

## Profits and predation in the bioeconomy of border controls

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In remotest rural Sicily lies *residence degli aranci*, the orange tree residence. It is a quaint name for a human hangar, surrounded by fences and guarded by anti-terror squads. This is Europe's largest refugee reception center, CARA di Mineo, with a capacity of up to 4,000 residents that is regularly exceeded – naturally enough, we may think, as Italy has faced large maritime arrivals since 2014. Yet the reason these former US military barracks have become such an overpopulated holding site is not that straightforward. In late 2014, prosecutors began uncovering Mafia involvement in Italy's migrant and refugee reception systems, and Mineo was a big earner. A highly placed official, *Newsweek* reported, "would steer contracts for building and maintaining refugee centers to his [criminal] associates, and then order that refugees to be sent to those centers, especially Mineo, filling it far beyond capacity." Managers were paid the equivalent of \$32 per day and resident.<sup>1</sup> Even the residents' pocket money – €2.50 per day – was not handed out in cash but rather put on their electronic cards, which could only be used at selected shops inside and outside the gates. But there was one loophole, residents explained to me on a 2015 visit: they could buy a packet of cigarettes for €5 from workers inside, an opportunity that arose every two days. These cigarettes could then be sold on inside the center for up to €3.60, with workers pocketing the €1.40 difference.

In short, Mineo was a money-spinner – but not to the benefit of migrants and refugees, as the Italian far right insisted, but rather to powerful groups ranging from the camp bureaucracy to the Mafia, and from politicians to businesses with a finger in the pie of migration controls.

Migrants and refugees frequently describe their treatment at Europe's borders as a racket. "This place is a business," one migrant at Mineo told *Newsweek*. "We are the business. The commodity. They keep us here and make money from us." In Libya, migrants frequently refer to themselves as "goods" that are used, abused and traded by officials, militias, criminals and smugglers who lock them up, enslave them and extort them or their families (Achtnich 2017), while in Greece, some Syrians stuck in camps in 2016 called themselves "products" with a (political or financial) price on their head as Turkey and EU member states bartered over their fate.<sup>2</sup> During my research on irregular migration between West Africa and Spain, I often heard similar vocabulary used (Andersson 2014). "Human trading," one migrant stuck in a reception center in Spain's North African enclave (and EU territory) of Ceuta told me in 2010. "Migrants are merchandise," said another migrant housed in this facility. "They eat from us," boat migrant deportees told me in Senegal, referring to the NGOs, border guards, security companies, politicians and local associations they saw as making a killing from their misfortune. As one deportee concluded: "There's lots of money in illegal migration."

The migrants, asylum seekers and deportees in Sicily, Spain and Senegal were acutely aware of the economics of their predicament. Having sought European shores as willing workers or as people fleeing violence, they had found themselves stranded in the limbo of camps where their former and future roles as labourers, consumers and citizens – in short, as members, however marginal, of late capitalist society – were suspended in

favour of primitive yet at times rather sophisticated forms of value extraction. On other segments of the migratory journey, in interdiction, deportation, detention and selective circulation, they similarly sensed that others stood to gain something from their misery.

Starting with this analysis provided by migrants themselves, I will here consider forms of profiting and predating on people on the move, but not as exploitable workers or even slaves, the guises in which migrant exploitation is usually treated. Rather, by reference to the US-Mexico and Euro-African borderlands, I will discuss the extraction and generation of value from human beings' vitality in the broadest sense, reaching from physical features to bodily presence, and from the capacity to move to the experience of lived time. I will gloss these layered value-generating processes as a *bioeconomy*, for reasons I go on to explain. While irregular migrants will be in focus, they are not necessarily the only targets of such extractive and generative processes; yet as they are situated at one particularly stark confluence of global capitalism with advanced security apparatuses and revived forms of exclusion, they are exemplary of a potentially larger trend. Understanding this complex economy of life is thus important not just for migration scholars, but for broader analytical efforts to peer into the cracks of late capitalism, and to tie current forms of exploitation to earlier historical eras with a view how best to change them.

Before visiting the empirical frontiers against migration, I will first discuss the conceptual and historical underpinnings of the "bioeconomies" of deterrence and control. Next, the paper's three empirical sections will delineate three overlapping dimensions of border security and deterrence, glossed here as terrain, containment and risk-based strategies. This tripartite division draws loose inspiration from Foucault's (2007) legal, disciplinary and security modalities of power – the first being concerned with sovereign control of territory and punishment of trespassers; the second, oriented towards shaping the behavior of "multiplicities" of individuals; and the third, with modifying rates of risk within a given population. This rather schematic parsing of logics of border control and deterrence allows for exploring the different economies at work in managing "undesirable" travelers (Agier 2011), and more specifically for seeing the various ways in which life itself (Rose 2007) becomes entangled in these economies.

### **The bioeconomy: (de)valuing life in the global borderlands**

First of all, a note on terminology. The notion of *bioeconomy* here is deployed in contrast and complementarity with the more familiar *biopolitics*, which has inspired studies of border and migration controls on topics ranging from the production of otherness (e.g. Fassin 2001; Rozaku 2015) to the enmeshment of humanitarian and deterrence logics (Williams 2015; Squire 2015). The two concepts are clearly intertwined. As Rabinow and Rose (2006:211) put it by reference to the biomedical field, "the economy of contemporary biopolitics operates according to *logics of vitality*, not mortality: while it has its circuits of exclusion, letting die is not making die" (emphasis added). Yet while biopolitical studies of migration and border controls have variously focused on technologies of discipline, spaces of exception and the political logics of governing populations – drawing on Foucault and Agamben (1998) – the term *bioeconomy* rather pushes analysis towards the relations of exchange, production and consumption enabled by the "logics of vitality" pinpointed by Rabinow and Rose. In addition to

complementing a biopolitical reading of borders, a bioeconomy perspective also complements – and complicates – Marxist-inflected critiques of biopolitical approaches (e.g. Owens 2009) by shining a light on processes of value generation taking place in settings such as the “orange tree residence”, the reception camp of Ceuta and the heavily policed borderlands of the West.

