# AESCHYLEAN TRAGEDY AND THE CULTIVATION OF FEAR IN CLASSICAL ATHENS

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Xavier Buxton

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Abstract:

This thesis explores a particular discourse of fear in Classical Athens, most richly developed in the tragedies of Aeschylus, but detectable also in the writings of Thucydides, Plato, and Aristotle. In these authors, fear is not merely a primal instinct for self-preservation but a reasonable and political emotion which, if cultivated in the correct manner, has a part to play in wisdom, virtue, and civic prosperity.

After considering the lexical range of Greek fear, I progress, in Part One, to the historiography, exploring the significance of the emotion in Thucydides' system of causation, its ambiguous value in battle, diplomacy, and politics, and the dubious prospects of its education through historical example. A second chapter tracks the emergence in Plato, and development in Aristotle, of a new, 'cognitive' understanding of fear, which nevertheless remains connected to the body; I link the paradox of 'fearless' courage to the paradox of aesthetic emotion.

In Part Two, three Aeschylus plays are studied in depth. In Chapter Three, on the *Suppliants*, I return Pelasgus' famous deliberation to its dramatic context, and show how the Argive king combines feeling and thinking in a way that is compatible with Aristotelian psychology. Chapter Four takes a sociological approach to fear in the *Seven Against Thebes*, demonstrating the difficulty of governing fear, as well as its capacity for sympathetic expansion. Chapter Five is addressed to the *Oresteia*, and the accommodation of fear at the end of the *Eumenides*; I show that this is not a miraculous 'transformation' but a recognition and representation of the salutary potential of the emotion that has been latent throughout the trilogy.

Note on texts, translations, transliterations, abbreviations, and citations

Texts:

For Aeschylus, I use Page's 1972 OCT edition, with deviances noted. For Thucydides the Greek text is drawn from the 1942 OCT (Jones, rev. Powell). For Aristotle, I use the most recent Loeb editions: Hett (*On the Soul*), Freese rev. Striker (*Rhetoric*), Rackham (*Nicomachean Ethics*), and Peck/Forster (*Movement of Animals*). For further details, see bibliography.

Translations:

Longer translations are from the most recent Loeb editions, with minor adjustments for clarity, unless otherwise noted. For shorter translations (< 5 words), I deviate more often, trying to bring out the 'literal' sense of the phrase.

Transliterations:

I transliterate single words (in the nominative, or first person singular, according to the dictionary headword), in specific circumstances: first, where the reference is independent of a citation of the Greek text, forming part of a wider thematic discussion; second, where the Greek text uses a cognate form of the noun in question. Thus I refer to the growth-fear-necessity *prophasis* as a motif across Thucydides Book I, and I discuss the *phobos* felt by the Chorus at *Sept.* 78, where they sing, θρεῦμαι φοβερά.

Abbreviations and Citations:

I use the abbreviations listed in the *Oxford Classical Dictionary* (4th edition). A few additional abbreviations are detailed in the first two parts of the bibliography. Books in prose texts are cited with Roman numerals; those in poetic texts, with Arabic numerals. Citations of commentaries and translations will usually not mention date or page number; the former are *ad loc.* unless otherwise noted.

# INTRODUCTION

## A: The Place Where Fear is Good

### Thesis statement and preliminary scope

ἔσθ᾽ ὅπου τὸ δεινὸν εὖ
καὶ φρενῶν ἐπίσκοπον
δεῖμ᾽ ἄνω καθήμενον·
ξυμφέρει
σωφρονεῖν ὑπὸ στένει.
τίς δὲ μηδὲν ἐν δέει
καρδίαν ἀνατρέφων
ἢ βροτὸς πόλις θ᾽ ὁμοί-
ως ἔτ᾽ ἂν σέβοι Δίκαν; (Aesch. *Eum.* 517-25)[1]

So the Erinyes sing in the central stasimon of Aeschylus' *Eumenides,* as they await the climactic trial of Orestes. There is a place, they say, where τὸ δεινόν is good. Their promotion of fear is at once psychological and political: here we find the φρένες have an ἐπίσκοπος, and the πόλις has a καρδία; fear both 'governs' the mind and 'nourishes' the city. The individual and the city are in this context ὁμοῖος: each must be reared and ruled by fear; each must learn restraint through grief; each must still revere justice.

[1] For the text of these lines, see n. 606.

This thesis is an attempt to locate the place where fear is good in the cultural discourse of Classical Athens. Across a range of texts, I find two persistent ideas. The first is that fear may be beneficial, just as Aeschylus' Erinyes claim. Aristotle says fear makes us 'deliberate' (βουλευτικούς, *Rh.* II.1383a7): it is prudent, rational, collaborative. We see this fearful thought at work in the *Suppliants*. A regular partner of *sebas* and *aidos*, fear is essential to piety, also. Yet it is not just the citizen but the city, too, that must be afraid, if justice is to prevail and the community prosper: in Thucydides, fear is said to guarantee domestic harmony, secure alliances, and lead to military success (II.37.3; III.11.2; II.11.4-5); in the *Oresteia* an established terror provides the psycho-political foundations for Athenian prosperity (*Eum*. 700-3; 990-1). In *Seven*, accordingly, the fate of the whole city hangs on the pious and pragmatic management of anxiety.

The second idea is that fear *can* be managed. As a phenomenon shared between citizens and amenable to reason, it may be regulated, educated – in the language of the Erinyes, 'reared' or 'cultivated' (ἀνατρέφων). Not all fear is good: virtue for both Plato and Aristotle means fearing the right things in the right way; these are habits of feeling that music and philosophy must develop. As a model for such development, Plato takes the experience of the Eleusinian initiate, a progression from terror to reverence. Thucydides makes fear the origin of the war he narrates, while panics and paranoia wreak destruction in domestic and military spheres. Yet his protagonists are actively concerned with the possibility of shaping, directing, and teaching citizens and soldiers to fear better, often by use of historical example; and Thucydides himself alludes, albeit cautiously, to the possibility that his history might serve as a warning to its readers. It is in tragedy, however, that the cultivation of fear is most pronounced: each of the plays I discuss is

structured by a dynamic juxtaposition of different modes of fear; the *Oresteia* stages a succession of evasions and exclusions before the emotion is finally accommodated in Athena's settlement.

As an investigation of ancient emotion, this thesis owes its focus and approach to two intellectual movements: a cognitive 'turn' in psychology, linguistics, and neuroscience from the middle of the twentieth century, and an emotional or affective 'turn' in philosophy, historiography, and across the human sciences towards its end. These developments have had a profound influence on classical studies in the last three decades, which have seen a trickle of short studies grow to a steady stream of monographs and edited volumes dedicated to the emotions in Greece and Rome. My thesis – attending to the (relatively) neglected emotion of fear – may be read as a contribution to this scholarship.

However, my focus is Aeschylus. The Eleusinian playwright's drama has from ancient times been associated with *ekplexis* (e.g. Ar. *Ran.* 961-2; *Vit. Aesch.* 1.29). The scholia, too, attest to the terror provoked by his plays. These ancient accounts are probably influenced by the prominence of fear within the texts; modern readers have regularly observed that Aeschylus' work is saturated with the emotion. Such observations have, however, mostly been limited to discussions of the role of fear in particular plays, with a concentration on the *Oresteia*. The few existing synoptic treatments, with one exception, tend towards the schematic. Studies devoted to fear in ancient Greece often neglect Aeschylus; those that do touch on his tragedies are necessarily selective, excerpting scenes and songs to illustrate a more general cultural pattern, while larger thematic

developments and the performative element are occluded. This dissertation, by contrast, attempts to understand Aeschylean fear both in cultural context and as it unfolds through his surviving tragedies, considering distinctions in the dramatic texture of its representation, all the while advancing my fundamental theses: that fear is shown as both educable and potentially salutary.

It may seem that I am being pulled two ways: is this a study of Aeschylean fear, with the contemporary Athenian discourse of fear adduced as cultural 'context'? Or is it an account of fear in Classical Athens, with Aeschylean tragedy serving as a privileged example or case-study? My answer is that it is both, and that each may complement the other. The kind of fear I am investigating is not historic and static, but rather something discursive and dynamic. Thucydides, Plato, and Aristotle, as much as Aeschylus, are directly engaged in the cultivation of emotion in their audiences; they serve not as background but as analogy for the workings of Aeschylean fear. As a form, however, tragedy operates on a different ontological plane: fear is presented within a divine and symbolic system, but also expressed, embodied, and enacted onstage. Moreover, tragedy has an essential polyphony, as various experiences and evaluations of fear are presented in sequence and parallel; none is explicitly approved by the author. The complexity of this treatment warrants special attention.

Then there is the question of chronology. Aeschylus' plays are composed half a century before Thucydides' *History*, perhaps a century before Plato's dialogues, and decades more before Aristotle's ethical treatises. In my thesis, then, he stands as the earliest promoter of salutary and educable fear. I am not arguing, however, that Aeschylus is the

inventor of this discourse;[2] nor do I aim to demonstrate the influence of Aeschylus upon later prose writers. Instead, I consider Classical Athenian culture – from the Persian Wars, in which Aeschylus fought, through to the death of Alexander, whom Aristotle taught – as a coherent and continuous period. It is in the emotional discourse of this period, as a whole, that I think Aeschylus' tragedies should be understood.

In this, I differ from the most significant previous treatment of my subject: Jacqueline de Romilly's *La crainte et l'angoisse dans le théâtre d'Éschyle*. This slim volume, published in 1958, deserves more attention than it has received. De Romilly substantially pre-empts our contemporary fascination with Greek emotions, bringing to Aeschylean fear a concentration and sensitivity of analysis not surpassed by later scholars. The book is divided into two sections: first, 'la description de la crainte', which includes both 'symptomes' and 'métaphores'; and, second, 'la signification de la crainte', concerned with the ethical implications of the emotion, the experience of which, de Romilly says, is always linked to the perception of divine will and divine justice. This 'sens affectif de la règle morale', pitched between spontaneous physiology and rational apprehension, is peculiar to Aeschylus.[3] His dramas thus represent 'un moment privilégié et même unique' in human history, where can be witnessed 'l'effort d'unification, de conciliation, d'identification entre un monde soumis à l'arbitraire divin, et le monde de la conscience où l'homme est non seulement responsable mais juge de ses propres actions'.[4] This latter

[2] Indeed, there are some passages in Homer that seem to give fear a role in deliberation (*Il*. 22.98-130; see Konstan (2006: 136-39) with the criticism of van Emde Boas (2022: 65-9)) and others that invoke a deterrent fear of (divine) justice (*Il.* 13.622-7; *Od*. 14.82-88). One even obliquely suggests the necessity of such fear for the preservation of the community (*Il.* 16.384-93). On these latter passages, see de Romilly (1958: 57-8) and especially Allan (2006). For *aidos* as an essential component of early Greek ethics, see Cairns (1993).
[3] De Romilly (1958: 74).
[4] De Romilly (1958: 102).

morality is manifest in the rational and secular ('laïque') fears of legitimate sanctions that we meet in Sophocles, Euripides, Thucydides, and Plato; yet it is absent, de Romilly claims, from all but the last of Aeschylus' extant plays. Only in the *Eumenides*, she writes, does 'l'utilité de la crainte' emerge, with Athena's establishment of the Areopagus court, where fear and reverence will restrain the Athenians from injustice. Aeschylus thus provides a crucial bridge between the Archaic and the Classical, and the *Oresteia* represents a psycho-historical transition, 'la fin de l'angoisse et l'avènement de la bonne crainte'.[5]

De Romilly's book – together with her 1956 article on fear in Thucydides – is far richer than this short summary suggests, and I will refer to it regularly throughout this thesis. Yet her periodization is misleading. Aeschylus, as I hope to show, is not a liminal figure, hovering on the boundary between Archaic superstition and Classical rationality: his predecessors are not so primitive, his successors not so enlightened as she suggests. De Romilly's account is avowedly indebted to the larger narrative of Bruno Snell's *The Discovery of the Mind* (1946, tr. 1953).[6] Snell traces an evolution in self-consciousness, from the primitive conception of 'Homeric man' – a mere bundle of organs, buffeted by external forces – through the intermediate phases of lyric impotence and tragic deliberation to the emergence of a separate and immaterial mind, as a centre of will and moral responsibility, in Plato, Aristotle, and their successors. Less well known is Snell's first monograph, *Aeschylus und das Handeln im Drama* (1928), which offers a more detailed account of the crucial, tragic episode in *Discovery* – the development of a

[5] De Romilly (1958: 114).
[6] For the intellectual and political context of Snell's work, see Lohse (2000); for a retrospective reappraisal of his claims, see Burkert (2004); for its current status in the discipline, see Holmes (2020).

deliberating conscience, succinctly articulated in Orestes' terrible question, τί δράσω; (*Cho*. 899). *Aeschylus* emphatically foregrounds fear as the keynote of Aeschylean tragedy, and as a site of philosophical transformation; *Discovery* rehearses the same argument.[7] It is thus hardly surprising that de Romilly quotes Snell's earlier text on the first page of her introduction, and that she presents *La crainte* as a mere marginal annotation to his *Discovery*.[8]

Yet her ostensible fealty to Snell's project is more limited in practice. For Snell, Aeschylus' innovation is embodied in his protagonists and their dilemmas; it is the self-consciousness that emerges in their moral crises that distinguishes a 'tragic' psychology from its predecessors. De Romilly, by contrast, attends more closely to choral articulations of fear; and while Io, Clytemnestra, and Orestes are discussed, it is their fearful guilt, rather than their hesitant action, that de Romilly explores. Thus Snell dwells at length upon the fearful deliberation of Pelasgus, contrasting it with the 'lyrical', helpless terror of the Danaid Chorus; the King's fear, Snell says, '[ist] aus der Reflexion entstanden' and 'treibt zu immer neuem Nachdenken'.[9] De Romilly, however, treats the choral emotion as typical of Aeschylus' outlook, and relegates Pelasgus ('le roi dans les *Suppliantes*') to a footnote.[10] On the very same page she declares, 'La crainte eschyléenne est, en général, brutale, physique, mystérieuse, involontaire. Elle ne prend point son origine dans une refléxion.' This Aeschylean fear, though interiorized, is incompatible with conscious, rational processes, and thus fundamentally different, de

[7] Snell (1928: chs. 2 and 3; 1953: 98-108).
[8] De Romilly (1958: 11, quoting Snell (1928: 43); 19).
[9] Snell (1928: 60): '…der *phobos*, der schon aus der Reflexion entstanden ist, treibt zu immer neuem Nachdenken …'.
[10] 1958: 58 n.2. Remarkably, de Romilly does not discuss *Supp.* 379-80, lines which for Snell (1928: 60) encapsulate the development from lyric to tragic consciousness.

Romilly says, from the prudential fear of Thucydides, and the inhibiting shame of Plato. While Snell's Aeschylus inaugurates a new, Classical mode of thought, de Romilly's stands in the dawning twilight, and alone.

This thesis proposes, instead, that Aeschylus should be read in parallel with later Classical writers. This more inclusive approach to Aeschylean fear-discourse is shared by most recent treatments of my topic, from David Rosenbloom's *tour-de-force* essay on the emotional dynamics of early Greek tragedy, to David Konstan's chapter on fear in his seminal *Emotions of the Ancient Greeks*; newer works by Maria Patera, Eirene Visvardi, and Anton Bierl all share a belief that Aeschylus can be understood as an ideological quasi-contemporary of Thucydides, Plato, and Aristotle.[11] Each of these scholars will be examined in more detail below, when I discuss the critical landscape: here I will only emphasise that none combines a sustained analysis of fear in the later prose texts with an attention to the dramatic texture of Aeschylus' extant plays.

But what is this 'fear' that I propose to investigate? Did the Classical Athenian, as a *homo sapiens*, *feel* the same emotion that we do, and merely perceive and articulate that feeling differently? Or is the very experience of emotion shaped by belief and language, and its biological expression no more than incidental? Such questions have racked both the science and the historiography of fear. My introduction will first of all map the contours of modern fear-studies, including the traditional faultline between physiological, universalist accounts on the one hand, and cognitive and constructionist accounts on the

[11] Rosenbloom (1993); Konstan (2006); Patera (2013); Visvardi (2015); Bierl (2018). Cf. Belfiore (1992).

other. I will next explore how the 'history of fear' has emerged as a subject in medieval and modern history, before turning to some recent work on fear in ancient Greece. Finally, I survey some recent scholarship on the 'theatre of fear', emphasising that I am less interested in the 'tragic passions' of Aristotle's audience than in the emotion represented on the Aeschylean stage. I then illustrate my own approach with a study of *Persians*, before setting out the structure of this thesis. The introduction will conclude with a lexical analysis of fear in Classical Greek.

## The Science of Fear

'It is certain', declared Sigmund Freud in his *Introductory Lectures*, 'that the problem of fear is the meeting point of many important questions, an enigma whose complete solution would cast a flood of light upon psychic life.' He was not, however, especially impressed by medical research in this area, including his own earlier investigations of the brain: 'these schools seem to be interested primarily in the anatomical cause of the condition of fear. They say the medulla oblongata is irritated, and the patient learns that he is suffering from neurosis of the nervus vagus. … But today I must say that I know of nothing more indifferent to me for the psychological comprehension of fear, than knowledge of the nerve passage through which these sensations must pass.'[12] Freud's

[12] Freud (1920 [1916-17]), "Lecture XXV: Fear and Anxiety", tr. Stanley Hall. ('[E]s steht fest, daß das Angstproblem ein Knotenpunkt ist, an welchem die verschiedensten und wichtigsten Fragen zusammentreffen, ein Rätsel, dessen Lösung eine Fülle von Licht über unser ganzes Seelenleben ergießen müßte. … Aber heute muß ich sagen, ich weiß nichts, was mir für das psychologische Verständnis der Angst gleichgültiger sein könnte als die Kenntnis des Nervenweges, auf dem ihre Erregungen ablaufen.)

own analysis of 'real' and 'neurotic' fear is well known: the former, he says, is a 'reaction to a perception of danger', while the latter represents the ego's attempt to escape the 'inner danger' posed by the claims of the libido; the first is healthy, 'rational', perhaps even necessary for self-preservation; the latter pathological, self-destructive, and in need of a therapeutic cure. The relation between the two is intriguing, and will be touched upon in the last chapter of this thesis. Here, however, the important element of Freud's lecture is his rejection of the physiological approach to emotion, which had become dominant in the latter decades of the nineteenth century, and which survives to this day.

Fear, according to this popular model, is 'hard-wired' in our brains and bodies; its 'natural' expression is predetermined by evolution. At the model's origin is Charles Darwin himself, who wrote, as a sequel to the *Descent of Man* (1869), a treatise on *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals* (1872). This book employed photography to demonstrate a continuity in the presentation of anger, grief, shame etc., across cultures and even species; the chapter on fear reports that humans (both 'European' and non-European, or 'savage'), dogs, and monkeys exhibit similar behaviours, from an increased heart rate to raised hairs on the back of the neck.[13] In 1884, the celebrated Italian physiologist Angelo Mosso wrote a popular book about *la paura*, in which he documented in more detail the 'mechanical' and 'involuntary' response of various mammals to perceived danger.[14] In the same year, William James would assert that such responses were not mere 'symptoms' of an emotion, bodily expressions of a mental state; instead, the 'bodily changes follow directly the perception of the exciting

[13] Darwin (1872). As pointed out by Konstan (2006: 10-11), Darwin drew on an older physiognomic tradition; Leys (2010: 71) notes that his illustration of fear is not in fact a photograph but an engraving based on a photograph from Duchenne de Boulogne's (1862) *Mécanisme de la physionomie humaine*.
[14] Mosso (1896 [1884]).

fact', and our conscious 'feeling' of these bodily changes '*is* the emotion'. Like Darwin and Mosso, James reckoned on fear having a particular physiological signature, distinct from other emotions: 'if inability to draw deep breath, fluttering of the heart, and … [a] peculiar epigastric charge … all spontaneously occur together in a certain person; his feeling of their combination *is* the emotion of dread'. Even if the 'trigger' for the emotion, 'in our "cultured age"', seems alien to the basic instincts of other animals and 'primitive societies', the nervous response is consistent, and it is the nervous response itself that is perceived as fear.[15]

Such expressive and anatomical analysis gained traction with the research of Silvan Tomkins in the 1960s and, more recently, Paul Ekman, who reduced Darwin's wider palate to a smaller set of 'basic' emotions or 'affect programmes', including fear. Tomkins' programmes, 'innately endowed and … genetically inherited', bear no inherent relation to the object (or thought or memory) which triggers them; what *is* inherent to them, as Darwin and Mosso had implied, are certain somatic reflexes and facial expressions.[16] In various experiments, Ekman sought to demonstrate that photographs of a fearful face would be universally recognised as such, by anyone, anywhere, at any time, thereby proving that there existed, underneath our cultural differences, some common phenomenon of 'fear'.[17] Although Ekman's methodology has been repeatedly questioned (even by his own students),[18] his results remain influential, and have been bolstered by neuro-anatomical research. A century after Mosso attempted to locate the 'seat of

[15] James (1884: 189-90; 199). Similar ideas were published by Carl Lange in 1885, and so this is sometimes called the James-Lange theory of emotion.
[16] Tomkins (1968: 105–6), cited by Leys (2017: 32)
[17] See e.g. Ekman/Friesen/Ellsworth (1972).
[18] See Fridlund (1994), Leys (2010) and (2017: 76-128).

emotional expression' in the 'optic thalamus', Joseph LeDoux, Antonio Damasio, and others would focus on an almond-shaped brain region called the 'amygdala', visibly activated during emotional arousal.[19] Damasio and his collaborators were particularly interested in the case of 'SM', a woman with severe genetic damage to her amygdala, who seemed incapable both of responding to fearful stimuli, and of recognising fear in the photographed faces of others.[20] Experiments on other amygdala-damaged patients and on animals corroborated these findings, so that the amygdala became the essential component of an evolutionarily programmed affective response, namely 'fear'.

In the meantime, however, numerous scholars across the disciplines have challenged this physiological and universalist position. Anthropologists have pointed to the problem of 'simulation' for Ekman's studies, and to his neglect of the communicative functions of facial expression.[21] Emotions, they suggest, cannot be abstracted from their social and cultural context. From a linguistic perspective, too, 'basic' emotions seemed problematic: is it just chance, Anna Wierzbicka wonders, that these primary affective states neatly map onto English concepts of 'grief', 'anger', 'fear' etc., while other languages have no exactly commensurate labels?[22] Neither of these criticisms is fatal for the universalist position. As Ekman himself has argued, his facial expressions do work as signals, communicating to others that 'something important is happening inside the person who shows the emotion'; even if the expression may be concealed or simulated, there is an involuntary impulse, which for Ekman comprises an emotion. Against Wierzbicka's

[19] LeDoux (1996: ch. 6); Damasio (1999: ch. 2).
[20] Adolphs, Damasio et al. 1995; cf. Feinstein, Damasio et al. 2011.
[21] See the 'behavioral ecology' of Fridlund (1994), summarized by Leys (2017: 220-65).
[22] Wierzbicka 1999; cf. Lutz 1988.

objection, Ekman protests that several of his experiments have involved matching faces to narrative situations, rather than emotion labels.[23]

Within Wierzbicka's account, however, is a more fundamental opposition to the physiological approach. All her emotions belong to 'cognitive scenarios' which relate to the external world of perception; though they involve a feeling or a desire, they are defined also by the perception of something 'good' or 'bad'. 'A man is afraid *of something*, angry *at something*', Magda Arnold wrote in 1960; 'as long as the emotion lasts, it maintains that focus on the object'.[24] This focus of emotion on an object is sometimes termed its 'intentionality'. The intentional object is not simply perceived, however: it must be 'appraised' (or 'judged', or 'evaluated') as beneficial or harmful. Both the object and its subjective appraisal, whether conscious or 'subconscious', are necessary to and in fact constitutive of the experience of emotion.[25] According to the radical 'cognitivist' account, 'emotions *are* judgments',[26] albeit judgements of a specific kind, concerning the well-being of the subject. Thus fear *is* an evaluation of impending harm. Martha Nussbaum, perhaps the most influential advocate of cognitive emotion in contemporary philosophy, makes this 'eudaimonistic evaluation' not only necessary but sufficient for emotion: nervous arousal and facial expression are merely incidental to what is, in essence, an 'upheaval of *thought*'.[27] Though the phrase is Proust's ('soulèvements géologiques de la pensée'), Nussbaum's touchstone is Aristotle, and

[23] Ekman (1998: xxi-xxxvi).
[24] Arnold (1960: I, 158–9).
[25] For the evolution of appraisal theory, and especially the work of Richard Lazarus, see Leys (2017: 129-219).
[26] Solomon (1976 *passim*), with useful clarification in Solomon (1988).
[27] Nussbaum (2001), with useful précis in Nussbaum (2004).

especially the *Rhetoric*, where emotions (*pathe*) are 'all those affections which cause men to change their opinion in regard to their judgements'.[28]

Yet Nussbaum does not dispute the relevance of evolutionary psychology and neuroscience to any philosophy of the emotions; in fact, her own PhD thesis comprises a commentary on Aristotle's *On the Movement of Animals*, a text that grants a much larger role to physiology in emotional experience.[29] Furthermore, although she is most famous for her liberal defence of manifestly social emotions such as compassion and love, her more recent treatments of fear have given plenty of space to the research of Damasio and LeDoux. Fear, she says, is a 'very primitive' emotion, located in a part of the brain shared with lower vertebrates; LeDoux's experiments show that 'it is an emotion a rat can have, in a way not utterly distinct from a human being'.[30] This makes the philosopher cautious about the possibility of a 'moralized' or educated fear.[31] LeDoux himself, however, has gone to some length in recent years to clarify that the patterns of neurological activations that he has identified in rats in humans are not, in themselves, 'fear', but a 'defensive survival circuit'; 'fear', he believes, is a word that should be reserved for the conscious sense of danger that the operation of these circuits may sometimes produce.[32] Such concessions in each direction have allowed a new moderate position to arise, sometimes called the 'conceptual act' or 'social construction' theory of emotion, and most associated

[28] Arist. *Rh*. II.1378a20-1. In the next clause, Aristotle adds a further qualification, that they are 'accompanied by pleasure and pain' – for the role of these affective charges in Aristotle's theory of emotion, see Chapter Two.
[29] Nussbaum (1978).
[30] Nussbaum (2012: 26).
[31] Nussbaum (2012: 28-9; 2018: ch. 1).
[32] LeDoux (2017). As for 'SM', the woman with the damaged amygdala: later experiments found that she did manifest a fearful response – and report an experience of fear – different from other threatening conditions; it has been argued that the amygdala's function is to focus attention rather than drive 'fear' *per se*. See Leys (2017: 124-5, with n.92).

with Lisa Feldman Barrett. This theory is a revision of James' approach, allowing that an internal 'core affect' is perceived by the brain ('interoception'), and instantly 'conceptualized' using a 'situation-specific knowledge of emotion learned from prior experience. The result is an intentional state that is at once affective and conceptual.'[33]

Since that 'conceptualization' is not innate, we cannot seek an experience of English 'fear' in Classical Athens; we should not imagine that any one word, or group of words, can capture all that the English word communicates. We can, however, assume that non-conceptual ingredients of fear will be present, and that comparable conceptualizations did take place. Even Wierzbicka, while cautioning against linguistic projection, acknowledges certain metalinguistic 'emotional universals'. All languages, she suggests, have at least one 'fear-like' word, which includes the semantic components 'something bad can happen (to me)' and 'I don't want this to happen'.[34] While we must attend to the particular connotations of such words – as I will in the lexical analysis that concludes this introduction – it is possible to work with fear as a loose category of bio-cultural experience, combining a feeling and a thought.

## The History of Fear

[33] Lindquist/Barrett (2008: 900). For the debt to James, see Barrett/Russell (2015: 2-3).
[34] (1999: 286-7). For a more recent linguistic approach, see Jackson et al. (2019), where a large 'colexification' database (2500 languages) suggests 'universal structure' alongside cultural variation.

Each of these models allows for a slightly different history of emotions: the universalist view requires us to examine the different ways in which this constant has been managed; the cognitivist observes how the intentional objects of fear differ from culture to culture; while the psychological constructionist traces changes in how affect is conceptualized. Yet it is no accident that the history of emotions has flourished with the ascent of cognitivism, which considers emotions to be a kind of ideology that varies with cultural change. Thus even as the first historians of emotion (Elias, Huizinga, Febvre etc.) focused on the ascent (in *longue durée*) of the 'civilized' ideals of emotional restraint and 'rationality', they rejected the essentializing claims of their psychologist contemporaries; already they understood terms like 'civilization', 'reason', and even 'emotion' itself to be historically contingent.[35] When emotional history was revived in the 1980s and 90s, scholars were still more sceptical; many were quick to deny any definitive boundary between emotion and cognition, between feeling and thinking. Meanwhile – under the influence of sociology and anthropology – historians such as Peter and Carol Stearns turned their attention from the prevalence of emotion, *per se*, to the dominant 'emotional style' or 'emotionology' of a society, with which individuals were expected, or required, to conform.[36] Variations upon this approach have been led by William Reddy, who suggests a typology of 'emotional regimes', allowing various degrees of emotional liberty,[37] and Barbara Rosenwein, who proposes that multiple 'emotional communities' can coexist within a single society.[38]

[35] For a defence of Elias' complexity, see Van Krieken (2014). For a broader introduction to the development of the field, see Boddice (2018: 8-40).
[36] Stearns/Stearns (1985).
[37] Reddy (2001).
[38] Rosenwein (2006).

It is within this context that the study of Greek and Roman emotion has boomed. First came the philosophers, who, questioning the physiological and behaviourist paradigms of their predecessors, found allies in Aristotle and the Stoics;[39] the renewed appreciation of Hellenistic and Roman psychology stimulated a collection of essays on the 'passions' in Latin literature.[40] Bernard Williams, meanwhile, looking to Homer and tragic poetry for the roots of contemporary morality, isolated 'shame' as a crucial component of ancient social ethics.[41] In the same year, Douglas Cairns published his magisterial treatment of *aidos*, arguing for a continuity in Greek thinking about this 'inhibitory emotion' from Homer to Aristotle.[42] Yet the target of Cairns' book is an earlier generation of intellectual historians (including Snell). The real flourishing of classical emotion as a subject in its own right arrived in the following decade, with seminal studies of anger by William Harris,[43] and of pity by David Konstan.[44] Other books soon followed: on envy and jealousy,[45] remorse,[46] and disgust,[47] as well as more positive emotions such as love,[48] affection,[49] and hope.[50] These volumes generally take a long view of the feeling in question, either tracing a diachronic narrative of affective transformation, or juxtaposing representations from different places and periods in search of shared, synchronic elements and motifs. Many adopt a cautious attitude towards emotional semantics, and focus squarely on ancient terminology. A number of scholars, however, have argued strongly that the study of ancient emotion should not be so restricted by lexicography; feelings

[39] Fortenbaugh (1975); Nussbaum (1994; 2001); Sorabji (2000); Knuuttila (2004).
[40] Braund/Gill (1997).
[41] Williams (1993).
[42] Cairns (1993: 2).
[43] W. Harris (2001), cf. the narrower focus of Kalimtzis (2012).
[44] Konstan (2001), cf. Sternberg (2005).
[45] Konstan/Rutter (2003); Sanders (2014).
[46] Fulkerson (2013).
[47] Lateiner/Spatharas (2016).
[48] Sanders/Thumiger/Carey/Lowe (2013).
[49] Konstan (2018).
[50] Caston/Kaster 2016; Spatharas/Kazantzidis 2018.

such as ‘pride’, which have no Greek equivalent, may be identified by an emotional ‘script’ of perception, evaluation, and response.[51] This broadening of methodology has been matched by a broadening of investigative scope: the extended project of Angelos Chaniotis, in particular, has helped to expand the source material for ancient emotion beyond canonical works of philosophy and literature to visual art, epigraphy, papyrology, and even archaeology.[52]

There have been studies, too, of ancient fear, not least from the pen of Chaniotis himself, though hardly on the scale of the monographs and volumes cited above. The first substantial effort to synthesise the Greek discourse of fear is a chapter by Konstan in his *Emotions of the Ancient Greeks* (2006); the subtitle of this volume (‘Studies in Aristotle and Classical Literature’) is suggestive of its approach. As with other emotions, Konstan starts his substantial discussion with the definition offered by Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*: ‘Let fear (φόβος) be a kind of pain or disturbance deriving from an impression (φαντασία) of a future evil …’. Taken together with the treatment of courage in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, this leads Konstan to the conclusion that Aristotelian fear is ‘not an instinctive aversion but a socially conditioned response in which relations of power and judgments concerning the status and attitudes of others play a crucial role’; in ethical terms, ‘fear is not the sign of a moral or other deficiency; it just is the response to a credible danger’. Konstan then introduces, alongside some modern examples, a range of other ancient

[51] Kaster (2005); Cairns (2008); Sanders (2014). A systematic lexical approach seems more popular in French scholarship: see e,g. Zaborowski (2002) and (2008), Coin-Longeray/Vallat (2015), and the dispute over Thucydidean *deos*, discussed in Chapter One.

[52] Chaniotis led a project in Oxford from 2009-2013, entitled, ‘The Social and Cultural Construction of Emotions: The Greek Paradigm’, out of which have come three edited volumes (Chaniotis (2012a), (2020); Chaniotis/Ducrey (2013)). For methodology, see especially the introduction to Chaniotis (2012a); for a review of recent work, see the introduction to Chaniotis (2020). Douglas Cairns has also edited a number of survey volumes that combine a range of methodologies and material: see Cairns/Fulkerson (2015), Cairns/Nelis (2017), and Cairns (2019).

Greek texts. Particularly interesting are his discussions of Hector's deliberation in *Iliad* 22, the battle exhortations of Phormio and Brasidas in Thucydides, and the terror of the Theban Chorus in Aeschylus' *Seven Against Thebes*. In each case, Konstan finds corroboration of 'Aristotle's cognitive account of fear'. In a subsequent section, Konstan acknowledges the co-existence of other, less cognitive kinds of fear in Greek literature, especially terror and panic, often represented by the term *ekplexis*. Konstan admits that 'the boundary between rational fear and wild fright' is no more 'strictly policed' in ancient Greek than in English; nevertheless, he argues such irrational emotions are separate from 'fear proper', as defined by Aristotle – and that Aristotle's cognitive understanding of fear reflects the popular attitude towards the emotion in ancient Greece.

Although I broadly agree with the conclusions of Konstan's chapter – specifically, his vindication of fear as at least *potentially* reasonable and deliberative – I will argue, in Chapter Two, that his reading of Aristotelian emotion neglects the physiological emphasis of the biological treatises. In other chapters, I will also offer slightly different readings of the Thucydidean speeches, and the *Seven* Chorus; in each case, I think he underplays the resistance of fear to rational correction. The error, I believe, comes from starting with Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, and then seeking corroboration in earlier texts.

Maria Patera's 2013 essay, published as part of Chaniotis' project, suffers from the same problem. Patera is interested in a 'certain discourse of fear … associated with manipulation of the masses and deception to that end', a 'usage of fear that *persists* through several centuries of Greek thought'. She then initiates her discussion with a Stoic definition of fear as 'an irrational flinching or flight in the face of expected evil',

illustrated with examples from Hellenistic and Imperial Greek writers, before identifying similar views in Xenophon, Plato, and Aristotle.[53] Patera thus projects 'persistence' *backwards* through the centuries. Her chapter proceeds to explore various ways in which this emotion might be countered, through veneration of the god Phobos, appeals to shame and honour, or to reason. At the same time, she observes a positive relation between fear and obedience to the law articulated in Clement of Alexandria, Aristotle, Aeschylus, Plato, Timocles, Menander, Theodoret of Cyrus, Plutarch, Polybius, and Sophocles (in that order).[54] The accumulation of (mostly very short) examples, from different periods, places, and genres, is impressive, yet nuance is lost: perhaps Aeschylus does express his own views 'through the mouth of Athena', but it seems unwise to associate Thucydides with the (unsuccessful) arguments of the Mytileneans; and does it not matter that Sophocles' Menelaus is a Spartan brute? To what extent can we say that these '[Greek] authors, be they philosophers or not, dissociate themselves from the masses' fear even as they recognise that fear is very useful for good governance of the city', when we have not a word of Aeschylus, Sophocles, or indeed Plato *in propria voce*?

Though Konstan is much more careful in this regard, providing relatively extended discussions of his chosen examples, Patera's skimming across the centuries illustrates a second weakness in his 'Greatest Hits' approach to ancient emotion. Emotions – or emotionologies, or emotional regimes – are not articulated in isolation: they belong to bodies, places, communities; they contribute to larger narratives and themes, and to

[53] Patera (2013: 109-10) (my emphasis). She cites Konstan here (p.10 n.6), clarifying that by 'irrational' the Stoics meant 'unreasonable' or unjustified rather than non-cognitive.
[54] Patera (2013: 123-6).

particular ideological structures.[55] This is not to deny the value of informed generalization, or of bringing together diverse material. The work of Chaniotis himself, on the epigraphic 'construction' of fear in Greek sanctuaries, expertly demonstrates a continuity in the way that these spaces were experienced, across the Hellenized world, from 300 BCE to 300 CE. Yet Chaniotis' conclusions, concerning the importance of 'emotional contexts' and 'emotional communities' in the analysis of texts and images, are mostly general and methodological; the 'cultural parameters' are so loose as to defy much specificity at all.[56]

The case of Spartan fear, noted by Patera but studied more thoroughly by Marie-Madeleine Mactoux and Nicolas Richer, illustrates the value of a different approach.[57] In Homer and Hesiod, Phobos is introduced as a deity, the son of Ares; he hitches his father's horses and drives his chariot into battle; he is said to be depicted on Athena's aegis and on the shields of Agamemnon and of Heracles.[58] Later, Aeschylus' Argives swear an oath to Phobos in the *Seven*; a fifth-century inscription from Selinous gives him credit for saving the city in war.[59] In Plutarch, we are told that both Theseus and Alexander sacrificed to Phobos before battle.[60] Only in Sparta, however, is there any record of an established Phobos cult. Plutarch, in his life of Cleomenes, reports that the Spartans have a temple devoted to the god. He goes on to explain that they see Phobos not simply as a baleful god to be propitiated before battle, but rather believe him to be

[55] This is a limitation even of de Romilly's book, despite the exclusive focus upon Aeschylus: her synoptic approach prevents any sense of thematic development within each drama, let alone how the emotion might have been communicated in a theatrical space. For theatrical fear, see the next section of this introduction.
[56] Chaniotis (2012b); citations at 207 and 229.
[57] Mactoux (1993); Richer (1999; 2005).
[58] Hes. *Th.* 933-4; *Il.* 15.119; 5.739; 11.37; [Hes.] *Sc.* 144. For iconography, see Shapiro (1993: 208-15).
[59] Aesch. *Sept.* 45-6; *IG* XIV 268.
[60] Plut. *Vit. Thes.* 27.2 ; *Vit. Alex.* 31.9.

'the chief support of their polity'. Plutarch connects this belief to Spartan values of obedience and respect, as well as an idea that 'bravery [is not] a lack of fear, but a fear of reproach and a dread of disgrace' (Plut. *Vit. Cleom.* 8-9). Though this is a common theme in Greek ethics from Plato onwards, Mactoux argues compellingly for the uniqueness of the Spartan Phobos, and his political function in particular: the cult, she suggests, is founded amidst a seventh-century social crisis, with the aim of 'channelling' the emotion for the benefit of the city; its contours are culturally and historically specific, combining a Lycurgan ideal of equality with the continuous threat of Helot revolt. Richer, meanwhile, observes the corresponding absence of a Spartan cult of Pan, venerated in Athens and across Greece as a god of rout.[61] Thus he proposes that in Archaic Sparta, Pan may have been displaced by Phobos – a reverse of the evolution suggested elsewhere[62] – again for specific local reasons. The Spartans, from about 570, no longer concerned themselves with livestock or hunting, but devoted their lives to military and political activity; thus Pan, a theriomorphic god of the Arcadian mountains, was not suitable for Spartan cult. Moreover, the preference of Phobos to Pan reflects, Richer suggests, the Laconic habit of simplicity and rationalization, embodied in the simultaneous elevation of Eros, Aidos, and various other *pathemata*.[63] The culture of fear in Sparta is thus distinct from the wider Greek culture of fear, in ways that necessitate separate investigation.

If Sparta is a special case, then what of Athens? Pan might be a place to start: the *aition* given in Herodotus suggests that the Athenian cult was introduced by Pheidippides,

[61] Richer (2005).
[62] On the putative displacement of Phobos by Pan, see Bernert (1941), contested by Borgeaud (1988 [1979]: 98-99) as well as Richer (2005).
[63] On the Spartan worship of Thanatos and Gelos, mentioned in *Cleomenes* passage, as well as Eros, Aidos, Hypnos, and Limos, see the bibliography cited in Richer (2005: 111 n.4). On the relation between Phobos and Aidos at Sparta, see Richer (1999).

returning from his failed embassy to Sparta before the battle of Marathon. As he passes through Arcadia, the god complains of his neglect by Pheidippides' countrymen; the Athenians consequently establish a sacred precinct of Pan below the Acropolis (VI.105-6). Could Pheidippides have been inspired by the Spartan Phobos-cult?[64] Perhaps not: Philippe Borgeaud has pointed out that Pan had a wide variety of associations in Athens, most of them quite distinct from battlefield emotion.[65] The Persian wars, however, certainly represent a fearful crisis in Athenian history. David Rosenbloom, in an essay on Phrynichus' *Capture of Miletus*, reconstructs the emotional landscape of early Classical Athens. 'Attika,' he writes, 'as no other territory in Greece, understood the value of fear, not so much as a means of social control … but as a vehicle of group cohesion that saved the city at Marathon and Salamis.' The credit given to the emotion for this salvation is clear from Plato's *Laws* (III.698a9-d2). How to explain, then, the absence of a cult? Rosenbloom is succinct: 'the Spartans built a temple to Phobos, and worshipped him as a god; the Athenians … celebrated tragedy'. Any 'history of fear' in Classical Athens must give ample space to this institution, especially in its early form where, as Rosenbloom observes, pity is mostly absent, and 'fear is the dominant emotion'.[66]

## Aeschylus and the Theatre of Fear

'Every tragedy,' Rosenbloom writes, 'is an attempt to instill fear in its audience.' This statement resonates with a long tradition of tragic criticism, going back as far as Gorgias

[64] So Richer (2005).
[65] On Pan in Athens, see Borgeaud (1988: 133-62).
[66] Rosenbloom (1993: 187).

and Plato; its most famous expression belongs, of course, to Aristotle's *Poetics*, where fear is installed, alongside pity, as one of the 'Great Twin Brethren' of *catharsis*: tragedy is supposed, 'through pity and fear, [to] achieve a catharsis of such feelings (τοιούτων παθημάτων)'.[67] This obscure principle – Aristotle does not refer to it again in the *Poetics* – has received enormous commentary, with no consensus reached about either the process or the παθήματα on which it operates.[68] This thesis is not concerned with Aristotelian poetics, seeking as it does a larger understanding of the discourse of fear in Classical Athens; certainly it does not seek to reconstruct the emotional experience of Aeschylus' original audiences. It does, however, consider various models of fearful education. The *Poetics* is thus relevant to the extent that the promotion of fear is encouraged, and the possibility of ethical improvement 'through fear' is suggested.

Three approaches thus warrant special mention in this introduction. The first is that of Elizabeth Belfiore, who examines the problem in the light of Aristotle's biological works, and suggests an 'allopathic' understanding of *catharsis*, in which pity and fear work to purge spectators of antisocial emotions. As part of this argument, she identifies in Classical Greece a shared belief about the benefits of a certain kind of 'apotropaic' fear, which 'preserves law and custom, prevents civil strife, and averts shameless crimes against kin'. This is 'the fear of wrongdoing and the respect for parents, gods, and custom that the Greeks called *aischune* or *aidos*'; it is opposed both to shameless desires and to maddening and destructive terror. The 'transformation' of terror into reverence that is

[67] *Po.* 1449b27-28. The 'Great Twin Brethren' is the expression of Stanford (1983: 2), whose work is discussed below. Koppenfels/Zumbusch (2016: 17) point out that the 'emotional turn' in literary studies is better termed a '*re*turn', since emotions are essential to the earliest accounts of poetry.
[68] For a survey of views, see the essays by Nussbaum, Nehemas, Janko, and Lear in Rorty (1992).

suggested by the *Eumenides* offers one analogy to the cathartic process of the *Poetics*.[69] A weakness of Belfiore's account, as others have pointed out, is that Aristotle's Greek can hardly sustain her 'allopathic' interpretation: the παθήματα that are the objects of catharsis must include pity and fear.[70] Hence Stephen Halliwell has defended, in various books, a sophisticated 'homeopathic' reading of catharsis, in which 'the expenditure of emotion' is accompanied by 'an amelioration in the underlying emotional disposition'; fear is to be understood not as an irrational spasm of shock but as a complex, cognitive, and sympathetic response to ethical structure of the tragic plot. 'The value of tragedy, on Aristotle's interpretation, channels understanding … through surges of deep emotion'; as such, it contributes to his moral psychology, best evidenced in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, which requires 'the harmonization of emotion with ethical judgment.'[71] The fear induced by the tragic spectacle is both the subject and the object of the catharsis, understood as an ethical amelioration.

Such treatments of Aristotle's poetics of emotion rarely attempt to relate these feelings to the tragic dramas that survive. One exception is Dana Munteanu's *Tragic Pathos* (2012). Munteanu first compares the accounts of tragic pathos in Gorgias, Plato, and Aristotle, then examines the representation and evocation of fear and pity in four tragedies (*Persians*, *Prometheus*, *Ajax*, *Orestes*). The most original part of the study, however, is the long chapter on Aristotle, where Munteanu uses the *Rhetoric* to establish a normative emotional sequence, in which the primary response to tragic suffering is pity; when spectators relate this suffering to a more general, human vulnerability, they feel fear.

[69] Belfiore (1992: ch. 1).
[70] See e.g. Scodel (1993).
[71] Halliwell (1998 [1986]: 198-9); (2011: 234, 260).

Tragic pleasure is derived from the mapping from the fictional world of the drama on to the real world of spectator: in this 'emotional syllogism', the final state is a fear that has been enlightened by the spectacle of suffering.[72] This is an intriguing idea that is well illustrated in Munteanu's later chapter on Sophocles *Ajax*, where Odysseus' emotional response to Ajax's madness seems to take a similar form. However, the other chapters are more speculative, concerning the 'probable' reactions of the Athenian audience to each episode of the drama. Although this is an important inquiry, it is vulnerable to a version of the 'affective fallacy', where we assume others must feel what we feel; as in Konstan's essay, the projection of Aristotelian and Platonic norms onto fifth-century drama obscures the emotional rhetoric of the text.[73]

It is interesting to juxtapose Munteanu's work with the seminal study of W. B. Stanford, *Greek Tragedy and the Emotions* (1983). Stanford starts by complaining of the long shadow cast by the *catharsis* of the *Poetics*; he is interested not in the 'reduction' of the emotions, but how they are stimulated and sustained.[74] His approach is highly empirical: rather than seeking out pity and fear, as Munteanu does, he identifies within the dramas a whole welter of feelings: from kindness to confusion to anger, hatred, revulsion, envy, shame, *eros*, *philia*, and joy.[75] Stanford concludes his book with a sort of emotional commentary on the *Agamemnon*, in which he highlights the role of emotion in each scene, and speculates on how the audience might have felt.; finally, he reviews the 'emotional vicissitudes' of the play by counting 'references' to each feeling. His results

[72] Munteanu (2012: 95, 129-30).
[73] As observed in Billings' (2012) review.
[74] For a persuasive anti-cathartic reading of tragic pleasure, see Liebert (2017), taken up by Telò (2020).
[75] Cf. Konstan (2019: 67-70), and especially (1999), where the discussion of Aeschylus' *Persians* and *Seven* in Aristophanes' *Frogs* is used to argue that tragedy might produce *tharsos* in an Athenian audience.

are surprising: 'grief' comes out on top (27 references), but it is followed by 'joy' (12), 'anger' (9), *philia* (8), pity (7), and *erōs* (6). Fear is only seventh on the list, with five references.[76] Though this score might be bulked out by 'anxiety' (3), *ekplexis* (3), *aidos* (2) and *tarache* (2), it is clear that such a tally does not match the role granted to the emotion by Snell, de Romilly, and Rosenbloom – nor by the text itself, in which there are nine references to *phobos* alone. The discrepancy is easily explained: Stanford, in seeking the 'emotionalism' of the drama, discounts expressed fears that he thinks are less salient for the audience, and amplifies the sorrows and griefs that he is sure they share.[77]

In this thesis, I will steer clear of such speculations, and rely only on what is said and done within the drama: the fear represented rather than the fear provoked. This is not to pretend that the emotion of the spectators is irrelevant to the Aeschylean theatre of fear. (Indeed, in both my chapter on the *Seven* and my chapter on *Oresteia*, I will show how, in different ways, Aeschylus brings the sympathetic fear of the spectator into the emotional discourse of the play.)[78] Rather, I believe that the fear represented in Aeschylus' dramas deserves special attention, not simply as a prompt or a guide to audience response, but as a discourse of its own, in dialogue with other literary forms. Indeed, the early reception of tragedy – in Aristophanes, Plato, and the orators – suggests that the genre was valued not just for its emotional effects, but for the political and ethical wisdom it contained; and much of the best recent work on tragedy has emphasised its dependence upon, and contribution to, Presocratic cosmology, historiography, medical science, ethics, moral

[76] (1983: 160). Stanford acknowledges that his statistics are 'approximate'; he offers no tabulation of references, leaving 'fuller investigation' to others.
[77] Stanford (148), for example, characterises the first half of the Cassandra scene (*Ag.* 1072-1135) as supremely 'pitiful', whereas the Chorus themselves describe her prophecies as 'carrying fear (φόβον) to learn' (1135).
[78] For a provocative take on such representational instability, see Sean Gurd's (2004) piece, 'Aeschylus Terrorist'.

psychology, and political theory.[79] In all of these intellectual fields, flourishing in Classical Athens, the nature and value of the emotions are important; Aeschylean fear, as verbalised and performed within the dramas, participates in the wider arguments and enquiries of his predecessors, contemporaries, and successors.

The most significant scholarship to pursue this line of inquiry remains that of de Romilly and Rosenbloom, already mentioned.[80] Each emphasises the peculiarity of the Aeschylean theatre, devoted (*pace* Stanford) much more to fear than to pity, in contrast with his successors.[81] To their work may be added the more recent studies of collective emotion, by Eirene Visvardi, and of 'Dionysiac' fear, by Anton Bierl, both of whom adopt a cognitive approach.

Visvardi juxtaposes the chorus of Greek tragedy with the *demos* of Thucydides' *History*, finding in both a representation of collective and affective decision-making.[82] Although she takes the emotions of Aristotle's *Poetics* (via Halliwell) as her starting point, she investigates 'the constitution of emotions as they are instantiated *within the plays*'; she is especially interested in the 'belief basis' of pity and fear, and the 'affective aspects … that render them … concerns that motivate action.' In Thucydides, she observes an entanglement of 'reason' and 'passion' (*gnome* and *orge*) in the deliberations of the

[79] E.g. Scapin (2020), Bakola (forthcoming); Pelling (1997); Jouanna (2012); Gagné (2013); Nussbaum (1992); Hill (2021). For the necessary revival of such intellectual approaches to Greek tragedy, see the introduction to Cairns (2013a).
[80] See also Rehm's brief essay (2003: 40-64), in which he emphasizes the political and collective nature of the fears expressed in tragedy, contrasted with the private and personal concerns of contemporary 'bourgeois' drama.
[81] Rosenbloom (1993: 186 n.94); de Romilly (1961).
[82] Visvardi (2015). For a similar comparison, see Budelmann (2018) on 'group-minds'.

*demos*; while sometimes destructive, shared emotional experience offers participatory pleasure, and may be harnessed for social cohesion and collective prosperity. Visvardi then proceeds to the 'active choruses' of Aeschylus: first *Eumenides*, where she identifies an evolution of fear, under Athena's guidance, towards a more 'self-aware', 'rational', and 'civilized' emotion; next, the *Suppliants*, where she suggests a similar transition is initiated, to be completed with the development of the trilogy, to a 'tamer and more sensible' fear, as the King, the Danaids and the *polis* expands their affective horizons to include the well-being of others; finally, in the *Seven*, Visvardi observes in the Chorus' initial fear for the city and final pity for the Labdacids, a collapsing of social boundaries, and a revision of the morality and politics of war. Thus in all three plays she finds a chorus actively promoting the 'reconsideration, sublimation, and/or institutionalisation of collective emotion', a process that she connects to the demands of modern, participatory democracy.[83]

Visvardi's argument runs close to my own, especially as regards the ambivalence of popular fear in Thucydides, and the complex evaluation of its potential benefits in tragedy. I am, however, more sceptical about the 'transformative' structure that she gives to the *Suppliants* and to the *Oresteia* (where she neglects the first two plays). I am dubious, too, about the separate analysis of 'collective' psychology, when the tragedies place so much emphasis on the motivation of individual acts; too resolute a focus on the 'active' choruses allows elements of Eteocles' and Pelasgus' emotions to go unnoticed – not to mention the 'passive' feelings of other Aeschylean choruses. Similarly, with Thucydides, Visvardi is uninterested in fear's role in the structure of historical causation,

[83] Visvardi (2015). Quotations at 17-18 (italics mine); 91, 120, and 241.

and the way in which the author establishes quasi-tragic *paradeigmata* as a means of rhetorical education.

Bierl, who does not cite Visvardi, takes a comparable approach to Aeschylean emotion, focusing on 'fear in choral action'. Starting with Sappho and Plato rather than Aristotle, he sees, like Visvardi, a nuanced cognitivism in ancient Greek ideas of emotion; the πάθει μάθος of the *Agamemnon* is, he says, an 'emblematic expression for this association of affectivity with recognition and cognitive learning'.[84] Yet Bierl is much more interested in the *performance* of emotion, as part of a Dionysiac chorus, whose 'fundamental role' is to 'transfer the quintessentially … Dionysian emotions, especially terror and fear, onto the audience'; a conventionally homeopathic catharsis is made to seem almost mechanical, as an 'emotional belt-drive transmission to canalize the spectators' *pathos*'.[85] Brief treatments of the earlier plays give way to a sustained discussion of the staging of terror in the *Eumenides*. The conclusion, however, is unclear: on the one hand, Athena is said to succeed in 'canalizing fear' both 'in service of social cohesion inside the city', and as a 'terrifying instrument directed against the enemies outside'; on the other, Bierl declares that 'trilogy is purged from the *pathe*'.[86] My own chapter on the *Oresteia* steers closer to the first of these statements.

[84] Bierl (2018: 21).
[85] Bierl (2018: 17, 22). Bierl cites Gruber's (2008) Tubingen dissertation, which argues for a ritual function of the Aeschylean chorus as an emotional intermediary between the action and the audience.
[86] Bierl (2018: 31-2). Cf. the similar conclusion in Bierl (2017).

Besides Visvardi and Bierl, recent studies of Aeschylean fear have limited themselves to single plays, or trilogies.[87] These will be discussed in the relevant chapters of my thesis, which are summarized below. I do not, however, include a chapter on the *Persians*, since I believe that the presentation of fear in this play has been lucidly explicated by Rosenbloom in his various treatments, as well as Munteanu, in the work discussed above.[88] For the sake of completeness, and as a sort of preface to my own work, I will briefly summarise his arguments, juxtaposed with what I think is the mistaken approach of a much-cited article by Ippokratis Kantzios.

*Persians*: The Politics and Ethics of Fear

Kantzios, who follows Simon Goldhill and Edith Hall in emphasizing a fundamental contrast, in the play, between Persian despotism and Athenian democracy, believes that this opposition is manifest in the differing role of fear attributed to each society. In the 'Persian model', the power of the king is articulated in the fear of his subjects, as witnessed in the awed description of his army in the parodos (φοβεροὶ μὲν ἰδεῖν, δεινοὶ δὲ μάχην, 27, cf. 40, 48, 58) and the choked terror of the Elders before the ghost of Darius (σέβομαι μὲν προσιδέσθαι | σέβομαι δ' ἀντία λέξαι | σέθεν ἀρχαίῳ περὶ τάρβει, 693-5, cf. 700-3). Against this despotic emotional landscape, Kantzios sets the 'Greek model', of 'a

[87] Especially: Susanetti (2018) (on *Suppliants*); Byrne (1997) (*Seven*); Golden 1961 and Avezzù 2018 (*Agamemnon*); Giannoti 2018 (*Eumenides*); Bierl 2017 and Schein 2018 (*Oresteia*).
[88] Rosenbloom (1993: 190-4); (1995: 93-8); (2006: esp. 39-61); (2013); Munteanu (2012: 151-63).

masterless and fearless society'.[89] This description is soon qualified: Kantzios notes that the *Eumenides* presents some forms of fear as beneficial for society; however, Greek fear is distinguished from its 'oriental' counterpart by its association with *aidos* and *aischune*.[90] Indeed, it is a lack of such *aidos* that damns the Persian army, who 'do not scruple' (οὐ … | … ηἰδοῦντο, 809-10) to plunder the temples of the gods; Xerxes, meanwhile, is characterized by outrageous 'rashness' (θράσει, 744, 831). Kantzios concludes by contrasting the 'servile … fear culture' of the Persians with the order, courage, and piety of the Athenians, for whom 'fear of a master is replaced by self-discipline[,] …the fear of disgrace[, and] … the proper fear of the gods'.[91]

There are several weaknesses to this argument. The simplest objection is that nowhere in the *Persians* does anyone attribute *aidos* or *aischune* to the Athenians, who remain perfectly fearless throughout.[92] The only fear culture on view is that of Persia: it is here that we must look for the salutary fear thematised elsewhere in Aeschylus. Oddly, though, Kantzios has nothing to say about the fears that are perhaps most prominent in the play: those of the Chorus of Persian Elders and of the old Queen, concerning the fate of the expedition. The significance of these fearful exchanges can hardly be overestimated. As Rosenbloom (and Munteanu) point out, a *hypothesis* to Aeschylus' play tells us that a previous version of this story, by Phrynichus, had begun with a eunuch announcing the disaster.[93] By delaying that announcement for some 248 lines, Aeschylus deliberately

[89] Kantzios (2004: 11).
[90] Kantzios here (12 n.31) cites Belfiore (1992), discussed above.
[91] Kantzios (2004: 15-19).
[92] Kantzios' best evidence is the παιᾶν' … σεμνὸν (393) sung by the Athenians as they advance, but σεμνός is not an emotion but an aesthetic quality; moreover, it is as likely to express the awestruck perspective of the Messenger as any reverent fear on the part of the Athenians. The next line tells of their 'cheerful confidence' (εὐψύχῳ θράσει).
[93] Rosenbloom (2006: 39); Munteanu (2012: 153-5); cf. Hall (1996: 105-6).

opens up a space for general trepidation, on the part of the Chorus, and vivid premonitions, on the part of the Queen.[94]

These fears are variously legitimised. First, as in the parodos of the *Agamemnon*, we see involuntary and irrational emotion vindicated against wilful and rational optimism. Fear thus appears a kind of foresight. Its mysterious powers are highlighted by the torn-clothes motif: initially a metaphor for fear (115; 161), torn clothes figure prominently in the Queen's ominous dream (199); soon we hear that Xerxes, at Salamis, did indeed tear his clothes in grief (468, 834-6); finally, with Xerxes' return, we are given the ocular proof (1018, 1030). Second, both the Chorus and the Queen demonstrate the 'deliberative' quality of fear – what Aristotle will describe as its βουλευτικός capacity.[95] The Chorus' response to their anxiety is to initiate a council: τόδ' ἐνεζόμενοι | στέγος ἀρχαῖον | φροντίδα κεδνὴν καὶ βαθύβουλον | θώμεθα, χρεία δὲ προσήκει (140-3). They are interrupted by the Queen's arrival, but her fears (φροντίς, 161; μέριμν', 165; φόβος, 168), drive her, in turn, to seek counsel: she requests that the Elders be her σύμβουλοι (170), and they readily agree (175). Thus, although a paralysing δέος παλαιὸν (703) may obstruct communication with Darius later on, here we see a different face of Persian 'fear culture', one that is collaborative and deliberative. Thirdly, the fears of the Queen and Chorus are rendered intensely sympathetic to an Athenian audience, itself experienced in the anxious wait for news from a far-off war.[96] Aeschylus dwells at length on the premonitory grief of the Persian women (132-7), in language hardly distinguishable from the description of grieving Greek wives in the *Agamemnon* (427-32).[97]

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[94] Rosenbloom (2006) gives his chapter on this part of play the title, 'Fear' (39-61)
[95] *Rh.* II.1383a7: see discussion in Chapter Two.
[96] So Munteanu (2012: 158-60). Cf. Lockwood (2017: 395-6) on the 'universality of fear' articulated here.
[97] The only suggestion of cultural difference in the *Persians* passage is ἁβροπενθεῖς (135); this is an uncertain reading of MSS ἀκροπενθεῖς, suggested in a scholion. In any case, Sommerstein's 'grieving in their luxury' is too strong. Garvie *ad loc.* suggests 'tenderly grieving'.

As well as the mysterious clairvoyance, the deliberative impulse, and the sympathetic quality of Persian fear in this play, Kantzios fails to account for the 'central historical distortion of the drama': namely, the rehabilitation of Xerxes' father Darius (instigator of the first invasion of Greece) as a wise and cautious King who did not overstretch his kingdom, and never sought to master the sea.[98] Here Rosenbloom is at his most radical. He argues that Aeschylus, in erasing the historical parallel between Xerxes and Darius, subtly implies a different, tragic parallel, between Xerxes and Athens. Athens, Rosenbloom points out, has made exactly the strategic shift that Darius condemns: a land-power with no fleet and empire at the time of the first invasion, she has, by the time of the *Persians* production in 472, become a naval power, and stretched her dominion over the Aegean. On this reading, the boldness (θράσει, 394) and apparent fearlessness of the Athenians in *Persians* is not an expression of their superior political culture, but instead an ominous echo of Xerxes' hubris. Darius, meanwhile, is not an awkward *post facto* moralist, but a tragic warner in disguise, one who discretely suggests that the Athenians should rein in their imperial overreach.

Darius' foregrounding of his own fear (also neglected by Kantzios) is crucial to this. Seeing his Queen at the tomb, Darius is afraid (ταρβῶ, 685); soon he is expressing a similar fear to hers, concerning the loss of stored-up wealth (δέδοικα, 751). At the same time, he criticises the fearlessness of Xerxes: his 'youthful rashness' is 'ignorant'(οὐ κατειδὼς … νέῳ θράσει, 744; cf. 782-3, 831); expecting to rule over even Poseidon, he lacks εὐβουλία (749); seduced by 'empty hopes' (κεναῖσιν ἐλπίσιν, 844), he will lose

[98] Rosenbloom (1993: 190).

what remains of his army.[99] Darius offers instruction in how to read the catastrophe: the Plataean dead will 'signal' (σημανοῦσιν, 819) that one should not think proud thoughts; look upon (ὁρῶντες, 823) the price paid for Xerxes' arrogance, he says, and do not despise your fortune; do not long for more; Zeus is chastiser of boasts (818-28).[100] This is no charter for a fearless society. Rather, it is a programme for emotional regulation, a programme in which the fearful spectacle of tragic suffering is given pride of place.[101] The potential for such a programme is writ large in the later dramas of the playwright.

Chapter Summary

The introduction will conclude with an analysis of fear-vocabulary in ancient Greek. This will take account both of Homeric usage, which has benefited from extensive study, of lyric and elegy, and of the earliest prose authors. The focus, however, is on the language of tragedy, including that of Sophocles and Euripides, in order to frame the 'generic' lexicon of Aeschylus. Citations are inevitably removed from their context in this lexical study; in later chapters, I will investigate how fear develops as discourse and experience. Here, I wish to share the lexical foundations for that main investigation. For the 'core' vocabulary of fear (*phobos*, *deos*, *tarbos*), I set out a quantitative analysis, tabulating the frequency of each word in the extant dramas; this is combined with more qualitative

[99] Of course, we do not have to believe Darius' explanation of Xerxes' downfall; others in the play are less severe upon his faults. See Haywood (2016).
[100] On the necessity of fearing the gods in Aeschylus, see Parker (2009: 151 and *passim*).
[101] On the tragic exemplarity of Xerxes, see Saïd (1988).

explorations of their usage and connotations. Three further groups of fear-vocabulary are discussed: first, terms that strongly connote a physiological expression of strong emotion (*phrike*, *tromos*); next, those that emphasise the cognitive impact of a stimulus (*ekplexis*, *tarache*); third, terms that may describe a kind of inhibition before action (*oknos*, *aidos*, *aischune*, *sebas*). None of these is always expressive of fear, as defined by Wierzbicka above, yet they are very often responses to perceived threats; many also take analogous syntactical constructions ('fear-clauses'). Indeed, each term's association with other emotions (pity, horror, shame) helps us to understand the quality of the fear that it does sometimes express.

I then proceed to Part One of the thesis, which examines the Athenian discourse of fear in which Aeschylus participates. I take my examples from two of the other genres that flourish in the Classical city: historiography and philosophy. The first chapter, on Thucydides, is divided into three parts. After an initial contrast with Herodotean emotion, I establish the primary role of fear in Thucydides' structure of causation; focusing on Book I, I emphasise the convergence of *logos* and *phobos* in the outbreak of war, and the historian's construction of fear as a 'reason-able' object of historical enquiry. The second section considers the ethical, strategic, and political value of fear in the *History* as a whole: starting from the sophistic historical account of the Athenian ambassadors at Sparta, I examine the ambivalent presentation of fear on the battlefield, fear in interstate relations, and fear within the polis. This ambivalence means that popular fear needs direction, management, and education: a final section examines the efforts made by various politicians to guide the fears of the Athenians, and their allies, especially through

the use of *paradeigmata*. This motif allows for a brief consideration of the intended 'utility' of the *History*.

Thucydides shows himself intensely interested in fear as an element of human nature; he thus participates in a wider philosophical discourse in Classical Athens about the nature and nurture of the emotions. My second chapter addresses the development of fear as a theme in ancient philosophy, from the ethical writings of Democritus, through the dialogues of Plato, to the diverse treatises of Aristotle. I find, in the first two philosophers, an inchoate sense of the cognitive aspects of fear, which finds fuller expression in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and *Nicomachean Ethics*. This must be balanced, however, against the physiological accounts of the emotion in the 'biological' works, especially *On the Soul* and *On the Motion of Animals*. After considering the virtue of courage in the *Ethics*, I suggest that the *Rhetoric* and the *Poetics* offer a model for the cultivation of fear, as a universal human experience, towards salutary ends.

The *Poetics*, of course, advances tragedy as an instrument of that cultivation. Part Two of my thesis investigates the salutary potential of fear as represented in Aeschylus' surviving tragedies. Chapter Three is a study of Aeschylus' *Suppliants*. I am especially concerned with the famous deliberation of Pelasgus in the first episode. This is set in the context of other kinds of thinking within the play, enacted by Danaus, the Danaids, the Egyptians, and the Argives. Prudence and piety, I suggest, are consistently associated with fear, and an explicit acknowledgement of vulnerability. In the crucial supplication scene, I follow Snell in observing a remarkable attention paid to the King's mental process. I contend, however, that Pelasgus' anxious thought is far more socialised, and far more embodied,

than Snell's Cartesian-Kantian paradigm allows. Aristotle's theory of *phantasia* offers a better model for understanding Pelasgus' deliberations.

While Chapter Three takes a cognitive approach to Aeschylean fear, pointing to the work of Damasio and others, Chapter Four applies Reddy's social anthropology of emotion to the *Seven Against Thebes*, a play that dramatizes the difficulty of maintaining an 'emotional regime' in a political crisis. In its opening scenes, the play introduces three distinct ways of fearing, embodied in Eteocles, the Argives, and the Chorus of Theban women. These modes of fearing are subsequently brought into conflict, as Eteocles seeks to enforce his emotional regime upon the Chorus, and rhetorically confronts that of the Argives in the shields-scene; after the announcement of his brother gate, however, it is Eteocles' emotions that need restraint, and the Chorus find themselves struggling to regulate the fears of their ruler. In the final third of the play, a different kind of fear emerges, felt by the spectator of catastrophe. This fear, shading into pity, promotes a sense of collective vulnerability as the emotional basis of the polis.

The idea that fear might serve as a foundation for political prosperity is of course articulated by the goddess Athena at the climax of the *Eumenides*. In Chapter Five, I start with Athena's settlement, and the received view that this represents a beneficent 'transformation' of the destructive fear that has saturated the trilogy, in parallel with the transformation of justice. Against this pervasive revolutionary paradigm, I will argue that what we witness in the *Oresteia* is rather a process of *recognition* and *accommodation*. The salutary potential of fear, though suppressed by chorus and protagonists alike, is enigmatically present from the first lines of the *Agamemnon*. The *Libation Bearers*

demonstrates the futility of attempting to eliminate or escape from fear; the *Eumenides* affirms the benefits of accommodating it.

This chapter travels from the climax of the trilogy back to its first prologue, then works its way forward again to the final exodos. I focus, however, on three linked odes, standing at the structural centre of their respective plays, each reflecting on the nature of fear, and each prefiguring Athena's final settlement. The Elders of the *Agamemnon* move from optimism to despair, skirting, in their bewilderment, the ethical potential of fear that is implicit in their imagery. The eponymous Chorus of *Libation Bearers* articulate something more complex: the terrors of the earth, sea and sky are matched by those of myth; Clytemnestra's crime takes its place within a network of other *deina* – what social psychologists have termed a 'narrative ecology'. The *Eumenides* ode, which echoes the imagery of the *Agamemnon* Chorus, pre-empts Athena's rhetoric of deterrence. Such continuity reveals that it is not the nature of fear that is transformed, but the understanding of it. Indeed, it is the representation of fear, in tragedy, that promises transformation – not of the emotion, but of the citizen and his city. Tragedy is indeed the place where fear is good.

## B: The Vocabulary of Fear

As Barbara Rosenwein points out, it is necessary, in any history of emotion, to 'problematize emotion terms', since 'many words or ideas had only fuzzy equivalents in the past'.[102] This holds true for fear: there is no one Greek word which covers the same semantic field expressed by the English term. Even if we limit fear, as Aristotle does, to 'a certain pain or disturbance caused by the impression of an imminent evil that causes destruction or pain' (1382a) – it is plain that φόβος is not the only word used to describe such a feeling. A crowd of candidates present themselves, from τρόμος to ταραχή, from ὄκνος to φρίκη. Each of these terms has its own nuance, its own associations; any study of Greek fear must attend to and account for this lexical diversity. Indeed, we see Athenians themselves arguing over the difference between φόβος and δέος in Plato's *Protagoras*;[103] Stoic philosophers would later produce typologies of the emotion, often contradicting one another.[104] With this in mind, I will not try to pin down the exact meaning of any term, in the style of a glossary, but rather highlight certain patterns of usage, and their variation according to period, genre, and author.[105] This thesis is most of all an exploration of Aeschylean fear, but one of its concerns is the relation between this emotion and the emotions of his predecessors, on the one hand, and his contemporaries on the other; it will thus be useful to examine not only the fear-vocabulary of archaic poetry, but also that of Herodotus, Thucydides, and Aristophanes. Above all, however, I will focus on the language of tragedy, in order to establish a generic lexicon of fear.

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[102] Rosenwein (2010: 13).
[103] 358a-e. See discussion p.54 below.
[104] Compare the six types of fear attributed to Chrysippus (Diog. Laert. VII.112-3) with the eight types identified by Arius Didymus, quoted by Stobaeus (*Ecl*. II.89-92 Wachsmuth), and with the thirteen types given by Pseudo-Andronicus (*De Affectibus* 1.3). Though there is much overlap (e.g. αἰσχύνη is a φόβος ἀδοξίας in all three) there are startling discrepancies, too: δεῖμα, for example is a φόβος δέος ἐμποιῶν in Chrysippus, a φόβος ἐκ λόγου in Didymus, and a φόβος ὑφορωμένου in Pseudo-Andronicus.
[105] For a range of views on the methodology of lexicography, see the essays collected in Stray/Clarke/Katz (2019).

What, then, is the vocabulary of fear in Attic tragedy? Are certain terms attached to certain objects of fear, certain responses to fear? Does the lexical choice reflect the gender, origin, or social status of its subject? Are these lexical associations consistent with pre-tragic usage, or are they specific to the genre? Are they constant through the period of fifth-century tragedy, or is there something peculiar to Aeschylean fear?

All of these questions are crucial to my thesis, and I do not intend to answer them fully in this introduction. Instead, I wish to set out the foundations for the more literary analysis that will follow. The analysis of fear first requires its diagnosis; and without access to the fictional bodies of the drama – since the gestural and choreographic performance of tragic feeling is almost wholly obscure to us – we must rely on the articulation of the emotion, its *verbal* symptoms as preserved in the extant texts. There are, in Greek, at least a dozen terms which, together with their cognate forms, map the contours of English 'fear'. These terms necessarily overlap; indeed, they are frequently used in conjunction with each other. In the passage from the *Eumenides* quoted earlier in this introduction, the Erinyes combined τὸ δεινόν and δέος with σέβας; but Athena, when she establishes the authority of the Areopagus court, first combines σέβας with φόβος (690-1), then adds τὸ δεινόν, δεδοικώς, ταρβοῦντες, and αἰδοῖον (698-705).

There are, on the other hand, certain tragic scenes and songs in which fear is *not* expressed with one of these keywords, but by some other means. In Aeschylus' *Seven*, the Chorus declare that the Argive vaunts 'pierce through [their] breast, and each lock of [their] hair stands up on end' (ἱκνεῖται λόγος διὰ στηθέων,| τριχὸς δ' ὀρθίας πλόκαμος ἵσταται, 563-4). Piloerection is well-attested as a biological symptom of strong emotion,

and is very frequently reported by Greek texts in conjunction with fear-vocabulary.[106] The fact that no such vocabulary appears in this instance will exclude the reaction from my analysis in this chapter, but not from my thesis as a whole, since its emotional origin would have been even more obvious to an Athenian audience than it is to a modern one.

There are other scenes, also, in which fear is evoked neither by one of the keywords, nor by any reported physiological symptoms; instead it is suggested by the psychological logic of a character's behaviour, or in the articulation of a threat. The inclusion of such episodes in an analysis of tragic fear admittedly runs the risk of universalism and 'presentism', if it depends on an assumption of psychological identity between Greek heroes and modern classicists. Yet it would be obtuse to deny that the Danaids are driven by fear of the Aegyptids as they 'flee' across the sea (φεύγομεν, *Supp*. 5; cf. 8, 14), or that Eteocles is afraid when he begs his father's Erinys not to destroy the city (*Sept*. 69-72). That these speakers do not explicitly name their emotion is interesting, but we must accept this silence as a contribution to the discourse of fear.

Nevertheless, it will be useful, for the reasons already mentioned, to examine the vocabulary in which fear is more directly expressed. This examination will not be exhaustive – there are more than a thousand occurrences of my fear keywords in the extant texts – but will combine macro- and statistical analysis with more qualitative explorations of each term's usage and connotations.

[106] E.g. Soph. *OC* 1624-5: πάντας ὀρθίας | στῆσαι φόβῳ δείσαντας εὐθέως τρίχας; Pl. *Ion* 535c: ὅταν … τι λέγω … φοβερὸν ἢ δεινόν, ὀρθαὶ αἱ τρίχες ἵστανται ὑπὸ φόβου. Biologists since Darwin have recognised piloerection as common mammalian response to danger: for bibliography, see Cairns (2015: 77 n.10).

Core Fear: φόβος, δέος, τάρβος

This first group of terms, which are by far the most common in tragedy and elsewhere, are found in almost every fear-context: they specify no particular physiological or psychological response, and may describe the fear of battle, the fear of divine anger or pollution, the fear of justice and the law, or the fear of sexual violence. And yet their usage is not wholly consistent between the tragedians; indeed, though the three terms are often combined, they cannot be treated as interchangeable. The following table records the incidence of each term, together with its cognate forms; for Aeschylus, I have also included a calculation of the frequency per 1000 lines.[107]

[107] Since this is not an exhaustive study, fragmentary plays are set aside. I also exclude the inauthentic *Rhesus* and *Prometheus Bound* as well as Euripides' *Cyclops* (as a satyr-drama).

Aeschylus

| | Total | /play | *Pers.* | *Sept.* | *Supp.* | *Ag.* | *Cho.* | *Eum.* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| φόβος + cognates | 59 | 9.8 | 9 | 17 | 12 | 9 | 9 | 3 |
| */1000 lines* | *8.4* | | *8.3* | *15.8* | *11.1* | *5.4* | *8.4* | *2.9* |
| τάρβος + cognates | 13 | 2.2 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 3 |
| | *1.8* | | *1.9* | *3.7* | *1.9* | *0.6* | *0.9* | *2.9* |
| δέος | 2 | 0.3 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| | *0.3* | | *0.9* | *0* | *0* | *0* | *0* | *1* |
| δείδω + compounds | 12 | 2 | 1 | 5 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 3 |
| | *1.7* | | *0.9* | *4.6* | *0.9* | *1.2* | *0* | *2.9* |
| δεῖμα + cognates | 14 | 2.3 | 3 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 5 | 0 |
| | *1.9* | | *2.8* | *0.9* | *3.7* | *0.6* | *4.6* | *0* |
| δεινός + cognates | 20 | 3.3 | 5 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 3 | 8 |
| | *2.8* | | *4.6* | *2.8* | *0* | *0.6* | *2.8* | *7.6* |
| Total | 120 | 20 | 22 | 29 | 18 | 14 | 18 | 18 |
| | *17* | | *20.4* | *26.9* | *16.8* | *8.3* | *16.7* | *17.1* |

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Sophocles:

| | Total | /play | *Ajax* | *Ant.* | *Trach.* | *OT* | *El.* | *Phil.* | *OC* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| φόβος + cognates | 55 | 7.9 | 6 | 4 | 8 | 17 | 6 | 6 | 8 |
| τάρβος+ cognates | 19 | 2.7 | 3 | 1 | 9 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 |
| δέος | 4 | 0.6 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| δείδω + compounds | 31 | 4.4 | 5 | 6 | 4 | 7 | 2 | 4 | 4 |
| δεῖμα + cognates | 10 | 1.4 | 1 | 0 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 |
| δεινός + cognates | 114 | 16.2 | 14 | 13 | 11 | 24 | 18 | 14 | 20 |
| Total | 234 | 33.4 | 31 | 23 | 35 | 51 | 31 | 27 | 35 |

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Euripides

| | Total | /pl. | *Alc.* | *Med.* | *Heracl.* | *Hipp.* | *Andr.* | *Hec.* | *Supp.* | *El.* | *HF* | *Tro.* | *IT* | *Ion* | *Hel.* | *Phoen.* | *Or.* | *Bacch.* | *IA* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| φόβος + cognates | 122 | 7.2 | 1 | 8 | 10 | 8 | 7 | 3 | 8 | 6 | 6 | 9 | 7 | 5 | 3 | 11 | 22 | 4 | 4 |
| τάρβος +cognates | 23 | 1.4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 4 | 2 | 5 |
| δέος | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| δείδω + compounds | 41 | 2.4 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 6 | 2 | 1 | 1 |
| δεῖμα + cognates | 30 | 1.8 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 4 | 5 | 2 | 5 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 0 | 0 |
| δεινός + cognates | 208 | 12 | 3 | 18 | 8 | 14 | 10 | 14 | 10 | 15 | 8 | 6 | 17 | 9 | 5 | 16 | 19 | 15 | 21 |
| Total | 431 | 25.3 | 6 | 29 | 20 | 26 | 26 | 27 | 26 | 32 | 20 | 18 | 28 | 20 | 10 | 35 | 50 | 26 | 31 |

Several patterns are immediately visible. φόβος, far and away the most ubiquitous of the fear-words, seems to decline in frequency: there are fewer φοβ-cognates per play in Sophocles than in Aeschylus, and fewer in Euripides than Sophocles. That said, it remains much more common than τάρβος and, if δεινός is excluded (for reasons that will become clear), as frequent as the τάρβος and δέος groups added together. τάρβος is favoured by Sophocles slightly more than Aeschylus or Euripides, as is δείδω; the latter two poets are more liberal in their use of the derivative noun, δεῖμα. δέος itself is rare, and entirely absent from Euripides. Most striking of all is δεινός: occurring a mere 20 times in Aeschylus, its usage explodes in Sophocles and Euripides.

