

Diplomatic Training and Spaces of Anticolonial Worldmaking

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Abstract: Focusing on training for African diplomats from newly independent countries in Cameroon, Kenya, and Zimbabwe, this paper makes the case for spaces of diplomatic training as sites for anticolonial “worldmaking” (Getachew 2019; *Worldmaking After Empire: The Rise and Fall of Self-Determination*). Recent scholarship has highlighted the value of African leaders’ visions but largely overlooked the actors, spaces, and practices through which these visions were to be enacted. Drawing on archival evidence from Africa, Europe, and North America, and oral history interviews, we argue that worldmaking projects were grounded, learnt, and transformed in places such as the classrooms and study tours we explore. Whilst many accounts of anticolonial and subaltern geopolitical projects focus on grassroots activism beyond and against the state, we argue we also need to attend to the contributions of those—like African diplomats in training—who critiqued Eurocentric and colonial international relations from subaltern positions whilst remaining privileged within the context of the postcolonial state.

Résumé: Cet article se concentre sur la formation des diplomates africains issus de pays nouvellement indépendants, comme le Cameroun, le Kenya et le Zimbabwe. Il soutient que les espaces de formation diplomatique peuvent être considérés comme des lieux de « worldmaking » anticolonial (Getachew 2019; *Worldmaking After Empire: The Rise and Fall of Self-Determination*). Si les recherches récentes ont souvent mis en avant les visions des dirigeants africains, elles ont souvent ignoré les acteurs, les espaces et les pratiques qui ont permis de mettre en œuvre ces visions. À partir de documents d'archives en Afrique, en Europe et en Amérique du Nord, ainsi que d'interviews orales, cet article montre que les projets de worldmaking se sont développés et transformés dans des lieux comme les salles de classe et les voyages d'étude. Alors que de nombreux récits sur les projets géopolitiques anticoloniaux et subalternes se concentrent sur l'activisme de base, souvent en dehors de l'État ou contre lui, nous soutenons qu'il est aussi essentiel d'examiner les contributions de ceux qui, comme les diplomates africains en formation, critiquaient les relations internationales eurocentriques et coloniales, tout en restant privilégiés dans le cadre de l'État postcolonial.

Keywords: worldmaking, anticolonial, diplomatic training, Africa, decolonisation, geopolitics

Introduction

This paper makes the case for spaces of diplomatic training as sites for anticolonial “worldmaking” (Getachew 2019). Through a focus on training for diplomats from newly independent African countries, developed in Cameroon, Kenya, and Zimbabwe, as well as that offered by UNITAR (the United Nations Institute for Training and Research) we argue that training spaces can be radical and inspiring: they were sites for African resistance to the ongoing coloniality of international relations, and for agency and solidarity in making different worlds after empire. Whilst diplomats from the decolonising world were postcolonial elites, they were also “marginally positioned within the global political system” (Craggs 2018:47). Research in geography focusing on subaltern, feminist, and other forms of geopolitics from below have, until recently, predominantly focused on grassroots movements and those excluded from the elite realm of international relations (e.g. Koopman 2011; Smith 2016). Yet, as Jo Sharp (2011) has argued, we also need to attend to the contributions of those—such as the leaders of newly independent countries—who critiqued Eurocentric and colonial international relations from subaltern positions whilst also remaining privileged within the context of the postcolonial state.

Looking back at the era of decolonisation from the present it is possible to miss the optimism, creativity, and revolutionary consequences of this period. More than solely a project of anticolonial nationalism, Adom Getachew (2019:2) argues decolonisation was an *international* endeavour: a “project of reordering the world that sought to create a domination-free and egalitarian international world order”. A slew of work across history, geography, and political science is now highlighting the contributions of politicians and thinkers in attempting to remake the postcolonial world. Much of this work has focused on anticolonial leaders, such as Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, Amílcar Cabral, and Thomas Sankara (deGrassi 2023; Getachew 2019; Murrey 2018). But alongside these leaders were academics, educators, diplomats, administrators, and others; individuals marginalised still further in Eurocentric narratives of the geopolitics of the mid/late 20th century, their creativity, intellectual innovation, and practices entirely obscured. Whilst undoubtedly representatives of (sometimes repressive) postcolonial states (see Murrey 2024), as well as of liberation movements still fighting for independence, the trainee diplomats we focus on here were also an important part of reimagining a more equal and just world after empire: their practices aimed not only at forwarding the perspectives of their states, but also remaking what the international could be.

Diplomats work within set norms and represent states to which they are directly answerable. Training is typically the passing on of professional skills and knowledge within the framework of existing practice. Given this, can diplomats really be radical, and could training provide the space for the development of radical practice? We suggest they can. Much work on power and resistance understands the latter to be spectacular, noisy, and defiant (Bhabha 1994; Daley and Murrey 2022), but resistance can also be quiet and sometimes hard to see, and coming from those with ambiguous positions within global politics (Noe 2022; Sharp 2011; Sou 2022). In the case of the training we focus on here, we can

discern both everyday resistance to the diplomatic norms and knowledges put forward by educators from the Global North and more fundamental attempts to rework what the international might look like from the South.

Surabhi Ranganathan (2024), drawing on Richard Delgado (1989), suggests that “stock stories” of this era—wherein diplomats, lawyers, and leaders from the formerly colonised world are often cast as utopian dreamers, or irrational and emotional actors—are often told from the Global North perspective. In these stories, alternative visions failed due to a lack of pragmatism and reason, rather than because political and economic structures—and narratives about them—provided little space for the development of alternatives (O’Malley and Thakur 2022; Ranganathan 2024). Yet the debates and programmes for alternative worlds discussed in and beyond training spaces matter. Progressive visions for a fairer international world provide a reservoir of alternative political and economic futures to work towards; as Nils Gilman (2015:11) has argued, they can “help us to reopen the possibility space of contemporary geopolitics”. This paper returns to these ideas and practices, and unsettles the stock stories about this era from the perspective of a novel set of spaces—those of training for African diplomats in the decade after 1970. Drawing on extensive archival research and new oral history interviews, we demonstrate the value of taking trainers, diplomats in training, and the spaces of this learning seriously as sites and practices of anticolonial worldmaking.

