

# **Rethinking Representation and European Integration**

**Christopher Alexander Prosser**

St Catherine's College, University of Oxford

Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of DPhil in Politics in  
the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Oxford

Trinity Term 2015

Word Count: 79,470

# **Rethinking Representation and European Integration**

**Christopher Alexander Prosser**

St Catherine's College, University of Oxford

Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of DPhil in Politics in  
the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Oxford.

Trinity Term 2015

## **Abstract**

In representative democracy the chain of political legitimacy runs from voters to governments through votes cast at elections. In order for representation to occur, political parties must offer distinct policy platforms that citizens consider in their vote choices. This thesis examines whether citizens are adequately represented within the European Union. It finds that although representation on left-right issues occurs, it does not occur for European integration preferences.

Over the course its history, European integration has changed from being primarily an economic issue to a social issue. This separation from the primary axis of political competition has increased the need for representation on EU issues directly. Political parties have polarised over European integration providing increased choice, but voters have not engaged with the issue. Examining how voters process party signals about policy positions shows that very few are affected by signals on the EU. Accounting for voters' cognitive biases suggests that the influence of EU issues in European Parliament elections has been overestimated and is non-existent in most member-states.

As direct democracy might offer an alternative to inadequate representation this thesis examines why referendums have been held on the EU but finds that they are largely driven by governments' desire to contain the threat of EU issues at national elections, further undermining representation.

However, as a result of institutional differences between national and European Parliament elections rather than the emergence of the EU as an electoral issue, the size of party systems at European Parliament elections has grown considerably over successive elections in many member-states, a change that has fed into national party systems. Although representation on EU issues is inadequate, the expansion of European party systems and the redrawing of the lines of political competition offers some hope that representation on EU issues might improve in the future.

# Contents

---

|                                                                                                          |     |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| <i>Table of tables</i> .....                                                                             | iv  |
| <i>Table of figures</i> .....                                                                            | vii |
| CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION .....                                                                           | 1   |
| 1.1 – THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT .....                                           | 3   |
| 1.2 – REPRESENTATION AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION .....                                                      | 8   |
| 1.3 – OUTLINE OF THE THESIS .....                                                                        | 16  |
| 1.3.1 – EU ISSUE REPRESENTATION .....                                                                    | 16  |
| 1.3.2 – BEYOND REPRESENTATION? .....                                                                     | 19  |
| CHAPTER 2 – BUILDING POLICY SCALES FROM MANIFESTO DATA: A REFERENTIAL CONTENT<br>VALIDITY APPROACH ..... | 21  |
| 2.1 – MEASURING PARTY POSITIONS .....                                                                    | 22  |
| 2.2 – BUILDING BLOCKS .....                                                                              | 28  |
| 2.3 – COMPONENT SELECTION: EXISTING APPROACHES .....                                                     | 36  |
| 2.4 – COMPONENT SELECTION: A NEW APPROACH .....                                                          | 42  |
| 2.4.1 – MEASURING COMPONENTS .....                                                                       | 44  |
| 2.4.2 – SCALE BUILDING .....                                                                             | 48  |
| 2.5 – OVERALL VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY .....                                                             | 53  |
| 2.6 – RESCALING .....                                                                                    | 57  |
| 2.7 – DIMENSIONALITY .....                                                                               | 58  |
| 2.8 – CONCLUSION .....                                                                                   | 60  |
| CHAPTER 3 – DIMENSIONALITY, IDEOLOGY AND PARTY POSITIONS TOWARDS EUROPEAN<br>INTEGRATION .....           | 63  |
| 3.1 – EXISTING APPROACHES .....                                                                          | 67  |
| 3.2 – THE DIMENSIONALITY OF EUROPEAN POLITICAL SPACE .....                                               | 70  |

|                                                                                                   |     |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| 3.3 – IDEOLOGY AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION OVER TIME .....                                           | 73  |
| 3.4 – DATA AND METHODOLOGY .....                                                                  | 76  |
| 3.5 – RESULTS .....                                                                               | 79  |
| 3.6 – EAST, WEST, AND THE IMPORTANCE OF TIME.....                                                 | 85  |
| 3.7 – DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION .....                                                             | 89  |
| CHAPTER 4 – PARTY SIGNALS, DUAL-PROCESS COGNITION, AND VOTER PERCEPTIONS OF PARTY POSITIONS ..... | 94  |
| 4.1 – THE SALIENCE-ATTENTION-COGNITION MODEL.....                                                 | 99  |
| 4.1.1 – SALIENCE .....                                                                            | 99  |
| 4.1.2 – ATTENTION .....                                                                           | 101 |
| 4.1.3 – COGNITION .....                                                                           | 103 |
| 4.2 – DATA AND METHODOLOGY .....                                                                  | 112 |
| 4.3 – RESULTS .....                                                                               | 115 |
| 4.4 – DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION .....                                                             | 122 |
| CHAPTER 5 – ASSIMILATION, CONTRAST, AND EU ISSUE VOTING .....                                     | 127 |
| 5.1 – DATA AND METHODOLOGY .....                                                                  | 136 |
| 5.2 – RESULTS .....                                                                               | 140 |
| 5.3 – DISCUSSION .....                                                                            | 149 |
| CHAPTER 6 – CALLING EUROPEAN UNION TREATY REFERENDUMS.....                                        | 152 |
| 6.1 – AN UNDER STUDIED QUESTION .....                                                             | 155 |
| 6.2 – ELECTORAL PRESSURE .....                                                                    | 158 |
| 6.3 – LEGAL OBLIGATIONS.....                                                                      | 159 |
| 6.4 – INSTITUTIONS AND VETO PLAYERS .....                                                         | 161 |
| 6.5 – TREATY LEVEL EFFECTS .....                                                                  | 163 |
| 6.6 – DATA AND METHODOLOGY .....                                                                  | 164 |
| 6.7 – RESULTS AND DISCUSSION .....                                                                | 169 |
| 6.8 – CONCLUSION .....                                                                            | 182 |

|                                                                                                                                     |     |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| CHAPTER 7 – SECOND ORDER ELECTORAL RULES AND NATIONAL PARTY SYSTEMS: THE DUVERGERIAN EFFECTS OF EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTIONS ..... | 185 |
| 7.1 – EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND NATIONAL PARTY SYSTEMS .....                                                                         | 186 |
| 7.2 – EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, ELECTORAL RULES AND PARTY SYSTEMS.....                                                                  | 188 |
| 7.3 – ELECTORAL SYSTEMS AND THE SIZE OF PARTY SYSTEMS .....                                                                         | 190 |
| 7.4 – DUVERGERIAN EFFECTS AND SECOND ORDER ELECTIONS .....                                                                          | 192 |
| 7.5 – ELECTORAL SYSTEMS AND PARTY SYSTEMS.....                                                                                      | 195 |
| 7.6 – DATA AND METHODOLOGY .....                                                                                                    | 198 |
| 7.7 – RESULTS .....                                                                                                                 | 203 |
| 7.8 – CONCLUSION .....                                                                                                              | 211 |
| CHAPTER 8 – CONCLUSION .....                                                                                                        | 214 |
| 8.1 – REPRESENTATION AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION – AN ASSESSMENT .....                                                                 | 215 |
| 8.2 – LIMITATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH .....                                                                                        | 219 |
| 8.3 – DEMOCRACY AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION .....                                                                                      | 223 |
| APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 2 .....                                                                                                         | 229 |
| BIBLIOGRAPHY.....                                                                                                                   | 238 |

## Table of tables

---

|                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |    |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----|
| TABLE 2.1. EXAMPLES OF COMPONENT CHOICE USED TO CONSTRUCT PREVIOUS GENERAL AND ECONOMIC 'LEFT-RIGHT' SCALES USING MARPOR DATA. ....                                                                                                                                         | 25 |
| TABLE 2.2. MANIFESTO COMPONENTS USED TO CONSTRUCT PREVIOUS 'SOCIAL DIMENSION' SCALES USING MARPOR DATA.....                                                                                                                                                                 | 26 |
| TABLE 2.3. COMPARISON OF EXOGENOUS SALIENCE BETWEEN COMPONENTS IN A 'RILE' SCALE CONSTRUCTED USING LOWE ET AL.'S (2011) LOGIT METHOD USING DIFFERENT SALIENCE MEASURES: MARPOR'S PERCENTAGE SALIENCE MEASURE, LOWE ET AL.'S (2011) SALIENCE MEASURE, THE RATIO OF LOGS..... | 48 |
| TABLE 2.4. FINAL COMPONENT SELECTION FOR THE NEW ONE DIMENSIONAL GENERAL LEFT-RIGHT SCALE CONSTRUCTED USING THE ITERATIVE REFERENTIAL CONTENT VALIDITY METHOD.....                                                                                                          | 50 |
| TABLE 2.5. FINAL COMPONENT SELECTION FOR THE NEW TWO DIMENSIONAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL SCALES CONSTRUCTED USING THE ITERATIVE REFERENTIAL CONTENT VALIDITY METHOD.....                                                                                                        | 53 |
| TABLE 2.6. MEASURES OF THE CONVERGENT VALIDITY OF THE NEW SCALES.....                                                                                                                                                                                                       | 54 |
| TABLE 2.7. MEASURES OF OVERALL SCALE INTERNAL VALIDITY (MEAN EXOGENOUS CORRELATION OF COMPONENTS WITH SCALE) AND RELIABILITY, CALCULATED BY THE MCDONALD AND BUDGE (2013) METHOD. ....                                                                                      | 56 |
| TABLE 3.1. DISTRIBUTION OF CASES BETWEEN MEMBER-STATES AND SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR THE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, GENERAL LEFT-RIGHT, ECONOMIC LEFT-RIGHT, AND SOCIAL LIBERAL-CONSERVATIVE SCALES.....                                                                            | 78 |

|                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |     |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| TABLE 3.2. RESULTS FROM MULTILEVEL MIXED-EFFECTS LINEAR MODELS ESTIMATING THE EFFECT OF GENERAL LEFT-RIGHT, ECONOMIC LEFT-RIGHT AND SOCIAL LIBERAL-CONSERVATIVE POSITIONS ON POSITIONS ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION (RANDOM EFFECTS NOT SHOWN).....                            | 81  |
| TABLE 3.3. RESULTS FROM MULTILEVEL MIXED-EFFECTS LINEAR MODELS ESTIMATING THE EFFECT OF GENERAL LEFT-RIGHT, ECONOMIC LEFT-RIGHT, SOCIAL LIBERAL-CONSERVATIVE POSITIONS ON POSITIONS ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION IN WESTERN AND EASTERN EUROPE (RANDOM EFFECTS NOT SHOWN)..... | 88  |
| TABLE 4.1 . RESULTS OF A MULTILEVEL MIXED-EFFECTS MODEL OF VOTER PERCEPTIONS OF PARTY POSITIONS. ....                                                                                                                                                                     | 117 |
| TABLE 5.1. RESULTS FROM A SERIES OF MULTILEVEL MIXED-EFFECT LINEAR REGRESSION MODELS ESTIMATING THE EFFECT OF LEFT-RIGHT ISSUE SELF-PLACEMENT AND PARTISAN ATTACHEMENT ON THE PERCEIVED LEFT-RIGHT POSITION OF A POLITICAL PARTY (RANDOM-EFFECTS NOT SHOWN).....          | 141 |
| TABLE 5.2. RESULTS FROM A SERIES OF MULTILEVEL MIXED-EFFECT LINEAR REGRESSION MODELS ESTIMATING THE EFFECT OF EU ISSUE SELF-PLACEMENT AND PARTISAN ATTACHEMENT ON THE PERCEIVED EU POSITION OF A POLITICAL PARTY (RANDOM-EFFECTS NOT SHOWN).....                          | 142 |
| TABLE 5.3. . MEAN LEFT-RIGHT AND EU ISSUE DISTANCES IN THE ACTUAL, FITTED, AND ADJUSTED DATA, AND THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE FITTED AND ADJUSTED DISTANCES FOR THE EU-27 MEMBER-STATES.....                                                                               | 145 |
| TABLE 5.4. CONDITIONAL LOGIT MODELS ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF LEFT-RIGHT AND EU ISSUE VOTING ON THE PROBABILITY OF VOTING FOR A PARTY (PARTY FIXED-EFFECTS NOT SHOWN) USING THE ACTUAL, FITTED, AND ADJUSTED DATA FOR EACH OF THE 27 EU MEMBER-STATES.. ....              | 146 |
| TABLE 6.1. REFERENDUMS HELD TO RATIFY EU TREATIES.....                                                                                                                                                                                                                    | 166 |

|                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |     |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| TABLE 6.2. SUMMARY STATISTICS AND BINARY VARIABLE CODING. ....                                                                                                                                                                                                                      | 167 |
| TABLE 6.3. THE MODEL BUILDING PROCESS: LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODELS SHOWING THE<br>ELECTORAL PRESSURE ONLY, INSTITUTIONAL PRESSURE ONLY, AND COMBINED<br>MODEL. THE TABLE ALSO SHOWS THE FINAL FULL MODEL RUN EXCLUDING THE<br>DANISH AND IRISH CASES AS A ROBUSTNESS CHECK.....      | 171 |
| TABLE 6.4. MODELS ESTIMATING THE EFFECT OF TREATIES ON THE PROBABILITY OF A<br>REFERENDUM BEING HELD USING FIXED EFFECTS AND MULTILEVEL LOGISTIC<br>REGRESSION MODELS.....                                                                                                          | 178 |
| TABLE 6.5. BEST LINEAR UNBIASED PREDICTIONS (BLUPS), FIXED EFFECT COEFFICIENTS, AND<br>MARGINAL EFFECTS (AVERAGE CHANGE IN PREDICTED PROBABILITY, ESTIMATED<br>FROM FIXED EFFECTS) SHOWING THE EFFECT OF INDIVIDUAL TREATIES ON THE<br>PROBABILITY OF A REFERENDUM BEING HELD. .... | 179 |
| TABLE 7.1. SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR PARTY SYSTEM SIZE AND DIFFERENCES IN ELECTORAL<br>DISTRICT MAGNITUDE BETWEEN EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND NATIONAL<br>ELECTIONS. ....                                                                                                                  | 199 |
| TABLE 7.2. RESULTS FROM MULTILEVEL MIXED-EFFECT GROWTH CURVE MODELS ANALYSING<br>CHANGES IN PARTY SYSTEM SIZE AT EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTIONS.<br>RANDOM EFFECTS NOT SHOWN. ....                                                                                                   | 204 |
| TABLE 7.3. RESULTS FROM MULTILEVEL MODEL ANALYSING CHANGES IN PARTY SYSTEM SIZE<br>AT NATIONAL ELECTIONS FOLLOWING EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTIONS.<br>RANDOM EFFECTS NOT SHOWN. ....                                                                                                 | 210 |

## Table of figures

---

|                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |    |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----|
| FIGURE 1.1. TURNOUT AT EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTIONS 1979-2014. ....                                                                                                                                                                 | 2  |
| FIGURE 2.1. COMPARISON OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF A POLICY SCALE CONSTRUCTED USING<br>THE BENOIT AND LAVER SOCIAL LIBERAL-CONSERVATIVE SCALE COMPONENTS<br>USING THE KIM-FORDING RATIO METHOD AND THE LOWE ET AL. LOGIT METHOD.<br>..... | 34 |
| FIGURE 2.2. EFFECT OF THE ADDITION OF 0.5 TO THE NUMERATOR AND DENOMINATOR ON<br>THE SCORE GIVEN ON THE LOGIT SCALE BY THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN 'LEFT' AND<br>'RIGHT' COMPONENTS IN THE SCALE. ....                                    | 35 |
| FIGURE 2.3. VALUE GIVEN BY THE LOWE ET AL. SALIENCE MEASURE TO COMPONENTS NOT<br>MENTIONED IN A MANIFESTO BY THE TOTAL LENGTH OF MANIFESTO. ....                                                                                     | 46 |
| FIGURE 2.4. EXOGENOUS CORRELATIONS (ABSOLUTE VALUES) OF SCALE COMPONENTS WITH<br>A SCALE CONSTRUCTED USING MARPOR'S RILE COMPONENTS AND LOWE ET AL.'S<br>(2011) LOGIT METHOD. ....                                                   | 49 |
| FIGURE 2.5. DISTRIBUTION OF THE ECONOIMC AND SOCIAL DIMENSION SCALES. ....                                                                                                                                                           | 58 |
| FIGURE 2.6. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE ECONOMIC LEFT-RIGHT AND SOCIAL LIBERAL-<br>CONSERVATIVE SCALES FOR ALL OBSERVATIONS IN THE MARPOR DATASET. ....                                                                                 | 59 |
| FIGURE 3.1. EU MEAN STANDARD DEVIATION OF PARTY POSITIONS ON EUROPEAN<br>INTEGRATION AT NATIONAL AND EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTIONS FROM<br>PARTY MANIFESTO DATA. ....                                                                | 64 |
| FIGURE 3.2. EU MEAN SALIENCE OF PARTY POSITIONS ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AT<br>NATIONAL AND EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTIONS FROM PARTY MANIFESTO<br>DATA. ....                                                                          | 65 |

|                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |     |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| FIGURE 3.3. PREDICTED PARTY POSITIONS TOWARDS EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AS AN EFFECT OF POSITIONS ON THE GENERAL LEFT-RIGHT DIMENSION IN 1958 AND 2008. ....                                                             | 80  |
| FIGURE 3.4. PREDICTED PARTY POSITIONS TOWARDS EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AS AN EFFECT OF POSITIONS ON THE ECONOMIC LEFT-RIGHT DIMENSION WITH SOCIAL LIBERAL-CONSERVATIVE HELD AT THE SAMPLE MEAN, FOR 1958 AND 2008. .... | 83  |
| FIGURE 3.5. PREDICTED PARTY POSITIONS TOWARDS EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AS AN EFFECT OF POSITIONS ON THE SOCIAL LIBERAL-CONSERVATIVE DIMENSION WITH ECONOMIC LEFT-RIGHT HELD AT THE SAMPLE MEAN, FOR 1958 AND 2008. .... | 84  |
| FIGURE 3.6. THE IDEOLOGICAL STRUCTURE OF PARTY POSITIONS ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION IN 1958 AND 2008. ....                                                                                                             | 90  |
| FIGURE 4.1. A DUAL-PROCESS COGNITION MODEL OF THE PROCESSING OF PARTY SIGNALS INTO PERCEPTIONS OF PARTY POSITIONS. ....                                                                                             | 111 |
| FIGURE 4.2. THE MULTI-LEVEL CROSS-CLASSIFIED STRUCTURE OF THE DATA. ....                                                                                                                                            | 112 |
| FIGURE 4.3. THE IMPACT OF POLITICAL INTEREST ON THE EFFECT OF PARTY SIGNALS ON VOTER PERCEPTIONS OF PARTY POSITIONS. ....                                                                                           | 118 |
| FIGURE 4.4. THE IMPACT OF EDUCATION ON THE EFFECT OF PARTY SIGNALS ON VOTER PERCEPTIONS OF PARTY POSITIONS. ....                                                                                                    | 119 |
| FIGURE 4.5. THE IMPACT OF POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE ON THE EFFECT OF PARTY SIGNALS ON VOTER PERCEPTIONS OF PARTY POSITIONS. ....                                                                                          | 119 |
| FIGURE 4.6. THE INTERACTION BETWEEN PARTISANSHIP, POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE, AND THE EFFECT OF PARTY SIGNALS ON VOTER PERCEPTIONS OF PARTY POSITIONS. ....                                                                | 120 |
| FIGURE 4.7. THE IMPACT OF AGE ON THE EFFECT OF PARTY SIGNALS ON VOTER PERCEPTIONS OF PARTY POSITIONS. ....                                                                                                          | 121 |

|                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |     |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| FIGURE 5.1. CHANGE IN THE (UNCONDITIONAL) PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF VOTING FOR A PARTY AT THE MEAN LEFT-RIGHT ISSUE DISTANCE AND CHANGING VALUES FOR THE ACTUAL, FITTED, AND ADJUSTED DATA FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM.. .....                                                                                                             | 148 |
| FIGURE 5.2. CHANGE IN THE (UNCONDITIONAL) PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF VOTING FOR A PARTY AT THE MEAN LEFT-RIGHT ISSUE DISTANCE AND CHANGING VALUES FOR THE ACTUAL, FITTED, AND ADJUSTED DATA FOR DENMARK.....                                                                                                                           | 148 |
| FIGURE 5.3. CHANGE IN THE (UNCONDITIONAL) PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF VOTING FOR A PARTY AT THE MEAN LEFT-RIGHT ISSUE DISTANCE AND CHANGING VALUES FOR THE ACTUAL, FITTED, AND ADJUSTED DATA FOR ESTONIA. ....                                                                                                                          | 149 |
| FIGURE 6.1. THE EFFECT OF PUBLIC SUPPORT AND DAYS TILL ELECTION ON THE PREDICTED PROBABILITY OF A REFERENDUM BEING HELD. ALL OTHER VARIABLES ARE HELD AT THEIR MEDIAN VALUES (COMPULSORY REFERENDUM = 0, BICAMERAL = 1, SEMI-PRESIDENTIAL = 0).....                                                                                    | 173 |
| FIGURE 6.2. THE EFFECT OF BICAMERAL AND SEMI-PRESIDENTIAL ILLUSTRATED BY THE MARGINAL EFFECT (CHANGE IN PREDICTED PROBABILITY) OF EACH VARIABLE AT CHANGING VALUES OF PUBLIC SUPPORT (WITH DAYS TILL ELECTION HELD AT 120) AND DAYS TILL ELECTION (WITH PUBLIC SUPPORT HELD AT 35) ON THE PROBABILITY OF A REFERENDUM BEING HELD. .... | 175 |
| FIGURE 7.1. LOCAL POLYNOMIAL REGRESSION FIT OF THE CHANGE IN THE EFFECTIVE NUMBER OF ELECTORAL PARTIES AT EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTIONS. ....                                                                                                                                                                                          | 201 |
| FIGURE 7.2. PREDICTED DIFFERENCE IN THE EFFECTIVE NUMBER OF PARTIES AT EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTIONS WHEN THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE LOGGED EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT MEAN DISTRICT MAGNITUDE AND THE LOGGED NATIONAL MEAN DISTRICT MAGNITUDE IS ONE ACROSS EIGHT EUROPEAN PARLI.....                                                        | 205 |

|                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |     |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| FIGURE 7.3. PREDICTED EFFECTIVE NUMBER OF ELECTORAL PARTIES AT THE FIRST AND EIGHTH<br>EP ELECTION BY THE DEGREE OF DIFFER BETWEEN THE DISTRICT MAGNITUDE OF<br>THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND NATIONAL ELECTORAL SYSTEMS. .... | 206 |
| FIGURE 7.4. PREDICTED AND OBSERVED CHANGES TO THE EFFECTIVE NUMBER OF ELECTORAL<br>PARTIES AT EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTIONS FOR THE PRE-2004 EU MEMBER-<br>STATES. ....                                                      | 208 |
| FIGURE 7.5. PREDICTED EFFECT OF EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT PARTY SYSTEM SIZE ON THE<br>EFFECTIVE NUMBER OF ELECTORAL PARTIES AT NATIONAL ELECTIONS<br>FOLLOWING EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTIONS. ....                                 | 210 |

*'The Assembly... shall be composed of representatives of the peoples of the States united within the Community...'*

– Treaty of Rome, 1957.

*'...this is the first time in history, a history in which we have so frequently been divided, pitted one against the other, bent on mutual destruction, that the people of Europe have together elected their delegates to a common assembly representing, in this Chamber today, more than 260 million people. Let there be no doubt, these elections form a milestone on the path of Europe, the most important since the signing of the Treaties.'*

– Simone Veil, first President of the elected European Parliament, 1979.

*'...our fellow citizens... are disenchanted with the present system. They are staying away from elections. Their faith in political parties is fading, as [is] their perception of the ability of the political parties to convey the will of the people.'*

– Romano Prodi, President of the European Commission, 2001

*'The elections were a missed opportunity. Too many political parties concentrated on national or personality issues. Europe was, to a large extent, the missing ingredient in the European elections.'*

– Pat Cox, President of the European Parliament, 2004.

## Chapter 1 – Introduction

---

On June 7, 1979 a unique experiment in electoral democracy began. Over the next four days voters from each of the (then) nine members of the European Community cast their ballots in the first direct elections for the European Parliament. The 1979 election marked not just a significant milestone of European integration but – as the first ever international election – a momentous occasion in the history of democracy. Three and a half decades later, and after eight European Parliament elections, it is fair to say that the experiment has not been an unqualified success.

Public enthusiasm for the European Parliament has been muted. Turnout at the first European Parliament election in 1979 was 62%. Although respectable by today's standards of low turnout, this was more than 20% lower than the average turnout at the national parliamentary elections preceding the 1979 election. Despite the European Parliament being granted considerably more powers since the first election, overall turnout has declined monotonically since the first election, as shown in figure 1.1, to a record low 42.5% in 2014.

Even amongst those who do turn out to vote, 'Europe' is seldom at the top of their minds when they do so – the consensus amongst scholars of European integration is that European Parliament elections are largely 'second order national elections', concerned with national political issues rather than European matters.<sup>1</sup> In its own words, the role of the European Parliament in the EU is 'to represent people's interests with regard to EU law-making and to

---

<sup>1</sup> Karlheinz Reif and Hermann Schmitt, "Nine Second-Order National Elections - A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of European Election Results," *European Journal of Political Research* 8 (1980): 3–44.

make sure other EU institutions are working democratically.’<sup>2</sup> If, as the outgoing President of the European Parliament Pat Cox put it after the 2004 elections, Europe is ‘the missing ingredient in the European elections’, the link between citizens preferences over European integration and the election of MEPs is tenuous.




FIGURE 1.1. TURNOUT AT EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTIONS 1979-2014.

This thesis examines the question of whether citizens are adequately represented within the European Union (EU).<sup>3</sup> It finds that although there is a link between the left-right preferences of

---

<sup>2</sup> European Parliament, “About the European Parliament,” 2015, <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/aboutparliament/en>.

<sup>3</sup> For the sake of parsimony, throughout this thesis the set of organisations (the European Coal and Steel Community, European Economic Community, Euratom, European Communities etc) that eventually evolved to become the European Union will be referred to simply as the European Union or the EU.

citizens and the outcome of European Parliament elections, the same cannot be said for European integration preferences and there are several challenges to representation on European issues that are not easily addressed by institutional reform.

This analysis suggests that the problems faced by a representative politics of European integration are not easily solved. An alternative to a representative model of a democratic politics in the EU is direct democracy. However, examining the circumstances in which referendums on EU treaties are held suggests that referendums may exacerbate, rather than ameliorate, the problems faced by representative democracy.

However, one potential reason to be more optimistic about the fate of EU democracy is the fact that, even in the absence of serious contestation over European integration, European Parliament elections are transforming the party systems of at least some EU member-states. Although it is too soon to say whether this will indeed overcome the barriers to EU democracy, it does show that electoral politics and party systems in EU member-states are not as static as they are sometimes assumed to be, and may adapt to the challenges to representation posed by European integration.

### **1.1 – The European Parliament and the democratic deficit**

Concerns about the democratic credentials of European integration had been expressed from the very outset. Clement Attlee, British Prime Minister at the time of the Schuman declaration, described what would become the European Coal and Steel Community as ‘utterly undemocratic and responsible to nobody’.<sup>4</sup> Although the architects of European integration were unapologetically technocratic and functionalist in their designs, a supranational democratic

---

<sup>4</sup> Hansard House of Commons Debates 27 June 1950 vol 476 c2169  
[http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1950/jun/27/schuman-plan-1#S5CV0476P0\\_19500627\\_HOC\\_387](http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1950/jun/27/schuman-plan-1#S5CV0476P0_19500627_HOC_387)

body had long been planned. The Treaty of Rome declared that 'the Assembly shall draw up proposals for elections by direct universal suffrage in accordance with a uniform procedure in all Member States.'

However, it was not until two decades after the signing of the Treaty of Rome that the first elections were held. Discussions about implementing the planned elections took place in fits and starts throughout the period but the implementation of an elected assembly was delayed largely due to the failure to agree a uniform electoral system. A compromise was reached whereby each country would run elections to a common assembly according to their own electoral rules, and although some common principles were finally agreed in 2002, the goal of a uniform electoral procedure has still not been met.

Although the compromise fell short of the original vision of uniform European elections, the newly elected European Parliament held out the promise that it would bring European citizens to the heart of the process of European integration. By introducing a democratic body into the decision making process, it was hoped the European Parliament would help solve the democratic deficit, a term introduced to the academic literature by David Marquand just before the first elections in 1979:

*'In the Community system, no one is unambiguously answerable for anything. The buck is never seen to stop; it is hidden from view, in an endless scrimmage of consultation and bargaining. This may not matter much when the Community's competences are as restricted as they are at present. If they were extended... it would matter a great deal... The resulting "democratic deficit" would not be acceptable in a Community committed to democratic principles. Yet such a deficit would be inevitable unless the gap were somehow to be filled by the European Parliament.'*<sup>5</sup>

---

<sup>5</sup> David Marquand, *Parliament for Europe* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1979), 64–65.

That the term 'democratic deficit' is so familiar today suggests that the European Parliament has not been unambiguously successful in filling that gap. Following the acceleration of integration under the Single European Act (SEA) and the Maastricht Treaty, and the corresponding end of the period of permissive consensus<sup>6</sup> many scholars began to argue that there was a serious democratic deficit in the European Union.<sup>7</sup>

The 'standard version' of the democratic deficit arguments can be summarized as follows:<sup>8</sup>

- 1) European integration has resulted in an increase in executive power at the expense of national parliamentary control. Many of the key decisions in the EU are made by national ministers voting in the Council, by national bureaucrats in the Committee of Permanent Representatives, and by officials in the Commission, all of whom are distant from the direct control of national parliaments.
- 2) The European Parliament is too weak to compensate for the loss of power by national parliaments. Although the European Parliament has equal legislative power with the Council under co-decision rules, most EU legislation is passed under consultation rules, where the Parliament only has the power to delay legislation. Similarly, its role in choosing the President of the Commission is institutionally subordinate to the Council.

---

<sup>6</sup> Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, "A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus," *British Journal of Political Science* 39 (2009): 1–23; Richard C. Eichenberg and Russell J. Dalton, "Post-Maastricht Blues: The Transformation of Citizen Support for European Integration, 1973-2004," *Acta Politica* 42 (2007): 128–152.

<sup>7</sup> For example: Vernon Bogdanor and Geoffrey Woodcock, "The European Community and Sovereignty," *Parliamentary Affairs* 44, no. 4 (October 1, 1991): 481–492; Brigitte Boyce, "The Democratic Deficit of the European Community," *Parliamentary Affairs* 46, no. 4 (October 1, 1993): 458–477; Kevin Featherstone, "Jean Monnet and the 'Democratic Deficit' in the European Union," *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 32, no. 2 (June 1, 1994): 149–170; Svein S. Andersen and Tom R. Burns, "The European Union and the Erosion of Parliamentary Democracy: A Study of Post-Parliamentary Governance," in *The European Union: How Democratic Is It?*, ed. Svein S. Andersen and Kjell A. Eliassen (London: Sage, 1996), 227–253; Fritz W. Scharpf, "Economic Integration, Democracy and the Welfare State," *Journal of European Public Policy* 4, no. 1 (January 1, 1997): 18–36; Tapio Raunio, "Always One Step Behind? National Legislatures and the European Union," *Government and Opposition* 34, no. 2 (April 1, 1999): 180–202.

<sup>8</sup> Andreas Follesdal and Simon Hix, "Why There Is a Democratic Deficit in the EU: A Response to Majone and Moravcsik," *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 44, no. 3 (September 1, 2006): 533–562.

- 3) Although there are elections to the European Parliament, there are no 'European elections' as these are not about politicians or parties at the European level or the direction of the EU policy agenda.
- 4) The EU is 'too distant' from voters. The EU is too complicated for citizens to understand and so they will never be able to engage and identify with it, both necessary pre-conditions for the emergence of a democratic polity.
- 5) European integration allows governments to implement policies at the European level that they would be unable to pursue at the national level where they are constrained by domestic political actors.

Many prominent scholars have come to the defence of the European Union, arguing that the case that there is a democratic deficit has been dramatically overstated, either because it misinterprets what the EU actually is (a supranational regulatory organisation rather than a nation-state) or because it holds the EU to higher standards than contemporary democratic nation-states.<sup>9</sup>

Assessing the case against the democratic deficit Follesdal and Hix conclude that on four of five counts the accusations of a democratic deficit are unwarranted.<sup>10</sup> On one issue however they conclude that there is a real democratic deficit – the ability to affect the course of European affairs through election:

---

<sup>9</sup> For example: Giandomenico Majone, "Europe's 'Democratic Deficit': The Question of Standards," *European Law Journal* 4, no. 1 (March 1, 1998): 5–28; Giandomenico Majone, "The Credibility Crisis of Community Regulation," *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 38, no. 2 (June 1, 2000): 273–302; Giandomenico Majone, "The European Commission: The Limits of Centralization and the Perils of Parliamentarization," *Governance* 15, no. 3 (July 1, 2002): 375–392; Andrew Moravcsik, "Reassessing Legitimacy in the European Union," *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 40, no. 4 (November 1, 2002): 603–624; Andrew Moravcsik, "Is There a 'Democratic Deficit' in World Politics? A Framework for Analysis," *Government and Opposition* 39, no. 2 (April 1, 2004): 336–363; Christophe Crombez, "The Democratic Deficit in the European Union Much Ado about Nothing?," *European Union Politics* 4, no. 1 (March 1, 2003): 101–120.

<sup>10</sup> Follesdal and Hix, "Why There Is a Democratic Deficit in the EU."

*'...there is no electoral contest for political leadership at the European level or the basic direction of the EU policy agenda. Representatives at the EU level are elected, and so can formally be "thrown out". However, the processes of electing national politicians and even the members of the European Parliament are not contests about the content or direction of EU policy. National elections are about domestic political issues, where the policies of different parties on issues on the EU agenda are rarely debated... European Parliament elections are not in fact about Europe, but are "second-order national contests". They are fought by national parties on the performance of national governments, with lower turnout than national elections, and hence won by opposition and protest parties. At no point, then, do voters have the opportunity to choose between rival candidates for executive office at the European level, or to choose between rival policy agendas for EU action...'*<sup>11</sup>

Looking at a similar problem from a retrospective standpoint, Hobolt and Tilley have shown that although voters are able to attribute responsibility to the EU for policy performance in areas where it has competence because of the absence of a strong link between the European Parliament and EU policy output, 'performance voting' is essentially non-existent at European Parliament elections.<sup>12</sup>

A potential solution to this problem, Follesdal and Hix suggest, is that the European Parliament could leverage its existing institutional role in approving the appointment of the President of the European Commission by proposing candidates itself. Different European Political Parties would propose candidates before the election and the Parliament would support the candidate of the party that won the most votes.<sup>13</sup> The elegance of this solution is that it would not require any

---

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., 552.

<sup>12</sup> Sara Hobolt and James Tilley, *Blaming Europe?: Responsibility Without Accountability in the European Union* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).

<sup>13</sup> Follesdal and Hix, "Why There Is a Democratic Deficit in the EU"; See also: Simon Hix, *Whats Wrong with the European Union and How to Fix It*, 1 edition (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008).

changes to the existing legal framework, only for actors to use their existing powers more persuasively.

At the 2014 election six of the European Political Parties, including the traditionally dominant European People's Party and the Party of European Socialists, did just that. Each of these parties presented a '*Spitzenkandidat*' (literally 'top candidate' in German) for the role of Commission President before the election.

Many European leaders were reluctant to agree to the European Parliament's aspirations in appointing the Commission President, a move that would diminish the power of the European Council.<sup>14</sup> Nonetheless, the appointment of Jean-Claude Juncker, the *Spitzenkandidat* of the European People's Party, suggests the European Parliament managed to leverage its limited powers effectively, for the first time creating a link between votes cast in a European Parliament election, and the composition of the EU executive.

## 1.2 – Representation and European integration

Although linking the outcome of elections to the composition of the executive is a necessary step in the democratic process, the 2014 European Parliament elections showed that the provision of an institutional link between electoral results and the composition of the European Commission is not itself sufficient to create a link between voters' preferences over European integration and the vote they cast in European Parliament elections. Not long after the election, Hobolt showed that the introduction of *Spitzenkandidaten* had a limited impact on voter turnout

---

<sup>14</sup> See for example: Laurens Cerulus, "Van Rompuy Scorns Direct Election of Commission President," Text, *EurActiv | EU News & Policy Debates, across Languages*, October 14, 2013, <http://www.euractiv.com/eu-elections-2014/van-rompuy-underlines-objections-news-531049>; Honor Mahony, "Merkel: EU Vote Not Decisive on Commission President," accessed August 17, 2015, <https://euobserver.com/political/121906>; Ian Traynor, "EU Power Struggle as Cameron Tries to Stop Juncker Getting Top Job," *The Guardian*, May 28, 2014, sec. World news, [http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/27/david-cameron-jean-claude-junker-eu-top-job?CMP=tw\\_t\\_gu](http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/27/david-cameron-jean-claude-junker-eu-top-job?CMP=tw_t_gu).

or vote choice.<sup>15</sup> Despite the introduction of an institutional link the problem that Follesdal and Hix identify, that European Parliament elections ‘are not about the content or direction of EU policy’, remains.<sup>16</sup>

Political representation requires more than formal institutional linkages between election results and institutional configuration. Representation also requires that there is some substantive connection between the views of citizens and the outcome of elections. Building on the classic model on political representation, the Responsible Party Model of government, Thomassen identifies five key requirements for political representation, which both political parties and those that cast their vote must meet:<sup>17</sup>

- 1) Voters have a choice between at least two parties with different policy proposals.
- 2) Party discipline is sufficient to enable them to implement their policy.
- 3) Voters have policy preferences.
- 4) Voters perceive the differences between the policy proposals of different political parties.
- 5) Voters vote according to their policy preferences.

In the context of the European Union, Thomassen acknowledges that the lack of an institutional linkage between electoral inputs and government outputs is a serious problem for the Responsible Party Model of government, but he argues:

“...the treaties on which the European political institutions are based do suggest that a system of political representation as expressed in the Responsible Party

---

<sup>15</sup> Sara Hobolt, “A Vote for the President? The Role of Spitzenkandidaten in the 2014 European Parliament Elections,” *Journal of European Public Policy* 21, no. 10 (November 26, 2014): 1528–1540.

<sup>16</sup> Follesdal and Hix, “Why There Is a Democratic Deficit in the EU,” 552.

<sup>17</sup> APSA, “Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System.,” *American Political Science Review* 44, no. 3 (1950); Jacques Thomassen, “Empirical Research into Political Representation: Failing Democracy or Failing Models?,” in *Elections at Home and Abroad, Essays in Honor of Warren Miller*, ed. M. Kent Jennings and T.E. Mann (Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press, 1994), 251–252.

Model is the goal to which the Union should aspire. Therefore, we do believe it is useful and justified to apply the Responsible Party Model as a benchmark to evaluate the effectiveness of the system of political representation at the European level.”<sup>18</sup>

The wording of several clauses of different EU treaties does indeed suggest that the EU aspires to be a representative democracy, an ambition which has increased over time. While the Treaty of Rome timidly suggested that what would become the European Parliament ‘shall be composed of representatives of the peoples’, later treaties were more bold. The Maastricht Treaty introduced a clause declaring that ‘political parties at European level are important as a factor for integration within the Union. They contribute to forming a European awareness and to expressing the political will of the citizens of the Union.’ The failed Constitutional Treaty went further, proclaiming that ‘the functioning of the Union shall be founded on representative democracy’ and that ‘citizens are directly represented at Union level in the European Parliament’. Although the Constitutional Treaty failed at ratification, this audacious statement of democratic principles remained in its replacement, the Lisbon Treaty.

To reiterate Thomassen’s point, that the Responsible Party Model does not neatly fit the EU because it lacks a formal institutional link between elections and the executive branch, does not tell us very much about democratic politics and European integration. The EU itself has staked a strong claim that its very legitimacy rests on representative democratic principles. Leaving aside institutional shortcomings, at least for the time being (and which at the 2014 election at least, might be less of an issue than they have been previously), where the Responsible Party Model succeeds and fails can tell us a great deal about the relationship between electoral politics and European integration, and where the challenges to a more democratic EU lie.

---

<sup>18</sup> Jacques Thomassen, ed., *The Legitimacy of the European Union After Enlargement* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 17.

Following the Maastricht Treaty and the transformation from European Communities to European Union, Schmitt and Thomassen evaluated how well the Responsible Party Model functioned in the EU.<sup>19</sup> They found that on the left-right dimension parties and voters both meet the requirements of the Responsible Party Model but that the same could not be said for European integration. The European integration policies presented by most of the mainstream political parties offered very little in the way of choice to voters, who paid very little attention to parties' European positions anyway. For both reasons, European integration issues ultimately had very little to do with the votes cast in European Parliament elections.

Returning to the issue a decade later Thomassen found that despite the apparent politicisation of Europe and the end of the period of permissive consensus, very little had changed.<sup>20</sup> In neither case were European citizens well represented on European integration issues.

Although this suggests the apparent failure of the Responsible Party Model in the EU, in both cases the model is declared a qualified success. Thomassen pardons the failure to represent citizens on European integration for three reasons: First, the primary axis of politics in the European Parliament is along left-right lines. Second, a unidimensional political axis is necessary for meaningful representation to occur. And third, changes to EU institutions have to be agreed by member-states and so should be a matter for domestic politics, not the European Parliament. Each of these justifications is problematic.

Although the primary axis of political contestation in the European Parliament is indeed the left-right dimension, division along a European integration dimension still represents a significant source of political conflict.<sup>21</sup> The point here is not that the left-right dimension is unimportant

---

<sup>19</sup> Hermann Schmitt and Jacques Thomassen, *Political Representation and Legitimacy in the European Union* (Oxford University Press, 1999).

<sup>20</sup> Thomassen, *The Legitimacy of the European Union After Enlargement*.

<sup>21</sup> Simon Hix, Abdul Noury, and Gérard Roland, "Power to the Parties: Cohesion and Competition in the European Parliament, 1979–2001," *British Journal of Political Science* 35, no. 02 (April 2005): 209–234;

but rather that if a division exists that is apparently unrelated to the votes cast by citizens, this is a clear problem for the Responsible Party Model.

That Thomassen does not think that this is a problem relates to the second reason, that policy voting can only yield meaningful representation when ‘political parties, in the composition of their programs, and voters, when they decide which party to vote for, are constrained by the same unidimensional ideology’.<sup>22</sup> That this is the case, Thomassen argues, relates to social choice theory and the many problems faced by majority rule. One problem that Thomassen points to is Ostrogorski’s paradox, which shows that when multiple issues are at stake in an election, if voters choose the candidate that they agree with on the majority of issues it is still possible that the majority of voters disagree with the winner of the election on every issue.<sup>23</sup>

Ostrogorski’s paradox is just one of a number of similar problems identified by social choice theory, which has shown more generally that multidimensional preferences are a serious

---

Simon Hix, Abdul G. Noury, and Gérard Roland, *Democratic Politics in the European Parliament* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

<sup>22</sup> Thomassen, “Failing Democracy or Failing Models?,” 254.

<sup>23</sup> Douglas W. Rae and Hans Daudt, “The Ostrogorski Paradox: A Peculiarity of Compound Majority Decision,” *European Journal of Political Research* 4, no. 4 (December 1, 1976): 391–398.

Ostrogorski’s paradox is illustrated by a simple example. Take an election with five voters (a, b, c, d, e), two parties (X, Y) and three issues (1, 2, 3). Whether each voter agrees with party X or party Y on each issue is shown in the table below:

| Voter | Issue |   |   | Party voter agrees with on most issues |
|-------|-------|---|---|----------------------------------------|
|       | 1     | 2 | 3 |                                        |
| a     | X     | Y | Y | Y                                      |
| b     | Y     | X | Y | Y                                      |
| c     | Y     | Y | X | Y                                      |
| d     | X     | X | X | X                                      |
| e     | X     | X | X | X                                      |

If each voter chooses the party they agree with on the majority of issues then Y is preferred to X by three of the five voters. On each of the three issues however X is preferred to Y by the majority of voters.

theoretical problem for majority decision making.<sup>24</sup> From this perspective if votes were cast along European integration lines as well as left-right lines this would itself be a problem for the Responsible Party Model. The 'problem' of representation on European integration issues is itself a necessary condition for broader representation on left-right issues to be possible.

However, multidimensionality is not the only problem that social choice theory identifies with majority rule: beyond the case where there are genuinely only two possible choices, a decision rule that satisfies a very minimal set of fairness criteria is impossible.<sup>25</sup> Summarising the implications of social choice theory for democracy, Riker argues that democracy, at least when conceived of as something that expresses 'the will of the people', does not, and cannot, exist.<sup>26</sup> From a social choice standpoint, the potential issue of a separate European integration dimension is probably the least of the Responsible Party Model's problems.

Many scholars have come to democracy's defence, arguing that even if the problems social choice theory identifies are true in abstract theory, in reality they are much less of a problem.<sup>27</sup> Even if one accepts the validity of the social choice arguments, as Dahl argues, this does not mean that 'the unassailable proposition that majority rule is imperfect – perhaps indeed highly imperfect – [leads] to the conclusion that it should be replaced by an alternative... the

---

<sup>24</sup> Richard D. McKelvey, "Intransitivities in Multidimensional Voting Models and Some Implications for Agenda Control," *Journal of Economic Theory* 12, no. 3 (1976): 472–482; Norman Schofield, "Instability of Simple Dynamic Games," *The Review of Economic Studies* 45, no. 3 (October 1, 1978): 575–594.

<sup>25</sup> Kenneth O. May, "A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision," *Econometrica* 20, no. 4 (October 1, 1952): 680–684; Kenneth J. Arrow, "A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare," *Journal of Political Economy* 58, no. 4 (August 1, 1950): 328–346; Allan Gibbard, "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," *Econometrica* 41, no. 4 (July 1, 1973): 587–601; Mark Allen Satterthwaite, "Strategy-Proofness and Arrow's Conditions: Existence and Correspondence Theorems for Voting Procedures and Social Welfare Functions," *Journal of Economic Theory* 10, no. 2 (April 1975): 187–217.

<sup>26</sup> William H. Riker, *Liberalism Against Populism: A Confrontation Between the Theory of Democracy and the Theory of Social Choice*, Reissue edition (Illinois: Waveland Pr Inc, 1988).

<sup>27</sup> Gordon Tullock, "Why so Much Stability," *Public Choice* 37, no. 2 (January 1, 1981): 189–204; Gerry Mackie, *Democracy Defended* (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

alternatives to majority rule are also deeply flawed.’<sup>28</sup> The problems of social choice remain, but the conclusion that multiple dimensions leads to endless vote cycling in abstract models has little bearing on the problem of the democratic deficit in the EU. The reality of democracy may be messy and imperfect, with the ultimate ‘meaning’ of votes cast in an election impossible to ascertain, but a more pragmatic view of democracy is ultimately more satisfying – either democracy is impossible and any additional insufficiencies are of trivial consequence, or we should strive to improve the system we have, even if the end goal of democratic perfection is unobtainable.

From this more realistic position, the unidimensionality restriction of the Responsible Party Model seems arbitrary and unnecessary, and the problem of representation on European integration issues returns. This is not to say that dimensionality is unimportant. Indeed if there is no evidence of representation on European integration issues directly, the relationship between European integration and other dimensions of political ideology is of paramount importance. Without a strong connection between European integration positions and other ideological dimensions ‘any representation that does exist on these [European integration] policy dimensions is more the effect of coincidence than of the operation of any set of conditions... that generate representation.’<sup>29</sup>

The Responsible Party Model provides a useful starting point for assessing representation on different issues, but because voters may be weighing up multiple considerations when casting their vote, in order to assess the level of representation on specific issues, it requires slight modification. Representation on different issues can be said to occur when:

---

<sup>28</sup> Robert Dahl, *Democracy and Its Critics* (Yale University Press, 1989).

<sup>29</sup> Wouter van der Brug and Cees van der Eijk, “The Cognitive Basis of Voting,” in *Political Representation and Legitimacy in the European Union*, ed. Hermann Schmitt and Jacques Thomassen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 153.

- 1) Voters have a choice between at least two parties with different issue positions.
- 2) Party discipline is sufficient to enable them to implement their policy.
- 3) Voters have policy preferences on the issue.
- 4) Voters perceive the differences between the issue positions of different political parties.
- 5) Voters' issue preferences have a significant impact on how they cast their vote.

A 'significant impact' is of course open to interpretation but it is necessarily vague – one voter may weigh multiple issues differently in their consideration to another and it is not clear that a particular issue needs to be paramount in all, or even most, voters' minds in order for issue representation to occur. Here a pragmatic approach is taken to this question – an issue is taken to have a 'significant' impact on vote choices when its effect is statistically discernible at conventional levels of statistical significance.

Schmitt and Thomassen's final reason for arguing that the absence of representation on EU issues in the European Parliament is not necessarily a problem is that if there is an EU democratic deficit, it is the absence of contention over EU issues in *national* elections.

*“Formal decisions on a further transfer of sovereignty from the national to the European level are subject to the intergovernmental regime of European decision-making. They need the consent of national governments and are, at least in principle, under the control of national parliaments and national electorates. Therefore, the interesting paradox is that what usually are called European issues are basically national issues. As far as the existing party system fails to offer a meaningful choice to the voters, this is a problem at the national rather than the European level.”<sup>30</sup>*

Although Schmitt and Thomassen are right that altering EU treaties is primarily a concern of member-state governments – and the absence of EU issue representation at the national level

---

<sup>30</sup> Schmitt and Thomassen, *Political Representation and Legitimacy in the European Union*, 259.

is itself a problem – since the Lisbon Treaty the European Parliament has had the power to ‘submit to the Council proposals for the amendment of the Treaties on which the Union is founded’ and participate in the convention examining the proposed amendments, and its consent is necessary for treaty changes under the simplified revision procedure (Article 48).<sup>31</sup>

Even leaving treaty changes to one side, the European Parliament is the pre-eminent venue for debates about European integration. That this is the case is perhaps particularly important given the apparent reluctance of member-states to engage in treaty form, despite (or perhaps because of) the pressure placed on current EU institutions by the Eurozone crisis.<sup>32</sup> The absence of representation on European matters in the most important public forum concerned with European integration cannot be easily dismissed.

### **1.3 – Outline of the thesis**

None of the three arguments that might ameliorate the absence of representation on European integration issues – that the primary axis of politics in the European Parliament is along left-right lines, that a unidimensional political dimension is necessary for meaningful representation to occur, and that the progress of European integration is primarily a concern for national politics – can sufficiently excuse the absence of representation on European integration. Given this, it is important to rethink the quality of representation on European integration in the European Union and identify where challenges to adequate representation lie.

#### **1.3.1 – EU Issue representation**

The issue representation model requires that both parties and voters meet certain requirements. One aspect of the model – that party discipline is sufficient to enable parties to

---

<sup>31</sup> Additionally, since the Single European Act, the European Parliament’s consent has been required in order for new member-states to accede to the EU.

<sup>32</sup> It is now longer since the signing of the Lisbon Treaty than between any previous treaties since the Single European Act, and there is no sign of a new treaty being on the table in the near future.

implement their desired policy is well established, and so is accepted as being sufficient for representation to occur.<sup>33</sup>

In order to assess the other requirements it is first necessary to measure party positions accurately. Chapter 2 develops a set of one and two dimensional general left-right and economic left-right/social liberal-conservative scales using party manifesto data that are used in subsequent analysis. Chapter 3 addresses whether parties provide voters with a choice of different positions on European integration and shows that parties have become increasingly divided over European integration and that it has been increasingly salient in party manifestos, at least at national elections.

The primary focus of Chapter 3 however is of the relationship between the European integration dimension and the left-right and social liberal-conservative dimensions. It shows that whether the dimensionality of politics is imagined in a one dimensional 'general left-right' form or two 'economic left-right/social liberal-conservative' dimensions leads to very different understandings of the way ideology structures positions towards European integration. It also demonstrates that the relationship between European integration and the other political dimensions has not been stable over time – party positions on European integration are decreasingly structured by the economic left-right dimension and increasingly structured by social liberal-conservative positions. Given the dominance of the left-right dimension in

---

<sup>33</sup> Hermann Schmitt and Jacques Thomassen, "Distinctiveness and Cohesion of Parties," in *Political Representation and Legitimacy in the European Union*, ed. Hermann Schmitt and Jacques Thomassen (Oxford University Press, 1999), 111–127; Clifford J. Carrubba and Matthew Gabel, "Roll-Call Votes and Party Discipline in the European Parliament: Reconsidering MEP Voting Behavior," European Parliament Research Group Working Paper No. 2-99, 1999; Abdul G. Noury, "Ideology, Nationality and Euro-Parliamentarians," *European Union Politics* 3, no. 1 (March 1, 2002): 33–58; Simon Hix, "Legislative Behaviour and Party Competition in the European Parliament: An Application of Nominate to the EU," *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 39, no. 4 (November 1, 2001): 663–688; Simon Hix, "Parliamentary Behavior with Two Principals: Preferences, Parties, and Voting in the European Parliament," *American Journal of Political Science* 46, no. 3 (July 1, 2002): 688–698; Hix, Noury, and Roland, "Power to the Parties"; Hix, Noury, and Roland, *Democratic Politics in the European Parliament*.

European politics, this presents an obvious threat to representation on European integration issues if issue specific representation does not occur.

Chapter 4 examines whether voters accurately perceive party positions on European integration using a dual-process cognition framework. It finds that although voters assign parties positions on the European integration dimension these positions are, on average at least, entirely unaffected by the information that the parties themselves provide about their own positions. Perceptions of party positions on both the left-right and European integration dimensions are affected by cognitive biases. This presents an important challenge to the issue representation model, both in the context of European integration and more generally.

Many recent studies have been optimistic about the influence of European integration attitudes on vote choice at European Parliament elections, commonly called EU issue voting. Continuing the psychological perspective of the previous chapter, Chapter 5 re-examines levels of EU issue voting at the 2009 European Parliament election in the light of projection bias, that is: the tendency for voters to perceive parties they favour as holding positions closer to their own than is actually the case (assimilation bias) and to perceive parties they dislike as holding positions further away from their own than is actually the case (contrast bias). A conventional estimate of EU issue voting suggests that significant levels of EU issue voting occurred in 21 of the EU-27 member-states. After controlling for projection bias however, only 13 of the EU-27 member-states have statistically equivalent EU issue voting effects. In another 13 member-states projection bias leads to an overestimation of EU issue voting, in 12 of these EU issue voting is completely accounted for by projection bias. Projection bias on the left-right dimension also leads to an underestimate of EU issue voting in one case, the United Kingdom.

### 1.3.2 – Beyond representation?

Chapters 3, 4, and 5 paint a fairly bleak picture of the state of representation on European integration issues. The failure of representation of European integration preferences casts the democratic credentials of the European Union into serious doubt. Given these failings any full assessment of European integration representation must look to see whether these problems are redressed by other forms of democracy.

Chapter 6 assesses whether direct democracy offers a viable alternative to representative democracy on European integration issues. Although referendums offer citizens a chance to voice their views on European issues, the decision to call referendums on the EU lies firmly in the hands of member-state governments. Examining the circumstances in which referendums are held on European integration reveals that referendums are only called in particular conditions – when European integration is unpopular and national elections are close – leading to a distorted picture of the views of the electorate towards European integration. The circumstances in which referendums are held – when European integration is a contentious issue and elections are imminent – are also the conditions that are likely to lead to electoral contestation over European integration at both the party and voter level. Rather than provide a solution to the representational deficit in European integration, direct democracy exacerbates the problem.

Following this bleak assessment Chapter 7 asks whether there are any prospects for future improvement to European integration and offers a glimmer of hope – European Parliament elections have resulted in an expansion of the party systems in many EU member-states, a necessary condition for overcoming the problems faced by representation in the EU. The source of this change is not competition over European integration, but the result of an understudied aspect of European Parliament elections – the electoral systems they use. The effects of

electoral rules on party systems have been well known since Duverger first proposed his famous law.<sup>34</sup> Many European Parliament elections are held under different electoral rules to national elections. Chapter 7 shows that where a more permissive electoral system is used for European Parliament elections, the size of the party system at European Parliament elections has grown towards what we would expect from the European Parliament electoral rules in isolation, and that this has led to a subsequent growth in the size of the national party system. This suggests that the potential for party system change is perhaps greater than is often thought, raising the possibility that representation on European integration may yet be improved.

Finally, Chapter 8 brings together the different assessments of representation on European integration issues from the previous chapters, concluding that although they cannot be completely separated from institutional problems and the behavior of political parties, the primary obstacle to European integration representation is voter engagement with European integration issues. In closing, the chapter details the opportunities and challenges for future representation on European integration.

---

<sup>34</sup> Maurice Duverger, *Political Parties, Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State* (London: Methuen, 1954).

## **Chapter 2 – Building policy scales from manifesto data: a referential content validity approach**

---

Central to both Schmitt and Thomassen's assessment of representation in the European Union, and the critique of that assessment offered here, is the idea that political conflict is structured by underlying ideological dimensions. The number and content of those dimensions, and how European integration positions relate to them, are key to understanding the functioning of representation on European integration. If European integration positions are fused with existing political dimensions then representation on those dimensions will ensure representation on European integration. If European integration issues do not form part of existing dimensions, then only votes directly influenced by European integration issues can bring about representation on European integration.

Subsequent chapters will explore the questions: what the relationship is between underlying political dimensions and European integration (Chapter 3); how accurately voters perceive party positions on left-right and European integration (Chapter 4; and whether votes are affected by European integration issues (Chapter 5). However in order to address the relationship between European integration and other political dimensions and how voters perceive party positions on different dimensions we first need to know what positions parties actually hold on each of these dimensions. As will be made clear in this chapter, for a variety of reasons – the availability of data over a long time span, decisions about the dimensional nature of political space, and methodological problems specific to building scales from manifesto data – existing approaches to measuring party positions on political dimensions are inadequate for these purposes. This

chapter develops a new set of scales that will be used in subsequent chapters to address the substantive concerns of this thesis.

## 2.1 – Measuring party positions

Determining where a party sits on a policy issue or an ideological dimension is one of the most fundamental questions of measurement in political science. There have been myriad answers to these basic questions which broadly draw on four methodological approaches – expert surveys, mass surveys, roll call votes, and electoral manifesto data. All of these approaches have their benefits and costs, and in an ideal world, many approaches would be used to ensure cross-validation of empirical findings. Unfortunately however, the world is far from ideal, particularly if we wish to analyse politics across a wide time span as is the case here: we cannot travel back in time and conduct expert and mass surveys, and the existing surveys do not cover a long enough period nor are they conducted at regular enough intervals to track fine grained developments in multiple countries. Scholars who wish to tackle these questions currently only have one option, to use manifesto data, specifically that collected by the group currently known as the Manifesto Project on Political Representation (MARPOR).<sup>1</sup>

Although a certain amount of methodological handwringing seems to be *de rigueur* amongst scholars who use them, the general validity of scales derived from MARPOR data has now been well established. MARPOR have endeavoured to show the validity of manifesto scales –

---

<sup>1</sup> Ian Budge et al., *Mapping Policy Preferences: Estimates for Parties, Electors, and Governments, 1945-1998* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2001); Hans-Dieter Klingemann et al., *Mapping Policy Preferences II: Estimates for Parties, Electors, and Governments in Central and Eastern Europe, European Union and OECD 1990-2003* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2006); Andrea Volkens et al., *The Manifesto Data Collection. Manifesto Project (MRG/CMP/MARPOR)* (Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB), 2013).

Depending on the date, this group has alternatively been called the Manifesto Research Group (MRG), Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP), or most recently, the Manifesto Project on Political Representation (MARPOR). MARPOR is used as a generic term to cover all of the incarnations of the project.

particularly their 'Rile' scale – across many different validity criteria.<sup>2</sup> Many authors however, particularly critics of MARPOR's scaling methods, have tended to focus only on convergent validity, tested by cross validation with scales derived from other techniques.<sup>3</sup>

Although a bewildering number of scales have been constructed from MARPOR data, their convergent validity is often tested against the same expert survey data – most commonly the Laver and Hunt/Benoit and Laver and Chapel Hill group expert surveys.<sup>4</sup> Although some authors seem to treat them as such in their validation approaches, expert surveys do not represent 'true' party positions, but rather estimates of these positions with their own strengths and weaknesses, and so their use in discriminating against competing manifesto scales is problematic.<sup>5</sup> Even leaving these debates to one side, the fact that many different scales, composed of different manifesto components and combined by different methods, all apparently perform equally well in terms of convergent validity suggests that although cross-

---

<sup>2</sup> Budge et al., *Mapping Policy Preferences: Estimates for Parties, Electors, and Governments, 1945-1998*; Klingemann et al., *Mapping Policy Preferences II: Estimates for Parties, Electors, and Governments in Central and Eastern Europe, European Union and OECD 1990-2003*.

<sup>3</sup> Ryan Bakker and Sara Hobolt, "Measuring Party Positions," in *Political Choice Matters*, ed. Geoffrey Evans and Nan Dirk de Graaf (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Ian Budge, "Validating Party Policy Placements," *British Journal of Political Science* 31, no. 1 (2001): 179–223; Budge et al., *Mapping Policy Preferences: Estimates for Parties, Electors, and Governments, 1945-1998*; Klingemann et al., *Mapping Policy Preferences II: Estimates for Parties, Electors, and Governments in Central and Eastern Europe, European Union and OECD 1990-2003*; Will Lowe et al., "Scaling Policy Preferences from Coded Political Texts," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 36, no. 1 (2011): 123–155; Leonard Ray, "Validity of Measured Party Positions on European Integration: Assumptions, Approaches, and a Comparison of Alternative Measures," *Electoral Studies* 26 (2007): 11–22.

<sup>4</sup> Kenneth Benoit and Michael Laver, "Estimating Party Policy Positions: Comparing Expert Surveys and Hand-Coded Content Analysis," *Electoral Studies* 26, no. 1 (2007): 90–107; Liesbet Hooghe et al., "Reliability and Validity of Measuring Party Positions: The Chapel Hill Expert Surveys of 2002 and 2006," *European Journal of Political Research* 49, no. 5 (2010): 687–703; Michael Laver and Ben W. Hunt, *Policy and Party Competition* (New York: Routledge, 1992); Marco R. Steenbergen and Gary Marks, "Evaluating Expert Judgments," *European Journal of Political Research* 46, no. 3 (2007): 347–366.

