democratic parties. Also, the rather ad-hoc manner in which the program was implemented, without research into the side effects it might have on the target communities, as well as the way in which it was ended, leaving the communities in a state of expectation and uncertainty, reveal the pervasive lack of training and capable people in the party ranks. The PAIT may have been a program designed with very good intentions and have been a part of a coherent strategy. Unfortunately, in implementation, the program proved to be a poorly planned operation, which disintegrated into frustrated expectations on the part of the poor.

The behavior of Venezuela's AD in the "barrios" during its first tenure in power in the fifties was characterized by lack of planning, inadequate training of local officials, and a high degree of sectarianism which limited the performance of local projects. These traits are analogous to the APRA's performance in implementing the PAIT. With experience, however, AD changed its approach and now functions in a less exclusive and defensive manner.[75] In the APRA's case, given the splits within the party, the poor overall performance by its government, and the grave crisis confronting Peru, it is unlikely that the situation in the
near future will be conducive to the party's reforming its tactics.

The PAIT's potential as a longterm solution to the problems of chronic unemployment and inadequate income levels was clearly diminished by the lack of planning and foresight in terms of funding and side effects on community life, and by the usurping of the program for political purposes by both the García administration and party functionaries. Communities and their existing organizations were often disrupted and then left in a state of uncertainty. The García government used the program to extract political capital, as is demonstrated by the increase in enrollments prior to the November elections and the forced attendance of PAIT workers at political rallies and marches, and the vast amount of government sponsored propaganda that it received on television and in the press. The program was presented, upon its formation, with a great deal of publicity and was used as a central part of the government's policy towards the marginalized "seventy percent". Then, when the government was short of funds and elections were far from sight, the program was quietly discontinued. The speculations that the program will start up again prior to the 1989 elections may be quite accurate. Party functionaries, meanwhile, demonstrated the sectarianism the APRA was traditionally known for, and a reliance on clientelism in their implementation of the program. The use of patronage occurred from the highest level - as is demonstrated by the case of the dismissed executive director of the program, Victor Lopez - to the
lowest, as is demonstrated by the many cases of friends of apristas getting a chance to work when spots were short, and by the reserving of leadership positions for party members.

The transfer of the program to the municipalities is not inherently negative, as the San Juan de Lurigancho municipality, for example, has demonstrated a superior understanding of the problems of the poor and has a much better record in addressing them than does the central government. However, as municipalities in Peru are extremely short of resources and highly dependent on the central government for funds, it is likely that most municipalities will not have the resources necessary to maintain the program. The maintenance of voluntary skills workshops would certainly be a contribution to the community, but it is not likely that they will be expanded from their very small scale. The immediate demand for income on the part of the community also limits the potential of a program which yields no immediate benefits; the ONAA program, for example, at least paid its workshop workers in food.

The district of San Juan de Lurigancho and the town of Huascar may have been better off temporarily due to the PAIT. However, the lack of foresight or follow through with which the program was implemented and then discontinued has resulted in many of the works that were started being left unfinished, such as the ditches in Huascar. Once the workers' extra income was spent, the program had, at great cost in terms of the central budget, an ephemeral effect on the problems of the urban poor. While the program did provide some women with a new awareness and sense of
independence, it is questionable whether it will have a lasting effect without any other employment opportunities. The program also caused some disruptions in the functioning of many Mother's Clubs and Communal Kitchens, which will take some time to repair. Finally, the program clearly raised expectations and awareness. These raised expectations will hardly be fulfilled with the termination of the program and the economic crisis the nation is experiencing, leading to the frustration that has so often been a part of the history of pueblos jóvenes such as Huascar. The economic crisis by mid-1988 was such that it eroded any short-term benefits the PAIT may have had; in the meantime the PAIT had disrupted the community's existing organizations, which were to be all the more crucial to survival in the face of the unprecedented deterioration of living standards that the latter part of the APRA government yielded.
Conclusion
Chapter IX - Conclusion
APRA 1968-1988: An Impossible Revolution?

The Peruvian Aprista party's first experience in power as a single governing party began as a potential success story in democratic reformist government - unprecedented in Peru - yet then deteriorated into political polarization and economic collapse. This analysis of the recent evolution of the APRA has sought, first and foremost, to lend insight to the very difficult challenges posed by democratic government in developing countries. The barriers to democratic reform are particularly acute in countries such as Peru, where social mobilization and politicization have far outpaced ability of the formal economy and polity to respond.

Huntington sees stable political institutions as integral to progress in development, and the sorry outcome of the APRA's "experiment" in Peru lends credibility to his thesis. The case of the APRA points to the role of the party as an institution, and the importance, particularly in the context of reformist parties in polarized societies, of ideological or doctrinal coherence. In the APRA's case, the party's ambiguity vis-a-vis reform versus revolution, coupled with the party's age-old authoritarian tendencies - and thus ultimately its commitment to electoral government - acted as a catalyst to polarization. The governing party's revolutionary rhetoric destroyed the consensus and confidence it initially built in the private sector and middle class, and at the same time was neither credible nor radical enough for the opposition on the left. The lack of agreement on doctrine within the party made it incapable of setting and abiding by "rules of the game", which are
critical to the consensus necessary for democratic reform. Kohli points to the prerequisites for successful democratic reform in the context of a private or pluralist economy: coherent leadership, an ideological and organizational commitment to reform, and a pragmatic attitude towards facilitating a non-threatening and predictable atmosphere for the propertied entrepreneurial classes.[1] He examines successful democratic reform - implemented by the Communist party - in India. "The CPM clarified the limits of its redistributive intent. All democratically elected parties in a private enterprise economy, even if communist in name, must set these limits."[2] Kohli makes a comparison with the Allende years in Chile:

Allende 'headed a precarious multiparty coalition lacking both internal cohesiveness and underlying agreement on the pace and character of change to be implemented'...As coherent ideology did not exist, the revolutionary utterances, whether sincere or not, created considerable economic uncertainty... As economic problems got worse, again in the absence of an organized, ideologically based core of support, short-term problems became impossible to handle.[3]

In the case of Peru, the lack of internal cohesiveness and agreement on the pace of change not only existed among parties but also within the APRA. This lack of agreement, the domination of the party by the erratic and autocratic Garcia, and the age-old sectarian traits of the party which precluded cooperation with non-party members of society, all served to alienate opposition on both sides of the political spectrum, and resulted in polarization and chaos similar in some respects to the Allende regime at the time of its breakdown. Peru had all of the characteristics that Sartori points to as typical of polarized polities: the presence of
relevant anti-system parties; the existence of opposition from both sides of the political spectrum; a party or group of parties in the center; a wide spectrum of political opinion with deep cleavages, low consensus, and the legitimacy of the system in question; the presence of irresponsible oppositions; and the prevalence of the politics of out-bidding or over-promising.[4] In Peru underlying economic conditions were far worse and the challenge from the armed left more formidable than in the case of Chile. Peruvian society in 1988 could be described as praetorian: social forces conflicting directly with each other, with a lack of agreement on a legitimate means for conflict resolution.[5]

After sixty years of being blocked from power by the military and the oligarchy, the APRA, Latin America's oldest mass-based reformist party, was finally allowed to come to power when both the military and the right were discredited as viable options. The APRA's subsequent performance was in keeping with Peru's age-old paradox: an extremely poor record of social reform in spite of the longterm presence of a strong reformist party. This raises the questions of why the implementation of reform is so difficult in Peru, and why was the APRA in particular so inept once in power. The failure of the APRA in government can be attributed to a variety of factors: the party's own traits; the backwardness of Peru's political institutions - the APRA being one of those - and politicians' inexperience or unwillingness to learn from past errors; the behaviour of individual leaders - primarily Alan García; and finally, and perhaps most
importantly, to the severity of the challenges Peru faced in the mid eighties. The outcome was by no means pre-ordained, and the analysis of the political and economic disintegration that occurred sheds light on issues key to successful reform: the manner in which the reformist debate is presented, the characteristics and ideology of the party in power, the ambitions of the nation's political leaders, and the nature and goals of the opposition. The performance of the APRA in power, and its failure to maintain the consensus that was so necessary to reform, adds to the understanding of the party and of the barriers to democratic reform in Peru.

The APRA Party

Since its inception, the APRA party has aroused more intense emotions than any other force in Peruvian politics. This occurred for two reasons. The first was that the party began with a revolutionary doctrine which sought to challenge if not transform the existing order. The young Haya's penchant for action placed the party much more in the forefront of the nation's attention than its counterpart on the left, the Communist party. Because the APRA machinery developed faster and much more extensively than that of the Communists, and early on launched insurrectionary activity, it was feared and opposed by the traditional elites more than any other political force. The second reason was the nature of the party itself. The sectarianism and sense of mission of the party members, which in part grew out of the persecution that the party suffered, made the APRA exclusionary by nature, and prohibited effective political
cooperation with other progressive forces. Ironically, by the mid-sixties, tired of persistent persecution, the party entered into an alliance with with the conservative forces in Congress in exchange for legality, and acted as a counterforce to reform. Its blocking of reform was not only a function of its "convivencia" with the conservatives, but also due to a deeply imbedded party sentiment that it alone could implement reform - "solo el APRA salvara el Perú".

The belief that only the APRA could implement reform was strongly shaken when the Velasco regime implemented a virtual carbon copy of the party's original program. The party was forced to revamp its strategy and renovate its doctrine and leadership ranks, which culminated in the election of Alan García. This involved an "opening up" of the party's image, including the temporary shelving of age-old APRA symbols which were seen as exclusive by outsiders. This "opening up" was neither complete nor permanent. The party's performance in government demonstrated that the sectarian tendencies, the sense of mission that prevailed over realism, and the hierarchical party structure that had led many external observers to attribute to it quasi-fascist rather than democratic characteristics, were all still evident. As the political situation increasingly became a crisis, these traits grew more pervasive and served to aggravate existing tendencies towards polarization in the system.

The APRA and the Poor

These traits were evident not only at the central government level, but were even more prevalent at the
municipal and middle rank party levels, where sectarianism and hierarchical approach resulted in the implementation of policies designed to help the poor in a manner that often did more harm than good. This was most evident in the party's implementation of the PAIT program, as the study in Huascar shows. The party operated without any concern for existing organizations and community structure, and merely super-imposed its own order. The commitment of community self-help groups such as communal kitchens has often been pointed to as a positive and democratic means that the poor themselves have developed to cope with economic crisis and chaos. The APRA's approach in implementing programs such as the PAIT, without any concern for the effects that it would have on such efforts, coupled with its insistence on party members dominating existing leadership structures in the highly successful Comités de Vaso de Leche, was both disruptive and authoritarian.

These traits were mirrored in the manner that the APRA implemented the Rimanacuy - avoiding existing campesino organizations - and in its total disregard for organized labor in its concertacion strategy. This centralist, authoritarian approach fostered clientelism and dependence rather than autonomous popular initiative and participation. It served to undermine efforts at independent municipal government, even those of its own party, as the experience of San Juan de Lurigancho also showed. This behaviour was in part a function of the concentration of power in the central government coupled with a scarcity of resources, which is
not unique to Peru. Again a comparison with Chile - during the Frei and Allende years - is relevant.

Their ubiquity (particularistic transactions) was reinforced by two important and continuing characteristics of Chilean society: centralization and scarcity. The centralization of the political system not only cut back on the autonomy of municipalities...it transformed local officials into brokers between the distant offices of an omnipotent government and community people who became dependent on its regulations and services.[6]

In Peru, the traditional government approach towards the issue of urban poverty has been either cooptation or neglect. The APRA's behaviour at the municipal level and its implementation of policies to help the urban poor are particularly important in light of this tradition and of the expansive nature of urban poverty, which has also become inextricably linked with the growth of Sendero and the additional migration that it has caused. Although the urban poor have shown themselves to be both extremely creative in building self-help organizations and small-scale cooperative production facilities, they also may become increasingly frustrated with an economy and a political process that ignores their concerns. As the APRA government's policies raised expectations and disrupted the poor's existing organizations, and then severely exacerbated their plight, frustration is likely to increase. At the same time those organizations increasingly became the focus of Sendero. The APRA's behaviour towards the urban poor was a means to determine its nature as a reformist party; unfortunately it did not score very well. The approach in implementing the PAIT, in retrospect, was not very different from Odria's cooptative granting of land titles and of Velasco's attempts
to control the autonomous organizations of the poor through SINAMOS, in that it was an approach from above which attempted to supersede vibrant and autonomous forms of popular organization with one designed to coopt political support. Most frustrating in analyzing the APRA government's failure was the initial success of the regime and the potential success of its programs for the informal sector. Initially the García regime clearly had the support and potential to alleviate the problems of urban poverty and unemployment, yet due to shortsightedness and poor implementation, it squandered that potential. At the same time, this coincided with Sendero's onslaught and the extension of terrorist violence on a widespread scale to the slums, a factor which would challenge autonomous popular organizations, and ultimately affect the potential of Lima's urban poor.

APRA and the Insurrectionary Left

The thesis cannot conclude without mention of armed insurrectionary groups and the ideological and practical challenges that they posed for the APRA party. The APRA began as the first political party in the nation's history to launch insurrection, and was subsequently a monopoly holder of the political space on the left until the 1950's "convivencia". The APRA as a movement and as an ideology influenced other revolutionary groups in Latin America, such as the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, a heritage the party took pride in. Thus ideologically the party was in a difficult position when faced with insurrection from the left. The APRA links of many leftist leaders - from Polay Campos to
Alfonso Barrantes to Luis de la Puente Uceda and the sixties guerrillas - coupled with the strong appeal and support for insurrectionary activity among the APRA youth, made the APRA's position in formulating a coherent approach towards the armed left a very difficult one. The contradictory position of the APRA, a supposedly revolutionary party, in the face of armed insurrection from groups either frustrated with the pace of reform or seeking to destroy existing social structures and government, points to the difficulty of implementing substantial social reform in a democratic context.

