Discrimination and ethnic group identity as explanations of British ethnic minority political behaviour

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Abstract

This thesis looks at the role of discrimination and ethnic group identity as explanations of political behaviour of ethnic minorities in Britain. Chapter 2 examines vote choice and partisanship, arguing that a group utility heuristic explains the high level of support for the Labour party among ethnic minorities. I provide individual-level evidence of this heuristic by showing that ethnic minority voters support the Labour party to the extent that they are (i) conscious of the experiences of their ethnic group members with regards to discrimination, and (ii) believe that the Labour party is the best political party to represent their interests. These two attitudes mediate the effects of group-level inequalities. Chapter 3 asks whether Muslims are alienated from mainstream politics by Islamophobia and British military intervention in Muslim countries. I find that perceptions of Islamophobia are linked with greater political alienation, to a greater likelihood of non-electoral participation, but also to a lesser likelihood of voting. Likewise, disapproval of the war in Afghanistan is associated with greater political alienation and a greater likelihood of some types of non-electoral participation. I also provide strong evidence that Muslims in Britain experience more religious discrimination than adherents of other minority religions. Chapter 4 considers the interaction between the extreme right and ethnic minority political attitudes and behaviour. I find evidence that the extreme right British National Party (BNP) increases voting for the Labour party, at the expense of minor parties and abstention. Surprisingly, the BNP effect also benefits the other main parties. Although they do not benefit in increased vote share, Liberal

Democrat and Conservative party and leader evaluations are more positive where the BNP stood and performed better in 2010, which I suggest is due to the electoral contrast provided by the BNP. Chapter 5 looks at the mobilisation effect of ethnic minority candidates on ethnic minority voters. I find a positive mobilisation effect of Pakistani and Muslim Labour candidates on Pakistani and Muslim voters, conditional on someone trying to convince the respondent how to vote. I also find a demobilisation effect of Labour Muslim candidates on Sikh voters.

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Introduction

This thesis is composed of four empirical chapters, with an introduction and conclusion linking the context and common themes between them. In this introduction I give a brief historical overview of the origins of the main ethnic minority groups in the United Kingdom today. I then set out the context of ethnic minority political behaviour and attitudes in the Great Britain, and simultaneously outline the key research questions that I tackle in the later chapters and their motivation. I then introduce the main dataset used in this thesis, the Ethnic Minority British Election Study (EMBES). The chapters are in reality individual papers in the form in which I wish to publish them, and so I ask the reader to kindly excuse any overlap between them when it comes to context and theory.

Historical overview

The United Kingdom has a long history as a receiving country of migration, reflected in the diversity of our linguistic roots. European Jews and Protestants found England to be more hospitable at times than other European countries, although the extent to which this was the case certainly varied across the centuries. Jews were expelled from England in 1290, but a few Sephardic Jews lived in England under false identities until in 1665 Rabbi Mennaseh Ben Israel petitioned Cromwell to recognise and allow Jews to stay in England, following pogroms in much of Europe. From this foothold, Jewish migrants, first Sephardic Jews from the Mediterranean and later Ashkenazi Jews from Central

and Eastern Europe, grew in number such that the Jewish population in 1800 is estimated to have been twenty thousand (Pollins, 1982).

In the seventeenth century, Protestant Huguenots sought refuge in England from persecution in Catholic France. They settled first in two areas in the centre of London – Spitalfields and Westminster, but spread quickly to much of the south of England. They had two main effects; increasing the number of Protestants in the country (the Huguenot population was approximately equal to the Catholic one), and bringing their industrial knowledge and financial resources. For instance, in 1485, England had no paper mills and relied on France for its supply, but in 1714 there were over 200, which was enough to match national demand. Similarly, when the Bank of England was founded in 1694, 123 Huguenot merchants put up almost 10% of its capital (Winder, 2010).

We should not overplay the importance of early examples of accepting refugees. However, it is important to bear in mind that England, and subsequently the United Kingdom, has a history of cultural and religious diversity that dates back before the twentieth century. Indians involved in colonial trade through the East India Company (both managers and lascars – mostly sailors) and African slaves were also present in the eighteenth and nineteenth century. The ethnic minority groups considered in this thesis however mostly arrived in the twentieth century.

The British effort in World War One relied heavily on colonial troops. The Indian subcontinent supplied 1.4 million men to the Allied war effort, which is more than Scotland, Wales and Ireland combined. There was no conscription, but posters in Hindi and Urdu promised good pay and little danger. The West Indies contributed too, although black soldiers were not trusted as frontline troops. 10,000 Caribbean troops were ferried by steamer from Jamaica. After the war however, black and Indian veterans were not welcomed in the UK. In 1919 there were protests or riots in Lanarkshire, Glasgow, London, South Shields, Liverpool, Salford and elsewhere after Indian, African and Caribbean veterans were hired. The government arranged for voluntary repatriation, but the ships were largely empty.

Either side of the WWI, Indian and Caribbean activists were resident in the UK. To the extent that these individuals involved themselves in politics, these were mostly communist and anti-colonial politics. For instance, the third Indian-origin Member of Parliament was Shapurji Saklatava, member for the Labour party in Battersea 1924-29. He had come to the UK as a manager with Tata. In the interwar years, affluent West Africans (mostly students) and a few Caribbeans formed political societies themed around national independence, which also campaigned around the theme of better pay and conditions for black seamen (who were barred from unions at the time). In 1925, the Colonial Office estimated that there were 125 African university students in the UK, so it would be wrong to overestimate the size of these groups. However, due to their affluence they were not voiceless. Key members include Ladipe Solanke from Nigeria, who founded the West African Students' Union; Oluwole Ayodele, a

Nigerian law graduate of Jesus College, Oxford and Middle Temple; and Dr Harold Moody, a Jamaican emigrant who married a white nurse and was the first president of the League of Coloured Peoples (Winder, 2010).

Troops from the Indian subcontinent and the Caribbean again played a significant role in the Allied effort in the Second World War. The expense of the war and Indian independence in 1947 meant that the British Empire no longer seemed as watertight as it had once done. In 1948, the Nationality Act was passed which granted free entry of all imperial subjects to the United Kingdom. This laid the way for post-war immigration (Spencer, 2002). The ship *The Empire Windrush* and her forerunner the *Ormonde* were private enterprises, but later migration would be encouraged by the Ministry of Labour looking to fill work shortages.

Indian independence and partition was important for migration from the subcontinent to the UK. The partition of northern India accounts for the relatively large proportion of Punjabi Sikhs and the first wave of Pakistani migration to the UK – fleeing violence or having lost their property to the other side of the border, Punjabi Indians settled in London, Glasgow, West Yorkshire and Birmingham. Military ties guided some of these decisions (for instance, ties between Glaswegian residents in the Second World War mean that it is possible to find Cockburn Streets in cities in the Punjab today); whilst other migrants were attracted to their destination by the employment opportunities and family ties. Hindus also arrived from the Punjab, but also from rural Gujurat. West London was a popular destination – Heathrow Airport had

become a significant employer of Indians by the 1960s. Similarly, Kashmiri Pakistanis, especially those who were going to or had lost their land to the Mangla Dam began to arrive in this period, settling in Birmingham and northern mill towns. There was a last injection of public money into the textile industry in 1959, which provided weekend and night shifts for the migrant workers.

The UK's borders would not remain open on a permanent basis. There was pressure from the public to stop "coloured" immigration, both as a result of racial prejudice and in response to race riots in Nottingham and Notting Hill in 1958. The Conservative Home Secretary Lennox-Boyd was resistant to the idea of excluding people on the basis of race, and threatened to resign in 1955 after some cabinet members voiced opinion in favour of limiting only immigration from the New Commonwealth. However, legislation was eventually passed in the form of the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act, which limited the automatic right to come and work and live in Britain to those whose passports had been issued in London. This did not immediately stop immigration from the Commonwealth, but it did begin to limit its character to that of family reunification.

The period from 1960 to 1992 was marked by increasing racial tension, as the ethnic minority population grew. Two important groups arrived during this time. Firstly, a large number of Bangladeshis, mostly from the Slyhet region arrived following the establishment of Bangladesh in 1971. Secondly, in 1972, Idi Amin expelled Asians from Uganda. Despite Britain's colonial legacy in this

country, it was a difficult and somewhat unpopular decision to accept refugees from Uganda and Kenya and the decision was met with protests by the National Front. The 1981 British Nationality Act rescinded the offer of British nationality to its former colonies, instead granting UK citizenship to anyone who has one parent who is a citizen or permanent resident.

First generation migrants in the postwar period had mostly stayed away from politics, especially the mainstream parties. However, the Labour party founded the Black Sections in 1983, which aimed to increase the representation of black and Asian people in local and national politics. In the same year, the Anglo-Indian Jonathan Sayeed was elected for the first time as the Conservative MP for Bristol East and Mid-Bedfordshire, although he did not identity as an ethnic minority (Butler & Kavanagh, 1997). The following General Election in 1987 saw the election of the first post-war Labour ethnic minority MPs – Diana Abbott, Paul Boateng, Bernie Grant and Keith Vaz. At the same time, trade unions found that there were self-organising black groups within their organisation, and the Trade Union Congress reserved places in its executive committees for ethnic minorities. The first ethnic minority leader of a trade union was Bill Morriss, General Secretary of the Transport and General Worker's Union from 1992 to 2003. In this way the Labour party co-opted civil rights and quasi-trade union groups which had initially been excluded on the grounds of colour by the main trade unions, such as the Indian Workers' association founded in 1957, the Southall Black Sisters founded in 1979, or the Asian Youth Movement founded in 1978.

The final wave of migration that is important context to the themes in this thesis is that of post-1990 refugees and asylum seekers. Although European migration also increased markedly in this period, EU migrants are not the subject of this thesis, or of the Ethnic Minority British Election Study. The other important group of migrants in this period are students, but again these are not targeted by EMBES, and due to their temporary nature many do not involve themselves in British politics. An increase in asylum seekers, initially from the Balkan conflict but soon from elsewhere, occurred simultaneously to a liberalisation of work permits that allowed greater numbers of economic migrants. Britain attracted more asylum seekers not because of a liberal policy, but because other European countries (notably Germany) closed their borders to asylum seekers more quickly. Family reunification or formation also increased post-1997 when the so-called primary purpose rule was abolished. These changes increased migration flows along established routes from former colonies, but also from Zimbabwe, Somalia and Afghanistan. Accordingly, many of the first generation black Africans in the Ethnic Minority British Election Study have more recent arrival dates than individuals from other groups. First generation migrants from this period have been reluctant to engage with institutional politics, but replicate the pattern of community and religious organising favoured by other first generation groups over the past century (Back & Solomos, 2002; Goodhart, 2013; Maxwell, 2012; Winder, 2010).

Having outlined the migration history behind the ethnic minorities discussed in this thesis, I will now engage more thoroughly with what is known about current levels of ethnic minority political engagement in the United Kingdom.

Political participation of ethnic minorities in Britain

Britain is a curious case internationally because, among registered voters, there is no general turnout gap between ethnic minorities and the white British population. This is contrary to the situation in other European countries (Bird, Saalfeld, & Wüst, 2010). Most of Britain's established ethnic minority groups come from countries that were once British colonies. This legacy has important ramifications for political behaviour because Commonwealth citizens with residence and leave to enter or remain in the UK can vote in national, local and European elections on the same footing as British citizens. Since the 1990s, studies have reported near parity between ethnic minorities and the white British in turnout among registered voters, or slightly higher turnout rates among South Asian voters (Anwar, 1990; 1998; Heath, Fisher, Sanders, & Sobolewska, 2011; Modood, 2005b; Saggar, 2000; Electoral Commission, 2005). Heath, Fisher, Rosenblatt, Sanders, & Sobolewska (2013) find evidence that ethnic minorities of South Asian origin may be more likely to over-report voting, which explains the slightly higher rates of self-reported voting among these groups when compared to white British self-reported rates. Heath et al. (2013) report generational differences in turnout rates, with much lower turnout among 1st generation migrants but higher turnout among 2nd and later generations, for whom there is no discernable difference in turnout from the white British population of the same age group.

However, there are some differences with regards to registration, with black Africans being much less likely to be registered to vote than the white British

or South Asian groups (Electoral Commission, 2005). (Heath et al., 2013) also find that black Caribbeans are less likely to be registered. Lower registration among black Africans is almost certainly due in part to lower eligibility among this group, as a larger proportion come from non-Commonwealth countries. Nevertheless, even after controlling for lower eligibility in this group, Africans are under-registered (Electoral Commission, 2005). Eligibility is not the main driver of non-registration however; in common with white British potential registrants, ethnic minorities who are younger, have arrived in Britain recently, are not fluent in English and live in privately rented accommodation are less likely to be registered to vote. Given the apparent parity in turnout between registered voters, registration appears to be the main hurdle to full ethnic minority participation as voters (Heath et al., 2013).

Support for the Labour party

One commonality with other countries is that Britain does not deviate from the pattern where ethnic minorities support the left-wing party. In 2010, 69% of ethnic minorities voted for the Labour party. This was in a year where Labour lost the general election and gained 29% of the vote nationally. This association emerged early on in the study of ethnic minority voting behaviour in Britain, and has not been countered since (Anwar, 1986; FitzGerald, 1987; Heath et al., 2011; Layton-Henry & Studlar, 1985; Saggar, 2000).

The same pieces of research that note the strong degree of Labour support are also at a loss as to how to explain it. Individual characteristics that predict left-wing support among white British voters, like class, education and income, do

not account for the extent of ethnic minority support for the Labour party (Heath et al., 2011; Saggar, 2000). Neither is it a result of ideological differences (Heath et al., 2013; Sanders, Heath, Fisher, & Sobolewska, 2013). Heath et al. (2013) argue that Labour partisanship can be explained by group influence – specifically the level of agreement with Labour party policies in an individual's ethnoreligious group is said to influence their partisanship directly, above and beyond the individual's own agreement with Labour positions.

In many ways, the extent of ethnic minority support for the Labour party remains the big sociological puzzle in ethnic minority political behaviour, particularly because theories that perform reasonably well in explaining the voting behaviour of the white British majority fail to predict or explain the extent of Labour support among ethnic minorities. Despite recent developments (Heath et al., 2013), this empirical puzzle remains largely unsolved, which motivates my interest in Labour party support in chapter 2. Responding to the chapter on partisanship in Heath et al. (2013), the first empirical chapter in this thesis revisits the question of Labour voting and partisanship, exploring the individual-level mechanisms and proposing that a group utility heuristic explains ethnic minority support for the Labour party. Theoretically this idea comes from the work of Dawson (1994) and Wilson (2012). Dawson introduces the concept of *linked fate* to explain African American support for the Democratic party, in particular the support of the wealthier black middle class who on the face of it might have more in common with white middle class Republican voters. Dawson's explanation is that as

long as race continues to be a significant influence on African American's economic and social outcomes, it makes more sense for African Americans to vote according to the broader interest of their racial group. Racial discrimination is a large part of this story, but it also has to do with more general economic disadvantage. Wilson (2012) reformulates the concept of linked fate into a certain type of group-based economic voting – but the essential idea is the same; African Americans tend to vote according to the interests of their racial group, even when they themselves have characteristics that predict voting for the Republican party in other populations. Britain does not have a comparable group to African Americans in terms of being historically disadvantaged over such a long period, but the general logic that differences in interests between ethnic groups may explain ethnic minority Labour support, rather than individual differences, is applicable in a British setting.

The relationship between ethnic minorities and the Labour party remains strong, but it has not been static throughout. Saggar & Heath (1999) observed the potential for the Conservative party to benefit from increasing numbers of more economically successful Indian supporters in the 1997 General Election. This prediction was substantiated in the 2010 General Election where a larger proportion of South Asians voted for Conservative candidates (Heath et al., 2011)[1]. It is unfair to compare levels of Conservative voting in two dissimilar

[1] Estimates from the 1997 Ethnic Minority British Election Study suggest that 13% (weighted) or 11% (unweighted) of Asians voted Conservative in 1997. The number of these voters in the study however is small at 36. Similar

elections, especially including the Labour landslide of 1997, but the emergence of a degree of stratification of ethnic minority vote choice by social class is evidence that the traditional association with the Labour party might be waning.

The second major disruption to levels of support for Labour was the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. British Muslims reacted extremely negatively to these conflicts. Labour were punished in 2005 in constituencies with larger Muslim populations, as measured by deviations from average swing (Curtice, Fisher, & Steed, 2005). Khan (2005) observed that Labour majorities were reduced sharply in the constituencies with the largest Muslim populations, most markedly in two Birmingham constituencies where sitting Labour MPs had their majorities reduced by over 35%. Although there appears to have been some unwinding of this effect in 2010 (Curtice, Fisher, & Ford, 2010), it was a major departure from business as usual.

Following from this, the third disruption to the association between ethnic minority voters and the Labour party came in the form of Respect, led by the bombastic George Galloway. Respect was initially a coalition of those who opposed the war in Iraq and splinters of the Socialist Workers Party, but actively courted Muslim voters before the SWP factions left in 2008. The first electoral victory for Respect came in May 2003 (British military involvement in

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estimates using the 2010 study are 19% of South Asians (weighted) or 17% (weighted). For comparability, South Asian here is taken to mean Indians, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis. Not all of these groups have similar propensities to vote for the Conservatives.

Iraq began in March 2003), where Labour lost control of Birmingham city council after 19 years; 11 of the 39 seats it lost were in wards with large Muslim populations. Success in European Parliament elections in 2004 and subsequent local elections were followed by a 2005 General Electoral victory in Bethnal Green and Bow, unseating a sitting Labour MP. Although Respect did not enjoy success in all wards or constituencies with significant Muslim populations, the party explicitly courted these votes where it won (Peace, 2013). For example, in the 2005 campaign, Galloway promised residents of Bethnal Green and Bow that he would step aside at the next election to make way for a candidate of Bengali origin. Respect was largely assumed to be a spent force until 2012 when George Galloway won a by-election in a supposedly safe Labour seat.

The impact of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan on support for Labour in areas with greater Muslim population density and the success of Respect suggest that there may be some particular political discontent among Britain's Muslim population. The other side to this is Islamophobia – a particularised form of religious discrimination that targets Muslims. There is evidence that Muslims face harsher labour market penalties than other South Asian minorities (Heath & Martin, 2013), and also of increased social hostility since at least the Rushdie affair in the 1980s and intensifying in the 2000s during the "War on Terror" (Asad, 1990; Modood, 1990; Saeed, 2007). This is matched in the political arena with the adoption of Islamphobic rhetoric by the extreme right groups the British National Party and English Defence League (Ford & Goodwin, 2014a). These circumstances lead to two primary motivations for studying the

political behaviour of Muslims in particular: (i) there is evidence of discontent that has been previously politically mobilised, and (ii) if social exclusion leads to political exclusion, there is an ethical concern over the failure of political representation. Chapter 3 therefore looks at the impact of Islamophobia and disapproval of the war in Afghanistan on political alienation and modes of participation among Muslims in Britain.

Ethnic minority political representation

Pitkin (1967) draws a distinction between substantive and descriptive representation. Substantive representation is where the substantive interests of a group are represented in decision-making. I consider the substantive representation of ethnic minority interests in chapters 2 and 3. Chapter 2 looks at the importance of discrimination and ethnic inequalities in unemployment and class in explaining support for the Labour party. Chapter 3 looks at the failure of all three main parties to accurately represent public opposition to the war in Afghanistan, an issue that is especially salient for Muslim voters.

Moving from substantive representation to descriptive representation, I address ethnic minority candidates in chapter 5, where I consider the potential mobilising effect of ethnic minority candidates on ethnic minority voters. Previous research outside the UK has found that selecting minority candidates are an effective way to mobilise ethnic minority voters (Barreto, 2007; Bergh & Bjørklund, 2010; Bobo & Gilliam, 1990; Tate, 2003). Non-white candidates are also associated with more positive attitudes towards politicians and the political system. Scherer & Curry (2010) showed that support for American

courts increased amongst blacks who believed black judges were over-represented, and Tate (2003) observed the same result with regards to Congress. Outside of experimental conditions, descriptive representation has been linked to higher political interest (Bobo & Gilliam, 1990; Vanderleeuw & utter, 1993), greater perceptions of responsiveness (Banducci, Donovan, & Karp, 2008), higher approval ratings (Box-Steffensmeier, Kimball, Meinke, & Tate, 2003; Tate, 2001; Tate & Harsh, 2005), and lower levels of political alienation (Pantoja & Segura, 2003). This may be irrelevant to some ethnic minority groups in Britain where there is not a deficit in turnout or in political trust; nevertheless, ethnic minorities are not proportionally represented in Parliament and so there may be a lingering question of legitimacy. Fisher, Heath, Sanders, & Sobolewska (2014) demonstrated that Pakistani candidates for parliament benefit from an average 8 percentage point increase in vote share from Pakistani voters, which suggests that the mobilisation hypothesis is worth testing in the British context.

An anomalous result in a previous British general elections hints at a different possible mechanism from solidarity between all non-white candidates and voters. In the 1997 landslide Labour election, the safe Labour seat of Bradford West saw a Conservative Muslim candidate make strong gains against a Labour Sikh candidate. Bradford West has a large Muslim population and this result was attributed to the reluctance of Muslims to vote for a Sikh, instead choosing a fellow Muslim from the Conservative party. This emphasises the importance and specificity of ethnic in-group identity and raises the question of whether conflicts between ethnic minority groups may have political effects, in addition

to the more familiar concern of conflict between ethnic minority and majority groups.

Moving onto substantive representation, early research into British ethnic minority political attitudes sought to investigate to what extent ethnic minorities had a distinct political agenda from white British citizens. Looking at issue priorities, Studlar (1986) concluded that there was "no such thing as a distinctive nonwhite political agenda" (p.176), whilst Messina (1989) agreed that "non-whites and whites share similar policy priorities" (p.49). More recently Dancygier & Saunders (2006) found that immigrants are no more likely to support increased social spending or redistributive measures than natives, once appropriate controls have been added. However, more nuanced analysis of the 1997 and 2010 EMBES surveys shows more variation (Heath & Khan, 2012; Saggar, 2000). On the issues of multiculturalism and unemployment there is evidence for a shared ethnic minority position. In particular there are differences between whites and ethnic minorities on issues of ethnicity, immigration and discrimination, where ethnic minorities have clearly distinct interests; "White ethnic group membership amounts to a rather powerful basis on which to distinguish respondents' attitudes" on immigration, multiculturalism and positive discrimination (Saggar 2000, p.167). When it comes to economic insecurity, Heath et al. (2013) show that ethnic minorities place significantly more importance on the threat of unemployment than do whites. Both of these dimensions provide the possible basis for a gap in the substantive representation of ethnic minorities if parties ignore the interests of

these groups – or an electoral opportunity for the party that does address them.

My interest in political representation is motivated firstly by a normative concern as to how well ethnic minority interests are integrated into political decision-making. At a most basic level a representative democracy that ignores an estimated 8% of its voters is not functioning fairly. Empirically investigating the extent and responses to both descriptive and substantive representation provides good quality evidence for debates about the extent to which representation in Britain is functioning effectively. There is also an empirical motivation to study representation though – in particular if differences in representation between groups can tell us more about the social and economic lives of different groups.

Bonding social capital and the integration paradox

Maxwell (2012) introduces the idea of the integration paradox. He argues that minority groups who are more socially integrated with the majority group will have less capacity for group mobilisation because they are more likely to interact with mainstream society and less likely to need strong coethnic networks for survival. In contrast, socially segregated groups will have greater capacity for group mobilisation because they are more likely to depend on coethnic networks for survival. These networks become a valuable resource for gaining political influence. Maxwell's story fits Britain particularly well; black Caribbeans have much higher levels of social integration, as measured by English language use, residential segregation and intermarriage with white

British, as well as sharing the Christian religious faith. By contrast, South Asian origin groups are much less socially integrated, with greater residential segregation, lower levels of English, different religious practices, and less intermarriage (Berrington, 1994; Muttarak & Heath, 2010). However, South Asians appear to have been much more successful in achieving political gains. Of the 29 ethnic minority MPs currently in Parliament, 8 are black Caribbean or African, whilst 18 are of South Asian origin, and the same proportions are reflected in the ethnicity of minority politicians at the local level as well (Dancygier, 2010; Maxwell, 2012). South Asians have also been successful in pursuing group-based claims through the political process, ranging from the exemptions for Sikhs to wear turbans in place of helmets on building sites or on motorcycles or the provision of local authority information in South Asian languages, to financial support from some local authorities for Hindu religious festivals.

At the neighbourhood-level, a higher density of coethnic residents in a neighbourhood has been linked to higher levels of voter registration and turnout, in particular among South Asians in Britain (Dancygier, 2010; Fieldhouse & Cutts, 2008; Fisher et al., 2014; Maxwell, 2012). Research from other countries supports a link between high levels of bonding social capital and higher political participation (Fennema & Tillie, 1999; Moya, 2005; Portes & Sensenbrenner, 1993). (Heath et al., 2013) look at the role of bridging and bonding social capital in explaining political engagement, finding that within-ethnic group associational capital is an important political motivator of non-electoral political participation. This echoes Fennema & Tillie (1999), whose

study of ethnic minorities in Amsterdam found a positive correlation between political trust and participation of ethnic minorities on the one hand, and a strong network of ethnic associations on the other. They argue that this is because these ethnic organisations provide social capital in the form of relationships and greater social trust, which leads to greater political engagement. There is also the possibility that religious organisations can provide a particular focal point for ethnic minority political mobilisation, either as another arena where social ties are built or by acting as the same way as politicised black churches in the United States in building ethnic consciousness (Calhoun-Brown, 1996; Wuthnow, 2002). Research on New York mosques suggests that mosque attendance is associated with higher participation rates, at least for Arab Muslims (Jamal, 2005a).

The evidence that bonding social capital and the presence of coethnics in the neighbourhood can have such profound impacts of political engagement and the success of political claims-making demonstrates the potential for influence by one's ethnic in-group, and as such reinforces the potential role of ethnic group identity in explaining these outcomes.

The effect of discrimination on political behaviour and attitudes

Discrimination and its effects on political behaviour and attitudes is a major theme in this thesis. Again, my interest in this comes from an ethical standpoint insofar as racial discrimination is a social problem and its impacts should be investigated and documented to better inform public debate. Differences in political agendas between ethnic minorities and the white British are one way

in which discrimination may impact political behaviour. Experiences of discrimination may lead to a preference for multicultural polices among ethnic minorities as a form of protection. Or labour market disadvantage may be blamed on discrimination by potential employers. Within the broad topic of discrimination I include egocentric discrimination – personal experiences of discriminatory behaviour, sociotropic discrimination – feeling that one's ethnic group is discriminated against, and the most overt political manifestation of discriminatory attitudes – the radical right, which in the British context is the British National Party (BNP).[2]

Theories of intergroup conflict and empirical research on ethnic minority political mobilisation suggest that experiences of discrimination can drive political participation to the extent that they increase group identification. The American context provides us with Shingles (1981), who explained the puzzle of high electoral participation despite economic disadvantage among blacks through black consciousness and a sense of internal political efficacy. Further research into black and Latino participation confirmed the general mechanism of discrimination reinforcing group identity and thus increasing participation (especially non-electoral) by providing a basis for mobilisation (Chong & Rogers, 2005; Jamal, 2005b; Leighley, 2001; Pantoja, Ramirez, & Segura, 2001; Shingles, 1981). Pantoja et al. (2001) demonstrate that there was a large increase in Latino naturalization (an important first step towards voter

[2] This was certainly true at the time of the main data collection in 2010. However, in the years since the BNP has collapsed both organizationally and electorally (Goodwin, 2013).

registration) in response to hostile immigration policies in California in the 1990s.

Coming back to Britain, Heath et al. (2013) report that feeling that one's ethnic group is disadvantaged is an important driver of participation among ethnic minorities in Britain. Maxwell (2009) demonstrates that perceived discrimination is associated with a lower likelihood of identifying as British among Caribbean and South Asian migrants in the UK, and the magnitude of the difference is larger than even differences between first and later generations of migrants. Similarly, Heath et al. (2013) demonstrate that satisfaction with democracy and trust in key political institutions are lower among ethnic minority individuals who feel that their ethnic group is disadvantaged. In a comparative study of European countries, Just & Anderson, (2012) show that anti-immigrant opinion climates depress participation among migrants and hinder the translation of grievances into political demands. Sanders et al. (2013) find that egocentric and sociotropic discrimination have different and countervailing effects on vote choice. For this reason I am careful to differentiate between egocentric and sociotropic discrimination throughout.

I am particularly interested in political manifestations of discrimination i.e. the extreme right, and to a lesser extent mainstream parties that are perceived as racist like the British Conservative party (Ashcroft, 2012). Research on the extreme right thus far has concentrated on what motivates white British people to support these parties (Biggs & Knauss, 2012; Ford & Goodwin,

2010a; 2010b; 2014b; Goodwin, 2011). I ask a new question by looking at the impact of the extreme right British National Party on voting behaviour and evaluations of other parties. It is important to understand the interaction between ethnic minorities and the extreme right not least because extreme right support is more likely to occur in more ethnically diverse cities, albeit within white enclaves (Biggs & Knauss, 2012; Bowyer, 2008). This implies that ethnic minorities are more likely to confront extreme right party activity and policies at the local level than most white British residents. It is also important to look at the interplay here to address a theoretical imbalance – in a conflictual relationship there are at least two sides, and focusing only on the behaviour and attitudes of whites that support the extreme right ignores the other side of this conflict i.e. ethnic minorities.

Research questions

From this starting point, I have written four empirical chapters each concerned with a theoretically related but distinct research question. Chapter 2 returns to the question of ethnic minority support for the Labour party in vote choice and partisanship. I explore which political positions are most associated with the Labour party, compare individual and group characteristics, replicate and discuss the contribution on partisanship by Heath et al. (2013), and consider whether a group utility heuristic is the most appropriate explanation for ethnic minority support for the Labour party. Chapter 3 focuses on Muslims, asking whether Islamophobia and British involvement in Afghanistan have resulted in political alienation among this group. I also look in chapter 3 at the links between political alienation and different types of political participation,

arguing that those who have reason to be politically alienated (in this case, sociotropic discrimination in the form of Islamophobia and a perceived failure of representation in the case of Afghanistan) are likely to avoid traditional electoral politics, and instead to express their political views through non-electoral means. Chapter 4 considers the effect of the British National Party on vote choice and party evaluations, with the hypotheses that the BNP will mobilise voters who would otherwise abstain in opposition to their xenophobic and racist campaigns, and that other parties and leaders (in particular the Conservatives) who are generally disliked by ethnic minorities will be rated more favourably in an implicit comparison with the BNP. Chapter 5 returns to the question of descriptive representation, asking whether and in which ways ethnic minority voters respond to ethnic minority parliamentary candidates. I conclude by drawing together the common threads of discrimination and ethnic group identity as explanations of ethnic minority political behaviour in Britain.

Introduction to the data

This thesis draws on data from the 2010 Ethnic Minority British Election Study (Howat, Norden, Williams, & Pickering, 2011). This is a nationally representation probability survey of the largest five major ethnic minority groups in Britain. The target population was adults aged 18 or over resident in Great Britain who would self-classify into one five Census groups: black Caribbean, black African, Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi. The survey also includes information about country of origin (the respondent's own, and both

parents) and religion that can be combined to derive more detailed classifications of ethnicity. One important omission in this regard was that only respondents who were not fluent in English were asked about other languages used at home. A question on non-English language proficiency would have likely provided more useful information on ethnic origin. The achieved sample size was 2,787.

Areas where less than 2% of the residents were ethnic minorities in the 2001 Census were excluded from sampling frame for reasons of excessive cost and inefficiency. This unfortunately excludes around 10-15% of each group who live in areas with lower densities of ethnic minority residents. These respondents were still eligible for inclusion in the main British Election Study, which had a different sampling frame. Clearly, an ideal study would include representative samples of as much of the target population as possible. However, EMBES's sampling frame compares reasonably well with other high quality social surveys of the British ethnic minority population. The ethnic minority boost sample in *Understanding Society* excludes postcode areas where less than 5% of the population are ethnic minorities. The 2011 *Citizenship Survey* excluded areas where the ethnic minority population density was less than 1%, and employed a different enumeration strategy in areas where it was between 1 and 18%. The exclusion of respondents from areas of low ethnic minority residential density means that we need to be cautious in generalizing our findings to the 10-15% of the ethnic minority population to whom this applies. Nevertheless, this survey does allow us to generalise to 85-90% of the ethnic minority population.

The response rate was between 58% and 66%, depending on how non-responses is treated. There is some ambiguity about whether people who cannot be contacted are eligible for the survey, and thus whether their non-participation is a refusal, or if it is due to a lack of eligibility. These response rates compare favourably with those from the British Election Study in 2010, where the response rate for the pre-election wave was 56% and for the top up post-election sample was 49%. However completion rates for the mail-back survey in EMBES were low – only 35% of respondents who completed the face-to-face interview returned the mail-back survey.