<sup>5</sup> Ian Budge, "Expert Judgements of Party Policy Positions: Uses and Limitations in Political Research," *European Journal of Political Research* 37, no. 1 (2000): 103–113; Steenbergen and Marks, "Evaluating Expert Judgments"; Andrea Volkens, "Strengths and Weaknesses of Approaches to Measuring Policy Positions of Parties," *Electoral Studies* 26, no. 1 (March 2007): 108–120.

validation is an essential method of establishing the general validity of different scales, it is perhaps less useful as a technique for choosing between them.

That different scales have been found to have essentially equal convergent validity is not completely surprising given the large overlap in the components used to construct them, as demonstrated by the three examples of 'left-right' scales shown in table 2.1, and the two 'social' scales shown in table 2.2. Each of these scales has been cross-validated against other measures of left-right, suggesting that scholars must turn to other measures of validity in order to choose between them.

Researchers interested in questions relating to the dimensionality of politics also face another concern – the various sets of scales on offer tend to treat the underlying dimensionality of politics as *either* unidimensional or multidimensional. MARPOR's Rile scale implies a single 'super dimension' ranging from liberal/state control of the economy/left to conservative/free market/right. Many other manifesto scale approaches have also adopted a one-dimensional approach.<sup>6</sup> One dimensional scales are prevalent in many streams of the political science literature, and not only when using scales from manifesto data. However, whenever scholars set out to look for multiple ideological dimensions, they tend to find them.<sup>7</sup>

---

<sup>6</sup> Simon Franzmann and André Kaiser, "Locating Political Parties in Policy Space: A Reanalysis of Party Manifesto Data," *Party Politics* 12, no. 2 (2006): 163–188; Matthew J. Gabel and John D. Huber, "Putting Parties in Their Place: Inferring Party Left-Right Ideological Positions from Party Manifesto Data," *American Journal of Political Science* 44, no. 1 (2000): 94–103.

<sup>7</sup> Ryan Bakker, Seth Jolly, and Jonathan Polk, "Complexity in the European Party Space: Exploring Dimensionality with Experts," *European Union Politics* 13, no. 2 (2012): 219–245; Andrija Henjak, "Political Cleavages and Socio-Economic Context: How Welfare Regimes and Historical Divisions Shape Political Cleavages," *West European Politics* 33, no. 3 (2010): 474–504; Norman Schofield, "Political Competition and Multiparty Coalition Governments," *European Journal of Political Research* 23, no. 1 (1993): 1–33; Heather Stoll, "Dimensionality and the Number of Parties in Legislative Elections," *Party Politics* 17, no. 3 (2010): 405–429; Paul Warwick, "Towards a Common Dimensionality in West European Policy Spaces," *Party Politics* 8, no. 1 (2002): 101–122.

Although the description given to these dimensions varies from scholar to scholar a consistent finding has been the existence of an economic dimension, consisting of issues surrounding markets, labour, economic planning and regulation, and a social dimension, consisting of issues surrounding personal freedoms, human rights, morality, and traditions.<sup>8</sup>

| Left                                                        |                                    | Right |                                    |
|-------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------|-------|------------------------------------|
| MARPOR 'Rile'                                               |                                    |       |                                    |
| 103                                                         | Anti-imperialism: Anti-Colonialism | 104   | Military: Positive                 |
| 105                                                         | Military: Negative                 | 201   | Freedom and Human Rights: Positive |
| 106                                                         | Peace: Positive                    | 203   | Constitutionalism: Positive        |
| 107                                                         | Internationalism: Positive         | 305   | Political Authority: Positive      |
| 202                                                         | Democracy: Positive                | 401   | Free Enterprise: Positive          |
| 403                                                         | Market Regulation: Positive        | 402   | Incentives: Positive               |
| 404                                                         | Economic Planning: Positive        | 407   | Protectionism: Negative            |
| 406                                                         | Protectionism: Positive            | 414   | Economic Orthodoxy: Positive       |
| 412                                                         | Controlled Economy: Positive       | 505   | Welfare State Limitation: Positive |
| 413                                                         | Nationalisation: Positive          | 601   | National Way of Life: Positive     |
| 504                                                         | Welfare State Expansion: Positive  | 603   | Traditional Morality: Positive     |
| 506                                                         | Education Expansion: Positive      | 605   | Law and Order: Positive            |
| 701                                                         | Labour Groups: Positive            | 606   | Social Harmony: Positive           |
| Benoit and Laver State involvement in economy <sup>11</sup> |                                    |       |                                    |
| 403                                                         | Market Regulation: Positive        | 401   | Free Enterprise: Positive          |
| 404                                                         | Economic Planning: Positive        | 402   | Incentives: Positive               |
| 406                                                         | Protectionism: Positive            | 407   | Protectionism: Negative            |
| 412                                                         | Controlled Economy: Positive       | 414   | Economic Orthodoxy: Positive       |
| 413                                                         | Nationalisation: Positive          | 505   | Welfare State Limitation: Positive |
| 504                                                         | Welfare State Expansion: Positive  |       |                                    |
| 506                                                         | Education Expansion: Positive      |       |                                    |
| 701                                                         | Labour Groups: Positive            |       |                                    |
| Bakker and Hobolt left-right <sup>12</sup>                  |                                    |       |                                    |
| 403                                                         | Market Regulation: Positive        | 401   | Free Enterprise: Positive          |
| 404                                                         | Economic Planning: Positive        | 402   | Incentives: Positive               |
| 405                                                         | Corporatism                        | 407   | Protectionism: Negative            |
| 406                                                         | Protectionism: Positive            | 410   | Productivity: Positive             |
| 412                                                         | Controlled Economy: Positive       | 414   | Economic Orthodoxy: Positive       |
| 413                                                         | Nationalisation: Positive          | 505   | Welfare State Limitation: Positive |
| 409                                                         | Keynesian Demand Management        | 507   | Education Limitation: Positive     |
| 415                                                         | Marxist Analysis: Positive         | 702   | Labour Groups: Negative            |
| 503                                                         | Social Justice                     |       |                                    |
| 504                                                         | Welfare State Expansion: Positive  |       |                                    |
| 506                                                         | Education Expansion: Positive      |       |                                    |
| 701                                                         | Labour Groups: Positive            |       |                                    |

TABLE 2.1. EXAMPLES OF COMPONENT CHOICE USED TO CONSTRUCT PREVIOUS GENERAL AND ECONOMIC 'LEFT-RIGHT' SCALES USING MARPOR DATA.

<sup>8</sup> Common names for the economic dimension include 'left-right', and 'materialist'. Common names for the social dimension are 'liberal-conservative', 'libertarian-authoritarian', 'post-materialist', 'Green/Alternative/Libertarian-Traditional/Authoritarian/Nationalist'. Here they will be called the 'Economic Left-Right', and 'Social Liberal-Conservative' dimensions.

<sup>11</sup> Benoit and Laver, "Estimating Party Policy Positions."

<sup>12</sup> Bakker and Hobolt, "Measuring Party Positions."

| <b>Benoit and Laver Social liberal-conservative</b> |                                    |                      |                                    |
|-----------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------|----------------------|------------------------------------|
| <b>Liberal</b>                                      |                                    | <b>Conservative</b>  |                                    |
| 103                                                 | Anti-imperialism: Anti-Colonialism | 104                  | Military: Positive                 |
| 105                                                 | Military: Negative                 | 201                  | Freedom and Human Rights: Positive |
| 106                                                 | Peace: Positive                    | 203                  | Constitutionalism: Positive        |
| 107                                                 | Internationalism: Positive         | 305                  | Political Authority: Positive      |
| 202                                                 | Democracy: Positive                | 601                  | National Way of Life: Positive     |
|                                                     |                                    | 603                  | Traditional Morality: Positive     |
|                                                     |                                    | 605                  | Law and Order: Positive            |
|                                                     |                                    | 606                  | Social Harmony: Positive           |
| <b>Bakker and Hobolt Libertarian-authoritarian</b>  |                                    |                      |                                    |
| <b>Libertarian</b>                                  |                                    | <b>Authoritarian</b> |                                    |
| 201                                                 | Freedom and Human Rights: Positive | 305                  | Political Authority: Positive      |
| 202                                                 | Democracy: Positive                | 601                  | National Way of Life: Positive     |
| 416                                                 | Anti-Growth Economy                | 603                  | Traditional Morality: Positive     |
| 501                                                 | Environmental Protection           | 605                  | Law and Order: Positive            |
| 502                                                 | Culture                            | 606                  | Social Harmony: Positive           |
| 602                                                 | National Way of Life: Negative     | 608                  | Multiculturalism: Negative         |
| 604                                                 | Traditional Morality: Negative     |                      |                                    |
| 607                                                 | Multiculturalism: Negative         |                      |                                    |
| 705                                                 | Underprivileged Minority Groups    |                      |                                    |
| 706                                                 | Non-economic Demographic Groups    |                      |                                    |

TABLE 2.2. MANIFESTO COMPONENTS USED TO CONSTRUCT PREVIOUS 'SOCIAL DIMENSION' SCALES USING MARPOR DATA.

Although the existing evidence supports a multidimensional interpretation of political space, the approach here remains agnostic to this question and recognises that the use of one or two dimensions in research may be driven by many reasons – from the appropriateness of multiple dimensions in different contexts to the simple matter of pragmatism around the availability of other data with which researchers wish to compare their data (left-right placements in survey research tend to be unidimensional for example, as is the case in Chapters 4 and 5).

On some questions, rather than taking an *a priori* stance on the question of dimensionality, scholars may wish to compare the results of alternately specifying unidimensional or multidimensional models investigating party competition – for example whether party positions on European integration are best explained by a one or two dimensional conception of political

space, as in Chapter 3. A problem facing such research questions is that scales using the MARPOR data have tended to be developed using either a unidimensional or multidimensional framework and there is no one set of scales that contains both unidimensional and multidimensional scales that shares an underlying method of component choice. MARPOR's venerable 'Rile' scale may well be appropriate for a unidimensional approach, or the Benoit and Laver state intervention in the economy and social liberal-conservative scales for a multidimensional approach. However comparing the Rile scale to the Benoit and Laver scales engenders not just a comparison of dimensionality, but also a comparison of different underlying assumptions about which component should be included and excluded in a scale. The results of any analysis based on such a comparison may occur not as a result of any true underlying relationship but because of different decisions about which components should be included or excluded from a scale. The aim of this chapter is to produce a set of one and two dimensional scales that are uniquely comparable across conceptions of dimensionality because they are based on the same assumptions and selection method, though each scale is of course suitable for standalone use as well.

Any scholar wishing to develop MARPOR scales faces three questions: What components should be used to construct the scale? How should they be combined? Are the scales valid measures of what they are supposed to measure? Although these questions suggest a natural order of enquiry, the existing literature has most satisfactorily answered them in reverse. As previously discussed the general validity of MARPOR scales is now well established. Similarly, several different methods of combining components have been developed and assessed.<sup>14</sup> However, existing approaches to component selection – or in other words, the content validity of scales –

---

<sup>14</sup> HeeMin Kim and Richard C. Fording, "Voter Ideology in Western Democracies, 1946-1989," *European Journal of Political Research* 33 (1998): 73–97; Lowe et al., "Scaling Policy Preferences from Coded Political Texts"; Ray, "Validity of Measured Party Positions on European Integration: Assumptions, Approaches, and a Comparison of Alternative Measures."

are less well developed and are often conducted on an ad hoc basis. This chapter argues that scholars should think carefully about the ways in which different methods of counting manifesto components affect the end result of the scale, and how individual components should relate to the overall scale. It then develops a novel method for selecting components based on their exogenous correlation with provisional overall scales and uses it to construct a set of new scales.

## **2.2 – Building Blocks**

The MARPOR dataset consists of observations of political parties at particular elections.<sup>15</sup> A political document (usually the party's electoral manifesto, though occasionally other documents are substituted) is coded by counting the number of 'quasi-sentences' that fit in 56 predefined categories.<sup>16</sup> MARPOR report the salience of each category in a manifesto as a percentage of the total number of quasi-sentences in the manifesto. Although each component is a measure of salience, MARPOR (and every subsequent measure) use combinations of categories to create positional measures. The general logic behind converting salience measures to positional measures being that the more a party emphasises 'left' or 'right' issues (salience) the more 'left' or 'right' (in terms of position) we can consider it to be.

The percentage measure is the most commonly used starting point for scale building, including the MARPOR's own 'Rile' scale. As the building block of positional scales however, it has one main problem in that it is not independent of irrelevant alternatives (IIA): the value assigned to a specific number of quasi-sentences changes with the inclusion of other additional, irrelevant, quasi-sentences. To demonstrate how this problem might adversely affect the outcome of positional scales take the case of an imaginary political party at two elections. The political party

---

<sup>15</sup> The analysis here is conducted on the full 2012b version of the MARPOR dataset (the latest at time of analysis), which contains 3,611 country-election-party observations from 614 elections in 55 countries.

<sup>16</sup> The analysis here does not include the additional subcategories that were later added to the original coding scheme for manifestos from former Soviet countries (per1011 – per7062) as they are not used in all countries.

(being lazy) copies its entire manifesto from the first election and uses it again – word for word – at the second, with the addition of one superficial and (from a policy perspective) irrelevant sentence congratulating a national sporting team on their success at the recent Olympics.<sup>17</sup> Despite having identical policies in both manifestos the total number of quasi-sentences in the two manifestos will be different and so each category will receive different percentage scores in each of the quasi-sentence categories and consequently, regardless of the method used to combine the information, will receive slightly different positions on a policy scale.

The IIA issue is potentially particularly problematic when building scales in a multidimensional setting. The percentage salience of components used in one scale will be affected not just by irrelevant information but by information that is relevant to other scales, leading to potential endogeneity problems. As parties emphasise issues on a particular dimension then the relative salience of others will decrease, leading to positions that are closer to the centre of the scale than would otherwise be the case.

One obvious alternative is simply to substitute the total number of quasi-sentences in each category for the percentage measure. However depending on the combination method used, this is also potentially problematic because the overall length of manifesto varies considerably between different parties. The data suggests that the different lengths are not randomly dispersed between countries and parties either: the mean number of total quasi-sentences varies considerably by country – for example Spain (mean length =1493.64, standard deviation

---

<sup>17</sup> It could perhaps be argued that even this is not actually an ‘irrelevant’ issue for some reason, but this case is simply meant to illustrate the IIA argument with a trivial example rather than the irrelevancy of this particular case.

The MARPOR position on this issue is that manifestos are created by political parties in a meticulously thought through, carefully negotiated, and thoroughly deliberate process and so we should take all policy statements as ‘intended’. How this affects the IIA argument depends in part on the purpose of a scale. If the scale is intended as a summary measure of an entire manifesto as a whole (which is one role of the RILE scale) then the IIA problem may not be an issue. If a scale is intended only as a measure of a *specific* policy dimension then not all statements will actually be relevant and so the IIA problem holds.

= 1230.82) has manifestos that are on average 10 times the size of those found in Denmark (mean length = 126.14, standard deviation = 124.31). Manifestos also vary considerably depending on the type of party writing them – on average Green parties (mean length = 732.17, standard deviation = 959.15) write manifestos that are about 200 quasi sentences longer than any other party family. Whether this is a problem depends on the method used to combine the components to form a scale. Specific methods will be discussed in more detail below but in general components are combined by one of two methods – additive scales or ratio scales. Both methods assign different components to a ‘side’ of a policy spectrum, additive scales subtract the total number of components on one side from the total components on the other, whilst ratio scales use a ratio of the additive scale to the total number of components used to construct it. Unless a party’s manifesto is particularly balanced between issues on either side of a policy scale, using the raw number of quasi-sentences to create additive scales will lead to more extreme positions on a scale (and a much bigger scale) and uncertain comparability of scores between parties. Again the significance of this is perhaps most easily shown with a hypothetical example.

Imagine two parties that are generally left-wing on economic issues. Both have similar positions and spend 80% of their manifesto discussing the merits of government intervention in the economy and 20% discussing the positive aspects of free markets. Using the percentage quasi-sentence measure in a simple additive fashion gives them both the same score of -60 (on a -100 to 100 scale). Now imagine that the parties have manifestos of very different lengths, the first is a Danish party and conforms to the Danish average and has a manifesto of 126 quasi-sentences (with some rounding 101 quasi-sentences on the left of the scale and 25 on the right), whilst the other party is Spanish, with a manifesto 1494 quasi-sentences long (1195 left quasi-sentences and 299 right). Using additive scales the Danish party has a score of -76 and the Spanish party has a score of -896 (on a scale that stretches to infinity in either direction). Are these scores in

any way meaningful? Is the Spanish party really more than 11 times more left wing than the Danish party simply because they are more verbose? The obvious answer to both questions is no. This example, although deliberately concocted to give an absurd result, illustrates the problem of using additive scales with the raw number of sentences.

The same problem does not exist for ratio scales. The simplest and most commonly used version of the ratio scale was developed by Kim and Fording.<sup>18</sup> To show how ratio scales cope with different sized manifestos a slightly modified (to keep 'left' values as negative numbers) version of the Kim-Fording formula is used to calculate scores for the two example parties:

$$\theta^R = \frac{\text{Right wing quasi-sentences} - \text{Left wing quasi-sentences}}{\text{Right wing quasi-sentences} + \text{Left wing quasi-sentences}}$$

Using the percentage values the score for both parties is -0.6 (on a -1 to 1 scale), whilst using the raw quasi-sentences yields -0.603 and -0.599 for the Danish and Spanish example parties respectively (the small differences due to earlier rounding).

The above discussion gives an early indication of how a desirable scale that takes into account the IIA problem might be constructed – using some sort of ratio measure with the raw quasi-sentence data. However using the ratio method in the way established by Kim and Fording has some serious drawbacks. When a manifesto only has quasi-sentences on one side of the policy scale, regardless of the number of quasi-sentences used to describe a policy it will equal 1 or -1. If this is the case a ratio scale cannot distinguish between a single sentence placatory statement and a 100 sentence ode of praise – a key feature in the logic of building positional scales from salience data. This is not just a theoretical problem, in practice, when the number of components included in a scale is small it leads to overly polarised scales, as demonstrated in figure 2.1, which

---

<sup>18</sup> Kim and Fording, "Voter Ideology in Western Democracies, 1946-1989."

shows the distribution of a Kim-Fording ratio scale using the components of the Benoit and Laver ‘social liberal-conservative’ scale (as shown in table 2.1).

More recently Lowe et al. developed what they call a ‘logit’ scale for MARPOR data using the raw number of quasi-sentences in manifesto components.<sup>19</sup> The logit scale is calculated using the formula:

$$\theta^L = \log \frac{R + 0.5}{L + 0.5}$$

Where  $R$  is the total number of quasi-sentences in the manifesto components on the ‘right’ of the scale and  $L$  is the total number of quasi-sentences in the manifesto components on the ‘left’.

The Lowe et al. logit scale has several desirable features: The nature of logarithms means that to some extent the logit scale can be considered to be both an additive scale and a ratio scale ( $\log \frac{a}{b} = \log a - \log b$ ). By using the raw number of quasi-sentences rather than the percentage measure to construct the scale it avoids the IIA problem and by using a ratio approach it avoids the problem of different manifesto sizes. Lowe et al. modify the general logic of the salience approach to positional scaling – although they still agree that additional mentions of ‘right’ or ‘left’ components shift a party’s position on a positional scale. Drawing on well established findings from psychophysics they argue that each additional mention of an issue is of diminishing importance compared to previous mentions (an argument which suggests the use of a logarithm): a shift from zero to one quasi-sentence mentions of support for the welfare state should make more of a difference to the policy position than a shift from 99 to 100. As well as a better fit with natural usage of emphasis and scales, the logit scale has the additional advantage in that it solves the problem of polarised scales found in the Kim-Fording ratio scale,

---

<sup>19</sup> Lowe et al., “Scaling Policy Preferences from Coded Political Texts.”

as the distribution of the Benoit and Laver 'social liberal-conservative' scale calculated using the logit scale method shows in figure 2.1.

The effect of the addition of 0.5 to the numerator and denominator in the logit scale approach warrants a brief discussion. Lowe et al. add 0.5 to prevent calculation in cases where either side of the scale is 0 (the problems occur because it is impossible to divide by 0 and because the log of 0 is undefined). They defend the addition of 0.5 as standard practice and argue that it has only a minimal effect on the actual calculation of the scale. However Budge and McDonald object to this addition, arguing that the additional 0.5 is arbitrary and contend that it leads to more 'extreme' results in some cases.<sup>20</sup> As figure 2.2 illustrates, this objection is unwarranted: because the 0.5 added to both sides is, by definition, a greater proportion of the smaller number (and the consequent ratio between the smaller and larger values is larger than the ratio between the two without 0.5) the logit between the two values is slightly closer to zero – the opposite of the objection suggested by Budge and McDonald. This effect is itself not worthy of an objection either: the effect of the 0.5 is consistent and the difference between the two scales is negligible: they are almost perfectly correlated (0.9999).

---

<sup>20</sup> Ian Budge and Michael D. McDonald, "Conceptualising and Measuring 'Centrism' Correctly on the Left-Right Scale (RILE) - Without Systematic Bias. A General Response by MARPOR," *Electoral Studies* 31, no. 3 (2012): 609–612.




FIGURE 2.1. COMPARISON OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF A POLICY SCALE CONSTRUCTED USING THE BENOIT AND LAYER SOCIAL LIBERAL-CONSERVATIVE SCALE COMPONENTS USING THE KIM-FORDING RATIO METHOD AND THE LOWE ET AL. LOGIT METHOD.




FIGURE 2.2. EFFECT OF THE ADDITION OF 0.5 TO THE NUMERATOR AND DENOMINATOR ON THE SCORE GIVEN ON THE LOGIT SCALE BY THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN 'LEFT' AND 'RIGHT' COMPONENTS IN THE SCALE.

A third set of general approaches to manifesto scale building are a variety of methods which 'derive' their scales from the data, for example by using factor analysis, multidimensional scaling, or maximum likelihood estimation.<sup>21</sup> Putting aside the problems of variable selection that these methods face (which will be discussed in detail below), any derivative scaling method

<sup>21</sup> Martin Elff, "A Dynamic State-Space Model of Coded Political Texts," *Political Analysis* 21, no. 2 (2013): 217–232; Gabel and Huber, "Putting Parties in Their Place: Inferring Party Left-Right Ideological Positions from Party Manifesto Data"; Thomas König, Moritz Marbach, and Moritz Osnabrügge, "Estimating Party Positions across Countries and Time—A Dynamic Latent Variable Model for Manifesto Data," *Political Analysis* 21, no. 4 (October 1, 2013): 468–491.

necessarily breaks a second type of IIA because it is dependent on the sample used by the researcher to calculate it – whether by conscious decision or the availability of data at the time: the estimated position of a party at time one will depend on whether or not the party is also measured at time two. Whether this is a problem is a decision for individual researchers – for isolated projects this IIA problem may not be an issue. However if the goal is to generate a scale that can be used for future research without having to recalculate a scale each time it is needed, with uncertain comparability to previous research then derivative scales are of no use. Additionally, unless the scale is derived from the entire manifesto dataset – as is the case in the Gabel and Huber approach – then some prior selection of components is still necessary, and so many of the potential pitfalls of component selection which affect non-derived scales still apply.<sup>22</sup>

### 2.3 – Component selection: existing approaches

Due to its robustness to IIA problems whilst still retaining the central feature of salience effects on party positioning the logit scaling method proposed by Lowe et al. provides the most appropriate method of scale calculation for the purposes of the present analysis.<sup>23</sup> It is yet to be established however which components should actually be used to calculate the scales. Component selection methods can be broadly divided into two categories: deductive and inductive methods.

The deductive method of component selection describes a process in which a researcher selects, *a priori*, the components which they think belong in a scale. The assumptions a researcher makes

---

<sup>22</sup> Gabel and Huber, “Putting Parties in Their Place: Inferring Party Left-Right Ideological Positions from Party Manifesto Data.”

<sup>23</sup> Although I stand by the arguments given here, those who are not convinced by the logit scales (as the core MARPOR team remain to be) or using the raw number of quasi-sentences instead of the percentage salience measure should take note that the method of component selection developed here could equally be carried out using any other type of salience measure or combination method.

are sometimes explicit, such as the original MARPOR 'Rile' scale, which is based on a conceptualisation of political ideology at the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, or Jahn's use of the political philosopher Norberto Bobbio's conceptualisation of left and right.<sup>24</sup> Often though the *a priori* assumptions researchers make are implicit, Benoit and Laver for example, justify their component selection using 'common-sense substantive judgements.'<sup>25</sup> Their selection is then confirmed by *a posteriori* cross validation with other scales. Occasionally the deductive selection of components is simply presented as a *fait accompli* without further justification.<sup>26</sup> For some purposes deductive scales may be perfectly suitable – there are valid questions which require measuring how well parties fit to predefined criteria. If however the purpose of the scale is to try and measure the underlying dimensionality of politics, the obvious potential problem with deductive methods is that the assumptions they make about how components relate to each other might be wrong.

In a discussion of the issues facing researchers interested in dimensionality, Benoit and Laver argue that:

*'Just as physical maps are spanned by physical dimensions, conceptual maps are spanned by conceptual dimensions, which we use to provide substantive orientation. Just as there is not one true map, neither is there 'one true dimensionality' for any given political setting. Sometimes, as with London's Central Line, a one-dimensional map will tell us everything we want to know. Sometimes, as with London's Circle Line, it will not. Nearly always, we ignore*

---

<sup>24</sup> Detlef Jahn, "Conceptualizing Left and Right in Comparative Politics: Towards a Deductive Approach," *Party Politics* 17, no. 6 (2011): 745–765.

<sup>25</sup> Benoit and Laver, "Estimating Party Policy Positions," 100.

<sup>26</sup> Thomas König and Bernd Luig, "Party Ideology and Legislative Agendas: Estimating Contextual Policy Positions for the Study of EU Decision-Making," *European Union Politics* 13, no. 4 (2012): 604–625; Heather Stoll, "Elite-Level Conflict Salience and Dimensionality in Western Europe: Concepts and Empirical Findings," *West European Politics* 33, no. 3 (2010): 445–473.

*potentially salient dimensions in the name of a parsimonious description of the world, just as we typically do not seek three-dimensional maps of London Tube stations – despite the fact that these stations do in fact have substantively meaningful geographical coordinates in three dimensions.’<sup>27</sup>*

The potential problems with deductive approaches to scale building are not the necessary assumptions of abstraction and reduction. To borrow Benoit and Laver’s mapping metaphor, the problem is incorrect cartography – a major road is missing from a street map or where the map says there is a forest there is in fact a lake. That researchers may have been making similar errors in mapping policy dimensions is readily apparent from comparisons between different scales. Compare for example, the two social dimension scales presented in table 2.2 which both claim to measure a similar dimension: the two scales each use component 201 – ‘positive mentions of freedom and human rights’ on different sides of the scale.

How do we know which of these choices is correct? The orthodox approach is to cross validate the scales with other sources of scale positions. That both the Benoit and Laver and Bakker and Hobolt scales have been cross validated using expert surveys is a good indication that this approach is ineffective for distinguishing between scales. The reason for this lies in the fact that with a sufficient number of components, the general shape of scales is remarkably robust to omitted and miscoded components. That this is the case is most easily illustrated by doing so deliberately, using the components of the Rile scale (table 2.1) calculated using the logit method. Compared to the full scale, removing four ‘social’ variables from the scale (201 - Freedom and Human Rights, 203 - Constitutionalism, 106 - Peace, and 107 - Internationalism) the two scales are still very well correlated (0.9459) and have a Cronbach’s alpha value equating to ‘excellent’

---

<sup>27</sup> Kenneth Benoit and Michael Laver, “The Dimensionality of Political Space: Epistemological and Methodological Considerations,” *European Union Politics* 13, no. 2 (2012): 216.

internal consistency between the scales (0.9687).<sup>28</sup> Removing an additional four 'economic' variables (402 - Incentives, 407 – Protectionism: Negative, 412 – Controlled Economy, and 413 - Nationalisation) leads to a correlation of 0.9225 with the full scale and actually increases the Cronbach's alpha to 0.9512. Even dropping a further four components (305 – Political Authority, 505 – Welfare State Limitation, 105 – Military: negative, and 403 – Market Regulation) so that only 14 of the original 26 components are left in the scale leads to a correlation of 0.8366 and a Cronbach's alpha over the 'excellent' threshold: 0.9016.

The same pattern can be shown when deliberately coding components on the wrong side of a policy divide. Compared to the 'correct' scale, a scale with component 401 – Free Enterprise swapped to the 'left' of the scale has a correlation of 0.9472 and a Cronbach's alpha of 0.9712. Swapping component 413 – Nationalisation (in addition to 401), gives a correlation of 0.9245 and a Cronbach's alpha of 0.9557. Swapping component 504 – Welfare State Expansion (again in addition to 401 and 413), drops the correlation to 0.7187, but still gives a 'good' Cronbach's alpha of 0.8211. Finally swapping component 414 – Economic Orthodoxy, so that there are now four components on the 'wrong' side, drops the correlation to 0.5693, but still yields an 'acceptable' Cronbach's alpha of 0.7077.

These examples, which include components which are by no means trivial to our understanding of 'left' and 'right', show the limitations of the cross validation method of justifying component selection – scales can be broadly 'correct' whilst missing important components, including erroneous ones, and coding components on the 'wrong' side.<sup>29</sup>

---

<sup>28</sup> Commonly used interpretations of Cronbach's alpha are scores over 0.7 are considered 'acceptable', those over 0.8 are 'good', and those over 0.9 are 'excellent'.

<sup>29</sup> The general robustness of manifesto scales to miscoding should also reassure the reader about the general validity of previous research based on manifesto scales. The point of the discussion here is not to 'invalidate' previous scales, indeed the general validity of manifesto scales – despite any of problems discussed here – is the key starting point for the new scales developed here.

Rather than face the obvious problems of choosing scale components by a deductive process, some scholars have used inductive statistical tools, primarily principal component analysis and factor analysis, to select scale components.<sup>30</sup> Such techniques are also prone to the IIA problem discussed in relation to inductively derived scales – they are reliant on (at most) the current MARPOR dataset, which is ever expanding as more elections are held and manifestos coded. Inductively selecting components rather than deriving party positions means that party positions on the scale are themselves robust to the inclusion of future parties (unlike derived scales). However, the components selected to form the scale are not – a future dataset may yield different results for whichever inductive technique is chosen. A similar problem is of course true for deductively selected scales as well – although assumptions about how different issues relate to underlying dimensions at any given time may be correct; politics changes and issues may lose or gain relevance over time. Ultimately there will never be any ‘true’ scale that will accurately map party positions across all times and places. The choice facing researchers is how to best construct ‘temporary’ scales that will hopefully last for a reasonable length of time. Given the concerns about the fallibility of human reason and ‘common sense’ in choosing scale components, an inductive approach is chosen here.

A re-examination of previous devised scales with factor analysis is a very revealing exercise and suggests that it is not an appropriate method for choosing scale components. An exploratory factor analysis of the components used to make MARPOR’s Rile scale reveals no fewer than 20

---

<sup>30</sup> Bakker and Hobolt, “Measuring Party Positions”; Ian Budge, “The Internal Analysis of Election Programmes,” in *Ideology, Strategy and Party Change*, ed. Ian Budge, David Robertson, and Derek J. Hearl (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Hans-Dieter Klingemann, “Party Positions and Voter Orientations,” in *Citizens and the State*, ed. Hans-Dieter Klingemann and Dieter Fuch (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); Michael Laver and Ian Budge, “Measuring Policy Distances and Modelling Coalition Formation,” in *Party Policy and Government Coalitions* (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: MacMillan, 1992).

factors with Eigenvalues above the conventional cut-off point of 1, with the best factor only explaining 5.013% of the variance.

The only way for factor analysis to reveal the number of dimensions commonly found in research (1 or 2) is if the dimensions are limited *a priori*. As Benoit and Laver discuss, there might be good reasons for doing so.<sup>31</sup> The results of the exploratory factor analyses presented here however suggest that the resulting dimensions are not coherent by the ordinary standards of factor analysis.

Why is this the case? The first problem with using factor analysis approaches is that they have tended to use conventional techniques, which were designed for use on interval data, rather than tools more appropriate to count data with many zero values (components with no quasi-sentence mentions), leading to serious calculation problems.<sup>32</sup> Even if more appropriate tools were used however, the nature of the manifesto dataset presents a serious obstacle for a factor analysis approach.

A Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy of the MARPOR dataset gives a value of 0.499, just below 0.5, the minimum standard indicating a matrix is suitable for factor analysis. The low KMO score is indicative of the fact that manifesto components are very poorly correlated with each other. Take the components used in the Rile scale as an example – the overall mean correlation between components on the ‘right’ is 0.12, whilst those on the ‘left’ is 0.11. Even the ‘best’ correlation, between 105 - military: negative, and 406 – protectionism: positive, is only 0.437. In short, unlike other common scales which use different measures of

---

<sup>31</sup> “The Dimensionality of Political Space.”

<sup>32</sup> Martin Ridout, Clarice G. B. Demétrio, and John Hinde, “Models for Count Data with Many Zeros” (presented at the International Biometric Conference, Cape Town, 1998); Wouter van der Broug, “Analysing Party Dynamics by Taking Partially Overlapping Snapshots,” in *Estimating the Policy Positions of Political Actors*, ed. Michael Laver (London: Routledge, 2001), 115–132; Michel Wedel, Ulf Bökenhold, and Wagner A. Kamakura, “Factor Models for Multivariate Count Data,” *Journal of Multivariate Analysis* 87 (2003): 356–369.

similar underlying factors (and when factor analysis is a more appropriate tool) the components used in manifesto scales simply do not co-vary in the same way and the logic behind combining them into a scale is different to that over ordinary scales that rely on multiple measurements of the same latent variable.

Similar manifesto components are, to a certain degree, substitutable, a logic which works at both the manifesto writing stage and the coding stage. Given a finite amount of space in a manifesto, parties will express their positions concisely – for example rather than two statements expressing support for orthodox economic practices and support for free enterprise they might combine their position into one statement. This is then compounded at the coding stage where statements are coded exclusively into one category. As the number of statements in some categories increases the space available for statements in other categories decreases. Components 105 and 406 (the two most highly correlated components used in the Rile scale) is an excellent illustration of this – comparing each component to a dummy variable indicating whether any mention of the other component is made reveals slightly negative correlations in both cases (-0.0188 for the 105 to 406 dummy and -0.0488 for the 406 to 105 dummy comparison) which indicates that the more a party mentioned one of the components the less likely they were to make *any* mention of the other. Although this is not true for all similar components (for example, parties making statements about welfare expansion [504] are also more likely to make statements about education expansion [506]) it is a good illustration of the complex relationship between scale components, and precisely why manifesto data does not lend itself to factor analysis.

## **2.4 – Component selection: a new approach**

Given the problems with existing methods of component selection in manifesto scales, it is clear that a new method is needed. In order to develop this method we must first ask a simple

question: what is a policy scale supposed to do? To borrow Benoit and Laver's mapping metaphor, a policy scale gives people the ability to navigate the complex combination of myriad policy issues in a comprehensible fashion. When we say x party is on the 'right' or 'left' we are asserting that it has particular positions on a broad range of issues, or in other words that certain issues tend to co-vary: parties on the economic 'right' tend to be in favour of both market deregulation *and* restrictions on trade unions; parties that are 'conservative' on the social dimension tend to be against gay marriage *and* limiting access to abortions.

That policy scales are heuristic devices that condense multiple issues into parsimonious measures is well established. Whether the issues included in existing scales are actually condensable is not. To use the more formal language of psychometrics: their content validity remains untested. In psychometrics the standard method of testing content validity is to ask a panel of experts and calculate a 'content validity ratio'.<sup>33</sup> The method here, though testing the same criteria, takes a different approach. In basic terms, it measures the extent that individual components actually co-vary with the policy scale. That we can perform such tests – which necessarily initially rely on using at least partially 'invalid' scales – is based on two already established properties:

- 1) The general validity of manifesto scales has been well established by tests of convergent validity.
- 2) Manifesto scales are fairly robust to missing and miscoded components.

That existing scales can be considered broadly 'correct', even if there are some components which should be included or excluded but are not, allows them to be used as initial scales against which we can measure the covariance of individual components. That scales are robust to the exclusion of components which should be included also allows us to overcome an endogeneity

---

<sup>33</sup> C. H. Lawshe, "A Quantitative Approach to Content Validity," *Personnel Psychology* 28, no. 4 (1975): 563–575.

problem: given the method by which scales are calculated we should expect a certain degree of correlation between a scale and any component that is included in it. That scales are robust to missing components allows us to test each component against a scale that does not include it in calculation. This then is the criteria by which components will be selected for inclusion or exclusion in a policy scale: the exogenous correlation between a component and the relevant policy scale.

#### 2.4.1 – Measuring components

In order to measure the exogenous correlation it is first necessary to decide how to measure the individual components. Unlike its use as the building block for the overall scale, the raw number of quasi-sentences in a component is not a good measure of the emphasis placed on a component in a manifesto because, as has already been discussed, it varies considerably with the size of a manifesto. A measure of salience must take into account both the number of quasi-sentences in a particular component and the total number of sentences in a manifesto.

Rather than use the original percentage salience measure, Lowe et al. argue that much like their logit scale measure, a logarithmic structure should be given to the salience measure because of the diminishing importance of subsequent mentions of a policy.<sup>34</sup> Lowe et al. propose a measure calculated by the formula:<sup>35</sup>

$$\theta^I = \log \frac{S + 1}{N}$$

Where  $S$  is the number of sentences for each relevant variable in a manifesto and  $N$  is the total number of sentences in a manifesto.

---

<sup>34</sup> Lowe et al., “Scaling Policy Preferences from Coded Political Texts.”

<sup>35</sup> Lowe et al. use this formula to measure the emphasis placed on issue and dimension scales as a whole using a different numerator ( $L + R + 1$ ). It is used here to measure the emphasis placed on individual components.

Although the implementation of a logarithmic approach is an innovative contribution to the question of how to measure salience in a manifesto, Lowe et al.'s specific measure has a serious flaw because it does not have a stable value for components that are not mentioned in a manifesto. As the total number of sentences in a manifesto increases the value assigned to components that are not mentioned (i.e. that have 0 quasi-sentences) decreases, as illustrated in figure 2.3. How problematic this is depends on the task the researcher wishes to use the measure for: for comparing the importance of particular components within a single manifesto the measure is acceptable, but for comparing the importance of components across manifestos the flaw may introduce serious bias according to the lengths of the manifestos examined. The changing value for components not mentioned is particularly problematic when comparing small and large manifestos: not mentioning an issue at all in a small manifesto may score higher than mentioning an issue in several sentences in a large manifesto. For example: the zero score for a manifesto with 150 sentences is -5.01064, whilst the score for an issue that is mentioned in five quasi sentences in a 1000 sentence manifesto is -5.116.

However this problem is easily overcome by using a different formula that retains the logarithmic elements of Lowe et al.'s scale but has a stable value for no mentions:

$$\theta^{I_2} = \frac{\log(S + 1)}{\log(N + 1)}$$

As in the earlier scale an additional value is added to the number of quasi-sentences in a component in order to prevent calculation problems when the number of quasi-sentences is zero. The value 1 is chosen because  $\log(1) = 0$ , which makes the value of no quasi-sentences in a component consistently 0. It is added to the total number of quasi-sentences in a manifesto for consistency.




FIGURE 2.3. VALUE GIVEN BY THE LOWE ET AL. SALIENCE MEASURE TO COMPONENTS NOT MENTIONED IN A MANIFESTO BY THE TOTAL LENGTH OF MANIFESTO.

Although unlike the Lowe et al. scale, the scale proposed here has a stable zero value, it is perfectly correlated with the values generated by the Lowe et al. scale for any specific manifesto. It also has the additional advantage over the Lowe et al. scale in its ease of interpretability as the new scale is a ratio of log values, rather than a logit, and ranges from 0 to 1, with a higher number indicating greater emphasis is placed on a component. The Lowe et al. scale by contrast unintuitively ranges from somewhere between -4 and -7 and gets closer to 0 as greater emphasis is placed on a component.

In any manifesto at least some components in the manifesto coding scheme will not be mentioned at all. For all 55 components the range of manifestos mentioning a component ranges from 6.05% to 89.07%, with a mean of 48.47% of manifestos mentioning a component. The large number of manifestos not mentioning a component creates potential problems for measuring the relationship between components, a problem known in the literature as the ‘structural zero problem’. The easiest solution to this problem is simply to exclude the empty cases from analysis. For methods that rely on analysing multiple components simultaneously, such as factor analysis or multi-dimensional scaling, this is obviously a serious problem. Not even a single manifesto mentions all of the components and so a listwise deletion strategy is obviously impossible, and a pairwise deletion strategy runs the risk of introducing biased estimates into the analysis.<sup>36</sup> The method used here sidesteps these problems by analysing each individual component separately. Thus the final measure of the relationship between a component and a scale is the exogenous correlation between all non-zero cases of a component and a scale.

The different possible methods of measuring the relationship between a component and a scale are shown in table 2.3, which demonstrates that these considerations are not just theoretical concerns. The choice of salience measure changes the size and in some cases, the direction, of the exogenous correlation between a scale and its components. A positive correlation indicates that the component is correlated with the ‘right’ side of the scale and a negative correlation indicates a correlation with the ‘left’. The results shown in table 2.3 also indicate that many of the components included in the Rile scale are poorly correlated with the scale: five components have correlations in the opposite direction to what we would expect from their positions on the scale, and several components have correlations close to zero.

---

<sup>36</sup> C. Hendricks Brown, “Asymptotic Comparison of Missing Data Procedures for Estimating Factor Loadings,” *Psychometrika* 48, no. 2 (1983): 269–291.

| Component | Percentage salience | Lowe et al. salience | Ratio of logs salience | Ratio of logs salience if > 0 |
|-----------|---------------------|----------------------|------------------------|-------------------------------|
| 'Right'   | 104                 | 0.1051               | 0.089                  | 0.0746                        |
|           | 201                 | 0.015                | -0.0652                | -0.0761                       |
|           | 203                 | 0.0279               | -0.0005                | -0.0174                       |
|           | 305                 | 0.0646               | 0.0397                 | 0.0427                        |
|           | 401                 | 0.28                 | 0.2638                 | 0.2711                        |
|           | 402                 | 0.0466               | -0.0224                | -0.0273                       |
|           | 407                 | 0.0595               | 0.0612                 | 0.0188                        |
|           | 414                 | 0.2026               | 0.1224                 | 0.1505                        |
|           | 505                 | 0.202                | 0.234                  | 0.1927                        |
|           | 601                 | 0.1943               | 0.1824                 | 0.1929                        |
|           | 603                 | 0.1132               | 0.1862                 | 0.1704                        |
|           | 605                 | 0.089                | -0.0006                | -0.0057                       |
|           | 606                 | 0.0411               | 0.0139                 | 0.0001                        |
| 'Left'    | 103                 | -0.0728              | -0.095                 | -0.1441                       |
|           | 105                 | -0.2402              | -0.2986                | -0.3579                       |
|           | 106                 | -0.1047              | -0.2468                | -0.2811                       |
|           | 107                 | -0.1441              | -0.1748                | -0.2041                       |
|           | 202                 | 0.0103               | -0.1367                | -0.1244                       |
|           | 403                 | -0.1665              | -0.214                 | -0.225                        |
|           | 404                 | -0.1194              | -0.1874                | -0.2156                       |
|           | 406                 | 0.0044               | -0.0017                | -0.0435                       |
|           | 412                 | -0.1737              | -0.2056                | -0.252                        |
|           | 413                 | -0.2689              | -0.2684                | -0.3406                       |
|           | 504                 | -0.1621              | -0.2053                | -0.2192                       |
|           | 506                 | -0.0909              | -0.1376                | -0.1447                       |
|           | 701                 | -0.2442              | -0.2751                | -0.3107                       |

TABLE 2.3. COMPARISON OF EXOGENOUS SALIENCE BETWEEN COMPONENTS IN A 'RILE' SCALE CONSTRUCTED USING LOWE ET AL.'S (2011) LOGIT METHOD USING DIFFERENT SALIENCE MEASURES: MARPOR'S PERCENTAGE SALIENCE MEASURE, LOWE ET AL.'S (2011) SALIENCE MEASURE, THE RATIO OF LOGS.

## 2.4.2 – Scale building

The scale building process begins with the construction of a single dimensional 'general left-right' scale, and starts by setting the threshold of exogenous correlation a component must have for it to be included in a scale. This is done by examining the exogenous correlations of all non-zero cases of manifesto components with a scale constructed using the components included in MARPOR's Rile scale (shown in table 2.1 and table 2.2). The distribution of the exogenous correlations, shown in figure 2.4, displays a clear trend, with two peaks of uncorrelated and correlated components. The junction between the two suggests itself as an obvious breakpoint

in the data and so the initial threshold for inclusion is set at its value: 0.15. Thus any component with an exogenous correlation with an absolute value of less than 0.15 will be excluded from a scale.




FIGURE 2.4. EXOGENOUS CORRELATIONS (ABSOLUTE VALUES) OF SCALE COMPONENTS WITH A SCALE CONSTRUCTED USING MARPOR'S RILE COMPONENTS AND LOWE ET AL.'S (2011) LOGIT METHOD.

The scale constructed from the Rile components then provides the 'naïve' starting scale for an iterative stepwise process of component selection:

- 1) The exogenous correlations between the scale and all non-zero cases of all components are measured.
- 2) Any component not already included in the scale with an exogenous correlation greater than 0.15 is added to the scale. Any component currently included in a scale with an exogenous correlation less than 0.15 is removed from the scale.

- 3) Steps 1 and 2 are repeated until the scale reaches a stable equilibrium point where all components with an exogenous correlation above the threshold are included in the scale and all components with an exogenous correlation below the threshold are excluded.
- 4) Next the distribution of the exogenous correlations with the stable scale are measured to see if the breakpoint between correlated and uncorrelated components has shifted, which it has, to 0.1.
- 5) Steps 1-4 are repeated with the new threshold of 0.1. The second interaction of step 4 does not reveal a change in the threshold and so the stable scale at this point is taken as the final scale.

The scale building process for the new general left-right scale takes 12 iterations (six at each of the threshold values) to reach a stable configuration. The results of the exogenous correlations at each step are shown in table A1 of the appendix. The components included in the final scale are shown in table 2.4.

| General left-right scale |                                            |       |                                    |
|--------------------------|--------------------------------------------|-------|------------------------------------|
| Left                     |                                            | Right |                                    |
| 105                      | Military: Negative                         | 109   | Internationalism: Negative         |
| 106                      | Peace                                      | 401   | Free Enterprise: Positive          |
| 107                      | Internationalism: Positive                 | 407   | Protectionism: Negative            |
| 108                      | European Integration: Positive             | 414   | Economic Orthodoxy: Positive       |
| 202                      | Democracy                                  | 505   | Welfare State Limitation: Positive |
| 301                      | Decentralisation                           | 507   | Education Limitation: Positive     |
| 303                      | Governmental and Administrative Efficiency | 601   | National Way of Life: Positive     |
| 403                      | Market Regulation: Positive                | 603   | Traditional Morality: Positive     |
| 408                      | Economic Goals                             | 608   | Multiculturalism: Negative         |
| 411                      | Technology and Infrastructure              | 702   | Labour Groups: Negative            |
| 412                      | Controlled Economy: Positive               |       |                                    |
| 413                      | Nationalisation: Positive                  |       |                                    |
| 416                      | Anti-Growth Economy                        |       |                                    |
| 501                      | Environmental Protection                   |       |                                    |
| 502                      | Culture                                    |       |                                    |
| 503                      | Social Justice                             |       |                                    |
| 504                      | Welfare State Expansion: Positive          |       |                                    |
| 506                      | Education Expansion: Positive              |       |                                    |
| 602                      | National Way of Life: Negative             |       |                                    |
| 604                      | Traditional Morality: Negative             |       |                                    |
| 701                      | Labour Groups: Positive                    |       |                                    |
| 705                      | Underprivileged Minority Groups            |       |                                    |
| 706                      | Non-economic Demographic Groups            |       |                                    |

TABLE 2.4. FINAL COMPONENT SELECTION FOR THE NEW ONE DIMENSIONAL GENERAL LEFT-RIGHT SCALE CONSTRUCTED USING THE ITERATIVE REFERENTIAL CONTENT VALIDITY METHOD.

This process is then repeated for the two dimensional scales. First, the 53 manifesto components are divided into 'economic' and 'social' categories, shown in table A2 of the appendix. Where the category of a component is ambiguous it is tested against both economic and social scales, as is the case for seven components.

The Benoit and Laver, and Bakker and Hobolt economic and social scales are then used to provide the starting point for initial 'naïve' scales. The exogenous correlations between each scale and its components are shown in table A3 of the appendix. Like the Rile scale the exogenous correlation analysis shows that there are several components in each scale that are poorly correlated with the overall scale, which highlights the necessity of developing new manifesto scales. The component 201 (positive mentions of Freedom and Human Rights) is worth particular attention as its inclusion on opposite sides of the scale in the Benoit and Laver, and Bakker and Hobolt scales (the 'conservative' and 'libertarian' sides respectively) was discussed earlier. For both scales however the component is correlated with the liberal/libertarian side of the scale, suggesting that its inclusion on the 'conservative' side of the Benoit and Laver scale is erroneous. The components for each naïve starting scale are selected by taking all the components included in either economic or social scale that have an exogenous correlation above the 0.1 threshold used for the general left-right scale. The new naïve scales are then measured against the relevant components and a natural break point is found, also at 0.1. Using this threshold the scale building steps are repeated until the scales have reached a stable equilibrium. In neither case does a re-examination of the distribution of exogenous correlations in step 4 suggest a new threshold and so the components for both scales are chosen in one sequence. The economic left-right scale takes four iterations to reach equilibrium, the results of which are shown in table A4 of the appendix.

In the third iteration of the social liberal-conservative scale a cycling problem occurs. When neither of two components (204 and 602) are included in the scale both are correlated above the threshold value, however when either of them are included in the scale the other does not reach the threshold value. Following the normal procedure results in a cycle between the second and third interaction scales – when they are excluded from the scale the procedure suggest they should be included, when they are included the procedure says they should be excluded. To break this cycle the components are included separately and the component with the highest correlation (602) is selected to remain in the scale, which remains stable at this point and so is used as the final scale. The results of the scale building process are shown in table A5 of the appendix.

One final consideration is necessary before finalising the component selection. Four of the components that were not clearly classifiable as economic or social issues (301: Decentralisation, 416: Anti-growth economics, 705: Underprivileged minority groups, and 706: Non-economic demographic groups) are correlated above the threshold with both the economic and social scales. All four components are correlated with the left side of the economic scale and the liberal side of the social scale, perhaps indicating that these are all what Kitschelt has called left-libertarian issues.<sup>37</sup> To avoid potential problems of endogenous collinearity between the two dimensions they should be removed from one of the scales. In all cases the components are more highly correlated with the social dimension and so they are removed from the economic scale. Doing so does not cause any significant change to the economic scale, the scale without the components has a correlation of 0.9884 and a Cronbach's alpha of 0.9942 when

---

<sup>37</sup> "Left-Libertarian Parties: Explaining Innovation in Competitive Party Systems," *World Politics* 40, no. 2 (1988): 194–234.

compared to the scale with the components. The final component selection for each of the two scales is shown in table 2.5.

| <b>Economic left right</b>         |                                      |                     |                                    |
|------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|---------------------|------------------------------------|
| <b>Left</b>                        |                                      | <b>Right</b>        |                                    |
| 403                                | Market Regulation: Positive          | 401                 | Free Enterprise: Positive          |
| 411                                | Technology and Infrastructure        | 407                 | Protectionism: Negative            |
| 412                                | Controlled Economy: Positive         | 414                 | Economic Orthodoxy: Positive       |
| 413                                | Nationalisation: Positive            | 505                 | Welfare State Limitation: Positive |
| 503                                | Social Justice                       | 507                 | Education Limitation: Positive     |
| 504                                | Welfare State Expansion: Positive    | 702                 | Labour Groups: Negative            |
| 506                                | Education Expansion: Positive        |                     |                                    |
| 701                                | Labour Groups: Positive              |                     |                                    |
| <b>Social Liberal Conservative</b> |                                      |                     |                                    |
| <b>Liberal</b>                     |                                      | <b>Conservative</b> |                                    |
| 105                                | Military: Negative                   | 109                 | Internationalism: Negative         |
| 106                                | Peace                                | 302                 | Centralisation                     |
| 107                                | Internationalism: Positive           | 305                 | Political Authority: Positive      |
| 201                                | Freedom and Human Rights             | 601                 | National Way of Life: Positive     |
| 202                                | Democracy                            | 608                 | Multiculturalism: Negative         |
| 301                                | Decentralisation                     |                     |                                    |
| 416                                | Anti-Growth Economy                  |                     |                                    |
| 501                                | Environmental Protection             |                     |                                    |
| 502                                | Culture                              |                     |                                    |
| 602                                | National Way of Life: Negative       |                     |                                    |
| 607                                | Multiculturalism: Positive           |                     |                                    |
| 704                                | Middle Class and Professional Groups |                     |                                    |
| 705                                | Underprivileged Minority Groups      |                     |                                    |
| 706                                | Non-economic Demographic Groups      |                     |                                    |

TABLE 2.5. FINAL COMPONENT SELECTION FOR THE NEW TWO DIMENSIONAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL SCALES  
CONSTRUCTED USING THE ITERATIVE REFERENTIAL CONTENT VALIDITY METHOD.

## 2.5 – Overall validity and reliability

Now that the components of the new scales have been selected we can assess the overall validity of the new scales. First it is important to evaluate the convergent validity between the new scales and the reference scales. Given that the reference scales have been cross validated against other data it is reasonable to assume that they measure the underlying political dimensions to some extent and so if the new scales also measure these political dimensions they should be correlated with the reference scales. Exactly how correlated the new scales should be with the reference scales is a nuanced question – they should be similar enough to show they are measuring the same thing but not so highly correlated that the new scales are redundant.

Table 2.6 shows the correlations and Cronbach's alphas for each new scale with their relevant reference scales. In all cases the new scales are reasonably well correlated with the reference scales. The general left-right scale has a 0.741 correlation with the RILE scale and a Cronbach's alpha indicating a 'good' level consistency between the scales. The economic left-right scale is correlated with both reference scales above 0.8 and the Cronbach's alpha measures show 'excellent' and 'good' levels of constancy between the Benoit and Laver and Bakker and Hobolt economic scales respectively. The social liberal-conservative scale is less highly correlated with the Benoit and Laver social liberal-conservative (0.5603), though the Cronbach's alpha still indicates 'acceptable' levels of consistency between the two scales. The social liberal-conservative is more highly correlated with the Bakker and Hobolt libertarian-authoritarian scale (0.7751) with a 'good' level of consistency between the two scales indicated by the Cronbach's alpha.

| New scale                   | Comparison scale                | Correlation | Cronbach's alpha |
|-----------------------------|---------------------------------|-------------|------------------|
| General left-right          | MARPOR Rile                     | 0.7410      | 0.8300           |
| Economic left-right         | BL State involvement in economy | 0.8637      | 0.9269           |
|                             | BH left-right                   | 0.8101      | 0.8951           |
| Social liberal-conservative | BL social liberal-conservative  | 0.5603      | 0.7182           |
|                             | BH libertarian-authoritarian    | 0.7751      | 0.8733           |

TABLE 2.6. MEASURES OF THE CONVERGENT VALIDITY OF THE NEW SCALES.

These results indicate a good degree of convergent validity between the new and reference scales. The correlations between the new and old scales is not so high however as to render the new scales redundant – there is still an important level of divergence between positions measured by each scale. Given this, it is necessary to look to other measures of validity to

adjudicate between the scales. The focus in this chapter on the content validity of scales suggests this is an obvious means of doing so.

In order to compare the content validity of each scale, the mean direction corrected exogenous correlation – that is correct ‘left’ components (which have a negative correlation with the overall scale) are given their positive value, incorrect left components are given their negative value, ‘right’ components are kept the same – of all components in each scale is measured. The results of this calculation are shown in table 2.7 and demonstrate that each new scale offers an improvement on each of the reference scales. The general left-right scale offers a 62% improvement in the average correlation of components compared to the Rile scale. The new economic left-right scale presents a 30% and 51% improvement to the Benoit and Laver and Bakker and Hobolt scales respectively. Finally the new social liberal-conservative scale shows 123% and 56% improvement over the Benoit and Laver, and Bakker and Hobolt scales respectively. The low level of internal validity of the Benoit and Laver social liberal-conservative scale also suggests the fault for the lower correlation between it and the new social liberal-conservative scale lies with the Benoit and Laver scale and not the new scale.

As well as improving the content validity of the components used to generate scales, the exogenous correlation approach may also improve the general reliability of the scales when compared to the reference scales. Although the validity and reliability of scales are two distinct concepts, improving the validity of the components used to generate a scale may also result in a reduction of non-systematic error. An ‘invalid’ scale component is here defined as a scale component that does not relate systematically to the overall scale. If such components are included in a scale they will introduce non-systematic variation in the scale position – that is, error. The overall reliability of the scale is measured using the method developed by McDonald

and Budge.<sup>38</sup> The results, also shown in table 2.7 demonstrate that the new scales are more reliable than all but one of the reference scales. Interestingly the one reference scale that scores a higher reliability coefficient – the Benoit and Laver Social Liberal-Conservative scale – is also the scale that scores lowest on the overall content validity measure (indeed the average exogenous correlation of the scale components is *below* the threshold values used to construct the new scales). If anything, this combination of results simply illustrates the difference between validity and reliability – a scale can be valid and unreliable, or invalid and reliable, both, or neither – in this case it appears the Benoit and Laver social scale is an invalid and reliable scale, and so not too much weight should be given to the fact that it has a slightly higher reliability coefficient than the new social scale.

| Political dimensions | Scale components                | Overall internal validity | Overall reliability |
|----------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------|
| One                  | MARPOR Rile                     | 0.126                     | 0.8587              |
|                      | New general left-right          | 0.2041                    | 0.8964              |
| Two                  | BL State involvement in economy | 0.1675                    | 0.8494              |
|                      | BH left-right                   | 0.1448                    | 0.8573              |
|                      | New economic left-right         | 0.2185                    | 0.8679              |
|                      | BL social liberal-conservative  | 0.0799                    | 0.8061              |
|                      | BH libertarian-authoritarian    | 0.1146                    | 0.7682              |
|                      | New social liberal-conservative | 0.1785                    | 0.7833              |

TABLE 2.7. MEASURES OF OVERALL SCALE INTERNAL VALIDITY (MEAN EXOGENOUS CORRELATION OF COMPONENTS WITH SCALE) AND RELIABILITY, CALCULATED BY THE MCDONALD AND BUDGE (2013) METHOD.

Also notable is that in all cases the social scales have both a lower overall content validity and reliability than their economic scale counterparts. The average content validity of the new scale is still well above the threshold value and the reliability coefficient is above conventional standards of acceptability, and so we should by no means dismiss the social scales. It may

<sup>38</sup> Michael D. McDonald and Ian Budge, “Getting It (approximately) Right (and Center and Left!): Reliability and Uncertainty Estimates for the Comparative Manifesto Data,” *Electoral Studies* 35 (September 2014): 67–77.

suggest however that scales based on manifestos are better at measuring economic issues than they are at measuring social issues, which may be an issue for future research to explore.

## 2.6 – Rescaling

For ease of interpretability the scales generated by the logit scaling method are rescaled to a 0-100 scale. Although the Lowe et al. logit scaling method generates a scale that has no endpoints, in practice it approaches  $\pm 7$ . Similarly it has no defined central point, and so the empirical centre – the mean value for each scale – is used as a central point. The scales are rescaled using the formula:

$$\text{Rescaled dimension} = (\theta^L - \bar{x}_{\theta^L} + 7) \times \frac{100}{14}$$

This now leaves both scales with a mean of 50. The economic left-right scale has an observed range of 3.97 to 93.74 and a standard deviation of 11.15. The social liberal-conservative scale has an observed range of 8.62 to 90.22 and a standard deviation of 12.18. The distribution of the two scales, shown in figure 2.5, approximates a normal distribution in both cases.




FIGURE 2.5. DISTRIBUTION OF THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DIMENSION SCALES.

## 2.7 – Dimensionality

Now that the new scales have been developed it is possible to briefly address the question of whether political space is best represented by one or two dimensions. The correlation between

the two dimensional scales is 0.2209, indicating a small trend from the left/liberal quadrant to the right/conservative quadrant. This trend is ambiguous evidence for answering the question on the number of dimensions: although it does offer some support to a single dimension interpretation of political space, the trend is weak, and an examination of the relationship between the two dimensions in figure 2.6 shows the relationship is far from linear, and there are many parties in the left/conservative and right/liberal quadrants as well.




FIGURE 2.6. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE ECONOMIC LEFT-RIGHT AND SOCIAL LIBERAL-CONSERVATIVE SCALES FOR ALL OBSERVATIONS IN THE MARPOR DATASET.

More interesting evidence to answer this question is found by examining the relationship between the two dimensions on a country by country basis, as shown in table A6 in the appendix. Three distinct relationships between the two dimensions emerge: a positive

correlation, indicating a trend for left/liberal parties and right/conservative, as found in most Western countries; no significant correlation between the two dimensions, indicating an orthogonal relationship; and a negative correlation, indicating a trend for left/conservative parties and right/liberal parties found in several Eastern European countries. These findings fit well with the existing literature: Kitschelt's left/libertarian thesis was primarily based on an examination of Western European countries, whilst Marks et al. have shown that partisan alignment in many Eastern European countries has taken on a left/conservative-right/liberal shape.<sup>39</sup>

The answer to the question of how many dimensions to include in analysis ultimately depends on the context of the research question. For case studies of some (but certainly not all) individual countries a single dimension may be sufficient to capture the ideological differences between parties. In many cases however it is clear that a two dimensional interpretation of political space is necessary, and no single dimension can capture the different alignment of the economic and social dimensions between countries, so they must be treated separately. Different conceptions of the underlying dimensionality of political space have important consequences for studying the relationship between left-right and European integration, as Chapter 3 shows.

## 2.8 – Conclusion

Researchers wanting to use dimensional scales based on MARPOR's manifesto dataset are faced with a wide array of different scales, with different conceptions of the underlying dimensionality and assumptions about how individual components relate to the overall scale. A fundamental question when choosing scales is the question of the underlying dimensionality of political space. Until now researchers have been forced to choose between making *a priori* decisions

---

<sup>39</sup> Kitschelt, "Left-Libertarian Parties: Explaining Innovation in Competitive Party Systems"; Gary Marks et al., "Party Competition and European Integration in the East and West: Different Structure, Same Causality," *Comparative Political Studies* 39, no. 2 (2006): 155–175.

about the dimensionality or comparing scales constructed using different methods and based on different assumptions. The scales here are constructed for the explicit purpose of providing a set of scales constructed using a uniform methodology that match the most commonly used conceptions of political space: either as a one dimensional 'general left-right' space or a two dimensional 'economic left-right' and 'social liberal-conservative' space.