The APRA's position was made more complex by the ambiguities in its doctrine and in the attitudes of its leaders about insurrection and commitment to democratic government. García's contradictory stances towards guerrilla movements and his blatant disdain for democratic leadership substantially undermined the legitimacy of the legislative system. APRA's predicament points to the importance of a commitment - both doctrinal and practical - to the democratic system on the part of reformist parties. Ambiguity and attempts to circumvent or dominate the system will ultimately serve to undermine it, particularly in the face of armed insurrection. Alan García could not act as both the leader of a democracy and as a revolutionary at the same time. In this sense, his "different future", his "revolution in absolute liberty", given the polarized nature of Peruvian society and the severity of the challenges that it faced, was indeed an impossible one. García made the oft repeated mistakes of radical reformers. By acting in a
manner that was characterized by "provocativeness, abruptness, and lack of planning", he created for himself the dilemma of the battling reformer, victimized by entrenched opposition from both sides. Given that the early years of his regime had shown that consensus for reform was possible, that the elites were not inextricably entrenched, this was a sorry outcome, and the worst "victims" were the marginalized population whose cause the APRA had espoused as a priority.

Under the APRA government, democracy was functioning only as a formality, reform was not being implemented, and while a substantial sector of society was actively engaged in armed insurrection, the debates in the halls of Congress grew increasingly irrelevant and polemical. This was indeed a product of the lack of political institutionalization that Huntington describes, but more fundamentally it was a result of the lack of agreement both within the APRA and in Peruvian society in general, about basic societal and political values.

Value sharing endows a social system with a homeostatic capacity...Dahrendorf has observed, 'For effective conflict regulation to be possible, both parties to a conflict have to recognize the necessity and reality of the conflict situation, and in this sense, the fundamental justice of the cause of the opponent.' The antagonists must, in short, share some of the same values.[7]

APRA's Political Culture: "Mistica"

Amidst all of this, the APRA continued to function, at a very different level, as a spontaneous force that provided many Peruvians with a sense of integration, a sense that so much of the nation was lacking. One observer noted that Haya de la Torre's foremost achievement in founding the APRA was
his attempt to provide a means to integrate Peru culturally and politically. Haya provided Peruvians with a political movement that was uniquely their own, with an ideology that was based on Peru's realities, and with a Latin American interpretation of history and view of the world. The APRA's influence outside Peru provided Apristas with a sense of pride; the party's activities inside the country and the persecution that it faced because of them, with a sense of mission and an identity. The ideology that Haya introduced, in its maximum and minimum programs, was clearly Marxist and anti-imperialist in its origins. However, its coining of the term "IndoAmerica", its focus on issues of Latin concern such as the Panama canal, and its inclusionary nature rather than a focus on class struggle - the alliance of manual and intellectual workers - combined to give the party an original and eclectic vision, one which Peruvians of diverse origins could identify with. This effect was augmented by the mercurial nature of Haya's philosophy, such as the theory of "espacio-tiempo historico", which could justify the APRA's ideological compromises and shifts, facilitating its appeal to a broader base. Haya was first and foremost an activist and a pragmatist, and his ideology reflected this. At the same time, Haya's concern for the oppressed, and his position as the first actor in modern Peruvian politics to challenge the nature of Peruvian society served to give him a stature that remains unequalled.

The APRA "mística" - its appeal to followers on a cultural and almost religious level rather than on a political one - was still evident in the eighties within the
APRA, and was what set it apart from all other political parties in the country. Aprismo at this level involved unquestioning loyalty - not so much to Alan García as to Haya de la Torre and his ideals - and a sense of shared experiences. There was for the older groups the shared experiences of persecution, and for some of the younger ones the shared experience of having at least met Haya and participated in the emotional events at the time of his death. The display of party activity and loyalty at the time of Haya's funeral was indeed remarkable. These loyalties were analogous to familial rather than political ties, and included groups who had very little interest in the nation's politics.

The one crucial group that did not share in these experiences, and thus had very different loyalties, was the APRA youth, who had never known Haya and for whom the party leader had been Alan García. These youth may clearly have admired García, but his youth and the realities of being President provided a very different image from the almost mythical Haya. Thus they sought their own myths, and in their impatience were drawn by the allure of the MRTA and even of Sendero. The desperate socio-economic situation in the country added to their need for a myth or a cause to inspire faith.

The APRA under Haya had been able to provide, at least for its adherents, a cause, a sense of belonging, a sense of integration. The post-Haya APRA was less able to do so. The partial loss of "mística" was in part a product of the different behaviour that holding power dictated for the
party leaders, and the necessary relegation of party affairs to secondary importance. It was also, however, due to the sort of leader and personality that Haya de la Torre was, and the stature that he held in Peruvian politics and history. Alan García, despite his oratorical skills and his complex emotional baggage, could not replace the figure of Haya and therefore an important part of the glue that had held the APRA together - through persecution and imprisonment, convivencia with Prado, alliances with Odria, and finally the military's "usurping" the APRA's revolution.

This cultural Aprismo will continue to exist and to give Peruvian politics a unique quality. However, due to the difficulties the party faces in power, to the growth of the left - both armed and unarmed, to the radicalization of the party's own youth; and ultimately to the absence of Haya and his contemporaries; this Aprismo popular will become less and less influential. The APRA as a political party, by 1988 and certainly in the future, was a very different party from the APRA under Haya. The APRA "mistica" remains a hope increasingly separate from political realities. This is in part due to the lack of real intellectual debate and even of intellectuals in the party, and thus the inability to respond with a coherent party platform designed to deal with the nation's problems. The lack of intellectuals was in part due to the prevalence of "mistica" over realistic debates on policy. Neither García's update of Haya's ideas in El Futuro Diferente nor endless debates over Haya's works can fill this gap. Ideological shifts were far less important to the party faithful than was their "mistica"; yet this had little
appeal to intellectuals who were not born into the party. The sectarianism that was part and parcel of this political culture also had limited appeal.

When Haya first introduced the APRA program, his approach was a first attempt on the part of any political leader to respond to and capture the nation's changing realities. Haya provided Peru and in some ways Latin America, with a new way - which was not imported from abroad - of looking at and overcoming existing realities and injustices. Haya's success lay both in his innovativeness and in his political genius, which managed to transform the APRA from a front of students with a support base among a few labour groups into a party of national and international renown. While the APRA under García initially was able to provide the crisis-stricken Peruvian nation with a temporary sense of hope, its efforts were short-lived and its plans empty. The APRA of the 1980's, lacking the brilliance that had characterized the generation of the twenties, had to rely on an underskilled party apparatus and on a party doctrine that was revolutionary and innovative in 1920, but hopelessly outdated in 1985. Thus APRA "mística" would continue, but it would continue to re-live Haya's past "glories", not to provide a solution for Peru's realities.

Without the ghost of Haya and the contradictory dreams of Aprismo, García would be but another helpless reformer in the morass of Peru's present social tragedy. Haya and Aprismo provide a ray of hope and faith and a banner of struggle in a nearly impossible situation; perhaps ultimately this is the most important of Haya's contributions to Peru.[8]
Peru by the mid-eighties faced what Jose Matos Mar has called a "desborde popular" or a popular overflow. The nation's institutions - economic as well as political - are totally incapable of dealing with the demands placed upon them by society, and thus society functions primarily outside them. Peruvian society has yet to be integrated politically, economically, and culturally, and this lack of integration is expressed in the economic sphere by the dominance of the informal economy and in the political and cultural spheres in its most extreme form by Sendero Luminoso and other groups involved in armed insurrection.

Uno de los procesos fundamentales que configuran la situación actual del Perú es la creciente aceleración de una dinámica insólita que afecta toda su estructura social, política, económica y cultural. Se trata de un desborde, en toda dimensión, de las pautas instituciones que encauzaron la sociedad nacional...los sectores populares que, cuestionando la autoridad del Estado y recurriendo a múltiples estrategias y mecanismos paralelos, estan alterando las reglas del juego establecidas y cambiando el rostro del Perú.[9]

The APRA's ideology, its message, and finally the personality of Haya de la Torre made the party a point of departure for cultural and political integration. Yet the polarized nature of Peruvian society made the unifying element of the APRA an immediate threat to the nation's elites. The APRA's confrontational behaviour coupled with the repression of its opponents early on served to polarize the debate: one was either for or against the APRA. While the nature of the debate changed with the military "revolution" and the emergence of the left, the APRA remained a unique and prevalent force in Peruvian politics. Despite a history of ideological compromise, the party retained its sense of mission, as well as the sectarianism
that grew out of that sense of mission and of the party's struggle to survive. However, once the APRA finally attained power, the very traits that had enabled it to survive were in large part responsible for its inability to provide the national integration that its mission called for.

The APRA's historical role as the most prevalent organized political force in Peru has linked it - either directly or indirectly - with most attempts to reform or transform the nation, whether through the Velasco regime's use of Aprista doctrine or Haya de la Torre's role in the transition to civilian rule; whether directly through Alan Garcia's government or indirectly through its links with the left: Barrantes, Polay Campos of the MRTA, and many in the guerrilla movement of the sixties all began their political careers as Apristas. Perhaps most ironically, the traditional rivalry between Haya and Mariategui - and Apristas and Communists - is now prevalent in a most extreme form, between the struggling APRA government and those who claim to be following Mariategui's "Shining Path".

Despite the APRA's own efforts and its direct links to other attempts to transform Peru, none have succeeded. The APRA's inability is a result of the lack of coherence and competence within the party; of the extent of polarization that exists in Peruvian society; and of the extent to which that polarization has been aggravated by the past decade of economic crisis. In Peru, "more than any other South American country, the economic depression of the early 1980's and the associated debt crisis exposed fundamental internal weakness."[10] In the face of increased social
mobilization and economic pressures, there was a total lack of agreement among the nation's leaders about basic political tenets, with particularistic ideologies and interests taking precedence over issues of national concern. "A society with weak political institutions lacks the ability to curb the excesses of personal and parochial desires...for the sake of general social objectives."[11]

In the case of Peru such personal and parochial impulses included fundamental disagreements among politicians over whether democracy was a permanent system or a stage before a violent transition to socialism. The fact that the total commitment to democratic government did not exist among all the ranks of the governing party nor of the democratic left - many advocated armed struggle - put pressure on the capacity of already weak institutions. In society in general, as was demonstrated by the rise of Sendero Luminoso, there was an absence of agreement on the basic values - the homeostatic equilibrium that Dahrendorf describes as essential to stable societies. In the face of overwhelming pressures on insufficient institutions and of a lack of agreement on basic values, the political system grew increasingly polarized, dominated by what Sartori labels centrifugal tendencies.[12] He notes that the position of the center party in polarized systems is often an untenable one, as the APRA's became, largely due to its own behaviour.

The very existence of a center party discourages 'centrality', i.e. the centripetal drives of the system. And the centripetal drives are precisely the moderating drives. This is why this type is centrifugal, and thereby conducive to immoderate or extremist politics...A center party that attempts to outdo the parties located on its left or right will
contribute, more than anything else, to a crescendo of escalation and extremism. [13]

A major factor leading to the breakdown in Chile during the Allende years was the loss of a coherent center coalition in the Christian Democrats, whose sense of mission and sectarian behaviour at the time - analogous to the APRA's - played a major role.

Even so, for such a multi-class party with such divisions over policy, the degree of party unity was surprisingly high... This was in part due to a common sense of ideological purpose, not unlike the other relatively united ideological force in Chilean politics, the Communist party.... There is little doubt that many members of the party felt that they had become the natural governing party of Chile which gave rise to a degree of sectarianism many Christian Democrats came later to regret. [14]

The increasing polarization that occurred at the end of the PDC government opened the way for the Allende regime and its breakdown. The right was infuriated with the PDC's reforms and was stressing non-democratic solutions. The left, meanwhile, profoundly affected by the Cuban Revolution, in the case of some factions, was speaking of guerrilla struggle and armed insurrection. [15] The loss of a pragmatic center coalition and the existence in its stead of a sectarian center party greatly aggravated polarization. [16] Sectarianism and sense of mission are distinct from ideological coherence, however. The APRA shared the former traits, but not the latter, and disagreements on fundamental issues such as armed insurrection added to the chaos in the APRA's case.

In response to the controversial banks measure, the right had experienced a resurgence which was based on an opposition to the threat of "totalitarianism"; at the same
time, half of the parliamentary left coalition overtly supported groups involved in armed struggle. The APRA hardly acted as a pragmatic center force; the party responded to the ensuing crisis with a pointless debate over whether Haya's doctrine applied to bank nationalizations. The entire process was made even more intractable by García's authoritarian decisionmaking and the party tradition of blind loyalty to its leader.