In many ways, of course, the tragedians are tracking normal Greek usage: τάρβος is much rarer than φόβος in epic and lyric as well as tragedy (it does not appear in prose);[108] the proliferation of δεινός, meanwhile, reflects a more general surge in its popularity. These historical trends, however, should not distract us from the semantic choices being made. As noted in the introduction to this section, each term has its own nuance and associations, partly inherited from archaic Greek and partly in dialogue with contemporary usage.

I will start with φόβος.[109] This word (with its cognates) has a very distinct meaning in Homer: according to the scholiast, it describes not the emotion of fear but the reaction of 'flight'.[110] Modern critics have qualified this assertion, pointing to places where an emotion of φόβος is clearly distinguished from the resultant flight (as at *Il.* 9.2: φύζα,

[108] It is absent from Classical Attic prose, though see [Plat.] *Axioch.* 270a8.
[109] φόβος/φοβέομαι are derived from φέβομαι, 'I flee, take flight' (Beekes). Cognates in Balto-Slavic languages suggest a PIE root *bhegw- 'run away, flee'. Further discussion in Chantraine, s.v.
[110] Scholion *ad Il.* 11.71a Erbse (… μνώοντ' ὀλοοῖο φόβοιο): ὅτι φόβον τὴν φυγήν. ὃν δὲ ἡμεῖς φόβον, δέος λέγει. cf. *Suda* φ 559: φόβος: φόβος παρ' Ὁμήρῳ φυγή.

φόβου κρυόεντος ἑταίρη) or is even compatible with a rally (as at 15.1-4: ἐπεὶ … ἔβησαν | φεύγοντες … | … ἐρητύοντο μένοντες | χλωροὶ ὑπαὶ δείους πεφοβημένοι).[111] Nonetheless, when φόβος strikes in Homer, flight is never far away. Insofar as it represents a subjective state, it is simple, and short-lived; it is stimulated by immediate threats of physical violence.[112] Phobos also appears as a deity in epic, fighting alongside Ares, named as his father, sometimes accompanied by his brother, Deimos; as we saw before, he is featured on heroic shields, routing the enemy.[113]

To what extent do these associations survive in the fifth century? There is clearly a general assimilation of φόβος to other kinds of fear: in Pindar, Herodotus, Thucydides, and Aristophanes, the word is often coordinate with δέος and τάρβος, and presented as an interior, 'psychological' phenomenon detached from any idea of flight.[114] No longer is φόβος restricted to immediate, physical threats, either; more abstract conceptions such as 'the growth of Athenian power' (Thuc. I.23.6), or the loss of one's wife (Hdt. VI.62.1) are now within its ken.[115] New, complex constructions are developed to absorb them: φοβεῖσθαι followed by μή, introducing a fear-clause ('lest…'), or φοβεῖσθαι with the infinitive, indicating a fearful inhibition ('I am afraid to do *x*'); prepositions are employed to express fear *concerning* something, or even *on behalf of* someone else.[116]

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[111] On the interpretation of this and other passages where φόβος should be understood as 'fear' rather than 'flight', see especially Gruber (1963: 22-5) and Zaborowski (2002: 131-5).
[112] Gruber (1963: 38): 'Bei Homer tritt *phobos* plötzlich auf, bringt die Krieger zur Flucht und ist dann wieder verschwunden.' Zaborowski (2002: 135): 'La cause de la crainte φόβος est principalement l'agression'. Cf. the idenitification of flight and φόβος in the new Archilochus fragment (17a.6-7 Swift).
[113] For references, see p.27 n.58.
[114] E.g. Pind. *Pyth.* 9.31-2; Hdt. IV.115.2; Ar. *Pax* 606-7. For a list of Thucydidean collocations where the two words 'evoke the same reality', see de Romilly (1956: 120 n.2).
[115] Cf. Serghidou (2007) on the use of φόβος to describe the fear of political subjection in Herodotus.
[116] For examples, see LSJ. In the fourth century, the first two constructions are combined: e.g. φοβοίμην ἂν τῷ ἡγεμόνι ἕπεσθαι, μὴ ἀγάγῃ … (Xen. *An.* I.3.17)

Some critics have argued that φόβος thus becomes indistinguishable from δέος: they point to a passage in Plato's *Protagoras*, where Socrates, deprecating Prodicus' 'definition of terms' (τὴν δὲ Προδίκου τοῦδε διαίρεσιν τῶν ὀνομάτων, 358a) argues that each word may describe the same 'expectation of evil' (προσδοκίαν … κακοῦ, 358d). there is, he declares, 'no difference' (οὐδέν … διαφέρει, 358e).[117] Yet Prodicus demurs, declaring this to be δέος, not φόβος; his demurral has its roots in archaic usage, as we have seen, and is later taken up by Ammonius.[118] There are assuredly places in Bacchylides and Herodotus where φόβος seems indicative of φυγή rather than προσδοκία κακοῦ.[119] Indeed, several Thucydidean scholars have argued for a persistent contrast between the two: while δέος, on the one hand, corresponds to an 'appréhension d'ordre intellectuel, qui comporte un calcul relatif à l'avenir et des mesures prises en conséquence', φόβος, on the other, 'appartient principalement au domaine de l'irrationel' and is 'en général mauvais'.[120] Moreover, although Phobos, god of rout, fades in prominence (it has been suggested that in the personification of panic-fear he is supplanted by Pan) there is patchy but sustained evidence of a Phobos-cult in Sparta; a fifth-century Selinountian inscription credits the god for a local victory; and visual representations of the god are scattered throughout the classical period.[121]

Tragedy offers an illustration of these developments. On the one hand, φόβος is provoked by a wide range of objects, from physical violence to dishonour. These may be immediate, like the Erinyes who spring upon Orestes (Eur. *Or.* 253), or quite abstract,

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[117] Gruber (1963: 38-9) compares *Laches* 198b, Arist. *Eth. Nic*. III.1115a, and *Rh*. II.1382a, all discussed in Chapter Two.
[118] φόβος: δέος μὲν γάρ ἐστι πολυχρόνιος κακοῦ ὑπόνοια, φόβος δὲ παραυτίκα πτόησις (*Diff*. 127); cf. West (1966: 415) *ad* Hes. *Th*.167. Gruber (1963: 26-28) explores the contrast in Homer.
[119] E.g. Bacchyl. 13.145-50 and Hdt. IX.68-9.
[120] De Romilly (1956: 120), affirmed by Huart (1968: 124), but disputed by Konstan (2006: 154) and others: see detailed discussion in my chapter one.
[121] For references and discussion of the cult and iconography of Phobos, including his relation with Pan, see pp. 27-8.

like the pollution that threatens Pelasgus (Aesch. *Supp*. 478-9); they may be associated with human or divine power.[122] φόβος is regularly coordinated with δέος and τάρβος, drives obedience and deliberation as well as distraction,[123] and does not necessitate flight or bodily movement of any kind: thus Deianeira '*sits*, struck with terror' as she watches Heracles battle with Achelous (ἥμην ἐκπεπληγμένη φόβῳ, Soph. *Trach.* 24; cf. Aesch. *Pers*. 206), while Agamemnon's carpet-treading is checked by pious hesitation (φόβου, *Ag.* 924), not by flight. Yet φόβος does maintain its martial associations, describing the mental condition of some who has already taken flight (Aesch. *Supp.* 223-4) or the motivation for doing so (Aesch. *Sept*. 240; Eur. *HF* 971-2); it is no accident that all those plays that feature or promise a pitched battle between opposing armies (Aesch. *Sept., Supp.*; Eur. *Heracl.*, *Supp., Phoen.*) deliver an above-average number of instances.[124] The cult of Phobos is also attested, at least in early tragedy: the Argive champions are said to swear an oath to him before battle (Aesch. *Sept*. 45, cf. 500), and there are several hints of personification in the *Oresteia*.[125] The archaic φόβος of panicked rout thus haunts tragic usage, and the language of Aeschylus especially.[126]

And what of δέος?[127] The term's traditional distinction in Homer has already been noted: this is a more durable apprehension of threat, an emotion that generally 'holds' or 'takes' the subject (ἴσχει, ἰσχάνει, εἶλεν), and involves no necessary reaction of flight. Indeed,

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[122] Violence: Aesch. *Sept*. 386; dishonour: Soph. *El*. 1426; mortal power: Soph. *Ant*. 505, Eur. *Hel*. 482; divine power: Soph. *OC* 39, 1625, Eur. *Hipp*. 1331, *IT* 37.
[123] Obedience: Soph. *Phil*. 1250; deliberation: Aesch. *Supp*. 379-80ff.
[124] Compare the usage of τρέω, as illustrated by LSJ: in Homer, this word always describes the act of fleeing, with the odd exception (*Il*. 11.554); in Aeschylus, it is sometimes found in battle contexts, but does not seem to dictate flight (e.g. *Sept.* 397, 436), and can even introduce a subordinate fear-clause (*Sept*. 790).
[125] See *Ag.* 14 and 1434 with Fraenkel's notes, as well as *Cho.* 32, 288, and Soph. *OC* 1651-2, *Phil*. 569, 1231, as discussed by Gruber (1963: 35-7).
[126] Cf. Gruber's conclusion: 'Die Vorstellung, dass dahinter etwas Dämonisches steckt, bleibt noch lange erhalten, aber *phobos* als psychischer Zustand bezeichnet nur noch das, was Homer mit *deos* ausdrückte' (1963: 38).
[127] Proto-Indo-European root: *dw-/*du-, 'two': see Benveniste (1954: 254-5) as well as Frisk, Chantraine, and Beekes, s. v. δείδω. Further discussion in Nagy (2010: 29-30).

combined with αἰδώς, δέος can actually inhibit flight.[128] Its objects vary from the clang of Diomedes' armour to the putative anger of the gods.[129] These eventualities are more complex than the direct aggression that inspires Homeric φόβος; they quite regularly feature the suffering of allies, friends, or intimates. This sympathetic 'crainte pour' (Zaborowski) may be expressed directly with a preposition, or, more frequently, with the μή constructions noted above; such constructions are far more common with δείδω than with any other verb of fearing.[130] In archaic Greek, δέος is the most common and capacious word for the emotion of fear.[131]

In the fifth century, as we have seen, this generic role is partly usurped by φόβος. Beyond Thucydides, whose peculiar usage of δέος has already been noted, the basic noun is quite rare: dubiously attested in Pindar, it crops up four times in Herodotus, half a dozen times in Sophocles, twice in Aeschylus, never in Euripides. The word is slightly more common in Aristophanes, but closer inspection reveals that seven out of nine instances consist of the same set phrase, ὑπὸ τοῦ δέους; similar formulae are found in Sophocles (ὑπὸ τοῦ δέατος, fr. 328) and Herodotus (ὑπὸ δέους, I.85.15).[132] Herodotus also favours the Homeric construction with ἔχω (τοὺς δὲ Ἕλληνας εἶχε δέος, 8.70.5; cf. IV.115.5). It seems the word faded from more organic usage towards the end of the fifth century.[133] In tragedy, indeed, there is strongly archaic flavour to δέος: the fear of Persian Chorus is

[128] *Il*. 15.657-8. However, see Zaborowski (2002: 75-6 and 82-3) for examples of *deos* inspiring flight and refuge.
[129] *Il*. 4.422; 13. 623-4.
[130] See eg. *Il*. 10.538, and other examples in Zaborowski (2002: 84-6). φοβέομαι + μή does not appear before Sophocles; ταρβέω + μή only once in Homer (*Od*. 16.179)
[131] Cf. Archil. fr. 122.4 Swift. Counting nouns only, without cognates, gives the following ranking for Homer: φόβος (35); δέος (25); τάρβος (6). Also common – though not necessarily fearful – are ἀιδῶς (25), τρόμος (15), and θάμβος (6).
[132] Perhaps all are related to the Homeric χλωρὸς ὑπαὶ δείους (*Il*. 10.376).
[133] One exception is Lysias, who makes regular use of the word outside of set idioms: see especially his *Pro Polystratou*, c. 410 BC (Lys. 20.9, 18, 21). In the fourth century, δέος is common in the orators, and especially in Plato.

labelled by Darius as a δέος παλαιόν (703); in *Eumenides* (522),[134] it is the 'fear' championed by the Erinyes, γραῖαι παλαιαὶ παῖδες (69), in pursuit of their γέρας παλαιόν (394). The noun thus seems to connote an ancient respect for authority, a respect not normally accorded to 'contemporary', or Greek, wielders of power. Sophocles gives this archaism an anti-democratic twist in *Ajax,* where the Spartan Menelaus uses the word three times in eleven lines (1074, 1079, 1084) as he promotes the values of oligarchical obedience and condemns the *polis* that allows its citizens to insult each other with impunity (1071; 1083).[135] The word is conspicuously absent from Athena's θεσμός in the *Eumenides* (681-710), which takes up much of the Erinyes' fear-based ideology, and rallies almost every other word for fear in Aeschylus' vocabulary.

While δέος appears to become less frequent, δείδω[136] continues to be a standard verb for fearful anticipation. As in Homer, an impulse to flight is not normally implied, though it is attested both inside and outside tragedy (Aesch. *Eum*. 38; Hdt. IV.160.9). δείδω uses all the same constructions as φοβέομαι: a wide range of direct objects in the accusative from the expected *hubris* of a tyrant (Pind. *Pyth*. 4.112), to the gods (Ar. *Nu*. 1462), to the plague (Thuc. II.57.1); prepositions to express sympathetic anxieties;[137] or supplementary infinitives,[138] to indicate something the subject is afraid *to do*. Such constructions are, however, unusual: in the vast majority of cases, δείδω is either absolute, or introduces a

[134] For the text of this passage, see n. 606.
[135] It is also, interestingly, the word used in the Sisyphus fragment (Sext. Emp. *Math.* 9.8-50) to describe the 'fear of the gods' (<θεῶν> δέος, 20) first introduced by a wise and clever man: again, this is an ancient terror felt towards unbounded power.
[136] The present stem is not found in fifth-century Attic, which prefers the perfect (δέδοικα; (rarely) δέδια) or aorist (ἔδεισα) forms.
[137] E.g. δέδια δ' ἀμφὶ σαῖς τύχαις, [Aesch.] *PV* 182; ἐδείσατε ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν καὶ οὐχ ἡμῶν, Thuc. I.74.3; ὑπερδείδω, Aesch. *Sept*. 293, Soph. *Ant*. 82.
[138] E.g. θανεῖν σε δείσας, Eur. *Ion* 1564.

fear-clause with μή.[139] These clauses are especially common in tragedy and historiography, where they may be extended by subordination, to elaborate on complex contingencies and causalities.[140]

The derived noun, δεῖμα, is more peculiar in its application. Like φόβος, δεῖμα is usually subjective, denoting a feeling of fear: Hector 'brings terror to the Danaans' (*Il.* 5.682)[141] and Pelias 'hides the fear in his heart' (Pind. *Pyth*. 4.97, cf. *Hymn. Hom. Dem.* 293). In Herodotus, who favours the cognate verb, δειμαίνω, this fear often relates to a far-distant prospect;[142] elsewhere, the threat seems more immediate (Tyrt. 11.3; Pind. *Pyth*. 5.58). It should be noted that both verb and noun are, however, mostly absent from Classical Attic outside of tragedy;[143] and it is in tragedy that δεῖμα develops a distinct association with dreams, ghosts, and other monstrous apparitions.[144] Atossa (Aesch. *Pers*. 210) and Clytemnestra (Aesch. *Cho.* 524, Soph. *El*. 410, 636) are both disturbed by fearful premonitions, and the Chorus of *Ajax* lament their wartime nightmares (Soph. *Aj.* 1212); Polydorus provokes Hecuba's δεῖμα (Eur. *Hec.* 54, 70), as does the ghost of Achilles (92); the bovine Io and the Atreids' golden lamb are greeted as 'horrors' (Aesch. *Supp*. 566; Eur. *El*. 710). Outside of tragedy, night-terrors are called φόβοι καὶ δείματα by

[139] This latter construction is far more common with δείδω than with other verbs. φοβέομαι + μή occurs only five times in the surviving tragedies (Soph. *Trach*. 550; Eur. *Alc.* 1057, *Hipp*. 1310, *Andr*. 48, *Or*. 770); ταρβέω + μή only four times (Soph. *OT* 1011, *Trach*. 297; Eur. *Andr*. 185, *IT* 731). δείδω + μή occurs more than twenty-five times. A similar pattern is evident in Thucydides (see following note).
[140] De Romilly (1956: 121 n.1) observes, with regard to Thucydides: 'parce qu'il s'attache au sentiment affectif, φοβεῖσθαι s'emploie plus volontiers avec un complément de personne a l'accusatif'. This includes, she notes, a 'caractéristique' proleptic accusative before μή etc., e.g. Thuc. IV.1.2; cf. Soph. *Trach*. 297.
[141] On this sole occurrence of the word in Homer, see Gruber (1963: 28), who describes Hector as 'fuer die Danaer … ein Schreckbild.'
[142] E.g. III.159.5; cf. Thgn. 541. Herodotus' 16 instances of the verb may be compared with one in Aristophanes, four in Plato, and none in Thucydides or Xenophon. For a tabulated comparison of fear-vocabulary in Herodotus and Thucydides, see Crane (1996: 46-7).
[143] There are 39 uses of the noun δεῖμα in extant Aeschylus, Sophocles and Euripides, and only 16 other attestations in Classical Attic. For δειμαίνω, see note above.
[144] Gruber (1963: 28): 'Bei den Tragikern bezeichnet *deima* Furcht oder Schrecken, insoweit er auf einen konkreten Anlass zurückgeht. Insbesondere benennt das Wort auch schreckliche Erscheinungen, etwa in Träumen oder von furchbaren Ungeheuern.'

Thucydides (VII.80.3), as are Alcmaeon's 'terrors' after he murders his mother (II.102.5): both instances reflect the kind of supernatural horror that rarely emerges in the *History*.

The word δεινός has a long and complicated history – one that has not yet been properly investigated. Derived from the same root as δέος, δείδω, and δεῖμα, in archaic Greek it always means 'fearful, terrible' (LSJ I) and is applied to gods, men, objects and abstractions 'que inspira[n] terror'.[145] This basic sense remains prominent in lyric and tragedy (e.g. Anacr. fr.395.9,[146] Aesch. *Pers.* 27; Soph. *Aj*. 366); and to utter δεινά is to issue threats (Aesch. *Sept.* 426; Soph. *El.* 779). In the later fifth century, however, other meanings develop. Feelings are described as δεινός (ἵμερος, Hdt. IX.3.1; οἶκτος, Soph. *Trach*. 298; τὸ ξυγγενές, [Aesch.] *PV* 39). The emotion of fear perhaps fades into the background here, yet one might argue that such feelings are terrible because they are 'irresistible': they imply a dangerous loss of control, a threat to the subject's autonomy. This sense of vulnerability may explain the term's increasing association with σοφός, as first in Herodotus: ἀνδρὶ Ἕλληνι δεινῷ τε καὶ σοφῷ (V.23.2; cf. Soph. *Phil.* 440, *OC* 806). The wise man, it seems, is fearsome, because he may outwit you. δεινός comes to describe a slightly dangerous kind of cleverness, especially with words; there is generally a suggestion of strangeness, and of mistrust (Soph. *OT* 545, Eur. *Med*. 585).

The ambivalence is well illustrated by the famous Ode to Man in *Antigone*. The opening *gnome*, πολλὰ τὰ δεινὰ κοὐδὲν ἀν- | θρώπου δεινότερον πέλει (332-3), undoubtedly

[145] *Diccionario Griego-Español* s.v. δεινός, 1.1. The authors rightly correct LSJ's inclusion of *Il*. 7.245 in the second sense of the word ('II. *marvellously strong, powerful'*): as they suggest, Αἴαντος δεινὸν σάκος ('*escudo terrible* por su tamaño e.e. *enorme'*) implies fear, and belongs in the same category as the ὅπλοισιν … δεινοῖσιν (10.254) cited in LSJ I. LSJ offers no other examples of 'II. *wondrous, marvellous, strange*' before Herodotus, except for the pseudo-Aeschylean *PV* 39 and the interpolated *Sept.* 1031.

[146] Anacreon seems to play on the etymology here: Τάρταρον δεδοικώς· | Αΐδεω γάρ ἐστι δεινὸς | μυχός. Bernsdorff cites Pl. *La*. 198b5-6 (ἡγούμεθα δ' ἡμεῖς δεινὰ μὲν εἶναι ἃ καὶ δέος παρέχει); cf. also Aesch. *Cho.* 586 (δεινὰ δειμάτων ἄχη), discussed below, and

imitates the opening of a *Libation Bearers* stasimon: πολλὰ μὲν γᾶ τρέφει | δεινὰ δειμάτων ἄχη (585-6). Yet where those δεινά were uniformly fearsome, the achievements of man in Sophocles' ode are generally 'wonderful'[147] feats of ingenuity: the arts of sailing and agriculture; the taming of the animal world; language; law; architecture. It is only in the final antistrophe (365-75) that the sinister side of δεινὸς ἄνθρωπος emerges: his resourcefulness 'advances sometimes to evil, at other times to good'; the Chorus consider the fate of the wicked man, cast out 'on account of his recklessness' (τόλμας). Thus, after an apparent celebration of man's 'cleverness', the original, fearful sense of δεινός seeps back in, colouring what has come before.[148]

τάρβος[149] is a much rarer word than φόβος and δέος; largely poetic, it disappears almost entirely between Homer and Aeschylus.[150] In epic and tragedy alike τάρβος is never inspired by gods,[151] but by humans, who may possess either greater power or greater status (Hom. *Il.* 1.131; 20.379-80). The Persian Chorus feel τάρβος alongside their δέος (Aesch. *Pers.* 694-6); the word describes the deference towards a husband and King that Clytemnestra casts off (with her shame, οὐκ αἰσχυνοῦμαι…) in addressing the Argives (*Ag.* 856-8). In an inferior, it is a commendable attitude (*Od.* 18.330-1; Eur. *El.* 261); in a warrior, it is a generally something rebuked (e.g. *Il*. 17.586), and heroic figures in epinician are often presented as free from τάρβος (e.g. ἀταρβής, Pind. *Pyth.* 5.51; cf. Bacchyl. 2.29) but both in Homer and in Aeschylus a moderate τάρβος is apparently

[147] The translation of Jebb and Campbell; the latter, *ad loc*., comments that δεινός is here seen 'in historical transition from "fearful" to "clever"'; Lloyd-Jones prefers 'formidable'.
[148] Both Segal (1964) and Viketos (1988) see sinister allusions to the plot throughout the ode.
[149]Comparisons have been made with Sanskrit *tarjati* ('threaten') and Latin *torvus* ('grim, fierce') as well as Middle Welsh and Hittite, but there are problems in the reconstruction of PIE roots, and 'aucun de ces rapprochements s'impose' (Chantraine).
[150] Alc. 119.15; Pind. fr.110. Negative compounds are preserved in epinician poetry.
[151] Oracles are perhaps an exception: Aesch. *Eum.*713; Soph. *OT* 1013.

allowed (οὔτέ τι λίην | ταρβεῖ, *Il.* 13.284-5; μηδ᾽ ἐπηλύδων | ταρβεῖτ᾽ ἄγαν ὅμιλον, Aesch. *Sept.* 34-5). Thus there is much continuity between Homeric and tragic τάρβος.

However, there are also some innovations, in keeping with the change of genre. The Homeric emotion is always 'egocentric', concerned with self-preservation;[152] in tragedy, τάρβος is often triggered by the sight of another's suffering. Thus the Chorus of *Prometheus* are 'frightened' by the sight of Io (ταρβῶ … | εἰσορῶσ᾽ Ἰοῦς, 898-9, my translation). Many other passages use this same construction, of ταρβέω with a participle of sight, to express the fear of a spectator.[153] This concept, though shared with other verbs of fearing, is alien to Homeric τάρβος.[154]

Fear: Physiology (φρίκη, τρόμος)[155]

A similar dynamic operates with regard to the bodily symptoms of fear. Like δεινός, these cannot be relied upon as indicators of fearful experience: the emotion must be inferred from presence of other fear words, or from context. φρίκη,[156] for example, is sometimes applied to the normal bristly texture of animal hair (Eur. *Phoen.* 1121), or to the analogous bristling of shields (*Phoen*. 1105; cf. Hom. *Il*. 4.282, 7.62, 13.339). In neither case is φρίκη presented as a response, let alone as an emotion. Yet this bristling was more commonly 'associated with immediate, automatic, and instinctive responses to

[152] Bourdel (1974): 'un sentiment égocentric … une crainte qu'on éprouve pour soi-même' (114).
[153] Cf. Aesch. *Pers*. 684-5; Soph. *Aj*. 545-6; *Trach.* 957-8; [Eur]. *Rh.* 889:
[154] Only twice, according to Zaborowski, is τάρβος triggered by visual stimuli – *Il*. 6.469-70 (Astyanax); and 15.279-80 (Danaans).
[155] A similar analysis might be applied to the less common πτήσσω, suggesting a cowering response, and often combined with core fear vocabulary (Aesch. *Pers.* 209; Soph. *OC* 171; Eur. *Bacch.* 1035), and τρέω, suggestive of flight (see n. 164).
[156] Enlarged form of φρίξ (Homer), the 'ruffling' of hair, or the sea; other Classical derivations are φρίσσω and φρικώδης. Pre-Homeric etymology is very uncertain.

direct, and often sudden, visual or aural stimuli'.[157] The emotional valence may vary: the Chorus of *Ajax* memorably declare that they 'shudder with desire', while 'soaring with pleasure' (ἔφριξ' ἔρωτι, περιχαρὴς δ' ἀνεπτόμαν, 693) when they hear Ajax is resolved not to kill himself.[158] In *Andromache*, Apollo's cry is said to be δεινόν … καὶ φρικῶδες, yet serves to rally the Delphians rather than to rout them, 'turning them towards courage' (στρέψας πρὸς ἀλκήν, 1148-9, my translation).[159]

Nevertheless, φρίκη is most commonly associated with fear, and regularly combined with φόβος (e.g. Aesch. *Ag.* 1243, *Sept*. 490-8; Eur. *Hipp*.1202-4, 1216-8). Douglas Cairns has noted that φρίσσω regularly takes a direct object in the accusative, just like other verbs of fearing; in *Hippolytus*, φρίσσω is even combined with a fear-clause introduced by μή (417-18).[160] Whether the verb communicates fear – a pain caused by the impression of an imminent evil – must be deduced from context. Creon, told that he 'stands on the razor edge of fate', responds, τί δ' ἔστιν; ὡς ἐγὼ τὸ σὸν φρίσσω στόμα (Soph. *Ant.* 997). Plainly it is not Teiresias' actual 'mouth' that affects Creon, but the ominous words that issue from it.[161] Similarly, Pelasgus 'shudders' at the sight of the shaded shrines (πέφρικα λεύσσων τάσδ' ἕδρας κατασκίους, Aesch. *Supp.* 346) because of the war they herald.[162]

Yet the context is not always so clear: when Sophocles' complicit Chorus 'shudders' at Clytemnestra's screams (*El.* 1407), are they delighted or dismayed? Or do they feel a kind of pity? φρίκη is very often a response to the suffering of others – most famously at

[157] Cairns (2015: 79)
[158] Cairns (2013: 81 n.28): 'intense, quasi-erotic joy'. Cf. Aesch. fr.387 Radt: ἔφριξ' ἔρωτι τοῦδε μυστικοῦ τέλους.
[159] Cf. Homer's pugnaciously bristling boars: *Il.* 13.471-5 and *Od.* 19.446.
[160] Discussed by Cairns (2015: 78). Perhaps still more striking is the accusative/infinitive construction that follows πέφρικα (Aesch. *Sept*. 720); this object-clause describes the dreaded fulfilment of the familial curse.
[161] Compare Soph. *OT* 447-8, οὐ τὸ σὸν | δείσας πρόσωπον.
[162] Cf. [Aesch.] *PV* 695, and the regular construction of ταρβέω + participle of seeing, discussed above.

the end of *Oedipus the King*, when the blinded King emerges and 'inspires [the Chorus] with … a shudder' (φρίκην παρέχεις μοι, 1306; cf. *Trach*. 1044); Io provokes a similar reaction ([Aesch]. *PV* 695). Indeed, where there is φρίκη, pity is often not far away: Oedipus has just been introduced by the messenger as a 'pitiful' spectacle (*OT* 1296), and Io has just pleaded that pity should not censor revelation (*PV* 686-7). Nevertheless, this is a pity that involves fear (*OT*: δεινὸν ἰδεῖν, 1297; *PV*: πήματα, λύματα, δείματα, 691), a 'sense of shared vulnerability'.[163] It is also a pity that often looks, like fear, towards the *future*: the choruses of *Seven* (720) and *Hippolytus* (855, 1284; cf. ἔλεος ἔλεος, 1286) shudder not at the current suffering of the protagonist, but a terrible event that is yet to come.

The pitying φρίκη is not exclusive to tragedy: similar shudders are reported in Gorgias' *Helen* (φρίκη περίφοβος καὶ ἔλεος πολύδακρυς καὶ πόθος φιλοπενθής, 9). However, it is wholly absent from Homer, where the verb applied to humans describes battle-fear (of Diomedes, *Il*. 11.383) or hostile horror (the Trojans shudder at Helen, 24.775). Elsewhere in archaic and classical literature it is often applied to divine epiphanies and supernatural portents (*Hom*. *Hymn*. *Dianam* 8, Eur. *Cyc*. 320, Pl. *Resp*. III.387c, Ar. *Ran.* 1335-6); these usages are also common in tragedy. Nevertheless, it is clearly the sympathetic shudder that Aristotle has in mind in the *Poetics,* where φρίκη momentarily takes the place of φόβος in the classic emotional duo (φρίττειν καὶ ἐλεεῖν, 1453b). If tragedy did not invent this kind of φρίκη, it certainly seems to have developed it.

[163] Cairns (2015: 89). His discussion of these passages (87-90) is intriguing: he proposes φρίκη as a quintessentially tragic emotion, a 'third-person' rather than 'vicarious' response to the suffering of others.

Often found alongside φρίκη is τρόμος.[164] Like φρίκη, this phenomenon does not always connote fear, or any emotion at all.[165] Limbs tremble with old age (Eur. *HF* 114, 231; cf. *Phoen*. 302) just as bodies shake in the agony of a poisoned death (*Med*. 1169). Yet τρόμος is also commonly juxtaposed with core fear vocabulary (e.g. Aesch. *Sept.* 294; Eur. *IT* 283, [Eur]. *Rh*. 36); and the emotional associations are clear in Homer.[166] Indeed, the same adjective that described the palsy of the Theban chorus in *Heracles* is sufficient to introduce a fear-clause in *Trojan Women* (τρομερὰ σκηνὰς ἔλιπον … μή με κτείνειν | δόξ᾽ Ἀργείων κεῖται μελέαν 176-8) and the verb τρέμω takes a similar construction, always with a proleptic accusative (Soph. *OT* 947; Eur. *Andr*. 808, 1057). The objects of such fears are quite various, from the anticipated arrival of news (Aesch. *Pers.* 64) or sight of violence (*Sept*. 294) in Aeschylus, to divine epiphany in Sophocles (*OC* 128, 256), to more personal threats in Euripides, where women variously tremble at the prospect of their husbands' ire (Eur. *Andr*. 808, 1057; *Tro*. 1026), the violent resentment of their sons, or subjects (*Ion* 1452, *El.* 643). Like δεῖμα, then, τρόμος seems slightly gendered (cf. Eur. *HF* 626-7; *Tro.* 1327; *Phoen.* 1284-5; *Bacch*. 600), and this fear is equally liable to being 'empty': both Jocasta and the Messenger use τρέμω to describe the supposedly mistaken fears of Oedipus (Soph. *OT* 947, 1014).

Fear: Psychology (ἔκπληξις, ταραχή)

[164] τρόμος and τρομερός (as well as the negatives ἀτρεμ-ής with -ία, -έω, -ίζω -αῖος etc.) are cognate with τρέμω, whose origin is the fairly-secure IE **trem*- 'tremble' (Beekes). On the potential relation of τρέω, see Chantraine; Zaborowski (2002) emphasises the distinction, and the difference in Homeric usage. These words are very rare in prose.

[165] In Homer, the subject of the trembling may not even be human (e.g. *Il.* 13.18). ταράσσω has a still stronger connection to the non-human world- see below.

[166] E.g. Dolon is 'green with fear' (χλωρὸς ὑπαὶ δείους, *Il.*10.376) when his limbs tremble under him ὑπὸ δ᾽ ἔτρεμε γυῖα (390); Cf. *Od*. 11.526.

Alongside such physiological symptoms of fear, extant tragedy shows sustained attention to the 'psychological' or cognitive correlates of the emotion – its impact on mental processes. Two terms emerge as regular accompaniments to fear: the cognates of ταραχή and ἔκπληξις. As with φρίκη, etc., the presence of these terms *per se* does not prove the presence of fear: context must be taken into account.

Perhaps the most straightforward – and consummately 'tragic' – of these is ἔκπληξις.[167] Translated by LSJ as 'consternation', the term is employed by Aristotle to describe the effect of tragic recognition (*Po.* 1454a4, 1455a18).[168] Yet it is worth noting the term's more general use. In the *Iliad*, the Trojan charioteers are 'stricken with terror' when they see Achilles (18.225; cf. δεινόν, 226); this ἔκπληξις is accompanied by a collective confoundment (κυκήθησαν Τρῶες, 229). When the confoundment is individual, it is explicitly located in the φρήν, and the result is ordinarily one of helpless paralysis, rather than flight: the terror-stricken drop their reins, or 'do not dare' to try to turn around (16.403; 13.394).[169] This sense is taken up with enthusiasm by Thucydides[170], who discerns ἔκπληξις both in armies and in the citizen body (e.g. III.82.5, IV.36.2); φόβος itself is said to 'drive out' memory (φόβος … μνήμην ἐκπλήσσει, II.87.4).[171] Sometimes a more straightforward rout is expressed (e.g. III.82.5). The verb does not always express fear in the historian, however: sometimes it is simply surprise, sometimes grief, sometimes 'la stupeur admirative' (e.g. VI.46.4).[172] Interestingly, the noun often

[167] The verb is a compound of ἔκ and πλήσσω, 'I strike'; tmesis is common. ἔκπληξις first appears in Aeschylus, ἐκπληκτικός in Thucydides.
[168] The term's association with aesthetic experience may begin with Gorgias (*Hel.* 15); it is certainly present in Plato (*Ion* 535b); for its elevation in [Longinus] 15.2, see Halliwell (2011: 332-5).
[169] Contrast κατεπλήγη φίλον ἦτορ (3.31), which precipitates Paris' immediate retreat.
[170] Huart (1968: 118) notes that both the verb and the noun – as well the analogous κατα- compounds – are better attested in Thucydides than in Herodotus or the tragic poets.
[171] Cf. Gorg. *Hel*. 17, discussed in Chapter Two.
[172] The phrase belongs to Huart (1968: 119), as do these examples. Halliwell (2011: 230 n.50) lists Platonic examples of *ekplexis* without surprise or fear; LSJ includes examples from Herodotus and Aristophanes.

precipitates resolution, military action, or new policy rather than retreat (IV.14.3; II.94.1; VIII.15.1).[173]

Such is the rich soil from which tragic ἔκπληξις draws some of its power. In our texts the physical paralysis is less apparent, but protagonists and choruses are regularly incapacitated by this terror. Atossa cannot speak: σιγῶ πάλαι δύστηνος ἐκπεπληγμένη | κακοῖς (Aesch. *Pers.* 290-1; cf. Eur. *Phoen*. 961, *Or*. 549); the bacchants, 'struck with fear', fall helpless and desperate to the ground (ἐκπεπληγμέναι φόβῳ, Eur. *Bacch*. 604). As in Homer, the event overwhelms the subject's cognitive capacity, which loses all power of discrimination: later, Atossa says, πάντα … φόβου πλέα … τοία κακῶν ἔκπληξις ἐκφοβεῖ φρένας (*Pers.* 603-6). Such bewilderment need not necessarily be fearful – Ion is surprised by the temple-visitor's tears (Eur. *Ion*. 241), but has no particular reason to fear. Incomprehension is often the principal idea (Soph. *Aj*. 33; Eur. *Hipp*. 934). Indeed, the term may be applied to other emotions in tragedy, such as joy (Aesch. *Cho.* 233; Eur. *Alc*. 1125, *IT* 795), pleasure (Soph. *Trach*. 629), and desire (Eur. *Med.* 8, 640; *Hipp*. 38; cf. *Hel.* 549). Nevertheless, it is pertinent to ask whether some terror is not also present in these psychological tumults. Indeed, since the joys are generally either threatened or forbidden, fear is rarely far away.

A peculiarity of tragic ἔκπληξις is its relationship to pity. This is not a response that is elsewhere provoked by the suffering of others. But in tragedy, like τάρβος and φρίκη – and φόβος to a lesser extent – this is a terror that may be experienced by a witness. Deianara sits as a spectator at Herakles' wrestling, ἐκπεπληγμένη φόβῳ (Soph. *Trach*. 24); the Oceanids have 'their modesty struck from [them]', and their sympathy aroused,

[173] Cf. Cusumano (2011), and my chapter below.

by the clanging of Hephaestus' irons ([Aesch.] *PV* 134-5). In the first of these cases, however, Deianara is certainly self-concerned – she fears 'lest her beauty bring her sorrow' (25; cf. 175-7); in the second, the terror is far from clear.[174] In every other example – and it is striking that the chorus only rarely suffer ἔκπληξις – the emotion is felt by an individual, considering their own personal vulnerability. In *Philoctetes*, meanwhile, the eponymous hero actually opposes ἔκπληξις (with δείδω and ὄκνος) to οἶκτος: καὶ μή μ᾽ ὄκνῳ | δείσαντες ἐκπλαγῆτ᾽ ἀπηγριωμένον | ἀλλ᾽ οἰκτίσαντες … φωνήσατ᾽ (225-9). In fact, while Aristotle celebrates the ἔκπληξις of recognition in the *Poetics*, in the *Rhetoric* he declares that οἱ ἐκπεπληγμένοι, 'the terrified', οὐ … ἐλεοῦσιν … διὰ τὸ εἶναι πρὸς τῷ οἰκείῳ πάθει διὰ τὸ εἶναι πρὸς τῷ οἰκείῳ πάθει (II.1382b33). There is a tension in the tragic spectacle – between bewilderment and understanding, fear and pity – well expressed by ἔκπληξις.

ταραχή[175] contains a comparable complexity. This is a word whose emotional force is only ever implicit in archaic Greek. In the *Odyssey*, Poseidon stirs up the sea; in the *Iliad*, assemblies of gods and men (and teams of horses) are 'disturbed'.[176] This political sense is picked up in elegy as well as comedy, where 'shit-stirrers' abound; in Thucydides, ταραχή is generally synonymous with civil disorder.[177] In the Hippocratic corpus, meanwhile, the term is standard in diagnoses, especially of a 'troubled' gut.[178] Pindar applies this trouble to the mind, when Tlepolemos, enraged, is undone by mental disorders (αἱ δὲ φρενῶν ταραχαί, *Ol*. 7.30).

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[174] LSJ give this as an illustration of '*strike out of, drive away from, expel'*.
[175] This noun, together with τάραγμα, ταραγμός and ταράκτωρ, etc., is derived from ταράσσω, which is itself supposed to have developed from PIE *$*d^hreh_2g^h$*- 'confuse, irritate'. This root is also responsible for the variant θράσσω and a cognate adjective, τραχύς. See Beekes.
[176] *Od.* 5.291, 304; cf. Archilochus fr.105; *Il*. 1.579, 2.95, 7.746, 8.86.
[177] Thgn. 218-9; Solon 37.7; Ar. *Eq*. 66, 309, 431, 692, 897; Thuc. VII.71.1. Vlastos (1946: 68-71) sees ταραχή and ἡσυχία as the orientating poles of Solonic political thought. For more comic examples and discussion, see Taillardart (1965: *701-5). For Thucydides, see Huart (1968: 114-6).
[178] Cf. Berrettoni (1970), who regards it as a 'euphemism'.

What does all this have to do with fear? The answer is not very much, which is what makes the tragic development of the term so interesting. ταραχή is connected to φόβος only once by Thucydides (ἐν πολλῇ ταραχῇ καὶ φόβῳ, III.79.3); Gorgias, meanwhile, describes how the vision is 'disturbed' by a fearful spectacle: ἐταράχθη καὶ ἐτάραξε τὴν ψυχήν, ὥστε πολλάκις κινδύνου τοῦ μέλλοντος <ὡς> ὄντος φεύγουσιν ἐκπλαγέντες. ἰσχυρὰ γὰρ ἡ συνήθεια τοῦ νόμου διὰ τὸν φόβον ἐξῳκίσθη τὸν ἀπὸ τῆς ὄψεως (*Hel*. 16). Here the external political disturbance, the lawless disturbance, is brought inside the mind, while fear collapses normal temporality. Aristotle, in the *Rhetoric,* will define fear itself as a ταραχή: ἔστω δὴ ὁ φόβος λύπη τις ἢ ταραχὴ ἐκ φαντασίας μέλλοντος κακοῦ φθαρτικοῦ ἢ λυπηροῦ (II.1382a21-2). Again, the fearful disturbance brings the future (μέλλοντος κακοῦ … λυπηροῦ) into the λύπη and ταραχή of the present.[179]

Tragic ταραχή takes this confusion one step further. The term and its cognates are relatively unusual in Aeschylus: Cassandra and Orestes are disturbed by prophetic visions and the Erinyes: δεινὸς πόνος … ταράσσων (*Ag.* 1215-6); μὴ φόβου νικῶ πολύ … ταραγμὸς ἐς φρένας πίτνει (*Cho.* 1052-6; cf. 287-9, φόβος … ταράσσει). These are personal, private, mental disturbances in the mould of Tlepolemos, but which interestingly confuse time and space, after the manner of Gorgias and Aristotle: Cassandra witnesses the past crimes of Thyestes (1217-22); Orestes sees the Erinyes that are not onstage, nor seen by the chorus, until the next play. Sophocles and Euripides present this confusion differently. For both poets, such disturbance is compatible with deliberation. Thus Creon can declare, when the chorus tell him to listen to the just-

[179] Also defined as ταραχή in the *Rhetoric* are αἰσχύνη (1383b13), while νέμεσις and φθόνος are ταραχώδης, and thus similar to φόβος (1386b18, b23).

departed Teiresias, 'I too know it well, and I am disturbed (ἔγνωκα καὐτὸς καὶ ταράσσομαι φρένας, Soph. *Ant.* 1095); his disturbance takes the form of two δεινός alternatives (1096-7); in Euripides' *Hecuba*, Agamemnon is torn between pity for the heroine and political self-preservation: ταραγμός falls upon him (857). Described in this language, such intellectual conflicts have a political resonance; Euripides thematizes the analogy in *Heracles*, where a political ταραγμός – the stasis in Thebes (533, 604-5) – is displaced by an individual one – the madness of the eponymous hero (835-6, 906-9, 1091-2).[180] ταραχή thus has some quite specific applications in tragedy, with distinct associations: it is a psychological disturbance that doubles as an image of the *polis*.

Fear: Shame and Inhibition (ὄκνος, αἰδώς, αἰσχύνη, σέβας)

We have considered the key psychological and physiological symptoms of fear. Now I wish to consider some related emotional concepts – these are cognitive events marked by pleasure or pain, which motivate a certain response – which have a significant overlap with fear. More precisely, each of these words may be used to indicate an impression of a future evil; and each may prompt a course of (in)action to avert that evil.

I will begin with ὄκνος, a word that has received almost no scholarly attention.[181] LSJ I gives as its primary sense a meaning of 'shrinking' or 'hesitation'. In the *Iliad*, it is

[180] Cf. Kosak (2004).
[181] See Lavery (1998), on Aesch. *Ag.* 1009, and Fabiano (2008) on the iconography of Oknos as reported by Pausanias.

distinguished from δέος: Athena asks Diomedes if δέος or κάματος has made him withdraw; Diomedes replies that neither δέος nor ὄκνος holds him back. (5.811-17). In Aeschylus and Thucydides too, the word may simply suggest 'slackness': certainly no fear is suggested by Eteocles' messenger, who 'has not delayed through hesitation' (ὄκνῳ, Aesch. *Sept*. 54; cf. Thuc. VII.49.4). Yet elsewhere this hesitation *is* connected with fear: the ὄκνος of the Guard in *Antigone*, for example, is explicitly produced by τὰ δεινά (243; cf. Thuc. III.39.3).[182] In the funeral oration, Pericles will celebrate the Athenian species of calculated courage; in other peoples, by contrast, such calculation naturally leads to ὄκνος (Thuc. II.40.3); ὀκνέω describes a reluctance to fight in Thucydides I.120.3, and a similar timidity (this time connected with φοβός) is rebuked by Herodotus' Xerxes (VII.50.2). The objects of this fear are comparable to those of δέος, abstract or far away – this is apprehension, rather than alarm or fright. Yet it is important to note that, unlike δέος, ὄκνος never seems to motivate action; rather it inhibits it.[183] This is clearest with the verb, ὀκνέω, which is normally followed by an infinitive.

Both verb and noun are relatively rare in archaic and classical Greek, and do not merit lengthy discussion – but one peculiarity of usage should be noted. As may be seen from the examples above, ὄκνος is normally a trait, or an attitude, to be disdained – like other forms of timidity, it is regularly connected with cowardice.[184] Yet when Homer's Diomedes is invited to flee by Sthenelus, his response is curious: 'Do not speak to me of flight … I have no intention of mounting a chariot (ὀκνείω δ' ἵππων ἐπιβαινέμεν), but as I

[182] Cf. also Soph. *Aj.* 139. Benveniste (1935: 102), quoted in Lavery (1998: 9), offers '"hesitation, paresse" : exprime proprement l'inhibition produite par un sentiment de crainte ou de l'insolence ; en autres termes une sorte de hébétude ou de paralysie".
[183] The one exception may be Aesch. *Ag*. 1009-10. See discussion in Chapter Five.
[184] Cf. Soph. *Aj*. 81-2; Eur. *Or.* 794: Ορ. οὐκ ἄρ' ὀκνήσεις; Πυ. ὄκνος γὰρ τοῖς φίλοις κακὸν μέγα.

am will go to face them; … that I should quake (τρεῖν) Pallas Athena does not allow' (*Il.* 5.252-6). Kirk (*ad loc.*) notes that 'ὄκνος is a strong term, implying revulsion as much as hesitation'; what revolts Diomedes is plainly the action proposed. ὄκνος is here opposed to cowardice, and the ally of courage: Diomedes fears for his honour. This prospective shame is suggested in Thucydides too,[185] and in tragedy its power is fully exploited. Neoptolemos declares that he is unwilling to be called a traitor (ὀκνῶ | προδότης καλεῖσθαι, Soph. *Phil.* 93-4; cf. 111); Alcestis says that she dies 'because [she] shrinks from abandoning [the marriage-bed] and [her] husband' (προδοῦναι γάρ σ' ὀκνοῦσα καὶ πόσιν, Eur. *Alc.* 180); Iolaus 'shrinks from abandoning' Heracles' children 'for fear someone might [criticise him]' (ὀκνῶν προδοῦναι, μή τις … εἴπῃ …, *Heracl.* 28). In each case, ὄκνος represents a fear not for one's safety, but for one's reputation.

The more usual way of expressing this in Greek is, of course, αἰδώς, and its close relative αἰσχύνη.[186] In verbal form (αἰδέομαι/αἰσχύνομαι), both suggest a similar moral inhibition – and an inhibition that is regularly opposed to baser fears. Thus the Greeks in response to Hector's challenge 'were ashamed to refuse, but feared to accept' (ἄιδεσθεν μὲν ἀνήνασθαι, δεῖσαν δ' ὑποδέχθαι, *Il.* 7.93; cf. Eur. *Hel.* 805);[187] the possibility of future αἰσχύνη twice inspires courage in Euripides' *Heraclidae* (284-5; 516-9).[188] Both words are normally translated by the English, 'shame', and have often been treated as

[185] At V.61.1, the Argives, though full of confidence about their ability to defeat the Spartans (V.59.4), are 'loth to break the truce' (τὰς σπονδὰς ὤκνουν λῦσαι): the hesitation is here one of shame, not self-preservation.
[186] αἰδώς is explicitly called an emotion (πάθος or παθήμα) by Aristotle, *Eth. Nic*. II.1108a30-35; like φόβος, it is given a mean (μεσότης), namely ὁ αἰδήμων. For the μεσότης of fear, see Chapter Two.
[187] A very similar αἰδώς can paradoxically also be combined with δέος, as discussed above: by a sort of hendiadys, shame and fear stop the Greeks from scattering in retreat at *Il*. 16.657-8; see discussion in Cairns (1993: 69).
[188] Compare also: Thuc. I.84.3: αἰδὼς σωφροσύνης πλεῖστον μετέχει, αἰσχύνης δὲ εὐψυχία.

indistinguishable in early Greek usage.[189] However, recent studies by Cairns (1993) and Konstan (2006) have highlighted the difference between prospective and retrospective shame; we are only interested in the former. In Homer, αἰδώς/αἰδέομαι, is 'always prospective and inhibitory';[190] this is also the usual sense in classical Greek verse[191] (though it fades from use) and Aristotle could still assert in the *Nicomachean Ethics* that αἰδώς is φόβος τις ἀδοξίας καὶ ἀποτελεῖται τῷ περὶ τὰ δεινὰ φόβῳ παραπλήσιον (IV.1128b12). αἰσχύνη, meanwhile, is characterised in the *Rhetoric* as λύπη τις ἢ ταραχὴ περὶ τὰ εἰς ἀδοξίαν φαινόμενα φέρειν τῶν κακῶν, ἢ παρόντων ἢ γεγονότων ἢ μελλόντων (II.1182b12), thus combining retrospective and prospective shame in one emotion. Though φόβος goes unmentioned, the components of this emotion are very similar to its definition on the previous page of the treatise, quoted above – not just the λύπη/ταραχή, but also the φαινόμενα, the κακῶν and the μελλόντων.

Where αἰσχύνη has this prospective sense – as often in tragedy (Aesch. *Sept.* 409; Soph. *Phil*. 120) – it certainly falls within our remit; when it is retrospective, it must be ignored.[192] αἰδώς, too, is not reliably prospective in the fifth century; Konstan notes that Phaedra, in *Hippolytus*, is 'ashamed' (αἰδούμεθα, 244) of what she has already said; as a result, she says, '[her] gaze is turned to shame' (ἐπ᾽ αἰσχύνην ὄμμα τέτραπται, Eur. *Hipp*. 246; cf. *Hec.* 968-72). Moreover, αἰδώς not always concerned with the vulnerability of one's own status and reputation; often it describes the regard due to others. From Homer down to Xenophon and beyond, men 'reverence' and 'respect' (αἰδεῖσθαι) gods, kings,

[189] As in Willliams (1993) and discussion in Konstan (2006: 93-8).
[190] Konstan (2006: 91-110); Cairns (1993: 14).
[191] E.g. Pind. *Pyth*. 9.41; Aesch. *Cho*. 899; Eur. *Alc*. 824.
[192] There is a rule, not always followed, that αἰσχύνομαι/αἰδέομαι + infinitive indicates something one is ashamed to do (and therefore does not do), while αἰσχύνομαι/αἰδέομαι + participle suggests something one is ashamed at doing, or having done. Most prospective, fearful shame is thus expressed with an infinitive. Cf. Smyth *2126.

and suppliants.[193] In this context, αἰδώς is comes very close to σέβας – an 'awe' normally accorded to the divine, without any threat implied.[194]

Such distinctions, however, are not always clear-cut: when Orestes declares himself 'ashamed to come into the sight' of Tyndareus 'because of the deed that I have done' (αἰδώς μ᾽ ἔχει | ἐς ὄμματ᾽ ἐλθεῖν τοῖσιν ἐξειργασμένοις, Eur. *Or*. 460-1, my translation): the shame derives from his prior behaviour, but is felt at the prospect of its exposure; the elderly patriarch himself, meanwhile, is deserving of reverence. It is clear also that the gods whom one 'reveres' possess overwhelming power, and as such they carry a latent threat to the reverent. When Demeter reveals herself, Metaneira is seized by αἰδώς, σέβας and χλωρὸν δέος (*Hymn. Hom. Cer*. 190);[195] Aeschylus' Pelasgus, 'revering the anger of Zeus, god of suppliants', declares this to be 'the highest fear among mortals' (ἀνάγκη Ζηνὸς αἰδεῖσθαι κότον | ἱκτῆρος · ὕψιστος γὰρ ἐν βροτοῖς φόβος, *Supp.* 478-9).[196] Indeed, the connection between such 'other-focused' αἰδώς and fear was something of a philosophical set-piece in classical Athens. Socrates quotes Stasinus for the *gnome*, 'where there is δέος there is also αἰδώς', and offers a correction: 'where there is αἰδώς, there is also δέος' (Pl. *Euthphr.* 12a-b). An almost identical thought is attributed to Epicharmus (fr.221 Kaibel), and visibly lies behind the Menelaus speech in *Ajax* already mentioned. If αἰδώς cannot always be treated as a species of fear – indeed, Konstan

[193] For examples, see *DGE* s.v. αἰδέομαι, I.1.
[194] In one striking Homeric passage, σέβας does seem to take on a sense of *prospective* emotion, familiar from ὄκνος, αἰδώς and αἰσχύνη: Iris, sent by Hera, tells Achilles, σέβας δέ σε θυμὸν ἰκέσθω | Πάτροκλον Τρῳῇσι κυσὶν μέλπηθρα γενέσθαι (*Il.* 18.178-9). Σέβομαι, meanwhile, is very occasionally is followed by an infinitive, expressing a fearful inhibition (Aesch. *Pers*. 694; Pl. *Ti*. 69d; and esp. *Leg*. VII.798b: σέβεται καὶ φοβεῖται … τό τι κινεῖν τῶν καθεστώτων); each of these is in a religious context.
[195] Cf. δεινή τε καὶ αἰδοίη θεός" (Thetis), *Il*. 18.394
[196] Cf. Aesch. *Pers.* 699-703, where the ghost of Darius initially identifies αἰδώς as the source of the chorus' hesitation; they respond in terms of δέος (see above).

doubts that it can truly be classed as an emotion[197] – it nevertheless has a significant role in the political discourse of vulnerability, a discourse that is crucial to this thesis.

[197] Konstan (2006: 96).

# THUCYDIDES AND THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF FEAR

τοιόνδε τοι ταρβοῦντες ἐνδίκως σέβας
ἔρυμά τε χώρας καὶ πόλεως σωτήριον
ἔχοιτ' ἂν οἷον οὔτις ἀνθρώπων ἔχει,
οὔτ' ἐν Σκύθησιν οὔτε Πέλοπος ἐν τόποις.

Aesch. *Eum.* 699-703

## Introduction: Thucydides vs Herodotus

In my introduction, I noted the emergence of a new kind of history, in the 1930s, devoted the emotions of the past; I discussed the influence of the social and cognitive sciences in the development of the field.

Yet the history of emotions has a prehistory, too. Herodotus, who famously declares (citing Pindar) that '*nomos* is king' (III.38.3), pays close attention to the variation in emotional culture across different societies, observing both its different objects and different expressions. Demaratus' explanation of Spartan courage is one example: the Persian Xerxes is astounded that the Spartans should stand steadfast against such superior numbers, thinking such bravery could only be produced by the fear of some all-powerful tyrant like himself, under compulsion of the lash (VII.103.4); Demaratus, a Spartan himself, explains that 'law is their master, whom they fear (ὑποδειμαίνουσι) much more than your men fear you' (104.4).[198] The objects of fear are shaped by custom and political

[198] Cairns (2021: 499): 'the difference between the two cultures depends on how they channel the same basic emotion'. Rutherford (2022: 356): 'Emotion becomes an indicator of ideology'. On *nomos* and *phusis* in this episode, see Thomas (2000: 109-11). On the Spartan cult of Phobos, see my introduction, p.27.

culture – a political culture which may be subject to historical change, as in the case of Sparta's reported transformation under Lycurgus (I.65.5-66.1). Yet Herodotus also allows, in the voice of Otanes, that there may be something innate in emotion, something beyond the reach of material or cultural circumstances: 'Insolence is created in him by the good things to hand, *while from birth envy is rooted in man*' (ἐγγίνεται μὲν γάρ οἱ ὕβρις ὑπὸ τῶν παρεόντων ἀγαθῶν, φθόνος δὲ ἀρχῆθεν ἐμφύεται ἀνθρώπῳ); thus even a monarchical tyrant is not ἄφθονος, but envies the most successful of his subjects (III.80.3-4). This universal desire for more is well illustrated by the text, spurring not only Persian expansion, but Athenian, Samian, and even Spartan policy;[199] one critic has even suggested that 'envy' is 'for Herodotus the primary motor of historical action'.[200]

Herodotus' view of causation, however, if not really so 'unsystematic' as once supposed,[201] is complex and ambiguous, with multiple explanations often offered, without discrimination or priority, for the same event.[202] His human nature is implicitly 'paradoxical' and 'contradictory',[203] and his protagonists regularly act in defiance of social custom as well as character.[204] Emotion sometimes has a role to play in these unexpected decisions, 'operating as wild card',[205] yet it is not a consistent or reliable one. Indeed, Otanes' claim for man's innate envy is contradicted by Herodotus himself, when he explains how the Agathyrsoi, sharing wives and all related to one another, are thus free

[199] Cf. Baragwanath (2008: 212): 'the *Histories* sets forth an idea of human nature … as something that inexorably leads individuals and communities to desire to possess more'.
[200] Harrison (2003: 157), who explains (n.50) the contradiction of the Agathyrsoi (see below) through their 'mirror status'. De Romilly (1971) highlights 'la vengeance' as a narrative thread; Gould (1989: 63-85) partners vengeance with gratitude as 'fundamental human motives in Herodotus' (65); Rutherford (2022: 356) reports that, on his lexical calculations, 'the most frequent emotional state in [Herodotus'] History is fear'.
[201] Momigliano (1966: 114), cited and discussed by Pelling (2019: 232-4).
[202] See discussions in Baragwanath (2008: 66-7 (Cyrus), 85-7 (Cambyses)) and Pelling (2019: 94-105), who locates Herodotus' 'overdetermination' of phenomena in a wider Greek (especially Hippocratic) tradition.
[203] Ubsdell (1983: 8), with Cleomenes as his case study in 'instructive paradox' (pp. 47-78).
[204] Harrison (2003: 151).
[205] Baragwanath (2008: 84).

from φθόνος (IV.104). Moreover, while certain scenes are made vivid by emotional display – perhaps most memorably the terror and grief of Xerxes as the spectator of Salamis – there is little reflection within the narrative on the significance and ethics of emotions *per se*; indeed, some of the most crucial decisions of the *Histories* are remarkable for an absence of emotion.[206] Traditionally, scholars have located Herodotus' genius elsewhere.[207]

Not so Thucydides. From the earliest times identified as a pre-eminently 'pathetic' writer (παθητικώτατος, Plut. *Vit. Nic*. 1.1), the Athenian historian has been widely recognised by modern scholars for his psychological approach to historical causation. Collingwood's postwar polemic is much-quoted ('What is the matter with the man, that he writes like that? ...') but the substance of his criticism is important: Thucydides is not really interested in past events, as a historian should be, but in 'psychological laws' that are true everywhere and always.[208] The universalizing and 'anti-historical' tendency of Thucydides is exaggerated – Collingwood ignores, for example, the attention paid to differences in 'national character', as well as the cast of exceptional individuals – yet the crucial role accorded to 'human nature' and especially the emotions is generally accepted by other Thucydidean scholars. Recent studies, moving away from the 'scientific' idealisation of the nineteenth century, have made Thucydides an artist and a storyteller, whose evocation of feeling within the narrative may be examined alongside poetic,

[206] As Froehlich (2013: 135-48) observes, of the many motives given for Xerxes' invasion of Greece, none is strictly 'emotional' – though see Baron's review (2015: xxii n.4) for problems with Froehlich's 'typology'.
[207] Dionysius (*Pomp.* 3.18) contrasts Herodotus' aptitude for characterisation (τὰ ἤθη) with Thucydides' skill in depicting emotion (τὰ πάθη). Damon (2017: 191) writes that 'emotions are not [Herodotus'] forte'; in Pelling's comprehensive study, *Herodotus and the Question Why* (2019; see notes above), emotions are almost entirely absent. But see now Cairns (2021), Rutherford (2022), and De Bakker (2022).
[208] Collingwood (1994 [1946]: 28-31).

philosophical, and rhetorical texts, with an eye as much to literary effect as to historical accuracy.[209]

For this Thucydides, situated 'between history and literature',[210] fear is absolutely central. Dionysius of Halicarnassus credits Thucydides with a particular tendency to inspire τὸ δεινὸν καὶ [τὸ] φοβερόν, (*Thuc.* 24.61-2; cf. *Pomp*. 3.21). Plutarch, in a famous passage, celebrates Thucydides' ability to reproduce, in the minds of his readers, τὰ γιγνόμενα περὶ τοὺς ὁρῶντας ἐκπληκτικὰ καὶ ταρακτικὰ πάθη (*De glor. Ath.* 347a).[211] Modern criticism, while continuing to speculate about the emotions of Thucydides' ancient audience,[212] has been more interested in fears that saturate the narrative itself.[213] De Romilly's short 1956 essay, identifying positive and negative strains of *deos* and *phobos* in the *History*, has been supplemented by more recent studies exploring the place of this emotion in 'mass' or 'collective psychology', democratic politics, and even the very definition of the *demos*.[214] Others have identified Thucydidean fear with human nature, or realist international relations.[215] Perhaps the most substantial engagement is that of William Desmond, who finds didactic purpose in Thucydides' work: his accounts of war, chance, and human nature offer 'lessons in fear', encouraging caution, prudence, and self-doubt.[216]

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[209] E.g. Hunter (1973); Lateiner (1977); Macleod (1983); Joho (2017). For the development of twentieth- and twenty-first century Thucydidean scholarship, see Hesk (2015).
[210] This phrase is borrowed from the title of a recent collection of essays, Tsakmakis/Tamiolaki (2013).
[211] Cf. παθητικώτατος in the *Nicias*, above, and τὸ παθητικόν in Dion. Hal. *Thuc*. 24.62. For a sophisticated reading of Thucydides' emotionalism, rejecting some recent 'immersive' accounts, see Rood (2022).
[212] See e.g. Damon (2017).
[213] There are 156 instances of *phobeomai*/*phobos*, and 132 of *deido*/*deos* (so de Romilly (1956: 119)). Huart (1968: 123) contrasts the relative absence of *phobeo* from Herodotus (23 occurrences): 'la disproportion est flagrante et révèle la place importante tenue dans l'œuvre [de Thucydide] par ce sentiment'. Cf. Hunter (1986: 415): '… fear is perhaps the predominant emotion in the 'History''.
[214] Hunter (1986); Visvardi (2015); Calabrese (2008); Wohl (2017).
[215] Luginbill (1999: 65-81); for the Thucydidean realist tradition, see Earley (2020), with 'fear' in index.
[216] Desmond (2006).

Thus the *History,* as a psychological and psychagogic text, offers both context and analogy for Aeschylean fear. I am not concerned here to track a line of influence, as Cornford did, or to resurrect the spectre of 'tragic history'.[217] Intellectually, Thucydides is peculiar – 'a lonely man', as Simon Hornblower puts it[218] – and self-consciously committed to an original and unique inquiry. His work does, however, reflect and contribute to a common Athenian discourse about fear and its usefulness; his ambivalence about 'exemplary' narrative, meanwhile, offers an intriguing approach to the function of tragedy.

This chapter will fall into three parts. First, I assess the significance of fear in Thucydides' *History*, considering especially its place in the structure of causation in Book I, and the role of the historian in exposing that structure. Next I consider the value attached to fear in Thucydides' text, both by his speakers and, implicitly, by the author himself. Finally, I will examine the various efforts made, within the narrative, to moderate or cultivate fear through language, and especially through *paradeigmata*. This motif allows for a brief consideration of the intended 'utility' of the *History* in Classical Athens.

## SIGNIFICANCE: 'Fear, most of all…'

The starting point for this discussion is of course, Book I, chapter 23, where Thucydides sets out his understanding of the causes of the conflict. As in Herodotus, war is

[217] Cornford (1907). On 'tragic history', see especially Walbank (1955) and Marincola (2013).
[218] Hornblower (1987: 135).

precipitated by the perceived growth of a rival power; unlike Herodotus, however, Thucydides includes a prominent role for *phobos*:[219]

> διότι δ᾽ ἔλυσαν, τὰς αἰτίας προύγραψα πρῶτον καὶ τὰς διαφοράς, τοῦ μή τινα ζητῆσαί ποτε ἐξ ὅτου τοσοῦτος πόλεμος τοῖς Ἕλλησι κατέστη. τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἀληθεστάτην πρόφασιν, ἀφανεστάτην δὲ λόγῳ, τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἡγοῦμαι μεγάλους γιγνομένους καὶ φόβον παρέχοντας τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἀναγκάσαι ἐς τὸ πολεμεῖν· αἱ δ᾽ ἐς τὸ φανερὸν λεγόμεναι αἰτίαι αἵδ᾽ ἦσαν ἑκατέρων, ἀφ᾽ ὧν λύσαντες τὰς σπονδὰς ἐς τὸν πόλεμον κατέστησαν. (I. 23.5-6)

There are two things that to note about this fear. The first is that there is nothing explicitly rational or irrational about its origin, or resultant action. *Phobos* does not descend upon the Spartans like a Homeric (or tragic) deity,[220] but is provoked by an authoritative fact – the growth of Athenian power. On the other hand, no credit is given to this Spartan fear by Thucydides, at least not yet; he does not say that the Spartan fear was a justified or even a realistic one, that the Athenians really *were* a threat to their interests, or even that this was a valid conclusion from the evidence. Furthermore, this fear, while 'compelling', does not preclude deliberation or the exercise of reason: as pointed out by Colin Macleod and others, the word *anagke*, in Thucydides as in Aeschylus and elsewhere in classical Greek, 'need not imply predetermination or total lack of choice'.[221] Fear drives human action, but it does not dictate it.

Indeed, as Book I progresses, we see that the growth-fear-necessity *prophasis*, which Thucydides tells us here is 'least apparent in *logos*', is not absent from *logos*

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[219] Fear goes unmentioned in I.46.1 (Croesus' perception of Cyrus' growing power), V.91.1 (Sparta-Athens) and VII.11.2-3 (Persia-Athens). As Munson (2001) observes in her study of Herodotean *anagke*, there is no 'psychological constraint' in his narrative.
[220] For the divine Phobos, see my Introduction, p.57.
[221] Macleod (1978: 64 n.1), citing Dover (1973: 65-6) on Agamemnon at Aulis; on the present passage see also Connor (1984: 32 n.31). For further discussion of *anagke,* fear, and freedom, see Chapter Three.

altogether.[222] The growth of Athenian power is the focus of both the first and second Corinthian *logoi* at Sparta (I.68-71, 120-4), as well as the Athenian representation (73-8), and it is noted, too, by the pro-war Spartan, Sthenelaidas (86.5). At Athens, the Corcyraeans warn their hosts that 'the Spartans, *through fear of you* (φόβῳ τῷ ὑμετέρῳ), are eager for war' (33.3). The eventual 'necessity' of war entailed by this dynamic – the third element of the *prophasis* – is suggested by the Corcyraeans (36.1), denied here by the Corinthians (42.2), but promoted by them later at Sparta (124.2), and affirmed, finally, by Pericles at Athens (144.3).[223] Thus the *prophasis*, including Spartan *phobos*, does not operate at some secret, sub-verbal level; this fear is no primal passion or biological mechanism, but rather a political phenomenon, the origin and expression of which may be publicly debated.[224]

The growth-fear-necessity *prophasis* is, nevertheless, ἀφανεστάτη λόγῳ; we cannot ignore this claim. Thucydides must mean that it is less apparent in speech than αἱ … ἐς τὸ φανερὸν λεγόμεναι αἰτίαι. And in fact, despite the instances just cited, it is true that no speaker combines all three elements of the *prophasis* as the historian himself does. Furthermore, the second element, the Spartan *fear* of Athens, is articulated only once (33.3, see above), and never by the Spartans themselves, or even in their presence. It is the least apparent element of the least apparent cause, ἀφανεστάτη ἀφανεστάτων, one could say; at the same time, it is the element that obtains most explicit reiteration by Thucydides himself.[225] Thus the first Spartan congress – at which their fear goes

[222] Cf. Rhodes (1987), who suggests (158) that 'the whole of book I is permeated by Thucydides' truest reason', and extensive discussion in Rood (1998: 205-48).
[223] *Pace* Rood (1998: 209), who cites Sealey (1975: 93 n.12) and Connor (1984: 126 n.41) for the view that 'the stress on necessity at 23.6 does not explicitly permeate book I'.
[224] On this passage, Wohl (2017: 444-5) aptly cites Ahmed (2004) for the view that emotion inheres neither in its subject not in its object, but in a relation between them that defines both; as a 'social practice', the passions are 'the product of politics as well as their engine'.
[225] Thucydides also repeatedly refers to the fears of Sparta's allies (I.67.1, 119.1 (Corinth); 67.2 (Aegina)), and of the rest of the Greece (II.8.5).

unmentioned – ends with a vote on the 'wrongdoing' (*adikein*) of the Athenians (87.2), and 'the decision of the assembly,' we are told, was 'that the treaty had been broken' (87.6). In the following sentence, however, Thucydides adds: 'the vote of the Spartans that the treaty had been broken and that they must go to war was determined, not so much by the influence of the speeches (λόγοις) of their allies, *as by fear* (φοβούμενοι) *of the Athenians*, lest they become too powerful, perceiving (ὁρῶντες) that the greater part of Hellas was already subject to them' (88, tr. Smith, adapted). The opposition of (open) *logoi* and (unexpressed) *phobos* distinctly recalls 23.6; for a second time, we are asked to see through the various articulated grievances to the underlying emotional motive, the 'truest cause' of the war.

Again, however, the opposition of *logos* and *phobos* must not be overstated. The Spartans are influenced 'not so much' (οὐ τοσοῦτον) by their allies, Thucydides tells us; he does not say they have no influence at all. Indeed, as noted above, the Corinthian speech is concerned with the Athenian ascendancy, which is the explicit ground of the Spartan fear in I.88. Moreover, the charges laid openly against Athens – disputes over Corcyra, Potideia, Aegina, and Megara – are all demonstrations of her growing political, military, and economic power, the very threat that Sparta is said to fear.[226] This causal relationship is clarified later in the book, before the second Spartan congress. Although Corcryra, Potideia, and other incidents, Thucydides writes, 'furnished the cause for this war' (πρόφασις τοῦδε τοῦ πολέμου κατέστη), it was in the preceding period (the Pentecontaetia) that Athens 'advanced to great power'. The Spartans, however, though 'aware' of this, would not go to war 'except under compulsion (μὴ ἀναγκάζωνται)'; 'until

[226] Cf. Jaffe (2017: 62): 'the explicit theme of the Spartan Congress is Athenian injustice, but its implicit theme is Athenian power'.

at last[, when] the power of the Athenians began to rise clearly and *they were laying hands on their allies*', the Spartans 'could bear it no longer', and resolved for war (118, tr. Smith, adapted). The language again evokes the analysis of 23.6, except now the *aitiai*, the incidental grievances of Athenian aggression towards the allies, are given the name of *prophasis*,[227] and have the force of *anagke*, driving the Spartans to war. Corcyra and Potideia are not false pretexts, concealments of the truest cause, but aspects or expressions of it. Indeed, the growth-fear-compulsion hypothesis is not something Thucydides has deduced from elsewhere, from some private, uncited source; rather, it is a pattern that the author derives from the very events and speeches – the *aitiai* and *logoi* – that he records.

This brings me to my second point about the *phobos* of I.23.6: the role of the historian. Fear is not only a rational – or at least reason-able – force; it is an intellectual object, in the sense that it is readable, recoverable through detached thought, despite intervals of time and space. Hornblower observes that Thucydides' innovation is not a sifting of false and true causes, but a distinction between superficial causes and profound ones.[228] Hence we have the superlative ἀληθεστάτην – not the true explanation, but the truest of several; and hence even here the *aitiai* are afforded genuine explanatory power, providing an 'occasion upon which' (ἐξ ὅτου) the war began, and 'because of which' (ἀφ' ὧν) the treaty was dissolved. These *aitiai* are relevant, significant, and entirely compatible with Thucydides' explanation, which is not so much a rejection as an integration or

[227] As commentators point out, *aitia* and *prophasis* may serve as synonyms (e.g. III.13.1); neither term carries authorial credibility in itself, and the Spartans seek a specious *prophasis* just a few pages later (I.126.1). Still, it is fitting that here, where the distinction of I.23.6 is eliminated, the *aitiai* should be thus renamed.

[228] *Ad* I.23.6. See especially VI.6.1, where Thucydides gives the ἀφανεστάτη πρόφασις of the Sicilian expedition; again, an underlying emotional motive (desire for conquest) does not exclude the influence of other, pretended motives.

interpretation of such claims. And it is in this process of interpretation that the historian himself comes to the fore: ἡγοῦμαι, he writes, *I think*. It is emphatically Thucydides who brings this obscure(r) fear into the light and gives it due prominence (cf. I.88); nowhere else in the *History* does he use ἡγοῦμαι of himself.

Yet this self-conscious argumentation, at the end of the proem, resonates with an earlier passage from the so-called Archaeology, in which Thucydides promotes his revisionist history of the Trojan war.

> Ἀγαμέμνων τέ μοι δοκεῖ τῶν τότε δυνάμει προύχων καὶ οὐ τοσοῦτον τοῖς Τυνδάρεω ὅρκοις κατειλημμένους τοὺς Ἑλένης μνηστῆρας ἄγων τὸν στόλον ἀγεῖραι. … ἅ μοι δοκεῖ Ἀγαμέμνων παραλαβὼν καὶ ναυτικῷ [τε] ἅμα ἐπὶ πλέον τῶν ἄλλων ἰσχύσας, τὴν στρατείαν οὐ χάριτι τὸ πλέον ἢ φόβῳ ξυναγαγὼν ποιήσασθαι.
>
> (I.9.1-3)

Here, as at 23.6, fear is a natural response to objectively measured power; its rationality is not in question. Here too, fear is said to be more significant than other more honourable motives, though these are demoted rather than dismissed. There is, finally, no suggestion here of new or different sources for his interpretation: while ostensibly sceptical, Thucydides draws all his information in this chapter from verbal tradition, citing Peloponnesian *logoi* and quoting the *Iliad* in his demonstration of Agamemnon's power;[229] in the next chapter, the historian refuses archaeological evidence as unreliable, preferring the exaggerations of the poets.[230] What we have here is not an inquiry based on

[229] 9.1, 9.3. At 10.4, Thucydides adduces some information about archaic ship-design, but this too may be derived from Homer (see bibliography in Gomme and Hornblower *ad loc.*).
[230] Thucydides does elsewhere (e.g. 8.1) occasionally appeal to archaeological evidence; see Hornblower (1987: 89-91).

new facts, then, but a new analysis, based entirely on received narratives.[231] In this philological history, Thucydides reads fear between the lines of Homer, just as he will read fear behind the *aitiai* of 23.6. As in that passage, too, the reading of archaic *logoi* grants a dramatic role to the author, in the first person: just as in 23.6 he 'thinks' the *prophasis*, so here the discovery of a fearful motive is explicitly subjective (μοι δοκεῖ … μοι δοκεῖ).[232]

This performance of revisionist judgment sets the stage for the analysis of contemporary conflict that follows. Thucydides is not just demonstrating his own tools of historical analysis; he is teaching us how to read. Indeed, it is not the historian alone who reads fear into the past of Book I. The Athenians, speaking at the Spartan congress, invoke the same emotion to explain the acquisition of their empire in the aftermath of Persian invasion 'The nature of the case,' they say, 'first compelled (κατηναγκάσθημεν) us to advance our empire to its present height – through fear, most of all, though honour and interest afterwards came in (μάλιστα μὲν ὑπὸ δέους, ἔπειτα καὶ τιμῆς, ὕστερον καὶ ὠφελίας)' (75.3, tr. Crawley, adapted). Note how the Athenians, like Thucydides himself, speak of fear as the largest but not the only factor in an event, even while, as at 23.6, it is attributed a 'compelling' power.[233] Note also that this is a revisionist account, like Thucydides' version of the Trojan war: the Corinthians have just painted them as bold and fearless (70.3-4), but now the Athenians claim to be governed by *deos*. While others argue ambition to be their motive, fear, they imply, is the 'truest cause' of their empire.

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[231] Cf. Luraghi (2000: 229): 'Thucydides uses Homer against Homer, so to speak'.
[232] Cf. VIII.56.3: δοκεῖ δέ μοι καὶ ὁ Τισσαφέρνης τὸ αὐτὸ βουληθῆναι … διὰ τὸ δέος …. The fears are laid out 57.1 (δεδιὼς μή …), culminating in a superlative anxiety (ἐφοβεῖτο μάλιστα …) – on which structure see below.
[233] In the following chapter, fear loses its primacy, as the three motives are made equally 'the greatest' in the *maintenance* of the empire (76.2).

VALUE: 'human nature' and *la bonne crainte*

Why do the Athenians say this? Thucydides prefaces their speech with two motives. On the one hand, they intend, Thucydides says, to answer none of the particular charges laid against them, but instead 'to show how on a comprehensive view (δηλῶσαι … περὶ τοῦ παντὸς ὡς) this was a matter not for hasty deliberation but rather more consideration'; on the other hand, 'they wish to call attention to the great power (δύναμιν) of Athens' (I.72.1). The first intention is echoed by the Athenians in the speech itself, when they declare a desire 'to show (δηλῶσαι) how, on a comprehensive view of the indictment (περὶ τοῦ παντὸς λόγου), … [they] hold [their] possessions not unreasonably (οὔτε ἀπεικότως)' (73.1). Thus, in 75.3, they offer a deeper historical interpretation, in the form of an underlying psychological explanation; and this explanation functions as an exculpation. The move from causation to justification is made explicit in the next chapter: 'there is nothing wonderful, or contrary to the common practice of mankind (ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀνθρωπείου τρόπου), if we did accept an empire that was offered to us, and yielding to (νικηθέντες) three of the strongest motives, honour, fear, and interest (τιμῆς καὶ δέους καὶ ὠφελίας) refused to give it up' (76.2). The pursuit of security is 'reasonable', normal human behaviour; as the Athenians put it in Book VI, making a similar argument (in Sicily) about their empire, 'no one can be quarrelled with for providing for his proper safety' (VI.83.2; cf. I.76.5). There, as here, fear of foreign domination not only explains but excuses Athenian imperialism.[234]

[234] Compare the very similar arguments made by Euphemus in Sicily in VI.82.1-83.4: ἀνάγκη καὶ περὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς εἰπεῖν ὡς εἰκότως ἔχομεν … τήν τε γὰρ ἐκεῖ ἀρχὴν εἰρήκαμεν διὰ δέος ἔχειν καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε διὰ τὸ αὐτὸ ἥκειν.