One productive starting point for the bioeconomy notion I develop here is Saskia Sassen’s (2014) recent account of value-generating processes in contemporary capitalism. In her *Expulsions*, Sassen identifies a “subterranean trend” in evidence at “systemic margins” of the world economy towards expulsion or exclusion of “surplus populations”. People are expelled from their source of sustenance as land is cleared for international agro-investors; from the social contract as racial groups are targeted for chronic incarceration, as in the United States; or from “the economy” as GDP measures fail to capture the radical economic exclusion suffered in countries such as austerity-hit Greece. In the “immiseration and exclusion of growing numbers of people *who cease being of value as workers or consumers* (emphasis added),” Sassen (2014:12) sees Western capitalism developing away from postwar, Keynesian incorporation towards a model of “extraction and destruction” centered on intensified zones of profit extraction worldwide. Rather than seeing evidence of evil masterminds behind this immiseration, Sassen further points the finger at “predatory formations”: complex assemblages made up of powerful groups, corporate interests, legal provisions and other elements that come together to produce what she terms “elementary brutalities” (2014:13-14).

We may wish to query the epochal claims implied in *Expulsions* – indeed, what was the slave trade other than a sophisticated formation feeding on brutality? – yet I bring in Sassen’s framework here above all as an intriguing starting point for peering around the edges of labour-focused, Marxist accounts of exploitation. As the argument usually goes, irregular migrants are principally useful as a source of vulnerable, unprotected labour, and border security thus serves an important economic function for “host states” (e.g. De Genova 2002; Mezzadra and Neilson 2013; Tsianos et al 2009). While this remains an important insight, Sassen’s *Expulsions* shows how certain populations may be “put to use” for extractive purposes other than labour exploitation.

If Sassen complicates Marxist accounts of migratory “expulsions”, another author helps us peer around the edges of the second theoretical paradigm holding sway at the borders today – Foucauldianism, and more specifically, biopolitics. In his account of the emergence of a “humanitarian border” at Europe’s southern frontiers, William Walters (2011) argues that scholars must “avoid the reflex action that treats contemporary forms of border regime as one more expression of a given repertoire of powers” (2011:152), suggesting we may need to look outside Foucault’s “toolbox” to understand the particular constellations of power emerging at the interstitial spaces of contemporary borders. The humanitarian border is a case in point. By using this term, Walters (2011:145) points to the “uneasy alliance a politics of alienation with a politics of care, and a tactic of abjection and one of reception” in sites such as Lampedusa, Ceuta and Mineo. While partially reading the complex enmeshment of care and control functions on Lampedusa through a “minimalist” biopolitics, echoing Agier (2011) and Fassin (2005), Walters however steers away from a larger biopolitical analysis. It is “insufficient to treat the birth of the humanitarian border as but one more instance of an ever-widening regime of biopower,” he argues (Walters 2011:152). The challenge, to Walters (2012:5), is not to

simply apply Foucault's tools wholesale, but rather to build "critical encounters" through which new analytical tools may emerge as empirics push against established frames.

Forging a bioeconomy perspective from these analytical starting points involves two moves: first, building on Sassen, a shift of focus onto *how the bodies and lifecourse of those "expelled" can become a source of value extraction and generation in their own right*, beyond their labour power and beyond the lands and assets which they leave behind. Second, pairing this to Walters' insights, by recognizing how predatory "extraction through expulsion" is only part of the story. Value is not just extracted but also *generated* in the borderlands, as seen in the humanitarian border controls Walters and other scholars discuss at length (e.g. Andersson 2014; Williams 2015; Pallister-Wilkins 2015), in ways which biopolitical frameworks fail to capture in full.

This analytical groundwork takes us onto the bioeconomy proper. The term itself, we should note, is far from new. In the wider economy, it usually designates "the sustainable production of renewable resources" – in other words, the recycling of biological products.<sup>3</sup> Besides natural resources, one field in which bioeconomics thinking has already been widely applied is biomedicine. Nikolas Rose (2007), my third key theoretical inspiration, has in this field taken further Foucault's broad genealogy of biopolitics and liberal governmentality in saying that "our growing capacities to control, manage, engineer, reshape, and modulate the very vital capacities of human beings as living creatures" (Rose 2007:3) introduces a new kind of politics – "the politics of life itself." This biopolitics, as noted, is intertwined with bioeconomics. As he puts it, the "economics of vitality" involves the emergence of "a new form of capital – biocapital," and new forms of economic governance (Rose 2007:6-7).

While inspired by Rose's conceptualization, I use *bioeconomy* in a broader sense than him. By *economy*, I do not refer only to economic exchanges. Rather, I treat these exchanges as complementary (or subsidiary) to deeper, more abstract circuits of production, exchange and consumption centered on human vitality and life itself. As I will show, the subtle forms of extraction and generation of value beyond the monetary sphere articulate with economies of border/migration controls in the financial sense alluded to by the migrant critique above. Such complex bioeconomies of control are further enmeshed with wider economies, including the exploitation of vulnerable labour.

In many ways, this broadened rendering of "the economic" chimes with the notion of "intimate economies" developed in recent work on migrant detention (Conlon and Hiemstra 2017). While this feminist-inspired reading of how detention enables a multitude of exploitative economic relationships – ranging from the overpriced sale of foodstuffs within US detention to the usage of captive labour behind camp gates – is important indeed, it still builds on a Marxist-inflected framework. While recognizing such forms of exploitation, I will here however broaden the account towards human economies that are concerned with using, trading, extracting and generating value from "life itself". This focus, I argue, widens our analytical and critical scope in how we understand the functioning of controls applied to "unwanted" people on the move today.

This takes us to the *bio* part of bioeconomy, in which I also broaden the notion of life itself from Rose's usage, for whom the focus falls quite naturally (given his topic of biomedicine) on a "molecular vision of life" (Rose 2007:17), or life in its smallest physical components. For *bio*, then, I do not just include the physical stuff of life of concern to biomedicine but also human vitality in a more encompassing sense. Vitality

can be rendered as “the power giving continuance to life” (OED), in its physical but also its mental/emotional aspects: that is, vitality can be situated in the overlapping physical, mental and social realms of what an earlier generation of anthropological scholarship called the “mindful body”. As phenomenologically inclined ethnographies have shown, migration controls can infiltrate the borderlands of the somatic and the mental with severe consequences, ranging from deep anxiety to depression, and from the lethargy of waiting to the maximum alertness of crossing borders (Willen 2007). Moreover, such reactions, as I will show, can be overtly targeted by border authorities to achieve certain ends and obtain “value”, whether of a financial or more ineffable kind (usually both).