Training as Worldmaking

Diplomatic training, we argue, opens up the contributions of diplomats and educators to what Getachew (2019) has called “worldmaking after empire”. A focus on diplomatic training adds depth and new dimensions to scholarship about the worldmaking ideas of “Third World” leaders during and after decolonisation (deGrassi 2023; Prashad 2008) by fleshing out *how* and *where* these ideas were debated, and plans for implementation were drawn up. Diplomatic training also takes us to overlooked places; geographical detail is barely present in many of the accounts of postcolonial worldmaking. Getachew’s (2019) rich account of alternative visions for the international world rarely touches down in specific places, and whilst Vijay Prashad’s (2008) book about the history of the Third World Project focuses on particular locations—from Paris to Bandung, and from Belgrade to Arusha—his is a sweeping narrative rather than a fine-grained historical geography. But worldmaking projects are grounded and practised in particular places (Legg et al. 2022; Lewis 2023). They are also learnt, disputed, and transformed in places such as the classrooms and study tours that are the focus of our account.

Whilst worldmaking as a term is only just beginning to be taken up in geography (see, for example, Featherstone et al. 2024; Loong in Constantinou et al. 2024; Murrey 2024), Getachew’s project connects to a range of work within and beyond the discipline that has returned to the politics of mid-20th century decolonisation afresh, highlighting progressive grassroots and activist visions and anticolonial networks rather than national leaders (Afro-Asian Networks Research Collective 2018; Davies 2020; Ferretti 2024; Lewis 2023). This complements

important and longstanding debates in this journal, stretching from early work highlighting the inadequacy and violence of postcolonial state-building, to the alternative transnational circuits and imaginaries of Black Power politics and other radical anti- and decolonial world making visions (Bledsoe and Wright 2019; deGrassi 2023; Featherstone 2023; Santos 1974; Slater 1973).

We argue that we need to look beyond these overtly radical actors and networks in order to fully understand the revolutionary potential of decolonisation and worldmaking after empire. In recent years, exciting new research has sought to elucidate the experiences and contributions of those Global South actors that were elites within postcolonial states but remained subaltern in the international sphere as representatives of marginalised countries (Ferretti 2022; Guyot-Récharid 2022; O'Malley and Thakur 2022; Ranganathan 2024; Sharp 2011). Our work contributes to these important conversations through a focus on the educators and would-be diplomats charged with materialising a still-state-centric, but alternative, more equal world in the 1970s and 1980s. We argue, as Ranganathan (2024:199) has for lawyers, that diplomats should be understood as “intellectual agents circulating ideas”, and thus as “an important category of worldmaking actors”.

Attention to the alternative projects discussed above has emerged, in part, in reaction to increasing acknowledgement of the ongoing coloniality of knowledge and expertise in the present day (and the consequential marginalisation of alternative worldmaking visions). Individual disciplines have come under the spotlight (for geography, see Esson et al. 2017; Radcliffe 2022; for IR and diplomacy, see Gani and Marshall 2022; Opondo 2010; Shilliam 2010), as have universities and their colonial histories (e.g. Bhambra et al. 2018). Professional training has been less of a focus but demonstrates similar patterns: racialised and Eurocentric notions of knowledge and expertise, upheld by, and reinforcing, huge power differentials (Kothari 2005).

We have argued elsewhere (McConnell et al. 2024) that diplomatic training in many instances can be understood in similar terms. Even when trainers were supportive of decolonisation, their training often imagined new diplomats fitting in to “international society” (Bull and Watson 1984), expanding rather than changing it. “Problems” of Third World diplomats were cast as individual deficiencies rather than structural issues emanating from colonial underdevelopment (for these dynamics in other contexts, see Daley and Kamata in Powell et al. 2017; Temin 2023). Resistance to diplomatic training provided by former colonisers—in the form of rejecting the training in its totality or in the classroom itself—was often cast as colonial irrationality rather than a logical response to ongoing coloniality. Education often acted as a site for the reproduction of social orders, not only in colonial contexts but also in the training of postcolonial diplomats by independent governments. Kira Huju (2023), drawing on Bourdieusian habitus, has made this point in her excellent account of the “cosmopolitan” social rules of the Indian Foreign Service after independence. The formal and informal curriculum that Indian diplomats-in-training received had “worldmaking powers” (Huju 2023:43) which upheld a certain upper-caste, Western-educated, cosmopolitan postcolonial vision for Indian diplomats.

Yet whilst these perspectives are important, there is a risk that, by highlighting the power imbalances and colonial continuities after decolonisation, we lose sight of the agency of formerly colonised peoples and their contributions (Táiwò 2022). As David Myer Temin (2023:236) has argued, critiques of Eurocentrism in political theory “can discredit the very possibility of anticolonial interpretive originality”, whilst attempts to produce a more “Global International Relations” (Acharya and Buzan 2019) can occlude the fact that (formerly) colonised peoples have been a part of the development of both the subject and practice of International Relations all along (Barnett and Zarakol 2023; Getachew 2019; Ohene-Nyako and Kaplan 2023; Shilliam 2010; Tieku 2021). Whilst in the discipline of International Relations a separation is often upheld between theory-making (associated with universities), and real-world international relations and diplomatic practice (associated with training courses and placements), knowledge production in fact seeps across these boundaries (Bayly 2023; Gani and Marshall 2022). It follows that we should understand diplomatic training as an active process of knowledge production. Given this, we argue that mid-20th century training for African diplomats, rather than being cast as a technical transfer of settled knowledge, should be understood as an explicit (geo)political project caught up in the large-scale relationships of decolonisation, the Cold War, and a desire for soft power on the behalf of the (often Western) funders, *but also as a site for alternative worldmaking visions emanating from the formerly colonised world—the focus of this article.*

In what follows, rather than identifying pure spaces and practices of anticolonial worldmaking, we offer a reading of diplomatic training in which “domination, resistance, appropriation and transformation have to be understood as congenitally entangled in the moment of knowledge production” (Shilliam 2010:20). Training opens up a new set of spaces for understanding how (anti)colonial worldmaking took place. Recent work has convincingly argued that conferences were key sites in the development, negotiation, and resistance to different postcolonial and internationalist political projects (Afro-Asian Networks Research Collective 2018; Hodder 2021; Hodder et al. 2015; Legg 2023; Ranganathan 2024). But training spaces, though less visible, provide equally ubiquitous sites for the making of such political projects. As Rachel Leow (2019:429) has argued in her research on trade union education against the backdrop of the Cold War, training could facilitate “unexpected encounters and fraternal connections that were experienced, and are best seen, at the level of the personal” and that constituted a form of “subaltern internationalism”.

