

Soldiers contra Diplomats: Britain's role in the Zimbabwe/Rhodesia Ceasefire (1979-80) Reconsidered

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This article reexamines part of the literature on Britain's role in the December 1979 to March 1980 Zimbabwe/Rhodesia ceasefire. The ceasefire ushered in an era of peace after a protracted internal war and it was an integral part of the transition from colonial white minority rule, towards black majority independence. Scholars present Britain's success in brokering and monitoring the Zimbabwe/Rhodesia ceasefire as the result of its judicious and accordant management of the road to peace. However, this article argues that in fact deep internal divisions plagued the British managers of the ceasefire. Internal divisions centered on authority struggles between diplomats and military actors, conflicting personalities, discordant approaches to and goals in the ceasefire, and inter-institutional rivalry between the Foreign Office and Ministry of Defence. The article concludes that Britain only managed the ceasefire effectively because its military's independence, political nous and competence ultimately prevailed over the injudicious views and machinations of diplomats.

KEYWORDS: Zimbabwe/Rhodesia ceasefire; Diplomatic-Military Relations; Personality and Politics; Institutional Rivalry.

On 11 November 1965 the Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith's Rhodesian Front (RF) government signed the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI). UDI was the rebellion of a minority white settler government against the British Crown, which was aimed at forestalling Britain's plan to establish black majority rule in Rhodesia. The RF government's firm intransigence on UDI and the fact that British prime minister Harold Wilson's administration would not use military means against kith and kin in Rhodesia in 1965, ultimately forced the main African nationalist parties – Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) and Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) – to wage an armed struggle against the Rhodesian settler state in order to achieve black majority rule.¹ With time ZAPU's military wing, the principally Soviet-trained Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), operated from neighbouring independent

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Zambia, while ZANU PF's military arm, the mainly Chinese supported Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), conducted guerrilla attacks in Rhodesia from the adjoining self-governing Mozambique.

After UDI was proclaimed, successive British governments floundered in their various attempts to resolve what came to be popularly known as 'the Rhodesia problem'. Wilson led further futile endeavors to resolve the Rhodesia problem through negotiations with Smith aboard HMS *Tiger* and HMS *Fearless* in 1966 and 1968 respectively.² In 1971 Edward Heath's, Wilson's successor as prime minister, government reached the Anglo-Rhodesian Agreement, which envisaged a gradual process towards majority independence for Rhodesia, with Smith but this too proved unsuccessful. Black Africans had not been party to the 1971 Anglo-Rhodesian talks. Thus the Anglo-Rhodesian Agreement had no traction with black Africans when they were asked to provide a judgment on it in the 1972 Pearce commission.³ Black Africans emphatically rejected the Anglo-Rhodesian Agreement in 1972 and later in the same year the African nationalist insurgency against Rhodesian colonial rule was renewed. The insurgency resulted in approximately 30,000 deaths and it generated 1,5 million refugees.⁴ In 1977 the British Foreign Secretary David Owen championed a new Anglo-American initiative to settle the Rhodesia problem. This new phase entailed working intimately with southern African states - including all protagonists in the Rhodesia war - towards an independence constitution and election for Rhodesia. Although the Anglo-American initiative failed to resolve the Rhodesia problem, it laid the principles (independence constitution, ceasefire, transition and inclusive election) on which the September to December 1979 British-led Lancaster House independence negotiations would proceed. Indeed 1979 proved to be a breakthrough year on the Rhodesia problem. A ceasefire, brokered by the British Foreign Secretary Peter Carrington and his team of Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO)

negotiators in London's Lancaster House, brought to an end a protracted military conflict, in which ZANLA and ZIPRA had not only fought the Rhodesian Security Forces (RSF), but also targeted each other. In December 1979, Britain assumed direct rule of its errant colony and dispatched Christopher Soames, a member of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's Conservative government, to Rhodesia as Governor. Soames was tasked with overseeing the December 1979 to April 1980 transition to independence, which would culminate in national elections inclusive of all political parties. A Commonwealth Monitoring Force (CMF) under the command of a British general called John Acland was charged with monitoring the ceasefire in an operation codenamed AGILA. The CMF's command was entirely British. The force was also mostly composed of British soldiers, who were carefully selected by the Ministry of Defence (MOD). Four Commonwealth countries, Kenya, Fiji, New Zealand and Australia, contributed smaller contingents to the CMF.

This article is concerned with the intramural politics that was at play during Britain's negotiation and implementation of the 1979 Rhodesia ceasefire agreement. Put precisely, the article argues that there was internal division over the manner in which the ceasefire was negotiated, between diplomats and military members of the British delegation who attended the Lancaster House negotiations. Subsequent to reaching agreement, many of these diplomats and military officers went to Rhodesia to implement the ceasefire. The Lancaster House tensions and disagreements between the British military and diplomats, which often overlapped with personality conflicts, deepened in Rhodesia. In this paper, the category diplomats represents the FCO and diplomatic officials who constitute it. The military classification primarily refers to the CMF command, which had Acland at its apex.

Existing literature presents Britain's role in the ceasefire as accordant.⁵ This partial view is epitomised by the principal study on the ceasefire - Susan Rice's *The Commonwealth Initiative in Zimbabwe, 1979–1980: Implications for International Peacekeeping*. Rice argues that 'the easy relations between the CMF leaders and the British authorities' was one of the factors that contributed to the success of Operation AGILA.⁶ Scholars such as Rice, Wiseman and Taylor, and Verrier, as well as the written reflections of actors in the ceasefire such as Soames and Carrington, do not identify internal division between the military and diplomats corresponding personality conflicts.⁷ This article therefore contributes towards a more subtle understanding of Britain's management of the ceasefire by identifying and developing this uncharted theme of antagonistic relations between the military and diplomats, and the overlapping personality clashes. To accomplish my refinement of existing studies on the Rhodesia ceasefire, I draw on Acland's private papers, which hitherto had not been accessed by researchers. Furthermore, I employ original interview material I gathered through qualitative interviewing of the key diplomats and military actors involved the ceasefire. My discussion also applies the work of Hew Strachan on the British army and Fred Greenstein on personality and politics.⁸ Strachan examines the British army's history since the 1600s and reveals that many of its generals have been anything but apolitical. Strachan does not advocate the army's takeover of public affairs but he does not condemn the political instincts of its generals either because were they to be curbed entirely, the army would make only nominal contributions to British defence – an outcome he is opposed to because he places significant value in generals' expertise in military affairs. Greenstein, on the other hand, accentuates the significance of human agency in politics. All too often, Greenstein maintains, scholars 'posit rationality, defining away personal characteristics', and yet 'political processes operate through human agency'.⁹

