“NESTOLICHNAYA KUL’TURA”:

Regional and National Identity in Post-1961 Russian Culture

A Dissertation Submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

By Victoria Donovan
St Antony’s College, Oxford, April 2011

I declare that this dissertation is my own work and contains nothing which is the outcome of work done in collaboration with others.

This dissertation does not exceed 80,000 words in length.
Партия торжественно провозглашает: нынешнее поколение советских людей будет жить при коммунизме!

- Nikita Khrushchev, Twenty-Second Congress of the Communist Party of the USSR, 2 August 1961

Мы не храним старицу не потому, что ее много, не потому, что среди нас мало ценителей красоты прошлого, мало патриотов, любящих родную историю и родное искусство, а потому, что слишком спешим, слишком ждем немедленной «отдачи», не верим в медленные целители души.

- Dmitrii Likhachev, 'Kraevedenie kak nauka i kak deyatelnost' ¹

¹ 'Kraevedenie kak nauka i kak deyatelnost', republished in Russkaya kul'tura (Moscow: Iskusstvo, 2000), p. 162.

² In an article on the Conservative government’s proposals to revise the national curriculum for history in British schools, Richard Evans notes that around 40% of A-level students choose Hitler
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................................................. 6

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS .................................................................................................................. 8

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .......................................................................................................................... 11

PART ONE ............................................................................................................................................ 13

INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................................... 14

1.1 1961 and its significance ............................................................................................................ 15

1.2 The revival of *kraevedenie* ...................................................................................................... 20

1.3 An overview of studies of the Russian regions ........................................................................... 25

1.3 Overview of the thesis ................................................................................................................ 32

PACKAGING LOCALNESS: THE FRAMING OF THE LOCAL PAST

IN TOURISTIC ACTIVITIES AND *KRAEVEDENIE* LITERATURE ................................................ 36

2.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................................... 37

2.2 The *zapovednik* experience .................................................................................................... 43

2.3 Trends in the publication of *kraevedenie* literature ............................................................... 53

2.4 Framing the legend of the Democratic Republic of Novgorod .............................................. 56

2.5 Pskov’s myth of military resilience ............................................................................................ 66

2.6 The ‘narodnaya fantasiya’ of Vologda ....................................................................................... 71

2.7 Amplifying and marginalizing the Soviet experience .............................................................. 76

2.8 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................... 80

EXHIBITING LOCALNESS: PATRIOTIC DISPLAYS OF

LOCAL HISTORY AND CULTURE IN REGIONAL MUSEUMS ....................................................... 83
3.1 Introduction ...........................................................................................................84
3.2 Reviving kraevedenie in local museums .........................................................86
3.3 Displays of Soviet ‘folk’ culture ......................................................................92
3.4 Clashes between local and national memory ................................................104
3.5 Writing the Soviet experience out ..................................................................107
3.6 The recovery of cultural authenticity ...............................................................116
3.7 Conclusion ..........................................................................................................119

CONSERVING LOCALNESS: ARCHITECTURAL VISIONS OF LOCAL

IDENTITY AND THE PRESERVATION OF CULTURAL HERITAGE ..................121

4.1 A brief history of heritage preservation in the Soviet Union ....................122
4.2 The Making of the ‘Old New Russian Town’ ..................................................126
4.3 From ‘refuge of delusion’ to work of art .........................................................136
4.4 ‘Chto takoe pamyatnik arkhitektury?’ ............................................................149
4.5 The failure of state preservationism ...............................................................156
4.6 Conclusion ..........................................................................................................166

PART TWO. ..............................................................................................................168

THE ‘POLITICS AND POETICS OF MEMORY’: REDEFINING LOCALNESS

IN THE LANDSCAPE AND THE URBAN SPHERE ..............................................171

5.1 Recovering the ‘Myths We Live By’ ...............................................................172
5.2 Monuments to democratic transition ...........................................................180
5.3 The dilemma of the Soviet PA-MYAT-NIK ....................................................192
5.4 Popular rituals and everyday memory ............................................................197
5.5 ‘Unintended monuments’ to the old and new regimes .....................................201
5.6 Conclusion ..........................................................................................................206
TALES FROM ‘DEEP RUSSIA’: THE NARRATIVE CONSTRUCTION
OF LOCALNESS IN ORAL TESTIMONY .................................................................208

6.1 Provincial stereotypes in Russian literature and culture .......................209
6.2 Background to the oral history work .....................................................212
6.3 The ‘enchanted’ provinces .....................................................................217
6.4 Nemnogoslovnost’, zamknutost’, and neprivetlivost’ ............................224
6.5 Playful ‘provincialism’ .........................................................................228
6.6 ‘Raznitsa est’?: Revising the capital-province dichotomy .......................234
6.7 Conclusion ..............................................................................................239

CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................240

APPENDIX ONE: STATISTICS FOR THE PUBLICATION OF KRAEVEDENIE
LITERATURE IN THE NORTHWEST, 1940-2009 .............................................249

APPENDIX TWO: STATISTICS PERTAINING TO VISITOR NUMBERS AND
MUSEUM EXCURSIONS, 1940-1988 ...............................................................256

APPENDIX THREE: TIMELINE OF LEGISLATION PERTAINING TO THE
PRESERVATION OF CULTURAL HERITAGE, 1947-2002 .................................260

NOTE ON SOURCES ..........................................................................................265

BIBLIOGRAPHY ..................................................................................................267
ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the state-sponsored rise of local patriotism in the post-1961 period, interpreting this as part of the effort to strengthen popular support for and the legitimacy of the Soviet regime during the second phase of de-Stalinization. It shifts the analytical focus away from the Secret Speech of 1956, the time of Khrushchev’s full-scale assault on Stalin and his legacy, to the Twenty-Second Party Congress of 1961, the inauguration of a utopian and pioneering plan to build Communism by 1980. The thesis considers how this famously forward-looking programme gave rise to an institutionalized retrospectivism as Soviet policy makers turned to the past to mobilize popular support for socialist construction. It examines how this process played out in the Russian North West, where Soviet citizens were encouraged to turn inwards to examine their local history and traditions, and to reread these through the lens of Soviet socialism.

The thesis takes as a case study the towns of Novgorod, Pskov, and Vologda, where the state-sponsored regeneration of local traditions significantly impacted on the self-perception of local communities. In the first part, I look at the strategies for representing and displaying local culture in pubic institutions: the textual treatment and symbolic ordering of urban space in local tourist guides; the heritage movement and the attribution of cultural value to certain objects from the local landscape; and the primary focuses of the exhibitive ‘gaze’ in local museums. The second part of the thesis shifts the focus from institutionalized
culture to popular culture, examining the informal practices and oral traditions that exist alongside the authoritative discourses of social identity in the post-Soviet period. The popular interpretation of public sculpture, the collective imagination of urban space, and the 'common knowledge' of the past as it is articulated in oral narratives are the focuses of discussion.
ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure 1. The vitrine showcase ‘Osvoenie kosmosa’ at
the Vologda kräumechskii museum, 1961.................................18

Figure 2. A group of visitors at the Vologda local
kräumechskii museum, 1961...............................................18

Figure 3. The Most Aleksandra Nevskogo from I. I.
Kushnir’s Novgorod, 1972................................................50

Figure 4. Ploshchad’ Revolyutsii in Pskov from

Figure 5. Pamyatnik ‘Tysyacheletie Rossii’ in Novgorod..........................60

Figure 6. A pensioner demonstrating work on a weaver’s
loom at the kräumechskii museum of the ‘Iskra’..........................89

Figure 7. A girl giving a presentation about the life of
the peasants of Poozer’e at the kräumechskii
museum ‘Iskra’................................................................89

Figure 8. The folk ensemble ‘Sadko’ in front of their
factory in Novgorod, 1984.................................................92

Figure 9. A lace working of the Soviet ‘Order of Victory’, 2010....................96

Figure 10. Pioneers on an excursion at the
Pskov kräumechskie museum, late-1950s..........................101

Figure 11. The prize-winning design for the new
Soviet coat of arms in Novgorod, 1967..............................127

Figure 12. Newspaper cartoon of a car travelling down a road
where old and new is harmoniously combined, 1960 ..................130

Figure 13. Exhibition of heritage-themed artwork at the
Trade Union House of Culture in Pskov, 1968.........................134

Figure 14. Tserkov’ Preobrazheniya na Kovaleve
at the end of the nineteenth century.................................138

Figure 15. The empty space where the church had stood
after it was destroyed in the Second World War..................138

Figure 16. The church in 2010 following its
reconstruction in the 1950s..............................................................138

Figure 17. Cartoon strip satirizing the behaviour of leaseholders
of architectural monuments in Novgorod, 1966..............................144

Figure 18. Dom Levashova on Ulitsa Gertsena,
Vologda, 2009..............................................................................149

Figure 19. Dom Volkova on Leningradskaya ulitsa,
Vologda, 2009..............................................................................149

Figure 20. Dom Zasetskikh on Ulitsa Gertsena,
Vologda 2010..............................................................................149

Figure 21. The house on Vorovskii Street, Vologda
before it was damaged by fire in the early-2000s.......................160

Figure 22. The house on Vorovskii Street,
Vologda after it was damaged by fire, 2009.................................160

Figure 23. Zurab Tsereteli’s monument to Ol’ga,
Pskov, 2009..................................................................................181

Figure 24. Vyacheslav Klykov’s monument to Ol’ga,
Pskov, 2010..................................................................................181

Figure 25. Vsegradskii Obydennyi sobor
functioning as a cinema in the 1960s.............................................187

Figure 26. The destruction of the Vsegradskii Obydennyi
sobor by army tanks in 1973..........................................................187

Figure 27. The commemorative cross on
ploshchad’ Revolyutsii, 2010..........................................................187

Figure 28. Monument of the brown bear
in Novgorod, 2009.....................................................................192

Figure 29. The pissing dog at the monument
to electrification in Vologda, 2009..............................................192

Figure 30. The ‘tourist’ monument in Novgorod, 2009........................192

Figure 31. A group of pioneers stands in front
of the Pamyatnik Lenina in Vologda, c1957.................................194

Figure 32. The Lenin monument on top of the
‘Red Square’ apartment building, New York, 2009......................194
Figure 34. An unfinished multi-storey hotel in Pskov, 2009..............................................................203

Figure 35. Elite ‘cottage’ settlement on the ‘Zolotaya naberezhnaya’, Pskov, 2009...........................................205

Figure 36. Visitors posing for photographs at the noble mansion, ‘Nesvoiskoe’, Vologda, 2008.........................205

Figure 37. John Lennon depicted in pulses, Pskov, 2009.................................................................220

Figure 38. Pamyatnik Belyaevu, Vologda, 2008........................................................................233

Figure 39. Pamyatnik geroyam Oktyabr’skoi Revolyutsii, 2008.......................................................233
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I dedicate this thesis to John and Sue Donovan, lovers of knowledge and
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PART ONE

CRAFTING PATRIOTISM: THE REGENERATION OF LOCAL CULTURE AND TRADITIONS IN NORTHWEST RUSSIA AFTER 1961
INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION

1.1 1961 AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE

European history of the second half of the twentieth century – the processes of material and psychological reconstruction, economic growth, urban modernisation, and social transformation – has often been dismissed as dull and unengaging by contrast with the cataclysmic events and social upheavals of the first half of the century. The bloody revolutions, violent repressions and purges, and physical devastation of the Second World War continue to hold the attention of European historians and, if the choices made by A-level students in British classrooms today are anything to judge by,\(^2\) will continue to dominate the historiographical horizon for the generation to come. Soviet historiography is far from an exception in this context, demonstrating a clear bias towards the ‘Events’ of the twentieth century: the Russian Revolution, Stalinism, and the

\(^2\) In an article on the Conservative government’s proposals to revise the national curriculum for history in British schools, Richard Evans notes that around 40% of A-level students choose Hitler and the Nazis for their special subject, and the next most popular topic is Stalin. See Richard J. Evans, 'The Wonderfulness of Us: The Tory Interpretation of History', *London Review of Books*, 17 March 2011 [http://www.lrb.co.uk/v33/n06/richard-j-evans/the-wonderfulness-of-us] [last accessed: 16 March 2011].
Second World War. The period between Stalin’s death and the collapse of the authoritarian system has consequently been interpreted as a political appendix of sorts, a tepid period of ‘thaw’ and ‘stagnation’ compared to the cascades and whirlpools of the previous decades.³

A number of excellent studies of the post-war period have nevertheless made headway into correcting this historiographical bias. These works have picked apart the idea of a ‘return to normalcy’ in the post-Stalin period, scrutinizing its political impulses and throwing light on its destabilizing social consequences.⁴ Polly Jones’s edited collection of articles, The Dilemmas of De-Stalinization, thus sheds light on the social and cultural impact of the de-Stalinizing reforms, comparing the reform agenda of the post-Stalin regime with the expectations of the Soviet public.⁵ Miriam Dobson, in her enlightening study of Gulag returnees after Stalin, builds on studies such as this to demonstrate the dual nature of de-Stalinization, as both a process of dismantling existing structures and the establishment of new forms of social control and institutionalized intolerance.⁶

These works have cast doubt on the wisdom of the conventional periodization of

³ A crude but nevertheless revealing measure of this situation is the number of hits that a search of the Oxford Libraries Information System (OLIS) produces when charged to find books with the words Stalin, Stalinism, or Stalinist in their titles (1038), as opposed to Khrushchev, post-Stalin, and de-Stalinisation/de-Stalinization (83).
⁵ The Dilemmas of De-Stalinization: Negotiating Cultural and Social Change in the Khrushchev Era, ed. by Polly Jones (London; New York: Routledge, 2006).
the post-war era, raising questions about the usefulness of categories such as 'late-Stalinism', 'Thaw', and 'stagnation'. Indeed, as Stephen Lovell’s history of post-1941 Russia and the Soviet Union has demonstrated, alternative chronological frameworks can challenge the relevance and applicability of such metaphors and provide new tools for conceptualising the period and its developments.\(^7\)

By rooting this analysis in the political events of 1961, I hope to contribute to this process of rethinking the existing periodization of post-war Russian history. The Twenty-Second Party Congress of 1961 marked a political and ideological shift whose significance was equal to that of the better-known Twentieth Congress in 1956. It was the moment that the Communist Party rallied and regained its ideological equilibrium after an interlude of political uncertainty and existential crisis. As Dobson maintains, the Congress was the source of a ‘coherent eschatological myth’, the moment in which the revelations of 1956 were worked into a teleological narrative and re-interpreted as grist to the mill in the march towards Communism.\(^8\) Following the discursive destabilization caused by the Secret Speech, the people of the Soviet Union were offered a concrete set of values and ideals: the Moral Code of the Builder of Communism and the new Programme of the Communist Party. Blueprints for the achievement of Communism replaced ideological equivocation. Once the foundations of the ‘glorious house of Communism’ had been laid, Khrushchev

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\(^8\) Dobson, p. 195.
explained, the ‘walls’ of the building – a surplus of material and cultural goods – could be raised and the redistribution of national wealth could take place.¹⁰

Yet, the ideological programme launched at the Twenty-Second Congress was riven by internal contradictions. If the society of the future was to be a consumer-driven one of material plentitude, the builders of that society were to be Communists of unshakable ideological integrity, whose primary concern was the collective good.¹² In the 12-point Moral Code, the ideal qualities of the New Soviet Man or Woman – patriotism, diligence, conscientiousness, social solidarity, decency and truthfulness – were laid out. Injustice, parasitism, deviousness, and professional opportunism, on the other hand, were

¹¹ VOKM, op. 1, d. 403, l. 30.
¹² VOKM, op. 1, d. 403, l. 31.
¹³ Catriona Kelly describes the attempt to combine ideological rigour with the promise of consumerism and material welfare in the 1961 programme in Refining Russia: Advice Literature, Polite Culture, and Gender from Catherine to Yeltsin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 314–315.
characteristics to be fought against in oneself or others. Yet the questions remained: How were such ideals to be inculcated in Soviet citizens in an increasingly materialist society? What sort of cultural work could be done to ensure the interests of Communist society remained relevant to an ever more individualistic and consumerist community?

The new programme was ostensibly focused on the future. Famously, Communism was supposed to be achieved by 1980. However, in the post-1961 period, as I argue in this thesis, the pre-revolutionary and Soviet past became one of the most important focuses of Soviet cultural work in the attempt to craft new forms of social solidarity. The past provided a source of heroes, myths, and icons to mobilize and spur the nation forward along the path to Communism. In an attempt to strengthen local and national patriotism, certain elements of the national past were ‘objectivized’ in institutions of cultural memory, such as museums and monuments, and commemorated in text, in tourist guides and history books. The familiarization with a particular vision of the national and local past was supposed to make Soviet citizens aware of their place in the nation’s history and their role in turning the last page of that volume, the construction of Communism.

Yet this was not a simple repetition of the events of the 1930s when, as David Brandenberger and others have illustrated, icons and myths from Russian history were deployed to mobilize popular support of the regime and lend it

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13 ‘Moral’nyi kodeks stroitel’ya kommunizma’, Programma KPSS, section V, part I.
legitimacy. In the post-Stalin period, the regeneration of cultural traditions took place not only at a national level; it also played out in the local arena, informing the activities of regional cultural institutions and elites. Soviet citizens were offered focuses of national memory – the Decembrist revolt, the life and legend of Vladimir Il’ich, the Second World War –, but were also encouraged to turn inwards to examine the particular role their locality had played in the events of national history and to celebrate their local heroes and heroines. By stimulating local patriotism, it was hoped, Soviet citizens would become more engaged in the process of constructing socialism, perceiving themselves as an integral part of the nation’s heroic past, present, and utopian future.  

1.2 THE REVIVAL OF KRAEVEDENIE

At the centre of the process of crafting local patriotism was the revival of the repressed discipline of kraevedenie, the history of which deserves to be detailed briefly in this introductory discussion. Kraevedenie, according to the Bol’shaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya, is the ‘всестороннее изучение определённой части страны, города или деревни, др. поселений местным населением, для

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15 These intentions were reflected in the language of cultural preservation that emerged in the post-Stalin era. For example, in the Decree № 1327 of the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR ‘On the Further Improvement of Work for the Preservation of Cultural Monuments in the RSFSR’ of 30 August 1960, it was stated that the preservation of local heritage ‘[имеет] важное значение в воспитании у трудящихся, особенно у молодежи, чувства глубокого уважения к историческому прошлому нашего народа и любви к Родине’. *Okhrana pamyatnikov istorii i kul’tury: Shornik dokumentov* (Moscow: Sovetskaya Rossiya, 1973), p. 139.
которого эта территория считается родным краем’.16 As Emily Johnson has shown in her study of the discipline’s evolution in the Leningrad context, *kraevedenie* originally cohered around the Central Bureau of *Kraevedenie* (TSBK), a body under the control of the Commissariat of Enlightenment that was established in the post-revolutionary period in response to the vulnerability of cultural institutions in the Russian provinces. In the wake of the devastation of the Civil War, the TSBK organized and coordinated *kraevedenie* work in the Russian regions, giving rise to local research centres focussing on ecological preservation, the discovery national resources, historical research, the study of local heritage, and much more.17

The rapid growth of the *kraevedenie* movement in the immediate post-revolutionary period reflected the level of official interest in acquiring knowledge about the Russian regions, in particular ethnographic and geographical information about the territory.18 Between 1918 and 1923, 270 new museums were established in the Soviet Union, of which 193 were *kraevedcheskie* museums.19 It was perhaps the rapid expansion of the semi-independent movement, many of the members of which endorsed a limited form of regional independence, that roused the suspicion of the central authorities at a

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18 The collection of information about the national territory in the early Soviet period was intended to facilitate the creation of plans for industrial and agricultural production; one might compare the conceptual evolution of the British census, which developed from a rather rudimentary head count in 1801 for the purposes of determining the size of the British army to a means of calculating the likelihood of a national famine in the eighteenth century. See D. V. Glass, *Numbering the People: The Eighteenth-Century Population Controversy and the Development of Census and Vital Statistics in Britain* (Farnborough: D.C. Heath, 1973).
period of increasing political centralisation. ‘Drawn out of their relative
isolation’, Johnson remarks, ‘and transformed into a real community, local
_kraevedy became more effective cultural workers, but they also might have
started to resemble an independent power base.’\textsuperscript{20}

From the end of the 1920s, the activities of the TSBK were gradually brought
under the control of the central government. In 1927, the regional branches of
the movement were subordinated to the central Ministry of Enlightenment by
Resolution of Council of People’s Commissars of RSFSR and the administrative
centre was relocated from Leningrad to Moscow. In line with the first Five Year
plan, which put cultural policy at the service of state industry, _kraevedenie was
redefined as an activity that should contribute directly to the improvement of the
economy. Those who were perceived to deviate from this mandate and to
continue to practice what was by this time understood to be ‘bourgeois’
retrospectivism were identified as enemies of the people and arrested.\textsuperscript{21} As
_kraevedenie metamorphosed into an extension of the state apparatus geared for
the fulfilment of plans and the promotion of ideological messages to the people,
so its attraction for the general public waned. Johnson notes that by 1934, 94-95%
of the _kraevedenie work consisted of research into valuable minerals, and
by the mid-1930s the discipline had lost its relevance to Soviet society
completely.\textsuperscript{22}

\textsuperscript{20} Johnson, p. 175.
\textsuperscript{21} D. O. Sviatsky and I. Greys were among the members of the Leningrad bureau branch who were
\textsuperscript{22} Johnson, p. 176.
The revival of the discipline of *kraevedenie* in the post-1961 period, which was part of a strategy of stimulating engagement with the goals of socialism through the association of those goals with local culture, provides the context for this examination of institutional memory and local identity in the North West. The ‘historical turn’ in late-Soviet culture has tended to be interpreted by scholars as evidence of creeping Russian nationalism in Soviet politics from the Brezhnev era onwards. In the analysis of Yitzhak Brudny, for example, increasingly vociferous critics of the regime are seen to have spurred an era of ‘inclusionary politics’ during which the nationalist threat was mitigated by the official espousal of certain aspects of its political manifesto.\(^{23}\) Yet, if nationalist and xenophobic overtones were sometimes remarkable in the patriotic discourse at a regional level,\(^{24}\) the reality was more complicated than the simple integration of nationalist ideas into Soviet rhetoric. The visions of local history and culture in Soviet institutions were highly ideologized, constituting not only a celebration of the nation and its traditions but also, and more importantly, a means of stimulating engagement with the ideals and values of the socialist state.\(^{25}\)

As the title ‘Nestolichnaya kul’tura’ suggests, my thesis is focused on what usually – and often dismissively – is named as the *provintsiya* or *periferiya*. While inevitably retaining the capital-non-capital dichotomy, the use of the term ‘nestolichnaya’ allows for greater neutrality in the discussion of regional culture,

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24 See, for example, my discussion of the exclusion of national minority cultures from museum exhibitions and festivals of national folklore in Chapter Two.
25 For an alternative interpretation of the rise of conservative history as a manifestation of ‘a complex landscape of social doubt, inquiry, and a search for origins’ in the post-Stalin period see Denis Kozlov, ‘The Historical Turn in Late Soviet Culture: Retrospectivism, Factography, Doubt, 1953-91’, *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History*, 2, 3 (Summer 2001), 577-600.
avoiding the evocation of negative stereotypes usually associated with the idea of ‘provincialism’ in both English- and Russian-language cultures. Nevertheless, the modifiers ‘local’ and ‘regional’ are employed with greater frequency throughout the thesis to refer in a non-pejorative sense to cultural developments outside of the capital cities. The idea of provincialism and its connotations in contemporary Russian culture is addressed directly in Chapter Five, in which I focus on the cultural stereotyping of provincial life and provincial Russians and the ways in which local inhabitants have responded to these social clichés.

The case study for this analysis of non-capital culture is the Russian North West, and specifically the medieval towns of Novgorod, Pskov, and Vologda. These towns were selected, not so much because they are representative in an overall sense of developments in post-1961 Russia, but rather as localities with specific historical associations in Russian culture that were emphasized, reinterpreted, ignored, or challenged in accordance with their correspondence to the vision of national history endorsed by the Soviet state. The legend of the Democratic Republic of Novgorod, the myth of military resistance associated with Pskov, and the notion of Vologda as the heartland of Russian culture thus supplied the substance from which patriotic visions of local culture were crafted. The cultural manifestations of this process and the ways in which it impacted

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26 By contrast, ‘stolichnaya kul’tura’ is understood to refer to developments in both the national capital, Moscow, and the northern or cultural capital, St Petersburg. This reasoning reflects the logic of many local inhabitants of the region, a number of whom have never visited Moscow and whose understanding of ‘big city life’ is framed by their experience of Leningrad/St Petersburg culture.

27 A large industrial town such as Chelyabinsk or a town where there was accelerated industrial development in the 1960s such as Tilikhvin would offer quite a different perspective to that of the medieval centre of northwest Russia.
upon the collective identity of the local community are central focuses of this thesis.

1.3 AN OVERVIEW OF STUDIES OF THE RUSSIAN REGIONS

It would a misrepresentation of the current state of Russian studies to claim that scholars have consistently overlooked the regions to focus on the political and cultural centres of the country. As several recent studies of the Russian regions have demonstrated, the post-Soviet period has, if anything, been marked by a trend in the opposite direction. As regional archives opened their files to the public, historians filled their reading rooms in an effort to ‘re-tell’ Russian and Soviet history from alternative perspectives. From collectivization in Siberia to baby-boomers in Saratov,28 familiar subjects have begun to be narrated ways that challenge the traditional emphasis on the Russian capitals as the most significant loci of political, economic, and social developments in Russian history.

This development, which might be seen as a ‘regional turn’ in Russian studies, has nevertheless been marked by a tendency to approach the region as a site for certain political and social ‘events’, rather than interrogating its historical or cultural composition as such. Thus, in James Hughes’s Stalinism in a Russian

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Province, the ‘province’ in question, Siberia, provides the context for developing a new hypothesis of Stalinist collectivisation rather than focussing on the specific implications the policy had for the region. A similar method might be noted in Stephen Kotkin’s account of Stalinism in the mining town of Magnitogorsk, Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilization. In this study, Kotkin presents Magnitogorsk not as a locality with a specific experience of the Soviet 1930s and 1940s, but rather as a ‘flagship’ Stalinist town, the study of which can contribute to an understanding of the cultural dimension of Stalinist politics.

The tendency to perceive the regional town as representative of Russian reality generally and, thus, as a platform from which to develop hypotheses about certain national experiences can also be remarked in several other recent studies of oral culture in Russia. Thus, while scholars such as Dale Pesmen and Donald Raleigh have situated their studies away from the metropolitan capitals (in Omsk and Saratov respectively), they have nevertheless tended to present their informants’ narratives as ‘representative of the wide array of experiences, lifestyles, and views of the larger collective’. Here, as elsewhere in English-language studies of Russian culture, the region has provided a means to qualify interpretations based primarily on the two capitals and test broad generalisations in an effort to understand the national rather than the local experience.

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29 Hughes.
32 Raleigh, p. 11.
This way of conceiving relations between the ‘local’ and the ‘national’ might be understood in terms of what Alon Confino and Ajay Skaria have described as the ‘logic of transcendence’. This logic holds that the national is in fact the local transcended into ‘higher levels of generality and abstraction’, and it is only through this spatial ‘transcendence’ that the meaning of the local is made clear. Confino correctly maintains that studies concentrating on how the national has penetrated the local tend towards descriptive analysis, deeming theory only relevant to higher levels of abstraction. As they argue: ‘The locality is either a pre-existing, anti-national entity that waits to be nationalized, or a pre-existing, traditional entity that waits to be modernized, or a pre-existing repository of sub-national sentiments that waits to be awakened.’ While it would be groundless to argue that the localities at the centre of Harris’s or Kotkin’s studies have substantial pre-national content, this pattern would appear to fit closely with Evtuhov’s approach to the culture of Nizhnii Novgorod or Pesman’s account of perestroika culture in Omsk.

In the Russian academy, however, the Russian town has witnessed a rather different conceptual evolution. This can be tied to the reorientation of Russian anthropologists towards urban culture, a development which according to Mariya Akhmetova and Mikhail Lur’e has been partially determined by the discipline’s dependence on established semiotic studies of ‘local texts’ and ‘local

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34 Confino and Skaria, p. 9.
myths’. As V. N. Sazhin has remarked in the introduction to the edited volume
Russkaya provintsiya, in recent years there has been a concerted effort on the
part of Russian anthropologists to ‘научиться понимать язык города’. Understanding the ‘vocabulary’ of this language, the ‘signs’ and ‘symbols’ that
constitute the meaning of a place and its inhabitants has become the task of
scholars looking at the semantic composition of towns such as Moscow, Perm’,
and Tver’.

It is perhaps unsurprising that these semiotic studies of provincial culture have
often placed the binary opposition of centre and periphery at the heart of their
understanding of the ‘local text’. The centre is frequently perceived as a negative
pole of identification for the periphery, the constitutive Other against which it is
able to define and understand itself. Nevertheless, the importance attributed to
such dichotomies has sometimes led scholars to overlook the unstable and
discursive nature of terms such as ‘centre’ and ‘periphery’. Far from natural
geographical definitions, centre and periphery are in fact relative and even at

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35 The ‘town text’ genre appeared in the 1970s and was heavily influenced by the semiotic
methods of scholars from the Tartu-Moscow school, such as Yuri Lotman and Vladimir Toporov,
for whom the cultural ‘text’ was a particularly important concept. Generally, the notion of the
‘town text’ has been used to refer to the ‘image of a town’ created in diverse materials from
literary texts, myths, and motifs to the knowledge and views about the town shared by local
people. See, Mariya Akhmetova and Mikhail Lur’e, ‘Materialy Bologovskikh ekspeditsii’,
36 Russkaya provintsiya: mif – tekst – real’nost’, ed. by A. F. Belousov and T. V. Tsiv’yan (St
Petersburg; Moscow: Tema, 2000).
37 V. V. Abashev, Perm’ kak tekst: Perm’ v russkoi kul’ture i literature XX veka (Perm’: Izd-vo
Permskogo universiteta, 2000); Moskva i "moskovskii tekst" russkoi kultury: Sbornik statei, ed. by
G. S. Knabe (Moscow: Rossiiskiigosudarstvennyi gumanitarnyi universitet, 1998); for a popular
reinterpretation of the town text genre see Yu. V. Domanskii, “Tvierskoi tekst” rok-poezii Borisa
Grebinshchikova’, in Belousov and Tsiv’yan, pp. 444-449.
38 See, for example, I. A. Razumova, ”Provintsiya/stolitsa” v povestvovatel’nom fol’klore’, in
Belousov and Tsiv’yan, pp. 291-298.
times interchangeable terms that derive meaning from the context in which they
are employed.\(^{39}\)

Drawing once more on Confino’s analysis of the local and the national, it might
be noted that the local is central to the national idea, being celebrated in
nationalist thought as the national ‘home’.\(^{40}\) While this is certainly true Confino’s
case study of post-1945 Germany and the ‘heimat’,\(^ {41}\) the idea can also be
extended to the Russian context. As Sander Brouwer has pointed out, the texts of
the ‘Impertsy’ writers, such as the Petersburg nationalists Pavel Krusanov and
Aleksandr Prokhanov, have frequently perceived the periphery as a repository
of authentic Russian values and an alternative cultural ‘centre’ to westernized
Moscow.\(^ {42}\) In this way, periphery and centre are seen not only to be
interchangeable, but also to be embedded within each other, constituting parts
of an organic national whole.\(^ {43}\)

\(^{39}\) For evidence of this, one might think of the popular saying pertaining to life in the capital,
‘Москва — это не Россия’, in which the centre is reconceived as unrepresentative, peripheral,
even foreign to the everyday Russian reality. Alternatively, the popular quirk of regional
inhabitants to conceive of their towns as capitals (of the North, the Volga region, West Siberia,
and so on) or centres (of Russian iconography, democracy, industry, etc.) can be seen to work in
the opposite direction, reordering the symbolic cartography into a more satisfyingly region-
centric configuration.

\(^{40}\) Confino, p. 9.

\(^{41}\) Confino argues that the concept of ‘heimat’ was developed in the post-war period as a means of
reconciling local, regional, and national identities, providing a means to reformulate the notion of
the nation state in politically discredited post-war Germany. See Confino, p. 17.

\(^{42}\) Sander Brouwer, ‘Centre and Borders in Dugin and Prokhanov’, paper presented at the
interdisciplinary workshop, ‘Russia on Edge: Reclaiming the Periphery in Contemporary Russian
Culture’, 11-12 December 2009 (CRASSH, University of Cambridge); Edmund Griffiths has made
similar observations with regard to the writings of the ‘Imperial’ author Sergei Kara-Murza. For
Kara-Murza, however, the heartland of Russian culture is located within the ‘Red Belt’ region of
Communist supporters in the southern regions of the Russian Federation. Edmund Griffiths,
‘Eurocentricism and the East-West Question: The case of S. G. Kara-Murza’, unpublished seminar
paper presented at the ‘Max Heyward Seminar Series’, 1 March 2011 (St Antony’s College,
University of Oxford).

\(^{43}\) For a comparable example of the way the capital-centric bias in French historiography has
The recent work on Russian ‘town texts’ has produced valuable insights into the internal workings of local folklore and the cultural composition of regional and urban identity. Of particular note in this regard is the work of Irina Razumova, whose studies of the less poetically inspiring localities of Petrozavodsk, and Kirovsk and Apatity in the Murmansk region have attempted to re-construct the local myth through oral rather than literary sources, paying particular attention to local sayings, proverbs, gossip, and jokes.\textsuperscript{44} Mariya Akhmetova and Mikhail Lur’e’s study of the equally unremarkable town of Bologoe, while not characterising itself explicitly as a ‘town text’, is also an impressive reading of the narrative and linguistic models that residents employ to understand their town in time and space. In these studies, the body of general knowledge shared by residents of a particular town about the place where they live has replaced the notion of ‘text’ which, as Akhmetova and Lur’e have remarked, can only exist in the minds of those who set about modelling it.\textsuperscript{45}

Another corpus of scholarly literature with which this thesis engages can be broadly defined as Russian collective memory studies.\textsuperscript{46} Interest in collective memory has developed relatively slowly among scholars of Russian history and culture. The slow drip of academic studies dedicated to practices of collective remembrance in Russia thus stands in stark contrast to the flood of scholarly publications dealing with the politics of memory in post-war Western Europe.

\textsuperscript{44} See I. A. Razumova, “...Kak blisko ot Peterburga, no kak daleko”: (Petrozavodsk v literaturnykh i ustnykh tekstakh XIX-XX vv.), in Belousov and Tsv’y’an, pp. 324-334.
\textsuperscript{45} Akhmetova and Lur’e, p. 338.
\textsuperscript{46} Works in this field have typically drawn on the conceptual vocabulary of the French sociologist Maurice Halbwachs and the Egyptologist Jan Assmann to explain their interpretation of memory as a social phenomenon, which acquires fixity of meaning through ceremonial communication and the creation of concrete memorials. See Maurice Halbwachs, \textit{La Mémoire Collective} (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1950); and Jan Assmann and John Czaplicka, ‘Collective Memory and Cultural Identity’, \textit{New German Critique}, 65 (1995), 125-133 (p. 127).
and more recently Eastern Europe.\textsuperscript{47} This situation can be linked to the conservative research outlook of the Russian academy, a legacy of the positivistic methods that dominated the Soviet educational system. As M. V. Loskutova has pointed out, ‘fashionable’ new research methods have thus tended to be treated with scepticism and, in some cases, rejected completely.\textsuperscript{48} Work on the memory of the Leningrad blockade, the construction of the Baikal-Amur Railway Line, and Brezhnev-era food shortages, much of which has come out of the innovative Oral History Centre at the European University at St Petersburg, can thus be counted among the first attempts to interrogate the form and function of collective memory in the construction of social identity.\textsuperscript{49}

If the notion of collective memory is more established in English language scholarship of Russian culture, this literature has nevertheless been divided along clear disciplinary lines. Political scientists such as Kathleen E. Smith and Nicolai N. Petro have thus focussed on the instrumental use of collective memory by post-Soviet politicians and local elites respectively, as a means to legitimate their claim to power and, as Petro argues, to weather the storm of political

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transition. In these accounts, the construction of historical discourse has been understood as a top-down monolithic process and the ways in which narratives of the past are received, interpreted, and perpetuated within a given community left unexplained. Where forms of everyday memory have been addressed, these have been located in a relationship of subordination to a ‘hegemonic collective memory’, or, as Nurit Schleifman has argued, to have ‘broken loose’ from this only in the post-Soviet period. This exaggeration of the capacity of the state to monopolize the discourses of public remembrance appears to stem from a specific understanding of cultural symbols and traditions as political resources whose meaning elites are able to manipulate at will.

Soviet historians have offered more sophisticated tools for approaching the production and persistence of certain historical narratives in Russian culture. In their edited collection on cultural legacies in Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union, Brandenberger and Platt have thus emphasized the role of writers, artists and members of the local intelligentsia in shaping historical discourse in Stalinist Russia. Frederick C. Corney, in his account of the legacy of the October Revolution in Soviet culture, has broadened the scope of analysis further still, showing how this foundation narrative of the Soviet state became routinized and acquired authority through its retelling and performance by Soviet citizens. Rather than looking at the representation of historical events in cultural

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institutions, studies such as these have focused on how episodes from the past are reinterpreted in biographical terms, becoming ‘landmarks’ in individual memory. As Margaret Paxson has stressed in her study of remembrance and ritual in the Russian village of Solovyovo, ‘inertial’ forms of memory, such as modes of speech and narrative genres, are subtle but important sources of self-definition for communities that exist outside and alongside authoritative discourses of identity.54

1.4 OVERVIEW OF THE THESIS

As this survey of the extant literature shows, scholars have tended to narrow their focus either to the way in which narratives of the past are ‘fixed’ in the lived environment, or to the psychological realities that this institutionalization of memory informs. This study, in an effort to bridge this divide, tracks the articulation of new narratives of identity through public institutions, but also draws on substantial oral history and participant observation work to examine how such narratives were routinized, reinforced and subverted through everyday practices and oral traditions.

In Part One of the thesis, I examine the strategies adopted in public institutions for representing the local past to regional and national communities, the tensions inherent in these representations, and their shifts in emphasis over time. Chapter One examines the packaging of local culture and history for touristic consumption, the means employed to frame the tourist’s experience of

the medieval town in excursions and guidebooks. The material forms through which the local past was commemorated in regional museums is the focus of Chapter Two. Of particular interest is the way in which displays of folk culture were conceived of, not only as a means of generating pride in local culture, but also as a tool for the promotion of the values and ideals of Soviet socialism. Chapter Three extends the analysis to the question of heritage preservation, examining local architectural monuments and the vision of the past they were intended to represent. The first part of the thesis thus constitutes an analysis of the ways in which the symbolic affirmation of the regions directed from the centre was given institutional expression at a local level.

Part Two of the thesis shifts the focus from institutionalized memory to popular culture, examining the informal practices and oral traditions that existed alongside the authoritative discourses of the past. Chapter Four examines the popular understanding of urban space, in particular the everyday rituals associated with public monuments, the knowledge and performance of which served to reinforce the boundaries of local community. The narrative construction of localness in the oral histories of town residents is the focus of Chapter Five. In this discussion, I examine local Russians' strategies of self-representation, arguing that the playful and self-ironizing genres of oral narrative challenge and undermine the bombast of official memory, investing ‘provincialism’ with new cultural value.

These chapters, which address diverse dimensions of the problem of cultural memory and local identity, are woven together by a number of thematic and
historical questions. What was the social impact of an inherently contradictory strategy of ‘looking backwards in order to move forwards’ in the post-1961 period? Or, in other words, how did the institutionalization of local memory effect the reception and implementation of the goals of socialist construction outlined in the Twenty-Second Party Congress? When and why did the focuses of local memory shift and what was the consequence of this discursive revisionism for the way in which local communities perceived themselves and engaged with their localities? What was the effect of the state-sponsored rise of local patriotism in the post-Soviet period, when the apparatus of political centralization was (at least partially) removed from public life? Answering these questions provides an insight into the processes of social transformation and collective identification that informed late-Soviet culture, but also sheds light on developments of the contemporary period, the growing regionalization in the increasingly regionalized political reality of the Russian Federation.

NOTE ON REFERENCES

All Russian quotations in the text are given in Cyrillic characters. Transliteration of titles, exhibitions, events, etc. follows the BGN/PCGN system throughout. Transliterated titles of publications, exhibitions, excursion routes, cultural programmes, and other events are italicized. Place names, names of buildings, churches, and names of monuments are transliterated but not italicized. I have translated the names of institutions where these are repeated throughout the text (i.e. Ministry of Culture, Novgorod State Museum).

55 These words (‘Идя назад, шагаем вперед’), a quotation from Alexander Herzen, were reproduced in a pamphlet published in 1974 on the role of kraevedenie and tourism in Soviet society. See I. S. Yun'ev, Kraevedenie i turizm (Moscow: ‘Znanie’, 1974), p. 11.
In the course of the text full details of every source are given at first citation. Thereafter they are referred to by the author’s name or the author’s name and an abbreviated form of the title if more than one item by the same author is cited. Primary sources are listed in the Bibliography by town. Online sources and interviews are listed in separate sections of the Bibliography, following a full list of primary and secondary sources.

Archival materials from the Novgorodskii gosudarstvennyi ob"edinennyi musei-zapovednik (NGOM), Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Novgorodskoi oblasti (GANO), Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv noveishei istorii Pskova (GANIP), Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Pskovskoi oblasti (GAPO), Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Vologodskoi oblasti (GAVO), Vologodskii oblast’ noii kraevedcheskii muzei (VOKM) are referred to by their abbreviated titles throughout.
CHAPTER ONE
CHAPTER ONE

Packaging Localness: The Framing of the Local Past in Touristic Activities

and *Kraevedenie* Literature

2.1 INTRODUCTION

In 1968, several entries from the Novgorod museum response book were selected for submission to the Regional Council for Tourism and Excursions. Among them was an effervescent appraisal of the city’s charms penned by a group of tourists from Moscow:

Побывать в древне-русском городе Новгороде была наша заветная мечта. На этой земле хранятся величайшие сокровища мировой культуры и искусства. Наше пребывание было коротким, но то, что мы увидели здесь поразило нас, вызвало чувство восторга и радости за наше искусство.56

The entry was selected for official perusal on the basis that it demonstrated what might today be called ‘public impact’. It provided neat justification for the central assumption of the post Stalin-era policy on tourism: that the exposure of Soviet

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56 This entry was among four that were presented at the front of the response and suggestion book of the Novgorod Council for Tourism and Excursions for 1968-1972. GANO, f. R-4063, op. 2-10, d. 140a, l. 2.
citizens to local sites of historical interest would reinforce patriotic identity, and improve the morale and community spirit of the nation.

The understanding of the role of tourism in the Khrushchev and Brezhnev eras built on the notion of proletarian turizm developed during the 1930s. Tourism under Stalin, as Diane Koenker has pointed out, was understood as a socially engaged and politically constructive activity, diametrically opposed to the ‘bourgeois’ practice in the West, which consisted of indulgent relaxation at the expense of the toiling classes. Unlike the idle western holidaymaker, proletarian tourists were travellers with an agenda; their mission, as it was outlined in the journal of the tourist movement, Na sushe i na more, was to produce knowledge through study of the territory of the Soviet Union that would contribute to the fulfilment of the Five Year Plan. Tourism in one’s own locality was encouraged as part of this process. However local tourism, like the broader discipline of kraevedenie with which it was associated, was treated with ambivalence by the political authorities. While encouraged as a means of discovering new raw materials for the country’s production goals, it was also regarded as a potential source of ‘local deviation’ given the close ties between local touristic movements and ideologically suspect organisations such as local folklore societies.

In the wake of the Second World War, domestic tourism was infused with new ideological importance. Organised travel within the Soviet Union was perceived

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58 Koenker, in Gorsuch and Koenker, p. 124.
as a means of limiting the influence of western culture in the Communist territories and reinforcing Soviet patriotic identity. A major focus of the new forms of patriotic tourism in late-Stalinism was the 'heart of the socialist motherland', Moscow. Embodying the idea of post-war reconstruction and recovery and the ideal of transformative modernization, the capital became the destination for organised excursions and the focus of touristic publications. In the Khrushchev period, however, the Moscow-centric model of Soviet tourism, whereby visitors from the regions came to observe and admire the developments in the capital, was reversed. The underdeveloped periphery rather than the urbane centre became the symbolic heartland of the country. The inversion of the capital-region dichotomy was reflected in Soviet literature, in which protagonists travelled away from Leningrad and Moscow to follow their destinies in distant locations, and in the music of Soviet 'bards' who sang of rootless adventurers and fearless al'pinisty, who shunned the comfort of life in the capital for the romance of the remote. 