The questionnaire design for EMBES was closely coordinated with the 2010 British Election Study. For the core political questions, items were used from the BES questionnaire – for instance on political outcomes, attitudes towards issues in the election, and socio-demographic classification. Other ethnic minority-specific items were taken from the 1997 EMBES, international surveys, or written from scratch. Questions underwent cognitive testing, and a pilot study was conducted in order to refine the questionnaire. The use of questions from the BES is extremely helpful as it gives us comparable measures of ethnic minority and white British political behaviour. This allows direct comparison between these groups, but also analysis of ethnic minority respondents that tests whether theories developed to explain majority political behaviour are easily transferable to ethnic minority behaviour.

I discuss the variables used for each piece of analysis within each chapter, and introduce the supplementary data where appropriate. EMBES is a high quality dataset that is very well suited to the theoretical questions at the heart of this thesis. The final advantage is that as a publicly available dataset, it opens up the possibility for replication and reproducible results. It can be found through the UK Data Archive, study number 6970. Further information is available in the appendices on question wording, weighting and sampling.

Explaining ethnic minority vote choice and partisanship in Great Britain

Abstract

Ethnic minority support for the Labour party is strong, long-lasting and persists when the Labour party is unpopular nationally. The extent of Labour support is not explained by differences in individual characteristics between ethnic minorities and white British voters. This article uses the 2010 Ethnic Minority British Election Study to explore why. I develop a general model of how group interests can result in larger differences in behaviour between groups than individual characteristics can explain. At the individual level this requires two things; a consciousness of the interests of group members, and a consensus that a political action is the best way to represent those interests. I show that ethnic minority voters support the Labour party to the extent that they are (i) conscious of the experiences of their ethnic group members with regards to discrimination, and (ii) believe that the Labour party is the best political party to represent their interests. Members of groups who experience more discrimination on average are more likely to support the Labour party. Living in social housing also proves to be important as a predictor of Labour support, at the individual and group level. An analysis of vote choice provides further support for the idea that ethnic minority Labour support is driven primarily by discrimination and ethnic inequality; the biggest difference on substantive issues between ethnic minorities and the Conservative party is the extent to which they think that the government needs to improve

opportunities for ethnic minorities, and this is where Labour has a clear advantage over other parties. Ethnic minorities who vote for parties other than Labour do not have a different position from other ethnic minorities on the importance of improving opportunities for ethnic minorities. Rather, they think that the party they vote for (other than Labour) is closer to their opinion than Labour voters do.

Theoretical question and empirical puzzle

The puzzle

Support for the Labour party among ethnic minorities exceeds that which would be predicted from individual characteristics, in particular class and unemployment. In 2010, 36% of those with manual occupations voted for Labour, compared to 69% of all ethnic minorities.[3] The contrast is striking, given the traditional importance of class in British party loyalties. This association emerged early on in the study of ethnic minority voting behaviour in the UK, and has not been countered since (Anwar, 1986; FitzGerald, 1987; Heath et al., 2011; Layton-Henry & Studlar, 1985; Saggar, 2000). There have been two exceptions to this pattern; firstly, a rejection of the Labour party among Muslim voters in 2005 in response to unpopular anti-terror laws and military interventions (Curtice et al., 2005), and the growing numbers of middle-class Indians supporting the Conservative party (Heath et al., 2011; Saggar & Heath, 1999). The magnitude of these deviations should not be overstated however – Muslim voters returned to the Labour party in 2010

[3] Weighted percentages from the British Election Study and the Ethnic Minority Election Study excluding non-voters

when 60% of Pakistanis voted for the Labour party in 2010. 24% of Indians voted for the Conservative party in 2010, but 61% voted for the Labour party.[4] The difference in Labour partisanship and vote choice between ethnic minorities and white British voters is not accounted for by economic and social characteristics of these different individuals within these groups. I want to see if group characteristics have an influence on individual behaviour above and beyond compositional effects. This is similar to the approach taken recently by Heath et al. (2013). They argue that the general level of agreement with the Labour party in someone's ethnic in-group will influence them to vote Labour more than we would expect from their own individual characteristics or political opinions. However more could be done to explore the individual-level mechanism. Heath et al. test the interaction of their measure with feelings of relative deprivation (an individual-level attitude) and with bonding social capital (an individual-level measure of a group and individual characteristic), but do not provide a clear causal path from a higher group level of agreement with the Labour party to individual behaviour. They observe that the groups with greater level of agreement with Labour tend to have higher levels of unemployment, but this is not explored systematically. The key questions in this paper therefore are concerned with (i) which individual-level mechanism might account for the influence of one's ethnorelgious group on individual partisanship and vote choice, and (ii) is there any regularity in which groups are more pro-Labour?

[4] Weighted percentages from the Ethnic Minority British Election Study excluding non-voters.

A group utility heuristic and linked fate

One key mechanism that would translate group level differences into individual-level behaviour is that individuals are explicitly voting according to a group utility heuristic. Dawson (1994) introduced the concept of *linked fate* to explain the support for the Democrats among African Americans. To the extent that group membership means that an individual's own fate is linked with that of the wider community, it makes sense for individuals to substitute group utility for their own when making political decisions. This idea has gained a large amount of support in the study of African American electoral behaviour, and appears to be equally important in explaining the political behaviour of Latinos in the USA (Kaufmann, 2003; Sanchez & Masuoka, 2010; Wilson, 2012). Wilson (2012) frames this explicitly in terms of group economic voting, arguing that a key determinant of African American presidential vote choice and candidate affect was the retrospective evaluation of how the economic situation of blacks had improved, whilst personal retrospective economic evaluations were not significantly related to Democratic support.

The extent to which perceived group economic interest influences Labour party support among ethnic minorities is certainly worth investigating more fully in the British context given the higher issue priority given to unemployment by these voters (Heath et al., 2013; Saggar, 2000). This is unsurprising given that most ethnic minorities are more likely to be unemployed than members of the white British population, even as education levels and access to the salariat have increased (Dustmann & Theodoropoulos, 2010; Heath & Cheung, 2007; Heath, McMahon, & Roberts, 2000; Jones, 1993).

Economic concerns are not the only possible basis for a group utility heuristic however; the other main candidate would be discrimination and prejudice. Although part of this certainly has economic effects, it also has a large social component that cannot be reduced to purely economic terms but nevertheless has profound effects on the way someone lives. Being more likely to be searched by the police or other forms of unfair treatment by public authorities, stereotyping by teachers and verbal harassment for instance are more social or political experiences than economic. If we are considering the possibility that voting according to a group utility heuristic explains Labour party allegiance then we should not assume that this heuristic is solely concerned with economic disadvantage. This is especially the case in Great Britain where not all ethnic minorities are obviously economically disadvantaged.

In formal terms, there are two stages involved in voting according a group utility heuristic. Firstly, the voter needs to be aware of group interests. Awareness of group interests here corresponds to the concept of *fraternalistic relative deprivation* – to what extent does someone think that people of their ethnic group receive less than they expect from life? This question is distinct from whether a person themselves feels disadvantaged; someone who is highly aware of the disadvantage of family, friends or even abstract strangers with whom they share a group identity may themselves be very privileged. Similarly, someone who is very disadvantaged themselves may not link this to their group membership or be aware of the situation of other group members. The second stage is the link between awareness of group disadvantage and a

political action – what could be done in political terms about this disadvantage? In our case this political action is support for the Labour party. In other words it is not enough to say that feeling fraternalistic relative deprivation leads to Labour party support; we also need to explain why believing one's ethnic group is disadvantaged would lead to Labour support, and if possible test this directly using questions that ask about who individuals consider to be political allies of their ethnic group.

Heath et al. (2013) and Sanders et al. (2013) argue that the Labour party's historical support for anti-discrimination legislation means that they have provided the best substantive representation of ethnic minority interests. Focus group respondents for a investigation by Conservative peer Lord Ashcroft into ethnic minority resistance to the Conservative party suggested that Labour support might also be to do with the lack of a viable alternative i.e. negative views of the Conservative party. One of the more complimentary respondents described the party thus; "the Conservative Party – without wishing to sound derogatory or offensive – is a party for the white middle class educated person".(Ashcroft, 2012)(p.36) Others were more direct in their criticism; "The Tories had a lot of racist policies so it was easy not to vote for them … 'If you want a n*gger for a neighbour, vote Labour'. And if you go back to the rivers of blood speech, Enoch Powell, there was no one in the Conservative Party denouncing him and saying this isn't the way forward.

What he said was widely accepted".[5] (Ashcroft, 2012) (p.36)This suggests that Labour party support may be driven less by support for leftist economic policies, and more by the relative party positions on racial equality.

Recent developments

As discussed above, Heath et al. (2013) tackle the puzzle of partisanship in their recent book *The Political Integration of Ethnic Minorities*. They frame their discussion in terms of Dawson's idea of linked fate, but instead go on to develop what they call "pro-Labour culture". The idea is that there is a kind of group party identity where Labour are felt to be "the party for us". They show that their measure of this explains 55% of the variation in Labour partisanship between ethnoreligious minority groups. Most interestingly, they claim that the individual level measure of this pro-Labour culture/consensus/sentiment tells only part of the story, and that the real finding here is that the level of pro-Labour culture in someone's ethnoreligious group has a direct effect on their party identity.

An especially exciting part of this analysis is the focus on the group-level, and the idea that one's social group can influence one's political behaviour beyond a compositional effect, which I replicate and extend upon in this paper. However, their analysis could be improved. The principal problem is the mismatch between the authors' measure and the concept they are attempting

[5] Powell lost his ministerial post and *The Times* called it an "evil speech". Thus there was opposition at the time. Nevertheless, this respondent's views are indicative of feelings that the Conservative Party are (or were) racially prejudiced.

to capture. Heath et al.'s measure of pro-Labour consensus is a group mean of an individual scale measuring agreement with the Labour party's position on 6 issues. The group here is a 28-part ethnorelgious classification. Essentially this measures the extent to which one's ethnoreligious group agrees or disagrees with the Labour party. This is not a measure of a "collective party identity", or "pro-Labour culture"; it tells us that people who belong to a group that agrees more with the Labour party are more likely to support the Labour party. It is interesting that the group level of agreement is a better predictor of individual partisanship than individual agreement, but this is not a good measure of linked fate or a sense that Labour is "the party for us", which are the terms in which Heath et al. (2013) frame the discussion. This is puzzling in light of the inclusion in the EMBES questionnaire of measures of both linked fate and which party best represents ethnic minority interests. In addition there are the problems explored above, where the individual-level mechanisms are not fully specified, and the determinants of the group-level of agreement with Labour are not explored.

Moreover, there significant difficulties in the construction of the scale of agreement with the Labour party and its constituent parts. The scale is composed of 6 items: in each case a respondent can be coded 1 if they agree with the Labour party, and 0 if they do not. This means the scale runs from 0 to 6. To begin with, the authors make use of three issue scales that ask the respondent to place both themselves and the three main parties. For example, one scale has at 0 "the government should cut taxes and spend much less on health and social services", and at 10 "the government should raise taxes a lot

and spend much more on health and social services". Heath et al consider someone to agree with Labour if they are at the same point or to the left of the mean perceived position of the Labour party. This discards potentially useful information, and ignores the problem that relational scales were designed to address; we don't necessarily know where respondents perceive parties to be – so a respondent who places themselves at 10 on the scale and the Labour party at 4 would not necessarily think they agree with the Labour party (on this issue), but Heath et al code them as doing so.

Another issue is the choice of an additive scale. Again this ignores potentially useful information – some items may be more important than others, and this may well vary across ethnoreligious groups. It would be best to either investigate this and weight accordingly, or to simply include all six items separately as independent variables (at both individual and group levels where appropriate). Insisting on an additive scale may be masking salient variation. This is especially the case when we consider the issues included in the scale. An issue scale on tax and spending, the bread and butter issue of British politics, is given the same importance as an issue scale on the balance between prisoners' rights and law and order. The war in Afghanistan is included in the same way as other issues, but we know that disagreement with this war is much higher among Muslim groups, and for Bangladeshis "don't know" responses appear to reflect disagreement due to social desirability bias (Fisher, Heath, Sanders, & Sobolewska, 2011). Clearly this is an important part of measuring agreement with the Labour party but not enough thought is given to the possibility that this issue is highly salient for some ethnoreligious groups (for whom it may be

a complete dealbreaker), and much less to others. The item on unemployment is curious too – one of the items is whether a respondent named unemployment as the most important issue facing the country. Although a link between the salience of unemployment and Labour support is intuitive, it is not clear that Labour's position was that the unemployment was the most important issue facing the country, so one might question whether it is appropriate to include it in a scale where the other items have plausible comparison points with the Labour party. On their own many of these are small criticisms, but they are important when taken together, given the weight that this scale of agreement with the Labour party carries in the key discussion of party identity in Heath et al. (2011).

Questions to answer

From this starting point, I look at vote choice and party identity among ethnic minorities using the Ethnic Minority British Election Study. What I am interested in explaining is why more ethnic minorities vote Labour than would be predicted from individual characteristics, and how this relates to the characteristics of someone's ethnic in-group. Is there any evidence that ethnic minorities in Britain are voting according to a group utility heuristic, as opposed to picking a party based on their individual preferences? And if so, which group characteristics are associated with supporting the Labour party?

It is important to consider both vote choice and party identity. Vote choice reflects the extent of support a given party has at one point in time, but the observed count at the polling stations is also influenced by tactical voting,

candidate effects, and tends to vary more between elections than party identity. The core of party identity is that it represents an enduring psychological attachment to a party (Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Stokes, 1960). Vote choice is the electorally important outcome, but party identity is more appropriate conceptually if we are interested in long-term attachment to the Labour party among ethnic minorities. Partisanship affects vote choice, but it also influences how electors perceive political information and their subsequent evaluations of parties, polices and leaders. It is a lens through which we see the world (Bartels, 2002; A. Campbell et al., 1960; Gerber, Huber, & Washington, 2010). This does not mean that electors do not change their party identity in response to political information or events, but due to the perceptual filter effect of partisanship, it tends to be stable within certain limits (Gerber et al., 2010; Rice & Hilton, 1996).

Partisanship is interesting in this context insofar as it is to some extent inherited from one's parents or social milieu (Achen, 2002; Campbell et al., 1960; Niemi & Jennings, 1991). Higher levels of Labour partisanship among ethnic minorities have the possibility to reinforce pro-Labour attitudes and identities. Moreover, Greene has suggested that partisanship can be understood as a social identity (Greene, 1999; 2004). Greene's idea is that partisanship itself is a form of social identity, but a more canonical understanding of partisanship is that it can be attached to a social identity (or aligned with a social cleavage). In our case, Labour party identity or support may be something that is associated with one's ethnic identity.

A more practical reason to consider both is that in the electoral circumstances of 2010, there were proportionally and numerically more people who identified with the Labour party but did not vote for them, due to the unpopularity of the Labour government and/or leadership (see table 5 later in this chapter).

My findings suggest that a group utility heuristic is important in explaining ethnic minority support for the Labour party. The strongest correlate of having a Labour party identity among ethnic minorities is believing that Labour is the party most likely to improve life for ethnic minorities (the Spearman's rank correlation coefficient is .52). Feelings of relative fraternalistic deprivation are also a strong predictor, in keeping with Heath et al. (2013). If we look at what drives these attitudes themselves, we see that they are associated with belonging to a group which experiences higher levels of discrimination, and a group with a higher proportion in social housing. Unemployment is unrelated to partisanship, and to these attitudes. I suggest that these attitudes mediate the relationship between group characteristics and partisanship.

This paper proceeds in the following way. I first introduce the main dataset and key variables. The analysis section has three main components. Firstly, I look at ethnic minority positions and their perceptions of where the three main parties stand on three issue scales, and how this relates to vote choice. Secondly, I compare three models of party identity, showing that fraternalistic relative deprivation and feeling that the Labour party are the best for ethnic minorities are important attitudinal predictors and possible mediators of

group characteristics. Thirdly, I look at the individual and group characteristics that are associated with these two attitudes to gain some insight into what might be driving these attitudes.

Data and measures

I use data from the 2010 Ethnic Minority British Election Study. It is a nationally representative probability sample of the five of the main ethnic minority groups in the UK; Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, black Caribbean and black African. Areas where less than 2% of the residents were ethnic minorities in the 2001 Census were excluded from the sampling frame, and the response rate was between 58% and 66%. The achieved sample size was 2,787. It was designed to be comparable to the established British Election Study, containing many of the same questions in addition to new items on political and demographic variables that are mostly only applicable to ethnic minorities.

Ethnoreligious group

How we define someone's ethnic in-group will affect in turn other variables whose effect we want to consider at the group level. It is best to err on the side of too much detail, as far as the data permits. I have used the 28 part ethnoreligious classification from Heath et al. (2013) in part to faithfully replicate their analysis but mostly because I believe it is the best that can be derived from the data as it is. Self-reported ethnicity is then divided by religion and denomination. Mixed race respondents and those who do not fit into any other category are not put in separate groups. It would be desirable to further subset by language, but unfortunately only those respondents who did not

speak English as their main language were asked about their other languages, which would severely limit and bias the sample towards first-generation migrants. The 28 categories are given in table 1 below. The average group size is 100 but there is considerable variation – the largest group is Pakistani Sunnis of which there are 542 respondents, the smallest is mixed race Christians of which there are 2 respondents. Consistent with Heath et al. (2013) I do not exclude smaller groups from the analysis.

Table 1: ethnoreligious categories

Ethnoreligious group	Freq.	Percent
Indian Christian	53	1.90
Indian Hindu	228	8.18
Indian Sikh	164	5.88
Indian Muslim	76	2.73
Indian other	66	2.37
Pakistani Sunni	542	19.45
Pakistani other Muslim	96	3.44
Other Pakistani	30	1.08
Bangladeshi Sunni	218	7.82
Bangladeshi other Muslim	46	1.65
Other Bangladeshi	6	0.22
Caribbean Anglican	76	2.73
Caribbean Roman Catholic	67	2.40
Caribbean Pentecostal	97	3.48
Caribbean other Christian	136	4.88
Caribbean other	25	0.90
Caribbean no religion	196	7.03
African Anglican	30	1.08
African Roman Catholic	91	3.27
African Pentecostal	139	4.99
African other Christian	90	3.23
African Sunni	88	3.16
African other Muslim	47	1.69
African other religion	39	1.40
Other Sunni	16	0.57
Other other religion	21	0.75
Mixed Christian	2	0.07
Mixed other	102	3.66

Data: EMBES
Unweighted frequencies

Attitudinal measures

I argue that there are two attitudes that are important for voting according to a group utility heuristic; awareness of group deprivation, and attaching a political action to this deprivation (in our case, support for the Labour party). The first is measured using what Heath et al. refer to as *fraternalistic relative deprivation*. This is agreement on a five-point scale (agree strongly, agree, neither, disagree, disagree strongly) with the statement "There is often a big gap between what people from my ethnic group expect out of life and what we actually get". The second attitude draws on a question that asks "Which party do you think is best able to help improve life in Britain for ethnic minority groups?" to measure the extent to which ethnic minority group membership is linked to a political action. It would be desirable to use a question that asked specifically about improving life in Britain for the respondent's ethnic group, but the available question is very close.

I directly replicated Heath et al.'s measure of pro-Labour sentiment.[6] They measure respondent's opinions on 6 policy issues. It is an additive scale, where agreement with Labour on one issue results in an increase of 1 on the scale. Three of these policy issues are measured with issue scales that ask the respondent to place themselves and the three main parties on a scale from 0 to 10. The content of these issue scales is discussed below. Heath et al. treat anyone who holds the same position as the average perception of Labour, or a position further to the left, as agreeing with Labour. The next policy issue concerns the treatment of asylum seekers; Heath et al. assume that the position

[6] For more details see note 26 on p.130 of Heath et al. (2013).

of Labour on asylum seekers was not to send them home immediately. On Afghanistan, they assume that the Labour position was that it was right to wage the war. On unemployment, the authors code anyone who mentioned unemployment as the most important issue as agreeing with Labour, on the basis that Labour's campaign in 2010 was against austerity measures. They then calculate the proportion within each ethnoreligious group who accepted Labour's position (or put themselves to the left of Labour on the issue scales) on each issue, and then sum the proportions.

Party identity and vote choice

The dependent variable in the analysis party identity is binary; Labour party identity, or any other party identity. I exclude those who do not identify with any party in order to ignore conflating the effects of any independent variables that influence ethnic minorities to hold any party identity with the effects of variables that influence ethnic minorities to hold a Labour party identity. For similar reasons, vote choice is a binary variable that contrasts those who voted Labour with those who voted for any other party.

Issue scales

There are three issue scales in EMBES that ask respondents to place themselves and the three main parties between two extremes. I look at respondents' attitudes and their perceptions of party positions for two reasons; firstly to see if all the issues show similar gaps between parties and voters or if one issue shows more divergence, and secondly to assess what

impact these evaluations have on vote choice, in line with spatial voting theory. The wording of the scales is as follows:

- *Using the 0 to 10 scale on this card, where the end marked 0 means that government should cut taxes and spend much less on health and social services, and the end marked 10 means that government should raise taxes a lot and spend much more on health and social services, where would you place [yourself/the Labour party/the Conservative party/the Liberal Democrats] on this scale?*

- *Some people think that reducing crime is more important than protecting the rights of people accused of committing crimes. Other people think that protecting the rights of accused people, regardless of whether they have been convicted of committing a crime, is more important than reducing crime. On the 0-10 scale, where would you place [yourself/the Labour party/the Conservative party/the Liberal Democrats] on this scale?*

- *Using the 0 to 10 scale on this card, where the end marked 0 means that there is no need for government to take action to improve opportunities for Black and Asian people, and the end marked 10 means that government should make every effort improve opportunities for Black and Asian people, where would you place [yourself/the Labour party/the Conservative party/the Liberal Democrats] on this scale?*

When used as an independent variable, I use a binary variable to indicate if the respondent thinks that Labour have the same position as themselves or not (Labour is at their ideal point).

Analysis

Voter ideal points and proximity to mainstream parties

Figure 1 shows the average ethnic minority ideal point and average perceived position on three attitude scales. The first measures political attitudes on the balance between tax and public spending, often known as the economic left-right scale. The second is taken from the group of questions used in the British Election Study to measure the social libertarian-authoritarian dimension; the balance between preventing crime and respecting the rights of criminals. The final scale asks about the extent to which government should be improving opportunities for ethnic minorities, ranging from not at all to making every effort.

There are two interesting things here. Firstly, looking at preferred levels of tax and spending, the distance between the average ethnic minority ideal point and the perceived position of the Labour and Conservative parties are almost exactly the same. In other words, neither of these parties is perceived to be much closer to ethnic minorities preferred position. Indeed, the average ideal point is almost midway between the position of Labour and Conservative, so that the Labour party is perceived as a bit too left-wing, and the Conservative party is perceived as a bit too right-wing. There is no clear closest party to ethnic minorities on the issue of tax and spending. This intensifies our puzzle; traditionally, the principal conflict between left and right in the British party

system is on the balance between tax and spending, between higher and lower levels of redistribution. If a group votes strongly for the major left-wing party, we would expect them to have strong left-wing views, perhaps even to the left of the party's manifesto position – but the relative positions of the parties and voters on the scale of tax and spending shows that this is not the case with ethnic minority voters in Britain.[7]

Figure 1 – average ideal points and perceived positions of Labour, the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats



Turning to the only item from the social libertarian-authoritarian scale, we can see that the answer to the puzzle does not lie in the attitudes that ethnic minorities have towards the crime and punishment. On average, ethnic minorities ideal points are further towards the "upholding the law is more

[7] It could alternatively be argued that those with strong left-wing views would not vote for the Labour party because the party's positions are too centrist. However, there is not a large turnout deficit among ethnic minorities, and even if there were a group who considered themselves too left-wing for Labour, the puzzle of why those who do vote Labour are not as left-wing as the party, and no further away from the Conservatives than Labour remains.

important" end of the scale than where they perceive the Labour party and Liberal Democrats to be, although the differences are not that great. The spot for the Conservative party's perceived position is in fact underneath the spot indicating where the average ethnic minority ideal point is.

This is not the case when we look at the final attitudes scale that deals with the extent to which government should be improving opportunities for ethnic minorities. Consistent with other research that shows that ethnic minorities perceive a greater need for government intervention to ensure racial equality, the average ideal point for ethnic minorities is further to the interventionist end of the scale than all three parties. Most interestingly however is the placement of the parties. The Labour party is clearly seen as the most in favour of government intervention in this area, but not enough in the eyes of most respondents. The Conservative party however is further away still – over twice the distance of Labour from the average ethnic minority ideal point. This supports equally the idea pushed by Lord Ashcroft that the Conservatives are not perceived as friendly to ethnic minorities, and the argument of Heath et al. that Labour benefit among ethnic minorities from their history of implementing anti-discrimination legislation.

Figure 2 shows that this is not the end of the story. If we look at perceptions of party positions and ideal points on this issue broken down by party, we can see that the key difference between Labour and Conservative ethnic minority voters is not their own position on the need for equal opportunity policies, but rather their perception of the Conservative party. Labour voters have a mean

position of 8.6, and on average believe the Conservative party to be at 6.4 on the same scale. Conservative voters have a mean position of 8.0, but believe on average that the Conservatives are much closer to themselves, at 7.3. Similarly, those who vote for the Liberal Democrats on average consider this party to be much closer to the average ideal point on this issue, and those who vote for another party show a much greater gap between themselves and the three mainstream parties (including Labour). So we have evidence that, on average, ethnic minority voters think that Labour are much closer to their position on the importance of promoting equal opportunities, that this difference is more pronounced than differences on the other two issue scales, and that those who choose another party from Labour do not see as much of a gap between themselves and this other party on equal opportunities.

There are two important caveats to all of this; the figures presented here only show the average position, not the correspondence between individual's positions on different scales. There is also the possibility of reverse causation, or at least mutual causation. Evans & Andersen (2004) use panel data to show that issue perceptions are contaminated by other aspects of political belief systems. Someone's political orientation influences how he or she perceives the position of parties on issue dimensions, such that a Conservative party voter may well end up perceiving the Conservatives as closer to them on the issue of equal opportunities as a result of voting for the Conservative party, rather than voting for the Conservative party as a result of perceiving them to be better on the issue of equal opportunities.

Figure 2 – average ideal points and perceptions of major parties' positions on whether the government should improve opportunities for ethnic minorities



Figures 3 and 4 address the latter concern by showing that the pattern of different perceptions of the position of voters' preferred party according to vote choice does not appear in the same manner when we look at the issues of tax and spending, and the rights of criminals. Figure 3 shows very little variation in average ideal point or party positions on tax and spending. Figure 4 shows a much greater variation in party perceptions by vote choice, but with the Conservative party the pattern observed in figure 2 is the other way round – the gap between the Conservative party's perceived position and the average voters ideal point is in fact greater for Conservative voters. This is mostly because Conservative party voters are further to the "upholding law and order" end of the scale than other voters, but the perceived position of the Conservative party does not vary much. However, in support of the criticism of these scales made by Evans & Andersen (2004), the Labour party's perceived

position on this position does vary according to vote choice, such that Labour and Liberal Democrat voters perceive the Labour party as closer to their average ideal point, and Conservative and other party voters perceive it as further away.

Figure 3 – average ideal points and perceptions of major parties' positions on the balance between tax and spending



Figure 4 – average ideal points and perceptions of major parties' positions on the balance between the rights of criminals and upholding the law



Table 2 presents a multilevel logistic regression model of vote choice among ethnic minorities where the dependent variable is Labour vote choice, compared to voting for any other party. This data is self-reported and not checked against validated turnout, in order to be comparable to similar models of vote choice elsewhere. The group level is the 28-part ethnoreligious classification, taken from (Heath et al., 2013). The dependent variable is binary Labour/non-Labour because the real question here is why ethnic minorities tend to vote for the Labour party, not why they vote for the Liberal Democrats as compared to the Conservatives or Respect. A binary dependent variable makes this clear and removes extraneous information.

Independent variables are included to test varying explanations of vote choice. To begin with there are two models of vote choice developed looking at the entire voting population (but in effect concentrating on the white majority group); spatial voting, and valence voting. Spatial voting explains vote choice as a function of voters' and parties' positions on political issues; spatial voting expects voters to pick the party who is closest to their own position. Spatial voting is accounted for with indicators of whether the Labour party was at the voter's ideal point on the three issue scales discussed above (the balance between tax and spending, between upholding the law and the rights of criminals, and the extend to which the government should improve opportunities for black and Asian people). Valence voting is when voters are more concerned with differences between parties in competence than in position. Some spatial theorists argue that the rise of this performance politics is due to smaller differences between mainstream parties on economic policy, but its importance in explaining vote choice whilst this persists in Britain cannot be denied (Clarke, Sanders, Stewart, & Whiteley, 2009; Sanders et al., 2013). Valence voting is tested using the extent to which voters thought that the governing party (Labour) had handled the economy well and which party voters thought was best equipped to address the most important issue facing the country. These indicators are chosen from those used by Clarke et al. (2009).

The other explanations of vote choice are those that have been developed explicitly to explain ethnic minority political behaviour; fraternalistic relative deprivation (Dawson, 1994; Heath et al., 2013; Wilson, 2012), pro-Labour

values in the sense of agreeing with Labour's stated position (Heath et al., 2013), and thinking that Labour is the best party for ethnic minorities. For each of these indicators, I include values both at the individual level, and ethnoreligious group-level means, in keeping with the analysis of partisanship in Heath et al. (2013), where they argue that the influence of attitudes (agreement with the Labour party) at the level of one's own ethnic group is in fact more important than one's own attitudes.

The results show that both spatial and valence considerations are predictors of vote choice among ethnic minorities in Britain. Voters were more likely to choose the Labour party if they thought it was at their ideal point on the scales that measured attitudes to tax and spending, and also on whether the government should be improving equal opportunities. It was irrelevant whether Labour shared their position on the balance between upholding the law and criminal's rights, which is unsurprising in light of the analysis of the three scales presented above. However valence considerations are also important. Those who thought the incumbent government had not done well when it came to stewardship of the economy were less likely to vote Labour, along with those who thought that either the Conservatives or the Liberal Democrats were best on their most important issue, whilst those who thought that the Labour party were best on their most important issue were more likely to vote Labour. It is sometimes claimed that it is more difficult to explain ethnic minority political behaviour, or that it does not fit with what we know about political behaviour in Britain more generally. I would argue that although this is true to some extent when it comes to individual's social and

economic characteristics, the influence of more proximate predictors of vote choice (i.e. spatial and valence voting) suggests that there are underlying similarities in the ways that ethnic minorities and the white British decide who to vote for.

Looking now at the importance of concerns that apply solely to ethnic minority voters, we can see that fraternalistic relative deprivation and feeling that the Labour party is the best for ethnic minorities are significant predictors, but that Heath et al.'s pro-Labour sentiment is insignificant. This is true both at the individual and at the group level. This supports the argument that ethnic minorities might use a group utility heuristic which leads them to prefer the party "best" for their group regardless of whether they themselves are in a position to need that benefit. It also reinforces the argument that Labour benefits from loyalty among ethnic minority voters due to the party's history of promoting ethnic minority rights, regardless of the absence of such proposals from their 2010 manifesto.

The second model in Table 2 includes party identity. One interpretation is that party identity may partially mediate the effects of fraternalistic relative deprivation and feeling that "Labour are the best for ethnic minorities" on vote choice; the coefficient for the first attitude is insignificant once party identity is controlled for, and the coefficient for the second attitude is approximately half its previous size. For those who prefer to interpret party identity as causally prior to other attitudes, it is interesting that the second attitude remains

significant, and moreover that indicators of which party is best on the issue most important to the voter are also significant.

It is intriguing that the group average level of fraternalistic relative deprivation ("There is a large gap between what people from my ethnic group expect and receive out of life") and of feeling the Labour party is the best for ethnic minorities are predictors vote choice. In particular, it suggests that Heath et al. were right to concentrate on the group level. Consequently, I look at the relationship of these two factors and group characteristics – for example, is it the case the individual experiences of discrimination explain whether someone feels their ethnic group is disadvantaged, or group levels, or a combination of the two? First, however, I look at the predictors of party identity, including these group level characteristi

Table 2: multilevel logistic regression model of vote choice (Labour=1, any other party=0)

	Vote choice		Vote choice	
	Coef	se	Coef	se
Fraternal relative deprivation	0.15*	0.07	0.09	0.09
Pro-Labour values	-0.08	0.06	-0.08	0.08
Labour best for ethnic minorities	1.78***	0.15	0.81***	0.20
Group mean - fraternalistic relative deprivation	1.11*	0.46	1.00	0.59
Group mean - pro-Labour values	0.19	0.47	0.01	0.60
Group mean - labour best for ethnic minorities	2.39*	0.97	1.26	1.25
Labour at voter's ideal point - tax/spend	0.35*	0.15	0.58**	0.20
Labour at voter's ideal point - crime/rights	0.12	0.15	0.22	0.19
Labour at voter's ideal point - promoting ethnic minority opportunities	0.38**	0.14	0.13	0.19
Labour best party on most important issue	0.91***	0.18	0.62**	0.23
Con. best party on most important issue	-1.16***	0.18	-0.74**	0.25
Lib. Dems. best party on most important issue	-1.50***	0.27	-0.83*	0.39
Approve Lab. handling of the economy	0.26***	0.06	0.25**	0.08
No party id (ref.)				
Labour pid			2.05***	0.21
Conservative pid			-2.87***	0.50
Lib Dem pid			-2.36***	0.35
Other pid			-1.95***	0.57
Constant	-7.05***	1.28	-5.60***	1.65
Group level random effect	-9.86	9897.08	-15.36	631361.68
n	1701		1701	

*p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001*
Data: EMBES
Weighted using the weights provided by the survey

What about party identity?