As mentioned, the next three sections delineate three overlapping strategies of border control and deterrence, glossed as terrain, containment and risk-based strategies. Section 1 on terrain strategies concentrates on the physical end of the vitality spectrum by showing how bodily parts and perils to human health have become sites of innovation and value generation/extraction. Section 2, on containment, is concerned with the usage of human vitality in a broader sense, considering how the selective immobility and circulation involved in migrant detention and retention taps into lived migrant time as a form of capital for deterrence purposes, while playing on stranded migrants’ hopes and dreams and using their bodily presence for financial purposes. Section 3 shows how this intricate psychological dimension is complemented or superseded by risk-based strategies such as the one currently holding sway in the US-Mexico borderlands. Here, human life becomes an abstract resource, as aggregate psychological reactions to collective punishment are built into a statistical modelling of risk used to predict and modify migrant behavior. This move from terrains and the physical to psychology and onwards to abstract social risk recalls, as mentioned, Foucault’s sovereign, disciplinary and security modalities of power, as well as his distinction between anatomopolitics and biopolitics. Yet the intention is not to apply Foucault’s toolbox wholesale – which he himself went on to modify – but rather to start with these categories and then interrogate and expand them in a “critical encounter” (in Walter’s vein) with a distressing empirical reality.

Some further caveats are in order concerning the scope of the argument. The first concerns history. By talking of a bioeconomy, I do not aim to make a grand theoretical statement, argue for an epochal change, or designate a readily distinguishable mode of capitalist-state activity. We need to be extremely careful in designating the “new”, as Walters (2011) and Rose (2007) agree, even as they both point towards emerging forms of power. “It is overwhelmingly the case that studies in the governmentality of borders and bordering have trained their attention on the immediate present,” writes Walters (2011:141): yet when historicizing such forms, we should also avoid positing a “Western” experience as a benchmark. Indeed, the processes mapped below may resonate particularly with exploitative processes present in the colonial era, resurrected – by some accounts – in what Gregory (2004) has memorably called the “colonial present”.

The second caveat, then, concerns geography, and not just in the sense of stepping out of the “West”, but also as pertains to important nuances within it. The two principal empirical areas I discuss below – the Euro-African and US-Mexico borderlands – are distinct in terms of colonial and settlement histories, as well as in terms of their political structures. Yet despite their differences, there are also significant overlaps in the *logics* of migration control in these settings (Chebel d’Appollonia 2012; Jones 2016). Bringing

these to the fore, the analysis here inevitably entails some risks of simplification but also of opportunity for further comparative research.

### **Terrain strategy, or pushing back the bodies**

Driving towards Mexico through Arizona, watchtowers rise out of the dry soil like tall cacti. The highway is adorned with clutches of cameras and, on the northbound lane, is blocked by a large Border Patrol checkpoint. Down at the border itself, a tall fence drives a wedge between Mexican and US Nogales. In the hinterland, drones buzz over the rattlesnake-infested ground, which is dotted by sensors whose antennae sprout like desert weed.

It is November 2015, and since my last visit to the overland Mexican trail a decade earlier (Andersson 2005), the fight against migration has reached new levels of terrifying sophistication. “You have to watch where you step,” says one middle-aged Central American man at a shelter in Mexican Nogales that night as he mimics a mine-clearing movement. The other migrants around us murmur and nod. Some are new to the route, some veterans, others deportees bent on returning home to the United States. All are caught up in the cat-and-mouse game of the border, where they are chased like prey while also playing another, complementary role: as guinea pigs in a state-of-the-art border control laboratory.

I will in this section consider the perhaps most primitive way in which human life becomes embroiled in border controls – through expensive efforts to “hold the line” against migrants. Since the 1970s, the US-Mexico borderline has increasingly been treated as a symbolic and physical defense against the country’s southern neighbors, a process that gathered pace in the 1990s, when the NAFTA agreement coincided with the building of border barriers. In Europe in the same decade, the first EU-funded anti-migration fences were built at Ceuta and its sister enclave Melilla, while joint EU patrols, radar systems and agreements with non-European states to hold back the coming “tide” were forged. The “fight against illegal migration”, as we know it today, was born.

This “fight” is generative of real economies of financial value. The US spends some \$12 billion a year on customs and border protection and Europe is increasingly militarizing its borders, with many other countries – including outside the West – following suit. Below, I will consider how this globalized real economy of borders has articulated with an incipient bioeconomy centered on the physical aspects of migrant vitality and mobility, drawing especially on the Arizona case, owing to its exemplary illustration of broader shifts in border policing.

In this earlier militarized quest to secure the borderline, the “fight” against migration fitted quite well into the legal modality of sovereign power traced by Foucault. Irregular migrants were treated as adversaries or enemies who were to be “denied terrain”, as one top-level US border chief recalled in a closed-door meeting I attended in 2015. This terrain strategy gathered pace after 9/11 and the creation of a vast Department for Homeland Security, adding the mandate to stop terrorists and “terrorist weapons” to the Border Patrol’s brief.

Securing the border was the paramount task, but there was just one problem, as high-level insiders recalled in that London meeting – no one could agree on what a “secure border” looked like. The Border Patrol and its mother agency, Customs and

Border Protection, then took it upon themselves to define it. “We’re not very sophisticated,” laughed one of the operatives. Looking back, he came to realize that he had thought that “every problem in my career can be solved through law enforcement”. Like a hammer in search of the proverbial nail, he recalled, this meant trying to intercept all migrants as they came across – lots of them, again and again, as they inevitably returned after their “voluntarily departure” (Heyman 1995).

This strategy, glossed as “reactive brute force”, amounted in the operative’s words to “enforcing our way out of it”, and it persisted as Border Patrol capabilities rose skyward. In the early 2000s, he said, “we had to buy our own batteries” for flashlights; a few years later, radar systems, sensors, advanced barriers and drones were being added to their equipment. “We’re gonna take all our hammers and hit all the nails out there,” was the strategy – an endless task. It never “worked”, but then it was never really meant to, as tough border security served principally political (propaganda) and economic functions in ensuring maximum exploitability of those who made it through (De Genova 2002).

Besides these gains for politicians and businesses, the strategy also paid off handsomely for the Border Patrol. “If you cut [apprehend/deport] people, you get funded; if you cut more people, you get funded more,” the operative recalled – and what was better than letting people slip out and then back in? It bumped up statistics. More apprehensions were a “measure of success”, but so were *fewer* apprehensions as it suggested “I’m reducing the flow”, the operative said, even though there was no “scientific basis” behind any of this.

