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Antisocial rewarding in structured populations

Abstract:

Cooperation in collective action dilemmas usually breaks down in the absence of additional incentive mechanisms. This tragedy can be escaped if cooperators have the possibility to invest in reward funds that are shared exclusively among cooperators (prosocial rewarding). Yet, the presence of defectors who do not contribute to the public good but do reward themselves (antisocial rewarding) deters cooperation in the absence of additional countermeasures. A recent simulation study suggests that ...

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Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Peer reviewed
Version:
Publisher's version

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Publisher copy:
10.1038/s41598-017-06063-9

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Department:
Oxford, MPLS, Zoology
Role:
Author
Publisher:
Springer Nature Publisher's website
Journal:
Scientific Reports Journal website
Volume:
7
Issue:
1
Pages:
Article: 6212
Publication date:
2017-07-24
DOI:
ISSN:
2045-2322
Pubs id:
pubs:713556
URN:
uri:21939257-4c42-44b9-bfc2-bf8df84fc0fc
UUID:
uuid:21939257-4c42-44b9-bfc2-bf8df84fc0fc
Local pid:
pubs:713556
Paper number:
1
Language:
English

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