

Beyond Corsairs:

The British-Barbary Relationship during the
French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars



A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
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The North African Barbary States are usually dismissed as an unimportant, though bothersome, pirate base of little consequence in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. This thesis challenges that idea by providing qualitative and quantitative evidence of Barbary's role in trade and diplomacy during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, especially as it affected Britain and how the British were able to carry out their military and political goals in the Mediterranean. The study is based on the correspondence between the British government and its military leaders in the region, the correspondence and reports generated by British consuls working in Barbary, import/export records, and a database tracking British shipping to and from North Africa during the conflict.

To the British, Barbary was not an irritation but an asset. Britain was able to manage Barbary's trade and foreign policy over the course of the twenty-three-year conflict. This was accomplished in two key ways: as a source of supplies for British forces and through the diplomatic role provided by Britain's extensive consul network. Though the North African states were neutral for the majority of both wars, Britain worked strenuously to maintain and increase its trade and diplomacy with Barbary for the benefit of the British armed forces. British trade with Barbary, supported by the British-Barbary diplomatic relationship, directly contributed to British successes in the Mediterranean and Iberian Peninsula.

Beyond Corsairs: The British-Barbary Relationship during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars

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This thesis examines the relationship between Britain and the Barbary States during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars to investigate its impact on Britain's war effort in the Mediterranean. For over a century prior to the outbreak of the French Revolutionary War, the British and French had been competing for diplomatic and economic primacy in the Barbary States. The new conflict between the two nations ensured that competition continued. Barbary is usually dismissed as an unimportant, though bothersome, pirate base of little consequence by the late eighteenth century. Instead, this thesis argues that the neutral Barbary States were a crucial source of supply and trade and their corsairs, still active during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, posed a threat to British allies in the Mediterranean. This thesis challenges the idea of Barbary's irrelevance by providing qualitative and quantitative evidence of Barbary's role in trade and diplomacy during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, focusing on the British war effort in the Mediterranean. To the British, Barbary was not an irritation but an asset. Britain was able to manage Barbary's trade and foreign policy over the course of the twenty-three-year conflict. This was accomplished in two main ways: as a source of supplies for British forces and through the diplomatic role provided by Britain's extensive consular network. Though the North African states were neutral for the majority of both wars, Britain worked strenuously to maintain and increase its trade and diplomacy with Barbary to allow the British military to draw the most benefit from the region. British trade with Barbary, supported by the British-Barbary diplomatic

relationship, directly contributed to British successes in the Mediterranean and Iberian Peninsula.

This thesis draws upon the conceptualization of naval history outlined by Sir Julian Corbett. The use of economic warfare and political influence over strategy to serve national interests outlined in Corbett's *Principles of Maritime Strategy* (1911) provides a paradigm with which to understand the Anglo-Barbary relationship. Corsair attacks targeted smaller states' merchant shipping, ensuring British trade success whilst British ships were protected. Additionally, the competitive diplomacy the consuls in Barbary engaged provided economic advantages for their own nation while preventing access to the same supplies to their enemies. By developing a symbiotic relationship with Barbary, Britain was able to not only extract benefit from the natural resources of North Africa but also combine the sea denial tactics of the corsairs with Britain's own policy of sea control, further strengthening the British position. Finally, Corbett emphasizes that major naval battles rarely result in lasting military victories. Instead, the navy must supplement the armed forces on land. In the Napoleonic War, this cooperation between army and navy resulted in great success during the Peninsular War. The last 'great' naval battle of the Napoleonic war was the Battle of Trafalgar in 1805 – ten years before Waterloo. For the majority of the Peninsular War, the British Navy relied on supplies from Barbary to feed itself, and to transport those same supplies to the British Army and its allies.

This thesis is also part of a broader discussion of Muslim-Christian interactions within the wider Mediterranean. Fernand Braudel's *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II* (1949) argues that the Mediterranean itself is a uniting factor. The wider Mediterranean is one civilization, not two split along its horizontal axis. North Africa and Europe were connected, diplomatically and

commercially, despite the cultural and political differences between the two shores. Through British political and diplomatic efforts, as well as the availability of increased trading profits, the Muslim Barbary States found it expedient and beneficial to ally and trade with former enemies such as Catholic Spain and Portugal, as well as the islands of Malta and Corsica. Those new alliances, in turn, benefited British goals.

As this thesis examines the relationship between the four Barbary States and Britain (and British diplomatic efforts in Barbary during the twenty-three year conflict with France), the bulk of its sources come from British archives and publications and concern British activities in the Mediterranean (military or mercantile) or those of its consuls in North Africa. The archival material is housed at the National Archives (NA), formerly the Public Record Office (PRO), and the British Library, both in London. Of principal interest is the correspondence, both private and official, of the British military leaders, consuls, and politicians involved in fighting the war in the Mediterranean. Though significant research has been done on the British war effort in the Mediterranean during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars (particularly during Lord Nelson's command), the focus of this thesis is to follow the British military, diplomatic, and political interactions with Barbary over the course of the wars and how these dealings affected both the British war effort and the Barbary States themselves. As a comparison, the thesis examines letter books of the French consuls in Algiers and Tunis, compiled by Eugène Plantet in the late nineteenth century. British pamphlets and memoirs by late eighteenth and early nineteenth century merchants and travellers in North Africa round out this study's source material. Of primary interest and importance are those written or published during the period under consideration (1792-1830). These provide a useful, non-military perspective about Barbary's value and its importance to the wider British world during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.

Correspondence has been analysed qualitatively in order to highlight the value the British military, political, and diplomatic leaders placed on Barbary over the course of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars and how the British-Barbary relationship was seen as part of the wider British war effort. An attempt has been made, however, to provide quantifiable and statistical data, where such data exists, drawing from consular shipping and import/export reports, reports on the strength and activities of the Barbary corsair fleets, and a French translation of the Algerine prize books from 1765 through 1830 (Devoulx, 1872). A database stretching from 1792 to 1816 was compiled from *Lloyd's List* shipping gazette, as it contains a continuous record of British shipping worldwide for the period in question. The database tracks British ships traveling to and from Barbary ports over the course of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars and amounts to over 1,000 records for the period. Its continuous nature allows generalizations to be drawn where the consular reports are lacking. Taken together, the data shows that the wars were a boon to Barbary, with trade rising as British holdings in the Mediterranean increased. As Barbary merchant shipping increased, the corsair fleets, particularly privately owned corsairs, fell. With more of the small Mediterranean states, the corsairs' normal prey, under British protection, it behoved Barbary to move away from corsair predation towards mercantile practices to supply the extensive British military apparatus. On the British side, the height of Barbary trade corresponded with the highest points of British need for supplies to feed their expanding military responsibilities in the Mediterranean. This was a particular advantage over the French, who did not have equal access to Barbary's natural resources. The British-Barbary relationship was a symbiotic one from which both sides benefitted.

As much as possible, this thesis attempts to follow a straight chronology to trace the development of the British position in Barbary and how the Anglo-Barbary

relationship changed over the course of the wars. The chapters end on major events in the Mediterranean. Additionally, though many of the naval battles fought by the British Royal Navy during these wars took place within the Mediterranean sphere, the battles themselves are not the focus of this study. Instead, it focuses on the British supply problems in the Mediterranean, both before and after battles and while on blockade. It begins, officially, with the start of the French Revolutionary War, in 1792, but extends beyond the end of the war, beyond Waterloo to the French invasion of Algiers in 1830 to provide a comparison between the symbiotic relationship between Britain and Barbary during the wars and how rapidly it changed after the war.

Chapter one provides the historical background of the Barbary States and their developing relationship with Britain and France. The establishment of the consular system and Royal Navy Victualling Board demonstrated the importance of diplomatic and trade agreements in supplying Naval fleets far from Britain. Chapter two covers the first coalition of the French Revolutionary War and examines how Britain's lack of naval bases and the historical French dominance in the Mediterranean hindered British efforts on that front at the start of the war. The initial turning point was the Battle of Cape St Vincent, after which, owing to a stabilised polity in North Africa and renewed British presence in the Mediterranean, the disparity between Britain and France in North Africa decreased. Chapter three covers the Battle of the Nile through the Peace of Amiens and examines how Britain benefited from the French invasion of Egypt, by overcoming French diplomatic pre-eminence in Barbary to the British advantage. By 1801, the British and French were on an equal footing in Barbary. The French invasion of Egypt had ended French dominance of North Africa, but it did not end the French threat.

Chapter four spans the Peace of Amiens and the start of the Napoleonic war, until the Battle of Trafalgar. The Peace of Amiens undid the advantages the British had acquired following the French invasion of Egypt, and chapter four examines how the British struggled against French efforts in Barbary as the Royal Navy prepared to fight what would be known as the Battle of Trafalgar. Nelson's tenure in the Mediterranean was dominated by a diplomatic crisis in Algiers, which underscored the importance of the consular system in managing Barbary relations with the British navy in the Mediterranean. Chapter five covers Collingwood's command of the Mediterranean fleet and marks a departure from the previous three chapters. For the first time, Britain, not France, was dominant in North Africa. Chapter five examines the way Britain diplomatic and trade efforts in Barbary expanded as British commitments in the Iberian Peninsula increased. Chapter six covers the last five years of the Napoleonic War (1810-1815) and demonstrates how the British had reversed their position from the beginning in 1793. The still increasing British reliance on Barbary with the Peninsular War culminated in the dispatch of a special envoy extraordinary, the A'Court Mission to Barbary in 1813. A'Court's mission demonstrated the importance of North Africa to the wider British war effort. Finally, chapter seven, covering Napoleon's hundred days through the French colonisation of Algiers, examines the rabid shift in the British-Barbary relationship that occurred at the end of the war. Three years after the success of the A'Court mission, Britain bombarded Algiers and threatened the rest of Barbary. Chapter seven shows how it was changing European politics, an economic vacuum caused by the withdrawal of the British military from the Mediterranean, and regional turmoil that led to the end of the corsairs, not any of the ten bombardments between 1815 and 1830.

The Barbary States were a crucial part of the British military strategy in the Mediterranean and a vital part of the British supply chain. The advantageous British-

Barbary relationship provided the British with better resources. Better resources allowed the British (and British allies) to be a more effective fighting force against the French. Correspondence between the admirals in the Mediterranean and the British government demonstrated the importance Barbary's trade and friendship held for Britain. Barbary provided supplies and food. Their necessity increased with each new force and garrison established there. The loss of that supply, or worse, the possibility of a new conflict in the southern Mediterranean, was a potential disaster. Every effort was made to avoid that outcome by all involved, even by the rulers of Barbary itself for whom Britain's trade and friendship were also necessary. Barbary mercantile efforts intensified after the Battle of Trafalgar and Bonaparte's Berlin Decrees, which established the British as the dominant European power in the Mediterranean and limited European shipping and trade. The Barbary States were neutral and assumed the vital role of maintaining the supply lines between Barbary and the British garrisons at Malta and Gibraltar as well as continuing their own mercantile efforts in the Mediterranean. As trade increased, Barbary corsairing decreased. The twin ends of the Napoleonic War and the War of 1812 allowed European and American carriers back into the Mediterranean and came at the expense of the nascent North African trade. In the absence of that trade, Barbary fell back on corsairing. Regional instability, in part caused by the end of the war, further contributed to the souring relations and ten separate attacks on Barbary ports. In the same way that the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars saw the last major Age of Sail battles, so too were they the last major wars involving privateering. Once the culture of war changed to eliminate that type of economic warfare, the days of the Barbary corsairs were numbered. Until that changed, the Barbary states of North Africa were an important part of the balance of power strategies advocated in Europe, particularly for Britain.

In loving memory of
David Ireland “Pop-Pop” Gale
&
أستاذي Dr. Farouk Mustafa

الله يرهمهم

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A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'C. M. Gale', with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

Caitlin M Gale
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FREQUENT ABBREVIATIONS

NA: The National Archives at Kew, London. (Formerly the PRO)

BL: British Library in London

DLN: Sir Nicholas Harris Nicolas, ed., *The Dispatches and Letters of Vice Admiral Lord Viscount Nelson*. 7 volumes. (London: 1844-5).

KP: W.G. Perrin, ed., *The Keith Papers: Selected from the Letters and Papers of Admiral Viscount Keith*. 2 volumes. (London: Navy Records Society, 1950).

PCC: Edward Hughes, ed., *The Private Correspondence of Admiral Lord Collingwood*. (London: Spottiswoode, Ballantyne, and Co., Ltd., 1957).

NCCC: G.L. Newnham Collingwood, ed., *A Selection from the Public and Private Correspondence of Vice-Admiral Lord Collingwood Interspersed with Memoirs of His Life*. 2 volumes. 3rd edition. (London: James Ridgeway, 1823).

DDW: John Gurwood, ed., *The Dispatches of Field Marshall the Duke of Wellington During His Various Campaigns in India, Denmark, Portugal, Spain, the Low Countries, and France*. 8 volumes. (London: J Murray, 1834-1839).

GLOSSARY

Agha: leader of the *Janissary* corps. In Algiers, the *Agha* usually became *Khaznadji* when the *Khaznadji* became Dey.

Ahdname/Ahdnâme: capitulation or formal agreement between the Ottoman Empire and another state. The first capitulations were signed between the French and the Ottoman Empire in 1569, which placed Europeans in the Ottoman Empire under the jurisdiction of the French and established French pre-eminence in the Ottoman court. French dominance in North Africa stemmed from their ‘most favoured nation’ status in Constantinople.

Bey: an Ottoman governor. The title held by the rulers of Tunis. Also the title held by the rulers of administrative districts in the Ottoman Regencies (such as Constantine or Tripolitania).

Bilad al-makhzen: literally the land of the storehouse – in Morocco, it designates the area under governmental control (where taxes can be secured from).

Bilad al-siba: literally the land of anarchy – in Morocco, it designates the area beyond governmental control (where taxes cannot be secured from).

Corsair: The name in the languages of the Mediterranean for a privateer; chiefly applied to the cruisers of Barbary, to whose attacks the ships and coasts of the Christian countries were incessantly exposed. In English often treated as identical with *pirate*, though the Saracen and Turkish corsairs were authorized and recognized by their own government as part of its settled policy towards Christendom. (OED, 2nd ed. *s.v.* “Corsair”)

Dey: the title given to the ruler of Algiers.

Diwan al-‘askar: Military Council, comprised of Ottoman and local military forces and the corsair captains (*reis*)

Firman: a royal edict or order from the Ottoman Empire.

Janissary: the elite infantry of the Ottoman military. In Ottoman North Africa, these were foreign fighters recruited from elsewhere in the Empire and stationed in North Africa – the *turks* of Barbary.

Kapudan-pasha: the leader of the Ottoman Navy, equivalent to Admiral. The office had historic ties to the corsair captains of North Africa.

Khaznadji: the state treasurer in Algiers, usually the next in line to replace the Dey.

Kulughli: children born of Turkish *Janissary* fathers and North African mothers. Allowed to integrate into the governments and militaries of Tunis and Tripoli, but remained separate in Algiers.

Lingua Franca: the pidgin language that developed in the Mediterranean generally and North Africa specifically to allow the various nationalities to communicate. A mixture of Arabic, Turkish, Berber, Spanish, Italian and French.

Maghreb: literally the land to the west. It refers to North Africa, excluding Egypt. It can also refer specifically to Morocco, though usually called either the *al-Mamlakah al-Maghrebiyah* (Kingdom of Morocco/the West) or *Maghreb al-aqsa* (the land farthest west).

Mawlay: honourific bestowed on those who claim *sharif* descent and the title held by the ‘Alawite rulers of Morocco.

Mediterranean Passes: a passport system that developed in the Mediterranean during the seventeenth century to determine which ships were free from corsair attacks and which were not. They were scalloped and cut in various ways, part of which went to the ship owner and part was sent to the North African state in question, with a copy held by the issuing government.

Mokadem: leader of the Jewish Community in Algiers, sometimes called ‘the Prince of the Jews’

Moor: Those of North African descent, though sometimes used by Europeans to designate all North Africans (though this happened rarely, Europeans, and especially British, were often well aware of the difference between a ‘Turk’ and a ‘Moor.’)

Ojaq: the collective term for the Ottoman military forces in North Africa

Pasha/Basha/Bashaw: literally Vice-Roy. Originally the title given to those directly appointed by the Ottoman Empire and the title held by the rulers of Tripoli.

Reis/Rais: literally head, leader. Specifically refers to Corsair Captains.

Sahib al-tabî’: literally “Guardian of the Seals” or the French *garde de sceaux*. Written variously in English as sapatapa, zapatap, or sapatabi.

Sharif/cherif: one who can claim direct descent from the prophet Muhammad. The rulers of Morocco since the sixteenth century have generally been *sharifs*. The current ‘Alawite dynasty of Morocco is of *sharif* descent.


Sublime Porte: a metonym for the Ottoman Imperial Government referencing the entrance to the state buildings in Constantinople (modern Istanbul).

Turk: those of Ottoman Turkish descent living in North Africa. The phrase ‘to turn Turk’ meant to become a renegade, convert to Islam and (usually) become a corsair.


‘ulama: the leaders of the religious community of Islam, trained in the Islamic law and legal tradition to which they belong.

MAPS


Europe & Barbary



Central Mediterranean & Ottoman Regencies



Strait of Gibraltar



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INTRODUCTION

When Lord Exmouth, at the head of a British squadron, bombarded Algiers in 1816, he ended over a hundred years of ‘peace and friendship’ and trade between Britain and the Regency. This attack, along with the US war led by Stephen Decatur the previous year, and France’s 1830 conquest of Algeria, the ‘scramble for Africa,’ and waves of colonisation that followed were seen as natural consequences of the ‘piratical’ actions of the four Muslim states of the *Maghreb* (Tripoli, Tunis, Algiers, and Morocco) for daring to attack European ships and enslave white Christians for three hundred years. Historians still see the American attack of Stephen Decatur in 1815 and the British bombardment by Lord Exmouth in 1816 against Barbary as the final nail in the coffin against the corsairs. Yet the many attacks against North Africa that occurred in the fifteen years preceding French colonisation were as unprecedented as they were unforeseen. The major maritime powers of Europe, especially Britain and France, had enjoyed long-standing diplomatic relations in the region. Barbary was an integral part of British strategy during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. The four states of Barbary were of diplomatic and logistical importance for the major European states, especially Britain.

This thesis examines the relationship between Britain and the Barbary States during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars to investigate that relationship’s impact on Britain’s ability to carry out their military effort in the Mediterranean. For over a century prior to the outbreak of the French Revolutionary War, the British and French had been competing for diplomatic and economic primacy in the Barbary States. The new conflict between the two nations ensured that competition continued. The North African Barbary States are usually dismissed as an unimportant, though bothersome,

pirate base of little consequence in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. This thesis challenges that idea by providing qualitative and quantitative evidence of Barbary's role in trade and diplomacy during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, especially as it affected Britain and how the British were able to carry out their military and political goals in the Mediterranean. To the British, Barbary was not an irritation but an asset. Britain was able to manage Barbary's trade and foreign policy over the course of the twenty-three-year conflict. This was accomplished in two main ways: as a source of supplies for British forces and the diplomatic role provided by Britain's extensive consular network. Though the North African states were neutral for the majority of both wars, Britain worked strenuously to maintain and increase their trade and diplomacy with Barbary to allow the British military to draw the most benefit from the region. That trade and diplomatic relationship directly contributed to British successes in the Mediterranean and Iberian Peninsula.

Britain had established strong commercial and diplomatic ties with North Africa during the sixteenth century but was not the dominant power in the Mediterranean. France had a stronger claim; her commercial and diplomatic ties predated and exceeded those of Britain. As the French Revolutionary War spread throughout Europe, the Mediterranean became the second most important naval front in the war and access to the supplies and harbours of Barbary were crucial to the war effort. At the start of the French Revolutionary War, France dominated the Ottoman regencies (though in the kingdom of Morocco, Britain and France were roughly equal owing to the importance of British Gibraltar). As the war progressed, France increasingly controlled Europe, including those states bordering the northern Mediterranean. It was not until after the successes of the Battle of Cape St Vincent and the Nile that Britain equalled France across North Africa. Both combatants remained in Barbary during the Peace of Amiens,

maintaining their competitive diplomacy and access to fresh supplies. After Trafalgar, Britain controlled the Mediterranean, but that dominance did not lessen British reliance on North Africa. As the British increased their blockades and began liberating the Iberian Peninsula, access to fresh food and water was crucial to maintaining the health of the fleet and allowing the British Army to move against the French. Additionally, the Peninsular War coincided with the closure of the ports of Europe to British ships with the Berlin decrees and later, the declaration of war from another neutral, the United States of America, in 1812. By the final stages of the Napoleonic war, Barbary was not just a convenient source of supplies in the Mediterranean, but sometimes the only one.

Britain had learned in the seventeenth century that signing treaties with the Barbary regencies behaved them far better than attempting to fight them. From the start of the French Revolutionary War, the relationship between Britain and Barbary was a growing symbiotic one, both diplomatically and commercially. Britain sought to make the region a boon to herself and a problem for her enemies. Britain was able to trade with the Barbary States (with protection from corsair attacks) and buy fresh food and water from fertile North Africa through local agents and consuls. Better supplies allowed the Royal Navy to maintain healthier vessels whilst stationed far from their homeports or on blockade.

Despite growing British dominance, the French were never expelled from Barbary; the region remained neutral for the duration (with the brief exception of the interim between the French invasion of Egypt and the Peace of Amiens). Trafalgar was a key turning point for the British in North Africa where it had far more significant effects than in the wider war. After Trafalgar, British primacy in Barbary was so secure that French negotiations for peace and trade were closely monitored, but not interfered with. This was because those negotiations were expensive and a drain on the French treasury.

With the French fleets under blockade there was no guarantee they would successfully export supplies back to France.

Barbary itself was not idle while Britain and France fought. The North African states continued to engage in corsair attacks, though on a smaller scale than in the seventeenth century. They primarily attacked small Mediterranean states unable to buy a treaty or pay the tribute to ensure peace. As the wars continued, Barbary also built up a sizable merchant fleet – transporting foodstuffs between the garrisons, fleets, and states in the Mediterranean, which European carriers caught in the Continental system could not. The collapse of this system, and the system of alliances in Europe that had allowed Britain and France to play Barbary off one another, led to the resurgence of corsair activities after the end of the Napoleonic wars. That resurgence, the anti-slavery sentiment growing in Europe, and the role Britain assumed of protecting smaller Mediterranean states, led to renewed efforts to eliminate the “pirates” of the Barbary States ten times in the fifteen years between the Congress of Vienna and French colonisation. That Britain (or anyone else) could not effectively end the long-established corsair practices argues against the traditional narrative of a society in decline. The reality was that the corsairs, and the states from which they operated, were still active participants in Mediterranean politics up until the French invasion in 1830.

The wider Mediterranean was crucial in both the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. Britain controlled, at various times, Gibraltar, Toulon, Corsica, Malta, and Minorca, which needed to import food to support their own populations. The increase of military personnel using expanding British bases, the Mediterranean fleet stationed there, and later the Peninsular Army in Spain and Portugal all needed constant supplies of food and water also. Some of those supplies could be shipped from the Victualling Board in London, but much within the Mediterranean was procured locally,

be it from the Italian states, the Spanish coast, or the North African Barbary Regencies. Yet little is known on the position the Barbary Regencies played during those years while supplying the British forces within the Mediterranean or her allies, partially one of the more neglected areas of North African history is the Ottoman period.

This thesis draws upon the conceptualization of naval history outlined by Sir Julian Corbett. The use of economic warfare and political influence over strategy to serve national interests outlined in Corbett's *Principles of Maritime Strategy* (1911) a paradigm with which to understand the Anglo-Barbary relationship. Corsair attacks targeted smaller states' merchant shipping, ensuring British trade success whilst British ships were protected. Horatio Nelson wrote William Wyndham, Secretary of State for the Foreign Office, of his frustrations with Barbary:

My blood boils that I cannot chastise these Pirates. They could not show themselves in the Mediterranean, did not our Country permit...But on the other hand, was I present with the Fleet of England, I could not prevent it, without plunging our Country in a war which our Merchants would reprobate, and Ministers not support me in.¹

Nelson openly acknowledges that, no matter his frustrations with Barbary, the British government would not support a war with the region or a threat to its trade. The British government 'permitted' Barbary to act thus as it benefited British aims. Additionally, the competitive diplomacy consuls in Barbary engaged in worked for economic advantages for their own nations while preventing access to the same supplies to their enemies. The Duke of Wellington, while fighting in the Peninsular War, wrote to the Secretary of State for War, that, "The affairs of that coast [Barbary] become every day more interesting. It is very desirable that the allies should, and that the enemy should not, enjoy their resources."² Not only did the British forces survive on the supplies procured from

¹ Sir Nicholas Harris Nicolas, *The Dispatches and Letters of Vice Admiral Lord Viscount Nelson*, v. 4

² John Gurwood, ed., *The Dispatches of Field Marshall the Duke of Wellington During His Various Campaigns in India, Denmark, Portugal, Spain, the Low Countries, and France* (London: John Murray, 1834-1839), v. 5, 646: to the Earl of Liverpool, 12 May 1812. [Hereafter, DDW].

Barbary, the French were also attempting to get those supplies. If the British had them, and the French did not, that would greatly assist the British war effort as it would weaken the French forces.

Finally, Corbett emphasizes that major naval battles rarely result in lasting military victories. Instead, the navy must supplement the armed forces on land. Instead, the navy must supplement the armed forces on land. In the Napoleonic War, this cooperation between army and navy occurred to great success during the Peninsular War. The last ‘great’ naval battle of the Napoleonic war was the Battle of Trafalgar in 1805 – ten years before Waterloo. For the majority of the Peninsular War, the British Navy relied on supplies from Barbary to feed themselves, as well as the British Army and its allies. Admiral Sir George Berkeley, Commander-in-Chief of the Lisbon squadron and in charge of maintaining the British Army in Iberia’s supply lines, called the supply from North Africa, “*of material importance* to His Majesty’s services, as well as the interests of Portugal,” in 1809.³ Barbary’s agriculture was ‘materially important’ to the armed forces in the Iberian Peninsula, and that agriculture was conveyed by the Royal Navy while they also ensured the tranquility of the surrounding seas for its safe passage.

This thesis is also part of a broader discussion of Muslim-Christian interactions within the wider Mediterranean. Fernand Braudel’s *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II* (1949) argues that the Mediterranean itself is a uniting factor. The wider Mediterranean is one civilization, not two split along its horizontal axis. North Africa and Europe were connected, diplomatically and commercially, despite the cultural and political differences between the two shores. Through British political and diplomatic efforts, as well as the availability of increased

³ National Archives (NA) FO 174/11 Sir George Berkeley to James Green, 29 May 1809. Emphasis mine.

trading profits, the Muslim Barbary States found it expedient and beneficial to ally and trade with former enemies such as Catholic Spain and Portugal, as well as the islands of Malta and Corsica. Those new alliances, in turn, benefited British goals. Whilst preparing for Britain's largest diplomatic overture to Barbary during the two wars, the Earl of Bathurst, Secretary of State for War, specifically told the British minister:

The war in Spain and the exhausted state of the Peninsula have obliged Great Britain to look to Barbary for supplies of corn and for the support of her business and ...*these countries have risen in comparative importance.*⁴

Bathurst also wrote that Barbary had, "encouraged a trade with Malta which has *grown into some importance.*"⁵ Spain spent the majority of the two conflicts at war with North Africa until the British intervened. Prior to French invasion and British conquest and colonization, Malta had been home to the Barbary corsairs' chief enemy, the Knights of St John at Malta. Yet through British diplomatic efforts and trade agreements, North Africa was happily and substantially assisting both, as that assistance benefitted Britain and increased Barbary profits from their maritime trade.

One of the most important modern works on North African history is Abdallah Laroui's *The History of the Maghrib: An Interpretive Essay* (1970). Laroui covers North Africa from Roman times until the modern day, arguing against the failings of previous historical work on the region. Though he makes a strong case for better scholarship on North Africa, Laroui glosses over the three hundred years of Barbary and credits the longevity of the corsairs to the role of outside interlopers (European Renegades), effectively removing any agency from the North African population. As *The History of the Maghreb* is a response to the myths of colonisation, Laroui does not focus on the

⁴ British Library (BL) ADD Ms 41512 Heytesbury Papers, Vol. II, p 10: Bathurst to A'Court, 27 Mar 1813. Emphasis mine.

⁵ BL ADD Ms 41512 Heytesbury Papers, Vol. II, p 22: Bathurst to A'Court, 27 Mar 1813. Emphasis mine.

external relations of North Africa. An important work for the study of Anglo-Barbary relations, and one of the first attempts to move away from the ‘scourge of Christendom’ narrative is Sir Godfrey Fisher’s *Barbary Legend: War, Trade and Piracy in North Africa 1415-1830* (1957). Though the book focuses on the relationship between Algiers and Britain, it relegates everything after the Treaty of Utrecht to the epilogue. Fisher would agree with Laroui - he frames the North Africans as the victims of Europe as opposed to both sides taking whatever advantage they could. As a study of Anglo-Barbary relations, it is useful, but it is weakest on the hundred years before French colonization. For that we have Daniel Panzac’s *Barbary Corsairs: End of a Legend 1800-1820* (2005), which covers those final years of Barbary. Panzac argues that what the West called ‘piracy’ was an integrating force that linked the different parts of the Ottoman North African provinces to their hinterlands, and the different societal groups who participated in arming the corsair ships or benefited from corsair revenues. Panzac addresses the process of corsairing as an economic tool that contributed to its links with Europe. For Panzac, the decline in corsairing that occurred during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars was a conscious decision to turn more towards trade with Europe. Panzac’s focus is on the merchant shipping that developed as corsairing declined and as such, glosses over the agricultural efforts of the Barbary States which provided their nascent merchant fleets with products *to* ship and were so crucial to their relationship with Europe.

Within North Africa, Morocco, Tunis, and Tripoli developed hereditary monarchies, with one ruler for almost the entire period. As such, studies looking at the rule of Morocco's Mawlay Suleiman, Tunis's Bey Hammouda Pasha, and Tripoli's Bashaw Yusuf Karamanli provide detailed information of those states during this time. Mohamed El Mansour’s *Morocco in the Reign of Mawlay Sulayman* (1990), Asma

Moalla's *The Regency of Tunis and the Ottoman Porte, 1777-1814: Army and Government of a North African Ottoman eyalet at the end of the Eighteenth Century* (2004), and Kola Fölayan's *Tripoli during the reign of Yūsuf Pāshā Qaramānlī* (1979), all written by African historians, look at the reign of a specific ruler and the wider role the state played during the period, including their diplomatic and economic efforts. These provide a strong framework into which we can place British interactions in North Africa. Such a framework does not exist for the same period of Algerian history owing to the republican and changing nature of late Ottoman Algerine politics and rulers.

On the British side of the question, plenty of scholarship exists on the naval aspects of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars. Even the Mediterranean station has received considerable attention, as it was where Horatio Nelson spent the majority of the war. Recent publications have looked at the processes by which the Royal Navy administration provided for their vessels. Roger Knight's and Martin Wilcox's *Sustaining the Fleet 1793-1815: War, the British Navy and the Contractor State* (2010) attempts to assess the Royal Navy's ability to supply its forces. They argue that British economic and fiscal strength allowed the Royal Navy to provision its enormous fleet across the globe. As it looks at the entire process of victualling the navy, *Sustaining the Fleet* does not go into much detail about any one station, focusing instead on 'local' British efforts and a general discussion of efforts abroad. There have been some studies on the supply and victualling of particular fronts during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, such as James Davey's *The Transformation of British Naval Strategy: Seapower and Supply in Northern Europe, 1808-1812* (2012). Davey looks at the efforts made to secure local foodstuffs in the Baltic and how officials dealt with geographical and economic obstacles to do so. Building on Knight and Wilcox, *The Transformation of British Naval Strategy* argues that changes and

improvements in the supply logistics on the Baltic station had a profound impact on the British Navy's ability to carry out their objectives. As a comparison, Michael Duffy's *Soldiers, Sugar, and Seapower: The British Expeditions to the West Indies and the War against Revolutionary France* (1987) examines the difficulties of supplying a fleet far from their home port, in this case the Caribbean. Duffy argues that the West Indies colonies were important because they, through the sugar trade, contributed to Britain's ability to endure and overcome French might. It was Britain's economic strength, not military might, which brought about British victory.

As previously mentioned, Panzac broadly discusses the role of trade in the Barbary states in their last years, but like studies on North Africa as a whole, works investigating the link between trade and war, especially in the Mediterranean in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, are few and far between. One is a University of Oxford D.Phil. thesis by Katerina Galani. She looks at the role of British trade in the Mediterranean during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars. Her *British Shipping and Trade in the Mediterranean in the Age of War, 1770-1815* (2010) argues against the belief that the wars must have disrupted British trade and shipping, concluding instead that British trade and shipping successfully adapted to the hazardous situation in the Mediterranean during those years. Galani concludes: "rather than an impediment, war acted as a catalyst" for trade.⁶ Galani focuses on the eastern Mediterranean and Greek mercantile efforts, which while comparable, are not the focus of this thesis. In the far west, James A.O.C. Brown looks at the mercantile and diplomatic relationship between Morocco and Britain in *Crossing the Strait: Morocco, Gibraltar and Great Britain in the 18th and 19th centuries* (2012). Brown argues that Mawlay Suleiman worked to improve foreign trade, particularly with Britain via

⁶ Katerina Galani, *British Shipping and trade in the Mediterranean in the Age of War, 1770-1815* (D.Phil Thesis: University of Oxford, 2010), ii.

Gibraltar, including establishing the state's first official consulate there in 1816. As Brown's title makes clear, *Crossing the Strait* focuses on Morocco, not the region as a whole.

A distinct difference between the category of Ambassador and Consul in Western diplomatic parlance did not emerge until after the Napoleonic Wars had concluded. To understand the diplomatic situation in general, and in Barbary specifically, in the late eighteenth century and early nineteenth century can be tricky as the consuls there were essentially acting as full diplomats. *The British Consul's Manual* by E.W.A. Tuson (1856), though written after the period under consideration here, attempts to outline the necessary skills and knowledge for consuls, and includes historical examples and copies of treaties between Britain and foreign powers for the benefit of both consuls and anyone who may have had need to deal with such persons. DCM Platt's *The Cinderella Service: British Consuls since 1825* (1971) similarly covers a later period, beginning when the role of consul and ambassador became more firmly distinguished. However, Platt's history, to describe that difference, necessarily looks back to when the Consular service was less defined. His study on how the diplomatic corps developed in Britain further demonstrates the in-between position of the consuls of North Africa, diplomats in all but name. Though a British history of North African consuls does not yet exist, other studies have emerged which discuss the value of North African consuls, trade, and their value to their respective governments, such as Leos Müller's *Consuls, Corsairs, and Commerce: The Swedish Consular Service and Long-Distance Shipping, 1720-1815* (2004) and Christian Windler's *La Diplomatie Comme Expérience de l'Autre: Consuls Français au Maghreb (1700-1840)* (2002). These works of Swedish and French consuls, respectively, provide a comparison to the British consular correspondence and experience, as well as show the interconnectedness of the consular community in North Africa in the late

eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, owing in no small part to the small society in which they moved.

Cooperation, diplomacy, and increased trade characterized the relationship between Britain and the Barbary Regencies over the course of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. That relationship then abruptly switched to one of antagonism and conflict after 1815, with increasing European interference along the North African coast. Unfortunately the ‘frontier’ nature of the western Mediterranean, and North Africa particularly, means that the literature that exists is scant at best, and tends to be hidden in works on other topics. There remains a North African-sized hole in the study of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. North Africa is on the frontier of both African and Middle Eastern history, situated between Sub-Saharan Africa and Europe and at the western extreme of the lands of Islam – traditionally the Middle East includes Egypt but there is debate whether it extends beyond into North Africa. Arabic has its own geographical term for the Muslim lands west of the Nile: *Maghreb*. Similarly, the Barbary period (1500-1830) is a grey area of *Maghrebi* history, where three of the four states of the region had been effectively colonised by the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman colonisation was neither the main colonisation by Europe nor the earlier ‘true’ North African kingdoms of the previous dynasties and as such has suffered from comparative neglect.

As this thesis examines the relationship between the four Barbary States and Britain (and British diplomatic efforts in Barbary during the twenty-three year conflict with France), the bulk of its sources come from British archives and publications and concern British activities in the Mediterranean (military or mercantile) or those of its consuls in North Africa. The archival material is housed at the National Archives (NA), formerly the Public Record Office (PRO), and the British Library, both in London. The

official letters of the admirals in the Mediterranean to the Admiralty are from series ADM 1/391-435, covering 1793 until 1816. Consular reports for Barbary as a whole, Morocco, Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli are in the Foreign Office record series FO 8, FO 52, FO 174, FO 3, FO 77, and FO 76 respectively. Letters relating to the British base of Gibraltar are in Foreign Office series FO 92 and for the base at Malta (1801 on) are in Colonial Office series CO 158. Papers relating to William A'Court's mission in Barbary are housed in the British Library (MS 41512-13) and the National Archives (CO 2/3-4). Published collections of letters (and many biographies) exist for most of the major Commanders in Chief of the Mediterranean station, including Nelson, Collingwood, Jervis, and Keith as well as long-term British consul in Morocco, James Matra, and the Duke of Wellington. Abraham Salamé, official translator for Lord Exmouth's expedition to Algiers, published a memoir of his experience, *Narrative of the Expedition to Algiers in the Year 1816, Under the Command of the Right Hon, Admiral Lord Viscount Exmouth* (1819). The shipping gazette, *Lloyd's List*, allows for the tracking of commercial British ships around the world, specifically to Barbary in this instance. Finally, as a comparison, there are letter books of the French consuls in Algiers and Tunis, compiled by Eugène Plantet, from the late nineteenth century. Additionally there is a French translation of the Algerine prize books from 1765 through 1830 (Devoulx, 1872).

British pamphlets and memoirs of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries from merchants and travellers in North Africa round out this study's source material. These provide a useful, non-military perspective about Barbary's value and its importance to the wider British world. Of primary interest and importance are those that were written or published during the period under consideration (1790s-1830). The most interesting of these come not from merchants however, but from the families of two consuls. *Narrative*

of Ten Years' Residence at Tripoli in Africa by Miss Tully, the sister-in-law of Richard Tully, and *Six Years Residence in Algiers* by Elizabeth Broughton, the daughter of Henry Blanckley, are especially noteworthy as both are written by women. They provide a unique perspective – both of the lives of the British consuls but also of the domestic life in North Africa as they recall close relations with the notables in their respective cities and the rulers' families. Tully's work is a published collection of her letters. Broughton's is the publication of her mother's diary, recorded while living in Algiers, edited with Broughton's reminiscences of her childhood experience. Their gender permitted all three women access to parts of Barbary society where men were forbidden and to the private lives of the consuls to whom they were related.

Correspondence has been analysed qualitatively in order to highlight the value the British military, political, and diplomatic leaders placed on Barbary over the course of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars and how the British-Barbary relationship was seen as part of the wider British war effort. An attempt has been made, however, to provide quantifiable and statistical data, where such data exists, drawing from consular shipping reports, Devoulx's prize register, and previous studies such as those by Panzac and Galani. A database stretching from 1792 to 1816 was compiled from *Lloyd's List* shipping gazette, tracks British ships traveling to and from Barbary ports over the course of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars and amounts to over 1,000 records for the twenty-five year period. Its continuous nature allows generalizations to be drawn where the consular reports are lacking. Taken together, the data shows that the wars were a boon to Barbary, with trade rising as British holdings in the Mediterranean increased. Though the corsairs never ceased operating, as merchant shipping from Barbary increased, the Barbary corsair fleets, particularly those *not* owned by the state fell. With more of the small Mediterranean states, the corsairs' normal prey,

under British protection, it behoved Barbary to move away from corsair predation towards mercantile practices to supply the extensive British military apparatus.⁷

This study begins with the historical background of North Africa from Ottoman control in Algiers and the Sa'diyyan dynasty in Morocco in the sixteenth century. This chapter also follows the rise of European relations with North Africa. France's close relationship with the Ottoman Empire led to French dominance of trade in the North Africa in the years preceding the French Revolutionary War. In Morocco, the position was equal due to British Gibraltar. Gibraltar's reliance on Barbary trade emphasised the necessity of good relations to maintain it. The development of the consular system in Barbary demonstrated Barbary's importance in British foreign policy and trade, but Britain remained in second place to the French in the Ottoman Regencies. As both the French and British navies and overseas holding expanded, the support systems for their navies changed. Finally, the chapter looks at how early modern navies procured supplies. In Britain this led to development of the Victualling Board and standardization of the methods the Royal Navy employed in acquiring supplies abroad. Compared to the French and Spanish systems, the Victualling Board's practices enabled Britain to better supply their ships over a wider area, providing a solid foundation to build upon once the French Revolutionary War began in 1792.

Chapter two covers the first coalition of the French Revolutionary War. It shows how Britain's lack of naval bases and the historical French dominance in the Mediterranean hindered British efforts on that front at the start of the war. The early 1790s were a time of political change in North Africa, leaving the region destabilised. Several British consuls changed during that time, further hurting British interests. British efforts to gain Mediterranean bases such as the brief occupation of Toulon or the British

⁷ Daniel Panzac, *Barbary Corsairs: End of a Legend 1800-1820*, Trans by Victoria Hobson (Leiden, Netherlands: Brill Publishers, 2005), 4.

Corsican Kingdom stressed the importance, and danger, of Barbary to the British effort. The British were reliant on supplies from North Africa and could not afford to have a second conflict develop. The initial turning point was the Battle of Cape St Vincent, after which, owing to a stabilised polity in North Africa and renewed British presence in the Mediterranean, the disparity between Britain and France in North Africa decreased.

Chapter three covers the Battle of the Nile through the Peace of Amiens. The invasion of a Muslim territory significantly damaged the French position in North Africa. The Ottoman Empire ordered its regencies to declare war on France, with backing from the British Royal Navy. Although the French were never expelled from North Africa, that decline provided a necessary window for the British to bolster their standing in the region. British reliance on the area increased after the conquest of Malta, also reliant on outside support to feed itself – a problem exacerbated by the creation of a British military garrison on the island. By 1801, the British and French were on an equal footing in Barbary. The French invasion of Egypt had ended French dominance of North Africa, but it did not end the French threat.

Chapter four spans the Peace of Amiens to the Battle of Trafalgar. The British remained in roughly the same position vis-à-vis Barbary as they had been after the Battle of the Nile. The advantages the British had gained over the French after the Battle of the Nile ended with peace. The British presence in the Mediterranean increased once hostilities resumed. Newly acquired Malta and the Navy's blockading duties rendered the North African states indispensable to the British. The equal position of the British and the French in Barbary forced the British to pay strict attention to Barbary's neutrality. Gibraltar, Malta, and the Mediterranean squadron were all reliant upon fresh food and water from North Africa. The British could not afford to damage that relationship, as it could lead to either a loss of supply, or worse, a new conflict. That fear

was clear during the difficulties in Algiers over the British consul Falcon, which lasted over a year. The fall-out that followed demonstrated the importance of the consular system in managing Barbary relations with the British navy in the Mediterranean.

Chapter five covers Collingwood's command of the Mediterranean fleet and marks a departure from the previous three chapters. For the first time, Britain, not France, was dominant in North Africa. As the Battle of the Nile had allowed the British to become equal to the French in Barbary, Trafalgar was the point when Britain dominated. Britain secured her position in North Africa at the same time as she solidified her position as the dominant naval power in the world. It was timely, as Britain would see its reliance on the region stretched even further. Bonaparte's Continental System limited European trade. The start of the Peninsular War required British efforts to support their own navy, army, and garrisons *and* the Spanish and Portuguese armies. As neutral, non-European states, the Barbary States were beyond Bonaparte's control. With the European merchant vessels under blockade, the Barbary corsairs became merchant shippers, carrying on the intra-Mediterranean shipping themselves – especially to British Malta. Collingwood's command saw an unusual period of stability, both in consuls and in the rulers of North Africa, which further aided the British war effort allowing increased trade between North Africa and British forces.

The period covered in chapter six, Collingwood's death in 1810 through Napoleon's escape from Elba in 1815, shows how the British had reversed their position from the beginning in 1793. French complaints of British domination in Barbary echo those by the British in the 1790s. The Peninsular Army was reliant upon supplies as the allied forces continued their push in the Iberian Peninsula. This came to a crisis when the other major neutral state in the war – the United States – declared war on Britain in 1812. Luckily this coincided with an agricultural boom in North Africa and increasing French

defeats. Those defeats re-opened European trade. The dispatch of a special envoy extraordinary, the A'Court Mission to Barbary in 1813 demonstrated the importance of North Africa to Britain by the end of the war. A'Court's mission was successful, renegotiating British treaties with the Barbary States and stressing their importance to the wider British war effort.

Finally, chapter seven, covering Napoleon's hundred days through the French colonisation of Algiers, argues that the fate of North Africa (bombardment and colonisation) was by no means obvious. The end of the war doomed the nascent merchant shipping that developed in Barbary after Trafalgar, leading to renewed corsair attacks. Regional instability, in part caused by the end of the war, further contributed to the changing relations. Britain's new position as 'protector' of the Mediterranean, changing opinions on slavery, and the Congress of Vienna's denouncement of piracy eliminated Europe's tolerance for the corsairs as demonstrated by the attacks on 1815, 1816, 1819, etc. This chapter also demonstrates that despite the attention the American or British attacks on Barbary receive, neither were successful – nor were any of the attacks that followed. Barbary endured beyond Exmouth's bombardment. It was changing European politics, an economic vacuum caused by the withdrawal of the British military from the Mediterranean, and regional turmoil that led to the end of the corsairs, not any of the ten bombardments between 1815 and 1830.

As much as possible, this thesis attempts to follow a straight chronology to trace the development of the British position in Barbary and how the Anglo-Barbary relationship changed over the course of the wars. The chapters end on major events in the Mediterranean. Additionally, though many of the naval battles fought by the British Royal Navy during these wars took place within the Mediterranean sphere (Cape St Vincent, the Nile, Trafalgar, etc), the battles themselves are not the focus of this study.

Instead, it focuses on the British supply problems in the Mediterranean, both before and after battles and while on blockade. It begins, officially, with the start of the French Revolutionary War, in 1792, but extends beyond the end of the war, beyond Waterloo to the French invasion of Algiers in 1830 to provide a comparison between the symbiotic relationship between Britain and Barbary during the wars and how rapidly it changed after the war.

It is necessary to include a note on the term Barbary. North African historian, Abdallah Laroui described the designation as, “Barbary, a malleable term that has undergone varying fortunes since the beginning of modern times and has finally been abandoned because of its political or even racial implications.”⁸ Its origins should be apparent, coming from the Greek *barbaros* or ‘one who’s language and customs are different from another’ from which we have our modern ‘barbarian’.⁹ A similar linguistic aspect follows the Arab designation for the indigenous people of North Africa – the Berber nations. The verb *barbar* means to babble or talk unintelligibly.¹⁰ Those who were from Barbary, therefore, were barbaric in nature or ‘rude, wild, uncivilized’ (in use by the seventeenth century) – no matter the original definition. The judgment inherent in the use of the word makes it unacceptable in modern contexts. However, Barbary is also synonymous with the corsair period in North Africa until the start of French colonisation (roughly 1500-1830).¹¹ It is effectively time-locked. As such, this thesis will continue to use the term *Barbary*, but exclusively to refer to North Africa during that period. Similarly, the designation of *Berber* for the indigenous nations of

⁸ Abdallah Laroui, *The History of the Maghrib: An Interpretive Essay*, Ralph Manheim, trans. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), 8.

⁹ *Oxford English Dictionary*, 2nd ed. s.v. “Barbarian.”; Graham A. Thomas, *Pirate Killers: The Royal Navy and the African Pirates* (Barnsley, South Yorkshire: Pen and Sword, 2011), 9.

¹⁰ *The Hans Wehr Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic*, J M Cowan, ed., 4th ed. s.v. “barbar.”; Michael Brett and Elizabeth Fentress, *The Berbers*, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1997), 1, 2-3, 5-6.

¹¹ Linda Colley, *Captives: Britain, Empire, and the World, 1600-1850* (New York: First Anchor Books, 2002), 43-4.; Paul Baepler, ed. *White Slaves, African Masters: An Anthology of American Barbary Captivity Narratives* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 2.

North Africa is problematic.¹² As those people are not time-locked and entitled to self-determination, the designation, *Berber* will not be used.

¹² Abderrahman Zouhir. "Language Situation and Conflict in Morocco " *Selected Proceedings of the 43rd Annual Conference on African Linguistics*, ed. Olanike Ola Orié and Karen W. Sanders, (Somerville, MA: Cascadilla Proceedings Project, 2013), 271.; Brett, *Berbers*, 5-6.

CHAPTER ONE: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

North Africa and Europe prior to 1792

Rise of the ‘Barbary’ States

The Ottoman Regencies

Seventeenth century Ottoman historian, Katib Çelebi wrote, “If the [Ottoman] admiral himself is not a corsair, he should consult with the corsairs concerning the sea and maritime war.”¹³ This was the first of Çelebi’s thirty-nine principles for successful management of the Ottoman Navy. Corsairs were not pirates. If anything, corsairs were closer to privateers, operating in a specific Mediterranean context. Corsairing emerged out of the Medieval Crusades and endured long after the holy wars on land had mostly died away in the east.¹⁴ Both Christians and Muslims across the Mediterranean took part. The Ottoman navy had been limited to the eastern Mediterranean, however, until the actions of two brothers, Uruj and Kheir ed-Din Barbarossa, brought North Africa (and the Western Mediterranean) into the Ottoman fold in the early sixteenth century. Kheir ed-Din’s success in North Africa and his experience as both a corsair and the admiral of

¹³ Katib Çelebi, *Tuhfat al-Kibar fi Asfar al-Bihar* (Istanbul, 1911), 159, quoted in Colin Imber, *The Ottoman Empire*, 2nd ed, (London; Palgrave Macmillan, 2009) 307.

¹⁴ Stefan Goodwin, *Malta, Mediterranean Bridge* (Westport, CT: Bergin and Garvey, 2002), 27, 34, 40.; Leos Müller, *Consuls, Corsairs, and Commerce: The Swedish Consular Service and Long-distance Shipping, 1720-1815* (Uppsala: Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis, 2004), 54-5.; Peter Lock, *The Routledge Companion to the Crusades* (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2006), 134-6, 204-213.; Julia Clancy-Smith, ed., *North Africa, Islam, and the Mediterranean World: From the Almoravids to the Algerian War*, (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001), 24-5.; Daniel Panzac, *La caravane maritime: Marins européens et marchands ottomans en Méditerranée (1680-1830)* (Paris: CNRS Éditions, 2004), 76. ; Jan Glete, *Navies and Nations : Warships, Navies and State Building in Europe and America, 1500-1860*, vol. I (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1993), 272. ; Charles-André Julien, *History of North Africa, Tunisia, Algiers, Morocco: From the Arab Conquests to 1830*, trans. John Petrie (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970), 274.; Richard Harding, *Sea Power and Naval Warfare 1650-1830* (London, UCL Press, 1999), 3, 56, 184-5.; Julian S Corbett, *England and the Mediterranean: A Study of the Rise and Influence of British Power within the Straits, 1603-1713*, vol. 1 (London: Lungmans, Green and Co., 1917), 5-6.; Molly Greene, *Catholic Pirates and Greek Merchants: A Maritime History of the Mediterranean* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 111.;

the Ottoman fleet allowed the Ottoman Navy to evolve into a Mediterranean naval power.¹⁵

The brothers were corsairs and the main agent(s) through which the Ottoman Empire extended their control over first, Algiers, then eventually Tripoli and Tunis. The brothers hailed from the Greek island of Mytiline; their father had either been a Turkish soldier stationed there or a Greek convert to Islam. Uruj, the elder, began the brothers' association with North Africa by offering their services to the Hafsid Sultan of Tunis in the early sixteenth century. In 1504, Uruj had two ships cruising along the North African coast and by 1513, twelve. With the death of King Ferdinand in 1516, the city of Algiers stopped paying tribute to Spain and asked Uruj for help. In the process of repelling Spain, Uruj established himself as the ruler of Algiers then conquered the countryside. However, in the summer of 1518, Spanish forces in Oran killed Uruj and Uruj's younger brother, Kheir ed-Din Barbarossa, took over.¹⁶

Kheir ed-Din was more pragmatic than his brother. He knew he would be unable to retain Algiers without assistance and sought the protection of the Ottoman Sultan, Selim I, in 1519. In exchange, Kheir ed-Din offered up Algiers and his other holdings to the Sultan. Selim, having just conquered Egypt, was more than willing to accept territory conquered through no effort of his own. Selim, and later his son, Suleiman I, appointed Kheir ed-Din as the governor of Algiers and granted him two thousand janissaries and artillery. In 1520, the Hafsids in Tunis assisted the former Algerine rulers in retaking the city from Kheir ed-Din. He returned to large-scale corsairing, amassed forty ships, and retook Algiers in 1525. For eight years, Kheir ed-Din governed and transformed Algiers

¹⁵ Imber, 295, 307.

¹⁶ Christine Isom-Verhaaren, *Allies with the Infidel: The Ottoman and French Alliance in the Sixteenth Century*. (London: I.B. Tauris, 2013), 72.; Jamil M. Abun-Nasr, *A History of the Maghrib in the Islamic Period* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 148-149.; Phillip C. Naylor, *North Africa: A History from Antiquity to the Present* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2009), 116-7.; Paul Masson, *Histoire des Établissements et du Commerce Français dans l'Afrique Barbaresques (1560-1793): L'Algérie, Tunisie, Tripolitaine, Maroc* (Paris: Librairie Hachette & Cie, 1903), 1-2.

for the Ottoman Empire. He turned it into a naval base, captured the Spanish-held Peñon garrison, and amassed a formidable fleet. With an empire that extended nearly halfway around the Mediterranean coastline, Suleiman saw the necessity of combining his eastern Mediterranean forces with those newly acquired under Kheir ed-Din in the west. Suleiman summoned the corsair to Constantinople in 1533 and named Kheir ed-Din his *kapudan pasha*, or commanding admiral, of the Ottoman Navy.¹⁷

Shortly after Kheir ed-Din's appointment, the first French overtures reached the Ottoman court. The French sought assistance against their Spanish-Habsburg neighbours – long the enemy of the Muslim Ottomans – especially after Andrea Doria, Kheir ed-Din's European equivalent, left the service of the French for the Spanish. These initial forays into diplomacy between the Ottomans and France, by way of North Africa, initially resulted in a truce between France and Kheir ed-Din, free transit for French ships between French and Ottoman lands, and the first negotiated (though not ratified) economic treaty between the two. This culminated in the joint Franco-Ottoman campaign of 1543-4, when Kheir ed-Din sailed the Ottoman fleet to France, and the joint force attacked Nice. The Ottoman fleet was compelled to winter in Toulon, where, by France's own entreaty, France paid for all the Ottoman fleet's needs to stay until spring. The campaign accomplished little, but was the start of the strong positive relationship between France and the Ottoman Empire in general, and France and North Africa specifically. The formal acknowledgement of that special status came in 1569, with the first *ahdname* (capitulation) in favour of the French, which required all Europeans (bar Venetians) trading in the Ottoman Empire to trade under the French flag and then in

¹⁷ Abun-Nasr, 150-1.; Imber, 41-2, 45, 305.; Katip Çelebi, *The History of the Maritime Wars of the Turks*, trans. James Mitchell (London, A.J. Valpy, 1831), 27.; Hess, *The Forgotten Frontier*, 61, 63, 64-5, 67, 68-9, 70.; Naylor, 117-9.; Clifford J. Rogers, ed., *The Military Revolution Debate: Readings on the Military Transformations of Early Modern Europe* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), 303, 321.; Masson, 2.; İdris Bostan, *Adriyatik'te Korsanlık: Osmanlılar, Uskoklar, Venedikliler, 1575-1620* (İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2009), 21.

1581 gave the French ambassador preference over those from other Christian nations. The Ottomans, and their North African holdings, were crucial players in maintaining the balance of power in wider Europe and France was the first to gain a foothold. Stemming from these first ‘capitulations’, France would remain the predominant European power in the Ottoman Empire – especially Ottoman North Africa –until the early nineteenth century.¹⁸

Kheir ed-Din retired as *kapudan pasha* of the Ottoman Empire in 1544 and died two years later.¹⁹ At the time of Kheir ed-Din’s retirement, his son was appointed governor of Algiers. Corsairs administered Algiers until 1587 when the post of *pasha* or vice-roy was created for the region, with three-year terms. Farther east, the Ottoman Navy captured Tripoli from the Order of the Knights of St John in 1551. (After the Ottomans conquest of Rhodes, Spain had given the Order Malta and Tripoli as a base in 1535.) In 1574, the Ottoman fleet, under the command of the Grand Vizier Sinan Pasha, newly refurbished and with 200 new ships, finally took Tunis. The conquest of Tunis was especially significant for two reasons. First, it meant that Ottoman power stretched across the North African coast from Egypt until the Algerine-Morocco border. Second, just three years prior, the Ottoman navy had suffered a severe defeat at Lepanto, losing three-quarters of their naval force. Lepanto had great ramifications for Christian Europe in that it bolstered their confidence in facing the seemingly unstoppable Ottoman

¹⁸ Isom-Verhaaren, *Allies*, 73-4, 76, 115-40.; Christine Isom-Verhaan, “Barbarossa and His Army Who Came to Succor All of Us”: Ottoman and French Views of Their Joint Campaign of 1543–1544” *French Historical Studies* 30, No. 3 (2007), 401-2.; Abun-Nasr, 151.; James Edgar Swain, *The Struggle for Control of the Mediterranean Prior to 1848: A Study in Anglo-French Relations* (Ph.D. Thesis: University of Pennsylvania, 1993), 9-11.; Halil Inalcik, *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age, 1300-1600*, trans. Norman Itzkowitz and Colin Imber (New Rochelle, NY: Orpheus Publishing, Inc., 1973), 35.; Harding, *Sea Power*, 224.; ACS Peacock, ed., *Frontiers of the Ottoman World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 14.; Fisher, *Barbary Legend*, 71.; Galani, 53.; Gillian Weiss, “Barbary Captivity and the French Idea of Freedom” *French Historical Studies* 28, no. 2 (2005), 233.; Panzac, *Barbary Corsairs*, 25.; Hess, *The Forgotten Frontier*, 68-9, 75.; Albert Hourani, *A History of the Arab Peoples* (London: Faber and Faber, 2013), 258-9.; Masson, 9.; Bostan, 46.; Galani, 53.

¹⁹ Abun-Nasr, 151-3, 169-70, 190.; Isom-Verhaaren, *Allies*, 74.; Çelebi, 69.

advance, but in terms of long standing accomplishments, Lepanto had little effect. The decimated Ottoman fleet rapidly rebuilt.²⁰

Morocco

Owing to a succession of weak Moroccan governments in the fifteenth century, the Portuguese conquered Ceuta in 1415, Tangier in 1471, and Melilla in 1497, but their primary targets were to the south to coordinate with their West African trade posts for the export of slaves. In response to the Catholic incursions, a *sharif* (one who can claim direct descent from the prophet Muhammad) family, the Sa'diyan's, were able to consolidate their power and were chosen by the people of Sus to defend the Muslims against the Europeans in 1510. Sus was able to trade with the Genoese and Spanish, local resources in exchange for war materials. The Sa'diyans conquered Marrakesh in 1525 from the Wattasids, their northern rivals, and Agadir from the Portuguese in 1541. The loss of Agadir led to the abandonment of most of the Portuguese holdings on the Atlantic coast – but not those on the Mediterranean. The Ottomans attempted to bolster the Wattasids against the Sa'diyan's, who the Turks viewed as a serious threat. The Sa'diyan's conquered Fez in 1549, though the Ottoman-backed Wattasids briefly retook the city in 1554. The sharif monarchy established themselves as holy warriors, defending Morocco from Catholic Portuguese incursions on the one hand, and against Ottoman Turkish expansion on the other. Using Marrakesh as their capital, the Sa'diyans sought

²⁰ Goodwin, *Malta*, 34-7.; Ayşe Devrim Atauz, *Eight Thousand Years of Maltese Maritime History: Trade, Piracy, and Naval Warfare in the Central Mediterranean*. (Gainesville, University Press of Florida, 2008), 73-4, 140.; Daniel Goffman, *The Ottoman Empire and Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 161.; Peter Earle, *Corsairs of Malta and Barbary* (London: Sidgwick and Jackson Limited, 1970), 7, 50.; Carlo M. Cipolla, *Guns and Sails in the Early Phase of European Expansion, 1400-1780* (London: Collins, 1965), 100-1.; Peacock, 8, 498.; Svatopluk Soucek, "Naval Aspects of the Ottoman Conquest of Rhodes, Cyprus, and Crete" *Studia Islamica* 98/99 (2004), 224, 242, 246.; Dorothy M. Vaughan, *Europe and the Turk: A Pattern of Alliances, 1350-1700* (Liverpool: University of Liverpool Press, 1954) 101-2, 104, 124, 128.; K.S. McLachlan, "Tripoli and Tripolitania: Conflict and Cohesion during the Period of the Barbary Corsairs (1551-1850)" *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 3, no. 3 (1978), 286.; Charles Wellington Furlong, "Tripoli in Barbary" *The Journal of Race Development* 2, no. 1 (1911), 20.; Andrew C. Hess, "The Battle of Lepanto and Its Place in Mediterranean History" *Past & Present* 57 (1972), 53, 54, 59, 62-3, 64, 69-70, 72.; Hess, *The Forgotten Frontier*, 73-6, 91, 92, 93, 95.; Brett, *Berbers*, 157, 158.; Hourani, 215.; Bostan, 21, 31-2, 35.

commercial ties with European countries, a policy their ‘Alawite successors would continue.²¹

Ottoman and Portuguese fears over the Sa’diyan expansion boiled over in 1578 at Ksar al-Kebir, or the Battle of Alcazar/Battle of the Three Kings. Sa’diyan prince ‘Abd al-Malik sought Ottoman assistance to overthrow his nephew on the Moroccan throne, Muhammad al-Mutawakkil. ‘Abd al-Malik succeeded in 1576 and Al-Mutawakkil fled to Portugal. In 1578, he returned with an army led by Portuguese King Sebastian. All three, Sebastian, al-Mutawakkil, and ‘Abd al-Malik, died in battle. Sebastian had no heir, so Spain annexed Portugal, along with the remaining Portuguese-Moroccan holdings. The Moroccan throne passed to ‘Abd al-Malik’s brother, Ahmed al-Mansur, who distanced himself from either Turkish or Portuguese control. Sa’diyan power diminished greatly after Ahmed’s death in 1603, owing to a power struggle between his sons. The country once more split along a north-south divide, with the north principally held by the Dila’iyya, a respected subset of the Sanhaja nation opposed to Sa’diyan power, and the south reverting to the control of local holy men. The exception to the Dila’iyya control of the north was the effective ‘republic’ of Rabat-Salé and their corsairs, more commonly known as the Sallee Rovers.²² Rabat-Salé governed itself until 1641 when the Dila’iyya finally conquered it.

²¹ Abun-Nasr, 206-214.; Robert Rézette, *The Spanish Enclaves in Morocco* Mary Ewalt, trans. (Paris: Nouvelles Editions Latines, 1976), 13, 29.; Alan G. Jamieson, *Lords of the Sea: A History of the Barbary Corsairs* (London: Reaktion Books, 2012), 31.; James A.O.C. Brown, *Crossing the Strait: Morocco, Gibraltar and Great Britain in the 18th and 19th Centuries* (Leidein: Brill, 2012), 26.; Magali Morsi, *North Africa 1800-1901: A Survey from the Nile Valley to the Atlantic*. (London: Longman: 1984), 31-2.; David Seddon, “Economic Anthropology or Political Economy? (II): Approaches to the Analysis of Pre-Capitalist formation in the Maghreb” *The New Economic Anthropology*, John Clammer, ed. (London: The Macmillan Press, 1978), 66.; Brett, *Berbers*, 170, 172.; David Abulafia, *The Discovery of Mankind: Atlantic Encounters in the Age of Columbus* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 90-2.; C. R. Pennell, *Morocco since 1830: A History* (London: Hurst & Company, 2000), 11.; Bernard Lewis, *The Jews of Islam* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), 23, 28, 61, 110.; Hourani, 244-5.; C.A. Bayly, *The Birth of the Modern World, 1780-1914* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), 70.; Rogers, *Military Revolution*, 320.; Mahfoud KBL ADDache, *L’Algérie durant la période ottomane* (Alger: Office des publications universitaires, 1991), 4.

²² Abun-Nasr, 214-20.; Rézette, 37.; Weston F Cook, Jr., *The Hundred Years War for Morocco: Gunpowder and the Military Revolution in the Early Modern Muslim World* (Boulder, CO: Westview

Barbary Politics and Governance

Ottoman Regencies

Initially, the three Ottoman regencies resembled one another, but by the early eighteenth century they developed administrative differences as well as their relative autonomy from the Ottoman Empire. Who held power in Algiers changed several times, but it remained essentially a military republic. Tripoli and Tunis ultimately developed monarchies with power held by the Karamanli and Husaynid dynasties respectively. Their differences in development were partly due to the government allowing the *kulughlis* – *janissary* father, local mother – to integrate into the army and administration of those regencies while remaining separate in Algiers.