Too often manifesto scales have been constructed with opaque or inappropriate assumptions about how the underlying components relate to the overall scale. In order to construct the new scales this chapter embarked on an analysis of previous methods of measuring and combining manifesto components into scales which makes plain the assumptions and reasoning behind the scales constructed here. However the critique of previous manifesto scales should not be mistaken for a dismissal of their general validity – a reoccurring theme of the analysis, and one of the central premises on which the new scale construction method is based, is that manifesto scales are remarkably robust to potential miscoding.

Given the general robustness of previous scales, what then is the point of yet another new set of manifesto scales? This question however, mistakes 'fine' for 'perfect' – which is not of course to say that the scales developed here are perfect. Rather the method here is offered in the spirit of the scientific goal of incremental improvement and modest progress. By offering a set of comparable scales across different conceptions of dimensionality the resulting scales fill an important gap in the body of existing scales based on manifesto data, and one that is of particular importance to the analysis of the relationship between European integration positions and other political dimensions conducted in Chapter 3.

The analysis here should also not be mistaken for an attempt to provide the 'final word' on the validity of manifesto scales. There is no one way of assessing the validity of a scale – it must be assessed by a range of different criteria including construct, convergent, content, criterion,

discriminant, and predictive validity. Although MARPOR has attempted to validate their Rile scale against many of these measures, the recent literature on scale building has tended to focus largely on convergent validity, specifically cross-validation of scales with expert surveys. Without wishing to deny the importance of convergent validity this chapter hopes to (re)introduce other criteria to the discussion about the validity of manifesto scales. The focus here has been on only one of these: content validity. A great deal of further work is required to assess the validity of different manifesto scales and scaling methods by other criteria. Such work might go a long way to resolving the ongoing debates about the validity and relative merit of different scales and perhaps help begin to reverse the trend of increasing disagreement over manifesto scales and scaling methods.

With the methodological question of how to measure party positions on different political dimensions in this thesis resolved, the thesis can now turn to its primary concern – representation and European integration. Using the scales developed in this chapter, Chapter 3 addresses the question of how European integration positions relate to ideological dimensions, and particularly how different conceptions of the dimensionality of politics leads to very different conclusions about how that relationship has changed over time. Chapter 4 then uses the general left-right scale to address the question of how accurately voters perceive party positions on different dimensions.

## Chapter 3 – Dimensionality, ideology and party positions towards European integration

---

The first step of the issue representation model is that parties provide different policy positions that voters are able to choose between. For much of its history however, the process of European integration seemed to be marked by a general consensus in favour of continued integration amongst both political elites and citizens. As many have noted, the Danish rejection of the Maastricht Treaty in the 1992 referendum appeared to mark an end to this period, ushering in a new phase of protest and public opposition to European integration and an increase in conflict between and within political parties over EU policy.<sup>1</sup> Scholars have been divided over the extent that this increased politicisation has impacted national political parties and party competition in EU member-states.<sup>2</sup> Gradually a consensus has emerged that although European integration has yet to play a major role in domestic electoral competition, it has become a 'sleeping giant' that could become an important electoral issue in the future.<sup>3</sup>

An examination of party polarisation of European integration issues in party manifestos at both European Parliament and national elections (measured by the EU average standard deviation of

---

<sup>1</sup> Ian Down and Carole J. Wilson, "From 'Permissive Consensus' to 'Constraining Dissensus': A Polarizing Union?," *Acta Politica* 43 (2008): 26–49; Sara Hobolt, "Direct Democracy and European Integration," *Journal of European Public Policy* 13, no. 1 (2006): 153–166; Aleks Szczerbiak and Paul Taggart, eds., *Opposing Europe?: The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism* (Oxford, 2008).

<sup>2</sup> Clifford J. Carrubba, "The Electoral Connection in European Union Politics," *The Journal of Politics* 63, no. 1 (2001): 141–158; Geoffrey Evans, "Europe: A New Electoral Cleavage?," in *Critical Elections: British Parties and Voters in Long-Term Perspective* (London: Sage, 1999), 207–222; Geoffrey Evans, "European Integration, Party Politics and Voting in the 2001 Elections," *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion & Parties* 12 (2002): 95–110; Peter Mair, "The Limited Impact of Europe on National Party Systems," *West European Politics* 23, no. 4 (2000): 27–51.

<sup>3</sup> Cees van der Eijk and Mark N. Franklin, "Potential for Contestation on European Matters at National Elections in Europe," in *European Integration and Political Conflict* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 32–50; Catherine E. de Vries, "Sleeping Giant: Fact or Fairytale?: How European Integration Affects National Elections," *European Union Politics* 8, no. 3 (2007): 363.

party positions at each election) largely concurs with this view, as shown in figure 3.1. Measured at the national level, party division has increased substantially over the history of European integration, reaching a peak in the early 2000s.<sup>4</sup> At the European Parliament level polarisation has increased as well, though there has been more fluctuation, with the peak in the mid-1990s (in line with the ‘post-Maastricht blues’ argument).




FIGURE 3.1. EU MEAN STANDARD DEVIATION OF PARTY POSITIONS ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AT NATIONAL AND EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTIONS FROM PARTY MANIFESTO DATA.

The salience of European integration tells a slightly different story at the national and European Parliament level, as shown in figure 3.2. At the national level, the salience of European integration is low for much of the early period of integration (with the exception of a peak in the early 1960s) but steadily increases from the mid-1980s (the time of the Single European Act)

<sup>4</sup> At the national level European integration position is measured on a scale constructed from the two manifesto components relating to European integration (108 - European Community: positive, and 110 - European Community: negative). At the European Parliament level European integration position is measured using the scale suggested by the Euromanifesto Project. Both scales are constructed using the logit scaling method.

before reaching a peak in the early 2000s. At the European Parliament level, although the salience of European integration is always higher than the national level, there has actually been a *decrease* in the salience of European integration issues at European Parliament elections. Although at first this seems counter-intuitive given the increased polarisation over Europe and its rising importance at the national level, from the second-order elections perspective it makes sense: as parties have realised that votes are determined by national issues rather than European ones, the importance of European issues has declined.




FIGURE 3.2. EU MEAN SALIENCE OF PARTY POSITIONS ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AT NATIONAL AND EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTIONS FROM PARTY MANIFESTO DATA.<sup>5</sup>

From the standpoint of issue representation these changes offer a mixed picture. On the one hand division over European integration has generally increased, offering voters more of a choice over Europe, but on the other, at the European Parliament level at least, parties have

<sup>5</sup> Volkens et al., *The Manifesto Data Collection. Manifesto Project (MRG/CMP/MARPOR)*; Daniela Braun et al., “Euromanifestos Project (EMP) 1979 – 2009,” 2015.

placed less of an emphasis on their European integration positions. Given this (and the additional fact that it is not clear that voters actually pay attention to the European integration positions that parties say they hold, as will be shown in Chapter 4) it is important to understand how European integration relates to other political dimensions. If European integration represents an entirely separate political dimension, then representation on European integration can only be achieved if votes are cast directly on European integration issues. If, on the other hand, European integration is concordant with other political dimensions, then representation on European integration might be achieved through votes cast primarily for other reasons.

A great deal of research has sought to explain the origins and structure of conflict over European integration between political parties. A consistent empirical finding has been the so-called 'inverted-U' pattern: when politics is envisaged as occurring in a two dimensional space with a general left-right dimension and a European integration dimension, support for European integration is highest among parties at the centre of the left-right spectrum and lowest at both extremes.<sup>6</sup>

Many attempts have been made to understand this pattern and to untangle the relationship between the left-right dimension and support for European integration. Different scholars have reached resoundingly different conclusions: that left-right and European integration are orthogonal dimensions, that they are fused dimensions, that left-right structures some but not all aspects of European integration, or that we need to move beyond the one dimensional left-

---

<sup>6</sup> Mark Aspinwall, "Preferring Europe: Ideology and National Preferences on European Integration," *European Union Politics* 3 (2002): 81–111; Simon Hix and Christopher Lord, *Political Parties in the European Union* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997); "Does Left/Right Structure Party Positions on European Integration?," *Comparative Political Studies* 35, no. 8 (2002): 965–989; Gary Marks, "European Integration and Political Conflict," in *European Integration and Political Conflict* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 235–259; Gary Marks, Carole J. Wilson, and Leonard Ray, "National Political Parties and European Integration," *American Journal of Political Science* 46 (2002): 585–594.

right framework and incorporate conflicts over 'new politics' into our models. To a large extent the scholars working on this question, perhaps because they work on different substantive aspects of European integration, have talked past one another. This chapter represents the first attempt to analyse competing models of the relationship between existing political dimensions and European integration. It finds, contrary to those who propose that European integration is an orthogonal political dimension, that party positions on European integration are structured by existing political dimensions. Testing different models of this relationship shows that a two dimensional (economic left-right and social liberal-conservative) conception of political competition provides more explanatory power than a unidimensional 'general left-right' model. Finally this chapter proposes that all existing models of the relationship between party ideology and support for European integration have failed to account for one dimension: time. Incorporating a time dimension into models of the relationship between party ideology and support for European integration reveals that the relationship has changed considerably over the course of European integration – shifting from a situation in which party positions are largely determined by positions towards economic issues to one in which positions are more strongly influenced by stances on social issues.

### **3.1 – Existing approaches**

One of the first explorations of the dimensionality of the politics of European integration was provided by Hix and Lord, who argued that positions towards European integration represent an independent political dimension, primarily concerned with the question of national sovereignty.<sup>7</sup> In this approach the national sovereignty dimension is orthogonal to the left-right dimension because they involve fundamentally different questions of resource distribution. The

---

<sup>7</sup> Simon Hix, "Dimensions and Alignments in European Union Politics: Cognitive Constraints and Partisan Responses," *European Journal of Political Research* 25 (1999): 69–106; Hix and Lord, *Political Parties in the European Union*.

national sovereignty dimension involves questions about the distribution of resources between *territorial* groups while the left-right dimension is about the division of resources between *functional* groups, such as social classes.

Similarly, Kriesi et al. argue that the process of European integration, and the process of globalisation more generally, has created new winners and losers in society.<sup>8</sup> European integration has created new social cleavages in areas such as protected and unprotected economic sectors, cultural competition between natives and migrants, and opponents and supporters of supranational governance. These divisions then structure positions towards European integration. According to this approach, the inverted-U pattern is explained because mainstream political parties have a strategic interest in maintaining the dominance of the left-right dimension in political competition and so mainstream parties have coalesced around a generally pro-European position. Similarly, but looking at the issue from the opposite perspective, Taggart argued that opposition to European integration constitutes a 'touchstone of dissent' for radical and extremist parties: an issue they try to use as a wedge to gain entry into a party system.<sup>9</sup>

Other scholars have argued that rather than being a new cleavage, conflict over European Integration is structured by existing political cleavages.<sup>10</sup> Hooghe, Marks and Wilson argue that the inverted-U shape is slightly misleading.<sup>11</sup> They claim that when fringe political parties are eliminated from analysis there is a linear relationship between European integration and the left-right dimension, ranging from a pro-integration left to a less-integration right. Kreppel and

---

<sup>8</sup> Hanspeter Kriesi et al., "Globalization and the Transformation of the National Political Space: Six European Countries Compared," *European Journal of Political Research* 45 (2006): 921–956.

<sup>9</sup> Paul Taggart, "A Touchstone of Dissent: Euroscepticism in Contemporary Western European Party Systems," *European Journal of Political Research* 33 (1998): 363–388.

<sup>10</sup> Gary Marks and Carole J. Wilson, "The Past in the Present: A Cleavage Theory of Party Response to European Integration," *British Journal of Political Science* 30 (2000): 433–459.

<sup>11</sup> Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson, "Does Left/Right Structure Party Positions on European Integration?"

Tsebelis, and Tsebelis and Garrett go as far as to argue that the European integration dimension has become fused with the left-right dimension.<sup>12</sup> This model argues that debate about European integration focuses on whether or not there should be more or less regulation across Europe, rather than whether or not integration is a good thing in general. The more-less regulation dimension is congruous with the left-right dimension and so the two are essentially the same.

Work by Hooghe and Marks showed that the left-right dimension shapes positions towards some, but not all, aspects of European integration, particularly policies concerned with redistribution and regulating capitalism.<sup>13</sup> Initially Hooghe and Marks hypothesised that the remaining elements of European integration consisted of an orthogonal dimension in much the same way as proposed by the earlier Hix and Lord model. However in later work Hooghe, Marks and Wilson conclude that the remaining aspects of positions toward European integration can be accounted for by positions on a 'new politics' dimension which builds on the scholarship concerned with the rise of political issues concerned with lifestyle, the environment, culture, nationalism and immigration.<sup>14</sup>

Drawing on this work, Hooghe, Marks and Wilson argue that European integration is perceived as a direct threat to the principles of those on the 'traditional-authoritarian-nationalist' pole of

---

<sup>12</sup> Amie Kreppel and George Tsebelis, "Coalition Formation in the European Parliament," *Comparative Political Studies* 32 (1999): 933–966; George Tsebelis and Geoffrey Garrett, "Legislative Politics in the European Union," *European Union Politics* 1 (2000): 9–36.

<sup>13</sup> Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, "The Making of a Polity: The Struggle over European Integration," in *Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 70–97.

<sup>14</sup> Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson, "Does Left/Right Structure Party Positions on European Integration?"; Mark N. Franklin, "The Decline of Cleavage Politics," in *Electoral Change: Responses to Evolving Social and Attitudinal Structures in Western Countries* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 383–405; Ronald Inglehart, *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990); Herbert Kitschelt, *The Transformation of European Social Democracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Herbert Kitschelt, *The Radical Right in Western Europe* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995); Müller-Rommel, "New Politics in Western Europe: The Rise and Success of Green Parties and Alternative Lists," 1989.

their new politics scale: hostility to immigrants, foreign cultures, cosmopolitan elites, and international institutions. Conversely, parties on the 'green-alternative-libertarian' pole of the new politics scale have mixed motivations towards European integration. The EU offers the possibility of enhanced cooperation in policy areas such as environmental protection but might also pose a threat to democracy and public interest groups.

Hooghe, Marks and Wilson's new politics theory can potentially explain variation in party competition over European integration in different countries. Marks et al. find that there is a geographic divide between western and eastern (post-Soviet) Europe in the pattern of party competition of European integration.<sup>15</sup> As a result of different alignments of the left-right dimension and the 'new politics' dimension in western and eastern Europe, competition over European issues tend to map more readily onto the existing party structures in eastern Europe, while in western Europe, European issues are more of cross cutting issue. The consequence of this is that where positions towards European integration do not align with existing party structures on the left-right and new politics dimensions they can act as a potentially volatile electoral issue.

### **3.2 – The dimensionality of European political space**

Despite the compelling nature of Hooghe, Marks and Wilson's theory, scholars of European politics have failed to reach consensus on the dimensionality of the politics of European integration. Whether they have explicitly followed Hooghe, Marks and Wilson or not, many scholars have adopted an economic, social, and European integration dimensions approach to the structure of European political space.<sup>16</sup> Others however, particularly those who study

---

<sup>15</sup> "Party Competition and European Integration in the East and West: Different Structure, Same Causality."

<sup>16</sup> For example: Bakker, Jolly, and Polk, "Complexity in the European Party Space: Exploring Dimensionality with Experts."

decision making within EU bodies such as the European parliament, have for the most part continued to use an orthogonal dimensions (left-right, and European integration/national sovereignty) approach.<sup>17</sup>

A problem with comparing different theories of the relationship between the left-right dimension and European integration, which faces scholars using the left-right concept in all contexts, is that different definitions of 'left-right' might be used by different scholars. In particular, two definitions of left-right are commonly used. The first, a 'general left-right' dimension uses left-right to denote a single 'super' dimension which structures political competition that involves both economic issues (left: government control of the economy; right: free market) and social issues (left: socially liberal/progressive; right: socially conservative/traditional). The second definition, an 'economic left-right' dimension, is only concerned with economic issues and social issues are considered to form a second political dimension.

Ultimately the question of the dimensionality of political space is one that might have different answers in different contexts. To reiterate a point made in the previous chapter: 'Sometimes... a one-dimensional map will tell us everything we want to know. Sometimes... it will not.'<sup>18</sup>

It is not hard to see the potential impact of the choice left-right definition has on our understanding of the relationship between ideology and positions towards European integration. According to the Hooghe, Marks and Wilson model, positions towards European integration are structured by both economic *and* social positions. These effects might be

---

<sup>17</sup> For example: Simon Hix and Bjørn Høyland, *The Political System of the European Union* (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011); Thomas König and Thomas Bräuninger, "Accession and Reform of the European Union. A Game-Theoretical Analysis of Eastern Enlargement and the Constitutional Reform," *European Union Politics* 5, no. 4 (2004): 419–439; Andreas Warntjen, Simon Hix, and Christophe Crombez, "The Party Political Make-up of EU Legislative Bodies," *Journal of European Public Policy* 15, no. 8 (2008): 1243–1253.

<sup>18</sup> Benoit and Laver, "The Dimensionality of Political Space," 216.

obscured by a more general one dimensional conception of left and right – things that occur as a result of changes in social positions might be wrongly attributed to economic positions.

Although most scholars explicitly state which conception of left-right they are using, their conceptions of the overall dimensional structure of European politics are not always the same, and so arguments about the role of 'left and right' and European integration may simply be talking past one another. Additionally restrictions to the availability of data limit the choices researchers are able to make. For example Arnold, Sapir, and de Vries make use of the combined Ray-Chapel Hill Expert survey dataset to test the effect of ideology on party positions towards European integration between 1984 and 2006.<sup>19</sup> The scope of their analysis is necessarily restricted to a one dimensional approach by the fact that prior to the 1999 survey the expert surveys only measured left-right ideology in the general sense. Similarly Hellström approaches the question of ideology and European integration using the MARPOR dataset.<sup>20</sup> Although Hellström draws on the Hooghe, Marks and Wilson argument, he is restricted to a one dimensional analysis by using a modified version MARPOR's general left-right Rile scale.

How much impact these different conceptions of the dimensionality of political space have on our assessments of the relationship between ideology and European integration is unclear. In many EU member-states the economic and social dimensions are closely aligned, and so the influence of dimensionality in those cases may well be minimal. Nonetheless, this is a potentially important issue which previous explorations of the relationship between ideology and positions towards European integration have tended to sidestep or ignore. This area is the first potential improvement to existing analyses offered by the present approach – the models developed here

---

<sup>19</sup> Christine Arnold, Eliyahu V. Sapir, and Catherine de Vries, "Parties' Positions on European Integration: Issue Congruence, Ideology or Context?," *West European Politics* 35, no. 6 (2012): 1341–1362; Steenbergen and Marks, "Evaluating Expert Judgments."

<sup>20</sup> Johan Hellström, "Partisan Responses to Europe: The Role of Ideology for National Political Parties' Positions on European Integration," *Journal of European Public Policy* 15, no. 2 (2008): 189–207; Volkens et al., *The Manifesto Data Collection. Manifesto Project (MRG/CMP/MARPOR)*.

will be tested using both one and two dimensional conceptions of political space. Following Hooghe, Marks and Wilson's finding that the economic and social dimensions affect positions towards different aspects of European integration, it is expected that because it provides greater explanatory power a two dimensional approach will also provide a better fitting statistical model of the relationship between ideology and European integration

*Hypothesis 1: A two dimensional conception of ideology will provide a better fitting model of the relationship between ideology and positions towards European integration.*

### **3.3 – Ideology and European integration over time**

Hooghe et al. argue that European integration has introduced many new issues to the political agenda as it has progressed.<sup>21</sup> Similarly, the rise of 'new politics' has introduced new issues that may clash with European integration.<sup>22</sup> Despite this argument, the question of how the relationship between ideology and European integration has changed over time has been neglected by previous analyses of ideology and positions on European integration. Given that Hooghe et al.'s expert survey data is limited to a particular time period this is unlikely to be a problem for their findings. However a cursory glance at the history of European integration suggests that modelling the relationship between ideology and positions on European integration in a dataset that covers a wider timespan is potentially problematic. Although it is generally referred to as a single process, the reality is that there has not been one European integration: there have been many different European integrations. The early stages of integration focused on specific industrial areas: coal and steel, and atomic energy. Later economic integration gained a free market focus before the turn to 'Social Europe' began to affect areas such as labour market regulation. Finally in the last two decades non-economic areas

---

<sup>21</sup> Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson, "Does Left/Right Structure Party Positions on European Integration?"

<sup>22</sup> Ibid.

such as social policy, military cooperation, and foreign policy, have begun to come under the remit of European integration as well.

Similarly, a brief examination of the history of the positions of certain political parties towards European integration reveals a relationship that changes across time. Much of this change has occurred on the left of the political spectrum: many parties on the left were opposed to European integration for much of its early history, perceiving it as a capitalist project to spread the free market across Europe. However the combination of the shift in European integration towards social policy in the late 1980s onwards and the move to a more moderate position by many left wing parties led many to a positive reassessment of European integration.

On the far-left, several west European Communist parties have moved from an openly hostile and Eurosceptic position to a positive (if still critical) stance.<sup>23</sup> Similarly many Green parties have shifted from an anti-integration position to embracing European integration as a platform to pursue their policy goals.<sup>24</sup>

More mainstream left parties have also experienced a large shift in their positions on European integration as well. Perhaps the most notable example of this is the British Labour Party.<sup>25</sup> Labour opposed Britain's involvement in the early stages of European integration and later became bitterly divided over Europe leading to the 1975 referendum and contributing to the 1981 Social Democratic Party split. By the time of their victory at the 1997 election however, Labour had embraced a wholehearted enthusiasm for Europe. Similarly in Greece, PASOK

---

<sup>23</sup> Giorgos Charalambous, *European Integration and the Communist Dilemma*, New edition edition (Farnham, Surrey ; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2013).

<sup>24</sup> Elizabeth E. Bomberg, *Green Parties and Politics in the European Union* (Psychology Press, 1998).

<sup>25</sup> Philip Daniels, "From Hostility to 'constructive Engagement': The Europeanisation of the Labour Party," *West European Politics* 21, no. 1 (1998): 72–96.

opposed Greece's entry to the EEC before eventually becoming the mainstream 'party of Europe' (before their electoral collapse).<sup>26</sup>

Any model that does not include some sort of temporal component implicitly assumes that these changes can be accounted for by shifts in party ideology rather than changes to the nature of European integration. Although such shifts have undoubtedly played some role, changes to the nature of European integration suggest that they are unlikely to account for all the shifts in party positions towards European integration. Specifically two changes are expected to occur over time. First, as integration progressed from its 'common market' phase to an integrated regulated market, the economic ideological structure of positions towards European integration is likely to have moved from a situation in which positions towards European integration became more favourable as parties were more right wing (as support for economic liberalisation and free trade increases) to one in which positions towards European integration are most positive in the centre of the economic dimension and more hostile as parties move away from the centre, because they either object to the 'market' focus of the EU (left pole) or to the burden of EU regulation (right pole):

*Hypothesis 2a: The relationship between economic left-right and European integration will shift from a left-right/anti-pro integration relationship to a centre-periphery/pro-anti integration relationship as European integration progresses.*

Secondly, as European integration has progressed from a functionalist economic project to its contemporary form of supranational governance – with competencies ranging from immigration to foreign policy cooperation – the relationship between the social liberal-conservative dimension will have shifted from a relationship of centrist support for integration to a

---

<sup>26</sup> Gerassimos Moschonas, "The Path of Modernization: PASOK and European Integration," *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans Online* 3, no. 1 (May 1, 2001): 11–24.

relationship marked by increasing division between those who see European integration as a threat to national sovereignty and integrity, particularly as a result of migration, and those that support the goal of international cooperation as a means of solving political problems:

*Hypothesis 2b: The relationship between social liberal-conservative positions and European integration will shift from a centre-periphery/pro-anti integration relationship to a liberal-conservative/pro-anti relationship as European integration progresses.*

In the case of the one dimensional model, where left and liberal, and right and conservative are fused, the combination of these two hypotheses will results in a model which shows a shift from an anti-integration left and a pro-integration right, to a pro-integration left and an anti-integration right.

*Hypothesis 2c: In the one dimensional model the relationship between left and right will shift from a left-right/anti-pro European integration alignment, to a left-right/pro-anti European integration alignment.*

### **3.4 – Data and Methodology**

The hypotheses are tested using a multi-level mixed effects growth curve modelling approach.<sup>27</sup> This method can essentially be understood as a standard multi-level linear model with a time covariate that is allowed to vary at the level of the unit of interest (i.e. random slopes are calculated for the time variable). This method allows longitudinal changes in a variable of interest (position towards European integration) to be modelled for each unit of analysis (political party). The time variable is measured in years, and is set at 0 for the date on which the Treaty of Rome came into effect (1 January 1958). The data is structured using a cross classified

---

<sup>27</sup> Sophia Rabe-Hesketh and Anders Skrondal, *Multilevel and Longitudinal Modeling Using Stata.*, vol. 1, Third Edition (College Station, Tex.: Stata Press, 2012), 343–349.

approach with observations cross classified between political parties and elections, which are nested within countries, allowing differences due to party, election, and country effects to be modelled.

Data is taken from the MARPOR dataset, using the scales developed in Chapter 2.<sup>28</sup> MARPOR data is chosen because it allows the widest range of cases, both across time and countries, of any available data source. It also allows the Hooghe, Marks and Wilson theory, which is based on expert survey data, to be tested on a new dataset.

In an ideal world the cases included in analysis would be all parties running in all EEC/EC/EU member-states elections. However as the dataset relies on MARPOR data it is necessarily restricted to the cases selected and coded by MARPOR. Unfortunately, at the time of writing three member-states do not have any manifestos coded from relevant elections (Cyprus, Latvia, and Malta, though future coding is planned for all three) and several member-states are missing at least one election.<sup>29</sup> This leaves a total available data pool of 1,238 cases. Manifestos that do not mention European integration are excluded, which reduced the total number of cases to 1050.<sup>30</sup> Unsurprisingly, given different lengths of EU membership and different party system sizes, the cases are not uniformly distributed between member-states. The distribution of cases is shown in table 3.1, along with summary statistics for each variable.

---

<sup>28</sup> Volkens et al., *The Manifesto Data Collection. Manifesto Project (MRG/CMP/MARPOR)*.

<sup>29</sup> In total there are 14 relevant elections that were not coded by MARPOR at the time of writing: Cyprus 2006, 2011; France 2012; Greece 2004, 2007, 2009, 2012; Latvia 2006, 2010, 2011; Lithuania 2008; Malta 2008; Netherlands 2012; Poland 2011;

<sup>30</sup> As a robustness check the regression models were run with the excluded cases included. Doing so does not affect the direction, approximate size, or statistical significance of any of the findings. However in keeping with best practise, the 'structural zero' cases are still excluded from analysis.

| Country           | Cases<br>(Excluded)   | European<br>integration<br>Mean<br>(SD) | General<br>left-right<br>Mean<br>(SD) | Economic<br>left-right<br>Mean<br>(SD) | Social liberal -<br>conservative<br>Mean<br>(SD) |
|-------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|----------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|
| Austria           | 24<br>(1)             | 55.66<br>(15.849)                       | 47.091<br>(10.484)                    | 43.021<br>(12.083)                     | 55.795<br>(7.244)                                |
| Belgium           | 143<br>(11)           | 63.615<br>(9.008)                       | 45.534<br>(8.258)                     | 47.341<br>(10.73)                      | 44.937<br>(9.339)                                |
| Bulgaria          | 3<br>(3)              | 59.96<br>(7.913)                        | 55.163<br>(2.858)                     | 58.5<br>(2.561)                        | 62.224<br>(4.487)                                |
| Czech<br>Republic | 11<br>(1)             | 61.95<br>(9.405)                        | 47.881<br>(4.727)                     | 50.493<br>(8.044)                      | 35.924<br>(8.595)                                |
| Denmark           | 82<br>(61)            | 40.881<br>(15.024)                      | 49.778<br>(12.251)                    | 50.585<br>(13.227)                     | 49.558<br>(11.096)                               |
| Estonia           | 12<br>(0)             | 60.822<br>(8.025)                       | 48.301<br>(6.447)                     | 36.353<br>(8.852)                      | 53.9<br>(7.851)                                  |
| Finland           | 28<br>(13)            | 48.851<br>(14.547)                      | 49.64<br>(8.452)                      | 48.214<br>(9.823)                      | 51.685<br>(9.326)                                |
| France            | 63<br>(21)            | 52.023<br>(14.191)                      | 47.588<br>(11.435)                    | 46.921<br>(12.59)                      | 48.776<br>(10.358)                               |
| Germany           | 62<br>(4)             | 59.752<br>(8.034)                       | 46.376<br>(9.352)                     | 48.59<br>(10.123)                      | 48.227<br>(9.402)                                |
| Great Britain     | 44<br>(0)             | 52.108<br>(14.719)                      | 47.273<br>(7.459)                     | 48.059<br>(9.631)                      | 48.916<br>(11.908)                               |
| Greece            | 28<br>(1)             | 50.969<br>(18.701)                      | 50.095<br>(7.977)                     | 44.447<br>(11.591)                     | 55.814<br>(10.98)                                |
| Hungary           | 11<br>(1)             | 63.193<br>(10.486)                      | 50.26<br>(4.513)                      | 45.55<br>(6.558)                       | 53.355<br>(6.537)                                |
| Ireland           | 44<br>(15)            | 50.661<br>(13.257)                      | 43.657<br>(9.28)                      | 43.584<br>(11.535)                     | 47.047<br>(12.065)                               |
| Italy             | 114<br>(28)           | 60.587<br>(13.177)                      | 47.621<br>(9.531)                     | 51.437<br>(10.535)                     | 51.151<br>(11.722)                               |
| Lithuania         | 6<br>(0)              | 56.381<br>(11.308)                      | 43.828<br>(9.406)                     | 37.403<br>(12.451)                     | 51.673<br>(5.198)                                |
| Luxembourg        | 50<br>(7)             | 52.67<br>(17.647)                       | 42.153<br>(11.564)                    | 42.714<br>(11.515)                     | 40.328<br>(11.227)                               |
| Netherlands       | 109<br>(4)            | 58.84<br>(12.229)                       | 47.633<br>(9.004)                     | 49.955<br>(8.455)                      | 43.779<br>(10.359)                               |
| Poland            | 10<br>(2)             | 54.923<br>(15.648)                      | 45.936<br>(8.886)                     | 39.503<br>(9.286)                      | 55.148<br>(6.58)                                 |
| Portugal          | 46<br>(5)             | 49.319<br>(17.43)                       | 42.947<br>(7.165)                     | 42.326<br>(10.209)                     | 52.629<br>(7.631)                                |
| Romania           | 4<br>(0)              | 58.94<br>(5.708)                        | 45.225<br>(6.05)                      | 43.135<br>(11.641)                     | 53.548<br>(7.387)                                |
| Slovakia          | 21<br>(0)             | 57.335<br>(15.889)                      | 52.756<br>(7.856)                     | 53.229<br>(10.027)                     | 50.702<br>(8.195)                                |
| Slovenia          | 25<br>(0)             | 60.155<br>(13.628)                      | 47.329<br>(3.906)                     | 49.313<br>(4.312)                      | 50.367<br>(6.966)                                |
| Spain             | 84<br>(5)             | 61.498<br>(15)                          | 36.628<br>(10.482)                    | 39.98<br>(11.533)                      | 38.882<br>(9.172)                                |
| Sweden            | 26<br>(3)             | 50.072<br>(18.835)                      | 45.903<br>(12.693)                    | 47.538<br>(12.985)                     | 37.24<br>(10.983)                                |
| <b>Total</b>      | <b>1050<br/>(188)</b> | <b>56.087<br/>(14.988)</b>              | <b>46.079<br/>(10.034)</b>            | <b>46.993<br/>(11.331)</b>             | <b>47.252<br/>(11.138)</b>                       |

TABLE 3.1. DISTRIBUTION OF CASES BETWEEN MEMBER-STATES AND SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR THE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, GENERAL LEFT-RIGHT, ECONOMIC LEFT-RIGHT, AND SOCIAL LIBERAL-CONSERVATIVE SCALES.

### 3.5 – Results

Interclass Correlation Coefficients from an empty multilevel model (results not shown) confirm the importance of investigating positions on European integration at the party level. The bulk of the variance occurs at the party level (ICC = 0.5), with a much smaller proportion at the country level (0.12), and the election level explaining very little (ICC = 0.03). The analysis of the relationship between ideology and European integration positions begins with an examination of the one dimensional (general left-right) conception of political ideology, shown in models 1-4 in table 3.2. Comparing the results and fit statistics between models 1 and 2 confirms the importance of modelling the relationship between the general left-right dimension and positions on European integration as a curvilinear relationship, as suggested by the frequently made ‘inverted U’ observation. Model 1 finds no statistically significant relationship between the general left-right scale and party positions on European integration, appearing to support the ‘orthogonal’ dimensions interpretation of the relationship. However this is no longer the case once a quadratic term is introduced: model 2 finds a statistically significant relationship between the general left-right dimension and the European integration dimension, with support peaking around the centre of the dimension – replicating the traditional ‘inverted U’ pattern of party support for European integration. This supports the argument that party positions towards European integration are structured by other political dimensions but are not fused with them.

Model 3 introduces the longitudinal analysis. The statistically significant years and years squared coefficient confirms that changes in party positions towards European integration can be modelled as a growth curve. Model 4 introduces an interaction between the years variable and the general left-right variable, which is statistically significant. The fit statistics confirm that this model is superior to the other one dimensional models, supporting the argument in favour of introducing temporal variation to the relationship between ideology and European integration. The results of model 4, illustrated by predictive margins in figure 3.3 confirm hypothesis 2c: at

the early stage of European integration positions towards European integration become more favourable as parties move towards the right of the scale, peaking around the centre right. Fifty years later the model shows the reverse, positions towards European integration become more favourable as parties move towards the left, peaking around the centre left.




FIGURE 3.3. PREDICTED PARTY POSITIONS TOWARDS EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AS AN EFFECT OF POSITIONS ON THE GENERAL LEFT-RIGHT DIMENSION IN 1958 AND 2008.

| Variable                            | One dimensional      |                      |                      |                      | Two dimensional      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |
|-------------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
|                                     | Model 1              | Model 2              | Model 3              | Model 4              | Model 5              | Model 6              | Model 7              | Model 8              | Model 9              | Model 10             | Model 11             |
| General left-right                  | -0.054<br>(0.047)    | 0.891***<br>(0.202)  | 0.750***<br>(0.195)  | 1.309***<br>(0.231)  |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |
| General left-right squared          |                      | -0.011***<br>(0.002) | -0.009***<br>(0.002) | -0.014***<br>(0.002) |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |
| General left-right X                |                      |                      |                      | -0.012***<br>(0.003) |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |
| Years interaction                   |                      |                      |                      |                      | 0.049<br>(0.041)     | 0.493***<br>(0.17)   |                      |                      | 0.499***<br>(0.166)  | 0.408**<br>(0.162)   | 0.748***<br>(0.21)   |
| Economic left-right                 |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      | -0.005***<br>(0.002) |                      |                      | -0.004**<br>(0.002)  | -0.003*<br>(0.002)   | -0.005***<br>(0.002) |
| Economic left-right squared         |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      | -0.005**<br>(0.002)  |
| Economic left-right X               |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |
| Years interaction                   |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |
| Social liberal-conservative         |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      | -0.155***<br>(0.036) | 0.826***<br>(0.174)  | 0.873***<br>(0.175)  | 0.821***<br>(0.168)  | 1.01***<br>(0.181)   |
| Social liberal-conservative squared |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      | -0.011***<br>(0.002) | -0.012***<br>(0.002) | -0.011***<br>(0.002) | -0.01***<br>(0.002)  |
| Social liberal-conservative X       |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      | -0.009***<br>(0.002) |
| Years interaction                   |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |
| Years                               |                      |                      | 0.283***<br>(0.102)  | 0.911***<br>(0.177)  |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      | 0.287***<br>(0.104)  | 1.005**<br>(0.19)    |
| Years squared                       |                      |                      | -0.003**<br>(0.002)  | -0.004**<br>(0.002)  |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      | -0.003<br>(0.002)    | -0.003**<br>(0.002)  |
| Constant                            | 57.141***<br>(2.609) | 38.346***<br>(4.665) | 35.268***<br>(4.798) | 13.102*<br>(6.949)   | 52.368***<br>(2.344) | 43.151***<br>(4.141) | 62.164***<br>(2.236) | 41.637***<br>(4.19)  | 27.676***<br>(5.658) | 24.343***<br>(5.773) | 0.591<br>(7.857)     |
| N                                   | 1050                 | 1050                 | 1050                 | 1050                 | 1050                 | 1050                 | 1050                 | 1050                 | 1050                 | 1050                 | 1050                 |
| Overall R <sup>2</sup>              | 0.74                 | 0.74                 | 0.785                | 0.787                | 0.743                | 0.741                | 0.741                | 0.756                | 0.758                | 0.793                | 0.797                |
| Fixed effects only R <sup>2</sup>   | <0.001               | 0.056                | 0.036                | 0.043                | 0.018                | 0.055                | 0.03                 | 0.062                | 0.117                | 0.102                | 0.104                |
| AIC                                 | 8111.796             | 8101.678             | 8076.784             | 8070.103             | 8112.028             | 8117.682             | 8095.547             | 8076.327             | 8081.996             | 8054.83              | 8057.807             |
| BIC                                 | 8141.536             | 8136.374             | 8126.35              | 8124.625             | 8141.767             | 8152.378             | 8125.286             | 8111.023             | 8126.605             | 8114.309             | 8127.198             |

Statistical significance: \* p<0.1, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01

TABLE 3.2. RESULTS FROM MULTILEVEL MIXED-EFFECTS LINEAR MODELS ESTIMATING THE EFFECT OF GENERAL LEFT-RIGHT, ECONOMIC LEFT-RIGHT AND SOCIAL LIBERAL-CONSERVATIVE POSITIONS ON POSITIONS ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION (RANDOM EFFECTS NOT SHOWN).

The analysis then turns to the two dimensional conception of political space. Model 5 and 6 confirm the curvilinear relationship between left-right and European integration. Model 7 and 8 examine the relationship between the social liberal-conservative dimension and European integration and again confirm that the relationship is curvilinear. Also important to note is that the fit statistics between the social and economic dimension models indicates that, on their own, the social dimension explains more of the variance in European integration positions than the economic dimension, perhaps indicating that the emphasis on left-right in the literature has been misleading. Model 9 combines the two dimensions and shows that the effects for each dimension are not conditional on a party's position on the other dimension: the coefficients for each dimension are statistically equivalent between the individual models (shown in model 6 and 8) and the combined model. Models 10 and 11 introduce the longitudinal component, which, as with the one dimensional left-right, shows an interaction effect between each of the dimensions and the years variable.

The changing effects of each of the dimensions across time are illustrated in figure 3.4 for economic left-right and figure 3.5 for social liberal-conservative. In both cases the relationship changes as suggested in hypotheses 2a and 2b. At the early stage of integration the positions on European integration are structured by an anti-integration left to a pro-integration right, which by more recent times has shifted towards a relationship that is almost flat, but with peak positions at the centre of the left-right dimension. The social liberal-conservative dimension on the other hand shifts from a relationship where positions on European integration are most positive in the centre and are more hostile at each extreme at the early stages of European integration. By the later stages of European integration this relationship has shifted to a pro-integration liberal end to an anti-integration conservative end.




FIGURE 3.4. PREDICTED PARTY POSITIONS TOWARDS EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AS AN EFFECT OF POSITIONS ON THE ECONOMIC LEFT-RIGHT DIMENSION WITH SOCIAL LIBERAL-CONSERVATIVE HELD AT THE SAMPLE MEAN, FOR 1958 AND 2008.

Comparing the fit of the different models reveals a complex set of considerations that must be examined when assessing what is ultimately the ‘best’ model of the relationship between ideology and European integration. In terms of absolute fit of the model and the data, model 11 produces the highest overall  $R^2$  value, indicating that the two dimensional ideological model is a better fitting model than a one dimensional model, supporting hypothesis one. Also supporting hypothesis one is the comparison of the fixed-effects only (the ideology and years variables without any of the country, election, and party effects)  $R^2$  values between model 4 and 11, showing that the fixed-effects portion of model 11 explains more than double the variance of party European integration positions than model 4 does.




FIGURE 3.5. PREDICTED PARTY POSITIONS TOWARDS EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AS AN EFFECT OF POSITIONS ON THE SOCIAL LIBERAL-CONSERVATIVE DIMENSION WITH ECONOMIC LEFT-RIGHT HELD AT THE SAMPLE MEAN, FOR 1958 AND 2008.

The Akaike information criterion (AIC) and Bayesian information criterion (BIC) statistics reveal a more complicated story. AIC and BIC give an indication of the trade-off between model fit and model complexity, with BIC penalising additional model parameters more harshly than AIC. Although the AIC statistics indicate that model 11 is to be preferred to model 4, the BIC statistics suggests that the improvement in model fit comes at the price of model complexity.

Similarly although model 11 is the best fitting of the two-dimensional models in absolute terms, both the AIC and BIC statistics favour model 10 (which has no interaction between time and ideology) and the BIC statistics favour models 8 (the social liberal-conservative only model) and 9 (both ideological dimensions without a time variable).

There is no final answer to the question of which of the models is the ‘best’ – ultimately it depends on the research purpose of the model. Here the goal is not just to model the relationship between ideology and positions on European integration but to understand what factors influence that relationship (i.e. one vs two dimensions) and how that relationship has changed across time. For these purposes the statistical significance of specific variables is more important than overall assessments of model performance. For other purposes the same may not be true: if the goal is simply to control for the effects of ideology as part of a wider model then the results here indicate that more parsimonious models may be sufficient.

### **3.6 – East, West, and the importance of time**

There are two main findings from the preceding analysis: One, the two dimensional (economic left-right and social liberal conservative) approach generally offers better model fit and greater explanatory power than the one dimensional (general left-right) approach. This finding also essentially replicates the earlier Hooghe, Marks and Wilson model with a dataset that is drawn from a different source (expert surveys vs manifesto data) and covers a wider timespan than the original Hooghe, Marks and Wilson model. Two, the relationship between the ideological dimensions and positions on European integration has changed considerably over time

The importance of taking the dimensionality of the relationship between ideology and European integration seriously, particularly the temporal dimension, and how failing to do so can lead to incorrect inferences, is easily illustrated by a comparison of parties in Western and Eastern Europe.

That party competition in Western and Eastern Europe is structured differently is well established, with competition in the West being dominated by the economic dimension, whilst

there is more emphasis on social issues in the East.<sup>30</sup> The origins of Western European party systems lie in shared historical developments, such as the industrial revolution and the rise of mass democracy in the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries, and developed along similar lines during the post-industrial era.<sup>31</sup> The much younger Eastern European party systems developed rapidly during the transition from Soviet rule and are characterised by a greater emphasis on ethnicity, religion, and region rather than socio-economic class conflict.<sup>32</sup>

Despite the fundamental differences in the structure of political competition in Western and Eastern Europe, Marks et al. find that the relationship between the economic and social dimensions, and European integration positions is fundamentally the same. To test this result with different conceptions of dimensionality a binary variable that measures whether a country is an Eastern European former Soviet state (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia) is added to the previous models and interacted with the ideological dimension variables. As the multi-level model already controls for country level variance in European integration positions, this variable measures whether there is anything specifically 'Eastern European' or 'Post Soviet' in the relationship between

---

<sup>30</sup> Emanuel Coman, "Dimensions of Political Conflict in West and East An Application of Vote Scaling to 22 European Parliaments," *Party Politics* (July 9, 2015): 1354068815593454.

<sup>31</sup> Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction," in *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives*. (Toronto: The Free Press, 1967); Rueschemeyer, *Capitalist Development and Democracy*, New edition edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992); Inglehart, *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society*; Kitschelt, *The Transformation of European Social Democracy*.

<sup>32</sup> Geoffrey Evans and Stephen Whitefield, "Identifying the Bases of Party Competition in Eastern Europe," *British Journal of Political Science* 23, no. 4 (October 1, 1993): 521–548; Radoslaw Markowski, "Political Parties and Ideological Spaces in East Central Europe," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 30, no. 3 (September 1997): 221–254; Geoffrey Evans and Stephen Whitefield, "The Structuring of Political Cleavages in Post-Communist Societies: The Case of the Czech Republic and Slovakia," *Political Studies* 46, no. 1 (March 1, 1998): 115–139; Stephen Whitefield, "Political Cleavages and Post-Communist Politics," *Annual Review of Political Science* 5, no. 1 (2002): 181–200; Anna Grzymala-Busse, "Authoritarian Determinants of Democratic Party Competition The Communist Successor Parties in East Central Europe," *Party Politics* 12, no. 3 (May 1, 2006): 415–437; Jan Rovny, "Communism, Federalism, and Ethnic Minorities: Explaining Party Competition Patterns in Eastern Europe," *World Politics* 66, no. 04 (October 2014): 669–708.

ideology and European integration positions in these countries. The results of these models are shown in table 3.3.

The results from model 12 show that using general left-right as a linear variable, there is a significant interaction between left-right and Eastern Europe, with the model suggesting that Eastern European parties are much more pro-integration than Western parties, and that in Western Europe the relationship between left-right and European integration is essentially flat whilst in Eastern Europe the left is more pro integration than the right. Model 13 introduces the squared general left-right term and shows that parties in Western Europe conform to the 'inverted u' pattern whilst left and centre-left parties in Eastern Europe are broadly pro-integration whilst those right of centre are less so. Model 14 reintroduces the time variable and the interaction with general left-right. Once differences due to time are accounted for, the apparent difference between Western and Eastern European parties diminishes and is no longer statistically significant. This suggests that the apparent difference between East and West found in the earlier model is in fact due to differences between past and present positions held by Western parties.

Models 15-17 repeat the analysis for the two dimensional conception of dimensionality, a more direct replication of the Marks et al. analysis. Models 14 and 15 both appear to show that Eastern parties are more pro-integration than Western parties and that there is a statistically significant interaction between Eastern Europe and economic left-right. Again however, as shown in model 17, when the time component of the model is included, the apparent Eastern European effects disappear.

|                                                             |                     | One dimensional         |                          |                       | Two dimensional         |                          |
|-------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------|
|                                                             | Model 12            | Model 13                | Model 14                 | Model 15              | Model 16                | Model 17                 |
| General left-right                                          | -0.0343<br>(0.0484) | 0.861***<br>(0.202)     | 1.294***<br>(0.235)      |                       |                         |                          |
| General left-right squared                                  |                     | -0.0106***<br>(0.00233) | -0.0112***<br>(0.00229)  |                       |                         |                          |
| General left-right X<br>Years interaction                   |                     |                         | -0.0119***<br>(0.00284)  |                       |                         |                          |
| Economic left-right                                         |                     |                         |                          | 0.101**<br>(0.0429)   | 0.522***<br>(0.166)     | 0.718***<br>(0.212)      |
| Economic left-right squared                                 |                     |                         |                          |                       | -0.00422**<br>(0.00181) | -0.00490***<br>(0.00187) |
| Economic left-right X<br>Years interaction                  |                     |                         |                          |                       |                         | -0.00476*<br>(0.00260)   |
| Social liberal-conservative                                 |                     |                         |                          | -0.169***<br>(0.0377) | 0.871***<br>(0.175)     | 1.038***<br>(0.183)      |
| Social liberal-conservative squared                         |                     |                         |                          |                       | -0.0117***<br>(0.00191) | -0.0101***<br>(0.00185)  |
| Social liberal-conservative X<br>Years interaction          |                     |                         |                          |                       |                         | -0.00948***<br>(0.00251) |
| Eastern Europe                                              | 31.54***<br>(11.23) | 26.25**<br>(11.09)      | 13.12<br>(11.88)         | 25.32**<br>(11.61)    | 23.45**<br>(11.31)      | 8.162<br>(11.91)         |
| Eastern Europe X<br>general left-right Interaction          | -0.514**<br>(0.224) | -0.414*<br>(0.221)      | -0.131<br>(0.238)        |                       |                         |                          |
| Eastern Europe X<br>Economic left-right Interaction         |                     |                         |                          | -0.284*<br>(0.161)    | -0.308**<br>(0.157)     | -0.174<br>(0.171)        |
| Eastern Europe X<br>Social liberal-conservative Interaction |                     |                         |                          | -0.103<br>(0.167)     | -0.0502<br>(0.163)      | 0.122<br>(0.174)         |
| Years                                                       |                     |                         | 0.917***<br>(0.181)      |                       |                         | 1.009***<br>(0.195)      |
| Years squared                                               |                     |                         | -0.00487***<br>(0.00171) |                       |                         | -0.00374**<br>(0.00178)  |
| Constant                                                    | 54.30***<br>(2.723) | 36.75***<br>(4.684)     | 11.88*<br>(7.100)        | 56.20***<br>(2.875)   | 24.89***<br>(5.690)     | -0.835<br>(7.945)        |
| N                                                           | 1050                | 1050                    | 1050                     | 1050                  | 1050                    | 1050                     |

TABLE 3.3. RESULTS FROM MULTILEVEL MIXED-EFFECTS LINEAR MODELS ESTIMATING THE EFFECT OF GENERAL LEFT-RIGHT, ECONOMIC LEFT-RIGHT, SOCIAL LIBERAL-CONSERVATIVE POSITIONS ON POSITIONS ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION IN WESTERN AND EASTERN EUROPE (RANDOM EFFECTS NOT SHOWN).

The original Marks et al. model did not include a time component in their analysis, but as it was based on more temporally limited expert survey data this did not confound their results. A direct replication of their analysis on a dataset with a wider range of cases (i.e. model 16) would lead to the erroneous conclusion that there was a significant difference between the underlying relationship between ideology and European integration in Western and Eastern Europe. Accounting for time however confirms the validity of the original Marks et al. finding – despite the different structural dimensionality of politics in Eastern and Western Europe, the relationship between the economic and social dimensions, and European integration is fundamentally the same.

### **3.7 – Discussion and conclusion**

One important implication of the results here is the understanding of *how* the way in which ideology structures positions towards European integration has changed over time. This is not simply a reiteration of the fact that there are longitudinal differences in the relationship between each dimension and positions on European integration – it is important to understand what we learn from the combination of the longitudinal approach with the two dimensional approach. The one dimensional general left-right approach models the data almost as well as the two dimensional approach, but the aggregation of economic and social preferences misses one of the key changes that is revealed by the two dimensional approach. Combining both dimensions, as shown in figure 3.6, reveals an important shift in the relationship between ideology and European integration. In the early stages, as illustrated for 1958, positions towards European integration were primarily structured by the economic left-right dimension with social liberal-conservative positions only influencing positions towards European integration within the range determined by economic left-right: the slope with the steepest gradient occurs along the economic left-right axis. Fifty years after the signing of the Treaty of Rome this situation had

reversed: positions towards European integration are now primarily structured by the social liberal-conservative dimension, with economic policy distance shifting positions towards integration within the bounds determined by the social dimension: the steepest gradient of the graph is now along the social liberal-conservative axis.




FIGURE 3.6. THE IDEOLOGICAL STRUCTURE OF PARTY POSITIONS ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION IN 1958 AND 2008.

The end result of this change is broadly captured by the general left-right models (as shown in figure 3.3) but it would be impossible to disentangle the underlying change using a one dimensional approach, and it would be too easy to assume that positions on economic aspects that tend to dominate our understanding of left-right, such as redistribution, are also the primary driver of the change in the relationship between the general left-right dimension and European integration. This conclusion would be entirely wrong. It is hard to overstate the importance of the social dimension in structuring positions towards European integration, a finding which differs considerably from most approaches to this topic which have tended to emphasise left and right. Although economic left-right certainly appears to be more important than the social dimension in the early stages of integration, by the contemporary period economic left-right no longer plays an important role. In the contemporary world, and, as the statistical results indicated, overall for the data analysed here, social liberal-conservative positions are much more important.

This finding aligns with much recent research on the role of factors such as hostility to immigration and authoritarianism – which fit within the conservative side of the social dimension – play in structuring citizen hostility towards European integration.<sup>33</sup> That the same can be said for political parties is probably of little surprise to even casual observers of European politics. In this respect, the analysis here has simply brought empirical models of party ideology and European integration into line with more general observations.

The analysis here also points to an important methodological consideration with implications for political science beyond the study of European integration. ‘Left-right’ is possibly one of the

---

<sup>33</sup> Lauren McLaren, “Public Support for the European Union: Cost/Benefit Analysis or Perceived Cultural Threat?,” *Journal of Politics* 64, no. 2 (2002): 551–566; Erik R. Tillman, “Authoritarianism and Citizen Attitudes towards European Integration,” *European Union Politics* 14, no. 4 (2013): 566–589; Claes H. de Vreese, Hajo G. Boomgaarden, and Holli A. Semetko, “Hard and Soft Public Support for Turkish Membership in the EU,” *European Union Politics* 9, no. 4 (December 1, 2008): 511–530.

most widely used concepts in all areas of politics, from its academic study to popular discourse. It is also a term that is inherently ambiguous – there can be no definitive answer to the question of whether left-right ‘really’ means a general catch-all super dimension that covers economic and social policy preferences, just economic preferences, or something else entirely. Comparing the models which alternatively use left-right as a general catch-all dimension and as an economic dimension shows how easy it would be to draw erroneous conclusions about the role of economic and social preferences in structuring party behaviour.

The results also illustrate the importance of testing for nonlinear relationships. In both the one and two dimensional models the simply linear relationship between left-right and positions towards European integration (models 1 and 5) is statistically insignificant. Whilst further testing reveals that a squared left-right term is important in both cases, if the analysis was halted at the linear stage, a very different conclusion would be reached about the relationship between left-right and European integration: that there is no link between left-right positions and positions on European integration, something that has previously been suggested in the literature but which is demonstrably incorrect. Of course, the structuring role of ideology is only one determinant of party positions on European integration. Other factors, from concerns particular to individual countries, participation in government, and electoral expediency – all of which have been identified in the literature – also play an important role in shaping the positions parties take on European integration. The analysis here does not deny the importance of these factors, but has set them to one side in order to concentrate on long term shifts in the structure of party positions to European integration.

From the perspective of issue representation, the findings here offer two reasons to be optimistic. First, the relationship between ideology and European integration positions is similar across the EU, a necessary condition for a coherent politics of European integration to emerge.

Second, the link between the social dimension and European integration positions suggests that representation on EU issues may take place if votes are determined by broader social dimension issues.

However, the changing nature of the relationship between European integration positions and ideology also presents a serious challenge. Left-right, at least conceived of in its economic form, has become decreasingly linked with European integration positions. This suggests that, if votes are largely determined by the traditionally dominant economic left-right dimension, the possibility of concordant representation on European integration has decreased over time, and the need for direct representation has grown.

As the beginning of this chapter showed, political parties have increasingly offered a wider range of positions on European integration for voters to choose from as European integration has progressed. This suggests that parties might be fulfilling at least part of their role in the issue representation model. Whether voters are responding to party positions on European integration in their vote choices will be examined in Chapters 4 and 5.

## **Chapter 4 – Party signals, dual-process cognition, and voter perceptions of party positions**

---

In terms of how well representation operates for European integration two things are clear from the previous chapter: one, political parties have increasingly polarised over European integration, providing more choice to voters over European integration; and two, European integration positions have become increasingly decoupled from the economic left-right dimension over the course of European integration. Both of these mean that the key to issue representation lies with the demands made of voters by the issue representational model. This is the case for two reasons: first, parties are fulfilling their side of the issue representation model by providing voters with a choice of European integration positions; secondly concordant representation – that is representation that happens because voters and parties agree on issues even when votes are cast for other reasons – is unlikely to occur when left-right and European integration are decoupled, and so votes cast directly for reasons to do with European integration are more important.

Much like political parties, it is possible that voter positions on European integration are structured by the social liberal-conservative dimension, and so if votes are cast according to this dimension then this will lead to representation on European integration issues. Unfortunately only a one dimensional general left-right scale is available in the 2009 European Election Study data and so a similar analysis to that done with political parties in Chapter 3 cannot be conducted at the voter level. However, although a one dimensional general left-right model does not provide the same explanatory power as a two dimensional economic left-right/social liberal-conservative model, Chapter 3 showed that it provides similar statistical power and so may be

sufficient for exploring whether voter positions towards European integration are similarly structured.

A quadratic model of the relationship between general left-right and European integration position (not shown) suggests that left-right does not structure voter positions towards European integration: the model explains less than 0.2% of the variance. This analysis suggests that individual voter positions are poorly structured by the general left-right dimension. It is beyond the scope of the data to explain whether this is because voters understand the general left-right question as primarily concerning economic issues (and from the analysis of party positions we might expect economic left-right not to have much influence on voters' European integration positions) or whether voters' positions on European integration are simply not structured by ideological dimensions in the same way as party positions.

What is clear however is that because both voters' and parties' positions on European integration are not structured by the left-right dimension, votes cast on left-right issues (the primary dimension of European political competition) are unlikely to lead to voters and parties agreeing on European integration issues. Consequently, in order for representation to occur on European integration, vote choice must be at least partially influenced by positions on European integration – representation must be issue specific.

The issue representation model makes three demands of voters, that they have preferences on an issue, that they perceive the difference between the positions of political parties, and that voters' issue preferences significantly impact how they cast their vote. It is clear that voters meet the first of these requirements: 91% of 2009 European Election Study respondents placed themselves on the scale measuring European integration preference. This scale shows a considerable range of preferences for how European integration should progress, with a standard deviation on the scale of 3.1 (on an 11 point 0-10 scale, the mean is 5.3). Clearly voters

have very divergent preferences over European integration – the EU is a long way away from the days of ‘permissive consensus’ – and these preferences need representing at the European level. Whether voters meet the other two requirements is addressed in this and the following chapter. This chapter addresses the question of whether voters perceive the issue positions of political parties on European integration accurately and Chapter 5 addresses the question of whether European integration preferences affect votes cast in European Parliament elections.

In order to assess how voters perceive issue positions it is necessary to turn away from the literature on European integration and to the wider literature on political behaviour and political cognition. Whether voters can actually meet the demands placed on them by representative models of democracy has long been called into question in the literature on political behaviour: Converse cast doubt on the idea that most voters had anything resembling stable opinions on many political issues.<sup>1</sup> In a recent review of the spatial voting literature, Adams notes that although political parties seem to behave as we would expect from this perspective, it is not clear that voters do.<sup>2</sup> As will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5, there is also a long literature documenting the tendency of voters to perceive parties as being closer or further away from their own positions depending on whether they feel close to a party or not.<sup>3</sup> Whilst still acknowledging the deficiencies in the political knowledge and reasoning of many voters,

---

<sup>1</sup> Philip E. Converse, “The Structure of Belief Systems in Mass Publics,” in *Ideology and Discontent*, ed. D. Apter (New York: Free Press, 1964).

<sup>2</sup> James Adams, “Causes and Electoral Consequences of Party Policy Shifts in Multiparty Elections: Theoretical Results and Empirical Evidence,” *Annual Review of Political Science* 15, no. 1 (2012): 401–419.

<sup>3</sup> For recent examples see: Samuel Merrill, Bernard Grofman, and James Adams, “Assimilation and Contrast Effects in Voter Projections of Party Locations: Evidence from Norway, France, and the USA,” *European Journal of Political Research* 40, no. 2 (2001): 199–221; Andrew J. Drummond, “Assimilation, Contrast and Voter Projections of Parties in Left-Right Space Does the Electoral System Matter?,” *Party Politics* 17, no. 6 (November 1, 2011): 711–743; Peter Grand and Guido Tiemann, “Projection Effects and Specification Bias in Spatial Models of European Parliament Elections,” *European Union Politics* 14, no. 4 (December 1, 2013): 497–521.

other scholars are more optimistic, arguing that by relying on cognitive heuristics most voters are able to vote 'correctly' most of the time.<sup>4</sup>

Perhaps because it has been driven by the normative question of whether voters can sufficiently meet the demands placed upon them by democracy and get the positions of parties 'right', this literature has sidestepped the more basic question of how voters develop their perceptions of party positions to begin with and how strong the link is between what parties say about their positions and voters' perceptions of those positions. This link is a necessary step for issue representation to take place, without knowing what parties say they will do and what positions they hold, voters would be unable fulfil their part of the issue representation model.

This chapter seeks to partially fill this gap by examining how voters translate the information that parties broadcast about their policies on left-right and European integration issues into perceptions of party positions. We already know a great deal about related areas, such as: 1) The determinants of political sophistication and its role in political information processing.<sup>5</sup> 2) How voters incorporate campaign information into their evaluations of candidates.<sup>6</sup> 3) The individual and system level influences on the extent to which voters agree on their perception of party positions.<sup>7</sup> 4) Some of the influences on the ability of voters to correctly perceive the

---

<sup>4</sup> Richard R. Lau and David P. Redlawsk, "Voting Correctly," *The American Political Science Review* 91, no. 3 (September 1, 1997): 585–598; Richard R. Lau et al., "Correct Voting Across Thirty-Three Democracies: A Preliminary Analysis," *British Journal of Political Science* 44, no. 02 (2014): 239–259.

<sup>5</sup> Robert C. Luskin, "Explaining Political Sophistication," *Political Behavior* 12, no. 4 (December 1, 1990): 331–361; Jennifer Jerit, Jason Barabas, and Toby Bolsen, "Citizens, Knowledge, and the Information Environment," *American Journal of Political Science* 50, no. 2 (April 1, 2006): 266–282; Stacy B. Gordon and Gary M. Segura, "Cross-National Variation in the Political Sophistication of Individuals: Capability or Choice?," *The Journal of Politics* 59, no. 01 (1997): 126–147; Paul Goren, "Political Sophistication and Policy Reasoning: A Reconsideration," *American Journal of Political Science* 48, no. 3 (July 1, 2004): 462–478.

<sup>6</sup> Larry M. Bartels, "Beyond the Running Tally: Partisan Bias in Political Perceptions," *Political Behavior* 24, no. 2 (June 1, 2002): 117–150; Milton Lodge, Marco R. Steenbergen, and Shawn Brau, "The Responsive Voter: Campaign Information and the Dynamics of Candidate Evaluation," *The American Political Science Review* 89, no. 2 (June 1, 1995): 309–326.