Table 3 shows the results of three successive models of party identification: firstly with demographic characteristics of individuals and their ethnoreligious group; secondly with individual and group attitudes (feeling that the Labour party is best for ethnic minorities, agreement with Labour party positions/Heath et al.'s pro-Labour sentiment, and fraternalistic relative deprivation); and finally combining the demographic and attitudinal models. Just as with vote choice, these are multilevel logistic regression models where the dependent variable is Labour party identification/not-Labour party identification among those who do identify with a party, and the group-level indicator is the same 28-part ethnoreligious classification.

The most immediate pattern evident in the first model is that in general individual-level characteristics are insignificant predictors of Labour party identity, but more group-level ones are significant. The only significant individual-level predictor is class, where unwaged and working class individuals are more likely to have a Labour party identity than middle class ones. Economic activity, housing tenure, whether someone belongs to an ethnic or religious organization (bonding social capital), and whether they personally have experienced discrimination in the past 5 years are all unrelated to having Labour party identity. In light of the argument about ethnic group influence it is especially interesting that bonding social capital is unrelated to Labour partisanship, as one would expect that those who have more within-group interactions would be more likely to have political opinions that are more in

line with the average i.e. supporting the Labour party. Of course it may be the case that individual participation in an ethnic or religious association encourages people to have a party identity to begin with, but does little to increase the likelihood of this identity being Labour.

Similarly, it is surprising that an individual's economic activity is not associated with identifying with the Labour party. (Heath et al., 2013; Saggar, 2000) show that ethnic minorities give higher priority to unemployment as a political issue, which is in keeping with the generally higher rates of unemployment among minorities and the hypercyclical effect of recessions on ethnic minority employment. At least at the individual level however unemployment does not appear to be a driver of support for the Labour party. A similar argument is made by the same authors about the role of discrimination – it is a more salient issue for ethnic minorities and the Labour party benefits from this, it is argued, because of their ownership of the issue. At the individual level, it does not appear that one's own experience of discrimination (or lack thereof) predict support for the Labour party. The lack of a significant effect of individual's housing tenure on Labour party identity is in keeping with (Heath et al., 2013), but nevertheless surprising given the traditional association between social housing and Labour party support among the white working class. None of these individual null results mean that these factors are unimportant in explaining Labour partisanship, but it does suggest that the processes at work are not individual-level i.e. ethnic minority Labour party support is not explained in a simple compositional way.

Looking at the group-level predictors however, the group average percentage of council tenants, members of ethnic and religious organisations, people out of work, and those who report having experienced discrimination in the past 5 years are all related to Labour partisanship. Whilst an individual's own housing tenure is unrelated to party support, the percentage of their own ethnic group that lives in social housing is positively related to Labour party support. Similarly, individuals who are members of an ethnic or religious organisation are no more likely to support Labour than those who are not; but members of ethnoreligious groups with higher proportions who belong to such organisations are more likely to support Labour than members of ethnoreligious groups with less bonding social capital. Individual experiences of discrimination are unrelated to Labour party identity, but the average proportion who have experienced discrimination is positively related. This ties in well with Heath et al.'s finding that feelings of fraternalistic relative deprivation are related to political action in general, and support for the Labour party more generally – they suggest that feeling your ethnic group is discriminated against induces support for the Labour party, and this result suggests that if someone's ethnic group does in fact experience more discrimination[8] they tend to support the Labour party. (A more direct analysis of the relationship between perceived fraternalistic relative deprivation and experiences of discrimination is presented below). The percentage of middle class occupations in each ethnoreligious group is unrelated to Labour party identity, as is the proportion in unemployment.

[8] It is conceivable that different ethnic groups report experiences of discrimination differently.

The group level random effect is still significant, implying that there is still significant group-level differences in Labour partisanship controlling for these characteristics.

Table 3: multilevel logistic model of Labour party identity (0=any other identity, 1=Labour party identity)

	Attitudes		Indv. and group characteristics		Combined model	
	Coef.	se	Coef.	se	Coef.	se
Fraternal relative deprivation	0.15*	0.07			0.16*	0.07
Pro-Labour values	-0.05	0.05			-0.03	0.05
Lab. best for ethnic minorities	2.70***	0.13			2.71***	0.14
Group mean - fraternal relative deprivation	1.14*	0.52			0.13	0.79
Group mean - pro-Lab. values	0.38	0.51			0.64	0.51
Group mean – Lab. best for ethnic minorities	1.27	1.11			0.23	1.23
Member ethnic/religious org.			0.02	0.11	-0.17	0.14
Experienced discrimination			-0.05	0.11	-0.05	0.14
Owner occupier (ref)						
Social housing			0.13	0.15	-0.16	0.17
Other tenure			-0.20	0.13	-0.29	0.16
Unemployed			0.02	0.16	-0.21	0.19
Middle class (ref)						
Working class			0.35**	0.12	0.30*	0.14
Unwaged or missing			0.36*	0.16	0.38	0.2
Group % unemployed			-1.28	1.85	-1.44	1.87
Group % in social housing			2.18**	0.74	1.34	0.84
Group % ethnic/religious org.			2.63**	1.01	1.66	1.11
Group % discrimination			2.13*	0.91	1.06	1.15
Group % middle class			-0.62	0.94	-1.16	1.00
Constant	-6.00***	1.51	-0.65	0.58	-3.24	2.43
Group level random effect	-1.37**	0.50	-1.40***	0.35	-15.36	1124129
n	2102		2196		2102	

*p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001*
Data: EMBES
Weighted using the weights provided by the survey

The general implication of significant group-level predictors and insignificant individual-level predictors is that the Labour party support depends, at least partly, on group-level processes. This supports the group utility perspective – even if one's own personal circumstances might be associated with a different vote choice, when ethnicity is a salient identity and substantial material differences persist between ethnic groups, it makes sense to vote according to the interests of one's own ethnic group. Taking a less individualistic perspective, it might also be that groups with greater difficulties due to discrimination or more people living in social housing would create more social pressure to support the Labour party. Of course, individual data can only suggest that group-level mechanisms like this are at work; without observing the interactions and the network in action we only have indirect evidence for these theories.

The second model of party identification looks at individual and group-level measures of our three attitudinal explanations of party allegiance; feeling that Labour is the best party for ethnic minorities, Heath et al.'s pro-Labour sentiment (agreement with Labour policies), and fraternalistic relative deprivation. When fraternalistic relative deprivation and feeling that Labour is the best party for ethnic minorities are included, an individual's pro-Labour sentiment is an insignificant predictor. This is interesting insofar as the previous analysis of vote choice shows whether a party is perceived to share the voter's own opinion on tax/spending and the role of government in addressing ethnic inequality of opportunity is related to vote choice, which suggests that party positions are not unimportant. Perhaps it is agreement

with the more specific idea of whether the Labour party is perceived to promote ethnic minority interests that is important, as opposed to general agreement with the basket of Labour positions. Moreover, once the other two attitudes are taken account of, the group level of agreement with Labour policies is not a significant predictor of Labour partisanship, contrary to Heath et al. (2013). However, the group level is important for the two other attitudinal explanatory variables; one's own perception of fraternalistic relative deprivation and the average opinion of one's ethnoreligious group are both positively related to support for the Labour party, and the same is true for feeling that the Labour party is the best party for ethnic minorities. However the group-level random effect is still significant, which implies that these attitudes do not on their own account for the differences between groups in Labour partisanship.

The third model combines the demographic and attitudinal models. We can see that out of the attitudinal predictors, only the individual level variables remain significant; feeling that the Labour party are the best for ethnic minorities and fraternalistic relative deprivation are still significant predictors of Labour party identity, but only at the individual level. Looking at the demographic predictors, we can see that none of the individual level predictors are significant, although being working class as opposed to middle class is the closest ($p<.06$). At the group level, two predictors are approaching conventional levels of significance ($p<.06$); the group proportion in the middle class which is associated with a lower likelihood of Labour partisanship, and the group proportion in social housing which is still associated with a greater

likelihood of Labour partisanship. The group-level random effect is no longer significant; the between-group level variance in Labour partisanship is fully accounted for by the independent variables in the model.

There are two points we could draw from this model. The first point is that believing that the Labour party are the best for ethnic minorities and fraternalistic relative deprivation are important predictors of Labour party identity, and deserve further investigation. Who believes that the Labour party are the best party for ethnic minorities, and why? Do feelings of fraternalistic relative deprivation bear any relation to empirical measures of disadvantage, or is it an attitude that is driven by different factors? Some of these questions are investigated in more depth below. On the other hand, we should be careful to bear in mind that this is cross-sectional data, and it not clear if these attitudes are causally prior to party identity. This limits the causal claims that can be made here – it might be a mutually causal or even a reverse causal relationship. These two cases would still be interesting – if it is a case of reverse causation then we could interpret the correlation with these attitudes as a *post hoc* justification for party identity. A case of mutual causation is more likely, but again this would not make these results irrelevant; party identity is often thought of a lens through which individuals interpret the world, but which they also update in an on-going manner according to events.

The second point to draw from this model is more speculative; if the many group level predictors that we see are each related to Labour partisanship in the demographic and attitudinal models are not significant in the combined

model, is there something in this model that is acting as a mediating variable? The obvious candidates are fraternalistic relative deprivation, and feeling that the Labour party is the best party for ethnic minorities. The theoretical story here is that group interests do not translate into political attitudes through individual interests – otherwise controlling for individual characteristics would explain the disparity between groups (here the interesting comparison is between the white majority and ethnic minority groups in their support for the Labour party). Rather, individuals are voting according to a group utility heuristic. They are (i) aware of the circumstances of their group e.g. the level of discrimination experienced by group members, and (ii) have linked this with a political action e.g. feeling that the Labour party will be better than the others at addressing ethnic disadvantages.

The theoretical model presented here would in fact suggest an interaction between the two attitudes; if both steps are required in order for someone to vote according to group interests, someone with both attitudes should be more likely to support the Labour party. Table 4 tests this interaction. The first two models present the simple attitudinal model, according to whether the respondent feels that Labour are the best party for ethnic minorities. We can see that the relationship between fraternalistic relative deprivation and Labour partisanship is insignificant among respondents who do not think that Labour are the best party for ethnic minorities, but significant and positive among those who do. The third model is a combined model with an interaction between the two terms; the average marginal effects are plotted in figure 5. The predicted probability of having a Labour partisanship is much lower for

those who do not think that Labour are the best for ethnic minorities – this is evident in the intercept being much lower for this group than the other. The slope also varies – i.e. the effect of fraternalistic relative deprivation varies, although the difference is smaller than that between feeling/not feeling that Labour are the best party. This further supports the theoretical model of group utility heuristic voting.

Table 4: attitudinal model of partisanship with an interaction effect

	Lab best=0		Lab best=1		Combined	
	Coef	se	Coef	se	Coef	se
Fraternal relative deprivation	0.11	0.08	0.25*	0.11	0.10	0.08
Pro-Lab values	-0.06	0.06	-0.05	0.09	-0.05	0.05
Group mean - fraternal relative deprivation	1.48**	0.51	0.71	0.74	1.13*	0.52
Group mean - pro-Lab values	0.21	0.52	0.46	0.78	0.38	0.51
Group mean - Lab. Best	1.69	1.00	2.32	1.70	1.24	1.11
Lab best					2.24***	0.47
Lab best*fraternal relative deprivation					0.14	0.14
Constant	-6.91***	1.34	-2.97	2.25	-5.81***	1.54
Group level random effect	-17.98	12976110	-2.03	3.71	-1.34**	0.48
n	776		1326		2102	

** p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001*
Data: EMBES
Weighted using the weights provided by the survey

I argue that fraternalistic relative deprivation and feeling that the Labour party is the best for ethnic minorities represent these two stages in the translation of ethnic group disadvantages into support for the Labour party. In the next section I take a further step back in the causal chain to investigate whether group and individual characteristics are related to these two attitudes.

Figure 5 – plot of average marginal effects of fraternalistic relative deprivation as feeling "Labour are best for ethnic minorities" varies from 0 to 1



Feeling that Labour are the best party for ethnic minorities

Table 5: 2010 party identity, 2010 vote choice and feeling that Labour are the best party for ethnic minorities

	Party identity	Vote choice	Best for ethnic minorities
Labour	60%	44%	55%
Conservative	8%	9%	6%
Liberal Democrats	9%	10%	7%
Other	2%	2%	2%
None	21%	34%	7%
Don't know	-	-	24%
n	2787	2787	2787

Data: EMBES
Weighted using the weights provided by the survey

Table 5 shows the percentages of respondents who voted for or identified with the Labour party in 2010, and these numbers reinforce the extent of Labour party loyalty. What is perhaps more interesting is the high proportion agreeing with the more specific contention that the Labour party are the best party for

ethnic minorities. Over half said that Labour were the best for ethnic minorities, and the most common response after that was don't know or refused. In many ways this is a more direct measure of the expectation that the Labour party will be better for the interests of ethnic minorities, or that Labour is "the party for us".

Table 6 presents the results of a multilevel logistic regression model of naming the Labour party as the "party best able to improve life in Britain for ethnic minority groups". Members of an ethnic or religious organization are more likely to think the Labour party are the best party to improve life for ethnic minorities, in keeping with the idea that this attitude is reinforced by in-group interactions. This effect is also significant at the group level, meaning that members of ethnoreligious groups where a greater proportion are members of an ethnic or religious organization are again more likely to think that Labour are the best party for ethnic minorities, regardless of whether they themselves are members of such an organization. Housing tenure is also important; those who live in social housing, or members of an ethnoreligious group where more people live in social housing are more likely to think that Labour are the best party to improve life for ethnic minorities. An individual's occupational class is related to whether they think Labour are the best party, but the group proportion of middle class occupations[9] is unrelated. Similar to the pattern we saw with regards to party identity, an individual's experience of discrimination is unrelated to whether they think Labour are the best party, but the average

[9] The same is true if we look at the proportion of the group in working class occupations instead.

level of discrimination experienced by their ethnoreligious group is positively related to thinking that Labour are the best party for ethnic minorities. Unemployment is once again unrelated, either at the group or the individual level.

Looking at attitudinal factors, we can see that the effect of Labour having the same position as the respondent on the economic left-right scale is important, as is the effect of Labour being perceived as having the same view as the respondent on whether the government should be trying to improve opportunities for ethnic minorities. Puzzlingly, Labour being at the respondent's ideal point on the balance between criminals' rights and upholding the law has a negative effect on the likelihood of voting Labour. It might be the case that I should consider other measures of the correspondence between party and respondent ideal points, such as Euclidean or relative distance. Finally, I was interested in testing whether opinions on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan may have damaged the perception that the Labour party will look after the interests of ethnic minorities, especially for Muslims or Pakistanis. The main effect of approval of the war in Afghanistan is positive, indicating that those who agreed with the government position are also more likely to say that Labour are the best party for ethnic minorities, but the interaction with whether the respondent is Muslim or not shows no difference between Muslims and non-Muslim ethnic minorities in this effect. Therefore it would be unjustified to say that Afghanistan (or Iraq, insofar as this measure will reflect attitudes about both wars) has affected the perception that Labour will look after ethnic minority interests.

This model shows that feeling that Labour is the party most likely to improve life for ethnic minorities is associated with both individual and group level characteristics. In particular, group level experiences of discrimination and social housing are strongly related to believing that the Labour party is the best for ethnic minorities. One interpretation here is that these particular problems ask for the kind of solution that a more interventionist party is more likely to promote – the provision of social housing and employment legislation are both market interventions. Drawing on British political history however it seems at least as plausible that the efforts of the Labour party in enacting anti-discrimination legislation, and the lack of such legislation under Conservative governments, is remembered by ethnic minority voters and has resulted in the perception that this party will do more for them. Equally, although the Labour government in power after 1997 did not expand social housing, the "right to buy" housing policy may have been unpopular as it reduced the housing stock for those on low incomes, including the greater than average proportion of ethnic minority tenants who rely on social housing. In the cases where these individual and group level characteristics are related to party identity (and proximately, vote choice), one of the ways they have an effect on party identity is through feeling that the Labour party is the best for ethnic minorities, in addition to other considerations (valence voting, spatial voting on other issues). This is how group context matters; not being surrounded by people who have similar views to the Labour party on a basket of issues.

Table 6: multilevel models of feeling that Labour are the best party for minorities, and fraternalistic relative deprivation

	Labour best for ethnic minorities		Fraternalistic relative deprivation	
	Coef	SE	Coef	SE
Member ethnic/religious org.	0.24*	0.10	0.05	0.04
Experienced discrimination	-0.07	0.09	0.32***	0.04
Owner occupier (ref)				
Social housing	0.22	0.12	0.16**	0.05
Other tenure	-0.07	0.11	0.07	0.05
Unemployed	0.24	0.13	0.00	0.05
Middle class (ref)				
Working class	0.22*	0.10	0.05	0.04
Unwaged or missing	0.04	0.13	0.11*	0.06
Group % unemployed	-1.56	1.37	-0.78	0.54
Group % in social housing	1.73**	0.59	0.51*	0.21
Group % ethnic/religious org.	2.36**	0.78	0.23	0.30
Group % discrimination	2.29**	0.74	0.51*	0.26
Group % middle class	0.63	0.86	-0.51	0.28
Labour at voter's ideal point - tax/spend	0.21*	0.09		
Labour at voter's ideal point - crime/rights	-0.55***	0.09		
Labour at voter's ideal point - opps for EMs	0.31***	0.09		
Respondent is Muslim	0.36	0.25		
Support for Afghan war	0.11*	0.05		
Muslim*support for Afghan war	0.02	0.08		
Constant	-2.31***	0.61	3.19***	0.17
Group level random effect	-1.77***	0.35	-2.94***	0.67
n	2396		2637	

** p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001*
Data: EMBES
Weighted using the weights provided by the survey

Fraternalistic relative deprivation

To complete the picture, we also need to ask how feelings of relative group discrimination are related to individual and group characteristics. Heath et al. (2013) emphasise the importance of fraternalistic relative deprivation as a explanation of political attitudes and behaviour, suggesting that this might be "the most important theme of [their] book". My analysis above reinforces its importance, but my theoretical claim goes one step further; I want to argue that fraternalistic relative deprivation reflects real differences in material circumstances and experiences of discrimination between ethnic minority groups. To test whether the data support this interpretation, table 6 also presents the result of ordinary least squares multilevel model where the dependent variable is the extent a respondent agrees with the statement

"There is often a big gap between what people from my ethnic group expect out of life and what we actually get". The group-level variable is the respondent's ethnoreligious group.

The stand out result here are that the two characteristics which seem to be related to feelings of fraternalistic relative deprivation are egocentric experience of discrimination, and housing tenure. Both are significant (or approaching significance) at the individual and group level, in support of the idea that feelings of relative discrimination reflect real experiences between different groups. The other point to draw from this model is that these are the same two characteristics which are associated with thinking that the Labour party is the best party for ethnic minorities. This lends additional support for the theoretical idea that voting according to a group utility heuristic requires (i) awareness of group interests and (ii) attaching this awareness to a political action. Feeling that Labour are the party best able to improve life for ethnic minorities is the second of these conditions; fraternalistic relative deprivation is the first.

Discussion and conclusions

This paper contributes to the growing understanding of ethnic minority vote choice and partisanship. I have replicated one of the key contributions of Heath et al. (2013) in their concept of group-level pro-Labour values, and found that my model makes their explanatory variables insignificant. My model is a theoretical improvement on Heath et al. (2013) insofar as it (i) explains the

individual-level mechanism more thoroughly, and (ii) accounts for which groups have stronger levels of Labour support.

I make three main claims. Firstly, that variations in ethnic in-group characteristics are an important part of the explanation of the extent of Labour party support among ethnic minorities. Secondly, that two individual-level attitudes mediate this effect – feeling that one's ethnic group is relatively disadvantaged, and feeling that Labour are the best party to address ethnic disadvantage. Thirdly, that the principal drivers of feelings of relative deprivation, and of Labour party support, are to do with discrimination and housing inequality, rather than unemployment or occupational class.

Group-level characteristics are related to having a Labour party identity, but when fraternalistic relative deprivation and feeling that Labour are the best party for ethnic minorities are controlled for, this association disappears. The relationship between fraternalistic relative deprivation and Labour partisanship is stronger among respondents who believe that Labour are the best party for ethnic minorities. Looking at these two attitudes as dependent variables, the same group characteristics predict attitudes that are associated with having a Labour party identity. It is not the expected variables of unemployment or class that drive these attitudes; rather belonging to a group which experiences more discrimination and has a greater proportion living in social housing predict Labour party identity, fraternalistic relative deprivation, and feeling that Labour are the best party for ethnic minorities. I find no evidence that attitudes towards Afghanistan are still important to Labour party

support among Muslim or Pakistani voters. The other interesting factor is social housing, which has been relatively unexplored as a driver of Labour partisanship or vote choice among ethnic minorities. Further work should address interesting questions in this area, including whether this is really a result of the factors which lead someone to be in social housing (low/insecure income, family crisis), or whether something similar to the sustained working class pro-Labour culture in social housing is going on.

Looking at vote choice separate from party identity, I find that key variables from both spatial and valence models of voting are related to vote choice, but that voters' perceptions of party's positions on the issue of whether the government should improve opportunities for ethnic minorities is an equally strong predictor of vote choice as economic concerns. Moreover, the three main parties are perceived as much the same on social and economic issues, but Labour has a sizeable advantage on improving opportunities for ethnic minorities; and ethnic minorities who do vote for parties other than Labour perceive the party they vote for to be much closer to their position on this issue. Economic interest may be part of the story, but the analysis in this paper suggests that experiences of discrimination are the main factor that leads to voting according to a group utility heuristic, and therefore to ethnic minority Labour support.

The importance of experiences of discrimination as a positive predictor of Labour support is interesting in light of Sanders et al. (2013), where the authors find results in the opposite direction using the same data (EMBES).

Sanders et al. (2013) report that egocentric discrimination is negatively related to voting for the Labour party, whilst I find that it is unrelated at the individual level to partisanship and positively related at the group level. On the other hand Sanders et al. also report that perceptions of sociotropic discrimination are positively related to voting Labour (in conjunction with adoption of British cultural practices) – so there is some continuity in the results.

I have emphasised the importance of a group utility heuristic in explaining voting behaviour and partisanship. However, I have not considered the impact of social influence – as a mechanism for reinforcing these attitudes or providing information about disadvantage, or perhaps working the other way for ethnic minority individuals with fewer coethnic friends. Likewise, there is also a gap when it comes to the role of ethnic and religious identity. To some extent this a function of the questions used in this paper to measure group utility attitudes; both fraternalistic relative deprivation and feeling that "Labour are best for ethnic minorities" are measured by questions that refer to "ethnic minorities" in general. The assumption lying behind this is that ethnic minority respondents substitute their own ethnic identity into the question when answering, or that a shared minority status is enough of an in-group to form a meaningful political identity. However there is evidence from EMBES of social distance between different ethnic minorities, and later in a subsequent chapter I show an instance of ethnic conflict where ethnic minorities are in one way more hostile to other ethnic minority candidates than towards white ones. Similarly there is evidence that the importance of ethnic identity and even self-classification into Census ethnicity categories changes between generations

(Owen, 1996). Further work therefore should investigate for which ethnic minorities these group utility heuristics are stronger, and whether their effect varies between ethnic groups.

Are British Muslims alienated from mainstream politics by Islamophobia and British foreign policy?

Abstract

This paper uses the 2010 Ethnic Minority British Election Study to look at the political attitudes and behaviour of Muslims in Britain. It tests the relationship between political alienation and political participation on the one hand, and Islamophobia and disapproval of British military involvement in Afghanistan on the other. The principal findings are that perceptions of Islamophobia are linked to greater political alienation, to a greater likelihood of non-electoral participation and to a lower likelihood of voting among Muslims. Likewise, disapproval of the war in Afghanistan is associated with greater political alienation and a greater likelihood of some types of non-electoral participation. There is strong evidence that British Muslims experience more religious discrimination than adherents of other minority religions, and that they perceive more prejudice at the group level. These findings have two theoretical implications. Firstly, they support the theory that non-electoral participation is motivated by dissatisfaction with the party political system, rather than being an endorsement of the status quo. Secondly, they suggest that perceptions of sociotropic discrimination (for minorities) and a rare salient political issue in which all parties are in opposition to most voters can lead to negative affect towards the political system and stimulate non-electoral participation at the expense of voting.

Introduction

Muslims in Britain can find themselves in a precarious space, politically and socially. Anti-Muslim sentiment has replaced the now-unacceptable racial epithets of the British National Party, and is echoed in the wider phenomenon where Muslims are implicitly or explicitly singled out as the focus point for concerns about migration and multiculturalism. Added to this, the UK has been involved in two high profile wars in Muslim countries in the past 12 years, which are unpopular among many Muslims because they implicate British troops in the deaths of Muslim civilians. To be sure, Afghanistan and Iraq have been unpopular among the rest of the country too – but evidence from the 2005 General Election suggests that Muslim voters punished Labour to a noticeable degree (Curtice et al., 2005). This paper asks to what extent Islamophobia and the unpopularity of British involvement in Afghanistan might have contributed to political alienation and non-electoral participation among British Muslims.

Theory and context

There are two key theoretical contentions behind this paper. Firstly, discrimination can be a driver of politically alienated attitudes because people feel that mainstream political actors and institutions do not care about their interests and have no reason to do so. Secondly, a salient political issue where mainstream parties are united in their opposition to public opinion can have the same effect. The attitudes and behaviours of British Muslims are a good candidate to test these theoretical propositions because of the twin

phenomena of Islamophobia (sociotropic discrimination) and the war in Afghanistan (salient political issue where most of the group are opposed to the main three parties). It is an open question as to whether discrimination and disagreement with mainstream party opinion will be associated with greater or lesser political participation. On the one hand, both of these provide an extra incentive to participate, but on the other hand they also provide a strong reason not to participate in that they lead to the belief that mainstream political actors are not concerned with the most salient political issue at hand, or have the wrong view on it. It may be that discrimination and/or disagreement with mainstream party opinion are associated with different kinds of participation – for instance, a rejection of mainstream party politics (voting), but an increase in political activity outside of these structures (protests, petitions, boycotts).

I proceed by introducing the British context with regards to Islamophobia and Muslim opposition to post-9/11 foreign policy, before returning to the theoretical ideas at the heart of the matter.

Islamophobia

Islamophobia as a phenomenon in Great Britain was first observed *en masse* in the wake of the fatwa declared against the British Indian author of *The Satanic Verses*, Salman Rushdie in 1989 (Poynting & Mason, 2007). Tariq Modood reported the controversy at the time, arguing that while for liberal intellectuals the fatwa was a "call to arms" over enlightenment principles, a large proportion of Britain's Muslim population were offended by the content of the

book. Quiet representations to the publishers by middle class Muslims in London went largely unnoticed, but the protests by Pakistani-origin Muslims in Bradford and those overseas made the issue highly visible.

The effect on relations between white Britons and Muslims was immediate. Racist attacks in Asian/Muslim areas increased, "Rushdie" became a racial taunt, and prison wardens were reported to have read passages from *The Satanic Verses* to a Muslim prisoner (Modood, 1990). John Hurd, then Home Secretary, reacted by giving a prominent speech to a gathering of Muslims on the importance of learning about British culture and integration, whilst his deputy John Patten wrote a public letter in *the Times* with a similar message. "Of course we recognise that each group will have its own specific issues which are of importance. But we also recognise that they must be dealt with in their proper context, within the framework of the laws and standards we share, and against the background of our desire to create a society free from racial or sex discrimination, with equality of opportunity for all." However, to many Muslims the decision of the government to dismiss out of hand the idea that blasphemy laws could be amended to include other religions apart from Christianity was the opposite of "equality of opportunity" (Asad, 1990).

After the Rushdie Affair, questions of religious integration and the proper relationship between Islam and politics receded from the news cycle into part of the broader multiculturalism debate. However, since the terrorist attacks on September 11th 2001 and the 7/7 bombings in London, concerns over domestic Muslim extremism have become recurring themes in the media and in political

speeches (Poynting & Mason, 2007; Saeed, 2007). Samuel Huntingdon's 1993 article and later book on the clash of civilizations meant that even elite intellectuals were discussing the Islamist view that Islam is incompatible with democracy (Huntington, 1993). There is also a noticeable trend in materials distributed by extreme right groups away from racialist arguments to singling out Muslims; a famous British National Party poster depicted a queue of benefit claimants headed by a man of Asian origin with a rocket launcher. Likewise, the English Defence League has mobilised mostly around a hatred of Islam, appropriating liberal arguments about the emancipation of women and tolerance of homosexuality in service of intolerance of Islam. In the labour market there is evidence of a specific penalty for Muslims from different ethnic groups, as compared to members of other minority religions (Heath & Martin, 2013).

In short, Muslims in Britain have faced particularly hostile discrimination when compared to other religious groups in the recent past. The trend in public debate is matched when we look at empirical instances of discrimination. In a 2005 study, planning applications from mosques were less likely to be approved in Birmingham than applications for Gurdwaras (Sikh temples) or Christian churches (Gale, 2005). This is in part due to the specific nature of proposals, in particular objections on the grounds of noise to the call to prayer from mosques, but in theory this objection would apply to many Gurdwaras as well. Similarly, over half of Muslim and Hindu organisations responding a survey claimed to have experienced "unfair treatment by planners", or

"unfairness in planning policy and practice", compared with one in five Christian organisations (Weller, Feldman, & Purdam, 2001).

Opposition to wars in Iraq and Afghanistan

British military involvement in Afghanistan and particularly Iraq has been deeply unpopular with Muslim voters. In the 2005 General Election, Labour were punished in constituencies with larger Muslim populations, as measured by deviations from average swing (Curtice et al., 2005). Labour majorities were reduced sharply in the constituencies with the largest Muslim populations, most markedly in two Birmingham constituencies where sitting Labour MPs had their majorities reduced by over 35% (Khan, 2005). Although there appears to have been some unwinding of this effect in 2010 (Curtice et al., 2010), it was a major departure from business as usual, given the usually high levels of support for the Labour party among all ethnic minorities. In the USA, religiosity among Muslims was heavily associated with negative ratings for the George Bush, despite his social conservatism (Ayers & Hofstetter, 2008). Returning to Britain, the Respect Party emerged on the back of anti-war sentiment in 2003 and has relied heavily on the support of Muslim voters since, especially after the splintering of the remaining elements of the Socialist Workers Party in 2007. The first electoral victory for the party came in May 2003 (British military involvement in Iraq began in March 2003), where Labour lost control of Birmingham city council after 19 years; 11 of the 39 seats it lost were in wards with large Muslim populations. Although Respect did not enjoy success in all wards or constituencies with significant Muslim populations, the party explicitly courted these votes where it won (Peace,

2013). In the 2005 campaign for instance, parliamentary candidate and party leader George Galloway promised residents of Bethnal Green and Bow that he would step aside at the next election to make way for a candidate of Bengali origin. Respect was largely assumed to be a spent force until recently when Galloway captured a supposedly safe Labour seat, emphasizing the concerns of Muslim voters in his campaign.

In this chapter however I am interested in the effect of the war in Afghanistan, because it is unique in that no party was strongly opposed. This make the war in Afghanistan a rare policy example where mainstream parties have been united in their opposition to public opinion. Well before the 2005 General Election and subsequently around 70% of the public have been in support of bringing British troops home soon or immediately. However, neither opposition party during that period was advocating withdrawal, and neither was the government. In short, all three parties had the same unpopular view. A voter who disagreed with the war and for whom Afghanistan was the most important issue really had no one to vote for.

Conceptualising political alienation

What do we mean by 'political alienation'? Simply put, someone is politically alienated to the extent that they feel that normal everyday political institutions and behaviours are irrelevant and not useful to them. This includes people who are purely apathetic – they have no interest in politics and do not really mind that politicians are not paying them attention. But it also includes people with more explicitly negative feelings towards political institutions and actors – for

instance, those who feel disenfranchised or frustrated because they cannot find a mainstream political party who represents their views, those who have been let down by a party they previously supported, or those who participate in protest politics and the like.