The Border Patrol here managed to leverage the political fears around migration in a political-practitioner symbiosis. This fueled the massive growth in Border Patrol agents, as well as a hugely expanded market in border security technology. However, this border security economy did not yet have bioeconomic dimensions; operations were mechanistic, one-dimensional and simply numbers-based. The same migrant may appear twice the same day to count as two apprehensions – their lifecourse did not matter.

Yet gradually, along with the shift to more resources came more sophisticated strategies, as I saw on my 2015 research visit to the Joint Intelligence Operations Center (JIOC) in Tucson, Arizona. Foreign delegations came by regularly to see the surveillance systems in action with a view to a purchase, said the JIOC chief. He had avoided giving out his phone number to companies, he admitted, to avoid receiving constant calls from corporates wishing to offer their wares for free. JIOC was one of the principal shop windows for the booming global border security market, which some industry players estimate will rise in value (together with maritime security) from €25bn in 2012 to €49bn by 2020 (Lemberg-Pedersen 2015). Yet JIOC was not just a passive target: businesses were actively courted through “executive tours”,<sup>4</sup> while Tucson itself played host to a large security fair where companies got direct access to “end users” and intermediaries (Miller 2014). It is in this emerging global security market that something resembling a bioeconomy makes an initial appearance, alongside mechanical apprehension-by-numbers, in the shape of technologies deployed to capture signs of human life in its most rudimentary, physical form: beating hearts, bodily heat, feet treading the desert grounds.

Advanced sensor technology was getting better at distinguishing human movement, a Border Patrol chief and a sensor operator both explained to me in Tucson. Especially, once combined with other technology including infrared cameras, the “humanity” of the target could be accurately identified and the person intercepted. With

this shift towards the advanced tracking of life, occurring in the same period at the Euro-African border, the tally of apprehensions was no longer the be-all and end-all; instead, “footfall” became important. Someone needed to tread those sensors, to show their usefulness; the technology needed its dry runs to convince government funders and foreign delegations of its innovative character. While migrants kept being “expelled”, their circulating signs of life were at the same time becoming incorporated into control strategies as a fundamental resource in its own right.

In Arizona, a laboratory was in the making that simultaneously generated specific economic and embodied relations. Financially speaking, the mechanical economy of apprehension statistics, which convinced Washington to open its purse, was now complemented by a more intricate form of tracking and apprehension. Border Patrol agents, skilled in time-honed ways of scouring the sandy grounds, were now “competing” with the technology of well-hidden sensors, remote sensing equipment and thermal cameras. Yet the portion of the “border security cake” did not shrink for the agents – instead the cake grew, on both sides of the Atlantic, bringing bonanzas for border agencies, security companies and neighboring states’ forces.

This economy of controls resonates with trends in other fields, which is precisely why I use such a deliberately broad term as *bioeconomy*. In Rose’s biomedical examples, he observes how “life itself has been made amenable to... new economic relations, as vitality is decomposed into a series of distinct and discrete objects—that can be isolated, delimited, stored, accumulated, mobilized, and exchanged” (Rose 2007:7). The traces left by sensors, radars, thermal cameras, heartbeat scanners and the like are not isolated and evanescent: they endure as data which is exported in circuits of production, consumption and exchange that will be delineated in later sections.

Besides the usage of detectable bodily parts as a catalyst for technological innovation, bioeconomic dimensions of bordering at this time further came to involve a foregrounding of migrant *vulnerability* to fuel investments, as border authorities skirted responsibility for generating that vulnerability in the first place (cf. Squire 2015).

During my interview with the JIOC chief, he defensively gave a justification for more border security. Around the time of mass arrivals in Arizona, in 2005-6, “our hospitals took a \$2bn hit through care to migrants,” he said. They treated “stuff” like dehydrations and “falling off the fence, falling off the cliff,” his colleague chipped in. This had a “huge economic impact,” concluded the JIOC chief. Rights activists said migrants “contribute to the economy, well, all the guys who wash dishes, [they are] not gonna contribute \$2bn... Securing the border has a very economic [dimension] to it.”

Yet this was not the cost of *migration* itself: rather it was one of the negative externalities of border security, as none of it would be incurred if migrants could enter safely and legally. Misidentifying the origins of the cost allowed for even more investments in controls. The Border Patrol here preyed on the vulnerability created via migrants’ diversion from relatively safer crossing areas (where fences and technology blocked their path) in two ways: first by using it as a justification for more resources, and next via a stepwise monopolization of “humanitarian rescues” (Williams 2015, 2016). In the latter development, “care” operations are no longer computed as a cost but as a *benefit* of border security, as border guards rescue those they expel. In this humanitarian-security nexus, repeated at the securitized borders of Europe, the disastrous



endangerment of migrants and refugees – the active creation of vulnerability – justifies continued growth in border security.

In short, technological innovation was but one element in a larger constellation of forces – an assemblage, industry or predatory formation – that started taking human life as its object of intervention in its “expellable” and vulnerable form. In the resulting border strategies, economic profits and relationships were actively being built around the border-crossing human being’s very vitality, both through evanescent signs of bodily life and, more broadly, through the human organism’s vulnerability at punishing desert and sea crossings. Fundamentally, both these aspects depended on the continued *circulation* of migrant bodies into more dangerous spaces: continuous footfall and re-routings were, in a subtler way than in earlier years, fundamental to the funding strategy. Indeed, Border Patrol agents, like their Spanish counterparts who I met during fieldwork, expressed the usefulness of border fences in temporal terms: a barrier just delays and re-routes migrants towards areas where the guards have “tactical advantage”, for instance the deadly Arizona desert. An economy of simultaneously devitalizing and detecting-cum-rescuing life articulated with the “real economy” of the border agencies’ budget lines.

While a biopolitical perspective helps shine a light on the violence of this “expulsion” into deserts and maritime spaces, a bioeconomy lens shifts analysis from violence in isolation towards the political economy that feeds and motivates such violence. Further, it also lets us glean how migrants and their bodies were rendered “useful” beyond their labour power, in highlighting the logics of value extraction and generation developed within border operations that treat vulnerable mobility as a source of revenue and institutional transformation.

While bioeconomic dimensions of border controls have been discussed in this section by reference to conventional economics – taxpayer-funded investments in more border security – more subtle relationships of production, exchange and consumption of migrant vitality are also in evidence in migration controls. To explore these dimensions, I will next switch to the other side of the Atlantic and to another migration control laboratory, the Spanish enclave of Ceuta at the Strait of Gibraltar, surrounded by six-metre-tall fences built to stop migrants from entering the EU.

