

THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN THE REDD+ MECHANISM AND FOREST-RELATED INSTITUTIONS IN INDONESIA

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ABSTRACT

A policy mechanism known as REDD+ ('Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation, and enhancing forest carbon stocks and conservation') is designed to contribute to climate change mitigation efforts and simultaneously support developing countries' national development agendas. This is effected by providing REDD+ host countries with financial incentives to produce measurable reductions in carbon emissions beyond what would have occurred without REDD+.

Indonesia is a key target of the REDD+ mechanism for several reasons, eg: (i) its forests support 10% of the world's remaining tropical rain forests and represent the fourth largest forest carbon stock globally, (ii) 80% of its GHG emissions result from deforestation and forest degradation, and (iii) it has the potential to reduce up to 120 million tons of CO₂ per year. Consequently, to date Indonesia has received donor's commitments of nearly US\$2 billion for REDD+ development. Given this profile, Indonesia's success in implementing REDD+ can contribute significantly to the efficacy of REDD+ globally. However, achieving this potential is undermined by a set of long-standing problems inherent within Indonesia's forest institutions, including issues of corruption, coordination, uncertainty in the forests' legal system, capacity to manage forests at multiple levels of government, and the use of forest concessions to consolidate political power. This thesis asks the primary research question: **"How do REDD+ institutions effect governance reform within Indonesia's existing national and sub-national forest institutions?"**

'Institutionalism', in particular the concept of 'institutional interplay' is the main conceptual framework deployed and grounded in the context of the vertical interplay between the internationally-formulated REDD+ mechanism and Indonesia's forest institutions. Guided by the themes that emerged from the data collected, this research explored and expanded certain analytical approaches within the perspectives of institutionalism and governance, namely 'historical institutionalism', 'clientelism', 'critical juncture', 'policy networks' and 'social learning'.

This thesis adopted the 'four paper route' and employed mixed methods of data collection (ie interview, shadowing, and policy document review). It found that during the process of institutional interplay as REDD+ institutions deployed the principles of good governance, advanced a robust system of measurement, reporting and verification of reductions in carbon emission, attracted large funding, and involved a broad range and multi-scale of actors, the REDD+ mechanism produced 'collateral benefits'. The tangible form of these benefits was the production of new policy instruments, eg the 'national REDD+ strategy' (paper 2), 'one map initiative' (paper 3), and 'village agreement' (paper 4) through which a significant body of evidence showed the capability of REDD+ to effect governance reform within and beyond Indonesia's forestry sector. Paper 1, revealed how policy actors perceived REDD+ and as such provides the basis of these three papers. The positive results of institutional interplay that occurred were determined not only by the characteristic of REDD+ institutions themselves but also by the existence of domestic reformists and the national reform agenda.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

AFD	<i>Agence Française de Développement</i> (French Agency for Development)
APHI	<i>Asosiasi Pengusaha Hutan Indonesia</i> (Association of Indonesian Forest Concession Holders)
APL	<i>Areal Penggunaan Lain</i> (Area for Other Uses)
BAL	Basic Agrarian Law (<i>Undang-undang Pokok-pokok Pertanahan</i>)
BAPPEDA	<i>Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah</i> (Regional Development Planning Agency)
BAPPENAS	<i>Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional</i> (National Development Planning Agency)
BFL	Basic Forestry Law (<i>Undang-Undang Pokok-pokok Kehutanan</i>)
BIG	<i>Badan Informasi Geospasial</i> (Geospatial Information Agency)
BOS	Borneo Orangutan Survival
CDM	Clean development mechanism
CI	Conservation International
CIFOR	Center for International Forestry Research
CIRAD	Centre for Agricultural Research for Development
CKPP	Central Kalimantan Peatland Project
CO ₂	Carbon dioxide
COP	Conference of the Parties of the UNFCCC
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DD	Deforestation and (forest) Degradation
DFID	Department for International Development (United Kingdom)

DNPI	<i>Dewan Nasional Perubahan Iklim</i> (National Council on Climate Change)
EMRP	Ex-Mega Rice Project
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FCPF	Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (World Bank)
FFI	Fauna and Flora International
FLEGT	Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (EU)
FPIC	Free, Prior and Informed Consent
FSC	Forest Stewardship Council
GCF	Governors' Climate and Forests Task Force
GHG	Greenhouse Gas
GEF	Global Environment Facility
Gol	Government of Indonesia
GTZ	<i>Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit</i> (German Technical Cooperation Agency)
Ha	Hectare
IAFCP	Indonesia-Australia Forest Carbon Partnership
ICDP	Integrated conservation and development project
ICEL	Indonesian Center for Environmental Law
ICRAF T	World Agroforestry Centre
IFCA	Indonesia Forest Climate Alliance
IFI	International Financial Institutions
IGES	Institute for Global Environmental Strategies

IMF	International Monetary Fund
IMM	Indicative Moratorium Map
INGO	International nongovernmental organisation
INPRES	<i>Instruksi Presiden</i> (Presidential Instruction)
IPPC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
KEPRES	<i>Keputusan Presiden</i> (Presidential Decree)
KADIN	<i>Kamar Dagang Industri</i> (Indonesian Chamber of Commerce)
Kanwil	<i>Kantor Wilayah (Kehutanan)</i> The central government's regional forestry office at provincial level (abolished in 2001)
KFCP	Kalimantan Forests and Climate Partnership
KPK	<i>Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi</i> (Corruption Eradication Commission)
LULUCF	Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry
MoE	Ministry of Environment
MoFor	Ministry of Forestry
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MRV	Monitoring, Reporting and Verification
MRP	Mega Rice Project
NAMA	Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions
NGO	Nongovernmental Organisation
OMI	One Map Initiative
Permenhut	<i>Peraturan Menteri Kehutanan</i> (Minister of Forestry Regulation)
RED	Reducing Emissions from Deforestation

REDD	Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries
REDD+	Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation and enhancing forest carbon stocks and conservation
SES	Social and environmental standards
SK	<i>Surat Keputusan</i> (Decree)
TNC	The Nature Conservancy
UKP4	<i>Unit Kerja Presiden Pengawasan dan Pengendalian Pembangunan</i> (The President's Unit for Development Control and Monitoring)
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNDRIP	United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNORCID	United Nations Office for REDD+ Coordination in Indonesia
UN-REDD	United Nations Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation in Developing Countries
VPA	Voluntary partnership agreement
WII	Wetlands International-Indonesia Program
WRI	World Resources Institute
WWF	World Wildlife Fund/ World Wide Fund for Nature

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

This research fits within the geography of forest governance: it examines the interplay between the policy mechanism known as REDD+ ('Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation, and enhancing forest carbon stocks and conservation') and Indonesia's forest-related institutions. Addressing the multi-level governance of the character of REDD+, this research traces the results of the vertical interplay between REDD+ institutions (established at the international level) with forest institutions at the national and sub-national levels. It asks: "How do REDD+ institutions effect governance reform within Indonesia's existing national and sub-national forest institutions?" Since addressing reform inevitably generates resistance from the 'status quo' that has benefitted from existing forest institutions - Indonesia's forest resources have a long and significant role in the consolidation and stabilisation of political and bureaucratic power - this study also explores the political dynamics amongst policy actors and the underlying political/economic rationale governing Indonesia's forests.

Geographers have had a long engagement with forestry, and as Liverman (2004) states: "Geography has much to offer a world in which environmental change is widespread and where new actors, scales, and metrics are transforming environmental decisions" (Liverman 2004, p 734). Notable is the deployment of core concepts within the discipline of human geography, namely the identification of actors

and policy networks which operate simultaneously at different scales of governance-setting in transforming institutions that manage environmental change (Bulkeley 2005, Liverman 2004). With the emergence of global climate change issues, intensive debate within the geography of environmental governance is centred around human-environment relations and how these relations are determined by space (eg regional differences) and time (Evans 2012, Liverman 2004, Young et al. 2008).

This thesis addresses the development of institutions that guide and structure collective efforts to manage forestry-related issues. It pays particular attention to the interactions of actors and policy networks at multi-level governance settings in influencing the development of policies that facilitate REDD+ implementation in Indonesia. Of particular importance, this thesis discusses the significance of the timing of REDD+ entrance into Indonesia's political and social arena in 2007 in the wake of the 'reformasi' movement, when the public-at-large demanded greater transparency and participation in the conduct of its government. It analyses how this timing was critical in determining the relative success of the interplay between REDD+ institutions and Indonesia's forest-related institutions as observed today.

REDD+ is considered as the first global initiative to directly address the cross-sectoral drivers of forest loss (McDermott 2014). It includes in its design multiple objectives ranging from reducing carbon emissions to biodiversity protection to poverty alleviation (McDermott et al. 2012b, Parker et al. 2009, UNFCCC 2011). As a consequence the REDD+ initiative opens up governance space for the involvement of a wide range of actors (including states, transnational NGOs, epistemic communities and global civil society networks) operating simultaneously across multiple scales that

contribute to the process for the development of REDD+ institutions (Di Gregorio et al. 2012, McDermott et al. 2012a, 2012b, Schroeder 2010, Thompson et al. 2011).

This thesis contributes to the debates within the geography of environmental and forest governance by providing regionally detailed analysis of the effect of internationally formulated REDD+ institutions on Indonesia's existing forest institutions at the national and sub-national levels. Moreover, it generates a richer conceptualisation on how policy actors transform institutions, how REDD+ institutions create a new space for forest governance, how they are affected by and affect existing formal and informal institutions, and how the process of transformation or institution-building is largely determined by time. This research pays particular attention to the policy-making process whereby multiple actors from multiple scales work in tandem via networks of governance. Moreover, it highlights the prominent roles of agency and individual leadership or 'champions' to move issues to the top of the policy agenda at different levels of governance.

1.1. The REDD+ Initiative and the Significance of Indonesia as a Case Study

Forest loss, which in 2007 was estimated to generate 17-20% of global anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (IPCC 2007) - a figure later revised to '12-17%' (Van der Werf et al. 2009) - has been framed as a problem requiring international collective action. Recognition of this problem led to the establishment of the REDD+ initiative, a policy mechanism for implementation in developing countries which emerged from the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC 2005). REDD+

was seen as an opportunity to create strategic linkages between the emerging climate change regime and international forest policy and has positioned tropical forest governance as a major focus of the global community (Bauer et al. 2006, Brown et al. 2008, McDermott et al. 2011). The fact that tropical forests store more than half of all carbon in terrestrial vegetation worldwide, and contain at least two thirds of the world's terrestrial biodiversity (Saatchi et al. 2011), means that developing countries with most of the world's remaining tropical forests, such as Brazil, the Congo Basin of Africa and Indonesia, have become targets for the implementation of REDD+.

The REDD+ mechanism is designed to contribute to climate change mitigation efforts and simultaneously support developing countries' national development agendas by, inter alia, improving the governance of forests and emphasising the enhancement of carbon stocks, forest conservation, and sustainable management (UNFCCC 2005, 2011). It is designed to provide developing countries with financial incentives to produce measurable reductions in carbon emissions beyond what would have occurred without REDD+ (UNFCCC 2011). REDD+ was identified as a potentially low-cost climate change mitigation strategy (Phelps et al. 2010, Stern 2006, Tavoni et al. 2007) that could achieve significant and immediate impact in a short timeframe (IPCC 2007, Nussbaum et al. 2009). For these reasons it was expected that this initiative would attract public and private investors to fund REDD+ as the least-cost form of emissions mitigation (Eliasch 2008, Phelps 2012, Stern 2006). In the process, REDD+ has positioned tropical forests as a focus of international and national policy agendas attracting nearly US\$5 billion of financial support for its 'readiness phase' alone (Kanninen et al. 2010, Knight, Stephenson 2010).

The RED initiative (with one 'D') was first introduced at the UNFCCC's Conference of the Parties (COP) 11 in 2005 in Montreal focused on reducing emissions from deforestation (UNFCCC 2005). In 2007 the 'Bali Action Plan', formulated at COP 13, added forest degradation (the second 'D') in the REDD concept (Angelsen, McNeil 2012, Campbell 2009). This Action Plan also stated that comprehensive action on the mitigation of climate change should include "Policy approaches and positive incentives on issues relating to reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries; and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries" (UNFCCC 2008: 1-b-iii). The concept of REDD became REDD+ to reflect these additional carbon-focused components: while the initial focus for 'REDD' was on reducing carbon emissions the '+' also aims to reward activities that enhance forest carbon stocks through, for example, forest restoration, rehabilitation, and afforestation/reforestation (Campbell 2009, p 397). In 2010, as stated in the Cancun Agreements that resulted from COP 16, the REDD+ activities include: (a) Reducing emissions from deforestation; (b) Reducing emissions from forest degradation; (c) Conservation of forest carbon stocks; (d) Sustainable management of forests; and (e) Enhancement of forest carbon stocks (UNFCCC 2011: para 70). Moreover, while the co-benefits of REDD, specifically poverty reduction, better governance, improved conservation of biodiversity, and the safeguarding of ecosystem services, have always been part of the REDD debate, with REDD+ the possibility to achieve them is greatly enhanced (Campbell 2009, p 397).

Within the Cancun Agreements 'a phased approach' to REDD+ implementation was agreed per the following steps: i) the development of national strategies or action

plans, policies, measures, and capacity building; ii) the implementation of national policies and measures, national strategies or action plans that could involve further capacity-building, technology development and transfer, and results-based demonstration activities evolving into; iii) results-based actions that should be fully measured, reported and verified (UNFCCC 2011: para 73). The ‘results-based actions’ or ‘performance-based approach’, with payments made only after results have been demonstrated, is considered to be essential not only to attract financing but also to maintain environmental integrity, ie that a real reduction in carbon emissions together with other indicators of good performance related to ‘REDD+ safeguards’ are achieved (Angelsen, McNeill 2012, McNeill 2012, Wertz-Kanounnikoff). Moreover, the Cancun Agreements requested developing countries to establish the necessary infrastructure for undertaking REDD+ activities, eg by developing a national strategy or action plan, a national reference emissions level or forest reference level, and a robust and transparent national monitoring system (UNFCCC 2011: para 71). Whilst the UNFCCC provides global norms (eg in the form of ‘REDD+ safeguards’) and policy guidance for the development of a REDD+ national infrastructure, there was also an agreement that national governments can shape REDD+ governance “in accordance with national circumstances and respective capabilities” (UNFCCC 2011: para 71). For instance, whilst guidance was provided on what the national strategy should address, eg the drivers of deforestation and forest degradation, land tenure issues, forest governance issues, gender considerations and related safeguards (UNFCCC 2011: para 72), how the strategy is to be developed and what structures and institutions are put in place are for national governments to decide.

Of particular note for this research is the inclusion of several principles of good governance within the UNFCCC's decisions on REDD+, notably through the 'REDD+ safeguards' which are intended to protect non-carbon forest values (McDermott et al. 2012a). The 'safeguards' (UNFCCC 2011: Annex I-2), and the guidance for REDD+ policies and activities (UNFCCC 2011: Annex I-1), articulate the principles of good governance: they request that developing country Parties undertaking REDD+ activities should promote and support, inter alia, transparent and effective governance, respect for the knowledge and the rights of indigenous peoples and local communities, full and effective participation of relevant stakeholders, enhancement of social and environmental benefits, consistency with other international agreements and with the Parties' national development goals and priorities, and the sustainable management of forests (UNFCCC 2011: Annex I 1-2). Included within the UNFCCC's decisions from COP 17 in Durban (UNFCCC 2012a: Decision 12/CP.17) was that developing country Parties should periodically report on how social and environmental safeguards were being addressed and respected during the phases of REDD+ implementation. However, details on the guidance and reporting system were minimal and left to the Parties to develop (UNFCCC 2012a: Decision 12/CP.17-para 2).

Whilst significant progress was achieved on REDD+ decisions relating to environmental and social integrity, such as the 'REDD+ safeguards' mentioned above, and the scientific and methodological basis for estimating GHG emissions (IPCC 2006), decisions on long term results-based finance have been slow (Di Gregorio et al. 2012, Streck, Parker 2012). Nonetheless, during the COP 15 in Copenhagen developed countries committed to provide new resources approaching US\$30 billion for

adaptation and mitigation for the period 2010-2012, and to mobilise US\$100 billion a year by 2020 for mitigation actions which are meaningful and transparent (UNFCCC 2010: para 8). At the COP 17 in Durban it was agreed that results-based financing may come from a variety of sources, including those that are public, private, bilateral and multilateral (UNFCCC 2012b: Decision 2/CP.17). Whilst this decision recognised the use of a market-based approach it failed to clarify details such as whether sub-national activities could be supported by markets, and whether any market-based mechanism would relate to those under the UNFCCC and any future legally-binding agreement post Kyoto (Climate-Focus 2012).

During COP 19 in 2013 in Warsaw the Parties decided to move forward with the REDD+ mechanism and officially approved the 'Warsaw Framework for REDD+' (UNFCCC 2013). This Framework encourages the Parties, organisations and the private sector to take action to reduce the drivers of deforestation and forest degradation (UNFCCC 2014: Decision 15/CP.19). It also reaffirms previous decisions (UNFCCC 2012: Decision 2/CP.17-para 65-67) which stated that results-based finance for the full implementation of REDD+ activities that are new, additional and predictable, may come from a variety of sources. These sources can be public and private, bilateral and multilateral, including alternative sources, and that both appropriate market-based approaches and non-market-based approaches could be developed to support REDD+ results-based actions (UNFCCC 2014: Decision 9/CP.19). Importantly, the Warsaw Framework states that results-based finance should be dependent upon safeguards being met (UNFCCC 2014: Decision 9/CP.19).

The Warsaw Framework also emphasises the importance of strengthening, consolidating and enhancing the sharing of relevant information, knowledge, experience and practices in the implementation of REDD+ activities (UNFCCC 2014: Decision 10/CP.19). In addition it emphasises the importance of robust national forest monitoring systems which produce data and information that are transparent, consistent over time, and suitable for measuring, reporting and verifying (MRV) anthropogenic GHG emissions based on the most recent IPCC guidance, and developing capacities for MRV which emphasise transparency in the process (UNFCCC 2014: Decision 11/CP.19). Moreover, the Framework addresses the system of information or communication relating to how REDD+ safeguards are being addressed and respected throughout the implementation of REDD+ activities (UNFCCC 2014: Decision 12/CP.19) and, as referred to in its previous decision (UNFCCC 2011: para 72 and 76), addresses the drivers of deforestation and forest degradation in the development and implementation of national strategies or action plans (UNFCCC 2014: Decision 15/CP.19). This Warsaw Framework for REDD+ is supported by pledges of US\$280 million from Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States of America to be managed by the World Bank's BioCarbon fund (UNFCCC 2013). In addition Norway made a US\$40 million pledge to the UN-REDD Programme (UN-REDD 2013).

Indonesia is a key target of the REDD+ initiative and a major recipient of REDD+ development funds receiving commitments of nearly US\$2 billion, including US\$1 billion from the government of Norway (Fujikasi 2012, LoI 2010). This is because: 1) Indonesia's 130 million ha of forests support 10% of the world's remaining tropical rain forests (Dauvergne 1994, FAO 2011a, Resosudarmo et al. 2014), representing the

fourth largest forest carbon stock globally (Strassburg et al. 2008); 2) Indonesia has an annual deforestation rate of 1.17 million ha (MoFor, 2009a, 2009b) and 80% of its GHG emissions result from deforestation and forest degradation (35% from forestlands and 45% peatlands) (Boer et al. 2009, DNPI 2009); and 3) there is a high level of political support with President Yudhoyono in 2009 committing to reduce the country's GHG emissions by 26% through its own effort, or 41% with international support by 2020 below 'business as usual' (Boer et al. 2009, LoI 2010). If delivered this commitment can potentially reduce up to 120 million tons of CO₂ emissions per year (equivalent to 1.2 gigatons) by 2020 (LoI 2010).

For these reasons research on REDD+ implementation in Indonesia is important as the country's performance in implementing REDD+ will contribute significantly to the global response to climate change as well as enhancing its national economic development. Indonesia has drawn massive attention from international donors and investors with over 30 REDD+ pilot projects and demonstration activities by year end 2009 from the total of 109 worldwide, and over 40 pilot projects by year 2012 (Atmadja, et al. 2010, Madeira et al. 2010, Steni, Hadad 2012). One such demonstration activity is the AUS\$47 million Australian government-funded project in Central Kalimantan Province (AIP 2009) on which this research has focused its field work. A landmark agreement was established by Indonesia in 2010 with the government of Norway potentially worth US\$1 billion for the period of 7-8 years (LoI 2010). Furthermore, analysis suggests that reducing Indonesia's deforestation rate by 5% could generate REDD+ payments of US\$765 million per year, while a 30% reduction could generate US\$4.5 billion annually (Purnomo et al. 2007). However, as discussed in

the following section the potential to exploit this value could be undermined by forest governance which has historically been weak (McCarthy 2000, 2004).

1.2. The Context of Indonesia's Forest Policy and Governance

Indonesia is the world's fourth most populous nation with a population of 237 million in 2010 and is projected to be 300 million by 2030 (GoI 2011a). It is the world's largest archipelago with 81,000 kilometres of coastline consisting of 16,000+ islands of which 3.1 million square km is territorial water and 2 million square km of land (REDD+ Task-Force 2012). Figures on the area of 'State forest' or 'Forest Estate' (*Kawasan Hutan*) land vary from 120 million ha to 143 ha, equivalent to 62% and 74% respectively of the total land surface (Barr et al. 2006, Contreras et al. 2005). Forest resources played an important role in the consolidation of power and the stabilisation and development of the economy following the transfer of power from Indonesia's first President (Sukarno) to Suharto in 1966 (Brockhaus et al. 2012, Jepson 2001). With population growth, the poverty level and the unemployment rate reaching 1.2%, 9.5% and 16.3% respectively in 2009 (GoI 2009, 2011a), forests continue to play a significant role in Indonesia's economic development, and even more so for the estimated 20 million Indonesians whose livelihood is forest-dependent (Barr et al. 2006). Forests are frequently designated for other uses such as housing, agriculture and mining. At the same time forest dependent people use this same forest resource for timber and rattan, and for services such as water catchment and flood protection.

Indonesia's forest governance institutions have historically been weak (McCarthy 2000, 2004), characterised by: 1) the use of forest concessions as a key

resource in the consolidation and stabilisation of political power (Jepson 2001, Peluso et al. 2008), 2) an explicitly rent-seeking environment (Brown 1999, Jepson et al. 2001, Larson et al. 2010), 3) poor coordination amongst government ministries and between national and sub-national governments (Sunderlin et al. 2008), 4) uncertainty and ambiguity in the legal systems surrounding forests (Barr et al. 2006, Marifa 2005, Rosenbarger 2009), and 5) limited capacity to manage forests at multiple levels of government (Sunderlin et al. 2008, McCarthy 2010).

Under the Suharto government (1966-1998) the majority of forests were designated as 'State forest' (*Kawasan Hutan*) via the Basic Forestry Law (BFL) 5/1967, a Law that brought 62-69% (120-133 million ha) of the country's total land surface under the legal jurisdiction of the Ministry of Forestry (MoFor), a provision reinstated in the subsequent BFL 41/1999 (Contreras et al. 2005, Li 2001, Wollenberg et al. 2006). Since the term 'State forest' is used to denote lands under the MoFor's jurisdiction and not necessarily areas covered by trees, significant State forest land is found either without trees or is community-planted agro forest which often results in land conflict between MoFor and the communities (McCarthy 2000, McDermott et al. 2010, Peluso 1995). This highlights the underlying issue of tenure rights in Indonesia's political history which results from its economic dependence on natural resources such as forests (Contreras et al. 2005, Gellert 2010, Resosudarmo 2005). The Suharto regime transformed patronage into a fusion of public authority and private interest which dominated the forestry sector in favour of an extractive model of development (Brockhaus et al. 2012, Gellert 2010). The regime maintained the deeply clientelist institutions amongst government and society by using forest concessions to award

supporters (Jepson et al. 2001, Li 2007, Tsing 2005). For instance, between 1967 and 1980 53 million ha were granted as timber concessions through non-bidding procedures (Barr 1998).

This condition was further challenged by Indonesia's contemporary socio-politics, characterised by instability and the rejection of state power resulting from the Asian financial crisis in 1997. This crisis was followed by a 'reformasi' movement, ie a reform movement where the public-at-large demanded a state administration free from corruption, collusion and nepotism that brought the Suharto regime to an end in 1998 (Jepson 2001, O'Rourke 2002). The resulting political instability raised fears that resource-rich provinces might seek independence. This led to President B.J. Habibie's decision in 1999 to decentralise the management authority of forests to the district (*kabupaten*, 3rd tier) level as a tactic to reduce the power of the provincial level (2nd tier) of government (Jepson 2001, Barr et al. 2006). Following this policy the MoFor released Ministerial Decree No. 310/1999 granting district government the right to issue small-scale (up to 100 ha) timber-extraction permits which immediately resulted in permits being issued at unprecedented rates (Rosenbarger 2009). In one district alone (Kutai Barat) in East Kalimantan 622 permits were issued in one year, many within the boundaries of a protected area (Resosudarmo 2004).

To regain control the MoFor issued another Decree, No. 541/2002, revoking previous rights granted but district governments refused to acknowledge it (Rosenbarger 2009). This resulted in more chaotic forest governance characterised by an intense power struggle amongst different levels of government over the control of forests (Rosenbarger 2009). Many suggest that the remaining old authoritarian


representatives sought to re-centralise the system, evidenced by the establishment of Regulation No 34/2002 on Forest Administration and Management which was an effort to re-centralise authority over the forestry sector (Barr et al. 2006, Nomura 2008, Rosenbarger 2009). The struggle over forest resources amongst different levels of government continues to occur as a consequence of the interplay between the role of forests as a key resource in the stabilisation of political power, the persistent conduct of clientelist institutions, and the legal ambiguity surrounding forests (Jepson 2001, Marifa 2005).

On the latter, not only can laws and regulations be interpreted according to actors' interests but higher levels of government can pass regulations which override others (Gol 2004, Marifa 2005). This legal system is complex notably because every government ministry or agency is supported by a national Law which often contradicts with another (Marifa 2005). This is exacerbated by poor coordination amongst government ministries, and between different levels of government, which together creates inconsistency in the development and application of regulations (Sunderlin et al. 2008). Figure 1.1 illustrates the hierarchy of laws and regulations in Indonesia.

This problem of ambiguity of law and regulation dates back to the 1960 Basic Agrarian Law (BAL) and the 1967 Basic Forestry Law (BFL). For instance, while the Basic Forestry Law established government control and management rights over forest (eg granting and managing concessions) via MoFor, the Basic Agrarian Law, which covers the entire Indonesian land-base, regulates tenure via the National Land Bureau (NLB). The subsequent BFL No. 41/1999 empowered the MoFor to manage State forest but control over land tenure rights remained with the NLB. This resulted in overlapping

authority with interpretation of laws often determined by the self-interest of policy actors (Marifa 2005). Moreover, many discrepancies are found within the same department, cross-sectoral, or between national and local government, most of which result in overlapping forest concessions (Barr et al. 2006).

Figure 1.1: Hierarchy of law and regulations in Indonesia



Source: Indonesian's Law No. 4/2004 on the Formulation of Laws and Regulations

For the above-mentioned reasons Indonesia's forest governance institutions have always received scrutiny from transnational networks promoting the principles of good governance. These networks included international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF, and NGOs. The work of the latter in effecting governance reform only gained real momentum in the 'reformasi' period from 1998 (Gellert 2010, Seymour, Dubash 2000). This period provided both the space and opportunity for

different networks of actors to voice their interests and make claims over forest land and its resources (Bakker, Moniaga 2010), and for the creation of broader networks which were instrumental in providing stronger constituencies for further governance reform (Gellert 2010).

Of particular importance to this research, the 'reformasi' movement led to the establishment of the Corruption Eradication Commission (*Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi or KPK*) in 2002 (GoI 2002a: Law No. 30) that gained wide public support. The KPK plays a significant role in maintaining the reform movement which led to the institutional development path observed today, ie more transparency in the conduct of government (Dermawan et al. 2011, Luttrell et al. 2014). Moreover, the reformasi period was marked by the increasing appearance of conservation groups supported by international donors, the deepening relationship between international financial institutions and research institutions, and between NGOs and the academic community, and importantly the increasing visibility and support for the indigenous people's alliance (Gellert 2010, Li 2001, Moniaga 1993, Seymour, Dubash 2000). REDD+ entered Indonesia's political and social arena in 2007, when the country hosted the UNFCCC COP 13th in Bali, in the wake of the 'reformasi' movement that began one decade earlier.

Since COP 13 issues of climate change have captured significant public attention in Indonesia. Inevitably, there has been resistance from interests representing 'business as usual' since the REDD+ initiative aims to break the long historical trends by which many powerful actors have benefited from economic development based on the extraction of natural resources (Brockhaus et al. 2012,

2013, Resosudarmo et al. 2014). This resistance was particularly evident during the process for establishing the national REDD+ strategy (the 'Strategy') when constituents for governance reform pushed for the inclusion of the drivers of deforestation within the Strategy document, versus the MoFor which initially expressed objection to their inclusion (discussed in chapter 4).

The drivers of deforestation in Indonesia identified during this Strategy-establishing process include: i) poor spatial planning, ii) tenure problems, iii) ineffective forestry management, and iv) poor forestry law and regulation and its enforcement (Bappenas 2011, JMS 2010). These identified drivers of deforestation reflect the weak forest governance addressed earlier in this section. The resistance from MoFor on the inclusion of the drivers of deforestation in the Strategy document was unsurprising given the challenge these drivers represent to powerful actors within the forestry sector, their inclusion also highlighting historical mistakes.

To this end, current literature argues that unless these drivers of deforestation are addressed, particularly by reforming land-use allocation policies which have historically supported the extraction of forest assets in favour of the pulp and paper industry, palm oil plantations, and the mining industry, the efficacy of REDD+ is at risk (see Brockhaus et al. 2012, Resosudarmo et al. 2014). Moreover, in a global context, the growing integration of food, energy and financial markets, together with a new wave of large-scale investment in agriculture, have increased pressure on forest land and constitute a major force that competes with REDD+ (Brockhaus et al. 2012, Pacheco et al. 2012, p 51). Indonesia is part of this global equation as it is a major

exporter of palm oil, pulp and paper, and coal¹ (Pacheco et al. 2012). With its national plan to achieve between 7 to 12.7% economic growth annually (Luttrell et al 2014), and, as mentioned earlier, with a population of 237 million and growth and unemployment rates reaching 1.2% and 16.3% respectively (Gol 2009, 2011a), its forest land and assets are under great pressure to provide food, energy, employment, and housing, and hence represent competing factors to REDD+ (Brockhaus et al 2012, Luttrell et al. 2014, Pacheco et al 2012).

This thesis' substantive chapters discuss directly and indirectly issues related to these drivers of deforestation, including; (i) the ambiguity and uncertainty of the legal system surrounding forests that has resulted in overlapping forest concessions and provided space for political actors to conduct rent-seeking (chapter 3 and 5); (ii) how policy actors argued different agendas to include or exclude these drivers of deforestation, and how to address them, including MoFor advocating that other relevant ministries with land-based use (eg agriculture, mining and energy, and public housing) should share responsibility for reducing carbon emissions (chapter 4); (iii) the national consensus on achieving economic growth of 7% while committing to reduce GHG emissions by 26% - or 41% with international support - annually (chapter 4); (iv) how path-dependent institutions in map-making have served the interests of the state in alliance with its cronies - the powerful forest industrialists - to control and govern access to forest land and its resources, resulting in poor spatial planning and land use

¹ In 2011 the export of pulp and paper, crude palm oil and coal represented approximately US\$35 billion (US\$4 billion, US\$9 billion, and US\$22 billion respectively), or about 20% of Indonesia's total export value (COMTRADE 2012 cited at Pacheco et al. 2012, p 57); coal production almost quadrupled in the ten years through 2012 and the area occupied by mining concessions expanded rapidly (Tragistina 2011 cited at Pacheco et al. 2012, p 57); anticipating a doubling of global demand for palm oil by 2025, the Indonesian government plans to double its current crude palm oil (CPO) production of 23 million tonnes over the next decade through intensification and by developing an additional 4 million hectares of oil palm plantation estates (Bahroeny 2009, Suparno, Afrida 2009 cited at Pacheco et al. 2012, p 58).

policies that favour the extraction of forest assets and which led to large scale deforestation (chapter 5).

In short, international REDD+ institutions are interplaying with Indonesia's historically weak forest governance institutions where policies and politics support the exploitation of forest assets. This study holds that these inherent problems, the political dynamics within Indonesia's forest institutions, and their interplay with new REDD+ institutions, needs to be fully understood for the successful implementation of REDD+.

1.3. Situating the Thesis within the Current Research on REDD+

In line with the three phases of REDD+ implementation (ie development of national strategy or action plan, implementation of policies and measures, and results-based actions), the literature on REDD+ can be grouped into three major themes: i) REDD+ architecture and governance issues, ii) the processes of policy formulation and decisions for early implementation of both national and sub-national policy reform and local projects, and iii) the impact of REDD+, particularly on forest carbon and local livelihoods (Angelsen et al. 2012, p 2-3).

The first generation of REDD+ research focused largely on institutions and governance issues, ie the design of the REDD+ mechanism necessary for it to be effective, efficient and equitable (Angelsen et al. 2012, p 2). This included issues on capacity building, enabling conditions and readiness activities, as well as issues on financing (eg Nussbaum et al. 2009, Phelps et al. 2010, Vatn, Angelsen 2009), technical and methodologically-related issues such as reference levels, leakage and MRV (eg Cattaneo et al. 2010, Ghazoul et al. 2010, Hajek et al. 2011), and the debate relating to

co-benefits in biodiversity protection, poverty alleviation and the protection of human rights (eg Asselt 2011, Cotula et al. 2009, Lyster 2010, Okereke, Dooley 2010, Parrota et al. 2012). Moreover, the literature illustrates different views on REDD+, much being in support of REDD+ with an equal number of authors expressing concerns.

Many authors are concerned with the potentially unfair distribution of REDD+ resources to local communities when existing tenure regimes are not pro-community (Larson et al. 2010, Palmer 2010), the risk of corruption (Barr et al. 2010, Tacconi et al. 2009), whether implementation will deny the rights of indigenous and local communities to both territories and forest resources (Ghazoul et al. 2010, Okereke, Dooley 2010), and if REDD+ can be implemented in a country where forest institutions are weak (Karsenty, Ongolo 2011). The counter arguments assert that REDD+ is designed to create opportunities for governance reform both inside and outside the forestry sector (Brockhaus et al. 2012, Murdiyarso et al. 2011), to strengthen the capacity for forest-law enforcement and the community's role in forest management (Skutsch et al. 2011, Wertz-Kanounnikoff, Angelsen 2009), and potentially to contribute to poverty reduction, livelihood improvement, and biodiversity protection (Brown et al. 2008, Madeira et al. 2010). Already REDD+ is seen as functioning as a new form of forest governance (Thompson et al. 2011) which has the ability to achieve 'transformational change' - defined as a shift in discourse, attitudes, power relations and action that leads to the formulation and implementation of policies away from those deemed as 'business as usual' (Brockhaus, Angelsen 2012).

Some are concerned that REDD+ is at risk of being undermined by multiple objectives which could endanger its effectiveness and initial attractiveness, ie large

scale emissions reduction with a performance-based payment, objectives that distinguish it from past efforts (Angelsen, Mc-Neil 2012). Others hold a different view, arguing that the widespread popularity of REDD+ lies in its ability to simultaneously promote non-carbon values associated with forest conservation and sustainable development (McDermott et al. 2012a). To a large extent the inclusion of non-carbon values was attributed to the involvement of a wide range of actors including NGOs, epistemic communities and international aid actors, all of which contribute to processes for establishing rules and norms in the design of the REDD+ mechanism (McDermott et al. 2012a, 2012b, Seymour, Angelsen 2012).

The second generation of REDD+ research focuses largely on analysis of REDD+ policy formulation and its early implementation at national and sub-national levels, highlighting the considerable challenges faced (Angelsen et al. 2012, p 3). For instance, the development of a national REDD+ strategy and agency in Indonesia faced challenges relating to conflicting perceptions and political economic interests held by national and subnational policy stakeholders (Luttrell et al. 2014, Mulyani, Jepson 2013: chapter 3 of this thesis), and the difficulty in breaking the institutional path dependence of policies which support the extraction of forest resources (Brockhaus, Angelsen 2012, Di Gegerio et al. 2012, Resosudarmo et al. 2014). On the latter, REDD+ implementation is challenged by the growing integration of food, energy and financial markets, increases and volatility of commodity prices, and a new wave of large-scale investment in agriculture (Pacheco et al. 2012). In Indonesia the competing forces come mainly from agriculture, the paper industry, palm oil plantations and mining

(Resosudarmo et al. 2014). As yet, the third generation of research, on the impact of REDD+, ie whether REDD+ works, cannot be answered (Angelsen et al. 2012, p 3).

Overall this research, which began in June 2010, corresponded to, among others, Gregersen et al. (2010) who held that though governance had been addressed by many authors its in-depth improvement received scant attention. This literature suggested that the interaction of new REDD+ institutions with existing local institutions needed greater attention (Gregersen et al. 2010). Moreover, Blom et al. (2010) highlighted how the success and failure of previous forest policies was largely determined by their strategic context and implementation at the local level. Corbera and Schroeder (2011) stressed the importance of research on the interplay between REDD+ and other institutions, and suggested research topics on: (1) whether REDD+ can transcend forest sector regulations, (2) the need to examine in-depth how policies and actions unfold in a local context, and (3) the understanding of the economic, socio-political and cultural factors which determine effective participation, affect power relations and enable the co-production of REDD+ strategies by stakeholders. On a similar point, Madeira et al. (2010) suggested that research was needed in relation to the evolving institutional and regulatory framework for REDD+ in Indonesia. This thesis fits within these research themes, filling the gaps identified by earlier literature, particularly on how internationally-formulated REDD+ institutions transform forest institutions at the national and sub-national levels. It enriches REDD+ governance literature by providing the geographic dimensions that include, (i) a detailed context of Indonesia's forest governance and policy-making processes at multi-scales of governance, (ii) how these processes and resulting policies are shaped by a particular

‘time’ (ie the ‘reformasi’ era), and (iii) how multi-scale actors and networks that work simultaneously in different governance settings produce policies and measures that enable the implementation of REDD+ in Indonesia.

1.4. Synthesis: The Significance of the Research, Its Aim and Objective, and Research Questions

Because of its profile (see section 1.1, the last two paragraphs) Indonesia plays an important role in the success of REDD+ globally, including the potential to reduce up to 120 million tons of CO₂ per year (LoI 2010) and manage sustainably 10% of the world's remaining tropical rain forests (Dauvergne 1994). However, since exploiting this potential is undermined by a set of problems inherent within Indonesia's forest institutions (see section 1.2) this research suggests that their interplay with REDD+ institutions needs to be fully understood if the future implementation of REDD+ is not to be at risk. Moreover, the extent to which REDD+ institutions can effect reform in Indonesia's forest governance institutions warrants significant examination given these three important factors: (i) the inclusion of the principles of good governance within the UNFCCC's decisions on REDD+ (UNFCCC 2011: Annex I 1-2) in combination with, (ii) the robust system for the MRV of reductions in forest-related carbon emissions (UNFCCC 2014: Decision 14 and 21/CP.19), and (iii) the broader ‘reformasi’ agenda in Indonesia. The resulting findings should be of value to other REDD+ host countries.

Thus, this research aims to examine the interplay between REDD+ and Indonesia's forest-related institutions. The objective is to contribute empirical findings

from an Indonesian case to the global comparative study of REDD+ conducted in other countries and recommend policies for the future implementation of REDD+. These findings can then contribute to the effort to assess the probable effectiveness of REDD+ institutions operating under a post-2012 climate change regime. To do so this research addresses the primary question mentioned earlier: **“How do REDD+ institutions effect governance reform within Indonesia’s existing national and sub-national forest institutions?”**, a question which is examined in greater detail through the four subsidiary questions below:

1. How is the REDD+ initiative perceived by governance actors in Indonesia?
2. How is the international design of REDD+ (particularly the incorporation of good governance principles within the UNFCCC decisions on REDD+) adopted by national policy networks tasked with creating a REDD+ strategy?
3. What, if any, is the tangible contribution of REDD+ institutions in effecting governance reform within Indonesia’s existing forest institutions?
4. What assembly of new/modified institutions is co-produced by the REDD+ initiative at the village level, and what benefits do these modified institutions bring, if any?

These subsidiary questions, designed to address the thesis’ primary research question, were developed based on the major themes which emerged from the results of the interviews and observation, developed through the course of data collection and simultaneous data analysis (discussed in chapter 2, ‘Methodology’).

1.5. Conceptual Frameworks

'Institutionalism', in particular the concept of 'institutional interplay', is the main conceptual framework 'grounded' in this research in the context of the interplay between the REDD+ mechanism and Indonesia's national and sub-national forest institutions. Institutions are broadly defined as conventions, norms and formally sanctioned rules of a society, or 'rules of the game' in a society (North 1990, Vatn 2005). Occurring vertically (ie across scales) or horizontally (ie across issues), institutional interplay happens where one set of institutional arrangements affects the results of others (Stokke, Oberthur 2011, Young 2002, Young et al. 2008). Informed by the grounded theory methodology, this research explored and expanded these conceptual frameworks based on the collected data and emerging analysis ('grounded theory' discussed in chapter 2, 'Methodology'). Moreover, some concepts and analytical approaches within these frameworks, namely 'historical institutionalism', 'clientelism', 'critical juncture' and governance perspectives which include 'policy networks' approach and the concept of 'social learning', were explored and expanded simultaneously during the course of data collection and data analysis to address the main research question.

1.5.1. *'Historical Institutionalism'*

'Historical institutionalism' is an analytical approach within 'new institutionalism'² (Hall, Taylor 1996, North 1990, Young 1999, Young et al. 2008). New institutionalism emphasises the roles that institutions play as determinants of the outcomes of

² See Hall, Taylor (1996) for other approaches (ie rational choice institutionalism and sociological institutionalism) within the new institutionalism.

interactive human behaviour (Young 2002). In this regard institutions are seen as sets of rights, formal and informal rules, and decision-making procedures that give rise to social practices, assign roles, and guide interaction amongst the participants in these practices (North 1990, Young 2002, Young et al. 2008).

‘Historical institutionalism’ emphasises the asymmetry of power associated with the development and operation of institutions embedded within the organisational structure of a political economy; this produces forms of path dependence (Hall, Taylor 1996, North 1990). In this regard institutions are seen as relatively persistent features of the historical landscape whereby access to decision-making is distributed unevenly across social groups (Hall, Taylor 1996, North 1990). This perspective assumes that Individuals’ behaviour is based not only on a strategic calculation, ie to maximise their own benefits (utilitarian), but also on the logic of appropriateness bounded by their worldview (cultural) (Hall, Taylor 1996).

Paying particular attention to the roles of norms and culture which operate alongside formal institutions as mechanisms guiding collective behaviour (Evans 2012, Young et al. 2008, Vatn 2005) this research explores the role of the ‘clientelism’ practice (Eisenstadt, Roniger 1984, Graziano 1976, Neher 1996) in Indonesia’s forest governance. Clientelism is also known as ‘patron–client relations’ with ‘patrons’ defined as individuals of higher socio-economic status who use their influence and resources to provide protection and/or benefits for clients (Graziano 1976, p 152); ‘clients’ are actors who provide political support to patrons in exchange for particular goods, favours or services (Auyero 1999, p 301). Clientelism describes the strong chain of relationship between patrons and their individual clients founded on mutual

advantage whereby the patron provides resources and protection in return for their clients' loyalty and political support (Auyero 1999, Eisenstadt, Roniger 1984). This is particularly relevant since 'clientelist' institutions are deeply-embedded and widely-spread within different levels of Indonesia's government, and play a central role in the management of forests (Jepson 2001, Peluso et al. 2008, Tsing 2005). Within these clientelist institutions informal actors such as 'oknum'³ and broker play a central role in the networks of Indonesia's forest management (McCarthy 2005, 2006, Wollenberg et al. 2006).

This 'clientelism' signifies the eclectic approaches of 'historical institutionalism' by which individuals' behaviour is seen as driven by both cultural and calculus/economic consideration. Central to 'clientelism' is a practice known as 'rent-seeking' which refers to a set of revenue-generating practices conducted by government officials to generate 'rents' that exceed normal profit or 'economic rent' (Brown 1999). In under-developed regions with large rural territories, limited transport and communication infra-structure, limited capacity for tax collection and weak law enforcement, this practice becomes institutionalised (Phongpaichit et al. 1994). This occurs over the long term, sometimes with inter-generational timescales, and is considered by the society involved as a viable if sub-optimal form of governance (Phongpaichit et al. 1994). This 'clientelism' and rent-seeking practice contributes greatly to the stabilisation of the institutional path dependence within Indonesia's forest governance institutions (Jepson 2001, Larson et al. 2010, Sunderlin et al. 2008). Attention to 'clientelism' is particularly relevant given the challenges

³ A common Indonesian term for government officers, police or military personnel who are involved in rent-seeking.

faced by new international policy mechanisms such as the REDD+ initiative. This is particularly so for mechanisms whose lifetime is relatively short, yet are expected to effect reform within institutions where 'clientelism' has prevailed on an inter-generational timescale.

To this end the 'path dependence' lens, which is rooted in 'historical institutionalism', provides a means to examine factors that have contributed to the persistence and stabilisation of Indonesia's forest governance institutions where policies were created to support the extractive model of economic development (Brockhaus et al. 2012, Luttrell et al. 2014). In this regard, whilst institutions were ideally developed to structure actors' behaviour and capture economic opportunities for the society, they were often created to serve the interests of the powerful (Hall, Taylor 1996, North 1990). Institutions are persistent and 'path dependence' is pervasive because supporters believe deviation will compromise their political and economic interests (Hall, Taylor 1996, Hall 2009). This is particularly so in Indonesia where government ministries/agencies are major employers, eg MoFor has 17,456 employees (MoFor 2012). As a result they often conduct rent-seeking practices to overcome what they determine to be salary or other budget shortfalls (Mulyani, Jepson 2013: chapter 3 of this thesis). Moreover, the institutional path dependence is particularly difficult to break when a coalition of powerful actors collides over ideas and core beliefs (Crouch, Farrell 2004, Stubbs 2008). In addition, because institutions affect behaviour, over time they shape actors' preferences which may result in them preferring a given institutional setup (Steinmo 2008).

While some historical institutionalists believe that institutional change is enabled predominantly by exogenous shock (see Hall 2010) this thesis provides evidence that, to a large extent, endogenous factors played a critical role in the development of new institutions (see chapter 4 and 5). Similarly, Crouch and Farrell (2004) and Deeg (2001) found that actors change to new ways of behaving either due to an endogenous factor or as a need to respond to an exogenous shock. Endogenous sources of change include actions undertaken by actors within the institutional system, or by events or processes that result directly from the mechanisms of the institutional-path reproduction (Deeg 2001). In this regard, the role of agency, eg individual leadership and governance systems, in shaping the way environmental problems are understood (Breitmeier 2006, Young et al. 2008), and how ‘champions’ play prominent roles that move issues to the top of the policy agenda (Lifshin 1994), are significant elements of endogenous factors for institutional change. To this end, perceptions (particularly those held by policy actors) influence how new institutions are developed, translated and enacted, and are shaped by different types of knowledge, assumptions, and value judgments which are not independent of their discursive and political context (Brown et al. 2011, p 383).

In short, the conceptual framework of institutionalism provides a means to examine the role of institutions in structuring both individual and collective behaviour towards achieving particular goals. This research seeks to determine the role of institutions as a source of ‘governance’ and is discussed in the following section.

1.5.2. Governance Perspective and Institutional Interplay

‘Governance’ refers to the process of steering or guiding societies toward desirable collective outcomes (Evans 2012, Young et al. 2008). It describes a complex set of arrangements through which individuals or groups manage their common affairs (Caluster, Salagean 2007, Carlsson et al. 1995). Governance as a concept gained significant momentum during the late 20th century with the shift from a unitary state towards a system of governance that incorporates both markets and the state into a broader process of steering society towards achieving common goals (Evans 2012, Delmas, Young 2009, Rhodes 2007). This relates particularly to the rise of ‘globalisation’, ie the increasing global interdependencies across environmental, economic and social issues, which has led to the decline of state power (Evans 2012). The hierarchy model is no longer considered effective in delivering services to society thus the cooperation of non-state actors, eg professionals, trade unions and markets, was central to the new mode of government (Bulkeley, Jordan 2012, Rhodes 2007). The state becomes no longer the sole policy-maker but merely a partner in a complex environment involving various non-state actors whose interactions are enacted through networks (Marsh, Rhodes 1992, Rhodes 2007).

The term ‘policy network’ captures the relationship between government and other actors in public policy-making. Interaction around shared interests occurs in a structured and continuous manner because of their need to exchange resources, with policies emerging from the negotiations between the networks’ members (Borzel 1997, Rhodes 2007, Sorensen et al. 2007, Torfing 2007). The ‘policy network’ approach, and in particular a ‘tiered policy network’ model (See Bulkeley 2000,

Rhodes, Marsh 1992), is a suitable analytical lens for issues such as climate change where new concerns, knowledge, ideas and interests are voiced by a wide range of actors (Bulkeley 2000, Schroeder 2010). This model provides a framework to capture an organisation of policy networks (formed surrounding the public policy-making process) that involve members from various types of networks that voice different concerns, interests and knowledge through the formation of, amongst others, discourse or advocacy coalitions and action networks (Bulkeley 2000). This approach states that since networks' members hold different resources a situation is created where some maintain a privileged position at the networks' core (the 'dominant coalition') and others occupy positions at the periphery (Bulkeley 2000). The 'dominant coalition' retains influence to decide which issues are included or excluded from the policy agenda, and whilst access is not necessarily restricted to the privileged few this coalition can elect to exclude others (Rhodes 2007). This issue of representation, together with the forms of interaction and communication deemed to be acceptable in public engagement or public deliberative processes, has captured wide attention in environmental governance (see Hobson 2013).

'Environmental governance', as a study of how to steer the relationship between society and its citizens with the environment, is central to governance's task and particularly so with the emergence of globalisation and increasing global problems such as climate change (Evans 2012, Hobson 2013). On this account, REDD+ institutions which function as a form of forest governance (Brockhaus et al. 2012, Thompson et al. 2011) increasingly involves forging transnational networks, including epistemic communities, NGOs and international financial institutions, that contribute

to processes for establishing the conventions, norms and rules within REDD+ decisions under the UNFCCC (Evans 2012, McDermott et al. 2012a, 2012b, Thompson et al. 2011, Schroeder 2010). Moreover, these networks of actors can by-pass reluctant government or put pressure on them to take necessary action (Evans 2012).

At the core of the study of governance is the concept of 'good governance' which emerged mainly because of the prevalence of bad governance, characterised by, inter alia, corruption, unaccountable government, weak law enforcement, and lack of respect for human rights (Caluster, Salagean 2007). Though the concepts of governance and good governance lack uniform definition (Caluster, Salagean 2007, Graham et al 2003), former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan stated that, "good governance is ensuring respect for human rights and the rule of law; strengthening democracy; promoting transparency and capacity in public administration" (Weiss 2010, p 797). This concept of good governance seeks to embed several norms in the conduct of government at all levels, namely transparency, participation, equity and fairness, coherence, coordination, effectiveness and efficiency, so that risks to the efficacy of public policy (eg corruption, human right abuses and environmental damage) can be managed at an early stage (Davis 2010, Graham et al. 2003, Heldeweg 2005) - see chapter 4 for more discussion on good governance. These norms have been incorporated within the UNFCCC decisions on REDD+, notably through the 'REDD+ safeguards' (UNFCCC 2011: Annex I-2) which are intended to protect non-carbon forest values (McDermott et al. 2012a, McDermott 2014). This research examines how these internationally-formulated norms are adopted within Indonesia's

national policy for REDD+ (see chapter 4) and influence existing forest governance institutions (see chapter 4 and 5).

How this good governance agenda adopted at the international and national levels affects local communities through the introduction of the REDD+ mechanism is examined in chapter 6. In this regard, the concept of 'social learning' provides a means to examine how the implementation of the good governance principles, particularly 'participation' through the implementation of the REDD+ mechanism on the ground, increases local communities' ability to secure their interests when interacting with REDD+ project proponent. Social learning, defined as a change in understanding that goes beyond the individual and becomes situated within communities, is seen as essential for developing the capacity of actors to negotiate rules, norms and interests with outsiders (Armitage et al. 2011, Pahl-Wost et al. 2008, Reed et al. 2010). Moreover, this thesis examines how 'social learning', acquired by local communities through previous engagement with several development and conservation projects, enables productive interaction between the communities and the newly-entered REDD+ project proponent and REDD+ institutions (see chapter 6).

In relation to the link between 'social learning' and 'public participation', several authors question the effectiveness of public participation. It is seen as time-consuming and costly and, if executed poorly, can lead to the polarisation of public opinion, decreased legitimacy of the policy-making process, and empower some groups over others thereby increasing inequality (Brewer 2013, McDermott 2014, Rydin, Pennington 2010). However, others argue that when conducted appropriately public participation tends to increase stakeholders' understanding of the issues and

increases their faith in, and support for, governance institutions (see Brewer 2013). In this regard, careful attention to the design and methods employed (eg the community consultation and facilitation meetings in a small-group setting) is critical to its success. Moreover, an optimal setting for a deliberative exchange, where participants are free to explore their own understanding and gain better access to and respect for the viewpoints of others, can stimulate and enhance social learning (Reed et al. 2010, Tippet et al. 2005). This concept of 'social learning' is particularly relevant to this research as it provides an analytical lens to examine the emergence of properties in a society such as shared rules and practices (Pahl-Wostl 2008). This thesis examines how this learning can result from the institutional interplay between existing local norms and new institutions such as REDD+.

In sum, this thesis addresses the role of institutions as a source of 'governance', ie institutions that emerge in response to a demand for governance with respect to a specific issue (Young et al. 2008). This research examines the extent to which REDD+ institutions established at the international level can serve as a means to effect reform of forest governance institutions at the national and sub-national levels. As mentioned earlier, and from the lessons drawn on previous development/conservation projects, the success or failure of the implementation of any international policy initiative in Indonesia is largely determined by its interplay with the complex system of the country's forest-related institutions. In this regard, the success of the implementation of new institutions is not only dependent on its own performance but also on its interplay with other institutions (Young et al. 1999).