British diplomats' relations with the military were characterised by sharp differences over three main issues. The first controversial matter was the way diplomats designed and brokered the ceasefire agreement. What the diplomats saw as effective negotiating tactics at Lancaster House on their part, the military interpreted as secretive and deceitful methods contrived to ensure that a settlement was reached without fail and regardless the dangers these approaches to the negotiations would eventually pose to the ceasefire. The second crucial disagreement was over which of the political parties contesting the 29 February 1980 election would triumph and form the independence government. The diplomats believed Nkomo's ZAPU would win the election, whereas the military foresaw a victory for Mugabe's ZANU PF party. In the end, ZANU PF won 57 seats (63%) to ZAPU's 20 seats (24%) in the election, vindicating the military's view. An accurate identification of the likely election winner was important because it would enable prudent advance planning for the transfer of power from Britain, which was going to be a particularly fragile process because ZANU PF, ZAPU and the RF all controlled undefeated rival armies. Certain diplomats were also in favour of proscribing some ZANU PF candidates in the election for voter intimidation. The military opposed banning ZANU PF candidates, arguing that this would restart the war. The final major dispute was over when the monitoring force would make an effective and honourable exit from Rhodesia. The military saw the end of the election as the correct moment for withdrawal and envisaged that at the moment of its departure, measures would have been put in place in the Assembly Points (APs), containing ZANLA and ZIPRA soldiers who had ceased fighting and gathered in large camps as stated in the ceasefire agreement, to ensure stability in the post CMF period. However, the diplomats preferred the military to remain in Rhodesia for longer, with a view to withdrawing some time after formal independence was granted in April 1980. The aforementioned arguments between the diplomats and military often coincided with personality conflicts. Lord Robin Renwick was the head of the FCO's Rhodesia Department during the ceasefire. Renwick

was a key negotiator in the Lancaster House talks and he went to Rhodesia for the independence transition as one of the FCO's chief diplomats there. Personal relations between Renwick and Acland, especially, were strained throughout the ceasefire period.

Four factors were the primary drivers of disagreement between the diplomats and military. Strachan's demonstration of how British generals have often behaved politically is pertinent to the first factor, which is that the political disposition of the CMF command resulted in forthright opposition to the diplomats' approaches to the ceasefire that were undergirded by expediency and desperation to resolve the Rhodesia problem. The second driver is the resultant struggle for authority between the diplomats and military. Third is the inter-institutional rivalry between the FCO and MOD. Fourth is the role of personality, in and of itself, in driving behaviours and determining relations during ostensibly rational political activities – a point advanced in Greenstein's work on the significance of personality in politics. It is puzzling, then, that the ceasefire held at all, given these divisions. The explanation to this puzzle is that the military's political nous and competence prevailed in its disagreements with the diplomats. Had the diplomats had their way completely, the ceasefire's likelihood of success would have been greatly diminished.

The body of this article is composed of two parts. The first section demonstrates the disagreements between the British diplomats and military, and the overlapping personality clashes. The second part expounds the logics behind these conflicts.

Britain's Intramural Ceasefire Politics

As stated by the FCO-brokered ceasefire agreement, there was to be seven days between the departure of the monitoring force from Britain and participating Commonwealth countries to

Rhodesia, and the truce taking effect. Necessarily, the military would have had to prepare the monitors and deployment plans within 24 hours, with the remaining 6 days taken up by the monitors' arrival and then their deployment to hundreds of sites in Rhodesia. The diplomats designed the ceasefire process to commence in this express manner because they wanted to guarantee that once an agreement was signed, there would be no scope for the signatories to resort to delaying tactics. The diplomats feared that any delay might provide opportunities for some cosigners to do a volte-face on the ceasefire agreement, thereby prolonging the Rhodesia problem. But the military saw the diplomats' rapid ceasefire commencement plan as inattentive to the importance of carefully planning Operation AGILA, in order to overcome the considerable operational difficulties landlocked Rhodesia posed. Acland described these operational challenges as follows:

Rhodesia is about the size of France, three times the size of England, and its communications particularly in terms of roads and tracks compare most unfavourably with both. In addition, the operation took place in the rainy season and the tracks to many Assembly Places, which were to serve as collection points for...[ZIPRA and ZANLA soldiers], were washed out and unusable. Although the Rhodesians had led us to believe that each Assembly Place would have a serviceable air strip, some had none and other strips, which were grass, dust or gravel, were unserviceable to Hercules aircraft after heavy rain. The problem therefore of deploying some 110 small groups over such a large country and in many cases into remote areas of the bush was formidable.¹⁰

Despite the patent need to cautiously negotiate these operational challenges, the diplomats were 'forcing us [the military] against time', recalled Brigadier Adam Gurdon, the CMF's Chief of Staff.¹¹ However, Renwick rejected the military's reservations about the ceasefire inception phase in the following terms:

what Acland did not like was the agreement we [diplomats] negotiated and we said that is too bad. This is the agreement. You are the soldier and you have to implement it. He had to be told this is the agreement and that is it. If he did not want to implement it, we would have replaced him.¹²

In reality, what assuaged the military's reservations about the expeditious ceasefire preparation timetable is that the Lancaster House negotiations, and the period between the reaching of agreement and the actual signing of the settlement, dragged on mainly because of ZANU PF and ZAPU's obduracy, 'giving the military grace in which to prepare for the arrival of the Commonwealth Force'.¹³ The diplomats also sent Soames to Rhodesia prematurely 'to step up

pressure on the parties [to Lancaster House] to agree' a settlement.¹⁴ Acland took advantage of the diplomats' negotiating tactic by securing seats on Soames' Rhodesia bound airplane for the CMF command. The CMF leadership therefore arrived in Rhodesia on 12 December, which was earlier than envisaged, affording it added time to fully appreciate the gravity of Operation AGILA, before the Lancaster House agreement was signed on 21 December. Still, this early disagreement set the tone for what was to prove a difficult relationship between the military and diplomats. For instance, Acland observed that 'it was very difficult to get any facts out of the Foreign Office' because they were 'determined to railroad this [Lancaster House] agreement through'.¹⁵ According to Acland, getting 'facts' out of the diplomats was especially trying because of their penchant for secretive bilateral talks at Lancaster House:

When the main talks ceased up, the politicians would get hold of Mr Nkomo or Mr Mugabe or General [Peter] Walls [RSF commander] and they would say to them individually, come on, give a bit there and we will give you a bit there and in the end they would get the 3 sides back in the conference room and an agreement would be reached. The very great difficulty about this is that there were leaders on all 3 sides who believed promises had been made to them by the Foreign Office in these bilateral talks, which were not recorded, not enshrined in the Lancaster House Agreement, but they believed these agreements with the FCO. These agreements were never disclosed by the FCO.¹⁶

These private bilateral agreements later made the military's monitoring duties more challenging. An example of this is that according to the ceasefire agreement, no foreign soldiers were to be present in Rhodesia besides the CMF, once the ceasefire launched. Nonetheless in January 1980 the international press exposed the presence of Rhodesian aligned Apartheid South Africa troops in the south of Rhodesia. Acland avowed that 'I was never told about the South African presence. The press discovered it quite soon after we got out there and we knew nothing about it'.¹⁷ Acland confronted Walls, subsequent to the discovery, to make clear that by concealing the South African troops, the RSF was in breach of the ceasefire. According to Acland, Walls responded by claiming that 'Carrington and the Foreign Office had agreed these South Africans should remain' during bilateral talks at Lancaster House.¹⁸ Walls, at Lancaster House, was bent on maintaining the presence of these South African troops in Rhodesia as insurance in case the ceasefire failed. He also did not want to be seen by his RSF subordinates

as having given away too much in the negotiations. The diplomats also kept secret the presence of South African troops in Rhodesia because ZANU PF and ZAPU, fearing entrapment of their armies, would have objected to it, thereby frustrating the negotiations.

In addition, the secret bilateral agreements threatened to collapse the ceasefire. This is evinced in the disagreement between Walls, Acland and the ZIPRA commander Dumiso Dabengwa, over what to do about a large number of ZIPRA soldiers who failed to enter the APs during the stipulated assembly phase of 29 December 1979 to 4 January 1980. I reproduce Acland's account of this row:

Dabengwa...passionately argued that it had been agreed at Lancaster House that if the guerrillas did not assemble in the week that had been allocated for the actual assembly.... the ceasefire period could be extended. He believed this because the Rhodesians had given the impression at Lancaster House that they really had the war contained and that the guerrillas whether they were ZIPRA or ZANLA were out on the periphery of the country when in actual fact they were all over the country....But Dabengwa was aware that the APs had been chosen on the periphery, far away from where the guerrillas were operating, so he was extremely concerned that they would not get there in time. So he told the Foreign Office that they will not get there in time and I cannot have the Rhodesians shooting them. The Foreign Office definitely gave him the impression that the assembly period could be extended. When we came to the end of the week and it was clear many guerrillas had not come in, Walls said they had all put themselves outside the law and his forces had the right to go and, as he put it, 'clobber them'. Dabengwa came to me and said, what about this extension of the ceasefire that we [the military] knew absolutely nothing about.¹⁹

Faced with certain collapse of the ceasefire if the RSF 'clobbered' ZIPRA soldiers outside the APs, Acland hastily approached Soames and convinced him to prolong the assembly phase to allow ZIPRA and ZANLA soldiers who were still on their way to the APs to come in. Soames' prolongation of the assembly phase 'infuriated the Rhodesian hierarchy and Walls who felt that no such concession should have been made'.²⁰ Owing to this controversy, and other reasons beyond the scope of this paper, Walls had a difficult relationship with Acland and Soames throughout the ceasefire.²¹

The diplomats' proclivity for carrying out negotiations through bilateral talks was acknowledged by Carrington, Renwick and Charles Powell, an additional FCO negotiator at Lancaster House.²² For the diplomats, bilateral talks were an effective tactic for reducing the

disparity of views between the delegations, thereby moving negotiations along. They disregarded the possibility that surreptitious agreements reached in these bilateral talks would later endanger the ceasefire. Significantly, Rice's study identifies the effective role bilateral talks played in facilitating negotiations but it does not develop how secret agreements made in these two-pronged discussions nearly derailed the ceasefire and fractured relations between the military and diplomats. Rice presents relations as harmonious yet this was not the case.

The second substantial difference between the military and diplomats was over who would win the independence election. Field Marshal Edwin Bramall, the British Chief of the General Staff (CGS), commented that 'Mugabe was not the Foreign Office's favourite to take over. They thought it would be Nkomo'.²³ Brigadier Andrew Parker Bowles, the CMF's senior liaison officer to ZANLA and ZIPRA, overtime cultivated good relations with the ZIPRA commanders and with the ZANLA commander Rex Nhongo.²⁴ Parker Bowles claimed that his indispensable links to these commanders afforded him unique insight in to their mind sights about and preparations for the election.²⁵ Parker Bowles asserted that 'the Foreign Office were entirely wrong because they thought Nkomo would win the election. Rex [Nhongo] had made a strong case to me that ZANU had the election sewn up and would win by a wide margin'.²⁶ But when Parker Bowles presented this case to the Foreign Office 'they kept saying no no no [ZANU PF will not win]'.²⁷

Major General Andrew Ritchie, then a British CMF officer based in the town of Gweru, whose duty was to monitor the RSF, supported Parker Bowles' account of the diplomats' refusal to accept military intelligence on the likely election outcome, by stating:

I met Josh Nkomo and Mugabe when they came to Gweru to campaign. The monitoring force would go to the rallies and party meetings to provide reassurance and to do reporting. There was no question as to who was going to win. It was going to Mugabe hands down. And we were reporting this up to our commanders but whenever the Foreign Office people would come to see us, they kept telling us this is not the way we see it. Nkomo is going to win. I was quite disappointed and disillusioned because you should always take

seriously what people on the ground are saying. There is a thing called ground truth.²⁸

Acland explained the diplomats' dismissal of the military's analysis, as follows:

Renwick was under some sort of instruction from Number 10 [Downing Street] or the Foreign Office to ensure Mugabe would not achieve victory and he was always giving advice to... Soames about proscribing Mugabe's candidates [for intimidating voters] in some areas. When Soames asked my opinion, I always told him that my monitors said the intimidation was not that bad and it was on all sides and you have to bear in mind the effect of doing it. If you proscribe Mugabe the war will restart.²⁹