This form of argument may owe something to the sophists of contemporary Athens, a world in which Antiphon, reported as Thucydides' teacher, had invoked a universal human φύσις to challenge the local claims of νόμος,[235] and in which Thrasymachus and Callicles could variously argue that justice was simply the rule of the stronger.[236] The ironic voice of the 'Old Oligarch' makes a similar apology for the Athenian *demos*: their system of government is deplorable, but 'one must forgive anyone who looks after his own interests' (II.20). More directly pertinent, though, is Gorgias' *Encomium of Helen*, in which the speaker excuses the infamous betrayal of Menelaus as an act 'comp[elled] by love (ἔρωτος ἀνάγκαις)'.[237] The nature of this ἔρως, operating through the eyes, is illustrated by the effects of fear: the disturbing and terrifying sight of hostile forces makes people run away; 'disregard of the law is planted in them because of fear (φόβον)', a fear that 'extinguishes and expels thought' (ἀπέσβεσε καὶ ἐξήλασεν ὁ φόβος τὸ νόημα); such a 'human (ἀνθρώπινον) malady' is not to be 'blamed as a crime but considered as a misfortune' (16-19). Where human nature compels, such arguments suggest, right and wrong become irrelevant;[238] fear is part of the human condition, and as such, morally neutral.

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[235] Antiphon DK 87 B44. Hermogenes makes Thucydides a student of Antiphon of Rhamnus, distinguishing him from Antiphon the orator (DK 87 A2); Marcellinus, in the *Life of Thucydides*, says his teachers were Antiphon the orator and Anaxagoras (22). Some modern scholars are inclined to identify the two Antiphons, though see Pendrick (2005). For the influence of Antiphon on Thucydides, especially concerning 'human nature', see Luginbill (1999: 22-30); for the influence of Anaxagoras, see Golfin (2007).

[236] Pl. *Resp.* I.338c2-3; *Grg*. 483d. For the continuities and contrasts between these 'immoralist' positions, see Barney (2017). Thucydides' Athenians articulate similar ideas in the Melian Dialogue (V.89, 109.2).

[237] Hunter (1986) presses the correspondence further, arguing that Thucydides' whole psychology of fear answers to that of Gorgias.

[238] Cf. IV.98.6, and III.39.2, where even Cleon is willing to excuse those who revolt in fear of enemy attack. As Fisher/Hoekstra (2017: 377) point out, such appeals to emotional compulsion were not uncontested in Athens: invoked by Helen herself in Euripides, they are dismissed by Hecuba and Menelaus (*Tro*. 983-97; 1036-9); and they are satirised by the 'Unjust Argument' in Aristophanes (*Nub*. 1075-82).

Yet the Athenian speech at Sparta in Book I is not only or even mainly an apology for the empire; it is at the same time, Thucydides indicates, a projection of δύναμις (72.1) intended to deter the Peloponnesians from war. This 'power' includes not just the military and diplomatic resources of Athens, but her cognitive and psychological capacities: the envoys' history of the Persian wars, designed 'to show … what sort of antagonist [Athens] is likely to prove' (73.3), passes swiftly over her naval supremacy to highlight the superior intelligence of her general, Themistocles, and especially her 'most unflinching patriotism' (στρατηγὸν ξυνετώτατον καὶ προθυμίαν ἀοκνοτάτην, 74.1, cf. 75.1). This daring zeal (προθυμίαν ... τολμηροτάτην) is elaborated by a contrast with the fearful (δείσαντες) capitulation of other Greek states, and even the belated action of the Spartans, which was motivated – so the Athenians claim – by fear for themselves (ἐδείσατε). The fearless *tolma* of Athens, relying only on 'desperate hope' (βραχείᾳ ἐλπίδι), makes her both superior to her allies and dangerous to oppose (74.2-4).

Such boasts and disparagements take up a theme of the preceding Corinthian speech, in which the Athenians were praised for their boldness, optimism, and lack of hesitation, and the Spartans criticised for their slowness and precaution (70.2-3). They stand in tension, however, with the Athenian confession of δέος in the chapters that follow (75.3, 76.2, discussed above). How is this Athenian *tolma* to be reconciled with the 'fear' that is the chief cause (and justification) of their empire? How can they scorn the emotion one moment, then appeal to its compelling power in the next?

The answer lies not so much in the dissimulation of the Athenians[239] as in the complex value of fear in Classical Athens, beyond the 'immoralist' provocations of the sophists.[240] By 'value', I mean the political and ethical status of the emotion, and the appreciation of its utility. For Thucydides, we will do well to begin with a particular fear, that of battle – the cultural salience of which is guaranteed by epic tradition, and illustrated by Gorgias' choice of *phobos*-analogy in the *Encomium*, as well as tragic texts such as the *Persians* and the *Seven Against Thebes*.[241] Next I will consider two fears generally regarded as distinct from such battle-fear: the apprehension of tactical and strategic risk, and the reverence accorded to the law. Having demonstrated the lexical and conceptual entanglement of these phenomena, I will suggest that it is not so much the experiential quality of the emotion as its context that determines its value in Thucydides. This means that successful generals and statesmen, themselves subject to the emotion, do not scorn the fear of armies and assemblies but rather seek to moderate and direct it according to circumstance.

In Thucydidean battles, the emotion generally corresponds with defeat – as in Homer, the word *phobos* may describe flight as well as fear[242] – and must be countered to achieve success.[243] Before the naval engagement off Naupactus, for example, Peloponnesian and Athenian admirals observe, in turn, the *phobos* of their men (II.86.6; 88.1), and, in turn, try to dispel it in parallel speeches of exhortation (87; 89).[244] The Peloponnesian

[239] See, e.g. Jaffe (2017: 77-97) and Fisher/Hoekstra (2017).
[240] Their teachings are more various than Barney's term implies; Antiphon himself recognises the role of fear in making men more 'temperate' (ὅστις … δειμαίνει … σωφρονέστερος, D55), an intensely moral concept in classical Greece. For Plato and Aristotle on good and bad fear, see Chapter Three.
[241] For the ubiquity of battle-fear in Homer, see Zaborowski 2002; for battle-fear in the *Persians* and *Seven*, see Introduction pp.37-41 and Chapter Four.
[242] See II.81.6, IV.56.1, VII.30.1, VII.79.5, and lexical discussion below.
[243] Conversely, generals seek to provoke fear in enemy forces: see, for example, Lamachus' advice at VI.49.2.
[244] Konstan (2006: 141-4) uses the Naupactus episode to exemplify his cognitive account of Greek fear, focused on Aristotle's *Rhetoric.*

speakers, Brasidas and Cnemus, confront an anxiety based on the recent success and greater experience of the Athenians: the former, they say, 'gives no just ground for terror' (οὐχὶ δικαίαν ἔχει τέκμαρσιν τὸ ἐκφοβῆσαι, 87.1); against Athenian experience, they set Peloponnesian *tolma*, arguing that unshakeable courage is superior to skill, since 'fear takes away presence of mind' (φόβος γὰρ μνήμην ἐκπλήσσει, 87.4), rendering experience useless. Such panic-fear, recalling Gorgias' language above, is plainly irrational and destructive. Yet these admirals, in engaging explicitly with the *phobos* and *deos* (87.1, 87.4; 87.5) of their own men, implicitly regard it as *potentially* rational, or reason-able; indeed, to say that a particular fear has no 'just ground' is to acknowledge that other fears *are* justified. Cowardice lies not in fear itself, then, but in unjustified fear: hence, while their last rout is excused by ill-preparation (87.2, 87.5), this time the commanders promise that improved planning will give no similar 'explanation' (πρόφασις) for running away (87.9). The speech concludes with a carrot-and-stick exhortation, which presumes that even the blind fears of the coward can be overcome by threats of punishment – a weighing of present and future dangers that might be termed 'deliberate'.[245]

The speech of Phormio, the Athenian admiral, has a similar structure, but a more radical psychology. First, he confronts an apprehension, based on the numerical superiority of the Peloponnesians, as he '[does] not like … them to be afraid of what is not really terrible' (οὐκ ἀξιῶν τὰ μὴ δεινὰ ἐν ὀρρωδίᾳ ἔχειν, 89.1) – for him, as for Brasidas and Cnemus, there are acceptable and unacceptable objects of fear. Next, he addresses the courage of the Peloponnesians, 'which they suppose constitutional to them' (πιστεύοντες …ὡς προσῆκον σφίσιν … εἶναι), but which is in fact, Phormio says, contingent on

[245] For discussion of φόβος βουλευτικός in Arist. *Rh*., and φαντασία βουλευτική/λογιστική in Arist. *De an.*, see Chapters Two and Three.

experience: at sea, the Athenians have the advantage (89.2-3). Thus Peloponnesian *tolma* is not to be feared (μὴ δὴ αὐτῶν τὴν τόλμαν δείσητε); in fact, the Athenians inspire in their enemies 'a much greater and better-founded fear' (πολὺ … πλείω φόβον … καὶ πιστότερον), based on their recent victory and on their present demonstration of *tolma* in the face of a larger force (89.5-6). In this analysis, courage (ἀνδρείοις, 89.2; εὐψυχίᾳ, 89.3) is reduced to confidence (θαρσοῦσιν, 89.2; θρασύτεροί, 89.3), and confidence, like fear, merely reflects a calculation of advantage. Thus the Athenian *tolma* communicates not some innate and unshakeable virtue but rather an expectation of specific success (89.5); the Peloponnesians, observing and 'considering' (λογιζόμενοι) this, are consequently fearful (πεφόβηνται) (89.6).[246] With this ultra-rational conception of the emotion, there is no shame attached to it: Phormio warns that defeat will 'bring nearer to the Athenians their fears (φόβον) for the sea' (89.10); though appealing to a collective rather than individual concern, this warning mirrors the Peloponnesian attempt to frighten their sailors into bravery.

Thucydides here presents two complementary but different treatments of fear. Which does he mean his readers to trust? On such questions, many scholars look to Thucydides' narrative to vindicate (or undermine) the arguments of the speeches.[247] In this case, the course of the ensuing battle seems to prove Phormio right – it is upon the Peloponnesians that fear falls (φόβος ἐμπίπτει), after an Athenian ship demonstrates amazing skill (91.4); they make mistakes, while the Athenians are then seized by θάρσος (92.1), just as Phormio had hoped. Courage, it is implied, is indeed a matter of experience and calculation, rather than of fearless temperament. Yet other aspects of Phormio's fear-

[246] For the same idea, see Hermocrates at VI.34.7
[247] For this method, see de Romilly (2012 [1956]: 70-1); in her analysis of Naupactus (80-7), the 'subtle' Phormio 'ruins' the Peloponnesian argument before he ruins their fleet, and 'the end of the battle proves Phormio right'.

discourse are left unproved: Thucydides does not say that the Athenians are motivated by fearful consequences of defeat, any more than the Peloponnesians are by the threats of punishment for cowardice. Indeed, other episodes suggest that such fears rarely influence the course of a battle; when fear intervenes, it brings disaster rather than resolve.[248]

At the level of tactics, on the other hand, fear seems reliably salutary. It is notable that Phormio's speech is itself inspired by fear (δεδιὼς καὶ αὐτὸς τὴν τῶν στρατιωτῶν ὀρρωδίαν, 88.1); his fear is a recognition of danger, prompting an effective intervention. Elsewhere, we see it is the fearful commander who foresees and forestalls disaster, while the more hopeful blunder in their complacency. So Demosthenes, when 'confident in his good fortune', advances into Aetolia without waiting for reinforcements, a mistake that costs Athens 'the finest group of men lost … in the course this [Archidamian] war' (III.97.2; 98.4).[249] The following winter, however, a wiser, more apprehensive[250] Demosthenes wins an important battle at Olpae: 'fearing' (δείσας) a flanking manoeuvre by the more numerous enemy, he stations an ambush party (3.107.3); the battle develops as he predicts, and the ambush strikes *phobos* first into the enemy flank, and then the whole army (108.1).[251] It falls to the Spartan Archidamus to make the general point. 'Often, a smaller force, if it is fearful (δεδιώς), overmatches a larger number, because the latter, in scorn of the enemy, is unprepared' (II.11.4, my translation). Archidamus immediately qualifies this recommendation of fear: a campaigning army should 'fight with bold resolution, but be prepared with practical fear (τῇ μὲν γνώμῃ θαρσαλέους

[248] The battle at the Anapus river is perhaps an exception. Nicias asks the allies to 'think the present difficulty and necessity more terrible (φοβερωτέραν) than the enemy' (VI.68.4); in the battle itself, they suffer *phobos* and *ekplexis* (70.1), but hold their nerve and rout the Syracusans. For fear as a cause of defeat as at Naupactus, see V.10.6, 11.2 (Amphipolis) and VII.43-5 (Epipolae). Calabrese (2008: 31-2) notes that such fears 'produce a disorder that *enhances* the original threat' (my emphasis).
[249] Cf. Cleon's confidence at Amphipolis V.9.3.
[250] Cf. 102.3-4, discussed below.
[251] For the symmetry of forecast and event, see de Romilly (2012: 73-4).

στρατεύειν, τῷ δ' ἔργῳ δεδιότας παρεσκευάσθαι);[252] this way, the men are more confident in attacking and more secure against being attacked.' (11.5). There appears a fundamental difference between this prudent apprehension, which looks forward to and even anticipates future events, and the panic of battle, which deprives combatants of their *mneme* – literally, their own past.

To some extent this is a lexical distinction, between *deos* and *phobos* – a distinction easily recognised in Homer, and clearly alluded to in Plato's *Protagoras* (338d), but first fully articulated by Ammonius: δέος μὲν γάρ ἐστι πολυχρόνιος κακοῦ ὑπόνοια, φόβος δὲ παραυτίκα πτόησις (*Diff.* 126).[253] According to de Romilly, Thucydides gives this temporal opposition a cognitive emphasis, presenting, *deos* as an 'intellectual', calculating fear, and *phobos* as an 'affective', irrational and paralysing fear. While the latter is 'en général mauvais', the former represents 'le côté constructif de la crainte', which is, she writes, one of Thucydides' 'traits les plus originaux'.[254] De Romilly's brief essay is taken up and substantially elaborated by Pierre Huart, who, in his comprehensive study of Thucydidean psychology, goes so far as to separate *deos* from the category of emotion, treating it largely in a section on 'intention, delibération, appréhension, [et] prévision'.[255] He notes the collocation of *phobos* with terms of shock and confusion (θόρυβος, ὀρρωδία, ἔκπληξις, κατάπληξις, ταραχή); *deos* is rather associated with verbs of thinking and knowing (γιγνώσκω, νομίζω).[256]

[252] For the contrast of infinitives, rather than *logos* and *ergon*, see Rusten *ad loc.*, whose translation I combine with Hammond's. Cf. Artabanus' famous advice at Hdt. VII.49.5.
[253] See lexical discussion in Introduction.
[254] De Romilly (1956: 120, 122). For further discussion and citation, see my Introduction, p. 54.
[255] *Phobos* is discussed under 'peur' (122-38), together with some compounds of *deos* (138-40); *deos* itself appears here only as a foil to *phobos* (122-4), receiving proper treatment under 'appréhension' (337-45).
[256] Huart (1968: 124, 132; 338-9). Huart analyses cognate nouns and verbs separately, but in each of these cases he finds little difference between them.

The scope of this 'bonne crainte' (de Romilly) obviously extends far beyond the field of battle, to military strategy, foreign policy, and even civilian ethics. Thus Demosthenes is alerted to the presence of Peloponnesian army near Naupactus: 'fearing (δείσας) for the city' he makes arrangements to fortify it, and thereby prevents its capture (IV.102.3-4); a 'fearful' (δεδιώς) Brasidas similarly pre-empts Thucydides at Amphipolis (V.105.1). In diplomacy, *deos* is the first cause not only of the Athenian empire (see above) but also of the Sicilian alliance: as Hermocrates says – employing the Persian invasion as an example – '*deos* always brings about a union' (πάντα ... ὑπὸ δέους ξυνίσταται, VI.33.5). If *phobos* is the origin of the whole war, Hermocrates celebrates the power of *deos* to restrain aggression (IV.62.4); for the Mytileneans, 'mutual *deos* is the *only* guarantee of alliance' (τὸ δὲ ἀντίπαλον δέος μόνον πιστὸν ἐς ξυμμαχίαν, III.11.2). This 'bonne crainte' has a domestic role too, in securing order, solidarity, and rectitude: 'it is through fear above all (διὰ δέος μάλιστα)', Pericles says, 'that we [Athenians] act lawfully, with obedience both to those in authority at any time and to the laws – especially those which are laid down for the helping of the wronged, and those which, although unwritten, carry a penalty of acknowledged disgrace (αἰσχύνην)' (II.37.3).

Here fear is again part of the Athenian self-image – the constitution that is a 'model' to others, the city which is an 'education' to the rest of Greece (37.1, 41.1). Indeed, readers across the centuries have discerned in this passage an idealism to which the bald 'fear' of *deos* seems inappropriate. A scholiast suggests αἰσχύνην, and several modern scholars have resorted to emendation.[257] R. Van Pottelbergh, aligning Pericles with the 'democratic conscience' of Aeschylus and Democritus, and against the tyrannical

[257] Richards (1913: 244): <οὐ> διὰ δέος … τῶν δὲ (for τε) …, '*not* through mere fear, but out of obedience to magistrates …'; Van Pottelbergh (1948: 488) reports various earlier interventions by Campe, Badham, and Döderlein.

discipline of Sparta and Persia, proposes to correct διὰ δέος to δί' αἰδῶ.[258] Other commentators have been content to gloss the word ('proper fear', 'reverence', 'reverent fear'); Gomme, adducing parallels from epic and tragedy, declares there to be 'no difficulty' in identifying δέος with αἰδώς/αἰσχύνη. De Romilly and Edmunds both cite Plato (*Euthyphr.* 12b), ἵνα γὰρ δέος ἔνθα καὶ αἰδώς, which, Edmunds points out, is 'probably proverbial in the fifth century'.[259] However, as Van Pottelbergh observes, there is no identity in the proverb between δέος and αἰδώς, but merely an association.[260] Indeed, any such identification of δέος and αἰδώς/αἰσχύνη in the Thucydides passage would render it circular, even tautological ('through αἰσχύνη most of all we do not transgress, with obedience to … laws … which carry acknowledged αἰσχύνη'). The final phrase (αἰσχύνην ὁμολογουμένην φέρουσιν) in fact demands that 'shame' is here of the retrospective rather than anticipatory kind, a penalty for transgression rather than a motive of inhibition.[261] Short of emendation, then, there is no escaping the implication of Pericles, that the Athenians obeyed their laws out of *fear*[262] – not a disinterested, ideal sense of right and wrong (note they obey *whoever* is in power), but an avoidance of harm, whether material or reputational.[263]

We should be wary, therefore, of treating this *deos* as a special 'crainte morale' (de Romilly), 'restraint' (Rusten), or 'shame', as if the word itself might suggest 'a virtue' (Edmunds). In this same speech, Pericles will celebrate the 'fearless liberality' (40.5) of

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[258] Van Pottelbergh 1948. For Democritus (especially fr. 41 DK: μὴ διὰ φόβον, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ δέον ἀπέχεσθαι ἁμαρτημάτων) and other pre-Socratics on fear, see Chapter 3.
[259] De Romilly (1956: 125); Edmunds (1975: 288).
[260] Van Pottelbergh (1948: 494). Socrates' reversal (ἵνα … αἰδὼς ἔνθα καὶ δέος, 12b9) would of course be unnecessary if the original proverb implied identity. Socrates' argument is that *aidos* is a part (μόριον, 12c6) of *deos*, *deos* being the larger concept.
[261] So the translations of Crawley, Smith, Rhodes, Hammond. See *CGL* s.v. φέρω, 10: 'earn, receive … incur'. (*Pace* Wohl 2017: 452).
[262] See Finley (1983: 134), and further bibliography in Hornblower *ad loc.*
[263] The importance of expected punishment, rather than conscience, in restraining crimes is confirmed in the plague narrative (II.53.4), discussed below.

his fellow-citizens, and claim that the eulogised dead fell 'at the crowning moment not of fear but of glory' (42.4)[264] – an admirable fearlessness both times expressed as an absence of *deos*. We have already seen the Athenians scorn the *deos*-driven policy of the Spartans in the Persian Wars, and all the admirals off Naupactus restraining the *deos* of their men; the Corinthians note that well-laid plans fail in their execution because of *deos* (I.120.5). Thus in domestic, tactical, and strategic spheres *deos* may be treated as unwelcome. Conversely, *phobos* is made a condition of effective planning by Hermocrates (VI.34.9), and sometimes, like *deos*, associated with the formation of alliances (I.123.1; VI.21.1); in the Corcyraean stasis, *phobos* is a restraining force, very much like Pericles' *deos*, though here disastrously absent.[265] Indeed, in both negative (IV.126.2-6; VI.49.2) and positive (IV.79.2) contexts, the two terms are often closely combined, such that they seem almost synonymous.[266]

Some Anglophone scholars have consequently been inclined to reject the distinctions of de Romilly and Huart. Konstan declares there is 'no cognitive difference between *phobos* and *deos* in ordinary Greek usage'; while admitting that *deos* may have 'a more elevated tone', he can 'find no context in which the two terms are not effectively interchangeable'.[267] This is too extreme. I have mentioned the pronounced contrast in archaic usage, and the continued identification of *phobos* with flight; to these observations could be added the predominance of *deos* in Thucydides' speeches, and the frequency with which *deido* introduces a subordinate clause, while *phobeo* prefers a

[264] For the interpretation of this famously tricky sentence, see Rusten *ad loc*.
[265] III.83.2: ἦν ὁ διαλύσων οὔτε λόγος ἐχυρὸς οὔτε ὅρκος φοβερός. As with Pericles' *deos*, translators ttend to obscure the emotion by rendering it as 'respect'. In this same chapter, *deos* is attached to the *less* intelligent (φαυλότεροι γνώμην), driving them to violent crimes faster than their complacent superiors (83.3) – see below.
[266] See especially IV.117.1, where even Huart has to acknowledge a syntactic equivalence.
[267] Konstan (2006: 154); cf. Desmond (2006: 360-1) and Calabrese (2008: 19-20), who take a more moderate view.

direct accusative object.[268] That one may usually be substituted for the other does not mean they have the same connotations; that the two may often coincide does not make them identical. It is more accurate to say that Thucydides does not always enforce a distinction: sometimes active, sometimes dormant, the lexical opposition cannot be relied upon to determine the value of the emotion described.[269]

This does not mean that we should dispense with the idea of 'bonne crainte' altogether. The normative statements of Archidamus, Pericles, and Hermocrates, with their narrative vindication, maintain some validity: fear, sometimes undesirable, is at other times promoted and revealed as salutary. But Thucydides does not allow his readers the comfortable illusion that these good and bad responses are easily distinguished, and that the intellectual apprehension of danger may be analysed separately from the embodied experience of it. Indeed, it is notable that Thucydides does not even exclude *ekplexis* – a term more definitively identified with panic[270] – from his accounts of salutary fear. So Hermocrates, after celebrating the pacifying restraint of *deos* in general terms, urges the Sicilians: 'So let us now, taking alarm (ἐκπλαγέντες) on account of both these things – the vague fear of this hidden future (τὸ ἀτέκμαρτον δέος), and the ... dread Athenian presence (διὰ το<ὺς> ἤδη φοβεροὺς παρόντας Ἀθηναίους) – … let us dismiss from the country the enemy who is already at our gates, and … make peace among ourselves …' (IV.63.1).[271] Here Ammonius' *phobos* and *deos* are complementary reactions to different

[268] For the syntactic variation in Thucydides, see de Romilly (1956: 121 n.7).
[269] For a parallel phenomenon, see Prauscello (2010) on *oiktos* and *eleos* in *Philoctetes*. Prauscello argues that, although the Homeric nuance (*eleos* has a particular drive towards action) is 'slackened' to the point of irrelevance in Sophocles' other tragedies, in *Philoctetes* 'the original hyponymic relation … is exploited as a means to highlight individual characterisation' (202).
[270] Huart (1968: 117-21); Hunter (1986: 416, 418-9); Desmond (2006: 361); Konstan (2006: 142, 152). See also my lexical introduction. For an extended discussion of 'the panic benefit' in democratic polities, see Calabrese (2008: 39-58).
[271] The text here is slightly dubious; I adapt Smith's translation. On the relation of these 'striking and original ideas' to the work as a whole, see Connor (1984: 123-6).

kinds of threat, whose combined product is *ekplexis*, culminating in effective action. Good fear combines caution and apprehension with motive and reaction.

How, though, to sort the good fears from the bad, when Thucydides offers no lexical guide? A more fruitful approach may be to consider the context of the emotion. Fear, as we have seen, is debilitating in battle, but salutary in the tactical approach to it. Both foreign policy and domestic affairs, however, present a more complex picture. Above, I noted the propensity of fear to drive states to peace and cooperation: this is often treated as beneficial – most explicitly by Hermocrates (IV.62.4; VI.33.5 – discussed above) – and sometimes proven to be so.[272] But other fear-driven truces and alliances prove ruinous to one or multiple parties. Consider the Peace of Nicias, to which both Athenians and Spartans are motivated by fear. The Athenians, after defeats at Delium and Amphipolis, fear (ἐδέδισαν) that their allies might defect; this act of precaution is mostly vindicated, as the run of revolts in the north is halted (V.14.2). The Spartans, too, make peace out of fear: with their treaty with Argos about to expire, they 'suspect' (ὑπώπτευον) that their Peloponnesian allies might revolt to join their ancient enemy (14.4). But as Thucydides points out in the very next clause, this is 'what in fact happened' (ὅπερ καὶ ἐγένετο, 14.4). The Spartans are immediately accused of making peace in order to 'enslave' the Peloponnese (27.2; cf. 29.3); the Mantineans, first to answer the Argive call, do so out of fear that Sparta, with its hands free, will now turn on her (29.1). Tim Rood explains: 'The Spartans' fears were self-fulfilling. They made peace to avoid simultaneous wars with Argos and Athens and in fear of their allies, but ended up at war with an alliance which included both Argos and Athens and some of their allies.'[273] Such

[272] As well as the examples above, see the famous Corcyraean argument at I.36.1. Profitable fear-driven alliances include, most prominently, the Peloponnesian and Sicilian leagues.
[273] Rood (1998: 80).

backfiring precaution is almost as common as vindicated apprehension in Thucydides' narrative.[274]

In domestic affairs, also, fear both helps and harms the city, although the conditions for each effect are slightly easier to generalise. I have discussed Pericles' elevation of *deos* in making citizens obedient to the law. Such salutary fear of the law is a traditional idea, though often more associated with Sparta. Consider Demaratus' explanation of Spartan courage in Herodotus, or Menelaus' celebration of hierarchical discipline in Sophocles' *Ajax* (1073-86); such Classical legends may lie behind the Spartan temple of Phobos described in Plutarch's life of Cleomenes.[275] This is also an Athenian idea, as my thesis will show: salutary fear of the law is abundant in Plato and Aeschylus. Here in Thucydides, however, such benign deterrence is hardly visible beyond this Periclean cameo. Only at Sybota do we see a hint of his ideal obedience in operation: the admirals, following their orders (I.45.3), resist engagement 'because they fear (δεδιότες) the charges[276] (πρόρρησιν) of the Athenians' (49.4). Elsewhere, the fear of prosecution is more dysfunctional: Alcibiades and his co-defendants 'fear' (δείσαντες) that their trial will be shaped by 'prejudice' (διαβολῇ, VI.61.6);[277] Nicias, 'knowing the Athenians' (ἐπιστάμενος τὰς Ἀθηναίων φύσεις), thinks that they will condemn him under a false accusation (VII.48.3-4). Both decide not to go home, to the serious detriment of their city.

[274] Rood gives several other examples (1998: 81).
[275] For 'Spartan' fear ideology, see Introduction p.27.
[276] Following LSJ II.1. (and now *CGL* 1.), commentators and translators identify this πρόρρησις (only here in Thuc.) with the 'instruction' given at 45.3 (προεῖπον x 2); as de Romilly (1956: 126 n.3) and Cairns suggest, this really requires the special sense of *deos* ('respect') that de Romilly discerns in II.37.3. But LSJ offers no parallels for this meaning of 'previous instruction'. On the other hand, πρόρρησις has a well-attested technical sense of '*public notice*, as in case of trials for murder' (LSJ II. 2.: Antiph. 5.88. 6.6; Pl. *Leg*. IX.871c, 873b). Rather than 'fearing/respecting the instruction' itself, perhaps the *strategoi* fear 'prosecution' back home – just as Alcibiades and Nicias do? 'Charges' preserves the ambiguity of the Greek.
[277] On διαβολή, see Hornblower *ad loc*.

These men do not fear the law *per se*, but rather their fellow-citizens – who, of course, in a democracy control the courts.[278] They mistrust the judicial process, which will leave them open to malice and misinformation. It is a comparable loss of faith in the law, and corresponding increase in mutual suspicion, that attends the two major domestic catastrophes in the *History*: the plague in Athens, and the stasis at Corcyra. Both episodes are100haracterrised by anarchy, and the suspension of normal restraints. I have already alluded to the fearlessness – the failure of ὅρκοι φοβεροί as a conciliatory force – that is symptomatic of the Corcyraean stasis. Yet these 'fearful oaths' are displaced not by reckless optimism, but by other fears, a 'calculation' (λογισμῷ) of danger and a 'provision against suffering' (μὴ παθεῖν προυσκόπουν); such canny suspicion (τῷ … δεδιέναι) drives citizens to pre-empt their neighbour's betrayal (III.83.2). At Athens, similarly, Pericles' fear of the law is almost immediately displaced by the fear of the plague. 'Neither fear of god nor law of man was any constraint' (θεῶν δὲ φόβος ἢ ἀνθρώπων νόμος οὐδεὶς ἀπεῖργε), Thucydides says: the former, because pious and impious seemed to suffer the same fate (cf. II.47.4); the latter, because no one expected to be brought to trial, and thought themselves anyway already condemned to a far worse penalty than any court could mete out (II.53.4). Both civil war and plague reveal how *la bonne crainte* can be displaced by a Hobbesian terror.[279]

Even in more ordinary circumstances, Thucydides' Athenians seem less afraid of the laws than of the *demos* itself, with dire consequences. Such fear of popular malice is not limited to the courts. In the assembly, fear of others' resentment is a dangerous obstacle to debate. It is Diodotus who first articulates this phenomenon: the intimidation of

[278] After his defeat in Aitolia, Demosthenes simply 'fear[s] the Athenians' (φοβούμενος τοὺς Ἀθηναίους), and stays away (for his official status in this period, see Gomme *ad loc*.).
[279] Cf. Desmond (2006: 365). For Thucydides influence on Hobbes' 'state of nature', see Klosko/Rice (1985).

speakers with charges of corruption, he says, means that 'the city is deprived of its counsellors through fear (φόβῳ)' (III.42.4). We see this mechanism in operation in the Sicilian debate: despite Nicias' exhortation of the old not to be shamed (καταισχυνθῆναι) into supporting the expedition (so as not to be thought a coward) (VI.13.1), those who oppose it 'stay silent (ἡσυχίαν ἦγεν), fearing (δεδιώς) that, if [they] vote against, [they] might seem disloyal to the state' (24.4).[280] In Book VIII, the boot is on the other foot, as the popular party are intimidated by the conspirators: opposition is 'frightened' (δεδιώς), and 'the people stay silent' (ἡσυχίαν εἶχεν ὁ δῆμος) (66.2), despite the relatively small numbers of oligarchical party. Such self-censorship runs directly counter to the idealism of Pericles, who juxtaposed a fear of the law with a fearlessness in political intercourse between citizens.

If the ensuing factional strife is not so deadly as that of Corcyra, it is only because the pro-democratic hoplites, mollified by some oligarchs in the theatre by Mounichia, 'became most fearful about the state as a whole' (ἐφοβεῖτο μάλιστα περὶ τοῦ παντὸς πολιτικοῦ).[281] They agree to hold a special assembly in the sanctuary of Dionysus, 'to discuss concord' (93.3). Though the assembly itself is interrupted by news of Peloponnesian attack, the common purpose survives, 'since a war launched by the enemy, greater than their private one, was not far away, but close to their harbour' (94.3). The mass mobilisation that follows is not sufficient to prevent the loss of Euboea, but this calamity, precipitating a larger storm of anxiety and consternation (ἔκπληξις μεγίστη … 96.1), leads to more public deliberation, and a constitutional reform that produces 'the best government' of Thucydides' lifetime (97.2). Thus Athens is rescued from civil strife,

[280] Cairns (1993: 350 n.25) has this *deos* 'answer' to the *aischune* of VI.13.1, citing it alongside the *deos* of I.49.4, II.11.4-5, and 37.3 as examples of *aidos*.
[281] On τὸ πολιτικόν (only here in Thucydides), embracing the totality of scattered and heretofore divergent Athenian interests, see Gomme *ad loc*.

and prompted to renewal, by the approach and arrival of an external threat. If plague and faction replace 'good fear' of the law with paranoia and suspicion, so too can private fears be overcome by a greater, public concern, to general benefit.

This may be as close to a rule as we can get: just as fear is salutary in a general before a battle, but dangerous for a soldier fighting it, so fear helps a city when it is directed towards the law or some external enemy, but becomes harmful when directed inwards, at fellow-citizens. In Thucydides' account, however, this ideal distribution appears fragile and unreliable. We have already seen how fear of *nomos* may be distorted or displaced by fear of the *demos*. Conversely, a domestic fearlessness may be translated into dangerous complacency in foreign relations. This is a point suggested by the Corinthians at Sparta (I.68.1), but made more explicitly by Cleon in the Mitylenean debate: 'Because you have no fear or suspicion of each other in daily life, you feel just the same with regard to your allies' (διὰ … τὸ καθ᾽ ἡμέραν ἀδεὲς καὶ ἀνεπιβούλευτον πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ ἐς τοὺς ξυμμάχους τὸ αὐτὸ ἔχετε), he says; as a result, they neglect the dangers into which the indulgence of rebels may lead them (III.37.2).[282]

EDUCATION: the guidance of popular fears

Where such confusion is possible, it falls to statesmen to guide and moderate the fears of the *demos*. This is a rather different task from that faced by the military leader, who must generally dispel the fears of his men, whatever the circumstances: so, in the run-up to

[282] While we might take Cleon's warning with a pinch of salt – he has just been introduced as the 'most violent of the citizens (36.6) – the *History* offers a certain vindication of his brutal arguments when the Mityleneans are among the first to revolt in Book VIII (5, 22 etc.). The Mytilenean debate is discussed below.

Naupactus, we are told that Phormio 'had in the past *always* (αἰεί) told them … that *no* naval force (οὐδὲν … πλῆθος νεῶν) was so large that they could not withstand its attacks' (II.88.2). Pericles, by contrast, is praised for his ability to manage citizens' fears according to context:

> ὁπότε γοῦν αἴσθοιτό τι αὐτοὺς παρὰ καιρὸν ὕβρει θαρσοῦντας, λέγων κατέπλησσεν ἐπὶ τὸ φοβεῖσθαι, καὶ δεδιότας αὖ ἀλόγως ἀντικαθίστη πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ θαρσεῖν.
>
> (II.65.9)

This genius is well illustrated within the *History*.[283] Pericles' first speech to the Athenians is focused on reassurance: he tells them not to be 'frightened into obedience' (φόβῳ … ὑπακούσαντες, I.140.5) by the Peloponnesians, since the Athenians have greater resources; indeed, 'neither the [Peloponnesian] fort-building nor their navy are worthy of fear (ἄξιον φοβηθῆναι)'. His last speech, presented to a *demos* made angry by the ravaging of Attica and dispirited by the plague, is explicitly designed to restore confidence (θαρσῦναι) and to make them more fearless (καὶ ἀδεέστερον καταστῆσαι, II.59.3). Noting their dejection, he declares their fearful consternation to be unreasonable (καταπεπληγμένους … παρὰ τὸ εἰκός), and makes a renewed case for optimism based on naval superiority (62.1-5). This is not simple encouragement, however. Both speeches are shaped by warnings. The first begins with the consequences of yielding to the Peloponnesian ultimatum: the Spartans are plotting against them, he says, and conceding now will only lead to larger demands (I.140.2-5). The final speech includes a parenthetical reminder of the disgracefulness (αἴσχιον) of losing what they have inherited (II.62.3); more significant is the substantial elaboration of the consequences of defeat: the loss of the empire, the danger (κινδύνου) of revenge from its former subjects, and even

[283] For a more critical approach to Pericles' management of the political passions, see Wohl (2017).

slavery in place of freedom (II.63.1-3). This chapter as a whole represents a redirection of Athenian fears, away from what Pericles represents as their private concerns, and towards the threatened common interest: like the hoplites at Mounichia in Book VIII, they are made to fear more for *to politikon* than for themselves.

Not all promotions of popular fear are so successful, however: Pericles' success in this field must be set against the implications of the Mytilenean debate. Here we see a theory of fearful education expounded, and its limitations exposed. First, Cleon urges the Athenians to carry through their initial policy of punishing the revolt with total extermination. His argument is founded first of all on justice – the Mytileneans, he says, deserve no compassion or clemency – but this justice is explicitly combined with expedience (III.40.4). He asks the Athenians to consider the consequences of pardoning the city: other subject allies will be more likely to revolt, 'If the reward of success is liberty, and the reward of failure is no irreparable harm' (39.7). It is with this second line of reasoning that Cleon concludes his speech, urging the assembly to 'set a clear example (παράδειγμα) to the other allies, that whoever revolts will be punished with death; for if they know this, you will have fewer wars with your allies [and be able to concentrate on your enemies]' (40.8; cf. 39.8). The lesson here is a tragic one: Cleon, would, like Aeschylus' Zeus, 'make *pathei mathos* into an effective law' (*Ag.* 177-8).

Though Cleon does not employ the language of fear, the mechanism of deterrence depends upon it, and it is this element of Cleon's argument that Diodotus contests most vigorously. In domestic law, he observes, even the death-penalty is inadequate to restrain citizens from criminal acts: no 'terror' (δέος) has yet been invented that is 'terrible' (δεινότερον) enough to prevent them (45.1, 45.4). Men are constrained by poverty, or

deluded by insolence; ‘everywhere there is hope and desire, … unseen phantoms prevail[ing] over the evident dangers (τῶν ὁρωμένων δεινῶν)’; hence it is ‘extreme naivety to think that, when human nature (τῆς ἀνθρωπείας φύσεως) is bent on any undertaking, it can be diverted from it by the strength of laws or by any other terror (ἄλλῳ τῳ δεινῷ)’ (45.5-7, tr. Smith, adapted).

This pessimistic view – a direct challenge to Pericles’ ideal *deos* as well as Cleon’s brutal policy – is vindicated not only by the Sicilian expedition, where the Athenians disregard the fears of Nicias under the influence of *eros* (VI.24.3), but by the Mytilenean revolt itself. When the rebels make their case at Delphi, they say they have observed Athens’ ruthless treatment of other allies, and this has made them frightened (οὐκ ἀδεεῖς, 10.4); indeed, although Cleon will claim that the fate of other rebels was no παράδειγμα to them (39.3), the Mytileneans actually do ‘use these past events as examples’ (παραδείγμασι τοῖς προγιγνομένοις χρώμενοι, 10.6). Yet the conclusion they draw from such fearful precedents is not the necessity of acquiescence, but the necessity of revolt (13.1). The Mytileneans are, of course, mistaken in their calculations of risk, but the inevitability of such mistakes accords with Diodotus’ ‘human nature’, and undermines Cleon’s programme of ‘paradigmatic’ justice.

## Conclusion

We have seen that Thucydides offers a rather ambivalent treatment of ‘good fear’. It is in the voices of his most favoured statesmen – Archidamas, Hermocrates, and Pericles himself – that the concept is fleshed out, as a military, strategic, and civic virtue. Yet

elsewhere the *History* gives us reason to doubt their wisdom. Generals occasionally exhort their men with warnings of punishment and public peril, sometimes to good effect, but they are mostly concerned to argue their soldiers *out of* fear; in combat, the dominant fear is that of the enemy, which does not make for reasoned resolution, but rather panic and disorder. Thucydides' narrative patterning vindicates a more calculating apprehension in the generals themselves, whose fear of the enemy appears almost a kind of prescience. Yet in wider, strategic terms, fearful foreign policy provokes conflict as often as it prevents it, and often precipitates the very consequences that it seeks to avert. And at a domestic level, while fear may help to secure public obedience to the law, and spur democracies to effective action, it is regularly distorted by mistrust, or, in times of crisis, displaced by more urgent terrors. Thucydides' language offers no easy way to separate out these different kinds of fear; rather, his readers are left to deduce from context whether the emotion is salutary or destructive.

This work of analysis echoes the task faced by the statesmen themselves, who must use their judgment to moderate and direct the fears of the city according to the situation. However – as illustrated in the previous section – even well-meaning statesmen may fail in the attempt; moreover, as in foreign policy, their efforts may actually exacerbate the threat that they perceive. The education of the passions, whether through laws, or through historical example, proves inadequate in the face of changing conditions on the one hand, and enduring human nature on the other. While Diodotus would make speeches the 'teachers of action' (διδασκάλους τῶν πραγμάτων, III.42.2), Thucydides gives war the title of διδάσκαλος; and this 'rough schoolmaster' (Crawley), whose depredations will recur always 'as long as the nature of man remains the same' (ἕως ἂν ἡ αὐτὴ φύσις ἀνθρώπων ᾖ), accommodates men's passions not to some higher truth and superior virtue,

but merely to their circumstances (ὁ δὲ πόλεμος … βίαιος διδάσκαλος καὶ πρὸς τὰ παρόντα τὰς ὀργὰς τῶν πολλῶν ὁμοιοῖ); the 'better sentiments' (ἀμείνους τὰς γνώμας) of peace and prosperity fall by the wayside (III.82.2).

Where does this leave Thucydides' *History*? What kind of an education is offered by the text itself, as a narrative of war, and as a stimulus of fear? In the first section of this chapter, I observed the thematic significance of fear in Thucydides' structure of causation, as the principal or underlying cause of human action. In the simplest terms, then, Thucydides teaches us *about* fear, and its importance in the development of historical phenomena, including not just wars, but alliances, empires, and civic harmony, all of which are produced by 'fear, most of all'. In addition, I showed how the exposure of this 'hidden' cause, in the Archaeology and in Book I as a whole, foregrounded the role of the historian, not as a source of information but as an interpreter of it; I suggested that Thucydides was teaching us how to read. This is a more complex lesson of the *History*: that the emotional drivers of human action may be obscure, but their force is discernible through reasoned analysis; fear is identified in the process of historical synthesis, the integration of received narratives that is the historian's work. This is in part because fear often operates not *against* rational argumentation, but *through* it. This reasonableness of fear – the third lesson of Book I – is borne out by the rest of the narrative, in which fear is regularly treated as intelligent, and amenable to argument.

Yet is it amenable to history? Does Thucydides hold out any hope that his text may not merely educate his readers about the fears of the past, but educate their own fears in the present and future? Can the *History* shape and guide their emotion like the rhetoric of

Pericles, or even surpass his mortal *logoi* with a 'possession for all time'? The lines about war as a violent schoolmaster recall the author's famous statement of purpose:

> καὶ ἐς μὲν ἀκρόασιν ἴσως τὸ μὴ μυθῶδες αὐτῶν ἀτερπέστερον φανεῖται· ὅσοι δὲ βουλήσονται τῶν τε γενομένων τὸ σαφὲς σκοπεῖν καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ποτὲ αὖθις κατὰ τὸ ἀνθρώπινον τοιούτων καὶ παραπλησίων ἔσεσθαι, ὠφέλιμα κρίνειν αὐτὰ ἀρκούντως ἕξει. κτῆμά τε ἐς αἰεὶ μᾶλλον ἢ ἀγώνισμα ἐς τὸ παραχρῆμα ἀκούειν ξύγκειται.
>
> (I.22.4)

Some have seen in these lines a redemptive promise, a suggestion that the tragedy of the war may help Thucydides' readers avert similar disasters in the future – more particularly, that the demise of Athens may offer a warning, an object lesson from which we, made fearful, may profit.[284] To these lines may be juxtaposed the admonition of the Melians, who forecast that the fall of Athens may not only trigger vengeance upon them, but 'become an example for the world' (τοῖς ἄλλοις παράδειγμα γένοισθε, V.90). The Athenians, whose 'fearless' temperament is especially marked in this episode (91, 97, 105, 111), make for a perfect cautionary tale. Yet these Melians are fundamentally deluded in their calculations of human nature, as their defeat demonstrates; and we have seen, in the Mytilenean episode, how weak is the power of rhetorical *paradeigmata* to inspire fear. Indeed, read closely, the promise in I.22.4 is much more limited: the helpfulness of the *History* is in the direction not of *improving* but of *understanding* human behaviour; on this view, to understand the past is not to avert its recurrence, but merely to recognise it. Even those who know their history are doomed to repeat it.

[284] See especially Desmond (2006) – but the educational value of Thucydides is implicit in much modern scholarship.

Thucydides does not believe, then, that our natures may be permanently reformed, or that our fears may be reliably shaped towards salutary ends. Yet this scepticism does not extend to cynicism: Thucydides engages with and shows appreciation for the power of law and *logos* to shape men's inclinations, however frangible that shape may be under the stresses of contingency and human weakness. Indeed, the regular appeals to a universal human nature (in his own voice, and in others') are counterbalanced by sustained attention to national temperament as a determinant of history.[285] The tension between these two positions is well expressed by Archidamus: '[We] ought … not to believe that there is much difference between man and man, but to think that the superiority lies with him who is reared in the severest school (ἐν τοῖς ἀναγκαιοτάτοις παιδεύεται)' (I.84.4, tr. Crawley). This education in *anagke* resonates with the historian's *anagke*, which binds the narratives of Book I, but here 'necessity' is explicitly a pedagogical tool. Archidamas is celebrating the political culture of Sparta that 'teaches (παιδευόμενοι)' its citizens to respect the 'plans of the enemy [as] very much like [their] own' and to recognise that 'the accidents of fortune are not determinable by calculation (λόγῳ)' (84.3). This is an education in the limits of education, in the continuity and the constraints of human nature; its end is not a confident prescience but a fearful precaution. This is, assuredly, a fear to be cultivated, though hard to learn.

[285] For the importance of this factor, see especially I.70 and VIII.96.5. Luginbill (1999) gives a solid analysis of human nature and national character in Thucydides, but his chapter on the 'formation of national character', focused on Syracuse, is unconvincing; as Rood (2000) points out in his review, 'the relation of national character to human nature remains rather unclear'.

# ARISTOTLE AND THE NATURE AND NURTURE OF FEAR

τίπτε μοι τόδ' ἐμπέδως
δεῖμα προστατήριον
καρδίας τερασκόπου ποτᾶται;

Aesch. *Ag*. 974-6

## Introduction

This chapter will discuss the importance of fear in Athenian philosophy, with a focus on Aristotle. Looking first at Democritus and Plato, I will show how a new, 'cognitive' understanding of fear emerges in the early dialogues, identifying the emotion with a *judgment* or *appraisal* of an object, and allowing for the possibility of its education. Plato's treatment, however, is nowhere systematic; Aristotle's various treatises offer a fuller analysis of the emotion, including both its physiological and its cognitive features. These tension between these elements is significant in defining the virtue of courage; it is also exploited by the mimetic arts. A last section considers the function of tragedy in the *Poetics*, as an engine for the catharsis of fear.

## Democritus and Plato

Early Greek philosophy was not especially concerned with the nature of emotions. While there is a psychology in Heraclitus, an ethical epistemology in Xenophanes, even an emotional aesthetics in Parmenides and Empedocles, none of these 'Pre-Socratics' directs

his attention to feelings *per se*.[286] Only Democritus of Abdera, a contemporary of Thucydides and definitely still living at the time of Socrates' death, shows any sustained interest in 'moral psychology', or the just constitution of the soul.[287] For Democritus, as for his Epicurean inheritors, the aim was tranquillity, or εὐθυμίη: feelings such as fear, anger, and envy disturb this tranquillity (hence it is sometimes called ἀθαμβίη); they must therefore must be confronted and conquered by reason (DK 68 A1; A169; B236; B290) or avoided through deliberate contemplation (B191). Fear, specifically, is the property of criminals (B174; B215), false flatterers (B268), but most of all the 'thoughtless' (ἀνοήμονες) who, in their ignorance, are afraid of death (B199; B205; B206). Wisdom (σοφίη), analogous to medicine (ἰατρική), does not regulate the πάθη but rather 'removes' (ἀφαιρεῖται) the soul from them altogether (B31).

Such a view of the emotions aligns Democritus with Gorgias, who, comparing the effect of λόγος on the soul to the effect of φάρμακα on the body, makes fear and confidence (and pain, and pleasure) analogous to the humours that are 'driven out' (ἐξάγει) by such drugs (*Hel.* 14).[288] However, while in Gorgias fear appears resolutely anti-cognitive (we are told later that φόβος 'drives out thought' (ἐξήλασεν … τὸ νόημα, 17), Democritus implicitly recognises that fears are founded on beliefs: it is the belief (οἰόμενοι) that gods are responsible for thunderstorms, for example, that makes the ancestors fear them

[286] Johnson (2020: 38-42), with bibliography; Tor (2017); Mackenzie (2021). Recent scholarship has emphasised these neglected areas. Zaborowski (2008) attempts a lexical analysis of the affective psychology of the Presocratics, but instances of some of his key terms (e.g. πάθος) in the fragments, as opposed to later testimonies, are extremely rare – see Renaut (2009).
[287] So Kahn (1985: 1). On Democritus' ethics, often criticized as banal and plagued by questions of authenticity, see Procopé (1989) and Johnson (2020).
[288] Later accounts of Pythagorean practice suggest a similar therapeutic practice, correcting the circulation of the irrational passions with music, ὡς διά τινων σωτηρίων συγκεκραμένων φαρμάκων (Iamblichus 15.64); see discussion in Kalimtzis (2012: 27-32). On the moral implications of fear in Gorgias, see discussion in my previous chapter.

(A75).[289] Democritean fear is, perhaps, conquerable through reason and contemplation only because it has a cognitive, propositional basis.

At the same time, Democritus elevates the concept of *aidos*, familiar from the epic tradition, as a kind of moral inhibition.[290] The 'sense of shame', he says, is the greatest part of ἀρετή (B179). Such *aidos* is not treated as a *pathos*, exactly,[291] but it does seem to have an analogous function: the wise man, establishing shame (αἰδεῖσθαι) as a law for the soul (νόμον τῇ ψυχῇ καθεστάναι), is thus prevented from doing harm (B264); if 'one must refrain from wrong actions not from fear but from duty' (μὴ διὰ φόβον, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ δέον ἀπέχεσθαι χρεὼν ἁμαρτημάτων, B41),[292] that is not because self-legislating duty may substitute for the fear of punishment as an inhibitor of crime. The substitution involves education: *aidos* is not simply innate, but 'learned' (μάθοιεν) like music or the alphabet (B179; cf. B244). 'Good sense' (φρονεῖν), meanwhile, is derived from a mixture of nature and upbringing (B183). Indeed, Democritus even asserts a general 'similarity' between nature (φύσις) and nurture, or teaching (διδαχή): 'for teaching reshapes the man, and in reshaping makes his nature' (B33).[293]

In Plato's *Protagoras*, the eponymous sophist – another Abderan, and a disciple of Democritus – is forced to defend a Democritean position on nature and nurture.[294] He focuses initially on αἰδώς, along with δίκη (322c). These are possessed by all citizens in

[289] As pointed out by Piergiacomi (2019: 75).
[290] For *aidos* as an emotion, and its close relation to *aischune*, see my lexical introduction.
[291] Here I dissent from Bossu (1982), who identifies this sense of shame with the fear of criminals (see citations above), borrowing de Romilly's expression, *la crainte morale* (see Chapter One), and compares the pangs of 'conscience' suffered by Orestes in Aeschylus and Euripides. However, in Democritus at least, such fears are not virtuous; *aidos* prohibits the wise man from the crimes that would occasion them.
[292] On this passage, see Cairns (1993: 364-6).
[293] On education in Democritus and Plato's *Laws*, see Annas (2002). On the *nomos-phusis* opposition more generally, see Long (2006).
[294] Cf. Taylor (2007).

some degree (323a-c), yet must be cultivated: it is the work first of parents, and then of teachers, and finally the state, to guide the citizen towards the higher levels of justice and self-restraint (325c-326e). In Protagoras' programme, unlike Democritus', external correction has a crucial role: punishment is partnered with instruction (325a) and the law doubles as a copybook and a corrective (παράδειγμα, 326c; εὐθυνούσης τῆς δίκης, 326d); the aim here is 'deterrence' (ἀποτροπή): 'preventing [the criminal] and others who see him punished from doing wrong again' (324a-b). We may recall here the exhortations of Thucydides' Cleon, to make a παράδειγμα out of Mytilene, and thus frighten the other allies.[295] The emotional mechanism is made explicit by Socrates in the *Gorgias*: the criminal should either be himself improved by his punishment, or become an 'example' (παραδείγμα) to others, so that they, watching his suffering, may 'in fear' (φοβούμενοι) improve themselves (525b). Through self-preserving fear, the spectators of justice are made more just.

In the *Protagoras*, however, the sophist makes no mention of fear itself. It is Socrates who first broaches the topic, towards the end of the dialogue. First, he alludes to a common view of 'knowledge' (ἐπιστήμη), which makes it not strong and sovereign, but rather governed by passions and pleasures and pains – 'at times by desire, often by fear' (ἐνίοτε δὲ ἔρωτα, πολλάκις δὲ φόβον) (352b-c). Protagoras agrees with Socrates that this is wrong, and that ἐπιστήμη (with φρόνησις, and σοφία) is in fact 'able to rule' (οἷον ἄρχειν) the human animal, as the κράτιστον element; he asserts that the idea that anyone could instead be ruled by one of these pleasures or passions is one of the many errors of mankind (352c-e). Already we see a conscious – ostentatious, even – divergence from a 'traditional' view of desire or fear as sometimes overpowering reason, a view that is

[295] See Chapter Two.

common in epic, lyric, and tragedy. Where Democritus had required the rational man to battle with his emotions, here the supremacy of the higher faculties is unshakeable.

What follows is even more remarkable. After a hypothetical interrogation of someone holding this common view – that we do bad things because overcome by pleasure or passion – Socrates concludes that is rather by 'ignorance' (ἀμαθία) that we choose immediate pleasures over the far-off good. (357d). Turning to the sophists present, he secures their agreement that 'no one willingly goes after evil or what he thinks to be evil,' because 'it is not in human nature (ἀνθρώπου φύσει), apparently, to do so' (358c-d). This 'human nature' is akin to that of Gorgias, and Thucydides' Athenians: it operates as a morally neutral compulsion. Indeed, as in Thucydides, such natural aversion is given the name of 'dread, or fear' (δέος καὶ φόβον).[296] Yet the definition which follows is new and strange: fear is what he calls 'an expectation of evil' (προσδοκίαν τινὰ λέγω κακοῦ τοῦτο, 358d). Here the emotion is made fully cognitive: it is not just *caused* by a belief (*doxa*) about the future, but *identified* with that belief. Virtually the same definition is given in the *Laches* (δέος … προσδοκίαν μέλλοντος κακοῦ, 198b); in the late *Laws,* 'confidence' (θάρρος) and 'fear' (φόβος) are both 'expectations of the future' (δόξας μελλόντων), with fear an expectation 'in advance of distress' (πρὸ λύπης, I. 644c-d).

Nothing quite like this is to be found in earlier moral psychology.[297] Granted the status of δόξα, the emotion is no longer a disturbance that reason must conquer, or wisdom remove from the soul; rather, it is a cognitive phenomenon to be *aligned* with reason and wisdom. So, in the *Republic*, a tripartite division of the soul separates the rational (τὸ λογιστικόν),

[296] For the sematic distinction between these terms, suggested here by Prodicus, see my lexical introduction.
[297] Contrast the body-soul dichotomy of the earlier dialogue, *Phaedo*, where φόβοι are among the 'fancies and foolishness' that make φρονῆσαι impossible (66c); to achieve knowledge, the soul must keep itself detached from such feelings (66e-67a).

the spirited (τὸ θυμοειδές), and the desiring (τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν) parts, yet temperance lies in the 'concord' or 'common *doxa*' of these elements (ὁμοδοξῶσι), and bravery remains a kind of enlightened fear: 'we call [a man brave] when τὸ θυμοειδές preserves, in the midst of pains and pleasures, the rule handed down by reason (τῶν λόγων) as to what is or is not to be feared (δεινόν)' (IV.442b-d, tr. Shorey).[298] In the chariot-allegory of the *Phaedrus*, it is the rational charioteer that is moved by fear (ἔδεισε), reining in the horses of spirit and desire; through training, these two beasts are eventually aligned with the reverent fear of reason (φόβῳ … αἰδουμένην τε καὶ δεδιυῖαν (254b-d).[299] Even in the *Timaeus*, where emotions belong to the mortal and corrupted part of the soul, φόβος remains a 'counsellor', albeit a foolish one (ἄφρονε συμβούλω, 69d), alongside θάρρος; the 'spirited part' is placed in the breast, so that it may be 'attentive' (κατήκοον) to reason in the head above, and work 'in conjunction' (κοινῇ) with reason to subdue the unruly desires of the abdomen below (70a). In Plato, fear has entered into a cooperative partnership with the rational.

This partnership allows for an education of emotion, and the cultivation of a 'good fear' – not simply as a goad to justice, but as an element of virtue. So, in the *Protagoras*, courage emerges not as an immunity to or conquest of fear (which would be against 'human nature'), but as a kind of 'wisdom', namely that which concerns 'what is and is not fearful' (ἡ σοφία … τῶν δεινῶν καὶ μὴ δεινῶν ἀνδρεία ἐστίν, 360d).[300] A very similar definition is presented in the *Republic*, where the auxiliary class acquire the correct δόξα

[298] On the 'evaluative propositional attitudes' that motivate even the lower parts of the soul in the *Republic*, see Knuuttila (2004: 9-10). On the continuity in the presentation of courage between *Protagoras* and *Republic*, see Wilburn (2015).
[299] On the putative development of Plato's psychology from the *Republic* and the *Phaedrus*, see Nussbaum (1986); on the progression to the *Philebus* and *Laws*, see Fortenbaugh (1975). Both are cited and discussed by Knuuttila (2004: 13-18).
[300] Cf. *Lach.* 194e-195a.

about what is to be feared from the lawgiver in their education; their courage lies in the preservation of such δόξα in the face of pleasures, pains, desires, and threats (IV.429c-30b). The *Phaedrus* is more esoteric: here the end goal of philosophical education is a whole-soul embrace of reverent fear (see above). In the *Laws*, the Athenian Stranger establishes two different forms of fear (δύο φόβων εἴδη). The first is an expectation of evils that will befall one; the second concerns the loss of reputation. The second kind of fear, the Stranger says, is called αἰδώς – the same virtue praised by Democritus – yet here it is explicitly a species of fear; thus bravery in battle requires one to be fearless in one sense, but fearful in another (I.646e-647b). This noble φόβος – at one point the Stranger calls it 'divine' (θεῖος φόβος, II.671d) – recurs through the dialogue as a check on drunkenness and depravity as well as cowardice.[301]

In none of these discussions, however, does Plato unpack the implications of his cognitive definition of fear. Indeed, although fear is again marked as δόξα at the beginning of the *Laws* (I.644d, cited above) it is also immediately treated as a dangerous *pathos*, one of the tendons pulling at the human puppet, which must resist ('defeat', νικᾷ) it and follow instead the pull of 'calculation' (λογισμός) (644e-645a). Later, the Stranger considers sleepless infants and frenzied adults, both cured by movement: 'both these affections (πάθη) are forms of fright (δειμαίνειν), and frights (δείματα) are due to a poor condition of the soul'; the fear is an internal 'agitation' (κίνησις) which must be 'overcome' (κρατήσασα) by external agitation (790e-791a). Neither of these accounts of 'conquered' fear allows much room for propositional belief; nor does Plato see any need to reconcile them with the 'expectation of evil' – perhaps because he distinguishes such

[301] cf. 699c and 840c. On fear in the *Laws*, contrast Bartels (2020) on the imperturbable steersman with Pfefferkorn (2020) on the virtue of fear.

irrational δείματα from true emotions like φόβος.[302] Yet Plato does not provide us with a unified or systematic concept of 'emotion' that we might apply to the nature of fear: for this, we must look to Aristotle.[303]

What is an emotion? *Rhetoric* vs *On the Soul*

When accounting for Aristotelian emotion, it has become conventional to start with Book II of the *Rhetoric.* Here, the philosopher gives a distinctly cognitive definition of the emotions, or *pathe*:

> ἔστι δὲ τὰ πάθη δι' ὅσα μεταβάλλοντες διαφέρουσι πρὸς τὰς κρίσεις οἷς ἕπεται λύπη καὶ ἡδονή, οἷον ὀργὴ ἔλεος φόβος καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα, καὶ τὰ τούτοις ἐναντία. (1378a20-22)

Their primary significance, here, lies in their effect on judgment, although Aristotle acknowledges that to qualify as a πάθος, an emotion must be 'accompanied' (ἕπεται) by pleasure or pain.[304] Aristotle then elaborates on his methodology, taking anger as his example:

> δεῖ δὲ διαιρεῖν περὶ ἕκαστον εἰς τρία, λέγω δ' οἷον περὶ ὀργῆς πῶς τε διακείμενοι ὀργίλοι εἰσί, καὶ τίσιν εἰώθασιν ὀργίζεσθαι, καὶ ἐπὶ ποίοις. (1378a23-26)

The 'three heads' of analysis here – the 'disposition of mind which makes men angry, the persons with whom they are angry, and the occasions which give rise to anger' – seem in one sense thorough, covering internal and external causes for the emotion.

[302] For the tragic associations of *deima*, see my lexical introduction.
[303] So Konstan (2020a).
[304] On the importance of these 'valences' for Aristotelian emotion, see especially Leighton (1982).

Yet such an approach is by Aristotle's own standards inadequate. In the first chapter of his treatise *On the Soul*, the philosopher sets down very different requirements for the definition of an emotion. He proposes that they are 'accounts expressed in matter' (λόγοι ἔνυλοι), and that 'their definitions must be in harmony with this: for instance, anger is a certain movement of a certain sort of body, or a part or a potentiality of a body, roused by *x*, for the sake of *y*' (ὥστε οἱ ὅροι τοιοῦτοι οἷον "τὸ ὀργίζεσθαι κίνησίς τις τοῦ τοιουδὶ σώματος ἢ μέρους ἢ δυνάμεως ὑπὸ τοῦδε ἕνεκα τοῦδε", I.403a25-27, tr. Miller, adapted). The analysis of anger proposed in the *Rhetoric* meets only one of these conditions – the agents of arousal (ὑπὸ τοῦδε). There is no reference to anger's somatic element, nor to *y,* the end in view (ἕνεκα τοῦδε).

Why does the *Rhetoric* fall short? The explanation is close at hand. In the very next sentence, Aristotle explains the purpose of his approach: 'for if we knew one or even two of the heads, but not all three, *it would be impossible to arouse the emotion'* (II.1378a27-28). The general analysis given here, and the particular analyses of individual emotions that follow, are not designed to be complete; they are merely sufficient for oratorical purposes.

In *On the Soul*, by contrast, the πάθη are central to a 'theoretical' investigation (402a8-9); indeed, their relation to the ψυχή is the first problem that Aristotle addresses in the treatise. He notes that 'the affections (πάθη) of the soul—spiritedness, mild-manneredness, fear, pity, confidence … all seem to involve the body, since at the same time as these the body is affected (πάσχει) in a certain way' (403a16-19). Defined as λόγοι ἔνυλοι, the πάθη are thus both cognitive *and* physiological. Aristotle is aware that he is here combining different modes of inquiry: a natural scientist (φυσικός), he says,

might define anger as 'the boiling of blood around the heart'; a dialectician (διαλεκτικός) would say it was a 'craving for retaliation' (ὄρεξιν ἀντιλυπήσεως). Aristotle's own definition of anger in the *Rhetoric* (II.1377a) is very much in the latter vein: there, anger is an ὄρεξις μετὰ λύπης τιμωρίας. Here in *On the Soul*, however, Aristotle takes a more holistic view: the true φυσικός, he says, is concerned with both the matter (ὕλη) and the form (λόγος) of the πάθος (I.403a29-b10).

## Definitions of Fear: *Rhetoric*, *Nicomachean Ethics, Movement of Animals, Parts of Animals*

*On the Soul* thus sets out the requirements for an adequate definition of fear.[305] To answer the question, 'What is fear?', we must consider not just its cognitive stimulus, but also its physiology, since 'the affections of the soul, such as anger and fear, are inseparable from the matter of living things in which their nature is manifested' (I.403b17-19). Modern accounts of Aristotelian φόβος however, focus almost exclusively on the *Rhetoric*, and Book II in particular, where fear is granted a small 'chapter' (II.1382a21-1383b12).[306] Here the definition is practical, rather than scientific; and its expression is accordingly provisional:

> ἔστω δὴ ὁ φόβος λύπη τις ἢ ταραχὴ ἐκ φαντασίας μέλλοντος κακοῦ φθαρτικοῦ ἢ λυπηροῦ … (1382a21)

This sentence is intriguing, and I shall return to it later: for present purposes, however, it is important to note only that fear is given a genus (λύπη τις) and a cause (ἐκ …), but no

[305] Leighton (2019) takes a similar approach to the one adopted in this section, although he focuses on the absence of any determinant 'desire' or action-orientation in Aristotle's definitions of fear.
[306] E.g. Konstan (2006: 129-55); Patera (2013); Nussbaum (2018).

material substrate. For this reason, even cognitivist scholars have admitted the definition is deficient.[307]

The *Nicomachean Ethics* presents a similar definition, with similar problems, in its discussion of ἀνδρεία:

> φοβούμεθα δὲ δῆλον ὅτι τὰ φοβερά, ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν κακά· διὸ καὶ τὸν φόβον ὁρίζονται προσδοκίαν κακοῦ. (III.1115a7-9)

Here we have dispensed even with the λύπη of the *Rhetoric*: fear simply *is* an 'expectation of evil', with no physiological component.[308] However, Aristotle is not here presenting his own definition, but a popular or conventional one (ὁρίζονται), which recalls the almost identical expressions in *Protagoras* (358d) and *Laches* (198d); the philosopher neither affirms nor disputes the theory he has quoted. Why not? The answer is found in Book I, where Aristotle proposes that political science – of which Aristotle suggest his ethics is a branch (1094b11-12) – should examine the ψυχή only πρὸς τὰ ζητούμενα, for the practice of politics (1102a24-26). Indeed, Aristotle repeatedly emphasises the approximate nature of his enquiry: he is not a mathematician, a θεατὴς τἀληθοῦς, seeking to define a right angle with exactitude, but instead a carpenter, seeking an approximation that will be πρὸς τὸ ἔργον (1098b29-34; cf. 1094b13-28). As in the *Rhetoric*, the exact nature of fear is of secondary concern.

In order to fulfil Aristotle's demands for a theoretical definition of the emotion, we must look to his biological and zoological works. The *Parts of Animals*, for example, repeatedly refers to the coldness of fear, normally related to the blood. So the chameleon,

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[307] Fortenbaugh (1975: 15-16) – though see Grimaldi *ad loc.* For the reliability of the *Rhetoric* as a source for Aristotle's views on emotion, see e.g. Sihvola (1996: 110-12).
[308] Compare also *Rh.* II.1382b29-30: εἰ δή ἐστιν ὁ φόβος μετὰ προσδοκίας τινὸς τοῦ πείσεσθαί τι φθαρτικὸν πάθος.

which has the least blood of all reptiles, is consequently subject to fear, since 'fear is a process of cooling produced through scantiness of blood and insufficiency of heat' (κατάψυξις γὰρ ὁ φόβος δι' ὀλιγαιμίαν καὶ δι' ἔνδειάν ἐστι θερμότητος, 692a22-25). A similar analysis is provided of the 'large-hearted' animals, who are fearful because their blood is comparatively cold (667a18-22). The hot-blooded species are correspondingly courageous (648a10). This physiological fear is found even in the *Rhetoric*, when Aristotle suggests: *'*[old men] are cowardly and inclined to anticipate evil, for their state of mind is the opposite of that of the young; they are chilled (κατεψυγμένοι), whereas the young are hot, so that old age paves the way for cowardice, for fear is a kind of chill (κατάψυξίς)' (II.1389b29-32).

To say fear is simply a cooling of the blood, however, would make one like the crude φυσικός of *On the Soul*: the true φυσικός must consider too the origin and the end of fear, the ὑπὸ τοῦδε and ἕνεκα τοῦδε. A passage in the *Movement of Animals,* discussing the 'origin of movement', suggests some answers:

> Ἀρχὴ μὲν οὖν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, τῆς κινήσεως τὸ ἐν τῷ πρακτῷ διωκτὸν καὶ φευκτόν· ἐξ ἀνάγκης δ' ἀκολουθεῖ τῇ νοήσει καὶ τῇ φαντασίᾳ αὐτῶν θερμότης καὶ ψύξις. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ λυπηρὸν φευκτόν, τὸ δ' ἡδὺ διωκτόν (ἀλλὰ λανθάνει περὶ τὰ μικρὰ τοῦτο συμβαῖνον), ἔστι δὲ τὰ λυπηρὰ καὶ ἡδέα πάντα σχεδὸν μετὰ ψύξεώς τινος καὶ θερμότητος. Τοῦτο δὲ δῆλον ἐκ τῶν παθημάτων. Θάρρη γὰρ καὶ φόβοι καὶ ἀφροδισιασμοὶ καὶ τἆλλα σωματικὰ λυπηρὰ καὶ ἡδέα τὰ μὲν κατὰ μόριον μετὰ θερμότητος ἢ ψύξεώς ἐστι, τὰ δὲ καθ' ὅλον τὸ σῶμα. (701b33-702a5)

Aristotle here implies a fully integrated somatic response system with the 'thought or imagination' of a painful object attended by a cooling body or body-part, resulting in

avoidance (φευκτόν). Fear, then, according to the definitional prescriptions of *On the Soul*, is 'a *cooling* of the body, or a part of the body, roused by the *thought or imagination* of *a painful object*, for the sake of *avoiding that object*.'[309]

Thought, opinion, imagination?

The alternative offered here, between 'thought' and 'imagination', νοήσις and φαντασία, may seem strange: what about the direct sensory perception of fearful objects?

To answer this question, we should first recall the placeholder definitions of the *Ethics* and the *Rhetoric*, where fear was respectively a προσδοκία or φαντασία of (future) κακόν; the latter treatise also intellectualizes the aim of fear (i.e. avoidance):

> ἀλλὰ δεῖ τινα ἐλπίδα ὑπεῖναι σωτηρίας, περὶ οὗ ἀγωνιῶσιν. Σημεῖον δέ· ὁ γὰρ φόβος βουλευτικοὺς ποιεῖ, καίτοι οὐδεὶς βουλεύεται περὶ τῶν ἀνελπίστων. (*Rhetoric* II.1383a5-7)

In order for there to be fear, for Aristotle, there must be some salvation at which the subject is aiming;[310] the emotion thus develops from the perception of imminent harm to an action intended to avert that harm, by means of 'deliberation' (βουλευτικός).

This statement has enthused cognitivist readers of Aristotle. '[F]or Aristotle,' David Konstan declares, 'fear … wasn't an instinctive aversion… [T]he reflex alone is not an emotion: for it to be a *pathos* requires that one also have evaluated the object as being

[309] Cf. the similar synthesis of Leighton (2019: 228), although he identifies a different *telos* for the emotion.
[310] Satan takes the same view in *Paradise Lost* IV.108-9: "Farewell hope, and with hope, farewell fear/ Farewell remorse! All good to me is lost …".

harmful, and hence involves higher order processes'.[311] He quotes Fortenbaugh on the 'ratiocination', the *logos*, involved in Aristotle's conception of fear:

> [a frightened soldier] sees a cloud of dust on the horizon and connects the cloud with an advancing army. He thinks the army hostile and capable of taking his life, which he values dearly. Making these connections is the work of logos [reason] (428a24); it also sets the stage for a further exercise of logos. As Aristotle tells us, fear makes men ready to deliberate … Believing themselves in danger, men desire safety and engage in practical deliberations whether to do this or that … [312]

The passage Fortenbaugh refers to, when he speaks of fear's connections as a work of *logos*, is from Aristotle's discussion of φαντασία in *On the Soul*. In this passage (II.427b-428b), one of the most controversial parts of the treatise, the philosopher distinguishes φαντασία from αἴσθησις and δόξα. All living creatures have αἴσθησις ('sensation'/'perception'), but only some have φαντασία ('imagination'/ 'visualization'); δόξα (opinion), because it requires πίστις (belief) and λόγος (reason), is exclusive to the human animal. The experience of fear is related to this final faculty of δόξα:

> τι δὲ ὅταν μὲν δοξάσωμεν δεινόν τι ἢ φοβερόν, εὐθὺς συμπάσχομεν, ὁμοίως δὲ κἂν θαρραλέον· κατὰ δὲ τὴν φαντασίαν ὡσαύτως ἔχομεν ὥσπερ ἂν οἱ θεώμενοι ἐν γραφῇ τὰ δεινὰ ἢ θαρραλέα. (427b22-26)

At first, this seems straightforward: as in the definitions offered by the *Rhetoric* and the *Nicomachean Ethics*, fear is triggered not just by the perception or appearance of something evil or harmful, but by the belief that it *is* harmful, that it may harm us; merely to observe or contemplate the fearful does not result in fear (φοβεῖσθαι) unless 'the rational faculty which is called *mind*' (τὸ λογιστικὸν καὶ ὁ καλούμενος νοῦς) …

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[311] Konstan (2006: 133-4). Cf. Konstan (2020b).
[312] Fotenbaugh, cited Konstan (2006: 133).

commands (κελεύει) it', although 'the heart is moved' (432b26-32; cf. *MA* 703b7-8). As in Plato, δόξα appears a necessary condition for the emotion of fear.

But if only humans have δόξα, do we then suppose that animals cannot feel fear? This position, occupied by Fortenbaugh, Konstan, and others, is contradicted in the passages from *Parts of Animals* and *Movement of Animals* already cited, as well as numerous instances in *History of Animals* where the fear of various species is recorded. Juha Sihvola has powerfully argued that we should not ignore these testimonies, which strongly suggest that Aristotelian animals are capable of certain emotional responses, and that it is φαντασία*,* not δόξα*,* that is necessary for emotion.[313] As Sihvola points out, it is φαντασία that dominates the description of fear in the *Rhetoric* (see below); and it is φαντασία rather than δόξα that precipitates fear in *Movement of Animals*:

> ἡ δὲ φαντασία καὶ ἡ νόησις τὴν τῶν πραγμάτων ἔχουσι δύναμιν· τρόπον γάρ τινα τὸ εἶδος τὸ νοούμενον τὸ τοῦ θερμοῦ ἢ ψυχροῦ ἢ ἡδέος ἢ φοβεροῦ τοιοῦτον τυγχάνει ὂν οἷόν περ καὶ τῶν πραγμάτων ἕκαστον, διὸ καὶ φρίττουσι καὶ φοβοῦνται νοήσαντες μόνον. (701b18-24).

Φαντασία here appears as the partner of thought (νοῦς), and is implicitly absorbed into the participle (νοήσαντες) at the end of the sentence. Similarly, in *On the Soul*, φαντάσματα and νοήματα take the place of direct perception; by means of these, 'just as if it were seeing, [the soul] calculates and plans (λογίζεται καὶ βουλεύεται) for the future in view of the present' (431b7-8). Here φαντασία βουλευτική appears as the instrument of the higher faculties, provoking a 'reasonable' fear that allows the soul to deliberate effectively about the future.

[313] Sihvola (1996).

Yet elsewhere φαντασία appears not as the partner of νοῦς, but as an alternative to it. Just after the passage quoted in the *Movement of Animals*, Aristotle attempts to explain the rapidity of human response:

> τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὀργανικὰ μέρη παρασκευάζει ἐπιτηδείως τὰ πάθη, ἡ δ᾽ ὄρεξις τὰ πάθη, τὴν δ᾽ ὄρεξιν ἡ φαντασία· αὕτη δὲ γίνεται ἢ διὰ νοήσεως ἢ δι᾽ αἰσθήσεως (702a18-20)

In this emotional process, from stimulus to appearance to desire to πάθη to the 'instrumental' body-parts, νοήσις may play no role at all; the φαντασία may be derived from thought *or* perception. The latter short-circuit sequence of stimulus and response is outlined similarly in *On the Soul.* At the end of his long discussion of φαντασία*,* differentiating it from other psychological phenomena, Aristotle offers his own cautious definition: imagination, he suggests, is 'a kind of movement … similar to the sensation … in virtue of it the possessor may act and be acted upon (ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν) in various ways' (428b12-18). Here, in the sequence of 'movements' and 'actions', νοῦς is entirely absent. The body may suffer and react, via αἴσθησις, φαντασία, ὄρεξις and πάθος, without the involvement of νοῦς, δόξα, or λόγος.

What then, can we make of the comments in *On the Soul* quoted above, contrasting the δόξα and φαντασία of the fearful (427b22-26)? How is it possible that the φαντασία of 'something frightful or fearful' (δεινόν τι ἢ φοβερόν) is sometimes sufficient for the experience of fear, and sometimes not? In order to answer this question, we move away from the definition of fear itself, and consider the idea of the 'fearful'.

The Fearful: *Rhetoric, Nicomachean Ethics*

The *Rhetoric*, as I have shown, offers only a provisional and incomplete definition of the emotion: it does not offer a material cause, and only briefly alludes to the final cause, that 'for the sake of which' we feel fear.[314] What it does provide is an extremely detailed elaboration of the 'efficient causes' of fear: the people, occasions, and subject-dispositions that trigger the emotion. Indeed, the description of φόβος itself lasts all of one paragraph, before Aristotle launches into the enumeration of τὰ φοβερά (1382a27-b27). These, as has often been noted, are all interpersonal. Angry enemies, unjust men, anxious criminals: these men are to be feared, if they have the power to injure one. There is, indeed, little to connect these fears with the animal instincts discussed in the previous section; even the fear of death, which might be assumed to common to all living beings, is in this context ruled out; 'all know they have to die', Aristotle suggests, 'but since death is not near at hand, they do not worry at all (οὐδὲν φροντίζουσιν)' (1382a24-6).

Such statements are typical of the *Rhetoric*, which is concerned with what men fear in general. In fact, while τὰ φοβερά are political rather than primitive, there is no attempt here to differentiate between political communities, as in Thucydides. Nor is there any ethical division between justified and unjustified objects of fear, or between more and less virtuous responses to such objects. Aristotle does discuss differences in susceptibility to fear, but not in terms of character; susceptibility instead reflects one's beliefs and

[314] I refer here to the Aristotle's doctrine of the four causes, as explained in *Phys*. II.3 and *Metaph.* V.2; see discussion in Hankinson (2009).

expectations, which may be linked to one's material circumstances – the prosperous, for instance, do not expect to suffer (1382b35-7). Yet even here a similarity in the objects of fear is assumed. Among τὰ φοβερά are 'those people who are fearful to those stronger than us … and those whom these stronger people fear, for the same reason' (1382b14-16). If the strong are scared, so should you be: this advice certainly has some relevance to tragedy.