In light of the APRA's shortcomings, it is suggestive to look at a party which was inspired by the APRA and has since been a bastion of democratic stability: Accion Democratica in Venezuela. AD began as a revolutionary party, with a program similar to the APRA's: agrarian reform, national control of the oil industry, and redistribution of wealth. The party shares the APRA's strong party discipline, and was strongly influenced by its founder, Romulo Betancourt. He did not, however, have the deified stature that Haya had, in the long run to AD's benefit. There are some critical differences between the parties. First of all, AD achieved power by 1958 and implemented land reform early on; in 1976 it nationalized the oil industry. Secondly, AD alternated tenure in power with another strong party, COPEI. Thirdly, Venezuela is much wealthier than Peru and does not have the rift between Andean and coastal cultures. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, there is a commitment in the AD to the democratic system, since "the system is fundamentally their creation."[17] AD's Political Thesis, updated in 1964 commits the party to working through democratic means, without violence.[18] AD formally
recognizes that it is a reformist and not a revolutionary party, which dictates certain behavioural norms. AD's approach is largely an outgrowth of its experiences in the 1945-48 "Triennio", when its exclusionary and confrontational behaviour led to entrenched elite opposition and the Perez Jimenez military dictatorship.

Adecos today are not interested in transforming the system, but in managing and improving it...It[AD] is pragmatic, in the sense that the principal source of variation in policy is economic feasibility, not ideology or loyalty to any one class or sector.[19]

Peru and Venezuela are incomparable cases in terms of social and economic characteristics. However, AD's record of successful reform must be largely attributed to a commitment - both practical and doctrinal - to making the system work, and to pursue pragmatic reform within that system. The APRA, by failing to choose between reform and revolution, was eluded by both.

The Reformist Debate

A key factor in this polarization process was the manner in which the reformist debate was presented. Initially the APRA government distinguished itself from other efforts at radical reform, which had all resulted in polarization. The manner in which reform is presented: the instruments used, the rhetoric chosen and the extent of provocation, "the willingness of policymakers to improvise and calibrate their measures despite ideological qualms....[as] opposition coalitions form as much from feelings of threat as from actual deprivations" [20], are all more important than the stated ideology or political category of the reformers. The success of Communist
reformers in a private enterprise setting that Kohli points to is a case in point. The creation of a predictable environment, in which the rules of the game - the extent of reformist intents - are clear, is critical to successful reform. Governments of different ideological bent, military or civilian, have all fallen into the same quagmire. Ascher compares Allende in Chile, Campora in Argentina, and Velasco in Peru. "The commonality of these efforts lay not in ideological uniformity, for neither Campora nor Velasco were Marxists, but rather in the provocativeness, abruptness, and lack of planning of each attempt."[21] The result of the reliance of these reformers on an increase in the public sector, leftist rhetoric, and confrontations to mobilize workers, was "the adamant opposition of a private business sector that feared massive expropriation"[22]. In some cases, such as Velasco's, this was the very sector that he had hoped to rely on for investment, and he was then forced to turn to an inadequate state. Surprisingly, after a very different start, the APRA government repeated the same mistakes.

In the first years of García's government, the debate was presented in such a way as to avoid antagonism and thus polarization. The term marginal was used instead of class, a tactic also utilized in the past by Chile's Christian Democrats. This contrasts sharply with García's later phrases about exterminating the middle class - as well as all owners of electric blenders - and calling for a "war economy". García's avoidance of unnecessary confrontation was key to consensus early on in his regime, and his
surprise shift at the time of the bank nationalizations was a major factor in its breakdown.

The shift from an inclusive and cooperative approach to a winner take all, "us versus them" approach proved fatal to democratic consensus. Economic elites in Peru, although their power had substantially been reduced by the military and while clearly accepting of the need for some social reform, still maintained enough strength so that their cooperation was necessary for an effective economic growth strategy, particularly in the absence of any foreign capital and the weak capacity of the state. Lower income groups, on the other hand, may have at first relished García's rhetoric — although the ownership of the banks was hardly an issue of import in most poor households — but were quickly disillusioned as economic collapse yielded hyper-inflation and acute shortages of both jobs and basic goods. Imposed in an autocratic and poorly planned manner, the banks nationalization was the classic case of alienating the private sector, while failing to build support for reformist initiative among other crucial groups. Most ironic is that the measure was imposed primarily for political reasons, and had no positive effect on distribution.

The radicals' effort met with the expected reaction: massive capital flight and political and economic reprisals. Even so, the possibility of maintaining the support or at least acquiescence of certain segments of the nonpoor population was not cut off until appallingly poor planning ravaged the incomes of these groups and consolidated the coalition of middle class and wealthy in adament opposition to the regimes...The ideological rigidity of...[the] governments, and their preoccupation with macropolitics rather than economic detail, inhibited the concrete planning and policy flexibility required...[23]
Ideological rigidity is not the same as ideological coherence. Ideological coherence entails a key distinction between democratic reformist and revolutionary approaches. Democratic reform involves inclusion of as many social sectors as possible and requires eliciting their cooperation; key to its success is a delicate process of consensus building. Revolutionary change most often involves coercion. The elites, as they did in Velasco's time, proved that when threatened with coercion, they would not cooperate. García - unclear himself about whether he was a democratic reformer or a revolutionary - tried to play both games, which was clearly impossible. The APRA had the same lack of clarity in its doctrine, which was not resolved in the 1980's renovation of the party. The lack of ideological coherence and García's penchant for radical rhetoric and grandiose gestures made democratic reform impossible. "Attention to detail, when the world seems to require radical transformation, is often regarded with disdain by radicals, giving rise to economic 'romanticism' or 'naivete'."[24]

Reform in Peru required substantive policies to alleviate poverty and create employment, something which the APRA government at first recognized. Ironically, with the banks nationalizations, García focused the debate in the same manner that it had been during Velasco's time: on the structure of property relations. At that time the poor fared no better than with the transfer of resources from private property to large state enterprises; they fared no better with the nationalization of the banks. Instead their
position was made worse by the ensuing economic collapse. At that point substantive policy was forsaken for endless dogmatic debate over whether or not the nationalizations were a "totalitarian" measure as the right asserted, whether or not they were in Haya's writings as the APRA internal debate went, and whether or not they sufficiently curbed elite power because foreign banks had been exempt, as the left pondered. The amount of time spent on dogmatic polemical debates in the face of economic collapse indeed exposed the weakness of Peru's institutions, the lack of responsibility on the part of its politicians, and a fundamental lack of coherence within the central governing party. In the absence of effective institutions, which were further weakened by García's authoritarian approach to government, dogma took on an increased and almost surreal importance at the expense of the pragmatic and often subtle qualities which are so necessary to reform in polarized societies. This dogma was augmented in the APRA by a tradition of blind obedience and of sectarianism which acted to further polarize the political scene, and rendered it incapable of responding to pressing realities.

In many ways the barriers to effective democratic reform in Peru existed throughout its history. Certainly the APRA, whose history was a struggle against a conservative and anti-reformist military/elite alliance had been frustrated by such barriers. During the first Belaunde regime the APRA itself acted as such a barrier, unwilling to accept the political costs of reform being implemented by an opposition party. The stalemate of all reformist attempts in
Congress, which was instigated primarily by the APRA, was one of the main factors in the military's frustration with and overthrow of the civilian political system. What is striking - and extremely disappointing - is that after the military docenio, the transition to civilian rule, and the supposed renovation of the APRA party and its initial success, that the barriers to reform are as evident as before. The nation's leadership seems to have learned few lessons, which is both a result of the "freezing" of political activity by the military, and thus a closing of opportunity for political experience, and of the absence of political institutionalization. There is not yet a sufficient commitment to the political system, and thus particularistic and partisan concerns continue to take precedence over effective governance.

The failure to develop during periods of longterm military rule is not unique to Peru, and is evident, for example, in Argentina with the resurgence of the radical wing of the Peronist party, and in Brazil with the re-emergence of the same politicians who were responsible for the failure of the civilian political system in the 1960's, such as Janio Quadros and Leonel Brizola, and in the drafting of a constitution which includes all sorts of unrealistic limits on economic policymaking[25]. While hardly a solution, the turn towards radicalism is an outgrowth of the continuing economic crisis that has accompanied the transition to democratic government in these countries. Both crisis and radical reaction are evident in their most extreme forms in Peru.
The social pressures in Peru are greater now than ever before, and are indeed the most extreme on the continent. Society is in a process of violent disintegration. The irony is that as the problems facing society grow larger, so does the temptation to revert to dogmatic debate, precisely at the time that pragmatic and careful solutions are most vital. The result is polarization, both within the political system and between the system and the society that it supposedly represents. The APRA as a party and government, has tended to exacerbate rather than ameliorate this process.

Conclusion

The question remains whether another political force could have performed better, given the constraints facing Peru in 1985. Success was not pre-ordained, but neither was disaster. For a variety of reasons, the APRA had a lack of skilled personnel within its ranks, and at the same time sectarian and authoritarian traits which acted as obstacles to the consensus building that is necessary for democratic government. Alan García was a unique orator and energetic leader, yet his autocratic style and volatile personality coupled with the unresolved dilemma in his own mind and in his party between democratic reform or radical confrontation led to incoherence in policymaking. García's dilemma was deepened by pressure from his closest advisors, many of whom favored a radical approach. While at first the APRA government was able to elicit the unprecedented cooperation of the nation's elites behind a reformist government, the haphazard shift on the part of the President to a
confrontational and exclusionary approach quickly upset the delicate balance that was required for this consensus. This, coupled with the APRA's lack of experience with expressing dissent with its leadership and the tendency of both the left and right to attempt to benefit from the APRA's errors rather than seek consensus, resulted in the virtual breakdown of policymaking and indeed regime coherence by 1988. Given these circumstances, Alan García's "revolution in liberty" was indeed impossible.

Peru is one of the poorest nations in Latin America and at the same time one of the most polarized. What was needed for successful democratic reform was pragmatic consensus building, in recognition that neither the state - as was tried by Velasco - nor the private sector and unrestricted foreign capital - as was demonstrated by the Belaunde years - could alone solve Peru's pressing economic and social problems. Initially the APRA government, taking a heterodox approach to economic management and eliciting the unprecedented cooperation of the private sector implemented a highly successful economic policy which included innovative policies for the poor. The government's strategy was by no means perfect and there was a great deal of room for progress. However a sudden change to a confrontational approach destroyed the invaluable consensus that the regime had built. The reformist debate again became - as it has been historically in Peru - one of confrontation, of winner take all, of the opposition behaving as if it had a greater stake in the failure of the government than in the success of the civilian political system.
In Peru, there are several obstacles to successful democratic reform. First and foremost is the lack of agreement on basic societal values and tenets - homeostatic equilibrium - as is evidenced by the relatively widespread support for groups involved in armed struggle. This presents a challenge for any government, but particularly for a reformist democracy which, without the backing of strong institutions, must rely totally on consensus building for effective government. The nation's political system is clearly underdeveloped, with inadequate institutions and a tradition of personalist rule. At the same time the nation's politicians are extremely dogmatic, whether it be the collection of competing Maoist, Moscovite or Trotskyite groups of the Izquierda Unida; the neoliberal forces of the right; or the complex baggage of sectarian, authoritarian, conservative, and revolutionary strains that pervade the APRA. The transition to democracy in the context of a severely underdeveloped economy with a massive employment shortage, with capital highly concentrated in either a few private firms or large state enterprises, a burgeoning informal sector, and a continuing economic crisis led to an increasingly doctrinaire approach to the nation's problems precisely at the time that they dictated pragmatism and consensus. The result was the termination of reformist initiatives, deepening economic crisis and social upheaval, and a plethora of endless and pointless ideological debates in the halls of Congress. While the system had not formally broken down by 1988, it was clearly disconnected with the
society that it supposedly represented. There was indeed the "desborde popular" that Matos Mar describes.

Democracy exists in Peru only in the sense that political freedom is not restricted. Huntington argues that democracy is not expected to solve the problems, rather it is expected to protect the people from the mistakes of its leaders and provide them with a mechanism with which to remove and replace them.[26] A broader definition is necessary, however, if democracy and reform or democracy and development are to be linked; a linkage which must occur if democracy is to have the same meaning in the developed and developing worlds.

The euphoria accompanying electoral fronts is giving way to sharp class cleavages and new popular movements...The populace is awaiting a new conception of democracy, one that combines changes in regime with transformation of the state and accumulation models.[27]

In Peru the "vieja democracia verbal" that Haya originally challenged, still prevails although it now even includes the Marxist left. Until the nation's divergent forces can forge some sort of consensus to work towards progress and social reform, there will not be the "fated progress towards equality"[28] that de Toqueville says must accompany democracy. Above all else, the success of reformist democracy in the context of weak institutions and polarized society requires a commitment to making the system work. The APRA, due to inexperience, sectarianism, and lack of coherent ideology and firm commitment, was unable to provide the necessary leadership.

The APRA proved to be as diverse and heterogeneous a group - ideologically and socially - as Peru itself. The
opening up of the party in early eighties accentuated existing divergences and resulted in the party functioning more like an electoral front than as an organized mass party, although there were remnants of the hierarchically organized party machinery that Haya had designed. Yet beyond the differences among sectors of the party: generational, sociological, and ideological divergences, there is something transcendental holding the party together: an emotional link to Haya de la Torre's attempt to integrate Peru, both politically and culturally. As the outgrowth of violence and polarization demonstrates, the APRA failed to do so - to provide the "homeostatic equilibrium" that is crucial to societal peace. The party was the first force in Peru to recognize the dire necessity of its task; its performance in power was in keeping with a history of frustrated attempts to achieve its elusive goal.
TABLE I - MAPS
PERU
TABLE I

LIMA

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Source: Carlos Amat y León, *La Desigualidad Interior en el Peru.*
Cra'fico de ubicación de los principales Asentamientos Humanos del Distrito de San Juan de Lurigancho.
### Table II

#### Basic Indicators

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<th>Statistical Profile</th>
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<td><strong>Area</strong> (Km²)</td>
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<td><strong>Birth rate</strong> (1980-85)</td>
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<td><strong>Mortality per 1000 inhabitants</strong> (1980-85)</td>
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<td><strong>Infant mortality per 1000 live births</strong> (1980-85)</td>
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<td><strong>Life expectancy at birth</strong> (1980-85)</td>
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<td><strong>Manufacturing sector</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Construction sector</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Current expenditures</strong></td>
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<td>1985</td>
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<td>1985</td>
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<td>1986</td>
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<td>1987</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Public sector</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Private sector</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Money supply (M1)</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Consumer prices (annual average)</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Real wages</strong></td>
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<td>1986</td>
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<td>1987</td>
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<td><strong>Real effective exchange rate</strong></td>
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<td>1984</td>
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<td>1986</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>External public debt</strong></th>
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<tr>
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<td>1986</td>
</tr>
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<td>1987</td>
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¹ The sources for the data contained in this table are listed on page 493.
** Preliminary estimate.
1 At market prices.
2 Long-term debt exclusively.