<sup>7</sup> Stefan Dahlberg, "Political Parties and Perceptual Agreement: The Influence of Party Related Factors on Voters' Perceptions in Proportional Electoral Systems," *Electoral Studies* 28, no. 2 (June 2009): 270–278; Stefan Dahlberg, "Does Context Matter – The Impact of Electoral Systems, Political Parties and

relative ordering of party positions.<sup>8</sup> A few recent studies have been conducted on voter responses to party signals using aggregate level data to try and answer the question of whether voters actually respond to party signals at all, with Adams, Ezrow and Somer-Topcu, and Fernandez-Vasquez reaching the opposite conclusion from the same data.<sup>9</sup>

In contrast, the literature on individual level responses to party signals is non-existent. This chapter seeks to correct this deficiency by combining data on the signals that parties give about their policy positions with individual level data on perceptions of those positions on two policy dimensions: a general left-right dimension and a European integration dimension, using the 27 country 2009 European Election Study.<sup>10</sup>

In order to assess how voters process political information, this chapter proposes a three step Salience-Attention-Cognition model of how voters translate party signals in perceptions of party positions. The effect of party signals on voter perceptions of party signals depends on 1) how much information about those positions is made available by the party and reported by the media (salience) 2) how much attention voters pay to the information that is available, and 3) how this information affects voters' perceptions depends on their cognitive skills (cold cognition) and their pre-existing ideas about party positions and motivations to maintain those positions (hot cognition).

---

Individual Characteristics on Voters' Perceptions of Party Positions," *Electoral Studies* 32, no. 4 (December 2013): 670–683; Wouter van der Brug, "Voters' Perceptions and Party Dynamics," *Party Politics* 5, no. 2 (April 1, 1999): 147–169.

<sup>8</sup> Caitlin Milazzo, "Getting It Right When It Counts: Constituency Marginality and Voter Perceptions of British Parties' Policy Positions," *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties* Advanced Access (2014): 1–26.

<sup>9</sup> James Adams, Lawrence Ezrow, and Zeynep Somer-Topcu, "Is Anybody Listening? Evidence That Voters Do Not Respond to European Parties' Policy Statements During Elections," *American Journal of Political Science* 55, no. 2 (April 1, 2011): 370–382; James Adams, Lawrence Ezrow, and Zeynep Somer-Topcu, "Do Voters Respond to Party Manifestos or to a Wider Information Environment? An Analysis of Mass-Elite Linkages on European Integration," *American Journal of Political Science* (May 1, 2014): n/a–n/a; Pablo Fernandez-Vazquez, "And Yet It Moves The Effect of Election Platforms on Party Policy Images," *Comparative Political Studies* 47, no. 14 (December 1, 2014): 1919–1944.

<sup>10</sup> EES, "European Election Study 2009," 2009, <http://www.piredeu.eu/>.

## 4.1 – The Salience-Attention-Cognition model

The Salience-Attention-Cognition model offers a simple framework for examining the process by which party signals about party positions are translated into voter perceptions of those positions. The logic behind the model is that in order for voters to form perceptions of party positions, information about those positions must be available, and voters must attend to and process this information. Each part of the model is elaborated below.

### 4.1.1 – Salience

That parties wish to transmit information about their policy positions is a central assumption to spatial models of electoral competition.<sup>11</sup> The cumulative evidence suggests that parties do actually behave in ways constant with the expectations with spatial theory – modifying and broadcasting their positions in ways designed to capture votes.<sup>12</sup> Whether because they are responding to the political environment, hold a strategic advantage on particular issues, or emphasise particular issues to please party activists, political parties provide different levels of information about their positions on different issues – that is, different issues have different political salience.<sup>13</sup>

The salience of a political issue refers to the extent that an issue features prominently on the political agenda. It can be thought of in terms of *absolute* salience (whether an issue is salient

---

<sup>11</sup> Of course the information that voters receive about party positions does not consist only of the signals parties *wish* to send. The information that voters receive about party positions will be influenced by the media, rival parties' framing, government policy output, or participation in a governing coalition (e.g. David Fortunato and Randolph T. Stevenson, "Perceptions of Partisan Ideologies: The Effect of Coalition Participation," *American Journal of Political Science* 57, no. 2 (April 1, 2013): 459–477.). For the sake of parsimony these issues are put to one side in the present analysis, which focuses on the effect of signals that parties do want to send.

<sup>12</sup> Adams, "Causes and Electoral Consequences of Party Policy Shifts in Multiparty Elections."

<sup>13</sup> Ian Budge and Dennis Farlie, "Party Competition: Selective Emphasis or Direct Confrontation? An Alternative View with Data," in *Western European Party Systems: Continuity and Change* (Beverly Hills, California: Sage, 1983), 267–305; Jane Green and Sara B. Hobolt, "Owning the Issue Agenda: Party Strategies and Vote Choices in British Elections," *Electoral Studies* 27, no. 3 (September 2008): 460–476; Markus Wagner and Thomas M. Meyer, "Which Issues Do Parties Emphasise? Salience Strategies and Party Organisation in Multiparty Systems," *West European Politics* 37, no. 5 (June 2, 2014): 1019–1045.

or not, or how salient an issue is) or *relative* salience (how prominent one issue is relative to another), and in terms of salience for parties, the media, and voters – that is, the extent to which different issues are important to the actors within particular groups. Here salience is meant only in terms of the prominence of political issues for parties and the media. This is not to deny the importance of voter level issue salience, simply that these issues are covered in the attention portion of the model. From the theoretical perspective of the Salience-Attention-Cognition model, salience can be taken in either the absolute or relative sense, in that more salient issue signals in both senses are more likely to be received by voters. Empirically however, in order to simplify the analysis, the salience part of the model is tested in the relative sense, specifically that signals about (general) left-right issues are more salient than signals about European integration.

The difference in salience between the left-right and European integration dimensions is likely to be an important driver of different perceptions of party positions for two reasons. 1) Almost by definition, parties will broadcast more signals about more salient issues. The more information that is available to a voter on an issue, the more likely they are to receive it, either because they actively seek out the information or simply encounter it passively. 2) Few, if any, voters have sufficient time, or desire, to pay attention to every signal that parties broadcast about their policies. Any signals that voters do receive, apart from those that are directly communicated from parties to voters (such as election leaflets) are likely to be filtered first by the media. Even ignoring, for the sake of simplicity, any possible editorial biases that may distort the signals that parties wish to give voters about their positions, the media will play an important filtering role in the transmission of party signals to voters: given the finite nature of airtime and column inches, the party signals that are actually transmitted through the media will necessarily be a subset of those broadcast by the party. Regardless of the number of signals a party

broadcasts, the salience of an issue at the media level will largely determine which issues voters receive information about.

The consensus amongst scholars is that European Integration is a generally low salience political issue at the party, media, and voter level.<sup>14</sup> In the 2009 European Parliament election data examined in this chapter, the mean proportion of a manifesto devoted to left-right issues is 53%, compared to only 17% for issues relating to European integration.

As the empirical focus in this chapter is on the voter side of the Salience-Attention-Cognition model, the effect of salience will only be tested in a simple fashion by comparing the effect of party signals on voter perceptions on a high salience dimension (left-right) with those on a low salience dimension (European integration). Because voters are more likely to receive high salience signals, left-right signals are expected to have more of an effect on voter perceptions on party positions than signals about European integration.

*Hypothesis 1: Party signals on left-right issues will have a larger effect on voter perceptions on party positions than signals about European integration.*

#### 4.1.2 – Attention

Human beings are not passive recipients of information. For information processing to occur, people must selectively focus their cognitive resources on a particular aspect of the information environment. The importance of attention in the study of politics has long been known: the first stage of Zaller's influential Receive-Accept-Sample model of public opinion formation argues

---

<sup>14</sup> Marco R. Steenbergen and David J. Scott, "Contesting Europe? The Salience of European Integration as a Party Issue," in *European Integration and Political Conflict*, ed. Gary Marks and Marco R. Steenbergen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 165–192; Catherine E. Netjes and Harmen A. Binnema, "The Salience of the European Integration Issue: Three Data Sources Compared," *Electoral Studies* 26 (2007): 39–49.

that politically aware individuals are more likely to receive elite messages about political issues, which has important consequences for subsequent information processing.<sup>15</sup>

In cognitive psychology a distinction is usually made between 'top-down' (or endogenous) and 'bottom-up' (exogenous) attention.<sup>16</sup> Top-down attention occurs as a result of deliberate, task-oriented selection of stimuli on which to concentrate (e.g. reading a book), whilst bottom-up attention occurs as a result of environmental stimuli that 'grab' your attention (e.g. a sudden noise). Both types of attention are likely to influence the amount of political information voters receive. Top-down political attention might take the form of following the news, engaging in political conversation, or reading election literature, whilst bottom-up political attention might take the form of significant political events about which information might reach voters without any effort on their part.

The 'attention' part of the Salience-Attention-Cognition model is concerned primarily with top-down political attention, not because bottom-up attention is unimportant, but because it is covered by the salience part of the model. By definition, salient events are prominent in the information environment and so are likely to demand the attention of voters. This suggests that although top-down attention is likely to be important for both high and low salience issues, it is likely to be relatively more important for low salience issues, as information is less likely to reach voters about these issues without deliberate effort.

Attention here is measured by two variables drawn from the European Election Study voter survey which tap respectively the goal and behavioural aspects of top-down political attention:

---

<sup>15</sup> John Zaller, *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion* (Cambridge [England]; New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

<sup>16</sup> R. Desimone and J. Duncan, "Neural Mechanisms of Selective Visual-Attention," *Annual Review of Neuroscience* 18 (1995): 193–222; S. Kastner and L. G. Ungerleider, "Mechanisms of Visual Attention in the Human Cortex," *Annual Review of Neuroscience* 23 (2000): 315–341; J. Theeuwes, "Exogenous and Endogenous Control of Attention: The Effect of Visual Onsets and Offsets," *Perception & Psychophysics* 49, no. 1 (January 1991): 83–90.

how interested the respondent says they are in politics, and how many days a week they follow the news. The more attention that voters pay to politics, the more likely they are to receive party signals, and the more likely these signals are to influence their perceptions of party positions.

*Hypothesis 2a: The more interested voters are in politics, the greater the effect of party signals will be on perceptions of party positions.*

*Hypothesis 2b: The more voters follow the news, the greater the effect of party signals will be on perceptions of party positions.*

*Hypothesis 2c: The effect of Hypothesis 2a and Hypothesis 2b is likely to be relatively more important for the European integration dimension than the left-right dimension.*

#### 4.1.3 – Cognition

Information about party positions, once received, does not translate directly into perception of that position; it must first undergo cognitive processing. In line with much of the recent work on motivated reasoning, the Salience-Attention-Cognition model sees political cognition as affectively driven and through the lens of dual-process models cognition.<sup>18</sup> Dual-process models of cognition see information processing taking place through an interaction between conscious, deliberate processes (cold cognition) and unconscious, uncontrolled, cognitive processes (hot cognition). Whenever a voter ‘thinks’ about politics, cognitive pathways that have previously been associated with political thinking are activated in order to facilitate the easy retrieval of prior political knowledge and opinions. The extent and sophistication of these pathways

---

<sup>18</sup> Milton Lodge and Charles S. Taber, “The Automaticity of Affect for Political Leaders, Groups, and Issues: An Experimental Test of the Hot Cognition Hypothesis,” *Political Psychology* 26, no. 3 (June 1, 2005): 455–482; Milton Lodge and Charles S. Taber, *The Rationalizing Voter* (Cambridge University Press, 2013); David P. Redlawsk, “Hot Cognition or Cool Consideration? Testing the Effects of Motivated Reasoning on Political Decision Making,” *The Journal of Politics* 64, no. 04 (2002): 1021–1044; Cengiz Erisen, Milton Lodge, and Charles S. Taber, “Affective Contagion in Effortful Political Thinking,” *Political Psychology* 35, no. 2 (April 1, 2014): 187–206.

determines how easily and accurately information can be processed, allowing voters to draw on associated knowledge and heuristics in order to incorporate new information into a cognitive schema. These cognitive pathways are 'affectively charged': the retrieval of political information also activates affective orientations previously associated with these political cognitions. These affective orientations – whether a voter feels positively or negatively about the political thought under consideration – provide the drive for 'motivated reasoning': a voter with a strong partisan identity might have a strong negative affective orientation towards a rival political party and so new information about that party's positions will be processed in ways which maintain the voter's partisan identity, perhaps taking the form of shallow processing making extensive use of partisan heuristics. Another voter might feel very positively about their reputation as a political independent and so be motivated to process new information more deeply and judiciously.

While every voter's cognitions will be unique and depend on the specific nature of their existing cognitive pathways, a vast body of evidence from political psychology suggests that we can make meaningful generalisations about how some aspects of cognition will affect political perceptions. The general expectation of the Salience-Attention-Cognition model is that a voter's 'cold' cognitive abilities (such as their political knowledge) will increase the effect of party signals on perceptions of party positions whilst 'hot' cognitive factors (such as partisanship) will decrease the effect, as they provide the means and motivation to maintain existing perceptions.

#### *Cold Cognition I: General cognitive abilities*

Processing political information involves many 'generic' cognitive skills, such as reading, listening, and the ability to recognise and process concepts and arguments, and so we should expect general cognitive abilities to have an important influence on the effect of party signals on voter perceptions of party positions. Although some degree of cognitive skill may be innate, education has an important role in developing cognitive skills relevant for information

processing and education is a widely used proxy measure for cognitive abilities.<sup>19</sup> The link between education and political sophistication and interest is disputed in the literature, but it is also important to control for general cognitive abilities in order to isolate the effects of domain specific cognitive skills from general cognitive abilities.<sup>20</sup> For both the left-right and European integration dimensions, higher levels of education are expected to increase the effect of party signals on voter perceptions of party positions:

*Hypothesis 3: The more educated a respondent is, the greater the effect of party signals will be on their perceptions of party positions.*

*Cold Cognition II: Political sophistication*

Domain specific cognitive skills play an important role in political information processing. Voters with higher levels of politics specific cognitive skills are able to make more sense of the political world by drawing on prior knowledge and heuristics when interpreting new information. For both left-right and European integration dimensions, political sophistication – here measured by the common proxy of levels of political knowledge – will increase the effect of party signals on voter perceptions of party positions.

*Hypothesis 4a: The higher the level of political knowledge a respondent has, the greater the effect of party signals will be on their perceptions of party positions.*

However we can also expect the importance of political sophistication relative to general cognitive sophistication to differ between the left-right and European integration dimensions.

---

<sup>19</sup> Michael Pressley, John G. Borkowski, and Wolfgang Schneider, "Good Information Processing: What It Is and How Education Can Promote It," *International Journal of Educational Research* 13, no. 8 (1989): 857–867.

<sup>20</sup> Luskin, "Explaining Political Sophistication"; Cindy D. Kam and Carl L. Palmer, "Reconsidering the Effects of Education on Political Participation," *The Journal of Politics* 70, no. 03 (2008): 612–631; Mikael Persson, "Education and Political Participation," *British Journal of Political Science* FirstView (2013): 1–15; Richard R. Lau and David P. Redlawsk, *How Voters Decide: Information Processing in Election Campaigns* (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

The high salience left-right dimension is generally concerned with institutions and issues that are likely to be more familiar to voters, regardless of any particular interest in politics, as they are concerned with many of the issues that are at the intersection between 'normal' and 'political' life, such as taxation, employment, and welfare. On the other hand, issues surrounding European integration are likely to be less familiar to voters unless they have a particular interest in politics. Regardless of general cognitive capacity, party signals relating to the European Union, European Commission, or specific EU policy areas can only be meaningful to the extent that voters are actually familiar with the concepts being discussed. A party signalling its desire to 'abolish CAP' is an essentially meaningless statement to even the most intelligent voter if they are unfamiliar with the Common Agricultural Policy but might convey a great deal to one already familiar with the system of coordinated subsidies and quotas.

*Hypothesis 4b: The impact of political knowledge on the effect of party signals on perceptions of party positions will be more important relative to the impact of education for the European integration dimension compared to the left-right dimension.*

#### *Hot Cognition I: Partisanship*

Partisanship has long been considered one of the most important influences on voter perceptions of the political world. The authors of *The American Voter* wrote that partisanship 'raises a perceptual screen through which the individual tends to see what is favorable to his partisan orientation. The stronger the party bond, the more exaggerated the process of selection and perceptual distortion will be'.<sup>21</sup> Two potential types of partisan 'perceptual screen' suggest themselves. Adams, Ezrow, and Somer-Topcu argue that partisan voters are more likely to receive party signals about their favoured party's positions because they are more likely to pay attention to information relevant to their own party, receive direct communications from the

---

<sup>21</sup> Angus Campbell et al., *The American Voter* (New York: Wiley, 1960), 133.

party, and have more direct interactions with party activists.<sup>22</sup> From this perspective we would expect partisanship to increase the effect of party signals on voter perceptions of party positions. The motivated reasoning, 'hot cognition' perspective taken here suggests the opposite effect: partisan voters are likely to have a (favourable) perception of what their preferred party's position is and their affective orientation towards the party may motivate them to maintain that perception, even in light of contradictory signals. This suggestion is supported by a comprehensive body of evidence showing that partisan voters are likely to have a projection bias in their perception of party positions (expanded on in Chapter 5).<sup>23</sup> Partisan voters are likely to perceive their favoured party's positions as being closer to their own position than is actually the case (assimilation bias) and see disfavoured party positions as being further away from their own position than is actually the case (contrast bias). This suggests that party signals will have *less* impact on partisan voters' perceptions of party positions than they will on non-partisan voters' perceptions.

*Hypothesis 5: The more partisan a voter is, the smaller the effect of party signals will be on their perceptions of party positions.*

#### *Hot Cognition II: Age*

Previous studies of political information processing and voter behaviour suggest two possible effects of age on political perceptions. Lau and Redlawsk find that the most important individual characteristic in explaining differences in political information seeking and retention is age.<sup>24</sup> Older voters seek out less information and remember it less accurately than younger voters.<sup>25</sup>

---

<sup>22</sup> Adams, Ezrow, and Somer-Topcu, "Do Voters Respond to Party Manifestos or to a Wider Information Environment?"

<sup>23</sup> Merrill, Grofman, and Adams, "Assimilation and Contrast Effects in Voter Projections of Party Locations"; Grand and Tiemann, "Projection Effects and Specification Bias in Spatial Models of European Parliament Elections"; Drummond, "Assimilation, Contrast and Voter Projections of Parties in Left-Right Space Does the Electoral System Matter?"

<sup>24</sup> Lau and Redlawsk, *How Voters Decide*.

<sup>25</sup> Although their findings are in line with many studies showing a general decline in cognitive capacity as people age, Lau and Redlawsk very fairly point out that their results may be caused (or exaggerated) by

This suggests that due to declining cognitive capacity party signals are likely to have less of an influence on older voters' perceptions of party positions.

An alternative perspective suggests the same effect – party signals having less effect on older voters' perceptions – but for very different reasons. 'Running tally' models of partisanship suggest that partisan identity can be considered as the sum of a voter's past political experience.<sup>26</sup> As voters get older so their tally of political experience increases and the marginal effect of any new piece of political information diminishes. Although the notion of partisanship as a form of 'Bayesian updating' has been highly disputed, there is still strong support for the idea that current political information may not carry as much weight as the sum of past experience, particularly experiences early in life.<sup>27</sup>

This may be particularly important for understanding the difference between perceptions of high and low salience party positions: older voters may have a greater amount of information about past party positions on high salience dimensions than younger voters. If perceptions of party positions are the combination of previous information about party positions and new information, then we might expect this new information to have a smaller effect on the perceptions of older voters, who have a greater sum of information to compare it with. The same may not be true however for low salience policy dimensions like European integration – regardless of age most voters will have less information about past party positions on European integration, both because there is less information to have received and because they may not

---

unfamiliarity with computers and a decline in *physical* capacity, making it harder for older subjects to access information in their experiment.

<sup>26</sup> Morris P. Fiorina, *Retrospective Voting in American National Elections* (New Haven: Yale Univ Pr, 1981); Christopher H. Achen, "Social Psychology, Demographic Variables, and Linear Regression: Breaking the Iron Triangle in Voting Research," *Political Behavior* 14, no. 3 (September 1, 1992): 195–211; Alan Gerber and Donald P. Green, "Rational Learning and Partisan Attitudes," *American Journal of Political Science* 42, no. 3 (July 1, 1998): 794–818.

<sup>27</sup> Bartels, "Beyond the Running Tally"; Larry M. Bartels and Simon Jackman, "A Generational Model of Political Learning," *Electoral Studies* 33 (March 2014): 7–18.

have put the cognitive effort into remembering 'less important' political information. Indeed for voters in some countries European integration may not even have been a political issue during their formative years – 12 of the 27 EU member-states at the time of the 2009 European Parliament election only became members of the EU five years earlier – suggesting a very limited set of past party positions with which to weight new information.

If, as suggested, the impact of age on the effect of party signals differs between the left-right and European integration dimensions, this provides support for a running tally interpretation of the effect of age rather than a cognitive decline explanation.

*Hypothesis 6a: For the left-right dimension, the effect of party signals on perceptions of party positions will be smaller for older voters.*

*Hypothesis 6b: For the European-integration dimension, the effect of party signals on perceptions of party positions will not vary with age.*

*Hot and Cold Cognition: The interaction of Political sophistication and Partisanship*

For the sake of parsimony, the different cognitive factors that are likely to affect the processing of party signals are modelled here separately and as if they operate independent of one another. In reality of course cognition involves the simultaneous interaction of many different factors, some of which may affect the role of others. The literature on political information processing suggests that one such interaction is likely to be particularly important – that occurring between political sophistication and partisanship.

In his Receive-Accept-Sample model, Zaller argues that as well as being more aware of more political signals, because voters with higher levels of political awareness receive multiple (and conflicting) political signals they can be more selective about which political signals they accept

and are more likely to accept those which confirm their prior beliefs.<sup>28</sup> Although voters with lower political awareness are likely to receive fewer political messages they are also more likely to accept them.

More recent work in political information processing suggests a similar pattern, albeit for slightly different reasons. Politically sophisticated voters make greater use of heuristic processing than politically unsophisticated voters which allows them to rapidly incorporate new information into their political schemas. Although this allows new information to be assimilated quickly and easily when information largely conforms to prior beliefs it can also lead to errors and bias when information that does not conform to prior beliefs is ignored or misinterpreted.<sup>29</sup> This may be particularly the case for partisan voters. The combination of partisanship and high levels of political sophistication provides some voters with both the motivation and the tools to discount information that is unfavourable to (their view of) their favoured party.<sup>30</sup> This suggests that the effects of partisanship (Hypothesis 5) are likely to vary by political sophistication.

*Hypothesis 7: The effect of partisanship in reducing the effect of party signals will be greater for politically sophisticated voters.*

The combination of all these factors is summarised in figure 4.1, which shows a simplified flow diagram of the dual-process cognition of party signals. Once party signals are received by the voter they undergo simultaneous parallel processing through hot and cold cognitive pathways. How well the voter is able to incorporate the party signals into their perception of party position

---

<sup>28</sup> Zaller, *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion*.

<sup>29</sup> Milton Lodge and Ruth Hamill, "A Partisan Schema for Political Information Processing," *The American Political Science Review* 80, no. 2 (June 1, 1986): 505–520; Richard R. Lau and David P. Redlawsk, "Advantages and Disadvantages of Cognitive Heuristics in Political Decision Making," *American Journal of Political Science* 45, no. 4 (October 1, 2001): 951–971; Logan Dancey and Geoffrey Sheagley, "Heuristics Behaving Badly: Party Cues and Voter Knowledge," *American Journal of Political Science* 57, no. 2 (2013): 312–325.

<sup>30</sup> Charles S. Taber and Milton Lodge, "Motivated Skepticism in the Evaluation of Political Beliefs," *American Journal of Political Science* 50, no. 3 (2006): 755–769.

is determined by their processing ability, which in turn depends on their general and politics specific cognitive resources. The processing of party signals simultaneously activates previous cognitive pathways associated with the political party and the issue at stake, including the voter's prior conception of the party's position, which in turn depends on how much previous information they have been exposed to about the party (age) and their level of partisanship. Partisanship also determines the affective orientation with which the voter will process the new information, providing the motivation to maintain or update their prior conception of the party position. Not shown in the diagram is the interaction between partisanship and political sophistication, which determines the extent to which the voter is able to maintain their prior conception.




FIGURE 4.1. A DUAL-PROCESS COGNITION MODEL OF THE PROCESSING OF PARTY SIGNALS INTO PERCEPTIONS OF PARTY POSITIONS.

## 4.2 – Data and methodology

In order to test the hypotheses derived from the Salience-Attention-Cognition model of voter perceptions of party positions, this paper uses multilevel mixed-effects modelling on data from the 2009 European Election Study. The data consists of 183,224 observations of left-right and European integration positions for 152 political parties in the 27 EU member-states at the time of the 2009 European Parliament election reported by 18,732 respondents to the 2009 European Election Study voter survey. As is standard practice with the European Election Study data the data is converted from wide to long format to give ‘stacked’ voter-party observations. An additional wide to long transformation combines the relevant left-right and European integration variables (party and self-placement, and party signals) into single variables of each type. The left-right and European integration observations are nested within a multilevel structure: observations of party positions are cross-classified by survey respondent and political party, which are both nested within countries. This data structure is illustrated in figure 4.2.




FIGURE 4.2. THE MULTI-LEVEL CROSS-CLASSIFIED STRUCTURE OF THE DATA.

A respondent's perception of a party's policy position is measured by their answer to one of two questions that asks where the voter would place each party relevant to their national political system on a 0-10 left-right or European integration policy scale. Interest in politics is measured on a four point scale (not at all interested – very interested). Attention to the news is measured by a question asking how many days a week the respondent follows the new. Education is measured by a variable that converts responses to country specific education level questions to International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) levels. Political knowledge is measured by the number of correct responses given to seven questions which test a respondent's political knowledge (four EU related and three country specific). Following the example of work on projection bias at the 2009 European Parliament election, partisanship is measured by a 0-10 scale which measures how likely a respondent is to *ever* vote for a political party.<sup>31</sup> Age is measured in years and calculated by subtracting the respondent's year of birth from 2009.

Party signals about their policy positions are taken from the Euromanifesto component of the European Election Study. Regardless of whether (m)any voters actually read party manifestos, they form the central repository of the party 'line' and so influence and encapsulate the signals that voters will actually receive, whether from the media or interactions with party activists.<sup>32</sup> Left-right party signals are measured by adapting the one dimensional general left-right scale developed in Chapter 2 to the Euromanifesto coding scheme (which is an expanded version of the MARPOR coding scheme). European integration is measured using the categories included in the Euromanifesto European integration scale. Both are rescaled to a 0-10 scale to provide easy comparability to the reported party position scale.

---

<sup>31</sup> Grand and Tiemann, "Projection Effects and Specification Bias in Spatial Models of European Parliament Elections."

<sup>32</sup> Adams, Ezrow, and Somer-Topcu, "Is Anybody Listening?"

As well as the variable of interest discussed above, the model also controls for two additional factors: projection bias and possible gender effects. Projection bias is controlled for by including an interaction between partisanship and self-placement on the left-right and European integration scales (see Chapter 5 for more details on this approach).<sup>33</sup>

There are no theoretical reasons to think that there are any innate differences in political cognition due to gender. Empirically however there are widely reported gender differences in both general political interest and political knowledge and in attitudes towards European integration.<sup>34</sup> In order to control for any gender effects not captured by the political sophistication or interest variables a dummy variable measuring gender is included in the model (one = female).

The model takes the form of a series of interactions (and their component terms) between the attention and cognitive factors of interest (political interest, days following the news, education, political knowledge, partisanship, age, and gender), party signals, and a dummy variable measuring whether the perceived party position and signals are on the left-right or European integration dimension (one = European integration dimension), as well as the interactions between self-placement, partisanship, and the dimension dummy variable. To account for cross-national differences in the meaning of the political dimensions and the effects of party signals, the party signals and dimension variables are given random slopes at the country level.

---

<sup>33</sup> This approach is discussed in more detail in chapter 5.

<sup>34</sup> Sidney Verba, Nancy Burns, and Kay Lehman Schlozman, "Knowing and Caring about Politics: Gender and Political Engagement," *The Journal of Politics* 59, no. 4 (November 1, 1997): 1051–1072; Elizabeth Frazer and Kenneth Macdonald, "Sex Differences in Political Knowledge in Britain," *Political Studies* 51, no. 1 (March 1, 2003): 67–83; Brent F. Nelsen and James L. Guth, "Exploring the Gender Gap Women, Men and Public Attitudes toward European Integration," *European Union Politics* 1, no. 3 (October 1, 2000): 267–291.

### 4.3 – Results

The results of the analysis are shown in table 4.1. The first question is whether party signals actually have any influence on party positions. The results here suggest they do – the party signal variable is positive and statistically significant at the  $p < 0.01$  level. The effect of party signals variable differs considerably between the two dimensions however, the interaction between the party signal variable and European integration dummy variable is negative and statistically significant at the  $p < 0.01$  level, suggesting party signals have less of an effect on the perception of European integration positions. An examination of the predicted marginal effects of party signals for each dimension suggests that, on average, party signals on the left-right dimension have a substantive, as well as statistically significant, effect on voter perceptions, while party signals have no statistically significant effect on voter perceptions of party European integration positions: the marginal effect of left-right signals is 1.119 (95% confidence interval  $\pm 0.207$ ) whilst the marginal effect of European integration signals is 0.123 (95% confidence interval  $\pm 0.206$ ), which is not statistically different from zero. These results offer strong support for Hypothesis 1 – the difference in the effect of party signals between the high and low salience dimensions is stark, on average voters are entirely unaffected by party signals about their European integration positions.

As expected (Hypothesis 2a), political interest increases the effect of party signals of voter perceptions of party positions, the interaction between party signals and political interest is positive and statistically significant at the  $p < 0.01$  level. Also as expected (Hypothesis 2c), political interest is relatively more important for the European integration dimension, the interaction between the European integration dummy variable, party signals, and political interest is positive and statistically significant at the  $p < 0.01$  level. The impact of political interest on the effect of party signals is illustrated in figure 4.3, which shows that although left-right signals always have more impact on perceptions of party positions, and that this impact increases with

political interest, political interest has a greater effect on the effect of European integration signals (the change in the marginal effect of party signals is 1.5 times greater for the European integration dimension compared to the left-right dimension). Importantly figure 4.3 shows that although on average European integration signals might have no effect on perceptions of party positions, they do have some statistically significant impact on voters with the highest levels of political interest.

However the interaction between party signals and the other attention variable, measuring the days a respondent follows the news, is not statistically significant for either dimension (Hypothesis 2b and Hypothesis 2c). This might suggest that the attention part of the Salience-Attention-Cognition model is not as important as was suggested. The fact that the political interest interactions were statistically significant suggests a slightly more nuanced story. Political interest is likely to lead to behaviours such as following the news, and so the null result of the days following the news interactions seems surprising. If the model is re-run excluding the political interest variable (results not shown) the days the respondent follows the news interactions are statistically significant. This suggests that motivational factors are particularly important in political attention and that someone who follows the news but lacks the motivation to pay particular attention to political stories will not just receive party signals as a matter of course.

| Variable                                                                           | Coefficient | Standard Error |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|----------------|
| Political interest                                                                 | -0.136***   | (0.047)        |
| Days follow the news                                                               | -0.008      | (0.024)        |
| Education                                                                          | -0.253***   | (0.028)        |
| Political knowledge                                                                | -0.338***   | (0.032)        |
| Self-placement                                                                     | -0.3***     | (0.005)        |
| Partisanship                                                                       | -0.123***   | (0.028)        |
| Self-placement x Partisanship                                                      | 0.084***    | (0.001)        |
| Age                                                                                | 0.012***    | (0.002)        |
| Female                                                                             | -0.025      | (0.077)        |
| Party signal                                                                       | 0.658***    | (0.114)        |
| Party signal x Political interest                                                  | 0.05***     | (0.009)        |
| Party signal x Days follow the news                                                | 0.001       | (0.005)        |
| Party signal X Education                                                           | 0.065***    | (0.005)        |
| Party signal x Political knowledge                                                 | 0.101***    | (0.006)        |
| Party signal x Partisanship                                                        | -0.017***   | (0.005)        |
| Party signal x Age                                                                 | -0.003***   | (0.0005)       |
| Party signal x Female                                                              | 0.011       | (0.015)        |
| Political knowledge x Partisanship                                                 | 0.007       | (0.006)        |
| Party signal x Political knowledge x Partisanship                                  | -0.007***   | (0.001)        |
| European integration dimension                                                     | 3.309***    | (0.355)        |
| European integration dimension x Political interest                                | -0.175***   | (0.059)        |
| European integration dimension x Days follow the news                              | -0.033      | (0.03)         |
| European integration dimension x Education                                         | 0.108***    | (0.036)        |
| European integration dimension x Political knowledge                               | 0.184***    | (0.04)         |
| European integration dimension x Self-placement                                    | 0.344***    | (0.006)        |
| European integration dimension x Partisanship                                      | 0.352***    | (0.035)        |
| European integration dimension x Self-placement x Partisanship                     | -0.06***    | (0.001)        |
| European integration dimension x Age                                               | -0.007**    | (0.003)        |
| European integration dimension x Female                                            | 0.201**     | (0.095)        |
| European integration dimension x Party signal                                      | -1***       | (0.058)        |
| European integration dimension x Party signal x Political interest                 | 0.025**     | (0.011)        |
| European integration dimension x Party signal x Days follow the news               | 0.009       | (0.006)        |
| European integration dimension x Party signal x Education                          | -0.033***   | (0.007)        |
| European integration dimension x Party signal x Political knowledge                | -0.041***   | (0.008)        |
| European integration dimension x Party signal x Partisanship                       | 0.01        | (0.007)        |
| European integration dimension x Party signal x Age                                | 0.002***    | (0.001)        |
| European integration dimension x Party signal x Female                             | -0.034*     | (0.019)        |
| European integration dimension x Political knowledge x Partisanship                | -0.028***   | (0.008)        |
| European integration dimension x Party signal x Political knowledge x Partisanship | 0.006***    | (0.001)        |
| Constant                                                                           | 1.653***    | (0.629)        |
| <b>Random effects</b>                                                              |             |                |
| <i>Country</i>                                                                     |             |                |
| Party signals (standard deviation)                                                 | 0.543       | (0.078)        |
| European integration dimension (standard deviation)                                | 0.99        | (0.136)        |
| Constant (standard deviation)                                                      | 2.988       | (0.432)        |
| <i>Party</i>                                                                       |             |                |
| Constant (standard deviation)                                                      | 0.999       | (0.064)        |
| <i>Respondent</i>                                                                  |             |                |
| Constant (standard deviation)                                                      | 0.924       | (0.008)        |
| Residual (standard deviation)                                                      | 2.295       | (0.004)        |
| <i>n</i>                                                                           | 183224      |                |
| <i>n Left-right</i>                                                                | 88335       |                |
| <i>n European integration</i>                                                      | 94889       |                |
| <i>n Respondents</i>                                                               | 18732       |                |
| <i>n Parties</i>                                                                   | 152         |                |
| <i>n Countries</i>                                                                 | 27          |                |

Statistical significance: \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

TABLE 4.1 . RESULTS OF A MULTILEVEL MIXED-EFFECTS MODEL OF VOTER PERCEPTIONS OF PARTY POSITIONS.




FIGURE 4.3. THE IMPACT OF POLITICAL INTEREST ON THE EFFECT OF PARTY SIGNALS ON VOTER PERCEPTIONS OF PARTY POSITIONS.

Moving to the cognitive part of the model, the interactions between party signals and both cold cognition factors, education (Hypothesis 3) and political knowledge (Hypothesis 4a) are positive and statistically significant at the  $p < 0.01$  level. The effect of education is illustrated in figure 4.4 and the effect of political knowledge is illustrated in figure 4.5. The impact of both education and political knowledge on the effect of party signals is greater for the left-right dimension. However as expected (Hypothesis 4b), the *relative* impact of political knowledge is greater for the European integration dimension. The change in the marginal effect of party signals moving from one end of the political knowledge scale to the other is twice the change in moving from one end of the education scale to the other for the European integration dimension, and only 1.3 times the change for the left-right dimension.




FIGURE 4.4. THE IMPACT OF EDUCATION ON THE EFFECT OF PARTY SIGNALS ON VOTER PERCEPTIONS OF PARTY POSITIONS.




FIGURE 4.5. THE IMPACT OF POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE ON THE EFFECT OF PARTY SIGNALS ON VOTER PERCEPTIONS OF PARTY POSITIONS.

As proposed by Hypothesis 5, the impact of partisanship on the effect of party signals is negative and statistically significant at the  $p < 0.01$  level. Party signals have less of an impact on partisan voters' perceptions of party positions. Also as expected, this effect varies considerably by the political sophistication of the voter (Hypothesis 7), as illustrated in figure 4.6. Interestingly this effect varies considerably between the left-right and European integration dimensions, and is much more pronounced for the left-right dimension.




FIGURE 4.6. THE INTERACTION BETWEEN PARTISANSHIP, POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE, AND THE EFFECT OF PARTY SIGNALS ON VOTER PERCEPTIONS OF PARTY POSITIONS.

Finally, as expected, the effect of age differs between the two dimensions. For the left-right dimension (H6a), the interaction between party signals and age is negative and statistically significant at the  $p < 0.05$  level, indicating that the effect of party signals on voter perceptions of party positions diminishes with age. The interaction between party signals, age and the European integration dimension is positive and statistically significant at the  $p < 0.01$  level, indicating that the effect of age is less pronounced for the European integration dimension (H6b). Indeed, as illustrated in figure 4.7, the slope of the line is almost flat, and the average effect is not statistically different from zero at any age.




FIGURE 4.7. THE IMPACT OF AGE ON THE EFFECT OF PARTY SIGNALS ON VOTER PERCEPTIONS OF PARTY POSITIONS.

#### 4.4 – Discussion and Conclusion

In order for representation through political parties to occur, voters must be able to recognise the positions that political parties take on different issues. The analysis here suggests that whether they are able to do so depends in part on what issue is at stake, and in part on the characteristics of the voter. For the average voter in the EU, party signals on left-right issues have a substantial effect on perceived left-right party positions – the average marginal effect of left-right party signals is close to one, indicating a very close relationship between the signals parties broadcast about their left-right positions and voters' perceptions of those positions.

The average effect of party signals on voter perceptions of European integration positions, however, is statistically indistinguishable from zero, suggesting that what parties say about their European integration positions has no effect whatsoever on where the average voter places parties on the European integration dimension. This finding offers strong support for the salience step of the Salience-Attention-Cognition model. That voters respond to party signals on the left-right dimension but do not for the European integration dimension suggests that voters are not receiving these signals to begin with, either because they are not available in the information environment or, if they are, because voters are not paying attention to them.<sup>35</sup>

The attention part of the Salience-Attention-Cognition model also receives empirical support, although here the picture is more complicated. The perceptions of voters who are interested in politics are more affected by party signals than those who are less interested. This suggests that, as we would expect, voters who are more interested in political issues pay more attention to the political information environment. What is unexpected however is that, when controlling for political interest, no support is found for the amount of time voters actually spend following

---

<sup>35</sup> Of course further research is necessary to test that this is indeed an effect of salience, and not something specific to European integration.

the news. Unsurprisingly, motivation influences behaviour and people who are more interested in politics on average spend more time watching the news than those who are not (those who are 'very interested' in politics follow the news 6.6 days a week on average, whilst those who are 'not at all' interested in politics follow the news 4.8 days a week). What is more surprising is the large number of people who are not interested in politics but still extensively follow the news – 48.7% of those who say they are not at all interested in politics still say they follow the news every day of the week. That the amount of time spent following the news has no statistically significant effect on voter perceptions of party positions suggests that motivated – top down – attention is particularly important for understanding political cognition.

This finding is important for understanding and potentially improving the way in which parties communicate their positions to voters. It suggests that simply being exposed to more information is not sufficient for increasing the effect of party signals on perceptions of party positions. In order to increase the effect of the signals that they transmit about their positions, political parties would have to increase the motivation of voters to pay attention to political information, something that is likely to prove a considerably more intractable problem than simply increasing the amount of information parties transmit.

The effects of the four cognition factors tested here – education, political knowledge, partisanship, and age – all fit the expectations developed from a dual-process cognition perspective. The two factors which increase a voter's ability to process political information (cold cognition) – general and politics specific cognitive sophistication – both increase the effect that party signals have on voter perceptions of party positions. Conversely, the two hot cognitive factors – partisanship and age – both decrease the effects of party signals, though as expected, the impact of age only applies to the left-right dimension.

One particularly interesting result that was not anticipated by the Saliency-Attention-Cognition model is the difference in the effect of partisanship between the left-right and European integration dimensions. As predicted, the effect of partisanship in diminishing the impact of party signals is greater for more politically sophisticated voters. Unexpectedly, this difference is much more pronounced for the left-right dimension than it is for the European integration dimension. Uncovering the reasons for this difference is beyond the capabilities of the present dataset but it does point in an interesting and potentially fruitful direction for future research. One potential explanation for the difference in the effect of partisanship between the two dimensions is that left-right issues represent the 'core' of political conflict, whilst European integration issues are generally more peripheral. It seems plausible that core issues are likely to be more central to partisan identities and so the motivation to maintain favourable perceptions of party positions (diminishing the potential effect of party signals) will be much higher for these issues. Partisans might be more open to acknowledging differences in their own and party positions on peripheral issues as these issues are less important for their connection with their favoured party.

The analysis here also suggests several other avenues for future research. Perhaps the most pressing is to test the arguments about the effects of low salience political issues on other issues to see whether the effects of European integration party signals can be attributed to the fact that it is a low salience political issue and not something specific to the European integration issue. The Saliency-Attention-Cognition model only examines the effects of the signals that parties wish to send about their own positions. Obviously the political information environment is considerably richer than this and further research is needed to establish what information voters of different types pay attention to and how they incorporate potentially conflicting information into their perceptions of party positions. More research is also needed on the effects of cognitive sophistication on the interpretation of party signals – are voters with lower

levels of general and political cognitive sophistication less affected by party signals because they do not attend to as many signals as do more sophisticated voters, or do they misinterpret signals, leading them to make inaccurate connections between what parties say and what their positions are?

How do these findings sit with the issue representation model? On the left-right dimension voters are clearly aware of the positions that parties adopt and respond to signals about those positions, suggesting that this condition for representation through electoral democracy is met. For the European integration dimension the answer is also clear, but the complete opposite – voters do not respond to party signals about European integration positions, and this seriously undermines the potential for political representation on these issues.

Although these results are clear, we should be cautious before laying the blame for the lack of effect of low salience party signals entirely at the feet of voters. Looking at changes to perceived party European integration positions over time using aggregated European Election Study data, Adams, Ezrow, and Somer-Topcu find that party signals have similarly little effect on changes to where experts see parties' European integration positions.<sup>36</sup> They do find however that aggregated voter placements of European integration positions shift in similar ways to placements from expert surveys, and suggest that voters might be responding to the wider information environment rather than the information parties provide about their positions. If this is the case it suggests that parties might be saying one thing about European integration and doing another – another serious problem from the perspective of issue representation. That some voters – those who are interested in politics and have high levels of general and political

---

<sup>36</sup> Adams, Ezrow, and Somer-Topcu, "Do Voters Respond to Party Manifestos or to a Wider Information Environment?"

cognitive sophistication – do seem to be responding to party signals, suggests that this picture is more complicated.

Given that many voters assign some sort of European integration position to political parties, even if it is not clear how they came to those perceptions, it is important to understand what impact this has on vote choice. If votes are decided by where people think parties stand on European integration then this step of the issue representation model still holds and only the accuracy of voters' perceptions of party positions on European integration need improving. If neither step takes place however, then trying to improve the accuracy of voter perceptions of party positions would not ameliorate the problems faced by European integration issue representation.

## Chapter 5 – Assimilation, Contrast, and EU Issue voting

---

Chapter 4 makes it clear that voters do not seem to respond to party signals on European integration. Given this, it might be reasonable to halt the assessment of European integration representation here – a key link in the chain of representation is broken, and so representation on European integration cannot occur. However, there are two reasons to continue the assessment of representation and examine the influence that European integration has on vote choice at European Parliament elections. First, as discussed in the previous chapter, voter and expert perceptions of European integration positions seem to shift with one another but not with manifestos (though the most sophisticated voters *do* seem to respond to what parties say about their European integration positions). Even though whether this is the case is not clear, at the least it suggests the problem may lie not with voters' perceptions of party positions but the mismatch between what parties say about their European integration positions and what they do in practice. Secondly, even if voter perceptions of party positions are inaccurate they may still *intend* to translate their European integration preferences into representation by casting their vote for the party they perceive as closest to them on European integration. If this is the case the solution to the problem of European integration representation is to increase the accuracy perceptions of parties' European integration positions, rather than to encourage voters to use their vote to express their European integration preferences.

Notwithstanding the problem of whether voters perceive party positions on European integration accurately, the influence of European integration on which parties voters choose to support is the key step in the process of European integration representation. Even if political parties upheld their end of the representative bargain perfectly, and voters knew exactly where

parties stood on European integration, representation can only occur if voters actually consider European integration at the ballot box. For several decades however, studies of voting behaviour in European Parliament elections have consistently shown that voters largely cast their ballots according to domestic political concerns and that attitudes towards the European Union have little to do with vote choice.<sup>1</sup> Similarly, the dominant argument in the literature has suggested that European integration has only had a minimal impact on voting and party competition at national elections.<sup>2</sup> As has already been discussed however, in the decades following the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty there has been a shift from ‘permissive consensus’ to ‘constraining dissensus’.<sup>3</sup> At the same time, some political parties – particularly those on the fringes of the party system – began to seek votes by altering the position and salience of their stance on European integration.<sup>4</sup>

Drawing on these developments, many scholars began to look for ‘European’ effects at national and European Parliament elections. At the national level, several studies found a small but significant influence of attitudes towards European integration on support for particular

---

<sup>1</sup> Reif and Schmitt, “Nine Second-Order National Elections - A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of European Election Results”; Simon Hix and Michael Marsh, “Punishment or Protest? Understanding European Parliament Elections,” *Journal of Politics* 69, no. 2 (2007): 495–510; Michael Marsh, “Testing the Second-Order Election Model after Four European Elections,” *British Journal of Political Science* 28, no. 04 (1998): 591–607; Karlheinz Reif, “National Electoral Cycles and European Elections 1979 and 1984,” *Electoral Studies* 3, no. 3 (December 1984): 244–255; Hermann Schmitt, “The European Parliament Elections of June 2004: Still Second-Order?,” *West European Politics* 28, no. 3 (2005): 650–679.

<sup>2</sup> Mair, “The Limited Impact of Europe on National Party Systems.”

<sup>3</sup> Hooghe and Marks, “A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration.”

<sup>4</sup> Silke Adam and Michaela Maier, “National Parties as Politicizers of EU Integration? Party Campaign Communication in the Run-up to the 2009 European Parliament Election,” *European Union Politics* 12, no. 3 (September 1, 2011): 431–453; Marks et al., “Party Competition and European Integration in the East and West: Different Structure, Same Causality”; Marks and Wilson, “The Past in the Present: A Cleavage Theory of Party Response to European Integration”; Steenbergen and Scott, “Contesting Europe? The Salience of European Integration as a Party Issue”; Taggart, “A Touchstone of Dissent: Euroscepticism in Contemporary Western European Party Systems”; Paul Taggart and Aleks Szczerbiak, “Opposing Europe? Three Patterns of Party Competition Over Europe,” in *Opposing Europe? The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism*, vol. 1, 2 vols., 2009, 248–363.

parties.<sup>5</sup> Similarly, although they tend to acknowledge the persisting importance of second order effects, many authors have argued that attitudes towards European integration increasingly play a role in determining vote choice at European Parliament elections.<sup>6</sup>

For the purposes of this chapter, the most important formulation of these ideas is the theory of EU issue voting, which fits well with the issue representation model.<sup>7</sup> Issue voting draws on the classical Downsian proximity model of electoral competition and argues that voters will cast their vote for the party whose position on an issue is closest to their own.<sup>8</sup> There is a growing body of evidence that EU issue voting does occur, though there is considerable individual and contextual variation in when it does. Tillman finds evidence for the existence of EU issue voting in the 1995 accession countries both before and after accession.<sup>9</sup> De Vries finds that EU issue voting occurs when there is a combination of partisan conflict and high EU issue salience

---

<sup>5</sup> Geoffrey Evans, "Euroscepticism and Conservative Electoral Support: How an Asset Became a Liability," *British Journal of Political Science* 28, no. 04 (1998): 573–590; Evans, "Europe: A New Electoral Cleavage?"; Evans, "European Integration, Party Politics and Voting in the 2001 Elections"; Carrubba, "The Electoral Connection in European Union Politics"; Matthew J. Gabel, "European Integration, Voters and National Politics," *West European Politics* 23, no. 4 (2000): 52–72; van der Eijk and Franklin, "Potential for Contestation on European Matters at National Elections in Europe"; de Vries, "Sleeping Giant: Fact or Fairytale?"

<sup>6</sup> Catherine E. de Vries and Erik R. Tillman, "European Union Issue Voting in East and West Europe: The Role of Political Context," *Comparative European Politics* 9, no. 1 (February 2011): 1–17; Sara Hobolt and Jae-Jae Spoon, "Motivating the European Voter: Parties, Issues and Campaigns in European Parliament Elections," *European Journal of Political Research* 51, no. 6 (2012): 701–727; Catherine E. de Vries, "EU Issue Voting: Asset or Liability? How European Integration Affects Parties' Electoral Fortunes," *European Union Politics* 11, no. 1 (March 1, 2010): 89–117; Catherine E. de Vries et al., "Individual and Contextual Variation in EU Issue Voting: The Role of Political Information," *Electoral Studies* 30, no. 1 (March 2011): 16–28; Sara Hobolt, Jae-Jae. Spoon, and James R. Tilley, "A Vote against Europe? Explaining Defection at the 1999 and 2004 European Parliament Elections," *British Journal of Political Science* 39, no. 1 (2009): 1–23; Simon Hix and Michael Marsh, "Second-Order Effects plus Pan-European Political Swings: An Analysis of European Parliament Elections across Time," *Electoral Studies* 30, no. 1 (2011): 4–15; Daniel Stockemer, "Citizens' Support for the European Union and Participation in European Parliament Elections," *European Union Politics* 13, no. 1 (2012): 26–46.

<sup>7</sup> de Vries, "Sleeping Giant: Fact or Fairytale?"; de Vries and Tillman, "European Union Issue Voting in East and West Europe"; de Vries et al., "Individual and Contextual Variation in EU Issue Voting"; Hobolt and Spoon, "Motivating the European Voter."

<sup>8</sup> Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper Collins, 1957).

<sup>9</sup> Erik R. Tillman, "The European Union at the Ballot Box? European Integration and Voting Behavior in the New Member States," *Comparative Political Studies* 37, no. 5 (June 1, 2004): 590–610.

amongst voters, a finding later echoed by Hobolt and Spoon.<sup>10</sup> De Vries and Tillman find that EU Issue voting has a stronger effect in the 2004 accession Eastern European states than in the older members of the EU, attributing the difference to the dynamics of post-communist politics.<sup>11</sup> De Vries, Edwards, and Tillman also find support for a conditioning effect of political institutions on EU issue voting, which they find is highest in countries with a high 'clarity of responsibility'.<sup>12</sup> In an experimental study Hobolt and Wittrock find that EU issue voting increases when voters are supplied with additional information about European integration.<sup>13</sup> Similarly, de Vries et al. find that EU issue voting at the 2009 EP election was highest in countries where the media provides higher levels of information about European integration.<sup>14</sup>

The cumulative weight of this evidence suggests that EU issue voting does indeed play an important role in elections at the national and European level, which is good news for issue representation. Like all proximity models however, EU issue voting faces a potentially fatal problem of endogeneity. In order for issue voting to occur it is necessary for voters to have some idea of the distance between their own position and that of different political parties, and for that issue distance perception to be independent of any prior attitudes a voter might have towards a party. A potential problem for any type of issue voting is that this may not be the case: rather than vote choice following from issue distance, the perception of issue distance may in fact follow from vote choice.

This is not a new problem for political science – many of the seminal early works in the study of voting behaviour express some concern about this issue: Berelsen et al. state that 'in almost

---

<sup>10</sup> de Vries, "Sleeping Giant: Fact or Fairytale?"; Hobolt and Spoon, "Motivating the European Voter."

<sup>11</sup> de Vries and Tillman, "European Union Issue Voting in East and West Europe."

<sup>12</sup> Catherine E. de Vries, Erica E. Edwards, and Erik R. Tillman, "Clarity of Responsibility Beyond the Pocketbook: How Political Institutions Condition EU Issue Voting," *Comparative Political Studies* 44, no. 3 (March 1, 2011): 339–363.

<sup>13</sup> Sara Hobolt and Jill Wittrock, "The Second-Order Election Model Revisited: An Experimental Test of Vote Choices in European Parliament Elections," *Electoral Studies* 30, no. 1 (March 2011): 29–40.

<sup>14</sup> de Vries et al., "Individual and Contextual Variation in EU Issue Voting."

every instance, respondents perceive their candidate's stand on the issues as similar to their own and the opponent's stand as dissimilar – whatever their own position'.<sup>15</sup> Similarly the seminal works of Campbell et al. and Converse both express the view that voters' perceptions of political issues are coloured by their partisan attachments.<sup>16</sup> In the decades since these early works, a vast quantity of evidence has been amassed which shows that voters are systematically biased in their perceptions of the positions that candidates and parties hold on a variety of political issues.<sup>17</sup>

The classic expression of this problem is that voters are prone to two forms of perceptual bias: assimilation and contrast. Assimilation bias occurs when voters perceive their favoured party's position as being closer to their own than it actually is. Contrast bias is the opposite: voters perceive their disfavoured party's positions as being further away from their own than it actually is. In the context of quantitative analysis of voting behaviour based on self-reported policy distances, the net effect of these biases results in the overestimation of the effect of policy distance on vote choice.

---

<sup>15</sup> Bernard Berelson, Paul F Lazarsfeld, and William N McPhee, *Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), 220.

<sup>16</sup> Campbell et al., *The American Voter*; Converse, "The Structure of Belief Systems in Mass Publics."

<sup>17</sup> Roberta S. Sigel, "Effect of Partisanship on the Perception of Political Candidates," *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 28, no. 3 (October 1, 1964): 483–496; Donald Granberg and Richard Jenks, "Assimilation and Contrast Effects in the 1972 Election," *Human Relations* 30, no. 7 (July 1, 1977): 623–640; Michael King, "Assimilation and Contrast of Presidential Candidates' Issue Positions, 1972," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 41, no. 4 (December 21, 1977): 515–522; Benjamin I. Page and Calvin C. Jones, "Reciprocal Effects of Policy Preferences, Party Loyalties and the Vote," *The American Political Science Review* 73, no. 4 (December 1979): 1071; Gregory B. Markus and Philip E. Converse, "A Dynamic Simultaneous Equation Model of Electoral Choice," *The American Political Science Review* 73, no. 4 (December 1979): 1055; Donald Granberg and Edward Brent, "Perceptions of Issue Positions of Presidential Candidates: Candidates Are Often Perceived by Their Supporters as Holding Positions on the Issues That Are Closer to the Supporters' Views than They Really Are," *American Scientist* 68, no. 6 (November 1, 1980): 617–625; Pamela Johnston Conover and Stanley Feldman, "Projection and the Perception of Candidates' Issue Positions," *The Western Political Quarterly* 35, no. 2 (June 1982): 228; Merrill, Grofman, and Adams, "Assimilation and Contrast Effects in Voter Projections of Party Locations"; Geoffrey Evans and Robert Andersen, "Do Issues Decide? Partisan Conditioning and Perceptions of Party Issue Positions across the Electoral Cycle," *British Elections & Parties Review* 14, no. 1 (2004): 18–39; Drummond, "Assimilation, Contrast and Voter Projections of Parties in Left-Right Space Does the Electoral System Matter?"

The origins of the study of voter projection effects lie in a number of early influential works in cognitive psychology. The first, cognitive dissonance theory, argues that people are motivated to minimise psychologically uncomfortable inconsistent ('dissonant') cognitions that arise as a result of mismatches between cognitions and behaviour.<sup>18</sup> Driven by this desire people are motivated to avoid dissonance inducing situations and information. However when such situations or information are encountered they are driven to achieve cognitive 'consonance' (consistency) by altering their existing behaviour and/or their cognitions. Which dissonance reduction strategy is adopted will depend on how important the dissonant cognitions and behaviour are to the person and the fundamental intractability of past behaviour.

Similarly, balance theory, and its later extension as congruity theory, argues that people are motivated to achieve cognitive consistency (or 'balance' and 'congruity') between competing cognitions.<sup>19</sup> Heider conceptualised the relationship between a person, a second person and an attitudinal object as a triad – Person A has attitudes towards Person B and Object C. Heider argued that triads that are 'balanced' – e.g. Person A likes both Person B and Object C and Person B likes Object C – are more pleasant than unbalanced triads – e.g. Person A likes Person B but dislikes Object C but Person B likes Object C. If either Person B or Object C (or both) are important to Person A, this results in a motivation for Person A to change their attitude towards either Person B or Object C, or alter their perception of Person B's attitude.

---

<sup>18</sup> Leon Festinger, *When Prophecy Fails: A Social and Psychological Study of a Modern Group That Predicted the Destruction of the World* (Harper & Row, 1956); Leon Festinger, *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance* (Stanford University Press, 1957); Leon Festinger and James M. Carlsmith, "Cognitive Consequences of Forced Compliance," *The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology* 58, no. 2 (1959): 203–210.

<sup>19</sup> Fritz Heider, "Attitudes and Cognitive Organization," *The Journal of Psychology* 21 (January 1946): 107–112; Fritz Heider, *The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations* (Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1958); Charles E. Osgood and Percy H. Tannenbaum, "The Principle of Congruity in the Prediction of Attitude Change," *Psychological Review* 62, no. 1 (1955): 42–55.

Finally, social judgement theory (from where the terminology of ‘assimilation’ and ‘contrast’ has been adopted by the political science literature) posits that how persuasive an attitudinal argument will be (i.e. the success an argument has in persuading a listener to shift their position on an issue) is determined by how close it is to a person’s existing attitudes.<sup>20</sup> Sherif et al. argue that an individual’s perceptions about attitudinal arguments are anchored in their own attitude on an issue. They find that people are prone to two types of perceptual bias when evaluating arguments. When arguments lie within a ‘latitude of acceptance’ the perceiver is prone to seeing the argument as lying even closer to the perceiver’s position than it actually is (thus minimising any persuasive power), which Sherif et al. term ‘assimilation’. Conversely, when an argument lies within the ‘latitude of rejection’ the perceiver is prone to seeing it even further away from their own position than it actually is, which Sherif et al. term ‘contrast’.

It is not hard to see how these theories might be applied to the question of electoral choice, particularly in light of more recent work in political psychology in the areas of affective priming and motivated reasoning, which, as discussed in the previous chapter, has shown that voter processing of political information are clouded by partisanship.<sup>21</sup> Voters hold cognitions and exhibit behaviours that relate to political issues – they might hold certain views on taxation, or may have joined a recent protest against government cuts – and they also hold cognitions and

---

<sup>20</sup> Muzafer Sherif and Carl I. Hovland, *Social Judgment: Assimilation and Contrast Effects in Communication and Attitude Change*, vol. xii (Oxford, England: Yale Univer. Press, 1961); Carolyn Wood Sherif, Muzafer Sherif, and Roger Ellis Nebergall, *Attitude and Attitude Change: The Social Judgment-Involvement Approach* (Greenwood Publishing Group, Incorporated, 1965).

<sup>21</sup> Ziva Kunda, “The Case for Motivated Reasoning,” *Psychological Bulletin* 108, no. 3 (1990): 480–498; Milton Lodge and Charles S. Taber, “Three Steps toward a Theory of Motivated Political Reasoning,” in *Elements of Reason: Cognition, Choice, and the Bounds of Rationality*, ed. Arthur Lupia, Matthew D. McCubbins, and Samuel L. Popkin (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 183–213; Redlawsk, “Hot Cognition or Cool Consideration?”; Lodge and Taber, “The Automaticity of Affect for Political Leaders, Groups, and Issues”; Charles S. Taber, Milton Lodge, and Jill Glather, “The Motivated Construction of Political Judgements,” in *Citizens and Politics: Perspectives from Political Psychology*, ed. James Kuklinski (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 198–226; Lodge and Taber, *The Rationalizing Voter*; Erisen, Lodge, and Taber, “Affective Contagion in Effortful Political Thinking.”

behaviours towards political parties and candidates – they might like or identify with a particular party and/or have voted for that party in the last election. When the attitudes of the voter and their supported party or candidate are congruent, the voter experiences cognitive consonance (in the terminology of cognitive dissonance theory) or balance (in the terminology of balance/congruence theories). However when these attitudes are incongruent then the voter will be motivated to change either a cognition or a behaviour in order to shift to a more consonant situation. This might be achieved by one of three ways: changing which party/candidate they support (issue voting), changing their own attitude on an issue (persuasion), or dissonance might be avoided by misperceiving the party/candidate's attitude towards an issue (projection bias). Alternatively, from the perspective of social judgement theory, voters may in fact prefer one party to another because of their position on certain issues in line with issue voting, but the similarity between their own attitude and their favoured party's and the distance between their attitude and that of disfavoured parties may be exaggerated (assimilation and contrast).

That voters are prone to projection bias when assessing the issue positions of political parties and candidates has been well substantiated by several decade of research: The bulk of this research was conducted on elections in the United States.<sup>22</sup> Recent comparative research has extended these findings to a variety of different democracies.<sup>23</sup> More recently still, Grand and

---

<sup>22</sup> Sigel, "Effect of Partisanship on the Perception of Political Candidates"; Granberg and Jenks, "Assimilation and Contrast Effects in the 1972 Election"; King, "Assimilation and Contrast of Presidential Candidates' Issue Positions, 1972"; Page and Jones, "Reciprocal Effects of Policy Preferences, Party Loyalties and the Vote"; Markus and Converse, "A Dynamic Simultaneous Equation Model of Electoral Choice"; Granberg and Brent, "Perceptions of Issue Positions of Presidential Candidates"; Conover and Feldman, "Projection and the Perception of Candidates' Issue Positions."

<sup>23</sup> Merrill, Grofman, and Adams, "Assimilation and Contrast Effects in Voter Projections of Party Locations"; Drummond, "Assimilation, Contrast and Voter Projections of Parties in Left-Right Space Does the Electoral System Matter?"

Tiemann found projection bias effects for both the left-right and European integration dimensions in the 2009 European Election Study.<sup>24</sup>

The present study builds on the findings by Grand and Tiemann by assessing the impact assimilation and contrast effects have on our inferences about the importance of EU issue voting in different EU member states. The most obvious potential effect of projection bias in EU issue voting is that it has led scholars to overestimate the effect of EU issue voting. If voters are assimilating their perceptions of their favoured party's/parties' position on European integration and contrasting their unfavoured party's/parties' position and reporting these biases in surveys then this will bias statistical estimates of EU issue voting towards a higher magnitude of effect.