### **Containment strategy, or warehousing vitality**

For the undocumented sub-Saharan African migrants who had managed to skirt or climb the fences of Ceuta, a prolonged stay in the enclave’s “temporary” migrant reception centre awaited. The “camp”, as its residents called it, showcased the “humanitarian” approach to migration honed in Spain’s Socialist years (2004-11), when I carried out my fieldwork there as a volunteer. Migrants received shelter and food, and even attended Spanish classes and workshops. Like its counterpart in Melilla, Ceuta’s camp involved a mix of care and control seen in other forms of migratory encampment (Agier 2011; Fassin 2005), while holding out the hope of eventual transfer from this tiny, fenced-in enclave to the Spanish mainland. In this sense, it was exemplary of the “humanitarian border” discussed by Walters (2011), showcasing a subtler form of expulsion combined with economic *incorporation* than that seen in terrain strategies.

During the Spanish boom years, migrants had been swiftly sent on to the mainland and set free with an expulsion order, turning into a readily exploitable

workforce in the Marxist sense. Yet after the financial crisis, mobility switched to stasis. The enforced stay in Ceuta was getting longer – about 1.5 years on average. It was at this time of “crisis” that another fundamental aspect of the emerging bioeconomy of controls consolidated in Spain: a containment strategy in which the task of deterring further entries meshed with humanitarian logics, in which authorities used migrants’ lived experience as a fundamental resource on interlinked political, financial and practical (policing and care) levels.

A subtler aspect of human vital presence was mobilized here by the authorities – migrants’ sense of lived time and, on an emotional and cognitive level, their hopes, dreams and frustrations. As I have discussed elsewhere (Andersson 2014), an elaborate temporal economy was at work: as one border police chief said, the enclave was a “trap” that supposedly deterred further entries. To explain how this worked, he took the example of human smugglers’ balance sheet: for each trafficked woman kept immobile in Ceuta, the trafficker might lose tens of thousands of euros. In this sense, the time migrants spent in the enclave constituted *capital* withheld from the presumed smuggling rings. However, the “mafias” were not the real target of this strategy because most sub-Saharan migrants – as the police chief was well aware – had arrived in Ceuta through their own efforts. For these migrants, retention constituted collective punishment, reducing them to indefinite confinement within the bounds of the enclave. The financial referent of the temporal economics of fighting smugglers here disappeared, like scaffolding, to reveal a bioeconomic edifice where care and control, containment and circulation, mingled.

Similar limbos exist elsewhere at the gates to the West, albeit often in a more starkly punitive guise (Mountz 2011). In Greece, large closed camps (“hotspots”) warehouse arrivals, while in Israel and Malta, prolonged detention is now the rule. In Australia’s “offshore solution”, Manus island and Nauru are used as detention sites where human rights are bracketed away for deterrence purposes.<sup>5</sup> In the United States, meanwhile, “recidivism” – repeated illegal entry – is now dealt with by mandatory incarceration of up to 180 days. In these tactics, shared around the world in the globalized business of borders, migrants’ lived time is usurped for border policing ends.

From a biopolitical perspective, this enforced limbo has been interpreted (albeit with nuances and contestations) as an example of “bare life” relegated to “spaces of exception” in Agamben’s (1998) sense. From a Marxian perspective, meanwhile, it has rather been interpreted as a “time lag”, with camps constituting a “decompression chamber” (Mezzadra in Tsianos et al 2009:8) through which temporal delays act as a disciplinary and/or regulatory mechanism for the supply of precarious labor. Both these perspectives have their merits. However, a bioeconomy lens brings to light the specific kinds of value leveraged through the usage of lived time in the containment setting itself. The first such value extraction is the deterrence value of downgrading and devitalizing lived time for migrants, however inefficient such deterrence may prove in reality. The second is the financial value obtained from this devitalization and immobilization of human life for actors ranging from the camp’s private security guards to service contractors, and from humanitarian organizations to state employees.

To return to Foucault’s tripartite frame, the bioeconomy of temporal deterrence recalls the legal/sovereign modality of power in controlling life in an absolute manner, yet it is also disciplinary in the sense Foucault (2007:6-7) detected in “exemplary punishments”, meted out with “the aim of having a corrective effect, if not on the culprit

himself – [then at least on the] rest of the population.” Exemplary punishment, an old technology of state power indeed, is resurrected in sophisticated garb as detained, retained or otherwise immobilized migrants are used for deterrence purposes. In containment strategies, then, migrants figure not as the enemies or adversaries of terrain strategies but rather as exemplars or human deterrents: that is (*pace* Agamben and to cite one migrant in Ceuta), they are “sacrificed” for a supposed greater good. Such usage of migrant exemplars is a key part of terrain strategies, too, as seen in the US “prevention through deterrence” approach built around hostile border terrain (De León 2015). Yet containment in camps, in its subtle meshing of care and control, of release and confinement, allows for more fine-tuned deterrence centered on the individual (something similar is achievable in deportations: West Africans, stigmatized by their forced return from Spain, have been treated as the “principal weapon of dissuasion” by Spanish police: see Andersson 2014). Here, through the appropriation of migrants’ present time and future hopes and anxieties, we find economies built around *psychological* time, in contrast with the focus on *physical* time in terrain strategies (based on delaying migrants by displacing them into areas of tactical advantage).

In Ceuta’s camp, uncertainty about the future permeated residents’ daily life. They could not work and had to obey by strict rules and curfews, or else face expulsion from the facility. The camp was set on the far edge of this tiny enclave, geographically elongating (or expelling) migrants from the social life of Ceuta, which to them constituted – as activists glossed it – a “golden prison”, hemmed in by fences and the sea. In this setting, each passing day was time lost in migrants’ life projects. Yet while despair was rampant, the containment strategy here also played on residents’ psychological vitality – their hopes, dreams, desires. In the camp, good behavior was presented as potentially opening an exit to the Spanish mainland; or else, government policy may change; or if you are in the good books of the workers, then you just *might*...