The paper focuses on the diplomatic training landscape, 1970–1980, drawing on evidence gathered as part of a wider project examining training for African diplomats in the period up to and after decolonisation. Whilst African societies had for centuries practised diplomacy (Adjaye 1996; Nanjira 2010), colonisation increasingly delegitimised both the agents and practices of African diplomacy (Opondo 2010). As such, both colonial powers and anticolonial nationalists agreed on the need for diplomatic training in the context of decolonisation. The broader project has explored training provided by ex-imperial powers in Europe (notably in the UK and France), alongside courses in Switzerland and the United States, in a period when many newly independent African countries did not yet

have their own domestic training provision. This paper zooms in on three courses in Africa, because we argue these were qualitatively different to those in Europe and North America, and as such can be understood as sites of specifically anticolonial worldmaking. These are two longstanding and still extant courses that were inaugurated in Cameroon and Kenya in the early 1970s, and a series of short courses that took place in newly independent Zimbabwe in 1980. The Cameroon and Kenya courses were the most significant diplomatic training courses in Africa that recruited beyond a domestic context. Thus, whilst they weren't representative of all training in Africa—where many countries began to do their own in-house training for diplomats shortly after independence—they were important across the continent. The Zimbabwean short courses were unusual in that they reflected the specific context of independence from the white rebel regime in Rhodesia, but similar training was later offered in the South African transition from apartheid.¹

We draw on extensive archival research in Cameroon, Kenya, Switzerland, the USA, and the UK, sourcing course student lists, curricula, and correspondence between trainers, directors, and trainees, alongside seven oral history interviews with diplomatic trainers and trainees who participated in the courses discussed.² Our access to these oral histories was constrained by circumstance, necessarily partial in scope, and reliant on the health and willingness of often elderly participants. Within interviews, inter-personal dynamics were largely those of a more senior, experienced professional narrating past experiences to a more junior researcher. Nevertheless, as white, British researchers, we are mindful of our own institutional locations, some of which were directly involved in the diplomatic training discussed in the wider project, reminding us of our privileged and entangled position within these landscapes of colonial and postcolonial education.

The paper shifts across scales, interweaving insights from the different courses, and beginning with the global before exploring the dynamics of the classroom. It starts by outlining large-scale changes in the training available for African diplomats in the 1970s, as provision became increasingly available on the African continent rather than only in Europe or the USA. These geographical shifts were also reflected in the teaching staff who became increasingly diverse. The second more substantive part of the paper sets out why these shifts mattered, both symbolically, but more importantly in terms of the opportunities offered for worldmaking after empire. We argue that African trainers and African spaces made pushing back against Eurocentric ideas and course content easier, producing new political and economic visions for the world. In addition, diplomatic training in Africa became a site through which networks of solidarity and African unity were produced.

Shifting Training Geographies

African decolonisation in the 1950s and 1960s saw the institution of training courses for the soon-to-be-diplomats of newly independent states in Europe and the USA. Often partially or wholly funded by former colonial powers, these

courses developed on an ad hoc basis, often emerging from training for colonial officials (Stockwell 2018). These early courses—especially in London, Oxford, and Paris—hardly challenged the wider international status quo, despite preparing the trainees to take up roles after independence (McConnell et al. 2024). These were joined by others, in Geneva and in New York, funded by the Swiss government and the US Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Bugnon 2019) which offered an alternative to those within a colony–metropole relationship, but at the same time, reflected a liberal internationalism framework and soft-power opportunities for the Swiss and US governments in the context of the Cold War (Harris 2024).

However, the international world was changing, largely due to the huge number of newly independent states joining international institutions such as the United Nations. These new states demanded a changed international society, and focused not only on state-building but also on reshaping the institutions, laws, and practices of the international realm (Getachew 2019; Thornton 2023). One response to these demands was the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the Group of 77, launched at the conclusion of its inaugural meeting in 1964 (Prashad 2013). UNCTAD and the Group of 77 embarked on a series of initiatives within the international system—most notably the New International Economic Order (NIEO). Supporters of the NIEO argued that, in order to overcome economic dependence inherited from colonialism, postcolonial states needed a radical redistribution of wealth and control over natural, monetary, and financial resources, and that international institutions created in a colonial world needed to be overhauled to allow this (Gilman 2015).

These pressures for change were also reflected in the diplomatic training landscape. Travelling north to Europe or the USA for training became increasing untenable as the 1960s progressed. Not only was it expensive, but anti-colonialist and pan-Africanist leaders tended to be wary of foreign tutelage (McConnell et al. 2024) and fought for the development of training and research centres either within their nation or the wider region. Over time, there was a clear shift in the geography of diplomatic training, diversifying from its previously Eurocentric patterns and with a rise in provision in Africa.

Two key international programmes emerged for training African diplomats in the early 1970s. The Carnegie Endowment had, from 1960, been funding training in Geneva and New York for the diplomats of newly independent states. At the end of 1969, the Endowment—based in the USA—took stock of its “Programs in Diplomacy” and indicated its intention to carry out a “Gradual Transfer of Programs to Africa” between 1970 and 1975.³ At the same time, the Cameroonian government had ambitions as a decisive regional actor at the “very center of the African continent”, inaugurating a bilingual university and hosting “several international organizations and many diplomatic and international missions”.⁴ The government seized the opportunity provided by the Carnegie Endowment decision, and the International Relations Institute of Cameroon (IRIC) was inaugurated in Yaoundé in 1971. Switzerland, through its association with the earlier Carnegie courses, became the primary international partner of the Cameroonian government in building and resourcing the new school. As a result, IRIC was born of the

Cameroonian ambition to play a leading role in regional and international geopolitics, and the Swiss international cooperation policy which sought to invest in international relations training and research as a form of cultural diplomacy (Machia A Rim 2022). This new institute would be for research as well as for advanced studies, and aimed to incubate an African-style diplomatic training which could support African nations in the international sphere.