If, as Parker Bowles alleged, Nhongo was certain that ZANU PF 'had the election sewn up', then the ZANLA commander would have interpreted Soames' proscribing of his party's candidates as a British move to deny ZANU PF victory and determine independent Zimbabwe's leadership. This interpretation would have encouraged ZANLA to resume the war, as Acland warned. ZANLA's renewal of its war effort was feasible because Nhongo had ordered a large section of his most experienced and better trained guerrillas in Rhodesia to stay out of the APs as insurance in case the ceasefire broke down and to allow these absenting ZANLA fighters to campaign for ZANU PF in the countryside.³⁰ That ZANLA had purposely sent most of its poorly trained or untrained guerrillas, many of whom were armed with what the Rhodesian army commander Sandy Maclean described as 'rotting weapons',³¹ was not lost on the CMF.³² Moreover Twarai Tipone, a member of ZANLA's high command, maintained that he was part of a sizeable ZANLA contingent that remained in Mozambique during the ceasefire.³³ Clearly, ZANLA had bargained for a possible recommencement of the war, meaning the diplomats risked triggering a return to conflict if they proscribed ZANU PF candidates. However, according to Acland, Soames proved to be a 'very practical man who was less susceptible to FCO pressure because he rightly saw that Mugabe was going to win. He also leaned on the army's advice. So he was influenced by the information we gave him not to proscribe Mugabe, which is not what Renwick and the Foreign Office wanted'.³⁴

Contrary to the military's account that the diplomats believed Nkomo would triumph in the election, Renwick claimed the diplomats 'knew Mugabe would win and win by quite a way'.³⁵

However, Powell contradicted Renwick's claim that the diplomats thought Mugabe would triumph, by saying:

The Foreign Office candidate was Nkomo. We had been dealing with him for quite a few years. We did not do the math very well because he simply did not have the numbers. We never realised Nkomo was not going to win until the results came in. There was even a sweepstakes in the Foreign Office on the election result and it was won by a man in Carrington's office called Sir Paul Lever. And it is interesting that he was the one person in Carrington's office who had had absolutely nothing to do with Lancaster House and Rhodesia, but he won!³⁶

In his memoirs, *Reflect on Things Past*, Carrington commented: 'I cannot say that the election's results were exactly what we had anticipated or that they gave to the British Government undiluted pleasure'.³⁷ Another diplomat in the Governor's office during the ceasefire also professed that they believed Nkomo would win the election.³⁸ Moreover, in a Situation Report (SITREP) to the MOD, which he penned on 4 March 1980 - the immediate aftermath of Mugabe's victory - Acland conveyed that 'a high proportion of the Rhodesian hierarchy seems to be in a severe state of shock as are the FCO' at the poll result.³⁹ Evidently, Renwick attempted to reconstruct history by alleging the diplomats correctly predicted the election winner.

The final major point of difference between the military and diplomats was the timing of the CMF's withdrawal from Rhodesia and how to fill the authority vacuum the monitors' exit would create in the APs. An appendix in the Lancaster House agreement stated that 'if this is the general wish the monitoring force would stay in Rhodesia until the independence government is formed and independence is granted; and would try to help in overcoming any problems which might arise in this period'.⁴⁰ But Acland held that 'it is certainly not our [the military] general wish and I do not see the significance of independence itself when... all [CMF, RSF, ZIPRA and ZANLA] are agreed that the catalyst [for withdrawal] will be the announcement of the election results'.⁴¹ Indeed, as early as January 1980, Acland had already begun to highlight, in his SITREPs to the MOD, what he saw as the importance of devising the

military's exit from Rhodesia to coincide with the end of the election. For example, in a SITREP on 14 January 1980, Acland wrote:

I remain firmly convinced...that the catalyst [for CMF withdrawal] will occur when the results of the elections are announced.... My view is that either at that point the ceasefire will break or by that point the Rhodesians will have established a sufficiently good working relationship with...[ZIPRA and ZANLA] to preserve the peace.... I therefore remain firmly of the opinion that we must withdraw our monitors from the Assembly Areas on 29 February.... Sir Anthony Duff [Deputy Governor] supports my reasoning both on political and military grounds. Renwick who is I understand back at the FCO for discussions this week is however more equivocal as has indeed been the case with him over every major issue. I accept that it may not be possible for the Governor or Ministers to go public at the present time on the withdrawal programme I have outlined. Nonetheless for planning reasons the Ministry of Defence must take a view now. I would be grateful if my view...could be pressed with the FCO in London.⁴²

Above and beyond the absence of a general wish for the military to remain until independence, Acland's standpoint that the monitors withdraw once the election result was announced originated in what he saw as the imperative of establishing local ownership of the peace, sooner rather than later.⁴³ A point related to the instituting of local ownership is the authority vacuum that would develop in the APs once the CMF withdrew. The CMF solely administered the APs and was a source of security and stability during the ceasefire. Thus, Acland reasoned that the APs risked becoming inhospitable and unstable in the CMF's absence. Volatile APs would promote mass exodus of ZIPRA and ZANLA soldiers from the camps to their former operational bases, thereby potentially reigniting the war. For Acland, the Rhodesian state was integral to filling the vacuum left by the CMF. He argued that if the Rhodesian state took over the administration and provision of security in the APs, peace would be maintained after the election. For the local state to assume gradual effective authority over the APs, it was necessary that a Rhodesian military and civil presence be established in all APs before the election and on this point Acland was, in his SITREPs to the MOD, fiercely critical of what he perceived as:

a frightening inertia on the part of the Governor's FCO staff to face up to the problem of the future of the... [ZANLA and ZIPRA] who have assembled. A matter, which they had not apparently even contemplated during the Lancaster House talks in London. I have been pressing since 2 January, I repeat, 2 January when it was evident there was going to be a major assembly of... [ZIPRA and ZANLA] for the Governor himself to get involved and for the matter [establishing the Rhodesian state's authority over the APs] to be pushed with the leaders of the various sides since without them being pushed into agreement and being forced to give the necessary instructions it is quite plain that nothing significant will be achieved. The FCO system of 'talks between officials' is still grinding on. There is reluctance on the part of the Governor and his staff for him

personally to grip an urgent and dangerous situation and I am fearful that all we have so far achieved may end in the same situation on the ground apart from the fact that the British government will have got the Rhodesia problem off their back. As obtained when we arrived this view was reinforced by a pathetic meeting in COMOPS [the Rhodesian High Command] yesterday when I stated my views forcibly. I got support from Flower, McLaren and Maclean and to some extent Walls on the Rhodesian side but the usual prevarication from Sir A Duff and Renwick on ours. I will pursue the matter yet again with Duff today. The Governor will sadly not move until all his staff push him into action. We now only have 3 weeks to the end of the election.⁴⁴