Institutional interplay or interaction generally refers to the phenomenon that institutions influence each other in ways that are relevant to their development and effectiveness (Oberthur, Gehring 2006, p 1). Interaction amongst institutions can reinforce the effectiveness of the institutions involved if interplay supports the objectives established within the institutions or, contrarily, create disruptions if it contradicts the institutions' objectives (Juncurt 2006, Oberthur, Gehring 2006, Young et al. 1999). With the former, the 'source' or 'newly-entering' institutions may request the 'target' institutions to adopt particular measures to support its policy implementation, and consequently these measures can support the effectiveness of the target institutions (Young 2002). As will become clearer in the analysis throughout this thesis, as the internationally formulated REDD+ institutions (the 'source') required certain policies and measures to be adopted by policy actors at the national and sub-national levels to enable the implementation of REDD+, the governance of the existing forest-related institutions (the 'target') was improved (discussed in chapters 4, 5 and 6).

As mentioned earlier, institutional interplay occurs where one set of institutional arrangements affects the results of others and can occur vertically (ie across scales) or horizontally (ie across issues) (Stokke, Oberthur 2011, Young 2002, Young et al. 2008). Particularly during the vertical interplay, and within the context of this thesis, institutional change can occur as a result of responses made by existing institutions to exogenous factors, ie the newly-entering institutions (Young 2010b). In this regard, it is important to understand that governance systems created to steer human-environment relations are often as complex and dynamic as the existing socio-

ecological systems that require management, where scholars forward the notions of 'institutional complexity' and 'institutional dynamics' (Oberthur, Stokke 2012, Young 2010a, p 379, Young 2010b). Inherent to the notion of institutional complexity is the interdependence and interaction of its elemental institutions as they interact and influence each other's emergence and development (Oberthur, Stooke 2012). Of particular relevance to this thesis, during interplay the source institutions can influence the rule-making and effectiveness of the target institutions (Oberthur, Gehring 2006⁴). During both vertical and horizontal interplays the strength and direction of the interactions may change over time, a phenomenon referred to as 'institutional dynamics', within which the development and performance of the institutions involved are effected (Cash et al 2006, Obertur, Stooke 2012, Young 2010a, 2010b). While recognising this dynamics, ie both source and target institutions may influence each other's development and effectiveness, this thesis focuses on a specific aspect of vertical interplay in ascertaining the contribution of the source institutions (ie REDD+) in effecting governance reform within the target institutions (ie Indonesian forest-related institutions).

The dynamic nature of the governance systems created to steer human-environment relations implies that, once established, the systems change continually in a variety of ways: step-by-step over relatively long periods of time, or more abruptly and far-reaching (Young 2010a, p 377, Young 2010b). This institutional dynamic relates to the concepts of 'path dependence' (mentioned earlier) and 'critical juncture': whilst institutions are persistent, particularly when powerful actors collide over ideas, core

⁴ See Oberthur, Gehring (2006) for the 'four causal mechanisms' that may drive interplay between institutions.

beliefs, and economic interests (Crouch, Farell 2004, Young 2010), institutional change can occur during interplay particularly when 'shorter bursts of change lead to the emergence of substantially reformed institutions in short order' (Young 2010, p 378), ie a phenomenon also known as a period of 'critical juncture' (see chapter 5). Nonetheless, the new or modified institutions may not endure, the system may return to the fixed point of prior equilibrium or old path dependence once the disturbance has passed, and hence there is nothing static about the concept of institutional dynamics (Young 2010a, p 379, 2010b) - see analysis in this thesis' chapters 4 and 5.

Since the global REDD+ architecture is a system of institutions (Angelsen et al. 2009) interplay may occur vertically between the procedures of international institutions and existing national and sub-national institutions, or horizontally between national policies aimed at reducing deforestation and degradation and other national land-use policies and processes (Corbera, Schroeder 2011). This research focuses on the former, investigates the consequences of the vertical institutional-interplay, and ascertains the contribution of REDD+ institutions in meeting the demand for forest governance reform in Indonesia.

In agreement with Young (2008, 2010b), while the effect of institutions is often non-linear and institutional interplay that encompasses several institutions renders the question of causality complex, this thesis holds that there is a need to assess the contribution of individual institutions by disaggregating the broad process of interaction to the interplay between two entities (Young 2008, p 20-21, Young 2010b). In a similar argument, Orberthur and Gehring (2006) states that complex interplay situations can be understood by disaggregating them into a clear causal analysis of the

interaction between two groups of institutions (Oberthur, Gehring 2006, p 5). This not only reduces complexity but allows the researcher to clearly differentiate between a target and a source institution (Loewen 2006). When the contribution of the source institutions in increasing the effectiveness of the target institutions is determined, appropriate policy recommendation can be produced.

1.6. Key Findings: Introduction to the Four Empirical Chapters and Contribution to Theory and Literature

This section introduces briefly how the conceptual frameworks mentioned above were deployed, explored and expanded within the thesis' four journal papers, ie to serve the thesis' four subsidiary research questions. It also highlights the thesis' key findings and contribution to theory and literature.

Overall, research results revealed a significant body of evidence that, during the process of institutional interplay between the internationally-formulated REDD+ institutions and Indonesia's existing forest-related institutions, the REDD+ initiative showed its ability to effect governance reform within and beyond the forestry sector. As will become clear in the substantive chapters that follow, and via a more in-depth discussion in the thesis' last chapter ('Conclusion and Recommendation'), the new institutions co-produced by the REDD+ mechanism which resulted from the institutional interplay are termed in this thesis as 'collateral benefits'. This is not to suggest that 'improved forest governance' was not anticipated as a result of the implementation of policies to reduce GHG emissions, but here 'collateral benefits' is used to refer to a scale of governance reform of a magnitude never achieved hitherto.

This study revealed that the positive results of institutional interplay that occurred were determined not only by the characteristics of REDD+ institutions themselves (eg the inclusion of a broad range of objectives, their ability to attract large scale funding, advancement of a robust system of MRV of carbon emissions, and the inclusion of social and environmental ‘safeguards’) but also because of the existence of domestic reformists and a national reform agenda. On this account, the timing of the REDD+ entry in the wake of the ‘reformasi’ movement, ie a period of ‘institutional fluidity’ when the public-at-large called for governance reform, was critical to its performance in effecting governance reform. The tangible form of the above-mentioned ‘collateral benefits’ was the process for the production of new institutions, eg the ‘national REDD+ strategy’, the ‘one map initiative’, and the ‘village agreement’, introduced briefly as follows.

1.6.1. Paper 1 - REDD+ and Forest Governance in Indonesia: a Multistakeholder Study of Perceived Challenges and Opportunities (see chapter 3)

Published: in the *Journal of Environment & Development*, 22(3) 261-283, October 2013

This paper analyses how policy stakeholders perceive the challenges and opportunities of REDD+. It is based on the premise that different types of knowledge, assumptions, and value judgments, which are not independent of their discursive, institutional and political context, shape perceptions (Brown et al. 2011, Hobson, Niemeyer 2011). Such perceptions - particularly those held by policy stakeholders - will influence how the REDD+ mechanism is translated and enacted nationally. While the problems inherent within Indonesia’s historic forest governance (explained below) were perceived as a major challenge for REDD+ efficacy, most interviewees thought the REDD+ mechanism

held promise as a means to improve forest governance or 'governance reform', 'network building', 'conservation' and 'economic development'.

The perceived challenges included 'REDD+'s complexity', 'uncertainty of REDD+ decisions', 'REDD+ is a tool of developed countries', and four problems inherent within existing forest governance relating to, i) the ambiguity of the legal system, ii) poor coordination, iii) lack of capacity, and iv) corruption. This paper aims to contribute to both institutional theory and literature on REDD+ by deploying the lens of 'clientelism' (Auyero 1999, Graziano 1976) to generate a more holistic understanding of the underlying causes of these last four problems. This study proposes that, whilst the significance of these problems in contributing to weak and inefficient forest governance is recognised by interviewees and analysts of Indonesian forest governance, less understood is the difficulty experienced in resolving them, ie answering a 'why' question of their persistency within existing institutions. This study proposes a clientelist perspective to explain the underlying causes of the above-mentioned problems identified by interviewees as challenges to REDD+ implementation. For instance, (i) An uncertain and ambiguous legal system creates the opportunity for government facilitators to charge a 'consultancy' fee for helping companies navigate the legal minefield when seeking to procure a forest concession. Moreover, uncertainty of land ownership may strengthen clientelist relations because certainty can be secured through the development of a mutually favourable exchange between patron, client and broker, (ii) Poor coordination among ministries assures that other agencies do not undermine established rent-seeking practices or compete for them, (iii) The lack of capacity to manage forests is difficult to resolve because

there is no real incentive to develop technical capacity since the role of a governmental office is as much to extract rents as it is to deliver public services, and (iv) The 'risk of corruption' can be understood in terms of 'rent-seeking', ie revenue-generating practices conducted by government officials as a tool to maintain the deeply-embedded and widespread 'clientelist' institutions within Indonesia's forest governance.

The above analysis is intended to add understanding and stimulate wider discussion of the role of clientelist institutions as the underlying cause behind the persistence of several problems inherent within existing forest governance institutions, issues identified in this study as challenges to REDD+ implementation. By so doing the results of this study drew greater attention to the deeply-embedded clientelist institutions which have played a key role in stabilising the current institutional path-dependence of forest governance institutions and through them Indonesia's wider political economy (Jepson 2001, Larson et al. 2010, Sunderlin et al. 2008). Moreover, the stakeholders' perception that REDD+ represents an opportunity for governance reform also begs the question to what extent REDD+ institutions can effect governance reform both within and beyond the forestry sector. This is addressed in the subsequent papers 2, 3 and 4.

1.6.2. Paper 2 - Policy Networks and Governance Reform in Indonesia: a Study of the Policy-making Process for the National REDD+ Strategy (see chapter 4)

Target journal: *Journal of Environment and Planning C*

This paper was presented at the South East Asia Symposium in Oxford on 9 March 2013 and at the Association of American Geographer annual meeting in Los Angeles on 9 April 2013.

This paper examines how the norms of good governance, as embedded within the UNFCCC decisions on REDD+ (UNFCCC 2011: Annex I 1-2), were strengthened in Indonesia's forest governance through the development of the national REDD+ strategy (the 'Strategy'). It is based on the premise that, as all future government plans for REDD+ will be based on this Strategy, the adoption (or not) of the principles of good governance within the Strategy will influence the ability of the REDD+ mechanism to effect reform within Indonesia's forest governance and consequently the success of its future implementation.

The study employs a policy network approach to examine the organisation, role and relative influence of actors within the policy process (Bulkeley 2000, Rhodes, Marsh 1992). By so doing, this paper seeks to enrich the debate on the 'policy networks' perspective by examining the national level of policy-making within the climate change policy arena where attention has largely been focused on the policy-making process and negotiations at the international level (Bulkeley 2000). In agreement with Bulkeley (2000), this study, while recognising the importance of understanding how global climate agreements are determined, believes that the role of processes at the national level that impact both the formation and the implementation of such international agreements is equally critical. Focusing its analysis on the adoption of the principles of good governance within the Strategy document and the process of policy networks' building during the Strategy-development process, key findings of this study are summarised in the following.

Whilst showing similarities with the 'tiered policy network' model (Bulkeley 2000, Rhodes, Marsh 1992) policy networks surrounding the development of the

Strategy are more complex: the 'periphery' was more defined and even contained members of the dominant coalition. Moreover, the 'periphery' also included networks' members that operated within several issue networks at the international and national level working as discourse and advocacy coalitions. In short, as found in other REDD+ host countries (see Brown et al. 2011, Di Gregorio et al. 2012) Indonesia's policy networks surrounding REDD+ politics are varied and complex. The dominant coalition (comprising MoFor and the National Planning Agency) engaged with both domestic and transnational networks that included: (i) policy communities from within government, donors under bilateral agreements and from international agencies, (ii) transnational advocacy networks comprising international NGOs, iv) international financial institutions, (v) professional networks that included experts and scientists representing universities and research institutions, and (vi) issue networks formed temporarily to respond to the draft Strategy. This created a space and structure for these actors to advocate their agendas and arrive at a negotiated output. Whilst acknowledging this achievement this study highlights several challenges during the process such as issues of representation and the lack of a 'feed-back' mechanism and, for the future, the challenge of converting the policy document to implementation.

Moreover, whilst departing from an understanding argued by previous studies (eg Gellert 2010, Seymour, Dubash 2000) that transnational networks played a central role in promoting good governance principles in the history of Indonesia's forest governance, this study found that domestic 'champions', eg reformists within the government and other domestic actors, played a significant role in enforcing certain principles of good governance for adoption within the Strategy document. By so doing,

this finding contributes to the debates on REDD+ and forest governance reform in developing countries, and in the process sets a new question that warrants further research - whether REDD+ can produce benefits in a country where reformist characteristics and national reform agendas do not exist.

1.6.3. Paper 3 - Does the REDD+ 'One Map Initiative' represent a new institutional path for Indonesia's forest governance? (see chapter 5)

Target journal: *Environmental Science & Policy*

This study seeks to contribute to literature on REDD+ governance, literature which discusses the challenges and opportunities for the REDD+ initiative to effect forest governance reform (eg Dermawan et al. 2011, Di Gregorio et al. 2012, Luttrell et al. 2014, McDermott 2014, Murdiyarso et al. 2011), by investigating one notable result that the REDD+ initiative effected within Indonesia's forest institutions. It argues that whilst it remains to be seen whether the REDD+ mechanism can achieve its initial objective (ie large scale emissions reduction under a performance-based system) in the process of its interplay with existing forest institutions at the national level the initiative has produced a benefit of significant importance. Namely, the government has decided to undertake the 'one map initiative' (OMI) in response to the call for greater transparency in forest governance and as an enabling condition for the implementation of REDD+.

This study seeks to answer the question, "Does the 'One Map Initiative' signify a switch to a new institutional path, or is it just another institutional innovation within an existing path dependence?" By using the 'path dependence' theory within 'historical institutionalism' it seeks to determine the extent to which the REDD+

initiative created a 'critical juncture', ie momentum sufficient for institutional development to move to a new path. This paper examines the origin of the OMI and its effect on forest governance and REDD+ implementation in the future. In this regard, whilst the challenges faced by the REDD+ initiative in competing with other businesses (eg timber, mining and agriculture) has been largely researched using path dependence and the political economy approach (eg Angelsen, McNeill 2012, Brockhaus et al. 2012, Pacheco et al. 2012, Resosudarmo et al. 2014), less researched is the tangible form of the contribution by the REDD+ initiative towards breaking institutional path dependence. This paper aims to fill this gap.

By deploying the lens of 'historical institutionalism' this study was able to map the institutional path dependence within Indonesia's forest-mapping which has been used both as a tool for the state to gain control of forests and for land use planning purposes (Peluso 1995). During its development process the OMI has shown positive signs of its ability to destroy the old path-dependence of map-making which was characterised, inter alia, by its lack of transparency, low level of public participation, and poor coordination amongst government ministries and agencies. Of particular importance, the study determined that while it is evident that the REDD+ initiative contributed to setting the development of the OMI at a critical juncture, this juncture does not result from an independent chain of events. It should be attributed to several historical events resulting from exogenous and endogenous factors of institutional change that preceded the REDD+ initiative. Thus, the timing of REDD+ entry in 2007 in the wake of the 'reformasi' movement was critical to its success in effecting governance reform to the stage we can observe today.

1.6.4. Paper 4 - The interplay between REDD+ initiatives with village institutions: a case study in seven villages within the area of Kalimantan Forests Climate Partnership (KFCP) in Central Kalimantan, Indonesia (see chapter 6)

Submitted for the Asia Pacific Viewpoint special issue: "From Global to Local Politics - The Social Dynamics of REDD+ in Southeast Asia"

This paper was presented at the 7th EuroSEAS Conference in Lisbon on the 2nd of July 2013 and the Royal Geographical Society annual conference in 26-28 August 2013.

This paper examines the interplay between the 'contractual agreement' (ie a tool essential for a market-based instrument to operate) and 'participation' (ie a norm within the democratic governance framework) through the implementation of the REDD+ mechanism at the community level. In so doing, it analyses the interplay between REDD+, an international policy mechanism established under the UNFCCC, and village institutions in Indonesia and thereby seeks to contribute to the policy literature on REDD+ and multi-level governance. In particular, while a growing body of literature has examined and presented normative claims on the importance of engaging the community in all phases of REDD+ activities (see Agrawal, Angelsen 2009, Levin et al. 2008, Resosudarmo et al. 2014, Sunderlin et al. 2013, Thompson, et al. 2011), how REDD+ demonstration projects unfold on the ground is less addressed. An example is how village-level communities that are the target of such policies respond and how this response impacts the policy.

Using the KFCP REDD+ demonstration activity as a case study, and deploying the concept of 'social learning', this paper investigates the degree of social learning involved in the process of achieving a contractual agreement and how this meshes with notions of participation. In this regard, while a growing body of literature

discusses the means with which to effectively secure the full participation of relevant stakeholders within REDD+ design and implementation (see Forsyth 2009, Resosudarmo et. al. 2014, Sunderlin et al. 2013), little attention has been given to the process for establishing the all-important contractual agreements. Such agreement contain several undertakings, each of which directly impacts subsequent performance in serving the interests of the relevant stakeholders.

Moreover, this study aims to contribute to the debate on the effectiveness and weakness of 'public participation'. Acknowledging the views that public participation can be time-consuming and costly, and risks empowering some groups over others and thereby increasing inequality if executed poorly (Brewer 2013, Rydin, Pennington 2010), this study holds the view that when conducted appropriately public participation can enhance social learning, a condition which ultimately influences the success of the implementation of an international policy on the ground. This paper provides evidence that the optimal setting for public participation (small-group settings whereby participants do not feel intimidated, are free to express their views, explore their own understanding, and gain better access to and respect for the viewpoints of others) is critical to the success of the community engagement process. Such settings are believed to stimulate and enhance social learning (Reed et al. 2010, Tippet et al. 2005).

Through an in-depth analysis of the process for establishing a 'village agreement' between the KFCP and each of the villages around the demonstration site, this study shows evidence that 'social learning' occurs during the process. Equally, there is sufficient evidence that 'social learning' gained through a history of engagement with previous development/conservation projects has enhanced the

capacity of village members to negotiate their interests vis a vis the KFCP/REDD+ project proponent. This was marked by the villagers' success in including some provisions and enforcing certain norms of good governance within the Agreement that protect their future interests. Examples include the adoption of safeguards that include the requirement for a minimum of 30% women in the 'Implementation and Monitoring Teams', equal opportunity for all villagers to participate in all stages of REDD+ activities, and that REDD+ benefits will be distributed in a transparent and equitable manner. Importantly, there is a provision to protect the status of community land against the risk of foreign assertion of ownership rights.

Nonetheless, significant challenges remain, including amongst others that the villagers' participation was constrained by insufficient knowledge of REDD+ and that their need for employment and financial income impacted the quality of their participation.

1.7. Scope and Limitation

This research focuses on the causality resulting from the interplay between two groups of institutions (Young et al. 2008). Here, causality concerns the extent to which REDD+ institutions influence or transform existing forest governance institutions. It aims to demonstrate causality at the level of the decision-making processes through which rules and regulations are developed and policy documents result. These include processes for the adoption of the principles of good governance, as articulated in the UNFCCC's decisions on REDD+, within Indonesia's national Strategy for REDD+ (chapter 4), for the formulation of a 'one map initiative' (chapter 5), and establishing 'village

agreements' (chapter 6). By definition this study is limited in its ability to trace the outcomes or question the effectiveness of the institutions involved. This is because this thesis will be completed shortly after the institutions co-produced by the REDD+ mechanism (as mentioned above) have been finalised, and prior to Indonesia beginning the third phase of REDD+ implementation, ie 'results-based actions'. This limitation is also faced by other researchers on REDD+ governance issues, eg Seymour and Angelsen (2012) who suggest that it will take another three to four years to determine the effectiveness or outcomes from the REDD+ institutions.

Moreover, as the REDD+ policy-making process and its progress moves quickly, as does the related scholarly debate, this research is challenged to keep data updated and information current. For instance, current discussions on approaches to REDD+ implementation, eg 'landscape', 'holistic', or 'hybrid' approach (see Schroeder, McDermott 2014, Rival 2013) are not included within this thesis. Nevertheless, the thesis' in-depth analysis that the introduction of the REDD+ mechanism can contribute to the improvement of forest governance in host countries provides a convincing rationale to invest time and energy in improving our understanding of the dynamic forces within institutional interplay.

1.8. Organisation of the Thesis

This chapter provides a brief introduction to the thesis' primary research question, "How do REDD+ institutions effect governance reform within Indonesia's existing national and sub-national forest institutions?" It includes an overview of the evolution of the REDD+ initiative emerging from within the UNFCCC's negotiations and the

significance of Indonesia as a REDD+ target country. The overview of Indonesia's forest policy and governance, which is also covered within this chapter, provides a basis for arguing why the implementation of any international policy must take into account the embedded norms and practices within existing institutions. Moreover, this section provides a point of departure not only for the argument that governance reform within Indonesia's existing forest governance institutions is an enabling condition for the efficacy of REDD+ implementation, but also that the REDD+ mechanism can be used as a means for wider governance reform. This overview of Indonesia's forest governance institutions is followed by a brief overview of the current research on REDD + which situates this present thesis within the literature of 'REDD+ governance'. The chapter then lays out the significance of the research, its aims and objective, and introduces the four subsidiary research questions. This is followed by a section introducing the main conceptual frameworks employed within this research as tools to gain insights. The chapter then highlights the thesis' key findings through the introduction of the four papers which serve the thesis' four subsidiary research questions. Since each paper has its own conceptual framework and literature review the thesis does not designate a single chapter for this; instead contribution to the theory and literature are highlighted within these key findings. This chapter ends with the scope and limitation of the thesis and its organisation.

Chapter Two discusses research methods in-depth, including the criteria for selecting research participants, data collection methods that include semi-structured interviews and shadowing technique, the process of data analysis, ethics, and the challenges of the methods selected. Also discussed in this chapter is how the themes

arising from the results of key-informant interviews set the development of the four subsidiary research questions.

Chapters Three, Four, Five and Six comprise each of the four papers respectively which serve to answer the four subsidiary research questions. The brief description of each paper is introduced earlier in the above-mentioned "Key Findings: introduction to the four empirical chapters and contribution to theory and literature" (see this chapter, section 1.6). These journal type papers have been converted to a single thesis format with individual bibliographies merged into a single bibliography. In relation to this 'four paper route', the repetition of particular topics within the body of this thesis is unavoidable but necessary for the readers of each individual paper. These topics include, amongst others, (i) the context of Indonesia's forest governance, (ii) a description of the REDD+ initiative, (iii) a description of research methods, (iv) a description of conceptual frameworks, (iv) a list of previous international policy initiatives implemented in Indonesia, and (v) the specifics of the KFCP demonstration activity, including its area and the people involved. However, efforts have been taken to minimise this issue including not to repeat the 'abstract' of each paper since this is included in this chapter (section 1.6), except for the paper which has been published (paper 1, chapter 3).

The thesis finishes with Chapter Seven: 'Conclusions and Recommendations'. It summarises the contribution of the REDD+ initiative in meeting the demand of governance reform within and beyond the forestry sector, drawing together the research questions and themes set out in the introduction and the four papers. This chapter also provides reflections on the conceptual frameworks employed, which

highlights the contribution of this thesis towards concepts within the perspectives of 'historical institutionalism' and governance. It then provides policy recommendations on how both domestic and international policy actors should approach the future implementation of REDD+ in a country like Indonesia whose forest governance institutions are weak, and where informal institutions such as 'clientelism' are deeply embedded within both forest institutions and the society-at-large. This chapter ends with suggestions for future research based on several important considerations: (i) the limitation of this thesis, ie its scope, which does not cover the questions of the impact of REDD+ implementation and the 'horizontal interplay' between the new institutions co-produced by the REDD+ initiative and other relevant national policies, (ii) that the REDD+ Agency was established during the time this thesis was being completed, and (iii) Indonesia's contemporary politics, which includes the national election for the new Parliament members in April 2014 and the President in July 2014.

PLATES 1-14: MIXED-METHODS OF DATA COLLECTION

The following chapter presents an in-depth discussion of the methods of data collection and data analysis. These plates provide a pictorial representation of the mixed methods of data collection. **Plates 1-8** show some examples of my participation in REDD+-related conferences and ‘closed’ workshops and press conference at the national and sub-national levels.

Plate 1: Indonesia’s President Yudhoyono opened the international conference, ‘Forest Indonesia’, Jakarta, Indonesia



Photo: Mulyani (2011)

Plate 2: Press conference at the ‘Forest Indonesia’ conference with (from right) Mrs Shinta Kamdani (Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry), Mr Hadi Daryanto (Secretary General of MoFor), and Mr Agus Purnomo (Secretary General of the National Climate Change Council)



Photo: Mulyani (2011)

Plate 3: Indonesia's Forests Congress 2011, Jakarta, Indonesia



Photo: Mulyani (2011)

Plate 4: Indonesia's Forests Congress 2011, Jakarta, Indonesia



Photo: Mulyani (2011)

Plate5: Governors' Climate and Forests Task Force, Annual Meeting 2011
Palangkaraya, Central Kalimantan, Indonesia



Photo: Mulyani (2011)

Plate 6: Workshop on 'REDD+ Social and Environmental Safeguards' involving representatives from NGOs, Civil Society Organisations, and academics from the national and sub-national level. Organised by the Clinton Climate Initiative, Jakarta, Indonesia



Photo: Mulyani (2011)

Plate 7: Workshop on the 'Implementation of REDD+'s capacity-building and institutional development by the KFCP involving representatives from NGOs, Civil Society Organisations, and academics from Central Kalimantan. Organised by the University of Palangkaraya, Central Kalimantan, Indonesia



Photo: Mulyani (2011)

Plate 8: Training for village leaders to apply for Government permits to implement 'Village Forests' (a vehicle for the communities to implement REDD+) Organised by 'TEROPONG', a CSO based in Kapuas District, Central Kalimantan, Indonesia



Photo: Mulyani (2011)

Plates 9-14 shows examples of my activities at the village level, including the ‘deep-hanging - out’ conducted during ‘pilot research’ in June 2010 and when shadowing KFCP employees in 2010 (pilot) and in 2011 (‘shadowing activities’).

Plate 9: ‘Deep hanging-out’, pilot research, Lamandau, Central Kalimantan, Indonesia



Photo: Mulyani (2010)

Plate 10: Pilot interview, Lamandau, Central Kalimantan, Indonesia



Photo: Mulyani (2010)

Plate 11: ‘Public consultation of REDD+ activities’ by the KFCP Mantangai village, Central Kalimantan, Indonesia



Photo: Mulyani (2010)

Plate 12: ‘Deep hanging-out’ with KFCP staff during the boat ride from one village to another (each ride took up to three hours) while conducting informal interviews
Kapuas, Central Kalimantan, Indonesia



Photo: Mulyani (2011)

Plate 13: ‘Deep hanging-out’ with the villagers involved in ‘REDD+ seedling activity’ while conducting informal interviews
Dusun Kanjarau, Central Kalimantan, Indonesia



Photo: Mulyani (2011)

Plate 14: ‘Village meeting’ to discuss payment for ‘REDD+ seedling activity’
Desa Tembang Muroi, Central Kalimantan, Indonesia



Photo: Mulyani (2011)

CHAPTER 2

METHODOLOGY

This research involved a total of 144 interviews, participation in REDD+-related conferences and workshops, 'shadowing' work, and review of REDD+-related policy documents, all of which were conducted in the course of the almost four years since the pilot investigation in June 2010. This chapter discusses research methods in-depth, including research design and process, the fieldwork, criteria for selecting research participants, methods to generate data, the process of data analysis, research ethics, and limitations.

2.1. Research Design and Process

Primarily this research takes a qualitative approach, utilising grounded theory as the basis of an iterative process of data collection and data analysis (Bryant, Charmaz 2007, Charmaz 2006, Corbin 2008, Glaser, Strauss 1967). Starting from the premise of being open to what occurs in the setting under study, grounded theorists start with data (Charmaz 2006). Thus, they study empirical events then pursue hunches and potential analytic ideas about them (Charmaz 2006, p 3). This approach provides flexibility when exploring, shaping and refining research questions during the simultaneous process of data collection and data analysis (Charmaz 2006, White 2009).

I identified the general topic of this research during the pilot investigation I conducted between June-August 2010. This investigation was stimulated by the

combination of my own research interest, and that of my supervisor, in the institutional interplay between policy instruments at multi-levels of governance. My interest in REDD+ policy resulted from previous research for my Masters Degree which focused on the implementation of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), another policy instrument under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) which achieved minimal success in Indonesia. My interviews with multi-stakeholders, and my 'shadowing' of a number of key informants from within CDM's project proponents, provided me with first-hand experience of the challenges to implementing an international policy mechanism in Indonesia's prevailing governance-setting. This setting was characterised by a lack of political support from influential policy actors and inherent problems within government, such as a lack of coordination amongst ministries, an explicit rent-seeking environment, lack of understanding amongst its stakeholders, and the complexity of the CDM mechanism itself (Mulyani 2009). The entry of another UNFCCC policy into Indonesia's climate change policy arena, namely REDD+, reinforced my interest in researching the performance and potential impact of this new international policy on existing institutions during the process of institutional interplay.

When I began my pilot investigation in Central Kalimantan (the first REDD+ pilot province selected in Indonesia) I was open to any possible findings. Through contacts developed during my previous research my pilot investigation was conducted on two sites: 1) the KFCP demonstration activity, and 2) the Lamandau carbon project which provided the information that follows. Most villagers had minimal knowledge of climate change and even less so of REDD+, and there was confusion on the concept of

‘carbon’. Poverty was evident and villagers expected that any development or conservation programme should immediately provide financial benefits to improve their livelihood. Community members had little trust in outsiders, including local or national government, due to the failure of previous development projects implemented in their area. Officials at the district government level expressed distrust in the national government given its overriding focus on interests at the national rather than the local level. When questioned, villagers cited ‘corruption’ as the main cause for their distrust of both district and national government. Moreover, there was strong evidence of the existence of ‘clientelist’ institutions whereby ‘patrons’ (usually former bosses from a ‘logging network’) occupied de facto power in the village with any new development project needing their prior approval. While discourse on REDD+ was more evident at the national level the lack of understanding and confusion about the mechanism was still noticeable. Nevertheless, many interviewees expressed hope that the new REDD+ policy might improve national and local economics and the governance of Indonesia’s forests in general.

The preliminary data generated from my pilot investigation, together with insights and experience from my previous research, reinforced my interest in pursuing the general theme of this thesis, ie the interplay between the new international policy of REDD+ with the existing national and sub-national forest institutions. I was interested in ascertaining the potential impact of this new policy on existing institutions and the challenges and opportunities it faced when interplaying with the complex system of formal and informal institutions within Indonesia’s forest governance.

Once the general theme of my research was determined I conducted an extensive literature review and designed more structured methods to generate data. While the semi-structured interview was employed as the primary means for data collection I also utilised other methods such as 'shadowing work', a review of policy documents related to REDD+, and participation in conferences and workshops. The use of mixed methods or diversity of data sources is believed to enable the 'triangulation of knowledge' to take place and increase the validity of data (Glaser, Strauss 1967, Schutt 1996). In this regard it is also useful to collect data in several phases with the emerging themes from the earlier phase providing the basis for further data collection (Egan 2002). Although the data generation process occurred throughout the course of my research I conducted my fieldwork in three phases: 1) the pilot investigation (June-August 2010), 2) field work 1 (May-December 2011), and 3) field work 2 (July-September 2012).

Consistent with grounded theory methodology (Egan 2002, Glaser, Strauss 1967) and based on the general research theme I explored an existing conceptual framework, 'institutionalism', to aid my 'theoretical sensitivity' (ie the ability of researchers to pay attention to the relevance of themes as they emerge from the data, aided by the comprehension of existing theories). The primary research question ("How do REDD+ institutions effect governance reform within Indonesia's existing national and sub-national forest institutions?") was explored and refined based on the emerging themes arising from my data and aided by the concept of institutionalism at its most broad. Subsequently, the four subsidiary research questions were shaped and addressed by reviewing the responses of all interviewees and the results of

observation through identifying some of the key elements of the contribution of REDD+ institutions to effecting governance reform in existing forest governance institutions. These elements, or themes, had emerged from data collection and analysis. Moreover, I explored certain existing substantive conceptual frameworks from within 'institutionalism' (eg 'clientelism', 'policy networks', 'critical juncture' and 'social learning') to help me develop plausible relationships between themes emerging from my own data (Strauss, Corbin 1994).

This research process corresponds to what Glaser and Strauss (1967) termed as 'advancing theory development during each step of data collection and analysis'. The deployment of existing theories in the grounded theory methodology is particularly useful in the process of 'advanced coding' (discussed later) and, when appropriate, researchers can also usefully carry into current studies any theory based on their previous research (Birks, Mills 2011, Charmaz 2006, Strauss, Corbin 1994). As a result, grounded theory tends to combine concepts and hypotheses that emerge from the present data with previous or existing theories (Charmaz 2006, Glaser, Strauss 1967). The following sections discuss comprehensively my methods of generating data and the process of data analysis.

2.2. Fieldwork and Generating Data

The concept of 'fieldwork' has raised debate, including the issue of the position of the researcher vis a vis the field (Massey 2003). In its classical concept the 'field' refers to 'a particular unit area' at some distance where a researcher goes 'out there', and by which the researcher is separated from the field, the field is passive, and the


fieldworker is active (Massey 2003). This has long been extended to the broader concept of 'spatialities of knowledge-production' by which the field includes multiple forms ranging from places, policies, human and non-human and the researcher itself (Latour 1999). The researcher can never be excluded from the field because his or her presence may influence the generation of data, particularly because it is the researcher who translates and interprets the data into new meanings (Latour 1999). My research follows this philosophical standpoint and the idea that data is co-produced through creative encounters between the researcher and the object of the study rather than 'discovered out there', ie also known as a 'knowledge event' or 'knowledge encounter' (Whatmore 2003).

To enable the generation of research data I conducted fieldwork in three major fields (see Figure 2.1); 1) Jakarta, the capital city of Indonesia, 2) Palangkaraya, the capital city of Central Kalimantan province, and 3) the KFCP site with the rationale for their selection explained in the next section. Moreover, during the fieldwork certain forms of 'field', such as conferences and workshops, proved to be significantly important not only in generating data that might otherwise be difficult to procure but more so to gain access to key informants, particularly those holding positions of high-rank within government. During these conferences key individuals, identified in advance through literature and policy document review, were concentrated in the same venue and became accessible. Appendix 5 lists the conferences and workshops which I either attended or presented findings from my research, including those in Jakarta, Palangkaraya, Kapuas, Oxford, London, Los Angeles and Lisbon.

2.2.1. The Field

Figure 2.1: Map of ‘the field’

1: ‘Jakarta’, the capital city of Indonesia; 2: ‘Palangkaraya’, the capital city of Central Kalimantan Province; 3: ‘Kapuas’, the district where the KFCP demonstration activity was implemented



Source: Esri, USGS, NOAA

I selected Jakarta, the capital city of Indonesia, as one of the main fields for interviews as this is where national policy-making takes place. This is also the only capital city in the world where the United Nations has a representative office ‘UNORCID’ (Office for REDD+ Coordination in Indonesia) as the focal point for REDD+ activities. Moreover, as well as a venue where all government ministries and agencies are based Jakarta hosts the offices of multilateral organisations, international NGOs, international financial institutions, foreign embassies, academic and research

institutions, and local NGOs, including those representing the indigenous people. Many of these networks of actors have been actively involved in shaping and influencing the development of climate change and REDD+ policies in Indonesia. During the two phases of field work in Jakarta I conducted a total of eighty interviews and attended several international conferences and national workshops on REDD+ conducted by either the government or donor agencies. Some were 'closed/invitation only' events which I was able to attend through my contacts within the REDD+ Task Force (see Appendix 5).


The second city, Palangkaraya, is the capital city of Central Kalimantan province. Since being selected in December 2010 by President Yudhoyono as Indonesia's first REDD+ pilot province to test and demonstrate strategies that inform policy implementation, Palangkaraya has attracted a broad range of actors concerned with the development of REDD+ policy. Central Kalimantan is one of four Indonesian provinces on the island of Borneo and is a target for REDD+ implementation for three important reasons: 1) it has a land area of 15.3 million hectare, of which 10.2 million ha is classified as forestland, 2) about 4.7 million ha of its forest land, including the area where the KFCP site is located, is in a critically degraded condition, and 3) it supports 14% of Indonesia's peatland (3 of 22 million ha) (GCF 2011). Peatland forest contains a disproportionately high level of carbon stock and it is estimated that 45% of Indonesia's total annual forest carbon emissions (which in 2000 was 821,250 gigagrams CO₂e), comes from peatlands (Boer et al. 2009, GCF 2011, Joosten et al. 2012). I divided my time in Palangkaraya between attending conferences and

workshops where I was able to meet key informants, and conducting interviews with provincial government officials and representatives from local NGOs and universities.

The KFCP demonstration site is located in the Kapuas District of the Central Kalimantan Province, covers an area of 120,000 ha in a single peat dome (see Figure 2.2). It is noteworthy that whilst I conducted my pilot investigation in two sites, ie the KFCP and the Lamandau carbon project (mentioned earlier), I decided to conduct my field work in the KFCP site as the latter was still in its infancy. At that time the Lamandau project developer was still assessing whether to continue the REDD+ pilot project, hence this site did not provide a setting adequate for investigating how REDD+ would unfold on the ground. In contrast, the KFCP had already adopted a definitive plan as outlined in its design document (see AIP 2009), and therefore I selected this site for several important reasons. Firstly, this demonstration activity, funded by the Australian government, was the first large-scale REDD+ activity in Indonesia and involved multi-scale actors (national and sub-national governments, NGOs and universities) thereby providing the means to investigate the interplay between different institutions at multi-levels of governance. Secondly, there are around 9,000 people (mostly indigenous 'Dayak Ngaju') that for several generations have occupied seven villages pertinent to the KFCP site, using land for food crops while also harvesting timber and non-timber forest products (AIP 2009). Since these people claim land within five kilometres of their villages based on customary law (AIP 2009) there is a potential conflict between the KFCP and the community. Therefore this site provides a space to examine how the REDD+ initiative is being perceived by those most affected by its future implementation. Thirdly, beside the carbon reduction goal, KFCP is

committed to improving the local communities' livelihood and strengthening institutions and governance, particularly in the payment mechanism which is designed to follow the best practices of transparency and accountability (AIP 2009). This is therefore a highly suitable site with which to examine the interplay between existing village institutions and new REDD+ institutions.

Figure 2.2: Map locating the KFCP project area
within the boundary of the 1996-1998 Mega Rice Project (block A-E)
in the Province of Central Kalimantan Indonesia



Source: Kalimantan Forests and Climate Partnership, Design Document, 2009

Fourthly, the KFCP site was within the boundary of the failed 1996-1998 mega rice project (Galudra et al. 2010) which resulted in community members distrusting outsiders. Given this history KFCP's relationship with the villagers was difficult during the first two years. Thus, this site was a highly suitable space with which to examine how villagers negotiate their interests vis a vis outsiders such as KFCP.

During my fieldwork in the KFCP site, and while 'shadowing' selected KFCP staff implementing the REDD+ activities, I conducted 64 interviews with villagers, local NGOs and KFCP employees. The following sections discuss in detail two fundamental actions underlying the techniques of qualitative research: asking and observing (Corbetta 2003).

2.2.2. Research Participants

I employed the purposive sampling method to identify key individuals influencing REDD+ policy development and implementation based on their level of engagement, expertise, experience, network or credibility (Patton 2002). Interviewees at the national and sub-national levels were selected to represent a broad range of perspectives and organisational types, comprising multi-level government officials, forest industry actors, donor agencies, international organisations, NGOs, academia/researchers and representatives of local communities and indigenous people. Subsequently I employed the technique of snowballing (Silverman 2001) to contact an increasing amount of interviewees. During the shadowing work interviewees, including the villagers, were selected from those actively involved in

REDD+ activities and, to ensure that a balanced perspective was represented, some who were not.

My decision to focus on interviewees from institutions which were actively engaged in climate change and REDD+ policy development and implementation was based on several reasons. Firstly, while discourse on climate change issues had been evident in Indonesia's political and social arena since the country hosted the UNFCCC' COP 13 in Bali in 2007 (Cronin, Santoso 2010) public awareness of the REDD+ mechanism was low. Secondly, to serve the over-arching aim of my research, ie to ascertain the results of institutional interplay between REDD+ and Indonesia's existing forest institutions, the perceptions and knowledge of actors holding decision-making roles in climate change, REDD+ and forest issues, was critical to my analysis. Nevertheless, to ensure that my research covered a broad spectrum of perspectives I also selected interviewees from institutions holding different views on REDD+, namely those 'pro' and 'contra'. This method of sampling minimised the risk of producing an inapt generalisation (Miles 1994).

I identified 'key informants', ie individuals with particular knowledge and experience on the issues being investigated (Fetterman 2008), from a combination of my previous research, the pilot investigation, literature and policy document reviews, and participation and networking through conferences and workshops. Moreover, being a resident of Jakarta my entry into this field was shaped by pre-existing contacts held with government officials, academics, journalists and the business community. These contacts resulted from my previous executive role within the private sector and my academic history at the undergraduate and Masters level in two of Indonesia's

leading universities. Through these contacts, and by employing the 'snowballing technique', I was able to gain access and to interview more government officials, academics, researchers and members of the private sector. While aware that this technique carried a specific challenge, ie interviewees tend to recommend others with similar perspectives, this technique proved beneficial in gaining access to additional contacts faster than otherwise likely through a lengthy bureaucratic process.

For instance, through my contacts at government ministries and foreign embassies I gained access to government officials at the level of minister or vice minister, climate change counsellors and ambassadors whose countries are significant REDD+ donors to Indonesia such as Norway and Australia, international financial organisations such as the World Bank, and United Nations organisations such as the UNDP and UNORCID. Through my contact with journalists I gained access to prominent environmental NGOs and organisations representing indigenous people. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, central to gaining access to the identified key informants was my participation in conferences and workshop. Through my contacts from the government, foreign embassies and the media I was able to participate in otherwise 'closed, invitation only' workshops and press conferences held by leading actors in the climate change and forestry sectors. At the provincial level my entry was facilitated by interviewees (representatives of a 'Palangkaraya-based' NGO) met during a workshop in Jakarta. My entry at the district and village levels was facilitated by KFCP's manager.

I was aware of the challenges in using key informants and employing the 'snowballing' technique to contact more interviewees. While key informants can be advantageous, for instance in assisting researchers to gain faster access and trust

within a community, acting as gatekeepers for access to additional participants, and facilitating the collection of in-depth information or the clarification of data, they also present challenges (Fetterman 2008, Given 2008). There is the possibility that, consciously or unconsciously, they will pass on their own political agendas, thereby influencing the extent to which their views are an accurate representation of the total population of the study (Fetterman 2008, Given 2008). To minimise this risk, I selected key informants from different types of stakeholders whose views on REDD+ varied. My key informants were not merely those actors holding a key role in REDD+ decision-making from several government ministries whose views on REDD+ varied, but also from organisations representing organisations for indigenous people (AMAN), grass-root organisations such as HuMa and Walhi, and private sector actors, all of whom influenced the development of REDD+ policies in Indonesia (see Table 2.1 and Appendix 2, with key informants selected amongst those mentioned interviewees and organisations). As discussed in this thesis' substantive chapters, interviewees from a cross section of stakeholders generally held positive views on the contribution of the REDD+ initiative in effecting governance reform within existing forest institutions. To a large extent these views can be attributed to the decision or belief held by different stakeholders, including some elements within government ministries and agencies, to use the REDD+ mechanism as a vehicle to achieve their own reform agendas as well as a national reform agenda (see analysis in chapter 3 , 4 and 5). Moreover, I used mixed methods of data collection (ie interviews, shadowing/observation and the review of policy documents) as a technique to triangulate information and thereby enhance the validity of the data generated (Given 2008, Ogden 2008a, Rothbauer 2008).

2.2.3. Generating Data through Interviews

Involving 137 interviewees I conducted a total of 144 interviews: 60 between May and December 2011, 20 between April and September 2012, and another 64 during the ‘shadowing’ work between October and mid-December 2011 (Table 2.1 lists the breakdown of the 137 interviewees according to ‘stakeholder type’).

Table 2.1: Breakdown of 137 interviewees according to their institution or ‘stakeholder type’

Stakeholder type	Number Interviewed	The institutions involved included:
Indonesia government (multilevel)	24	eg Ministries of Forestry, Environment, National Planning Agency, National Council on Climate Change, National Aviation and Space Agency, REDD+ Task Force, and from the provincial and district levels.
International organisation/ donor	12	eg Embassy of Norway, Australia, and United Kingdom, the World Bank, the UNDP and the UN-REDD Programme.
National/sub-national NGO	15	eg the National Alliance for Indigenous People (AMAN), Association for Community and Ecology-Based Law Reform (HuMa), Friends of the Earth (Walhi) Central Kalimantan and ‘Pokker ShK’ (community participatory land-mapping network).
International NGO	10	eg Conservation International, World Wildlife Fund for Nature, World Resource Institute, Clinton Climate Initiative, Rain Forest Norway and Forest Peoples Programme.
Private sector	11	eg ‘Rimba Makmur’, ‘Carbon Conservation’, ‘Terra Capital’ (companies that are interested in becoming REDD+ project proponents) and ‘APHI’ (Association of Indonesia Forest Concessionaires).
Academic/ researcher	18	eg University of Indonesia, University of Palangkaraya, Cifor and Indonesian Institute of Science (LIPI).
Villagers	33	From seven villages at the KFCP demonstration site including those who were actively involved in REDD+ activities and those who were not.
KFCP personnel	14	KFCP managers and key personnel who were responsible for ‘community engagement’ activities and ‘institutional building’.

Notes: Appendix 2 and 3 list details of persons interviewed

I interviewed a number of key informants twice as I sought to triangulate information received from my interviews with different data generated from the

review of policy documents, other literature, and my shadowing work. This second interview, conducted to clarify certain information or to generate additional data, proved particularly important in keeping me up-to-date with the continuous process of REDD+ policy development and implementation. Here the use of double or cumulative interviews provides opportunities for more encounters thereby increasing the reliability of the research data (Whatmore 2003).

Most interviews were conducted in Jakarta, Palangkaraya and seven villages within the KFCP demonstration site (Appendix 2 and 3 lists the interviewees). I employed a semi-structured interview method as the primary means to generate data. I prepared the interview questions in a standard format, rephrasing them and adjusting their order during the interview process as appropriate based on the flow and responses from the interviewees (Merriam 1998, 2002). At the national and sub-national levels the goal of my interviews was to capture interviewees' general perceptions of REDD+ initiatives in relation to Indonesia's existing forest governance and institutions. As such, questions sought to gain interviewees' insights on how the current institutions might be influenced by the new REDD+ policy, and simultaneously how the implementation of this international policy is determined by the existing forest governance institutions. Interview questions were developed based on the general research theme identified at the earlier stage of my research, ie the interplay between the REDD+ and Indonesia's existing forest-related institutions.

Most questions were open-ended to provide interviewees with the flexibility necessary to express their views on forest governance issues. I opened interviews by asking interviewees what they understood and perceived of REDD+. When, for

instance, interviewees responded that it would be difficult to implement REDD+ in Indonesia, with most citing the inherent problems within existing forest governance as the reason, I followed with the question, “Do you think the REDD+ mechanism can be used as a means to improve forest governance?” Conversely, when interviewees stated that the REDD+ mechanism had the potential to improve Indonesia’s forest governance I followed with the question “What is new about REDD+ when compared with previous forest-related initiatives?”, or I asked them to identify the current activities or regulations within the forestry sector that had emerged as a result of REDD+. In this regard most interviewees cited the process for the development of the national strategy for REDD+. This prompted further questions on the potential benefits and challenges for the implementation of the national strategy and other types of new institutions REDD+ has introduced. With respect to those village interviewees living around the KFCP site my interviews focused on generating information on how they understood REDD+, their expectations and concerns of this new policy, and the challenges of implementation and benefits they experienced, if any. Appendix 4 provides the list of questions. In short, I designed the key interview questions to elicit more revealing questions and draw upon each informant’s expertise and unique viewpoint, questions which also enabled exploration of relevant topics that came to light during the course of the interview (Merriam 2009).

Interviews at the national and sub-national levels lasted between thirty and ninety minutes. In the course of the three data collection phases mentioned above my interview methods became more focused: at the beginning interviews were long becoming shorter and more specific at the latter stages, a practice which is expected

(Egan 2002). As well as becoming more familiar with the interview topics my interviews at the later stages followed the lead of the emerging themes that had resulted from the previous data collection and analysis, thereby becoming more focused.

Interviews were recorded electronically or in detailed field notes. While I was aware that using an electronic recorder might lead to interviewees giving less information, or perceiving that their position might be compromised (Wall, Overton 2006), my experience proved otherwise. Interviewees at the national and sub-national levels were used to their comments being recorded, hence I found their responses to be very open. This could be a result of their experience from speaking with journalists and researchers, particularly in a subject as popular as climate change and REDD+. Nonetheless, I ensured that I received prior consent from my interviewees, and with those few who preferred not to be recorded electronically I used detailed field notes. When interviewees stated that their responses were 'off the record' their information was not used in this thesis.

During 'shadowing' activity at the village level semi-structured interviews were conducted in an informal setting to provide interviewees (particularly the indigenous 'Dayak Ngaju' people) with a non-intimidating environment. While most interviews at the national and sub-national levels were conducted in the interviewee's office those in the village were conducted at the interviewee's home. In this setting more villagers sometimes joined the session which converted my 'one-to-one' interview into a focus group discussion. Interviews lasted between 20-45 minutes, during which I took brief field notes with a detailed note completed immediately afterwards or later that night

to ensure important points were well-recorded. The range of questions included whether the interviewee was aware of REDD+, their understanding and expectation of it, what new ideas introduced by REDD institutions - if any - were affecting village institutions, and whether they had sufficient knowledge to enter into a 'village agreement'. This agreement, as mentioned in the introductory chapter, was initiated by the KFCP as a means for the two parties to enter into a contract for the implementation of REDD+ activities. Appendix 4 provides the list of the interview questions.

I conducted the majority of the interviews in 'Bahasa Indonesia', the national language of which I am a native speaker, and used English for interviews with representatives from international organisations or foreign embassies. The ability to speak the local language was important for this research, particularly when a sensitive topic such as 'corruption' was explored. Moreover, being of the Javanese ethnicity (an ethnicity which has dominated government since Indonesia achieved independence in 1945) I used Javanese phrases to 'break the ice' with government officials at the initial encounters. This tactic enabled me to be considered as an 'insider' with interviewees revealing more information than would be disclosed to a non-Javanese or non-Indonesian. This phenomenon was evidenced when I compared the information I received with that provided by the same interviewees to the media or research institutions.

2.2.4. Generating Data through the 'Shadowing' Technique

'Shadowing', a technique borrowed from ethnography work, is also known as 'structured observation', 'direct observation' or 'ethnographically-inspired technique' (Czarniawska 2007, Laven 2008). It is also known as 'participant observation' (Silverman 2001), not because the researcher takes an active part in the researched-subject's activities but because it is not possible to be present in the field without being a part of it (Laven 2008). Once the subject is selected the researcher observes and follows the chosen subject in action, observing what they say and do, interviewing them and others who are encountered during the shadowing, accessing various notes and documents, and attending to both context and process (Laven 2008, Silverman 2001). In short, this technique is used to learn what is happening (Czarniawska 2007).

As mentioned earlier, I selected the KFCP's REDD+ demonstration activity as a vehicle with which to investigate how the REDD+ mechanism is demonstrated on the ground and to examine the interplay between REDD+ institutions and existing village institutions. I was given permission to use this project for field work verbally by KFCP's senior officer (Tim Jessop) during a REDD+ workshop in Jakarta in June 2010, and subsequently substantiated in our meeting in July 2011. I then conducted the shadowing activity between September and mid-December 2011. The KFCP operational manager at that time (Bapak Erwinsyah) assigned several key personnel who were responsible for 'community engagement' activities and 'institutional building' to be shadowed.


Organised around the relevant activities of the 'shadowed personnel' my shadowing work involved attending formal meetings (eg with government officials and

KFCP project partners), KFCP workshops, public consultations, village meetings, women's group meetings, and interviewing the shadowed subjects and others encountered. During the shadowing activities I conducted a total of 64 interviews: 33 with Dayak Ngaju community members, 11 with local NGOs' members, 6 government officials at the provincial and district levels, and 14 KFCP staff. The KFCP's activities were divided into two phases: phase 1 (1 January to 30 June 2009) focused on design work and phase 2 (1 July 2009 to 30 June 2012 and extended until June 2013) was the implementation phase. Thus my time in the field, comprising the pilot investigation in August 2010 and the shadowing activities between September and mid December 2011, covered both phases. This enabled me to observe changes with regard to local communities' perceptions of REDD+ and progress in the implementation of certain REDD+ activities.

Seven villages (becoming nine villages in 2012) and seven hamlets are located within the KFCP site with a linear distribution along the Kapuas River on the west project boundary (Figure 2.3). These settlements support a mostly indigenous 'Dayak Ngaju' population of 9,000 people that have inhabited the area for several generations. Large numbers of the residents are considered poor (37.9% of the residents in Kapuas District live below the poverty line) and most hold a low level of education (AIP 2009). Residents use land for food crops and rubber plantations, supplementing their income by fishing and mining for gold in the river and collecting non-timber forest products like 'rattan', 'jelutung' and 'gemor', and subsistence products used for house construction, food, medicines and handicrafts (AIP 2009, Care 2009).

The ecological, economic and social landscapes of these fourteen settlements have been fundamentally altered by previous development and conservation projects whose achievements were minimal at best (discussed in chapter 6). One of the failed projects was the Mega Rice Project (Galudra et al. 2010) which contributed significantly to the crisis of trust on the part of the villagers towards outsiders, including towards government at both the national and sub-national levels.