### TABLE III
COMPARATIVE INDICATORS
COMPARACION DE INDICADORES SOCIO-ECONOMICOS ENTRE ALGUNOS PAISES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INDICADORES</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. Total (millones, 1979)</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>26.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Crecimiento anual medio (%) 1970-79</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.2</td>
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<td>1. PNB per capita (año 1979-dolares americanos)</td>
<td>1,690</td>
<td>730</td>
<td>1,050</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>1,010</td>
<td>1,780</td>
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<td>2. PNB. Tasa de crecimiento anual promedio (%) 1960-1970</td>
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<td>4.3</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>4.8</td>
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<td>3. Proporción del PIB por sectores (año 1979)</td>
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<td>En área urbana</td>
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<td>45</td>
<td>33</td>
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<tr>
<td>En la ciudad más grande</td>
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<td>1. Ingestión per cápita diaria de calorías (porcentaje de los requerimientos) - 1977</td>
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<td>97</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>83</td>
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<td>1. Tasa de mortalidad niños de 1 a 4 años (%)</td>
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<td>23</td>
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<td>1. Población con acceso a agua potable (porcentaje), año 1975</td>
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<td>1. Tasa de alfabetización de adultos (porcentaje) año 1976</td>
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<td>80</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>76</td>
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<td>1. Participación porcentual en el ingreso familiar por grupos**:</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>3.5</td>
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<tr>
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<td>20 por ciento más bajo</td>
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<td>10 por ciento más alto</td>
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</tr>
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<td>1. Consumo per cápita de:</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hidrocarburos (kg. petróleo)</td>
<td>513</td>
<td>415</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>338</td>
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<td>Energía eléctrica (Kw/h)</td>
<td>940</td>
<td>528</td>
<td>312</td>
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<td>599</td>
<td>958</td>
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* de Referencia: País Año País Año (Source: Amat y Leon, 1983.)

- **Shah, Jain**: "Banco Mundial: "Size distribution of Income". Referida a la PEA nacional."
# TABLE IV—ELECTIONS 1931-1980


<table>
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<th>Department</th>
<th>1931</th>
<th>1945</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vote</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Share</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>S.C.</td>
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<tr>
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<td>19,943</td>
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<td>4,929</td>
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<td>41.3</td>
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<td>18,366</td>
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<td>5,092</td>
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<td>80.4</td>
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<td>26,299</td>
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<td>60.1</td>
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<td>25,631</td>
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<td>18.6</td>
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<td>12,549</td>
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<td>35.1</td>
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<td>81,210</td>
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<td>6,050</td>
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<td>21.0</td>
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<td>Puno (3,076)</td>
<td>(76.6)</td>
<td>(3.9)</td>
<td>(19.5)</td>
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<td>San Martín</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vote</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Haya</td>
<td>FBT.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Odria</td>
<td>UPP</td>
</tr>
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<td>Left</td>
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<td>Amazonas</td>
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<td>50.8</td>
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<td>Arequipa</td>
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<td>43.4</td>
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<td>Ayacucho</td>
<td>93,068</td>
<td>16.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cajamarca</td>
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<td>36.6</td>
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<td>Callao</td>
<td>70,056</td>
<td>59.5</td>
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<td>Cusco</td>
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<td>Huanuco</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ica</td>
<td>32,136</td>
<td>46.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junín</td>
<td>66,443</td>
<td>49.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Libertad</td>
<td>96,256</td>
<td>25.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lambayeque</td>
<td>105,854</td>
<td>75.3</td>
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<td>Lima</td>
<td>69,598</td>
<td>62.7</td>
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<td>Loreto</td>
<td>709,512</td>
<td>26.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M. de Dios</td>
<td>47,375</td>
<td>30.5</td>
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<td>Moquegua</td>
<td>2,608</td>
<td>33.5</td>
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<td>San Martín</td>
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<td>19.9</td>
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</table>

(continued)
### TABLE IV, p.2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department</th>
<th>Total Vote</th>
<th>Haya</th>
<th>FBT.</th>
<th>Odria</th>
<th>UPP</th>
<th>1978 Vote</th>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Left</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PPC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MO</td>
<td>18,670</td>
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<td>.2</td>
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<td>40.9</td>
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<td>17.2</td>
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<td>Total:</td>
<td>1,814,568*</td>
<td>623.501</td>
<td>708,662</td>
<td>463,085</td>
<td>19,320</td>
<td>4,173,571</td>
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</table>

Notes: Haya = Haya de la Torre
S.C. = Sánchez Cerro (Pasco was not a separate department in 1931.)
B.R. = Bustamante y Rivero
F.B.T. = Belaúnde
UPP = Union of the Peruvian People
PPC = Popular Christian Party
* = 93,661 blank and 46,055 null


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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>UNO</th>
<th>APRA</th>
<th>FDC</th>
<th>AP</th>
<th>PC &amp; others</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>28.44</td>
<td>32.93</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>32.19</td>
<td>3.54</td>
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<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>25.52</td>
<td>34.36</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1978 Constituent Assembly</td>
<td>PDP</td>
<td>UNO</td>
<td>APRA</td>
<td>FNTC</td>
<td>FDC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right 28.4 Percent</td>
<td>Center-Right 35.34 Percent</td>
<td>Left 36.25 Percent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>* PCP</td>
<td>APRA</td>
<td>AP</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>UDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right 10.2 Percent</td>
<td>Center-Right 27.4 Percent</td>
<td>Center 45.4 Percent</td>
<td>Left 16.7 Percent</td>
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*SOURCES: Palmer, 1980; Woy-Hazelton in Gorman, ed.*
### Table V
Registration and Results for 1978 Constituent Assembly

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<th>Right</th>
<th>Registration %</th>
<th>Votes %</th>
<th>Seats</th>
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<tr>
<td>Movimiento Democratico Peruano</td>
<td>57,104 6.0</td>
<td>68,619 1.95</td>
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<tr>
<td>Union Nacional Odrista</td>
<td>68,001 7.2</td>
<td>74,134 2.11</td>
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<td>Partido Democratica Reformista Peruano</td>
<td>50,876 5.4</td>
<td>19,594 .55</td>
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<tr>
<td>Partido Popular Cristiano</td>
<td>154,850 16.3</td>
<td>835,294 23.78</td>
<td>25</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>330,746 34.9</td>
<td>997,644 28.39</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Accion Popular</td>
<td>137,000 14.5</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>APRA</td>
<td>77,777 8.2</td>
<td>1,241,174 35.34</td>
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</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>214,777 22.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frente Nacional de Trabajadores y Campesinos</td>
<td>86,000 9.1</td>
<td>135,552 3.86</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partido Democrista Cristiano</td>
<td>70,000 7.4</td>
<td>83,075 2.37</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partido Socialista Revolucionario</td>
<td>54,479 5.8</td>
<td>232,520 6.62</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accion Revolucionaria Socialista</td>
<td>41,130 4.3</td>
<td>20,164 .57</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partido Comunista Peruano</td>
<td>50,000 5.5</td>
<td>207,612 5.91</td>
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<tr>
<td>Frente Obrero Campesino Estudiantil y Popular</td>
<td>47,194 4.9</td>
<td>433,413 12.34</td>
<td>12</td>
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<tr>
<td>Union Democratica Popular</td>
<td>53,004 5.6</td>
<td>160,741 4.58</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>401,807 42.6</td>
<td>1,273,077 36.25</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>947,330 99.2</td>
<td>3,511,895 99.98</td>
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Source: Woy Hazelton in Gorman, ed.
## TABLE VI: Elections 1980-85

### Municipal Elections - November 1980-86

Total Votes - Lima (%):

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Nov. 1980</th>
<th>Nov. 1983</th>
<th>Nov. 1986</th>
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<tr>
<td>AP</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>---</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPC</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>26.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>APRA</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>37.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>IU</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>34.8</td>
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</table>

Nationwide (%):

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<th>Nov. 1980</th>
<th>Nov. 1983</th>
<th>Nov. 1986</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AP</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPC</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APRA</td>
<td>22.6</td>
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<td>42.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IU</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>32.0</td>
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</table>

Source: Andean Reports; Tuesta, 1988

1986 - Major Cities (%):

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<tr>
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<th>APRA</th>
<th>IU</th>
<th>PPC</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lima</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trujillo</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>22.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chiclayo</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>13.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ayacucho</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>(null+blnk:20%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Puno</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>---</td>
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Puno (1983) 10.0 56.0

Source: Andean Report, November 1986

### APRA in Lima (%):

<table>
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<th>Year</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>25.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>1980(P)</td>
<td>22.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980(M)</td>
<td>17.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>28.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>1985</td>
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<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>37.6</td>
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Sources: Woy-Hazelton in Gorman, ed.; LAWR, 18 November 1983; Tuesta, 1988
### TABLE VI, p.2

**National Elections - 1985**

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<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Total (%)</th>
<th>Percent of Total Electorate</th>
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<tr>
<td>APRA (Garcia)</td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>Garcia (1985) 43.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IU (Barrantes)</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>Belaunde (1980) 28.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPC (Bedoya)</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AP (Alva)</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Null and blank</td>
<td>8.6</td>
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</table>

(null and blank vote was half the average of the first four elections)

**Congress - Senate**

<table>
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<th>Seats</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APRA</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IU</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CODE</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Izquierda Nacionalista</td>
<td>1</td>
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</table>

(CODE = PPC and Townsend’s Movimiento de Bases Hayistas)

Source: Andean Report, May 1985
TABLE VII
Peru: Initial Macroeconomic Returns on the Heterodox Program*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Growth of GDP</th>
<th>Inflation Rate</th>
<th>Growth of Real Wages</th>
<th>Exchange Rate</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>60.8</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>82.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>3.1</td>
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<td>3.6</td>
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</tr>
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<td>0.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>-12.0</td>
<td>125.1</td>
<td>-15.9</td>
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<tr>
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<td>4.7</td>
<td>111.5</td>
<td>-5.9</td>
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<td>1985</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>158.3</td>
<td>-2.2</td>
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<td>1986</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>62.9</td>
<td>19.7</td>
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<td>1987</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>229.7</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>125.7</td>
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</table>

(millions of dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Trade Balance</th>
<th>Net International Reserves</th>
<th>Traditional Exports as % of Total</th>
<th>Intermediates &amp; Capital Goods as % of Imports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>3,916</td>
<td>3,090</td>
<td>826</td>
<td>1,276</td>
<td>78.4</td>
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<td>1981</td>
<td>3,249</td>
<td>3,802</td>
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<td>772</td>
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<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>3,293</td>
<td>3,722</td>
<td>-429</td>
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<tr>
<td>1983</td>
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<td>293</td>
<td>856</td>
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<td>2,140</td>
<td>1,007</td>
<td>1,103</td>
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<td>2,525</td>
<td>-16</td>
<td>924</td>
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<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>2,605</td>
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<td>-463</td>
<td>68</td>
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</table>

(As % of GDP)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Gross Fixed Investment (As % of GDP)</th>
<th>Service on Public Debt as % of Exports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Public)</td>
<td>(Private)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>9.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>1981</td>
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<tr>
<td>1982</td>
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</table>

*Data for 1986 and 1987 are cited with some caution. Although the figures are cited as final estimates in national data sources, there is some discrepancy in reports between state agencies. Presented here are those estimates around which there was some consensus in government reports.