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60 Gorsuch, p. 772; Katerina Clark has argued that from the 1920s onwards Moscow became 'the acme in the symbolic system of the country, the end point in a spatial hierarchy that is simultaneously temporal and anthropological'. See Katerina Clark, 'Eisenstein's Two Projects for a Film about Moscow', Modern Language Review, 101 (2006), 184-200 (p. 186).

61 As Katerina Clark has pointed out, heroes of Soviet fiction in the late-1950s and early-1960s would often retreat into self-imposed exile. The protagonists of Soviet novels, such as V. Aksenov's Zvezdniy biliet (1961) and Anatolii Kuznetsov's Prodolzhenie legendy (1957), thus travelled away from Moscow and Leningrad to 'other places' that were usually associated with the new schemes of the Khrushchev regime. See Katerina Clark, The Soviet Novel: History as Ritual (Chicago; London: The University of Chicago Press, 1981), p. 228, for adventurers and al'pinisty in the songs of Soviet bards see, for example, Yuriiz Vizbor, 'Reportazhi s trassy Khorog-Osh' (1965-1966) in which a traveller is described moving steadfastly away from civilization, 'O' goroda Xoroga/ В далекий город Ош'; and Alexandr Gorodnitskii, 'Derevyannye goroda' (1959) in which a stranger sings of his sense of belonging in a distant town stripped of modern accoutrements.
A related development in the Khrushchev period was the re-forging of the link between tourism and kraevedenie. On the one hand kraevedy and kraavedcheskii literature were put at the service of the Soviet tourist. In preparation for their trips, independent tourists were instructed to familiarise themselves with the literature on a given region and, following their arrival, to consult the resident kraevedy in order to obtain the maximum information possible about their destination. On the other, tourists were encouraged to contribute personally to the study of the local region they were visiting. As I. S. Yun’ev pointed out in a pamphlet intended for prospective tourists in 1974, the latter requirement was in fact an inevitability: 'туризм, с какой бы целью он ни проводился (отдых, спорт, любознательность и т. д.), неизбежно увлекает путешественников краеведением; одних – в меньшей мере, других – настолько глубоко, что многие становятся заядлыми краеведами, деятельно изучающими облюбованный ими край'.

Tourism was thus understood as a means of engaging the Soviet citizen in the study of the regions with the goal of reinforcing their identification with the ideals of the Soviet state. As Karl Qualls notes with reference to tourism in post-war Sevastopol, the individual ‘identities’ of towns or regions, whether industrial conglomerates or ‘cradles of Russian civilization’, were seen to complement rather than to contradict their essentially Soviet characters. Each locality, so the argument went, was a constituent part of the larger Soviet whole. This somewhat contradictory logic was articulated by the medieval historian and

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cultural critic Dmitry Likhachev in a article published in a book of essays, *Zametki o kul'ture*, in 1984:

Каждая страна - это ансамбль искусств. Грандиозным ансамблем культур или памятников культуры является и Советский Союз. Города в Советском Союзе, сколь бы они ни разставляли между собой, не обособлены друг от друга. Москва и Ленинград не просто не похожи друг на друга - они контрастируют друг другу и, следовательно, взаимодействуют. Не случайно они связаны железной дорогой столь прямой, что, проехав в поезде ночь без поворотов и только с одной остановкой и попадая на вокзал в Москве или Ленинграде, вы видите почти то же вокзальное здание, которое вас провожало вечером: фасады Московского вокзала в Ленинграде и Ленинградского в Москве одинаковы. Но одинаковость вокзалов подчеркивает резкое несходство городов, несходство не простое, а дополняющее друг друга.64

The problem of framing difference to emphasize similarity – in the context of touristic visions of the Russian North West – is the focus of this chapter. In the following discussion I examine the ways in which individual histories, culture, and landscapes were worked into a national patriotic narrative, how episodes and objects from the local past were emphasized or ignored in order to support a vision of localness endorsed by the Soviet state. I begin with an overview of the strategies of displaying localness to domestic and foreign tourists, focusing on the way in which the experience of the local landscape was mediated by Soviet institutions. The second half of the chapter deals with the representation of the local past in kraevedenie materials – local histories, guidebooks, and architectural handbooks. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the

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64 D. S. Likhachev, *Zametki o russkom* (Moscow: Sovetskaya Rossiiia 1984), p. 27.
treatment of the socialist past in local texts, examining the consequences of the exclusion of the Soviet experience from official memory in the post-Soviet era.

2.2 THE ZAPOVEDNIK EXPERIENCE

In the post-Stalin period, the focus of historical tourism shifted from Moscow, the heart of socialist transformation, to the periphery of the country, and in particular to medieval Russian towns. The 'rituals of public self-admiration' were extended beyond the borders of the modern, renovated capital city to the 'cradles of Russian civilisation', where the vestiges of the past were combined with the symbols of Soviet modernity. The vehicle for this new form of historical tourism was the muzei-zapovednik, an open-air architectural museum comprising prominent architectural buildings or ensembles preserved in their historic surrounds. Kostroma, Novgorod, Nizhnii-Novgorod, and Yaroslavl'-Rostov all achieved the status of zapovedniki by Order of the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR in 1958 and 1959. Given that the other towns had been spared the destruction of wartime occupation, the decision to include Novgorod, a town that had suffered extensive material damage during the Second World War, on the list of zapovedniki may have been prompted by the desire to showcase the post-war restoration work in the town. The wish to establish a zapovednik that was closer to the 'cultural capital' Leningrad, not to mention the Baltic States and Finland, may also have informed the decision to transform the town into a national tourist attraction.

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65 Gorsuch, p. 771.
The *muzei-zapovedniki* were primarily sites of domestic tourism. Among the 3,359 tourist excursions conducted in Novgorod in 1961, for example, 141 were with foreign tourists.\(^{67}\) Moreover, many of the domestic tourists who visited the museums were members of the local community. In addition to the school trips from Moscow, the groups of university students from Central Asia, and visiting parties of pensioners from nearby towns, local schoolchildren, students from local institutes of higher education, factory and kolkhoz workers also visited the museum on a regular basis.\(^{68}\) The impression that these visitors received from the museum was carefully mediated. In organised excursions, the attention of tourists was directed towards certain focuses of local and national pride and their experience of museum exhibits manipulated by excursion guides and written texts. The word *dostoprimechatel’nost* (literally, ‘places worthy of note’) is instructive in this regard for the embedded subjectivity of its claim. The ‘sights’ selected for touristic display in the *muzei-zapovedniki* were not simply places of objective artistic and historic value, but also reflections of the Soviet ideal of medieval culture and its relationship with the socialist present.

Tourists’ experiences of their surroundings were regulated in various ways, the most obvious of these being the control of what was seen. On package tours of the Soviet Union, tourists were presented with selective visions of the national

\(^{67}\) Moreover, the large part of foreign tourism to Novgorod was from the Soviet Socialist Republics and the countries of the eastern bloc. See the report on the work of the Novgorod Museum for 1961. NGOM, op. 1, d. 407, l. 19. This trend is confirmed by the statistics for foreign language publications. In Novgorod, for example, there were no touristic materials available in languages other than Russian until the late-1970s (see Appendix One).

\(^{68}\) See the museum response book for the Novgorod Museum for 1969, 1974-1976, and 1980. NGOM, op. 2, d. 611; NGOM, op. 2, d. 812; and NGOM, op. 3, d. 1079.
landscape that invited particular interpretations of the country’s history. Tours of Kiev and the old Russian towns of the North West, for example, presented tourists with a vision of medieval Rus’ as the cultural foundation for the modern Soviet state; excursions to Novgorod, Brest, and Minsk, on the other hand, encouraged visitors to reflect on the Phoenix-like rebirth of the country from the ashes of total war.⁶⁹ A similar framing of the touristic experience could be observed at a local level. On the tourist route Proshloe i nastoyashchee goroda Novgoroda, for example, architectural masterpieces from the medieval period were alternated with Soviet buildings in such a way as to imply the continuity of creative innovation between the two periods. The excursion route V dolinu muzhestva, on the other hand, comprised the sites of historical battles in the town, highlighting the tradition of heroism and resilience in the Russian lands.⁷⁰ Guided tours thus offered the tourist a specific presentation of the local landscape, in which monuments functioned as a body of evidence for a particular interpretation of the past and an exposition of contemporary achievements.

The tourist’s attention was frequently directed towards local monuments that were considered to embody certain ideals and values endorsed by the Soviet state. In particular, visitors to the Novgorod zapovednik were encouraged to admire the centrepieces of medieval Russian architecture, buildings that were presented as objects of sublime and transcendental beauty. In the vein of the

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⁷⁰ These excursion routes were mentioned in the short description of the 30-day tourist package at the tour-base ‘Ozera Il’men’ in 1977. See GANO, f. R-4063, op. 2-57, d. 908, l. 11.
romantic poets of the eighteenth century,\textsuperscript{71} authors of Soviet tourist guides identified certain ‘natural’ elements in objects of local cultural heritage: the organically undulating walls of the Sofiskii sobor; the upwards surging form of Tserkov’ Fedor Stratilata; or the laconic purity of decoration of Tserkov’ Spasa Preobrazheniya na Nereditse in Novgorod.\textsuperscript{72} Architectural monuments, like the awe-inspiring mountainscapes of the romantic poets, were described as having a transcendental effect on the observer. The fictional \textit{flâneur} through the medieval Russian province could thus find himself contemplating the mythical town of Kitezh as he approached the Spaso-Prilutskii monastyr’ on the outskirts of Vologda,\textsuperscript{73} or, on beholding the disintegrating walls of the Pskov Kremlin, could be whisked back in time to the arrival of the Slavs of the banks of the river Velikii.\textsuperscript{74}

Not only the objects that tourists encountered, but also the paths which led them to these objects were chosen with the aim of creating a particular patriotic vision of the national and local past. This strategy was made explicit in an article by the head of the department for construction and architecture, S. Ruzhentsev, and the renowned local architect and restorer, I. Kushnir, published in the \textit{Novgorodskaya pravda} in 1966. Amongst a tirade of criticism levelled at the head of the inspectorate for the preservation of monuments, T. Chinova, Ruzhentsev

\textsuperscript{71} For a discussion of the ‘Imperial Sublime’, which is understood by the author Harsha Ram as the confluence of Baroque traditions of late Muscovy and the newer literary forms and cultural fashions imported from France and Germany under the monarchs Peter, Anna, and Elizabeth, see Harsha Ram, \textit{The Imperial Sublime: A Russian Poetics of Empire} (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 2003).
\textsuperscript{73} Fekhner, p. 59.
\textsuperscript{74} Yu. P. Spegal’ski, \textit{Pskov: Khudozhesvennye pamyatniki} (Leningrad; Moscow: Iskusstvo, 1963), pp. 117-118.
and Kushnir remarked that tourists were being led to the Yur'ev monastyr' along the main road since all other paths were blocked by detritus of an entirely unhistorical kind (‘[улицы] загромождены ящиками из-под макарон и папирос, бочками, ржавыми кастрюлями и многим другим, ничего общего не имеющим с историей’).75 As the article revealed, the routes that tourists followed were selected with the intention of bringing the visitor face-to-face with the cultural foundations of Soviet contemporaneity. In order to justify the idea of cultural continuity between the great civilization of the past and the Soviet Union, however, manifestations of the less admirable face of socialist modernity – in this case, the reckless disregard for the natural environment and cavalier waste of resources – had to be hidden from the tourist’s view.

The interpretative intervention of excursion guides and, in the case of non-Russian speaking tourists, translators, also framed visitors’ impressions of the cultural landscape. As V. E. Bagdasaryan and others have noted, excursion guides were not so much objective commentators on cultural phenomena as state-sponsored ‘propagandisty sotsializma’.76 While their discussion analysed guided tours aimed at foreigners, tours for Soviet visitors were just as carefully orchestrated. The particular blend of propaganda that excursion guides in medieval towns such as Novgorod provided throughout the 1960s and 1970s reflected a growing emphasis on local and national patriotism. For a tourist to appreciate the local landscape in an ideologically correct way, a cultural guide

steeped in knowledge of geographical, historical (Soviet and pre-revolutionary), and art historical specificities of the region was considered essential.\textsuperscript{77}

The reactions of several groups of tourists who attended excursions in Novgorod in the 1960s provide some illustration of the patriotic content and delivery of the lectures on local history and architecture. A group of visitors from Moscow thus complimented their guide on the ‘большая любовь и патриотизм’ with which he presented his lectures on local history. Visitors from Leningrad echoed these words, congratulating another member of the museum staff on the patriotic tone of her presentation ‘в её рассказах чувствуется, что она патриот своего города’. In a particularly laudatory entry, a group of tourists from Moscow demanded institutional recognition for the ‘знание и истинный новгородский патриотизм’ of their guide.\textsuperscript{78} From these entries it would appear clear that local patriotism was not merely a nominal requirement of local tourist guides, but rather one that was enthusiastically implemented in practice and positively received by consumers of local culture.

Another way in which the touristic experience could be regulated was through the control of its forms of remembrance. In a discussion on the pages of the \textit{Novgorodskaya pravda} in 1964, G. Naryshkin elaborated the need for mass-produced ‘souvenirs’, in particular postcards, which he considered preferable to photographs for several reasons:

\textsuperscript{77} Lectures in \textit{kraevedenie} constituted a substantial part of the training that excursion guides received at courses in Moscow and Novgorod in 1974. See the materials on the training of tourist guides. GANO, f. R-4063, op. 2-15, d. 270a, ll. 16-45.

\textsuperscript{78} See the response and suggestion book of the Novgorod Council for Tourism and Excursions for 1968-1972. GANO, f. R-4063, op. 2-10, d. 140a, ll. 2, 3, and 9.
Given that the tourist may not have the ‘privileged view’ of a particular
landscape or monument (a point that was emphasised in the article through the
reference to the need for a tripod to photograph properly), recorded evidence of
the touristic experience, it was argued, was better supplied by the Soviet state.
The discussion of the advantages of postcards over photographs was also
revealing of the more general understanding of tourism as a cultural
phenomenon in the Soviet Union. Tourists were expected to take away a
‘postcard experience’ of the Soviet Union rather than an individual impression.
The objects that they saw, their interpretation of the landscape, and even the
material memories of their experience were thus regulated to conform with a
ideologically acceptable vision of the past and its relationship to the Soviet
present.

The ‘correct’ view of the local landscape, judging by photographs published in
guidebooks, postcards, and other visual materials produced in the late-Soviet
period, was one in which the traditional and the modern were seen to exist in

organic harmony. Thus, in I. I. Kushnir’s 1972 guide to Novgorod, the centrepiece of the city’s medieval architecture, the Novgorod Kremlin, was shown in the background of the concrete Most Aleksandra Nevskogo on which traffic was seen speeding across the River Volkhov.\(^8\) Likewise, in Yelena Morozkina’s 1982 handbook to Pskov, the Tserkov’ Mikhaila i Gavriila Arkhangelov provided the backdrop for the carefully tended ploshchad’ Revolyutsii, the epicentre of civic life.\(^9\) It is worth noting the symbolic ordering of old and new in these images. Objects of architectural heritage were consistently located *behind* the modern Soviet bridges and squares, providing the symbolic backdrop for images of socialist development.

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\(^8\) Kushnir, p. 52.

While foreigners made up a relatively small number of the tourists who visited the medieval Russian towns in 1961, their numbers grew exponentially throughout the 1960s.\textsuperscript{82} By the end of the 1960s, foreign tourism had become such an important part of local culture that newspapers considered it necessary to provide instruction in inter-cultural etiquette. In an article that appeared in \textit{Novgorodskaya pravda} in 1968, A. Drozdova advised on the culinary tastes of ‘foreign guests’, providing some pointers on the preparation of foreigner-friendly dishes:

Много гостей у нашего города. Приезжают они из разных стран, со всех континентов земли. Каждого надо встретить не только хлебом-солью, как велит старинный наш обычай, надо суметь подать ему, если не самое любимое блюдо, то хотя бы то, которое не будет противоречить его привычкам. Изучить полностью национальные кухни всех стран невозможно, но особенности питания представителей различных народов знать необходимо. А особенностей таких много.\textsuperscript{83}

Of interest here, apart from the insight into national and cultural stereotypes, is the understanding of Russian culture (in this case, culinary traditions) as something which ought to be adapted to fit with the tastes and preferences of foreign visitors. Foreign tourists were not to be welcomed with the traditional offering of bread and salt (the telling ‘tol’ko’ in the article reveals the perceived meagreness or cheapness of the tradition), but rather with a reflection of their own cultures, in the form of nationally and regionally themed dishes. It is possible to explain this logic with reference to the broader trends in displaying

\textsuperscript{82} Shawn Salmon has noted that the number of foreign tourists to the Soviet Union doubled to roughly one million between 1957 and 1965. See Shawn Salmon, ‘Marketing Socialism: Inturist in the Late 1950s and Early 1960s’, in Gorsuch and Koenker, pp. 186-204 (pp. 190-191).
and packaging national culture for consumption by foreign tourists in the post-1961 period. While folkloric practices were frequently and self-consciously displayed to visiting guests, emphasis was consistently laid on the modern rather than traditional elements of national culture.  

In the highly mediated context of Soviet tourism, foreign tourists who pursued their own versions of ‘reality’ were at particular risk of seeming subversive. In an article which appeared in Novgorodskaya pravda in 1960, several examples of touristic deviance were elaborated. The story of one American tourist, who slipped away from the excursion group to photograph overflowing bins in a nearby courtyard, was singled out for particular criticism. Not only was the foreigner seen to have acted in a hypocritical way (one local was reported to have shouted: ‘оставь пленку для фотографий у себя, в Америке, для трущоб, в которых живут рабочие’), she had also deviated from the accepted model of Soviet tourism. Instead of demonstrating the appropriate admiration and respect for the achievements of socialism by photographing the Sofiiskii sobor or the newly asphalted road, she had demonstrated an unpardonable lack of respect for her hosts. As the author of the article commented: ‘Приглашая за стол, мы не позволяем кладь ноги на стол. Забывающим о том, кто гости, а кто хозяева, мы вежливо но решительно об этом напоминаем’. 

84 Compare, for example, the exhibitions of Russian folk art and crafts or the performances of folk song and dance ensembles, in which the conditions of modern urban life were consistently emphasized. I discuss the discursive treatment of the traditional and modern in displays of folk culture in Chapter Two.

85 The Soviet Union was not the only country to ‘commodify’ local culture for touristic consumption. For a discussion of the commercialization of local traditions and practices in the Mediterranean Region and the strategies of covert resistance to such developments that emerged among local communities see Jeremy Boissevain’s introduction to Coping with Tourists: European Reactions to Mass Tourism, ed. by Jeremy Boissevain (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1996), pp. 1-27.

86 V. Molotkov, ‘О наших гостях’, Novgorodskaya pravda, 4 August 1960, p. 3.
To return to the experience of the Soviet tourist, arguably the most important factor that shaped visitors’ impressions of their surroundings was their knowledge and understanding of local history. This, as I have argued above, they were expected to acquire from local tourist guides, the introductions to which detailed the most important events and historical personages in the towns’ pasts, kraevedcheskie materials such as collections of historical essays and conference papers, and reports which could be obtained from local libraries and tourist agencies. While, in reality, it is unlikely that tourists consulted all the varieties of kraevedcheskii literature before departing on their excursions, tangentially related literary forms, such as local histories and scholarly publications, nevertheless informed the content of guidebooks and were frequently authored by the same local historians and specialists. For this reason, I have included in the following analysis of textual representations of local history not only guidebooks and architectural directories, but also collections of scholarly essays and local histories which shaped the approach and content of the materials for touristic consumption.

2.3 TRENDS IN THE PUBLICATION OF KRAEVEDENIE LITERATURE
Before beginning to discuss the content and style of kraevedcheskie materials, it is instructive to consider certain trends in publication numbers for the period in question. Drawing on the information available at the Russian National Library for the 1940-2010 period, it is clear that a far greater number of materials were

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87 These preparatory steps were details in Yun’ev’s pamphlet on tourism and kraevedenie. See Yun’ev, p. 11.
published for Novgorod (88), than for Pskov (36) and Vologda (9). The publication numbers for Novgorod are in fact artificially inflated by a series of pamphlets with small circulations produced by the ‘Novgorodskaya pravda’ press to coincide with the 1100th anniversary of the town in 1959. Nevertheless, judging by circulation numbers alone, significantly more ink was spent describing Novgorod and its history, than Pskov and Vologda.89

The publication numbers for Novgorod remained high throughout the Soviet period reflecting the status of the town as a significant medieval centre and important tourist destination. Eight books about Novgorod with circulations of 25,000 copies or over were released in the 1970s, and a further six publications with equally high print-runs were produced in the 1980s. After 1990, however, while the average number of publications each decade dropped only slightly, the number of guides with circulations of over 25,000 plummeted. On the one hand, the buoyancy of publication numbers reflects the greater activity of specialist academic presses, such as the ‘Dmitry Bulanin’ press in St Petersburg, and local presses, such as the ‘Novgorodskii gosudarstvennyi universitet Yaroslava Mudrogo’ press in Novgorod. On the other hand, the drop in the number of guides with large circulations was indicative of the fall off in state-sponsored tourism in general, and the decline in the status of Novgorod as a showpiece of national heritage tourism in particular.

88 For full details of publication figures for kraavedcheskie materials in Novgorod, Pskov and Vologda between 1940 and 2009 see Appendix One.
89 There are 25 publications for Novgorod with circulations of 25,000 copies or more, compared with 8 for Pskov, and 5 for Vologda.
While publication numbers were consistently lower for Pskov and Vologda, these nevertheless increased steadily during the 1950s and 1960s, reflecting the growth in interest in the towns as historical tourist destinations. The peak of state-sponsored tourism in Pskov appears to have come in the 1970-1979 period when three guides were published about the town with circulations of 25,000 copies or over. As opposed to Novgorod, the number of publications about Pskov fell dramatically to just two guides with circulations of 25,000 copies or fewer in the 1980s. This appears to indicate the waning commitment on the part of the Soviet state to support the touristic development of the town. In the post-Soviet period, as for Novgorod, publication numbers were maintained by the activity of local presses, although no guides with circulations of over 25,000 were published after 1978.

Judging by the statistics, it would appear that Vologda did not surface as a national tourist destination until end of the 1960s, when the first guide with circulation number of over 25,000 copies was published.90 Guides with large circulations continued to be published throughout the 1970s, but, as for Pskov, the number of publications declined sharply in the 1980s, signalling a drop-off in official interest in the town. The post-Soviet period, however, saw an increase in the activity of local presses analogous to that in Novgorod and Pskov. But, by contrast with the other two towns, no publications were released by presses in Moscow and St Petersburg after 1972. This would appear to indicate that the

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90 It is worth noting that this was a guide dedicated to four towns in the Russian North rather than specifically commemorating local architecture, history, and culture in Vologda. See G. Bocharov and V. Vygolov, Vologda, Kirillov, Ferapontovo, Belozersk (Moscow: Iskusstvo, 1969).
town had disappeared from the national tourist radar, despite the best attempts of local writers and historians to raise the profile of local culture and history.

To gauge with any accuracy how these guides were used in the Soviet period is a more difficult question. Judging from the pristine appearance of the copies I was shown by local residents, many guidebooks were prestige purchases, intended for occasional perusal by visiting guests, rather than practical pocket-guides of the dog-eared ‘Lonely Planet’ variety. It might therefore be reasonable to assume that the guidebooks are local variants of the ‘works of Dostoevsky’ phenomenon: largely undigested literary œuvres with a near decorative function in the domestic sphere, and the possession of which marked the boundary of a particular community.91 The display of guides (in the same way as the unread ‘collected works’) in the vitrine-like bookstands that furnish many Khrushchev-era flats might be interpreted as a ritualistic form of self-display, a domestic analogy of the museicization of local culture that began at the same period.

2.4 FRAMING THE LEGEND OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF NOVGOROD

Finding an ideologically correct interpretation of the historical myth of the Democratic Republic of Novgorod was perhaps one of the most delicate tasks that faced authors of post-war Soviet tourist guides to Novgorod. The legend of Veche Republic, and, in particular, the romantic story of its struggle, led by Marfa-Posadnitsa, against thuggish Muscovy had been a popular source of

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literary interpretation in the pre-revolutionary period. In the Soviet Union, it was necessary to reformulate the tale of thwarted democratic self-government in terms not entirely antagonistic to the Communist project, and certainly not offensive to the status of its capital. In particular, the composition of the Novgorod Veche, the depiction of Ivan IV, and the consequences of the unification of Novgorod with the state of Muscovy became the focus of creative reinterpretation.

Several historians circumvented the obstacle of Novgorod’s recalcitrant past by emphasizing the ‘revolutionary’ character of the Republic and the role of the ‘common people’ in its governance. In particular, the ousting of Prince Vsevolod Mstislavich in 1136, which left the Novgorodians ‘free to choose their princes’ [volny v knyaz’yakh], was emphasized as an indicator of the of the town’s ‘democratic’ character. In this rendition of the Novgorod narrative, the ‘common people’ [chernye lyudi] were depicted as the most important actors in local politics rather than the ‘privileged’ boyars. In an architectural guide to the Novgorod Kremlin published in 1964, for example, the local historian A. I. Semenov described the conflict between these groups on the Veche square:

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Здесь в феодальные времена поднимались восстания городских низов против правящих боярских верхов. В ней в месте с привилегированными слоями населения в политической жизни участвовали [...] городские ремесленники и не закрепощённые крестьяне.94

By depicting the Republic as a state in which artisans and peasants struggled and won political representation from the exploitative boyars, historians were able to cast the medieval town as a proto-Communist state. Not all scholars were prepared to make this ideologically convenient connection, however. In 1962, the renowned medievalist and archaeologist Valentin Yanin published a historical study of the medieval Republic in which he refuted the proposition that the Veche was made up of ‘common people’, asserting instead that it comprised wealthy landowners including the ‘posadnitsy’. According to Yanin, these latter had increased their influence with the reforms of 1416-1417, which resulted in the advancement of the boyar-dominated Council of Lords. Far from a democracy, Yanin argued, medieval Novgorod in the fifteenth century had constituted a ‘boyar oligarchy’ and the ‘democratic’ Veche a mere talking shop with no real influence on local politics.95

Yanin’s rejection of the ‘democratic’ myth elicited criticisms from more orthodox historians who expressed their disagreement with his thesis on the pages of tourist guides and historical essays. In a collection of articles published to mark the 1100th anniversary of the town in 1964, A. G. Feodoruk pointed out the short-sightedness of ‘some historians’ who refused to acknowledge the central importance of class to the development of political life in the town:

94 Semenov, p. 3.
Историки, готовые видеть вместо классовой борьбы одну только «централизацию власти как всеобъемлющий процесс русской истории XIV – XV веков», не замечали того, что вечевые традиции Новгорода опирались на «черных людей». Мужи новгородцы, свободные люди, составляли основу новгородского ополчения. Это было «бургерство» русского средневекового города, устойчивое, крепкое население, имевшее значительные права, подтвержденные официально документами Великого Новгорода, дававшего грамоты и от имени «черных людей» - основной массы новгородского населения.96

The democratic legend of Novgorod was not only reinforced in historical publications but was also read into local architecture. The revolutionary and democratic aspect of Novgorodian culture was alluded to in architectural guides in which local art and architecture were associated with features of the 'local character'. In V. Gippenreiter's interpretation of Novgorod architecture, for example, the simplicity, strength, and dignity of the Novgorodian warrior was seen to be reflected in the city’s monuments:

Одного взгляда на крепкие, кореные памятники Великого Новгорода достаточно, чтобы понять идеал новгородца – доброго воина, ни очень обтесанного, мужикавого, но себе на уме, почему и добившегося вольницы задолго до других народов, предприимчивого не в пример соседям, почему и колонизовавшего весь гигантский север; в его зодчестве – такие же, как сам он, простые, но крепкие стены, лишенные назойливого узорочья, которое, с его точки зрения «Ни к чему», могучие силуэты, энергичные массы. Идеал новгородца – сила, и красота его – красота силы. Не всегда складно, но всегда великолепно, сильно, величественно, покоряющее.97

A similar emphasis on the role of the ‘common people’ could be found in S. N. Semanov’s photograph album dedicated to the Pamyatnik ‘Tsyacheletie Rossii’. In the guide, the author picked out the figure of the Russian peasant bearing the weight of the gigantic globe – and almost completely obscured from view by the figures at the forefront of the sculpture – as the symbolic centrepiece of the monument. This Atlasesque figure, Semanov argued, conveyed the essentially proletarian message of the sculpture. Despite his pompous entourage, 'Ибо нам как бы напоминают, что подлинная сущность явлений определяется им, простым русским мужиком, тружеником и воином, который тысячу лет держал и оберегал великую Российскую державу.'

![Image](image.png)

**Fig. 5.**
The Pamyatnik ‘Tsyacheletie Rossii’ in Novgorod. The anonymous peasant symbolically bearing the weight of the globe is just visible on the left of the photo between Peter the Great and Ivan III.

By insisting on the ‘democratic’ nature of the Novgorodian state, and in particular its gradual decline into boyar-dominated patrimonialism in the fifteenth century, Soviet historians were able to interpret Moscow’s annexation

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99 Semenov, p. 36.
of the territory in 1478 as an event of ‘progressive’ historical significance. As R. G. Skrynnikov has pointed out, Soviet historians argued that reforms of 1416-1417, which strengthened the role of the elite institution, the Council of Lords, resulted in degeneration of local politics into a ‘boyar oligarchy’ and disappearance of local democratic traditions. With the corruption of the democratic state, some historians argued, the common people of Novgorod turned to Moscow to defend their interests. In a passage from the edited volume of historical essays Novgorod published in 1985, V. F. Andreev argued that the ‘common people’ of Novgorod saw in Ivan III a defender of their interests against the exploitative boyars:

В среду непривилегированного населения города уже начала проникать идея о необходимости единовластия, о том что только сильная власть способна справиться с боярским самовластием, установить в стране порядок и справедливость. Недаром, некоторые «черные» люди Новгорода обращались к Ивану III видя в нем своего сильного покровителя, с жалобами на бояр.100

Rather than the thuggish subjugation of the freedom-loving Republic, the annexation of Novgorod was presented as a progressive ‘union’, desired and, indeed, helped along by the ‘common people’. The folkloric protector of Novgorod’s independence Marfa-Posadnitsa was, logically enough, excluded from these narratives. While a reflection of the tendency to play down evidence of local recalcitrance, official distaste for the Marfa-Posadnitsa myth may also have stemmed from its inconsistency with Soviet gender stereotyping. The belligerent and commanding figure of Marfa Boretskaya was at odds vision of

100 V. F. Andreev, Novgorod (Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1985), p. 63.
subservient and malleable femininity advanced in Soviet propaganda.\textsuperscript{101} If it had been permissible for women to be depicted in acts of military aggression towards the external enemy during the Stalin era,\textsuperscript{102} in the post-1961 period icons of female bellicosity, particularly those whose ire was directed at the forces of the ‘progressive’ centre, were disbarred from public view.

Local rebels against Muscovite dominance (represented since the Stalin years as ‘progressive centralism’) were an obvious embarrassment. Equally, the legend of the Veche bell, which was said to have smashed itself on the rocks of Izborsk when Ivan III attempted to remove it from the town, was excluded from most guides, or otherwise rewritten in less symbolic terms.\textsuperscript{103} In this case, however, the analogies with the actions of the German troops in Novgorod during the Second World War, not to mention the anti-religious activities of the Soviet authorities may also have influenced the decision to play down the myth. If passing mention was made of the tsar’s bell-maiming antics in a small number of


\textsuperscript{102} See Anna Krylova’s discussion of the reality and representation of women fighter pilots in the early-Stalin period in ‘Stalinist Identity from the Viewpoint of Gender: Rearing a Generation of Professionally Violent Women-Fighters in 1930s Stalinist Russia’, \textit{Gender and History}, 16, 3 (2004), 626-653.

\textsuperscript{103} Legend has it that the bell, which could be rung by any citizen of Novgorod who wished to raise an issue connected with town politics, smashed itself on the hills of Valdai while being transported to Moscow after the annexation of Novgorod in 1478. According to the version of the myth, the bell’s pieces were either forged into miniature bells by carriage drivers, or transformed of their own accord into miniature bells, which were then transported around Russia to spread Novgorod’s message of democracy and freedom. The legend also provided a source of popular literary interpretation appearing in the poetry of Mikhail Lermontov and the writing of Nikolai Karamzin among others. For an overview of the appropriation of the myth in Russian literature and culture see Nicolai N. Petro, \textit{Crafting Democracy: How Novgorod Has Coped with Rapid Social Change} (New York: Cornell University Press, 2004), pp. 134-137.
architectural guides, much more attention was lavished on the miraculous recovery of the bell of the Sofiskii kolokol’nya from the bottom of the Volkhov, where it had sunk as the Germans attempted to transport them out of the city. The myth of Novgorod’s bells was thus framed in such a ways as to avoid highlighting parallels between the town’s various historical ‘occupiers’.

In the historical publications and architectural guides of the 1980s, the ‘unification’ of Novgorod with the Grand Duchy of Moscow continued to be interpreted as an event of ‘progressive’ significance. In his guide Arkhitektura Novgoroda, published in 1985, the local historian M. I Kushnir condemned the reactionary boyars: ‘часть новгородского боярства, стараясь сохранить свои феодальные привилегии, начала борьбу против прогрессивного стремления объединения с Москвой’. V. F. Andreev’s edited volume Novgorod assessed the post-‘unification’ period in similarly glowing terms: ‘присоединение Новгорода к Москве было выдающимся событием в процессе образования Российского государства [...] Это было исторически прогрессивным явлением, способствовавшим дальнейшему политическому, экономическому и культурному развитию Новгорода’. A parallel existed between the unequivocally positive presentation of the Novgorod’s union with Moscow and the way in which the integration of the Soviet Socialist Republics, such as Kalmykia and Kabardino-Balkiriya, was

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104 See, for example, V. V. Gormin, Yaroslavovo dvorishche i drevnii torg (Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1968), p. 29; M. I. Kushnir, Arkhitektura Novgoroda (Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1983), p. 31.


107 Andreev, p.70.
described by Soviet historians.\textsuperscript{108} If colonial exploitation, particularly at the hands of western capitalists, was the focus of unambiguous condemnation, the centralising thrust of Empire, with its analogies in the Soviet period, was enthusiastically endorsed.

In the post-Soviet period, the difficulties of democratic transition and the new discourse of regional independence appeared to inspire some historians to reinterpret the legend of the Democratic Republic as a tale of democratic governance strangled in its infancy by authoritarian Muscovy. In his suggestively titled, \textit{Tragediya Novgoroda}, Skrynnikov thus argued that the ‘unification’ of Novgorod with Moscow was neither historically inevitable nor politically desirable. Rather than an enlightened and ‘progressive’ patron of the ‘common people’, Muscovy was recast as a brutish aggressor set on sacking the democratic civilization for its own misconceived gain:

Опричный разгром Новгорода невозможно оправдать ссылками на необходимость преодоления пережитков уделной раздробленности или экономической обособленности древней земли. Поход царя на Новгородскую землю был мерой жестокой и бессмысленной. Ограбление новгородцев не отвечало даже интересам фикса, поскольку на десятилетия подорвало исторически налоговых поступлений в казну.\textsuperscript{109}

This interpretation can be situated in the context of developments in national cultural politics at this time. As Nicolai N. Petro has pointed out in his analysis of Novgorod’s political transition in the post-Soviet period, the theme of ‘what


could have been’ if Novgorod rather than Moscow had triumphed in the fifteenth century gained popular currency in the post-Soviet period both in academic writing and historically based fiction.\textsuperscript{110} In one such analysis published posthumously in the \textit{Vestnik Rossiiskoi akademii nauk} in 1998, the émigré linguist Aleksandr Isachenko argued that had the democratic state prevailed in the fifteenth century, a full translation of the Bible into Russian could have appeared in the sixteenth century, bringing about the literary and spiritual regeneration of the Russian state. Counterfactual readings of national history thus provided a means for nationalist critics to reconceptualise contemporary political developments, interpreting the turbulent events of the twentieth century as a political and cultural aberration from the natural path of the nation’s historical development.

The symbolic affirmation of Novgorod as a bastion of authentic Russian culture was frequently linked with the fact that it had escaped Tatar-Mongol occupation, and thus avoided the ‘унизительный \textit{коллаборационизм с оккупантами’}.\textsuperscript{111} Indeed, categorically negative interpretations of Russian-Tatar relations were also remarkable in local guidebooks of the Soviet era. While at a central level, for instance in Andrei Tarkovskii’s film \textit{Andrei Rublev} (1966), the Tatar ‘invasion’ had been presented as a chaotic process of shifting alliances and opportunistic collaboration between local warlords and Tatar invaders, the local version of events was marked by nationalist overtones. The North West’s escape from Tatar

\textsuperscript{110} Petro mentions several publications on this theme including the book by Aleksandr Bushkov and Andrei Burovskii, \textit{Rossiya kotoroi ne byla} (\texttt{http://bushkov.int.ru/rossiya2/1.htm}) [last accessed: 11/08/2010]; see Petro, p. 143.

tyranny, and the consequent preservation of authentic national culture on its
territory, was nevertheless linked with the decidedly ‘socialist’ character of the
region. ‘Authentic’ Russian culture, sustained and perpetuated in the North West,
was thus presented as a primitive forerunner of Soviet socialism.

In this reading of Novgorod as the cultural and spiritual capital of Russia that
never was parallels can be drawn with some of the works of the ‘Impertsy’
writers, and in particular the prolific nationalist and editor of Zavtra, Aleksandr
Prokhanov. As Sander Brouwer has pointed out, Prokhanov’s Kholm, in which the
author-narrator collects earth samples from historically important sites in Pskov
in an attempt to restore the imperial order after the collapse of the Soviet Union,
can be seen as a literary attempt to establish a new spiritual centre for the
Russian Empire in the wake of Moscow’s submission to the ‘satanic forces of
international capital’.112 The counterfactual reflections on the consequences of
Novgorod’s victory over Muscovy reveal a similar impulse to invert the centre-
periphery dichotomy and recover the ‘authentic’ narrative of national history
from the history of foreign interventions and cultural corruption.

2.5 PSKOV’S MYTH OF MILITARY RESILIENCE

Aligning the history of Pskov with the socialist perceptions of the past posed
fewer problems to the authors of Soviet tourist guides. The town’s extensive

112 Sander Brouwer, ‘Centre and Borders in Dugin and Prokhanov’, paper presented at the
interdisciplinary workshop ‘Russia on Edge: Reclaiming the Periphery in Contemporary Russian
Culture’, 11-12 December 2009 (CRASSH, University of Cambridge).
experience of warfare and rebellion provided ample material from which Soviet historians could craft narratives of patriotic fervour and class consciousness. In particular, authors advanced the notion of Pskov as a ‘fortress town’, whose history comprised episodes of defensive warfare against foreign invaders. ‘Every fortress wall, every chapel, every graceful belfry speaks of the heroic courage and mighty deeds of their defenders’ wrote Savely Yamshchikov in his photograph album of Pskov’s architectural monuments published in 1978. Architectural monuments were thus seen to resonate with the glorious past of the town and to act as humanised messengers bearing the knowledge of the heroic experiences of the local community to future generations.

The myth of the ‘fortress town’ provided a convenient space for developing stereotypes of national as well as local identity. In descriptions of Pskov’s medieval battles against foreign invaders, Soviet historians frequently employed notions of solidarity, patriotism, and selflessness that were familiar to readers from accounts of Russian history from the Patriotic War of 1812 to the Great Patriotic War of 1939-45. This tradition had already been established in the years directly following the Second World War. Describing the Polish-Lithuanian invasion in 1946, for example, S. A. Tarakanova had reiterated the stereotype of the unyielding Russian soldier, recording the words of the Polish king Stephen Báthory:

Они на защитне своих городов не думают о жизни, – писал Баторий, – хладнокровно становятся на месте убитых или

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взорванных действиями подкопа, загружая проломы грудью, день и ночь сражаясь едят один хлеб, умирают от голода, но не сдаются.114

The description of the Pskov soldiers, valiantly sacrificing their lives for the Motherland, would have resonated with readers in the post-war period who were aware of the story of Aleksandr Matrosov, the Second World War hero, who had blocked off an embrasure with his own body. In the Khrushchev period, the same motifs of stoicism and patriotic commitment recurred, albeit in less dramatic formulations. N. S. Khrabrovoi and B. S. Skobel’tsyna thus drew on the traditional notion of Russian resilience in the face of invasion in their description of the Siege of Pskov of 1581:

Псковские земледельцы стали воинами. Вооружившись, кто чем мог, ремесленники, купечество и духовенство встали на смерть у городских стен. Женщины отставали свои дома, «в мужскую крепость и храбрость облекаясь», как говорит о них автор «повести об осаде Пскова» и тоже вышли в бой.115

The history of Pskov was thus presented as a microcosm of Russian history and the local community a case study for the character of the Russian nation. Readers were invited, not to admire the exceptionality of local people, but rather to identify with them, to perceive in their mentality and actions an idealized reflection of the national self.

Certain specificities of local history were nevertheless recorded in the guides, another feature that was consistent from the early-1960s through to the 1980s.

114 S. A. Tarakanova, Drevnii Pskov (Moscow; Leningrad: Akademiya nauk SSSR, 1946), p. 45.
115 N. S. Khrabrovoi and B. S. Skobel’tsyna, Pamyatniki drevnorusskogo zadochestva (Pskov; Leningrad: Iskusstvo, 1968).
As in the guides to Novgorod, the experience of democratic self-government was underlined and the ‘progressive’ character of the Veche Parliament was emphasized. Social developments in the medieval town were interpreted through the prism of Marxist-Leninism, with the result that episodes of civic unrest became ‘popular uprisings’, and their causes translated as ‘social inequality’ and ‘class anger’. As for Novgorod, the ‘tradition of class struggle was mapped onto local architecture. Medieval churches, the symbols of decentralized popular government, were celebrated for their ‘democratic character’. By contrast, the merchant palaces of the seventeenth century were understood as the products of capitalist exploitation, the architectural result of the ‘недоверие «больших людей» к враждебной им малоимущей массе и боязнь их сохранность своих богатств’.

If local architects such as Yurii Spegal’skii asserted the independence of the Pskov school of architecture from that of Novgorod in the 1950s and 1960s, the recognition of cultural diversity was carefully distinguished from political separatism. For the authors of Soviet tourist guides, the unification of the territory with the Grand Duchy of Moscow in 1510 was argued, not to have brought this cultural blossoming to a premature end, but rather to have provided the economic and cultural conditions in which it could flourish. As S. I. Kolotilova reasoned in her collection of essays on local history, unification was beneficial for both medieval polities: ‘Для Москвы было важно сохранить Псков в сфере

119 O. K. Arshakuni, pp. 60-61.
своего влияния, для Пскова – не оказаться отторгнутым от русских земель'.

This interpretation remained the dominant one as late as the 1980s. According to Lagunin’s architectural guide Pskov. Izborsk, for example, unification with the centralized state had provided an impetus for economic and cultural growth resulting in a boom in architectural innovation and an intensification of building work.

One can speculate that authors of Soviet tourist guides were disinclined to interpret unification with Moscow in negative terms for fear of drawing an analogy with the highly centralized system of government in the Soviet Union. This would seem to explain the interpretative shift in the post-Soviet period, when the term ‘unification’ was frequently replaced by ‘subjugation’ and the relationship between the province and the capital reconceived in antagonistic terms. One colourful example of this trend comes from K. M. Plotkin’s medieval history of the region Drevnii Pskov. Illustrating the energetic revival of folk narrative forms in the post-Soviet period, Plotkin recounts the legend of how Pskov was saved from destruction at the hands of Ivan IV’s troops. Moscow and its cast of historical characters were found here in the role of the knaves as opposed to the heroes of local history, the relationship between the centre and periphery being presented as one of savage coercion rather than acknowledged mutual benefit.

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121 Lagunin, p. 4.
122 Nikola the Holy Fool was said to have scared the Tsar away by descending on a broomstick and crying ‘Иванушко! Иванушко! Кушай хлеб-соль, а не христианской крови!’ See К. М. Plotkin, Drevnii Pskov (Pskov: Izd-vo Pskovskogo oblastnogo instituta povysheniya kvalifikasiy rabotnikov obrazovaniya, 1997), p. 89-90.
2.6 THE ‘NARODNAYA FANTAZIYA’ OF VOLOGDA

The treatment of the northern Russian town of Vologda in Soviet tourist guides differed from that of medieval Novgorod and Pskov. Neither a ‘cradle of Russian civilization’, nor a ‘fortress city’ that had sacrificed itself for the defence of the Motherland, Vologda tended to be presented in lyrical rather than epic terms as a centre of spirituality, unadulterated Russian nature, and authentic national culture. As in the textual representations of Novgorod discussed above, the cultural ‘purity’ of Vologda was frequently associated with the fact that the city had avoided the imperialist influence brought by foreign invasion. From the Tatar-Mongol conquest of Rus’ in the thirteenth century to the German incursion into Russia during the Second World War, Vologda had remained unviolated and, as such, culturally ‘uncorrupted’ by alien mastery. G. Bocharov and V. Vygodov thus remarked in their guide to the town published in 1969: ‘Север в тяжёлые времена татарского ига и много позднее являл собой богатый и относительно свободный край’. The authors of the guide were nevertheless careful not to present the cultural distinctness of the region in terms that contradicted the Soviet understanding of national culture. On the contrary, the ‘authentic’ traditions that had survived in Vologda corresponded closely with the principal tenets of Soviet culture: ‘Эти обстоятельства и придали искусству Севера более демократичный и народный характер’.