Figure 2.3: Map of the KFCP site and 14 settlements along the Kapuas River on the west project boundary, in Kapuas District, Central Kalimantan Province, Indonesia



Source: Kalimantan Forests and Climate Partnership, Design Document, 2009

With this background when the KFCP entered these villages it resulted in them spending about 18 months gaining acceptance from community members. In this context I was aware that because my entrance to the villages was facilitated by the KFCP the villagers' responses to my presence and my questions might be pre-determined by their previous experience and their initial distrust of the KFCP.

The family I lived with in the village of 'Petak Puti' was of the 'upper-class' with significant influence in the village and a matriarch who was active in REDD+ activities. This situation carried some consequences: it gave me greater access to other families who were also active in REDD+ activities but limited my access to those who were not. I solved this problem by conducting informal meetings with village members independently without the presence of KFCP staff. Moreover, to maintain my independence as a researcher, and ensure that I covered a range of perspectives that included those who disagreed with the REDD+ initiative, I engaged with and interviewed representatives from the local NGO 'Yayasan Petak Danum' which is a prominent organisation opposed to REDD+. I also interviewed a number of villagers who initially were supportive of REDD+ but at a later stage decided to oppose REDD+ implementation in their village.

Moreover, I was also aware that the villagers felt overwhelmed by the many consultations conducted by the previous projects' proponents and the interviews by many researchers. In this regard I decided to spend the first week engaged in 'deep hanging-out' (Geertz 1973) to get to know the villagers without conducting any interviews. Once my relationship with the villagers was well established I conducted interviews with particular individuals. Some interviews were in the presence of the

KFCP staff I shadowed, and some without their presence to ensure that the villagers were more open in sharing information.

As mentioned earlier, interviews in the village were conducted in a more informal setting, often during lunch or 'hanging out' with a group of women in front of village shops, or during my many boat rides with KFCP staff. Nonetheless, far from being a neutral conversation, these interviews were an interactional accomplishment (Denzin 2009). Open-ended and conducted in the national language of Bahasa Indonesia (most villagers speak both this language and their indigenous Dayak language) I began my interviews by enquiring about the villagers' daily lives, later raising the topic of climate change and REDD+. This enabled me to better contextualise climate change into people's everyday life through events such as forest fires or flood.

During my shadowing work I witnessed two institutional developments put in place by the KFCP, ie the process for establishing the 'village agreement' and the framework to disburse early payment for REDD+ activities. Two teams were established in each village to oversee the implementation of REDD+ activities: an activity-implementation team (*Tim Pengelola Kegiatan, or TPK*) and a monitoring team (*Tim Pengawas, or TP*). Members of these teams were chosen by the communities in a village meeting and could be replaced if the community chose to do so. KFCP expected that at the end of the demonstration period these village-level institutions would become permanent entities capable of managing REDD+ activities and payment transactions.

I witnessed the 'early life' of these institutions when intensive training was conducted in each village by KFCP staff to equip team members with basic

administration skills (book-keeping, maintaining an inventory of seedling stocks, and recording financial activity). Here my shadowing work required me to follow the KFCP manager responsible for institutional building from one village to another, done either on foot, motorcycle or small canoe. At these meetings I was introduced by the KFCP as a 'student' or 'researcher' from England. These meetings were an important venue for 'knowledge-encounter' with which I gained more trust and acceptance from the villagers.

Of particular importance was the process for establishing the 'village agreement', ie a cooperative agreement between the KFCP and each village which establishes an institutional framework and procedure for REDD+ activities and incentive payments. I witnessed the process for finalising this Agreement by following the KFCP manager and team responsible for ensuring that the villagers understood the Agreement (drafted by both parties) and securing the signature of the village head. Findings from my observation and interviews relating to this institutional building formed the basis of my inquiry into the institutional interplay between REDD+ and existing village institutions (subsidiary question 4) whose analysis materialised in paper 4 (chapter 6).

2.3. The Process of Data Analysis

As mentioned earlier, my research utilised grounded theory as the basis of an iterative process of data collection and analysis. This approach allows research findings to emerge from the frequent, dominant or significant themes inherent in raw data through 'qualitative coding' (Charmaz 2006, Corbin 2008, Thomas 2006). Coding is an

activity for establishing categories that involves three subcomponents: 'naming', 'comparing' and 'memoing' (Locke 2001). This process includes: (i) identifying dominant themes in the text and labelling these themes or coding them to create categories and sub categories ('naming'), (ii) continuously 'comparing' the data collected to create links amongst these categories or to synthesise the data, and combining or reducing overlap or redundancy amongst categories ('comparing') (Charmaz 2006, Thomas 2006). The third subcomponent 'memoing' is central to grounded theory methodology, and involves taking notes to capture insights and ideas from the data's emerging themes and recording the progress or evolution of the researcher's flow of thinking (also known as a research journal). Throughout the process the role of the researcher is critical to ensure that during the process of reviewing, selecting, interpreting and summarising the information the distortion of meanings is minimal (Lofland, Lofland 1995).

My data was recorded and exists in four major forms: 1) an audio file containing the results of most interviews at the national and sub-national levels, 2) field notes recording those interviews which were not recorded electronically and most interviews conducted at the village level, 3) a research journal that recorded the progress of my thinking and important themes that emerged from my data, and 4) policy-relevant documents of REDD+, both publicly available documents such as the national REDD+ strategy or the UNFCCC decisions on REDD+, and those which I gathered from key informants within the government ministries/agencies and 'closed' workshops.

Results of the electronically-recorded interviews at the national and sub-national levels were transcribed and coded using nVivo software⁵ (QSR 2012). Interview results from my shadowing work were coded manually. I began my coding by reading through the transcribed interviews and field notes, examined the interviewees' comments for common themes as well as those that were unique, and developed abstract meanings or concepts of those comments by articulating ('naming') them, ie I developed main 'categories'. During the constant process of comparing interviewees' comments I developed sub categories, linked them with the main categories, combined some categories (which also reduced redundancy), and decided which categories were most important to serve the overarching aim of the research. As well as utilising the nVivo software as a system to organise and store my data (Bazeley 2007) I maintained a research journal ('memo') to record any new ideas about the data that occurred to me and the main categories as they emerged and evolved. Categories are more than names assigned to data. They also provide a 'meaningful picture' that helps the reader to 'see and hear vividly' from the perspective of a research participant (Glaser, Strauss 1967).

In this regard, through the process of studying and comparing data then recording thoughts in writing a researcher defines ideas that best interpret data to fit tentative analytic categories (Charmaz 2006). As mentioned earlier, I addressed and refined my primary research question, as well as the four subsidiary questions, based on the themes that emerged during the course of data collection and analysis. Here

⁵ Developed in 1999 by Tom Richards, nVivo is qualitative data analysis computer software intended to help users organise unstructured data, to classify and arrange information, and examine relationships in the data (QSR 2012).

the reflexive iteration process (Srivastava, Hopwood 2009) was at work, ie visiting and revisiting the data, collecting more data based on the emerging insights, making comparisons and connections with emerging categories, which together lead to a refining of the research questions.

For instance, interviewees' frequent response to my main interview question, "What is your general perception of REDD+?", led to the development of two main categories: (i) 'opportunities' that REDD+ offers, and (ii) 'challenges' for REDD+ implementation. These categories helped shape the subsidiary research question 1: "How is the REDD+ initiative perceived by governance actors in Indonesia?", which formed the basis of paper 1 (chapter 3). Furthermore, from the frequent responses on the type of opportunities that REDD+ offers I developed several sub-categories which included 'governance reform', 'network building', 'conservation' and the 'sustainable management of forest', and 'economic development'. The themes that emerged under the category of 'challenges for REDD+ implementation' mostly referred to the main issues or 'root causes' affecting existing forest governance which led me to develop the following sub categories: 'coordination issues', 'lack of capacity', 'ambiguity of legal system', 'corruption', 'complexity of REDD+', 'lack of understanding of REDD+', 'REDD+ is a form of ecological imperialism' and 'uncertainty of REDD+ decisions'.

Under the sub category 'governance reform' two properties (Glaser, Strauss 1967) emerged, ie 'transparency' and 'participation', which interviewees cited most as the norms promoted by the REDD+ mechanism that can contribute to improving existing forest governance. With respect to these two norms of governance, when asked to identify a tangible form of institutional development that resulted from the

REDD+ initiative the majority of the interviewees cited the development of the 'national strategy for REDD+' and the 'one map initiative'. These sub categories helped me to formulate subsidiary research questions 2 and 3 which formed the basis of papers 2 and 3 (chapter 4 and 5).

Furthermore, my coding activity of interview results from the village level revealed similar findings. Most interviewees cited the word 'transparency' and 'participation' when asked, "What new idea had REDD+ introduced to the village institutions?" Moreover, when asked to identify a tangible form of the implementation of these two norms of good governance the majority of interviewees cited the development of the 'village agreement' between the KFCP and their villages, and the process to establish village-level institutions to implement and monitor the implementation of REDD+ activities. During my observation of village meetings several points were noticeable: (i) a high level of enthusiasm from villagers to be engaged in the process, (ii) a high degree of capability on the part of local communities to negotiate their interests vis a vis the KFCP, (iii) an awareness of community rights including access to forest land and resources, and (iv) evidence of 'trust building' and 'social learning'. Nonetheless, there was also a significant gap of knowledge and financial resources between the two parties, and evidence of the issue of representation. These emerging themes shaped my subsidiary research question 4 and formed the basis for paper 4 (chapter 6). Table 2.2 provides detail of the themes or categories that emerged from data analysis, the research questions, and the respective four papers.

Throughout the process of data analysis categories not only coalesce as the researcher interprets collected data but become more 'theoretical' as the researcher engages in successive levels of analysis (Charmaz 2006). This process data analysis (see Glaser 1978, Meriam 2002) includes constant comparison of interviewees' responses and focuses its examination on the common and unique patterns of interviewees' responses by asking: what is this data a study of, what is actually happening, under what conditions does this phenomenon occur, and what category does this incident indicate? This process produces 'analytic categories' and the relationship drawn between them provides a conceptual basis, ie the abstraction is built directly from the data (Charmaz 2006). Simultaneously, and as mentioned earlier regarding the iterative process of data collection and analysis, emerging analytic categories are continuously checked and refined with the additional data collected, ie known as 'theoretical sampling' (Charmaz 2006, Merriam 2009).

In the process known as 'advanced coding' (Birks, Mills 2011) or 'theoretical coding' (Charmaz 2006), I linked my categories with certain existing theories (Charmaz 2006, Glaser 1978). As argued by Charmaz (2006) 'theoretical coding' can be enhanced by 'theoretical sensitivity' which includes the process of scrutinising literature for existing theories that might be relevant to the emerging 'grounded' theory developed largely through continuing conversation with the data (Charmaz 2006). In this process there is a high degree of 'reciprocal shaping' between the researcher and the researched objects or data (Charmaz 2006). As a result a grounded theory tends to combine concepts and hypotheses that emerged from the present data with existing

theories: thus, grounded theories are systematic statements of plausible relationships within the data (Glaser, Strauss 1967, Straus, Corbin 1994).

As will become clearer in the chapters that follow (ie the substantive chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6), in the process of producing my 'grounded theories' I was informed by several existing conceptual frameworks, namely 'clientelism', 'policy networks', 'path dependence', 'critical juncture' and 'social learning'. For example, there was strong evidence that; (i) the implementation of REDD+ is influenced by existing and inherent problems within Indonesia's forest governance institutions, (ii) in the process of the interplay between the REDD mechanism with national and sub-national forest institutions REDD+ has produced new institutions with the potential to improve existing forest governance. In this regard I engaged in the constant process of comparison and theoretical coding, likening the emerging categories from my data with existing conceptual frameworks.

For example, during the process to develop 'analytic categories', I linked the categories of 'opportunities' that REDD+ offers and 'challenges' for REDD+ implementation (which included the sub categories 'corruption', 'coordination issues', 'ambiguity of legal system' and 'lack of capacity') with the existing concept of 'clientelism'. I then built systematic statements of the plausible relationship between these analytic categories to address the subsidiary research question 1: "How is the REDD+ initiative perceived by governance actors in Indonesia?" The development of sub-categories under 'governance reform' (eg 'transparency', 'participation' and 'national REDD+ strategy') and under 'network-building' (eg 'involvement of diverse networks', 'transnational networks', 'domestic networks' and 'domestic reformists')

was informed by the existing concepts of ‘good governance principles’ and ‘policy networks’. The linking of this emerging data with existing concepts helped me address sub-question 2: “How is the international design of REDD+, particularly the incorporation of good governance principles within the UNFCCC decisions on REDD+, adopted by national policy networks tasked with creating a REDD+ strategy?”

Moreover, the sub-category ‘one map initiative’, which emerged under the category ‘governance reform’, provided a plausible relationship between REDD+ institutions (eg the robust system of measuring, reporting and verifying GHG emissions reduction) and their role in improving the governance of Indonesia's map-making. Till then the latter had been developed on a path of institutional dependence tied to the country's political economy. In this regard, as explored in paper 3 (chapter 5), I linked my categories with the existing concepts of ‘path dependence’ and ‘critical juncture’ to shape and address sub-question 3: “What, if any, is the tangible contribution of REDD+ institutions in effecting governance reform within Indonesia's existing forest institutions?”

Lastly, through continuous ‘conversation’ with my data while being ‘theoretically sensitive’ (Charmaz 2006) I developed several categories from the interview results at the village level, eg the category of ‘contribution of REDD+ institutions’. This led to further development of sub-categories, ie ‘transparency’, ‘participation’ and ‘village agreement’, all of which informed the formulation of subsidiary research question 4: “What assembly of new/modified institutions is co-produced by the REDD+ initiative at the village level, and what benefits do these modified institutions bring, if any?” In this regard, there was a notable relationship

between the implementation of the principle of 'full participation' in the process for establishing the 'village agreement' between the KFCP and the villages with improved capacity on the part of villagers to negotiate their interests vis a vis the KFCP. By linking this theme with an existing concept of 'social learning' I developed the plausible connection that the success of the villagers in securing their interests via a vis KFCP was to some extent helped by their experience of being engaged with previous development and conservation projects prior to the KFCP. Table 2.2 provides detail on the themes, research questions, and the respective four papers.

Table 2.2: Themes emerging from interviews and subsidiary research questions & addressed within the respective chapters

Themes/Categories and sub categories		Research Question 1 addressed in Chapter 3:	Research Question 2 addressed in Chapter 4:	Research Question 3 addressed in Chapter 5:	Research Question 4 addressed in Chapter 6:
		REDD+ and forest governance in Indonesia: a multi-stakeholder study of perceived challenges and opportunities	Policy Networks and Governance Reform in Indonesia: a Study of the Policy-making Process for the National REDD+ Strategy	Does the REDD+ 'One Map Initiative' represent a new institutional path for Indonesia's forest governance?	The interplay between REDD+ initiatives with village institutions: a case study in seven villages within KFCP's demonstration activity in Central Kalimantan
Opportunity of REDD+	Governance reform: deployment of REDD+ institutions, eg 'transparency', 'participation', 'rigorous MRV system', 'protection of communities land tenure'; Policy results: 'National REDD+ strategy', 'One Map Initiative', 'village agreement'.	✓	✓	✓	✓
	Network Building: 'reformists', 'transnational networks', 'domestic	✓	✓	✓	
	Conservation and Sustainable Management of Forests	✓	✓	✓	✓
	Economic development (incl. improvement of communities' livelihood)	✓	✓	✓	✓
Challenges for implementation	Coordination issues	✓	✓	✓	
	Government's lack of capacity to manage forests	✓	✓	✓	✓
	Ambiguity of legal system: issues resulting from overlapping concessions, tenure	✓	✓	✓	✓
	Corruption and clientelism	✓	✓	✓	✓
	Complexity of REDD+; knowledge gap	✓	✓		✓
	REDD+ is 'ecological imperialism'; its uncertainty , low carbon price	✓			

2.4. Research Ethics

'Informed consent' and the protection of the identity of interviewees are two principle ethical concerns, particularly when a number of informants hold high positions within government. However informed consent, whilst a common practice in the western world, can be irrelevant to norms prevailing elsewhere such as in Africa and Asia (Macklin 1999). In Indonesia, informed consent is a notion which though understood among academia is not widely implemented by it, nor is it widely understood outside academia (Mollet 2011). During my interviews and shadowing activities verbal consent from interviewees (including government officials) was deemed by most interviewees as more appropriate than seeking written consent. In particular, prior to entering the villages I obtained verbal consent from the traditional village leaders which was deemed to be more appropriate than seeking written consent from each research participant.

I presented an introduction letter from the University of Oxford (with a translation in the national language 'Bahasa Indonesia') which explained my status as a DPhil student and that any information obtained from my interviews would be used only for academic purposes. Moreover, before beginning my shadowing activity I obtained a written permit from the Kapuas government which allowed me to conduct research in the district where the KFCP activity took place. To secure this permit I submitted the introduction letter from the University of Oxford and a research proposal, both of which were translated in 'Bahasa Indonesia'. Obtaining this permit was straightforward, taking only one day, which probably results from the familiarity

of government officials with the many researchers applying for permits to research REDD+ in their area.

With regard to protecting the identity of interviewees and as mentioned earlier, prior to any interview I asked whether I could record the interview electronically, and whether the interviewee wanted anonymity. Since I planned to publish my research findings in the form of journal papers, to ensure full anonymity - even when not all interviewees requested it - they are referenced by a unique number (eg 1-80) and where appropriate their organisational affiliation. Despite interview data being rendered anonymously during the process of data analysis, I am aware of the risk that interviewees could be identified by others within the field once the data or papers are published. Hence, I only used direct quotes from those interviewees who elected not to be anonymous. Most quotes were used in an indirect form with multiple sources of interviewee numbers securing a stronger anonymity. Notable is that with the emerging democracy and reform ('reformasi') movement in Indonesia (since the fall of the Suharto regime in 1998) a large number of interviewees were pleased to be named and have spoken in public about data this particular research has generated.

Other issues of importance with regard to research ethics related to my position as a woman and my Javanese ethnicity. These factors determined how to dress, the level of formality used in language, the norms of cultural behaviour that needed to be observed, and sensitive issues to be avoided. I paid careful attention to the prevailing religious and village norms, values and practices, as well as following formal guidance from Oxford University's research ethics. For instance, I ensured that

my interview schedule and venues were sent to my supervisor in Oxford and someone in Jakarta (my husband) prior to interviews, and I was never alone with a male interviewee in the village. Moreover, when doing shadowing work at a village meeting where most participants were men I engaged a lady-chaperone (typically the head of a womens' group from the same village). While avoiding sensitive local issues such as religion and race, it is necessary to mention here that 'clientelism', and its related practice of rent-seeking or corruption, is not considered a sensitive subject in Indonesia and therefore does not put the researcher or informants at risk. Nonetheless, during my interviews at the national level some government officials and representatives from foreign embassies wanted anonymity when commenting on corruption, whose quotes I did not use directly.

Aware that being Javanese might generate challenges when interviewing different ethnicities in Central Kalimantan Province (the majority of villagers around the KFCP site are indigenous Dayak Ngaju) my experience differed from that anticipated. In fact, the majority of the Dayak Ngaju interviewees were more welcoming compared with the minority of Javanese residents in the study villages, a response which could result from this Javanese minority group being opposed to REDD+. To ensure that I gained a balanced perspective of community members, through my local NGO contact I was introduced to a representative from the grass root organisation 'Yayasan Petak Danum' which represented a 'contra voice' to REDD+. Through this organisation I managed to interview villagers who opposed to REDD+. In sum, while paying attention to Oxford University's formal guidance on research ethics I was able to follow local practices, norms and values without compromising my ability

to collect data. This ethical approach is what Thrift (2003) calls 'good judgement' rather than merely following formal protocols.

2.5. Reflexivity: 'Positionality' and 'Limitation'

As mentioned earlier, I hold the view that data is co-produced by the researcher and the research subjects, and that a researcher's presence can influence the generation of data and the interpretation of the research findings (Latour 1999, Whatmore 2003). In this regard, since I deployed primarily qualitative methods, which require an understanding of the experiences and perceptions of research participants of a particular phenomenon (Merriam 2009), I was aware of the risk of bias particularly in my efforts to interpret data (Merriam 2009). However, as widely acknowledged, in both quantitative and qualitative methods the researcher's personal and political values, cultural perspective, and behaviour, may influence the research process and therefore bias can occur in both methods (Ogden 2008b). Particularly in qualitative research, since this approach allows flexibility or an iterative process of data collection and analysis, and because the researcher itself is an instrument of the research (Patton 2002), bias can occur throughout the course of the research.

To minimise this problem I employed mixed methods of data collection, namely interviewing, shadowing or observation, participation in relevant policy workshops, and the review of policy documents. This triangulation process, by which researchers search for convergence among multiple and different sources of information, provides a means to improve the validity and reliability of qualitative research (Creswell, Miller 2000, Patton 2002). 'Validity' refers to how truthful the interviewees' responses are,

while 'reliability' relates to the extent to which the results are a consistent and accurate representation of the total population of the study (Golafshani 2003). In an effort to increase the reliability of my research, and while deploying a predominantly qualitative method, I also utilised a quantitative method (Golafshani 2003, Patton 2002). This can be seen through my effort to quantify and weigh my interviewees' responses of their perceptions of REDD+ challenges and opportunities as expressed in the final results in statistical form (see paper 1 in chapter 3).

Reflecting on my 'positionality' as a researcher vis a vis the field, I was aware of both the advantage and challenge of being a 'native' conducting my fieldwork at home. The tradition of empiricism has been bent towards distancing the researcher from the research in order to claim an 'objective' vision (Outram 1996). However, agreeing with Masey (2003), I hold the view that there is neither total distancing nor total immersion, and instead the co-production of knowledge between the researcher and the research object is at work. The challenge of conducting fieldwork at 'home' relates to the difficulty of seeing the status quo in a new light. For instance, being Indonesian and having grown up in the country, I was already cognisant of the many issues surrounding forest governance institutions, particularly the norms of the 'patron-client' relationship and rent-seeking which are embedded within society-at-large. In this regard, 'familiarity' often numbs inquisitiveness and generates an unwillingness to surrender one's assumptions of the world (Latour 1999). Throughout this research I constantly strived to suspend my preconceptions and generate a consciousness that prompted curiosity, to follow things and events, and not take for granted features that appeared to be cursory.

On the other hand, being a 'native' researcher and considered an 'insider' by the interviewees carried significant advantages. For example, I found interviewees to be more open when expressing their political views, with some stating that they only shared certain information because I was Indonesian. This was particularly so when several interviewees expressed their perception of the REDD+ initiative as being 'neo-colonial environmentalism'. Moreover, my position as a student from an eminent overseas university added another advantage as many interviewees, particularly government officials, wanted to voice their view in the hope and expectation that it would be captured in a final thesis. Being aware of this dynamic I ensured that, while acknowledging the possibility of my own bias, I strived to be as objective as possible in the course of data collection and data analysis.

Reflecting on the methods I chose to generate data, particularly with respect to the shadowing technique, I am aware that this poses a question relating to how long it should be done. The two and a half months of my shadowing work, in addition to six months of interviews at the national and sub-national levels and three months of pilot investigation, is indeed severely short in the lens of the tradition of participant observation (Silverman 2001). However, since the goal was not to achieve holistic representation but to examine the immediate results and potential impact of the institutional interplay between the REDD+ mechanism and village institutions, the method I deployed has served the purpose of the relevant research question posed (subsidiary research question 4). Nonetheless, I recognise the limitation of this technique: shadowing can be awkward for the 'shadowed' person, ambiguous for the researcher, and inconvenient for others (Czarniawska 2007) though in all these

contexts a native researcher is at an advantage. I quickly developed a good relationship with my shadowed subjects, and by helping them in their work as 'community engagement officers' and spending a considerable amount of casual time with them I minimised the 'distance' and feeling of awkwardness they might otherwise have held.

As mentioned earlier, since every research project is 'knowledge co-production' between the researcher and the research objects, the process of transformation is at work, ie 'reduction' and 'amplification' where at each stage of the research process 'something is reduced and other things are gained' (Latour 1999, p 70). I am aware that while I attempted to interpret the data and shape it into narrative or text, much was reduced. During the course of my research I constantly had to decide which data was relevant for recording and which should be included in the final text. Nonetheless, during the same process 'amplification' (Latour 1999) also took place, ie the construction of new meanings or concepts when key elements of the data are constantly being compared (Charmaz 2006).

Moreover, I am aware that since my research is a 'case study' my findings represent a particular period of time and thus their validity is temporal (Ellinger et al. 2005). Here 'case study' is broadly defined as scholarly investigation of a specific phenomenon based on a research aim, and which usually describes a series of events and their relationships as they occurred (Dooley 2002, Stake 1994, Yin 1994). In my research, the examination of how REDD+ institutions effect governance reform within Indonesia's forest institutions served as a case study for the general research aim, ie the institutional interplay between an international policy mechanism with relevant

institutions at the national and sub-national levels. Another limitation of a case study method is its ability to generalise the case study's results at a broader level (Yin 1994). Nevertheless, as mentioned in the introductory chapter, my overarching objective is to contribute an empirical finding from an Indonesian case to the global comparative study of many other REDD+ case studies conducted at different geographical locations (by many other researchers) both in the same period as well as at different times. My contribution to the collective findings can then contribute to the effort to assess the probable effectiveness of REDD+ institutions operating under a post-2012 climate change regime.

During the course of my research, there were limitations of access and time that prevent certain interviews and observation from taking place, and certain documents from being unearthed. Nonetheless, through my attempt to deploy mixed methods of data collection, and the holistic process of data analysis, I am confident that there is significant weight to my argument, something the reader can ponder and debate.

PLATES 15-18: ACTORS ACROSS SCALE AND SECTOR SURROUNDING THE DEVELOPMENT OF REDD+ POLICY

The following substantive chapters show how the REDD+ initiative attracted interest from actors across sectors at multi-levels of governance through which transnational and domestic networks, including organisations representing indigenous people and local communities, influence the policy-making of REDD+. **Plates 15-18** provide a pictorial representation of how these multiple networks become interacted via the introduction of the REDD+ initiative.

Plate 15: The UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon visited Palangkaraya, the capital city of Central Kalimantan Province (Indonesia's first selected REDD+ pilot Province)



Photo: Oeban (2011)

Notes: far left, the Governor of Central Kalimantan (Mr Teras Narang) shakes hand with the head of local 'Friends of the Earth' (Noorhadi), and H.E. Ban Ki-Moon shakes hand with the head of local NGO 'Pokker Shk' (both Noorhadi and Oeban were key informants in this research)

Plate 16: Press conference at the 'Forest Indonesia' conference where Minister Erik Solheim (Norway), Minister Jim Paice (United Kingdom), the World Bank's Andrew Steer, and CIFOR's Frances Seymour reiterated their support for the implementation of REDD+



Photo: Mulyani (2011)

Plate 17: Key actors within Indonesia's REDD+ Task Force



Photo: www.satgasreddplus.org

Note: these actors came from across sectors; from the left Iman Santoso (MoFor), Minister Kuntoro Mangunsubroto (Head of Task Force), Mubariq Ahmad (academic and representing the World Bank), Agus Sari (private sector), Nirarta Samadhi (academic and representing UNDP), and Chandra Kirana (academic)

Plate 18: Villagers at Desa Petak Puti receiving officers from the World Bank and the KFCP management team



Photo: Mulyani (2011)

CHAPTER 3

REDD+ AND FOREST GOVERNANCE IN INDONESIA: A MULTI-STAKEHOLDER STUDY OF PERCEIVED CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

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Abstract

Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) represents the strategic linkage between a climate change regime and international forest policy. But the future success of REDD+ will depend, in part, on how policy-makers perceive the challenges and opportunities it offers stakeholders. This study investigated perceptions towards REDD+ based on interviews with sixty Indonesia-based key-informants influencing REDD+ policy. Interviewees cited 'governance reform', 'network building', 'conservation' and 'economic development' as opportunities. The perceived challenges included 'REDD+'s complexity', 'uncertainty of REDD+ decisions', 'REDD+ is a tool of developed countries', and problems inherent within existing forest governance related to coordination, lack of capacity, ambiguity of legal system, and corruption. Adopting a clientelist perspective we draw attention to the underlying causes of these problems and the implication for REDD+. Despite highlighting significant challenges, most informants viewed the REDD+ mechanism as a potentially useful instrument to improve forest governance. Based on our findings, we suggest that identifying governance reforms that do not require major structural changes in the bureaucratic system in the short term holds the best chance of success for capitalising on the opportunities REDD+ may offer in the future.

Keywords

Climate change, forest governance, Indonesia, institutions, REDD+, clientelism

3.1. Introduction

This article contributes to grounded understandings of how the perceptions of national and sub-national level policy stakeholders influence the adoption of international environmental policy mechanisms. It takes its inspiration from Brown et al. (2011)'s study of perceptions of opportunities and challenges in implementing the REDD+ (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation) mechanism in the Congo Basin of Africa. We add an Indonesian case-study and extend Brown et al. (2011)'s work by asking more specifically how forestry institutions in Indonesia influence perceptions on the efficacy of REDD+ both as a mechanism for forest and carbon governance, but also how this mechanism becomes a lever for wider governance reform. A focus on perceptions recognises that whilst stakeholder perceptions may be based on incomplete or possibly misguided knowledge they influence the formulation and enactment of policies. Moreover, because perceptions *"can be a reflection of differing types of knowledge, assumptions, and value judgements, which are not independent of their discursive, institutional, and political contexts"* (Brown et al. 2011, p 383) there is a need to understand how internationally formulated mechanisms are perceived at the national level (and lower) if the efficient and effective enactment of international environmental policy is to be assured. Furthermore, this study employs a 'clientelist' perspective as a means to generate a more holistic understanding of the set of challenges and opportunities in implementing REDD+ in Indonesia.

The REDD+ mechanism is a component of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC): it is a response to evidence that tropical

forests account for over half of the carbon stored in terrestrial vegetation (Saatchi et al. 2011) and that processes of deforestation and forest degradation account for 12%-17% of total anthropogenic carbon emissions globally (IPCC 2007, Van der Werf et al. 2009). The international policy significance of REDD+ is underlined by the Cancun Agreements (UNFCCC 2011) and donor pledges amounting to nearly US\$5 billion (up until 2012) to encourage early action on REDD+ ('REDD readiness') among developing country Parties (Kanninen et al. 2010).

REDD+ comprises a broad set of initiatives aimed at conserving and enhancing forest carbon stocks and the sustainable management of forests, while tackling rural poverty and conserving biodiversity (UNFCCC 2011). It is based on the logic that: (a) quantification of forest carbon stocks enables a mechanism to pay for measurable reductions in forest carbon emissions, (b) investors will pay for such reductions because they will be cost-competitive compared to other forms of emission mitigation, and (c) as a result developing countries will adopt REDD+ because it provides financial incentives for policies to maintain and sustainably manage forest resources more efficiently (McDermott et al. 2012a, UNFCCC 2011). Two approaches for REDD+ implementation have been discussed within UNFCCC: (a) a project/result-based payment mechanism (UNFCCC 2011: Decision 1/CP.16-para 77), and (b) country-governed REDD+ programmes that could become part of wider NAMAs: Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (UNFCCC 2008: Decision 1/CP.13). Despite uncertainty over a future climate agreement and a lack of clarity in UNFCCC decisions on NAMAs they are expected to become the main mechanism for climate mitigation actions in developing countries under any future climate agreement (Tewari 2013).

Indonesia is a major target for adoption of the REDD+ mechanism. This is because it has the third largest area of tropical rainforest that supports the fourth largest forest carbon stock globally, that an estimated 80% of Indonesian's total annual carbon emissions result from its forestry sector, and there is a high level of political support for REDD+ adoption (Boer et al. 2009, FAO 2011a, Strassburg et al. 2008). Specifically, in 2009 President Yudhoyono committed to reduce Indonesia's emissions voluntarily by 26%, or 41% with international support, below 'business as usual' by year 2020 (REDD-I 2009).

The majority of Indonesia's forests were designated as 'State forest' under the Basic Forestry Law 5/1967, an act that brought 62-69% (120-133 million ha) of the country's total land surface under the legal jurisdiction of the Ministry of Forestry (MoFor) (Contreras et al. 2005). From the perspective of MoFor, REDD+ is the latest in a series of international policy initiatives through which international actors have sought to influence its governance of forest land. These include Reduced Impact Logging (early 1990s), the National Forest Programmes (1995-1997), the Integrated Conservation and Development Project (late 1990s), Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) certification (2000s) and, in a limited sense relating to afforestation/reforestation the Clean Development Mechanism (2005 - ongoing). Collectively, the impact of these initiatives is generally considered sub-optimal (Linkie et al. 2008, Wells et al. 1999).

This attributed to a set of problems inherent within Indonesia's historic forest governance, including poor coordination among government ministries, limited capacity to manage forests at multiple levels of government, and clientelist institutions characterised by 'rent-seeking' and a tradition of awarding access to forest resources

to supporters (Jepson et al. 2001, McCarthy 2005, 2006, Sunderlin et al. 2008). For instance, between 1967 and 1980 53 million ha were granted as timber concessions through non-bidding procedures (Barr 1998). The political instability following the fall of the Suharto New Order Regime (1967-1998) raised fears that resource-rich provinces might seek independence. In a political manoeuvre to weaken the power of this second-tier level of government President B.J. Habibie decentralised (1999-2002) forest management authority to the district level (3rd tier), including the right to issue small-scale (up to 100 ha) timber-extraction permits (MoFor Decree No. 31/1999) (Barr et al. 2006). This led to power struggles amongst different levels of government and chaotic forest governance (McCarthy 2000, Rosenbarger 2009). In short, international forest policy mechanisms interplay with a dynamic and complex political ecology affecting Indonesia's forests.

This article reports the findings of a study of the perceptions of stakeholders who were influencing the process of translating REDD+ into a national-level policy. It is not directly comparable to the Congo Basin study because we selected interviewees influencing REDD+ policy in Indonesia, whereas the former study chose interviewees on the basis of their decision-making role in climate change and forest issues rather than REDD+ policy issues specifically. The findings presented are intended to inform wider discussion of the effective and efficient delivery of REDD+ policy at the international and national level. They complement work on other aspects of REDD+ effectiveness such as MRV (Monitoring, Reporting and Verification) and reference levels (eg Cattaneo et al. 2010, Hajek et al. 2011), capacity building, readiness activities and financing (eg Angelsen et al. 2009, Nussbaum et al. 2009, Phelps et al. 2010), as

well as broader debates relating to ‘safeguards’ or ‘co-benefits’ in poverty alleviation, biodiversity protection, and human right protection (eg Cotula, Mayers 2009, Lyster 2010, Okereke, Dooley 2010, Pereira 2010). Whilst these issues are widely discussed there is less attention in the literature to perceptions of the opportunities and challenges of REDD+ from actors in REDD+ host countries (Brown et al. 2011). This study contributes findings on both the similarities and differences in perceptions between stakeholders in Indonesia and other countries and highlights the relevance of their perceptions for REDD+ implementation in the future.

3.2. Methods

Key-informant interviews were combined with content analysis of REDD+ policy documents, particularly the UNFCCC decisions on REDD+ and Indonesia’s National REDD+ Strategy. A purposive sampling method was employed to identify key individuals influencing REDD+ policy making or implementation based on their level of engagement, expertise and standing (Patton 2002). Interviewees and topics were identified through a pilot investigation conducted between June and August 2010 in Jakarta and Central Kalimantan, and from a combination of policy documents, networking, and recommendations of interviewees. Central Kalimantan was chosen because it is the first REDD+ pilot province selected in Indonesia.

Sixty key-informant interviews were conducted between June-December 2011: in London and Oxford (7), Jakarta (40), and Palangkaraya (provincial capital of Central Kalimantan; 13). A semi-structured interview format was adopted based on the main question, *“Can REDD+ be used as a means to improve existing forest governance?”* A

standard format of questions was applied consistently to all interviewees with question delivery adapted during the process to reflect the interviewees' responses (Merriam 1998). Most questions were open-ended to provide key-informants with the flexibility necessary to express their personal experience and perceptions on the most important issues. Interviews lasted 45 to 90 minutes, the majority were recorded (with consent), transcribed and coded using nVivo software⁶ (QSR 2012). Where interviewees asked not to be recorded (mostly in government ministries) notes were taken during the interview. The frequent, dominant and significant themes arising from the interviewees' comments were coded and categorised into, (a) 'opportunities' that REDD+ offers for Indonesia, and (b) 'challenges' for implementation (the majority of challenges cited related to 'root causes' affecting the existing forest governance). In addition, the weight accorded to a particular theme was assessed based on: (a) percentage of respondents mentioning the topic, and (b) the average order in which it was mentioned (ie taking immediacy as a proxy for emphasis).

To assure anonymity whilst gaining meaningful insights in the context of Indonesia's REDD+ policy setting, interviewees' quotes are referenced in a logical and consistent system (ie interviewees 1-60), and interviewees are assigned to one of six groups: (a) Echelon 1 government official (director general and assistant minister), (b) government official (director and sub-director), (c) Indonesian or expatriate official at an international organisation or a foreign embassy, (d) Indonesian or expatriate NGO policy officer, (e) academic/researcher, (f) private sector (head of a company in the

⁶ Developed in 1999 by Tom Richards, nVivo is qualitative data analysis computer software intended to help users organise unstructured data, to classify and arrange information and examine relationships in the data.

forestry sector). The distinction between ‘Indonesian’ and ‘expatriate’ is significant as this study is alert to the potential for bias in an interviewee’s response, reflecting their culture or the self-interest of the individual or the institution they serve. Table 3.1 reports the breakdown of the sixty key-informants according to their institution. It is noteworthy that the NGOs include actors from international and local NGOs and organisations representing the indigenous and local communities.

Table 3.1: Breakdown of 60 key-informants according to their institution

	Indonesia Government (multi-level)	International organisation/Donor	NGO	Private sector	Academic /Researcher
Indonesian	19	3	7	5	6
Expatriate		7	4	5	4
Total	19	10	11	10	10

3.3. Results

3.3.1. Perceptions of Challenges for REDD+

Interviews identified seven issues that were perceived as key challenges for REDD+ implementation. Of these, four relate to forest governance institutions in Indonesia and three to international relations. Coordination among ministries was perceived as a key challenge irrespective of organisational category, whereas other challenges were strongly associated with particular categories. For example, REDD+ as a tool of developed countries was emphasised by governmental interviewees and ambiguity of law by private sector and academic interviewees (see Table 3.2).

Table 3.2: Key perceptions of the challenges of implementing REDD+ in Indonesia according to five organisational categories in a 2011 interview of REDD+ stakeholders in Indonesia

Challenge Type	All Interviewee N = 60		Government (multilevel) N = 19		International Donor N = 10		NGO N = 11		Private sector N = 10		Academic/ Researcher N = 10	
	% Cite	Order cite	% Cite	Order cite	% Cite	Order cite	% Cite	Order cite	% Cite	Order cite	% Cite	Order cite
Coordination ¹	98.18	2.57	100	2.53	100	2.00	90.91	2.80	100	3.10	100	2.40
Complexity ²	86.08	3.34	89.47	3.00	50.00	1.80	90.91	4.30	100	3.90	100	3.70
Uncertainty ³	84.08	3.24	89.47	2.35	40.00	2.75	90.91	4.00	100	2.50	100	4.60
Lack of capacity ⁴	86.81	4.31	63.16	4.08	100	3.80	90.91	4.40	80.00	4.75	100	4.50
Ambiguity of legal system ⁵	84.02	2.63	47.37	3.22	100	3.60	72.73	2.25	100	2.00	100	2.10
Risk of corruption ⁶	81.37	3.65	36.84	4.57	70.00	2.57	100	2.91	100	3.90	100	4.30
Tool of developed countries ⁷	19.22	2.88	57.89	2.64	-	-	18.18	2.00	-	-	20.00	4.00

Note:

^{1,4,5,6}: relate to forest governance institutions in Indonesia.

^{2,3,7}: relate to international relations.

(-): not mentioned by the interviewees.

%-cite: percentage of interviewees mentioning the challenge.

Order cite: average order in which challenge type was mentioned by interviewees. '1' = highly emphasised, ie always mentioned first (taking immediacy as a proxy for emphasis), was assessed as being 'more important' or given 'stronger emphasis' by interviewees when compared with the respective order numbers.

Coordination Issues: Overlapping Authorities, Competing Interests, and 'ego sectoral'

All but one key-informant (59/60) perceived poor coordination among government ministries and between different levels of government as a major challenge for REDD+ implementation. Government officials spoke about 'ego sectoral' attitudes: how different ministries argue that they each have better laws and interpret them based on their own interests. An Indonesian academic summed this up as: *"Each ministry has its own 'sectoral' law which has equal power with other 'sectoral' laws, and since a coordinating minister is not empowered by law, 'coordination' [amongst the ministries] becomes a big issue"*. He perceived a 'tradition' in Indonesia whereby to overcome failings in a ministry, *"the President creates a new agency with a similar remit but without terminating the current institutions' responsibilities, thereby creating many overlapping authorities"*(59).

This point chimes with President Yudhoyono's 2010 decision (via Presidential Decree No. 19/2010 renewed by decree No. 25/2011) to create the REDD+ Task Force, mandated with preparing the national REDD+ infrastructure and coordinating all activities related to REDD+. Interviewees said this decision received strong resistance from MoFor and other existing ministries. One example of the intense political battles between MoFor and the new Task Force was the process for releasing the Presidential Decree No. 10/2011 (GoI 2011d) to suspend the licensing of new forestry concessions and publish an indicative moratorium map as required under the Norway-Indonesia US\$1 billion REDD+ partnership agreement (Letter of Intent [LoI] 2010).

Several interviewees noted that infighting between national and sub-national governments is also a problem. An expatriate from a donor agency cited the example of

a REDD+ demonstration activity approved by the national government which required two years to secure the approval of the district government because *“officials at the district level do not like to receive instruction from higher levels of government”* (36). A government official summed up the problem: *“Coordination is ‘an old disease’ which will not end. Indonesia’s bureaucracy is a battle ground; sometimes you win, sometimes you lose”* (9).

The Complexity of REDD+ and Misunderstanding Among stakeholders

The majority of key informants (52/60) perceived the complex and technical character of REDD+ as a major challenge for implementation. The Clean Development Mechanism (‘CDM’) was cited as an example of a complex mechanism which had proven difficult to communicate and implement, and several interviewees expressed concern that communicating the technical concepts and terms of REDD+ to district and village level stakeholders, who are mostly of a low educational level, might be even more challenging.

An Indonesian researcher asserted: *“the combination of the abstract concept of carbon and the limited capacity of ‘REDD+ facilitators’ has led to confusion and the misperception that REDD+ will automatically lead to the distribution of money”* (52). Interviewees with on-the-ground experience of REDD+ readiness activity told of villagers’ who, (a) think that because carbon is stored in the tree they can cut the tree, extract the carbon and sell it, (b) worry the government will prohibit them from entering the forests, and (c) are frustrated at not seeing any ‘REDD+ money’ after several years experiencing REDD+ demonstration activity in their area. Such

misunderstandings, and in particular the direct link between REDD+ and money, were perceived as a major risk to effective REDD+ implementation by all interviewees from the government, NGOs and research institutes with on-the-ground experience of REDD+ readiness activity, but were mentioned only briefly by interviewees from international organisations, REDD+ donors and private sector organisations.

The Implications of the Uncertainty Over a Future Climate Agreement and Its Effect on REDD+

Uncertainty over the future of a climate agreement and REDD+ was perceived as a significant challenge by most interviewees from the government, private sector and research organisations, but was mentioned only briefly by interviewees from NGOs and REDD+ donor organisations. Government and private sector interviewees generally believed that this uncertainty was having a negative impact on the demand for forest carbon and thereby its price, which in turn undermined the ability of REDD+ to compete economically with the traditional timber businesses or the mining industry. For instance, an echelon 1 official asserted that Indonesia will not cut its trees if the price of carbon credits exceeds the price of timber (2). At the time of the interviews carbon was trading at between US\$5 to US\$6 per ton CO₂e (Gordon et al. 2011). Interviewees revealed that this low carbon price has lessened interest from the private sector as well as district level government. A national-level government official told how when trying to convince a head of district ('Bupati') to adopt REDD+ the Bupati responded that his interest was on the benefits that can be seen in less than five years, ie his tenure period in office (40). This 'wait-and-see' attitude was perceived as a major barrier to REDD+

implementation since it undermines efforts to achieve consistent perspectives among government officials on REDD+-related policies.

Lack of Capacity

Local and international NGOs, academics and some government interviewees external to the MoFor strongly expressed the view that lack of capacity (particularly with regard to law enforcement) within government forest management agencies at all levels represented a major challenge for REDD+ implementation. An interviewee from an organisation representing indigenous people said he did not believe MoFor had the capability to manage 10% of the 133 million ha of forests under their jurisdiction, and that this is when *“forests become ‘open access’, when all the illegal logging and illegal mining happens (20).”* A non-MoFor government official told how when MoFor *‘took back’* forest concessions from *‘Suharto cronies’* in the late 1990s the logging machinery was left with workers and in the absence of any capacity to control their activities *‘open access’* resulted (14). In contrast, most interviewees from MoFor blamed the high deforestation rate in the early 2000s on decentralisation and the lack of capacity within sub-national governments to regulate forest access.

The Ambiguity of the Legal System Surrounding Forests

A large proportion of interviewees (48/60) regarded the uncertainty and ambiguity of the legal system surrounding forests as a major issue that could undermine the success of REDD+ implementation. As mentioned earlier, Indonesia’s legal system is complex because each ministry has its own (sectoral) laws which often conflict with others, and

because there are many discrepancies in forestry regulations between national and sub-national government that result in overlapping forest concessions (Barr et al. 2006).

Interviewees noted that overlapping forest concessions (more evident in the decentralisation period: 1999-2002) was a particular challenge for REDD+ implementation. In the words of an interviewee from the private sector: *"There are always overlapping concessions. We are looking at thirty REDD+ projects and want to invest, but there are a lot of mining and other businesses in natural resources that try to get concessions on the land allocated for REDD pilot projects"* (45). Similarly interviewees with experience of the Central Kalimantan REDD+ pilot project told how some demonstration sites allocated by the MoFor in Jakarta were found to have forest land use permits issued by the district government already in place. In addition, private sector interviewees saw the lack of clarity in regulations relating to revenue sharing and 'carbon ownership', and the opaque nature of regulations concerning the acquisition of ecosystem restoration concessions (which form the basis of some REDD+ projects), as significant challenges. Interviewees from the academic/research community, NGOs and non-MoFor government officials emphasised the lack of clarity in Indonesian law relating to community land rights, asserting that unless this issue is resolved future REDD+ implementation faces a high risk of conflict with local communities. A government official in the President's Office for Climate Change said addressing the issue of land tenure conflict is an important initiative under the current presidency (9), but it was notable that interviewees from MoFor did not mention the issue which was said to be 'taboo' within the ministry (25). Nonetheless, when pressed to respond to this issue several MoFor interviewees emphasised that under the existing Basic Forestry

Law No. 41/1999 their ministry held legitimacy to manage the 'State forest' and they were merely fulfilling their responsibility.

Risk of Corruption

The risk of corruption in REDD+ implementation was perceived as a key challenge (44/60 of interviewees) except by MoFor officials who generally avoided the topic during the interviews. An expatriate Indonesia-based researcher (58) pointed to the huge corruption involved in the disbursement of the Indonesia Reforestation Fund. Established in 1989, and financed by a volume-based levy paid by timber concessionaires, it is reported to have lost 89% of its value in 1997 (US\$5.8 billion) through mismanagement and fraud (Barr et al. 2010). This history was reflected in comments such as MoFor *"sees REDD+ as a threat"* (20), *"is not very serious about REDD+"* (38), and *"they are so powerful and are known to be corrupt"* (34).

Nonetheless, the rigorous accounting and reporting procedures attached to REDD+ funds from international donors are intended to guard against corruption. However, an interviewee from a donor agency with early experience in implementing REDD+ demonstration activity described how alternative 'incentives' had to be found, *"such as sending the officials for a 'study tour' overseas"* in order to secure their support and permits from district government (36). Several interviewees extended the theme of corruption to 'carbon cowboy', a term used to describe a person or company (mostly foreign entities) who were perceived to have profited by misleading both government officers and communities on REDD+. Added to this was the perception widely cited by interviewees external to donor agencies that only a small part of the REDD+ funding disbursed by developed countries reached local communities. In the words of a

government official, *“the majority of funds went back to their (international) consultants and to pay for international flights and meetings at luxurious hotels”* (19).

REDD+ is a Tool for the Developed Countries to Control Developing Countries

The perception that REDD+ is a means for developed countries to limit the economic development of developing countries was expressed less frequently (15/60) by interviewees in MoFor, other government departments, NGOs and research institutions, but nevertheless with strong emphasis. When held by policy-makers this perception can have a significant impact on how REDD+ policies are shaped, enacted and implemented. Three examples illustrate a common story line expressed by interviewees from MoFor and other long-term bureaucrats: *“developed countries want to stop us utilising our forests for their own benefit”* (6), *“developed countries [are] continuously blaming developing countries for deforestation but never wanting to address the demand side”* (2), *“We have to be cautious of REDD+ [...] Why do we think they [Norway] want to give US 1 billion dollars? What is their business? Its oil, so they are a [greenhouse gas] emitter. There is also a possibility that their business is pulp and paper so they don’t want us to cut our forests. This is a global competition!”* (12). More forcefully an interviewee from a local NGO described ‘carbon offsets’ in terms of developed countries *“use(ing) our forests as their toilet...they want ‘carbon offsets’ so that they can continue to emit [GHG]”*. These sentiments interplay with reasoning raised by some government officials that ignoring REDD+ creates the risk of Indonesia being isolated by the international community, which would negatively affect other national interests such as trade.

3.3.2. Perceptions of Opportunities for REDD+

We identified four issues that were perceived as opportunities arising from the implementation of REDD+ in Indonesia (Table 3.3). Together, these suggest that REDD+ is no longer seen as merely a mechanism for GHG emissions reduction but also as a means to effect reform within the forestry sector and to achieve ‘co-benefits’ in poverty reduction, biodiversity conservation, and the protection of the rights of indigenous and local communities.

Governance Reform

The majority of the interviewees (55/60) perceived REDD+ as a significant opportunity to build momentum for improvements in forest governance as it has placed the issue high on Indonesia’s political agenda. A common response from the NGOs was the hope that the mechanism can support their own objectives, eg solving the ‘tenure-based conflicts’ and protection of the community and indigenous peoples’ rights to forests. One interviewee from an organisation representing indigenous people asserted that the main goal of REDD+ should be to reform policies that support the non-sustainable extraction of natural resources (20). Several interviewees stressed the importance of REDD+ as an opportunity to tackle the link between poor governance and deforestation. They cited the REDD+-initiated moratorium on issuing new forest licenses seeing it as a ‘breathing space’ for government to review and improve regulations on land use change and to strengthen dialogue with community groups on land tenure reform.

The notion of ‘transparency’ was cited widely with respect to the development of the National REDD+ Strategy. One interviewee from an NGO representing local

communities' rights said: *"I have never experienced any process [of policy making] so transparent in the history of Indonesia's forest governance. Our organisation is invited to give input and a lot is incorporated in the final draft (21).* Many interviewees from the NGOs, academic/research institutions and international organisations commented how the head of the REDD+ Task Force had been willing to accommodate calls for government to address the issue of 'rights' via the REDD+ mechanism. Similarly, others asserted that the real promise of REDD+ is that it addresses issues of transparency, participation, tenure and legal reform, which collectively characterise the democratic process and as one interviewee commented, *"once people start to embrace democracy it is very difficult to stop"* (34). An unexpected finding was the perception of most private sector interviewees (9/10) that REDD+ created a momentum that might facilitate an overhaul of government bureaucracy and change the business paradigm from a 'short term' orientation to a long term sustainable one.

Table 3.3: Key perceptions of the opportunities from implementing REDD+ in Indonesia according to five organisational categories in a 2011 interview of REDD+ stakeholders in Indonesia

Opportunity Type	All Interviewee N = 60		Government (multilevel) N = 19		International Donor N = 10		NGO N = 11		Private sector N = 10		Academic/ Researcher N = 10	
	%Cite	Order cite	%Cite	Order cite	%Cite	Order cite	%Cite	Order cite	%Cite	Order cite	%Cite	Order cite
Governance reform	98.18	2.57	100	2.53	100	2.00	90.91	2.80	100	3.10	100	2.40
Network building	86.08	3.34	89.47	3.00	50.00	1.80	90.91	4.30	100	3.90	100	3.70
Conservation/Sustainable forest	84.08	3.24	89.47	2.35	40.00	2.75	90.91	4.00	100	2.50	100	4.60
Economic development	86.81	4.31	63.16	4.08	100	3.80	90.91	4.40	80.00	4.75	100	4.50

Note:

%-cite: percentage of interviewees mentioning the opportunity.

Order cite: average order in which opportunity type was mentioned by interviewees. '1' = highly emphasised, ie always mentioned first (taking immediacy as a proxy for emphasis) was assessed as being 'more important' or given 'stronger emphasis' by interviewees when compared with the respective order numbers.

Network Building

Many informants (51/60) perceived REDD+ as an opportunity to foster and strengthen network building between local and international organisations. Some examples cited were: (a) the Governor Climate Forum which comprises 16 states and provinces globally including five from Indonesia), (b) provincial government's engagement with local NGOs in readiness activities, and (c) the network formed between local universities in Central Kalimantan and foreign universities to improve capacity in the science and practice of the MRV of carbon stocks. Strengthening collaboration between grass root organisations and international donors was perceived as a particular opportunity by interviewees from Central Kalimantan who had experienced funding channelled through the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation, CIFOR (Center for International Forestry Research), and the Clinton Climate Initiative. An interviewee from an indigenous community organisation argued that the only reason MoFor recognised their existence was because REDD+ had enabled them to align with similar international organisations, thereby creating a credible voice at the global level (20). Many interviewees across organisational categories commented on the 'transparent' and 'participatory' process of developing the National REDD+ Strategy and how this had facilitated a more open dialogue among government agencies, and between government and the NGOs.