*Hypothesis 1: When there are strong EU issue assimilation and contrast effects, they have led to an overestimate of the degree of EU issue voting in a country.*

Perhaps less intuitively, assimilation and contrast effects may also have led to an *underestimate* of EU issue voting. Given the importance of the left-right ideological spectrum in European politics and the role of domestic politics in structuring voting in second order elections, most studies of EU issue voting have examined the effect of EU issue distance conditional on the effect of left-right issue distance (that is EU issue voting controlling for left-right 'issue' voting). In the 2009 EES the effect of left-right issue voting is found to be larger than EU issue voting in all EU member-states. Here too assimilation and contrast effects may have resulted in an overestimate of left-right issue voting, which, because it is more dominant than EU issue voting, may in turn have led to an underestimate of the effects of EU issue voting.

---

<sup>24</sup> Grand and Tiemann, "Projection Effects and Specification Bias in Spatial Models of European Parliament Elections."

*Hypothesis 2: When there are strong left-right issue assimilation and contrast effects, they have led to an underestimate of the degree of EU issue voting in a country.*

Grand and Tiemann find that although assimilation and contrast effects vary between EU member-states, they do not seem to do so in any systematic fashion. Following this finding, the present chapter remains agnostic as to which countries EU issue voting will be over or under estimated in, or the distribution of cases between the two conditions.

## **5.1 – Data and methodology**

Data is drawn from the voter survey of the 2009 (PIREDEU) European Election study, carried out in all (at the time) 27 EU member states. Six survey questions are of key interest: Two questions which ask participants to assign their positions on 11 point (0-10) left-right and EU issue scales. Two sets of questions which ask participants to assign positions on each of these scales for each of the political parties running in their country's elections. Following Grand and Tiemann, partisan attachment is measured using the 11 point (0-10) propensity to vote question, which asks participants how likely they are to ever vote for a particular party, and finally, a question recording each participant's vote choice at the 2009 European Parliament election. Again the observations are stacked to give participant-party observations, which yield one observation for each of the parties that each participant answers for the issue dimension and vote propensity questions. As assimilation and contrast effects will first be measured separately, accounting for missing data in each of the questions yields a slightly different number of observations for each issue: for the left-right issue analysis is conducted on a total of 116,571 observations, given by 18,251 participants, whilst analysis of EU issue is conducted on a total of 126,443 observations, given by 19,315 participants.

Because the primary interest here is in country specific EU issue voting effects, the analysis here departs from the approach taken by Grand and Tiemann by estimating models for each country

separately. For each county the analysis proceeds in three stages: First a model is run to estimate assimilation and contrast effects on perceived party positions for each of the left-right and EU issue scales. Secondly the results from these models are used to estimate party placements for each participant that adjusts for assimilation and contrast effects. Finally, these results and the unadjusted data are used to estimate a conditional logit model of the effects of left-right and EU issue distance on vote choice at the 2009 European Parliament election. A comparison of the adjusted and unadjusted models reveals the impact of assimilation and contrast effects on the (mis)estimation of EU issue voting. A more detailed discussion of each stage of the analysis follows below.

The approach to estimating individual assimilation and contrast effects taken by Grand and Tiemann and many earlier studies of projection bias in other contexts use deviations from the 'true' party position (approximated by the mean placement for each party) as a dependent variable in order to assess the effect of partisan attachment on party placement. Since the current study is less interested in the direct estimation of the magnitude of assimilation and contrast effects, a slightly different approach is taken, which models the effect of partisan attachment and issue scale self-placement directly on party placement for each issue and treats voter and party 'true' positions as latent variables. The latent 'true' positions for voters and parties are estimated by random-effects in a multi-level mixed-effects model with observations cross-classified between parties and respondents. Self and party placements on each scale are operationalized using the relevant EES questions, and following Grand and Tiemann, partisan attachment is operationalized using a log transformation of the propensity to vote variable. Individual heterogeneity in assimilation and contrast effects is accounted for by including random coefficients for the issue self-placement and partisan attachment variables at the survey respondent level.

Although a model with this specification would be sufficient for the purposes of exploring the effects of issue self-placement and partisan attachment on party placement, the demands of the approach taken here are slightly higher. The goal of the analysis is to produce an estimate of party placements which adjusts for assimilation and contrast effects, but is otherwise identical to the original data (that is, an estimate of what a voter's unbiased perception of party positions would be). Since modelling the data as described above only explains some of the overall variance in party placement, there are still considerable residuals in the fitted party placements – which would make the direct comparison between the conditional logit models fitted with the real, fitted, and adjusted data in the final stage of analysis quite difficult. This problem is overcome by including a random interaction between the survey respondent and party levels in the random-effects component of the model.<sup>25</sup> Since each respondent-party observation is a single case this effectively includes a random-effect for each observation in the data. Although the results of this interaction are not analytically interesting (or computationally efficient) it results in a model fit that very closely matches the observed data (the overall  $R^2$  for each of the left-right and EU issue models for all countries are above 0.99), which facilitates comparison at the later stage.

The goal of the second stage of analysis is to produce an estimate of each participant's perceived party position as if they were neutral in their attachment towards the party and on the issue scale (i.e. an estimate that puts each participant in the position least likely to experience assimilation or contrast bias). For ease of calculation each of the variables in the first stage of analysis are centred on their middle ('neutral') value. This allows the adjusted values to be calculated simply by holding the coefficients of the self-placement and partisan attachment variables at zero (because the neutral value of each centred variable is zero) and adding the

---

<sup>25</sup> Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, *Multilevel and Longitudinal Modeling Using Stata.*, 1:448–451.

intercept of the fixed-effect portion of the model and the BLUPs (Best Linear Unbiased Predictions) of each level of the random-effects portion of the model (party, respondent, and random interaction) together.<sup>26</sup>

Following the analysis in stage one, three distance variables are calculated for each of the issue scales. In each case this distance is simply the absolute value of a respondent's position on a scale minus the position they give (or are estimated to give) to each party on a scale. The three distances that are calculated are for the actual distance given by the respondent in the EES survey, the distance using the values of party positions fitted by the full model in the first stage of the analysis (to check the robustness of the comparison between models), and the distance using the adjusted estimate of party position calculated by holding assimilation and contrast effects at zero.

In order to estimate the effect of issue distance three conditional logit models of vote choice are estimated for each country, a standard method of estimating the effects of EU issue voting.<sup>27</sup> In a conditional logit model the observations are assumed to be match case-control groups, which given that each observation in the model is an individual survey respondent, is a safe assumption in the present study. Similarly any party level effects (such as party size, government status) are accounted for by including dummy variables for each party. In each of the three models the dependent variable is which party a respondent voted for at the 2009 EP election. The independent variables are the distances between the voter and each party on the left-right and

---

<sup>26</sup> In order to centre the logged partisan attachment variable a slightly more complicated process than the usual method of subtracting the value at which the centre value from all observations is necessary, due to the fact that the log of zero or a negative number is undefined the partisan attachment variable cannot be log transformed after it is centred. The partisan attachment variable is transformed by the formula  $\log(\text{attachment} + 1) - \log(5 + 1)$ : the 1 is added to the attachment score because the log of zero (the lowest attachment level) is undefined, and added to the centre value for consistency. This effectively transforms the partisan attachment score into a logit ( $\log \frac{\text{attachment}+1}{6}$ ). The end result is equivalent to the uncentred log attachment variable.

<sup>27</sup> See for example de Vries et al., "Individual and Contextual Variation in EU Issue Voting."

EU issue scales. The first model is estimated using the actual reported distances, the second using the fitted distances from the earlier analysis, and the third using the adjusted distances, controlling for projection bias effects. Of particular interest are the differences in the magnitude and statistical significance of the EU issue distance coefficients between the models. If issue voting is occurring the coefficients will be negative (because the greater the distance between a voter and party, the less chance they have of voting for them), and the further away from zero the coefficient is, the larger the magnitude of the issue voting effect.

## **5.2 – Results**

The regression results for the first stage of the analysis, estimating the effect of partisan attachment and issue self-placement are shown in table 5.1 and table 5.2 for the left-right and EU issue scales respectively. For all countries the interaction between left-right self-placement and party attachment is statistically significant, indicating the presence of some form of perceptual bias that is dependent on partisan attachment – in this case the classic assimilation and contrast effects of high and low partisan attachment. For the EU issue the interaction effect is also statistically significant for all except one country – Portugal (which still shows evidence of perceptual bias – the coefficient for EU issue self-placement is statistically significant – just not one which differs according to partisan attachment) – again indicating some form of perceptual bias that varies according to partisan attachment in most EU member-states.

| Country        | Party attachment<br>(SE) | LR Self Placement<br>(SE) | Interaction<br>(SE) | Constant<br>(SE)  | Observations<br>(Cases) |
|----------------|--------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------|-------------------|-------------------------|
| Austria        | 0.078<br>(0.048)         | 0.146***<br>(0.018)       | 0.312***<br>(0.02)  | -0.183<br>(0.641) | 5576<br>(838)           |
| Belgium        | 0.422***<br>(0.078)      | 0.218***<br>(0.021)       | 0.309***<br>(0.029) | 0.013<br>(0.284)  | 4819<br>(726)           |
| Bulgaria       | 0.181**<br>(0.066)       | 0.19***<br>(0.024)        | 0.183***<br>(0.021) | 0.741<br>(0.653)  | 2582<br>(491)           |
| Cyprus         | 0.231***<br>(0.059)      | 0.131***<br>(0.014)       | 0.206***<br>(0.016) | 0.395<br>(0.882)  | 3115<br>(565)           |
| Czech Republic | 0.216***<br>(0.052)      | 0.13***<br>(0.017)        | 0.222***<br>(0.018) | -0.09<br>(1.025)  | 3259<br>(722)           |
| Denmark        | 0.002<br>(0.04)          | 0.16***<br>(0.012)        | 0.298***<br>(0.014) | 0.421<br>(0.579)  | 6658<br>(901)           |
| Estonia        | 0.548***<br>(0.101)      | 0.176***<br>(0.026)       | 0.409***<br>(0.042) | 0.503<br>(0.356)  | 2270<br>(450)           |
| Finland        | 0.218***<br>(0.047)      | 0.147***<br>(0.015)       | 0.264***<br>(0.018) | 0.575<br>(0.59)   | 5918<br>(802)           |
| France         | 0.334***<br>(0.045)      | 0.102***<br>(0.014)       | 0.261***<br>(0.016) | -0.421<br>(0.828) | 5210<br>(759)           |
| Germany        | 0.5***<br>(0.043)        | 0.229***<br>(0.018)       | 0.275***<br>(0.018) | -0.25<br>(0.775)  | 4127<br>(872)           |
| Greece         | 0.113**<br>(0.05)        | 0.131***<br>(0.017)       | 0.245***<br>(0.017) | 0.12<br>(0.84)    | 4156<br>(776)           |
| Hungary        | 0.24***<br>(0.049)       | 0.08***<br>(0.016)        | 0.211***<br>(0.015) | 0.26<br>(1.009)   | 3863<br>(674)           |
| Ireland        | 1.082***<br>(0.068)      | 0.141***<br>(0.017)       | 0.297***<br>(0.025) | 0.257<br>(0.347)  | 4658<br>(840)           |
| Italy          | 0.274***<br>(0.055)      | 0.108***<br>(0.016)       | 0.224***<br>(0.018) | 0.035<br>(0.889)  | 3291<br>(478)           |
| Latvia         | 0.554***<br>(0.077)      | 0.274***<br>(0.026)       | 0.332***<br>(0.027) | 0.635<br>(0.411)  | 3681<br>(521)           |
| Lithuania      | 0.594***<br>(0.078)      | 0.18***<br>(0.023)        | 0.283***<br>(0.027) | 0.029<br>(0.332)  | 3282<br>(452)           |
| Luxembourg     | 0.305***<br>(0.054)      | 0.229***<br>(0.017)       | 0.338***<br>(0.021) | -0.318<br>(0.579) | 5445<br>(785)           |
| Malta          | 0.39**<br>(0.12)         | 0.27***<br>(0.033)        | 0.351***<br>(0.033) | 0.147<br>(0.681)  | 933<br>(283)            |
| Netherlands    | 0.297***<br>(0.065)      | 0.225***<br>(0.019)       | 0.3***<br>(0.021)   | 0.069<br>(0.729)  | 3074<br>(655)           |
| Poland         | 0.232***<br>(0.044)      | 0.126***<br>(0.018)       | 0.182***<br>(0.017) | -0.226<br>(1.215) | 2660<br>(584)           |
| Portugal       | 0.82***<br>(0.092)       | 0.216***<br>(0.021)       | 0.275***<br>(0.025) | 0.329<br>(0.319)  | 2622<br>(453)           |
| Romania        | 0.144**<br>(0.061)       | 0.259***<br>(0.022)       | 0.258***<br>(0.021) | -0.01<br>(0.568)  | 4339<br>(636)           |
| Slovakia       | 0.234***<br>(0.053)      | 0.138***<br>(0.014)       | 0.308***<br>(0.016) | 0.108<br>(0.443)  | 5665<br>(709)           |
| Slovenia       | 0.254***<br>(0.049)      | 0.135***<br>(0.019)       | 0.275***<br>(0.017) | -0.541<br>(0.42)  | 5543<br>(758)           |
| Spain          | 0.042<br>(0.044)         | 0.119***<br>(0.011)       | 0.281***<br>(0.015) | 0.506<br>(0.692)  | 6267<br>(864)           |
| Sweden         | -0.015<br>(0.051)        | 0.196***<br>(0.013)       | 0.348***<br>(0.019) | 0.376<br>(0.411)  | 8096<br>(839)           |
| United Kingdom | 0.587***<br>(0.064)      | 0.166***<br>(0.017)       | 0.308***<br>(0.025) | 0.298<br>(0.271)  | 5462<br>(818)           |

TABLE 5.1. RESULTS FROM A SERIES OF MULTILEVEL MIXED-EFFECT LINEAR REGRESSION MODELS ESTIMATING THE EFFECT OF LEFT-RIGHT ISSUE SELF-PLACEMENT AND PARTISAN ATTACHMENT ON THE PERCEIVED LEFT-RIGHT POSITION OF A POLITICAL PARTY (RANDOM-EFFECTS NOT SHOWN).

| Country        | Party attachment<br>(SE) | EU Self Placement<br>(SE) | Interaction<br>(SE) | Constant<br>(SE)    | Observations<br>(Cases) |
|----------------|--------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|-------------------------|
| Austria        | 0.715***<br>(0.048)      | 0.152***<br>(0.016)       | 0.127***<br>(0.014) | -0.176<br>(0.497)   | 6056<br>(887)           |
| Belgium        | 1.016***<br>(0.066)      | 0.2***<br>(0.024)         | 0.094***<br>(0.021) | 0.029<br>(0.185)    | 5143<br>(769)           |
| Bulgaria       | 0.523***<br>(0.077)      | 0.299***<br>(0.036)       | 0.046*<br>(0.025)   | 0.576**<br>(0.167)  | 2934<br>(506)           |
| Cyprus         | 0.372***<br>(0.064)      | 0.303***<br>(0.027)       | 0.116***<br>(0.018) | 0.72**<br>(0.228)   | 3236<br>(571)           |
| Czech Republic | 0.461***<br>(0.063)      | 0.299***<br>(0.023)       | 0.121***<br>(0.021) | 0.406<br>(0.408)    | 3401<br>(742)           |
| Denmark        | 0.554***<br>(0.044)      | 0.148***<br>(0.017)       | 0.107***<br>(0.016) | 0.405<br>(0.381)    | 6906<br>(925)           |
| Estonia        | 0.991***<br>(0.079)      | 0.205***<br>(0.028)       | 0.104***<br>(0.027) | 0.691***<br>(0.163) | 2735<br>(524)           |
| Finland        | 0.352***<br>(0.04)       | 0.19***<br>(0.018)        | 0.111***<br>(0.015) | 0.421<br>(0.48)     | 6038<br>(813)           |
| France         | 0.997***<br>(0.059)      | 0.168***<br>(0.02)        | 0.088***<br>(0.016) | 0.118<br>(0.309)    | 5460<br>(783)           |
| Germany        | 0.717***<br>(0.052)      | 0.262***<br>(0.019)       | 0.133***<br>(0.016) | 0.486<br>(0.323)    | 4277<br>(896)           |
| Greece         | 0.488***<br>(0.055)      | 0.203***<br>(0.019)       | 0.092***<br>(0.015) | 0.108<br>(0.625)    | 4362<br>(805)           |
| Hungary        | 0.688***<br>(0.066)      | 0.286***<br>(0.026)       | 0.167***<br>(0.021) | 0.637*<br>(0.34)    | 4040<br>(678)           |
| Ireland        | 1.389***<br>(0.053)      | 0.211***<br>(0.021)       | 0.105***<br>(0.018) | 0.168<br>(0.332)    | 5163<br>(913)           |
| Italy          | 1.021***<br>(0.08)       | 0.175***<br>(0.027)       | 0.109***<br>(0.022) | 0.387**<br>(0.189)  | 3431<br>(495)           |
| Latvia         | 1.369***<br>(0.084)      | 0.139***<br>(0.03)        | 0.05**<br>(0.025)   | 0.572***<br>(0.118) | 4090<br>(560)           |
| Lithuania      | 1.096***<br>(0.078)      | 0.225***<br>(0.032)       | 0.091***<br>(0.025) | 0.246**<br>(0.087)  | 4066<br>(530)           |
| Luxembourg     | 0.898***<br>(0.048)      | 0.215***<br>(0.018)       | 0.099***<br>(0.014) | -0.005<br>(0.439)   | 5810<br>(816)           |
| Malta          | 0.777***<br>(0.112)      | 0.259***<br>(0.042)       | 0.102**<br>(0.031)  | 0.74**<br>(0.364)   | 1385<br>(401)           |
| Netherlands    | 0.491***<br>(0.069)      | 0.267***<br>(0.024)       | 0.135***<br>(0.021) | 0.422<br>(0.425)    | 3405<br>(698)           |
| Poland         | 0.867***<br>(0.069)      | 0.262***<br>(0.03)        | 0.04**<br>(0.02)    | 0.248<br>(0.408)    | 2724<br>(585)           |
| Portugal       | 1.449***<br>(0.095)      | 0.259***<br>(0.033)       | 0.005<br>(0.024)    | 1.054***<br>(0.2)   | 3579<br>(571)           |
| Romania        | 0.47***<br>(0.057)       | 0.317***<br>(0.027)       | 0.158***<br>(0.02)  | 0.156<br>(0.292)    | 4787<br>(677)           |
| Slovakia       | 0.739***<br>(0.053)      | 0.216***<br>(0.021)       | 0.079***<br>(0.015) | 0.79**<br>(0.296)   | 6258<br>(767)           |
| Slovenia       | 1.003***<br>(0.065)      | 0.188***<br>(0.025)       | 0.078***<br>(0.019) | 0.108<br>(0.193)    | 6139<br>(772)           |
| Spain          | 0.333***<br>(0.042)      | 0.114***<br>(0.016)       | 0.153***<br>(0.015) | 0.291<br>(0.616)    | 6381<br>(868)           |
| Sweden         | 0.695***<br>(0.049)      | 0.118***<br>(0.016)       | 0.084***<br>(0.017) | 0.348<br>(0.283)    | 8522<br>(866)           |
| United Kingdom | 1.13***<br>(0.055)       | 0.181***<br>(0.019)       | 0.072***<br>(0.017) | -0.054<br>(0.262)   | 6115<br>(897)           |

TABLE 5.2. RESULTS FROM A SERIES OF MULTILEVEL MIXED-EFFECT LINEAR REGRESSION MODELS ESTIMATING THE EFFECT OF EU ISSUE SELF-PLACEMENT AND PARTISAN ATTACHEMENT ON THE PERCEIVED EU POSITION OF A POLITICAL PARTY (RANDOM-EFFECTS NOT SHOWN).

Due to the centring of all variables and the log transformation of the partisan attachment variable the coefficients of the models are not intuitively interpretable. The differences in perceptual biases between countries are more easily understood by looking at the substantive results, estimated by generating the fitted and adjusted party distances, as described in the previous section. As this chapter is interested in the effect of perceptual bias in estimating vote choice, these perceptual biases are demonstrated by showing the mean assimilation or contrast effect on issue distance for party voters and non-voters, as shown in table 5.3, which shows the mean of each of the three issue distance estimations for party voters and non-voters. Assimilation and contrast effects are most easily shown in columns 6 and 10 (for left-right and EU respectively) which show the differences between the mean fitted and adjusted distances. A positive value indicates an assimilation effect (i.e. the adjusted issue distance is larger than that perceived by the voter) and a negative value indicates a contrast effect (i.e. the adjusted distance is smaller than that perceived by the voter).

For left-right issue distances, the results in table 5.3 illustrate mean assimilation effects for party voters and mean contrast effects for party non-voters, as would be expected from previous research. For EU issue distances the results are more complicated – although in some countries projection bias takes the form of the assimilation and contrast bias, for just over half of the countries the model actually indicates differing degrees (weakest or close to no bias at low attachment, strongest at high attachment) of assimilation bias. Contrast effects are only found for 12 countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain, and Sweden. In all but one of these cases the contrast effect is smaller for EU issue distance than left-right – the exception being Spain. Conversely, in most countries the assimilation effect is greater for EU issue distance than it is for left-right, the exceptions to this trend being Denmark, Finland, Italy, Malta, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the

United Kingdom.<sup>28</sup> These results, which reveal differences not readily apparent from the pooled approach taken by Grand and Tiemann, emphasise the importance of examining these effects on a country by country basis.

The results of the next stage of analysis, examining the effect of left-right and EU issue distance on the probability of voting using conditional logit models, are shown in table 5.4. Using the actual and fitted data, statistical support for EU issue voting (i.e. the EU issue distance coefficient is negative and statistically significant) is found for 21 of the EU-27 member states, the exceptions being, the Czech Republic, France, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, and the United Kingdom.<sup>29</sup> Once projection bias is accounted for statistical support for EU issue voting is only found in nine of the 21 countries where it was previously: Austria, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Greece, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal (at the  $p < 0.1$  level), and Sweden. Additionally, in the United Kingdom, where previously no support was found for EU issue voting, the adjusted model is now statistically significant. The adjusted data no longer offers support for EU issue voting in 12 countries where it was before: Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, or Spain.

---

<sup>28</sup> One country exhibits a rather unexpected result: in Latvia partisan supporters actually exhibit a contrast effect – those who vote for a party seem to perceive EU issue distance as being greater than it actually is. The initial suspicion with a result such as this is that it is due to some error in the modelling process – however in this case there is sufficient evidence to dismiss this explanation: the modelling process is exactly the same for all countries, and results from analysis using the unmodelled distance variable both here (see table 5.4) and elsewhere (e.g. see table 1 in de Vries et al. 2011) show a positive coefficient for the effect of EU issue distance on the probability of voting for a party, the opposite of what would normally be expected. Whether this represents a real (and very unusual) situation in Latvian voting behaviour or if it results from an error in the data collection process is unclear, and so any substantive interpretation of the Latvian results is put to one side in the present analysis.

<sup>29</sup> In Bulgaria the EU issue coefficient is only statistically significant at the  $p < 0.1$  level, and in Portugal it is only statistically significant (again at the  $p < 0.1$  level) in the fitted data, not the actual data, depending on the chosen cut off point for statistical significance, these could also be considered as exhibiting EU issue voting effects.

| Country        | Voted for party | Mean left-right distance |             |               |                            | Mean EU policy distance |             |               |                            |
|----------------|-----------------|--------------------------|-------------|---------------|----------------------------|-------------------------|-------------|---------------|----------------------------|
|                |                 | Actual data              | Fitted data | Adjusted data | Fitted-Adjusted difference | Actual data             | Fitted data | Adjusted data | Fitted-Adjusted difference |
| Austria        | No              | 3.253                    | 3.237       | 2.847         | -0.39                      | 3.39                    | 3.348       | 3.211         | -0.137                     |
|                | Yes             | 1.457                    | 1.444       | 1.733         | 0.289                      | 2.357                   | 2.324       | 2.628         | 0.304                      |
| Belgium        | No              | 2.833                    | 2.721       | 2.518         | -0.203                     | 2.88                    | 2.784       | 2.655         | -0.129                     |
|                | Yes             | 2.033                    | 1.923       | 2.244         | 0.321                      | 2.324                   | 2.255       | 2.645         | 0.39                       |
| Bulgaria       | No              | 3.705                    | 3.65        | 3.377         | -0.273                     | 2.799                   | 2.722       | 2.863         | 0.141                      |
|                | Yes             | 1.276                    | 1.262       | 1.698         | 0.436                      | 2.444                   | 2.337       | 2.866         | 0.529                      |
| Cyprus         | No              | 1.444                    | 4.127       | 3.801         | -0.326                     | 2.957                   | 2.877       | 3.268         | 0.391                      |
|                | Yes             | 3.668                    | 1.425       | 1.929         | 0.504                      | 2.443                   | 2.38        | 3.237         | 0.857                      |
| Czech Republic | No              | 1.417                    | 3.649       | 3.397         | -0.252                     | 2.667                   | 2.6         | 2.786         | 0.186                      |
|                | Yes             | 3.376                    | 1.391       | 1.75          | 0.359                      | 2.11                    | 2.001       | 2.609         | 0.608                      |
| Denmark        | No              | 1.226                    | 3.358       | 3.003         | -0.355                     | 2.878                   | 2.829       | 2.708         | -0.121                     |
|                | Yes             | 2.808                    | 1.216       | 1.606         | 0.39                       | 2.04                    | 2           | 2.214         | 0.214                      |
| Estonia        | No              | 2.893                    | 2.769       | 2.318         | -0.451                     | 2.647                   | 2.555       | 2.785         | 0.23                       |
|                | Yes             | 1.17                     | 1.629       | 1.818         | 0.189                      | 2.473                   | 2.401       | 2.713         | 0.312                      |
| Finland        | No              | 3.538                    | 2.847       | 2.62          | -0.227                     | 2.573                   | 2.506       | 2.597         | 0.091                      |
|                | Yes             | 1.248                    | 1.146       | 1.391         | 0.245                      | 1.887                   | 1.865       | 2.082         | 0.217                      |
| France         | No              | 2.811                    | 3.483       | 3.144         | -0.339                     | 3.32                    | 3.289       | 3.16          | -0.129                     |
|                | Yes             | 1.369                    | 1.224       | 1.451         | 0.227                      | 2.749                   | 2.687       | 3.075         | 0.388                      |
| Germany        | No              | 1.569                    | 2.772       | 2.598         | -0.174                     | 2.679                   | 2.631       | 2.817         | 0.186                      |
|                | Yes             | 4.087                    | 1.332       | 1.594         | 0.262                      | 1.947                   | 1.909       | 2.47          | 0.561                      |
| Greece         | No              | 1.22                     | 3.712       | 3.28          | -0.432                     | 3.491                   | 3.449       | 3.475         | 0.026                      |
|                | Yes             | 3.158                    | 1.557       | 1.936         | 0.379                      | 2.429                   | 2.412       | 3.023         | 0.611                      |
| Hungary        | No              | 2.05                     | 4.083       | 3.629         | -0.454                     | 3.026                   | 2.952       | 2.881         | -0.071                     |
|                | Yes             | 4.029                    | 1.21        | 1.458         | 0.248                      | 2.246                   | 2.186       | 2.839         | 0.653                      |
| Ireland        | No              | 1.353                    | 3.027       | 2.361         | -0.666                     | 2.914                   | 2.836       | 2.517         | -0.319                     |
|                | Yes             | 3.212                    | 1.956       | 2.11          | 0.154                      | 2.12                    | 2.063       | 2.285         | 0.222                      |
| Italy          | No              | 1.967                    | 3.993       | 3.632         | -0.361                     | 3.661                   | 3.628       | 3.297         | -0.331                     |
|                | Yes             | 3.253                    | 1.325       | 1.757         | 0.432                      | 2.911                   | 2.828       | 3.244         | 0.416                      |
| Latvia         | No              | 1.553                    | 3.137       | 2.76          | -0.377                     | 2.95                    | 2.825       | 3.22          | 0.395                      |
|                | Yes             | 3.068                    | 1.833       | 2.342         | 0.509                      | 3.582                   | 3.494       | 3.44          | -0.054                     |
| Lithuania      | No              | 1.429                    | 3.166       | 2.797         | -0.369                     | 3.009                   | 2.938       | 2.702         | -0.236                     |
|                | Yes             | 3.947                    | 1.499       | 1.988         | 0.489                      | 2.162                   | 2.127       | 2.804         | 0.677                      |
| Luxembourg     | No              | 1.235                    | 2.966       | 2.628         | -0.338                     | 2.937                   | 2.885       | 2.799         | -0.086                     |
|                | Yes             | 3.039                    | 1.378       | 1.669         | 0.291                      | 2.468                   | 2.406       | 2.676         | 0.27                       |
| Malta          | No              | 1.204                    | 3.988       | 3.485         | -0.503                     | 3.273                   | 3.241       | 3.092         | -0.149                     |
|                | Yes             | 3.639                    | 1.194       | 2.23          | 1.036                      | 2.143                   | 2.068       | 2.674         | 0.606                      |
| Netherlands    | No              | 1.606                    | 2.979       | 2.665         | -0.314                     | 2.802                   | 2.741       | 2.532         | -0.209                     |
|                | Yes             | 3.447                    | 1.172       | 1.616         | 0.444                      | 1.902                   | 1.844       | 1.988         | 0.144                      |
| Poland         | No              | 1.162                    | 3.606       | 3.248         | -0.358                     | 2.942                   | 2.875       | 2.9           | 0.025                      |
|                | Yes             | 4.036                    | 1.579       | 2.11          | 0.531                      | 2.003                   | 1.937       | 2.654         | 0.717                      |
| Portugal       | No              | 1.848                    | 3.426       | 3.322         | -0.104                     | 2.877                   | 2.81        | 3.143         | 0.333                      |
|                | Yes             | 1.625                    | 1.161       | 1.447         | 0.286                      | 2.425                   | 2.35        | 2.91          | 0.56                       |
| Romania        | No              | 3.643                    | 3.999       | 3.489         | -0.51                      | 3.399                   | 3.386       | 3.177         | -0.209                     |
|                | Yes             | 1.867                    | 1.84        | 2.672         | 0.832                      | 2.01                    | 1.998       | 2.875         | 0.877                      |
| Slovakia       | No              | 3.603                    | 3.191       | 3.033         | -0.158                     | 2.675                   | 2.592       | 2.596         | 0.004                      |
|                | Yes             | 1.524                    | 1.559       | 1.957         | 0.398                      | 1.968                   | 1.873       | 2.41          | 0.537                      |
| Slovenia       | No              | 3.612                    | 3.463       | 3.109         | -0.354                     | 3.001                   | 2.946       | 3.148         | 0.202                      |
|                | Yes             | 1.204                    | 1.716       | 2.213         | 0.497                      | 2.324                   | 2.303       | 2.839         | 0.536                      |
| Spain          | No              | 3.108                    | 3.571       | 3.009         | -0.562                     | 3.775                   | 3.736       | 3.041         | -0.695                     |
|                | Yes             | 1.784                    | 1.498       | 1.87          | 0.372                      | 2.121                   | 2.051       | 2.466         | 0.415                      |
| Sweden         | No              | 3.612                    | 3.553       | 3.157         | -0.396                     | 3.13                    | 3.064       | 2.868         | -0.196                     |
|                | Yes             | 1.204                    | 1.191       | 1.6           | 0.409                      | 1.916                   | 1.875       | 2.055         | 0.18                       |
| United Kingdom | No              | 3.108                    | 2.976       | 2.329         | -0.647                     | 2.774                   | 2.687       | 2.834         | 0.147                      |
|                | Yes             | 1.784                    | 1.636       | 1.915         | 0.279                      | 2.505                   | 2.403       | 2.609         | 0.206                      |

TABLE 5.3. . MEAN LEFT-RIGHT AND EU ISSUE DISTANCES IN THE ACTUAL, FITTED, AND ADJUSTED DATA, AND THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE FITTED AND ADJUSTED DISTANCES FOR THE EU-27 MEMBER-STATES.

| Country        | Issue distance | Actual data          | Fitted data          | Adjusted data        | Country    | Issue distance | Actual data          | Fitted data          | Adjusted data        | Country        | Issue distance | Actual data          | Fitted data          | Adjusted data        |
|----------------|----------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|------------|----------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------|----------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| Austria        | Left-right     | -0.429***<br>(0.034) | -0.441***<br>(0.035) | -0.424***<br>(0.039) | Germany    | Left-right     | -0.421***<br>(0.036) | -0.448***<br>(0.038) | -0.474***<br>(0.04)  | Netherlands    | Left-right     | -0.571***<br>(0.037) | -0.622***<br>(0.04)  | -0.579***<br>(0.041) |
|                | EU             | -0.141***<br>(0.026) | -0.157***<br>(0.028) | -0.157***<br>(0.03)  |            | EU             | -0.141***<br>(0.04)  | -0.165***<br>(0.044) | -0.045<br>(0.049)    |                | EU             | -0.156***<br>(0.034) | -0.191***<br>(0.038) | -0.213***<br>(0.041) |
| Belgium        | Left-right     | -0.232***<br>(0.037) | -0.272***<br>(0.041) | -0.187***<br>(0.045) | Greece     | Left-right     | -0.49***<br>(0.034)  | -0.512***<br>(0.036) | -0.501***<br>(0.037) | Poland         | Left-right     | -0.375***<br>(0.039) | -0.389***<br>(0.041) | -0.367***<br>(0.043) |
|                | EU             | -0.112***<br>(0.036) | -0.134***<br>(0.04)  | -0.028<br>(0.047)    |            | EU             | -0.178***<br>(0.028) | -0.194***<br>(0.029) | -0.141***<br>(0.029) |                | EU             | -0.205***<br>(0.043) | -0.232***<br>(0.047) | -0.121**<br>(0.051)  |
| Bulgaria       | Left-right     | -0.549***<br>(0.053) | -0.583***<br>(0.057) | -0.594***<br>(0.059) | Hungary    | Left-right     | -0.662***<br>(0.063) | -0.689***<br>(0.067) | -0.77***<br>(0.07)   | Portugal       | Left-right     | -0.572***<br>(0.052) | -0.59***<br>(0.053)  | -0.574***<br>(0.052) |
|                | EU             | -0.08*<br>(0.048)    | -0.095*<br>(0.053)   | -0.023<br>(0.066)    |            | EU             | -0.109**<br>(0.045)  | -0.118**<br>(0.05)   | -0.054<br>(0.057)    |                | EU             | -0.066<br>(0.043)    | -0.085*<br>(0.047)   | -0.1*<br>(0.051)     |
| Cyprus         | Left-right     | -0.424***<br>(0.032) | -0.442***<br>(0.034) | -0.486***<br>(0.036) | Ireland    | Left-right     | -0.219***<br>(0.026) | -0.253***<br>(0.029) | -0.215***<br>(0.041) | Romania        | Left-right     | -0.25***<br>(0.033)  | -0.268***<br>(0.036) | -0.248***<br>(0.042) |
|                | EU             | -0.099**<br>(0.039)  | -0.131***<br>(0.045) | -0.06<br>(0.05)      |            | EU             | -0.1***<br>(0.029)   | -0.107***<br>(0.031) | -0.06<br>(0.043)     |                | EU             | -0.144***<br>(0.04)  | -0.18***<br>(0.046)  | -0.028<br>(0.063)    |
| Czech Republic | Left-right     | -0.446***<br>(0.041) | -0.458***<br>(0.042) | -0.488***<br>(0.044) | Italy      | Left-right     | -0.527***<br>(0.048) | -0.605***<br>(0.055) | -0.632***<br>(0.056) | Slovakia       | Left-right     | -0.454***<br>(0.05)  | -0.501***<br>(0.056) | -0.425***<br>(0.05)  |
|                | EU             | -0.049<br>(0.043)    | -0.065<br>(0.048)    | -0.025<br>(0.052)    |            | EU             | -0.071*<br>(0.038)   | -0.089**<br>(0.044)  | 0.002<br>(0.051)     |                | EU             | -0.171***<br>(0.056) | -0.206***<br>(0.063) | -0.035<br>(0.063)    |
| Denmark        | Left-right     | -0.535***<br>(0.038) | -0.548***<br>(0.039) | -0.522***<br>(0.041) | Latvia     | Left-right     | -0.283***<br>(0.034) | -0.33***<br>(0.038)  | -0.226***<br>(0.041) | Slovenia       | Left-right     | -0.294***<br>(0.026) | -0.397***<br>(0.034) | -0.382***<br>(0.037) |
|                | EU             | -0.181***<br>(0.034) | -0.194***<br>(0.035) | -0.177***<br>(0.037) |            | EU             | 0.089***<br>(0.031)  | 0.117***<br>(0.035)  | 0.057<br>(0.05)      |                | EU             | -0.108***<br>(0.033) | -0.121***<br>(0.038) | -0.045<br>(0.044)    |
| Estonia        | Left-right     | -0.373***<br>(0.053) | -0.418***<br>(0.057) | -0.416***<br>(0.071) | Lithuania  | Left-right     | -0.319***<br>(0.055) | -0.347***<br>(0.059) | -0.407***<br>(0.071) | Spain          | Left-right     | -0.545***<br>(0.055) | -0.581***<br>(0.059) | -0.692***<br>(0.065) |
|                | EU             | -0.112**<br>(0.05)   | -0.117**<br>(0.057)  | -0.16**<br>(0.074)   |            | EU             | -0.154**<br>(0.064)  | -0.195***<br>(0.075) | 0.039<br>(0.102)     |                | EU             | -0.128*<br>(0.065)   | -0.166**<br>(0.074)  | 0.047<br>(0.085)     |
| Finland        | Left-right     | -0.592***<br>(0.04)  | -0.632***<br>(0.043) | -0.617***<br>(0.044) | Luxembourg | Left-right     | -0.381***<br>(0.034) | -0.434***<br>(0.038) | -0.391***<br>(0.04)  | Sweden         | Left-right     | -0.554***<br>(0.034) | -0.592***<br>(0.036) | -0.644***<br>(0.04)  |
|                | EU             | -0.211***<br>(0.038) | -0.228***<br>(0.041) | -0.232***<br>(0.042) |            | EU             | 0.028<br>(0.035)     | 0.025<br>(0.038)     | 0.012<br>(0.042)     |                | EU             | -0.203***<br>(0.032) | -0.237***<br>(0.035) | -0.242***<br>(0.037) |
| France         | Left-right     | -0.511***<br>(0.047) | -0.559***<br>(0.051) | -0.618***<br>(0.056) | Malta      | Left-right     | -0.387***<br>(0.059) | -0.398***<br>(0.061) | -0.395***<br>(0.061) | United Kingdom | Left-right     | -0.347***<br>(0.036) | -0.436***<br>(0.042) | -0.318***<br>(0.048) |
|                | EU             | -0.047<br>(0.036)    | -0.061<br>(0.04)     | -0.01<br>(0.053)     |            | EU             | -0.08<br>(0.068)     | -0.092<br>(0.073)    | -0.049<br>(0.084)    |                | EU             | -0.034<br>(0.029)    | -0.034<br>(0.034)    | -0.091**<br>(0.04)   |

Statistical significance: \* p<0.1, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01

TABLE 5.4. CONDITIONAL LOGIT MODELS ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF LEFT-RIGHT AND EU ISSUE VOTING ON THE PROBABILITY OF VOTING FOR A PARTY (PARTY FIXED-EFFECTS NOT SHOWN) USING THE ACTUAL, FITTED, AND ADJUSTED DATA FOR EACH OF THE 27 EU MEMBER-STATES..

Logit regression coefficients are not easily interpretable beyond the direction of their effect in the simplest of models and this is particularly the case for conditional logit models, where the predicted effect of each coefficient for each respondent is conditional on the probability of voting for all the other possible parties. In order to assess the differences between the effects of EU issue voting between each of the models for each country, the coefficients in each model are converted to unconditional predicted probabilities, which although they do not predict the probability of voting for any particular party for any given participant, still illustrate the general effect of EU issue distance. These predicted probabilities are estimated at the mean left-right issue distance for each model with no party fixed-effects. In order to control for changes in the effect of left-right distance between models (which changes the absolute probability of voting for a party) these predicted probabilities are measured as the change in the probability of voting for a party as a voter moves closer to a party on the EU issue rather than the absolute probability of voting for a party.

Of the 10 countries that now have statistically significant EU issue voting effects, eight have an increased EU issue voting effect compared to the actual and fitted data models: Austria, Denmark, Finland, Greece, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. However, only in the United Kingdom, which is illustrated in figure 5.1, are these differences statistically significant (as determined by overlapping confidence intervals of the predicted probabilities). In the other eight cases, as demonstrated by Denmark in figure 5.2 the confidence intervals are overlapping across the entire issue distance space, and so we should consider the estimated effect of EU issue voting in these cases as statistically equivalent across models.




FIGURE 5.1. CHANGE IN THE (UNCONDITIONAL) PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF VOTING FOR A PARTY AT THE MEAN LEFT-RIGHT ISSUE DISTANCE AND CHANGING VALUES FOR THE ACTUAL, FITTED, AND ADJUSTED DATA FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM.




FIGURE 5.2. CHANGE IN THE (UNCONDITIONAL) PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF VOTING FOR A PARTY AT THE MEAN LEFT-RIGHT ISSUE DISTANCE AND CHANGING VALUES FOR THE ACTUAL, FITTED, AND ADJUSTED DATA FOR DENMARK.

In the remaining two cases that have a statistically significant EU issue voting effect, Estonia and Poland, the adjusted data model predicts a decreased EU issue voting effect. However, only in Estonia, illustrated in figure 5.3 is this difference statistically significant. As before we must consider the Polish models as all making statistically equivalent predictions.




FIGURE 5.3. CHANGE IN THE (UNCONDITIONAL) PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF VOTING FOR A PARTY AT THE MEAN LEFT-RIGHT ISSUE DISTANCE AND CHANGING VALUES FOR THE ACTUAL, FITTED, AND ADJUSTED DATA FOR ESTONIA.

### 5.3 – Discussion

Overall, when projection effects are controlled for, 13 of the EU-27 member-states are estimated to have the same EU issue voting effects (or non-effects) as models estimated using unadjusted data. In eight of these cases, a statistically significant effect for EU issue voting is found across the different models: Austria, Denmark, Finland, Greece, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, and Sweden. In five countries – the Czech Republic, France, Latvia, Luxembourg, and Malta – no statistically significant EU issue voting effect is found in any of the models. In 12 of

the cases where statistical support for EU issue voting was found with the unadjusted data – Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain – support is no longer found with the adjusted data. This leaves two remaining cases. In Estonia, where EU issue voting is found across the adjusted and unadjusted data, the effect is statistically significantly smaller in the adjusted model. In the United Kingdom, where no statistical support for EU issue voting is found in the unadjusted models, the adjusted model reveals a statistically significant effect.

These results support both hypotheses outlined earlier. In 13 countries, EU issue voting is overestimated, in all but 1 of them to the point where the effect of EU issue voting is no longer statistically significant, offering strong support for hypothesis one. Although only one case – the United Kingdom – fits the criteria for hypothesis 2, this also represents an important difference from previous results. In particular it is a result that fits better with observations of the role of European integration in British politics, which has seen numerous inter and intra party conflicts over the EU, frequent demands for a referendum on EU membership, and the rise of the United Kingdom Independence Party.

These results are by no means trivial or simply a matter of improving the technical specification of statistical models. The 12 cases where no statistical support for EU issue voting in the adjusted data account for more than half of all the countries that were estimated to have EU issue voting effects in the unadjusted models – a drastic difference. These results must call into question previous analysis about the distribution of EU issue voting across the EU. For example, de Vries and Tillmann previously argued that EU issue voting was particularly prominent in post-Soviet East and Central European countries, a fact which could be explained by the role that the legacy of the Soviet era plays in shaping political contexts in these countries.<sup>30</sup> The present findings

---

<sup>30</sup> de Vries and Tillman, “European Union Issue Voting in East and West Europe.”

suggest a different pattern – only two of the ex-Soviet Eastern European countries have an EU issue voting effect which survives the adjustment process: Estonia and Poland, and the effect is weaker in the case of Estonia. Indeed projection bias seems to be particularly important in the former Soviet countries which joined the EU in 2004, which account for half of the cases where the statistical significance of EU issue is removed by the adjusted data.

From the issue representation perspective these results are troubling. An initial examination of the data suggested that there was good reason to be optimistic about the possibility of European integration issue representation – EU issue voting appeared to play an important role in two-thirds of EU member states – an encouraging, if imperfect finding. However, only in 10 EU member states are EU issue voting effects still found once projection bias has been accounted for. Although it could be seen as good news for issue representation that EU issue voting survives the adjustment for projection bias in *any* EU member states, the fact that EU issue voting is absent in the majority of EU member states, which account for about two-thirds of the EU-27 population and seats in the European Parliament, is extremely problematic for European integration issue representation.

A full assessment of European integration issue representation will be made in the concluding chapter but it is clear from the preceding three chapters that, at the least, representation on the EU is operating far from perfectly. This begs the question of whether the representation model is actually the best form of democracy for European integration to take. An alternative that has frequently been suggested is direct democracy. As we shall see in the next chapter however, referendums offer a flawed substitute for representation.

## Chapter 6 – Calling European Union treaty referendums

---

The previous three chapters have shown that European integration issue representation is not functioning well in the European Union. Changes in the relationship between party positions on the economic left-right dimension and European integration positions have made the need for representation on European integration directly more pressing. However, voters do not seem to respond to party signals on European integration in their assessment of where parties stand on European integration and voters in the majority of EU member-states are not influenced by EU issues when they cast their votes in European Parliament elections. In short, several steps of the issue representation model are not functioning adequately for European integration.

Given the shortcomings of European integration issue representation an assessment of what might ameliorate the problem of representation in the EU may be useful in pointing to where improvements to EU democracy could be found. This chapter explores whether direct democracy in the form of referendums, which have been frequently used in the EU, has been able to make up for the shortcomings of European integration representation.

Letting the people decide on issues directly seems like an obvious potential solution to the problem of representation in the European context. The use of the referendum as a democratic tool is well studied in the academic literature – from the reasons referendums are held, to citizen attitudes to referendums and direct democracy, and the desirability of referendums as political instruments.<sup>1</sup> Research in other contexts has shown that direct democracy, when it can be

---

<sup>1</sup> Tor Bjørklund, “The Demand for Referendum: When Does It Arise and When Does It Succeed?,” *Scandinavian Political Studies* 5, no. 3 (1982): 237–259; David Butler and Austin Ranney, eds., *Referendums: A Comparative Study of Practice and Theory* (Washington D.C.: American Enterprise for

initiated by citizens, can be an effective remedy to deficits of representation.<sup>2</sup> Even when a direct democratic route is not pursued, the existence of direct democratic institutions that can be triggered by citizens can be sufficient to improve representation as legislators anticipate being overruled by their citizens.<sup>3</sup> Direct democracy may be particularly appealing because it allows issues to be unbundled and voted on directly, overcoming any difficulties caused by the dimensionality of political competition.<sup>4</sup> Given this, the desirability of referendums in the EU context of a representational deficit seems obvious.

The use of direct democracy is well established in the EU. Many referendums have been held on many different European integration issues, from accession to the EU to whether to join the Euro. Most commonly referendums have been held to ratify changes to EU treaties and indeed several times in the history of European integration the implementation of a new treaty has been delayed or stopped entirely because it has been rejected in a referendum. The Danish electorate voted no to the Maastricht Treaty, and Irish voters rejected the Nice and the Lisbon treaties. The most remarkable example of the role that referendums have played in European integration was the failed Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (the Constitutional

---

Public Policy Research, 1978); David Butler and Austin Ranney, eds., *Referendums around the World: The Growing Use of Direct Democracy* (London: Macmillan, 1994); Laurence Morel, "The Rise of Government-Initiated Referendums in Consolidated Democracies," in *Referendum Democracy: Citizens, Elites and Deliberation*, ed. Matthew Mendelsohn and Andrew Parkin (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 47–64; Shaun Bowler, Todd Donovan, and Jeffrey A. Karp, "Enraged or Engaged? Preferences for Direct Citizen Participation in Affluent Democracies," *Political Research Quarterly* 60, no. 3 (September 1, 2007): 351–362; John R. Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse, *Stealth Democracy: Americans' Beliefs About How Government Should Work* (Cambridge University Press, 2002); Jon Elster, ed., *Deliberative Democracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Lawrence LeDuc, *The Politics of Direct Democracy: Referendums in Global Perspective* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003); Mads Qvortrup, *A Comparative Study of Referendums: Government by the People, Second Edition* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005).

<sup>2</sup> John G. Matsusaka, "Direct Democracy Works," *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 19, no. 2 (2005): 185–206; John G. Matsusaka, "Popular Control of Public Policy: A Quantitative Approach," *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 5, no. 2 (August 22, 2010): 133–167.

<sup>3</sup> Elisabeth R. Gerber, "Legislative Response to the Threat of Popular Initiatives," *American Journal of Political Science* 40, no. 1 (February 1, 1996): 99–128; Lucas Leemann and Fabio Wasserfallen, "The Democratic Effect of Direct Democracy," *American Political Science Review* (Forthcoming).

<sup>4</sup> Timothy Besley, "Issue Unbundling via Citizens' Initiatives," *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 3, no. 4 (December 31, 2008): 379–397.

Treaty): ten European Union (EU) member-states announced that they would hold referendums to ratify the treaty.<sup>5</sup> On May 29 and June 1, 2005 the Constitutional Treaty was rejected by French and Dutch voters, and the treaty was derailed. Overall, of the 13 times a treaty has been put to referendum, it has been (at least initially) rejected on five occasions.

From this it would seem that direct democracy may have been an important corrective to the failings of representation in the EU. An important qualification to the democratic credentials of EU referendums however, is that (with the possible exception of two member-states where referendums are constitutionally mandated in some circumstances, though as will be discussed, even this is not entirely straightforward) referendums are held at the discretion of the government, and not on the demands of the people.<sup>6</sup> Given that the power to decide whether to hold referendums on EU issues lies in the hands of governments, in order to understand whether referendums have ameliorated the problems of representation in the EU it is necessary to understand why governments have chosen to call referendums. If referendums are held to accommodate the democratic demands of citizens then they may well have counteracted some of the failures of representation in the EU. If however referendums have been held for the strategic advantage of political parties, their democratic credentials must be called into question.

Much scholarly work has gone into trying to understand voter behaviour at European integration referendums.<sup>7</sup> We know comparatively little however, about why those referendums were held

---

<sup>5</sup> EU is used as a shorthand to denote both the European Union and its predecessor organisations.

<sup>6</sup> A more general qualification to the corrective properties of citizen initiated direct democracy is that political parties often play a key role in initiating and campaigning on referendums, suggesting that in some cases at least, direct democracy is simply the continuation of representative politics by other means. See for example: Georg Lutz, "The Interaction Between Direct and Representative Democracy in Switzerland," *Representation* 42, no. 1 (April 1, 2006): 45–57.

<sup>7</sup> Mark Franklin, Michael Marsh, and Lauren McLaren, "Uncorking the Bottle: Popular Opposition to European Unification in the Wake of Maastricht," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 32, no. 4 (1994): 455–472; John Garry, Michael Marsh, and Richard Sinnott, "'Second-Order' versus 'Issue-Voting' Effects

in the first place. In setting out an agenda for future referendum research Hobolt argued that 'more research is... needed to establish when and why governments opt for the referendum strategy, despite the obvious risks'.<sup>8</sup> This chapter attempts to answer this question and argues that the decision to hold a referendum on a European integration treaty is primarily driven by the combination of low public support for European integration and the timing of upcoming elections, and the configuration of domestic political institutions.

## 6.1 – An Under Studied Question

Although there is a well-established literature on many aspects of referendums more generally – with the exception of studies of voting behaviour – the literature on EU referendums more specifically is fairly small. The earliest approach to understanding the decision to hold EU treaty referendums looked at them from the perspective of being a bargaining tool in negotiations at Intergovernmental Conferences.<sup>9</sup> These scholars argued that European integration is a two-level game and that member-states may tie their hands on the domestic level, by announcing a referendum, in order to increase their bargaining strength at the European level. Closa also suggests that another possible European level influence on the decision to hold a referendum is the ratification process in other member-states, arguing that debates and policy decisions

---

in EU Referendums," *European Union Politics* 6, no. 2 (2005): 201–21; Andrew Glencross and Alexander Trechsel, "First or Second Order Referendums? Understanding the Votes on the EU Constitutional Treaty in Four EU Member States," *West European Politics* 34, no. 4 (2011): 755–772; Hobolt, Spoon, and Tilley, "A Vote against Europe? Explaining Defection at the 1999 and 2004 European Parliament Elections"; Sara Hobolt, "When Europe Matters: The Impact of Political Information on Voting Behaviour in EU Referendums," *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion & Parties* 15, no. 1 (2005): 85–110; Sara Hobolt, "How Parties Affect Vote Choice in European Integration Referendums," *Party Politics* 12, no. 5 (2006): 623–647; Sara Hobolt, "Taking Cues on Europe? Voter Competence and Party Endorsements in Referendums on European Integration," *European Journal of Political Research* 46, no. 2 (2007): 151–182.

<sup>8</sup> Hobolt, "Direct Democracy and European Integration," 158.

<sup>9</sup> Simon Hug and Thomas König, "In View of Ratification: Governmental Preferences and Domestic Constraints at the Amsterdam Intergovernmental Conference," *International Organization* 56, no. 2 (2002): 447–476; Gerald Schneider and Lars-Erik Cederman, "The Change of Tide in Political Cooperation: A Limited Information Model of European Integration," *International Organization* 48, no. 4 (1994): 633–662.

surrounding treaty ratification in one member-state influence debates in other member-states and so the decision to hold a referendum by one member-state will increase the pressure on others to do the same.<sup>10</sup>

It was not until the flurry of referendums surrounding the Constitutional Treaty that a few scholars began to turn their attention towards the role that domestic political factors might play on the decision to hold a referendum on an EU treaty. Drawing on the more general literature on the reasons referendums are held Mateo argues that most of the Constitutional Treaty referendums were driven by domestic political factors.<sup>11</sup> Similarly, Closa finds that the absence of solid parliamentary majorities, disputes within ruling parties, and electoral calculation drove the decision to hold referendums on the Constitutional Treaty.<sup>12</sup> Finke and König contend that Constitutional Treaty referendum decisions were driven by the desire of treaty-friendly governments to circumvent parliamentary opposition, also noting that governments sought to decouple the referendum issue from electoral campaigns.<sup>13</sup> Finally, Dür and Mateo use measures of government and opposition party positions on whether to hold a referendum, public support for the treaty, party size, and the time until the next election to argue that electoral competition was a primary driver behind party positions on referendums.<sup>14</sup>

Moving beyond the Constitutional Treaty case, Oppermann explores the relationship between domestic and European level motivations for holding referendums and develops a two-by-two

---

<sup>10</sup> Carlos Closa, "Why Convene Referendums? Explaining Choices in EU Constitutional Politics," *Journal of European Public Policy* 14, no. 8 (2007): 1311–1332.

<sup>11</sup> Gemma Mateo, *Domestic Politics and Referendums on the Constitutional Treaty*, EUI Working Papers 32 (Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies: European University Institute, 2006).

<sup>12</sup> Closa, "Why Convene Referendums? Explaining Choices in EU Constitutional Politics."

<sup>13</sup> Daniel Finke and Thomas König, "Why Risk Popular Ratification Failure? A Comparative Analysis of the Choice of the Ratification Instrument in the 25 Member States of the EU," *Constitutional Political Economy* 20 (2009): 341–365.

<sup>14</sup> Andreas Dür and Gemma Mateo, "To Call or Not to Call? Political Parties and Referendums on the EU's Constitutional Treaty," *Comparative Political Studies* 44, no. 4 (2011): 468–492.

(European/domestic and offensive/defensive) typology.<sup>15</sup> Applying this typology to all discretionary EU referendums Oppermann concludes that although referendums fitting each type have been held, the single most common type of referendum is one that was held for domestic-defensive reasons. Additionally, Qvortrup, drawing on the earlier work of Bjørklund and Morel, examines the cases where referendums have been held on EU issues to argue that referendums on European integration are held for tactical reasons, driven by the desire to increase electoral support.<sup>16</sup>

With the exception of Oppermann and Qvortrup, the existing literature on the domestic politics of EU referendums has focused on the Constitutional Treaty. Given that the Constitutional Treaty is an atypical case in both the number of referendums held on it and the politicisation of debates surrounding it, it is not clear whether we can draw generalizable conclusions about EU referendums from the Constitutional Treaty or if these arguments only fit the specific case. This chapter attempts to answer this question by examining the ratification of all major EU treaties.

Although the literature on the domestic factors which influence the decision to hold EU treaty referendums is small, there is an emerging consensus that the referendums on the Constitutional Treaty were driven by electoral politics. The argument put forward here follows this literature and argues that the primary driver of referendums has been domestic political pressure. This pressure can be divided into two forms – electoral pressure and institutional pressure. Electoral pressure to hold a referendum stems from the desire for governments to avoid being punished by voters for an unpopular policy. By holding a referendum governments seek to depoliticise the issue of European integration at elections and avoid voter defections to

---

<sup>15</sup> Kai Oppermann, "The Politics of Discretionary Government Commitments to European Integration Referendums," *Journal of European Public Policy* 20, no. 5 (2013): 684–701.

<sup>16</sup> Matt Qvortrup, *Referendums and Ethnic Conflict* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014); Bjørklund, "The Demand for Referendum: When Does It Arise and When Does It Succeed?"; Morel, "The Rise of Government-Initiated Referendums in Consolidated Democracies."

more Eurosceptic parties. Institutional pressures stem from potential veto players to the ratification of the treaty (such as an executive president or the upper chamber in a bicameral parliament) and the use of referendums to bypass such veto players.

These two factors should be viewed as complementary rather than competing explanations. When elections are near and a government's European policy is unpopular, the bargaining power of veto players will increase and they will have a greater effect on government decisions. Similarly, when veto players have more of a role in ratifying a treaty the potential for political conflict is higher, increasing the salience of European issues, which may in turn increase electoral pressure.

This argument fits squarely with Oppermann's domestic-defensive type. It does not aim to deny the possibility of domestic-offensive or European level motivations in the decision to hold a referendum on a European treaty. However, driven by the desire for parsimony and the limitations of a relatively small dataset, these issues are put to one side for the time being.

## **6.2 – Electoral Pressure**

EU treaty ratification is a difficult issue for governments to deal with at an electoral level because, unlike other political issues, governments cannot strategically modify the content of a treaty for electoral reasons once it has been signed. As they are negotiated at an intergovernmental level, once a treaty is signed the space for strategic manoeuvring is very limited. When treaty ratification is on the political agenda, governments are restricted in their policy manoeuvring to a binary choice – whether they are pro or anti ratification. Faced with this policy bind one of the few strategic choices available to governments facing electoral punishment from an electorate hostile to European integration is whether to try to depoliticise the issue by holding a referendum. By allowing voters a ballot specifically on European integration, governments hope that European issues will not affect vote choice at subsequent

elections. Of course, governments do not face electoral pressure evenly throughout their terms in office, particularly in the case of generally low salience issues such as European integration. Governments will face greater electoral pressure when they have to ratify a treaty closer to an election, suggesting an interaction between public support for European integration and the time until the next election.

*Hypothesis 1a: Referendums are more likely to be held to ratify a treaty when public support for European integration is low.*

*Hypothesis 1b: Referendums are more likely to be held to ratify a treaty when elections are close.*

*Hypothesis 1c: There will be an interaction between public support for European integration and the time until the next election, such that referendums are more likely to be held when public support for integration is low and elections are close.*

### **6.3 – Legal obligations**

One of the most obvious drivers of holding a referendum is some form of legal requirement to do so, as found in Ireland and Denmark. However the fact that Denmark did not hold referendums on the Nice and Lisbon treaties is the first indication that referendums are not simply a matter of legal determinism. The provisions governing the requirement of referendums are found in Section 20 of the Danish Constitution, which states:

*‘Subsection 1. Powers that are granted to the authorities of the Kingdom under this Constitution may, by means of an Act and to a specific extent, be transferred to international authorities created by mutual agreement with other States to promote international legal order and cooperation.*

*Subsection 2. A majority of five-sixths of the Members of Parliament is required to pass Bills in this respect. If such a majority is not obtained, but the majority required to pass normal Bills is obtained, and the Government maintains the Bill, it is submitted to the parliamentary electors for approval or rejection in accordance with the rules established for referendums in Section 42'*

As it is possible to ratify treaties by supermajority a referendum is never absolutely necessary, however no treaty has been ratified this way. Section 20 applies when *powers are transferred to international authorities*. When Section 20 does not apply, as it was deemed to be the case for the Nice and Lisbon treaties, ratification falls under Section 19, which covers other aspects of foreign policy and only requires a Bill to pass a normal majority vote. Although whether a treaty falls under Section 19 or 20 should technically be a legal matter, as Laursen argues, in reality there is a great deal of political involvement in the decision.<sup>17</sup>

Although Ireland has held referendums to ratify every treaty since the Single European Act (SEA), there is also ambiguity in whether a referendum is always legally obligatory. The requirement to hold referendums arose from a legal decision in *Crotty v. An Taoiseach*, which was brought to challenge the Irish government's ratification of the SEA. Ireland's entry to the EC was ratified by the third amendment to the Irish constitution which states that:

*'No provision of this Constitution invalidates laws enacted, acts done or measures adopted by the State necessitated by the obligations of membership of the Communities or prevents laws enacted, acts done or measures adopted by the Communities, or institutions thereof, from having the force of law in the State'*

This allows the government the power to introduce some European laws into Irish law without further amending the constitution. The Crotty case decided that the provisions of the SEA

---

<sup>17</sup> Finn Laursen, "Denmark and the Ratification of the Lisbon Treaty: How a Referendum Was Avoided" (presented at the 4th Annual EUCE conference, Dalhousie University, 2010).

relating to foreign policy cooperation did not meet the requirement of an 'obligation of membership' and ruled that the government could not enter foreign policy cooperation without a further change to the constitution, which in turn required a referendum. Consequently the SEA was put to a referendum, and so has every EU treaty since, though it is far from clear that they have been legally necessary under the reasoning of the Crotty case.

With the exception of the Irish referendum on the SEA it is not simply a matter of referendums being held because there is a legal requirement to do so. Rather, legal arrangements make the *political* pressure to hold a referendum much greater because they increase the political costs of parliamentary ratification.

*Hypothesis 2: Referendums are more likely to be held when a country has a legal requirement for a referendum on some EU treaties, even if the legal requirement does not explicitly extend to the treaty in question.*<sup>18</sup>

## 6.4 – Institutions and Veto Players

As veto players in the political process, political institutions are also expected to influence the decision to hold a referendum. Tsebelis defines a veto player as an actor whose consent is required to change the status quo.<sup>19</sup> Although a referendum could be considered as a veto

---

<sup>18</sup> It could also be true that the opposite case – a legal provision *preventing* a referendum being held to ratify international treaties, such as exists in Italy – might also apply. Since Italy has never held a referendum on an EU treaty this argument could be correct, but because there is no variation of outcome, it is impossible to test statistically. The fact that there have been frequent political demands in Italy for treaty referendums and the fact that a referendum was held on the powers of the European Parliament in 1989 suggests that the absence of treaty referendums is not simply a case of legal determinism - were there sufficient political will for a referendum a way would be found to hold one. If the reader is unconvinced they should be assured that the results presented here are robust to the exclusion of Italy.