### TABLE VIII - Voting Behaviour: Urban Poor

**Votación de los Partidos en Distritos Poíres en Relación a su Votación Total de Lima**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APRA</td>
<td>90,647</td>
<td>80,053</td>
<td>66,688</td>
<td>124,563</td>
<td>509,433</td>
<td>385,633</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(24.0%)</td>
<td>(23.8%)</td>
<td>(26.9%)</td>
<td>(28.7%)</td>
<td>(44.8%)</td>
<td>(47.2%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>AP</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>191,635</td>
<td>137,503</td>
<td>40,957</td>
<td>40,449</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(27.6%)</td>
<td>(26.2%)</td>
<td>(21.6%)</td>
<td>(41.5%)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPC</td>
<td>71,185</td>
<td>30,588</td>
<td>48,103</td>
<td>54,135</td>
<td>3,562</td>
<td>122,363</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(14.8%)</td>
<td>(13.9%)</td>
<td>(21.6%)</td>
<td>(19.4%)</td>
<td>(20.9%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>IU</td>
<td>174,256</td>
<td>69,405</td>
<td>160,827</td>
<td>233,983</td>
<td>297,466</td>
<td>405,218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(35.7%)</td>
<td>(37.7%)</td>
<td>(40.2%)</td>
<td>(55.6%)</td>
<td>(53.6%)</td>
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#### Primer Lugar por Distrito (1978-1986)

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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ATE</td>
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<td>IU</td>
<td>IU</td>
<td>APRA</td>
<td>IU</td>
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<td>CARABAYLLO</td>
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<td>IU</td>
<td>IU</td>
<td>APRA</td>
<td>APRA</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMAS</td>
<td>IU</td>
<td>AP</td>
<td>IU</td>
<td>IU</td>
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<td>IU</td>
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<tr>
<td>CHORRILLOS</td>
<td>PPC</td>
<td>AP</td>
<td>AP</td>
<td>IU</td>
<td>APRA</td>
<td>APRA</td>
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<tr>
<td>EL AGUSTIMO</td>
<td>IU</td>
<td>AP</td>
<td>IU</td>
<td>IU</td>
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<td>IU</td>
<td>AP</td>
<td>IU</td>
<td>IU</td>
<td>APRA</td>
<td>IU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LURIGANCHO</td>
<td>IU</td>
<td>AP</td>
<td>AP</td>
<td>IU</td>
<td>APRA</td>
<td>APRA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAN JUAN DE LURIGANCHO</td>
<td>IU</td>
<td>AP</td>
<td>IU</td>
<td>IU</td>
<td>APRA</td>
<td>APRA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAN JUAN DE MIRAFLORES</td>
<td>IU</td>
<td>AP</td>
<td>IU</td>
<td>IU</td>
<td>APRA</td>
<td>APRA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAN MARTIN DE PORRES</td>
<td>IU</td>
<td>AP</td>
<td>IU</td>
<td>IU</td>
<td>APRA</td>
<td>APRA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VILLA MARIA DEL TRIUNFO</td>
<td>IU</td>
<td>AP</td>
<td>IU</td>
<td>IU</td>
<td>APRA</td>
<td>APRA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VILLA EL SALVADOR (*)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>IU</td>
<td>APRA</td>
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#### RESULTADOS ELECTORALES DESDE 1978 HASTA 1983 EN SAN JUAN DE LURIGANCHO Y EN LA PROVINCIA DE LIMA

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<tr>
<th>PPC</th>
<th>AP</th>
<th>APRA</th>
<th>Izquierda</th>
<th>OTROS</th>
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<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constituyente</td>
<td>1978*1</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipales</td>
<td>1980*2</td>
<td>10.14</td>
<td>20.56</td>
<td>34.61</td>
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<tr>
<td>Municipales</td>
<td>1983*1</td>
<td>7.82</td>
<td>18.91</td>
<td>7.4</td>
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</table>

Fuentes: 
*1 Henríquez y Ponce, 1985, pág. 91, 81, 82.
*2 DESCO.

TABLE IX

DEMOGRAPHICS/INCOME - SAN JUAN DE LURIGANCHO

| Población de los distritos más poblados del área metropolitana (1972 - 1981) |
|---------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|
|                                | 1972            | 1981            |
| San Martín de Porres           | 230,813         | 404,851         |
| Lima                           | 354,292         | 371,122         |
| Comas                          | 173,101         | 283,079         |
| La Victoria                    | 265,636         | 270,778         |
| Callao                         | 198,573         | 264,133         |
| San Juan de Lurigancho         | 86,173          | 259,390         |

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tasa de crecimiento</th>
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<tr>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.0</td>
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</table>

DESEMPLEO Y SUBEMPLEO EN LIMA DE 1973 A 1977
(EN % DE LA PEA)

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<td>Desempleo</td>
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<td>6.5</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>8.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Subempleo</td>
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<td>19.9</td>
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<td>28.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total inadecuadamente empleados</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>36.7</td>
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LA DESOCUPACIÓN EN EL DISTRITO

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<th></th>
<th>1961</th>
<th>1972</th>
<th>1981</th>
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<tr>
<td>Desocupación</td>
<td>525</td>
<td>2,249</td>
<td>10,395</td>
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<tr>
<td>o/o de la PEA de SJL</td>
<td>4.76</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>12.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Los que buscan un trabajo por 1era vez</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4,551</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o/o de la PEA de SJL</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5.5</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

INGRESOS DE LAS FAMILIAS DE SJL SEGÚN SU LUGAR DE VIVIENDA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Familias de SJL que viven en PPJJ.</th>
<th>Resto PPJJ. - Resto</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Familias que perciben per cápita hasta 1/3 de un SMV</td>
<td>40 o/o</td>
<td>22 o/o</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Familias que perciben per cápita entre 1/3 y 1/2 de un SMV</td>
<td>33 o/o</td>
<td>22 o/o</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Familias que perciben per cápita entre 1/2 y 1 SMV</td>
<td>11 o/o</td>
<td>38 o/o</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Familias que perciben per cápita más de 1 SMV</td>
<td>16 o/o</td>
<td>18 o/o</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100 o/o</td>
<td>100 o/o</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE X

WATER/ELECTRICITY COST - URBAN POOR

Fig 2.—Monthly consumption of water and its cost in terms of minutes worked to pay for it, relative to that for illumination, by types of water service.

PAIT
75,300 nuevos empleos para los pueblos jóvenes de LIMA

CONVOCATORIA

El Gobierno Nacionalista, Democrático y Popular del Presidente Alan García, a través de Cooperación Popular, invita a las personas desocupadas de los pueblos jóvenes de Lima para que se inscriban entre el 4 y el 8 de Agosto, a fin de participar en el sorteo público de 75,300 nuevos puestos de trabajo en el Programa de Apoyo al Ingreso Temporal (PAIT).

(REQUISITOS)

1. Habitar en el Pueblo Joven donde se ejecutan los trabajos del PAIT.
2. Estar desocupado y cónyuge en igual condición.
3. Edad mayor de 18 años con Libreta Electoral.
4. No ser jubilado ni pensionista.
5. Inscribirse en un (1) solo sector de trabajo y sólo una (1) persona por núcleo familiar.

NOTA:
- La remuneración mensual será equivalente al salario mínimo vital.
- Todas omisiones o información falsa, descalificarán al participante.
- Si el número de inscritos calificados excede el número de empleos asignados, se procederá a sorteo público.
- La Inscripción es gratuita.
- Los programas del PAIT en provincias favorecerán, igualmente, a las zonas de extrema pobreza y se darán a conocer oportunamente.

(CRONOGRAMA)

- Fecha de inscripción: del 4 al 8 de agosto.
- Lugares de inscripción: Centros Educativos y Comunales de los Pueblos Jóvenes.
- Fecha de Sorteo: 9 - 10 de agosto.
- Publicación de resultados: 12 de agosto.

ZONAS

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<th>Zonas</th>
<th>No. DE EMPLEOS</th>
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<td>7,795</td>
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<td>INDEPENDENCIA</td>
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<td>PUENTE PEDRA</td>
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<td>CIENEGUILLA</td>
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<td>CHORRILLOS</td>
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<td>LURIN</td>
<td>2,280</td>
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<td>PACHACAMAC</td>
<td>830</td>
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<td>SAN JUAN DE MIRAFLORES</td>
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<tr>
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<td>ATE-VITARTE</td>
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<td>CHACLACAYO</td>
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<td>LA MOLINA</td>
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<td>LURIGANCHO/CHOSICA</td>
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<td>4,510</td>
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<td>4,160</td>
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<td>CARMEN DE LA LEGUA</td>
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<td>LA VICTORIA</td>
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<td>MAGDALENA</td>
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<td>PUEBLO LIBRE</td>
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<td>SAN ISIDRO</td>
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<td>SAN LUIS</td>
<td>350</td>
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<td>SAN MIGUEL</td>
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Table XII
PAIT Enrollments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total Employed</th>
<th>Amount Invested (1000 intis)</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>PAIT in San Juan de Lurigancho:</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept-Dec. 1986</td>
<td>4,526</td>
<td>17,706.46</td>
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<tr>
<td>Apr-June 1987</td>
<td>2,450</td>
<td>11,588.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov-Dec. 1987</td>
<td>584</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>PAIT in Huascar:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Sept-Dec. 1986</td>
<td>423</td>
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<tr>
<td>Apr-June 1987</td>
<td>554</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nov-Dec. 1987</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>1,090.00</td>
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Source: PAIT District Office, San Juan de Lurigancho

TOTAL - 1986
PROGRAMACION PAIT 1986

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<td>I</td>
<td>II</td>
<td>III</td>
<td>IV</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lima Metropolitana</td>
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<td>Trapecio Andino</td>
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<tr>
<td>Resto Sierra</td>
<td>30,500</td>
<td>17.00</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resto Provincias</td>
<td>48,800</td>
<td>21.00</td>
<td>12,500</td>
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<tr>
<td>Empleos Trimestral</td>
<td>185,800</td>
<td>36,300</td>
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<td>72,500</td>
<td>37,500</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>880'630</td>
<td>103'000</td>
<td>195'730</td>
<td>383'525</td>
<td>198'375</td>
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<tr>
<td>Costo de Puestos de Trabajo</td>
<td></td>
<td>5,290²</td>
<td>5,290</td>
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<td></td>
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</table>

Costo Total: I/ 880'630,000.00  US$ 62'902,142.00

PROJECTED - 1987
PROYECCIONES PAIT 1987

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>TOTAL %</th>
<th>TRIMESTRES</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>I</td>
<td>II</td>
<td>III</td>
<td>IV</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Lima Metropolitana</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trapecio</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>12,500</td>
<td>12,500</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resto Sierra</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>7,500</td>
<td>7,500</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Resto Provincias</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>12,500</td>
<td>12,500</td>
<td>12,500</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invers. Intis Mil</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>42,500</td>
<td>42,500</td>
<td>42,500</td>
<td>42,500</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,058'000</td>
<td>224'825</td>
<td>224'825</td>
<td>409'975</td>
<td>198'375</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costo puesto trabajo en base a costo '86</td>
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<td>5,290</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Costo Total: I/ 1,058'000,000  US$ 75'571,428.

### TABLE XIII

**DESCRIPTION OF PAIT WORKERS**

**a) Por Sexo**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Hombres</th>
<th>Mujeres</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>24 %/o</td>
<td>76 %/o</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**b) Por Grupos Etáreos**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grupos Etáreos</th>
<th>%/o</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>De 16 a 20 años</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De 21 a 25 años</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De 26 a 30 años</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De 31 a 35 años</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De 36 a 45 años</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De 46 a 50 años</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De 51 a 60 años</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Más de 60 años</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No contesta</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>%/o</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**c) De acuerdo al Estado Civil**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Estado Civil</th>
<th>%/o</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Solteros</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casado o Conviviente</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viudo o Divorciados</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No contesta</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**d) De acuerdo a Condición Familiar**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condición Familiar</th>
<th>%/o</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jefes</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Esposos/as</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hijos/as</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Padres/Suegros</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Otros parientes</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Otros</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**80%**

### Jefes de familia que trabajan en el PAIT

- Jefes de familia que trabajan en el PAIT: 33 %/o
- Jefes de familia que trabajan por su cuenta: 26 %/o
- Jefes de familia que trabajan para una empresa privada: 19 %/o
- Jefes de familia que trabajan para el Estado: 11 %/o
- Jefes de familia que trabajan para un familiar: 0.3% o
- Jefes de familia que trabajan como domésticos: 0.7% o
- Jefes de familia que no trabajan: 10 %/o

**Fuente:** M.L. Vigier y P. Paredes, "Los Trabajadores del PAIT", Proyecto PER 85/007 INP-OIT-PNUD.

### Estera o Cartón

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Villa El Salvador</th>
<th>San Juan d'Lurig.</th>
<th>V. María d. Triunfo</th>
<th>Carmen de La Legua</th>
<th>Carabayllo</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Estera o Cartón</td>
<td>57.2</td>
<td>57.4</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>49.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madera</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adobe/Quincha</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ladrillo/Cemento</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>65.0</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>41.2</td>
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</table>