In Algiers, initially the Ottoman-appointed governor (with *janissary* support) held chief political power. The first governor was Kheir ed-Din's own son, Hasan. After 1587, the Ottomans began appointing *pashas* to rule for three-year terms. The *pashas* and the Ottoman military forces were both outsiders to the Algerine population. Though the *janissaries* were allowed to marry within the local population, *kulughlis* were not allowed in the army or administrative system. In 1659, the *janissaries'* leader, the *agha*, seized power from the Ottoman *pashas*. The rule of the *aghas* did not last long. The corsair captains, or *reises*, had become a distinct group earlier in the seventeenth century. In 1671, the captains assassinated the *agha*, appointing another officer, the *Dey*, as the unofficial ruler of the country. After 1689, the *diwan al-'askar* (*Divan*) or military council, appointed the *Deys*. By then, Algiers was effectively a military republic, ruled in the name of the sultan in Constantinople but running itself. Until the early eighteenth century, the Porte continued to appoint *pashas* for the regency, while the *Deys* held the

Press, 1994), 242, 258.; Morsi, 32-3.; Jeremy Black, *European International Relations 1648-1815* (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 64.; Hess, "Lepanto," 65-8, 70-1. Hess, *Forgotten Frontier*, 12-3, 34, 95-8.; Brett, *Berbers*, 173.; Thornton, 104.; Chouki El Hamel, *Black Morocco: A History of Slavery, Race, and Islam* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 143-4, 145, 146-50.; Hourani, 231.; Rogers, *The Military Revolution Debate*, 322.; Laroui, 247, 248, 253, 257.

real power. After 1711, the Ottomans simply conferred the title on the Deys themselves, uniting the role of official and actual ruler. After the Dey, the *khaznadji* (state treasurer) was the first minister who normally became Dey after the old Dey's death. After the *khaznadji* came the *agha*, who followed the *khaznadji*'s advancement by advancing to the position of *khaznadji* himself. Those ministers along with the cavalry commander and the captain of the marines formed the Divan. This ruling system lasted until French colonisation in 1830.²³

After the Ottoman conquest of Tripoli in 1551, Murad, a Turkish officer, was initially appointed governor. Two years later, the Sultan raised Dragut, a corsair *reis*, to the post. Dragut, ruled for 12 years and turned Tripoli into an effective corsair base and extended Ottoman control to the interior of the country and its nations. The far south proved too resistant for direct control. Tripoli allowed the people there to rule themselves in return for gold and slaves, being a principle stop on the Trans-Saharan trade routes. From Dragut's death until the early eighteenth century, Ottoman-appointed pashas governed Tripoli. The *pasha* oversaw the Divan, made up of state officials and notables. In 1711 a *kulughli* cavalry chief, Ahmed Karamanli, seized control of the regency whilst the Ottoman appointed *pasha* was in Istanbul. He killed the janissaries who stood in his way and repulsed two Ottoman attempts to restore control. After a profession of loyalty (and tribute), the Ottomans recognised Karamanli and granted him the title of *pasha* or

²³ Abun-Nasr, 153, 158-60.; Ellen G. Friedman, *Spanish Captives in North Africa in the Early Modern Age* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1983), 9-10, 29.; Jamieson, 153.; Robert Lambert Playfair, *The Scourge of Christendom: Annals of British Relations with Algiers Prior to the French Conquest* (London: Smith, Elder & Co., 1884), 7-8.; Jackson, 10.; J.S. Bromley, "A Letter-Book of Robert Cole, a British Consul-General at Algiers, 1694-1712," In *Corsairs and Navies, 1660-1760* (London: The Hambledon Press, 1984), 30.; Peacock, 9.; Tal Shuval, "The Ottoman Algerian Elite and its Ideology" *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 32, no. 3 (2000), 324, 326, 328, 333.; Fisher, 92-3.; Panzac, *Barbary Corsairs*, 11-2, 14, 20.; Roy F. Nichols, "Diplomacy in Barbary" *The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography* 74, no. 1 (1950), 118-9.; Ramiro Feijoo, *Corsarios Berberiscos: Españoles contra renegados*. (Seville: Publidisa, 2011), 299. Manuel Conrotte, *España y Los Países Musulmanes Durante el Ministerio de Floridablanca* (Seville, Ediciones Espuela de Plata, 2006), 51, 53.; Charles Robert Ageron, *Modern Algeria: A History from 1830 to the Present*, Michael Brett, trans., (Trenton NJ: Africa World Press, Inc., 1991), 3.; Hourani, 228-30.; KBL ADDache, 11, 19, 20, 33, 105.; Laroui, 267.

Bashaw. In 1795, under Yusuf Karamanli, the system of government became more consolidated. The Divan lost its military status, instead becoming a state council presided over by the Bashaw and consisting of the *agha*, naval admiral, treasurer, and the mayor of the city of Tripoli itself. Apart from seventeen months between 1793-5, the Karamanli family ruled Tripoli until 1835.²⁴

At the start of the sixteenth century, the Hafsids ruled Tunis but the Ottoman conquest of 1574 led to an Ottoman-appointed *pasha*. The janissary troops (4,000 in 1574) were commanded by a *dey*. The *bey*, in charge of maintaining peace in the interior of the Regency and collecting taxes, assisted the *pasha*. As in Algiers and Tripoli, the Divan comprised chiefly military officers. The initial governor of Tunis had included more local notables in the Divan, but after 1591 this ended when the troops rebelled, forcing the *pasha* to entrust much of the administration to a *dey*. As in Algiers, the Ottoman *pasha* ruled in name only with real power held by the *dey*. Tensions between Ottoman and *Maghrebi* traditions, rule of law, and religious practices placed the Ottoman administration and army at odds with the local Tunisian people. In order to carry out their jobs, the *beys* had needed to recruit local armies to enforce tax collection and peace, developing into a rival power away from the ruling class. In the mid-seventeenth century, Bey Murad received the title of *pasha* from the sultan and the Muradists began to reduce the position of *dey* into that of a mere figurehead. They also reduced the role of the Divan. They ruled based on the recognition by the local populace, their local army, and the control of Tunis's finances. After the 1660s when Tunis opened up to European trade, the *beys* controlled the customs duties and sale of agriculture to

²⁴ Abun-Nasr, 190-3, 199.; Fisher, *Barbary Legend*, 92-3.; Panzac, *Barbary Corsairs*, 11-2 17.; Furlong, 20.; Conrotte, 57-58.; Dirk Vandewalle, *A History of Modern Libya*, 2nd ed., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 16.; Hourani, 228-30.; Salvatore Bono, *Lumi e Corsari: Europa e Maghreb nel settecento* (Perugia: Morlacchi Editore, 2005), 250-1.; Salvatore Bono, *Corsari nel Mediterraneo: Cristiani e musulmani fra Guerra, schiavitù e commercio* (Milan: Arnoldo Mondadori Editore, 1993), 27.; Kola Folayan, *Tripoli during the reign of Yūsūf Pāshā Qaramānlī* (Ile-Ife, Nigeria, University of Ife Press: 1979), 1-15.

foreign merchants. Muradist rule ended in 1702, when the *agha* had the bey assassinated and took power. He lasted only three years before being overthrown by an Algerine invasion. In 1705, Husayn b. ‘Ali became Bey and expelled the Algerines, founding a new dynasty, the Husaynids, that lasted until 1956. Husayn was a *kulughli*, and he made use of local armies in his defeat of Algiers. The Ottoman troops ceased to be a ruling class and *kulughlis* were officially recruited into the army, alongside the ‘local’ army of native Tunisians.²⁵

Morocco

Beyond Ottoman control, ‘Alawite Morocco was a true monarchy. As with the Sa’diyans before them, sharifian descent remained an important source of political and religious legitimacy. The ‘Alawites adopted the traditional term for a sharif, *Mawlay*, as their customary honorific. When Mawlay Rashid (d. 1672) came to power in 1668 he unified Morocco after the disorder caused by the Sa’diyan fall from power and the ‘Alawite family remains on the Moroccan throne today. Meknes became the new capital, as it was central and free of previous political alliances. It also was outside the realm of European merchants trading in the northern cities. The new dynasty also increasingly brought the corsairs under state control.²⁶

²⁵ Abun-Nasr, 168-74.; Kenneth J Perkins, *Tunisia: Crossroads of the Islamic and European Worlds* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986), 55.; Fisher, *Barbary Legend*, 92-3.; Panzac, *Barbary Corsairs*, 11-2, 17.; Clancy-Smith, *North Africa*, 105, 120.; Conrotte, 55-7.; Lisa Anderson, *The State and Social Transformation in Tunisia and Libya, 1820-1980* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 66.; Paul Sebag, *Tunis: Histoire d’une ville* (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1998), 152-6, 206-211, 213.; Hourani, 228-30.; Daniel Panzac, *Commerce et Navigation dans l’Empire Ottoman au XVIII^e siècle* (Istanbul: Les Editions Isis, 1996), 179.; Henri Cambon, *Histoire de la Régence de Tunis* (Paris: Éditions Berger-Levrault, 1948), 59-60.; Bono, *Corsari nel Mediterraneo*, 27.; Laroui, 262-5.

²⁶ El Hamel, 57-8, 96, 103, 154-5, 157-68, 184-5, 209.; Abun-Nasr, 228-42.; Jamieson, 158.; Patricia Mercer, “Palace and Jihād in the Early ‘Alawī State in Morocco” *The Journal of African History* 18, no. 4 (1977), 532-3.; George Joffé, ed. *North Africa: Nation, State and Region* (London: Routledge, 1993), 23-4, 25.; Pennell, *Morocco*, 12.; Hourani, 245-6

Britain arrives in the Mediterranean

England was slow to become active in the Mediterranean. Lagging behind France by nearly fifty years, England did not establish official diplomatic relations or her own capitulations with the Ottoman Empire until the 1580s. The English capitulations initially dealt with the rights of English traders in the Ottoman Empire and the legal status of the English community there. England and the Ottomans hoped for the same benefit from the treaty – protection from Spain. Though France had entered into relations with the Ottomans for similar reasons, France protested the extension of those advantages to the English. England and France were in competition with one another for pre-eminence from the moment both nations had diplomatic interests in the Ottoman Empire. England did not have the quick association with Ottoman North Africa that Barbarossa's stay in Toulon brought to France; shortly after securing capitulations, England asked the Ottomans for help with Algiers. The Pasha of Algiers refused not to attack English ships, though he stressed that the two states were not at war – several letters were exchanged between Queen Elizabeth and the Pasha in the first years of the seventeenth century, but there was no official treaty and ships from both sides were seized. In Morocco, on the other hand, trade with England began in 1551, focusing on the exchange of English weapons for Moroccan saltpetre, a necessary ingredient in gunpowder. The exchange of English war materials for Moroccan raw materials would characterise the Anglo-Moroccan relationship until the mid-nineteenth century. Within thirty years of the start of Anglo-Moroccan trade, the value of exports to England tripled. Yet by the end of the first quarter of the seventeenth century, the corsairs at Rabat-Salé

had become an even greater threat to English ships than the corsairs from the Ottoman Barbary regencies.²⁷

The Century of the Corsair

The seventeenth century was the ‘golden age’ of the Mediterranean corsairs whether in Morocco, the Ottoman regencies, or amongst the Christian states. Lemnouar Merouche, an Algerian historian of the Ottoman period, called it “le siècle de la Course.” In the decade between 1612 and 1622, nearly one thousand prizes were brought back to Algiers alone. The crews were kept as captive slaves and the ships added to the corsair fleets. The relative peace in the Mediterranean following the Ottoman-Spanish truce of 1578 had released the Barbary corsairs from service in the Ottoman navy and they returned to North Africa. The expulsion of the *Moriscos* in the first decade of the seventeenth century increased Moroccan corsair attacks. A third factor also helped develop the corsairs’ success in the seventeenth century and further link Europe and North Africa – the growing participation of ‘renegades’: Christian (European) sailors who ‘turned Turk’ and converted to Islam and became corsairs themselves. Some were captives who converted to improve their lot in North Africa. Some travelled to North Africa for the express purpose of participating in the *corso*, drawn by the relatively open society of the corsair states and potential for wealth. These renegades brought new information to North Africa and had a tangible impact on the expansion of corsairing

²⁷ Maurits H. van den Boogert, *Capitulations and the Ottoman Legal System: Qadis, Consuls and Beraths in the 18th Century* (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 16-17, 35-7.; Liane Saunders, *The Motives, Pattern and Form of Anglo-Ottoman Diplomatic Relations c. 1580-1661* (D.Phil. Thesis: University of Oxford, 1993), 1, 12-3, 19-21, 33, 36, 59, 78, 140.; Playfair, 26-34.; Jamieson, 80-1, 108.; Brown, 28, 30-1.; Bovill, 184-5.; Richard Woodman, *Neptune’s Trident: Spices and Slaves: 1500-1807*. (Stroud, Gloucestershire, UK: The History Press, 2008), 56.; Ronald Hope, *A New History of British Shipping* (London: John London, 1990), 93, 106, 120, 144.; Black, *European Diplomatic Relations*, 25, 206.; Mercedes García-Arenal and Gerard Wiegars, *A Man of Three Worlds: Samuel Pallache, a Moroccan Jew in Catholic and Protestant Europe*, trans. Martin Beagles (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), 32-3.; Colley, 122.; Swain, 9-11.; Galani, 5.; Tito Benady, “The Settee Cut: Mediterranean Passes Issued at Gibraltar” *The Mariner’s Mirror* 87, no. 3 (2013), 281.; Brown, 66.; Naylor, 126.; El Hamel, 146.; Roger Morriss, *The Foundations of British Maritime Ascendancy: Resources, Logistics and the State, 1775-1815* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 216.

activities. Beyond providing local knowledge of their places of birth and navigation beyond the Mediterranean, they also helped merge Mediterranean and European, especially North Sea, methods of ship building and sailing. Though galleys would never be fully eliminated from the Mediterranean, (they were perfectly suited to the shallow inshore areas and quick manoeuvres used by corsairs), the new sailing ships allowed the corsairs to carry more guns and expand beyond the confines of the Mediterranean into the Atlantic world. The switch occurred quickly. In 1581, the Algerine fleet consisted of 36 galleys; by 1634 it had doubled in size, the majority of their ships were sailing vessels carrying between 25 and 40 guns.²⁸

Beyond changing how the corsairs themselves were able to operate, the change from galley to sailing ships also changed the society the corsairs operated in. As the corsairs relied on fewer galleys, they needed fewer captive-slaves to operate them and the number of Christian slaves in the North African states declined. The corsairs of Algiers, for instance, held an average of 25,000 Christian slave-captives a year at the start of the seventeenth century but only 10,000 by the start of the eighteenth – a number that continued to decrease until there were fewer than 2,000 for the last fifty years corsairs operated out of Algiers. In Europe, however, the changes in technology did not necessarily correspond with decreases in *their* Muslim slaves; Louis XIV and the Knights of St John both held Muslim slaves and their reluctance to free the Muslims

²⁸ Lemnouar Merouche, *Monnais, prix, et revenus 1520-1830*. v. 1. (Paris: Bouchene, 2002), 173-9.; Lemnouar Merouche, *La course, mythes et réalité*. (Paris: Bouchene, 2010), 137-8.; Panzac, *Barbary Corsairs*, 25-7.; Saunders, 21.; Jamieson, 85-91.; Gillian Weiss, *Captives and Corsairs: France and Slavery in the Early Modern Mediterranean* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), 14, 23-4.; W. F. Monk, *Britain in the Western Mediterranean* (London: Hutchinson's University Library, 1953), 14-15.; Christopher Lloyd, *English Corsairs on the Barbary Coast* (London: William Collins Sons & Co Ltd, 1981), 33, 72.; Fisher, *Barbary Legend*, 92-3, 149, 159-61, 165.; Corbett, *England*, 1, 11-4, 16-7.; Guilmartin, 1-4, 7, 35-6, 108, 120.; Cipolla, 77-80, 80, 103.; John B Hattendorf, ed., *Naval Policy and Strategy in the Mediterranean: Past, Present, and Future* (London: Frank Cass Publishing, 2000), 20.; Earle, *Corsairs*, 46, 48, 50, 52.; Rhoads Murphy, *Ottoman Warfare, 1500-1700* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1999), 108, 144.; Michel Fontenay, "L'Empire Ottoman et le risqué corsaire au XVIIe siècle." *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaines (1954-)* 32, no. 2 (1985), 187-8.; Tim Travers, *Pirates: A History* (Stroud, Gloucestershire: The History Press, 2009), 228-34.; Pennell, *Bandits at Sea*, 91.; Jeremy Black, *Naval Power: A History of Warfare and the Sea from 1500* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 12-3, 15, 23-6.; Rogers, *Military Revolution*, 100, 303.;

hindered French and Maltese efforts to exchange prisoners. Those held in North Africa could be ransomed and returned to their homes, and they carried back tales of their experience. A new type of literature, the captivity narrative, emerged, ensuring that Europeans were familiar with North Africa, even if that familiarity was skewed.²⁹

Barbary Society

The inhabitants of Barbary are principally composed of two great and distinct classes, the Berebers and the Arabs, from the latter of whom and their descendants, occasionally mixed with Europeans and Negroes, is formed the great mass of the population generally, but improperly known by the name of Moors. Add to these the Jews and the Negroes, the Christian slaves and renegadoes, and we have all the component parts of the present population of the Barbary States.³⁰

G.A. Jackson's 1817 description of Barbary was correct for the majority of the eighteenth century. At the start of the nineteenth century, Morocco and Algiers had roughly four million each, while Tunis and Tripoli had between one and a half to two million each.³¹ North African society was incredibly diverse and cosmopolitan; its urban, port nature was a product of the mixing of the various cultures of the Mediterranean and its history of being conquered by various powers from Rome to Arab to Ottoman. North Africa was a frontier of Mediterranean, Christian-Muslim, and African society. It was a liminal space in which diverse groups of people travelled across, both willingly and unwillingly, interacting and encountering cultures and peoples different than their own.

In the Ottoman Regencies, the largest group were the Moors (a European designation). These were North Africans of Arab descent. The Ottoman Turks usually

²⁹ Jamieson, 115-20, 124, 131.; Weiss, *Captives and Corsairs*, 10, 58-9, 179-93.; Peter Lamborn Wilson, *Pirate Utopias: Moorish Corsairs and European Renegadoes* (Brooklyn: Automeia, 2003), 156-7.; Fisher, *Barbary Legend*, 103, 165.; Frederic C Lane, *Venetian Ships and Shipbuilders of the Renaissance* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), 1, 9, 13, 28, 48, 141.; Weiss, "Barbary Captivity," 252-3.; Lewis, 150.; David Abulafia, *The Great Sea: A Human History of the Mediterranean* (London: Allen Lane, 2011), 452, 460-1.; Thomson, 44-6.; Merouche, *La course*, 146, 165.; Wolfgang Kaiser, ed., *Le Commerce des Captifs : Les Inter-médianes dans l'échange et le rachat des prisonniers en Méditerranée, XV^e – XVIII^e siècle* (Rome: École Française de Rome, 2008), 84, 91-2.

³⁰ Jackson, 115.

³¹ Morsi, 7.; Anderson, *State and Social Transformation*, 37.

were more powerful than the Moors, but constituted a much smaller population. The next largest group were the Jews. Jews had lived in North Africa at least as long as Muslim control, if not longer, but their population significantly increased after the expulsion of the Jews from Iberia in the late fifteenth century. Barbarossa's second in command was Sinan, a Sephardic Jew called the "Great Jewish Pirate."³² Mordecai Noah, American consul in Tunis and a Jew himself, estimated the entire Jewish population of Barbary as 700,000 in 1819, and in most urban centres they constituted roughly 10 per cent of the population. The Jewish communities of North Africa were well placed to act as intermediaries in both trade and diplomatic endeavours between the Turks, Moors and Europeans drawing upon language skills and family networks extending into Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and the New World. It was not uncommon for Jews to be appointed as vice-consuls for European consular agencies or act as consul themselves for the North African states in Gibraltar. Though Spain originally tried to prevent any Jews from living in Gibraltar when the town passed to Britain, the 1729 treaty specifically granted the right for Moroccan and Jewish merchants to reside there. By 1753, nearly one third of Gibraltar's civilian population was Jewish. For all their size, the Jewish population of North Africa was not free of the prejudices that they faced in Europe. They generally had their own quarters in the various cities of Barbary, and their position at the head of trade made them targets for civilian unrest.

The European population of the Barbary States was generally small. As the eighteenth century continued, Christian slave numbers declined, until they were barely 2,000 by the end of the century. Otherwise, the small community was principally the consuls, their families, and various merchants. North Africa also had a sizable Black African population, some of whom were freemen, but most were slaves. Morocco,

³² Edward Kritzer, *Jewish Pirates of the Caribbean: How a Generation of Swashbuckling Jews Carved out an Empire in the New World in their Quest for Treasure, Religious Freedom – and Revenge* (New York: Anchor Books, 2009), 6., 60.; Kaiser, 83.

Algiers, and Tripoli were all terminal points of the Trans-Saharan Slave trade, which moved black Africans from sub-Saharan Africa into the Ottoman Empire. The final principal group were the various indigenous nations, usually referred to collectively as Berbers (though as mentioned in the preceding chapter, a problematic name), who inhabited the interior and mountainous regions of each state.³³

War to Peace

As the corsairs were able to attack farther and farther away from their home bases in North Africa, enjoying prodigious success in the first half of the seventeenth century, European calls for a response to the corsair threat likewise increased. Before the end of the century, all four Barbary States would see a blockade or an attack by either England or France. In 1621, Britain attacked Algiers, Rabat-Salé in 1637, Tunis in 1655, and attempted to blockade Algiers again in 1669. The 1660s brought two great changes to North African-English relations. In 1661, King Charles II's marriage to Portugal's Princess Catherine was announced; her dowry included the Portuguese-held town of Tangier in Morocco. England had no Mediterranean land or bases, and hoped to turn the northern Moroccan town into one. An English Garrison was established in Tangier in January 1662, with the hope that it would grow into an English colony in Africa and trade centre. More importantly, 1662 saw the passage of new English treaties with all

³³ Brown, 19, 25, 95-7, 102, 113, 114, 143-6., 193.; John Buffa, *Travels Through the Empire of Morocco* (London: J.J. Stockdale, 1810), 51, 67, 70-2, 125-6, 130, 149.; Mordecai Manuel Noah, *Travels in England, France, Spain, and the Barbary States in the Years 1813-14 and 15* (New York: 1819), 55, 356.; Thomas Macgill, *An Account of Tunis* (London: 1816), 61.; Miss Tully, *Narrative of a Ten Years' Residence in Tripoli in Africa*, 2nd ed. (London: 1817), 160-3.; Morsi, 15-7, 42-3.; Goodwin, *Malta*, 40-2.; García-Arenal *Samuel Pallache*, 21-3, 26-7, 32-3; John B. Wolf, *The Barbary Coast: Algiers under the Turks, 1500-1830* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1979), 294-5.; Kritzler, 6, 58, 60, 68, 75.; Fisher, *Barbary Legend*, 62, 149, 293.; McLachlan, 291-2.; Mercer, 535, 539.; Clark, "Barbary Corsairs," 26-7.; Furlong, 22, 31.; Michel Le Gall, and Kenneth Perkins, eds. *The Maghrib in Question: Essays in History and Historiography* (Austin: The University of Texas Press, 1997), xi, 7-8, 9, 11, 12.; Hess, *The Forgotten Frontier*, 46, 174-6.; Weiss, *Captives and Corsairs*, 24.; Brett, *Berbers*, 161-4.; Pennell, *Morocco*, 21.; Sebag, 156-69, 217-224.; Lewis, 32-3, 61, 63, 110, 113, 148-50.; David Cesarini, ed, *Port Jews: Jewish Communities in Cosmopolitan Maritime Trading Centres, 1550-1950* (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2002), 3, 4, 14, 52.; Avigdor Levy, ed., *Jews, Turks, and Ottomans: A Shared History, Fifteenth Through the Twentieth Century* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2002), xix, 6, 15-7.; Hourani, 220, 235.; Earle, *Pirate Wars*, 52.; Pennell, *Bandits at Sea*, 56-7.;

three Ottoman regencies regarding trade. The 1662 treaties established an important – and simple – innovation in Mediterranean trade for ships hoping to avoid conflict with the Barbary corsairs: the Mediterranean indenture or pass.

They enjoined the examiner to suffer the ship to pass with her company, passengers, goods and merchandise, without any let or hindrance, as testimony had been given under oath that they belonged to subjects of ‘Our Sovereign Lord the King’. As the corsairs were generally illiterate the expedient was resorted to of issuing the passes with a large engraving at the top, cut into or ‘scolloped’ in an eccentric manner. The passes were issued ‘scolloped’ and the tops that had been cut off were sent to the Consuls in the Barbary ports to issue to the corsair captains. They could then verify the validity of the pass of any ship they stopped by placing the ‘tops’ next to the body of the pass to make sure it made one whole.³⁴

The passes were simple but not perfect, and arguments over who could receive them and their validity continued for their entire duration. They did last until 1830, however, when the French invasion of Algiers dismantled the corsair system. Strict records were kept regarding the ships, crew, and cargos of those ships given passes and the system would be imitated by other European nations operating in the Mediterranean, and the design was changed at various times to prevent fraud.³⁵

The treaties with Tunis and Tripoli in 1662 would form the basis for all future English treaties with them. Algiers and England continued to have strained relations past the 1662 treaty. An English patrol operated off the coast of Algiers from 1679-1681, but a lasting treaty was signed in 1682, owing to Algiers’ increased hostility with France and the desire to play the English and French against one another. The 1682 treaty was the

³⁴ Benady, “The Settee Cut”, 281-2.

³⁵ Jamieson, 137, 140-1, 143-4, 146-7, 148-9.; Benady, “The Settee Cut”, 281-2, 288, 290, 292, 294.; E.M. Routh, “The English at Tangier” *The English Historical Review* 26, no. 103 (1911), 469.; Müller, 59, 144-6, 153.; Dan H Andersen and Hans-Joachim Voth, “The Grapes of War: Neutrality and Mediterranean Shipping Under the Danish Flag, 1750-1807” In *Discussion Papers in Economic and Social History* no. 18 (1997), 6-7.; Desmond Gregory, *Minorca, the Illusory Prize: A History of the British Occupations of Minorca between 1702 and 1802* (Madison, NJ: Farleigh Dickinson University Press, 1990), 152-4.; Desmond Gregory, *The Ungovernable Rock: A History of the Anglo-Corsican Kingdom and it’s Role in Britain’s Mediterranean Strategy during the Revolutionary War (1793-1797)* (Cranbury, NJ: Associated University Presses, 1985), 97.; Quentin Hughes, *Britain in the Mediterranean & the Defence of her Naval Stations*, (Liverpool: Penpaled Books, 1981), 9.; Panzac, *Barbary Corsairs*, 31, 40-1.; Galani, 9-10.; Merouche, *La course*, 270.; E.W.A. Tuson, *The British Consul’s Manual* (London: Longman and Co., 1856), 514-5.; Abulafia, *The Great Sea*, 490-3.

foundation of all English treaties with Algiers until 1816. France had similar difficulty in 1682 and 1683, which required the French-dominated Knights of St John at Malta to intervene and induce the French to agree to end hostilities. Another spat broke out in 1689 but the Franco-Algerine treaty that year proved as lasting as the English one from 1682.³⁶

The Consul System in North Africa

The normalization of diplomatic relations between the Ottoman Regencies and England (and France) by the end of the seventeenth century coincided with the formalization of the English diplomatic service, notably through consuls. Consuls as facilitators of trade had been operating in the Mediterranean since the start of English interest there, but they only became public servants appointed by the crown after 1649. Initially, consuls were concerned with port issues, foreign trade, seamen and their regulation. But once consuls became part of the state apparatus, their role expanded, to include, “matters of national interest: political intelligence, naval agencies, and, eventually, information for the promotion of British trade.”³⁷ E.W.A. Tuson, who wrote, *The British Consul’s Manual: Being a Practical Guide for Consuls* in 1856, laid out the principal qualifications that made one an efficient and effective consul. The first was the knowledge of the mercantile and maritime laws of the country the consul resided in, followed by a knowledge of the local language in addition to the languages of diplomacy, as translations took time. In North Africa, those languages varied. The Ottoman Regencies, had Turkish as their primary language, but they all also conducted

³⁶ Jamieson, 131-2, 141, 148-9, 151, 152.; Brown, 34.; Tuson, 276, 514-5, 534, 535.; Weiss, *Captives and Corsairs*, 72.; Jeremy Black, *British Diplomats and Diplomacy, 1688-1800* (Exeter, University of Exeter Press, 2001), 168.; Bromley, 29-31.; Colley, 51-2.; Matar, *Britain and Barbary*, 133, 165.; Daniel Baugh, “Great Britain’s ‘Blue-Water’ Policy, 1689-1815” *The International History Review* 10, no. 1 (1988), 38.; Lloyd, *English Corsairs*, 127.; Fisher, *Barbary Legend*, 323.; Panzac, *Barbary Corsairs*, 25, 31, 35, 40-1.; Weiss, “Barbary Captivity,” 247-8; Benady, “The Settee Cut,” 281.; Sebag, 210.;

³⁷ DCM Platt, *The Cinderella Service: British Consuls since 1825* (London: Longman Group, 1971), 7.

business and communicated in Italian and *Lingua Franca*, the slave pidgin language that developed in North Africa to allow Europeans, Turks, and Moors to communicate with one another. Tunis also used Arabic, which was the official state language in Morocco. Morocco's proximity to Iberia meant Spanish was the more useful European language there. The importance of consuls trained in the languages used in the Ottoman Empire and Barbary was demonstrated in the establishment of chairs in Arabic and Turkish at both Oxford and Cambridge during the 1630s, at the height of the Corsairs power.³⁸ Tuson also recommended knowledge of international mercantile and maritime law, such as it existed, as foreign consuls were regularly called upon to assist people from nations other than their own.³⁹ Perhaps the most significant recommendation Tuson made was "a Consul should be able to command himself, so as to have neither prejudice nor leaning on any side, in settling the important disputes he may be called to adjudicate upon."⁴⁰ For consuls working in a region as different as Islamic Africa, this last was particularly important – and difficult.

Barbary's idiosyncratic status was extended to their consuls; in principle consuls were only concerned with economics and trade, but in North Africa they were effectively diplomats, Ambassadors in all but name. Even their pay reflected this, being higher in North Africa than elsewhere. This was partly because the consuls in North Africa had to

³⁸ Colley, 105.

³⁹ Platt, 5-8.; Tuson, 6-7.; Müller, 17-20, 46-7, 84-5.; Seton Dearden, *A Nest of Corsairs: The Fighting Karamanlis of Tripoli* (London: Butler and Tanner, Ltd, 1976), 216.; Eric R. Dursteler, "Speaking in Tongues: Language and Communication in the Early Modern Mediterranean" *Past & Present* 217 (2012), 50, 51, 53, 55, 58-9, 60, 63-4, 67-8, 69-70.; Macgill, 15-6.; Asma Moalla, *The Regency of Tunis and the Ottoman Porte, 1777-1814: Army and government of a North-African Ottoman eyalet at the end of the eighteenth century* (London: Routledge, 2004), 70.; Noah, 257.; William Spencer, *Algiers in the Age of the Corsairs* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1976), 70.; Elizabeth Broughton, *Six Years Residence in Algiers* (London: Saunders and Otley, 1839), 23, 31, 37, 211.; Jackson, 12.; John Buffa, *Travels Through the Empire of Morocco* (London: J.J. Stockdale, 1810), 170; Brown, 143, 162.; Abraham Salame, *Narrative of the Expedition to Algiers in the Year 1816* (London: John Murray, 1819), 10.; El Hamel, 155-6.; James Davey, *The Transformation of British Naval Strategy: Seapower and Supply in Northern Europe, 1808-1812* (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2012), 59.; Garrett Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy* (Mineola, NY: Dover, 1988), 186, 204.; Galani, 30, 33.; Christian Windler, *La diplomatie comme expérience de l'autre: consuls Français au Maghreb (1700-1840)* (Geneva: Libraire Droz S.A., 2002), 154, 415, 417, 422.

⁴⁰ Tuson, 7.

deal with the corsairs but also because, by the late seventeenth century, the three Ottoman Regencies were increasingly acting, and recognised, as independent from the Ottoman Empire. After the 1640s, Ottoman sultans moved away from personal oversight of military and foreign policy, loosening the tether to North Africa. Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli continued to acknowledge Ottoman authority, supporting the navy with corsairs during the wars between 1685 and 1699, but the Regencies made their own treaties with Europe, independent of the Porte and each other. The Ottoman Empire received an ambassador from England and the Regencies (and Morocco) received consuls, but they acted as Ambassadors. This meant that the foreign consuls in North Africa were in competition with one another, as the states which they represented were in competition, for both mercantile and diplomatic advantages.⁴¹

Morocco and Gibraltar

Though English relations were on a solid footing in the Ottoman Regencies by the 1680s, in Morocco they were still complicated. England abandoned the colony at Tangier in 1684, twenty-two expensive years later, which relieved the tension somewhat. Portugal had lost its Moroccan *presidios* when the Spanish crown absorbed the smaller country, but Spain retained Ceuta and Melilla even after the two kingdoms split again in the 1640s. Foreign encroachments on Moroccan soil caused considerable strain on European relations. The second 'Alawite ruler, Mawlay Ismael, consolidated the Moroccan corsairs, requiring them to pay a percentage of their tribute to the state for authorization to operate which helped as it meant the state would regulate who they could or could not attack. The greatest change in Anglo-Moroccan relations, however, came in the early eighteenth century, when England captured Gibraltar in 1704 during

⁴¹ Platt, 131.; Tuson, 7, 277.; Müller, 31, 46-7, 55, 77, 83-5, 126.; Saunders, 40.; Jamieson, 151.; D.B. Horn, *The British Diplomatic Service 1689-1789* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1961), 35, 50-1.; Black, *British Diplomats* 11, 168.; Janet Macdonald, *The British Navy's Victualling Board, 1793-1815: Management, Competence and Incompetence* (Woodbridge, UK: The Boydell Press, 2010), 64.; Noah, 413.

the War of Spanish Succession. Despite the conquest not being confirmed until the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713 and Morocco and England failing to come to a peace agreement in 1705, Morocco did promise to supply the new garrison at Gibraltar, which could not feed its own population, with fresh food and provisions. Terms were reinforced the following year when a Moroccan delegation travelled to London and with orders, “to assure Queen Anne that the sultan was ready as a friend to supply the Gibraltar Garrison at all times with whatever supplies they needed.”⁴² Morocco and England, now Great Britain, finally secured a treaty in 1721, the basis for all those until the mid-nineteenth century, heavily motivated by Britain’s need to ensure the continued supply of food to the garrison and friendly relations with the opposite country in the Strait of Gibraltar. Gibraltar’s reliance on North Africa was so important that the small territory received its own distinct form of Mediterranean pass, known as the ‘settee cut’. After 1721, Britain held treaties with all four Barbary States, treaties that would remain in effect for nearly a century.⁴³

The Century of Trade

The relationship between Morocco and Britain over Gibraltar was emblematic of the wider symbiotic relationship the whole of North Africa developed with Britain in the

⁴² P.G. Rogers, *A History of Anglo-Moroccan Relations to 1900* (London: Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 1991), 70, 73, 74-5.

⁴³ Routh, 469, 480.; Brown, 33.; Jamieson, 159-163.; Rogers, *Anglo-Moroccan Relations*, 70-5.; Roger Knight and Martin Wilcox. *Sustaining the Fleet 1793-1815: War, the British Navy and the Contractor State* (Woodbridge, UK: Boydell and Brewer Ltd., 2010), 33.; Rézette, 39-40, 137-8.; Benady, “The Settee Cut”, 282-4.; M.S. Anderson, “Great Britain and the Barbary States in the Eighteenth Century” in *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research* 29 (1956), 88, 93-4, 96.; H.W. Howes, *The Gibraltarian: The Origin and Development of the Population of Gibraltar from 1704*, 3rd ed. (Gibraltar: Mediterranean Sun Publishing, 1991), 2, 3-4. ; Colley, 87.; A.B. Rodger, *The War of the Second Coalition, 1798-1801: A Strategic Commentary* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1964), 203.; Vasallo, 63-4.; Baugh, “‘Blue-Water’ Policy,” 46.; Tito Benady, *The Royal Navy at Gibraltar* (Liskeard, Cornwall: Maritime Books, 1992), 27, 30.; Fisher, *Barbary Legend*, 288.; John D Harbon, *Trafalgar and the Spanish Navy: The Spanish Experience of Sea Power* (London: Conway Maritime Press, 1988), 6-7.; Galani, 101, 144-5.; Tuson, 522-3.; Robert Holland, *Blue-Water Strategy: The British in the Mediterranean since 1800* (London: Penguin Books, 2012), 9.; Fernando de Castra Branão, *Portugal e as Regências de Argel, Tunes, e Trípoli: Subsídios para a História Diplomática Portuguesa* (Porto: Secretaria de Estado de Emigração, Centro de Estudos, 1985), 39.

eighteenth and early nineteenth century. The development of trade and peace treaties for Britain, France, and the Netherlands with Barbary allowed them a certain level of security, whereby for tribute/presents *their* ships were allowed to travel unmolested by the corsairs in the Mediterranean. But, nations who did not have such treaties were still pursued by the Barbary corsairs. These treaties may have led to a decrease in prizes but the rise in tribute made up the difference. The Barbary States, generally preferring to remain neutral in European conflicts to reap the largest benefit by forcing the European states' to compete for Barbary's benefits, became a crucial part of any European states' Mediterranean policy. In 1729, a Frenchman from Marseilles neatly answered the question of 'why was Barbary allowed to operate thus?' "We are well aware that it is not in our interest for all the corsairs of Barbary to be destroyed...for without them, we would be on par with all the Italians and peoples from the North."⁴⁴ Further, the Barbary States were increasingly participating in more 'traditional' maritime trade networks, supplying British Gibraltar with food and developing trade supplying foreign navies. To differentiate the seventeenth century, when corsairing was primary, from the 'long' eighteenth century (1688-1815) where trade, tribute, and the threat of the force established the century before, Merouche designated the latter as 'le Siècle du Blé', or the 'century of wheat,' underscoring the importance of Barbary and trade.⁴⁵

⁴⁴ Quoted in Weiss, *Captives and Corsairs*, 101.

⁴⁵ Panzac, *Barbary Corsairs*, 10-2, 13, 35, 39-40. Brown, 33, 35-6, 48.; Weiss, *Captives and Corsairs*, 101, 122, 124.; Jamieson, 170-1, 172.; Panzac, *La caravane maritime*, 76.; Merouche, *Monnaies*, 41, 177-85.; Merouche, *La course*, 20, 263-4. Desmond, *Minorca*, 196.; Colley, 65.; Stephen Clissold, *The Barbary Slaves* (London: Elek Books Ltd., 1977), 149.; Andersen, "Grapes of War," 5-6.; Phillips, "Navies and the Mediterranean," 25.; Anderson, "Piracy," 188.; Charles S. Hyneman, *The First American Neutrality: A Study of the American Understanding of Neutral Obligations During the years 1792 to 1815*. (Philadelphia: Porcupine Press, 1974), 57 n. 11, 72 n. 74.; Sebag, 210, 244, 247.; Eloy Martín Corrales, *Comercio de Cataluña en el Mediterráneo musulmán [siglos XVI-XVIII]: El comercio con los "enemigos de la fe"* (Barcelona: Alborán Bellaterra, 2000), 19, 75.; Bono. *Lumi e Corsari*, 2-3.

The Royal Navy's Victualling Board

During the eighteenth century the British Royal Navy, and the infrastructure that developed to support it, were among the largest in the whole of the British government. Coinciding with this naval expansion was the development of the 'fiscal-military state' in Britain, allowing for the effective raising of taxes, paying of national debts, and ability to borrow larger sums of money than British competitors. To prevent the problems with supply and quality of food, which plagued the British Navy during the seventeenth century, the Victualling Board was created in 1683, subordinate to the Admiralty. From its base in London, the Victualling Board was responsible for the supply and provisioning of food and water for all naval vessels. This required warehouse storage, and manufacturing capabilities, to turn raw materials into the necessary finished product – like grain into ships biscuit. British Victualling bases were located in principal ports, like Portsmouth or Dover, but after the conquest of Gibraltar, a naval yard with victualling capabilities, the first overseas base, was founded in 1739 (after 1801, Malta would become another). The Gibraltar base received provisions from Britain, but also had the ability to acquire local produce – especially from North Africa. This was particularly important during the various grain crises that hit Britain during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. The consuls in North Africa were invariably urged to provide the garrison and fleets in the Mediterranean with updates on market prices in their states and assist in procuring supplies.⁴⁶

⁴⁶ Knight, *Sustaining the Fleet*, 4, 19-21, 31, 33-4, 36, 46-66, 73-80, 133.; Janet Macdonald, *Feeding Nelson's Navy: The True Story of Food at Sea in the Georgian Era* (London: Chatham Publishing, 2006), 37, 45-6, 52-6, 59-60 119-20.; Macdonald, *British Navy's Victualling Board*, 1-2, 8-12, 16, 21, 24-5, 26-7, 64-9.; Morriss, 271, 272-3, 274-6, 278-85, 292-4, 297.; Davey, *Transformation*, 62, 72, 96-7.; James Davey, "Supplied by the enemy: the Royal Navy and the British Consular Service in the Baltic, 1808-1812" *Historical Research* 85 (2012), 265, 268-9, 270-5.; Harding, *Sea Power*, 123.; NAM Rodger, "War as an Economic Activity in the 'Long' Eighteenth Century" *International Journal of Maritime History*, XXII, no. 2 (2010), 5, 8.; Michael Duffy, *Soldiers, Sugar, and Seapower: The British Expeditions to the West Indies and the War against Revolutionary France* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), v.; Galani, 101, 107.; Daniel A. Baugh, "Withdrawing from Europe: Anglo-French Maritime Geopolitics,

Access to fresh food had a profound impact on a navy's ability to carry out certain tasks, especially blockading. Though lemon juice was not officially required until 1795, the link between fresh food and the delay in the onset of scurvy (roughly two months without sufficient Vitamin C) had been observed long before. As most of the meat and vegetables were salted to last at sea, much of their nutritional value was lost. Citrus fruits, containing large amounts of ascorbic acid, were the strongest anti-scorbutic, but fresh cattle, cabbage, and onions also were used. Both Admirals Jervis and Nelson placed considerable value on lemons, and Nelson was a frequent purchaser of onions for the same purpose. Fresh water was also crucial, as ships had to take all their water for a voyage in casks – both for drinking and for rinsing the salt off meat before it was consumed. The British system was incredibly effective at providing sufficient (and non-spoilt) food through its many avenues. In contrast, France and Spain had moved away from open market systems. France, especially after the Revolution, used state-control of the supply and seizure of resources when abroad, though Bonaparte used contractors to some extent. Spain did not have the ability to sustain the open market system Britain developed and relied on private monopolies of resources. Neither system was as effective as Britain and as the two wars dragged on, Britain's better access to supply began to show, giving her distinct advantages over her enemies.⁴⁷

1750-1800." *The International History Review* 20, no. 1 (1998), 7, 11.; Black, *Naval Power*, 60-1.; Morriss, 23.

⁴⁷ Knight, *Sustaining the Fleet*, 5-8, 10-11, 36, 46, 133, 211.; Macdonald, *Feeding Nelson's Navy*, 37, 52, 154-66, 119-20.; John B Hattendorf, ed., *Maritime History, Volume 2: The Eighteenth Century and the Classic Age of Sail* (Malabar, FL: Kreiger Publishing Company, 1997), 130.; James D.G. Davidson, *Admiral Lord St. Vincent – Saint or Tyrant? The Life of Sir John Jervis, Nelson's Patron* (Barnsley, UK: Pen & Sword Maritime, 2006), 55, 58, 60-1.; Christopher Lloyd, ed. *The Health of Seamen: Selections from the Works of Dr. James Lind, Sir Gilbert Blane and Dr. Thomas Trotter* (London: Spottiswoode, Ballantyne and Co, 1965), 21, 23.; Davey, *Transformations*, 6, 61-2.; NAM Rodger, *The Wooden World: An Anatomy of the Georgian Navy* (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1996), 86-7, 100-2.; Christopher D Hall, *British Strategy in the Napoleonic War, 1803-1812* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992), 31-2, 39.; Galani, 33, 42-3.; Stephen R. Bown, *Scurvy: How a Surgeon, a Mariner and a Gentleman Solved the Greatest Medical Mystery of the Age of Sail* (Chichester: Summersdale, 2003), 9-11, 54, 56-7, 60-1, 90, 243, 245, 257.

North African Trade

Although North Africa's reputation in the eighteenth century was almost entirely based on corsairs, the region's earlier reputation as the 'bread basket' of the Mediterranean still held true. The majority of North Africa subsisted by agro-pastoral means. Two-fifths of Tunis's economy came from corsairing and maritime commerce, and another two-fifths from agriculture.⁴⁸ Travellers' accounts of the area frequently commented on the fertile soil. All four states provided cattle, sheep, and grains (usually wheat, barley or corn). Cattle were especially plentiful at Morocco and Tripoli, and frequently cheaper than elsewhere.⁴⁹ Tunis also exported olive oil and Algiers exported coral products fished off the coast. Morocco had the widest range of resources available, helped by her dual coasts on the Mediterranean and Atlantic, allowing for greater access. Her principal exports of benefit to Gibraltar and the British were fish, wheat, corn, oranges, lemons and other citrus fruits, vegetables, cows, and sheep. However, she also sold rye, rice, oats, barley, grapes, pomegranates, figs, almonds, dates, melons, cucumbers, donkeys, mules, horses, goats, and cheese. Tetuan was convenient for watering, only nine miles from Gibraltar. The trip between Gibraltar and Tetuan could take five to six hours in good weather, and merchant and courier ships went back and forth constantly. Nelson frequently used it during his tenure as Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean squadron in the run up to the Battle of Trafalgar, owing to its ease of use.⁵⁰ France dominated the trade with the three Ottoman Regencies for the majority of the eighteenth century and Britain enjoyed primacy in Morocco, due to her presence in Gibraltar. Even where France was the principle market, the British were still engaged in trade through their consuls. This trade coupled with the victualling network described

⁴⁸ Anderson, *State and Social Transformations*, 39.

⁴⁹ Folayan, *Yūsūf Pāshā*, 62-3. Tripoli cattle could usually be resold in Malta for twice the price.

⁵⁰ DLN, v. 4, 436. Private Diary, 22 Jul 1805.

above, developed into an increasing advantage for the British as the eighteenth century went on.⁵¹

The Run-Up to War

As the eighteenth century continued, Barbary's relationship with Britain and France increased its reliance on diplomacy and trade. By the 1720s, Britain had stable relations with all four states. In the Ottoman Regencies, the French position remained supreme, dominating trade and consular efforts. French interest was so entrenched that in the 1780s Marseilles alone accounted for two-thirds of all European trade in Tunis.⁵² Marseilles saw an average of 150 ships travelling between it Barbary each year in the decade before the outbreak of the French Revolutionary war.⁵³ The increasing number of states seeking treaties with the Barbary states had led to decreasing corsair prizes and the tenuous relationship between the *bilad al-makhzan* (area under government control) and the *bilad al-siba* (area outside government authority) meant taxing the land was difficult at best.⁵⁴

The Barbary States began to look outwards for revenue. Having established their prowess and danger as corsairs the century before, most of Europe responded by entering into treaties of 'peace and friendship' with North Africa. Subject to regular payment of

⁵¹ Buffa, 173-5; Spencer, 98-104.; Macgill, 62, 62, 66, 96, 119-20, 135.; Noah, 290, 357.; Jackson, 19, 46.; Panzac, 135-42, 161-78.; Brown, 45, 121-31.; Mohamed El Mansour, *Morocco in the Reign of Mawlay Sulayman* (The Cottons, Wisbech, England: Middle East and North African Studies Press, 1990), 1, 3, 63.; Robert Gardiner, ed. *Fleet Battle and Blockade: The French Revolutionary War, 1793-1797* (London: Chatham Publishing, 1996), 95, 98; Goodwin, 38-9.; Gregory, *The Ungovernable Rock*, 47.; Seddon, 66, 68.; Howes, 11.; Perkins, *Tunisia*, 65.; Davey, *Transformations in British Naval Strategy*, 196.; Jason R Musteen, *Nelson's Refuge: Gibraltar in the Age of Napoleon* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2011), 23-4.; Nicolas Michel, "The Individual and the Collectivity in the Agricultural Economy of Pre-Colonial Morocco" in *Money, Land and Trade: An Economic History of the Muslim Mediterranean*, Nelly Hanna, ed. (London: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 2002), 16.; Furlong, 26, 27.; Clancy-Smith, *North Africa*, 122-3.; Noah, 96.; Flournoy, 34.; Lewis, 115.; James Curtis, *A Journal of Travels in Barbary in the Year 1801 with Observations on the Gum Trade of Senegal* (London: D.N. Shury, 1803), 26, 30-1.

⁵² Windler, "Diplomatic History," 82.; Panzac, *Barbary Corsairs*, 73.; Panzac, *Commerce et Navigation*, 181, 187.; Hourani, 252, 261.; Jeremy Black, *British Foreign Policy in an Age of Revolutions 1783-1793* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 46.

⁵³ Panzac, *Barbary Corsairs*, 73.

⁵⁴ Brown, 37-43, 62.; Brett, *Berbers*, 174.; Naylor 126.; Pennell, *Morocco*, 28.; Anderson, *State and Social Transformations*, 31, 42.

tribute to maintain those treaties, timely delivery of ‘presents’ (usually of cash, arms, or maritime equipment), at certain intervals (e.g. change of ruler) the treaties protected those countries from corsair attacks. In non-dynastic Algiers, this could occur quite frequently.⁵⁵ Failure to either pay tribute or deliver presents could invalidate the treaty, which allowed corsair attacks to resume. Small northern European states and the Italian states could not afford to secure treaties with North Africa and so remained the corsairs’ most constant prey. North Africa increased its trade with Europe as the eighteenth century continued. Morocco’s role in supplying Gibraltar has already been mentioned, but other parts of the Mediterranean were equally reliant on produce from the Barbary States. Morocco’s Sidi Muhammad (r. 1757-90) established a new town of Essaouira, or Mogadore, in 1765 in order to keep better control over Moroccan foreign trade and it was the most frequented port by British merchants not involved in Gibraltar’s trade.⁵⁶ Merouche’s designation of the eighteenth century as the ‘century of wheat’ reflects the changing nature of the Barbary economy. With the corsair threat managed by the various diplomatic treaties between European nations and the states of Barbary, Euro-Barbary relations necessarily changed. Europe, especially Britain and France (at war with for much of the eighteenth century) competed over access to trade with North Africa. North Africa in turn saw the value of remaining neutral, outside of these conflicts as it drove up the revenue Barbary could extract from European nations. Spain remained the exception, and her continued operations against Barbary provided a ‘training ground’ for young Spanish officers. After the French Revolutionary War hit the Mediterranean, Britain took full advantage of that symbiotic relationship. Though initially hampered by the strong French presence in North Africa in the early 1790s, by the end of the century the British relationship had eliminated the French advantage. The 150 ships a year average traveling

⁵⁵ Wolf, 292.; Julien, 323.; Flournoy, 23-5.

Between 1638 and 1818, Algiers had thirty deys; fourteen were assassinated.

⁵⁶ See Appendix III: Lloyd’s List (p. 265)..

between Barbary and Marseilles in the 1780s was down to an average of 28 ships a year between 1793 and 1799.⁵⁷

⁵⁷ Brown, 35-6, 37-43, 44, 48-9; Merouche, *Monnaies*, 174.; Merouche, *La course*, 319.; Müller, 58-9, 60, 126, 199; Howes, 11, 14, 15.; Tully, 160-3.; Bromley, 29.; Hyneman, 127.; Ray W Irwin, *The Diplomatic Relations of the United States with the Barbary Powers, 1776-1816* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1931), 18-9.; Blondy, "The Barbary Regencies," 241, 245.; Michela "In the 'English' Mediterranean" *Journal of Mediterranean History* 12, no. 2 (2002), 272.; Panzac, *Barbary Corsairs*, 11, 39, 40-1, 73-4, 135.; Panzac, "Maritime Trade," 192-3.; McLachlan, 290.; Gutelius, 40-1, 42, 45, 46.; Michael Kitzen, "Money Bags or Cannon Balls: The Origins of the Tripolitan War, 1795-1801" *Journal of the Early Republic* 16, no. 4 (1996), 620.; Anderson, "Piracy," 185.; Clancy-Smith, *Rebel and Saint*, 65.; Conrotte, 38.; Brett, *Berbers*, 179-80.; Robert J. Allison, *The Crescent Obscured: The United States and the Muslim World, 1776-1815* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), xv.; Anderson, *State and Social Transformations*, 40-1.; Macgill, 96, 119-20.; Black, *British Foreign Policy*, 46, 502.; Panzac, *Commerce et Navigation*, 129.; Panzac, *Barbary Corsairs*, 73.

CHAPTER TWO: 1792-1798

In April 1792, France declared war on Austria and Prussia, beginning the conflict that would engulf Europe (and beyond) almost continuously for the next twenty-three years. In September, the French monarchy was overthrown and the French Republic established. The Republican army won several early victories, conquering the Rhineland, the Austrian Netherlands and Savoy. On 1 February 1793, France declared war on Britain.⁵⁸

The British Admiralty chose Samuel Hood, Admiral and Viscount, to be the Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean fleet, the second most important naval command in the Royal Navy after the Channel. From the start of the conflict, the Mediterranean was central to the British war effort. Royalist forces in Toulon rebelled against Republican control and surrendered the town to Hood two months after he arrived in the Mediterranean. The port provided a central base from which the British hoped to support French royalists, their Spanish and Portuguese allies, and the Italian states. After assuming command, Hood dispatched messages of friendship to North Africa, as the neutral Barbary States would be crucial to supplying the fleet. He also hoped to try to sway them away from their long-established partnership with France or at least discourage the shipment of grain to southern France. Additionally, once Britain committed herself to defending Toulon, North Africa was necessary to supply the town, which under normal circumstances struggled to feed itself.⁵⁹

⁵⁸ Charles J. Esdaile, *The French Wars, 1792-1815* (London: Routledge, 2001), 1, 4, 9.; Monk, 75.; Eugène Plantet, *Correspondance des Deys d'Alger avec la Cour de France, 1579-1830*, Volume II (Paris: Ancienne Librairie Germer, 1889), 432-3.; NAM Rodger, *The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain 1649-1815*. (London: Penguin Group, 2004), 427.; Gregory, *The Ungovernable Rock*, 51.; Panzac, *Barbary Corsairs*, 73.; Martin Robson, *The Napoleonic Wars* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2014), 1.

⁵⁹ J. Holland Rose, *Lord Hood and the Defence of Toulon* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1922), 9, 11, 13, 14-5, 19, 53-4.; Jennifer Mori, "The British Government and the Bourbon Restoration: The Occupation of Toulon 1793" *The Historical Journal* 40, no. 3 (1997), 699-700, 713, 714.; Elisa A Carrillo, "The Corsican Kingdom of George III," *The Journal of Modern History* 34, no. 3 (1962), 254.;

Unfortunately, the start of the French Revolutionary War coincided with a period of instability, dynastic struggle, and consular change in North Africa. In Morocco, emperor Mawlay Yazid died on 17 February 1792, two months before the outbreak of war.⁶⁰ His death caused a dynastic struggle between his brothers, lasting six years.⁶¹ Maslama declared himself emperor in the North at the end of February, but lack of money, a string of military defeats, and the loss of local support caused him to flee to Algiers in late April making Suleiman the uncontested ruler of northern Morocco.⁶² Mawlay Suleiman's advancement was a boon for British interests in the region, as he would need foreign support to bolster his rule, reported British consul-general, James Matra. Matra had already managed to secure reduced duties on cattle and a marked preference for the British in Tangier. Under Yazid, the British had been granted 'most favoured nation' status, a position they could not afford to give up with the new war in Europe.⁶³

James Matra had been the British Consul-General in Tangier since 1787, having previously served as secretary for the British Ambassador to Constantinople where he learned Turkish. In Morocco, he "studied the local language, as much to realize any opportunities that might appear for making money as much as for affecting his official business (which he was able to conduct largely in French, Spanish, and Italian)."⁶⁴ His experience in Morocco rendered him indispensable once hostilities broke out in Europe.

Gregory, *The Ungovernable Rock*, 47.; Gardiner, 94.; Isom-Verhaaren, *Allies*, 134.; Roger Knight, *The Pursuit of Victory: The Life and Achievements of Horatio Nelson* (London: Allen Lane, 2005), 152, 154.; Robson, 39-41.; Ben Wilson, *Empire of the Deep: The Rise and Fall of the British Navy* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2013), 378.

⁶⁰ El Mansour, 89.; Alan Frost, *The Precarious Life of James Mario Matra: Voyager with Cook, American Loyalist, Servant of Empire* (Canton, Victoria, AUS: Melbourne University Press, 1995), 137.; Swain, 16-7.; Hattendorf, *Maritime History* 246.; Hattendorf, *Naval Policy* ix.; Julien, , 266-9.; Abun-Nasr, 241.; Tully, 286.

⁶¹ El Mansour, 89.; Brown, 57.; El Hamel, 225.

⁶² El Mansour, 89, 91-2.

⁶³ El Mansour, 91.; NA FO 52/10 Matra to Dundas, 22 April 1792; Frost, 137.; Brown, 55-7, 66.; Jeremy Black, *British Foreign Policy*, 502.; Henri Cambon, *Histoire du Maroc* (Paris: Brodard et Taupin, 1952), 64-5.

⁶⁴ Frost, 134.;

He was familiar with the Mediterranean, had a vast informant network, and was intimately connected with the British garrison at Gibraltar. When Morocco's dynastic struggle broke out in 1792, he advocated the British support Suleiman.⁶⁵

Suleiman's need for foreign support was good for British interests, but it also meant the new ruler would be in favour of *other* foreign states trading with Morocco, such as France and Spain. Suleiman needed to ensure trade continued with those nations, both to fill his own coffers and to present himself as a leader capable of ensuring that trade, and win foreign support. In November, after securing control of northern Morocco, Suleiman appointed Muhammad Ibn 'Uthman, closely connected with Spain, as his minister for foreign affairs.⁶⁶ Matra spent considerable time counteracting Spanish intrigues in the Moroccan court.⁶⁷ In May 1793, Suleiman granted Spain the right to conduct trade and export wheat out of Casablanca under the same terms as had been granted to Spain during the reign of Suleiman's father, Sidi Muhammad (d. 1790).⁶⁸ Morocco's proximity to Gibraltar and the Spanish mainland (and Spanish Ceuta and Melilla in North Africa) rendered the Spanish relationship with Morocco both complicated and necessary.

Algiers, the largest of the Ottoman regencies, had no dynastic succession or ruling family, but the Deys were subject to the whims of the *divan* and the janissary military force. They could be replaced suddenly, frequently, and violently. Luckily, at the start of 1793 Algiers was enjoying a long period of stability. The current Dey, Sidi Hassan had come to power upon the death of his predecessor, Muhammad, at the start of

⁶⁵ Ibid. 85, 88-90, 123, 134-7.; NA FO 52/10, no. 219-20 Matra to Dundas, 22 April 1792.

⁶⁶ El Mansour, 94.; Frost, 137.

⁶⁷ Frost, 137.; Anderson, "Great Britain and the Barbary States," 92-3.

⁶⁸ El Mansour, 63, 94.; Frost, 131.; Conrotte, 353.

the decade (Muhammad had ruled for nearly thirty years).⁶⁹ However, Charles Logie, British Consul-General in Algiers since 1785, was replaced at the same time as France declared war on Britain.⁷⁰ The impending arrival of his successor, General Charles Mace rendered Logie obsolete. The new consul would come bearing new orders and gifts for the Dey.⁷¹ Logie's lame-duck status caused trouble for the British at Gibraltar, as Rear-Admiral Samuel Goodall observed to Sir Philip Stephens (Secretary to the Admiralty) when a British vessel was the victim of "a barbarous act of violence committed by the commander of an Algerine ship" in November 1792.⁷² Goodall reported he would have sent a frigate to the regency to deal with the insult, but, "as I understand the new Consul for that place is coming out and is daily expected to arrive here to carry the usual Compliment to the Dey, I will take that opportunity of demanding satisfaction for this insult, and which thro' this circumstance may be rendered more effectual."⁷³ Goodall held the consul's impending arrival 'with compliments' for the Dey (meaning consular gift) as particularly important. In Goodall's opinion, the conflict was caused, "by the new Dey having received Presents from every European state excepting England since his accession to the regency."⁷⁴ It had been more than a year since the current Dey rose to power, a long time to not receive the customary gifts for a new ruler; even more so as Britain's was the last to be received.

Yet things were not all bad. Goodall continued: "until the present instance I am well assured, that the Algerine cruisers have behaved remarkably friendly towards the British commerce in the Mediterranean" indicated by their respecting the British flag or

⁶⁹ Plantet, *Algiers*, 585-6.; NA ADM 1/391, no. 3, Samuel Goodall to Philip Stephens, 6 January, 1793.; Lucette Valensi, *On the Eve of Colonialism: North Africa before the French Conquest*, trans. Kenneth J Perkins (New York: Africana Publishing Company, 1977), xvi.

⁷⁰ NA ADM 1/391, no. 3, Samuel Goodall to Philip Stephens, 6 January, 1793; no. 10, Samuel Goodall to Philip Stephens, 5 February 2014, 1793.; Playfair, 202.

⁷¹ Playfair, 220-21.:

⁷² NA ADM 1/ 391 no. 3, William Gregory to Samuel Goodall, 17 November 1792.

⁷³ NA ADM 1/391 no. 3, Samuel Goodall to Philip Stephens, 6 January 1793.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

merely spot-checking the passes compared to their more forceful treatment of the ships of other nations.⁷⁵ Goodall concluded his report with the sanguine observation: “affairs in Barbary remain in the same peaceable footing; and supplies continue to be regularly bought from thence into the Garrison” at Gibraltar.⁷⁶ The Dey demonstrated his commitment to foreign trade by granting an important Jewish merchant house, Bacri and Busnach, special status. Well connected in Algiers and the wider Mediterranean world, they were granted the lucrative monopoly on exporting grain from the regency – which benefited both French and British alike.⁷⁷ The next month, Goodall ordered one of his ships to transport the new consul for Algiers, Charles Mace, to the regency and return to Gibraltar with the outgoing consul.⁷⁸ His orders, coupled with the restraint shown to British ships by the Algerine cruisers, lent further credence to Goodall’s belief that the Dey had used the attack on the British ship to indicate his displeasure at their lack of acknowledgement, a tactic commonly employed by Barbary.⁷⁹ With war looming, Goodall was anxious to have the new consul in Algiers where Mace could resolve this conflict so supplies could continue to be regularly sent to the Garrison. The British military in the Mediterranean were relying on the British diplomatic corps in North Africa to ensure their food supply.

Tripoli, the eastern-most of the Barbary States, began the war in complete disorder. The same ship Goodall ordered to transport the new British Consul for Algiers

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Merouche, *Monnaies*, 183.; Morton Rosenstock, “The House of Bacri and Busnach: A Chapter from Algeria’s Commercial History” *Jewish Social Studies* 14, no. 4 (1952), 351.; Panzac, *Barbary Corsairs*, 234.; Noah, *Travels*, 426.; Levy, *Jews, Turks, and Ottomans*, 32-3.; Hourani, *History of the Arab People*, 266.

The huge amounts of grain France purchased from Bacri and Busnach (and the debts accrued from them) were to play a crucial part in France colonization of Algiers in 1830. For more information, see Chapter 7.

⁷⁸ NA ADM 1/391 no. 10, Samuel Goodall to Philip Stephens, 5 February 1793.; Richard B Parker, *Uncle Sam in Barbary: A Diplomatic History* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2008), 78.

⁷⁹ Colley, 69.; Allison, 4.:

In 1756, Morocco attacked several British ships, taking their crews hostage, in order to force Britain to appoint a consul officially to that country and aid in trade negotiations. In 1778, Morocco did the same to the United States.

was also to transport the new British consul for Tripoli. Simon Lucas was dispatched to replace Richard Tully, who had been consul-general since 1773.⁸⁰ Lucas, a former captive in Morocco and Vice-Consul there for fifteen years, had also served as Oriental Secretary at the Court of St. James.⁸¹ Yet for all his qualifications, Lucas was of little use in Gibraltar where he was stuck at the outbreak of war. He arrived at the garrison in early February and prepared by collecting the necessary money for transport and taking precautions, “should hostilities commence before my departure – and a declaration of war is hourly expected.”⁸² Hood’s fleet was delayed arriving in Gibraltar and Lucas did not arrive in Tripoli until 24 July 1793.⁸³

To add to the confusion, Tripoli had also been experiencing a dynastic struggle for three years.⁸⁴ Yusuf, the third and youngest son of the Bashaw, Ali Karamanli, had killed his elder brother in the summer of 1790, fled the city, and joined with various groups in the south. Yusuf periodically besieged Tripoli until 1793.⁸⁵ Even worse, a Turkish fleet arrived off the coast at the same time as Lucas. On board was an Ottoman officer, Ali Burghol, with a *firman* (royal edict or order) from the Sultan ordering Burghol to take control and restore order to the regency as Ottoman-appointed governor.⁸⁶ The Bashaw and his second son, Ahmed, fled to Tunis and by the end of July, Burghol had all of the old Bashaw’s officials strangled and assumed control, right

⁸⁰ NA ADM 1/391 no. 10, Samuel Goodall to Philip Stephens, 5 February 2014, 1793.; Dearden, 126.; Robin Hallett, *The Penetration of Africa: European Enterprise and Exploration Principally in Northern and Western Africa up to 1830* Volume 1 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965), 206, 208.

⁸¹ Dearden, 124.; 216; Frost, 135.; Hallett, 199-200.; Dursteler, 69-70.

⁸² NA FO 76/5 Lucas to Nepean, 21 February 1793.

⁸³ NA FO 76/5 Lucas to Nepean, 3 April 1793.; Rose, *Lord Hood*, 13.; NA FO 76/5 Lucas to Nepean, 27 May 1793.; Dearden, 126.

⁸⁴ Tully, 231-239.; Dearden, 126-7.; Folayan, *Yūsūf Pāshā*, 9, 11-15, 16.

⁸⁵ Dearden, 116-123.; Abun-Nasr, 195.; Ettore Rossi, *Storia di Tripoli e della Tripolitania dalla conquista Araba al 1911*, Maria Nallina, ed. (Rome: Istituto per l’Oriente, 1968), 255.

⁸⁶ McLachlan, “Tripoli,” 289.; Abun-Nasr, 195-6.; Rossi, 255-6.; Folayan, *Yusuf Pasha*, 11-15, 16.

as the new British consul arrived in the Regency.⁸⁷ Yusuf gained his father's supporters after Burghol's arrival and subjected Tripoli to an intense blockade, preventing the arrival of any food from the country reaching the city. The situation grew desperate by late August and food was imported from Malta. Tully and his family left Tripoli on 23 August, escaping the increasing hostile situation in the city. In September, the nations who had supported Yusuf withdrew in preparation for their autumn harvest, relieving the tension. Yusuf fled to his estranged father and brother in Tunis, ending the blockade and allowing trade to resume, to the relief of the city.⁸⁸

Initially, Burghol seemed favourably inclined toward the British. Lucas reported to Henry Dundas, then Home Secretary, that the new ruler "has charged me to forward the enclosed letter for His Majesty...he sent to acquaint me that it was merely expressive of his great regard for our most gracious Sovereign and the British Nation."⁸⁹ Shortly after, an incident occurred which changed Lucas's mind, and made clear how tenuous his position was under the Ottoman interloper. A British sailor, Peter Lyle, had escaped from Lucas's ship, snuck ashore and "turned Turk". To avoid accusations of theft, Lyle, a Scottish mate, had apostatised and become Muslim. Lucas protested to Burghol, as this was against the terms of the Anglo-Tripolitan treaty:

No subject of the King of Great Britain shall be permitted to turn Turk or Moor in the city and kingdoms of Tripoli unless he voluntarily appear before the Dey or Governor, with the English consuls Dragoman, three times, in three days, and each day declare his resolution to turn Turk or Moor.⁹⁰

However, as Burghol pointed out, *he* had not signed any treaties with Britain. The new Bashaw was under no obligation to adhere to any previous treaty between Britain and

⁸⁷ NA FO 76/5 Tully to Dundas 20 July 1793, Lucas to Dundas 22 Aug 1793.; Moalla, 50-1.; Dearden, 127-31.; Tully, 336-7.; John L. Esposito, ed. *The Oxford Dictionary of Islam* s.v. "Farman." (OUP, 2004, 82).