Conservation and Sustainable Forest Management

A widely perceived (51/60 interviewees) but less strongly expressed opportunity was the potential for REDD+ to achieve forest conservation or the sustainable management of forests. The term 'conservation' was used mainly by the NGOs, and

‘sustainability’/‘sustainable forestry’ by government and private sector interviewees. An official outside MoFor stated that REDD+ is a *“sustainable choice, something we should do for our next generation, instead of following the ways of the mining industry which has a short term vision”* (9). All MoFor interviewees expressed the view that their ministry has made efforts towards making forests sustainable, and whilst generally not overly-enamoured with REDD+ several of them expressed hope that REDD+, with its attendant massive attention from the international community, would accelerate their efforts. Similarly, high-ranking officials at both the provincial and district government levels expressed hope that REDD+ would help wider society achieve a better awareness of forest conservation. An NGO interviewee felt that *“REDD+ provides a momentum to actually push things [conservation work] which we have been working on all this time”* (28) and several private sector interviewees thought that REDD+ offered a means to change their sector’s ethos from cutting timber to conserving it and establishing ‘sustainable business’ models for forestry.

Economic Development

Interviewees (50/60) expressed the economic opportunities in a less optimistic tone despite their recognition of the level of international funding for REDD+-readiness activities (Indonesia has received the largest amount of funding pledges internationally, nearly US\$2 billion including US\$1 billion committed by Norway (IGES 2012)). This less optimistic view was expressed largely because of policy uncertainty, low carbon prices, and high transaction costs. Most interviewees from the private sector and some from MoFor mentioned that by attempting to achieve many things

(eg biodiversity, conservation and social benefits) the cost of REDD+ implementation has become too high, thereby undermining its economic potential. Nevertheless, expectation was raised particularly by interviewees from the NGOs and sub-national governments that REDD+ income should be used to enhance local economic and livelihood opportunities. Another hope expressed by several government officials, NGOs and academic/researchers was that REDD+ readiness activities, including network-building, capacity-building, policy review and regulatory reform, would help prepare the framework for a 'green economy'. In addition, some saw government action to build a 'one map system' (inspired by REDD+) as a crucial step towards a better and transparent system of land use planning which would lay the foundation for increased economic benefits (eg through directing palm oil production and agricultural forestry to land already degraded).

3.4. Discussion

This study identified seven perceived challenges and four perceived opportunities relating to REDD+ implementation in Indonesia. Four of the challenges, related to issues in forest governance and the REDD+-methodology, have already been identified in the literature on REDD+ and also by Brown et al. (2011)'s study in the Congo Basin. These are challenges associated with coordination among government agencies, lack of implementation capacity, corruption and the complexity of REDD+ (see eg Brown et al. 2011, Bozmoski, Hultman 2010, Caravani, Graham 2011, Dermawan et al. 2011, May et al. 2011). In addition, this study found that uncertainty over the future of an

international agreement on climate change, the implications this may have for REDD+ and the direct effects on market demand and price for carbon, has generated a negative perception on the economic viability of the mechanism. Two other significant perceptions concerned challenges relating to the ambiguity of Indonesia's legal system surrounding forests and related land-tenure issues, and the perception that REDD+ is a tool used by developed countries to limit the economic development of developing countries.

In our study the architectural and methodological complexity of REDD+ (eg the establishment of a baseline and issues of leakage, permanence, and the MRV system (Clémenton 2008)) was perceived as a challenge because it renders Indonesia dependent upon expatriate skills and knowledge, and requires coordination between several different Ministries (eg Forestry, Agriculture, and the Land Use Planning Unit) where coordination is historically problematic (Atmadja, Wollenberg 2010). This perception was undoubtedly influenced by the poor performance of CDM in Indonesia and globally which was widely attributed to the interplay between its methodological complexity with the broader political structures, institutions, and conflicts of the host country (eg Newell 2009, Restuti, Michaelowa 2007).

With regard to corruption, whilst Brown et al. (2011) subsumed it under the heading of 'sharing of revenues' our interviewees stated this challenge more explicitly as corruption. This may be a consequence of differences in methodology between the two studies: our main interview question was *"Can REDD+ be used as a means to improve existing forest governance?"* whereas Brown et al. (2011) asked their interviewees whether they were aware of REDD+ and their perception of its

opportunities and challenges. Our framing of the question prompted interviewees' response about problems inherent within existing forest governance. Moreover, we included policy-makers with pre-existing knowledge of REDD+ whereas Brown et al. (2011) interviewed actors with decision-making roles in climate change and forest issues generally. Furthermore, combating corruption has a high public and political profile in Indonesia (discussed below). Nonetheless, the theme of 'corruption' appears broadly similar as they both refer to concerns of 'who will and who should' receive REDD+ financial benefits.

The issue of land tenure, which has been flagged as a major challenge for forest governance reform by a succession of analysts (eg McCarthy 2000, Contreras et al. 2005, McDermott et al. 2010), was widely recognised by our interviewees external to MoFor as a key challenge to REDD+ implementation. The lack of recognition by MoFor interviewees was explained in terms of the topic being 'taboo' but also the view that their role is to manage Indonesia's forests based on the existing legal framework. Interviewees external to MoFor perceived land tenure is a major challenge because as a market-based mechanism REDD+ requires 'binding contracts', which in turn requires legal clarity on who owns forest land and the carbon credits 'produced', whom is to be paid, and who is to be held responsible for both delivering and avoiding the leakage of the carbon-related services. Our study draws attention to the problem of overlapping forest concessions (which was exacerbated by the government's decentralisation policy) that undermines REDD+ efficacy. The significance of this issue is recognised by our interviewees and analysts of Indonesian forest governance, but we question whether the difficulties of resolving this issue are fully appreciated by REDD+ policy-

makers outside Indonesia. This is because this issue is closely related to the deeply-embedded 'clientelist' institutions which will become clearer in the discussion to follow.

The perception that REDD+ is a tool of developed countries adds a new and important dimension to understanding the challenges of implementing REDD+ and indicates that old antipathies, perhaps dating back to colonial times, are still at play. If government policy-makers perceive that REDD+ serves the interest of developed countries at the cost of Indonesia, those with influence are likely to slow down the process. For example, although the REDD+ Strategy document was completed in June 2012 it is widely known that major political struggles among the ministries has resulted in the REDD+ National Agency not yet being finalised.

The four opportunities identified - governance reform, network building, conservation and sustainable forest management, and economic development - can be understood in the context of wider political and societal change in Indonesia. During the 'reformasi' period (1997-2003), which followed the collapse of the Suharto regime, policies were put in place to create a clean state administration, including the formation of the Corruption Eradication Commission (GoI 2002a). REDD+ gives an external and additional push to this reform agenda. As cited by many interviewees, the two year moratorium on new forest licenses, the participatory process to develop the National Strategy for REDD+ (the Strategy) and the inclusion of governance reform in the Strategy, are considered tangible manifestations of progress towards improved forest governance and bigger national agendas (Edwards et al. 2012, Murdiyarso et al. 2011). In particular, the Strategy explicitly includes fundamental preconditions for

governance reform including, inter alia, the improvement of the quality of forest data and related laws, the guarantee of forest access and tenure for indigenous and local communities, the creation of a 'one map programme', and the improvement of law enforcement capacity (GoI 2012). The lack of these pre-conditions was seen as a key reason for previous international policy initiatives (as summarised in the Introduction) failing to effect reform in the forestry sector (Gellert 2010). Several analysts asserted that REDD+ has the potential to change the balance of the underlying economic market forces and policies that currently favour deforestation and the exploitation of forest assets, and to create opportunities for necessary reforms both inside and outside the forestry sector (Brockhaus et al. 2012, Clémentçon 2008).

The analytical perspective of Clientelism offers a means to generate a more holistic understanding of the set of challenges and opportunities this study identified. Clientelism describes an old and widespread form of social organisation also known as 'patron-client relations' (Eisenstadt, Roniger 1984, Neher 1996). It involves complex chains of personal bonds between political patrons and their individual clients founded on mutual advantage, whereby the patron offers resources and protection and assures a basic social safety net; in return their clients provide loyalty and political support (Auyero 1999, Graziano 1976). This system is deeply-embedded in Indonesian institutions; indeed the Indonesian word 'Bapak' is used for both patron and father (Jepson 2001, McCarthy 2002).

Clientelist systems institutionalise the informal and semi-informal exchange of money (fees) and power which can be viewed as corrupt. However, it is important to understand the term 'rent-seeking' when analysing the perceptions and actions of

government officials (Brown 1999). Rent-seeking refers to a set of revenue-generating practices conducted by government officials to generate 'rents' in order to pay departmental salaries, build and maintain offices, and finance operations (Phongpaichit et al. 1994). To illustrate this point the 'salary' of most senior MoFor civil servants is around US\$450 per month or US\$900 including allowances (GoI 2011b), whilst achieving a standard of living in Jakarta equivalent to that of a mid-level expatriate advisor would require a monthly income of US\$10,000 (GoI 2002b). Rent-seeking activities are therefore conducted partly to overcome what each ministry determines to be salary and other budget shortfalls. In the case of MoFor these activities generate fees linked to forest concessions, timber extraction and monitoring, as well as a set of practices known locally as 'milking' aid flows (Jepson 2001). Whilst 'rent-seeking' under the Suharto authoritarian regime was centrally controlled (Brown 1999), the succeeding decentralisation of government has resulted in rent-seeking becoming out of control (Barr et al. 2001). This background contributes to the interviewees' perception of the risk of corruption in the implementation of REDD+.

From a clientelist perspective an underlying rationale can be discerned for issues framed as challenges. For instance, (a) an uncertain and ambiguous legal system creates the opportunity for government facilitators to charge a 'consultancy' fee for helping companies navigate the legal minefield when seeking to procure a forest concession, (b) poor coordination among ministries assures that other agencies do not undermine established rent-seeking practices or compete for them, and (c) uncertainty of land ownership may strengthen clientelist relations because certainty can be secured through the development of a mutually favourable exchange between patron,

client and broker. Under a clientelist system the lack of capacity to manage forests is difficult to resolve because there is no real incentive to develop technical capacity since the role of a governmental office is as much to extract rents as it is to deliver public services. A 'clientelist' perspective draws attention to the challenge of changing deeply-entrenched 'rent-seeking' practices and the need to develop new financing models to replace them. Moreover, it underscores the problem of untangling networks of informal exchange and agreements that may involve powerful actors over time.

Despite highlighting these challenges, interviewees expressed hope that REDD+ institutions, with their rigorous system of MRV and safeguards that emphasise transparency and the participation of relevant stakeholders (UNFCCC 2011: Annex I), together with the sheer magnitude of financial support, will play a significant role in improving existing forest governance and contribute to the development of 'sustainable forestry'. As asserted by other analysts, promoters of REDD+ need to convince established actors that it offers more opportunities than threats (Di Gregorio et al. 2012). To this we would add that they need to show how REDD+ can offer a viable alternative to rent-seeking through, for example, the transparent benefit sharing regulations under REDD+.

However, interviewees in this study were not very optimistic concerning the opportunities for economic development under REDD+. They expressed concerns that future REDD+ income will be insufficient to cover both the opportunity and the transaction costs. Nonetheless, expectations were raised that REDD+ income should be used to achieve 'co-benefits' (eg to improve the livelihood of forest dependent people and forest conservation). These perceptions were also found in separate studies in the

Provinces of Jawa Tengah, Central Kalimantan and Jambi (Purnomo et al. 2012, Suyanto, Noordwijk 2009). In short, given the combination of a low carbon price (Euro3.50 in May 2013 (Szabo 2013)), uncertainty over long-term financing and the many expectations placed on REDD+, it may prove difficult for the mechanism to serve as a viable alternative to the entrenched modes of forestry financing in Indonesia.

3.5. Conclusion

This study identified key perceptions of REDD+ opportunities and implementation challenges in Indonesia based on interviews with stakeholders influencing the formulation of national-level REDD+ policy. Whilst many interviewees across organisational categories (government, international donor, private sector, academic/researcher and NGO) identified the same challenges and opportunities their order of importance was emphasised differently.

The common perception related to forest governance highlights the interdependency between existing forest governance and REDD+ institutions. Whilst the problems inherent within Indonesia's historic forest governance (ie coordination, lack of capacity, ambiguity of legal system, and corruption) were perceived as a major challenge for REDD+ efficacy, most interviewees thought the REDD+ mechanism held promise as a means to improve forest governance. To this end, we suggest that the combination of the strong 'safeguards' within the REDD+ mechanism, the magnitude of financial support, and the timing of its introduction which coincides with a strong national movement for governance reform creates the best chance yet for a

meaningful reform within forest governance institutions. Indications of success are already emerging; for instance stakeholder capacity and network-building, the improvement of forest data quality and its transparency, and the review and improvement of relevant laws. We consider these important pre-conditions for reform and their absence previously may explain why earlier international forest governance instruments (summarised in the introduction) failed to effect reform in the forestry sector.

However, this optimistic assessment needs to be tempered with the perception that REDD+ is a tool for developed countries to gain competitive economic advantage, and concern that income under REDD+ will be insufficient to compete with the traditional timber business. When held by key-actors influential in the forestry sector, such perceptions are likely to have significant impact on how REDD+ policies are enacted and implemented. From a 'clientelist' perspective this is a major challenge because actors who have benefitted from the status-quo for generations are unlikely to see REDD+ as a viable means for forestry financing whilst the carbon price is low. Given the potential contribution of the REDD+ mechanism towards climate change mitigation, achieving national economic development, and the sustainable management of forests, it is important that the international community work together to ensure the economic viability of the REDD+ mechanism.

Policy Recommendations

This study recognises the intent of actors external to the MoFor and existing ministries to use the REDD+ mechanism as a tool for effecting major structural change and

governance reform within the forestry sector. However, past experience showed that any new policy initiative will fail without securing support from existing influential actors. Since this support is contingent on their perceiving that any new policy mechanism will neither weaken nor threaten their position, we suggest a pragmatic approach is to identify governance reforms that do not require major structural changes in the bureaucratic system in the short term. For instance, policies included in the National REDD+ Strategy such as the: review and improvement of laws related to the management of land-based resources, tenure and rights for indigenous and local communities, a 'one roof' enforcement system and improvement of forest prosecutors and police, are reforms that can potentially be enacted without unsettling or dismantling the existing bureaucratic system. In contrast, proposals to establish a REDD+ national agency external to MoFor might prove problematic.

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CHAPTER 4

POLICY NETWORKS AND GOVERNANCE REFORM IN INDONESIA: A STUDY OF THE POLICY-MAKING PROCESS FOR THE NATIONAL REDD+ STRATEGY

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4.1. Introduction

The role of transnational networks in creating the institutions of international environmental governance is widely recognised. Specifically, transnational networks are central to processes for establishing the conventions, norms and rules based on the principles of good governance that guide and structure collective efforts to manage environmental problems (Betsill, Bulkeley 2004, Corbera, Schroeder 2011, Evans 2012, Newell 2000). These networks, which involve state and non-state actors, operate simultaneously within domestic and international political arenas and may have a significant degree of autonomy from the state (Andonova et al. 2009, Betsill, Bulkeley 2004, Bulkeley, Schroeder 2011, Risse-Kappen 1995). Termed a 'policy network', the relationship between government and other actors in public policy-making is structured around shared interests, whereby their interaction happens continuously because of their need to exchange resources, with policies emerging from the negotiations between the networks' members (Borzel 1997, Rhodes 2007, Sørensen, Torfing 2007). Scholars concerned with transnational environmental

governance seek to understand how institutions are emerging through trans-boundary networks, coalitions and actors (Bulkeley, Jordan 2012).

In the climate change policy arena attention has largely been focused on the policy-making process and negotiations at the international level (Bulkeley 2000). Though this is essential to an understanding of how global climate agreements are determined, the role of those processes at the national level that impact both the formation and the implementation of such international agreements is equally critical (Bulkeley 2000, p 727). This paper seeks to contribute to the debate on national policy-making by examining the process for the development of the national strategy for REDD+ (the 'Strategy') in Indonesia, focusing its analysis on the adoption of the principles of good governance within the Strategy. The study adopts the premise that as all future government action plans for REDD+ in Indonesia will be based on this Strategy, the adoption (or not) of the principles of good governance within this policy document will influence the ability of the REDD+ mechanism to effect reform within forest governance and consequently the success of its future implementation.

REDD+ ('Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation, and enhancing forest carbon stocks and conservation') is a mitigation policy under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) which is designed to provide developing countries with financial incentives to produce measurable reductions in carbon emissions (UNFCCC 2011). Because of the complex nature of the mitigation challenge in climate change, the development of the REDD+ mechanism has involved the interaction of multiple networks concerned with particular sub-issues related to forest governance and development (Andonova et al. 2009, Bulkeley, Jordan

2012, Schroeder 2010, Thompson et al. 2011). These networks include, amongst others, epistemic communities such as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), academic and research institutions, transnational NGO advocacy networks, international financial institutions such as the World Bank, and global civil society networks including organisations representing the indigenous people. Of particular importance, through their engagement with REDD+ initiatives some indigenous communities have managed to gain a voice and strengthen their influence over REDD+ decision-making (Mulyani, Jepson 2013 – chapter 3 of this thesis, Schroeder, McDermott 2014). REDD+ is notable because the initial imperative to create markets for forest carbon represented a form of departure from traditional state-centric forms of forest governance. Moreover, the incorporation of a broad range of objectives (from emission reduction to poverty alleviation to human rights and biodiversity protection) has opened spaces for networks promoting broader governance agendas to engage with the design of REDD+ (Andonova et al. 2009, Angelsen et al. 2012, McDermott et al. 2012a, 2012b).

One influential agenda that was incorporated in the design of REDD+ is the principle of ‘good governance’. The concept was brought forward by the United Nations as early as the 1960s (Weiss 2000) and gained significant momentum in the late 1980s with the emergence of transnational governance networks that acted as its key promoter (Gellert 2010, Nomura 2008). These networks included international NGOs (that gained significant growth in late 1980s as a result of the spread of democratic ideas) and the international financial institutions (a la the World Bank and the IMF) who incorporate good governance principles as conditions of financial lending

to developing countries (Gellert 2010, Nanda 2006, Nomura 2008). The concept of good governance seeks to embed several norms in the conduct of government at all levels. The principles most enlisted being transparency, participation, equity and fairness, coherence, coordination, effectiveness and efficiency (Carlsson et al. 1995, Davis 2010, Heldeweg 2005). These norms are explicitly incorporated within the UNFCCC decisions on REDD+, notably through the 'REDD+ safeguards' mechanism (UNFCCC 2011: Annex I 2 (a-e)). This study examines the interplay of these 'good governance' principles that are embedded in REDD+ institutions at the international level with the process of translation into REDD+ policy at the national level in Indonesia.

Indonesia is an important case study for three principle reasons. 1) Its forest governance has been widely criticised for, among other things, an explicitly rent-seeking environment (Brown 1999, Jepson et al. 2001, McCarthy 2010), poor coordination amongst government ministries (Sunderlin et al. 2008), uncertainty and ambiguity in the legal system governing forests (Barr et al. 2006, Rosenbarger 2009), all of which runs counter to the principles of good governance. 2) The country's 130 million ha of forests represents the fourth largest forest carbon stock globally (Resosudarmo et al. 2014, Strassburg et al. 2008). Consequently Indonesia is a major recipient of REDD+ development funds (including the US\$1 billion committed by the government of Norway (LoI 2010) and is advanced in developing its national REDD+ strategy. 3) REDD+ 'entered' Indonesia in 2007, almost ten years after the collapse of the Suharto New Order regime and the rise of a 'reformasi' movement to create state

administration free from corruption, collusion and nepotism, a movement which gained a broad political and public mandate (Luttrell et al. 2014).

The analysis of this paper is based on the review of literature and policy documents (such as the UNFCCC decisions on REDD+ and Indonesian policy documents, particularly the National REDD+ Strategy) to ascertain the forest governance and policy context. This combined with sixty key informant interviews, conducted between June-December 2011 and between August-September 2012, to enable an understanding of the process of networks' formation and their dynamics. Interviewees included those identified from the literature review and others recommended by interviewees. They represented multi-level government officials (national and sub-national governments), forest industry actors, REDD+ project developers, donor agencies and international organisations, NGOs and academia/researchers. To assure anonymity in the following narrative interviewees are referenced by a unique number (ie 1-60) and where appropriate their organisational affiliation.

Employing a policy network approach, this study focuses its investigation on the process of policy networks' formation and how different networks intersect and members negotiate with each other. Moreover, paying particular attention to transnational networks, it investigated the roles of different networks in enforcing the implementation of certain principles of good governance in the policy-making process and their subsequent adoption within the REDD+ Strategy. The principles of good governance as articulated within the UNFCCC's decisions for REDD+, ie within the

‘safeguards’ and guidance for REDD+ policies and activities (UNFCCC 2011: Annex I 1-2), are examined within the Strategy development process and the resulting document. These UNFCCC’s decisions (UNFCCC 2011: Annex I 1-2) state that developing country Parties undertaking REDD+ activities should promote, inter alia, transparent and effective governance (transparency), respect for knowledge and the rights of indigenous peoples and local communities (equity and fairness), stakeholder participation (participation), enhancement of social and environmental benefits (effectiveness), consistency with international agreements and with Parties’ national development goals and priorities (coherence), and the sustainable management of forests (effectiveness and efficiency).

In the next section the concept of policy networks is introduced briefly, followed by a section capturing the complex relationship between policy networks engaged with Indonesia’s forest governance and REDD+ politics. Section 4.4 presents the Strategy development process which includes the formation of the networks involved (some are positioned in the core of the networks, others at the periphery). Section 4.5 reveals the negotiation process, highlighting important aspects discussed and reform agendas advocated by different networks, and their effect on policy outcomes. This paper ends with a discussion and conclusion which highlights the study’s findings and policy recommendation.

4.2. Policy Networks Approach and the Principles of Good Governance

The core concept of policy network is that government is no longer dominated by a unitary state (Rhodes 2007). Government has shifted to a new form of governance


whereby society is governed with and through networks that involve multiple state and non-state organisations and markets (Rhodes 2007, Sørensen, Torfing 2007). Non-state actors take the opportunity to work with government in the hope of influencing policy, while states invite them to participate in order to add legitimacy to the policy-making process and resulting policy (O'Riordan, Jordan 1996). There is no single definition of policy network but the following properties are typically held in common: (1) more or less stable patterns of relations between networks of actors because of resource dependencies; (2) formation of networks around policy problems or programmes; (3) processes of regular communication, negotiation, and the exchange of resources (eg authority or legal, money or financial, political, informational and organisational); and (4) policies that emerge from bargaining between network members (Bulkeley 2000, Kickert et al. 1997, Rhodes 1990, 2007).

Conceived as a mesolevel concept, the policy network approach attempts to describe the relationship between interconnected interests and government, ie between different actors, decisions, institutions and structures, and the impact of these relationships on the policies that result (Bulkeley 2000, Bulkeley, Schroeder 2011, Marsh, Rhodes 1992). This approach, which also takes into account links between actors and governance across scales from international, national and sub-nationals levels, provides a means to examine the complex organisation, role and relative influence of actors within the policy process and its outcomes (Bulkeley 2000, Rhodes, Marsh 1992). Rhodes (1990) identified a continuum of five policy network types, ie policy community, professional network, intergovernmental network, producer network and issue network. At one end, the government-dominated policy

community is the most stable, highly institutionalised, centred on one government department, and characterised by shared values and world views where members tend to agree on how a policy response should be structured. At the other end is the 'issue network' which is less-institutionalised, not permanent, and holds a low consensus on the issues at hand and how a policy response should be addressed (see discussion on Bulkeley 2000, p 729, and Rhodes and Marsh 1992 for the updated typology). These networks carry out the process of determining policy through the formation of different types of coalitions: (1) a discourse coalition, in which there is a shared understanding of a problem but not necessarily the same world view; (2) an advocacy coalition, considered as a special type of discourse coalition where world views are also shared; and (3) action networks which consist of different types of organisations focused on particular goals and who will disperse either when the goals are achieved or the policy 'window' has passed (Bulkeley 2000, Hajer 1993).

Since networks' members hold different resources those with less are positioned at the periphery, while others maintain a privileged position at the networks' core (Bulkeley 2000). The latter is termed the 'dominant coalition' (Marsh, Rhodes 1992). This configuration of networks is modeled as 'tiered policy network' whereby different types of networks can exist simultaneously for a particular policy issue (Bulkeley 2000). Specifically, in the arena of climate change policy this tiered policy network model is useful to capture complex networks that involve members from various types of networks that voice different concerns, interests and knowledge (Bulkeley 2000, Rhodes, Marsh 1992).

Figure 4.1: A tiered policy network model (Bulkeley 2000)



Holding significantly more resources, the ‘dominant coalition’ retains some influence to decide which issues are to be included or excluded from the policy agenda (Rhodes 2007). And whilst access is not necessarily restricted to the privileged few this coalition can choose to exclude others or limit their participation (Rhodes, Marsh 1992). Consequently, a policy network approach has been criticised as being more useful for explaining stability and continuity rather than analysing change (Richardson 2000).

However, Rhodes (2007) argues that policy changes actually occur when actors in the network shape and construct their ‘world’, choosing whether, and how, to respond during the policy-making process. This change arises through the renegotiation of consensus and is seen to result from policy learning and the acquisition of new resources, ie exogenous factors (Marsh, Rhodes 1992). These exogenous variables include economic factors, ideological shifts, new knowledge or institutional restructuring, which in turn affect the power and resources of different actors (Bulkeley 2000, Betsill, Bulkeley 2004, Marsh, Rhodes 1992). To this end, the

importance of transnational networks in influencing institutional change is embodied in their means to bring current information and knowledge to the policy-making process (Betsill, Bulkeley 2004). Important also is their ability to build norms about the characteristics and relevance of subject matter representing issues (Betsill, Bulkeley 2004). These transnational networks, which operate simultaneously at international and domestic levels, exercise their roles through effecting information-sharing, capacity-building and rule-setting (Andonova et al. 2009).

Central to these functions is the role of transnational networks in promoting the principles of good governance. As mentioned earlier, the following are some of the norms of good governance most enlisted: (1) 'Transparency' refers to the decision-making process which ensures information is freely available and accessible to those affected by the decisions taken (Caluster, Salagean 2007, Graham et al. 2003). (2) 'Participation' by relevant stakeholders is promoted based on the belief that an inclusive process of policy-making ensures that decision-makers are aware of the public's issues and concerns. This enables potential conflicts to be managed at an early stage when change is still feasible (Brito et al. 2009). (3) 'Fairness and equity' refers to the importance of the fair and equitable allocation of resources and benefits (FAO 2011b). (4) 'Coordination' stresses the importance of various government ministries and other actors advancing a common objective (Brito et al. 2009). (5) 'Effectiveness and efficiency' refers to processes and institutions that (can) produce results that meet needs, while making the best use of resources (Graham et al. 2003). (6) 'Coherence' stresses the importance for consistency across the boundaries of sectoral policies and of incorporating relevant drivers of particular policy issues (Heldeweg 2005).

Within the context of REDD+ Strategy development, promoting the principle of coherence means that a broad range of issues with respect to the drivers of deforestation and forest degradation ('DD') must be taken into account so that appropriate strategies can be developed accordingly. This is in line with the UNFCCC's call that national REDD+ strategies need to address, inter alia, the drivers of DD, together with issues such as land tenure, forest governance and gender (UNFCCC 2011: para 72).

4.3. Forest Governance, REDD+ Politics and Policy Networks in Indonesia

Indonesia's forest institutions have historically been weak (McCarthy 2000, 2004) and characterised by amongst others the lucrative issuance of forest concessions (Barr 1998). Consequently they have received continuous scrutiny from transnational networks who promote rules and norms based on the principles of good governance (Gellert 2010, Seymour, Dubash 2000). Under the Suharto government (1967-1998) the majority of forests were designated as 'State forest' (*Kawasan Hutan*) (McDermott et al. 2010, Peluso et al. 2008, Wollenberg et al. 2006), an act that brought 62-69% (120-133 million ha) of Indonesia's total land surface under the legal jurisdiction of the Ministry of Forestry (MoFor) (Contreras et al. 2005). The Suharto regime transformed patronage into a fusion of public authority and private interest which dominated the forestry sector in favour of an extractive model of development (Brockhaus et al. 2012, Gellert 2010, Peluso 1992). For instance, between 1967 and 1980 53 million ha were granted as timber concessions via non-bidding procedures (Barr 1998).

The work of the transnational networks to promote good governance principles, involving the NGOs and international financial institutions such as the World Bank, gained momentum in the post-Suharto era (Gellert 2010, Seymour, Dubash 2000). This period, known locally as the 'reformasi' era, was marked by the public-at-large demanding a political system free from corruption, collusion and nepotism. This demand for governance reform resulted in the formation of the Corruption Eradication Commission (locally known as 'KPK') which was mandated to monitor government agencies and officials, and to prevent, investigate and prosecute corruption (Gol 2002a). The result is that transnational networks have stronger government and domestic allies in their effort to effect governance reform. However, their efforts to affect reform in Indonesia's forest governance achieved minimal success (Gellert 2010, REDD+ Task-Force 2012, Seymour, Dubash 2000, Wells et al. 1999).

These efforts included initiatives such as (i) Reduced Impact Logging (RIL), a mechanism introduced in the 1990s to encourage sustainable forestry and promoted by the International Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO), (ii) the development of national forest programmes (NFPs) promoted by the Intergovernmental Panel on Forests (IPF active 1995-1997) and subsequently taken forward by FAO, (iii) the Integrated Conservation and Development Project (ICDP) promoted by the World Bank and targeting major biodiversity reserves, (iv) Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) certification promoted by WWF and others, and (v) The Structural Adjustment Loans (SAL) by the World Bank and IMF in 1998 which included forest governance reform as a pre-condition for lending. In October 2013 the government of Indonesia signed an agreement on FLEGT-VPAs (Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade -

Voluntary Partnership Agreements), an initiative promoted by the European Union (see discussion on 'Indonesian VPA' at Lesniewska, McDermott 2014). This initiative aims to promote trade in legally-produced timber and has been praised for its design to provide a means for stakeholder participation (see Lesniewska, McDermott 2014). However, since the agreement has just been signed its success has yet to be seen. REDD+ (together with FLEGT-VPAs) is the latest in a series of international policy initiatives that have sought to influence Indonesia's forest governance. As revealed by interviewees outside MoFor, Indonesia's REDD+ policy arena is marked with virulent political dynamics and resistance to the REDD+ initiative from actors supporting the status quo. This is because the REDD+ mechanism aims to break long-standing historical trends by which many powerful actors have benefited from the extraction of forest resources. Nonetheless, interviewees stressed that the combination of the massive presence of international organisations and the significant level of international funding for 'REDD+ readiness' has resulted in the involvement and formation of an unprecedented number of policy networks.

One early formation of a REDD+ policy network in Indonesia is the Forest Climate Alliance (IFCA) under the coordination of MoFor and involving other relevant ministries, the private sector, academics, NGOs and donors (Purnomo et al. 2007). Formed in July 2007, this network aimed to provide a forum for stakeholders to communicate, coordinate and consult on REDD+ related issues (Purnomo et al. 2007). Given that REDD+ includes multiple objectives which potentially impact Indonesia's economic development and land-based resource management, this policy initiative has attracted the most coherent policy community, including various government

ministries and agencies. They are, amongst others, the Ministries of Forestry, Agriculture, Public Work, Home Affairs, Environment, and the National Development Planning Agency (Bappenas), the President's Delivery Unit for Development Monitoring and Oversight (UKP4), the National Council of Climate Change (DNPI), and the National Land Agency (BPN). Whilst holding different views on how best to implement REDD+ these policy communities shared similar view that the REDD+ initiative provides momentum to improve forest governance (Mulyani, Jepson 2013 - chapter 3 of this thesis). For instance, interviewees from International and local NGOs expressed the view that actors within UKP4, which played a central role in the formation of REDD+ Task Force (discussed later), were open and willing to listen to civil society's views on several pressing issues such as tenure and the rights of indigenous people to forest land. Moreover, many interviewees, including several elements within government and the NGOs, asserted that they support REDD+ because its institutions are aligned with their own reform agendas, thereby enabling the use of REDD+ as a vehicle to achieve both their own reform agenda and a broader national reform agenda.

Transnational advocacy networks, such as the World Wide Fund for nature (WWF), The Nature Conservancy (TNC), Fauna & Flora International (FFI), Conservation International (CI), and the Clinton Climate Initiative (CCI), together with local NGOs and the indigenous people alliance (AMAN), academics, as well as research institutions such as the Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR) and the World Agroforestry Center (ICRAF), acted as discourse and advocacy coalitions in their efforts to influence REDD+ policy-setting both at the national and sub-national levels. Another

influential policy community is the UN-REDD Programme (hereafter called 'UN-REDD'). This was formed by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). Its Indonesia representative office was opened in March 2010 with a budget of US\$5.6 million (UN-REDD 2011). This network of strongly institutionalised policy communities was formed to assist REDD+ host governments build consensus on key issues for national REDD+ architecture through promoting the principles of fairness, equity, transparency and the participation of multi-stakeholders (UN-REDD 2011). Moreover, Indonesia has also received funding commitments from other networks including international financial institutions and bilateral governments. They are, amongst others, the World Bank through its Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) with US\$3.6 million, the government of Norway with US\$1 billion, and together with others donors the pledges amount to almost US\$2 billion (IGES 2012). As will become clearer in the sections to come, some of these networks' members became integrated into the Strategy development process. Since they offered different resources to the policy-making process, some were able to manoeuvre within the core of the networks whilst others were left at the periphery.

Many interviewees cited the US\$1 billion pledged by the government of Norway in 2010 as an exogenous response to President Yudhoyono's commitment in 2009 to reduce the country's GHG emissions by 26% through its own effort, or 41% with international support by 2020. This voluntary commitment was seen by many interviewees as an important milestone which led to the formation of the President's REDD+ task force - hereafter called 'Task Force' (GoI 2010: Kepres-19, GoI 2011c:

Kepres-25, Gol 2013a: Kepres-5). The Task Force, whilst not permanent, can be considered a 'policy community': it included a limited number of members, each holding significant resources such as structural legitimacy, expertise and finance, and frequently exchanged resources during the policy-making process (Rhodes, Marsh 1992). The Task Force was established to follow through on the requirements specified in the Norway-Indonesia partnership agreement, one being the development of the national REDD+ strategy (hereafter called 'the Strategy'). My interviews and observation revealed that whilst the Task Force includes ten government ministries or agencies (Table 4.1), the discourse surrounding REDD+ shows that when policy actors mention 'Task Force' they consider it as a single organisation without referring to the affiliation of its members. This is so even when these policy actors are themselves officials from the ministries or agencies which are members of the Task Force. In other words, except for the representative from the UKP4 (from which the head of the Task Force was selected) the sense of affiliation amongst members was low.

The president's decision to form a new policy network (ie the Task Force), as opposed to mandating MoFor to set up the national REDD+ infrastructure, was seen by interviewees outside the MoFor as a way to push for governance reform more quickly (Mulyani, Jepson 2013). Previously, the MoFor had served as the primary legal authority for REDD+ (see Ituarte-Lima et al. 2014). For instance, MoFor Decree No 455⁷ in 2008 created a legal basis for the REDD Commission and a REDD+ working group (Ituarte-Lima et al. 2014). Inevitably, the creation of a new Task Force generated

⁷ Minister of Forestry Decree Number SK.455/Menhut-II/2008 on the Working Group on Climate Change (also known as 'MoF Decree on REDD+ Commission') dated 2 December 2008, as replaced by SK.13/Menhut-II/2009 dated 12 January 2009, as replaced by SK No. 64/Menhut-II/2010 dated 26 January 2010


tensions between the MoFor and those actors appointed to lead the Task Force. Further, interviewees revealed that the appointment of Minister Kuntoro Mangunsubroto as the head of the Task Force, a well-known reformist who is also the head of the Presidential Delivery Unit for Development Monitoring and Oversight, created a space within which to mobilise wider constituencies for reform. Minister Kuntoro assembled a maverick team of reformists to be involved in the development of the Strategy, drawn from within and outside the government. This move, whilst widely supported by the international donors and NGOs, was not well-received by the ministries involved, with one interviewee saying:

“These new people hired at the Task force are creating new rules to manage forests without enough experience from the field. The Task Force is a temporary agency, and when it is ended those people will go and we - officials at the ministries - are left with the problems of unfit regulations, as often happens”(Interviewee 3).

In sum, policy networks surrounding REDD+ politics are diverse (see Figure 4.2), involving both domestic and transnational networks which include policy communities from within the government and international donors agencies (eg FAO, UNDP, UNEP, and bilateral donor), transnational advocacy networks consisting of international NGOs, international financial institutions, professional networks involving scientists and experts from universities and research institutions, and issue networks which were formed to respond to the draft of the REDD+ Strategy (discussed later). The minimal involvement of Parliament and the producer network (such as private sector project proponents in REDD+) was notable, with one interviewee saying:

“Parliament members are not happy with the President because they felt left behind, the private sector was engaged only at the later stage, and if Indonesia wants to be successful with REDD+ implementation in the future these two actors must be involved” (Interviewee 54).

Figure 4.2: Representation of the policy networks surrounding the development of national REDD+ policy in Indonesia



Notes: the above figure aims to illustrate the broad types of policy networks surrounding the development of REDD+ architecture at the national level, in particular the development of the national strategy for REDD+. This figure reflects different types of organisation which influenced the development of REDD+ policy via both formal and informal means. Whilst an effort is made to show the policy networks posited at the core of the network (ie 'dominant coalition') and those at the periphery, the figure does not represent the exact proximity to or distance between network members in the policy-making process. Three policy communities, ie MoFor, Bapenas and UKP4 which are also members of the REDD+ Task Force (see Table 4.1), are illustrated with a larger symbol and located near the network's centre because of their central role in the Strategy-development process. The following section provides an in-depth analysis of the interactions amongst the networks' members. Abbreviations are defined in the text.

4.4. The Development of National REDD+ Strategy ('the Strategy')

The structure of the REDD+ mechanism requires that developing country Parties develop a national REDD+ strategy (UNFCCC 2011: para 71-a) which should address, for example, the drivers of deforestation and degradation, land tenure issues, gender considerations and related safeguards (UNFCCC 2011: para 72). In the case of Indonesia's REDD+ strategy, phase 1 of the drafting process began in July 2010 under the coordination of the National Development Planning Agency (Bappenas). This highly institutionalised policy community holds structural legitimacy to develop any national strategy, and together with MoFor which holds the legal authority to manage 'State forest', they represented a dominant coalition. The policy-makers within Bappenas and MoFor formed three action networks in a linked hierarchy to finish the Strategy's drafting process, namely a steering committee (*Tim pengarah*), a working group (*Tim pelaksana*) and a writer team (*Tim penulis*) (UN-REDD-I 2010).

The steering committee was responsible for providing guidance (the issues and agendas the Strategy should address) and monitoring the work of the working group to ensure that the Strategy is in line with other national policies, ie supports the principle of coherence (Bappenas 2011). The working group was responsible for developing an initial draft of the Strategy that was released for public consultation, and the writer team was tasked with incorporating the results of the public consultation into a final draft (Bappenas 2011). Table 4.1 lists the action networks' members tasked to develop the Strategy, with individuals named in Annex 1.A.

Table 4.1: Organisations participated in the REDD+ Strategy action network
Information compiled from National Development Planning Agency (Bappenas) and REDD+ Task Force

Organisation	Action networks					Organisation Type				
	Phase one			Phase two		National Gov.	International NGO	Local NGO	IGO/IFI	Academic/ research
	Steering committee	Working group	Writer team	Working group	Writer team					
*) Bappenas	✓	✓	✓			✓				
*) Ministry of Forestry (MoFor)	✓	✓	✓			✓				
*) Ministry of Environment (MoE)	✓	✓				✓				
*) Ministry of Agriculture (MoA)	✓	✓	✓			✓				
National Mapping and Survey Agency	✓	✓				✓				
Ministry of Public Works (MoPW)	✓					✓				
Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA)	✓					✓				
*) Ministry of Energy and Mineral	✓					✓				
*) National Council on Climate Change	✓					✓				
National Aviation and Space Agency	✓	✓				✓				
*) National Land Agency (BPN)						✓				
*) UKP4	✓					✓				
University of Indonesia (UI)				✓						✓
Institute of Agriculture Bogor (IPB)		✓	✓	✓	✓					✓
CIFOR		✓			✓					✓
The World Agroforestry Center		✓		✓	✓					✓
The Nature Conservancy (TNC)		✓					✓			
World Wildlife Fund for Nature (WWF)		✓					✓			
Conservation International (CI)		✓					✓			
Center for Environmental Law (ICEL)		✓	✓	✓	✓			✓		
Alliance for Indigenous People (AMAN)		✓						✓		
Kemitraan (Partnership)		✓						✓		
UNDP		✓	✓						✓	
The World Bank (WB)				✓	✓				✓	
HuMa		✓						✓		

Note:

*) Members of the Task Force based on Presidential Decree No. 25/2011; the Ministry of Finance and Cabinet Secretary were two members of the Task Force who were not involved in the action networks of the Strategy. Abbreviations are also defined in the text.

Whilst all members of the steering committee were state actors, the working group and writer team involved members of state and non-state actors, including scientists and experts from universities, research institutions and NGOs (Bappenas 2011). Several interviewees said that the involvement of the intergovernmental organisations, NGOs and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), universities and research institutions in the action networks had increased the credibility of the process (Interviewees 1, 5, 12, 21, 23, 33, 34 and 59). However, in an official report published by the dominant coalition (which included Bappenas, MoFor, MoA and UN-REDD) they recognised that because non-state actors were not included in the steering committee the process failed to accommodate the interests of relevant stakeholders at an early stage (Bappenas 2011). For instance, an interviewee from a provincial government expressed the view that their late involvement was done only to add legitimacy to the policy-making process but doubted that the national government was serious about taking their input into account (Interviewee 60).

The formation of the steering committee, whose members were all state actors, and the committee's mandate, substantiated the criticism that the dominant coalition held the privilege to decide which issues should be included or excluded from the policy agenda and thereby limit participation. Through this formation of action networks these powerful policy communities, armed with structural legitimacy and holding financial resources, can steer constituents through the policy-making process and subsequently influence the resulting Strategy. Moreover, the dominant coalition acknowledged that the process to select participants for the public consultations was

not executed according to the criteria provided, attributing this to the ‘feudalistic culture’ still held by several high ranking officials (Bappenas 2011).

In phase two, marked by the submission of the final draft Strategy from Bappenas to the Task Force on 18 November 2010, a second working group was established consisting of eight experts in the field of forest governance and development. The Task Force, in close consultation with Bappenas and MoFor, were tasked under a presidential mandate to produce a consolidated version of the Strategy that accommodated the interests of different ministries and public actors, and achieve a consensus on the main themes and structure of the Strategy (Caldecott et al. 2011). Furthermore the writing team, which consisted of five experts, was established to finalise the draft Strategy document (see Annex 1.B for names). The Task Force completed the Strategy document and released it in June 2012.

Interview findings revealed that the involvement of experts associated with both transnational and domestic networks resulted from efforts by these networks’ members to reach out to the head of the Task Force and vice versa. There was also willingness by the maverick team within the Task Force to exercise a new paradigm of governance, ie ‘transparency’ and ‘participation’. An interviewee from a university said:

“We [a group of actors from local NGOs and universities] approached Bapak [Mr] Kuntoro and requested that the Task Force should involve more experts from Indonesia, not only those from international organisations, because we know the governance context better. He responded positively to our approach” (Interviewee 59).

The formation of the policy networks described above, which involved several powerful policy communities such as MoFor, Bappenas and UKP4, an advocacy

coalition such as WWF, TNC and CI, and issue networks such as AMAN and HuMa⁸, has opened up greater space for dialogue not only amongst government ministries but also between bureaucrats and specialist experts, and between the government and NGOs, thereby enabling different actors to advocate their agendas. Interviewees revealed that issue networks such as HuMa and AMAN have become more closely connected with their international counterparts and received resources in the forms of finance and capacity-building. Moreover, this Strategy development process has prompted the formation of two new issue networks, both created to respond to the draft Strategy. One involved two bilateral donors (the German Technical Cooperation Agency (GTZ) and the French Development Agency (AFD) and Centre for Agricultural Research for Development (CIRAD)) and the UNDP. The second network involved eight local NGOs who formed an 'alliance for civil society' (*Jaringan Masyarakat Sipil*) with nine additional members joining the alliance during phase two (see Annex 1.C for members).

Interview findings revealed that in phase 1 a strong relationship between Bappenas and the UN-REDD has played a significant role in pushing several principles of good governance to be implemented during the Strategy development process. A report published by this dominant coalition specified that this process implemented four principles of good governance, ie stakeholder participation, transparency, credibility and institutionalism (Bappenas 2011). The deployment of these principles was to prevent risk to the efficacy of REDD+ implementation in the future, eg the marginalisation of indigenous people and local communities, and environmental

⁸ Association for Community and Ecology-Based Law Reform

damage (Bappenas 2011). The inclusion of institutionalism is noteworthy as this principle aims to institutionalise ideas, knowledge, norms and values from all relevant stakeholders (Bappenas 2011). In so doing it ensures that the substance of the Strategy will be comprehensive and address the drivers of deforestation and forest degradation (Bappenas 2011). Interviewees stressed that during this process the implementation of the principles of transparency and participation was most noticeable.

For example, the principle of participation was delivered through a stakeholder engagement process under the coordination of Bappenas and the UN-REDD that began in July 2010 and lasted four months. It included focus group discussions and public consultations conducted at seven regional levels that involved 387 participants representing more than 200 organisations (UN-REDD-I 2010). The breakdown was: government representatives (46%), civil society organisations including the indigenous people alliance (42%), academics (9%) and the private sector (3%) (UN-REDD-I 2010, Bappenas 2011). In a follow-up survey 90% of the participants reported that their understanding of REDD+ had increased as a result of the public consultations (UN-REDD-I 2010, UN-REDD 2011). Many interviewees, including those from government ministries, stressed that this participatory process represented significant progress when compared with previous policy-making processes (Interviewees 1, 5, 12, 33, 21, 23, 34 and 59). *One of them said:*

"In the past, we were invited to a policy-making process simply to add legitimacy but our input was hardly taken into account. Now we feel that the Task Force listens to us" (Interviewee 21, CSO).

Additional consultations were conducted by the Task Force (in phase 2) with public stakeholders and government ministries as part of the finalisation process. Some interviewees from the working group revealed that an objective to be achieved during this phase was to reach a consensus amongst government ministries on the drivers of deforestation so that relevant action plans could be developed. Moreover, key informants (interviewee 31 and 33) from within the Task Force revealed that in order to gain wider support from government ministries consultation sessions were conducted (on 14 March 2011) separately with, i) fourteen high level (*echelon 1 and 2*) officials from MoFor, ii) six officials from the Ministries of Agriculture, Energy and Minerals, and iii) fifteen officials from eleven Ministries/Agencies: Forestry, Environment, Energy and Minerals, Finance, Public Works, Bappenas, Land Agency, National Council on Climate Change, Home Affairs, and the Presidential Delivery Unit for Development Monitoring and Oversight. Lastly, a national consultation was held on 5-6 April 2011 which included 142 participants from five Ministries/Agencies (Forestry, Economic, DNPI, Land Agency and Space Agency), 17 sub-national governments, 42 local NGOs and CSOs, eight private companies, representatives from international NGOs such as the WWF and TNC, universities/researchers and donor agencies.

Whilst there were some limitations with respect to the lack of non-state actors in the steering committee and the representation of women, the Strategy development process showed the willingness of the dominant coalition to involve other networks who held fewer resources and allow them to advocate their agendas. The process was also marked by the involvement of different types of policy networks:

from highly-institutionalised policy communities to issue networks which were less permanent.

The Strategy development process showed that implementation of the principles of 'transparency' (eg the publication of the draft Strategy on the Task Force's website for thirty days) and 'full participation' (eg encouraging the public to provide input to the draft Strategy) has prompted the formation of a broad range of policy networks. For instance, key informants from the second working group and writer team revealed that during the thirty day publication of the draft Strategy the Task Force received 114 written public comments and input which were then considered for inclusion within the Strategy document (interviewee 31 and 33). This had further implications for the final document with respect to improved quality and its legitimacy. Many interviewees, including those from government ministries, cited this stakeholders' involvement as a phenomenon in the history of policy-making in Indonesia.

4.5. Negotiations amongst Policy Networks and Their Effect on Policy Outcomes

The following analysis presents an overview of the negotiations amongst the policy networks during the formulation of the Strategy. It highlights important aspects discussed and reform agendas advocated by different networks, and their effect on policy outcomes. It aims to give a sense of the negotiation process, showing which actors promoted which ideas as they sought to either affect reform or to maintain the status quo of forest institutions. This study identified several pressing agendas

advocated by different actors, and explored how these were aligned with the principles of good governance as articulated within the UNFCCC's decisions for REDD+. These norms, as articulated within the 'safeguards' and guidance for REDD+ policies and activities, are 'transparency', 'participation', 'equity and fairness', 'coherence', 'coordination', and 'effectiveness and efficiency' (UNFCCC 2011: Annex I 1-2).

When asked to identify what was special about the Strategy development process many interviewees from across the networks cited the principles of 'transparency' and 'participation'. Moreover, they revealed that actors within the dominant coalition (eg UN-REDD and the Task Force particularly those from the UKP4), supported by other networks consisting of NGOs, donors, academic and research institutions, were keen to ensure that these principles of good governance were implemented. These were the two principles of good governance promoted most during policy-making, with the UN-REDD stating that Indonesia's National REDD+ Strategy would be the world's first fully participatory Strategy (UN-REDD-I 2010).

However, many interviewees from the NGOs and CSOs highlighted several weaknesses such as the lack of representation from women, the absence of a feedback mechanism, and the unavailability of information prior to public consultation. These issues were also noticed by policy communities central to the process, such as Bappenas and the UN-REDD who argued that the limited timeframe undermined efforts to circulate information early enough. On this account the Civil Society for Climate Justice, an issue network formed to respond to the draft Strategy, pushed for a safeguard and complaint mechanism and for the principle of 'Free Prior Informed Consent (FPIC)' to be adopted within the Strategy. This received a positive response

with the Strategy subsequently stating that relevant stakeholders must be provided with full access to REDD+ information (GoI 2012: Strategy, p 7) and that FPIC will be implemented (GoI 2012: Strategy, p 7, 8).

One of the issues most debated with respect to transparency in forest management was the inaccuracy of the numerous land-cover maps used by different ministries. In the context of the 'Forest Moratorium', ie a REDD+ initiated policy to suspend for two years⁹ the licensing of new concessions in the natural/primary forests and peatlands, actors within NGOs, universities and research institutions, and reformists within the government called for MoFor to release the 'Indicative Moratorium Map' (IMM). Interviewees (20, 21, 23 and 31) revealed that initially MoFor was reluctant to publish the IMM, but through strong pressure from Minister Kuntoro (the head of the Task Force) who held political capital from President Yudhoyono and was supported by large numbers of NGOs, academics and international donors, the MoFor finally released land-cover data for public review in 2009 followed by the IMM in August 2011. The success of the coalition for governance reform, involving both transnational networks and domestic reformists, can be seen via the inclusion of the provision of the Moratorium and its enforcement in the Strategy document (GoI 2012: Strategy, p 10) and a plan to accelerate the implementation of Law No. 4/2011 on Geo-Spatial information with respect to the integration of all existing maps (GoI 2012: Strategy, p 20).

The issue networks, comprising NGOs and CSOs, policy communities such as UNESCO, and several sub-national governments (eg the provinces of Aceh and Papua),

⁹ Issued via Presidential Instruction No. 10/2011 in May 2011, and extended for another two years via Presidential Instruction No. 6/2013 issued in May 2013.

were strong proponents of the principles of equity and fairness. They called for the Strategy to address issues such as the tenure and rights of indigenous people to forest land, a mechanism to address tenure-related conflicts, property rights over carbon, and agrarian-land reform (JMS 2010, 2011). They also called for the Strategy to provide the means for indigenous people and local communities to implement REDD+ projects, to protect the rights of local communities living in and around forests, to provide a mechanism for benefit-sharing which is fair and just, and to protect the environment and its biodiversity (JMS 2010, 2011, IGA 2010). As a result the Strategy adopted 'fairness' as one of the five principles of good governance (see Table 4.2 for details). This represents a significant achievement by the networks for governance reform.

With respect to the principle of 'coordination', the Strategy is expected to enable better coordination between government ministries and agencies, and between the national and sub-national governments, which has all been inherently poor (Mulyani, Jepson 2013 - chapter 3). In this regard, many interviewees across networks revealed that the establishment of Indonesia's REDD+ Agency was heatedly debated. Debate focused on whether the REDD+ Agency would be attached to any of the existing ministries or formed separately. Given the object of the governance (ie forests) are in MoFor's jurisdiction, the ministry argued that the REDD+ Agency should be part of their organisation. However, the NGOs and foreign donors supported the second option, ie the REDD+ Agency should be formed separately, reasoning that an independent agency would reduce the risk of corruption in the implementation of REDD+ given that MoFor was perceived to be corrupt (Interviewees 20, 21, 23, 34 and 38). Interviewees (2, 5, 8, 12, 13 and 31) revealed further that powerful policy

communities such as MoFor, Bappenas, the Ministry of Environment, and Ministry of Finance warned of the potential for overlapping authority if a future REDD+ Agency is set up independently. On this point MoFor proposed that if the REDD+ Agency was formed outside the existing ministries the agency should only be given a function of 'coordination' and without an 'executing' role. Eventually a consensus was achieved, and the Strategy states that the REDD+ Agency will be independent and report directly to the president but with its mandate limited to a 'coordination' function (GoI 2012: Strategy, p 11).

Interviewees revealed that another heavily debated issue during the Strategy's development process concerned the identification of the drivers of deforestation and forest degradation (DD). This is related to the principle of coherence which is based on the belief that the Strategy needs to incorporate a broad range of initiatives directly related to the underlying problems of forest loss so that appropriate action plans can be developed. The World Agroforestry Centre (ICRAFT) proposed two categories for the drivers of DD: 'planned deforestation' and 'unplanned deforestation'. An alliance of six CSOs proposed four types of drivers: 1) poor spatial planning, 2) tenure problems, 3) ineffective forestry management, and 4) poor basic forestry law and its enforcement (Bappenas 2011, JMS 2010). Whilst policy communities such as Bappenas and UKP4, and most other networks (eg NGOs, CSOs, donors, academics and research institutions), were keen on including these drivers of DD in the Strategy, initially the MoFor objected to it (Interviewees 12, 20, 21 and 31).