**TOTAL** 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

**Source:** Billone, 198
Table XIV - Huascar Demographics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>%</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Huascar</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>59.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bayovar</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>40.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own home</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>92.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Care for others</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Family members</td>
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<td>5.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other</td>
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<td>.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wall Construction</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cement/brick</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>brick</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>straw matting</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>46.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cardboard/tin</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wood</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Where buys water</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>from truck</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>98.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>from neighbor</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooks with kerosene stove</td>
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<td>Has television</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>77.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Most frequently watched show</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>none</td>
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<td>3.7</td>
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<td>soap opera</td>
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<td>3.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>news</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>46.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Belongs to Mother’s Club</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>70.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yes</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>28.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>doesn’t know</td>
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<td>.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belongs to Vaso de Leche</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>no</td>
<td>101</td>
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<td>68.7</td>
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<td>doesn’t know</td>
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<tr>
<td>Does Communal Work</td>
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<td>.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Number of Floors</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 Floor</td>
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<td>2 or more</td>
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<td>4.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Roof Construction</td>
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<tr>
<td>cement/brick</td>
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<td>10.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>straw mat</td>
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<td>69.9</td>
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<td>cardboard/tin</td>
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<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wood</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.9</td>
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<td>other</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>15.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>other</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Where buys water</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>from truck</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>98.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>from neighbor</td>
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<tr>
<td>other</td>
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<td>.3</td>
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<td>Kind of light</td>
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<td>kerosene</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>74</td>
<td>22.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has radio</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>no</td>
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<td>247</td>
<td>75.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>music, etc.</td>
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<td>sports</td>
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<td>26.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belongs to Mother’s Club</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>no</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>70.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yes</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>28.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>doesn’t know</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Belongs to Vaso de Leche</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
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<td>31.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yes</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>68.7</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>To Communal Kitchen</td>
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</tr>
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<td>89.0</td>
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<td>10.7</td>
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<td>.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On Communal Directorate</td>
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<td>no</td>
<td>229</td>
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<td>yes</td>
<td>81</td>
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<tr>
<td>doesn’t know</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Total cases (valid observations - 326)
Source: Instituto de Investigacion Nutricional, survey conducted by Dr. Francisco Lazo, March 1988
Table XV
Huascar - PAIT Workers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of times in PAIT</th>
<th>How entered program</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>none, but tried</td>
<td>by lottery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>signed up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 or more</td>
<td>both</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>invalid</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Why entered program</th>
<th>Abandoned mother</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>need for income</td>
<td>yes, is</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>invalid</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Was in PAD or Mother’s Club</th>
<th>Com. kitchen/ Vaso Leche</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yes, still</td>
<td>yes, still</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yes, dropped</td>
<td>yes, dropped</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>invalid</td>
<td>invalid</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First work with income</th>
<th>Previous work(of the 11)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>yes</td>
<td>selling food</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no</td>
<td>washing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>invalid</td>
<td>street sales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lima job</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>dom. servant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>invalid</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quality of PAIT work</th>
<th>Wants to work again</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>easy/OK</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hard, but OK</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>too hard</td>
<td>invalid</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Want to political rallies</th>
<th>Went to rally/didn’t mind</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>yes, obligated</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yes, voluntary</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no</td>
<td>invalid</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Advantages</th>
<th>Disadvantages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>near home</td>
<td>work too hard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>income</td>
<td>instability/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gives woman work</td>
<td>lottery system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fixed salary</td>
<td>only party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>improves commun.</td>
<td>people in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>illiterate/no job</td>
<td>rich get work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>invalid</td>
<td>invalid</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Felt party favoritism</th>
<th>Was sole salary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no</td>
<td>had other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>invalid</td>
<td>invalid</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total cases (valid observations) - 23
Source: Author’s survey, Huascar, January/March 1988
Endnotes - Introduction


2. Ibid.


Endnotes - Chapter I


4. Ibid., p.240.

5. Klaren, op cit., (1973), p.xvii. Klaren’s view of the extent to which the north coast was dominated by the Graces and Gildemeisters may be an exaggerated one. However his interpretation is useful in understanding the resentment of foreign influence that was a key factor in the support for the APRA party. For a revision of Klaren’s conclusion’s see Bill Albert, *An Essay on the Peruvian Sugar Industry, 1880-1920* (Norwich, 1976).


7. Ibid.

8. Eudocio Ravines, *The Yenan Way* (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1951). Ravines, who was initially friendly with Haya, then became a leader of the Peruvian Communist party, and subsequently defected and became an informer for the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, must be read with caution. However, his proximity to both Haya and Mariategui in the crucial twenties decade makes his insights worthy of note.

9. Ibid., p.47.


21. Ibid., p.90.

22. Harry Kantor, The Ideology and Program of the Peruvian Aprista Movement (Washington, D.C.: Saville Books, 1966), p.13. Kantor is overly sympathetic to the APRA and to the apristas' view of history, which should be taken into account when reading his work. Moreover, Kantor looks exclusively at the published ideas of the party and does not examine how the party followed those ideas in practice.


27. Ibid.

28. Ibid.

29. Thorp and Bertram, op cit.,(1979), pp.299-300.


32. Miller, op cit.,(1982).

33. Ibid.


38. Ibid.

39. Ibid.


42. Long and Roberts, op cit.,(1984), p.79.


44. Ibid.

45. Ibid.


47. Bourricaud, op cit.,(1967).

49. Pike, op cit., (1967), pp. 276-7. Prado was opposed in the elections only by Jose Quesada, a weak candidate who was supported by the Revolutionary Union, a party that had been organized to support Sanchez Cerro in the 1931 elections.


53. Cesar Garrido Lecca, Former Peruvian Army Officer, member, Peruvian Aprista Party, Interview, Lima, Peru, 8 March 1988. Garrido Lecca left the military service in the late 1950's and joined the APRA party.


56. Jose Luis Bustamante y Rivero, Tres Años de Lucha por la Democracia en el Peru (Buenos Aires: Published by the Author, 1949).


58. Ibid.


60. Thorp and Bertram, op cit., (1979), pp. 187-188.

61. Ibid., p. 188.

62. Ibid., p. 168.


68. Ibid., p. 135.
69. Ibid.


73. Sanchez, Vol.III, p.1092. See also Grant Hilliker, The Politics of Reform in Peru (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971), pp.58-9. APRA’s goal at this point was to keep a democratic government in power for the next six years so that the party could contest the 1962 elections. The pact with Prado was negotiated by Ramiro Prialé, as Haya was in exile. Prialé also purportedly spoke with Odria with the same intent at the time, but was unable to negotiate a suitable agreement.

74. Ibid., p.1084.


79. Ibid., p.91.


85. Ibid., p.93.

86. Ibid., pp.99-102.

87. Ibid., p.71.


91. Ibid.


95. Ibid., p.viii.


98. Ibid., p.109-12.

99. Ibid., p.113.


Endnotes
Chapter II


3. Luis Alberto Sanchez, Vice President, Republic of Peru, Interviews, Lima, Peru, 5 February/16 March 1988.


6. Guillermo Thorndike, La Revolución Imposible (Lima: EMISA, 1988), p.238. Thorndike's book is a semi-official autobiography of Alan García. He has published a historical novel about the APRA, El Año de la Barbarie and also served as an advisor to the Velasco regime. The accuracy of his facts in La Revolución Imposible was confirmed by the author's interview with Cesar Atala, a member of the APRA party and Peruvian Ambassador to the United States.

7. Javier Valle Riestra, Senator, Partido Aprista Peruano, Interview, Lima, Peru, 3 March 1988. Valle Riestra is a high ranking member of the APRA party, and at one point was slated as a possible candidate for the 1985 elections.


12. Luis Alberto Sanchez, Testimonio Personal, Tomo V (Lima: Mosca Azul, 1988), p.209. Sanchez asserts, both in his book and in the author's interviews with him, that 90% of the text of the law adopted by the military was the same as that proposed by the APRA. While this may be an exaggeration, most observers agree that the land reform that the military implemented was not vastly different from the various proposals circulating in Congress prior to the coup.
13. James S. Kus, "The Sugar Cane Industry of the Chicama Valley, Peru", Unpublished paper, Department of Geography, California State University, 1986. Kus's conclusions were verified by the author with data from the Peruvian Ministry of Agriculture which confirm the drop in productivity of the Peruvian sugar farms as well as the drop in wages. The sugar haciendas are now heavily in debt to the government, and Peru is a net sugar importer.


22. Ibid.

23. Ibid.


26. Ibid., p.155.


29. Ibid., p.174.
30. Ibid., p.189.


32. Ibid., pp.73, 80-82.


34. Carlos Franco, Interview, Lima, Peru, 8 March 1988. Franco worked closely with Delgado during the Velasco years.


36. Ibid., p.60.

37. Ibid., p.20.

38. Carlos Franco in Cesar Vasquéz Bazán, La Propuesta Olvidada (Lima: Okura, 1988), p.101. It is unlikely that Franco is exaggerating here. Delgado's influence has been noted by both critics and supporters of the regime.


42. Angell and Thorp, op cit., (1980). Even the officially sponsored CTRP did not remain loyal to the government.


44. Andres Townsend Escurra, "El Aprismo, Las Fuerzas Armadas, y Una 'Revolución' Sin Pueblo".


51. Ibid.

52. Sanchez, op cit.,(1988), Tomo V, p.291. See also Kus’s conclusions earlier in the chapter.

53. Ibid., p.295. This is confirmed by Cronología Política [1972].

54. Ibid., p.289. Mulder (see following note) also recounts these incidents in his article, but with less detail.


56. Sanchez, op cit.,(1988), p.290. Again this can be confirmed by the relevant dates in Cronología Política [1972]

57. Ibid., p.188. Again, this is confirmed in Cronología Política. Sanchez' interpretation of the deportation of Idiaquez as a direct stab at Haya is probably correct, given the dependence of Haya on Idiaquez, particularly as he grew older. The Velasco regime, meanwhile, must have been aware of the public uproar and opposition that deporting Haya would have caused.


59. General Pedro Richter Prada, Prime Minister (Former), Republic of Peru, Interview, 11 February 1988.


64. General Pedro Richter Prada, Interview, Lima, Peru, 11 February 1988.

65. Andres Townsend Escurra, Interview, Lima, Peru, 3 March 1988. This has been confirmed by the author's conversations with both Apristas and non-Apristas.


69. This even pervaded diplomatic channels. Allende apparently had been very friendly with the APRA and visited the party every time he came to Peru. "Nos tratábamos como verdaderos correligionarios." Once the Velasco government was in power, Allende apparently ignored APRA overtures and maintained relations with anti-apristas. He invited a group of "antiapristas and antiadecos" (AD in Venezuela) to his swearing in. Sanchez, op cit.,(1988), Tomo V, p.337.

70. Luis Alberto Sanchez, op cit.,(1988), Tomo VI, p.60.


74. Wilbert Bendezú Carpio, Congressional Deputy, Partido Aprista Peruano/Director, Casa Central de Pueblos Jovenes, Interview, Lima, Peru, 5 March 1988.


78. Ibid.


80. Directors, Generacion en Marcha (young Lima wing of the APRA), Group Interview, Lima, 27 January 1988. See also Imelda Vega Centeno’s paper, "Aprismo Popular: Cultura, Religión, y Política", or her published works, in which she describes in detail the remoteness of much of the APRA party from the central leadership.


82. Ajuero, op cit., (1988). The crucial role of the student movement in pressuring the leadership of the APRA into a more radical stance was also discussed in detail in the author’s interview with Pedro Richter Prada, former
Prime Minister and Interior Minister during the military years.

83. Ibid.


88. "Entrevista: Manuel García". The events are confirmed by Cronología Política, February 1975. There are few - if any - accounts by the actors, such as García's.

89. Ibid.

90. Peru: Cronología Política, Tomo V [February 1975]


92. Peru: Cronología Política, Tomo V [February 1975]


95. Peru: Cronología Política, Tomo V [29, August, 1975].


97. Sanchez, op cit., (1988), Tomo VI, p.29. This is confirmed by Cronología Política, [1975].


100. Peru: Cronología Política, Tomo VI [30 August 1976].

101. Sanchez, op cit., (1988), Tomo VI, p.31. While there may have been other contacts between the APRA and the military, the author was unable to find any documented accounts, and those that Sanchez accounts indeed may have been the first ones.

102. Ibid., p.32.
103. Peru: Cronología Política Tomo VI [7 May 1976].


105. Sanchez, op cit., (1988), Tomo VI, p.34. AP boycotted the entire Constituent Assembly process.

106. Ibid., p.35.


111. Ibid., p.35.


114. Ibid., p.39.

115. Ibid., p.40.


117. Sanchez, op cit., (1988), Tomo VI.

118. Peru: Cronología Política Tomo VII [July 1978].


120. Ibid., pp.40-42.


123. Crabtree, op cit., (1985). A strong executive is not necessarily good for Peru. Recent comparative studies done by Valenzuela suggest that parliamentary systems are better for dealing with polarized political systems, as the emphasis is on coalition building rather than on intransigent opposition in an all or nothing game. Arturo Valenzuela, "Party Politics and the Failure of Presidentialism in Chile: A Proposal for a Parliamentary Form of Government", Unpublished paper for presentation at
Haya had voiced concerns in late 1977 that there could be a repetition of 1962 in Peru and 1970 in Chile, where due to the failure of the majority vote, the president was elected by the Congress. Francois Bourricaud suggested to him the French system, where a second run-off is held in the absence of a majority; this system was adopted, to begin with the 1985 elections. [Francois Bourricaud, Interview, Washington, D.C., 1 November 1988]

Endnotes
Chapter III


5. Ibid.


9. Ibid.


18. Cesar Garrido Lecca, Interview, Lima, 1 February 1988. Garrido Lecca, a former military officer, joined the APRA in the 1950's and was a very close friend of both Andres Townsend and Armando Villanueva. This was confirmed by the author's interview with Townsend and telephone conversation with Villanueva.


22. Luis Alberto Sanchez, Vice President, Republic of Peru, Interview, 5 March 1988. Ramiro Priale was another aprista who dropped his support for Townsend when he formed his own party.


31. Ibid.

32. Francois Bourricaud, Interviews, Washington, D.C., 5 October/14 October 1988. The author would like to thank Bourricaud for reading the entire manuscript and for his helpful comments.


34. Tito Ajuero, APRA Youth Leader, Interview, Lima, 8 March 1988. Ajuero, along with other APRA youth members interviewed by the author such as Coco Mora, Pepe Barreto, and Ivan García, knew García as a fellow member of the APRA youth - of the next generation in age - prior to his quest for general secretariat and the presidency.


37. Ibid.

38. Ibid.


53. Ibid.


56. Alan García, Un Futuro Diferente in Ricardo Vergara, "Un Futuro Diferente...al del Haya Primigenio", Que Hacer 21, February 1983.

57. Francois Bourricaud, Interviews, Washington, D.C., 5 and 14 October 1988. Bourricaud was one of García's main advisors when he was at the Sorbonne in the 1970's. García continued to consult Bourricaud after he returned to Lima. In particular, García visited Bourricaud in Paris after his election, prior to his inauguration; and Bourricaud spent ten days in Lima, at the Presidential palace, in December of 1987.