A key part of political alienation is a relatively low level of system support (Easton, 1957) i.e. dissatisfaction and withdrawal of consent to or support for key political institutions. This does not mean that politically alienated citizens are opposed to the ideals of democratic representative government; support for a political system is not unidimensional and citizens evaluate their system of government at different levels. Norris and colleagues argue that since at least 1970 increasing numbers of citizens "value democracy as an ideal yet…remain dissatisfied with the performance of their political system, and particularly the core institutions of representative government" (Norris, 1999). These people are politically alienated. This lack of support might manifest in negative evaluations of political institutions – for instance, seeing political parties as obstructive or ineffective or believing politicians to be corrupt, or it might manifest in low levels of trust in political institutions or actors.

For some, feelings of disenfranchisement or a lack of perceived political power are also part of political alienation. This may be because someone feels that none of the major parties truly represent their political views, and so are in constant disagreement with the majority of politicians. This could also be frustration with a majoritarian electoral system which makes it difficult for new and smaller parties to have a real political impact, or with political

campaigns that focus exclusively on marginal seats, taking the votes of those in safe seats for granted. For ethnic minorities, this apparent political invisibility might be due to the reluctance of the three main parties to adopt further anti-discrimination policies, both of which are highly salient to ethnic minority voters (Heath et al., 2013). In the 2010 election, neither the Conservative nor Labour party manifestos had any explicit mention of racial or religious discrimination, suggesting that party strategists are not particularly interested in the votes of ethnic minorities. Similarly, someone who is political alienated may feel less of a civic duty to vote; why participate in an ineffective system whose key actors cannot be trusted and are reluctant to engage with voters concerns.

However, some citizens may be both alienated, but feel that they have political power. Gamson (1968) formalised the relationship between political trust and efficacy, arguing that low trust combined with high political efficacy is the optimum condition for participation. His expectation has been well substantiated with regards to "non-allegiant" (i.e. non-electoral or non-conventional) participation (Paige, 1971; Pollock, 1983; Seligson, 1980), but not in the case of conventional electoral participation, where institutional participation is low among those with distrustful attitudes and both and low levels of efficacy (Fraser, 1970; Hooghe & Marien, 2012). It may be therefore that efficacy is the most important predictor of participation, rather than alienated attitudes *per se.*

Political participation and alienation

How does political participation relate to political alienation? One school of thought is that political participation of any kind is the opposite of political alienation. In particular, the social movements thesis argues that social movements have become a normalised part of the political process, and the associated forms of participation (boycotting, protests and demonstrations, petition-signing) are now conventional political activities (Meyer & Tarrow, 1998). Similarly, supporters of the post-materialism thesis argue that new types of citizenship, typified by non-electoral political behaviour, are more suited to post-materialist citizens who prefer to mobilise around single issues than to attach themselves to a political party (Dalton, 2008; Inglehart, 2002). The connection between alienation and turnout is somewhat more intuitive – voting requires some trust in the electoral system and, in systems where there is no "none of the above" option, a decision to choose one person or group to govern above the others may be an endorsement that an alienated potential voter is unwilling to give. This is not to say that politically alienated people do not vote, but if they do not trust the process or the politicians involved then there is an additional reason for them to abstain which does not apply to the less alienated.

However, there is also considerable evidence that those who engage with politics outside the conventional institutions and behaviours of parties and voting are more likely to be dissatisfied with the current system i.e. that feelings of political alienation are positively associated with non-electoral forms of participation. Hall (1999) challenged the presumption that higher political trust is linked with higher levels of participation in showing that the

two are unrelated at the individual-level, and suggesting that low trust can be a driver of participation. Similarly, John, Fieldhouse, and Liu (2011) present evidence to the effect that those with lower political trust, another low valence attitude, are in reality more likely to engage in civic behaviour than those who believe all is well. We can make a link here to *The Civic Culture* – Almond & Verba (1963) were strong proponents of the idea that a certain level of skepticism is essential to the health of a democracy.

Indeed, although this paper focuses on traditional measures of non-electoral participation, it is important to be aware of other modes of participation that may not be captured by a survey such as EMBES. Marsh, O'Toole, and Jones (2007) criticise the conception of political participation employed by most political scientists as overly narrow, and imposes a largely top-down view of citizenship and politics on respondents. This paper would fall into that category, as it focuses on types of political action directed towards the state. This may not accurately describe many people's conception of citizenship or politics, espeically those alienated from formal politics. In particular, Bang, (2004) proposes two new archetypes of political participation, the Expert Citizen and the Everyday Maker. The Expert Citizen is not oppositional to the political system, but believe that they themselves can implement policy as well as the authorities. They are often professionals in voluntary organisations, and were once grassroots activists. The Everyday Maker by contrast is uninterested in normal politics, and is interested in getting things done. Bang describes them as living a credo of everyday experience. Li and Marsh (2008) use the 2001 Citizenship Survey to quantitatively investigate the relative prevalence of

these two modes of citizenship, plus two others – the Political Activist and the Non-Participant. It may be that alienated ethnic minorities turn to alternative modes of participation that will not be observed easily using EMBES. However, Li et al.'s work shows that ethnic minorities are less likely to participation in the two new modes of participation than white British citizens.

One of the key findings about non-electoral participation is that it is much more prevalent among highly-educated individuals (Marien, Hooghe, & Quintelier, 2010; Pattie, Seyd, & Whiteley, 2004; Yates, 2011). Marien et al. for instance worry that non-electoral participation reinforces educational political inequality. This provides us with some reason to be sceptical that alienated individuals may increase their non-electoral participation, as this form of participation tends to require greater resources than electoral. Nevertheless, international research shows that less trusting voters sometimes vote for fringe parties in response to their dislike of mainstream ones (Bélanger & Nadeau, 2005; Hooghe, Marien, & Pauwels, 2011). If Labour policy has alienated some ethnic minority voters who feel that the other parties are unacceptable to them, non-electoral participation may represent a form of expressing their discontent.

Previous research

The most comprehensive recent study of political disaffection among ethnic minorities in Britain shows that Muslim groups are not particularly disaffected (Heath et al., 2013). Bangladeshis and Pakistanis have noticeably higher levels of satisfaction with democracy and agreement that it is every citizen's duty to

vote than the white British. There are some signs of discontent – the same authors reported slightly higher levels of protest activity among Bangladeshis and of boycotts among Pakistanis – but nothing that singles out Muslim groups as particularly alienated or disengaged from mainstream British politics.

In fact, the pattern in most previous research is that South Asian groups, including Bangladeshis and Pakistanis, tend to be the more politically active and involved ethnic minorities in Britain. South Asians have been much more successful in achieving political gains than black Caribbean or black African groups, which would lead us to expect higher levels of cognitive engagement and satisfaction with the political process. In terms of turnout and registration, studies since the 1990s have reported either equal levels of voter turnout than whites among South Asian groups, or slightly higher (Anwar, 1990; 1998; Heath et al., 2011; Modood, 2005a; Saggar, 2000; Electoral Commission, 2005). Of the 29 ethnic minority MPs currently in Parliament, 8 are black Caribbean or African, whilst 18 are of South Asian origin, and these proportions are reflected in the ethnicity of minority politicians at the local level as well (Maxwell, 2012). South Asians have also been successful in pursuing group-based claims through the political process, ranging from the exemptions for Sikhs to wear turbans in place of helmets on building sites or on motorcycles, or the provision of local authority information in South Asian languages, to financial support from some local authorities for Hindu religious festivals. However, Muslims have not always been a part of this – Muslims (and Hindus) had to wait until the Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003, and

the Equality Act 2006 before religious discrimination against these groups became illegal.

Discrimination and political alienation

A keystone of Almond & Verba (1963) is that one needs to feel part of a community to engage with it, but persistent experiences of discrimination and exclusion from the political process can lead to individuals feeling that they are no longer part of the broader political community. Maxwell (2009) demonstrates that perceived discrimination is associated with a lower likelihood of identifying as British among Caribbean and South Asian migrants in the UK, and the magnitude of the difference is larger than even differences between first and later generations of migrants. Similarly, Heath et al. (2013) demonstrate that satisfaction with democracy and trust in key political institutions is lower among ethnic minority individuals who feel that their ethnic group is disadvantaged. In a comparative study of European countries, Just & Anderson (2012) show that anti-immigrant opinion climates depress participation among migrants and hinder the translation of grievances into political demands.

It is easy to see how perceptions and experiences of discrimination might lead and individual or group to decide that mainstream politics are not for them. The mechanism described above suggests that exclusion by majority members in social and political life inhibits the development of a particular group identity or belonging (for instance, British identity) that some scholars argue is a necessary driver of political participation. A rational choice story can told

too; if mainstream parties have little electoral incentive to cater for ethnic minority voters, then an important supply side driver of political engagement is missing. Nationally, the incentive to court ethnic minority votes has been low until recently – and even now, only an estimated 8% of the electorate are non-white (Heath et al., 2013). However residential segregation means that ethnic minorities, including Muslim groups, do have electoral clout in certain areas. Often these areas were Labour safe seats, which combined with parties record on anti-discrimination policies, made the Labour party crucial to the political integration of migrant and migrant-origin groups in Britain. However, although the New Labour government did bring in anti-religious discrimination legislation, mainstream parties have found themselves under pressure from the extreme-right British National Party (the English Defence League did not gain national prominence until after 2010) and the more respectable UK Independence Party whose policies have a strong anti-immigration component. The 2005 Conservative party manifesto was just one indicator that mainstream parties were unconcerned about winning Muslim votes over the period since 2001, and more interested in courting the anti-immigration vote. In this light it is unsurprising that neither the Conservatives nor Labour included any new proposals for racial or religious equality in their 2010 manifestos; ethnic minority voters, especially Muslims, are not a priority for mainstream parties. A rational actor who perceived this lack of interest would perceive a reduction in the incentive to engage with these institutions and actors – why participate if no one will listen, why trust politicians and institutions to look after your interests if they have demonstrated that they are a low priority?

Empirical research supports the idea that discrimination can be a driver of political participation among ethnic minorities insofar as it leads to greater group identification (Chong & Rogers, 2005; Jamal, 2005b; Leighley, 2001; Pantoja et al., 2001; Shingles, 1981). This is particularly the case for non-electoral participation. A contemporary example from the US is the mobilising effect of political debates on immigration reform among Latino residents, in particular the 2006 protests. Merolla, Pantoja, Cargile, and Mora (2013) used an experimental design the demonstrate the link between media coverage of the immigration debate and political mobilisation among Latinos, whilst Pantoja et al. (2001) argue that immigration reform was the driving force behind an increase in Latino voter registration in California in the 1990s. Returning to the UK, Heath et al. (2013) show that a feeling of fraternal relative deprivation is an important driver of participation among ethnic minorities in Britain. More recent political history gives an example where Muslims in a geographically concentrated area were mobilised in favour of the anti-establishment candidate from the Respect Party, George Galloway. Galloway's campaign directly allied itself with the protest movements in the Arab world (he went so far as to call his victory "the Bradford Spring"). It targeted dissatisfied and disengaged Muslim voters who were ignored by mainstream parties strategy in the area of relying on community elders to command groups of voters with roots in the same Pakistani village. However it is an open question to what extent disaffection can be a driver of participation without an active social movement or energetic political campaign.

Nevertheless, discrimination and exclusion from mainstream society can provide structural benefits for political mobilisation as well as motivational ones. A long-standing example of this in Britain is the role of residential segregation in driving higher levels of political engagement among South Asian origin ethnic minorities. Maxwell (2012) describes this as the paradox of integration. South Asian migrants typically have (or had) greater social and religious differences on arrival from the white British than West Indian migrants had on their arrival – religious prohibitions on alcohol, more traditional/patriarchal family structures and no inclusion through Christian churches meant that South Asian groups tend to have denser and more exclusive social networks than black Caribbeans. In conjunction with chain migration patterns, this led to residential segregation, which paradoxically leads to greater political influence as ethnic minorities approach an electoral majority in particular wards. South Asian groups have often been quick to capitalise on this political opportunity.

Foreign policy and political alienation

Valence theory emerged from theories of vote choice, but more recently has been applied to ideas of democratic support (Clarke et al., 2009; Sanders, Clarke, Stewart, & Whiteley, 2011). Valence theory contends that voters respond to policy delivery. If the political system delivers satisfactory policy outcomes, citizens are more likely to engage positively with it – they will be more likely to display institutional confidence and satisfaction, and more likely to feel that they can influence the political process. If the political system does not give a voter satisfactory political outcomes the opposite will happen, and

they will become alienated from the system as a whole as well as the particular party in government (Clarke et al., 2009; Sanders, Fisher, Heath, & Sobolewska, 2012). Foreign policy is a clear example of how this might happen – Muslims who disapprove strongly of British military involvement in Muslim countries may become less inclined to support a political system that has failed to deliver on a key policy.

This is particularly pertinent in view of the crucial role of the Labour party in integrating ethnic minorities into British electoral politics; not only did the two most important parties in Westminster politics support the war, but it was a Labour government in charge of the military intervention. For Muslim voters who had loyally voted for Labour in previous elections and harbour long-standing suspicions about the Conservative party, this meant a betrayal on a highly salient political issue without a clear alternative. As noted above, there is evidence that Labour were punished by Muslim voters in 2005 (Curtice et al., 2005), but British foreign policy may have had a more lasting impact on political attitudes insofar as it represented for some Muslims a permanent detachment from the Labour party and greater skepticism towards politicians in general. The lack of engagement with Muslim voices outside of the unpopular Muslim Council of Britain may have further reinforced the feeling of mis- or under-representation

The anti-war movement in 2003 was very much protest-based. The Respect party that formed out of the Stop the War coalition contained large elements of the Socialist Workers Party, at least until 2006. The SWP is well-known for its

engagement in demonstrations and strikes, and this behaviour was reflected in the tactics of the Respect party, especially where it relied heavily on local mobilisation efforts (Peace, 2013). To the extent that these protests and the Respect party mobilised previously apathetic Muslim individuals, it may have provided formative political experiences in a social movement setting with few electoral allies (aside from the Liberal Democrats and a handful of Labour backbenchers/resigned cabinet members).

Hypotheses

Perceptions of discrimination and group-level disadvantage are associated with a lower-likelihood of having a British identity (Maxwell, 2009), lower satisfaction with democracy, and less trust in key political institutions (Heath et al., 2013). Anti-migrant opinion climates depress migrant political participation (Just & Anderson, 2012). Therefore I expect that Islamophobia, a particularised form of discrimination, will lead to great political alienation among Muslims.

H1: Perceptions of Islamophobia are positively associated with political alienation

Feelings of alienation from a political community and system can be associated with lower levels of political engagement, so one might expect Islamophobia to be negatively associated with political participation. However, lower satisfaction and trust can lead to non-conventional political participation – if

you do not trust the institutions or people in power, direct political pressure outside elections is more appealing (Hall, 1999; John et al., 2011). Moreover, discrimination can be a driver of political participation when it leads to a stronger group identity (Chong & Rogers, 2005; Heath et al., 2013; Jamal, 2005b; Leighley, 2001; Pantoja et al., 2001; Shingles, 1981). With conflicting theoretical expectations, there are two conflicting hypotheses about whether Islamophobia will be associated with greater or lesser participation, and whether different types of participation will have different associations.

H2a: Perceptions of Islamophobia are associated with a lesser likelihood of non-electoral political participation
H2b: Perceptions of Islamophobia are associated with a greater likelihood of non- electoral political participation
H3a: Perceptions of Islamophobia are associated with a lesser likelihood of voting
H3b: Perceptions of Islamophobia are associated with a greater likelihood of voting

Valence theory predicts that voters will withdraw their support from a political system that fails to deliver their preferred outcomes on key political issues (Sanders et al., 2011); disapproval for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq was particularly high among Muslims, to the extent that there was noticeable shift in vote choice at the next election (Curtice et al., 2005). Furthermore, the Labour party is the most popular party among Muslim voters, so this policy difference may be perceived as a betrayal of Muslim voters. Most Muslims are

still reluctant to vote for the Conservative party (Ashcroft, 2012), and consequently many Muslims found their views unrepresented in party politics.

H4: Disapproval of British military involvement in Muslim countries is positively associated with political alienation.

Again, we have conflicting expectations as to whether disagreement with a major policy will be associated with a greater or lesser likelihood of political participation. On the one hand, there is a greater incentive to participate; on the other, with all three parties in favour of the war (Afghanistan, not Iraq) there is little reason to believe that one would be listened to, at least with regards to voting. In addition, resistance to the Iraq war in particular was protest-based, and the successful Respect party that emerged from resistance to the Iraq war has relied on local mobilisation in a similar way to a social movement.

H5a: Disapproval of British military involvement in Afghanistan is associated with a lesser likelihood of non-electoral political participation
H5b: Disapproval of British military involvement in Afghanistan is associated with a greater likelihood of non-electoral political participation
H6a: Disapproval of British military involvement in Afghanistan is associated with a lesser likelihood of voting
H6b: Disapproval of British military involvement in Afghanistan is associated with a greater likelihood of voting

Figure 1: hypothesised relationships between discrimination and disapproval of the war in Afghanistan, and political alienation and non-electoral participation



Data and measures

Data

The 2010 Ethnic Minority British Election Study is a nationally representative probability survey of the major ethnic minority groups in Britain. It was closely coordinated with the 2010 British Election Study, and includes a large number of variables on political attitudes and behaviour. Areas where less than 2% of the residents were ethnic minorities in the 2001 Census were excluded from the sampling frame, and the response rate was between 58% and 66%. The number of Muslim respondents in EMBES is 1121, of which 638 are of Pakistani origin, 264 of Bangladeshi origin and 139 of black African origin.

Dependent variables

Political alienation can be measured using a variety of indicators. The approach taken in this paper is to perform factor analysis on a group of indicators to get a more comprehensive and coherent measure than any one question could provide. Factor analysis looks at covariance between different question responses to construct a measure of an underlying latent variable or variables.

The questions selected for this factor analysis were chosen as they each provide some information on political alienation. Other indicators were considered but this combination best satisfied the twin conditions of theoretical suitability, and performance in the factor analysis. I look at political efficacy, satisfaction with democracy, feeling that "politicians are only interested in the votes of black and Asian people, not their opinions", trust in politicians, interest in the 2010 General Election, trust in parliament, trust in

the police, feeling that opportunities for black and Asian people will remain the same regardless of which party is in power, feeling a sense of satisfaction in voting, believing that voting is a civic duty, and thinking that no party fully represents one's views.

Participation can be measured through the self-reported measures in EMBES. I measure turnout using self-reported information on whether someone voted or not. The total population in models of turnout are those who were eligible to vote - in this paper I do not analyse registration as a separate step. For non-electoral participation I look at the three available measures which deal with explicitly non-partisan politics – attending a protest, signing a petition or boycotting a product or service in the past 12 months.

Factor analysis

I use three tests to determine whether the set of political alienation measures is suitable for factor analysis. Cronbach's alpha is .66, above the .6 that is conventionally considered suitable. Bartlett's test of sphericity is significant ($p < .000$), and the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy is .82 - higher than .6 which is generally considered adequate. These tests suggest that the variables are sufficiently correlated that factor analysis is an appropriate method of analysis to use here.

I use principal factor analysis and orthogonal varimax rotation to extract the factors, and a scree test to determine the number of factors to retain. Theoretically I expect there to be one factor, measuring alienation (or it's

opposite, positive system affect). The levelling off after the first factor in a screeplot of eigenvalues supports the expectation of a one-factor solution. The eigenvalue for the first factor is 2.35, for the second factor it was 0.41, and for the third it was 0.26. The results reported here use all available respondents in EMBES to extract the factors (n=2499), with only the subsequent regression analysis restricted to Muslims. The analysis was replicated using only Muslim respondents to extract the factors (n=1121) but the substantive results were not affected so the decision was made to avoid limiting the number of respondents and therefore maximise the statistical potential of the data when extracting factors.

Table 1 shows the factor loadings. All but three are above .3 (and two of these are .28 and -29), suggesting a decent degree of communality between the different variables and the factor. The variables with the highest loading are trust in parliament (.68), trust in the police (.59) and satisfaction with democracy (.55). The lowest are feeling that opportunities for ethnic minorities remain the same regardless of who is in power (.14), political efficacy (.28) and interest in the General Election (-.29). Most variables are correlated in such a way that the more positive end is a higher score on the factor, so I interpret this factor as the opposite of alienation i.e. a lower score indicates someone with higher alienation. The opposite of alienation is not exactly clear, but I refer to it in this paper as positive affect towards the political system.

Table 1: factor loadings

Variable	Factor loading	Uniqueness
Efficacy	0.28	0.92
Satisfaction with democracy	0.55	0.70
Only interested in votes	-0.36	0.87
Trust politicians	0.72	0.48
Interest in GE	-0.29	0.91
Trust parliament	0.68	0.54
Trust police	0.59	0.65
EM opportunities the same regardless of party	-0.14	0.98
Feel sense of satisfaction when vote	-0.34	0.88
Voting is a civic duty	0.34	0.89
No party represents r's views best	-0.42	0.86

Independent variables

I measure perceptions of Islamophobia using a question that asks respondents "which groups, if any, do you think there is prejudice against?". Responses are unprompted, and the previous question implies that the interviewer is interested in racial prejudice nowadays. People who responded unprompted that Muslims face prejudice today (36% of the Muslims in our sample)[10] are coded as perceiving Islamophobia, those who do not say that Muslims specifically face prejudice are coded as not perceiving Islamophobia. This question is slightly different from asking whether Muslim respondents have themselves experienced discrimination as a result of their religion. Instead, this question measures perceptions of sociotropic discrimination, a concept that has a lot in common with the idea of *linked fate* (Dawson, 1994). The measure of perceptions of group prejudice is more suited to our purpose because we want to know whether Muslims are affected by discrimination against other Muslim individuals, and by more general hostility that also might

[10] Many non-Muslims also said that Muslims face prejudice although the proportion is slightly smaller – 32% of non-Muslims compared to 36% of Muslims. The difference is statistically significant.

not be reported as a personal experience of direct discrimination. For instance, school policies that prohibit Islamic dress[11] or media debate over the incompatibility of Islam and democracy do not involve Muslims without school age children or those not directly involved in the media conversation – but they may still be interpreted as instances of hostility to Islam and Muslims.

I also look at personal experiences of discrimination to see what evidence for Islamophobia there is at the individual level. Egocentric discrimination is measured by asking whether the respondent has "experienced discrimination or been treated unfairly by others in the UK because of [their] ethnicity, race, skin colour, language, accent, religion, age, gender, sexuality or disability?". This allows us to measure the relative incidences of discrimination among different groups, and also to differentiate between different causes of discrimination. Sociotropic discrimination for other groups is measured using the same question as for Muslims; I use information on whether respondents thought there is discrimination against Sikhs, Hindus and Asians in general. I do not look at the effect of egocentric discrimination on alienation or

[11] There are two phenomena here. Firstly, there are individual schools and colleges that have prohibited items of clothing associated with religion practice or tradition (both Sikh and Muslim), which frequently make the news when they are taken to court by parents. In September 2013, the Birmingham Metropolitan College reversed its policy that student must remove all hoodies, hats, caps and veils whilst on premises a day before a planned protest and after 9000 signatures had been collected on a petition set up by National Union of Students Black Students Campaign. The second is public discussion by cabinet members (albeit the current government, not the government in 2010 which is more pertinent to EMBES) of the possibility of banning the hijab and niqab in public spaces. The prime minister's spokesperson has made it clear that he would not be opposed to a ban, and the deputy prime minister has suggested that it might be inappropriate for teachers to wear the veil.

participation because I am interested in the extent to which perceptions of discrimination against one's religious group motivate political behaviour and attitudes, but this measure gives us a handle on the extent to which Muslims experience more discrimination than other groups.

I measure disapproval of British military involvement in Afghanistan[12] by a question that asks to what extent respondents support the war in Afghanistan. I look at Afghanistan only because there was no major party opposition to it. Nevertheless, the Iraq and Afghanistan are linked issues, and so one may speculate that people who do not support the war in Afghanistan were also not highly supportive of the war in Iraq. Cross tabulations are unavailable, but in YouGov polls (albeit of the general population) which ask questions about both conflicts the proportions who feel that the conflict was a good idea are nearly identical. The same is true of questions that ask about troop withdrawal.[13] The question wording of the item used here is "Please indicate whether you strongly approve, approve, disapprove, or strongly disapprove of Britain's involvement in the war against the Taliban in Afghanistan", and response categories also included "neither approve nor disapprove" and "don't know".

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[12] For some Muslims it is not just British foreign policy in Iraq and Afghanistan that garners disapproval; the UK's position on the Israel-Palestine conflict and participation/lack thereof in military interventions involving Muslims (for instance Bosnia, Syria or Libya) are also contentious issues. Nevertheless, Iraq and Afghanistan were especially damaging insofar as they appeared to alienate Muslims who had previously supported the party. Furthermore it is unclear to what extent blanket disapproval of British military policy is an extreme view and EMBES is ill placed to measure this concept.

[13] The polls on which this statement is based can be found here - http://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/8j5p7iqr7p/YG-Archives-Pol-Trackers-Afghanistan-080113.pdf

Although it is a scale I treat this as a continuous variable, with 5 as "strongly approve" and 1 as "strongly disapprove". Fisher et al. (2011) suggest that "don't know" responses to this question among Bangladeshis might indicate disapproval due to social desirability bias, so I coded these responses as disapproval. Ultimately the results were the same regardless of whether these respondents were included or not.

I control for a number of factors known to be associated with political attitudes and participation. Immigration generation and age are both related to ethnic minority political engagement and integration (Heath et al., 2011; Maxwell, 2010). Higher education is associated with more conventional and non-conventional political participation (Brady, Verba, & Schlozman, 1995), and with some differences in political attitudes. I control for ethnicity, because not all Muslims in the UK have the same ethnic background. In particular it might be that Pakistani origin Muslims have stronger feelings of opposition to the war in Afghanistan than other Muslim groups (Fisher et al., 2011). A lack of language fluency is generally associated with lower political participation (Heath et al., 2013) – this is explained by the inhibiting factor of not being able to understand the majority of political debate and the extra barrier to participation (despite translation services). Language fluency may also relate to more positive attitudes towards the political system, insofar as a lack of English fluency is almost uniquely a first-generation problem, and migrants who do not become fluent may be the ones who retain the idealistic vision of British politics in comparison to their country of origin due to a lack of engagement with day-to-day politics. I also control for the importance of

religion, as it may be that Muslims with a greater sense of religious identity may feel more separate from British society and politics due to increased salience of a non-mainstream identity, above and beyond perceptions of Islamophobia or disagreement with foreign policy. Social capital has a strong theoretical role to play in explaining both electoral and non-electoral participation. I choose to include only associational capital as Heath et al. (2013) (using the same data) found this to be important. I consider the effects of both bridging social capital (being a member of a voluntary organization where more than half the members are of a different ethnic group) and bonding social capital (being a member of an ethnic or religious organization). Finally, there are a couple of political variables which deserve to be included. Firstly, I include the marginality of the seat on the basis that marginal seats receive a disproportionate amount of political attention and this would be expected to increase turnout and effect political attitudes. The reference category is ultrasafe (margin of victory ≤ 20 percentage points), and the comparison categories are safe (10 percentage points ≤ margin of victory < 20 percentage points) and marginal (margin of victory < 10 percentage points). For the same reasons I control for whether any party contacted the respondent during the election campaign. And finally I control for the percentage of Muslim residents in the constituency during the 2011 Census, as Fieldhouse and Cutts (2008) showed a positive effect on turnout for South Asians of having coethnic neighbours.

Methods

For turnout I use logistic regression as the dependent variable is binary and neither event (voting or abstention) is particularly unlikely. For the three measures of non-electoral participation however there is a risk of bias because the number of successes is extremely small compared to the number of failures - i.e. far more people did not participate than did participate in any non-electoral political activity – so these successes should be treated as rare events. This is a potential source of bias when using maximum likelihood estimation: because far more information is available about failures, the estimate of the successes will be biased downwards (King & Zeng, 2001). To correct for this I use penalised maximum likelihood logistic regression, as proposed by Firth (1993).

Results

Perceptions of discrimination and support for the war in Afghanistan

Firstly we should examine what the data in EMBES have to say on individual experiences of discrimination and perceptions of Islamophobia among Muslims – is it the case that Muslims report noticeably more egocentric discrimination, and are they more likely to perceive sociotropic discrimination than other minority religious groups? Table 2 shows the percentages of ethnic minorities from different religions that report experiencing or perceiving discrimination.

When we look at egocentric experiences of discrimination for any reason, there is little evidence for Islamophobia; Muslims are no more likely to report having been discriminated against for any reason than are Hindus (27% compared to 25%), and Sikhs, Christians and atheists are more likely to report experiencing discrimination than Muslims. The high percentages reporting discrimination among ethnic minority Christians and atheists (42% and 47% respectively) is explained by the greater proportion of black Caribbeans in these religious groups, who are more likely to report experiencing discrimination than other ethnic groups. However, if we look at the reasons given for experiences of discrimination we can see that Muslims are much more likely to report that they were discriminated against because of their religion than are members of other minority religions; 49% of Muslims who reported an incident of discrimination said it was due to their religion as opposed to 17% of Sikhs and 5% of Hindus. This is evidence that Muslims face much more prevalent religious discrimination than members of other minority religions. Accordingly, if we compare incidences of religious discrimination between Muslims and other groups, 13% of Muslims report experiencing religious discrimination as opposed to 6% of Sikhs and 1% of Hindus.

A similar pattern emerges when we look at sociotropic discrimination. There are no differences between Sikhs, Hindus and Muslims as to whether they think Asians face racial prejudice in Britain: 41-43% of each group believes this. However, when it comes to religious groups, Muslims are much more likely to say that their own religious group faces racial prejudice than are either Sikhs or Hindus. 35% of Muslims believe that Muslims face racial

prejudice, compared to 7% of Sikhs who believe that Sikhs do so, and 8% of Hindus who believe that Hindus do so. Racial discrimination is a real issue for ethnic minorities of South Asian origin, but religious discrimination is markedly more salient for Muslims than for Hindus or Sikhs.[14]

We can also see from the same table that Muslims are far less supportive of British involvement in the war in Afghanistan than other ethnic minorities; only 8% of Muslims approve or strongly approve of "Britain's involvement in the war against the Taliban in Afghanistan", compared to 26% of Hindus and 26% of Sikhs.

Table 2: personal experiences of religious discrimination and support for the war in Afghanistan among EMBES respondents

	Christian	Hindu	Muslim	Sikh	None
Egocentric discrimination	42%	25%	27%	37%	47%
Of which religious	9%	5%	49%	17%	4%
Experienced rel. discrimination	4%	1%	13%	6%	2%
Sociotropic discrimination	.	8%	35%	7%	.
Support war in Afghanistan	22%	26%	8%	26%	17%

Base: all EMBES respondents
Weighted percentages using the weights provided by the survey

[14] Sikhs and Hindus are the most appropriate comparison groups for Muslims in this context, because they are minority religions in the UK, whose adherents are mostly ethnic minorities. Nevertheless, whilst Sikhs and Hindus in the UK are almost exclusively of South Asian origin, there are 139 Muslim respondents in the sample of black African origin.

Political attitudes

Table 3 shows the results of an ordinary least squares regression model of our measure of political alienation. Due to the way the original variables were scored, a higher score corresponds to a lower level of political alienation (i.e. more positive affect towards the political system). The coefficient for perceiving Islamophobia is negative, suggesting that Muslims who perceive Islamophobia are more politically alienated than Muslims who do not. This is consistent with hypothesis 1. Approval of the war in Afghanistan is associated with a higher score i.e. with lower alienation. Therefore Muslims who disapproved more of the war in Afghanistan are on average more politically alienated than Muslims who disapprove less, or approve. This is consistent with hypothesis 4.

The dependent variable has an arbitrary value, so it is difficult to interpret the size of these effects. However, we can compare its size to those of another important predictor, also binary. The coefficient for immigrant generation (2nd and later generations as compared to the 1st) is -.40. The coefficient for perceiving Islamophobia is just over half this size at -.26. Taking confidence intervals into account we cannot discount the possibility that the effect sizes are the same. The other significant binary predictor in the model, not being fluent in English, also has a coefficient of .26 (with a different sign). Both immigrant generation and language fluency are generally taken to be substantively important predictors, and so at the very least we should consider the possibility that perceptions of religious prejudice play an equally important role in explaining some political attitudes among Muslims.

The model has an adjusted r-squared value of .12, suggesting that it does a reasonable job of explaining some of the variance in the scale – but there is much variance left unexplained. Further attempts to increase the amount of variance explained resulted in a long list of mostly insignificant variables, and not much improvement in the adjusted r-squared. The total number of observations is 843, reduced from a total sample of 1121 Muslims in EMBES. This is due to missing values; 2011 Census information is unavailable for Scottish constituencies at the time of writing, and other choices in the coding of missing responses meant that a number of respondents are excluded from the final analysis.