The African character of IRIC was to be reflected in its curriculum, its teaching staff, and its architecture (Figure 1). It was built in the form of an “African village—a saré—combining traditional and modern styles, located on a hill ... pretty lodgings in the shape of ‘boukarous’ ... All harmoniously integrated into lush vegetation”.⁵

Its first director, Adamou Ndam Njoya, explicitly articulated the appropriateness of the site, which:

could not be better placed than on this hill, which only yesterday was like any of the hills that give Yaoundé such charm and beauty, with their simple tam-tam messages echoing between them, but now will be a central node of thought and ideas, of the development of a certain ethic of international life.⁷

Before opening its doors to students, the institute would host a series of important international conferences, among them the 1972 African seminar on the Law of the Sea (International Legal Materials 1973), widely credited with developing the concept of the Exclusive Economic Zone which ensured state sovereignty over



Figure 1: IRIC buildings on the campus of the University of Yaoundé⁶ (source: IRIC Brochure, Graduate Institute Archive, Geneva, HEI 2431; reproduced by permission of the International Relations Institute of Cameroon)

the resources of their coasts and seas. Present at this and other seminars was the Cameroonian UN Convention on the Law of the Sea negotiator Paul Bamela Engo, who taught at IRIC throughout the 1970s in parallel with his UN role. Whilst the archives reveal numerous reports, visits, and meetings from the Swiss and American partners in IRIC, as well as their contribution of almost half the funding required to establish it, it is clear that this support had to remain in the background. Though several Swiss trainers were among its staff in the 1970s, a 1971 Carnegie Endowment report was direct in stipulating that “The African character of IRIC will not allow the majority of its teaching staff to be of non-African origin”.⁸

IRIC was soon joined, in 1973, by the University of Nairobi Diplomatic Training Programme (DTP) which, like IRIC, emerged following a series of Carnegie training “institutes”, to become a long-term collaboration between Kenyan and Swiss governments. It was not a fully fledged institute like IRIC, and focused on training with less research emphasis. The DTP operated without a distinct campus and relied on staff from elsewhere in the University, with support from visiting lecturers. However, it was intended that it would “cooperate closely” with IRIC, with a “full exchange of programmes and students between both institutions”,⁹ and that it would run as a bilingual programme to train diplomats from across Africa. Most of its multinational staff were African, and some had taught first in IRIC before coming to Nairobi. Nevertheless, the connection between the two courses was never more than a loose association, maintained by a shared Swiss connection. Former DTP director Michael Chege framed its founding as part of the Kenyan government’s “decision to make Nairobi a centre for international activities for the region, if not the world”.¹⁰ Both the course in Cameroon and that in Kenya thus reflected part of a wider attempt to shift the geography of international institutions towards Africa more broadly.

By the time Zimbabwe became independent in 1980, IRIC and the DTP were well established, however they could not meet Zimbabwe’s demands for rapid training of diplomats, emerging from more than a decade of violent struggle against the racist Rhodesian regime. Instead, a bespoke four-week training programme (which ran several times in the spring/summer of 1980) was devised by the Commonwealth Secretariat, the central administrative body of the Commonwealth (Figure 2). Whilst the Commonwealth had colonial origins, it had by the 1970s become a firm critic of empire and advocate for racial justice in Southern Africa, with many connections with liberation movements (Craggs 2018; Mole 2023), and the Secretariat was responding to a direct request from Robert Mugabe. The courses were held in Salisbury (now Harare), and led by the Ghanaian Ambassador to the UK, Ebenezer Moses Debrah, with organisational support from Raja Gomez and Emeka Anyaoku from the Secretariat (Figure 3). That this multinational team all hailed from the “Third World”, with two from Africa, was no accident, reflecting both the make-up of the Commonwealth and its Secretariat staff, and the broader demands of a training course for a proudly independent African state.¹¹ Lecturers and trainers were drawn from across the Commonwealth, with a focus on Zimbabwean and African contributors, including at least eight from various ministries in the country and the University of Zimbabwe. The



Figure 2: Course for Zimbabwean diplomats run by the Commonwealth in Salisbury, 1980 (source: Commonwealth Secretariat photo 00007667; reproduced by permission of the Commonwealth Secretariat)



Figure 3: Programme Director Ebenezer Moses Debrah (left) and co-organiser Emeka Anyaoku (second left) during the training course (printed in *Commonwealth Currents*, June 1980) (source: Commonwealth Secretariat CID55518; reproduced by permission of the Commonwealth Secretariat)

next section explores why this shifting pattern of location and representation in diplomatic training mattered, and what it enabled.

Economic Worldmaking

A central focus of the diplomatic training provided in Yaoundé, Nairobi, and later Salisbury was securing greater economic independence. It had been widely hoped

that political self-determination would be a catalyst for economic development, as independent states would invest their economic resources in the service of their populations rather than the imperial metropole. However, by the late 1960s, the challenges of materialising this development were beginning to show. African politicians and diplomats played a key role in defining and building the right to development, which was “placed on the diplomatic agenda” by Senegal’s Foreign Minister, Doudou Thiam, speaking to the UN General Assembly in 1966 (Spies 2016:46). Following this, “development diplomacy”, an alternative form of diplomatic practice focused on countering asymmetry in the global economy, became a central part of African diplomacy (Spies 2016). African demands, alongside insights from diplomats, politicians, academics, and activists from across the Global South, shaped the norms of wider international society throughout the 1970s, as a need for economic redistribution was widely recognised if not universally embraced. Efforts to promote the NIEO agenda would culminate in the adoption of a Declaration on the Establishment of an NIEO by the UN General Assembly on 1 May 1974.

Diplomatic training provided an ideal space for the discussion of these ideas around economic redistribution and how best to materialise them. However, not all of those involved in training for African diplomats felt these demands for redistribution were realistic or useful. Ralph Feltham, the former British diplomat who led Oxford University’s Foreign Service Programme (FSP), provides a salient example. The FSP had, since its reincarnation from a training course for British Colonial Administrators in the mid-1960s, taught a wide range of diplomats, primarily from Commonwealth states within and beyond Africa. Moreover, Feltham had authored a key text for diplomatic training, the *Diplomatic Handbook* (1970)—an orthodox, Western-oriented how-to guide which spread his influence far beyond the Oxford course. Speaking in 1973 to an audience that included the director of newly created IRIC, Feltham identified, amongst other “educational needs” of would-be diplomats from the decolonising world, one stemming from what he called the “UNCTAD ethos”. This, he said, was “the growing insistence in less developed countries that the developed countries have a moral obligation to share their wealth with them”. Feltham felt this “ethos” was unhelpful, leading to an unrealistic gap between “the sacrifices that the rich countries are likely to make, and the sacrifices that poorer countries are becoming convinced that they have a right to expect them to make”.¹² Rather than playing a role in advocating for this global economic redistribution, for Feltham, diplomats from the formerly colonised world should be acting as brakes on this idealism. “It is the diplomats, with their sense of realism and political awareness who have to convince their political masters that change, in human attitudes and outlook, is a slow process”, Feltham argued.¹³ From this perspective, diplomatic training could act as a space to diminish or even eliminate these unrealistic alternative visions for the world after empire. The training courses based in Yaoundé, Nairobi, and Salisbury sought to displace such an approach and provide space to debate and materialise more equitable worlds.