<sup>19</sup> George Tsebelis, *Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work* (New York and Princeton, New Jersey: Russell Sage Foundation and Princeton University Press, 2002).

player in its own right this chapter draws on the idea that referendums can be used as a means of bypassing institutional obstacles to policy change.<sup>20</sup>

According to the logic of the veto players model, when players have different preferences on a policy spectrum, policy will shift to a Pareto optimal point between their different preferences. However, when the policy in question is a binary choice (as it is in the case of treaty ratification), if any player has different preferences, a compromise position is impossible as a point between the choices does not exist. Consequently, if veto players have different preferences on ratification this may result in policy deadlock. If this situation arises (or is anticipated) then governments may resort to referendums as a tool to bypass veto players or as a bargaining tool to win their support.

In many cases it is impossible to know the preferences of different actors with regard to treaty ratification and so rather than a preference modelling approach this chapter takes a probabilistic view on the impact of veto players that is agnostic as to the actual preferences of different actors and simply argues that because they must exist in order to present an obstacle to policy the probability of referendums is higher in countries where veto players are present. In particular two key institutions are expected to increase the likelihood of a referendum: an executive President and a bicameral legislature.

*Hypothesis 3a: The presence of a bicameral legislature will increase the likelihood of a referendum being held.*

*Hypothesis 3b: The presence of an executive President will increase the likelihood of a referendum being held.*

---

<sup>20</sup> Pier Vincenzo Uleri, "On Referendum Voting in Italy: Yes, No or Non-Vote? How Italian Parties Learned to Control Referenda," *European Journal of Political Research* 41 (2002): 863–883.

The literature on referendums suggests that they are also used to bypass opposition from unicameral parliaments and the lower chamber of bicameral parliaments in cases where the government does not have a legislative majority.<sup>21</sup> Closa argues that this is true in the cases of EU treaty ratification as well, and so this theory will be examined alongside the other institutional hypotheses.<sup>22</sup>

*Hypothesis 3c: The absence of a parliamentary majority will increase the likelihood of a referendum being held.*

## 6.5 – Treaty level effects

The asymmetric distribution of referendums between different treaties suggests that the drive to hold ratification referendums may not be completely attributable to domestic political concerns. Several treaty level factors might influence the decision to hold a referendum: First, the degree of change a treaty brings might affect the electoral pressure a government will face when ratifying the treaty as citizens are concerned with new developments in European integration. It is probably no coincidence that the two treaties that have had the most referendums held on them, Maastricht and the Constitutional Treaty, are also two of the most important treaties in the history of European integration in terms of structural and symbolic changes. Secondly, member-states holding referendums may add pressure on other member-states to do the same, such as Closa suggests occurred with the Constitutional Treaty.<sup>23</sup> Conversely it may be in their collective interest to avoid referendums so as not to risk ratification

---

<sup>21</sup> Bjørklund, "The Demand for Referendum: When Does It Arise and When Does It Succeed?"; Morel, "The Rise of Government-Initiated Referendums in Consolidated Democracies."

<sup>22</sup> Closa, "Why Convene Referendums? Explaining Choices in EU Constitutional Politics."

<sup>23</sup> Ibid.

failure. In the case of the Lisbon Treaty Oppermann suggests that this helps explain why member-states avoided referendums despite public pressure to hold them.<sup>24</sup>

The research design adopted here is intended to explore the domestic drivers of the decision to hold a referendum and so is not well suited to disentangling these possible treaty level effects, a question which is better suited to other methods such as process tracing. It can however offer an exploratory analysis of treaty level effects which will reveal whether any discernible treaty level effects exist or whether the pattern of referendums across treaties is simply due to the confluence of other factors at particular treaties. If such treaty level effects do exist, the results here can point future research towards the treaties where, holding domestic political concerns constant, the number of referendums held was greater or fewer than we would otherwise expect.

## 6.6 – Data and Methodology

As the unit of analysis is the government of an EU member-state this chapter analyses aggregate country level data using a combination of logistic regression with clustered standard errors and multi-level mixed effect logistic regression to determine the effect that the hypothesised variables have on the probability of a country holding a referendum. The cases ( $n = 106$ ) are each time a country needed to ratify a treaty, beginning with the SEA and including all treaties up to and including the Lisbon Treaty.<sup>25</sup>

---

<sup>24</sup> Kai Oppermann, “The Politics of Avoiding Referendums on the Treaty of Lisbon,” *Journal of European Integration* 35, no. 1 (2013): 73–89.

<sup>25</sup> This does not include the ratification of entry or founding treaties. While the ratification of reform treaties can be considered generally equivalent there are good reasons why the other treaties should not. Joining the EU is a very different process to ratifying a treaty when already a member and the political pressures will be different in each case.

The dependent variable is a binary measure of whether or not a referendum was called to ratify a treaty (one = referendum). In 19 of the 106 times a treaty faced ratification a referendum was called, a list of which is shown in table 6.1.

Data on public opinion towards European integration is taken from the Eurobarometer survey series, using the closest survey that was conducted before each treaty. Aggregate level public support for European integration is measured by the public support variable which is the proportion of respondents in each country answering 'a good thing' to a question that asks survey respondents whether they 'think [their country's] membership of the European Union is a good thing/bad thing/neither a good or bad thing?'

The amount of time until the next election, days till election, is calculated by counting the number of days between the signing date of the treaty and the closest election following the signing of the treaty.<sup>26</sup> Details on when elections are held come from Mackie and Rose prior to 1991 and from the *European Journal of Political Research* data yearbooks from 1991 onwards.<sup>27</sup> Where elections are held on multiple days the date of the first day of the election was used.

---

<sup>26</sup> It might be objected that the days to election might be misleading in cases where an early election was called and a better measure would be the length of current government incumbency. The same objection might be made here - it assumes early elections catch governments by surprise. The statistical analysis was run with both measures and the results are robust to the use of either. Days till Election is used because interpretation of the coefficients is more intuitive given the argument that referendums are more likely when elections are close.

<sup>27</sup> Thomas T. Mackie and Richard Rose, *The International Almanac of Electoral History*, Third Edition (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan, 1990).

| Treaty       | Countries ratifying treaty by referendum |
|--------------|------------------------------------------|
| SEA          | Denmark                                  |
|              | Ireland                                  |
| Maastricht   | Denmark                                  |
|              | France                                   |
|              | Ireland                                  |
| Amsterdam    | Denmark                                  |
|              | Ireland                                  |
| Nice         | Ireland                                  |
| Constitution | Czech Republic*                          |
|              | Denmark*                                 |
|              | France                                   |
|              | Ireland*                                 |
|              | Luxembourg                               |
|              | Netherlands                              |
|              | Poland*                                  |
|              | Portugal*                                |
|              | Spain                                    |
|              | United Kingdom*                          |
| Lisbon       | Ireland                                  |

\*Cancelled after French and Dutch no votes

TABLE 6.1. REFERENDUMS HELD TO RATIFY EU TREATIES

A country's institutional arrangements are measured by a series of binary variables, which are coded one when the institution is present. Whether or not a country has some legal obligation to hold a referendum is measured by compulsory referendum. Information on whether a country has a unicameral or bicameral parliament is measured by bicameral and is taken from the International Parliamentary Union's Parline database. Semi-presidential, which measures whether a country has an executive president is taken from Shugart.<sup>28</sup> Data on whether a government did not have a parliamentary majority at the time of a treaty is measured by minority and is taken from the *European Journal of Political Research* data yearbooks and

<sup>28</sup> Matthew Sørensen Shugart, "Comparative Executive–Legislative Relations," in *The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions*, ed. R. A. W. Rhodes, Sarah A. Binder, and Bert A. Rockman (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 344–365.

Woldendorp, Keman and Budge.<sup>29</sup> Summary statistics and the coding of each of the binary variables are shown in table 6.2.

| Variable              | Mean   | Standard Deviation                                                                                                   | Minimum | Maximum |
|-----------------------|--------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------|---------|
| Public Support        | 56.53  | 13.74                                                                                                                | 29      | 85      |
| Days till Election    | 715.76 | 423.95                                                                                                               | 27      | 1711    |
| % of cases            |        | Countries coded 1                                                                                                    |         |         |
| Compulsory Referendum | 11.32  | Denmark, Ireland                                                                                                     |         |         |
| Bicameral             | 55.66  | Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, UK |         |         |
| Semi-presidential     | 22.64  | Austria, Bulgaria, France, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia                                            |         |         |
| Minority              | 18.87  | <b>SEA:</b> Denmark, Greece, Netherlands, Portugal.                                                                  |         |         |
|                       |        | <b>Maastricht:</b> Denmark, Netherlands,                                                                             |         |         |
|                       |        | <b>Amsterdam:</b> Denmark, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal, Sweden.                                                    |         |         |
|                       |        | <b>Nice:</b> Denmark, Sweden.                                                                                        |         |         |
|                       |        | <b>Constitution:</b> Denmark, Latvia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden.                                                       |         |         |
|                       |        | <b>Lisbon:</b> Denmark, Spain.                                                                                       |         |         |

TABLE 6.2. SUMMARY STATISTICS AND BINARY VARIABLE CODING.

Although logistic regression is a common statistical tool in political science, the relatively small dataset here presents a number of challenges. First, the data is structured with cases cross-classified at the country and treaty levels. The ideal approach to this situation would be to conduct a multi-level model with cross-classified random effects. From a practical standpoint this approach is impossible as the small sample size causes insurmountable estimation problems and the models fail to converge. Further analysis suggests that this is less of a problem than it

<sup>29</sup> Jaap Woldendorp, Hans Keman, and Ian Budge, *Party Government in 48 Democracies (1945-1998): Composition - Duration - Personnel* (Dordrecht, Boston and London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000).

might first appear. Conducting likelihood ratio tests on the models alternatively specified with treaty and country level random effects suggests that although including treaty level effects results in a model superior to a single-level model the same is not true for the country level model, which suggests that the variables included in the fixed effects component of the model sufficiently account for the variance due to country differences.

From a theoretical standpoint however there are reasons to be cautious about using multilevel models with a small number of higher level units. The number of treaty level units falls well below the minimum number of units recommended by Stegmueller and so there is a danger that the results of these models may be biased.<sup>30</sup> As the dataset includes all of the relevant EU treaties, gathering more data is impossible.

The solution to this problem is to adopt a two stage approach and to confirm the overall robustness of the analysis by the convergent validity of the results of each stage. The first stage of the analysis is conducted using single level logistic regression without treaty level effects. The second stage then adds treaty level effects to the single level model in two ways, first by including treaty fixed effects in the single model (to avoid estimation problems each treaty is added to the model separately) and then by replicating the single level model as a multilevel model with cases grouped at the treaty level.

An additional statistical concern is that we might expect the error terms to suffer from heteroskedasticity because of two factors affecting the data – referendums are not distributed evenly across all member-states – Ireland and Denmark together account for ten of the 19 referendums, and the cases are unevenly distributed between countries because the EU grew

---

<sup>30</sup> Daniel Stegmueller, “How Many Countries for Multilevel Modeling? A Comparison of Frequentist and Bayesian Approaches,” *American Journal of Political Science* 57, no. 3 (2013): 748–761.

from 12 to 27 member-states during the period.<sup>31</sup> Additionally, because each country is observed at different time points, the data breaks the assumption of independence of observation. To avoid biasing the results due to these problems clustered robust standard errors are used, which allow for the breaking of the independence and homoskedasticity assumptions.<sup>32</sup>

Finally, the small sample size raises the additional concern of overfitting. Ideally of course the sample size would be larger. However it is not just an issue of practicality but of impossibility – the dataset already covers all of the existing relevant cases of EU treaty ratification. In order to guard against problems caused by the small sample size statistical models will be built cautiously, following the advice of Hosmer and Lemeshow by building models incrementally to ensure that the results are not simply due to overfitting a relatively large number of variables to a small data set.<sup>33</sup>

## 6.7 – Results and Discussion

The results of the model building process are shown in table 6.3. First the electoral pressure and institutional pressure portions of the model are constructed separately before being combined, which shows that the effects of each part of the model are robust to the exclusion of the other, suggesting that the results are not simply due to overfitting. Only one of the hypothesised effects – minority government – is not statistically significant at either stage of the analysis. Hosmer and Lemeshow suggest excluding statistically insignificant variables as an additional caution against

---

<sup>31</sup> A sceptical reader might wonder whether the results are entirely driven by the fact that Denmark and Ireland account for almost half of the referendum cases. The results presented here are robust to the exclusion of Denmark and Ireland as shown in table 6.3

<sup>32</sup> W.H. Rogers, "Regression Standard Errors in Clustered Samples," *Stata Technical Bulletin* 13 (1993): 19–23; R.L. Williams, "A Note on Robust Variance Estimation for Cluster-Correlated Data," *Biometrics* 56 (2000): 645–646.

<sup>33</sup> David W. Hosmer and Stanley Lemeshow, *Applied Logistic Regression*, Second Edition (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2000).

overfitting and so the institutional only and full models are re-run excluding the minority variable.<sup>34</sup> In both cases the coefficients of the other variables remain stable whilst the fit statistics – measured by the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) and Akaike information criterion (AIC) – indicate that the minority variable decreases model fit, suggesting that is simply adding error to the model. Consequently the final model used in the analysis is the combined model excluding the minority variable.

The results of these models give strong support for the theory that domestic pressure drives the decision to hold a referendum on an EU treaty. As was hypothesised, there is a statistically significant interaction between public support for European integration and the time until the next election. This interaction is illustrated in figure 6.1 and shows that the probability of a referendum being held increases when public support for European integration is low (hypothesis 1a) and elections are close (hypothesis 1b) and that the interaction between the two is important – referendums are likely to be held when both of these factors hold (hypothesis 1c). It also shows that the opposite case is true and referendums are predicted when public support for European integration is high and elections are far away. Most of the graph is flat, illustrating that for most levels of public support and time until elections, and without accounting for additional pressure from any treaty effects, the probability of a referendum being held is very low, which fits with the reality that referendums are rare events and governments prefer to take the safer parliamentary ratification route.

---

<sup>34</sup> Ibid.

|                                              | Electoral pressure only models |                      |                      |                        | Institutional pressure only models |                        |                        |                        |                        |                        | Combined models        |                        |                               |
|----------------------------------------------|--------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------------|
|                                              | 1                              | 2                    | 3                    | 4                      | 1                                  | 2                      | 3                      | 4                      | 5                      | 6                      | 1                      | 2                      | Excluding Denmark and Ireland |
| Public Support                               | .0310<br>(0.0259)              |                      | 0.0331<br>(0.0258)   | -0.0589***<br>(0.0218) |                                    |                        |                        |                        |                        |                        | -0.0784**<br>(0.0307)  | -0.0775***<br>(0.0286) | -0.0931***<br>(0.0249)        |
| Days till Election                           |                                | -0.0002<br>(0.0006)  | -0.0004<br>(0.0005)  | -0.0099***<br>(0.0025) |                                    |                        |                        |                        |                        |                        | -0.0111***<br>(0.0040) | -0.0109**<br>(0.0037)  | -0.0136***<br>(0.0035)        |
| Public Support X Days till election          |                                |                      |                      | 0.0001***<br>(0.00003) |                                    |                        |                        |                        |                        |                        | 0.0002***<br>(0.0002)  | 0.0002***<br>(0.0001)  | 0.0002***<br>(0.00005)        |
| Compulsory Referendum                        |                                |                      |                      |                        | 3.8549***<br>(0.9202)              |                        |                        |                        | 4.7967***<br>(0.9418)  | 4.6660***<br>(0.7536)  | 4.8382***<br>(0.8165)  | 4.9483***<br>(0.7763)  |                               |
| Bicameral                                    |                                |                      |                      |                        |                                    | 0.6581<br>(0.8713)     |                        |                        | 1.4149*<br>(0.8311)    | 1.4778**<br>(0.6917)   | 1.7034**<br>(0.8313)   | 1.6431***<br>(0.6416)  | 1.6466**<br>(0.7546)          |
| Semi-presidential                            |                                |                      |                      |                        |                                    |                        | -0.1128<br>(0.6901)    |                        | 1.0060<br>(0.6194)     | 1.0316*<br>(0.6047)    | 1.5172**<br>(0.7199)   | 1.4833**<br>(0.6835)   | 1.6744**<br>(0.7413)          |
| Minority                                     |                                |                      |                      |                        |                                    |                        |                        | 0.8782<br>(0.7298)     | -0.2501<br>(1.3083)    |                        | 0.2310<br>(1.2558)     |                        |                               |
| Constant                                     | -3.6870**<br>(1.5320)          | -1.348**<br>(0.5901) | -3.5484*<br>(1.6783) | 2.6115***<br>(1.1591)  | -2.2454***<br>(0.3147)             | -1.9218***<br>(0.6786) | -1.4966***<br>(0.5232) | -1.7255***<br>(0.4651) | -3.5440***<br>(0.9277) | -3.6167***<br>(0.7418) | 1.0395<br>(1.5251)     | 1.0645<br>(1.5167)     | 1.8557<br>(1.4503)            |
| Treaty random intercept (Standard Deviation) |                                |                      |                      |                        |                                    |                        |                        |                        |                        |                        |                        |                        |                               |
| <i>n</i>                                     | 106                            | 106                  | 106                  | 106                    | 106                                | 106                    | 106                    | 106                    | 106                    | 106                    | 106                    | 106                    | 94                            |
| <i>AIC</i>                                   | 101.0026                       | 103.526              | 102.576              | 95.3907                | 74.15213                           | 102.1256               | 103.6586               | 101.4865               | 74.3548                | 72.4023                | 72.57447               | 70.60862               | 57.04929                      |
| <i>BIC</i>                                   | 106.3295                       | 108.853              | 110.566              | 106.0445               | 79.47901                           | 107.4525               | 108.9855               | 106.8134               | 87.67199               | 83.0561                | 93.88198               | 89.2527                | 72.30906                      |
| <i>ROC C</i>                                 | 0.6044                         | 0.543                | 0.6419               | 0.7302                 | 0.9398                             | 0.5777                 | 0.5097                 | 0.5774                 | 0.8327                 | 0.8364                 | 0.9183                 | 0.9171                 | 0.8549                        |
| <i>Parliament Correct</i>                    | 100%                           | 100%                 | 100%                 | 99%                    | 97.70%                             | 100%                   | 100%                   | 100%                   | 97.70%                 | 97.70%                 | 96.55%                 | 96.55%                 | 96.47%                        |
| <i>Referendum Correct</i>                    | 0%                             | 0%                   | 0%                   | 10.53%                 | 52.63%                             | 0%                     | 0%                     | 0%                     | 52.63%                 | 52.63%                 | 47.37%                 | 47.37%                 | 11.11%                        |

Statistical Significance: \* =  $p < 0.1$ , \*\* =  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* =  $p < 0.01$ .

TABLE 6.3. THE MODEL BUILDING PROCESS: LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODELS SHOWING THE ELECTORAL PRESSURE ONLY, INSTITUTIONAL PRESSURE ONLY, AND COMBINED MODEL. THE TABLE ALSO SHOWS THE FINAL FULL MODEL RUN EXCLUDING THE DANISH AND IRISH CASES AS A ROBUSTNESS CHECK.

The first of these findings fits with the theory that governments hold referendums when they face the risk of electoral punishment over European integration. The second finding, that referendums are also likely when European integration is popular and elections are far away, is less expected from the perspective of this theory, but it suggests that the model is also picking up an alternative domestic drive for a referendum, similar to Oppermann's domestic-offensive type.<sup>35</sup> Ratifying a treaty through a referendum may have benefits for governments in terms of popularity and approval. However, the results here suggest that governments are risk-averse and will only call referendums when they are sure that a referendum will pass (high public support) and when they have a time buffer in case things do not go to plan (elections are far away).

As expected, compulsory referendum is statistically significant, indicating that some form of legal obligation to hold a referendum significantly increases the probability of a referendum being held (hypothesis 2). If figure 6.1 was redrawn with the compulsory referendum variable held at one the results would be almost the opposite: for the most part, the probability of a referendum being held is very high. When European integration is unpopular *and* elections are sufficiently far away the probability of a referendum being held drops considerably. The only time a referendum is not predicted to be held when elections are close is when public support for integration is very high. This supports the theory outlined earlier that legal obligations to hold a referendum increase the political pressure to hold a referendum rather than simply creating a legal obligation to hold one.

---

<sup>35</sup> Oppermann, "The Politics of Discretionary Government Commitments to European Integration Referendums."




FIGURE 6.1. THE EFFECT OF PUBLIC SUPPORT AND DAYS TILL ELECTION ON THE PREDICTED PROBABILITY OF A REFERENDUM BEING HELD. ALL OTHER VARIABLES ARE HELD AT THEIR MEDIAN VALUES (COMPULSORY REFERENDUM = 0, BICAMERAL = 1, SEMI-PRESIDENTIAL = 0).

Both bicameral (hypothesis 3a) and semi-presidential (hypothesis 3b) are statistically significant and indicate that the presence of each veto player increases the probability of a referendum being held, with bicameralism having a greater effect. However, no support is found for the effect of minority (hypothesis 3c). Given its prominence in the literature on both European integration referendums and referendums more broadly this is a surprising result. It suggests that although European integration is a difficult issue for governments, it is not a difficult issue for specifically *minority* governments and their general ability to command the confidence of parliament extends to European issues. The focus on minority governments perhaps stems from the Danish case, which has had a minority government during all of the previous EU treaties. The comparative perspective taken here suggests that the importance of minority government on the decision to hold a referendum may have been exaggerated.

The effect of the different veto players in terms of the change in the predicted probability (marginal effect) of a referendum being held between a case with and without a veto player across different levels of public support and time until the next election is illustrated in figure 6.2. As was expected, the impact of the veto players is not an absolute increase in the probability of a referendum being held but one that is contingent on electoral pressure – as support for European integration grows and the time until the next election increases the impact of veto players diminishes. This suggests that the bargaining power of veto players is contingent on public attitudes to European integration and the timing of elections. As figure 6.2 illustrates, both veto players have a similar magnitude of effect, though there is greater statistical uncertainty about the effect of semi-presidentialism. The average (marginal) effect of a case having a bicameral parliament is an 11% increase in the probability of a referendum being held ( $p=0.007$ ) whilst having a semi-presidential system increases the probability of a referendum by 13% ( $p=0.035$ ).

These results suggest that, leaving the effect of public support and electoral timing to one side, some EU member-states are systematically more likely to hold referendums on EU treaties than others. With compulsory referendums and a bicameral parliament, Ireland tops this list, closely followed by Denmark, with compulsory referendums and a unicameral parliament. The next most likely are Austria, France, Poland, and Romania which have both bicameral parliaments and a semi-presidential system of government. These are followed by the eight bicameral parliamentary member-states – Belgium, the Czech Republic, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Slovenia, Spain, and the UK, and the four unicameral semi-presidential member-states – Bulgaria, Lithuania, Portugal, and Slovakia. Together these member-states account for all but one of the referendums held on EU treaties (the remaining referendum being the Luxembourg referendum on the Constitutional Treaty).




FIGURE 6.2. THE EFFECT OF BICAMERAL AND SEMI-PRESIDENTIAL ILLUSTRATED BY THE MARGINAL EFFECT (CHANGE IN PREDICTED PROBABILITY) OF EACH VARIABLE AT CHANGING VALUES OF PUBLIC SUPPORT (WITH DAYS TILL ELECTION HELD AT 120) AND DAYS TILL ELECTION (WITH PUBLIC SUPPORT HELD AT 35) ON THE PROBABILITY OF A REFERENDUM BEING HELD.

Only six of the countries that have the institutional configuration that make referendums more likely - Austria, Bulgaria, Italy, Lithuania, Slovakia, and Romania - have not held any treaty referendums. With Bulgaria, Lithuania, Slovakia and Romania all being relative new comers to the EU, the two most interesting cases are Austria and Italy, which are both illustrative of different aspects of the effect of electoral pressure to hold a referendum.

Looking purely at public support for European integration, electoral pressure to hold a referendum in Austria appears to be very high, with a public support mean of 37.25. Indeed political discourse over the EU in Austria often revolves around calls for a referendum on the EU. Looking at the timing of Austrian elections relative to EU treaties helps provide an explanation of why Austrian governments have been able to avoid holding referendums. Austria has a relatively long mean time (589.75 days) between the signing of a treaty and elections. Furthermore, in the only case where the election was closer than this mean time – the Lisbon Treaty – this was an unexpected election caused by the collapse of the governing coalition. At the time the treaty was signed the election was not due for an additional three years.

Italy represents almost the polar opposite case. Italy's mean time until an election following a treaty signing is 430.67 days but one election was held very close to treaty signing – the 1992 Italian election was held only 58 days after the signing of the Maastricht Treaty. However support for European integration in Italy is relatively high with a mean public support of 64.17, with higher support around the time of Maastricht at 74.

Moving on to the second stage of the analysis, the inclusion of treaty effects does not affect the overall validity of the results presented so far. Including treaty fixed effects (shown in table 6.4) does not alter the direction or statistical significance of any of the relationships between electoral pressure and institutional variables. Similarly the results are robust to specifying the model as a multilevel model with random effects at the treaty level (also shown in table 6.4).

The convergence between these results and those presented earlier offers good evidence for the robustness of the earlier results to different specification.

It is also clear from these results that there are distinct treaty level effects which influence the probability of a referendum occurring and that the pattern of referendums on EU treaties cannot be explained by domestic factors alone. Using the likelihood-ratio tests on the multilevel specification of the model alternatively specified as random intercept and random coefficient models suggest that treaty level effects are best modelled by a random intercept approach. This suggests that the effect of different treaties is an increase or decrease in the political pressure to hold a referendum, operating in much the same way as the institutional variables. Estimates of the magnitude of each treaty effect taken from the fixed and multilevel models are shown in table 6.5. Both specifications suggest that there have been distinct treaty effects for the three most recent treaties: the Nice, Constitutional, and Lisbon treaties.

|                                        | SEA                    | Maastricht              | Amsterdam              | Nice                   | Constitution          | Lisbon                 | Multilevel model<br>with treaty effects |
|----------------------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|-----------------------------------------|
| Public Support                         | -0.0751***<br>(0.028)  | -0.0856***<br>(0.0285)  | -0.0782***<br>(0.0294) | -0.1134***<br>(0.0422) | -0.0941**<br>(0.0438) | -0.0902***<br>(0.0271) | -0.1961<br>(0.1247)                     |
| Days till Election                     | -0.0108***<br>(0.0037) | -0.0118***<br>(0.0035)  | -0.0107***<br>(0.0035) | -0.0144***<br>(0.0041) | -0.0128**<br>(0.0053) | -0.0142***<br>(0.0042) | -0.0264**<br>(0.0134)                   |
| Public Support X<br>Days till election | 0.0002***<br>(0.0001)  | 0.0002***<br>(0.0001)   | 0.0002***<br>(0.0001)  | 0.0002***<br>(0.0001)  | 0.0002**<br>(0.0001)  | 0.0002***<br>(0.0001)  | 0.0004**<br>(0.0002)                    |
| Compulsory<br>Referendum               | 5.0048***<br>(0.8516)  | 4.9322***<br>(0.7645)   | 4.9418***<br>(0.7814)  | 6.1615***<br>(0.9933)  | 8.2281***<br>(1.3583) | 7.358***<br>(1.5339)   | 13.4004**<br>(5.2766)                   |
| Bicameral                              | 1.625***<br>(0.6322)   | 1.6376***<br>(0.6396)   | 1.6022**<br>(0.6441)   | 2.0562**<br>(0.8869)   | 2.7368***<br>(1.042)  | 2.9936**<br>(1.2441)   | 4.4473**<br>(2.0802)                    |
| Semi-presidential                      | 1.4553**<br>(0.6916)   | 1.5523**<br>(0.6908)    | 1.4169**<br>(0.6638)   | 1.5898*<br>(0.8323)    | 2.1162*<br>(1.2623)   | 2.6365***<br>(0.82)    | 3.5282**<br>(1.7986)                    |
| Constant                               | 1.059<br>(1.5637)      | 1.43280.333<br>(1.481)  | 1.2088<br>(1.5778)     | 3.2683<br>(2.2685)     | -1.138<br>(1.7936)    | 0.2137<br>(1.5237)     | 2.3272<br>(6.3541)                      |
| Treaty fixed effect                    | -0.6116<br>(0.8456)    | 0.75830.298<br>(0.7284) | -0.8569<br>(0.7337)    | -3.6236***<br>(0.7912) | 4.6855***<br>(0.9269) | -5.8163***<br>(1.5349) |                                         |
| Treaty random<br>intercept (SD)        |                        |                         |                        |                        |                       |                        | 4.0535<br>(2.0663)                      |
| <i>n</i>                               | 106                    | 106                     | 106                    | 106                    | 106                   | 106                    | 106                                     |
| <i>AIC</i>                             | 72.31444               | 72.03231                | 72.23411               | 66.12251               | 49.89877              | 59.94218               | 52.1941                                 |
| <i>BIC</i>                             | 93.62195               | 93.33982                | 93.54162               | 87.43002               | 71.20629              | 81.24969               | 73.5016                                 |
| <i>ROC C</i>                           | 0.9220                 | 0.9111                  | 0.9214                 | 0.9359                 | 0.9722                | 0.9456                 | 0.9909                                  |
| <i>Parliament Correct</i>              | 97.70%                 | 97.70%                  | 97.70%                 | 96.55%                 | 94.25%                | 97.70%                 | 97.70%                                  |
| <i>Referendum<br/>Correct</i>          | 42.11%                 | 57.89%                  | 47.37%                 | 63.16%                 | 78.95%                | 68.42%                 | 84.21%                                  |

Statistical Significance: \* =  $p < 0.1$ , \*\* =  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* =  $p < 0.01$ .

TABLE 6.4. MODELS ESTIMATING THE EFFECT OF TREATIES ON THE PROBABILITY OF A REFERENDUM BEING HELD USING FIXED EFFECTS AND MULTILEVEL LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODELS.

For the Nice and Lisbon treaties this effect manifests itself as a decrease in the probability of referendums (by about 15% and 19% respectively using estimates from the fixed effects models) from what we would otherwise expect, a finding which supports Oppermann's argument that member-states actively sought to avoid referendums on the Lisbon Treaty.<sup>36</sup> The effect of the Constitutional Treaty is an increase in the probability of referendums being held (by about 31% according to the fixed effects model) from what we would otherwise expect, suggesting either that the significance of the Constitutional Treaty increased pressure on governments to hold referendums, or, as Closa suggests, that the decision to hold referendums in some states increased the pressure to hold them in others.<sup>37</sup> The multilevel model results also suggest that the Maastricht Treaty had a similar, albeit smaller, effect to the Constitutional Treaty, though these results are not supported by the fixed effects model so the robustness of this result is unclear.

| <b>Treaty</b>                   | <b>SEA</b> | <b>Maastricht</b> | <b>Amsterdam</b> | <b>Nice</b> | <b>Constitution</b> | <b>Lisbon</b> |
|---------------------------------|------------|-------------------|------------------|-------------|---------------------|---------------|
| <i>BLUP</i>                     | 0.3333     | 3.1325            | -0.0075          | -4.675      | 5.8585              | -3.8929       |
| <i>Standard Error</i>           | (1.9095)   | (1.2898)          | (3.4177)         | (1.5681)    | (0.6338)            | (1.9365)      |
| <i>Fixed effect coefficient</i> | -0.6116    | 0.7583            | -0.8569          | 3.6236***   | 4.6855***           | 5.8163***     |
| <i>Standard Error</i>           | (0.8456)   | (0.7284)          | (0.7337)         | (0.7912)    | (0.9269)            | (1.5349)      |
| <i>Marginal effect</i>          | -0.0429    | 0.066             | -0.0573          | -0.1492     | 0.3097              | -0.1908       |

Statistical Significance (only applicable to fixed effects coefficients): \*\*\*= p<0.01.

TABLE 6.5. BEST LINEAR UNBIASED PREDICTIONS (BLUPS), FIXED EFFECT COEFFICIENTS, AND MARGINAL EFFECTS (AVERAGE CHANGE IN PREDICTED PROBABILITY, ESTIMATED FROM FIXED EFFECTS) SHOWING THE EFFECT OF INDIVIDUAL TREATIES ON THE PROBABILITY OF A REFERENDUM BEING HELD.

Exactly how important these treaty effects are depends on the question of interest. From a purely statistical perspective the treaty effects explain most of the variation in the data (the

<sup>36</sup> Oppermann, "The Politics of Avoiding Referendums on the Treaty of Lisbon."

<sup>37</sup> Closa, "Why Convene Referendums? Explaining Choices in EU Constitutional Politics."

Intraclass Correlation coefficient for the treaty level in the multilevel model is 0.8331), suggesting that treaty differences explain most of why more referendums have been held on some treaties than others, and it is not that the alignment of public opinion and electoral timing happened to coincide on certain treaties. However, treaty differences do not explain why some member-states hold referendums whilst others do not. Predicting outcomes using only the treaty portion of the model predicts that all member-states would have held referendums on the SEA, Maastricht, Amsterdam, and Constitutional treaties and no member-states would have held referendums on the Nice and Lisbon treaties, which gets 17 of the 19 referendum cases correct but only 40 of the 87 parliamentary cases correct, yielding a ROC C (area under the curve) statistic of 0.7505. Conversely, ignoring the treaty level effects and generating predictions from the domestic politics model (i.e. the combined model 2 in table 6.3) still predicts 85 of the 87 parliamentary cases correctly and nine of 19 referendum cases correctly, with a ROC C statistic of 0.9171, indicating better overall fit for the domestic only portion of the model.

Obviously separating the components of the model is an artificial exercise and the role that domestic political factors play must be seen within the context of each EU treaty. The best predictive capability is given by the multilevel specification of the full model, which yields remarkably accurate predictions of the pattern of EU treaty referendums. The full multilevel model correctly predicts 101 of the 106 cases: 85 of the 87 parliamentary cases, and 16 of the 19 referendum cases, and yields a ROC C statistic of 0.9909, indicating excellent model fit. The cases the model predicts incorrectly are themselves illustrative of its strength. All five incorrectly classified cases are on the Constitutional treaty: the model incorrectly predicts that Austria and Belgium should have held referendums, and that the Czech Republic, the Netherlands, and Portugal should not. As an outcome is predicted when the probability of a referendum being held is greater than 0.5, assessing whether or not a result is 'wrong' is a difficult task. Predictions must be assessed by more relative means – how improbable are the 'incorrect' predictions? In

three of the cases the ratification route that a member state took is not implausible given the predicted probability – Belgium is predicted a 0.53 chance of a referendum, the Netherlands 0.49, and Portugal 0.44. In these three cases the probability of the actual ratification route taken ranges from 46 per cent to 49 per cent, by no means completely unlikely events.

The other two cases are more interesting. The model predicts that the Czech Republic only had a 0.20 probability of holding a referendum on the Constitutional Treaty. The events surrounding the Czech referendum are illustrative of the effects that a presidential figure may have in the decision to hold a referendum. Although the Czech Republic is classified as a parliamentary system in this analysis and the constitutional powers of the President of the Czech Republic are quite limited, through the personal popularity of some of the holders of the office some Presidents are able to wield considerable political power. At the time of the Constitutional Treaty President Václav Klaus voiced considerable opposition to the treaty and became a rallying point for Czech Eurosceptics. If the Czech Republic is classified as a Semi-Presidential system instead, the predicted probability of a referendum on the Constitutional Treaty would increase to 0.89, which is perhaps a more accurate reflection of what actually happened.

Conversely, Austria is predicted a 0.76 probability of holding a referendum on the Constitutional Treaty (although even here there is an almost one in four chance of a referendum not being held). What might explain the fact that Austria didn't hold a referendum? One possibility is that by Austrian standards, public support for European integration was relatively high at the time of the Constitutional Treaty (public support is at least eight points higher at the Constitutional Treaty compared to any other treaty). Another plausible explanation is the reverse of the Czech case. Although the Austrian President has considerable power on paper, in practice it is rarely exercised. If Austria is coded as though it were a parliamentary system the predicted probability of a referendum decreases to 0.08.

## 6.8 – Conclusion

The analysis here provides clear evidence that the pattern of referendums on EU treaties is explained by a combination of domestic level political factors – electoral pressure over European integration, legal obligations to hold referendums, and domestic institutional veto players – and differences between EU treaties. The remarkable accuracy of the model in predicting the ratification pattern of EU treaties without reference to factors relating to treaty negotiation strategy echoes Oppermann’s argument that undue weight has been given to European level explanations and insufficient attention has been paid to the role that domestic factors play in the decision to call a referendum.<sup>38</sup> That this is the case perhaps helps explain why many EU referendums have failed: they are often held precisely because of the circumstances that make it difficult to rally support in favour of European integration.

These findings fit well with a growing empirical consensus that referendums on the Constitutional Treaty were held because of electoral pressure. By extending the analysis beyond a single treaty this chapter has shown that a generalisable pattern of calling EU referendums exists, albeit with important differences in the political pressure that different treaties bring to bear on the ratification process.

That a member-state’s institutional structure, particularly whether it is bicameral or semi-presidential, influences the probability of a referendum being held is a new contribution to the literature on referendums on European integration. The role of domestic political institutions has also been neglected in the wider literature on European integration, and the findings here point to the importance of understanding domestic political structures in the domestic politics of European integration, and that future research is necessary to understand their influence.

---

<sup>38</sup> Oppermann, “The Politics of Discretionary Government Commitments to European Integration Referendums.”

One thing that is unclear, and will only become apparent in the future, is whether the repeated rejection of European treaties at referendums has led to an increased reluctance to hold them and what this might mean for the future of European integration. If member-states are more reluctant to hold referendums because of past failures, they could become a thing of the past. However, at least two member-states, Austria and the UK, have already promised future referendums: the Austrian government announced in 2008 that it would hold a referendum on Turkish membership of the EU if accession talks concluded in favour of a membership agreement, and the British government passed the European Union Act 2011 requiring a referendum on any future EU treaties. However the likelihood of referendums being held on future treaties and the high risk that the electorate in some countries might reject a new treaty, delaying or blocking reform, seems to have led to an increased reluctance on the part of EU member-states to actually engage in major treaty negotiations, a development which will have a serious impact on the future direction of European integration. Regardless of their merits as a cure for the ills of representation in the EU and whether or not they are actually held, referendums look likely to continue to play an important and turbulent role in European integration.

From the perspective of direct democracy as a correction to the failings of representation, the findings of this chapter do not offer much consolation. Although public opinion is an important influence on whether governments decide to hold referendums, perhaps suggesting the potential for increasing government responsiveness to citizen views, that it does so in interaction with the timing of elections is problematic for two reasons. First, the fact that referendums are often held in circumstances in which they are most likely to fail leads to a distortion of the apparent public will towards European integration. This creates the perception, if not necessarily the reality, that elites are ploughing on with integration in spite of public opposition. Second, the evidence here suggests that one of the primary drives to hold

referendums is to avoid political contestation over European integration at elections. That this is the case is particularly problematic for representation, as it is precisely this sort of competition that would improve representation. While citizen initiated direct democracy may improve policy congruence, given the circumstances in which they are held, it seems unlikely that the same could be said for government controlled referendums. Given these problems, referendums seem unlikely to provide a cure for the ills of European integration representation.

## **Chapter 7 – Second Order Electoral Rules and National Party Systems: The Duvergerian effects of European Parliament elections**

---

The previous chapters have painted a fairly grim picture of the state of electoral democracy and representation in the European Union. Chapters 3-5 showed that European integration issue representation is not functioning adequately. The analysis in Chapter 6 shows that because the power to call referendums lies with governments, direct democracy does not offer a remedy to the problems of representation in the EU. An obvious question that must be asked is what the prospects are for future improvements to the deficit of representation. Given the barriers that exist for representation at both the party and voter level the answer to this question must be that unless there are fundamental changes to the lines of political competition in the EU, and to the party systems of EU member-states, the prospects for substantial improvement seem very slim indeed.

The reshaping of party systems in the EU would not automatically fix the problems faced by European integration representation – even if EU member-states developed completely new party systems it is entirely possible that they would be equally deficient in how they represented citizens' preferences on European integration. However without a fundamental reshaping of EU party systems, any possible improvement to European integration representation would come only through existing parties acting against their strategic interest and increasing the politicization of European integration issues. The reshaping of EU party systems would not guarantee improvement to European integration representation, but without changes to existing party systems, the continued failure of European integration representation seems

certain. This chapter argues that EU party systems *are* changing, which offers some hope for the future of European integration representation. These changes have resulted from party competition at European Parliament elections. Given the failings of European integration representation this may seem unlikely at first but this chapter argues that is not the content of party competition at European Parliament elections that has driven party system change. Rather, party system change has been driven by the different electoral rules used at European Parliament elections.

## 7.1 – European integration and national party systems

The prevailing wisdom is that European integration has had a very limited impact on national party systems.<sup>1</sup> There are, however, two areas where scholars have argued that European integration *has* had an impact on national party systems, and neither of them suggests an expansion of the lines of political competition, but rather a contraction. First, because many policy areas are now decided at the European level, European integration has restricted the policy space in which parties can compete.<sup>2</sup> Secondly, because of the number of decisions taken in intergovernmental meetings and the fact that parties have not yet come up with mechanisms in response to this development, European integration has increased the power of executives vis-à-vis their parties.<sup>3</sup> There is a clear consensus that European integration has *not* had a major impact on national party systems in terms of the political cleavages on which parties compete:

---

<sup>1</sup> For example Mair, “The Limited Impact of Europe on National Party Systems.”

<sup>2</sup> Robert Ladrech, “Europeanization and Political Parties: Towards a Framework for Analysis,” *Party Politics* 8 (2002): 389–403; Peter Mair, “Political Opposition and the European Union,” *Government and Opposition* 42, no. 1 (January 1, 2007): 1–17; Peter Mair, “Political Parties and Party Systems,” in *Europeanization: New Research Agendas*, ed. Paolo Graziano and Maarten P. Vink (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), 154–166; Peter Mair, *Ruling The Void: The Hollowing Of Western Democracy* (London ; New York: Verso, 2013).

<sup>3</sup> Thomas Poguntke et al., “The Europeanisation of National Party Organisations: A Conceptual Analysis,” *European Journal of Political Research* 46, no. 6 (2007): 747–771; Tapio Raunio, “Why European Integration Increases Leadership Autonomy within Political Parties,” *Party Politics* 8, no. 4 (July 1, 2002): 405–422.

many scholars agree that party competition over Europe may have the potential to redraw the lines of party competition, but for the moment at least, it has not actually done so.<sup>4</sup>

Whilst the above may be true, because scholars have tended to look for some sort of ‘European’ impact of European integration on party systems, they may have missed an important effect of European Parliament elections on national party systems that has resulted in the growth of the size of national party systems. By examining European Parliament elections simply *qua* elections rather than specifically as part of the process of European integration, this chapter shows that where more permissive electoral rules are used for European Parliament elections, party systems have grown. The analysis remains agnostic as to whether this change reflects any ‘Europeanisation’ of national party systems. However, even if the changes to party competition do not reflect European concerns *per se*, the expansion of the party systems of many member states suggest that the prospect for redrawing the lines of political competition may be greater than many scholars have realised.

The question of how national party systems have been affected by elections that are held at the national level (even if the institution filled by those elections is a supranational body) with different electoral systems to those used for national parliamentary elections has been largely ignored in the academic literature. This chapter argues that the impact of these ‘second order electoral rules’ follows a simple Duvergerian logic: where the electoral system used for European Parliament elections is more permissive (i.e. has a greater district magnitude) than that used at national elections, the size of the party system at European Parliament elections will grow over successive elections to what we would expect from the more permissive electoral system. The growth in party systems at the European Parliament level will also feed back into national party

---

<sup>4</sup> van der Eijk and Franklin, “Potential for Contestation on European Matters at National Elections in Europe”; de Vries, “Sleeping Giant: Fact or Fairytale?”

systems, as existing and new parties use European Parliament elections to help overcome some of the obstacles they face from national electoral systems. These effects occur because European Parliament elections are held under more permissive rules and provide an arena where the costs of coordination between voters and elites are lower than the national level, facilitating changes to national party systems.

That this might be the case is easy to see from a cursory glance at the evidence. In the first European Parliament elections in 1979, four parties won seats in (West) Germany and four party tickets (covering 5 parties) won seats in France. At the 2014 European Parliament elections 15 parties won seats in Germany and six party tickets (covering 13 parties) won seats in France.<sup>5</sup> Similarly, several small parties, such as the French and British Greens, first achieved representation in the European Parliament before going on to win seats in the national legislature.

In order to examine these arguments more systematically this chapter first outlines the existing literature on European integration, electoral rules, and party systems before drawing on the more general literature on electoral system effects to develop a theory of why European Parliament electoral rules will have an impact on national party systems. The theory is then tested using multilevel mixed-effects growth curve modelling, which confirms the arguments developed here.

## **7.2 – European integration, electoral rules and party systems**

Although scholars have primarily focused on electoral behavior at European Parliament elections, a few scholars have examined the effects of European Parliament electoral systems in

---

<sup>5</sup> The German case is exaggerated by the German Constitutional Court's ruling that first a 5%, and then a 3%, electoral threshold was illegal. Seven parties achieved more than 5% of the vote in 2014, a rise of 3 since 1979 and a rise of two since the first European Parliament elections held following reunification in 1994.

different contexts: Kousser argues that when the rules governing European Parliament elections are less of a barrier to small parties than national electoral systems, voters will alter their voting strategies accordingly.<sup>6</sup> Farrell and Scully investigate how differing electoral formula lead to differing electoral outcomes, focusing on differences between member-states rather than the difference between national and European Parliament elections.<sup>7</sup> Shifting the focus away from the elections themselves, Hix has shown that whether MEPs are elected by open or closed lists is a good predictor of voting behaviour in the European Parliament.<sup>8</sup> Similarly, Hix and Hagemann have investigated the effects of different electoral systems on the link between voters and MEPs.<sup>9</sup> With these exceptions however, the impact of differing electoral systems, particularly in the classical Duvergerian sense of the number of parties winning votes, has been overlooked.

That this is the case is perhaps understandable. If we accept that European Parliament elections are largely second order elections we might simply expect the party system resulting from European Parliament elections to continue to resemble that of the national party system. Alternatively, we might expect any resulting change in the size of the party system at the European Parliament level to arise from voters using elections which have no impact on the composition of government to cast protest votes for fringe parties. If this is the case we might expect these changes the party system to be unrelated to any difference in electoral systems between the national and European Parliament level. In essence this is the conclusion reached in the influential study by van der Eijk and Franklin who argue that the success of small parties

---

<sup>6</sup> T. Kousser, "Retrospective Voting and Strategic Behavior in European Parliament Elections," *Electoral Studies* 23, no. 1 (March 2004): 1–21.

<sup>7</sup> David M. Farrell and Roger Scully, "Electing the European Parliament: How Uniform Are 'Uniform' Electoral Systems?," *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 43, no. 5 (2005): 969–984.

<sup>8</sup> Simon Hix, "Electoral Institutions and Legislative Behavior: Explaining Voting Defection in the European Parliament," *World Politics* 56, no. 02 (2004): 194–223.

<sup>9</sup> Simon Hix and Sara Hagemann, "Could changing the electoral rules fix European parliament elections?," *Politique européenne* 28, no. 2 (October 26, 2009): 37–52.

in European Parliament elections can largely be attributed to strategic context rather than the electoral system.<sup>10</sup> Although they do not grant the same role to the electoral system as is proposed here, van der Eijk and Franklin suggest that by granting small parties an arena in which to compete, over the long-term European Parliament elections might impact national party systems by increasing the number of alternatives available to voters. In order to understand why party systems may change as a result of the electoral systems used in European Parliament elections it is necessary to turn to the literature on the effects of electoral systems.

### 7.3 – Electoral systems and the size of party systems

In the 1950s the French sociologist Maurice Duverger first proposed what has since become known as Duverger's law and hypothesis: that the plurality electoral rule tends to result in a two-party system (law) and that more proportional systems tend to result in multipartism (hypothesis).<sup>11</sup> This basic insight has been expanded, systematized, and generalized by many scholars in the ensuing decades and has become a cornerstone of electoral research.<sup>12</sup> In its generalized form, Duverger's findings have come to mean that that the higher the district magnitude, the larger the resulting party system.<sup>13</sup>

As expressed by Cox, Duvergerian effects arise because of the needs of voters and elites to strategically coordinate their electoral behaviour so as not to waste their vote or candidacy by

---

<sup>10</sup> Cees van der Eijk and Mark N. Franklin, *Choosing Europe? The European Electorate and National Politics in the Face of Union* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996).

<sup>11</sup> Duverger, *Political Parties, Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State*.

<sup>12</sup> William Roberts Clark and Matt Golder, "Rehabilitating Duverger's Theory Testing the Mechanical and Strategic Modifying Effects of Electoral Laws," *Comparative Political Studies* 39, no. 6 (August 1, 2006): 679–708; Gary W. Cox, *Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems* (Cambridge University Press, 1997); William H. Riker, "The Two-Party System and Duverger's Law: An Essay on the History of Political Science," *The American Political Science Review* 76, no. 4 (December 1, 1982): 753–766; Rein Taagepera, *Predicting Party Sizes: The Logic of Simple Electoral Systems* (Oxford University Press, USA, 2007); Rein Taagepera and Matthew Sørensen, *Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989).

<sup>13</sup> For the sake of simplicity, the term 'Duvergerian effects' is used here to refer to these generalized effects that capture both the 'law' and 'hypothesis'.

supporting a losing party.<sup>14</sup> As district magnitude increases an electoral system becomes more 'permissive' in the sense that it reduces the costs of electoral coordination – a smaller number of people need to coordinate their preferences in order for a candidate to win – and so facilitates the entry of smaller and new parties to the electoral arena.

Coordinating preferences at elections is difficult for two reasons – everyone votes at approximately the same time and vote choices remain unknown until after the end of the election. If we imagine a hypothetical electoral blank slate where no previous elections have been held and there are no established political parties, we would expect that there would be many 'wasted' votes as there was no previous information by which people could coordinate. Over successive elections it would gradually become clear which candidates and parties were popular and the number of serious competitors in the election would stabilize around what we would expect from the electoral rules.

When a new electoral arena like the European Parliament is introduced we would expect the already established party system to provide the starting point for electoral competition. If the electoral system used in the new electoral arena is approximately the same as that used in national elections then we would expect little or no difference to emerge between the new and existing party systems. However if, following the logic of Duverger, we expect the electoral system used in the new arena to produce a party system size that is different to the existing party system (that is Duvergerian effects apply equally to national and European parliamentary elections) then over successive elections the resulting electoral party system might move from being very similar to the existing party system to what we would expect from the electoral

---

<sup>14</sup> Cox, *Making Votes Count*.

system used for the new arena, as elites and citizens adjust to the new rules at play. This leads to the first hypothesis:

*Hypothesis 1: When the electoral system used at European Parliament elections is more permissive than that used in national elections, the size of the party system at European Parliament elections will grow over successive elections as a function of the electoral rules used in European Parliament elections.*

There are two reasons why support for hypothesis 1 might not be found. One, there might be no change in the size of the party system over consecutive European Parliament elections and two, the size of the party system at European Parliament elections does increase but this change may be unrelated to differences in electoral rules and instead a result of the second order nature of European Parliament elections. If this is the case it suggests that the Duvergerian effects of electoral rules might not apply to second order elections or that Duvergerian effects of electoral systems do not exist more generally.

#### **7.4 – Duvergerian effects and second order elections**

It is easy to understand why the second order nature of European Parliament elections might be an obstacle to the theory put forward here: a plausible corollary of European Parliament elections being decided primarily by domestic political concerns is that party systems will continue to resemble existing national party systems. Electoral systems do not operate directly on party systems; they facilitate the actions of political elites and voters. We must look to the motivations of both to understand how electoral rules facilitate party system change.

If elites have no interest in altering the existing party system and/or voters have no interest in shifting their support for existing parties, then we will observe no change in the resulting party system, regardless of the electoral system. If however a sufficient number of people decide that

they wish to support a new electoral party (or alter the balance of power between the existing parties) then the ease with which they can do so will be determined by the electoral rules at play.

If the electoral system at European Parliament elections is the same as at national elections then elites and voters may find that the party system is already 'full', making the entry of a new party difficult. A more permissive set of electoral rules at the European Parliament level introduces a gap between the existing party system and the *potential* party system (as determined by the electoral system), allowing space for the entry of new parties. The motivations for elites and voters at European Parliament elections may well be second order in the sense that they are motivated by domestic rather than European political concerns. Whether they are or not does not affect the theory presented here (though it may determine *which* parties are supported). The theory here simply assumes that some new party or parties wish to enter the party system or existing parties wish to alter the balance of the party system (or both), and that voters are willing to support them. If these assumptions do not hold then the predicted growth of the party system will not occur. The existence of parties which have entered representative politics at European Parliament elections, and the fact that voters have voted for them, suggests that these assumptions are not unreasonable.

If the above is correct and support is found for hypothesis 1, the increase in the size of the party system at European Parliament elections in some countries will also have implications for our understanding of the role of European Parliament elections in national politics. If the Duvergerian effects of electoral systems apply in an absolutely strict fashion then we would not expect any change to party systems at the national level as the party system will already be 'full'. If this is the case, it would have a serious implication for the second order election paradigm as it would suggest that the party system at European Parliament elections was becoming

decoupled from the national party system. However understanding different elections as connected occasions in which elites and voters must coordinate their preferences, and the role that electoral systems play in that process, suggests that this will not happen, and that the national party system will grow alongside the European Parliament party system.

Just as European Parliament elections are not run in isolation from national elections, neither are national elections run in isolation from European Parliament elections. European Parliament elections may weaken the effects of a less permissive national electoral system in a similar fashion to the 'contamination' effects that the proportional tier of a mixed electoral system has on voting at the plurality level.<sup>15</sup> If European Parliament elections are primarily concerned with domestic politics then it should not be surprising if people look to European Parliament elections for information about the preferences of others with regard to national politics. If European Parliament elections are run under more permissive electoral rules than national elections then this will facilitate the entry of new parties (or the growth of support for existing parties) into national politics because European Parliament elections provide an arena in which the potential supporters of such parties can coordinate their preferences at a lower cost than in national elections. The 'second order' nature of European Parliament elections may even further lower the cost of coordination because the cost of a 'wasted' vote will be smaller in the low stakes arena of the European Parliament. The existence of this secondary arena in which to coordinate electoral preferences may help overcome the Duvergerian effects of a more restrictive national electoral system and the size of the resulting party system at the national level may outstrip

---

<sup>15</sup> Karen E. Cox and Leonard J. Schoppa, "Interaction Effects in Mixed-Member Electoral Systems Theory and Evidence From Germany, Japan, and Italy," *Comparative Political Studies* 35, no. 9 (November 1, 2002): 1027–1053; Erik S Herron and Misa Nishikawa, "Contamination Effects and the Number of Parties in Mixed-Superposition Electoral Systems," *Electoral Studies* 20, no. 1 (March 2001): 63–86.

what we would expect from the national electoral system in isolation. This leads to hypothesis 2:

*Hypothesis 2: If the size of the party system at European Parliament elections increases then this will lead to a corresponding increase in the size of the party system at national elections.*

## 7.5 – Electoral systems and party systems

Although the Duverger effects of electoral systems are some of the most widely cited and examined ideas in the study of elections, its validity has recently been questioned. Some scholars have argued that the frequently observed correlation between the permissiveness of an electoral system and the size of a party system occurs not because of any effects of the electoral system but that electoral systems are in fact endogenous to party systems because they are originally chosen by the parties which run in those elections.<sup>16</sup> Although the historical basis of some of these arguments has been criticized, it is not necessary for the theory proposed here to dispute the argument that in most cases electoral systems are endogenous to party systems.<sup>17</sup> It is only necessary to disagree with the implication of this argument – that electoral systems are largely endogenous to party systems means that there are no electoral system effects as proposed by Duverger. Here endogeneity is just as much of a problem for those who argue that there are no Duvergerian effects: they cannot directly address the question of what would happen if an electoral system was imposed exogenously.

---

<sup>16</sup> Carles Boix, "Setting the Rules of the Game: The Choice of Electoral Systems in Advanced Democracies," *The American Political Science Review* 93, no. 3 (September 1, 1999): 609–624; Josep M. Colomer, "It's Parties That Choose Electoral Systems (or, Duverger's Laws Upside Down)," *Political Studies* 53, no. 1 (2005): 1–21.

<sup>17</sup> For criticisms of the historical basis of these arguments see for example Marcus Kreuzer, "Historical Knowledge and Quantitative Analysis: The Case of the Origins of Proportional Representation," *American Political Science Review* 104, no. 02 (2010): 369–392.

European Parliament elections provide a unique opportunity to examine the Duvergerian effects of electoral systems because although the electoral systems used in European Parliament elections are ultimately decided by the member states and so do not entirely overcome the endogeneity problem, the choice of electoral system in European Parliament elections is at least influenced by exogenous factors such as European Union law and seat allocation in the European Parliament.

Throughout the history of European integration, various attempts have been made to introduce uniform electoral procedures to elect the European Parliament. Long before the first European Parliament elections were held, article 138(3) of the Treaty of Rome (1958) declared that:

*“The Assembly [European Parliament] shall draw up proposals for elections by direct universal suffrage in accordance with a uniform procedure... The Council shall... lay down the appropriate provisions, which it shall recommend to Member States for adoption...”*

Despite several proposals from the then European Parliament, it was not until 1976 that the Council finally agreed to implement the direct election of the European Parliament. The design and adoption of ‘uniform procedure’ was deferred until a later date and in the meantime electoral procedures were left to the discretion of member-states.

After repeatedly failing to reach agreement on any uniform procedures the general principle was reasserted in the Maastricht Treaty (Section E, Article 40 of the provisions amending the Treaty of Rome) before being amended by the Amsterdam Treaty (Article 38) to include the watered down provision that European Parliament elections be held using “uniform procedure... or in accordance with *principles common* to all Member States [emphasis added]”. In 2002 the European Parliament and Council finally agreed these principles: that elections to the European Parliament would be held using some form of proportional representation, that member-states

were free to establish constituencies provided they did not affect proportionality, and that electoral thresholds could not exceed 5%. At the time of the agreement this simply affirmed the status quo of arrangements for electing MEPs. Importantly however, this decision restricted the choice of electoral system for European Parliament elections available to member-states joining the EU after 2002.

More importantly however, one determinant of the permissiveness of the electoral system used in each member-state is established exogenously: the number of seats each member-state has in the European Parliament. The number of MEPs allocated to each member-state has been negotiated in the various EU treaties but is essentially determined in proportion to relative population size. This, combined with the decision of most member-states to implement a single national constituency, has been a pivotal factor in determining the district magnitude of the electoral system used for European Parliament elections.

European Parliament elections provide the perfect opportunity to test the arguments of those who have disputed the causal effects of electoral systems. For example, Colomer argues that the growth of a party system occurs *before* the introduction of a more proportional electoral system and will not continue to grow following its introduction: the only effect of the permissiveness of an electoral system is to reinforce existing party systems.<sup>18</sup> If hypothesis 1 is correct and the European Parliament party system size of those member-states using more permissive electoral systems does increase (which contradicts what would be predicted by Colomer), it will show not only the effects of European Parliament elections but also the more general validity of the Duvergerian effects of electoral systems.

---

<sup>18</sup> Colomer, "It's Parties That Choose Electoral Systems (or, Duverger's Laws Upside Down)."

## 7.6 – Data and Methodology

Analysis is conducted in two stages on a dataset of the (at time of writing) 145 times a European Parliament election has been held in an EU member-state between 1979 and 2014 (excluding, because it has only held one election, Croatia) and the 102 domestic elections that have followed European Parliament elections.<sup>19</sup> The first stage analyses the effects that differences in electoral systems have on the size of the party system at European Parliament elections. The second stage analyses the effect that changes in the size of the party system at the European Parliament level has on the size of the party system at the national level.

Data was gathered on the mean district magnitude and size of party system, measured using Laakso and Taagepera's effective number of electoral parties ( $N_V$ ), for each European Parliament and national election.<sup>20</sup> The effective number of electoral parties rather than the effective number of parliamentary parties is used because the main concern of this analysis is how votes are cast, rather than how those votes are translated into seats. Data on the effective number of electoral parties is taken from the ParlGov database supplemented by new calculations for more recent elections.<sup>21</sup> Data on mean district magnitude at national elections is taken from Bormann and Golder.<sup>22</sup> Mean district magnitude for each European Parliament election are new calculations based on official information. Summary statistics for the size and change in the effective number of electoral parties and district magnitude are shown in table 7.1.

---

<sup>19</sup> This excludes Luxembourg from the analysis of the effects of European Parliament elections on the party system as European Parliament and national elections are held simultaneously.

<sup>20</sup> Markku Laakso and Rein Taagepera, "'Effective' Number of Parties: A Measure with Application to West Europe," *Comparative Political Studies* 12, no. 1 (April 1, 1979): 3–27.

<sup>21</sup> Holger Döring and Philip Manow, "Parliament and Government Composition Database (ParlGov): An Infrastructure for Empirical Information on Parties, Elections and Governments in Modern Democracies. Version 12.," 2012, <http://www.parlgov.org/>.

<sup>22</sup> Nils-Christian Bormann and Matt Golder, "Democratic Electoral Systems around the World, 1946–2011," *Electoral Studies* 32, no. 2 (June 2013): 360–369.

| Variable                                                                | Mean | Standard deviation |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|--------------------|
| Effective number of electoral parties before first EP election          | 4.51 | 1.67               |
| Mean change in EP Effective number of electoral parties                 | 0.98 | 1.3                |
| Mean change in domestic Effective number of electoral parties           | 0.49 | 1.14               |
| Difference in Mean district magnitude between EP and national elections | 3.23 | 46.15              |
| Number of EP elections                                                  | 3.67 | 2.19               |

TABLE 7.1. SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR PARTY SYSTEM SIZE AND DIFFERENCES IN ELECTORAL DISTRICT MAGNITUDE BETWEEN EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND NATIONAL ELECTIONS.

The dependent variable for the analysis is the effective number of electoral parties at each election. As the size of the party system at the European Parliament level is expected to grow from the existing national party system, the model also includes the effective number of parties at the national election preceding each country's first European Parliament election.