MoFor's initial objection came as no surprise since the identified drivers of DD pointed it's historical mistakes. Interviewees (5, 14, 20, 21, 25, 31 and 34) revealed

further that after a long process of negotiation and consultation MoFor finally expressed their agreement to the inclusion of the identified drivers of DD in the Strategy document. This can mean that policy learning had occurred during the process of negotiation, or that MoFor, which holds significant resources and in particular structural legitimacy, had negotiated their agenda strategically. With regard to the latter interviewees (2 and 31) revealed that in a letter addressed to the Task Force the MoFor asserted that in order to overcome the drivers of DD all issues related to 'Land Use, Land Use Change, and Forestry' (LULUCF) needed to be addressed, and therefore the Forestry Department should not be the only ministry held accountable for reducing GHG emissions from the land-based sector.

This means that, whilst agreeing to acknowledge those drivers of DD, the MoFor was successful in pushing their agenda that other government ministries (eg Ministry of: Agriculture, Energy and Minerals, and Public Works) should share responsibility (GoI 2012: Strategy, p 9). To this end, whilst resistance to governance reform existed, the Strategy development process showed how policy change can occur as a result of continuous and repeated negotiation amongst policy networks (in this case a two year period from July 2010 to June 2012). The adoption of the identified drivers of DD, all of which challenge powerful actors within the forestry sector, should be seen as an achievement by the coalition for reform having issues of tenure, rights and poor governance openly addressed as never before.

With respect to the principle of 'effectiveness' and 'efficiency' members of the dominant coalition, such as Bappenas and MoFor, called for the Strategy to ensure that the emissions reduction plan is implemented side-by-side with the national

economic growth plan. Large numbers of interviewees from the local NGOs saw the government's plan to reduce GHG emissions by 41% below 'business as usual' by 2020, while maintaining economic growth of 7%, as unrealistic. The Strategy states that the country's emission reduction target will be achieved while meeting the national economic growth plan (GoI 2012: Strategy, p 4, 24). Moreover, the principle of effectiveness is also based on the belief that policy efficacy can be achieved when several basic 'enabling conditions' for reform are put in place. On this subject, several issue networks such as AMAN and other CSOs, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), TNC and the network of international donors (consisting of GTZ, AFD-CIRAD and UNDP) called for law reform in all land-based sectors, the strengthening of law enforcement, and an improvement in the capacity of law enforcement (Bappenas 2011, JMS 2011). These calls received a positive response with the Strategy subsequently adopting these reform agendas (see Table 4.2 for examples).

Another significant achievement of the coalition for governance reform is the inclusion of 'changes of work paradigm and culture' as one of the five main approaches in the Strategy (GoI 2012: Strategy, p 24). Several interviewees from the second working group and writer teams, NGOs and international donors stressed that any governance reform can only be effective when policy actors and coalitions are able to break away from institutions of old path-dependencies. The Strategy states that to implement REDD+ effectively changes in the work paradigm and culture (including an individual's knowledge, attitude, integrity, work ethic and motivation for the implementation of REDD+) are required (GoI 2012: Strategy, p 24, 28).

Table 4.2: Examples of the adoption of the principles of good governance within the REDD+ Strategy document (2012)

‘Transparency’: • Full access to REDD+ information for relevant stakeholders as a pre-requisite for effective participation (p 7) • The enforcement of a forest moratorium (p 10); the acceleration of the implementation of Law No. 4/2011 on Geo-Spatial information with respect to the integration of all existing maps (p 20)
‘Participation’: • Participation of multi-stakeholders as one of the Strategy’s five main approaches (p 5) • Stakeholders, particularly the indigenous people and local communities, to be engaged in all REDD+ processes (p 24,28,30) and provided with sufficient knowledge, information and time for effective participation (p 29,30,38) • Implementation of FPIC (p 7, 8) • Community managed forests to be increased (p 28)
‘Equity’ and ‘Fairness’: • ‘Fairness’ is one of the five principles of good governance adopted in the Strategy (p 7) • Indigenous people and local communities can become REDD+ project proponents (p11) • Ministry of Home Affairs and National Land Agency to register the existence of the indigenous people (p 21) • Environmental and social safeguards emphasise a synergy between GHG emissions reduction and the protection of biodiversity and human right (p 33), including: - Equality for all people including women and society groups vulnerable to environmental change (p 7, 8) - Government to guarantee the rights of the indigenous and local communities to forest land, not only based on formal law but also on customary law (p 34) - Conservation practices based on local customs to be prioritised (p 23) - Fairness in the distribution of REDD+ benefits; all land-rights holders to be included (p 36) - Development of sustainable local economies and improvement of human resource skills (p 25)
‘Coherence’: • Five strategies to address DD are stated, ie (1) through policies addressing multi-level governance and a green economy, (2) for monitoring and control, (3) effective forest governance, (4) multi-stakeholder engagement, and (5) law enforcement • REDD+ will be implemented in line with other national policies and laws, eg forestry (Law 41/1999), environmental management and protection (Law 32/2009), and spatial planning (Law 26/2007), and The mainstreaming of REDD+ ideas within the National/Regional Medium-Term Development Plans (p 8)
‘Coordination’: • REDD+ Agency to ensure effective coordination amongst the various ministries and governmental agencies, between national and sub-national governments, and to synchronise policies and programmes amongst all these institutions (p 11, 12, 13)
‘Effectiveness’ and ‘Efficiency’: • REDD+ will be implemented within the framework of a low carbon and green economy and sustainable development (p 4), ie the emission reduction target is to be achieved in synergy with the national economic growth plan (p 4, 24) • Review and improvement of all existing legal frameworks on the forestry sector, better land-based resource management, and the strengthening of law enforcement (p 6, 9, 12, 19) • Creation of a legal framework with respect to concession processes and land use conflict resolution (p 20, 24) • Changes of work paradigm and culture (including an individual’s knowledge, attitude, integrity, work ethic, and motivation) as one of the five main approaches in the Strategy (p 24)


Notes: ‘P’ indicates the page number of the Strategy document

4.6. Discussion and Conclusion

The Policy networks surrounding the development of Indonesia's REDD+ Strategy, whilst showing a similarity with the 'tiered policy network' concept (Rhodes, Marsh 1992) as used by Bulkeley (2000) to understand climate change policy networks (see Figure 4.1), also revealed some differences. The similarity was that in the action networks formed to develop the Strategy there was clear distinction between the dominant coalition and networks positioned at the periphery. These action networks (ie the steering committee, working group and writer team) involved numerous types of networks, from the strongly institutionalised policy community to the less permanent issue network. The Task Force, comprising representatives of ten relevant government ministries/agencies and in particular the two powerful departments of Bappenas and MoFor, clearly formed a dominant coalition. This was evident by their mandate to set the terms of reference (eg the agendas the Strategy should address), select the steering committee members, and hold financial resources from the UN-REDD Programme and Norway. The working groups and writer teams were therefore situated at the periphery. However, these action networks were more complex than Bulkeley (2000)'s model. Firstly, the 'periphery' was more structured and temporarily institutionalised, and even contained participants from the dominant coalition. Secondly, participants from outside the dominant coalition were active in several issue networks operating at the international and national levels through functioning as discourse and advocacy coalitions (see Figure 4.2). Figure 4.3 illustrates the representation of the action networks formed to develop the Strategy.

Figure 4.3: Representation of action networks surrounding the development of the National Strategy for REDD+ in Indonesia

(Phase one: July-November 2010; Phase two: November 2010-June 2012)



Notes: see table 4.1 for network members and annex 1 for names of individual representative

- : Government ministries or agencies
- : International Governmental Organisation/donor
- : Academics/research institutions
- : Local NGOs/CSOs
- : International NGOs



: Indicates appointed individual representative from relevant organisation

----- : Indicates the fluid boundary of the networks. These action networks are more structured, temporarily integrated, and contain members from the dominant coalition

As mentioned above, the configuration of the action networks created the conditions necessary for established forest interests and other actors seeking to reform forest governance to negotiate successfully for embedding good governance principles. Importantly, the networks' formulation was marked by the ability of domestic issue networks and reformists within the government to create a close link with transnational networks. Equally, the transnational networks involved who brought significant resources (eg financial, expertise and political pressure) to the policy-making processes, were able to manoeuvre within the networks' core and form a strategic alliance with the domestic reformists (see Figure 4.2 for illustration).

This study shows how the norms of good governance, as embedded within the UNFCCC decisions on REDD+ (particularly on REDD+ safeguards and guidance for REDD+ policies), were strengthened in Indonesia's forest governance through the development of the Strategy. The formation of policy networks created a space and structure for their members to interact and negotiate more effectively; arising from the different resources they brought to the negotiation process. For instance, structural legitimacy and financial resources were held by the dominant coalition which comprised policy communities within the government ministries, transnational networks within the UNREDD Programme, and donor governments such as Norway. The transnational networks of NGOs and international finance organisations exercised their function as advocacy and discourse coalitions by providing experts and expert input for the draft Strategy, through both their involvement within the institutionalised action networks and informal interaction. Moreover, they were also directly involved with some domestic NGOs and CSOs by providing financial resources and capacity-

building. The domestic NGOs and CSOs added legitimacy to the policy-making process and resulting policy document as they were seen as representing the grass roots.

During the Strategy development process different networks emphasised different agendas of reform and contributed to the rule-setting, evident by the inclusion of the reform agendas and the adoption of principles of good governance within the Strategy document (examples in Table 4.2). For instance, a national consensus was achieved on several pressing issues, including the drivers of deforestation (eg issues of tenure, spatial planning and poor governance) and the call for government to provide a guarantee of rights for indigenous people to forest land based on customary law. Most notably, the Strategy embraced the principles of 'participation' and 'transparency' by calling for the government to involve indigenous people and local communities in all stages of REDD+ activities (eg including them as a potential REDD+ project proponent) and provide them with full information and facilities in that process. In this case study, the REDD+ Strategy has served as a connector between the 'good governance agenda' at the international level and the 'reform agenda' at the national level.

Whilst these achievements can in part be attributed to the role of the transnational networks, to a large extent they were secured by an elite group within the Indonesian government and other domestic constituencies working for governance reform. This study's findings differ from earlier literature which found that the promotion of good governance principles in effecting reform within Indonesia's forest governance was predominantly by transnational networks (see Gellert 2010, Seymour, Dubash 2000). Instead, this study demonstrates the significant role of the domestic

network of reformists. For instance, the creation of the President's REDD+ Task Force in 2010, and the appointment of a well-known reformist (Kuntoro Mangunsubroto) as its head, was instrumental in pushing the reform agenda. Minister Kuntoro holds significant political capital because he also serves as the head of the Presidential Delivery Unit for Development Monitoring and Oversight.

Indonesia's legal and administrative framework requires that any national strategy development process should be led by the National Development Planning Agency (Bappenas). In this case study, because the MoFor holds authority under the Basic Forestry Act 41/1999 to manage Indonesia's 'State forests', Bappenas is required to collaborate with MoFor. Whilst inevitably an anathema to MoFor, the creation of the Task Force outside MoFor provided the opportunity for Minister Kuntoro to assemble a maverick team of reformists. This team then created a second working group and writer team which included established experts from the transnational and domestic networks (see Annex 1B for experts' names) that shared a similar agenda for governance reform. Together with the relationships held with international donors, and as opposed to the coalition for 'business as usual', this created a coalition that mobilised broader constituencies for governance reform.

In sum, the combination of two major factors, i) REDD+ characteristics, and ii) domestic reformist characteristics including the national reform agenda, has effected greater reform than international policies introduced previously (see section 4.3). The characteristics of REDD+ include its ability to attract a significant magnitude of funding (see section 4.3) and to address the cross-sectoral drivers of forest loss (McDermott 2014). The domestic reformist characteristic includes the availability of a large

constituency advocating governance reform, comprising reformist government officials of high-rank and other domestic networks such as universities and local NGOs. In this regard, the timing of REDD+ entrance into Indonesia's political and social arena, ie within the period of 'reformasi', was critical. The significance of this 'timing' also holds for other international policies which enter Indonesia within this period, such as FLEGT-VPA, although the Indonesian VPA appears limited when addressing the cross-sectoral drivers of forest loss, particularly the leading drivers of deforestation, ie palm oil (Lesniewska, McDermott 2014, p 4). During this period of 'reformasi', which began with the collapse of three decades of an authoritarian regime, the infrastructure for governance reform was established. This included the formation of the Corruption Eradication Commission, and the freedom to speak and build social coalitions whereby the-public-at-large could continue their demand for a political system free from corruption, collusion and nepotism. The outcome was that transnational networks secured stronger government and domestic allies in their effort to effect governance reform. With REDD+, this collaboration between reformists within the government, other domestic networks, and the transnational networks has become well-integrated, multi-dimensional, and with large scale financial funding that renders them collectively stronger when pushing the reform agenda.

Whilst acknowledging this achievement, this study holds that several challenges remain which warrant further research. For instance, the translation from the policy document to implementation needs not only strong national leadership but, equally, a robust national law to support the implementation of REDD+. This is because Indonesia's contemporary politics suggest that ministers who are political appointees,

and not from the president's political party or its coalition, do not necessarily follow the president's instruction. The REDD+ Strategy, issued in June 2012 but whose legitimacy to date arises solely from a decree issued by the head of the REDD+ Task Force, is perceived by many actors as having little authority without being reinforced by a presidential decree or national law.

Furthermore, the establishment of the REDD+ National Agency, which is essential for the implementation of REDD+, was long delayed due to the major differences existing amongst policy actors on whether the agency should be attached to any of the existing ministries or formed separately. President Yudhoyono finally issued a Presidential Decree No 62 (GoI 2013b) in September 2013 establishing the REDD+ Agency outside the MoFor. However, as of December 2013 the formation of actors within this agency has not been finalised. It is widely understood that this delay reflects political infighting amongst a powerful network of actors, comprising those who for more than three decades have benefitted from the practice of extracting forest resources (ie the supporters of the status quo) and others who support governance reform. This 'political economy' underlying the management of Indonesia's forests requires REDD+ supporters to keep building political support from wider elements within government, and particularly Parliament members who so far have felt excluded. Given the presidential election in 2014 this is an issue of importance, and the future of REDD+ in Indonesia will be influenced highly by how REDD+ supporters can convince powerful domestic actors that REDD+ offers an opportunity rather than a threat.

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Annex 1: Supplementing Material

A. Members of the REDD+ Strategy Action Networks – Phase one

Information compiled from Indonesia's National Planning Agency (Bappenas, 2011)

Steering Committee ('Tim Pengarah')

Chairperson:	Deputy Minister of National Development Planning / Deputy Head of National Development Planning Agency (Bappenas)
Secretary:	Deputy Secretary of Natural Resources and Environment, Bappenas

Members (*echelon one official*):

1. Director General of Forestry Planning, Ministry of Forestry (MoFor)
2. Director General of 'Production Forest' Management, MoFor
3. Director General of Forest Protection and Nature Conservation, MoFor
4. Director General of Land Rehabilitation and Protection, MoFor
5. Head of Forest Research and Development Division, MoFor
6. Minister's Advisor on Partnership, MoFor
7. Minister's Advisor on Environment, MoFor
8. Head of Research and Development Agency, Ministry of Agriculture (MoA)
9. Deputy Head of Remote Sensing Division, National Aviation and Space Agency (LAPAN)
10. Deputy Head for the Basic Survey of Natural Resource, National Mapping and Survey Coordination Agency (Bakosurtanal)
11. Director General of Spatial Planning Division, Ministry of Public Works
12. Deputy Director of Environmental Arrangement, Ministry of Environment (MoE)
13. Director General of Mineral, Coal and Geothermal, Ministry of Energy, Mineral and Natural Resources
14. Director General of Regional Development, Ministry of Home Affairs
15. Deputy 1, Presidential Delivery Unit for Development Monitoring and Oversight (UKP4)
16. Presidential Advisor on Climate Change Issues/Head of Secretariat of National Council on Climate Change (DNPI)

Working Group ('Tim Pelaksana')

Chair: Director of Conservation and Water Resources, Bappenas

Secretary: Director of Inventory and Monitoring of Forest Resources, MoFor

Members *(Members from the government ministries are echelon two officials):*

1. Director of Planning and Utilization of Production Forests, MoFor
2. Head of Center for Research and Development of Socio-Economic and Forestry Policy, MoFor
3. Head of the Center for Agricultural Land Resources Research and Development, MoA
4. Director of Cultivation of Annual Plant, MoA
5. Head of Data Center of Remote Sensing, LAPAN
6. Head of the Center of Topographic Basic Mapping and Spatial Planning, Bakosutarnal
7. Director of Environment, Bappenas
8. Director of Food and Agriculture, Bappenas
9. Hariadi Kartodihardjo, Institute of Agriculture Bogor (IPB)
10. Rizaldi Boer, IPB
11. Mas Achmad Santosa, UNDP Indonesia
12. Daniel Murdiyarso, Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR)
13. Sonya Dewi, The World Agroforestry Center (ICRAF)
14. Wahjudi Wardojo, The Nature Conservancy (TNC)
15. Iwan Wibisono, World Wildlife Fund for Nature (WWF)
16. Iwan Wijayanto, Conservation International (CI)
17. Rino Subagio Indonesia Center for Environmental Law (ICEL)
18. Abdon Nababan National Alliance for Indigenous People (AMAN)
19. Emmy Hafield, Kemitraan (Partnership for Government Reform)

Writer Team ('Tim Penulis')

(Members of the writer team are individuals/experts selected from relevant ministries and NGOs and IGO)

1. Lukita Dinarsyah Tuwo (Bappenas)
2. Endah Murningtyas (Bappenas)
3. Sri Yanti (Bappenas)
4. Basah Hernowo (Bappenas)
5. Wahyudi Wardojo (TNC)
6. Nur Masripatin (MoFor)
7. Ruandha Sugardiman (MoFor)
8. Nur H. Rahayu (Bappenas)
9. Hariadi Kartodihardjo (IPB)
10. Ngaloken Ginting (MoFor)
11. Mahyuddin Syam (International Rice Research Institute)
12. Pungky Widiaryanto (Bappenas)

13. Abdul Wahib Situmorang (UNDP Indonesia)
14. Robi Rohana (MoA)
15. Josi Katharina (ICEL)

B. Members of the REDD+ Strategy Action Networks – Phase two

Information compiled from key informants within the REDD+ Task Force

Working Group ('Tim Pelaksana')

(Members are experts in their own particular field)

1. Dr. Mubariq Ahmad (*Forest Policy expert, the head of the Working Group*), associated with the World Bank and University of Indonesia
2. Dr. Azis Khan (*Forest Policy & Institution Expert*), associated with the University of Indonesia
3. Dr. Hariadi Kartodihardjo (*Forest Policy and Institution Expert*), associated with the Institute of Agriculture Bogor (IPB)
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6. Mila Nuh MSc, MA (*Stakeholders Engagement Expert*), associated with the World Bank
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8. Giorgio Budi Indarto (*Lawyer*), associated with ICEL

Writer Team ('Tim Penulis')

(Members are experts in their own particular field)

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2. Dr. Daniel Murdiyarso, associated with CIFOR
3. Dr. Sonya Dewi, associated with ICRAFT
4. Professor Hariadi Kartodiharjo, associated with IPB
5. Giorgio Budi Indarto, Lawyer, associated with ICEL

C. Members of alliance for civil society (*Jaringan Masyarakat Sipil*)

*Formed to respond to the draft Strategy**

Phase one:

1. HuMa: *Association for Community and Ecology-Based Law Reform*
2. Lembaga Bela Banua Talino, Pontianak Kalimantan Barat
3. Community Alliance for Pulp and Paper Advocacy Jambi
4. Down to Earth Bogor
5. Bank Information Center
6. Konsorsium pendukung Sistem Hutan Kerakyatan (KpSHK, Bogor: *A network organization of indigenous people and local communities concerned about Indonesia's forest as a source of natural wealth.*
7. Yayasan Merah Putih, Palu, Sulawesi Tengah: *focus on empowering local communities to utilise natural resources in a sustainable and just way*
8. The Indigenous people organisation-AMAN

Phase two:

Organisations mentioned above plus newly-joined members:

1. Indonesia Center for Environmental Law (ICEL)
2. Friends of the Earth Indonesia (WALHI)
3. Scale up-Riau
4. Yayasan Merah Putih, Palu Sulawesi
5. Greenpeace, Asia Tenggara
6. Yayasan Bentang Borneo
7. Friends of the Earth (Walhi), Central Kalimantan
8. Solidaritas Perempuan (Women Solidarity)
9. Pusaka (Women Solidarity)

***) Source:** JMS 2010, JM, 2011

CHAPTER 5

DOES THE REDD+' ONE MAP INITIATIVE' REPRESENT A NEW INSTITUTIONAL PATH FOR INDONESIA'S FOREST GOVERNANCE?

Mulyani & Jepson

Target Journal: Environmental Science & Policy

5. 1. Introduction

Maps, established via a variety of statistical and cartographic techniques, are fundamental tools in the governance of natural resources including forests (Demeritt 2001). Framing forests spatially and quantitatively enables a state to claim these resources in the interests of the nation, and to exercise surveillance and control (Demeritt 2001, p 435). Thus map-making has always been a political act: a means for controlling space and territory and governing the access of political, business and individual interests to land and its resources (Fox 1996, Peluso 1995). As the world's third largest tropical forest nation the mapping of forest resources has been central to Indonesia's political economy since colonial times (Fay et al. 2000). Following the country's independence from the Dutch in 1945, and in particular during the Suharto New Order regime (1967-1998), forest resources were deployed to rapidly increase GDP, attract foreign investment, and consolidate and structure power across a vast archipelago (Jepson 2001, Peluso 1993). In this regard, map-making institutions were characterised by 'clientelism' or 'crony capitalism' (Barber, Schweithelm 2000).

The 'One Map Initiative' (OMI), a national strategic policy whose instruction was delivered by President Yudhoyono during the ministerial cabinet meeting on 23 December 2010 (REDD+ Task-Force 2012), suggests a significant development in the political economy of Indonesian forests. This is because the policy requires that, i) cross-sectoral ministries, particularly those with land-based competencies (eg Forestry, Agriculture, Housing and Public Works), work together to create a single authoritative state land-cover map, ii) that the public are provided with free access to digital land cover maps and the opportunity to evaluate them, and iii) that indigenous customary lands are to be integrated into the state map (REDD+ Task-Force 2012). This has the potential to address the problem of different land-cover maps (or versions thereof) being used by different ministries and at different levels of government, which contributes to issues of overlapping concession areas, corruption, land-related conflicts and social unrest (REDD+ Task-Force 2012, Resosudarmo et al. 2014).

The OMI was developed in the context of REDD+ ('Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation, and enhancing forest carbon stocks and conservation'), a major international policy initiative that emerged from the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). REDD+ is designed to provide developing countries with financial incentives to produce measurable reductions in carbon emissions beyond what would have occurred without it (UNFCCC 2005, 2011). The REDD+ mechanism includes several activities that: (a) reduce emissions from deforestation; (b) reduce emissions from forest degradation; (c) conserve forest carbon stocks; (d) manage forests sustainably; and (e) enhance forest carbon stocks (UNFCCC 2011).

Of particular importance is the performance-based approach within the REDD+ mechanism. While market-based finance was initially expected to be the primary source of funding for the REDD+ activities, in the process it has proven that market funding for REDD+ is inadequate due to the absence of a new international climate agreement (Angelsen, McNeill 2012). The latest decisions of the UNFCCC stated that results-based finance for the implementation of REDD+ may come from both the public and private sectors, can be bilateral and multilateral, and that both appropriate market-based approaches and non-market-based approaches could be developed to support REDD+ results-based actions (UNFCCC 2013). This performance-based approach implies that assessments of the results of REDD+ programmes, and in particular the reduction of carbon emissions, must be completed before any payments can be made (Wertz-Kanounnikoff, McNeil 2012). On this account a key policy element within this mechanism is the development of a transparent and accountable system for measuring carbon stock and the subsequent system for monitoring, reporting and verifying (MRV) reductions in carbon emissions in REDD+ host countries (UNFCCC 2011, 2013). This entails a significant investment in the development of accurate forest datasets and mapping across multiple spatial scales (Boer 2012, REDD+ Task-Force 2012, Resosudarmo et al. 2014).

This paper examines the origin of the OMI, and its implications for future forest governance and REDD+ implementation in Indonesia. It aims to answer the question, “Might the ‘One Map Initiative’ signify a switch to a new institutional path, one that foregrounds transparency, public participation, cross-sectoral planning, and the integration of indigenous customary lands within the state map, or is it just another

innovation within existing institutions of Indonesia's forestry?" We employ the concept of 'path dependency' within 'historical institutionalism' to ascertain the role of the REDD+ initiative in the OMI and ask whether REDD+ has been instrumental in creating a 'critical juncture', ie momentum for Indonesian resource and land governance institutions to move to a new path.

By positioning REDD+ in this broader context of institutional interplay and political economy this paper complements and extends recent literature on REDD+ governance that analyses the challenges and opportunities for the REDD+ initiative to effect forest governance reform (eg Dermawan et al. 2011, Di Gregorio et al. 2012, Luttrell et al. 2014, McDermott 2014, Murdiyarso et al. 2011). Whilst concepts of path dependency and the political economy have been deployed to explain the challenges REDD+ faces in creating incentives for forest conservation that would 'out-compete' other interests, such as timber, mining and agricultural economics (Brockhaus et al. 2012, Pacheco et al. 2012, Resosudarmo et al. 2014), there is little research on the tangible contributions of REDD+ policy process to creating new institutional path-ways. This paper aims to fill this gap.

5. 2. Approach and Methods

The perspective of 'Historical Institutionalism' sees institutions as formal and informal procedures, norms and conventions, embedded in the organisational structure of a political economy, that determine the behaviour of political and economic actors (Hall, Taylor 1996, Hall 2010, Vatn 2005). Historical institutionalism asserts that history matters because the 'how and why' of policy choices made at one point in time affect

choices at subsequent points (North 1990, Steinmo 2008). Furthermore, historical institutionalism emphasises the asymmetry of power associated with the development and operation of institutions that produce forms of path dependency. Institutions tend to serve the interests of the powerful and give some groups greater access than others to the decision-making process (Hall, Taylor 1996). As such the state is not considered as a 'neutral broker' among competing interests but as a complex of institutions capable of structuring the outcomes of group conflict towards forwarding its own interests (Hall, Taylor 1996).

'Path dependency' theory posits that institutions are persistent because supporters believe deviation will compromise their political and economic interests (Crouch, Farrell 2004, Hall 2010, Stubbs 2008). Because institutions affect behaviour, over time they shape actors' preferences (Steinmo 2008, p 168). Moreover, the institutionalisation of policies leads to the formation of powerful interest groups that resist change (Brockhaus et al. 2013). This phenomena is termed 'institutional stickiness' whereby policy actors prefer a given institution and resist change, even when such change would lead to a better overall outcome (Boettke et al. 2008). Whilst some believe that institutions remain essentially stable (at equilibrium) until they are faced with external or exogenous shock (see Hall 2010), others argue that institutional change ultimately results from a mixture of exogenous and endogenous pressures that lead to a series of path-changing initiatives (Crouch, Farrell 2004, Steinmo 2008). Endogenous sources of change may include actions undertaken by actors within the institutional system as a response to the exogenous factors of change (Deeg 2001).

Institutional theorists forward the concept of 'critical juncture' to identify a crucial founding moment that sets institutional development on a new path (Collier, Collier 1991, Thelen 1999) and thereby signifies a radical separation between periods of institutional stability and change (Hall 2010). Critical junctures have been associated with periods of 'institutional fluidity' where structural institutions are less constrained and actors' decisions are freer, thereby enabling significant change to take place (Capoccia, Kelemen 2007, Deeg 2001). In periods of institutional fluidity contingency is enhanced, but whilst contingency implies that wide-ranging change is possible and even likely, re-equilibration to older institutional paths is not excluded (Capoccia, Kelemen 2007, Mabey 2011). Junctures become 'critical' when a particular decision is taken which sets institutions on new paths or trajectories that are very difficult to alter (Capoccia, Kelemen 2007, Mahoney 2001).

There is no uniform idea on what constitutes a critical juncture. However the literature identifies a number of characteristics: it must be brief relative to the duration of the path-dependent process it instigates (Capoccia, Kelemen 2007); they are invariably initiated by an economic crisis, military conflict, and/or the presence of coalitions calling for governance reform (Capoccia, Kelemen 2007, Deeg 2001, Di Gregorio et al. 2012); and because structural institutions are less constrained, actors shape outcomes in a more voluntary fashion than normal circumstances permit (Capoccia, Kelemen 2007, Mahoney 2001). Determining whether the OMI signifies a critical juncture or is just another innovation within path dependent institutions of Indonesia's forest governance, and the extent to which REDD+ can be considered as an initiating force, is the focus of this paper.

Our analysis draws on the findings of research conducted by the lead author between June 2011 and September 2012 which covered a broader scope of the interplay between REDD+ and Indonesia's forest institutions at multi-levels of government. This involved eighty semi-structured interviews with individuals engaged in the REDD+ policy process in Indonesia, policy document reviews, and participation in several workshops convened by the REDD+ Task Force and local NGOs, including those on the 'forest moratorium' and 'one map initiative' conducted in Jakarta on 4, 5, 10 and 11 September 2012. Sixty interviews were conducted between June-December 2011, and 20 between April and September 2012. Interviewees were selected to represent a wide range of perspectives on REDD+ and organisational types, comprising multi-level government officials (23), forest/carbon private actors (11), donor agencies (12), NGOs/civil society organisations (17) and academia/researchers (17). To assure anonymity while gaining meaningful insights in the context of Indonesia's REDD+ policy setting, interviewees' quotes are referenced in a logical and consistent system (ie interviewees 1-80), and interviewees are referred to by their organisations (see Mulyani, Jepson 2013 - chapter 3 of this thesis).


5.3. Path Dependency in Indonesian Forest Institutions: the Role of Forests as a Key Resource in Indonesia's Political Economy

Indonesia's forest governance institutions are complex (McCarthy 2000, 2004). They are characterised by the uncertainty and ambiguity of the legal systems surrounding forest access and ownership (Barr et al. 2006, Marifa 2005) and a rent-seeking environment that maintains deeply embedded clientelist practices and norms across

government and society (Jepson 2001, Larson 2011, Sunderlin et al. 2008). Present-day institutional pathways can be traced back to the Dutch colonial era and the 1870 Agrarian Law which declared all land without certified ownership to be the state's domain (Lev 1985, McCarthy 2000). This law reflected broader policies among colonial powers that framed forests as public goods and strategic resources that needed protection, and the 'rational use' of powers that ensured efficient exploitation whereby forests were seen to provide both goods and income (Larson et al. 2010).

In the early period of Indonesian independence under the presidency of Sukarno (1945-1965) the 1870 Agrarian Law was revised as the 1960 Basic Agrarian Law (BAL). The latter was designed to improve justice in land rights and recognise customary law (McCarthy 2000, Tjondronegoro 1991) whilst still asserting that state sovereignty over forests should be superior to these considerations (Contreras et al. 2005). The 1960 BAL established a National Land Bureau (NLB) to regulate land tenure and the right of peasants to settle, cultivate, and claim ownership of up to two hectares of forest land (Contreras et al. 2005). This introduced a disjuncture between national level forest zoning and local forest conversion, and created tension between local (district) government and higher levels of government (Resosudarmo 2004). It exacerbated the issuance of land title permits which provided local administrations with a valuable source of revenue through the collection of fees (rents) associated with the process (Contreras et al. 2005, Rosenbarger 2009).

Figure 5.1: The Basic Agrarian Law and Basic Forestry Law in Indonesia's history



The early Act passed by the Suharto New Order regime (1966-1998) was the 1967 Basic Forestry Law (BFL). This reasserted state control over the majority of Indonesia's forests lands which amounted to 120-133 million ha or 62-69% of Indonesia's total land surface (Wollenberg et al. 2006). Importantly, BFL-1967 legislated the right of government to grant and manage forest concessions. This enabled the emergence of institutions of capital accumulation through the exploitation of forest resources, involving state actors and commercial enterprises who utilised economic development to stabilise the power-base of the New Order regime (Jepson 2001, Resosudarmo 2005, Tsing 2005).

The imperative of the regime to control the allocation of lucrative forest enterprises across a nation of 27 provinces and five major islands prompted three significant institutional innovations: i) elevating the management of forestry from within the Ministry of Agriculture to a separate Ministry of Forestry (MoFor) in 1983, ii) establishing a state-level forest zoning and classification map (1981-1985, see Table 5.1) known as the 'TGHK' (*Tata Guna Hutan Kesepakatan*) based on legal provisions within the BFL-1967, and iii) establishing a representative office of MoFor (called

Kanwil Kehutanan) in each province (MoFor 1983: SK Menhut No. 20.II/1983) to assure that provincial forestry departments conformed with, and gave precedence to, the interests of the regime. This normalised the connection between the exercise of power and control over forest resources.

An important policy impetus for the TGHK was the continuation and acceleration of the transmigration programme by the New Order regime. Originally conceived in 1905, this programme involved moving people from the densely populated islands of Java, Lombok and Madura to the larger and less populated islands, principally Sumatra, Kalimantan (Indonesian Borneo), Sulawesi and West Papua (Fearnside 1997). It was supported by a series of World Bank loans between 1976 and 1992 and was vigorously criticised by civil society groups for the lack of social and environmental safeguards (Whitten 1987). This transmigration programme is associated with its role for accelerating deforestation, and through this, further embedding corrupt practices in the political economy of Indonesia (Whitten 1987).

To address some of these criticisms the office of Regional Physical Planning Programme for Transmigration ('RePPPProt'), based within the National Coordination Agency on Survey and Mapping ('Bakosurtanal'), led the development of the 'RePPPProt map-making project' (1987-1992). This project aimed to establish a more reliable map as a basis for transmigration. Funded by the UK Overseas Development Administration, this map-making development applied advanced techniques (for the time) to produce maps of land systems, land use, and land status, which involved a revision of the TGHK and its mapping at the larger scale of 1:250,000 (REDD+ Task-Force 2012).

Notwithstanding this effort, the data on forests and land-cover maps still varied amongst ministries and was not well integrated (REDD+ Task-Force 2012).

Complexity and uncertainty in the governance of forest land and resources were exacerbated by government ministries and local government using inaccurate and outdated maps, resulting in conflicting customary and statutory land tenure and overlapping forest-land concessions (Resosudarmo et al. 2014). The Spatial Planning Law No.24/1992 was passed to reconcile this issue and provide rules for spatial land use planning called 'RTRW' (*Rencana Tata Ruang Wilayah*) or Regional Spatial Land Use Planning under the authority of the National Development Planning Agency (Bappenas) and its provincial-level offices (Bappeda) (Brockhaus et al. 2012). In response, in 1997 the MoFor engaged in the production of its own 'integrated maps' (*Peta Paduserasi*) which were refused by some provinces who continued to refer to the earlier 'TGHK' map (Brockhaus et al. 2012). This brief account illustrates path dependent and incremental developments in forest resource mapping where Indonesian forestry institutions maintained the status quo in terms of their control over the political and economic capital vested in forest lands.

The Suharto New Order regime was brought to an end in 1998 by the reform ('reformasi') movement, a response to the Asian financial crisis of 1997 which served as an 'exogenous shock' to the political system. 'Reformasi' initiated a period of institutional fluidity including public demonstrations and media calling for an end to 'KKN' (*Korupsi, Kolusi, Nepotisme*) or corruption, collusion and nepotism. The 'reformasi' movement presented a major challenge to the unity of the Indonesian state and forestry institutions. In response the Habibie government (1998-1999) acted

to manage the political power of resource-rich provinces by delegating regional autonomy for resource planning, and devolving decision-making to the third (district) tier of government (Jepson et al. 2001). This policy was effected via Law No 22/1999 on regional autonomy and Law No. 25/1999 on fiscal redistribution between the central and regional governments. Under a new Basic Forestry Law (No 41/1999) the state devolved management of all forest lands (other than national parks and reserves) according to standards set by MoFor with control over land tenure rights remaining with the National Land Bureau (NLB). This period was characterised by an increase in the overlapping authority between different levels of government and amongst ministries, chaotic implementation of the policy of decentralisation (or regional autonomy), and an intense power struggle amongst different levels of government (Barr et al. 2006, Gellert 2010, McCarthy 2004). It gave rise to the phenomenon of 'wild logging' (*penebangan liar*) involving government officials, community leaders and 'local entrepreneurs' controlling logging networks, which prompted widespread concern and criticism (Barr et al. 2006, McCarthy 2006, 2005, 2004, Wollenberg et al. 2006).

In an effort to control this situation and effect forest governance reform several new initiatives were implemented, particularly to improve forest data and integrate forest-land maps, most of which were supported by international donors (see Table 5.1). Notably, in the year 2000 the World Bank supported a Forest Datasets Integration project which consolidated the plethora of forest maps and data sets. The resulting report emphasised the depleted state of Indonesia's forest resources (Holmes 2008) and, together with the chaos associated with the decentralisation policy, gave MoFor

the pretext to gradually reassert control over forest resources (Barr et al. 2006, Jepson et al. 2001, Rosenbarger 2009).

Table 5.1: Previous efforts to integrate forest land maps and forest datasets

Year/project	Actors involved and the projects
1981-1985 'TGHK' mapping project	The 'Forest Land Use Consensus' (<i>Tata Guna Hutan Kesepakatan</i> -TGHK): ▪ Led by the MoFor and involving other ministries (agriculture, public works, and agrarian) and provincial governments ▪ Result: the '1983 TGHK map' at a scale of 1:500,000 which classified State forest into six land use categories, namely: i) protection forests for watershed protection, ii) conservation forest for protected areas, iii) limited production forest, where logging was to be accompanied by measures to reduce impact on soil erosion, iv) production forest for commercial logging, v) conversion forest for conversion of degraded production forest to agriculture or other uses, and vi) unclassified lands
1987-1990 'RePPPProt' mapping project	The 'Regional Physical Planning Programme for Transmigration' ('RePPPProt'): ▪ Conducted to establish a more reliable map and data on land quality for the 'transmigration' programme: ▪ Led by the 'RePPPProt' office which was based within the National Coordination Agency on Survey and Mapping ('Bakosurtanal', and now BIG) and funded by the UK Overseas Development Administration ▪ Result: the 'RePPPProt maps' at a scale of 1:250,000 consisted of three sets, namely: i) 'Land Systems' (based on land suitability for agriculture), ii) 'Land Use' (based on the existing forest zoning), and iii) 'Land Status' (with proposed forest zoning based on climate, slope, and soil type)
1997 'Paduserasi' mapping project	The 'Integrated Maps' ('Peta Paduserasi'): In 1992 under the Spatial Planning Law No. 24/1992 authority was given to the National Development Planning Agency ('Bappenas') to manage the country's spatial land use planning. In response, in 1997 the MoFor engaged in the production of its own 'integrated maps' (<i>Peta Paduserasi</i>) which was refused by some provinces who continued to refer to the earlier 'TGHK' map.
2000 Forest Datasets Integration project	Following support in 1986-1991 from the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), in 2000 the World Bank assisted the government to consolidate various existing maps and data sets. <i>(Previous project was conducted in 1986-1991)</i>

Notes: Information was gathered from various sources, including Brockhaus et al. (2012) and REDD+ Task-Force (REDD+ Task-Force 2012)

In summary, despite a series of initiatives supported by international policy communities and donors, the state planning and mapping agencies (Bappenas and Bakosurtanal) have had minimal success in integrating and standardising key datasets and land classification systems developed by different ministries and/or provincial governments (REDD+ Task-Force 2012). This underlines the strength of path dependency of institutional practices attributed to 'ego sectoral' attitudes whereby policy actors put the interest of their ministries first (Seymour et al. 2000). Part of the problem lies in the fear that policy coordination amongst ministries and across-levels of government will risk undermining the established rent-seeking practices used to finance departmental budget shortfalls (Mulyani, Jepson 2013 - chapter 3). Such institutional 'stickiness' served to maintain the status quo and, arguably up until 2008 or even later, enabled the prevailing equilibrium within Indonesian forestry governance institutions to return (Nomura 2008). In short, the institutional fluidity and basis for reform provided by the 'reformasi' movement was insufficient to challenge the powerful domestic industrialist timber network (Gellert 2010).

On account of these inherent conditions Indonesia's forestry institutions have been the subject of transnational networks seeking to effect governance reform. Significant policy initiatives included: i) Reduced Impact Logging (RIL), a mechanism introduced in the 1990s to encourage sustainable forestry and promoted by the International Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO), ii) the development of national forest programmes (NFPs) promoted by the Intergovernmental Panel on Forests (IPF active 1995-1997) and subsequently taken forward by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations in 1996, iii) the Integrated Conservation and

Development Project (ICDP) promoted by the World Bank and targeting major biodiversity reserves (Wells et al. 1999), (iv) Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) certification promoted by WWF and others, and (v) The Structural Adjustment Loans (SAL) by the World Bank and IMF in 1998 which included forest governance reform as a pre-condition for lending (Gellert 2010). Together with the European Union-led 'Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade - Voluntary Partnership Agreements (FLEGT-VPAs) which was signed by MoFor in 2013, REDD+ represents the latest exogenous policy initiative seeking to improve forest governance in Indonesia.

Indonesia is a key target for REDD+ implementation for four important reasons: a) among nations it supports the third largest area of tropical rainforest with the fourth-largest forest carbon stock (FAO 2011a, Strassburg et al. 2008), b) an estimated 80% of it's carbon emissions result from deforestation and forest degradation (Boer et al. 2009), c) it has an annual deforestation rate of 1.17 million ha (Boer et al. 2009), and d) as described earlier, its forest governance has historically been regarded as weak (Barr et al. 2006, McCarthy 2004). The adoption and integration of REDD+ policies is supported by nearly US\$2 billion of donor pledges including US\$1 billion from the government of Norway (Fujisaki 2012, LoI 2010). Nonetheless, since previous international policy initiatives achieved minimal success in effecting governance reform this questions the ability of REDD+ to initiate a break from institutional path dependence.

5. 4. The Policy and Political Context of the OMI: the Role of REDD+ in Producing a Critical Juncture

The stated objective of the 'One Map Initiative' (OMI) is to create an integrated map that will provide a single reference map of Indonesia for any decision-making related to land-based management (REDD+ Task-Force 2012). The map is to be based on, i) 'one reference', meaning a map-making process supported by one 'geodetic' control network, ii) 'one standard' of thematic mapping, namely the Indonesia National Standard (SNI 7645:2000) for land-cover classification, iii) 'one database', ie one integrated database of spatial and non-spatial information compiled from across ministries and different levels of government, and iv) 'one geo-portal' or web address which stores all this information, a system intended to be fully transparent and enable public participation (REDD+ Task-Force 2012). Interviewees from academia and research institutions identified the emphasis on agreed standards for land-use classification and the geospatial reference system as a significant development because the lack of these had previously compromised the production of integrated thematic maps. Interviews revealed that the OMI emerged from the process of establishing REDD+ policy and measures at the national level.

Of particular importance was the timing of REDD+ entry into Indonesia's political and social arena in the wake of the 'reformasi' era. As mentioned earlier, 'reformasi' legitimised and popularised discourse on 'KKN' (*Korupsi, Kolusi, Nepotisme*) which led to the establishment of the Corruption Eradication Commission (*Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi or KPK*) in 2002, gaining wide public support in the process (Luttrell et al. 2014). This period of structural indeterminism, associated with the


dismantling of an authoritarian regime and the introduction of democracy, was marked by political uncertainty and unpredictability (Bakker, Moniaga 2010, O'Rourke 2002). However, it provided levels of political freedom for policy actors and the public-at-large that had not previously been experienced. For instance, in 1999 Suharto's successor, President Habibie, revoked the 1963 Anti-subversion Law¹⁰. Interviewees from NGOs and academia noted that as a result reformists within the government became more open in their view of governance reform and reached out to form alliances with non-state actors calling for reform.

Significantly, the REDD+ initiative entered Indonesia's political arena when Indonesia hosted the UNFCCC's Conference of the Parties (COP) 13 in Bali in 2007. Hosting major international meetings accrues political capital to senior political actors internationally and at home. In the context of the institutional fluidity following the end of the New Order regime, the confluence of populist support for anti-KKN policies, and the government occupying, albeit briefly, centre stage 'big-picture' on the international policy issue of climate governance, enabled and empowered influential actors within Indonesia greater freedom with which to act. Most notably, President Yudhoyono's voluntary commitment in 2009 to reduce the country's GHG emissions by 26% through its own effort, or 41% with international support by 2020, was cited by interviewees as an historic landmark in Indonesia's forest governance. This commitment led to the US\$1 billion commitment from the government of Norway to assist Indonesia in the preparation of REDD+ infrastructure, including the development of a National Strategy and the establishment of the REDD+ National Agency (LoI 2010,

¹⁰ A Law which can be used to criminalise people whose ideas are deemed by the government to be subversive.

Scheyvens, Setyarso 2010). This demonstrated how endogenous and exogenous sources of institutional change become strongly interwoven when influential actors within government are involved. Figure 5.2 highlights the historical points relating to REDD+ which marked the institutional development of map-making towards the OMI.

Figure 5.2: Historical events in Indonesia's REDD+ which lead to 'One Map Initiative'



Notes: abbreviations are also defined in the text

In accordance with the Indonesia-Norway partnership agreement in 2010 President Yudhoyono established a 'REDD+ Task Force' outside the MoFor. The Task Force comprised representatives of ten relevant government ministries/agencies, and was mandated with preparing the national REDD+ infrastructure and coordinating all activities related to REDD+ (see Presidential Decree No. 19/2010, renewed by Decree No. 25/2011). Interviewees revealed that the appointment of Minister Kuntoro Mangunsubroto, a well-known reformist who is also the head of the Presidential Delivery Unit for Development Monitoring and Oversight (UKP4), as the head of the Task Force has created greater opportunity for the mobilisation of wider constituencies for reform. Moreover, interviews revealed mixed opinion on the merits of this decision. One such opinion held that introducing new actors into forest policy is

the only way to overcome institutional ‘stickiness’ within forest institutions and break the path-dependency of the weak forest governance. Another opinion feared widening membership of this important policy committee would exacerbate the problem of overlapping authority inherent in Indonesia’s forest governance (Mulyani and Jepson 2013, chapter 3). Furthermore, the former group of interviewees cited the recommendations of the 2010 Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK)'s review of the forestry sector which had not been followed through by MoFor.

The KPK identified significant regulatory uncertainty and inconsistency within MoFor that had facilitated mismanagement, misuse and corruption (Dermawan et al. 2011). Key recommendations were the review and improvement of current regulations for forest concession permits, and the establishment of a single map at 1:50,000 scale to be used as the only reference basis for issuing forest concessions (KPK 2010a, 2010b). Interviewees from the NGOs and academia revealed that these recommendations had not been followed through by the MoFor. The response of an interviewee from the private sector captures the wider view:

“I hold the strong belief that MoFor is more than capable of developing an accurate map with full transparency, but the question is whether they want to do it, as transparency would limit their income from rent-seeking” (Interviewee 41).

In sum, the REDD+ initiative, as viewed by many interviewees, has provided an external push for institutional change as initiated by domestic actors such as the KPK. The Indonesia-Norway partnership agreement on REDD+ includes a clause on the suspension of licensing of new concessions in the natural/primary forests and peatlands for two years, known locally as the ‘Moratorium’. Through Presidential

Instruction No. 10/2011¹¹ this Moratorium policy included a clause on the production of an 'Indicative Moratorium Map' (IMM) with the MoFor assigned to lead the process. Moreover, this policy has provided the means for efforts that improve coordination and communication, not only amongst government ministries/agencies but also between them and the indigenous people and civil society organisations (Table 5.2).

**Table 5.2: Tasks given to several ministries/agency to integrate data on forests
(Under Presidential Instruction No.10/2011)**

Ministries/ Agency	Tasks:
MoFor	<i>to build an integrated database related to permits to manage, use and change the designation of land claimed by the indigenous/local communities</i>
MoE	<i>to integrate and build an e-application for an environmental permit for land utilisation</i>
MoHA	<i>to build an inventory system of data for the location of all permits, or recommendation of permits, issued by provincial and district governments</i>
BPN	<i>to build an integrated database for 'Business Usage Right', 'Transmigration Land Management Right', and land claims by indigenous people and local communities</i>

Notes: MoFor (Ministry of Forestry); MoE (Ministry of Environment); MoHA (Ministry of Home Affairs); BPN (*Badan Pertanahan Nasional* or National Land Agency)

The Moratorium and its map (scale 1:19,000,000) was released in May 2011 (Wells, Paoli 2011). Interviews revealed that influential political actors within MoFor were initially reluctant to release the map. Furthermore, it was only after robust criticism from civil society and environmental groups of the map's small scale, format (absence of 'meta-data'¹²), and lack of transparency on how it was generated that MoFor published the underlying land-cover data (in 2009) and a series of larger (1:250,000) scale maps (in June 2011). Notwithstanding these criticisms international

¹¹ Extended for another two years via Presidential Instruction No. 6/2013 issued in May 2013

¹² Metadata is additional information associated with geospatial data that provides information about the data content, including for example when the image was created, who created it, and how the data was collected.

donor and academic interviewees held that the release of the IMM marked a significant step towards greater transparency. They stressed the importance of the IMM as the embryo of the One Map Initiative. The bi-annual updating process of the IMM brings together key government ministries and agencies (see table 5.3) and involved a stakeholder feedback mechanism.

Table 5.3: Ministries/Agencies tasked to oversee the implementation of the ‘Indicative Moratorium Map’ (IMM) updating process

Ministries/Agency	Tasks:
UKP4	<i>to coordinate the whole process</i>
BIG	<i>as a technical coordinator and to provide topographic maps</i>
MoFor	<i>to provide forest cover and forest status maps</i>
MoA	<i>to provide peatland map</i>
BPN	<i>to provide land title map</i>

Notes: UKP4 (President's Delivery Unit for Development Monitoring and Oversight); BIG: (Geospatial Information Agency); MoFor (Ministry of Forestry); MoA (Ministry of Agriculture); BPN (National Land Agency)

The ‘IMM updating process’ involves ‘ground verification’ by a monitoring team of the REDD+ Task Force and solicits input from government and private stakeholders across all levels of administration (REDD+ Task-Force 2012). As such this process can be seen as evidence of the persistence of a coalition for reformist governance actors within and outside government. One REDD+ Task Force official commented that:

“This is the first time in Indonesia’s history of forest governance that various ministries joined force to update the state map which the public is able to view on line and review” (Interviewee 59).

Many interviewees cited President Yudhoyono’s instruction to develop the OMI, delivered during a ministerial cabinet (23 December 2010), as a significant

moment in Indonesia's history of forest governance. Interviewees revealed that the president's instruction was a response to reports from Minister Kuntoro Mangunsubroto, the head of UKP4 and REDD+ Task Force, concerning the challenges faced in publishing the IMM due to discrepancies in land-cover maps between the Ministries of Forestry and of Environment (MoEnv). In this regard, a MoFor official indicated that an issue of dispute concerned the quality and accuracy of the maps: the older 1990 MoFor's map included data from a ground survey whereas the newer MoEnv's map was produced by a consultant. The same official said: *"I encouraged fellow officials at the MoFor to leave our 'ego-sectoral' position and support the One Map Initiative as it is good for our country"* (Interviewee 5). Several interviewees revealed that though the idea for 'one map' and initiatives to integrate land-cover maps and forest data have been introduced before (see Table 5.1) it had never gained such momentum until it was attached to the REDD+ initiative. In particular, many interviewees cited the words 'transparency' and 'participation' when asked about the contribution of the REDD+ initiative in relation to the OMI. One interviewee said:

"The significance of REDD+ is that it emphasises public participation and transparency which are key elements of democracy. Once the people experience these elements it is very difficult to stop" (Interviewee 34).

5.5. The Significance of the OMI for Forest Governance Reform

When asked, "What benefits does the OMI bring to Indonesia's forest governance, and what challenges are faced in its implementation?" interview responses fell into six general themes, namely i) coordination, ii) transparency, iii) participation, iv) cost-efficiency, v) improved data quality and vi) protection of indigenous peoples' land.

Many interviewees cited one of the OMI's most significant contributions as the contingency effect with respect to policy coordination amongst government ministries. The Geospatial Information Law No. 4/2011 which mandates the Geospatial Information Agency to lead the implementation of the OMI policy, including the preparation of system infrastructure and the standardisation of existing maps, was considered significant as it decouples mapping from 'ego-sectoral' strategies. Indeed several interviewees expressed the hope that the OMI becomes a vehicle to improve sectoral policy integration by breaking forms of 'ego-sectoral' path-dependency that puts the interests of individual ministries before those of the nation. An official at the National Aviation and Space Agency (LAPAN) stated:

"The OMI movement has certainly increased communication and the sharing of information amongst government ministries as never before, and as the technical working group we have promised to guard the OMI to success" (Interviewee 61).

Improved data sharing and communication amongst Ministries (particularly Forestry, Agriculture, and Mining and Energy), was seen as a vehicle to improve efficiency in natural resource management. The inherently poor communication and coordination amongst them has resulted in major overlaps in resource concessions.

A REDD+ Task Force report stated that the OMI is intended to promote greater transparency and provide all stakeholders with access to information about existing and new land-use licences and permits (REDD+ Task-Force 2012). In the process, the Geospatial Information Agency established a 'one geo-portal' (available at <http://maps.ina-sdi.or.id>) to provide the public with greater access to information about the state map as well as encouraging them to provide input that improves it

(REDD+ Task-Force 2012). This represents significant progress from previous institutional practice, and in the words of a senior REDD+ Task Force official:

"The OMI is not merely a map or product, it is a movement towards greater transparency and public participation in map-making, and importantly transparency in the land-use licensing process, all of which represent a new paradigm in the governance of map-making" (Interviewee 14).

Whilst acknowledging these positives, interviewees from civil society organisations and environmental NGOs stated that it is still difficult to gain access to maps from MoFor, one of them (Interviewee 78) saying: *"there is no deliberative action from MoFor to release data, and they will only do so when we ask"*. On this account, the 'one geo-portal' facility being established under the OMI policy represents a significant change from the old form of limited transparency towards a 'deliberative' form of transparency.

