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The Doomsday Argument and the self-indication assumption: Reply to Odum

Abstract:

In a recent paper in this journal, Ken Olum attempts to refute the doomsday argument by appealing to the self-indication assumption (SIA) that your very existence gives you reason to think that there are many observers. Unlike earlier users of this strategy, Olum tries to counter objections that have been made against (SIA). We argue that his defence of (SIA) is unsuccessful. This does not, however, mean that one has to accept the doomsday argument (or the other counter-intuitive results that...

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Publication status:
Published

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Publisher copy:
10.1111/1467-9213.00298

Authors


Bostrom, N More by this author
Cirkovic, MM More by this author
Journal:
PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
Volume:
53
Issue:
210
Pages:
83-91
Publication date:
2003-01-05
DOI:
EISSN:
1467-9213
ISSN:
0031-8094
URN:
uuid:1d28d9dd-8092-4de8-8e04-aa522f0600ce
Source identifiers:
67699
Local pid:
pubs:67699
Language:
English

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