Elsewhere in his private papers, Acland described Renwick as ‘jumpy and arrogant’.⁴⁵ He also noted that Duff had ‘charm, toughness, humour’ and governed ‘by anecdote and trivia’ – qualities which, put together, he ‘hated’.⁴⁶

The diplomats, in interviews with me, rebuffed the military’s allegation that they did not accord profound consideration to when and how the monitoring force’s exit from Rhodesia would occur. Renwick recounted the important role the diplomats played in this regard:

We had to contain an incipient revolt by the Rhodesian military [when Mugabe won the election]. So we told Walls he had to go and see Mugabe [to defuse any possible revolt]. And Thatcher rejected any suggestion by the Rhodesians that the polls had been unfair, though in fact the polling in Victoria province had been very unfair [because of ZANU PF’s intimidation of voters]. Mugabe was urging Soames, me and our military to stay because he needed us. We helped him construct his government. We said you should try to keep David Smith [Ian Smith’s pragmatic deputy prime minister and Finance Minister] for a while in government. And keep Denis Norman [leader of the white-dominated Rhodesia Farmers Union]. I and Soames had sessions with him [Mugabe] about... [redistribution of land from whites to blacks]. We said we would help finance a progressive, orderly, [land] reform programme.⁴⁷

Another diplomat in Soames’ office reinforced Renwick’s defence:

One of the things [we were] ...trying to do was... to build confidence in the whites who were going to be essential in at least the first 5 years, if Zimbabwe was going to stay afloat economically. [We] saw the farmers ...[we were] telling them the new government will look after you. John Acland did not like the Foreign Office because his younger brother Antony was a rising star in the Foreign Service. He was an ambassador at the time and had a brighter career than John. Antony later became head of the Foreign Service. John loathed the the Foreign Office for this reason. It was antagonism between brothers on one plane. We normally get along with the military but in this case, with John Acland, it was difficult. Acland’s Aide-De-Camp [Ian Duncan Smith] would also parrot appalling criticisms of diplomats. We interpreted it as him simply parroting his master’s views. And I will tell you who did not dream up a BMATT [British military training and integration of ZANLA, ZIPRA and the RSF] for Zimbabwe but will tell you that he did – John Acland! He does not have the wit to dream it up but he will certainly tell you that he did. Look at his successors in Zimbabwe, Patrick Palmer and Rupert Smith [the inaugural BMATT commander and BMATT deputy commander respectively]. They went very far in the British army, much further than Acland. Acland was quite lucky in his career.⁴⁸

What is more, according to Renwick, it was in fact Acland - not the diplomats - who risked wrecking the ceasefire because:

Acland’s ‘great idea’, and this is where we had a furious row, was that the day after the election he was going to withdraw all the monitoring forces from the assembly places and we told him it was madness because the war would start all over again. And Acland was heavily involved with [the Rhodesian army’s Chief of Staff] Major General [Derry] MacIntyre’s wife during the ceasefire, which was not a particularly sensible thing for

him to do in that volatile context. So there we are. Acland was the problem and it was a personality thing in my view because relations with Gurdon and the military in general were first class. No problem at all. It was a specific Acland problem. And he did not like me because I negotiated the agreement under Carrington. So did we have an adversarial relationship with Acland? Yes we did. We have got equally unkind things to say about Acland. He was one of these bluff soldiers. He was one of these hot-tempered soldiers who really think he is some kind of....anyhow. Acland is one of these people who believe he is right all the time.⁴⁹

This final point about the timing and nature of the military's exit strategy from Rhodesia was exceptionally contentious. As shown, it provoked cantankerous and often personalised responses from the military and diplomats. Having established the main arguments between the diplomats and military, I now turn to teasing out the underlying rationales for these disputes.

The Diplomats and Military: Logics of Strained Relations

Four principal factors underlay the disagreements between the diplomats and military. The first of these was the conflicting goals and methods of the diplomats and military in the ceasefire. The right of the Conservative party accused Carrington of being 'indifferent' to the destinies of kith and kin in Rhodesia.⁵⁰ Consequently Carrington did not expect to last more than 6 months in the Foreign Secretary job, if he did not resolve the Rhodesia problem in a manner his right wing critics deemed satisfactory. This sense of make or break for Carrington, helps explain some of the desperate and unscrupulous methods he and his team of FCO negotiators employed at Lancaster House. During the Lancaster House negotiations, 'Carrington manipulateda high quality intelligence gathering network to his tactical advantage. The British government liberally used eavesdropping devices to monitor conversations' within and between ZANU PF and ZAPU, to the degree that they 'never escaped being bugged' in London.⁵¹ ZANU PF and ZAPU were conscious of the fact that they were under surveillance. For instance, Powell disclosed that Nkomo 'always insisted on having the radio on, playing loud music, while he talked to you in private because he was convinced he was being bugged'.⁵² Powell also admitted that FCO negotiators had 'softened Walls up [at Lancaster House] by having him meet the Queen mother for tea and he saw Thatcher because we were looking to

influence him'.⁵³ 'We were up to our old Foreign Office tricks but that is how negotiations succeed', Powell concluded.⁵⁴

Carrington ruminated on the Lancaster House talks by saying 'there was a lot of luck involved in it all. When we started the Lancaster House conference I would never have put a penny on it working. It was an absolute freak'.⁵⁵ However, Renwick took a different view to Carrington, arguing that 'it was not all luck, as Carrington likes to say. You make your luck you see. We made our luck by showing we were serious about getting a settlement, by taking control of negotiations ourselves and by the risks we took'.⁵⁶ One of these risks was the diplomats' private bilateral agreements, which facilitated negotiations but, as shown, damaged relations with the military and threatened to wreck the ceasefire ultimately. Besides this, the diplomats' desperation to resolve the Rhodesia problem led them to, in Gurdon's parlance, force the military against time in the ceasefire inception phase – an approach which made relations difficult early on.