Interviewees from academia highlighted possible cost-savings resulting from the OMI, noting that this is the first time in Indonesia's history of map-making that the costly process of acquiring and curating satellite data images is coordinated and provided by one government agency. The National Institute of Aeronautics and Space (LAPAN) received a presidential instruction to act as the sole authority to acquire, process, and maintain satellite data on land-cover and land-use for distribution to other government ministries/agencies (Presidential Instruction No. 6/2012). A recent analysis showed that cost efficiency will be one fourth when compared with the method previously prevailing by which each ministry/agency bought satellite imaging data individually (REDD+ Task-Force 2012). To this end the REDD+ Task Force has procured the technology and licences that enable direct reception of satellite data at

LAPAN's earth station (REDD+ Task-Force 2012). This 'one point system' for acquiring and processing satellite data images is widely believed by interviewees to be much less expensive than has been practiced to date. Moreover, several interviewees again suggested that reformists within the REDD+ Task Force played a significant role in making this policy materialise.


Interviewees from organisations representing indigenous and forest-dependent communities stressed the importance of the OMI as providing an opportunity for indigenous people's land to be formally integrated into the State map. One said:

"The OMI has provided important momentum for us as our work focuses on community participatory mapping and communicating to the government the existence of indigenous territories. We want to ensure that 'community-made maps' are used not only when there is land conflict, but for any decision-making process related to development programmes within the area where communities live" (Interviewee 76).

In 14 November 2012 the National Alliance for Indigenous People (AMAN) together with Participatory Mapping Network (JKPP) officially handed to the REDD+ Task Force 265 maps covering 2.4 million ha of indigenous peoples' land. This was seen as an important event in the long running efforts within Indonesia's system of resource governance (AMAN and JKPP, 2012).

In summary, Figure 5.3 illustrates the historical points of institutional development that lead to the OMI. As stated in the text accompanying the figure, it is evident that in the development process the OMI has already shown significant signs that it represents a switch to a new institutional path for map-making.

Figure 5.3: Summary of different map institutions in Indonesia
(Abbreviations are defined in the text)



5.6. Discussion and Conclusion

This paper asks two questions: 1) whether the 'One Map Initiative' signifies a switch to a new institutional path, one that foregrounds transparency, public participation, cross-sectoral planning, and the integration of indigenous customary lands within the state map, or it is just another innovation within existing forestry institutions, and 2) what is the role of the REDD+ initiative in creating a 'critical juncture' (ie momentum for Indonesian resource and land governance institutions to move to a new path) through the OMI. Since the development of the OMI is at its initial stage it is too early to tell whether it represents a permanent break from path dependency or whether there will be a 're-equilibrium' within map-making institutions. However this study, through the deployment of historical institutionalism and the concept of path dependency, identifies a body of evidence which suggests that the OMI signifies a switch to a new institutional development of map-making.

Firstly, the OMI is more than a map as it embodies the comprehensive governance of map-making which adopts a new paradigm that incorporates full transparency and public participation, a paradigm not used in the old institutional path dependence. Here, 'full transparency' refers to the commitment taken by the government to provide free access for the public to the state map and its 'meta-data'¹³ via 'one geo-portal' (available at <http://maps.ina-sdi.or.id>)¹⁴. This portal is developed

¹³ Metadata is additional information associated with geospatial data that provides information about the data content, including for example when the image was created, who created it, and how the data was collected.

¹⁴ Nonetheless, the data provided may not be legible to all peoples including the indigenous communities. Not only may they not have easy access to the internet, they may also lack the language fluency and ability to interpret and apply the data.

as an integrated data base to store all spatial and non-spatial information from cross-ministerial and cross-levels of government. In the old system, the public wanting to gain access to this information was required to make an official request to each of the ministries, a process that took considerable time and often money. The incorporation of this new paradigm is particularly important because once the decision to scale-up transparency and public participation was taken, eg the involvement of the public to review and improve the map, it became progressively more difficult to return to the initial point of path dependence.

Secondly, the president's decision to take the 'OMI path' and choose a new actor (UKP4 and BIG) to lead its development, as opposed to continuing to use the MoFor's land-cover map, was critical in setting the development of map-making on a new path. A different decision could have plausibly led to strengthening the 'status quo' where MoFor leads forest land-cover map-making. From the 'critical juncture' lens, the significance of this policy is also the contingency and downstream effects which appear to be unstoppable, such as the improvement of coordination amongst government ministries/agencies and between them and the indigenous and local communities.

Thirdly, the duration of the juncture is brief relative to the institutional path dependence (ie to qualify for a moment as a 'critical juncture'). In this regard, it is the period from the landmark decision of President Yudhoyono in committing to reduce the country's GHG emissions by 26%/41% in September 2009 till his instruction for the development of the OMI in December 2010, relative to Indonesia's history of

forest governance. Of particular importance was the timing of REDD+ entry in the wake of the 'reformasi' movement, ie within a period of structural fluidity. During this period the president and other influential reformists within the government held a significant degree of political freedom given the high level of political support existing within the public-at-large. From a 'critical juncture' lens, the impact of the president taking this decision within this period is greater than if it was taken in 'normal' times. This is because during this particular time (ie the 'reformasi' era) any reform agenda, such as the OMI, was supported by a broad constituency from both the domestic and international arena.

If we accept that a critical juncture of map-making institutions is underway the next question is to analyse the role of the REDD+ initiative. What is so special about the REDD+ mechanism which appears to be able to generate changes at a scale that had not previously been achieved? Of particular importance is the initial policy to generate funding from the carbon market via a performance-based system. Although the initial characteristics of REDD+ that made it different from past efforts (ie large scale reduction in carbon emissions and the creation of a market to provide financial incentives to forest owners) is at risk of being over-shadowed by other objectives (Angelsen, McNeill 2012), the performance-based approach under this mechanism has generated robust institutions for forest governance.

In order to work the performance-based approach, with payments made only after results have been demonstrated, requires a system capable of measuring and verifying the results of REDD+ programmes (Wertz-Kanounnikoff, McNeil 2012). In particular, the market-based approach requires assurance in the form of contractual

agreement and transparency. These requirements generated the development of a robust system within the REDD+ mechanism to establish the base-line or reference level of carbon stock and subsequently the system of MRV of the reduction in carbon stock. Key to this system is the development of forest data sets and land-cover maps which are accurate, consistent and transparent. Accuracy and consistency in forest map-making requires the use of one standard or reference of 'thematic' map or 'land-cover classification', and 'spatial and non-spatial' information as explained earlier in section 5.4. By this account, there is a need for coordination amongst cross-sectoral ministries and different levels of government. The development of the OMI fits this scenario.

This study suggests that REDD+ policy, with characteristics as mentioned above, has stimulated the development of a new institution, namely the OMI. As mentioned previously, the REDD+-national policy on the 'Moratorium' of forest concessions has stimulated the development and publication of the Indicative Moratorium Map (IMM) and enforced transparency and public participation in the process. This IMM then stimulated the development of the OMI. Moreover, the REDD+ initiative, which embodies multiple agendas and objectives, from climate change mitigation, to poverty reduction and the protection of human rights and biodiversity, has created unparalleled levels of support and the involvement of a wide range of actors from international and domestic levels, and attracted funding at an unprecedented scale. In the context of the OMI its progress has been enabled significantly by the funding from Norway.

To this end, we suggest that the contribution of the REDD+ initiative in setting the development of the OMI at a critical juncture is evident. However, research findings revealed that this juncture did not result from an independent chain of events. As mentioned earlier, several historical events resulting from exogenous and endogenous factors of institutional change that preceded the REDD+ initiative were instrumental to providing the basis for support for REDD+ policy development in Indonesia. For instance, the 1997 Asian financial crisis served as an exogenous shock that generated the 'reformasi' movement. This reform movement was an endogenous factor of change in response to an external shock that together led to the end of three decades of the Suharto regime. The existence of a broad domestic constituency supporting governance reform, which was influential in setting the REDD+ policies on the path we observe today, is a consequence of the 'reformasi' movement. This suggests that significant changes in institutional path dependence can occur, particularly when exogenous and endogenous factors for change are interwoven strongly. On this account, the REDD+ mechanism has served as an exogenous factor of change through the implementation of its robust system of MRV created to serve the performance-based policy.

This paper contributes to the concept of path dependency by showing evidence how the REDD+ initiative has served as a 'policy connector' amongst different elements of a critical juncture. As mentioned earlier, while there is no uniform idea on what constitutes a critical juncture, historical institutionalists generally agree that the momentum usually involves factors that include an economic crisis, military conflict or the presence of coalitions that call for reform (Capoccia, Kelemen 2007, Deeg 2001, Di

Gregorio et al. 2012). We argue that while these factors are critical to produce 'institutional fluidity' (as shown with the end of the Suharto regime and the rise of democracy), these alone are not enough to produce new institutions which break the old institutional path dependence. In this regard the REDD+ initiative has served as a policy framework which connects all the elements of change enabled by the 'institutional fluidity' during the 'reformasi' era, and shaped these elements into a tangible form of policy action. One such example, the OMI, created in the process of establishing REDD+ architecture at the national level, produced 'collateral benefits' of an importance and scale not anticipated hitherto.

The OMI has shown positive signs of its ability to break the old path-dependence of map-making which was characterised by a lack of transparency, low level of public participation, poor coordination amongst government ministries/agencies, and the absence of standards for reference and methodology. The potential impact of the OMI for forest governance covers a broad group of elements including increased transparency, more public participation, and cost efficiency, all of which are expected to result in the better management of forests and other land-based resources. The implication of the OMI for the future implementation of REDD+ is threefold. Firstly, clarity on categories of forest land use produces certainty where REDD+ can take place. Secondly, transparency on forest data, particularly on the concessions already issued, means that there is no risk of REDD+ investment being undermined by overlapping concessions. Thirdly, and importantly, for the performance-based approach, and particularly for a market-based system that requires carbon emissions reduction to be assessed, the development of accurate

forest data sets and land-cover maps is critical to the efficacy of REDD+ implementation.

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PLATES 19-32: SHADOWING ACTIVITIES DURING THE 'VILLAGE AGREEMENT' ESTABLISHMENT PROCESS

The following chapter discusses in depth how local communities at seven villages around the KFCP demonstration site perceived REDD+ and responded to the KFCP's efforts to engage them in REDD+ activities, particularly in the process for establishing the 'village agreement'. These plates provide a pictorial representation of the life of the communities and my activities to shadow certain KFCP employees conducting a 'village meeting' and attempting to secure the signature of the head of the villages when finalising the 'village agreement'.

Plate 19 and 20: The ecological landscape within the KFCP site was fundamentally altered (ie dried peat-swamp forest) by the failure of the 'Mega Rice Project'



Photos: Mulyani (2011, 2010)

Plates 21-24: The communities' settlements are relatively remote, have limited public infrastructure, and poor access to both health and education services



Photos: Mulyani (2011)

Plate 25-28: Some examples of the communities' livelihood; fishing (plate 25), fish trade (26), mining for gold in the river (27), and farming (28)



Photos: Mulyani (2011, 2010)

Plate 29-32: Shadowing KFCP employees in communicating the content of the draft of the 'village agreement' and securing the signature of the village head



Photos: Mulyani (2011)

CHAPTER 6

THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN REDD+ AND VILLAGE INSTITUTIONS: A CASE STUDY OF THE KALIMANTAN FORESTS CLIMATE PARTNERSHIP (KFCP) IN CENTRAL KALIMANTAN INDONESIA

Mulyani and Jepson

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6.1. Introduction

This paper examines the process for establishing a 'contractual agreement' (an essential tool for a market-based instrument) and how it interplays with the norm of 'participation' within the international good governance framework using the KFCP demonstration activity as a case study. By so doing, this study analyses the interplay between REDD+, an international policy mechanism, and village institutions in Indonesia and thereby seeks to contribute to the policy literature on REDD+ and multi-level governance.

REDD+ ('Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation, and enhancing forest carbon stocks and conservation') emerged from the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and is designed to provide developing countries with financial incentives to produce measurable reductions in

carbon emissions beyond what would have occurred under a 'business as usual' scenario (UNFCCC 2011, 2005). REDD+ was initially designed as a market-based mechanism for conservation whereby actors in developed countries provide direct payments in exchange for developing countries protecting their forests (Penca 2013). Subsequently, Parties within the UNFCCC recognised the importance of mobilising multiple financial resources from both the public and private sectors in order to achieve the scale of funding necessary to meet the objective of large scale emissions reduction (Streck, Parker 2012). The 'Warsaw framework on REDD+', which resulted from the UNFCCC's Conference of the Parties (COP) 19, restated the importance of developing both market-based and non-market-based approaches to support REDD+ results-based actions (UNFCCC 2014: Decision 9/CP.19).

For a market-based instrument to work, ie through carbon trading and a performance-based system, REDD+ requires a contractual agreement between the parties involved. Proponents of a market mechanism see this approach as efficient, cost-effective and innovative (Penca 2013). Nonetheless, fearing that a market-based approach will focus only on the goal of carbon reduction, supporters of 'democratic governance' recognise the importance of simultaneously promoting the principles of good governance to safeguard REDD+ in order to avoid harm to people and the environment (McDermott et al. 2012a). The principle of the participation of relevant stakeholders, in particular indigenous peoples and local communities, was adopted as one of the main 'REDD+ safeguards' under the UNFCCC's decisions (UNFCCC 2011: Annex I-2a).

A growing body of literature discusses the means with which to effectively secure the full participation of relevant stakeholders within REDD+ design and implementation (Forsyth 2009, Resosudarmo et al. 2014, Sunderlin et al. 2013) but little attention has been given to the process for establishing contractual agreements and their subsequent performance. Through on-the-ground examination of the interplay between two 'instruments', the 'contractual agreement' (a market-based tool) and 'participation' (a democratic governance norm), this study aims to fill this gap. In particular, it investigates the degree of social learning involved in the process of achieving a contractual agreement (ie an institutional framework which lays out the procedure for REDD+ activities and payments between the parties involved) and how this meshes with notions of participation. Here, social learning is defined as a change in understanding that goes beyond the individual and becomes situated within communities (Pahl-Wostl et al. 2008). Social learning is considered as essential for developing the capacity of actors to negotiate rules, norms and interests with outsiders (Reed et al. 2010).

The REDD+ initiative represents a prime case of multi-level environmental governance where policy-making processes can occur simultaneously at several levels (Mertens 2013, Skutsch, Van Laake 2008). Its objective has evolved since the UNFCCC's COP 11 in 2005 when the idea was introduced: from carbon only (ie through reducing emissions by avoiding deforestation and forest degradation - the 'REDD') to multiple objectives (the '+') which includes the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests, and enhancement of forest carbon stocks (UNFCCC 2005, 2008, 2011). With its multiple-objectives, including the protection of the environment, its biodiversity, and

human rights, REDD+ has drawn involvement from a wide range of state and non-state actors at the international, national and sub-national levels who interact both officially and informally (Brockhaus, Angelsen 2012, Schroeder 2010, Mertens 2013). In this regard it is important to create a form of governance that encourages participation from multi-levels and multi-actors to negotiate, formulate and implement policy (Forsyth 2009, Thompson 2011).

When conducted appropriately public participation can enhance social learning (Brewer 2013) which ultimately influences the success of the implementation of an international policy on the ground. However, public participation can also be time-consuming and costly, and if executed poorly risks empowering some groups over others and thereby increase inequality (Brewer 2013, McDermott 2014, Rydin, Pennington 2010). Here, careful attention to the design and methods employed is critical to its success. The optimal setting for a deliberative exchange which can stimulate and enhance social learning usually involves a small-group setting with intensive and repeated meetings, where participants are free to explore their own understanding and learn from and have respect for the viewpoints of others (Brewer 2013, Ostrom 1990, 1996, Reed et al. 2010, Tippet et al. 2005).

Recognising that local actors, in particular the indigenous and local communities, are likely to be affected by the REDD+ mechanism it is vital to incorporate their perspectives, interests and concerns in the design of REDD+ policies (Lyster 2011, Resosudarmo et al. 2014). By so doing, their support which determines the sustainability of the programmes can be secured. The importance of engaging the community in all phases of REDD+ activities has been discussed extensively in the

current REDD+ governance literature. Some authors suggest a form of participation that engages the community in the provision of services for REDD+ implementation (Hajek et al. 2011, Thompson et al. 2011). Others emphasise the importance of providing them with transparent access to decision-making and ensuring that the basic right of 'Free, Prior, and Informed Consent' (FPIC) is met (Lyster 2011, May et al. 2010). To provide consent they must understand why REDD+ activities are important to climate change mitigation efforts and how REDD+ will be implemented (Sunderlin et al. 2013). Importantly, local communities must be provided with information related to benefit and cost distribution, the rights and responsibilities, and risks that affect their lives (Resosudarmo et al. 2014).

In short, the literature to date examines and presents a number of normative claims on how participation should best be conducted. Less addressed is how implementation of the norm of 'participation' unfolds on the ground, particularly through the process for establishing a contractual agreement. A contractual agreement is an essential tool not only for a market-based mechanism to operate but importantly also to protect the communities' interests vis a vis outsiders. This paper reports the findings of an in-depth analysis of the process for establishing a 'village agreement' (Agreement) between the KFCP and villages around the demonstration site. It aims to understand how 'participation' was approached by the KFCP team during the establishment process, and how this approach might enhance social learning. Moreover, this paper seeks to determine the role of social learning accumulated by the communities from their engagement with previous development and conservation projects.

In Indonesia the REDD+ initiative is implemented through two interacting processes: i) the national REDD+ strategy, and ii) REDD+ pilot projects that test and demonstrate approaches that inform policy implementation (Mulyani, Jepson 2013 - chapter 3 of this thesis, GoI 2012). By March 2012 there were around 40 REDD+ pilot projects being trialled in Indonesia (Steni, Hadad 2012). The KFCP is one such REDD+ demonstration activity implemented in the Province of Central Kalimantan, and the rationale to select this site as a case study is explained in the following section.

6.2. Methods

6.2.1. Case Study Region

In December 2010 President Yudhoyono announced the selection of Central Kalimantan as a REDD+ pilot province to test and demonstrate approaches that inform policy implementation (REDD+ Task-Force 2013). This action was part of the REDD+ Task Force's action plan under the US\$1 billion partnership agreement between the governments of Indonesia and Norway (LoI 2010, REDD+ Task-Force 2012a). The Task Force was established by the president (through Presidential Decree No. 19/2010¹⁵) in September 2010 to prepare a policy framework and form a national agency for REDD+. After a long delay due to political infighting (Mulyani, Jepson 2013, Ituarte-Lima et al. 2014) a National REDD+ Agency was finally established in September 2013 through Presidential Decree Number 62/ 2013.

Central Kalimantan is one of four Indonesian provinces on the island of Borneo. The province has a land area of 15.3 million hectare, of which 10.2 million ha is

¹⁵ This was renewed by Decree No. 25/2011


classified as forestland. It is a focus for REDD+ because it supports 14% of Indonesian peatland (3 of 22 million ha) (GCF, 2011). Peatland forest contains a disproportionately high level of carbon stock with that in the province estimated to contain 6.4 gigatons of carbon (GCF, 2011, AIP 2009). To put this into context, Indonesia's total annual forest carbon emissions (ie from Land Use Change and Forestry) in 2000 was 821,250 gigagrams CO₂e, ie 60% of the country's total greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions of 1.378 billion metric tons of CO₂e (Gol 2009, REDD+ Task-Force 2012a). The drying of peatlands not only releases carbon content into the atmosphere (it is estimated that 75% of all carbon in the atmosphere comes from peatlands) but also renders them increasingly vulnerable to fire (Joosten et al. 2012).

The majority of the provinces' 2.5 million people live in rural areas with livelihoods dependent on agriculture and fishing (AIP 2009). About 4.7 million ha of forest land (including the area where the KFCP site is located) is degraded and in critical condition due to land conversion, forest and land fires, illegal mining and logging, and the implementation of the infamous 'Mega Rice Project' (MRP). The MRP, which was deemed to be a failure, has fundamentally altered the ecological landscape and economy of the area (Galudra et al. 2010, REDD+ Task-Force 2012b). For instance, local communities have had to adapt to a drier peat swamp forest (resulting from the drainage of the peatlands) and become more dependent on peatland farming (AIP 2009). Moreover, in recent years oil palm companies have been allowed by the provincial, district, and village governments to operate in this area resulting in further ecological and social problems. With respect to the latter, conflicts resulted from oil

palm companies operating without the communities' consent on lands they claim as their customary lands (FPP 2011).

The KFCP project area (Figure 6.1) covers a 120 000 ha peat dome in the District of Kapuas.

Figure 6.1: Map locating the KFCP project area within the boundary of the 1996-1998 Mega Rice Project (block A-E) in the Province of Central Kalimantan Indonesia



Source: Kalimantan Forests and Climate Partnership, Design Document, 2009

The northern half covers intact peat forest while the southern half is a mix of previously-logged and degraded peatlands (IAFCP 2009). Fourteen settlements/hamlets are located in the area supporting a mostly indigenous 'Dayak Ngaju' population of 9,000 people that have inhabited the area for several generations. Settlements are relatively remote, have limited public infrastructure, and poor access to both health and education services (CARE 2009a). Isolation limits the range of available employment opportunities and the large scale deforestation and forest fires in 1997 greatly impacted livelihood opportunities (CARE 2009a). Large numbers of the residents are considered poor (37.9% of the residents in Kapuas District live below the poverty line) and most hold a low level of education (AIP 2009, CARE 2009a). Residents use land for food crops and rubber plantations, supplementing their income by fishing and mining for gold in the river and collecting non-timber forest products (eg 'rattan', 'jelutung' and 'gemor') and subsistence products used for house construction, food and medicines (AIP 2009, CARE, 2009a).

Tenure in this area is uncertain (AIP 2009). Legally the vast majority of the KFCP demonstration site is classed as 'State forest' or 'Forest estate' (*Kawasan Hutan*) under the 1967 Basic Forestry Law (BFL), and its subsequent 1999 BFL (AIP 2009). This forest-land is managed under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Forestry (MoFor). The KFCP project design document recognises the history of the MRP where the district government accorded recognition to community land use rights up to 1.5 km inland from the river but did not formalise this with land titles (AIP 2009). This created confusion and distrust amongst the community members.

The KFCP site was selected for this study for several important reasons. Firstly, it was conceived as the first large-scale REDD+ activity in Indonesia involving actors across multiple levels of governance (national and sub-national governments, NGOs, and universities), thereby providing the means to investigate the interplay between different institutions at multi-levels of governance. Secondly, since the communities around the KFCP site claim land within five kilometres of their villages based on customary law (AIP 2009) there is the potential for conflict with the KFCP whose site is State forest land. This site therefore provides a space to examine how the REDD+ initiative is being perceived and responded to by those most affected by its implementation. Thirdly, beside the carbon reduction goal, KFCP also aims to improve the livelihood of local communities and build technical and institutional readiness on the part of local government and villages (AIP 2009). This is therefore a highly suitable site with which to examine the interplay between existing village institutions and new REDD+ institutions.

6.2.2. Methods of Data Collection and Data Analysis

This research involved developing an understanding of the history of external project engagement in the area and the process for reaching a contractual agreement under the KFCP. This involved a review of the project documents and relevant policy, though the primary data source was from the KFCP project personnel and Dayak Ngaju villagers in the project area. Data collection was conducted by the first author through extensive fieldwork between June-August 2010 (pilot investigation) and October-December 2011 (shadowing work). The shadowing work was conducted by following

selected KFCP field staff during the implementation of REDD+ activities. This included observing them in communicating the objectives of the Agreement to the villagers, participating in village meetings, and following the KFCP staff as they sought to secure the signature of the village heads to the Agreement. Alongside this shadowing activity a total of 64 interviews were conducted, 22 with Dayak Ngaju community members who were actively involved in REDD+ activities and, to ensure a balanced perspective, 11 who were not. Additional interviews were conducted with local NGOs (11), government officials at the provincial and district levels (6), and KFCP managers and staff (14). These interviews were combined with the review of documents such as the Village Agreement and other relevant documents released by the KFCP, and reports on KFCP published by NGOs and other researchers.

Inspired by McDermott (2013) this paper exercises three dimensions, ie 'Procedural', 'Contextual' and 'Distributive' within the 'equity framework' (McDermott et al. 2013) as a tool to gain insights. The aim is not to conduct an in-depth analysis of the equity issue in the Village Agreement but to examine how participation was addressed in the process for its' establishment and in the resulting document (the 'Agreement'). The procedural dimension focuses on the equity of the decision-making processes; the contextual dimension refers to the overall capacity of different actors to participate and capture benefits; and the distributive dimension focuses on how costs, benefits, and risks are distributed (McDermott et al. 2013, McDermott 2013, p 2). Moreover, the 'parameter setting', ie decisions on how to prioritise different dimensions of equity (McDermott et al. 2013), was applied in 'certification' as part of the scheme for 'governance', 'standard-setting' and 'implementation' (McDermott

2013, p 2). These parameters are adapted in this paper as follows: 1) the 'process' for establishing the Agreement, 2) the 'content' of the Agreement, and 3) the 'impact' of the 'process' and its resulting Agreement on 'social learning'. The three dimensions (procedural, contextual and distributive) are exercised across these three parameters (see Table 6.1).

Table 6.1: The equity framework and its application to 'REDD+ Village Agreement'
(Adaptation from McDermott (2013): the equity framework and its application to certification)

Parameters	Dimensions		
	Procedural	Contextual	Distributive
Process	How was participation addressed?	Who held greatest capacity to influence decision-making?	How did participants address costs, benefits and risks?
Content	How does the Agreement address participation?	How does the Agreement address actors' capacities to participate and capture benefits?	How does the Agreement address the distribution of costs and benefits?
Impact	How does the participatory process impact 'social learning'?	How does the Agreement impact actors' capacity to negotiate with outsiders?	How does the Agreement impact the distribution of costs and benefits in the future?

Findings from the 'process' parameter across three 'dimensions' provide a rich insight into how 'participation' was addressed in the process for establishing the Village Agreement. The 'distributive' dimension across three 'parameters' provides a means to ascertain whether the participatory process in the establishment of the Agreement (process) resulted in better regulation of the distribution of benefits and costs (content) which helps estimate the future condition of benefit-sharing (impact). Moreover, the extent to which the Agreement incorporated input from the villagers

indicates the overall capacity of local actors to negotiate their interests with outsiders and the likely impact in the future. This also reinforces how participation may facilitate social learning and, equally, how social learning accumulated from previous experience might have facilitated the current participatory process. Attention to the 'procedural' dimension in the 'process' parameter provides evidence how the design and setting of community engagement, eg the facilitation meeting, plays a significant role in facilitating the enhancement of social learning.

6.3. Results

6.3.1. History of Previous Development Policy in the Region

A key finding from this research was that villagers were cautious when the KFCP team introduced the project due to their disappointing experience with previous development and conservation projects in their area. The three projects involved, and cited most by the interviewees, were the above-mentioned Mega Rice Project, a project known locally as 'Bos-Mawas project', and a third known as 'CKPP'. These projects are summarised briefly below drawing on a combination of document review and interviews.

6.3.1.1. Mega Rice Project (MRP): 1996-1998

The Mega Rice Project was a strategic national project of the centralised Suharto regime (1967-1998) that aimed to achieve self-sufficiency for Indonesia in rice production by converting one million ha of peat swamp forest into rice paddies. This

involved the construction of a 4,600 km network of canals to drain peatlands in an area designated as 'State forest' under the jurisdiction of MoFor (Galudra et al. 2010). This was a 'top-down' state project and community stakeholders did not participate in the project design process. When interviewed village leaders described how they contested the legal status of the land and demanded that government rehabilitate and compensate them for damage to land within 5 km of their village. In the event, they were only compensated for the impact on land within 90 to 150 metres from either their plantations or the canals built (see also Galudra et al. 2010). The villagers interviewed also associated an increase in forest fires with the project. It is well documented that the drying of the peatlands, combined with the severe 1997 El Nino event, resulted in fires affecting 3 million ha of peat swamp forest (Galudra et al. 2010, Suyanto et al. 2009). The project failed, ceased operation in 1999, and the abandoned canals facilitated access and transportation for illegal logging.

The area, known as the 'Ex Mega Rice Project' (EMRP) has been the subject of a number of development and conservation initiatives to revert it to its original condition, involving state and non-state actors from multi-levels of governance. After the fall of the Suharto regime in 1998 a series of presidential decrees were issued to stop the MRP and hand over management rights of the area to the provincial and district governments, including the Kapuas District (CARE 2009b). This led to around 41 forest concessions being immediately issued by the district governments¹⁶ which contributed to further deforestation (Galudra et al. 2010). In an effort to regain control over the EMRP the MoFor issued decree No. 6882/2002, a decree that district

¹⁶ This was enabled by MoFor decree No. 34/2002 which granted district governments the right to issue small scale - up to 100 ha - timber-extraction permits.

governments refused to acknowledge (Rosenbarger 2009). In 2007 Presidential Instruction No 2/2007 was issued to accelerate the process for the rehabilitation of peatlands in this area (REDD+ Task-Force 2013). Several actors proposed plans to develop the EMRP, including the NGO 'Borneo Orangutan Survival' (BOS). The area continued to be contested by different levels of government and in 2009 around 369,000 ha was allocated as oil palm concessions and 41,536 ha for mining concessions with many of these concessions overlapping (Galudra et al. 2010).

This historical precedent has huge implications for the KFCP whose site is within the EMRP, and since a number of palm oil concessions were under discussion at the district level before the KFCP was enacted. When interviewed a KFCP manager mentioned that because the decision to select the KFCP project site came from the national government it took almost two years to get full support from the district government. This is a common phenomenon in Indonesia's contemporary forest governance where district government does not like to receive instruction from higher levels of government (Mulyani, Jepson 2013). Moreover, there was a crisis of trust on the part of the villagers because their claims over their ancestral lands were not met by the government.

6.3.1.2. MAWAS Conservation Programme by the Borneo Orangutan Survival (BOS) Foundation: 2003 - present

The project (known locally as the 'Bos-Mawas project'), is one of the BOS Foundation's strategic plans, aims to protect an estimated 3,000 wild orangutans by conserving their habitat (BOS 2013). It began in 2003 after the Central Kalimantan Parliament approved

a new land-use plan that allocated 500,000 ha in 'Mawas' area to be managed by the BOS Foundation for conservation (IGES 2011). Though the designation of the area was contested by the Central Kalimantan government, through Presidential Instruction No.2/2007 the national government designated it as a conservation area under the jurisdiction of the MoFor (BOS 2013).

This project is implemented in an area within the EMRP where 53 villages with a population of 29,000 families have lived for generations (IGES 2011) and 9,000 people from these families live around the KFCP site. Whilst the BOS Foundation claims that participation of the local communities was promoted (BOS 2013) most villagers interviewed asserted that they were not consulted prior to project implementation. The programme, which also aimed to assist communities achieve independence and self-sustaining livelihoods outside the conservation area, claims that they have achieved success both in ensuring the protection of the orangutan and their habitats and in improving the local communities' economic conditions (BOS 2013). However, villagers interviewed claimed that the BOS Foundation's promises (eg providing livelihood support such as fishponds) were not kept leading to their distrust of government and any outsider offering such promises. Moreover, interviewees stressed that their access to the conservation area was restricted, with many who entered the area to collect wood for building a house, or boat, or to harvest rattan being reported to the police. As a result the villagers felt that the government and foreign NGOs cared more about the welfare of orangutan than them.

In particular, villagers in the village of 'Petak Puti' (one of the nine villages¹⁷ where the KFCP site is located) revealed during interviews that these experiences were traumatic and feared that the KFCP would treat them the same. The villagers were confused further when some of the BOS-Mawas employees became 'KFCP' team members, changing their identity in the process. Many villagers interviewed claimed that the main reason they did not immediately accept KFCP activities in their village was because it had hired individuals who had previously worked for the BOS-Mawas project.

6.3.1.3. Central Kalimantan Peatland Project (CKPP): 2005-2008

The CKPP project, funded by the Dutch Royal government, was developed as a large scale restoration programme aimed at rehabilitating degraded peatlands, involving multi actors that included, i) the Borneo Orangutan Survival Foundation, ii) CARE International Indonesia, iii) the World Wide Fund for Nature - Indonesia, iv) Wetlands International Indonesia Programme, and iv) the provincial University of Palangka Raya, all organised as a consortium (CKPP 2008). The consortium has a local advisory group whose members include provincial government bodies and is chaired by the governor (CKPP 2008). The project was designed to meet the objective of conservation (focused on rehabilitating block A and E within the EMRP - see Figure 6.1) and poverty relief (CKPP 2008). With regard to the latter the project also aimed to develop alternative livelihood strategies and improve local health facilities in 25 villages consisting of 9,020 households (IRI 2008).

¹⁷ Initially seven villages prior to village-splitting (KFCP 2012d)

Participation was addressed by engaging community stakeholders in the process of designing planning activities and capacity-building of the villagers, particularly in forest fire management (CKPP 2008). The project activities included damming drainage canals to restore natural hydrologic conditions, re-vegetating denuded areas with commercially-important native tree species, capacity-building of villagers in fire management, and improving local communities' socio-economic conditions via the introduction of sustainable agricultural and fishery techniques (IRI 2008). Whilst the villagers interviewed generally expressed neutral comments on this project they also highlighted that the project lacked sustainability, citing that the alternative livelihood programmes were not continued once the project ended. Interviewees from local NGOs and academics stated that the programmes lacked an effort in capacity-building that would equip community members with the ability to manage their financial affairs in a sustainable manner. Field observation revealed that community members use their money (resulting from development projects and logging activities) for consumption such as buying a television or motor cycle. With no ability to sustain their income they fall into poverty on a regular basis once the money is spent. This resulted in their perception that development projects implemented in the area have not resulted in a positive change in their livelihood.

6.3.2. Kalimantan Forests and Climate Partnership (KFCP)

6.3.2.1. Origin and Component of the KFCP

The KFCP is a REDD+ demonstration activity funded by the Australian government with Aus\$47 million in the context of a 2007 bilateral agreement to cooperate on reducing

carbon emissions associated with deforestation in Indonesia (AIP 2009). KFCP's early implementation phase started in January 2009 within the framework of, a) Presidential Instruction No. 2/2007 to rehabilitate the Mega Rice Project area, and b) the National REDD+ Strategy and pilot project framework to test approaches and innovations relating to the technical and institutional application of REDD+ and thereby inform future policy-making (REDD+ Task-Force 2012b).

The KFCP design framework consists of four components which correspond to the key aspects of REDD+ activities: 1) reducing GHG emissions by providing incentives to local people, and technical means such as blocking canals to restore the hydrology and thereby reduce forest fires, reforesting degraded land, and developing alternative livelihoods for forest-dependent communities; 2) developing methods and capacity to measure and monitor GHG emissions; 3) developing and testing equitable and practicable payment mechanisms for villagers engaged in these activities, and 4) building institutional and technical readiness on the part of local government and villages to implement REDD on a sustainable basis (AIP 2009). The design of these activities was based on the work of the previous development project, in particular the CKPP's work on community engagement, reforestation, and blocking canals and dams (AIP 2009).

Interview findings revealed that for practical reasons the KFCP engaged several organisations that previously worked for the CKPP as 'implementing partners'. These included CARE (the international development NGO) responsible for community engagement and REDD+ socialisation, baseline socio-economic survey, alternative livelihood design, and socio-economic monitoring; Wetlands International Indonesia

(the environmental management NGO) which was tasked with designing the dams, training communities in dam construction, and monitoring hydrology; and the BOS foundation (see above) led the efforts on reforestation, GHG emissions monitoring, illegal logging, and fire monitoring (AIP 2009). In addition, the provincial University of Palangka Raya was engaged to conduct carbon stock monitoring, and Kapuas District established a 'REDD+ working group' which served as the implementing partner representing district government (AIP 2009).

Interviewees from the Dayak Ngaju villagers and local NGOs commented that they found the KFCP's engagement with these implementing partners to be problematic. In particular, the involvement of the BOS Foundation, and the individuals that used to work for it, resulted in confusion and concern amongst local communities of the possibility of continued poor treatment. Moreover, field observations revealed internal tensions within KFCP; team members were loyal to their 'mother' organisation, such as CARE or BOS Foundation, rather than the KFCP. For instance, in the case of a complaint from the communities a member of KFCP's field staff (employed by NGO 'A') would tend to lay the blame on poor communication by a KFCP staff member employed by a different NGO, or claim that they could not respond because all decisions "come from Jakarta". When interviewed one KFCP manager in Central Kalimantan Province confirmed this, as did a member of the REDD+ Working Group at the district level. In addition, during a period of four years the KFCP has had four different 'coordinators' resulting in unstable leadership and a crisis of trust within the organisation.

The community engagement programme was regarded as the strongest achievement of the KFCP while other components of activity faced many criticisms (Olbrei, Howes 2012). KFCP positioned one 'community engagement' (CE) officer in each village and hamlet tasked to keep the community intensively informed about KFCP and REDD+, create awareness of climate change and the dangers of forest fire, and listen to community concerns and expectations (KFCP 2012a). Field observations revealed that villagers built a strong relationship with the CE officers during the project period which resulted in an increase in trust towards the KFCP. Nonetheless, interviews and field observations also revealed that several villagers chose not to get involved in KFCP activities, which to some extent can be attributed to the influence of some local NGOs, in particular the 'Yayasan Petak Danum' (YPD). The YPD, a member of the influential environmental NGO 'Walhi Central Kalimantan' (a term linked to 'Friends of the Earth'), had opposed REDD+ from the beginning.

6.3.2.2. The Process for Establishing the Village Agreement

The 'Village Agreement' (the Agreement) is intended as a cooperative agreement between the KFCP and each of the seven (in 2012 this became nine) villages that establishes an institutional framework and procedure for REDD+ activities and incentive payments (KFCP 2012c). Its purpose is to outline the general principles, rights and responsibilities for collaboration, including how payments will be made for community input into KFCP-funded activities (KFCP 2012c). The 'Indonesia-Australia Forest Carbon Partnership' is a strong advocate for a REDD+ market mechanism to be included in a post-2012 global climate change outcome (AIP 2009). Following this

principle KFCP developed and tried payment mechanisms (designed to follow the best practices of transparency and accountability) based on three forms of incentive that encourage sustainable practices. These incentives are: i) 'input-based', ie immediate remuneration or other direct benefits linked to adopting and implementing interventions, such as building dams, planting trees, or eliminating the use of fire on peat soil; ii) 'performance-based', ie annual payments for sustaining interventions, such as maintaining dams in order to keep water levels high, protecting the forest from encroachment, or reducing the incidence and extent of fire; or iii) 'outcome-based', ie payments commensurate with GHG emissions reductions, initially as a proxy for a future forest carbon market (AIP 2009).

6.3.2.2. A. The Community Engagement Process ('Procedural dimension')

The Agreement was developed over a period of 12 months through a process which sought to ensure the participation of all stakeholders, including marginal and vulnerable groups (KFCP 2012c). When interviewed villagers and KFCP staff suggested that during the early process for developing the Agreement community engagement and the consultative process was intensive. Executed on a step-by-step basis, firstly community members were grouped into several interest groups, facilitation meetings were then conducted first with each of the 'interest groups' then through general village meetings. Intensive facilitation meetings were conducted during May and June 2011, a period of almost two and half years since KFCP commenced in January 2009. Table 6.2 summarises the design and process of the community engagement.

Table 6.2: Design and process of community engagement in developing 'Village Agreement'

Design	Process
Establishment of 'interest groups'	Each group consists of up to thirty families who selected a leader to represent them in the negotiation process with KFCP.
Establishment of 'Village Agreement Consultation Team' (<i>Tim Konsultasi Perjanjian Desa - TKPD</i>)	Several TKPD teams were established in each village, each consisting of four persons selected from amongst and by the villagers and tasked to communicate the purpose for establishing the Agreement to each of the interest groups. The team members received training and were involved in designing the facilitation meeting (known as 'TKPD meeting').
'TKPD meeting' (ie facilitation meeting)	The meeting was designed to provide opportunity for full participation of community stakeholders, and was chaired by the TKPD members (KFCP staff were present to provide any necessary technical guidance). The meeting was designed to facilitate participants identifying and understanding their varying viewpoints on REDD+ activities, including their concerns and expectations. Communities' concerns and interests were recorded in detail, and they were invited to provide a list of REDD+-related development programmes they wanted in their village.
Establishment of the 'Implementation and Monitoring Teams' (<i>Tim Pelaksana Kegiatan-TPK; Tim Pengawas-TP</i>)	In June 2011 two teams were established in each village to oversee the implementation and monitoring of REDD+, each consisting of at least three villagers who were selected through a village meeting.
Village meeting	The Village Agreement was ratified in each village through a formal village meeting, and endorsed by the village head, the local customary leader (<i>mantir adat</i>), and the head of the district.

Source: Interviews, shadowing work, and document review (eg Collins 2010, KFCP 2012c)

Many villagers interviewees revealed that by going to these meetings they learned to respect the different viewpoints of other members of their community. There was also a shift in the views of villagers who came to meetings regularly. For instance, 'contra voices' expressed during the early implementation stage of the KFCP shifted to at least 'apathy' or even 'pro voice' at the later stage. A neutral statement such as "We don't mind KFCP activities in our villages as long as they do not disadvantage the communities' livelihood" was raised often during the interviews.

Another notable discourse related to forest fires. Many villagers interviewed stressed that since KFCP entered their village the frequency of forest fires had reduced. They believed that the intensive training in fire management conducted by the KFCP had increased awareness and helped villagers become more prudent in their 'slash and burn' practice by not leaving material that could trigger fires. Nonetheless, challenges remain such as how not to alienate villagers still opposed to REDD+, and to minimise risk that social learning may occur to a limited number of representatives - such as just the heads of the interest groups.

6.3.2.2. B. Interactions between KFCP and Community ('Contextual dimension')

This research found that from the beginning local communities were cautious about the intention of KFCP and it took about 18 months for them to build trust. This was largely due to their unpleasant experience with the three previous projects and the involvement of organisations and individuals from those projects as implementing partners of the KFCP project (discussed above). However, in the interaction process they developed the capacity to organise themselves and better negotiate their interests which was evident during the negotiation process between the communities and KFCP when finalising the 'Village Agreement'.

Interviews and observation revealed evidence that the traditional authoritative actors, such as the head of the village and head of customary law, held significant power with which to decide the direction of a negotiated input or output. Whilst this can be seen as a challenge, in that these elites may represent their interests above those of the communities, field observation showed that their leadership was essential to achieving a negotiated output which favoured the communities versus the KFCP. For

instance, in several village meetings conducted to resolve a dispute over payment for seedling activity, under the strong leadership of their leaders communities were able to secure payments above the performance indicators. This dispute related to an event when many of the seedlings had failed to grow and where the two parties had agreed earlier that payment would only be made for seedlings of good quality based on a 'performance-based' mechanism. Moreover, some village Heads stated that they would only sign the Village Agreement if the seedling payment requested was fulfilled. This reflected the significant power held by traditional village leaders over the KFCP teams and, because of the distrust developed during their engagement with previous development projects, they were more 'hard-line' and careful in the negotiation process with the KFCP.

Results from 'shadowing work' (ie observation of the KFCP team members seeking to secure the signature of the village heads) provided evidence that many of the village heads were reluctant to sign the Agreement, reasoning that neither they nor their communities understood the content of the Agreement. There was a strong sense of 'democracy' by which village leaders wanted to make sure that their community members understood fully the content of the Agreement before they signed it. Similarly, the villagers wanted to understand the content of the Agreement as they did not want to be misled by the KFCP. This cautious action undoubtedly influenced by their experience with previous development and conservation projects.

Whilst the facilitation meeting was designed to ensure that an evolution in learning occurred and that communities were not overwhelmed with technical information, when the final draft of more than 50 pages was completed communities

were unable to understand it comprehensively. The Agreement (KFCP 2012b: Village Agreement) consisted of concepts still new to the communities such as climate change, greenhouse gas, carbon, relevant laws, a trust fund and payment mechanism, and was made in the national language of 'Bahasa Indonesia' rather than the local Dayak language. Field evidence suggested that the combination of the abstract concept of carbon, the low educational level of local communities, and the limited capacity of 'REDD+ facilitators' led to confusion on REDD+.

Under the strong leadership of their village leaders the communities requested that KFCP should continue the facilitation meetings until all villagers understood the document, and only then would they sign the Agreement. However, since communities needed financial income KFCP held a significant amount of power in the process of finalising the Agreement. During this process several REDD+ activities were already in place (eg seedlings and plantings) and early payments disbursed through the two teams (TP and TPK, see Table 6.2). KFCP staff interviewed stated that their management would not continue activities until the villages signed the Agreement which raised protests of 'blackmail'. Moreover, whilst KFCP stated that Village Agreements are entered into voluntarily it was difficult for local communities to refuse as they needed the related employment and benefits.

Several other challenges were faced during the process for establishing the Agreement with some female interviewees stating that they were not informed of any meetings. Field observation suggested that the invitation process for the meetings was largely decided by the head of the 'RT' (RT is a formal neighbourhood organisation that coordinates up to 100 families). However the KFCP manager responsible for the

community engagement process stressed that it was their priority to ensure that all families were informed of any meetings, a commitment demonstrated by positioning a community engagement officer in each village. Many villagers were also frustrated at not seeing any 'REDD+ money' (or seeing very little of it) after almost two years experiencing KFCP in their area, stating that KFCP had held too many meetings but with little activity resulting.

Another challenge was the 'consultation fatigue' phenomenon evident amongst villagers. KFCP's approach towards community engagement, ie intensive facilitation meetings in a small-group setting and repeated regularly, can be understood as an effort to facilitate increased understanding or knowledge in a gradual and systematic process, thereby enabling 'social learning'. However, villagers found this practice to be very tiring, particularly when their main expectation was to achieve better financial income to support their daily needs. A statement such as, *'We do not want meetings, what is important is real activity which can help increase our income'*, was commonly raised by those villagers interviewed.

6.3.2.2. C. How did Participants Address Benefits and Risks ('Distributive dimension')?

The facilitation meetings employed a set of questions designed to capture the communities' views with respect to their expectation of benefits and their concerns about the risks from REDD+ activities (Collins 2010). KFCP staff interviewed stated that the views of different interest groups were recorded in detail and explored in terms of developing solutions, ie the terms of cooperation to be included in the Village

Agreement. Table 6.3 highlights the concerns and expectations raised most during the interviews and facilitation meetings.

Table 6.3: Communities' concerns and expectations raised during the process for establishing the 'Village Agreement'

Concerns:	▪ Tenure: KFCP would change the status of land ownership ▪ Restriction of access to forests and river ▪ Unequal opportunity to participate in REDD+ activities ▪ Unequal distribution of REDD+ benefits
Expectations:	▪ The partnership between the villages and KFCP should be based on the principles of a 'win-win' solution, honesty and transparency; ▪ Financial statements should be announced every month to all villagers; ▪ KFCP activities must be communicated in advance to all families for their approval, and communities should have the freedom to provide input on any planning activities; ▪ REDD+ benefits should be shared equally amongst all villagers; ▪ Equal opportunity should exist for all villagers to get involved in REDD+ activities; and ▪ Type of REDD+ activities wanted in the villages, include: ○ Income-related programmes (eg rubber seedlings and planting, the development of fishery, and rice cultivation); and ○ Protection of forests (eg fire management training, availability of fire extinguishers in each village, and 'canal blocking').

Source: interviews and shadowing work

The communities' concerns related mostly to their fear that KFCP activities would negatively impact their livelihood. There was strong concern about security of tenure, particularly of foreign assertion of ownership rights over community land. Several villagers interviewed mentioned that in their 'Dayak Ngaju' custom the very act of planting trees secures individual land tenure rights over that area. KFCP tree planting activities could thus be interpreted as an assertion of ownership rights over their land. As a result communities demanded that KFCP activities should never change the status of land ownership in their villages.

The communities' expectations covered a wide range of subjects which reflected their understanding of the importance of 'good governance' principles, in particular 'participation' and 'transparency'. There was strong emphasis in the communities' input with regard to securing 'equal footing' in the negotiation process, transparency in the implementation of REDD+ activities and the disbursement of payments, and equal opportunity for participation. These inputs reflected a collective understanding which undoubtedly accumulated through their engagement with prior development and conservation projects. This also suggests that whilst communities had an unpleasant experience with previous project proponents (reflected through statements such as "KFCP should not lie to the community" and often raised during the interviews) through the process of past engagement they learned and developed the capacity to negotiate and thus secure their interests.

The list of REDD+-related development programmes provided by the communities showed that whilst they understood the importance of protecting the forests their main expectation of REDD+ benefits was financial income. On this account, the issue of benefit-sharing captured significant attention. Whilst some communities' members suggested that REDD+ benefits should be shared equally amongst all villagers others stressed that 'land ownership title' (*Surat kepemilikan tanah*) should be considered as the basis for benefit sharing. Some others favoured a performance-based system. Field observation during the facilitation meetings showed that communities were not only able to negotiate their interests but also learned how to re-assess the priorities they considered most important for their livelihood and village.

6.3.2.3. The content of the 'Village Agreement' (the 'Agreement')

After incorporating a large number of inputs and demands from villagers the Agreement placed significant attention on ensuring equitable participation in the decision-making processes, in benefit-sharing, and on equal opportunity for all villagers to be involved in REDD+ activities. Table 6.4 summarises the content of the Agreement employing the 'equity framework' mentioned earlier.

Table 6.4: The content of the Agreement with respect to equity in 'participation', 'actor capacity to capture benefits', and 'distribution of cost and benefits'

Dimensions within the equity framework ¹⁾	Examples of the provisions within the Agreement based on relevant 'dimensions'
'Procedural': <i>How does the Agreement address participation?</i>	All villagers have the right to: ▪ full and effective participation in REDD+ activities; and ▪ obtain accurate information about KFCP activities. Both parties agree: ▪ to keep each other informed of anything that occurs or might occur which could negatively affect the other; ▪ to safeguards on 'representation' and REDD+-related meetings; ▪ with minimum of 30% female representation in the implementation and monitoring teams (TPK and TP); ▪ that the TPK and TP members must not be involved in the existing village government; ▪ that representatives of interest groups hold the authority to speak for their groups in the negotiation process; and ▪ that the results of 'Village meetings' bind all attendees and groups represented.
'Contextual': <i>How does the Agreement address actors' capacities²⁾ to participate and capture benefits?</i>	▪ Vulnerable groups (eg the poor, disabled, widowed and the infirm) are provided with the means to participate and receive benefits and employment; ▪ Tenure: KFCP will not change the status of land ownership in the village; ▪ FPIC: KFCP commits not to undertake any action with which the community does not agree; and ▪ Capacity-building: KFCP's role is to provide technical assistance in the form of training, documents, advice and access. The village's role is to ensure that the communities' members attend KFCP workshops to further develop both technical capacity and financial management skills.

Table 6.4, continued

Dimensions within the equity framework¹⁾	Examples of the provisions within the Agreement based on relevant 'dimensions'
'Distributive': <i>How does the Agreement address the distribution of costs and benefits?</i>	▪ REDD+ benefits to be distributed equally to all 'rights holders' and are spread throughout the entire village; and ▪ Equal salary for men and women for similar work, and that all jobs are available to persons of both genders.

Source: KFCP 2012, Village Agreement

Notes: ¹⁾ Refer to Table 6.1; ²⁾ Actors' capacity refers to knowledge, tenure, and capacity-building

6.4. Discussion and Conclusion

The impact of the village agreement on the future implementation of REDD+ in the case study area has yet to be seen, and there is little empirical evidence at this stage. This section discusses its potential impact, both for future REDD+ implementation and for any development project the local communities are likely to encounter with outsiders. This section also discusses the impact of the participatory process involved in the Agreement's development on social learning within the community. These analyses are based on the 'equity framework' (see Table 6.1) explained earlier.

With respect to the 'procedural dimension' this research showed a body of evidence that KFCP's design of the facilitation meeting, ie repeated and intensive meetings in a small-group setting, increased trust amongst villagers and between them and the KFCP. This is because small-group settings enable community members to learn and respect different viewpoints and negotiate their interests without feeling

intimidated. This conforms to earlier literature which found that this particular design of public participation enabled reflective or 'double loop' learning to take place and thus hasten social learning (Brewer 2013, Ostrom 1996, 1990, Rydin, Pennington 2010). Such setting, ie a deliberative arena of exchange, is more intensive than an everyday setting thus enables an important shift of understanding to occur faster (Tippett et al. 2005).

With regard to reflective learning, we suggest that villagers' increased understanding of the importance of avoiding forest fires in relation to climate change is part of the evidence that 'social learning' occurred collectively. Other evidence was villagers' ability to focus on how they could benefit from REDD+ collectively rather than focusing on their differences with respect to their expectations and concerns of REDD+ implementation. As suggested by Brewer (2013), this ability can be seen as an indication of improved social learning or increased adaptive capacity of the community's members towards the changing environment. However, it is also important to note that some dissatisfied community members joined an activist NGO which had opposed REDD+ initiatives from the beginning. In this regard we suggest that the 'representative model' of participation (ie communities' members grouped into interest groups) whilst generating the benefits mentioned earlier also involves a significant challenge. For instance, the Agreement states that the results of village meetings bind all attendees and groups represented in the meeting. This risks creating resentment amongst villagers or those marginalised who chose not to be part of an interest group.

With respect to the 'contextual dimension', ie the extent to which the Agreement potentially impacts the communities' capacity to negotiate their interests with future project proponents, we suggest that the Agreement model can serve as a negotiation tool. Despite the limited lifetime of the KFCP (it stopped in June 2013), communities now have a framework or legal template with which to enter any contract with a future project proponent. The Agreement lays out an institutional framework which outlines the rights, responsibilities, 'safeguards' and procedures to implement REDD+ activities and a payment regime. This institutional framework can be used for any future project utilising a 'market-based' and/or 'performance-based' mechanism. The large number of the communities' inputs adopted within the Agreement indicated the overall capacity of community members to participate and negotiate their interests. We suggest that by holding this legal template, ie the Agreement, and being involved intensively in the process, communities will have a stronger stand point vis a vis any future project proponent. The latter has, at least, to comply with the minimum requirements already achieved through this Village Agreement.