Vologda’s architecture, it was argued, reflected the democratic character of the northern people. On the one hand, it was characterised by ‘laconicism’ and

123 Bocharov and Vygolov, p. 5.
'northern severity', the architectural analogy of the lack of loquacity and reserve that was said to distinguish the local population. On the other hand, local buildings, and particularly churches, were described as 'full-blooded' and 'authentic', free from any lofty pretensions or obscurantist 'mysticism'. Through this insistence on the democratic quality of local culture, the authors to the guides were able to align their interpretations with the artistic values of the time, which, during the Khrushchev period in particular, rejected 'decorative extravagances' [izlishestva] in favour of more popular architectural forms. As Bocharov and Vygolov underlined, there was nothing ostentatious or snobbish in the architecture of the northern town, on the contrary, its 'простые, а порой и примитивные образы насколько конкретны и настолько демократичны, что воспринимаются как порождение живой народной фантазии'.
universally acclaimed. In their directory of local architecture, V. Banige and N. Pertsev thus lamented the replacement of the ascetic beauty of the architecture of the medieval period with the elaborate ornamentalism of Moscow Baroque. The imposition of the foreign style was seen to have created ‘strange’ and ‘clumsy’ structures such as the Tserkov’ Dmitriya Prilutskogo na Navoloke that stood out for their cultural rootlessness and incompatibility with local traditions.\footnote{V. Banige and N. Pertsev, \textit{Vologda} (Moscow: Iskusstvo, 1970), p. 26-28.}

The textual treatment of the merchant architecture of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was similarly ambiguous. As the heritage of ‘bourgeois’ capitalist culture, the neoclassical mansions were difficult to write into a Soviet socialist landscape or to frame as ideologically acceptable objects of national heritage. Consequently, the buildings were described only cursorily, or banished to an appendix at the end of the texts.\footnote{See, for example, Fehkner’s guide to the town in which discussion of the merchant architecture was limited to an appendix at the end of the text.} While ‘Old Russian architecture’ was celebrated as a material manifestation of the Soviet values of modesty and integrity, the ornate wooden estates were dismissed as imitative and uninteresting relics of an unremarkable period in national history.

The local merchant architecture was only permitted into the pantheon of orthodox architectural styles in the late-Brezhnev era when it began to be celebrated as an integral part of national culture. Rather than criticising the buildings as embarrassing reminders of an unenlightened era, authors of local tourist guides began to praise the way in which the neo-classical mansions
enhanced the local landscape. In Sergei Razgonov’s guide to the Vologda region Severnye etyudy, the tourist’s attention was consequently directed away from the Troitskii sobor, past the seventeenth-century Tserkov’ Ioanna Predtechi, to rest on a nineteenth-century wooden house. In this tour d’horizon of Vologda architecture, the architectural inheritance of the late-Imperial period, formerly dismissed as the relics of an ideologically unsavoury past, was recast as an integral part of the local cultural tradition.

In Soviet guidebooks to Vologda, the natural landscape was praised in equal measure to the architectural cityscape. Vologda was depicted as a natural idyll, a town founded on dense forests, limpid lakes and crystal rivers. This landscape, it was claimed, had provided the creative inspiration for Russian artists and writers across the ages. A line was thus drawn along the local horizon linking Dionysius, who had painted the frescoes of the monastery of Ferapontovo, to the Soviet writers Vasili Belov and Aleksandr Yashin, who continued to commemorate the region in their patriotic prose.

In a travelogue published in Ogonek in 1979, the Russian nationalist writer Dmitrii Zhukov described the uncanny atmosphere of the town during the ‘White

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132 Banige and Pertsev, p. 34.
133 S. N. Razgonov, Severnye etyudy (Moscow: Molodaya gvardiya, 1972), p. 29.
134 See, for example, the opening lines to Bocharov and Vygolovoy guides to Vologda: ‘Вологда! Старинный русский город, возникший в краю дремучих лесов, тихих, бескрайних озер и чистых, прозрачных прихотливо бегущих рек.’ Bocharov and Vygolovoy, p. 5.
135 See the documentary film ‘Vologda’ (c1975) in which shots of Dionysius’s frescoes are juxtaposed with scenes of local writers signing books at a book fair in Vologda. [The film, which was retrieved from the archive of the Vologda State Museum in 2008, appears to have been produced to promote tourism in the region. In 2008, it was in the process of being restored by the Vologda documentary filmmaker Yurii Ganichev. A copy of the film is with the author].
Nights’ season, a time when the creative elite was prompted to take to the streets and to their pens:

Был уже поздний час, но небо и не думало темнеть, жемчужный свет белой ночи заливал стройные громады старинных зданий на «соборной горке», платиновую гладь речной излучины внизу, особняки и церкви Заречья. Это она, белая ночь, выглянула нас, местно и повсеместно чтимых литераторов и гостя их, из прокуренной комнаты вологодского отделения на свежий простор, где в речах засквозила боль неурадич, страстное желание найти выход из всех тупиков, любовь к родной земле и зазвучали стихи самой высокой поэтической прозы.136

Despite the judicious placement of inverted commas around sobornaya gorka, the spiritual undertones of the article were obvious. If Vologda lacked the majestic past of Novgorod or the heroic myth of Pskov, it was nevertheless a land of transcendent beauty whose soulfulness shone through its nature and architecture. The literary school of ‘village prose’ writers, as Kathleen Parthé has shown, would provide variations on this theme in their writings dedicated to the traditions and culture of the northern region.137 In the post-Soviet period, with Orthodoxy restored to its place at the centre of Russian culture, the sacred significance of the region, a land ‘touched by the hand of God’,138 would find more explicit and categorical endorsement.

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2.7 AMPLIFYING AND MARGINALIZING THE SOVIET EXPERIENCE

The establishment of Soviet power at the beginning of the twentieth century was presented in the guidebooks of the socialist period as one of the defining moments in local history, the beginning of the towns’ transformation from provincial backwaters into vibrant centres of culture and industry. In their 1970 handbook to Vologda, for example, Banige and Pertsev described the provincial tedium of life in the town prior to the revolution: ‘дальнейшая жизнь Вологды, вплоть до революции, протекла спокойно и тихо, даже можно сказать дремотно-тихо и монотонно’.139 This contrasted with the dynamic sense of urban development and cultural evolution under Soviet power. As Varlamov explained in his 1976 guide to the town, ‘на глазах преображается облик города. Он украсился новыми садами, скверами и парками, административными и культурно-просветительными зданиями’.140

The emphasis placed on ‘mastering’ the landscape, energizing and transforming the lived environment contrasted with the celebration of unadulterated nature in contemporaneous European guides. In his collections of essays, Mythologies, Roland Barthes remarked the emphasis on ‘ruggedness’ in the presentation of landscape in the Guide Blue series, which he professed, ‘ne connaît guère le paysage que sous la forme du pittoresque [...] est pittoresque tout ce qui est accidenté’.141 Soviet guides, by contrast, were more likely to praise the purposeful taming of nature, or to draw attention to the civic rather than natural aspects of the local environment. An illustration can be drawn from L. I.

139 Banige and Pertsev, p. 8.
Malyakov’s guide to the sights of Pskov, which began by underlining the very synthetic characteristics of the town, describing it as ‘один из крупнейших на северо-западе нашей страны индустриальных и культурных центров, современный социалистический город’.  

The primacy placed on the events of the Soviet period was reflected in the textual representation of historical time. History was seen to pivot on the events of October 1917, which provided a structural caesura around which the texts were organised. Moreover, the events in local history before October were often interpreted through the conceptual lens of Marxist-Leninism and presented as an extended prelude to the revolution. Kushnir’s 1972 guide to Novgorod, for example, presented ‘pre-revolutionary history’ through essays on the architecture of the Democratic Republic, architectural developments from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century, and Novgorod in the ‘capitalist period’. This narrative of the pre-revolutionary past, in which the pre-modern egalitarianism of the Democratic Republic was seen to be gradually subsumed by the conditions of manipulative capitalism, reflected the Marxist-Leninist conception of history in which economic factors drive the organisation of society towards a preordained end.  

Presentations of Soviet history in the guides to the northwest towns were marked by certain thematic emphases and expressive tendencies that succeeded in framing a common experience of life under Soviet power. In formulaic style, the authors detailed the local experience of revolution, the industrial and

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143 Kushnir, 1972.
cultural achievements of the 1920s and 1930s, the devastation of wartime occupation, victory, liberation and post-war recovery and the creation of prosperity and the conditions of well-being in the present day. The narrative form also held for towns, such as Vologda, that had not experienced occupation and large-scale reconstruction in the post-war period. In Fekhner's account of architectural practices during the Soviet period, for example, the formula of revolutionary inception, wartime subjugation (albeit of the nation rather than the region) and recovery was reproduced.\textsuperscript{144}

In the post-Soviet period, professional writers and amateur historians were impelled to correct what they perceived to be the distorted narratives of local history and culture established under Communist rule. The overemphasis on Soviet experience was addressed through the reproductions of guidebooks written at the beginning of the twentieth century, which, for obvious reasons, excluded the Soviet period from their discussion. N. F. Okulich-Kazarin’s 1913 publication \textit{Sputnik po drevnemu Pskovu} (republished in 2001) and V. P. Laskovskii’s 1910 text \textit{Putivoditel’ po Novgorodu} (republished in 2007), thus transported to reader back to a time before the transformative impact of Soviet modernisation had impacted upon the local context.\textsuperscript{145} The republication of the guides was also intended to retrieve the memory of local objects, and in particular churches, that had been razed to the ground by the wrong-headed architects of Soviet modernization. As G. Raikov commented in his introduction

\textsuperscript{144} Fekhner.
to Laskovskii’s guide: 'Живой взгляд из прошлого позволяет нам увидеть то, что сегодня стерто с лица земли и уничтожено «Иванами, родства не помнящими'.'

A parallel trend, reflected in A. I. Sazonov and E. A. Starikov’s 2007 publication Moya Vologda, was to write individual lives into the history of the Soviet period, colouring impersonal historical narrative with autobiographical detail to provide a near ethnographic account of the Soviet experience. Moya Vologda thus chronicled the intimate detail of everyday life, cataloguing the childhood memories, domestic routines, and family traditions that had been excluded from the standardized presentations of socialist life published during the Soviet period. The authors of the text blurred the distinction between memory and history, writing their individual recollections into a collective experience of the period. Following an account of his own family history, Starikov thus meditated on the more general ‘atmosphere’ of grandmotherly life in the town during the socialist period, embellishing his account with national and local detail that was intended to be recognisable to a reader of the same generation:

Ту атмосферу вдовой старушечьего быта забыть невозможно: на стенах фотографии сыновей и братьев в военной форме эпохи Первой мировой войны, портреты родных, не вернувшихся с Великой Отечественной. Иногда тут же на стене – фото из цветного журнала только-только входившей в моду Аллы Пугачевой. Обязательные атрибуты дома – икона в красном углу, под которой на специальной подставке располагается подушечка для плетения кружев с начатой салфеткой.

146 Laskovskii, 2007, p. 3.
Sazonov and Starikov’s text might be understood as part of a genre of autobiographical literature published in the post-Soviet period which, as Irina Paperno has argued, was characterised by the desire to create a record of the ‘Soviet experience’. According to Paperno, the ‘impulse to publish’ in the post-Soviet period derived from the existential anxiety of contemporary authors and intellectuals, their desire to fill the ‘vacuity’ of the post-Soviet present with narratives of Soviet experience and to construct a ‘tangible self and extended community’ in text.148 This impulse was particularly strong in the Russian regions where particularistic interpretations of the past were often subsumed within ‘national’ historical narratives. Texts such as Moya Vologda were thus propelled by the double impetus to write individual experience into detached historical discourse and to assert the significance of the periphery in a capital-centric understanding of national history.

2.8 CONCLUSION

As I have argued in this chapter, domestic tourism in the post-1961 era was promoted as a means of reinforcing patriotic identity and stimulating local and national consciousness among the population. In touristic visions of Soviet towns, elements from the local landscape and episodes from the local past were emphasised and creatively interpreted in an effort to create an understanding of localness that conformed with the ideals and beliefs of the Soviet state. The Veche Republic of Novgorod was thus reconceived as a proto-socialist state in which class tensions periodically erupted into social rebellion; the history of

Pskov was rewritten as a series of patriotic battles against foreign invaders; Vologda, by contrast, was presented as the spiritual heartland of Soviet Russia, the civic manifestation of the national qualities of simplicity and modesty and the ideological attributes of ‘democracy’ and ‘progressiveness’. By aligning local histories with the ideological values of late-socialism, the Communist state was able to assert the somewhat paradoxical claim that the Soviet Union was mosaic of divergent cultures that nevertheless cohered around specific socialist values and objectives.

The actors involved in energizing the pre-revolutionary past in the post-Stalin period were primarily members of the local community. Local writers, historians, tourist agents, excursion guides, and non-experts were involved in the performance of local history to a national audience. This took place both within institutionalised structures, such as sightseeing excursions, and in informal contexts, such as the presentation of photograph albums and tourist guides to non-locals. The performance of culture reinforced the boundaries of the local community, while the ritualistic acknowledgement of these activities in newspapers and museum response books provided a focus of social identity and local pride. Tourism endured as a centre of local identity in the post-Soviet period, although the emphasis shifted away from the socialist past to focus instead on the pre-revolutionary period. As I have argued in this chapter, the emergence of new genres of historical commemoration, such as the history-memoirs that wrote individual experience into official memory, revealed strategies of negotiating this abrupt and disorienting change.
CHAPTER TWO
CHAPTER TWO

EXHIBITING LOCALNESS: PATRIOTIC DISPLAYS OF LOCAL HISTORY AND CULTURE IN REGIONAL MUSEUMS

3.1 INTRODUCTION

In the post-1961 period, state museums shifted their focus away from contemporary developments in socialist society as a whole towards the specific experiences of the regions. Reviving the repressed discipline of kraevedenie, museums placed renewed emphasis on localness in their exhibition work in an effort to heighten people’s awareness of and identification with the goals of socialist construction. By contrast with the 1920s, however, when kraevedenie had constituted a viable discipline made up of energetic regional specialists from

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149 According to the online Bol'shaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya, kraevedenie is «всестороннее изучение определённой части страны, города или деревни, др. поселений местным населением, для которого эта территория считается родным краем». The entry goes on to point out that in the Soviet Union, the primary focus of kraevedenie work was «изучение и охрана природы края, выявление его природных ресурсов; изучение истории (в т. ч. революционного движения, Гражданской и Великой Отечественной войн), культуры края, изучение и охрана местных памятников культуры и старины, изучение народного творчества, хозяйственных достижений, опыта передовиков производства, пропаганда знаний о своём крае, обобщение научной информации, сосредоточение библиографических данных, фототек, организация выставок, краеведческих кабинетов, лекториев, экскурсий, небольших исследовательских экспедиций, музеев». ‘Kraevedenie’, Bol'shaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya (http://bse.sci-lib.com/article065588.html) [last accessed: 10 January 2011].
a range of scholarly backgrounds, the discipline's revival in the 1960s was driven almost entirely by the state. While there was clearly a measure of overlap at the level of rhetoric - the desire to know, and consequently love the 'motherland' through the study of a particular locality was emphasised in equal measure in both periods\textsuperscript{150} - the discipline in the 1960s was more an extension of the state apparatus, an aid to the dissemination of socialist ideals and values, than a rigorous field of study.\textsuperscript{151}

In this chapter, I focus on the work of local museums in Novgorod, Pskov, and Vologda to analyse the content and form of the visions of localness presented to members of the local community in the post-1961 period. I argue that displays of local culture, while ostensibly intended to stimulate patriotic affiliation with the socialist state, focused exclusively on 'Russian' traditions, positing an idea of the North West as a repository of authentic national values that was reiterated back to the museum in response books and other forms of public commentary. In the second half of the chapter, I consider the tensions inherent to the process of

\textsuperscript{150} Compare, for example, the description of kraevedenie as an impulse 'to know the motherland, understand it and serve it' in L.M Grey's 1923 article 'Kraevedenie i ekskursionnoe delo', in Raikov and others, \textit{Voprosy ekskursionnogo dela: Po dannym petrogradskoi ekskursionnoi konferentsii, 10-12 marta 1923} (Petrograd: Nachatki znanie, 1923), p. 3, quoted here from \textit{How St Petersburg learned to study itself: The Russian Idea of Kraevedenie}, by Emily D. Johnson (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2006), p. 156; and the following description of the work of kraevedcheskie museums in a letter from the regional cultural authorities in 1961: «[краеведческий] музей путем всестороннего изучения природы, истории дореволюционного прошлого и советского периода, современного состояния местного края, собрания и показа музейных экспонатов распространяет знания о крае среди широких масс населения, воспитывает у трудящихся чувство советского патриотизма, любовь к своему краю, к своей социалистической Родине». Novgorodskii gosudarstvennyi oblastnoi muzei (hereafter NGOM), op. 1, d. 410, l. 24.

\textsuperscript{151} For more on the evolution of kraevedenie and the repression of the discipline in the late-1920s see Johnson; for a related discussion of the practices of exhibiting visions of 'localness' to the populations of the Russian regions in the 1920s and 1930s see Emma Widdis, \textit{Visions of a New Land: Soviet Film From the Revolution to the Second World War} (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), p. 44 and 100.
crafting local patriotism, in particular the clash between local and national cultural authorities over the ownership of historical relics. My contention is that diverse, and at times contradictory historical narratives were institutionalized at this time, preparing the ground for the introspective turn in local museum culture in the post-Soviet period.

3.2 REVIVING KRAEVEDENIE IN LOCAL MUSEUMS

In the Khrushchev era, kraevedcheskie museums were once more put at the service of the Soviet state. However, rather than simply focusing on the problems of production, as they had in the 1930s, museums' task was to reinforce the authority of the Communist Party, endorsing its central values and aims. In the recommendations of the Sixth Congress of the Methodological Council for the work of Soviet museums in 1965, these intentions were elaborated:

В исторических музеях и в отделах истории краеведческих музеев плановое комплектование должно быть основано на глубоком изучении жизни страны, республики, края, области, района; охватывать все основные, существенные явления в их взаимосвязи и взаимозависимости, учтывать все основные вопросы развития общества, а именно: развитие производительных сил и производственных отношений, руководящую роль КПСС, союз рабочего класса и крестьянства, братскую дружбу народов Советского Союза, развитие советской демократии и др.152

Throughout the 1960s, kraevedcheskie museums and sections of museums were founded not only in the regional capitals, but also in towns with populations of no more than a few thousand inhabitants. In the Novgorod region, for example,

152 GAVO, f. 4795, op. 6, d. 108, l. 73.
local history museums opened in Valdai in 1961, Staraya Russa in 1967, and Borovichi in 1971.\textsuperscript{153} In the Pskov region, regional museums in Velikie Luki, Sebezh, Porkhov, and Pechory were promoted to the status of inter-regional kraevedcheskie museums in 1965.\textsuperscript{154} The museums nevertheless faced a major obstacle to their work: the repression of the kraevedenie industry in the 1920s and the replacement of locally specific displays with generic visions of Soviet life had left them with few objects suitable for incorporation into exhibitions of local culture.\textsuperscript{155}

These developments began to be openly denigrated in the 1960s. At a national meeting of museum workers in Novgorod held in 1960, visitors from the capital criticised the non-specific nature of displays of history and culture at the local museum, which included objects from central Russian regions and the Ukraine and provided little information about the Novgorod region. The tendency to gloss over local practices in favour of generic presentations of national culture appeared to be a general problem faced by local museums at this time, or at least, one that was widely identified. Museum workers were consequently instructed to trawl the surrounding regions for objects that could be incorporated into exhibitions, reorienting the focus of museum work inwards at the local community, its history and traditions.\textsuperscript{156}

\textsuperscript{153} NGOM, istoricheskaya spravka, op. 1.
\textsuperscript{154} See the annual report of the Pskov Cultural Authorities for 1965. GAPO, f. R-1855, op. 1, d. 247, l. 143.
\textsuperscript{155} This shortcoming was noted at a meeting of museum workers in Novgorod in 1960. NGOM, op. 1, d. 380, l. 27.
\textsuperscript{156} NGOM, op. 1, d. 380, l. 27.
Over the course of the decade, museum workers visited villages and towns in the local district in order to identify and acquire objects appropriate for museum display. In Novgorod, expeditions were carried out in the Okulovskii and Krestetskii regions in 1962, during which scholars visited factories, local theatres, and churches in search of potential museum exhibits. Certain objects, such as materials related to the technical reconstruction of Okulovskii weaving factory and the activities of its workers, provided the local dimension to a vision of socialist construction that had been a focus of museum work since the early-Stalin period. Others, such as the decorative distaffs, looms, chests, engraved and carved salt-cellar constitutted a break with earlier strategies of museum display, marking a revival of the ethnographic approach of the *kraevedenie* work of the 1920s. Like the Film Train of the 1920s and 1930s, which had screened images of life in the regions to communities at the Soviet periphery, many of the exhibits were transported to villages and towns in the surrounding region as part of a mobile cultural service. A return to the practices of exhibiting localness to the regions as a means of generating a greater sense of pride in local and national culture was thus underway.

157 Employees at the Pskov State Museum visited Pushkinogorsk, Pechory, Porokhov, Gdov, and Ostrov in 1962 in search of museum exhibits, while workers at the local museum in Novgorod carried out expeditions to Okulov, Gory, Kuznets, and Borovichi with the same objective in the 1960s. See the annual report of the Pskov State Museum for 1962 and the annual reports of the Novgorod State Museum for 1964, 1965, and 1968. GAPO, f R-1855, op. 1, d. 164, l. 50; NGOM, op. 2, d. 318; NGOM, op. 2, d. 814; and NGOM, op. 2, d. 954.

158 See the annual report of the Novgorod State Museum for 1962. NGOM, op. 1, d. 429, l. 17.

159 For a discussion of the cine-propaganda and its role disseminating ideas of socialist development in the Russian regions see Widdis, p. 100.

160 According to a report on the work of the Novgorod State Museum in 1962, ten mobile exhibitions were organised in the Novgorod region and included displays on the themes *Rabot khudozhnikov Novgorodskoi oblasti* and *Rabot narodnykh umel'tsev Novgorodskoi oblasti*. NGOM, op. 1, d. 429, l. 25-26.
A pensioner demonstrating examples of work on a weaver’s loom to a group of pioneers at the kraevedcheskii museum of the ‘Iskra’ kolkhoz in the Novgorod region in 1977.\textsuperscript{161} 

A girl talking about the pre-revolutionary life of the peasants of Poozer’e at the kraevedcheskii museum of the ‘Iskra’ kolkhoz, 1977.\textsuperscript{162}

If the incorporation of objects of industrial production into Soviet patriotic displays was fairly straightforward, the way in which objects of folk culture could be made to work for the goals of socialism was less obvious. An implicit contradiction existed between the categorical endorsement of the notions of progress, industrial development and modernity, and the positive appraisal of folk culture the existence of which depended on the persistence of traditional modes of production and ways of life. Some museums circumvented this problem by separating folk culture from its traditional context, praising the former while criticizing the latter. The painting techniques, weaving, and toy-making practices of the Russian peasant were thus the objects of lavish praise, while the rural conditions in which traditional arts and crafts had originated

\textsuperscript{161} NGOM, op. 1, d. 2256n.a, l. 11.
\textsuperscript{162} NGOM, op. 1, d. 2256n.a, l. 12.
were condemned as inhumane and backward. The explanatory notes from an exhibition at the Vologda State Museum in 1963, *Vologodskaya guberniya XII-XX vv.*, reveal the underlying tension in the treatment of folk culture. While traditions such as lace making and the preparation of the bride’s dowry-trunk were spared heavy ideological criticism (the only negative remark in the notes to the exhibition concerned the ‘stuffy workshops’ [*dushnye masterskie*] in which the lace-makers had worked),\(^{163}\) the explanatory text accompanying a reconstructed interior of a peasant *izba* poured forth with ideological indignation:

Грязный немощенный двор делается все грязнее и наконец превращается в воюющее непроезжее болото, столь же вредное для человека, как и для животных. В избе грязь, пол в дырах, старая лачуга расшаталась и разлетается. Наконец является жалкая изба, на которой не только нет ни резьбы, ни украшений, но к жалким трехвершковым окнам хозяин не в состоянии приделать даже карнизов. Вот что представляют жилища крестьян-бедняков в Вологодской губернии.\(^{164}\)

In the note, the contradiction between the treatment of peasant life and folk traditions was resolved through the implication that popular arts and crafts were threatened by the organisation of labour in capitalist societies. The lack of decorative carvings or folk details on the *izba* in question was explained by the fact that the owner ‘was not in a condition’ to carry them out, in other words, his creative spirit had been crushed by the exploitative conditions of capitalism. Following this line of reasoning to its logical conclusion, folk traditions were

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\(^{163}\) See the notes to the exhibition. *VOKM*. op. 1, d. 491, l. 50.

\(^{164}\) *VOKM*, op. 1, d. 491, l. 21.
understood to be able to thrive only in conditions of economic and social equality, that is, in just societies such as the Soviet Union.

The presentation of folk ensembles [narodnye ansambli] provides a point of comparison in this regard. Folk ensembles, as Laura Olson has pointed out, became popular in the post-war period when state-sponsored dance and music companies were founded throughout the territory of the Soviet Union. ¹⁶⁵ In the North West groups of folk dancers performed at Soviet festivals that had replaced religious celebrations such as Russkaya zima and Prazdniki vsrechi vesny, as well as touring neighbouring socialist republics and occasionally kapstrany in the West.¹⁶⁶ Like the exhibition of folk culture in Soviet museums, however, folk ensembles were intended, not only to generate pride in national traditions, but also to provoke respect for the Soviet way of life which allowed for the preservation and perpetuation of such practices.¹⁶⁷ Consequently, little attempt was made to conceal the modern context in which the ‘traditional’ songs and dances were performed. Indeed, the poem which opened a publication dedicated to the Novgorod folk ensemble ‘Sadko’ challenged the very ‘traditionalness’ of the ensemble’s activities by sitiating the performers within the hyper-modern context of the Soviet factory:

От родного завода пошла далеко
Слава песен и танцев ансамбля «Садко»...
Отставляем на время станки и приборы.

¹⁶⁷ See the report from 1974 on the work of folk collectives in the Pskov region. GAPO, f R-1855, op. 1, d. 776, l. 99.
Мы сегодня – артисты! Мы с русским задором  
В сельских клубах, Дворцах, в зарубежных гастролях –  
Всюду Родину славим, страну новостроек,  
Человека труда и плоды его дел,  
Нерушимую дружбу советских людей!168

Reading about the ‘Sadko’ ensemble, Soviet citizens were invited to contemplate  
the modern context in which the traditional practices were performed; folk  
culture, it was suggested, was not alien to Soviet society, but rather an integral  
part of the socialist way of life.

Fig. 8.  
The folk ensemble ‘Sadko’ in front of their factory in Novgorod from  
‘Sadko’ – Narodnyi ansambl’, 1984.169

3.3 DISPLAYS OF SOVIET ‘FOLK’ CULTURE

In the post-Khrushchev period, the contradiction between the celebration of  
peasant traditions and the assertion of the primacy of modern urban life became  
less important. In accordance with the growth in interest in Soviet

168 A. Bukhvalov, ‘Ot rodnogo zavoda poshla daleko’, in P. A. Bolvin and M. N.  
Mironov, ‘Sadko’ – Narodnyi ansambl’, (Novgorod: Novgorodskaya pravda,  
1984).
169 Bolvin and Mironov, p. 26
ethnography,\textsuperscript{170} museums turned their attention to describing the traditional ways of life in the rural sphere. Expeditions to Russian villages developed from missions for the collection of locally specific exhibits to become ethnographic research trips for the study of peasant life. The reports compiled by museum workers during these expeditions meticulously detailed the architectural specificities and layout of village houses, the occupations of the residents, forms of social organisation, and dialectical specificities of the region. Rather than condemning wooden \textit{izbas} as unhygienic and pitiful, employees of the Novgorod State Museum described the village houses of Gorneshno and Perevoz in the Vologda region in intricate detail as objects of considerable cultural value.\textsuperscript{171} Yet ethnographical research continued to be shaped by ideological factors. As Tatyana Shchepanskaya has noted, Soviet ethnographers were obliged to work within exacting ideological conditions, inventively reinterpreting their research to correspond with official objectives.\textsuperscript{172}

The tendency to self-censor ethnographic work was also remarkable at the local level. In the late-1960s, museum workers collected considerable material related

\textsuperscript{170} By the end of the 1960s, work was underway on a number of scholarly publications dedicated to the history and culture of the Soviet peoples. Prominent works included the section ‘Narody evropeiskoi chasti SSSR’ in the multi-volume ethnographic encyclopedia \textit{Narody mira}; ethnographic maps for a Siberian ethnographic atlas, the atlas \textit{Russkye}, and regional atlases, in particular an atlas of the Baltic States and the republics of the South West. Ethnography was also given more attention in academic journals, such as \textit{Sovetskaya etnografiya} and the Ukrainian language journal \textit{Narodnye iskusstvo i etnografiya}, which increased its yearly output from three to six editions annually in 1967. See the report on ethnographic work at the Novgorod State Museum in 1967. NGOM, op. 2, d. 520, l. 9.

\textsuperscript{171} See the reports from expeditions to Gorneshno and Perevoz in the Vologda region in 1968. NGOM, op. 1, d. 814 n.a., l. 5-6.

\textsuperscript{172} Shchepanskaya quotes the Soviet ethnographer Solomon Bruk who recalls that while working on the ‘Atlas of Peoples of the World’ scholars at the Ethnographical Institute AN SSSR were obliged to erase certain points from the map, either because they were prohibited from referring to repressed peoples, or on the request of foreign governments whose official positions were in contradiction with the contents of the atlas. Tať’ya Shchepanskaya, in ‘Forum o forum (ili o sostoyanii diskussionnogo polya nauki)’, \textit{Antropologicheskii forum}, 10 (2009), 161-168 (p. 163).
to the ethnic minorities in the regions, such as the Karelian community in the Okulovskii region of Novgorod and the Estonian settlement around the village of Dyachino that had moved to the Novgorod region in search of free land before the Stolypin reforms.\textsuperscript{173} But while the minorities in the Pskov and Novgorod regions were considered appropriate research topics for the museums of the Soviet republics in which they were the titular nations,\textsuperscript{174} they were clearly regarded as unsuitable subject matter for exhibitions at local history museums. The materials and objects collected during the expeditions to the regions were never incorporated into displays at the Novgorod State Museum despite the contemporary relevance of the theme and its interest to the local community.\textsuperscript{175}

Throughout the Brezhnev era, local history museums in the North West placed the emphasis in the exhibitions of ‘folk’ culture almost exclusively on ‘Russian’ heritage. Typical exhibitions at this time thus included \textit{Severnye pryalki} in Vologda (1970) where painted distaffs, wood carvings, folk sculptures and other objects of applied art were displayed;\textsuperscript{176} \textit{Narodnoe tvorchestvo} (1967) in Novgorod which included exhibits of clothing, textiles, and domestic and agricultural equipment of ethnic Russians;\textsuperscript{177} \textit{Vologodskoe kruzhevo} (1977) an exhibition of Vologda lace-making from the nineteenth and twentieth centuries;\textsuperscript{178} and \textit{Vologodskii natsional’nyi kostyum} (1979), an exhibition of ethnic

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\textsuperscript{173} See the report from the expedition to the Okulovskii region in 1967. NGOM, op. 1, d. 318 n.a., l. 16-20.
\textsuperscript{174} The need for ethnographic museums in Estonia to carry out research in the region was noted in the report. NGOM, d. 318n.a., l. 16.
\textsuperscript{175} Pers. Inf. A number of acquaintances in Novgorod and Pskov regretted the fact that the culture and traditions of local minorities were not better reflected in local cultural institutions. V. V., Novgorod, Summer 2008; V. G., Vologda Summer 2009.
\textsuperscript{176} See the annual report of the Vologda State Museum for 1970. VOKM, op. 1, d.678, l. 70.
\textsuperscript{177} See the documents on the exhibition \textit{Narodnoe tvorchestvo} in 1967. NGOM, op. 2, d. 789.
\textsuperscript{178} See the response book for the exhibition \textit{Vologodskoe kruzhevo} in 1977. VOKM. op. 1, d. 863.
\end{flushleft}
Russian clothing in Vologda. At local folk festivals, a similarly exclusive approach was taken to the presentation of ethnic arts and crafts. At the folklore festival at the 'Vitoslavlitsy' Museum in Novgorod in 1977, for example, demonstrations by specialists in Russian arts and crafts were followed by performances by Russian folk ensembles from the various regions of the oblast, while no space was allowed for displays of the handiwork of the minority cultures of the region.

In the explanatory notes to the exhibitions of local 'folk' culture, museum workers were at pains to highlight the significance of the objects displayed to the objectives of contemporary Soviet society. In a report on the Vologodskoe kruzhevo exhibition, for example, the preservation and artistic reinterpretation of the tradition in the Soviet period was singled out for particular praise – 'особая ценность [произведений] состоит в сохранении многовековых народных традиций, обогащенных современным художественным языком'. However, for those who visited the exhibitions, the logical connection between the exhibits and the Soviet project was not always clear. While one zealous visitor endeavoured to formulate her response to the exhibition of Vologda lace work Soviet bureaucratese ('здесь мы узнали много нового о достижениях сельского хозяйства, промышленности нашей области') and another visitor remarked how much Lenin himself would have approved of the show, for most visitors the exhibits were a display of 'Russian' rather than 'Soviet' talent.

179 See the annual report of the Vologda State Museum for 1979. VOKM, op. 1, d. 998.
180 See the programme of the folklore festival in Novgorod in 1977. NGOM, op. 2, d. 952, l. 1.
181 See the annual report of the Vologda State Museum for 1976. VOKM, op. 1, d. 849, l. 5.
182 VOKM. op. 1, d. 863, l. 47.
The most overtly nationalistic comments to the exhibitions were left by visitors to the museum from more ‘Soviet’ towns of Russian East, as well as Russian inhabitants of neighbouring Soviet Republics. A resident of the industrial city of Chelyabinsk in the Urals thus poured forth with patriotic enthusiasm for the exhibition of lace work held in Vologda in 1977: ‘Спасибо за радушный прием в этом удивительном царстве кружев. Ваши кружева – прекрасны. Они русские! Огромное спасибо организаторам выставки за предоставленное удовольствие!’\(^{183}\) Russians from Baku, the capital of the Caucasian Republic of Azerbaijan, also expressed their appreciation for the preservation of Russian culture at the *Russkii samovar* exhibition in Vologda in 1975: ‘Мы, жители города Баку, с большим интересом посмотрели выставку «Русский

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\(^{183}\) Author’s own photograph, Vologda, Summer 2009.  
\(^{184}\) See the museum response book for the exhibition *Vologodskoe kruzhevo* in 1977. VOKM, op. 1, d. 863, l. 190б.
самовар». Большое спасибо за организацию русской старины. Большое спасибо за то, что не забывается русская история, быт русских людей. Нам, русским, живущим на Кавказе, это особенно отрадно'. The resonance of these exhibitions appeared to be particularly rich for Russians who perceived themselves to be estranged from an imagined national homeland, culturally stranded in industrial megalopolis or a foreign territory.

At the same time, exhibitions of local traditions were celebrated for their contribution to national culture in the comments of Russian visitors living in the historic centres of the country. One engineer from the medieval city of Perm’ thus praised the tradition of Vologda lace making as a craft inspired by the beauty of the Russian natural landscape: ‘Создать такую красоту! Нужно знать всю красоту природы, чтобы вплести её руками Вологодских кружевниц. Это огромный дар наших русских женщин Вологжанки’. Another tourist from the historic town of Vladivostok in the Russian Far East waxed eulogistic about the monuments of the Novgorod State Museum: ‘Спасибо, Русь Великая, что ты нам оставила такое наследство. Спасибо вам, русские люди Новгорода, что Вы сохранили это. Обрел полное душевное равновесие, глядя на все это истинное русское – Наше’. Comments such as these revealed the all-Soviet impact of the idea that the towns of the North West captured the essence of ‘Russian’ culture, even if this idea was rendered in more

185 See the response book for the exhibition Russkii samovar in Vologda in 1975. VOKM, op. 1, d. 826, l. 29.
186 VOKM, op. 1, d. 863, l. 190b.
187 See the response book to the exhibition of applied arts in Novgorod in 1969-1970. NGOM, op. 2, d. 611, l. 29ob.
explicitly nationalistic tones than the conservative discourse of Soviet patriotism would normally permit.

The shift in the focus of museum exhibitions towards specifically 'Russian' themes and the increasingly patriotic reactions of the general public to such displays ought to be understood within context of developments in Brezhnev-era cultural politics. As John B. Dunlop has pointed out, cultural manifestations of Russian nationalism became increasingly pronounced during the Brezhnev period. The ‘spirituality’ of the Russian countryside, which was alluded to in films such as Vasilii Shukshin’s *Kalina krasnaya* (1974), the destructive impact of Soviet modernisation on traditional ways of life which provided the theme of novels such as Vladimir Rasputin’s *Proshchanie s Materoi* (1976), and the demise of the Orthodox Church were among nationalist concerns that made their way into the mainstream of Soviet culture at this time.\(^{188}\) While Dunlop maintains that the year 1970 marked a watershed in the regime’s tolerance for Russian nationalism,\(^ {189}\) events of nationalistic importance, such as the exhibition of Il’ya Glazunov’s paintings in 1978, continued throughout the 1970s. The patriotic comments of visitors to museum exhibitions thus joined a chorus of nationalistic commentary that issued from Soviet thick journals, *samizdat* publications, national cinema and literature.

Up until this point, I have focused on the treatment of Russian folk culture and traditions in local museums, the inventive ways in which museum workers

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\(^{189}\) After 1970, Dunlop claims, expressions of Russian patriotism that were not melded with Marxist-Leninism began to be persecuted by the state. Dunlop, p. 43.
underlined the relevance of these themes to the political priorities of the Soviet state. However, much of the work of *kraevedcheskie* museums was directly related to developments of the Soviet period, the contemporary achievements of the local community in the domains of industry and agriculture. In the Velikolukskii *kraevedcheskii* museum in the Pskov region in 1972, for example, exhibition themes dedicated to the Soviet past included the history of Velikie Luki during the October Revolution and the Second World War, the achievements of the local community during the first two years of the Ninth Five Year Plan, and the lives of local revolutionaries. In the same year, the Sebezhskii *kraevedcheskii* museum in the Pskov region organised a number of exhibitions on patriotic themes from the Soviet period, including the collaboration of Latvian, Belarussian, and Russian troops in the defeat of the counterrevolutionary forces, the collaborative efforts of partisan movements to defeat the Nazi occupiers during the Second World War, and the organisation of collective farms in the Pskov region.\(^{190}\)

Like the exhibition of folk culture, the displays of materials connected with the Soviet present were intended to raise awareness of the role of the local community in the national project of constructing socialism. By reflecting an idealised version of the lived reality in the museum context, it was hoped that Soviet citizens would acquire an understanding of the place of the local community within the broader context of the socialist state. In an article published in *Pskovskaya pravda* in 1960, the ideal reaction of a visitor to a local exhibition of Soviet culture was described:

\(^{190}\) See the annual report of the Pskov State Museum for 1972. GAPO, f R-1855, op.1, d. 629, l. 5.
Экскурсанты с гордостью осматривали стенды, где представлена нынешняя продукция их предприятия – самые различные электродвигатели, электромagnиты, преобразователи тока.
Девушка с увлеением говорила о новых машинах, когда кто-то из подруг подозвал ее к соседнему снимку:
– Смотрите, ты тоже в музее!
Валя умолкла, взглянула на снимок. Да, на фото была она. Фотограф снял ее за сборкой экспортного электромагнита.
– Выходит, в историю попала – улыбнувшись, пошугила подругу.
Валя смущилась. Но в шутке подруги была большая доля правды. Ведь она, Валя Гостева, и десятки ее товарищей по цеху являются наследниками славного прошлого завода, традиций старшего поколения, своими руками творят, продолжают историю бывшего «Металлиста» - ныне крупного электромашиностроительного предприятия.191

In the concluding comments to this excerpt ['Ведь она, Валя Гостева...'], the author of the article made the logic of the kraevedenie revival explicit. The exhibition of localness to regional communities was intended to raise national consciousness and to impress upon people the relevance of their own contribution to the development of socialism. Valya Gosteva was not simply a worker on a construction line a Soviet factory, but an integral part in the construction of socialism. Moreover, she was responsible for the perpetuation of the traditions of production established by her socialist predecessors.

It is difficult to gauge the extent to which the efforts of museum workers and schoolteachers succeeded in achieving the goals of national and local affirmation.

191 A. Goluzov, 'V muzei prishli rabochie...', Pskovskaya pravda, 6 February 1961, p. 4.
The mindless repetition of the key dates and figures from local history by an uninterested excursion guide may well have succeeded in substituting curiosity for indifference in some cases, while the obligation to attend ‘educative’ school trips in the middle of the summer holidays must have been the resented by more than a few students. The fact that most local residents in the contemporary period share a corpus of knowledge about their localities – the year that the town was founded, the dates of the most famous local battles, the names of figures from local history, among other facts – nevertheless points to the efficacy of such activities for marking the boundaries of communities through a shared understanding of the past and its role in shaping and framing contemporary life.

A more tangible result of the activities of local museum workers and teachers was the creation of an acceptable vocabulary in which to express recognition of the value of the local past and its traditions. Thus, while some comments from

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192 GAPO, f. R-1855, op. 1, d. 164, l. 71.
schoolchildren in the Vologda museum response book for 1961 appeared relatively unaffected (‘Мы очень довольны музеем, но жаль, что нет пистолетов’), others typified the overblown style and convoluted language of contemporaneous textbooks celebrating the national past. One comment from the students of school №32 in Vologda, which may have been dictated by a teacher, reflects the overly technical vocabulary and artificial euphoria of many entries of this kind: ‘Музей это храни [sic: хранитель] культуры! Пройдя все залы музея, мы очень много узнали об истории Вологды, о передовиках производства, о сельских тружениках. Мы желаем дальнейших успехов в развитии музея!’ The standardized nature of this genre of comment, while providing evidence of the capacity to engage with Soviet officialese, also offers an insight into writers’ understanding of their discursive contexts. The association of local history with the goals of socialist construction – industrial productivity and agricultural toil – was clearly considered a prerequisite of public commentaries of this kind and one which was delivered with a degree of expertise.

The revival of kraevedenie work in the post-1961 period stimulated greater historical consciousness among members of local communities. In the Khrushchev and Brezhnev eras, every town, village, settlement, school, club, and family became a prospective subject of scholarly research, every local object a

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194 VOKM, op. 1, d. 406, d. 4.
195 For a discussion of public commentary in Soviet Russian culture and the ways in which this can be interpreted by the historian see Miriam Dobson, 'Letters', in Reading Primary Sources of Texts from Nineteenth and Twentieth Century History, ed. Miriam Dobson and Benjamin Ziemann (London: Routledge, 2008), pp. 57-73.
potential museum exhibit, and every piece of information a possible historical fact. In letters to the Novgorod State Museum in 1960 and 1961, history lovers from the region enquired into the historical origins of their particular settlements, the lives of local war heroes, the details of Novgorod's liberation from the German occupiers, and the history of local burial grounds. The museum provided detailed answers to each enquiry from its own archives, encouraging the efforts of the local population even when these were perceived to range into the realm of non-historical fantasy. In response to a question from the schoolchildren at Yablonovskii school No. 8 in Novgorod in 1961 about the significance of a stone with strange markings which was said to mark the spot of buried treasure, the museum offered the following response:

Что касается рассказов о кладе и разбойниках, то это обычное явление - о всех загадочных местах и непонятных предметах в народе всегда создавались подобные легенды. Однако эти легенды также следует записать, потому что в этих легендах можно получить другие сведения, чем те, о которых они говорят.