Table 3: OLS regression models of positive system affect/political alienation

	Coefficient	SE
Islamophobia	-0.26***	0.06
Support for Afghan war	0.12***	0.03
1st gen (ref.)		
2nd and later gen	-0.40***	0.07
Age	0.00	0.00
Pakistani (ref.)		
Indian	0.16	0.12
Bangladeshi	0.00	0.07
Black Caribbean/African	-0.12	0.09
Not fluent in English	0.26***	0.07
Importance of religion	-0.02	0.04
Bridging assoc. capital	0.08	0.09
Bonding assoc. capital	0.07	0.07
GCSE or equivalent (ref.)		
A level or equivalent	0.03	0.07
Degree or higher	0.06	0.08
Ultrasafe seat (ref.)		
Safe seat	0.01	0.08
Marginal seat	0.04	0.07
% Muslim in constituency	-0.001	0.002
Contacted by any party	0.03	0.06
Constant	0.12	0.26
n	843	

** p<0.05, ** p<0.01, p<0.001*
Data: EMBSE
Base: Muslim respondents only
Weighted using the weights provided by the survey
Robust standard errors at the level of the primary sampling unit

Political participation

Table 4 reports the results of four logistic regression models of different types of political participation. The first column gives the results of a logistic regression model of turnout estimated using maximum likelihood; the models reported in other columns used penalised maximum likelihood to reduce bias in the estimates due to the outcomes being rare events.

Firstly, turnout. Perceiving Islamophobia has a negative effect on turnout – in line with hypothesis 3a, Muslims who believe that Muslims as a group are discriminated against is less likely to vote. However, support for the war in Afghanistan is unrelated to turnout, against both hypotheses 6a and 6b. This might be because dissatisfaction with the war could be adequately expressed through voting for the Liberal Democrats,[15] or because the major issues driving vote choice among Muslims in 2010 did not include foreign policy.

Moving on, what do our results have to say about non-electoral participation? Perceptions of Islamophobia are associated with a greater likelihood of all three non-electoral political activities – attending a protest or demonstration, signing a petition, or boycotting a product or service. This is consistent with hypothesis 2b. Approval of the war in Afghanistan is negatively associated with

[15] Although the Liberal Democrats were not against the war in Afghanistan, they were vocal in their opposition to the war in Iraq which may have garnered them enough support from anti-war Muslims despite their position on Afghanistan.

boycotting and petitions signing (so those who disapprove were more likely to take part in these activities), but unrelated to protest attendance.

Discussion and Conclusions

This analysis uses cross-sectional data and therefore we cannot use it to prove the direction of causation; we can only say that these results are consistent or inconsistent with certain causal stories. It is possible that those who are more politically alienated and oriented to protest politics are more likely to perceive discrimination and object more strongly to British military action in Muslim countries. Nevertheless, with these caveats in mind, we can draw a number of conclusions from these results.

Firstly, Muslims do not report more personal experiences of discrimination than other South Asian origin groups i.e. Sikhs and Hindus. Nor are they more inclined to think that Asians in Britain face racial prejudice. However, religious discrimination is much more salient for Muslims than for other minority religions; of those who report being discriminated against, 49% of Muslims attributed it to their religion compared to 17% of Sikhs and 5% of Hindus. Far more Muslims say that people from their religion face prejudice than do Sikhs or Hindus. These results deserve more analysis on their own, but as a starting point it is clear that there is strong evidence for Islamophobia from the experiences and perceptions of Muslims in Britain.

These results support the idea that sociotropic discrimination among Muslims does lead to alienation when it comes to political attitudes, and moreover that

it is associated to some extent with a rejection of voting, and instead with more non-electoral political participation. Protests by Muslims often attract fearful and negative attention, partly in reaction to previous violent protests (the most high profile being the Rushdie affair and the protests after a Danish cartoonist portrayed Mohammed) and partly in fear of political Islam. Images of Islamists burning the British flag overseas are certainly a powerful symbol. With this in mind, some might be concerned at the association between Islamophobia and disapproval in Afghanistan with an increased likelihood of non-electoral participation, interpreting this rejection of the political mainstream as a starting point for violent and anti-democratic political action. This would be a large jump from these results – attendance at a protest is one of the types of non-electoral participation analysed here, but the other two were petition signing and boycotting goods or services. Neither of these are violent activities, and indeed most protests in Britain are overwhelmingly peaceful. Further analysis (not reported) revealed no association between either Islamophobia or disapproval of the war in Afghanistan and three questions in EMBES which ask about the acceptability of violent protests in different political situations. These results suggest that Muslims who feel socially alienated are dissatisfied with mainstream political institutions and actors and rejecting traditional party politics in favour of more direct (and peaceful) methods. It is interesting that even the Labour party seems reluctant to engage with issues of discrimination, especially Islamophobia, but as the Respect Party's success in Bradford suggests, there may be a political opportunity here for a mainstream party that does.

Turning now to the effect of the legacy of Iraq and Afghanistan on Muslim political attitudes and engagement with electoral and non-electoral politics, there is evidence that dissatisfaction with these engagements has a measurable impact almost a decade after troops were first sent to Afghanistan (at the time of the fieldwork in 2010). Muslims who disagreed with Britain's involvement in Afghanistan were more politically alienated, and more likely to engage in two forms of non-electoral politics. It is interesting that feelings about Afghanistan were unrelated to the likelihood of attending a protest, in light of the protest-based nature of the anti-Iraq war movement.

Some context is appropriate when we look at the absolute levels of political alienation among Muslims, especially when we compare them to the white British; when it comes to political efficacy and satisfaction with democracy, Muslims are more satisfied than the white British. 37% of Muslims feel that they have no political influence, compared to 40% of the white British. Similarly, 21% of Muslims say they are very or a little dissatisfied with the way democracy works in this country, compared to 35% of the white British. Some may say that these numbers are too high for both groups, but they do imply that Muslims who find themselves alienated from British politics are in the company of a substantial proportion of the white British population as well.

This paper has focused on Muslims in Britain, but there are theoretical implications beyond this one group. Given existing scholarship, there is a strong case to be made that the result that discrimination is associated with politically alienated attitudes is one that generalizable to other ethnic minority

groups in Britain and Europe (Heath et al., 2013; Maxwell, 2009). There are similarities between the story where Islamophobia is associated with non-electoral politics and the role of protest politics in African American, Latino and Native American enfranchisement and political mobilisation. However, it is interesting that this pattern is observed among British Muslims, who are no less likely to vote than white or Christian Britons, whilst this is not the case for other minority groups which have made use of non-electoral politics.

It is unclear whether Afghanistan is a special case, and how these findings might be more widely generalised. Afghanistan in 2005 and 2010 was a policy issue where the three main parties were united in their opposition to public opinion; the overwhelming majority of voters could not find a party that would provide their preferred policy, and the war in Afghanistan was particularly salient to Muslims. An avenue for future research is whether the same situation elsewhere (where voters' preferred policy on a highly salient issue is not provided by political parties) is associated with either political alienation or with non-electoral participation. Similarly, it is interesting that feelings of political alienation are not necessarily associated with a withdrawal from political participation; in fact the scale of positive affect used here is negatively correlated with the three measures of non-electoral behaviour (-.07 with protest, -.06 with petition signing, and -.07 with boycotting). This is not altogether news (Hall, 1999; Norris, 1999), but it remains an underemphasised finding and counters the common assumption that non-electoral and electoral participation are driven by the same factors. In this case, it appears that

dissatisfaction with the outcomes of conventional party politics may have lead to a preference for political engagement outside of those institutions.

In summary, in this paper I have presented evidence that Islamophobia is associated with political alienation among Muslims, a greater likelihood of engaging in non-electoral politics, and a lesser likelihood of voting. Disapproval of the war in Afghanistan is likewise associated with greater political alienation among Muslims, and a greater likelihood of some forms of non-electoral political engagement, but not protest attendance or voting. The association between perceptions of Islamophobia and political alienation may be taken as a warning that the largest religious minority in Britain is at risk of political exclusion if anti-Muslim sentiment remains commonplace.

Table 4: logistic regression models of political participation

	Turnout		Protest		Petition		Boycott	
	Coefficient	SE	Coefficient	SE	Coefficient	SE	Coefficient	SE
Islamophobia	-0.31*	0.15	0.54*	0.25	0.49**	0.18	0.71**	0.24
Support for Afghan war	-0.03	0.07	-0.20	0.13	-0.35***	0.10	-0.64***	0.15
1st gen (ref.)								
2nd and later gen	0.23	0.18	0.41	0.29	0.21	0.21	0.30	0.27
Age	0.02*	0.01	-0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.02	0.01
Pakistani (ref.)								
Indian	0.14	0.29	0.31	0.47	-0.01	0.34	0.33	0.41
Bangladeshi	0.33	0.19	0.35	0.30	-0.07	0.23	-0.14	0.32
Black Caribbean/African	-0.40	0.22	-0.17	0.44	-0.67*	0.33	-0.42	0.42
Not fluent in English	0.20	0.18	-0.57	0.39	-0.97***	0.26	-0.86*	0.40
Importance of religion	0.03	0.10	-0.02	0.18	0.20	0.13	-0.16	0.17
Bridging assoc. capital	0.02	0.22	0.49	0.30	0.46	0.24	-0.09	0.32
Bonding assoc. capital	0.23	0.16	1.26***	0.25	0.83***	0.19	1.03***	0.24
GCSE or equivalent (ref.)								
A level or equivalent	0.10	0.18	0.30	0.31	0.32	0.23	0.36	0.33
Degree or higher	0.18	0.20	-0.04	0.36	0.22	0.25	0.94**	0.34
Ultrasafe seat (ref.)								
Safe seat	-0.42*	0.20	0.35	0.34	0.44	0.24	0.06	0.35
Marginal seat	-0.41*	0.17	0.19	0.30	0.03	0.22	0.30	0.28
% Muslim in constituency	-0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.01*	0.01	0.00	0.01
Contacted by any party	0.46**	0.15	0.04	0.26	0.36	0.19	-0.01	0.25
Constant	-0.15	0.61	-2.79*	1.14	-2.35**	0.83	-1.04	1.09
n	906		904		903		903	

** p<0.05, ** p<0.01, p<0.001*
Data: EMBES
Base: Muslim respondents only
Weighted using the weights provided by the survey
Robust standard errors at the level of the primary sampling unit

The effect of the British National Party on ethnic minority feelings towards mainstream parties; context-dependent evaluations a strategic considerations

Abstract

The British National Party tends to do well in areas with higher proport ethnic minority residents. Research so far has focused on the likelihood white British individuals voting for or supporting the party. This paper explores how the far right might affect ethnic minority voting behaviou perceptions of parties. The BNP is an anti-immigrant party with racist a xenophobic policies. They are therefore a particularly frightening party ethnic minority voters. I argue that this is an example of context-depen choice, when the entire choice set has an effect on the utility of a given alternative to the decision-maker. I demonstrate this in two ways. First candidate, especially one who attracts a greater share of the vote in the Election, is associated with less ethnic minority abstention, to the benef Labour party. Secondly, Conservative and Liberal Democrat party and l evaluations are more positive among ethnic minorities in seats where t stood and/or performed better in 2010.

Introduction

This paper suggests and tests two mechanisms through which an extreme right party affects the party evaluations and voting behaviour of ethnic minorities. I propose two mechanisms. The first mechanism is that an extremely unattractive party increases the expected utility of voting, especially for a mainstream party (with a large pre-existing vote share), and therefore is expected to increase the likelihood of turnout and decrease the likelihood of voting for minor parties. The second mechanism is that the presence of an extremely unattractive party can make the other options seem more attractive by providing a contrast or reference point. I proceed by outlining the empirical context of the extreme right in Britain, before exploring the theoretical justification behind these mechanisms.

The empirical setting – the British National Party and the far-right in Britain

There is good reason to expect that the campaign activities and electoral success of a racially hostile and anti-immigrant party will lead to political anxiety among ethnic minorities; the presence and perceived success of such a party is evidence both of racially hostile attitudes among other voters, and a signal that mainstream parties may be less reluctant to give high priority to ethnic minority political interests as they try to win back voters tempted by the far right party. The British National Party's leader admits that many people would describe his policies as racist (The Telegraph, 2014), and was convicted in 1998 of incitement to racial hatred for denying the Holocaust. In a 2002

interview he said “the ultimate aim for me and for the BNP still remains an all-white Britain” (The Financial Times, 2002).

The British National Party is extremely opposed to immigration, with manifesto commitments to voluntary repatriation schemes and to halt immigration. Unsurprisingly given the immigrant-origin of most ethnic minorities in the UK, these voters give higher priority to immigration as a policy issue, and have more pro-immigration views than the white British (Heath et al., 2013). Perhaps aware of competition from the anti-Islam group the English Defence League, the British National Party was quick to capitalise on the rise in Islamophobia (Field, 2007), and the perception that religious prejudice is more acceptable than racial prejudice. For example, a 2004 BNP election poster titled “The Truth About Islam” lists the five letters of Islam as a mnemonic for negative terms they wish to attach to Muslims – “Slaughter”, “Looting”, “Arson”. (Ironically they also include the word “Intolerance”.) In short there is little to doubt that the BNP is a xenophobic and racist party that is opposed to immigration and to minority religions, and it would be difficult not to draw that conclusion from the party’s campaign materials.

The British National Party has never had widespread national success, in part due to the bias against small parties under the majoritarian electoral system used for General Elections. Indeed, Britain is sometimes treated as a case of absence by researchers in this area (Ivarsflaten, 2007). However, they were successful in local and European elections from 2001-2010. Membership of the party exceeded 14,000 in 2010, and the party was an important part of local

elections, especially in the North West, Yorkshire, Midlands and South East regions of England (Ford & Goodwin, 2010b). Similarly to other far right parties, the BNP draw their support from natives who are opposed to immigration, and who display racial or religious prejudice (Ford & Goodwin, 2010b; Ivarsflaten, 2007). Ethnic diversity is related to the success of the BNP – individuals in areas with higher Muslim populations (of both Pakistani and black African origin) are more likely to vote for the BNP (Ford & Goodwin, 2010b), and cities with higher ethnic minority populations were more likely to have BNP members (Biggs & Knauss, 2012). More recent research has highlighted the importance of local campaigning efforts, both suggesting that areas where the BNP are electorally active do not simply reflect the pre-existing levels of support for the party, but may increase support for the party. Cutts and Goodwin (2013) show that the extreme right did better where it ran intensive local campaigns, whilst Ford and Goodwin (2010a) demonstrated a legacy effect of far right activism. Ethnic minorities in areas with BNP activism are more likely to be exposed to racist or anti-immigrant campaigning, and therefore we might expect a change in voting behaviour and party evaluations.

There is also some evidence that parties facing an electoral threat from the BNP may change their campaigns in response. An East London branch of the Conservative party drew attention when it published an election leaflet with pictures of only white councillors, when there were several ethnic minority candidates also standing in the election. Similarly, the MP David Lammy voiced concern after a large number of ethnic minority councillors and candidates were deselected in wards that were vulnerable as a result of BNP electoral

activity. On the other hand, the comprehensive defeat in 2010 of the BNP in the council elections in Barking and Dagenham was attributed to the strong anti-BNP campaign run by the Labour party and sitting MP Margaret Hodge. Prior to the 2010 elections the BNP had been the official opposition on the council with 12 out of 51 seats, and had polled 17% of the vote in the 2004 local election. In the 2010 election they lost all of these seats; although their vote share was not much reduced at 16%, the Labour campaign successfully attracted Conservative voters to ensure the defeat of the BNP candidates.

Mechanisms and hypotheses

Mechanism 1: a far right party increases the expected utility of voting, especially for a mainstream party, due to strategic concerns

In traditional decision theory, the utility derived from voting (as opposed to abstention) or for choosing to vote for one party over another is not invariant to the choice set. In other words, the presence of an extremely undesirable party on the ballot paper increases the expected utility of one's chosen party by making the alternative against which it is evaluated much less desirable. Moreover, voting is a strategic act where individuals take into account the expected behaviour of other agents – so we would expect the effect of the undesirable party on vote choice (and an individual's likelihood of turning out to vote) to increase as support for the undesirable party increases. In Riker & Ordeshook's (1968) terms, this is equivalent to increasing the benefit term in the calculus of voting, that is "the differential benefit, in utiles, that an individual voter receives from the success of [their] more preferred candidate over [their] less one" (ibid, p.19).

Applying this to the situation where an ethnic minority voter is confronted with a ballot paper containing the BNP, we would expect the utility derived from voting to increase in this context. Two things follow from this. Firstly, an increase in an individual's likelihood of voting, following Riker and Ordeshook (1968). Secondly, an increase in support for the party (or parties) best able to ensure the extreme right party is not elected i.e. tactical voting. A variation on this theme would be an increase in support for a mainstream party on the condition that it was acceptable to the voter in other ways.

In some ways it is unlikely that the presence of an extreme right party would lead to tactical voting, as the BNP has never approached a majority of votes in a parliamentary election. The most successful BNP candidate in 2010 was the party leader Nick Griffin who managed third place with 14.6% of the vote, compared to the winning candidate, Margaret Hodge, who received 54.3% of the vote. Nevertheless, we could still expect an increase in support for mainstream parties for two principal reasons. Firstly, rational choice explanations of political behaviour often tell us something useful, but do not completely explain voting behaviour. The classic example is the calculus of voting mentioned above; it does very well at explaining change at the margins (for instance, higher turnout in more competitive seats or when the ideological distance between parties is greater), but does very poorly at explaining the absolute number of voters (in that people do vote). Following on from this, maybe voting against the BNP has a symbolic value – even if they do not pose a real electoral threat, there is a strong reason why ethnic minorities (and white

voters and politicians concerned with racial equality) would wish to overwhelm the vote share of the far right. Larger shares of the vote for a party legitimise their policy agenda, and signal something about public opinion. In this way, voting does have a rational explanation, but the desired end is not casting the decisive vote and influencing the outcome of the election. Rather, voting is a signal to those involved in the election about the relative strength and support for different parties and agendas.

The hypotheses to be tested here are that ethnic minority turnout is higher, and that ethnic minorities favour major parties in seats where the BNP stood, and where the BNP had a higher vote share.

Mechanism 2: an extremely unattractive party can make the other options seem better

When it comes to thinking about party evaluations, there is a plethora of evidence that our preferences (separate from decisions) are affected by the entire choice set, even if we do not have to make a strategic decision at the end. This violates a crucial axiom of value-based decision theory, namely that our preferences should be invariant to the presence of irrelevant alternatives. So if I prefer apples to oranges when there are only two choices in the fruitbowl, and oranges to tangerines, then my preference for an apple should stay the same when I am offered the choice between all three. In reality, this is often not the case. Tversky and Simonson (1993) formalise a context-dependent theory of preference. They show that in many cases the relative attractiveness of one

option compared to another can be altered by the presence or absence of a third option.

All this should make us question the importance of the political context on non-strategic political evaluations as well as voting behaviour. One effect in particular seems most applicable to thinking about the influence of an extreme right party on ethnic minority political preferences. The attraction effect occurs when the presence of an inferior alternative influences the relative attractiveness of other alternatives in a choice set (Simonson, 1989). We might think of this more colloquially as a contrast effect – just as the same room appears brighter or darker depending on whether we have been outside on a cloudy or sunny day, a party may seem more or less attractive when stood in contrast to the other options available. Crucially this is not about weighing up the relative pros and cons of actually voting for the party, but how positively each option is evaluated independent of having to make a voting decision.

The hypotheses to be tested here are that evaluations of mainstream parties and their leaders are more positive in seats where the BNP stood, or where the BNP had a higher share of the vote.

Data and methods

Data

The 2010 Ethnic Minority British Election Study is a nationally representative probability survey of the major ethnic minority groups in Britain. It was closely coordinated with the 2010 British Election Study, and includes a large number

of variables on political attitudes and behaviour. Areas where less than 2% of the residents were ethnic minorities in the 2001 Census were excluded from the sampling frame, and the response rate was between 58% and 66%. The achieved sample size is 2787 respondents.

Dependent variables

There are two measures here of how the BNP might affect the party political preferences of ethnic minorities. Firstly, we can look directly at how much respondents like parties, and their leaders. These are scales from 0 to 10, where 0 indicates that the respondent "strongly dislikes" the party or leader, and 10 indicated that the respondent "strongly likes" them. I look at evaluations of both parties and leaders because there is strong evidence that party leadership evaluations affect vote choice in a way that might not be captured by simply looking at the respondents' feelings towards the parties themselves (Stevens, Karp, & Hodgson, 2011; Stewart & Clarke, 1992). I use ordinal logistic regression to analyse these scales, with robust standard errors clustered at the constituency level.

In addition to traditional measures of political preference, I also consider the effect of the BNP on an attitude that chapter 2 argues is crucial in explaining ethnic minority voting behaviour – namely, feeling that one party in particular will be better at representing ethnic minority interests. This is a more specific measure of a party's "likeability", but the same attraction mechanism (an unattractive party makes the others look better) that might lead to a change in evaluations of the general likeability of a party may also lead to a change in

which party ethnic minorities believe is the best to promote their interests, or if they think that any one party is better than the others.

I measure the extent to which parties are thought to promote the interests of ethnic minorities with responses to the question "Which party do you think is best able to help improve life in Britain for ethnic minority groups?". Because it only asks for the party "best able" it will not show an increase in the extent to which parties are thought to represent ethnic minority interests other than the "best" one. However, it does allow us to see if there is a change in the extent to which any party is nominated, and which party this change might affect the most. The analysis of this variable follows the same lines as that of vote choice (see next paragraph).

Secondly, we can look at if and how respondents choose to vote. I have two dependent variables here; one that combines turnout and vote choice, and one that looks at vote choice within voters. The first dependent variable has five categories, and I use multinomial logistic regression to analyse it. The baseline category is abstention, and the comparison categories are voting for the Labour party, the Conservative party, the Liberal Democrat party, or any other party. The advantage of modelling it in this way is that it allows us to see exactly who benefits from any increase in turnout. This is important in this context because there were proportionally and numerically far more ethnic minorities who identified with the Labour party in 2010 but did not vote than minorities who identified with other parties and also abstained. Of course the disadvantage of this approach is that it does not allow us to see any increases in the share of the

vote of different parties that are not due to increases in turnout, which is why I also include a multinomial logistic regression model of vote choice among voters, with Labour as the baseline category as it is by far the more common option.

Independent variables

I use two measures of British National Party electoral activity; a binary variable indicating whether or not the BNP stood in a constituency, and a continuous variable of their percentage of the vote in constituencies where they did stand. I am interpreting both of these as measures of the relative level of support for the BNP in the constituency.

I control for individual characteristics which are good predictors elsewhere of political engagement or turnout among ethnic minorities. Bonding social capital is measured by whether the respondent is a member of an ethnic or religious organization. I control for housing tenure, economic activity and occupational class. When the dependent variable is a scale measuring like/dislike of a party/leader I control for party identity, and for whether the respondent places the party in question at the respondent's ideal point on three issue dimension scales. When the dependent variable is vote choice I control for the Labour vote in the constituency in 2005. This is because a big worry is that the BNP tends to stand in areas that traditionally have higher levels of Labour support. BNP members in 2009 were more likely to live in areas with higher unemployment, greater density of social housing and more overcrowded housing (Biggs & Knauss, 2012; Ford & Goodwin, 2010b). In the

models of vote choice I also include binary variables to control for which party is closest to the respondent's position on three scales, how well the respondent thought the Labour party had handled the economy, and whether they think Labour are the best party for ethnic minorities. These models of vote choice are similar to those presented in chapter 2 on vote choice and partisanship.

Results

Party and leadership evaluations

There are two measures of BNP electoral activity – whether the BNP stood in a constituency, and their vote share in constituencies where they did stand. Throughout I exclude the two constituencies containing parts of the Barking and Dagenham local authority, where the BNP returned 17% of the vote in the 2006 local elections. These are the seat of Barking where the party's leader Nick Griffin was standing, and the neighbouring seat of Dagenham and Rainham. These two seats are general outliers in BNP activity and support as measured by vote share and campaign spending by the party.

Tables 1 to 4 report the results of six ordered logistic regression models of evaluations of the Labour, Conservative and Liberal Democrat parties, and of their leaders. The scales run from 0 to 10, where 0 means strongly dislike and 10 means strongly like, so a positive coefficient corresponds to a more favourable rating. There are no apparent effects on Labour support – this is probably due to a ceiling effect as opinions of the Labour party are much more favourable than the other two parties, especially when it comes to protecting ethnic minority interests. When we look at the Conservative party however,

there is a positive effect of both the presence of a BNP prospective parliamentary candidate, and of them receiving a higher vote share in 2010 on feelings towards the Conservative party. Similarly, there is a positive association between the presence of a BNP candidate and feelings towards the Conservative party leader, David Cameron. There is no effect on feelings towards the Liberal Democrat party, but leadership evaluations of Nick Clegg are more positive among respondents who live in a seat with a candidate from the BNP. Nevertheless, they are consistent with the theory that the presence of a far-right party can make other mainstream parties appear more appealing. The more significant effects on evaluations of the Conservatives and David Cameron also suggests that this effect might be stronger for the party otherwise seen as less friendly to ethnic minority interests.

Vote choice and abstention

These effects on feelings towards parties and leaders are interesting, but what effect do these evaluations have on voting behaviour? Tables 5 and 7 report the results of two multinomial logistic regression models of vote choice. Abstention is the baseline category, with Labour, Conservative, Liberal Democrat and any other party as comparisons. The reason for this choice is that in 2010 the big story with regards to ethnic minority vote choice was the abstention of Labour supporters, in addition to these voters defecting to other parties (Heath et al., 2013). This approach allows us to see (i) if there are any increases in turnout, and (ii) if so, which party or parties benefit from this increase. Once again, Barking and Dagenham, and Dagenham and Rainham are excluded from the analysis as outliers. There are no significant effects on

voting behaviour of the presence of a BNP candidate.[16] However, a higher BNP vote share has a positive effect on the likelihood of voting Labour as compared to abstaining, and also a negative effect on the likelihood of voting for another party other than the Conservatives or Liberal Democrats.

Tables 6 and 8 compares party choice among voters, with Labour as the baseline category. There are no significant effects of the BNP on vote choice among the three main parties. However, in areas where the BNP performed better in 2010, ethnic minorities are once again less likely to vote for a small party (any party other than Labour, the Conservatives or the Liberal Democrats). This would be consistent with the idea that voters are reluctant to vote for a small party with a lower chance of winning the race if a candidate or party they particularly dislike is standing (and therefore has a chance of winning themselves). Moreover, the Labour party in particular appear to benefit from a stronger electoral threat from the BNP. It appears that more positive feelings towards the Conservatives or Liberal Democrats has not translated into changed voting patterns – but again the evidence is consistent with the argument that the electoral threat posed by the BNP changes the voting behaviour of ethnic minorities. Faced with a threat from the far-right, these results suggest that ethnic minority voters are keener to vote for the Labour party, especially those who otherwise might have abstained or voted

[16] When Barking and Dagenham, and Dagenham and Rainham are included, there is a significant negative effect on the likelihood of not voting as compared to voting Labour i.e. ethnic minorities were more likely to vote Labour instead of not voting in these two seats. This is no doubt to the strong anti-BNP campaign run by the Labour party in these seats. However it does not appear to be generalizable outside these seats.

for a smaller party. It might be that in the constituencies where the BNP tends to stand, the Labour party is the most credible party to win – the BNP is more popular in places with strong Labour party support, higher levels of social housing, and lower education levels (Biggs & Knauss, 2012; Ford & Goodwin, 2010b).

There is a potential conflict between these results. In the first instance, we see that an increased vote share of the BNP (interpreted here as a measure of the magnitude of the far right's electoral threat) is associated with more positive evaluations of the Conservative and Liberal Democrat parties and/or leaders, but not for the Labour party or their leader. In the second instance, we see evidence that the Labour party could be benefitting from the presence or electoral strength of the BNP. Both of these can be explained by mechanisms that explicitly consider the effect of the entire choice set on the decision, but with different effects. The discrepancy can be resolved if we return to the model of vote choice introduced in chapter 2, where I argue that one of the crucial reasons that ethnic minorities tend to vote for the Labour party is that they generally believe that the Labour party is the best party for ethnic minorities. If Labour is still seen as the best party, ethnic minorities might still vote for them regardless of having more positive evaluations of the other parties. In this, it makes sense to ask whether (i) there is any effect of the BNP's presence/electoral strength on perceptions that any party (especially mainstream ones) are the best at looking after ethnic minority interests, and (ii) if this effect is equally spread across parties, or if it refers to one party more than the others.

Tables 9 and 10 shows the results of two multinomial logistic regression models of responses to the question "Which party do you think is best able to help improve life in Britain for ethnic minority groups?". The baseline category is the combined responses of "none" or "don't know". Once again the seats of Barking and Dagenham, and Dagenham and Rainham are excluded as outliers. This time the standard errors are clustered according to the respondent's ethnoreligious group, as there are ethnoreligious group-level control variables. See chapter 2 for further discussion.

There is no effect of the presence of the BNP, but in seats where the BNP did better ethnic minorities are more likely to say the Labour party are the best party for ethnic minorities, as opposed to "none" or "don't know". This may be another instance of the attraction effect, or it may reflect something different about the Labour party in constituencies where the BNP is stronger e.g. differences in campaigning strategies. In any case, it appears that although the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats are rated more favourably by ethnic minorities where the BNP is present, only the Labour party benefit from contrast with the BNP when it comes to crucial attitude of feeling that a party will represent ethnic minority group interests (the group utility heuristic). Therefore we should not be surprised that different evaluations of the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats are not associated with an increase in the likelihood of voting for these parties. Moreover, both this question and voting require a slightly different evaluation process from the individual; if you are asked "who is the best?", or "who will you vote for?", you need to pick one

option only. It is perfectly possible to think more highly of the alternatives in seats where the BNP stood or did well, but still prefer the Labour party overall.

Discussion and conclusions

There are a number of different ways in which the far right and ethnic minority political behaviour may interact; this paper has taken a look at just one of them. Research on the British National Party in particular has focused on what drives support and membership of this party. However on the ground there are at least two sides to what Dancygier (2010) calls ethnic conflict; the group being hostile, and the group they are being hostile towards. Some early responses to racism took a more violent form – the Bradford and Oldham riots are one example. However, as the extreme right has moved into the electoral sphere, it is more appropriate to look at the political response to this.

This paper proposed two mechanisms. The first is that voting has greater utility for ethnic minorities when the far right put forward a candidate (especially if that candidate gains more votes), and in particular voting for a major party that will most clearly signal opposition to the far right party's agenda. The results show that ethnic minorities are more likely to vote for the Labour party where the BNP is stronger electorally. It appears that these are probably voters who would have otherwise abstained. Whether this is due to higher than normal abstention levels among ethnic minority Labour supporters in 2010 is unclear. In any case, I interpret this increased likelihood of voting for the Labour party as evidence that the presence or electoral

strength of a far right party increases the incentive to vote among ethnic minority voters.

The second proposed mechanism pertains to evaluations of other parties. I suggest that this might be a case of the attraction effect, where the presence of an inferior alternative influences the perceived attractiveness of the other options. Quite simply, the openly racist BNP and Nick Griffin might make the Conservative party and David Cameron seem more moderate. In line with that expectation, the results show that the Conservative and Liberal Democrat parties and/or leaders are evaluated more positively in seats where the BNP stood, and performed better.

The pro-Labour influence of the extreme right on vote choice underlines another key theme in this thesis; the importance of sociotropic discrimination and ethnic group utility in explaining support for the Labour party. This might explain the discrepancy between more positive evaluations of the Conservatives/Liberal Democrats, but no increases in the likelihood of voting for them. It is also interesting that the presence and electoral strength of the BNP increased the likelihood of saying that Labour were the best party for ethnic minorities – is this another example of the attraction effect? Or is it that the importance of a party representing ethnic minority interests increases when the BNP are involved in an election? The evidence is consistent with either interpretation insofar as it seems that the increase in support for Labour as the party best able to improve life for ethnic minorities looks as if it comes

from people who otherwise would not have picked a party, rather that those who thought that the Conservatives or Liberal Democrats were best.

Chapter 3 argued that perceptions of Islamophobia were associated with political alienation and a preference for protest politics over voting. It would be interesting to assess the potential effect of the far right on political alienation and political participation among all ethnic minorities. Theoretically it is a similar situation insofar as the BNP might be thought of as something that would contribute to perceptions of sociotropic discrimination. That said, it is one step removed – one can be aware of the BNP without necessarily thinking that there is widespread prejudice elsewhere against ethnic or religious minorities, and the negative reactions to the party in the media and by other politicians may go some way to reinforcing the opposite idea.

This paper uses data from the 2010 General Election. The BNP hoped that 2010 would be a breakthrough election for the BNP; they fielded candidates in 338 constituencies, nearly three times the number in 2005. However they suffered high profile local election defeats and lost their deposits in almost 80% of seats. Nick Griffin has recently lost his seat as an MEP. So for the foreseeable future the extreme right as represented by the BNP looks to be electorally weak. It is unclear to what extent other parties might adopt some of their policy positions – the Eurosceptic United Kingdom Independence Party has been criticised for what some perceived as racist undertones in their campaigns, and it is certainly true that some of their voters are motivated by ethnic exclusionism (Ford, Goodwin, & Cutts, 2011). It is unclear to what extent

the mechanisms suggested here require a truly extremist party, or if they might still apply to a less extreme party like UKIP. Regardless of UKIP, Ford & Goodwin (2010a) demonstrate a legacy effect whereby areas with a history of far-right support are more likely to have far right activists. It might be the case that some areas remain hostile to ethnic minorities and immigrants regardless of the failure of the BNP, and that in these places single-issue candidates may stand on an extreme-right platform.