Our analysis of the curricular development of diplomatic training courses in the Global North from 1960 confirms that though some lectures on economic and

social development and international aid were included, these courses did not extend to any specific training in “development diplomacy”. By the mid-1960s, with the institutionalisation of UNCTAD and UNITAR, the situation began to change. In Geneva, criticisms were made of the Carnegie courses’ lack of engagement with the economic realities of diplomatic activity after decolonisation,¹⁴ and Roy Preiswerk began a seminar on “the diplomacy of development” on the UNITAR course there.¹⁵

However, it was Sub-Saharan Africa’s first university-based diplomatic training course that radically prioritised development diplomacy within its curriculum. From its very first year, IRIC students took a core module on the topic, examining the “political and diplomatic aspects of international economic relations of developing countries, and the power and principles of negotiation”.¹⁶ Another compulsory module on international economics was taught by Joseph Tchundjang Pouemi, a radical Cameroonian economist openly critical of the IMF and French policy in Africa. Ambroise Behalal (IRIC 1974–1976) recalled how professors like Pouemi were influential in critiquing Eurocentric international economics, and introducing the “Third-Worldist” ideas of Gunnar Myrdal, Tibor Mende, Samir Amin, and André Gunder Frank which he found particularly formative.¹⁷ According to IRIC’s former director Joseph Owona, “it was very important that all those who would teach at IRIC were motivated to make development diplomats capable of discussing hard problems ... in the spirit of African solidarity and unity”.¹⁸ Owona also highlighted another important dimension, the kind of diplomats that Africa needed:

[We were concerned with training] development diplomats, committed to the construction of the NIEO because that is an idea which, at the time, was a very expansive idea to remake the spirit, the structures of the international organisations, of the economic and political international order.¹⁹

IRIC was not alone in linking diplomatic training to the NIEO. UNITAR, which was established to serve the interests of developing states, was also charged by a UN General Assembly “to organize its work in the sphere of economic and social research and training” in furtherance of the NIEO.²⁰ This was expressed in regular “North–South seminars” on Multilateral Diplomacy and the NIEO from 1977,²¹ which brought together junior diplomats from both the Global North and South in Vienna for presentations and debates on how to advance the economic and political provisions of the NIEO. In such training spaces, North–South interactions were made possible in ways that challenged the established Western-oriented international system.

The “UNCTAD ethos” was also carried through from the IRIC and DTP courses in Africa into their European excursions. A 1979 DTP trip to Europe led by Michael Chege provided the opportunity to challenge the mindset of European speakers and hosts:

I remember, Brussels, one of the directors of Africa was outlining ... the architecture of EU development assistance to Africa, by the medium of African, Caribbean, and Pacific states. And, of course, he saw it as a not just benevolent, but mutual gain ... He hit

the wrong chord, even the most silent students in the group said they thought the trade framework reproduced the colonial pattern ... I saw the guy's face go ashen. Because it's like he had actually expected "Thank you" ... he got the reverse.²²

Participants in the Commonwealth Secretariat Zimbabwe training were also trained in the NIEO and wider development diplomacy. Providing two sessions on the UN was Don Mills, a Jamaican diplomat who was key in articulating the NIEO vision internationally, and who had given similar training to Caribbean diplomats as part of UNITAR training the same year (Mills 2009).²³ One of the few participants to hail from beyond Africa (or not be based there at the time of the course), it seems likely that Mills was asked to contribute as a result of his experience and contribution to articulating this vision of the NIEO. Sessions on the course addressed different political and economic groupings and approaches, prioritising African connections and associations. The timetable included sessions on African organisations, Approaches to Economic Development, the EEC, Bilateral relations (with speakers from the UK, Canada, India, and Romania), UNCTAD, and the Non-Aligned Movement.²⁴ According to the Course Director, many speakers "effectively articulated Third World positions" whilst speakers from "the Developed World were also good ... making it possible for the participants to realise the enormity of the problems faced by the Third World in seeking a new and just international economic order to buttress their hard-won but very fragile political independence".²⁵ By the time of Zimbabwean independence in 1980 the power of the NIEO as an idea was waning, threatened by the growing hostility of the USA and the concomitant rise of neoliberalism and structural adjustment. Nevertheless, the idea of the NIEO remained important in the Zimbabwe training course, both as a detailed programme to put into practice, and as a wider motivating idea to imagine a path towards economic independence for African countries. Those trained at IRIC, the Nairobi DTP, and in Zimbabwe in the 1970s and early 1980s, and those who attended UNITAR courses elsewhere, were socialised into a world where a fundamental global economic re-ordering—through the NIEO—was widely accepted and expected. In their training, they discussed and debated how to make this vision a reality.

Political Worldmaking

The shift in location and staffing of diplomatic training courses in the 1960s from Europe to Africa also allowed for fundamentally different kinds of conversations and classroom dynamics between trainers and students. Guillaume Nseke, a student at IRIC (1983–1986) remembered:

we had a French professor Michel Drouin, who was teaching us international economics. And every example he gave towards the international economy, he took it from France, and I stood I said "Now, why can't you make an effort, you know, to also talk about Africa?"²⁶

According to Nseke, after being challenged, Drouin began to research African contexts to use in his teaching. Interviewees recalled similar dynamics in the

Nairobi classroom, where students complained of “patronising” visiting tutors from prestigious European schools, including Oxford’s Ralph Feltham, who “could not relate” and “didn’t impress the students”, and the Graduate Institute’s Lucius Cafilisch, who students complained had “no understanding of [the] continent ... picking up examples from God knows where”.²⁷

This willingness of students and staff to confront European contributors demonstrated confidence in their position and a willingness to challenge the international and still colonial order. Chege put this down to a range of factors:

it’s a combination of being older students, graduate students, being sure of themselves, representing their countries, and also the teaching. We intended them to be critical of the international system as it was then, the position of Africa and African solutions.