There was some degree of collusion among residents and authorities; no one could win the game yet all agreed on the rules, and all invested in migrants’ hopes and desires as a resource. Migrants desired a final administrative decision on transfer to detention on the mainland, holding out hope for a *fuera* (“out!”), as they called the often long-delayed decision letter. Collusion around these temporal horizons could easily tip over into conflict, however. Camps are notorious sites of protest, and a common way of contesting containment is to inflict violence on one’s own body – sowing together lips, self-immolation and other horrifically desperate acts. But in “open” centers such as Ceuta’s, there was a wider array of opportunities to protest. That summer of 2010, migrants came into town, waving placards and denouncing the camp as “Guantánamo” in a protest they labeled a “strike” – a term that made explicit their own analysis of the economy of controls. Camp residents saw themselves as “working for” the authorities by doing time in the camp, and by serving as a showcase for Spain’s nominally humane approach to visiting media, researchers and dignitaries, for whom it was a ready-made site of migratory consumption. All these examples – from alterations to one’s body to the “strike” – reveal an acute awareness among migrants of the fundamental battleground and *business* site for containment strategies: migrants’ life itself.

A bioeconomy of psychological time frames time as withheld capital, as the police chief had indicated. To achieve this end, containment requires large sums of actual capital, generating a “real economy” with its own set of vested interests. To take an

example from further afield, in Australia, AU\$9.6bn has been spent on punitive measures, mainly on offshore and mainland detention, in only four years, while impoverished Papua New Guinea and Nauru have received large pay-offs for hosting the camps.<sup>6</sup> In Ceuta and Melilla, the partly EU-financed camps are big employers; in Greece, the proposed privatization of camps was announced as a good employment strategy; and in the US, migrant detention facilities tend to be located in marginal areas, low on employment prospects, where locking people up is an economic life-saver (Barry 2011). As one Ceuta camp resident told me in 2010, “Migrants are merchandise... If they let the migrants go, unemployment would spike in Ceuta. It’s big business here.”

Conflicts, of the ground-up variety of Ceuta’s “strike” or on a higher political level, can render the otherwise “subterranean” workings of a bioeconomy of controls momentarily visible. When the PNG Supreme Court ruled the detention of refugees and migrants on Manus to be unconstitutional, the prime minister predicted closure would have a negative economic effect as “local businesses have invested to expand their operations to support the Manus center.” Meanwhile the local MP said Australia had to keep promises made to the community in return for establishing the centre. “If it has to be closed down it has to be closed down, but we still need our roads fixed.”<sup>7</sup> Meanwhile the biggest winner of the offshore strategy was the company running the centre, much as US and UK migration detention are in the hands of large conglomerates.

The PNG example shows starkly the growing stakes in outsourced migration controls not just for corporations, but also for poor “partner” states, which increasingly do the dirty work of fighting migration on richer states’ behalf. Besides the conflicts, such externalization presents political and economic *opportunities* for the more powerful among partner states, as seen most clearly at Europe’s southern shores. As the EU has exported the notion of migration as a threat, states such as Morocco, Libya, Turkey and Tunisia can use this threat as leverage to put pressure on Europe to offer concessions of various kinds, or else to generate internal gains through violence. The worst example of this today is conflict-ravaged Libya, where Gaddafi-era migrant detention centers (part-financed by the EU) have been appropriated by various militias and armed groups that treat African migrants as walking cashpoints, where they get stuck in a spiral of paying steep “liberation fees” only to face the risk of another detention, robbery or violent attack once they are out (Achnich 2017). The resulting desperation creates a captive market for smugglers, leading to steeper prices, the usage of more dangerous vessels and routine “warehousing” and torture of migrants and extortion of their families back home. Similar predations on “expelled” migrants take place among refugees fleeing across the Sinai towards Israel as well as in the drug cartel violence on Central Americans’ route through Mexico. In the torture endured on such routes, migrants’ body parts can convey criminals’ messages to migrants’ relatives back home.<sup>8</sup> As in earlier examples, the very bodily features of the migrant – the “distinct and discrete objects” (Rose 2007) of a particularly savage form of biocapital – become the site of a predatory “investment” by criminals.

There are dark historical echoes to the policing relationship between Western states and their “partners”. While a fuller historical account cannot be offered here, it is worth noting Duffield’s (2005) argument that the geopolitical strategizing of the Cold War era has come to be replaced (or complemented) by a (biopolitical) concern with securitized populations. This, he asserts however, is only “new if one takes the recent past of the Cold War as a starting point”. Rather, it rehearses themes of liberal

imperialism from the colonial era: “The brave but short-lived world of independent states has given way to what is perhaps the real heir of decolonization: an innovative, unstable and circulatory ‘world of peoples’. Given the uncertainties and dangers this has created, it is unsurprising that the sentiments of liberal imperialism, including the policing role of effective states, have been rehabilitated” (Duffield 2005:143-144).

Besides colonial echoes, other historical eras resonate with the political economy of brutalization in the global borderlands, as exemplified by Libya. Amid the unprecedented arrivals from this conflict-hit country in 2015, the Italian prime minister said: “We are facing a new slave trade and new slave traders... We are going back in time when people made money from human life.”<sup>9</sup> What he failed to mention was that this line of business – of treating migrants as a “good”, in their own words – was the direct result of the deterrence policies pursued by states including his own, as criminal predation depends upon the generation of vulnerability through border security. Further, the warehousing and kidnapping practices in Libya also exhibit family resemblances to the containment strategies delineated in this section. As one migrant in Ceuta referred to his retention: “It’s the slave trade all over again,” while others invoked colonialism and racism in describing their treatment in containment.

In sum, a bioeconomy lens on containment strategies shines a light on the articulation of different vested interests in the manufactured chaos of irregular migration. On the one hand, we see an interlocking between policing gains and care-in-confinement in sites such as Ceuta: that is, of using migrants’ vital time for deterrence purposes and simultaneously generating financial value off this extraction. On the other hand, we see an interlocking of *political* gains in spectacularly containing irregular migrants (cf. De Genova 2002) with the *economies* discussed here. Such instrumentalization and (de)valuing of life is seen in its most sophisticated form in the advanced risk strategies for fighting migration, to which we will now turn.

### **Risk strategy, or fighting migration by econometrics**

In the London border management meeting of 2015, discussion shifted onto how the Border Patrol had eventually moved beyond “reactive brute force”. Instead of the “law enforcement mindset” of going after the “big guy”, Mafia-style, the early 2010s had seen the birth of a risk-based strategy based on treating smuggling organizations “as a business”, one former top operative said. This meant deterring recidivism while pushing up smugglers’ costs. Yet in the face of incorrect beliefs among US citizens that overland migration was increasing, border chiefs had to answer a simple question, the operative said: “How do we know that we’re winning?” And, we must add, how can the government be convinced this is so?