This note explaining the difference between real historical study and mere fantasy highlights an important consequence of the state-sponsored emphasis on historical enquiry at a local level. As individuals became increasingly aware of their historical contexts, they also became inclined to question the historical narratives commemorated in public institutions and subtly to question the authority of the state to evaluate the past. From buried treasure to historic

196 See the materials on the restoration and preservation of monuments for 1960 and the correspondence between the Novgorod State Museum and local schoolchildren in 1961. NGOM, op. 1, d. 398, l. 28-30ob; NGOM, op. 1, d. 422, l. 7-8, 13, 14-15, and 33.
197 NGOM, op. 1, d. 422, l. 38-39.
monuments, the relics of bygone times became a focus of political negotiation as local communities, empowered with knowledge of the local history, asserted particular vision of how that history ought to be represented in cultural institutions.\textsuperscript{198} This tension could also be identified in relations between local and national cultural authorities, where the rhetorical commitment to the idea of national unity through cultural diversity was put to the test.

3.4 CLASHES BETWEEN LOCAL AND NATIONAL MEMORY

The establishment of local history museums provided an appropriate excuse for museum workers to settle some old scores concerning the rightful ownership of certain historical objects. While some claims, such as the return of 170 medieval paintings that had been removed by Nazi troops to the Pskov State Museum,\textsuperscript{199} were universally recognized, others proved more controversial. In 1965, the head of the Novgorod Regional Cultural Authorities wrote to the Ministry of Culture to request that the Vasil’evskii Gates, which had been removed from the Sofiskii sobor and hung on the Troitskii sobor in Aleksandrov by Ivan IV following the unification of Novgorod with the Grand Duchy of Moscow, be returned to the Novgorod State Museum.\textsuperscript{200} The request was one of symbolic restitution whose controversy lay in the implication that Ivan IV had removed property from Novgorod without the consent of the local community. Indeed, the

\textsuperscript{198} For example, in a letter published in the Novgorodskaya pravda in 1967 one reader questioned the wisdom of the official logic directing the preservation of historic buildings in the Novgorod. See G. Melomedov, ‘O gorode mom Rodnom’, Novgorodskaya pravda, 6 January 1967, p. 4. (Quoted in full in Chapter Three); for a related discussion of the way that the ‘historical turn’ in late-Soviet culture challenged social cohesion see Denis Kozlov, ‘The Historical Turn in Late Soviet Culture: Retrospectivism, Factography, Doubt, 1953-91’, Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History, 2, 3 (Summer 2001), 577-600.

\textsuperscript{199} See the correspondence between the Pskov Cultural Authorities and the Ministry of Culture for 1964. GAPO, f R-1855, op.1, d. 226, l. 1.

\textsuperscript{200} See the correspondence between the Novgorod State Museum Authorities and the Ministry of Culture for 1965. NGOM, op. 1, d. 480, l. 35.
suggestion that the relationship between the towns had been one of subordination rather than collaboration conflicted with the established narrative of ‘the gathering of Russian lands’ in which unification with Muscovy was presented as a ‘progressive’ development for the territories at the periphery.\footnote{For a discussion of representation of Moscow’s annexation of the Novgorod territory in Soviet historiography see R. G. Skrynnikov, Tragediya Novgoroda (Moscow: Izd-vo im. Sabashnikovykh, 1994); for more on Soviet historiography of ‘the gathering of the Russian lands’ see Lowell Tillet, The Great Friendship: Soviet Historians and the Non-Russian Nationalities (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press); cf. my discussion of the representation of the ‘unification’ of Novgorod with the Principality of Moscow in Soviet tourist guides in Chapter One.}

The response of the Ministry of Culture to the letter in which the idea of the gates’ relocation was definitively rejected was thus categorical:

Таким образом, врата находятся в Александрове 400 лет, и не случайно, а в связи с историческим событием, событием создания русского национального государства, и исторически основано находятся в Троицком соборе Александрова. Думается, в наше время нет надобности заниматься перемещением памятников, связавших свою судьбу с другими городами.\footnote{NGOM, op. 1, d. 480, l. 43-44.}

The implication of the letter was that local historical enquiry, while endorsed by the state in principle, was nevertheless subordinated to the exigencies of national historical narrative. As part of the national history of the foundation of the Russian state, it was argued, the gates’ place was in Aleksandrov; their role in the history of the Democratic Republic of Novgorod was thus dismissed as of secondary importance. The letter revealed a condescending attitude towards local culture that contradicted the rhetorical commitment kraevedenie and the affirmation of its practitioners. Yet if a capital-centric vision of national history was nothing new, the state-sponsored revival of local culture in the post-1961 era provided the conditions for similar clashes throughout the 1960s and 1970s.
Historians and museum workers in the regions would continue to file complaints against the cultural chauvinism of the centre and to assert interpretation of historical events and objects from a local perspective.

One such event came in 1962, when a group of specialists from the Russian Museum in St Petersburg visited Pskov with the declared objective of consulting the museum's archive of Old Russian art and transporting certain objects for further study and restoration work to Leningrad. Following the visit, it was reported, the group had acquired an icon from the town of Ostrov and transported it back to Leningrad without the permission of the local authorities.203 A comparable affair was reported by the Novgorod State Museum collective in 1968, when during an excursion to the villages of Borovno, Zagub’e, and Mel’nitsa it was discovered that museum workers from Leningrad and Moscow had been scouring the region for local icons.204 Anger at the neo-colonial treatment of the regions translated into barely contained letters of indignation to the Authorities for Artistic Affairs in the 1960s, in which the audacity of the national institutions (which, it was noted, already possessed several first-class works from the region) was deplored.205

The state-sponsored kraevedenie movement was thus only partially successful in the realisation of its aims. While the institutionalization of local culture and history succeeded in stimulating greater historical consciousness, this did not

203 See the correspondence between the Pskov Cultural Authorities and the Ministry of Culture on the subject of the restoration of local objects of cultural heritage. GAPO, f R-1855, op. 1, d. 157, l. 23.
204 See the report on the expeditions of the Novgorod State Museum in 1968. NGOM, d. 814 n.a, l. 11-12.
205 GAPO, f R-1855, op. 1, d. 157, l. 23.
always correspond to the creation of new forms of social solidarity and a strengthened sense of identification with the goals of the socialist state. On the contrary, actors with vested interests in the interpretation of the past – historically minded individuals, cultural institutions, and local authorities, for example – often found themselves in conflict as they struggled to assert the primacy of their own visions of the local and national history. As the state entered an era of protracted reform these tensions would be subsumed into a process of cultural restructuring as museums were instructed to address more directly the social and spiritual needs of politically disengaged local communities.

2.5 WRITING THE SOVIET EXPERIENCE OUT

The work of local museums was inevitably affected by the period of political restructuring [perestroika] between 1985, when Mikhail Gorbachev launched his package of political reforms, and 1991, when the new union treaty was ratified, symbolically marking the end of the Soviet Union. Gorbachev’s politics were influenced by new currents of intellectual thought, in particular Tat’yana Zaslavskaya’s idea of activating the ‘social factor’ to inspire constructive and critical engagement of the population in the reform of national politics. These ideas were reflected in the work of state cultural institutions, which began to

206 As Geoffrey Hosking has pointed out, the perestroika reforms can be seen to be divided into two stages: ‘perestroika mark one’, which constituted the continuation of the Andropovite policies of tightening labour discipline, stepping up the campaign against political corruption, and economic ‘acceleration’; and ‘perestroika mark two’, which involved the introduction of competitive elections and the sanctioning of informal organisations and associations in support of perestroika that critically undermined the legitimacy of the regime. See Geoffrey A. Hosking, *The Awakening of the Soviet Union* (London: Heinemann, 1990), p. 218.

engage Soviet citizens more directly at this time in an attempt to address pressing problems such as the lack of trust in the political system, rampant alcoholism, and the decline of the work ethic. At meetings of museum collectives, the need to render exhibitions and cultural activities more relevant to the ‘spiritual’ [dukhovnyi] needs of the national community replaced the preoccupation with strengthening national patriotism and identification with the goals of the socialist state.

In 1986, a meeting was held at the Vologda State Museum to discuss the implementation of objectives outlined in the programme of the Twenty-Seventh Congress of the Communist Party. In order to align the work of the museum with the political priorities of the Communist Party, it was argued, the museum needed to improve not only its economic, but also its ‘spiritual’ efficiency. This was to be achieved through a thorough the restructuring of ideological work and, in particular, through the adoption of a more scientific approach to collection and exhibition work.208 Similar discussions in which the need for greater ‘spiritual’ engagement with the local community was asserted were underway all over the Soviet Union at this time. In a report from Pskov in 1989, for example, museum workers were instructed to direct their attention towards the improvement of cultural services for the workers, and the satisfaction of their spiritual needs.209 Following from Zaslavskaya’s social theory, surveys were

208 See the notes from meetings with the director of the Vologda State Museum in 1986. VOKM, op. 1. d. 1331, l. 8.
209 See the report on the work of cultural institutions in the Pskov region for 1989. GAPO, f R-1855, op. 1, d. 1712, l. 15.
carried out among local communities, which aimed at identifying and responding to the social and psychological requirements of the local population.\textsuperscript{210}

In the climate of self-reflection initiated by Gorbachev’s perestroika movement, local museum collectives began to discuss the shortcomings of their work. The sections of museums dedicated to pre-revolutionary and Soviet history, which comprised, for the most part, a random series of objects collected during expeditions to the surrounding regions, were criticized for their failure to articulate a coherent message to visitors.\textsuperscript{211} According to the authoritative voices in these meetings, unstructured exhibitions, in which posters from factories, busts of Lenin, banners from demonstrations, and workers’ clothing were displayed with little attention to narrative coherence, had to be replaced by more lucid representations of the party’s main aims. Yet, the ideological vision that should replace the ‘inefficient’ ideological work of the past was not always clear. During a discussion about the reconstruction of the Oktyabr’skii zal in the Vologda State Museum in 1987, for example, the remarks of the museum director that visitors should not ‘suffer’ as a result of the troubles the museum was facing, that there should be no ‘ambiguities’ in or ‘complaints’ about the exhibition, spoke volumes about the challenges facing state cultural institutions.\textsuperscript{212}

The comments of the director of the Vologda State Museum reflect the ambiguity at the centre of the work of state museums at this time. How were museums to

\textsuperscript{210} In 1989 surveys were carried out in Pskov on the themes of Chelovek i ucherezhdeniya kul’tury and Klub v Vashei zhizni in an effort to more directly address the social and cultural needs of the local community. GAPO, f R-1855, op. 1, d. 1712, l. 16.

\textsuperscript{211} See the notes from meetings with the director of the Vologda State Museum in 1987. VOKM, op. 1, d. 1394, l. 5.

\textsuperscript{212} VOKM, op.1, d. 1394, l. 5.
improve their responsiveness to the spiritual demands of the population while remaining faithful to the ideological tenets of their work? How could boring, repetitive exhibitions be restructured for the spiritual benefit of the local community? As hard as museum collectives tried to improve the originality of their exhibitions by reorganizing the route through the displays and placing key exhibits, such as portraits of Lenin and important declarations, at the visitor’s eye-level, the results were limited.\(^{213}\) It was only in the post-Soviet period, when the ideological constraints on museum work were removed, that exhibitions were able to reorient their work towards more engaging, locally specific themes.\(^{214}\) In the wake of the Soviet collapse, the interest in folk traditions and culture, which had developed in \textit{kravedcheskie} museums from the Khrushchev period onwards, became the main focus of museum work. Rooms which had been populated by objects and information related to the construction of socialism were subsequently occupied with exhibitions of an explicitly local character. \textit{Yubileinye daty Novgorodskogo kalendarya, Budnie i prazdniki Novgorodskogo krest’yanina,} and \textit{Tipy mel’nits Russkogo Severa} were among the exhibitions at the Novgorod State Museum that reflected this shift in emphasis.\(^{215}\)

In the post-Soviet period, certain aspects of local history, which had long been excluded from museum exhibitions for their ideologically inappropriate content were brought to the centre of exhibition work. In Vologda the history of the local

\(^{213}\) These were two of the recommendations of the museum director in Vologda to improve the \textit{Oktyabr’skii zal} of the museum in 1987. See VOKM, op.1, d. 1394, l. 5-6; the dearth of comments in visitor response books engaging with the political content of these exhibitions is a guide to their relative lack of success in achieving the ideological goals outlined in the meetings cited above. See visitors’ response books to exhibitions at the Vologda State Museum from 1989 and 1992. VOKM, op. 1, d. 1400; VOKM, op. 1, d. 1715.

\(^{214}\) Museum work was restructured following the adoption of the Federal Law of the Russian Federation on the museum archives and museums in the Russian Federation of 27 May 1996. See \textit{Sobranie zakonodatel’stva RF, Rossiiskaya gazeta,} 4 June 1996.

\(^{215}\) See the plans for these exhibitions at the Novgorod State Museum in 1993. NGOM, op. 4, d. 1645; NGOM, op. 4, d. 1658; NGOM, op. 4, d. 1659.
merchant class and its influence on town culture was thus commemorated in exhibitions such as *Iz istorii vologodskogo kupechestva* in 1991 and *Vologodskie kuptsy – fabrikanty i zavodchiki XVII – nach. XX vv.* in 1993. The notes accompanying the 1991 exhibition reveal the shift in the values at the centre of museum work. The activities of the merchant class, which had previously been condemned as exploitative and antithetic to the objectives of socialism, were now represented in more conciliatory language. In the same way, magic, myth and legend, which had been omitted from Soviet museums as irrational and morally degenerate topics for public consumption, re-emerged in the post-Soviet period in the form of projects such as *Narodnye verovaniya i obrazy svyazannye s kul’tom koldovstva* conducted by Vologda museum workers in 1994.

An excerpt from a pamphlet explaining to schoolteachers in Vologda the rationale of a textbook published in 1998, in which myths and legends associated with various places in the town were described, reflected this shift in perspective:

Открывая сборник «Рассказов о Вологде» данным преданием (когда-то в глубокой древности, задолго до основания города Вологды, в данном месте существовал центр поклонения языческим богам), мы не пытаемся доказать его несомненную подлинность, это, скорее всего, одна из гипотез. Наша задача — обратить внимание подрастающего поколения на интересные, загадочные места города. Окунуть их в атмосферу сказки, дать почувствовать, что чудеса могли происходить не только где-то за морями, океанами, огромными горами и обширными лесами: но и здесь, в

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216 See the plans for these exhibitions at the Vologda State Museum. VOKM, op. 1, d. 1648; VOKM, op. 1, d. 1728.
217 VOKM, op. 1, d. 1648.
218 See the ethnographical report for this project in 1994. VOKM, op. 1, d. 1792.
Myths and legends were thus no longer understood as inappropriate material for educative purposes, nor, as the museum workers who responded to the children’s letter about buried treasure in 1961 had suggested, a means to acquire information about real historical events. On the contrary, the popularization of these narratives was hoped to strengthen the engagement of young people with the local reality, stemming the drop off in interest in local culture and history that had occurred following the collapse of state-enforced kraevedenie work.

Ambitious projects to regenerate interest local culture were nevertheless limited by the financial crisis of 1994, which had devastating consequences for the country’s state-funded cultural sector. In the Russian regions, the museum sector suffered in particular from the combination of funding cuts, the fall in domestic tourism, and the appearance of competitors in the cultural sphere. The gravity of the situation provoked the director of Vologda State Museum to write to the Ministry of Culture in 1994 appealing for funding to allow the museum to continue its exhibition work and research. The Novgorod State Museum, despite its relatively well-developed touristic infrastructure, found itself in a similar position. The opening of a report detailing the museum’s activities in 1999, in which it was noted that the realisation of the plans of the museum

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220 These were factors identified as contributing to a decline in museum attendance in an assessment of museum work in Pskov in 1994. GAPO, f P-1855, op. 1, d. 1930, l. 5.
221 See the correspondence between the Vologda Cultural Authorities, museums, archives, institutes and libraries for 1994. VOKM, op. 1, d. 1777, l. 18.
would depend on optimal financial conditions, reflected the climate of pessimism that pervaded the local cultural sector at this time.\textsuperscript{222}

In the post-Soviet period, local museums, which had seen visitor numbers rise steadily from the 1960s to the 1980s, began to attain lower attendance figures. In Vologda, for example, visitor numbers, which had reached 144,627 in 1961, 203,194 in 1970, 417,000 in 1984, and 450,00 in 1988, fell in the mid-1990s to 205,313.\textsuperscript{223} In a report on the work of the local museum in Novgorod in 1999, it was also noted that visitor numbers had fallen in recent years.\textsuperscript{224} The fact that museum attendance was no longer a civic responsibility, the fulfilment of which was policed by various community organizations, appeared to be one of the main factors contributing to the decline in museum attendance. In one assessment of developments in the Pskov State Museum in the 1994-1998 period, the overemphasis of particular aspects of local culture (in particular, the Great Patriotic War and the life and times of Alexander Pushkin)\textsuperscript{225} was identified as the main factor deterring people from visiting the exhibitions. In the absence of state initiatives to guarantee visitor attendance, many such boring exhibitions, which

\textsuperscript{222} See the annual report of the Novgorod State Museum for 1999. NGOM, op. 7, d. 1762, l. 7.

\textsuperscript{223} It is possible that visitor numbers were artificially inflated during the late-Soviet period in order to fulfil the ever more exacting demands of the Ministry of Culture to herd the local population into Soviet cultural institutions. Nevertheless, it is likely that visitor numbers did fall significantly in the post-Soviet period, not least as a result of the increase in prices for museum tickets and membership cards. See the annual reports for the Vologda State Museum in 1961, 1975, 1984, 1988, and 1996. VOKM, op. 1, d. 403, l. 14; VOKM, op. 1, d. 678, l. 29; VOKM, op. 1, d. 1225, l. 10; VOKM, op. 1, d. 1457, l. 26; VOKM, op. 1, d. 1844, l. 11; for museum attendance and excursion figures in Novgorod and Pskov see Appendix Two.

\textsuperscript{224} NGOM, op. 7, d. 1762, l. 7.

\textsuperscript{225} See the report on the development of the Pskov State Museum in 1994-1998. GAPO, f R-1855, op. 1, d. 1930, l. 5; the overly zealous, but also academically incompetent, commemoration of Alexander Pushkin at the Pskov State Museum was satirized in Sergei Dovlatov’s novel \textit{Zapovednik: povest’} (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Ermitazh, 1983).
had repeated the same topics and themes *ad nauseam*, were abandoned by the local population.\textsuperscript{226}

One of the first changes to museum displays in the post-Soviet period was the radical reduction in the size, if not total removal of the exhibitions of Soviet history. This was not just a regional phenomenon. As Catherine Merridale has noted in an article on historical revisionism in contemporary Russia, the Soviet Communist Party became an object of ‘mild satire’ in national museums such as the Museum of Contemporary History in Moscow (formerly the Museum of the October Revolution) in the post-1991 era.\textsuperscript{227} In regional museums, exhibitions celebrating the decisions of most recent Party Congress and the local drive towards the construction of Communism were replaced by displays of Russian ethnography and pre-revolutionary history. New exhibitions at the Novgorod State Museum in 1993 thus included *Russkii samovar*, a display of tea-making paraphernalia donated by members of the local community, and *Natsional’ni kalendar*, a collection of objects and information relating to rural festivals in the Novgorod region.\textsuperscript{228} The activities organized by the Vologda State Museum in 1996 revealed an analogous tendency to pass over the Soviet twentieth century in silence and to focus instead on the medieval history of the town. *Iz glubiny vekov, Vologda v ee starine* and *Drevnyaya moya Vologda* thus ranked among he

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\textsuperscript{226}Catherine Merridale has suggested that the fall in museum attendance in the post-Soviet period was also symptomatic of a broader fall off in interest in history in general and the ‘painful Soviet past’ in particular. Catherine Merridale, ’Redesigning History in Contemporary Russia’, *Journal of Contemporary History*, 38, 1 (2003), 13-28 (p. 20).

\textsuperscript{227}Merridale, p. 17.

\textsuperscript{228}See the annual report of the Novgorod State Museum for 1993. NGOM, op. 4, d. 1672, l. 66.
themes for excursions, lectures, and quizzes that excluded the experience of socialism from their horizons of interest.\textsuperscript{229}

The decision to elide the Soviet period from representations of local history was far from universally endorsed. In an entry to the Vologda museum response book in 1996, for example, a pensioner from St Petersburg expressed his disapproval of the way the museum had neglected the memory of local figures from Soviet history:

Хотелось бы пожелать, чтобы в экскурсии были разделы посвященные Советскому периоду в истории края. Мне думается, что Вы потрогились закрыть Октябрьский зал. Годы с 1917 по 1941гг. и 1945г. по наст. время дали и Вологде, и России, и Советскому Союзу много замечательных людей. Потомки не простят. Вам надо заботиться об их памяти.\textsuperscript{230}

As the public reaction to other forms of historical revisionism in the post-Soviet period reveals, this visitor to the museum was not alone in his opinion.\textsuperscript{231} While historical institutions rushed to correct the skewed vision of national history in cultural institutions, members of the public expressed more conservative attitudes towards the relics of recent history, which revealed, if not nostalgia for the Soviet past, then the existence of individual affinities with the material culture of the vanished regime.

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item See the annual report of the Vologda State Museum for 1996. VOKM, op. 1, d. 1844, l. 11-14. \textsuperscript{229}
\item See, for example, the public outcry against the proposal to change the name of Karl Marx Street in Vologda to \textit{Boevaya Slava Street} in 2009. Blog gubernatora Novgorodskoi oblasti Mitina Sergeya Gerasimovicha ([http://mitinsg.livejournal.com/2585.html?page=4\#comments](http://mitinsg.livejournal.com/2585.html?page=4\#comments)) [last accessed 29 December 2010]; I discuss this event and the public reaction to it in Chapter Three. \textsuperscript{231}
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3.6 THE RECOVERY OF CULTURAL AUTHENTICITY

The Soviet understanding of museums as ‘enlightening’ institutions with a formative role to play in shaping the behaviour and mores of the local population remained important in the immediate post-Soviet period. In a programme for the development of the cultural life in Pskov launched in 1992-1993, the failure of museums to organise cultural events for the younger generation was thus directly correlated with the growth in anti-social and criminal behaviour among ‘culturally unrooted’ [svoobodo bol'tayushchiesya] teenagers.232 Young people in particular were perceived to be ‘alienated’ [otchuzhdennye] and ‘detached’ [otorvanny] from national culture and heritage. A gap was perceived to be opening up between the generations that, if nothing was done, would be filled by invasive western trends:

Современное состояние культурного наследия характеризуется разрушением традиционных форм культуры, народных ее пластов. Широкие слои населения, особенно молодое поколение, оторваны от исконо русских традиций. Сфера духовной жизни переживает кризис. Молодежь воспитывается на западных образцах легкой музыки, остаются невостребованными богатства народной культуры. Носители народных традиций уходят из жизни, прерывается культурное взаимодействие между поколениями.233

This observation, recorded by a worker involved with the project for cultural regeneration in Pskov, reveals a continuity of anxiety with the Soviet period concerning the infectious decadence of western culture. What had changed in the

232 GAPO, f R-1855, op. 1, d. 1930, l. 10.
233 See the reports on the Programme for Preservation and Development of Culture and Art in Pskov in 1992-1993. GAPO, f R-1855, op. 1, d. 1892, l. 82.
post-1991 era, however, was the ideal of national culture, which was now 'traditional' rather than 'Soviet' in content.

Given the challenges that were perceived to face national culture, local museums were charged with designing projects to restore and revive ‘authentic’ Russian values and traditions. As in other moments of cultural disorientation, they turned to the rural sphere for patriotic inspiration. However, as a consequence of the policies pursued during the Khrushchev regime and the catastrophic agricultural reforms that followed, the post-Soviet Russian village was far from a rustic idyll populated by birch-bark plaiting lasses and fist-fighting lads.234 In the Pskov region, for example, the rural population had declined rapidly in the second half of the twentieth century, from 1,045,000 in 1950 to 870,000 in 1970, and at the end of the Soviet period the number of people living in villages dropped again to 841,00 in 1990.235 Moreover, following the disappearance of the centralised market for agricultural produce, many villages had been propelled into poverty and inactivity with the concomitant rise of social problems, such as alcoholism, drug-abuse and anti-social behaviour.236 The museum collective thus drew on an ideal of rural life that was informed by cultural stereotypes and the literary imagination to lend colour and content to their programme for cultural regeneration.

In the 1990s and 2000s, stylised village traditions were imported to local towns in the form of museums of folk architecture, clubs and schools offering instruction in village crafts such as clay toy making, drawn-thread work, and withe plaiting. Residents of regional towns were encouraged to take part in village festivals, such as Prazdnik poselka, Osennyaya yamarka and Igrai garmon’, zveni chastushka, to participate in rituals and games that reinforced traditional values and social roles. Individuals were no longer intended to recognize themselves in exhibitions, to reflect on their role in the transformation of society, but rather to admire and derive moral inspiration from an ideal of the pre-modern past. In an unwitting repetition of the strategies of the Soviet 1930s, national folklore and ethnography was transformed into a tool for social engineering and moral instruction. The values of progress, modernity, and social transformation, which had formed the core of Soviet cultural work and the context of socialization for many of those who attended the events, were banished from view as the relics of the era of cultural aberration.

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237 In 2008 and 2009, I visited ethnographic schools in Vologda and Novgorod where children were taught local weaving practices, crafts such as toy and lace making, and songs in the local dialect, among other activities. The schools organised festivals and performances of local culture and traditions where members of the local community could participate in ‘master classes’ of traditional practices for a small fee. These events were extremely popular among the local community and attracted hundreds of visitors from the surrounding region. For a discussion of the role of ethnography and folklore in the educational sphere in Vologda see O. A. Fedotovskaya, ‘Fol’klorno-ethnograficheskoe napravlenie v sisteme obrazovaniya’, in Na puti k vozrozhdenyi: Optry osvoeniya traditsii narodnoi kul’turny Vologodskoi oblasti (Vologda: Otkrovenye, 2001), pp. 21-25.

238 As part of the Prazdnik dereven’ Mysa in Pskov, visitors were invited to participate in the Doiki-materi competition, where women were asked to demonstrate their culinary talents, flower arranging skills, and ability to describe the character and ‘inner worlds’ of their husbands. See the report on museum activities for 1993. GAPO, f R-1855, op. 1, d. 1895, l. 62.

3.7 CONCLUSION

Under Communist rule, national traditions were imagined as the cultural roots or kernel out of which socialism had grown. Soviet citizens were encouraged to admire the exotic practices of the past in museums and to perceive this heritage as the cultural foundation upon which Soviet society had been built. Exhibitions of local folk culture, history, and developments in the Soviet period were intended to stimulate collective self-consciousness and to impress upon people the relevance of their own contribution to the development of socialism. The objects displayed in exhibitions of local life – from traditional lace work to factory machinery – were thus worked into a teleological narrative of history, as material traces of a process of societal transformation that pivoted on the 1917 revolution.

In the post-Soviet period, this logic was reversed in an effort to replace the skewed representation of history in the Soviet period with legitimate expressions of local culture. The modes of representation and the logical thrust of Soviet cultural work were inverted to establish a rupture with the ideologized past and to write the process of transition into institutional memory. The ‘correction’ of local memory corresponded with the marginalization of the Soviet experience and the foregrounding of the pre-revolutionary period, and in particular peasant life. Yet, by expelling the authoritative discourses of the past from their institutional contexts in an attempt to de-Sovietize the nation, cultural elites provoked reactions contrary to their intentions. Rather than reinforcing traditional values and ideals among members of the local community, the exclusion of the Soviet experience from the public realm underlined the
relevance of its memory among individuals who had been born into and socialized as part of a vanished way of life.
CHAPTER THREE
CHAPTER THREE

CONSERVING LOCALNESS: ARCHITECTURAL VISIONS OF LOCAL IDENTITY
AND THE PRESERVATION OF CULTURAL HERITAGE

4.1 A BRIEF HISTORY OF HERITAGE PRESERVATION IN THE SOVIET UNION

In the Khrushchev and Brezhnev eras, the heritage of the pre-revolutionary period became a focus of state preservationism in an effort to strengthen Soviet patriotism and foster new forms of social solidarity. This was not the first time that the Soviet state had endorsed the conservation of architectural heritage for community-building purposes. From the collapse of the tsarist regime in February 1917, the country’s architectural monuments had served as symbols of national unity and focuses of patriotic attention. Despite the iconoclastic fervour and the burning and vandalism of noble mansions and estates that accompanied the 1917 revolution, the tendency in the years that followed was to favour the preservation of cultural heritage over iconoclasm. In an article

Richard Stites discusses the tension between iconoclastic and preservationist impulses during the Russian Revolution in his chapter ‘Iconoclastic Currents in the Russian Revolution:’
published in the newspaper *Rech’* on the 8 March 1917, Maksim Gorkii, as the leader of the self-appointed Commission for Artistic Affairs, had spoken stirringly about the preservation of tsarist heritage relating it to the new conditions of social equality in the Soviet state: Граждане! Старые хозяева ушли. После них осталось огромное наследство. Теперь, оно принадлежит всему народу. Берегите это наследство, берегите дворцы. Они станут дворцами всенародного искусства. 241 From the end of the 1920s, however, these words declined into pious sentiments, as the exigencies of forced industrialisation added to the ideological drive to create the ‘model socialist town’ generated mass demolition of heritage objects, particularly churches. 242

During the Second World War, cultural heritage was infused with new patriotic significance. Following the Nazi invasion of the USSR in June 1941, the Commission for the Protection and Restoration of Architectural Monuments took measures to popularize the destruction of Russia’s national heritage under the jackboot of the German enemy.


242 Among the many buildings destroyed at this time were the Kazanskiy sobor in Moscow (demolished in 1936 and replaced by a public toilet), the Blagoveshchenskaya tserkov’ in Leningrad (demolished to make way for a tramway line in 1929), the Aleksandro-Nevskii sobor in Rostov-na-Donu (demolished in 1930 and replaced by ploshchad’ Sovetov), and the church, bell-tower, and parts of the walls of the Mikhailo-Arkhangelskii monastery in Arkhangel’sk (demolished in 1930 and replaced by residential housing).
Exhibitions of ruined monuments were displayed in train stations, hospitals, and other public spaces, often accompanied by lectures on heritage-related themes. A gutted medieval church or bombed-out Kremlin became the symbol for the violation of Soviet sovereignty and the barbarity of Nazi occupation. Following the liberation of the occupied territories, reconstructing national heritage was rendered synonymous with the reassertion of national pride. This was illustrated by the tendency to claim, in Soviet tourist guides and local histories, that certain monuments had been reconstructed immediately after the liberation of the occupied territories, before the local community had even been provided with housing or electricity. The association of architectural heritage with the perceived attempts of the Nazi occupiers to annihilate the material traces of Russian culture allowed the preservationist cause to become an integral part of the mythologization of the Great Patriotic War in the post-1945 period.


244 Consider, for example, the following account of how the Pamyatnik ‘Tysyacheletie Rossii’ in Novgorod was rebuilt following the liberation of the city in November 1944: ‘В холодный осенний вечер 5 ноября 1944 г. трудящиеся города собирались в кремль на открытие памятника. Над колоннами алеи кумачовые полотнища с призывами: «Товарищи новгородцы! Из пепла и руин возродим родной город! Сделаем его лучше и краше прежнего! Все силы на восстановление Новгорода!». Быстро стемнело. Электричества в городе еще не было. Памятник пришлось осветить прожекторами автомобильных фар’. A. G. Fedoruk, ‘Sovremennyi Novgorod i perspektivy ego razvitiya’, in M. N. Tikhonirova, Novgorod k 1100-letiyu goroda: Sbornik statei (Moscow: Nauka, 1964), p. 8; Karl Qualls notes a similar tendency in Soviet guidebooks to Sevastopol where the Pamyatnik zatoplennym korablyam was presented as a symbol of local and national pride. See Karl Qualls, ’”Where Each Stone is History”: Travel Guides in Sevastopol after World War II’, in Turizm: The Russian and East European Tourist Under Capitalism and Socialism, ed. by Anne E. Gorsuch and Diane P. Koenker (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2006), pp.163-185 (p. 173-174).

245 In his unpublished dissertation, Steven Maddox argues that the emphasis placed on the preservation and restoration of architectural monuments in the post-war period was part of the Soviet state’s mission to redefine its image based on the myth of war and the country’s tsarist heritage. See Steven Maddox, ‘Healing the Wounds: Commemorations, Myths, and the
In this chapter, I examine the developments in state-sponsored heritage preservation in the post-1961 period, when the emphasis was once more placed on the architectural relics of the national past in an effort to kindle patriotic affiliation with the Soviet state and engagement with its transformative agenda. The experiences of Novgorod, Pskov, and Vologda provide insight into the tensions and contradictions at the centre of the process of preserving an ideal of local and national culture on the landscape at a time of rapid urban modernization. As I argue in the discussion that follows, the focus of architectural memory shifted in the post-1961 period, expanding from the nation’s medieval ‘Golden Age’ in the late-Khrushchev and early-Brezhnev eras to encompass the architectural culture of the nation’s ‘capitalist’ past in the late-1970s. As I contend in the final part of the chapter, this inconsistency in the preservationist logic, combined with a discernable rift between the rhetoric and reality of heritage conservation, engendered a culture of cynicism towards the declared aims of the state with regard to the relics of the nation’s history, transforming architectural monuments into symbols of political alienation rather than focuses of local pride.


4.2 THE MAKING OF THE ‘OLD NEW RUSSIAN TOWN’

Following the Twenty-Second Congress of the KPSS, urban modernization in the Russian regions accelerated. Local populations witnessed the construction of huge factories providing work for entire local communities, sprawling residential areas on the edges of towns, and a comprehensive network of cultural institutions intended to educate and ‘enlighten’ the local population.\(^{247}\) The changes to urban life in Khrushchev's Russia were so dramatic that in newspaper articles, tourist guides, and Soviet history books it became commonplace to state that the towns had changed ‘beyond recognition’.\(^{248}\) These changes were understood not only in material but also in abstract terms. In a debate about the new coat of arms of Novgorod published in *Novgorodskaya pravda* in 1967, for example, a reader reasoned that the ‘provincial’ motifs of the old crest – two bears crossing staffs – had become inappropriate given the sleek results of the town’s recent modernization: ‘На наш взгляд, не следует помещать медведей в самом центре герба крупным планом. Что именно символизируют они – глухую провинцию, так называемый «медвежий угол»? Не лучше ли поместить их где-либо в стороне?’\(^{249}\) The Soviet regime had ushered in a new era of urbanity and sophistication, it was implied, rendering the cultural heritage of the past irrelevant and out of place.

\(^{247}\) For an indication of the levels of construction work in Moscow at this time see Timothy J. Colton, *Moscow: Governing the Socialist Metropolis* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1995), pp. 371-373; Stephen Bitner provides an separate account of social change, also from the perspective of the national capital, in *The Many Lives of Khrushchev’s Thaw: Experience and Memory in Moscow’s Arbat* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2008).

\(^{248}\) For a typical example of this sort of observation (‘сквер стало не узнать!’), see G. Naryshkin, ‘Новы скивер в Новгороде’, *Novgorodskaya pravda*, 21 May 1960, p. 3.

The editors of the newspaper, however, advocated a less radical position on the issue. Selecting as the winning entry to the competition a design that incorporated both the traditional elements of the local crest, the Novgorod bears, and the emblem of Soviet modernity, the light bulb, they endorsed an idea of socialist contemporaneity in which the heritage of the past and the innovations of the present were combined in organic harmony. The suggestion that the cultural inheritance of the past be jettisoned, they argued, might be taken as evidence enough of the provincialism this reader so deplored. After all, one could not imagine the people of Moscow advocating the replacement of the horseman on their coat of arms with a trolleybus or a metro-car! Horseman and bears, according to this interpretation, were historical symbols and ought not to be dismissed so easily. Indeed, their preservation was essential if local diversity so treasured by the Soviet state were to be maintained.\(^{250}\)

\(^{250}\) Ibid.
The discussion of the new coat of arms was emblematic of a more general debate on the role of cultural heritage in the Soviet era. Like the editors of the provincial daily, the architects of Soviet modernization rejected the idea of cultural iconoclasm, advocating instead the harmonious combination of old and new on the national landscape. In the context of medieval Russian towns such as Novgorod, urban modernization was presented as a process of ‘rejuvenation’ and ‘reinvigoration’ leading to the creation of ‘the old new Russian town’. A local poetaster echoed this idea in a patriotic verse published in Novgorodskaya pravda in 1964:

‘Протянулись бульвары/ С шелестящей листвой./ Ты и новый и старый/ И совсем молодой’.  

A photograph album to Vologda published in 1964 opened with a similarly ebullient ditty in which the medieval town was imagined to have emerged re-invigorated from its decrepit former

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251 Ibid.  
aspect: 'Тебя судьба не обделила славой/ Российский город, Вологда мою/ Помоложеев, встань ты величаво/ Своих богатств и силы не тая'.

Yet, if the notion of the ‘old, new Russian town’ was easily assimilated into the vocabulary of Soviet propaganda, the combination of medieval heritage and Soviet architecture on the urban landscape was in reality more problematic. According to the architect I. I. Kushnir, building regulations in Novgorod were regularly ignored and preservation zones routinely violated as construction work intensified throughout the 1950s and 1960s. And it was not only state planners who were hostile to preservationist regulations. Certain members of the public were equally contemptuous of the restrictions heritage legislation put on local urban development. In one letter published in Novgorodskaya pravda in 1967, for example, a reader complained about the obstacles heritage legislation posed to plans to build a multi-storey hotel on the bank of the river Volkhov near to the Novgorod Kremlin:

Пусть себе стоит гостиница – она украсит набережную, прикроет один из неказистых районов. Мы и берег Волхова на большом расстоянии преобразим. Надо ли понизить этажность гостиницы? Едва ли: иначе выйдет не нормальное здание, а какой-то недоносок [...] Все новгородцы, с которыми я говорил, так считают. А уж мы-то свой город знаем хорошо и любим больше, чем те, кто не хочет признавать в Новгороде города живущего и

254 Kushnir complained in particular that the visual integrity of monuments such as the Tserkov’ Dvenad’tsati Apostolov, Tserkov’ Dmitriya Solunskii, and Tserkov’ Klimenta had been compromised as a result of the construction of blocks of flats within the preservation zones around these buildings. See I. I. Kushnir, Novgorod (Leningrad: Stroiizdat, 1972), pp. 89-118.
As the letter suggests, academics and cultural figures, such as the medieval historian and cultural critic Dmitrii Likhachev, had rallied in reaction to the disappearing panoramas and rapidly changing cultural landscapes of towns such as Novgorod in the 1960s. In an article published in *Literaturnaya gazeta* in 1965, Likhachev had singled out Novgorod and Pskov as key instances of bad practice. Through their irresponsible treatment of the question of ‘etazhnost’, he maintained, Soviet planners had threatened the visual integrity of historical ensembles and the sense of space and aesthetic harmony of the towns. In another article on Novgorod’s cultural heritage from the same year, Likhachev singled out the standardisation of the provincial landscape as one of the most distressing consequences of Soviet urban development. Playing on the propagandist idea of the ‘old new Russian town’ Likhachev asked of Soviet planners and architects: ‘Думаете ли вы, что все города нашей Родины должны быть похожими друг на друга? Думаете ли вы, что древним городам нужно только «второе рождение» и «вторая молодость?»’.

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Fig. 12.
A modern car travels down a road on which a medieval monument, a nineteenth-century wooden house, and a Soviet Stalinist stand harmoniously side-by-side.258

The sense that the individual character of Russian provincial towns was being lost as a result of Soviet modernization pervaded the language of preservationism. The anthropomorphization of landscape, which Likhachev had identified as a trait in the writing of romantic historians at the beginning of the twentieth century,259 was a discernable trope in the texts of those writing about the fate of national heritage. Critics began to employ more liberally terms such as ‘character’ [obraz], ‘countenance’ [litso], and even ‘soul’ [dusha] with reference to individual architectural facades, ensembles, and natural landscapes.260 Architectural monuments, on the other hand, could be found to be cast in the humanised role of living

witnesses of the past, educators of the future, and messengers bearing the knowledge of the past and present to future generations.\textsuperscript{261}

The creation of an official organisation for the protection of national heritage in 1965 was a consequence of increasingly outspoken criticism of the treatment of historical buildings, which had gained resonance within Soviet society by the middle of the 1960s. In May 1964, the Rodina club was founded by the restorer Petr Baranovskii in Moscow for the promotion and study of historic monuments and the propaganda of their cause in cultural institutions.\textsuperscript{262} According to Nikolai Mitrokhin, the movement began to receive support from the regime only at the end of the Khrushchev administration, when the leader of the Party had already lost control over the political apparatus, and following Khrushchev’s removal from power in 1965.\textsuperscript{263} In 1964, an article appeared in the Komsomol’skaya pravda positively evaluating the group’s activities,\textsuperscript{264} and in May 1965, a letter signed by Sergei Konnenkov, Pavel Korin, and Leonid Leonov was published in Molodaya gvardiya condemning the treatment of architectural


\textsuperscript{262}Colton, pp. 406-407.


\textsuperscript{264}Quoted in Mitrokhin, p. 309.
heritage in Russia, and particularly in Moscow.\footnote{265} If cultural figures such as Dmitry Likhachev had been calling for the creation of a national society for the preservation of monuments since 1961,\footnote{266} by the mid-1960s, these individual voices had turned into a chorus of national celebrities that was more difficult for the state to ignore.

As a consequence of the public criticism of state preservationism, the \textit{Vserossiiskoe obshchestvo okhrany pamyatnikov istorii i kul’tury} (VOOPIiK) was formed by Decision of the RSFSR Council of Ministers in 1965. The society, as Yitzhak Brudny has pointed out, was a mainstream Soviet organisation, intended to mollify nationalist critics while affirming the authority of the Communist party over the question of heritage preservation.\footnote{267} The organisational committee of the central branch of VOOPIiK in Moscow was made up of state officials from various ministries and departments of local government and excluded many of the national patriots who had campaigned for the foundation of the society.\footnote{268} Rather than a simple mouthpiece for nationalist sentiment, the society promoted a vision of historical preservationism that was entirely congruent with a strong sense of Soviet patriotism and a love for the Motherland. Activists campaigned for the preservation of old Russian architecture, but also for

\footnote{266}In an article published in \textit{Istoriya SSSR} in 1961, Dmitry Likhachev called for greater ‘democracy’ in the resolution of questions related to the preservation of monuments. He also identified the societies for the preservation of cultural monuments in Georgia and Latvia as models for a similar organisation in the RSFSR. See D. S. Likhachev, ‘Pamyatniki kul’tury – vsenarodnoe dostoyanie’, \textit{Istoriya SSSR}, 3 (May-June 1961), 3-12.
\footnote{268}Ibid.
Lenin sites, World War II monuments, Soviet buildings, folklore, memorials to nineteenth-century and Soviet writers and more.\footnote{For a record of the main focus of the activities and membership of VOOPiK see the annual reports on the society in the Ezhегодник Bol'shoi sovetskoi entsiklopedii, ed. by B. A. Vvedenki (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe nauchnoe izdatel' stvo, 1969-1990).}

The branches of the society established in the regions in the years that followed imitated the structure and composition of the Moscow organisation. In Novgorod, for example, the organisational committee of the local VOOPiK founded in September 1965 was dominated by members of the local political administration, including the leaders of the regional ispolkom and cultural authorities, who acted as the chairmen of the local society.\footnote{For the organisation of the conference, 'Tysyacheletnie korni russkoi kul'tury' in 1968 see GANO, f. R-4563, op. 1-1, d. 11, l. 4; for the organisation of an exhibition of photographs of architectural monuments in 1968 see GANO, f. R-4563, op. 1-1, d. 13, l. 3; for a list of the lectures and films from 1968 see GANO, f. R-4563, op. 1-1, d. 19; for a discussion of plans for attracting more individuals from the regions to join the society see GANO, f. R-4563, op. 1-1, d. 14.} The focus of its activity was the organisation of events propagandizing the cause of national cultural heritage, rather than the restoration or preservation of architectural monuments as such. The society organised conferences, lectures, and photograph exhibitions, and occupied itself with the publication of materials related to commemorative places and monuments and the extension of its support base through the promotion of the work of local 'primary organizations'.\footnote{Yet, as a consequence of the limited resources at the organization’s disposal and the bureaucratized nature of its activities, the condition of many objects of local heritage continued to deteriorate throughout the Brezhnev period, provoking cultural figures such as Dmitry Likhachev to pen scathing}
criticisms of the regional authorities and town planners on the pages of national journals.272

Fig. 14.
Exhibition of heritage-themed artwork at the Trade Union House of Culture in Pskov273

The official appropriation of preservationist arguments was intended to strengthen the connection between the Soviet people and the political regime and to reinforce the ideals and values of Soviet socialism in contemporary society. Heritage was invested with ideological significance; its preservation was justified not merely on the basis of its artistic and cultural value, but also with reference to its capacity to contribute to the construction of state communism. In the medieval towns of the North West this process had a number of specific dimensions. On the one hand, the Old Russian churches that comprised the architectural centrepieces of the local

landscape also constituted material evidence of the cultish, benighted practices of the past that the regime had made it its mission to annihilate. These buildings thus had to be reconceived as ‘works of art’ in order for their preservation in the socialist context to be justified, a task which involved the creative reinterpretation of their past functions and significance. On the other hand, the architectural inheritance of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries fell into a legislative grey area of “selected” [отдел’ным] monuments of civic and cultic architecture’ according to the post-war legislation, creating uncertainty over its preservation that needed to be resolved. In the late-Soviet period, the evaluation of late-Imperial architectural heritage shifted according to developments in state ideology, evolving in the minds of Soviet officials from an ‘imitative’ style of little artistic merit to a prima inter pares among Russian architectural styles.274

4.3 FROM ‘REFUGE OF DELUSION’ TO WORK OF ART

The history of Novgorod and Pskov was inextricably bound to the many medieval churches that functioned not only as spiritual centres, but also as public meeting places, debating houses, mini-fortresses and treasuries in the medieval period. Over the centuries, myths and legends had developed around local monasteries, churches, and their sacred inhabitants,

274 For a discussion of the shifting focus of architectural preservation in the 1970s and 1980s see A. S. Shchenkov, ‘Organizatsiya i upravlenie v oblasti okhrany i restavratsii pamyatnikov arkhitектury’, in Shchenkov, pp. 590-593 (p. 591); Alexei Elfimov, by contrast, argues that the rehabilitation of the cultural heritage of the late-Imperial period, including its neoclassical architecture, occurred during the political and cultural restructuring of the perestroika period. See Alexei Elfimov, Russian Intellectual Culture in Transition: The Future to the Past (New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 2003), p. 57.
immortalizing the religious architecture in folk narrative and establishing its place in the oral tradition.275 In the Soviet period, however, church architecture was inevitably associated with the ‘noxious religious cult’ that the regime, with renewed impetus during the Khrushchev period, made it its mission to annihilate. In 1926, Anatolii Lunacharskii had written the following of the role of religious architecture in Soviet society: ‘Но ведь церковь есть храм богу ложному, ибо всякий бог давно уже в глазах победоносных передовых сил нашей страны – тяжела, гнетущая людей ядовитая ложь. Можем ли мы, в таком случае, интересоваться разными продуктами этой великой социальной лжи?’276 In the medieval towns of Khrushchev’s Russia, where the products of the ‘great social lie’ were also the symbolic centerpieces of the local landscape, this question had lost none of its relevance.