⁸⁸ NA FO 76/5 Tully to Dundas, 20 July 1793, Lucas to Dundas, 22 August 1793; Dearden, 132-3.; Tully, 359-62.; Rossi, 257.; Folayan, *Yūsūf Pāshā* 16-7.

⁸⁹ NA FO 76/5 Lucas to Dundas, 22 August 1793.

⁹⁰ Quoted in Dearden, 133-4.

Tripoli, much less return the Scotsman. This was the precarious nature of diplomacy in Barbary, even more so with an interloper outside the normal power structure. It was up to the consul to ensure the continuity of diplomatic agreements with subsequent new rulers as quickly as possible to prevent such disagreements. Lyle was subsequently taken under Burghol's wing, assumed the name Murad Rais, and would become the head of Tripolitan navy and corsair captain himself.⁹¹

Tunis began the war with over a decade's stability. The Bey, Hammuda ibn 'Ali, had come to power after his father abdicated in 1777.⁹² Hammuda Pasha was well thought of by European visitors to the regency. Thomas Macgill described him as, "...a man of a handsome, shrewd, and penetrating countenance; he is possessed of very good natural talents, and considering his extremely limited education, his judgement is tolerably enlightened."⁹³ George Anson Jackson praised Hammuda's governance, "He extends a very liberal protection to all classes of his subjects, even Christians and Jews, who, before his time, might be insulted, or killed with perfect impunity...the general state of society has been greatly ameliorated since his accession to power."⁹⁴ The French writer, François-René Chateaubriand, wrote in 1807, "The current Bey is a clever man...this prince speaks Italian, converses spiritedly, and understand the politics of Europe better than most Orientals."⁹⁵ In addition to being trained in governance prior to assuming control, Hammuda was the first, and probably last, of the Husaynid dynasty in Tunis who was formally instructed in Turkish, in addition to his native Arabic.⁹⁶

⁹¹ Dearden, 133-4. Tuson, 534. Treaty of 5 March 1676.; Noah, 358.; Travers, 234.

⁹² Moalla, 45-6, 49.; Macgill, *Tunis*, 15.; Alphonse Rousseau, *Annales Tunisiennes, ou Aperçu historique sur la régence de Tunis* (Alger: Bastide, 1864), 195.; Abun-Nasr, 182.: Most contemporary European records date his reign as starting with his father's death in 1782.

⁹³ Macgill, 15-6.

⁹⁴ Jackson, 273-4.

⁹⁵ Windler, "Diplomatic History" 86.

⁹⁶ Windler, "Diplomatic History" 85-7.; Windler, *La Diplomatie*, 415.; Moalla, 70.; Macgill, 15-6.; Dursteler, 69-70.; Abun-Nasr, 182.; Noah, 250, 251-2.

Similarly, the British Consul-General in Tunis, Perkins Magra, was well established by 1793. Magra was the younger brother of James Matra, consul in Morocco, who had used his influence to secure Magra's appointment in 1789.⁹⁷ A Major in the British Army, Magra shared his brother's interest in Africa.⁹⁸ The combination of an experienced consul and an undisputed leader meant as Britain began to mobilise the war effort in the Mediterranean, the British government could rely on Tunis's assistance without any of the complications seen elsewhere in Barbary. In opposition to the early correspondence with the other three Barbary States, Dundas wrote to Magra concerning the necessity of securing a truce between Tunis and Portugal shortly after the French declaration of war:

You will perceive the expediency of your endeavouring to accommodate the difference which has arisen between the Portuguese and the regency of Tunis in order that the former may not be prevented from cooperating with the British Admiral for the service of the common cause – I am therefore to signify to you His Majesty's commands that you do not fail to make use of all the influence you may derive from the character with which you are invested in order to obtain so desirable an object...⁹⁹

Such an order would have been impossible in the other Barbary States as the presence of either a new consul or new ruler meant the British would not have had any 'influence' yet to draw upon. Magra had served in the regency since 1789 and was already in a position to support British policy in the Mediterranean – a position the consuls in the other Barbary States would have to develop quickly if they were also to be of assistance. Portugal was a long-time ally of the British and any assistance the British consul could give to that nation regarding protection or supply from Barbary would benefit the British war effort.

⁹⁷ NA FO 77/3 Whitehall to Magra, 10 June 1789; Frost, 134, 167-8.; W.G. Perrin, ed. *The Keith Papers: Selected from the Letters and Papers of Admiral Viscount Keith* Vol. 2 (London: Navy Records Society, 1950), 124. [Hereafter, KP]; Rousseau, 224.

⁹⁸ Frost, 2.

It is not clear why the two consuls spelled their surnames differently, but I will maintain the difference, as that is how their letters are signed. It also makes it clearer which brother/regency I am referring to.

⁹⁹ NA FO 335/45 Folder 6, Henry Dundas to Perkins Magra, 29 April 1793.

That is not to say Magra did not have challenges ahead of him. With different consuls competing to ensure the best terms for their nation's trade, the consular situation in Barbary was complicated even during times of peace. During war, and as more and more European nations were drawn into the conflict on one side or the other, a consul's good standing within a neutral regency could have a large impact on his nation's success in the region. Macgill described the situation as:

At all times in Barbary, the Christians are divided into two parties, and are either attached to the interest of Britain or of France; therefore, in considering what nation has the most influence, we must mean, whether Great Britain or France has the greatest power at the courts of the Barbaresque states.¹⁰⁰

Magra, as the head consul for the British faction, was not only working to ensure British success but also to counteract French dominance in North Africa. French dominance was such that during the 1780s Marseilles alone accounted for two-thirds of all European trade in Tunis.¹⁰¹ The British military system in the Mediterranean encountered this during the defence of Toulon in the second half of 1793. Admiral Hood sought to secure the favour of Tunis, as that port was crucial to supplying the French army outside Toulon and British strategy demanded the cutting off of that supply. Hood had initially dispatched a small squadron to Tunis in June, but owing to the presence of French ships in her harbour, the British withdrew as they were both outnumbered and in neutral waters. He tried again in October, this time sending Commodore Linzee to cut off French trade from Tunis and to convince the Bey to support the British cause. Linzee was also to protest against the Bey's partiality towards the French but not offend him, as his friendship was crucial. This attention to Tunis's neutrality was at odds with the treatment

¹⁰⁰ Macgill. 94.

¹⁰¹ Windler, "Diplomatic History," 82.; Panzac, *Barbary Corsairs*, 73.; Panzac, *Commerce et Navigation*, 181, 187.; Hourani, 252, 261.; Jeremy Black, *British Foreign Policy in an Age of Revolutions 1783-1793* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 46.

of other neutrals in the war, such as British orders banning trade with France or French colonies.¹⁰²

Unfortunately, Hammuda stood by his neutrality. Hood believed Hammuda's refusal stemmed from the arrival of a Spanish squadron, "which must have sown the seeds of jealousy against England."¹⁰³ Captain Horatio Nelson, who accompanied Linzee, described the difficult situation the British had been placed in:

The English never yet succeeded in a negotiation against the French, and we have not set the example at Tunis, for the Monsieurs have completely upset us with the Bey; and had we latterly attempted to take them I am sure he would have declared against us and done our trade some damage.¹⁰⁴

As Hood's instructions to Linzee made clear, the British could not afford to anger the Dey and thus have their right to procure supplies and foodstuffs from the regency withdrawn. Nelson, despite his frustration with Linzee for not engaging the French, acknowledged the other problem with angering the Bey – the Tunisian corsairs. As Britain was committing itself to war along the northern coast of the Mediterranean, Britain could not afford to also fight another war or risk its warships and trade to capture by Tunis. An issue of neutrality was best left to diplomacy – the British consuls – to sort out. In the end, Tunis's neutrality caused fewer problems for the British hold on Toulon than the French army. After surrounding the port town, the British were forced to abandon the city and royalists there in December, 1793.¹⁰⁵

As 1793 ended, Suleiman further consolidated his claim to the Moroccan throne. In October, he informed the European consuls, that any Moroccan port that did not recognize his rule in the north or his brother, Hisham's, rule in the south would be

¹⁰² Rose, *Lord Hood*, 53-4.; Gardiner, 95.; John D. Forbes, "European Wars and Boston Trade, 1783-1815" *The New England Quarterly* 11, no. 4 (1938), 712-3, 714.; Weiss, *Captives and Corsairs*, 122.; Knight, *Nelson*, 162-4.; John Sugden, *Nelson: A Dream of Glory*, v. 1. (London: Jonathan Cape, 2004), 450-1.; Robson, 40-1.

¹⁰³ Rose, *Lord Hood*, 54.

¹⁰⁴ DLN v. 1, 338, To William Locker, Lieutenant Governor, Greenwich Hospital, December 1st, 1793.; Knight, *Nelson*, 162-4.; Sugden, v. 1, 452.

¹⁰⁵ Rodger, *Command of the Ocean*, 427.

blockaded. This was aimed particularly at Casablanca, where another brother had fled. Suleiman refitted corsair ships to patrol the region and seize any vessels (most carrying wheat) sailing out of that port. The blockade worked; in July 1794 Casablanca gave in after losing money from a lack of Spanish trade.¹⁰⁶ The blockade was not the only hit Spanish trade took. Shortly before the blockade of Casablanca was declared, Suleiman granted Spain and Portugal the right to import grain from Fez, but the city protested against giving assistance to their long-time Catholic enemies to such an extent that Suleiman was forced to rescind the order.¹⁰⁷ To ease this, Suleiman tried again to grant the Spanish additional privileges for importing grain in March of 1794, this time in Larache. Matra informed Dundas that the ‘mountainmen’ again protested any grants given to the Spanish – but they had no such complaints regarding the British presence. “There doesn’t appear to be the least design to interrupt the British Trade, the Mountainmen declaring their friends the English are welcome to the country as their commerce is an advantage to it, but they will not stand for the Spaniards, whom they thereafter plan to force from this place.”¹⁰⁸ Instead, the Spanish bought grain from Algiers.¹⁰⁹ This was good for British interests in Morocco, but not for Suleiman who needed both the Spanish and British, his major trading partners across the Straights of Gibraltar. As 1794 progressed, Suleiman’s rule became more secure in the north (he held his first audience as Emperor of Fez and Meknes in late June), but it would be several years before he controlled the whole country.¹¹⁰

In Algiers (like Tunis), the British had been trying to secure a peace agreement between their ally, Portugal, and the regency. Portugal had made overtures to both the

¹⁰⁶ El Mansour, 93-4.; Brown, 63.; Abun-Nasr, 242.

¹⁰⁷ NA FO 52/10 no. 252 Matra to Dundas, 30 Sept 1793.

¹⁰⁸ NA FO 52/10 no. 260-1 Matra to Dundas, 5 Mar 1794.

¹⁰⁹ H.G. Barnby, *The Prisoners of Algiers: An Account of the Forgotten American-Algerian War 1785 – 1797* (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), 112.

¹¹⁰ NA FO 52/10 no. 267 Matra to Dundas, 26 Jun 1794.; Brown, 75.; Pennell, *Morocco*, 18.

British and the Spanish, looking for assistance in securing peace with North Africa. With increasing French victories, Britain had been anxious to ensure Portugal's success and commanded outgoing Consul Logie to begin negotiations in 1793. Unfortunately, Logie, who won Algerine support for the plan, did so without consulting Portugal – the cost of peace was too high for Portugal to afford. Logie attempted to renegotiate on Portugal's behalf, but Algiers struck a new truce with the Netherlands and was unwilling to compromise on a second treaty (that would further reduce the corsairs' pool of prey). The treaty fell apart, and temporarily damaged British standing in the regency, as Dey Sidi Hassan blamed Logie for the treaty's collapse. The Americans, who were trying to negotiate a truce and redemption of captives in Algiers at the same time, also viewed the British efforts on Portugal's behalf with hostility. They saw it as a British attempt to thwart American trade in the Mediterranean.¹¹¹

French interests in the region were of greater concern than the Spanish, Portuguese, or American. Following the British expulsion from Toulon in late 1793, French forces moved to reconquer the Austrian Netherlands and the Rhineland, and invaded Catalonia.¹¹² In August, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, Philibert Buchot wrote the Dey of Algiers, “ancien ami et allié de la nation Française,” to stress to the Dey's best interests lay with France and not with her “lâches et cruels ennemis.”¹¹³ Buchot warned England would lie to the Dey but:

La vérité sortira de la bouche de ceux qui, au milieu de tant d'ennemis, ont su résister à tous, les ont chassés du territoire de la République qu'ils avaient souillé et les ont poursuivis jusque dans le leur...Il appartenait à des cœurs généreux comme le tien de s'intéresser en faveur de la cause qui a pour elle la raison, la

¹¹¹ Parker, 74-9.; Richard K. Irons, *The Influence of the Barbary States in International Relations, with Special Reference to the United States* (D.Phil Thesis: University of Oxford, 1932), 88-98.; Barnby, 103, William Shaler, *Sketches of Algiers, Political, Historical, and Civil: Containing an Account of the Geography, Population, Government, Revenues, Commerce, Agriculture, Arts, Civil Institutions, Tribes, Manners, Languages, and Recent Political History of that Country* (Boston: Cummings, Hilliard, and Company, 1826), 106.

¹¹² Esdaile, *The French Wars*, 2.; G.L Rives, “Spain and the United States in 1795” *The American Historical Review* 4, no. 1 (1898), 71-2.

¹¹³ Plantet, *Algiers* II, 439-41, Le Citoyen Buchot a Sidi Hassan, 28 Aug 1794.

justice et la gloire. Aussi sommes-nous flatté de ton amitié, jaloux de la conserver et de te donner de preuves de la nôtre. Nous désirons qu'elle soit éternelle.¹¹⁴

Buchot needed to reassure Algiers that the French were still supreme; Britain had conquered Corsica at the start of the summer. After the loss of Toulon, Britain needed a new central port in the Mediterranean, both as an anchorage and a base to support the war effort in Italy.¹¹⁵ Yet the new Anglo-Corsican Kingdom was not without its troubles. North Africa was unwilling to accept Corsica as British while the island continued to use its own flag, with the inflammatory 'Moors Head' motif, on its ships. As a result a large number of Corsicans were taken captive that summer while illegally coral fishing off the African coast. Their redemption, and recognition of Corsica as a British territory would take until the following year to be secured.¹¹⁶

In Tripoli, Lucas, at least, had good news for Dundas. The consul reported "I have the honour to acquaint you that this government is now in a state of perfect tranquillity..." which was certainly an improvement over the previous year, but he was not sanguine about the odds of Tripoli remaining thus.¹¹⁷ He worried the current peace was illusory and Burghol's:

...enterprising disposition it is now feared will soon involve him in new troubles, for not satisfied with his late success being embroiled with Tunis, he dispatched seven of his cruisers on the twenty-fourth of [September] with about a thousand troops to attack the island of Jerba on that coast, which they took with little or no opposition.¹¹⁸

In light of the attack on Jerba, Lucas told Dundas, "it is thought that the Tunisians will shortly pay us a visit by sea and by land in which case we will be much worse off than

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ Max Adams, *Admiral Collingwood: Nelson's Own Hero* (London, Weidenfield & Nicholson, 2005), 140-1.; Carrillo, 254.; Musteen, 15.; Robson, 41.

¹¹⁶ Carrillo, 256, 261.; Playfair, 221-2.; Gregory, *The Ungovernable Rock*, 97-9.; Merouche, *La course*, 317.; Sugden, v. 1, 455.; Robson, 43-4.; Wilson, *Empire of the Deep*, 379

¹¹⁷ NA FO 76/5 Lucas to Dundas, 20 October 1794.

¹¹⁸ Ibid.; Moalla, 51, 52-3.; Dearden, 134-6.; Abun-Nasr, 196.

we were...”¹¹⁹ Lucas’s prediction was correct; in November, Hammuda Pasha placed Jerba under blockade, and dispatched an army to retake the island in December. Meanwhile a group of merchants from both Tunis and Tripoli travelled to Constantinople. They informed the Porte of Burghol’s behaviour, had the *firman* appointing him governor withdrawn, and the Karamanli family reinstated.¹²⁰ Beyond war between two Barbary States and yet another change of ruler, the British position itself changed. Vice Admiral William Hotham replaced Lord Hood as Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean that autumn.¹²¹

Following their success at Jerba, the Tunisian army marched on Tripoli in January 1795. On 16 January, the Tunisians surrounded and besieged the city. Two days later, Ali Burghol ordered the city evacuated while he and his allies completely pillaged the palace and riots broke out.¹²² The Tunisian force successfully expelled the “Turkish Usurper,” and on 2 February, the old Bashaw, Ali Karamanli, and his two sons returned to Tunis in a British frigate. Lucas reported the new situation in Tripoli in glowing terms:

...to relate the occurrences, which, fortunately for the European trade in the Mediterranean, happened in this regency since that period, and by which I am happy to acquaint you, We are now not only freed from the despotism of an arbitrary Tyrant, but once more restored to the peaceful enjoyment of our former rights and privileges, by the restoration of the lawful Princes of the Caramali family...¹²³

Shortly thereafter, the old Bashaw, Ali, abdicated in favour of his son, Ahmed, and Lucas was able to renew the British treaties with the regency, “particularly for the benefit of His Majesty’s Corsican subjects.”¹²⁴ From the British point of view, the return of Karamanli rule was good news. The two-year interlude of Ali Burghol was merely an

¹¹⁹ NA FO 76/5 Lucas to Dundas, 20 October 1794.

¹²⁰ Dearden, 134-6.; Moalla, 51-2.; Rossi, 257.; Folayan, *Yūsūf Pāshā* 20.

¹²¹ Gardiner, 87.; Adams, 141.; Robson, 44.; Wilson, *Empire of the Deep*, 381.

¹²² Dearden, 136.

¹²³ NA FO 76/5 Lucas to Dundas, 6 Feb 1795.

¹²⁴ NA FO 76/5 Lucas to Dundas, 20 Feb 1795.

unfortunate hiccup for their efforts in Tripoli – now Lucas could truly begin to carry out his original orders by cementing Tripoli’s aid and friendship in the effort against France.¹²⁵

Similarly in Morocco, the beginning of 1795 saw Suleiman strengthening his claim to the throne. Suleiman used the abdication of yet another brother as an excuse to extend his naval blockade. Suleiman had effectively gained control of the country (though he would not be recognised as the undisputed ruler for three more years). Suleiman worked on solidifying his place through his international relations. He granted Spain the exclusive right to the port of Larache, which had caused such problems the previous year. Matra expressed concern over French efforts to export saltpetre from Morocco, a trade Britain had successfully been exploiting since Elizabethan times.¹²⁶ The French also sought to export corn for their military forces. Captain Cuthbert Collingwood, on his appointment to the Mediterranean Fleet, observed, “The south of France...depends very much on the import of corn from Africa, and their fleets must come to sea to protect that trade.”¹²⁷ It was in the British interest to prevent French access to both saltpetre *and* foodstuffs. The French consul-general also moved his residence from Salé to Tangier, to better observe the Strait, causing further concern.¹²⁸ Yet Suleiman granted the British free export of grain; and by the new year two dozen ships had departed Essaouira on the supply chain.¹²⁹ In return, Suleiman asked to buy military stores, including forty-eight cannons, to be paid for by waiving the duties on further grain exports.¹³⁰ Matra also informed the Duke of Portland that Morocco had

¹²⁵ Moalla, 52.; Dearden, 134-7.; Rossi, 257.; Folayan, *Yusuf Pasha*, 20.

¹²⁶ David Cressy, *Saltpeter: The Mother of Gunpowder* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 92.

¹²⁷ Edward Hughes, ed. *The Private Correspondence of Admiral Lord Collingwood* (London, Spottiswoode, Ballantyne and Co., Ltd., 1957), 68: # 34. To Dr. Alexander Carlyle, 2 Jul 1795. [Hereafter PCC]

¹²⁸ Jeremy Black, *A History of Diplomacy* (London: Reaktion Books, Ltd., 2011), 139.

¹²⁹ See Appendix III: Lloyd’s List (p. 265).

¹³⁰ Brown, 65.

declared war on Sweden, Genoa, Venice, and Holland as those states had no consuls present in Morocco or standing treaties. The British position in Morocco was high, but she still had to contend with Spain and France.¹³¹

Between the expulsion of Ali Burghol from Tripoli and the increasing power of Suleiman in Morocco, North Africa stabilised as 1795 continued. Tunis, after her reconquest of Jerba and the siege of Tripoli, decided it would be prudent to send an embassy to the Ottoman Porte, both to justify the attack on their neighbour and win favour with the Porte. Hammuda Pasha sent presents with Yusuf Khuja, more commonly referred to as Yusuf Sahib al-Tabi', the head of the delegation. He was an Ottoman Mamluke from Moldavia, and the Guardian of the Seals – the second most powerful person in Tunis. Yusuf Sahib al-Tabi' was also “the most virulent enemy” of the French government. The French consuls initially rejoiced at his absence from the regency until they realised Yusuf Sahib al-Tabi' had left spies behind to watch over the French consul's actions. According to the consul, the Sahib al-Tabi's spies convinced the Bey that the French were cheating Tunis owing to a recent large French present to Algiers.¹³²

Tripoli, despite the eviction of Burghol and restoration of the Karamanlis, was not yet fully stable. A few months after the ‘usurper's’ flight, Yusuf, who had tried to seize power prior to Ali Burghol's arrival, finally took control. On 11 June, Yusuf took advantage of his elder brother, Ahmed's, absence from Tripoli to bar the city gates against him and declare himself Bashaw, causing his brother to flee back to Tunis.¹³³ Despite his violent beginnings, Yusuf would reign until 1832, when he abdicated in favour of his son. G. A. Jackson praised the new ruler: “Sidi Yusuf... is a sensible man,

¹³¹ El Mansour, 94.; NA FO 52/11 no. 29-30 Matra to Portland, 9 April 1795.; NA FO 52/11 no. 33-35 Matra to Portland, 28 June 1795.; Clissold, 153-4.

¹³² Eugène Plantet, *Correspondence des Beys de Tunis et de Consuls de France avec la cour 1577 -1830* Vol. III, (Paris: Ancienne Librairie Germer, 1899), 255-6, #535: Louis-Alexandre Herculais au Comite de Salut Public, 11 Jun 1795; 257, #538: Herculais au Comite de Salut Public, 22 Jun 1795.

¹³³ Abun-Nasr, 196-7.; Rossi, 259.; Folayan, *Yūsūf Pāshā*, 21.

speaks good Italian, and has a fine countenance; he is fond of pomp, magnificence and show: he is endowed with dignity, and his manners are agreeable and polite... the people seem very much satisfied with him.”¹³⁴ For the most part, this change was little more than a minor concern for the foreign consuls in Tripoli. Britain was preoccupied with securing the new base of Corsica and power remained in the Karamanli family.¹³⁵ The new ruler would need foreign support and therefore be more willing to work within the diplomatic modes previously established – unlike Burghol.

The new Bashaw immediately set to work restoring order after five years of dynastic struggle and the violence of Burghol. As Burghol had emptied the castle and the treasury before he fled, the Bashaw raised new funds by summoning the foreign consuls – *except* France and Britain – requiring them to pay their annual tribute early. Yusuf needed to raise the necessary money to pay the troops enforcing the new, strict laws and rebuild the corsair fleet, which would refill his coffers in the long term. France and Britain’s exemption was an indication both of Yusuf’s desire to favour the two powers as much as his lack of ability to enforce his request against them. They would have provided welcome money, but they also had the naval force (already on hand in the Mediterranean) to punish the struggling new leader. Instead, Britain and France effectively refurnished the Bashaw’s palace by themselves, through the consuls’ own possessions and gifts from their respective countries.¹³⁶ Then Yusuf set about strengthening his naval forces. He raised Murad Reis, the renegade Scotsman Peter Lyle, to Admiral and within one year doubled his corsair fleet from three to six ships.¹³⁷

¹³⁴ Jackson, 35.

¹³⁵ Dearden, 137.; Tully, 367-8.; Charles William Janson, *A View of the Present Condition of the States of Barbary, or, an account of he Climate, Soil, &c. of Morocco, Fez, Algiers, Tripoli, Tunis* (1816), 14-5.; Jackson, 35.

¹³⁶ Dearden, 141-2.

¹³⁷ Folayan, *Yūsūf Pāshā*, 25-9.

Throughout 1795, the competition between France and Britain over access to North African resources continued. As Collingwood observed, southern France relied on corn from Barbary, and the British needed to prevent their getting it. In July, Nelson was ordered to intercept vessels bound for France, regardless of origin. He observed “the Genoese begin to quake; Tuscany will do the same; and the Dey of Algiers seems the only Power which England fears; but if we are to finish the war with France, we must not be disposed to stop at trifles.”¹³⁸ Stopping ships from a state Britain had a trade treaty with and that had declared its neutrality was a diplomatic problem. Britain could not afford to offend Barbary and lose her trade nor could they afford to have a new conflict open up in the Mediterranean. The issue was further complicated by the fact several of the ships bound for France would have legal passes from the regency. Nelson seemed regretful about those occurrences: “There are several Vessels here loaded with corn for France, and some of them under passports from the Dey of Algiers. However, they must be stopped if met by the Squadron under my orders...”¹³⁹ The pass system, for all its simplicity, was strictly regulated and effective with the British government, consuls, Mediterranean fleet, and the North African Government in question, all having copies of the information. If British ships were to cause trouble for other nation’s passes, it could set a dangerous precedent regarding the protection of their own ships passes. In the end, British fear of reprisal was unfounded. Vice Admiral Hyde Parker reported the Royal Navy intercepted the French trade of corn from Tunis bound for Minorca, whilst continuing friendly relations with Algiers.¹⁴⁰

The command of the British Mediterranean fleet changed again in late 1795. Admiral John Jervis was appointed in August to replace Hotham, whose tenure resulted in little more than two inconclusive engagements against the French. Hotham struck his

¹³⁸ DLN, v. 2, 62. To William Suckling, 27 Jul 1795

¹³⁹ DLN, v. 2, 63, To Admiral Hotham, 28 Jul 1795.

¹⁴⁰ NA ADM 1/393 no. 306 Hyde Parker to Evan Nepean, 26 Nov 1795.

flag in November; Jervis arrived in the Mediterranean and assumed command the following month.¹⁴¹ The British situation had grown precarious. Prussia and Spain signed treaties with France in early 1795 and withdrew from the war.¹⁴² Jervis was expected to continue the blockade of Toulon and prevent supplies from reaching the French forces, all while the Mediterranean fleet lacked basic foodstuffs and medical supplies. Jervis needed not just food, but *fresh* foods such as citrus fruits and onions, to prevent scurvy, which was much more likely to occur on blockade duty.¹⁴³ In an effort to solve the problem, the Duke of Portland issued a circular to all the British consuls in North Africa, ordering them, “to use your utmost endeavours to obtain a free export of corn and grain” from their regency for the benefit of British forces in the Mediterranean and “to give all the protection and assistance in your power to the persons employed in making purchases of those articles.”¹⁴⁴ Securing their own benefit from North Africa was as important to the British war effort as thwarting the French efforts (and they were negotiating for the same privilege at the same time) – an effort made more difficult by the Mediterranean fleet’s lack of small frigates to use as transports.¹⁴⁵

As 1795 ended, the situation in British Corsica became more precarious. Spain’s peace with France, and British intelligence, indicated Spain would soon re-enter the war on France’s side, making the Mediterranean base crucial. Sir Gilbert Elliot, British viceroy in Corsica, had written to the Ottoman Regencies in November to inform them of Corsica’s new status and to ensure Corsican vessels and crew were treated as British subjects. Tripoli had acquiesced, but Algiers and Tunis were a different story as they

¹⁴¹ Gardiner, 88.; Davidson, 52-3.; Denis A Orde, *Nelson’s Mediterranean Command: Concerning Pride, Preferment & Prize Money* (Edinburgh: The Pentland Press, Ltd., 1997), 21.; Robson, 46.

¹⁴² Esdaile, *The French Wars*, 2.

¹⁴³ Davidson, 56, 60-1.; O.A. Sherrard, *A Life of Lord St Vincent* (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1933), 84.; Captain W.V. Anson, *The Life of John Jervis, Admiral Earl St Vincent* (London: John Murray, 1913), 115.; Ian Speller, *Understanding Naval Warfare* (Abingdon, Oxon, UK: Routledge, 2014), 49.; Corbett, *Principles*, 187, 189-90.

¹⁴⁴ NA FO 335/45 Folder 7, Portland to Perkins Magra, 14 Dec 1795.

¹⁴⁵ Davidson, 52-53, 56, 58, 60-61.; Gardiner, 87-88, 94, 118.; Esdaile, *The French Wars*, 2.; Adams, 141.; Plantet, *Algiers*, 454-5: Le directoire exécutif de la République Française a Sidi Hassan,

were the most affected by Corsica's illegal coral fishing operations off their coasts. Elliot believed the Algerine Dey, Sidi Hassan, was using the situation as an excuse to break relations with Britain. Since the British position was weak, Elliot had no choice but to agree to the Dey's demands. Unfortunately, the British consul, Charles Mace, had fallen out with the Dey abandoned his post. Elliot dispatched Frederick North to the regency and he arrived in later December. By the middle of January 1796, North secured an end to hostilities between Corsica and Algiers and the redemption of captives. The Dey also agreed to receive another British consul. The British had a harder time with Tunis. For that mission, Jervis sent Vice Admiral Waldegrave, along with a squadron to "give weight to these negotiations," with Tunis in March. As the Bey knew the amount given to Algiers, Hammuda demanded a higher sum than was offered. The Bey assured Waldegrave, whilst the friendship between Britain and himself remained undiminished, he would regard Tunis as still at war with Corsica. Waldegrave was not authorised to declare war, nor could Britain afford to have a new battlefront open at their rear, leaving Elliot little choice but to authorise the seizure of Tunisian vessels. By May, Tunis was ready to agree to a six months truce, allowing Corsica to import much-needed grain for the remaining few months of the Anglo-Corsican Kingdom.¹⁴⁶ Between the stabilisation of the Barbary following the tumult of the previous years and the necessities of British Corsica, 1796 was the most active of the French Revolutionary war. The number of British ships travelling to and from Barbary ports (and the number of visits they made) were three times what they had been in 1795.¹⁴⁷

The British position worsened as 1796 waned, however. A young general named Napoleon Bonaparte had been appointed commander of the French 'Army of Italy' in

¹⁴⁶ Gregory, *The Ungovernable Rock*, 97-100.; Carrillo, 261.; Playfair, 221-224.; Adams, 142.; Musteen, 16.; NA ADM 1/393 no. 24 Jervis to Nepean, 28 Mar 1796.; Plantet, *Tunis*, 286-7, #556: Devoize au Comte du Salut Public, 271-2., #578 Devoize a Delacroix.; Barnby, 133, 192, 214-5.

¹⁴⁷ See Appendix III: Lloyd's List (p. 265)..

March 1796 and invaded Genoa, Monaco, Nice, Savoy, and Tuscany. In June he successfully seized Leghorn, an important neutral port used by the British and the North African corsairs as well as a major European contact for North African Jewish merchants.¹⁴⁸ The loss of Leghorn put further pressure on the strained victualing situation for the British Royal Navy. Moroccan cruisers seized four British ships and over fifty captives in July – part of Suleiman’s blockade of Salé. The situation in Algiers at least was improving in Mace’s absence. North requested that Nelson, who was blockading Leghorn, grant the American tribute for Algiers safe-passage. Nelson’s acquiescence bought the British goodwill and the ability to purchase fresh cattle cheaply.¹⁴⁹

Unfortunately, that same month, Spain re-joined the war on the side of France with the second Treaty of San Ildefonso. According to the treaty, Spain was to go to war with Britain within a month (Spain waited until October). This meant the end of the Anglo-Corsican Kingdom. Jervis had told the British government the year before that any alliance between the Spanish and French fleets would render Corsica indefensible. The orders to evacuate the island were issued on 31 August 1796. Elliot received them in late September, and with assistance from the British Navy, the island was fully evacuated within a month. The British government actually rescinded those orders, due to perceived French defeats in northern Italy, but they did not reach the Mediterranean until a month after the evacuation. Britain was once more left with no major

¹⁴⁸ Sebag, *Tunis*, 217, 218-9.; Earle, *Pirate Wars*, 52.; Robson, 46.

¹⁴⁹ Gregory, *The Ungovernable Rock*, 144, 166-7, 177.; Gardiner, 118.; Piers Mackesy, *The War in the Mediterranean, 1803-1810* (London: Longman, Green and Co., 1957), 3.; Greene, *Catholic Pirates*, 82, 84.; Galani, 144-5.; Adams, 145.; DLN, v. 2 236, 254-5.; Playfair, 227.; DLN, v. 2, 236: To Admiral Sir John Jervis, K.B., 5 Aug 1796; DLN v. 2, 254-5: To the Right Hon. Sir Gilbert Elliot, 25 Aug 1796.; Cesarini, *Port Jews*, 3, 4, 14, 52.; David Cesarini and Gemma Romain, ed, *Jews and Port Cities, 1590-1990: Commerce, Community, and Cosmopolitanism*. (Middlesex, UK: Valentine Mitchell, 2006), 32, 33-4, 36-7, 42-3.

Mediterranean bases besides Gibraltar.¹⁵⁰ In response, the British shipping to and from Barbary, which had risen so dramatically in 1796, was halved in 1797.¹⁵¹

To make matters worse, the new British consul for Algiers, Richard Masters, had only arrived in late November and “was as little qualified for the task as his predecessor”¹⁵² and, “a very honest, honourable man, but very little qualified for that or any other employment.”¹⁵³ Jervis complained of Masters’ behaviour in December, and expressed concern for his actions and their effect on the British position in that regency, but as the British Navy had withdrawn from the Mediterranean he could send no reinforcements. Meanwhile, the French consul in Tunis had reported, “La nation française à Tunis est beaucoup plus nombreuse, dit-on, qu’elle ne l’a jamais été.”¹⁵⁴ It seemed the French had gained complete ascendancy over the British in the Mediterranean, both in the war and in Barbary.¹⁵⁵

After the disappointments of 1796, there was little reason to expect 1797 to be anything but a struggle. Jervis and the Mediterranean fleet were shut out of that very sea. The British had lost all their bases apart from Gibraltar. French successes continued unabated. Spain had entered the war as a French ally. Yet on 14 February, the British Mediterranean fleet encountered the Spanish fleet off Cape St Vincent. Fifteen ships of the line to twenty-three, the smaller British fleet unquestionably defeated the Spanish, taking four of her ships as prizes whilst the remainder of the Spanish fleet escaped into

¹⁵⁰ Gregory, *The Ungovernable Rock*, 166-7, 177.; Davidson, 53, 67, 75.; Swain, 16-7.; Anson, 131, 147-8.; Carrillo, 271-2, 273-4.; Esdaile, *The French Wars*, 2-3.; Rodger, *Command of the Ocean*, 436.; Holland, 10.; Robson, 47-8.; Wilson, *Empire of the Deep*, 399.; Sugden, v. 1, 665-6. NA ADM 1/ 394 no. 24, Jervis to Nepean, 28 Mar 1796; 112 Robert Man. To Nepean, 27 Jul 1796; NA ADM 1/395 no. 135 Jervis to Nepean 20 Aug 1796, 192 Jervis to Nepean 1 Dec 1796.

¹⁵¹ See Appendix III: Lloyd’s List (p. 265)..

¹⁵² Playfair, 227.

¹⁵³ Letter from Thomas Trigge to Henry BL ADDington, 1 Feb 1804 in Black, *British Diplomats and Diplomacy*, 174-5.

¹⁵⁴ Plantet, *Tunis*, #577, 283: Mémoire pour server d’instruction au Citoyen Beaussier.,

¹⁵⁵ Gregory, *The Ungovernable Rock*, 144, 166-7, 177.; Esdaile, *The French Wars*, 2-3.; Davidson, 53,67. Carrillo, 271-2, 273-4.; Adams, 145.; Rodger, *Command of the Ocean*, 436. NA ADM 1/ 394 no. 24, Jervis to Nepean, 28 Mar 1796; no. 112 Robert Man. To Nepean, 27 Jul 1796; NA ADM 1/395 no. 135 Jervis to Nepean 20 Aug 1796, 192 Jervis to Nepean 1 Dec 1796.; Playfair, 227.; Plantet, *Tunis*, 282-6, #577: Mémoire pour server d’instruction au Citoyen Beaussier.,; Lord, 46.

Cadiz. The victory gave the British enough breathing space to re-enter the Mediterranean, and the purview of the Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean squadron had now grown to include all of Iberia as well. To prevent the Spanish ships from joining the French fleet, Jervis, soon to be made Earl St. Vincent, placed Cadiz under blockade in early April. With the majority of the British fleet on blockade off the Atlantic coast of Spain, the lack of central Mediterranean bases became less crucial as the fleet was closer to Morocco, Gibraltar, and Britain itself for victualling purposes.¹⁵⁶

Beyond changing the situation in the Mediterranean, the Battle of Cape St Vincent re-established the British as a major player in the region and left the Barbary States with a strong desire to stay on Britain's good side. In March, Consul Masters wrote the Duke of Portland that the Dey of Algiers had been angered over reports of a British frigate attacking an Algerine cruisers. Masters reported the Dey's, "first resolution was to declare war against England, and had not Sir John Jervis's important victory reached Algiers about the same time, I believe he would have done so."¹⁵⁷ Instead, the Dey merely wrote to the Admiral for an explanation. The victory at Cape St Vincent had been a reminder of British naval power, causing Algiers to pursue a diplomatic solution rather than a military one. The remainder of 1797 was quiet, though positive, for the British in North Africa. Simon Lucas observed, "...The growing power of this Bashaw must require a little more attention from the different European powers, whose free trade and commerce in the Mediterranean and Levant Seas require their vigilance and protection."¹⁵⁸ Lucas requested an increase in the presents given to the Bashaw, both to remain in competition with the French agents in the regency and to guarantee the

¹⁵⁶ Musteen, 16, 18.; Esdaile, *The French Wars*, 3, 13.; Adams, 153, 158.; Rodger, *Command of the Ocean*, 438-440. Gardiner, 132.; NA FO 3/8 Master to Duke of Portland, 9 Mar 1797.; Arthur Bryant, "Factors underlying British Foreign Policy" *International Affairs* 22, no. 3 (1946), 345.; Knight, *Nelson*, 236-7.; Robson, 51-2, 54.

¹⁵⁷ NA FO 3/8 Master to Duke of Portland, 9 Mar 1797.

¹⁵⁸ NA FO 76/5 Lucas to the Duke of Portland, 9 Apr 1797.

continued protection for British trade in the Eastern Mediterranean. The Bashaw, still increasing his naval power, had nearly doubled his fleet again – by 1798 he had eleven vessels up from 6.¹⁵⁹ Two months later, Jervis praised the agent victualler, Mr Vaughan, at Gibraltar and his success in supplying both the garrison and the Mediterranean fleet with “live cattle in good condition from Tangier upon such moderate terms as would surprise anyone...”¹⁶⁰ Jervis’s praise succinctly demonstrated the effectiveness of the three-way partnership between the agents of the Victualing board, local consuls, and the British military system in the Mediterranean. The British had been building the means to best capitalise on that relationship for much of the eighteenth century and were beginning to reap the benefits.¹⁶¹

The influence the victory at Cape St Vincent had won the British in Algiers wore off by November and the regency again threatened war. Jervis was obliged to dispatch a small squadron to convince the Dey to give up his “extravagant, unjust, and inadmissible demands” for more military supplies and hints of rising export duties, with orders that, should the Dey refuse to comply the squadron would, “punish the injustice and temerity of his Highness by seizing, burning, sinking, or otherwise destroying all ships bearing the Algerine flag; and to block up the ports of his Highness and to cut off all commerce and navigation between them and the ports of other nations.”¹⁶² However such an extreme response proved unnecessary. The commander of that squadron, Captain Thomas Thompson wrote on 20 January 1798:

The Dey...gave us to understand that in February next he should commence hostilities should his demands not be complied with. He is, however, I am by no means convinced, inclined to have recourse to arms, and before quitting here retracted this

¹⁵⁹ Folayan, *Yūsūf Pāshā*, 27.

¹⁶⁰ NA ADM 1/396 no.96, Earl of St Vincent to Evan Nepean, 2 Jun 1797.

¹⁶¹ Esdaile, *The French Wars*, 3.; NA FO 3/8 Master to Duke of Portland, 9 Mar 1797.; Knight, *Sustaining the Fleet*, 31-2.; NA ADM 1/396 no. 96, Earl of St Vincent to Evan Nepean, 2 Jun 1797.; NA FO 76/5 Lucas to the Duke of Portland, 9 Apr 1797.

¹⁶² Davidson, 119-20.

declaration and said he would wait for six months. In short I am persuaded there is nothing which His Highness more wishes to avoid than a rupture with England.¹⁶³

That conclusion was further justified the following month, when Jervis reported a British ship had been wrecked off Algiers' coast but "the assistance given by the Dey of Algiers upon this unfortunate occasion was most humane and friendly and will not be exceeded by any Christian Nation."¹⁶⁴ Algiers was attempting to reassert her power in the Mediterranean and increase her gains from Britain, but not yet willing to go as far as open war.

Elsewhere in Barbary, things were not as encouraging. In Tunis, the Bey expressed his displeasure with the British consul, and Jervis sent a ship to the regency to mediate. Thompson's report stressed the discord was caused by the consul; the Bey stressed his friendship for the British but feared being led to do something drastic about the 'breach of harmony' between himself and the British consul, Magra.¹⁶⁵ Tunis initially protested against Magra remaining in the Regency but the conflict was resolved and Magra remained as British consul until 1804. Britain was able to retain the friendship of both Tunis and Algiers. By May, Jervis was convinced relations in Ottoman North Africa were once more amicable. He told Nelson

...the Dey is extremely well-disposed towards us – the Bey of Tunis...is also perfectly neutral and good-humoured. From the Bashaw of Tripoli, I have every reason to believe any ships of your squadron which touch there will be received in a most friendly manner.¹⁶⁶

They thought they had Tripoli, but unbeknownst to the British, the British withdrawal from the Mediterranean had bolstered the French presence. In 1798, Bonaparte dispatched an emissary named M. Naudé to secure the Bashaw's agreement for using the

¹⁶³ NA ADM 1/397 no. 29, Extract Letter from Captain Thompson, 20 Jan 1798, Earl St Vincent to Evan Nepean, 8 Feb 1798.

¹⁶⁴ NA ADM 1/397 no. 31, Earl St Vincent to Evan Nepean, 9 Feb 1798

¹⁶⁵ NA ADM 1/397 no. 83, Captain Thompson to Earl St Vincent, 17 May 1798.

¹⁶⁶ Jervis to Nelson, 21 May 1798, quoted in John Holland Rose, ed., *A History of Malta During the Period of French and British Occupations, 1798-1815* (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1909), 41.

regency to transport supplies and information between Paris and Cairo ahead of the French invasion of Egypt; The Bashaw agreed to the proposal and renewed the Tripoli-French treaty of 'peace and friendship'. However, Tripoli publically maintained its neutrality and supply trade with the British so Britain remained unaware.¹⁶⁷

In Morocco, Suleiman's remaining political rivals finally submitted to his rule. In February 1798, Suleiman became the uncontested ruler in Morocco after six years of struggle.¹⁶⁸ Yet the British consul, James Matra, sent a distressed letter to Jervis in April, in which he concluded the Emperor was hampering British interests.

I am very sorry to inform Your Lordship that the Emperor has stopped the export of sheep and bullocks – other articles are left as usual. The orders are general for all nations, but certainly meant against us, because it is well known that we are almost the only shippers of cattle.¹⁶⁹

As unfortunate as the sudden lack of livestock from Morocco was, it is doubtful the Emperor was targeting Britain. It was unlikely the order was given expressly to hurt the British, but rather, hurting the British, as the chief exporter of livestock, was a side effect of the order. The reality was 1798 ushered in a three-year period of intense distress in Morocco. A major locust invasion, coupled with a severe drought had hit the state and would last the entire year and the weakened population would then be ravaged by a two-year outbreak of plague in 1799. The restriction on exporting cattle and sheep was more likely a response to that crisis than Suleiman trying to punish Britain specifically.¹⁷⁰

Things accelerated in the spring when the focus of the French war effort moved back into the Mediterranean. Intelligence suggested the French army, then on the move, was somewhere in the Levant. Nelson was dispatched with a small squadron to hunt them down. The French forces conquered Malta, expelling the Knights of Malta and freeing their Muslim slaves. The reasons behind Naudé's mission had become clear. The

¹⁶⁷ Dearden, 144-5.

¹⁶⁸ Macdonald, *Victualling Board*, 69.

¹⁶⁹ NA ADM 1/397 no. 69 James Matra to Earl St Vincent, 19 Apr 1798.

¹⁷⁰ El Mansour, 97-8.; 36-7.

French forces proceeded to Egypt, where the British, fearing they meant to launch an overland attack on India, would fight in the battle of Aboukir Bay on 1 August.¹⁷¹

The British spent the initial years of the French Revolutionary War trying to overcome French dominance, both in terms of diplomacy and trade, in North Africa. Early French victories coupled with the turmoil that most of the Barbary States experienced as the war began, led to an initial decrease in British shipping to and from Barbary.




Figure 1: British Shipping to/from Barbary, 1792-1797

The exception was in 1796, as Figure 1 shows. The massive spike in both the number of ships and the number of journeys those ships made to the region corresponds with efforts to supply British-held Corsica as Britain consuls in North Africa worked to grant recognition of British protection to the island. Even though the Anglo-Corsican kingdom fell in late 1796, the increase in trade demonstrated the success of the British diplomatic efforts to supply the island and maintain their trade with Barbary during the early years of the war.

¹⁷¹ Davidson, 130, 140.; Dearden 144-5.; Esdaile, *The French Wars*, 15.; Rodger, 457-460.; Goodwin, 49.; Clissold, 153-4.; Merouche, *La course*, 317.; Naylor, 133.; Robson, 55.

CHAPTER THREE: 1798-1801

The French invasion of Egypt had far more lasting positive effects on the British position in the French Revolutionary War than their victory at Cape St Vincent. Though the 1797 victory had allowed the British to regain a position in the Mediterranean beyond Gibraltar, the invasion of Egypt, and the Battle of the Nile that followed re-established the British as a power player in that sea. When Nelson sighted the French fleet at anchor in Egypt, he ordered an immediate attack, surprising the French. The British overwhelmingly defeated the unprepared French. French Rear-Admiral Villeneuve, himself a former Knight of Malta, managed to escape with two ships of the line and two frigates but the rest were taken or sunk. News of the victory took much longer to reach Europe than the news the French had landed in Egypt, which raised British fears over India. When the victory was known, it encouraged renewed efforts against the French and a Second Coalition was formed – this time with the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Porte had historically been closer to France than Britain, dating to the signing of the Capitulations in the early sixteenth century, but the invasion of Egypt could not be ignored. The Battle of the Nile was a major turning point for the British in the Mediterranean as it began the process of undoing French dominance, both in the Mediterranean as a whole and in Barbary in particular.¹⁷²

Nelson's victory allowed the British control of the Mediterranean as the French Fleet was (temporarily) destroyed and the French army stranded in Egypt. But the victory had its costs; Nelson's fleet badly needed repair. Though they had not *lost* any ships, the British fleet was heavily damaged and at the opposite end of the Mediterranean from Gibraltar – Britain's nearest naval base. Nelson directed five ships (and six prizes),

¹⁷² Rodger, *Command of the Ocean*, 459-61.; Esdaile, *The French Wars*, 15-6.; Panzac, *Barbary Corsairs*, 74.; Hourani, 265.; Black, *British Foreign Policy*, 45.; Denis Orde, *In the Shadow of Nelson – The Life of Admiral Lord Collingwood* (Barnsley, South Yorkshire: Pen & Sword, 2008), 169.; Robson, 56, 62.

to Gibraltar for repairs before they returned to Jervis's main fleet off Cadiz. Using Naples as a temporary base, Nelson imposed a blockade on French-controlled Alexandria to prevent the French army from escaping or being supplied. Nelson placed Malta, captured by the French in June, under blockade in September and the British succeeded in capturing Minorca in November. (Britain had previously gained the island as part of the peace process after the War of Spanish Succession but lost it as part of the peace process after the War of American Independence). Within four months the landscape of the entire Mediterranean had changed in favour of the British.¹⁷³

In Algiers, things likewise turned in favour of the British. Relations remained tense between the British consul, Richard Masters, and the Dey, Sidi Hassan, following the arrival of a British squadron off Algiers. Though Captain Thompson did not think the Dey actually wanted a war, the disagreement reached such a level that Masters' felt his only remaining option was to leave the regency in protest. The Dey declared he would wait six months for the British response before he would declare war but before then Sidi Hassan died from an infection. His nephew and *khaznadji*, Mustapha, was chosen as the new Dey, "without any effusion of blood."¹⁷⁴ Mustapha owed his election in part to Naphtali ben Moses Busnach, a prominent Jewish merchant in Algiers and half of the merchant house Bacri and Busnach. The new Dey subsequently made Busnach head of the Treasury. Masters reported Mustapha was favourably inclined towards the English, and wished to repair the breach that had occurred under his predecessor:

I have this day received a letter...containing the following information,
'That on the 18th May the new Dey in Council with the Haznagee and Aga sent for him and desired he would write to me immediately in their name and that of the Regency to assure His Britannic Majesty of their particular wish and desire to continue in peace and friendship with England, and that upon the arrival of the Consul every thing would be settled to his satisfaction. The new

¹⁷³ John Sugden, *Nelson: The Sword of Albion*, v. 2 (London: Jonathan Cape, 2012), 105, 107, 115, 117-8, 123.; Plantet, *Algiers*, 488-9.; Rodger, *Command of the Ocean*, 462.; Gregory, *Minorca*, 196-7, 214.; Davidson, 127.; Knight, *Nelson*, 297.; Robson, 62, 65.; Branão, 54.

¹⁷⁴ NA FO 3/8 Consul Masters to Duke of Portland, 24 Jun 1798.; Valensi, xvi.;

Dey has given directions to the different Beys to stop all exportation of Cattle and Corn excepting to the English.¹⁷⁵

This attitude, so clearly in favour of the British, coupled with the success in Egypt and the capture of Minorca pointed to a change in the direction of the war in the Mediterranean. Only two years before the British were forced out of the Mediterranean by the French-Spanish alliance. Now, in six months, they had defeated the French navy, captured one strategically important island (Minorca) whilst blockading another (Malta). The allies who had fled came back in force. The Ottoman Empire declared war on the new Republic – and more importantly – issued a *firman* ordering Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli to do likewise. In December 1798, George Elphinstone, Admiral and Lord Keith, arrived in the Mediterranean and assumed command of the Mediterranean Fleet in June. Overall, Bonaparte's failed invasion of Egypt provided the diplomatic and military justification for Britain to renew the war effort against France –in the Mediterranean.¹⁷⁶

Tripoli, where the Bashaw had been secretly working with the French before the invasion of Egypt, was reluctant to declare war on France. When the *firman* arrived, the Bashaw made a token show of compliance by placing all French subjects in prison, but immediately released them once the Ottoman messenger departed. In protest, Lucas, the British consul, struck his flag and withdrew to Naples.¹⁷⁷ The Bashaw certainly did not want England for an enemy, but he did not want to alienate France either. To ensure Tripoli followed through on the Ottoman demands, Nelson dispatched Captain Hardy to the regency. After Hardy's departure, Tripoli continued to do as it pleased. In March of 1799, Lucas reported the Bashaw had struck the French flag, and expelled their consul,

¹⁷⁵ NA FO 3/8 Consul Masters to Duke of Portland, 23 Jul 1798.

¹⁷⁶ Rodger, *Command of the Ocean*, 462-3.; Plantet, *Algiers*, II, 488.; KP, xi.; Alexander Allardyce, *Memoir of the Honourable George Keith Elphinstone, K.B.: Viscount Keith, Admiral of the Red* (Edinburgh: Blackwood and Sons, 1882), 153, 178.; Davidson, 127, 140. Esdaile, *The French Wars*, 15-6, 20.; Merouche, *La course*, 317.; Panzac, *Barbary Corsairs*, 74-5, 235.; Weiss, *Captives and Corsairs*, 125-6.

¹⁷⁷ Dearden, 145.

only to shortly afterwards conclude a new peace treaty with France, including the right to export supplies from Tripoli. Reports from Tunis and intercepted French letters to Malta backed up Lucas's story. The Bashaw's subjects took offense at "the partiality shewn to the Enemies of the Grand Signior...his Excellency has been driven to the extremity of cutting off some heads..."¹⁷⁸ For a ruler who had alienated his family and seized power through a series of coups, Yusuf knew he was particularly prone to public opinion – which would side with the caliph and Ottoman Empire over the French. Nelson sent a small squadron under the command of Commodore Campbell to Tripoli, along with a letter for the Bashaw. In it, Nelson reminded the Bashaw of both Nelson's personal successes against the French as well as the British alliance with the Ottoman Empire:

I beg leave also to acquaint your Highness, that the French in Malta pretend that your subjects will supply them with provisions: this I believe to be equally false with the other reports. As the subject of a Sovereign who is in the closest alliance with the Sublime Porte for the defense of the Ottoman Empire, and being also in alliance with your Highness, I shall anxiously await your Highness's answer; for, should evil councilors have abused the goodness of your heart, I beg leave, with all respect, to offer the Victor of the Nile as a mediator between your Highness and the Sublime Porte: for it will be my duty to join with the Admiral of the Ottoman Fleet in chastising those enemies of the True Faith and of the Grand Signior...¹⁷⁹

Nelson gave the Bashaw a way out (or equally, enough rope to hang himself) by allowing Karamanli to place the blame on lying subjects and "evil councillors." His not-so-subtle reference to himself as the 'Victor of the Nile' and to his 'duty' to help the Ottoman Navy to 'chastise' their enemies would all have been intended to, as politely and diplomatically as possible, remind Tripoli of the disparity in strength between the British Navy and the regency (as well as a reminder of who had recently won in the contest between the French and the British).¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁸ NA ADM 1/399 no. 94, Lucas to Nelson, 5 Mar 1799.

¹⁷⁹ DLN, v. 3, p. 300: To His Highness the Bey of Tripoli, 20 Mar 1799.

¹⁸⁰ Dearden, 145-7.; NA ADM 1/399 no. 94, Lucas to Nelson, 5 Mar 1799.

When Campbell arrived in Tripoli, he sent Nelson's letter to the Bashaw through Bryan McDonough, acting vice-consul while Lucas was in Naples. The Bashaw's response seemed evasive. When the squadron returned from a brief trip to Tunis to find nothing changed, the British opened fire, hit Tripoli's flagship and ran it ashore (Lyle, captain of the Regency's flagship, was captured in the attack). The Bashaw capitulated to British demands, worried by the damage to his growing navy. The French, including their consul, were removed to the French squadron and dispatched to Genoa. An additional truce with Portugal, Britain's principal ally, was concluded with Tripoli. Lyle, his crew, and the captured ships were released. Lucas returned to Tripoli and confirmed in July the regency had declared war on France.¹⁸¹

Unlike Tripoli, Tunis did not require the use of force. The French consul, Jacques-Philippe Devoize, was informed in early 1799 that France was an enemy of the regency, and he and the rest of the French populace were sequestered in the French quarter. Devoize initially reassured the French government things were not as bad as they seemed due to the Bey having used 'extreme prudence of language,' but the capture of a French warship soon proved Tunis, at least, took the *firman* seriously.¹⁸² Algiers declared war shortly after Tunis, though it was apparent to the British Naval officers in the area it was only done out of deference to the Ottoman Porte and not by their own desire.¹⁸³

Complicating matters in Algiers was the continued absence of the British consul, Richard Masters. He did not return to Algiers until late March.¹⁸⁴ His absence was creating problems, such as a lack of supplies being procured for the British forces in the Mediterranean or Gibraltar privateers abusing their passports.¹⁸⁵ Such abuses by

¹⁸¹ Dearden, 147-9.; NA FO 76/5 Lucas to Duke of Portland, 4 Jul 1799.; Swain, *Struggle for Control*, 32.

¹⁸² Moalla, 59-60.; Plantet, *Tunis*, v.3, 373, 390, 395, 400.; Cambon, *Tunis*, 83, 84.; Windler, *La Diplomatie*, 46.

¹⁸³ NA ADM 1/399 no. 44, Captain George Hope to Earl St Vincent, 6 Mar 1799.; Playfair, 229.

¹⁸⁴ NA ADM 1/399 no. 58, Earl St Vincent to Evan Nepean, 17 Mar 1799.

¹⁸⁵ NA ADM 1/399 no. 68, Earl St Vincent to Evan Nepean, 24 Mar 1799.

privateers under British protection had the potential to undermine the British treaties with the various Barbary powers. How could the British consuls put pressure on the governments of the North African Barbary States to uphold their end of the treaties regarding *their* corsairs if the British could not control their own privateers? Nelson complained to the British consul at Tunis, Perkins Magra, about the necessity of having the passports respected. It was a diplomatic and military issue, but also one of public relations. Nelson was aware of the necessity of the British being seen to be on the moral side of the conflict, as well as the importance of military power.

Morocco was outside Ottoman control so the *firman* directing Ottoman regencies to declare war against France did not apply. The French influence in that state was also less than elsewhere on the North African coast. Morocco was Britain's strongest and most consistent partner in the region. After the locust invasion the previous year, conditions appeared to be returning to normal. British squadrons called on Moroccan ports for supplies and water. Unfortunately, the damage wrought by the locust invasion paved the way for a catastrophic health crisis in the form of plague, the worst recorded since the fourteenth century. Spreading from rural, western Algiers, the pestilence took hold in an already weakened and impoverished Moroccan countryside. It was at its worst from April to July, with reports in Fes ranging from 1,000 to 2,500 deaths a day. Over the summer it abated somewhat but reappeared in southern Morocco in the autumn. Over the winter and the following spring, it spread northwards toward Tetuan, partly due to the highly religious Emperor Suleiman refusing to enforce the European consuls' recommendations for quarantine, citing it as a challenge to God's will. By the time the plague rescinded in late 1800, one quarter to one half of the population of Morocco had died, with heavier casualties occurring in urban areas.¹⁸⁶

¹⁸⁶ Brown, 73.; El Mansour, 97-8.; 36-7.;

The plague of 1799-1800 also had a profound socio-political impact. After three years of turmoil, Morocco then entered a period of agricultural and population boom. It cemented Suleiman's claim to the throne, as the last of his challengers died. The government went through a shake-up; officials died and were replaced. The most important of these new appointments was Muhammad Ibn 'Abd al-Salam al-Salawi. He was a black slave brought up in the court of Meknes. In 1797 he had been appointed governor of Tangier, working with European consuls. Following the death of the previous chief minister during the pestilence, al-Salawi was raised to the position, entrusted with the royal seal, and from then on, in charge of dealing with Morocco's foreign affairs and go-between for the European consuls and the Sultan. He was an able and competent minister, and, most importantly, favoured the British.¹⁸⁷

Late 1799 saw the British navy was using its relationship with the Barbary States to the utmost advantage, helped by the three Ottoman regencies technically being at war with France. In June, Keith officially replaced Jervis as the commander-in-chief.¹⁸⁸ That same month, a circular was sent from Whitehall directing the North African consuls to cooperate fully with the British military forces in the region and extend every effort in supplying them. Perhaps feeling a lingering nervousness after his brush with Nelson earlier in the year, the Bashaw of Tripoli was concerned Nelson had not called on the regency or shown 'greater friendship'. Nelson explained he "had not the smallest cause for complaint" with Tripoli but his other duties kept him away:

I am now pressing Malta very hard, and it shall soon surrender. Your Highness will not now think I have either been neglectful of your friendship or idle.¹⁸⁹

¹⁸⁷ Davidson, 152.; El Mansour, 18, 20-1, 36-7, 98-100, 114.; G.L. Newnham Collingwood, *A Selection from the Public and Private Correspondence of Vice-Admiral Lord Collingwood Interspersed with Memoirs of His Life*. v. 1, 3rd ed., (London: James Ridgeway, 1823), 169. [Hereafter NCCC]; Brown, 181

¹⁸⁸ Kevin D McCranie, *Admiral Lord Keith and the Naval War against Napoleon* (Gainesville: University of Florida, 2006), 2.

¹⁸⁹ DLN, v. 4, 13, To his Highness the Bashaw of Tripoli, 13 Sept 1799.; DLN, v. 4, 14, to B. M'Donough, Esq., Consul at Tripoli, 13 Sept 1799

The blockade of Malta was a crucial undertaking for the British in the Mediterranean; if successful, the island would be a much-needed central base. As long as Tripoli behaved, Nelson had little reason to micromanage the Regency.¹⁹⁰

Unfortunately in Algiers, the string of ineffective consuls continued. Masters received instructions for provisioning the fleet in July, but shortly left Algiers permanently, having been appointed Governor of Tobago. The Duke of Portland, following the common practice at the time, chose Masters' former secretary, John Falcon, as the new consul. Unfortunately, the regency already disliked Falcon and protested his appointment making "repeated representations that [Falcon] had rendered himself obnoxious during his residence with Mr Masters."¹⁹¹ Keith pressured Algiers to accept Falcon despite their complaints. Falcon renewed the treaty between Britain and Algiers from afar (he would not arrive until the next year) but was thrust into a diplomatic dispute between Nelson and the regency regarding British passports. The Algerines were capturing Maltese and Neapolitan vessels granted safe passage by the British. They were carrying provisions and supplies for the British blockading Malta, but the Regency was disinclined to acknowledge their historic enemies as anything but fair game.¹⁹²

Nelson's frustration with the entire affair is evident in his letters on the subject. To Admiral Duckworth he expressed his desire to "get as large a force as possible off Algiers" but lamented, "how little support I shall experience."¹⁹³ To Earl Spencer, Nelson complained, "it has been impossible to make them [Algiers] fear us as they

¹⁹⁰ Perrin, xi.; Davidson, 140. Irons, 136.; NA FO 95, no. 1 15 Jun 1799.; DLN, v. 4, 13, To his Highness the Bashaw of Tripoli, 13 Sept, 1799.; DLN, v.4, 14, to B. M'Donough, Esq., Consul at Tripoli, 13 Sept 1799.; Anson, 253.

¹⁹¹ Playfair, *Scourge of Christendom*, 239.

¹⁹² NA ADM 1/400 no. 177, Keith to Nepean, 24 Jul 1799.; Playfair, 229-30.; DLN, v. 4, 113, To Rear-Admiral Duckworth, 27 Nov 1799.; DLN, v. 4, 119-21, To the Right Honourable Earl Spencer, K.G., 29 Nov 1799.; Black, *British Diplomats*, 174-5.

¹⁹³ DLN, v. 4, 113, To Rear-Admiral Duckworth, 27 Nov 1799.

ought” and that “under all circumstances the Barbary States ought to be made sensible of the attention which is due to the signature of an English Admiral.”¹⁹⁴ Nelson repeated his desire to use force in his letter to Spencer, arguing:

Terror is the only weapon to wield against these people. To talk kindly to them is only to encourage them. Demand nothing that is not just, and never recede, and settle the whole in half-an-hour.¹⁹⁵

The idea one concerted effort would make quick work of eliminating the Barbary threat is rife throughout military and political descriptions of North Africa during this time, and continues to appear in more modern works on Barbary.¹⁹⁶

Despite his frustration and desire to solve the issue with force, Nelson was clearly aware of the position held by Barbary in British foreign policy. Within his letters were two apt observations that encapsulated Britain’s relationship with the region and demonstrated a shrewd understanding of his role in that relationship – however little he may have liked it. In his letter to Earl Spencer on 29 November 1799, Nelson wrote if he found the Dey of Algiers “insolent,” he would, “show him in the moment that he cannot go robbing in the Mediterranean without the consent of Britain.”¹⁹⁷ Britain was happy to tolerate, and occasionally encourage, the Barbary corsairs to continue their 300-year tradition of ‘robbing’ because it was to their benefit. By long standing treaties, British ships and subjects were free from attack or capture by Algiers or the other North African States. The Barbary States were a threat to others. The British could pay the demanded price and buy the corsairs’ favour and good graces where their smaller competitors could not, thereby forcing those states’ shipping and trade into British ships or risk capture and loss. Once it ceased to be to the benefit of Britain, or if the Barbary States did not hold up their end of the treaties, the British Navy was ready to enforce said treaties or punish

¹⁹⁴ DLN, v. 4, 119-20, To the Right Honourable Earl Spencer, K.G., 29 Nov 1799.

¹⁹⁵ DLN, v. 4, 121, To the Right Honourable Earl Spencer, K.G., 29 Nov 1799.

¹⁹⁶ Playfair, 287.; Jamieson, 111.; Perkins, *Gunfire in Algiers*, 32.; Thomas, 107-8, among others.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid.

the North African states as British policy dictated. Having just gained the upper hand in the Mediterranean, the British could not afford to have a new conflict open up in North Africa while trying to contain the French in both Egypt and Europe. That did not mean, however, the threat of such an attack was not used all the same.

A few days after his letter to Spencer, Nelson wrote to William Wyndham, the British ambassador to Tuscany:

...my blood boils that I cannot chastise these Pirates. They could not show themselves in the Mediterranean, did not our Country permit. Never let us talk of the cruelty of the African Slave trade, while we permit such a horrid war...¹⁹⁸

This quote is used frequently in modern works attempting to compare the trans-Atlantic slave trade with Barbary, to show European ‘disgust’ with the actions of North Africa, through the eyes of one as esteemed as Nelson.¹⁹⁹ While there was certainly discomfort and may have been disgust, removing this quote from its specific historical context (Nelson’s frustration with the ongoing diplomatic issue regarding the safe passage of non-British ships and the respect for his authority) makes it appear as if it is a declaration of some great truth, as opposed to a frustrated complaint about a work issue. Further, Nelson did not stop there. He continued, saying:

...But on the other hand, was I present with the Fleet of England, I could not prevent it, without plunging our Country in a war which our Merchants would reprobate, and Ministers not support me in.²⁰⁰

Nelson may have been disgusted with the actions of North Africa, but the British Government, and the merchants who supported (and funded) it, were not. Peace and commercial treaties with Barbary were good business and very much a part of Britain’s diplomatic strategy since the late seventeenth century. The region’s importance to British

¹⁹⁸ DLN, v. 4, 125, To His Excellency the Honourable William Wyndham, 2 Dec 1799.

¹⁹⁹ Such as: Stephen Taylor, *Commander: The Life and Exploits of Britain’s Greatest Frigate Captain* (London: Faber and Faber, 2013), 239.; Tom Pocock, *Breaking the Chains: The Royal Navy’s War on White Slavery* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2006), 8.; Jamieson, 197-8.; Roger Perkins and Captain KJ Douglas-Morris, RN., *Gunfire in Barbary: Admiral Lord Exmouth’s battle with the Corsairs of Algiers in 1816 – the story of the suppression of white Christian slavery* (Hampshire: Kenneth Mason, 1982), 35-6.