The solution lay in statistics and advanced modelling of risks and costs. On the face of it, the new strategy was simply an outgrowth of the deterrence-based one in the previous sections, yet it operated on a different level. To bring us back to Foucault’s tripartite divide, whereas containment strategies amalgamated disciplinary and predatory processes, the risk-based strategy worked on *populations*, on rates and averages. In doing so, it used the dominant scientific tool in migration policy – neoclassical economics (Massey et al 1993) – to quantitatively tweak the cost of the journey.

As an analyst laid out this risk-based strategy, I protested that the main reason for

the fall in arrivals was Mexico's demographic shift, besides economic causes, but the analyst responded that this had all been factored into the model. To this end, he presented a slide that said:

It is possible to show that the following holds mathematically:

$$T_v/T = (1-D)*A$$

where T is the total number of apprehensions made by border enforcement agents,  $T_v$  is the number of recidivist apprehensions, A is the probability of apprehension, and D is the probability of giving up after being caught.

This formula was in turn predicated on another, modelling people's decision to migrate. The formula was a tweak to existing neoclassical models, in which the estimated cost of the journey is weighed against the estimated benefits of arriving safely:

Migrate if: Expected benefit > Cost + Pr(App)\*Consequences

In this formula – unlike under containment strategies – deterrence is turned into a scientifically validated objective of border enforcement. The first part, “cost”, refers to the ramping up of pressure on smugglers, which raises the price for the journey. While this can be explained by recourse to standard economics, the second part – Pr(App) [probability of apprehension]\*Consequences – incorporates deterrence as lived experience.

“Consequences” is a broad tent. It includes the humiliation of detention in unsanitary conditions; of being frogmarched, handcuffed, through “Operation Streamline” before a judge to confess illegal entry; of being deported, often after separation from family members, to border sites far away from places of original entry; and of the fear of prolonged incarceration, as anyone trying again will be identified by their biometric record as criminalized “recidivists”.

Next, another analyst produced a slide showing how deterrence efforts, principally felony prosecutions against recidivist migrants, had “worked”. This was done through “counterfactual simulations” that – the analyst said while nodding to me – somehow took account of demographic shifts. Economic variables did play a role in the decline of Mexican migrations, he asserted, while “border enforcement build-up did not have a big impact”. While the terrain strategy was thus unscientific, in this analysis, the new risk-based strategy was a gold standard of sorts, ready for export to Europe.

What kind of “migrant” is thought and fought in these models? While terrain strategies conjured a physical adversary and containment strategies a human deterrent, risk-based strategy invoked a familiar *homo economicus* who calculates their behavior via a simple cost-benefit analysis. Yet while this on the face of it lends migrants some rationality, in the neoclassical economic vein, it does so in the narrowest of terms as migrants are treated as creatures responding to negative stimuli in predictable reactive patterns. Moreover, as the model's bare-boned rational-choice individual is deployed to show how prolonged detention and other punitive consequences “work” in the aggregate, it undercuts any legal defense centered on the human individual who it discursively

replaces.

The complex matrix of deterrence is thus profoundly dehumanizing both in its effects and in its assumptions. As for the effects, our speakers tried their best to laugh them off: “The maximum consequence is 180 days in jail... we’re not talking East Germany here,” said one. “The sandwich and the orange drink [upon initial detention] are enough of a deterrence,” quipped another.

In considering such abstract dehumanization, we may wish to combine Agamben (1998) and Sassen (2014) to apprehend how human life is “stripped naked” to a formula through the workings of a predatory formation in which statistical modelling, analysts, security companies, the Border Patrol, Mexican authorities, US politicians and detention conglomerates conspire to generate “elementary brutalities”. Yet the other side of the coin is that this predatory formation is itself a model of value extraction and generation – built, as seen in the formulae, on the psychological, physical and temporal deterrence effects on human life.

Internally in the Border Patrol, as in other law enforcement agencies, the top aim was to secure funding in competition with other authorities. The old way of doing so, via apprehension statistics, was by the second half of the 2000s in trouble for a simple reason – demographics. Mexico’s young population was declining, and irregular border crossings kept diminishing, with apprehensions per agent at record lows. For political reasons, Congress still kept pushing for more agents, though the participants in our meeting saw this as pointless (“keep your opinions to yourself,” the operative chief had been told by his boss when raising doubts). In sum, given the political demand for more border security and the ground-level reality of fewer arrivals, a cynical view of vested interest leads us to a simple conclusion: a new formula had to be invented to justify and guarantee funding indefinitely.

The graphic on “counterfactual simulations” did this job masterfully, representing visually how effective the risk-based strategy was. This visual success was based on readings of the factor “D” for deterrence. It was a weak variable, however, based on surveys among deportees carried out by a subcontracted Mexican organization at the border at the moment of deportation. The model as a whole rested on further assumptions, including the estimated number of undetected arrivals. It also excluded “other-than-Mexicans” and asylum seekers – and it was precisely these two groups that kept growing at the borders. Further, no account was taken of the statistical correlation between the growth in the Border Patrol budget and the *increase* in the US undocumented population inland (Massey et al 2016). Yet none of this mattered: the model, in showing very selectively that “consequences” worked quantitatively, allowed the Border Patrol and CBP to keep pitching their funding needs *quite regardless of migrant numbers*.

In deterrence by econometrics, we may see a Foucauldian “apparatus of security” at work, whose sophistication correlates with its brutal consequences. Through this perspective, risk-based deterrence seems simply to reiterate neoliberal models of governance. Yet by applying the bioeconomy lens, I wish to put focus on more specific logics and processes that underpin such governance. Deterrence, in this abstract model, is achieved through small-scale ignominies that target the human subject, decreasing his or her desire for migration by imposing *vital costs in the aggregate*, including the humiliation, confinement and bodily effects (through lack of salubrious conditions or proper nutrition) of apprehension and detention as well as the deeper human fear of

steeper consequences for recidivist attempts.