I have suggested some mechanisms, and provided evidence from a cross-sectional survey that is in line with what would be expected were they to be correct. This is definitely a case where experimental data would be useful, especially when it comes to party evaluations as distinct from vote choice. A survey experiment where the list of candidates would vary between including a BNP candidate and not including one would allow one to look at party evaluations and vote choice in a more isolated way, in order to test whether the mechanisms suggested here show up when BNP presence is truly randomly allocated. It would also be an ideal opportunity to test whether UKIP and the BNP have similar effects. Another avenue for further research is to look at the local level, considering that the BNP relies heavily on local activists, and appears to benefit from their activities Ford & Goodwin (2010a). This kind of analysis would help to flesh out the theory as to what exactly about BNP electoral success that affects the party evaluations and voting behaviour of ethnic minorities. Is it seeing posters with racist messages that increases perceptions of racial threat? Do other candidates engage with these messages, and address ethnic minority concerns in response – thereby leading to more

positive evaluations? Or maybe the BNP have an effect on how people engage with each other outside of politics? These are certainly avenues for future research. The significant results with the available data suggest that the interaction between the extreme right and ethnic minorities is worth some attention.

Table 1: ordered logistic regression models of feelings towards political parties

	Labour		Conservatives		Lib Dem	
	Coefficient	SE	Coefficient	SE	Coefficient	SE
BNP candidate	-0.05	0.07	0.21**	0.07	0.06	0.07
Bonding associational capital	-0.09	0.08	-0.01	0.08	0.03	0.08
Experienced discrimination	-0.21**	0.07	-0.43***	0.08	-0.21**	0.08
Owner occupier (ref)						
Social housing	0.28**	0.09	-0.41***	0.09	-0.25**	0.09
Other tenure	0.47***	0.09	-0.17	0.09	0.02	0.09
Employed or full-time education (ref)						
Retired	0.63***	0.13	0.11	0.13	-0.29*	0.13
Unemployed or long-term sick	-0.02	0.10	0.03	0.10	-0.18	0.10
Middle class (ref)						
Working class	0.24**	0.08	-0.07	0.08	0.07	0.08
Unwaged or missing	0.09	0.11	-0.20	0.11	0.08	0.12
No party id (ref)						
Labour	2.04***	0.10	-0.35***	0.10	-0.06	0.10
Conservative	-0.44**	0.15	2.67***	0.16	0.24	0.15
Lib Dem	-0.12	0.14	0.00	0.14	2.32***	0.15
Other party id	-0.65*	0.27	-0.69*	0.28	-0.13	0.27
Party at voters ideal point - tax/spend	0.25**	0.08	0.05	0.08	0.17*	0.08
- crime/rights	0.01	0.07	0.19*	0.08	-0.14	0.08
- equal opportunities	0.33***	0.07	0.01	0.08	0.10	0.08
cut 1	-2.55***	0.16	-2.59***	0.13	-2.74***	0.14
cut 2	-2.11***	0.15	-1.98***	0.13	-1.97***	0.13
cut 3	-1.56***	0.14	-1.31***	0.12	-1.27***	0.13
cut 4	-0.97***	0.13	-0.70***	0.12	-0.68***	0.12
cut 5	-0.42***	0.12	-0.17	0.12	-0.12	0.12
cut 6	0.74***	0.12	1.05***	0.12	1.07***	0.12
cut 7	1.35***	0.12	1.76***	0.13	1.71***	0.13
cut 8	2.09***	0.13	2.56***	0.14	2.47***	0.14
cut 9	2.96***	0.13	3.53***	0.16	3.23***	0.15
cut 10	3.51***	0.14	4.23***	0.19	3.90***	0.17
n	2597		2487		2376	

** p<0.05, ** p<0.01, p<0.001*
Data: EMBES
Weighted using the weights provided by the survey
Robust standard errors at the level of the primary sampling unit

Table 2: ordered logistic regression models of feelings towards party leaders

Feelings towards	Gordon Brown		David Cameron		Nick Clegg	
	Coefficient	SE	Coefficient	SE	Coefficient	SE
BNP candidate	0.10	0.07	0.25***	0.07	0.17*	0.07
Bonding associational capital	0.09	0.08	-0.04	0.08	-0.04	0.08
Experienced discrimination	-0.32***	0.07	-0.57***	0.08	-0.44***	0.08
Owner occupier (ref)						
Social housing	0.12	0.09	-0.07	0.09	-0.14	0.09
Other tenure	0.42***	0.09	0.14	0.09	0.10	0.09
Employed or full-time education (ref)						
Retired	0.49***	0.13	0.12	0.13	-0.34*	0.13
Unemployed or long-term sick	-0.01	0.10	-0.03	0.10	-0.12	0.11
Middle class (ref)						
Working class	0.12	0.08	-0.08	0.08	-0.07	0.08
Unwaged or missing	0.00	0.11	-0.42***	0.12	-0.14	0.12
No party id (ref)						
Labour	1.11***	0.09	-0.02	0.10	-0.03	0.10
Conservative	-0.38**	0.14	2.07***	0.15	0.59***	0.15
Lib Dem	0.01	0.14	0.44**	0.14	1.72***	0.15
Other party id	-0.69*	0.27	-0.27	0.27	0.23	0.29
Party at voter's ideal point - tax/spend	0.13	0.07	0.10	0.08	0.16	0.08
- crime/rights	-0.02	0.07	0.19*	0.08	-0.13	0.08
- equal opportunities	0.29***	0.07	0.09	0.08	0.07	0.08
cut 1	-2.10***	0.14	-2.32***	0.13	-2.65***	0.14
cut 2	-1.62***	0.13	-1.78***	0.13	-2.10***	0.13
cut 3	-1.08***	0.12	-1.22***	0.12	-1.43***	0.13
cut 4	-0.59***	0.12	-0.58***	0.12	-0.75***	0.12
cut 5	-0.08	0.12	-0.07	0.12	-0.28*	0.12
cut 6	0.71***	0.12	0.84***	0.12	0.64***	0.12
cut 7	1.26***	0.12	1.46***	0.12	1.32***	0.13
cut 8	1.90***	0.12	2.19***	0.13	2.13***	0.13
cut 9	2.75***	0.13	3.15***	0.15	3.04***	0.15
cut 10	3.44***	0.14	3.87***	0.17	3.70***	0.17
n	2615		2487		2300	

** p<0.05, ** p<0.01, p<0.001*
Data: EMBES
Weighted using the weights provided by the survey
Robust standard errors at the level of the primary sampling unit

Table 3: ordered logistic regression models of feelings towards political parties

Feelings toward	Labour		Conservatives		Lib Dem	
	Coefficient	SE	Coefficient	SE	Coefficient	SE
BNP vote share	-0.01	0.03	0.05	0.03	0.05	0.03
Bonding associational capital	0.03	0.11	-0.09	0.12	0.08	0.12
Experienced discrimination	-0.35**	0.11	-0.35**	0.11	-0.07	0.11
Owner occupier (ref)						
Social housing	0.22	0.13	-0.49***	0.14	-0.22	0.14
Other tenure	0.65***	0.14	-0.22	0.14	0.14	0.14
Employed or full-time education (ref)						
Retired	0.50*	0.20	0.09	0.20	-0.11	0.22
Unemployed or long-term sick	0.00	0.15	0.24	0.15	-0.05	0.16
Middle class (ref)						
Working class	0.18	0.12	-0.16	0.12	0.06	0.12
Unwaged or missing	0.05	0.16	-0.40*	0.17	0.01	0.18
No party id (ref)						
Labour	2.06***	0.15	-0.36*	0.15	-0.02	0.15
Conservative	-0.19	0.23	2.50***	0.24	0.19	0.23
Lib Dem	-0.21	0.20	-0.12	0.20	2.08***	0.21
Other party id	-1.05**	0.39	-0.58	0.40	-0.06	0.40
Party at voters ideal point - tax/spend	0.10	0.11	0.01	0.13	0.12	0.12
- crime/rights	-0.13	0.11	0.13	0.12	-0.11	0.12
- equal opportunities	0.45***	0.11	-0.03	0.12	0.20	0.12
cut 1	-2.60***	0.26	-2.71***	0.22	-2.61***	0.24
cut 2	-2.15***	0.24	-2.11***	0.21	-1.70***	0.22
cut 3	-1.63***	0.22	-1.46***	0.21	-0.96***	0.21
cut 4	-1.04***	0.21	-0.87***	0.20	-0.43*	0.21
cut 5	-0.56**	0.20	-0.35	0.20	0.11	0.21
cut 6	0.70***	0.20	0.95***	0.21	1.44***	0.21
cut 7	1.33***	0.20	1.65***	0.21	2.04***	0.22
cut 8	2.00***	0.21	2.35***	0.22	2.86***	0.23
cut 9	2.91***	0.22	3.17***	0.25	3.64***	0.25
cut 10	3.46***	0.22	4.04***	0.29	4.30***	0.28
n	1201		1139		1088	

** p<0.05, ** p<0.01, p<0.001*
Data: EMBES
Weighted using the weights provided by the survey
Robust standard errors at the level of the primary sampling unit

Table 4: ordered logistic regression models of feelings towards party leaders

Feelings toward	Gordon Brown		David Cameron		Nick Clegg	
	Coefficient	SE	Coefficient	SE	Coefficient	SE
BNP vote share	0.00	0.03	0.06*	0.03	0.02	0.03
Bonding associational capital	0.21	0.11	-0.11	0.11	-0.08	0.12
Experienced discrimination	-0.33**	0.11	-0.59***	0.11	-0.37**	0.12
Owner occupier (ref)						
Social housing	0.14	0.13	-0.05	0.13	-0.17	0.14
Other tenure	0.53***	0.13	0.24	0.14	0.28*	0.14
Employed or full-time education (ref)						
Retired	0.51*	0.20	0.30	0.20	-0.14	0.22
Unemployed or long-term sick	0.07	0.14	0.14	0.15	-0.12	0.16
Middle class (ref)						
Working class	0.09	0.11	-0.10	0.12	-0.07	0.12
Unwaged or missing	-0.03	0.16	-0.44**	0.17	-0.14	0.18
No party id (ref)						
Labour	1.25***	0.14	0.13	0.14	0.18	0.15
Conservative	-0.18	0.22	1.99***	0.23	0.45	0.23
Lib Dem	-0.10	0.19	0.27	0.20	1.57***	0.21
Other party id	-0.89*	0.38	-0.45	0.39	0.60	0.40
Party at voters ideal point - tax/spend	0.11	0.11	0.06	0.12	0.18	0.12
- crime/rights	-0.05	0.11	0.20	0.12	-0.16	0.12
- equal opportunities	0.28**	0.11	0.07	0.12	0.12	0.12
cut 1	-2.04***	0.22	-2.16***	0.22	-2.48***	0.23
cut 2	-1.58***	0.21	-1.69***	0.21	-1.94***	0.22
cut 3	-1.05***	0.20	-1.14***	0.20	-1.35***	0.21
cut 4	-0.54**	0.20	-0.55**	0.20	-0.65**	0.21
cut 5	-0.05	0.19	-0.03	0.20	-0.20	0.20
cut 6	0.73***	0.19	0.94***	0.20	0.74***	0.21
cut 7	1.27***	0.20	1.54***	0.20	1.44***	0.21
cut 8	1.93***	0.20	2.28***	0.21	2.26***	0.22
cut 9	2.76***	0.21	3.25***	0.23	3.15***	0.24
cut 10	3.48***	0.22	3.97***	0.26	3.94***	0.27
n	1221		1151		1060	

** p<0.05, ** p<0.01, p<0.001*
Data: EMBES
Weighted using the weights provided by the survey
Robust standard errors at the level of the primary sampling unit

Table 5: multinomial logistic regression model of vote choice and turnout, with abstention as the baseline category

	Labour		Conservatives		Lib Dem		Other	
	Coefficient	SE	Coefficient	SE	Coefficient	SE	Coefficient	SE
BNP candidate	0.16	0.09	-0.10	0.16	0.11	0.15	-0.03	0.30
Bonding associational capital	0.37***	0.10	0.35	0.18	0.34*	0.17	0.25	0.33
Experienced discrimination	-0.15	0.10	-0.27	0.18	-0.09	0.16	-0.32	0.34
Owner occupier (ref)								
Social housing	-0.46***	0.12	-0.76***	0.21	-1.00***	0.21	-1.73***	0.51
Other tenure	-1.09***	0.12	-1.23***	0.22	-1.19***	0.2	-0.99**	0.37
Employed or full-time education (ref)								
Retired	0.53**	0.18	-0.05	0.31	0.23	0.29	-0.64	0.76
Unemployed or long-term sick	-0.05	0.13	0.00	0.23	0.04	0.22	0.37	0.39
Middle class (ref)								
Working class	-0.06	0.11	-0.22	0.18	-0.19	0.17	0.04	0.34
Unwaged or missing	-0.25	0.15	-0.66*	0.27	-0.88***	0.26	-0.46	0.5
Labour closest to ideal point - tax/spend	0.22	0.12	-0.33	0.23	0.00	0.21	0.28	0.38
crime/rights	-0.08	0.15	0.07	0.26	0.46*	0.22	0.20	0.45
equal opportunities	-0.05	0.11	-0.32	0.22	-0.29	0.20	-0.10	0.39
Conservatives closest to ideal point - tax/spend	-0.19	0.17	0.13	0.24	0.01	0.26	-0.11	0.53
crime/rights	0.1	0.18	0.87***	0.24	0.40	0.25	0.59	0.47
equal opportunities	0.08	0.2	0.47	0.26	-0.07	0.29	0.68	0.47
Lib Dems closest to ideal point - tax/spend	0.21	0.16	0.01	0.25	0.75***	0.21	0.32	0.46
crime/rights	0.00	0.12	0.26	0.24	0.14	0.22	-0.19	0.48
equal opportunities	-0.15	0.18	-0.22	0.30	0.13	0.24	-0.3	0.57
Labour best on most important issue	0.36**	0.11	-0.90**	0.30	-0.28	0.23	-0.44	0.43
Conservatives best on most important issue	-0.09	0.16	1.66***	0.19	0.36	0.22	-0.32	0.45
Lib Dems best on most important issue	-0.26	0.26	-1.09	0.61	1.92***	0.23	-0.59	0.76
Labour best for ethnic minorities	1.04***	0.11	-0.67***	0.19	-0.47*	0.19	-0.62	0.38
Evaluation of government record on the economy	0.22***	0.05	-0.05	0.07	-0.03	0.07	-0.15	0.14
Labour vote in 2005	2.08e-5**	9.76e-6	2.60e-6	1.87e-5	-7.60e-5**	2.43e-5	-9.07e-5	4.73e-5
Constant	-1.23***	0.32	-0.48	0.49	0.44	0.46	-0.26	0.84
n	2760							

** p<0.05, ** p<0.01, p<0.001*

Data: EMBES

Table 6: multinomial logistic regression model of vote choice, with Labour as the baseline

	Conservatives		Lib Dems		Other	
	Coefficient	SE	Coefficient	SE	Coefficient	SE
BNP candidate	-0.20	0.18	-0.04	0.17	-0.17	0.31
Bonding associational capital	-0.09	0.19	-0.07	0.18	-0.09	0.34
Experienced discrimination	-0.10	0.20	0.11	0.18	-0.12	0.34
Owner occupier (ref)						
Social housing	-0.30	0.23	-0.48*	0.22	-1.33**	0.52
Other tenure	-0.07	0.25	-0.09	0.23	0.16	0.38
Employed or full-time education (ref)						
Retired	-0.59	0.32	-0.3	0.29	-1.17	0.76
Unemployed or long-term sick	0.23	0.26	0.15	0.25	0.61	0.42
Middle class (ref)						
Working class	-0.31	0.20	-0.24	0.18	-0.05	0.35
Unwaged or missing	-0.53	0.31	-0.68*	0.30	-0.39	0.52
Labour closest to ideal point - tax/spend	-0.59*	0.25	-0.2	0.22	-0.04	0.39
crime/rights	0.27	0.28	0.51*	0.25	0.22	0.46
equal opportunities	-0.22	0.23	-0.29	0.21	-0.12	0.40
Conservatives closest to ideal point -						
tax/spend	0.38	0.27	0.37	0.28	0.05	0.54
crime/rights	0.75**	0.26	0.33	0.27	0.46	0.48
equal opportunities	0.62*	0.30	0.03	0.32	0.74	0.49
Lib Dems closest to ideal point -						
tax/spend	-0.01	0.27	0.66**	0.23	0.17	0.47
crime/rights	0.22	0.25	0.04	0.24	-0.24	0.48
equal opportunities	-0.08	0.33	0.31	0.27	-0.15	0.59
Labour best on most important issue	-1.33***	0.30	-0.73**	0.23	-0.85*	0.43
Conservatives best on most important						
issue	1.75***	0.21	0.44	0.24	-0.20	0.46
Lib Dems best on most important issue	-0.90	0.64	2.13***	0.28	-0.42	0.78
Labour best for ethnic minorities	-1.80***	0.20	-1.56***	0.19	-1.72***	0.38
Evaluation of government record on the						
economy	-0.27***	0.08	-0.24**	0.08	-0.38**	0.14
Labour vote in 2005	-6.78e-6	1.74e-5	-8.55e-5***	4.73e-5	-8.44e-5**	2.59e-5
Constant	0.99	0.55	1.96***	0.50	1.38	0.86
n	1770					

** p<0.05, ** p<0.01, p<0.001* *Weighted using the weights provided by the survey*

Data: EMBES *Robust standard errors at the level of the primary sampling unit*

Table 7: multinomial logistic regression model of vote choice and turnout, with abstention as the baseline category

	Labour		Conservatives		Lib Dem		Other	
	Coefficient	SE	Coefficient	SE	Coefficient	SE	Coefficient	SE
BNP vote share	0.15***	0.04	0.12	0.07	0.12	0.07	-0.39*	0.18
Bonding associational capital	0.38*	0.16	0.55*	0.27	0.49*	0.25	0.45	0.50
Experienced discrimination	-0.24	0.15	-0.34	0.27	-0.09	0.24	-0.14	0.48
Owner occupier (ref)								
Social housing	-0.60***	0.18	-0.79*	0.31	-1.08***	0.31	-1.55*	0.71
Other tenure	-1.22***	0.19	-1.38***	0.36	-1.19***	0.30	-1.23*	0.60
Employed or full-time education (ref)								
Retired	0.28	0.28	0.25	0.48	0.22	0.46	-0.34	1.09
Unemployed or long-term sick	-0.03	0.20	0.31	0.33	0.10	0.31	-0.32	0.68
Middle class (ref)								
Working class	-0.02	0.16	-0.10	0.27	-0.13	0.24	0.00	0.52
Unwaged or missing	0.15	0.23	-0.36	0.40	-0.47	0.37	0.42	0.69
Labour closest to ideal point - tax/spend	0.24	0.18	0.09	0.34	0.23	0.29	-0.15	0.64
crime/rights	0.20	0.23	0.23	0.39	0.58	0.33	0.44	0.64
equal opportunities	-0.09	0.17	-0.43	0.33	-0.46	0.30	-0.02	0.58
Conservatives closest to ideal point -								
tax/spend	-0.18	0.25	0.22	0.38	0.06	0.38	0.21	0.75
crime/rights	-0.02	0.27	0.79*	0.38	0.25	0.37	-0.28	0.83
equal opportunities	0.29	0.30	0.89*	0.40	0.04	0.44	0.84	0.71
Lib Dems closest to ideal point -								
tax/spend	0.57*	0.24	0.72*	0.35	0.84**	0.32	0.60	0.65
crime/rights	-0.13	0.19	0.22	0.37	-0.07	0.35	-0.46	0.81
equal opportunities	0.00	0.27	-0.42	0.45	0.08	0.34	-0.50	0.82
Labour best on most important issue	0.59***	0.17	-1.11*	0.48	-0.06	0.33	-0.32	0.71
Conservatives best on most important								
issue	-0.03	0.23	1.36***	0.28	0.49	0.32	-0.26	0.64
Lib Dems best on most important issue	-0.27	0.38	-1.69	1.05	2.10***	0.34	-0.67	1.10
Labour best for ethnic minorities	1.33***	0.16	-0.42	0.29	-0.52	0.27	-1.04	0.68
Evaluation of government record on the								
economy	0.18*	0.07	-0.15	0.11	-0.13	0.10	-0.52*	0.22
Labour vote in 2005	1.50e-5	1.39e-5	-1.35e-5	2.3e-6	-7.85e-5**	2.08e-5	8.35e-5	3.93e-5
Constant	-1.41**	0.49	-0.01	0.76	0.28	0.68	1.77	1.30
n	1291							

** p<0.05, ** p<0.01, p<0.001* *Weighted using the weights provided by the survey*

Data: EMBES *Robust standard errors at the level of the primary sampling unit*

Table 8: multinomial logistic regression model of vote choice, with Labour as the baseline

	Conservatives		Lib Dems		Other	
	Coefficient	SE	Coefficient	SE	Coefficient	SE
BNP vote share	-0.06	0.08	-0.66***	0.19	-0.06	0.07
Bonding associational capital	0.13	0.29	-0.04	0.54	0.06	0.26
Experienced discrimination	-0.12	0.30	0.14	0.52	0.31	0.26
Owner occupier (ref)						
Social housing	-0.28	0.36	-1.41	0.81	-0.62	0.35
Other tenure	-0.10	0.41	-0.09	0.67	0.10	0.35
Employed or full-time education (ref)						
Retired	-0.11	0.51	-0.86	1.12	-0.28	0.48
Unemployed or long-term sick	0.59	0.38	0.11	0.75	0.25	0.37
Middle class (ref)						
Working class	-0.07	0.30	-0.05	0.56	-0.11	0.27
Unwaged or missing	-0.48	0.45	0.24	0.76	-0.48	0.42
Labour closest to ideal point - tax/spend	-0.14	0.37	-0.51	0.67	0.05	0.32
crime/rights	0.07	0.41	0.21	0.68	0.30	0.36
equal opportunities	-0.43	0.34	-0.30	0.62	-0.63*	0.32
Conservatives closest to ideal point - tax/spend	0.51	0.43	0.40	0.81	0.43	0.42
crime/rights	0.59	0.42	-0.58	0.87	0.22	0.40
equal opportunities	0.66	0.44	0.62	0.76	-0.32	0.48
Lib Dems closest to ideal point - tax/spend	0.30	0.37	0.06	0.69	0.33	0.34
crime/rights	0.26	0.38	-0.73	0.85	-0.12	0.37
equal opportunities	-0.59	0.50	-0.75	0.87	0.01	0.39
Labour best on most important issue	-1.75***	0.47	-1.02	0.71	-0.73*	0.33
Conservatives best on most important issue	1.45***	0.31	-0.23	0.68	0.51	0.34
Lib Dems best on most important issue	-1.43	1.08	-0.47	1.16	2.42***	0.41
Labour best for ethnic minorities	-1.82***	0.30	-2.60***	0.68	-1.92***	0.27
Evaluation of government record on the economy	-0.39**	0.12	-0.71**	0.22	-0.31**	0.11
Labour vote in 2005	-4.96e-5*	2.47e-5	1.09e-4	2.28e-5	-1.14e-4*	4.14e-5
Constant	1.98*	0.87	4.19**	1.49	2.06**	0.78
n	850					

** p<0.05, ** p<0.01, p<0.001* *Weighted using the weights provided by the survey*

Data: EMBES *Robust standard errors at the level of the primary sampling unit*

Table 9: multinomial logistic regression model of feeling that Labour are the best party for ethnic minorities, with no party/don't know as the baseline

	Labour Coefficient	SE	Conservative Coefficient	SE	Lib Dem Coefficient	SE	Other Coefficient	SE
BNP candidate	-0.04	0.07	-0.34	0.25	0.13	0.17	-0.27	0.24
BNP vote share								
Bonding associational capital	0.38***	0.09	0.07	0.28	0.43*	0.21	0.67*	0.31
Experienced discrimination	0.03	0.13	-0.14	0.18	0.08	0.22	0.25	0.33
Owner occupier (ref)								
Social housing	0.21	0.14	-0.09	0.22	-0.05	0.22	-1.01*	0.50
Other tenure	-0.05	0.14	-0.04	0.25	-0.09	0.16	0.13	0.48
Employed or full-time education (ref)								
Retired	-0.05	0.22	0.15	0.23	-0.93*	0.42	-13.96***	0.33
Unemployed or long-term sick	-0.14	0.12	-0.23	0.24	-0.33	0.33	-0.05	0.46
Middle class (ref)								
Working class	0.03	0.09	0.20	0.21	-0.51***	0.15	-0.84*	0.36
Unwaged or missing	-0.01	0.13	0.49	0.26	-0.36	0.25	-0.74	0.62
Group % unemployed	-0.22	1.13	-2.00	2.02	2.16*	0.98	1.07	2.60
Group % in social housing	0.50	0.46	-0.33	0.86	-0.57	0.51	-2.64*	1.09
Group % in ethnic/religious association	1.70**	0.65	-1.71	1.00	-1.30	0.86	-1.24	1.49
Group % experienced discrimination	1.29	0.71	-0.12	1.20	-0.83	0.78	1.30	1.72
Group % middle class	-0.96	0.79	0.92	1.04	0.21	0.89	-4.34**	1.50
Constant	-0.23	0.56	-0.85	0.74	-1.12*	0.46	-0.58	1.04
n	2760							

** p<0.05, ** p<0.01, p<0.001*
Data: EMBES
Weighted using the weights provided by the survey
Robust standard errors at the level of the ethnoreligious group

Table 10: multinomial logistic regression model of feeling that Labour are the best party for ethnic minorities, with no party/don't know as the baseline

	Labour Coefficient	SE	Conservative Coefficient	SE	Lib Dem Coefficient	SE	Other Coefficient	SE
BNP vote share 2010	0.07*	0.04	-0.07	0.13	0.04	0.06	-0.11	0.11
Bonding associational capital	0.53***	0.16	0.55	0.38	0.65**	0.25	0.92	0.55
Experienced discrimination	0.11	0.17	-0.59*	0.29	0.01	0.24	0.83**	0.32
Owner occupier (ref								
Social housing	0.35*	0.16	0.08	0.31	-0.17	0.32	-0.42	0.69
Other tenure	0.07	0.20	0.06	0.28	0.16	0.24	0.57	0.66
Employed or full-time education (ref)								
Retired	0.22	0.30	-0.20	0.74	-0.02	0.46	-11.86***	0.35
Unemployed or long-term sick	-0.28	0.17	-0.48	0.33	-0.29	0.56	-0.16	0.63
Middle class (ref)								
Working class	0.17	0.17	0.55	0.49	-0.34	0.22	-0.5	0.75
Unwaged or missing	0.24	0.18	1.16***	0.24	-0.37	0.35	-0.01	0.72
Group 5% unemployed	-0.28	1.49	-4.06	3.74	-0.46	1.57	1.83	3.43
Group % in social housing	0.03	0.64	-0.73	1.67	-0.59	0.64	-2.31	1.46
Group % in ethnic/religious association	3.03***	0.91	-2.32	2.24	-1.4	1.04	-6.12**	2.19
Group % experienced discrimination	1.63	0.90	-0.26	1.92	1.27	0.78	-0.25	2.2
Group % middle class	-1.87*	0.95	0.01	2.58	-1.64	1.24	-2.53	3.27
Constant	-0.81	0.68	-0.09	1.24	-0.64	0.80	-0.32	1.92
n	1291							

** p<0.05, ** p<0.01, p<0.001*
Data: EMBES
Weighted using the weights provided by the survey
Robust standard errors at the level of the ethnoreligious group

Do ethnic minority candidates mobilise ethnic minority voters? Evidence from the 2010 General Election

Abstract

This paper investigates whether ethnic minority individuals are more likely to vote when they can vote for a candidate who shares their ethnic background. It uses individual-level data from the 2010 Ethnic Minority British Election Study, and finds that Pakistani individuals were more likely to vote when they had to opportunity to vote for a Pakistani candidate from the Labour party and that this effect is due to people in their social network attempting to convince them how to vote. I interpret these results as evidence that *biraderi* is being used to mobilise these voters along ethnic lines. Muslim candidates from the Labour party are associated with lower turnout among Sikhs. However there were no candidate mobilisation effects among Indians, black Caribbeans or black Africans, or for Conservative or Liberal Democrat candidates.

Introduction

It is no secret that the Westminster Parliament is not demographically representative of multicultural Britain; in 2014, 4% of MPs are not white British, compared to an estimated 8% of the electorate (Heath et al., 2013), and 20% of the population of England and Wales. Some campaigners argue that this discrepancy undermines the legitimacy of Parliament; a more testable

question is whether it negatively affects political engagement among ethnic minorities? Previous research outside the UK has found that minority candidates are an effective way to mobilise ethnic minority voters (Barreto, 2007; Bergh & Bjørklund, 2010; Bobo & Gilliam, 1990; Tate, 2003), but this has yet to be tested with regards to Westminster politics. This paper fills this gap and investigates whether ethnic minority candidates in Britain encourage greater turnout among ethnic minority voters; and if they do, which candidates are most able to do so. This paper proceeds by outlining the salient features of the British political context, before generating the hypotheses from existing theory.

Literature review and context

The 2011 Census revealed a substantial degree of ethnic diversity in the British population, confirming the pattern observed in previous Censuses. Around 20% of the population are not white British, and 13% were born outside the UK. Although all ethnic minorities suffer some degree of ethnic penalty in the labour market (Heath et al., 2000), there are important differences between the main immigrant origin groups in terms of economic, social and political integration. Very broadly, black Caribbeans are the most integrated socially (in terms of residential segregation and intermarriage with the white British) but have more economic disadvantage (principally unemployment) and low levels of political engagement and representation. South Asians on the other hand have tended to be more separate in social terms, but this has yielded benefits for economic success (employment opportunities and access to financial resources through in-group networks) and political representation (more

residential segregation leads to greater electoral leverage). Unlike other European countries, in Great Britain there is not a large participation gap between the white majority and immigrant origin groups, in part due to a post-colonial law which allows Commonwealth citizens to vote in all elections on the same basis as British citizens.[17] Still, black Africans and black Caribbeans are slightly less likely to register to vote than the white British, in part due to the lower eligibility among the first group.

Turning to the numbers of ethnic minorities in Parliament however, there is a larger gap; there are 27 ethnic minority MPs in the current Parliament, of which 2 are black Caribbean, 7 are black African, 7 are Pakistani, 9 are Indian (including those from East Africa), one Bangladeshi, and one Iraqi Kurd. In total they make up 4% of the Parliament, in contrast to the estimated 8% of the electorate that these groups compose. This gap in descriptive representation comes after a landmark election for ethnic minority MPs – the 27 in the current Parliament is a marked increase from the 16 in the 2005-10 Parliament, and previous to that 12 from 2001 to 2005. Sobolewska (2013) notes that this increase is mostly due a change in strategy by the Conservative party in that they selected ethnic minority candidates in safe seats. Concurrent with this is that Conservative ethnic minority MPs in particular represent mostly white constituencies (of the 11 Conservative ethnic minority MPs in 2010, 10 represent constituencies where 0-10% of the electorate are ethnic minorities),

[17] Technically, this applies to Commonwealth citizens with residence and leave to enter or remain in the UK.

which Sobolewska (2013) argues is a step change in the nature of ethnic minority political representation.

The other salient feature of the British context is that it is a parliamentary system where campaigning is heavily dominated and organised centrally by national political parties. For this reason, researchers were, for good reason, initially sceptical as the whether candidate effects would be observed in the UK (Carey & Shugart, 1995; Norris, 1999). However, work showing the existence of an incumbency effect demonstrates that candidates can have an influence on voters (Butler & Kavanagh, 1988), either through their personal charisma and effectiveness as a representative (Cain, Ferejohn, & Fiorina, 1983), through the local campaigns mobilised around them (Johnston & Pattie, 2008; Johnston, Pattie, Cutts, Fieldhouse, & Fisher, 2011; Sudulich & Wall, 2011), or through their social characteristics (Campbell & Cowley, 2013; Norris, Vallance, & Lovenduski, 1992; Shephard & Johns, 2008).

Theory and hypotheses

Ethnicity is an easily observable characteristic that can elicit in-group solidarity on the basis of shared ethnic identity, or indeed out-group hostility towards a different ethnic group. In an electoral context this can translate into stronger support for a candidate because of their ethnicity, but also into higher turnout if ethnicity was a motivating factor to vote for people who otherwise would have abstained. There were not enough ethnic minority candidates in UK general elections previous to 2005 to allow for any nationwide analysis, nor the individual-level data on ethnic minority political behaviour provided by the

2010 Ethnic Minority British Election Study, but examples from a few constituencies suggest that mobilisation on the basis of ethnicity is a definite possibility.