At IRIC, P-Kiven Tunteng—author of a critical essay entitled “Political Freedom and Mental Colonization” (1974)—held an important early role in teaching Africa-oriented modules such as “African Foreign Policy”, “Third World States and International Relations”, and “African regionalism”.²⁸ As an anglophone Cameroonian, he also embodied IRIC’s commitment to bilingual African unity. He was ultimately disillusioned, however, resigning in 1974 and writing to IRIC’s board of directors that “if IRIC is to be relevant to the needs of contemporary Africa, it must assume a more active role in the social and political concerns of the continent ... Its relevance in contemporary Africa requires a more activist role”.²⁹ The tutors who replaced him, Collins Ngwa (Cameroon) and Abdulaziz Jalloh (Sierra Leone), appear to have taken on this activist role. Openly critical when the Swiss Graduate Institute sought to impose conditions on its cooperation,³⁰ they were remembered by Joséphine Fotso (IRIC 1976–1978) as “revolutionaries” and “dreamers” who were driven and committed teachers.³¹ During weekly bilingual seminars, where students would present their research, they would debate political, economic, and legal questions at length in an open pedagogical environment. This stood in stark contrast to the “Franco-African tradition” used at the neighbouring Université Fédérale, “consisting of a monologue and even a dictated text”.³² Whilst more challenging, the IRIC approach was widely appreciated by students, who according to Joseph Owona, felt it gave them “an ability to react ... to defend the interests of Africa”.³³

Later, leading the Zimbabwe Diplomatic Training Seminar, Debrah suggested a clear dividing line between old, colonial, classroom dynamics, and those the course would endeavour to inculcate. He suggested that the training team were “not instructors trying to impose a particular ideology but friends who were sharing experiences”, promoting mutual learning and solidarity. An evaluation noted that the organisers “roped in as many Zimbabwean scholars as ... [they] could get their hands on”, instilling “a sense of pride and involvement” in the course participants and undermining any sense of hierarchy between teacher and learner.³⁴ Despite this lack of hierarchy, Debrah nevertheless had a strong sense of the role the course needed to play ideologically:

My mission as Director as I saw it, was thus to ensure that the participants ... were made aware, fully, that they are Zimbabweans, that they are Africans, that Africa abhors apartheid, colonialism, all forms of discrimination and are committed to the success of the moves for a New International Economic Order. We were not training mere diplomats. We were training Zimbabwean diplomats with a mission!

Whilst some training programmes for African diplomats in Europe imagined a future international society broadly unchanged (McConnell et al. 2024), here was a sense of a world transformed through the practice of the diplomats who were part of the course. That this was a transformation rooted in Africa was reflected directly in the programming which included lectures on “Zimbabwean history, politics, and economic situation”. The history sessions featured visits to the national museum and national archives, and “emphasised that the history of the country did not start with Cecil Rhodes or the Pioneer Columns”.³⁵ Whilst we have not found much in the way of explicit interaction or critique between radical academics in the universities and these diplomatic training courses (for discussion of these disjunctures, see Opondo *forthcoming*), in this focus, the course reflected wider moves in African universities around this time to “move the centre” of understanding from the West to Africa: to centre African knowledges and pre-colonial histories as a corrective to Eurocentric scholarship (Ngũgĩ 1993; Sharp 2019).

When reflecting on his generation of African diplomats and trainers, Michael Chege, head of the Nairobi DTP, suggested that he and his colleagues felt that African unity was needed, and that diplomatic training could be a part of materialising that vision:

[We had] a fierce commitment to work for African Unity and to arrest the drift towards political instability and lack of economic development. We had the highest hope. We intended whatever we were doing to be a significant contribution to that goal, without compromising ... to us a pan-Africanist vocation if you want to call it that, informed, not just teaching and writing but also building and proposing new institutions like this [the DTP].³⁶

The next section explores how these economic and political visions were strengthened through pedagogy, classroom dynamics, and the bringing together of international cohorts of trainers and trainees.

The Classroom as Space for African Unity and Liberation

Beyond their formal curriculum, the courses in Yaoundé and Nairobi cultivated international and especially pan-African spaces simply by bringing together students from across the continent. In its first decade from 1972, students from 31 different African countries studied at IRIC. Apart from Cameroonians, the most common sending countries were Zaire (now Democratic Republic of Congo), Chad, and Niger, though people also came from countries such as Madagascar, Angola, and Tanzania. For the Nairobi DTP, which taught 15 different nationalities, beyond Kenya, the most common sending countries were Zambia, Tanzania,

and Ghana, but students also arrived from Egypt, Sudan, and Zaire, for example.³⁷

Located in Yaoundé, the only capital of Africa where bilingualism was official at the level of state and educational institutions, IRIC aimed to cross the linguistic borders which often hindered inter-state cooperation to produce African diplomats and African unity. Joseph Owona highlighted the guiding ideas behind IRIC as he saw them:

the spirit of the time was African unity ... IRIC trained diplomats from all over Africa and that is something very important. To be trained with the same concepts, with the same spirit, with an overarching mode which is African unity and African solidarity, even beyond languages. That's to say we were going beyond the French-speaking or English-speaking worlds, so that we are going to receive the guys from Tunisia, from Tanzania, from Ghana, from Nigeria ... We even received a Sudanese, one from Benin, many African countries.³⁸

This diversity was also used to pedagogical advantage. Weekly seminars at IRIC gave rise to often passionate debates between the students, who often advocated the foreign policies of their countries, and their ideological alignments with the socialist, capitalist, or Third World. At Nairobi a similar approach was taken, privileging learning through debate. For example, in the early 1980s many, especially from the Southern African liberation movements, were advocating socialist approaches to national development, but were challenged by Ghanaian students following their experiences and their country's trajectory.³⁹ Studying together was intended to create an epistemic community of African diplomats, and living together formed a strong esprit de corps. International communities of learning were formed in and outside of the classroom. Nseke remembered:

all of us ... were on campus. All of us. We took breakfast together, lunch together, dinner together, and we shared, more or less everything together after school, we went to the library together. The group of students met together, you know, to prepare papers ... so it made us to become [united].⁴⁰

Michael Chege, course Director of the DTP in Nairobi recalled similar dynamics between students and the wider African diplomatic milieu in the city:

why should the Ghanaian friend [who] was sitting next to you leave you because he was going over to the ministry or the embassy to collect his mail? You would go over [with them] to sit down and have a cup of tea and maybe talk to ... the first or second or third secretary who is a good friend of the Ghanaian or Zambian or Sierra Leonean diplomat.⁴¹

Whilst formally part of larger universities, both IRIC and DTP students to some extent stood apart from the wider student body, particularly as many of the trainees were older, had often already embarked on their careers, and were no doubt networking in part with an eye to how these connections might help professionally in the future. Indeed, these social connections far outlasted the courses themselves. As Nseke recalled: "I served at the African Union. And at a point in

time, we had about, out of the 52 countries, we had about 20 ambassadors who studied in Cameroon ... African networking was very, very important".⁴²

Chege recalled that the "benefits the interaction between Kenyans and non-Kenyans offered at the university" were led by "the female student diplomats of Kenya".⁴³ Josephine Awuor, who studied there in 1980–1981, explained that she and other Kenyan female students found it "only natural" to befriend and organise social activities with the students from abroad, particularly other women—visiting markets and hosting cocktails in the home, rather than frequenting bars.⁴⁴ This recollection hints at the entrenched gender roles within diplomatic culture globally at this time, as well as the differentiated experiences of male and female diplomats in training on these courses. Whilst none of our female interviewees recalled being excluded from formal training opportunities they were always in the minority, though this varied markedly across training courses, with a relatively high proportion of female trainees on the Nairobi DTP (30%) due to Kenya's targeted recruitment quotas, and very few on the Zimbabwe courses (as Figure 2 illustrates).