The second principal factor that strained relations between the military and diplomats was a struggle for authority between these actors. Strachan notes that scholars have cultivated a misleading perception that the British army is apolitical and entirely subordinate to civilian authority.⁵⁷ This deceptive view, Strachan continues, has been sustained by the fact that the British army has never carried out a coup d'état and by military officers' habitual declarations that they are apolitical, which scholars have been quick to take at face value. Strachan has challenged this uncomplicated predominant representation of the British army, by arguing that armies are innately political because they are implanted in the structure of the political state. Strachan validates his argument by tracing the British army's evolution since 1660, illuminating that the conduct of many of its generals across time has been anything but

apolitical; the political and military dominions have often overlapped. A couple of examples of this overlap will suffice here. The first of these examples is that British military officers were only prohibited from political activity in 1927. Before this, military officers were merely instructed not to wear their uniforms at political gatherings, resulting in some of them holding political posts simultaneously.⁵⁸ Nevertheless, the 1927 ban did not curb some generals' political instincts. An archetypal case in point is the military career of Field Marshal Alan Brooke who was the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS) from 1941 to 1946. As CIGS, Brooke had a tempestuous relationship with the civilian authority, Prime Minister Winston Churchill. Brooke 'answered back [to Churchill]. He protected the army's field commanders, interposing himself between them and the Prime Minister, injecting realism in the latter's schemes, and protesting when their achievements were called into question'.⁵⁹ Churchill wrote of Brooke: 'when I thump the table and push my face towards him what does he do? Thumps the table harder and glares back at me'.⁶⁰

Acland can be counted among the long line of British generals who did not actively subordinate themselves to civilian authority. In 1970 Acland, then only a Commanding Officer of the 2nd Battalion Scots Guards, published a lead letter in the British *Times* newspaper censuring the 'political hierarchy of the Ministry of Defence and existing Defence Policy and, specifically, the proposed reduction of Infantry Battalions in the Army'.⁶¹ Acland's letter was inherently political and it was an act of insubordination for which, according to regulation, he ought to have been dismissed from the army. However, as Acland writes in his private papers, 'in the event, the policy decisions which I attacked were reversed some 6 months later and, in 1971, I was promoted to Colonel and posted to the Ministry of Defence with responsibility for mobilisation plans and for Army organisation'.⁶² As CMF commander, Acland was the Governor's military advisor but as can be seen in his advice to Soames not to proscribe ZANU

PF candidates in the election, his role also traversed the political realm. Indeed Bramall, himself a renowned political CGS,⁶³ explained that he appointed Acland as CMF commander because:

he was a strong character who knew his way around politically. You needed someone like him to move things along. I also preferred Acland because we heard the Foreign Office was going to send out Soames who was a very difficult character. We needed someone strong on our side [the military] too, to stand up to Soames. If the Foreign Office had sent William Whitelaw to Rhodesia we would not have sent Acland.⁶⁴

So part of the strains in the relationship between the diplomats and military during the ceasefire stemmed from Acland's political nous, independence and forthrightness, which some diplomats objected to because it was a threat to civilian authority. Recall how Renwick dismissed Acland's criticisms of the ceasefire agreement by saying 'that is too bad. This is the agreement. You [Acland] are the soldier and you have to implement it.... If he [Acland] did not want to implement it we would have replaced him'.⁶⁵ Renwick's understanding of diplomats' relationship with the military insisted on subordination of the military to civilian authority. But Acland's political nous and independence deviated from this, and hence their conflict ridden relationship. The diplomats' claims to authority also played out in other ways. For instance, they attempted to shore up their authority by casting doubt on Acland's credibility as a general. The diplomats endeavoured to accomplish this by comparing Acland's military career to that of supposedly more successful British generals who also served in Zimbabwe, such as Patrick Palmer and Rupert Smith. The diplomats also constructed Acland, who qualified to read for an undergraduate degree in the University of Oxford but chose to join the army instead, as 'witless' and 'lucky'.

The aforementioned struggles over authority coincided with personality conflicts, which are the third factor underlying strained relations. Here, I appropriate Greenstein's accentuation of the role of personality in political processes. Certainly, as seen in the preceding section of this paper, there was significant personal derision between the diplomats and military, with Acland and Renwick being especially contemptuous of each other. But we must still treat critically

these outward displays and statements of mutual personal dislike. To begin with, the diplomats' attempts to delegitimise Acland's criticisms of them on the grounds that the general's views were shaped by his sibling rivalry with Antony, together with diplomats' claims that their relations with the military 'were first class.... it was a specific Acland problem', reflect the use of personality to obscure real differences in approaches to the ceasefire and the diplomats' own misjudgements. Additionally, the diplomats' dismissal of Duncan Smith's reproaches 'as him simply parroting his master's views' is to deny Acland's Aide-De-Camp any agency. The diplomats *did* miscalculate on the likely election winner. In addition, strained relations with the military were hardly 'a specific Acland problem', as Gurdon confirmed:

When I returned from Rhodesia I handed in my report on the ceasefire to the Foreign Office. They read it and made no comment on it at all. Later, when I was now in the Cabinet Office working in intelligence, the chap who was my boss said I would be very interested to read your report on the ceasefire because I was on the edge of it on the Foreign Office end and I would like to see what you have to say about it. And so I gave him my personal copy. Now whether this was Foreign Office or not, I do not know, because that copy went missing. The report was very critical of the Foreign Office in many respects. They got it all wrong. If it had not been for us [the military] the ceasefire would not have worked at all. They were not clever. They did not even have a clue on who was going to win the election. My suspicion has always been that the Foreign Office did not want anybody to know what I and the Monitoring Force thought of them so they made that report disappear.⁶⁶

In an interview with me, I asked Gurdon to recount the criticisms he made in this 'missing' ceasefire report. His censures of the diplomats were similar to those expressed by Acland in earlier sections of this paper. Gurdon was critical of how the diplomats negotiated the ceasefire agreement. He emphasised that the arrangement was ambiguous about the RSF's code of conduct during the truce. As a result of this ambiguity, many of the RSF liberally left their bases on missions to provoke ZIPRA and ZANLA soldiers in the APs to break the ceasefire, which caused the military problems because they were frequently called upon 'to put out fires' that threatened to engulf the ceasefire.⁶⁷ Last of all, Gurdon criticised the diplomats for taking a lethargic approach to devising an exit strategy from Rhodesia.