60. Riding, op cit.,(1985).


64. Gonzales, op cit.,(1983).


67. Ibid.


69. Ibid.


72. Ibid.


74. Ibid. Null and blank vote nationwide fell from 21.7% in 1980 to 8.2% in 1986, in conjunction with an increase in the total number of voters. Tuesta, DESCO, 1988.


80. Ibid.


Endnotes - Chapter IV


3. Ibid.

4. Ibid. For details of measures, see above source.


10. Andean Report, February 1986. The February measures included increases in the minimum wage and in pay for state workers and teachers; a reduction of 5% in the general sales tax; and another cut in interest rates. Electricity rates were cut for industry and for farmers. A multiple exchange rate system was set up, with a frozen base rate for imports of basic need items, and a free market rate - approximately 25% higher - for luxury items or items competing with local production. Exporters were allowed to exchange 30% of their foreign currency earnings on the parallel market. [same source]


representative for debt negotiations for the government for its first two years in power. (Author’s interview with Webb, Lima, 11 March 1988). The extent to which Garcia’s stance affected international creditors in not clear. While it did not change their public stance towards Peru, it may have been the impetus for the October 1985 Baker Plan, as is suggested by Baker’s former advisor Robin Broad: "How About a Real Solution to Third World Debt", The New York Times, 29 September 1987.

15. Thorp, op cit., (1987). Indicative of this concentration was the rapidly rising number of bank deposits in agencies located in "sectores populares", and the evidence of dynamic growth on the production side, with a flurry of auto-construcccion activity, as judged by the increase of demand in materials; an increase in such construction reflects increases in income. [Same source]


17. Thorp, op cit., (1987). The so-called April package also included subsidies - through a Fondo de Inversion e Empleo - for some industrial projects, particularly those outside of Lima. However, the positive benefits of the package were undermined by poor policy coordination and the announcement of the compulsory bond repatriation at the same time.

18. Ibid.


21. The Financial Times, 31 July 1987. A key member of the concertacion process, Ricardo Vega Llona - president of the Exporters Association and of the National Federation of Private Business Institutions (CONFIEP) - resigned in protest from two top committees that co-ordinated state and private sector activity. [Same source]


24. Peru Report, May 1987. The government’s attempts to incorporate union concerns were indeed minimal: even spokesmen from large companies openly stated that they preferred the government to decree wage increases so they could avoid negotiating with the unions. Que Hacer, 47, June/July 1987.


27. Tito Ajuero, APRA Youth Leader, Interview, Lima, Peru, 7 March 1988. Ajuero's observations are confirmed by the minimal role played by the CTP in all the general strikes of the García regime. For trends in the late 1970's, see Angell, op cit., (1979, 1982) and also p.5 in Lewis Taylor, "Maoism in the Andes: Sendero Luminoso and the Contemporary Guerrilla Movement in Peru", University of Liverpool, Centre for Latin American Studies, Working Paper No.2, 1983.


29. Caretas, 11 July 1988. The party was aware of its weak position among organized labor, as was evidenced by the CEN call for a renovation effort on the part of all directors with responsibilities for union affairs.


31. Alan Riding, "Peru, In Disarray, Directs Its Fury at the President", The New York Times, 19 October 1988. The size of the fiscal deficit is less relevant than how the money is spent. The U.S. deficit at its peak was 4.6% of GDP, and Mexico's is 8.7%. However, in both cases a much greater percentage was spent on investment, guaranteeing future growth, as opposed to Peru's which was primarily spent on subsidizing imports of consumer goods and food. [Edward M. Bernstein, Interview, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 17 August 1988]

32. El Comercio, 15 March 1988. Prior to announcing the package, García called in a host of external advisors, including Javier Silva Ruete, who was Economics Minister under Morales Bermudez, and Felipe Ortiz de Zevallos, who was a high level functionary during the Belaúnde years. PetroPeru's deficit was $900 million for 86/87, and $90 million was spent on the import of crude, a product Peru used to export. [El Comercio, 15 March 1988.]


34. Barbara Durr, "Peru Economic Policy Submerged By Politics", The Financial Times, 22 March 1988. 70% of those polled said that the measures would not help and 58% said that they disapproved of the García administration. [Same source]

35. "Del Crecimiento Record a la Hiperinflación", Caretas, 4 April 1988.


38. Webb, Interview. It was rumored that Jeffrey Sachs, the Harvard professor that designed Bolivia's plan was in Peru prior to the announcement of the shock plan.


42. Bourricaud, Interview, 21 October 1988. Bourricaud's assessments are based on both his experience with Garcia as a student in the 1970's, and on his conversations with Garcia in Lima - after the bank nationalizations - during Bourricaud's stay at the government palace in December 1987.


44. Javier Iguiniz, "Las Chances y Las Restricciónes de la Política del APRA", unpublished paper presented at University of California at San Diego Conference on "APRA as Party and Government: From Ideology to Praxis", 21 March 1988. For a demonstration of such practices, see the case study in Part III.

45. Alan Angell and Rosemary Thorp, "Inflation, Stabilization and Attempted Redemocratization in Peru, 1975-1979", World Development, Vol. 8, No. 11, 1980. The inadequacy of the state mechanism, coupled with García's autocratic tendencies, resulted in the executive, more often than not, by-passing the state, which only served to further undermine it. Demonstrative was García's purported refusal to deal with the Central Bank team, and his reliance on his personal team of advisors which had a basis in the Instituto Nacional de Planificación. The economists from the central bank, however, are some of the most talented in the state apparatus. (Author's off the record conversations with Central Bank official and with an independent Peruvian economic analyst in Washington, D.C.). For more on the Peruvian state and economic policymaking, see relevant sections of Rosemary Thorp and Lawrence Whitehead, eds., Inflation and Stabilization in Latin America (London: MacMillan, 1980), and Thorp and Bertram, op cit., (1979), p. 45.
Endnotes:
The Banks Expropriations


49. Caretas, Si, 10 August 1987. The largest group, the Romero group, controlled 128 enterprises through the Banco de Credito. While associated banks controlled 44.4% of commercial credit, the private banks controlled 55.6%. In terms of credit concentration, the 500 largest entrepreneurial groups controlled 33.8% of total commercial credit; the ten largest 9.9%; and the largest, the Romero group, 2.2%. [Si, 10 August 1987]

50. Manuel Moreyra, "El Proyecto de Estatización es Clamorosamente Inconstitucional", El Comercio, 17 August 1987, p.A4. Ironically, Garcia had christened 1987 the "Year of Investment", and later claimed that the primary motive behind the measure was to force businesses to invest, as they had not invested as much as he needed. [Durr, "To Govern Must Be to Change", The Financial Times, 9 September 1987.]

51. The 5 foreign bank branches which operate - although they had been scaling down their operations and only held 2% of credit - in Peru were exempt from the measure, most likely for practical reasons. The government was in the process of opening the door to foreign credit and it stood to lose over $80 million per year in trade credit lines, which foreign bank branches were required to extend by law in proportion to their deposits. [Barbara Durr, "Peruvian Senate Axes Foreign Bank Takeover", The Financial Times, 23 September 1987.]


56. Barbara Durr, "To Govern Must Be to Change", The Financial Times, 9 September 1987. The role of supply bottlenecks may have played a role in determining the


58. Moreyra, op cit., (1987). It is relevant to note that state banks loaned 50 to 60% of their credit to businesses with which they had links. [Same source]


60. Caretas, 10 August 1987. Also the author's interview with Carlos Franco, 8 March 1988.


63. Ibid.


65. Felipe Ortiz de Zevallos, "Bank Nationalizations Signals End of Peru's Spending Spree", The Wall Street Journal, 14 August 1987. The first week that the expropriation proposal was announced, public opinion on the issue was split 50-50; as the controversy deepened and dragged on into October and November, García' approval rating fell as low as 39%. Regional opposition in Arequipa and Piura was so strong that García withdrew the "Bancos Regionales" from the expropriations list. [Same source and "Paso Ligero", Caretas, 11 January 1988.]

66. Stallings, op cit., (1989). At the time the government was also revamping its strategy on external debt towards a cautious opening to foreign credit and negotiations with the World Bank. [Javier Iguíñiz, "Economic Debt and Politics in Peru", Lecture, St. Antony's College, Oxford, 20 October 1987]

67. In light of the damaging effects of the bank nationalizations, it is interesting to note the example of Mexico in 1982, when Lopez Portillo nationalized the nation's banks also for primarily political reasons. [See Diane Stewart, "Nationalization of the Banking Sector and its Consequences" in George Philip, ed., Politics in Mexico (London: Croom Helm, 1985).]

69. The law was finally approved by the Senate on September 28 and was promulgated as law on 9 October. The debate in the Senate led to many modifications, such as Armando Villanueva's article 16, which exempted over 250 enterprises linked to the banks from takeover. The voting in favor of the modifications pitted the APRA in conjunction with the AP and the PPC against the IU. Alva Castro was able to gain points with the left at the expense of Garcia by leading a movement in protest of the modifications in the Chamber of Deputies. ["Que Tal Sancochado", Oiga, 21 September 1987.]

Bank owners attempted a plethora of tactics, including physically moving - beds included - into their banks, and the Banco de Credito's devolution of its shares to its employees, a move which several of the other banks copied. High level officials approved the sale as a means to solve the controversy. It was rumored that Garcia changed his mind when the Banco de Credito leaked to the press copies of two checks which proved him guilty of tax fraud in the payment of a house. The Credito sale was then declared illegal by the government and on October 15 several banks were forcibly taken over by the government with riot policemen and armored cars. [Caretas, 19 October 1987] Subsequently, the government removed a judge who ruled that the government's taking control of the banks prior to a legal ruling was unconstitutional and replaced him with an APRA judge who reversed the ruling. This semi-ridiculous situation could hardly be to the government's credit, nor did it contribute to a supposedly democratic climate. The controversy dragged on, with Garcia calling an extraordinary legislature in January and finally approving the Credito solution in March 1988. Several other banks followed suit, but the Banco Wiese remained under government control until October 1989. In another highly publicized controversy in July 1988, police - supposedly upon orders from the Interior Minister - stormed the bank in order to eject Guillermo Wiese. ["A La Bruta", Caretas, 4 July 1988]


72. Apoyo, S.A., Opinion Polls, September 1987, November 1987. Opinion polling in a country like Peru, with volatile public opinion, is clearly fraught with difficulties. As a result, even polling agencies with acceptable survey methods are held to be unreliable. APOYO is a generally well respected firm, although it may at times underestimate support for the left.


Endnotes - Chapter V


4. Ibid. This is confirmed by several conversations that the author had with both high level APRA party members and with government officials.


6. Francois Bourricaud, Interview, Washington, D.C., 14 October 1988. Bourricaud claims that García said this when he was visiting him in Paris in mid-1985, after his election and prior to his inauguration. García’s lack of trust in either friends or advisors has been noted by government and party functionaries, and by acquaintances of García’s, as well as by Bourricaud.


22. Ibid.


25. Group interview with "Generación en Marcha".


41. Tito Ajuero, Interview.

42. Coloquios: Revista de la Juventud, Año 1, No.1, Agosto/Septiembre 1986.

43. Ivan García, former APRA militant, Interview, Lima, Peru, 8 March 1988.

44. Tito Ajuero, Interview.


47. Tito Ajuero, Interview. See also Caretas, 11 July 1988.

48. Ibid. This was confirmed by the author by tracing the press coverage of the APRA student movement in Cronología Política, 1977-1980.


53. Barreto Family, Former Persecuted Apristas, Interviews, 15 March 1988. There are hundreds of APRA families which have a history of some sort of persecution, Alan García’s included. A good example of Aprismo popular is the icons that loyal Apristas invariably have. Almost all APRA government officials interviewed had at least a picture, if not a bust, of Haya de la Torre in their offices. The APRA families the author met with had pictures of Haya de la Torre in the bedrooms, placed on the wall either next to or in the place where a religious cross might normally hang.


55. Ibid.

56. Ibid.
57. Iván García, Interview; also interviews with members of Generación en Marcha, and with Tito Ajuero and Coca Mora, members of the APRA youth.
Endnotes - Chapter VI


2. Felipe Ortiz de Zevallos, Lecture, St. Antony’s College, Oxford, 23 May 1988. This assertion is confirmed by several of Barrantes’ own statements, in the press, and in the author’s interview with him.


14. Javier Iguiniz, Política Económica: Deslindes Para el Futuro (Lima: DESCO, 1987), p.116. This is not a surprise, given the lack of skilled technicians in the APRA, the absence of APRA related think tanks, and the poor quality of the education offered at the APRA affiliated university, Villareal. In contrast is the plethora of left-affiliated think tanks - many of them set up during the Velasco years - such as DESCO and CEDEP, and the better quality of education offered at the Universidad Católica, one of the main training institutions of IU.


17. Mario Vargas Llosa, Interview, Lima, Peru, 1 March 1988. This assertion is made more credible by statements from dissenting Apristas, such as Barnechea and Torres Vallejo, as well as the author's conversations with several APRA youth leaders.


19. Diego Palma, "Un Discurso Eficaz Para Un Proyecto Político", Que Hacer 51, Marzo/Abril 1988. This was also hinted at in the author's conversations with Vargas Llosa's campaign manager.