It will be noticed that these last two φοβερά are rather similar: οἱ τοῖς κρείττοσιν αὐτῶν … φοβεροί and οὓς φοβοῦνται οἱ κρείττους αὐτῶν. Grimaldi, in his commentary, suggests that they these two 'topics' represent the 'objective' and 'subjective' aspects of φοβερός. This is persuasive, but the second phrase remains surprising, not least because this is the first use of the verb φοβέομαι since the list of φοβερά began. There have been nine intervening uses of the adjective. If this adjective represents the objective aspect, and the verb the subjective aspect, why does Aristotle so scrupulously avoid the latter? The same pattern does not hold for the description of anger and mildness, or love and hate, in the preceding chapters. Finally, at the end of his list, Aristotle concludes, 'These are, so to say, nearly all the most important things *which are fearful and which men fear* (τὰ φοβερὰ καὶ ἃ φοβοῦνται)' (1382b27-8). Again, the apparent tautology is no accident: Aristotle is drawing a careful distinction between the appreciation of the fearful and the *pathos* – one might say the *pathology* – of fear. It is a distinction that will prove crucial to his discussion of fear in the *Nicomachean* and *Eudemian Ethics.*

Fear is not given its own chapter in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, where the psychology, as I noted before, aspires to be no more than πρὸς τὰ ζητούμενα. Yet the emotion receives

some attention in Book II and more sustained discussion in Book III. In Book II, outlining his general theory of ἀρετάι, Aristotle's first example is courage. 'The man who flees from everything in fear, and never endures anything, becomes a coward; the man who fears nothing but encounters everything becomes rash' (1104a20-23). Here, as in the *Eudemian Ethics*, the virtue of courage is defined as mean disposition between fear and confidence (1104a26-7; cf. 1107b1-4, *Eth. Eud.* 1228b1-2).[315] Aristotle will go on to explain that emotions are not bad or good: 'a man is not praised for being frightened or angry, nor is he blamed for being angry merely, but for being angry in a certain way' (1105b33-1106a2). This 'wrong' way of feeling an emotion is matched by a 'right' way of feeling it: τὸ δ' ὅτε δεῖ καὶ ἐφ' οἷς καὶ πρὸς οὓς καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ ὡς δεῖ, μέσον τε καὶ ἄριστον, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς (1106b21-23).

In this sentence, the μέσον of courage emerges as something more than the midpoint on a spectrum of emotional intensity: it appears to have a qualitative as well as quantitative aspect, since not all occasions, directions, objectives, and manners of emotion are equally justified.[316] A proper consideration of courage must engage with the qualitative as well as quantitative aspects of fear. Thus when, in Book III, Aristotle resumes his treatment of courage, defined again as a μεσότης … περὶ φόβους καὶ θάρρη (1115a7), he considers also the nature of the 'fearful':

> φοβούμεθα δὲ δῆλον ὅτι τὰ φοβερά, ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν κακά· διὸ καὶ τὸν φόβον ὁρίζονται προσδοκίαν κακοῦ. (III.1115a8-9)

[315] On the complexity of courage as a mean of two different variables (fear and confidence), see Pears (1980).
[316] See Taylor *ad loc.*

As noted earlier, Aristotle stays fairly close to the *Rhetoric* here: there fear is caused by the φαντασία of a κακόν, and said to be accompanied by a προσδοκία (II.1382b29). Indeed, the apparent tautology of the opening phrase here in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (φοβούμεθα … τὰ φοβερά) actually preserves the subtle distinction constructed by the *Rhetoric*, between the objectively fearful, the φοβερά, and the subjective experience of fear: all that we fear is fearful; but not all that is fearful is necessarily feared – at least not by all men.

Yet here the treatments rapidly diverge. Aristotle, in the *Rhetoric*, claims that 'we do not fear all evils … but only such as involve great pain … and … appear to be imminent' (II.1382a22-5). Here, in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, he claims the opposite: 'It is true then that we fear all evil things, for example, disgrace, poverty, disease, lack of friends, death' (III.1115a10-11). This last, and significant, φοβερόν, death, is explicitly excluded from the φοβερά of the *Rhetoric* (II.1382a26-7, discussed above). This contradiction is not easily explained, but it is plausibly a consequence of the context: the *Rhetoric* is focused on the normal arousal of emotions, in men gathered in the assembly; the *Nicomachean Ethics* attends to the whole ethical life of a citizen, and thus includes his less quotidian anxieties.

Moreover, it is concerned with how emotions *should* be, not how they are. In the case of fear, he lists permissible and impermissible objects: fear of disgrace is noble, and fear of envy, or insult to your family, is not cowardice; conversely it is right not to fear poverty or disease. However, Aristotle's point is that neither fear nor fearlessness with regard to any of these φοβερά constitutes true courage, which can only be displayed in relation to

the greatest of fearful things, namely death: φοβερώτατον δ' ὁ θάνατος· … κυρίως δὴ λέγοιτ' ἂν ἀνδρεῖος ὁ περὶ τὸν καλὸν θάνατον ἀδεής (III.1115a26-34).

This courage seems a radical departure from the measured virtues of Book II. If the brave man must 'fearlessly' (ἀδεής) confront his death, what has happened to the mean? Courage, we were told, exists between the excess and deficiency of fear – but here the courageous man is expected to feel *no* fear – and this before the most fearful (φοβερώτατον) prospect of all. The contradiction is recognised by Konstan, who nevertheless dispatches it to an endnote; there he quotes Leighton's dry observation that 'Aristotle's commitment to fearlessness in courage is not long lasting'.[317] It is true that within a few lines Aristotle seems to row back on this absolute fearlessness, acknowledging that even the courageous man may sometimes feel fear:

> λέγομεν δέ τι [φοβερὸν] καὶ ὑπὲρ ἄνθρωπον. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν παντὶ φοβερὸν τῷ γε νοῦν ἔχοντι· … ὁ δὲ ἀνδρεῖος ἀνέκπληκτος ὡς ἄνθρωπος. φοβήσεται μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ὡς δεῖ δὲ καὶ ὡς ὁ λόγος ὑπομενεῖ τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα· τοῦτο γὰρ τέλος τῆς ἀρετῆς (III.1115b7-13)

And sure enough, a couple of paragraphs later, the philosopher reprises the 'right' way of feeling an emotion as described in Book II (1106b21-23, see above), applying it now to the fear of a courageous man: ὁ μὲν οὖν ἃ δεῖ καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα ὑπομένων καὶ φοβούμενος, καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ θαρρῶν, ἀνδρεῖος (III.1115b17-19). Aristotle is back on message. Virtue is a disposition to act in accordance with a mean of feeling and conduct; this mean is both quantitative and qualitative.

[317] Konstan (2006: 315-6 n.10), citing Leighton (1987: 85).

Still, the tension cannot be so easily dismissed as Konstan would like. It stretches back, in fact, to the general discussion in Book II. There, too, the quantitative had to accommodate the qualitative, so that virtuous feelings were defined according to their occasions and expressions, as well as their intensity. Even at this introductory stage, it is unclear whether the courageous man should ever feel fear:

> ἐθιζόμενοι γὰρ καταφρονεῖν τῶν φοβερῶν καὶ ὑπομένειν αὐτὰ γινόμεθα ἀνδρεῖοι, καὶ γενόμενοι μάλιστα δυνησόμεθα ὑπομένειν τὰ φοβερά. (II.1104b1-3)

To 'despise' (καταφρονεῖν) terrors would seem to exclude the possibility of fearing them; but if they are not fearful, what is there to be 'endured' (ὑπομένειν)? Courage, in Book III, is dependent on a confrontation with fear: for this reason, Aristotle argues, the 'angry', who are 'blind to danger' (οὐθὲν τῶν δεινῶν προορῶντα) cannot be truly courageous, nor the 'sanguine' or the 'ignorant', who both expect to suffer nothing (1116b24-1117a27). But here in Book II the very experience of pain (λύπη) – which in the *Rhetoric* was presented as essential to fear – is a signifier of cowardice:

> σημεῖον δὲ δεῖ ποιεῖσθαι τῶν ἕξεων τὴν ἐπιγινομένην ἡδονὴν ἢ λύπην τοῖς ἔργοις … καὶ ὁ μὲν ὑπομένων τὰ δεινὰ καὶ χαίρων ἢ μὴ λυπούμενός γε ἀνδρεῖος, ὁ δὲ λυπούμενος δειλός. (II.1104b4-8)

The courageous man greets τὰ δεινὰ with pleasure (χαίρων). The question thus arises: how can one be duly, virtuously afraid, and 'endure' that emotion, while at the same time 'despising' it, and taking pleasure from the danger that provokes it?

There is no straightforward solution to this implicit paradox of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. In the *Eudemian Ethics*, however, where Aristotle covers the same ground, he gives us more clues. Considering those fearful things that are 'simply' so (ἁπλῶς) – which is to say, fearful 'to human nature' (τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ φύσει) – Aristotle suggests that the courageous man

> πρὸς ταῦτ᾽ ἔχει ἀφόβως, καὶ ὑπομένει τὰ τοιαῦτα φοβερά, ἃ ἔστι μὲν ὡς φοβερὰ αὐτῷ, ἔστι δ᾽ ὡς οὔ, ᾗ μὲν ἄνθρωπος, φοβερά, ᾗ δ᾽ ἀνδρεῖος, οὐ φοβερὰ ἀλλ᾽ ἢ ἠρέμα ἢ οὐδαμῶς. ἔστι μέντοι φοβερὰ ταῦτα· τοῖς γὰρ πλείστοις φοβερά. (III.1228b23-30)

Thus what Aristotle requires is a kind of doubleness: the courageous man must be both affected and unaffected at the same time. Perhaps, as David Pears has suggested, it is a matter of fear's expression: the courageous man must feel fear, in accordance with a reasoned recognition of the fearful; yet he must behave *as if* he is fearless – by running towards danger in battle, for instance.[318] This 'behavioral use' of the word, 'fearless', 'comments only on the manner of the agent's conduct'; it is to be separated from the kind of ἀφοβία associated with madmen and Celts (1229b25-8; cf. *Eth. Nic.* III.1115b25-29;), who do not recognise generally agreed dangers for what they are. However, as Pears acknowledges, the distinction is not always clear in Aristotle, and the *Eudemian Ethics* suggests that the fearlessness of the courageous man applies to his feelings as well as his conduct. In these contexts, Pears argues, '['fearless'] must mean that he will not be troubled by emotional perturbation'.

[318] Pears (1980: 178-80).

Pears does not elaborate on this fear-without-perturbation, but the passage from the *Nicomachean Ethics* just quoted (1104b4-8) seems relevant: the courageous man meets τὰ δεινά without pain, and perhaps even with pleasure (χαίρων ἢ μὴ λυπούμενός γε). If the courageous man still recognises δεινά as δεινά, then we have here something approximating to the experience of φαντασία in the *On the Soul*: in φαντασία, Aristotle suggested, we look upon τὰ δεινά 'like spectators looking at a picture', and are not 'affected' (συμπάσχομεν) in the normal way (427b22-6, quoted above). This aesthetic analogy becomes all the more startling when we consider the place in Aristotle's work where fear is most famously associated with pleasure. Near the beginning of the *Poetics,* Aristotle observes that we 'take pleasure (χαίρομεν) in contemplating the most precise images of things whose sight in itself causes us pain (ἃ αὐτὰ λυπηρῶς ὁρῶμεν)' (1448b10-11); later Aristotle suggests that 'the pleasure appropriate to tragedy (ἡδονὴν ἀπὸ τραγῳδίας … τὴν οἰκείαν)' is the pleasure which derives from pity and fear by means of mimesis (τὴν ἀπὸ ἐλέου καὶ φόβου διὰ μιμήσεως … ἡδονὴν)' (1453b10-12). Could the alchemy of art produce the doubleness that the ethics of fear require?

## Cultivating Fear: *Rhetoric* and *Poetics*

Virtue, Aristotle makes clear in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, is not an emotion or a capacity, but a 'disposition' of the soul (II.1105b20-1106a13). In order to feel a virtuous measure of fear, the soul needs to be disposed a certain way. This is difficult, as Aristotle acknowledges, since our dispositions are shaped by our feelings and actions, and our actions and feelings shaped by our dispositions. Still, Aristotle maintains, we are

responsible for all three, and 'hence it is incumbent on us to control the character of our activities, since on the quality of these depends the quality of our dispositions' (I.1103b22-4). Fortunately, we are not the only ones capable of influencing our dispositions: not only may we be 'trained up from childhood in one set of habits or another'; the state, too, can and should 'train its citizens in right habits of action' (1103b2-4).

What disposition, then, is needed for noble fear? We might start by asking what disposition is required for any fear at all. Here the *Rhetoric* is useful. Aristotle there informs us that those who think they are invulnerable, and 'will suffer nothing at all' cannot feel fear; such people include the very prosperous, who are consequently 'insolent, contemptuous and rash' (ὑβρισταὶ καὶ ὀλίγωροι καὶ θρασεῖς, II.1383a2). On the other hand – as noted before – fear needs some hope of salvation:[319] without it, people are 'chilled to indifference as regards the future' (ἀπεψυγμένοι πρὸς τὸ μέλλον, 1383a4). Indeed, it is those who exist between these two poles of certainty, and 'think themselves likely', but not certain, 'to suffer something', who feel fear (ἀνάγκη τοίνυν φοβεῖσθαι τοὺς οἰομένους τι παθεῖν ἄν, 1382b33).

How can they achieve this moderate disposition, if they don't already have it? How can it be brought about by the state, or by a lawgiver? Aristotle has a very direct answer for this*:*

[319] It is interesting that at 1116a1-3, Aristotle says that the coward is 'despondent' (δύσελπις), while the brave man is ἐναντίως; he is not, however, so εὔελπις as the sanguine (1117a), who are not courageous at all because, like the prosperous here in the *Rhetoric*, they feel no fear.

> ὥστε δεῖ τοιούτους παρασκευάζειν, ὅταν ᾖ βέλτιον τὸ φοβεῖσθαι αὐτούς, ὅτι τοιοῦτοί εἰσιν οἷοι παθεῖν· καὶ γὰρ ἄλλοι μείζους ἔπαθον· καὶ τοὺς ὁμοίους δεικνύναι πάσχοντας ἢ πεπονθότας, καὶ ὑπὸ τοιούτων ὑφ᾽ ὧν οὐκ ᾤοντο, καὶ ταῦτα καὶ τότε ὅτε οὐκ ᾤοντο. (II.1383a8-12)

When we considered τὰ φοβερά in the *Rhetoric*, we saw that the list of social anxieties touched briefly on a kind of fearful sympathy: Aristotle suggests that we should be frightened of those that we see the strong are frightened of. Here, in the closing sentence of the chapter on fear, he returns to this question of other men's fears, but now the sympathy is very different. Before, our fears were provoked by the fears of the strong (οἱ κρείττους); now, it is the suffering of our superiors (ἄλλοι μείζους), and their *failure to fear* this outcome, that produces fear in the audience.

This programme is designed, of course, for the orator, who wishes to engage, even manipulate, his audience's emotion in a particular case. But there is no reason why similar methods should not be employed by the state.[320] Aristotle suggests as much in the *Politics*, observing 'those with a care for the constitution, who wish to encourage obedience and patriotism, may need to contrive causes of fear (φόβους παρασκευάζειν), in order that the citizens may keep guard and not relax their vigilance' (V.1308a27-30).[321] We are not told much more about such contrivances in the *Politics*. But there is one state-sponsored event that Aristotle certainly did believe should φόβους παρασκευάζειν; moreover, he elaborates, in some detail, on how such a result may be produced.

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[320] For efforts to evoke fear in the *demos*, see Chapter One.
[321] Aristotle also speaks here of 'bringing the distant [danger] near' (καὶ τὸ πόρρω ἐγγὺς ποιεῖν), in a way that distinctly recalls the *Rhetoric*: we fear ταῦτα ἐὰν μὴ πόρρω ἀλλὰ σύνεγγυς φαίνηται ὥστε μέλλειν (1382a24-5).

Tragedy, as defined in the *Poetics*, is designed to elicit fear (1449b27; cf. 1452a2, 1453b1-12 etc.). How does it do so? In many ways, it seems to fulfil the requirements of the *Rhetoric*: 'worthy' men who are 'better' than us (σπουδαίους … βελτίονας ἢ καθ' ἡμᾶς 1448a1-4) are seen to fear, and suffer; this is an 'efficient cause' for fear in the audience. But the *Poetics* goes further in the development of this fearful sympathy: when Aristotle discusses the different possible plot arcs, he rejects the decline of the wicked in the following way:

> τὸ μὲν γὰρ φιλάνθρωπον ἔχοι ἂν ἡ τοιαύτη σύστασις ἀλλ᾽ οὔτε ἔλεον οὔτε φόβον, ὁ μὲν γὰρ περὶ τὸν ἀνάξιόν ἐστιν δυστυχοῦντα, ὁ δὲ περὶ τὸν ὅμοιον, ἔλεος μὲν περὶ τὸν ἀνάξιον, φόβος δὲ περὶ τὸν ὅμοιον, ὥστε οὔτε ἐλεεινὸν οὔτε φοβερὸν ἔσται τὸ συμβαῖνον. (1453a2-5)

Aristotle twice emphasises, as if to correct a possible misunderstanding, that it is φόβος, not ἔλεος, that involves identification – or at least a recognition that someone is 'like us'. Tragedy's subjects were previously supposed to be 'better than us'; in their suffering they are reduced to our peers.[322] One reason we fear their suffering is that it we can imagine it happening to us.[323]

On the whole, however, the *Poetics* does not seem very interested in sympathy of this kind: nowhere else are characters supposed to be in any way 'relatable'. Indeed, characters in general are of secondary importance, subordinated to the requirements of μῦθος. This principle applies also to the tragic emotions, which are rarely, if ever,

[322] Later, Aristotle will list τὸ ὅμοιον as a fundamental element of characterisation. (1454a24) Halliwell (*ad loc*.) reads this as likeness-to-audience as well as likeness-to-mythical-type.
[323] On this psychological logic, see Munteanu (2012), discussed in my introduction.

accorded to the characters themselves:[324] the φόβος of the audience is generally discussed without any explicit reference to fear felt onstage. Instead, the *Poetics* stresses 'objective' φοβερά.[325] Thus Aristotle writes:

> ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐ μόνον τελείας ἐστὶ πράξεως ἡ μίμησις ἀλλὰ καὶ φοβερῶν καὶ ἐλεεινῶν, ταῦτα δὲ γίνεται καὶ μάλιστα [καὶ μᾶλλον] ὅταν γένηται παρὰ τὴν δόξαν δι' ἄλληλα. (1452a1-3)

Why should the 'unexpected' (παρὰ τὴν δόξαν) evoke more fear than the 'expected'? Both the definitions in the *Rhetoric* and the *Nicomachean Ethics* supposed that fear consisted precisely in the *expectation* (προσδοκία) of pain or harm. But for Aristotle, the tragic effect is achieved not in the anticipation of events, but in their outcome (φρίττειν καὶ ἐλεεῖν ἐκ τῶν συμβαινόντων, 1453b3-4). It is the arrangement of the plot that produces the greatest emotional impact (τὰ μέγιστα … ψυχαγωγεῖ), 'especially the reversals and recognitions' (1449b33-5). These περιπέτειαι and ἀναγνωρίσεις are by nature contrary to expectation. 'Recognition' is a 'change from ignorance to knowledge' (ἐξ ἀγνοίας εἰς γνῶσιν μεταβολή, 1452a30-31); this is best arranged in conjunction with a reversal, a 'change of the events to the opposite' (ἡ εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον τῶν πραττομένων μεταβολή, 1452a23-24). The παρὰ τὴν δόξαν quality of this change is demonstrated by the example that follows: 'the person comes to bring Oedipus happiness, and intends to free him from fear about his mother; but he produces the opposite effect, by revealing Oedipus' identity'. The emotional impact of tragedy is achieved by events that have not

[324] As Leighton (2019: 234) observes, Aristotle does sometimes attend to emotions on stage: his examples are 1454b11-13 (anger, ease); 1455a28-33 (anger; storminess); 1456a28-b5 (pity, fear, anger). Only in the last case, however, discussing the rhetoric of διάνοια, does Aristotle parenthetically note a similarity between onstage and offstage emotion; this similarity is not a matter of sympathy, but of analogy, as onstage and offstage emotions are elicited by the same rhetorical techniques.

[325] Cf. 1452b32; 1452b36; 1453a1; 1453a6; and especially 1453b1 and 1453b9 on pity and fear produced by ὄψις and μῦθος.

been foreseen by their agents and victims: their *failure to fear*, as at the end of the *Rhetoric* chapter, is a trigger for fear in the audience.

This may be clarified, I think, by a passage from chapter fourteen in the *Poetics*, when Aristotle takes up the question of ποῖα δεινὰ ἢ ποῖα οἰκτρὰ φαίνεται (1453b14). Lucas (*ad loc.*) notices the lexical deviation from φοβερός, but explains simply, 'δεινά is appropriate to terrible events'. He does not refer to the use of δεινά in the previous chapter, where Aristotle describes tragedians' growing preference for a small range of mythical subjects, 'Alcmaeon, for example, Oedipus, Orestes … and others who have suffered or committed terrible deeds' (παθεῖν δεινὰ ἢ ποιῆσαι, 1452a22). There, as in chapter fourteen, the adjective modifies a voluntary *action*, as opposed to a neutral event. (φοβερός is never used in the *Poetics* of an action in this sense.) The second passage goes on to discuss whether it is better for the action to be committed 'with full knowledge and understanding'; Aristotle favours those tragedies in which the protagonists 'do the terrible thing in ignorance' (ἀγνοοῦντας … πρᾶξαι τὸ δεινόν, 1453b30), and 'to discover after having acted' (πράξαντα … ἀναγνωρίσαι); this kind of recognition, he says, is 'terrifying' (ἐκπληκτικόν, 1454a3-5). What is it that the agent has 'recognised' here? Surely, it is the 'fearful', δεινός quality of their own actions – actions that were δεινά when they were committed, but not recognised as such, not adequately feared; now, and too late, wise fear comes.

Such terrifying surprise, however, can hardly be thought to apply to the spectators – who must, after all, know Oedipus' identity before they enter the theatre. Their fear, to which Aristotle so regularly alludes, is produced by the plot in its entirety – the 'causal nexus'

of tragedy, as Halliwell puts it, in which the 'unexpected' events nevertheless 'conform to probability' (κατὰ τὸ εἰκός, 1452a12, a28, a38, etc.).[326] The threats and sufferings of the drama do not directly concern the audience, but they do so in a more general way, insofar as the dreadful sequence of events depicted is reasonably plausible in the world of the spectator. Unlike the fear of those onstage, this fear does not involve pain; indeed, it is given no physiological, expressive, or behavioral shape at all. Though some ancient accounts suggest a more visceral response to tragedy, there is no mention in the *Poetics* of blood running cold, or flight from the auditorium.[327] This φόβος, it appears, is simply the reasonable appreciation of τὰ φοβερά.

Conclusion:

At the beginning of this chapter, I outlined the emergence of a new kind of fear in Democritus and Plato, one which was not merely conquerable by the faculties of σοφία, δόξα, and ἐπιστήμη, but actually identified with them; onve fear is a species of thought, it may be brought into harmony with reason. Aristotle complicates this picture by attending closely to the physiological element of the emotion, while granting it essential cognitive components. Indeed, despite the high-cognitive treatment of the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle's biological works emphasize that neither thought nor belief is necessary for the emotion, and that – for animals, for example – *phantasia* alone may be sufficient.

[326] Halliwell (1987: 125). Cf. Frede (1992) for a discussion of this criterion in the wider Aristotelian context. Frede concludes that Aristotle's 'unusual-yet-plausible' plots, involving 'complex constellations' of agency and motivation, provide the 'complexity and plausibility' that 'examples in ethics are too general to allow', and that history, with its 'confused script' of chance occurrences, obscures (210, 212, 214-5).
[327] For a selection of these, see Stanford (1983: ch. 1).

For humans, however, the *phantasia* of the fearful does not always carry the full physiological force of the emotion; *On the Soul* suggests we are capable, in *phantasia*, of looking upon and appreciating the fearful without being affected by it. In the ethical treatises, this doubleness finds paradoxical expression in the courageous man, who is both 'fearless' and feels a medial, virtuous fear where necessary; certainly, he remains appreciative of the fearful, while neither fleeing nor feeling any concomitant pain. Such intellectualized fear, without perturbation, is in fact compatible with pleasure. This pleasurable experience of fear recalls the *Poetics*, where Aristotle observes our enjoyment not only of painful sights but even of fear itself. In tragedy, in fact, the emotion is deliberately cultivated, through the representation of others' suffering, an emotional mechanism that is suggested by the *Rhetoric*. Yet the aesthetic distance once again grants this fear a double character: in the audience, we recognize the fearful, but we feel no pain; the emotion is stripped of its physiological character, and transformed into a simple recognition of what is reasonably and plausibly φοβερός.

This 'transformation' may be partly a matter of context: as in the *Rhetoric* and the *Ethics*, the physiology of fear is not relevant to the *Poetics*. Yet a rationalization of φόβος offers an attractive reading of the most famous crux of the treatise:

> ἔστιν οὖν τραγῳδία μίμησις πράξεως σπουδαίας καὶ τελείας μέγεθος ἐχούσης, ἡδυσμένῳ λόγῳ χωρὶς ἑκάστῳ τῶν εἰδῶν ἐν τοῖς μορίοις, δρώντων καὶ οὐ δι' ἀπαγγελίας, δι' ἐλέου καὶ φόβου περαίνουσα τὴν τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων κάθαρσιν. (1449b22-28)

Fear is once again doubled: it is 'through the arousal of pity and fear' that tragedy 'effects a catharsis of such emotions'. Assuming (as most do) a homeopathic sense in this final phrase, we must imagine an audience who experience fear and purge their fear at the same time. For Stephen Halliwell, what Aristotle means by this is that 'the expenditure of emotion' is accompanied by 'an amelioration in the underlying emotional disposition'; in a 'harmonization' of feeling and ethical judgment, we attain a new level of 'emotional understanding'.[328] I would emphasise that this 'emotional understanding' resonates with Aristotle's *Ethics*, where the courageous man must find a way to feel fear ὡς δεῖ and endure fear ὡς ὁ λόγος and τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα (III.1115b10-12, cited above). For Aristotle, tragedy offers a means by which fear may be cultivated not only for pleasure, but for the development of virtue.

[328] For references, see n. 71. Cf. Fortenbaugh (1975: 21-22).

# FEELING THE FUTURE: FEAR, FORETHOUGHT, AND DELIBERATION IN AESCHYLUS' *SUPPLIANTS*

ὁ γὰρ φόβος βουλευτικοὺς ποιεῖ …

Arist. *Rh.* II.1383a6

δεῖ τοι βαθείας φροντίδος σωτηρίου,
δίκην κολυμβητῆρος εἰς βύθον μολεῖν
δεδορκὸς ὄμμα μηδ᾽ ἄγαν ὠνωμένον

Aesch. *Supp.* 407-9

## Introduction: Approaching *Suppliants*

In de Romilly's seminal study of Aeschylus, she demonstrates the ubiquity of fear in his extant plays, and the peculiar attention given to the interior experience of this emotion. Whereas in Homer, she argues, fear is generally observed from the outside (teeth chattering, limbs trembling, etc.), Aeschylus' characters and choruses describe their own feeling from the inside, and attach moral significance to that feeling. Thus the poet offers not only 'une évocation précise' but 'une philosophie de la crainte'. Fear presents itself in analysable form, and seeks justifications; most often, these are religious: 'la peur est alors peur des Dieux … [E]lle pose donc le problème d'une culpabilité humaine, dont elle serait la marque et annoncerait la punition.' But while this consciousness of guilt may imply a certain moral insight, de Romilly is at pains to emphasise that Aeschylean fear remains 'brutale, physique, mystérieuse, involontaire. Elle ne prend pas son origine dans

une refléxion. Elle n'a rien d'intellectuel ni de calculateur.'[329] This moral, prophetic , and irrational experience is to be contrasted with Thucydidean δέος, and even the 'prévision alarmante' of Sophocles and Euripides; such 'craintes laïques', she argues, are the product of a later age.[330]

One fear that is not discussed in de Romilly's daring, synoptic account is that of Pelasgus in the *Suppliants*. This may be because the vocabulary of fear is less pronounced here than elsewhere in Aeschylus. Yet Pelasgus' initial reaction to the Danaids' demand for asylum is to 'shudder' (πέφρικα, 346); with his first formulation of the dilemma, 'fear grips [his] mind' (φόβος μ' ἔχει φρένας, 379); and his final decision is justified by reference to the 'highest fear among mortals' (ὕψιστος … ἐν βροτοῖς φόβος, 479). The intervening lines, I will argue, are structured by the same emotion: the cognition of threat, and a reaction to threat. These elements are clearly defined; and negotiating between them is φροντίς (407, 417, 418; cf. φράζομαι, 437, 438).[331] This fearful 'thought', which is intricately elaborated by Pelasgus and the Chorus, works towards a practical solution to the crisis.

The focus on thought is exactly what excited Bruno Snell, who perceived in this same scene an unprecedented evocation of 'das innere Leben'. In the lines quoted in my epigraph – where Pelasgus declares the need to plunge, like a diver, into deep thought – '[wird] zum erstenmal [in Greek literature] ausgesprochen, daß das Handeln "tiefes Sinnen" erfordert'. Pelasgus is allowed to fear, but only in a moral or existential sense:

[329] De Romilly (1958: 16, 57, 58-9).
[330] For de Romilly's periodisation, see my introduction, pp.12-14.
[331] Frisk and Beekes, s.v. φράζομαι, both suggest an origin in φρα-, shared with φρήν, φροντίς etc.; Chantraine, s.v. φράζω, calls this etymology '[une] simple possibilité, mais sémantiquement satisfaisante'. For the wordplay in context, see below.

'Der φόβος [ist] der Zustand einer Krise'. Notably absent from this intellectual 'Angst' ('wir übersetzen schon zu schwach mit "Furcht"'), is any sense of interpersonal influence. Comparing Hamlet, Snell celebrates the way Pelasgus 'carries the *Zwiespalt* within himself': his reflection ('nachdenken') carries clear features of the *bios theoretikos*; his conscious decision – 'als Triumph aus dem inneren Ringen' – is free from any constraint ('er … sich nicht irgendeinem Zwang gefügt hat').[332]

Reworking these ideas in his seminal *The Discovery of the Mind* (1953 [1946]), Snell makes this isolation more explicit, dismissing all external influence: unlike the deliberations of Homer's men and women, 'the decision of Pelasgus … is … a wholly independent and private act … a free decision'; 'like [Aeschylus'] Achilles, Eteocles, Orestes[,] … Pelasgus … cannot be made to swerve from [his] course of action, however powerful the motives operating against it may be'. The king thus emerges as a proto-Sophoclean hero, in the Knoxian mode, steadfast and absolute, 'choos[ing] the noble alternative of death, in full view of the commands of justice and fate'.[333] In Snell, fear is conceived almost existentially.[334] Stripped of physiological and social context, the emotion is no more (and no less) than a springboard for modern consciousness.

Snell's broad psycho-historical strokes find little sympathy with contemporary scholars.[335] In fact, his exaltation of the diver metaphor goes unmentioned in all four modern commentaries on the play. Stuart Lawrence, meanwhile, in a recent monograph on *Moral Awareness in Greek Tragedy*, is grateful that Snell's 'absurd idea [of mental

[332] Snell (1928: 53-62).
[333] (1953: 102-6). For a comparable view, see Will (1976: 12). Mackinnon (1978: 77), Parker (1983: 312) and Naiden (2006: 84-6) all discount the importance of the Danaids' threats in Pelasgus' decision.
[334] De Romilly describes Snell's Aeschylean fear as 'le reflet d'une certaine condition humaine' (1958: 18).
[335] For Snell's status in the discipline, see my Introduction.

progression] is no longer current'.[336] The academic development is well explained by Christopher Gill: Snell's expectations of the modern, individual subject – defined by self-consciousness, rationality, intentionality and autonomy – were premised on Cartesian and Kantian norms; recent philosophy and psychology has pivoted towards an objectivist-participant approach, where the mind is 'composite', and ethics defined by engagement in interpersonal and communal relationships.[337] Crucial to this shift is Bernard Williams, who demonstrated, *contra* Snell, that a sense of agency and responsibility is legible in Homer; despite the absence of a 'theory of soul', or a noun for 'intention', Homeric heroes *do* see themselves as decision-makers.[338]

But while all these writers take issue with Snell's reading of Homer, none engages with his analysis of the *Suppliants*. Williams and Gill are not so focused on tragedy, but Lawrence's silence on this extended soul-searching is remarkable.[339] It fits, however, with a more general neglect: surveys of Aeschylus regularly seem to forget about the scene altogether;[340] in line with contemporary criticism on tragedy, most treatments of the *Suppliants* attend to social, religious, or political concerns.[341] Even though, as Garvie observes, Pelasgus' real-time 'mental turmoil' has no parallel in Aeschylus, it has attracted nothing like the sustained critical attention enjoyed by Eteocles and

[336] (2013: 8).
[337] Gill (1996: 11-41).
[338] Williams (1993: esp. 21-74).
[339] Lawrence discusses twenty-one tragedies in total, over twenty chapters. Of authentic Aeschylus, only *Persians* and *Suppliants* are denied discussion on their own terms. Pelasgus is mentioned just once, as a contrast to Agamemnon, on p.74.
[340] See e.g. the inapplicable generalizations of Gregory (2005: 260) ('[Aeschylus and Sophocles] pass rapidly over … moments of indecision') and Saïd (2005: 223) ('[Aeschylus] shows the direct and constant involvement of divine forces in human action').
[341] Political: Burian (2006 [1974]); Meier (1993); Bakewell (2013); Pattoni (2017). Religious historians on the ethics of supplication: Gödde (2000); Naiden (2006). Gender/marriage: Seaford (1987); Zeitlin (1996); Papadopoulou (2011: 51-64).

Agamemnon.[342] Most often, Pelasgus serves as a critical foil for these more celebrated heroes.

These silences are somewhat remedied in psychological surveys of Aeschylus: both David Sansone and Shirley Sullivan take a keen interest in the representation of the φρήν/φρένες, including those of Pelasgus. Yet their treatment of the scene is partial: the first treats only metaphor, the second, only vocabulary. Thus Sansone's excellent analysis of the diver image ignores its dialogic context, while Sullivan examines Pelasgus' invocation of *phrontis* (407-17) without discussing its actual articulation in the two *rheseis* that follow (438-54; 468-79).[343] An integration of these speeches is attempted by Michael Carroll, who explores the sequence of images that illustrate Pelasgus' deliberations. Carroll's aim is largely theoretical, however: he sets out to show how a cognitive linguistic approach enriches our understanding of these metaphors. Although he suggests that the development of the 'image-schema' helps us to understand how the King comes to his decision, he is not so concerned with its relation to the themes of the tragedy as a whole. Moreover, while he rightly highlights the importance of 'embodiment' in the experience and communication of Pelasgus' mental process, he does not attend to its emotional and its collaborative dimensions.[344] Eirene Visvardi, on the other hand, traces the 'circulation of fear' throughout the drama, showing how it compels debate, reveals needs and desires, and becomes 'gradually tamer and more sensible'.

[342] Garvie (2006 [1969]: 133). For bibliography on the character of Eteocles, see Lawrence (2007); for Agamemnon, see Easterling (1973) and Bednarowski (2015). For a good recent overview, with a narratological slant, of the problems of characterization in Aeschylus, see van Emde Boas (2017), with Pelasgus at p.327.
[343] Sansone (1975: 22-4); Sullivan (1997: 64-94), with Pelasgus' *phrontis* on pp.91-2.
[344] Carroll (forthcoming). Tarkow (1970) also delivers an analysis of the nautical metaphors in the scene.

However, her interest in *collective* emotion distorts her analysis of Pelasgus' deliberation, and she is too optimistic about the evolution of 'sympathy' through the play.[345]

While making use of these discussions, my approach to Pelasgus' dilemma will be rather different: I am concerned with his emotional thinking. First, I will show how the parodos and first episode introduce the theme of forethought, suggesting both its necessity and its limits. After the Chorus of fearful Danaids emphasize the unknowability of a divinely-ordained future, Danaus demonstrates a skilful negotiation of such uncertainty, involving the recognition of multiple possibilities, and the selection of the most advantageous course of action. Crucial to this negotiation is the faculty normally identified with the φρήν, and expressed by the Greek verb φρονεῖν; other vocabulary, however, may express the same prudent relation to a contingent future. The second section of the chapter will explore a pair of exchanges, 505-23 and 710-75, in which Pelasgus and Danaus attempt to reassure the Danaids; taken together, these locate fear in the φρένες and show it at least partially amenable to reason. Next, I will briefly contrast the overconfidence of both the Aegyptids and the Danaids in the last portion of the play. Only then will I examine the dilemma of Pelasgus. Seen in this context, his extended deliberation will emerge not as a primitive example of 'free' thought, nor as a reluctant yielding to coercion or necessity, but as a dynamic and collaborative calibration of fear, more embodied and interpersonal than the cerebral Angst of Snell, but more reasoned, calculating and potentially civic than the visceral dread of de Romilly.

This involvement of thought and emotion answers certain contemporary trends in philosophy and cognitive science. Aristotelians since Fortenbaugh have argued that his

[345] Visvardi (2015: 120-147); Buxton (1982: 67-89) makes a similar argument about 'persuasion'.

πάθη are dependent on beliefs and assessments of the external world, including other people; these beliefs and assessments are influenced by culture and susceptible to reason.[346] This approach has been championed not only by moral philosophers, including Bernard Williams, who integrate 'feelings' into ethical evaluation, but also by neuroscientists seeking to explain motivation and decision-making.[347] As emotions have grown more rational, reason has been rooted in emotion. Perhaps most influential of these neuroscientists is Antonio Damasio, for whom emotions are essential to deliberation; when an outcome is considered, the brain may simulate expected somatic experience, provoking a positive or negative impulse towards that outcome.[348] More recently, Andy Clark has argued that such top-down 'prediction' is not an occasional cognitive venture, but fundamental to our normal perceptual processing; this same cognitive machinery is then employed in the 'imaginarium', which, although 'off-line' in relation to the outside world, remains embodied and enactive.[349] Both, however, are partly anticipated by Aristotle's concept of φαντασία: my penultimate section will explore the importance of this faculty in Pelasgus' emotional thought.

Thinking ahead

In my chapter on *Seven Against Thebes*, I suggest that the play valorises a pious 'uncertainty principle' in the attitude of Theban champions – an explicit recognition that success is always contingent upon the favour of the gods. The *Suppliants* opens with a

[346] Fortenbaugh (1975). For further discussion of Aristotle's 'cognitive' emotions, with bibliography, see Chapter Two.
[347] For a polemical account of Aristotle's compatibility with recent trends in physics, biology, and cognitive science, see Feser (2019).
[348] Damasio (1994).
[349] Clark (2015: esp. 85-108).

powerful articulation of this same piety, a ten-line prayer entreating Zeus to 'look graciously upon [this] band' (1-2). The Danaid Chorus, descended from his union with Io, look to him as their champion (see especially 590-5). However, they are also keenly aware of the possibility of failure, right from the beginning of the play. They vividly imagine the threatened assault of the Aegyptids (37-9), and 'fear' (δειμαίνουσα, 74) that they will not find a sympathetic reception. At the end of their song, they consider the possibility that he will ignore their appeals and 'turn his face away' (ἔχων παλίντροπον / ὄψιν, 173-4; cf. 154-61).

Such anxious prayers are comparable to those of the Chorus in *Seven*, who similarly call upon the gods to 'look upon' and 'protect' their suppliant band (107-10), but repeatedly allude to the possibility of divine 'betrayal' or 'abandonment' (104-6, 169-170, 219-20, 251, 253) – dusphemic expressions that Eteocles tries in vain to shut down. There, however, the panicked Chorus never rise to a level of theological abstraction. The Danaids, by contrast, leave off their personal concerns to elaborate on the nature of Zeus' power (86-103). Particularly interesting is their image of his 'desire':

> εἴθ' εἴη 'κ Διὸς εὖ παναληθῶς·
> Διὸς ἵμερος οὐκ εὐθήρατος ἐτύχθη·
> δαυλοὶ γὰρ πραπίδων
> δάσκιοί τε τείνου-
> σιν πόροι κατιδεῖν ἄφραστοι. (86, 87, 93-95)[350]

The inscrutability of divine will is, Holgar Friis Johansen and Edward Whittle (hereafter FJW) point out, a 'well-established axiom' of archaic literature;[351] however, this spatial

[350] I follow here Westphal's universally accepted transposition of 88-90 and 93-5.
[351] In their 1980 commentary, *ad loc*.

mapping of Zeus' mind is all but unique.[352] The relationship of ἵμερος and πραπίδες may owe something to *Il.* 24.514, where 'longing departs from Achilles' πραπίδες and γυῖα', but it is clear from the following lines that the Danaids are here concerned with the fulfilment of Zeus' ἵμερος rather than its cessation. Thus 'the paths provide passage for the ἵμερος', FJW argue, on its journey to accomplishment; Sommerstein[2] reckons that it is Zeus' 'thought' that travels down these πόροι.[353] Yet implicit in οὐκ εὐθήρατος is a different journey, attempted not by Zeus but by the inquiry of mortals: δαυλοί and δάσκιοι continue this image of a hunt; the paths are κατιδεῖν ἄφραστοι not for Zeus, but for us.[354] This unknown – and unknowable – future, represented as a landscape traversed by Zeus' desire, but impenetrable to human thought, will emerge as crucial to the ethics of fear at the end of the play.

Here, Danaus shares his daughters' sense of uncertainty, but his emphasis is less pious than practical. His daughters have already introduced him, in the opening anapaests:

> Δαναὸς δὲ πατὴρ καὶ βούλαρχος
> καὶ στασίαρχος τάδε πεσσονομῶν
> κύδιστ' ἀχέων ἐπέκρανεν (11-13)

Bowen notes that βούλαρχος, as well as στασίαρχος, may have been coined by Aeschylus; it will be used again of Danaus at the end of the play (πρόνοον | καὶ βούλαρχον, 969-70). As 'leader of counsel', he is established as someone who deliberates about the future; πεσσονομῶν, 'player of pieces', suggests a complex calculation of options and outcomes.[355] The move he has chosen – flight to Argos – the Chorus regard

[352] For the unknowability of Zeus' mind, see e.g. Hes. *Op*. 483.
[353] Roads (ὁδοῖ) carry thoughts at Soph. *OT* 67 and Eur. *Hec.* 744.
[354] Cf. *Ag.* 367-8, where it is in fact possible to 'track' (ἐξιχνεῦσαι) the blow of Zeus to its source. Here, however, the event is in the past, a πρᾶγμα τέλειον, as the Danaids put it, which παντᾶι τοι φλεγέθει (92, 88).
[355] On the significance of this verb, see Bakewell (2008) and (2013: 43-5).

as ‘the most honourable of painful options’. This enforced selection foreshadows the terrible choice that Pelasgus will have to make, but here there is an appreciation of skill.

When Danaus finally speaks, at line 176, he is not shy of making such claims himself:

> παῖδες, φρονεῖν χρή· ξὺν φρονοῦντι δ’ ἥκετε
> πιστῶι γέροντι τῶιδε ναυκλήρῳ πατρί.
> καὶ τἀπὶ χέρσου νῦν προμηθίαν λαβὼν (176-8)

These first words are often taken as a rebuke – Danaus perhaps seeks to rein in the rash speech of his daughters. But it is possible that he is also speaking more generally. Eteocles opens *Seven* by addressing the Thebans and noting what one must say (Κάδμου πολῖται, χρὴ λέγειν τὰ καίρια, 1); that drama will turn on this question of appropriate speech.[356] In this play, Danaus, addressing the Chorus, is concerned with the necessity of ‘thought’ (φρονεῖν). Immediately, he gives two examples of his own. First, he has been a ‘sensible shipmaster’: since they are now arrived at Argos, his planning (11-13) has so far been successful. Second, he has already ‘taken προμηθία regarding the situation on land’.[357] Although attested in Alcman, Xenophanes and Pindar, in Aeschylus the noun προμηθία appears only here; later, Pelasgus will worry about strife arising ἐξ ἀέλπτων κἀπρομηθήτων πόλει (*hapax,* 357), and the Chorus will pray for Argos to enjoy προμαθὶς … ἀρχά (*hapax,* 700). This triple use of a term otherwise neglected by the playwright suggests a deliberate thematization.

But what does it mean?[358] Although the noun can simply denote ‘consideration’ for another (cf. Xenophanes B1.24), in all of three *Suppliants* instances it seems closer to the

[356] On the importance of correct speech in *Seven*, see Cameron (1970).
[357] For τἀπὶ χέρσου as an accusative of respect (*pace* Bowen) see FJW and Sandin.
[358] LSJ *s.v.* προμήθεια: ‘foresight, forethought’; ‘consideration’; *s.v.* προμηθής, ‘forethinking, provident’; ‘caring about a thing’. Slater *s.v.* προμάθεια: ‘foresight’.

sense of 'forethought' and precaution, found regularly in Pindar.[359] At *Nem*. 11.46, προμάθεια is opposed to ἀναιδὴς ἐλπίς;[360] and in the seventh *Olympian*, when the sons of Helios to bring fire for a sacrifice, we are told that Προμαθέος Αἰδώς gives mortals ἀρετή (43-4).[361] Pindar's forethought is thus connected to αἰδώς, a sense of limit, and of vulnerability;[362] located in the φρένες (*Ol*. 7.47; 8.60-1) or the νόος (*Isthm*. 1.40), it prompts aversive action. Here in Aeschylus, Danaus follows the announcement of his προμηθία with an instruction to the Chorus to 'take care of [his] words' (179); next he draws their attention to a dust-cloud, the noise of wheel-sockets, a mass of men approaching (180-3). On the basis of these signs he begins to speculate about who might be coming, and why, but recognises that he cannot judge whether their intent is friendly or hostile (184-7); finally, he tells the Chorus that 'it is best from every point of view' for the girls to 'sit at this rock sacred to the gods' (188-9). Thus his προμηθία involves (or perhaps precipitates) an attention to emerging events, and a recognition of the dangers they may carry; this uncertainty is then managed by a precautionary principle, and a course of action proposed.

After listening to some further instructions concerning their speech and behaviour, the chorus finally respond at 204-6. Their language demonstrates their clear understanding of the recommended attitude:

> πάτερ, φρονούντως πρὸς φρονοῦντας ἐννέπεις·
>
> φυλάξομαι δὲ τάσδε μεμνῆσθαι σέθεν

[359] Cf. Thuc. IV.62.4, where Hermocrates highlights the προμηθία of a community living in fear (δεδιότες) of bad luck.
[360] For a discussion of this passage, and the ambivalence of hope in Pindar, see Johnston (2018).
[361] Cf. *Isthm*. 1.39-40, where προμάθεια is gained by suffering, and *Ol*. 8.60-1, where it is again linked to experience.
[362] For αἰδώς as a species of fear, see my lexical discussion (a prime example being Aesch. *Supp.*478-9, discussed later in this chapter).

κεδνὰς ἐφετμάς· Ζεὺς δὲ γεννήτωρ ἴδοι. (204-6)

Picking up their father's vocabulary, the Danaids recognise that he has shown himself 'thoughtful' (φρονούντως), and promise to 'take care' (φυλάξομαι) to remember his advice.[363] But perhaps more significant is the assertion that they themselves are 'thinking' (φρονοῦντας), as well as simply obeying Danaus' instructions. Indeed, Danaus had exhorted them to 'think' just as he did; now, they announce themselves as a community of the 'thoughtful'. Accordingly, in the dialogue that follows, we see the Chorus act on their own initiative. Their father says nothing about praying, but the Chorus request that Zeus look over them (206); once they have drawn close to the mound, they again call upon Zeus, 'to look on them with pity' (209). This may seem a simple resumption of their prayers in the parodos, but what follows is an intensely collaborative exchange, as Danaus reinforces their prayers (210, 216), and directs them to different statues (211-2, 214, 218, 220). Just before Pelasgus' entry, he gives one last instruction:

σκοπεῖτε κἀμείβεσθε τόνδε τὸν τρόπον

ὅπως ἂν ὑμῖν πρᾶγος εὖ νικᾶι τόδε. (232-3)

Withdrawing from the dialogue for more than two hundred and fifty lines, Danaus hands over responsibility to his daughters. They are the ones who must 'watch now' (Bowen) or 'consider these things' (Sommerstein[2]), and speak in such a way as to secure their desired outcome. The βούλαρχος, the φρονῶν ναύκληρος, does not work alone, but in concert; as at 176, the Chorus are expected not simply to follow instructions, but to φρονεῖν, too.[364]

Reason and reassurance

[363] In addition, μεμνῆσθαι picks up Danaus' μέμνησο in 202.
[364] Cf. Bowen's paraphrase of 176: 'I can think sensibly, can you?'. FJW (1980: I, 39) observe that '[the Danaids'] dependence on their father's guidance is offset by their capacity for *independent thought* and action' (my emphasis).

The opening scenes of this play thus develop a certain model of thought: a pious, prudent and collaborative orientation towards a dangerous and contingent future. In this attitude, fear featured as an input (74), but its relation to τὸ φρονεῖν was unspecified. Later in the play, we see these two psychological phenomena brought into contact in various ways. This section will briefly investigate two scenes focused on the mind of the Danaids, where their fear is disputed by others.

The first of these follows immediately on the supplication scene. After Pelasgus has yielded to their request, and is about to escort Danaus to the city, the Chorus asks the King to give them reassurance (ποῦ θράσος νεμεῖς ἐμοί; 505). He tells them to come down from the altar into the 'smooth meadow' of the orchestra (508), but they are frightened of being left alone:

> Χο. Καὶ πῶς βέβηλον ἄλσος ἂν ῥύοιτό με;
>
> Βα. Οὗτοι πτερωτῶν ἁρπαγαῖς <σ'> ἐκδώσομεν.
>
> …
>
> Χο. Οὗτοι τι θαῦμα δυσφορεῖν φόβῳ φρένας.
>
> Βα. ἀεὶ γυναικῶν ἐστι δεῖμ' ἐξαίσιον.
>
> Χο. Σὺ καὶ λέγων εὔφραινε καὶ πράσσων φρένα. (509-10, 513-15)

There is some symmetry here: the Danaids were sent by their father to sit 'in fearful flight' on the mound (πάγον, 189); now Pelasgus wants them to descend from it, and

leave their fear behind.[365] Their emotion is now a problem: for the Chorus, it makes the φρένες 'distraught'; for Pelasgus, it is ἐξαίσιον.[366]

Implicit in both their statements, however, is an assumption that some fears are appropriate, ἐναίσιος or ἐναίσιμος.[367] The response of the Chorus develops this view: their fear may be assuaged by the speech or action of the King. Firmly established in the φρήν/φρένες, this φόβος is amenable to persuasion. Indeed, after Pelasgus' reassurance (516-20), they are willing to follow his lead: he tells them to pray for success, and hopes that persuasion and luck may attend him; their stasimon opens with a prayer for the same (524-30), and proceeds with a hopeful identification of their cause with Io's.

This scene, of fear and reassurance, is repeated in expanded, lyric form in the third episode of the play. Danaus, seeing the Aegyptids approaching from afar just as he had earlier spotted Pelasgus in the first episode, once again seeks to regulate the emotions of his daughters as directs them to the mound.[368] This time, however, he follows Pelasgus in seeking to contain their fear: 'Don't tremble!', he tells them twice (μὴ τρέσητε, 711, 732); and twice, 'have courage!' (θάρσει, 732, 740). Initially, Danaus is not so successful as the Argive King. The Chorus respond:

> Χο. Πάτερ, φοβοῦμαι, νῆες ὡς ὠκύπτεροι
> ἥκουσι, μῆκος δ' οὐδὲν ἐν μέσῳ χρόνου.

[365] On the setting, stage action, musical elements etc. of this play, see the excellent summary in Papadopoulou (2011: 77-96), as well as the Taplin (1977: 192-239).
[366] The first half of 514 is corrupt: γυναικῶν is Linwood's conjecture for MS ἀνάκτων. Other emendations generally offer another subjective genitive ἀνάλκτων (West), ἀναλκῶν (Citti-Miralles); Ludwig suggests ἀνάτων, which could be subjective or objective. All these, however, qualify δεῖμ': not *all* fears are always excessive.
[367] ἐναίσιμος is an important word for Aeschylus: cf. *Ag.* 774-5. Δίκα … | τὸν δ' ἐναίσιμον τίει βίον.
[368] The dramaturgical similarities between these two scenes are often pointed out: in both, Danaus observes an approaching force, and gives advice to his fearful daughters; Taplin calls them 'mirror scenes' (1977: 99-101; 210-11); cf. Papadopoulou (2011: 89) and Bowen (2013: 21-2). The quality of the Danaid fear is, however, quite different.

Περίφοβόν μ’ ἔχει τάρβος ἐτητύμως

πολυδρόμου φυγᾶς ὄφελος εἴ τί μοι·

παροίχομαι, πάτερ, δείματι. (734-8)

The Chorus’ fear here is extreme and overwhelming. After the Coryphaeus briefly sets out the basis for their emotion in iambics, the whole Chorus combine to reiterate their terror in vivid, violent dochmiacs. It is possible, as Bowen suggests, that Danaus has descended from his vantage point on the mound (713), and that they are dancing ‘at him’.[369] His calm rebuttals show him to be unswayed.

The scene is formally reminiscent of the first *epirrhema* in *Seven*, where Eteocles seeks to restrain the panic of the Theban women; there the King argues the Chorus into iambics, and wins their temporary acquiescence. Here, Danaus makes no such progress. His assurances – that the Argives will come to their aid, and be more than a match for the Egyptians – have little effect. Like Pelasgus, his departure is followed by a stasimon, but its tone is very different.[370] The Chorus are moved to suicidal despair:

τὸ πᾶν δ᾽ ἄφαντος ἀμπετὴς ἀιδνὸς ὡς

κόνις ἄτερθεν πτερύγων ὀλοίμαν.

ἀλυκτὸν δ᾽ οὐκέτ᾽ ἂν πέλοι κακόν·

κελαινόχρων δὲ πάλλεται φίλον κέαρ.

πατρὸς σκοπαὶ δέ μ᾽ εἶλον· οἴχομαι φόβῳ. (782-6)[371]

The final line here recalls παροίχομαι … δείματι in the opening of the *epirrhema* (738): the Chorus are still ‘undone by fear’. The repetition not only highlights the failure of

[369] So also Sommerstein (2010 [1996]: 113).
[370] Bowen, *ad* 776-824: ‘For a second time the Chorus are alone in the orchestra. Last time they were hopeful, this time fearful.’
[371] The MS text of 784-5 is clearly corrupt. For extended (and inconclusive) discussion, see FJW. The text adopted here is Sommerstein[2]’s.

Danaus' consolations, but also illustrates the kind of fear in operation. The Danaids are apparently beyond reasoning,[372] and 'incapable of controlling themselves'.[373] De Romilly (who reads ἄφρικτον … κέαρ in line 784) comments on these verbs:

> L'homme épouvanté cesse, en quelque sorte, d'être lui-même. Il est comme annihilé … La victime ne peut pas voir clair, ni contenir ses larmes. Elle est sans force. Elle ne peut plus raisonner, ni parler. (1958: 34)

This view has some justice: in their escapist fantasy, the Chorus seemingly withdraw from any attempt to remedy their situation; they wish to escape their bodies, and the human realm altogether. All the resourcefulness of their dispute with Pelasgus has gone; are they no longer the φρονοῦντες that they once claimed to be? Certainly, their emotion concerns not the 'thinking' φρήν[374] but the 'feeling' κέαρ; the blackness of the heart, and its leapings, speak to the physiology, rather than 'psychology', of the experience.[375]

Yet de Romilly exaggerates. The Danaids do not cease to speak. Neither are they entirely *sans force*: later in the song they resume their prayers to the gods and Zeus in particular (808-15); they declare that the conclusion of this struggle ('the beam of the balance') is wholly up to him (822-4). This prayer accords with the parting instructions of their father, whose language implicitly appeals to the salutary impetus of fear: 'Since you are afraid,

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[372] Bowen (*ad* 748) describes their attitude as 'unreasoning panic'. FJW suggest that the sense of παροίχομαι is 'I am beside myself, out of my mind', understanding an implied genitive of separation, e.g. φρενῶν; Sommerstein[2] doubts this.

[373] Visvardi (2015: 136).

[374] So Sansone argues that *noesis* – the faculty of 'pure thought' – 'is in Aeschylus always located in the *phrenes*' (1975: 21), but the distinction between a feeling καρδία and a thinking φρένες is rarely clear-cut: cf. *Pers*. 161-5, *Sept.* 967-8, *Ag.* 11, 176-181, 995-7, and *Eum*. 103-4, with Sullivan (1997: 122-3). Padel (1992: 20) quotes an interesting passage from *De Morbo Sacro*, who dismisses both the popular belief that τὸ φρονεῖν and τὸ νοεῖν are located in the φρένες; he also rejects an alternative proposition that we think (φρονέομεν) with the καρδία (17.1-13).

[375] Buxton (1982: 82) offers an intriguing psychological explanation of the colouring: 'Hitherto blackness has been a quality [ascribed by the Danaids to] the Aigyptioi …; but now the men are so close that they infect the girls' imaginings'. The image is, however, a common one, in Aeschylus and beyond. Sommerstein[2] notes that Aristotle (fr. 243 Rose) explains the blackening of the heart and pallor of the skin, in fearful experience, as a product of blood racing to the heart.

take thought not to neglect the gods' (σὺ δὲ | φρόνει μὲν ὡς ταρβοῦσα μὴ ἀμελεῖν θεῶν, 772-3; cf. 724-5). Thus the τάρβος that 'holds' (ἔχει) the Chorus at 736 is not, in the end, wholly incompatible with 'thought'. Indeed, for all their extreme rhetoric, it should be admitted that the fears of the Danaid Chorus turn out to be entirely justified: despite all their father's soothing patter (especially 764-72), there *was* hardly any time remaining (735), and the Egyptian herald *does* arrive before their father returns; moreover, he proves just as dismissive of the altar's sanctity as they suspected.[376]

'I'm not scared.'

The prudence of their fear is set off by the contrast of this Egyptian arrival. We have been well prepared for some wrong-thinking. In the prologue, the Danaids sing of the mental faults of their Aegyptid cousins: τεθαλὼς | δυσπαραβούλοισι φρεσίν | καὶ διάνοιαν μαινόλιν (106-9); their marriage, they say, would be a γάμος δύσφρων (394, cf. δρακόντων δυσφρόνων ἐχθίοσιν, 511). Sullivan rightly points out that 'the unholiness that the Danaids so abhor seems centred in the *phrenes* of the Aegyptids, as do their bold plans'.[377] But in what does this unholiness consist? From the Danaid point of view, it is the ὕβρις of their cousins' desire to force marriage upon them (80-1, 104-7, etc.); their father, too, thinks such ambition cannot be 'holy' (ἁγνός, 228).[378] Though this judgment may be, and has been, disputed,[379] there is no room for doubt about the hubris displayed

[376] Certainly these fears cannot be written off as 'hysteria', as they are by e.g. (recently) Ireland (1986: 19); Conacher (1996: 96); Bowen (2013: 22). On gender in the play more generally, see Papadopoulou (2011: 51-64), with bibliography.
[377] Sullivan (1997: 90).
[378] Against the common view that incest is what they abhor, see Olive (2021).
[379] Rape may have been regarded as a paradigm case of *hubris* in Athenian law (Fisher 1992: 41; for the status of rape in antiquity, see Deacy/Pierce (1997). Some critics, however, have doubted (like Pelasgus), that the Danaid claims of injustice are valid (see, e.g., Sommerstein[2] *ad* 387-91). Their case is substantially weakened by their failure to answer Pelasgus' jurisdictional questions (336-9, 343-4, and especially 387-91).

by the Herald and his attendants, in their refusal to respect the Argive gods and their altars.[380] So much is forecast by the Danaids: their cousins, they say, 'care nothing for the sanctity of altars':

οὐλόφρονες δ' ἐκεῖνοι, δολομήτιδες
δυσάγνοις φρεσίν, κόρακες ὥστε, βω-
μῶν ἀλέγοντες οὐδέν. (750-2)

Again, the defect is emphatically located in the φρένες. That this is a failure of fear is confirmed by their iambic response to Danaus: 'Father, they certainly won't keep their hands of us for fear (δείσαντες) of these tridents or the awesomeness of the gods (θεῶν σέβη)' (753-4). The Danaids then return, with emphatic lexical and syntactical symmetry, to their strophic condemnation of the Aegyptid mindset:

περίφρονες δ' ἄγαν ἀνιέρῳ μένει
μεμαργωμένοι κυνοθρασεῖς, θεῶν
οὐδὲν ἐπαΐοντες. (755-7)

This bestial bravado is well illustrated by the Herald and his attendants when they enter at 825. This second chorus, occupying the orchestra vacated by the terrified Danaids (832), have no respect for the Danaids (ἀτίετ', 853),[381] or their hair (ὁλκὴ γὰρ οὗτοι πλόκαμον οὐδάμ' ἄζεται, 884). They soon confirm that they have no fear of Greek divinities, either: οὗτοι φοβοῦμαι δαίμονας τοὺς ἐνθάδε (893). This irreverence is noted by Pelasgus on his arrival: 'You show no respect (σέβῃ) for the gods' (921; cf. 923, 927). Like the Danaids, he locates the Egyptian's error in the latter's φρένες: 'you have made a great mistake, and

[380] Cf. Fisher (1992: 262-70).
[381] MS has ἀτιετανα πόλιν εὐσεβῶν, which Page oblelizes. From the scholion (μήποτε <μὴ?> μετέχων τῆς τιμῆς ἐν τῆι πόλει τῶν εὐσεβῶν), Peiper conjectured ἀτίετον ἄπολιν; Bowen prints ἀτίετ(α); Sommerstein[2] ἀτίετ(ε).

your mind is not straight at all (οὐδὲν ὤρθωσας φρένα)' (915; cf. 911).[382] To think straight is to think ahead – and to be afraid.

The Egyptians soon retreat, promising to return in force (950-1). Straight-thinking, reverence, and prudence, however, remain centre stage. Pelasgus encourages the Danaids to 'take confidence' (θράσος λαβοῦσαι, 955), but they instead call for their father, 'who thinks ahead and makes our plans' (πρόνοον καὶ βούλαρχον, 969-70, tr. Bowen). Right on cue, Danaus enters to instruct them in 'grateful reverence … from the bottom of the φρήν' (ἐκ πρυμνῆς φρενὸς | χάριν σέβεσθαι, 989-90),[383] and renews his constant exhortations to σωφρονεῖν (σωφρονίσμασιν, 992; τὸ σωφρονεῖν, 1012; cf. 198, 710, 724). As in the first episode, the Danaids pick up their father's language:

> τἄλλ᾽ εὐτυχοῖμεν πρὸς θεῶν Ὀλυμπίων·
> ἐμῆς δ᾽ ὀπώρας οὕνεκ᾽ εὖ θάρσει, πάτερ.
> εἰ γάρ τι μὴ θεοῖς βεβούλευται νέον,
> ἴχνος τὸ πρόσθεν οὐ διαστρέψω φρενός. (1014-17)

Their confidence, although tempered by the piety of 1016, is striking: why should the fixity of their φρήν be excluded from the prayer for good fortune from the gods? As Sullivan puts it, 'these women put too much trust in their own mind and its working'.[384] We see this weakness developed in the lyrical exchange with the Argive soldiers, with

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[382] To a certain extent, the presentation of the Aegyptids, their Herald, and his attendants derives from Egyptian cultural stereotype: see Bacon (1961: 15-30) and Hall (1989: 118-19, 125-6). However, as Hall shows (123-4), Egyptians were also associated with cunning intelligence, such as that shown by Danaus. Indeed, the Danaids themselves, in their identity and behaviour, subvert the polarity of Greek and non-Greek, while the Pelasgians too were mythical 'outsiders' (Mitchell (2006); cf. Turner (2001)). The play is thus not a straightforward contrast between Greek and barbarian, civic reason and savage emotionality, as some would have it (e.g. Burian 1974 – see discussion below).

[383] M: εὐπρυμνῆ. Page obelizes the two lines, but Portus' emendation (ἐκ πρυμνῆς) is accepted by FJW, West, Bowen, and Sommerstein[2]; for the missing main verb, West supplies χρέων at end of 990. For the sense, compare *Ag.* 805 οὐκ ἀπ᾽ ἄκρας φρενός.

[384] (1997: 86).

which the play concludes.[385] If the second chorus, of Egyptians, was characterised by an arrogant lack of fear, this third chorus expresses exactly the misgivings now neglected by the Danaids. Warning them not to neglect the power of Aphrodite (Κύπριδος ... οὐκ ἀμελής, 1034; cf. 725, 773) and her 'awesome deeds' (ἔργοις σεμνοῖς, 1036), they say they are afraid on the Danaids' behalf: 'For the fugitives I foresee and fear (προφοβοῦμαι) punishments still to come …' (1043-4).[386] For the audience, knowing the myth, this fear is a prescient one, and sets off the misguided confidence of the Danaids.

But the Argive fears have a more general application, as representations of a normative (and eminently tragic) worldview.[387] They go on to explain:

> ὅ τι τοι μόρσιμόν ἐστιν, τὸ γένοιτ᾽ ἂν—Διὸς
>
> οὐ παρβατός ἐστιν
>
> μεγάλα φρὴν ἀπέρατος (1047-9)

As scholars have noted, their language here distinctly recalls the imagery of the parodos, where the πόροι of Zeus' πραπίδες were tangled, dusky, and κατιδεῖν ἄφραστοι.[388] Here again the mind (φρήν) of Zeus, a sort of map of the μόρσιμον, is not to be traversed by human thought. In the first case, the Danaids were implicitly chastising the reckless ambition of the Aegyptids, while ignoring the relevance of their words to their own case. Now the same argument returns, but this time in the voice of the Argives, and directed at the Danaids' own situation. The Danaids resist, but then present a third theological image very much in the same mode:

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[385] The identity of this chorus has been much debated: lines 977-9 of the MS introduce some φίλαι δμωίδες of the Danaids, but these have fallen under suspicion. In allocating 1034-51 etc. to the Argive bodyguards introduced by Danaus at 985, I follow FJW, Bowen, and Sommerstein[2].

[386] Sommerstein's translation captures the emphasis of προ-φοβοῦμαι; in his commentary, he notes parallels including *Sept*. 332 προταρβῶ, discussed in Chapter Four. Here, as there, the prefix expresses a *sympathetic* as well as *proleptic* element to the fear.

[387] Sommerstein[2] calls it a cliché: Aeschylean parallels include *Sept.* 281, *Ag*. 68, and *Cho*. 103-4. For the ethical implications of such divine necessity, see Nussbaum 2001 [1986] and Lawrence 2013.

[388] See Sansone (1975: 29).

Χο: σὺ δὲ θέλγοις ἂν ἄθελκτον.

Ἀρ: σὺ δέ γ’ οὐκ οἶσθα τὸ μέλλον.

Χο: τί δὲ μέλλω φρένα Δίαν

καθορᾶν, ὄψιν ἄβυσσον; (1055-8)

As in the parodos, Zeus’ mind is imagined spatially, inaccessible by reason of its extension; so too in the Argive warning, quoted above. Yet this exchange is a dispute, and the views of the two choruses do not align. Indeed, it is by this juxtaposition that a certain faultiness in the Danaid theology is highlighted. The Argives present Zeus’ φρήν as a landscape that cannot be *crossed*; the Danaids, a landscape that cannot be *seen*. There is some piety in the latter attitude, and the Argives do not contest it. Yet in the context of the whole exchange, it is clear that the Danaids are not so much accepting Zeus’ inscrutability as refusing it. The Argives stand anxiously at the edge of a forbidding future, peering fearfully across its variety and expanse; the Danaids pray for one future, but will not speculate on any others.

This is reckless. We know, as the Athenian audience did, what the myth dictates: not only will they be forced to marry the Aegyptids, but one of their number will change her φρήν (cf. 1017, above), perhaps with fatal consequences for the rest of them. Despite their respectful references to the will of Zeus, here and at 1016, their conviction of his support manifests itself in something dangerously close to *hubris*. The Argives tell them to pray for something μέτριον (1059); though they seem to welcome this guidance (τίνα καιρόν με διδάσκεις; 1060), their final demand is an outrageous one, that he should ‘give victory to women’ (κράτος νέμοι γυναι- | ξίν, 1068-9). Failing to take on board advice, their thought is neither fearful, not collaborative. This serves as a powerful contrast to Pelasgus, to whom I will now return.

Pelasgus: Fear, Deliberation, Thinking with Others

Despite the hopes of the Danaids (58-62; 73-6), and their strategic arrangement around the altar, Pelasgus expresses no sentiment of pity in response to their supplication.[389] Instead, the beginning, middle, and end of his deliberations are characterised by fear (πέφρικα, 346; φόβος μ' ἔχει φρένας, 379; ὕψιστος φόβος 479). The next two sections of the chapter will explore the quality of this fear. In the first, I will show that the King's emotional reflections are not conducted privately, but publicly, through a kind of social reasoning; persuasion, not coercion, is the engine of his conversion, which concludes in a normative emotional judgment. In the pursuit of this structural understanding of the scene, I will necessarily skip over the intriguing metaphors that represent the embodied development of Pelasgus' thought. These will be examined in the following section, through the lens of Aristotelian psychology.

First: the social nature of the King's deliberations. I started this chapter with a discussion of Snell and his elevation of Pelasgus as the first coherent subject in 'Western' literature, whose action is the product of deep thought and inner struggle: in accordance with Kantian prescriptions, he is a private, self-conscious, rational individual, making a free decision. This view may be contrasted with the current consensus on Pelasgus' deliberations, in which his responsibility for the decision is variously discounted. Some highlight the King's invocation of ἀνάγκη (440, 478);[390] most, however, are directly concerned with the Danaids' 'coercion'. Thus they adduce Pelasgus' articulations of fear

[389] *Pace* the arguments of Johnson (2016: 79-80) concerning his αἰδώς, criticised by Finglass (2017).
[390] Lesky (1966: 80); Deagustini (2018: 39). Both allow for a combination of freedom and compulsion.

as evidence that he is being 'manipulated';[391] several have suggested that the apparently defenceless suppliants are 'the real wielders of power'.[392] At the moment of crisis, Pelasgus is subjected to 'psychological' or 'religious blackmail',[393] or some species of 'violence',[394] so that, 'utterly helpless', he is 'left with no choice' and simply 'accepts the inevitable'.[395] In sum, 'against his better judgment',[396] he is 'forced'[397] into a 'completely irrational … decision dictated by fear'.[398]

The truth lies between these two extremes: Pelasgus' deliberations are shaped and guided by the Danaids, but his autonomy, his ability to calculate and choose, remains uncompromised. As in the rest of the play, fear works as an integral part of prudent thought. The structure of fearful persuasion is established in the stichomythia that initiates it. Confronted by the Danaid request, the King is immediately afraid, 'shuddering' at the spectacle of their supplication:

> Βα. πῶς οὖν πρὸς ὑμᾶς εὐσεβὴς ἐγὼ πέλω;
>
> Χο. αἰτοῦσι μὴ 'κδοὺς παισὶν Αἰγύπτου πάλιν.
>
> Βα. βαρέα σύ γ' εἶπας, πόλεμον ἄρασθαι νέον.
>
> Χο. ἀλλ' ἡ Δίκη γε ξυμμάχων ὑπερστατεῖ.
>
> Βα. εἴπερ γ' ἀπ' ἀρχῆς πραγμάτων κοινωνὸς ἦν.
>
> Χο. αἰδοῦ σὺ πρύμναν πόλεος ὦδ' ἐστεμμένην.
>
> Βα. πέφρικα λεύσσων τάσδ' ἕδρας κατασκίους.

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[391] Papadopoulou (2011: 43).
[392] Burian (2006: 204); cf. Turner (2001: 35-6).
[393] Papadopoulou (2011: 42); Bowen (2013): 24. Cf. Parker (2009: 136), 'moral blackmail'; Susanetti (2018: 190), 'aggravated blackmail', and Hose (2014: 44), 'Erpressung'.
[394] Conacher 1996: 91 ('incipient violence'); Bowen *ad* 455-79: ('the paradoxical violence of the weaker party').
[395] Sommerstein (2010: 97-8).
[396] Rosenmeyer (1982: 305).
[397] Turner (2001: 46); Bowen (2013: 3).
[398] Susanetti (2018: 191-2).

Χο. βαρύς γε μέντοι Ζηνὸς ἱκεσίου κότος. (340-347)[399]

In this exchange, the Chorus try to guide Pelasgus towards their own concerns: first, they seek to allay his anxiety about any military conflict, then they point out that, even if Argos' practical security is endangered, so is its religious integrity.[400] Pelasgus' shudder in 346 has generally been understood as a mark of their success, since he focuses his attention on the appeal in front of him (τάσδ'); πέφρικα implies a strong, involuntary, physiological reaction. Yet this must not be mistaken for some pre-conscious startle reflex: φρίσσω may introduce complex 'fear-clauses', and regularly attaches to objects not fearsome in themselves, but in what they presage.[401] In this line, the real object of the fear is uncertain: Pelasgus may shudder at his religious obligations, or he may still be thinking of the war that will follow on their fulfilment (cf. 342 and πόλεος, 345).[402] The Chorus' answer, in 347, highlights the alternative threat of Zeus' anger, as a consequence of *rejecting* their supplication. The repetition of βαρέα–βαρύς (342, 347) serves to point the dispute: the question is what is to be feared.

Many scholars have pointed to the employment of the same adjective by Agamemnon, in his response to Calchas at Aulis: βαρεῖα μὲν κὴρ τὸ μὴ πιθέσθαι· | βαρεῖα δ' εἰ | τέκνον δαΐξω (*Ag.* 206-8). It is true that both kings face a terrible choice, torn between contrary obligations. Yet the dramaturgy of that dilemma is entirely different. Agamemnon's deliberation is brief and monologic: forty-two words in the protagonist's voice, without

[399] I follow Page and H. Friis Johansen's first edition (1970) in the traditional attribution of line 347 to the Chorus (*paragraphoi* are missing for 346 and 347 in the MS). Since FJW, most editors (West, Sommerstein, Sandin, Bowen, Sommerstein[2]) have given it to Pelasgus, though Griffith (1986: 334) remains dubious.

[400] Conacher (1996: 90): 'Immediately, the Chorus-Leader, having failed to win her case on its own terms, so to speak, changes her approach and bids the King respect the suppliant wreaths about the city's gods.' Her purpose in the argument is, however, constant: to make accepting the Danaid supplication less frightening than rejecting it.

[401] On this verb, see my lexical study.

[402] So Sommerstein[2] (*ad* 347), *contra* FJW (*ad* 357-8), who think the fear of 346 'concerns the consequence of rejecting the Danaids'.

interruption from other speakers. It is Agamemnon who vividly imagines 'polluting his fatherly hands with girl-slaughtering streams', on the one hand, and the criminal charge of λιπόναυς on the other (209-13).[403] When exactly the decision takes place, and the role of divine forces, may be disputed, but Agamemnon does not consult or debate with his human peers; according to the choral narrative that follows his reported speech, it is he himself who 'breathes an impious veering of the mind (φρενός)', and 'changes his mind (φρονεῖν μετέγνω) to thoughts of utmost daring' (218-221).

In the *Suppliants*, by contrast, the deliberation is dialogic, and extended over 130 lines. This is significant: while Agamemnon seems to recognise without assistance the two grievous options open to him, Pelasgus must be brought to his dilemma, and eventually his decision, through discussion with others.[404] Indeed, throughout the *epirrhema*, Pelasgus returns continually to the fearful consequences of accepting the Danaids (357-8, 399-400), while they repeatedly remind him of his supposed religious responsibilities. The King acknowledges these only when prompted: it is only when the Chorus sing of the differential treatment of the 'holy man' (ἀνδρὸς ἁγνοῦ, 364) who respects suppliants, that the King starts worrying about pollution (μιαίνεται, 366);[405] it is only when they tell him to 'guard against guilt' (ἄγος φυλάσσου, 375), that he admits it is 'unwise to disregard these prayers' (378). Even his desire to sink into deep thought (407) is reframed as a question to the Chorus (μῶν οὐ δοκεῖ δεῖν φροντίδος σωτηρίου;, 417); and this period of apparent introspection is overwritten, in dramatic terms, by a choral ode

[403] For its associations see Raeburn/Thomas *ad loc*. Fraenkel argues that it is with this rhetorical image of desertion that the King's mind 'is made up'. Denniston/Page counter (*ad loc.* and pp.xxiv-xxvi) that the second option is 'unthinkable'. The scholarship on Agamemnon's decision is vast: for a recent account with bibliography, see Lawrence (2013: 74-83).
[404] Cf. Lesky (1966: 81).
[405] The 'hint' of 364 is identified by Sommerstein[2]. The resonance of ἁγνοῦ (364) and ἄγος (375, 376), whether etymological (cf. Beekes *s.v.*) or phonetic, may add to the intensity of their pressure.

brimming with cognitive instruction: φρόντισον, μηδ' ἴδῃς, γνῶθι, μή τλᾶις εἰσιδεῖν, ἴσθι, φράσαι (418-37). As Bowen puts it, the Chorus give him 'material for thought':[406] images of violence and violation, and further warnings of divine retribution. Pelasgus's response suggests that he has heard them (καὶ δὴ πέφρασμαι, 438).

It is here that Snell isolated the birth of tragic consciousness, the individual searching within himself, the dramatization of thought itself. However, his translator, Thomas Rosenmeyer, reading the same scene, comes to the opposite conclusion: 'Aeschylus prefers not to articulate the process of deliberation', he writes. 'The agony of decision-making is hinted at but largely displaced and in effect neutralized by imagery, silence, and the intrusion of the chorus'.[407] The imagery I will turn to in the next section, but first it is necessary to vindicate this 'intrusion'. It is true that 'there is no reasoned speech in which Pelasgus explores the pros and cons in detail', but this is only one model of deliberation. Here, the 'pros and cons' are not elaborated by Pelasgus alone; instead, they emerge through his negotiation with the Chorus. The hero does not decide independently, as Snell would have it, but in collaboration with others.

This kind of interpersonal or 'social' reasoning – as opposed to Snell's private deliberation – has recently gained significant attention in both moral philosophy and cognitive science. Against the Enlightenment elevation of the individual, Habermas posited a kind of 'communicative reason', particularly relevant in the negotiation of moral and political problems. 'Practical reason,' Habermas wrote, 'can no longer be founded in the transcendental subject'; rather, as an intersubjective 'procedure',

[406] *ad* 418. Cf. Rosenmeyer (1982: 305): 'The materials that must go into [Pelasgus'] pondering are given in a brief chorus song that is delivered while the king is silent…'
[407] Rosenmeyer (1982: 305). The same passage is critiqued by Carroll (forthcoming).

rationality is achieved through consensus and negotiation.[408] Cognitive science, too, has reached an 'intersubjective turn': it is recognised that 'individuals participate in each other's sense-making';[409] even 'self-reflection' (such as that of Snell's Pelasgus) is a social act, involving the adoption of other perspectives.[410]

Language is central to both of these theories; necessarily interpersonal, its shared symbols allow normative values to be framed and reframed in mutual exchange. Tragedy, as Simon Goldhill and others have pointed out, often works through such lexical contestation,[411] and this scene of deliberation is no different: starting with βαρέα–βαρύς (342, 347), the King and the Danaids constantly pick up on each other's vocabulary, syntax, and imagery.[412] These resonances reflect a shared moral universe, in which propositions and values may be tested and interrogated; participants in such a dialogue can be persuaded, signalling their final agreement in a common language.