Two documented phenomena suggest that for South Asians, and Muslims in particular, the ethnicity of a candidate has been used as a tool for mobilisation. Labour activists have fielded accusations of ethnic entryism, that is they argue that increased South Asian Labour party membership is ethnically motivated and aimed purely at selecting candidates of South Asian origin, often with no or little regard for Labour party policy or principles (Fielding & Geddes, 1998). Fielding and Geddes attribute some of this negative reaction to a political and institutional context "where perceptions of racial and ethnic difference certainly have an important effect" (p.70); others were keener to attribute it directly to racism. However these reports do tally with early evidence of mass recruitment – Back & Solomos (2002) reported that "mass recruitment was endemic in constituencies such as Small Heath during the 1980s" (p.106). Reports of groups of a single cheque being used to pay the membership fees of extended family and neighbours do suggest a high degree of social organisation among new party members. There are also some indications of illegal activity – Purdam (2001) documents accusations of illegally inventing party members in order to secure the selection of a Muslim candidate, and of using council funds to bribe Labour party members to secure support for a particular Muslim Labour party candidate.

Some of the most explicit examples of ethnically motivated voting in the UK come from Pakistani-dominated wards, in the form of *biraderi. Biraderi* is an Urdu term with a similar meaning to "family", but with wider connotations, such that it is frequently described as more like a clan. In Britain the term is associated with voting in favour of a candidate not only from the same country of (parental) origin as oneself, but from the same clan or village. *Biraderi* in the UK is most often noticed when the candidate mobilising this type of support is an independent, such as the disgruntled Pakistani who set up the short-lived Democratic Party in 1986 to protest against Labour's "milking of the ethnic vote", but Labour candidates have used the tactic as well (Back & Solomos, 2002; Garbaye, 2002; Joly, 1987). The Conservative Research Department records show awareness of this from early years too – documents from 1974 advise that "there is still a strong sense of hierarchical respect for community leaders amongst Asians, and although one must be warned that assurances from self-styled leaders can turn out to be in the event disappointingly unrepresentative, it is nevertheless essential to pay personal respects to these leaders...Many migrant voters still tend to support the person they know more than the party or policy" (cited in Dancygier (2010) p.92). In fact, after losing his seat in an election where an independent candidate mobilised Muslim voters along *biraderi* lines, former Labour MP Shahid Malik reported in 2010 that "the *biradari* pre-select candidates – for whichever party, since *biradari* membership trumps party affiliation" (Hart Dyke & Readings, 2010). Nevertheless there is also evidence of a backlash against this practice, in particular the way it excludes younger and female candidates from selection. There is also evidence that younger second-generation Muslims tend to

identify more with religion rather than clan or ethnicity (Akhtar, 2012; Field, 2011).

Candidate ethnicity can provide informational cues to voters. McDermott (1998) argues that voters use demographic characteristics as informational shortcuts to infer ideological and issue positions of candidates. Ideologically, black candidates are stereotyped as more liberal than the average white male, whilst on policy issues they were seen as more concerned with minority rights than whites. These experiments are based on the perceptions of white Americans, but the theoretical point is that ethnicity may lead voters to associate candidates with certain positions more readily than others.

There is ample evidence from the US that voters do in fact support coethnic candidates in elections where they have the chance (Barreto, 2007; Barreto, Ramirez, & Woods, 2005a; Bergh & Bjørklund, 2010; Tate, 2003). The same research has found increased turnout in the same situation (Barreto, 2007; Barreto & Segura, 2004; Barreto, Villarreal, & Woods, 2005b; Bobo & Gilliam, 1990). The mechanisms are not tested generally directly by these authors, but the hypothesised mechanisms on the supply side are either instrumental, such that minorities believe a coethnic representative will advocate for their interests better, or symbolic, such that minority representation is pursued as a goal in itself by minority electors. On the demand side, the hypothesised mechanism is at the campaign level – primarily that increased minority concentrations increase campaign efficacy and their involvement of minorities.

This research also suggests that descriptive representation is associated with more positive attitudes to political engagement. The mechanism here is that the presence of a non-white candidate may legitimise broader political institutions, signalling either a lack of discrimination, or, in the presence of discrimination, a commitment of a particular party organisation against this. Scherer & Curry (2010) showed that support for American courts increased amongst blacks who believed black judges were over-represented, and Tate (2003) observed the same result with regards to Congress. Outside of experimental conditions, descriptive representation has been linked to higher political interest; blacks who live in areas with African American mayors are more politically active, as a result of greater attentiveness to politics and more higher trust and political efficacy (Bobo & Gilliam, 1990). Vanderleeuw and Utter looked at rates of voter roll-off and showed that black voters were more likely to complete their ballot where the line-up was not all white. They hypothesised that this was due to greater interest (Vanderleeuw & Utter, 1993). Descriptive representation has also been linked with greater perceptions of responsiveness; in New Zealand this is linked with an increase in political participation, and in the US it is associated with greater political knowledge and greater contact with representatives (Banducci et al., 2008). Multiple scholars have found higher approval ratings and knowledge of Congressional representatives in the US (Box-Steffensmeier et al., 2003; Tate, 2001; Tate & Harsh, 2005). Finally, Pantoja and Segura find lower levels of political alienation among Latinos with descriptively representative state legislators, arguing that this descriptive representation increases perceptions of political empowerment (Pantoja & Segura, 2003).

Although Heath et al. (2013) show some important similarities in the political agendas and opinions of black and South Asian ethnic minorities in Britain, it is important to consider whether all candidates are equally likely to mobilise ethnic minority voters. Firstly, there is the issue of the candidate's party. Ethnic minorities are overwhelming likely to vote for the Labour party. This association emerged early on in the study of ethnic minority voting behaviour in the UK, and has not been countered since (Anwar, 1998; FitzGerald, 1987; Heath et al., 2011; Layton-Henry & Studlar, 1985). In 2010 69% of all ethnic minorities voted for the Labour Party, compared to 36% of the manual working class, and 29% of the whole electorate. The Conservative party in particular has had difficulties in attracting the support of ethnic minority voters, as recognised recently in polling by the Conservative backer Lord Ashcroft. Whilst 80% of black people and 76% of people of South Asian descent thought that the Labour party "understands minorities", only 20% and 36% respectively thought the same of the Conservative party. When it comes to voting, 45% of black people said they would never vote Conservative and 26% said they would never vote Liberal Democrat – compared to only 5% who would never vote Labour. Among people of South Asian descent, 29% said they would never vote Conservative and 23% would never vote Liberal Democrat, compared to 6% who would never vote Labour (Ashcroft, 2012). Although there are examples of ethnic minorities being mobilised by Conservative candidates (Bradford West and Bethnal Green and Bow in 1997), the long-standing loyalty to the Labour party among many ethnic minorities suggests that candidates from other parties have an uphill battle on their hands to

capture voters from this section of the population. For this reason, this paper will investigate whether any mobilisation effect is conditional on a candidate's party.

Secondly, ethnicity. I concentrate primarily on coethnic mobilisation in this paper. Although some of the mechanisms might apply more broadly to all ethnic minorities in a constituency, at their core they rely on a shared in-group identity. Ethnicity is a notoriously fuzzy concept, and ultimately it is up to an individual if they consider themselves part of an ethnic minority, and which one. Nevertheless, I think it is unlikely that Indian voters will be mobilised by a black African candidate for instance, because of a lack of shared identity and social distance between these groups.

The exception to my focus on coethnicity is motivated by an example from the 1997 General Election. In this landslide Labour election, the safe Labour seat of Bradford West saw a Conservative Muslim candidate make strong gains against a Labour Sikh candidate. Bradford West has a large Muslim population, and this result was attributed to the reluctance of Muslims to vote for a Sikh, instead choosing a fellow Muslim from the Conservative party. It is possible that this story is really about mobilisation in favour of the Muslim candidate, rather than the Sikh candidate losing votes due to his religion. However, this example highlights two points that are important in our analysis. Firstly, religion provides another possible basis for political mobilisation, especially in the case of Muslims and Sikhs. Muslims are members of a global community of believers (*ummah*), whilst Sikhs mostly share a common geographical origin in

the Punjab where Sikhism is linked to a political movement for an independent Sikh state of Khalistan. Therefore I also test whether Muslim and Sikh candidates were able to mobilise their co-religionists. The second point to draw from Bradford West in 1997 however is that an ethnic minority candidate may alienate other ethnic minority voters, as well as prejudiced white ones. For this reason I also test whether Sikh and Muslim candidates had any negative effect on the turnout of Muslims and Sikhs, respectively. To my knowledge, this is the first paper to consider a demobilisation mechanism.

Contextual or candidate effects?

Candidates are not allocated to seats at random; they are selected by local parties. It is entirely possible that ethnic minority candidates are only selected in places where it is believed their ethnicity will not be an electoral disadvantage, and may even be an advantage. In particular, minority candidates are more likely to stand in constituencies where there are higher proportions of ethnic minority voters than in largely white constituencies. As a rough guide, the average percentage of residents who are white in neighbourhoods where a non-white candidate was standing was 82%, whilst neighbourhoods with only white candidates to choose from were on average 95% white. This is potentially an important source of bias. Fieldhouse & Cutts (2008) used marked electoral registers to demonstrate the importance of neighbourhood coethnic density for registration and turnout of South Asian voters in Britain; turnout is higher among South Asian voters where these groups are concentrated, and Muslim registration levels are higher in predominantly Muslim areas. Heath et al. (2011) replicated the result for

turnout using a combination of self-reported and externally validated measures of voting, showing in addition that greater coethnic density increases the likelihood of voting for black Africans and Caribbeans, as well as for voters of Indian, Pakistani or Bangladeshi origin. Therefore I control for neighbourhood ethnic composition.

Hypotheses

The principal hypothesis of this paper is that ethnic minorities are more likely to vote in seats where they had the opportunity to vote for a candidate from the same ethnic group. Secondly, I suspect that this effect only obtains for Labour candidates due to reluctance among many ethnic minorities to vote for the Conservative or Liberal Democrats. Thirdly, I think that Sikh and Muslim candidates will lead to lower turnout among Muslims and Sikh, respectively, especially if the candidate is standing for the Labour party.

If our findings support any of these hypotheses, our data allow us to test some of the possible explanations. Is mobilisation achieved through greater campaigning efforts, perhaps targeted at ethnic minorities? Is it achieved through social and religious networks? Or do coethnic candidates engender more positive orientations to politics as suggested by Tate (2003) and others, which in turn lead to higher turnout?

Data and Methods

The Ethnic Minority British Election Study (EMBES) is a nationally representative probability sample of the five main established ethnic minority groups in Great Britain, including respondents from Indian, Pakistani,

Bangladeshi, black African and black Caribbean origin. Other minority groups were excluded, importantly people of Chinese origin and white ethnic minorities, partly due to difficulties in securing adequate sample sizes, but also due to the fact that most recently-arrived migrants from non-Commonwealth countries are ineligible to vote in national elections (although not local ones). Most ethnic minority candidates in 2010 however were either black or South Asian so this is not a difficulty for our present purpose.

I use four categories of ethnicity in this analysis, which I believe are meaningful enough to their member to be plausible bases for political mobilisation. These are Indian, Pakistani, black Caribbean and black African.[18] In addition I also look at Sikhism and Islam as possible bases for coethnic/religious mobilisation, and counter mobilisation. The candidate ethnicity variable was compiled from publicly available information. Only candidates from the three main parties nationally were included. The number and distribution of candidates allows us in most cases to test the effect of candidates from different parties with different coefficients. This is unfortunately not the case for Sikhs, where I can only look at the effect of a Sikh candidate from any party.

The dependent variable is turnout, which is a combination of turnout verified from the electoral register, and the imputed data in the publicly available

[18] EMBES also surveyed a number of people of Bangladeshi descent, but there were too few candidates of Bangladeshi origin to allow for meaningful analysis, so they are excluded from this paper. All but one of the Bangladeshi respondents in EMBES who had the chance to vote for a Bangladeshi candidate were situated in one constituency, Bethnal Green and Bow.

release of EMBES for respondents who refused to allow data linkage with the electoral register.

As regards control variables, the approach taken here is to control for exogenous predictors of the dependent variables, except for those that are potential mediators. In the cases where I observe an effect I then add in potential mediating variables in an attempt to explain the observed effects. I control for generation (1st generation ref., 2nd and 3rd generation), age, education (GCSE or equivalent ref., A levels or equivalent, degree or higher), and social class (middle class ref., working class, unemployed or missing). I also include the percentage of coethnic residents in the constituency, taken from the 2011 Census, and the marginality of the constituency (ultrasafe ref., safe, marginal).

I test three explanations of coethnic political mobilisation. The campaign explanation is that parties target ethnic minorities when an ethnic minority is standing, which leads to higher turnout. I test this using 5 variables; whether the respondent thought that any parties had campaigned specifically for the votes of ethnic minorities, the natural log of campaign spending by the party of the coethnic candidate, whether the respondent had been contacted by any canvasser, whether the respondent had been contacted by the party of the coethnic candidate, and whether the respondent had been contacted by a coethnic canvasser. Each of these was chosen because it represents a way that parties might try to target ethnic minority voters in seats where an ethnic minority candidate stands. The second potential explanation is that having an

ethnic minority candidate, particularly a coethnic one, on the ballot has an effect on other political attitudes that lead to an increased likelihood in turnout. I test this using three key attitudes; political interest, political knowledge (a 5 point scale), and duty to vote. The final explanation under consideration is that ethnic minority candidates draw support from ethnic and religious networks. I am particularly interested in this with regards to Pakistani candidates because of suggestions that *biraderi* is involved in candidate selection and campaigns. This is operationalised by looking at whether respondents said that a family member, a friend or someone from their place of worship had tried to convince them how to vote.

Results

Tables 1 and 2 show the results of logistic regression models of turnout among different ethnic groups. Looking at the four ethnic minority groups, there is no general mobilisation effect, but there is a positive effect of Labour Pakistani candidates on the turnout of Pakistanis. Turning to Sikh and Muslim respondents, there is no positive effect of a Muslim candidate on turnout among Muslims, but Sikhs are less likely to vote when the Labour candidate is Muslim. There is no discernable effect of a Sikh candidate on Sikh turnout, but Muslims are less likely to vote when there is a Sikh candidate (p=.06)

Table 3 shows the same models of turnout for Pakistanis and Muslims, with a variable that shows whether someone from the respondent's family, friends or place of worship tried to convince them how to vote. The interaction term between the presence of a coethnic/coreligious candidate shows that in both

cases, the positive effect on turnout of a coethnic/coreligious candidate is conditional on someone in the respondent's social network trying to convince them how to vote. Muslim candidates were not significantly associated with turnout in the previous model without the social network term, but there does appear to be a positive effect on turnout among those who had someone in their social network try to convince them how to vote. In the British context we might tentatively interpret these interaction effects as evidence that *biraderi* remains an electoral force among Pakistani origin voters. Unfortunately due to the distribution of responses I cannot test the interaction between candidate and social networks among Sikhs, or for Sikh candidates and Muslim voters. The model in Table 3 also includes the predictors for the two other explanations of coethnic mobilisation; measures or campaigning, and attitudes that might have a mediating effect (political interest, duty to vote and political knowledge). Although some of these predictors are significant in themselves, they are do not mediate the effect of a coethnic Labour candidate on turnout among Pakistanis or Muslims.

Figures 1 to 3 plot the predicted probabilities of voting for different groups to show the magnitude of the effect. Apart from the variables of interest, continuous variables are held at the mean and categorical variables at the reference category. Figure 1 shows the effect of a Pakistani Labour candidate on voting among Pakistanis according to whether someone in the respondent's social network had tried to convince them how to vote. When there was a Labour Pakistani candidate but no one tried to convince the respondent how to vote, the predicted probability of voting is .77, but when someone did try to

convince them it is .96. Without a Labour candidate or someone trying to convince them how to vote, the predicted probability of voting among Pakistanis is .58. Figure 2 shows the similar effect of a Labour Muslim candidate on the likelihood of voting among Muslims, again varying according to the social influence variable. Without someone trying to convince the respondent how to vote, the predicted probability of voting among Muslims is .62, but when someone does try to convince them how to vote this rises to .85. Figure 3 shows the evidence for a demobilisation effect of a Labour Muslim candidate on Sikhs; without a Labour Muslim candidate the predicted probability of voting is .81, but with a Labour Muslim candidate this falls to .57.

Figure 1: average marginal effects of a Pakistani Labour candidate on likelihood of voting among Pakistanis when someone had not or had tried to convince the respondent how to vote



Figure 2: average marginal effects of a Muslim Labour candidate on likelihood of voting among Muslims when someone had not or had tried to convince the

respondent how to vote



Figure 3: average marginal effect of a Labour Muslim candidate on likelihood of voting among Sikhs



Discussion and Conclusions

In summary, the evidence from 2010 suggests that Pakistanis are more likely to vote when a Pakistani candidate stands, but only from the Labour party. However there is also evidence for two demobilisation effects; Sikhs are less likely to vote when the Labour candidate is Muslim, and Muslims are similarly less likely to turnout to vote when there is a Sikh candidate ($p<.06$). The lower number of Sikh candidates means that I cannot test the effect of the candidate's party. Interestingly there is no positive mobilisation effect of Muslim candidates on Muslim voters, although most Pakistani candidates are themselves Muslim.

These results show that ethnic minority candidates at the constituency level can have a real impact on turnout of ethnic minority voters. Potential voters of Pakistani origin are 45% more likely to make the trip to the polling station if they have the opportunity to vote for a coethnic candidate, albeit only if the candidate is from the Labour party. This is unsurprising in light of the hostility of many Pakistanis to the Conservative party – although there were a number of Pakistani Conservative candidates they failed to mobilise voters from their own ethnic group. It is slightly more puzzling in the case of the Liberal Democrats, as there is not the same policy legacy of hostility to immigration and reticence on legislation to address racial and religious discrimination. Nevertheless, the Liberal Democrats are generally less popular among ethnic minorities than among the white British. Perhaps the most striking evidence of loyalty to the Labour party for some ethnic minorities though is the negative effect on turnout on Sikhs of a Muslim candidate from the Labour party; this

suggests that some Sikhs would rather not vote at all than have to pick between a Muslim from the Labour party, or a candidate from any other party.

As to the mechanisms behind this effect, there is evidence indicating that pressure through social and religious environments is responsible for the effect on turnout among Pakistanis, which is interpreted here as evidence for *biraderi* or clan voting. *Biraderi* has been identified in media coverage of particular seats, reaching national prominence most recently in the Bradford West by-election; the analyses in this paper suggest that it happens more frequently than it makes the headlines. There is a long tradition of especially Labour politicians engaging in patronage politics with the Pakistani diaspora, but there is some scepticism as to its efficacy. We cannot directly attribute the higher turnout observed to effect of community leaders, but these models do show that the increased likelihood of voting was higher among Pakistanis who reported having a friend, co-worker or someone from their place of worship try to convince them how to vote.

However, there is no generalised mobilisation effect for any party or any ethnic group; in some cases an ethnic minority candidate may result in higher ethnic minority turnout, but this was not the case in 2010 for Indians, black Caribbeans or black Africans of any party, nor for Conservative of Liberal Democrat candidates of any ethnicity.

It is interesting that we observe effects of candidate characteristics on turnout in Britain, given that most previous research has been conducted in the US

where candidates traditionally have a greater role in campaigns than they do in the Westminster parliamentary system. Stegmaier, Lewis-Beck, and Smets (2013) showed that ethnic minority candidates in 2010 were at a disadvantage compared to white candidates when standing against a white incumbent, providing further evidence that candidates do matter.

These results provide evidence that ethnic and minority religious identities are a basis for political mobilisation in Britain, in particular for Sikhs and Pakistanis. Survey evidence from EMBES suggests that ethnic minorities are strongly in favour of increasing the number of black and Asian MPs - a clear majority of all ethnic minority groups agreed that more black and Asian people in parliament would improve things for ethnic minorities, and no more than 15% of any group disagreed. Nevertheless, there is a difference between expressing support for an idea in a survey, and changing one's behaviour to achieve it. This paper shows evidence of differences in voting behaviour between Pakistanis who had the chance to vote for a coethnic candidate from the Labour party, and those who did not but not for other ethnic and religious groups. In conclusion then, a few ethnic minority candidates can mobilise ethnic minority voters and did so in the 2010 General Election, but other ethnic minority candidates and other parties do not have the same mobilising effect.

Table 1: logistic regression models of turnout among Indians, Pakistanis, black Caribbeans and black Africans

	Indians		Pakistanis		Black Caribbeans		Black Africans	
	Coef	se	Coef	se	Coef	se	Coef	se
Lab coethnic candidate	0.23	0.55	1.05*	0.53	-0.12	0.50	-0.20	0.53
Con coethnic candidate	0.06	0.33	-0.1	0.28	-0.04	0.75	-0.14	0.84
Lib Dem coethnic candidate	-0.18	0.80	0.56	0.29	-0.15	0.45	0.36	1.20
1st generation (ref.)								
2nd and later generation	1.24***	0.27	0.25	0.21	0.62*	0.25	0.01	0.32
Age	0.04***	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.04***	0.01	0.02*	0.01
GCSE or equivalent (ref.)								
A level or equivalent	0.16	0.29	-0.21	0.22	0.30	0.24	-0.20	0.30
Degree or higher	0.23	0.30	-0.21	0.29	0.42	0.32	0.46	0.28
Middle class (ref)								
Working class	0.43	0.27	0.27	0.26	-0.39	0.26	-0.02	0.27
Unwaged or missing	-0.13	0.40	0.02	0.31	-0.90**	0.30	-0.09	0.29
Ultrasafe seat (ref.)								
Safe seat	0.02	0.24	-0.51	0.30	0.19	0.26	-0.46	0.27
Marginal seat	-0.17	0.27	-0.03	0.24	0.25	0.26	-0.12	0.26
% coethnic residents	0.01	0.01	-0.01	0.01	0.04	0.03	0.05*	0.02
Constant	-2.00***	0.56	0.00	0.51	-1.80**	0.58	-0.99	0.54
n	592		638		666		539	

** p<0.05, ** p<0.01, p<0.001*
Data: EMBES
Weighted using the weights provided by the survey
Robust standard errors at the level of the primary sampling unit

Table 2: logistic regression models of turnout among Muslims and Sikhs

	Muslim resps. only		Sikh resps. only		Sikh resps. only		Muslim resps. only	
	Coef	se	Coef	se	Coef	se	Coef	se
Lab Muslim cand	0.10	0.46			-1.50*	0.62		
Con Muslim cand	0.07	0.26			-1.13	0.90		
Lib Dem Muslim cand	0.11	0.23			-0.19	0.67		
Any Sikh candidate			1.01	0.96			-1.10	0.59
1st generation (ref.)								
2nd or later generation	0.22	0.19	1.95***	0.59	2.01***	0.60	0.22	0.19
Age	0.02**	0.01	0.07***	0.02	0.06**	0.02	0.02**	0.01
GCSE or equivalent (ref.)								
A level or equivalent	-0.14	0.19	0.29	0.56	0.13	0.53	-0.15	0.19
Degree or higher	-0.05	0.22	0.20	0.65	0.09	0.64	-0.06	0.22
Middle class (ref)								
Working class	0.18	0.20	0.65	0.52	0.73	0.52	0.17	0.20
Unwaged or missing	-0.13	0.22	-0.52	0.71	-0.42	0.72	-0.15	0.22
Ultrasafe seat (ref.)								
Safe seat	-0.48*	0.22	0.27	0.69	0.02	0.70	-0.46*	0.22
Marginal seat	-0.34	0.19	-0.63	0.58	-0.85	0.57	-0.36*	0.17
% Muslim residents	-0.01	0.01					0.00	0.01
% Sikh residents			-0.05	0.05	-0.04	0.04		
Constant	-0.09	0.41	-1.99	1.32	-1.31	1.35	-0.08	0.40
n	1074		163		163		1074	

** p<0.05, ** p<0.01, p<0.001*
Data: EMBES
Weighted using the weights provided by the survey
Robust standard errors at the level of the primary sampling unit

Table 3: logistic regression models of turnout among Pakistanis and Muslims

	Pakistanis only		Muslims only	
	Coef	se	Coef	se
Lab coethnic cand*social influence	2.20*	1.04		
Con coethnic cand*social influence	-0.74	0.73		
Lib Dem coethnic cand*social influence	-0.88	0.59		
Lab coethnic cand	1.20*	0.59		
Con coethnic cand	0.33	0.48		
Lib coethnic cand	1.19**	0.44		
Lab Muslim cand*social influence			1.83*	0.80
Con Muslim cand*social influence			-0.76	0.54
Lib Dem Muslim cand*social influence			-0.24	0.53
Lab Muslim cand			0.09	0.38
Con Muslim cand			-0.14	0.22
Lib Dem Muslim cand			-0.03	0.25
Social influence	0.02	0.31	-0.1	0.22
Political interest	0.06	0.08	-0.02	0.07
Political knowledge	0.12	0.11	0.12	0.08
Voting is a civic duty	0.23*	0.10	0.28***	0.08
Any party campaigned for black/Asian votes	0.030	0.21	0.05	0.16
Ln(spending of coethnic candidate)	-0.19	0.11	0.01	0.06
Coethnic canvasser	0.44	0.34	0.23	0.27
Contacted by coethnic party	-0.02	0.46	-0.32	0.44
Contacted by any party	-0.02	0.27	0.45*	0.20
1st generation (ref.)				
2nd or later generation	0.20	0.23	0.25	0.20
Age	0.01	0.01	0.02*	0.01
GCSE or equivalent (ref.)				
A level or equivalent	-0.29	0.23	-0.24	0.19
Degree or higher	-0.18	0.28	-0.03	0.23
Middle class (ref)				
Working class	0.24	0.26	0.20	0.21
Unwaged or missing	0.12	0.30	-0.04	0.22
Ultrasafe seat (ref.)				
Safe seat	-0.50	0.31	-0.46	0.24
Marginal seat	-0.05	0.24	-0.37*	0.18
Constant	-1.36*	0.64	-1.60**	0.54
n	666		1102	

** p<0.05, ** p<0.01, p<0.001*
Data: EMBES
Weighted using the weights provided by the survey
Robust standard errors at the level of the primary sampling unit

Conclusions

This thesis contains four distinct empirical chapters on ethnic minority political behaviour in Great Britain This concluding section brings together the themes that link the four chapters together, and discusses the implications of the findings when taken as a whole. I finish by sketching out the directions for future research that emerge from this thesis.

Key themes

The effect of discrimination on political behaviour is a key theme linking all four empirical chapters, but in particular the first three. I consider manifestations of discrimination at multiple levels; egocentric experiences, the group average of egocentric experiences, perceptions of sociotropic discrimination, and political manifestations of discriminatory attitudes in the extreme right British Nation Party. I have looked at generalised discrimination in the chapters on support for the Labour party and on the British National Party, and I have also considered the effect of specifically religious discrimination on Muslims in the chapter on Islamophobia.

Chapter 2 showed that experiences of discrimination at the group-level are strongly related to Labour partisanship, but that individual egocentric experiences of discrimination are not. A similar result obtains in chapter 3, where sociotropic perceptions of religious discrimination are predictors of both attitudes and political participation. This echoes Sanders et al. (2013), who found that egocentric experiences of discrimination and sociotropic

perceptions of discrimination (in combination with British cultural practices) have effects in opposing directions on the likelihood of an ethnic minority voter choosing the Labour party. The importance of the group-level measure of discrimination or perceptions of group-level discrimination throughout the thesis support the argument advanced in chapter 2 that experiences of discrimination are primarily important as drivers of political behaviour through their effect on perceptions of ethnic group interests. The evidence in this thesis points to a group-interest explanation of ethnic minority political behaviour.

The strongest evidence for the group heuristic model comes from the mediating mechanisms between group-level experiences of discrimination and partisanship that is explored in chapter 2. I show that the effect of group-level characteristics on party identity is mediated by two attitudes. The first is fraternalistic relative deprivation – the feeling that people from one's ethnic group get less than they expect out of life. The second is feeling that the Labour party is the most likely to improve life for ethnic minorities. I argue that this fits the most plausible individual-level account of group voting – members of the group must feel that their group has a particular interest (in this case, that their group is disadvantaged), and then attach a political action to that (in this case, voting for the Labour party). I will discuss the second attitude below, but at this point I want to focus on fraternalistic relative deprivation and the explicit and implicit links with discrimination and one's ethnic group being the important level of analysis here. Heath et al. (2013) reference fraternalistic relative deprivation heavily, describing it as "perhaps the most important

theme of this book". They describe it as a concept focusing on people's perceptions of social injustice - the extent to which people feel that they are not receiving the benefits or opportunities to which they are entitled. In the context of ethnicity and ethnic group disadvantage, this implicitly includes the disadvantage that comes from being discriminated against, as well as any economic disadvantage in the form of an ethnic penalty that may or may not be due to discrimination (Heath et al., 2000). The question expressly asks to what extent "people from my ethnic *group*", so was designed to elicit opinions about the group-level and not an individual's own position. More explicitly, fraternalistic relative deprivation is linked with discrimination by the finding in chapter 2 that the group level of egocentric discrimination is a good predictor of feelings of fraternalistic relative deprivation. To be sure, individual-level characteristics are important too, with egocentric experiences of discrimination, being unwaged or otherwise outside the Erikson-Goldthorpe occupational schema, and living in social housing all associated with a higher reported level of fraternalistic relative deprivation. However, the importance of these group-level predictors suggests that our individual-level explanations of voting behaviour for ethnic minorities are insufficient, and that voting according to group interest, rather than individual, is a crucial step in understanding ethnic minority political behaviour.

Heath et al. (2013) also comment on "the need for mainstream political parties to address [feelings of relative deprivation]" (p.13). As such, my argument builds on their work, rather than starting afresh. I find that the second step in the process of voting according to a group utility heuristic is just as important,

and amplifies the effect of fraternalistic relative deprivation on support for the Labour party. A simple analysis of the correspondence between perceived party positions and voter's own ideal points leads me to argue that the key distinction of the Labour party in the eyes of ethnic minority voters is their position on promoting equal opportunities for ethnic minorities. Those who do vote for other parties do not have a different position on this issue from Labour ethnic minority voters – rather, they are more likely to think that the Conservatives or Liberal Democrats or an other party are much closer to their own ideal points, and the perceived position of the Labour party. I interpret this as further evidence that it is really concerns about ethnic inequality and discrimination that drive support for the Labour party.

Chapter 4 on the effect of the British National Party on vote choice and party evaluations reinforces this argument; even controlling for prior Labour vote share in the area, the presence of a British National Party candidate and especially one with a higher vote share is associated with a greater likelihood of ethnic minorities voting Labour, as opposed to abstaining or voting for a minor party. The threat posed by a party that mobilises on the basis of racial prejudice and anti-immigrant sentiment appears to push ethnic minority voters towards the Labour party. Similarly in chapter 5, the effects of Pakistani and Muslim candidates on turnout are conditional on the candidate being from the Labour party.

Chapter 5 on the effects of candidate ethnicity on turnout further reinforces the importance of ethnic group identity on political behaviour. I report two main

effects; a positive effect of a coethnic candidate on likelihood of voting among Pakistanis and Sikhs, and a negative effect of a Pakistani/Sikh candidate on likelihood of voting among Sikhs/Pakistanis respectively. I also show evidence consistent with a clan voting (*biraderi*) explanation among Pakistanis. The positive mobilisation effect depends on identification with one's ethnic group as meaningful such that it leads to support for coethnic candidates. The demobilisation effect is even less likely to make sense without reference to the ethnic group-level. Sikhs and Pakistani Muslims have a great deal of tension arising from the violent history of the Punjab, including the violence on both sides of the border during the partition of India and Pakistan in 1947. This is the most likely driver of the demobilisation effect, as it does not obtain between other combinations of ethnic minority groups and non-coethnic candidates (results not reported). Clearly this is to do with ethnic group identity informing prejudice against Sikhs/Pakistani Muslims, rather than a coincidental pattern of idiosyncratic individual-level prejudice. Although this is not a theme explored in detail in the paper, chapter 5 on candidate effects therefore contributes to the general narrative of ethnic group identity as a motivator of ethnic minority political behaviour.

Chapter 3 concentrated on the Muslim respondents in EMBES, looking at the impact of Islamophobia and opposition to the war in Afghanistan on political alienation and participation. Both over-arching themes of discrimination and group identity as explanations of ethnic minority political behaviour are prominent in this paper. I find strong evidence that Muslims are unique among British ethnic minorities in the extent of religious prejudice they experience.

The effects of perceiving Islamophobia are an increase in politically alienated attitudes, and a decrease in the likelihood of voting but an increase in the likelihood of non-electoral participation. Both of these are consistent with the story that perceptions of sociotropic discrimination lead to alienation from and a rejection of the mainstream party political system, accompanied by an increase in non-conventional political participation. Hall (1999) and John et al. (2011) both suggest a possible correspondence between negative attitudes towards the political establishment and alternative forms of participation, but my contribution synthesises the theoretical side of this and applies it to a situation where the driver of alienation is perceptions of sociotropic discrimination.