²⁰⁰ DLN, v. 4, 125, To His Excellency the Honourable William Wyndham, 2 Dec 1799.

strategy only increased during the French Revolutionary War; North Africa helped alleviate the over-stressed victualing apparatus based in London, troubled by periodic crop failures in Britain. Britain needed North Africa and was not about to lose that assistance or start a new war over, in this particular instance, sixty-five captured men (none of whom were actually British).²⁰¹ Nelson may have been frustrated and angry at the actions of Algiers, but he was fully aware of the importance placed on the Regency by his government back home and his own fleet's reliance.

The situation in Algiers did not escalate to a point where Nelson needed to 'chastise' the regency, but things remained tense. In mid-December, the new consul, Falcon, wrote that he had learned of the capture of another Maltese vessel bearing Nelson's pass and flying the British colours and which the Dey refused to return. Falcon believed it would throw the Dey's own claim regarding an Algerine vessel bearing the Dey's pass (condemned at Gibraltar) into question.²⁰² Three days later, Nelson wrote the Dey himself, both to alert him an Ottoman official bearing dispatches for the Dey was travelling to the Regency in a British ship and address the recent vessels captured by Algiers. He argued for their return as:

...these Vessels having certificates were not carrying merchandize (for to such I never gave certificates), but provisions, for those who were fighting against the common Enemy. You might as well have taken their arms as their bread.²⁰³

This type of argument, appealing to both the Dey's humanity ('you might as well have taken their bread') and justifying the legality and correctness of Nelson's actions ('these vessels...were not carrying merchandize (for to such I never gave certificates) but provisions...') demonstrated Nelson's understanding of how the diplomatic game in Algiers needed to be played. Despite privately advocating blowing the Regency out of

²⁰¹ DLN, v. 4, 120, To the Right Honourable Earl Spencer, K.G., 29 Nov 1799.

²⁰² NA FO 3/8 Falcon to Portland, 15 Dec 1799.

²⁰³ DLN, v. 4, 146-7, To His Highness the Dey of Algiers, 18 Dec 1799.

the water less than a month ago, Nelson officially opted to take the moral, legal, and diplomatic high ground.

Compared to Nelson's response to Algiers, Tunis received a far different reaction. Britain organised the negotiations that would lead to a truce between Tunis and Portugal (and with Sardinia and Sicily).²⁰⁴ The Portuguese-Tunisian treaty in particular, was long overdue after the previous failure in 1794; the truce of 1799 would last three years.²⁰⁵ The French minister, Tallyrand, wrote Devoize that these treaties were to provide security to those states assisting the British in blockading French-occupied Malta. He concluded with the disgruntled, "Je reconnais là l'influence des Anglais."²⁰⁶ French domination of Barbary was no more. In the 1780s, the port of Marseilles alone dominated Tunisian exports and an average of 150 ships per year were travelling between there and North Africa. By 1799, the average number of ships travelling from Barbary to Marseilles was a meagre 28 per year.²⁰⁷ Britain was not yet dominant, having seen her own trade take a harsh hit following the abandonment of the Mediterranean at the end of 1796, but France was no longer the dominant foreign power in the region.

The new treaties and Britain's history of friendship with Tunis were not enough to prevent problems from arising however. Tunis, like Algiers, was taking vessels that had passes, yet Nelson's letter to Hammuda far more conciliatory than any he sent to Algiers:

I cannot permit an English Cutter to go even into the Bay of Tunis, without expressing to your Highness my most sincere respect, which, on all occasions, I shall feel happy in showing, not only as an obedience to the great King, my Master, but also from my own inclination... Your Highness well knows that not one Portuguese ship has been cruising on your Coast. This is such a mark of my attention as no time can efface from your Highness's head. The number of Vessels taken, having certificates from me, and the English Commander of Malta, that they were actually employed in carrying provisions for those who

²⁰⁴ Moalla, 62.; Irons, 154.;

²⁰⁵ Irons, 154-5.

²⁰⁶ Plantet, *Tunis*, v. 3, 398: no. 740, Devoize a Hammuda, Bey de Tunis, 21 Aug 1799.

²⁰⁷ Panzac, 73

were fighting against the common Enemy, I own, hurt me. To a mere trader, I never have, nor ever will give a certificate; but as people cannot fight without food...I trust that you will order their restoration, and, in particular the poor people carried into slavery. This will be considered as a great act of friendship and esteem shown by your Highness to your most faithful and attached...²⁰⁸

In Algiers, there were threats and stern, unmoving facts. Tunis received appeals to ethos and fairness. There were no hints of violence against Tunis. Nelson framed the entire argument in terms of Britain's and his own friendship with the regency. He wrote of how he had extended every effort to protect Tunis and how the seizure of vessels bearing his passes hurt him. Nelson reiterated his refusal to grant passes to merchants but used far friendlier language than in Algiers. The restitution of the vessels and freeing of the slaves were presented as a balm to a wound, a mark of friendship and humanity – not as demanded and required.

In a subsequent letter, Nelson restated his role in protecting the regency from the Portuguese prior to their truce and that the passes were only for ships carrying food. Only then, does Nelson even hint at violence:

Your Highness is also well aware that I have never suffered the Portuguese Squadron, since they have been under my command, to approach your Coast, *which I might have done*, if it was not out of respect to your Highness, being the Ally of my Royal Master.²⁰⁹

However, still differing from Algiers, this allusion referenced salvation from *past* violence (and hence gratitude should be shown), not a threat of future violence (leading to fear and submission). A large part of the difference in the British strategy pursued in the neighboring regencies was due to their political situation. Algiers had a stable government but no ruler stability – the government structure itself was not questioned but those in power had a decidedly limited life span. In the seven years since the outbreak of war, Algiers had had two rulers and four consuls. Tunis, on the other hand,

²⁰⁸ DLN, v. 4, 111-2, To His Highness the Bey of Tunis, 26 Nov 1799.

²⁰⁹ DLN, v. 4, 161, To His Highness the Bey of Tunis, 23 Dec, 1799. Emphasis mine.

was a stable dynasty, with only one ruler (Hammuda Pasha) and consul (Major Perkins Magra) since 1792. Furthermore, Magra was generally good at his job: effective, efficient, and commanding the respect of both the government he served and the one of which he was a resident – an opinion Nelson shared. In the midst of resolving the two different pass-related crises in Barbary, Nelson wrote Lord Grenville of Magra's value as a consul:

I cannot let this opportunity slip of recommending this gentleman [the British consul at Corfu] to your Lordship's notice; and as I am on this subject, give me leave to recommend another Consul to the notice of Government, Major Magra, residing at Tunis. It is strict justice only in me to say that these two Consuls are the only ones I have found in the Mediterranean who have really attended to their duty.²¹⁰

Nelson's praise of Magra stands in stark contrast to Falcon's inauspicious appointment in Algiers. The Regency had protested Falcon's appointment before he had even arrived, based on his 'obnoxious' behaviour the last time he had been in Algiers and as 1799 drew to a close, he was *still* not actually in the regency.

In Tripoli, where the British Royal Navy had actually used force, Nelson's preoccupation with the blockade of Malta and the situations in Algiers and Tunis had left the Bashaw nervous. With Bonaparte's abandonment of his siege at Acre and return to France over the summer, French influence would have looked less attractive to the Bashaw as the Mediterranean looked increasingly British. Bonaparte, preparing for his November coup of the Directory, was not going to trouble himself with Tripoli.²¹¹ The Bashaw indicated his concerns to McDonough, still acting as consul, in late summer, who passed them on to Nelson.²¹² Nelson explained:

He [the Bashaw] is right that if he had behaved ill, I would have brought the whole Squadron to Tripoli; but as His Highness is come to a proper way of

²¹⁰ DLN, v. 4, 117, To the Right Honourable Lord Grenville, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 28 Nov 1799.

²¹¹ Roger Knight, *Britain Against Napoleon: The Organization of Victory, 1793-1815* (London: John Allen, 2013), 524.; Esdaile, *The French Wars*, 16.

²¹² DLN, v. 4, 13, To his Highness the Bashaw of Tripoli, 13 Sept 1799.

thinking, I have sent nothing. You will explain this, that I had not the smallest cause for complaint.²¹³

Nelson also informed McDonough that Simon Lucas was returning to Tripoli to resume his post, which would further alleviate the tensions.²¹⁴ In one of Lucas's first letters after his return, he wrote that the Bashaw, "...will be always happy to render every service and assistance in his power throughout his dominions to the English nation whenever they apply for any necessary they may want, as far as his Country can supply..." and noted, like in Tunis, a new Peace treaty between Portugal and Tripoli had been concluded. McDonough had assisted the Portuguese, and that kingdom designated McDonough to act as Portuguese consul.²¹⁵

The start of the new century saw both Britain and the North African States concerned about one very crucial thing: grain. Britain, which even before the start of the war could not grow enough grain to feed itself, was once again in a grain shortage. The wet summer in England had resulted in a poor harvest, price hikes, and bread riots. Even worse, the crisis in 1800 coincided with a period of increased demand for fresh food by the British armed forces, both in Europe and the Mediterranean.²¹⁶ Evan Nepean, Secretary to Board of Admiralty, directed Keith:

It has been judged expedient by Parliament in consequence of the present very high price of corn in this country to give bounties for the eventual encouragement of persons to import on their own account supplies of that article from the Mediterranean, as well as from other parts of the world; and in order to facilitate such importations from the Mediterranean the Lords Commissioners of HM Treasury have directed that as many transports as are then in the pay of Government which can be spared from the public service shall be discharged in order to their taking freights of corn to Great Britain: I have therefore the command of My Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to acquaint you therewith, and to signify to their direction to you to grant such convoys from time to time to the said ships of such others, whether British or Neutral, as shall be

²¹³ DLN, v. 4, 14, To B. M'Donough. Esq., Consul at Tripoli, 13 Sept 1799.

²¹⁴ Ibid.; DLN, v. 4, 17, To His Excellency, Rear-Admiral the Marquis de Niza, 13 Sept 1799.

²¹⁵ NA FO 76/5 Lucas to the Duke of Portland, 12 Jan 1800.

Consuls of one nation acting as the consul for another (allied) nation were not uncommon. McDonough remained the British vice-consul.

²¹⁶ Knight, *Britain Against Napoleon*, 157-9.; Morriss, 21, 275.

engaged for a homeward bound passage with wheat, as you may be able to spare consistently with a due attention to other important services committed to your care.²¹⁷

Nepean's letter demonstrated the necessity of neutral nations and the reliance Britain placed on them as part of the war effort in the Mediterranean. The British Royal Navy was putting the final pressure on French-occupied Malta and maintaining the regular convoys from Britain for the Levant Company as well as the normal duties of war. Neutral ships were necessary to carry on the trade that funded and fed the British war effort.

Nepean was aware of these difficulties and careful to stress any assistance in this matter was not to come at the expense of the war itself. He continued:

...you will regulate convoys according to their arrangement as far as you shall find it consistent with the public service to do so. It is understood that their attention will be directed among other places to the ports of Palermo and Girgente in the island of Sicily, and to Tunis, where it is expected considerable quantities may be procured; and if that expectation is not disappointed very little arrangement will be necessary in respect to said convoys, as from their locality, our convoy will only be necessary for the three ports when a sufficient number of ships shall be ready.²¹⁸

Keith was not to waste resources on small shipments. Neither was he to worry about protecting agents roaming freely around the Mediterranean – they were to focus on those areas the British Government thought most likely to be able to purchase ‘considerable quantities’ – like Barbary. Ahead of the expected grain shortage, the Duke of Portland had written Magra, asking for a report on the current and projected prices of grain (especially wheat) in the regency.²¹⁹ Two months later, Portland followed up by requiring Magra to “employ all your influence to induce the Bey of Tunis to encourage the exportation of Grain from that Country to Great Britain and Ireland.”²²⁰ Tunis was

²¹⁷ KP, 77-8: “21. Secretary of Admiralty to Keith 20 Mar 1800.

²¹⁸ Ibid.

²¹⁹ NA FO 335/45, Folder 8, Portland to Magra, 23 Dec 1799.

²²⁰ NA FO 335/45, Folder 8, Portland to Magra, 28 Feb 1800.

not just feeding the British military forces in the Mediterranean; the small regency was being relied upon to feed Britain itself.

On 13 March, Whitehall also issued a circular to the Barbary States, about the availability of grain.²²¹ The various consuls promised to look into the matter, but Morocco was still gripped by the plague that prevented her assisting in this matter, which was a cause for concern (especially considering Morocco's consistent assistance in such matters and proximity to Gibraltar).²²² Luckily, the plague abated by the end of summer and Morocco resumed supplying the British.²²³ Not only were the Barbary States a crucial part of the diplomatic strategy in the Mediterranean as a neutral power to play off of French interests but they helped feed both Britain and Ireland *while* still supplying the British military in the Mediterranean.

Algiers was still without a consul. Falcon had only reached Minorca by January 1800. Yet, despite having no current or local knowledge of the situation, the missing consul was advocating that Nelson send "a small ship of war" to complain about the Dey's 'aggression' and reticence in freeing the Neapolitan slaves captured the previous year.²²⁴ Keith suspected the Dey hoped for more money, and disagreed with Falcon's desire for a show of force (though Falcon used the tensions to again delay sailing to Algiers).²²⁵ Falcon also complained about "the Jew Bacri" being "still the avowed friend of the French and the irreconcilable enemy of England," and as such he saw it as his "duty to employ every possible means for the destruction of his credit with the Dey".²²⁶ Unfortunately, Joseph Cohen Bacri and his business partner, Naphtali Busnach, were at the height of their influence. Busnach had been declared the head of the Jewish

²²¹ NA FO 52/11 Whitehall circular, 13 Mar 1800.

²²² NA FO 76/5 Lucas to the Duke of Portland, 22 Apr 1800.; NA FO 52/11 Matra to Portland, 3 Feb 1800.; El Mansour, 20, 99.

²²³ El Mansour, 99.

²²⁴ NA FO 3/8 Falcon to the Duke of Portland, 8 Jan 1800.

²²⁵ NA ADM 1/401 no. 63, Keith to Evan Nepean, 18 Feb 1800.

²²⁶ NA FO 3/8 Falcon to the Duke of Portland, 8 Jan 1800.

community in Algiers in February (he was also *khaznadji*), and he and his partners were heavily involved in paying out loans to both Dey and consuls alike – whether to buy/redeem slaves or purchase cargoes seized by the Algerine corsairs.²²⁷ However, Falcon’s desire to challenge and antagonize the Jewish merchants would lead to his own destruction a few years later.

Algiers arguing over the redemption of non-British sailors was not high on Keith’s list of priorities. As the plague in Morocco abated, trade resumed. Relations with Tripoli were stable, and Tunis was assisting the British with their grain shortage. However, Keith did not abandon the captured vessel or her cargo. The British just chose to continue to pursue it through diplomatic channels. Nelson sent the Dey another letter in late March with a much firmer tone than before:

...the Vessel and cargo is absolutely the property of the English Government, and of course the seizure is not only censurable but almost an act of hostility. Therefore, Nelson of the Nile, who has always endeavored to prove himself the sincere friend of your Highness, hopes that this Vessel, or her value, with the Cargo, will be immediately given up. This act will mark the justice of your Highness.²²⁸

The only references or hints of a threat Nelson makes are his allusion to his victory over the French (‘Nelson of the Nile’) and the veiled threat that the seizure of the ship was ‘almost an act of hostility.’ Otherwise, the letter is civil and pleasant; Nelson demands the return or reimbursement of the vessel and her cargo—no mention of any crew – as an act of friendship and demonstration of the Dey’s commitment to the Anglo-Algerine treaty. Diplomacy, not rash action, was the official British strategy to dealing with Algiers. The situation improved in May when the Ottoman Empire issued a new *firman* to Algiers and Tunis. Algiers recent friendly attitude combined with the Ottoman ‘imposition of authority’ gave Keith hope these matters would soon be resolved, for all

²²⁷ Rosenstock, “The House of Bacri and Busnach,” 343-6.

²²⁸ DLN, v. 4, 209, To His Highness the Dey of Algiers, 24 Mar 1800.

Falcon was *still* not in Algiers.²²⁹ Keith thanked the Dey, “for the offer of supplies, of which we shall stand in need as His Majesty has a great army coming to Malta.”²³⁰ The blockade of Malta was in its final months and the pressure on the French forces remaining was such that they were effectively starving under the blockade.²³¹

Yet the following month, Falcon (still in Minorca) lamented about more issues over Neapolitan ships and Nelson’s passes. However, this letter provided an explanation for *why* there were so many issues regarding the passes issued to the Neapolitans. Falcon speculated the confusion came from then current Anglo-Algerine treaty, which:

...does not stipulate that any but regular Mediterranean passes are to be respected by the Algerines; these vessels were not supplied with such and have been captured – Restitution I find is refused – on the other hand the Dey complained that vessels having on board his property and his Pass have been captured by his Majesty’s Cruizers, condemned and sold.²³²

It was hard to maintain the moral high ground when the Algerines claimed the British had caused the same offence they themselves were protesting. The arguments over the Neapolitans had been going on for eight months before someone checked the explicit terms of the treaty. The British may have felt they were within their legal right given the *spirit* of the law, but the Algerines had the right within the *letter* of the law, a common source of conflict between the British and North Africans.

Tunis, unaffected by the diplomatic quibbles elsewhere in Barbary, continued to enforce her war with France. The Bey kept the French merchants shut inside the French quarter, causing Devoize, French consul, to complain rats would destroy all their wares. Devoize not only protested the length of their confinement but compared their plight to the much more favourable situation in Algiers and Tripoli (where the French were

²²⁹ NA ADM 1/402/no. 128, Keith to Evan Nepean, 7 May 1800.

²³⁰ NA ADM 1/402/no. 129, Keith to His Highness the Dey of Algiers, 21 Apr 1800.

²³¹ Goodwin, *Malta*, 49.

²³² NA FO 3/8 Falcon to Lord Keith, 4 Jun 1800.

released shortly after the token declaration of war) or Morocco (where war had not been declared).²³³ Devoize, in a letter to the Bey argued:

Il y en a plus de seize que les Français sont libres à Alger, ils l'étaient aussi à Tripoli. L'Empereur de Maroc n'a pas même déclaré guerre. Par quelle fatalité arrive-t-il que Votre Excellence, dont je n'ai cessé de louer la sagesse et la justice, se soit distinguée des autres souverains de la Barberie par une sévérité qui fait bien des malheureux sans aucun avantage pour Votre Excellence? Notre expédition en Egypte a été le motif de la guerre que vous avez déclarée à la république; la cause a cessé; l'effet doit cesser aussi.²³⁴

Devoize, for a consul with many years experience, appears driven to extremes. Tunis was only concerned with Algiers's actions if they threatened the smaller regency, ditto with Tripoli.²³⁵ Morocco's actions would likewise have been no cause for concern, as the western-most Barbary state was outside the Ottoman Empire. The Bey would not have viewed any of those comparisons as compelling arguments. Finally, Devoize concluded his argument by protesting as the French invasion of Egypt had been the reason for the declaration of war and since the French had been expelled from Egypt there was no longer any reason to be at war – as if their defeat erased the fact that they invaded their sovereign's territory. For someone of Devoize's reputation, the argument comes across as desperate.

In contrast with Devoize's plight, Magra wrote to Lord Keith, demonstrating the difference between the French and British situation in the Regency. Magra had learned of the impending arrival of a large number of troops on Minorca, already suffering from food shortages, and took it upon himself to secure cattle for the island. The Bey initially refused this request, and the Bey followed up by requesting the assistance of the British to procure a new galley. Magra protested against the Bey's request, as his own had been refused – and a permit for the cattle shipment was immediately written up.²³⁶ Tunis was

²³³ Moalla, 60.

²³⁴ Plantet, *Tunis*, v. 3, 405: Devoize to the Bey of Tunis, 19 May 1800.

²³⁵ Moalla 36-7.

²³⁶ KP, 124-5, no. 71: Perkins Magra to Keith, Tunis, 13 Jul 1800.; Gregory, *Minorca*, 153-4.

well placed to supply both Minorca and Malta (which the French would surrender in September), and the British had military supplies the regency wanted and thus were able to negotiate their cooperation. Tripoli was assisting Britain as well - Lucas arranged for the “dispatch of regular supplies of food to H.M. ships and garrisons in the Mediterranean.”²³⁷ Admiral Keith reminded the Lords of the Admiralty of the Bashaw’s avowed willingness to supply British forces should a new need arise.²³⁸ Likewise, in Morocco, with the end of plague by the end of the summer, regular supplies of provisions resumed. British support from Barbary was quite stable and strong. In early October, Keith was able to procure fresh water for most of the fleet from Tetuan.²³⁹ British ships traveling to and from Barbary in 1800 was double what it had been in 1799 – not yet at 1796 levels but higher than they had been in any other year of the war.²⁴⁰

Falcon *finally* arrived in Algiers in late September. Keith reported, not only was the British consul in residence, but the Dey had “acceded in part to our demands; and manifests a disposition for further compliance.”²⁴¹ Such prospects of additional cooperation were desperately needed in the autumn of 1800. Having succeeded in removing the French and gaining Malta, Britain was now left with a particularly tricky situation.²⁴² Once the Knights of St John took control of the island in the sixteenth century, Malta had been the leading Christian enemy of the Muslim Barbary states. When the French invaded in 1798, the Knights of St John had been expelled and all Muslim slaves freed. It had been a strong enticement for French support prior to Bonaparte’s disastrous Egyptian campaign. But the memory of Malta’s past was still strong in North Africa. A newly freed Malta, even under British command, would rouse

²³⁷ Dearden, 149.

²³⁸ NA ADM 1/403 no. 252, Lord Keith to Evan Nepean, 2 Sept 1800.

²³⁹ NA ADM 1/403 no. 285, Lord Keith to Evan Nepean, 1 Oct 1800.

²⁴⁰ See Appendix III: Lloyd’s List (p. 265).

²⁴¹ NA ADM 1/403 no. 288, Lord Keith to Evan Nepean, 2 Oct 1800.

²⁴² A.B. Rodger, *Second Coalition*, 198.; Atauz, 181.

anger. Even worse – the island could not feed itself under the best of conditions – much less with a British army garrison and Naval base.²⁴³ The island was reliant on outside assistance to survive. It was crucial to secure the region’s good will so they would supply the island.

Keith, awaiting official orders from the British government, took it upon himself to issue British passes to the senior officers in charge of Malta.²⁴⁴ In November, Falcon reported trouble with the British seizure of Malta, and explained Bacri and Busnach (who the Consul had vowed to destroy in January) were stirring up trouble due to their pro-French sentiments.

Such is the attachment of the Jews to the French, and the favourable sentiments they have inspired the Dey with for that nation, that the mention of Malta being in possession of the English put him in the greatest passion...The Dey in his anger declared, notwithstanding Malta belonging to the English, his cruisers should capture every vessel belonging to it they met with; tomorrow, probably, he will say quite the contrary. I had already made the arrangements to prevent in future the capture of Maltese vessels; but the Dey is so worked upon by the Jew Busnah...that no reliance can be placed on His Highness’s declaration.²⁴⁵

Bucnach and Bacri, Falcon’s Jewish bogey-men, form a frequent part of the consul’s communication from Algiers; he forever saw them, rightly or wrongly, as the cause for all his difficulties. Falcon explained that he had succeeded in making liberal arrangements for supplies from Algiers, ‘whenever required’ and that the Dey had promised they, ‘should be immediately furnished.’²⁴⁶ Yet, once the Jewish merchants became aware of these arrangements they “induced the Dey to a refusal, notwithstanding all his former promise. The Jew wants to monopolise the trade for himself and furnish only what he thinks proper.”²⁴⁷ There is a virulent anti-Semitism underlining Falcon’s complaints against these merchants, anger at their undertaking the same strategies and

²⁴³ Goodwin, *Malta*, 45.; Robert Gardiner, ed., *The Campaign of Trafalgar, 1803-1805* (London: Chatham Publishing, 1997), 10, 15.

²⁴⁴ NA ADM 1/403 no. 286, Lord Keith to Evan Nepean, 1 Oct 1800

²⁴⁵ KP, 129, no. 76, Consul at Algiers to Keith, 12 Nov 1800.

²⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

tactics employed by British diplomats and merchants targeting British enemies (only Bacri and Busnach appeared to be succeeding). Regardless of whether these Jewish merchants were specifically targeting Falcon, the issue of a non-French Malta was already causing considerable difficulties in the Mediterranean.

Unhelpfully, Morocco was experiencing the aftershocks from three years of turmoil. Suleiman was hesitant to allow the exportation of foodstuffs away from his recovering populace.²⁴⁸ He did not agree to allow the victualing convoys for Gibraltar to resume until December, and only in limited amounts. Luckily, the British consul, James Matra, noted it was *only* Britain who was allowed to export food.²⁴⁹ Yet by the end of the month, all exports were suspended again.²⁵⁰ The silver lining with Morocco was they were too far west to regularly supply Malta – only Gibraltar would be affected. Yet by the new year, food shipments were again being arranged between Tangier and Gibraltar for the garrison. The Duke of Portland wrote Matra with the promise of new presents for the Emperor.²⁵¹ They were well timed. The League of Armed Neutrality having formed in Northern Europe in late 1800, eliminating one of the other sources grain shortage-hit England relied upon; Morocco's friendship and agriculture were even more crucial.²⁵² Luckily, after the locust invasion and plague, Morocco entered a period of agricultural boom. James Curtis, an English doctor living in Morocco, observed that spring: "...the country seemed better cultivated than might have been expected from the fatal effects of the plague."²⁵³ A noticeable dip occurs in the British shipping to Barbary in the later half of 1800 until the spring of 1801, when trade with Morocco could resume fully. Out of the 32 ships that travelled to and from Barbary in 1800 and 1801, only five made the

²⁴⁸ Brown, 73, 74.

²⁴⁹ NA FO 52/11 Matra to Portland, 2 Dec 1800.; Brown, 74-5.

²⁵⁰ NA FO 52/11 Matra to Portland, 25 Dec 1800.

²⁵¹ NA FO 174/10 Raleigh to Matra, 10 Jan 1801.; NA FO 8/5 Portland to Matra, 20 Jan 1801.

²⁵² Esdaile, *The French Wars*, 16.; Mackesy, *The War in the Mediterranean*, 10.; Curtis, 11.

²⁵³ El Mansour, 37.; Curtis, 32.

journey between December 1800 and May 1801.²⁵⁴ Corn was also available from Tripoli where a depot was built in Benghazi funded by none other than the Jewish merchant Bacri in Algiers (and William Wickham confirmed they were active in providing loans in Tripoli as well).²⁵⁵

A minor setback occurred in late 1800, when Algiers was able to pressure Tunis into signing a truce with France. It was short-lived, as the Ottoman Empire threatened the two regencies with force and economic sanctions if they did not rescind said truce.²⁵⁶ Both did, and once more expelled the French from their states (and Algiers released all the vessels and sailors under British colours/protection they had taken captive). Simultaneously, Falcon was able to procure a new shipment of supplies for Minorca.²⁵⁷

Even better was the recognition of Malta's new British status. The British government directed the consuls in Barbary to make sure all subsequent treaties included Malta to ensure her new British status was extended to her ships and crews.²⁵⁸ Falcon did so in early 1801, noting:

...that from the 7th day of December last 1800 the inhabitants [of Malta] shall be treated upon the same footing as the rest of His Britannic Majesty's subjects – and the said island shall be considered in all respects like the other places subject to the Crown of Great Britain and agreeable to the convention made with His Britannic Majesty by Ibrahim Rais, Ambassador from His Highness the Dey.²⁵⁹

Charles Logie, former British consul in Algiers, now Swedish consul, summarized the value of Algiers to the British war effort in the Mediterranean when he observed:

The friendship of Barbary may be of good use to this country by supplying our garrisons in the Mediterranean, Victualing our fleets there, furnishing our Merchant Vessels with a place of safety, provisions, and other stores, that may be

²⁵⁴ See Appendix III: Lloyd's List (p. 265)..

²⁵⁵ KP, 365, no. 4. Extract from Wickham's Dispatch to Lord Grenville forwarded to Keith, Vienna, 25 Jan 1801.

²⁵⁶ Moalla, 61.

²⁵⁷ NA FO 3/9 Falcon to the Duke of Portland, 20 Jan 1801.; KP, 366, no. 5: Falcon to Keith, 30 Jan 1801; KP, 369, no. 7: Perkins Magra to Keith, 21 Feb 1801.

²⁵⁸ NA ADM 1/404 no. 100, Keith to Evan Nepean, 20 Apr 1801.

²⁵⁹ NA FO 3/9 Treaty between Algiers and Britain signed by Mustafa Dey and John Falcon, 19 Mar 1801.; Rose, *Malta*, 349.

necessary.²⁶⁰

Few historical works, if they talk about Barbary in general or Algiers in particular, mention that Britain saw Algiers as a place of safety, much less discuss the value placed on the regency by the British during times of war in the Mediterranean. Nearly the entire northern coast of the Mediterranean was in enemy hands. As Malta was taken into the fold of 'accepted' shipping locations, her support from Barbary increased beyond simple inclusion in British treaties with the region. By the end of spring 1801, both Tunis and Tripoli had sent shipments of bullocks to the island.²⁶¹ The successful integration of Malta into the British Mediterranean fold turned the island into the main trading partner of Tunis and Tripoli. In that first year of British control, 1,228 ships from Barbary called on Malta—over half all ships to visit the island. North Africa, principally the regencies of Tripoli and Tunis, supplied 88 per cent of Malta's imports of cattle and 96 per cent of their sheep imports.²⁶² For an island that could only produce enough food to feed itself for three months a year *without* the addition of a naval base and army garrison, this level of support was vital. The British consuls in Barbary were able to solve the problems that had plagued British Corsica and ensure prompt and extensive support from Barbary for Malta at the onset.

Unfortunately, relations with Tripoli were about to become complicated. Simon Lucas, consul there for nearly 8 years, died on 4 March 1801. Before his death, he had adopted his surgeon and vice-consul, Bryan McDonough, as his son, and left the consulate in McDonough's hands.²⁶³ Shortly thereafter, owing to a dispute over how much money Tripoli received compared to Algiers and Tunis, Tripoli declared war on

²⁶⁰ NA FO 3/9 'Observations by Mr Logie on the claims made by the Algerine Ambassador,' Apr 1801.; Playfair, 220.

²⁶¹ NA FO 335/45 folder 1, General Pigot to Clark, 2 Mar 1801; FO 335/45 folder 1, McDonough to Clark, 30 Apr 1801.; Macgill, *Tunis*, 101.

²⁶² See Appendix IV: Malta Imports (p. 267).

²⁶³ Dearden, 149.; NA FO 76/5 McDonough to Portland, 15 May 1801.

the young United States, cutting down their flagpole.²⁶⁴ The United States dispatched a small squadron and set up an ineffective blockade of the regency. William Eaton, US Consul in Tunis, assured Henry Clarke, British vice-consul, the blockade should not have any effect on British shipping and two separate shipments of cattle sailed for Malta in the six months after the declaration of war.²⁶⁵ However, the relations between the British and the American consulates in North Africa were not all pleasant. Eaton made an official complaint to Magra about McDonough in Tripoli – who, Eaton said, had:

...for a long time pursued a system of conduct in that Regency hostile to the United States of America; that he has been notoriously instrumental in stimulating that Bashaw to make war against the said United States.²⁶⁶

McDonough protested, and apart from the US consul's claims, there is little to substantiate the allegation. McDonough had helped the US consul at Tripoli, Leander Cathcart, gain an audience with the Bashaw in the first place.²⁶⁷

Elsewhere, there were increasing anxieties about French interests in the region. The British government was worried about French plots and intrigues against the Barbary States and directed Matra to watch and report on all the French activities in Morocco.²⁶⁸ The renewed strength of Moroccan agriculture specifically, and the necessity of foodstuffs from Barbary in general, made ensuring those states remained neutral in the power struggle between Britain and France of the utmost importance. Falcon reported more trouble in Algiers in favour of the French caused by Busnach and

²⁶⁴ Dearden 153-4.; Kitzen, 609, 611, 612, 615, 620-1, 622.; Kola Folayan, "Tripoli and the War with the U.S.A., 1801-5" *The Journal of African History* 13, no. 2 (1972), 261.; Nichols, "Diplomacy in Barbary," 114.; Parker, 133-5.; Baepler, *White Slaves, African Masters*, 9, 159.; London, 95.; Folayan, *Yūsūf Pāshā*, 32-5, 36.

²⁶⁵ NA FO 76/5 McDonough to Portland, 15 May 1801.; FO 335/45 folder 3, McDonough to Magra, 10 Dec 1803.; NA FO 335/45 folder 2, Eaton to Clark, 24 Jul 1801.; Abun-Nasr, 198

²⁶⁶ NA FO 335/45 folder 2, Eaton to Magra, 1 Sept 1801.

²⁶⁷ Dearden, 152-5.; Noah, 358.; Jonathan Cowdery, "American Captives in Tripoli; of Dr Cowdery's Journal in Miniature. Kept during his late captivity in Tripoli," In Baepler, *White Slaves, African Masters*, 161, 166.

Cowdery's journal contradicts the 'traditional' American description of events, for example Peter Lyle is not shown as anti-American but helpful and kind (Baepler, 166).

²⁶⁸ NA FO 8/5 Duke of Portland to Matra, 18 Jul 1801.

Bacri. He wrote Magra in Tunis complaining about the machinations of ‘the Jews,’ claiming they had done all they could to prevent his arrival in Algiers, the Jews feared him due to their prior acquaintance (when Falcon was the previous Consul’s secretary), and any false reports Magra might hear had been deliberately spread by Falcon himself.²⁶⁹ His whole letter appears paranoid. Falcon wrote Magra again with more specific claims against the Jews and the Dey:

A few days ago a packet employed by the Jews for the sole purpose of carrying out a most traitorous correspondence with the French was captured by one of His Majesty’s ships – the Dey warmly supports the Jews and declares he will not grant any further supplies to the English until this vessel be given up...²⁷⁰

Even though Algiers was at least nominally at war with France, it would not have been Falcon’s place to declare merchants, with trade networks and connections in France, ‘traitors’ for communicating with France. The merchants (and the Dey) had every right to complain about the seizure of their vessel. Putting pressure on the offender (Britain) by refusing trade was the way the game was played in Barbary. Britain employed that tactic all the time. It was effective. Britain acquiesced and released the vessel and the Dey lifted the ban on exports, including authorizing a shipment of cattle from Bona.²⁷¹

In Tunis, there were still some issues relating to Malta’s status as British. Thirty-seven Maltese were in captivity in the regency, “taken under English passports in carrying provisions to Malta during the blockade, and who have been detained upwards of two and a half years under the most cruel treatment and oppressive labour” along with several vessels and cargoes meant for the island.²⁷² Captain Campbell in Malta also reported several ships employed in supplying the island under British passes had been captured, though he had detained the captor in Valetta.²⁷³ As treaties and opinions were

²⁶⁹ NA FO 335/45 folder 1, Falcon to Magra, 22 Jun 1801.

²⁷⁰ NA FO 335/45 folder 2, Falcon to Magra, 10 Aug 1801.

²⁷¹ NA FO 3/9 Falcon to the Duke of Portland, 5 Sept 1801.

²⁷² KP, 385-6, no. 22: *Demands for Indemnification...*, 10 Sept 1801.

²⁷³ *Ibid.*

being revised, the British consuls needed to ensure the newly British Maltese rights were being respected (or the island would starve), though the British were quick to acknowledge that the captured Maltese in question had been taken prior to the British conquest of the island.

In Morocco, at least, there were few issues – the latest report on the victualing opportunities in Tetuan listed bread (and grains), wine, water, cattle, and other stores as available for the British.²⁷⁴ There were some difficulties over the duties charged when exporting cattle owing to confusion over the standing treaty between Tetuan and Gibraltar.²⁷⁵ The issue was soon resolved however, and led to a valuable new treaty between the British Garrison at Gibraltar and the Moroccan court (signed late that year), which guaranteed an annual shipment from Tangier of 2,000 head of cattle for a reduced duty rate.²⁷⁶ That treaty would hold for the remainder of the war.

It looked as if all the machinations, successes and troubles in North Africa would shortly have been for nothing. In October, a preliminary peace was signed in London between Britain (and her allies) and France. The news reached the Mediterranean starting in mid-October. The Ottoman Regencies would take advantage of this opportunity to once more make peace with France. Before the ratification of the peace at Amiens the following spring, it was unknown what was required of the British military in the Mediterranean regarding their newly acquired territories, leaving the area in a holding pattern for the winter. What did not change was the necessity of relations with North Africa to provide food for Gibraltar, Minorca, and Malta, for however long they remained British.²⁷⁷

²⁷⁴ NA ADM 1/405 no. 274, Charles Pole to Evan Nepean, 12 Sept 1801.

²⁷⁵ NA FO 174/9 Pelham to Matra, 29 Sept 1801.

²⁷⁶ El Mansour, 114.; Tuson, 523.

²⁷⁷ KP, 361.; NA ADM 1/405 no. 360, Charles Pole to Evan Nepean, 5 Nov 1801.; NA FO 3/9 Falcon the Duke of Portland, 24 Dec 1801.; Moalla, 61.

Though not yet the dominant power in Barbary, Britain had eliminated the French diplomatic and mercantile life in North Africa after the Battle of Abukir Bay. French trade to North Africa, which previously averaged over 150 ships a year between Barbary and France was down to fewer than 30.²⁷⁸ British shipping, principally between British ports and North Africa, was growing, though not as high as in 1796.




Figure 2: British Shipping to/from Barbary, 1798--1801

The lower numbers of ships and journeys shown in Figure 2 during 1798 and 1799 can be explained by Morocco's famine and public health crisis when plague broke out during those years. However with recovery in 1800 came an increase in shipping. To the data shown in Figure 2, another type of shipping must be added to evaluate British successes during the last years of the French Revolutionary War – that of Barbary's trade to British bases. The British conquest of Malta avoided the difficulties that had plagued British Corsica. Within one year of becoming British, Barbary itself was trading with the new British island: 55 per cent of all ships calling at Malta came from North Africa (1,228 ships specifically) and they brought over 5,000 cows and 6,000 sheep.²⁷⁹ Britain had learned from previous experience to quickly ensure that Malta would be supplied from North Africa, and North Africa responded enthusiastically. Though peace came before

²⁷⁸ Panzac, 73

²⁷⁹ NA CO 158/20, Malta Public Secretary's Report – Arrivals and Importations, from 1801-1811.

much could be made of this benefit, the island could not feed itself regardless and Britain would need to call on her relationship with Barbary to ensure that it was.

CHAPTER FOUR: 1801-1805

By the time the preliminaries to the Peace of Amiens were signed on 30 September 1801, Britain and France had been at war for almost a decade. Britain gained little (Trinidad and Ceylon) in the negotiations, and lost much. The Cape Colony and Dutch East Indies Islands were to be returned to the Batavian Republic; British troops withdrawn from Egypt; Minorca returned to Spain, and Malta returned to the Knights of St. John. France was only required to withdraw from the Papal States and the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. Britain recognized the French Republic and both sides would exchange prisoners and hostages. Henry Addington's new ministry hoped the French Consulate would actually be interested in an enduring peace.²⁸⁰

The Peace process quickly hit a snag over Malta. Article 10, the longest of the treaty, addressed Malta and was complicated, with multiple requirements and timelines:

Detailed provisions were made for the restoration of the island to the rule of the Knights of the Order...The British occupying forces were to be evacuated within three months of ratification, when they were to deliver the islands to the Grand Master, so long as he or his commissioner and the replacement Neapolitan troops, had arrived. The garrison under the Order was to be half Maltese, and half others, under overall Order command. Until this force was recruited and organised, the garrison was to consist of 2,000 Neapolitan soldiers, whose posting to Malta was to last for one year or until the Order's forces were sufficient to replace them. The independence of the islands and the system laid out by the treaty was to be guaranteed by six European powers: 'Great Britain, France, Austria, Russia, Spain, and Prussia'; of these, three – Britain, France, and Spain were signatories of the Treaty. The Order and Malta were declared perpetually neutral.²⁸¹

Initially, the British government, acting in good faith, began the process of returning Malta to the Order. In late April, Lord Hobart (Secretary of War) ordered Lieutenant General Fox at Malta to begin the evacuation process - provided the Order had sent

²⁸⁰ Rodger, *The Command of the Ocean*, 472, 528.; John D. Grainger, *The Amiens Truce : Britain and Bonaparte, 1801-1803* (Woodbridge, Suffolk: Boydell Press, 2004), 1, 49, 42-3, 51, 53-4, 76-79, 81-3, 210.; NA CO 158/6 Downing Street to Lt General Fox, 30 Apr 1802.; Brian Blouet, *The Story of Malta* (Malta: Progress Press, 2004), 135.; Robson. 96-7.; Wilson, *Empire of the Deep*, 431.

²⁸¹ Grainger, *Amiens*, 76-7.

representatives to enact the handover and the Neapolitan troops had arrived.²⁸² That same month, Hobart met with Maltese deputies who had travelled to Britain expressly to persuade the British to stay but Hobart maintained Britain would abide by the treaty.²⁸³ After the re-appointment of Sir Alexander Ball as Civil Commissioner of Malta in June, another group of Maltese men on the island declared the King of Great Britain was their sovereign.²⁸⁴ Locally, it did not appear the Order would be welcome to return.

Article 10 called for the British to evacuate after three months and in late August the French government requested British assistance in transporting the Neapolitan troops from Sicily to Malta. Lord Hawkesbury (Secretary of State) responded that as the election of the new Grand Master had not been completed and Russia, Austria, and Prussia had not yet agreed to act as guarantors, neither the movement of troops nor the evacuation of the British could occur.²⁸⁵ Austria only provisionally accepted the position, Russia disapproved of several details of the arrangement and Prussia was proving unlikely to concede. Further the new Grand Master (when finally elected) Barthelémy de Ruspoli, was reluctant to accept the post. He was rightly apprehensive: the order was unpopular in Malta, the previous Grand Master had rescinded his resignation, and Bonaparte was trying to make an example of the island in his dealing with the British.²⁸⁶ In October, Hobart ordered, “that the process of restoring the *status quo ante bellum* in Malta...should be suspended.”²⁸⁷ By December, Ruspoli had still not accepted his post, and the continued pressure Bonaparte placed on Malta made it increasingly likely war would erupt over the small island. Russian ministers began hinting the British should

²⁸² Ibid., 119-20.; NA CO 158/ 6 Downing Street to Lieutenant General Fox, 30 Apr 1802.

²⁸³ Grainger, *Amiens*, 119.; Rose, *Malta*, 405-432.

²⁸⁴ Desmond Gregory, *Malta, Britain, and the European Powers, 1793-1815* (Cranbury, New Jersey: Associated University Presses, 1996), 158.; Blouet, 135.

²⁸⁵ Knight, *Nelson*, 526.; Grainger, *Amiens*, 121.

²⁸⁶ Grainger, *Amiens*, 123.

²⁸⁷ Ibid., 125.

keep the island. Early the next year, the Russian foreign minister openly told the British ambassador the Tsar wanted Britain to retain Malta.²⁸⁸

In the background of Britain and France's territorial disputes over Malta lurked the Barbary States. France's expulsion of the Order (and freeing of approximately 2,000 Muslim slaves) from Malta in 1798 had eased relations between the island and Barbary. The British government hoped Article 10 would allow Malta to have:

a discontinuance of that state of perpetual hostility between the Maltese and the Barbary States, which had, from the first establishment of the Order in Malta, converted that island into a place of arms, and subjected its inhabitants to the consequences of the most disastrous kind of warfare.²⁸⁹

Yet three months later, the British were not as hopeful of how the return of the order would be greeted. Not only were the Maltese not in favour of the return of the Order, but Commissioner Ball requested support from Admiral Bickerton, in command of the Mediterranean fleet, for passports to be granted to the Order, or, he surmised, the Barbary States would blockade and starve the island.²⁹⁰ Ball's query led Bickerton to request directions on how, "to act between the States of Barbary and the Government of the Order of St John."²⁹¹ The following day, Ball avowed, "in a fortnight after the English evacuate" Tunis would declare war on the island and place it under blockade.²⁹² In September, while the British government worked towards repatriating the Order of St John, the government responded. The answer was clear; Ball was to cooperate with Bickerton, "in a manner least likely to occasion differences with any of the Barbary States."²⁹³

Barbary's importance to British Malta had little to do with their historic animosity towards one another and more that Malta could not feed itself. Malta had not

²⁸⁸ Ibid., 123, 158.

²⁸⁹ NA CO 158/3 Letter to Charles Cameron, Apr 1802.

²⁹⁰ NA CO 158/3 Sir Alexander Ball to Rear Admiral Bickerton, 18 Jul 1802.

²⁹¹ NA ADM 1/406 no. 152, Rear Admiral Bickerton to Evan Nepean, 19 Jul 1802.

²⁹² NA CO 158/3 Sir Alexander Ball to Rear Admiral Bickerton, 20 Jul 1802.

²⁹³ NA CO 158/3 Downing Street to Sir Alexander Ball, 6 Sept 1802.

been able to grow enough food to feed itself for centuries.²⁹⁴ Worse, the island's population growth was drastic – Malta's population (excluding the Order) doubled during the eighteenth century.²⁹⁵ Under the best conditions, the island could only produce enough grain for three to four months.²⁹⁶ Malta usually purchased its grain from nearby Sicily, but even during the Order's reign, they supplemented their supply from Barbary.²⁹⁷ If war broke out again between Britain and France – as 1802 progressed, this looked increasingly likely – Malta would need help. Just the year before the vast majority of its cattle and sheep imports had come from North Africa, as had over half of the ships calling on the island.²⁹⁸ Britain was well versed in trading with the four states of North Africa, but had also learned in the last war the difficulty of securing recognition (and food) for short-lived British Corsica.

With peace in Europe had come peace in the wider Mediterranean. The Ottoman Empire and her North African regencies were again at peace with France.²⁹⁹ Despite Tunis's promises to declare war on non-British Malta, the small regency was perfectly willing to trade with the island under British control. Tunis sent two different shipments of provisions to the island in the first half of the year, and another to Minorca. Consul Magra described the first shipment as occurring, "even at a time that they have been refused to every other nation, and I cannot but speak of the Bey's conduct in the highest term of praise."³⁰⁰ Magra's second shipment was granted at a discount of 15 to 20 per cent for the island.³⁰¹ These shipments demonstrated the value of knowledgeable consuls

²⁹⁴ Blouet, 115.; Gregory, *Malta*, 27.

²⁹⁵ Gregory, *Malta*, 28.; Blouet, 85.

Malta's non-Order population was 45,288 in 1687 and 93,756 in 1797. The Knights of St John numbered approximately 2,000.

²⁹⁶ Gregory, 27.; NA CO 158/13 Charles Livingston to Sir Alexander Ball, 25 Feb 1807.; Mackesy, 14.

²⁹⁷ Blouet, 115.; Gregory, 27, 201, 207.; Knight, *Nelson*, 442.

²⁹⁸ See Appendix IV: Malta Imports (p. 267).

²⁹⁹ Moalla, 61-2.; Windler, *La Diplomatie*, 185, 382-3.; NA FO 76/5 McDonough to Lord Pelham, 2 Dec 1802.; Allardyce, . 315-6.

³⁰⁰ NA FO 77/5 Perkins Magra to Lord Pelham, 25 Feb 1802.

³⁰¹ NA FO 77/5 Perkins Magra to Lord Pelham, 28 Mar 1802

and pre-existing relationships with foreign markets in general, and the Barbary Coast specifically. Magra was able to acquire desperately needed provisions for Britain and her territories. The Bey favoured British requests over ‘every other nation’. Magra also supplied Malta at a discount. Malta would be dependant on Britain maintaining that ‘special relationship’ if she was to survive, much less be of any benefit to the British war effort. This was very different from the situation Britain had found herself in at the start of the last war.

Malta was not alone in needing food from Barbary. In June, Bickerton reported a food scarcity in the fleet, in part caused by Lord St Vincent’s reforms. They had been rooted in a desire to weed out corruption but had the negative effect of nearly immobilizing the Victualling board.³⁰² Lord Pelham (Secretary of State for the Home Office) advised James Matra (British consul in Morocco) it was the “policy of this country not only to present a friendly intercourse in a political sense with the Barbary States, but also to extend its commerce with them.”³⁰³ Morocco sent shipments of bullocks in March and May, but then the Emperor, Mawlay Suleiman, suddenly put a “stop to the provisions trade for all nations whatsoever.”³⁰⁴ This caused understandable concern, but shortly after Matra clarified the situation:

...the Emperor’s orders have just arrived for our provisions trade to go on as usual. It appears that the former order was a mistake... as Poultry, eggs, and oranges were scarce, H.I.M. meaning was that they should not be made articles of commerce, but that order is not to affect the Kings ships who are to be supplied as usual.³⁰⁵

As the items affected by the ban did not affect British interests, the confusion and trouble was soon resolved. Matra made provisions for, “the exportation of cattle sufficient to prevent his Majesty’s garrisons and fleets in the Mediterranean from suffering or want of

³⁰² Knight, *Nelson*, 442.; Knight, *Britain Against Napoleon*, 214-5.

³⁰³ NA FO 8/5 Lord Pelham to Matra, 10 Mar 1802.

³⁰⁴ NA FO 52/12 Matra to Lord Pelham, 18 Mar 1802.; NA FO 52/12 Matra to Lord Pelham, 3 May 1802.; NA FO 52/12 Matra to Lord Pelham, 6 May 1802.

³⁰⁵ NA FO 52/12 Matra to Lord Pelham, 14 May 1802.

necessary supplies” in July. As Bickerton had reported scurvy in the fleet the previous December and described their situation as ‘desperate’ by January, any actual cessation of supplies would have been disastrous.³⁰⁶ In all, British shipping to and from Morocco doubled in 1802 over 1801.³⁰⁷

Algiers also provided a “liberal supply of bullocks” for the fleet, despite continuing disputes between that regency and the British consul, John Falcon.³⁰⁸ Falcon argued he was unable to provide more assistance to the fleet due to the monopoly on grain and cattle held by the merchant house, Bacri and Busnach – Falcon’s Jewish foes.³⁰⁹ Tripoli was in a difficult situation as well. The Peace of Amiens ended the Bashaw’s secret assistance to the French troops in Egypt but it also ended a major source of prey for his corsair fleet. His declaration of war against the United States of America the previous year had resulted in a blockade of that regency, however ineffective it might have been.³¹⁰ In the end, British supplies from Tripoli were unaffected by the US-Tripoli War (the supply of livestock from Tripoli to Malta actually steadily rose over the course of the war), but in 1802 the British Military could only see another potential loss of supply in the Mediterranean.³¹¹ These obstacles were especially problematic with a fleet suffering from a food shortage, a contested island base that could not feed itself and war once again looming on the horizon.

By late 1802, the resumption of hostilities seemed inevitable. The evacuation of Malta had been suspended in October and Russia, which had been supposed to ensure the island’s neutrality, was pressing Britain to retain it. Britain was slow to understand the strategic value of Malta, but by March 1803, it was the only remaining bargaining

³⁰⁶ NA FO 8/5 Lord Pelham to Matra, 9 Jul 1802.; Knight, *Nelson*, 442-3.

³⁰⁷ See Appendix III: Lloyd’s List (p. 265)..

³⁰⁸ NA FO 3/9 Captain Bradley to His Excellency the Dey of Algiers, 5 Mar 1802.

³⁰⁹ NA FO 3/9 Falcon to Lord Pelham, 3 Apr 1802.

³¹⁰ Dearden, 149-51, 154, 156.; Folayan, *Yūsūf Pāshā*, 35-6.

³¹¹ Folayan, “Tripoli and the War with the U.S.A.,” 268.; Folayan, *Yūsūf Pāshā*, 41. Specifically, the trade between Tripoli and Malta went undisturbed.

piece. Britain had followed through on most of her requirements from the Treaty, until nearly the only thing she still held *was* Malta. France had not been so diligent in keeping to her terms.³¹² At least this time, unlike a decade before when war broke out, Britain would not be limited to Gibraltar at the far west of the Mediterranean as her lone base – if Britain held Malta.

Possibly because of the long British blockade of the island, Barbary was far less hesitant to acknowledge the Maltese as British subjects than they had been with Corsica.³¹³ In response, Britain started the process of freeing Maltese civilian captives held in Barbary.³¹⁴ Malta avoided the problems that had plagued British Corsica; this would save the island (and the British) a secondary conflict with the region while also providing Malta with a necessary trading partner. The latter was doubly necessary in early 1803 as General Vilette at Malta reported a new and suspicious difficulty with procuring cattle from Sicily – from where Malta was historically supplied:

I think it proper to inform Your Lordship that some interruption having lately occurred in the receipt of our usual supply of Cattle from Sicily for the use of the Troops in this Island, and some vexatious difficulties, apparently sanctioned by the Sicilian government, being daily made on this head for some time past, so as to threaten a total prohibition of this supply in future...³¹⁵

One of France's conditions in the Treaty of Amiens had been to withdraw from all Neapolitan ports and France had not done so.³¹⁶ Naples was still vulnerable to French influence yet Neapolitan troops were supposed to defend Malta's neutrality from France.³¹⁷ Bonaparte's refusal to follow through on his end of the peace agreement (whilst protesting the 'lack' of British efforts) coupled with French machinations over the cattle trade did nothing to help turn the tide back from war. Barbary, at least, was still

³¹² Gregory, *Malta*, 117.; Grainger, *Amiens*, 173.

³¹³ Gregory, *Malta*, 207.; Weiss, *Captives and Corsairs*, 124-5.

³¹⁴ Gregory, *Malta*, 207.

³¹⁵ NA CO 158/15 General Vilette to Lord Hobart, 19 Jan 1803.

³¹⁶ Grainger, *Amiens*, 42, 115.

³¹⁷ Knight, *Nelson* 451, 456.

more than willing to trade with Malta – North Africa exported over 5,500 cattle and 12,000 sheep to the island in 1802, 96 per cent and 94 per cent of the total cattle and sheep imports respectively. Though Barbary's percentage of Malta's total sheep imports had decreased slightly since the year before, the total amount of sheep coming from North Africa had doubled in that first year alone.³¹⁸

In Morocco, at least, the British position was strong. Muhammad b. 'Abd al-Salam al-Salawi had been appointed governor of Fez the year before, and Consul Matra wrote Lord Pelham of further good news:

...it is the appointment of Sidi Hamet al Salawi the Governor of Fez to his former office of Minister [Chief Minister] which took place a few days past... This certainly will be a great benefit to all of us...³¹⁹

Al-Salawi was described as “for a great many years past a sincere friend to the British nation,” and the more power and influence he held in the Moroccan government the better it would be for the British consul and the British Military in the Mediterranean.³²⁰ Matra also conveyed the Emperor's concern over rumours of the renewal of war.³²¹ On 10 May 1802, the British Ambassador to France had been ordered to return to Britain. Last minute attempts to forestall war by Tallyrand (who helped draft the peace in the first place) failed, and the British ambassador left France on 13 May. Britain officially declared war five days later. Two days previously, Vice Admiral Horatio Nelson had been appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Fleet. On 20 May 1803, he sailed for the Mediterranean.³²² Matra informed Mawlay Suleiman of war and, “had a most favourable answer from H.I.M., which he conveys by saying he sends orders to all

³¹⁸ See Appendix IV: Malta Imports (p. 267).

³¹⁹ NA FO 52/12 Matra to Lord Pelham, 16 May 1803.; El Mansour, 19-21.; Pennell, *Morocco*, 38: The Chief Minister or *al-wazir al'az'am* was also the in charge of foreign affairs and the prime intermediary between the Emperor and foreign consuls. Al-Salawi signed his letters to the European consuls as *wazir al-bahr wa sh'un al-ajnas* or Minister for Foreign Affairs. (El Mansour, 19).

³²⁰ Buffa, 76.

³²¹ NA FO 52/12 Matra to Lord Pelham, 16 May 1803.

³²² Rodger, *Command of the Ocean*, 528.; Grainger, *Amiens*, 190, 191, 192, 199.; Terry Coleman, *The Nelson Touch: The Life and Legend of Horatio Nelson* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 299-300.; Sugden, *Nelson*, v. 2, 590.; NA, ADM 1/407 no. 76, Nelson to Evan Nepean, 18 May 1803.

his ports to treat us with generosity, and that whatever we want from his dominions shall be granted.”³²³ Morocco’s guarantee of continued assistance and foodstuffs was a great relief to the British consul, government, and military (present and incoming) in the Mediterranean, especially after the scare over supplies the previous year.

Events elsewhere in the Mediterranean further demonstrated the importance of promises of victualing assistance. The war between the US and Tripoli left the British concerned about the transport of supplies for the fleet and Malta.³²⁴ Having made peace with France the year before, Tunis once more attempted to maintain strict neutrality; the regency publicly made every effort to balance the two European powers and tried to prevent the appearance of favouritism being given to either the British or the French. In many ways this suited the British, as it kept Tunis’s ports free and open (and cost the French money), but was still caused concern for the British consuls and military leaders in the region. In early 1803, the Bey of Tunis sent an envoy to France to discuss which conquered nations were to be given ‘French protection’ for redeeming captives in Tunis.³²⁵ The French Consul, Devoize, had already received recognition for the new Italian Republic in January.³²⁶ In April, Bonaparte wrote the Bey himself and sent a large gift of silver, and Tallyrand remarked, “J’espère qu’il verra dans cet acte de la munificence du Premier Consul un nouveau gage de ses heureuses dispositions pour la Régence de Tunis.”³²⁷ Such positive reports were worrying. Britain wanted France to waste time, energy, and money negotiating in the neutral North African states, but only if France was unsuccessful.

³²³ NA FO 52/12 Matra to Lord Pelham, 25 Jun 1803.

³²⁴ NA FO 335/46 folder 5, Preble to George Davis, 12 Nov 1803.; Sugden, v.2, 652.

³²⁵ Plantet, *Tunis*, v. 3, 445, Fn. 1, 445-6: no. 812, Devoize a Tallyrand, 2 Dec 1802.; Plantet, *Tunis*, v. 3, 448: no. 819, Mustafa Arnaout a Tallyrand, 3 Feb 1803.;

³²⁶ Plantet, *Tunis*, v. 3, 447: no. 816, Devoize a Tallyrand, 10 Jan 1803.

³²⁷ Plantet, *Tunis*, v. 3, 451z: no. 827, Tallyrand a Mustafa Arnaout, 6 Apr 1803.

Once war was officially declared in May, Britain and France began competing for position in Tunis, primarily over the Bey's exact definition of neutrality. In August, the British protested against the French transporting prizes to the port of Tunis and selling them there.³²⁸ Devoize reported, "le Bey lui a déclaré qu'il maintenait l'usage de la vente libre, dans ses ports, de toutes les prises faites par des puissances en paix avec la Régence."³²⁹ The Bey's answer regarding the freedom of his ports for all powers at peace with the regency was not enough for Nelson, who dispatched Captain Donnelly to meet with vice-consul Clarke and the Bey regarding the capture of British ships. Nelson had also learnt of Tunisian ships transporting French merchandise between the regency and Marseilles and Donnelly was to:

...apprize [the Bey] beforehand that the enemy's property is liable to seizure what ever flag the Vessel may carry which has it on board. It is my sincerest wish to put it out of the Bey's power to say that his Vessels are improperly detain'd, as he is now apprized under what circumstances they will be stopped. His Highness will I trust take this caution from me in good part as I intend, for if he issues an order against his Vessels being hired to the French and his Subjects disobey it, the fault and consequences will lay with them and not with the English officers.³³⁰

Donnelly met with the Bey on 30 September, and the captain found Hammuda Pasha a man of "more judgement and good sense than is the [common] lot of those barbarians" and a ruler who was adept at playing off both sides to maintain his nation's neutrality³³¹ The Bey said the French were operating from Zembra, an island off the coast of Tunis and 'out of cannon shot' of the shore and therefore beyond his control. The British were free to act against them in any way they saw fit – provided they did not trespass in Tunisian waters.³³² This was in accord with the 1762 treaty between Tunis and Britain

³²⁸ Sebag, 152-3.; Plantet, *Tunis*, v. 3, 454: no. 836, Devoize a Tallyrand, 20 Aug 1803.

³²⁹ Plantet, *Tunis*, v. 3, 454: no. 836, Devoize a Tallyrand, 20 Aug 1803.

³³⁰ White, *Nelson*, 334: no. 373, Nelson to Clarke, 23 Sept 1803.

³³¹ Sugden, v.2, 353.

³³² *Ibid.*

where cannon-shot had been determined as the marker of Tunis's territorial waters.³³³ Nelson issued orders to eliminate the French at Zembra, but to proceed only in a manner "strictly consistent with the Neutrality of Tunis."³³⁴ Anything that happened beyond cannon shot of Tunis' shore was outside the Bey's control – he could deny all responsibility and knowledge of it. Nelson's orders to 'strictly' follow the Bey's instructions demonstrated the value the Royal Navy placed on their relationship with that regency. It would not help the British war effort if they suddenly found themselves embroiled in a diplomatic squabble with the small Regency. Tunis's goodwill and cooperation was too valuable to lose over an attempt to capture a handful of Frenchmen.

All of that paled in comparison to the situation in Algiers. On 21 April, mere weeks before the official declaration of war, "a most extraordinary circumstance seemingly trivial and of small importance in its origin but which in its consequences has been extremely disagreeable, took place."³³⁵ Dey Mustapha expelled the British consul, John Falcon, forcing him to flee to a British merchant vessel in port until a Royal Navy ship could officially remove him from the regency. Falcon explained the circumstances to Lord Pelham, as he understood them, leading to his expulsion. Apparently, two of his male servants – one a Christian captive in Algiers, the other a servant brought from England – had hidden two Moorish women into an uninhabited part of the house. The women were discovered after a few days and the servants fled. The English servant took refuge in the French Consul's house and confessed. Falcon's attempts to meet with the

³³³ Tuson, 535.; Speller, 20.; Hyneman, 113.

The idea of 'cannon-shot' being the limit of territorial waters was true for all four Barbary States, and for other states at the time. (Hyneman, 113).

³³⁴ DLN, v. 6, 2-3: To Captain Sir William Bolton, 3 May 1803,.

³³⁵ NA FO 8/10 Falcon to Lord Pelham, 22 Apr 1803.

Dey were refused and the consul and his family were forcibly removed and forbidden to return on shore.³³⁶

In the same letter were Falcon's arch nemeses, the Jewish merchants Bacri and Busnach. Falcon claimed they saw in his plight an opportunity, "deemed too favourable by the Jews to be let slip" and the Jews pushed the Dey towards expulsion.³³⁷ Falcon claimed this antipathy stemmed from his complete loyalty to Britain and British interests:

Had I been a creature of the Jews and unmindful of the honor and intents of my country probably this accident (unavoidable for me) would have been overlooked, but as I have frequently observed to Your Lordship when the improbability of detaching me from my duty has made them use every expedient in order to get me out of the country and such will ever be their conduct towards any future Consul who may not be subservient should the present insult be overlooked by His Majesty's government.³³⁸

What Falcon seemed to forget was Algiers and the current Dey had been forced to accept his appointment in 1799, claiming Falcon had 'rendered himself obnoxious.'³³⁹ His behaviour was such the daughter of future consul, Henry Blanckley, described Falcon as, "a gentleman still remembered by the sobriquet of 'the Mad Consul.'"³⁴⁰ Further, Falcon himself had vowed to destroy the Jewish 'credit' with the Dey before he had even arrived in Algiers.³⁴¹ It appeared Bacri and Busnach, instead, would destroy the consul. There is no question Bacri and Busnach had ties with France and had considerable influence with the Dey; Busnach had been essential in ensuring the Dey's ascension to that role, the Bacri's had family in Marseilles, and Busnach had been elected the head of the Jewish community in 1800.³⁴² There is no evidence however, apart from Falcon's

³³⁶ Ibid.; NA FO 8/10 Falcon to the Commander of any of His Majesty's Ships that may arrive in the Bay of Algiers, 22 Apr 1803.

³³⁷ NA FO 8/10 Falcon to Lord Pelham, 22 Apr 1803.

³³⁸ Ibid.; Playfair, *Scourge of Christendom*, 233-4.; Sugden, v. 2, 644-5.

³³⁹ Playfair, *Scourge of Christendom* 229-30..

³⁴⁰ Broughton, 10.

³⁴¹ NA 3/8 Falcon to the Duke of Portland, 8 Jan 1800.

³⁴² Rosenstock, 344-6, 350-1.; Sugden, v. 2, 644.

word, these merchants had anything to do with his dismissal. It is far more probable, if the tone of his communications with the British government and other reports on his behaviour are any indication, the Dey had never liked the consul. Falcon had, once again, ‘rendered himself obnoxious.’ The Dey, and possibly Bacri and Busnach, had simply had enough.³⁴³

Nelson had not been in the Mediterranean a full month before he was thrust into the Falcon affair.³⁴⁴ Nelson understood the seriousness of the incident, describing it as, “an offense...which will never be forgiven by a Moor,”³⁴⁵ and a “crime to a Mahometan [which] was the greatest possible...I believe, had it been any other nation, that his head would have been off,”³⁴⁶ but Nelson also worried about the precedent allowing this sort of insult to stand would send to the regency:

The insolence of the Dey’s Cruisers is beyond whatever I have known, and if we give up one title of what we originally demand, we shall always be troubled with his insolence...Should the business be left to me, I shall go to Algiers, and if the Dey refuses to acquiesce in our demands, instantly take all his Cruisers.³⁴⁷

Nelson was faced with the difficult situation of needing to ensure respect for British agents and thereby the British nation, but was also wary of additional conflicts in the Mediterranean or the loss of a source of victualing. Nelson’s comments about the Dey showing restraint simply because Falcon was British, meant the admiral believed the Dey sensible of both the importance of Britain to Algiers as well as the threat the British Navy posed. Nelson’s repeated reference to the severity of the crime committed in Falcon’s house demonstrated his knowledge of the delicacy of the situation – the offense of the expulsion of the British consul was serious, but so was the crime.

³⁴³ Elizabeth Broughton tells a story in which Falcon, after a race with the French consul for precedence, apparently threw the French consul over a bannister and down a flight of stairs. (Broughton, 10-11.)

³⁴⁴ Knight, *Nelson*, 454.

³⁴⁵ DLN v. 5, 94: To Sir Evan Nepean, Bart., Admiralty, 22 Jun 1803.

³⁴⁶ DLN v. 5, 182; To Sir Evan Nepean, Bart., Admiralty, 26 Aug 1803.

³⁴⁷ DLN v. 5, 94: To Sir Evan Nepean, Bart., Admiralty, 22 Jun 1803.