The issue of tenure, addressed in the Agreement, underlines the communities' capacity to negotiate their interests. However, it also reveals some important shortcomings. The Agreement, in response to the communities' request, states that KFCP will not change the status of land ownership in the village. However, there is no other provision with regards to protecting villagers who do not hold a land ownership title. Moreover, whilst it is mentioned that benefits are to be distributed equally to all rights holders there is no clarity on how it is to be done. This means that villagers

without land ownership title remain in a vulnerable position with regards to the benefit-sharing from REDD+ activities. Consequently they are also in a vulnerable position to negotiate their interests in the future. Moreover, whilst there was a serious effort towards capacity-building there was still a significant gap in knowledge between the communities' members and KFCP. The point here is that the villagers' participation was constrained by insufficient knowledge of REDD+ and other issues being negotiated which undermined the quality of their input. The communities' primary need for employment and financial income also impacted the power of their negotiating position.

There was little clarity with regard to the 'distributive dimension', ie how the Agreement may impact the distribution of cost and benefits in the future implementation of REDD+ and how it potentially impacts community welfare. This is because the financial benefits that can be distributed will depend eventually on the carbon proceeds that the project is able to secure. This is an important issue of sustainability since communities' members will be unlikely to commit to any activities unless they have certainty that they will be adequately rewarded. Nonetheless, with the strong provision relating to the equal distribution of REDD+ benefits established under the Village Agreement, any future REDD+ project proponent will need to comply, at the very least, with this requirement.

To conclude, whilst several challenges existed, there was significant evidence that 'social learning' occurred as result of the well-designed participatory process for establishing the Village Agreement. Equally, there was strong evidence that villagers' ability to negotiate and secure their interests vis a vis the KFCP was influenced by their

learning experience accumulated from their previous engagement with several development and conservation projects. However, a significant challenge remains. Notwithstanding the careful attention to the design and process of the community engagement and capacity-building that has been implemented, there was still a significant gap in knowledge, finance and other resources between the villagers and KFCP. This is a phenomenon likely to occur with any future project proponent. As such we suggest that local communities should only enter into a legal contract with the support of a well-qualified publicly-paid lawyer.

To this end, we suggest that the ability of villagers as a collective to negotiate and secure their interests vis a vis any future project proponent will impact the efficacy of any forms of performance-based system. This is where the importance of ‘appropriate design and process of public participation’, which results in enhanced ‘social learning’ of the communities involved, comes into play. When communities feel that their voices are heard and their inputs are incorporated in the Agreement the prospect of the sustainability of the programmes is increased. In particular, if market-based finance is expected to be the main source of funding for future REDD+ projects, the clarity of rules and terms or engagement between the parties involved (ie a contractual agreement) is vital for the projects to work. The communities’ ability to understand the contract and secure their interests will in turn determine the efficacy and sustainability of the projects in the long term.

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CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1. Background: Revisiting the Research Questions

The REDD+ initiative, which covers multiple objectives ranging from reducing carbon emissions to biodiversity protection to poverty alleviation, has been seen as a means to simultaneously contribute to the efforts to mitigate climate change, address cross-sectoral drivers of forest loss, and support the economic development of developing countries (UNFCCC 2011, McDermott 2014, Stern 2006). These objectives are to be effected through the deployment of a robust methodology for carbon stock measurement, reporting and verification (MRV), as well as social and environmental ‘safeguards’ (UNFCCC 2011, 2012a, 2014: Decision 11/CP.19). However, as with the introduction of any international policy initiative (see Young 2002, Young et al. 2008) the success of REDD+ implementation is not only dependent on its own characteristics but essentially on its interplay with existing relevant institutions at the national and sub-national levels. It is for this reason that this research selected as its theme: “The interplay between the REDD+ Mechanism and Indonesia’s forest-related Institutions”. In this context, whilst the prognosis of many analysts for the success of this institutional interplay was not particularly encouraging, this research found some positive results which support the case for the ability of REDD+ institutions to effect forest governance reform.

In short, there is an extensive body of literature which discusses the risks and challenges in the implementation of REDD+, eg the potentially unfair distribution of REDD+ benefits, particularly to local communities when existing tenure regimes are not pro-community (Larson et al. 2010, Palmer 2010), the risk of corruption (Barr et al. 2010, Tacconi et al. 2009), whether implementation will deny the rights of indigenous and local communities to both territories and forest resources (Ghazoul et al. 2010, Okereke, Dooley 2010), and if REDD+ can be implemented in a country where forest institutions are weak (Karsenty, Ongolo 2011). What this thesis reveals however is that whilst challenges and resistance from the 'status quo' exists, during its interplay with existing forest institutions the REDD+ mechanism has stimulated the production of new/modified institutions from which a significant body of evidence showed their ability to effect wider governance reform within and beyond Indonesia's forestry sector.

My approach differs from that of many other researchers in that it focuses on the contribution of REDD+ institutions in meeting the demand for forest governance reform. Shaped by the themes which emerged from my data collection and analysis, the main research question addressed in this thesis is: **"How do REDD+ institutions effect governance reform within Indonesia's existing national and sub-national forest institutions?"** This question, as mentioned in the introductory chapter, is addressed through four subsidiary research questions as reiterated below:

1. *How is the REDD+ initiative perceived by governance actors in Indonesia?*
2. *How is the international design of REDD+, particularly the incorporation of good governance principles within the UNFCCC decisions on REDD+, adopted by national policy networks tasked with creating a REDD+ strategy?*

3. *What, if any, is the tangible contribution of REDD+ institutions in effecting governance reform within Indonesia's existing forest institutions?*
4. *What assembly of new/modified institutions is co-produced by the REDD+ initiative at the village level, and what benefits do these modified institutions bring, if any?*


The following section provides a summary of the research findings, answering both the main research question and the subsidiary questions. This is followed by sections on 'reflection on the conceptual frameworks deployed', 'policy recommendations', and 'suggestions for future research'.

7.2. Overview of Research Findings

During the process of institutional interplay, as REDD+ institutions a) deployed the principles of good governance, particularly 'transparency' and the 'full participation' of relevant stakeholders, b) advanced a robust system of measurement, reporting, and verification (MRV) of reductions in carbon emissions, c) attracted funding of a significant magnitude, and d) involved a broad range and multi-scale of actors, they produced 'collateral benefits' that effected governance reform in Indonesia's existing forest institutions. The tangible form of these 'collateral benefits' was the production of policy instruments (eg the 'national REDD+ strategy', 'one map initiative' and 'village agreement') through which a significant body of evidence showed the capability of the REDD+ mechanism to effect wider governance reform within and beyond Indonesia's forestry sector. The positive results of institutional interplay that occurred were determined not only by the characteristics of REDD+ institutions themselves but also because of the existence of domestic reformists and the national reform agenda. On this account, the timing of the REDD+ entry in the wake of the 'reformasi' movement, ie a period of 'institutional fluidity' when the public-at-large had called for governance reform, was critical to its performance in effecting governance reform.

The statements above summarise the answer to the thesis' primary research question, "How do REDD+ institutions effect governance reform within Indonesia's existing national and sub-national forest institutions?", and is illustrated in the following model.

Figure 7.1: Model of institutional interplay between REDD+ and Indonesia's forest-related institutions and the production of 'collateral benefits'



Here I use the term 'collateral benefits' to describe the 'unintended scale of significant magnitude' and the 'snowballing effect' of governance reform that the REDD+ initiative produced. In this regard, while 'improved forest governance' together with the other benefits of economic development, sustainability and equity were anticipated to result from the implementation of policies that address greenhouse gas mitigation, ie 'intended co-benefits' (IPCC 2001, UNFCCC 2011), my research revealed a significant body of evidence that the scale of governance reform was of a magnitude that was unexpected and had never occurred hitherto.

Before revisiting the analyses of the four papers (ie substantive chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6) which led to the above-mentioned propositions, I would like to draw attention to the nature of the institutional interplay. As mentioned in the introductory chapter this research focused on the vertical interplay between REDD+ and existing national and sub-national forest-related institutions. While recognising 'institutional dynamics', ie during interplay both 'source' (REDD+) and 'target' (Indonesia's forest-related) institutions can influence each other's development and performance, my research focused on how the source institutions effect reform in the target institutions. It examined the policy-making processes through which rules and regulations were developed to facilitate the implementation of REDD+ activities, and the effects of these process in improving the governance of existing institutions (ie 'top-down learning'). 'Bottom-up' learning (discussed later) was revealed more during my research observation but was less noticed by my interviewees. Thus my research focused predominantly on the question of the immediate output of the institutional interplay. This in turn leads to the question of how institutional interplay influenced

the effectiveness of the institutions involved. Since by the time this thesis is completed the Parties under the UNFCCC will not have finalised the REDD+ mechanism, and the 'results-based actions' phase of REDD+ will not have been started by most REDD+ host countries, including Indonesia, addressing the ultimate effectiveness of the REDD+ mechanism itself is beyond the scope of this thesis. Instead, and guided by the themes which emerged from my data collection, my analysis focused on the immediate consequences of the institutional interplay in effecting reform within existing forest governance institutions, and in particular, that which occurred during the policy-making process for establishing the national and sub-national REDD+ architecture.

In the process of institutional interplay the 'source', or 'newly-entering' institutions (ie REDD+), may request the target institutions to adopt particular measures to support its policy implementation, and these measures may in turn enhance the effectiveness of the target institutions (Young 2002). For instance, the structure of the REDD+ mechanism under the UNFCCC requires that developing country Parties aiming to undertake REDD+ activities develop, amongst others, a national strategy or action plan, a national forest reference emission level, and a robust and transparent national forest monitoring system (UNFCCC 2011: para 71). Moreover, the REDD+ 'safeguards' and the guidance for REDD+ policies and activities which articulate the principles of good governance request REDD+ host countries to promote, amongst others, transparent and effective governance, respect for the knowledge and the rights of indigenous peoples and local communities, stakeholder participation, enhancement of social and environmental benefits, consistency with international agreements and with Parties' national development goals and priorities,

and the sustainable management of forests (UNFCCC 2011: Annex I (1-2)). As revealed by this research the adoption of these rules and norms by national policy actors resulted in the improvement of the governance of existing institutions. This was evident in both the process of policy-making and in the resulting policy documents.

The process for the adoption of these internationally-formulated institutions into national and sub-national level policies for REDD+ is influenced by the perceptions held by policy stakeholders of the opportunities and challenges of the REDD+ initiative. My research results revealed that while most interviewees cited problems inherent within existing forest governance that relate to 'coordination', the 'lack of capacity', the 'ambiguity of legal system' and 'corruption' as a major challenge for REDD+ efficacy, they also saw the REDD+ mechanism as an opportunity and a vehicle to further 'governance reform', 'network building', 'conservation' and 'economic development' agendas. These statements summarise the answer to the first subsidiary research question, **"How is the REDD+ initiative perceived by governance actors in Indonesia?"** The significance of these perceptions, particularly as they were held by policy stakeholders, is that they influenced the formulation of REDD+ policies and subsequently the efficacy of its implementation. How these perceptions shaped REDD+ policy in Indonesia was evident in the process for establishing the national strategy for REDD+ within which a wide range of actors across governance scale negotiated their agendas based on the different types of knowledge, assumptions and value judgements they held.

My research results revealed that during the process for establishing the national strategy for REDD+ (the 'Strategy') the implementation of two particular

international norms of good governance, ‘transparency’ and ‘participation’, were influential. Both norms were implemented by national policy actors tasked to develop the Strategy at a scale of magnitude never experienced hitherto. Moreover, within both the policy-making process and the Strategy document the norms of good governance as articulated in the UNFCCC decisions on REDD+ (namely ‘transparency’, ‘participation’, ‘equity and fairness’, ‘coherence’, ‘effectiveness’ and ‘efficiency’ (UNFCCC 2011: Annex I (1-2)) were strengthened. Research results showed that, besides the involvement of transnational networks, reformists within the government and other domestic actors played a significant and central role in enforcing certain principles of good governance for adoption within the Strategy. This finding challenges earlier literature which suggested that transnational networks played a central role in promoting reform in Indonesia’s forest governance (Gellert 2010, Seymour, Dubash 2000). The statements in this paragraph summarise the answer to the second subsidiary research question: **“How is the international design of REDD+ (particularly the incorporation of good governance principles within the UNFCCC decisions on REDD+) adopted by national policy networks tasked with creating a REDD+ strategy?”**

The existence of a broad constituency for governance reform in the domestic socio-political arena resulted from a chain of historical events which began with the 1997 Asian financial crisis. This exogenous shock triggered a ‘reformasi’ movement (ie an endogenous response to an external shock) which led to the demise of three decades of the Suharto authoritarian regime. This reform movement involved reformists within the government, universities and the public-at-large who pushed

governance reform and demanded a political system free from corruption, collusion and nepotism. Within this 'institutional fluidity', ie where structural institutions were less constrained and actors' decisions were freer thus enabling significant change to take place (Capoccia, Kelemen 2007, Deeg 2001), the REDD+ initiative entered Indonesia's political arena. This research argues that this timing was critical to enabling REDD+ institutions to effect major governance reform within and potentially beyond the forestry sector. The combination of a broad domestic constituency for governance reform, which included high-ranking government officials, and extensive support from transnational networks that included funding of significant magnitude, enabled the production of 'collateral benefits'. One of the most tangible forms of the 'collateral benefits' is the 'one map initiative'.

The 'one map initiative' (OMI) is a government strategic policy which was stimulated by the REDD+ initiative in the process for establishing REDD+ architecture at the national level. In order to serve the objective of its performance-based system the REDD+ mechanism requires REDD+ host countries to develop national capacity to apply a robust and transparent system of MRV of reductions in carbon emissions (UNFCCC 2011: para 71). In so doing, developing country Parties must improve the quality and transparency of forest data and land-cover maps. This resulted in the improvement not only of the 'product', eg the maps, but also the institutions of map-making. Research findings indicated that in the development process these new institutions - 'one map initiative' - have already proved their ability to break the old institutional path-dependence of map-making which was characterised by its lack of transparency, a low level of public participation, and poor coordination amongst

government ministries and agencies. Importantly, the OMI produces ‘collateral effects’, ie governance reform of a significant magnitude which includes, (i) the inclusion of indigenous peoples’ land within the state land-cover maps (never done hitherto), (ii) improvement in coordination amongst government ministries/agencies, (iii) increased transparency and public participation, (iv) cost efficiency, and (v) improved efficacy in wider land-based resource management. The statements in this paragraph summarise the answer to the third subsidiary research question: **“What, if any, is the tangible contribution of REDD+ institutions in effecting governance reform within Indonesia’s existing forest institutions?”**

My observation and interviews at the village level revealed similar findings. In the policy-making process to establish institutions that facilitate the implementation of REDD+ activities on the ground, the implementation of the principles of ‘transparency’ and ‘participation’ was most noticeable. In particular, during the process for establishing the ‘village agreement’ (the ‘Agreement’) between the KFCP (‘Kalimantan Forests and Climate Partnership’) and each village involved in REDD+ activities research findings indicated that ‘social learning’ was enhanced as result of an appropriate design and an intensive process for community engagement. Equally, there was sufficient evidence that ‘social learning’ gained through the history of engagement with previous development/conservation projects prior to the KFCP has provided the villagers with an appropriate level of skills with which to negotiate their interests vis a vis the KFCP. This finding was marked by the inclusion of the villagers’ input (raised during the negotiation process) into the Agreement. The community’s proposal included a provision to protect the status of their indigenous land against the

risk of foreign assertion of ownership rights, equal opportunity for all villagers to participate in all stages of REDD+ activities, and to receive REDD+ benefits. The overarching benefit of this newly-established institution is that local communities now have a framework or legal template with which to enter into any contract with a future project proponent. The statements in this paragraph summarise the answer to the fourth subsidiary research question: **“What assembly of new/modified institutions is co-produced by the REDD+ initiative at the village level, and what benefits do these modified institutions bring, if any?”** With respect to institutional interplay, the Village Agreement was established to meet the requirements of a performance-based system under the REDD+ design. For this system to work, particularly when market-based carbon credits are expected as the source of funding, it is essential to develop a contractual agreement which lays out an institutional framework for benefit and cost distribution, and the rights, responsibilities and risks of the parties involved.

The above analyses reiterated from the four papers (ie chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6) show a link and similarities between processes of policy-making at the national level and at the village level. The case of the ‘village agreement’, as with the ‘national strategy’ and ‘one map initiative’, shows that institutional interplay, by which new REDD+ institutions require existing institutions to adopt particular measures that facilitate the implementation of REDD+ policies, enhanced governance of existing institutions and the improvement in ‘social learning’ by the stakeholders involved. As revealed throughout this research, most interviewees at the national, sub-national and village levels noticed that the two norms, ie ‘transparency’ and ‘full participation’ of relevant stakeholders (as embedded within REDD+ institutions under the UNFCCC),

were implemented intensively during the policy-making process. This thesis argues that the scale to which these norms were implemented was at a magnitude never experienced in Indonesia hitherto. This resulted in the contingency and downstream effects of governance reform which appear to be unstoppable. Moreover, the intensive implementation of the principles of 'participation' and 'transparency' during the policy-making processes enhanced the 'sense of ownership' by the stakeholders involved, thereby increasing the probability that the programmes will be sustainable. The above analyses show 'top-down' learning in which policy actors and stakeholders at the national and village levels learned and adopted the internationally formulated REDD+ institutions into national and village institutions. 'Bottom-up' learning, whilst not cited often by my interviewees, was revealed more during my observations and reflected the dynamics of the institutional interplay. As an example of 'national-to-international-level' learning, Indonesian policy actors while open to adopting internationally formulated policy goals and institutions were nationalistic in their views. They perceived REDD+ as a tool of developed countries to repress Indonesia's economic development, and since this view was held by influential policy makers it shaped policy development (chapter 3). For instance, a provision was included in the national REDD+ strategy that while aiming to achieve an emissions reduction goal of 26% or 41% with international support Indonesia will maintain an economic growth goal of 7% (see chapter 4: Strategy, p 24). Lessons learned therefore include the need for international policy actors to demonstrate greater sensitivity in their approach to countries with a long history of colonialism such as Indonesia.

Another provision included in the Strategy is government guaranteeing the rights of the indigenous people to forest land, not only based on formal law but also on customary law (Gol 2012: Strategy, p 34). My research results revealed that several organisations representing the indigenous and local communities were influential in advocating this provision (chapter 4). Some organisations such as AMAN and HuMa, while represented formally in the Strategy's 'action networks'¹⁸, also had their leaders advocate issues of 'tenure and rights' of indigenous people informally to the head of the Task Force, with the latter acknowledged as very accommodating (see chapters 3 and 4). Several other grass root organisations formed the 'civil society alliance' and influenced the policy-making process informally (chapter 4)¹⁹. The learning that resulted from the engagement of actors at cross-organisational and multi-levels, evident in the provisions included in the Strategy (see chapter 4: Table 4.2), reflected the dynamic nature of the institutional interplay.

Moreover, the following 'bottom-up' learning, from the national-to-international level, emerged from the process of developing the national REDD+ strategy (chapter 4) and the One Map Initiative (chapter 5). Whilst it is essential for transnational networks to form a close alliance with high-ranking reformist officials within government, equally important is not to by-pass other influential actors who protect the status-quo interests and who may oppose REDD+. This is because any international policy will only be effective with the support of existing influential actors

¹⁸ See chapter 4: Table 4.1 for the organisations representing indigenous and local communities that were formally engaged in the 'action networks' during the Strategy-developing process; Annex 1 C for the alliance of civil society and its members engaged informally in the process

¹⁹ See chapter 4: Annex 1 C for the alliance of civil society and its members

who do not feel threatened by the new policy (see chapters 3 and 4). Therefore a 'reversed-scenario' question is whether the process for establishing the national REDD+ architecture, including the REDD+ Agency, would have been easier if President Yudhoyono had initially involved MoFor (the president had the foreign affairs minister sign the bilateral agreement with Norway without involving MoFor). Lessons learned for an international policy actor such as Norway is that they could have suggested to the Indonesian government that MoFor be involved from the beginning.

At the village level, two 'bottom-up' learning lessons emerged from the process of resolving a dispute between the KFCP and villages over payments for seedling activity (chapter 6). They are: i) the 'performance-based' system, whilst agreed in advance by the two parties involved, must take into account local and customary practices; disputes cannot always be resolved based on a written agreement and require greater flexibility; ii) to avoid crop failure the type of seedlings suited to local soil should have been determined by the local communities. Moreover, the KFCP also learned of the customary law that the act of planting trees secures an individual's rights over land, a lesson that resulted in the village agreement including a provision that the KFCP will not change the ownership status of indigenous land (KFCP 2012b: Village Agreement). Other evidence of learning occurred during the finalisation process of the village agreement when the village leaders, in their efforts to protect the interests of their communities, insisted that the KFCP continue facilitation meetings for a total of twelve months until all villagers understood the content of the Agreement, and only then would they sign it (discussed in chapter 6). A lesson learned for any future project proponent, whether government or from the private sector, is the need

to allocate sufficient time to the process for securing a contractual agreement with villagers. With the KFCP communicating their lessons learned to the UNFCCC to "support and inform international negotiations on REDD" (AIP 2009, p 8), these lessons reflected 'bottom-up' learning from the village to international level, and simultaneously from the village to national level as the Indonesian government was also informed of the results.

To this end, the above analyses recapped from this thesis' substantive chapters showed the relative success of the institutional interplay. Nevertheless this was not without shortcomings, including issues that need careful attention by the REDD+ Agency and future REDD+ project proponents. As discussed throughout the substantive chapters, several issues emerged with respect to the notions of 'representation' and 'transparency'. In the process of establishing the national REDD+ strategy issues such as 'lack of women representation' (an issue found also at the village level), 'the absence of a feedback mechanism', and the 'unavailability of information prior to public consultation', were highlighted predominantly by networks of NGOs, CSOs and academics/researchers. These issues were acknowledged by the 'policy communities' central to the process, such as Bappenas (the National Development Planning Agency) and the UN-REDD Programme, who argued that the limited timeframe undermined efforts to circulate information early enough. Led by the REDD+ Task Force, the policy networks responsible for finalising the Strategy document responded to these shortcomings by including provisions that relevant stakeholders must be provided with: full access to REDD+ information in sufficient time before any consultation or negotiation processes take place, equal opportunities in all

stages of REDD+ activities (including as a potential REDD+ project proponent), and facilities to empower them to participate in REDD+ activities.

My research also revealed that whilst the agency of individual reformists within high-ranks of the government has enabled the REDD+ initiative to be moved to the top level of national policy agenda, it also poses a challenge. For instance, it was noticeable that Minister Kuntoro Mangunsubroto (then head of the REDD+ Task Force), who is also the head of the Presidential Delivery Unit for Development Monitoring and Oversight, holds significant political capital not only with the president but also with international donors and other transnational and domestic NGOs. He is seen by actors from across sectors and scales as a proponent for governance reform. This poses a particular challenge for the efficacy of the REDD+ implementation if the new head of the REDD+ Agency, ie Heru Prasetyo, cannot draw and rely on the same level of political goodwill as did his predecessor.

Research findings from the village level revealed similar result. The 'representative model' of participation (ie communities' members grouped into small interest groups) whilst offering benefits, eg enabling communities' members to develop a sense of belonging and trust within a stakeholder group (Tippett et al. 2005), also carries a significant challenge. For instance, since the 'village agreement' states that the results of village meetings bind all attendees and groups represented in the meeting it risks the development of resentment amongst any villagers who chose not to participate. In this context, it is essential to discuss the notion of 'full participation'. The KFCP's 'village institutions' document (Collins 2010) stated that facilitation meetings were designed to provide opportunity for the 'full participation' of

community stakeholders, ie providing equal opportunity for all villagers to participate in the decision-making processes and express their concerns and interests without feeling intimidated. The notion of 'full participation' is also stated within the signed village agreement, the provisions of which include the equal opportunity for all villagers to participate in all REDD+ activities, including the opportunity to capture REDD+ benefits and to become a REDD+ project proponent (KFCP 2012b).

However, and as discussed in chapter 6, the 'opportunity to participate' in itself is not enough to ensure that villagers will gain an equal stance in the decision-making process and benefits capture. This is because different actors have unequal capacities to participate and capture benefits, ie the 'contextual dimension' where actors' capacity refers to knowledge, tenure, and capacity-building (McDermott et al. 2013, McDermott 2013). To this end, and as my research results revealed, whilst 'social learning' amongst villagers as a collective increased as result of the well-designed participatory process for establishing village agreements there was still a significant gap in knowledge, finance and other resources between the villagers and the KFCP (see analysis in chapter 6). This is a phenomenon that is likely to occur with any future project proponent. Thus, 'full participation' can only be effective when actors in power, whether government or project proponent, provide less powerful actors with the facility and power necessary for them to participate fully. Future REDD+ project proponents and representatives of the REDD+ Agency must be careful to ensure that the future implementation of REDD+ does not alienate those villagers who may still oppose REDD+. It is also critical to minimise the risk that community participation and

the resulting 'social learning' occur only to a limited number of representatives such as the heads of the interest groups.

Beside issues relating to the notions of 'transparency', 'representation' and 'participation' as highlighted above, an important issue warranting further attention is REDD+ finance. As mentioned in chapters 3 and 4, Indonesia has received the largest amount of funding pledges internationally, nearly US\$2 billion including US\$1 billion committed by Norway (IGES 2012). However, as with REDD+ funding pledges globally disbursement in Indonesia is slow and consequently small (Streck, Parker 2012)²⁰. Therefore one question requiring reflection is how power and governance dynamics surrounding REDD+ may change when large amounts of funding flow. Some analysts stress that at this stage international funding for REDD+ comes primarily from development aid or public funds, thereby contributing to a broader scope of REDD+ and multiple objectives that include poverty reduction and sustainable development (see Angelsen et al 2012, Angelsen, Neil 2012). Others suggest that investor and/or donor governments' involvement in REDD+ decision-making was focused predominantly on carbon, their interest in 'safeguards' being a means to manage risks in carbon-related investment, while the participation of NGOs was to serve non-carbon interests (McDermott et al. 2012a, p 70).

In the case of the Norway's US\$1 billion pledge to Indonesia, the requirements attached to it aim not only to assist Indonesia develop its national and sub-national REDD+ architecture and capacity building but a large portion of the funding is to be

²⁰ In 2011 when the pledges had reached US\$4.17 billion, only US\$446 million had been allocated and approved for specific countries or funds (Nakhooda et al. 2011 cited at Streck and Parker 2012).

used for performance-based emissions reduction (LoI 2010). Other donors, such as Australia, Japan, EU, Germany and USA, provide technical and financial assistance for the establishment of REDD+ pilot projects, capacity building, and MRV at the local level (see IGES 2012). The different approaches of donor countries can result in different power and governance dynamics.

For example Australia's approach through its KFCP demonstration activity, which was 'prescriptive' and 'hands-on', tends to maintain power in the hands of the donor. My research results revealed criticism of KFCP as only a small part of REDD+ funding reached local communities, interviewees recognising the classical development aid practice of the majority of donor funds returning to the donor's international consultants (see chapter 3). Norway's 'hands-off' approach, which places the authority for the development of REDD+ policy and its implementation in the hands of the recipient (local actors), carries both advantages and a significant challenge. The challenge is that its approach requires a long lead time due to the complex chain of bureaucracy and the political infighting amongst Indonesia's policy actors (see chapters 3, 4 and 5). The advantage of the 'hands-off' approach whereby the recipient holds authority for REDD+ policy development, as evident in the process for establishing the REDD+ strategy, was an increased sense of ownership on the part of Indonesian government and the domestic stakeholders involved, thereby increasing the potential sustainability of the programmes (see chapter 4).

Within the first REDD+ phase the public funds disbursed, such as those from Norway and the UN-REDD Programme, has enabled the implementation of large scale capacity-building, the socialisation of climate change and REDD+ issues with relevant

stakeholders, and the inclusion of good governance principles that safeguard the implementation of REDD+ (see chapter 4). Moreover, Norway's funding was also influential in the development process of the OMI, eg to procure the technology and licences that enable the direct reception of satellite data at Indonesia's LAPAN's earth station, the benefit of which is increased cost efficiency and transparency (see chapter 5). In this regard donor funding was used largely to stimulate governance reform and add capacity and resources to existing institutions.

To this end, I propose that the disbursement of large public funds in the future can strengthen existing governance institutions and safeguard the implementation of REDD+, provided government establishes the appropriate infrastructure and a robust system that meet internationally recognised fiduciary standards which ensure the transparent and accountable use of REDD+ funding. Nonetheless, in agreement with McDermott et al (2012a), while this proposition can be implemented successfully in the first phase of REDD+, taking into account the implementation of REDD+ safeguards during the process for establishing policy and measures, we cannot assume that the practice of safeguarding REDD+ will continue at the later phases. In particular, a greater challenge will be faced in the third phase of REDD+, involving payment based on verified emissions reduction, if there is no commitment that performance-based payments will be conditional upon meeting REDD+ safeguards (McDermott et al. 2012a, p 70). On this account I propose that a provision within the Warsaw Framework for REDD+, which states that REDD+ host countries "should provide the most recent summary of information on how all of the safeguards referred to in decision 1/CP.16, appendix I, paragraph 2, have been addressed and respected before

they can receive results-based payments" (UNFCCC 2014: Decision 9/CP.19), increases the possibility that the non-carbon values within REDD+ are protected. This possibility is dependent upon an adequate application of REDD+ safeguards, based on each country's interpretation (McDermott et al. 2012a).

Another finance issue relates to market-based finance. My research results revealed that whilst acknowledging the large amounts of funding pledged to Indonesia's 'REDD+ readiness' the majority of interviewees were pessimistic that REDD+ income from carbon credits could cover the high transaction and implementation costs (see chapter 3). In this regard, the low price of carbon has very significantly reduced the interest and ability of the private sector to implement REDD+ projects. Should there be an increase in the demand for forestry carbon and therefore the price of carbon²¹, the resulting private sector investment can lead to the following scenarios.

On the positive side, since financial viability is a prerequisite to the motivation of private sector investment, any future REDD+ projects implemented by the private sector should deliver greater profitability. This financial viability generates an increase in the benefits and resources that can be shared with the stakeholders involved, including the local communities. With appropriate rules and safeguards these benefits and resources can be used to target the protection and improvement of the environment and reduce poverty, measures which can in turn sustain projects. On the

²¹ See GCP et al. (2014): *'Stimulating Interim Demand for REDD+ Emission Reductions: The Need for a Strategic Intervention from 2015 to 2020'*, a report produced by the Global Canopy Programme in collaboration with the Amazon Environmental Research Institute, Fauna & Flora International, and UNEP Finance Initiative. This action aims to stimulate demand for REDD+ emission reductions, and thereby increase the price of carbon credits from the forestry sector, with the overarching objective of achieving the scale of finance necessary to meet emission reduction targets in tropical forest countries.

negative side, any motivation based purely on a financial objective tempts actors to override good governance, ie there is the potential that some private sector investors may focus exclusively on the carbon reduction goal.

In this regard, the REDD+ safeguards within the UNFCCC (UNFCCC 2011: Annex I) and their adoption into the national REDD+ strategy aim to protect the people and the environment (see analysis in chapter 4). At the village level, the village agreement established between the KFCP and the villages also includes strong provisions for REDD+ safeguards (see chapter 6). The challenge, as with any written policy document, is in their implementation. Since the 'implementation stage' of the policy document falls outside my research boundary, my research outlines recommendations for future policy action and research (see section 7.4 'Policy Recommendations': 7.4.5, 7.4.6, and 7.5 'Suggestions for Future Research': 7.5.2).

In short, large amounts of private investment which may flow in the future can influence power and governance dynamics in two opposite directions; i) strengthen governance and benefit the stakeholders involved including local communities, or ii) undermine governance which further marginalises vulnerable groups. To ensure the former, and in order to protect the people and the environment, the government must implement the already well-established national REDD+ strategy which includes REDD+ safeguards that will overcome this risk (see section 7.4 'Policy Recommendations'). Importantly, these safeguards include the need for government to establish a clear and legitimate benefit-sharing mechanism which is a critical element in determining whether stakeholders, particularly the most vulnerable groups, will be rewarded appropriately and whether private sector investors will be confident in the proper

application of the safeguards necessary to guarantee the sustainability of their projects. In this regard, an issue surrounding the uncertainty of MoFor's Decree No 36/2009²² which regulates benefit-sharing amongst the stakeholders involved, ie government, communities and developers, needs to be resolved (see Ituarte-Lima et al. 2014). Moreover, the newly-established REDD+ agency needs to finalise urgently a system to manage REDD+ funding and distributions, and a robust system of information on how REDD+ safeguards are addressed and implemented throughout the REDD+ phases.

7.3. Reflections on the Conceptual Frameworks Employed

'Institutionalism', particularly 'institutional interplay', provided a conceptual umbrella for this thesis and was employed to guide my 'theoretical sensitivity' in the process of 'advanced coding' (discussed in chapter 2). During this process, when I linked the themes or categories which emerged from my own data with existing concepts within the perspectives of institutionalism and governance (ie 'clientelism', 'policy networks', 'path dependence', 'critical juncture' and 'social learning'), several insights emerged which are highlighted in the following.

For instance, whilst the link between clientelism and poor governance has been covered in existing literature (eg Jepson et al. 2001, McCarthy 2005, 2006, Phongpaichit et al. 1994, Sunderlin et al. 2008) less addressed is the underlying reasons why problems inherent in Indonesia's forest governance continue to persist,

²² This MoFor Decree No P.36/2009 is being contested by Ministry of Finance, but the subsequent MoFor Decree No 11/2013 has not revoked regulation of the distribution of income stated in the previous decree (see Ituarte-Lima et al. 2014)

notwithstanding the reform efforts attempted by several international policy initiatives. As mentioned throughout this thesis these governance problems include issues of ambiguity within the forestry legal system, poor coordination amongst ministries, corruption, and the government's lack of capacity to manage forests and enforce the law. My research suggested that whilst the significance of these problems in determining weak forest governance is understood by my interviewees and analysts of Indonesian forest governance alike, less understood is the difficulty in resolving them. My study proposed the lens of clientelism as a means to gain insight to the underlying causes of the persistence of problems identified by interviewees as major challenges to REDD+ implementation (see chapter 3).

For example, my research suggested that uncertainty and the ambiguities within the legal system are difficult to solve because 'lack of certainty' provides the opportunity for actors within clientelist institutions to exercise their role as 'facilitator' or 'broker' (and navigate the legal minefield in exchange for financial reward). Moreover, policy actors resist the efforts to improve coordination amongst different agencies because better coordination means increased transparency, a condition which threatens the 'status quo' practice of rent-seeking. My research suggests that unless these underlying issues are well understood any international policy initiative will continue to prescribe inappropriate policy measures and thus compromise its efficacy. By so doing this research drew greater attention to the deeply-embedded clientelist institutions which have played a key role in stabilising the current institutional path-dependence of forest governance institutions and through them

Indonesia's wider political economy (Jepson 2001, Larson et al. 2010, Sunderlin et al. 2008).

The significant role of clientelist institutions in stabilising the path-dependence of forestry institutions was addressed directly and indirectly throughout the thesis' substantive chapters. For example, it was reflected through the notion of 'corruption' often cited by my interviewees, a notion also known as 'rent-seeking', ie a key tool to maintaining clientelist institutions (chapter 3). Moreover, the clientelist practice used for over three decades by the Suharto authoritarian regime created a phenomenon that transformed patronage into a fusion of public authority and private interests. With this phenomenon patrons within the forestry sector awarded forest concessions to supporters or clients to gain loyalty and political support, a practice which dominated the forestry sector in favour of an extractive model of development (mentioned in chapters 3, 4 and 5). Chapter 5 examined path-dependence institutions in the case of map-making whereby maps had been created and used as a tool for a regime (since colonial time and through three decades of the authoritarian Suharto regime) to control forest lands and resources, and where the lack of transparency and accuracy of maps was maintained to secure corruption or rent-seeking practices. Chapter 6 discussed the role of traditional patrons, ie the heads of villages and customary leaders, in leading their communities to secure the villages' interests vis a vis the KFCP. This clientelist practice is deeply embedded within Indonesia's forestry sector and society-at-large (Jepson 2001, Larson et al. 2010, Sunderlin et al. 2008), and has prevailed on an inter-generational timescale.

Reflecting on the above analysis, an international policy initiative such as REDD+ which works on a much shorter time scale than that of clientelism, should not be expected to effect reform in the short term. Here my research attempts to contribute to the debate within 'historical institutionalism' by generating a more holistic approach towards understanding the underlying causes of the challenges perceived in the implementation of REDD+. It proposes that challenges related to existing forest governance institutions, including 'rent-seeking', overlapping forest concessions, tenure-related conflict, and the uncertainty of the legal system surrounding forests, are rooted in the conduct of deeply-embedded and widespread 'clientelist' institutions at different levels of Indonesia's government and within society-at-large. By so doing, this research draws greater attention to the role of informal institutions, ie 'clientelism', in contributing to the stabilisation of the path-dependence of Indonesia's forest institutions.

My research findings suggest that, as with any other international policy mechanism, REDD+ supporters must take into serious account the informal institutions such as clientelism which guide collective behaviour. In this regard, identifying the influential 'patron' - particularly the reformists - within the existing system is critical for the efficacy of any new international policy. As revealed in this research, the ability of high-ranking reformists within the government and the 'traditional patron' at the village level to move certain issues to the top of the political agenda was a key factor determining the success of the interplay between the REDD+ mechanism and existing institutions. In addition, the intensive involvement of a broad range of transnational

networks also played a significant role in determining the success of the institutional interplay.

Through linking the themes which emerged from data analysis (eg 'involvement of diverse networks', 'transnational networks', 'domestic networks' and 'domestic reformists') with the existing concept of 'policy networks', my research advanced the 'tiered policy network' model (Bulkeley 2000). The research results revealed differences between the structure of policy networks that were formed during the establishment process of Indonesia's National REDD+ Strategy and those in Bulkeley (2000)'s model. Whilst this model showed a clear distinction between the 'dominant coalition' positioned at the centre of the networks and those at the periphery, the 'national strategy' networks were more complex. Firstly, the 'periphery' was more structured or temporarily institutionalised, even containing participants from the dominant coalition. Secondly, participants from outside the dominant coalition were active in several issue networks and discourse and advocacy coalitions operating at the international and national level. In short, the 'national strategy' networks were more diverse, closely-woven and multi-dimensional. This created the conditions necessary for established forest interests and other actors seeking to reform forest governance, to negotiate successfully for embedding good governance principles within the national strategy for REDD+ (discussed in chapter 4).

'Transparency' was one of the principles of good governance most cited by my interviewees, and was also noticeable during my observation of the process for establishing REDD+ architecture at the national and village levels. Thus it warrants further discussion. As mentioned in chapter 4, 'transparency' in a decision-making

process refers to a condition in which information is freely available and accessible to those affected by the decisions taken (Caluster, Salagean 2007, Graham et al. 2003). In this regard, scholars emphasise the importance of access to information and justice particularly for the most vulnerable groups, the comprehensiveness and timeliness of the relevant information, and the rights to participate in government decision-making (Davis 2010, Lyster 2011). Moreover, the government needs to provide facilitation and guidance to the public who seek information, particularly for those communities whose capacity to access information is limited (Lyster 2011). If this is not done appropriately 'transparency' risks increasing inequality whereby powerful actors gain most benefit from the availability of information, and hence their ability to influence policies, whilst vulnerable groups are marginalised even further.

For example, and as discussed in chapter 5, in the case of the 'one map initiative' (OMI), whilst most interviewees responded positively on the transparency of the review and updating processes of the 'Indicative Moratorium Map' (ie the 'embryo' of the OMI), several challenges surfaced. My research results revealed that forest data and maps from the MoFor were only released after repeated requests by the NGOs, ie there was no 'deliberative transparency'. This phenomenon creates the risk that actors who hold political, economic and technological capital gain most benefit from non-deliberative transparency, and hence their ability to influence the development and implementation of policies is greater. To minimise this risk, and as part of the OMI development, a move towards 'deliberative' transparency was effected by publishing the current state maps and forest data in one geo portal web followed by Mofor's plan to publish data related to forest concessions .

To this end, the transparency of forest data and maps while producing benefits (outlined in chapter 5) carries certain risks. As mentioned in chapter 5, maps have historically been created as fundamental tools for a state to exercise control over territory and natural resources, including forests, and framing forests spatially and quantitatively enables the state to claim and manage these resources (Demeritt 2001, p 453). In this regard the work of Scott (1998) on the notion of 'legibility' is noteworthy. It highlights that 'being legible' carries certain risks to the people involved notwithstanding that the development of data relating to population and nature is essential to enable a state to establish appropriate interventions for its population's health, education, and economic welfare (Scott 1998). A fundamental shortcoming of 'legibility' relates to the notion of 'simplification' in which the process of data or map creation can never capture the real value of society and nature (see Scott 1998, p 3). The simplification and reduction of society and nature to mere 'numbers' associated with their economic function, eg the elimination of most elements of forests and their ecosystem and the cultural values of the indigenous people, risks marginalising the already vulnerable groups and enabling powerful actors to gain more control over resources (Scott 1998). Chapters 4, 5 and 6 of my thesis directly and indirectly discuss this issue by which national and village policy actors negotiated the inclusion of provisions that protect the economic interests, knowledge, and cultural values of the indigenous people and local communities, as well as the protection of ecosystem services and biodiversity. In this regard, my research results suggest that REDD+ institutions differ from path-dependent institutions, and with its safeguards and robust

system of monitoring REDD+ holds a better prospect of protecting more than simply the economic value of the forests and people.

In the same work Scott (1998) stresses that the risks of 'transparency', as discussed above, are not necessarily attached to the legibility of the data and maps themselves but more to the form of the state and the conditions of society (Scott 1998, p 5)²³. The authoritarian state uses the legibility of population and nature, eg the data and maps created, to exercise coercive power over society and serve the interests of the elites, with the prostrate civil society lacking capacity to resist a state's top-down policies (Scott 1998, p 5-6). Contrarily, in a democratic government with strong civil society the legibility of data on population and nature, where data and policies are created through a negotiation process between the state and society, can spur governance reform (Scott 1998). The case of the path dependence institutions of map-making under the Suharto regime, whereby maps and data on forests were created to serve elites and marginalise forest-dependent people (discussed in this thesis' chapter 5), conformed with Scott's 'authoritarian logic'. Conversely the OMI, developed during a democratic governance period (ie during the 'reformasi' era) and which aims to break this old path dependence, conformed with the 'democratic logic' (see analysis in chapter 5). In this regard my research results suggest that in a democratic system where civil society is relatively strong and supported by transnational networks, the 'legibility' and 'transparency' of population and nature can be used by all actors to protect and negotiate their interests vis a vis others and thus stimulate governance reform (see chapters 4 and 5).

²³ See Scott (1998, p 3-4) on the four elements of the logic behind the failure of state-initiated social engineering

However, as also revealed in my research, the indigenous and forest-dependent communities still lack financial and knowledge capital and hence the risk of marginalisation is probable. This lack of knowledge is closely related to the issues of language and literacy. As revealed in chapter 6, the low-level of education among the indigenous people and local communities, and their limited ability to understand the content of the village agreement which was made in the national language instead of their dayak language, reduced their negotiation power vis a vis KFCP. This language barrier means that written policy documents such as the village agreement, whilst accessible to the actors involved, are not equally transparent to all. My research suggests that indigenous and local communities should only enter into a legal agreement or contract with future REDD+ project proponents with the support of a lawyer paid by the public sector (chapter 6). Moreover, as stated within the national REDD+ strategy, government should provide appropriate facilities for the indigenous people and other vulnerable groups to access information and participate in the policy-making process (chapter 4). Unless this is done the risks associated with transparency are probable.

It is noteworthy that while some interviewees highlighted the shortcomings of the implementation of 'transparency' in the policy-making processes, such as the lack of a feed-back mechanism and that information was not distributed early enough prior to the negotiation process (mentioned earlier in this chapter and discussed in chapter 4), the majority of interviewees responded positively on the effects of 'transparency'. To a large extent these positive effects (ie the implementation of 'transparency' in the policy-making process and its adoption within the resulting policy documents) can be

attributed to the reformists within the government, supported by a large constituency that was advocating governance reform within the domestic networks. The transnational networks with their expertise and financial funding contributed to push the good governance agenda, as embedded within the internationally-formulated REDD+ institutions. This finding differs from earlier literature which suggested that transnational networks, holding a minimal alliance with domestic actors, had played a central role in pushing governance reform within Indonesia's forestry sector (eg Gellert 2010, Seymour, Dubash 2000). This begs the question, "What is unique about REDD+ vis a vis previous international policy initiatives?"

In many cases governance reform can result from institutional interplay whereby the domestic system responds to an exogenous factor of change (Crouch, Farrell 2004, Deeg 2001). Historical institutionalists suggest that when interplay occurs within a 'critical juncture', or a period of 'institutional fluidity' (ie when structural institutions are less constrained and thus actors' decisions are freer), the chance of institutional change is greater (Capoccia, Kelemen 2007). However, my research revealed that a 'critical juncture' alone is not necessarily enough to produce change of significant magnitude, or a switch from path-dependence to a new institutional path. As research results showed, immediately after the fall of the Suharto regime in 1998 (ie the period of 'institutional fluidity') some international initiatives supported by the IMF, World Bank and other donor countries, intended to effect reform in the forest governance, failed (see chapters 4 and 5). My research revealed that it requires a particular form of institution(s) to capitalise on the window of opportunity created by a 'critical juncture'.

Research results revealed that specific features of the REDD+ mechanism (eg a robust and transparent system for establishing a national forest reference level, MRV of the reduction in carbon stock, and social and environmental 'safeguards') have stimulated the development of new institutions. These include the 'one map initiative' (OMI) which then created the opportunity for the 'snowballing effect' of reform. There is a significant body of evidence that the OMI represents a breakaway from the old path dependency of map-making. The governance reform which the OMI generates (which includes improvements in transparency and public participation) is on a scale and magnitude never achieved hitherto. This is attributed to the combination of exogenous factors of change (ie the characteristic of REDD+ institutions being supported by large scale financial funding) and an endogenous factor (ie institutional fluidity which provided a broad constituency for governance reform).

Institutional interplay at the village level showed evidence that there was a causal relationship between the 'participation' of villagers at the policy-making process and 'social learning' achieved collectively within the community. Research observation initially indicated that the community engagement processes conducted by the KFCP (a REDD+ project proponent) during the process for establishing new institutions (the 'village agreement'), and formed to facilitate the implementation of REDD+ activities, resulted in the enhancement of 'social learning'. This is because, as has been researched intensively, an appropriate design of community engagement (ie small-setting, intensive and repeated meetings) enables reflective learning to take place and thereby hastens social learning (Brewer 2013, Ostrom 1996, 1990, Rydin, Pennington 2010). Adding to this proposition, my research results revealed other important

evidence. For instance, from the early stage of their interaction with the KFCP the villagers appeared to already possess the ability to negotiate their interests. Through further in-depth observation and interviews my research results suggested that the negotiation capacity of the villagers (particularly those held by the traditional 'patron') resulted not only from the community engagement process conducted by the KFCP but also from the 'social learning' achieved through their engagement with previous development/conservation projects implemented in their area. This begs the question whether the same result, ie the enhancement of 'social learning', can be achieved in a governance-setting where villagers have never been engaged by development/conservation projects.

In conclusion, the findings of this research suggest that the interplay between the REDD+ mechanism and existing forest-related institutions in Indonesia produces positive results in the form of new/modified institutions. These new institutions, while created to serve the objectives of REDD+ implementation, have shown a body of evidence of their potential to effect greater reform within and beyond Indonesia's forestry sector. Whilst some shortcomings surfaced during the institutional interplay they did not create disruptions to the objectives of the institutions involved, and the weaknesses revealed during the policy-making processes were addressed within the resulting policy documents for improvement and safeguarding REDD+ activities in later phases. The key determinant of success was not only the characteristics of REDD+ but also the existence of the national reform agenda and a large number of reformists, including Indonesian officials high in the line of political command. Whilst resistance exists from certain actors supporting the 'status quo', the 'coalition for governance

reform' was able to advocate their agenda during the course of the policy-making processes. The 'strategic alliance' between reformists within the government, other domestic networks, and the transnational networks has become closely-woven, multi-dimensional, and with financial funding of a significant magnitude is collectively stronger when pushing the reform agenda. REDD+ is no longer seen as merely a mechanism for the reduction of GHG emissions but also as a means to effect reform within and beyond the forestry sector.

7.4. Policy Recommendations

This thesis proposes a pragmatic approach for REDD+ supporters particularly for REDD+ implementation in Indonesia, which is also applicable to other REDD+ target countries with forest governance institutions of similar characteristics. The following policy recommendations are based on the recognition: (i) that actors external to the Ministry of Forestry (MoFor) intend to use the REDD+ mechanism as a tool for major governance reform; (ii) that any new international policy initiative will fail without securing support from existing influential actors; (iii) Indonesia's contemporary politics, which includes the national election for the new Parliament members in April 2014 and the president in July 2014 and the hierarchical system of law and regulations (see chapter 1), and (iv) the vulnerable position of indigenous people and local communities vis a vis the state and the private sector.

7.4.1. Prioritise governance reforms that do not require major structural change

REDD+ supporters need to identify and prioritise governance reforms that do not require major structural change in the bureaucratic system of target countries in the short-term. This approach holds the best chance of success for capitalising on the opportunities REDD+ can offer in the future. For instance, in Indonesia's case, policies included in the National REDD+ Strategy such as the review and improvement of laws related to forests and the management of land-based resources, the quality of data on forests and the related concessions, national and sub-national spatial planning, tenure and rights for indigenous and local communities, and the enforcement system and quality of forest prosecutors and police, are reforms that can be enacted without unsettling or dismantling the existing bureaucratic system.

7.4.2. Continue to build political support from a wider constituency of government ministries/agencies

This thesis has foregrounded the significance of President Yudhoyono's decision to establish a REDD+ Task Force independently from MoFor. This created a space of interaction between REDD+ institutions and reformist actors to capitalise on the 'critical juncture' provided by the 'reformasi' movement to establish new/modified institutions that push further governance reform. However, from the narrow perspective of REDD+ policy goals, particularly those on the reduction of carbon emissions from the forestry sector, this could prove problematic during the implementation of the 'results-based actions' phase of REDD+. This is because the MoFor holds the legal jurisdiction to manage the majority of Indonesia's forests based

on the Basic Forestry Law No 41/1999. Therefore, unless the REDD+ Agency receives full support from the MoFor and other relevant ministries/agencies, the efficacy of REDD+ implementation is at risk. To minimise this risk, appointed actors within the REDD+ Agency need to continue to build political support from within the government by identifying influential ‘reformists’ in each existing ministry and convince them that the new REDD+ Agency will not weaken or threaten their position. The REDD+ Agency needs to convince influential actors within the bureaucratic system that REDD+ represents an opportunity with which to achieve a common goal, ie the reduction in national emissions and continuing economic growth which can only be achieved when all sectoral ministries work together.

7.4.3. Build political support from Parliament

Currently the involvement of Parliament in the development of REDD+ policies is minimal. Considering that in Indonesia’ contemporary politics Parliament has power relatively equal to that of the president, and that the current president will be replaced through a presidential election in July 2014, it is imperative that REDD+ supporters (via the newly established REDD+ Agency) develop and build strong support within Parliament. This is also in anticipation that the new president may have a different policy towards climate change issues. With the election of new Parliament members occurring in April 2014 it is critical that the REDD+ Agency uses this window of opportunity to gain support from newly-elected Parliament members at the earliest time possible. Recognising that the REDD+ Agency may not have full support from the MoFor and other relevant ministries the UNORCID (Office for REDD+ Coordination in Indonesia) should be engaged to play the role of mediator as UN bodies are perceived

by Indonesian's policy actors as neutral agents. In this context, and as implemented previously by the UN-REDD Programme, the UNORCID can facilitate a more open dialogue between different government ministries and between government and the NGOs.

7.4.4. Build political support from the private sector

The REDD+ Agency needs to engage more with the private sector's business community in order to achieve funding of sufficient magnitude to support the implementation of large-scale carbon emissions reduction. The 'stakeholders committee', which was established to provide advice and input to the REDD+ Agency, should involve the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (KADIN) whose involvement to date has been minimal. Within the current institutional setting the business community is not encouraged to implement REDD+ projects because of the difficulty in securing a concession permit for 'ecosystem restoration' (ie a permit which facilitates the implementation of REDD+ projects). It is widely known that several applicants still await a decision 3-4 years after making an application (see chapter 3). When exercising a market-based mechanism which involves binding financial contracts the REDD+ mechanism requires a clear and transparent regulatory environment in which to operate and its absence in Indonesia is perceived as a major challenge. In this regard, the REDD+ Agency needs to work closely with the MoFor to hasten the application process whilst also ensuring that social and environmental safeguards are met.

7.4.5. Engaging indigenous people and forest dependent communities and protecting their interests

Indigenous people and local communities are likely to be affected by REDD+ implementation and therefore their involvement in all phases of REDD+ activity is vital to ensuring that their interests are protected and that the programme is sustainable. Through its specific provisions on environmental and social safeguards the National REDD+ Strategy places strong emphasis on the principle of FPIC ('Free Prior Informed Consent') and equality for all people, including women and society groups vulnerable to environmental change. Moreover, the Strategy calls for a guarantee by the government to acknowledge the rights of the local communities with respect to land and forests, based not only on formal law but also to consider their rights under customary law (*hukum adat*). Furthermore, it stresses the need for fairness in the distribution of REDD+ benefits and to include all parties who hold rights in areas where future REDD+ projects are to be implemented.

These provisions represented success for the 'coalition for governance reform' during the negotiation process vis a vis the 'coalition for the status quo' (see chapter 4). However, as often occurs in Indonesia's history of forest governance, unless a policy document is followed through with an implementation plan that is supported by an adequate legal instrument its efficacy is at risk. On this account, and to both safeguard and assist the implementation of the National REDD+ Strategy, this thesis recommends that the REDD+ Agency seeks to secure a presidential regulation which outlines detailed instruction on which a specific ministry or agency is responsible for each particular task.