Disapproval of the war in Afghanistan is also a group issue; some Muslims are particularly opposed to British involvement in wars in Muslim countries as it implicates British soldiers in the death of Muslim civilians. It is interesting to question whether the effect of disapproval of the war in Afghanistan is evidence of a mechanism that would be applicable to other groups – but the political situation of a highly salient issue where all main parties are opposed to the majority of public opinion is difficult to come across. Perhaps the pro-immigration consensus in 1990s would provide a parallel for white voters in terms of public opinion being in opposition to elite, but the issue salience of immigration for many white voters would not be comparable to that of the Afghanistan war for Muslims. Nevertheless, the effect whereby greater disapproval of the war in Afghanistan is associated with greater political

alienation gives support to extending valence theory from a model of political preference to a partial explanation of democratic system support.

Further research

The first avenue for further research that presents itself from these themes is the extent to which the influence of group identity and discrimination vary between ethnic groups. Chapter 3 established that Muslims in particular experience a much greater amount of religious discrimination than other minority religious groups in Britain, and chapter 5 on the mobilisation effect of Labour Pakistani candidates on Pakistanis suggests that coethnic mobilisation is mostly limited this (largely Muslim) group. Is there something particular about the position of Muslims in Britain that makes group mobilisation more likely? Chapter 5 presented tentative evidence that clan networks (*biraderi*) might be involved in mobilising Pakistani voters, and this fits with journalistic accounts. How does Rahsaan Maxwell's paradox of integration cope with ethnic group voting among black Caribbean and black African groups? Or is there variation between South Asian and black groups in the extent of group voting such that the integration paradox still holds? There is also the prospect of investigating group voting behaviour in the white British population. However there are difficulties here, primarily in identifying the appropriate reference group without biasing the results by cherry-picking. The theoretical question is interesting though; are white British voters more individualistic in their vote behaviour, or are they indeed as concerned with voting according to what they

perceive as their interest group but with a greater diversity of groups that members of this population belong to?

The role of anti-discrimination policy in forming and strengthening ethnic minority support for the Labour party is suggested by Heath et al. (2013) and Sanders et al. (2013), and my analysis supports this perspective insofar as Labour are overwhelmingly considered to be the party most likely to improve life for ethnic minorities. However, in the last general election the Labour party's manifesto did not include a single proposed bill on the topic of racial or religious discrimination. Since the 2010 election public concern over immigration appears to have increased – for instance, in May 2010 29% of the public said that immigration/race relations/immigrants was the most important issue facing the country, but in January 2014 that figure was 41%.[19] In the most recent European elections, the United Kingdom Independence Party returned 28% of the vote and performed better than any other party (albeit on low turnout). Ford et al. (2011) demonstrate that a significant driver of UKIP support is xenophobic attitudes. This confluence of factors presents two interesting sets of questions.

Firstly, how will Labour react in terms of their stance on immigration and racial equality, and what influence will this have on their electoral dominance among ethnic minority voters? Sobolewska, Fieldhouse, & Cutts (2013) show

[19] Taken from the Ipsos-MORI Issues Index at http://www.ipsos-mori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/2905/Issues-Index-2007-onwards.aspx?view=wide

that although ethnic minorities perceive less contact than white voters, parties do campaign equally hard in areas with high ethnic minority population densities and target minorities within these areas. This suggests that the Labour party is aware of the importance of ethnic minorities to their electoral prospects, but given the worry about losing traditional white working class voters it is conceivable that the party will fail to promote immigrant and ethnic minority interests. If this is the case it will be interesting to see whether ethnic minority support for the Labour party is eroded – or if historical support and a lack of viable alternatives preserve the current level of ethnic minority Labour voting.

The second question that arises from the popularity of anti-immigrant sentiment is the extent to which UKIP may function in the same way as the BNP when it comes to ethnic minority support for Labour and evaluations of other mainstream parties. In chapter 4 I argue that the BNP push ethnic minority voters back to Labour, away from abstention and voting for minor parties, out of a fear that a racist and xenophobic party will be legitimised by a high vote share. Evaluations of the Liberal Democrat and Conservative parties/leaders are higher in seats where the BNP are present and electorally stronger, which I suggest is due to an evaluation effect where the far more extreme views of the BNP make even the Conservatives appear more attractive to ethnic minority voters. The BNP is now electorally and organizationally collapsing (Goodwin, 2013), and the closest thing to an extreme right party is UKIP. Will UKIP candidates have the same effect on vote choice and party evaluations as the BNP? Or will their reputational shield (Ivarsflaten, 2006) of concern with the

European Union prevent this? To my knowledge there is no opinion survey of ethnic minority's opinions on the European Union; will the anti-immigrant message of the most prominent Eurosceptic political party turn ethnic minorities into Europhiles?

Conclusion

This thesis has investigated British ethnic minority vote choice, partisanship, turnout, non-electoral participation and feelings of alienation. The twin conclusions emerging from this body of research are that discrimination is a key motivator of ethnic minority political behaviour, but that sociotropic discrimination (perceptions that one's group is discriminated against) is a much more powerful motivator than egocentric discrimination (personal experiences of discrimination). Voting on the basis of ethnic minority group interests (in part informed by sociotropic discrimination) largely explains the extent of Labour support among ethnic minorities, and other phenomena discussed in this thesis. These results imply that both discrimination and ethnic minority group identity will remain highly salient in the study of British ethnic minority political behaviour for some time to come.

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Appendix: Sampling and Weighting

The 2010 British Election Survey (BES) surveyed British residents immediately after the 2010 general election. However, it was not feasible to interview substantial numbers of ethnic minorities within the BES, and thus the Ethnic Minority British Election Study (EMBES) was designed to target the five largest ethnic minority groups in Great Britain. These groups are residents of Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Black Caribbean and Black African background. Unlike the 1997 BES ethnic minority booster sample, the 2010 EMBES is a distinct survey but as it was designed to compliment the 2010 BES, many questions overlap.

Sampling

Residents 18 and over who self-classify into one of the aforementioned five categories were targeted. The goal was approximately 350-400 interviews for Bangladeshis (the smallest group) and approximately 600 interviews for the other four, for a total of 2,750 to 2800 interviews.

The sample design consisted of three stages:

1. A stratified random sample of 715 Primary Sampling Units (PSUs) consisting of Lower Level Super Output Areas (LSOAs) in England and Wales and Data Zones (DZs) in Scotland (with 119 of these initially allocated to a reserve pool)
2. A systematic random sample of 25-75 addresses (from Residential Postal Address Files) from each sampled PSU
3. One individual randomly sampled from those eligible at each of those addresses

Some possible interview candidates were systematically excluded in two key ways:

1. Approximately 10-15% of each group live in areas where that group is too thinly spread for efficient sampling.
2. Addresses were screened based on information provided by a single resident, and there are likely to be cases where individuals were erroneously excluded.

Because the Bangladeshi population was smaller than the other four categories, an additional booster sample was included of 29 PSUs (with 5 in the reserve pool), with 40-75 sampled addresses in each one.

The set of PSUs was filtered prior to sampling in order to target the minimum required to achieve 80% coverage for all chosen ethnic groups. This was achieved by ranking PSUs in terms of 2001 census results for each group. The estimated actual coverage levels are as follows (from table 3.2 of the EMBES technical report):

Ethnic group	Estimated Coverage
Black Caribbean	88%
Black African	89%
Indian	85%
Pakistani	91%
Bangladeshi	90%
Total	88%

PSUs were explicitly and implicitly stratified to minimise sample variance prior to sampling. Stratification was primarily by ethnic mix with the intention of achieving the target coverage percentages. The method used was *k*-means clustering, which produces *k* clusters that are as different as possible with respect to the five input variables (target ethnic group population percentages).

The Bangladeshi booster sample was required because there was no way to ensure enough Bangladeshi interviews while targeting the other four groups equally. This meant that the sample design focused on the other four groups, while a booster sample of self-identifying Bangladeshis was added to increase their sample size by approximately 100 to 350-375 interviews.

Weighting

EMBES 2010 provides weights to allow statistical analysis to properly account for how each response is representative of the population it is selected from. Weighting was carried out first with respect to unequal selection probabilities in sample design and second to account for differences in non-response and re-align results with population estimates.

While the address probabilities for each ethnic group were recorded during the sampling phase, the possibility of multiple dwelling units or large households present at a single address means individuals at addresses with smaller households have a higher likelihood of selection. Thus the final selection probability is calculated as the product of the following probabilities

1. Address selection probability
2. 1/number of dwelling units at the address
3. 1/number of eligible occupants at the selected dwelling unit

The design weight is then 1/final selection probability. Caps were applied to excessive values, and the values were trimmed to ensure the factor of largest to smallest weights was not excessive.

Non-response rim weights were created to bring populations in line with the 2009 Labour Force Survey and the Office of National Statistics (ONS) mid-year population estimates from 2007 on age, sex and region. An optional additional weight was provided for grouping all populations into one category based on the ONS estimates.

Further non-response weights were applied to mailed surveys, using the following variables from the face-to-face results as comparison.

1. Age-group of respondent
2. Gender
3. Ethnicity
4. Region
5. Interest in the general election
6. Whether has volunteered to get involved in politics or community affairs
7. How much has in common with British people in general
8. How, and if cast vote in 2010 election
9. Level of comfort with being asked directions from picture of woman in Niqab
10. Whether place of worship encouraged members to vote
11. Whether British citizen
12. Whether got information about the election and recent issues in Britain from newspapers
13. Whether got information about the election and recent issues in Britain from television
14. Whether got information about the election and recent issues in Britain from the radio

These variables were entered via a forward stepwise procedure (though the first four were included as control variables). These were calculated into non-response probabilities by taking their reciprocal. Again to avoid extreme weights the first and 99th percentiles were trimmed.

The weights used in this thesis are the design weight, the final weight for the face-to-face survey with all five groups together and the final weight for the postal mail back survey with all five groups together.

Appendix: Survey Questions and Response

Below are the questions from the *British Election Study 2010 Ethnic Minority Survey Questionnaire* that were pertinent to this thesis. The basic format of these questions is as follows.

[variable name] **"Wording of question asked"** (Any notes to interviewers)
Only ask: If respondent fulfills criteria specified
Possible
Responses
To
Question

In some cases there are two variable names for the same question. In this case these are separated by a '|' as in: [variable name|alternate name].

Some questions are 'Looped questions', meaning approximately the same question is asked with respect to multiple topics (called 'options' below), and all the possible responses are the same. These are called looped because they 'loop' over the different options, and they are formatted in the following manner.

[variable name] Looped Question
Only ask: If respondent fulfills criteria specified
Preamble
First: **"For the first option in this looped question, could you please begin the question with this preamble"**
Subsequent: **"For all subsequent questions could you begin the question with this preamble"**
Options
"which is followed by the first option?"
"which is followed by the second option?"
"which is followed by the third option?"
Conclusion
"All questions end with this conclusion."
Possible Responses
Possible
Responses
To
Questions

The interviewer would read the first option as:

"For the first option in this looped question could you please begin the question with this preamble which is followed by the first option? All questions end with this conclusion."

The second option would then read:

"For all subsequent questions could you begin the question with this preamble which is followed by the second option? All questions end with this conclusion."

Questions

"To start with I would like to ask you some questions about yourself and your background."

[zq88] Respondent's gender
Male or Female (Observed and recorded by interviewer)

[zq89] **"What was your age last birthday?"**
Age in years (range [18, 97], greater than 97 is coded as 97)
DK REF

[zq90] **"Can I just check which of these applies to you at present? Please take your answers from this card"**
Married
Living with a partner
Separated (after being married)
Divorced
Widowed
Single (never married)
DK REF

[zq101|bq101] **"Now I'd like to ask you some questions about your ethnic background and national identity. Firstly, please could you look at this card and tell me which of these best describes your ethnic group? Please take your answers from this card."**
WHITE
British
Irish
Gypsy or Irish Traveller
Any other White background
MIXED
White and Black Caribbean
White and Black African
White and Asian
Any other mixed background
ASIAN
Asian or Asian British – Indian
Asian or Asian British – Pakistani

Asian or Asian British – Bangladeshi

BLACK

Black or Black British – Caribbean
Black or Black British – African
Any other Black/Black British background
Chinese
Any other ethnic group DK REF

Chinese

Any other ethnic group
DK REF

[zq106_1|bq106_1] **"Do you regard yourself as belonging to any particular religion?"**

Yes
No
DK REF

[eq106_a] **"Which one? Please take your answers from this card."**

Only ask: If 'yes' at [zq106_1]
Christian
Jewish
Hindu
Muslim
Sikh
Buddhist
Other (Write in)
DK REF

[eq4] **"How important is your religion to you? Please take your answers from this card."**

Only ask: If 'yes' at [zq106_1]
Extremely important
Very important
Somewhat important
Not very important
Not important at all
DK REF

[eq106_4] **"In the past 12 months, how often did you participate in religious activities or attend religious services or meetings with other people, other than for events such as weddings and funerals? Please take your answers from this card."**

Only ask: If 'yes' at [zq106_1]
At least once a day
At least once a week
At least once a month
Occasionally (but less than once a month)

Only on festivals
Not at all
DK REF

[bq9_1] **"Now some questions about politics and voting. Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as Labour, Conservative, Liberal Democrat, (Scottish National/Plaid Cymru1) or what?"**
None/No
Labour
Conservatives
Liberal Democrats
Scottish National Party (SNP)
Plaid Cymru
Green Party
United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP)
British National Party (BNP)
Something else – please write in what (Write in)
DK REF

[bq9_2] **"Do you generally think of yourself as a little closer to one of the parties than the others?"**
Only ask: If 'None/No', DK or REF for [bq9_1]
Yes
No
DK REF

[bq9_3] **"Which party is that?"**
Only ask: If 'yes' at [bq9_1]
None/No
Labour
Conservatives
Liberal Democrats
Scottish National Party (SNP)
Plaid Cymru
Green Party
United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP)
British National Party (BNP)
Another party – please write in which (Write in)
DK REF

[bq11] **"As far as you know, is your name on the electoral register, that is, the official list of people entitled to vote, either at this address or somewhere else?"** (Multiple responses accepted)
Yes – where living now
Yes – another address
No
DK REF

[bq17] Looped Question

Preamble

First: **"On a scale that runs from 0 to 10, where 0 means strongly dislike and 10 means strongly like, how do you feel about"**

Subsequent: **"And how do you feel about"**

Options

[bq17_2] **"the Labour Party?"**
[bq17_3] **"the Conservative Party?"**
[bq17_4] **"the Liberal Democrats?"**
[bq17_5] **"the Green Party?"**
[bq17_6] **"the BNP?"**

Conclusion

"Please take your answers from this card."

Possible Responses

Strongly dislike
one
two
three
four
five
six
seven
eight
nine
Strongly like
DK REF

[bq16] Looped Question

Preamble

First: **"Now, thinking about British political institutions like Parliament, please use the 0 to 10 scale to indicate how much trust you have for each of the following, where 0 means no trust and 10 means a great deal of trust. Firstly, how much do you trust"**

Subsequent: **"How much do you trust"**

Options

a **"the Parliament at Westminster?"**
b **"British politicians generally?"**
c **"the Police?"**

Conclusion

"Please take your answers from this card."

Possible Responses

No trust
one
two
three
four
five
six
seven
eight

nine
A great deal of trust

[bq15] Looped Question

Preamble

First: **"Now let's think about party leaders for a moment. Using a scale that runs from 0 to 10, where 0 means strongly dislike and 10 means strongly like, how do you feel about"**

Subsequent: **"And how do you feel about"**

If necessary: **"Please think about how you felt about"**

Options

"Gordon Brown[?]"
"David Cameron[?]"
"Nick Clegg[?]"

Conclusion

If necessary: **"at the time of the election?"**
"Please take your answers from this card."

Possible Responses

Strongly dislike
one
two
three
four
five
six
seven
eight
nine
Strongly like
DK REF

[bq61] **"On the whole, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way that democracy works in this country? Please take your answers from this card."**

Very satisfied
Fairly satisfied
A little dissatisfied
Very dissatisfied
DK REF

"Now a few questions about how active you are in politics and community affairs."

[bq54_2] **"Over the past few years, have you volunteered to get involved in politics or community affairs?"**

Yes - I have volunteered
No - I have not volunteered
DK REF

[bq54_3] **"Over the past few years, how active have you been in a voluntary organisation, like a local community association, a charity, or a sports club? Please take your answers from this card."**

Very active
Somewhat active
A little active
Not at all active/Not involved
DK REF

[eq13_1] **"In the last 12 months, have you participated in a protest, like a rally or a demonstration, to show your concern about a public issue or problem?"**

Yes
No
DK REF

[eq13_2] **"In the last 12 months, have you signed a petition, to show your concern about a public issue or problem?"**

Yes
No
DK REF

[eq13_3] **"In the last 12 months, have you participated in a boycott of a particular product or service?"**

Yes
No
DK REF

[eq13_4] **"In the last 12 months, have you given money to a political cause or advocacy organisation (other than a political party)?"**

Yes
No
DK REF

[bq1] **"Let's talk for a few minutes about politics in general. How much interest do you generally have in what is going on in British politics? Please take your answers from this card."**

A great deal
Quite a lot
Some
Not very much
None at all
DK REF

[bq2_1] **"Now, I'd like to ask you a few questions about the issues and problems facing Britain today. As far as you're concerned, what is the single most important issue facing the country at the present time?"** (Code one from possible responses, first if multiple given, do not prompt)

Asylum seekers

Britain's membership of the European Monetary Union (the Euro)
Britain's relations with the European Union
Law and order
Education
Environment
National Health Service
Inflation, Prices generally
Public transport
Taxation
State of the economy
Unemployment
My standard of living
Price of petrol
War in Iraq
War in Afghanistan
War against terrorism
Immigration/People coming to Britain
Other (Write in)
There are no important issues
DK REF

[bq3] **"How well do you think the last government handled this issue: the economy in general? Please take your answers from this card."**

Very well
Fairly well
Neither well nor badly
Fairly badly
Very badly
DK REF

[bq18] Looped Question

Preamble

First: The first question is not pertinent to this thesis.

Subsequent: **"And how much do you agree or disagree with this statement"**

Options

[bq18_2] **"There is often a big gap between what people like me expect out of life and what we actually get."**

[bq18_6] **"It is every citizen's duty to vote in an election."**

[eq14_1] **"It doesn't really matter which party is in power, in the end opportunities for Black and Asian people will stay much the same."**

[eq14_2] **"Parties are only interested in the votes of black and Asian people, not in their opinions."**

Conclusion

"Please take your answers from this card."

Possible Responses

Strongly agree
Agree

Neither agree nor disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
DK REF

[bq40] Looped Question

Preamble

First: **"Now, another issue. Using the 0 to 10 scale on this card, where the end marked 0 means that government should cut taxes and spend much less on health and social services, and the end marked 10 means that government should raise taxes a lot and spend much more on health and social services, where would you place"**

Subsequent: **"And where would you place**"

Options

a **"yourself"**
b **"the Labour party"**
c **"the Conservative party"**
d **"the Liberal Democrats"**

Conclusion

"on this scale? Please take your answers from this card."

Possible Responses

Government should cut taxes a lot and spend much less on health and social services
one
two
three
four
five
six
seven
eight
nine
Government should increase taxes a lot and spend much more on health and social services
DK REF

[bq41] Looped Question

Preamble

First: **"Some people think that reducing crime is more important than protecting the rights of people accused of committing crimes. Other people think that protecting the rights of accused people, regardless of whether they have been convicted of committing a crime, is more important than reducing crime. On the 0-10 scale, where would you place"**

Subsequent: **"And where would you place"**

Options

a **"yourself"**
b **"the Labour party"**

c **"the Conservative party"**
d **"the Liberal Democrats"**

Conclusion

"on this scale? Please take your answers from this card."

Possible Responses

Reducing crime more important
one
two
three
four
five
six
seven
eight
nine
Rights of accused more important
DK REF

[bq74] Looped Question

Preamble

First: **"Using the 0 to 10 scale on this card, where the end marked 0 means that there is no need for government to take action to improve opportunities for Black and Asian people, marked 10 means that government should make every improve opportunities for Black and Asian people, you place"**

Subsequent: **"And where would you place"**

Options

a **"yourself"**
b **"the Labour party"**
c **"the Conservative party"**
d **"the Liberal Democrats"**

Conclusion

"on this scale? Please take your answers from this card."

Possible Responses

No need for government to take action to improve opportunities for Black and Asian people
one
two
three
four
five
six
seven
eight
nine
Government should make every effort to improve opportunities for Black and Asian people
DK REF

[bq57_1] **"Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with each of the following statements: I feel a sense of satisfaction when I vote. Please take your answers from this card."**

Strongly agree
Agree
Neither agree nor disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
DK REF

[bq59] **"On a scale from 0 to 10 where 10 means a great deal of influence and 0 means no influence, how much influence do you have on politics and public affairs? Please take your answers from this card."**

No influence
one
two
three
four
five
six
seven
eight
nine
A great deal of influence
DK REF

[eq16a] **"Some people think of themselves first as British. Others may think of themselves first as (Black/Asian). Which best describes how you think of yourself?"** (Show on a screen)

Only ask: If codes 9-15 at [zq101] is "Black" if zq101 = 13-15, "Asian" if zq101 = 9-12

ASIAN/INDIAN
ASIAN/PAKISTANI
ASIAN/BANGLADESHI
ASIAN/OTHER
BLACK/AFRICAN
BLACK/CARIBBEAN
BLACK/OTHER

(Black/Asian), not British,
More (Black/Asian) than British,
Equally (Black/Asian) and British,
More British than (Black/Asian),
British, not (Black/Asian).
or, do you think of yourself in some other way? (Write in)
DK REF

[eq20_1] **"During the run-up to the general election, did you think any of the political parties campaigned specifically in order to win the votes of Black and Asian people?**

Yes
No
DK REF

[eq20_2] **"Which party was that?"** (probe) **"Any others?"** (Multiple responses accepted)

Only ask: If Yes to [eq20_1]
Labour
Conservatives
Liberal Democrats
Scottish National Party (SNP)
Plaid Cymru
Green Party
United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP)
British National Party (BNP)
Other (Write in)
DK REF

[eq21_1] **"And during the run-up to the general election, did you think any of the political parties campaigned specifically in order to win the votes of White people who are prejudiced against Black and Asian people?"**

Yes
No
DK REF

[eq21_2] **"Which party was that?"** (probe) **"Any others?"** (Multiple responses accepted)

Only ask: If Yes to [eq21_1]
Labour
Conservatives
Liberal Democrats
Scottish National Party (SNP)
Plaid Cymru
Green Party
United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP)
British National Party (BNP)
Other (Write in)
DK REF

[bq79] Randomised Looped Question

Preamble

First: **"Please tell me if you think that the following statements are true or false. If you don't know, just say so and we will skip to the next one. Remember - true, false, or don't know."**

Subsequent: **"Please tell me if you think this statement is true or false."**

Options

[bq79_1] **"Polling stations close at 10.00pm on election day."**
[bq79_3] **"The minimum voting age is 16."**

[bq79_5] **"The Chancellor of the Exchequer is responsible for setting interest rates in the UK."**

[bq79_8] **"Any registered voter can obtain a postal vote if they want one - by contacting their local council and asking for a postal vote."**

[eq79_9] **"The Labour party has the most MPs from ethnic minorities."**

Possible Responses

True
False
Don't Know

[eq24] **"Do you think there is a lot of racial prejudice in Britain nowadays, a little or hardly any?"**

A lot
A little
Hardly any
DK REF

[eq25] **"Which groups, if any, do you think there is prejudice against?"** (Do not prompt, code all that apply)

Asian people (Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi)
Black people (Caribbean, African)
Chinese people
White people
Mixed race people
Buddhists
Hindus
Jews
Muslims
Sikhs
Asylum seekers/Refugees
New immigrants
Eastern Europeans
Other (Write in)
None
DK REF

[bq71] **"Which party do you think is best able to help improve life in Britain for ethnic minority groups?"**

Labour
Conservatives
Liberal Democrats
Other (Write in)
None, no party (Volunteered)

[bq12_1] **"Now some questions about politics and voting. Talking with people about the general election on May 6th we have found that a lot of**

people didn't manage to vote. How about you, did you manage to vote in the general election?"

Yes, voted
No, did not vote
Don't know
Do not want to answer

[bq12_2] **"Which party did you vote for in the general election?"**

Only ask: If 'yes' at [bq12_1=1]
Labour
Conservatives
Liberal Democrats
Scottish National Party (SNP)
Plaid Cymru
Green Party
United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP)
British National Party (BNP)
Someone else – please write in who (Write in)
Don't know
Do not want to answer

[bq45] **"Please indicate whether you strongly approve, approve, disapprove, or strongly disapprove of Britain's involvement in the war against the Taliban in Afghanistan."**

Strongly approve
Approve
Neither approve nor
Disapprove
Strongly disapprove disapprove
Don't know
Do not want to answer

[eq37] **"Discrimination may happen when people are treated unfairly because they are seen as being different from others. In the past 5 years, do you feel that you have experienced discrimination or been treated unfairly by others in the UK because of your ethnicity, race, skin colour, language, accent, religion, age, gender, sexuality or disability?"**

Yes
No
DK REF

[eq42] **"Have you taken part in the activities of an ethnic or cultural association or club in the past 12 months?"**

Yes
No
DK REF

[eq46_1] **"Now, I would like to ask you about the ways your ethnicity or culture may be important in your social life. As far as you know, how**

many of your friends have the same ethnic background as you?" (Options read out)

All of them
Most of them
About half of them
A few of them
None of them?
DK REF

[eq46_2] **"As far as you know, how many of the people you work with have the same ethnic background as you?"** (Options read out)

All of them
Most of them
About half of them
A few of them
None of them?
Not in employment/ work
DK REF

[eq46_3] **"As far as you know, how many of the people in your neighbourhood have the same ethnic background as you?"** (Options read out)

All of them
Most of them
About half of them
A few of them
None of them?
DK REF

[eq46_4] **"As far as you know, how many of the people at your church or place of worship have the same ethnic background as you?"** (Options read out)

Only ask: if respondent has a religion (bq106_1=1)
All of them
Most of them
About half of them
A few of them
None of them?
Do not go to church/a place of worship
DK REF

[bq55] **"Did anyone, for example, a friend, a member of your family, or someone at work, try to persuade you to vote for a particular party in the recent general election? Please take your answers from this card."** (probe) **"Any others?"** (All that apply coded)

Friend(s)
Family member(s)
Someone at work
Someone from your church or place of worship

Someone from your neighbourhood
Someone from your ethnic, cultural or religious association or club
Someone from another association or club
Other person(s)
No one tried to convince me
DK REF

[bq86_1] **"Did any of the political parties contact you, either in person or over the phone, during the recent election campaign?"**

Yes
No

[bq86_2] **"Which of the political parties contacted you during the recent election campaign?"** (probe) **"Any others?"** (Code all that apply, maximum of 9)

Only ask: If 'yes' at [bq86_1]
Labour
Conservative
Liberal Democrat
Scottish National Party
Plaid Cymru
Green Party
United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP)
British National Party (BNP)
Other (Write in, maximum 60 characters)

[eq50] Looped Question

Only ask: If respondent is not from mixed background [bq101 not 5-8]
Preamble
"And can you remember whether the"
Options
All parties from [bq86_2]
Conclusion
"cavasser was [bq101 response] or not?"
Possible Responses
Yes, [bq101 response]
No, not [bq101 response]
Don't remember
DK REF

[bq102_1] **"In which country were you born?"**

England
Scotland
Wales
Northern
India
Pakistan
Bangladesh
Other (Write in)

DK REF

[eq52_f] **"In which country was your father born?"**
Only ask: If born in UK [bq102_1=1-4]
Ireland
England
Scotland
Wales
Northern Ireland
India
Pakistan
Bangladesh
Other (Write in)
DK REF

[eq52_m] **"In which country was your mother born?"**
Only ask: If born in UK [bq102_1=1-4]
England
Scotland
Wales
Ireland
India
Pakistan
Bangladesh
Other (Write in)
DK REF

[eq52_x] Interviewer codes whether respondent's mother was born in the same country as their father.
Only ask: If mother and father both born abroad [eq52_f=8 & eq52_m=8]
Yes
No

[bq102_r] **"In which year did you first move to Britain?"**
Only ask: If not born in UK [bq102_1=5-8]
Write in year or age if necessary
DK REF

[eq61_1] **"Is English the MAIN language that you speak at home?"**
Yes
No
DK REF

[eq61_3] **"Can I just check, in day-to-day life, how good are you at speaking English when you need to? For example to have a conversation on the telephone or talk to a professional such as a teacher or a doctor? Would you say you are…"** (Read out)
Only ask: if no [eq61_1=2]
very good,

fairly good,
below average,
or poor?
SPONTANEOUS ONLY: No opinion
DK REF

[zq93_1] **"Does your household own or rent this accommodation?"** ('Own' includes on a mortgage)
Own
Rent
Neither
DK REF

[zq93_2] **"Do you own your home outright or on a mortgage?"**
Only ask: If 'own' [bq93_1 = 1]
Own the leasehold/freehold outright
Buying leasehold/freehold on a mortgage
DK REF

[zq93_3] **"Who do you rent from?"**
Only ask: If 'rent' [bq93_1 = 2]
Local authority
New Town Development Corporation
Housing Association
Property company
Employer
Other organisation
Relative
Other individual
Housing Trust
Rent free, squatting
Shared ownership (e.g. part rent, part buy)
Other (Write in)
DK REF

[eq63] **"Do you have any British educational or work-related qualifications?"**
Yes
No
DK REF

[zq95_3] **"Taking your answers from this card, which is the highest British qualification you have? Please just give me the number next to it."** (If not on list, probe for equivalent if possible.)
Only ask: If 'yes' [eq63 = 1]
Postgraduate degree
First degree
University/polytechnic
Teaching qualification

Nursing qualification
HNC/HND, City & Guilds
A level and equivalent
Scottish Higher and equivalent
ONC/OND, City & Guilds level 3, NVQ/SVQ 3
GCSE A*-C, CSE grade 1, O level grade A-C
Scottish Standard grades, Ordinary bands
GCSE D-G, CSE grades 2-5, O level D-E
City & Guilds level 2, NVQ/SVQ 2 and equivalent
City & Guilds level 1, NVQ/SVQ 1 and equivalent
Clerical and commercial qualifications
Recognised trade apprenticeship
Youth training certificate, skill seekers
Other technical, professional or higher qualification (Write in)
DK REF

[eq64_1] **"Do you have any qualifications you have not yet told me about that you gained overseas? I mean qualifications gained either at school, at college or university through work or training or independently through your own study?"**

Yes
No
REF

[eq64_2] **"Which phrase on this card comes closest to describing what sort of qualification this is?"**

Only ask: If yes [eq64_1 = 1]

School exam – Below University Entrance Level (i.e. equivalent to GCSE/O-Level)
School exam – University Entrance Level (i.e. equivalent to A-Level)
First Degree from University or similar institution (i.e. equivalent to BA, B.Ed, BSc)
Higher Degree (i.e. equivalent to MA, MSc, PhD)
Commercial qualifications (e.g. typing, shorthand, book-keeping, commerce)
Any other vocational or work related qualification
Some other sort of qualification
DK REF

[eq65_1] **"Which of the descriptions on this card best applies to you?"**

In paid work
In full-time education
Unemployed for six months or
Unemployed for less than six
Permanently sick or disabled
Retired
Looking after the home
Doing something else (Write in)
DK REF

[eq65_2] **"And which of the descriptions on the card best applies to your wife/husband/partner?"**

Only ask: If married or living with partner [bq90 = 1 OR 2]
In paid work
In full-time education
Unemployed for six months or more
Unemployed for less than six months
Permanently sick or disabled
Retired
Looking after the home
Doing something else (Write in)
DK REF

[eq65_3] **"Which one of the descriptions on this card best applies to you?"**

Only ask: If in work [eq65_1 = 1]
Employee
Self-employed but without employees
Self-employed with employees
Unpaid family worker
DK REF

[eq65_4] **"Which one of the descriptions on this card best applies to your wife/husband/partner?"**

Only ask: If partner in work [eq65_2 = 1]
Employee
Self-employed but without employees
Self-employed with employees
Unpaid family worker
DK REF

[zq98_1] **"From this card please tell me which best describes the sort of work you do. (If you are not working now, please tell me what you did in your last job)."**

Professional or higher technical work
Manager or senior administrator
Clerical
Sales or services
Small business owner
Foreman or supervisor of other workers
Skilled manual work
Semi-skilled or unskilled manual work
Other (Write in)
Never worked
DK REF

[zq98_2] **"From the same card, please tell me which best describes the sort of work your (husband/wife/partner) does (or did in (his/her) last job)."**

Only ask: If 'married' or 'living with a partner' [bq90=1 OR 2]
Professional or higher technical work
Manager or senior administrator
Clerical
Sales or services
Small business owner
Foreman or supervisor of other workers
Skilled manual work
Semi-skilled or unskilled manual work
Other (Write in)
Never worked
DK REF