Turning to Acland's alleged affair with the Rhodesian chief of staff's wife, Major General Jonathan Bailey, a CMF monitor in AP Romeo during the ceasefire, recalled an occasion when

Acland came to inspect conditions in his assembly area:

Just after Acland had got off the helicopter, I noticed that his fly button was undone. As a junior officer I naturally felt compelled to tell him. I said, 'General, your fly button is undone'. 'Do not worry, the bird is too old to leave its nest', Acland replied.⁶⁸

Acland's assertion that 'the bird' was 'too old to leave its nest' could not be further from the truth because Maclean corroborated the genuineness of Renwick's account that the CMF commander was 'heavily involved' with MacIntyre's wife:

Acland created a very bad odour in COMOPS [the Rhodesian High Command] because he had an affair with one of our senior officer's wife. MacIntyre's wife. She was under the impression that he was going to bring her to England and marry her after the ceasefire. So she actually went over there [to England after the ceasefire], only to find Mrs Acland was there and apparently she was a very big and firm woman. Acland did not see this woman when she came. His wife saw her and told her, 'on your bicycle, go back to where you came from'. She went away and it resulted in a divorce and Acland was still with his wife. Look, the ceasefire was not an easy time and Acland created a bad odour here.⁶⁹

Likewise, Bramall acknowledged the Acland-Mrs MacIntyre affair, noting that 'Acland had quite a reputation with the ladies', but he remained of the view that Acland was the appropriate appointment in the end, because the ceasefire held.⁷⁰

The fourth driver of divergence between the military and diplomats was inter-institutional rivalry. This can be seen in the diplomats and military's respective attempts to claim exclusive responsibility for the ceasefire's success. For example, Gurdon's conspiratorial allegation that the FCO made his report on the Rhodesia ceasefire, which was critical of the diplomats' role, 'disappear' can be seen as a demonstration of the FCO's undertaking to preserve its institutional reputation. The diplomats' refusal to accept military intelligence on the likely 1980 election winner also suggests the privileging of one institution's intelligence gathering network over that of another. And when Acland counselled that 'for planning reasons the Ministry of Defence must take a view now', on the timing of the CMF's exit from Rhodesia, and requested that the MOD press his standpoint 'with the FCO in London', he was invoking institutional support. Furthermore, despite his homage to the role of 'luck', Carrington still lauded the FCO's prime part in resolving the Rhodesia problem. 'I had an excellent team in the Foreign

Office working on Rhodesia; Derek Day... Tony Duff, Robin Renwick, Charles Powell, all first class, dedicated men – I know that no institution but the Foreign Office could have produced such support and such skill’, Carrington records in his memoirs.⁷¹ Similarly, Renwick extols the FCO’s Rhodesia department and Powell, in particular, who he describes as combining ‘qualities of intelligence, imagination and determination rare in any bureaucracy, anywhere’.⁷² In opposition, the military took a dim view of the FCO’s institutional capacity. For instance, in a SITREP to the MOD on 4 March 1980, Acland sarcastically belittled the FCO because unlike the MOD, it lacked a Staff College that knowledgeably trained future commanding officers and provided institutional memory:

On 23 December [1979] when discussing with my [CMF] staff some of the extraordinary problems that faced us and suggesting that they might very well be fed in to test the keen young officers at the Staff College we idly wondered what sort of problems the FCO would look at if they had a Staff College. In light of the situation then obtaining I wrote a note to Renwick of the FCO as follows: ‘you are a keen, ambitious and comparatively senior Foreign Office official who for the last three months has been negotiating in London to ensure the return of a moderate right wing government in Rhodesia. You arrive in Rhodesia to find that your best efforts have achieved precisely the reverse. What do you do now?’ That is the state the FCO find themselves out here at present and it will take a little while for them to face the realities of the situation.⁷³

Relations between the military and diplomats were, then, also strained by inter-institutional rivalry originating in the FCO and MOD’s obligatory collaboration in the Rhodesia ceasefire.

Before concluding, I draw the reader’s attention to a pertinent caveat, which is that this paper’s highlighting of divisions between diplomats and the military must not blinker us from internal divisions in the military and diplomats categories. It is limiting to only see division simply in binary terms (diplomats and military). In the military, by way of example, Gurdon was critical of the Vice Chief of the General Staff (VCGS), John Stanier, who he described as ‘a problem’ during the Operation AGILA planning stage.⁷⁴ Gurdon served in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda prior Operation AGILA. Conversely, Stanier:

had never served outside Europe but was too happy to question my plan. He kept asking why we were not taking heavy arms with us and was always saying we were all going to be killed. Stanier behaved this way because he got too close to Walls. Walls was almost living in his house [during the Lancaster House talks].

Anything Walls said about black Africans, Stanier believed, which was very stupid of him. I kept saying to him, Walls has got to say these things. He has got to produce threats. Black Africans are not irrational or barbaric. He is trying to make us tougher on them than we need to be. The Africans understand that if they hurt or kill the monitors, the Rhodesians will come in and kill them. We do not have to come down hard. I had great difficulty convincing Stanier.⁷⁵

Imperial and non-imperial officers in the military therefore held contradictory views during the planning of Operation AGILA.