The sense that churches should simply be demolished as ‘refuges of delusion’ [ochagi durmanstva], the standpoint adopted during the Cultural Revolution of 1928-1932, had vanished by the Khrushchev period. The near total devastation of the towns of the liberated North West as a result of wartime fighting made the prospect of further ‘voluntary’ demolition both undesirable and unfeasible. The heritage legislation of the mid-1940s277 had put ‘Old Russian architecture’ at the centre of the

275 See, for example, ‘Tserkovnye predaniya’ in G. M. Kovalenko and V. G. Smirnov, Legendy i zagadki zemli Novgorodskoi (Moscow: Veche, 2007), pp. 35-57.
277 See the Decree of 14 October 1948 ‘On the Means to Improve the Preservation of Cultural Monuments’ and the Decree of 3 March 1949 Short Instructions ‘On the Procedure for Recording, Registering, and the Contents of Artistic Monuments’. See Okhrana pamyatnikov istorii i kul’tury:
preservation drive, with the consequence that more medieval churches were reconstructed in Novgorod between 1950 and 1960 than were demolished in the name of enlightened atheism. In Novgorod, for example, the Tserkov’ Dmitriya Solunskii, Ioanna na Opokhakh, Nikoly na Lipne, Spasa na Nereditse, Petra i Pavla na Slavne, Vlasiya, Blagoveshcheniya i Mikhaila na Torgu, and Klimenta were rebuilt from ruins in the decade and a half that followed the end of the Second World War. The reconstruction of these buildings was rationalised as an act of ‘patriotic restoration’ and a means of providing material evidence of the resilience and continued relevance of Russian culture in the post-war world.

An emblematic project of this kind was the restoration of the sixteenth-century Tserkov’ Preobrazheniya na Kovaleve in Novgorod. During the Second World War, the church, which had been located on the front line of the fighting between the Nazi forces and the Red Army, had been reduced to rubble. According to the architects on the project, the reconstruction of the church was essential not only to restore its function as a gateway, or ‘Propylaeum’ to the city, but also as a symbol of the triumph of Russian culture over foreign aggression. In the notes to the restoration project, the political significance of the church’s reconstruction was underlined: ‘Сам факт реставрации ковалевской церкви будет иметь немаловажное политическое значение. Этот акт будет противостоять варварской

_Sbornik dokumentov_, (Moscow: Sovetskaya Rossiya, 1973), pp. 104-110; for a timeline of the main legislative developments in heritage preservation see Appendix Three.

_278 Arkhitekturnoe nasledie Velikogo Novgoroda i Novgorodskoi oblasti_, ed. by M. I. Mil’chik (St Petersburg: Liki Rossi, 2008), p. 27.
The revival of the war against religion in the Khrushchev period nevertheless instigated an era of greater suspicion towards the restoration and preservation of religious architecture. The reconstruction of war-damaged medieval churches, which had absorbed a large part of state funding for restoration in the 1950s, ceased at the beginning of the 1960s. Local restoration workshops turned their attention away from religious architecture of the medieval period to concentrate their efforts on the reconstruction of objects of civic architecture and, in particular, local

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279 See the explanatory note on the project for the reconstruction of the ‘Tserkov’ Preobrazheniya na Kovalev in Novgorod from 1969. GANO, f. 4137, op. 4-25, d. 124, l. 21.
280 From the album of photographs attached to the project for the reconstruction of the church from 1969. GANO, f. R-4137, op.15, d. 125, l. 19ob.
281 GANO, f. R-4137, op.15, d. 125, l. 30b.
kremlins and their towers. Medieval churches nevertheless retained their protected status on state lists of inviolable monuments in accordance with the 1940s legislation. While local lists of architectural monuments were shortened at the beginning of the 1960s, the buildings that were excluded from state inventories tended to be objects of civic architecture from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries rather than the onion domed churches of the medieval period.

In Khrushchev’s Russia, the answer to Lunacharskii’s question of whether it was permissible to take an interest in the material culture of religion was thus yes, so long as the objects in question were reconceptualised as ‘works of art’ or ‘architectural monuments’. This was the message communicated in an article by M. Knyazeva which appeared in the Novgorodskaya pravda in 1961: ‘Памятники архитектуры древнего города, которые ранее неразрывно были связаны с приторным запахом ладана и надоедливым колокольным звоном, теперь осмысливаются совсем по-другому. Освобожденные от тлетворного содержания религиозного культа, они воспринимаются сейчас как замечательные творения русского зодчества’. The semantic metamorphosis of churches from sacred spaces to works of art was underlined in the materials produced about local churches in tourist

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283 In 1962, three quarters of the funding available for restoration work in Pskov were reserved for the restoration of the Pskov Kremlin and Mstislavskaya bashnya, while less than one quarter of all resources was dedicated to the restoration of local churches. GAPO, f. R-1855, op. 1, d. 157, l. 2.

284 For a list of the objects that were removed from the itinerary of federally protected state monuments in Novgorod in 1966 see GANO, f. R-3994, op. 5-66, d. 317, l. 31.

guides, pamphlets, museum exhibitions, and souvenir brochures. In these
texts the ecclesiastical function of religious architecture was frequently
passed over in silence, while the artistic and architectural merit of the
buildings was described in meticulous and, at times, tedious detail.\textsuperscript{286}

Given that only a handful of churches continued to function in their
original capacity during the Soviet period, the most relevant question for
the Soviet authorities concerned the function to which these de-sacralised
spaces ought to be put in contemporary society. How were medieval
churches to be made to contribute to the realisation of the ideals of Soviet
socialism? How could monuments of church architecture strengthen the
local community’s identification with the values of the atheist regime? In a
conference held in Novgorod in 1968, I. V. Petryanyov formulated a
preliminary answer to this question. As the academician and laureate of
the Lenin Prize pointed out, monuments had to be made to ‘work’ for
Soviet society rather than allowed to exist as petrified relics of the pre-
revolutionary past:

Понятие «охрана» - понятие пассивное. Ведь то, что надо
охранять, следует запереть на замок и спрятать
подальше ключ. Я не убежден, что это верно. Не только
охранять надо памятники нашей истории, нашей

\textsuperscript{286} For examples of this genre of tourist literature see T. M. Konstantinova, \textit{Novgorod (Posobie
dlya ekskursantov i turistov)} (Novgorod: Novgorodskaya pravda, 1958); I. Larionov, \textit{Pamyatniki
arkhitektury XVII veka} (Pskov: Pskovskaya pravda, 1960); and M. V. Fekhner, \textit{Arkhiitektura
gorodov SSSR: Vologda} (M.: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel’stvo literature po stroitel’stvu, arkhitekture
i stroitel’nym materialam, 1958); for a related discussion of late-Soviet ‘factography’, which the
author of the article understands as the obsession with historical minutiae as a means of
negotiating cultural change see Denis Kozlov, ‘The Historical Turn in Late Soviet Culture:
Retrospectivism, Factography, Doubt, 1953-91’, \textit{Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian
History}, 2, 3 (2001), pp. 577-600.
культуры, а нужно все наши неисчислимые художественные, исторические, культурные сокровища, и самые древние, и более поздние, и те, что создаются в наши дни, заставить работать на наше советское время, на наше дело.

One of the ways in which architectural monuments could be made to contribute to the goal of socialist construction was through their museicization. By 1964, 31 of a total of 146 monuments had been converted into museums in the Novgorod region, while three monuments were housing exhibitions and one church was functioning as a planetarium in Pskov. The museicization of medieval churches was seen as a means of undermining the spiritual associations of the buildings and providing them with new relevance through the establishment of what Lotman and Uspenskii have called ‘legitimate forms of anti-behaviour’. Members of local communities were thus encouraged to visit local churches in a ceremonious fashion and to contemplate local icons in a reverent way, but, by doing so, to provide these former spiritual spaces with new ideological meaning. The reconceptualization of the Sofiskii sobor in Novgorod as a ‘pantheon’ of famous people in the town’s history, or the Troitskii sobor in Pskov as a museum of atheism, was consequently understood as a means

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287 ‘Chustvo Rodiny’
288 See the correspondence between the Novgorod oblispolkom and the Restoration Workshop for 1962 and the correspondence between the Pskov Cultural Authorities and the Ministry of Culture for 1964. GANO, f. R-3994, op. 5-66, d. 317, l. 163; GAPO, op.1, d. 226, l. 144-152.
of challenging the status of these buildings as local centres of Orthodox faith while maintaining their prominent social function in town life.\textsuperscript{290}

Over the course of the decade, the understanding of the most appropriate content of such museums shifted. By the late-Brezhnev period, it had become commonplace to turn churches into ‘exhibits’ in their own right rather than convert them into museums of atheism or local history. In a discussion of the exhibition to be held in the Tserkov’ Spasa Priobrozheniya na Il’ine in Novgorod in 1970, for example, it was agreed that the building should not be overloaded with too many exhibits which would detract from the impact of the frescoes decorating the church’s interior.\textsuperscript{291} Several years earlier, the director of the Pskov museum had made a similar point about the need to preserve consistency between monuments and their thematic content. While medieval churches should be made to work for the socialist present, it was argued, this should be through the exhibition of themes in keeping with their artistic and architectural merit – displays of photographs of restored monuments or collections of icons – and not through the exhibition of socialist realia.\textsuperscript{292}

Another way in which medieval churches could be made to participate in the construction of communism was through their reconstruction as civic institutions that could contribute to the enlightenment and material

\textsuperscript{290} See the annual report of the Novgorod State Museum for 1966 and the correspondence between the Pskov Cultural Authorities and the Ministry of Culture for 1964. NGOM, op. 1, d. 410, l. 43; GAPO, f. R-1855, op. 1, d. 226, l. 122.
\textsuperscript{291} See the annual report of the Novgorod State Museum for 1970. NGOM, op. 2, d. 634, l. 15-16.
\textsuperscript{292} See the notes on party meetings in Pskov for 1965. GANIP, f. 1060, op. 1, d. 19, l. 11.
welfare of the local community. A number of local churches consequently acquired new identities at this time. In the introduction to an album of photographs of Novgorod published in 1967, it was stated that the church of the Derevyanitskii monastyr’ had been converted into a canteen for a fibre-glass factory, the Tserkov’ Pokrova in the Novgorod Kremlin had been recreated as the ‘Detinets’ restaurant for tourists, and the Tserkov’ Mikhaila na Mikhailovskoi ulisce had been reconstructed as a dormitory for the local school of music.293 Churches had also been adapted for civic functions during the Stalin period when they had been used as dye works, machinery workshops, or warehouses for fruit and vegetables.294 During the Brezhnev era, however, such functions were no longer considered appropriate for buildings that were now understood as ‘architectural monuments’. Statements in tourist guides and photograph albums about the cultural functions for which local churches had been adapted were thus expressions of pride in the ‘enlightened’ attitude of the state towards national heritage.

If the political authorities advocated the adaptation of medieval churches for socially constructive purposes, the mishandling of monuments by their proprietors was vigorously condemned. According to the legislation on the preservation of heritage adopted in the mid-1940s, lessees of architectural monuments were obliged to guarantee the appropriate treatment and

upkeep of the monuments they rented.\textsuperscript{295} The professionalization of the preservationist movement in the Khrushchev period helped to ensure that these regulations were more consistently implemented. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, local officials issued warnings to leaseholders of monuments who were perceived to have violated their contractual agreements. The head of the Vologda cultural authorities thus criticized the use of Sinozerskii pustynnik as an aviary in 1960, and the conversion of Tserkov’ Dmitriya Solunskogo, a building which contained valuable eighteenth-century frescoes, into a warehouse for fruit and vegetables was condemned in a report by the Novgorod VOOPliK in 1979.\textsuperscript{296} The reckless disregard for the preservation of medieval churches was also satirized in local newspapers. In one cartoon published in Novgorodskaya pravda in 1966, boorish leaseholders were depicted thoughtlessly causing damage to medieval churches and adapting medieval monuments for entirely inappropriate functions.

\textsuperscript{295} Okhrana pamiatnikov istorii I kul’tury, Sbornik dokumentov, p. 104-110.

\textsuperscript{296} See the correspondence between the Vologda State Museum, the Ministry of Culture, and other regional cultural institutions on the subject of the preservation of architectural monuments from 1960 and the report on the activities of the Novgorod VOOPliK for 1979. GAVO, f. 4795, op. 1, d. 231, l. 38; GANO, f. Р-4563, op. 1-4, d. 40, l. 14.
Throughout the Brezhnev period, medieval churches remained the central symbols of the architectural landscape of the Russian North West. They provided the images for the front covers of tourist guides, the theme for souvenir postcards and miniatures, the focuses of tourist excursions, and the inspiration for the patriotic poetry and song. Through its reconceptualization as ‘architectural monuments’, or objects of national heritage, church architecture could be reconceptualised as the cultural foundation of the atheistic Soviet state. The buildings’ associations of spirituality and religious ascetism blended easily into a discourse on the national character, which emphasized the modesty, simplicity and the industriousness of the Russian people.

297 I. Il’in and P. Ivanov, ‘Arendatory – ‘Novatory’, Novgorodskaya pravda, 19 October 1966, p. 3. 298 For a discussion of tourist souvenirs and publications featuring religious monuments such as the Mirozhskii monastery and the Snetogorski monastery in Pskov see GAPO, f. R-1855, op. 1, d. 226, l. 118; for verses featuring church architecture see, for example, the song performed by the local choir of lace makers at a folk festival in Vologda in 1967: «...А ты идешь по Вологде/ Смотри купола,/ Веселый добрый молодец,/ Овчинная пола!». GAVO, f. 134, op. 4, d. 131, l. 110.
This reasoning was communicated to members of the local community through forms of mandatory and voluntary cultural work. According to a report compiled by the Vologda VOOPliK, 90 talks, 114 excursions, 21 films, and 92 thematic evenings were dedicated to the theme of architectural preservationism in 1970. Members of the local community were not only expected to listen passively to lectures about the need to preserve old buildings, they were also encouraged to get directly involved in the conservation of local heritage. Groups of school children thus participated in trips to clear rubbish away from monuments, Saturday outings [subbotniki] were organized to ensure that the historic buildings were equipped with the necessary facilities, and professional collectives became patrons of particular local buildings and memorials. By the late-Brezhnev period, the preservation of heritage had evolved into one of the most important forms of voluntary activity in the Soviet Union endorsed and promoted by individuals of all ages, professions, and backgrounds.

The promotion of the preservation of heritage in state cultural institutions succeeded in bolstering popular support for VOOPliK and its goals. Both individual membership and the number of ‘primary organizations’ associated with the society increased steadily throughout the 1960s and

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299 See the statistical report for the Regional and Town Departments for the Preservation of Historical and Cultural Monuments in Vologda from 1970. GAVO, f. 843, op. 1, d. 35, l. 1ob.
300 NGOM, op. 1, d. 410, l. 28.
301 See the annual report of the Novgorod VOOPliK for 1980. GANO, f. R-4563, op. 1-5, d. 83, l. 7.
1970s. While it is difficult to determine how successful the society was in strengthening Soviet patriotism through the identification of the political regime with the principles of heritage conservation, a more tangible result of this process was the creation of a specialist vocabulary in which members of Soviet society could express their concerns about the transformative impact of urban modernization. The language of official preservationism allowed Soviet citizens to criticise the changes taking place around them with less risk of appearing reactionary or subversive. For example, in a letter published in *Novgorodskaya pravda* in 1968, a reader upbraided the local authorities for their heavy-handed treatment of a village church:

Красивая была церковь в селе Горицы Горицкого сельсовета Вологодского района. Теперь ее не узнать. Кто-то ретивый велел свернуть купол. И чего добились? Изуродовали неповторимое здание, самое красивое на селе. Насчет влияния этого трудоёмкого действия на численность верующих сомневался: для борьбы с религией есть другие, более разумные и действенные пути. В Московском Кремле десятки церковных куполов – а никто их не опасается. А вот в Горицах одного испугались...

It is difficult to imagine such outspoken public criticism of the regime’s anti-religious activities, however aesthetically wrong-headed, being permitted during the iconoclastic fervour of the Cultural Revolution or even a decade earlier during Khrushchev’s battle against religious cultism.

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302 See, for example, the figures for individual members and primary organisations of VOOPliK in Vologda in 1970 and 1973. GAVO, f. 134, op. 4, d. 244, l. 6; GAVO, f. 843, op. 1, d. 35, l. 4. For national statistics on the society’s membership see the annual reports on VOOPliK in Vvedenkii, 1969-1990.

Yet, within the pro-preservationism context of Brezhnev's Soviet Union, members of the local community were empowered to express their frustration with the local authorities, with explicit reference to the preservation of monuments and implicit relevance for the social consequences of Soviet modernization. Thus, while the Soviet state was responsible for engendering a community of zealous preservationists, it was not always in control of the focus of this community's attention. Throughout the 1960s, local officials and local branches of VOOPliK had repeatedly to explain to letter-writing members of the local community that the dilapidated old churches at the end of their streets were just 'ordinary buildings' [*ryadovye zdaniya*] and not architectural monuments worthy of note.\(^{304}\) It appeared that the preservationist drive had raised popular expectations, generating an idea that *everything* from the national past was worthy of conservation – a position that was untenable in both ideological and financial terms.

4.4 ‘CHTO TAKOE PAMYATNIK ARKHITEKTURY?’

If medieval heritage, its simplicity of form and freedom from ornamental overindulgences was celebrated as an ideal of ‘democratic’ architecture, the architectural inheritance of the late-Imperial period, which had provided the inspiration for many buildings in the Stalinist ‘Empire style’,

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\(^{304}\) Letters continued to be sent to the local authorities until the end of the Soviet period. In response to a letter enquiring about the status of a church in the village of Glyadkii in 1986, for example, the Vologda VOOPliK issued the following regretful response: ‘Было бы прекрасно восстановить эти здания, хотя они и культовые [...] с тем, чтобы они ласкали глаз и использовали их в интересах работы учреждений культуры. Но возможность для этого в области в настоящее время нет.’ VOOPliK. GAVO, f. 843, op. 1, d. 213, l. 38.
fell out of favour at this time. As much was clear from tendencies that developed in regional restoration workshops in the Khrushchev period. The widespread practice of purging medieval monuments of their eighteenth- and nineteenth-century additions and restoring the ‘lost’ original details to objects of old Russian architecture reflected the value judgements attached to the different architectural styles. In Novgorod, prominent examples of this tendency, known as ‘husking’ [vylushchivanie], included the twelfth-century Tserkov’ Ioanna Predtechi na Opokakh, the fourteenth-century Klimentievskaya tserkov’ and Borisoglebskaya tserkov’, all of which lost their nineteenth-century side chapels and bell towers in the process of restoring their aesthetically ‘superior’, original exteriors. The discourse of restoration, in which late-Imperial additions to buildings were described as historical ‘distortions’ [iskazheniya] and their removal as ‘liberation’ [osvobodzhenie] provided further evidence of the differing approaches to the architectural inheritance of the two periods.

Indicative of the ambivalence that characterised state attitudes to neo-classical architecture was the treatment of the eighteenth- and nineteenth-

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305 Shchenkov argues that Khrushchev’s architectural front, the war on ‘architectural extravagances’ [izlishstvya] resonated throughout the country in the post-Stalin period, shaping not only attitudes to buildings of the contemporary period, but also the appreciation of architectural heritage. Shchenkov, p. 469.
306 Shchenkov, p. 496.
307 Mil’chik, pp. 271, 206, and 282.
308 See, for example, the discussion of the restoration of Leont’evskaya tserkov’ in Vologda in 1960. GAVO, f. 4795, op. 1, d. 231, l. 110; and the description of the Syamskii Bogoroditse-Rozhdestvenskii monastyr’ in Vologda in 1968. GAVO, f. 4795, op. 6, d. 213, l. 140. Catriona Kelly has noted the overlap between the vocabulary of architectural restoration and the historical narrative of the repulsion of the invaders during the Second World War. See Catriona Kelly, “Ispravlyat’ li istoriyu?.”
century merchant mansions of Vologda. The wooden mansions in the
merchant, noble and bourgeois styles had been constructed in the town
between the seventeenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries in
connection with the thriving commercial culture of the late-Imperial
period. In the late-1800s, a local variant on the architectural style – a two-
storey, two-roomed wooden house with a covered balcony and corner
staircase – had emerged.309 Yet despite the recognition of the value of the
local mansions by local and national architects,310 only three buildings in
this style were included on federal lists of protected architectural
monuments in 1960.311 In state publications, the buildings were frequently
dismissed as ‘imitative’ and ‘unremarkable’ architectural constructions
that did not qualify for preservation on the basis of their cultural and
historical value.312 It may be assumed that, as the product of the ‘capitalist’
culture of the tsarist period, these buildings were considered difficult to
write into a socialist landscape or to conceptualise as the cultural
inheritance of the Soviet regime.313

309 Fekhner, p. 152.
310 See, for example, Fekhner, pp. 137-164; and Banige and Pertsev, pp. 27-32.
311 Spisok pamyatnikov istorii i kultury Vologodskoi oblasti: Vologodskoe otdelenie vserossiiskogo
obshchestva okhrany pamyatnikov istorii i kultury, compiled by T. N. Voronina and G. A.
312 N. I. Shurgin, ‘Restavratsiya pamyatnikov russkoi derevyannoi arkitektury’, in A. S.
Shchenkov, pp. 542-549 (p. 549).
313 The obvious exception in this case was the neo-classical architecture of Leningrad, much of
which was considered emblematic of the local style and worthy of preservation. For a discussion
While medieval churches were deemed appropriate focuses for reflection on the cultural traditions of the Soviet state, the architecture of the late-Imperial period was considered inconsistent with the vision of national history endorsed by the Communist Party. Indeed, the exclusion of late-Imperial architecture from the cultural landscape had an analogy in the museum context where the cultural developments of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were elided from presentations of local history or otherwise portrayed in an broadly negative terms. Members of the local

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314 Author’s own photograph (March, 2009).
315 Ibid.
317 See Chapter Two where I discuss the treatment of the history and culture of the late-Imperial period in local museums.
community nevertheless evaluated the architectural legacy of this period more positively than state officials. In articles and readers’ letters to local newspapers, members of the local community expressed their concern that too narrow a definition of heritage had been adopted by the Soviet state with the result that many valuable buildings from recent history had been excluded from lists of national heritage. In one letter published in Novgorodskaya pravda in 1967, a local electrician argued for the inclusion of certain ‘old houses’ onto state lists, if only for the sake of historical coherence:

Возможно, старые дома не имеют большой архитектурной ценности и не являются соперниками шедевров зодчества. Однако, памятниками они все же являются. И если далеко не на каждом надо укрепить мемориальную доску, то уж оберегать их, пусть не все – наш долг. [...] Наконец, нельзя взорвать, разбить шар-бабой все домики, построенные за последние 250 лет. Этак останутся, за редким исключением, сооружения лишь времен середины и второй половины XX века. Образуется пустота: ничто не будет напоминать о жизни города между двумя этими, такими непохожими эпохами.318

This was far from the only criticism of the state’s efforts to objectivize a vision of national history on the Russian landscape. In an article written by the Novgorod journalist and local historian G. Naryshkin in 1966, the wisdom of the official logic which held that medieval buildings were ‘unique’, while nineteenth-century architecture was ‘imitative’ and ‘uninspired’ was questioned. Directing his enquiry at specialists of national architecture, Naryshkin asked: ‘Дорогие товарищи, с чего вы взяли, что

318 ‘O gorode moem rodnom’
XIX век повторяется? Будет ли к примеру, совхоз строить храмы? Нет, ему церкви не к чему'. In the late-1960s, this opinion was echoed by a number of prominent Soviet architects. In an article on monuments and modernity which appeared in Izvestiya in 1967, for example, the secretary of the Union of Architects of the USSR Yu. Yaralova argued that the accepted definition of heritage was too limited and that it should be extended to include some of the ‘most interesting’ buildings from the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The idea that the architecture of the ‘capitalist’ period ought to be excluded from the pantheon of national cultural traditions was losing its hold.

The definition of an architectural monument broadened in the Brezhnev era to include many of the historic buildings that had been excluded from state lists of cultural heritage in the early-1960s. In Pskov, for example, a number of the merchant palaces and civic buildings constructed between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries were added to state lists in 1974, while a further 33 eighteenth- and nineteenth-century buildings were ‘uncovered’ by the Vologda authorities in 1977. This was, in part, a result of the efforts of local architects who were able to make use of the institutional framework created with VOOPlIiK to lobby Moscow officials.

319 Ibid.
responsible for the preservation of national monuments.323 Attitudes to heritage in the Soviet Union were also informed by the Venice Charter of 1964, which stipulated that an inclusive approach ought be taken to the preservation of architectural monuments, in which 'valid contributions from all periods' were represented on the national landscape.324

The revision of the definition of an architectural monument to include historical buildings of the late-Imperial period also reflected broader changes in national historiography and a shift in the understanding of the purpose of heritage in socialist society. Rather than a constituting a reflection of the socialist values of ascetism, simplicity, and industriousness as it had in the Khrushchev era, cultural heritage in the late-1970s began to be understood as an architectural chronicle of national history, a material timeline stretching from Rus' to the construction of Communism. There were still emphases and omissions in official memory – as Tumarkin has shown, World War Two memorials became one of the major focuses of heritage preservation in the Brezhnev era325 – but the 250 year lacuna in architectural historiography, the source of anxiety for the author of the letter cited above, had been at least partially closed. It did not follow, however, that the conservative critics of the modernizing regime laid down their pens in recognition of the shift in preservationist ideals. In the reconfiguration of political alignments that arose from the perestroika-

323 Shchenkov, in Shchenkov, p. 591.
era reforms, heritage preservation emerged as an important site of public disaffection and social tension.

4.5 THE FAILURE OF STATE PRESERVATIONISM

The climate of greater openness created by the perestroika movement at the end of the 1980s provided an opportunity for more outspoken criticism of the state’s policy on the preservation of architectural monuments. Momentum had been building throughout the late-Brezhnev era. In 1978 in an article published in Literaturnaya gazeta, Dmitrii Zhukov had poured scorn upon the official society for the preservation of heritage: ‘Сколько памятников стоит в лесах, но редко увидишь на них рабочего с мастерской!’ 326 In 1982, in an interview published in Ogonek, Dmitry Likhachev added to this criticism, condemning the Society for its inactivity at the Soviet periphery and stressing the need for centralized cooperation of state organs, the creation of general programmes and a common policy for the protection of monuments in the provinces.327 Likhachev’s words sparked a lively reaction from Soviet citizens living in the Russian regions. In a summary of readers’ letters written in response to the interview, residents of Omsk, Simferopol, Yaroslavl’ and Irkutsk added their own local gripes to the criticisms of state preservationism expressed by the medieval historian.328

In the late-1980s, the perestroika initiative permitting the foundation of unofficial societies gave rise to civic movements for the preservation of heritage in Moscow, Leningrad, and the Russian regions. As the state organisation for the preservation of heritage VOOPliK became increasing bureaucratised and unwilling to challenge official decisions, supporters of the preservationist cause began to establish alternative alliances for the advancement of their aims. Invested with a new sense of relevance and with a sizeable support base, some of these groups, particularly in Moscow and Leningrad, evolved into movements for social change. In an interview conducted in St Petersburg in 2008, the architect and restorer Aleksandr Margolis described the transformation of local preservationist groups into a force for political transformation in perestroika Leningrad:

То есть возникла такая дуга, соединившая практически представителей всех поколений. И они действительно стали способны вывести на улицы и на площади многих. То есть вот это вот сидение клубное, которое мы наблюдали в шестидесятые и в начале семидесятых, когда мы собирались там, обсуждали наши проблемы, делали друг другу доклады там, смотрели слайды, и так далее, вот неожиданно стало общественным движением, таким почти что площадным.329

Among the civic movements that emerged around the question of heritage preservation in the perestroika period was the radical anti-Semitic organisation *Pamyat*. These ‘primitive patriots’, as the members were

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329 Oxf/AHRC-SPb-08 AP PF. Aleksandr Davidovich Margolis. Interview conducted by Aleksandra Plir, 29.01.2008. Interview transcripts are currently being processed for archiving and will be stored at the Oxford Russian Life History Archive: http://www.ehrc.ox.ac.uk/lifehistory/.
dubbed in an article published in *Izvestiya* in 1987, it developed a conspiratorial theory of the destruction of Russian civilisation, in which Judeo-Masonic groups were held responsible for the country’s social and economic problems, including the degeneration of national heritage. Throughout the 1980s, associated bodies emerged throughout the Soviet Union in urban centres such as Leningrad, Chelyabinsk, Irkutsk, Novosibirsk, Sverdlovsk, Tyumen, Magnitogorsk, and Zlatoust. Yet, despite claims by the movement’s leaders that membership had reached 5,000 in Leningrad and 20,000 in Moscow, with branches of the organisation existing in 30 Russian towns, it is likely that the popularity of *Pamyat* was grossly exaggerated. According to Brudny, who quotes from lists of registered unofficial organisations, between 200-400 members of the organisation were active in Moscow and approximately 1000 supporters existed throughout the entire country. In the medieval towns of the North West, employees at *kraevedcheskie* museums and the authorities for the preservation of heritage had no knowledge of local branches of *Pamyat* having existed in the region during the perestroika period. It would thus appear that the movement was a highly localized phenomenon and that the appeal of its arguments in the Russian regions was overemphasized in the perestroika press.

331 Brudny, p. 205.
333 Brudny, p. 205.
Political elites in the post-Soviet period continued to endorse preservationist principles in an effort to strengthen their support bases and increase their legitimacy. However, by contrast with the Soviet era when the Communist Party had dominated political discourse, in post-socialist Russia different political groups competed to define the cultural significance of public symbols. An illustrative example of this process was the public debate that accompanied the restoration of the Sofiskii sobor in Novgorod in the early-1990s. As Nicolai N. Petro has pointed out in his study of political symbolism in transitional Novgorod, the restoration of the church was interpreted variously by different local elites with vested interests in associating themselves with the project. For Russian nationalists the restoration of the cathedral was thus interpreted a manifestation of the country’s cultural specificity; for local democrats as evidence of the irrelevance of the KPSS; and for reform-minded Communists as a means to assert their capacity to adapt to political change.335 While it is surely an exaggeration to assert, as Petro does, that local elites in Novgorod were able to weather the political transition to democracy more successfully as a result of the appropriation of public symbols,336 heritage and its preservation continued to function as a focus of populist politics in the new conditions of democratic local government.

Yet, if politicians echoed the sentimental, patriotic language of local writers and historians in their rhetorical treatment of architectural monuments, everyday attitudes towards local heritage was more ambiguous. Following the adoption of the Statute of 26 November 1994 ‘On the Privatization of Non-Moveable Historical and Cultural Monuments of Local Value’, a number of local monuments passed into the hands of regional businessmen and individuals. Yet little effort was made to enforce the new proprietors’ observance of their contractual obligations and throughout the 1990s an unrelenting stream of reports detailing the damage and ruin visited on monuments by their owners issued from the local press.\(^{337}\) Local politicians were also directly involved in the violation of the legislation on the preservation of cultural heritage. An article published in *Izvestiya* in 1995, for example, detailed a scandal in which the former mayor and deputy governor of Vologda, Boris Uladyshev, had illegally apportioned land in the ‘preservation zone’ of an architectural monument to local officials and businessmen for the construction of elite ‘cottages’.\(^{338}\) According to one of the most active petitioners for the protection of architectural monuments in the town, the head of State Directorate for the Preservation, Restoration, and Use of Monuments Mikhail Karachev such actions were entirely characteristic of the local administration, which had

\(^{337}\) For records of violations of legislation on cultural heritage in Pskov see, for example, ‘Eshche raz pro “bol’ obshchestva”’, *Novosti Pskova*, 21 April 2004, p. 5; ‘Pobega syatnaya gora?’, *Pskovskaya provintsiya*, 26 July 2007, p. 3; and ‘Kak bystro i beboleznennno promotat’ kulturnoe nasledie’, *Gorodskaya gazeta*, 15–21 April 2008, p. 5; for articles on the destruction of cultural heritage published in Vologda see, for example, ‘Goryat...kvartiry...doma...sklady’, *Russkii sever*, 29 September 2000, p. 3; ‘Delit’ya nada!’, *Russkii sever*, 11 October 2000, p. 1 and 5; and ‘Kak “prospali” pamiatnik kul’tury’, *Russkii sever*, 28 January 2000, p. 13.

allowed the law on the protection of monuments to be broken over sixty
times in the course of its administration.339

The romantic descriptions of Mikhail Karachev in the Vologda press as a
tragic hero battling single-handedly against a disinterested political elite
can be seen to reflect popular attitudes to architectural heritage in
particularly, and democratic governance in general at this time. In 1998, one
local newspaper, Prim’er, thus described Kacharev, whose professional
commitment to the preservationist cause was indeed exceptional, as ‘чутъ
ли не Робин Гуд, бесстрашно воюющим за сохранение исторического
облика Вологды’.340 The mythologization of the ‘honest official’ [chestnyi
chinovnik] almost certainly reflected – as well as reinforced - the popular
belief that engagement in politics was not only a senseless, but also an
extremely dangerous activity. The preservation of cultural heritage in post-
Soviet Vologda was thus acknowledged as one more in a series of goals
worth pursuing in an ‘ideal’ democratic Russia, but beyond reach in the
current climate of corruption and social inequality.

In the perceived absence of a democratic government willing to attend to
cs public concerns about the preservation of heritage, alternative forms of
popular representation began to emerge. Members of local communities
turned to prominent figures among the country’s cultural elite to amplify

339 Ibid.; cf. ‘Rukopisi ne goryat. A pamyatniki?’, in which it was claimed that 41 wooden
monuments had burned in suspicious circumstances between 1991 and 2001. According to the
article, this was more than the combined total of monuments to have perished in the Pskov,
Yaroslavl’, and Vladimir regions for the same period. ‘Rukopisi ne goryat. A pamyatniki?’, Russkiy
Sever, 22 February 2001, p. 4.
their anxieties about the conservation of architectural monuments and
bring them to the attention of the political authorities. In a letter to Dmitrii
Likhachev in 1991, Elena Morozkina, an art historian and architect from
Pskov, communicated her anxiety over the fate of the seventeenth-century
church of the Krypetskii monastyr’, which, she explained, was at risk of
suffering irreparable damage if it was not immediately restored.
Morozkina articulated her sense of alienation from the organs of political
power, imploring the Russian scholar: ‘Трудно мне Вас тревожить – Вы
един на нас всех. Но больше идти не к кому’. Morozkina went on to
explain how her scholarly studies of Pskov architecture from the twelfth to
the eighteenth century had remained unpublished as a result of
accusations from jealous colleagues of subversive behaviour. In this
climate of political unscrupulousness and irrationality, she implied,
popular concerns for the preservation of local heritage could only achieve
public impact through the intervention of paragons of national integrity
such as Dmitrii Likhachev.

The proliferation of legislation pertaining to the preservation of heritage
throughout the 2000s served to obfuscate the means by which
architectural monuments could be maintained rather than render this
process more democratic. The amendments to the 2002 federal law ‘On the
Objects of Cultural Heritage (Historical and Cultural Monuments) of the
Peoples of the Russian Federation’ in 2006, which divided the powers for

341 Personal archive of D. S. Likhachev, Rukописный отдел Института русской литературы РАН
(Pushkinshkii Dom), f. 769. Letters to D. S. Likhachev. Papka 4, No. 25, l. 1. [This archive is not yet
catalogued, and hence is not formally open to readers. Reference supplied by Catriona Kelly.]
342 Ibid.
conservation issues between local authorities and central government bodies, created a situation in which regional organs for the preservation of heritage were subordinated to two levels of government.\textsuperscript{343} The bureaucratic inefficiency that resulted was illustrated by the case of one federal monument in Vologda, which was seriously damaged as a result of a fire in the early-2000s. As one of the residents of the building, Leonid, explained in an interview in 2009, the authorities for the preservation of national monuments in Moscow were not informed by the local government that the building had been partially destroyed as a result of the fire. Moreover, as a consequence of the ambiguities in national legislation, no official report of the damage caused by the fire was compiled and the building remained in a state of woeful disrepair in 2009.\textsuperscript{344}


\textsuperscript{344} P. I. Leonid, d.o.b. 04.12.56, photographer and journalist. Interview conducted on 22.09.09 at the informant’s workshop in Vologda (interview with author).
Rather than bolster patriotic sentiment, support for local elites, and faith in democratic governance, official preservationism in the post-Soviet period cultured a mood of deep cynicism and distrust in politics, reaffirming the widely held belief that Russian society was divided between powerful and corrupt officials and a disenfranchised general public. Local monuments, such as the house on Vorovskii Street became symbols of public disillusion with government rather than focuses of local pride. Moreover, efforts to maintain heritage were frequently perceived with scepticism, as acts of political opportunism at best and elite corruption at worst. A popular anecdote concerning the visit of the former President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin to Vologda in Spring 2001 captures the air of disenchantment that pervaded the Russian regions at this time. According to urban myth, the route the President would follow through the town, which local authorities had attempted conceal from the public, was made obvious when buildings on particular streets began to be restored and repainted. Particularly galling for the local community was the fact that these ‘improvements’ were carried out in a slapdash and unprofessional fashion intended to create a positive impression on the visiting leader rather than address the real problems of heritage preservation. The

345 Photograph by Leonid Starikov, mid-2000s.
346 Photograph author’s own, Vologda, Summer 2009.
falsification of the architectural landscape for political ends provided an apt metaphor for political governance in the regions more generally. Vologda thus appeared as a Potemkin (or perhaps ‘Putinkin’) village, whose political elite was more concerned with professional expediency than the welfare of the local community.\footnote{See the discussion in the online forum Vabla.ru on the theme ‘davайте искать по городу признаки скорого приезда Путина’, Vabla.ru (http://wobla.ru/forum/Default.aspx/postid=214558) [last accessed 8 February 2010].}

The chasm separating the political interests of elites from those of the local community was highlighted in another heritage-related discussion on the personal website of governor of Novgorod Sergei Mitin in 2009. In this case, the debate concerned the ‘correction’ of Soviet road names, and specifically the proposal to rechristen the anachronistic ulitsa Karla Marksa as the more defiantly triumphant Ulitsa boevoi slavi. The proposal elicited a spirited reaction from members of the local community, provoking criticism of what was perceived to be the government’s evasive and populist tactics. One cynical blogger thus gave vent to his spleen in an indictment of all public sector workers: ‘Да везде так,час врачи как бомбили таксисты,норовят побольше урвать,впрочем как все, и чиновники в том числе ,вот и власть пудрит народу мозги-как будто серьёзней проблем нету,отвлекают от насущного,понятно,что б волнений не было,забастовок’.\footnote{prohojly48, 2010-04-08 18:40 (UTC), Blog Mitina.} Another observed that the name-change was intended not to improve the welfare of the local community so much as commemorate the political elite who were its engineers: ‘Я ходил
в школу на улице Желябова, которую Прусак\textsuperscript{350} переименовал в Прусскую, живу рядом с Григоровской которую назвали пр. Корсунова. Теперь очередной "политик" хочет увековечить свое имя?\textsuperscript{351} In a particularly sour reflection on the political reality, another participant in the discussion claimed that the forum itself was a sham, posing as a vehicle for public debate while decisions continued to be made behind closed doors: 'Господа! Чё вы так разволнялись. Всё давно решено. Показали вам видимость свободы, гласности, ну ещё этого...плурализма. Поверьте мне ещё не один "Корсуновский" проспект нас ожидает. Будет ещё и Митинский и Единоросский... расслабьтесь и получайте удовольствие'.\textsuperscript{352} Rather than supplying the symbols of local patriotism, heritage in the post-Soviet period had become a metaphor for the dysfunctional political system and a focus for feelings of frustration with the actions of an unprincipled local elite.

4.6 CONCLUSION

The official endorsement of heritage preservation in the post-1961 period succeeded in highlighting certain tensions in the modernizing Soviet state. The contradiction between the 'crash' modernization of the Khrushchev period, which was particularly marked in the Russian regions, and the conservation of historical monuments undermined official efforts to strengthen Soviet patriotism through the affiliation of the state with the

\textsuperscript{350} Mikhail Prusak was the governor of Novgorod between 1991 and 2007 after which he was replaced by Sergei Mitin, the incumbent governor at the time of writing.

\textsuperscript{351} mrmischief_62, 2010-04-08 05:29 (UTC), Blog Mitina.

\textsuperscript{352} dorochev_1, 2010-04-08 18:22 (UTC), Blog Mitina.
cultural traditions of the nation. Local communities became increasingly aware of the value of local monuments as a result of lectures, films, discussion, and exhibitions and were alerted to the need to maintain an architectural record of national history on the landscape. Yet, historical consciousness also spurred critical awareness of the gap between the theoretical endorsement of conservationism and the reality of neglect for local heritage. Rather than strengthening identification with the ideals and values of the Soviet socialism, the preservationist drive thus provided a centre around which controversy could cohere and a vocabulary in which to articulate popular frustrations.

Following the collapse of the regime, the preservation of heritage became a focus of popular disillusionment with local and national politics. The duplicitous actions of public officials, who publically endorsed the preservation of heritage, while privately ignoring and violating heritage legislation prompted popular criticism in public forums such as newspaper articles and social networks. The shared experience of political disenfranchisement, of which the preservation of heritage was emblematic, provided a pole of collective identification for local communities. Neglected or abandoned architectural monuments became symbols of the democratic deficit, their juxtaposition with flamboyant, privately funded elite ‘cottages’ a reflection of the growing economic disparity and social inequality of the former socialist state.
PART TWO

LOST IN TRANSITION?: LOCAL IDENTITY AND CULTURAL TRANSFORMATION IN THE POST-SOVIET PERIOD
In the chapters which have preceded, I have concentrated on the ways in which local identity was crafted in text, institutions of cultural memory, and on the landscape in an effort to forge new forms of social solidarity in the post-1961 period. For the most part, I have restricted my analysis to the visions of localness that were presented in state-controlled forums, from the Soviet guidebook to the preservation of heritage. While I have sought to highlight the ways in which these authoritative discourses of identity were echoed back to the institutions from which they originated, and the channels through which they were challenged and endorsed, this has not been the principal focus of my attention in Part One. In the two chapters that follow, I will shift my attention away from institutions to the individuals that peopled them, focusing in particular on the ways in which local identity was constructed through everyday practices and oral traditions.

This shift in focus demands a shift in method. By bringing the people who inhabit the Russian regions into relief, I move away from the archive and toward the domestic and public spaces, from the written report to the spoken word and ritualized act. The research that I draw on consists for the most part of participant observation and oral history work that was conducted during the four years of the DPhil and, in particular, the academic year 2008-2009 when I lived and worked in the North West. The reflections that I offer in the chapters that follow are particular to this period, and, while building on the discussion of institutional discourses of identity in the previous chapters, constitute a methodological break with the broadly chronological and document-based argument that has provided the structure for the previous chapters. I
nevertheless intend the two parts to be understood as integral parts of a single narrative, which develop common questions and themes.