In a letter to Lord Hobart, Nelson also theorised the Dey might have objected to Falcon's 'low' status:

...he was secretary to the former Consul, and such persons...are held in very low estimation with the Moors. Therefore he never was really well received, or looked upon by the Dey; therefore I can readily believe he did not think the turning away Mr. Falcon (in the ignominious manner he did) the same as if he sent away any other Consul. The crime which was committed in Mr. Falcon's house was the very greatest.³⁴⁸

The idea Falcon was dismissed in part because the Dey did not respect his status of former secretary (not because of machinations of the Jewish traders) meant Nelson entertained the idea that there was more to the relationship between Falcon and the Dey than Falcon claimed; Nelson at least recalled the strain under which the Dey accepted the consul in the first place. Others in the British government likewise assumed Falcon's previous status led to his downfall.³⁴⁹ Nelson was willing to consider the severity of the offense of dismissing the consul might have had different implications for the Dey and the Algerines than for the British – as was the case with regards to Falcon's crime. With only Falcon's word to go on - and Falcon not yet having met Nelson in person – the admiral was hopeful the affair was simply a misunderstanding which, when cleared up, would have no effect on British diplomatic efforts in the Mediterranean.

Unfortunately, Nelson's theory that it was Falcon's prior status as 'secretary' that caused the lack of respect is absurd – the elevation of a consular secretary to the post of consul was standard British practice and regularly occurred in the Mediterranean, and Algiers, without issue.³⁵⁰ It is possible Bacri and Busnach *were* taking advantage of the situation to either rid Algiers of the consul or cause trouble for Britain. Relations between Algiers and France became strained during the peace with corsair attacks on

³⁴⁸ DLN v. 5, 250: To the Right Honourable Lord Hobart, 16 Oct 1803.

³⁴⁹ Black, *British Diplomats*, 174-5.

³⁵⁰ Horn, 162.; Dearden, 211.; Müller, 126.; Bromley, "Robert Cole," 31, 33-4.

"Except in such special cases, the absent diplomat almost invariably named his private secretary to carry on the correspondence and this arrangement would be automatically confirmed by the secretary of state." (Horn, 162).

French ships and Bonaparte threatening to attack the regency.³⁵¹ With the renewal of war, the French had been increasing their presence in Algiers.³⁵² Bacri, with family contacts in France, remained on a friendly footing with the republic, but the two Jewish merchants had contacts with almost *all* of the European representatives in Algiers. That year, the two were instrumental in securing a treaty between Portugal and the Regency. They had helped prevent a break between Britain itself and Algiers in 1800, in addition to securing the peace arrangements for France and Algiers in 1801. They had worked for a Swedish-Algerine treaty in 1795, and the United States during their negotiations with the Regency in the 1790s and after.³⁵³ The French themselves were not thrilled with their close relationship with the Jewish merchants, “France alone used to enjoy the privilege of not being under Jewish influence...Herculais [former French consul] placed himself...under the fist of the Jews...the Jews simultaneously deceive the Dey and the consuls...they ask the questions and give the answers to affairs, and always end them to their own advantage.”³⁵⁴ Bacri and Busnach may have favored the French, but whether they were French agents or working expressly for the benefit of France is by no means clear. As with the Dey, they could have simply found Falcon intolerable and ‘obnoxious’ and taken advantage of an opportunity to remove him.

At the same time Nelson was dealing with the debacle in Algiers (which put all acquisition of supplies from there on hold – no British ships travelled to or from Algiers during the Falcon affair), he was trying to streamline the process for acquiring food for the fleet in the Mediterranean.³⁵⁵ Shortly after arriving, Nelson set to establishing the blockade of Toulon. He discovered the current arrangement would not work – a Mr. Wilkie had been appointed to arrange for provisions at Malta, but refused to supply

³⁵¹ Rosenstock, 354-5.;

³⁵² Black, *European International Relations*, 226.

³⁵³ Rosenstock, 347-8.; Barnby, 167-8195, 197-8, 279.; London, 59-60.; Noah, *Travels*, 149.

³⁵⁴ Rosenstock, 348.

³⁵⁵ See Appendix III: Lloyd’s List (p. 265)..

anywhere else but Malta.³⁵⁶ Nelson needed someone who could contract and deal with the whole Mediterranean, especially those places where British bills from the Victualling Board were not accepted. He needed hard cash. Parts of Italy and Barbary usually only accepted payment in Spanish dollars.³⁵⁷ Wilkie was a normal ‘Agent Victualler’ attached to the base in Malta; he was responsible for managing the base, contacting the Victualling Board in England, and making local contacts for fresh foodstuffs.³⁵⁸ Wilkie’s refusal to operate outside the island led Nelson to request an ‘Agent Victualler Afloat’, or an agent attached to the fleet – not a base. An agent afloat was:

...attached to a particular squadron, under the direct command of the Commander-in-Chief...aside from liaising with Agents Victualler at bases when they were within reach, they also corresponded with merchants and officials near to where their squadron was operating for the purpose of buying fresh provision.³⁵⁹

Nelson was already reporting scurvy in the fleet in July and any delay in acquiring fresh supplies (especially with the situation in Algiers) would only make the situation worse.³⁶⁰ Luckily, Malta continued to receive support from Barbary. In 1803, nearly 4,000 head of cattle (92 per cent) and nearly 13,000 sheep (99 per cent) came from North Africa.³⁶¹

The fleet received cattle from Morocco and Tunis (which was also supplying Malta) that fall, but it needed more.³⁶² Perkins Magra (long-time consul in Tunis) returned to England in early 1803, leaving the consulate in the care of vice-consul, Henry

³⁵⁶ DLN v. 5, 133-4: To Admiral Earl St Vincent, K.B., 12 Jul 1803.; DLN v. 5, 131-2, To Evan Nepean, Bart., Admiralty, 12 July 1803.

³⁵⁷ DLN v. 5, 133-4, To Admiral Earl St Vincent, K.B., 12 Jul 1803.; Knight, *Nelson*, 465.; White, 336: no. 375, to Thomas Troubridge, 20 Oct 1803,.

³⁵⁸ Knight, *Sustaining the Fleet*, 33-4.

³⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 34.

³⁶⁰ DLN v. 5, 133-4: To Admiral Earl St Vincent, K.B., 12 Jul 1803.; Knight, *Nelson*, 467.

³⁶¹ See Appendix IV: Malta Imports (p. 267).

³⁶² NA FO 52/12 Matra to Charles Yorke, 17 Oct 1803.; DLN v. 5, 228-9: to Lieutenant William Pemberton, Resident Agent of Transports, Malta, 7 October 1803.; Knight, *Nelson*, 464.

Clarke. His replacement, Richard Oglander, was not appointed until early 1804.³⁶³ There was an outbreak of yellow fever in Gibraltar in 1803, which lasted until the following year and stopped the base's trade.³⁶⁴ Then there were still issues over British passports. As with Gibraltar and Corsica, Malta's vessels were entitled to protection from the Barbary corsairs, as they were now British. The Admiralty had promised updated passes for Barbary would be sent in late 1802, but Nelson was still asking about them in August 1803. When Nelson dispatched Captain Donnelly to Algiers to report on the situation since Falcon's expulsion, it became apparent the affair over the two Moorish women had been the last straw in a series of disagreements. The real problem was over passports for non-British ships operating in the Mediterranean and both sides had demands. The Dey, who agreed to receive a British consul provided it was not Falcon, wanted restitution for *El Veloce*, an Algerine ship condemned as French in Gibraltar. Britain complained of disrespected passes. According to Falcon, the regency had been taking Neapolitan and Sicilian ships with Maltese passes. In 1802 alone, Algerine corsairs captured nineteen Neapolitan ships. Britain protested against the seizure of the *Ape*, an English ship carrying English cargo, but whose crew had not been sufficiently English.³⁶⁵

Donnelly spoke to Busnach, the *khaznadji*, who was worried about the potential breach in relations between Britain and Algiers, undermining Falcon's belief in Busnach's desire for the overthrow of the British. Busnach admitted that he believed the British correct in regards to the *Ape*, but the Dey had forbidden them to compromise on the issue. Nelson had Ball send copies of the passes to the fleet, and admitted there might have been mistakes on the British side, "...our Vessels make so many mistakes, and call

³⁶³ David Wilson, *List of British Consular Officials in the Ottoman Empire and its former territories, from the sixteenth century to about 1860*. July 2011. Accessed 1 Feb 2014. <http://levantineheritage.com/pdf/List_of_British_Consular_Officials_Turkey%281581-1860%29-D_Wilson.pdf>, 51.

³⁶⁴ Benady, 292.; Sugden, v. 2, 697.; See Appendix III: Lloyd's List (p. 265)..

³⁶⁵ Sugden, v. 2, 644-5.; DLN v. 5, 181-2: To Sir Evan Nepean, Bart., 26 Aug 1803.; Devoulx, 75-82.; DLN v. 5, 92-3: To the Dey of Algiers, 1 Jul 1803.

every Barbary Cruiser an Algerine, that I fear, if we should go to war with that State, that some untoward mistakes may happen.”³⁶⁶ In truth, the passes given to the Neapolitans were problematic; even Falcon admitted their claims were weak when pressed. Due to many of Malta’s ships being destroyed during the French occupation, Ball had been writing passes for foreign ships to allow the supply of provisions to continue. These passes were meant for one journey but reused over and over again, rendering the passes illegal and the ships fair prizes. A similar issue had occurred in Tripoli in late April. The Admiralty solved this issue in part by ordering a change in passports for 1804 for all ships eligible for British protection from the Barbary States. Unfortunately, those passes did not arrive until 1805.³⁶⁷

Nelson received the longed-for Agent Victualler afloat in February 1804, Richard Ford; with his arrival came improvements in the fleet’s arrangements for procuring provisions both at a distance from England or locally. As Gibraltar was again hit by yellow fever, Nelson increasingly saw the value of Malta as a base. More ships travelled from Barbary to Malta in 1804 than in 1803, though British shipping to and from North Africa fell slightly.³⁶⁸ The continued uncertainty in Algiers and sickness in Gibraltar would have left British merchants wary. Changes in government also worked in Nelson’s favor. The peacetime government of Addington fell and William Pitt the Younger returned to power, bringing with him Lord Melville as First Lord of the Admiralty.³⁶⁹

British ally and Moroccan foreign minister, al-Salawi was given even more responsibility within Morocco which further strengthened the British position. Relations between the two countries were so strong Morocco sent a merchant to London to buy armaments and warships, with the British consul in Morocco, Matra, acting as the

³⁶⁶ DLN v. 5, 282-3: To Sir Alexander Ball, Bart., 7 Nov 1803.

³⁶⁷ Sugden, v. 2, 645-6, 649, 652.; DLN v. 5, 282-3: To Sir Alexander John Ball, Bart., 7 Nov 1803.; NA FO 76/5 Alexander Ball to Consul McDonough, 30 Apr 1803.; Bendady, “The Settee Cut,” 282.

³⁶⁸ See Appendix IV: Malta Imports (p. 267).; See Appendix III: Lloyd’s List (p. 265)..

³⁶⁹ Knight, *Nelson*, 465-7.; Sugden, v. 2, 628, 630.;

Moroccan merchant's go-between with British banks. When Bonaparte declared himself Emperor of France, Mawlay Suleiman refused to send congratulations or acknowledge his conquests in Italy.³⁷⁰ Moroccan trade in 1804 was heavily tied up in the garrison at Gibraltar. Earl Camden, Secretary of State for War, wrote Matra expressing the government's concern over Gibraltar's ability to feed itself as well as the need to procure fresh provisions for the use of the fleet and to ask that Matra "give every assistance" in Morocco "to procure such an arrangement of supply" as cheaply as possible.³⁷¹ Matra responded with a detailed description of the methods Morocco supplied Gibraltar already, noting "the King's ships are...supplied at Gibraltar at a rate a trifle lower than the King's troops" and warning it would "shew most clearly how dangerous to the publick interest any innovations would at this time be."³⁷²

Matra's concerns stemmed from the Agent Victualler at Gibraltar entering into a separate contract for live cattle without consulting Matra (who, in 1801, had arranged a standing contract for 2,000 cattle for the Garrison at a reduced rate).³⁷³ Matra explained the provisions trade, "has been for a few years past in the hands of a junto of Jews" in Gibraltar who worked with their co-religionists in Morocco. Matra originally opposed them but realized it was easier to work with them, concluding, "they now supply us on better terms than others can."³⁷⁴ Morocco had a population of nearly 100,000 Jews, many of whom were involved in mercantile pursuits on an international level, particularly with Gibraltar and Leghorn.³⁷⁵ Matra, during his long tenure in Morocco, had managed to build a strong relationship with the state's Jewish population, as demonstrated by an

³⁷⁰ El Mansour, 20-1, 43, 108, 115.; Knight, *Britain Against Napoleon*, 526.; Wilson, *Empire of the Deep*, 434. NA FO 52/12 Matra to Charles Yorke, 23 Apr 1804.; NA FO 52/12 Matra to Earl Camden, 16 Sept 1804.

³⁷¹ NA FO 8/5 Earl Camden to Matra, 18 Aug 1804.; Benady, *Gibraltar*, 64.

³⁷² NA FO 52/12 Matra to Earl Camden, 27 Sept 1804.

³⁷³ *Ibid.*; El Mansour, 114.

³⁷⁴ NA FO 52/12 Matra to Earl Camden, 27 Sept 1804.; Brown, 144-7.

³⁷⁵ El Mansour, 14.; Benady, *Gibraltar*, 64.; Brown, 144-7.; Schroeter, 41.

earlier incident when a supposedly Syrian (actually French) spy was reported there. The spy became quite close to the Spanish consul (troubling when Britain was anxiously awaiting neutral Spain's alliance with France) and was wealthy and generous with his money. But, Matra pointed out, "his principal servants and interpreters are Jews, and I know that I can command the service of the Jewish priesthood in Morocco and of some others there, and I hope in the course of the summer to have him completely surrounded."³⁷⁶ This was a very different attitude towards the Jewish merchants in Morocco than Falcon had in Algiers. The North African Jewish community was a necessary and valuable part of the trade between Barbary and Europe – especially British-held European possessions – and a strong ally when the consul could win their favor.

Meanwhile, the troubles in Algiers continued. By early January, Falcon had repaired aboard the *Victory* and Nelson was preparing to send a strongly worded letter to the Dey regarding the expulsion of the British consul and the capturing of Maltese sailors and ships.³⁷⁷ Captain Keats was chosen to deliver the letter and received detailed instructions from Nelson on how to behave. Keats was not to salute the Dey. He was to deflect any discussion of the Dey's complaints and only discuss the matter of the British consul and the Maltese, agreeing to nothing but complete acceptance of Nelson's terms:

Never appear satisfied with what has been granted, but demand what has not; and leave the question of Peace or War entirely open, so that it may hang over his head.³⁷⁸

Keats' meeting did not go well. The Dey offered to receive another consul and do away with the customary 'presents' given to the regency, but would not hear anything about

³⁷⁶ NA FO 52/12 Matra to Charles Yorke, 6 Jun 1804.; Rodger, *Command of the Ocean*, 531.; Knight, *Nelson*, 458.

³⁷⁷ NA FO 3/10 Falcon to Charles Yorke, 9 Jan 1804.; Sugden, v. 2, 646-7.

³⁷⁸ DLN v. 5, 349-50: Memorandum for the guidance of Captain Keats in his transactions with the Dey of Algiers, 9 Jan 1804,

Falcon or the Maltese issue and stormed off in a rage. Keats withdrew to the fleet waiting offshore and Nelson promptly issued a memorandum to British ships:

The Dey of Algiers having refused to receive the British Consul, all ships are cautioned to beware how they approach the Coast of Algiers, or permit themselves to be boarded by the Algerine Cruisers.³⁷⁹

Lord Hobart warned Nelson, “to forbear proceeding to actual hostilities until you can strike an effective blow against the Algerine cruisers.”³⁸⁰ Without a consul, it was unknown whether the Dey would feel obligated to hold to the treaty protecting British shipping or if the regency would declare war. Nelson may have threatened the possibility of war if the Dey did not give in to his demands, but that did not mean it was the outcome the Admiral desired. Nelson’s views on Barbary had matured since 1799 when he argued, “Terror is the only weapon to wield against these people. To talk kindly to them is only to encourage them.”³⁸¹ He now saw the value of diplomacy – or at least the danger of its absence when already dealing with overstretched resources.³⁸² Nevertheless, no British ships had travelled to or from Algiers since the conflict over Falcon began.³⁸³

Nelson had no intention of attacking Algiers at that time, for all he felt, “we had better be at open War than insulted as we have been.”³⁸⁴ Beyond the danger of a secondary conflict in the Mediterranean, Algiers was a valuable trading partner, victualing supplier, and necessary part of the British strategy in that arena. The neutrality of the North African States was carefully protected. This was demonstrated by the myriad of ways conflicts were solved through diplomatic channels rather than with force, and the scrupulous attention given that neutrality when discussing how the British were

³⁷⁹ DLN v. 5, 379: General Memorandum, 19 Jan 1804.; Sugden, v. 2, 647-9.

³⁸⁰ NA ADM 1/408 no. 27, Lord Hobart to Nelson, 3 Mar 1804.; Sugden, v. 2, 646.

³⁸¹ DLN v. 4, 121: To the Right Honourable Earl Spencer, K.G., 29 Nov 1799.

³⁸² Sugden, v. 2, 646.

³⁸³ See Appendix III: Lloyd’s List (p. 265)..

³⁸⁴ DLN v. 5, 367: To the Right Honourable Lord Minto, 11 Jan 1804.

to gain the upper hand over the French in clashes in the region. Despite Falcon's avowal of treachery, Captain Donnelly's report from the regency and Captain Keats's subsequent negotiations showed it was not Busnach or the Algerine *divan* antagonizing the British, but the Dey.³⁸⁵ And if there was any consistent rule in Ottoman Algerine politics, the Dey was not guaranteed to rule for long. If diplomatic negotiation failed, all Nelson need do is wait for the inevitable change in power and begin negotiations anew.

In stark contrast to Algiers was Tunis. Due to the stability and affability of the Bey, Hammuda Pasha, as well as the value and amount of foodstuffs the regency exported (mainly to Malta) Britain protected Tunisian neutrality.³⁸⁶ The Bey requested extraneous passports from Nelson for a few Dutch vessels sailing with presents for the Bey. Nelson recommended approval for "so reasonable" a request but as the ships were not yet in the Mediterranean, the passes needed to come from the British government in London. He asked pro-consul Clarke to forward any identifying information on to Lord Hobart and directed Clarke:

You will also take this opportunity of assuring his Highness of my earnest wish to do everything in my power to accelerate the arrival of the articles from Holland; and also assure him of my high esteem for his person and character.³⁸⁷

In an effort to forestall any potential issues regarding Malta and the soon-to-be updated Mediterranean passes, Nelson then instructed Clarke to ensure the Bey understood the Maltese would thenceforth be considered British and entitled to all the respect that went along with it. Nelson's aim was to prevent any complaints so, "in future no mistakes can happen by pretended ignorance," of the corsairs.³⁸⁸ Part of maintaining friendly

³⁸⁵ NA FO 8/10 Falcon to Lord Pelham, 22 Apr 1803.; Sugden, v. 2, 645, 646-7.;

³⁸⁶ Macgill, 17, 62.; Panzac, *Barbary Corsairs*, 178.

³⁸⁷ NA FO 335/45 folder 14, Nelson to Clarke, 2 Mar 1804.; DLN v. 5, 434-5: To Henry Clarke, Esq., British proconsul at Tunis, 2 Mar 1804, 434-5.; NA FO 335/45 folder 14, Nelson to His Highness the Bey of Tunis, 22 Mar 1804.

³⁸⁸ NA FO 335/45 folder 14, Nelson to Clarke, 2 Apr 1804.

diplomatic relations with the neutral regency was ensuring both sides agreed on what they were agreeing *to*.

Nelson's warning against "any insult upon the British flag" might seem hostile, but ensuring the Bey was aware of who was allowed passports would prevent false captures and the problems that followed. The situation in Algiers would have been fresh in Nelson's mind, where the conflict was in part over non-British ships bearing British passports. Additionally, the Admiral was already dealing with an issue over an illegally seized ship in Tunis – only this time a British privateer had captured a vessel "fitted out by one of the subjects of the Bey."³⁸⁹ Nelson sought assistance from Lord Hobart and the governor of Gibraltar:

...that the disgraceful conduct of the Privateer in question calls loudly for redress, and may involve unpleasant consequences between our Country and the Bey of Tunis, who very justly demands redress...³⁹⁰

Further, there was worry over the effect this attack on Tunisian interests would have on British relations with that regency. The size of Tunis's corsair fleet and army were not such as to make Britain or the British military apparatus in the Mediterranean truly nervous should they choose to attack; they would be little more than a nuisance from a military standpoint. The danger lay in the regency abandoning her neutrality, declaring for France and cutting off British victualling supply. That access was particularly crucial as the British military infrastructure in Malta increased, and the small regency provided grain and meat for the Maltese civilian population and the British military stationed there.³⁹¹ Though the North Africa's portion of Maltese imports fell in 1804 from 1803 (down to only 70 per cent of cattle and 95 per cent of sheep), the island still received

³⁸⁹ CO 92/1 20 Sept 1804.

³⁹⁰ DLN v. 6, 62: To the Right Honorable Lord Hobart, 8 Jun 1804..

³⁹¹ NA ADM 1/408 no. 126, Nelson to Marsden, 7 Oct 1804.; NA FO 335/45 folder 13, Lord Camden to Clarke, 10 Oct 1804.; Macgill, 101.

over 3,000 head of cattle and a total increase of their sheep imports – a staggering 14,448 sheep, the yearly import total since Britain captured the island.³⁹²

Effectively there had been a break in British-Algiers diplomatic relations, with no consul and no trade, but neither the regency nor Nelson acted as if they were at war. In May, Nelson sent Captain Keats on his second mission to negotiate with the Dey. Nelson suspected Algiers had not chosen to send its corsairs after British ships.³⁹³ Both sides were proceeding with caution. Nelson instructed Keats to find, “an intelligent interpreter” to assist them.³⁹⁴ They had been using the American consul in Algiers, but Nelson thought him, “not quite a faithful interpreter of our communications with the Dey.”³⁹⁵ The American consul had been a former captive in Algiers during the 1780s; he and his countrymen had suspected Britain, smarting from their defeat in the American War of Independence, of scheming with the Algerines against American interests.³⁹⁶ It was possible this animosity remained.

Keats had more success on his second mission. He received a “solemn declaration” from the Dey that no future consul would be treated as Falcon had been and reiterated his willingness to receive a new consul. Keats was also able to find out the particulars on the eleven ships Falcon claimed were seized while transporting products to Malta. Six of them had been seized prior to the 1801 treaty in which Algiers recognized Malta as British and were therefore valid prizes. Additionally, their crews had already been freed. Five Neapolitan ships remained, four of which had illegal passes. As a show of goodwill, the Dey was willing to free the Masters of those ships but the crews were the responsibility of the King of Naples. That left the *Ape*, a British ship with a British

³⁹² See Appendix IV: Malta Imports (p. 267).

³⁹³ DLN, v. 6, 20: To Captain Richard Goodwin Keats, 15 May 1804.; DLN, v. 6, 44-5: to the Right Honorable Lord Hobart, 31 May 1804.

³⁹⁴ DLN, v. 6, 20: To Captain Richard Goodwin Keats, 15 May 1804.

³⁹⁵ DLN, v. 6, 18: To Sir Alexander John Ball, Bart., 14 May 1804.

³⁹⁶ Sugden, v. 2, 647.; Baeppler, *White Slaves, African Masters*, 103.; Barnby, 71.; Irons, 82.

cargo (but Neapolitan crew) and a valid passport. The Dey still demanded restitution for the *El Veloce* in the *Ape*'s place, and there negotiations broke down. Nelson refused to accept half-success and told the Dey that until the *Ape*, her whole crew and apologies for the injustice were delivered to him, he had nothing further to say on the matter: "When your Highness shall have complied with these just claims, I will then send a Consul to Algiers, therefore, from this moment, if an English Consul is not at Algiers, the cause rests entirely with your Highness."³⁹⁷

Nelson had had enough of the issue. As far as the Admiral was concerned, there was nothing more to be done until something in the Regency changed, be it the Dey's attitude or the Dey himself:

I have done with him. He wishes to be thought a Marabout. Next Spring it will be thought necessary to turn the thoughts of the Ministers towards Algiers; but the more we appear to give way, the more insolent he is.³⁹⁸

The British government disagreed. They appointed a new consul, Richard Cartwright, in October.³⁹⁹ Nelson, felt his authority undermined and lamented to Ball in Malta, "I do not expect that the Dey will now give up an atom...the French and Spanish Consuls are both very able, both at Tunis and Algiers."⁴⁰⁰ As Algiers had been granted a new British consul without the concessions demanded, Nelson had no faith he or the new consul would be able to make the regency agree to anything in the future. Britain did not want war with Algiers – especially as it was increasingly likely Spain would ally with France.

Consular issues in all three Ottoman Regencies necessitated new appointments by the end of 1804. Tunis, long managed by Perkins Magra, had been temporarily in the hands of pro-consul Henry Clarke since 1803. In 1804, Richard Oglander was appointed

³⁹⁷ DLN, v. 6, 92-3: To His Highness, the Dey of Algiers, 1 Jul 1804.; Sugden, v. 2, 650

³⁹⁸ DLN, v. 6, 233-4: To the Right Honorable Earl Camden, K.G., 11 Oct 1804.

³⁹⁹ NA FO 3/10 no. 103, Falcon to Earl Camden, 12 Oct 1804.; Wilson, 48.

⁴⁰⁰ DLN, v. 6, 310-1: to Sir Alexander John Ball, Bart., 1 Jan 1805.

as the new consul-general.⁴⁰¹ Tripoli had been managed by Lucas's surgeon and adopted son, Bryan McDonough, since Simon Lucas's death in 1801, In 1804, the British government officially appointed Lucas's old secretary, William Langford, as the new consul.⁴⁰² McDonough had hoped to have his position as proconsul confirmed, and since he was the Portuguese consul, remained in the regency to Langford's consternation.⁴⁰³ By the time Cartwright joined the squadron in late December, the landscape of the war in the Mediterranean had entirely changed – and not for the better.⁴⁰⁴ Three new and inexperienced consuls, a regency under U.S. blockade and another just emerging from two years of conflict: this was not a stable platform for Nelson to base the supply and victualing of his fleet upon.

In December, Spain officially declared war on Britain.⁴⁰⁵ Spain promised ships and troops to the French war effort; Bonaparte's combined fleet now outnumbered the British.⁴⁰⁶ Spanish ships almost immediately began to interfere with the crucial North African-Gibraltar trade, which brought much-needed cattle to the garrison.⁴⁰⁷ Bonaparte, hoping to clear the seas for an invasion of England, issued multiple orders calling for the French fleets at Toulon and the West Indies to combine with the Spanish fleet at Cadiz. Admiral Villeneuve, who had also fought at the Nile, commanded the French fleet in Toulon. After a brief escape in January, the French admiral broke the Toulon blockade in late March and collected the Spanish ships from Cadiz under Vice Admiral Gravina. On 10 April 1805 the combined fleet of 18 ships sailed for Martinique in the West Indies. Nelson, initially supposing the French would go westwards toward Egypt and India, was

⁴⁰¹ Wilson, *Consuls*, 51.

⁴⁰² NA FO 76/5 Langford to the Secretary of State, 16 May 1804.; Dearden, 211.; Wilson, 49.

⁴⁰³ NA FO 76/5 Lucas to the Duke of Portland, 12 January 1800.; NA FO 76/5 Langford to Charles Yorke, 10 July 1804.

⁴⁰⁴ Sugden, v. 2, 651.

⁴⁰⁵ Rodger, 532.; Esdaille, 25.; Sugden, v. 2, 725.; Robson, 105.; Wilson, *Empire of the Deep*, 437.

⁴⁰⁶ Sugden, v. 2, 725.; Rodger, 532.

⁴⁰⁷ Benady, *Gibraltar*, 81.

a month behind when he finally set off across the Atlantic with eleven ships. The British Admiralty, distracted by an internal shake-up, did not initially realize Nelson had left the Mediterranean, which left the supply convoys unprotected. They ordered Vice Admiral Collingwood to take fourteen ships of the line from the Channel Fleet south to Cadiz. Villeneuve captured part of a British convoy in the Caribbean in June. When he learnt Nelson had also crossed the Atlantic, Villeneuve raced back to Europe. Nelson followed, only two days behind, arriving off Gibraltar in late July. Villeneuve's fleet was in Cadiz by mid-August, where the British Mediterranean fleet again placed it under blockade.⁴⁰⁸

While Nelson and the Mediterranean fleet were occupied with the combined fleet's antics, the situation in Barbary at the start of 1805 was not as bad as it had seemed at the end of 1804. In Morocco, where the Marseilles trade had "controlled more trade than all other competitors combined," the French were down to just one trade house in Essaouira at the start of 1805, and would have none by the following year – all French-Moroccan trade from then on being in the hands of Moroccan merchants trading under the British exemption given to neutral states.⁴⁰⁹ British trade out of Essaouira held steady, however.⁴¹⁰ In Algiers, Captain Keats successfully landed the regency's new consul, Richard Cartwright, in early January, restoring British-Algerine relations. Despite Nelson's misgivings, the Dey agreed to renounce his claims on the *El Veloce*, pay compensation for the *Ape*, and free her crew. Nelson told Camden he believed Britain had been returned to 'most favoured nation' status in the Regency:

The Dey having received the Consul, as he expressed himself at the time, 'I receive you without presents;' and our amity with Algiers being, perhaps more firmly established than for many years past, I submit to your Lordship's consideration, whether it would not at this moment cement the friendship, was

⁴⁰⁸ Coleman, 301-320.; Rodger, *Command o the Ocean*, 529-42.; Charles D. Pringle and Mark J. Kroll, "Why Trafalgar Was Won before It Was Fought: Lessons from Resource-Based Theory" *The Academy of Management Executive* (1993-2005) 11, no. 4 (1997): 73.; Sugden, v. 2, 725, 735-46.; Robson, 104-5, 109, 111, 113, 117.; Corbett, *Principles*, 140, 183-4.

⁴⁰⁹ El Mansour, 63-4.

⁴¹⁰ See Appendix III: Lloyd's List (p. 265)..

some presents to be made to the regency, not upon account of the Consul, but as a particular present from his Majesty.⁴¹¹

The Dey had followed through on his promise to Keats, in their first meeting the year before, of receiving the new consul ‘without requiring the normal tribute.’⁴¹² In effect, the Dey acknowledged the special circumstances of this consular appointment. He was, if not admitting his own culpability, symbolically declaring it was not Britain’s fault the change had occurred. Nelson’s recommendation that the British government send presents anyway demonstrated an understanding of how the politics in North Africa worked (as well as his relief at the conclusion of the whole affair). That he had been frustrated and angry about the situation was plain, but his recommendation shows Nelson’s desire to return diplomatic relations between the two states to what they had been, and ensure Britain remained ‘most favoured nation’ in the regency.

Further changes came in the spring. Despite Britain having resolved its strained relations with Algiers, the regency itself was in turmoil. An assassination attempt was made against the Dey in March. In May, Bacri and Busnach were accused of creating a grain scarcity in the Regency.⁴¹³ Algiers had been suffering from low harvests bordering on famine levels since the previous year. Lemnour Merouche described it as, “la récolte de 1805 est catastrophique dans toute l’Algérie.”⁴¹⁴ The Bacri-Busnach merchant house held the export monopoly on grain and public anger was directed at them.⁴¹⁵ That anger boiled over the following month; on 28 June, a janissary killed Busnach himself. This led to a general plundering of the Jewish quarter in Algiers, with nearly every synagogue attacked and between seventy and one hundred Jews were killed. Leading members of

⁴¹¹ DLN, v. 6, 322-3: To Earl Camden, K.G. Secretary of State for the War Department, 16 Jan 1804.

⁴¹² Sugden, v. 2, 648.

⁴¹³ Playfair, 235.; Henri Delmas de Grammont, *Histoire d’Alger sous la domination Turque, 1515-1830* (Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1887), 359-60.; Rosenstock 358.

⁴¹⁴ Merouche, *Monnaies*, 117.; El Mansour, 37-8.

⁴¹⁵ Rosenstock, 352.

the Jewish community took refuge with the European consuls.⁴¹⁶ The public anger at Bacri and Busnach and the assassination of the head of the Jewish community with close personal and professional ties to the Dey did not bode well for Mustafa.⁴¹⁷ An assassination attempt, the murder of his chief financier, a grain scarcity, civil discord, a two-year break with the British, and the threat of violence from the British Royal Navy, all would have shaken confidence in the current Dey. It was unsurprising there was a palace coup in August and Mustafa assassinated. Ahmed, the *agha*'s father-in-law and who held a prior hatred for Bacri and Busnach, became Dey.⁴¹⁸ Ahmed was described as “a man of strong sense and integrity”⁴¹⁹ and “un heureux contrast avec son prédécesseur; il était instruit, de manières affables, d’un caractère calme et résolu.”⁴²⁰ Any lingering worries about the status of British interests in the regency were gone, as the new Dey wasted no time finalizing the redemption of the remaining Maltese in captivity and made promises regarding the Neapolitans as well – something the new Dey did not have to do. Cartwright delivered the presents Nelson initially requested for Mustafa to Ahmed instead, further cementing the new relationship.⁴²¹

Beyond their ability to provide foods for the British in the Mediterranean, the Barbary States had a second role in assisting the British war effort. Barbary's economy was still partially based on corsairing, predation, and sea denial; any country that did not have a treaty with a state in Barbary was automatically a target unless a bigger state offered to protect it. France's long history of friendship with Barbary meant Britain convincing the region to attack their main enemy was not an option. Once Spain allied

⁴¹⁶ Rosenstock, 358-9.; Playfair, 235-6.; Grammont, 360-1.; Ismet Terki-Hassaine, *Relaciones políticas y comerciales entre España y la Argelia otomana (1700-1830)* (Alcalá de Henares, Spain: Universidad de Alcalá Servicio de Publicaciones, 2011), 399.; Valensi, xvii.; Panzac, *Barbary Corsairs*, 236.; Abun-Nasr, 167.

⁴¹⁷ Rosenstock, 360.; Merouche, *Monnaies*, 178, 274.

⁴¹⁸ Rosenstock, 360.; Sugden, v. 2, 654.; Grammont, 363.; Playfair, 236.; Merouche, *Monnaies*, 118.

⁴¹⁹ Playfair, 236.

⁴²⁰ Grammont, 363.

⁴²¹ Playfair, 236.

with France and declared war on Britain, it was a different situation. On 11 January, Camden issued a circular to the consuls in North Africa instructing them to inform the rulers in their respective states Britain was now at war with Spain. It advised the consuls to be vigilant against any ‘mischief’ that might occur but also urge Barbary, “to distress and annoy [Spain] by making captures of their ships and destroying their commerce.”⁴²² When Spain was allied with Britain, Britain endeavoured to discourage attacks on Spanish shipping and had even gone so far as to attempt to negotiate peace treaties on her behalf with North Africa. With the declaration of war, however, Britain was prepared to use every advantage they had. In the Mediterranean, that included threats from the North African corsairs. The three Ottoman Regencies all had sizable fleets. Tripoli, pursuing the Bashaw’s desire to grow his naval strength, had 24 vessels. Tunis had 38 state-owned ships, with another 302 privately operated corsair vessels. Algiers had ten ships, and between 1804 and 1805 they captured 17 prizes worth over 460,000 francs.⁴²³ With the British consuls having the ear of the Barbary governments, able to assure the rulers and corsair captains that the Royal Navy would not interfere should the corsairs attack Spain, British diplomacy worked to assist the British military aims within the Mediterranean.

Barbary continued to supply the British in the Mediterranean while preying on Spanish ships. With the bulk of the combined fleet near or in the Atlantic, Morocco, at the far west of North Africa and its coastline in both the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, became the most crucial. Camden wrote Matra in early April, stressing the need for the consul to provide information on the actions of the other nations in Tangiers (the consular hub in the country) as well as the importance of maintaining good relations with

⁴²² NA FO 8/5 Camden to Matra, 11 Jan 1804.; NA FO 335/46 folder 1, Camden to Oglander, 11 Jan 1804.

⁴²³ Devoulx, 82-6. Paul Sebag, *La Course Tunisienne au XVIII^e siècle* (Tunis, IBLA: 2001), 8., Folayan, *Yūsūf Pāshā*, 27.

the Emperor and his government.⁴²⁴ Camden also reaffirmed the importance of Moroccan trade for supplying the garrison and fleet at Gibraltar. On this point Matra did not need reminding; the consulate in Morocco had Nelson concerned for its finances as the admiral suspected the British consuls there had been providing cattle for the fleet out of their own pocket and purchased it at excessive cost.⁴²⁵

Nelson, on his return from the West Indies, placed a similar primacy on Morocco. After chasing the combined fleet across the Atlantic, Nelson had been unable to access fresh water or procure fresh food, even though the Agent Victualler afloat, Richard Ford, went with the fleet.⁴²⁶ On the return chase, Nelson dispatched Captain Sutton in the *Amphion* to sail ahead, “to Tangier Bay, sending a boat onshore for information to Mr. Matra, the British Consul, to know from him if the Enemy have entered the Straits, or gone into Cadiz; and such other information as may be important for me to be acquainted with.”⁴²⁷ Nelson’s orders echoed those of Camden in April, instructing Matra to monitor the movements of other nations, and speak to the importance of Morocco’s dual coastline. Nelson sent similar instructions to Matra himself, by way of Sutton, and asked for supplies of “bullocks, onions, lemons, and oranges for the ships companies”, which Matra had pre-emptively arranged to be available at Tetuan.⁴²⁸ By late July, Nelson was back off Gibraltar, preparing to join Collingwood’s squadron and replenish his much-diminished stores of food and water. Scurvy had appeared in the fleet in the two months they had been absent from the Mediterranean.⁴²⁹ Nelson’s access to better resources, namely fresh food and water both prior to departure and immediately upon their return to

⁴²⁴ NA FO 8/5 Camden to Matra, 19 Ap 1805.

⁴²⁵ Ibid.; White, *Nelson*, 349: no. 349, to James Cutforth, 10 May 1805,.

⁴²⁶ Sugden, v. 2, 746.; DLN, v. 6, 463: to Captain Keats, 19 Jun 1805.

⁴²⁷ DLN, v. 6, 495: to Captain Sutton, 30 June 1805.; Knight, *Nelson*, 495.; Benady, *Royal Navy at Gibraltar*, 82-3.

⁴²⁸ DLN, v. 6, 466: to J.M. Matra, H.M. Consul at Tangier, 30 June 1805.; Knight, *Nelson*, 495.

⁴²⁹ DLN, v. 6, 473-4: to William Marsden, Admiralty, 20 Jul 1805.; DLN, v. 6, 479: to His Excellency Sir John Acton, Bart., 21 Jul 1805.; DLN, v. 6, 479: To Sir Alexander John Ball, Bart., 21 Jul 1805.; DLN, v. 6, 481: to Rear-Admiral Sir Richard Bickerton, Bart., 21 Jul 1805.

the Mediterranean, allowed the smaller British fleet to be a more effective fighting force as they were in a good state of health and not hampered by sickness as the French and Spanish fleets were. They were better equipped to handle the long blockades, which characterised Nelson's command, as the length of time the fleet could remain at sea was directly related to fresh food (and lemon juice) to hold off scurvy.⁴³⁰

On 18 August 1805, Nelson left for England, his first shore leave in nearly two and a half years, leaving Collingwood in charge of the blockade. When Nelson was on his way back to the Mediterranean in late September, Matra was again directed to pass any available information on the movements and actions of foreign states – specifically France and Spain – to Nelson upon his return.⁴³¹ Nelson sent his ships to Tetuan to refresh their water and food supplies, in an attempt to keep the Mediterranean fleet prepared for any attempt by the combined fleet in Cadiz escaping – a resource the combined fleet blockaded in port did not have access to.⁴³² Villeneuve grew desperate when he learned Bonaparte intended to replace him. When Nelson sent six more ships to Tetuan for fresh provisions and water, Villeneuve put the combined fleet to sea; they outnumbered the British fleet thirty-three to twenty-seven. At mid-day on 21 October 1805, the Battle of Trafalgar began.⁴³³

The peace had brought the highest rates of British shipping to and from Barbary (excepting 1796) since the war began. Britain had ended the war having caught up to the French position in North Africa. Similarly, North African intra-Mediterranean shipping increased. When war resumed, both British shipping and Barbary shipping slumped – though not as significantly on Barbary's end.

⁴³⁰ Knight, *Sustaining the Fleet*, 213.; Robson, 117.

⁴³¹ NA FO 8/5 Castlereagh to Matra, 14 Sept 1805.

⁴³² NA ADM 1/411 no. 299, Collingwood to Marsden, 12 Sept 1805.; White, 447: no. 502, To Rear Admiral Thomas Louis, 2 Oct 1805.; DLN, v. 7, 63: To William Marsden, Admiralty, 2 Oct 1805.; DLN, v. 7, 77: to Vice Admiral Collingwood, 5 Oct 1805.; Pringle, "Why Trafalgar," 73-4, 76.

⁴³³ Coleman, 301-320.; Rodger, *Command of the Ocean*, 529-42.; Pringle, "Why Trafalgar," 73.; Benady, *The Royal Navy at Gibraltar*, 82-3.; Orde, *Shadow*, 187.




Figure 3: British Shipping to/from Barbary, 1802-1805

<i>Year</i>	Ships originating from Barbary	Ships from Elsewhere
1802	1400	1134
1803	1108	1269
1804	1257	1159
1805	1085	1445

Figure 4: Malta Public Secretary's Report: Number of Ships at Malta and Origins, 1802-1805

The Falcon affair, and the subsequent break in British-Algerine diplomatic arrangements is certainly part of the decrease in British shipping during Nelson's time as Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean squadron. Tripoli's war with the United States would likewise have cut into both British and Barbary shipping figures. Yet the amount that shipping was transporting was still high; 1802 was the first year Matra's contract for 2,000 cattle for the Gibraltar Garrison went into effect and Malta continued to receive an average of 4,300 cattle from North Africa each year. The amount of sheep sent to Malta from Barbary also skyrocketed – it had doubled from 1801 to 1802 and finally peaked at nearly 19,000 in 1805.⁴³⁴ The drop in shipping to and from Barbary, as well as the anxiety felt amongst the officers in the fleet, demonstrated the importance of a functioning diplomatic corps in North Africa to the war effort. Nelson's reliance on North Africa for fresh supplies after his race across the Atlantic in pursuit of the French

⁴³⁴ See Appendix IV: Malta Imports (p. 267).

Fleet, and his ability to send his ships to nearby (and friendly) Morocco immediately prior to the battle of Trafalgar demonstrated the importance of diplomacy for maintaining valuable supply lines, an importance underscored by the sickly condition of the French and Spanish combined fleet. After spending the previous war and the first years this war fighting, diplomatically, for dominance along the northern coast of Africa, the victor of this battle would be able to set the tone in the Mediterranean in the aftermath.

CHAPTER FIVE: 1805-1810

On 21 October 1805, the British Royal Navy defeated the combined French and Spanish fleets. Nelson died in battle; his second-in-command, Vice Admiral Cuthbert Collingwood, assumed control of the Mediterranean fleet.⁴³⁵ Nelson and Collingwood were contemporaries and close friends. Nelson referred to Collingwood as “my dear/dearest friend,” “my dear Collingwood,” and most frequently, by the informal “My dear Coll.”⁴³⁶ Nelson’s death, in addition to Collingwood’s personal grief, meant the new Commander-in-Chief inherited command of the entirety of the British Mediterranean force (along with 17 prizes) as a hurricane approached the Spanish coast. The storm battered the damaged ships. Though the British fleet survived intact, they only managed to retain four prizes (some were retaken by the French or escaped, but twelve sank or ran aground during the storm).⁴³⁷

The storm that followed the battle of Trafalgar paralleled Collingwood’s tenure as Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean. The battle itself had been won, but the hard work was just beginning – the benefits of victory had to be protected. Trafalgar won the British an unchallenged command of the sea but it had not won them the war. Bonaparte was still master on land.⁴³⁸ The battle won the British freedom of movement for troops and supplies for herself and her allies, even when Bonaparte shut off mainland Europe under the Continental System. The Mediterranean remained a critical front, though no more major sea battles would be fought there. The long-standing symbiotic relationship Britain maintained with the four Barbary States would be one of Britain’s strongest assets in the region. The goodwill and privileged position Britain had

⁴³⁵ W. Clark Russell, *Collingwood* (London: Methuen and Co., 1891), 156, 173.; Robson, 142, 163.

⁴³⁶ DLN, v. 1-7: Nelson was using “my dear Coll” as early as 1785.

⁴³⁷ Rodger, *Command of the Ocean*, 542-3, 549-50.; Knight, *Nelson*, 522-3. Russell, 156, 173.; Adams, 219.

⁴³⁸ Gardiner, 9.

developed in North Africa since Napoleon's invasion of Egypt became monumentally important during Collingwood's time as Commander-in-Chief.

Collingwood's first priority however, was to care for the wounded from the battle and storm, whatever their nationality. Collingwood arranged for an exchange of wounded with the governor of Cadiz, and received a pledge of 'Spanish honour' that British wounded ashore would be cared for. The governor also offered the use of Spanish hospitals.⁴³⁹ The French were blamed for the defeat and did not receive the same solicitous attention the British did. To demonstrate his gratitude, the governor of Cadiz sent Collingwood a cask of wine, which Collingwood reciprocated with English cheese and porter. Despite still being at war, Collingwood's humanity had endeared him to Spain and would be remembered.⁴⁴⁰ After the wounded had been seen to, Collingwood sent the most damaged ships back to England for repairs, including the *Victory* with Nelson's body. Then Collingwood, promoted to Vice Admiral of the Red in November, re-established the blockade of Cadiz, where the remnants of the Combined Fleet had taken refuge.⁴⁴¹

Collingwood sought to improve the British relationship with Barbary, which the British in the Mediterranean depended on for fresh food and water. After Trafalgar, British relations with Barbary were the strongest they had ever been. The new Dey of Algiers, Ahmed, fulfilled his promise to free the remaining Maltese captives in the regency.⁴⁴² Devoize, French consul in Tunis, repeatedly complained of Anglo-Maltese privateers attacking and capturing French ships. Worse, a French-captured British

⁴³⁹ Murray, *Collingwood*, 188-9.; Knight, *Nelson*, 523.

⁴⁴⁰ Murray, 188-9, 200.; Knight, *Nelson*, 523.; Adams, 251-2.

⁴⁴¹ Knight, *Nelson*, 527.; Rodger, *Command of the Ocean*, 542-3.; Murray, 199.; Adams, 219.; Patricia Crimin, "'A Great Object with Us to Procure this Timber...': the Royal Navy's Search for Ship Timber in the Eastern Mediterranean and Southern Russia, 1803-1815." *International Journal of Maritime History* 4, no. 2 (1992), 83, 113.; Tom Pocock, *Stopping Napoleon: War and Intrigue in the Mediterranean* (London: John Murray, 2004), 47.

⁴⁴² NA CO 158/10 Alexander Ball to Viscount Castlereagh, 26 Dec 1805.

privateer had to be returned as the French had violated Tunis's neutrality.⁴⁴³ After the United States' failed attempt to replace the Bashaw of Tripoli, Yusuf Karamanli, with his exiled brother, the US-Tripoli war ended after four years, shortly before the Battle of Trafalgar.⁴⁴⁴ Despite the war's heightened place in the American canon, immortalized by the "Marine's Hymn" of the United States Marine Corps, Tripoli's strong naval presence, led by Scottish renegade Murad Reis (Peter Lyle) had rendered the American blockade obsolete; the war's length and fear of his ousted brother forced the Bashaw to finally agree to peace. President Thomas Jefferson's refusal to pay tribute to the regency for the maintenance of peace, which Jefferson saw as a 'bribe', had caused the initial breach when the Bashaw discovered Tripoli received less than either Algiers or Tunis. Jefferson and the U.S. Congress were no better off after the war; to free the captured Americans, cost the country \$60,000 (plus loss of the USS *Philadelphia*), so an imperfect victory.⁴⁴⁵ Peace with the United States also brought about a shift in his relationship with France. Yusuf blamed the French for encouraging war with the United States and after the French defeat at Trafalgar, favoured the British. The French consul in Tripoli lamented, "Tout le pays, d'ailleurs en général est dévoué aux Anglais, et avides de nouvelles qui nous sont contraires."⁴⁴⁶ In contrast, British consul, Langford, wrote of "...the perfect tranquillity and health in this Country, and that in consequence of the late rains, a plentiful harvest is expected."⁴⁴⁷ With the garrisons, local population of Malta, and the fleet to support, a peaceful (and bountiful) Tripoli was of great importance.⁴⁴⁸

⁴⁴³ Plantet, *Tunis*, v. 3, 462-3: no. 861 Devoize a Tallyrand, 7 Sept 1805.; 463-3: no. 866 Devoize a Tallyrand, 9 Nov 1805.; 464: no. 868 Devoize a Tallyrand, 26 Jan 1806.

⁴⁴⁴ Dearden, 210-1.; Folayan, "Tripoli and the War with the USA," 262-266.; 133-47.; Folayan, *Yūsūf Pāshā*, 32-42.

⁴⁴⁵ Dearden, 151-210.; Folayan, "Tripoli", 264-6.; NA FO 76/6 Langford to Earl Camden, 9 April 1805.; NA FO 76/6 Langford to Earl Camden, 5 Jun 1805.; Baepler, *White Slaves, African Masters*, 9.; Allison, 24-6, 31.; Jeremy Black, *The War of 1812 in the Age of Napoleon* (London: Continuum, 2009), 124-5.

⁴⁴⁶ Dearden, 210-1.

⁴⁴⁷ NA FO 76/6 Langford to Lord Viscount Castlereagh, 20 Mar 1806.

⁴⁴⁸ Abun-Nasr, 199.

Increased North African support post-Trafalgar was even more important as Bonaparte continued to dominate the war on land. Barbary ships took over the intra-Mediterranean shipping the normal European carriers could no longer undertake. Many smaller corsair captains made the transition to merchant shipping following Trafalgar.⁴⁴⁹ After Trafalgar, the number of privateers who used Malta's ports increased – but they were not coming from Barbary. Across the Mediterranean, despite the increasing presence of Barbary vessels, a mere 10 per cent (average) were corsairs.⁴⁵⁰ During the first five years of the nineteenth century, Tunis had over 300 privately owned corsair vessels. Over the next five years, that number dropped to just 23, and stayed low for the remainder of the war. In contrast, Daniel Panzac, accounts for 305 Tunisian vessels operating in Europe from 1801, when Britain conquered Malta, through to the end of the war in 1815.⁴⁵¹ The other Barbary States developed sizable merchant fleets as well, though Tunis had the largest and was historically the most interested in trade. Panzac records 177 vessels for Algiers, 228 for Tripoli and 108 for Morocco. Of those 818 merchant ships, over half were calling on Malta (and 90 per cent of those calling on Malta came from Tunis or Tripoli).⁴⁵² As Barbary shipping increased, so did British shipping to and from Barbary; after Trafalgar, the number of British ships travelling to Barbary increased. The average during Nelson's tenure had been 11 ships but 1806 saw 15 ships.⁴⁵³ The British victory at the Battle of Trafalgar had left the Mediterranean effectively in the hands of the British, and Barbary's trade flourished.

News of the French defeat at sea reached England at the same time as news of further French victories on the Continent. Whilst Trafalgar had secured British control of the seas, it had not turned the tide of the war. Bonaparte redoubled his efforts in Europe

⁴⁴⁹ Panzac, *Barbary Corsairs*, 75 163-74.

⁴⁵⁰ Panzac, *Barbary Corsairs*, 170.; See Appendix IV: Malta Imports (p. 267).

⁴⁵¹ Sebag, *La Course*, 8.; Panzac, *Barbary Corsairs*, 169.

⁴⁵² Panzac, *Barbary Corsairs*, 169.

⁴⁵³ See Appendix III: Lloyd's List (p. 265)..

and sought economic strategies to defeat Great Britain.⁴⁵⁴ In February 1806, French forces invaded Naples. The Kingdom of the Two Sicilies had been problematic since the Treaty of Amiens, with both France and Britain fighting for control. Supposedly a secret ally of Britain, the kingdom had been under increasing French pressure until finally Bonaparte's forces invaded. The loss of Sicily left Malta even *more* dependent on shipments from North Africa.⁴⁵⁵

Unfortunately, the situation in Barbary was far from perfect. After poor grain harvests, the Bey of Tunis passed a prohibition against its export in 1806.⁴⁵⁶ Elsewhere, the Ottoman regencies and Morocco were plagued by consular worries and difficulties. Though none of these were as extreme as the problems over John Falcon in Algiers, they caused unease and delays in victualing and support. In Tripoli, Langford continued to prove he was unequal to the task of countering his competitor, McDonough, or handling local politics.⁴⁵⁷ With Tunis prohibiting grain exports to Malta, such a person controlling the arrangements for exports from Malta's other principal North African supplier was a serious problem. In Morocco, long-time consul James Matra died on 29 March 1806 after nearly twenty years in Morocco.⁴⁵⁸ James Green was appointed to replace Matra in early April.⁴⁵⁹ Morocco was crucial to supplying the squadrons in the Atlantic and western Mediterranean as well as Gibraltar. The loss of over 20 years stability provided by James Matra, regardless of his successor's competence, raised concern in the beginning of Collingwood's command when so much of his attention was on maintaining a blockade within Morocco's sphere of influence.

⁴⁵⁴ Esdaile, *The French Wars*, 32.; Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery* (London: Fontana Press, 1991), 153.; Speller 45, 48.; Holland, 15.

⁴⁵⁵ Esdaile, *The French Wars*, 26.; Murray, 199.; Gregory, *Malta*, 207.; Goodwin, *Malta*, 40.

⁴⁵⁶ Macgill, 122.; El Mansour, 378.

⁴⁵⁷ Dearden, 211.

⁴⁵⁸ Knight, *Nelson*, 495.; Wilson, *Consuls*, 53.; Frost, 138.; Buffa, 45-6.; NA FO 8/5 Castlereagh to Matra, Jan 1806.; NA 8/5 Windham to James Green, 8 Apr 1806.; NA FO 52/13 Salvador Abizdazar to Castlereagh, 2 Apr 1806.

⁴⁵⁹ Wilson, *Consuls*, 53.; NA FO 52/13 Downing Street to James Green, Apr 1806.; NA FO 8/5 Windham to James Green, 8 Apr 1806.

And then there was Algiers. Richard Cartwright had officially replaced Falcon in October 1804 but only arrived in January 1805. By late 1805 it was clear his tenure would also be a failure. Despite his early successes and the fortuitous election of a new Dey, Cartwright lamented that Bacri, imprisoned after the troubles of the previous summer, had been released and was back in the service of the French:

...unless a different line of conduct be adopted [by the British government], it will be impossible for any consul worthy of His Majesty's choice, to maintain his ground here.⁴⁶⁰

Unable to work with the Dey or the *divan*, Cartwright quit on 22 February 1806 citing the 'horrors and indignities' he had experienced as the reason.⁴⁶¹ He attempted to justify his actions by arguing, "Very soon after my arrival I perceived that it was utterly impossible for any one worthy of bearing His Majesty's commission to maintain harmony between the two countries."⁴⁶² Collingwood, doubting this tale, opened an official inquiry into Cartwright's behaviour and Henry Blanckley became the new consul.⁴⁶³ A veteran of the American War of Independence and formerly consul for the Balearic Islands, Blanckley disproved Cartwright's prophesy of doom.⁴⁶⁴ His wife's journal, edited by their daughter, Elizabeth Broughton, of their 'Six Years Residence of Algiers' showed Blanckley was accepted from the start. After landing in Algiers on 9 October, 1806, the new consul met the Dey the following day:

The Dey received Mr Blanckley very graciously, although on his offering him his hand to salute, Mr B. respectfully, but in the firmest manner, declined doing so, as being an homage he only felt due to his own Sovereign. The Dey looked earnestly at him, whilst the Dragoman interpreted Mr B.'s answer, then good-humouredly held out his hand, and shook Mr B.'s very heartily.⁴⁶⁵

⁴⁶⁰ Playfair, 236-7.; Rosenstock, 360-1.

⁴⁶¹ Playfair, 237.

⁴⁶² Ibid.

⁴⁶³ Ibid., 238.; NA FO 3/10 Downing Street to Mr Blanckley, 26 May 1806.

⁴⁶⁴ Playfair, 238.; Broughton, 2, 261.

⁴⁶⁵ Broughton, 3-4.; Playfair, 238-9.

Any misunderstandings or awkwardness over Blanckley's introduction to the Dey was handled with a grace that Cartwright, and even Falcon, had evidently lacked. The previous three years had been characterised by the failure of British diplomacy in Algiers. Blanckley was already an experienced diplomat and his first encounter with the Algerine Dey demonstrated the strength to be gained from having *skilled* consuls.

Yet as 1806 progressed, the worries of the beginning of the year drifted away.

Consul Green in Morocco took his instructions seriously:

One of the most important objects of your mission is to take care that every possible assistance be afforded in procuring supplies of livestock, corn, vegetables, and water and all kinds of provisions for His Majesty's fleets and for his garrisons of Gibraltar and Malta.⁴⁶⁶

More importantly, the agriculture of the country was flourishing in the aftermath of the turmoil of 1799-1801. John Buffa, an English doctor travelling in Morocco in 1806 described the countryside as "cultivated to the very summits," and "covered with immense flocks of sheep, and herds of cattle."⁴⁶⁷ Buffa also remarked positively on the British efforts in Morocco, particularly their ally, Al-Salawi, Morocco's chief minister and governor of Tangiers.

You will no longer apprehend the ascendancy of the French in this part of the world, as it is all over with them; nor will they ever succeed as long as this excellent Moorish Chief guides the councils of the Emperor.⁴⁶⁸

Even better news came late that summer, when the French were attempting to gain recognition across Barbary for their Italian conquests, namely Naples, so they too would be exempt from corsair attacks.⁴⁶⁹ Morocco refused to accept French-conquered Italy; Tunis was also reluctant to acknowledge the conquest.⁴⁷⁰ Blanckley's initial success with

⁴⁶⁶ NA FO 52/12 Downing Street to Mr. Consul Green, Apr 1806.; NA FO 8/5 Windham to James Green, 8 Apr 1806.

⁴⁶⁷ Buffa, 33.

⁴⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 213.; NA FO 52/13 Dr John Buffa to John Ross, Acting Consul-General, Tangiers, 17 May 1806.

⁴⁶⁹ El Mansour, 115.; Plantet, *Tunis*, v. 3, 465: no. 872, Tallyrand a Devoize, 20 Jun 1806.; 465-7: no. 873, Devoize a Hammuda, Bey de Tunis, 24 Jun 1806.

⁴⁷⁰ El Mansour, 115.; Plantet, *Tunis*, v. 3, 468-9: no. 872, Devoize a Tallyrand, 20 Nov 1806.

the Dey of Algiers continued; a few weeks after his arrival he interceded on behalf of a captured Maltese privateer to free its crew (convincing the Dey of the machinations of the French consul in the process).⁴⁷¹ Blanckley further secured the Dey's support for the British the following month and reported, "the conduct of the French consul has been extremely obnoxious to the Dey."⁴⁷² A dangerous charge for a consul, apparently, as the Dey had the offending consul arrested, leaving the French consul in Tunis to remark, "Les Anglais sont les instigateurs avérés de ces violences."⁴⁷³

Nowhere was the difference greater than in Tripoli. The Bashaw's favour for Britain led to an increase in transports and the start of an era of prodigious cattle shipments to Malta.⁴⁷⁴ This increase was part of a larger Mediterranean increase of merchant shipping to Malta generally, as well as merchant shipping originating from North Africa (as opposed to corsair ships).⁴⁷⁵ Over the course of 1806, eighteen separate shipments of livestock (principally cattle, but also sheep, mules, and horses) were shipped from Tripoli to Malta.⁴⁷⁶ With Sicily threatened by the French, Tripoli's trade was of even greater importance. In 1806, nearly all (92 per cent) of cattle imported to Malta came from North Africa (and 92 per cent of sheep as well).⁴⁷⁷ Even more impressive than the number of cattle were the number of shipments, their regularity, and their international nature. Ships from Malta, Tripoli, the Ionian Republic, and Tunis were listed as the carriers meaning the British did not have to waste ships or effort supplying their garrison at Malta. The neutral states of North Africa, along with small vessels from Malta and Ottoman Greek merchant ships filled the gap the war had created in

⁴⁷¹ NA FO 3/10 Blanckley to Wyndham, 16 Oct 1806.

⁴⁷² NA FO 3/10 Blanckley to Wyndham, 21 Nov 1806.

⁴⁷³ Plantet, *Tunis*, v. 3, 468: no. 876, Devoize a Tallyrand, 12 Oct 1806.

⁴⁷⁴ NA FO 76/7 Langford to Earl of Liverpool, 20 Feb 1810.

⁴⁷⁵ Panzac, *Barbary Corsairs*, 177-9.; Galani, 104, 107, 172, 312, 313.; Abulafia, *The Great Sea*, 528.

⁴⁷⁶ NA FO 76/6 Langford to Windham, 31 Dec 1806 – "Return of Cattle sent this year to Malta."; NA FO 76/6 Langford to Windham, 7 Aug 1806.; NA FO 76/6 Langford to Windham, 16 Sept 1806.; NA FO 76/6 Langford to Windham, 15 Oct 1806.; NA FO 76/6 Langford to Windham, 12 Nov 1806.:

In total, Tripoli exported 690 head of cattle and 900 sheep to Malta over the course of 1806.

⁴⁷⁷ See Appendix IV: Malta Imports (p. 267).; See Appendix III: Lloyd's List (p. 265)..

transporting merchandise across small distances in the Mediterranean.⁴⁷⁸ Combatants were in danger of attack so vessels of nations outside the conflict – neutrals – reaped the mercantile benefits. The frequency also demonstrated the importance – and justified the British concern – for ensuring the Barbary States had recognized Malta’s new status as British. None of this trade would have been possible if the island had not been included in the Barbary treaties concerning who received British Mediterranean passports.

By the end of 1806, Collingwood’s concerns in Barbary had resolved themselves while the wider war moved in France’s favour. From conquered Berlin, Bonaparte issued his “Berlin Decrees” in November, an attempt to defeat Britain through economic warfare by prohibiting British trade with conquered Europe.⁴⁷⁹ The British responded with several ‘Orders in Council,’ effectively placing the whole of the continent under blockade. Combined, these two initiatives eliminated any concept of neutrality – non-combatant nations were forced to trade with Europe on terms set by either France or Britain. As Barbary’s neutrality was beneficial to Britain, too valuable to risk alienation or North Africa declaring for France, the region was allowed to maintain her neutrality in spite of the Orders in Council or Berlin Decrees. Others, such as the United States, would not be so lucky. Tensions escalated between Britain and her former colonies in June, when HMS *Leopard* attacked the USS *Chesapeake* shortly after the *Chesapeake* left to relieve US ships patrolling the Mediterranean in the aftermath of the US-Tripoli war. President Jefferson declared an embargo on exports in an attempt to punish Britain (and to a lesser extent, France) for violating neutrality rights.⁴⁸⁰ Bonaparte’s edicts led to

⁴⁷⁸ Galani, 5, 101, 104, 107, 144-5.

⁴⁷⁹ Davey, *Transformation*, 1.; Galani, 313-4.

⁴⁸⁰ Allison, 207-8.; Forbes, “European Wars and Boston Trade,” 720-5.; Black, *War of 1812*, 26.; Andrew Lambert, *The Challenge: Britain Against America in the Naval War of 1812* (London: Faber and Faber, 2012), 7, 27-9, 136-7.; Bayly, 99.; Robson, 183-4, 201.

renewed fears in London over the potential revival of the “League of Armed Neutrality,” especially with Russia’s increasingly hostile attitude.⁴⁸¹

In November, Collingwood sent Admiral Duckworth to the eastern Mediterranean to put pressure on the Ottoman Empire. Duckworth’s mission failed leading to the Anglo-Turkish ‘phoney’ war of 1807.⁴⁸² The British had learned from France’s experience in Egypt. When Bonaparte invaded, the Ottoman Empire issued a *firman*, ordering her Barbary regencies to declare war on France. In 1807, to prevent the same break the British Secretary of State and Collingwood each wrote to the Barbary consuls to report on “what sensation the probability of a rupture between Great Britain and the Porte” had caused, and whether there was “any declaration...of [their] determination to maintain his friendship with England inviolate.”⁴⁸³ Constantinople certainly made her regencies aware of the ‘rupture’ with Britain, but did not require Barbary to declare war this time. The French invasion of Egypt had allowed Britain to overcome French dominance in North Africa. War with the Ottoman Empire would place Britain in a tricky situation diplomatically in North Africa, right as the region’s value was increasing to the British war effort. With British dominance assured after the Battle of Trafalgar, Britain would have been worried about any loss of standing, much less of trade and supply.⁴⁸⁴ Tunis, ever mindful of her neutrality, did not openly declare for Britain, but did require a new treaty from Consul Oglander.⁴⁸⁵ The strongest support

⁴⁸¹ Rory Muir, *Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon 1807-1815* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), 7-8, 23.; Esdaile, *The French Wars*, 39.; Esdaile, *The Peninsular War*, 2.; Rodger, *Command of the Ocean*, 550.; Hall, *Wellington’s Navy*, 111-2.; Hyneman, 64-5, 111.; Kennedy, 161-2.

⁴⁸² Muir, *Britain*, 8.; Rodger, *Command of the Ocean*, 551-2.; Pocock, *Stopping Napoleon*, 61-2.; Speller, 116-7, 121.; Robson, 164.

⁴⁸³ NA FO 335/46 folder 4, Collingwood to Oglander, 4 Apr 1807.; Circular: NA FO 8/5 Castlereagh to Green, 10 May 1807.; NA ADM 1/413 no. 102 Collingwood to Marsden, 23 May 1807.

⁴⁸⁴ NA FO 76/6 Langford to William Wyndham, 20 Feb 1807.

⁴⁸⁵ Moalla, 62.

came from Algiers and Tripoli. The Dey assured Blanckley the conflict would not affect Britain's friendship with Algiers.⁴⁸⁶ In Tripoli, Langford reported:

From a conversation I had with the Bashaw...I have every reason to be assured that...he will not only remain neutral, as I observed in my last [letter], but act wholly as you may instruct me to request of him.⁴⁸⁷

The rest of Langford's letter confirmed those promises; the Bashaw hinted at a forthcoming abundant harvest, beneficial to the British, and concluded with, "a Supply of Cattle is this day exported to Malta."⁴⁸⁸

Of more concern than the 'phoney' war between Britain and the Ottomans was the actual war between Algiers and Tunis in 1807. Tensions between the two Regencies erupted in open warfare in 1807. They had a long history of antagonism before Bey Hammuda declared war on Algiers and dispatched 40,000 men to Constantine in March.⁴⁸⁹ Unfortunately for Tunis, the first battle was a total rout.⁴⁹⁰ In response, the Bey sent a new force, led by Yusuf Sahib al-Tabi', to the Algerine border in May. This time the Tunisians were successful, taking 7,000 prisoners.⁴⁹¹ Unfortunately the Bey lost his Ottoman political patron with the overthrow of Sultan Selim III.⁴⁹² The coup in Constantinople, and subsequent fear of the lack of Ottoman support prevented Hammuda taking his army into Algiers, but it did allow Tunis to cease payments to Algiers and regain full diplomatic autonomy from Algiers.⁴⁹³ After the worry about the reception the news of the Anglo-Ottoman war would have in Barbary, and Algiers's history of

⁴⁸⁶ NA FO 3/11 Blankley to Castlereagh, 16 Jul 1807.