We see just such a dynamic unfold in this scene. The King notably avoids one crucial phrase introduced by the Chorus at the end of the initial stichomythia: Ζηνὸς ἱκεσίου κότος (347). This anger is the nub of the Danaid argument, the fear they are trying to engage. They repeat the threat almost word-for-word at 385 (μένει τοι Ζηνὸς ἱκταίου κότος), and tirelessly articulate its component parts. Almost immediately they are asking Pelasgus to 'see [them] as the suppliant' (ἴδε με τὰν ἱκέτιν, 350), a phrase itself reframed at the end of the *epirrhema* (τὰν ἱκέτιν εἰσιδεῖν, 429). Early on, they repeat their appeal to

[408] (1976: 120), cited (Jay 2016: 125).
[409] De Jaegher (2018).
[410] Gillespie (2007).
[411] Goldhill (1984), for example, highlights the thematic use of λόγος, πατήρ, δίκη, and other terms in the *Oresteia*. Rutherford (2012: 89-95) adopts a more cautious approach to keywords.
[412] E.g. ἴδε–ὁρῶ (350, 354); ἄνατον–ἄνατον (356, 359); ἐφέστιοι–ἑστίαν (365, 372); κρῖνε–εὔκριτον–κρῖμα–κριτήν (396, 397); φροντίδος–φρόντισον (417, 418). For more examples, see FJW *ad* 348-437. Bowen (*ad* 348-437) notes that each party speaks an almost equal number of words (218 vs 215).

a suppliant Zeus (ἱκεσία Θέμις Διὸς κλαρίου, 360), and will invoke τὸν ὑψόθεν σκοπόν (381) by name again at 402-3 (ὁμαίμων… Ζεύς) and 437 (δίκαια Διόθεν). The anger returns at 427, in a succinct summary of their warnings: φύλαξαι κότον.

Pelasgus refuses to adopt any of these three keywords in the *epirrhema*.[413] The suppliants are referred to as κατάσκιον | νεύονθ' ὅμιλον (354-5), ἐφέστιοι (365), even as ἐν θεῶν ἕδραισιν ᾧδ' ἱδρυμένας, but never ἱκέτις, or ἱκέτιδες.[414] In his first longer *rhesis* (407-417), he worries about the βαρὺν ξύνοικον … ἀλάστορα (415, cf. βαρύς, 347), but does not credit it with κότος. In his second *rhesis* (438-54) he will mention Zeus, but only a hypothetical Zeus Ktesios (448). It is only in his third and final *rhesis* (468-89), when the King yields, that he adopts this specific language:

> ὅμως δ' ἀνάγκη Ζηνὸς αἰδεῖσθαι κότον
>
> ἱκτῆρος· ὕψιστος γὰρ ἐν βροτοῖς φόβος. (478-9)

We should not be deceived by ἀνάγκη here: Pelasgus, like Agamemnon, *chooses* the least awful, the least fearful course.[415] Hence he now accepts – and repeats – their arguments without a word of rebuke; he even gives a justification (γάρ) for his decision. Having recognised the correct (or 'necessary') course, Pelasgus expresses no further doubts, and

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[413] Pelasgus does once speak of his enemies as παλιγκότοι (376), but he will not consider divine κότος.
[414] Pelasgus earlier acknowledges they have come as suppliants (ἱκνεῖσθαι, 333), judging from their appearance. Once he knows their demands, however, he studiously avoids this language.
[415] Cf. *Ag*. 218-9 ἀνάγκας ἔδυ λέπαδνον, with the excellent reading of Judet de La Combe (2009: 291-8), who demonstrates that 'le roi ne sacrifice aucune liberté[;] il analyse, et décide'. Lesky (1966: 79-81) suggests that a combination of freedom and compulsion is implied by *Supp*. 478-9; Cairns (1993: 192 n.44): 'a virtual compulsion … imposed by the recognition [of the] consequences'. On the question of autonomy, compulsion, and responsibility in tragedy, see Lawrence (2013). Compare also Arist. *Eth. Eud.* II.8 and *Eth. Nic.* III.1, and discussion in Arnold (2001), Meyer (2011: 98-110), and Lienemann (2013). In the more mature treatise, Aristotle distinguishes between truly 'forced actions', and 'things done because of fear of greater evils'. The latter, he says, are 'voluntary' – and treated as voluntary by his Classical contemporaries – because 'at the actual time when they are done they are chosen' and 'the origin of the movement of the instrumental parts in such acts lies within [the actor]' (*Eth. Nic.* II.1109b35-1110a23). For *anagke* in Thucydides, see discussion in Chapter One.

no regrets; his acquiescence in the Danaid position is both total and final.[416] When the messenger, in the next episode, paraphrases Pelasgus' speech to the Argive assembly, it is striking that an almost identical phrase returns (Ζηνὸς ἱκεσίου κότον, 616 cf. 347): the king apparently reproduces the same fearful arguments used by the Chorus (615-20). Like Pelasgus, the δῆμος is 'persuaded' (πειθώ, 523; ἔπειθε, 615; εὐπειθής, 623).[417] By a process of public deliberation, by means of δημηγόρους … στροφάς, they are brought to recognise the ὕψιστος φόβος. Their decision is (according to Danaus) unanimous (ἔκραν' ἄνευ κλητῆρος, 622), and claims divine approval (Ζεὺς δ' ἐπέκρανεν τέλος, 624).[418] Fear is again the agent of persuasion, of 'social reasoning': if there is 'compulsion', it is simply that of the stronger argument.[419]

The most important lexical patterning in this dialogue, however, is that of αἰδώς. As mentioned earlier, this term suggests a religious responsibility to respect the Danaids, *qua* suppliants of Zeus (640-1).[420] The word may also carry a sense of vulnerability and a recognition of human or social limitation – hence its occasional inhibitory force. In this scene, as we will see, αἰδώς is transferred from the Danaids to the divine anger that they threaten, and thus becomes a kind of fear.[421]

The Chorus began by praying to be received with an αἰδοῖον πνεῦμα (28) and Danaus recommended that his daughters employ αἰδοῖα … ἔπη (194), 'words deserving of

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[416] Contrast the explicit 'unwillingness' of Hephaestus (ἄκων, [Aesch.] *PV* 19), the persistent αἰδώς of Agamemnon after yielding (*Ag.* 948), the regretful tears shed by the Argive champions (*Sept*. 50-1). For the relationship between *anagke* and '(un)willingness', see note 12 above and Rickert (1989: 15-93).
[417] The text is uncertain here: either the δῆμος is 'obedient', or the speech is 'persuasive'; my point is that πειθώ is responsible.
[418] On the fearful basis of this civic decision, see Visvardi (2015: 134-5); on its unanimity, see Budelmann (2018).
[419] For the traditional opposition of *peitho* and *bia*, see Buxton (1982: 58-63). As Buxton admits, the opposition is sometimes undercut for paradoxical effect, e.g. Aesch. *Ag.* 385 βιᾶται δ' ἀ τάλαινα Πειθώ.
[420] For the role of *aidos* in supplication, see Cairns (1993).
[421] For inhibition (ὄκνος, αἰδώς, αἰσχύνη, σέβας) as a species of fear, see my lexical discussion..

respect' (tr. Collard).[422] Accordingly, the Danaids now seek to elicit Pelasgus' 'respect' at 345 (αἰδοῦ σὺ…), and again in the *epirrhema*, requesting that he 'respect one that turns to him for succour' (ποτιτρόπαιον αἰδόμενος, 362). After Pelasgus' attempted disengagement (452-4), the Chorus demand his attention once more: πολλῶν ἄκουσον τέρματ᾽ αἰδοίων λόγων (455). Commentators regularly see this as the 'turning point' (τέρμα) of the scene, with the announcement of new tactics on the part of the Danaids; in the ensuing stichomythia they will make their crucial suicide threat.[423] Bowen thus suggests that the girls' earlier 'respect [has been] qualified', but that by contrast 'the immodesty of 457 is palpable'; Sommerstein[2] declares that 'what they have to say now will be very far from respectful'. In context, however, αἰδοίων in 455 is clearly passive in emphasis: the Danaids' ultimate purpose is to win αἰδώς, not to show it. τέρματ', meanwhile, refers not simply to this line, but looks forward to the threat what follows:[424] 'Listen to the *culmination* of [my] many αἰδώς-eliciting arguments.'[425] Sure enough, when Pelasgus finally concedes, it is with the verb αἰδεῖσθαι (479, see above); in his response, Danaus will immediately identify Pelasgus as an αἰδοῖον … πρόξενον (491);[426] the Argive people, accepting their supplication, are said (by the Chorus) to 'respect the supplicants of Zeus' (αἰδοῦνται δ᾽ ἱκέτας Διός, 641). This lexical continuity belies the

[422] Contrast 'words that display respect' (Sommerstein) or 'words of respect' (Bowen). Sandin rightly argues that the more common 'passive' sense prevails here ('*commanding* reverence/pity'). See LSJ A.1, *DGE* I.1 s.v. αἰδοῖος, and Cairns (1993: 185-7) (on *Supp.* 194). *LFrGE* s.v. lists cases of an ambivalent 'activ. und passiv.' sense, frequently applied to young women; Cairns suggests 'reciprocity' as a norm.

[423] Buxton (1982: 75) oddly implies that they give up on language altogether: 'Since the girls have so far failed in their attempt to persuade him *by words*, they resort to a more direct form of action by *threatening* suicide' (my emphasis). In fact, Pelasgus will treat their threat as emphatically verbal: ἤκουσα μαστικτῆρα καρδίας λόγον (466); μίασμ᾽ ἔλεξας οὐχ ὑπερτοξεύσιμον (473).

[424] Cf. Burian's translation: 'Hear the *last* of many righteous pleas.' For this sense of τέρμα, see LSJ s.v. II.3, and especially Pind. *Isthm*. 4.67. In another way, the suicide-threat was always the τέρμα of the Danaid plan, as they hinted in the parodos (157-60).

[425] Cairns (1993: 192) suggests that τέρματ᾽ αἰδοίων λόγων is double in sense: as well as a 'culmination' of the efforts to elicit αἰδώς from Pelasgus, the Danaids signal an 'a departure from the normal, passive suppliant appeal to *aidos*' and 'an abandonment of the ['respectful'] *aidos* actively urged on [them] by their father.'

[426] Again, this is often regarded as active (FJW: 'showing αἰδώς'; cf. Sommerstein, Bowen), but Cairns (1993: 185 n.20) suggests 'ambivalence', since Pelasgus' display of αἰδώς to the suppliants 'makes him deserving of their αἰδώς in return'.

idea of a turning-point in the Danaids' approach. Their aim is consistent: to cultivate a specific fear in Pelasgus, namely, the fear of Zeus' retribution.

This fear they call αἰδώς, but Pelasgus recognises it also as a kind of φόβος – indeed, as the 'highest φόβος among men' (479). The phrase confirms, if αἰδώς were not enough, that this is a culturally saturated fear, particular to the human animal; ὕψιστος signals not only its religious object but also, in the superlative, an element of comparison, of calibration. Pelasgus makes a *normative* judgment, and in doing so aligns himself not just with the Chorus (τὸν ὑψόθεν σκοπόν, 381) but with a body of classical piety.[427] To call the fear of Zeus ὕψιστος is to invoke the cult of Zeus Hypsistos, and the shared set of beliefs that name implies.[428] Pelasgus' fear does not subtract from his moral and religious responsibilities; instead, it is integral to them.

At the same time, the noun φόβος recalls Pelasgus' earlier statement of his dilemma, and resolves it:

> ὑμῖν δ' ἀρήγειν οὐκ ἔχω βλάβης ἄτερ·
> οὐδ' αὖ τόδ' εὖφρον, τάσδ' ἀτιμάσαι λιτάς.
> ἀμηχανῶ δὲ καὶ φόβος μ' ἔχει φρένας
> δρᾶσαί τε μὴ δρᾶσαί τε καὶ τύχην ἑλεῖν. (377-80)

Confronted with two[429] possible courses of action, Pelasgus is fearful of each; the combination of these fears seems to render the king helpless (ἀμηχανῶ). It might seem

[427] Cf. *Trag. Adesp.* 356: φόβος τὰ θεῖα τοῖσι σώφροσιν βροτῶν.
[428] ὕψιστος is an epithet of Zeus at *Eum*. 28 (cf. Soph. *Trach*. 1191, Ζηνὸς ὕψιστον πάγον) and Pausanias has him worshipped under this name at Thebes and Olympia; there was a shrine to Zeus Hupatos on the acropolis (Paus. I.26.5). Whether Pelasgus' elevation of the *fear* of Zeus is in fact conventional cannot be known, but compare Soph. *Phil*. 1289, ἀπώμοσ' ἀγνοῦ Ζηνὸς ὑψίστου σέβας (pler. codd.).
[429] The three infinitives of 380 are all dependant on both ἀμηχανῶ and φόβος, but the third is probably an extension of the second option (Sommerstein; Rosenmeyer). Alternatively, it is 'explicative' of both (FJW; cf. Sandin, Sommerstein[2]).

apt to compare Gorgias' *Helen* 17, where fear is said to 'extinguish and drive out thought' (ἀπέσβεσε καὶ ἐξήλασεν ὁ φόβος τὸ νόημα).[430] Note, however, the location of Pelasgus' φόβος, in the φρένες: so Rosenmeyer translates: 'fear grips me *as I think* / To act or not to act and grasp this chance'.[431] Rather than a 'deprivation' of thought,[432] this fear is both 'the outcome of a reflection' (FJW), and a stimulus to further deliberation (φροντίς, 407, 417, 418).[433] The King's *amechania* is only temporary. The two fears are weighed against one another in the dispute; finally, with 479, one φόβος is found to be ὕψιστος.

To sum up: the decision to help the suppliants is not 'forced' on Pelasgus, any more than it is 'private and independent'. Instead, the Danaids persuade him that the dangers of pollution and divine retribution are graver than t of war with the Egyptians. They do not use violence, nor are they charged with it; Pelasgus takes full responsibility for his choice. His fears are the normative fears of Greek society. Indeed, as Peter Burian points out, they are part of what defines him as a Greek: pious and thoughtful, with 'swift and lucid comprehension of the need to decide between dreadful evils', he is concerned above all for the 'safety of the state'.[434] Thus he carries the Danaid warnings to the assembly, where the Argives, too, are persuaded. His fear is not only compatible with reason and religion; it is deliberative and democratic. This is a far cry from de Romilly's unanchored, inexplicable dread – and much closer to Aristotle's analysis, to which I will now turn.

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[430] See discussion Ch. o1 (p.87) (Ch 1) and Ch. 2 (p.111).
[431] Rosenmeyer (1982: 304). Compare Danaus' advice to his terrified daughters, discussed above: σὺ δὲ | φρόνει μὲν ὡς ταρβοῦσα μὴ ἀμελεῖν θεῶν (772-3).
[432] Sansone (1975: 75).
[433] Cf. Snell (1928: 60): 'der *phobos*, der schon aus der Reflexion entstanden ist, treibt zu immer neuem Nachdenken'. Compare *Ag.* 1243-4, where the same expression accompanies comprehension (ξυνῆκα καὶ πέφρικα, καὶ φόβος μ' ἔχει | κλύοντ' ἀληθῶς οὐδὲν ἐξηκασμένα) and 'dread … do[es] not so much detract from rational understanding as support it' (Budelmann/Easterling (2010: 297)).
[434] Burian (2006: 205).

Pelasgus: Phantastic Thought:

Pelasgus' mental process is comparable to the cautious 'thought' espoused by Danaus, Pelasgus, and the Argive Chorus, and inconsistently by the Danaids. In this thought – elaborated in dialogue, through a combination of deliberation and persuasion – we can also recognise a forerunner to the φόβος βουλευτικός of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*.[435] I suggested in the introduction to this thesis that Aeschylus's representation of fear is best understood as 'classical', rather than 'archaic'; in this sense, Snell is right to claim a fundamental continuity in 'conceptual thought' between Pelasgus and Plato, even if he mistakes this continuity for individualist Kantian 'abstraction'.[436] Pelasgus' fearful thought is not individual, but social. Moreover, Snell overlooks the physiological, 'embodied' elements of Aristotelian thought, and of Pelasgus' emotional deliberation. The latter will surface when we attend more closely to the mechanism of his conversion.

To understand this, it is useful to look not at the *Rhetoric* but at *On the Soul* and *On the Movement of Animals.* In the former treatise, as is often pointed out, emotions are λόγοι ἔνυλοι, and must have physiological as well as psychological foundations. Thus anger is both a boiling of the blood and a longing for revenge. The material substrate of fear is not so clearly defined, but there are frequent references to the cooling of the blood; as in Aeschylus, the heart (καρδία) is often in focus.[437]

[435] See Chapter Two.
[436] Snell (1928: 84): 'Wir sehen, wie der Weg der Abstraktion und des begrifflicheren Denkens nach vorn fürht: er geht gradlinig von Aischylos zu Platon. Nach rückwarts verschwimmt alles im Dunkel.' For the embodiment of fear in early Plato, see Chapter Two, p.114, n.296.
[437] For discussion of these texts, see Chapter Two.

Most relevant to Pelasgus, however, are the discussions of φαντασία and the νοῦς πρακτικός. In the *Rhetoric*, we are told that φόβος is a pain or disturbance arising from the 'appearance' (φαντασία) of imminent evil; the evil must 'appear' (φαίνηται) near enough to be imminent, and 'appear' (φαίνεται) to be capable of inflicting great pain (II.1382a21-2). This 'appearance' is earlier said to be a kind of 'weak sensation' (ἡ δὲ φαντασία ἐστὶν αἴσθησίς τις ἀσθενής, I.1370a28), such as is produced by hope or memory, rather than direct sensory stimulation.

This analogous relationship finds fuller expression in *On the Soul*. There φαντασία is defined as 'the faculty by which we say that an image (φάντασμα) is presented to us'; though unreliable, and indeed partly volitional, 'it is a movement produced by sensation actually operating' (III.428a2-4; 429a2-4). Later, Aristotle is trying to explain the process of 'locomotion' – how the soul moves the body. He starts with a basic sensorimotor system: 'when a [sensory] object is pleasant or unpleasant, the soul pursues or avoids it' (431a8-10). Higher animals, however, are capable of more abstract motivation:

> τῇ δὲ διανοητικῇ ψυχῇ τὰ φαντάσματα οἷον αἰσθήματα ὑπάρχει. ὅταν δὲ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν φήσῃ ἢ ἀποφήσῃ, φεύγει ἢ διώκει. διὸ οὐδέποτε νοεῖ ἄνευ φαντάσματος ἡ ψυχή. (III.431a15-17)

In this way, the faculty of 'thought', νόησις, is made dependent on the faculty of φαντασία; indeed φαντάσματα are the building blocks of practical deliberation: in the absence of physical stimuli,

> τοῖς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ φαντάσμασιν ἢ νοήμασιν ὥσπερ ὁρῶν [τὸ νοητικὸν] λογίζεται καὶ βουλεύεται τὰ μέλλοντα πρὸς τὰ παρόντα. (III.431b3-6)

The same idea is expressed in emotional terms in *On the Movement of Animals*:

> αἱ μὲν γὰρ αἰσθήσεις εὐθὺς ὑπάρχουσιν ἀλλοιώσεις τινὲς οὖσαι, ἡ δὲ φαντασία καὶ ἡ νόησις τὴν τῶν πραγμάτων ἔχουσι δύναμιν· τρόπον γάρ τινα τὸ εἶδος τὸ νοούμενον τὸ τοῦ θερμοῦ ἢ ψυχροῦ ἢ ἡδέος ἢ φοβεροῦ τοιοῦτον τυγχάνει ὂν οἷόν περ καὶ τῶν πραγμάτων ἕκαστον, διὸ καὶ φρίττουσι καὶ φοβοῦνται νοήσαντες μόνον. (701b17-22).

This kind of φαντασία – which Aristotle calls φαντασία λογιστική (*De an.* III.433b29) or φαντασία βουλευτική (434a7), to distinguish it from φαντασία αἰσθητική – presents objects of desire (ὄρεξις) to the thinking soul, allowing it to pursue less obvious goals.[438] It is significant that the 'phantasmatic' objects precipitate the same physiological response as their real-world, 'aesthetic' counterparts, including emotional responses such as fear; these emotions are crucial in the development from thought to action (*De motu an.* 702a18-20).[439]

However, not every φάντασμα is acted upon. In *On the Soul*, Aristotle contrasts our 'immediate reaction' when we *believe* that something is dangerous, with our reaction κατὰ τὴν φαντασίαν, where 'we are like spectators (ὥσπερ … οἱ θεώμενοι) looking at something dreadful or encouraging in a picture' (III.427b22-26). Within the emotional field, phantasmatic experience allows for simulation, analysis, and judgment between desirable and undesirable outcomes.[440] These outcomes may be juxtaposed and compared before action is taken:

> ἡ μὲν οὖν αἰσθητικὴ φαντασία, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις ὑπάρχει, ἡ δὲ βουλευτικὴ ἐν τοῖς λογιστικοῖς. πότερον γὰρ πράξει τόδε ἢ τόδε, λογισμοῦ

[438] Aristotle goes on (701b32-6) to frame this motivation in terms of a 'practical syllogism', where the first premise is provided by the appetite ('I am thirsty'), and the second is presented by perception, imagination or thought ('Here's drink'). For discussion, see Gill (1996: 50).
[439] This passage is furthered discussed in Chapter Two.
[440] This fits with the recent hypotheses of Damasio (1994) and Clark (2015), cited above.

> ἤδη ἐστὶν ἔργον· καὶ ἀνάγκη ἑνὶ μετρεῖν· τὸ μεῖζον γὰρ διώκει. ὥστε δύναται ἓν ἐκ πλειόνων φαντασμάτων ποιεῖν.
>
> (III.434a5-11)

As Nussbaum explains, this 'combination' of φαντάσματα in the 'work of calculation' (λογισμοῦ … ἔργον) may be understood in two ways. According to the first, each φάντασμα represents a different option or outcome, which, in the process of deliberation, must be compared according to a single standard of 'the greater good' (τὸ μεῖζον), so that the soul can choose *this rather than that*; from such a process of combination and comparison emerges a singular φαντασία, presenting the desired option. Alternatively, the φαντάσματα represent a sequence of events, following on from one another*, this then that*; the sequence must be synthesized into a single φαντασία, presenting this option as an object of desire. Such a sequence-φαντασία, representing a chain of events as more or less desirable, can then be compared with another sequence-φαντασία, according to that single standard of 'the greater good'.[441] This comparison of sequential φαντάσματα corresponds to the most complex processes of deliberation – such as, I will show, are displayed in Aeschylus.

I have argued above that Pelasgus' decision to help the Danaids is arrived at through persuasion, rather than coercion, and that a thoughtful, consultative fear is the medium of this deliberative process. What remains is to examine the stages of his conversion, and the forms this fear takes. From the first, it is marked as a mental event – φόβος μ' ἔχει φρένας (379) – but Aeschylus goes further, foregrounding, as Snell recognised, the 'mental process' involved in the decision.

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[441] Nussbaum (1978: 263-4). For *phantasia* as a basis for emotion in Aristotle, see Sihvola (1996), and my Chapter Two.

This is achieved through a complex web of interlocking imagery, starting with the famous diver image of my epigraph:

> δεῖ τοι βαθείας φροντίδος σωτηρίου,
>
> δίκην κολυμβητῆρος εἰς βύθον μολεῖν
>
> δεδορκὸς ὄμμα μηδ᾽ ἄγαν ὠνωμένον. (407-9)

What can we make of this image? First, we should note that φροντίς encapsulates the prudent, fearful thought so thematised in this play: the noun, a favourite of Aeschylus, suggests both a state of mind (anxiety) and a mental activity (deliberation); here, as elsewhere in tragedy,[442] it is σωτηρίου. Depth, meanwhile, is regularly associated with thinking, and the φρένες, in archaic poetry; the image seems particularly connected with planning and plotting.[443] Here, however, the conventional 'depth' of thought serves as a metaphorical 'pivot', the profundity of thought suggesting the profundity of the sea, into which a diver plunges. Michael Silk, however, notes that it is not the sea but rather the *diver* who is made analogous to thought, and that the quality of depth is thus transferred from agent to environment; he sees no 'propriety' in this 'dissonant effect'.[444] The syntax, too, is strangely convoluted, as a genitival construction is juxtaposed with an infinitive phrase;[445] the subject of that infinitive, μολεῖν, should be the accusative δεδορκὸς ὄμμα, but some critics have found it too 'grotesque' that the 'seeing eye' should travel.[446] Yet this wandering and wondering eye, floating free of its syntactic frame, well expresses the

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[442] Aesch. *Pers*. 142, *Ag*.1530-1; Soph. *OT* 170-1.
[443] See *Od*. 17.66 etc. κακὰ φρεσὶ βυσσοδόμευον; Aesch. *Pers*. 142; *Supp*. 1057-8 (discussed above).
[444] Silk (1976: 96 n.4). The scholiast's effort to reconcile the images (δεῖ δὴ εἰς βυθὸν μολεῖν φροντίδος βαθείας σωτηερίου δίκην κολυμβητῆρος), rejected as not credible by FJW, reflects this awkwardness. Sansone (1975: 22-3) argues that both the ὄμμα and the βυθός represent the φρένες, which is descending *into itself*.
[445] FJW: 'the import of the first line is amplified by the acc. c. infin. construction in the second and third'; Sommerstein[2]: 'the accusative-infinitive construction is best taken as final-consecutive' (*contra* Sommerstein).
[446] Bowen. Sandin sees ambiguity: 'the subject is not certainly defined'.

transition from 'aesthetic' to 'phantasmatic' experience. Carroll, who takes a 'cognitive linguistic' approach, aptly explains this 'emergent property':

> Thought, unlike perception, allows a person to 'see' a possible outcome or opportunity without having to move closer to it in reality – the eye of cognition can be detached from its owner's present circumstances – and Pelasgus is unwilling to commit to a particular course of action until he has left time for his deliberations to come across fresh considerations.[447]

As a depiction of thought, this is very much in tune with Aristotle's φαντασία λογιστική, which enables the mind 'to calculate and deliberate *just as if it were seeing'*. The point is not so much that 'thought and perceiving are the same',[448] but rather that thinking involves imagination, and imagination simulates sensation – in this case, sight.[449]

Such second sight is, of course, difficult, as the diver image suggests: to keep one's eye open and 'seeing' (δεδορκός) underwater requires discipline and sobriety. And although the metaphor fades here, the syntax bears the strain of this calculative imagination: a further seven lines, introduced by ὅπως, detail the outcomes that this visual exploration is supposed to avert:[450]

> ὅπως ἄνατα ταῦτα πρῶτα μὲν πόλει,
> αὐτοῖσί θ' ἡμῖν ἐκτελευτήσει καλῶς,
> καὶ μήτε δῆρις ῥυσίων ἐφάψεται

[447] (Forthcoming).
[448] So Aristotle characterises the embodied psychology of οἱ ἀρχαῖοι, with Empedocles and Homer as his examples (*De an.* III.427a22-30); cf. Padel (1992: 44).
[449] The most striking tragic parallel is Soph. *OT* 67-9, where Oedipus reports that he has 'wandered far and wide in his thought' (πολλὰς δ' ὁδοὺς ἐλθόντα φροντίδος πλάνοις, 67, tr. Jebb) while 'looking closely' (εὖ σκοπῶν) for a solution to the plague.
[450] For ὅπως with the future indicative following verbs of precaution such as φροντίζω, see *Cambridge Grammar of Classical Greek* (*CGCG*) ch. 44 and Goodwin *MT* 339. (Tucker offers a useful paraphrase of 407-10: δεῖ βαθέως φροντίσαι ὅπως …). van Emde Boas suggests (in person) that this construction might alternatively be glossed as an indirect question: 'there is need of consideration … *how* these things might end well …' (cf. *CGCG* 44.5).

μήτ’ ἐν θεῶν ἕδραισιν ᾧδ’ ἱδρυμένας

ἐκδόντες ὑμᾶς τὸν πανώλεθρον θεὸν

βαρὺν ξύνοικον θησόμεσθ’ ἀλάστορα,

ὃς οὐδ’ ἐν Ἅιδου τὸν θανόντ’ ἐλευθεροῖ·

μῶν οὐ δοκεῖ δεῖν φροντίδος σωτηρίου; (410-17)

The first pair of these lines sets out Pelasgus’ two ‘positive’ goals, that he and his city should survive unharmed. Here, after five iambic lines (407-11), the audience will have expected the King to stop, in keeping with the pattern followed throughout the *epirrhema*. Yet the syntax lurches on: two unwanted outcomes – battle or polluted violation – are elaborated over a further five lines (412-6). Pelasgus is figuratively submerged in ‘deep thought’ until line 416. The extended sentence, all strung off the initial δεῖ of 407, is a staggering 53 words long – and that in a play noted for short sentences and simple syntax.[451] The second negative outcome (μήτ’ ἐν θεῶν …, 413-16) involves three participles and a relative clause as well as a finite verb; these figure four different timeframes, with a sequence of eventualities. Although the King is not immediately successful, he is attempting to compare phantasmatic outcomes, in Aristotelian style. Pelasgus’ final line (417) recalls his first, reminding the audience that all this deliberation must take place within ‘(deep), saving thought’.[452] Such is the cognitive complexity of φαντασία λογιστική, negotiating a variety of fearful outcomes.

The intervening choral song (418-37) we have already discussed: Pelasgus receives the cognitive input that he has asked for. They finish by telling him to ‘consider’ (φράσαι,

[451] Sommerstein[2]: ‘the longest spoken sentence in the play’. Ireland (1977: 205) notes the ‘overwhelming tendency of this play towards simplicity of syntax’; the *Suppliants* also has the shortest average sentence-length of Aeschylus’ surviving works, at 12.1 words (206).

[452] FJW, following van Otterlo’s terminology, label this ‘inclusive ring composition: i.e. ring composition with the function of making a … passage stand out clearly as a compositional unit’.

437); he tells them that he has considered (καὶ δὴ πέφρασμαι, 438), and responds with another metaphor.

> καὶ δὴ πέφρασμαι, δεῦρο δ' ἐξοκέλλεται·
> ἢ τοῖσιν ἢ τοῖς πόλεμον αἴρεσθαι μέγαν
> πᾶσ' ἔστ' ἀνάγκη, καὶ γεγόμφωται σκάφος
> στρέβλαισι ναυτικαῖσιν ὡς προσηγμένον.
> ἄνευ δὲ λύπης οὐδαμοῦ καταστροφή. (438-42)

This time, it seems, he is on land, where a ship is driven ashore (ἐξοκέλλεται, 438), but now ready to sail again (440-1).[453] The tenor of this image is usually taken to be Pelasgus' reflections;[454] as in 407-9, these reflections are figured as a journey of exploration. After the discovery that there are only two options – war with Aegyptids, or 'war' with the Danaids (and pollution) (439-40, 442) – the exploration has been suspended. As in the previous speech, the intellectual metaphors of the opening lines are programmatic for what follows: in place of practical deliberation focused on imminent eventualities, Pelasgus resorts to traditional, gnomic wisdom (443-7).[455] Some evils, he suggests, can be rectified *post facto*, whereas pollution requires aversive action: '… but to ensure that kindred blood shall not be spilt, one should make ample offerings, and many victims should fall in sacrifice to many gods' (449-51). Here Pelasgus repeats the syntax and some of the vocabulary of 407-17, an unusual ὅπως μή with a future indicative (γενήσεται) that is dependent on δεῖ. However, in this grammatical reprise, only one outcome is to be averted – war with the Aegyptids – and the remedy is not 'deep thought' but sacrifice. The syntactic echo thus serves as a tool of contrast, emphasizing Pelasgus' retreat from the marine adventures of fearful deliberation into a simpler prayer.

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[453] The text of this speech is corrupt. I follow Page's reconstruction.
[454] So Sansone, FJW, Carroll, Sommerstein[2]; Bowen reads the image differently, and suggests the ship is both the ship of state, running into trouble, and the Danaid's argument, whose landing cannot be resisted.
[455] For the topos, see *Il*. 9.406-9; Aesch. *Ag.* 1007-21; Eur. *Supp*. 775-7.

This retreat is made more explicit in the lines that follow:

> ἦ κάρτα νείκους τοῦδ᾽ ἐγὼ παροίχομαι·
>
> θέλω δ᾽ ἄιδρις μᾶλλον ἢ σοφὸς κακῶν
>
> εἶναι· γένοιτο δ᾽ εὖ παρὰ γνώμην ἐμήν. (452-4)

As Carroll argues, Pelasgus' decision to 'stand aside from the dispute' (452) not only returns Pelasgus to his position of political neutrality; it participates in the 'image-schema' of the forerunning lines. The King 'refuses to commit … to either of the two routes into the future … [H]is decision is to stay on the shore.' It is not, however, merely the 'boat of action' which remains unlaunched; the boat of thought, too, is beached. Pelasgus' detachment is psychological as well as political: 'How completely unconnected I *feel* with this quarrel' (Bowen, my emphasis).[456] Still more striking is Pelasgus' further determination, 'to be ignorant rather than knowledgeable about these troubles', hoping things will turn out well in despite of his γνώμη (453-4). Pelasgus' words are only partly explained by a wish to remain innocent;[457] his language suggests a total disengagement of the intellect. In particular, the adjective ἄιδρις ('unknowing', from οἶδα) signifies a termination of his earlier efforts to 'think' and deliberate about the future; before, he required a 'seeing eye', but now he wants to turn a blind one.[458]

Pelasgus' implicit withdrawal of φροντίς, and the seeing, fearing φρένες, will find an analogue in the Danaids' later refusal to 'gaze down the mind of Zeus, a bottomless view' (1057-8); at this point, however, they contest it. This is the context of their final,

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[456] For the emotional sense of παροίχομαι, cf. 738 and 786 (discussed above).
[457] FJW: 'skill, like knowledge can be equated with experience, and σοφὸς κακῶν basically means no more than *Pers*. 598 κακῶν ... ἔμπειρος'.
[458] Tucker's translation stresses the intellectual, deliberative element: 'skilless rather than learned in foretelling ills.' For the association of ἄιδρις with sight, cf. Soph. *Aj*. 911, where it is partnered with κωφός; *pace* FJW, it is also relevant to prophecy (Aesch. *Ag.* 1105: τούτων ἄιδρίς εἰμι τῶν μαντευμάτων).

fearsome threat, their αἰδοῖοι λόγοι (455): they are seeking not to coerce the King, but to make him *think*. In what does this thought consist? First, they return his attention to the immediate scene, from which he has so emphatically detached himself; they point to their belts and robes (457). 'From *these*,' (ἐκ τῶνδε) they say, '[will come] a fine method' (μηχανὴ καλή, 459); if he does not help '*this* band' (τῷδ' … στόλῳ, 461), they will decorate '*these* statues' (βρέτεα … τάδ, 463); 'from *these* statues' (ἐκ τῶνδ', 465) they will hang themselves. The deictics ground Pelasgus' imagination in the concrete world. Attending to present objects, however, is not enough: the Danaids want him to 'know' what is yet to happen, the future possibilities latent in these objects (ἴσθι … 459; cf. ἄιδρις 453). Their 'cruel' indirection is partly a tease, and partly a test: will the King re-engage his φροντίς?[459]

When Pelasgus finally understands, the emotional impact is felt not in the φρένες but in the 'heart' – the same organ that will host the Danaids' epirrhematic panic before the arrival of Pelasgus (κελαινόχρων … πάλλεται … κέαρ, 785).[460] Yet Pelasgus' horror should be distinguished from that dochmiac dread:

> Βα. ἤκουσα μαστικτῆρα καρδίας λόγον.
>
> Χο. ξυνῆκας· ὠμμάτωσα γὰρ σαφέστερον. (466-7)

This fear is the product of λόγος (cf. 455): it is rational discourse, not unanchored dread, that whips his heart into action.[461] This is 'thought' and 'feeling' combined: an argument that hurts. So the Chorus observe that he has 'understood' (ξυνῆκας) at last, before

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[459] 'Cruelty' and 'sardonic humour' is charged by FJW (*ad* 455-67; *ad* 463); Bowen (*ad* 455-79) speaks of 'ruthless wit'. Bednarowski (2010: 202-3) argues that ancient spectators may have been equally perplexed by these 'riddling words'.

[460] Discussed above.

[461] Compare the 'whip of persuasion' (μάστιγι Πειθοῦς) applied by Aphrodite to Medea at Pind. *Pyth*. 4.219; Buxton (1982: 40) sees here a 'satisfying *frisson* of oxymoron, since Peitho is normally opposed to force-compulsion'.

returning to the visual theme: 'I have given you clear sight' (Bowen). ὠμμάτωσα … σαφέστερον, of course, recalls the δεδορκὸς ὄμμα of 409, 'seeing clearly' in the depths; Pelasgus is now 'seeing' the future as he should.[462]

The correction to Pelasgus' thought is not simply a return to 407-17, however, where phantasmatic thought ranged across future possibilities. Then, there was no pleasure or pain associated with the simulation, no physiological arousal beyond that suggested by φροντίς. But now, with μαστικτῆρα, we have a fear experienced in the body. Now the φαντασία of approaching disaster, the κακὸν μέλλον of the *Rhetoric* (II.1382a22), pains him in the present, and drives him, in Aristotle's terms, to 'flee' it.[463] Pelasgus' final marine image demonstrates this mental adjustment:

> †καὶ μὴν πολλαχῆι γε† δυσπάλαιστα πράγματα,
> κακῶν δὲ πλῆθος ποταμὸς ὣς ἐπέρχεται·
> ἄτης δ' ἄβυσσον πέλαγος οὐ μάλ' εὔπορον
> τόδ' ἐσβέβηκα, κοὐδαμοῦ λιμὴν κακῶν. (468-71)

These lines combine various features of the two earlier metaphors – the depth of the sea, the absence of safe harbour – but, as Carroll points out, the essential orientation has changed. Before, Pelasgus prepared to dive into a sea of thought, and declined to sail into a sea of trouble. Now, a flood of troubles heads straight for him; he finds himself already embarked (ἐσβέβηκα) upon this ruinous flood.[464] Deliberation is no longer an abstract, theoretical activity, a moral debate, to be taken up and abandoned at will. Instead, it is a

[462] Cf. Visvardi (2015: 143): 'The sharper the pain of fear that he experiences, the clearer his perception becomes'.
[463] Cf. Visvardi (2015: 132): '… his affectively grounded knowledge compels him to take action').
[464] Carroll observes a 'remarkable discontinuity … in image-schematic terms'; this 'combination of metaphors points to … the King's new-found understanding of the paradoxical nature of his situation'.

practical necessity, in which the subject is already vulnerable, the threats real and imminent.

When Pelasgus weighs his options for a final time, there is a new clarity of expression: a pair of vivid first-person future-indicative conditionals (εἰ μὲν γὰρ ὑμῖν μὴ τόδ' ἐκπράξω …; εἰ δ' αὖθ' ... | ... διὰ μάχης ἥξω τέλους, 472-5) foregrounds his own decisive role. The contribution of the Danaids, however, is not overlooked: 'If I do not this for you, *you have spoken of* (ἔλεξας) an unsurpassable pollution'(477).[465] This οὐχ ὑπερτοξεύσιμον judgment, with its implied comparison, foreshadows the ὕψιστος φόβος of 479; here, the μίασμα is recognised as more serious than the ἀνάλωμα of battle (476).[466] The scene, which began with a weighing of heavy consequences (346-7), is finally resolved by a calculation; in a great feat of φαντασία λογιστική – a feeling of the future that is logical and affective at the same time – Pelasgus judges one threat to be more compelling than the other. Having made this judgment as to the preferable course, he will pursue τὸ μεῖζον – not under compulsion, but under his own free and fearful will.

Conclusion:

The first part of this chapter explored the discourse of forethought in this play. I showed how the Danaids and their father espoused a cautious attitude towards the future, one that

[465] Naiden (2006: 84-6) argues counter-intuitively that the suicide threat is 'unimpressive', and not the reason that Pelasgus accepts the supplication; Sommerstein[2] (2019: 21 n.81) rightly questions why else it is that Pelasgus yields at this moment, and not before.
[466] The word ἀνάλωμα may speak itself of calculation. Cf. *Ag*. 572 (of totting up the dead): τοὺς ἀναλωθέντας ἐν ψήφῳ λέγειν. FJW compare also Eur. *Supp*. 775-7, where Adrastus laments 'the life of a man' as 'the only expenditure (ἀνάλωμα) that it is not possible for mortals to recover once it has been made (ἀναλωθὲν). But for money there are ways and means.' (tr. Morwood).

reckoned with danger and uncertainty, and engaged in productive, collaborative deliberation. This mental attitude, encapsulated by the verb φρονεῖν, is shown to be compatible with fear. Later in the play, we see the relationship between thought and fear probed more deeply: two epirrhematic exchanges situate φόβος in the φρήν/φρένες; in the first, it is amenable to persuasion and reassurance; in the second, less so. Against this prudential fear is set the hubris of the Egyptian Chorus, and the obstinacy of the Danaids in their final exchange. The exhortations of the Argive Chorus – to beware uncertainty, to consider alternative futures – go unheeded.

Pelasgus' scene of deliberation is at the heart of the tragedy, and elaborates on its central theme. Fear is the stimulus to the King's deliberation, but also its subject matter: the twin imperatives articulated by himself and by the Chorus. Through this dialogue, the King is brought to recognise the superior claim of Ζηνὸς ἱκεσίου κότος; this is a socialised fear that drives him to immediate – and successful – political action. It is, however, in the course of Pelasgus' conversion that the true value of this emotion is exposed, as well as its refinement: the suppliants' demand provokes Pelasgus to a 'deep' and searching fear, whose movements are displayed to the audience in metaphor. In this φαντασία βουλευτική, what we witness is not pure introspection, nor unanchored dread, but an embodied and emotional mind, feeling through thought.

## Ways of Fearing: *Seven Against Thebes*

ὁ δὲ ἀνδρεῖος ἀνέκπληκτος ὡς ἄνθρωπος. φοβήσεται μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ὡς δεῖ δὲ καὶ ὡς ὁ λόγος ὑπομενεῖ τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα· τοῦτο γὰρ τέλος τῆς ἀρετῆς.

Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, III.1115b10-13

Introduction:

In my introduction, I showed how scientists, philosophers, and historians have moved towards an increasingly 'cognitive' understanding of fear, while continuing to recognise its biological and evolutionary foundations. I also pointed to some contemporary sociological approaches, suggesting ways in which feelings might be constrained, if not entirely defined, by social structures; culture, in its broadest sense, is held to 'script' our emotions, as to *when* we should feel them, and *how* we should express them. In this chapter, I will employ the theory of a social anthropologist, William Reddy, to investigate the varieties of fear scripted in Aeschylus' *Seven Against Thebes*.

In *The Navigation of Feeling* (2001), Reddy seeks to combine the findings of experimental psychology, anthropology, and social history into a politicised understanding of these emotional norms. What others call 'standards' or 'feeling rules' he calls an 'emotional regime': 'a set of normative emotions and the official rituals, practices, and emotives that express and inculcate them' (129). This regime, though it may make different demands on different social subgroups,[467] is necessary for the 'unity

[467] Reddy (2001: 128) mentions wealth, gender, and ethnicity as possible variables; I would add age to this list.

of the community', whose 'emotional order must take the form of ideals to strive toward and strategies to guide individual effort' (62-3). Crucial to this effort are the emotives themselves, which Reddy defines as

*A type of speech act … which both describes … and changes … the world, because emotional expression has an exploratory and a self-altering effect on … emotion.* (2001: 129)

Thus, over time, the rehearsal of appropriate, sanctioned 'emotives' is supposed to have feedback effect, gradually naturalizing the emotional regime. This rehearsal, done deliberately, Reddy calls 'emotional management' (129).[468]

If, however, an individual or group fails to submit to a given regime, there are often consequences: 'leaders must display mastery of [a] normative style [of emotional management]; those who fail to conform may be marginalized or severely sanctioned' (121). The threat of these consequences may produce pain for the individual, whose feelings, we might say, are 'torn': Reddy calls this 'induced goal conflict' (125). Most cultures, however, develop 'emotional refuges' – organizations, rituals, and private activities, where normal rules are relaxed, or even reversed. These refuges, which, in his analysis, include literature, may either 'shore up' the regime by purging the undesirable emotions, or 'provide a place from which conflict, contestation and transformation may be launched' (128).

This chapter will apply Reddy's analysis of emotional structures to Aeschylus' *Seven Against Thebes*. This tragedy dramatizes the difficulty of maintaining an emotional

[468] Much of this theory resonates with Aristotle's treatment of fear, and other emotions, in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, where courage is defined as a disposition to feel a certain way toward the fearful. See my epigraph above, and Chapter Two.

regime in a political crisis. As noted above, such emotional norms regulate not only the appropriate objects of an emotion, but also its appropriate expression; these norms vary according to social subgroup. I will therefore analyse the fears in the play by subject (who is afraid?), object (what do they fear?) and expression (how do they communicate their fear, and respond to it?). I will show how in the prologue and parodos three distinct modes of fear are introduced, in the persons of Eteocles, the Argives, and the Chorus. Eteocles, alert to the Argive threat, anxious about his reputation, and wary of divine displeasure, specifies practical responses to the emotion. The Argives, though they weep freely in their contemplation of death, exercise a much stricter control over the verbal expression of foreboding; and already here there is a suggestion of the excessive fearlessness that Aristotle condemns as rashness.[469] The Chorus' fear, though it shares its objects with Eteocles, is more explicit, and marked by confusion as well as urgent purpose.

These modes of fear are then brought into conflict by the first and second episodes: in the first, Eteocles seeks, unsuccessfully, to enforce an emotional regime upon the Chorus; in the second, Eteocles' emotional regime is contrasted with that of the Argives, too. After the famous 'turn' of line 653, a new dynamic develops, in which the Chorus seeks, equally unsuccessfully, to regulate the fears of their King. In the final third of the play, a different kind of fear emerges that will be crucial to this thesis as a whole: the fear felt by the spectator of catastrophe. This fear, as I will show, collapses the categories of subject and object that were so important to emotional regimes advanced earlier in the play, and instead promotes a sense of collective vulnerability as the emotional basis of the *polis*.

[469] See Chapter Three, p.128.

Before beginning my investigation, however, I must emphasise that it will not be structured around terminology.[470] While I will attend to the specific words used to denote fear, my typology depends on a wider conception of the emotion, as discussed in my introduction;[471] I am concerned with a diverse range of responses to a perceived threat, from anxiety to panic, and from silence, to shaking, to shrieking. Indeed, verbal expressions of fear – what Reddy would call 'emotives' – are a site of conflict in *Seven Against Thebes*; and the play, as I will show, also presents a variety of non-verbal expressions of the emotion. By discussing all these fears together, I hope not to blur but to stress the distinctions between them.

It should also be acknowledged that fear in the *Seven* has received some significant attention already. De Romilly, investigating 'la crainte et l'angoisse' in the Aeschylean corpus as a whole, finds ample material here, with a chorus who 'ne vit que dans la terreur de l'armée ennemie'. However, de Romilly prioritises the 'description concrète' of the emotion: 'non pas pourquoi … les personnages ont peur, ni de quoi, mais comment' (20). As a result, she gives little attention to the discipline of Eteocles, and none to the fearsome Argives; the civil politics of fear are also neglected.[472]

Focussing on a single play, Byrne is able to take a broader approach. She shows how the Chorus' anxieties about the city's capture are insistently linked to a fear of rape, and a fear of marriage, especially in the first stasimon (287-368). The expression of this fear, Byrne argues, is represented as 'politically subversive', threatening the militaristic and patriarchal values of Eteocles. She emphasises, however, that such a representation is

[470] De Romilly notes the danger of a lexical approach, which would exclude 'tous les cas où la crainte est décrite par ses symptômes sans être nommée directement' (1958: 14).
[471] Pp.47-8.
[472] For further discussion, see Introduction pp.11-14.

neither realistic nor sympathetic; rather, it 'colludes with male analysis and treatment of women in the real Athenian polis'.[473] Nevertheless, the Chorus' fears are figuratively validated by the tragedy's conclusion: on the shield of Polyneices a young man is led by a female Justice to the possession of a household (644-8), in an inversion of Greek marriage custom; later, the brothers' mutual slaughter is imaged as a sort of sexual union (940). The Chorus' fears are thus not a marginal commentary on the action, but an integral part of the developing catastrophe.

Like de Romilly, however, Byrne does not question the fundamental opposition of the play – between a group of terrified women and a courageous Eteocles, who must resist 'the "female" emotions of cowardice and fear' (150-1).[474] This view is shared by Hutchinson, for whom the 'male, martial atmosphere', is contrasted with a 'female [atmosphere]'. On the one hand, there is the 'resolve' and 'outrageous confidence' of the Argives, and the 'manly resolution and confidence' of Eteocles; on the other, a chorus 'characterized especially by impassioned terror'.[475] Applying Reddy's concept of emotional management, however, one can recognise in Eteocles, and even in the Argives, a very deliberate effort to *master* the emotion of fear – to control, moderate, and direct its expression. Thus the prologue and parodos offer three interlinked studies in fear-management – as discussed in Part I below.

A different approach has been taken by Konstan (2006) and Patera (2013). Both read *Seven* as an illustration of 'the discourse of fear' (Patera) in ancient Greece; and both seek to discount the opposition between passion and reason. According to Konstan, the

[473] Byrne (1997: 149)
[474] Cf. Conacher (1996: 46) on the first episode and 'the contrast it presents between the strength and masculinity of the protagonist and the terror of the female Chorus'.
[475] Hutchinson (1985: xxxiii-xxxvii).

Chorus' fear is based on a (mistaken) 'inference' of the enemy's superior strength; this initial fear is eventually conquered by *logos*, as the Chorus are reassured by Eteocles' tactical deployments, and 'turn their attention to the issue of fratricide' (146-7).[476] I will dispute this account on two fronts. The main issue of conflict in the first episode is not the 'rationality' of the women's fear, but their expression of it.[477] This conflict, over the proper emotives for fear, will be discussed in Part II. In addition, I reject the hard distinction between the fear felt in the first half of the play, and the 'horror' expressed at the prospect, and then news, of the fratricide. This continuity of fear will be argued in Part III.

Ways of Fearing: Eteocles

Three modes of fear are elaborated in the opening scenes of the play (1-181). The first of these is that modelled and prescribed by Eteocles. The King, addressing the Κάδμου πολῖται gathered before him, rallies old and young alike (10-12) to the defence of the city; the harangue concludes with a sequence of six imperatives (30-5), urging the men to hurry to their positions and to 'have good confidence' (εὖ θαρσεῖτε, 34). This might seem an apt climax to the largely practical instructions that precede it, and to a general's speech of 'encouragement' (Hutchinson). The final injunction, however, is still to come: μηδ' ἐπηλύδων | ταρβεῖτ' ἄγαν ὅμιλον (34-5). In one way this seems to fulfil a natural, if slightly redundant, rhetorical balance: 'Be confident, and don't be afraid …'. Yet the

[476] Patera (2013: 118) makes a very similar case, without crediting Konstan.
[477] This conflict is substantially reviewed, though without any focus on fear, by Stehle (2005), who challenges Eteocles' arguments about ritual propriety.

ἄγαν is curious: 'Don't be *too* frightened'. Eteocles implies that some measure of fear is inevitable, and perhaps even desirable.[478]

Indeed, while Eteocles' purpose is plainly to prime his soldiers for battle, his address seems designed to evoke fear as much as hope. Isabelle Torrance writes that he 'encourages the men to think of victory'[479] but that outcome is only glanced at (εἰ μὲν γὰρ εὖ πράξαιμεν, αἰτία θεοῦ, 4; cf. εὖ τελεῖ θεός, 35); the King dwells much longer on the possibility of defeat (5-8). Eteocles next refers to the immaturity and advanced age of some of their soldiers (11-12), and then lists what is at stake: their city, their religious rites, and their children (14-16). These are, undoubtedly, reasons to be frightened. The stakes established, Eteocles elaborates on the threat, the προσβολὴν Ἀχαιίδα predicted by Teiresias (28-29). Everything about the way this attack is described serves to provoke fear, rather than confidence: it is μεγίστην; it is plotted at night (νυκτηγορεῖσθαι). When the citizens are finally dispatched, they are directed not to the plain, where the Trojans fight in the *Iliad*, but to the defensive fortifications, the parapets, and the battlements (30-33).[480] Ringing in their ears is not so much what they have to win, but what they have to lose.[481]

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[478] Cf. Eteocles makes a similar plea to the Chorus in the first episode, discussed below: εὔκηλος ἴσθι μηδ' ἄγαν ὑπερφοβοῦ (238). Fearing 'too much' is a motif in Aeschylus: at the beginning of *Persians*, the Chorus speak of their 'too-foreboding' (κακόμαντις ἄγαν, 10) heart; later, they will tell the queen that they do not wish 'to say what would make [her] too fearful or too confident' (οὔτ' ἄγαν φοβεῖν λόγοις | οὔτε θαρσύνειν, 215-6).

[479] Torrance (2007: 15).

[480] For the association of fortifications with cowardice, see Pl. *Leg*. III.678d-679a.

[481] Contrast the battle-cry at Salamis (*Pers.* 402-5), where the Athenians fight not so much for the 'preserv[ation … [of] their freedom' (Kantzios (2004: 11)) as for the *liberation* of their homeland and sanctuaries (ἐλευθεροῦτε πατρίδ', etc.) currently occupied by Persians. It is the *hope* for freedom, rather than the *fear* of conquest, that the Athenians naturally emphasise at this moment. Eteocles' harangue is different.

Thus Eteocles presents the enemy as a legitimate object of fear for the Κάδμου πολῖται. Indeed, Eteocles himself expresses a comparable fear at the end of the prologue, when, left alone, he prays, 'Do not let my city be captured by its foes, … do not bind this free land and free city with the yokestrap of slavery' (72, 74). Appreciating the military threat, he is moved to express his fear in prayer.[482] Even before the messenger's terrifying report, in the opening lines of the play, Eteocles' vigilance is edged with anxiety:

> Κάδμου πολῖται, χρὴ λέγειν τὰ καίρια
> ὅστις φυλάσσει πρᾶγος ἐν πρύμνῃ πόλεως
> οἴακα νωμῶν, βλέφαρα μὴ κοιμῶν ὕπνῳ. (1-3)

Much has been made of the conventional ship-of-state metaphor;[483] much less of the sleepless lids. Hutchinson quotes *Iliad* 4.223-225, where Agamemnon's sleeplessness (οὐκ … βρίζοντα) is connected with fearlessness (οὐδὲ καταπτώσσοντ') and desire for battle (μάλα σπεύδοντα μάχην). There are, however, closer parallels, in another Aeschylean prologue, and in the *Seven* itself. βλέφαρα and ὕπνος are both mentioned by the Watchman in *Agamemnon*, who, while 'watching' (φυλάσσω, 8) like Eteocles, is kept awake by fear: φόβος γὰρ ἀνθ' ὕπνου παραστατεῖ, | τὸ μὴ βεβαίως βλέφαρα συμβαλεῖν ὕπνῳ (14-15). Later in *Seven*, the Chorus confess a similar condition: φόβῳ δ' οὐχ ὑπνώσσει κέαρ (287).[484] In both cases, φόβος takes the place of ὕπνος – and this is absolutely the norm with tragic insomnia.[485] Eteocles is acutely conscious of the danger

[482] Giordano-Zecharya (2006: 59-65) rightly reads *Sept.* 69-77 (Eteocles) and 78-181 (parodos) as 'reactions to [the] fear' provoked by the Argives; she glosses the first as εὐχή, the second as λιτή.
[483] See especially Thalmann (1977: 32-8). The helmsman, too, may connote a virtuous precaution, opposed to foolish rashness: cf. Eur. *Supp.* 508-10, σφαλερὸν ἡγεμὼν θρασύς | νεώς τε ναύτης ἥσυχος, καιρῷ σοφός | καὶ τοῦτ' ἐμοὶ τἀνδρεῖον, ἡ προμηθία. For the relationship between προμηθία, fear, and thought, see Chapter Three, pp.151-2.
[484] Byrne notes the resonance between the two images, but asserts: '[Eteocles'] metaphor expresses the courage and steadfastness of a good statesman, whereas the women's spiritual sleeplessness … is due to fear' (1997: 157). I think the resonance is designed to emphasise similarity as well as contrast.
[485] See Aesch. *Cho.* 32-7, Soph. *OT* 65-7, Eur. *IA* 1-79, and especially Soph. *Trach*. 27-30 and Eur. *El*. 617. On sleep in Greek drama, see Montiglio (2016: 107-144).

that threatens the city, and anxiety, though not explicit, may be inferred from this tragic *topos*.

Eteocles' speech, then, far from seeking to dispel fear, draws attention to the danger, and models a watchful caution. Yet he tells the citizens not to be *too* afraid, raising the question, *how afraid* should they be? It is important to see this instruction in context:

> ἀλλ' ἔς τ' ἐπάλξεις καὶ πύλας πυργωμάτων
> ὁρμᾶσθε πάντες, σοῦσθε σὺν παντευχίαι·
> πληροῦτε θωρακεῖα, κἀπὶ σέλμασιν
> πύργων στάθητε, καὶ πυλῶν ἐπ' ἐξόδοις
> μίμνοντες εὖ θαρσεῖτε, μηδ' ἐπηλύδων
> ταρβεῖτ' ἄγαν ὅμιλον. εὖ τελεῖ θεός (30-35)

The two instructions concerning morale, εὖ θαρσεῖτε and μηδ' … ταρβεῖτ' ἄγαν, come at the end of a sequence of imperatives directed to practical ends. Eteocles has already elaborated on the Argive threat: now he gives commands for how to respond to that threat. The response he demands is haste (ὁρμᾶσθε, σοῦσθε) and resolution (στάθητε); the final pair of exhortations (θαρσεῖτε, μηδ'… | ταρβεῖτ') command a certain attitude to be taken while 'standing firm' (μίμνοντες). Indeed, standing firm at the gates may be seen as the *expression* of virtuous (εὖ) and moderate (μηδ' … ἄγαν) emotions (confidence and fear).[486] Eteocles does not want their fear expressed in a rout, or their confidence expressed in some rash sortie into the field. Manning the walls is the emotional response that Eteocles demands.

[486] μίμνοντες may be read thus as a 'participle of manner' (Smyth *2062).

This, then, is the 'emotional regime' that Eteocles imposes on the citizens: they are encouraged to fear the enemy, but not too much; they must respond to that fear in specific ways (haste, steadfastness). Both threat and response are made universal (10-14), thus producing a kind of unity.[487] Such harangues are partly traditional: Tyrtaeus' elegies regularly exhort listeners to fight and die 'for their country' and 'for their children' (frs. 6.1-2, 13-4; 8.33-4), and there is a strong emphasis on steadfastness (frs. 6.15, 31-2; 7.11, 21-2). Eteocles also seems to echo Tyrtaeus' morale-boosting injunctions: θαρσεῖτ'· οὔπω Ζεὺς αὐχένα λοξὸν ἔχει | μηδ' ἀνδρῶν πληθὺν δειμαίνετε μηδὲ φοβεῖσθε (fr. 7.2-3). Yet Tyrtaeus' prohibition against fearing the enemy is, as ever, absolute (cf. frs. 7.14; 6.16). Eteocles' emotional regime is distinguished by the allowance given to appropriate fear – both here in the prologue (34-5), and in the first episode (238).

In another departure from Tyrtaeus, there is, in fact, a second object of fear in this prologue, for Eteocles perhaps the most powerful of all: divine indifference, or hostility. Zeus begins and ends the scene as an invoked source of protection (ἀλεξητήριος, 8; ἀλκή, 76); but he is also imagined as an agent of destruction who, combined with the Erinys and other gods, might 'extirpate' (μὴ . . . ἐκθαμνίσητε, 71-2) the city. The presence in this invocation of the Ἐρινὺς … μεγασθενής, identified with the curse upon his family (Ἀρά … πατρός, 70), communicates Eteocles' sense of exceptional vulnerability. Though the association of Erinys and fear is 'not yet explicit', Winnington-Ingram argues that

> … the audience of Aeschylus may have been ready to assume that a man who is the object of an Erinys is a man in fear. It may be suggested, then, that throughout the first part of the play Eteocles is in fear, which is not fear of battle or death (for in human affairs he is courageous), but fear of the Erinys. (1983: 29)

[487] This rhetoric participates in the classical discourse of *metus hostilis*, on which see Kapust (2008: 58-64).

Winnington-Ingram's distinction is, I think, artificial: while Eteocles does not fear battle or death *per se*, he does fear Theban defeat and the disgrace that would follow (a fear that, Aristotle will argue, is entirely compatible with 'courage').[488] This threat is identified with the Erinys.

What response to this fear is appropriate? Prayer is the most obvious, and is demonstrated by Eteocles at 8-9 and 69-77; the latter entreaty, directed in part to the 'gods of this city' (πολισσοῦχοι θεοί, 69), may have been accompanied by some ritual gesture towards the statues in the orchestra (cf. 95-96).[489] Yet Eteocles stresses above all the importance of appropriate *speech*: Κάδμου πολῖται, χρὴ λέγειν τὰ καίρια, he begins (1); at the end of the final prayer he 'hopes' that he is 'speaking in … common interest' (ξυνὰ … λέγειν, 76) with the gods. This concern with proper speech goes beyond conventional framing: the mere mention of disaster is interrupted by apotropaic prayer (5, 8), and 'the god' is credited with all past and future successes (4, 21, 35). In fact, the first statement of the drama may be regarded as programmatic for the whole.[490]

The avoidance of *dusphemia*, and proper attribution of success, is crucial to Greek religion – and will itself become a site of conflict later in the play – but its enforcement here has a social as well as a religious function. The King exercises a strict control over what Reddy calls 'emotives'. One must speak appropriately about fear, because the way one speaks shapes the way one feels, and the way other people feel. Eteocles rehearses, describes, and prescribes a way of being afraid, determining both the proper objects and the proper expression of the emotion. This emotional regime is set in stark contrast with

[488] See discussion in Chapter Two.
[489] So Stehle (2005: 110).
[490] See Cameron (1970).

the other two models of fear in this play – that of the Chorus, and that of the Argive champions.

Ways of Fearing: the Argives

It is the latter that is introduced first, albeit briefly. Immediately after the citizens have departed, a scout enters with reports of the enemy's preparations.

ἄνδρες γὰρ ἑπτά, θούριοι λοχαγέται,
ταυροσφαγοῦντες ἐς μελάνδετον σάκος,
καὶ θιγγάνοντες χερσὶ ταυρείου φόνου,
Ἄρην Ἐνυὼ καὶ φιλαίματον Φόβον
ὡρκωμότησαν, ἢ πόλει κατασκαφὰς
θέντες λαπάξειν ἄστυ Καδμείων βίαι,
ἢ γῆν θανόντες τήνδε φυράσειν φόνῳ (42-48)

Parodied in Aristophanes (*Lys*. 187-9), and quoted with approval in Longinus (15.5) and Stobaeus (3.7.10), these are, indeed, 'most heroic images' (Longinus). What place is found for fear? Phobos, invoked here alongside Ares and Enyo, is a god well-known from early hexameter poetry: he yokes the horses of the war-god and is engraved on the shields of Agamemnon and Heracles.[491] Scholars since Aristarchus have equated this figure with action as much as emotion: the scholiast declares that Phobos is equivalent to Phuge, 'flight' (*ad Il*. 11.71a Erbse).[492] Here in *Seven* Phobos appears in a martial, 'blood-loving' context: the oath, as Torrance suggests, is an 'attempt by the swearers to coopt to their

[491] For references, see my introduction, p.27, n.59.
[492] See discussion in my lexical introduction.

side, and against an enemy, forces which could well prove destructive to them'.[493] This fear is external and projected: the Argives are concerned with the fear felt not by themselves for the enemy, but by the enemy for themselves.

However, it would be mistaken to regard the Argives as straightforwardly 'fearless'. In the lines just quoted, the possibility of defeat (and death) is acknowledged;[494] and in those that follow there are clear signs of pain felt at this prospect:

> μνημεῖά θ' αὐτῶν τοῖς τεκοῦσιν ἐς δόμους
> πρὸς ἅρμ' Ἀδράστου χερσὶν ἔστεφον, δάκρυ
> λείβοντες, οἶκτος δ' οὔτις ἦν διὰ στόμα·
> σιδηρόφρων γὰρ θυμὸς ἀνδρείαι φλέγων
> ἔπνει λεόντων ὡς Ἄρη δεδορκότων. (49-53)

In an episode that was also popular with vase-painters,[495] the Argives leave 'mementos' for their parents, locks of hair to be treasured after their deaths. They consider this outcome with emotion: in tragedy, men shed tears only in extremity of feeling (e.g. Soph. *Aj.* 317-21; *Trach.* 1070-5); we may note that, in Homer, such feelings include despair (*Il.* 13.88-9; *Od*. 10. 201, 570).[496] However, while this bodily expression of prospective grief is permitted to the Argives, no verbal articulation is allowed: οἶκτος δ' οὔτις ἦν διὰ στόμα. Sommerstein translates, 'no word of pity passed their lips', but οἶκτος is not necessarily other-regarding, like English 'pity';[497] in Aeschylus it regularly describes the

[493] Torrance (2014: 120).
[494] Seaford (2017: 229-30) points out that the pouring of the bull's blood (43) anticipates the pouring of the Argives' own (48) and suggests that 'the feeling produced' by the Argives' anomalous combination of pre-battle and oath sacrifices is one of 'anxiety absorbed into highly controlled solidarity'.
[495] *LIMC* s.v. Septem *25, *27, *29.
[496] Van Wees (1998) shows how frequently Homeric heroes weep in joy, rage, and grief as well as fear. Examples of the last are on pages 12-13.
[497] LSJ A.2: 'lamentation, piteous wailing'. This passaged is cited. Palladini (2016: 251) translates: 'no wailing was on their mouths'. See the discussion of Aeschylean οἶκτος in Rosenbloom (1993: 186 n.94).

self-pitying 'lament' of the fearful (e.g. *Supp*. 59; 386).[498] In the context of this tableau, it seems reasonable to imagine something similar is suggested – or rather denied – here: whatever fearful misgivings they have, the Argives will not speak of them, but weep in silence.

Why? Hutchinson observes that 'the opposition between tears and lamentation is at the least unusual' – the two are normally performed, or resisted, together – 'the poet is taking pains to unite pathos with valour'.[499] This 'valour', it might be added, consists in a kind of self-control – what Reddy would call emotional management – and it may have a practical purpose. Later in the play Eteocles will briefly give way to lament, but then steady himself, for the sake of the city:

> ὦ θεομανές τε καὶ θεῶν μέγα στύγος,
> ὦ πανδάκρυτον ἀμὸν Οἰδίπου γένος·
> ὤμοι πατρὸς δὴ νῦν ἀραὶ τελεσφόροι.
> ἀλλ' οὔτε κλαίειν οὔτ' ὀδύρεσθαι πρέπει,
> μὴ καὶ τεκνωθῆι δυσφορώτερος γόος. (653-7)

Here the tears (πανδάκρυτον) and lamentation are not so directly opposed, but it is significant that the rejected modes of grief (κλαίειν, ὀδύρεσθαι, γόος) all indicate a loud, vocal expression of the emotion. These emotives are rejected as not being 'appropriate' (πρέπει) – recall the συμπρεπές concern of the Theban πολῖται (13). A reason is given: 'lest [this grieving] give birth to a lament even harder to bear'. Eteocles means, of course, the wails of defeated Thebes, vividly imagined in the prologue (6-8); this defeat is made

[498] Cf. Pl. *Resp*. III.387d.
[499] Cf. *Il*. 7.426-8, where the Trojans, 'shedding hot tears' (δάκρυα θερμὰ χέοντες), are forbidden from lamentation (κλαίειν), and heap up the corpses 'in silence, grieving in their hearts' (σιωπῇ … ἀχνύμενοι κῆρ). On the other hand, Odysseus celebrates Neoptolemus' dry-eyed courage, contrasted with his tearful, fearful comrades (*Od*. 11. 526-30).

more likely by giving vocal expression to his grief. The King makes very similar arguments in the first episode, seeking to control the fearful wailings of the panicked women (182-6; 242-3 etc.; see Part II); for the preservation of the city, certain emotives are forbidden. The Argives, too, seem to *control* their emotional expression, in pursuit of victory.

Indeed, as in Eteocles' harangue, attention is drawn to the outward performance of 'courage': weeping, silence, 'warlike looks' (Ἄρη δεδορκότων). Such blazing bravery clearly commanded imitation: besides the parody of *Lysistrata* is the passage in *Frogs*, where Aristophanes' Aeschylus presents the *Seven* as an exemplar of his didactic tragedy: ὃ θεασάμενος πᾶς ἄν τις ἀνὴρ ἠράσθη δάϊος εἶναι (1022). The line clearly echoes the battle-lust of Tydeus (μάχης ἐρῶν, 392; cf. Eteocles' κακοῦ … ἔρωτος, 687-8). But the Argives of *Seven* are also conjured up a few moments earlier, when Aeschylus describes the Athenian citizens he produced: πνέοντας δόρυ καὶ λόγχας … | … καὶ θυμοὺς ἐπταβοείους (1016-17). The metaphor picks up the martial 'breathing spirit' of *Seven* (θυμὸς … | ἔπνει, 52-3). Aeschylus' Argives are supposed, albeit comically, to model a certain emotional regime, inspiring audiences to emulate their actions and attitudes.

Yet there is a contrast too in these emotional regimes. The Argives are far more rigid than the Theban King, who, we recall, not only approved a moderate fear of the enemy but himself was moved to entreat the Erinys to spare his city. The Seven, by contrast, do not pray for the aversion of defeat, but rather swear to the gods that the future will be as they promise – victory or death. Their θυμός is σιδηρόφρων (52), a rare adjective that describes the harsh disposition of those who feel no compassion ([Aesch.] *PV* 244; cf. Eur. *Phoen*. 672); when Achilles rejects his plea for mercy, Hector recognises that 'the

heart in [his] breast is iron' (σιδήρεος ἐν φρεσὶ θυμός, *Il*. 22.357). Though iron might elsewhere signify emotional restraint,[500] we are told that the Argive θυμός is also 'blazing with courage' (52), an image more redolent of excess than of control (cf. Pl. *Leg.* IV.716a, ἀνοίᾳ φλέγεται; cf. *Chrm*. 155d). In this way the Argives are contrasted with the moderation of Eteocles, whose confidence is qualified, and whose anxieties are carefully articulated.

In the second episode, these Argives will be set in opposition to Eteocles and the Theban champions. There the expression of their 'courage', of their fearlessness, will appear wholly ungoverned, juxtaposed with the emotional restraint of their enemies. Before this scene, however, a third term is added to the comparison, and immediately brought into conflict with the first.

Ways of Fearing: The Chorus

When the Chorus burst onto the stage at line 78, their terror is explicit: θρεῦμαι φοβερὰ μεγάλ' ἄχη (78). The first two words announce their double intention: to express fear, and to define its objects.[501] The latter emerge straightaway: the Argive army that has left its camp (79), announced by the dust-cloud (81), and the sound of hooves, shields and spears (84, 100, 103). These literal sources of terror are summed up in 121:
φόβος δ' ἀρείων ὅπλων. This is the same fearful object highlighted in Eteocles' address

[500] Odysseus, watching Penelope weep, 'hides his tears' (δάκρυα κεῦθεν) with eyes fixed as if made of iron (σίδηρος) or horn (*Od.* 19.209-12).
[501] Scholars have disagreed about φοβερά, which, depending how the line is scanned, might be nominative (feminine singular) or accusative (neuter plural). The latter is favoured by Hutchinson and West (1990: 99).

to the citizens: Don't be too afraid, he said, 'of this horde of foreigners' (ἐπηλύδων … ὅμιλον, 34-5).

In both cases, however, the Argive army is only the immediate stimulus of fear. What these sounds of course signify is the threat of Theban defeat. Thus the Chorus sing that the host comes 'against the city' (91; cf. 116, 120, 156, 164, 169, 180); they beg the gods to save them from the 'slavery' (110) that will follow on its 'capture' (119).[502] When they ask Poseidon for 'release from fears' (ἐπίλυσιν φόβων, 134), these fears are metonymical for the φοβερὰ … ἄχη of 78; and they are framed by prayers to Athena and to Ares to protect the city (ῥυσίπολις γενοῦ, 129; πόλιν … φύλαξον, 135-6). Just as Eteocles highlighted the larger threat of the Argives – to their religious rites (15), to their children (16), but above all to their city (6, 14) and motherland (16-20) – so now the women of Thebes are overwhelmingly focused on civic and collective, rather than personal, danger.[503]

The Chorus share, too, Eteocles' fear of divine indifference. Eteocles had prayed at the end of the prologue, to Zeus and the πολισσοῦχοι θεοί, together with Ge and his familial curse, not to let the city be captured by its foes, but to 'be its defence (γένεσθε δ' ἀλκή)' (69-76). The Chorus, likewise, pray to the θεοὶ πολιάοχοι χθονὸς (109, cf. 87, 94) and Zeus (116), invoking the gods as 'all-defenders' (παναλκεῖς, 166). Yet, as in Eteocles' speech, these gods are invested with destructive as well as preservative potential:

[502] This fear of enslavement and rape is the subject of the first stasimon, as well as Byrne's (1997) study, discussed above. In the parodos, however, Aeschylus highlights the objects of fear common to Chorus, King, and *politai*.
[503] Roisman (2004: 96) suggests that the Chorus are 'expressing not only their own fears but those of the entire population,' but this is an assumption: what is clear is that the dangers perceived are common dangers, since they are highlighted by Eteocles also.

προδώσεις, παλαίχθων

Ἄρης, τὰν τεάν γᾶν;

ὦ χρυσοπήληξ δαῖμον, ἔπιδ’ ἔπιδε πόλιν

ἄν ποτ’ εὐφιλήταν ἔθου. (104-7)

Divine ‘betrayal’ is foregrounded as possibility, even as divine protection is entreated, and returns at the end of the ode: πόλιν δορίπονον μὴ προδῶθ’ | ἑτεροφώνῳ στρατῶι (169-170). Such doubts reverberate through the episode that follows (ὦ ξυντέλεια, μὴ προδῶις πυργώματα, 251; cf. 219-20, 253).[504] The fear of divine indifference is of course inseparable from their fear of Theban disaster: the latter is presented as the inevitable consequence of the former.

However, while their fear shares its objects with that modelled and prescribed by Eteocles, its expression, and of course its subject, are starkly different. To take the latter first: the Chorus are composed of unmarried Theban women, who refer to themselves as a παρθένων | ἱκέσιον λόχον (110-11, cf. 171). The martial and Homeric term, λόχος, sets them into direct contrast with the λόχος headed by each Argive champion (56); its striking application to a ‘band of supplicant virgins’ sets off their femininity.[505] This femininity needs no special articulation, of course: the costumes of this chorus, and the ‘robes and crowns’ (πέπλων καὶ στεφέων, 101) they carry to deck the statues, mark them as quite different from the troop of citizens ‘in full armour’ (σὺν παντευχίαι, 31) that vacates the orchestra a few minutes before they arrive. Nevertheless, while the Chorus is clearly identified with the feminine, there is nothing feminine about their fears *per se*: they fear the Theban army, divine abandonment, and dreadful consequences of defeat.

[504] Compare the attitude of the Danaids at the beginning of the *Suppliants*, discussed pp.148-50.
[505] This is the earliest ‘metaphorical’ use of the noun recorded by LSJ (s.v. 3.b). Cf. *Eum.* 46-7 and 1026.

Their fear is thus differentiated from that of Eteocles not by its objects, but by its subject, and by its mode of expression. Their first word, θρεῦμαι, is programmatic for the ode. The verb, as LSJ notes, is used only of women; in Aeschylus, it regularly refers to apprehensive lamentations in lyric metre (*Supp*.112, *Ag*.1165). (Nothing could be further removed from the austere silence of the Argive champions, through whose mouths no οἶκτος is allowed to pass.) Here the verb introduces a hundred lines of wildly agitated dochmiacs.[506] Scholars disagree on the looseness of the ode's structure. Some (e.g. Page, West) heavily emend to restore strophic responsion from 109; others (Hutchinson) regard the parodos as astrophic until 150. In any case, the dancing that accompanied these lyrics was probably violently expressive.[507] Many have suggested that the Chorus' entrance is staggered; some have even gone so far as to divide the opening lyrics between different speakers, in the manner of *Agamemnon* 1346-71.[508] Their disorder is most visible in lines 98-103, where the Chorus twice exhort themselves to attend to the statues, and are twice distracted by the noise of the Argive army:[509]

… τί μέλ-

λομεν ἀγάστονοι;

ἀκούετ' ἢ οὐκ ἀκούετ' ἀσπίδων κτύπον;

πέπλων καὶ στεφέων <ποτε> πότ' εἰ μὴ νῦν ἀμ-

[506] For the ancient understanding of dochmiacs, see Fries (2016). Two scholia to this parodos are crucial to her evidence.
[507] So Thalmann (1977: 87), who compares the *epiparodos* of the Erinyes at *Eum*. 254ff. To this I would add Io's astrophic dochmiacs ([Aesch.] *PV* 561-73): she makes direct references to her own jerking, jumping movements.
[508] For scattered entry and divided speakers: Taplin (1977: 141-2); Thalmann (1977: 87-8). Against: Hutchinson. On divided choruses more generally, see Budelmann (2018).
[509] So Stehle (2005: 105). Stehle interprets 109-150 as a 'near miss' at strophic responsion, representing a failed first attempt at achieving euphemic prayer.

φὶ λιταν<ὰ βαλεῖν χρείαν> ἔξομεν;

κτύπον δέδορκα· πάταγος οὐχ ἑνὸς δορός· (98-103)[510]

Even if there is no division of speakers here,[511] it is notable that that the Chorus speak of their ritual purpose in the first-person plural (μέλλομεν; ἔξομεν), yet revert to second-person address (ἀκούετ') and first-person singular statement (δέδορκα), when they are distracted. This pattern is repeated later in the ode: 'we are born (γεγόναμεν) of your blood', they sing, 'and we approach (πελαζόμεσθα) you with cries and prayers' (144-5); terrified by new sounds, they speak again as individuals: 'I hear (κλύω) the rattle of chariots …' (151).[512] In this parodos, fear is thus expressed in distraction, rhetorical division, and disarray. Indeed, the Chorus themselves declare that the 'terror of the Argive arms throws [them] into confusion' (φόβος δ' ἀρῆων ὅπλων |<θράσσει>, 121-2).[513] This fearful behaviour could hardly be more different from the patriotic and steadfast solidarity commanded by Eteocles.