The Nairobi DTP also provided exposure to African liberation movements who both addressed trainees and joined the programme as students. For example, Japheth Isaack, a member of the anticolonial South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO), attended the Nairobi training course in 1984–1985, several years before Namibian independence. Chege recalled that Isaack "changed the mood in the class completely ... even before he got into government he was self-assured of what his position was and what SWAPO was about, and the politics of the region". He remembered that whilst accepting the conventional course content, Isaack was also one of those most likely to ask questions of it: "he was, in that class, the one more likely to say 'an education which is not supportive, which is not geared towards liberation for Africa, is not helping us'".⁴⁵

The politics of solidarity underpinning African unity, focused at the time around the frontline states and liberation movements of Southern Africa, were woven into the teaching of diplomatic practice. Taught by Dietrich Kappeler of Switzerland, a veteran of the Carnegie courses and IRIC, the DTP simulations pioneered a commitment to realism that simulated negotiations between African governments that related to contemporary issues. One multilateral example simulated a "Special Committee" of the Organisation of African Unity, set up to "consider means and ways to assist Frontline States" following "economic and military measures South Africa threatens to take up against her neighbours".⁴⁶ Kappeler later wrote that using African examples with a multinational group, and using rooms in the imposing Kenyatta International Conference Centre (another part of Kenya's attempts to make Nairobi a central diplomatic space in Africa) "allowed the students to negotiate in a relatively familiar context and made identification with the country represented easy".⁴⁷

Independence for Zimbabwe was an early victory in the fight for liberation in Southern Africa, and African commitment to Zimbabwean independence was crucial in securing support from member states for the Commonwealth training. Gomez remembered getting a lot of positive answers when he began trying to assemble the training team at double-quick speed.⁴⁸ Debrah's own evaluation of

the course aligned it with this broader solidarity and optimism: “Zimbabwe’s attainment of independence is the one historical fact which, within the last year, has greatly gladdened the hearts of many Third World countries and peoples”.⁴⁹ Such was the excitement that Gomez warned in his addendum to the course evaluation that there was a risk that “the euphoria of the way in which the course was received” might blind organisers to some of the shortcomings and improvements that could be made in the pedagogy and course content for future iterations.⁵⁰ Nevertheless, in his letter of thanks, the new Zimbabwean Foreign Minister, Simon Muzenda (pictured third from left in Figure 3), suggested that the organisers’ “demonstrated commitment to our struggle was directly associated with the successful outcome of the two seminars”.⁵¹ Once again underlining the longevity of the political networks produced by these training courses, Gomez recalled that:

It was a very rewarding course. And then a lot of the reward for me was in the next two or three years, every time one of the Zimbabwean Ambassadors or High Commissioners passed through London, there was a knock on my door, someone coming to say how much they appreciated it.⁵²

Diplomatic training brought international African cohorts together in African institutions to learn diplomacy, but also to discuss what kinds of international worlds they wanted to make, and the best practices through which these could be materialised. The classrooms and study visits built networks of African diplomats and educators that exceeded national boundaries and produced forms of transnational solidarity that stretched far beyond the courses in time and space.

Conclusion

The international classrooms in Cameroon, Kenya, and Zimbabwe were spaces where Western geopolitical expertise was increasingly questioned and settled visions of international society challenged. They were spaces in which networks of postcolonial solidarity were formed and reproduced. They were sites where new visions for a more equal political and economic international order were debated and materialised by the African diplomats-in-training, alongside the educators leading the courses. Whilst there has not been space to discuss it here, these diplomats were also involved, with others, in the reshaping of the socio-cultural world, for example through their contributions to institutions such as UNESCO (Andersen 2021; Brumann 2021).⁵³ Education in colonial and postcolonial contexts has often been understood as reproducing colonial assumptions and power relations, as Leow (2019:430) has put it, replaying “civilizational hierarchies: between leaders and the masses, between elites and non-elites, and between developed and developing nations in the global order of nations; in short, between those who taught and those who learned”. Yet, training also made space for forging international connections, discussing alternative visions for the world, and for thinking about how these might be put into practice.

Our focus on diplomatic training directs attention to educators and diplomats-in-training as hitherto unrecognised actors in anticolonial worldmaking. Against

the stock story of decolonisation as an expansion of international society in which postcolonial leaders merely focused on nation-state building and aped the “developed” world, recent accounts have aimed to highlight the creativity and *international* ambitions of an array of independence leaders (e.g. Getachew 2019). Others have highlighted subaltern networks of anticolonial and radical thinkers working beyond and against the state in this period (Featherstone 2023; Gowland 2021; Gowland et al. 2024; Lewis 2023; Ohene-Nyako and Kaplan 2023). We argue that in addition to both high-profile political leaders and radical grassroots organisers, there are a range of people—in our case educators and diplomats-in-training, but also students, academics, technocrats, and administrators—who are often ignored, but were central to anticolonial worldmaking. Whilst undoubtedly part of an elite domestically, these people were still marginalised within international society.

Diplomats were often charged with materialising the alternative worlds envisaged by postcolonial political leaders and their training provided a key space in which they could debate and elaborate on how this was to be done. Our examination of training therefore focuses attention on worldmaking *practices* and locates these in specific sites and spaces across Africa. This counters *both* traditional accounts of the international relations of the later part of the 20th century that have located innovation and agency in the USA, Europe, and the USSR, *and* more recent correctives that have demonstrated the intellectual innovations of Global South leaders whilst overlooking the spaces and practices through which these were worked towards.

Methodologically, diplomatic training—and training spaces more generally—expand the sites through which we can look for worldmaking practices. Training courses often leave archival traces—however mundane they seem—through which it is possible to provide new insights into worldmaking, adding to what Hodder et al. (2021:3) have described as the “scattered archipelago” of the archives of internationalism. Beyond our case studies, this paper highlights the overlooked area of training more broadly as a site of active knowledge production. Training has rarely been the focus of academic research: seen as both too technical and too boring for attention. Yet it is both ubiquitous (who doesn’t undertake professional training in their working lives?) and a crucial connection between the academy and professional practice. Whilst knowledge and practice are never separated in ways that they are sometimes imagined (Gani and Marshall 2022), training is a place where these connections are explicit (and therefore at their most visible, including to researchers).