⁴⁸⁷ NA FO 76/6 Langford to Wyndham, 14 Mar 1807.

⁴⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁸⁹ Moalla, 18, 37, 54-55, 56-7.; Macgill, 44.; Broughton, 33.; Plantet, *Tunis*, v. 3, 470: no. 883, Devoize a Tallyrand, 29 Mar 1807.; NA FO 3/11 Blanckley to Windham, 7 Apr 1807.; NA ADM 1/413 no. 102, Collingwood to Marsden, 23 May 1807.

⁴⁹⁰ Moalla, 56-7.; Broughton, 35.; Plantet, *Tunis*, v. 3, 470: no. 884, Devoize a Tallyrand, 14 May 1807.; Macgill, 44.

⁴⁹¹ Moalla, 56-7.; Plantet, *Tunis*, v. 3, 471: no. 887, Devoize a Tallyrand, 15 Jul 1807.; Macgill, 49-50.; Abun-Nasr, 183.

⁴⁹² Moalla, 56-7.; Hale, 15-6.

⁴⁹³ Macgill, 49-50.; Moalla, 57.; Anderson, "Great Britain," 88-9.

Since the 1756 war between Algiers and Tunis, when Algiers invaded the smaller Regency and restored the Husaynid line to the throne, Tunis had been required to pay Algiers a yearly sum and acknowledge Algiers' dominance in regional affairs. (Moalla, 44).

complicating diplomacy in the Mediterranean, the Tunisian victory in 1807 would have been especially good news for the British in the Mediterranean.⁴⁹⁴

The British were so successful in remaining on the good side of the Barbary States, it drew the indignant notice of the French. Devoize, French consul at Tunis, lamented to his superiors in Paris:

Les Anglais n'épargnent aucun sacrifice pour conserver leurs liaisons avec les Régences, quoiqu'en guerre avec le Grand Seigneur. Je n'ai pas dissimulé au Bey, il y a deux jours, qu'on ne pouvait s'empêcher de remarquer que, dans une circonstance semblable, il avait tenu une conduite bien différente avec la France.⁴⁹⁵

Since, like the French in 1798, the British landed troops in Egypt in March, Devoize's comment is particularly telling.⁴⁹⁶ In 1798, the Ottoman Empire had commanded her regencies to declare war on France and they complied; in 1807, silence. Whether affected by the disruption in Ottoman politics resulting from the overthrow of Selim III or a lack of fear of reprisals from the diminished status of French sea power after Trafalgar, Barbary felt secure enough to continue trading and working with the British despite the Anglo-Ottoman war. This was very different from the British position in 1793.

Summer 1807 saw diplomatic issues in all four Barbary States. While none of the issues caused a break, they added to the difficult situation in the Mediterranean, compounding several small issues into one large, North African problem. On Tunis, Collingwood wrote:

We are upon very ticklish ground with all the Barbary States and the Port of Tunis swarms with French Privateers; our consuls do not manage these affairs well.⁴⁹⁷

⁴⁹⁴ Panzac, 178, 181. Noah, 392-3.

⁴⁹⁵ Plantet, *Tunis*, v. 3 471: no. 887, Devoize a Tallyrand, 15 Jul 1807.

⁴⁹⁶ Rodger, *Command of the Ocean*, 551.

⁴⁹⁷ PCC 215: no. 135. To Capt Hallowell, 22 Jul 1807.;

As with Nelson and Zembra, Collingwood was reluctant to attack the French in case of a breach with Tunis. The French privateers' nuisance was small compared to the potential danger of losing Tunisian support and supplies.⁴⁹⁸ Collingwood's lament over British consuls, 'not managing affairs well,' was a common complaint of his. Shortly after assuming command of the Mediterranean fleet, he argued:

Our affairs with the Barbary States, which are now become very important, should only be entrusted to persons who are sufficiently dextrous to conform to manners so perfectly different from those of Europeans.⁴⁹⁹

In Collingwood's opinion, the men 'entrusted' with the consular posts in Barbary were rarely so 'dexterous'. Collingwood would have agreed with T.W. Buson's recommendation that British consuls abroad needed, "...to command [themselves], so as to have neither prejudice nor leaning on any side..."⁵⁰⁰ For Collingwood, Barbary suffered from unsatisfactory consular appointments and those diplomatic failings put the British war effort in danger.

In Algiers, Blanckley was experiencing difficulties related to the sudden departure of Cartwright the previous year. Cartwright had taken with him all the consular papers – including copies of the British-Algerine treaties – and the consular seal.⁵⁰¹ Whether from malice aforethought or simply one last failure, this meant Blanckley was unable to verify particular points of contention when arguing the treaties' meaning with the regency without having to obtain a copy. Blanckley could be sure the Algerines would pay close attention to the contents of those treaties, taking what advantage they could. Collingwood believed:

Those states of Barbary, whatever might have been their former condition as to their knowledge of treaties, or their regard for them, at present shew no

⁴⁹⁸ Adams, 225-6.; Mackesy, 115.

⁴⁹⁹ Adams, 227.

⁵⁰⁰ Tuson, 7.

⁵⁰¹ NA FO 3/11 Blanckley to Windham, 9 Feb 1807.

deficiency in either way; and their respect for a treaty can only be maintained by a scrupulous adherence to it on our part.⁵⁰²

As was usually the case in Algiers, whatever the British opinion regarding the *spirit* of the treaty, the Algerines could be relied upon to follow the *letter* of the treaty strictly. The Regency could use a misstep on the British side to invalidate the treaty and require a new one (along with payment and presents), leaving Blanckley in a perilous position without the ability to reference past treaties. The consuls were not alone in attracting Collingwood's frustration. He was equally troubled by the situation in Algiers where the regency and the Admiralty Court in Malta had fallen foul of one another regarding the condemnation of ships by the court.⁵⁰³ Echoing his concerns over the 'dexterity' of British officials working with Barbary, Collingwood worried:

The Admiralty Court at Malta will certainly make a war with Algiers in despite of everything I can do to avert it. There is not that dexterity in their management which our present state requires and I am really of opinion that we suffer more from a want of skill in ourselves than we do by French artifice...⁵⁰⁴

Collingwood clearly felt the greater danger to the British war effort in the Mediterranean came from deficient representatives rather than their enemies. At the same time, Blanckley reported renewed efforts by the French to counteract the British-Algiers friendship.⁵⁰⁵ By this stage in the war, the French were not a considerable threat to the British efforts in Barbary; damage was more likely to come from their own agents' ineptitudes.

At the same time, an event occurred with far reaching consequences for the British and Algiers. Earlier that year, the Dey called for a meeting with Blanckley, and told him:

...he had determined upon shewing that on his [the Dey's] side there was the strongest inclination to benefit and please the English; and he was now to evince

⁵⁰² NCC, v. 1, 293: To Lord Castlereagh, 4 Jul 1807

⁵⁰³ Broughton, 41.; Hughes, 215: no. 135. To Capt Hallowell, 22 Jul 1807.

⁵⁰⁴ Hughes, 215: no. 135. To Capt Hallowell, 22 Jul 1807.

⁵⁰⁵ NA FO 3/11 Blanckley to Castlereagh, 16 Jul 1807.

that such were his intentions, by offering to the King that which England's great enemies, the French were most anxious to retain, namely the exclusive trade of Bona, and the right to colonize and take possession of... the Coral Fishery on that coast. That the French had for more than two centuries enjoyed these privileges and benefits; and that the period of their last treaty having expired, he was determined, notwithstanding the French Consul's earnest endeavours to the contrary, to offer to enter into a treaty with his good friends the English; and that he now made a tender of these possessions to him...⁵⁰⁶

Blanckley was pleased with the offer, but when he proposed to pass the offer on to the British government, the Dey only allowed the consul twenty-four hours to consider the proposal or the contract would revert to the French.⁵⁰⁷ In the end, Blanckley accepted the proposal on behalf of the British government and communicated his actions to the British Government.⁵⁰⁸ The response from London was positive.⁵⁰⁹ The triumph came less from the value placed on the coral fishing, but from the ability to deny France Bona and out-manoeuvre her in Algerine politics.⁵¹⁰ As has been shown in previous chapters, the British were certainly aware of the frequent diplomatic issues that arose over Bona and the coral fisheries, usually regarding illegal actions taken by citizens of various Italian states and their subsequent capture. That the British still approved the new acquisition would indicate the British did not foresee those issues being a problem in the future or believed they could handle them. The seemingly unimportant agreement in 1807 was to become of supreme importance to British relations with Algiers after peace in 1815.⁵¹¹ In amongst all the other difficulties in the Mediterranean that year, however, the British acquisition of Bona and the fisheries was simply a positive achievement.

In Tripoli, Langford was still having trouble with the previous British consul, McDonough. Despite success at managing the growing Tripoli-Malta trade, Langford

⁵⁰⁶ Broughton, 26-7.

⁵⁰⁷ Ibid., 28.; Playfair, 239.

⁵⁰⁸ Broughton, 29.; Playfair, 239.

⁵⁰⁹ Broughton, 49-50.; Playfair, 241.; NA FO 3/11 Blanckley to Castlereagh, 16 Jul 1807.

⁵¹⁰ Broughton, 27.

⁵¹¹ Weiss, *Captives and Corsairs*, 129, 147.; Goodwin, *Malta*, 49-50.; 151.; Barnby, 214-5..

lacked Collingwood's required 'dexterity' to handle the political side of the job.⁵¹² Langford initially ran into problems in April, when reports reached Tripoli of an Easter demonstration in Malta, where the Bashaw had been told the Maltese burned an effigy of a Muslim holy man (in reality, Judas Iscariot). There were riots and the Bashaw called Langford to account for this, saying other foreign consuls, including the Portuguese consul (McDonough) had vouched for the effigy being a Muslim. This problem was resolved but the situation worsened over a dispute regarding Maltese ships in Tripoli's harbour. Langford left Tripoli altogether for Malta in June.⁵¹³ Things escalated when the English brig, *Hirondelle*, arrived in port. McDonough met Lieutenant Skinner and took him to an audience with the Bashaw, who granted him a gift of fresh cattle and vegetables for his ship, but also took the opportunity to vent his frustrations with Langford, which Skinner subsequently passed onto Collingwood.⁵¹⁴

Collingwood called Langford to explain himself as the Admiral was uneasy about the potential loss of supply, "of the highest importance to the service of our fleet, and to the island of Malta."⁵¹⁵ Langford protested: "Mr M'Donogh, the Portuguese Consul, is the sole cause of my present difference with His Highness."⁵¹⁶ Collingwood was satisfied by Langford's account and wrote the Bashaw: "I have found nothing in the Consul's conduct that ought, in justice and truth, to have given to Your Highness dissatisfaction."⁵¹⁷ He supported Langford's actions regarding the Maltese demonstration

⁵¹² NA FO 76/6 Langford to Windham, 31 Jan 1807.; NA FO 76/6 Langford to Windham, 14 Mar 1807.; NA FO 76/6 Langford to Windham, 4 Apr 1807.; NA FO 76/6 Lt. Skinner to Captain Mombay, 23 May 1807.; NA FO 76/6 Langford to Castlereagh, 10 Aug 1807.; NA FO 76/6 Langford to Castlereagh, 29 Aug 1807.; NA FO 76/6 Langford to Castlereagh, 9 Nov 1807.; NA FO 76/6 Langford to Castlereagh, 1807: Return of the Exportation of Cattle from the Regency of Tripoli in the West, 31 December 1807.

At least one shipment of cattle was exported from Tripoli to Malta in 1807 in every month except January.

⁵¹³ Dearden, 212-3.; NA FO 76/6 Langford to Castlereagh, 26 Jun 1807.

⁵¹⁴ Dearden, 213.; NA FO 76/6 Lt. Skinner to Captain Mombay, 23 May 1807.;

⁵¹⁵ NA FO 76/6 Langford to Castlereagh, 13 Oct 1807.; Dearden, 214.

⁵¹⁶ NA FO 76/6 Langford to Castlereagh, 26 Jun 1807.

⁵¹⁷ NA FO 76/6 Collingwood to His Highness, the Most Illustrious Bashaw of Tripoli, 21 Jul 1807.

and the Maltese ships, and suggested that perhaps the Bashaw had been misled.⁵¹⁸ Langford returned to Tripoli on 9 August and resumed his duties; a load of cattle for Malta was prepared the next day.⁵¹⁹ The potential loss of a consistent, and growing, trade partner for Malta could have been ruinous for the British war effort.⁵²⁰ In 1807, Tripoli exported over 1,100 head of cattle to Malta, nearly 30 per cent of the total cattle brought into the island.⁵²¹ Collingwood needed to restore relations with Tripoli and ensure their goodwill as soon as possible in order to keep the garrisons and fleet supplied.

In Morocco, the British ran into the opposite problem; there was no consular dispute, but trade was affected. The year had begun on a positive footing; Al-Salawi was now the governor of both Tangier and Tetuan (and therefore working closely with the British consuls) and ships were reporting purchasing supplies free of export duties.⁵²² But in early May, Green reported unexpected problems exporting cattle from Tetuan: "...orders have been forwarded from the collector of the Custom house not to allow our transports any more cattle..."⁵²³ The Emperor, Mawlay Suleiman had apparently stopped allowing the British to export any cattle, except those which were part of the yearly allowance under contract since 1801.⁵²⁴ Green told Collingwood and Collingwood wrote the Emperor himself to understand why the shipments had been stopped. Collingwood summed up the situation – and its dangers:

On the 14th I received a letter from Mr Green...to inform me the Emperor of Morocco had prohibited the exportation of cattle and all other supplies from the ports of Barbary – an order which is exceedingly injurious to the well-being of this squadron whose health was preserved by those supplies, - whether this order

⁵¹⁸ Ibid.

⁵¹⁹ NA FO 76/6 Langford to Castlereagh, 10 Aug 1807.

⁵²⁰ NA FO 76/6 Langford to Castlereagh, 1807 Return of the Exportation of Cattle from the Regency of Tripoli in the West, 31 Dec 1807.:

In truth, Langford's departure had little effect on trade. Three shipments were sent during his absence.

⁵²¹ NA FO 76/6 Langford to Castlereagh, 1807 Return of the Exportation of Cattle from the Regency of Tripoli in the West, 31 Dec 1807.: See Appendix IV: Malta Imports (p. 267).

⁵²² El Mansour, 21.; NA FO 174/13 Gynn to Green, 5 May 1807.

⁵²³ NA FO 52/13 Green to Windham, 12 May 1807.

⁵²⁴ NA FO 52/13 Green to Castlereagh, 25 May 1807.; El Mansour, 114.; Brown, 76.

was the result of French intrigues or a consequence of the Turkish war I do not know, but it is unquestionably levelled at us...⁵²⁵

Green told Castlereagh:

I have further acquainted H.I.M. that Tunis, Tripoli, and Algiers from a thorough conviction of our difference with the Porte being brought about by the wicked machinations of the French Agent will maintain their neutrality.⁵²⁶

Green explained he urged the Emperor to likewise maintain her friendship with Britain.⁵²⁷ As the principal supplier for the ships off the Iberian coast and the garrison at Gibraltar, Collingwood did not exaggerate when he called the prohibition ‘exceedingly injurious.’ Unlike in Tripoli, this was an actual loss of trade with far-reaching effects, not a potential one.

Luckily, Collingwood received a prompt response to his letters; from al-Salawi:

...the immediate object of that letter was the strongest assurance of the Basha’s personal regard for the English, and that as far as his obedience to his sovereign did allow, they [the fleet] should have supplies, and every kindness from him.⁵²⁸

Assurances of friendship meant the French had not pulled some sort of diplomatic coup but did not guarantee a resumption of trade. The Moroccan Foreign Minister, al-Salawi, had always been a ‘friend’ of the English, but his friendship was of little value against an imperial order. From the Emperor, Collingwood received a curious request – a set of masts for a 36-gun frigate to be paid for in cattle. Collingwood surmised, “his motive for the prohibition was probably to ensure those masts being granted to him.”⁵²⁹ As such, Collingwood forwarded the request onto the British government, as the fleet needed the supplies and the friendship of Morocco. By late July, Green reported the cattle trade had resumed; the Emperor released a thousand head of cattle for the ‘immediate supply’ of

⁵²⁵ NA ADM 1/413 no. 103, Collingwood to Marsden, 23 May 1807.

⁵²⁶ NA FO 52/13 Green to Castlereagh, 25 May 1807.

⁵²⁷ Ibid.

⁵²⁸ NA ADM 1/413 no. 116, Collingwood to Marsden, 30 May 1807.

⁵²⁹ Ibid.

the fleet.⁵³⁰ A mark of the level of concern caused by this brief suspension of supply can be seen in Green's report:

...it is very satisfying to have the power of procuring beef, should the fleet become unhealthy for want of it, also for me to be convinced H.I.M's intentions are friendly towards me...⁵³¹

The Admiralty had had little choice but to agree to the Emperor's request; the need for the cattle was too great. Further, Morocco frequently paid for its purchase of British armaments in food, whether agriculture or livestock. In the end, the brief interlude had no lasting effect on trade; British trade to and from Morocco had increased in 1807 with twenty ships visiting the kingdom, up from 14 the year before.⁵³²

Underscoring British concerns over the consular and trade difficulties in North Africa were the continued French victories in Europe. Russia's Tsar Alexander I sued for peace with France, resulting in the Treaty of Tilsit on 25 June. Russia, in exchange for allying with Bonaparte, gained Polish territory and support for her continued war with the Ottomans. It was also understood if Britain did not come to terms with France, Russia would close her ports as part of the continental blockade. Finally, it was agreed Sweden, Denmark and Portugal were to be likewise encouraged to join the blockade – by force if necessary.⁵³³ This, coupled with the tense relationship Britain had with neutral Denmark, resulted in the British sending troops to Copenhagen in late August.⁵³⁴ After a three-day bombardment, the city agreed to capitulate, thus surrendering all of their fleet and naval stores to the British, provided the British agreed to withdraw.⁵³⁵ The victory allowed the British breathing space in the North Sea, but unfortunately, Tilsit gave

⁵³⁰ NA FO 52/13 Green to Castlereagh, 22 Jul 1807.

⁵³¹ Ibid.

⁵³² See Appendix III: Lloyd's List (p. 265)..

⁵³³ Muir, *Britain*, 7, 22.; Esdaile, *The French Wars*, 36.; Esdaile, *The Peninsular War*, 2.

⁵³⁴ Muir, *Britain*, 23-24.; Paul C. Krajeski, *In the Shadow of Nelson: the Naval Leadership of Admiral Sir Charles Cotton, 1753-1812* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2000), 52.; Hyneman, 144 n. 50.

⁵³⁵ Muir, *Britain*, 24-5.; Esdaile, *The French Wars*, 45; Morriss, 179.

France the Ionian Islands in the Mediterranean.⁵³⁶ Denmark also declared war on Britain in March.⁵³⁷ The British Orders in Council, and the French Berlin Decrees, angered the neutral United States, and they placed an embargo on all trade. The Barbary States were effectively Britain's last remaining neutral trading partners. As other neutrals grew closer to France (or at least acted *against* Britain), the reliance upon North Africa increased. Outside Europe, the continental blockade did not affect them. Barbary's neutrality meant neither the British nor the French were attempting to police their trade. A further benefit came when Bonaparte closed the free port of Leghorn in December, leaving British Malta as the primary port for Mediterranean mercantile traffic – an island whose first decade under British rule had over 40 per cent of all its trade come North Africa.⁵³⁸

One of the last European states resisting Bonaparte's continental system was Portugal. French efforts to force her to join the European system had far reaching effects, both in the war as a whole and for the British. The British ally was left in a precarious position after the treaty of Tilsit as Spain was still allied with France. In July, the Portuguese minister in France was told Portugal must close her ports to Britain or risk war. The next month, the French and Spanish ambassadors in Portugal went further, declaring Portugal must join the alliance against Britain by the end of the month. Portugal, not wanting to break with Britain (her primary trade partner) but unable to defend herself against France and Spain, tried to play both sides, offering to close her ports and sever relations with Britain whilst informing Britain of France's commands and begging for assistance. The French and Spanish ambassadors withdrew from Portugal in late September and a month later the Treaty of Fontainebleau was signed

⁵³⁶ Esdaile, *The French Wars*, 45.; Rodger, *Command of the Ocean*, 551.

⁵³⁷ Muir, *Britain*, 26.; Rodger, *Command of the Ocean*, 552-3.

⁵³⁸ Monk, 91.; Panzac, *Barbary Corsairs*, 178.; Davey, *Transformation*, 193.; J. Clayburn La Force, "The Supply of Muskets and Spain's War of Independence" *The Business History Review* 43, no. 4 (1969), 530.; See Appendix IV: Malta Imports (p. 267).

which divided Portugal between them. By then, the French General Junot was marching on Lisbon.

Junot's advance forced the Portuguese Royal family to flee to Brazil, along with the Portuguese navy, many members of the court, and most of the portable wealth of the country. By year's end, the French occupied Portugal.⁵³⁹ The invasion of Portugal moved the British focus of war into the Iberian Peninsula, and back into the sphere of the Mediterranean naval command, which stretched from the Levant in the east to Cape St Vincent in the west.⁵⁴⁰ In whatever capacity Collingwood would be called upon to use the Mediterranean squadron, they and the British garrisons there would require supplies from Barbary.

The impact of the invasion of Portugal could be felt in North Africa itself. Since late August, the British consul in Algiers had been working on behalf of the Portuguese to secure a truce with the Regency, as:

Eight or ten different times have preliminaries been entered into between the two governments, and have always failed of accomplishing their object.⁵⁴¹

It appeared Blanckley's efforts were having more success than the British attempt in 1793-4.⁵⁴² Even after the Portuguese royal family escaped to Brazil, Blanckley was urged to continue his efforts.⁵⁴³ Portugal had long since ceased being able to produce enough wheat to feed itself. Access to that North African staple was one of the reasons the kingdom had originally conquered Ceuta in the early fifteenth century.⁵⁴⁴ As Portugal's situation worsened, having her ships or supplies threatened by Algerine

⁵³⁹ Muir, *Britain*, 29-30.; Esdaile, *The French Wars*, 45.; Esdaile, *The Peninsular War*, 5-8.; Donald D. Horward, "Wellington and the Defence of Portugal" *The International History Review* 11, no. 1 (1989), 39-40.; Adams, 251.; Krajewski, 54.; Hall, *Wellington's Navy*, 6, 8-9.; Robson, 166-7.

⁵⁴⁰ Krajewski, 139

⁵⁴¹ Broughton, 52-3.

⁵⁴² Irons, 82-98:

For more information about Britain's 1793 attempt to secure peace with Algiers for Portugal see Chapter 3.

⁵⁴³ Broughton, 70.; PCC, 227-9: no. 145. To Rear-Admiral Purvis, 1 Dec 1807.

⁵⁴⁴ Carrie Gibson, *Empire's Crossroads: A History of the Caribbean from Columbus to the Present Day* (London: Macmillan, 2014), 2, 4.

corsairs (and the fleet increased to 20 ships in 1808) would only exacerbate the problem. Ensuring peace with Algiers for British allies made it easier for British forces to supply and support their European allies in the Mediterranean.

In Morocco, closest to the Iberian Peninsula, the recent events left that kingdom uneasy. They worried the invasion of Portugal would lead to an invasion of Morocco itself. Rumours of a French expedition against the Spanish Ceuta further fuelled the fear.⁵⁴⁵ Collingwood himself wrote in February 1808:

I am mistaken if that the French do not engage actively against Gibraltar and perhaps go to Ceuta, and the possessing of Tangier is also in the contemplation...in any attempt of the French to invade his territory he may depend on his Majesty's forces. The Barbary States have all good cause of alarm but so little is the information they get, they do not comprehend the whole plan of Bonaparte, which is to possess himself of the entrance to the Mediterranean, and to make all nations in it subject to his power.⁵⁴⁶

Reports of French intentions against Ceuta led the Emperor to renew attempts to reclaim the Spanish territory on Morocco's Mediterranean coast.⁵⁴⁷ As an enemy-held garrison, Ceuta was always a potential danger to Morocco, but with the Spanish-French alliance and invasion of Portugal, the enclave was thought to be the entryway for an invasion of Morocco.⁵⁴⁸ Ceuta was only twenty miles from Tetuan.⁵⁴⁹ As fears of French action grew, Morocco became even closer to the British. Collingwood wrote in April:

I am glad to hear we are on good terms with the Emperor of Morocco, all the Barbary States are dreading the French power which is grown immense.⁵⁵⁰

Conveniently, as Moroccan 'gallophobia' rose, so did the British reliance on Morocco.⁵⁵¹ Moroccan fears were not unfounded. That same month, Bonaparte wrote, "A foot in Africa would give England something to think about," and commissioned a report on how

⁵⁴⁵ El Mansour, 113.

⁵⁴⁶ PCC, 234: no. 148. To Rear-Admiral Purvis, 4 Feb 1808.

⁵⁴⁷ El Mansour, 113.

⁵⁴⁸ Rézette, 29, 37, 40, 44.; El Mansour, 113.

⁵⁴⁹ Buffa, 69.

⁵⁵⁰ PCC, 244: no. 156. To Rear-Admiral Purvis, 24 Apr 1808.

⁵⁵¹ Murray, 203.; CO 174/11 To James Green, Esq. HM Consul-General at Tangier, 4 Feb 1808.; Brown, 67.

best to land French forces.⁵⁵² He sent Vincent-Yves Boutin, an officer of engineers to survey Algiers and determine the best plan of attack. There also was a ‘public relations campaign’ in the French press, with reports from French consuls decrying the ‘white European slavery’ (as opposed to the ‘laughing’ black slavery) found in Barbary and suggesting the seizure of North African territory to make up for lost Caribbean colonies.⁵⁵³

Even more alarming for Morocco was the French invasion of Spain in 1808. After dispersing large contingents of the Spanish army around Europe, Bonaparte dispatched Joachim Murat and 60,000 troops to Madrid. Bonaparte raised his brother, Joseph, to the Spanish throne. Unfortunately, Joseph would never have the opportunity to prove himself; the *Dos de Mayo* uprisings began before Joseph was crowned. The political turmoil, caused by the loss of the Royal Family and sudden increase in French troops, culminated in a large and violent riot on 2 May, brutally crushed by Murat. Over the next three weeks, news of the invasion and the riot spread throughout the rest of the country. In late May and early June, the Spanish people rose against the French occupation. French troops spread throughout the Iberian Peninsula. To Moroccan eyes, the only thing standing between those troops arriving in Africa and continued independence was the British.⁵⁵⁴

On location in the Mediterranean, Collingwood was in a position to respond to the changing situation in the Peninsula, even before the news reached London. The Admiral learned of the uprising in June and went straight to Cadiz. Collinwood’s humanitarian actions after Trafalgar were remembered and he had remained on good personal terms with the Spanish admiral. He was welcomed into the harbour.

⁵⁵² Jamieson, 210.; Panzac, *Barbary Corsairs*, 275-6.

⁵⁵³ Weiss, *Captives and Corsairs*, 129-30.

⁵⁵⁴ El Mansour, 113.; Muir, *Britain*, 32-4.; Esdaile, *The French Wars*, 45.; Esdaile, *The Peninsular War*, 30-53.; Monk, 92.; Adams, 251.

Collingwood told the six French warships there to surrender. After two-days bombardment, they did so and were seized. Meanwhile, an official group from Asturias in northern Spain arrived in London on 8 June; they brought the news of the rising in the north, reports of the revolts in the rest of the country, and an appeal for assistance. They were followed by a Galician delegation. Both groups stressed the need for support and arms, not men. Instead, the Spanish wished the British army sent to Portugal, and the British government initially appointed Sir Arthur Wellesley to command. Admiral Charles Cotton, commanding the Lisbon squadron, had been supporting the Portuguese in their own resistance efforts. Wellesley arrived in early August. General Junot marched on the British but left a force of about 6,000 to hold Lisbon. This move probably cost him the battle, as the Anglo-Portuguese army now outnumbered him and the uprising in Spain cut him off from the rest of the French army. The French attacked on 21 August, but the British defeated them. Sir Hew Dalrymple, who superseded Wellesley in command, arrived shortly after the battle in time to conclude the truce, the Convention of Cintra. The truce was received with anger by the British government, for it allowed the French army to evacuate Portugal. However, Cintra allowed for the quick liberation of Portugal.⁵⁵⁵

Owing to Collingwood's continued good relations with the Spanish and his assistance to the rebellion, the Admiral was able to mobilise the extensive British military and diplomatic structure to assist the Spanish. He informed Green in Morocco:

...the Spanish government at Seville having applied to [Collingwood] to endeavour to obtain permission from the Emperor of Morocco to purchase in his dominions one thousand horses and five hundred mules for drawing cannons and military stores, and His Majesty having directed that every possible aid shall be given to the Spanish nation in their efforts to expel the enemy from their country,

⁵⁵⁵ Adams, 251-2.; Horward, 40-41.; Rodger, *Command of the Ocean*, 551, 553-4.; Muir, *Britain*, 37, 41-3, 49-51.; Krajewski, 55, 71, 80-2, 95.; Hall, *Wellington's Navy*, 19.; Mackesy, *The War in the Mediterranean*, 104.; La Force, 530, 537-8.; Orde, *Shadow*, 235-6.; Speller, 75.; Robson, 169.

his Lordship desired that I [Green] would give my assistance and exert my influence in this negotiation.⁵⁵⁶

Green met with al-Salawi, who passed the request on to the Emperor. Al-Salawi was a confirmed ally of the British but he was not enough to overcome the problems regarding the sale of horses in the religious Emperor's eyes or the political desires of the court.⁵⁵⁷

Green wrote Lord Castlereagh (Secretary of State for War) of the meeting:

Sidi Mohamet Slowey began by a assurance of the great satisfaction this government would feel in being instrumental to expel the French from Spain, but to allow Christians the purchase and exportation of horses was contrary to their religion, that they would furnish at their own expense two thousand horses or more if necessary, and to expedite the grand object, the horses should be immediately taken from the cavalry and the whole might be ready by the period we could send vessels for them, that for this essential service money could not be received, the Moors must obtain a reciprocal benefit from Spain in order to sanction His Imperial Majesty's conduct, that this benefit would doubtless be pointed out in the Emperor's answer to the Admiral, which if complied with would enable them to allow Spain in her present state every supply that Country might require.⁵⁵⁸

Spain had endeavoured to buy horses from Morocco before, in the run up to Trafalgar, and had been refused under the same religious prohibition. Spain bought them from Algiers instead.⁵⁵⁹ In 1808, with the French threat just across the Strait, the Moroccan government was willing to offer the Spanish a loophole if it meant Morocco could reap the reward.

Green had a strong idea what the 'reciprocal benefit' Morocco would demand of Spain was:

In my Opinion, Ceuta will be demanded...I shall not fail to remind Lord Collingwood should it be the case of the advantages proposed by this restitution of that fortress for should the Spaniards acquiesce, I shall conceive it to be from British influence, and that consequently we are entitled to the advantageous terms offered...⁵⁶⁰

⁵⁵⁶ NA FO 52/13 Green to Castlereagh, 4 Jul 1808.

⁵⁵⁷ Mercer, 552.; Brown, 67, 76-7.

⁵⁵⁸ NA FO 52/13 Green to Castlereagh, 4 Jul 1808.

⁵⁵⁹ Terki-Hassaine, 393.

⁵⁶⁰ NA FO 52/13 Green to Castlereagh, 4 Jul 1808.

The Emperor and al-Salawi were willing to provide the Spanish with their much-sought after and praised horses in order to eliminate the danger of having a foreign power holding territory on their shores.⁵⁶¹ The Moroccan fears of a French invasion spilling over from Spain through Ceuta would have caused an even greater desire to reclaim the territory, hence the generous terms of more horses than requested and promises of ‘every supply that country might require.’ The Spanish, in light of their new, if uneasy, alliance with Britain, hoped the standing the British had in Morocco would help them have better success than in 1804.

Across the North African coast, the diplomatic efforts the British had put in over the course of the war were reaping benefits, helped in part by the removal of any further worries regarding the British relationship with the Ottoman Empire; peace was signed in January 1809.⁵⁶² In addition to Green’s hope of ‘advantageous terms’ for the British in assisting Morocco regain Ceuta, Morocco still supplied Gibraltar. Green took advantage of any appropriate ships to transport cattle.⁵⁶³ The new year brought increased food supplies, with citrus fruits and vegetables added to the shipments of cattle – seven thousand cattle were sent to Gibraltar.⁵⁶⁴ The British won a new contract for mules and oranges from Tangiers, and Green predicted a favourable grain harvest.⁵⁶⁵ After Sir John Moore’s autumn 1808 campaign in northern Spain and the battle at Coruña in January, the British involvement and commitment in the western Mediterranean increased.⁵⁶⁶ With the majority of the European navies shut in port by the British, the British had effective control of the Mediterranean and were able to extract the maximum benefit

⁵⁶¹ El Mansour, 113.; El Hamel, 136.; Buffa, 102.; Noah, 101.

⁵⁶² NA ADM 1/415 no. 27 Collingwood to Pole, 27 Jan 1809.

⁵⁶³ NA FO 52/13 Green to Castlereagh, 10 Nov 1808.

⁵⁶⁴ NA FO 52/15 Green to Castlereagh, 14 Feb 1809.; NA FO 52/15 Green to Castlereagh, 3 Mar 1809.; NA FO 174/11 Duckworth to Green, 3 Mar 1809.; NA FO 174/11 Duckworth to Green, 8 Mar 1809.

⁵⁶⁵ NA FO 174/11 Duckworth to Green, 8 Mar 1809.; NA FO 52/15 Green to Castlereagh.

⁵⁶⁶ Rodger, 554.; Muir, *Britain*, 67-74.

from Barbary – crucially as the number of bases, garrisons, and states for which they had promised to assist were also growing.

Langford in Tripoli maintained the cattle supply to Malta despite rough seas and bad weather in the first quarter of the year and Tripolitan ships being captured by French privateers.⁵⁶⁷ After three vessels in a row were captured in June, the Bashaw (understandably) put a halt on further shipments until Collingwood could ensure their safety.⁵⁶⁸ The admiral sent a brig with a letter to the Bashaw in July. The Bashaw:

...was most happy to learn the sentiments of his Majesty to be so favourable towards him, and that He shall ever consider the English to be his best friends.⁵⁶⁹

After Collingwood's reassurance, the shipments resumed. Despite no cattle shipments in four months of the year, Langford was able to report, "no vessel nevertheless coming from Malta for bullocks has returned without her cargo," and Tripoli increased its exports of cattle to Malta by over 200, to 1,396 head of cattle in 1808. That accounted for 49 per cent of the total cattle sent to Malta in 1808.⁵⁷⁰ The shipments continued in 1809, even though the Regency was experiencing a drought and Tripoli had to import grain from Morocco.⁵⁷¹ Similarly, England had experienced a poor yield that summer, placing further reliance on local supplies for her fleets abroad.⁵⁷² The amount of support Tripoli gave Malta, an example of the primacy of British influence and the strength of the British relationship in that regency in the aftermath of Trafalgar, was summed up in Langford's report of 1809. Langford declared their "supply has annually increased since the year 1806", the first full year after the battle and effective expulsion of the French

⁵⁶⁷ NA CO 76/6 Langford to Lord Hawkesbury, 2 Mar 1808.; NA FO 76/6 Langford to Castlereagh, 3 Jul 1808.

⁵⁶⁸ NA FO 76/6 Langford to Castlereagh, 3 Jul 1808.

⁵⁶⁹ NA FO 76/6 Langford to Castlereagh, 30 Jul 1808.

⁵⁷⁰ NA FO 76/6 Langford to Castlereagh, 15 Dec 1808.; NA FO 76/6 Langford to Castlereagh, 5 Jan 1809.; See Appendix IV: Malta Imports (p. 267).

⁵⁷¹ NA FO 76/6 Langford to Castlereagh, 30 Apr 1809.; NA FO 76/6 Langford to Castlereagh, 22 May 1809.; NA FO 76/6 Langford to Castlereagh, 4 Aug 1809.; NA FO 76/6 Langford to Castlereagh, 15 Nov 1809.; El Mansour, 37.

⁵⁷² Rodger, *Command of the Ocean*, 558.

Navy from the Mediterranean. Then Tripoli had sent less than 700 cattle to Malta, not even one fifth of the island's imports. Just two years later the Regency had increased their exports until Tripoli alone accounted for roughly half of all Malta's cattle imports.⁵⁷³

In Tunis, as the British position strengthened, so the French position weakened.

Long-time French consul, Devoize, fell out with the Bey. Devoize complained:

Les corsaires anglais ont exercé impunément sur les côtes de la domination de Votre Excellence, dans le golfe, dans le rade même de La Goulette, les déprédations les plus violentes...Je réclamai en vain la neutralité et l'immunité du golfe stipulés par un traité. Votre Excellence me témoigna au contraire le désir qu'elle avait que les corsaires français s'abstinsent du conduire leurs prises dans les ports tunisiens. Il est évident que Votre Excellence a résolu d'éloigner les corsaires français de ses côtes pour laisser le champ libre aux Anglais.⁵⁷⁴

Echoing British complaints over the neutrality of Tunis the previous decade, Devoize accused the Bey of openly ignoring his neutrality in favour of the British and endangerment of the French.

Devoize, in explaining himself to the French Foreign Minister placed the blame for this falling out everywhere but himself:

Depuis que le Bey est parvenu à secouer le joug d'Alger, son caractère est tellement changé qu'on peu dire que le gouvernement d'Alger est aujourd'hui à Tunis. Ce souverain n'a plus que quelques ménagements pour les Anglais... Ce n'est que depuis les événements d'Espagne que le Bey s'est écarté des égards qu'il avait constamment manifesté pour la France...Tunis est inondé d'écrits incendiaires imprimés à Séville et à Malte, annonçant entre autres choses l'existence d'une armée d'Afrique destinée à faire la conquête de la Barbarie, et dont les circonstances actuelles avaient fait abandonner le projet; le Bey a cru à tous ces bruits.⁵⁷⁵

Devoize believed the Bey changed after 'freeing himself from the yoke of Algiers' in 1807 and because he had been scared by 'inflammatory pamphlets' describing the French plan to conquer Barbary. It is true British-Tunisian relations were strengthened in

⁵⁷³ NA FO 76/7 Langford to the Lord of Liverpool, 20 Feb 1810.; See Appendix IV: Malta Imports (p. 267).

⁵⁷⁴ Plantet, *Tunis*, v. 3, 479: no. 911, Devoize a Hammuda, Bey de Tunis, 8 Dec 1808.

⁵⁷⁵ Plantet, *Tunis*, v. 3, 482: no. 911, Devoize au C^{te} de Champagne, 13 Dec 1808.

1807, but that was more because of a renewal of treaties and the primacy of trade with British Malta, not the Algerine-Tunisian war.⁵⁷⁶ As for the pamphlets, regardless of which nation they were produced by, fears of a French invasion of North Africa following the conquest of the Iberian Peninsula were widespread following the overthrow of the Spanish royal family. Regardless of whether or not such an army existed, Bonaparte's own words and actions showed there was good reason for North Africa to fear a French attack.⁵⁷⁷ Meanwhile, the British were increasing their reliance on the small regency; Lieutenant-Colonel Gordon in Gibraltar requested (and received) a report on the foodstuffs available for export from Tunis to Gibraltar from Consul Oglander.⁵⁷⁸ The Bey still claimed neutrality, allowing prizes taken by the French to be sold in his port, but he had more freedom to favour one side over the other.⁵⁷⁹ Yet the French, as they saw the situation, were receiving fewer benefits of that neutrality:

La proximité de Malte, la recette immense que procure à la Douane de Tunis son commerce très actif avec cette ile et les fréquentes apparitions à La Goulette des bâtiments de guerre anglais inspirent au Bey beaucoup de ménagements pour cette nation.⁵⁸⁰

This had more to do with the strength of the British in the Mediterranean generally, than the British in Tunis. The Bey's profits from the Maltese trade and fear of British reprisals were the reasons for the Bey's apparent change for Devoize. Hidden within his complaint, however, is the tacit admission that the French navy was not capable of defending French rights in Tunis, or elsewhere in the Mediterranean. Devoize wrote the British 'inspired caution' in the Bey, but they also inspired the confidence to allow the British to effectively dominate Tunisian trade and diplomatic relations.

⁵⁷⁶ Moalla, 62.

⁵⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 62-3.; Weiss, *Captives and Corsairs*, 129-30.

⁵⁷⁸ NA FO 335/46 folder 15, Ear of Liverpool to Oglander, 12 Jan 1810.; NA FO 335/46 folder 15, Lieut. Col. Gordon to Oglander, 4 Apr 1810.

⁵⁷⁹ Plantet, *Tunis*, v. 3, 486: no. 929, Billon au C^{te} de Champagne, 30 Jan 1810.

⁵⁸⁰ Plantet, *Tunis*, v. 3, p. 483: no. 919, Devoize au C^{te} de Champagne, 9 May 1809.

In Algiers, Blanckley ensured the British position remained stable despite a series of political hiccoughs in late 1808 and early 1809. In August, relations between that regency and Sicily, under British protection, soured.⁵⁸¹ The Sicilians captured an Algerine vessel and news reached the Dey of the Algerine prisoners being ‘treated so brutishly.’ The Algerines responded by targeting Sicily’s ships, and placing all the Sicilian slaves in the regency (including the British consul’s servant) in chains.⁵⁸² Around the same time, the Dey and his ministers ordered the Bacri family to pay a 4,000,000 Fr. ransom for their protection and to cover Busnach’s debts. The Bacris initially refused and it was only through the intercession of Blanckley and the other consuls that an arrangement was worked out for the repayment.⁵⁸³ Two months later, janissaries shot the Dey, Ahmed Pasha.⁵⁸⁴ During the ensuing chaos, David Bacri, now leader of the Jewish community, and other Algerine Jews, took refuge in the British consuls’s house (even though Bacri was still described as “the great French adherent”).⁵⁸⁵ Blanckley’s assistance of the Bacri family stands in stark contrast to the complaints lodged against them by Cartwright or the debacle that was Falcon’s tenure in Algiers. The warmer interactions between Bacri and Blanckley could be explained by the ascendancy of the British in the region. However, part of the change has to be attributed to the fact Blanckley was better suited to the role of consul in Algiers than either of his predecessors, evident by his lasting longer than Cartwright and Falcon combined.

The new Dey, Ali b. Muhammad, did not impress Blanckley, who described him as, “a stupid old fellow, ignorant even of the office of consul.”⁵⁸⁶ Even so, the change in

⁵⁸¹ Knight, *Britain Against Napoleon*, 241.

⁵⁸² Hughes, 253: no. 163, to Rear Admiral Purvis, 20 Sept 1808.; Broughton, 101-2.

⁵⁸³ Rosenstock, 360.

⁵⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 361.; Broughton, 108-9.; Playfair, 245.; NA FO 3/11 Blanckley to Castlereagh, 10 November 1808.; NA FO 8/1 Blanckley to Collinwood, 10 November 1808.; Valensi, *Eve of Colonialism*, xvii.; Merouche, *Monnaies*, 118.

⁵⁸⁵ Rosenstock, 361. Broughton, 110-1.

⁵⁸⁶ Broughton, 110.

control of the regency allowed the question of Sicily to progress (and eliminated Bacri's debt). Less than a month after his violent ascension to the throne, Blanckley's wife wrote that word had finally come from Sicily: "empowering Mr Blanckley to make proposals of peace between Sicily and this country. The Dey returned a favourable answer." Yet she conveyed her husband's annoyance at the delay:

However, had Mr B's advice met with earlier attention from the Sicilian government, he has no doubt that, with Achmet Pacha, he could have made a more desirable arrangement than he can flatter himself to effect with the present Dey.⁵⁸⁷

Blanckley did not yet have a strong relationship with the new Dey and did not believe he was likely to develop one. He was correct, as Ali was only in power for four months. On 4 March 1809, Ali was assassinated, having rendered himself 'generally disliked'.⁵⁸⁸ In contrast, the new Dey, Hajji Ali b. Khalil was described by Collingwood as, "at present popular – as is a continued friendship with Great Britain."⁵⁸⁹ Mrs Blanckley conveyed similar approval while relating a story of the consuls' first meeting with the new Dey:

Mr Blanckley and the other Consuls have all been to pay their respects to the new Dey; Mr B., as usual, only offered to shake hands with him. And when the others tendered him the homage of kissing his hand, the new Dey would not permit them to do so; but followed the example which Mr B. had set, by merely shaking hands with them.⁵⁹⁰

Dey Hajji Ali would see out the rest of the war.⁵⁹¹

The new Dey also allowed the British consul to make great strides regarding the British war effort in Algiers. In the wake of continued difficulties in procuring horses for Spain from Morocco, they purchased over two hundred horses from Algiers, as the new Dey wished, "por castigar la arrogancia de Francia."⁵⁹² The change in power also gave

⁵⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸⁸ Ibid., 120, 125.; Playfair, 246.; NA FO 3/11 Blanckley to Castlereagh, 4 Mar 1809.; NA ADM 1/415 no. 66, Collingwood to William Wellesley-Pole, 24 Mar 1809.; Valensi, *Eve of Colonialism*, xvii.

⁵⁸⁹ NA ADM 1/415 no. 66, Collingwood to William Wellesley-Pole, 24 Mar 1809.

⁵⁹⁰ Broughton, 125.

⁵⁹¹ Plantet, *Algiers*, v. 2, 585-6.

⁵⁹² Terki-Hassaine, 394, 396.

the British greater hope for resolving the crisis between Algiers and Sicily. The same month Hajji Ali came to power, Collingwood reported:

His Majesty's proconsul, from the disposition of the present Algerine government, is inclined to believe they sincerely wish to obtain [peace], and that the peace may be concluded in much more moderate terms than were proposed by the late Dey.⁵⁹³

Echoing Blanckley's earlier sentiments regarding the previous Dey's stance on Sicily, negotiations returned to the favourable footing they were on before. Through Collingwood's intercession, the British built on the discussions between Algiers and Sicily to draw the attention of the Bey in Tunis. By summer, Collingwood had opened up communication between the Sicilian Minister, Marquis Circello, and the Bey in addition to the negotiations in Algiers.⁵⁹⁴ As in Algiers, Tunis seemed amenable to the proposal.⁵⁹⁵ Yet, Collingwood was not hopeful of their success,

...as neither Algiers nor [Tunis] are likely to conclude Peace with Sicily without money being paid for – I am afraid they will yet have difficulties greater than they can surmount.⁵⁹⁶

However, if the negotiations in the regencies failed over Sicily's inability to pay, the fault would not be Collingwood's, the consuls' or the regencies. Algiers and Tunis' willingness to enter into potential negotiations, when their possible corsair targets was dwindling as the war waged on, was a mark of the influence the British had in Barbary.

There were issues in Algiers, but Collingwood thought Consul Blanckley to blame, not the Regency. As the regency was neutral, Algiers was able to transport goods for other nations around the British blockade of Europe. While good news for Spain, who took advantage of being supplied by Barbary with British permission, the Americans were also contracting Algerine vessels to move their goods. Problematically,

⁵⁹³ NA ADM 1/415 no. 66, Collingwood to William Wellesley-Pole, 24 Mar 1809.

⁵⁹⁴ NA ADM 1/415 no. 6, Collingwood to William Wellesley-Pole, 23 Jun 1809

⁵⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁹⁶ NA ADM 1/415 no 77, Collingwood to William Wellesley-Pole, 24 Aug 1809.

some of those vessels were found going to Marseilles.⁵⁹⁷ The Americans were taking advantage of the neutral status of Algiers to evade the British blockade of Europe.⁵⁹⁸

Algerine ships bound for France were caught by the British and sent to Gibraltar.

According to Collingwood:

I wrote to the Dey, remonstrating against his permitting a practice – so injurious to the British interests – and which was strictly prohibited by His Majesty’s Order in Council: In his answer, he justifies what has been done and rests his justification on the certificate given by the consul.⁵⁹⁹

Collingwood demanded an explanation from Blanckley, who claimed he had been misled and had no means of discerning the truth.⁶⁰⁰ Publicly, Collingwood let the matter of

Blanckley drop, but in private he was far more scathing.⁶⁰¹ To his sister, Collingwood wrote:

I have a great trouble at present with the Dey of Algiers. He had countenanced a trade to France which was not allowable. Some of his ships have been stopped bound to Marseilles and he is very indignant, threatening to make reprisals. This all comes of a dull, unintelligent person, who we have got as a Consul [Blanckley], who either himself cannot comprehend, or does not take the pains to inform them what commerce is prohibited for them to carry on, and has no ingenuity to combat the intrigues of the French and Americans.⁶⁰²

Despite Blanckley’s previous successes, even he was not free from mistakes. Blanckley’s negligent behaviour had, in the Admiral’s eyes, endangered the British war effort, not just by allowing supplies to reach France but also by threatening the diplomatic relationship between Britain and Algiers.

Further straining Anglo-Algerine relations was the seizure of three vessels by a British sloop in June. One was a French privateer; the others were Algerine vessels with passports from Blanckley. The Algerine passes had been respected by other British ships prior to their capture, but Captain Hollinworth of the *Minstrel* sent them all on to

⁵⁹⁷ NA ADM 1/415 no. 23, Collingwood to William Wellesley-Pole, 30 Jul 1809.

⁵⁹⁸ PCC, 288, fn 1.

⁵⁹⁹ NA ADM 1/415 no. 23, Collingwood to William Wellesley-Pole, 30 Jul 1809.

⁶⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰¹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰² PCC, 288-9. No. 184, To his sister, 13 Aug 1809.

Gibraltar.⁶⁰³ Collingwood sided with the Algerines, who he believed were justifiably angry owing to, “the illegality of the act,” which set, “all neutrality at defiance.”⁶⁰⁴ The admiral believed the, “Algerine government is entitled to redress,” not least because they were threatening to stop exporting British provisions in the wake of the dispute.⁶⁰⁵ The Mediterranean squadron’s reliance on food from Algiers, the increasing British commitment in Spain and Portugal, and a bad harvest in England meant the crisis over Blanckley’s passports and Hollinworth’s illegal seizures could not have come at a worse time.⁶⁰⁶ To remedy the situation, Collingwood undertook some diplomatic efforts of his own, dispatching letters of friendship to the Dey. He reported in autumn that the tension was easing:

I hope our affairs at Algiers are in train to be amicably settled, Capt. Hallowell is returned from there, where he found the Algerians with the most pacific disposition and trusting to our justice. In all those affairs I think the Algerians have been exceedingly ill-used.⁶⁰⁷

It was in sticky diplomatic situations that Collingwood excelled; Collingwood was better able to understand, and successfully work with the ruling powers in North Africa, than those who came before or after him.⁶⁰⁸

Collingwood’s entreaties were able to prevent further threats to the Anglo-Algerine relationship; in September he surmised, “The Dey of Algiers I believe desires sincerely to maintain a good understanding with England.”⁶⁰⁹ As further proof, the Dey expelled the prizes of French privateers from Algiers.⁶¹⁰ A few days later, Collingwood admitted privately to his sister the stress of his position was getting to him but he was hopeful:

⁶⁰³ PCC, 291-2, no. 185, To Rear Admiral Purvis, 19 Sept 1809.; Playfair, 245-6.; NA FO 8/1 Collingwood to William Wellesley-Pole, 20 Sept 1809.

⁶⁰⁴ PCC, 291-2, no. 185, To Rear Admiral Purvis, 19 Sept 1809.

⁶⁰⁵ NA FO 8/1 Collingwood to William Wellesley-Pole, 20 Sept 1809.; Playfair, 246.

⁶⁰⁶ Adams, 255.; Rodger, *Command of the Ocean*, 558.; Hall, *Wellington’s Navy*, 6, 8-9.

⁶⁰⁷ Hughes, 291-2, no. 185, To Rear Admiral Purvis, 19 Sept 1809.

⁶⁰⁸ Adams, 225-6.; Rodger, *Command of the Ocean*, 550.; Orde, *Shadow*, 221.

⁶⁰⁹ NA FO 8/1 Collingwood to William Wellesley-Pole, 16 Sep 1809.

⁶¹⁰ *Ibid.*; Playfair, 247.

My Algerine business I hope is composing, but it is hard to make up for all the fooleries and ignorance of other people. The Africans seem to be wiser and better judging than the people we employ amongst them.⁶¹¹

A month later, the issue was put to rest:

“I am glad our affairs are so far settled with Algiers that we have nothing to apprehend from their resentment. The Dey behaved with more temperance than would have been found in more enlightened courts. The Consul omitted to do his duty and the Captain of the *Minstrel* committed a violent outrage...”⁶¹²

It is clear Collingwood held the British entirely to blame for the debacle, but luckily they had ‘nothing to apprehend’ over the issue. Across the whole region, Collingwood reported, “Our affairs with the Barbary States are quite composed,” in late November. The Dey requested the assistance of a frigate to carry an Algerine ambassador to Constantinople, which given the recent events, Collingwood promised to supply as soon as one was available.⁶¹³ In the new year, lingering fears over Algiers were gone; Blanckley reassured Major General Campbell at Gibraltar, “the Garrison of Gibraltar shall be supplied with every article of provision this kingdom affords,” which included, “bullocks, sheep, fowls, eggs, oil, butter, wheat, barley also if required biscuit” which could be purchased at market price.⁶¹⁴ At the same time, Blanckley updated Lord Liverpool on his efforts to convince the Dey of the disadvantages of trading with France (which as a neutral nation, Algiers was free to do), and recommended a present of military stores, such as ammunition and cannons, would strengthen the Anglo-Algerine bond.⁶¹⁵

Morocco’s importance for the British and allied forces fighting in the Iberian Peninsula superseded even Algiers. The western-most state of North Africa was separated from Iberia by fewer than ten miles. This was reinforced by Iberia and

⁶¹¹ PCC, 293, no. 186 to his sister, 20 Sep 1809.

⁶¹² PCC, 295, no. 185 to Rear Admiral Purvis, 6 Oct 1809.

⁶¹³ NA FO 8/1 Collingwood to William Wellesley-Pole, 26 Nov 1809.

⁶¹⁴ NA FO 3/12 Blanckley to Major General Campbell, 12 Mar 1810.

⁶¹⁵ NA FO 3/12 Blanckley to Lord Liverpool, 12 Mar 1810.

Barbary's shared partnerships with Britain, especially after Wellesley made Lisbon, not Cadiz, the base of the British army in 1809. The British forces saw Portugal as more helpful and committed in the fight against the French.⁶¹⁶ For the young Lieutenant-General, the more obvious fortress and trade center of Cadiz were actually disadvantages as, "the very weaknesses of Portugal, which made her totally dependent on Britain, could be turned to advantage... Britain could never have coerced Spain as she coerced Portugal nor without outside help, would the Portuguese have continued the struggle..."⁶¹⁷ And help her, Britain did. The British Royal Navy in the Mediterranean saw its role shift in the aftermath of Trafalgar and the start of the Peninsular War from being the forefront of the action to an ancillary supply force simultaneously providing security for the coastal defenses and ensuring the supplies for their Army counterparts in Portugal and Spain. The consuls in North Africa had the provisioning of the British and allied forces in Iberia added to their responsibilities, whilst needing to ensure British garrisons, along with the Navy, were still provided for.⁶¹⁸

The cooperation between the British Military and diplomats in Barbary to ensure the supply and assistance of the war in Spain and Portugal can be best illustrated by a letter from Admiral Sir George Berkeley, commander-in-chief of the Lisbon squadron and in charge of the supply of Wellesley's forces.⁶¹⁹ Berkeley wrote Consul Green, acknowledging the receipt of a shipment of cattle from Tangiers. Berkeley then outlined the necessity of Barbary trade for the success in Portugal:

...[I] feel very much indebted to you for the trouble you have taken in the business of procuring cattle which is certainly of material importance to His Majesty's services, as well as the interests of Portugal, as such a supply of course keeps down their markets; under this idea I have applied to the Regency of this Kingdom to give the necessary orders to their consul that some benefit may

⁶¹⁶ Muir, *Britain*, 87.; Rory Muir, ed. *At Wellington's Right Hand: the Letters of Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Alexander Gordon, 1808-1815* (Gloucestershire: Sutton Publishing Limited, 2003), 52.

⁶¹⁷ Muir, *Britain*, 87.

⁶¹⁸ Knight, *Sustaining the Fleet*, 53-4.

⁶¹⁹ Muir, *Britain*, 207.

accrue from the Emperor's permit, which has in fact been of no use to Portugal for the last two years, and I cannot but express my surprise that a moment's hesitation could be made on the part of the Consul, in a matter so evidently calculated for the benefit of this Country.

The success of His Majesty's Arms under Sir Arthur Wellesley has driven the enemy from the North of Portugal, and of course cleared the Beiras from the depredations of the French, but the havoc and devastation they have occasioned will of course render the supply less productive and therefore if we can obtain it from Barbary it will not only be a means of their gaining time to replace their stock, but it will be of material service to our Army in the Alentejo and that part of Spain where their operations are likely to be divided.⁶²⁰

Complications in relations between Portugal (and Spain) and North Africa were a common issue during the majority of the wars of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as demonstrated by Berkeley's mention of Portugal's two-years of difficulty in trading with Morocco. Britain, who had no such difficulty and had spent the previous two decades ensuring the best possible relations with North Africa, was in position to intercede on her allies' behalf. That summer, Berkeley requested, and was granted, 200 mules for the Peninsular Army; by the end of 1809 Green had exported nearly a thousand additional oxen to Portugal and two thousand to Spain. Green also negotiated for the exportation of mules and grain from Morocco for the benefit of the allied forces in Iberia.⁶²¹

In January 1810, French forces moved into Andalusia, captured Seville, and threatened Cadiz. The Spanish general, the Duque de Albuquerque, arrived just in time to prevent the port from being taken by the French, who placed Cadiz under siege for the next two years. The danger to Cadiz convinced the Spanish to allow a British garrison to be established; the first British forces arrived in February and were reinforced by three battalions from Wellesley and two more Portuguese battalions. The garrison,

⁶²⁰ NA FO 174/11 Sir George Berkeley to James Green, 29 May 1809.

⁶²¹ NA FO 174/11 Sir George Berkeley to James Green, 17 Aug 1809.; NA FO 52/15 Green to Castlereagh, 10 Oct 1809.; Muir, *Britain*, 113.

commanded by Lieutenant-General Thomas Graham, would eventually number nearly 10,000 men.⁶²² Ahead of his arrival, Green was directed to:

...endeavor to secure the concurrence of the Moorish government as to furnishing such constant supplies of corn, Cattle or otherwise, as General Graham may wish to draw from Morocco, for the use both of the British Garrison, and of the Spanish engaged in the Defense of Cadiz – and I am to recommend to you the utmost attention and the adoption of such measures as may be best calculated to ensure the active Friendship of the Moorish government at this important time.⁶²³

The Moroccan minister, al-Salawi, still hopeful the British would convince the Spanish to relinquish Ceuta in exchange for Moroccan assistance, promised to provide the British with whatever assistance he was able.⁶²⁴ Shortly after, 45 oxen were shipped to Cadiz, and supplies were procured for the garrisons at Gibraltar, Cadiz, and Ceuta itself.⁶²⁵

By the time Green shipped the oxen to Cadiz, the British situation in the Mediterranean changed. Sir Alexander Ball, the Civil Commissioner in Malta almost since the beginning of the island's possession by Britain, died on 25 October 1809. General Hildebrand Oakes, the former garrison commander, succeeded him.⁶²⁶ In London, the ministry of the Duke of Portland collapsed, replaced by Spencer Percival.⁶²⁷ Even more crucially, Admiral Collingwood, commander-in-chief of the Mediterranean since Nelson's death nearly five years prior and who had been asking to be relieved of command for some time, was finally allowed to resign on 22 February 1810.⁶²⁸ After putting his affairs in order, Collingwood handed over temporary command to Admiral Purvis and sailed for England, where he had not spent more than a year since 1793, nor been back since before Trafalgar.⁶²⁹ Unfortunately, Collingwood, described as, "the

⁶²² Muir, *Britain*, 115.

⁶²³ NA FO 8/5 Bunbury to Green, 23 Feb 1810.; FO 174/19 Bunbury to Green, 23 Feb 1810.

⁶²⁴ NA FO 52/15 Translation of letter, Slowey to Green, 3 Mar 1810

⁶²⁵ NA FO 52/15 Green to Liverpool, 12 Mar 1810.; NA FO 8/5 Bunbury to Green, 7 Apr 1810.; Hall, *Wellington's Navy*, 40.

⁶²⁶ NA CO 158/14 E.F. Chapman to E. Corke, 26 Oct 1809.; Gregory, *Malta*, 158, 174.

⁶²⁷ Muir, *Britain*, 105-108.

⁶²⁸ Rodger, *Command of the Ocean*, 554-5.; Orde, *Collingwood*, 248.; Russell, *Collingwood*, 173.; Pocock, *Stopping Napoleon*, 145-6.

⁶²⁹ Orde, *Collingwood*, 249.

perfect English gentleman”⁶³⁰ and “a better seaman than Nelson, a subtler diplomat, and despite his conservative politics, a naval reformer at least fifty years ahead of his time,”⁶³¹ died en route on 7 March.⁶³²

After the Battle of Trafalgar, the British became the dominant European power in the Mediterranean – a position they would hold until the end of the war. As the French unveiled the Berlin Decrees (and Britain responded with the Orders in Council), European trade was increasingly shut to Europeans, but not to North Africa. Barbary ships carrying out British trade to both Livorno and Malta averaged 40 per cent of those ports traffic.⁶³³ Corsairs on the other hand, were rapidly declining; Tunis and Algiers both saw their corsair fleets downsize during this time and Malta (which had 89 per cent of the privateers calling at the port came from Barbary in 1801) recorded only 11 per cent of the privateers calling at the port as being from Barbary. British shipping, itself, to and from North Africa rose dramatically during this period, and continued to rise.




Figure 5: British Shipping to/from Barbary, 1806-1810

⁶³⁰ Adams, 25.

⁶³¹ Adams, 16.

⁶³² NA ADM 1/416 no. 108, W. Reasmeay to Croker, 12 March 1810.; Monk, 95.; Orde, *Collingwood*, 249.; Rodger, *Command of the Ocean*, 555.

⁶³³ Galani, 144.; MALTA APPENDIX

Collingwood's skill at diplomacy, both his own and managing the consuls in the region, coupled with British dominance of the Mediterranean, led to the post Trafalgar years of the Napoleonic war being a boom time in Barbary trade. This came at the time when British efforts in the war were likewise grew as Britain economically and military supporting both Spain and Portugal in the Peninsular War. The British consul in Tripoli, William Langford, called the Barbary supply line, "of the highest importance to the service of our fleet,"⁶³⁴ and Sir George Berkeley, of the Lisbon squadron, called it, "of material service to our Army"⁶³⁵ in Spain. As the war continued, that importance grew – but luckily so did the trade.

⁶³⁴ NA FO 76/6 Langford to Castlereagh, 13 Oct 1807

⁶³⁵ NA FO 174/11 Sir George Berkeley to James Green, 29 May 1809.

CHAPTER SIX: 1810-1815

As Collingwood had resigned in February 1810, Sir Charles Cotton was given command of the Mediterranean squadron. He arrived in late April. Cotton's new post dwarfed his previous commands; the Mediterranean command stretched over 2,000 miles east to west and by 1810 was larger than the Channel Fleet, encompassing multiple states under the control of various powers engaged in distinct disputes both separate and related to the greater war in Europe. Collingwood had been adept at balancing the multitude of factions and interests present in the Mediterranean and Cotton would be expected to maintain the same level of skill.⁶³⁶ He would be expected to maintain peace in the Mediterranean between the various allies of the British and ensure the local supply sources from North Africa. That region required careful management to ensure it had provided the maximum benefit to the British war effort. Collingwood had overseen the most productive trade period in Barbary since the wars had begun in 1792; an average of 24 British ships making 39 journeys travelled to and from North Africa each year of Collingwood's command.⁶³⁷ Barbary had exported an average of 3,000 cows and 4,000 sheep to Malta each year, or 94 per cent and 84 per cent respectively of Malta's total imports.⁶³⁸ Gibraltar was guaranteed 2,000 cows a year from Morocco, and Tripoli's exports to Malta had increased each year until in 1809 half of *all* cattle the island received came from Tripoli alone.⁶³⁹ If the British were to continue to support the growing efforts in the Iberian Peninsula, Collingwood's successor would need to ensure these successes continued.

⁶³⁶ Rodger, *Command of the Ocean*, 550, 555.; Krajeski, 138-40. ; Knight, *Sustaining the Fleet*, 49.; Edward Osler, *The Life of Admiral Viscount Exmouth* (London: Smith, Elder and Co., 1835), 268.; NA ADM 1/416 no. 114, Cotton to John Croker, 28 Apr 1810.

⁶³⁷ See Appendix III: Lloyd's List (p. 265)..

⁶³⁸ See Appendix IV: Malta Imports (p. 267).

⁶³⁹ El Mansour, 114.; Folayan, 62-3.

By the time Cotton arrived, the main crux of the British effort against Bonaparte was the Peninsular War. The Royal Navy was tasked with supporting the Army in the Iberian Peninsula and maintaining a defensive stance in the wider Mediterranean. The first half of Cotton's year-long command would be the most difficult. He blockaded the French Fleet at Toulon, whilst managing the British fleet and protecting the trade convoys spread across the Mediterranean. His immediate concern, however, was a lack of victualing provisions for the British off Toulon. Cotton needed grain, water, wine, and lemon juice immediately. By September, the problem was so severe the fleet was on two-thirds rations.⁶⁴⁰ The extent of Cotton's needs completely overwhelmed the small depot at Mahon (closest to Toulon), causing a month delay whilst they acquired the necessary stores despite difficulties from North Africa and Italy.⁶⁴¹ Delays were dangerous as they both had the possibility for sickness and scurvy.

Algiers and Dey Hajji Ali (victor of the dynastic struggle in 1808-9) were cooperative with the British. In early March, Major General Campbell at Gibraltar purchased barley for the garrison from the regency. Less than a month after Cotton's arrival, the British consul at Algiers, Henry Blanckley, reported "the Dey was inclined to favour the British," though there were still problems of French privateers in Algerine ports.⁶⁴² Despite being the uncontested naval power in the Mediterranean, Britain could not simply demand or force Algiers (or any of the other Barbary States) to stop trading with or declare war on France. British strategy in the Mediterranean was built upon Barbary neutrality. Every treaty France bought was money she could not spend elsewhere. Every issue Britain had with French privateers using North African ports was an issue France would have with British privateers. Barbary was of far greater value to Britain neutral (and free) than formally allied and under blockade.

