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Labour Contracts and Efficiency in On-the-Job Training.

Abstract:

Two sources of inefficiency in the provision of on-the-job training are examined: an externality between firms which arises if there is imperfect competition between firms in the labor market, and allocation inefficiency due to asymmetry of information about the value of the trained worker. The second source of inefficiency may compound the first. Various contracts between the worker and the training firm are considered. Analysis of a simple example suggests that a contract in which the wage ...

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Authors


Margaret Stevens More by this author
Journal:
Economic Journal
Volume:
104
Publication date:
1994
URN:
uuid:2125db55-06a8-46a9-98dd-d68d747f066c
Local pid:
oai:economics.ouls.ox.ac.uk:10581
Language:
English

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