The cultural institutions examined in Part One represented the past with reference to specific issues that were seen as important in the political ideology of the day. The process of evolution in the non-official process of remembrance was rather more elusive. As I argue in Chapter Four, developments to public memorialization and their reception in the post-Soviet period reflect a more general process of marking the intangible notion of ‘transition’ in material form. The didacticism and authoritativeness of Soviet culture was replaced by (controlled) disorder, semantic plurality, and playful interactivity. The formulaic modes of representing localness that one encounters in the Soviet tourist guide and museum exhibition ceded to self-conscious acts of cultural redefinition and, as I argue in Chapter Five, playful strategies of self-narration. However, such conscious forms of cultural redefinition did not so much establish a break with the past as posit that past as a pole of negative identification (‘the past is not like the present’). While inverting the modes of expression used to engage with the past, replacing patriotic bombast with deflationary irony and instruction with improvisation, local communities and governing elites continued to assert the importance and relevance of the Soviet experience to contemporary culture.
CHAPTER FOUR
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THE ‘POLITICS AND POETICS OF MEMORY’: REDEFINING LOCALNESS IN THE LANDSCAPE AND THE URBAN SPHERE

5.1 RECOVERING THE ‘MYTHS WE LIVE BY’

The frantic reordering of the monumental landscape in Eastern Europe in the post-Communist period has attracted particular attention from scholars of public memory, who have attempted to monitor the shifting focuses of national identity through close readings of the personages and events commemorated in urban space.353 These studies have focused on the strategies adopted by political elites to redefine the national self through the co-option, glorification, disavowal, or contestation of its historical symbols. They have also examined the cultural

practices associated with monuments, such as the laying of wreaths at national memorials or festive parades, as means to ‘naturalize’ collective identity through the enactment of ritualized forms of behaviour in the urban sphere.\textsuperscript{354} In these enquiries, local communities have been attributed relatively little agency in the shaping of meaning of commemorative objects, being viewed as passive participants in the construction of public myths and historical narratives or, when their roles have been recognized, sources of contestation and subversion of the authoritative discourses of the past.

Such analyses might be understood as part of a corpus of scholarly literature that has tended to reject the ‘celebration of traditions’ as perpetuating the belief in the reality of imaginary conceptions and to focus instead on the actions of political elites to shape the material and symbolic representation of the past. Following the lead of Maurice Agulhon, whose study of how the changing image of Marianne was used to give concrete form to political identity in the French Republic,\textsuperscript{355} a body of collective memory studies has emerged that has interrogated the way in which commemorative objects and traditions served the purposes of political propaganda.\textsuperscript{356} While these studies were initially directed

\textsuperscript{354} See, for example, Catherine Merridale’s study of the processes of remembrance of the Second World War in \textit{Ivan’s War: The Red Army, 1939-1945} (London: Faber and Faber, 2005); Sergei Oushakine has also discussed the new rituals of patriotic remembrance in post-Soviet Russia in a paper, ‘Ya pomnyul Ya gorzhus’: vsopominaya o neprozhitoi voine’, presented at the conference, ‘Sovetskije traditsii: Stanovienie i transformatsii’, 18 February 2011 (European University at St Petersburg, St Petersburg).


\textsuperscript{356} Benedict Anderson’s exposure of nationalism as a fabrication of provincial elites in the eighteenth century and Eric Hobsbawm’s interpretation of tradition as a set of cultural instruments employed by elites to ensure social coherence in periods of rapid political change are probably the most influential of these theses. See Benedict Anderson, \textit{Imagined Communities: Reflections On the Origins and Spread of Nationalism} (London: Verso, 1983); and \textit{The Invention of Tradition}, ed. by Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
against the commemorative historiography of the nation-state builders of the
nineteenth century, their deconstructivist methods have also been borrowed to
investigate the instrumental use of traditional symbols and legends by self-
interested political elites in periods of political and social transition.\(^\text{357}\)

The result of this approach has been, one might say, to valorise form over
content. The sociological investigation of how dominant narratives of the past
have been perpetuated across space and time has been given more attention than
the study of which memories have actually been perpetuated. The ‘myths we live
by’, as Raphael Samuel and Paul Thompson have put it,\(^\text{358}\) have been largely
eschewed as objects of study in favour of the social mechanisms for perpetuating
certain beliefs and knowledge of the past. In effect, a tradition of anti-tradition
has emerged, particularly in Hobsbawm and Ranger’s influential book, where the
belief in ‘tradition’ emerges as a variant of what classical Marxists would call
‘false consciousness’. Olivia Harris has remarked that this unwillingness to
address the existence and significance of traditions, however recent (‘invented’)
these may be, is due to the undoing of the Enlightenment certainties, following
which ‘it has become easier to speak of magic without self-consciousness than to
talk about tradition’.\(^\text{359}\) Nevertheless, a scholarly emphasis on the public

\(^{357}\) For a discussion of the nation-building historiography of the Annales School see Jacques Le
Goff, *History and Memory*, trans. by Steven Rendall and Elizabeth Clamen (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1992); for analyses of the manipulation of national memory for political gain in
post-war Europe see Henry Rousso, *The Vichy Syndrome: History and Memory in France Since
Robert Gildea, *Marianne in Chains: In Search of the German Occupation, 1940-1945* (London:
Macmillan, 2002); cf. my note on publications dealing with post-war memory in Western Europe
and, more recently in Eastern Europe in the Introduction (footnote 46).


\(^{359}\) Olivia Harris, ‘The Temporalities of Tradition: Reflections on Changing Anthropology’, in
representations of the past at the expense of an investigation into their private interpretations risks telling only half the story of how memory informs our sense of identity and self.

Some scholars have recognised the limitations of the post-modern orthodoxy, which rejects the reification of tradition and interprets evidence of cultural continuities as a constant process of re-invention rather than repetition. Patrick Hutton, for example, has drawn attention to the overemphasis of tangible icons by post-modern historians, which he argues to be due to their insistence on objectivity, and to their failure to address the ways in which imagination, implicit in the habits of the mind, remains crucial to the historical enterprise. Hutton thus challenges the current preoccupation with disentangling explicit form from implicit content in terms reminiscent of Bourdieu’s *habitus* of memory, suggesting that, since temporality is a human condition rather than an obstacle to be overcome, post-modern historians cannot help but interpret from within a cultural framework.

Hutton’s observation that temporality is ‘not merely within our thoughts but in our existential condition’ suggests that tradition and memory, in terms of the force of habit which prompts our understanding and behaviour, are in fact meta-historical concepts which hardly deserve their Foucauldian reputation as

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362 Hutton, p. 23.
constructs fated to recede into tomorrow’s oblivion. The relationship between history and memory is thus presented in inverted terms; history does not begin where memory ends, as Pierre Nora has suggested in his elegiac appraisal of living memory’s extinction, but is formed by cultural traditions and habits which encircle our living memories.

The idea of the embeddedness of history within memory, the public in the private and the collective in the individual has appeared in the work of authors writing and dealing with autobiographical accounts of the past. In Jacquelyn Dowd Hall’s account of the autobiographical works of Katherine Du Pre Lumpkin, the social history of the Lost Cause in the American South is seen to interweave with the lived memory of childhood, dominated by the political aspirations of an exigent father, in the writer’s interpretations of the past. Dowd Hall argues that this coexistence of politics and poetics is inherent in every attempt to retell the past. The present is a product of ‘the history we have learned through reading and research and the history we have experienced and inherited, passed down through groups with which we identify, sedimented in the body and created through talk’.

Luisa Passerini’s ‘group self-portrait’, Autobiography of a Generation: Italy 1968, achieves a similar fusion of the private and public by winding a historical narrative of a recognisable moment in Italy’s past around the author’s own life.

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363 Hutton, p. 159.
story. Passerini consciously weaves the intimate recollections of her own past with the collective experiences of her generation to blur the conceptual differentiation between memory and history and question the notion of a professional and truly objective historian. Passerini reflects on the how the collective experiences of her generation framed her own individual remembrances of the past, saying, ‘if I had not heard the life stories of the generation of ‘68, I would not have been able to write about myself: these stories have nourished mine, giving it the strength to get to its feet and to speak’. However, these collective memories are only given meaning within the context of Passerini’s own history, as she remarks, ‘I couldn’t have borne them, in their alternation of being too full and too empty, if I had not confronted myself and my history with the double motion of analysis and of the exercise of remembering’.366

Autobiographical writing, then, has claimed every history to be a history-memory, infused with personal experience and shaped by the events of individual pasts. This has long been recognised by modernist creative writers as well. In Tsvetaeva’s memoir-essay about Pushkin, the historical narrative of the poet is subordinated to the powerful image of the Pushkin Monument in Moscow that stands at the centre of her childhood as a goal of a race or the limit of a walk. As Tsvetaeva sketches an impression of her Pushkin, the intimate experiences of childhood are fused with the collective memory of ‘all child-Moscow’ who swings with her on the chains that surround the monument.367 In Tsvetaeva’s account the individual, collective and historical boundaries are collapsed to create a

limitless and protean history of the poet which, like the monument itself, forever turns its back to the historian who tries to capture it in its entirety.

Historical narrative is thus exposed by the autobiographer as just one attempt to tell the past among many individual and collective alternatives. The authority of the historian to speak on behalf of others, to differentiate historical fact from imagination, or indeed, in the case of the post-modern historian, to pass judgement on the inventedness of history itself, is thus challenged. When history is located within memory in this way, the distinction between the authentic and inauthentic past loses its meaning; the active participation in remembering and forgetting the past in itself becomes characteristic of historical consciousness, and history-making (if not history writing) becomes a part of being human.

Raphael Samuel has remarked that ‘if history were thought of as an activity rather than as a profession the number of its practitioners would be legion’.

Like the autobiographer, he claims history back from the historian, defining it as ‘a social form of knowledge’, created by a thousand different hands driven by the desire to ‘turn fragments into mysteries and signs’.

He locates the sources of our historical knowledge not only in the classroom textbook but also in the unofficial knowledge contained in schoolyard rhymes and rhythms, school plays and historical ‘topic’ work. In Samuel’s opinion, the collector, librarian, bibliographer and antiquarian deserve equal status to the historian as the professional memory makers of our day; he remarks that we live in an expanding

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369 Samuel, p. 7.
historical culture, ‘in which work of inquiry and retrieval is being progressively extended into all kinds of spheres that would have been thought unworthy of notice in the past’.370

The idea of a socially constructed memory implicitly critiques the Foucauldian tradition for its underestimation of the role of human agency in understanding the past. In this alternative view, dominant narratives of the past may exist and be perpetuated by public institutions, but they are nevertheless qualified by private memory, which frames them and moulds their interpretation. Versions of the past that emanate from state and non-state institutions, media productions and entertainments exist and compete for dominance in ‘the field of public representations of the past’.371 However knowledge of the past is also seen to be produced in the course of everyday life, through the ‘common sense of the past’, generated and perpetuated in everyday talk, in personal comparisons and narrative.372 This more private sense of the past, found in the residue of intimate cultural interactions, in diaries, letters, photograph albums, and collections of things associated with bygone days, is intertwined with public discourse, which often supply the very terms by which private memories are made understandable, but nevertheless exist independently from them.

In this chapter, I examine the interaction between history, as public institution, and unofficial forms of remembrance through the prism of the commemorative landscape. I consider the public reactions to shifts in institutional memory in the

370 Samuel, p. 25.
post-Soviet period; the means by which the Soviet experience, expunged from the language of public commemoration, has nevertheless been recognized through in popular tradition and oral culture. I argue that commemorative landscapes in the post-1991 era have become more introspective, that local elites have rejected the generic symbols of the Soviet past in order to establish an esoteric language of commemoration through a series of monumental ‘in jokes’ in the urban sphere. Yet these efforts have had unintended consequences, underscoring the connection between urban space and lived experience, and bestowing the symbols of the old commemorative system with new relevance and meaning.

5.2 MONUMENTS OF DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION

The intangible notion of ‘transition’, a concept which scholars have argued has disputable purchase for explaining the political processes of the early-1990s,373 was given material expression in the landscape in the post-Soviet period. The resacralisation of spaces that were perceived to have been profaned through their association with the Soviet regime was one of the principal means by which the ‘return to normalcy’ was made manifest. Between 1990 and 2011, 27 churches were transferred to the local dioceses in Vologda,374 21 buildings were reclaimed by the local eparchy in Novgorod,375 and 29 churches and monasteries began to function as centres of Orthodox faith in Pskov.376 The transformation of buildings was marked in ritualistic ways, such as the blessing of the Sofiskii sobor in

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Novgorod by the patriarch of the united Leningrad and Novgorod diocese in 1991, but also though aesthetic practices, such as the restoration and symbolic renewal of the religious buildings that had fallen into disrepair during the Soviet period.

The restitution of church architecture was presented in the language of historical inevitability, justice and atonement. In an exchange between the Vologda diocese and local museum collective over the rightful ownership of the Navratnaya tserkov’ of the Spaso-Prilutskii monastyr’ in 1989, the archbishop of the diocese Mikhail Mu’d’yuchin thus reminded the museum of its role in the dissemination of atheistic ideas (‘Было время, когда музей занимался антирелигиозной пропагандой’), underlining the need for this moral transgression to be expiated. In a discussion of the proprietary rights to the Voskresenskii sobor in Vologda, which took place on the pages of the local newspaper Prim’er in July 2000, the bishop of the Vologda and Velikie Luki regions Maksimilian emphasised the need to establish ‘историческая справедливость’; the re-consecration of the building which, as a result of ‘печальные исторические обстоятельства’ had been stripped of its original identity, was interpreted as a means of readdressing the historical balance and establishing the correct order of things.

378 The Soﬁiskii sobor in Novgorod was the focus of a high-profile restoration project that was partially funded by the Russian Orthodox Church in the early 1990s. Other prominent restoration projects in Novgorod include the Zverin-Pokrovskii monastyr’ and the Uspenskii sobor of the Gorne-Uspenskii monastyr’, both of which began to be restored in 1995.
379 See the notes on the meeting of the Vologda State Museum of 22 December 1989. VOKM, op.1, d. 1520, l. 46-47.
380 ‘Vlasti davno soglasny otdat’ sobor…’, Prem’er, 19-25 July 2000
The material expunging of the atheist past was also achieved through the establishment of new focuses of Orthodox memory. In Pskov, for example, the legend of Princess Ol’ga, the fabled founder of the Troitskii sobor and first Christian ruler of Rus’, was elevated to the status of foundation myth following the collapse of the Soviet regime. The recovery of the myth was associated with the new democratic climate in which local initiatives were seen to have replaced the centralized politics of the Soviet period. The Vserossiiskoe Ol’ginskoe obshchestvo, a local group which campaigned for the institutionalisation of the Ol’ga myth in local culture, thus stressed the continuity of their activities with those of the pre-revolutionary society of the same name. The projects that had begun in the early-1900s, including the construction of a chapel in honour of the local saint and the creation of an icon-bearing procession from Pskov to Vybuty, would be completed in the post-Soviet period, they asserted, marking the closing of a historical parenthesis around an era of cultural aberration.\(^{381}\)

The project to construct a monument to Saint Ol’ga was one of the strategies of marking the transition from atheist regime to liberal democracy in monumental format. However, the project became the centre of controversy when a proliferation of monuments undermined the representative authority of the ‘official’ rendering of the saint. In addition to the monument commissioned from the sculptor Vyacheslav Klykov, in which Ol’ga was depicted facing the Troitskii sobor, holding a cross in her right hand and with her young grandson, Prince

Vladimir, the future Baptiser of Rus’, by her side (2003), a second monument was donated to the town by the sculptor Zurab Tsereteli (2003). In Tsereteli’s work Ol’ga was portrayed in the garb of medieval warrior, wearing a breastplate and holding a sword, an allusion to the wrathful character of the legendary Princess who avenged her husband’s death by interring the Drevlyans she believed responsible for his murder in a ship burial while still alive.382 The decision to banish Tsereteli’s ‘false Ol’ga’ to the undistinguished location of the garden of the Soviet Hotel ‘Riga’ in the concrete suburbs of the town was certainly inspired by the brute quality of the sculpture, a signature feature of Tsereteli’s monuments that have rendered the sculptor infamous in Russia.383 At the same time, the gesture was an official endorsement of Klykov’s pious and maternal depiction of Ol’ga, a reflection the shifting image of Pskov from defiant bastion of Russian culture to centre of spirituality in the national imagination.384

In urban myth, the ‘tale of two Ol’gas’ was amplified and elaborated in inventive ways. Margarita, an English teacher at the Vol’nyi Institut in Pskov, explained her preference for Klykov’s monument over Tsereteli’s belligerent sculpture:

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382 For the legend of Saint Ol’ga see Stepennaya kniga tsarskogo rodosloviya po drevneishim spiskam: teksty i kommentarii v trekh tomakh, ed. by N. N. Pokrovskii and G. D. Lenkhoff (Moscow: Yazyki slavianskikh kul’tur, 2007).
383 See, for example, the article published in the newspaper Stolitsa in 1997, which included a petition against the erection of the Pamyatnik Petru I in Moscow. Sergei Mostovshchikov, ‘Bez tsary v golove: Pamyatnik Petru Pervomu Raboty Tsereteli’, Stolitsa, 1997 (http://www.stolitsa.org/27-bez-carya-v-golove-pamyatnik-petru-pervomu-raboty.html) [last accessed: 21 March 2011].
384 The idea of Ol’ga as a pious and sagacious ruler was officially endorsed in the speech delivered by the former President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin in Pskov at the celebrations of the 1100th anniversary of the town’s first mention in the Primary Chronicle. Underlining the town’s integral role in national history, the President remarked: ‘Глубоко символично, что именно Псковской земле родилась святая Ольга Российская, мудрая правительница Руси. Потомки хранят о ней благодарную память’. See Vladimir Putin’s speech at the event, ‘Ne predstavit Rossiyu bez Pskova’, in Pskov, 16-23 June 2003. GAPO, f R-1855, op. 1, d. 2288, l. 9.
Соб.: Какие праздники Вам понравились больше всего?
Инф.: [...] Единственно мне запомнился день, когда нам исполнялось 100... 1100 лет Пскову было. В 99-м получается. В 99-м, если я не ошибаюсь. Потому что к нему подготовились на федеральном уровне. Во-первых, весь город был очень красиво засажен цветами. Новые памятники подарили городу, эти новые памятники. Два памятника Ольге, один около "Рижской", Церетели, не очень удачный. И более удачный памятник там, на площади Октябрьской.
Соб.: А почему неудачный?
Инф.: Ну, не знаю, она мне как-то больше напоминает Царицу Тамару. Это грузинская Царица. Церетели - он сам грузин. И у меня такое ощущение, что он лепил Тамару, а получилась, как бы, Ольга! (смеются). Она, мне кажется, немного не отражает её дух. А вот здесь она уже с внуком Владимиром стоит, и над ней нимб, вот, недалеко от нашего Вольного института, вот это вот, и там Славянской написано вязью, и там цветы идут у нас по кругу, да? У основания. Он как-то ближе нашему русскому духу, вот.385

The idea that Tseriteli’s Ol’ga began life as the Georgian Princess Tamara might be a regional variation on the legend of the sculptor’s Pamyatnik Petru I in Moscow, which, it is claimed, was originally cast as an effigy of Christopher Columbus and only adapted for the Moscow landscape when the gift was refused by the American and Spanish governments.386 However, this excerpt also reveals the manner in which monuments serve to define and reinforce a particular vision of the national self. Tseriteli’s Ol’ga is rejected for its departure from the Orthodox imagination, its failure to represent the ‘spirituality’ of the national idea. Indeed, its symbolic apparel is seen to hint at the constituent Other in Russian culture, the Southern Caucasus, which through the efforts of the Russian

385 P.I. Margaritita, d.o.b. 26.09.57, teacher. Interviewed at her home in Pskov, 01.08.09. (transcript/recording with author).
386 For a disputuation of this myth see Lev Kolodny, ‘Петр и Колумб – разные люди и памятники’, Komsonol’skaya Pravda, 15 October 2010 (http://kp.ru/print/article/24569/742341) [last accessed: 21 March 2011].
media and political elites has come to be associated with the ideas of militancy and bellicosity.\footnote{Disparaging representations of Caucasian peoples abound in the Russian media. See for example the caricature of the hot-tempered television presenter from Pyatigorsk in the Stavropol region on the popular series \textit{Nasha Rasha} (Comedy Club Productions, 1996-2011); and the election campaign advertisement for the \textit{Rodina} party broadcast on Russian television in 2005, in which migrants from the Caucasus were shown tossing watermelon rinds on the ground. The slogan which accompanied the advert read 'Очистим город от мусора...'. See 'Oчистим город от мусора...', \textit{Videoinet}, [http://www.videoinet.ru/view.html?id=YNJZl61iB7HcWdR] [last accessed: 7 April 2010].}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{image.png}
\caption{Zurab Tsereteli's monument to Saint Ol'ga, outside the Hotel 'Riga' on Rizhskii prospekt\footnote{Author's own photograph, Pskov, Summer 2009.}\textsuperscript{388}}
\end{figure}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{image.png}
\caption{Vyacheslav Klykov's monument to Ol'ga, in which the saint is depicted with her grandson Vladimir\textsuperscript{389}}
\end{figure}

Forty and Küchler have described the paradox of memorials in the \textit{Art of Forgetting}. The creation of a material presence in place of an absence, they argue, forecloses the possibility of semantic abundance; memorialization is thus an exercise in forgetting rather than remembering.\footnote{389 'Pamyatnik Ol'ge', \textit{Yandex.fotki} [http://fotki.yandex.ru/tags] [last accessed: 12 March 2011].} The inclination to replace

\footnote{390 \textit{The Art of Forgetting}, ed. by Adrian Forty and Susanne Küchler (Oxford; New York: Berg, 1999), p. 9.}
symbolic ambivalence with cultural definition can be remarked in the post-Soviet practice of constructing commemorative crosses in the empty spaces where Orthodox had stood before their destruction in the Soviet period. The evocative absence of the Vsegradskii Obydennyi sobor, for example, which was demolished in 1973, was substituted for a seven-metre high steel cross in 1999.\(^{391}\) The melodramatic way in which the church, which was functioning at the time as a cinema, was demolished etched the event into people’s memories, a real-life metaphor for the ruthless authoritarianism of Soviet culture.\(^{392}\) Arguably, the erection of the cross on the empty space in 1999 served to limit the interpretative freedom of the local community to redefine the event in popular culture. By attributing the space a strictly spiritual significance, alternative readings of the church’s destruction – as an act of arrogant and unwarranted violence against the local community for whom this was a focus of cultural life, for example – were marginalized.

\(^{391}\) Legend has it that the original wooden church, built in 1654, was constructed in one day to defend the town against the approaching epidemic of the Bubonic Plague. In the seventeenth century it was replaced by a stone building, which was restored and altered according to the architectural tastes of the nineteenth century. It is possible that the folkloric associations of the church protected the building against destruction in the Stalinist period (unlike the Afanasiya Aleksandriiskogo tserkov’ on the same square, which was knocked down in 1927) and informed the decision to transform it into a house of culture and later a cinema. The church functioned as a cinema until 1973, when the local authorities decided that it no longer fit with modern aesthetic of the square and demolished it. See A. I. Sazanov, E. A. Starikov, *Moya Vologda: Gorod nashei pamyati* (Vologda: Drevnosti Severa, 2007), p. 123-127; for the opening of the commemorative cross see Andrei Sal’nikov, ‘I vostanet krest na meste sobora’, *Krasnii sever*, 10 October 1997, p. 4

\(^{392}\) Army tanks were used to raze the thick seventeenth century walls. A number of friends and acquaintances in Vologda remembered the event, which they had gathered on the square to watch. Pers. Inf. V. G., Vologda, Summer 2008.
By restoring churches to their original function and endorsing the commemoration of lost objects of religious architecture, the political elite was able to cast the immediate post-Soviet period as a return to normalcy, a correction of history after almost a century of political deviation. At a local level, the dawning of a new historical era was acknowledged through a movement away from the standardized and extravagant forms of memorialization that characterised the Soviet period. As a corrective to the standardizing influence of Soviet rule – a situation that was reflected in the uniform nature of local landscapes – unconventional, locally stylized monuments were raised that symbolically demarcated the horizon, emphasizing the cultural autonomy of the regions. Thus, as Svetlana Boym has remarked (albeit with reference to the country’s ‘cultural capital’, St Petersburg), the ‘defiantly anti-monumental’

394 Ibid.
395 Author’s own photograph, Vologda, Winter 2008.
sculptures of ‘Piter’ - the puffed up siskin on the Fontanka or the hare at the entrance to the Petropavlovskaya krepost’, for example – distanced the town from the pompous topography of the capital and brought it closer to the self-reflective cityscapes of central Europe. The ludic turn in local commemorative practices can thus be understood as a purposeful ‘provincialization’ of the local landscape, the assertion of the value of local culture through the rejection not only of the cultural model of the centre, but also the reasoning behind that model.

The ‘provincialization’ of the local landscape was an attempt to delimit the regions in time as well as space. In the late-Soviet period, monuments were expected to communicate unambiguous ideological messages to the viewer, to articulate the importance of past events and their relevance to the organization of contemporary society. It was commonplace for monuments to be charged with representing several foundational events or achievements of Soviet society simultaneously – for example, the October Revolution, the Civil War, and Second World War, as in the case of monuments to Soviet conquest and liberation. In the literary context, this tendency to overburden monuments with the responsibility to represent was satirized in Evgenii Popov’s short story, Voskhozhdenie (1979). In the tale, set in the provincial town of K., a monument, encumbered with the representation of both the Bogatyr past of the river E. and ‘happy present’ of K., is cast as an effeminate young man on all fours; its representational impotence is reflected in its disfigured masculinity.²⁹⁷

The weightiness and the abstractness of the themes Soviet monuments were expected to symbolize (death, glory, triumph, brotherhood, for example) frequently led to the creation of signifying bodies that visibly sagged or swelled with the effort to ‘mean’. An illustrative case was the Pamyatnik ‘Pobedy’ in Novgorod, which was erected on the Ekaterinskaya gorka on the bank of the River Velikii in 1974. The monument, the work of sculptors G. Neroda and A. Filippova, depicted a horseman, sword in hand, on the back of a rearing mount trampling a swastika under its hooves. The vastness of the monument, as well as its entirely unaccomplished execution provoked criticism from the Ministry of Culture in the form of the Decision in 1974 ‘On the Serious Shortcomings in the Planning and Construction Work of the Pamyatnik ‘Pobedy’ in Novgorod’. Moreover, the monument became the focus of popular ridicule. According to one article from the Novaya Novgorodskaya gazeta in 2004, chastushki began to be composed about the monument soon after it was erected. One playful rhyme reported by the newspaper satirized the rudimentary execution of the monument: ‘Потому что на монумент откуда не смотри - всё одно: будто по бронзе папа Карло прошёлся привычным топором’,  

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398 A proliferation of unaccomplished monuments throughout the 1970s resulted in a Decree of the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR in 1976 ‘On the Means to Improve the Future Planning and Construction of Monuments of the RSFSR’. In this Decree, the representational shortcomings of certain national monuments were underlined: ‘нередко сооружаются памятники, не отвечающие высоким идейно-художественным требованиям, упрощённые и невыразительные по композиционному решению, не раскрывающие в должной мере значения событий, которым они посвящены’. See the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR of the 29 September 1976 № 545 ‘On the Means to Improve the Future Planning and Construction of Monuments of the RSFSR’, Bestpravo.ru (http://www.bestpravo.ru/ussr/data03/tex14253.htm) [last accessed: 12 March 2011].

In the post-Soviet period, local planners attempted to bring about the
democratization of the monumental landscape, a material reflection of the
political processes taking place at the political centre. The oversized effigies of
political leaders surveying the population from their pedestals in the centre of
towns were replaced by accessible and interactive sculptures that quickly
became the focus of local traditions and urban folklore. An example of this
process from the northern capital was the Pamyatnik Petru I by Mikhail
Shemiakin located within the Petropavlovskaya krest'. The ghoulish
appearance of the tsar, his elongated fingers and disproportionately small head
were a source of controversy when the monument was first unveiled in 1991.
Many considered Shemiakin’s monument to be an inappropriate representation
of the respected namesake of the town.\footnote{Ol’ga Boitkova discusses the reception of Shemiakin’s monument in an essay on interaction with the landscape in tourist photographs. See Ol’ga Boitkova, “Standing Still is Not Interesting”: Poses in Tourist Snapshots’, \textit{National Identity in Russia from 1961: Traditions and Deteriorisation}, 2 (November 2008) (\url{http://www.mod-langs.ox.ac.uk/russian/nationalism/newsletter.htm}) [last accessed: 8 March 2011].} Nevertheless, the statue quickly
became a centrepiece of Petersburg monument tourism with the result that it
was constantly surrounded by domestic and foreign tourists, jostling to have
their photographs taken perched coquettishly on the tsar's knee or rubbing his
spindly fingers. The avuncular Peter contrasted sharply with the aloof and
inaccessible Lenin on the armoured train at the nearby Finlyandskii station.\footnote{There was, however, a riddle about this monument: ‘Что за старый большевик/Забрался к нам на броневик,/Кепку он направо носит/Букву «Р» не произносит,/Человек он не простой,/Догадайся – кто такой?’. [Thanks to Catriona Kelly for this information.]}
The construction of Shemiakin’s monument represented not only a turn to the
past, the recovery of the memory of the tsarist period, but also a movement
forward into the era of interaction between the public and private spheres,
transparency and democracy.
The development of a new language of memorialization was even more remarkable in the Russian regions. In towns such as Novgorod and Vologda, the solemn sculptures of the Soviet period began to share the public space with a stone and bronze menagerie and effigies of anonymous individuals. By contrast with the monuments of Lenin, which depicted the leader in a state of impassioned discourse or inspired reflection, or war memorials, in which soldiers were portrayed fearlessly advancing guns clasped to chests, post-Soviet sculptures lacked dynamism and theatricality. In Novgorod, the town emblem, a brown bear, was sculptured lounging on a bench contemplating the river Volkhov (2000) and a tourist was captured in bronze relaxing near the Most Aleksandra Nevskogo after an exhausting day visiting the local sights (2009). In Vologda, a monument to electrification, a replica of the first lamppost in the town was adorned by a sculpted dog (2004), leg cocked in oblivious disrespect for the commemorative significance of the spot. This tendency can be interpreted as an effort to shift the focus of commemoration away from intangible icons of national politics towards ‘the people’, celebrating the everyday and the familiar rather than the abstract and the ideal. One might speculate that such practices are intended to emphasize the new lines of demarcation between government and governed in the post-Soviet period; the political regime was no longer understood to embody the will of the people, as Lenin monuments embodied the ideal of Communism, but was rather imagined to be at the service of the community, reflecting and responding to a lived reality.
5.3 THE DILEMMA OF THE SOVIET PA-MYAT-NIK

As Katherine Verdery illustrates in her survey of monument dismantling in post-socialist Eastern Europe, shifts to the political order are often accompanied by changes to the monumental bodies ‘who both stabilize the landscape and temporally freeze particular values in it’. 405 However, if ‘crash’ reforms were accompanied by enthusiastic displays of monument desecration in former-Czechoslovakia and Poland, 406 the revision of the national landscape, like political transition, sputtered and stalled in post-Soviet Russia. After a first wave of Soviet monument purges, which famously included the toppling of the Dzerzhinsky

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404 Photograph author’s own, Novgorod, Summer 2009.
406 Inventive examples of monument vandalism include of the Monument to Soviet Tank Crews in Prague, which was painted pink by David Černý in 1991, and the toppling of the Dzerzhinsky Monument on Dzerzhinsky Square in Warsaw, which constituted the symbolic event of the early-transition period. Monuments located in Soviet military cemeteries in Poland were nevertheless left in tact as a mark of respect to the deceased and their families. [Thanks to Piotr Chochol for this information].
monument on Lubyanka Square in Moscow in 1991, the national horizon re-stabilized. As in the Soviet period, the symbolic centre of commemorative landscape remained the monument of Lenin, although the function of this object shifted, evoking not only the iconic personage and the ideals he espoused, but also the vanished way of life in Soviet Union.

Lenin monuments functioned, and still function today, as cultural orientators, symbolizing through their presence or absence on the local landscape membership of a particular community. Two examples serve to illustrate this point. In Vologda, a friend, Valentina, narrated a story about a trip she had taken to Czechoslovakia in the 1980s. On a bus excursion around the centre of Prague, she and her friends had been astounded to find that there were no Lenin monuments on any of the town’s squares. For Russians who had travelled widely within the Soviet Union, she claimed, this discovery was unsettling. How could how a country within the eastern bloc, which presumably shared the values and objectives of the Soviet Union, fail to observe the established custom?⁴⁰⁷ By contrast, the existence of a Lenin monument on the roof of a building in New York,⁴⁰⁸ which I pointed out to friends in Vologda during a viewing of holiday photos, met with astonishment and incredulity. The incongruity of Lenin’s body presiding over a town, which was perceived to be worlds away from the Russian reality, appeared absurd, indeed, impossible.

⁴⁰⁸ The statue, apparently the work of Soviet sculptor Alexander Gerasimov, was purchased by Walker Ursitti and McGinniss Gallery in 1993 and was placed on the roof of the ‘Red Square’ apartment building at East Houston Street and Avenue A in 1994. See ‘Red Square (and the Lenin statue)’, The Big Apple (http://www.barrypopik.com/index.php/new_york_city/entry/red_square_and_the_lenin_statue/) [last accessed: 7 April 2011].
In the 2000s, several attempts were made to purge the local landscape of its Soviet signifiers. This was most obvious at the level of local toponyms, which, as I discuss in Chapter Three, became the focus of revisionist activity on the part of populist and self-serving political elites. In a parallel development in 2009, the Pskov administration proposed to relocate the Pamyatnik Leninu on ploshchad’ Lenina to allow for the construction of an underground system of traffic beneath the square. In the middle of the financial crisis, there was little doubt that this inordinately expensive project would never be realised; indeed, it was almost certainly a bid by the local governor, Andrei Turchak, to distract attention away from the economic problems that had brought cuts in wages, price rises, and, consequently, considerable anxiety to the local community. The governor’s

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409 Photograph belongs to Natalya Petukhova, c. 1957.
410 Author’s own photograph, New York, Summer 2009.
attempt to capitalise on the perceived unpopularity of Soviet monuments
nevertheless proved to be misjudged. The proposal provoked an animated
debate in which alternative understandings of the sculpture, as a memorial to
lived history of the Soviet Union and, somewhat counter-intuitively, a symbol of
political tolerance, were articulated.411

In her perceptive study of the posthumous lives of certain prominent ‘bodies’ in
post-socialist culture, Katherine Verdery pithily describes the process by which
statues immortalize and consecrate the dead:

Statues are dead people cast in bronze or carved in stone. They
symbolize a specific famous person while in a sense also being the
body of that person. By arresting the process of that person’s bodily
decay, a statue alters the temporality associated with the person,
bringing him into the realm of the timeless or the sacred, like an
icon. For this reason, desecrating a statue partakes of the larger
history of iconoclasm. Tearing it down not only removes that
specific body from the landscape, as if to excise it from history, but
also proves that because it can be torn down, no god protects it.412

In the Soviet Union, where monumental bodies stood for not only the human
bodies they depicted, but also the body politic represented by those individuals,
iconoclasm meant both revoking the sacred status of the human body and the
system it symbolized.413 Yet such systemic iconoclasm presented a paradox. For
those people who had formed constituent parts of that system, who had lived by
its rules (willingly or not) and participated in its rituals, the symbolic rejection of

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412 Verdery, p. 5.
413 For more on the iconography of the Lenin and Stalin leadership cults see Victoria Bonnell,
this past was undesirable, indeed impossible. A cleavage was thus discernable in the responses to the proposal on the webpage of the Pskovskaya lenta novostei. While members of the younger generation (identifiable by their characteristically idiosyncratic use of syntax and orthography) advocated the expeditious removal of the monument (‘Скажите Уважаемые, куда заслать денег, чтобы лысого-сифилитика снести [sic. снесли] как можно быстрее...’),\textsuperscript{414} those who had grown up under the Soviet regime were more reluctant to expel its symbols from history. In an interview in the local newspaper Kur’er in 2009, a 42-year old schoolteacher articulated an opinion in which the perceived distinction between Communist rule and the lived experience of the Soviet Union was made explicit:

Памятник ни в коем случае нельзя ни убирать, ни переносить. Он же... ПА-МЯТ-НИК! Понимаете? Это часть нашей истории. Может получиться как при коммунистах, когда сносили церкви [sic. церкви]. Ничего хорошего не получится.\textsuperscript{415}

No longer an ideological emblem, the sculpture (and its preservation) is presented as a symbolic marker of the transition from authoritarian government to pluralistic democracy, a shift from intolerance to liberalism. Ironically, the icon of Communist rule is re-construed as a monument to the system’s downfall, its incongruence in the contemporary context a material manifestation of the closing of an era and the burgeoning of a new political reality.\textsuperscript{416}

5.4 POPULAR RITUALS AND EVERYDAY MEMORY

Susanne Küchler has remarked that we know about our past not only through objects and images but also through our bodily habits, as found in gestures, skills, or simply in our ability to move about in an environment both predictably and without accident.\textsuperscript{417} We could extend this idea to include, not only our ability to cross the road, but also our more abstract knowledge of places and their meanings, which allows us to negotiate the social and cultural, as well as the geographic landscape. Our knowledge of the special significance of certain places: meeting points, lovers’ dens, or make-shift children’s playgrounds (for example the chains around the Pushkin Monument on which Tsvetaeva with ‘all child-Moscow that has, was, is, and would be swing’)\textsuperscript{418} might be considered examples of collective habit-memory. The past, as Küchler has noted, is thus in no way uncontaminated by memory, but is ‘already the product of memory-work, and only as such a product is the past present and conscious’.\textsuperscript{419}

In Soviet Russia, this embodied knowledge of the past played a particularly important role in the definition of community boundaries. The standardization of the urban landscape, a feature of Soviet reality that was parodied in media productions such as the cult TV-film \textit{Ironiya sud’by ili S lekim parom} (1975).\textsuperscript{420}

\footnotesize
\textsuperscript{418} Tsvetaeva, p. 326.
\textsuperscript{419} Küchler, p. 27.
\textsuperscript{420} Cf. the lightly sarcastic voice-over that begins the film, in which the creation of identical monuments, the generic renaming of streets, and the building of indistinguishable \textit{mikroraiony} in Soviet towns is recognised with the words «Красиво, не правда ли?.». Emil’ Veniaminovich Braginskii, El’dar Ryazanov, ‘Ironiya sudby, ili S lekim parom’ (Mosfilm, 1975) (http://lib.aldebaran.ru/author/braginskii_yemil/braginskii_yemil_ironiya_sudby_ili_s_legkim_p)
provided an impulse to invest generic objects with specific significance, to attribute the uniform reality of everyday life with mythological meaning. The folklorization of urban space was an expression of this tendency that was arguably more marked at the periphery than at the centre of the country. In the Russian regions, where, according to Dmitry Likhachev, the national mosaic of cultural diversity was gradually ceding to monotonous homogenization,\textsuperscript{421} new systems of signification were established that provided urban landscapes with local distinctness and individuality.

The proliferation of collectively endorsed toponyms for Soviet monuments was one of the ways in which the local landscape was redefined in popular culture. The nickname ‘Kon’ for the Pamyatnik Pobedy in Novgorod,\textsuperscript{422} ‘Zub Parmenova’ or ‘Palisad’ for the Pamyatnik geroyam Oktyabr’skoi revolyutsii in Vologda,\textsuperscript{423} and, more respectfully, ‘Poet s nyanoi’ for the Pamyatnik ‘Pushkin i krest'yanka’ in Pskov were among the examples of knowing allusions that form part of a shared corpus of knowledge about the local sphere. Furthermore, the function of commemorative objects in local culture was renegotiated by local communities. Certain monuments to literary figures, such as the Pamyatnik Batyushkovu in Vologda and the Pushkin monument in Pskov, acquired reputations as meeting places for ‘civilized’ groups of literary minded youngsters and, in the post-Soviet period, Europhile sub-cultures, such as ‘goths’ and ‘emo’ fans. By contrast Soviet monuments, such as the Pamyatnik geroyam Oktyabr’skoi revolyutsii in Vologda,

\textsuperscript{422} The name makes reference to the huge horse on which the soldier is mounted.
\textsuperscript{423} Vladimir Parmenov was the chairman of the gorispolkom in Vologda between 1967 and 1984; ‘Palisad’ is a more obvious allusion to stake-like appearance of the monument.
were renowned as the locations of hard-drinking and anti-social gangs, a place to avoid on one’s walk home through town at night. Monuments featured in local jokes and anecdotes (such as the quip ‘он пошел в танк’, which made reference to the T-34 military tank in Vologda that also functioned as the location for prostitutes); and they were used to parody Soviet officialise, such as the military sounding construction ‘противотанковый магазин’ used to signify the household goods outlet located opposite the military monument in Vologda. Through such practices, urban space was reclaimed from the political authorities, renamed and redefined by the local community in a subtle but significant act of resistance and an expression of collective self-consciousness.

Subversive and playful forms of interaction with commemorative objects were another way in which the solemnity of historical discourse was challenged and public space was invested with locally specific meaning. The eastertime ritual of colouring of the genitalia of the horse of the Pamyatnik Pobedy monument – a ritual which gave rise to another local nickname for the monument ‘Yaitsa’424 – formed part of a genre of monument related lewdness acknowledged and tolerated with good humour by most members of the local community.425 Frivolous behaviour in the urban sphere challenged the virtues of sobriety, industriousness, rationality, and diligence that constituted the authoritative

424 This tradition is mentioned on the ‘alternative’ local website to the town ‘Velikii Novgorod: Al’ternativnoe kraevedenie Novgorodskoi oblasti’ ([http://www.nov.ru/wiki/Великий_Новгород](http://www.nov.ru/wiki/Великий_Новгород)) [last accessed: 16 May 09].
425 Another local ‘tradition’ was the disfigurement of the ‘pissing dog’ sculpture at the monument to electrification in Vologda. According to a friend this dog’s private parts had been stolen so many times that the local authorities had decided to leave the sculpture incomplete in 2009. Pers. Inf. N. S., Vologda, Summer, 2009.
basis for organised life in the Russian regions.\textsuperscript{426} Expanding the limits of accepted public behaviour, ludic practices and traditions associated with public sculpture constituted a form of escapism from the highly regulated character of public life, but also a source of empowerment and collective self-definition for the local community.

Local monuments became the centre of popular ‘fetishes’ in the post-Soviet period, acquiring supernatural powers to bestow wealth, fertility, happiness, and other beneficial qualities on those who observed their customs. Thus, stroking the paw of the right-hand pair of sculpted lions in the Novgorod Kremlin brought luck in love, while caressing the leg of the left-hand sculpture could hasten a windfall.\textsuperscript{427} In Vologda, rubbing the boot of the monument to Konstantin Batyushkov ensured creative success while stroking the finger of the nearby figurine granted the participant a wish.\textsuperscript{428} The proliferation of superstitions associated with public sculpture was due in part to the greater accessibility of monuments in the post-Soviet period. Wrested from their pedestals and thrust into the lived environment, monuments ceased to function as inaccessible symbols of a secular belief system and acquired folkloric associations, frequently connected with capacity to bestow good fortune. Yet the pseudo-traditional practices that emerged around public sculpture also reflected the growing ‘commodification’ of urban culture for consumption by local and national audiences. As an informant who worked as an events manager in Vologda

\textsuperscript{426} For a discussion of playfulness and its function in the urban sphere see Quentin Stevens, \textit{The Ludic City: Exploring the Potential of Public Spaces} (London: Routledge, 2007); and Lyn H. Lofland, \textit{The Public Realm: Exploring the City's Quintessential Social Territory} (Hawthorne, N. Y.: Aldine de Gruyter, 1998).

\textsuperscript{427} P.I. E. S., St Petersburg, Summer 2010.

\textsuperscript{428} P.I. Y. G., Vologda, Summer 2009.
explained, a number of modern wedding customs had been introduced by local wedding planners, who wised to multiply the number of local sites visited by couples on their wedding day.⁴²⁹ ‘Invented’ or otherwise, the knowledge and execution of such traditions constituted means acknowledging and performing local identity on the public stage, reinforcing the boundaries of the community through ceremonial participation in a stock of collectively recognized cultural acts.