So far, I have looked at the three overlapping border strategies by recourse to Foucault's three modalities of power. However, in the spirit of a critical encounter, it is worth briefly comparing the strategies by recourse to an *economic* tripartite division that works by metaphorical extension. Terrain strategies resemble industrial-style production: physically removing an alien adds to the statistics of success, much as a production line for Soviet tractors or the Vietnam war body count. Containment strategy retains this industrial approach (as seen, for instance, in the US "bed mandate" put in place in 2010, where 34,000 detention beds were required to be filled each day) while combining it with another, more abstract model. In deterring people by retaining lived time, construed as withheld capital, the policing strategy discussed above resembles the competition of listed companies (buy or devalue the "shares" of the smuggler competitor, and so increase your competitive advantage). Finally, risk strategy incorporates both of these preceding modes yet adds another resembling financial trades, and especially the derivatives business. By abstracting certain elements from the migrant-border encounter and codifying them in deceptively rigorous-looking shorthand (especially the elusive and error-prone D value, but also the hardly quantifiable  $\text{Pr(App)} \times \text{consequences}$ ), the Border Patrol and its associates can increase their "value" as they vie for government attention. A bioeconomy lens here reveals how border enforcement, by increasingly tapping into and (de)valuing human life, from the physical scale of bodily presence to the psychological and aggregate social scales of containment and risk strategies, combines logics of vitality with the institutional logics of the real economy, ensuring growing financial investments in the border security model.

"Lessons for Europe" was the tagline of our 2015 London meeting, and the risk-based model – already adapted, albeit in more rudimentary form, by the EU border agency Frontex (Andersson 2014) – does hold strong promises for actors invested in securitizing the border. It points the way towards a self-perpetuating border industry that, much like derivatives, can keep increasing its value and market even though its basic collateral (footfall at the border) may be dwindling.

## Conclusion

This paper has taken a deliberately broad view of what constitutes an economy of border controls, and of what may count as a *bioeconomy* within that. The aim has been to stretch the familiar Foucauldian framework of governmentality and biopolitics towards a political economy account of globalized bordering practices to account for ways in which human life in its various, layered aspects may be mobilized as a resource.

In conclusion, it is worth briefly looking beyond migration for comparative angles. In our dire times, disaster, danger and risk present business opportunities in fields ranging from war-fighting to emergency relief and incarceration, something journalists such as Klein (2014) and Loewenstein (2015) have explored with reference to the term "disaster capitalism". A bioeconomy lens takes us beyond disasters, however, to peer into broader "subterranean" patterns in extracting and generating value from life itself. Biotechnologies of migrant detection, for instance, show family resemblances with the biomedical markets discussed by Rose (2007), and in a different sense with the extreme predatory economy of the international organ trade (in which, as it happens, vulnerable



refugees evading border security have become an important “resource”). The bioeconomies of containment, meanwhile, show family resemblances with the global kidnapping industry, as both “warehouse” people for the extraction of different forms of value (political, policing, financial) and both moreover overlap empirically, as seen in Libya. As for bioeconomies of risk, one parallel is found in “biocriminological” interventions dealing with epidemiological models of crime (Rose 2007), while another may be found in corporate practice. In an intriguing ethnographic account of an international management consultancy in China, Chong (2012:89) has examined how the consultancy’s Human Capital Strategy program “financializes” labour through a sleight of hand that computes “employee engagement scores” as total shareholder return. As Chong says (2012:96), deploying “a concept that has traditionally been used to measure the performance of capital” to the acculturation of labor “alters the ontological basis in which labor is configured”. At the consultancy, she concludes, “the desired subject is constructed as a financial asset” in what she terms an “ontological takeover”.

This “takeover” through shifting corporate logics echoes the punitive bioeconomies that migrants face as they go from being adversaries at the border to being recast as human deterrents or stimuli-responding cogs in a deterrence formula. Such “takeovers” also point towards larger questions. The institutional frame of this paper leaves us with an incomplete view of attempts to marketize life. What is life like under these conditions generated by border security? What are the “subject effects”, in a Foucauldian sense, of life in a bioeconomy? There is no space here to delve further into subjecthood, besides noting the manifold forms of resistance *enabled* by the logics of devitalization and the economies of life itself – including, as mentioned, instrumentalizing one’s own body parts; reframing protests as “strikes”; or indeed asserting one’s own role as a “human deterrent”, as deportees I met in Senegal did. This deep entanglement of emerging forms of subjecthood and predatory markets is, one hopes, something that a bioeconomy perspective may help lift to the analytical forefront.

Rose (2007) has suggested that “we are inhabiting an emergent form of life” traced by the “post-human” possibilities of biotechnology and biomarkets. Setting aside any epochal claims, the “we” of this account seems to suggest a citizen of rich (Western) societies; while “we” are post-human, “they” remain stranded in their old humanity. By expanding the notions of *bio* and *economy*, this paper has shifted focus to non-western, marginal social groups, showing how supposedly excluded or “expelled” irregular migrants may be facing the direst consequences of an institutional logic of extraction, accumulation and value-generation from life itself. As we have seen, those who face predatory economies in their daily life often show an acute analysis of such modalities of extraction, while being cognizant of their historical resonances. From a bioeconomy lens, migrants can thus be seen at the forefront of forms of profit and predation from life itself, and their tactics and analyses in response to this predicament may lead the rest of us to find alternative paths to the dark political road ahead.

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## Notes

<sup>1</sup> See <http://www.newsweek.com/2015/06/19/migrants-and-new-mediterranean-mafia-341468.html>

<sup>2</sup> Unpublished footage by Henriette Holm, 2016.

<sup>3</sup> See

[http://ec.europa.eu/research/bioeconomy/policy/bioeconomy\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/research/bioeconomy/policy/bioeconomy_en.htm). By metaphorical extension, the *human* bioeconomy I delineate here similarly "recycles" and appropriates vital energies otherwise used for labor power or consumption.

<sup>4</sup> See <http://homelandcouncil.org/executive-programs/executive-tours/>

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<sup>5</sup> The *Guardian*, <https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2016/sep/12/senate-to-investigate-allegations-of-child-abuse-on-nauru-and-manus-island>.

<sup>6</sup> See <https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2016/sep/13/australia-has-spent-96bn-on-asylum-seeker-policy-in-four-years-says-report>.

<sup>7</sup> See <http://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2016/apr/27/manus-island-detention-centre-to-close-papua-new-guinea-prime-minister-says>

<sup>8</sup> See <http://africalatestnews.com/2016/06/at-least-7000-eritreans-in-israel-survived-torture-rape-in-sinai-haaretz/>

<sup>9</sup> See <http://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20150420/local/eu-summit-on-thursday-muscat-renzi-agree-on-need-to-stop-people.564751>