Chapter VI: The Challenge from the Armed Left


24. Ibid.


30. Ibid. Sendero's tactics have been compared to those of the Khmer Rouge, and indeed the similarities in terms of ideology - seeking a revolution more radical than that of China or the Soviet Union, and also romancing ancient civilizations: the Incas and the Angkor in Cambodia - and tactics - Maoist encircling of the cities; willingness to use revolutionary violence in an extremely brutal manner, including assassinations of entire families in front of villages as "warnings" - are frighteningly striking. For detail see William Shawcross, Sideshow (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979) and Francois Ponchaud, Cambodia: Year Zero (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1977).


35. "Desarrollar La Guerra Popular."

36. Ibid.


40. Ibid.

41. Ibid.


45. Ibid.


47. Granados, op cit.,(1987).

48. Ibid.

49. Ibid. There is a striking similarity here with the Khmer Rouge's view of neutrality and value placed on human life: "Better to kill an innocent person than leave an enemy alive...Nothing to gain by keeping them alive, nothing to lose by doing away with them." [Ponchaud, op cit.,(1977), p.66]

50. Ibid.


52. McClintock, op cit.,(1989). Demonstrative of this support was the turnout in Ayacucho - a city with a population of 70,000 - of 30,000 at the 1982 funeral of
Edith Lagos, a young Senderista. The group's attempts to sabotage the 1980 elections were also highly successful, as the region displayed the highest levels of any in the country of null and blank voting in the May presidential and November municipal elections.


55. "Desarrollar La Guerra."


63. "El Costo del Terror", Oiga, 21 December 1987. An example of such sabotage was the assassination in late 1987 of the director and other high level functionaries of a long awaited multi-million dollar irrigation and hydroelectric development plan for the Andean Trapezoid, the Rio Cachi plan. [Same source] Sendero was also able to sponsor highly successful general strikes in Ayacucho and Huancayo in late 1988. "Recuperamos Junin y Ayacucho", Oiga, 26 December 1988.

64. "Asesinato Intencionato", Caretas, 1 August 1988.

66. Hernan Garrido Lecca, Interview, Lima, 21 January 1988. Also the author’s conversations with several members of the APRA youth.


69. Ibid.


72. Ibid. In late November the government had attempted to negotiate by sending INP chief Tantalean to Tarapoto. His efforts were thwarted by the presence in the village at the time of a reunion of the military command for the region. ["Tantalean en Tarapoto: En Busca de Dialogo", Caretas, 16 November 1987.]


88. Ibid. Most of the polls were taken by a respected firm, DATUM. The 1987 poll was taken by APOYO which at times may underestimate support for the Marxist left.

89. Ibid. This is also confirmed by the author's interviews with Hernan Garrido Lecca, leader of the APRA group Generacion en Marcha; Javier Valle Riestra, APRA Senator who is active in human rights issues; and several conversations with members of the APRA youth.

Endnotes
Chapter VII


11. Ibid. The labor surplus became most evident after industrialization, as the number of migrants coming to the capital in response to perceived opportunities was greater than the jobs available in the modern sector. At the turn of the century there was actually a labor shortage in the agriculture sector. (See Thorp and Bertram, op cit., (1979).

12. Ibid.


17. Barbara Durr, "Peru Banks to Make Credit More Available," The Financial Times, 12 April 1988 and "Siguen Las Invasiones: Alternativas de Solución de la Unión Formal-Informal", El Comercio, 7 March 1988. De Soto was key in sponsoring a law which was decreed in April 1988, requiring all banks to lend 10% of their credit to small scale entrepreneurs.


19. Ibid., p.252.

20. Ibid.


26. Ibid.


30. Ibid., p.34.

33. Ibid.
36. Ibid., p.142.
37. Ibid., pp.135-141.
44. Henry Dietz, Unpublished Survey: Poverty and Voting 1982 – Lima, University of Texas, Austin, 1984. Dietz carried out extensive surveys of Lima’s urban poor during the time that SINAMOS was active. He then returned to the same pueblos jovenes and conducted voting surveys, in 1981 and again in 1984. His conclusions of the behaviour of the urban poor in the seventies are complemented by those of David Collier; and in the 1980’s by the work of Fernando Tuesta at DESCO; Tuesta focuses more specifically on the role of the left.

Chapter VII - Part II

46. Ibid., p.118.
47. Ibid.
49. Caretas, 4 April 1988. The assertions of Ascueta are confirmed by the work of Julio Velarde, op cit.,(1987) on credit to the informal sector, and by the author’s
attendance at a Friedrich Ehbert Foundation conference on the role of the informal credit market, Lima, 20 August 1987.

50. Ramon Barua, Acción Comunitaria, Interview, 1 September 1987.


58. "Historia de Un Tren y Algunas Piscinas Sin Agua", Qiga, 9 February 1987. The author also conducted site visits to the Olympic pool in San Juan de Lurigancho, as well as to a government built "high-technology" institute, which towers above most of the buildings in the modest district, but remains empty and non-functional.


60. "Reflexiones de Mujeres Organizadas y la Ley del PAD", Centro de Investigación Social y Educación Popular, Lima, Diciembre 1986. This was confirmed by the author’s interview with Mary Fukumoto, Sociologist, Instituto de Investigación Nutricional and Universidad Catolica, 28 August 1987; and the author’s conversations with a health survey team in Canto Grande; and the author’s attendance at a Vaso de Leche Committee meeting where the committee had
previously been run by IU and was then being run by the APRA.


63. Ibid.

64. Ibid. See also "Reflexiones de Mujeres Organizadas y la Ley del PAD", Centro de Investigacion Social y Educacion Popular, Lima, Diciembre 1986; and the author’s conversations with PAIT/PAD officials, both in San Juan de Lurigancho and in the central offices.

65. Ibid.

66. Ibid.

67. Ibid.


69. Javier Camara, Director of Community Services, Municipality of San Juan de Lurigancho, Interview, Zarate, Lima, 14 March 1988.
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75. Ibid.

76. Ibid.

77. Director of PAIT Program for Suyana, Piura, Interview, Cooperación Popular Offices, Lima, 10 February 1988.

78. Director of PAIT Program for Cora Cora, Ayacucho, Interview, Cooperación Popular Offices, Lima, 10 February 1988.

79. Peredes and Vigier, op cit., (1986). Many of the conclusions of this survey are supported by the results of the author's study of the PAIT in practice in Chapter VIII.

80. Ibid.

81. Ibid.

82. Ibid.

83. Ibid.

84. Ibid.

85. Ibid.

86. Ibid.


88. "Primer Conversatorio Sobre PAD-PAIT".

89. Hilary Creed Kanashiro, Instituto de Investigación Nutricional, Interview, 28 August 1987.
90. Health Survey Team for Cantogrande, Instituto de Investigacion Nutricional, Group Interview, Cantogrande, Lima, 29 August 1987.

91. Oiga, 19 September 1988, pp.14-15. The timely announcement of new PAIT posts was in keeping with past policy, such as the raising of enrollment levels prior to the November 1986 elections. To the author's knowledge, the 200,000 new posts have yet to materialize.


93. Peri Peredes, Interview, ADEC/ATC, Lima, 25 August 1987. Peredes' description of the practices within the PAIT bureaucracy were confirmed by the author's conversations with PAIT officials, both at the central level and in San Juan de Lurigancho, and also by the author’s observations in the field (see Chapter VIII).

94. Ibid.

95. Houghton, Interview, Lima, 19 August 1987. The study of the PAIT in practice (Chapter VIII) confirms Houghton’s conclusions about the willingness of APRA party functionaries to use the program for political ends.

96. Peredes and Vigier, op cit.,(1986).


98. Cantogrande Health Survey Team, Group Interview. Again, the author’s observations in the field confirm these assertions.

99. Houghton, Interview, Lima, 19 August 1987. See also the section in this chapter on the informal sector, and footnote no.9.


102. Jaime Ruiz-Tagle and Roberto Urmeneta, Los Trabajadores del Programa del Empleo Mínimo (Santiago: PISPAL, 1984.)

103. Ibid., p.5.


Chapter VII - Part IV

111. Wilbert Bendezú Carpio, Congressional Deputy, Interview, Lima, 5 March 1988. The author’s observations of the functioning of the Casa Central on several different occasions confirm Bendezú’s description of the program administration.


113. Ibid.

114. Ibid. See Chapter IV, endnotes 43 and 44 on state positions being filled by Apristas.


119. Caretas, 4 April 1988. The author’s attendance of an APRA rally in Surquillo the same day (March 3, 1988) that the Casa Huerta settlers marched in close proximity to the rally confirmed that the protesters were allowed to march freely. In fact, they protested - without interference - outside the APRA rally, where Mayor del Castillo was speaking, in order to get his attention.

120. Sofia Madrid, Field Worker, Instituto de Investigacion Nutricional, Letter from Huaraz, 4 October 1988 to Dr. George Graham, Director, IIN, Lima.

Endnotes Chapter VIII:
The Pait in Practice


2. Ibid., p.132.

3. Ibid., p.12.


7. Poloni, p.112.

8. Ibid., p.124.

9. Jubilia Salazar, Hauscar Resident, Interview, Huascar, Lima, 19 January 1988. Mrs. Salazar’s account was supplemented by the author’s conversations with another of the original settlers of Huascar, Mrs. Suarez (see note no.14). The timing and the size of the invasion are documented by press coverage in *Cronología Política* [1976].

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid.


13. Ibid., p.125.


15. Víctor Raúl Ortiz Pilco, Mayor, San Juan de Lurigancho, Interview. The accounts that both Mrs. Salazar and Mrs. Suarez give of difficulty obtaining land titles lend credibility to this assertion.


21. Ibid., pp.126-7. This is in keeping with the record of both Belaúnde governments in terms of a tendency towards grandiose and expensive infrastructural projects rather than programs oriented at the most needy. Examples include the building of the Paseo de la República highway in Lima, the infamous Carretera Marginal, and the Torres San Borja housing project, which was designed for middle rather than low income families.

22. Ibid., p.132.

23. Victor Raúl Ortiz Pilco, Mayor, San Juan de Lurigancho, Interview, 3 February 1988. Municipalities in Latin America are in general under-funded; see note no.42, this chapter.


26. Ibid.


29. Claudio Lanata, M.D., Director, Instituto de Investigación Nutricional; George G. Graham, M.D., President, Instituto de Investigacion Nutricional; Interview, La Molina, Lima, 20 January 1988.


33. Carlos Franco, Interview, CEDEP, Lima, 10 March 1988. The campaign effort made in San Juan de Lurigancho by the APRA and Ortiz Pilco in particular was raised in conversations that the author had with several members of the central offices of the Lima municipality.


36. Ibid. The mayor’s assertions were confirmed by interviews with four social workers who operate in the area; none of the four were Apristas. In addition, the author’s interviews in the municipality with the women who worked in the PAIT resulted in high ratings for the mayor, lending support to his claims of attempting to operate in a non-partisan manner.

37. Javier Camara, Director of Community Services, Municipality of San Juan de Lurigancho, Interview, 26 January 1988.


39. Victor Raúl Ortiz Pilco, Mayor, San Juan de Lurigancho, Interview, 3 February 1988. Again success was not total, but interviews with residents of the district confirmed that the mayor was a substantial improvement over his predecessors. Huascar, for example, finally was able to attain electrical services in 1986, ten years after the initial settlement.


41. Victor Raúl Ortiz Pilco, Interview, 3 February 1988. This was confirmed by the author’s visit to the non-functioning "high technology" institute.


44. Mercedes Cabanilla, Social Worker, Municipality of Lima, Interview, 28 August 1988. The author also observed the distribution of Vaso de Leche milk at the San Juan de Lurigancho municipality.

45. Alfonso Barrantes, Former Mayor of Lima, Interview, 9 March 1988. Barrantes’ assertions are confirmed by the author’s interviews with social workers who have worked in such communities both under the Barrantes(IU) and del Castillo(APRA) municipalites; interviews with Nicholas Houghton, an ILO representative in Lima; and by the author’s field observations, particularly attendance at Vaso de Leche committee meetings.

47. Nicholas Houghton, Interview, 12 February 1988. This was confirmed by the author's extensive interviews with various APRA officials in charge of the PAIT in San Juan de Lurigancho.

48. Javier Camara, Director of Community Services, Municipality of San Juan de Lurigancho, Interview, 15 February 1988.


56. Ibid.


61. Ibid.


63. Survey of Huascar PAIT Workers.

64. Ibid.

66. Survey of Huascar PAIT Workers.

67. Ibid.

68. Survey of Pamplona Alta PAIT Workers.


70. Javier Camara, Director of Community Services, Municipality of San Juan de Lurigancho, Interview, 29 January 1988.

71. Survey of Pamplona Alta PAIT Workers.

72. Survey of Huascar PAIT Workers and the author's conversations with San Juan de Lurigancho PAIT officials.

73. Billone, op cit.,(1986).


Endnotes

Conclusion


3. Ibid., pp.232-3.


11. Huntington, pp.22-23.


13. Ibid.


15. Ibid., p.39.


18. Ibid., p.8.
19. Ibid., pp.7-8. Another comparison worthy of note is that of the Peronists in Argentina. The Peronists, like the APRA, seem to be a divisive rather than a unifying force in Argentine politics, and the intense loyalties and opposition aroused are analogous. In addition, once in power, both parties substantially raised popular expectations, only to find that they were unable to sustain economic growth and fulfil the demands that they had generated. The political and economic chaos that subsequently set in in both cases is comparable. For a description of the violence that accompanied the return of Peronism in the 1973-1976 period, see Richard Gillespie, Soldiers of Peron (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982).


21. Ibid., p.16.

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid., p.18.

24. Ibid., p.291.


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