**5.5 ‘INTENDED MONUMENTS’ TO THE OLD AND NEW REGIMES**

In an article on the definition of monuments published in 1903, Alois Reigl spoke about ‘unintentional monuments’ as places of ‘little official historical importance that arouse nostalgia and public interest as symbols of transition and change’.⁴³⁰ Such transitory monuments, the relics of the former political system, are embedded within the lived environment of post-Soviet Russia in the form of human effigies, local toponyms, and the organisation of urban space.⁴³¹ One might speculate that, while retaining their signifying function, these symbols now exist within a changed semantic system which no longer renders them authoritative, but underscores the failure and discredited nature of the former order. If, as Sergei Oushakine has argued, the emblems the pre-revolutionary past permitted the post-Soviet public ‘to evoke a shared experience, to point

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⁴²⁹ One of these traditions was the practice of the bride’s mounting the horse of the Batyushkov monument while the groom smoothed the horse’s backside for fertility. P. I. Yurii, d.o.b 18.03.71, self-employed. Interviewed at Café ‘Parizh’ in Vologda on 25.09.09 (recording with author).


toward a common vocabulary of symbolic gestures',\textsuperscript{432} the relics of the Soviet past signified something very different. The half-faded Soviet icons and disintegrating buildings that dominate the local landscape were ubiquitous reminders of the discredited past, their lingering presence an indication of the unachieved ideal of political transition.

The so-called ‘dolgoroi’ – the unfinished mega-projects undertaken during the Soviet Union and abandoned in the 1990s – were perhaps the most poignant monuments to the perestroika years and collapse of the Soviet Union. These objects were symbols of the paradoxical condition of unquestioning faith in the eternity of the system and the inevitability of that system’s demise that Alexei Yurchak has identified in his study of the ‘last Soviet generation’.\textsuperscript{433} In Pskov, for example, the colossal shell of an unfinished hotel on the bank of the River Velikii provided material evidence of the untrammelled ambition of Soviet planners while its air of sad abandonment expressed the abrupt and definitive character of the collapse. The ‘unfinished building’, through its evocative associations with the post-Soviet climate of cultural disorientation and identity flux, became a popular trope among writers and directors in the 2000s. Kira Muratova’s 2001 film Vtorostepennyye lyudi was thus set in an abandoned housing estate, the post-Soviet variant of the eerily deserted ‘ghost town’ of depression-era America, while the unfinished project at the centre of Arsenii Danilov’s short story Dolgoroi (2006), an ophthalmology centre turned brothel, provided a material

\textsuperscript{432} Serguei Oushakine, “We’re Nostalgic but We’re Not Crazy”: Retrofitting the Past in Russia’, Russian Review, 66, 3 (2007), pp. 451-482 (p. 469).

focus for the author’s reflections on the moral degeneration of post-Soviet Russian culture.

Alongside the ruins of Soviet civilization, icons of the new regime appeared. Russian villas, the construction of which began in the 1990s and intensified in the first half of the 2000s, embodied the ideals of social exclusivity and conspicuous consumerism that Caroline Humphrey among others has identified as characteristically ‘post-socialist’. In her discussion of the cultural identity of ‘New Russians’, Humphrey argues that the architectural style of the post-Soviet ‘kottedzh’ is part of a process of self-identification, the material appropriation of national historical myth and European culture by the new Russian elite in an effort ‘to represent themselves to themselves’.\(^{435}\) However, in the late-2000s the

\(^{434}\) Photograph author’s own, Pskov, Summer 2009.

stylised European villas also formed part of the system of identification for non-
elite Russians; they were objects which through their self-conscious foreignness
supplied means of self-definition for local communities, affirming what the
ordinary masses are not. As Humphrey points out, the owners of these
properties were perceived to be both foreign and familiar, having ‘derived and
spun away from “us”, the unmarked mainstream’. The ways in which local
communities interacted with the material culture of this group reflects this
interpretative ambiguity, constituting at once a rejection of the imagined
unscrupulousness with which the wealth to purchase such houses was acquired
and a fascination with this alternative model of domesticity that borders on the
unwholesome obsession with glamour and celebrity.

The inaccessibility of the elite ‘cottages’ – many of which were owned by wealthy
individuals from St Petersburg and Moscow – contributed to the experience of
social exclusion in the Russian regions. In Pskov, for example, a settlement of
Italian-inspired villas fashioned from exotic-looking red brick and flanked by
landscaped gardens was visible from the public park on the opposite bank of the
river, but unreachable for those without a permit for the bridge that connected
them with the town. This condition of exclusivity propelled members of the local
community to participate in spectatorial rituals of showing and narrating the
architecture, strengthening through routinized forms of self-display the notions
of social segregation and marginality. This process was encouraged by some
local proprietors who permitted visitors controlled access to their domestic
realms. During a visit to a former noble mansion, which had been restored by a

436 Humphrey, p. 177.
local businessman and converted into a hunting lodge,\textsuperscript{437} my Russian fellow-visitors enthusiastically photographed themselves with the flamboyant furniture and fittings. The act of photographing oneself in this environment served to externalise the experience, rendering it foreign and separate from everyday life. Moreover, the display of these photographs to friends and family reinforced the opposition between exotica and familiarity, strengthening the boundaries of social identity through the collective recognition of difference.

![Image](image_url)

\textbf{Fig. 36.} A house from the elite 'cottage' settlement on the 'Zolotaya naberezhnaya' in Pskov\textsuperscript{438}

\textbf{Fig. 37.} Visitors pose for photographs at the noble mansion, 'Nesvoiskoe', in Vologda\textsuperscript{439}

\section*{5.6 Conclusion}

Thinking etymologically about the word 'monument', it is instructive to note the early signification of 'tomb', a sense that has been preserved in the Welsh

\textsuperscript{437} The eighteenth-century estate, 'Nesvoiskoe', was restored by Leonid Komarov in the mid-2000s and opened to the public in 2009. As the website of the estate indicates the intended clientele are wealthy Russians who wish to experience the atmosphere of 'eighteenth-century noble life'. The owners of the estate also encourage people to visit the premises. See 'Usadba 'Nesvoiskoe': Odykh i pomes'te XVIII veka' (http://www.nesy.ru/service.html) [last accessed 8 March 2011]. Leonid Komarov also published a short essay in 2006 on his life, his business, and the restoration of 'Nesvoiskoe'. See L. Komarov, \textit{Svoe Nesvoiskoe}, (Vologda, 'Fest', 2006).

\textsuperscript{438} Photograph author's own, Pskov, Summer 2009.

\textsuperscript{439} Photograph author's own, Vologda, Winter 2008.
mynwent (derived from the classical Latin monumentum) meaning graveyard. It is only in the fourteenth century that the meaning of the word expanded to signify ‘anything that preserves a memory of something’, and in the seventeenth century that it obtained its abstract notion of a ‘lasting work of literature, science or art’. Many of the monuments examined in the preceding discussion reflect the earliest meaning of the word, in as much as they commemorate things that have ceased to be. The effigies of Communist leaders and unfinished buildings of the perestroika period preserve in memory a vanished way of life in the Soviet Union. Moreover, the new additions to the landscape, the symbols of Orthodoxy and villas of the new Russian elite, draw their cultural significance through their opposition to values of the Soviet past, atheism and egalitarianism respectively.

The cultural landscape of late-2000s Russia was thus defined by the material and symbolic heritage of Soviet past. The ‘revisionist’ actions of political elites and the attempts of the Orthodox Church to achieve a return to ‘normalcy’ obtained legitimacy through their opposition to the Communist ‘vision’ or the ‘abnormality’ of Soviet culture. One might consider the implications of this argument for the conceptualisation of historical time. As Mikhail Epstein has pointed out, the temporal qualifier ‘post-’ presumes a new emphasis on the past, locating contemporaneity in definitional relation to that which has preceded it. ‘Post-Soviet’ culture is thus by definition retrospective, deriving authority

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440 See definition of ‘monument’ in the Oxford English Dictionary [http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/00315291?query_type=word&queryword=monument&first=1&max_to_show=10&sort_type=alpha&result_place=1&search_id=OF50-bjxWe7-6388&hilite=00315291], (last accessed 18 October 2010).
and identity through its demonstrable opposition to the 'Soviet'. Yet, as I have argued in this chapter, this is not necessarily true of developments in popular culture, where ways have been found to incorporate the past into contemporary self-perceptions and where spontaneity and play have opened up space for cultural invention and transformation. This can be noted in the ritualised forms of behaviour that have emerged in urban realm, but also in the evolution of oral traditions, as I discuss in the chapter that follows.

CHAPTER FIVE
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TALES FROM ‘DEEP RUSSIA’: THE NARRATIVE CONSTRUCTION OF LOCALNESS IN ORAL TESTIMONY

6.1 PROVINCIAL STEREOTYPES IN RUSSIAN LITERATURE AND CULTURE

In an article which appeared on the website of the Russian current affairs magazine *Skepsis* in 2008 Ivan Leshchinskii described a new human life form which, in his opinion, had resulted from the degeneration of people in the Russian provinces.\(^\text{442}\) Half ‘One Dimensional Man’ (the creature of uniform dress, thoughts, and false desires imagined by Herbert Marcuse in his work of the same name),\(^\text{443}\) half-illiterate peasant of tsarist Russia, the caricature of provincial Russians was intended as a critique of cultural devolution outside of the capital. Leshchinskii’s text can be situated in a long tradition of mocking provincialism which has its origins in the satirical portrayals of the Russian provincial elites in the eighteenth century. Denis Fonvizin, for example, penned scathing caricatures of this new privileged class in works such as *Nedorosl’* (1782) and *Brigadir*

(1769), while the morally reprehensible character of members of the local administrations and corrupt law courts was elaborated by writers such as Mikhail Varevkin in *Tak i dolzhno* (1773), and Vasilii Kapnist in *Yabella* (1798).

In the nineteenth century, Nikolai Gogol’s *Revizor* (1836) and *Mertvye dushi* (1842) marked the apotheosis of comic satire at the expense of the rapacious and inept provincial gentry. In *Mertvye dushi*, the reader was offered a *tour d’horizon* of provincial boorishness as the conniving protagonist Chichikov visited the estates of landowners living in one Russian *guberniya* and in *Mirgorod* (1835), the writer turned his satirical ire against the provincial Ukrainians. Gogol’s tradition was differently developed in the second half of the nineteenth century by writers such as Mikhail Saltykov-Shchedrin in his novels *Istoriya odnogo goroda* (1869) and *Pompadury i pompadurshki* (1873), which poked fun at the country’s ridiculous provincial governors and the simpleton Russians who had put up with their tyrannical rule. The author’s last work, *Poshekhonskaya starina* (1887-1889), which combined a semi-autobiographical memoir of the author’s own childhood on his father’s provincial estate in Tula with a historical panorama of Russia in the 1880s, helped proverbialize the term *poshekhontsy*, referring to the quintessentially provincial inhabitants of the district of Poshekhon’ie, now in the Yaroslavl’ oblast’.

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444 In a similar way to the Irish of the British ‘paddywhackery’ tradition, *poshekhontsy* became synonymous with feats of provincial idiocy such as attempting to milk their chickens, looking down the barrels of their guns, or dragging their cows out to graze on their roofs. See ‘Poshekhontsy’, *Rossiiskii gumanitarnyi entsiklopedicheskii slovar*, (http://slovari.yandex.ru/dict/rges/article/rg3/rg3-0300.htm?text=пощекошны&stpar3=1.1) [last accessed 13 January 2010].
In the Soviet period, the perceived ‘provincialization’ of Russian culture and literature provided new impetus for émigré and dissident writers to engage with the theme of the backward province. The self-important provincial artists of Evgenii Popov’s *Voskhozdenie* (1979) and the pompous, Pushkin-idolizing Pskovichi of Sergei Dovlatov’s *Zapovednik* (1991) thus joined the ranks of literary provincial fools whose function was to expose the intellectual hollowness and pomposity of the administrative regime. Post-Soviet variations on the theme have included the genre of cinematic docu-realism labelled *chernukha*, which has specialized in grimy close-ups of the primitive provinces and their vile inhabitants.\(^4\) In the world of *Runet* blogging, the counter-cultural internet community, *padonky*, have also observed the tradition by electing the provincial Belarusian town of Bobruisk the ‘dustbin of history’ for all inadequate creative efforts.\(^4\)

For the purposes of this paper, which focuses specifically on the narrative construction of localness in the oral tradition of Russians from the North West, the details of this literary tradition are not necessarily as important as the imprint they have left on contemporary Russian culture. While many Russians may only be vaguely aware of the satirical portrayals of provincial life, apart maybe from those in Gogol’s *Mertvye dushi*, literary contributions to the theme


\(^4\) The full expression used to express disdain towards another blogger’s creative endeavour is ‘в Бабутык, живите!’, the Welsh provincial town of Llanddewi Brefi, nationally known as the hometown of ‘the only gay in the village’ as a result of the cult television series *Little Britain* might be compared as an obscure province turned cultural icon as a result of popular culture; cf. Al’tbert Baulin, ‘Yazik padonkall’, *National Identity in Russia from 1961: Traditions and Deterriorisation Newsletter*, 1 (2008), pp. 9-11 (http://www.mod-langs.ox.ac.uk/russian/nationalism/newsletter.htm) [last accessed: 21 March 2011].
have nevertheless helped to establish a set of (largely negative) characteristics traditionally identified as ‘provincial’. Laziness, drunkenness, stupidity and nosiness, the main qualities of the fictional provincial Russian of the nineteenth century, thus remain central to the contemporary provincial stereotype, particularly from the point of view of those living in St Petersburg and Moscow. The way in which Russians from the provinces engage with these received ideas is nevertheless more a more complex question, and one which I address in the course of the following chapter.

6.2 BACKGROUND TO THE ORAL HISTORY WORK

The main source of this discussion is a summer of oral history work conducted in Novgorod, Pskov, and Vologda between the beginning of July and the end of September 2009. The research was conducted using a semi-structured interview format that touched on a number of themes central to this study of local traditions and cultural memory in the North West. These included representations of localness, forms of social identity and focuses of local pride, perceptions of the collective self and the local environment, the production and perpetuation of local myths and traditions, and strategies of self-presentation (to foreigners and ‘locals’). The interviews were conducted by the author and, in the case of the interviews taken in Novgorod, in tandem with a Russian ethnologist and former resident of the town, Svetlana Podrezova.

The oral history work followed a year of research in the Russian North West, during which I was able to meet and establish regular contact with many of the people whom I would go on to interview the following summer. However, since
the large part of my time in the towns was spent in local libraries and archives, a predominantly female domain, the majority of my contacts were middle-aged females with a specialization in foreign languages or literature and, thus, constituted an unrepresentative cross-section of the local community. If I began the interview work with little doubt that the balance between blue-collar male and white-collar female informants could be easily redressed, convincing men to give interviews turned out to be more difficult than I originally anticipated. These problems stemmed not only from my own status as a young, foreign female and the perceived moral ambiguity involved in my meeting privately with men to talk about their past experiences and personal ‘memories’. More significantly, perhaps, the apparent absence of an appropriate milieu for conducting interviews with men posed an obstacle to the conduct of the oral history work, which could be negotiated with only limited success.

While the domestic environment and, in particular, the kitchen table provided a natural setting for interviews with female informants, no such predetermined space appeared to exist for holding conversation with Russian men. The confidential atmosphere achieved by one’s presence in another person’s home or the ceremonious partaking of tea and sweets together was rarely achieved with male informants. Male talk thus more frequently came in the form of raucous conversation with multiple interlocutors, fidgety mini-dialogues conducted on

447 The way that I defined the objectives of the interview work evolved over the course of the summer, acquiring nuances and emphases in response to the reactions of local people. I thus quickly abandoned my initial definition of the project as ‘a study of local/non-capital culture’ after several people declined to give interviews on the grounds that their knowledge of local history was too patchy to be of use. The shift in emphasis from ‘local culture’, which appeared to evoke ideas of memorizing historical dates and figures at school, to ‘local memory’ produced more successful results, although it was not uncommon for people, especially those within the 60-80 age bracket, to protest that they had only banal, if any memories at all of the past.
the hoof or during brief coffee breaks, or noisy visits to local cafes. Perhaps the only exchange with a man which approximated the many lengthy and intimate discussions I shared with female informants was conducted with Igor448 at his dacha on the outskirts of Pskov. In his exquisitely tended garden, we appeared to inhabit a significantly less gendered domestic setting in which conversation emerged more naturally and fluently than in other private places.

The actual experience of interviewing also departed significantly from my theoretical expectations. My initial intention to stick closely by the lengthy semi-structured interview was thus quickly revised when confronted with the sterile and halting dialogue it produced. In addition, certain questions, which I had hoped would produce lively responses, instead provoked confusion or even irritation. Direct questions about the existence and nature of local stereotypes, for example, were frequently brushed off, in a display of enlightened political correctness, or otherwise answered mechanically with withering looks in the direction of the indiscreet interviewing party.449 The experience of interviewing in tandem with a member of the local community in Novgorod required even greater flexibility in terms of interview technique, as spontaneous conversational diversions based on shared memories of people and places began to exert a greater influence over the direction and development of the narratives. These processes of personal intellectual development can also be recognised in the

448 All surnames have been omitted to preserve the anonymity of the informants.
449 Interestingly, this question provoked an explicitly negatively reaction on only one occasion when my colleague, Svetlana Podrezova, asked it of her former teacher and acquaintance, provoking the response: 'Светла! Это что за вопрос?!'. Clearly, if such indiscretions were to be expected of a culturally unaware foreigner, they were less excusable from a member of one’s own community.
interviews, and are manifest in their changing structure and the thematic focus of the discussions.

The period in which this study was conducted, the late-2000s, must be seen as a moment of relative political stability in the turbulent history of post-Soviet Russia. The violent political infighting of the early 1990s, which turned provincial towns such as medieval Novgorod into ‘subdivisions of Chicago’, to quote the title of one recent study of those turbulent years,\(^{450}\) appeared to have given way to a \textit{modus vivendi} between money-pilfering local authorities and grumbling but largely passive populations. At the same time, however, this period was marked by heightened anxiety and personal insecurity spurred by the late-2000s financial crisis. Most households in the towns that I visited had seen some reduction in their monthly incomes as a result of shortened working hours or pay cuts, and several informants voiced sincere concerns that the country and its inhabitants were about to repeat the painful experience of the 1998 default.

The extent to which these specific historical conditions affected the way people talked about themselves and their pasts is difficult to determine. While one might agree with Bertaux and others that the ‘autobiographical candour’ of the immediate post-Soviet era gave way to a more positive collective memory of the Soviet past,\(^{451}\) many of the ‘modes of speaking’ identified by Nancy Ries in her study of conversation during perestroika were still identifiable in contemporary

\(^{450}\) Maksim Grigor’ev, \textit{Filial Novgorodskogo Chikago} (Moscow: Fond issledovaniya problem demokratii, 2008).

oral culture. Thus, the ‘sacralization of private talk’ that Ries recognizes as a product of an authoritarian Soviet regime precluding people from expressing themselves openly and honestly in public, remained important for the ‘production of value’ in contemporary Russian culture. No longer a safe-haven from ideological pressure, private talk in the post-Soviet period retained its value as a meaningful alternative to what was perceived by many to be the hollow, insincere rhetoric of public life.

It should come as no surprise that contemporary voices are self-referential, and that they return to former ways of expressing and understanding the world in circumstantially similar situations. As Lotman and Uspenskii have notably pointed out, ‘every new stage in history, while orientating itself in opposition to the past, inevitably incorporates, repeats similar events, historical or psychological situations, or texts’. In the late-2000s, many of the people I spoke with were experiencing a sense of frustration and incomprehension with the perceived lot of the Russian people that was far from unfamiliar and led them to reconfigure their own personal histories into a series of thwarted hopes and expectations. The employment of speech genres recorded by writers such as Ries and Pesmen in the perestroika period – self-irony, mock-epic, and the lament, among others – paid testament, if not to the continuity between Soviet and post-Soviet experiences, then to the cyclical, conservative nature of Russian talk.

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452 As Ries explains, in the world of talk ‘there is no absolute value referent, but rather a constant assertion and negotiation of positive and negative value which takes place via the symbolic dimension of all the practices of day-to-day living, and which is intimately tied to the creation of selfhood and collective identities.’ See Nancy Ries, Russian Talk: Culture and Conversation During Perestroika (Cornell University Press: Ithaca and London, 1997), p. 20.

Oral tradition in late-2000s Russia nevertheless differed qualitatively from that of the perestroika period, if only from the point of view of its broadened horizon of reference. In the post-Soviet period, the boundaries of modern memory expanded; Russians benefited from unprecedentedly high levels of access to information and freedom with which that information could be interpreted. The emerging market in genealogy, for example – an attempt to fill the gaps in family histories left by the biography censoring practices of the Soviet state – furnished individuals with a knowledge of their ancestors and their activities which had important consequences for their understanding of themselves and their lives. In a similar way, the state-sponsored revival of kраeведение in the post-Soviet period created a canon of local topoi, events, and iconic images that lent structure and detail and to personal memories of the local past.

6.3 THE ‘ENCHANTED’ PROVINCES

During the Khrushchev and Brezhnev eras, the towns of the Russian North West experienced unprecedented demographic growth. This was partly, as Judith Pallot has pointed out, a result of the staggering levels of rural out-migration in the post-war period, a consequence of the increased urban employment opportunities, housing availability, and other quality of life issues that emerged.

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454 Courses in genealogical methods offered at local universities and libraries have resulted in a dramatic increase in the number of amateur historians active in Russia today. In the provincial archives where I worked between 2008-2009, I met several female pensioners who, having successfully traced their own family trees back several generations, were earning a moderate additional income by researching the genealogical roots of their friends’ and colleagues’ families.

at this time.\textsuperscript{456} Urban migration was also spurred by other factors. Housing shortages, particularly in the larger industrial towns in the North and East, drove many young people to take advantage of new legislation permitting the formation of house building cooperatives to move to developing small towns such as Novgorod and Pskov in the North West, and Astrakhan in the South West. Others moved with family members who were assigned military posts in the region, pulling strings to be sent back to their hometowns after extended periods serving in other Soviet republics. Others still moved out of a sense of romanticism for small town life, taking advantage of the increase in residence associated freedoms to escape the larger metropolises for smaller, less congested locations.\textsuperscript{457}

Urban migrants to the North West recalled their first impressions of the medieval towns in the course of narrating their life histories in interview. They described their idealistic expectations of life in the North West, which had been informed by cultural stereotypes, cinema, literature, and history lessons. Margarita, who moved to Pskov as a young woman in 1973 from a small town in Siberia, recalled her assumptions about the nature of cultural life in European

\textsuperscript{456} Illustrative of this trend are the figures provided for the Pskov region by V. V. Polukoshko and V. V. Shevel'kov, which show that the urban population of the oblast' increased gradually from 200,000 in 1945 to 258,000 in 1960, before exploding to 466,300 in 1979; over the same period, the rural population dropped sharply from 1,550,000 in 1945 to 1,045,000 in 1960, only to fall below 50\% of the total population to 384,600 in 1979. See V. V. Polukoshko and V. V. Shevel'kov, Zemlya Pskovskaya: Istoriya i sovremennost' (Pskov: Izdatel'skii Dom 'Sterkh', 2003), pp. 142-143.

\textsuperscript{457} Workers obtained greater freedom of movement in the 1950s as a result of several factors: the right to change jobs voluntarily was re-awarded to workers in 1956, and recruiting agencies such as the organized hiring of workers to industrial enterprises (Orgnabor) and the State Labour Reserve Schools lost much of their coercive power or abandoned recruitment altogether. As a result migration was facilitated, and even encouraged in some cases through state projects such as the Virgin Lands Campaign and 'new construction' campaigns. See Donald Filtzer, \textit{Soviet Workers and De-Stalinization: The Consolidation of the Modern System of Soviet Production Relations, 1953-1964} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 70.
Russia. A proud Siberian, she took pleasure in contrasting the ‘provincial’ reality of the North West with the more progressive mentality of that of her Eastern hometown:

Инф: В общем, мы решили уехать сюда, и хотелось просто, – когда даже на экскурсии ездили в Новосибирск, или в Томск, или в Кемерово, – хотелось почему-то выбраться в Европу очень сильно. Думали, что в Европе будет всё совершенно по-другому. Мы мечтатели! Мы, русские люди, такие мечтатели! Вот мы прочитали о чём-то и... Недаром говорят, что у нас литературоцентристская страна. Что прочитали, и уже мечтаем об этом. Но, тем не менее, потом мы попадаем в Европу, сначала в город Великие Луки, Псковской области, который мне совершенно не понравился, просто деревенщина какая-то! Мне казалось, по сравнению с Сибирью, где я жила, в маленьком, казалось, городе, там было столько умных людей, и у нас был такой замечательный класс! А тут я ... Даже, вот, диалект: "Каво ты-ы? Чаво ты-ы?".
Соб.: Правда?
Инф.: Вот эта вот неграмотная русская речь меня просто поразила. В Сибири люди говорили очень грамотно. Может, потому что там ссылали декабристов в своё время, вот, но там либо ээки, заключённые, либо – такая вот полярность такая – либо очень грамотные люди. Грамотные и очень хорошо одевающиеся. И я удивилась: я думала, что Европа сейчас меня просто обескуражит своей культурой, своим шармом. Ничего подобного!458

The impressions of those who moved to the North West in the late-Soviet period were informed not only by their scope for comparison, but also by their social and cultural background. The naïve romanticism that Tkachenko recalls in her younger self might thus be grounded in the zealous idealism of her parents who had moved to Siberia in the 1950s to help build Communism in their native land. Moreover, the cultural associations that Europe possessed for Tkachenko were somewhat particular to her generation of western oriented, Beatles-loving

458 P. I. Margarita, d.o.b. 26.09.57, teacher. Interviewed at her home in Pskov on 01.08.09. (transcript/recording with author).
‘sixtniks’, who identified the region with the ideals of individual creativity and libertine attitudes of 1960s Western Europe.\textsuperscript{459} According to this logic, European Russia, even its provincial towns, would overshadow the industrialized East in terms of cultural innovation and societal permissiveness.

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.4\textwidth]{image.png}
\caption{Fig. 38. The symbol of western liberalism, John Lennon, depicted in pulses on the wall of Margarita’s flat in Pskov\textsuperscript{460}}
\end{figure}

Other informants who had moved to the North West in the Soviet period recalled the former provincialism of the towns with romantic sentimentality. The underdeveloped aspects of urban life – the wooden housing, dialectical specificities, and rural surrounds – provided the background for memories of ‘poor but happy’ childhoods and fairytale-like depictions of everyday life in the Soviet Union. The traditional wooden ‘fabric’ of the towns, which was systematically replaced by Soviet panelled housing in the 1950s, was the focus of

\textsuperscript{459} It goes without saying that the ‘swinging sixties’ in western Europe is also a cultural construct, the belief in which was perpetuated in Soviet Russia by the illicit exchange of records, clothing, and other western merchandise. For a discussion of the myth of the 1960s in Russia and the Soviet Union see Petr Vail and Aleksandr Genis, \textit{60-e: Mir sovetskogo cheloveka} (Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 1996).

\textsuperscript{460} Photograph author’s own, Pskov, Summer 2009.
childhood memories and a source of reflection on how the towns had changed 'beyond recognition' in the contemporary period.\textsuperscript{461} In one individual narrative, Tat’yana, who moved to Vologda from Siberia as a child, described how the captivating local architecture had caused her to lose her way as she wandered through the town as a child:

Когда я приехала, город не знала совсем. Я приехала летом, был август месяц, в Вологде было много аллей, бульваров, нежели теперь. И наша улица была вся обсыпана большими тополями. И вот я ходила по городу от одного дома до другого деревянного, не зная ни улиц, иногда даже могла заблудиться и потом спрашивала местных жителей, как мне выйти в центр города. Потому что эти дома буквально завораживали. Они были удивительные. Каждый дом был по-своему хорош.\textsuperscript{462}

This description draws on tropes of the Russian folk narrative: the wooden houses cast a spell on the passer-by like trees in an enchanted forest; the protagonist finds herself lost among the architecture, a condition both bewildering and exhilarating. The exotic and the fantastical is emphasised and an implicit comparison is drawn with the mundane urbanity of contemporary town life. As in many recollections of 'how the town used to be', the 'Sovietization' of the landscape looms depressingly over the horizon, an inevitable transformation that the informant recognises but of which her former self is blissfully unaware.

\textsuperscript{461} Cf. my discussion of the positive connotations of this term in the Soviet propaganda of the 1960s in Chapter Three.

\textsuperscript{462} P. I. Tat’yana, d.o.b. 13.12.55, excursion guide. Interviewed, at Muzei zabytkh veshchei in Vologda on 10.03.09 (transcript/recording with writer).
In a comparable account of her first impressions of Pskov, Galina, who moved to
the town from Ukraine at the end of the 1970s, recalled the attraction the
mysterious old houses had held for her as a child:

Я больше видела город вот теми глазами, я думаю. Я какие-то
старые дома всё время... Но представьте маршрут
определённый: каждый день едешь там и рассматривашь
dома, где они, какие тебе нравятся, а в какие бы ты хотел
попасть. Плюс ещё мы исследовали город, когда мы ходили на
dемонстрации, да... И была возможность после демонстрации
погулять по всяким там закоулкам, потому что так ты не
поедешь гулять в город: перед родителями тогда отчитываться
надо было, вот. А так, вроде, и повод. И мы ходили, мне
нравились какие-то дворы... Вот я помню, всё время ездила
мимо какого-то дома, и они стыковались, и между ними был
такой узкий проход. Мне очень было интересно посмотреть,
есть там ход или нет. Я всё-таки этот дом исследовала. Ход там
был, и очень интересно было там погулять. Мы вот так вот
лали по городу.463

The disintegrating old houses that populated the local landscape are depicted in
this memoir as an enchanted playground, vanishing – like childhood itself –
before one’s very eyes. Indeed, the memories of the towns’ former aspects were
frequently fused with recollections of childhood, the local architecture
functioning as an evocative backdrop for descriptions of childish games, rites of
passage, and rituals.

Non-native informants contrasted the provincial landscapes of the past not only
with their memories of other Russian towns, but also with the contemporary
reality, which, for many, constituted an urban dystopia. The idyllic rusticity of life
in the past was described with mock incredulity, the probability of its ever

463 P. I. Galina, d.o.b. 21.02.74, primary school teacher. Interviewed at a friend’s home in Pskov on
26.07.09 (transcript/recording with writer).
having existed thrown into doubt in the modern urban context. Irina, who moved to Pskov from a village in the region in the 1970s, thus described, in unmistakably symbolic language, how the sunset, which had been visible from the window of her flat at the periphery of town, had been gradually eclipsed by multi-storey blocks of residential housing:

Соб.: И Вы помните, когда эти дома начали строить? 
Инф.: Да. Когда мы сюда заехали, еще в некоторых подъездах закончиваются ремонтные эти работы, и двор был совершенно, очень неустроен, асфальтовых дорожек не было, деревьев не было, во дворах только груды песка, строительного мусора. Вот и вот домов, которые сейчас перед нами, тоже еще не было. И было очень интересно нам с пятого этажа наблюдать, вот в этом месте, где наши окна выходят на улицу; мы всегда видели закат солнца. Дальше за этими домами уже идут поля, уже загородная местность, и было очень красиво смотреть, как солнце опускается за деревья. Потом, когда построили один дом, девятиэтажный, стало меньше вида. А потом еще один – еще меньше вида. Мы ограничивались только тем, что смотрели в проем между двумя домами и видели краешек солнца. Теперь мы, фактически, не видим этой картины, как солнце заходит. Но мы знаем все равно, что вот там запад у него, солнце там заходит.464

The region described by the informant, Zapadnaya, is located at the very periphery of the town, around thirty kilometres from the Estonian border. From this liminal territory, the meeting place of the rural and urban spheres, the impact of urban modernisation was most obvious. As waves of migrants moved to the town in the post-war period, the concrete frontier edged further into the undeveloped countryside. In this fictional memoir, the eclipse of the sunset behind multi-storey blocks of flats provides an evocative metaphor for the processes of Soviet ‘cultivation’ (both in the sense of mastering nature and

464 P. I. Irina, d.o.b. 04.03.64, administrator. Interviewed at her home in Pskov on 20.07.09 (transcript/recording with writer).
inculcating certain social and cultural values). Moreover, as in the examples cited above, the ‘provincial’ aspects of town life described by the informant derived meaning through contrast with the modern urban landscape of the contemporary period. The description of the rural reality of the 1960s was lent evocative power and interest through the context of its telling, a fifth-floor flat in a densely populated housing estate, the epitome of urban modernity.

6.4 Nemnogoslovnost’, Zamknutost’, and Neprivetlivost’

As I have noted above, the literary vision of the glubokaya provintsia and its antediluvian inhabitants has perpetuated a particular stereotype of life outside the Russian capitals since the eighteenth century. Other genres of ‘provincial’ literature - the tourist guide, the local history, for example - nevertheless exist in which the regional town is celebrated as a unique cultural entity, and its origins and ‘character’ mythologized in folkloric narrative and iconic images. While it would be an oversimplification to say that personal narratives ‘borrow’ from such texts, there clearly exists a shared palette of subjects, themes, and moods for talking about localness that are invoked, cited, refuted, or ironized in speech, accordingly. The position speakers choose to adopt in relation to this established ‘corpus of knowledge’ may vary according to their age, social background and place of origin, not to mention the impression they wish to create on their listener.

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465 It is worth noting in this context the widespread use of the Soviet word kulturnost’ as a particular form of cultural consciousness, or, according to Vera Sandomirsky Dunham, a ‘fetish notion of how to be civilized’. From a term whose application was originally limited to personal hygiene, kulturnost’ expanded under Stalinism to become an umbrella concept denoting appropriate conduct, civilized speech, and good manners. See Vera Sandomirsky Dunham, In Stalin’s Time: Middle Class Values in Soviet Fiction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), p. 22.
The following excerpts from interviews, in which the established stereotype of North-West Russians being ‘people of few words’ [nemnogoslovnye lyudi] is addressed, illustrate the range of ways in which speakers incorporate ‘common knowledge’ of a particular subject into their individual narratives. The first is taken from an interview with Tat’yana, a well known figure in Vologda’s cultural sector who hosts regular ‘salons’ at the quirky museum of nineteenth-century life, Mir zabytykh veshchei. Tat’yana’s years of experience as a tourist guide in various local museums as well as her general erudition provide her conversation with an authority and almost theatrical intellectualism that is admired by many who attend her gatherings. During the interview, she was able to reach effortlessly for literary references to illustrate her thesis on the local ‘character’.

In the following passage, this authoritative cross-referencing is evident:

Соб: Опишите, пожалуйста, характер Вологжан. Чем они отличаются?
Инф: Наш писатель Варлам Шаламов пишет, что лучшие дворники были из татар по национальности, а конвоир - это вологжане. Они немногословны. Это вольные люди, хозяйственные, крепкие, трудолюбивые, которые много работали, но сами свое добро и берегли.466

In this extract, the established stereotype of the northwest Russian as reserved yet ingenuous, simple but hardworking is lent authority by the invocation of the words of local literary hero Varlam Shalamov. Moreover, Tat’yana appears to interpret the textual anecdote literally, shifting seamlessly from Shalamov’s mot to her own opinion of the ‘the way things are’ in Vologda. This is perhaps

466 Tat’yana.
unsurprising if one considers the 'literary sphere' which the speaker inhabits
and her professional preoccupation with the artistic and cultural life of the town.
The informant’s self-confessed distaste for the contemporary local reality might
also go some way to explain her emphasis on the very 'literary' aspects of life in
Vologda.

In a more anecdotal account of the local ‘character’ of Pskovichi, Galina, who
moved to the town from Murmansk in 1977, reproduces a similar stereotype of
the reserved or unfriendly [zamknutyj] northwest Russian. Rather than drawing
her authority from literary texts, however, the character development of the
local ‘type’ is explained with reference to the experiences of another group, of
which the informant is a member, the immigrant community from the North:

Соб.: Да? И Вы заметили разницу между...?
Инф.: Ну, да...это - да. Ну, это, как в каждом...северяне - они
более...или там меньше город, или вообще там нет, по-моему, до
сих пор сейчас говорят, что северный народ ...он немножечко
совсем другой. Он более открытый. Вот, единственное, что, это
самое, когда приехала, и когда с истинными такими
псковчичами... они немножечко, может быть, закрыты в этом
плане.
[...]
...и, когда, вот, я говорю, как бы, псковским, таким, вот, нету,
как бы, долгих таких отношений, а вот северные - они, может
быть, это сплачивает то, что пережито там. Может быть, вот я
так думаю. Здесь, может быть, в этом плане, может быть, легче,
э-э, было, что здесь больше родственников, э-э, сельская
местность, как бы, жили сначала в сельской местности, потом
они переехали в город, да? И у них и там остались, и в сельской
местности знакомые, родственники там, но больше круг
родственников, может быть. Может быть, им легче это было. А
мы, здесь, северные, когда приехали, мы, как бы, одни...

467 Татьяна.
Unlike the noble lack of loquacity [*nemnogoslovnost*] of the Vologzhane described by Tat’yan, the reservedness of the locals in Pskov is presented as an essentially negative characteristic, in direct contrast to the positive ‘northern’ qualities of openness and sociability. It is notable that the speaker incorporates an alternative set of diaspora myths to help explain the divergence in the two people’s character development; the displaced people from the North, through their shared experience of marginality, are perceived to possess a greater sense of openness and generosity than the more introverted, standoffish Pskovichi.

The last reference to the legendary unfriendliness of the Russians of the North West is taken from an interview with Dmitrii, a native of Pskov who moved to St Petersburg to pursue a Ph.D. in history in 2005. In Dmitrii’s narrative, dourness [*neprivetlivost*] is neither a sign of hidden depths of character nor a harmless regional quirk, but rather a symptom of the malaise that engulfs European Russia in the contemporary period:

Вот, здесь, с одной стороны, как на Западе, всё очень индивидуально. Но вот, в отличие от Запада все сами по себе. Вот, и друг другу не доверяют, и очень агрессивны. Иногда мне кажется, что в каких-то других местах России всё чуть проще. Вот, и люди более приветливы и спокойны и более идут на контакт...⁴⁶⁸

Of note here is the informant’s European frame of reference, in particular his comparison of the positive ‘individualism’ of the West and the mistrust and suspicion that are seen to be characteristic of contemporary Russia. As part of a generation of educated Russians who grew up with an acute sense of Russia’s

⁴⁶⁸ P. I. Dmitrii, d.o.b. 18.12.79, post-graduate student. Interviewed at his home in Pskov, 01.08.09 (transcript/recording with writer).
social and cultural inferiority in comparison with the ‘developed’ West, Dmitrii engages with the traditional type from a specific social perspective. His interpretation of the northwest stereotype is thus as a sort of ‘lost-in-transition’ character, who embodies the rabid individualism of market capitalism, while never quite acquiring the qualities of respect and mutual trust that are perceived to characterize the western capitalist. Unfriendliness and mistrust are thus the markers of the incompetent imitator of western ideals, a stereotype that has its own established tradition in Russian culture.

6.5 PLAYFUL ‘PROVINCIALISM’

Far from every informant would willingly engage with the ‘corpus of knowledge’ concerning provincial stereotypes. Perhaps unsurprisingly, direct questions about the existence and nature of local stereotypes often produced demonstratively tolerant responses from informants, in which the ordinariness of local people was stressed, and well-known prejudices were benignly dismissed. In one particularly broad-minded response of this kind, Slava, a Pskov-born man in his mid-30s, maintained that while inflating the worth of one’s community was probably natural, it was nevertheless deluded:

Соб.: В Пскове, Вы думаете, что у людей в Пскове есть отдельные черты характера?
Инф.: Не думаю. Нет, нет, обычные нормальные люди. Просто дело в том, что, когда рождается ребенок... Ну в основном, не буду говорить, что все поголовно, в основном, родил родитель – думает, что их ребенок – исключительный! Вот он – исключительный! Вот он – лучше, всё равно вот, соседского и того соседского! Он какой-то исключительный. Нет! Он обычный, нормальный ребенок. То же самое: мы обычные, нормальные люди. Ну, как говорят, в семье не без урода,
бывают всякие. Но в основном – хорошие, добрые люди. Отьзвывчивые. Не только в Пскове, вообще в России.469

As a prominent member of the local Methodist church, Slava might be considered a particularly likely candidate for such charitable outpourings. Indeed, his manifest tolerance in the interview functioned in the opposite way to most other declarations of this kind, rejecting overly-positive interpretations of the local community in favour of a more mundane, undistinguished vision of local people. In most cases, informants’ allusions to the ‘normalness’ of the community appeared, by contrast, intended to deny the authority of negative local stereotypes. In one very public example of such narrative strategies, the mayor of Pskov, Mikhail Khoronen, ended a speech on Pskov’s growing economic competitiveness within Russia with the somewhat bathetic exclamation that ‘мы нормальные люди из великой страны’.470 Here, it appeared, ‘normalness’ was asserted in response to the perceived accusations of abnormality by outsiders, and in particular those making the decisions in Moscow.

But if direct enquiries about the typical characteristics of the local community often met with such narrative rebuffs, another kind of engagement with provincial stereotypes also appeared to exist, which relied upon techniques of self-irony. This was particularly notable in informants’ memories of their first trips to the bustling metropolises of Moscow and Petersburg. Playing on the stereotype of the wide-eyed, inexperienced provincial, informants narrated personal memoires in which they would find themselves lost in the Moscow

469 P. I. Slava, d.o.b. 19.05.75, professional soldier. Interviewed at a friend’s home in Pskov on 22.06.09 and 25.06.09 (transcript/recording with writer).
470 Speech made by Mikhail Khoronen at the opening of the Dni goroda celebrations on the 25.07.09 (recording with writer).
metro, manhandled in the Petersburg trolleybuses, or asleep from exhaustion in the capital’s planetarium. One such self-deprecating narrative was provided by Dmitrii, a doctoral student from Vologda at the time of the interview, who had moved to St Petersburg to pursue his studies:

Я дико боялся сходить с эскалатора. То есть, я никак не мог сделать вот шаг с этой бегущей ленты, и вот, да, на твердую землю. Я помню, что я все - все, уже подъезжаешь, а я иду назад, назад, назад, назад, наконец, какая-то, причем местная тетушка меня просто взяла за руку и со мной вот этот шаг сделала. Вот. Просто сначала я этого просто дико боялся. У меня такие вот первые воспоминания о Питере.471

In an inversion of this caricature, some informants remembered their own attempts at playing the refined urbanite back at home. Irina, for example, painted a humorous picture of herself as an affected, champagne-sipping student in 1970s Pskov:

Мы любили ходить в театр, потому что мы считали, что это признак интеллектуальности – ходить в театр. Вот. В кафе иногда тоже ходили. Было кафе, оно как раз называлось "Снежинка". Мы любили очень молочные коктейли пить. Еще там были "Молодежные" коктейли с шампанским, на основе шампанского – там тоже мороженое; что-то добавлялось там... Сок?.. Вот это ходили, это было тоже интересно.472

The playful ironizing of provincial pompousness is perhaps best evidenced by some of the creative endeavours on personal websites and in internet chat rooms. On one website, for example, which describes itself as the *Al*ternativnoe kraevedenie Novgorodskoi oblasti, the grandiloquent opening lines of countless

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471 Oxh/4HRC-SPb-07 PF 32. Dmitrii, doctoral student. Interview conducted by Aleksandra Piir on 29.01.2008. Interview transcripts are currently being processed for archiving and will be held at the Oxford Russian Life History Archive: http://www.ehrc.ox.abc/llifehistory/.
472 Irina.
tourist guides and historical studies are the subject of a humorous pastiche. Instead of the anticipated formula of 'Новгород — один из древнейших городов России...' we are offered flippant comments about the city's deceiving 'double', Nizhny Novgorod:

Это не тот Новгород, о котором вы подумали. Он не стоит на Волге, в нем нет ярмарки, а Борис Немцов и Максим Горький не имеют к нам никакого отношения. Словом, перестаньте нас, наконец, путать! Наш Новгород — Великий. Великий — не по размерам, а исторически. Это город, который еще называют «Господин Великий Новгород». Точнее, называли. Теперь так называется теплоход, учебное судно Новгородского Клуба юных моряков — кстати, крупнейшего и старейшего в России.

In place of the typically self-aggrandising claims about the significance of Velikii Novgorod in Russian history and culture, the fictional narrator-guide to the alternative Novgorod website offers us a tour of the city's sites which is self-consciously coloured by feelings of provincial inferiority. The result is a virtual excursion around the city's least glamorous attractions from the local hypermarket Lenta ('est. 2006'), to the highly un-medieval shashlyk (old only in a bad sense: 'Злые языки утверждают, что на эти шашлыки идет просроченное, перемороженное мясо, а цвет и запах - это достижение химической промышленности'), to universally hated local monuments such

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473 See, for example, the opening sentences of M. K. Karger, Novgorod Velikii (Leningrad; Moscow: Iskusstvo, 1961); I. I. Kushnir, Novgorod, Izdanie 2-e (Leningrad: Literaturi po stroitel'stvu, 1972); M. Dunaev and F. Razumovsky, Novgorod: A Guide (Moscow: Raduga Publishers, 1984), among others.
475 'Lenta', Alternativnoe kraevedenie Novgorodskoi oblasti (http://www.nov.ru/wiki/"Лента"_(гипермаркет)) [last accessed 09.11.09].
476 'Shashlyki', Alternativnoe kraevedenie Novgorodskoi oblasti (http://www.nov.ru/wiki/Шашлыки) [last accessed 09.11.09].
as the Pamyatnik 'Pobedy' also known as Kon'. By inverting the genre of the provincial tourist guide, the website parodies the stereotype of the imperious, blustering provincial, the likes of whom one might encounter in the semi-fictional world of Dovlatov's Zapovednik. Yet, the authors of the virtual guide do not appear entirely without sympathy for the absurd provincial world which they depict. In fact, it seems that the very capacity to self-ironize is itself perceived as a positive facet of provincial culture, as opposed to the self-important grandiosity of the capital.