This paper demonstrated divisions between diplomats and the military so as to challenge prevailing representations of Britain's role in the Rhodesia ceasefire as accordant. These divisions were driven by four main factors. The first was diplomats' desperate bid to resolve the Rhodesia problem once and for all, which led them to adopt approaches to the ceasefire that antagonised the military and that would later pose a threat to the truce. A struggle for authority between the diplomats and military was the second factor fanning division. Thirdly, inter-institutional rivalry between the FCO and MOD also fomented division. The final cause of division was the clash of personalities. Amid these differences, Britain is mainly indebted to the military for the ceasefire's success because the military proved to have political and tactical nous, which made up for the diplomats' weaknesses. Take for instance the military's astute decision to join Soames when he departed early for Rhodesia, which allowed it added invaluable time to grasp the operational challenges ahead. Without this supplementary time, the ceasefire planning would have been compromised. The military, unlike the diplomats, correctly calculated that Mugabe would win the election and rightly influenced Soames not to proscribe his candidates because the war would recommence. Moreover, the military's view that the election should mark the beginning of its exit prevailed eventually. By the time of its withdrawal, the military had established a Rhodesian presence in the APs and a foundation for local ownership of the peace had been laid. That the war did not resume following its withdrawal vindicates the military's exit strategy. Acland's personal imprudence with

MacIntyre's wife aside, the military in the Rhodesia ceasefire were 'just reasonable men who' successfully contested 'unreasonable behaviour' by diplomats.⁷⁶

1 Tekere, *A Lifetime of Struggle*; Nkomo, *The Story of My Life*.

2 Smith, *The Great Betrayal*.

3 Todd, *The Right to Say No*.

4 Evans, 'The Wretched of the Empire'.

5 Examples include: Wiseman and Taylor, *From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe*; Rice, 'The Commonwealth Initiative in Zimbabwe'; Verrier, *The Road to Zimbabwe*; Carrington, *Reflect on Things Past*; Renwick, *Unconventional Diplomacy*; Soames, 'From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe'.

6 Rice, 'The Commonwealth Initiative in Zimbabwe', 203.

7 See: Wiseman and Taylor, *From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe*; Rice, 'The Commonwealth Initiative in Zimbabwe'; Verrier, *The Road to Zimbabwe*; Carrington, *Reflect on Things Past*; Soames, 'From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe'.

8 Strachan, *The Politics of the British Army*; Greenstein, 'Can Personality and Politics Be Studied?'

9 Greenstein, 'Can Personality and Politics Be Studied?'

10 Acland, 'The Rhodesia Operation'.

11 Interview with Brigadier Adam Gurdon, England, 19 June 2012.

12 Interview with Lord Robin Renwick, England, 12 February 2014.

13 Learmont, 'Reflections from Rhodesia'.

14 Renwick, *Unconventional Diplomacy*, 55.

15 Conrad Wood (Imperial War Museum) interview with Major General Sir John Acland, England, 12 December 1990.

16 Ibid.

17 Ibid.

18 Ibid.

19 Ibid.

20 Ibid.

21 See Rice, 'The Commonwealth Initiative in Zimbabwe' for other disagreements that worsened Walls' relations with Soames especially.

22 Interview with Lord Peter Carrington, England, 11 June 2012; Interview with Lord Charles Powell, England, 11 October 2013; Interview with Lord Robin Renwick, England, 12 February 2014.

23 Interview with Field Marshal Edwin Bramall, England, 2 July 2012.

24 Interview with Dumiso Dabengwa, Zimbabwe, 27 August 2011; Interview with Colonel Tshinga Dube, Zimbabwe, 7 April 2014; Rice 'The Commonwealth Initiative in Zimbabwe'.

25 Interview with Brigadier Andrew Parker Bowles, England, 5 October 2011.

26 Ibid.

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- 27 Ibid.
- 28 Interview with Major General Andrew Ritchie, England, 27 October 2011.
- 29 Conrad Wood (Imperial War Museum) interview with Major General Sir John Acland, England, 12 December 1990.
- 30 Flower, *Serving Secretly*.
- 31 Interview with General Sandy Maclean, Zimbabwe, 17 August 2012.
- 32 Interview with Andrew Parker Bowles, England, 5 October 2011.
- 33 Interview with Brigadier General Twarai Tipone, Zimbabwe, 16 December 2012.
- 34 Conrad Wood (Imperial War Museum) interview with Major General Sir John Acland, England, 12 December 1990, (Ref 11753/3).
- 35 Interview with Lord Robin Renwick, England, 12 February 2014.
- 36 Interview with Lord Charles Powell, England, 11 October 2013.
- 37 Carrington, *Reflect on Things Past*, 303.
- 38 Interview with Confidential FCO Source, England, 8 November 2013.
- 39 Acland 'Situation Report: 4 March 1980'.
- 40 Zimbabwe Government, 'Lancaster House Agreement'.
- 41 Acland, 'Situation Report: 14 January 1980'.
- 42 Ibid.
- 43 Ibid.
- 44 Acland, 'Situation Report: 7 February 1980'.
- 45 Acland, 'Personal note'.
- 46 Ibid.
- 47 Interview with Lord Robin Renwick, England, 12 February 2014.
- 48 Interview with Confidential FCO Source, England, 8 November 2013.
- 49 Interview with Lord Robin Renwick, England, 12 February 2014.
- 50 Carrington, *Reflect On Things Past*, 287.
- 51 Rice, 'The Commonwealth Initiative in Zimbabwe', 53.
- 52 Interview with Lord Charles Powell, England, 11 October 2013.
- 53 Ibid.
- 54 David Dimbleby interview with Lord Charles Powell in "Rebellion", British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) DVD documentary, 1999.
- 55 Interview with Lord Peter Carrington, England, 11 June 2012.
- 56 Interview with Lord Robin Renwick, England, 12 February 2014.

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- 57 Strachan, *The Politics of the British Army*.
- 58 Ibid.
- 59 Ibid., 160.
- 60 Churchill, *The Second World War*, 233.
- 61 Acland, 'Biographical Note'.
- 62 Ibid.
- 63 Tillotson, *Dwin Bramall*.
- 64 Interview with Field Marshal Edwin Bramall, England, 2 July 2012. William Whitelaw is a former British Conservative party politician who was widely regarded as an amiable figure in British politics.
- 65 Interview with Lord Robin Renwick, England, 12 February 2014.
- 66 Interview with Brigadier Adam Gurdon, England, 19 June 2012.
- 67 Ibid.
- 68 Interview with Major General Jonathan Bailey, England, 21 June 2012.
- 69 Interview with General Sandy Maclean, Zimbabwe, 17 August 2012.
- 70 Interview with Field Marshal Edwin Bramall, England, 2 July 2012.
- 71 Carrington, *Reflect on Things Past*, 292.
- 72 Renwick, *Unconventional Diplomacy*, 33.
- 73 Acland, 'Situation Report: 4 March 1980'.
- 74 Interview with Brigadier Adam Gurdon, England, 19 June 2012.
- 75 Ibid.
- 76 Here, I paraphrase a general observation about military generals that was made by Lieutenant General Graeme Lamb, 'On Generals and Generalship' in Bailey, Iron and Strachan (Eds), *British Generals in Blair's Wars*, 153.

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