Besides this metrical and dialogic agitation, the Chorus' articulation of their fear is also marked by a peculiar temporal shift, which I will call prolepsis, whereby future suffering is retrojected into the present. This, too, is apparent in the opening statement: θρεῦμαι φοβερὰ μεγάλ' ἄχη (78). These 'great sufferings' have no location in time. Is it the present pain occasioned by feelings of fear? Or is it a future pain, which is itself to be

[510] Here I print West's supplements to lines 101-2.
[511] Here the metrical evidence for division is strongest: 100 and 103 are both iambic trimeters, and could be spoken by the Coryphaeus. Cf. Kaimio (1970: 115); Thalmann (1977: 88).
[512] Kaimio (1970) shows that the first-person singular is regularly used by choruses to express emotions, perceptions, and opinions (150); the plural is more common in prayers (153). He finds no correlation, however, between singular verbs and the division of lyrics between different voices.
[513] This is Ritchl's supplement, mining the scholiast's ὁ ὑπὸ ἀρῆων ὅπλων φόβος ταράσσει. (Σ 121e). It is adopted by Sommerstein, but rejected by Hutchinson as unnecessary unless one is seeking to restore strophic responsion in 109-50. If the verb is merely a gloss on the Chorus' psychological state, the gloss is surely a correct one (cf. Σ 132a τεταραγμένης δὲ ψυχῆς).

feared? φοβερά can be read either (and indeed, both) ways.[514] Later in the ode, the Chorus describe how the horses' 'bits sing slaughter' (κινύρονται φόνον χαλινοί, 124). The battle is not yet joined, but, in the imagination of the Chorus, hearing these noises, the bloodshed is here and now. Indeed, the very presence of these sounds is presented as an assault: the noise of the hoof-stricken earth 'grazes [their] ears' (ὠτ- | ὶ χρίμπτει, 83-4),[515] we are told, and the 'war-cry [comes?] over the walls' (βοὰ < > ὑπὲρ τειχέων, 89). By contrast with the first stasimon, there is no sustained articulation of future suffering. Instead, in this fearful prolepsis, time and space are collapsed into a single welter of distress.

Yet their fear is not all confusion. As several critics have recently argued, the Chorus' motivation is very clear in this ode.[516] They have come, bearing robes and garlands (101), to supplicate (110-11) the statues of the gods. Eteocles, engaging the citizens' fear, dispatched them to the battlements; the Chorus's fear, meanwhile, drives them to leave their homes, to gather, and to fall at the feet of the ancestral images (<πάτρια> ποτιπέσω βρέτη δαιμόνων, 95-6). They appeal to these gods first together (87-88, 93-99, 108-110), then one by one: Zeus (116-7), Athena (128-130), Poseidon (131-4), Ares (135-6, cf. 105-8), Aphrodite (140-144), Apollo (145-7) and Artemis (147-8), Hera (152). Artemis, Apollo, Ares and Athena are then supplicated again (154-165), before a more orderly prayer is made to the whole assembly of gods (166-180). The accompanying request is consistent: 'watch over', 'protect', 'defend', 'deliver' the city of Thebes.

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[514] De Romilly is perceptive on this point: in Aeschylus, she writes, 'toute souffrance se double d'une crainte pour l'avenir'; indeed, 'la terreur est partie intégrante de la peine et non une réflexion sur son éventualité' (1958: 14, 59).

[515] Both these lines are corrupt, but the quoted words, and sense, are fairly secure. See Hutchinson and West (1990) *ad loc.*

[516] E.g. Roisman (2004), Konstan (2006), Patera (2013).

Yet these invocations are interrupted, as we have seen, with reports of battle-noise; the Chorus struggle to focus their attention on the task in hand. Like Eteocles, they aspire to a moderation of their feelings; they even echo his rejection of excess: τί μέλλομεν ἀγάστονοι; (98-9; cf. ταρβεῖτ' ἄγαν, 35). Indeed, as Eva Stehle has shown, they gradually eliminate disharmonic and dusphemic elements; in the final strophic pair (166-181) they achieve a perfectly conventional, uninterrupted, euphemic prayer.[517] This success should not be misunderstood as a wholesale retreat of fear, however. As the Chorus explain in the following episode: 'I rose up in fear (φόβῳ) to pray to the blest ones, that they might spread their protection over the city (πόλεος | ἵν' ὑπερέχοιεν ἀλκάν)' (214-15; cf. 240). The whole parodos, including the final prayer, must be construed as a song of φοβερά: a fear that finds expression in agitation, disorder, prolepsis, and prayer.

The first third of the play thus presents three tableaux: Eteocles and the *politai*, the Argive champions, and the young Theban women of the parodos. Each of these groups recognises an imminent threat to their wellbeing, and that of their community; each seeks to regulate the fear triggered by this threat, and control its expression in such a way as to benefit the community. Eteocles prescribes haste, steadfastness, and solidarity; scrupulously avoiding dusphemic speech himself, he implicitly commands silent obedience from his soldiers. The Argives, meanwhile, allow tears but no lamentations, as they seek to enlist Phobos as an ally in battle. The Chorus, alone of the three, seek an appropriate verbal expression of their fear; although their fear is initially expressed in disorder and proleptic experiences of catastrophe, they hope finally through euphemic prayer to win the assistance of the gods. Thus three emotional modes are established in parallel; the next two episodes will see them thrown into conflict.

[517] Stehle (2005).

## Part II: Governing Fear

### II.a: Eteocles vs Chorus (181-368)

In Reddy's theory of 'emotional regimes', there is some attention given to the phenomenon of 'deviance' – what happens when an individual, or group of individuals, 'fails to conform' to the emotional norms prescribed by their community. Reddy suggests that, in some societies, there are 'severe penalties' for those who refuse, or who fail to conceal their insincerity. Other regimes only apply strict emotional discipline in certain institutions, certain seasons, certain stages of life. Whenever such penalties are threatened, an 'induced goal conflict' develops, as the individual is 'torn' between their instinctive impulse and the fear of the sanction; such conflict usually involves emotional suffering. At this point, 'normative emotives' may become 'more attractive … for their power of emotional enhancement' – they may help to align one's feelings with those that are demanded.[518]

Aeschylus' play does not give us access to the 'inner' or 'secret' workings of emotion; we know only of the emotions that are articulated. What we do see, however, is an attempt to enforce an emotional regime upon a deviant group. Eteocles violently rejects the Chorus' expressions of fear, which he perceives as dangerous. Threatening sanctions, he demands a wholly different kind of emotional management.[519] This model is distinct from that proposed in the prologue, and explicitly gendered; it is contested by the Chorus,

[518] Reddy (2001: 124-5).
[519] Fletcher (2007: 27-31) interestingly suggests that Eteocles acts as a kind of *choregos*, marshalling, organizing and instructing a maiden chorus; having entered in disarray, they must be directed into the 'prescribed formation of the tragic chorus'.

who defend their behaviour as reasonable and appropriate. When they finally submit, Eteocles changes tack, and prescribes a new set of sanctioned emotives. In the stasimon that follows, the Chorus conspicuously fail to conform with these instructions.

Eteocles re-enters with a long speech (181-202), rebuking the women for their fearful behaviour. The occasion of this rebuke is evident in the opening lines:

> ὑμᾶς ἐρωτῶ, θρέμματ' οὐκ ἀνασχετά,
> ἦ ταῦτ' ἄριστα καὶ πόλει σωτήρια
> στρατῶι τε θάρσος τῶιδε πυργηρουμένῳ,
> βρέτη πεσούσας πρὸς πολισσούχων θεῶν
> αὔειν, λακάζειν, σωφρόνων μισήματα; (182-6)

It is 'the manner of their prayer [that] Eteocles deplores' (Hutchinson). αὔειν and especially λακάζειν gloss the whole preceding song as inarticulate 'crying' and 'howling'; such noise is 'hateful to the wise'. The King also disparages their mode of supplication, falling at the feet of the statues while making their prayers. This criticism is sustained through the episode: at 258, he accuses them of 'saying ill-omened words again … while touching the images'; at 265, he asks them to 'get away from the images'. Eteocles also takes issue with their panicked movements, τάσδε διαδρόμους φυγάς (191; cf. φυγών 209). In place of these expressive noises and movements he first demands stillness and silence: σὸν δ' αὖ τὸ σιγᾶν καὶ μένειν εἴσω δόμων (232; cf. 201, 250, 252, 262). Having finally won their compliance, however, he adds new instructions, demanding that they 'utter a better prayer' (εὔχου τὰ κρείσσω, 266), together with a 'sacred, auspicious ululation of triumph' (ὀλολυγμὸν ἱερὸν εὐμενῆ, 268). After making his own εὐχή, promising dedications of sheep and trophies in the event of success (271-

8), Eteocles enjoins them once again: 'Make prayers like that (τοιαῦτ' ἐπεύχου) to the gods, not mournfully, nor with wild, useless pratings' (279-80).

Both the vehemence of Eteocles' rebuke (especially the misogyny of 187-90; cf. 256) and the religious norms he sets down are controversial among scholars. Most illuminating is the parallel with *Iliad* 6, where Hector returns within the walls to instruct Hecuba to gather the Trojan women and make offerings to Athena, and promise great sacrifices if Diomedes is slain. His encounters with his mother and his wife, and their subsequent actions, have been used to demonstrate *both* the political and religious rectitude of Eteocles, *and* the excess of his abuse, or even the perversion of ritual norms.[520] What is less often noticed is that Hector's regulation of female fear and ritual is coordinated with a comparable regulation of male fear: at Helenus' initiative (6.73-85), Hector first rallies the Trojan men, who are in full flight (102-12); only then, as Helenus suggests (86-98), does Hector go within the city to direct the women (238-493). Thus Eteocles' attempt to manage the fears of the Chorus should be seen in the context of his general fear-management, especially his prior exhortation to the citizens in the prologue. Such management, however ill-executed, is a traditional responsibility of a city-defending hero.[521]

It is also notable that Eteocles never castigates the Chorus for their fear itself – he never tells them not to be afraid. The closest he comes is at 238: εὔκηλος ἴσθι μηδ' ἄγαν ὑπερφοβοῦ. As in the opening harangue, it is an *excess* of fear that is prohibited. But what is excess, ἄγαν, in this case? In the lines that follow, Eteocles repeats the word:

[520] Religious rectitude: Hutchinson; Giordano-Zecharya (2006: 63 n.40). Excessively 'harsh': Torrance (2007: 97, 107). Perversion of ritual norms: Roisman (2004: 96); Foley (2001: 46-47).
[521] Cp. Thucydides' celebration of Pericles' management of popular fear and confidence (II.65.9), discussed in Chapter One.

Ετ. μή νυν, ἐὰν θνήισκοντας ἢ τετρωμένους

πύθησθε, κωκυτοῖσιν ἁρπαλίζετε·

τούτῳ γὰρ Ἄρης βόσκεται, φόνῳ βροτῶν.

Χο. καὶ μὴν ἀκούω γ' ἱππικῶν φρυαγμάτων.

Ετ. μή νυν ἀκούουσ' ἐμφανῶς ἄκου' ἄγαν. (242-6)

Eteocles can neither prevent the women from hearing the noises which frighten them, nor deny that they are frightening. Indeed, he makes little effort to reassure the Chorus, either about his own preparations, or about the security of divine support.[522] Instead, he seeks to control their *expression* of fear, how 'openly' (ἐμφανῶς) they show it.[523] As with the citizens, the expression of fear must be regulated and directed.

The justification for this control is stressed in Eteocles' opening lines: '… is this the best policy, does it help to save our city, does it give confidence to our beleaguered population…?' (183-4). Eteocles is concerned not with the basis of fear, but with its effect. The women, he says, have 'spread panic and cowardice among the citizens' (πολίταις … διερροθήσατ' ἄψυχον κάκην, 191-2); later he worries they will 'make the citizens lose heart' (πολίτας μὴ κακοσπλάγχνους τιθῆις, 237), and begs them, 'don't terrify your own side' (μὴ φίλους φόβει, 262). The proposed *ololugmos*, on the other hand, he expects to 'give confidence to our friends and dispel their fear of the foe' (θάρσος φίλοις, λύουσα πολέμιον φόβον, 270). The men will be encouraged by the women's confidence, just as they were frightened by their fear.

[522] Once, Eteocles says victory will depend on the gods (217), and once he asks if '[his] taking counsel about all this is [not] enough' (248). As Konstan (2006: 147) points out, his 'logistical arguments' against fear are reserved for the next episode.

[523] Roisman (2004: 96) places the dispute over this 'frank expression' of fear in the context of Athenian *parrhesia.* Cf. Visvardi (2015: 165).

How is this emotion communicated from one subject to another? And what is its object? Konstan, as part of his rationalisation of fear in the play, writes: 'Eteocles is right to worry that they may communicate their fear (that is, their judgement of the power of the enemy) to the Theban army, which will damage its effectiveness'.[524] Yet Eteocles' language gives no evidence of such cognitive persuasion. Instead, it is violent and visceral (διερροθήσατ'; κακοσπλάγχνους), with the object left unspecified. At the end of the episode, Eteocles anticipates that the 'hasty, noisy words' of a messenger may 'set all ablaze' (ταχυρρόθους | λόγους … φλέγειν, 285-6), and the Chorus themselves, after Eteocles leaves, compare their fear to a fire, 'kindled' by their cares (μέριμναι ζωπυροῦσι τάρβος, 290). These pyrogenic images suggest a rapid, irresistible conflagration, surging and leaping from person to person, 'caught' involuntarily, and overwhelming conscious attention: μέλει, φόβῳ δ' οὐχ ὑπνώσσει κέαρ (288).[525] This 'emotional contagion'[526] is presented as destructive to the *polis*, a fire that needs to be contained.

Such is the danger perceived by Eteocles. The women become enemies within, 'advanc[ing] the cause of the enemy' and 'sacking the city from the inside' (193-4). As Reddy suggests, deviance from emotional norms menaces the unity of the community, and thus is often met with sanctions; these sanctions induce goal-conflict in the deviant subjects. Eteocles' initial reaction to the Chorus follows this pattern: 'If anyone fails to obey my command … there is no way they will escape death by stoning' (196-9). Whether proportionate or not,[527] the political logic is clear: obedience may be secured by

[524] Konstan (2006: 148); cf. Visvardi (2015: 155).
[525] Cf. *Ag*. 1034, ζωπυρουμένας φρενός. De Romilly (1958: 45) compares also the 'tempête' of fear at *Cho.* 183 (κλυδώνιον) and 272 (δυσχειμέρους). Both fire and storm represent the 'violent et … irrésistible' quality of the emotion. Cf. Bacon (1964: 30).
[526] For an overview of this concept, see Kelly (2001).
[527] Torrance (2007: 98) suggests that an Athenian audience would find this excessive, but Lycides was stoned to death at Salamis for demoralizing the besieged Athenians (Hdt. IX.5). The connection is explored by Rosivach (1987: 239).

fear of state violence.[528] Eteocles hopes to enforce his emotional regime by substituting one object of fear (the Argives) for another (death by stoning).

He is, of course, unsuccessful: the women ignore his threat, and instead expand upon the fear that motivated their gathering (ἔδεισ', 203; ταρβοσύνῳ φόβῳ τάνδ' ἐς ἀκρόπτολιν … ἱκόμαν, 239-40) and their prayer (ἤρθην φόβῳ πρὸς μακάρων λιτάς, 214). Eteocles seems to recognise the failure of his edict; at any rate, he does not press the point. Instead, he doubles down on the Chorus' fears of the Argives and of the gods, stressing the jeopardy of the city (218, 254), and their ill-omened speech (223, 258). Yet, despite all his warnings, the Chorus continue to disobey, expressing their fear in desperate supplication. This defiance is not born of any bravery, but of fear itself: ἀψυχίαι γὰρ γλῶσσαν ἁρπάζει φόβος (259). Their fear – of the Argives, of divine abandonment – renders them ungovernable: unable to control themselves, they cannot be controlled by others.

Thus even when the Chorus are briefly persuaded to comply (263), their resolution is short-lived. In the stasimon that follows, they quickly diverge from Eteocles' recommended model of prayer. Rather than promising sacrifices in gratitude for victory, they return to their earlier theme of divine betrayal of the Theban earth (304-11); and although they do briefly ask the gods to help in the battle, by casting ἀνδρολέτειραν κάκαν | ῥίψοπλον ἄταν (314-15)[529] upon the enemy, they rightly characterise their prayer not as the prescribed εὐχή (266, 279), nor as a παιάν or an ὀλολυγμός (268), but as ὀξυγόοις λιταῖσιν (320). Metrically, this 'shrill-wailing' song is initially distinguished from the parodos and *epirrhema*: the first strophic pair contains no dochmiacs. However,

[528] Cf. Thuc. II.37.3 and *Eum.* 690-706, discussed in Chapters One and Five.
[529] For the text, see Hutchinson *ad loc.* (Page: ἀνδρολέτειραν | καταρρίψοπλον ἄταν).

in the second and third pairs these agitated rhythms return, as the Chorus lament the pitiful consequences of defeat (321-68).[530] Eteocles' efforts to control the women's expression of fear is a failure.[531]

IIb: Eteocles vs the Seven (369-630)

The first episode brings Eteocles' prescribed emotional norms into conflict with the behaviour of the Chorus. In the second, they are confronted with the furious bravery of the Argives. The Theban commander does not, of course, seek to regulate his enemies' emotions as he does those of the city's women. Instead, one by one, he juxtaposes the virtuous temperaments of his own champions. Through this contrast – which also involves the Scout, the Chorus and Eteocles himself – Aeschylus highlights a different aspect of Eteocles' emotional regime. Where before the Commander was keen to silence or redirect expressions of fear, now the explicit recognition of uncertainty is made essential to piety.

In this famous scene, huge scholarly attention has been paid to the shield-emblems of the warriors,[532] and to the controversial question of exactly when and how the deployments are made.[533] The emotional dynamics of the scene have been comparatively neglected. Torrance briefly, though boldly, identifies the Scout's confessed terror of the Argive

[530] See De Poli (2018: 47-8). I will return to the latter part of the ode in Part III.
[531] Giordano-Zecharya regards 'the more reciprocal terms' and 'customary ritual addresses' of this stasimon as evidence of Eteocles' success (2006: 71); Fletcher thinks that they become more 'harmonious', 'coherent', 'composed', 'sober and self-controlled' (2007: 30). Most critics, however, emphasise the women's continued deviance. See Konstan (2006: 146), Torrance (2007: 102), and Sommerstein (2010: 69). Stehle interestingly argues that this stasimon is more dusphemic than the parodos, as a result of Eteocles' ill-judged interventions (2005: 116).
[532] See, e.g. Bacon (1964), Cameron (1970), Zeitlin (1982).
[533] e.g. Taplin (1977: 149-56); Sommerstein (2010: 73-4); Palladini (2016: 113-136).

panoply with the women's terror in the parodos. His announcements, she points out, are noisy, hasty, and inflammatory, as foreseen by Eteocles at the end of the first episode (285-6); if less 'hysterical' than the women (in keeping with his masculinity), he is undeniably 'fearful'. De Poli also recognises the Scout's 'increasing anxiety', and the terror communicated by his reports; although Eteocles seeks to 'overcome this verbal pressure', the Chorus' dochmiacs show them to be 'more and more frightened'. Konstan, on the other hand, thinks that Eteocles' 'demonstration' of Theban superiority reassures the Chorus, who, at the end of the episode, 'give over their fear of the enemy'. Hutchinson is more circumspect: 'there is perhaps a fluctuating movement towards confidence in the future'; this movement, he says, 'climaxes' in the fourth section, before the fearful atmosphere returns. Here he discerns a 'change in emotional quality' in Eteocles too, who opens his fifth, sixth and seventh speeches with 'increasing passion'.[534]

Such divergent interpretations demand a more systematic analysis, noting the different subjects, objects, and expressions of fear in this episode. I will treat both the Argives and the Thebans as a class, rather than individually, to draw out what I see as the structuring contrast of the scene, between impious boasts and the cautious and – significantly – *articulated* recognition of contingency.[535] While these observations do not constitute fear *per se* (no physiological arousal is implied), they nevertheless represent the cognitive ground for fear, and sustain the deliberative apprehension depicted in the prologue.

[534] Torrance (2007: 102-3); De Poli (2018: 48-50); Konstan (2006: 146); Hutchinson (1985: 104).
[535] I exclude from my analysis the figures of Amphiaraus and Polyneices, whose emotional states are wholly different from their allies, and serve a different structural role. Amphiaraus, like his comrades, has no fear of battle; unlike them, however, and more like Eteocles, he reveres the gods, and eventually regards death as certain. Polyneices, as a mirror to his brother, reckons on the possibility of death and defeat, but believes justice will lead him to victory (see Part IIc).

The emotions of the Argive champions were first introduced in the double tableau of the prologue, swearing an oath over a slaughtered bull (42-8), and pinning mementos to Adrastus' chariot (49-53). As discussed in Part I, there they sought to enlist Phobos as an ally, a divinity who frighten the Thebans; 'iron-hearted' and 'blazing with bravery', fear, as a motivating passion, seemed entirely absent. The Argives did, however, admit the possibility of death and defeat (47); imagining this prospect, and their forsaken parents, they were moved to silent tears.

When these champions are reintroduced in the second episode, much of this characterisation is revived. Fear is an emotion they aim to provoke, rather than feel. Tydeus rails against Amphiaraus for 'cringing (σαίνειν) before death and battle through cowardice (ἀψυχίαι)' (383). His shield-bells, meanwhile, 'clang terror' (κλάζουσι … φόβον, 386). Later, Hippomedon, 'glancing terror' (φόβον βλέπων, 498; cf. Parthenopaeus' γοργὸν … ὄμμ', 537), is actually identified with Phobos himself (500). This fear is very much a martial one, emanating from the shields and eyes of warriors: it has the same subject (Theban *politai*) and object (Argive enemy) as that envisaged by Eteocles in the prologue; the Argives hope that it will be expressed in panic – like that of the parodos – and in flight. Such a response is modelled throughout the scene: the Chorus 'tremble to see' (τρέμω … ἰδέσθαι) the deaths of the Theban champions (419-21); the Scout admits that he 'shuddered' (ἔφριξα), at the sight of Hippomedon (489-90); cf. the Chorus' fearful piloerection, 563-6).[536] Indeed, he wonders whether any man could be relied upon to stand his ground before Tydeus (395-6), and asks, after introducing Capaneus, 'Who can stand against him? Who will await without panic (μὴ τρέσας μενεῖ) the onset of this braggart man?' (435-6). This terror he considers irresistible.

[536] On the fearful connotations of *phrike* and piloerection, see my lexical introduction.

Eteocles, however, has a fearlessness to match. His first line of the episode sets the tone: κόσμον μὲν ἀνδρὸς οὔτιν' ἂν τρέσαιμ' ἐγώ (397). All the panoply of battle, the σήματα, the λόφοι, the κώδωνες that have so frightened the Scout – these he disdains to fear, as carrying no substantial threat (οὐδ' ἑλκοποιὰ γίγνεται, 398-9).[537] In fact, the Argive attempt to provoke fear in the Thebans seems, in this episode, a comprehensive failure. Melanippus, ranged against Tydeus, matches his opponent's rejection of cowardice (μὴ κακὸς δ' εἶναι φιλεῖ, 411). Megareus, sent to face Eteoclus at the third gate, is as unflappable as his commander: οὔτι μάργων ἱππικῶν φρυαγμάτων | βρόμον φοβηθεὶς ἐκ πυλῶν χωρήσεται (475-6). Eteocles' Thebans, like their adversaries, appear to have no fear of battle, or any of its attendant horrors.

Here the emotional similarity ends. For the fearlessness of the Argives, as presented in this scene, goes much further. Not only are they wholly unalarmed by the prospect of battle; they have no reverence for the gods. Tydeus dismisses Amphiaraus' warnings (378ff.); Capaneus declares that 'not even the weapons of Zeus' can stop him (428-9); Eteoclus' shield says the same of Ares (469); Hippomedon's Typhon-emblem implicitly defies the triumph of Zeus (493-4); Parthenopaeus 'reveres (σέβειν) his spear more than a god' (530). Such outrageous boldness is decried by Eteocles as ὕβρις (406, 502), as 'dishonouring the gods' (441), and as 'unholy boasts' (551).

The Thebans, on the other hand, are remarkable for their piety, which is expressed, in part, by their fear of divine displeasure. Melanippus, Eteocles says, 'honours the throne of

[537] Cf. Bacon (1964: 27): '[the scene] focuses our attention on what is really to be feared'; Eteocles 'recognizes the shields as masks of terror, mere appearances, without power to harm'.

modesty'; to point the contrast, he 'hates arrogant words' (τὸν Αἰσχύνης θρόνον | τιμῶντα καὶ στυγοῦνθ' ὑπέρφρονας λόγους, 409-10).[538] Such religious respect is not explicitly attributed to the other Thebans, but it is stressed that they make no boasts like those of the Argives (440, 473, 554). Eteocles, meanwhile, constantly stresses that any Theban success depends on divine support (415-6, 450, 501-3, 550-2, 614, 618-9).

The Argives, meanwhile, fearing neither mortal nor divine adversaries, neither death nor blasphemy, declare themselves absolutely sure of success. "I will burn the city!" reads Capaneus' shield (434). Eteoclus' emblem represents himself already atop the wall (466-7). The sworn readiness for death, and the tearful pinning of mementos to Adrastus' chariot – these are long forgotten. Triumph is now the only imagined eventuality. Parthenopaeus, interestingly, swears a new oath:

> ὄμνυσι δ' αἰχμὴν ἣν ἔχει, μᾶλλον θεοῦ
> σέβειν πεποιθὼς ὀμμάτων θ' ὑπέρτερον,
> ἢ μὴν λαπάξειν ἄστυ Καδμείων βίαι
> Διός (529-32)

The oath is strikingly similar to the one sworn in the prologue, reproducing word-for-word most of its first term (ᾗ πόλει κατασκαφὰς | θέντες <u>λαπάξειν ἄστυ Καδμείων βίαι</u>, 46-7).[539] Yet the echo really serves to highlight the difference. Parthenopaeus swears not over a slaughtered bull but upon his own spear;[540] and rather than invoking gods, he rejects them. It is not only gods that are excluded, however: the whole second term of the oath – the promise 'to perish and mix their blood into the soil' if they fail – has no

[538] Hutchinson compares Thuc. I.84.3: αἰδὼς σωφροσύνης πλεῖστον μετέχει, αἰσχύνης δὲ εὐψυχία. For shameful courage in Aristotle, see Chapter Two.
[539] Such alternative, 'do-or-die' oaths seem to have been traditional: Hutchinson compares Alc. 129.17-20 and Ephorus *FGH* 70 F 216.
[540] For oaths sworn on objects, see Torrance (2014: 111-132); weapons, including Parthenopaeus' spear, are discussed pp.125-6.

equivalent here. With the echo, Aeschylus underscores the transformation of the Argives' attitude: the prospect of defeat, and any fear it might entail, has disappeared from view.

Eteocles, by contrast, is careful to avoid such presumptuous predictions. Take, for example, his forecast for Megareus at the third gate:

> ἀλλ' ἢ θανὼν τροφεῖα πληρώσει χθονὶ
> ἢ καὶ δύ' ἄνδρε καὶ πόλισμ' ἐπ' ἀσπίδος
> ἑλὼν λαφύροις δῶμα κοσμήσει πατρός.
> (477-9)

Though this is no oath, the language again recalls the Argives in the prologue: two alternatives are clearly laid out. Megareus may conquer, but equally he may die. Here the possibility of failure is at the centre of Eteocles' *rhesis* (473-80); more commonly, it is reserved for the conclusion of his speeches. Thus the match between Tydeus and Melanippus at the first gate will be decided by Ares' dice (414-6). Twice, this pious uncertainty is introduced only in the final line of Eteocles' response. At the sixth gate, after praising Lasthenes' ability to exploit vulnerability with the spear, Eteocles declares, θεοῦ δὲ δῶρόν ἐστιν εὐτυχεῖν βροτούς (625). More strikingly, discussing the Sphinx on Parthenopaeus' shield at the fifth gate, Eteocles has already foretold the Argive champion's defeat ('she will blame her bearer when she gets an intense pounding below the city walls!' (560-1)) before he belatedly restores the normative caveat: θεῶν θελόντων τἂν ἀληθεύσαιμ' ἐγώ (562).[541]

[541] This is conventional Greek piety: see e.g. Bias (via Demetrius of Phalerum, via Stobaeus 3.1.172.86-7) ὅ τι ἂν ἀγαθὸν πράσσῃς, θεοὺς μὴ σεαυτὸν αἰτιῶ.

This hedged attitude towards the future, which I will call the 'uncertainty principle',[542] is a common feature of all six Eteoclean responses before his crisis at 653. The first, third, fifth and sixth speeches I have already dealt with. In the second (437-451), it is less apparent: Eteocles says that he is 'confident' (πέποιθα, 444) that a thunderbolt will strike Capaneus, and describes Polyphontes as a 'reliable defender' (φερέγγυον φρούρημα, 449). The first statement stops short of certainty; the second assures us of Polyphontes' courage, but not his success.[543] At the fourth gate, where Hippomedon looms, Eteocles seems at his most assured: immediately, he declares that Athena will ward off the arrogant Argive (501-3); and the opposition of the shield-emblems (Typhon vs Zeus) means that 'we [Thebans] are on the side of the winners' (516). It is enough to convince even the Chorus, who declare their confidence in Hyperbius (πέποιθα … 521-5).[544] Yet even here the uncertainty principle is observed. Athena's assured protection does not stretch to Hyperbius himself, who is 'ready to learn his fate in this crisis of fortune' (θέλων | ἐξιστορῆσαι μοῖραν ἐν χρείαι τύχης, 505-6). More significantly, at the end of the speech, Eteocles acknowledges that the logic of the shields only makes it 'probable' (εἰκός) – not certain – 'that the human opponents will fare the same' (519),[545] while Zeus' role as Saviour is relegated to a 'potential optative' (σωτὴρ γένοιτ' ἂν Ζεὺς, 520).[546]

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[542] This normally describes a theory in particle physics, first proposed by Weiner Heisenberg in 1927, according to which, at a subatomic level, the world remains random, in defiance of Newtonian physics. It was in protest against such ideas that Einstein famously declared, 'Der Alte würfelt nicht!' (Einstein/Born/Born 1971: 92). Eteocles would disagree (414), as perhaps would other Greeks: Hutchinson compares Soph. fr. 895 and [Eur.] *Rh.* 183.

[543] In the Messenger's post-battle report, all seven Thebans are described as φερεγγύοις |… μονομάχοισι προστάταις, even though 'things are well' (καλῶς ἔχει –) at only six gates (797-9).

[544] For Hutchinson (*ad* 369-652), this is the 'climax' of confidence in the scene, where 'victory for Thebes is assured' and 'not even the Chorus are anxious' (104). Note, however, that immediately afterward this Choral statement, as if to ward off the ill-omen of such confident predictions, the Scout adds: οὕτως γένοιτο (526).

[545] Hutchinson deletes 519 – included in most MSS, but mobile between 516 and 520 – as an intrusion from the margin; its position after 517, favoured by most editors (Page, West, Sommerstein), he finds 'painfully explicit'. On my reading, such explicitness is essential to Eteocles' piety, developing the implications of 516-7, but avoiding hubristic certainty. Moreover, the εικός prepares the ground for the optative of 520 (see note below).

[546] Smyth *824: 'the potential optative with ἄν states a future possibility, propriety or likelihood, as an *opinion* of the speaker'.

For Eteocles, then, if no Argive bombast is to be feared, no victory is to be forecast, either. It is this uncertainty principle, this consciousness of vulnerability, that sets the Thebans apart from their enemies. Even the Chorus attune themselves to this cautiously sanguine attitude.[547] Their fearful reactions, noted above, are always balanced by a prayer for positive success (417-9 before τρέμω … ἰδέσθαι, 419-21; 566-7 after the hair-raising fright of 563-6). Other responses feature no explicit fear, yet acknowledge the significance of the Argive threat (454-6; 628). Those prayers that do not – the third and fourth – nevertheless stress the contingency of divine will; nothing is guaranteed without it.[548]

If popular morality is not enough to commend this sentiment, and condemn its hubristic opposite, the play emphatically confirms its rectitude. The vaunts of all six Argives, as Eteocles hopes (550-1), are finally punished: after the battle, the Messenger reports that 'the boasts of mighty men have fallen to the ground' (πέπτωκεν ἀνδρῶν ὀβρίμων κομπάσματα, 794). Eteocles' six champions, reverent towards the gods, moderate in their courage, avoiding all such dangerous emotional expression, are rewarded with victory (799). Only Eteocles falls, at the Seventh Gate. While this is plainly a fulfilment of his ancestral curse (811-3), I will show that this curse manifests itself partly in a disruption of Eteocles' emotional management.

[547] Konstan's view that the Chorus are 'freed from fear' by Eteocles' 'logistical arguments' (2006: 147), is difficult to sustain: as my analysis suggests, there is no linear development of choral emotion within the episode; the emotion of the stasimon that follows is not so distinct from what has come before as he suggests (see below).
[548] Cf. Eteocles' own pronouncements in the prologue and first episode: εὖ τελεῖ θεός (35); οὐκ οὖν τάδ' ἔσται πρὸς θεῶν; (217).

Part IIc: Chorus vs Eteocles (631-720)

Until this point in the play, Eteocles has shown himself a master of fear. Appreciative of the military threat, wary of divine displeasure, and fearfully conscious of the Erinys that hangs over him, he takes practical precautions for the safety of his city, is careful to avoid *dusphemia*, and prays for divine clemency. Most significantly, he exercises strict control over his own emotional expression. This strictness is replicated in his government of the emotions of others: he guides, and moderates, the fears of his soldiers; then, albeit temporarily, he interrupts and redirects the fearful expressions of the Chorus. In the second episode, he continues to regulate his speech, avoiding *hubris*, and constantly referring all success to a pious uncertainty principle. This, however, all changes after 631, when his brother is announced. In order to understand how his emotional regime is transformed, it is necessary to consider first the attitudes he is confronted by in Polyneices.

Eteocles' brother, we are told, approaches the seventh gate in exultant spirits, 'sounding out a jubilant paean for [the city's] capture' (ἀλώσιμον παιᾶν' ἐπεξιακχάσας, 635).[549] He curses and prays (ἀρᾶται καὶ κατεύχεται, 633),

> σοὶ ξυμφέρεσθαι καὶ κτανὼν θανεῖν πέλας
> ἢ ζῶντ' ἀτιμαστῆρα τὼς ἀνδρηλατῶν
> φυγῆι τὸν αὐτὸν τόνδε τείσασθαι τρόπον. (636-8)

The resonance with the original Argive oath is again unmistakeable. As with Megareus, and with Parthenopaeus, two alternative fates are contemplated; once again, two

[549] This is the rendering of Sommerstein, who deletes 634; for Hutchinson, who notes the Eleusinian reference, ἐπεξιακχάσας suggests 'the frenzy with which Polyneices will utter this cry', but situates that cry in the prayed-for future, after he has mounted the walls (634). Either way, the joyous paean precedes the grim confrontation with Eteocles.

infinitives are coordinated by ἤ, and once again, one of the possible outcomes is victory. However, like Parthenopaeus, Polyneices distorts the emotional valence of the Argive ritual. First, this is not an oath, but a prayer: both possibilities are welcomed. Whereas then the prospect of death provoked weeping in the champions, not even mutual fratricide, with its attendant pollution, holds any horror for Polyneices now. Eteocles will rightly characterise him as 'all-daring' (παντόλμῳ, 671).[550] This prayer is quite different, it should be stressed, from the impious boasts of the other Argives: they had no fear because they recognised no potential for reversal. Polyneices, by contrast, calmly contemplates his polluted death,[551] and seems actively to desire it. [552]

Eteocles' initial reaction has already been discussed: he struggles to contain his emotional impulse, for the good of the community, bringing his prospective lamentation under control (653-7; see Part I). When he begins his answer proper, however, he does not recover the emotional balance that has so far characterised his responses in this scene. Rather than 'turning' the shield-semiotics, as before, he simply rejects them as nonsense (γράμματα |… φλύοντα σὺν φοίτῳ φρενῶν, 660-1). Thus Eteocles finds himself denying the presence, and influence, of a deity (Δίκη) invoked by his opponent, whereas before he was always the one introducing the divine element (668-9); his implicit assertion of divine support (τίς ἄλλος μᾶλλον ἐνδικώτερος; 673) has the hollow ring of repetition.[553] His confidence in Polyneices' defeat, meanwhile, is emphatic (τάχ' εἰσόμεσθα, 659; τούτοις πεποιθώς, 672), and unchecked by any caveat.

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[550] Stehle (2005: 118) attributes the perversity of κτανὼν θανεῖν to the work of the Erinys.
[551] His shield is more akin to those of his peers. Justice is shown to promise, 'I will bring this man back from exile, and he will possess his father's city…' (647-8). The future tense certainty (κατάξω, ἕξει) recalls Capeneus' inscription, πρήσω πόλιν (434).
[552] Amphiaraus, it is true, also marches calmly (εὔκηλος, 590) to his death; unlike Polyneices, however, he expects a death that is οὐκ ἄτιμον (589).
[553] On this failure to turn the sign, see Cameron (1970) and Stehle (2005: 119).

This is not to say Eteocles is by any means confident of success – in the ensuing *epirrhema* with the Chorus, he demonstrates his conviction that he will suffer evil (683), that the whole house of Laius will be destroyed (691-2). Nor does he neglect the divine: he continues to attribute future events (and past ones, 653-5) to divine will (690, 695, 719). Yet the uncertainty principle has been forgotten. Regarding all as predetermined, Eteocles, like Polyneices (and like Cassandra),[554] goes to his death without fear:

> θεοῖς μὲν ἤδη πως παρημελήμεθα,
> χάρις δ' ἀφ' ἡμῶν ὀλομένων θαυμάζεται;[555]
> τί οὖν ἔτ' ἂν σαίνοιμεν ὀλέθριον μόρον; (702-4)

Why does Eteocles embrace death in this way? Why does he not shun the pollution of fratricide? These questions are perhaps the most vexed in the scholarship on the *Seven*. It seems logical to start with the commentary of the Chorus. After Eteocles first states his resolution (672-5), the Chorus immediately offer an explanation:

> μή, φίλτατ' ἀνδρῶν, Οἰδίπου τέκος, γένῃ
> ὀργὴν ὁμοῖος τῶι κάκιστ' αὐδωμένῳ· (677-8)

It is Eteocles' 'temperament' (ὀργή)[556] that makes him similar to his outrageous brother. The irrational motivation is developed through the exchange (τί μέμονας, τέκνον; … δορίμαργος … ἔρωτος, 688-9), as the Chorus seek to reason with their King; it is 'too harshly-stinging desire' that 'provokes' him (ὠμοδακής σ' ἄγαν ἵμερος ἐξοτρύνει, 692; cf. μὴ 'ποτρύνου, 698). Such battle-lust connects Eteocles with Tydeus, who was described in similar terms: μαργῶν καὶ μάχης λελιμμένος, (380); μάχης ἐρῶν (392).

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[554] See discussion in Chapter Five.
[555] Page and West punctuate 703 as a statement, but see Hutchinson's discussion *ad loc.*
[556] Tr. Palladini. Sommerstein: 'passions'. Hutchinson suggests 'nature', and points to similar collocations with ὁμοῖος, 'always with this sense'.

Perhaps most tellingly, Eteocles echoes Tydeus' contempt for fear, in the idea of 'cringing before death' (σαίνοιμεν ὀλέθριον μόρον, 704; cf. σαίνειν μόρον, 383). The Theban King thus seems transformed into a furious and fearless madman, dismissive of dissuasion, and indistinguishable from the Argives he opposes.

However, unlike Tydeus, Eteocles knows he is doomed. Moreover, as Lawrence has pointed out, the Chorus implicitly assume that he can control his emotions, and that he *chooses* to yield.[557] κακοῦ … ἔκβαλ' ἔρωτος ἀρχάν (687-8), they tell him, as if he has mastery of the ἀρχή of his passions; 'Stay, *while you have the chance*!' (μίμν' ὅτε σοι παρέστακεν, 705).[558] Thus they try to persuade him. The irony of this, after the dispute of the first episode, has often been noted. The metrical symmetry is especially striking: 686-720 reprises the *epirrhema* and *stichomythia* of 203-263.[559] Where before Eteocles sought to regulate the passion of the Chorus (discussed above, Part IIa), now they seek to regulate his.[560] As Hutchinson suggests, the Chorus' 'unrestrained emotion' in the earlier scene is answered by Eteocles' 'suppressed … horror' in this one; his attempted moderation of their fear is followed by their attempted stimulation of his.

Thus the Chorus, in their initial response, set down the two premises of their argument: first, *contingency*, since there exist alternative courses of action; second, *seriousness of harm*, since the evil that Eteocles is embracing is a catastrophic one.

> ἀλλ' ἄνδρας Ἀργείοισι Καδμείους ἅλις
>
> ἐς χεῖρας ἐλθεῖν· αἷμα γὰρ καθάρσιον.

[557] Lawrence (2007: 350-2).
[558] μίμν' is West's conjecture, adopted by Sommerstein.
[559] On the metrical resonance (and divergence), see De Poli (2018).
[560] Winnington-Ingram (1983: 33-4).

ἀνδροῖν δ’ ὁμαίμοιν θάνατος ὧδ’ αὐτοκτόνος,

οὐκ ἔστι γῆρας τοῦδε τοῦ μιάσματος. (679-82)

Though ‘fear’ itself goes unmentioned here, these two premises are, arguably, its cognitive components;[561] the action they point towards – the avoidance of death – is interpreted by Eteocles as a fearful one (704). Both premises are reiterated through the exchange. The Chorus speak of ‘ruin’ (ἄτα, 687) that threatens, and warn that the fratricide would be ‘bitter-fruited’ (πικρόκαρπον, 692). Other alternatives, including propitiatory sacrifice, are also proposed (699-701; 705-8). Why does Eteocles not pursue these? ‘From 653 onwards’, Sommerstein explains, ‘Eteocles behaves like a complete fatalist’, believing that the Erinys is ‘determined (we might say) to get him, and that further evasive action will merely incur disgrace’.[562] Yet this disgrace is no ‘mere’ distraction from the dispute for Eteocles: it is absolutely crucial to his decision.

When the Chorus make their argument for fearing the duel (679-82), Eteocles does not counter with any arguments for its desirability, since, in his judgment, this evil is already fixed. He focuses, instead, on what remains uncertain:

εἴπερ κακὸν φέροι τις, αἰσχύνης ἄτερ

ἔστω· μόνον γὰρ κέρδος ἐν τεθνηκόσιν,

κακῶν δὲ κἀισχρῶν οὕτιν’ εὐκλείαν ἐρεῖς. (683-5)

The only κέρδος available – all there is to play for, so to speak – is reputation, on a spectrum from αἰσχύνη to εὐκλεία.[563] One is to be feared, and avoided; the other is to be

[561] Both premises are necessary conditions of fear, according to Aristotle’s discussion in the *Rhetoric*: seriousness: ἔστω δὴ ὁ φόβος λύπη τις ἢ ταραχὴ ἐκ φαντασίας μέλλοντος κακοῦ φθαρτικοῦ ἢ λυπηροῦ (1382a21-2); contingency: ἀλλὰ δεῖ τινα ἐλπίδα ὑπεῖναι σωτηρίας, περὶ οὗ ἀγωνιῶσιν (1383a5-6). For a discussion, see Chapter Two.

[562] (2010: 78).

[563] Winnington-Ingram (1983: 35-9) relates this κέρδος to the κέρδος of 697, where Eteocles quotes the ‘Curse’ as saying: κέρδος πρότερον ὑστέρου μόρου. The ‘gain’ of honour and the ‘gain’ of revenge are, he argues, identical to Eteocles.

desired, and pursued. The Chorus take up this point at 698-9: 'You will not be called a coward, if you find an honourable way to stay alive' (κακὸς οὐ κεκλήσῃ βίον εὖ κυρήσας). Eteocles' response, apparently scorning fear, in fact implicitly vindicates the emotion, if the first premise set down by the Chorus were valid. τί οὖν ἔτ' ἂν σαίνοιμεν ὀλέθριον μόρον; ([Since we are doomed], why then should we *keep* cringing to our doom?', 704).[564] Fear of death would be justified, if there were still hope of survival; since there is not, his decisions are shaped by another fear – the fear of disgrace. Thus the Chorus, in their attempt to dissuade their King, attempt to undermine the grounds for this fear in the final stichomythic exchange, by attacking the second premise, that of seriousness: νίκην γε μέντοι καὶ κακὴν τιμᾶι θεός (716). When Eteocles rejects this argument, as dishonourable to a soldier (ἄνδρ' ὁπλίτην, 717), the Chorus' make a final effort to awaken his fear of the fratricide:

Χο. ἀλλ' αὐτάδελφον αἷμα δρέψασθαι θέλεις;

Ετ. θεῶν διδόντων οὐκ ἂν ἐκφύγοις κακά. (718-9)

Their question powerfully combines the two premises set out in their first reaction (679-82): θέλεις frames the fratricidal duel as a choice, implying alternatives; the bold metaphor of αὐτάδελφον αἷμα δρέψασθαι makes vivid once more the hideous perversity of the course proposed. Eteocles's answer, equally powerfully, declares there to be no alternative to the duel, thus nullifying the basis for fear. At the same time, he returns to his fear of dishonour: it is the *soldier*, the hoplite, armed as Eteocles now is, who should not, cannot, must not flee.

[564] Palladini's translation, my emphasis. Eteocles, interestingly, uses the same collocation of τί οὖν when rejecting the Chorus' fear in the first *epirrhema* (208); there, too, he rejects the fear not as unjustified, but as unproductive.

With these words, Eteocles exits. His decision, whether ill-fated, crazed, or honourable, is partly shaped by an emotional disturbance. The pious fears of the divine, tied as they were to an urgent sense of contingency, fade from view; instead, he is guided by concern for his reputation, and the threat of dishonour. The Chorus battle hard to revive his religious anxieties, emphasising the horror of the fratricide, and the existence of other options; they also seek to downplay the significance of any disgrace. Such attempted substitution of fear recalls Eteocles' threat of violence against the Chorus in the first episode. Both attempts, however, are ultimately unsuccessful. Fear, in this tragedy, twice proves itself resistant to management.

What, then, becomes of the emotional regime? If fear cannot be governed, by force or by persuasion, how is the 'unity of the community', as Reddy understands it, to be maintained? What is there to prevent fear becoming an ungovernable force, destroying rather than preserving the *polis*? In the final section of this chapter, I will argue that while *Seven* demonstrates the difficulty of maintaining a coherent emotional regime, it offers a different model for collective response. This model, as I will show, subverts the categories of subject and object that seemed so crucial to the organisation of fear in the first part of the play; embracing, rather than fleeing, vulnerability, one answer to fear is pity.

## Part III: Spectatorial Fear

In a fascinating, if speculative, article on Phrynichus' *Capture of Miletus*, Rosenbloom suggested that the representation of *oikeia kaka* (for which Herodotus tells us Phrynichus

was fined), remained central to early tragedy, but was thenceforth carefully disguised in *allotria kaka*. Nevertheless, fear, not pity, remained 'the dominant emotion of the early theatre'; indeed in Aeschylus 'pity' often seems hardly distinguishable from grief itself.[565] This certainly seems true of the οἶκτος of 51, where the Argives are contemplating their own demise, rather than anyone else's, and the emphasis is on the oral *expression* of grief. No pity is expressed, or even explicitly requested, in the parodos or first episode: in these scenes, the Chorus are defined as fearful, not pitiful.

In the first stasimon, however, something interesting happens: after their 'shrill-wailing prayers' (ὀξυγόοις λιταῖσιν, 320), the Chorus renew, and substantially expand, the proleptic fears of the parodos. The second strophe begins:

> οἰκτρὸν γὰρ πόλιν ὧδ' ὠγυγίαν
> Ἀίδαι προϊάψαι (321-2)

The destruction of Thebes is presented here as 'pitiful'. One might argue that this emotion is analogous to that of the prologue: οἰκτρός, like οἶκτος, need not be other-focused; perhaps this is the same wailing of defeated Thebes that Eteocles envisaged in the prologue (φροιμίοις πολυρρόθοις | οἰμώγμασίν, 7-8). Yet the absence of both an article to limit πόλιν, and a finite verb to define temporality, allows the statement to become generic; as Sommerstein translates, 'it is pitiful that so ancient a city should be cast down to Hades …'.[566] The implication is that the decline of *any* such city would be οἰκτρόν. An identical construction opens the antistrophe: 'And it is lamentable when those just reared are plucked unripe, and traverse, before the lawful time, a hateful path away from their homes' (κλαυτὸν δ' … διαμεῖψαι …, 333-5). Again, there is no article,

[565] Rosenbloom (1993: 186, with n. 94).
[566] Cf. Collard: 'A cause for pity's tear's it is, to hurl a city …'. Articles are of course often omitted in Greek verse, and the reference may be more specific: Aeschylus exploits this poetic ambiguity.

no finite verb, just an aorist infinitive and a predicate adjective: the statement could apply to any city, at any time.

Of course, the application of these phrases to the present crisis is clear: the Chorus are concerned with the imminent threat to Thebes and the fate of its women. Yet the generic quality is surprising – especially after the exceptional particularity of their appeal to 'local gods', both in the parodos and in the first part of this stasimon. Also striking is the Homeric phrasing of Ἀίδαι προϊάψαι (cf. Ἄϊδι προΐαψεν, *Il.* 1.3): 'no allusion', as Hutchinson notes, 'could be more ostentatious'.[567] Thebes, ravaged by 'the Achaean man' (324), becomes Troy, becomes the literary *topos* of a city being sacked. The urgent, personal anxiety is meanwhile replaced by an apparently detached narrative, which is οἰκτρόν, 'worthy of lament' (Hutchinson). The scenes described – women dragged by the hair, their clothes torn from their bodies, abduction – clearly match the anxieties of this virgin chorus, and are vividly reported in the present tense, but the first person, where it appears, seems detached from the action: ἦ τὸν φθίμενον γὰρ προλέγω | βέλτερα τῶνδε πράσσειν (336-7). Only once in this narrative, at the end of the second strophe, do the Chorus refer to their own vulnerability, their dread: βαρείας τοι τύχας προταρβῶ (332). Even here, the connection with the violent pillaging just described is left vague and implicit.

The Chorus thus seem to play two different roles within the scene they construct: they are both victims and observers, lamentable, and lamenting. They are afraid of the brutality of a city-sacking, but it is a fear at one remove: προταρβέω suggests a danger that is

[567] There are Homeric phrases earlier in the ode also, at 300 and 316. See Hutchinson *ad loc*.

somehow far-off, or threatening somebody else.[568] In this case, both senses of προ- are relevant. The urgent, self-concerned fear of the parodos has been displaced by a fear that includes the vulnerabilities of others, in other places.[569]

This ethos is reproduced, in a different way, in the second stasimon, after Eteocles' departure. Most of those who have written about fear in the *Seven* have marked a change in the Chorus' emotion at the end of the shield-scene. They are still frightened, however:

> πέφρικα τὰν ὠλεσίοικον
>
> …
>
> πατρὸς εὐκταίαν Ἐρινὺν
>
> τελέσαι τὰς περιθύμους
>
> κατάρας Οἰδιπόδα βλαψίφρονος· (720-1)

As Sommerstein points out, of the ten stanzas of this song, only one (758-765) is devoted to the safety of the city, which until 653 was the sole object of the Chorus' attention. The rest are dedicated to their new concern, the fate of the Labdacid house.[570] This too is represented as a kind of fear – and once again the *prolepsis* is striking: the Chorus not only seem to know that the brothers will kill one another (734-5), but speak of this cursed event as if already executed (766-7). Nevertheless, the ode ends, as it begins, with an avowal of fear: 'And now I tremble (τρέω) lest the swift-footed Erinys may fulfil (τελέσῃ) this' (790-1).

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[568] LSJ προταρβέω I: 'fear beforehand'. Yet προ- in compound verbs may imply personal as well as temporal displacement (LSJ πρό D.III.3); LSJ προταρβέω II: 'fear *or* be anxious for [some]one'. Cf. προφοβοῦμαι at *Supp.* 1043, discussed below and in Chapter Three.
[569] Cf. Visvardi (2015: 162-3), on the Chorus' 'expansion of the sympathetic imagination'.
[570] Sommerstein (2010: 83).

What kind of fear is this? Konstan writes: 'The new crisis involves miasma, rather than the physical annihilation of the city, and the women respond to it not with fear but with horror'.[571] Yet neither πέφρικα nor τρέω is new to the play's vocabulary: the Scout 'shuddered' (ἔφριξα, 490) similarly at the sight of Hippomedon, and wondered who could confront Capaneus μὴ τρέσας (436); the Chorus 'trembled to see the bloody deaths' of the Thebans (τρέμω … ἰδέσθαι, 419-21).[572] When the Herald announces the brothers' death, the Chorus do not understand, pronouncing themselves 'out of [their] minds with fear' (παραφρονῶ φόβῳ, 806); this response recalls their terrified deafness to Eteocles' abuse (202-4). In fact, rather than trying to distinguish this horror about the royal house from the personal and civic anxieties expressed earlier, Aeschylus' language seems to highlight a continuity between the two. The Chorus use the language of their personal fears – fear *of* the Argives, fear *of* divine abandonment – to express their newfound sympathetic fear – fear *for* Eteocles, and fear *for* the Labdacid house.

The two modes of fears are indeed entwined: thus the Chorus sing, δέδοικα δὲ σὺν βασιλεῦσι | μὴ πόλις δαμασθῆι (764-5); this fear is justified by the oracle of Laius, who was told to 'die without issue and so save his city (σώιζειν πόλιν)' (749-50). The framing of the prophecy dictates that the altruistic fears of the Chorus are united with their more personal anxieties. Similarly, at the end of the *Suppliants*, the Argives 'fear for [the Danaids] punishments still to come, and dire suffering and bloody wars' (φυγάδεσσιν δ' ἔτι ποινὰς κακά τ' ἄλγη | πολέμους θ' αἱματόεντας προφοβοῦμαι, 1043-4); it is of course Argives, rather than Danaids, who will bleed in the war to come. In both cases, therefore,

[571] Konstan (2006: 147).
[572] For the etymological and semantic relation between τρέω and τρέμω, signifying 'agitation, secousse, fuite', see Chantraine s.v.

the sympathetic fear of the observer is entangled with a personal vulnerability that is not merely speculative, but vindicated by the plot.

It might be assumed that after the Herald's double announcement – of victory for Thebes and catastrophe for the Labdacids – that both kinds of fear would disappear. And indeed it is true that the last passage of the play is dominated not by fear but by grief. And yet there are hints, within these closing lyrical exchanges, that the city's troubles are not complete, and that the lamentation has a prospective as well as a retrospective orientation. Most significant of these are the lines spoken just before the entrance of the bodies:

> βουλαὶ δ' ἄπιστοι Λαΐου διήρκεσαν.
>
> μέριμνα δ' ἀμφὶ πτόλιν·
>
> θέσφατ' οὐκ ἀμβλύνεται. (842-4)

The 'disobedient decision of Laius' is assuredly recalls Apollo's instruction, and Laius' defiance, as reported by this Chorus a hundred lines earlier. The price of this defiance was the safety of the polis itself (749-50); and the Chorus are here aware that the 'oracles do not lose their edge'. In this context, it is natural to see in μέριμνα (843) not just 'lamentation' (Hutchinson, Sommerstein) or 'despair' (Collard), but also 'anxiety'[573] concerning the final fulfilment of Apollo's threat.[574] This will come, of course, with the successful attack of the Epigoni, in the next generation. The concluding catastrophe in the Theban saga is scarcely present in the *Seven*, as Aeschylus brings his trilogy to satisfying end: indeed, we are told emphatically that 'the controlling power (δαίμων), having

[573] For this sense in Aeschylus, see esp. *Pers*. 165, *Sept.* 290, *Ag*. 99, 460. ἀμφὶ πτόλιν is perhaps 'throughout the city' (Sommerstein, cf. Hutchinson) rather than 'for the city' (LSJ s.v. μέριμνα), though see *Pers*. 8 and 165 for fears with ἀμφί and the dative.

[574] Hutchinson reckons the θέσφατα of 844 to include the curse of Oedipus (840-1) as well as the disobedience of Laius (842), 'both' of which 'have endured down to their fulfilment'. But Oedipus' φάτις can hardly be θέσφατος, and it is unclear how the oracle of 749-50 has yet been fulfilled, despite the Messenger's judgment at 800-2.

defeated two men, has ended (ἔληξε) its work' (959-60; cf. 689-91, 813). At 902-3, however, the Chorus sing that the 'property' of Eteocles and Polyneices 'awaits the Epigoni' (μένει | κτέανα τοῖς ἐπιγόνοις, 903).[575]

What is to be 'gained', as Hutchinson puts it, 'from such inconsistency'?[576] Why would Aeschylus 'disrupt' the impression of finality? We may offer two answers, one historical, and one ideological. The first brings us back to the first stasimon, where the Chorus used the same word, μέριμνα, to reintroduce their fearful visions of the sacked city (290). As Rosenbloom suggests, the piteous description of fire, smoke, and charred earth, of defiled piety, and of ruined and wasted crops cannot have failed to evoke, for the Athenian audience, memories of the two Persian sackings of their city in 480 and 479: this is representation of *oikeia kaka* under the guise of *allotria.* Rosenbloom is quick to explain the objective of such detached re-enactment as 'hedonistic', citing Aristotle's *Rhetoric* for the pleasure of remembered toils once they are escaped.[577] Yet his own analysis of the *Persians*, discussed in my introduction, suggests a potential political significance. If *Persians* was a lesson in imperial overreach, disguised as a triumphalist celebration of Athens, might *Seven* not also contain a warning to the Athens of 467, disguised as hedonistic detachment? Though our sources for this period are patchy, we know that Xerxes raised a new fleet and army at the beginning of the decade;[578] such developments must have caused consternation in Athens, despite their recent successes. Could Aeschylus' allusions to the Epigoni – indirect, ambiguous, and inconsistent – reflect this

[575] So Page. Most MSS give κτέανα τ' ἐπιγόνοις. West (following Blaydes) prefers the variant κτέανα δ' ἐπιγόνοις; each must posit a corresponding lacuna in the strophe. Hutchinson (following Verrall) deletes 903.
[576] *Ad* 903.
[577] Rosenbloom (1993: 189).
[578] This is the fleet that Cimon defeated at the Eurymedon, in a battle dated alternatively to 469 or 466 BCE. 'They had six hundred ships, according to Phanodemus, and three hundred and fifty according to Ephorus' (Plut. *Vit. Cim.* 12.5; cf. Thuc. I.100.1). For the enduring fifth-century fear that Persia would invade Greece again, see Cawkwell (2005: 127-9).

ambivalent sense of endangered security? Does the 'disconcerting' recurrence of the Chorus' anxiety work as warning to a complacent audience, that Persian Epigoni may come?

The second explanation does not require us to speculate in this way, but merely to look forward to the next chapter. Aeschylus' *Oresteia* follows a different emotional trajectory from the Theban trilogy; certainly there is no room, in *Seven*, for the celebratory spirit that pervades the exodos of *Eumenides.* It will be remembered, however, that after Orestes is freed from the fear of the Erinyes, and withdraws, Athena does not exclude the goddesses, or the emotion, from her city; rather, she installs them at the centre of Athens. She endorses the value of fear not only in the presence of obvious danger, but as a general attitude, securing justice and prosperity. The *Eumenides* concludes with an outpouring of joy, set off by the elevation of fear for the Athens of its audience; the *Seven* ends with an outpouring of grief, inflected by an enduring anxiety, to be vindicated by the audience's knowledge of Theban saga.

## Conclusion

This study of *Seven Against Thebes* is in part a survey of fears. As communal phenomena, they are subject to political regulation: communities develop emotional regimes, whereby certain objects are supposed to feared by certain groups in certain ways. Deviants face penalties for failing to control their emotional expression. In many ways, the *Seven* confirms the prudence of such emotional control: the Argives are defeated after failing to fear divine displeasure; Eteocles and Polyneices, refusing to fear

pollution, also go to their death. Yet the tragedy also dramatizes the difficulty of maintaining correct feelings, both in government of others, and in self-government. Reddy suggests that the vicarious experience of literature might offer, under a repressive emotional regime, an ‘emotional refuge’ – an outlet for forbidden modes of feeling, or for the development of new ones. In this play we saw how fear might be expanded by sympathy to include the suffering of others, and how the suffering of others, conversely, might provoke a broader conception of fear.

# ***PHOBOI MATHOS*: THE EMOTIONAL ECOLOGY OF THE *ORESTEIA***

> … διὰ δέος μάλιστα οὐ παρανομοῦμεν, τῶν τε αἰεὶ ἐν ἀρχῇ ὄντων ἀκροάσει καὶ τῶν νόμων, καὶ μάλιστα αὐτῶν ὅσοι τε ἐπ᾽ ὠφελίᾳ τῶν ἀδικουμένων κεῖνται καὶ ὅσοι ἄγραφοι ὄντες αἰσχύνην ὁμολογουμένην φέρουσιν.
>
> Thuc. II.37.3

## Introduction

While my last two chapters examined some cognitive and political benefits of fear, as explored in the *Suppliants* and the *Seven Against Thebes*, this final chapter will confront the problem of fear's cultivation. How does fear *become* good? What is the role of tragedy? Some answers to these questions have been suggested in the first part of this thesis, especially in Chapters Two and Three. In order to comprehend Aeschylus' full contribution to this discourse, however, we must look to his Athena, and her famous celebration of fear.

## *Eumenides*: Against the Masterplot

> κλύοιτ᾽ ἂν ἤδη θεσμόν, Ἀττικὸς λεώς,
> πρώτας δίκας κρίνοντες αἵματος χυτοῦ. (681-2)

'Hear now my ordinance, people of Athens ….' So Athena commands at the critical juncture of Orestes' trial, and the climax of the *Oresteia*. In itself, this line is an

extraordinary *coup de théâtre*. Tragic convention forbids the *dramatis personae* from addressing the audience explicitly, and here, the Ἀττικὸς λεώς is represented by the jurors on stage. Nevertheless, the imperative invites the Athenian spectators to hear themselves addressed – indeed, to see themselves embodied in those who are 'deciding this first lawsuit for shed blood'.[579] In any case, here is a goddess giving directions: Athenians are likely to have sat up. Athena, in fact, has been trailing her *thesmos* for two hundred lines (cf. 484); the Erinyes have anticipated a 'revolution of new ordinances' (καταστροφαὶ νέων | θεσμίων, 490-1); and Athena has already commanded 'these men and the whole city … to learn [her] θεσμούς' (571). The revolution, long delayed, is now (ἤδη) imminent.

What follows? In fine revolutionary style, Athena sets up a committee, a δικαστῶν … βουλευτήριον, which 'will always exist, even in future time, for Aegeus' people' (683-4). This is the 'council of the Areopagus', an archaic deliberative body that had survived into the fifth century.[580] In the *Eumenides*, this court, which is 'sharp to anger … and a wakeful guard on behalf of those who sleep' (704-6), emerges as a solution to the cycle of violence that has structured the *Oresteia*. Scholars have understandably focused on the nature of this new institution, how far it reflects contemporary Athenian legal practice, and the historical reforms Athena might allude to when she cautions against 'innovations in the laws, polluting bright water with evil in-pourings' (693-5).[581] This continuing debate, however, mostly serves to highlight Athena's vagueness on the question of reform; moreover, it has obscured the main emphasis of her 'extended advice' (707) to

[579] For the convention see Taplin (1977: 130-2); possible exceptions are discussed by Carter (2010: 59-63).
[580] See Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 8.2, 8.4, 16.8, 25.2.
[581] See, e.g. Leão (2010); E. Harris (2019), with bibliography.

the Athenians. Crucially, both before and after her warning against any pollution of the court, Athena stresses the importance of fear in her new settlement.

> … ἐν δὲ τῶι σέβας
> ἀστῶν φόβος τε ξυγγενὴς τὸ μὴ ἀδικεῖν
> σχήσει τό τ᾽ ἦμαρ καὶ κατ᾽ εὐφρόνην ὁμῶς,
> …
> τὸ μήτ᾽ ἄναρχον μήτε δεσποτούμενον
> ἀστοῖς περιστέλλουσι βουλεύω σέβειν
> καὶ μὴ τὸ δεινὸν πᾶν πόλεως ἔξω βαλεῖν·
> τίς γὰρ δεδοικὼς μηδὲν ἔνδικος βροτῶν;
> τοιόνδε τοι ταρβοῦντες ἐνδίκως σέβας
> ἔρυμά τε χώρας καὶ πόλεως σωτήριον
> ἔχοιτ᾽ ἂν οἷον οὔτις ἀνθρώπων ἔχει,
> οὔτ᾽ ἐν Σκύθησιν οὔτε Πέλοπος ἐν τόποις. (690-2, 696-703)

It is hard to overstate the centrality of emotion in these precepts. ‘Reverence and its cousin fear’ are supposed to deter the Athenians from injustice (τὸ … ἀδικεῖν); these same Athenians are asked to ‘revere’ (σέβειν) neither anarchy nor despotism; they must not cast ‘the fearful’ (τὸ δεινόν) entirely from the city. Fear is made a necessary condition for justice (699). Indeed, the fear of this ‘reverend court’ is itself described as ‘just’ (τοιόνδε … ταρβοῦντες ἐνδίκως σέβας), and will make the city more secure than any other.

While the concentration of such sentiments is striking, there is nothing hugely surprising in any one of them. Modern democracies may aspire to a more consensual acquiescence,

but Pericles seems not ashamed, but rather proud, that Athenians obeyed their laws 'through fear most of all' (δέος, Thuc. II.37.3);[582] Plato's Socrates is even more explicit about the purpose of punishment (*Gorg*. 525a).[583] Athena's collocation of *phobos, deos*, and *sebas* is also found in Platonic discourse; the necessity of moderate fear recalls Aristotle's ethical works; whole speeches in Thucydides are devoted to the civic security granted by the emotion. Indeed, as I have shown already in this thesis, Aeschylus' own plays consistently suggest that fear is essential to piety, prudence, and effective governance, and thus contribute to a widespread Athenian discourse of 'good fear'.

The problem, for critics of the *Oresteia*, has been that fear has heretofore been associated with the tyranny of Aegisthus and Clytemnestra. Clytemnestra's governance is defined by fear in the *Agamemnon* (154-5), where the Chorus of Elders are afraid to speak their minds (549); the Chorus of *Libation Bearers* are similarly frightened into silence (46-7, 102). Both Chorus and Cassandra are fearful and helpless before the murder of the King; in its aftermath, the former 'fear (δέδοικα) the beating storm of rain that shakes the house' (*Ag.* 1533, tr. Smyth). In *Libation Bearers*, Clytemnestra is afflicted by the φόβος of her prophetic dreams (32-5; cf. 524, 547-8, 930). Meanwhile, Orestes sets about his task in order to avoid a comparable 'madness and vain φόβος of the night' (288). With brutal irony, he is, after the matricide, possessed by φόβος (1024-5, cf. 1052, 1056), but, Apollo, coming to his rescue, tells him, 'let not φόβος overcome your wits' (*Eum*. 88). In this final play of the trilogy, fear, and especially the δεινός variety that Athena wishes to

[582] On the meaning of δέος here, see Chapter One, p. 94.
[583] See Chapter Three. The effectiveness of such fearful deterrence is questioned by Diodotus in Thuc. III.45: see discussion in Chapter Two. On deterrence arguments in Athenian oratory, see Allen (2000: 191-4).

preserve, is explicitly identified with the monstrous, bloodsucking Erinyes,[584] who, Apollo says, belong only in a place of beheading, eye-gouging, and castration (186-9). Athena herself, patron goddess of Athens, is 'not at all afraid' (ταρβῶ … οὐδέν, 407). Yet in her *thesmos*-speech she plants this emotion at the heart of her city. How is Athena's civic fear reconciled with the emotion that has dominated the trilogy – the instrument of tyrants, harbinger of destruction, destroyer of minds? What place can be found for such an emotion in the democratic, prosperous, rational city that Athena now promises?[585]

The simplest solution – and the one to which the overwhelming majority of commentators have subscribed – is that fear is 'transformed' in Athena's speech.[586] Seth Schein's recent treatment is typical of this approach:

> In endorsing "fear," a key element of what one might call Fury-justice, Athena definitively transforms the emotion from something negative to something positive, from an irrational element associated with antisocial violence and murder to a rational, necessary component of social order and of a healthy and prosperous Athens. (2018: 93-4)

[584] *Eum.* 34: ἦ δεινὰ λέξαι, δεινὰ δ' ὀφθαλμοῖς δρακεῖν;, with Sommerstein *ad loc*.; cf. 38 (δείσασα).
[585] This conundrum must be at the root of Bierl's strange conclusion that '[c]ontrary to tyrants, the democratic leadership will no longer be grounded in fear and will not exert its power through terror' (2017: 553), which takes no account of the fear and reverence of the Areopagus that is instituted by Athena.
[586] One standout exception is Rosenmeyer, who firmly asserts (1982: 366) the continuity of the Erinyes' terror: it is still, at the end of the play, 'radical and elemental … It is the same fear that Orestes felt before the murder, …, and after. The fear now recommended by Athena is more productive, socially and politically … But the experience of terror is the same.' Compare Bacon (2001: 58-9), who sees the goddess '*reaffirming* the positive aspect of fear', but at the same time witnessing its 'discovery'. Belfiore (1992: ch. 1) and Pestell (2017) both intermittently suggest that fear, like the Erinyes, is subject to a change of perception rather than any essential transformation; this insight is neither consistent nor accompanied by any substantial investigation of fear earlier in the trilogy.

Negative to positive, irrational to rational, antisocial to pro-social, murderous to salutary: these are all commonly highlighted aspects of the alleged 'transformation'. This hermeneutic tradition goes back at least as far as de Romilly, who suggested that Aeschylean fear, while maintaining its sacred character, becomes more 'rationelle, utile, dominée … apprivoisée' at the end of the *Eumenides*, as 'angoisses douleureuses' evolve into 'la bonne crainte'.[587] For Visvardi, the play presents a 'transition … to a new type of fear', which is 'more rational, for want of a better word': the new court will 'expand … the rational basis of the emotions involved in judgment, and direct the motivational force of fear so as to render attachment conciliatory and valuable for the community as a whole'.[588] According to Belfiore, there is a development in the *Oresteia* from 'destructive fear to reverence'; she connects this to 'the function of tragedy', which provides 'a warning[,] through the arousal of terror caused by shameful wrongdoing and pollution, and through its kathartic transformation into reverence and respect.'[589] Ben Pestell tracks a parallel evolution in fear's vocabulary: as the trilogy progresses, *phobos* falls away, and is replaced by *deinos* and its cognates, 'strongly suggest[ing] a shift in the nature of fear,' away from 'physical flight' and towards 'intellectual admiration'.[590] Visvardi sees this shift as a kind of 'sublimation', while Enrico Corti celebrates Athena's 'trasforma[zione del] φόβος incarnato dalle Erinni, in una forma simbolica di controllo sociale che trova la sua espressione nel manifesto del buon governo ateniese.'[591]

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[587] De Romilly (1958: 106). See further discussion in my introduction.
[588] Visvardi (2015: 99, 120).
[589] Belfiore (1992: 23, 29). Compare Lebeck (1971: 175 n.13): 'As the trilogy progresses, guilty terror (φόβος) is transformed into religious awe (σέβας), that salutary fear which teaches men to revere justice (σέβοι δίκαν, *Eum*. 525).' (This interpretation, I believe, runs counter to her general hermeneutic, as explained below.) Rose (1992: 232-3), by contrast, makes *sebas* the *first* term in his dialectic: he sees a development from monarchical *sebas* in *Agamemnon*, to tyrannical *phobos* in *Libation Bearers*, to democratic *deos* in *Eumenides*. For discussion of such lexical distinctions, see my Introduction B.
[590] Pestell (2017: 314).
[591] Visvardi (2015: 114); Corti (2014: 26-27). Cf. Macleod (1982: 135); Giannotti (2018: 196).

All these interpretations fit with a once-dominant – and still current – evolutionary view of the trilogy,[592] according to which forces and concepts initially presented as destructive or malign emerge in the dénouement as essential to peace and prosperity.[593] Most significant, perhaps, has been the application of this paradigm to 'justice', as articulated by *dike*. This term, so the story goes, refers in the first two plays to the principle of personal retribution: *dike* describes the sack of Troy and the murders of the Agamemnon and Clytemnestra; when Orestes confronts Clytemnestra in *Libation Bearers*, '*Dike* fights with *Dike'* (*Cho*. 461), and a contradiction is exposed; this contradiction is resolved by a transformation of *dike,* which in the latter part of the *Eumenides* signifies not retribution but a legal process, a court, and 'justice' as the judgment of that court.[594] Similar careers have been sketched for Persuasion (*Peitho*),[595] and the Erinyes;[596] some critics have even argued that Zeus himself is 'transformed' in the course of the trilogy.[597]

[592] Explicitly in Sommerstein's commentary*, ad Eum*. 34: '. 'as *Eu*. proceeds, fear, like many other thematic concepts of the trilogy … will be viewed in a less wholly negative light …'.
[593] The interpretative tradition is summarized by Porter (2005: 301-4). As examples, he includes: Gargarin (1976: 84), 'the forces that were harmful before are now beneficial for all'; and Winnington-Ingram (1983: 166), 'Words, themes and symbols formerly associated with crime and disaster now appear ... free from contamination'. Contemporary hold-outs include Seaford (1995) and Sommerstein (2010: 121-212). De Romilly (1958: 105) sees this transformation dynamic as a reflection of Aeschylus' historical moment: 'le monde représenté par Eschyle, comme celui qu'il vit lui-même, est un monde en pleine transformation'.
[594] With variations: Kitto (1956: 78-86); Podlecki (1966: 63-78); Sommerstein (2010: 193-203).
[595] Rynearson (2013: 19); Sommerstein (1989: 255). Cf. Goldhill (1984: 44, 169, 263-5); and esp. Buxton (1982: 105-14).
[596] Winnington-Ingram (1983: 166); Mitchell-Boyask (2009: 27-29); Sommerstein (2010: 201-2); Bednarowski (2015: 200).
[597] Kitto (1956: 69); Sommerstein (2010: 202-3, 274-9); see now the effective refutation of Scapin (2020: 83-9).

This transformational meta-narrative[598] or masterplot[599] has, however, been challenged in recent decades. Scholars have critiqued it on two fronts:[600] on the one hand, they have questioned the extent of innovation in the *Eumenides*; on the other, they have pointed to the proleptic presence of such innovation earlier in the trilogy. Thus, regarding justice, some suggest that the old system still applies in the *Eumenides*: in Hugh Lloyd-Jones's classic account, the final scenes of *Eumenides* confirm that 'even in the law of the Athenian polis in the fifth century, the blood feud and the Erinyes have their allotted place';[601] David Cohen argues that the new political order is not accompanied by any corresponding redemption of Zeus' arbitrary justice.[602] On the second, proleptic front, Simon Goldhill notes that, already in the *Agamemnon*, *dike* clearly alludes to public hearings (813-4; cf. 41, 1412-21).[603] Such legal language may be merely 'figurative' or 'metaphorical',[604] but it is significant, because it allows the contours of a different form of justice, the judicial *dike* represented in the *Eumenides*, to shadow the retributive form of justice of the *Agamemnon*. At the start of the *Libation Bearers*, Electra distinguishes between a δικαστής ('judge') and a δικηφόρος ('avenger', 120); at its end, Orestes is seen

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[598] The term originates with Lyotard (1979), who defined 'la condition postmoderne' as a scepticism towards the dominant, often Hegelian, 'métarécits' of progress, enlightenment, etc. Hegel himself discusses the *Eumenides*, first translated into German in 1802, in his *Natural Law* essay of 1802-3; Billings (2014: 150-8) makes this discussion crucial to the development of Hegel's historical dialectic. For an explicitly dialectical account of the trilogy, see Rose (1992: 185-265), who, like Zeitlin (1978), suggests that Aeschylus adapted this structure from Hesiod's *Theogony*.

[599] For 'masterplot', compare Brooks (1977) on Freud and narrative desire. My application of this term to the *Oresteia* is inspired by Crisafi (2022), who seeks alternatives to the 'masterplot' of Dante's *Divine Comedy*.

[600] See Goldhill (1984) and especially Porter (2005).

[601] Lloyd-Jones (1971: 94). The previous sentence is often quoted: 'The cliché we have heard repeated all our lives, that the *Eumenides* depicts the transition from the vendetta to the rule of law, is utterly misleading'.

[602] Cohen (1986). Moreover, as Goldhill (2004: 30-31) points out, even in the prototypical trial of Orestes, *dike* continues to fight with *dike*, and the court fails to adjudicate the dilemma without Athena's (surely one-off) intervention. Rosenmeyer (1982: 356) is characteristically acute: 'The trial makes it possible to look at the various issues tidily and symmetrically. But the divided vote also argues the insolubility of the case.'

[603] Goldhill (1986: 41-48); Cf. Allen (2000: 21).

[604] Rosenmeyer (1982: 357); Sommerstein (2010: 194). Rutherford (2012: 132) suggests that in these first two plays, there is a 'gap' between the extrajudicial, retributive action and the legal language used to describe it; in the third play, 'the gap is closed'.

calling the sun as witness to his trial (μάρτυς ἐν δίκῃ, 987). Electra's distinction is ignored by the Chorus, and Orestes' expectation of testimonial *dike* almost nonsensical, since such 'trials' have not yet been invented by Athena (cf. πρώτας δίκας, *Eum.* 682). Nevertheless, the second critique of the transformational meta-narrative argues that such anachronistic hints prepare the ground for the new institution; indeed, they work to anchor the Athenian innovation, with all its emphatic futurity, in the archaic, mythic narrative that it concludes. Analogous challenges have been made to masterplot interpretations of Persuasion and the Erinyes.[605]

Such revisionist accounts of the structure of the *Oresteia* demand we look again at the 'transformation' of fear in the *Eumenides*. We might begin by questioning why Aeschylus, if he had wanted to suggest a wholesale 'sublimation' of fear, would have Athena echo the emotional rhetoric of the Erinyes almost word for word. Here are the Erinyes in the second stasimon of *Eumenides*:

> ἔσθ' ὅπου τὸ δεινὸν εὖ
> καὶ φρενῶν ἐπίσκοπον
> δεῖ μένειν καθήμενον·
> ξυμφέρει
> σωφρονεῖν ὑπὸ στένει.
> τίς δὲ μηδὲν ἐν δέει
> καρδίαν ἀνατρέφων
> ἢ βροτὸς πόλις θ' ὁμοί-

[605] Persuasion: Kennedy (2009: 36-7) (limited innovation); Rosenmeyer (1982: 350-1) (prolepsis). Erinyes: Montiglio (2000: 41-42) (limited innovation); Bacon (2001), Bakola (2019) (prolepsis).

ως ἔτ’ ἂν σέβοι Δίκαν;[606]

μήτ’ ἄναρκτον βίον
μήτε δεσποτούμενον
αἰνέσῃς· (517-28)

The verbal parallels with the *thesmos*-speech are so numerous that one editor (Dindorf) suggested Athena’s lines should be rejected as duplication. Not only the vocabulary, but the form of the argument is repeated. So Desmond Conacher observes: ‘there is a precise parallel [between the two passages] in the transition from homicidal jurisdiction to social and political authority through the concepts of Fear and Respect’.[607] Even Athena’s startling address to the Ἀττικὸς λεώς is pre-empted: here the Chorus, using the second person (αἰνέσῃς; cf. 542), seem to exhort the Athenian audience, and give instructions for all time (ἐς τὸ πᾶν σοι λέγω | βωμὸν αἴδεσαι Δίκας, 538-9).