If the website Alternativnoe kraevedenie Novgorodskoi oblasti is almost certainly the work of an internet-savvy local elite, the popular practice of re-naming town monuments can be seen to have a similar function of deflating pretentious manifestations of provincial eminence. As the following excerpt from a Live Journal blog suggests, the humorous nicknames attributed to monuments are often intended less to deride the local figures and events they commemorate than their overly grandiose artistic renderings:

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absyrд_aprelja: вся Вологда в фотографиях с комментами здесь http://gudea.livejournal.com/
памятник "пресловутому палисаду" находится на улице Мальцева. еще есть памятники чупа-чупс и писающей собаке... это народные названия :)
winch: Спасибо!
vsebudet_ok: А чупа-чупс, никак не пойму, что это?
absyrд_aprelja: памятник Беляеву, напротив ТЮ3а
vsebudet_ok: Да уж, креативщик.
winch: а почему так называют?
absyrд_aprelja: потому что он на чупа-чупс больше похож, чем на Беляева в космо-шлеме :)))
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477 Pamyatnik 'Pobedy', Alternativnoe kraevedenie Novgorodskoi oblasti (http://www.nov.ru/wiki/конь) [last accessed 09.11.09].
absyrəd_aprelia: na nego sмотреть не надо. он как ориентир на палисад... то ж не далеко ;) чупа-чупс найти проще, а палисад через квартал по прямой.
vsebudet_ok: Мне кааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааааa

Fig 39.
Pamyatnik Belyaevu (aka 'Chupa Chups')\textsuperscript{479}
Fig. 40.
Pamyatnik geroyam Oktyabr'skoi revolyutsii (aka 'Palisad' or 'Zub')\textsuperscript{480}

The parodic re-naming of monuments is not a practice that is restricted to the provincial context. In St Petersburg, for example, the Lenin Monument in front of the Finlyandskii station has been rechristened ‘Ленин, торгующий пиджаком’, and ‘Лисий камень’, a name it shares with various other effigies to the

\textsuperscript{479} The nickname ‘Chupa Chups’, referring to the Spanish brand of lollipops sold in Europe and Russia, provides a ‘globalized’ reference for a distinctly local phenomenon. Photograph author’s own, Vologda, Winter 2008.
\textsuperscript{480} Ibid.
Bolshevik leader around the country.\textsuperscript{481} The relatively small number of monuments in regional towns such as Vologda, and the incongruity between their ostentatious executions and their modest surrounds has nevertheless made these objects more likely candidates for public ridicule.\textsuperscript{482} The collective mockery of public sculpture can be seen to have the function of empowering the local community, enabling individuals to challenge the authority of local officials to attribute exclusive and definitive meaning public places or objects.\textsuperscript{483}

6.6 ‘RAZNITSA EST’?: REVISING THE CAPITAL-PROVINCE DICHOTOMY

The importance of the capital-province opposition for the definition of the collective self has been underlined in several recently published studies of provincial culture. According to Irina Razumova, who writes about the distinction between centre and periphery in the oral tradition, ‘тема враждебности столицы – одна из самых актуальных и муссируется, главным образом, в слухах, толках, анекдотах’.\textsuperscript{484} In small town Russians’ memories of life under Soviet rule, the ostensible enmity with the capital was a source of creative humour. In all three towns, variations on the old Soviet joke about the experience of Brezhnev-era defi
tsit were narrated:

\textsuperscript{481} One may presume that a number of new nicknames for the monument arose following the vandalization of the sculpture on 1 April 2009, when a hole was blown in the Bolshevik leader’s backside. See ‘V Peterburge vzorvali pamyatnik Lenino na Finlyandskom vokzale’, Zaks.ru, 1 April 2009 (http://www.zaks.ru/new/archive/view/55347) [last accessed: 8 April 2011].

\textsuperscript{482} For example, Catriona Kelly has noted that the practice of ‘domesticating’ monuments or notable buildings through the attribution of nicknames is not as common in St Petersburg as in other Russian cities such as Ekaterinburg. See Catriona Kelly, “‘The Hermitage and My Own Front Door’: Local Identities in St. Petersburg’, Ab Imperio, 4 (2010), 463-505 (p. 479).

\textsuperscript{483} I discuss the practices of renaming and redefining the function of public sculpture in greater detail in Chapter Four.

This anecdote, often told by inhabitants with a sort of masochistic glee, makes reference to a condition of material shortage, which became especially aggravated under the leadership of Leonid Brezhnev, making it necessary for people living in the northwest towns to make regular visits to the better stocked shops in St Petersburg or Moscow. The absurdness of this arrangement was particularly apparent to inhabitants of towns that produced basic foodstuffs such as Vologda, who would often recall having to travel hundreds of miles to purchase the butter manufactured several miles from their homes. But if most informants admitted that there was, and still is a greater supply of goods in the capitals than in the provinces, the quality of life in small towns was still deemed to be superior to that in St Petersburg and Moscow. In the following extract, Alesha, an unemployed man from Novgorod, compared the levels of civility in the regions with those of the residents of large urban centres such as St Petersburg:

Соб1: Но, все равно, ты считаешь что в Новгороде лучше чем...
Инф: Да, между прочим вот, сравни Питер с Новгородом, мы живем лучше, чем в Питере.
Соб2: Да?
Инф: Чисто в культурной сфере, мы лучше, чем Питер.
Соб2: Это более культурный город, что ли? А люди тут культурнее, или это, в принципе, обоих касается?

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485 On Runet, this joke appears in regional variations that include Tula, Voronezh, Obninsk, Saratov and other provincial towns; for more on Soviet jokes of the Stalin period, many of which endured into the 1960s and 1970s see Political Humour Under Stalin: An Anthology of Unofficial Jokes and Anecdotes, ed. by David Brandenberger (Bloomington, Indiana: Slavica Publishers, 2009).


Инф: Знаешь... Это... Вообще, со статистической точки зрения, да, мы намного отличаемся от Питерцев. Питерцы тебя облают. Вот я приведу пример. Сел я в троллейбус, да. Вот приехал когда в Питер, сел я в троллейбус. Подошел ко мне кондуктор. Я естественно заплатил, это самое, кондуктору, и говорю «спасибо», естественно, за его работу – я его должен благодарить. Вот с точки зрения этих, да, он на меня посмотрел, как на идиота! А здесь вот скажешь кондуктору «спасибо», он еще тебе улыбнется и скажет «спасибо Вам». Вот. Разница есть?488

By depicting Petersburgers as bad mannered and discourteous, Alesha inverts the traditional dichotomy of the urbane capital and the ignorant province. And, in fact, while few other informants went as far as to say that Novgorod was the more cultured city of the two, many agreed that people in the provinces were generally more considerate and polite than those in the cultural centres of the country.489 This inhumanity was often associated with the pace of life in the capital, the more demanding workloads and exhausting commutes to work that left residents exhausted and irritable. Galina described the 'live to work' routine of her Petersburg friends, explaining why she preferred the quiet 'provincial' life:

Я не знаю, у меня живут там друзья, и я как-то приезжала и посмотрела, какой образ жизни они ведут. Это... Утром встают, едут на работу, в метро снят. В десять вечера едут с работы, в метро снят. Возвращаются домой где-то в полдвенадцатого вечера, час – спать. Утром встают, едут на работу, в метро снят. Я говорю: «Я здесь на вашу петерску жизнь посмотрела, я не

488 P. I. Alesha, d.o.b. 28.02.1975, unemployed. Interviewed at the Novgorod museum archive, 19.09.09 (recording with writer). Aleshä's account of Petersburg frigidity might not be as exaggerated as it first appears. From my own experience, public service personnel, and particularly conductors on public transport tended to be friendlier in provincial towns than their harassed, hawk-eyed counterparts in the capitals. It would be difficult, for example, to imagine a conductor in Novgorod, for the most part chatty middle-aged women, prohibiting a female passenger from placing her bags of heavy shopping on the seat before paying for her ticket, as one did in the presence of a friend in St Petersburg recently. Pers. Inf. S. C., St Petersburg, Summer 2009.

489 A similarly disparaging attitude to the capital can be found in Great Britain where Northerners continue to refer to London as 'The Great Wen', an unflattering nickname developed by William Gobbett in the 1820s to compare the rapidly expanding town to a cyst on the face of the nation.
In this dystopian vision of Petersburg life, the conventional understanding of the capital and the province is once more turned on its head. Life at the centre becomes a meaningless struggle for survival, while ‘provincial’ existence, its comforts and opportunities, is seen to be the more humane, even civilized alternative. One might suspect a certain *resentment* to be at play here, that is, a positive re-evaluation of the values of local culture as a means for coping with its perceived inferiority to that of the capital. More likely, however, is that the informant fully endorsed the romantic idea that small town life, and, in particular, the greater sense of community in the regions was more conducive to one’s overall happiness, a belief that has also contributed to the waves of suburbanization in the United States and in some parts of Britain.\(^{491}\)

When questioned about how the regional towns had changed in the post-Soviet period, many informants pinpointed differences that were remarkably similar to those that were seen to exist between the province and the capital. As such, people in the post-Soviet regions, and particularly the younger generation, were often deemed to be more selfish, ill-mannered, and economically ruthless than their predecessors, who were, by contrast, credited with a greater community mindedness and compassion for their neighbours. In one account of modern life

\(^{490}\) Galina.

in Pskov, Igor animatedly described the degeneration of humankind that had occurred after the collapse of the Soviet regime:

Инф.: Да, люди стали поганые! У-у-у, люди... отвратительные стали. Отвратительные.
Соб.: В каком смысле?
Инф.: В каком смысле? Люди стали отвратительные!
Соб.: А почему?
Инф.: Не знаю... Я не могу судить, почему они стали такими... У меня тут был такой момент, я страдал подагрой. Знаете такую болезнь? Подагра - это воспаление суставов там и прочее. Ну и мне в наследство достался такой подагрический артрит. Тоже болят суставы. (Нрэб) дремлет, а тут чего-нибудь съешь не то – она начинает... И вот я как-то... Болели суставы больших пальцев. Я ходить не мог практически. Даже место не уступит! Он сидит, развалившись в автобусе, пацан, тринадцати – пятнадцатилетний. Пьют, наркотики... Не, народ – поганый! Нервный, психованный какой-то весь...не знаю...Ну недоброжелательный, не поможет никогда. Выйдешь на дорогу... Как-то у меня прихватило сердце, и я не мог на машине уехать. Вышел на дорогу. Я подсчитал, только пятьдесят первая машина остановилась в город меня довести! Нет, с таким народом... И чуть что – сразу лезут в драку. Ко мне не лезут. Потому что лицо такое неприятное; вообще – боятся. Ну это небо и земля – сравнивать с теми людьми, с которыми я сталкивался, и с теми, с которыми сейчас сталкиваюсь. Вседозвolenность, конечно.492

The moral implications of the story of how fifty-one cars drove past a sick old man without stopping are clear; in Pskov, it appears, people love their neighbour even less than those on the road from Jerusalem to Jericho. This tale of individualism and indifference to human suffering resembles closely many stories told by informants about how people behave in the metropolises.
Valentina, a housewife from Vologda, for example, narrated a scene she had witnessed in St Petersburg in which an old man was pushed out of an

492 P. I. Igor, d.o.b. 13.03.41, retired engineer. Interviewed at his dacha in Pskov, 01.09.09 (transcript/recording with writer).
overcrowded bus and, rather than being picked up, was trampled underfoot by fellow passengers eager to take his place.\textsuperscript{493} In this story, the inference was that the inhabitants of big cities, driven by economic ruthlessness and untrammelled individualism, were indifferent to the suffering or distress of others. By implication, small towns were established as places of greater collective compassion, where a sense of community was still a prominent feature of everyday life.

Despite the thematic overlap illustrated above, the dichotomies of space (centre-periphery) and time (Soviet-post-Soviet) appear to exist independently of each other in residents’ oral narratives. If the behaviour of people in the post-Soviet provinces was understood to be driven more by egoism and lust for individual success than in the past, the distinction between the centre and the periphery was still imagined as a central social cleavage. As an increasing number of educated young people move to St Petersburg and Moscow for work and study, the traditional dichotomy between the ‘civilized’ capital and the ‘ignorant’ province is being reinforced. This is as clear as anywhere in the large ‘cultured’ cities such as St Petersburg, where the stereotype of the inbred, drunken, and illiterate provincial is still as prominent as ever.

\textbf{6.7 CONCLUSION}

In this chapter I have discussed the different ways in which the idea of localness has been articulated and challenged in the oral narratives of northwest Russians. I have attempted to bring into focus the views of diverse social groups: the

\textsuperscript{493} Pers. Inf. V. G., Vologda, Summer 2009.
provincial intelligentsia and urban migrants, as well as post-Soviet communities of ‘brain-drainers’, bloggers and net-surfers. The way in which members of these groups have interpreted the collective myths and stereotypes associated with their localities is informed by traditional markers of identity, such as age and social background, but is also influenced their separate spheres of socialisation. The self-parodic climate of the blogosphere or the self-reflective context of the capital city can thus be understood as forming the discursive frameworks within which ideas of localness acquire specific nuances and modes of expression.

The efforts of educated and internet-savvy locals to deconstruct established stereotypes and invert traditional province-capital dichotomies have changed what it means to be ‘provincial’ in a globalized world. Contrasting the periphery with the pompous, self-aggrandizing centre that strives towards global competitiveness but achieves only urban dystopia, small town Russians assert the value of the their way of life, presenting themselves as shrewd judges of the national climate rather than ‘provincial fools’ deprived of agency. The renegotiation of the terms according to which ‘provincialism’ is defined has relevance not only for Russians at the periphery of the country, but also for the construction of national identity in general. The perceived ‘provincialism’ of Russian culture in the European context has thus been reinterpreted a source of national pride in the post-Soviet period, a symbol of the maverick character of Russians and their nonconformist aspirations.494 The endorsement of

494 A discrete but nevertheless revealing example of this phenomenon was the reception of a music video, ‘Tamozhnya otzighaet’, recorded by a group of border guards in Vladivostok and posted on youtube in 2011. The video, which went viral within a few hours, was celebrated for its blatant exposition of the indulgent fantasies of regional border guards at the Vladivostok-China border. The refrain of the song (Коламбия Пикчерз не представляет, как на таможне
‘provincialism’ as an integral part of the national identity provides a means to escape the uncomfortable categorisation of ‘developing country’, according to which Russia has been excluded from the ‘civilized’ heartland of Western Europe.

народ отжигает’) asserts the value of culture at the (global) periphery through the strategies of knowing self-ironization. See ‘Tamozhnya otzhigaet. Vladivostok’), youtube (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7WPSm2eK-Kg&feature=fvest) [last accessed: 22 March 2011]; M. L. Spivak has argued in an analysis of the use of the term provintsiya in contemporary Russian culture that the idea of provincialism has acquired connotations of sophistication and even eroticism in the post-Soviet period. The television programme ‘Provintsial’nii salon’ in the Rostov region, the newspapers Zolotaya provintsiya in Izhevsk and Delovaya provintsiya in in Kaluga, and the pop music album ‘Provintsial’naya devchenka’ (1998) by Natali are among the illustrations of this provincial renaissance. See M. L. Spivak, ‘“Provintsiya idet v region”: O nekotorykh osobennostyakh sovremennogo upotrebeniya slova provintsiya’, in Geopanorama russkoi kul’tury: provintsiya i ee lokal’nye teksty, ed. by L. O. Zaiants (Moscow: Yazyki slavianskoj kul’tury, 2004).
CONCLUSION
CONCLUSION

This thesis has examined the revival of local patriotism in the post-1961 period, arguing that this was part of a strategy to strengthen popular support for and the legitimacy of the Soviet regime during the second phase of de-Stalinization. In an effort to rethink the conventional periodization of this era, I have shifted the analytical focus away from the Secret Speech of 1956, the time of Khrushchev's first full-scale assault on Stalin and his legacy, to the Twenty-Second Party Congress of 1961, when a utopian and pioneering plan was advanced to build Communism by 1980. I have argued that this programme, which was renowned for its forward-looking logic, gave rise to an institutionalized retrospectivism as Soviet policy makers turned to the past to mobilize support for their efforts to construct socialism. In the preceding chapters, I considered the evolution of this process in three medieval towns of the Russian North West where Soviet citizens were encouraged to turn inwards to their local history and traditions to stimulate recognition of and affinity with the ideals and values of the Soviet state.
In Part One of the thesis, I examined the means by which localness was represented to local and national populations in Soviet cultural institutions, the tensions inherent to those representations, and the reception and response of individuals to official visions of the past. Chapter One considered the narrative construction of local history and culture in the context of Soviet tourism, specifically through touristic activities, guidebooks and kraevedenie materials. I argued that in the context of the northwest Russian town Soviet citizens were encouraged to recognize the creative genius of the Russian people in the cultural heritage of the medieval period, but also to perceive this heritage as the cultural foundation upon which Soviet society had been constructed. The touristic experience was framed in such a way as to emphasize the aspects of local culture and history that corresponded with the ideals of the Soviet state – democracy, military resilience, and the moral integrity of the Russian people and their culture. By contrast, episodes and individuals from local history that were understood to challenge the national patriotic logic – local freedom fighters or separatist myths, for example – were excluded from the tourist’s view.

The display of local history and culture in regional museums, a process which was connected with the revival of the repressed discipline of kraevedenie in the post-Stalin period, was the focus of Chapter Two. I argued that local communities were exposed to visions of local folk culture, history, and developments in the Soviet period in an attempt to stimulate local patriotism and to make communities aware of their own role as a cog in the larger machinery of the Soviet state. The objects displayed in exhibitions of local life – from traditional lacework to factory machinery – were worked into a teleological narrative of
history, and their relevance to the ideals and values of socialism, even where this
was at best tenuous, was underlined. Yet, as I argue in the chapter, museum
workers were not always in control of the signifying functions of the objects in
their displays, which for some visitors served to pique feelings of national
patriotism rather than encourage affinity with the goals of state socialism.

In Chapter Three, I considered the ways in which local culture and history were
framed through the preservation of cultural heritage. Examining the cultural and
historical significance attributed to architectural monuments from the local
landscape, I argued that socialist values, such as democracy, rationality, and
ascetism, were read into historical buildings and that heritage was infused with
ideological relevance and instrumentality in the Soviet context. Soviet citizens
were encouraged to recognize the value of the architectural inheritance of the
past and to perceive it as the material manifestation of the ingenuity and
creativity of the Russian people that persisted into the Soviet period. The shifting
focus of state preservationism – from Old Russian architecture to buildings in the
late-Imperial style – was, I argue, evidence of the instability of the Soviet
patriotic discourse, which evolved in line with political changes at the centre and
pressures from without in the late-Soviet period.

This is not to suggest that the strategies of representing localness were uniform
in the three localities examined in this study. The episodes, figures, and themes
from the history of each town constituted diverse sets of materials from which
patriotic narratives could (with varying degrees of success) be crafted. Some
legends and myths, such Pskov’s history of military resistance to foreign
invasion, fitted easily with the form and character of patriotic discourse in the post-1961 period. Other episodes from the local past, for example the ‘Golden Age’ of the Democratic Republic of Novgorod, had to be carefully framed in order to emphasize the aspects that complimented Soviet values and ideals such as democracy and class-consciousness. Certain themes in local history, which were perceived to be incompatible with the vision of localness that the Soviet authorities wished to present, were excluded altogether from the public sphere. Myths of local resilience to political centralization and accounts of cultural advances during the era of capitalism thus disappeared from view.

It is instructive to note that Novgorod rather than Pskov was marketed as the centre of Old Russian culture and heritage in post-1961 period. While the landscapes of both towns comprised an impressive number of medieval monuments and both localities suffered extensive material damage during the Second World War, only Novgorod benefitted from the status of muzei-zapovednik in the post-war period and the significant expansion of local tourism and cultural activity. This decision, while presumably informed by practical factors such as the proximity of the town to the northern capital of Leningrad, and moreover the Baltic States and Finland, reflected a shift in emphasis away from the belligerent rhetoric of the immediate post-war period towards the nation-building practices of the late-Khrushchev era. Novgorod was selected as a national cultural symbol not only because it comprised beautiful old buildings or captured the idea of the national military might, but because it could be cast as a cradle of Russian civilization and culture whose traditions endured in the socialist state.
In many ways, Vologda is an exception among the three case studies examined in the thesis in as much as it reflects the way that ‘localness’ was understood primarily as the recovery of rural traditions. By contrast with Novgorod and Pskov, whose historical legends could be woven into a socialist patriotic narrative with relative ease, northern Vologda, which had thrived on the trade of fur and timber in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and suffered little at the hands of foreign invaders, was more difficult to present as a model socialist city. With the large part of its dynamic merchant history banished from public view, visions of localness in Vologda comprised pastoral imagery and rural traditions that contributed to a cultural stereotype of the town as the spiritual heartland of the nation. The impact of the romantic rendering of the town in the contemporary period is remarkable in the oral narratives of local residents, many of whom framed their memories of childhood by the idyllic scenery and surrounds of ‘the town that used to be’.

In addition to analyzing the strategies of representing localness to local communities, the thesis addressed the question of the social impact of this work, examining the reception of patriotic discourses through readers’ letters to local newspapers and visitors’ entries in museum response books. These texts, I have argued, provide evidence less of the patriotic endorsement of Soviet goals, than of individuals’ understanding of the discursive framework within which they acted and their sense of what constituted ‘ideological correctness’. The fact that people so frequently transgressed the boundaries of acceptable criticism – through the overzealous endorsement of cultural iconoclasm or the excessive praise of Russian heritage, for example – reflects the contradictions inherent in
the discourse of Soviet patriotism and the difficulties involved in echoing it back to state institutions.

One of the central contradictions in this discourse was between its endorsement of patriotic retrospectivism and its condemnation of Russian nationalism, in other words, between political populism and ideological rigour. The discursive overlap between these two, which increased and diminished at different times in the post-1961 period, created a space of ambiguous intentionality, where the boundaries of permissible commentary were oblique and unstable. The dexterity with which individuals were able to negotiate this space depended on their knowledge of the rules that governed it, their mastery of the language of national patriotism and capacity to self-censor. Thus, figures such as Dmitrii Likhachev were able to advance relatively radical criticisms of urban modernization, one of the core ideas of Soviet socialism, while remaining within the boundaries of orthodox patriotic discourse. While few were as fluent as Likhachev in the rhetoric of national patriotism, many of the authors of the letters and remarks recorded in the dissertation exhibit at least a rudimentary understanding of the expressive and linguistic exigencies of the genre.

The view from the regions thus provides a valuable new dimension to our understanding the rise of cultural nationalism in late-Soviet Russia. It highlights the conservative nature of the national patriotic discourse in the regions, the limited scope of its interest and the highly regulated nature of its forms of expression. The cultural heritage of the pre-revolutionary past was celebrated in local cultural institutions, but in an attempt to ensure that it was interpreted in
the ‘correct’ way, the presentation of this heritage was often formulaic and uninspired. The ritualistic repetition of the same facts and themes in tourist guides, history books, museum exhibitions, and excursions served to limit the rhetorical power of state-sponsored patriotism, rendering people’s engagement with its institutionalized forms ceremonial and even trivial rather than transformative in any social sense.

Yet if the institutionalized representation of local history and culture was conservative and determined by the centre, unofficial memory provided greater scope for individual affinities with the locality, and even a sense of playfulness about being ‘provincial’. Official representations of localness, which had been crafted to correspond with emphases of the national historical narrative, were revised in popular ritual, urban lore, and oral tradition. In Part Two of the thesis, I have argued that unofficial strategies of collective identification, and in particular the ludic forms of self-identification, existed alongside authoritative discourses of identity and derived their cultural significance through their opposition to the highly regulated nature of Soviet public life. These sites of unofficial memory endured in the post-Soviet period, highlighting the perceived continuity of the gap between public commemoration and private memory, despite the efforts of local elites to blur this divide.

Unofficial memory frequently contrasted with institutionalized representations of local history and culture in terms of its focus, tone, and format. If Soviet cultural institutions revised local history to reflect the emphases and elisions of the national narrative, extra-institutional commemoration focused more on the
esoterically ‘local’. Rather than local renderings of national events – the 1917 Revolution, World War Two, or the construction of socialism, for example – local memory frequently comprised the objects, people, and places that rendered the locality distinct within the Soviet state. The generic vocabulary which subsumed episodes and objects from the local past into an all-Soviet discourse of historical transformation was supplemented by obscure references and knowing allusions, the comprehension of which served to mark the boundary of the local community. This impulse to delimit the local community within the national context through the renegotiation of the constituent parts of its culture and history was particularly marked in the post-1961 period, when the drive towards urban standardization accelerated and intensified.

As I demonstrated in Chapters Four and Five, the focus of official commemoration shifted in the post-Soviet period as local elites attempted to engineer a return to cultural ‘normalcy’ in the wake of the regime’s collapse. In a crude inversion of the modes of representation and the logical thrust of cultural work of the Soviet period, the political authorities attempted to enact a rupture with the ideologized past. The ‘correction’ of local memory corresponded with the marginalization of the Soviet experience – its exclusion from historical narrative and the erasure of its emblems from the landscape – and the foregrounding of local history and culture of the pre-revolutionary period, and in particular peasant life. Yet the official repression of the lived experience of Soviet rule served to emphasise the importance of its memory at an everyday level as individuals, born into and socialized as part of vanished state, sought to re-interpret the meaning of their lives in the contemporary context.
The exclusion of the Soviet experience from official memory highlighted a tension in contemporary Russian culture. By condemning the illiberal state and the repressive society it engendered, political elites also undermined the experience of everyday life in that state, the rites of passage, everyday rituals, and individual relationships that were bound together with the structures of political power. Individual biographies were woven into the institutional tapestry of life in the Soviet Union, with the result that remembering became a political act, a justification or condemnation of the former regime. The desire to recover that past, to extricate the Soviet experience from the Soviet regime and provide the former with a measure of legitimacy, informs the attempts to commemorate individual histories in text and in oral narrative that are recorded in this thesis.

In post-Soviet Russia, the efforts to stimulate local patriotism through the commemoration of localness in state institutions became part of the lived experience of Soviet rule. The authoritative discourses of the past, expelled from their institutional contexts, remained present in individual biographies as part of the experience of life under socialism. By contrast, popular forms of self-identification, the playful traditions and ritualized forms of behaviour that reinforced community boundaries, were appropriated by local elites in an effort to exhibit their popular mandate. Local jokes were given public airings in Internet forums; maverick practices became tourist attractions. As I argue throughout the thesis, this process of generic evolution challenges the notion advanced by Pierre Nora that history begins where memory ends, asserting
instead that history and memory are embedded within one another, caught in a process of perennial recreation as myth, matter, and lived experience.

Looking at the content and form of local memory ‘from the ground’ provides an important dimension to our understanding of political changes in the post-Soviet era. The reorientation towards local ‘traditions’ after 1961, while being driven by the political centre and intended to underpin the authority of the Soviet regime, resulted in the strengthening of local particularism and a sense of cultural distinctness. In the post-Soviet period, when the centralizing structures of power were partially rolled back, the consequences of this process became more obvious. Drawing on a symbolic vocabulary of local patriotism established during the Soviet rule, regional elites were able to capitalize on feelings of local specificity, leading to a process of political and culture regionalization that departed dramatically from visions of a ‘United Russia’.
APPENDICES
APPENDIX ONE:
STATISTICS FOR THE PUBLICATION OF KRAEVEDENIE LITERATURE IN THE NORTHWEST, 1940-2009

1) Novgorod

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495 1959 was the 1100th anniversary of the first mention of the town in the Primary Chronicle. As a consequence of the large number of commemorative books and pamphlets that were published in this year (particularly by the local publishing house 'Novgorodskaya pravda', which published 15 texts on local monuments) the number of publications for 1950-1959 period is disproportionately high.
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unknown: -</td>
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</tr>
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</table>

### 3) Vologda

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Russian Publications</th>
<th>Place of Publication</th>
<th>Foreign language publications</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1940-1949</td>
<td>-</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950-1959</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Moscow/Petersburg:</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Of which under</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>1,000-1,999: -</td>
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<td>10,000-14,999: -</td>
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<td>15,000-24,999: -</td>
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</tr>
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<td>25,000-49,999: -</td>
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<td>50,000-99,999: -</td>
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<td>100,000-149,999: -</td>
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<td>Moscow/Petersburg:</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
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<td>Of which under</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,000: -</td>
<td>Local: 1</td>
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<td>Other: -</td>
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<td>Year Range</td>
<td>Frequency Distribution</td>
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<td>------------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
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</tr>
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<td>1970-1979</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Moscow/Petersburg: 2</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Local: 2</td>
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</tr>
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<td>1990-1999</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Moscow/Petersburg: -</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Local: 2</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
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<td>Local: 1</td>
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</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Other: -</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Unknown: -</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown:</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX TWO:
STATISTICS PERTAINING TO VISITOR NUMBERS AND MUSEUM EXCURSIONS, 1940-1986

1) Novgorod

Between 1940 and 1961, visitor numbers to the Novgorod Museum increased exponentially from 82,000 to around 140,000 a year – this was clearly linked with the increase to the local population, on the one hand, but also a reflection of the rise of social control and the state’s employment of cultural institutions for the propaganda of its aims. Numbers of visitors increased by a further 100,000 over the next five years (from around 140,000 in 1961 to 240,000 in 1966) – no figures for overall visitor numbers between 1966 and 1986, but there was a yearly average increase of around 70,000 visitors.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Visitors to the Museum</th>
<th>Excursions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>82,000</td>
<td>1,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>139,827</td>
<td>3,359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>514,427 (individuals)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>88,400 (part of an excursion)</td>
<td>211 (part of ‘Intourist’)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>141 (other foreign tourists)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>156,430</td>
<td>2,885</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>201,475</td>
<td>3,088</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>240,000</td>
<td>3,515</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>Figure not available</td>
<td>4,334</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>Figure not available</td>
<td>5,075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>Figure not available</td>
<td>5,853</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>116 (Soviet history)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>114 (science and atheism)</td>
<td>217⁹⁷ (art)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>Figure not available</td>
<td>7,188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>305 (Soviet history)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>222 (science and atheism)</td>
<td>629 (art)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>Figure not available</td>
<td>12,040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,779 (53,370)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(schoolchildren)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9,263 (280,921)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(workers)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>433 (9,959) (kolkhoz)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

⁹⁶ The statistics for museum attendance in Novgorod are taken from the annual reports for the work of the Novgorod State Museum for the years cited: NGOM, istoricheskaya spravka; NGOM, op. 1, d. 407, l. 19; NGOM, op. 1, d. 407, l. 18; NGOM, op. 1, d. 504, l. 9; NGOM, op. 2, d. 602, l. 15; NGOM, op. 1, d. 634, l. 49; NGOM, op. 2, d. 805, l. 19-20; NGOM, op. 3, d. 1404, p. 1.

⁹⁷ The pre-revolutionary sector of the museum was closed for refurbishment in 1969 and 1970.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Visitors to Museum</th>
<th>Excursions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>57,508 (individual visitors)</td>
<td>383 (12,965) (adult excursions at history, Soviet and art sectors); 190 (4,738) (children’s excursions at history, Soviet and art sectors); 249 (5,526) (adult excursions around historical monuments); 32 (889) (children’s excursions around historical monuments); Lenin museum apartment: 264 (7,002) (adult excursions around Lenin museum apartment); 168 (4,597) (children’s excursions around Lenin museum apartment)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>307,000 14,332 (exhibitions at museum) 19,600 (exhibitions not at the museum)</td>
<td>2,004 (46,092)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2) Pskov\(^{498}\)

3) Vologda\(^{499}\)

\(^{498}\)Since the museum archive in Pskov was closed for repairs following a fire in Summer 2009 I was unable to access the reports in which the statistics for museum attendance and excursions in the post-1961 period were detailed. For this reason the statistics for Pskov are less full than those for Novgorod and Vologda. Those statistics cited are taken from reports of museum work available at the Gosudarstvennyi arkhiw Pskovskoi oblasti: GAPO, f R-1855, op. 1, d. 164, l. 57; GAPO, f R-1855, op. 1, d. 517, l. 1.

\(^{499}\)Statistics for museum attendance and excursions in Vologda are taken from the annual reports of the Vologda State Museum: VOKM, op. 1, d. 403, l. 14; VOKM, op. 1, d. 599, l. 38; VOKM, op. 1, d. 768, l. 37; VOKM, op. 1, d. 678, l. 29; VOKM, op. 1, d. 679, l. 1-2; VOKM, op. 1, d. 1225, l. 10; VOKM, op. 1, d. 1335, l. 18; VOKM, op. 1, d. 1457, l. 26; VOKM, op. 1, d. 1844, l. 11.
Visitor numbers grew rapidly between 1961 and 1975 (from 144,627 to 401,885 = an average increase of 18,375 each year), but then leveled out between 1975 and 1986 (increased from 401,885 to 417,696) = an average increase of 1,437 a year -- number of excursions grew rapidly from just 958 in 1961 to 3,990 in 1970 to 9,503 in 1979 (on average 474 extra a year) – excursions increasing at a much quicker rate than increases to visitor numbers indicates the emphasis laid on guided spectatorship.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Visitors to Museum</th>
<th>Excursions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>144,627&lt;br&gt;79,748 (museum)&lt;br&gt;11,624 (Petrovskii domik)&lt;br&gt;25,720 (Kremlin complex)</td>
<td>958 (town)&lt;br&gt;96 (10%) (Petrovskii domik) at museum:&lt;br&gt;179 (18%) (Soviet sector)&lt;br&gt;157 (16%) (Nature sector)&lt;br&gt;185 (19%) (History sector)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>203,194&lt;br&gt;112,143 (museum)&lt;br&gt;26,166 (house museum M. I. Ul'yanova)&lt;br&gt;22,047 (Petrovskii domik)&lt;br&gt;38,321 (excursion bureau)&lt;br&gt;4,517 (mobile museum)</td>
<td>3,990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>401,885&lt;br&gt;307,269 (museum and branches)&lt;br&gt;48,695 (stationary exhibitions)&lt;br&gt;10,739 (mobile exhibitions)</td>
<td>307,269&lt;br&gt;121,069 (39%) (museum inc. mobile exhibitions)&lt;br&gt;34,075 (11%) (M. I. Ul'yanova house museum)&lt;br&gt;33,872 (11%) (Petrovskii domik)&lt;br&gt;118,254 (38%) (excursion bureau)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>361,852&lt;br&gt;340,160 (stationary exhibitions and branches of the museum)&lt;br&gt;21,692 (mobile exhibitions)</td>
<td>361,852&lt;br&gt;168,090 (46%) (stationary exhibitions)&lt;br&gt;42,039 (11%) (M. I. Ul'yanova house museum)&lt;br&gt;40,858 (11%) (Petrovskii domik)&lt;br&gt;110,815 (30%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Museum Visitors</td>
<td>Excursion Bureau Visitors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>403,199</td>
<td>9,503 (total)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>149,423 (museum)</td>
<td>1,669 (17%) (museum)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>111,496 (excursion bureau)</td>
<td>4,804 (50%) (excursion bureau)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>50,762 (M. I. Ul'yanova house museum)</td>
<td>1,541 (16%) (M. I. Ul'yanova house museum)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>55,441 (Petrovskii domik)</td>
<td>1,202 (12%) (Petrovskii domik)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>17,914 (Priluki)</td>
<td>286 (3%) (Priluki)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>417,000</td>
<td>8,823</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>267,800 (museum)</td>
<td>5,066 (57%) (museum)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>63,100 (M. I. Ul'yanova house museum)</td>
<td>1,800 (20%) (M. I. Ul'yanova house museum)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>43,700 (Petrovskii domik)</td>
<td>983 (11%) (Petrovskii domik)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>42,400 (Priluki)</td>
<td>989 (11%) (Priluki)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>417,696</td>
<td>9,075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>240,260 (museum)</td>
<td>4,838 (museum)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>60,006 (M. I. Ul'yanova house museum)</td>
<td>1,807 (M. I. Ul'yanova house museum)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>50,568 (belltower)</td>
<td>1,283 (belltower)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>45,085 (historical architectural ensemble of former Prilutskii monastyr*)</td>
<td>1,036 (historical architectural ensemble of former Prilutskii monastyr*)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20,422 (Literature department)</td>
<td>580 (Literature department)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>450,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>205,313</td>
<td>3,747</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Prilutskii monastyr* (Priluki) was converted into a branch of the Vologda *kraevedcheskii* museum in the early-1970s.
APPENDIX THREE:
LEGISLATION PERTAINING TO THE PRESERVATION OF CULTURAL HERITAGE, 1947-2002

1) Major legislative developments concerning the preservation of cultural heritage in the post-war period

22 May 1947: Decree of the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR № 389 'On the Preservation of Architectural Monuments'

14 October 1948: Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR № 3898 'On the Means to Improve the Preservation of Cultural Monuments'

3 March 1949: Short Instructions 'On the Procedure for Recording, Registering, and the Contents of Artistic Monuments'

29 June 1957: Decree of the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR № 781 'On the Improvement of Work for the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Monuments in the RSFSR'

30 August 1960: Decree of the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR №1327 'On the Further Improvement of Work for the Preservation of Cultural Monuments in the RSFSR'


24 May 1966: Decree of the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR № 473 'On the Condition and Means of Improving Historical and Cultural Monuments of the RSFSR'

4 December 1974: Decree of Council of Minsters of RSFSR № 624 'On the Addition to and Partial Adaptation of the Decree of the Council of Ministers of 30 August 1960 № 1327''

7 September 1976: Decree of Council of Ministers RSFSR № 495 'On the Additions to the Resolution of the Council of Ministers of 30 August 1960 № 1327'

29 October 1976: Law of the USSR 'On the Preservation and Use of Historical and Cultural Monuments'

15 December 1978: Law of the RSFSR 'On the Preservation and Use of Historical and Cultural Monuments'

13 May 1986: Order of the Ministry of Culture of the USSR 'Instructions On the Process for Registering, Ensuring the Preservation, Contents, Use, and Restoration of Non-Moveable Historical and Cultural Monuments'

30 November 1992: Decree of the President of the RF № 1487 'On Particularly Valuable Objects of Cultural Heritage of the Peoples of the Russian Federation'

6 October 1994: Statute № 1143 'On the State List of Particularly Valuable Objects of Cultural Heritage of the Peoples of the Russian Federation'

26 November 1994: Statute № 2121 'On the Privatisation of Non-Moveable Historical and Cultural Monuments of Local Value'

20 February 1995: Decree of the President of the RF № 176 'On the Approval of the List of Objects of Historical and Cultural Heritage of Federal (All-Russian) Value'

2) Legislation pertaining to the registration of historical and cultural monuments in Novgorod, Pskov, and Vologda

a) Federal monuments:

30 August 1960: Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR №1327 'on the further improvement of work for the preservation of cultural monuments in the RSFSR'

4 December 1974: Resolution of Council of Minsters of RSFSR № 624 'on the addition to and partial adaptation of the Resolution of the Council of Ministers of 30 August 1960 № 1327''

7 September 1976: Resolution of Council of Ministers RSFSR № 495 'on the additions to the Resolution of the Council of Ministers of 30 August 1960 № 1327'

20 February 1995: Decree of the President of the RF № 176 'on the approval of the list of objects of historical and cultural heritage of federal (all-Russian) value'

b) Regional monuments

i) Novgorod

31 January 1966: Order (Rasporyazhenie) of the obispolkom №31-r

22 January 1968: Decision (Reshenie) of obispolkom № 50

3 July 1973: Order of the obispolkom № 452-r

28 October 1974: Decision of obispolkom № 610

24 January 1975: Order of the obispolkom № 51-r

19 February 1975: Order of the obispolkom № 122-r

23 May 1975: Decision of obispolkom № 247

10 July 1975: Decision of obispolkom № 519

23 August 1976: Order of the obispolkom № 631-r

29 July 1977: Order of the obispolkom № 507-r

22 February 1978: Decision of obispolkom № 79

11 February 1982: Decision of obispolkom № 77
16 July 1982: Order of the oblispolkom № 459-r
20 September 1982: Order of the oblispolkom № 598-r
17 May 1984: Decision of oblispolkom № 200
17 July 1984: Decision of oblispolkom № 302
29 December 1984: Decision of oblispolkom № 550
12 May 1985: Decision of oblispolkom № 170
7 May 1985: Decision of oblispolkom № 171
14 November 1985: Decision of oblispolkom № 442
18 November 1986: Decision of oblispolkom № 409
17 September 1987: Decision of oblispolkom № 314
23 May 1989: Decision of oblispolkom № 161
12 May 1996: Resolution of the Administration of the Novgorod Region № 138
16 January 1997: Resolution of the Administration of the Novgorod Region № 12
23 January 1997: Resolution of the Administration of the Novgorod Region № 21
30 September 1998: Resolution of the Administration of the Novgorod Region № 389

ii) Pskov

24 February 1986: Decision of oblispolkom № 107
28 May 1986: Decision of oblispolkom № 265
29 June 1995: Decision of Pskov oblast

iii) Vologda

30 December 1958: Decision of the executive committee of the Vologda regional ispolkom № 760

30 August 1960: Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR № 1327
23 August 1963: Order of the Council of Ministers of RSFSR № 3630-r

14 April 1974: Decision of the executive committee of the Vologda regional Council of People’s Deputies № 196

18 October 1977: Decision of the executive committee of the Vologda regional Council of People’s Deputies № 617

27 April 1977: Decision of the executive committee of the Vologda regional Council of People’s Deputies № 257

16 November 1978: Decision of the executive committee of the Vologda regional Council of People’s Deputies № 653

6 April 1979: Decision of the executive committee of the Vologda regional Council of People’s Deputies № 239

15 July 1985: Decision of the executive committee of the Vologda regional Council of People’s Deputies № 328

6 April 1988: Decision of the executive committee of the Vologda regional Council of People’s Deputies № 146

8 October 1991: Decision of the executive committee of the Vologda regional Council of People’s Deputies № 434
NOTE ON SOURCES

Interviews and Participant Observation Work
This thesis draws on interview and participant observation work carried out in
Novgorod, Pskov, and Vologda between October 2007 and August 2010. I
conducted a total of 42 interviews with individuals and groups in the towns. I
have also quoted from interviews conducted as part of a collaborative project,
‘From the Plough to the Factory Furnace: Retracing the Paths of Soviet Urban
Migration in North West Russia’ sponsored Geschichtswerkstatt Europa
Programme that was carried out in 2010. A number of interviews were
conducted by colleagues as part of the AHRC project ‘National Identity in Russia
after 1961: Traditions and Deterioriation’. A number of the Interview
transcripts are currently being processed for archiving and will be held at the
Oxford Russian Life History Archive: http://www.ehrc.ox.ac.uk/lifehistory/

Archives

The main archive holdings consulted were:

i) Novgorod

Novgorodskii gosudarstvennyi ob”edinennyi muzei-zapovednik (NGOM)
Op. 2 za 1967-1979 gody
Op. 4 za 1993-1994 gody

Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Novgorodskoi oblasti (GANO)
f. R-3994. Управление культуры Новгородского областного отделения

f. R-4063. Новгородская областная секция профессионального союза Новгородской областной совета по туризму и экскурсиям: отдел транспортных путешествий и экскурсий

f. R-4137. Специальная научно-реставрационная производственная мастерская Управления культуры областного совета Новгородского областного совета

f. R-4563. Центральный совет VOOPIK совет Новгородского областного отделения

ii) Псков

Государственный архив новейшей истории Пскова (GANIP)

f. 1060 Первомая партийная организационно-историко-художественного музея г. Псков

Государственный архив Псковского района (GAPO)

f. R-1855. Управление культуры исполнительного комитета Псковского областного совета депутатов трудящихся, отделы планово-финансовые.

iii) Вологда

Государственный архив Вологодского района (GAVO)

f. 134 Управление культуры городского отделения Вологодского областного совета

f. 843 Областное отделение Всероссийского общества охраны памятников истории и культуры

f. 4795 Управление культуры Вологодского областного отделения

Вологодский областной краеведческий музей (VOKM)

Op. 1 за 1923-1979 годы

f. 52 (parate file)
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