Following the literature on electoral systems the effect of district magnitude is expected to have diminishing returns as district magnitude increases, which suggests a log transformation of district magnitude (e.g. Taagepera and Shugart's  $N_V = 1.25 (2 + \log M) \pm 1$ ).<sup>23</sup> The variable measuring the difference in the permissive of the electoral systems used in European Parliament and national elections is calculated by subtracting the logged national mean district magnitude from the logged European Parliament mean district magnitude. The intuition behind this calculation is that the same difference in district magnitude will have more of an effect on the European Parliament party system when the district magnitude at national elections is low than when it is higher. For example, having a district magnitude of four at European Parliament

<sup>23</sup> *Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems*.

election and a plurality electoral system at the national level ( $\log 4 - \log 1 = 1.39$ ) will have more impact than a district magnitude of 14 at the European Parliament will have on an national system with a district magnitude of 11 ( $(\log 14 - \log 11 = 0.24)$ ).

The analysis at the European Parliament level is conducted using a multi-level mixed effects growth curve modelling approach.<sup>24</sup> This method models change in the dependent variable as a function of a time variable (in this case, the number of European Parliament elections that each country has had) which is allowed to vary at the country level, producing an equation of the development of each party system over successive European Parliament elections for each country. The multi-level growth curve approach accounts for between country differences that are likely to affect the change in size of party system (such as the 'demand' for new parties) with country level random effects, enabling the construction of a parsimonious model that only includes time and electoral system variables at the fixed effects level.

In order to determine the appropriate shape of the growth curve, a non-parametric (local polynomial regression) analysis is conducted on the data. The results for European Parliament party systems, shown in figure 7.1, suggest that most of the change in the effective number of electoral parties occurs between a country's third and sixth elections, with the curve approximating a logistic function with the point of maximum growth occurring around the fourth election.

---

<sup>24</sup> Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, *Multilevel and Longitudinal Modeling Using Stata.*, 1:343–349.




FIGURE 7.1. LOCAL POLYNOMIAL REGRESSION FIT OF THE CHANGE IN THE EFFECTIVE NUMBER OF ELECTORAL PARTIES AT EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTIONS.

The non-parametric curve is closely approximated in a parametric analysis by centring the variable measuring the number of European Parliament elections on the fourth election and transforming it with a logistic function (where  $x$  is the European Parliament election variable):

$$f(x) = \frac{1}{1 + e^{-(x-4)}}$$

A comparison of model fit between models specified with a linear, quadratic and logged European Parliament election variables confirms the superiority of this approach.

The first step in each stage of the analysis is a simple growth curve model which models changes in party system size for each country as a function only of time, which provides a base point for model comparison. The second step introduces the measure of district magnitude difference. Changes in party size at the European Parliament level are expected to manifest themselves over successive elections, with diminishing returns as the European Parliament party system reaches that expected from the European Parliament electoral system, suggesting an interaction between the time and the difference between district magnitude variables, which is added to the model in the third step of analysis. In summary, the fixed effect portion of the model is specified as follows:

$$N_{V \text{ EP election}} = \beta_1 N_{V \text{ Initial}} + \beta_2 E\text{Pelection (transformed)} + \beta_3 \text{District magnitude difference} \\ + \beta_4 E\text{Pelection (transformed)} \times \text{District magnitude difference}$$

The fourth stage of analysis introduces a set of control variables which might also plausibly explain the change in the size of European Parliament party systems – differences in electoral thresholds between national and European Parliament elections, differences in turnout between national and European Parliament elections, and change to the size of the national party system between European Parliament elections.

The effect of an increase in European Parliament party system size is expected to operate more directly on national elections, with changes at a European Parliament election impacting on the size of the party system at the next national election. The second stage of analysis models the impact of European Parliament party system size on national elections following European Parliament elections. A multilevel model is run with variables measuring the national party system size before a European Parliament election and the size of the party system at the European Parliament election, controlling for changes to electoral system at the national level

using the same difference of log magnitudes measure used for European Parliament elections.

The fixed effect portion of the model is specified as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
 N_{V \text{ National after EP election}} \\
 = \beta_1 N_{V \text{ National before EP election}} + \beta_2 N_{V \text{ EP election}} \\
 + \beta_3 \text{Change in national district magnitude}
 \end{aligned}$$

## 7.7 – Results

The results for stage one of the analysis, investigating the change in the size of the party system at European Parliament elections, are shown in table 7.2. Model 1 shows a growth curve model of change in the size of the party system without accounting for electoral system differences and finds a statistically significant average growth coefficient, indicating an average growth of party system size across European Parliament elections. The model predicts that there has been an average growth from a party system size of 4.7 effective electoral parties to 6.1 effective electoral parties across eight European Parliament elections, an average of 0.17 additional effective electoral parties per election, though this effect is non-linear, with the largest period of growth occurring between the third and sixth elections.

Model 2 adds the variable measuring the difference between the European Parliament and national electoral systems to the model as an initial test of the effect of electoral system differences. The coefficient is statistically significant and positive, indicating that the difference between electoral systems has on average increased the size of the party system at European Parliament elections.

Model 3 introduces the interaction term between the variables measuring the number of elections and differences in electoral systems and shows that as expected, the interaction between the two is statistically significant. Figure 7.2 illustrates this interaction and shows the

marginal (average across all countries) effect of the difference between the electoral systems at the European Parliament and national level. Figure 7.2 shows the effect of a one unit increase in the difference between the logged European Parliament mean district magnitude and the logged national mean district magnitude (which is an electoral system at the European Parliament level that has a mean district magnitude that is  $e$  times greater than the national mean district magnitude). This is predicted to lead to a growth of 0.81 more effective electoral parties across the eight European Parliament elections than if the electoral systems were the same, an average growth of 0.1 effective parties per election, though again the effect is nonlinear and occurs mostly between the third and sixth election elections.

|                                                                            | <b>Model 1</b>       | <b>Model 2</b>       | <b>Model 3</b>       | <b>Model 4</b>       |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| Effective number of electoral parties before first EP election             | 0.770***<br>(0.0893) | 0.867***<br>(0.103)  | 0.822***<br>(0.0982) | 0.869***<br>(0.102)  |
| EP election number (transformed)                                           | 1.477***<br>(0.337)  | 1.454***<br>(0.346)  | 0.848<br>(0.516)     | 0.931*<br>(0.489)    |
| EP - national district magnitude difference                                |                      | 0.275***<br>(0.0949) | 0.0646<br>(0.111)    | 0.0477<br>(0.112)    |
| Election X Magnitude difference interaction                                |                      |                      | 0.760***<br>(0.231)  | 0.743***<br>(0.220)  |
| Change in Effective number of electoral parties at prior domestic election |                      |                      |                      | 0.408***<br>(0.119)  |
| EP - national turnout difference                                           |                      |                      |                      | 0.00806<br>(0.00833) |
| EP - national electoral threshold difference                               |                      |                      |                      | 0.0171<br>(0.0610)   |
| Constant                                                                   | 1.316***<br>(0.436)  | 0.763<br>(0.510)     | 1.079**<br>(0.489)   | 1.102**<br>(0.535)   |
| N                                                                          | 145                  | 145                  | 145                  | 145                  |

Statistical significance: \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

TABLE 7.2. RESULTS FROM MULTILEVEL MIXED-EFFECT GROWTH CURVE MODELS ANALYSING CHANGES IN PARTY SYSTEM SIZE AT EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTIONS. RANDOM EFFECTS NOT SHOWN.




FIGURE 7.2. PREDICTED DIFFERENCE IN THE EFFECTIVE NUMBER OF PARTIES AT EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTIONS WHEN THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE LOGGED EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT MEAN DISTRICT MAGNITUDE AND THE LOGGED NATIONAL MEAN DISTRICT MAGNITUDE IS ONE ACROSS EIGHT EUROPEAN PARLI

An alternative way of visualizing these results is by comparing what the expected party system would be at the first European Parliament election and after eight European Parliament elections for different levels of district magnitude differences between national and European Parliament electoral systems. These results are illustrated in figure 7.3, which shows that at the first election there is very little effect of different electoral systems but by the eighth election a clear difference has emerged. As the European Parliament electoral system becomes more permissive than the national electoral system, the expected difference in the size of the party

system after eight elections increases, with an effective doubling in the size of the party system predicted for the largest level of difference between electoral systems.




FIGURE 7.3. PREDICTED EFFECTIVE NUMBER OF ELECTORAL PARTIES AT THE FIRST AND EIGHTH EP ELECTION BY THE DEGREE OF DIFFER BETWEEN THE DISTRICT MAGNITUDE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND NATIONAL ELECTORAL SYSTEMS.

Model 4 adds the three control variables to the model. Neither different levels of turnout nor differences in electoral thresholds have a statistically significant effect on the size of the European Parliament party system. Unsurprisingly, changes to the national party system (which may result from prior changes to the European Parliament party system, as examined in the second part of the analysis) also affect the European Parliament party system, though these do

not affect the size nor statistical significance of the impact of any of the variables included in model 3.

These results offer support for hypothesis one: the size of the party system at European Parliament elections grows as a function of the differences between electoral systems used at European Parliament and national elections. It is also important to note that the main effect of time is also statistically significant in model 3. This indicates that although the party system in member-states with a more permissive European Parliament electoral system grow more than those which use a more comparable electoral system, even those with equivalent electoral systems are predicted to grow by 0.79 effective electoral parties over eight European Parliament elections. This suggests that as well as an effect of district magnitude there is also a more general 'European Parliament' effect on the size of the party system.

The final model provides a very accurate estimation of the changes in European Parliament party system size. Figure 7.4 illustrates the predicted and observed changes in the size of the European Parliament party system size restricted to the 15 pre 2004 EU members (because the older member-states have had more elections and so are more illustrative of the results). Two countries in particular are worth examining in more detail because of changes introduced to the European Parliament electoral system in each country after several European Parliament elections had already been held: France and the UK. Between 1979 and 1999 France conducted European Parliament elections with a single national constituency, with a mean district magnitude of 83.4 across the 5 elections. In 2004 France introduced eight regional constituencies, with a mean district magnitude of 9.75. Following the logic of the Duvergerian effects of electoral systems we would expect this to result in a reduction in the size of the party system, which is both what is predicted by the model and observed in the data.




FIGURE 7.4. PREDICTED AND OBSERVED CHANGES TO THE EFFECTIVE NUMBER OF ELECTORAL PARTIES AT EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTIONS FOR THE PRE-2004 EU MEMBER-STATES.

The UK offers the opposite case. The four European Parliament elections held prior to 1999 were held using single member districts elected by a plurality voting rule (except for Northern Ireland, which elected its three MEPs in a single constituency by Single Transferable Vote, and continues to do so). In 1999 a more proportional electoral system was introduced, with 12 regional constituencies electing an average of 7.25 MEPs each (falling to 6 by 2009 due to a reduction in the number of British MEPs). Again, following the logic of the Duvergerian effects of electoral systems we would expect this to result in a change to the size of the party system, this time an increase in the effective number of electoral parties, which is what is predicted by the model and observed in the data.

The results for stage two of the analysis, investigating the feedback effect of change in the size of the party system at European Parliament elections on the size of party system at the national level, are shown in table 7.3. The results show that, accounting for prior party system size at the national level, the effect of the European Parliament party system size on subsequent national party system size is statistically significant, supporting hypothesis 2. The effect of changes to national district magnitude is not statistically significant, though this is likely due to the fact that for the vast bulk of cases the electoral system is reasonably stable and large differences are only observed for a handful of cases. The impact of the party system at the European Parliament level are illustrated in figure 7.5. Each additional effective electoral party at the European Parliament level is expected to result in an additional 0.23 effective electoral parties at the national level. This suggests that although the European Parliament party system does feed back into the national party system as expected, the relationship is not simply a case of one for one substitution and that the European Parliament party system may be acting as a more expansive parallel national party system.

|                                                                     | Model 5              |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
| National Effective number of electoral parties prior to EP election | 0.615***<br>(0.0967) |
| Effective number of electoral parties EP                            | 0.234**<br>(0.0909)  |
| Change to domestic electoral rules                                  | -0.271<br>(0.172)    |
| Constant                                                            | 0.672**<br>(0.294)   |
| N                                                                   | 102                  |
| Statistical significance: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01            |                      |

TABLE 7.3. RESULTS FROM MULTILEVEL MODEL ANALYSING CHANGES IN PARTY SYSTEM SIZE AT NATIONAL ELECTIONS FOLLOWING EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTIONS. RANDOM EFFECTS NOT SHOWN.




FIGURE 7.5. PREDICTED EFFECT OF EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT PARTY SYSTEM SIZE ON THE EFFECTIVE NUMBER OF ELECTORAL PARTIES AT NATIONAL ELECTIONS FOLLOWING EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTIONS.

## 7.8 – Conclusion

This chapter set out to analyze two questions: does the electoral system used in European Parliament election affect the size of the party system at European Parliament elections, and do changes to the size of the party system at the European Parliament level feed back into the party system at the national level. The evidence strongly supports an affirmative answer to both of these questions. Where more permissive electoral systems are used for European Parliament elections there has been more growth in the size of the party system. The growth of European Parliament party systems has in turn led to an increase in the size of party systems at national elections.

It is important not to overstate these results. The analysis here does partially support the earlier argument put forward by van der Eijk and Franklin that the success of new parties and the resulting change in the size of the party system can be attributed to the strategic context of European Parliament elections.<sup>25</sup> Regardless of differences in electoral systems between the national and European Parliament level, party systems tend to grow over consecutive European Parliament elections. Where the present analysis differs to the earlier analysis by van der Eijk and Franklin is the finding that electoral systems do have an influence on changes to party systems: party systems tend to grow *more* when the electoral system used for European Parliament elections is more permissive than that used for national elections.

These findings have two important implications for the future prospects of representation in the European Union. First they suggest that there is at least some reason to be optimistic about a future improvement in representation of European integration matters. That party systems in the EU have, on average, grown considerably over the course of European Parliament elections

---

<sup>25</sup> van der Eijk and Franklin, *Choosing Europe? The European Electorate and National Politics in the Face of Union*.

suggests that they are more fluid and the lines of political contestation less frozen than many have suggested. That party systems have grown at the European Parliament level more than the national suggests that prospects for change may be even greater at the European level than the national level, which is good news for representation on EU issues.

Second, and less optimistically, the effect of electoral systems suggest that the prospects for change are not evenly distributed between member-states. Those with a higher degree of difference between national and European Parliament electoral systems are more likely to see changes to their party systems than those with less difference in their electoral systems. This suggests that if European Parliament elections do play an important role in facilitating the future development of European integration as an electoral issue, such a development is likely to occur unevenly across the EU. There is no simple solution to this problem. Given that a key determinant of differences in electoral systems is the relative population size of each member-state, substantial changes to the electoral rules that might facilitate electoral change seem highly unlikely.

These findings also have implications for the wider academic literature. That European Parliament electoral rules have an effect on national party systems at the European Parliament and national levels is an important finding for scholars of both European Parliament elections and electoral systems more generally. Although a great deal of attention has been paid to voting behaviour in European Parliament elections, the importance of the relationship between national and European Parliament electoral systems has been overlooked by most of the existing scholarship. Following the fourth European Parliament election, van der Eijk, Franklin, and Marsh argued that the unique nature of European Parliament elections provide an important comparative resource that can give us insights into not just how voters make decisions on the European level but how the institutional and contextual factors condition vote choices more

generally.<sup>26</sup> The findings here have two implications for more general research on the effects of electoral rules. First, it supports the general validity of Duvergerian effects against those who have argued that we only observe the correlation between electoral and party systems because of endogeneity. When the implementation of electoral rules is influenced by exogenous factors, as is the case in European Parliament elections, we observe changes to party systems along Duvergerian lines.

Second, the questions raised here about the impact that electoral rules for second order elections have on national party systems have implications for more general research on the effects of electoral systems. Elections and electoral systems are often studied as if they exist in a vacuum. Although European Parliament elections may be unique as supranational elections, many countries have experience with using different electoral systems for different elections, whether for different chambers of parliament, for presidents and legislatures, or regional and local elections. How these different elections interact in determining political outcomes is a neglected area of the study of politics which has tended to assume that only the electoral system for the most important political arena matters. The results here suggest that we may have been wrong to do so: the electoral rules of 'second order' elections may well have important consequences for first order politics.

---

<sup>26</sup> Cees van der Eijk, Mark Franklin, and Michael Marsh, "What Voters Teach Us about Europe-Wide Elections: What Europe-Wide Elections Teach Us about Voters," *Electoral Studies* 15, no. 2 (May 1996): 149–166.

## Chapter 8 – Conclusion

---

The experiment in supranational electoral democracy that began with the first European Parliament election in 1979 is ongoing but the interim results are not encouraging. In representative models of democracy the chain of political legitimacy runs from voters to governments through votes cast in elections. The findings of this thesis suggest that although these links may run smoothly for the left-right dimension, on European integration issues the chain is broken. Although political parties have increasingly offered voters a wider set of choices on European issues, most voters do not seem to have noticed. European integration has little influence on votes cast in European Parliament elections and so the views of the citizens of the EU can have little influence over the direction of European integration.

This concluding chapter offers a final evaluation of how well European integration issue representation meets the demands of the issue representation model, bringing together the assessment of the individual components of the model in Chapters 3 to 5. It then asks whether, given the explanation of why referendums are held in the European Union in Chapter 6, direct democracy offers a solution to these problems or whether the expansion of national party systems, shown in Chapter 7, offers the prospect of improvements to representation. Many questions about the nature of representation in the European Union remain unanswered, and the second section of this chapter addresses the most important of these and what we might learn from further analysis. The chapter concludes with an assessment of what the findings of this thesis mean for the state of democracy in the European Union.

## 8.1 – Representation and European integration – an assessment

In two influential assessments of the state of representation in the European Union, Schmitt and Thomassen conclude that the fact that representation on European integration does not occur is not a problem because a multidimensional political space would itself be a challenge to political representation.<sup>1</sup> This thesis has shown that this argument is mistaken – the unidimensionality requirement of social choice theory is only a problem for an abstract model of democracy that is unobtainable for other reasons. From a more pragmatic, imperfect, but ultimately more realistic view of democracy the lack of representation on European integration is certainly a problem. Given this, it was necessary to rethink the nature of representation in the context of European integration and assess where the challenges to adequate representation in the European Union lie.

The first question that needed answering was whether European integration preferences form a distinct political dimension or whether they line up with existing political dimensions, particularly the left-right dimension. In order to make this assessment, Chapter 2 developed a new set of comparable one and two dimensional left-right and social liberal-conservative scales. Using these scales, Chapter 3 makes two important findings. First, that it is important that we take the multidimensional nature of politics in the EU seriously. Using a one dimensional approach that sees ‘left-right’ as a catch-all super dimension, rather than as the part of a multidimensional political space that is primarily concerned with economic issues, misses the most important change in the relationship between ideology and European integration over the course of the development of the EU. This change, the second important finding of Chapter 3, is that economic left-right has decreasingly structured party positions on European integration whilst social liberal-conservatism has done so increasingly. That the nature of the relationship

---

<sup>1</sup> Schmitt and Thomassen, *Political Representation and Legitimacy in the European Union*; Thomassen, *The Legitimacy of the European Union After Enlargement*.

between ideology and European integration positions has changed substantially over the course of European integration history fills an important gap in the literature on political parties and European integration, which hitherto has neglected the temporal dimension in party conflict over European integration.

That European integration positions are decreasingly structured by economic left-right – the principal dimension of political competition in Europe – suggests that representation on European integration issues directly has become more important as the EU has developed. While left-right voting may once have led to the concordance of voter and party positions on European integration, this has been decreasingly likely to happen. For representation on European integration to occur it has become increasingly important that votes are influenced directly by attitudes towards European integration. In order to assess whether representation on European integration issues is adequate this thesis has addressed three aspects of the issue representation model, the modification of the Responsible Party Model proposed in this thesis, namely whether:

- 1) Voters have a choice between at least two parties with different issue positions.
- 2) Voters perceive the differences between the issue positions of different political parties.
- 3) Voters' issue preferences have a significant impact on how they cast their vote.

The answer to the first, as shown in Chapter 3 is that parties have increasingly offered voters different options on European integration as they have become more polarised over the EU. That this is the case suggests that, although for much of its history European integration has been characterised by elite consensus, political parties are now starting to fulfil their side of the representative bargain.

It is not clear, however, that voters are fulfilling their side of the bargain. Chapters 4 and 5 examined the question of how voters respond to party positions in their voting decisions through the lens of cognitive psychology. Chapter 4 showed that, for most voters, what parties

say about their European integration positions has no influence whatsoever on where voters saw parties as standing. Although most voters seem to be influenced by left-right party signals, only the most politically interested and cognitively sophisticated voters were influenced by party signals about the European integration positions.

Regardless of how voters seem to have come to their views about where parties stand on European integration, previous research has shown that EU issue voting occurs in most member-states. This would be a positive result for representation on European integration issues, but as Chapter 5 shows, in most of the countries that exhibit EU issue voting effects these effects are largely driven by cognitive bias on the part of voters, particularly the tendency to project their own views onto parties they like and opposing views onto parties they dislike. Only in 10 EU member-states do significant EU issue voting effects exist; in almost two-thirds of the EU, European integration has no impact on citizen vote choices in European Parliament elections.

The results of Chapters 4 and 5 are important for the literature on voting behaviour and European integration but they also have implications for the wider literature on how voters see the political world. The most important finding for the purposes of this thesis is that despite being heavily distorted by attentional and political biases, party signals do seem to translate into voter perceptions of party positions on the left-right dimension and left-right spatial voting does occur. That this is the case is reassuring for representative democracy and shows that the requirements of the issue representation model are not impossible – they can be met for other issues, and so might be met for European integration in the future.

Given the perilous state of European integration representation in the EU, the attraction of alternative forms of democracy seems obvious. Yet as Chapter 6 has shown, rather than present a solution to the problems of representation, the use of referendums in the EU may have exacerbated the problems of representation further. One of the main drivers of EU government

decisions to hold referendums on EU treaties is the desire to avoid facing European integration as an electoral issue. From an academic perspective the implications of this are important both for the literature on EU referendums and direct democracy more generally. From a democratic perspective the implications are worrying – rather than enhancing democracy, governments have been using direct democracy to avoid having to confront issues at elections, undermining the already slim possibility of representation on European integration issues further.

In making a final assessment of the state of representation and European integration it is hard to reach any conclusion other than that representation of European integration preferences in the European Union is inadequate. Voters are unable to translate their policy preferences about European integration into policy outcomes at the European level for the simple reason that they do not use their votes to express their preferences. We should be cautious about laying the blame for this entirely at the feet of voters. Although political parties have become increasingly divided over European integration, as Chapter 6 suggests, they have also done their best to stop it emerging as an important electoral issue, and as Chapter 4 shows, the low salience of European integration has important consequences for how well voters are able to process information about party positions.

That this is the case is worrying from a democratic perspective. The EU has faced an onslaught of political crises in the last decade, from the collapse of the Constitutional Treaty to the current refugee crisis. For the last six years the European Union has narrowly dodged disaster on many occasions as the global recession has transformed into the Eurozone crisis. That even this does not seem to have made European electorates engage with European integration begs the question of what would.

Yet this thesis does offer some hope that representation might improve in the future. Chapter 7 has shown that, at least in those EU states that have a more permissive electoral rules at the

European Parliament level than the national level, party systems are expanding. Where European Parliament elections are held under more permissive electoral systems, the effective number of parties has grown considerably over successive elections. This in turn has led to a growth in the party system at national elections. The interaction between national and supranational elections in altering existing party systems is important both for understanding how European integration has impacted on electoral competition and for understanding the effects of electoral systems more generally. The approach in Chapter 7 cannot shed any light on whether this expansion reflects an incorporation of a European dimension into party competition and the findings of earlier chapters suggest this is very unlikely to be true. Given the absence of competition over European integration in most member-states despite the troubles the EU has faced in the last decade, it seems likely that the redrawing of the lines of party competition are a necessary – if possibly insufficient – condition for a democratic politics of European integration to emerge.

## **8.2 – Limitations and further research**

These findings are not, of course, the final word on representation and European integration. The specific limitations of each piece of analysis have been detailed at the end of each chapter and there is no need to revisit them here. There is one limitation to the approach taken by the thesis that is worth exploring in more detail as it points to where future research might uncover ways in which European integration representation might be improved. The research here has sought to assess how the representation of European integration preferences functions at the level of the European Union as a whole and so has not examined any country specific effects in great detail.

The two areas where country level differences were taken into account in this thesis were in the analysis of when EU Treaty referendums were held (Chapter 6) and the effects of European

Parliament electoral systems (Chapter 7). Both of these suggest that institutional differences between countries play an important and underappreciated role in EU electoral politics. That different institutional configurations have a significant influence over the structure and events of EU politics seems obvious, but they are a neglected factor that may help explain country differences in the politics of European integration more broadly. Several other chapters of the thesis point to areas where such an exploration could yield useful insights.

Chapter 3 demonstrated that there is a common relationship between economic left-right, social liberal-conservatism and party positions towards European integration across the European Union. Although they share a common structure, there are obviously differences between countries in how political parties have responded to European integration that remain unexplored. Equally, although across the EU only the most engaged citizens seem to respond to party signals about European integration positions, there will again obviously be differences between countries in the way party signals are conveyed to voters, particularly the role of the media, that are likely to produce different levels of responsiveness to European integration signals.

Even with the aggregate level focus adopted here, some intriguing patterns of differences between countries have been shown by the analysis. Perhaps the most fascinating pattern of country differences emerged in the analysis of projection bias and EU issue voting in Chapter 5. EU issue voting effects were found in 10 countries: Austria, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Greece, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. All of the 1995 accession countries (Austria, Finland, and Sweden) exhibit EU issue voting effects. Similarly (and with substantial overlap between the two groups) all three Nordic EU member-states (Denmark, Finland, and Sweden) exhibit EU issue voting effects. Conversely only one of the original six founding countries (the Netherlands) and two of the post 2004 countries (Estonia and Poland)

show signs of EU issue voting. Indeed the list of countries with EU issue voting effects that survive after accounting for projection bias are dominated by the ‘middle’ period of accession countries – those who joined between 1973 and 1995 – that account for seven of the ten countries. Looking at it the other way round, of the nine countries that joined the EU between 1973 and 1995, only Ireland and Spain do not exhibit statistically significant EU issue voting effects.

A different but equally intriguing pattern is shown by the list of countries in which voters fall prey to contrast bias. Although only 12 member-states exhibited contrast effects for the EU issue, this list includes five of the six founding countries (Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands) and only two of the 12 post-2004 accession countries (Hungary and Lithuania).

That these patterns seem to cluster by when member states joined the EU could be down to path dependency – political division over EU membership at the time of accession may continue to influence the nature of the politics of European integration, though research is needed to test this theory which could reveal potentially invaluable insights into the electoral politics of European integration. However this thesis can only point to their existence and cannot shed light on why they occur, or if they are anything more than a coincidence.

Additionally, Chapters 4 and 5, both focus only on the 2009 European Parliament election. The main finding of Chapter 3, that the relationship between ideology and European integration has changed substantially over the course of European integration, suggests that further work is needed to explore how and why voter perceptions of party positions on European integration and the pattern of EU issue assimilation and contrast has developed over the course of European integration. Such work may also help explain the variation in projection effects found

between countries, and the difference in projection effects between the left-right and European integration issues.

The analysis of the perception of party positions in Chapter 4 and the effects of projection bias in Chapter 5 both suggest other areas which need further research with relevance to both the study of European integration and the role of cognition and perceptual biases in voting behaviour. Although the existence of perceptual biases in political behaviour has been known for decades, many key aspects remain unexplored. That this is the case may be largely due to the fact that only recently has the projection bias paradigm been applied to cases outside of the United States. Multiparty and multidimensional politics present different challenges to political perception than the stable two party system of the United States. In a two party system the implications of projection bias are clear: voters pull the party they like closer towards them and push the party they dislike away. If voters are assessing multiple issues across multiple parties they are likely to have a more complicated rating of different political parties than the binary polarisation of the two party system.

Particularly pressing is the issue of how and why cognitive biases vary between different types of political issue. Several questions suggest themselves: 1) Are 'core' political dimensions like left-right more prone to bias than 'secondary' issues? 2) If this is the case, and the European integration case in Chapter 5 suggests it might be, is it due to the fact that voters simply do not hold strong opinions about secondary issues, or that they do, but are happy to support parties they disagree with if they agree with them on core issues? 3) How do voters assign positions when information is scarce? Chapter 4 suggests that voters are happy to place parties *somewhere* on the European integration dimension, even if they do not seem to be responding to party signals about those positions. Existing research would suggest that voters are likely to make use of partisan heuristics but it is not clear how useful these heuristics would be for issues

that cut across other political dimensions. 4) Finally, and perhaps most importantly from the perspective of representative democracy, under what circumstances does the accurate processing of party signals occur and how can we promote accuracy motivations in the processing of political information? Solving the problem of representation in the European Union will require answers to these, and many other questions.

### 8.3 – Democracy and European integration

The Treaty of Lisbon proclaims that ‘the functioning of the Union shall be founded on representative democracy’. Given the findings of this thesis it is difficult to reach any conclusion other than that the legitimacy of the European Union rests on shaky foundations.

Most proposed solutions to the democratic deficit in the European Union suggest that institutional reform is necessary in order to give citizens greater control over the EU. One reform that has frequently been suggested is that there should be a link between the results of European Parliament elections and the composition of the European Commission. With the introduction of the *Spitzenkandidaten* at the 2014 European Parliament election the aim of this reform has been at least partially achieved.

The appointment of Jean-Claude Juncker, the *Spitzenkandidat* of the European People’s Party, suggests that the *Spitzenkandidaten* were a victory for the European Parliament, which managed to increase its power in the appointment of the Commission considerably. It would be difficult to argue however that the *Spitzenkandidaten* made much difference to the way votes were cast in the 2014 elections.<sup>2</sup> For all but those in their home countries, the *Spitzenkandidaten* were unfamiliar to most voters and it was not clear whether they would be successful in their

---

<sup>2</sup> Hobolt, “A Vote for the President?”; Hermann Schmitt, Sara B. Hobolt, and Sebastian Adrian Popa, “Does Personalization Increase Turnout? Spitzenkandidaten in the 2014 European Parliament Elections,” *European Union Politics* (June 4, 2015).

bid to appoint the President of the Commission. It is not surprising then that most voters paid very little attention to the *Spitzenkandidaten* and they had very little influence over the outcome of the elections. Although a triumph for the European Parliament, it could hardly be said to be a triumph for democracy.

This could, of course, change in subsequent elections. As the *Spitzenkandidaten* idea becomes more embedded, voters may pay more attention to the performance of the President of the European Commission and their assessment of rival candidates play more of a role in their voting decisions. Although we are fewer than 18 months into the term of the first *Spitzenkandidat* President of the European Commission, it cannot be said that such a future looks likely any time soon.

The EU has faced two major crises since Juncker has come to power – the near exit of Greece from the Eurozone and the refugee crisis that faces Europe at the time of writing. In both cases a central plank of European integration has come under pressure – the financial solidarity of the Eurozone, and shared EU borders and the freedom of movement. Although he has undoubtedly been playing an important role in trying to resolve both crises, compared to national political leaders Juncker has been largely invisible. How the performance of the Commission in more usual and mundane circumstances is meant to filter through to EU voters is unclear. Events may of course prove this pessimistic conclusion wrong but without a link between voter opinions about European integration and the votes they cast in elections, no amount of institutional tinkering will rectify the missing link between citizen preferences and the outcomes of European integration.

Another solution would be to make citizens vote on European issues directly, and increase the use of direct democracy in the EU. Chapter 6 has shown that the current use of referendums is far from ideal from a democratic perspective because governments have the power to decide

when they are held. The obvious solution would be to take the power to decide when referendums are held on EU issues away from governments. Leaving aside the likelihood of being able to implement such an idea, which would undoubtedly be met without much enthusiasm by EU governments, even if citizens were granted powers to decide when referendums were held it is not clear that referendums would really improve the EU's democratic deficit. As Follesdal and Hix argue:

*'The problem with referendums... is that they only allow voters to express their views about isolated fundamental constitutional issues and not on the specific policy content within a particular constitutional status quo. Referendums are... ineffective mechanisms for promoting day-to-day competition, or contestation between policy platforms, or indeed articulation and opposition in the EU policy process.'*<sup>3</sup>

For issues of day-to-day competition over the direction of European integration, even with its current problems, the best hope for EU democracy is likely to be the realisation of the goal of representation. Although this thesis suggests this goal is a long way from being achieved it does also suggest that a coherent form of supranational representation is possible. Left-right voting exhibits similar patterns across the EU and although EU issue voting occurs in only a minority of member-states, the shared nature of the relationship between ideology and European integration across the EU means that if voters do engage with European issues, a coherent supranational politics of European integration could emerge.

Democratic politics at the EU level also have important implications for democratic politics in EU member states more generally. Many assessments of the impact of European integration on democracy have not been kind to European integration. Some scholars, most notably Peter Mair, have argued that the process of European integration has narrowed the lines of political

---

<sup>3</sup> Follesdal and Hix, "Why There Is a Democratic Deficit in the EU," 552.

competition because it shifts political competencies away from the arena of national electoral competition, undermining the foundations of political representation through political parties.<sup>4</sup>

As governments have set policy within an increasingly constrained set of choices, limited not just by European integration but the wider process of globalization, the core of European democracy has been slowly hollowed out. In his last assessment before his untimely death, Mair was not optimistic about the future of representative democracy in Europe:

*‘Part of the problem here is that it is increasingly difficult to separate out what is European and what is national... when we talk about Euroscepticism, and about opposition to Europe, we are also sometimes talking about skepticism and opposition towards our own national institutions and modes of governance. This is a skepticism about how we are governed, and it is, in my view, a skepticism that is at least partly fostered by the increasingly limited scope for opposition within the system – whether that system be European or national, or both at the same time... Political opposition gives voice. By losing opposition, we lose voice, and by losing voice we lose control of our own political systems. It is not at all clear how that control might be regained, either in Europe or at home...’<sup>5</sup>*

One finding of this thesis suggests that there may be at least one reason to be more sanguine about the future of representative democracy in Europe. This is not to disagree with Mair’s prescient diagnosis of the crisis of European politics, simply that as well as a source of decline, European integration may also prove a facilitator of renewal. Chapter 7 showed that in member-states where more permissive electoral systems are used for European Parliament elections, party systems have grown at both the European Parliament and national level. These shifts in European party systems are not necessarily arising as a response to European integration itself, and so may not prove a cure for the problems of representation at the European level. Perhaps

---

<sup>4</sup> Mair, “Political Opposition and the European Union”; Mair, “Political Parties and Party Systems”; Mair, *Ruling The Void*.

<sup>5</sup> Mair, *Ruling The Void*, 139–142.

even *because* of the failure of representation at the EU level, the European Parliament provides an arena in which there is less need to vote strategically, assisting the entry of new parties and the redistribution of support between existing parties, which may facilitate improvements to representation.

Many of the beneficiaries of this opening up of party competition in EU member-states have been radical right and populist parties who are overtly hostile to the idea of European integration and demand an end to the EU. These parties only provide a solution to the problem of representation in the EU by ending the EU itself. Although they often attract the most attention, these parties have not been the only beneficiaries of the expansion of party competition. Many green and new left parties that, at least until the onset of the Eurozone crisis, were more open to European integration and saw supranational cooperation as a necessary component of solving political problems have also benefited from elections to the European Parliament. The onset of the Eurozone crisis has altered many new left parties' positions towards European integration and they have been very vocal in their opposition to centrally imposed austerity, a policy largely accepted by mainstream political parties. Although they are clearly more Eurosceptic as a result of the crisis, new left parties tend to argue for the reform of the European Union rather than its destruction. Whether on the right or left, either in themselves, or because they force older parties to confront new political issues, these new parties may yet help renew the democratic process, both in the European Union, and within member-states.

This thesis has shown that there are many challenges to representation in the European Union. The evolution of the dimensionality of party positions on European integration has increased the need for representation directly on European integration. Despite this, in most EU countries voting on European issues does not occur. Voters do not engage with European issues and parties use referendums to keep Europe of the electoral agenda. Any assessment of the current

state of democracy in the European Union must then reach a fairly gloomy conclusion: there is a serious deficit of representation. The expansion of party systems in many European countries gives at least some cause to be hopeful, however the future of representative democracy in Europe is far from certain. Whether the opening up of party competition in some EU member states represent the first shoots of democratic renewal in Europe or the seeds of the end of European integration remains to be seen.

## Appendix to Chapter 2

---

TABLE A1. RESULTS OF EACH STAGE OF THE COMPONENT SELECTION PROCESS FOR THE ONE DIMENSIONAL GENERAL LEFT-RIGHT SCALE. CORRELATIONS IN BOLD INDICATE COMPONENTS THAT WERE INCLUDED IN THE SCALE IN THAT ITERATION..... 230

TABLE A2. ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND AMBIGUOUS MANIFESTO COMPONENTS. .... 233

TABLE A3. EXOGENOUS CORRELATIONS BETWEEN FOUR EXISTINGS MANIFESTO SCALES AND THEIR COMPONENTS..... 234

TABLE A4. RESULTS OF EACH STAGE OF THE COMPONENT SELECTION PROCESS FOR THE ECONOMIC LEFT-RIGHT SCALE. CORRELATIONS IN BOLD INDICATE COMPONENTS THAT WERE INCLUDED IN THE SCALE IN THAT ITERATION. .... 235

TABLE A5. RESULTS OF EACH STAGE OF THE COMPONENT SELECTION PROCESS FOR THE SOCIAL LIBERAL-CONSERVATIVE SCALE. CORRELATIONS IN BOLD INDICATE COMPONENTS THAT WERE INCLUDED IN THE SCALE IN THAT ITERATION. .... 236

TABLE A6. CORRELATION BETWEEN THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL SCALES FOR ALL COUNTRIES IN THE MARPOR DATASET..... 237

TABLE A1. RESULTS OF EACH STAGE OF THE COMPONENT SELECTION PROCESS FOR THE ONE DIMENSIONAL GENERAL LEFT-RIGHT SCALE. CORRELATIONS IN BOLD INDICATE COMPONENTS THAT WERE INCLUDED IN THE SCALE IN THAT ITERATION.

| Component | Iteration      |                |                |                |                |                |                |                |                |                |                |                |
|-----------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
|           | 1              | 2              | 3              | 4              | 5              | 6              | 7              | 8              | 9              | 10             | 11             | 12             |
| 101       | -0.0192        | -0.0487        | -0.0395        | -0.0367        | -0.0385        | -0.0306        | -0.044         | -0.0429        | -0.0447        | -0.0476        | -0.0454        | -0.0464        |
| 102       | -0.1281        | -0.071         | -0.1069        | -0.1133        | -0.114         | -0.1143        | <b>-0.1288</b> | <b>-0.074</b>  | -0.0903        | -0.0881        | -0.0766        | -0.0751        |
| 103       | <b>-0.0316</b> | -0.0681        | -0.1373        | -0.1453        | -0.155         | <b>-0.1512</b> | <b>-0.136</b>  | <b>-0.0748</b> | -0.0514        | -0.0708        | -0.0288        | -0.0253        |
| 104       | 0.0482         | 0.0958         | 0.0667         | 0.0736         | 0.0818         | 0.0834         | 0.0731         | 0.0952         | 0.0541         | 0.0847         | 0.082          | 0.0786         |
| 105       | <b>-0.296</b>  | <b>-0.3401</b> | <b>-0.2934</b> | <b>-0.3023</b> | <b>-0.3073</b> | <b>-0.306</b>  | <b>-0.3262</b> | <b>-0.3313</b> | <b>-0.2888</b> | <b>-0.3382</b> | <b>-0.3162</b> | <b>-0.3083</b> |
| 106       | <b>-0.2058</b> | <b>-0.205</b>  | <b>-0.189</b>  | <b>-0.2022</b> | <b>-0.206</b>  | <b>-0.2024</b> | <b>-0.2051</b> | <b>-0.1877</b> | <b>-0.1773</b> | <b>-0.1795</b> | <b>-0.1717</b> | <b>-0.1679</b> |
| 107       | <b>-0.1849</b> | <b>-0.2467</b> | <b>-0.1923</b> | <b>-0.1856</b> | <b>-0.1822</b> | <b>-0.1691</b> | <b>-0.1767</b> | <b>-0.2354</b> | <b>-0.197</b>  | <b>-0.2286</b> | <b>-0.2282</b> | <b>-0.2311</b> |
| 108       | -0.0846        | -0.1031        | -0.0729        | -0.0611        | -0.0535        | -0.0625        | -0.0963        | -0.1181        | <b>-0.1166</b> | <b>-0.1345</b> | <b>-0.1397</b> | <b>-0.1555</b> |
| 109       | 0.079          | 0.1429         | 0.0374         | 0.0313         | 0.0319         | 0.0178         | 0.0273         | 0.134          | <b>0.0427</b>  | 0.1282         | <b>0.1284</b>  | <b>0.1306</b>  |
| 110       | -0.0617        | -0.0383        | -0.0786        | -0.0803        | -0.0809        | -0.0831        | -0.1112        | <b>-0.0465</b> | -0.0633        | -0.0602        | -0.0418        | -0.042         |
| 201       | <b>-0.0718</b> | -0.0354        | -0.0369        | -0.0372        | -0.0397        | -0.047         | -0.0542        | -0.0625        | -0.0511        | -0.0658        | -0.0529        | -0.0536        |
| 202       | <b>-0.0782</b> | -0.1821        | <b>-0.1884</b> | <b>-0.1833</b> | <b>-0.1849</b> | <b>-0.1916</b> | <b>-0.2107</b> | <b>-0.1968</b> | <b>-0.2034</b> | <b>-0.2042</b> | <b>-0.1973</b> | <b>-0.2015</b> |
| 203       | <b>0.0447</b>  | 0.0699         | 0.0754         | 0.0814         | 0.0838         | 0.0831         | 0.0432         | 0.0495         | 0.0488         | 0.0183         | 0.0311         | 0.0281         |
| 204       | 0.1043         | 0.0579         | 0.0167         | 0.0254         | 0.0368         | 0.056          | 0.039          | 0.0481         | 0.0366         | 0.0351         | 0.0361         | 0.0365         |
| 301       | -0.1092        | -0.1653        | <b>-0.1487</b> | -0.1424        | -0.1355        | -0.1293        | <b>-0.1299</b> | <b>-0.1752</b> | <b>-0.1763</b> | <b>-0.1723</b> | <b>-0.1802</b> | <b>-0.1881</b> |
| 302       | 0.0405         | 0.0677         | 0.0713         | 0.0756         | 0.0682         | 0.0745         | 0.0556         | 0.0742         | 0.0541         | 0.0547         | 0.0487         | 0.05           |
| 303       | -0.0001        | -0.0536        | -0.045         | -0.0231        | -0.0099        | -0.0106        | -0.0423        | -0.0792        | -0.0846        | -0.0959        | -0.1086        | <b>-0.1086</b> |
| 304       | -0.0285        | 0.0086         | 0.0068         | -0.0035        | -0.0055        | -0.007         | -0.0276        | 0.0122         | -0.0175        | -0.0076        | -0.0126        | -0.029         |
| 305       | <b>0.0726</b>  | 0.105          | 0.0609         | 0.0642         | 0.0637         | 0.0554         | 0.0431         | 0.0726         | 0.0798         | 0.0597         | 0.0799         | 0.0724         |
| 401       | <b>0.2482</b>  | <b>0.2265</b>  | <b>0.2821</b>  | <b>0.2921</b>  | <b>0.2966</b>  | <b>0.3101</b>  | <b>0.2956</b>  | <b>0.231</b>   | <b>0.2602</b>  | <b>0.227</b>   | <b>0.2175</b>  | <b>0.2064</b>  |
| 402       | <b>-0.0294</b> | 0.0158         | 0.049          | 0.0666         | 0.0772         | 0.0783         | 0.0368         | 0.004          | 0.004          | -0.0182        | -0.0274        | -0.0391        |
| 403       | <b>-0.1484</b> | -0.1853        | <b>-0.1538</b> | <b>-0.1399</b> | -0.1421        | -0.1307        | <b>-0.1456</b> | <b>-0.1825</b> | <b>-0.1687</b> | <b>-0.1939</b> | <b>-0.1932</b> | <b>-0.2024</b> |
| 404       | <b>-0.1138</b> | -0.0711        | -0.0473        | -0.0386        | -0.0376        | -0.0344        | -0.0556        | -0.0799        | -0.075         | -0.0842        | -0.0946        | -0.0969        |
| 405       | 0.0007         | 0.017          | 0.0399         | 0.045          | 0.0434         | 0.0441         | 0.0291         | 0.0157         | 0.0222         | 0.0053         | -0.0026        | -0.0097        |

TABLE A1 (CONTINUED). RESULTS OF EACH STAGE OF THE COMPONENT SELECTION PROCESS FOR THE ONE DIMENSIONAL GENERAL LEFT-RIGHT SCALE. CORRELATIONS IN BOLD INDICATE COMPONENTS THAT WERE INCLUDED IN THE SCALE IN THAT ITERATION.

| Component | Iteration      |                |                |                |                |                |                |                |                |                |                |                |
|-----------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
|           | 1              | 2              | 3              | 4              | 5              | 6              | 7              | 8              | 9              | 10             | 11             | 12             |
| 406       | <b>0.0319</b>  | 0.0379         | -0.0341        | -0.0285        | -0.0306        | -0.0239        | -0.0049        | 0.0401         | 0.009          | 0.0394         | 0.0408         | 0.0446         |
| 407       | <b>0.1109</b>  | 0.1363         | 0.1433         | 0.1498         | 0.1559         | <b>0.1556</b>  | <b>0.1238</b>  | <b>0.1395</b>  | <b>0.1189</b>  | <b>0.1173</b>  | <b>0.1162</b>  | <b>0.1166</b>  |
| 408       | -0.0655        | -0.0715        | -0.0551        | -0.0422        | -0.041         | -0.0431        | -0.0667        | -0.0769        | -0.0871        | -0.1007        | <b>-0.1061</b> | <b>-0.1166</b> |
| 409       | 0.0242         | 0.0425         | 0.048          | 0.047          | 0.0476         | 0.0454         | 0.0321         | 0.0512         | 0.0479         | 0.0334         | 0.032          | 0.0299         |
| 410       | -0.0768        | -0.045         | -0.067         | -0.0389        | -0.0295        | -0.0177        | -0.0544        | -0.0589        | -0.0891        | -0.0788        | -0.088         | -0.0954        |
| 411       | -0.1148        | -0.1619        | <b>-0.121</b>  | -0.1164        | -0.1014        | -0.0921        | -0.1183        | <b>-0.1541</b> | <b>-0.1425</b> | <b>-0.1646</b> | <b>-0.1711</b> | <b>-0.186</b>  |
| 412       | <b>-0.2009</b> | <b>-0.2227</b> | <b>-0.2121</b> | <b>-0.2143</b> | <b>-0.2164</b> | <b>-0.2135</b> | <b>-0.2096</b> | <b>-0.2115</b> | <b>-0.219</b>  | <b>-0.2124</b> | <b>-0.2123</b> | <b>-0.2157</b> |
| 413       | <b>-0.2889</b> | <b>-0.2306</b> | <b>-0.2401</b> | <b>-0.2466</b> | <b>-0.2423</b> | <b>-0.2475</b> | <b>-0.2652</b> | <b>-0.2301</b> | <b>-0.2217</b> | <b>-0.2375</b> | <b>-0.2107</b> | <b>-0.2096</b> |
| 414       | <b>0.2142</b>  | <b>0.2114</b>  | <b>0.2221</b>  | <b>0.2332</b>  | <b>0.2387</b>  | <b>0.2342</b>  | <b>0.2039</b>  | <b>0.1999</b>  | <b>0.1806</b>  | <b>0.1787</b>  | <b>0.1659</b>  | <b>0.1537</b>  |
| 415       | -0.1167        | -0.0345        | -0.0393        | -0.0662        | -0.0866        | -0.112         | <b>-0.0663</b> | -0.0418        | 0.0087         | -0.0315        | 0.0211         | 0.0232         |
| 416       | -0.2556        | <b>-0.2605</b> | <b>-0.1989</b> | <b>-0.2005</b> | <b>-0.2017</b> | <b>-0.2006</b> | <b>-0.2122</b> | <b>-0.2559</b> | <b>-0.2373</b> | <b>-0.2627</b> | <b>-0.2755</b> | <b>-0.2822</b> |
| 501       | -0.2188        | <b>-0.2805</b> | <b>-0.2357</b> | <b>-0.2273</b> | <b>-0.2204</b> | <b>-0.2132</b> | <b>-0.2201</b> | <b>-0.2811</b> | <b>-0.249</b>  | <b>-0.2728</b> | <b>-0.272</b>  | <b>-0.2758</b> |
| 502       | -0.1762        | <b>-0.1774</b> | <b>-0.1907</b> | <b>-0.1668</b> | <b>-0.1515</b> | <b>-0.1521</b> | <b>-0.1676</b> | <b>-0.2032</b> | <b>-0.2079</b> | <b>-0.2073</b> | <b>-0.2162</b> | <b>-0.2276</b> |
| 503       | -0.322         | <b>-0.3559</b> | <b>-0.3386</b> | <b>-0.3428</b> | <b>-0.3366</b> | <b>-0.3322</b> | <b>-0.3355</b> | <b>-0.3534</b> | <b>-0.341</b>  | <b>-0.352</b>  | <b>-0.3461</b> | <b>-0.3458</b> |
| 504       | <b>-0.1951</b> | <b>-0.2591</b> | <b>-0.2633</b> | <b>-0.2453</b> | <b>-0.2192</b> | <b>-0.2132</b> | <b>-0.2319</b> | <b>-0.278</b>  | <b>-0.2764</b> | <b>-0.2743</b> | <b>-0.2874</b> | <b>-0.2917</b> |
| 505       | <b>0.2734</b>  | <b>0.1937</b>  | <b>0.2301</b>  | <b>0.2354</b>  | <b>0.24</b>    | <b>0.2362</b>  | <b>0.2077</b>  | <b>0.1976</b>  | <b>0.1979</b>  | <b>0.1738</b>  | <b>0.1723</b>  | <b>0.1555</b>  |
| 506       | <b>-0.1286</b> | -0.1982        | <b>-0.1682</b> | <b>-0.147</b>  | -0.1473        | -0.1414        | <b>-0.1598</b> | <b>-0.1928</b> | <b>-0.2074</b> | <b>-0.2075</b> | <b>-0.2213</b> | <b>-0.2306</b> |
| 507       | 0.2206         | <b>0.2689</b>  | <b>0.2745</b>  | <b>0.2635</b>  | <b>0.2578</b>  | <b>0.2504</b>  | <b>0.217</b>   | <b>0.2872</b>  | <b>0.2376</b>  | <b>0.2511</b>  | <b>0.2502</b>  | <b>0.2458</b>  |
| 601       | <b>0.1899</b>  | <b>0.1037</b>  | <b>0.0986</b>  | <b>0.0933</b>  | <b>0.0928</b>  | <b>0.0858</b>  | <b>0.1458</b>  | <b>0.0843</b>  | 0.1732         | <b>0.1555</b>  | <b>0.1743</b>  | <b>0.1765</b>  |
| 602       | -0.0689        | -0.1104        | -0.1542        | <b>-0.1065</b> | -0.1155        | -0.077         | -0.1414        | <b>-0.1369</b> | <b>-0.1489</b> | <b>-0.153</b>  | <b>-0.136</b>  | <b>-0.1328</b> |
| 603       | <b>0.1063</b>  | 0.1243         | 0.1059         | 0.103          | 0.1078         | 0.1019         | <b>0.0988</b>  | 0.1314         | <b>0.101</b>   | <b>0.1323</b>  | <b>0.1317</b>  | <b>0.1318</b>  |
| 604       | -0.1756        | <b>-0.1914</b> | <b>-0.1697</b> | <b>-0.1702</b> | <b>-0.1655</b> | <b>-0.1604</b> | <b>-0.1842</b> | <b>-0.1868</b> | <b>-0.2004</b> | <b>-0.1936</b> | <b>-0.2031</b> | <b>-0.2048</b> |
| 605       | <b>-0.0252</b> | 0.0085         | 0.0206         | 0.0326         | 0.0446         | 0.0481         | 0.0303         | 0.0018         | -0.0075        | -0.0053        | -0.0155        | -0.0319        |
| 606       | <b>-0.0034</b> | -0.004         | -0.0107        | -0.016         | -0.0171        | -0.0216        | 0.0022         | -0.007         | 0.0075         | 0.0044         | 0.0083         | 0.0053         |

TABLE A1 (CONTINUED). RESULTS OF EACH STAGE OF THE COMPONENT SELECTION PROCESS FOR THE ONE DIMENSIONAL GENERAL LEFT-RIGHT SCALE. CORRELATIONS IN BOLD INDICATE COMPONENTS THAT WERE INCLUDED IN THE SCALE IN THAT ITERATION.

| Component | Iteration      |                |                |                |                |                |                |                |                |                |                |                |
|-----------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
|           | 1              | 2              | 3              | 4              | 5              | 6              | 7              | 8              | 9              | 10             | 11             | 12             |
| 607       | -0.0903        | -0.0932        | -0.0889        | -0.0779        | -0.078         | -0.0721        | -0.0598        | -0.1126        | <b>-0.0706</b> | -0.0823        | -0.0863        | -0.081         |
| 608       | 0.2174         | <b>0.1841</b>  | <b>0.1826</b>  | <b>0.1822</b>  | <b>0.1806</b>  | <b>0.1796</b>  | <b>0.178</b>   | <b>0.1868</b>  | <b>0.1753</b>  | <b>0.1878</b>  | <b>0.18</b>    | <b>0.1769</b>  |
| 701       | <b>-0.2571</b> | <b>-0.2662</b> | <b>-0.2685</b> | <b>-0.2687</b> | <b>-0.2636</b> | <b>-0.2613</b> | <b>-0.2895</b> | <b>-0.2706</b> | <b>-0.2517</b> | <b>-0.2924</b> | <b>-0.2664</b> | <b>-0.2673</b> |
| 702       | 0.2389         | <b>0.2236</b>  | <b>0.2181</b>  | <b>0.2152</b>  | <b>0.2078</b>  | <b>0.2202</b>  | <b>0.1518</b>  | <b>0.2288</b>  | <b>0.149</b>   | <b>0.159</b>   | <b>0.1532</b>  | <b>0.1487</b>  |
| 703       | -0.0706        | -0.0192        | -0.0437        | -0.0231        | -0.014         | -0.0075        | -0.0278        | -0.0361        | -0.0559        | -0.0519        | -0.0572        | -0.06          |
| 704       | -0.0956        | -0.0565        | -0.0436        | -0.0399        | -0.0345        | -0.0336        | -0.0058        | -0.0564        | -0.0162        | -0.0288        | -0.0317        | -0.0317        |
| 705       | -0.2118        | <b>-0.2771</b> | <b>-0.2267</b> | <b>-0.2168</b> | <b>-0.2131</b> | <b>-0.2121</b> | <b>-0.2253</b> | <b>-0.2795</b> | <b>-0.2608</b> | <b>-0.2779</b> | <b>-0.2881</b> | <b>-0.2958</b> |
| 706       | -0.2094        | <b>-0.2418</b> | <b>-0.2078</b> | <b>-0.1921</b> | <b>-0.1881</b> | <b>-0.187</b>  | <b>-0.1848</b> | <b>-0.2511</b> | <b>-0.2137</b> | <b>-0.2353</b> | <b>-0.2456</b> | <b>-0.2473</b> |

TABLE A2. ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND AMBIGUOUS MANIFESTO COMPONENTS.

| Economic issues  |                                            | Social Issues                        |                                         |
|------------------|--------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------|
| 303              | Governmental and Administrative Efficiency | 101                                  | Foreign Special Relationships: Positive |
| 401              | Free Enterprise: Positive                  | 102                                  | Foreign Special Relationships: Negative |
| 402              | Incentives: Positive                       | 103                                  | Anti-imperialism: Anti-Colonialism      |
| 403              | Market Regulation: Positive                | 104                                  | Military: Positive                      |
| 404              | Economic Planning: Positive                | 105                                  | Military: Negative                      |
| 405              | Corporatism                                | 106                                  | Peace: Positive                         |
| 406              | Protectionism: Positive                    | 107                                  | Internationalism: Positive              |
| 407              | Protectionism: Negative                    | 109                                  | Internationalism: Negative              |
| 408              | Economic Goals                             | 201                                  | Freedom and Human Rights: Positive      |
| 409              | Keynesian Demand Management                | 202                                  | Democracy: Positive                     |
| 410              | Productivity: Positive                     | 203                                  | Constitutionalism: Positive             |
| 411              | Technology and Infrastructure              | 204                                  | Constitutionalism: Negative             |
| 412              | Controlled Economy: Positive               | 304                                  | Political Corruption                    |
| 413              | Nationalisation: Positive                  | 305                                  | Political Authority: Positive           |
| 414              | Economic Orthodoxy: Positive               | 501                                  | Environmental Protection: Positive      |
| 415              | Marxist Analysis: Positive                 | 502                                  | Culture                                 |
| 503              | Social Justice                             | 601                                  | National Way of Life: Positive          |
| 504              | Welfare State Expansion: Positive          | 602                                  | National Way of Life: Negative          |
| 505              | Welfare State Limitation: Positive         | 603                                  | Traditional Morality: Positive          |
| 506              | Education Expansion: Positive              | 604                                  | Traditional Morality: Negative          |
| 507              | Education Limitation: Positive             | 605                                  | Law and Order: Positive                 |
| 701              | Labour Groups: Positive                    | 606                                  | Social Harmony: Positive                |
| 702              | Labour Groups: Negative                    | 607                                  | Multiculturalism: Positive              |
|                  |                                            | 608                                  | Multiculturalism: Negative              |
| Ambiguous issues |                                            |                                      |                                         |
|                  | 301                                        | Decentralisation                     |                                         |
|                  | 302                                        | Centralisation                       |                                         |
|                  | 416                                        | Anti-Growth Economy: Positive        |                                         |
|                  | 703                                        | Farmers                              |                                         |
|                  | 704                                        | Middle Class and Professional Groups |                                         |
|                  | 705                                        | Underprivileged Minority Groups      |                                         |
|                  | 706                                        | Non-economic Demographic Groups      |                                         |

TABLE A3. EXOGENOUS CORRELATIONS BETWEEN FOUR EXISTINGS MANIFESTO SCALES AND THEIR COMPONENTS.

| Component | Benoit-Laver<br>State<br>involvement in<br>economy | Bakker-Hobolt<br>left-right | Component | Benoit-Laver<br>Social liberal-<br>conservative | Bakker-Hobolt<br>libertarian-<br>authoritarian |
|-----------|----------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------|-------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------|
| 401       | 0.3191                                             | 0.2969                      | 103       | -0.0573                                         |                                                |
| 402       | 0.0235                                             | 0.0522                      | 104       | 0.061                                           |                                                |
| 403       | -0.0861                                            | -0.0966                     | 105       | -0.3084                                         |                                                |
| 404       | -0.0633                                            | -0.0095                     | 106       | -0.2496                                         |                                                |
| 405       |                                                    | 0.0669                      | 107       | -0.0833                                         |                                                |
| 406       | 0.0211                                             | 0.0662                      | 201       | -0.1444                                         | -0.1562                                        |
| 407       | 0.1153                                             | 0.1483                      | 202       | -0.0467                                         | -0.1468                                        |
| 409       |                                                    | 0.0174                      | 203       | -0.0245                                         |                                                |
| 410       |                                                    | -0.0074                     | 305       | 0.0527                                          | 0.1288                                         |
| 412       | -0.2036                                            | -0.2074                     | 501       |                                                 | -0.17                                          |
| 413       | -0.3024                                            | -0.2851                     | 502       |                                                 | -0.1287                                        |
| 414       | 0.246                                              | 0.2678                      | 601       | 0.1759                                          | 0.2001                                         |
| 415       |                                                    | -0.2177                     | 602       |                                                 | -0.2284                                        |
| 503       |                                                    | -0.308                      | 603       | 0.0923                                          | 0.0901                                         |
| 504       | -0.1978                                            | -0.1678                     | 604       |                                                 | -0.1463                                        |
| 505       | 0.2727                                             | 0.2454                      | 605       | 0.0895                                          | -0.0012                                        |
| 506       | -0.098                                             | -0.0813                     | 606       | -0.0089                                         | 0.0623                                         |
| 507       |                                                    | 0.1658                      | 607       |                                                 | -0.1289                                        |
| 701       | -0.2714                                            | -0.263                      | 608       |                                                 | 0.1694                                         |
| 702       |                                                    | 0.2414                      | 705       |                                                 | -0.1915                                        |
|           |                                                    |                             | 706       |                                                 | -0.2291                                        |

TABLE A4. RESULTS OF EACH STAGE OF THE COMPONENT SELECTION PROCESS FOR THE ECONOMIC LEFT-RIGHT SCALE. CORRELATIONS IN BOLD INDICATE COMPONENTS THAT WERE INCLUDED IN THE SCALE IN THAT ITERATION.

| Component | Iteration      |                |                |                |
|-----------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
|           | 1              | 2              | 3              | 4              |
| 303       | 0.0648         | -0.0026        | -0.0308        | -0.0604        |
| 401       | <b>0.3484</b>  | <b>0.2923</b>  | <b>0.3043</b>  | <b>0.2915</b>  |
| 402       | <b>0.0626</b>  | 0.0822         | 0.0386         | 0.0167         |
| 403       | -0.0763        | -0.1157        | <b>-0.1274</b> | <b>-0.1508</b> |
| 404       | -0.0483        | -0.0608        | -0.0568        | -0.0677        |
| 405       | 0.0568         | 0.0195         | 0.0419         | 0.0368         |
| 406       | 0.0159         | -0.0394        | -0.036         | -0.0459        |
| 407       | <b>0.147</b>   | <b>0.1629</b>  | <b>0.1492</b>  | <b>0.1369</b>  |
| 408       | -0.0092        | -0.032         | -0.0573        | -0.0722        |
| 409       | -0.0101        | 0.0447         | 0.012          | 0.0252         |
| 410       | 0.0121         | 0.0031         | -0.0404        | -0.0774        |
| 411       | -0.0135        | -0.0665        | -0.1205        | <b>-0.1246</b> |
| 412       | <b>-0.2048</b> | <b>-0.2493</b> | <b>-0.2345</b> | <b>-0.2326</b> |
| 413       | <b>-0.2984</b> | <b>-0.289</b>  | <b>-0.2921</b> | <b>-0.2806</b> |
| 414       | <b>0.2734</b>  | <b>0.2312</b>  | <b>0.2172</b>  | <b>0.2038</b>  |
| 415       | <b>-0.2413</b> | <b>-0.1325</b> | <b>-0.0849</b> | -0.042         |
| 503       | <b>-0.2898</b> | <b>-0.3097</b> | <b>-0.3409</b> | <b>-0.3371</b> |
| 504       | <b>-0.0923</b> | -0.2145        | <b>-0.266</b>  | <b>-0.2913</b> |
| 505       | <b>0.2736</b>  | <b>0.1947</b>  | <b>0.217</b>   | <b>0.2151</b>  |
| 506       | -0.0795        | -0.1004        | <b>-0.1413</b> | <b>-0.1726</b> |
| 507       | <b>0.1698</b>  | <b>0.2</b>     | <b>0.2115</b>  | <b>0.2273</b>  |
| 701       | <b>-0.2459</b> | <b>-0.2633</b> | <b>-0.278</b>  | <b>-0.2751</b> |
| 702       | <b>0.2585</b>  | <b>0.2006</b>  | <b>0.2302</b>  | <b>0.2313</b>  |
| 108       | -0.0327        | -0.0661        | -0.0811        | -0.0969        |
| 110       | -0.1136        | <b>-0.1135</b> | <b>-0.1079</b> | <b>-0.1076</b> |
| 301       | -0.0334        | -0.0858        | -0.1201        | <b>-0.1404</b> |
| 302       | 0.0903         | 0.0372         | 0.0352         | 0.0254         |
| 416       | -0.1858        | <b>-0.1749</b> | <b>-0.1708</b> | <b>-0.1762</b> |
| 703       | 0.0413         | 0.007          | -0.0278        | -0.0561        |
| 704       | -0.0451        | -0.0723        | -0.0679        | -0.07          |
| 705       | -0.1412        | <b>-0.1844</b> | <b>-0.2035</b> | <b>-0.2234</b> |
| 706       | -0.1096        | <b>-0.1614</b> | <b>-0.1885</b> | <b>-0.219</b>  |

TABLE A5. RESULTS OF EACH STAGE OF THE COMPONENT SELECTION PROCESS FOR THE SOCIAL LIBERAL-CONSERVATIVE SCALE. CORRELATIONS IN BOLD INDICATE COMPONENTS THAT WERE INCLUDED IN THE SCALE IN THAT ITERATION.

| Component | 1              | 2              | 3              | 4<br>(cycle<br>break 1) | 5<br>(cycle<br>break 2) |
|-----------|----------------|----------------|----------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|
| 101       | -0.0053        | -0.0109        | -0.001         | -0.011                  | -0.0009                 |
| 102       | 0.0037         | -0.0015        | -0.0095        | -0.0017                 | -0.0094                 |
| 103       | 0.0434         | 0.0686         | 0.0616         | 0.0695                  | 0.0607                  |
| 104       | 0.039          | 0.0352         | 0.0279         | 0.0358                  | 0.0274                  |
| 105       | <b>-0.1623</b> | <b>-0.1452</b> | <b>-0.1473</b> | <b>-0.1473</b>          | <b>-0.145</b>           |
| 106       | <b>-0.1546</b> | <b>-0.144</b>  | <b>-0.1352</b> | <b>-0.1453</b>          | <b>-0.1338</b>          |
| 107       | -0.2442        | <b>-0.2396</b> | <b>-0.2533</b> | <b>-0.2385</b>          | <b>-0.2539</b>          |
| 109       | 0.2037         | <b>0.2127</b>  | <b>0.2194</b>  | <b>0.2128</b>           | <b>0.2192</b>           |
| 201       | <b>-0.1347</b> | <b>-0.1176</b> | <b>-0.1261</b> | <b>-0.119</b>           | <b>-0.1245</b>          |
| 202       | <b>-0.1129</b> | <b>-0.1184</b> | <b>-0.1205</b> | <b>-0.119</b>           | <b>-0.1197</b>          |
| 203       | 0.0306         | 0.0416         | 0.0553         | 0.0394                  | 0.0574                  |
| 204       | 0.0808         | 0.1006         | <b>0.0904</b>  | 0.0904                  | <b>0.1006</b>           |
| 304       | 0.0668         | 0.0589         | 0.0563         | 0.0597                  | 0.0553                  |
| 305       | <b>0.1268</b>  | <b>0.1451</b>  | <b>0.1535</b>  | <b>0.1441</b>           | <b>0.1545</b>           |
| 501       | <b>-0.2216</b> | <b>-0.2397</b> | <b>-0.2522</b> | <b>-0.2389</b>          | <b>-0.2527</b>          |
| 502       | <b>-0.198</b>  | <b>-0.2112</b> | <b>-0.2225</b> | <b>-0.2101</b>          | <b>-0.2236</b>          |
| 601       | <b>0.1797</b>  | <b>0.2096</b>  | <b>0.2081</b>  | <b>0.2099</b>           | <b>0.2077</b>           |
| 602       | <b>-0.0998</b> | -0.1525        | <b>-0.0564</b> | <b>-0.1525</b>          | -0.0564                 |
| 603       | 0.0464         | 0.0329         | 0.032          | 0.0338                  | 0.031                   |
| 604       | <b>-0.0675</b> | -0.0806        | -0.0844        | -0.08                   | -0.085                  |
| 605       | 0.0103         | -0.0206        | -0.0258        | -0.0198                 | -0.0265                 |
| 606       | 0.0561         | 0.0439         | 0.0421         | 0.0438                  | 0.0423                  |
| 607       | <b>-0.1383</b> | <b>-0.1624</b> | <b>-0.1614</b> | <b>-0.1662</b>          | <b>-0.1574</b>          |
| 608       | <b>0.1507</b>  | <b>0.1712</b>  | <b>0.1684</b>  | <b>0.1728</b>           | <b>0.1666</b>           |
| 108       | -0.0659        | -0.0864        | -0.0814        | -0.0859                 | -0.0817                 |
| 110       | 0.0537         | 0.0696         | 0.069          | 0.0694                  | 0.0692                  |
| 301       | -0.1821        | <b>-0.1856</b> | <b>-0.1816</b> | <b>-0.1888</b>          | <b>-0.1776</b>          |
| 302       | 0.1212         | <b>0.1237</b>  | <b>0.1109</b>  | <b>0.1237</b>           | <b>0.1109</b>           |
| 416       | -0.206         | <b>-0.2119</b> | <b>-0.218</b>  | <b>-0.2113</b>          | <b>-0.2186</b>          |
| 703       | -0.0393        | -0.0529        | -0.0561        | -0.0529                 | -0.0561                 |
| 704       | -0.1124        | <b>-0.1055</b> | <b>-0.1079</b> | <b>-0.1044</b>          | <b>-0.1089</b>          |
| 705       | <b>-0.2124</b> | <b>-0.2291</b> | <b>-0.2354</b> | <b>-0.2289</b>          | <b>-0.2355</b>          |
| 706       | <b>-0.2498</b> | <b>-0.2557</b> | <b>-0.2653</b> | <b>-0.2575</b>          | <b>-0.2635</b>          |

TABLE A6. CORRELATION BETWEEN THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL SCALES FOR ALL COUNTRIES IN THE MARPOR DATASET.

| Country                    | Correlation | Country          | Correlation |
|----------------------------|-------------|------------------|-------------|
| Albania                    | 0.3434**    | Korea            | 0.26        |
| Armenia                    | -0.0395 †   | Latvia           | -0.1599     |
| Australia                  | 0.204*      | Lithuania        | 0.2326      |
| Austria                    | -0.0738     | Luxembourg       | 0.4297***   |
| Azerbaijan                 | 0.1323 †    | Macedonia        | -0.1903     |
| Belarus                    | 0.1242 †    | Malta            | 0.8484 †    |
| Belgium                    | 0.1409*     | Mexico           | -0.0365     |
| Bosnia-Herzegovina         | 0.3486*     | Moldova          | -0.1606     |
| Bulgaria                   | -0.1588     | Montenegro       | 0.5199***   |
| Canada                     | 0.0437      | Netherlands      | 0.196**     |
| Croatia                    | 0.049       | New Zealand      | 0.2898***   |
| Cyprus                     | -0.2862 †   | Northern Ireland | 0.3423*     |
| Czech Republic             | 0.0025      | Norway           | 0.4208***   |
| Denmark                    | 0.2426***   | Poland           | -0.3579***  |
| Estonia                    | 0.1308      | Portugal         | 0.1131      |
| Finland                    | 0.2388***   | Romania          | 0.3234**    |
| France                     | 0.3322***   | Russia           | 0.0707      |
| Georgia                    | -0.1178     | Serbia           | 0.1186      |
| German Democratic Republic | 0.1382 †    | Slovakia         | -0.0389     |
| Germany                    | 0.2733**    | Slovenia         | 0.4234***   |
| Great Britain              | 0.2284*     | Spain            | -0.0352     |
| Greece                     | 0.2766*     | Sri Lanka        | 0.4018 †    |
| Hungary                    | -0.2762*    | Sweden           | 0.2071**    |
| Iceland                    | 0.4608***   | Switzerland      | 0.4683***   |
| Ireland                    | 0.3833***   | Turkey           | 0.0975      |
| Israel                     | 0.2509***   | Ukraine          | -0.4013***  |
| Italy                      | 0.4248***   | United States    | 0.1994      |
| Japan                      | 0.2363**    |                  |             |

Statistical significance: \* =  $p < 0.1$ , \*\* =  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* =  $p < 0.01$

†Low number of observations in MARPOR dataset (<20), interpret correlation/(lack of) significance with caution.