Athena’s repetition of the Erinyes’ song has bolstered the critiques of the meta-narrative mentioned above.[608] Some transformationists, on the other side, have attempted to differentiate between the rhetoric of the Erinyes and of Athena. De Romilly points out that while fear (τὸ δεινόν) and reverence (σέβας) are already reconciled in the Erinyes’

[606] Although the text of this sentence (522-5) is very uncertain (see, most recently, Morosi/Paduano 2022), Sommerstein comments, ‘the general sense is clear: “What man or city would revere justice, if not disciplined by Fear?”’. I print Page’s text with Casaubon’s conjecture in 522 (MSS: ἐν †φάει†) and Rose’s inversion in 524 (MSS: πόλις βροτός θ’; cf. Sommerstein *ad loc.*).
[607] Conacher (1987: 187 n.64). Giannotti (2018: 206) observes that this kind of repetition is unique in Aeschylus.
[608] Lloyd-Jones (1971: 94). Goldhill, exploring this ‘rhetoric of appropriation’, effectively contrasts the conservative and liberal/progressive readings of Athena’s repetition in terms of continuity and transcendence; he inclines to the latter, while emphasising that ambiguities persist in the new order (1986: 48-50).

song, fear comes first, and reverence only as a consequence; in Athena's speech, by contrast, the two are combined as a single, perhaps even familial, unit: σέβας … φόβος τε ξυγγενής (691).[609] Di Benedetto makes a similarly subtle distinction: while the Erinyes move from 'ethico-religious' obligations (517-25) to political moderation (524-29) (with some crossover), Athena moves in the opposite direction, from political considerations, including moderation (690-8), to 'ethico-religious' obligation (699). This indicates, it is argued, a difference of priorities between the Erinyes and Athena.[610] Leaving aside the questionable 'ethico-religious' emphasis of 699 (τίς γὰρ δεδοικὼς μηδὲν ἔνδικος βροτῶν), it is unlikely that a live audience would have noticed such a delicate inversion. Their overwhelming impression must be one of an ideological identity between the two passages.

Most transformationists who acknowledge this identity accept it without any such qualification. They see the second stasimon as 'something of a turning point', suggesting that the parallel paves the way for the reversal of the Erinyes' attitude at the end of the play.[611] But this proleptic good-fear discourse disturbs them also. The foreshadowing is 'inconsistent with the dramatic personality' of the Erinyes, Conacher complains; he agrees with Rosenmeyer that here the Chorus step out of their dramatic character and temporality altogether, in a kind of authorial parabasis.[612] Dover, observing the imperatives apparently addressed to the audience (529, 537-8), makes the stasimon analogous to 'paraenetic elegy'.[613] Both interpretations effectively neutralize the problem

[609] De Romilly (1958: 111). ξυγγενής either means 'inborn' (Sommerstein *ad loc.*; cf. *Ag.* 832) or 'kinsman' (Smyth, Collard; cf. *PV* 14; Hdt. I.109.3).
[610] Di Benedetto (1978: 226), cited Giannotti (2018: 210).
[611] Winnington-Ingram (1983: 165); Lebeck (1971: 145); Conacher (1987: 158).
[612] Conacher (1987: 158, with 184-5 n.52); Rosenmeyer (1982: 164-8, 174).
[613] Dover (1957: 231-2).

of prolepsis, leaving the transformation masterplot intact: the early appearance of salutary fear is treated as a dramaturgical anomaly.

One critic, Anne Lebeck, has dared to suggest that the 'transformation' of fear – or rather of its dramatic surrogate, the Erinyes-chorus – might begin even earlier than the second stasimon. At the end of the *epiparodos* (254-75),[614] the Chorus drop their bloodthirsty rhetoric, and broaden their moral vision, hinting at the idea of deterrence: 'You will see that if any other (τις ἄλλος) mortal sins / by failing to reverence (ἀσεβῶν) god or guest / or dear parents, each receives his due of justice'; they then invoke Hades as the 'great judge of mortals, … who supervises all things with his recording mind' (μέγας εὔθυνος βροτῶν … δελτογράφῳ δὲ πάντ᾽ ἐπωπᾷ φρενί, 269-75, tr. Podlecki). Lebeck reads the expansion of the Erinyes' remit beyond familial bloodletting (cf. 220) as the beginning of their transformation; we might add that the 'supervision of the mind' is the role of fear in the second stasimon (φρενῶν ἐπίσκοπον, 518). A little later, at the end of the savage Binding Song, the Chorus sing:

> τίς οὖν τάδ᾽ οὐχ ἅζεταί
>
> τε καὶ δέδοικεν βροτῶν,
>
> ἐμοῦ κλύων θεσμὸν
>
> τὸν μοιρόκραντον ἐκ θεῶν
>
> δοθέντα τέλεον; (389-93)

Lebeck writes: 'The Furies' frightfulness is contrasted with the emergence of an awe-inspiring quality'.[615] Again, I would go further: the Erinyes are here appreciably aware of

[614] This is the Chorus' second entry song, accompanying their arrival at Athens.
[615] Lebeck (1971: 147-8).

the institutional value of fear, inspired by 'ordinances' (θεσμοί) passed down from the gods. This is a word that is otherwise in the trilogy exclusively associated with the institution of the Areopagus;[616] it also opens the crucial second stasimon (θεσμίων, 491). The resonance of the noun here is reinforced by its combination with κλύων – compare Athena at 681: κλύοιτ' ἂν ἤδη θεσμόν, Ἀττικὸς λεώς. The phrasing of the Erinyes' inquiry, meanwhile, is lightly echoed in both the second stasimon (τίς δὲ μηδὲν … βροτός … σέβοι δίκαν, 522-5), and Athena's speech (τίς γὰρ δεδοικὼς μηδὲν ἔνδικος βροτῶν, 699).

Although the benefits of Erinyes-fear are not yet explicit, this passage is clearly cut from the same ideological cloth as 517-25 and 690-700. Even Lebeck's moderate suggestions, however, have met with coolness and resistance in subsequent scholarship. Podlecki, Sommerstein, and Goldhill make only brief or parenthetic reference to this 'verbal foreshadowing' of the fear-rhetoric to come.[617] Conacher, in an endnote, alludes to Lebeck's interpretation, but directs the reader to Winnington-Ingram's refutation; Winnington-Ingram's refutation, also in a footnote, turns out to be a citation of Oliver Taplin;[618] Taplin, it transpires, has himself condemned Lebeck to a footnote. The dismissal is telling:

> Lebeck argues that elements of the less narrow and more awe-inspiring aspects of the Erinyes emerge earlier in the play …. While there is some truth in this (cf. 269ff., 333ff, 389ff.), her *overemphasis* detracts from *the full impact* of the new insights revealed by the later song 490ff. (1977: 391 n.4 (emphasis mine))

[616] Cf. 484, 571, 615, 681.
[617] Podlecki *ad* 321-96, 517-21; Sommerstein *ad* 389-90; Goldhill (1984: 232).
[618] Conacher (1987: 184 n.48); Winnington-Ingram (1983: 165 n.36).

According to this circular reasoning, the suggestions of Erinyes-beneficence (and beneficent fear) in the first half of the play must be suppressed in order to preserve the surprise of its emergence in the second. Lebeck's analysis is spoiling the big reveal, it seems, and stealing the transformational thunder. But how can Taplin be so sure of the 'full impact' that the climactic transformation is supposed to make? The masterplot – here transparently a matter of dramatic taste – takes priority over the evidence.

It will be clear by now that I intend to defy the tyranny of this masterplot, which has, I believe, obscured the elaboration of the fear-theme in the *Oresteia*. This investigation must reach back further than the second stasimon of the concluding play, and shake out the roots of salutary fear in the *Agamemnon* and the *Libation Bearers*. These roots are vigorously denied by the transformationists, since they are committed to sudden inversion rather than progression. 'Athena endorses a type of fear that is alien to the preceding plays', writes one; 'this fear [sc. the fear promoted by the second stasimon and Athena] is powerfully contrasted with the foreboding or horror in the face of violence and guilt which we have witnessed continually in the trilogy', writes another.[619] Both critics, like most of those who write about fear in the *Eumenides*, are cursory in their treatment of the earlier plays, reducing their fear-discourse to a dark hinterland as they narrate the vivid 'transformation' staged by the Erinyes and Athena.[620] Conversely, those who examine the fear-theme in *Agamemnon* and *Libation Bearers* tend to neglect its role in the

[619] Pestell (2017: 314); Macleod (1982: 135).
[620] Belfiore (1992: 24-5), for example, breezes through the first two plays, confusing the order of scenes, mistranslating lines, and imposing a crude schema upon each drama. The Chorus' 'long threnody of fear' (*Ag.* 975-1034) is not, as she suggests, 'in response to Cassandra's [visions]', since it is sung before she utters a word; at 1306, the Chorus do not ask 'who will turn fear aside', but 'what fear turns [Cassandra] aside' (τίς σ' ἀποστρέφει φόβος). 'All these fears,' Belfiore concludes, 'are aroused by Agamemnon's murder by his wife… In the *Libation Bearers* also, fear is aroused by kin murder, as Orestes kills his mother, Clytemnestra'. Visvardi (2015) only discusses Orestes' fear at the end of *Libation Bearers* – and that very briefly (105-6).

*Eumenides*.[621] Such partial approaches are misleading, as most Aeschylean scholars acknowledge: in this chapter, I will give each play equal weight as I seek to reconcile their treatments of fear.

This reconciliation is emphatically not incompatible with development. As Lebeck observes, there is a structural pattern that dominates the *Oresteia*: 'proleptic statement and gradual development' of images and themes, accompanied by a 'movement from enigmatic utterance to clear statement'.[622] Moreover, fear *is* accorded a new role in the *Eumenides*. Transformation, however, is the wrong paradigm. Instead, I will argue, what we witness in the *Oresteia* is a process of recognition and accommodation.[623] This process is at once psychological and political: psychological, in that we see the participants in the drama move from the exclusion to the psychical integration of fear;[624] political, in that this integration is achieved through a civic and democratic expansion of the emotional landscape. The personal becomes political. At the same time, in this emergent ecology of fear, tragedy takes up its proper place, nurturing and cultivating the terrors necessary to the flourishing of the polis.

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[621] E.g. Golden (1961); Stanford (1983: 122-63); Bierl (2017); Avezzù (2018).
[622] Lebeck (1971: 2). Lebeck's mode of imagistic analysis, though challenged by West (2013: 225), has been a popular approach to the *Oresteia* in recent decades – see Brown (2018: 40-2, with n.109) for discussion and examples.
[623] These concepts, unlike transformation, have a persistent lexical presence in the text: μανθάνω and its cognates occur 30 times in the trilogy; οἶκος and its cognates, 48 times. I can find no recurrent vocabulary of 'change'.
[624] I am indebted in this reading to a short, unfinished, and neglected essay on the *Oresteia* by Melanie Klein (1975). Klein observes that Agamemnon's 'persecutory anxieties', characterized by a fear of the gods, give way to Orestes' guilt, which is characterized by 'internalized' persecution in the form of the Erinyes. With the help of Athena, the 'good mother', the different parts of the ego – 'represented … by the Areopagus' – are reconciled; there is, finally, an 'integration' of destructive impulses into the healthy psyche. Klein's treatment is frustratingly schematic and ahistorical, but she is fundamentally correct, I believe, in recognizing the political settlement as simultaneously a psychic one. For discussion, see Alford (1990).

My reading will trace fear from the opening to the final lines of the trilogy. I will, however, pay particular attention to two odes, the third stasimon of *Agamemnon* (975-1034), and the first of *Libation Bearers* (585-651), which represent in miniature the dynamics of fear in their respective plays. In fact, both are linked formally as well as thematically with the second stasimon of the *Eumenides*, which I touched on above. The three odes stand at the centre of the three plays – the point where, in Martin West's compelling schema of Aeschylean 'dynamic structure', the 'anxiety/doubt' has been expressed, and then 'clarified', so that the 'battery is fully charged'.[625] In dramaturgical terms, the visitor has arrived and been partially received, but their welcome is not yet complete, and the decisive action not yet taken. In each case, one character remains onstage.[626] The three odes are also metrically linked: each is dominated by trochaic cola, especially *lekythia*. The thematic use of this metre in the *Oresteia* has attracted particular attention: it dominates the so-called Hymn to Zeus (*Ag.* 160-83), and is a significant element in the second stasimon of the *Libation Bearers* (783-837) and the exodos of the *Eumenides* (916-1020), as well the three odes I have selected. Many connotations have been suggested, which can be grouped in two categories: on the one hand, the lyrics suggest 'suspense', 'foreboding', even 'bewilderment' about the events at hand; on the other, a 'meditation' on the unchanging justice of Zeus.[627] For my three odes, I propose that this combination of fear and justice is tied to a lexical keynote. In each ode, groups of *lekythia* are focused on *deos* and its cognate forms (*Ag*. 975-83; *Cho*. 585-92; *Eum*. 517-25). Thus this rhythmical unit, perhaps accompanied by a particular dance, reinforces a

[625] West (1990: 4-7).
[626] In the *Agamemnon* ode, Cassandra remains onstage. For both of the other two, it has been questioned whether Orestes remains, but see, for *Libation Bearers*, Brown *ad* 584 and Marshall (2017: 87-92) (vs Taplin (1977: 338)), and, for *Eumenides*, Taplin (1977: 391-2) and Sommerstein *ad* 489 (vs Podlecki *ad* 489).
[627] On the *lekythia* in the *Oresteia*, see Scott (1984: 36-8); Sommerstein (2010: 148, 151-2); Raeburn/Thomas (2011: 252); and especially Chiasson (1988), who observes that *lekythia* are 'not often a dominant or even prominent rhythm in tragic lyric systems' (1).

thematic resonance across the three songs, with each interrogating the nature and value of fear.

As a consequence, when *lekythia* return at the end of the *Eumenides*, these earlier interrogations are recalled; even though *deos* is not explicitly invoked, it shadows the Erinyes' blessings like an after-image. In the final two sections of this chapter, I will examine this exodos, where the role of fear is sometimes neglected. In fact, I demonstrate, it is here that the political accommodation of fear is completed, and tragedy's role in the new emotional ecology fully developed.

## ***Agamemnon***

I have suggested that the salutary potential of fear is present, in enigmatic form, long before its more emphatic emergence in the *Eumenides*. This may be demonstrated by an initial examination of the *Agamemnon* prologue, and the first three odes of that play. The latter also present a mode of emotional education that is crucial to the significance of the trilogy. The fearful insight hinted at by these scenes and songs is, however, resisted and suppressed, with Watchman and Chorus both preferring the 'cure of silence'. Their discursive refusal of fear is then embodied and enacted by Clytemnestra and Agamemnon. The third stasimon concisely articulates both the salutary potential and the optimistic suppression of fear; its concluding lines introduce a second mode of psychic resistance, in the form of despair. It is a similar despair that undermines the fear of

Cassandra, which is nonetheless justified and prophetic, preparing the audience for the fears of the *Libation Bearers.*

The Watchman: Therapy and Supervision

The prologue speech, given by the Watchman, is often observed to introduce in miniature the themes, concepts, and emotional dynamics that will shape not just the play but the trilogy.[628] In this vein, many critics comment on the sense of 'foreboding' that pervades the Watchman's words.[629] This foreboding is made explicit in lines 12-15:

> εὖτ' ἂν δὲ νυκτίπλαγκτον ἔνδροσόν τ' ἔχω
> εὐνὴν ὀνείροις οὐκ ἐπισκοπουμένην
> ἐμήν· φόβος γὰρ ἀνθ' ὕπνου παραστατεῖ,
> τὸ μὴ βεβαίως βλέφαρα συμβαλεῖν ὕπνῳ· (12-15)

Despite the disturbed syntax – itself perhaps an indicator of the Watchman's anxiety[630] – the basic meaning has seemed obvious to critics: the Watchman longs to sleep, but is kept awake by fear.[631] This fear is a burden on the Watchman; like the dewy, night-walker's bed itself, it is one of the 'toils' from which he wants deliverance (τῶνδ' ἀπαλλαγὴν πόνων, 1, cf. 20). The fact that this fear has no explicit object makes it all the more

[628] E.g. Stanford (1983: 122) and Sommerstein (2010: 171), 'overture'; Conacher (1987: 7), 'sets up the tragic rhythm'; Raeburn/Thomas (2011: *ad* 1-39), 'the sequences of thought and utterance of 16-19 and 31-9 are paradigmatic'.
[629] See citations above, with Denniston/Page p.xxxi.
[630] So Stanford (1983: 123).
[631] Fraenkel, reckoning the stress to fall on ἐμήν, thinks the Watchman is 'bitter' that others can sleep while he cannot; Raeburn/Thomas have him 'complaining'. Denniston/Page, on the other hand, recognize that νυκτίπλαγκτον (12) implies the Watchman 'gets up at intervals [*in order*] *to keep himself awake*' (my emphasis).

'oppressive':[632] the Watchman's anxiety is compounded by the 'fear [of] naming [his] fear'.[633] We may even see Φόβος as a grim personification,[634] displacing the benign figures of Ὕπνος (14) and Ὄνειροι (13), who might otherwise 'watch over' and 'stand beside' him, relieving his weariness.[635]

On the other hand, we might consider that Ὕπνος, as brother of Θάνατος, is hardly an unambiguous figure.[636] And in this context, where the Watchman is required by Clytemnestra (ὦδε γὰρ κρατεῖ, 10) to keep watch, sleep is dangerous: line 15 may plausibly be understood as a euphemism for the 'firm' sleep of death, feared by the Watchman as punishment for the more prosaic sleep his body demands.[637] Indeed, it is very unclear that the Watchman even does want to drop off: in the lines that follow, he applies song as a remedy *against* sleep (ὕπνου τόδ' ἀντίμολπον ἐντέμνων ἄκος, 17).[638] If sleep is the disease, then fear, like song, serves as a remedy. It has been pointed out that παραστατέω, like ἐπισκοπέω, has medical connotations of attending to and caring for a patient;[639] these connotations are picked up by the more explicit medical imagery of

[632] Avezzù (2018: 23, 28-9).
[633] Goldhill (1984: 52).
[634] Cf. *Sept*. 45 and 500, as well as *Cho*. 32-7 and 1024. For the personification of Fear in archaic poetry, see introduction p.57. On personification across these lines, see Fraenkel *ad loc*.
[635] Dreams regularly 'stand over the head' of sleepers in Homer (e.g. *Il*. 2.20 (Oneiros); *Od*. 6.21)
[636] Hom. *Il*. 14.231, 16.672, 682; cf. Hes. *Th*. 212 where Θανάτος, Ὕπνος and Ὄνειροι are all children of Night, along with Μόρος, Κήρ, Μῶμος, Ὀιζύς, etc.
[637] So Thomson, *ad loc*., with parallels. Most other editors treat τὸ μὴ … συμβαλεῖν as a clause of prevention, after παραστατεῖ, but a fear construction with the infinitive is possible: see Smyth *2338a.
[638] This potential contradiction in the desires of the Watchman is observed by Thomas (2013: 491-2) who proposes, with some papyrological support, an emendation of line 17: τόδ' ἀντίμολπον <αὐτὸς> ἐντέμνων ἄκος. With Thomas' text, it is the fearful cares rather than sleep that the Watchman is seeking to remedy. But the emendation is unnecessary if one recognizes that lines 12-15 express no more desire for sleep than 16-17.
[639] Robertson (1944: 34-5). For παραστατέω, cf. Soph. *Aj*. 674-5 τὸ γὰρ | νοσοῦν ποθεῖ σε ξυμπαραστάτην λαβεῖν. For ἐπισκοπέω, cf. [Dem.] 59.56 τὰ πρόσφορα τῇ νόσῳ φέρουσαι καὶ ἐπισκοπούμεναι; Xen. *Cyr*. VIII.2.25, *Mem*. III.11.10.

ἐντέμνων.[640] Even at this early stage, before the trilogy has properly begun, Aeschylus hints at the salutary, therapeutic capacity of fear.

This is a hint that will be taken up in the second stasimon of the *Eumenides*: a few lines before those quoted above (517-25), the Erinyes threaten a world without punishment, where murders proliferate, and a man asking for 'abatement or remission of sufferings', 'mixes only uncertain remedies' (λῆξιν ὑπόδοσίν τε μόχθων | ἄκεά … οὐ βέβαια τέμ- | νων, 505-7).[641] Note the repetition of τέμνω as well as ἄκος from the Watchman's prologue. A moment later, the Erinyes are promoting τὸ δεινόν, if not as a cure, then at least as a preventive remedy for the preservation of justice (517-25).

We can go further with these Watchman's lines. Within Aeschylus, both παραστατέω and ἐπισκοπέω have an additional resonance. The first is elsewhere used of a divine helper, or champion – one who stands alongside as a protector.[642] In the stasimon that I will discuss at length later on, the phonetically and semantically cognate adjective προστατήριος[643] will be applied to the δεῖμα that absorbs the Chorus (976). This is fear's defensive capacity, which will eventually be concretized in the Areopagus, described by Athena as ἕρυμά τε χώρας καὶ πόλεως σωτήριον (*Eum.* 701). ἐπισκοπέω, meanwhile, generally describes the gaze of a supervising deity – a gaze which is sometimes benign, but usually judgmental.[644] This verb takes on a special significance in the *Oresteia*: after the Chorus of *Libation Bearers* salute the supervision of Justice (61), Orestes invokes the supervision

[640] Guardasole (2000: 256-7).
[641] For the medical imagery in this passage, see Thomson *ad loc.*
[642] *Ag*. 1079; *Sept*. 669; cf. Soph. *El*. 917.
[643] Compare LSJ παραστατέω A.II and παραστάτης A.II.2 (incl. *Pers.* 957) with LSJ προστατέω A.II (incl. *Sept*. 396), προστάτης LSJ A.III (incl. *Sept*. 408, 498), and προστατήριος LSJ A.II (incl. *Sept*. 449).
[644] Benign: *Sept*. 272; Judgmental: *Supp*. 381, 402, 646.

of the chthonic spirits under the earth (126); then, in the *Eumenides*, he summons Athena as a protective supervisor (296). But in the second stasimon, quoted above, the Erinyes will appoint τὸ δεινὸν as the φρενῶν ἐπίσκοπον (517-8). Fear is once again the overseer, as it implicitly was in the Watchman's speech.[645] The term appears a final time in the exodos, when the Erinyes ask Athena what blessings they should invoke. Athena replies: 'Such as *look to* no base victory' (ὁποῖα νίκης μὴ κακῆς ἐπίσκοπα, 903, tr. Podlecki). The guardianship of fear is converted into a guardianship of victory.

Thus Aeschylus does not merely signal the immediate and practical usefulness of fear to the Watchman; he connects this emotion with the ethical and political system of salutary fear that emerges through the trilogy. In these opening lines, the benign attributes of fear are only lightly suggested – it is hard to say if the Watchman himself is conscious of them – but they are the same attributes that will be recognized, accommodated, and celebrated at the climax of the *Oresteia*. This is Lebeck's paradigm in action: proleptic statement and gradual development; enigma to clear utterance. It remains to point out that Aeschylus signals this continuity through explicit allusion in Athena's θεσμός, quoted above. After establishing the virtue of fear on the Areopagus, she describes the court as 'awake on behalf of those who sleep, a sentinel of the land' (εὐδόντων ὕπερ | ἐγρηγορὸς φρούρημα γῆς, *Eum.* 705-6; cf. πόλεως φρούριον, 948). This is without doubt supposed to recall the 'sentinel' who opened the trilogy (φρουρᾶς, *Ag.* 2), who was prevented from sleep by fear.[646] Sommerstein (*ad loc*.) suggests that Athena's lines offer a 'resolution' to

[645] Although this verb is not directly applied to fear in the Watchman's prologue, the Dreams-Sleep identity hardly needs to be pressed; if fear replaces sleep as an παραστάτης at the Watchman's bed, it surely also substitutes for dreams as an ἐπίσκοπος.

[646] Athena's image may lie behind Aristotle's injunction in the *Politics*, that 'those who take thought for the constitution must contrive causes of fear (φόβους παρασκευάζειν), in order that the citizens may keep guard and not relax their vigilance for the constitution like a watch in the night (ὥσπερ νυκτερινὴν φυλακήν)' (V.1308a27-30). For the cultivation of fear in Aristotle, see Chapter Three.

the theme of sleep, since 'now at last the citizen will be able to sleep securely in his bed, knowing that the Areopagus is watching over his safety'. This may be true – certainly there are no happy sleepers in the rest of the trilogy – but Athena's edict also vindicates the sleeplessness of fear that defined the Watchman's vigilance.

In a few short lines, then, the Watchman's speech hints at two positive aspects of fear: its therapeutic power, and its protective potential. Though these are lightly sketched – a connotation here, an allusion there – they will be integrated into the fear-discourse of the trilogy. Indeed, we are encouraged to read between the lines: with Pindaric *hauteur*, the Watchman says he 'speak[s] intentionally to those that understand and [is] intentionally oblivious to those who do not (ὡς ἐκὼν ἐγὼ | μαθοῦσιν αὐδῶ κοὐ μαθοῦσι λήθομαι, 38-9).[647]

However, we are not in the *Eumenides* yet: the beneficence of fear is not fully recognized. Indeed, the Watchman, like the Chorus for the best part of the play, appears unwilling to explore his φόβος, whose object is, as noted above, unspecified. We might see this in Freudian terms: whereas 'real fear' is provoked by a definite object, 'neurotic fear', or 'anxiety', is a 'free-floating' response, normally a symptom of unconscious repression.[648] Yet here we need not resort to such psychic speculation: it is, after all, an explicitly 'intentional' forgetting that is indicated, such that the fearful truth can hardly be hidden from the Watchman himself, who consciously opts to censor his thoughts,

[647] On the tangled hermeneutics of this line, and the whole prologue, see Goldhill (1984: 1-12).
[648] On Freud, fear, and anxiety, see my introduction, pp.15-16; on Melanie Klein's treatment of the *Oresteia* see n. 624 above. For 'vigilance-avoidance theory', see n. 654 below.

aligning himself with the silence of the house (36-8).[649] Nevertheless, a connection is established between speaking and learning, fear and understanding, that will prove crucial as the trilogy progresses.

The Chorus: Hope, Anxiety, and Education

This pattern – of enigmatic anxiety and self-censorship – is rehearsed repeatedly in the odes and episodes that follow. Many scholars have noted how, in the parodos, the Chorus punctuate their account of the dreadful events at Aulis with expressions of groundless hope: the emotional tension is succinctly articulated in the refrain, 'Sing the dirge, the dirge, but may the good win out!' (121, 138, 159).[650] The song ends much like the prologue, with a curtain of reticence suddenly drawn across the scene of Iphigeneia's death:

> τὰ δ' ἔνθεν οὔτ' εἶδον οὔτ' ἐννέπω·
> τέχναι δὲ Κάλχαντος οὐκ ἄκραντοι.
> Δίκα δὲ τοῖς μὲν παθοῦ-
> σιν μαθεῖν ἐπιρρέπει· τὸ μέλλον δ'
> ἐπεὶ γένοιτ' ἂν κλύοις· προχαιρέτω·[651]
> ἴσον δὲ τῷ προστένειν·

[649] On the application of ἑκών to λήθομαι as well as αὐδῶ, see Fraenkel ('a valuable piece of early psychology'); he finds parallels in Hdt. III.75.1 and III.147.1. In the shorter sentences of lines 35-9, Fraenkel discerns the communication of 'suppressed passion'.
[650] Lebeck (1971: 31-2); Winnington-Ingram (1983: 212).
[651] Here I follow the MSS. Page, Sommerstein, and West print πρὸ χαιρέτω (Denniston/Page: 'beforehand, dismiss it from your thought'), but, as Raeburn/Thomas suggest, this 'balances προστένειν less neatly'.

τορὸν γὰρ ἥξει σύνορθρον αὐγαῖς. (248-54)

The Chorus gesture towards the doom that hangs over Agamemnon: in their own narration, the 'skilled prophecies' of Calchas have included 'a fearsome (φοβερά), guileful keeper of the house, a Wrath that remembers and will avenge a child' (154-5, tr. Sommerstein). This future looms. If we define fear, like Plato and Aristotle, as the 'expectation of evil', then these lines are brimming with it;[652] προστένειν is a near approximation to the λύπη that accompanies such expectation in the *Rhetoric* and elsewhere.[653] Yet it is not insignificant that the core vocabulary of fear is entirely absent. In fact, at no point in the entire parodos do the Elders speak of φόβος or δέος or τάρβος in their own voice,[654] and there are no fear-clauses or constructions. The same is true of the first stasimon (351-488), and the second stasimon (681-781), too.[655] Is this because the Chorus are unafraid up until the moment that Agamemnon enters the house? This seems unlikely: when the Herald interprets their cryptic preference for silence as fear (ἔτρεις τινάς;), they tacitly confirm his intuition (549-50). But if the Chorus *are* afraid, then lack of direct articulation of that fear is striking. I suggest it is symptomatic of a larger pattern of avoidance that finds its fullest expression, and is 'tested to destruction', in the Cassandra-scene.[656]

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[652] Commentators who ascribe 'fear' or 'foreboding' to these lines: Avezzù (2018: 31-2); Denniston/Page *ad* 249ff. ('The Chorus are reluctant to express their foreboding'); Goldhill (1984: 31-3) ('the naming of fear is passed over in silence'). Raeburn/Thomas *ad* 248-9.

[653] See Chapter Two.

[654] The prophecy of Calchas, quoted above, is the one exception. For the distinction of 'core' fear vocabulary, see my Introduction B.

[655] This curious fact seems to have gone unnoticed by commentators on the play.

[656] It is worth noting here that recent psychological research on 'repressors', dispensing with Freud's unverifiable unconscious, still seeks to explain our 'defensive processes'. One model recently advanced is the 'vigilance-avoidance' theory, according to which certain personalities may demonstrate a two-stage response: their attention and judgement is initially biased towards threatening stimuli and interpretations, but then switches to an avoidant bias, ignoring threatening stimuli, interpretations, and memories. (Derakshan/Eysenck/Myers 2007). Perhaps a similar dynamic is in operation in the parodos.

The early choral odes, however, are not completely devoid of fearful language. Twice in the parodos, and once in the first stasimon, they articulate their anxiety in more explicit terms. Seeing Clytemnestra's servants kindling flames on the city's altars, they plead to her for an explanation:[657] 'Tell us what you can', they sing, and

> … παιών τε γενοῦ
> τῆσδε μερίμνης,
> ἢ νῦν τοτὲ μὲν κακόφρων τελέθει,
> τοτὲ δ' ἐκ θυσιῶν ἃς ἀναφαίνεις
> ἐλπὶς ἀμύνει φροντίδ' ἄπληστον
> †τὴν θυμοφθόρον λύπης φρένα†. (98-103)

There is some continuity here with the Watchman's speech: the fear has no object; it is juxtaposed with hopeful expectation; their 'uneasiness … translates into discursive obscurity, contradiction, and semantic indeterminacy.'[658] But there are significant differences too. The Chorus do not speak of their φόβος, but their μέριμνα and their φροντίς, both more neutral words for mental activity, whose negative valence must be supplied by additional clauses (100, 103). They are further from acknowledging their fear than the Watchman was. Moreover, while the Watchman's φόβος was implicitly presented as a remedy, here anxious thought is itself presented as a kind of sickness, in need of healing (παιών, 98), or warded off (ἀμύνει, 102) by hope.[659]

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[657] Most commentators believe Clytemnestra is not onstage at this point, despite the direct address of 83-103. See Taplin (1977: 280-5).
[658] Avezzù (2018: 30).
[659] παιών with a genitive implies healing-as-deliverance *from* that genitive object, rather than healing-as-restoration *of* that genitive object: cf. Soph. *Phil*. 168 παιῶνα κακῶν, and θάνατος as healer in Aesch. fr. 255 1-3 (ὦ θάνατε παιάν, μή μ' ἀτιμάσῃς μολεῖν· | μόνος <γὰρ> εἶ σὺ τῶν ἀνηκέστων κακῶν | ἰατρός …) and Eur. *Hipp*. 1373.

Their desire to be rid of 'insatiate thought' is suggested again in the so-called Hymn to Zeus:

> οὐκ ἔχω προσεικάσαι
> πάντ' ἐπισταθμώμενος
> πλὴν Διός, εἰ τὸ μάταν ἀπὸ φροντίδος ἄχθος
> χρὴ βαλεῖν ἐτητύμως. (163-6)

Clytemnestra has failed to appear, and the Chorus' thoughts have proceeded unhealed. Their φροντὶς ἄπληστος has led them κακόφρων through Calchas' grim prophecy, and is now condemned both as μάταν and as an ἄχθος. Once again, the object of fear is uncertain;[660] once again the syntax is obscure.[661] Note, however, that here the desire to be rid of thought is placed in the conditional, subtly introducing the possibility that it might *not* be necessary 'truly' to throw off τὸ … φροντίδος ἄχθος – that this thought might not be μάταν after all. This doubt – however inadvertent or merely rhetorical[662] – opens up a sequence of thought that will develop through the trilogy, culminating in Athena's injunction 'not to *throw* the fearful entirely out of the city' (μὴ τὸ δεινὸν πᾶν πόλεως ἔξω βαλεῖν, 698). As in the Watchman's speech, we are already being prepared for the valorisation of prudent, pious, civic fear in the *Eumenides*.

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[660] Gagarin (1976: 144): the fate of the expedition; Smith (1980: 13): the sacrifice of Iphigenia; Raeburn/Thomas: the ominous words of Calchas. Conacher (1987: 11) and Schenker (1994: 4-5) argue for an 'inclusive' φροντίς, embracing all of these concerns.

[661] προσεικάσαι expects a dative: for interpretation, see Denniston/Page *ad loc.* and Smith (1980: 8-12). Parker (2009: 137) observes: 'as so often in Aeschylus, the hearer must struggle, anxiously and only in part successfully, to understand'.

[662] So Smith (1980: 15): '[this] condition must remain logically (and emotionally, too) open'.

We do not have to wait so long. Even in this ode-within-an-ode, the Chorus do not seem 'truly' (ἐτητύμως) to cast off the burden of φροντίς. The corresponding lines of the antistrophe see the Chorus praising the man who sings προφρόνως; it is he, they say, who hits perfectly upon 'wisdom' (φρενῶν) (174-5). The following strophe further vindicates fearful thinking, as the Chorus seek consolation in Zeus:

> τὸν φρονεῖν βροτοὺς ὁδώ-
>
> σαντα, τὸν πάθει μάθος
>
> θέντα κυρίως ἔχειν·
>
> στάζει δ' ἀνθ' ὕπνου[663] πρὸ καρδίας
>
> μνησιπήμων πόνος· καὶ παρ' ἄ-
>
> κοντας ἦλθε σωφρονεῖν·
>
> δαιμόνων δέ που χάρις βίαιος
>
> σέλμα σεμνὸν ἡμένων. (176-83)

One might distinguish between the 'thought' inculcated by Zeus (τὸν φρονεῖν, σωφρονεῖν) and the futile anxiety (φροντίδος) thrown off in 165.[664] Yet there is continuity too, indicated by the development of φρήν-cognates through the passage. Thought is simultaneously what they seek to escape, and where they find refuge.[665]

Indeed, while we must be careful not to abstract the Hymn from its narrative context, or to Christianize its doctrine, the Chorus' moralizing is more profound than some scholars have allowed. For the famous πάθει μάθος, the scholiast cites Hesiod, παθὼν δέ τε νήπιος

[663] MSS: ἔν θ' ὕπνῳ; Page: ἔν γ' ὕπνῳ. I print Emperius' emendation, with West, Sommerstein, and Raeburn/Thomas.
[664] E.g. Smith (1980). My reading is similar to that of Goldhill (1984: 26-28) and Haselswerdt (2018: 152-4).
[665] Such valorisation of φρονεῖν recalls the fearful thought of the *Suppliants*, discussed in Chapter Three.

ἔγνω (*Op.* 218); almost identical expressions are found in Homer (*Il.* 17.30-2=20.196-8) and Sophocles (*OT* 402). In all cases, it is the victim who learns, and what he learns is simply that he was wrong. Alcibiades, in Plato's *Symposium*, is more explicit: 'I tell you this, Agathon, … so that by laying our sad experiences to heart you may be on your guard and escape learning by your own pain, like the fool in the proverb (κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν ὥσπερ νήπιον παθόντα γνῶναι)' (222b5-7). Adducing these examples, Michael Gagarin and others conclude that there is no higher theodicy being invoked here, and certainly no redemption in suffering: the relevance is to Paris, or Troy, or perhaps to Agamemnon, each of whom will 'learn the hard way'.[666] Aegisthus will promote a comparable 'education' through violence; incarceration and starvation are even said to be 'excellent healer-seers to instruct the mind' (διδάσκειν ἐξοχώταται φρενῶν | ἰατρομάντεις, 1622-3; cf. 1425). While taking up the 'fear-as-medicine' and 'fear-as-foresight' themes established earlier in the play,[667] Aegisthus speaks of a wisdom no more elevated than the obedience of the victim to his ruler (1619-20).

That this mode of instruction is invoked by the tyrants should give us pause. Is this really all that the Chorus mean? Is this the only consolation offered by Zeus? Is this the only φρονεῖν on offer? There are some reasons to think otherwise. The first is that the Hesiodic proverb (παθόντα γνῶναι) is altered: the Chorus sing not of 'recognition' (γνῶναι), but of 'learning' (μάθος); and while the proverb's aorist participle and infinitive communicate a flash of realization after the event, the Chorus' collocation of nouns leaves both suffering and learning open-ended. Indeed, the 'road to understanding' invoked in the previous line suggests an ongoing process, rather than a moment, while the present infinitives φρονεῖν

[666] Paris: Gagarin (1976: 139-50); Smith (1980). Agamemnon: Denniston/Page.
[667] For fear as medicine, see above; for fear as foresight, see below.

and σωφρονεῖν indicate not revelation but a condition or attitude of understanding. Indeed, on the road to understanding there is a medial stage: the continuous present (στάζει) experience of μνησιπήμων πόνος, dripping before the heart. Such embodied rumination and reflection upon suffering, leading to wisdom, belong not to Paris, or to Agamemnon, but to the Chorus – who have been concerned, throughout this parodos, with the painful memory of Aulis. Though fear is not directly invoked, ἀνθ' ὕπνου … πόνος echoes the Watchman's φόβος … ἀνθ' ὕπνου (14);[668] the Chorus' later description of a 'droplet running to their heart' (1120-2) seems to communicate a similar mixture of pain, fear, and incomprehension.[669] The Chorus occupy a 'space between *pathos* and *mathos*', a space that is not only intertemporal but also interpersonal, since the suffering that they recall is not their own.[670] And so alongside the πάθει μάθος of the protagonist, who learns in the proverbial way from their own suffering,[671] there is the πάθει μάθος of the (choral) spectator, who learns, in fear, from the suffering of others.[672]

This mode of education, which I will call 'allopathic', runs alongside the dominant 'autopathic' mode in the *Agamemnon*.[673] The latter is certainly present at the end of the parodos, quoted above, where 'Justice weighs out learning to those who have suffered' (Δίκα δὲ τοῖς μὲν παθοῦ- | σιν μαθεῖν ἐπιρρέπει, 250-1). Yet these lines are freighted too

[668] Cf. Gargarin (1976: 210 n.10); Stanford (1983: 125).
[669] Cf. the 'surge of bile' at *Cho*. 183-4, with parallels in Garvie and Jouanna (2012: 74-6).
[670] Haselswerdt (2018: 137; cf. 151-6). For choral intertemporality, see Grethlein (2013).
[671] Commentators regularly cite Hdt. I.207, where Croesus declares, τὰ δὲ μοι παθήματα ἐόντα ἀχάριτα μαθήματα γέγονε. Perhaps these μαθήματα implicitly belong to the victim, rather than any observer (Godley: 'Disaster has been my teacher'). Just two lines later, however, Croesus is instructing Cyrus: μάθε, ὡς κύκλος τῶν ἀνθρωπηίων ἐστὶ πρηγμάτων. Alcibiades, in the *Symposium* passage already quoted, also seeks to turn his autopathic lessons to allopathic purpose.
[672] Lebeck (1971: 25-6, with 174 n.3); cf. Conacher (1987: 11-12, 83-5); Goward: (2005: 69-70); Sommerstein (2010: 195-6); and Raeburn/Thomas *ad loc*.
[673] For these two modes, cf. Polybius I.35.7: δυεῖν γὰρ ὄντων τρόπων πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις τῆς ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον μεταθέσεως, τοῦ τε διὰ τῶν ἰδίων συμπτωμάτων καὶ τοῦ διὰ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων, ἐναργέστερον μὲν εἶναι συμβαίνει τὸν διὰ τῶν οἰκείων περιπετειῶν, ἀβλαβέστερον δὲ τὸν διὰ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων.

with allopathic implications: the Trojans are τοῖς μὲν παθοῦσιν;[674] the idiom expects a τοῖς δέ to balance the sentence, and who are τοῖς δέ but Agamemnon and the Greeks?[675] The Chorus swerve from the inference: for Agamemnon's fate, they substitute a vague 'future', and prefer to rejoice rather than groan in advance. Autopathic learning is invoked again in the second stasimon, when Troy, in catastrophe, 'learns [Helen's bridal-song] anew' (μεταμανθάνουσα, 709) as a lament.[676] Yet Troy is destroyed before it can get on Zeus' 'road to understanding' – as indeed are Agamemnon, and Clytemnestra. Indeed, revisionist scholars[677] have been pleased to point out that no one, protagonist or chorus, seems to learn from their own suffering in the *Oresteia*.[678] This does not, however, undermine the optimism of the trilogy, which rides most of all on allopathic education. In Lloyd-Jones' pithy formulation: 'From the observation of the working of the law of Zeus, men may learn to think safely [i.e. σωφρονεῖν] … [I]t is the observer rather than the victim who profits from the lesson.'[679]

This is the meaning of πάθει μάθος that survives the action of the trilogy, and finds its ultimate expression in the second stasimon of *Eumenides* and Athena's *thesmos*, where the ideology of deterrent fear is set out in full. The central premise of this ideology, however, is already discernible here in the *Agamemnon*: as Peter Rose points out, the Elders' 'powerful image of internalized anxiety' corresponds to the 'internalized fear (*to deinon, deos*)', promoted by the Erinyes and Athena as 'the essential psychological

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[674] For the identification, see Denniston/Page and Sommerstein (2008) *ad loc*.
[675] Denniston/Page go so far as to articulate a logical alternative to 250-1: 'τοὺς δὲ (sc. the Greeks) μῆνις μένει τεκνόποινος.' Raeburn/Thomas, meanwhile, believe that 'the position of μέν indicates that Δίκη is the notional subject of the δέ-clause', suggesting that the Chorus 'begin with the thought, "As for what Justice will weigh out for Agamemnon in the near future …" but then resort … to euphemistic optatives.'
[676] Cf. 367-8, discussed below.
[677] For a list, see Rose (1992: 238 n.71), to which can be added Raeburn/Thomas (2011: xli).
[678] Orestes, in the *Eumenides*, declares himself to have been διδαχθεὶς ἐν κακοῖς (276), but what he has learned is the right time to act and speak; he has not learned from his suffering, but from the wise instruction of Apollo (σοφοῦ διδασκάλου, 279).
[679] Lloyd-Jones (1971: 87). For a different account of πάθει μάθος, see Dodds (1960: 29-31).

correlative of an effective government of laws'.[680] We may note other parallels too, especially between the Hymn to Zeus and the Erinyes' song: the image of the supervising authority 'sitting' over and above the fearful subject; and suffering presented as a necessary condition for *sophrosyne* (*Eum.* 519, 521). The Hymn to Zeus also introduces for the first time the *lekythion*, the metrical signature that will come to define the choral meditations on useful fear.[681] We must be careful here not to 'look forward':[682] the audience, hearing these first *lekythia* of the trilogy, do not yet know their intellectual significance. Nevertheless, when they recur – in the central stasimon of this play, the corresponding stasima in the *Libation Bearers* and *Eumenides* – the audience are reminded, musically as well as thematically, of this first dark and obscure articulation of fear's wisdom. The recollection surely precludes any sense of transformation.

As these later odes make clear, the psychological mechanism of allopathic education is fear. But even as early as the first stasimon of *Agamemnon*, we can see the mechanism in operation. The Chorus, told of the fall of Troy, respond with an invocation of Zeus, celebrating the 'total destruction' (361) of their enemies. Yet this celebration is accompanied not by joy, but rather fearful reverence:[683] 'I revere (αἰδοῦμαι) the greatness of Zeus, god of hospitality, who brought this about' (362-3, tr. Sommerstein). The Chorus continue:

> Διὸς πλαγὰν ἔχουσιν [Karsten: ἔχοις ἂν] εἰπεῖν,[684]

[680] Rose (1992: 238). De Romilly (1958: 107-9) suggests that the 'sanctions légitimes' of the Hymn to Zeus are analogous to those of Athena's court.
[681] See above, p.x.
[682] As cautioned by Brown (2018: 42).
[683] For the connection between *aidos, sebas* and fear, see *Pers*. 694-703 with Cairns (1993: 207) and my Introduction B.
[684] ἔχουσιν, preferred by Page, West, and Sommerstein, is Triclinius' correction of a lost MS; another copy of this MS has both ἔχουσαν and ἔχουσ'.

πάρεστιν τοῦτό γ’ ἐξιχνεῦσαι·
ἔπραξεν ὡς ἔκρανεν· οὐκ ἔφα τις
θεοὺς βροτῶν ἀξιοῦσθαι μέλειν
ὅσοις ἀθίκτων χάρις
πατοῖθ’· ὁ δ’ οὐκ εὐσεβής·
πέφανται δ’ ἐγγόνοις
†ἀτολμήτων ἄρη†[685]
πνεόντων μεῖζον ἢ δικαίως,
φλεόντων δωμάτων ὑπέρφευ
ὑπὲρ τὸ βέλτιστον. (367-78)

While the first line of this strophe may gesture momentarily at the autopathic education of the Trojans, its movement is towards moral generalization. Certainly the possibility of ‘tracing the violence to its source’ is not limited to the victims of Zeus’ justice; the Chorus’ own song illustrates the fact that the pursuit of this causal logic is open to others. The result of this inquiry is at first simple: Zeus is the source of the Trojan catastrophe. But a second, more complex explanation immediately follows: although some (impious) people *said / used to say* (ἔφα, aorist / imperfect) the gods were not stirred by the trampling of the sacred, now the ruin that follows on the reckless deeds of the overproud *has been made manifest* (πέφανται, perfect). There is learning here, even without the language of *pathos* and *mathos*: impiety – a lack of *sebas*, an excess of *tolma*[686] – is

[685] ἐγγόνοις, ἀτολμήτων and ἄρη are all uncertain readings: see Denniston/Page *ad loc*., and the fuller apparatus of West.
[686] As noted above, the text is uncertain, but cf. 408, where Helen ‘dares what should not be dared’ (ἄτλητα τλᾶσα).

indeed punished by the gods.[687] The 'total destruction' of Troy demonstrates a truth of universal validity, which others may observe; the correct response, as modelled by the Chorus, is αἰδώς.

A similar dynamic – of intellectual correction, promoting reverence – unfolds in the next stasimon.[688] After the allegory of the lion cub, the Chorus recall 'a hoary saying' that from prosperity and good fortune are born 'insatiable misery for the family' (750-5). But then the Chorus dispute this:

> δίχα δ' ἄλλων μονόφρων εἰ-
>
> μί· τὸ δυσσεβὲς γὰρ ἔργον
>
> μετὰ μὲν πλείονα τίκτει,
>
> σφετέραι δ' εἰκότα γένναι·
>
> οἴκων γὰρ εὐθυδίκων
>
> καλλίπαις πότμος αἰεί. (757-62)

Commentators usually point out that the Chorus are not nearly so 'original' or 'exceptional' as they pretend, citing Solonic (and Pindaric) passages about how it is *excessive* wealth and pride that lead to ruin.[689] However, as Conacher observes, Aeschylus places a greater insistence on 'the impious deed' (τὸ δυσσεβὲς … ἔργον), as a phenomenon independent of wealth.[690] Indeed, the very category of *dussebeia* is an Aeschylean innovation: the archaic moralising of Solon is concerned with *hubris* and

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[687] Denniston/Page, against Fraenkel and others, regard these lines as an illustration of the doctrine of inherited guilt. This requires a forced interpretation of the passage; the antistrophe (*pace* Denniston/Page) is focused on Paris' crimes against Zeus Xenios, not the crimes of his ancestors. Cf. Conacher (1987: 64 n.39).

[688] On the 'metatheological discourse' of these two odes, see Scapin (2020: 16-21).

[689] Solon fr. 4.7-9, 6.3-4, 13.7-16; Pind. *Ol*. 1.55-6. For more references, see Denniston/Page. For criticism of wealth in *Agamemnon*, see also 378-84, 471-4, 773-81 and Rose (1992).

[690] Conacher (1987: 29). Helm (2004) argues for a new, specifically Aeschylean 'genealogy of morals', into which 'impiety' is inserted as the parent of *hybris*.

*koros*, rather than impiety or irreverence *per se*.[691] In any case, whether 'original' or not, the Chorus present their ideas as a corrective to the amoral interpretation of suffering promoted by their predecessors; they rhetorically revise a common interpretation of what causes the gods to punish mortals – just as they did in the first stasimon. And just as there the upshot of their analysis was αἰδώς, so here the implicit exhortation is towards the avoidance of τὸ δυσσεβές, an avoidance which must entail σέβας.[692] While *hybris* breeds *hybris* and 'Ruin, black for the house' (763-72), reverence produces justice, which produces prosperity.

This same genealogy of morals is taken up in the second stasimon of *Eumenides*. There the Erinyes confirm that *hybris* (cf. *Ag.* 763) is the child not of *koros* but of *dussebia*; consequently, it is necessary to 'respect' (αἴδεσαι, αἰδόμενος) the altar of justice and the rights of guests; the reward for such righteous reverence is prosperity (*Eum.* 534-52). In Athena's *thesmos*, of course, *sebas* (with *phobos*) prevents injustice (690-2); ταρβοῦντες ἐνδίκως σέβας produces security for the city (700). In the exodos, Athena promises that prosperity will follow those who 'revere' (σέβοντι) the Erinyes (897); this system is confirmed by the Erinyes in their final lines: those who 'revere' their metic status 'will have no cause to complain about their fortunes' (εὐσεβοῦντες οὔτι μέμ- | ψεσθε συμφορὰς βίου. 1019-20). Thus what is presented as a marginal, even contrarian, idea in the *Agamemnon* – that human attitudes, rather than a capricious wheel-of-fortune fate, dictate our happiness – becomes the unanimous conclusion of the *Eumenides*. This is the paradigm of the *Oresteia*: not transformation, but clarification and integration, learning and accommodation.

[691] δυσσεβής and its cognates do not appear before Aeschylus; ἀσεβής is attested in Xenophanes and Theognis.
[692] For the fearful associations of this word, see my Introduction B.

So far I have tried to show that, even in the opening scenes of *Agamemnon*, the salutary potential of fear is adumbrated, and that the odes present a mode of allopathic education that relies on the mechanism of fear. At the same time, however, both Watchman and Chorus, shy away from the full expression of this emotion; and while the latter will profess *aidos*, and signal the importance of *sebas*, they will not speak of *phobos* or *deos*, and seek to throw off their anxious thoughts, swerving from fearful inferences of Agamemnnon's fate. In their refusal to articulate their more immediate fears, the Chorus recall the 'emotional regimes' of the *Seven Against Thebes*, discussed in Chapter Three; indeed, at the end the first stasimon, hoping for happy news from the Herald, they declare that they 'abhor speaking (ἀποστέργω λόγον) of the opposite alternative'; indeed, they wish that whoever 'prays differently (ἄλλως τῆιδ' ἐπεύχεται) … may reap the fruit of his mind's perversity'. The expression of fear is forbidden in this Chorus-community.

Yet 'wisdom', we remember, 'comes even to the unwilling'. This 'violent grace of the gods' is brutally embodied in the person of the far-seeing Cassandra, on whom Apollo, 'the wrestler, powerfully breathed his χάρις' (1206).[693] In the Cassandra-scene, however, it is not the prophet but the Chorus who prove themselves unwilling to learn wisdom – just as they have done throughout the play.[694] As Lebeck observes, it is in this exchange that μάθος is most intensely associated with πάθος and φόβος: 'here the sense of dread and the possibility of knowledge reach their height'.[695] Both are, however, once again refused.

[693] The image of the wrestler also recalls that of the Hymn, where Zeus was described as τριακτῆρος (171-2).
[694] Their intellectual obstinacy is justified at a divine level as a consequence of Apollo's curse; however, it is also motivated at a psychological level. For the double motivation, see Winnington-Ingram (1983: 213).
[695] (1971: 28).

The Chorus's initial incomprehension of Cassandra's prophecies is articulated explicitly (ἄιδρις, 1105, οὔπω ξυνῆκα, 1112), while their emotional detachment is signalled by their use of spoken trimeters in response to her sung dochmiacs. Soon, however, they catch Cassandra's rhythm,[696] and with it her feelings: 'a saffron-coloured drop', the Chorus sing, 'runs to [their] heart' (ἐπὶ δὲ καρδίαν ἔδραμε κροκοβαφὴς | σταγών, 1121-2).[697] Both pallor and the running of blood to the heart were widely understood in classical Greece as symptoms of fear.[698] But the σταγών and the καρδία also recall the steady drip of μνησιπήμων πόνος in the Hymn to Zeus: this is the fearful suffering that leads to wisdom. As Budelmann and Easterling put it: 'the Chorus do not understand what Cassandra means, but her words instil fear in them, and that fear is of course justified … in this scene emotions do not so much detract from rational understanding as support it.'[699] This affective understanding is highlighted by the Chorus themselves, who note that prophets like Cassandra 'bring fear as their lesson' (φόβον φέρουσιν μαθεῖν, 1135, tr. Collard). Here πάθει μάθος is momentarily translated into φόβῳ μάθος: learning through fear.

Yet this Chorus are still resistant to such education. The phrase just quoted concludes a complaint about prophecies, which bring no good word but only evil (1132-5). In the next antistrophe, they recognise again the fearful import of Cassandra's words (τὰ δ' ἐπίφοβα … | μελοτυπεῖς), but dismiss her 'misery' as 'futile' (ματαίους δύας, 1151-3); we recall again the 'futile burden of anxiety' they sought to cast off in the parodos (165-6). Later,

[696] A rhythm that is probably also expressed in dance. Stanford (1983: 149): 'they react physically to her fearful utterances'; Conacher (1987: 43) 'they now begin to follow the frenzied dances of Cassandra'.
[697] For the image of dripping through the trilogy, see Lebeck (1971: 80-91).
[698] Compare χλωρῶι δείματι at *Supp*. 566, and further references in Thomson and Fraenkel. For Aristotle's wider physiology of fear, see Chapter Two.
[699] Budelmann/Easterling (2010: 296-7).

when both Cassandra and Chorus have returned to calmer trimeters, they link fear and understanding a final time. What she says about Thyestes' banquet, the Chorus-leader says, he 'understands and shudders at'; he 'is afraid when [he] hears these things that were truly not figurative in any way' (ξυνῆκα καὶ πέφρικα, καὶ φόβος μ' ἔχει | κλύοντ' ἀληθῶς οὐδὲν ἐξηκασμένα, 1243-4). These visions of past events had occupied the first part (1217-22) of Cassandra's preceding speech. 'For the rest', however – Cassandra's extended warning of Agamemnon's imminent murder (1223-38) – the Chorus profess themselves to have 'lost the track' of comprehension (1245). When Cassandra continues to warn them in the bluntest of terms, they resort to their former strategies of evasion: the reproval of *dusphemia* (1247), a prayer for all to be well (1249), and, finally, renewed avowals of incomprehension (οὐ ξυνῆκα, 1253; δυσμαθῆ, 1255). This Chorus will not learn to be afraid, until it is too late.

Too late for Agamemnon, at least. The Chorus, on the other hand, despite their manifest 'reluctance, amounting to refusal, to face [the] facts'[700] of Agamemnon's imminent assassination, show themselves already prepared for the intellectual adjustment that his death will provoke. After Cassandra's exit, they reflect briefly in anapaests on man's insatiate appetite for success, a universal truth that is by illustrated[701] by Agamemnon's successful capture of Troy (1331-7). They then consider the consequences 'if he pays for the blood shed by his forefathers, and by dying causes the dead to exact further deaths as a penalty' (1338-40, tr. Sommerstein). These lines predict the bloody course of *Libation Bearers*; the conclusion sets up the spectatorial justice of the *Eumenides*: 'What mortal,' they conclude, 'perceiving these things, could boast himself born to a destiny without

[700] Winnington-Ingram (1983: 212).
[701] Denniston/Page: 'καὶ τῷδε: introducing an illustration of the general rule'.

pain?' (τίς ἂν ἐξεύξαιτο βροτῶν ἀσινεῖ | δαίμονι φῦναι ταδ' ἀκούων; 1341-2). This is recognisably the emotional paradigm of the Erinyes' song, and Athena's *thesmos*: when we perceive the unjust are punished, we are reminded of our vulnerability; through such allopathic education, we learn to be afraid, and thus to be just.

Agamemnon, Clytemnestra, and Cassandra: Hesitation, Hubris, and Despair

In *Agamemnon*, the πάθος enacted is the King's death. As noted above, however, it is not the victim but the observer that is educated by suffering, learning fear and reverence. Still, it adds to the clarity and effectiveness of this lesson if the victim is characterized by a failure of fear and reverence.[702] So Paris was implicitly presented as one of the 'irreverent' (372) who thought the gods were not concerned by sacrilege, while Helen 'lightly dared what should not be dared' (407-8). In the action of the play itself, all three heroic characters[703] enact a fearlessness that leads them to their doom. Agamemnon and Clytemnestra may be treated together; Cassandra presents a special case.

Agamemnon, we are told, 'blew his mental wind in an impious direction' at Aulis (φρενὸς πνέων δυσσεβῆ τροπαίαν), taking on an all-daring mindset (τὸ παντότολμον φρονεῖν); emboldened (θρασύνει) by infatuation, he dared (ἔτλα) to become sacrificer of

[702] For the ethics and effectiveness of such *paradeigmata* in Thucydides, see Chapter One; for failure to fear in Aristotle's *Poetics*, see Chapter Two.
[703] I use this word in the sense of *dramatis personae*; it is possible, as Easterling (1973), Gould (1978), and especially Budelmann/Easterling (2010) demonstrate, to attend to the psychology communicated by Aeschylus' *personae* – their perceptions, beliefs, motivations – without speculations about their implicit 'character' (traits, predispositions, etc.). See n.699 below.

his own daughter (219-24). The King's return to Argos is marked by a similar combination of impious daring and bad judgement. Although his own speech of thanksgiving is relatively sensible (810-54), he is gradually corrupted by the Peitho (cf. 385) of Clytemnestra until he casts aside his caution and reverence and becomes once more an example of recklessness. While the choral odes indicated a failure of *sebas*, and the importance of *aidos*, the dispute over the 'carpets' is explicitly a question of *phobos* and *deos* as well. Agamemnon initially recognizes that 'there is no way for mortal to tread on these beautiful embroideries without fear (ἄνευ φόβου)';[704] this, he says rightly, is 'good sense (τὸ μὴ κακῶς φρονεῖν) … the greatest gift (δῶρον) of the god' (923-8). However, τὸ μὴ κακῶς φρονεῖν , with its suggestive litotes, recalls the fateful decision at Aulis, as well as the 'wisdom' that is the violent 'gift' (χάρις) of Zeus in the parodos.[705] Indeed, Agamemnon's conclusion – that, following such pious principles, he may be 'confident' (εὐθαρσής, 930) – suggests an underlying refusal of fear, the same 'bold' daring that misled him at Aulis (cf. θρασύνει, 222), and will do so again at Argos.

Clytemnestra's persuasive strategy relies on teasing out this fearlessness in Agamemnon.[706] First, she seeks to diminish his stated anxiety by relativising it: 'Might you have vowed to the gods, when terrified (δείσας), that you would do this thing?' (933).[707] Clytemnestra tacitly alludes to Agamemnon's choice at Aulis, where he decided

[704] Sommerstein would make this φόβος objective rather than affective (cf. LSJ II. 2): 'to tread on beautiful embroideries cannot be anything but *perilous*.' Agamemnon is, however, focused on the morality of his attitude (927, 930 etc.), not the possibility of punishment.
[705] So Goldhill (1984: 76).
[706] Denniston/Page *ad* 931ff.: '[Agamemnon's] personal fears of divine retribution and human censure are allayed'; Stanford (1983: 142): 'Clytemnestra … first quells his religious scruples and then overcomes his *aidos*…'. Such psychological readings (especially Fraenkel's much-ridiculed diagnosis of 'gentlemanly' concession) were unfashionable for a period but are no longer so scorned as they once were. See note 696 above, and, on this scene, Easterling (1973: 12-15). See also Goward (2005: 80-2), who warns us, in dismissing Fraenkel's naivety, 'to be aware of our own pre-suppositions'.
[707] Sommerstein's translation ('Might you … *in a moment of danger* …?) conceals the affective element.

that the killing of Iphigenia was less dreadful than betraying his fleet.[708] There are circumstances, she implies, in which he might put aside the φόβος he has just invoked; Agamemnon, acknowledging the Aulis allusion,[709] must admit that this is true (934). Next, she intimates that that there is something craven in his fear, by translating it into temporal terms: 'Do not feel shame (αἰδεσθῇς) at the criticisms of mortals' (937). Although Agamemnon's initial φόβος had involved a religious sensibility,[710] he now adopts Clytemnestra's worldly perspective, justifying his alleged *aidos* through the 'great strength' of popular talk (938). Clytemnestra, dismissing such talk as the price of success (939), suggests that his fears are not only craven but pointless, too, since what he fears is in fact inevitable. In the last exchanges, she removes Agamemnon's potential fear of losing the argument by emphasising the compatibility of his yielding with his dignity (941, 943). Thus, throughout this stichomythic exchange, she minimizes the fears that he has advanced, resisting their religious and objective elements, and insinuating instead that they are relative, subjective, and insignificant.

The King's final concession compresses the emotional dynamic of the stichomythia. Hesitating to trample on the embroideries, he decides to walk barefoot, as if to mitigate the religious interdiction he previously invoked (944-5). After an apotropaic prayer, Agamemnon confirms his pious anxiety: 'I feel a great sense of impropriety about despoiling this house under my feet' (948).[711] Yet this αἰδώς, supposedly πολλή**,** is

[708] Cf. Conacher (1987: 37-8).
[709] One 'knowledgeable person' (τις εἰδώς) who might prescribe such a sacrilege is the seer Calchas, as Sommerstein, Conacher and Easterling (1973: 18) observe.
[710] Cf. *Supp*. 478-9: … ἀνάγκη Ζηνὸς αἰδεῖσθαι κότον | ἱκτῆρος· ὕψιστος γὰρ ἐν βροτοῖς φόβος. For discussion see Chapter Three.
[711] The syntax of 948, αἰδώς + infinitive, might be understood as a fear-construction (see Smyth *2338 and *CGCG* p.522 n.1). Agamemnon is still waiting for his sandals to be removed, as requested in 944-5 (so Sommerstein and Raeburn/Thomas); it is thus a *prospective* shame that he articulates, about an action not yet taken. For further discussion, see my Introduction B

quickly thrust aside: ‘So much for that!’ (τούτων μὲν οὕτω, 950). We may recall the Watchman’s prologue, and the conclusions of the parodos and first stasimon: fear suppressed, dismissed, even condemned; here it is simply cast away, as the King walks across the embroideries to his doom.

Clytemnestra, too, has a habit of casting off her fear. Defined from the beginning of the play by ‘hope’,[712] she is invoked as ‘not husband-fearing’ but ‘fearsome’ in the parodos (οὐ δεισήνορα … φοβερά, 153-4). She will dramatically disavow τάρβος on Agamemnon’s arrival: ‘with the passing of time, fear dies away in the human mind’ (858). This past fear is substantiated by what follows: a complaint of the ‘horrible evil’ (ἔκπαγλον κακόν) of sitting at home hearing dire reports (861-73), and a description of long, sleepless nights, lying and waiting, like the Watchman, for Agamemnon’s return (887-94). Now she celebrates her ‘griefless’, implicitly fear-free, ‘heart’ (ἀπενθήτῳ φρενί, 895). After Agamemnon’s murder, her fearlessness becomes more defiant: before, she ‘felt no shame’ to speak her love (οὐκ αἰσχυνοῦμαι, 856); now she ‘feels no shame’ (οὐκ ἐπαισχυνθήσομαι, 1373) at the prospect of self-contradiction. Accused of having a ‘reckless mouth’ (θρασύστομος, 1399), she declares her murderous responsibility ‘with dauntless heart’ (ἀτρέστῳ καρδίαι, 1402). When the Chorus threaten her with retribution, she proudly swears, ‘by Ate and by Erinys’:

> οὔ μοι φόβου μέλαθρον ἐλπὶς ἐμπατεῖ
> ἕως ἂν αἴθῃ πῦρ ἐφ’ ἑστίας ἐμῆς
> Αἴγισθος, ὡς τὸ πρόσθεν εὖ φρονῶν ἐμοί·
> οὗτος γὰρ ἡμῖν ἀσπὶς οὐ σμικρὰ θράσους. (1434-7)

[712] 11: γυναικὸς ἀνδρόβουλον ἐλπίζον κέαρ; cf. 262, 266, 899, 1434.

Clytemnestra's fear will come back to haunt her, quite literally, in the *Libation Bearers*, but for now we may simply note the domestic imagery: fear is excluded from the household (μέλαθρον).[713] Clytemnestra, like Agamemnon, hopes to ward off fear, to shield herself with the confidence supplied by Aegisthus (cf. θαρσῶν, 1371). The *Libation Bearers* will demonstrate the failure of this emotional economy, as fear forces its way into the heart of the house; the *Eumenides* will see it installed at the heart of the city.

Indeed, despite her disavowals, Clytemnestra's precautionary fear has been critical to her practical success. As she declares to Agamemnon in her characteristic double-speak: 'Careful thought' (φροντίς), 'not overcome by sleep'- just like the Watchman! – 'will set all else to right' (912-13). Clytemnestra has planned for everything. Later she will boast that the 'showdown' with Agamemnon 'had long been in her thoughts' (ἐμοὶ δ' ἀγὼν ὅδ' οὐκ ἀφρόντιστος πάλαι, 1377, tr. Sommerstein). This is the kind of far-seeing, deliberative fear that Pelasgus requires in the *Suppliants*, and that the Chorus of *Agamemnon* long for now:

> ἀμηχανῶ φροντίδος στερηθεὶς
> εὐπάλαμον μέριμναν
> ὅπαι τράπωμαι πίτνοντος οἴκου.
> δέδοικα δ' ὄμβρου κτύπον δομοσφαλῆ
> τὸν αἱματηρόν. (1530-4)

[713] Alternatively, φόβου may be taken with μέλαθρον: 'for me, expectation treads not in the house of fear' (Denniston/Page; cf. Smyth, Collard, and discussion in Fraenkel). Raeburn/Thomas, noting the literal ἑστία of the following line, prefer a literal meaning for μέλαθρον.

The audience will remember that this same Chorus of Elders had earlier sought a healer for their μέριμνα (99), a means to 'throw off the burden of φροντίς' (165-6; cf. φροντὶς ἄπληστος, 102). Now, too late, they recognize the εὐπάλαμος quality of anxiety, the options afforded by the φροντίς that they rejected. In its place, they are left with a hopeless fear, a resigned 'foresight', as Sommerstein translates it, that offers no opportunity for intervention or aversive action. Delusional optimism is succeeded by despair. For the Chorus of *Agamemnon*, fear's promise goes unrealized.

In this despair – indeed the very imagery of these lines – the Chorus echo the attitude of Cassandra. The Trojan prophetess articulates her fear at greater length than either Agamemnon or Cassandra, but, like them, she eventually discards it. I have discussed above the Chorus' strategies of denial in this exchange: how close they come to the fearful wisdom that the prophetess offers, and how they shy away from it. But Cassandra herself appears to be possessed by fear, right from the beginning of this scene: before she even speaks, the Chorus observe, 'she has the manner of a wild beast just trapped' (1063). When she finally opens her mouth, it is to emit cries of horror (1072, 1076); these continue to punctuate her visions of past and future bloodshed.

Interestingly, however, Cassandra largely avoids language of fear: it is almost 150 lines after her initial shrieks that she first describes her 'toil of true prophecy' as 'terrible' (δεινὸς ὀρθομαντείας πόνος, 1215); even then, it is unclear whether she means that her prophecy is fearsome to her, rather than to the frightened Chorus.[714] Nevertheless, we are reminded once more of the connection between fear and knowledge: Cassandra's

[714] δεινός, as noted in my Introduction B, has strong connotations of spectacular fear.

prophecies, as the Chorus say, φόβον φέρουσιν μαθεῖν (1135); the pain and confusion of fear lead to a certain truth. But this is not Cassandra's emphasis. At the end the scene, as she perhaps shies away from the door, the Chorus impute fear (φόβος, 1306) to her; in response, she seems to scorn the emotion:[715]

> οὔτοι δυσοίζω θάμνον ὡς ὄρνις φόβῳ
> ἀλλ' ὡς θανούσῃ μαρτυρῆτέ μοι τόδε (1316-7).

Cassandra is not, herself, moved by fear.[716] Why not? The Chorus ascribe her attitude to bravery: '[her] resolution', they say, 'comes from a courageous mind (τλήμων οὖσ' ἀπ' εὐτόλμου φρενός, 1302); they see her 'dying a fine death' (εὐκλεῶς … κατθανεῖν, 1304). Indeed, facing death was recognized by Plato and Aristotle as requiring the greatest courage.[717] Yet Cassandra does not present this as her motivation: asked how she steps so 'boldly' (εὐτόλμως, 1298) towards her doom, she does not speak of her *kleos,* or of some greater religious or communal purpose, like other tragic heroes who go willingly to their deaths .[718] Instead, she recognizes these doomed steps to be her only choice: οὐκ ἔστ' ἄλυξις, she tells the Chorus (1299); ἥκει τόδ' ἦμαρ. σμικρὰ κερδανῶ φυγῆι (1301). This is not courage, but despair – a state that Aristotle specifically opposes to courage in the *Nicomachean Ethics*.[719] In the *Rhetoric*, such despair precludes fear, too: 'δεῖ τινα ἐλπίδα ὑπεῖναι σωτηρίας, περὶ οὗ ἀγωνιῶσιν. σημεῖον δέ· ὁ γὰρ φόβος βουλευτικοὺς ποιεῖ,

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[715] The Chorus offer στύγος as an alternative (1308), and Cassandra responds: φόνον δόμοι πνέουσιν αἱματοσταγῆ (1309). Taplin (1977: 320): 'it is not fear or apprehension that turns her back, but the smell which she detects about the house.'
[716] The meaning of δυσοίζω, only elsewhere attested in the *Rhesus* (724, 805), is disputed. Hesychius δ 2620 makes it a synonym for φοβέομαι; so Sommerstein translates, 'I am not *shying away* out of empty terror'. For alternative interpretations, see Fraenkel and Denniston/Page. The action is, in any case, one that a fearful bird might take, and all commentators agree that Cassandra is denying such a fear in herself.
[717] See Chapter Two.
[718] Contrast the patriotic sacrifices of Euripides' *Children of Heracles* and *Iphigenia at Aulis*, and Ajax's motives for suicide in Sophocles.
[719] 1116a2-3.

καίτοι οὐδεὶς βουλεύεται περὶ τῶν ἀνελπίστων (*Rh*. II.1383a5-8).[720] Cassandra is not afraid – avoiding and rejecting the language of fear – because she has no hope of deliverance. This distinguishes her fearlessness from that of the Chorus, and from Agamemnon and Clytemnestra, all of whom suppress their well-justified fears through wilful and reckless delusion. Cassandra, by contrast, would 'profit' (κερδανῶ) from her premonitions if she could, and flee; yet in her these far-seeing 'fears' are sterile. Indeed, they are not fears at all.

Third Stasimon: The Guardian of the Heart

I turn now to the Chorus again. Their movement through the tragedy from optimism to despair, skirting the salutary potential of fear, is presented in miniature by the third stasimon of the play (975-1034), which follows Agamemnon and Clytemnestra's entries into the palace. I have already highlighted the formal and dramaturgical features that connect this ode with the first stasimon of *Libation Bearers* and the second of *Eumenides.* What remains to be explored are the *thematic* connections: the ways in which the Elders' fearful meditations both draw together various strands of thought within the *Agamemnon*, and prepare the conceptual ground for the developments of the later plays.[721]

Agamemnon and Clytemnestra have cast aside their fears as they enter the palace, but the Chorus are unable to do the same:

τίπτε μοι τόδ' ἐμπέδως

[720] For discussion, see Chapter Two.
[721] De Romilly, while neglecting other through-lines of the trilogy, does admit that there is something in this ode of the 'bonne crainte' promoted in *Eumenides* (1958: 110).

δεῖμα προστατήριον

καρδίας τερασκόπου ποτᾶται;

μαντιπολεῖ δ’ ἀκέλευστος ἄμισθος ἀοιδά,

οὐδ’ ἀποπτύσαι δίκαν

δυσκρίτων ὀνειράτων

θάρσος εὐπειθὲς ἴ-

ζει φρενὸς φίλον θρόνον. (975-83)

We may see, in these opening lines, a continuity with earlier representations of fear in the play. First, there is the implied obstinacy of the fear: just as earlier the Chorus struggled to throw off the burden of φροντίς, so here δεῖμα hovers ‘persistently’ (ἐμπέδως). Then there is the vagueness of this emotion, highlighted, as Avezzù points out, by the apparent specification of τόδ’.[722] Despite the deictic pronoun, fear once again has no object, and no explicit rationale.

This unwelcome and unspecified fear is nevertheless recognized as προστατήριος, recalling the way that φόβος ‘stood beside’ (παραστατεῖ, 14) the Watchman. The image at the same time looks forward to the *Eumenides*, where fear is granted a civic role: the adjective, προστατήριον may equally imply political authority;[723] the Erinyes will propose τὸ δεινόν as a φρενῶν ἐπίσκοπον in the second stasimon (518-19). Indeed, the choreography of emotion in this ode is echoed in that one: here the Elders complain that hope has been dislodged from the ‘throne of thought’ (Denniston/Page); there the Erinyes give fear a place to ‘sit’ (καθήμενον, 519) as supervisor over the φρένες. In addition, the

[722] Avezzù (2018: 35)

[723] The cognate προστάτης is commonly used of a champion of the *demos*. Collard’s translation preserves both local and political significations: ‘terror hovering …in front of my heart, to rule its divinations’. Cf. *Pers*. 703, where δέος παλαιόν … φρενῶν ἀνθίσταται.

audience might recall here the *lekythia* of the Hymn to Zeus, where the gods 'sat on an august bench of command', distributing educative suffering. Already here in the *Agamemnon*, then, the Chorus are concerned with the proper place of fear in the governance of the mind, and, implicitly, the city.

Yet they are not yet ready to accommodate fear in that ethical and political system. While the Erinyes, and Athena, will offer a stable and permanent location to the emotion (ὅπου, *Eum*. 517; ἐν … τῷ, 692) the Chorus of Elders present it as mobile and extraneous. The δεῖμα προστατήριον, in oxymoron, does not stand (or sit) but 'flies about' (ποτᾶται). Indeed, even while acknowledging its mantic power, the Chorus desire for fear to be excluded from their consciousness – for θάρσος εὐπειθές to 'spurn' it (literally, to 'spit it out', ἀποπτύσαι). We have seen this 'persuasive optimism' in operation throughout the first half of the *Agamemnon*; here it quickly provides reasons not to be afraid (984-9). However, this language of revulsion and expulsion is new; it will be taken up in the moral exclusions of the *Libation Bearers.*

If the strophe hints at fear's future political role, the antistrophe is more explicitly concerned with its ethical potential; the strophe ends, however, in a familiar, hopeful prayer:

> τὸν δ' ἄνευ λύρας ὅμως ὑμνῳδεῖ
> θρῆνον Ἐρινύος αὐτοδίδακτος ἔσωθεν
> θυμός, οὐ τὸ πᾶν ἔχων
> ἐλπίδος φίλον θράσος.
> σπλάγχνα δ' οὔτοι ματάι-

ζει πρὸς ἐνδίκοις φρεσίν,

τελεσφόροις δίναις κυκλούμενον κέαρ·

εὔχομαι δ’ ἐξ ἐμᾶς

ἐλπίδος ψύθη πεσεῖν

ἐς τὸ μὴ τελεσφόρον. (990-1000)

The Chorus here, while lamenting again the displacement of φίλον θράσος (cf. 982-3) grant to the fearful stirrings of their σπλάγχνα not only a prophetic capacity (τελεσφόροις; cf. τερασκόπου) but also a proximity to their ἔνδικοι φρένες. The meaning of this phrase is disputed – as well as the nature of the proximity implied by πρός – but a link between fear, justice, and rationality is assuredly established. This foreshadows, of course, the emotional ethics of the *Eumenides*. Indeed, this Chorus explicitly invokes a ‘Erinys-lament’ (θρῆνον Ἐρινύος): whether this is taken to signify the current stasimon, or a second song that the Elders can hear and we cannot, the emergence of a Erinyes-chorus in the final play must be recognized as a concretisation of the θρῆνος described here.[724]

Despite these promising suggestions, however, the Chorus lapse into the wilful delusion of prayer (998-1000). The repetition of τελεσφόρος (997, 1000) highlights the contradiction between their justified forebodings and their blind hopes. The strophe and antistrophe are in fact structured by a more substantial repetition: the spontaneous song of the heart, resisted by θάρσος εὐπειθές.[725] This psychological resistance to fear is matched by striking limitations in the usefulness of the emotion as adumbrated across lines 975-

[724] See De Romilly (1958: 76-8); Thalmann (1985) connects this stanza specifically with the Binding Song (e.g. ἄνευ λύρας ὑμνῳδεῖ | θρῆνον Ἐρινύος (*Ag.* 990-1) ≈ ὕμνος ἐξ Ἐρινύων … ἀφόρμικτος (*Eum.* 331-3)).
[725] Goward (2005: 96) observes this ‘ring-composition’.

1000. The Chorus' forebodings still have no definite object; the whirling vortex of 997 speaks of confusion rather than insight;[726] there seems no possibility of deliberation or aversive action. The σπλάγχνα may 'not stir in vain' (οὔτοι ματάιζει; cf. τὸ μάταν …φροντίδος ἄχθος, 165) but no intervention is even considered. (Of course, when the final crisis comes with Agamemnon's screams, the Chorus will be paralyzed and helpless.)[727] Their fear is not yet able to 'restrain injustice' – the essential role of the emotion in Athena's *thesmos*.

This active capacity of fear is articulated only in the second strophe. This opens with a statement about the proximity between 'great and insatiate health' and 'sickness', which 'presses hard on the party-wall' (1001-4).[728] The gnome recalls the sentiment of the old adage quoted in the second stasimon – that from 'great prosperity' springs 'insatiate woe'. This proverb was adjusted in favour of new morality, in which *sebas* was accorded a crucial role (750-8). Here we see a similar pattern of adjustment, albeit less emphatic:

> καὶ πότμος εὐθυπορῶν
>
> …
>
> ἀνδρὸς ἔπαισεν ἄφαντον ἔρμα.
>
> καὶ τὸ μὲν πρὸ χρημάτων
>
> κτησίων ὄκνος βαλὼν
>
> σφενδόνας ἀπ' εὐμέτρου

[726] Stanford: '[the stasimon presents] the most effective expression of *tarache* and of anxious, ill-defined fear in Greek tragedy' (1983: 146). Contrast Fraenkel, who sees a distinction in the strophe between 'uncertain' δυσκρίτων ὀνειράτων and the Chorus' δεῖμα, 'which is so frightful because it is so certain. … The θρῆνος Ἐρινύος does not deal with a vague horror, a mere foreboding, but with the certainty of a universal law' (1950: II, 451-2).

[727] For different perspectives on the psychology of this crisis, see Winnington-Ingram (1983: 208-16) and Budelmann (2018).

[728] 1001-6 are 'incurably corrupt' (Denniston/Page); Medda, *ad* 1001-2: 'una profonda corruttela'. For attempted remedies, see West and Raeburn/Thomas.