⁶⁴⁰ Krajewski, 165.

⁶⁴¹ Krajewski, 140, 143-5, 153, 165, 168.; Taylor, 214

⁶⁴² Krajewski, 149.

Another shipment of barley, flour, and cattle left Algiers for Gibraltar on 16 June. To further assist the Peninsular War, Cotton was ordered to try to convince the Dey to sign another treaty with Portugal. The admiral sent Captain George Dundas to negotiate with Algiers, both about Portugal and the French privateers. The privateers were a nuisance to British shipping, but conflicts between Portugal, where the British army was stationed, and Algiers were far more serious. An important western Mediterranean victualling source like Algiers could disrupt the delicate balance the British military established in the region.⁶⁴³

Before Dundas arrived, the Portuguese envoy, Admiral Searnischia, and the secured a two-year truce with Algiers and the redemption of captives in exchange for ransom. Wellesley, now the Duke of Wellington, advocated another Portuguese representative be sent to Algiers to finalise those negotiations. Wellington was busy arranging for the transport for 3,000 tons of corn from Algiers to Lisbon and well aware of the necessity of Barbary support for his Iberian forces. Dundas focused on his other objective, the French privateers capturing British vessels and bringing the prizes back to Algiers. Dundas argued this was in violation of the British treaties with Algiers. Algiers disagreed, arguing their neutrality. The French had a similar problem in Tunis. The French vice-consul at Tunis, François-Joseph Billon, wrote on 28 August that the Bey of Tunis, Hammuda Pasha, had returned a French ship taken by the British to its owner. Much like the British complaints against the French in Algiers, the British-captured French ship was brought to Tunis after its capture. In Algiers, Dundas could not get the Dey to agree to prevent the French from bringing their prizes into the port, but the Dey promised he would forbid Christian ships (of any nation) from sailing *out* of Algiers to capture prizes. Dundas concluded his time in Algiers by securing food for the fleet off

⁶⁴³ Shaler, 114.; Krajeski, 149-51, Irons, 154-5.

Toulon, where supplies were low, and returned to the fleet in early September. The British had secured their two diplomatic goals in Algiers; Portugal had reached a truce with the Regency, and Britain had received some restrictions against French privateers while ensuring the continued victualling supply.⁶⁴⁴

Hammuda Pasha sought to increase his cooperation with the British in 1810 after the French consul, Devoize, returned to Paris. The Bey sent an embassy to London led by Mahmud al-Jalluli, who became Tunis's residing envoy in Malta from 1810-13.⁶⁴⁵ He was a representative for Tunisian commercial and military interests, as well as for arranging the purchase of ships for the Tunisian navy. Tunis's private corsair fleet, which prior to Trafalgar had been over 80 per cent of their entire fleet and numbering in the hundreds, only comprised 32 per cent and an average of 28 vessels during the decade after Trafalgar.⁶⁴⁶ Several new trade agreements between Tunis and Britain, to the disadvantage of the French, had been reached, which saw English goods imported at a flat three per cent tax, regardless of whether they came from England or on an English ship. French goods, on the other hand, were charged three per cent only if they were imported from France on French ships – eight per cent otherwise. English merchant, Thomas Macgill, described the discrepancy:

This advantage, in former times, was little attended to, as the commerce with Great Britain was of trivial consequence; but now, that the whole supply must inevitably come from Malta, it becomes of consideration, and is an eye-sore to all in the French interest at Tunis.⁶⁴⁷

Early the next year, French Vice-Consul Billon wrote to the Duke of Bassano, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, stating, “Il paraît que le commerce de Tunis avec la France

⁶⁴⁴ DDW, v. 4, 55: To Charles Stuart, 6 May 1810. [Hereafter, DDW]; DDW, v. 4, 436: To Charles Stuart and H.F. Sampayo, 28 Nov 1810.; DDW, v. 5, 177: to Charles Stuart, 22 July 1811.; DDW, v. 5, 183: To Charles Stuart, 24 July 1811.; Krajeski, 149-51.

⁶⁴⁵ Brown, 95.

⁶⁴⁶ Sebag, 8.

⁶⁴⁷ Macgill, 95.

va cesser entièrement.”⁶⁴⁸ Where France dominated Tunisian trade in the 1780s, now the British dominated the regency.⁶⁴⁹ French interest and prestige had diminished in proportion to Britain’s increasing primacy, leaving the French concerned with the tipped balance of power in the aftermath of the invasion of Egypt in 1798 and their defeat at Trafalgar in 1805.⁶⁵⁰

Morocco was the main supplier of the Iberian Peninsula. In October 1810, the Moroccan emperor, Mawlay Suleiman, permitted the export of additional 1,000 oxen to Gibraltar in exchange for gunpowder and cannons. The following January, 200 oxen were sent to Cadiz plus grain and barley for His Majesty’s forces in the final stages of regaining Portugal.⁶⁵¹ Any trade the British secured with North Africa was both beneficial to themselves and all their dependents in the region, but also trade that was unavailable for the benefit of the French.

At the other extreme of Barbary, the British consul in Tripoli, William Langford, had again fallen out with the Bashaw, Yusuf Karamanli. In December 1810, Langford called on the *divan* and the Bashaw to intercede on behalf of a Maltese merchant about to be expelled from the regency. When Langford said he would report the incident to the King, the Bashaw became enraged:

The Bashaw looked hard at me; and when on retiring, I had reached the middle of the hall, he roared out, ‘Tu minaccia me?’ [You threaten me?] and clapping his hand on his pistol, he descended from the throne and ran at me, repeating the words, ‘Tu minaccia me?’. When near my person, he stopped and knocking the turban half off his head, he seized hold of his right ear, exclaiming “Chi stat e!” [Who are you!]. The Bashaw at this moment both in voice and gesture demonstrated madness, and I am convinced that the timely interference of the Divan alone prevented the offering of further insult...⁶⁵²

⁶⁴⁸ Plantet, *Tunis*, v. 3, 439: no. 952: Billon au Duc de Bassano, 12 May 1811.

⁶⁴⁹ Windler, “Diplomatic History,” 82.; Panzac, *Barbary Corsairs*, 73.

⁶⁵⁰ Moalla, *The Regency of Tunis*, 63, 65-6.; Plantet, *Tunis*, v. 3, 489: no. 936: Billon au Comte de Champagne, 18 Aug 1810.; Macgill, 95.;

⁶⁵¹ NA FO 52/15 Green to Liverpool, 6 Oct 1810.; NA FO 52/15 Green to Liverpool, 23 Jan 1811.; NA FO 52/15 Green to Liverpool, 20 Apr 1811.; Horward, 52.

⁶⁵² quoted in Dearden, 216.

When the Bashaw cooled down, he attempted to resolve the disagreement privately, but Langford demanded a public apology in front of the full *divan* – which the Bashaw adamantly refused. In consequence, the Bashaw withdrew Langford’s consular privileges, and took the British shipping under his own protection, and ordered the Consul from Spain to handle British affairs. Langford and his family were informed if they left their house they would be arrested. The British consul was only saved from this predicament by the arrival of a British schooner in March, which compelled the Bashaw to relent.⁶⁵³ In May, Langford was ordered to return to England to explain the situation.⁶⁵⁴

Langford had other ideas, however, as Civil Commissioner of Malta, Hildebrand Oakes, wrote the Secretary of State: “the Consul has neither intimated the subject of your Lordship’s dispatch to the Bashaw nor shown any disposition to quit Tripoli.” Patrick Wilkie, former British Consul at Carthegena, was chosen as Langford’s replacement.⁶⁵⁵ Consular disputes threatened British diplomatic standing in the Barbary States and could disrupt trade. The British had to tread a delicate balance between ensuring trade and diplomatic relations resumed as soon as possible while not damaging their standing or respect in the region. In 1810, Langford had reported yet another increase in Tripoli’s exports to Malta now up to 3,000 head of cattle and the number of merchants travelling between the island and the Regency had likewise been increasing.⁶⁵⁶ Tripoli alone was providing up to half of Malta’s total cattle imports; a dangerous supply to have threatened by diplomatic difficulties or subpar consuls.

⁶⁵³ Dearden, 217.

⁶⁵⁴ CO 174/21 Downing Street to Oakes, 9 May 1811.

⁶⁵⁵ CO 174/17 Oakes to Liverpool, 30 July 1811.; Dearden, 218.

⁶⁵⁶ Folayan, *Yūsūf Pāshā*, 62-3.; NA FO 76/6 Langford to Windham, 31 Dec 1806 – “Return of Cattle sent this year to Malta.”; NA FO 76/6 Langford to Castlereagh, 1807 Return of the Exportation of Cattle from the Regency of Tripoli in the West, 31 Dec 1807.; NA FO 76/6 Langford to Castlereagh, 1808 Return of the Exportation of Cattle from the Regency of Tripoli in the West, 5 Jan 1809.; NA FO 76/7 Langford to Castlereagh, 1807 Return of the Exportation of Cattle from the Regency of Tripoli in the West, 20 Feb 1810.

By the time of Wilkie's appointment however, the overall command of the Mediterranean squadron had changed. In early 1811, Cotton was given command of the Channel fleet and the Admiralty appointed Sir Edward Pellew as Cotton's successor in April. Pellew took command on 18 July 1811. Pellew assumed command, charged with the same directive as Cotton – assisting the British Army in the Peninsular War. When Pellew arrived, Wellington had regained Portugal and pushed the French back into Spain, but he was still outnumbered. Wellington needed the Navy to supply the army and feed their Iberian allies.⁶⁵⁷ Pellew would need to supply the allied forces in the Iberian Peninsula as well as all the British garrisons and his own fleet. For that, he needed to keep North Africa under control.

The perennial problem in North Africa – unsuitable consuls – reared its head again in Algiers over Blanckley. A British contractor in Algiers was concerned because Blankley had told him cattle for the fleet could no longer be exported and the monopoly for the sale of corn (duty free) for the British had been sold to another for a vastly reduced price. By August 1811, the issue over cattle exports had been resolved, but the right to ship the corn was still contested. It should have been sold for at least twice its price and, “It appears from all this that the Country [UK] has not been benefited by Mr Consul Blankley's treaty with the Dey.”⁶⁵⁸ Pellew forwarded the reports to the Admiralty, concluding his letter with, “I must observe that the conduct of Mr Blanckley must be viewed at present with considerable distrust.”⁶⁵⁹ Algiers was not just an important victualling source for the fleet, but also Gibraltar and the Iberian Peninsula. A

⁶⁵⁷ C. Northcote Parkinson, *Edward Pellew: Viscount Exmouth, Admiral of the Red* (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd, 1934), 388-9.; Taylor, 219, 221-2.; Rodger, 561.; Thomas M. Barker, “A Debacle of the Peninsular War: the British-Led Amphibious Assault against Fort Fuengirola 14-15 October 1810” *The Journal of Military History* 64, no. 1 (2000), 24-5.

⁶⁵⁸ ADM 1/421 no. 797: Pellew to Croker, 17 Aug 1811.

⁶⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

potential price spike or loss of supply at the time when Wellington's forces were preparing to push forward into Spain was worrisome and dangerous.⁶⁶⁰

At the same time, French vice-consul, Billon, reported that Admiral Searnischia, the Portuguese envoy who arranged the 1810 truce with Algiers, had arrived in Tunis to negotiate peace between Portugal and the Bey. The treaty between Tunis and Portugal would be finalised in 1813. In late August, Billon lamented, "Le Bey est entièrement dominé par l'influence anglaise."⁶⁶¹ The next month, the Bey further strengthened his rule by crushing a *janissary* revolt. Like Ottoman sultan, Selim III, the Bey had attempted to reform his *janissaries*. The Bey's reforms were no more successful than the Sultan, deposed in 1807 by *his* janissaries – but Tunis was not Constantinople. The foreign *janissaries*, protesting the increasingly local nature of the Tunisian army, revolted and locked themselves in the Qasbah. They were crushed by Yusuf Sahib al-Tabi. The survivors attempted to flee to Algiers, but were pursued and killed by the Bey's indigenous soldiers. Billon's observation was simply, "La rébellion a été étouffée dans le sang."⁶⁶² Yusuf Sahib al-Tabi increased his already considerable influence in the Regency, to the consternation of the French who considered him a fierce enemy. The Bey subsequently reduced his *janissary* corps by nearly a quarter, and increased his reliance on local soldiers. The next month the Algerine navy blockaded the Tunisian port, using the rebellion and the Bey ceasing payment to Algiers after the 1807 war as justification. The Moroccan Emperor also experienced challenges to his rule – the indigenous nations in the mountains of the Middle Atlas erupted into open revolt.

⁶⁶⁰ Ibid.; Julien, 321.; Charles J. Esdaile, "Wellington and the Military Eclipse of Spain, 1808-1814." *The International History Review* 11, no.1 (1989), 55-6, 61-2.; Horward, 52-3.

⁶⁶¹ Plantet, *Tunis*, v. 3, 498: no. 963, Billon au Duc de Bassano, 28 Aug 1811.

⁶⁶² Plantet, *Tunis*, v. 3, 498: no. 964, Billon au Duc de Bassano, 12 Sept 1811.

Eliminating that challenge would distract and occupy Mawlay Suleiman for the next decade.⁶⁶³

Charles Stuart, British ambassador to Portugal, wrote Wellington on the subject of “the encouragement of trade with Barbary.”⁶⁶⁴ Stuart conveyed the Portuguese government’s anxiety over the flow of supplies from North Africa. The ambassador directed Richard Oglander, British consul in Tunis, to recommend Tunisian merchants sell their grain to Portugal owing to, “the failure of the harvests in the provinces of Portugal laid waste during the late invasion.”⁶⁶⁵ By the end of the year, Oglander had secured grain for the British Army and Navy from Tunis, to be repaid in naval stores. Not a moment too soon, as Stuart further stressed Portugal’s need for grain in his next letter, “The want of grain has increased to a degree which already materially affects the operations of the army in the field.”⁶⁶⁶ Wheat was the most problematic food to supply for Spain and Portugal; 1811 coincided with another bad harvest in England. Little grain could be gotten in the Iberian Peninsula itself, though thirty new Agent Victuallers were sent to Iberia in 1811 to assist the war effort there.⁶⁶⁷

Stuart ordered Oglander, “to spare no expense to persuade the Moorish government to give their consent for the exportation of a quantity of wheat, Indian corn, and Barley to Lisbon,” as well as “despatch a vessel laden with corn and consigned to [Stuart].”⁶⁶⁸ Wellington told Stuart the bad harvest in Britain meant Portugal could only get grain from the Mediterranean and America, urging the ambassador to “make an effort

⁶⁶³ Plantet, *Tunis*, v. 3, 496, no. 961, Billon au Duc de Bassano, 3 Aug 1811.; 498: no. 963, Billon au Duc de Bassano, 28 Aug 1811, no. 964, Billon au Duc de Bassano, 12 Sept 1811.; Moalla, 56-8, 59, 64, 65, 106-7, 108-9.; Hale, 16-7.; Jackson, 274.; Macgill, 29.; NA FO 77/6 Prince Regent to Bey of Tunis, Oct 1811.; Julien, 331, 269.; Perkins, *Tunisia*, 63.

⁶⁶⁴ NA FO 8/5, Charles Stuart to Wellesley, 30 Nov 1811.

⁶⁶⁵ NA FO 335/47 folder 5, Charles Stuart to Oglander, 12 Dec 1811.

⁶⁶⁶ NA FO 335/47 folder 5, Charles Stuart to Oglander, 23 Dec 1811.

⁶⁶⁷ Morriss, 74.

⁶⁶⁸ NA FO 335/47 folder 5, Charles Stuart to Oglander, 23 Dec 1811.

to get grain from the coast of Africa.”⁶⁶⁹ James Green, consul in Morocco, had sent grain and barley for the British forces fighting in Spain and Portugal in April. In addition to the oxen sent at the beginning of the year, the contract for 1812 (building upon the 1801 treaty) included 2,000 oxen for Gibraltar and another 1,000 for the British Army and Navy based at Cadiz. By the end of 1811, Bonaparte’s planned invasion of Russia was already drawing men away from the French peninsular forces. The withdrawal of French troops provided the opportunity for Wellington to begin the reconquest of Spain in early 1812.⁶⁷⁰

In many ways, 1812 was the beginning of the end of Bonaparte’s power in Europe. He siphoned troops away from his forces fighting in the Iberian Peninsula to aid his campaign against Russia – doomed from the start – and the reduction of troops in Spain provided the perfect opportunity for the British and Portuguese troops to push into Spain. Portugal’s continued independence from Bonaparte and the increasing progress in Spain destroyed the efficacy of Bonaparte’s continental system at the same time as the Emperor destroyed his own army in the Russian winter. Pellew and the Mediterranean fleet provided auxiliary support for their allies on land: transporting supplies and victuals from around the Mediterranean and keeping the French under blockade. It was also a time of petty disruptions for the fleet – two different North African states saw consul turnover, two states were embroiled in a conflict with Spain, and one of the major sources of grain for the peninsular campaign – the United States – was in danger due to

⁶⁶⁹ DDW, v. 5, 393: to Charles Stuart, 6 Dec 1811.; DDW, v. 5, 411: To Charles Stuart, 17 Dec 1811.

⁶⁷⁰ Krajewski, 150.; NA FO 8/5 Stuart to Wellesley, 30 Nov 1811.; NA FO 335/47 folder 5, Charles Stuart to Oglander, 12 Dec 1811., NA FO 77/6 Oglander to James Chapman, 22 Dec 1811.; Knight, *Sustaining the Fleet*, 53-4.; NA FO 52/15 Green to Liverpool, 20 Apr 1811.; NA FO 52/15 Green to Liverpool, 23 Jan 1811.; NA FO 52/15 Green to Liverpool, 12 Dec 1811.; Esdaile, “Wellington,” 61-2.; Don W. Alexander, “French Replacement Methods during the Peninsular War, 1808-1814” *Military Affairs* 44, no. 4 (1980), 195-6.; Godfrey Davies, “The Whigs and the Peninsular War, 1808-1814” *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 2 (1919), 127.; Kennedy, 169.

the outbreak of war between the U.S. and Great Britain.⁶⁷¹ The ‘War of 1812’ put further stress on the victualling support for the peninsular army. Wellington told the British government:

...you will readily believe that these accounts [of war] have occasioned a good deal of anxiety. Not only Portugal but the neighbouring provinces of Spain have subsisted upon these importations.⁶⁷²

Luckily the British apparatus in the region was adept at ensuring the transportation of foodstuffs from the northern coast of Africa to the British fleet, army, allies, and territories in the Mediterranean by this point in the war, while managing the consuls and their difficulties.

The trouble with Consul Langford in Tripoli had not been resolved the previous year, and relations between the consul and the Bashaw were still tense. Langford remained in the regency despite being recalled in May 1811.⁶⁷³ “Your employment as consul-general has ceased,” Oakes wrote Langford in January 1812, “you should deliver over into the hands of the proconsul, whom I may send for that purpose from this Island, all papers, seals, and property whatsoever connected with the office of Consul.”⁶⁷⁴ Langford protested this to Secretary of State, Lord Liverpool, but in vain. Langford lamented he had hoped to be promoted but was informed he was to leave immediately and his remaining was “highly censurable.”⁶⁷⁵ Langford finally left in late January, and his replacement, Patrick Wilkie, arrived in the regency the next day, accompanied by his secretary, James Somerville.⁶⁷⁶ On 6 February, in his initial report, Wilkie thought the

⁶⁷¹ Forbes, 726-7.; Rafael Dobado-González, Alfredo García-Hiernaux, and David E. Guerrero, “The Integration of Grain Markets in the Eighteenth Century: Early Rise of Globalization in the West” *Journal of Economic History* 72, no. 3 (2012), 672, 676.; Hyneman, *The First American Neutrality*, 27-9.; Flournoy, 35.; Black, *The War of 1812*, 138-9.; Robson, 202.

⁶⁷² DDW, v. 5, 645: To the Earl of Liverpool, 12 May 1812.

⁶⁷³ Dearden, 218

⁶⁷⁴ NA CO 158/18 Oakes to Langford, 18 Jan 1812.

⁶⁷⁵ NA FO 76/8 Langford to Liverpool, 29 Jan 1812.; NA FO 76/8 Wilkie to Liverpool, 6 Feb 1812.; Dearden, 218.

⁶⁷⁶ NA FO 76/8 Langford to General Bentinck, 30 Jan 1812.; Dearden, 218.

Bashaw was pleased with the change.⁶⁷⁷ Wilkie was to be the new consul, *ad interim*, and only for that year.⁶⁷⁸ Langford, however, would continue to pester the British government in London over his dismissal after his arrival back in England.⁶⁷⁹ He complained of being ignored and shunned in June and lamented “the state of Tripoli...[was] notorious for fabricating personal exception to His Majesty’s Consul.”⁶⁸⁰ Langford’s removal allowed the regency to resume diplomatic and mercantile transactions with the British. Oakes wrote Liverpool a month after Willkie’s arrival, to confirm the success of the change. Oakes had received a letter from the Bashaw, reconfirming Yusuf’s ‘pleasure’ at the new consul and his ‘attachment to the British Government and Nation.’⁶⁸¹ As far as Tripoli, Malta, and the British forces in the Mediterranean were concerned, the trouble with the consul was resolved.

Algiers also had a new consul. Blanckley, consul since 1807, was relieved of his position in the spring. He had grown “old and infirm” and there had been complaints about his “inefficiency” during both Collingwood and Cotton’s command.⁶⁸² Blanckley left in April 1812 and was replaced by Hugh McDonnell, who would remain consul until 1824.⁶⁸³ McDonnell had previously worked as a commissary agent in Gibraltar.⁶⁸⁴ He arrived with a letter to the Dey from the Prince Regent, responding to the Dey’s complaints of not hearing from “his friend, George III”, and instructions to “be active in thwarting the enemy’s intrigues, keeping at the same time a firm tone with the Dey.”⁶⁸⁵ Admiral Pellew asked McDonnell to report on the “regularity of future supplies of corn, cattle, and other refreshments” for the fleet, garrisons, and army. When Pellew reported

⁶⁷⁷ NA FO 76/8 Wilkie to Liverpool, 6 Feb 1812.

⁶⁷⁸ Dearden, 218

⁶⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁸⁰ NA FO 76/8 Langford to Liverpool, 25 June 1812.; NA FO 76/8 Langford to Bathurst, 1 Sept 1812.; NA FO 76/8 Langford to Bathurst, 3 Mar 1813.; The issue dragged on until 1814.

⁶⁸¹ NA CO 158/18/ Oakes to Liverpool, 2 Mar 1812.

⁶⁸² Irons, 147

⁶⁸³ NA FO 3/14 McDonnell to Bunbury, 13 May 1812.

⁶⁸⁴ Irons, 147

⁶⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

McDonnell's answers to the Admiralty, he both demonstrated the interconnectedness of the British operations in the Mediterranean and the British reliance on supplies from North Africa:

Looking to the future of our supplies from Barbary...I have judged it expedient to send Mr. Felton, Agent Victualler at Mahon to Algiers, that he may concert measures with His Majesty's pro-consul which may be best calculated for ensuring those objects, which in the event of operation in the Eastern Provinces of Spain or the present scarcity in England will be indispensable.⁶⁸⁶

British victualing agents and consuls were not merely communicating with each other, but actively travelled around the Mediterranean to determine how best to provide the necessary supplies for the British forces operating in the region. Further, the war's progress in Europe had rendered the victualing supplies from North Africa vitally necessary. Continuing grain shortages in England meant grain could not be sent from the victualling board and had to be procured elsewhere. The War of 1812 placed the supply from the United States in danger. That left North Africa, fertile and nearby – local access was cheaper and faster.

To better serve various interests in the Mediterranean, consular management in the Mediterranean was transferred to two local British ambassadors in 1812. With the consular troubles in Tripoli and Algiers still fresh, Wellington had lamented:

Our measures to procure supplies from the coast of Barbary have failed, principally, as I am informed, from the deficiencies of the persons employed by the British government to conduct their affairs on that coast.⁶⁸⁷

Such an indictment from the leader of the armies in Iberia necessitated change in the oversight of the consuls to prevent further complications at an already tense moment for supplying said armed forces. The consuls in Morocco, led by consul-general, James Green, were placed under the direction of Sir Henry Wellesley (Spain), to allow

⁶⁸⁶ NA ADM 1/422 no. 189: Pellew to Croker, 13 May 1812.

⁶⁸⁷ DDW, v. 5, 646: To the Earl of Liverpool, 12 May 1812.

Morocco to assist the supply to the peninsular forces.⁶⁸⁸ Sir William Bentinck (Sicily) assumed control over the consuls in the Ottoman regencies, Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli (along with Egypt).⁶⁸⁹ Bentinck was directed to, “bend every effort towards extracting the maximum of supplies” from the regencies under his command.⁶⁹⁰ This shift allowed for more local control over the consuls’ actions, with answers given by men who had a better grasp of the changing local landscape than the government in London (and a faster response time). This was a crucial period for the British in the Mediterranean, as Wellington’s war against the French in the Iberian Peninsula intensified. After the War of 1812 threatened the United States’ shipments of grain to the Iberian Peninsula, the British relied on Barbary to make up the difference.⁶⁹¹

Grain scarcities were causing problems across the Mediterranean. Britain had been experiencing grain shortages since 1810, which not only prevented her from exporting grain to the Mediterranean but also contributed to Britain’s economic problems as food prices soared.⁶⁹² In the Mediterranean, an average of seven or eight thousand tons of grain a year could be bought in Algiers, but the wider Mediterranean was also having trouble.⁶⁹³ Majorca, Minorca’s larger neighbour, repeatedly asked Pellew for assistance with the grain shortage. In June, Pellew, through the contract between Felton, the Port Mahon Victualling Agent, and McDonnell in Algiers, was able to export surplus grain to Majorca.⁶⁹⁴ Tunis, which had been struggling with a grain shortage itself since 1805, placed an embargo on exporting grain in 1812.⁶⁹⁵ Morocco

⁶⁸⁸ NA FO 174/19 Letter from Liverpool to Green, 19 Dec 1811.; FO 52/16 Letter from Green to Liverpool, 20 Jan 1812.

⁶⁸⁹ NA WO 6/57 Liverpool to Bentinck, Downing Street, 3 Jan 1812

⁶⁹⁰ Ibid.; Irons, 146-7.

⁶⁹¹ Flourney, 35.

⁶⁹² Knight, *Britain Against Napoleon*, 395, 410-1.; Rodger, *Command of the Ocean*, 564.

⁶⁹³ Jackson, *Algiers*, 20.

⁶⁹⁴ NA ADM 1/423 no. 237, Pellew to Croker, 23 Jun 1812.

⁶⁹⁵ Macgill, 122, 135-6.; Moalla 136-7.

suffered another locust invasion in the south.⁶⁹⁶ France was also having difficulties procuring grain in the Mediterranean. Billon, French vice-consul in Tunis, was told by the French consul in Algiers that they had trouble contracting for grain for the French Army in Egypt with the Dey and the Algerine Jewish Bacri family.⁶⁹⁷ The French still owed a sizable debt to the Bacris stemming from their grain purchases during the *last* war, aking the merchant hesitant to sell additional supplies to France.⁶⁹⁸

On the back of the rest of the problems in the Mediterranean, the War of 1812 had the potential to be disastrous. Prior to 1812, the amount of grain from the United States had been increasing: in 1811 the U.S. export of grain was seven times that of 1805.⁶⁹⁹ With grain shortages increasing and over 400,000 allied mouths supported by the British in the Iberian Peninsula (not including the Minorca, Malta, or Gibraltar, none of which could sustain themselves), a total loss from the United States market was impossible to allow.⁷⁰⁰ American ships were given British licenses to transport supplies for the Peninsular Army. The federalist New England states (who opposed the war) controlled the American merchant ships; American flour supplies continued to cross the Atlantic.⁷⁰¹ The U.S. government did not prohibit their ships from using British passes until July 1813; by that point the continental system was rapidly deteriorating and grain could be again obtained from the Baltic after Bonaparte's disastrous Russian campaign.⁷⁰² Additionally, a contract for the British fleet with Bacri for 10,000 measures of wheat in 1813 was signed in November 1812.⁷⁰³ By the time the war with the U.S. could actually harm British operations in the Mediterranean, the landscape of the war

⁶⁹⁶ El Mansour, 105.

⁶⁹⁷ Plantet, *Tunis*, v. 3, 499: no. 968, Billon au Duc de Bassano, 26 Feb 1812.

⁶⁹⁸ Rosenstock, 354-5.

⁶⁹⁹ Hall, 6.; Robson, 175.

⁷⁰⁰ Rodger, *Command of the Ocean*, 561.; Jackson. 20.; Hall, 6.

⁷⁰¹ Knight, *Britain Against Napoleon*, 426.; Rodger, *Command of the Ocean*, 564-565; Black, *War of 1812*, 119, 138-9.; Lambert, 58, 207-8, 425.; Robson, 175.

⁷⁰² Knight, *Britain Against Napoleon*, 426.; Rodger, *Command of the Ocean*, 571.; Black, *War of 1812*, 138-9.

⁷⁰³ NA FO 3/14 Treaty between Blanckley and Jewish Firm of Bacri, 1 Nov 1812.

had changed once again. Like the U.S.-Tripoli war of 1801-1805, the War of 1812 accomplished little and did not harm the British war efforts in the Mediterranean.

Although Britain was on excellent terms with the Barbary States, not all of her allies were. While Pellew worked to ensure the supply of grain from Algiers, Algiers and Spain were becoming increasingly hostile. In April 1812, Pellew warned of rising tensions:

The displeasure of the Dey of Algiers towards the Spanish Government does not promise to be easily satisfied, though I employed my mediation from a persuasion of the policy of procuring a good understanding between them.⁷⁰⁴

Pellew explained what other measures he was taking to further attempt to appease the Algerines. One of the Dey's ministers had requested some cables that could not be obtained in Algiers and Pellew, "thought it a good opportunity to assure his friendship by sending him three of the size he required from our stores."⁷⁰⁵ This did the double duty of sweetening Pellew's attempts at mediating the diplomatic conflict between the regency and Spain, as well as reaffirming the friendship between Britain and Algiers. Pellew concluded by warning that the Dey had complained of experiencing 'neglect' at the hands of the British Government and "dissatisfaction at the conduct of our commercial agents within his dominions."⁷⁰⁶ Whatever complications might arise from a conflict between Algiers and Spain would be nothing compared to the potential problems arising from Algiers feeling 'neglected' diplomatically by Britain – the regency could make the exportation of grain difficult at a crucial moment in the war. Britain could not afford a repeat of the Falcon debacle with the war in the Iberian Peninsula.

Pellew was not alone in his concerns. Sir Henry Wellesley, British Ambassador to Spain, conveyed similar anxieties:

⁷⁰⁴ NA ADM 1/422, no. 160, Pellew to Croker, 17 Apr 1812.

⁷⁰⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁰⁶ Ibid.

His Majesty's Fleet in the Mediterranean is entirely supplied with Bullocks from Algiers, and any difference between the Dey and the British Authorities in the Mediterranean would of course have stopped this necessary supply, as well as the supplies of Grain to the Balearic Islands and to the eastern coast of Spain, which the expected arrival of forces from Sicily made it of the utmost importance to continue.⁷⁰⁷

Wellesley had received Pellew's report in May, and inquired about their trouble with the Spanish government. Spain was aware of the problem but financially strapped; as the only way to placate the Dey was to pay the tribute, the Spanish government was in a bind. As the dispute between Algiers and Spain threatened not just Spanish interests, but British as well, Wellesley recommended:

Considering this to be one of the cases in which I should be justified in advancing a portion of the sum placed at my disposal for the service of Spain, I agreed to advance the sum specified by Sir Edward Pellew as necessary to satisfy the Dey, if the Spanish government would authorise the British Admiral to send an officer to Algiers for the purpose of adjusting the dispute between the Spanish government and the Dey.⁷⁰⁸

Thus, with British financial assistance, Pellew dispatched Captain Adam of the HMS *Invincible* to Algiers to negotiate with the Dey. From this point onwards, Britain assumed the role of 'protector of the Mediterranean,' negotiating with and sometimes even paying for her European allies' treaties with North Africa in the name of defeating France. Britain could no more afford to have her minor allies, with their ships carrying British supplies, attacked by the Barbary corsairs, than her own.⁷⁰⁹ This was a major change from the British position during the French Revolutionary war, when Britain would assist, diplomatically, in arranging treaties but not provide the financial backing or earlier, when Britain would do neither.

Whilst Adam was in Algiers, the Spanish problem worsened. Consul Wilkie in Tripoli wrote that Tripolitan cruisers had captured Spanish merchant vessels. Pellew concluded:

⁷⁰⁷ NA FO 72/132 Wellesley to Castlereagh, 4 Nov 1812.

⁷⁰⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁰⁹ NA ADM 1/423 no. 312, Pellew to Croker, 31 Jul 1812.; Shaler, 117.

I have no further information on this subject, except that when at Mahon a few days ago, a report was in circulation, but of which I could not trace the origin, that the Bey of Tripoli had declared war against Spain.⁷¹⁰

The next month, McDonnell, consul in Algiers, reported a “strong squadron” had sailed from Algiers with Spanish ships as their probable target.⁷¹¹ Pellew dispatched three ships to prevent “any unpleasant occurrence” as he believed, “the Spanish trade may be exposed to considerable risk”⁷¹² Algiers declared war against Spain (and against the United States) in September, by which point the Algerines had already successfully captured a Spanish barque off Majorca.⁷¹³ Pellew worked to re-establish peace between Spain and Algiers, but vowed to “give [Spain] the fullest protection as our allies by every means in my power”⁷¹⁴ Pellew’s concern for the damage caused by those attacks on Spanish trade demonstrated that despite the decline in corsair activities since 1805, it was still an effective form of economic warfare. In 1812, Algiers had 15 corsair vessels, and they captured 12 prizes (2 Spanish, 2 American, 2 Neapolitan, 5 Greek, and 1 Tunisian) worth a total of 2,136,675 Francs.⁷¹⁵ Pellew’s declaration of providing Spain with “the fullest protection as our allies” put him at odds with the British position in Algiers, a conflict with Britain’s role as ‘protector of the Mediterranean.’ Britain and Algiers were not at war with one another and the British military apparatus in the Mediterranean relied on that trade for food and supplies. Britain’s conflicting relationships over trade with North Africa and protecting other Mediterranean states would cause major discord after the war ended.

Luckily, Adam reported his success in re-establishing peaceful relations between Spain and Algiers shortly after Pellew’s report on the Algerine declaration of war. On 18

⁷¹⁰ NA ADM 1/423 no. 312, Pellew to Croker, 31 Jul 1812.

⁷¹¹ NA ADM 1/423 no. 324, Pellew to Croker, 18 Aug 1812.

⁷¹² *Ibid.*

⁷¹³ NA ADM 1/424 no. 357, Pellew to Croker, 12 Sept 1812.; Devoulx, 94.

⁷¹⁴ NA ADM 1/424 no. 357, Pellew to Croker, 12 Sept 1812.;

⁷¹⁵ Devoulx, 95.

September, Adam wrote of the successful release of eight Spanish ships, crews, and cargoes and the Dey's promise that Spanish vessels would be respected as allies of Britain. After the arrangements were concluded, the Algerines captured a Spanish ship, the *Espos y Mina*. However, their promise to return the ship to Spain was, for Wellesley, a demonstration of the Dey's commitment to respect Spanish shipping.⁷¹⁶ Algiers continued shipments of cattle and grain during the dispute, a relief to those involved in the extensive British system in the Mediterranean. Britain could not afford to lose either Spain as an ally or Algiers as a trade partner.

Not all of Barbary's international relations during 1812 were as tense, however. Britain was effectively directing Barbary's foreign policy behind the scenes. In April, Wilkie, consul in Tripoli, promised Lt. Col. Bunbury he would look after "the mercantile interests of Portugal in this Regency."⁷¹⁷ The following month Tunis concluded a peace treaty with Sicily, heavily influenced by Britain, which provided for the redemption of Sicilian captives.⁷¹⁸ The French then tried to arrange a treaty between Tunis and Naples to free Neapolitan captives, but failed as:

...the claims raised by the Bey for the ransom of slaves as well as the presents due to the regency during the official installation of the Neapolitan consul and the national flag, far exceeded the figure fixed by the Government of Naples.⁷¹⁹

French interests were not strong enough to allow them to contribute to their 'duty' of redeeming Christian captives, nor could France pay to secure the treaty as Britain did. Britain was able to put pressure on both Tunis and Sicily to arrange for *its* treaty. Pellew reported his belief:

...of the beneficial results of a similar mission with all practicable dispatch to Algiers for the purpose of arranging the differences with that Regency on various subjects, of our allies the Spaniards, as well as our own.⁷²⁰

⁷¹⁶ NA FO 72/132 Wellesley to Castlereagh, 4 Nov 1812

⁷¹⁷ NA FO 76/8 Wilkie to Lt. Col. Bunbury, 21 Apr 1812.

⁷¹⁸ Moalla, 64.; Plantet, *Tunis*, v. 3, 502: no. 977, Billon au Duc de Bassano. 27 Apr 1812.; Rouseau, 276-9.

⁷¹⁹ Rouseau, 280.; Moalla, 64.

At the same time, Captain Smith of the Royal Navy, on the British ambassador to Sicily, Lord William Bentinck's, orders, arranged a treaty of peace and friendship between Tripoli and Sicily, on the same terms as with Tunis.⁷²¹

Morocco continued to be a stable partner for the British. The westernmost state neither had consular problems nor new treaties for the British to negotiate. Green acknowledged his orders to report to Wellesley and vowed:

I shall most cordially cooperate with His Excellency, in every arrangement he may point out, at the same time, I must with candour and justice to myself observe, the provisions His Majesty's forces have been supplied with from the ports of Barbary were never so abundant as during the period I have had the honour to hold the appointment of British Consul-General in Morocco.⁷²²

Green had held his post since 1806, and never experienced any of the complaints or squabbles typical of his colleagues in Tunis, Tripoli, or Algiers. As the correspondence from the Mediterranean makes clear, Morocco was a steady supplier of food both during his tenure, as he claimed, but also under his predecessor James Matra. The efficacy of the consular network in Morocco at working with the British and the Moroccan government was vitally important as the efforts in the Iberian Peninsula dragged on.

The British were eager to keep Morocco, and its water and food sources, pro-British. In April, Wellesley received a request from the Emperor of Morocco.⁷²³ Mawlay Suleiman asked the Ambassador for a frigate to travel to Alexandria and collect Suleiman's son, who had been undertaking the *hajj* in the Arabian Peninsula and bring him back to Tangier. Pellew agreed to the request and summarised the British strategy regarding Morocco:

⁷²⁰ NA ADM 1/422 no. 189, Pellew to Croker, 17 Apr 1812.

⁷²¹ Irons, 158.

⁷²² NA FO 52/16 Green to Liverpool, 20 Jan 1812.

⁷²³ NA ADM 1/422 no. 133, Admiral Legge to Croker, 11 Apr 1812.; Knight, *Britain Against Bonaparte*, 428.

...as it appears to be of the utmost importance to keep His Imperial Majesty in a good understanding with the British Government, both on account of receiving our own supplies as well as to preventing the enemy from receiving any...⁷²⁴

Not only was keeping Morocco on Britain's side beneficial to themselves, it was also detrimental to France. Supplies Britain procured were supplies France could not have. Such an easy task for the British (it could be doubled with convoy duties) was an minor inconvenience which would buy them the goodwill of the Moroccan government. Assisting the Moroccan Emperor in this matter was to the benefit of Britain and her mercantilist aims, as Wellington observed: "The affairs of that coast [Barbary] become every day more interesting. It is very desirable that the allies should, and that the enemy should not, enjoy their resources."⁷²⁵ To prevent France trading in North Africa would have been a breach of neutrality, but that did not mean it was not in the British interest for her consuls to convince Barbary to restrict French access and that doing so was to Barbary's benefit.

Morocco continued to provide necessary supplies for the British in the Mediterranean.⁷²⁶ Rear Admiral Legge petitioned al-Salawi, Moroccan Foreign Minister, for an additional thousand oxen for the fleet, which were provided free of duty.⁷²⁷ Green informed the Secretary of State, the Earl of Bathurst, that more grain from Morocco had been sent to the forces in the Peninsula in November.⁷²⁸ In December, Green sent a report of the "reflections of the number of oxen exported from the dominions of the Emperor of Morocco to Gibraltar, Cadiz, and elsewhere," which demonstrated Morocco's primacy in the western Mediterranean.⁷²⁹ In 1812, Britain purchased a total 8,500 head of cattle from Morocco, well in excess of the 3,000 the previous year, or the

⁷²⁴ NA ADM 1/422 no. 133, Admiral Legge to Croker, 11 Apr 1812.

⁷²⁵ DDW, v. 5, 646: to the Earl of Liverpool, 12 May 1812.

⁷²⁶ NA FO 52/15 Green to Liverpool, 12 Dec 1811.

⁷²⁷ NA FO 52/16 Admiral Legge to Slowey, 6 Oct 1812.

⁷²⁸ NA FO 52/16 Green to Bathurst, 29 Jul 1812,

⁷²⁹ NA FO 52/16 Green to Bunbury, 14 Dec 1812.

2,000 promised by the 1801 contract.⁷³⁰ That year had been one of intense trade with Morocco. 112 ships called at Tangier from Gibraltar.⁷³¹ 23 British ships made 43 journeys to and from the Moroccan port of Essaouira alone – higher than the total number of journeys to and from Barbary in any other year of either war.⁷³² Wellington’s push into Spain, with the support of the Navy, was the primary British concern. Morocco’s position and continuous support through victualing supplies was extremely necessary when the Peninsular Army finally started to make gains over Bonaparte.⁷³³

After the many peace treaties arranged by various British agents on behalf of their allies and the North African states on an *ad hoc* basis, the British government decided to consolidate their efforts and dispatched a special envoy to secure more permanent diplomatic arrangements and improve trade agreements in Barbary. Major William A’Court, a diplomat who would later succeed Bentinck as Ambassador to Sicily, was appointed as His Majesty’s Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in January of 1813; his mission, “to strengthen the friendship between Britain and the several states of Barbary.”⁷³⁴ Ambassadors Stuart, in Portugal, and Wellesley, in Spain, were directed to provide A’Court with any information he needed, particularly relating to the cattle and grain requirements of the military and people in the Iberian Peninsula. A’Court, who was given access to all the Foreign Office correspondence related to Barbary prior to his departure, was likewise directed to stop at Lisbon and Cadiz for advice en route to North Africa.⁷³⁵ A’Court’s position, far above an ordinary consul, would give him an elevated prestige when dealing with the four North

⁷³⁰ Ibid.

⁷³¹ Brown, 68.

⁷³² See Appendix III: Lloyd’s List (p. 265)..

⁷³³ Davies, “The Whigs,” 128-9.

⁷³⁴ NA FO 8/6 War Department Circular, 14 Apr 1813.

⁷³⁵ NA FO 72/142 Castlereagh to Stuart and Wellesley, 6 Jan 1813.; Irons, 160-1.; S.T. Bindoff, E.F. Malcolm Smith and C.K. Webster, *British Diplomatic Representatives, 1789-1852*, Vol. L (London: Offices of the Royal Historical Society, 1934), 5.; BL ADD Ms 41512 Heytesbury Papers, Vol. II, p 5-6: Castlereagh to A’Court, 12 Mar 1813.; BL ADD Ms 41512 Heytesbury Papers, Vol. II, p 9-26: Bathurst to A’Court, 27 Mar 1813.

African states, hopefully allowing him to procure more favourable results. The previous year had been successful, but disjointed – each treaty, agreement, and promise had been arranged piecemeal. A’Court’s mission was to streamline the process and to improve what had been accomplished in 1812.

As the arrangements for A’Court’s mission continued in Britain, events in Barbary further demonstrated the need for A’Court’s undertaking in 1813. In late January, Oglander, British consul in Tunis, reported his difficulty procuring grain for the Peninsular Army owing to the continued embargo on Tunis’ grain.⁷³⁶ Oglander’s difficulty had nothing to do with Britain’s standing in the Regency, however. French consul, Billon, received encouragement from the French government, urging the consul:

...Le peu de succès de vos efforts pour vaincre la partialité du Bey en faveur des Anglais ne doit point refroidir votre zèle à cet égard; il faut au contraire les renouveler sans cesse; il faut opposé à ce système.⁷³⁷

A’Court would hopefully be able to overcome the Bey’s reluctance to export grain as well as reaffirm the Bey’s favour for the British. Morocco, on the other hand, had had over a decade of ‘agricultural prosperity’ and low prices (and was even shipping wheat to Tunis). Morocco exported an additional 50,000 quintals of grain to the allied forces in Lisbon and Cadiz in February.⁷³⁸ A’Court’s mission was both to ensure such assistance continued and see if more could be exported, or for a reduction in price. He was to stress to that, “the interests of Portugal can hardly be separated, at the present moment, from those of the British Army,” and thereby secure both protection and further supplies for Iberian forces.⁷³⁹ A’Court’s mission briefing also included a troubling letter from Stuart stressing the sudden decrease in availability of cattle in Portugal and need for assistance

⁷³⁶ NA FO 77/6 Oglander to Bathurst, 22 Jan 1813.

⁷³⁷ Plantet, *Tunis*, v. 3, 506: no. 988, Le Duc de Bassano a Billon, 2 Feb 1813.

⁷³⁸ El Mansour, 37-8

⁷³⁹ BL ADD Ms 41512 Heytesbury Papers, Vol. II, p 16: Bathurst to A’Court, 27 Mar 1813

from Barbary.⁷⁴⁰ By March, reports of Bonaparte's defeat in Russia were circulating in Barbary. James Somerville, Consul Wilkie's former secretary and new British consul (also *ad interim*) in Tripoli, wrote Colonel Bunbury that the Russian victory had been made public in the Regency on 8 March.⁷⁴¹ Later that month, Bunbury heard the news was public in Tunis, and speculated such news boded well for British interests in the regency.⁷⁴² Billon reinforced Somerville's prediction:

Nos ennemis les Anglais ne cessent d'insinuer au Bey que S.M. l'Empereur a des projets sur l'Égypte et la Barbarie, qu'ils avaient même été consentis par l'Empereur de Russie dans les articles secrets du traité de paix de Tilsit.⁷⁴³

Bonaparte's defeat alleviated lingering fears about his capacity to wage war or invade Barbary. France's defeat was a relief to North Africa and for British interests there. It reaffirmed the belief Britain, as the military power in the Mediterranean and increasingly beyond, was the safe choice to support over France – even at the potential risk to North Africa's neutrality.

A'Court departed with the auspicious news of the Russian defeat preceding him. His instructions from London were explicit. Morocco, with whom Britain had had much success and little trouble, was to be mostly a meeting of renewing friendship. A'Court was to see if he could arrange for the duty on cattle exports to be lowered, or increase the number exported. A'Court was urged to ensure Morocco would continue providing grain to Spain and Portugal but to avoid all discussion of the Spanish territory Ceuta, which the Emperor had attempted to acquire in exchange for horses during Collingwood's tenure in the Mediterranean. At Algiers, on the other hand, A'Court was to remind the regency of the might of British Navy and how it had *not* been used against the Dey and his ships. The British government was concerned with “the maritime strength which the

⁷⁴⁰ BL ADD Ms 41512 Heytesbury Papers, Vol. II, p 29: Hamilton to Bunbury, 27 Mar 1813.; BL ADD Ms 41512 Heytesbury Papers, Vol. II, p 31: Stuart to Castlereagh, 6 Mar 1813.

⁷⁴¹ NA FO 76/8 Somerville to Lt Col Bunbury, 8 Mar 1813.; Kennedy, 169.

⁷⁴² NA FO 77/6 V. Robinson to Lt Col Bunbury 29 Mar 1813.

⁷⁴³ Plantet, *Tunis*, v. 3, 506: Billon au Duc de Bassano, 4 Mar 1813.

Algerines have acquired,” stemming from their doubling of their corsair fleet and more than quadrupling their money from prizes the year before.⁷⁴⁴ A’Court was to make it clear that Malta and Ionian Islands were under British protection and as long as the British army was in the Iberian Peninsula, Britain would not tolerate attacks on Spanish or Portuguese shipping. After consulting with Bentinck, A’Court was to recommend the Dey sign a truce with Sicily. Finally, A’Court was to, “inform the Dey that His Majesty’s government has not been well satisfied with the conduct of Consul Blanckley in regard to the contracts to Bona and La Cala,” and Britian planned to give up the holding if they did not become profitable.⁷⁴⁵ Tunis’s instructions matched Algiers, and both regencies were to be allowed to purchase naval and military supplies from Britain in lieu of payment for grain and cattle. At Tripoli, the threats and recommendations were the same, but that regency was *not* to be offered any naval stores for cattle exports as it was a ‘mere nest of pirates’ and the Bashaw, ‘but a chief of corsairs.’⁷⁴⁶ In addition to his formal instructions, a petition from the Sardinian government arrived in England shortly before A’Court departed, asking for help freeing Sardinian slaves in Barbary. A’Court would make an attempt, but his former instructions were the primary responsibility. He also carried letters from the Prince Regent to the Emperor, Dey, Bey, and Bashaw. Thus equipped, A’Court departed in late April 1813.⁷⁴⁷

He reached Lisbon on 21 May, and the Portuguese sent an envoy with A’Court to Algiers to secure a permanent peace. They arrived in Algiers on 10 June and A’Court presented his credentials to the Dey shortly afterwards. A’Court, on Portugal’s behalf, reduced the Dey’s price for peace, which saved the Portuguese over \$100,000 (Spanish).

⁷⁴⁴ BL ADD Ms 41512 Heytesbury Papers, Vol. II, p 10: Bathurst to A’Court, 27 Mar 1813.; Devoulx, 93, 95.

⁷⁴⁵ BL ADD Ms 41512 Heytesbury Papers, Vol. II, p 15: Bathurst to A’Court, 27 Mar 1813.

⁷⁴⁶ Irons, 162.; BL ADD Ms 41512 Heytesbury Papers, Vol. II, p 24: Bathurst to A’Court, 27 Mar 1813.

⁷⁴⁷ NA CO 2/3 Instruction to A’Court, 27 Mar 1813; Irons, 160-3.; BL ADD Ms 41512 Heytesbury Papers, Vol. II, p 9-26: Bathurst to A’Court, 27 Mar 1813.

The Portuguese were to pay an additional \$24,000 (Spanish) a year as tribute, and a biennial consular present of \$16,000 (Spanish). A'Court used the threat of British naval action to secure the reduction, though A'Court recognized such a peace could endure only as long as Britain was willing to enforce it. A'Court was assured the Spanish-Algerine truce (1810) would continue to be respected. A'Court left at the end of the month, holding off on the issue of Sicily until he had met with Ambassador Bentinck.⁷⁴⁸

A'Court next visited Morocco. He landed at Tangier on 4 July, stayed for two weeks, then travelled inland to the court at Meknes. A'Court described the Moroccan countryside as “one continuous plain of perhaps the finest corn land in the world”⁷⁴⁹ and John Gaghran, a doctor attached to the A'Court mission noted in his journal that, “The inhabitants are better acquainted with English manners than the Algerines.”⁷⁵⁰ He arrived in Meknes in late July, received a royal welcome, and presented his credentials and a gift of military stores on 2 August. Since 1801, the British purchased 2,000 cattle at a reduced duty of \$5 per head, with a higher duty on subsequent purchases. A'Court was to try and reduce that duty, though he noted, “a duty of 200 per cent did not raise the price of a Moorish bullock to within 60 per cent of the market price at Lisbon.”⁷⁵¹ A'Court managed to secure permission to export an additional 4,000 cattle at \$15 per head and 400 mules at \$60 per head for Spain. As in 1809, the emperor refused to allow the export of horses, again citing religious reasons. The treaty was signed on 6 August, and he next headed to Sicily to call on Bentinck. In the interim, the consul in Morocco, James Green arranged cattle shipments for Gibraltar and the fleet for the next year, noting the positive impact of diplomatic mission. The positive effects of A'Court's

⁷⁴⁸ NA CO 2/3 A'Court's Reports from Algiers, 14, 20, 21 Jun 1813.; Bindoff, 5.; Irons, 163-4.; BL ADD Ms. 42109 Journal of JJ Gaghran, 1813-14: 4-20.

⁷⁴⁹ El Mansour, 37.

⁷⁵⁰ BL ADD Ms. 42109 Journal of JJ Gaghran, 1813-14: 27.

⁷⁵¹ Irons, 165.; Ambassador Stuart noted that in Portugal cattle were five times what they were in Barbary. (BL ADD Ms 41512 Heytesbury Papers, Vol. II, p 31: Stuart to Castlereagh, 3 Mar 1813.)

mission were being immediately felt in Barbary, before the mission had even been completed.⁷⁵²

After Sicily, A'Court travelled to Tripoli, arriving on 26 September. He presented his credentials the next day, where A'Court impressed the Bashaw with the dignity and uniqueness of the mission – and a not so subtle threat of British Naval power. They signed a peace treaty between Spain and Tripoli. The Bashaw agreed to continue exporting supplies and cattle. Importantly, after yet another refusal in Morocco, Tripoli authorised the sale of horses to Spain.⁷⁵³ A'Court left the issue of Sicily in Somerville's hands and left for Tunis in early October. He presented his credentials to the Bey on the 11th.⁷⁵⁴ The Bey signed a three-year truce with Portugal and a two-year truce with Sicily. A'Court arranged for the redemption of all Tunis's Sicilian captives. The Bey only gave a verbal promise, however, about respecting Ionian vessels under British protection. A'Court departed Tunis and returned to Algiers for a second audience. Having consulted with Bentinck in Sicily, A'Court arranged a peace between Sicily and Algiers, signed on 1 November. A'Court departed North Africa having fulfilled every part of his mission in North Africa. He returned to Lisbon in late November where he wrote a summary of his mission.⁷⁵⁵ A'Court had secured either peace treaties or multi-year truces between Britain's southern European allies and North Africa, and ensured the continued export of food and supply from Barbary.

⁷⁵² NA CO 2/4 A'Court's reports from Morocco, 15 Jul and 10, 20 Aug, 1813.; Bindoff, 79.; Irons, 165-6.; NCCC, v. 2, 166-7, To Viscount Castlereagh, 3 Jul 1808.; NA FO 52/16 Green to Bathurst, 23 Sept 1813.; BL ADD Ms. 42109 Journal of JJ Gaghan, 1813-14: 26-39.

⁷⁵³ Bindoff, 163.; NA CO 2/4 A'Court's report from Tripoli, 3 Oct 1813.; BL ADD Ms. 42109 Journal of JJ Gaghan, 1813-14: 47-51.; BL ADD Ms. 41513 Heytesbury Papers, Vol. III, 51-4.

⁷⁵⁴ Bindoff, 163-4.

⁷⁵⁵ NA CO 2/3 A'Court's Reports from Algiers, dated 14, 20, 21 Jun 1813.; NA CO 2/4 A'Court's reports from Morocco, dated 15 Jul and 10, 20 Aug, 1813.; NA CO 2/4 A'Court's mission, report from Tunis, 10, 16 Oct 1813.; NA CO 2/4 A'Court's report from Tripoli, 3 Oct 1813.; NA CO 2/4 A'Court: dispatch from Lisbon, 15 Dec 1813.; Irons, 165-8.; Moalla, 64.; BL ADD Ms. 42109 Journal of JJ Gaghan, 1813-14: 56-81.; BL ADD Ms. 41513 Heytesbury Papers, Vol. III, 1-4, 33-4.

A'Court's mission had also included confidential instructions to report on the state of the consuls active in North Africa regarding their level of pay, competence, duties, and relation to the governments they worked with. He was directed to inform Bathurst, "of the light in which each of the consul generals may be regarded in the country where he is resident."⁷⁵⁶ A'Court believed good use was made of the disbursement of funds in Algiers to secure foodstuffs, but was unclear of the value of the coral fisheries off Bona. A'Court believed the only people who benefited from the British contract were the Sicilians, to whom the British leased fishing rights. He thought Bona a disappointment and should be relinquished as soon as possible, advice the British would shortly wish they had followed. On the subject of consular duties and pay, A'Court concluded the £800 salary with £2,000 annually taken in fees was sufficient for the Tunisian consul and his needs. The consuls in Morocco and Algiers, however, were paid too little. His conclusion was not based so much on the requirements of their job or the difficulty of the post, but rather as, "the opportunities for speculation and peculation which were numerous enough to corrupt the honesty of any agent who was not made completely independent by his salary."⁷⁵⁷ Further, in the case of Algiers, if the consul was not made independent by his salary, he would be more dependent on the will of the Dey and thus unable to take the firm tone required. The consul would be more concerned about the ruler requesting a new consul than doing his job. As for Tripoli, A'Court reported that local opinion was that former consul Langford had been corrupt and subject to bribes, and he should be officially replaced and a permanent consul appointed. Finally, A'Court suggested the establishment of pensions for consuls who served a long time or who were dismissed for having been firm to the ruler of their regency.⁷⁵⁸ These changes

⁷⁵⁶ BL ADD Ms. 41512 Heytesbury Papers, Vol. II, 44-5: Bathurst to A'Court, 31 Mar 1813.

⁷⁵⁷ Irons, 167.

⁷⁵⁸ NA CO 2/4 A'Court: Lisbon dispatch, 15 Dec 1813.; Irons, 163-4, 167.; Macgill, 107-8.; Noah, 413.: Mordecai Noah, American consul in Tunis in 1813-4, echoed A'Court's recommendations.

were to ensure the first loyalty of British consuls was to the British government, not their wallets. A'Court's recommendations were a recognition that for all they were called consuls, the primary function of the consul stationed in North Africa was shifting away from mercantile and trade interests and more firmly into the realm of true diplomacy – they were acting as diplomats and ambassadors and should be compensated accordingly.

A'Court had successfully achieved everything he had been directed to do; he reaffirmed treaties and trade with all four states, guaranteed British recognition for Malta, Ionian Islands, and Iberian allies, assisted Portugal, Spain, and Sicily in achieving peace with Barbary, and reported on the state of the consuls there. The growing corsair fleet in Algiers that had worried the British prior to A'Court's departure was half of its 1812 strength; their 15 corsair ships were down to 7 in 1813. Also their pool of potential prey had likewise been affected by A'Court's successful diplomatic manoeuvring. In 1812, the Algerine corsairs had their most bountiful year for prizes in either the French Revolutionary War or the Napoleonic War, capturing 12 prizes (5 Greek, 2 Spanish, 2 Neapolitan, 2 American, and 1 Tunisian) worth 2,136,675 Francs. In 1813, with A'Court negotiating peace with Spain, Sicily, and discouraging discord amongst the Barbary States, the smaller Algerine corsair fleet only took 3 prizes (all Greek), worth 172,329 Francs – less than one tenth the takings the year before. Finally, British shipping to and from Barbary remained steady – 21 ships making 27 journeys. This was slightly below 1812's 22 ships and 37 journeys but 1813's Barbary shipping record was still higher than the average British shipping to North Africa prior to Trafalgar. Additionally, in May of 1813 plague was reported across the island of Malta, which severely restricted any ships calling there for nearly a year.⁷⁵⁹

⁷⁵⁹ NA CO 2/3 A'Court's Reports from Algiers, dated 14, 20, 21 Jun 1813.; NA CO 2/4 A'Court's reports from Morocco, dated 15 Jul and 10, 20 Aug, 1813.; NA CO 2/4 A'Court's mission, report from Tunis, 10, 16 Oct 1813.; NA CO 2/4 A'Court's report from Tripoli, 3 Oct 1813.; NA CO 2/4 A'Court: dispatch from Lisbon, 15 Dec 1813.; Irons, 165-8.; Devoulx, 95, 97.; Panzac, *Barbary Corsairs*, 103.; NA ADM 1/429

The efforts in 1813 which brought the Mediterranean under British influence coincided with the Russian and British victories over the French. In 1814 it looked as if the British had arranged the chessboard in the Mediterranean to suit her interests and needs. Even the American War of 1812, still on going, was no longer a threat to the British war effort in Europe; as Bonaparte's continental system fell apart, northern European markets reopened making up the loss of American shipping in 1813. On 1 April, Vice Admiral Pickmore reported the Mediterranean convoys of supplies were once more travelling to Malta for the first time since plague had broken out in May 1813.⁷⁶⁰ Just five days after Pickmore's report, the Allied forces in Paris forced Bonaparte to abdicate and take exile at Elba.⁷⁶¹ All the preparation and effort that had gone into the diplomatic efforts the previous year to aid the British war effort were quickly looking like they would be for naught.

Not that the Regencies were disappointed or upset the conflict was over. Word spread across North Africa in late April and early May. The Moroccan emperor, worried about French designs on his state, welcomed peace.⁷⁶² Colonel Hanmar Warrington, the new Consul-General for Tripoli, permanent per A'Court's recommendations, sailed for Tripoli in early July, to replace Somerville.⁷⁶³ The British military began to be broken up in early August. Pellew closed the smaller victualling offices at Port Mahon and Palermo, consolidating them under the Victualling Agent at Malta, where the agent would, "...retain only a proportion of Provisions for 5,000 men for six months to answer the demands of Rear Admiral Hallowell's squadron..." a far cry from the over 400,000

no. 211 Pickmore to Croker, 1 Apr 1814; NA CO 158/22 Oakes to Bathurst, 12 May 1813.; CO 158/24 Maitland to Bunbury, 29 Oct 1813.; CO 158/24 Maitland to Bunbury, 14 Feb 1814.; See Appendix III: Lloyd's List (p. 265)..

⁷⁶⁰ NA ADM 1/429 no. 211 Pickmore to Croker, 1 Apr 1814; NA CO 158/22 Oakes to Bathurst, 12 May 1813.; CO 158/24 Maitland to Bunbury, 29 Oct 1813.; CO 158/24 Maitland to Bunbury, 14 Feb 1814.; Monk, 111.; Holland, 35.; See Appendix III: Lloyd's List (p. 265)..

⁷⁶¹ Knight, *Britain Against Napoleon*, 449.; Osler, 285-6.

⁷⁶² Rouseseau, 287.; El Mansour, 113

⁷⁶³ NA FO 76/9 Warrington to Bunbury, 8 Jul 1814.; Dearden, 221, 3.

mouths the Victualling Board was concerned with in the Mediterranean before the end of the war.⁷⁶⁴ Excess supplies would be returned to England.⁷⁶⁵ After 23 years of nearly continuous warfare, the Mediterranean would be able to return to its normal existence.

For North Africa, however, peace meant a return to corsair activities.⁷⁶⁶ Since the Battle of Trafalgar, when the Mediterranean effectively became a British lake, it behoved North Africa to engage in trade; that revenue meant Barbary only attacked ships from smaller nations not allied with Britain. Yet with the end of the war, the situation drastically changed. European nations were now once more trading and moving merchandise in the Mediterranean, forcing out the Barbary merchantships. Those smaller allied states were allies *for the war*. As A'Court had warned when brokering the peace between Portugal and Algiers, the war was over and those states were once more fair game for corsairs. That is what happened to Genoa in August 1814. The Genoese had been granted British passes as long as Genoa was under the protection of Great Britain. However, after the war, Captain Hallowell warned McDonnell in Algiers:

As the Genoese flag is flying at this place and throughout the territory of Genoa, I am very much afraid the right of the British consul to afford such protection to the subjects of a nation at war with the Barbary States will be disputed by them and that they will direct their cruisers to seize them.⁷⁶⁷

Two weeks later, Hallowell reported his fears confirmed:

I am informed that some...vessels have already fallen a prey to the Tripolitans and Algerine cruisers, and that Tunisians cruisers were preparing for sea determined to follow the example in capturing all of the same description they meet with.⁷⁶⁸

Those vessels and their crew were now captive in Tripoli and Algiers – Hallowell promised he would attempt to secure their release, but as their passes were illegal he was

⁷⁶⁴ NA ADM 1/429 no. 275 Exmouth to Croker, 3 Aug 1814.; Rodger, *Command of the Ocean*, 561.

⁷⁶⁵ NA ADM 1/429 no. 275 Exmouth to Croker, 3 Aug 1814

⁷⁶⁶ Panzac, *Barbary Corsairs*, 267-8.; Earle, *Pirate Wars*, 212.; Holland, 35.

⁷⁶⁷ NA ADM 1/429 no. 309 Hallowell to McDonnell 16 Aug 1814.

⁷⁶⁸ NA ADM 1/429 no. 335 Oglander to Hallowell, 31 Aug 1814.

not hopeful.⁷⁶⁹ If 1812 had been Barbary's most financially successful year for corsair captures, 1814 was Algiers' second most successful, with 17 prizes worth 1,954,132 Francs. Those 17 prizes, which consisted of 4 Swedish, 4 Dutch, 3 Danish, 3 Spanish, 2 Greek, and 1 Neapolitan ships, were the highest number of prizes taken by the Algerine corsairs in the entire Napoleonic War, though valued below 1812.⁷⁷⁰ Tripoli, between 1814 and 1815, took 43 prizes from nine different countries, but primarily from small Italian states (27 from Naples, Tuscany, and Genoa).⁷⁷¹ The Barbary States preying on the ships of nations without protection was a return to the status quo for North Africa. Only now it was more complicated for Britain, who had assumed responsibility for many of these smaller states during the war. Those feelings of responsibility for their well being, both in the public and the government, continued beyond the peace.

Further changes came to the Mediterranean; long-reigning Bey of Tunis, Hammuda Pasha, died on 15 September, ending one of the most prosperous periods in Tunisian history.⁷⁷² His half-brother, Uthman, succeeded him.⁷⁷³ Oglander remarked the new Bey was less in favour of the British than Hammuda had been, and with his death, corsairing was renewed:

The predatory warfare, formerly carried on by the States of Barbary against the Italian States and other small Christian powers, has again since the general peace been actively renewed by those states and with considerable success.⁷⁷⁴

New British consul, Hanmar Warrington, arrived in Tripoli and presented himself to the Bashaw on 1 December. Peter Lyle, the Scottish renegade, acted as translator.⁷⁷⁵ He would have his work cut out for him. Corsair activities spiked after peace was

⁷⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁷⁰ Devoulx, 100, 51-101.

⁷⁷¹ Panzac, *Barbary Corsairs*, 113.

⁷⁷² Montana, 6-7, 29, 30-1.; Sebag, 208.; Macgill, 17.

⁷⁷³ Plantet, *Tunis*, v. 3, 524-5: no. 1036, Astoin-Sielve au Compte de Jaucourt, 16 Sept 1814.; Panzac, *Barbary Corsairs*, 296-7.; Rousseau, 288.; Moalla, 63.; Perkins, *Tunisia*, 64-5.; Abun-Nasr, 183.; Noah, 253.

⁷⁷⁴ NA FO 77/6 Oglander to Bathurst, 23 Sept 1814.

⁷⁷⁵ NA 76/9 Warrington to Bathurst, 10 Dec 1814.; Dearden, 226, 230-1.

declared.⁷⁷⁶ On average, the Ottoman regencies doubled their corsair attacks in 1814/15 from 1812/13.⁷⁷⁷ Peace in Europe brought chaos to the Mediterranean.