## Bibliography

---

- Achen, Christopher H. "Social Psychology, Demographic Variables, and Linear Regression: Breaking the Iron Triangle in Voting Research." *Political Behavior* 14, no. 3 (September 1, 1992): 195–211.
- Adam, Silke, and Michaela Maier. "National Parties as Politicizers of EU Integration? Party Campaign Communication in the Run-up to the 2009 European Parliament Election." *European Union Politics* 12, no. 3 (September 1, 2011): 431–453. doi:10.1177/1465116511410234.
- Adams, James. "Causes and Electoral Consequences of Party Policy Shifts in Multiparty Elections: Theoretical Results and Empirical Evidence." *Annual Review of Political Science* 15, no. 1 (2012): 401–419. doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-031710-101450.
- Adams, James, Lawrence Ezrow, and Zeynep Somer-Topcu. "Do Voters Respond to Party Manifestos or to a Wider Information Environment? An Analysis of Mass-Elite Linkages on European Integration." *American Journal of Political Science* (May 1, 2014): n/a–n/a. doi:10.1111/ajps.12115.
- . "Is Anybody Listening? Evidence That Voters Do Not Respond to European Parties' Policy Statements During Elections." *American Journal of Political Science* 55, no. 2 (April 1, 2011): 370–382. doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2010.00489.x.
- Andersen, Svein S., and Tom R. Burns. "The European Union and the Erosion of Parliamentary Democracy: A Study of Post-Parliamentary Governance." In *The European Union: How Democratic Is It?*, edited by Svein S. Andersen and Kjell A. Eliassen, 227–253. London: Sage, 1996.

- APSA. "Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System." *American Political Science Review* 44, no. 3 (1950).
- Arnold, Christine, Eliyahu V. Sapir, and Catherine de Vries. "Parties' Positions on European Integration: Issue Congruence, Ideology or Context?" *West European Politics* 35, no. 6 (2012): 1341–1362. doi:10.1080/01402382.2012.713749.
- Arrow, Kenneth J. "A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare." *Journal of Political Economy* 58, no. 4 (August 1, 1950): 328–346.
- Aspinwall, Mark. "Preferring Europe: Ideology and National Preferences on European Integration." *European Union Politics* 3 (2002): 81–111.
- Bakker, Ryan, and Sara Hobolt. "Measuring Party Positions." In *Political Choice Matters*, edited by Geoffrey Evans and Nan Dirk de Graaf. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.
- Bakker, Ryan, Seth Jolly, and Jonathan Polk. "Complexity in the European Party Space: Exploring Dimensionality with Experts." *European Union Politics* 13, no. 2 (2012): 219–245.
- Bartels, Larry M. "Beyond the Running Tally: Partisan Bias in Political Perceptions." *Political Behavior* 24, no. 2 (June 1, 2002): 117–150.
- Bartels, Larry M., and Simon Jackman. "A Generational Model of Political Learning." *Electoral Studies* 33 (March 2014): 7–18. doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2013.06.004.
- Benoit, Kenneth, and Michael Laver. "Estimating Party Policy Positions: Comparing Expert Surveys and Hand-Coded Content Analysis." *Electoral Studies* 26, no. 1 (2007): 90–107.
- . "The Dimensionality of Political Space: Epistemological and Methodological Considerations." *European Union Politics* 13, no. 2 (2012): 194–218.
- Berelson, Bernard, Paul F Lazarsfeld, and William N McPhee. *Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954.
- Besley, Timothy. "Issue Unbundling via Citizens' Initiatives." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 3, no. 4 (December 31, 2008): 379–397. doi:10.1561/100.00008059.

- Bjørklund, Tor. "The Demand for Referendum: When Does It Arise and When Does It Succeed?" *Scandinavian Political Studies* 5, no. 3 (1982): 237–259.
- Bogdanor, Vernon, and Geoffrey Woodcock. "The European Community and Sovereignty." *Parliamentary Affairs* 44, no. 4 (October 1, 1991): 481–492.
- Boix, Carles. "Setting the Rules of the Game: The Choice of Electoral Systems in Advanced Democracies." *The American Political Science Review* 93, no. 3 (September 1, 1999): 609–624. doi:10.2307/2585577.
- Bomberg, Elizabeth E. *Green Parties and Politics in the European Union*. Psychology Press, 1998.
- Bormann, Nils-Christian, and Matt Golder. "Democratic Electoral Systems around the World, 1946–2011." *Electoral Studies* 32, no. 2 (June 2013): 360–369. doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2013.01.005.
- Bowler, Shaun, Todd Donovan, and Jeffrey A. Karp. "Enraged or Engaged? Preferences for Direct Citizen Participation in Affluent Democracies." *Political Research Quarterly* 60, no. 3 (September 1, 2007): 351–362. doi:10.1177/1065912907304108.
- Boyce, Brigitte. "The Democratic Deficit of the European Community." *Parliamentary Affairs* 46, no. 4 (October 1, 1993): 458–477.
- Braun, Daniela, Hermann Schmitt, Andreas M. Wüst, Sebastian Adrian Popa, Slava Mikhaylov, and Felix Dwinger. "Euromanifestos Project (EMP) 1979 – 2009," 2015.
- Brown, C. Hendricks. "Asymptotic Comparison of Missing Data Procedures for Estimating Factor Loadings." *Psychometrika* 48, no. 2 (1983): 269–291.
- Brug, Wouter van der. "Voters' Perceptions and Party Dynamics." *Party Politics* 5, no. 2 (April 1, 1999): 147–169. doi:10.1177/1354068899005002001.
- Budge, Ian. "Expert Judgements of Party Policy Positions: Uses and Limitations in Political Research." *European Journal of Political Research* 37, no. 1 (2000): 103–113. doi:10.1111/1475-6765.00506.

- . “The Internal Analysis of Election Programmes.” In *Ideology, Strategy and Party Change*, edited by Ian Budge, David Robertson, and Derek J. Hearl. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987.
- . “Validating Party Policy Placements.” *British Journal of Political Science* 31, no. 1 (2001): 179–223.
- Budge, Ian, and Dennis Farlie. “Party Competition: Selective Emphasis or Direct Confrontation? An Alternative View with Data.” In *Western European Party Systems: Continuity and Change*, 267–305. Beverly Hills, California: Sage, 1983.
- Budge, Ian, Hans-Dieter Klingemann, Andrea Volkens, Judith Bara, and Eric Tanenbaum. *Mapping Policy Preferences: Estimates for Parties, Electors, and Governments, 1945–1998*. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2001.
- Butler, David, and Austin Ranney, eds. *Referendums: A Comparative Study of Practice and Theory*. Washington D.C.: American Enterprise for Public Policy Research, 1978.
- . , eds. *Referendums around the World: The Growing Use of Direct Democracy*. London: Macmillan, 1994.
- Campbell, Angus, Philip Converse, Warren Miller, and Donald Stokes. *The American Voter*. New York: Wiley, 1960.
- Carrubba, Clifford J. “The Electoral Connection in European Union Politics.” *The Journal of Politics* 63, no. 1 (2001): 141–158.
- Carrubba, Clifford J., and Matthew Gabel. “Roll-Call Votes and Party Discipline in the European Parliament: Reconsidering MEP Voting Behavior.” European Parliament Research Group Working Paper No. 2-99, 1999.
- Cerulus, Laurens. “Van Rompuy Scorns Direct Election of Commission President.” Text. *EurActiv* / *EU News & Policy Debates, across Languages*, October 14, 2013.

<http://www.euractiv.com/eu-elections-2014/van-rompuy-underlines-objections-news-531049>.

Charalambous, Giorgos. *European Integration and the Communist Dilemma*. New edition edition. Farnham, Surrey ; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2013.

Clark, William Roberts, and Matt Golder. "Rehabilitating Duverger's Theory Testing the Mechanical and Strategic Modifying Effects of Electoral Laws." *Comparative Political Studies* 39, no. 6 (August 1, 2006): 679–708. doi:10.1177/0010414005278420.

Closa, Carlos. "Why Convene Referendums? Explaining Choices in EU Constitutional Politics." *Journal of European Public Policy* 14, no. 8 (2007): 1311–1332.

Colomer, Josep M. "It's Parties That Choose Electoral Systems (or, Duverger's Laws Upside Down)." *Political Studies* 53, no. 1 (2005): 1–21. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9248.2005.00514.x.

Coman, Emanuel. "Dimensions of Political Conflict in West and East An Application of Vote Scaling to 22 European Parliaments." *Party Politics* (July 9, 2015): 1354068815593454. doi:10.1177/1354068815593454.

Conover, Pamela Johnston, and Stanley Feldman. "Projection and the Perception of Candidates' Issue Positions." *The Western Political Quarterly* 35, no. 2 (June 1982): 228. doi:10.2307/448017.

Converse, Philip E. "The Structure of Belief Systems in Mass Publics." In *Ideology and Discontent*, edited by D Apter. New York: Free Press, 1964.

Cox, Gary W. *Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems*. Cambridge University Press, 1997.

Cox, Karen E., and Leonard J. Schoppa. "Interaction Effects in Mixed-Member Electoral Systems Theory and Evidence From Germany, Japan, and Italy." *Comparative Political Studies* 35, no. 9 (November 1, 2002): 1027–1053. doi:10.1177/001041402237505.

- Crombez, Christophe. "The Democratic Deficit in the European Union Much Ado about Nothing?" *European Union Politics* 4, no. 1 (March 1, 2003): 101–120. doi:10.1177/1465116503004001583.
- Dahlberg, Stefan. "Does Context Matter – The Impact of Electoral Systems, Political Parties and Individual Characteristics on Voters' Perceptions of Party Positions." *Electoral Studies* 32, no. 4 (December 2013): 670–683. doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2013.02.003.
- . "Political Parties and Perceptual Agreement: The Influence of Party Related Factors on Voters' Perceptions in Proportional Electoral Systems." *Electoral Studies* 28, no. 2 (June 2009): 270–278. doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2009.01.007.
- Dahl, Robert. *Democracy and Its Critics*. Yale University Press, 1989.
- Dancey, Logan, and Geoffrey Sheagley. "Heuristics Behaving Badly: Party Cues and Voter Knowledge." *American Journal of Political Science* 57, no. 2 (2013): 312–325. doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2012.00621.x.
- Daniels, Philip. "From Hostility to 'constructive Engagement': The Europeanisation of the Labour Party." *West European Politics* 21, no. 1 (1998): 72–96. doi:10.1080/01402389808425233.
- Desimone, R., and J. Duncan. "Neural Mechanisms of Selective Visual-Attention." *Annual Review of Neuroscience* 18 (1995): 193–222. doi:10.1146/annurev.neuro.18.1.193.
- de Vries, Catherine E. "EU Issue Voting: Asset or Liability? How European Integration Affects Parties' Electoral Fortunes." *European Union Politics* 11, no. 1 (March 1, 2010): 89–117. doi:10.1177/1465116509353456.
- . "Sleeping Giant: Fact or Fairytale?: How European Integration Affects National Elections." *European Union Politics* 8, no. 3 (2007): 363.

- de Vries, Catherine E., Erica E. Edwards, and Erik R. Tillman. "Clarity of Responsibility Beyond the Pocketbook: How Political Institutions Condition EU Issue Voting." *Comparative Political Studies* 44, no. 3 (March 1, 2011): 339–363. doi:10.1177/0010414010384373.
- de Vries, Catherine E., and Erik R. Tillman. "European Union Issue Voting in East and West Europe: The Role of Political Context." *Comparative European Politics* 9, no. 1 (February 2011): 1–17. doi:10.1057/cep.2009.7.
- de Vries, Catherine E., Wouter van der Brug, Marcel H. van Egmond, and Cees van der Eijk. "Individual and Contextual Variation in EU Issue Voting: The Role of Political Information." *Electoral Studies* 30, no. 1 (March 2011): 16–28. doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2010.09.022.
- Döring, Holger, and Philip Manow. "Parliament and Government Composition Database (ParlGov): An Infrastructure for Empirical Information on Parties, Elections and Governments in Modern Democracies. Version 12.," 2012. <http://www.parlgov.org/>.
- Down, Ian, and Carole J. Wilson. "From 'Permissive Consensus' to 'Constraining Dissensus': A Polarizing Union?" *Acta Politica* 43 (2008): 26–49.
- Downs, Anthony. *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. New York: Harper Collins, 1957.
- Drummond, Andrew J. "Assimilation, Contrast and Voter Projections of Parties in Left-Right Space Does the Electoral System Matter?" *Party Politics* 17, no. 6 (November 1, 2011): 711–743. doi:10.1177/1354068810376781.
- Dür, Andreas, and Gemma Mateo. "To Call or Not to Call? Political Parties and Referendums on the EU's Constitutional Treaty." *Comparative Political Studies* 44, no. 4 (2011): 468–492.
- Duverger, Maurice. *Political Parties, Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State*. London: Methuen, 1954.
- EES. "European Election Study 2009," 2009. <http://www.piredeu.eu/>.

- Eichenberg, Richard C., and Russell J. Dalton. "Post-Maastricht Blues: The Transformation of Citizen Support for European Integration, 1973-2004." *Acta Politica* 42 (2007): 128–152.
- Elff, Martin. "A Dynamic State-Space Model of Coded Political Texts." *Political Analysis* 21, no. 2 (2013): 217–232.
- Elster, Jon, ed. *Deliberative Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
- Erisen, Cengiz, Milton Lodge, and Charles S. Taber. "Affective Contagion in Effortful Political Thinking." *Political Psychology* 35, no. 2 (April 1, 2014): 187–206. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9221.2012.00937.x.
- European Parliament. "About the European Parliament," 2015. <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/aboutparliament/en>.
- Evans, Geoffrey. "Europe: A New Electoral Cleavage?" In *Critical Elections: British Parties and Voters in Long-Term Perspective*, edited by Geoffrey Evans and Pippa Norris, 207–222. London: Sage, 1999.
- . "European Integration, Party Politics and Voting in the 2001 Elections." *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion & Parties* 12 (2002): 95–110.
- . "Euroscepticism and Conservative Electoral Support: How an Asset Became a Liability." *British Journal of Political Science* 28, no. 04 (1998): 573–590.
- Evans, Geoffrey, and Robert Andersen. "Do Issues Decide? Partisan Conditioning and Perceptions of Party Issue Positions across the Electoral Cycle." *British Elections & Parties Review* 14, no. 1 (2004): 18–39. doi:10.1080/1368988042000258763.
- Evans, Geoffrey, and Stephen Whitefield. "Identifying the Bases of Party Competition in Eastern Europe." *British Journal of Political Science* 23, no. 4 (October 1, 1993): 521–548.
- . "The Structuring of Political Cleavages in Post-Communist Societies: The Case of the Czech Republic and Slovakia." *Political Studies* 46, no. 1 (March 1, 1998): 115–139. doi:10.1111/1467-9248.00133.

- Farrell, David M., and Roger Scully. "Electing the European Parliament: How Uniform Are 'Uniform' Electoral Systems?\*" *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 43, no. 5 (2005): 969–984. doi:10.1111/j.1468-5965.2005.00604.x.
- Featherstone, Kevin. "Jean Monnet and the 'Democratic Deficit' in the European Union." *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 32, no. 2 (June 1, 1994): 149–170. doi:10.1111/j.1468-5965.1994.tb00491.x.
- Fernandez-Vazquez, Pablo. "And Yet It Moves The Effect of Election Platforms on Party Policy Images." *Comparative Political Studies* 47, no. 14 (December 1, 2014): 1919–1944. doi:10.1177/0010414013516067.
- Festinger, Leon. *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance*. Stanford University Press, 1957.
- . *When Prophecy Fails: A Social and Psychological Study of a Modern Group That Predicted the Destruction of the World*. Harper & Row, 1956.
- Festinger, Leon, and James M. Carlsmith. "Cognitive Consequences of Forced Compliance." *The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology* 58, no. 2 (1959): 203–210. doi:10.1037/h0041593.
- Finke, Daniel, and Thomas König. "Why Risk Popular Ratification Failure? A Comparative Analysis of the Choice of the Ratification Instrument in the 25 Member States of the EU." *Constitutional Political Economy* 20 (2009): 341–365.
- Fiorina, Morris P. *Retrospective Voting in American National Elections*. New Haven: Yale Univ Pr, 1981.
- Follesdal, Andreas, and Simon Hix. "Why There Is a Democratic Deficit in the EU: A Response to Majone and Moravcsik." *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 44, no. 3 (September 1, 2006): 533–562. doi:10.1111/j.1468-5965.2006.00650.x.

- Fortunato, David, and Randolph T. Stevenson. "Perceptions of Partisan Ideologies: The Effect of Coalition Participation." *American Journal of Political Science* 57, no. 2 (April 1, 2013): 459–477. doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2012.00623.x.
- Franklin, Mark, Michael Marsh, and Lauren McLaren. "Uncorking the Bottle: Popular Opposition to European Unification in the Wake of Maastricht." *Journal of Common Market Studies* 32, no. 4 (1994): 455–472.
- Franklin, Mark N. "The Decline of Cleavage Politics." In *Electoral Change: Responses to Evolving Social and Attitudinal Structures in Western Countries*, edited by Mark N. Franklin, Tom T. Mackie, and Henry Valen, 383–405. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
- Franzmann, Simon, and André Kaiser. "Locating Political Parties in Policy Space: A Reanalysis of Party Manifesto Data." *Party Politics* 12, no. 2 (2006): 163–188.
- Frazer, Elizabeth, and Kenneth Macdonald. "Sex Differences in Political Knowledge in Britain." *Political Studies* 51, no. 1 (March 1, 2003): 67–83. doi:10.1111/1467-9248.00413.
- Gabel, Matthew J. "European Integration, Voters and National Politics." *West European Politics* 23, no. 4 (2000): 52–72.
- Gabel, Matthew J., and John D. Huber. "Putting Parties in Their Place: Inferring Party Left-Right Ideological Positions from Party Manifesto Data." *American Journal of Political Science* 44, no. 1 (2000): 94–103.
- Garry, John, Michael Marsh, and Richard Sinnott. "'Second-Order' versus 'Issue-Voting' Effects in EU Referendums." *European Union Politics* 6, no. 2 (2005): 201–21.
- Gerber, Alan, and Donald P. Green. "Rational Learning and Partisan Attitudes." *American Journal of Political Science* 42, no. 3 (July 1, 1998): 794–818. doi:10.2307/2991730.
- Gerber, Elisabeth R. "Legislative Response to the Threat of Popular Initiatives." *American Journal of Political Science* 40, no. 1 (February 1, 1996): 99–128. doi:10.2307/2111696.

- Gibbard, Allan. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result." *Econometrica* 41, no. 4 (July 1, 1973): 587–601. doi:10.2307/1914083.
- Glencross, Andrew, and Alexander Trechsel. "First or Second Order Referendums? Understanding the Votes on the EU Constitutional Treaty in Four EU Member States." *West European Politics* 34, no. 4 (2011): 755–772. doi:10.1080/01402382.2011.572390.
- Gordon, Stacy B., and Gary M. Segura. "Cross–National Variation in the Political Sophistication of Individuals: Capability or Choice?" *The Journal of Politics* 59, no. 01 (1997): 126–147. doi:10.2307/2998218.
- Goren, Paul. "Political Sophistication and Policy Reasoning: A Reconsideration." *American Journal of Political Science* 48, no. 3 (July 1, 2004): 462–478. doi:10.1111/j.0092-5853.2004.00081.x.
- Granberg, Donald, and Edward Brent. "Perceptions of Issue Positions of Presidential Candidates: Candidates Are Often Perceived by Their Supporters as Holding Positions on the Issues That Are Closer to the Supporters' Views than They Really Are." *American Scientist* 68, no. 6 (November 1, 1980): 617–625.
- Granberg, Donald, and Richard Jenks. "Assimilation and Contrast Effects in the 1972 Election." *Human Relations* 30, no. 7 (July 1, 1977): 623–640. doi:10.1177/001872677703000704.
- Grand, Peter, and Guido Tiemann. "Projection Effects and Specification Bias in Spatial Models of European Parliament Elections." *European Union Politics* 14, no. 4 (December 1, 2013): 497–521. doi:10.1177/1465116513490238.
- Green, Jane, and Sara B. Hobolt. "Owning the Issue Agenda: Party Strategies and Vote Choices in British Elections." *Electoral Studies* 27, no. 3 (September 2008): 460–476. doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2008.02.003.

- Grzymala-Busse, Anna. "Authoritarian Determinants of Democratic Party Competition The Communist Successor Parties in East Central Europe." *Party Politics* 12, no. 3 (May 1, 2006): 415–437. doi:10.1177/1354068806063089.
- Heider, Fritz. "Attitudes and Cognitive Organization." *The Journal of Psychology* 21 (January 1946): 107–112. doi:10.1080/00223980.1946.9917275.
- . *The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations*. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1958.
- Hellström, Johan. "Partisan Responses to Europe: The Role of Ideology for National Political Parties' Positions on European Integration." *Journal of European Public Policy* 15, no. 2 (2008): 189–207. doi:10.1080/13501760701817690.
- Henjak, Andrija. "Political Cleavages and Socio-Economic Context: How Welfare Regimes and Historical Divisions Shape Political Cleavages." *West European Politics* 33, no. 3 (2010): 474–504.
- Herron, Erik S, and Misa Nishikawa. "Contamination Effects and the Number of Parties in Mixed-Superposition Electoral Systems." *Electoral Studies* 20, no. 1 (March 2001): 63–86. doi:10.1016/S0261-3794(00)00002-0.
- Hibbing, John R., and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse. *Stealth Democracy: Americans' Beliefs About How Government Should Work*. Cambridge University Press, 2002.
- Hix, Simon. "Dimensions and Alignments in European Union Politics: Cognitive Constraints and Partisan Responses." *European Journal of Political Research* 25 (1999): 69–106.
- . "Electoral Institutions and Legislative Behavior: Explaining Voting Defection in the European Parliament." *World Politics* 56, no. 02 (2004): 194–223. doi:10.1353/wp.2004.0012.
- . "Legislative Behaviour and Party Competition in the European Parliament: An Application of Nominate to the EU." *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 39, no. 4 (November 1, 2001): 663–688. doi:10.1111/1468-5965.00326.

- . “Parliamentary Behavior with Two Principals: Preferences, Parties, and Voting in the European Parliament.” *American Journal of Political Science* 46, no. 3 (July 1, 2002): 688–698. doi:10.2307/3088408.
- . *Whats Wrong with the European Union and How to Fix It*. 1 edition. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008.
- Hix, Simon, and Sara Hagemann. “Could changing the electoral rules fix European parliament elections ?” *Politique européenne* 28, no. 2 (October 26, 2009): 37–52.
- Hix, Simon, and Bjørn Høyland. *The Political System of the European Union*. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011.
- Hix, Simon, and Christopher Lord. *Political Parties in the European Union*. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997.
- Hix, Simon, and Michael Marsh. “Punishment or Protest? Understanding European Parliament Elections.” *Journal of Politics* 69, no. 2 (2007): 495–510. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2508.2007.00546.x.
- . “Second-Order Effects plus Pan-European Political Swings: An Analysis of European Parliament Elections across Time.” *Electoral Studies* 30, no. 1 (2011): 4–15.
- Hix, Simon, Abdul G. Noury, and Gérard Roland. *Democratic Politics in the European Parliament*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
- Hix, Simon, Abdul Noury, and Gérard Roland. “Power to the Parties: Cohesion and Competition in the European Parliament, 1979–2001.” *British Journal of Political Science* 35, no. 02 (April 2005): 209–234. doi:10.1017/S0007123405000128.
- Hobolt, Sara. “A Vote for the President? The Role of Spitzenkandidaten in the 2014 European Parliament Elections.” *Journal of European Public Policy* 21, no. 10 (November 26, 2014): 1528–1540. doi:10.1080/13501763.2014.941148.

- . “Direct Democracy and European Integration.” *Journal of European Public Policy* 13, no. 1 (2006): 153–166.
- . “How Parties Affect Vote Choice in European Integration Referendums.” *Party Politics* 12, no. 5 (2006): 623–647.
- . “Taking Cues on Europe? Voter Competence and Party Endorsements in Referendums on European Integration.” *European Journal of Political Research* 46, no. 2 (2007): 151–182.
- . “When Europe Matters: The Impact of Political Information on Voting Behaviour in EU Referendums.” *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion & Parties* 15, no. 1 (2005): 85–110.
- Hobolt, Sara, and Jae-Jae Spoon. “Motivating the European Voter: Parties, Issues and Campaigns in European Parliament Elections.” *European Journal of Political Research* 51, no. 6 (2012): 701–727. doi:10.1111/j.1475-6765.2012.02057.x.
- Hobolt, Sara, Jae-Jae. Spoon, and James R. Tilley. “A Vote against Europe? Explaining Defection at the 1999 and 2004 European Parliament Elections.” *British Journal of Political Science* 39, no. 1 (2009): 1–23.
- Hobolt, Sara, and James Tilley. *Blaming Europe?: Responsibility Without Accountability in the European Union*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.
- Hobolt, Sara, and Jill Wittrock. “The Second-Order Election Model Revisited: An Experimental Test of Vote Choices in European Parliament Elections.” *Electoral Studies* 30, no. 1 (March 2011): 29–40. doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2010.09.020.
- Hooghe, Liesbet, Ryan Bakker, Anna Brigevid, Catherine E. de Vries, Erica Edwards, Gary Marks, Jan Rovny, Marco R. Steenbergen, and Milada Vachudova. “Reliability and Validity of Measuring Party Positions: The Chapel Hill Expert Surveys of 2002 and 2006.” *European Journal of Political Research* 49, no. 5 (2010): 687–703.

- Hooghe, Liesbet, and Gary Marks. "A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus." *British Journal of Political Science* 39 (2009): 1–23.
- . "The Making of a Polity: The Struggle over European Integration." In *Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism*, edited by Herbert Kitschelt, Peter Lange, Gary Marks, and John D. Stephens, 70–97. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
- Hooghe, Liesbet, Gary Marks, and Carole J. Wilson. "Does Left/Right Structure Party Positions on European Integration?" *Comparative Political Studies* 35, no. 8 (2002): 965–989. doi:10.1177/001041402236310.
- Hosmer, David W., and Stanley Lemeshow. *Applied Logistic Regression*. Second Edition. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2000.
- Hug, Simon, and Thomas König. "In View of Ratification: Governmental Preferences and Domestic Constraints at the Amsterdam Intergovernmental Conference." *International Organization* 56, no. 2 (2002): 447–476.
- Inglehart, Ronald. *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990.
- Jahn, Detlef. "Conceptualizing Left and Right in Comparative Politics: Towards a Deductive Approach." *Party Politics* 17, no. 6 (2011): 745–765.
- Jerit, Jennifer, Jason Barabas, and Toby Bolsen. "Citizens, Knowledge, and the Information Environment." *American Journal of Political Science* 50, no. 2 (April 1, 2006): 266–282. doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00183.x.
- Kam, Cindy D., and Carl L. Palmer. "Reconsidering the Effects of Education on Political Participation." *The Journal of Politics* 70, no. 03 (2008): 612–631. doi:10.1017/S0022381608080651.

- Kastner, S., and L. G. Ungerleider. "Mechanisms of Visual Attention in the Human Cortex." *Annual Review of Neuroscience* 23 (2000): 315–341.
- Kim, HeeMin, and Richard C. Fording. "Voter Ideology in Western Democracies, 1946-1989." *European Journal of Political Research* 33 (1998): 73–97.
- King, Michael. "Assimilation and Contrast of Presidential Candidates' Issue Positions, 1972." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 41, no. 4 (December 21, 1977): 515–522. doi:10.1086/268411.
- Kitschelt, Herbert. "Left-Libertarian Parties: Explaining Innovation in Competitive Party Systems." *World Politics* 40, no. 2 (1988): 194–234.
- . *The Radical Right in Western Europe*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995.
- . *The Transformation of European Social Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
- Klingemann, Hans-Dieter. "Party Positions and Voter Orientations." In *Citizens and the State*, edited by Hans-Dieter Klingemann and Dieter Fuch. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.
- Klingemann, Hans-Dieter, Andrea Volkens, Judith Bara, Ian Budge, and Michael D. McDonald. *Mapping Policy Preferences II: Estimates for Parties, Electors, and Governments in Central and Eastern Europe, European Union and OECD 1990-2003*. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.
- König, Thomas, and Thomas Bräuninger. "Accession and Reform of the European Union. A Game-Theoretical Analysis of Eastern Enlargement and the Constitutional Reform." *European Union Politics* 5, no. 4 (2004): 419–439.
- König, Thomas, and Bernd Luig. "Party Ideology and Legislative Agendas: Estimating Contextual Policy Positions for the Study of EU Decision-Making." *European Union Politics* 13, no. 4 (2012): 604–625.

- König, Thomas, Moritz Marbach, and Moritz Osnabrügge. "Estimating Party Positions across Countries and Time—A Dynamic Latent Variable Model for Manifesto Data." *Political Analysis* 21, no. 4 (October 1, 2013): 468–491. doi:10.1093/pan/mpt003.
- Kousser, T. "Retrospective Voting and Strategic Behavior in European Parliament Elections." *Electoral Studies* 23, no. 1 (March 2004): 1–21. doi:10.1016/S0261-3794(02)00030-6.
- Kreppel, Amie, and George Tsebelis. "Coalition Formation in the European Parliament." *Comparative Political Studies* 32 (1999): 933–966.
- Kreuzer, Marcus. "Historical Knowledge and Quantitative Analysis: The Case of the Origins of Proportional Representation." *American Political Science Review* 104, no. 02 (2010): 369–392. doi:10.1017/S0003055410000122.
- Kriesi, Hanspeter, Edgard Grande, Romain Lachat, Martin Dolezal, Simon Bornschier, and Timotheos Frey. "Globalization and the Transformation of the National Political Space: Six European Countries Compared." *European Journal of Political Research* 45 (2006): 921–956.
- Kunda, Ziva. "The Case for Motivated Reasoning." *Psychological Bulletin* 108, no. 3 (1990): 480–498. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.108.3.480.
- Laakso, Markku, and Rein Taagepera. "'Effective' Number of Parties: A Measure with Application to West Europe." *Comparative Political Studies* 12, no. 1 (April 1, 1979): 3–27. doi:10.1177/001041407901200101.
- Ladrech, Robert. "Europeanization and Political Parties: Towards a Framework for Analysis." *Party Politics* 8 (2002): 389–403.
- Lau, Richard R., Parina Patel, Dalia F. Fahmy, and Robert R. Kaufman. "Correct Voting Across Thirty-Three Democracies: A Preliminary Analysis." *British Journal of Political Science* 44, no. 02 (2014): 239–259. doi:10.1017/S0007123412000610.

- Lau, Richard R., and David P. Redlawsk. "Advantages and Disadvantages of Cognitive Heuristics in Political Decision Making." *American Journal of Political Science* 45, no. 4 (October 1, 2001): 951–971. doi:10.2307/2669334.
- . *How Voters Decide: Information Processing in Election Campaigns*. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
- . "Voting Correctly." *The American Political Science Review* 91, no. 3 (September 1, 1997): 585–598. doi:10.2307/2952076.
- Laursen, Finn. "Denmark and the Ratification of the Lisbon Treaty: How a Referendum Was Avoided." Dalhousie University, 2010.
- Laver, Michael, and Ian Budge. "Measuring Policy Distances and Modelling Coalition Formation." In *Party Policy and Government Coalitions*. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: MacMillan, 1992.
- Laver, Michael, and Ben W. Hunt. *Policy and Party Competition*. New York: Routledge, 1992.
- Lawshe, C. H. "A Quantitative Approach to Content Validity." *Personnel Psychology* 28, no. 4 (1975): 563–575.
- LeDuc, Lawrence. *The Politics of Direct Democracy: Referendums in Global Perspective*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003.
- Leemann, Lucas, and Fabio Wasserfallen. "The Democratic Effect of Direct Democracy." *American Political Science Review* (Forthcoming).
- Lipset, Seymour Martin, and Stein Rokkan. "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction." In *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives.*, edited by Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan. Toronto: The Free Press, 1967.

- Lodge, Milton, and Ruth Hamill. "A Partisan Schema for Political Information Processing." *The American Political Science Review* 80, no. 2 (June 1, 1986): 505–520. doi:10.2307/1958271.
- Lodge, Milton, Marco R. Steenbergen, and Shawn Brau. "The Responsive Voter: Campaign Information and the Dynamics of Candidate Evaluation." *The American Political Science Review* 89, no. 2 (June 1, 1995): 309–326. doi:10.2307/2082427.
- Lodge, Milton, and Charles S. Taber. "The Automaticity of Affect for Political Leaders, Groups, and Issues: An Experimental Test of the Hot Cognition Hypothesis." *Political Psychology* 26, no. 3 (June 1, 2005): 455–482.
- . *The Rationalizing Voter*. Cambridge University Press, 2013.
- . "Three Steps toward a Theory of Motivated Political Reasoning." In *Elements of Reason: Cognition, Choice, and the Bounds of Rationality*, edited by Arthur Lupia, Matthew D. McCubbins, and Samuel L. Popkin, 183–213. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
- Lowe, Will, Kenneth Benoit, Slava Mikhaylov, and Michael Laver. "Scaling Policy Preferences from Coded Political Texts." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 36, no. 1 (2011): 123–155.
- Luskin, Robert C. "Explaining Political Sophistication." *Political Behavior* 12, no. 4 (December 1, 1990): 331–361.
- Lutz, Georg. "The Interaction Between Direct and Representative Democracy in Switzerland." *Representation* 42, no. 1 (April 1, 2006): 45–57. doi:10.1080/00344890600583776.
- Mackie, Gerry. *Democracy Defended*. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
- Mackie, Thomas T., and Richard Rose. *The International Almanac of Electoral History*. Third Edition. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan, 1990.
- Mahony, Honor. "Merkel: EU Vote Not Decisive on Commission President." Accessed August 17, 2015. <https://euobserver.com/political/121906>.

- Mair, Peter. "Political Opposition and the European Union." *Government and Opposition* 42, no. 1 (January 1, 2007): 1–17. doi:10.1111/j.1477-7053.2007.00209.x.
- . "Political Parties and Party Systems." In *Europeanization: New Research Agendas*, edited by Paolo Graziano and Maarten P. Vink, 154–166. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007.
- . *Ruling The Void: The Hollowing Of Western Democracy*. London ; New York: Verso, 2013.
- . "The Limited Impact of Europe on National Party Systems." *West European Politics* 23, no. 4 (2000): 27–51.
- Majone, Giandomenico. "Europe's 'Democratic Deficit': The Question of Standards." *European Law Journal* 4, no. 1 (March 1, 1998): 5–28. doi:10.1111/1468-0386.00040.
- . "The Credibility Crisis of Community Regulation." *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 38, no. 2 (June 1, 2000): 273–302. doi:10.1111/1468-5965.00220.
- . "The European Commission: The Limits of Centralization and the Perils of Parliamentarization." *Governance* 15, no. 3 (July 1, 2002): 375–392. doi:10.1111/0952-1895.00193.
- Markowski, Radoslaw. "Political Parties and Ideological Spaces in East Central Europe." *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 30, no. 3 (September 1997): 221–254. doi:10.1016/S0967-067X(97)00006-8.
- Marks, Gary. "European Integration and Political Conflict." In *European Integration and Political Conflict*, edited by Gary Marks and Marco R. Steenbergen, 235–259. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
- Marks, Gary, Liesbet Hooghe, Moira Nelson, and Erica Edwards. "Party Competition and European Integration in the East and West: Different Structure, Same Causality." *Comparative Political Studies* 39, no. 2 (2006): 155–175.

- Marks, Gary, and Carole J. Wilson. "The Past in the Present: A Cleavage Theory of Party Response to European Integration." *British Journal of Political Science* 30 (2000): 433–459.
- Marks, Gary, Carole J. Wilson, and Leonard Ray. "National Political Parties and European Integration." *American Journal of Political Science* 46 (2002): 585–594.
- Markus, Gregory B., and Philip E. Converse. "A Dynamic Simultaneous Equation Model of Electoral Choice." *The American Political Science Review* 73, no. 4 (December 1979): 1055. doi:10.2307/1953989.
- Marquand, David. *Parliament for Europe*. London: Jonathan Cape, 1979.
- Marsh, Michael. "Testing the Second-Order Election Model after Four European Elections." *British Journal of Political Science* 28, no. 04 (1998): 591–607.
- Mateo, Gemma. *Domestic Politics and Referendums on the Constitutional Treaty*. EUI Working Papers 32. Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies: European University Institute, 2006.
- Matsusaka, John G. "Direct Democracy Works." *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 19, no. 2 (2005): 185–206.
- . "Popular Control of Public Policy: A Quantitative Approach." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 5, no. 2 (August 22, 2010): 133–167. doi:10.1561/100.00009055.
- May, Kenneth O. "A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision." *Econometrica* 20, no. 4 (October 1, 1952): 680–684. doi:10.2307/1907651.
- McDonald, Michael D., and Ian Budge. "Getting It (approximately) Right (and Center and Left!): Reliability and Uncertainty Estimates for the Comparative Manifesto Data." *Electoral Studies* 35 (September 2014): 67–77. doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2014.04.017.
- McKelvey, Richard D. "Intransitivities in Multidimensional Voting Models and Some Implications for Agenda Control." *Journal of Economic Theory* 12, no. 3 (1976): 472–482.

- McLaren, Lauren. "Public Support for the European Union: Cost/Benefit Analysis or Perceived Cultural Threat?" *Journal of Politics* 64, no. 2 (2002): 551–566.
- Merrill, Samuel, Bernard Grofman, and James Adams. "Assimilation and Contrast Effects in Voter Projections of Party Locations: Evidence from Norway, France, and the USA." *European Journal of Political Research* 40, no. 2 (2001): 199–221. doi:10.1111/1475-6765.00594.
- Milazzo, Caitlin. "Getting It Right When It Counts: Constituency Marginality and Voter Perceptions of British Parties' Policy Positions." *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties* Advanced Access (2014): 1–26. doi:10.1080/17457289.2014.892010.
- Moravcsik, Andrew. "Is There a 'Democratic Deficit' in World Politics? A Framework for Analysis." *Government and Opposition* 39, no. 2 (April 1, 2004): 336–363. doi:10.1111/j.1477-7053.2004.00126.x.
- . "Reassessing Legitimacy in the European Union." *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 40, no. 4 (November 1, 2002): 603–624. doi:10.1111/1468-5965.00390.
- Morel, Laurence. "The Rise of Government-Initiated Referendums in Consolidated Democracies." In *Referendum Democracy: Citizens, Elites and Deliberation*, edited by Matthew Mendelsohn and Andrew Parkin, 47–64. New York: Palgrave, 2001.
- Moschonas, Gerassimos. "The Path of Modernization: PASOK and European Integration." *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans Online* 3, no. 1 (May 1, 2001): 11–24. doi:10.1080/14613190120050449.
- Müller-Rommel, Ferdinand, ed. *New Politics in Western Europe: The Rise and Success of Green Parties and Alternative Lists*. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1989.
- Nelsen, Brent F., and James L. Guth. "Exploring the Gender Gap Women, Men and Public Attitudes toward European Integration." *European Union Politics* 1, no. 3 (October 1, 2000): 267–291. doi:10.1177/1465116500001003001.

- Netjes, Catherine E., and Harmen A. Binnema. "The Salience of the European Integration Issue: Three Data Sources Compared." *Electoral Studies* 26 (2007): 39–49.
- Noury, Abdul G. "Ideology, Nationality and Euro-Parliamentarians." *European Union Politics* 3, no. 1 (March 1, 2002): 33–58. doi:10.1177/1465116502003001003.
- Oppermann, Kai. "The Politics of Avoiding Referendums on the Treaty of Lisbon." *Journal of European Integration* 35, no. 1 (2013): 73–89.
- . "The Politics of Discretionary Government Commitments to European Integration Referendums." *Journal of European Public Policy* 20, no. 5 (2013): 684–701.
- Osgood, Charles E., and Percy H. Tannenbaum. "The Principle of Congruity in the Prediction of Attitude Change." *Psychological Review* 62, no. 1 (1955): 42–55. doi:10.1037/h0048153.
- Page, Benjamin I., and Calvin C. Jones. "Reciprocal Effects of Policy Preferences, Party Loyalties and the Vote." *The American Political Science Review* 73, no. 4 (December 1979): 1071. doi:10.2307/1953990.
- Persson, Mikael. "Education and Political Participation." *British Journal of Political Science* FirstView (2013): 1–15. doi:10.1017/S0007123413000409.
- Poguntke, Thomas, Nicholas Aylott, Robert Ladrech, and Kurt Richard Luther. "The Europeanisation of National Party Organisations: A Conceptual Analysis." *European Journal of Political Research* 46, no. 6 (2007): 747–771. doi:10.1111/j.1475-6765.2007.00716.x.
- Pressley, Michael, John G. Borkowski, and Wolfgang Schneider. "Good Information Processing: What It Is and How Education Can Promote It." *International Journal of Educational Research* 13, no. 8 (1989): 857–867. doi:10.1016/0883-0355(89)90069-4.
- Qvortrup, Mads. *A Comparative Study of Referendums: Government by the People, Second Edition*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005.

- Qvortrup, Matt. *Referendums and Ethnic Conflict*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014.
- Rabe-Hesketh, Sophia, and Anders Skrondal. *Multilevel and Longitudinal Modeling Using Stata*. Vol. 1. 2 vols. Third Edition. College Station, Tex.: Stata Press, 2012.
- Rae, Douglas W., and Hans Daudt. "The Ostrogorski Paradox: A Peculiarity of Compound Majority Decision." *European Journal of Political Research* 4, no. 4 (December 1, 1976): 391–398. doi:10.1111/j.1475-6765.1976.tb00542.x.
- Raunio, Tapio. "Always One Step Behind? National Legislatures and the European Union." *Government and Opposition* 34, no. 2 (April 1, 1999): 180–202. doi:10.1111/j.1477-7053.1999.tb00477.x.
- . "Why European Integration Increases Leadership Autonomy within Political Parties." *Party Politics* 8, no. 4 (July 1, 2002): 405–422. doi:10.1177/1354068802008004003.
- Ray, Leonard. "Validity of Measured Party Positions on European Integration: Assumptions, Approaches, and a Comparison of Alternative Measures." *Electoral Studies* 26 (2007): 11–22.
- Redlawsk, David P. "Hot Cognition or Cool Consideration? Testing the Effects of Motivated Reasoning on Political Decision Making." *The Journal of Politics* 64, no. 04 (2002): 1021–1044. doi:10.1111/1468-2508.00161.
- Reif, Karlheinz. "National Electoral Cycles and European Elections 1979 and 1984." *Electoral Studies* 3, no. 3 (December 1984): 244–255. doi:10.1016/0261-3794(84)90005-2.
- Reif, Karlheinz, and Hermann Schmitt. "Nine Second-Order National Elections - A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of European Election Results." *European Journal of Political Research* 8 (1980): 3–44.
- Ridout, Martin, Clarice G. B. Demétrio, and John Hinde. "Models for Count Data with Many Zeros." Cape Town, 1998.

- Riker, William H. *Liberalism Against Populism: A Confrontation Between the Theory of Democracy and the Theory of Social Choice*. Reissue edition. Illinois: Waveland Pr Inc, 1988.
- . “The Two-Party System and Duverger’s Law: An Essay on the History of Political Science.” *The American Political Science Review* 76, no. 4 (December 1, 1982): 753–766. doi:10.2307/1962968.
- Rogers, W.H. “Regression Standard Errors in Clustered Samples.” *Stata Technical Bulletin* 13 (1993): 19–23.
- Rovny, Jan. “Communism, Federalism, and Ethnic Minorities: Explaining Party Competition Patterns in Eastern Europe.” *World Politics* 66, no. 04 (October 2014): 669–708. doi:10.1017/S0043887114000227.
- Rueschemeyer. *Capitalist Development and Democracy*. New edition edition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992.
- Satterthwaite, Mark Allen. “Strategy-Proofness and Arrow’s Conditions: Existence and Correspondence Theorems for Voting Procedures and Social Welfare Functions.” *Journal of Economic Theory* 10, no. 2 (April 1975): 187–217. doi:10.1016/0022-0531(75)90050-2.
- Scharpf, Fritz W. “Economic Integration, Democracy and the Welfare State.” *Journal of European Public Policy* 4, no. 1 (January 1, 1997): 18–36. doi:10.1080/135017697344217.
- Schmitt, Hermann. “The European Parliament Elections of June 2004: Still Second-Order?” *West European Politics* 28, no. 3 (2005): 650–679. doi:10.1080/01402380500085962.
- Schmitt, Hermann, Sara B. Hobolt, and Sebastian Adrian Popa. “Does Personalization Increase Turnout? Spitzenkandidaten in the 2014 European Parliament Elections.” *European Union Politics* (June 4, 2015): 1465116515584626. doi:10.1177/1465116515584626.

- Schmitt, Hermann, and Jacques Thomassen. "Distinctiveness and Cohesion of Parties." In *Political Representation and Legitimacy in the European Union*, edited by Hermann Schmitt and Jacques Thomassen, 111–127. Oxford University Press, 1999.
- . *Political Representation and Legitimacy in the European Union*. Oxford University Press, 1999.
- Schneider, Gerald, and Lars-Erik Cederman. "The Change of Tide in Political Cooperation: A Limited Information Model of European Integration." *International Organization* 48, no. 4 (1994): 633–662.
- Schofield, Norman. "Instability of Simple Dynamic Games." *The Review of Economic Studies* 45, no. 3 (October 1, 1978): 575–594. doi:10.2307/2297259.
- . "Political Competition and Multiparty Coalition Governments." *European Journal of Political Research* 23, no. 1 (1993): 1–33.
- Sherif, Carolyn Wood, Muzafer Sherif, and Roger Ellis Nebergall. *Attitude and Attitude Change: The Social Judgment-Involvement Approach*. Greenwood Publishing Group, Incorporated, 1965.
- Sherif, Muzafer, and Carl I. Hovland. *Social Judgment: Assimilation and Contrast Effects in Communication and Attitude Change*. Vol. xii. Oxford, England: Yale Univer. Press, 1961.
- Shugart, Matthew Sjøberg. "Comparative Executive–Legislative Relations." In *The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions*, edited by R. A. W. Rhodes, Sarah A. Binder, and Bert A. Rockman, 344–365. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.
- Sigel, Roberta S. "Effect of Partisanship on the Perception of Political Candidates." *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 28, no. 3 (October 1, 1964): 483–496.
- Steenbergen, Marco R., and Gary Marks. "Evaluating Expert Judgments." *European Journal of Political Research* 46, no. 3 (2007): 347–366. doi:10.1111/j.1475-6765.2006.00694.x.

- Steenbergen, Marco R., and David J. Scott. "Contesting Europe? The Salience of European Integration as a Party Issue." In *European Integration and Political Conflict*, edited by Gary Marks and Marco R. Steenbergen, 165–192. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
- Stegmueller, Daniel. "How Many Countries for Multilevel Modeling? A Comparison of Frequentist and Bayesian Approaches." *American Journal of Political Science* 57, no. 3 (2013): 748–761. doi:10.1111/ajps.12001.
- Stockemer, Daniel. "Citizens' Support for the European Union and Participation in European Parliament Elections." *European Union Politics* 13, no. 1 (2012): 26–46.
- Stoll, Heather. "Dimensionality and the Number of Parties in Legislative Elections." *Party Politics* 17, no. 3 (2010): 405–429.
- . "Elite-Level Conflict Salience and Dimensionality in Western Europe: Concepts and Empirical Findings." *West European Politics* 33, no. 3 (2010): 445–473.
- Szczerbiak, Aleks, and Paul Taggart, eds. *Opposing Europe?: The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.
- Taagepera, Rein. *Predicting Party Sizes: The Logic of Simple Electoral Systems*. Oxford University Press, USA, 2007.
- Taagepera, Rein, and Matthew Søberg Shugart. *Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989.
- Taber, Charles S., and Milton Lodge. "Motivated Skepticism in the Evaluation of Political Beliefs." *American Journal of Political Science* 50, no. 3 (2006): 755–769. doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00214.x.
- Taber, Charles S., Milton Lodge, and Jill Glather. "The Motivated Construction of Political Judgements." In *Citizens and Politics: Perspectives from Political Psychology*, edited by James Kuklinski, 198–226. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

- Taggart, Paul. "A Touchstone of Dissent: Euroscepticism in Contemporary Western European Party Systems." *European Journal of Political Research* 33 (1998): 363–388.
- Taggart, Paul, and Aleks Szczerbiak. "Opposing Europe? Three Patterns of Party Competition Over Europe." In *Opposing Europe? The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism*, 1:248–363, 2009.
- Theeuwes, J. "Exogenous and Endogenous Control of Attention: The Effect of Visual Onsets and Offsets." *Perception & Psychophysics* 49, no. 1 (January 1991): 83–90.
- Thomassen, Jacques. "Empirical Research into Political Representation: Failing Democracy or Failing Models?" In *Elections at Home and Abroad, Essays in Honor of Warren Miller*, edited by M. Kent Jennings and T.E. Mann, 237–265. Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press, 1994.
- , ed. *The Legitimacy of the European Union After Enlargement*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
- Tillman, Erik R. "Authoritarianism and Citizen Attitudes towards European Integration." *European Union Politics* 14, no. 4 (2013): 566–589. doi:10.1177/1465116513483182.
- . "The European Union at the Ballot Box? European Integration and Voting Behavior in the New Member States." *Comparative Political Studies* 37, no. 5 (June 1, 2004): 590–610. doi:10.1177/0010414004263661.
- Traynor, Ian. "EU Power Struggle as Cameron Tries to Stop Juncker Getting Top Job." *The Guardian*, May 28, 2014, sec. World news. [http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/27/david-cameron-jean-claude-juncker-eu-top-job?CMP=tw\\_t\\_gu](http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/27/david-cameron-jean-claude-juncker-eu-top-job?CMP=tw_t_gu).
- Tsebelis, George. *Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work*. New York and Princeton, New Jersey: Russell Sage Foundation and Princeton University Press, 2002.

- Tsebelis, George, and Geoffrey Garrett. "Legislative Politics in the European Union." *European Union Politics* 1 (2000): 9–36.
- Tullock, Gordon. "Why so Much Stability." *Public Choice* 37, no. 2 (January 1, 1981): 189–204.
- Uleri, Pier Vincenzo. "On Referendum Voting in Italy: Yes, No or Non-Vote? How Italian Parties Learned to Control Referenda." *European Journal of Political Research* 41 (2002): 863–883.
- van der Broug, Wouter. "Analysing Party Dynamics by Taking Partially Overlapping Snapshots." In *Estimating the Policy Positions of Political Actors*, edited by Michael Laver, 115–132. London: Routledge, 2001.
- van der Brug, Wouter, and Cees van der Eijk. "The Cognitive Basis of Voting." In *Political Representation and Legitimacy in the European Union*, edited by Hermann Schmitt and Jacques Thomassen, 129–157. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
- van der Eijk, Cees, Mark Franklin, and Michael Marsh. "What Voters Teach Us about Europe-Wide Elections: What Europe-Wide Elections Teach Us about Voters." *Electoral Studies* 15, no. 2 (May 1996): 149–166. doi:10.1016/0261-3794(96)00009-1.
- van der Eijk, Cees, and Mark N. Franklin. *Choosing Europe? The European Electorate and National Politics in the Face of Union*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996.
- . "Potential for Contestation on European Matters at National Elections in Europe." In *European Integration and Political Conflict*, edited by Gary Marks and Marco R. Steenbergen, 32–50. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
- Verba, Sidney, Nancy Burns, and Kay Lehman Schlozman. "Knowing and Caring about Politics: Gender and Political Engagement." *The Journal of Politics* 59, no. 4 (November 1, 1997): 1051–1072. doi:10.2307/2998592.

- Volkens, Andrea. "Strengths and Weaknesses of Approaches to Measuring Policy Positions of Parties." *Electoral Studies* 26, no. 1 (March 2007): 108–120. doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2006.04.003.
- Volkens, Andrea, Pola Lehmann, Nicholas Merz, Sven Regel, and Annika Werner. *The Manifesto Data Collection. Manifesto Project (MRG/CMP/MARPOR)*. Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB), 2013.
- Vreese, Claes H. de, Hajo G. Boomgaarden, and Holli A. Semetko. "Hard and Soft Public Support for Turkish Membership in the EU." *European Union Politics* 9, no. 4 (December 1, 2008): 511–530. doi:10.1177/1465116508095149.
- Wagner, Markus, and Thomas M. Meyer. "Which Issues Do Parties Emphasise? Salience Strategies and Party Organisation in Multiparty Systems." *West European Politics* 37, no. 5 (June 2, 2014): 1019–1045. doi:10.1080/01402382.2014.911483.
- Warntjen, Andreas, Simon Hix, and Christophe Crombez. "The Party Political Make-up of EU Legislative Bodies." *Journal of European Public Policy* 15, no. 8 (2008): 1243–1253.
- Warwick, Paul. "Towards a Common Dimensionality in West European Policy Spaces." *Party Politics* 8, no. 1 (2002): 101–122.
- Wedel, Michel, Ulf Bökenhold, and Wagner A. Kamakura. "Factor Models for Multivariate Count Data." *Journal of Multivariate Analysis* 87 (2003): 356–369.
- Whitefield, Stephen. "Political Cleavages and Post-Communist Politics." *Annual Review of Political Science* 5, no. 1 (2002): 181–200. doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.5.112601.144242.
- Williams, R.L. "A Note on Robust Variance Estimation for Cluster-Correlated Data." *Biometrics* 56 (2000): 645–646.

Woldendorp, Jaap, Hans Keman, and Ian Budge. *Party Government in 48 Democracies (1945-1998): Composition - Duration - Personnel*. Dordrecht, Boston and London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000.

Zaller, John. *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion*. Cambridge [England]; New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 1992.