Of particular importance is ensuring that there is the means for indigenous people and local communities to implement REDD+ projects, through for instance the creation of 'partnership forests management' or 'village forests'. In this regard the Ministerial Decree (MoFor decree No 36/2009, amended by No 11/2013) which regulates the procedures for applying licenses for the commercial utilisation of carbon sequestration and/or storage (ie to implement REDD+ projects) has already been issued. This decree, which also determines which actors are eligible to implement REDD+ projects, implicitly allows local communities to become a REDD+ project proponent as part of a cooperative (*kooperasi*) (see Ituarte-Lima et al. 2014). Nonetheless, unless there is a tangible form of programme to empower and facilitate local communities to establish a cooperative and develop REDD+ projects the communities alone do not have sufficient capacity. In this case, and given its significant financial resources, the REDD+ Agency needs to allocate an amount adequate for establishing the capacity of local communities and empowering them to participate in the implementation of REDD+.

Moreover, as revealed by my research findings, notwithstanding the efforts in capacity building and the community engagement process conducted by the KFCP there is still a large gap in knowledge, finance, and other resources between the villagers and KFCP. This phenomenon is likely to be repeated with any future project proponent. Thus, this thesis recommends that the REDD+ Agency creates an infrastructure of legal support that provides local communities with the services of a well-qualified publicly-paid lawyer when entering into a legal contract with any future partner or project proponent.

7.4.6. Safeguarding the National REDD+ Strategy with an appropriate legal instrument

To provide official legitimacy until a presidential decree was issued the National REDD+ Strategy was issued in September 2012 via a decree of the head of REDD+ Task Force (No.02/SATGASREDDPLUS/09/2012). However, up until completion of this thesis the presidential decree has not been issued. Since all future government action plans for REDD+ implementation will be based on this Strategy, and with due consideration for the hierarchical system of law and regulation in Indonesia whereby higher levels of government can pass regulations which override others (see chapter 1), it is critical that the Strategy is supported with an appropriate legal instrument. The REDD+ Agency therefore needs to convince the new president to issue a presidential decree and should mobilise support from the international community and domestic networks to add political pressure on the new president to do so.

Of particular importance are provisions included within the Strategy with regard to the review and improvement of all existing legal frameworks in the forestry sector, better land-based resource management, the strengthening of law enforcement and improvement in the capacity of law enforcement officers, and the creation of a legal framework with respect to concession processes and land use conflict resolution. This thesis recommends that the REDD+ Agency prioritise these actions and partner with relevant ministries/agencies, particularly with the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) which holds strong public support.

7.4.7. Follow through the implementation of the 'one map initiative'

Research results indicated that the 'One Map Initiative' holds great potential for effecting lasting governance reform within the forestry sector and the wider sector of all land-based resource management. In the development process it has shown significant contributions including policy coordination amongst government ministries/agencies, improved transparency by providing the public with greater access to information about the state map (through 'one geo-portal' at <http://maps.inasdi.or.id>) and encouraging them to provide input that improves the map, and the registration of indigenous peoples' land in the state map. These contributions represent significant progress within map-making institutions as has never occurred hitherto. For this reason it is important that REDD+ supporters, led by the REDD+ Agency, prioritise this policy and monitor and extend support for the implementation of the OMI.

For instance, while the Geospatial Information Agency (BIG) is mandated (under the Geospatial Information Law No. 4/2011) to lead the implementation of the OMI, the REDD+ Agency needs to extend full support with respect to the provision of resources such as finance and technical experts. In this regard, as the REDD+ Agency holds the authority to manage funding received from both international and potentially domestic donors, it can continue to facilitate the procurement of the technology of satellite imaging data necessary for the development of the OMI. The public-at-large, led by domestic networks such as the environmental NGOs, academics and journalists, need to continue to monitor the development process and maintain political pressure on the government to ensure this policy materialises.

7.4.8. International actors need to acknowledge and address the prevailing national psyche with respect to the perception that the REDD+ initiative is a 'neo-colonial' form of economic and environmental governance

Research results revealed that a large number of high-ranking government officials and long term bureaucrats expressed the view that REDD+ is a tool of developed countries to control or repress the economic development of developing countries (see chapter 3). This suggests that REDD+ and future international policy initiatives face distinct challenges in countries with a long history of colonialism such as Indonesia. Should government policy-makers believe that REDD+ serves the interest of developed countries at Indonesia's cost, those with influence are very likely to slow down the process. This long term effect of colonialism on Indonesia's national psyche should not be under-estimated and requires international policy makers to demonstrate a high level of sensitivity as they interact with local actors.

7.4.9. Transnational networks need to maintain their presence and involvement in REDD+ activities in Indonesia

As revealed from this research, one of the key factors which determined that the REDD+ mechanism gained a significant level of support from the president and reformists within government was the intensive involvement and political pressure from a broad range of transnational networks and bilateral donor countries. It is important that these networks, including international environmental NGOs, international financial organisations such as the World Bank, and UN bodies such as UNORCID, UNEP, UNDP and FAO, do not weaken their presence in Indonesia. In this context, the UNORCID can play a significant role as a connector between these transnational networks and domestic state and non-state actors.

7.5. Suggestions for Future Research

During the period in which this thesis was completed some national REDD+ infrastructures (eg the National REDD+ Strategy and the REDD+ Agency) have only just been established. Therefore, questions on the outcomes or effectiveness of these institutions are beyond the scope of this research and suggest that they should be addressed by future research. Moreover, as the second phase of REDD+ ('implementation of policies and measures') in Indonesia is underway, and the third phase ('results-based actions') will begin in the near future, this thesis proposes that future research should address the following themes.

7.5.1. The Institutional Interplay between the REDD+ Mechanism and Forest Institutions at the Provincial and District Level

Readers of this thesis will realise that this research did not allocate a chapter specifically to address institutional interplay at the provincial or district level. This is because, as shown by the case study of the KFCP demonstration activity, the provincial and district levels were by-passed by the national government in the policy-making process for selecting the project site, the formation of the national organisation, and on most elements of the implementation activities. The Indonesia-Australia Forest Carbon Partnership, an 'umbrella' organisation which operates the KFCP activities, consists of policy actors from the national level of government. The Australian government is represented by Australian Aid and the Indonesian government by the MoFor. The decision to select the project site, State forest land under the jurisdiction of the MoFor, was taken at the national level without prior consultation with the

provincial and district governments. Since KFCP was selected as a case study to examine how REDD+ activities were implemented on the ground, given the minimal involvement of the provincial and district governments (ie they were engaged in the consultation processes at the latter stages but had no decision-making authority), this research focused its analysis on examining those new institutions that emerged at the national and village levels and which were most relevant to the KFCP.

However, as REDD+ projects can also be implemented within forest-land which falls under the jurisdiction of the district government, this thesis proposes that future research should examine the results of institutional interplay occurring at the district level. Moreover, it will also be interesting to compare the implementation of REDD+ projects in forest areas under the MoFor's jurisdiction versus those under the district government by examining which actor plays the most effective role and why, and in which situation does the benefits of REDD+ mechanism flow more to local communities and indigenous people. Another subject which warrants research is the emerging institutions at Central Kalimantan Province related to the registration of the indigenous people's land. Examination of the role of the REDD+ initiative in pushing this development will provide evidence whether REDD+ institutions can produce a 'collateral benefit' at the provincial level: if not why, and which factors differentiate it from events occurring at the national level; if yes, which factors enable this development.

7.5.2. How the National REDD+ Strategy is translated into Practice

This research revealed how the norms of good governance, as embedded within the UNFCCC decisions on REDD+, were adopted through the process for developing the

National REDD+ Strategy and the resulting document. This Strategy consists of provisions that place strong emphasis on using the REDD+ mechanism not only as a means to achieve the reduction of carbon emissions but also to effect governance reform within and beyond the forestry sector, to protect biodiversity as well as the human rights of the indigenous people and local communities, and achieve the economic development goals of the country. Nonetheless, as with any policy, its success is largely determined by the translation of the policy document into an action plan supported by an appropriate legal instrument.

The National REDD+ Strategy was officiated in September 2012 and this thesis recommends that future research should examine how this policy document is translated into action plans by the relevant government ministries and agencies. Moreover, future research can include the examination of how the principles of good governance and/or social and environmental ‘safeguards’ within the National REDD+ Strategy are adopted by policy actors at the sub-national levels, what type of policy networks were involved and emerged from the process, whether there is a strong and broad enough constituency for governance reform, the challenges and opportunities faced, and how these issues affect the implementation of REDD+ activities on the ground. Research on this idea can be done in different REDD+ target countries as most of them are in a similar phase, ie they have recently finalised a national strategy for REDD+.

In Indonesia’s case, there is a need to trace the progress of the implementation of several important provisions within the Strategy, particularly those which provide not only enabling conditions for the implementation of REDD+ but also the entry point

for governance reform that breaks the institutional path-dependence of Indonesia's land-based resource management. These provisions include the review and improvement of: laws related to the management of land-based resources, tenure and rights for indigenous and local communities, the enforcement system and capacity of forest prosecutors and police, concession permits that have been issued and the related application process, and importantly the 'one map initiative'. At a later stage, research can examine the impact of these reform agendas on the efficacy of REDD+ implementation, particularly at phase 3 ('results-based actions').

7.5.3. How the REDD+ Agency Navigates its Way in the Complex Political System and How this Determines the Success of REDD+ Implementation

The process for the development of the REDD+ Agency was one of the issues most debated during the policy-making process for establishing the REDD+ infrastructure at the national level (see chapter 3 and 4). Long delays in finalising the Agency reflected the political struggle between the 'status quo' interests and the 'coalition for change'. The MoFor argued that the REDD+ Agency should be part of their ministry since they hold legal jurisdiction to manage the majority of Indonesia's forests. Other actors, consisting predominantly of NGOs, academics and foreign donors, believed that an independent agency would reduce the risk of corruption in the implementation of REDD+. Moreover, this group reasoned that, because REDD+ implementation requires the involvement of cross-sectoral Ministries (eg Forestry, Agriculture and Mining) and between the national and sub-national governments, an independent agency is needed to synchronise policies and programmes amongst relevant institutions. President Yudhoyono finally signed Decree No. 62/2013 for the establishment of the

REDD+ Agency in August 2013. The agency was developed outside the MoFor and reports directly to the president.

As this research revealed and is widely known, there has been strong resistance from existing government ministries/agencies towards the then REDD+ Task Force and consequently with the new REDD+ Agency. With mandated tasks that include coordinating, synchronising, planning, facilitating, managing, monitoring, overseeing and controlling REDD+ in Indonesia (Presidential Decree No. 62/2013: article 4), the REDD+ Agency may face systemic problems and challenges on the ground. It should be noted that the tasks stated in the Decree do not include the 'implementation' of REDD+. This means that as long as MoFor holds the legal jurisdiction necessary to manage the majority of Indonesia's forests their support is imperative to the success of REDD+ implementation. This thesis recommends that future research should investigate how the relationship between the new REDD+ Agency and MoFor (as well as with other relevant ministries) unfolds, and its consequence on the efficacy of REDD+ implementation. It will also be valuable to know how the newly-incoming president in July 2014 approaches REDD+ initiatives and the REDD+ Agency, whether the agency will survive, or whether the president will transfer the agency's authority to MoFor. Moreover, as highlighted above, how Parliament's members are engaged and their response will impact the efficacy of REDD+ institutions in pushing governance reform either positively or negatively. Similarly, whether the REDD+ Agency can utilise political capital provided by transnational networks and domestic networks who have so far committed to promote the REDD+ mechanism will be critical to its future.

7.5.4. The Horizontal Interplay between the 'One map initiative' with Policies in other Sectors, and the Future of the OMI

This research suggests that in its current development the OMI has already shown a body of evidence of its ability to move the institutions of map-making to a new institutional path which adopts a new paradigm never implemented hitherto. As mentioned earlier, this paradigm incorporates greater transparency and full public participation and pays significant attention to incorporating indigenous peoples' land within the state maps. This research also suggests that the significance of the OMI for governance reform is its contingency effect on greatly improving cross-sectoral coordination amongst government ministries/agencies. If this is fully materialised the effect will be cross-sectoral efficiency and increased effectiveness in the management of land-based resources as a whole. The problem inherent within forest governance, eg overlapping forest concessions and land-related conflicts which also affect other land-based sectors, can be minimised when relevant ministries/agencies use the same single land-cover map. Nonetheless, given the profile of 'critical juncture' (discussed in chapter 5) which includes that, whilst institutional change is very likely to occur during critical juncture, the re-equilibrium of the status quo is also possible. Thus there is more space for research given to this subject. Importantly future research should focus on identifying factors which will ensure that the opportunity provided by the critical juncture of map-making institutions (ie the OMI) have ever-lasting impact on the governance of forests and other land-based resource management, factors could otherwise jeopardise this opportunity and risk the old institutional path of map-making returning into force. Moreover, future research should focus significant attention on how the OMI interplays with policies in other sectors related to land-based resource

management, and the outcomes and impacts of the OMI on the efficacy within these sectors.

7.5.5. Can the REDD+ Initiative Produce a Collateral Benefit of Significance in a Country where Reformist Characteristics and National Reform Agendas do not exist?

These research results suggest that the relative success of the vertical interplay between REDD+ and Indonesia's forest-related institutions were not only determined by the features or characteristics of the REDD+ mechanism itself but also by the timing of its entry into Indonesia's political arena. This timing, within a period of institutional fluidity ('reformasi' era), was marked by the existence of a large constituency advocating governance reform which included reformists within the highest ranks of government. In other words, in Indonesia's particular context REDD+ has served as a 'connector' between the 'good governance agenda' at the international level with the reform agenda at the national level. This begs the question whether REDD+ can produce benefits of significance in a country where reformist characteristics and national reform agendas do not exist. The work of Karsenty and Ongolo (2011) touched on this issue questioning if REDD+ can be implemented in a country where forest institutions are weak. In this regard, other analysts suggest that REDD+ is designed to improve existing institutions that are weak (eg Brockhaus et al. 2012, 2013, Murdiyarso et al. 2011). What this thesis suggests is for future research to do more in-depth analysis that compares Indonesia's case (whereby REDD+ entered within an environment of institutional fluidity) with other countries where neither champions for governance reform nor national reform agendas exist.

7.5.6. The Implementation of REDD+ within the ex-KFCP Demonstration Site

One of the focuses of this research was the immediate consequence of the institutional interplay between REDD+ and village institutions using the KFCP as a case study. Through in-depth examination of the negotiation processes during the development of the 'village agreement' research results indicated that there was a causal link between the implementation of the principle of 'participation' and 'social learning'. In this regard, the appropriate design, setting, and process of the community engagement implemented by the KFCP enhanced the 'social learning' of the community members involved. Here social learning is referred to as the ability of villagers to negotiate their interests vis a vis outsiders. Equally, research results also suggested that before entering into negotiation with the KFCP villagers already held negotiating skills as a result of their continuous engagement with previous development and conservation projects implemented in their area. These results beg several questions which warrant further research. For instance, whether social learning can be enhanced through the same design and setting of community engagement as conducted by the KFCP in an area where villagers have never encountered other development projects.

It will also be interesting to understand how villagers in the ex-KFCP site respond to future REDD+ project proponents, whether they are themselves able to act as future project proponents, and how the established 'village agreement' which provides the legal template for communities to enter into contract with future project proponents plays a role in protecting their interests. These subjects are also related to the controversial decision by Australian-Aid to stop the KFCP project in June 2013

before it achieved its objectives in full (Rosenberg, Wilkinson 2013). In this regard the local communities, as with their previous engagements with development and conservation projects, might feel disappointed and their initial distrust of any 'outsider' (see chapter 6) again proven to be justified. These developments will undoubtedly influence the future implementation of REDD+ in this particular area.

7.6. Final Summary

In sum, both policy recommendations and suggestions for future research can be endless, reflecting the development progress of policy and measures to facilitate the implementation of the REDD+ mechanism in target countries such as Indonesia. The thesis' recommendations correspond to the latest development of REDD+ architecture in Indonesia which include the establishment of a national strategy, the REDD+ agency, a one map initiative, and a village agreement at the ground level. Since these institutions were established during the time this thesis was being completed the recommendations are focused on the need for policy actors to follow through with these newly-established institutions and ensure that they are being implemented appropriately. Suggestions for future research are focused on the need for assessing the effectiveness of the newly-established institutions, and trace how they develop during the implementation stage. Whilst based on the empirical findings of my research in Indonesia these policy recommendations and suggestions for future research should be of value to other REDD+ target countries, particularly those with similar characteristics of forest governance. Finally, two of the most significant points

of the overall conclusion of this thesis (see this chapter, section 7.2) are reiterated below.

Firstly, whilst resistance from actors supporting the interests of the 'status quo' exist, the interplay between REDD+ institutions and existing forest-related institutions has produced several 'collateral benefits' that support the case of the ability of the REDD+ mechanism to effect governance reform in Indonesia's forestry sector and beyond. This thesis has shown examples of tangible forms of 'collateral benefits', with evidence of governance reform that occurred or existed both within the policy-making processes and the resulting policy documents of three policy instruments, namely the 'national strategy', 'one map initiative', and 'village agreement'. In this regard, during the process of institutional interplay the 'newly-entering' institutions (ie REDD+), by requesting the target institutions (Indonesia's forest-related institutions) to adopt particular measures to support the objectives of REDD+ implementation, improved the governance and effectiveness of the target institutions.

Secondly, the positive results of the institutional interplay were determined not only by REDD+ own characteristics (eg the inclusion of social and environmental safeguards, a robust system of the MRV of reduction in carbon emissions, and financial funding of significant magnitude for REDD+ readiness) but also by the reform characteristics prevailing domestically. The latter are marked by the existence of a broad range of reformists involving state and non-state actors (which include high-ranking officials within the government) and national reform agendas. In this regard, the timing of REDD+ entrance to Indonesia's political and social arena in the wake of the 'reformasi' movement is vital in determining the level of support REDD+ receives

and the relative success of its interplay with Indonesia's forest-related institutions as observed today.

In conclusion, and as stated in the introductory chapter, the aim of this thesis is to examine the interplay between REDD+ and Indonesia's forest-related institutions by addressing the main research question: "How do REDD+ institutions effect governance reform within Indonesia's existing national and sub-national forest institutions?" The overarching objective is to contribute empirical findings from an Indonesian case to the global comparative study of other REDD+ studies conducted in other countries and recommend policies for the future implementation of REDD+. In this regard, the thesis' policy recommendations and suggestions for future research, whilst based on empirical findings in an Indonesian case study, are highly relevant to other REDD+ host countries as most are in a similar 'REDD phase', ie entering or in the midst of the second phase 'implementing policy and measures'. On this note, I hold that this thesis has met its aim and objectives, and provided significant empirical findings and insights which will contribute to the effort to assess the probable effectiveness of REDD+ institutions operating under a post-2012 climate change regime. This is something the reader can consider and debate.

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APPENDIX 1: NOTES ON PAPERS AND CONTRIBUTIONS OF COLLABORATING AUTHOR

This appendix summarises the contributions of the co-author and provides relevant additional background information to the papers.

Chapter 3:

REDD+ and Forest Governance in Indonesia: a Multi-stakeholder Study of Perceived Challenges and Opportunities

Mulyani and Jepson, published in Journal of Environment & Development, October 2013, 22(3) 261-283 DOI: 10.1177/1070496513494203

I drafted this paper which Dr Jepson and I then revised together. Dr Jepson contributed ideas on the deployment of the 'clientelist' perspective as a means to provide a holistic understanding of the challenges faced by the implementation of REDD+ in Indonesia. Moreover, he advised how best to quantify and weigh my interviewees' perceptions of REDD+ challenges and opportunities in a statistical form, thereby increasing the reliability of my research (ie Table 3.2 and 3.3 in chapter 3).

Chapter 4:

Policy Networks and Governance Reform in Indonesia: a Study of the Policy-making Process for the National REDD+ Strategy

Mulyani and Jepson; target Journal: Environment and Planning C

I drafted this paper which Dr Jepson and I then revised together. An earlier version of the paper was reviewed by Dr Nancy Peluso prior it being presented at the Association of

American Geographer (AAG) annual meeting in Los Angeles on 9 April 2013. This version was then submitted for my 'Confirmation of Status' report and received comments from two internal examiners (Dr Constance McDermott & Dr Kersty Hobson). The current version of the paper has addressed comments from the two examiners and input from the reader and audience at the AAG meeting.

Dr Jepson contributed ideas on the perspective of 'policy networks' which might inform the study. I then further explored the model of 'tiered policy network', as used by Bulkeley (2000) to better understand climate change policy networks. Dr Jepson also suggested that I develop a table summarising the organisation or policy networks involved in the process for the development of the national strategy for REDD+ (ie Table 4.1 in chapter 4).

Chapter 5:

Does the REDD+' One Map Initiative' represent a new institutional path for Indonesia's forest governance?

Mulyani and Jepson; target Journal: Environmental Science & Policy

I drafted this paper which Dr Jepson and I then revised together. As with other papers which were informed and shaped by the themes or categories that emerged from my data collection and analysis, in this paper I linked these themes with existing concepts (ie 'path dependence' and 'critical juncture') within the 'historical institutionalism'. Dr Jepson agreed that linking would provide an in-depth insight to the research questions proposed for this paper: 1) whether the 'One Map Initiative' signifies a switch to a new institutional path in Indonesia's map-making (one that foregrounds transparency, public participation, cross-sectoral planning, and the integration of indigenous customary lands within the

State map), or it is just another innovation within existing forestry institutions, and 2) what is the role of the REDD+ initiative in creating a 'critical juncture', ie momentum for Indonesian resource and land governance institutions to move to a new path, through the OMI?

In particular, Dr Jepson contributed his knowledge and experience with the technology of map-making and its effect on the governance of land-based resource management, and map development projects previously conducted in Indonesia. He also suggested that I develop a table to summarise different map institutions in Indonesia, an input which I expanded further to demonstrate the 'historical link' between the institutions of map-making before and after the entrance of REDD+ (ie Figure 5.3 in chapter 5). An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 'conservation governance lab' meeting in Oxford on 3 February 2014 and the current paper has incorporated input from the lab's members.

Chapter 6:

The Interplay between REDD+ and Village Institutions: *a case study of the Kalimantan Forests Climate Partnership (KFCP) in Central Kalimantan Indonesia*

*Mulyani and Jepson; **Submitted** for the Asia Pacific Viewpoint special issue:
'From Global to Local Politics - The Social Dynamics of REDD+ in Southeast Asia'*

I drafted this paper which Dr Jepson and I then revised together. I linked the themes of 'community participation' (which emerged from my data collection in relation to the development process for establishing the 'village agreement' which facilitates the implementation of REDD+ activities on the ground) with the existing concept of 'social

learning'. Dr Jepson contributed ideas on how to strengthen the argument with respect to the causal link between the 'village agreement' (ie a contractual agreement) developed by the KFCP and the villages involved in REDD+ activities with the 'market-based system' under the REDD+ mechanism. I explored further the idea that any 'performance-based system', whether 'market-based' or 'fund-based', requires a contractual agreement. Moreover, Dr Jepson suggested that I develop a table to summarise the content of the 'village agreement' (ie Table 6.4 in chapter 6).

An earlier version of the paper was presented at the 7th EuroSEAS Conference in Lisbon, on 2 July 2013, the Royal Geographical Society annual conference in 26-29 August 2013, and the 'forest governance' meeting in Oxford on 18 June 2013. The current version of the paper has incorporated input from both the conferences and the 'forest governance' meeting's audience which included Dr Constance McDermott and Professor Steven Newman.

Statement from Dr Jepson

I confirm that the above details are correct to the best of my knowledge and that the leading role of Mari Mulyani in each of these papers is beyond dispute.

Oxford, 27 March 2014

Dr Paul Jepson

APPENDIX 2: DETAIL OF PERSONS INTERVIEWED: 2010-2013

(In chronological order)

Notes:

- The names (and 'position' in a sensitive case) of the interviewees, which were provided solely for the purpose of the assessment of the 'confirmation report' (and later for the final assessment of the thesis), were deleted to protect their anonymity .
- Language **(L)**/Media **(M)** recording: **E** (English); **I** (Indonesian); **D** (Digital); **Nt** (Note taking)
- Location: 'Palangkaraya' is the capital of Central Kalimantan Province

Name	Affiliation	Position and notes on involvement in REDD+	Interview			
			Type	Date	Location	L/M
	Rare International	Vice President Asia <i>Rare International is a conservation organisation seeking to develop a REDD+ project.</i>	Pilot	03/06/2010	Jakarta	E/Nt
	Yayorin	Operational Manager <i>Yayorin is a local conservation NGO seeking to develop a REDD+ project</i>	Pilot	07/06/2010	Lamandau, Central Kalimantan	I/Nt
	Yayorin	Community engagement officer	Pilot	06-11/06/2010	Lamandau	I/Nt

	Yayorin	Community engagement officer	Pilot	06-11/06/2010	Lamandau	I/Nt
	Conservation International	Conservation policy specialist <i>CI was involved in developing 'OSIRIS' (decision support tools for REDD+).</i>	Pilot	10/07/2010	Jakarta	I/Nt
	Conservation International	Development and Partnership Director	Pilot	10/07/2010	Jakarta	I/Nt
	University of Indonesia	Lecturer in Climate Change issues, former vice chairman of the IPCC (1999-2009)	Pilot	21/07/2010	Bali	I/Nt
	Australia national University	REDD+ researcher	Pilot	21/07/2010	Bali	I/Nt
	Forest Carbon (FC)	Director of Carbon Forestry <i>FC was a potential REDD+ project proponent.</i>	Pilot	20/08/2010	Jakarta	E/Nt
	Sindicatum Sustainable Resources (SSR)	CEO <i>SSR is a private sector company seeking to develop a REDD+ project.</i>	Pilot	26/08/2010	Jakarta	E/Nt
	Saïd Business School, Oxford	Researcher, expert in 'shadowing technique'	Pilot	19/01/2011	Oxford	E/Nt
	DFID - UK	Former coordinator of the Indonesia-Australia Forest Carbon Partnership (IAFCP) <i>DFID-UK: Department for International Development, United Kingdom</i>	Pilot	23/05/2011	London	E/D
	London School of Economics	Researcher of Indonesia's agriculture governance	Pilot	24/05/2011	London	E/Nt
	University of Oxford	REDD+ researcher	Pilot	06/06/2011	Oxford	E/D
	United Nations University	REDD+ researcher	Pilot	09/06/2011	Oxford	E/Nt
	Saïd Business School, Oxford	Academic and REDD+ researcher	Pilot	09/06/2011	Oxford	E/D
	University of Oxford	REDD+ researcher	Pilot	09/06/2011	Oxford	E/D
	Value for Nature (VN)	VN is a REDD+ project proponent	Pilot	14/06/2011	Oxford	E/Nt

	Fauna & Flora International	Regional Director, Asia-Pacific <i>Fauna & Flora International is a REDD+ project proponent.</i>	Pilot	23/06/2011	London	E/Nt
	DFID – UK	Former coordinator of the Indonesia-Australia Forest Carbon Partnership	Standard	23/06/2011	London	E/D
	London School of Economics	Academic and researcher of Indonesia's forest governance	Standard	27/06/2011	London	E/Nt
	Australia Aid		Standard	13/07/2011	Jakarta	E/Nt
	IAFCP	Forest and Climate Specialist <i>IAFCP: Indonesia-Australia Forest Carbon Partnership</i>	Standard	13/07/2011	Jakarta	E/D
	SIEJ	Executive Director <i>SIEJ: Society of Indonesian Environmental Journalists</i>	Standard	14/07/2011	Bogor	I/Nt
	SSR	CEO. SSR is a private sector company seeking to develop a REDD+ project <i>SSR (Sindicatum Sustainable Resources)</i>	Standard	15/07/2011	Jakarta	E/D
	University of Vienna	PhD research on forest governance and palm oil in South east Asia	Standard	15/07/2011	Jakarta	E/D
	CIFOR	Research Fellow-Climate Change Forests and Livelihoods Programme	Standard	18/07/2011	Bogor	I/Nt
	University of Indonesia	Lecturer in Climate Change issues, former vice chairman of the IPCC (1999-2009)	Standard	18/07/2011	Bogor	I/Nt
	University of Indonesia	Co-author of the 'Indonesia-Norway REDD+ Partnership: first evaluation of deliverables'	Standard	18/07/2011	Bogor	I/Nt
	WRI	Project Manager of Palm Oil, Timber and Carbon Offsets <i>The World Resource Institute (WRI): People & Ecosystems Programme</i>	Standard	21/07/2011	Jakarta	E/D
	Gol	Assistant Special Staff to the President for Climate Change <i>Gol: Government of Indonesia</i>	Standard	21/07/2011	Jakarta	I/Nt
	Norway	Royal Norwegian Embassy in Jakarta	Standard	22/07/; 14/12/2011	Jakarta	E/Nt
	AMAN	Secretary General <i>AMAN: National Alliance for Indigenous People</i>	Standard	25/07/2011	Jakarta	I/D

	MoFor	Secretary General <i>MoFor: Ministry of Forestry</i>	Press conference	26/07; 27/09/ 2011	Jakarta	I/Nt
	British Embassy	Head, FCO Climate Change and Economy Group	Standard	28/07/ 2011	Jakarta	E/Nt
	WWF Indonesia	Programme manager, Nature Resources Management	Standard	04/08/ 2011	Jakarta	I/D
	HuMa	Programme Coordinator of HuMa <i>HuMa: Association for Community and Ecologically-Based Law Reform</i>	Standard	04/08/ 2011	Jakarta	I/D
	Forest Carbon	Director of Carbon Forestry. Forest Carbon is a REDD+ project proponent	Standard	05/08/ 2011	Jakarta	E/D
	CIFOR	REDD+ researcher	Standard	09/08/ 2011	Jakarta	E/Nt
	UKP4	Minister, head of UKP4; head of the REDD+ Task Force <i>UKP4: President's Delivery Unit for Development Monitoring and Oversight</i>	Press conference	10/08/ 2011	Jakarta	E/Nt
	University of East Anglia	PhD research on REDD+ case study in East Kalimantan, Indonesia	Standard	10/08/ 2011	Jakarta	E/Nt
	IAFCP	Coordinator	Standard	16/08/ 2011	Jakarta	I/D
	UKP4	Deputy I to the Minister and to the head of the REDD+ Task Force <i>UKP4: President's Delivery Unit for Development Monitoring and Oversight</i>	Standard	16/08/ 2011	Jakarta	I/D
	MoFor	Chairperson Climate Change Working Group within the MoFor, and Senior Adviser to the Minister on Environment & Climate Change;	Standard	19/08/ 2011	Jakarta	I/D
	MoFor	Head of the National Forest Inventory division	Standard	19/08/ 2011	Jakarta	I/D
	University of Tokyo	PhD research on Indonesia's forest governance	Standard	19/08/ 2011	Jakarta	I/Nt
	Greenpeace	Political Forest Campaigner in Indonesia and South East Asia	Standard	23/08/ 2011	Jakarta	I/Nt
	Clinton Climate Initiative	National Coordinator, Indonesia	Standard	23/08/ 2011	Jakarta	I/D
	Clinton Climate Initiative	Project Management Officer – Forestry Indonesia	Standard	23/08/ 2011	Jakarta	E/D

	MoFor	Director of Forest Management Unit and Forest Area Utilisation Arrangement at the Directorate General of Forestry Planning	Standard	24/08/2011	Jakarta	I/D
	UNDP	National Project Manager, Project Management Unit REDD+	Standard	25/08/2011	Jakarta	I/D
	Kemitraan	Chief of Cluster, Economic and Environmental Governance <i>Kemitraan is an NGO also known as 'Partnership for Governance Reform'</i>	Standard	06/09/2011	Jakarta	I/D
	MoFor	Director General of Forests utilization Department	Standard	07/09/2011	Jakarta	I/D
	MoFor	Head of Legal Unit of the Directorate General of Forestry Planning	Standard	07/09/2011	Jakarta	I/D
	JKPP	National Coordinator <i>JKPP is Indonesian Community Mapping Network</i>	Standard	07/09/2011	Jakarta	I/Nt
	MoFor	Division of Forest Inventory and Monitoring	Standard	08/09/2011	Jakarta	I/D
	UN-REDD Programme	National Programme Director, Indonesia	Standard	08/09/2011	Jakarta	I/D
	MoFor	Special staff to the Minister for Revitalization of Forestry	Standard	12/09/2011	Jakarta	I/D
	Bappenas	Director for Forestry and Water Resources Conservation <i>Bappenas: National Development Planning Agency</i>	Standard	13/09/2011	Jakarta	I/D
	LIPI	Researcher on Indonesia's forest governance <i>LIPI: Indonesian Institute of Sciences</i>	Standard	13/09/2011	Jakarta	I/D
	Forest People Programme	Policy Advisor Indonesia	Standard	14/09/2011	Jakarta	E/Nt
	RFN	Program Coordinator, South East Asia <i>RFN: Rainforest Foundation Norway</i>	Standard	14/09/2011	Palangka-raya	E/D
	APHI	Executive Director <i>APHI: Association of Indonesia Forest Concessionaires</i>	Standard	15/09/2011	Jakarta	I/D
	University of Indonesia	PhD research on REDD+ and tenure system in Central Kalimantan	Standard	19/09/2011	Palangka-raya	I/D
	Terra Global Capital (TGC)	Principal <i>TGC is a REDD+ project proponent.</i>	Standard	20/09/2011	Palangka-raya	E/D
	Carbon Conservation	Senior Counsel, Legal & Policy <i>Carbon Conservation is a REDD+ project proponent.</i>	Standard	21/09/2011	Palangka-raya	E/D

	Walhi	Executive Director <i>Walhi: Friends of the Earth Indonesia – Central Kalimantan</i>	Standard	24/09/2011	Palangkaraya	I/D
	DNPI	Chair, Working Group on Land-use, Land-use Change, and Forestry <i>DNPI: National Council on Climate Change</i>	Standard	20/09/2011	Palangkaraya	I/D
	Gol	<i>Central Kalimantan Province</i>	Standard	20/09/2011	Palangkaraya	I/Nt
	MLH	Executive Director <i>Mitra Lingkungan Hidup Kalteng: an environmental NGO based in Palangkaraya</i>	Standard	21/09/2011	Palangkaraya	I/D
	University of Palangkaraya	Member of the Working Group of REDD+ in Central Kalimantan Province	Standard	21/09/2011	Palangkaraya	I/D
	Gol	Head of Environmental Division, Head of Provincial REDD+ Task Force	Standard	21/09/2011	Palangkaraya	I/D
	PT Rimba Makmur Utama	President Director. RMU is a REDD+ project proponent.	Standard	26/09/2011	Jakarta	I/D
	Mazars, Starling Resources	Advisor. Mazars is a REDD+ project proponent.	Standard	26/09/2011	Jakarta	I/D
	The World Bank	Consultant	Standard	27/09/2011	Jakarta	I/D
	Royal Norway	Minister of the Environment and International Development	Press Conference	27/09/2011	Jakarta	I/D
	KADIN	Head of Environmental Division <i>KADIN: Indonesian Chamber of Commerce & Industry</i>	Press Conference	27/09/2011	Jakarta	E/D

	Gol	Chair of the Working Group of KFCP <i>Head of the District Planning Agency, Kapuas</i>	Standard	20/11; 28/10/2011	Palangkaraya	I/D
	DNPI	Special Staff to the President for Climate Change <i>DNPI: National Council on Climate Change</i>	Standard	03/10/2011	Jakarta	I/D
	Norway	The Embassy of the Royal Norwegian for Indonesia	Standard	13/12/2011	Jakarta	E/Nt

	The World Bank	Sr. Social Development Specialist. <i>The World Bank was involved in setting up the trust fund for the KFCP</i>	Standard	22/12/2011	Jakarta	E/Nt
	The Green Energy Company (GEC)	CEO <i>GEC is a REDD+ project proponent. Agus Sari also chairs the Working Group on Finance in the REDD+ Task Force</i>	Standard	27/02/2012	London	I/Nt
	REDD+ Task Force	Former coordinator of the Working Group of National REDD+ Strategy	Standard	29/04/2012	Via Skype	I/D
	IPB	The lead author of Indonesia's National Communication to the UNFCCC <i>IPB: Institute of Agriculture Bogor</i>	Standard	12/09/2012	Bogor	I/Nt
	REDD+ Task Force	Chair, Working Group of National REDD+ Strategy	Standard	30/08/12	Jakarta	I/D
	ICEL	Programme officer. ICEL was involved in the development of the National REDD+ Strategy <i>ICEL: Indonesia Center for Environmental Law</i>	Standard	05/09/2012	Jakarta	I/Nt
	Forest Watch Indonesia	Researcher	Standard	05/09/2012	Jakarta	I/Nt
	ICEL	Lawyer. Giorgio was one of the writer team of the National REDD+ Strategy <i>ICEL: Indonesia Center for Environmental Law</i>	Standard	05/09/2012	Jakarta	I/Nt
	Bakosurtanal	Bakosurtanal is responsible for leading the 'one map programme' <i>Bakosurtanal: National Mapping Agency</i>	Standard	05/09/2012	Jakarta	I/Nt
	Greenpeace	Political Forest Campaigner of Greenpeace Indonesia and South East Asia	Standard	05/09/2012	Jakarta	I/Nt

	University of Palangkaraya	Dean of the Faculty of Agriculture; involved in REDD+ policy development in Central Kalimantan	Standard	10/09/2012	Jakarta	I/Nt
	UNDP	REDD+ facilitator	Standard	10/09/2012	Jakarta	I/Nt
	WWF Indonesia	Spatial Analyst	Standard	10/09/2012	Jakarta	I/Nt
	University of Unmul	REDD+ researcher <i>Samarinda, East Kalimantan</i>	Standard	10/09/2012	Jakarta	I/Nt

	LAPAN	Director of Remote Sensing; a member of the Working Group of 'MRV', REDD+ Task Force <i>LAPAN: Indonesian National Institute of Aeronautics and Space: Remote Sensing Technology Data Centre</i>	Standard	11/09/2012	Jakarta	I/Nt
	Ministry of Environment	A member of the Working Group on 'MRV', REDD+ Task Force	Standard	11/09/2012	Jakarta	I/Nt
	University of Indonesia	A member of the Working Group on 'National REDD+ Strategy', REDD+ Task Force	Standard	11/09/2012	Jakarta	I/Nt
	JICA	Forest management coordinator	Standard	11/09/2012	Jakarta	E/Nt
	Conservation International	Terrestrial Conservation Science Manager. CI conducts several visibility studies for REDD+	Standard	11/09/2012	Jakarta	I/Nt
	SIEJ	Director <i>SIEJ: Society of Indonesian Environmental Journalists</i>	Standard	11/09/2012	Jakarta	I/Nt
	HuMa	Programme Coordinator of HuMa <i>HuMa: Association for Community and Ecologically-Based Law Reform</i>	Standard	12/09/2011	Jakarta	I/D
	CIFOR	Principal Scientist – Climate Change Forests and Livelihood Programme	Standard	12/09/2012	Bogor	E/Nt
	CIFOR	Senior REDD+ Research Fellow	Standard	12/09/2012	Bogor	E/Nt
	REDD+ Task Force	Chair, Working Group of National REDD+ Strategy	Standard	24/03/2013	Via Skype	I/D

	Rutgers University	REDD+ Researcher	Standard	09/04/2013	LA	E/Nt
	University of Hawaii	REDD+ Researcher	Standard	09/04/2013	LA	E/Nt
	UNORCID	Director and Executive Head <i>UNORCID: UN Office for REDD+ Coordination in Indonesia</i>	Standard	25/11/2013	Oxford	E/Nt

APPENDIX 3: DETAIL OF PERSONS INTERVIEWED RESULTING FROM THE 'SHADOWING' ACTIVITIES

(Between October and mid-December 2011)

Only if sensitive, the names and/or position of the interviewees, which were provided for the purpose of the assessment of the 'confirmation report' (and later for the final assessment of the thesis), were deleted to protect their anonymity.

Affiliation /Name	Notes on involvement in REDD+	Interview		
		Location	Type	Media recording
Kalimantan Forests and Climate Partnership (KFCP):				
	Manager	Palangka- raya	Standard	Digital
	Manager	Palangka- raya	Standard	Note taking
	Activity Coordinator	Petak Puti	Standard	Note taking
KFCP/CARE (personnel are hired by the KFCP from 'CARE International'):				
	'Shadowed subject', manager of 'community engagement'	Palangka- raya	Standard	Digital
	'Shadowed subject', unit manager of 'governance and payment'	Mantangai Hulu	Standard	Note taking
	'Shadowed subject', supervisor of 'community engagement'	Petak Puti	Standard	Note taking
	'Shadowed subject', staff of 'community engagement'	Petak Puti	Standard	Note taking
	'Shadowed subject', staff of 'governance and payment'	Mantangai Hulu	Standard	Note taking
	Manager	Palangka- raya	Standard	Digital
	Supervisor	Palangka- raya	Standard	Digital
	Supervisor of 'community engagement'	Palangka- raya	Standard	Note taking
KFCP/ BOSF (personnel are hired by the KFCP from 'Borneo Orang utan Survival')				
	Unit manager, 'reforestation'	Petak Puti	Standard	Note taking
	Staff, 'reforestation'	Petak Puti	Standard	Note taking
	Staff, 'reforestation'	Petak Puti	Standard	Note taking

Affiliation/ Name	Notes on involvement in REDD+	Interview		
		Location	Type	Media recording
Civil Society Organisations/NGOs/University:				
Edy Subahani from Pokker ShK	Pokker ShK is a CSO focused on participatory community forest management, and is involved in capacity building activities with respect to ‘FPIC’ and ‘village planning’.	Palangka -raya	Standard , FGD	Note taking
Herry Teras, Rico, and Ato	YTT is involved with capacity building activities with respect to FPIC (<i>YTT: Yayasan Tahanjungan Tarung</i>)	Palangka -raya and Kapuas	Standard , FGD	Note taking
Lilik and Kiki from Kemitraan /Partnership	Kemitraan/Partnership is involved in policy advocacy with the provincial government, including forestry sector decentralisation, bureaucracy reform, and REDD+ governance.	Palangka -raya	Standard , FGD	Note taking
Ikhwan from Yayasan Petak Danum (YPD)	YPD is involved in capacity building activities with respect to FPIC and ‘participatory village mapping’ .	Palangka -raya	Standard , FGD	Note taking
Hayu Wibawa from the Indonesian Ecolabelling Institute (LEI)	Together with the Clinton Climate Initiative, LEI is involved in testing the criteria and indicators of REDD+ Social and Environmental Standards (SES) in Central Kalimantan	Palangka -raya	Standard	Note taking
Dedi Siswanto from YCI	YCI is involved in capacity building activities with respect to FPIC and ‘participatory village mapping’. (<i>YCI: Yayasan Cakrawala Indonesia</i>)	Palangka -raya	Standard , FGD	Note taking
Abdi Rahmat from SLPPKT	SLPPKT is involved in capacity building activities with respect to FPIC and ‘participatory village mapping’. (<i>SLPPKT: ‘Simpul Layanan Pemetaan Partisipatif Kalimantan Tengah’</i>)	Palangka -raya	Standard , FGD	Note taking
Kasmita widodo from JKPP	Indonesian Community Mapping Network (<i>Jaringan Kerja Pemetaan Partisipatif</i>)	Palangka -raya	Standard , FGD	Note taking
Ari Rompas from Walhi	Friends of the Earth Indonesia - Walhi Central Kalimantan	Palangka -raya	Standard , FGD	Note taking
Ambang Wijaya from WWF	WWF-Indonesia Central Kalimantan	Palangka -raya	Standard	Note taking
Tampung N. Saman	University of Palangkaraya. Former manager of Central Kalimantan Peatlands Project	Palangka -raya	Standard	Digital

Affiliation/ Name	Notes on involvement in REDD+	Interview		
		Location	Type	Media recording
Provincial and District Government:				
	Kapuas District Government	Palangka- raya	Standard	Digital
	Central Kalimantan Provincial Government	Palangka- raya	Standard	Digital
	Central Kalimantan Provincial Government	Palangka- raya	Standard	Digital
	Central Kalimantan Board for Indigenous Dayak People	Palangka- raya	Standard	Digital
	Member of the Working Group of REDD+ in Central Kalimantan Province	Palangka- raya	Standard	Digital
	Member of the Working Group of KFCP REDD+ demonstration activity Kapuas District Government	Palangka- raya	Standard	Note taking

Local Communities at villages around the KFCP's site:				
DESA (village) PETAK PUTI AND DUSUN (sub-village) KANJARAU:		Location	Type	Media recording
Mama Mety	Involved in REDD+ activity: 'seedling'	Interviewee's house	Standard	Note taking
Bapak Mety	Not involved in REDD+ activity	Interviewee's house	Standard	Note taking
Bapak Suharga	Village Secretary	Interviewee's house	Standard	Note taking
Bapak Goyang	Head of dusun Kanjarau	Interviewee's house	Standard	Note taking
Bapak Yanto	Head of 'Tim Pelaksana Kegiatan' (TPK), organisation set up to disburse payments for REDD+ activities	Interviewee's house	Standard	Note taking
Ibu Sri	Treasurer of TPK	Interviewee's house	Standard	Note taking
Bapak Ato	Member of 'Tim Pengawas' (TP), i.e. the team responsible for monitoring the work of TPK	Interviewee's house	Standard	Note taking
Bapak Undun	Member of 'Badan Permusyawaratan Desa' (BPD), i.e. a 'people's representative body'	Mama Mety's house	Standard	Note taking
Bapak Kiting S Suta	'Mantir Adat', i.e. village cultural head	Interviewee's house	Standard	Note taking
Bapak Haji Pandi	'Ketua RT', i.e. head of a sub-village	Bapak Kiting's house	Standard	Note taking
Mama Olga	Not involved in REDD+ activity	Mama Mety's house	Standard	Note taking
Mama Norma	Not involved in REDD+ activity	Mama Mety's house	Standard	Note taking
Mama Sisi	Not involved in REDD+ activity	Mama Mety's house	Standard	Note taking
Mama Abi	Not involved in REDD+ activity	Mama Mety's house	Standard	Note taking
Mama Bayu	Not involved in REDD+ activity	Mama Mety's house	Standard	Note taking
Ibu Goyang Nihe	Involved in REDD+ activity: 'seedling'	Interviewee's house	Standard	Note taking

DESA TUMBANG MUROI:		Location	Type	Media recording
Bapak Julianto	Head of TPK	Interviewee's house	Standard	Note taking
Bapak Karsi Uper	Member of TPK	Bp. Julianto's house	Standard	Note taking
Bapak Phip H Saloh	Village Head	Interviewee's house	Standard	Note taking
Bapak Barnie	Not involved in REDD+ activity	Interviewee's house	Standard	Note taking
DESA SEHAAS:				
Bapak Aris	Head of TPK	Interviewee's house	Standard	Note taking
Ibu Ratih	Secretary of TPK	Bapak Aris' house	Standard	Note taking
Bapak Jalah	Village Secretary	Bapak Aris' house	Standard	Note taking
DUSUN TANJUNG KALANIS				
Bapak Johan	Head of sub-TPK	Interviewee's house	Standard	Note taking
Bapak Kadus	Dusun's head	Interviewee's house	Standard	Note taking
Bapak Jarni	Head of sub-dusun (ketua RW)	Interviewee's house	Standard	Note taking
DESA KATUNJUNG				
Bapak M Andut	Head of TPK	Interviewee's house	Standard	Note taking
TPK's secretary		Bp. Andut's house	Standard	Note taking
DESA KALUMPANG				
Bapak Bambang	Head of TPK	Interviewee's house	Standard	Note taking
Bapak Alpan	TPK's secretary	Bp. Bambang's house	Standard	Note taking
DESA MANTANGAI HULU				
Bapak Norhadi	Former village Secretary, active in REDD+ activity	Palangkaraya	Standard	Digital
Bapak Basri	Involved in REDD+ activity	Palangkaraya	Standard	Digital
TPK's head, secretary,		TPK's head	FGD, TPK meeting	Note taking

Notes: Language used was 'Bahasa Indonesia'

APPENDIX 4: SAMPLE INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

Name:	Date of Interview:
Gender:	Location of Interview:
Occupation / Job title:	Length of Interview:
Organisation:	Digitally Recorded: Y/N

At the national and sub-national levels

1. How did you and your organisation become involved with REDD+?
2. What is your general perception of REDD+?
 - A. *When interviewees responded that it would be difficult to implement REDD+ in Indonesia, with most citing the inherent problems within existing forest governance as the reason, a follow up question was addressed: "Do you think the REDD+ mechanism can be used as a means to improve forest governance?"*
 - B. *Conversely, when interviewees stated that the REDD+ mechanism had the potential to improve Indonesia's forest governance, a follow up question was addressed: "What is new about REDD+ when compared with previous forest-related initiatives?" or another follow up question ('No. 6' below)*
3. Is there anything new or different about REDD+ when compared with previous forest-related initiatives with which you are familiar? *(This question was addressed when an interviewee did not mention '2.B')*
4. How do you see the existing forest governance in Indonesia? What are the main issues? *(This question was addressed when an interviewee did not mention '2.A')*
5. Do you think REDD+ can be implemented in Indonesia or not?
 - If not, why?
 - What are the challenges in implementing REDD+?
 - If so, what are the enabling conditions needed to move forward with REDD+?

6. What activities, rules and/or regulations have emerged resulting from the REDD+ initiative which are positive for the improvement of the governance of Indonesia's forests?

The following questions were prompted by responses from the majority of the interviewees to question number 6, ie "the development of the National REDD+ Strategy (the Strategy) shows a great improvement in 'participation' and 'transparency' in the policy-making processes".

- a. Are you involved in the development of the Strategy? If so, what is your role?
- b. Which ministry or government agency is responsible for the process?
- c. What is your general view of the process?
- d. What is new when compared with the previous policy-making process?
- e. What are the challenges?
- f. *(I heard there are political struggles amongst policy actors in the process):* How is the political dynamic and what issues are debated most?

(On 'transparency', several interviewees mentioned the government's plan to undertake the 'one map programme'). This prompted further questions:

- g. What is the history of the initiative - the 'one map programme' - and who is the proponent of it?
- h. Do you think this programme is prompted by the REDD+ initiative?
- i. Which ministry is given the task to develop this system?
- j. What are the challenges so far?
- k. What do you think are the benefits?

During the ‘shadowing activity’

Questions posed to KFCP personnel, and to representatives of district government and local NGO/CSOs

1. What is your role in KFCP (or in the government/NGO/CSO with respect to the KFCP demonstration activity)?
2. How did you get involved with REDD+?
3. What is your general perception of REDD+?
4. How is the implementation of the demonstration activity so far? What are the challenges?
5. What new idea is there (if any) that REDD+ can introduce to improve forest management?
6. What do you think are the benefits (if any) that REDD+ could bring to the local communities?

Questions posed to the local communities

1. Have you heard about REDD+ or climate change? When did you hear it and from whom?
2. What do you understand about REDD+? What is your perception of it?
3. Are you involved in any REDD+ activities in your village? If so, how did you get involved?
4. Do you think REDD+ is good or not for your village?
 - If not why
 - If yes why, and what is your expectation of it?
5. What new idea is there, if any, that REDD+ has introduced to your village institutions?
6. On the ‘Village Agreement’ (between the KFCP and your village):
 - Do you know anything about it?
 - Have you read the draft of the Agreement? Do you understand it?
 - What do you think of the Village Agreement?

APPENDIX 5: ATTENDANCE AT SELECTED CONFERENCES, WORKSHOPS, AND MEETINGS THAT INFORMED THE RESEARCH

Notes:

- *Language: E (English); I (Indonesian)*
- *Form of participation: 1 (presenter of a paper/research findings); 2 (active participant/facilitator); 3 (attendee)*
- *Location: 'Jakarta', the capital city of Indonesia; 'Palangkaraya', the capital city of Central Kalimantan Province - the first selected REDD+ pilot province in Indonesia; Kapuas, the capital city of Kapuas District where the KFCP demonstration site was located*

Conference/Workshop	Location	Date	Notes: Language and form of participation
2013			
The Royal Geographical Society (RGS) with IBG Annual International Conference 2013	London	26-29/08	E/1
Euro-South East Asia Study Conference 2013	Lisbon	2-5/07	E/1
The 2013 Rainforest Club Dinner	Oxford	19/06	E/1
Forest Governance Group Meeting	Oxford	18/06	E/1
<u>Workshop: 'Sustainable Production and Consumption: Are we making the link?'</u> <i>Organised by Dr Constance McDermott, James Martin Senior Research Fellow in Forest Governance, ECI.</i>	Oxford	31/05	E/3
The Anglo-Indonesian Monthly Meeting	London	30/05	E/1
The 2013 Association of American Geographer (AAG) Annual Meeting	Los Angeles	9-13/04	E/1
South East Asian Symposium 2013	Oxford	9-10/03	E/1
South East Asia Seminar 2013	Oxford	28/02	E/1

2012			
Workshop on the strategy and implementation of REDD+'s MRV (<i>Lokakarya Penyempurnaan Strategi dan Rencana Implementasi MRV REDD+</i>). Organised by Indonesia's REDD+ Task Force.	Jakarta	10-11/09	E/2
Midway Workshop Toward The Third Revision of Moratorium Indicative Map. Organised by Indonesia's REDD+ Task Force.	Jakarta	4-5/09	I/2
Meeting on 'Indonesia's forest governance', conducted by the alliance of civil society.	Jakarta	05/09	I/3
2011			
Workshop and training for village leaders to apply for Government permits to implement 'Village Forests' (a vehicle for the communities to implement REDD+)	Kapuas	19/11	I/2
Workshop on the 'Implementation of REDD+'s capacity-building and institutional development by the KFCP involving representatives from NGOs, Civil Society Organisations, and academics. Organised by the University of Palangkaraya, Central Kalimantan	Palangkaraya	18/11	I/2
Workshop on the 'management of indigenous peoples' land'. Organised by Central Kalimantan Governor office	Palangkaraya	11/11	I/2
KFCP full staff meeting	Palangkaraya	27/10	I/2
Workshop and training for 'community engagement in REDD+ using smart-phone'. Organised by 'Pokker ShK' and 'Kemitraan'	Palangkaraya	15/10	I/2
Indonesia's Forests Congress 2011	Jakarta	23-24/11	I/3
International conference 'Forest Indonesia'	Jakarta	27/09	E/3
Meeting on 'Indonesia's forest governance', conducted by the alliance of civil society.	Jakarta	05/09	I/3
2010			
International meeting of the Association for Tropical Biology and Conservation		19-23/07	E/1