οὐκ ἔδυ πρόπας δόμος

πλησμονᾶς γέμων ἄγαν,

οὐδ' ἐπόντισε σκάφος. (1005-1013)

Lines 1005-6 adapt the domestic imagery of the previous lines to the world of seafaring: again, the cause of disaster is nothing more than success itself (εὐθυπορῶν), perhaps carried to an extreme.[729] The following lines, however, reframe the nautical scene:[730] no longer is the ship wrecked upon the unseen, and thus *unforeseeable*, reef; instead it struggles, overladen, in a storm. The second conceit allows for foresight to avert disaster. This foresight is given an emotional emphasis: it is not the captain but 'caution' itself (ὄκνος) that makes the necessary sacrifice of goods.[731] Nowhere else in Greek literature is ὄκνος 'executive'; in normal usage it prevents rather than provokes action.[732] The personification is thus a bold one: it draws attention to the active and salvific role now granted to this psychological phenomenon. *oknos*, like *phobos* and *sebas* in Athena's *thesmos*, is presented a source of safety.

The relevance of these *gnomai* to the situation at hand in the *Agamemnon* is loose and inexplicit.[733] It is true, as de Romilly points out, that we have just witnessed Agamemnon

[729] εὐθυ-πορέω naturally suggests morally *correct* behaviour; cf. Pind. *Ol*. 7.90 ὕβριος ἐχθρὰν ὁδὸν εὐθυπορεῖ. Fraenkel (*ad loc*.) connects this image with the 'excessive' health of the previous lines: 'In exactly the same way … does a course which is *too* direct lead to a shipwreck' (my emphasis). A seven-syllable lacuna, determined by the antistrophe, makes it hard to read too much into these lines.
[730] As noticed by Raeburn/Thomas. Similar cognitive jumps are made by Pelasgus in his three marine images, as discussed by Carroll (2023) and my Chapter Three.
[731] For ὄκνος as an emotion, see my introduction.
[732] For discussion, see Lavery (1998), who argues that ὄκνος cannot mean 'caution' here; adducing much later evidence, he suggests a 'crane' or 'derrick' is signified. Fraenkel presents a powerful rebuttal of a similar meaning given by earlier scholars to σφενδόνη: in a storm, sailors do not use cranes to throw things overboard. Moreover, a personified Oknos is observed by Pausanias (X.29.1-2) in a painting at Delphi by Polygnotus, and recorded as a figure of Egyptian mythology by Diodorus (I.97). For further references, see Fabiano (2008), who suggests that 'la figure d'Oknos … [est] l'expression d'une émotion profonde et particulière qui surgit face à la mort' (273).
[733] Cf. Scott (1984: 339), who connects the gnomic voyage with the success of the Trojan expedition (984-89).

'hesitating' before stepping on the embroideries; the Chorus' 'obscur sens moral' is also a 'préfiguration instinctive et timide du délire de Cassandra' (75). Yet it is Agamemnon's violence, rather than his material greed, that has worried the Chorus so far; and the fearful sacrifice of wealth, for the preservation of life, sounds uncannily like Clytemnestra's first argument for stepping on the embroideries. Indeed, several scholars have implied there is a kind of escapism at play here: this 'pious philosophizing' and 'traditional wisdom' is merely a 'substitute for a precise definition of the [threat] that confronts these old men'.[734] Even the lines that follow, concerning the irreversibility of blood spilt upon the ground, are not connected by the Chorus with the murder of Iphigenia, or the embroideries; while we are invited to recognize the relevance of these images, the Chorus seem unable to apply their wisdom to the crisis.

For an explanation of this psychological block, commentators look to the concluding antistrophe:

> εἰ δὲ μὴ τεταγμένα
> μοῖρα μοῖραν ἐκ θεῶν
> εἶργε μὴ πλέον φέρειν,
> προφθάσασα καρδία
> γλῶσσαν ἂν τάδ' ἐξέχει·
> νῦν δ' ὑπὸ σκότῳ βρέμει
> θυμαλγής τε καὶ οὐδὲν ἐπελπομέ-
> να ποτὲ καίριον ἐκτολυπεύσειν

[734] Stanford (1983: 147); Thalmann (1985: 115).

ζωπυρουμένας φρενός (1024-34)

The significance of the protasis (1024-6) is obscure, depending on how each μοῖρα is understood,[735] but the apodosis (1027-8) presents a clear opposition between heart and tongue; unable to pour out 'these things' (τάδ'; cf. τόδ' ... δεῖμα, 975-6), the heart is reduced to dark mutterings (βρέμει). As with the θρῆνος Ἐρινύος in the first antistrophe, it is unclear whether the stasimon itself is an expression of these dark, sublingual noises, or a verbal response that fails to translate them. Either way, the stasimon ends in disarticulation and despair.[736] Several scholars have posited an implicit 'unconscious' here, unable to actualize its instincts.[737] I need only add that the content of any supposed unconscious must be fear; it is fear, with all its salutary potential, that is suppressed. The καρδία τερασκόπος, before which fear had hovered as a guard, is left utterly hopeless and helpless, while the mind is aflame with passion. We are assuredly being prepared for the Cassandra-scene to come, where the prophetess can see her fearful future, but hopes neither to communicate it, nor to avert it.

The third stasimon thus presents a triple articulation, and triple rejection, of fear's potential. From the political imagery of the first strophe, and the ethical promise of the first antistrophe, we move to a pious moderation in the second strophe. Each of these are rejected: the first pair, by a wilful optimism, and the third by a despair resigned to the constraints of μοῖρα, which prevents the heart's fears from expressing themselves or effecting anything καίριον. However, the failure of fear in this ode does not undo the

[735] For discussion, see Scott (1969: 340-2); Thalmann (1985: 100-7); and Scapin (2020: 221-3); as well as Fraenkel *ad loc*.
[736] So Goward (2005: 95): 'linguistic failure', and Thalmann (1985) *passim*.
[737] Lebeck (1971: 30-1); Stanford (1983: 147); Thalmann (1985: 108, 110-2, 117); Goward (2005: 96).

hints contained within it: these suggestions are substantial enough to survive the inadequacies of the Chorus, and lodge themselves in the minds of the tragic audience.

*Eumenides*: Accommodation

Indeed, they are recalled in the *Eumenides*, and in the second stasimon particularly, the song in which the Erinyes declare that 'there is a place where fear is good' (517).[738] Alongside the metrical and dramaturgical resonances, I have already noted correspondences with the first strophic pair of this *Agamemnon* ode – how προστατήριον prepares us for ἐπίσκοπον, and how the θρῆνος Ἐρινύος proleptically invokes the *Eumenides* Chorus. More striking, however, is the Erinyes' reprise of the Elders' gnomic imagery. Here we find again not only the rich man's ship, overladen with plunder (*Eum.* 552-65), but a whirling eddy (δίναι, 559) and a shipwrecking reef (ἔρματι, 544). First, though, we meet moral 'health-of-mind' (ὑγιείας φρενῶν, 536). The phrase recalls φρενῶν ἐπίσκοπον, just twenty lines earlier (518): a healthy mind is assuredly a fearful one. But it also reaches further back, to this *Agamemnon* ode, where ὑγίεια seemed to reach an ἀκόρεστον τέρμα., and sickness pressed close to it. Here in *Eumenides*, health seems transformed: ἐκ … ὑγιείας, they sing, comes not νόσος but ὄλβος (536-8). Yet in truth this is only a confirmation of the adjustment already signalled in the *Agamemnon* ode: just as the Elders there introduced wealth-sacrificing ὄκνος as a means to prevent disaster, so here the Erinyes-chorus attach to ὑγιεία φρενῶν an injunction to αἰδώς (539-

[738] The connections between this ode and those of the *Agamemnon* are discussed by Lebeck in her concluding chapter (1971: 160-6); see also Winnington-Ingram's brief note (1983: 165 n.38).

41). It is 'from' such αἰδώς (cf. αἰδόμενος, 549), as much as it is 'from' health-of-mind, that prosperity comes, and disaster is averted: ἐκ τῶνδ᾽ … οὐκ ἄνολβος ἔσται | πανώλεθρος δ᾽ οὔποτ᾽ ἂν γένοιτο (550-2).

The Erinyes' corollary case – of the impious, irreverent, and unjust man – answers the *Agamemnon* ode still more directly.

> Τὸν ἀντίτολμον δέ φαμι παρβάδαν
> ἄγοντα πολλὰ παντόφυρτ᾽ ἄνευ δίκας
> βιαίως ξὺν χρόνῳ καθήσειν
> λαῖφος, ὅταν λάβῃ πόνος
> θραυομένας κεραίας. (*Eum*. 553-7)

We recall the Elders' ship of fortune, 'crammed too full with surfeit' (πλησμονᾶς γέμων ἄγαν, 1012); here the excess is disordered and explicitly unjust. This ἀντίτολμος man, lacking in αἰδώς and δίκη, is clearly deficient also in ὄκνος. Failing to lower his λαῖφος in advance, he finds the whole sailing rig destroyed[739] – just as 'the whole house', in the *Agamemnon* ode, is ruined if ὄκνος does not intervene. The Erinyes then elaborate on and clarify the shipwreck that is averted in the Elders' song. We see the 'headstrong man, who boasted it would never happen' (ἀνδρὶ θερμῷ, | τὸν οὔποτ᾽ αὐχοῦντ᾽, 560-1): this illustrates, by inversion, the wise caution of the Elders' *gnome*. In the final lines, the Elders' reef becomes explicitly symbolic: 'he has wrecked the ship of his former lifelong prosperity on the reef of Justice (ἔρματι … Δίκας)' (563-4).

[739] So Sommerstein *ad loc*.: the captain does not actually lower his sail; the storm takes the matter out of his hands.

The relation between these two odes is thus an intimate one, secured not only by metre, dramaturgy, and imagery, but also by the theme of salutary fear. In the *Eumenides*, the emotion is released from the suppressions of optimism and despair. The Erinyes have no doubt that the system of punishment that they preside over acts as a deterrent force; the connection between fear and justice, obscure and tentative in the *Agamemnon* ode, is clarified and confirmed. Yet this cannot be called a 'transformation': as with the therapeutic imagery of the prologue, and the *sebas*-genealogy of the second stasimon, the *Eumenides* merely realizes that which has already been suggested, recognizes that which was earlier suppressed.

The institution of φόβος and σέβας nevertheless reflects a new emotional ecology in the *Eumenides*, in which the beneficence of fear is not only recognized but *accommodated*. Fear is not simply an occasional phenomenon, justified by circumstance, vindicated by events; it is to become a permanent fixture of the political, cultural, and even physical landscape. Thus the final two hundred and fifty lines of the trilogy are concerned with the *metoikia* of the Erinyes. Athena is not content to appropriate their rights and powers for the Areopagus: she wants them to make their home in Athens. Why? Because the role of the Erinyes is not limited to justice, in the legal sense: they are connected throughout the trilogy to the correct management of the earth's resources. Bakola, cited above, has interpreted this Aeschylean innovation as the manifestation of 'a conscience which today we would characterize as ecological'.[740] Her emphasis is on the second term, but I would like to press the first: in the conclusion of the *Oresteia*, 'conscience' itself – the site of moral reflection – is integrated into the environment.

[740] (2019: 117).

This integration is embodied by the Erinyes, as representatives of τὸ δεινόν. These figures progress from abstract allusion in *Agamemnon*, through invisible presence at the end of *Libation Bearers*, to concrete realization in *Eumenides,* before finally accepting a new status as 'co-residents' of both Athena (ξυνοικήτωρ, 833; ξυνοικία, 916) and the Athenians (μέτοικοι 1011; μετοικία, 1018). Great emphasis is laid by Athena not only on their 'home' or οἶκος, but also on the 'seat' (ἕδρα, 805-6, 855) that the Erinyes will enjoy in the new settlement. It is in this latter aspect of the goddess' offer that the Chorus first show interest: 'Lady Athena, what seat (ἕδραν) do you say I shall have?' (916). This seat recalls the 'seating' (καθήμενον, 519) of fear as ἐπίσκοπος in the second stasimon, as well as the 'bench of the gods' (*Ag*. 183) in the Hymn to Zeus. Until this point, however, the 'seat' has been a metaphor for steady authority – just like the psychic θρόνος of hope in the *Agamemnon* ode (983), and indeed the θρόνοι …Ἐρινύων of the second stasimon (*Eum*. 512). Yet in the final scenes of the trilogy this authoritative location takes on a topographic reality and specificity. Athena first promises the Erinyes ἕδρας τε καὶ κευθμῶνας ἐνδίκου χθονός (805), then a ἕδραν near to her temple on the acropolis (855). After their acceptance, she directs them to their θαλάμους (1004), their ἔνερθε καὶ κάτω χθονὸς τόπους (1023); the Athenian escorts guide them to κεύθεσιν ὠγυγίοισιν (1036). These ἕδραι, θάλαμοι, and κεύθη are probably references to the cave-sanctuary of the Semnai Theai (to whom the Erinyes seem assimilated, 1041), which was located on the acropolis side of the Areopagus. In the final lines of the trilogy, this is made the 'home' (οἶκοι, 1044) of the Erinyes.

***Libation Bearers***

The significance of this emotional ecology can only be understood in relation to the terrors of the *Libation Bearers*. While the *Agamemnon* presented a pattern of suppression, the fears of its sequel are subject to a subtly different fantasy – of elimination. Fear in this play is not generally scorned or overridden.[741] Clytemnestra and Orestes both act on their fears, seeking to avert eventualities that they foresee. Both err, however, in thinking they can escape from *phobos*, and somehow live without it. At the end of the play, *phobos* reasserts itself, as Orestes falls under the sway of the Erinyes. His flight, continued in the *Eumenides*, dramatizes a desire to escape the inescapable. In the Chorus, *phobos* persists, although its more respectable cousins *sebas* and *aidos* are preferred. At Delphi, revulsion takes the place of fear: Apollo seeks to exclude the *deinon* that the Erinyes represent. His exclusion is remedied at last by Athena's inclusive *thesmos*, and the triumphant exodos that concludes the trilogy.

This final accommodation of fear is, however, proleptically figured in the first stasimon of the *Libation Bearers*. Here the Chorus, invoking a series of monstrous exempla, integrate the fate of Clytemnestra into a narrative ecology that recalls the allopathic education adumbrated by the Elders of *Agamemnon*. Thus even as the Chorus reject these *deina* as hateful and revolting, they paradoxically imply that they have a cultural

[741] Aegisthus is the exception. θαρσῶν at the end of *Agamemnon* (1671), he enters this play scorning the γυναικῶν δειματούμενοι λόγοι (845). Similar attitudes are articulated by Pelasgus and Eteocles (*Supp.* 514, *Sept.* 181-202; see Chapters Three and Four); in each case the Chorus' anxieties prove more justified than their male detractors allow. Here, despite his claim to cool and rational insight (854), Aegisthus is the dupe: Cilissa has persuaded him to come ἀδειμάντως (771). As we saw with Agamemnon, it is confidence that kills.

function. This prefigures the metatheatrical allusions of the end of the trilogy, where the terrors of the *Oresteia* are themselves proposed as beneficial to the city.

Clytemnestra: Curing Fear

We saw, in *Agamemnon*, a Clytemnestra who had cast off first *tarbos* then *aischune*, and finally *phobos*, boldly declaring that 'no fearful apprehension stalked her house' (οὔ μοι φόβου μέλαθρον ἐλπὶς ἐμπατεῖ, 1434). This disavowal is strikingly refuted in the parodos of *Libation Bearers*, where the enslaved Chorus report:

τορὸς γὰρ ὀρθόθριξ Φόβος[742]
δόμων ὀνειρόμαντις ἐξ ὕπνου κότον
πνέων ἀωρόνυκτον ἀμβόα-
μα μυχόθεν ἔλακε περὶ φόβῳ,
γυναικείοισιν ἐν
δώμασιν βαρὺς πίτνων. (32-7)

The language here recalls the previous play: the night-fears of the Watchman, the dream-fears of the third stasimon, and the horror (*phrike*) of the Cassandra-scene. Aeschylus thus promptly returns his audience to the fear-discourse that preceded Agamemnon's murder. But here there is no suggestion of denial, no countervailing hope or prayer. Indeed, the sentence presents an objective confirmation: Phobos, as personified agent, produces a scream that is expressive of *phobos* (περὶ φόβῳ). Nor is fear 'hard to

[742] I print here Brown's text, which, following Thomson and Garvie, substitutes the scholiast's φόβος for the manuscripts' φοῖβος. Page, Sommerstein, and West prefer deletion. For the personification, see *Cho*. 289, 1024, *Sept*. 500 and my introduction, p.57.

interpret', as in the *Agamemnon* ode: we are told immediately that 'interpreters of this dream' (κριταί … τῶνδ' ὀνειράτων, 38) explained to Clytemnestra that the dead were angry. The fact that they 'cry out' (ἔλακον, 39) their interpretation just as Fear had 'cried out' (ἔλακε, 35) in the dream itself serves to emphasize the direct transmission of significance. There is no obscurity here.

Nor does Clytemnestra hesitate to act on her fear: it is she who has dispatched the Chorus to the tomb of Agamemnon with offerings 'for the aversion of trouble' (ἀπότροπον κακῶν, 44); later we hear that she commissioned the libations 'in the hope of a surgical cure for her troubles (ἄκος τομαῖον ἐλπίσασα πημάτων, 539). The sentiment recalls that of Elders, who had asked Clytemnestra to be a παιών … τῆσδε μερίμνης (*Ag*. 98-9): fear is presented as disease that must be remedied. The Chorus of *Libation Bearers*, however, understand the futility of Clytemnestra's commission – there is no ἄκος, they say (72). Orestes understands this too. Agamemnon's murder is an ἀνήκεστον πάθος, he suggests (516), and continues, 'Pour out all you have in atonement for one man's blood—and your work is wasted: so the saying goes.' (520-1). These images look back to the *Agamemnon* ode, in which a sacrifice of wealth (motivated by ὄκνος) was said to avert disaster; there, as here, such wise precautions were felt to be hopeless in the face of blood already spilt. Clytemnestra's fear is that of the guilty, not of the innocent; for this simple reason, it cannot prevent crime like the fear of the *Eumenides*.[743]

Nevertheless, the very fact that fear is seen to be motivating action distinguishes this play from the last. Meanwhile, the emotion continues to be prophetic – not in the dim,

[743] De Romilly (1958: 82-3) suggests that Clytemnestra's fear serves as 'le substitute de remords'.

foreboding manner of the Elders' anxiety, but in the legible, specific manner of Cassandra. When the Chorus describe the snake-dream in more detail to Orestes, they emphasize her emotion (δειμάτων πεπαλμένη, 524; ἐπτοημένη, 535); the protagonist rehearses this terror as he interprets the meaning of her visions (ἀμφὶ τάρβει … ἐπώμωξεν, 547). 'Since she nursed this horrific portent (ἔκπαγλον τέρας),' Orestes declares, 'she is destined to die by violence' (548-9). Clytemnestra's final line confirms his reading:

> οἳ 'γώ, τεκοῦσα τόνδ' ὄφιν ἐθρεψάμην·
> ἦ κάρτα μάντις οὐξ ὀνειράτων φόβος. (929-30)

What was feared has been actualized: as with Cassandra, there is an exact correspondence between the premonition and the event. Note, however, that while Cassandra herself scorned fear, because of her omniscient despair, Clytemnestra leaves the stage with an affirmation of φόβος. It is fitting that the former apostle of fearlessness should exit with this recantation on her lips.

Orestes: On the Run

Orestes, almost completely absent from the *Agamemnon*, is invoked by the Chorus in the dying lines of the drama: they take comfort in the possibility that some δαίμων will lead him home (1667). Aegisthus speaks from experience: 'I know that men in exile nourish their hopes (ἐλπίδας)' (1668). This 297haracterization establishes a parallel not only between Orestes and Aegisthus, but also between Orestes and Clytemnestra, so consistently associated with ἐλπίς throughout the *Agamemnon*. Now, at the opening of

*Libation Bearers*, Clytemnestra is possessed by fear, while a hopeful Orestes illustrates the forecast of Aegisthus, praying at the tomb of his father for the assistance of Chthonic Hermes (1-9).[744] Indeed, until the end of this play, Orestes never admits to present fear, since he is convinced, as Clytemnestra was, that he can live without it.

The key passage comes in the first episode. The Chorus are afraid lest the siblings be overheard (264-6), but Orestes is confident:

> οὗτοι προδώσει Λοξίου μεγασθενὴς
> χρησμὸς κελεύων τόνδε κίνδυνον περᾶν
> κἀξορθιάζων πολλά, καὶ δυσχειμέρους
> ἄτας ὑφ' ἧπαρ θερμὸν ἐξαυδώμενος,
> εἰ μὴ μέτειμι τοῦ πατρὸς τοὺς αἰτίους
> τρόπον τὸν αὐτόν, ἀνταποκτεῖναι λέγων. (269-74).

In these lines, there is a clear opposition between the security afforded by Apollo if Orestes fulfils the god's instructions, and the terrifying sufferings that will follow on their non-fulfilment. Warmth, in Greek physiology, is correlated with courage; cold, with fear: 'the whole phrase [i.e. 271-2] refers to the terror inspired by the prospect of the punishments rather than their effect, which will be described very fully in the following lines' (Brown). Orestes is apparently moved by this prospective terror, but at the same time proceeds without anxiety: he has no fear either of being overheard or of being punished for the matricide.

[744] For the opening atmosphere ('hope, but not without foreboding'), see Garvie (1988: 46).

Thus fear is set at one remove from the action: Orestes treats the emotion as an experience that can itself be averted or excluded by following the correct course. In his view, it is not himself, the virtuous avenger, but the *non-avenger* who suffers from fear. Apollo has warned him of the 'assaults of the Erinyes' (προσβολὰς Ἐρινύων, 283), whose 'dark weapon' is φόβος itself:

> τὸ γὰρ σκοτεινὸν τῶν ἐνερτέρων βέλος
> ἐκ προστροπαίων ἐν γένει πεπτωκότων,
> καὶ λύσσα καὶ μάταιος ἐκ νυκτῶν φόβος,
> κινεῖ, ταράσσει, καὶ διωκάθει πόλεως. (286-89)[745]

This partially personified *phobos* is obviously akin to that which roused Clytemnestra from her sleep at the beginning of the play; it is the fear of the guilty, rather than the innocent. Moreover, it is presented as anti-civic: rather than securing the *polis*, as in the *Eumenides*, this wild φόβος renders the guilty man *apolis*, forbidden from the mixing-bowl, and bereft of friends and honour (291, 295); indeed, Orestes characterises it as μάταιος (288; cf. *Ag.* 165, 985-6): whether he means object of the φόβος is 'unreal' (Garvie) or that the nightmares carry no 'physical harm' (Brown), the fear is condemned. Indeed, despite his initial suggestion of a chilled heart, Orestes distances himself from such fearful motivation at the end of his speech. First, he doubts the veracity of the oracular horrors, then declares the deed must be done in any case, because 'many motives converge together' (297-9). Orestes then lists these ἵμεροι: he is driven, he says, by 'the god's commands' (θεοῦ … ἐφετμαί), grief for his father, desire to reclaim his possessions, and the liberation of the Argive citizens (300-4). Fear is nowhere to be seen.

[745] Garvie, followed by Brown, emphasizes *ad* 288 that 'the first καί introduces the apposition to βέλος (see Denniston, *GP*, 291), which takes the form of madness and fear. … It is best to put a comma after φόβος, so that βέλος is the real subject of the singular verbs [of 289]'. I print his text here, identical with Brown's, including διωκάθει (Porson) for the MS διώκεσθαι in 289.

This marginalisation of fear is as unsustainable for Orestes as it is for Clytemnestra. In the final scene of the *Libation Bearers*, he is overcome by the very Erinyes-driven madness and terror that he sought to escape: his 'wits' are 'out of control', and 'Fear (φόβος), next to the heart, is ready to sing and dance in accompaniment to Wrath' (1023-5). This fear provokes ταραγμός (1056), and will drive him from the city (1062, cf. 289). Now it is the Chorus' turn to discount the emotion: as Orestes recoils from the Erinyes he perceives, they tell him not to be afraid (μὴ φοβοῦ) of such 'visions' (δόξαι) (1051-2). They treat his φόβος as μάταιος. Orestes' response – that these Erinyes are *not* visions (1053) – is vindicated by the Erinyes-chorus in the following play, where φόβος is proved the opposite of μάταιος.

But even before this guilty madness descends on Orestes, fear has forced its way back into his psychological landscape. On the brink of matricide, Orestes will hesitate, checked by his mother's invocation of αἰδώς: 'Stop, my son, and have respect (αἴδεσαι), my child, for this breast …' (896). Orestes turns the problem over to his companion: Πυλάδη, τί δράσω; μητέρ᾽ αἰδεσθῶ κτανεῖν; This is a prospective αἰδώς, describing an attitude towards an action not yet committed; like *oknos*, it communicates a kind of fearful inhibition.[746] In his brief answer, Pylades does not dismiss Orestes' anxiety, but recalls another, more compelling threat:

> ποῦ δαὶ τὸ λοιπὸν Λοξίου μαντεύματα
> τὰ πυθόχρηστα, πιστά τ᾽ εὐορκώματα;

[746] Attaching an infinitive, Orestes converts the 'embarrassment' of 665 and 896 into fear. Cf. Cairns (1993: 200-2).

ἅπαντας ἐχθροὺς τῶν θεῶν ἡγοῦ πλέον. (900-2)

Rather than the 'many motives' for the deed enumerated in the earlier episode, Pylades invokes only the first: the gruesome consequences of failure forecast by Apollo's oracle. There is here no duty to avenge, no desire to inherit, no aspiration for Argive liberty – only the forbidding prospect of Apollo and the Erinyes' enmity. At the ethical level, Orestes' deliberation is a contest between the claims of mother/human and father/god; at the emotional level, it is a 'judgment' (κρίνω, 903) between two fears.[747] The dramatic elision of other motives is made explicit by Orestes himself in the final episode, when he gives a second account of his actions: 'as my prime inducement to this daring deed, I name Loxias, the prophet god of Pytho' (καὶ φίλτρα τόλμης τῆσδε πλειστηρίζομαι | τὸν πυθόμαντιν Λοξίαν, 1029-30). It is not the 'god's commands' (300) that Orestes refers to now, but his promises and threats: 'the oracle that told me that if I did it I would be free from guilt and blame, but if I failed to — I shall not speak of the punishment' (1030-2). Thus, as the play progresses, other motives shrink away: in the final reckoning, it is fear that moves the action, and fear that follows inevitably from it.[748]

Electra and the Chorus: Fear vs Reverence?

As in the *Agamemnon*, the parodos plays a crucial role in shaping the fear-discourse of the play. It is here that the atmosphere of tyranny, which critics emphasize, is established.

[747] Compare Pelasgus in the *Suppliants* who, interestingly, uses the same image of the impossible bowshot (477) to illustrate his calculations as Orestes does in *Cho.* 1033.
[748] In the *Eumenides*, Athena's first reaction to hearing of the matricide is to suggest a fearful motive (ἆρ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἤ τινος τρέων κότον;, 426); in his defence-speech, Orestes describes the murder as requital for his father's (464) but concludes by recalling, once more, the ἄλγη threatened by Apollo, which acted as ἀντίκεντρα καρδίᾳ (466).

The Chorus, after reporting Clytemnestra's nightmare, declare themselves afraid to speak (φοβοῦ- | μαι δ' ἔπος τόδ' ἐκβαλεῖν, 46-7), before mourning the death of Agamemnon (51-4).[749] The same verb, φοβέομαι, is taken up in the same place in the antistrophe:

> σέβας δ' ἄμαχον ἀδάματον ἀπόλεμον τὸ πρὶν
> δι' ὤτων φρενός τε δαμίας περαῖνον
> νῦν ἀφίσταται. φοβεῖ-
> ται δε τις. (55-8)

The Chorus seem to lament an emotional regime-change: as the beloved monarchy has been displaced by tyranny, σέβας has been exchanged for φόβος. The location of both emotions is ambiguous: σέβας may describe either the object or experience of reverence; τις may indicate Clytemnestra, whom the Chorus fear to name (Garvie), or function as a generic third-person pronoun – 'Men are afraid' (Brown).[750] Schein, linking these lines to the reported nightmare, suggests that Clytemnestra's fear is 'contagious', and that τις implies a 'generalized affect'.[751] The rebellious Electra must dislodge such fear in order to gain the counsel of the Chorus: 'Don't hide your thoughts within your heart for fear (φόβῳ) of anyone' (102, tr. Sommerstein). Fittingly, αἰδώς, a near-synonym of σέβας, is the feeling that overcomes their φόβος: it is because they revere (αἰδουμένη) Agamemnon's tomb that they are willing to speak (106-7, cf. ἠδέσω, 108). There seems thus to be a neat distinction, then, between the 'stark fear' that attaches to Clytemnestra

[749] Gruber (2009: 388-91) observes a 'dreifacher φόβος' at work in this parodos: the Chorus are dispatched by a fearful Clytemnestra (32-7); 'people are afraid' of Clytemnestra (57-8); and they are afraid to speak ἔπος τόδ' (46-7).
[750] See LSJ s.v. τίς II.3 ('a definite person, whom one wishes to avoid naming') and 4 ('indefinitely, where we say *they*'). For the latter, compare the usage of the French pronoun *on.*
[751] (2018: 93). Cf. Lloyd-Jones' translation: 'fear is rife'.

and her rule, and the reverence that characterizes Agamemnon, his rule, and those loyal to him.[752]

A contrast between an honourable σέβας and a debilitating φόβος suits the transformation narrative. Thus de Romilly describes the φόβος of lines 55-9 as 'la mauvaise crainte' which 'ne s'accompagne pas de respect'; she contrasts the Erinyes' song (*Eum*. 516-25) and Athena's *thesmos* (681-710), where fear and respect are reconciled, allowing for the emergence of 'la bonne crainte'.[753] Sommerstein, commenting on Athena's σέβας … φόβος τε ξυγγενής (690-1), recalls that 'in *Ch.* 45-9 [*sic*] these were viewed as opposed to one another, but in a well-ordered society the ruling power must inspire both'. There is, however, no explicit 'opposition' of σέβας and φόβος in the *Libation Bearers* passage, beyond the ambiguous δέ. This particle is best read as an adversative (respect is gone, *but* people are [still] afraid): the sentence then suggests, in line with conventional Greek thought, that respect and fear normally go together;[754] the situation remarked upon is their separation, the *survival* of fear without respect. Nor, indeed, is there anything really 'mauvaise' about this 'crainte'. In fact, the following lines (59-65) establish a relationship – albeit an obscure one – between fear, success, and justice that seems consistent with the relationship outlined in the *Agamemnon* and the *Eumenides* and discussed earlier in this chapter.[755] The fear of the forerunning lines, meanwhile, is more pious than pernicious: a

[752] Conacher (1987: 104). The Chorus address their Agamemnon as an embodiment of σέβας (157), and Electra seems especially keen on it (122, 141, 243), while avoiding φόβος, δέος, and τάρβος, altogether. This distribution of reverence is prepared for in the *Agamemnon* (779-80, 785, 833, 1612). Cf. Cairns (1993: 207) on these passages: '*Sebas*, therefore, is not simply fear of the powerful, but encompasses admiration of authority which one regards as legitimate'.

[753] De Romilly (1958: 110, 114).

[754] For the *topos*, see Pl. *Euthphr.* 12a-b, ἵνα γὰρ δέος ἔνθα καὶ αἰδώς, discussed in my introduction p.73 and in Chapter One, p.95.

[755] τὸ δ' εὐτυχεῖν, | τόδ' ἐν βροτοῖς θεός τε καὶ θεοῦ πλέον· | ῥοπὰ δ' ἐπισκοπεῖ Δίκας | ταχεῖα τοὺς μὲν ἐν φάει, | τὰ δ' ἐν μεταιχμίῳ σκότου | μένει χρονίζοντας ἄχη, | τοὺς δ' ἄκρατος ἔχει νύξ (59-65). For the text and meaning of these lines, see Garvie.

reverential, self-censoring φόβος prevents the Chorus from rehearsing Clytemnestra' unholy prayers (46-7). Electra will be similarly restrained from impiety by a lack of θάρσος (91). It is a different φόβος – a fear of the tyrants themselves – that Electra exhorts the Chorus to leave aside at 102.

Indeed, it is only this fear that the Chorus do leave aside. Soon afterwards, when Electra mentions 'something new', the Chorus begs her to speak, since their 'heart is leaping with fear' (ὀρχεῖται δὲ καρδία φόβῳ, 167). In the *kommos*, as Orestes laments the fall of his house, the Chorus' 'heart shakes' as they 'lose hope' (πέπαλται … κῆρ… δύσελπις, 410-2); when he and Electra invoke a just resolution (Δίκαι Δίκα, 461; ἐνδίκως, 462), the Chorus sing of a 'tremor (τρόμος) stealing over [them]' (463). Fear is the emotion with which the Chorus anticipate any future event, whether good, bad, or ambiguous.[756] As in the parodos, it is neither incompatible with reverence, nor 'mauvaise'.

But is it 'good', as in the *Eumenides*? There is no suggestion so far as to the culture and cultivation of fear. For this, we must look to the first stasimon.

The First Stasimon: Narrative Ecology

As noted earlier, the first stasimon of *Libation Bearers* (585-652) is structurally, metrically, and thematically linked to the third stasimon of *Agamemnon* and the second of *Eumenides*. At the midpoint of the drama, with Orestes and Pylades onstage and awaiting

[756] Electra, on discovery of Orestes' lock, is similarly overwhelmed by fear-like symptoms (183-4, 211). For the blurring of fear and hope in Aeschylus, see De Romilly (1958: 14-15).

the crisis of the play, the Chorus break into an iambo-trochaic meditation on the nature and variety of the fearful:

> πολλὰ μὲν γᾶ τρέφει
> δεινὰ δειμάτων ἄχη. (585-6)

The song proceeds first to list some natural δεινά, which are capped by the pride of men and the passions of women; the latter are held responsible for the overthrow of wedded households. This priamel, which occupies the opening pair of strophes (585-602), is followed in the next two strophic pairs (613-38) by a second priamel, comprising a catalogue of mythical women who are led by passion to cause the death of men in their own family.[757] Thus Althaea plots the death of her son, Scylla cuts from her father his lock of immortality, and an unnamed woman, in a 'hateful marriage', 'plots against a husband bearing arms' (624-7 – the text is corrupt); 'among wrongs', however, 'the Lemnian one is pre-eminent' (631). This second cap is linked back to the theme of the ode: 'men have likened any later horror (δεινόν) to the woes of Lemnos' (633-4). The final strophe describes the pain produced by such horrifying injustice as a sword (ξίφος) penetrating 'close to the lungs', (639-40); in the antistrophe, a second weapon is prepared by 'the swordsmith (φασγανουργός) Destiny' as the Erinys 'imports a child into the house to pay at last for the stain of older deeds of blood' (647-52).

Commentators on this ode have generally worked backwards from its conclusion: the purpose of the song is to prepare the audience for the imminent bloodletting, by reminding us of 'the enormity of [Clytemnestra's] crime', and persuading us 'to accept

[757] For the rhetorical form of priamel, see Race (1982).

Clytemnestra as a fit victim of matricide'.[758] I will argue that the ode has a broader, perhaps even meta-tragic function, establishing the *Oresteia* within a 'narrative ecology'. Certainly the first priamel elevates 'perverse passion' (ἀπέρωτος ἔρως, 600) like that of Clytemnestra and Aegisthus to the height of horror, and the concluding lines of the song frame Orestes' violent retribution in terms of justice and injustice (*Dike*, 641, 646). The central passage of *exempla*, however, is problematic, for two reasons.

The first is relevance. Althaea is not subject to 'perverse passion' in other versions of the myth; even here, she seems more devious than emotional as she burns the log to which Meleager's life is tied (μήσατο, 606; πρόνοιαν, 607-8). An erotic passion of Scylla for her father's enemy, King Minos, is found in later accounts, but here she is 'persuaded by a gold-wrought Cretan necklace' (616-8). Moreover, neither woman kills her husband, as Clytemnestra does, and neither, in the Chorus' account, is punished, as Clytemnestra will be. (Elsewhere, we read of Althaea's suicide and Scylla's transformation into a sea-bird.) The third parallel – the Lemnian women – makes for a closer crime-and-punishment analogy. Still, it is a stretch: both the motive of the women and the bloody act itself are passed over by the Chorus; other sources have them moved by jealousy rather than desire. Moreover, the Lemnians survive unpunished to mix merrily with the Argonauts, even if their descendants – so the Chorus assure us – are god-hated and dishonoured (634-5).[759]

The second problem with the *exempla* is the order in which they are presented. The normal function of the priamel is to highlight the final, climactic, term. In this case,

[758] Brown *ad* 585-652; Conacher (1984: 115). Marshall (2017: 83) suggests that 'it is a profound, reflective song that focuses the chorus *completely* on the thoughts of Orestes and his revenge' (my emphasis).
[759] Cf. Holtsmark (1966: 216).

Althaea and Scylla are followed by the unnamed woman plotting against her husband, whom most editors assume to be Clytemnestra; this strophe ends with a preference for an 'unheated domestic hearth' (629), which must hark back to the house-destroying female ἔρως (599-602) that is supposed to unite the *exempla*. Yet this is *not* the climactic term: the antistrophe that follows emphatically presents the Lemnian wrong as 'pre-eminent' (πρεσβεύεται, 631). If the point of this ode is to illustrate the magnitude of Clytemnestra's crime, as most assume, it seems strange to invoke a larger one.

The first problem – of relevance – is the more easily solved. ἔρως must be broadly understood to include non-sexual passions, such as the anger of Althaea at her brother's death, or Scylla's acquisitive desire for the necklace, or the Lemnians' jealousy.[760] More significantly, the resonance of these allusions should not be limited to Clytemnestra's passion-inspired killing of Agamemnon. Althaea's murder of her child recalls Agamemnon's own sacrifice of Iphigeneia, while Scylla's betrayal of her parent foreshadows Orestes' murder of his mother.[761] In each case, the gender of the agent and victim is reversed, so that the female is made the villain. There is thus a 'triplicate reference', as Lebeck puts it, with Clytemnestra's crime folded into those of her victim and of her killer.[762] The absence (or belatedness) of punishment in the *exempla*, meanwhile, is only problematic if one reckons the rhetorical purpose of the ode to be the justification of Orestes' retribution. In fact, as we saw above, the Chorus are primarily concerned with the definition of τὸ δεινόν:[763] once female passion is established as the foremost category of the horrible, we are treated to a secondary specification – which

[760] So Garvie, with parallels.
[761] Note that the language of nurturing in the first strophe (τρέφει, ἀγκάλαι, 586-7) recalls Clytemnestra's snake-dream (θρεπτήριον, ἔθρεψεν, 545-8); if the snake is Orestes, then he too is one of the horrors.
[762] (1967: 183).
[763] As observed by Race (1982: 89-90).

horror is pre-eminent in this pre-eminent category? After two parent-betrayals (Althaea, Scylla) are considered, Clytemnestra's mariticide is introduced in the third strophe; finally, in the antistrophe, the Lemnian crime is selected by the Chorus as the most horrible of all.

This brings us to the problem of order. Why is Clytemnestra's crime – which the whole song was supposed to explore – reduced to the status of a foil, merely paving the rhetorical way for the Lemnian climax? A number of scholars, following Preuss, have taken the drastic step of inverting strophe (623-30) and antistrophe (631-8), in order to restore the conventional order of *illustrantia* and *illustrandum*. With this alteration, the Lemnian women emerge immediately after Althaea and Scylla as the pre-eminent δεινόν. It is then – against the backdrop of these 'justly gathered' (638) stories – that Clytemnestra is reintroduced in 623.[764]

The scale of this transposition, however, would be almost unparalleled in the manuscripts of Aeschylus,[765] and, as Brown points out, misses the essential problem – that the Lemnian crime is explicitly pre-eminent (πρεσβεύεται), while Clytemnestra's is presented as a casual illustration:

> ἐπεὶ δ' ἐπεμνησάμαν ἀμειλίχων
> πόνων, ἄκαιρ' οὐδὲ[766] δυσφιλὲς γαμή-

[764] Transposition, accepted by Sommerstein, is argued for by Stinton (1979); see also Conacher (1987: 116-8), Dawe (1999: 25-8), and Marshall (2017: 85). For counter-arguments, see Holtsmark (1966), Lebeck (1967), West (1990: 249-50), and Brown *ad* 631-7. Lloyd-Jones, Garvie, and Collard also keep the MS order.
[765] The only widely accepted, large-scale transposition is *Pers*. 93-101/102-110; cf. the smaller correction required at *Supp*. 88-90/93-5.
[766] I print here Stinton's emendation, approved by West and Sommerstein, for the MS ἀκαίρως δὲ.

λευμ' ἀπεύχετον δόμοις. (623-5)

They sing as if it is the mythical exempla that call to mind Clytemnestra's crime, rather than the other way around. In this paradigmatic reversal, the murder of Agamemnon is not the exceptional, climactic case, 'set against' the others (Brown). Instead, it is an illustration set *among* other passionate female horrors. Indeed, just as the invocations of Althaea and Scylla map Clytemnestra's bloody deed onto those of Agamemnon and Orestes, the unusual sequence of this priamel 'places [her] offence (which itself has passed into paradigm) within the larger frame of the Rule of Women'.[767] Clytemnestra's crime and punishment remain the dramatic focus of the ode, but the mythical rhetoric of its central strophes integrates this δεινόν within a network of bloody δεινά, extending through and beyond the trilogy.

It is at this point that I wish to invoke the idea of 'narrative ecology'. This is a concept recently developed in social psychology to describe 'the stories that are available to a person as he or she develops, the stories that form each person's particular narrative landscape'.[768] The Greeks, like us, lived in a world of stories, shaping personal and social development in the same way that geography and climate do.[769] 'Ecology' is preferred to 'environment' because of the dynamic relation between component parts – between personal, familial, and cultural stories, master-narratives and counter-narratives – as individuals develop. New experiences and emergent narratives are aligned with, or

[767] Zeitlin (1978: 155). Cf. Rosenmeyer (1982: 160-2): 'the Clytemnestra segment itself becomes one of the illustrations from the past … [T]he confluence of past and present makes for an even greater horror.'
[768] McLean (2016: 5).
[769] Socrates makes a similar analogy between the cultural and natural environment in Pl. *Resp*. III.401b-c (cf. VI.491d-92a, X.606d and *Leg.* VI.765e) on which see Ford (2002: 209-226). Socrates suggests, however, that evil models, like Clytemnestra, are like poisonous herbs, and that the guardians should live in a purified environment, guided insensibly by the breezes emanating from works of beauty. A different, more Aeschylean, view is suggested by the promotion of exposure therapy in *Laws* I.648c-49e, and of course by the *katharsis* of Aristotle's *Poetics*, discussed in Chapter Two.

opposed to, the narratives that we receive from others, narratives which are themselves continuously evolving, inflected by the narratives and experiences of individuals.[770]

Applying this theory to the *Libation Bearers* stasimon, we see the horror of Agamemnon's murder situated both within the narrative ecology of the *Oresteia* trilogy, and also within a larger mythic ecology, embracing Althaea, Scylla, and the Lemnian women. In fact, throughout the ode, there is a focus on the communication and cognition of narrative. After the initial challenge – 'who could *speak* (τίς λέγοι) of … men's pride and … women's passions?' (594-7) – each strophe of exemplification begins with a reference to the reception of myth (ἴστω, 603; ἐν λόγοις στυγεῖν, 613; ἐπεμνησάμαν, 623; πρεσβεύεται …λόγῳ, 631). In the climactic, final case, the Chorus even make the process of narrative integration explicit: all new horrors, they say, are compared (ἤικασεν) with that of Lemnos (633-4). Their conclusion adds a new, moral element to this cultural process: 'Which of these stories have I gathered unjustly? (οὐκ ἐνδίκως)' (638). This compositional 'justice' prepares the way final part of the song, where the present infraction of justice is punished in time by the 'renowned' (κλυτά, 650) Erinys. Thus, as the horror of Orestes' retribution takes its place in the system of legend, Aeschylus draws the audience's attention to the functioning of that system, illustrating the ways in which the mythical past can be used to illuminate a present crisis. The meta-poetic implications are both manifest and manifold.[771]

[770] For a typology of narrative ecologies (including 'temperate zones', 'deserts', 'jungles', and even 'allotments'), see Gabriel (2016).
[771] See Grethlein (2013: 89-92) and *passim*.

In the concept of 'narrative ecology', the natural world serves as an analogy to the cultural one; one might speak instead of a dynamic 'network' or 'complex'. The *Libation Bearers* ode, however, gives us reason to prefer the ecological model: in the opening strophes, the Chorus themselves connect the world of stories with the world of elements and organisms. They begin, as we saw above, with a statement of the variety of earthly horror:

> πολλὰ μὲν γᾶ τρέφει
> δεινὰ δειμάτων ἄχη,
> πόντιαί τ᾽ ἀγκάλαι
> κνωδάλων ἀνταίων
> βρύουσι· βλάπτουσι καὶ πεδαίχμιοι
> λαμπάδες πεδάοροι
> πτανά τε καὶ πεδοβάμονα· κἀνεμόεντ᾽ ἂν
> αἰγίδων φράσαις κότον. (585-92)[772]

The Chorus enumerate the horrors of land, sea, and sky: monsters, shooting stars, whirlwinds.[773] Scholars have noted the inclusion of all four Empedoclean elements (earth, water, wind, and fire), but one might also observe the combination in this priamel of animate, inanimate, and divine[774] horrors. When, in the antistrophe, human horrors are introduced, an opposition is suggested by ἀλλ' (594, '… but who can describe the audacious pride of man?).[775] By the end of the antistrophe, however, the human and animal worlds are united once again: 'conjugal households' are 'conquered by the

[772] There are several minor textual uncertainties in 587-92; I print Sommerstein's text.
[773] There may be reference to Hes. *Op.* 101; cf. *Pers.* 707-8, πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐκ θαλάσσης, πολλὰ δ' ἐκ χέρσου κακὰ | γίγνεται θνητοῖς.
[774] As well as the sky-lights, which might include Zeus' lightning, the whirlwinds are called αἰγίδες – LSJ offer '*rushing storm, hurricane*, terrible as the shaken aegis'.
[775] Garvie, against Denniston, suggests this ἀλλ' is the answer to the μέν in 585.

reckless passion that overpowers the female, both among beasts and among men (κνωδάλων τε καὶ βροτῶν)' (599-601; cf. 588). Although the examples that follow are focused on human women, Althaea's δαλός, a wooden torch that is 'coeval' (ἥλικ') with her son (608), embodies the interdependence of human life and the natural world; Scylla, meanwhile, is described as 'dog-hearted' (κυνόφρων) – a common blurring of human female and animal life.[776] Clytemnestra's crime is therefore connected not only with the horrors of the 'plu-past'[777] – the myths of Althaea, Scylla, and the Lemnian women – and with the other murders of the trilogy. It is also, in this stasimon, implicitly integrated with all the horrors of the cosmos. The murders of the *Oresteia* are established in a cosmological system of δεινά.

Gorgons and Erinyes I: Recognition

After Orestes has led his mother into the house, and Aegisthus, with his brief and rash cameo, has followed, the Chorus sing a second stasimon. While the previous ode had hinted at fear's place in a narrative ecology, here the Chorus call upon divine aid for the extermination of Clytemnestra. Urging Orestes onwards, they tell him to 'set the heart of Perseus in his breast … causing within the house the bloody ruin of the fell Gorgon, and for a fitting death, destroy her utterly' (831-7, tr. Brown).[778] The assimilation of Clytemnestra to a Gorgon resonates with her place in the previous ode's cosmic paradigm

[776] For a discussion of the ethical implications of such bestial misogyny, see Payne (2011: ch. 4) on Semonides fr. 7. The monstrous Scylla of the *Odyssey*, invoked as parallel to Clytemnestra at *Ag*. 1233-4, may not be far away here (Hopman 2012: 258).
[777] Grethlein (2013: 91).
[778] Although the Gorgon of 835 is widely accepted, lines 836-7 remain 'an unsolved problem' (Garvie): see discussion in Garvie, West (1990: 256-7), and Brown, who offers ἐναίσιον δ' | ἐξαπόλλυ <νιν> μόρον.

of horror: Medusa, Perseus' adversary, suggests a comparable mix of fear and revulsion, and her severed head proves useful to Perseus. Indeed, the Gorgon's head, or *gorgoneion*, is said in Homer to have decorated Athena's *aegis*, as well as the shield of Agamemnon; these Gorgon-faces seem to have been popular in Attic pottery, and perhaps attributed with apotropaic power.[779] Yet the Chorus make no allusion to these aspects of the story; they want Orestes to be 'confident' (θαρσῶν, 826), and to 'destroy' or 'exterminate' (ἐξαπόλλυ') the Gorgon, rather than instrumentalize her terror.

The Perseus/Medusa allusion resonates through the second half of the play, and into the *Eumenides*: Orestes must confront and defeat not only his Gorgon-mother, but also the Erinyes that pursue him after her death. These 'hideous women', too, are 'like Gorgons', Orestes says, 'dark-clothed and thickly twined about with snakes' (1048-50).[780] At the beginning of the next play, the Pythia, terrified by the Erinyes-chorus gathered in the shrine (ᾗ δεινὰ λέξαι, δεινὰ δ' ὀφθαλμοῖς δρακεῖν, 34; cf. δείσασα, 38), again highlights their Gorgon-likeness:

> πρόσθεν δὲ τἀνδρὸς τοῦδε θαυμαστὸς λόχος
> εὕδει γυναικῶν ἐν θρόνοισιν ἥμενος.
> οὔτοι γυναῖκας ἀλλὰ Γοργόνας λέγω·
> οὐδ' αὖτε Γοργείοισιν εἰκάσω τύποις.
> εἶδόν ποτ' ἤδη Φινέως γεγραμμένας[781]
> δεῖπνον φερούσας· ἄπτεροί γε μὴν ἰδεῖν

[779] Cf. *Il*. 5.741, 11.25-7. For the apotropaic power of the *gorgoneion*, and its relevance to the *Eumenides*, see Belfiore (1992; ch. 1), discussed in my introduction.
[780] I translate West's emendation, σμοιαί, for MS δμωαί, in 1048 (cf. Lobel: δμοιαί). Frontisi-Ducroux (2007: 169) suggests a double meaning in Γοργόνων δίκην – 'like Gorgons' but also 'Gorgon justice'.
[781] Page, following Wakefield, suggests a lacuna between 49 and 50, but this is rejected by Podlecki, Sommerstein, and West.

αὗται μέλαιναί τ', ἐς τὸ πᾶν βδελύκτροποι,

ῥέγκουσι δ' οὐ πλατοῖσι φυσιάμασιν,

ἐκ δ' ὀμμάτων λείβουσι δυσφιλῆ λίβα. (46-54)

The Erinyes – still unnamed as such, and unseen – are Gorgons *sous rature*; the identity is established and denied in the same breath.

This conceit of (mis)recognition can be read in two ways. The first aligns with the general pattern of the *Oresteia*, in which the beneficent potential of fear is continuously suggested but never affirmed; like the Erinyes themselves, it is dismissed until finally acknowledged by Athena. Thus here the terrifying band are first assimilated to Gorgons, whose image is associated with Athena and attributed an apotropaic role at the symposium or the feast. As Belfiore and Bacon have variously suggested, the Gorgon-myth offers an analogue for the ethical ambiguity of the Erinyes; Athena may even sport a *gorgoneion* when she arrives on stage, 'flapping the folds of her *aegis*' (404).[782] In the Pythia's prologue, however, the Gorgons are immediately displaced by Harpies, destroyers rather than protectors of the feast, who enjoy no happy connection with Athena. Indeed, Greek myth gives the Harpies no redeeming qualities: they must be chased away from the house of Phineus by the Boreades, and pursued to the edges of the earth; the version presented by Aeschylus, in his lost *Phineus*, has them put to death.[783] The Pythia, for her part, has no doubt that these Harpy-creatures need to be excluded

[782] So Sommerstein *ad loc.* The display of the snake-tressed *aegis*, as Rynearson (2013: 16-17) points out, would offer a proleptic 'visual kinship' between Athena and the Gorgon-like Erinyes, who are presumably wearing snake-tressed masks: 'Athena … [is] a model for the Erinyes, since she deploys the power of fear, emblematized by the aegis, in order to protect favored mortals … as well as to support the cosmic order defined by her father's rule.'

[783] The story is narrated at length in Apollonius' *Argonautica* II.178-499; cf. Hes. frr.150-156 M-W, Apollod. I.2.6. Aeschylus' *Phineus* (frr. 258-259) was part of the *Persians* tetralogy of 472; Philodemus *On Piety* (pp. 16.14–18.7 Gomperz) indicates that it ended with the slaughter of the Harpies.

from the shrine: they are revolting in their appearance, their exhalations, and their secretions (βδελύκτροποι; οὐ πλατοῖσι φυσιάμασιν; δυσφιλῆ λίβα); their attire is not 'right' (δίκαιος) for temples or homes (55-6).

The Pythia, accordingly, looks to Apollo to purify the scene (καθάρσιος, 63), and the god does not disappoint. First, in the prologue, he confirms her judgments, describing to Orestes a group of 'savage … abominable (κατάπτυστοι) maidens, … with whom no god or man or beast consorts' (67-70); these 'objects of hatred' (μισήματ'), he says, are 'born for evil', and 'have their home (νέμονται) in the dark of Tartarus, below the earth' (72-3). After the parodos, he addresses them directly, and his first word ἔξω, well expresses his intent. His speech, which begins and ends with exhortations to depart (χωρεῖτ', ἀπαλλάσσεσθε, 180; χωρεῖτ', 196), expands upon his earlier revulsion with a stream of threats and abuse. Like his priestess, he emphasises that they are unfit not only for the Delphic shrine (185, cf. 207), but for 'the whole civilized Greek world; their proper place is among the cruel executions, tortures and mutilations [cf. 186-9] practised by the 'barbarians''[784]. They are ἀπόπτυστοι to the gods as well (191), and should live as lions in a cave, or as goats (193-5). In the dialogue that follows, Apollo refuses to acknowledge the 'privileges' of the Erinyes, the τιμαί that they claim as their right (207, 227-8); indeed, like the Pythia, he does not give them any name at all.[785] Thus recognition and accommodation are denied together.

[784] Sommerstein *ad loc*.
[785] Clytemnestra's ghost also neglects to address the Erinyes by any name, or to speak of their parentage, calling them, like Apollo, 'goddesses of the nether world' (ὦ κατὰ χθονὸς θεαί, 115). This makes Athena's respectful questions all the more striking.

This hostile misrecognition and expulsion of the Erinyes from Delphi must be contrasted with the polite acknowledgment and reception that they receive at Athens. Athena observes that they are 'visitors to the land' (καινὴν … τήνδ' ὁμιλίαν χθονός, 406), and wonders at their appearance (407), but without the fear of the Pythia or the hostility of Apollo; she simply asks who they are (τίνες ποτ' ἐστέ, 408). The Erinyes respond, equally simply, with their parentage, (one of) their names, and their place of abode: 'We are children of eternal Night, and are called "Curses", in our homes beneath the earth' (ἡμεῖς γάρ ἐσμεν Νυκτὸς αἰανῆς τέκνα, | Ἀραὶ δ' ἐν οἴκοις γῆς ὑπαὶ κεκλήμεθα, 416-7). After Athena affirms their 'lineage and the names by which they are called' (γένος μὲν οἶδα κληδόνας τ' ἐπωνύμους, 418),[786] they offer to tell her their τιμαί (419); Athena declares herself 'ready to learn, if someone gives a clear account' (μάθοιμ' ἄν, εἰ λέγοι τις ἐμφανῆ λόγον, 420). The account that follows is clear enough – 'We drive murderers from their homes … [to] the place where there is no joy' (421, 423) – and, importantly, Athena does not dispute it.

Indeed, she does what she promises, and *learns* it. After the trial, she is at pains to affirm the survival of their τιμή: they are not dishonoured, she says (796, 824); they will receive new honours from the Athenians (807, 833, 854, 868). However, it is only when Athena alludes to their continued right to punish (895) that the Erinyes begin to be assuaged; it is only after she confirms their role as destroyers of the impious (τῶν δυσσεβούντων δ' ἐκφορωτέρα πέλοις, 910) that they accept her invitation (916). Even as the Chorus sing of promised benefits to the Athenians, Athena emphasises the confusion and destruction of their victims (931-7), and their distribution of unhappiness as well as happiness (950-5),

[786] On the significance of such κληδόνες in the *Oresteia*, see Peradotto (1969) and Prins (1991).

in language that recalls the Erinyes' earlier accounts of their office. It is this capacity for harm that she promotes as their chief contribution to the *polis*. In addition, Athena finds them a home under the earth, to match the one they claimed at 417; and in the closing monody, sung by Athena's attendants, the Erinyes are identified again as children of Night (1034).[787]

This recognition – and reaffirmation – of the Erinyes' home, parentage, and τιμή is preceded, of course, by the integration of their fear-discourse into the Athenian *polis*. As noted above, Athena's *thesmos*-speech borrows much of its emotional rhetoric from the second stasimon of the play. This chapter began with a juxtaposition of their two doctrines of fear; I cast doubt on some attempts to distinguish between them, emphasising that the overwhelming impression, to a theatre audience, would be one of identity between the passages. Yet even though the doctrine remains the same, the context is utterly transformed. The Erinyes sing in a dramatic space occupied only by themselves and by Orestes, and their moral psychology is focused on the individual mortal, the individual moral agent; the *polis*, where introduced, is analogous to this singular person: 'But what man, or what city likewise (ἢ βροτὸς πόλις θ' ὁμοί- | ως), if they did not nourish their heart in fear, would still revere justice?' (522-5). Their public exhortations, too, are in the singular (αἰνέσῃς, 529; σοι 538; ἀτίσῃς, 542). Athena, by contrast, addresses a stage packed with jurors and attendants; accordingly, she largely uses plural verbs, even in conjunction with singular vocatives (κλύοιτ'… λεώς, 681; cf. ἀκούετε, πόλεως φρούριον …;, 948-9). Most significantly, she fills the gap implied by Erinyes' 'what man or what city', by centering a new, plural agent: the ἀστοί (691, 693, 708) /

[787] For the accommodation of Erinyes, see pp.292-3 above.

πολῖται (693). Where before the *polis* was personified, as a mortal in need of fear's cultivation, now the personal is politicized, and mortals (βροτῶν, 699) become citizens. The political recognition of the Erinyes is thus accompanied by a political recognition of fear – not as the experience of an individual, but as a civic and collective attitude to the court, and to one another.[788]

## Gorgons and Erinyes II: Fear and Figuration

Earlier in this chapter, I observed the extraordinary emphasis upon the 'seat' or 'settlement' of the Erinyes in this final scene of the trilogy, suggesting that this should be seen in 'ecological' terms.[789] Later, I argued that the first stasimon should be understood as articulating a 'narrative ecology' in which the horrors of the *Oresteia* could find their place. I now wish to bring these ideas together, and explore the meta-tragic potential of the establishment of the Erinyes at the end of the trilogy. Oliver Taplin and Peter Wilson long ago argued that the trilogy's treatment of song and chorus offered an aetiology for the tragic genre: they observed that the Erinyes' blessings are couched in musical terms; that the Erinyes seem to have become metonymic for tragedy in later classical art and comedy; and that their 'fearsome faces' (τῶν φοβερῶν τῶνδε προσώπων, 990) at the end of the *Eumenides* may allude to tragic masks, and to the benefit derived from fear by the audience of tragedy.[790] Similar arguments had already been made by Elizabeth Belfiore,

[788] On the subjective/objective ambiguity of ἀστῶν φόβος (691) see Sommerstein *ad loc*.
[789] See pp.292-3 above.
[790] Taplin/Wilson (1993: 175-7).

who drew an analogy between tragedy and the *gorgoneion* at the feast, and by Ruth Padel, who suggests that tragedy was in fact 'the place where fear is good'.[791]

None of these, however, relate the Erinyes' presentation back to the first stasimon of *Libation Bearers*, with its cosmological exploration of τὸ δεινόν. This song enables a different understanding of the Pythia's bewilderment, and of the *Eumenides* as a whole, which emerges as a drama of representation or figuration, as much as one of recognition.[792]

The *Libation Bearers* stasimon, we saw, proceeded from gnomic statement to mythical exemplification, drawing the crimes of the *Oresteia* into a network of other horrors, human and non-human, a network that is crowned by the Lemnian evil, to which any other *deinon* is 'compared' (ᾔκασεν , 633). Such systematic 'gathering' of stories was claimed to be 'just' (639). Now, at the beginning of the *Eumenides*, the Pythia makes a similar attempt at analogy, as she tries to describe the Erinyes she has seen concealed within the shrine. They provoke a crisis of representation, as 'terrible to speak of' as they are 'terrible to look upon' (δεινὰ λέξαι, δεινὰ δ' ὀφθαλμοῖς δρακεῖν, 34). In the passage that follows, quoted above, the Pythia cycles through some categories, human and nonhuman. Women give way to Gorgons, who give way to Harpies, from whom the Erinyes are immediately distinguished as being black, and unwinged, and 'utterly nauseating'; the Pythia cannot identify the 'tribe' (φῦλον, 57) from which they come. This failure of recognition is also a failure of representation, and not only because the

[791] Belfiore (1992: ch. 1); Padel (1992: 189-92).
[792] Cf. Prins (1991); Frontisi-Ducroux (2007).

Pythia is describing something offstage. Just as the *Libation Bearers* ode had stressed the transmission and reception of λόγοι, so here the Pythia draws attention first to her speech (λέγω, 48, cf. λέξαι, 34), then to a process of comparison (εἰκάσω, 49), and mimetic figuration (τύποις, 49; γεγραμμένας, 50). The Pythia attempts to integrate the Erinyes into a mediated tradition, by comparing them with similar figures, just as the *Libation Bearers* chorus did with Clytemnestra. In this passage, however, the integration fails; the sequence ends not in grim resolution, but in aporia.

The crisis of representation is left unsolved by Apollo, who resorts to deictic reference and paradox as he describes the (perhaps still concealed)[793] Erinyes to Orestes: 'you see these mad [ones] taken captive', he says, 'these abominable gold maidens, these aged virgins' (67-9); for him as for his priestess, they are defined by separation and negation rather than analogy (69-70). Athena, too, is initially bewildered, unable to conjure a comparison that might represent this strange company, 'similar (ὁμοῖαι) to no race of begotten beings, neither seen by the gods among the goddesses, nor resembling (ἐμφερεῖς) the forms of mortals' (410-12).[794] As observed above, Athena distinguishes herself from the Pythia and Apollo by asking and 'learning' the self-identity of the Erinyes. By the end of the play, however, she *has* found an analogue for these creatures. The assimilation is gradual, and implicit, at least until the final lines of the play: first 'gleaming thrones'; then first fruits and offerings for childbirth and marriage; then a place near the Acropolis; then the blessings of wealth and fertility; then, finally a torchlit

[793] So Taplin (1977: 369-74), Prins (1991), vs e.g. Sommerstein (1989) and Podlecki (1989).
[794] Page: ὑμῖν θ'· ὁμοῖαι δ' οὐδενὶ σπαρτῶν γένει, | οὔτ' ἐν θεαῖσι πρὸς θεῶν ὁρώμεναι, | οὔτ' οὖν βροτείοις ἐμφερεῖς μορφώμασιν· The text is difficult here – see West for discussion.

procession to their homes under the earth (806, 834-6, 855, 903-10, 1003-13). It is widely accepted that all these are allusions to the cult the Athenian cult of the Semnai Theai.

There is no complete identification, however. Although the ancient hypothesis of the play suggests that, after Orestes' acquittal, Athena 'addresses the mollified Erinyes as Eumenides' (τὰς δὲ Ἐρινύας πραΰναςα προσηγόρευσεν Εὐμενίδας),[795] scholars emphasize that the latter name does not appear in our text. The Σεμναὶ θεαί are likewise never explicitly invoked: 1040-2, in the received text, gives only ἵλαοι δὲ καὶ εὐθύφρονες γᾶι | δεῦρ' ἴτε σεμναὶ < > πυριδάπτῳ | λαμπάδι τερπόμεναι καθ' ὁδόν. The Semnai Theai of the Areopagus cult are nowhere else named simply as Semnai, and this has led most editors to accept Hartung's supplement, <θεαὶ>.[796] Yet it may be that Aeschylus wanted to avoid a final, total assimilation, preferring to juxtapose and compare the two sets of goddesses, rather than crudely equate them. As noted above, the Erinyes remain 'children of Night' (1034), a title not otherwise associated with the Semnai Theai. Moreover, as the procession moves off, the Semnai Theai cult is not the only operative allusion; the red cloaks that Athena invokes (1028), are reminiscent of those worn by metics in the Panathenaic procession – nothing to do with the Semnai cult, but very appropriate both to the metic-status of the Erinyes, and to the involvement of Athena; further references to the Panathenaea have been detected in the torches of 1029, and the εὐάνδροισι συμφοραῖς of 1031.[797] And of course there is the mention of πρόσωπα (990), reminding the audience that this is drama, and they are sitting in the Theatre of Dionysus. The procession that concludes the trilogy, then, is no mock-up of the Semnai cult, but instead mixes elements

[795] Cf. the almost identical report in Harpocration s.v. Εὐμενίδες, where the verb is ὠνόμασεν. On both documents, see Brown (1984: 269-72).
[796] So Podlecki, Sommerstein, and West.
[797] See Thomson *ad* 1028-32.

from different festivals. On this reading, the Erinyes are not renamed so much as reframed: the cultic allusions allow these 'fearful faces' to be seen in Attic light, and to be interpreted within the political, religious, and cultural framework of contemporary Athens.

This final, successful figuration of the Erinyes – as Semnai Theai, as metics, and as a tragic chorus – must be understood as the culmination of a pattern that has structured the trilogy. The *Agamemnon* began with a report of φόβος standing beside the Watchman's bed, in place of dreams; the audience heard the Chorus longing for Clytemnestra to heal their μέριμνα. Neither fear had a definite object, nothing to give it form or substance. The third stasimon brought that indeterminacy to the fore: 'what is this fear' the Chorus asked, and why can it not be rejected 'like a hard-to-interpret dream'? The fear sang, unbidden, a Erinys-lament, but it could not be communicated, and the ode ended in disarticulate despair. The φόβος of the *Libation Bearers*, too, expressed itself in dreams, Clytemnestra's midnight shriek echoed in Orestes' 'vain terror of the night'. When φόβος returned at the end of the play, standing 'near to [Orestes'] heart, ready to sing and dance', once more it was inaudible, invisible. Yet in this second play we saw fear move the protagonists: first the offstage Clytemnestra, and then the onstage Orestes, pursued by Erinyes that we perceive indirectly, through their effect.

In the *Eumenides*, the Pythia introduces a variation on this indirect representation: she, too, not only articulates but enacts the terror that the Erinyes inspire, scrabbling back in fright on her hands and knees (*Eum*. 36-7); yet her powers of description fail in the end. The gradual, sporadic emergence of the Chorus that follows, said to have inspired such

violent horror in the Athenian audience, is answered by the self-conscious formality of the Binding Song: 'Come, let us now join in the dance (χορόν), since we have resolved to display (ἀποφαίνεσθαι) our horrifying artistry (μοῦσαν στυγεράν)' (307-9). This dramatic 'display' finally gives form to – performs, even – the φόβος that has loomed offstage and invisible in earlier plays: this is the θρῆνος Ἐρινύος of the *Agamemnon* stasimon, and the dancing and singing φόβος witnessed by Orestes at the end of *Libation Bearers*. Yet it does *not* terrify Orestes: φόβος does not conquer or bind his wits (88, 332, 345); Athena, too, is unfrightened (407). The following stasimon sees the focus of the Erinyes shift away from the fear of the protagonist to the fear of the *polis* (524), whose watching citizens they seem to address in the second person (529, 539). Paradoxically, the onstage actualisation of Erinyes corresponds with the loss of compulsive power; their representation of fear precipitates a return to the allopathic mode of the *Agamemnon*, with the suffering of others inspiring reverence, caution, and wisdom.

Indeed, there is a powerful irony in the blessings of the exodos. I noted above that Athena recalls the destructive power of the Erinyes, while they sing only of benefits. These benefits, however, are repeatedly couched in negative terms: 'May no wind bringing harm to trees', the Erinyes sing, 'blow scorching heat … : let that not pass the borders of the land. Nor let grievous crop-destroying plague come upon them…' (938-43); 'I forbid the misfortunes that make men die before their time …' (956-8); 'I pray that civil strife, insatiate of evil, may never rage in this city, and may the dust not drink up the dark blood of the citizens and then, through lust for revenge, eagerly welcome the city's ruin through retaliatory murder' (976-83, tr. Sommerstein). These are phenomena normally associated with the Erinyes, and in fact promoted by them earlier in the same scene (778-92; 808-22). They are also the very stuff of tragedy. Thus, at the conclusion of the *Oresteia*, the

Erinyes, as symbols of tragedy, are integrated into Attic cultural landscape; this integration is coupled with an exclusion, from Attica, of tragic events. The representation of the fearful keeps the fearful away.

## Conclusion: Facing Fear

In this discussion of the *Oresteia*, I was determined to push back against a dominant hermeneutic, or 'masterplot', according to which fear – like justice, persuasion, and the Erinyes themselves – was transformed from something destructive into something beneficial. I have argued that the salutary potential of the emotion is suggested in the earliest stages of the *Agamemnon*, although both the Chorus and the characters of the drama refuse it; that the *Libation Bearers* illustrates the impossibility of curing or escaping fear; and that the *Eumenides* affirms the benefits of accommodating it. I have been especially concerned with three linked odes, central to their respective plays, each confronting head-on the nature of τὸ δεινόν. All three variously present a proleptic image of the concluding settlement. The *Agamemnon* ode suggests the possibility of an inhibitory fear, averting the ruin of injustice, as well as a political and ethical role for the emotion. The *Libation Bearers* ode integrates the horrors of the *Oresteia* into a narrative ecology, serving more to intensify fear than to diminish it, and implicitly arguing for the usefulness of such a mythical system in framing acts of (in)justice. The *Eumenides* ode, recalling the imagery and sentiment of the *Agamemnon*, pre-empts Athena's public address, and her rhetoric of deterrence. In the final exodos, fear, in the person of the

Erinyes, is recognized and established in the literal landscape of the Athens, guaranteeing political and ethical benefits to her citizens.

Thus there is a significant continuity in the fear of the *Oresteia.* This is not to say that the appearance of the emotion does not change through the trilogy: the murky suggestions and psychic deflections of the first play, the vain delusions and derangements of the second, the revolted refusal of horror at the start of the third – these are all stages in a journey towards the understanding of fear that emerges in the *Eumenides* settlement. This understanding is at once a *recognition* (in both the intellectual and the political sense) and a *representation* of the emotion, as the Erinyes, embodied onstage, are refigured in Athenian cult. If the faces of these Erinyes inspire horror in the audience, as both Athena and the *Life of Aeschylus* suggest,[798] this horror is transmuted into the salutary fear that has haunted the choral rhetoric of the trilogy; what lurked in simile and gnome is brought forth, embodied, and embedded in the cultural discourse of contemporary Athens.

It is with this cultural discourse that my thesis has been concerned. I have argued for Aeschylus's contribution to an intellectual debate about the usefulness of fear, and the possibility of its cultivation. Such cultivation, the *Oresteia* makes clear, is not an abstraction from or transcendence of a primitive form of the emotion, but an accommodation of its potential. That accommodation involves the institution not just of a court, but of a tragic festival, in which Athenians, observing the sufferings of others, may

[798] See especially *Vita Aeschyli* 9: τινὲς δέ φασιν ἐν τῆι ἐπιδείξει τῶν Εὐμενίδων σποράδην εἰσαγαγόντα τὸν χορὸν τοσοῦτον ἐκπλῆξαι τὸν δῆμον ὡς τὰ μὲν νήπια ἐκψῦξαι, τὰ δὲ ἔμβρυα ἐξαμβλωθῆναι. For a recent review of scholarship on the *Vita Aeschyli*, see Bakola 2018: 138 n.48. Both Lefkowitz 2012 [1981]: 74 and Prins 1991 reckon the story to be derived from the Aeschylean text itself.

learn to be afraid, and thus guarantee the prosperity of their city. In the final reckoning, fear finds not only an ethical and political home in Athens, but a cultural one, in tragedy.

# CONCLUSION

This thesis has explored a certain discourse of fear in Classical Athens, most richly developed in the tragedies of Aeschylus, but detectable also in the writings of Thucydides, Plato, and Aristotle. In these authors, fear is not merely a primal instinct for self-preservation but a reasonable and political emotion that, if cultivated in the correct manner, has a part to play in wisdom, virtue, and civic prosperity.

I began with Thucydides, the first book of whose *History* serves as a vindication of fear's determining influence on the conduct of individuals and states; I emphasized that the compelling power of the emotion operates *through* language and argument, rather than displacing it. Yet the value of fear – in battle, in strategy, and especially in domestic affairs – remains ambiguous in his narrative, and the governance of fear precarious at best. While Pericles succeeds in managing and directing the fears of the *demos*, the Mytilenean episode exposes the limitations of such emotional manipulation and the way in which fearful *paradeigmata* may backfire. Ironies such as this help us to understand the educative design of Thucydides' narrative, which promotes a fearful recognition both of contingency and of the constraints of human nature.

The nature of our human fears was the subject of my second chapter, which examined the development of the emotion through the writings of three philosophers active in Classical Athens. I traced in Democritus' fragments and Plato's middle and later dialogues the emergence of a new understanding of fear, based on beliefs and expectations, amenable

to reason, and capable of philosophical education. This 'cognitive' approach to emotion finds fuller expression in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and ethical works. Against some more recent studies, however, I maintained the salience of the more holistic methodology promoted in *On the Soul*, and employed Aristotle's biological and zoological works to synthesize an 'Aristotelian' definition of fear that encompassed both physiology and cognition. Returning to Aristotle's ethics, I identified a paradox in the medial virtue of courage, involving a recognition of the fearful without any concomitant pain or perturbation. I linked this courageous fear with the pleasurable experience of fear described in the *Poetics*, and suggested that the enigma of catharsis might be connected with the cultivation of an abstract and intellectualized emotion.

With my third chapter, I moved to the representation of fear within tragedy, examining the fearful deliberations of Pelasgus in Aeschylus' *Suppliants*. Here the intellectualization of fear came under scrutiny. After demonstrating the thematic importance of prudent, pious foresight in the first section of the play, I examined two scenes in which the Chorus' fear appears irrational. In the first, however, it is assuaged by reasoned argument; in the second, it is vindicated by subsequent events. Next, I considered the impious fearlessness of the Egyptians; their refusal of fear is matched by the ominous confidence of the Danaids at the end of the play. Pelasgus, on the other hand, offers a model of pious and fearful reflection. This is not, as Snell would have it, a private, rational, and abstract deliberation; nor is Pelasgus coerced or bullied into submission. Instead, he conducts his reasoning freely, but in dialogue with the Chorus, and through an embodied exploration of future possibilities. This emotional contemplation is fully compatible with Aristotelian psychology: for Aeschylus as for Aristotle, fear is not just a stimulus to thought, but an

integral part of its process; in the final reckoning, Pelasgus' fear, felt as bodily pain, offers an affective morality.

The prudence and morality of fear is equally at issue in the *Seven Against Thebes*. In Chapter Four, I took a sociological approach to this play, analyzing the 'emotional regimes' of Eteocles, the Argive champions, and the Chorus. Between the hubristic Argives (who recall the Egyptians of the *Suppliants*) and the terror-stricken Theban women (who recall the Danaids), Eteocles presents and promotes a moderate fear, compatible with the virtue of courage outlined in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. However, as in Thucydides, the enforcement of an emotional regime is shown to be difficult: the Chorus' persistent disorder, even under threat of execution, is matched by Eteocles' obstinate refusal to fear the pollution of fraternal slaughter. The Chorus, for their part, advance a sympathetic expansion of fear, induced by the spectacle of catastrophe; less abstract and detached than the fear of the *Poetics*, this emotion is premised on the spectators' shared and continuing vulnerability.

The metatragic implications of the *Seven* are more fully developed in the conclusion of the *Oresteia*, when Athena accommodates in Athens the φοβερὰ πρόσωπα of the *Eumenides* Chorus, and foresees the great benefit that will derive from them; it is not just the *recognition* of the Erinyes but also their *representation* on the tragic stage that unlocks their benevolent power. Yet this institution of tragic fear is not, as some have suggested, a 'transformation' of the emotion; my final chapter demonstrates that the salutary potential of the emotion is implicit right from the opening lines of the trilogy, and especially in the three interlinked odes that stand at the centre of their respective

dramas. This pre-emption of Athena's rhetoric has an aesthetic function, lending coherence to the proliferation of fear across the three plays; but it also has an ideological significance. For it is not only on the Areopagus, or even only in Athens, that fear may be salutary. The previous two plays, both set in Argos, repeatedly suggest that fear might serve as a protector, or a resource: the gnomic wisdom of the third stasimon in *Agamemnon*, and the ecological vision of the first *Libation Bearers* stasimon, each suggest a more general – perhaps even universal – application of fear's nurturing and salutary power.

It is perhaps this abstract and potentially universal quality of the fear-discourse in the *Oresteia* that has made it so famous. From Sophocles's adaptation of the *Libation Bearers'* πολλὰ … δεινά in the so-called 'Ode to Man', to Bobby Kennedy's quotation of the *Agamemnon*'s Hymn to Zeus after the assassination of Martin Luther King, the emotional wisdom of the *Oresteia* has resonated across centuries and continents. Indeed, it is to a common, human experience of affective morality that George Eliot points when she invokes the song of the 'old Eumenides' in her historical romance, *Romola*:

> *Having once begun to explain away Baldassarre's claim, Tito's thought showed itself as active as a virulent acid, eating its rapid way through all the tissues of sentiment. His mind was destitute of that dread which has been erroneously decried as if it were nothing higher than a man's animal care for his own skin: that awe of the Divine Nemesis which was felt by religious pagans, and, though it took a more positive form under Christianity, is still felt by the mass of mankind simply as a vague fear at anything which is called wrong-doing. Such terror of the unseen is so far above mere sensual cowardice that it will annihilate that*

> *cowardice: it is the initial recognition of a moral law restraining desire, and checks the hard bold scrutiny of imperfect thought into obligations which can never be proved to have any sanctity in the absence of feeling. "It is good," sing the old Eumenides, in Æschylus, "that fear should sit as the guardian of the soul, forcing it into wisdom—good that men should carry a threatening shadow in their hearts under the full sunshine; else, how shall they learn to revere the right?" That guardianship may become needless; but only when all outward law has become needless—only when duty and love have united in one stream and made a common force.* (2005 [1862-3]: Ch. XI, p.57)

These lines, with which my thesis began, articulate for Eliot something important about ethical motivation. The instinctive dread of the divine and the intuitive fear of injustice that is felt by ordinary people seem to her in no way inferior to the rational morality of her more enlightened contemporaries; in fact, she doubts the viability of any system of obligation that does not engage 'feelings' such as these.[799] In Eliot's account, the fear promoted by the Eumenides is opposed both to base, 'animal' self-interest, and to the 'hard bold scrutiny' of secular ethics. My own study has suggested that the flight instinct, pious dread, and moral deliberation lie rather on a continuum of fear; I have also emphasized the political element of the Erinyes song that Eliot has elided in her paraphrase.[800] Nevertheless, I can only agree with her conclusion – although I struggle to imagine that world in which we no longer require the guidance of Aeschylus' old Eumenides.

[799] For Eliot's relation to contemporary ethical theories, including utilitarianism, see Anger (2019).
[800] For Eliot's use of Greek tragedy, including her free style of translation, see Easterling (1991).

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