Whilst many of the anticolonial worldmaking visions discussed and debated in diplomatic training courses in Africa did not come to pass, they still mattered. As Ranganathan (2024:198–199) argues in relation to the defeat of radical proposals during the negotiations of UN Convention on the Law of Sea, their failure does not render them irrelevant: “in the moment these proposals and their reiterations *meant* something, their articulation was *doing* something”. Even failures shifted the “discursive and normative environment at the international level” (O’Malley and Thakur 2022:63), with legacies far beyond the immediacy of policy defeat. As O’Malley and Thakur (2022:61) argue for global South actors at the UN, “the

very act of creating solidarity networks, communities of interest, and informal structures of cooperation had effects" on the workings of the institution itself. Whilst visions for a more equal world after decolonisation are sometimes written off as utopian and failed projects (Getachew 2019; Ranganathan 2024), there is value in returning not only to the abstract visions, but also to those who dedicated their professional lives to trying to make them happen, and to the training, and trainers, that shaped their practice, their networks, and their communities.

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Data Availability Statement

Some of the data that support the findings of this study are openly available in KCL Figshare at <https://doi.org/10.18742/25315051>.

Endnotes

¹ A more comprehensive dataset and visualisation of training for African diplomats produced by the project can be found here: <https://diplotraining.sites.er.kcl.ac.uk> (last accessed 3 December 2024).

² This paper draws on archives at the Graduate Institute Archive, Geneva (HEI); Swiss Federal Archive, Bern (AFS); Commonwealth Secretariat Archive, London (ComSec); UN Secretariat Archive, New York; and Oxford University Diplomatic Studies Programme, Oxford (FSP). In total, we conducted 43 interviews with trainees, trainers, directors, and administrators from a range of training programmes, though we only quote from seven here: three trainers and four trainees from Cameroon, Kenya, and Sri Lanka. Interviews and archival sources in French were translated by the project team.

³ AFS E2005A#1983/18#177*—Programme de Formation Diplomatique, December 1969.

⁴ HEI 2431—IRIC; Principles, organization and programme of a Cameroonian venture, international in character and set up in cooperation with agencies from abroad, 1971.

⁵ HEI 2432—*La Presse du Cameroun*, 20 November 1973.

⁶ Obviously, these infrastructures have evolved greatly since then.

⁷ HEI 2432—Discours de M. Adamou Ndam Njoya, 17 November 1973.

⁸ AFS E2005A#1983/18#177*—Rapport général sur l'exécution du décret n° 71/DF/195 bis du 24 avril 1971 portant création de l'institut des relations internationales du Cameroun.

⁹ AFS E2005A#1983/18#177*—Dietrich Kappeler Aide Memoire, 27 July 1972.

¹⁰ Interview with Michael Chege, Nairobi, 18 May 2023.

¹¹ "Third World" was the terminology used by the Course Director E.M. Debrah—"Report on the Zimbabwe Diplomatic Training Seminar, Salisbury, 13 May–13 June 1980", p. 8. Commonwealth Secretariat Archives.

¹² FSP Publicity File—R. Feltham, November 1973.

- ¹³ FSP Publicity File.
- ¹⁴ HEI 1969—P. Bungener to J. Freymond, 11 August 1966.
- ¹⁵ HEI 2117/1-6—UNITAR training schedule, 1966.
- ¹⁶ HEI 2431—L. Dembinski, Rapport sur les activités académiques au cours de l'année 1973/74.
- ¹⁷ Interview with Ambroise Behalal, Yaoundé, 8 September 2022.
- ¹⁸ Interview with Joseph Owona, Yaoundé, 23 September 2022.
- ¹⁹ Interview with Owona.
- ²⁰ UN General Assembly A/9839 United Nations Institute for Training and Research: Report of the Second Committee.
- ²¹ AFS E2005A#1991/16#6051*—S. Marcuard, 9 March 1978, "Séminaire sur le nouvel ordre économique international"; UN Secretariat Archive S-0911-0007-08—D. Nicol to K. Waldheim, 23 May 1977.
- ²² Interview with Chege.
- ²³ AFS E2025A#1991/168#6372*—UNITAR Orientation Course on Multilateral Diplomacy and International Cooperation for Senior Government Officials from the Eastern Caribbean, Belize, and Suriname.
- ²⁴ Debrah, "Report", p. 8.
- ²⁵ Debrah, "Report", pp. 7–8.
- ²⁶ Interview with Guillaume Nseke, Yaoundé, 15 September 2022.
- ²⁷ Interview with Chege.
- ²⁸ HEI 2431—L. Dembinski, Rapport sur les activités académiques au cours de l'année 1973/74.
- ²⁹ HEI 2431—P.K. Tunteng, Reflections on the Institute of International Studies (IRIC), 10 June 1974.
- ³⁰ HEI 2431—A. Jalloh, Report of incoming Director of Studies, 1980.
- ³¹ Interview with Joséphine Fotso, Yaoundé, 21 September 2022.
- ³² Interview with Behalal.
- ³³ Interview with Owona.
- ³⁴ Debrah, "Report", p. 8.
- ³⁵ Debrah, "Report", p. 7.
- ³⁶ Interview with Chege.
- ³⁷ Full details can be found here: <https://diplotraining.sites.er.kcl.ac.uk> (last accessed 3 December 2024).
- ³⁸ Interview with Owona.
- ³⁹ Interview with Chege.
- ⁴⁰ Interview with Nkese.
- ⁴¹ Interview with Chege.
- ⁴² Interview with Nseke.
- ⁴³ Interview with Nseke.
- ⁴⁴ Interview with Josephine Awuor, Nairobi, 20 May 2023.
- ⁴⁵ Interview with Chege.
- ⁴⁶ HEI 792—Report on a simulation exercise of a multilateral negotiation held at Kenyatta International Conference Centre on 25–27 February 1986.
- ⁴⁷ HEI 791—Simulated Negotiations: The Experience of Ten Years (paper presented to the Seminar on the Training of Third World Diplomats organised by the DTP in April 1988).
- ⁴⁸ Interview with Raja Gomez, London, 27 January 2022.
- ⁴⁹ Debrah, "Report", p. 1.
- ⁵⁰ ComSec—Raja Gomez, 23 June 1980, "Addendum to Mr Debrah's report", p. 1.
- ⁵¹ ComSec—Letter to Shridath Ramphal from Simon Muzenda, 30 October 1980.
- ⁵² Interview with Gomez.
- ⁵³ Thank you to one of the anonymous reviewers for this point.

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