The new year brought more change. Bey Uthman was strangled and replaced by his cousin, Mahmoud, making three Beys in as many months.⁷⁷⁸ Oglander had worried Uthman was less inclined toward the British than Hammuda, but Mahmoud definitely favoured the French. French consul, Devoize, who left the regency in disgrace in 1809, returned to Tunis with the restoration of the Bourbon monarchy. Hammuda refused to receive him, but Mahmoud recalled Devoize, and then had the anti-French Yusuf Sahib al-Talib executed.⁷⁷⁹ Increased tension caused by the three Ottoman regencies resuming large-scale corsair activities and British attempts to protect their former allies led the British to erroneously capture a Moroccan vessel in January 1815. However, Consul Green reported to Bathurst the “unpleasant business” had not affected British interests in Morocco and 2,000 oxen had been shipped to Gibraltar.⁷⁸⁰ Lloyd’s List Shipping Gazette shows that the end of the war had not affected British shipping to and from Barbary in 1814 but had actually increased over 1813 (helped by the ending of Malta’s quarantine).⁷⁸¹ Finally, the United States, ended the War of 1812 on 24 December 1814, and declared war on Algiers in late February, contributing to the unstable dynamic in the Mediterranean.⁷⁸²

All that was nothing compared to March 1815. Early that month, Bonaparte escaped from exile on the island of Elba and headed for Paris.⁷⁸³ The next day, the assembled statesmen at the Congress of Vienna declared him an outlaw, but Paris greeted

⁷⁷⁶ Panzac, *Barbary Corsairs*, 259, 268.

⁷⁷⁷ Panzac, *Barbary Corsairs*, 267.; *Britain*, 165.; Dobado-González, 695.

⁷⁷⁸ Rousseau, 291.; Panzac, *Barbary Corsairs*, 217.; Noah, 253-4.; Sebag, 208.

⁷⁷⁹ Moalla, 63, 68.; Rousseau, 296.; Panzac, *Barbary Corsairs*, 297.; Abun-Nasr, 184

⁷⁸⁰ NA FO 52/16 Green to Bathurst, 10 Jan 1815.

⁷⁸¹ See Appendix III: Lloyd’s List (p. 265)..

⁷⁸² Panzac, *Barbary Corsairs*, 270.; Rodger, 572.; Knight, *Britain Against Napoleon*, 448.; Nichols, “Diplomacy in Barbary,” 114.; Shaler, 120.

⁷⁸³ NA ADM 1/430 no. 88 Israel Pellew to Croker, 12 Mar 1815.

Bonaparte with a warm welcome.⁷⁸⁴ Two days later, Pellew, now Lord Exmouth, was reappointed Commander in Chief of the reforming Mediterranean fleet.⁷⁸⁵ That same day, however, the Dey of Algiers, Hajji Ali, who had ruled since 1809, was assassinated and succeeded by Muhammad Khaznadji.⁷⁸⁶ Britain was once again at war, but this time, instead of being an asset, North Africa was a danger.

British diplomatic and mercantile successes gained during Collingwood's tenure commanding the Mediterranean were continued under Pellew (and Cotton). Britain remained the dominant European power in the Mediterranean but after Bonaparte's defeat in Russia, increasingly European merchants were able to re-enter the intra-Mediterranean trade. This, coupled with the near-total closure of Malta during 1813 accounts for the seeming decline in British shipping to and from Barbary in Figure 6 – though the last years of the Napoleonic War still saw higher rates of shipping than the pre-Trafalgar period.




Figure 6: British Shipping to/from Barbary, 1811-1815

The decline in the British armed forces in the Mediterranean following Peace in 1814 would also have cut into Barbary's trade.

⁷⁸⁴ Knight, *Britain Against Napoleon*, 455.; Rodger, *Command of the Ocean*, 573.

⁷⁸⁵ Taylor, 241.; Osler, 287.

⁷⁸⁶ Panzac, *Barbary Corsairs*, 294-5.; Valensi, xvii.

CHAPTER SEVEN: 1815-1830 (AND BEYOND)

A common argument is that with the end of the Napoleonic wars came the end of the Barbary corsairs.⁷⁸⁷ It is true the 1814 Peace of Paris began the dismantling of the corsair institution, but not because it allowed European nations to ally, attack and bomb Barbary into submission, as the narrative frequently goes. Rather, the end of the war and the Congress of Vienna that followed changed the outlook of the European leaders, Britain in particular. This then changed the tolerance for and practices of the North African states. The condemnation of piracy (and slavery), and Britain's new role as protector of the small states in the Mediterranean – the bulk of the corsairs' prey – produced an environment where the corsairs were no longer tolerated. Between 1815 and 1830, there were ten different attempts to bomb Barbary, eight of which came after the 'definitive' campaign of Decatur in 1815 or the 'final straw' of Lord Exmouth's bombardment in 1816.⁷⁸⁸ Not even the French invasion of Algiers in 1830 was able to fully eliminate piracy in North Africa, despite being the justification for the invasion.

The rise and fall of the 'scourge of Christendom' and 'den of pirates' of Barbary also fit neatly into the now-weakening Ottoman decline theory.⁷⁸⁹ By the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire was thought to be in such an obvious state of decline, its shrinking size and eventual collapse seemed self evident to many modern historians. The same was said of Barbary, with three of the four states part of the Ottoman Empire, though that relationship was tenuous. As their prizes had declined

⁷⁸⁷ Jamieson, 184.; Jackson, 285.; Spencer, 133.; Panzac, *Barbary Corsairs*, 4, 259.; Nevill Barbour, "North West Africa from the 15th to 19th Centuries." In *The Muslim World, A Historical Survey: The Last Great Muslim Empires* Trans. F.R.C. Bagley (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1969), 101, 146.

⁷⁸⁸ Parkinson, *Pellew*, 468.; Baepler, *White Slaves, African Masters*, 9.; Thomas, 107.; Earle, *Corsairs*, 46.; Clissold, 149, 158.; Blondy, 241.; Jamieson, 169, 184.

⁷⁸⁹ Playfair, *Scourge of Christendom*, 5.; Jackson, 19-20.; Thomas, 1, 75.; Perkins, *Gunfire in Barbary*, 13.; Earle, *Pirates*, 254.; Travers, 228.; Abraham Salamé, *Narrative of the Expedition to Algiers in the Year 1816, Under the Command of the Right Hon, Admiral Lord Viscount Exmouth* (London: John Murray, 1819), 1, 222-3.; Sugden, v. 2, 633, 649.; Hale, 7.; Parkinson, 420-2.; Swain, 58.; Lloyd, 18.; Fisher, 290.; Perkins, *Tunisia*, 64-5.

since the seventeenth century, Barbary must obviously be ready to fall, should Europe attempt a concerted effort. However, as with the Ottoman decline theory, the idea that it was obvious Europe would turn against Barbary after the return of peace, was no more evident prior to the end of the Napoleonic war than the Ottoman destruction prior to the end of the First World War. As has been demonstrated in the preceding chapters, the British and French engaged in a secondary diplomatic war on the North African coast, fighting for pre-eminence and the best access to supplies. Britain specifically invested significant amounts of time, money, and energy into the further development of her diplomatic and trade relations with Barbary since her ascendancy over the French after Trafalgar. This culminated in the A'Court mission of 1813, reaffirming previous treaties Britain held with all four states and Britain's commitment to trading with the region. The shift from fighting over the trade and diplomatic advantages of Barbary to fighting Barbary itself was as sudden as it was unforeseen.

After Bonaparte's abdication in April 1814 and the first Peace of Paris the following month, events moved forward that simultaneously signalled the end of the symbiotic arrangement Britain (and to a lesser extent, France) had developed in North Africa and continued reliance on that same arrangement. Foreign merchants – kept out of the Mediterranean by both British naval power and the Continental system – were now able to return to trading in the Mediterranean after peace.⁷⁹⁰ Those merchant vessels took over the inter-Mediterranean shipping the North African states had been carrying out during the war. That mercantile effort, at its height after 1805, had allowed North Africa to increase trade, and corsair efforts declined.⁷⁹¹ The increased competition occurred at the same time as the reduction of the British military in the Mediterranean following

⁷⁹⁰ Panzac, *Barbary Corsairs*, 266.; Mark Jarrett, *The Congress of Vienna and its Legacy: War and Great Power Diplomacy after Napoleon* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2014), 62.; Jamieson, 198.; Galani, 312-4.

⁷⁹¹ Panzac, *Barbary Corsairs*, 267.; Laroui, 295.

peace.⁷⁹² British shipping to and from Barbary dropped to just 17 ships making 25 journeys in 1815.⁷⁹³ The economies of the North African states could not handle the loss of both sources of revenue. They needed to return to corsairs to make up the difference.

Bonaparte's escape from Elba and brief return to power in France in the spring of 1815 suddenly threw British reliance on North Africa back into focus.⁷⁹⁴ Admiral Pellew, now Lord Exmouth, was reappointed. Exmouth immediately wrote the Admiralty on North Africa's importance for victualling: "As it is possible it may become necessary to purchase fresh supplies on the coasts of Barbary...for the use of the fleet under my command..."⁷⁹⁵ The British easily fell back on their reliance on North Africa; if Bonaparte's coda to the Napoleonic war had been longer, the Navy would have been increasingly reliant on the fresh food and supplies from Barbary. Yet by November, with Louis XVIII back in Paris, France was forced to accept the second Peace of Paris.⁷⁹⁶ Britain, which benefitted most from North Africa during the war, was one of the main proponents of the new world order that would eliminate the Barbary Corsairs. The outlawing of the slave trade in 1807 and the British desire to enforce that ethos abroad created a situation where Barbary and Europe were in opposition soon after Europe fought over Barbary's assistance.

In Algiers, 1815 was especially fraught. The stress of a new war in the Mediterranean, the influx of foreign merchants, a new round of locusts and drought and the U.S. declaration of war in late February created intense turmoil, and led to a series of assassinations in April.⁷⁹⁷ Dey Hajji Ali, who had come to power in 1809, was

⁷⁹² NA ADM 1/429 no. 275, Edward Pellew to J.W. Croker, 3 Aug 1814.

⁷⁹³ See Appendix III: LLOYD'S LIST (p. 266).

⁷⁹⁴ Jarrett, 158-9.; NA ADM 1/430 no. 88, Israel Pellew to J.W. Croker, 12 Mar 1815.

⁷⁹⁵ NA ADM 1/430 no. 72, Exmouth to Croker, 7 Apr 1815.

⁷⁹⁶ Jarrett, 164, 172, 174.

⁷⁹⁷ Panzac, *Barbary Corsairs*, 304, 270, 295.; Thomas, 83.; Playfair, 250-1.; Plantet, *Algiers*, v. 2, 585-6.; Perkins, *Gunfire in Barbary*, 47.; NA FO 3/16 McDonell to Bunbury, 4 Apr 1815.; NA FO 3/16 McDonell to Bunbury, 12 Apr 1815.; NA FO 8/2 Bunbury to William Hamilton, 10 May 1815.

assassinated and replaced by Hajji Muhammad. Muhammad lasted barely two weeks before being strangled and replaced.⁷⁹⁸ The new Dey, Omar b. Muhammad was installed on 7 April 1815, and described as: “forty-two years of age...he impressed his visitors as an alert and intelligent leader.”⁷⁹⁹ Though many historians have criticised his actions over his two year reign and his losses to the Americans and the British, his reign coincided with one of the most difficult and dangerous periods in Algiers since the seventeenth century, and his achievements were impressive.⁸⁰⁰

It was Omar who, barely three months into his reign, had to deal with the return of the American Navy to the Mediterranean. Commodore Stephen Decatur, veteran of the US-Tripoli war and War of 1812, led a squadron to North Africa in order to release the United States from tribute payments and to free captives. Decatur arrived in June and fell in with the Algerine frigate, *Meshuda* captained by the regency’s most prolific *rais*, Hamidou.⁸⁰¹ Hamidou had been separated from the rest of his squadron. After a protracted fight, the Americans captured the *Meshuda*; killing Hamidou and around 30 of his crew. Two days later, the Americans captured another Algerine ship. With two prizes and nearly 500 Algerine captives, Decatur reached Algiers on 28 June.⁸⁰² With his reign as Dey still unsecure (and the fresh memory of his predecessor’s 16-day reign), it is unsurprising Dey Omar agreed to the American peace terms of no tribute, no American captives, and the return of captured ships in a matter of days.⁸⁰³ Omar then freed the Algerine captives and ships. The American squadron proceeded on to Tunis and Tripoli, requiring and receiving the same concessions as from Algiers. Alan G. Jamieson, in his

⁷⁹⁸ Playfair, 250-1.; Thomas, 83.

⁷⁹⁹ Spencer, 251.; Perkins, *Gunfire in Barbary*, 47.

⁸⁰⁰ Taylor, 83; Pocock, *Breaking the Chains*, 31.

⁸⁰¹ Jamieson, 165-6.; Earle, *Corsairs*, 252-62.; Panzac, *Barbary Corsairs*, 270-1.; Abun-Nasr, 166.

⁸⁰² Jamieson, 167-8.; Playfair, 252.; Nichols, “Diplomacy in Barbary,” 116.; Baepler, *White Slaves, African Masters*, 9.

⁸⁰³ Jamieson, 168.; Thomas, 82.; NA FO 8/2 Copy of Treaty between United States and Algiers, 30 Jun 1815.; Naylor, 140.

Barbary history, *Lords of the Sea*, argued: “The American success against Algiers in the war of 1815 was to mark the end of the revival of Barbary corsairing which had taken place in the previous two decades.”⁸⁰⁴ If that were true, this chapter would end here. It does not. Moreover, it attributes far too much credit to a very small-scale affair. The Americans instigated the war (unlike in 1801 with Tripoli), and the extent of their ‘fighting’ involved taking two prizes. That show of force was merely the final straw; Algiers had just experienced prolonged internal turmoil leaving the Dey in favour of quickly reconciling the issue. The Regency still had ten corsair ships and in 1815 took eight prizes, though those prizes only amounted to 770,415 Francs, less than half of the value of 1814. Additionally, Tunis and Tripoli saw huge jumps in their corsair campaigns following the end of the war. Since Trafalgar, Tunis had seen fewer than 29 corsair campaigns a year, but in 1815 had 41. Tripoli, similarly declining post-Trafalgar down fewer than 17 campaigns a year, saw that number more than double to 35 after peace returned to the Mediterranean. It was hardly the ‘end’ of Barbary corsairing.⁸⁰⁵

The end of the Napoleonic wars did more than allow other European merchant vessels into the Mediterranean; it also dismantled the system of alliances Britain had created. The British took great pains to ensure all their allies were able to operate freely in the Mediterranean, ensuring their protection under British treaties with Barbary. Yet as with Genoa in 1814, once peace was declared, those alliances and protections ended.⁸⁰⁶ In March 1815, Sir Thomas Maitland, British governor of Malta, advised Hanmar Warrington, consul in Tripoli, that the British could no longer protect or defend Austrian subjects; the Bashaw had declared war on Austria and took three Austrian ships

⁸⁰⁴ Jamieson, 169.

⁸⁰⁵ Devoulx, 101.; Panzac, 75, 267.; NA ADM 1/431 no. 215, Exmouth to Croker, 18 Oct 1815.

⁸⁰⁶ NA ADM 1/429 no. 309, Captain Hallowell to Croker, 16 Aug 1814.; NA ADM 1/429 no. 335, Capt Hallowell to Croker, 31 Aug 1814.

as prizes.⁸⁰⁷ Warrington was told he could endeavour to free those Austrians captured, but no more.⁸⁰⁸ In Tunis, the corsairs returned preying on the Italian states.⁸⁰⁹ Lord Exmouth reported the summer of 1815 had seen, “attacks of the Tunisian squadron off the coasts of Italy.”⁸¹⁰ Tunisian corsair they successfully raided a Sardinian town in October, carrying 160 captives back to Tunis.⁸¹¹ The corsairs were not limiting themselves to nations without treaties this time either. Unlike before the war when a treaty protected that nation’s shipping from corsair attacks, any merchant vessel was now possible prey. Tripoli captured a French ship in addition to Austrian prizes. In Algiers, a British ship was recorded as a prize for the first time in 50 years.⁸¹² The British consul and the Bashaw of Tripoli fell out over a Maltese ship with a British pass; though that ship was returned, it led to another British ship being captured. Consul Warrington struck his flag and left Tripoli, refusing to return until the *reis* was hanged by those British seamen captured. The Bashaw acquiesced quickly, and Warrington’s status was such by the end of the year he was asked to be the ‘acting’ consul for Sicily, Portugal, Holland, Austria, Hanover, Tuscany, and Russia.⁸¹³

North Africa’s increased corsair activity was not the only reason for Europe’s disillusionment. Building on Britain’s 1807 law against the slave trade, the Congress of Vienna issued similar condemnation less than a month before Bonaparte’s escape from Elba.⁸¹⁴ Originally aimed at the Trans-Atlantic slave trade, the conversation soon turned to Britain’s ‘hypocrisy’ in allowing the sale and trade of white Christians by African and

⁸⁰⁷ NA CO 158/26 Maitland to Warrington, 17 Mar 1815.; Panzac, *Barbary Corsairs*, 75.

⁸⁰⁸ Panzac, *Barbary Corsairs*, 268.; NA CO 158/26 Maitland to Warrington, 17 Mar 1815.

⁸⁰⁹ Panzac, *Barbary Corsairs*, 268.

⁸¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 267.

⁸¹¹ *Ibid.*

⁸¹² *Ibid.*, 268.; Devoulx, *Prises maritime*, 101-2.

⁸¹³ Dearden, 239-41.

⁸¹⁴ Jarrett, 146.; Panzac, *Barbary Corsairs*, 259.; Oded Löwenheim, “‘Do Ourselves Credit and Render a Lasting Service to Mankind’: British Moral Prestige, Humanitarian Intervention and the Barbary Pirates” *International Studies Quarterly* 47, no. 1 (2003), 23, 24.; Federico Cresti, “La population d’Alger et son évolution Durant l’époque ottomane: un état des connaissances controversé” *Arabica* 52, no. 4 (2005), 479.; Klein, 229-30.; Robson, 227.; Wilson, *Empire of the Deep*, 471.; Shaler, 124.

Turkish Muslims whilst condemning the black slave trade. It is true the British benefited greatly from their relationship with Barbary and ensured the corsair attacks were focused against states with whom both North Africa and Britain were at war, but Britain did not encourage captive taking. As has been demonstrated in previous chapters, Britain worked strenuously to best serve British interests, maintain British honour, and serve the British war effort in the Mediterranean. However, the British focus was primarily on trade – what resources and support she could procure in Barbary, shutting out her enemies from the same – not encouraging the Barbary States to take more captives.

Europeans and Americans certainly saw the British position as hypocritical.⁸¹⁵ British Admiral Sir Sidney Smith disapproved of ‘main-line’ British abolition efforts working for Black emancipation and in 1814 founded ‘The Knights Liberator of the Slaves in Africa.’⁸¹⁶ Smith was not concerned with all slavery in Africa, only white, Christian slaves.⁸¹⁷ He would have agreed with Nelson’s lament:

...my blood boils that I cannot chastise these Pirates. They could not show themselves in the Mediterranean, did not our Country permit. Never let us talk of the cruelty of the African Slave trade, while we permit such a horrid war.⁸¹⁸

It is doubtful if Smith, like Nelson, would have also seen the value in the Barbary States for the British military in the Mediterranean. Robert Playfair, in his history of Anglo-Algerine relations, embraced the popular opinion that North African slavery was equally as horrific as the slavery in the Americas when he endorsed Shaler’s view of ‘white slavery’:

Mr Shaler...very naturally observes that the horrors of the negro slave trade are tender mercies when compared with the sufferings which are inflicted upon the inhabitants of Italy and Spain by these detestable barbarians.⁸¹⁹

⁸¹⁵ Jarrett, 145.; A.D. Harvey, *Collision of Empires: Britain in Three World Wars. 1793-1945* (London: The Hambledon Press, 1992), 83-4.; Löwenheim, 25, 28.; Nichols, “Barbary Captivity,” 124.; Baepler, *White Slaves, African Masters*, 27. Adam Zamoyski, *Rites of Peace: The Fall of Napoleon and the Congress of Vienna* (London: Harper Perennial, 2008), 346.

⁸¹⁶ Perkins, *Gunfire in Barbary*, 35, 37-9.; Clissold, 157-8.; Löwenheim, 39.; Zamoyski, 382.

⁸¹⁷ Perkins, *Gunfire in Barbary*, 38.; Valensi, 53-4.; Conrotte, 63.; Pockock, *Breaking the Chains*, 8, 10.

⁸¹⁸ DLN v. 4, 125: To His Excellency the Honourable William Wyndham, 2 Dec 1799.

Archibald Robbins, an American shipwrecked off the coast of modern Western Sahara, had no empathy for the plight of the Africans enslaved back in his country. Instead Robbins wrote:

These Africans, of every name and feature and complexion, take delight in enslaving each other and although the slave trade, carried on by Christian merchants, on the coast of Africa, excites the just indignation of the Christian world, yet it can hardly be expected that an American, who has for months and years been enslaved by them, can feel so much compassion towards a slave here as those do, who have always enjoyed the blessings of humanity and liberty.⁸²⁰

Once the Napoleonic wars had ended, Europe was free to project their new anti-slave trade sentiments into the wider world, especially if they saw themselves excluded from its benefit.⁸²¹

For Barbary, the end of the wars triggered a period of crisis. After the end of what Merouche called “le Siècle de la Course” and the height of the profits from corsairing, the eighteenth century was “le Siècle du Blé,” and revenue was derived from exports and tribute.⁸²² After the peace, the British military decreased in the Mediterranean and the necessity and value of trade from Barbary likewise decreased. While the American success over Algiers (and Tunis and Tripoli) cannot in any way be considered definitive or an end to Barbary ‘piracy’, it threatened the already stressed economies of the Ottoman North African states. By pressuring Algiers into releasing them from their obligation to pay tribute, “without a shot having been fired,” the United States aroused Britain’s jealousy, as well as increasing the pressure on her for a meaningful response.⁸²³

⁸¹⁹ Playfair, 253.

⁸²⁰ Archibald Robbins, *A Journal, Comprising an Account of the Loss of the Brig Commerce: of Hartford (Con.) James Riley, Master, Upon the Western Coast of Africa, August 28th, 1815* (Hartford: F. D. Bolles, 1817) 77.; Baepler, *White Slaves, African Masters*, 29.

⁸²¹ Bayly, 119.

⁸²² Merouche, *Monnaies*, 173, 177.; Panzac, *Barbary Corsairs*, 259.

⁸²³ Perkins, *Gunfire in Algiers*, 45.; Taylor, 242.; Pocock, *Breaking the Chains*, 35.; Pennell, *Bandits at Sea*, 125, 127.

Another motivation for a demonstration of British strength in North Africa came from the other side of the Mediterranean. Small states that received British protection from Barbary during the war petitioned Britain for continued assistance.⁸²⁴ This made a serious departure from the British position before the wars. Lord Sheffield, in his pamphlet, *Observations on the Commerce of the American States*, written after the American War of Independence, succinctly laid out the British policy vis-à-vis weaker foreign states and Barbary:

It is not probable the American States will have a very free trade in the Mediterranean; it will not be the interest of any of the great maritime powers to protect them there from the Barbary States...That the Barbary States are advantageous to the maritime powers is certain. If they were suppressed, the Little States of Italy, &c. would have much more of the carrying trade... The armed neutrality would be as hurtful to the great maritime powers, as the Barbary States are useful. The Americans cannot protect themselves from the latter; they cannot pretend to a navy.⁸²⁵

Specifically addressing the American request for continued protection under British treaties following independence, Lord Sheffield made it clear there was no British benefit in granting small states' protection. Even as late as 1814, British Admiral, Sir David Milne, wrote:

The Americans and Algerines are, however, going to war, and nothing would give me so much pleasure as to hear of the Yankees getting a good thrashing. I almost think it would be good policy for some of the Europeans to join the Algerines and destroy the American squadron.⁸²⁶

The Barbary States and their corsairs had protected the British share of Mediterranean commerce thanks to the Anglo-Barbary treaties.⁸²⁷ Yet with the new world order the Napoleonic wars had created, that policy was no longer viable, due to increased mercantile competition, the condemnation of Barbary tactics, and Britain's own abolition efforts. Exmouth, himself a 'Knight Liberator', was given orders in September 1815,

⁸²⁴ Taylor, 242.

⁸²⁵ John, Lord Sheffield, *Observations on the Commerce of the American States*, (London: J. Debrett, 1784), 204-5.

⁸²⁶ Hume, 296.

⁸²⁷ Galani, 30, 46-7, 144-5, 312-4.

ordering him to visit the Ottoman regencies, renegotiate treaties, and extend protection to Piedmont-Sardinia, The Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, and the Ionian Islands.⁸²⁸

It rapidly became apparent, even without force being mentioned in Exmouth's orders, that these negotiations would be a departure from the amicable relations Britain had enjoyed in Barbary for the past twenty years, much less the highpoint following the A'Court mission in 1813. In October 1815, McDonell, British consul in Algiers, successfully freed some captive sailors, owing, the consul felt, to the Dey hoping to secure a frigate to transport an Algerine mission to Constantinople.⁸²⁹ Exmouth passed the information on to the Admiralty noting:

...for although usual to grant it on former occasions, the present state of politics, with respect to the Barbary Powers, and their continued aggressions, may perhaps induce a different system, which makes me desirous of specific instructions.⁸³⁰

It had been common practice to assist any of the states in this way during the wars; frequently the Admiral in charge of the Mediterranean would stress to the Admiralty the importance of facilitating North Africa's goodwill. Now the situation was not so clear.

Even worse for Algiers was the response jotted down in the margins of Exmouth's letter: "Lord Exmouth had better acquaint the Dey that it will not be in his power to share a vessel for the purpose mentioned in the letter."⁸³¹ Exmouth repeated his request for clarification of his orders, as the new situation in the Mediterranean was a departure from his time in the latter years of the Napoleonic War.⁸³² Exmouth expected subsequent orders to direct him to at least use the threat of force to ensure the cooperation of the Barbary States.

⁸²⁸ Perkins, *Gunfire in Algiers*, 38-9, 63.; Taylor, 241, 245.; Clissold, 158.; Blondy, 241.; Hume, 281.; Baugh, "Withdrawing from Europe," 11.; Harding, 34-5.; Pocock, *Breaking the Chains*, 27.

⁸²⁹ NA ADM 1/431 no. 213, Exmouth to Croker, 14 Oct 1815.

⁸³⁰ Ibid.

⁸³¹ Ibid.

⁸³² NA ADM 1/431 no. 215, Exmouth to Croker, 18 Oct 1815.

By the new year, Britain was undoubtedly preparing for the potentiality of force, if not resigned to its inevitability. In late January, Castlereagh wrote regarding Exmouth's orders in Algiers. Castlereagh, following his negotiations at the Congress of Vienna, echoed the denouncement of piracy:

Lord Exmouth will employ the most friendly arrangements in the execution of [his instructions], but if necessary, he will consider himself as authorized to employ force.⁸³³

If it was possible to retain their relationship with North Africa and convince the Regencies to abandon their 'piracy' through friendly means, so much the better. However, the British government expected that to be an unlikely outcome.

Castlereagh neatly summed up the post-war crisis the North African states were contending with:

His Lordship will however not conceal from the Barbary Powers the spirit of resistance that is rising in Europe against the practices which their squadrons have lately indulged, and that it well deserved their serious consideration, whether the prosperity of their dominion cannot by some other means be better reconciled with the modern system of Europe.⁸³⁴

The strained relationship between the Barbary States and the major powers of Europe was entirely new. The irony of Castlereagh's query is the North African states *had* been financing themselves through other means than corsair attacks for over twenty years, and especially in the ten years after Trafalgar. As shown in chapter five, the number of corsair attacks drastically decreased as North African ships were used in the absence of European shipping. Peace in Europe and the loss of that trade caused the North African states to default back on corsairing as much as it caused the new 'modern system of Europe' to disapprove of actions it had previously found useful.

⁸³³ NA FO 8/2 Castlereagh to Earl Bathurst, 29 Jan 1816.

⁸³⁴ *Ibid.*

In preparation for meeting with Algiers in the spring, Exmouth ordered Captain Warde to survey Algiers and its port of which, “the sea defences are the first object.”⁸³⁵ Warde was to keep his investigation secret from both the British consul and the Algerine government. He submitted his report in February, down to the number and calibre of Algiers’s cannons.⁸³⁶ Thus informed, Exmouth and his squadron arrived off Algiers on 1 April.⁸³⁷ At first, the negotiations proceeded normally; the ships in his squadron all received fresh food, and the treaties were secured quickly. Exmouth secured recognition for the Ionian Islands as British subjects and the release of any Ionian subjects without ransom. Sardinia and Sicily did not fare as well, but they still received the peace they desperately desired. Exmouth succeeded in redeeming 357 of the approximate 1,000 Sicilian captives in Algiers and the British consul, McDonell, was appointed to act as the Sicilian consul.⁸³⁸

Exmouth next went to Tunis and Tripoli. In Tunis, the treaties were signed, with 524 Sicilian captives ransomed at half the price of Algiers, and 257 Sardinian captives freed at no cost. Additionally, Exmouth received the Bey’s promise to stop Christian slavery and a written promise all captives in the future would be treated as ‘prisoners of war’, not slaves.⁸³⁹ Then Tripoli, where the Admiral secured identical terms to Tunis and the release of 414 Sicilian and 154 Sardinian captives – and another promise to renounce Christian slavery.⁸⁴⁰ Exmouth returned to Algiers on his way back out of the Mediterranean, to see if he could convince the Dey to end Christian slavery as well. He had been ordered to lodge an official protest with the Dey regarding their treaty with the

⁸³⁵ Perkins, *Gunfire in Barbary*, 64.

⁸³⁶ *Ibid.*, 63-5.; Panzac, *Barbary Corsairs*, 276.; Thomas, 86.; Taylor, 246.; Pocock, *Breaking the Chains*, 27.

⁸³⁷ Thomas, 86.; Playfair, 253.; Jamieson, 203.; Shaler, 129.; Bono, *Corsari nel Mediterraneo*, 38.

⁸³⁸ Playfair, 253-4.; Thomas, 86.; Taylor, 250.

⁸³⁹ Taylor, 250-2.; Playfair, 255. NA FO 77/7 Oglander to Maitland, 13 May 1816.

⁸⁴⁰ Taylor, 252.; Playfair, 255.; Dearden, 243.; NA FO 8/2 Admiralty Office Report on Exmouth’s dispatch, 18 Jun 1816.

United States; since Decatur had secured an exemption from tribute, Exmouth argued it was prejudicial to British interests as British allies still paid.⁸⁴¹ For Exmouth, however, as one of Smith's Knights, the opportunity to convince Algiers to abandon taking white Christian slaves was too great an opportunity to miss.

The second meeting was not as successful as the first. Exmouth arrived back off the coast of Algiers in mid-May. He and McDonnell called on the Dey, both to protest the American treaty and convince him to abandon taking captives. For the former, Dey Omar was conciliatory; he argued the treaty had been imposed on him unfairly owing to the troubled circumstances of the regency at the time and the Americans would revert back to their former treaty of 1796, (which required tribute), or Algiers would declare war. As for Christian slavery, the Dey sent the matter to the *divan* then declared no answer could be given without first asking Constantinople, a delay of six months. Once the meeting dissolved into arguments, Exmouth and the consul left. In a fit of anger, with severe consequences, the Dey ordered the arrest of all British subjects in the regency. The consul and his family were placed under house arrest. Under a flag of truce by the British that evening, the Dey released the consul pending negotiations and a meeting the next morning was agreed upon. The Admiral sent his brother, Israel Pellew to meet with the Dey. Omar admitted he had sent orders calling for the seizure of British subjects but publically rescinded it in Pellew's presence. The final meeting took place between Exmouth and the Dey on 20 May and the Dey expressed regret for his temper. No resolution was reached regarding Christian slavery; the Dey still argued the need to check with the Porte. To expedite matters, Pellew offered the Dey a frigate to carry an envoy to Constantinople. One wonders if Omar's reticence on the matter of slavery was merely to secure such a frigate, which he had requested and been denied the previous

⁸⁴¹ Taylor, 252.; Playfair, 255.

autumn. As previous chapters have shown, this was not an uncommon tactic in North Africa to convince reticent European powers to grant Barbary what it wanted. If it was such a ploy, however, it had disastrous consequences even if it did get Omar his desired transport to Constantinople. Exmouth returned to Britain in late June, having accomplished all he had been required to do.⁸⁴²

The time between Exmouth's arrival in Algiers and his return to England was, unfortunately, long enough for the situation in North Africa to reverse. In Morocco, the long time minister, and 'good friend' to Britain, al-Salawi died after a lengthy illness the previous autumn. Though the cattle flow to Gibraltar was uninterrupted by the change, his death caused chaos in the Moroccan government.⁸⁴³ In Tripoli, the Bashaw's eldest son rebelled in February; his second son quelled the revolt and the eldest fled to Egypt.⁸⁴⁴ Tunis had another failed *janissary* revolt in May.⁸⁴⁵ Additionally, neither regency kept their promise to end piracy and Christian slavery; Tripoli reneged immediately after Exmouth left for Algiers. Tunis launched 12 corsair raids between February and July alone.⁸⁴⁶ Another round of locusts and drought hit Morocco, and food shortages across North Africa added further stress to the region.⁸⁴⁷

The stability of the region and the close relationship with Britain that existed at the end of the 1813 A'Court mission was gone. North Africa was threatened from without and within. After Exmouth's arrival in Britain, news followed of a massacre of Sicilians in Bona. In 1807, the British consul, Blanckely, had been granted the exclusive rights to the coral fisheries off the coast of Bona, previously held by the French.⁸⁴⁸ As

⁸⁴² Taylor, 253-9.; Playfair, 255-8.; Thomas, 87.; Perkins, *Gunfire in Barbary*, 68-74.; Panzac, *Barbary Corsairs*, 274.; Nichols, "Barbary Captivity," 122-3.

⁸⁴³ El-Mansour, 201.; NA FO 52/16 Green to Bathurst, 31 July 1815.; NA FO 52/16 Green to Bathurst, 20 October 1815.; NA FO 52/17 Green to Bathurst, 6 February 1816.

⁸⁴⁴ Panzac, *Barbary Corsairs*, 299.

⁸⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 298.; Moalla, 71.

⁸⁴⁶ Dearden, 243.; Panzac, *Barbary Corsairs*, 291.

⁸⁴⁷ El Mansour, *Morocco*, 185.; Panzac, *Barbary Corsairs*, 304.

⁸⁴⁸ Broughton, 27.

the British had little use for those products, they leased the fishing rights to the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. In the time between the Dey of Algiers issuing his order to seize British subjects and its withdrawal, a rider set out for Bona, reaching the town two days after Exmouth and in the confusion, the Algerines killed around 200 Sicilians. Despite the Dey publicly expressing his regret over the incident and willingly providing an explanation to the foreign consuls, the attack provided the justification Britain needed to declare Algiers in breach of the treaty and return to the city in force.⁸⁴⁹ Having just arrived home, Exmouth was ordered to return to Algiers and demand restitution.

The new squadron refitted and weighed anchor on 28 July. Abraham Salamé, an Egyptian Christian, joined as an interpreter.⁸⁵⁰ Salamé published his experiences in his book, *A Narrative of the Expedition to Algiers in the year 1816*. When they arrived at Gibraltar, the British were joined by a detachment of Dutch ships, seeking to secure their own exemption from tribute.⁸⁵¹ The combined fleet reached Algiers on 27 August; much of the city had evacuated to the countryside, including the captives held in Algiers. Salamé was rowed to the mole-head in the harbour. Salamé had spent the journey translating Exmouth's ultimatum for the Dey into both Arabic and Turkish. The terms required the immediate abolition of Christian slavery, the release of Christian slaves held in Algiers, return of money paid by Sicily and Sardinia, peace with the Netherlands, and the release of the British consul. Salamé also translated Exmouth's *Declaration for the Abolition of Christian Slavery*, which the Dey was to sign. Refusal would lead to an immediate attack. Once Salamé passed on Exmouth's letter and demands, the Dey had

⁸⁴⁹ Perkins, *Gunfire in Barbary*, 74-5.; Spencer, 140-1.; Thomas, 260-2.; Salamé, 2.; Playfair, , 258.; Jamieson, 204.; Wilson, *Empire of the Deep*, 470.; Shaler, 133.

⁸⁵⁰ Salamé, iv.; Perkins, *Gunfire in Barbary*, 87.

⁸⁵¹ Perkins, *Gunfire in Barbary*, 97-103.; Taylor, 271-2.; Jamieson, 204.

one hour to respond, though the British waited two. When no answer came, Salamé returned to the fleet and Exmouth signalled to prepare for the attack.⁸⁵²

Exmouth's report to the Admiralty, written the following day, described the action:

The battle was fairly at issue between a handful of Britons in the noble cause of Christianity, and a horde of fanatics, assembled round the city, and enclosed within its fortifications to obey the dictates of their Despot.⁸⁵³

By the Admiral's own recollection, the Algerines fired first at around quarter past three in the afternoon, and the firing continued until eleven when the fleet moved beyond the reach of the city's guns. Shaler, the American consul, described the scene: "Every part of the town appears to have suffered from shot and shells."⁸⁵⁴ He estimated the death toll in Algiers at 2,000. Comparatively, the combined fleet was equally mauled with 141 killed and 742 wounded. According to Salamé's report, the fleet used over 100 tons of powder and 500 tons of shot; HMS *Impregnable* was hit over two hundred times alone. Shaler pronounced, "Much has been done to suppress Algiers as a piratical power; all their ships are destroyed...the ruin of the batteries is very extensive."⁸⁵⁵

On the morning of 28 August, Salamé again approached, with Exmouth's letter for the Dey. It cut straight to the chase:

Sir, for your atrocities at Bona on defenceless Christians, and your unbecoming disregard of the demands I made yesterday in the name of the Prince Regent of England, the fleet under my orders has given you a signal chastisement, by the total destruction of your navy, storehouse, and arsenal, with half your batteries. As England does not war for the destruction of cities, I am unwilling to visit your personal cruelties upon the unoffending inhabitants of the country, and I therefore offer you the same terms of peace, which I conveyed to you yesterday in my Sovereign's name. Without the acceptance of these terms, you can have no peace with England.⁸⁵⁶

⁸⁵² Salamé, 21-39.; Perkins, *Gunfire in Barbary*, 95, 107-116.; Playfair, 261-5.; Thomas, 106-7.; NA ADM 1/432 Declaration for the Abolition of Christian Slavery, 20 Aug 1816.; Merouche, *La course*, 320.

⁸⁵³ Exmouth to Secretary of the Admiralty, 28 August 1816, quoted in Playfair, 262

⁸⁵⁴ Perkins, *Gunfire in Barbary*, 134.

⁸⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 153.; Robson, 230.

⁸⁵⁶ Perkins, *Gunfire in Barbary*, 136.; Salamé, 55-6.

Within two hours the Dey and *divan* accepted Exmouth's conditions. For the second time in a year, Omar was forced to grant concessions to a foreign power at the expense of his pool of 'attackable' ships and captives. The various Christian captives had been removed from Algiers prior to the battle, along with the treasury's money, so it was several days before the Algerine government could comply with Exmouth's conditions. Consul McDonell, at least, was freed from prison and returned to his post. The Algerines reclaimed the rights to Bona to prevent further problems. Eventually, over \$380,000 was paid (nearly half the value of the prizes the Regency had captured the year before) and 1,642 Christian captives released. Exmouth wrote the Bey in Tunis and the Bashaw in Tripoli to inform them of the outcome of his action in Algiers and demand they free any slaves they might still be holding after his mission in May. Combined, Exmouth secured the release of over 3,000 slaves from Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli in 1816, only 18 of which were British and had been captured the day before the battle in an attempt to rescue the consul.⁸⁵⁷

The British squadron sailed on 5 September. The true number of casualties in Algiers is unknown; reports range from 600 to 8,000. The former figure is from the US Consul and eyewitness, William Shaler, who possibly wished to undersell the British victory, and the latter figure is certainly an exaggeration. Salamé himself only put the number at 2,000 and that was thought to be high. There was no discounting the structural damage to the city, however. Both Salamé and Shaler reported much of the city (particularly its defences) and nearly all the Algerine ships had been damaged.⁸⁵⁸ Exmouth bragged to the Pope, "the slavery of Christians is abolished forever" while the Dey wrote the Ottoman Sultan, requesting arms, supplies, and soldiers to "defend our

⁸⁵⁷ Perkins, *Gunfire in Barbary*, 137, 141-2.; Panzac, *Barbary Corsairs*, 286-7.; Playfair, 274-5.; Thomas, 106-7.; Salamé, 64, 69-70, 108-9, 144.; NA FO 174/22 General Dun to Vice Consul Simpson (Morocco), 1 Dec 1816.; Taylor 292-4.; Black, *A History of Diplomacy*, 152.

⁸⁵⁸ Taylor, 293-4.; Thomas, 107.; Panzac, *Barbary Corsairs*, 287-8.; Pocock, *Breaking the Chains*, 63.

religion and country.”⁸⁵⁹ Jamieson argued the American ‘victory’ in 1815 was the death knell for the Barbary States and, “the impact of Decatur’s victory would be reinforced in the following year when the Anglo-Dutch fleet under Admiral Lord Exmouth bombarded Algiers and destroyed the remaining ships of the Algerine Navy. The Barbary corsairs never recovered from these blows...”⁸⁶⁰ Unfortunately for Jamieson, and other historians with a similar view of the American and British attacks on Algiers, neither was the final death stroke their commanders (and historians) hoped they would be. If Exmouth had won an end to Barbary corsairing, or even of ‘slavery’ on the Barbary Coast, this chapter would end here. Again, it does not.

Dey Omar quickly proved the lie that Algiers ‘never recovered’ from the bombardment. The two best ships of the Algerine navy had been scuttled to protect them from fire and cannon damage. They were raised, unharmed, within days of the British departure. Shaler reported the city’s defences rebuilt in only six months.⁸⁶¹ The following year Algiers purchased a brig and schooner from Leghorn, a polacca from Naples, and was given a polacca as a gift from Tripoli.⁸⁶² This was a remarkable turnaround for any country, much less one deemed ‘irreparable.’ In many ways Exmouth’s bombardment of Algiers in 1816 echoed the Battle of Lepanto in 1571. The Holy League’s victory against the Ottoman Navy was short lived and ineffectual in the long term. It may have broken the illusion of the Ottoman Empire being undefeatable, but it did not turn back the tide of Ottoman expansion. Nor did the steep losses on the Ottoman side (30,000 dead and 200 warships lost) long hamper the Ottoman navy – by

⁸⁵⁹ Perkins, *Gunfire in Barbary*, 148-9.; Panzac, *Barbary Corsairs*, 287.

⁸⁶⁰ Jamieson, 169.

⁸⁶¹ Thomas, 107.; Perkins, *Gunfire in Barbary*, 153.; Holland, 33.; Shaler, 138-9.

⁸⁶² Panzac, *Barbary Corsairs*, 52-3.; Jamieson, 206.; Perkins, *Gunfire in Barbary*, 165.

the following year the fleet was rebuilt and its weaponry modernised.⁸⁶³ Algiers after 1816 was Lepanto on a smaller scale. While the regency would never regain the golden age of the sixteenth and seventeenth century, Exmouth's bombardment was merely a symbolic victory with few long-term effects. The taking of Christian captives had been declining for over a century. By the following October, the Algerine corsairs took to the sea (along with the Tunisian and Tripolitan fleets) and would average five ships a year for the next four years with \$35,000 in total spoils. Though this figure was down from the nearly one million Francs averaged in last five years of the Napoleonic war, the corsairs were certainly not dead yet.⁸⁶⁴

Unfortunately for Omar, these impressive results were not enough. The loss of life and damage to the city, two defeats at the hands of foreigners combined with renewed plague outbreaks, famines, and food shortages across North Africa meant his days as Dey were numbered.⁸⁶⁵ There were riots in the city and on 16 September, his *janissaries* strangled him.⁸⁶⁶ The new Dey, Ali Khodja, "was the greatest tyrant and libertine that ever sat upon the throne of Algiers."⁸⁶⁷ Elsewhere in North Africa, tensions ran high along with pestilence and hunger. Tunis saw a rebellion in the western Kef region. Morocco had a particularly bad plague outbreak.⁸⁶⁸ This was exacerbated by Mawlay Suleiman's change from his previous policy of limiting or halting exports of food during such crises – this time he continued to allow wheat exports to France during

⁸⁶³ Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*, v. 2, Siân Reynolds, trans. (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1973), 1088-1122.; Friedman, *Spanish Captives in North Africa*, 39.

⁸⁶⁴ Panzac, *Barbary Corsairs*, 291.; Valensi, Hess, "Lepanto," 62-3, 72.; Weiss, *Captives and Corsairs*, 152-3.; Pennell, *Bandits at Sea*, 92.

⁸⁶⁵ El Hamel, *Black Morocco*, 252.; El Mansour, 184.; Panzac, *Barbary Corsairs*, 304, 306-7.; Playfair, 281-4.; Nichols, "Diplomacy in Barbary," 128-9.; Merouche, *Monnaies*, 123-4.

⁸⁶⁶ Grammont, *Histoire d'Alger*, 380.; Playfair, 281.; Jamieson, 205.; Perkins, *Gunfire in Barbary*, 154.; Panzac, *Barbary Corsairs*, 295. Plantet, *Algiers*, v. 1, 585-6.; Holland, 33.; Shaler, 139.

⁸⁶⁷ Playfair, 281.

⁸⁶⁸ Panzac, *Barbary Corsairs*, 298.; Brown, 80.; Sebag, *Tunis*, 226.

the famine, driving prices up dangerously.⁸⁶⁹ The situation became so bad, that in a reverse of the normal flow of trade, European consuls were importing grain *from Gibraltar to Morocco* to feed the starving populace.⁸⁷⁰ In Tripoli, the *Awlad Sulayman* confederation of nations rebelled, though the Bashaw was able to quell the rebellion. In Algiers, an earthquake in 1818 worsened the trouble caused by plague and famine.⁸⁷¹ Finally on 1 March, Dey Ali Khodja, died of plague himself – less than six months after coming to power.⁸⁷²

The new Dey, Hussein b. Hassan, continued the rebuilding efforts Omar had begun.⁸⁷³ Even with the regency ravaged by earthquakes (another in 1819), plague, and food shortages, neither Decatur's mission nor Exmouth's bombardment eliminated the corsair threat or convinced Barbary to abandon it. True, in 1817, Mawlay Suleiman officially announced the end of Moroccan corsairing, but in 1818 he gave one of his last frigates to Algiers.⁸⁷⁴ Algiers bought a new 32-gun frigate and Ottoman sultan, Mahmud II, gifted a 46-gun frigate to the regency as well.⁸⁷⁵ The much-praised destruction of the Algerine cruisers during Exmouth's bombardment was rendered moot.

The fact that the need to suppress the Barbary corsairs was discussed during the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818 certainly contradicted the idea that either Decatur or Exmouth's actions were definitive. Though not the focus of the Congress, the question of how best to eliminate the "scourge which has for so long desolated Africa, degraded Europe, and afflicted humanity" was raised, with the decision that a joint European

⁸⁶⁹ El Mansour, 185.; Brown, 75.

⁸⁷⁰ El Mansour, 185.

⁸⁷¹ Panzac, *Barbary Corsairs*, 304.

Earthquakes are frequently mentioned throughout Mrs Blanckley's diary (Broughton, *Six Years Residence in Algiers*).

⁸⁷² Panzac, *Barbary Corsairs*, 295-6.; Playfair, 284.; Grammont, 382.; Plantet, *Algiers*, v. 2, 585-6.;

Nichols, "Diplomacy in Barbary," 130.; Pocock, *Breaking the Chains*, 75.; Shaler, 153.

⁸⁷³ Playfair, 284

⁸⁷⁴ El Mansour, 107-11.; Jamieson, 190, 206.; Panzac, *Barbary Corsairs*, 53.; Brown, 93.; Goodwin, 49.;

Julien, 269.; Barbour, 110.

⁸⁷⁵ Jamieson, 206.; Panzac, *Barbary Corsairs*, 53.

coalition was needed.⁸⁷⁶ The Congress decided to send a joint French and British squadron to Algiers to convince the Dey to abandon “a system hostile to peaceful commerce,” in the hopes the united power of two nations who had for so long dominated the foreign affairs of Barbary could induce compliance.⁸⁷⁷ Little recognition was given by either the French or English that less than four years ago, they had both been fighting each other over access and favour from said ‘scourge’. When the squadron arrived off Algiers in September 1819, they carried a note for Dey Hussein:

The powers of Europe, which met last year at Aix-la-Chapelle, have charged France and England to make in their names serious representations to the Barbary States regarding the necessity of their discontinuing the depredations and acts of violence committed by armed vessels of these regencies.⁸⁷⁸

If Barbary did not comply, they courted, “a general league of all European States; and they should consider, before it be too late, that the effect of such a league will endanger their very existence.”⁸⁷⁹ Similar notices were dispatched to the Bey of Tunis and Bashaw of Tripoli.⁸⁸⁰

Despite continued outbreaks of plague in Algiers and Tunis, famine, another earthquake in Algiers, and another rebellion and small pox epidemic in Tunis, both regencies rejected the squadron’s threat.⁸⁸¹ Tripoli, at least, accepted the call for the end of piracy, but this was because of the always small-scale nature of corsair operations out of Tripoli, and Bashaw Yusuf’s preoccupation with the conquest of Bornu along the Trans-Saharan slave trade, which would supplement the economy after the end of

⁸⁷⁶ Weiss, *Captives and Corsairs*, 153.; Merouche, *La course*, 321.; British and Foreign State Papers: 1820-1822, Volume 10 (London: 1850), 95.

⁸⁷⁷ Playfair, 285.; Jarrett, 180, 194, 202.; Zamoyski, 543.; Weiss, *Captives and Corsairs*, 153-4.; Panzac, *Barbary Corsairs*, 289-290.; Bono, *Corsari nel Mediterraneo*, 38, 39.; William Shaler, *Sketches of Algiers* (Boston: Cummings, Hilliard, and Company, 1826), 302. Appendix H: Protocol of the Congress of Aix la Chapelle.

⁸⁷⁸ Shaler, 305. Appendix H: Protocol of the Congress of Aix la Chapelle.

⁸⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 286.; Julien, 328.

⁸⁸⁰ Spencer, 164.; Panzac, *Barbary Corsairs*, 289.; Playfair, 285-7.; Terki-Hassaine, 240.; Grammont, 384.; Perkins, *Tunisia*, 64-5.

⁸⁸¹ Panzac, *Barbary Corsairs*, 289-90, 298, 304.

corsairing.⁸⁸² Also, Tripoli quickly abandoned that promise. Both Algiers and Tunis cited their treaties with Europe in their refusal. The Bey of Tunis in particular, issued this statement:

Let him be called robber and pirate who captures ships and takes belongings without reason, without justice, and outside all laws, disregarding customs and treaties. As for us – thanks be to God! – we have never had evidence, or heard it said, that in our ports we have failed to respect customs or treaties; to deserve such intimidation from you ...is not appropriate, since in the past the goods of our own merchants have been taken, and treaties of friendship have been broken by people whom we should never have believed it possible...How can we agree to your demand that we never again arm out ships? And if it happened that war broke out between one of the Powers and the Ottoman Porte, what would we answer, when asked to arm our ships to go to its aid, following the custom that we have always practised?⁸⁸³

As previous chapters have shown, during the wars, Barbary carefully toed the line between continuing their corsair practices and maintaining their treaties with foreign nations. They were *not* pirates. Bey Mahmud stated that Tunis held the same definition of piracy Europe had free and unrestrained attacks on shipping/commerce without regard for treaties, nationalities or laws. Tunis was certainly justified in arguing they themselves had not violated their treaties – as both Nelson and Collingwood acknowledged.⁸⁸⁴ All of the arguments Tunis presented for her rejection of the Anglo-French mission were arguments previously respected by Europe.⁸⁸⁵ Unfortunately, now with pressure on France and Britain to abandon supporting the region against their enemies, the case was altered.

With plague still stretching across North Africa, Algiers and Tunis remained undaunted after their refusal to agree to the European powers statement on corsairing.⁸⁸⁶ By 1820, Algiers had completely rebuilt their fleet to pre-1816 levels.⁸⁸⁷ On 17 May,

⁸⁸² Ibid., 75, 289.; Abun-Nasr, 199-200.; Anderson, *State and Social Transformation*, 5, 105.

⁸⁸³ Panzac, *Barbary Corsairs*, 290.

⁸⁸⁴ NCCC, v. I, 293: To Lord Castlereagh, 4 July 1807.

⁸⁸⁵ Panzac, *Barbary Corsairs*, 290.

⁸⁸⁶ El Hamel, 232.; Panzac, *Barbary Corsairs*, 304.

⁸⁸⁷ Jamieson, 206.; Panzac, *Barbary Corsairs*, 265.

five Algerine corsair ships were recorded to have set sail in, “una manera indirecta de desafiar a la Europa.”⁸⁸⁸ Algiers was still seen to be a large enough threat to merit Spain’s Ferdinand VII ordering his Secretary of War to take all measures necessary to protect the Spanish from the corsairs.⁸⁸⁹ Starting in 1820, relations between Algiers and Spain would remain tense until 1824, owing to debts the Spanish consul had accrued with the Bacri trading house.⁸⁹⁰ Tunis’s maritime activity rose until it was double Algiers.⁸⁹¹ Perhaps for this reason, Algiers abandoned the agreement reached under Ali Kodja in 1817 (recognizing Tunis as equal to Algiers) and attacked the smaller regency on land and sea. Algiers captured several Tunisian ships, but before Tunis could respond, the Ottoman Sultan dispatched troops to quell the fighting and forced them to sign a peace agreement, on the same terms as 1817.⁸⁹² The Porte did not need her North African Regencies fighting each other at the outbreak of the Greek Revolution; the Porte called on the Barbary corsairs for naval aid shortly afterward. Neither the corsairs themselves were finished, nor their reputation diminished. Egypt’s Mehmet Ali was recruiting Algerian corsairs as he attempted to build his war fleet, in an echo of the early days of the corsairs and the Ottoman Navy.⁸⁹³

Mawlay Suleiman’s renouncement of corsairing in 1817 protected Morocco from the fallout after the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle. Of even greater importance was the special relationship between British Gibraltar and Morocco, which was unaffected by peace. Britain would not allow any danger to come near Morocco while the state’s chief foreign trade partner remained Gibraltar. British consul, James Green, had retired in 1817 and his replacement, James Douglas, could not enter Morocco until late 1821 due

⁸⁸⁸ Terki-Hassaine, 240.

⁸⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁹⁰ Ibid., 241.

⁸⁹¹ Panzac, *Barbary Corsairs*, 266, 291.

⁸⁹² Ibid., 302.; Devoulx, 103.; Moalla, 68.

⁸⁹³ Panzac, *Barbary Corsairs*, 291.; Pocock, *Breaking the Chains*, 77.

to plague. The commerce of Tetuan was completely closed to outsiders until 1822.⁸⁹⁴ In the interim, the food and health crisis gripping Morocco had strained the already tense relationship Suleiman had with the indigenous nations and religious orders within his country. That relationship grew more fraught after 1811; the new teaching of Wahabbism emerged in the Arabian Peninsula and reached Morocco that year. Religious Mawlay Suleiman appeared to favour the new movement to the worry of the Moroccan religious community.⁸⁹⁵ The combination of religious strife and environmental turmoil broke out in a wide-spread rebellion in 1817. Instead of fighting to eliminate the threat of Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli, Britain went to great (and expensive) lengths to assist Morocco. Over the last four years of Suleiman's reign, Britain gave \$40,000 worth of ammunition and military supplies (and 2,000 muskets) to Morocco for troops fighting against rebels in Tetuan and Fez, both to maintain a friendly power on the throne and the vital trade between Morocco and Gibraltar.⁸⁹⁶ After Suleiman's disastrous loss against the *Ait Zammur* and *Ait Umalu* nations in 1819, Britain, France, and Sweden supplied an additional fifty cannons in 1820.⁸⁹⁷ Less than a year after Britain and France had joined forces to threaten Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli, they were actively supplying arms to Morocco. Britain provided another twenty heavy mountain guns via Gibraltar in 1821 while Spain provided arms through Ceuta. Denmark ensured the payment of back-tribute amounting to \$100,000 to ensure Mawlay Suleiman had ready cash.⁸⁹⁸ As united as Europe appeared to be on the 'evils' of the Ottoman regencies, the powers were equally united on the need to protect Morocco. European assistance was even more necessary as

⁸⁹⁴ Rogers, *Anglo-Moroccan Relations*, 133-4.; Brown, 73.; NA FO 52/18 Green to Bathurst, 24 Apr 1817.

⁸⁹⁵ Abun-Nasr, 243-6.; El Mansour, 138-43.; El Hamel, 227.; Bayly, 76, 87, 105-6.

⁸⁹⁶ Abun-Nasr, 246-7.; El Mansour, 190.; Brown, 79, 81.

⁸⁹⁷ Abun-Nasr, 246-7.; El Mansour, 188-90.; Brown, 81.

⁸⁹⁸ Brown, 81.; Abun-Nasr, 247.

the Emperor marched on rebellious Fez. The city held out until April 1822, but once it submitted to Mawlay Suleiman's rule, the rebellion died away.⁸⁹⁹

Mawlay Suleiman did not live much beyond his success. The Moroccan Emperor died in November and the throne passed to his nephew, Mawlay 'Abd al-Rahman (d. 1859).⁹⁰⁰ As the former governor of Essaouira, the new Emperor had strong ties with European (especially British) and Jewish merchants and continued many of his uncle's policies.⁹⁰¹ The 1824 Anglo-Moroccan treaty was nearly identical to the 1801 treaty, with special rates for the export of cattle for Gibraltar.⁹⁰² The new British consul, Douglas, proudly proclaimed shortly after his arrival:

...the British nation stands in the highest degree of estimation with the whole population of this country from the Emperor to the peasant, it is sufficient for them to find that you are English to meet with every possible attention.⁹⁰³

The new consul estimated the revenue of Morocco was approximately \$1 million, with the cattle trade with Gibraltar alone accounting for up to ten per cent.⁹⁰⁴

Yet for all the continuity between 'Abd al-Rahman and his uncle, they differed on one major point. Though Suleiman had stopped Morocco's corsairs in 1817, the new Emperor restarted corsairing and rebuilt the Moroccan fleet in an attempt to supplement the government's fund through foreign tribute rather than relying on taxing the countryside as his uncle had done.⁹⁰⁵ For all the strength of the Anglo-Moroccan relationship, this reversal was yet another blow to the Aix-la-Chapelle efforts. Algiers and Tunis, the two main targets, had outright refused to acknowledge the agreement in 1819 and Morocco resumed corsair attacks. This is not to suggest the post-Napoleonic

⁸⁹⁹ Abun-Nasr, 247.; Brown, 84.; Gutelius, 47.; El Hamel, 231-3.

⁹⁰⁰ Abun-Nasr, 245-7.; Brown, 85.; Jamieson, 190.; El Hamel, 233.; El Mansour, 189.; Pennell, *Morocco*, 19.

⁹⁰¹ El Mansour, 219.; Brown, 91-3.; El Hamel, 233.

⁹⁰² Brown, 91-3.

⁹⁰³ Quoted in Brown, 83.

⁹⁰⁴ Brown, 82, 85, 130-1.

⁹⁰⁵ Brown, 93.; Jamieson, 190.; Pennell, *Morocco*, 24.

War corsairs were as strong as during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, but in the early nineteenth century, it was by no means clear the system would shortly collapse. For every supposed final blow struck against the corsairs, they defiantly endured.

Algiers also saw the start of three years of locusts invading the region in 1822, though the plague finally died out in 1824.⁹⁰⁶ There was a rebellion of the *Kabyle* nation near Bougia in 1823.⁹⁰⁷ Yet neither the Regency nor its corsairs were subdued. They captured a Spanish ship and took its crew captive in early 1824. McDonnell, with whom relations had remained tense after Exmouth's departure, argued this was against the treaty the Dey had been forced to sign in 1816. The Dey remarked he considered the agreement from 1816 binding for only three years and Christian slavery resumed. In response, McDonnell withdrew from the regency (rather than risk prison again) while the British blockaded the port. In July, the British began a 'desultory' bombardment of the city, whose only claim to fame was it featured the first steamship, HMS *Lightning*, used in British naval operations. After a few rounds, the Dey agreed to discuss terms, which resulted in the freeing of the Spanish and the return of a British consul, provided it was not McDonnell.⁹⁰⁸ Piedmont-Sardinia sent a force to Tripoli in September 1825 to protest having to pay tribute. The Sardinian Navy sank several Tripolitan vessels, forcing the Bashaw to agree to terms including ending tribute.⁹⁰⁹ On the surface, these actions were successful – they forced the state in question to acquiesce to European demands. Yet they repeatedly had to 'attack' Barbary and re-force the regencies to follow through on those demands. The importance was not the success in achieving their short-term ends (and they were very short lived) but Barbary bounced back each time, possibly slightly

⁹⁰⁶ Panzac, *Barbary Corsairs*, 304.

⁹⁰⁷ Playfair, 288-9.; Grammont, 383.

⁹⁰⁸ Playfair, 290-1.; Panzac, *Barbary Corsairs*, 288.; Jamieson, 207.; Pocock, *Breaking the Chains*, 95-6.

⁹⁰⁹ Panzac, *Barbary Corsairs*, 271.; Carlo Randaccio, *Le marinerie militari italiane: nei tempi moderni, 1730-1860, memorie storiche*, 2nd ed. (Genoa: Luigi Beuf, 1870), 29-33.

weaker than before, but enough to remain a menace and require further action.⁹¹⁰ Not even a decade after Exmouth's bombardment in 1816, Europe had already needed three additional actions off the Barbary Coast, two of which involved both Algiers and Britain, further dispelling the myth 1816 had been any sort of definitive event.

Yet more changes came to the region. The Bey of Tunis, Mahmoud, died in March 1824, and his son, Hussein II (d. 1835) succeeded him. Shortly after, the small regency was gripped by internal trouble as rebellions in the northeast of Tunis took until the following year to suppress. Algiers, as part of the negotiations following the British attack the previous year, received a new consul, Morris Thomas, in January 1825. Despite the British and Sardinian attacks, Algiers and Tripoli provided ships for the naval escort for the Ottoman convoy of supplies between Egypt and Greece. Yusuf Karamanli also began expanding the Tripolitan navy in spite of the losses sustained in the Sardinian bombardment and his promise to end corsairing in 1819.⁹¹¹

More than the 1815 U.S. action or the 1816 British action, if any year in the post-war era could be called the beginning of the end for the Barbary corsairs, it was 1827. In Tunis, corsair attacks were down to only two campaigns a year. At the battle of Navarino between British and Ottoman forces, the Ottoman fleet was destroyed along with three Tunisian ships. Even more significant, however, were the events in Algiers. On 30 April, problems dating to the very start of the French Revolutionary War finally came to a head between France and the regency. In what would become known as the *coup d'éventail* or the 'fly-swatter incident', the Dey struck the French consul, Deval, with his fan – for which France blockaded Algiers for three years.⁹¹²

⁹¹⁰ Panzac, *Barbary Corsairs*, 271.; Bono, *Corsari nel Mediterraneo*, 39.

⁹¹¹ Plantet, *Tunis*, v. 3, LXXVI.; Panzac, *Barbary Corsairs*, 298.; Abun-Nasr, 185, 202.; Jamieson, 207.; Brown, 89-90. 24.; Galani, 144-5, 312-4.; Earle, *Pirate Wars*, 232.; Holland, 50.

⁹¹² Panzac, *Barbary Corsairs*, 291, 332.; Jarrett, 348.; Jamieson, 207-8.

The background to the *coup d'éventail* involved the intertwined relationship between the French Government, the Algerine government, and the Jewish merchant house of Bacri and Busnach. Between 1793 and 1798, France purchased vast amounts of grain from Algiers to feed its starving populace and armed forces. The Republican Government could not afford to pay, however, and France borrowed 1,000,000 Francs from the Bacri's. Bacri further assisted with procuring supplies for French armies in Italy, Egypt and Germany and a further loan of another 1,000,000 Francs for peace with Algiers in 1801. By the inter-war period, the French government owed Bacri 8,000,000 Francs, some of which was paid off. Yet by 1815, further loans had brought the total back to 7,000,000 Francs. Shortly after arriving in Algiers in 1815, Deval promised Bacri repayment. Another agreement was reached in 1819, reaffirming the commitment to the debt, but no money was forthcoming. Jacob Bacri himself was forced to ask the British for a loan in 1824. It was insufficient to cover Bacri's own debts and he was imprisoned, with the Dey assuming the rights to the 7,000,000 Franc French debt. The Dey, upset over delays to pay off the debt *he* was now owed, demanded France repay the debt and remove Deval for his failure. Instead, France sent a frigate in 1826, which forced the Dey to disavow the conduct of Algerine corsairs. The Dey complied, but still demanded Deval's removal. In 1827, four more French ships arrived in the regency in support of the French consul. Thus, when the Dey received an unsatisfactory answer from Deval regarding the debt and struck the consul, the French were poised to respond. France issued an ultimatum to Algiers, requiring a public apology, the punishment of pirates, the return of France to most-favoured nation status *and* the Dey's public declaration the debt had already been liquidated. Unsurprisingly, the Dey refused to accept those terms, and in mid-June, the French blockade of Algiers began.⁹¹³

⁹¹³ Panzac, *Barbary Corsairs*, 291, 332.; Jarrett, 348.; Jamieson, 207-8.; Monk, 123.; Earle, *Pirate Wars*,

Plans existed at the start of 1828 for an invasion of Algiers, but a change of power in the French Government shelved the idea. Instead, the blockade intensified – though it was more an inconvenience to French merchants. The corsairs managed to capture several Spanish ships in spite of the blockade. Algiers was not alone in North Africa in facing European protests against corsairing; all four Barbary States experienced ‘demonstrations’ of power in protest of corsair attacks, each by a different European nation. Morocco, having restarted its corsair program, still received tribute from Sweden, Denmark, and Naples. Morocco broke the standing Austrian-Moroccan treaty in 1828, capturing several Austrian merchant ships. Austria responded by blockading the Moroccan coast and bombing Larache in 1829. Moroccan corsairs mistakenly captured two British ships in 1828 as well, which led to a brief British blockade of Tangier. In truth, the capture and detention of the ships and their crew (held less than a month before being released) was legal as the ships had incorrect passes. The blockade resulted from the Emperor’s refusal to pay the British government compensation, but the blockade forced him to do so anyway. The whole situation justified Admiral Collingwood’s frequent complaint:

...in the questions which occasionally arose between the English cruisers and [Barbary], they were uniformly in the right, and that they adhered to the strict letter of their treaties, with a fidelity which he did not discover in the government of more civilised countries.⁹¹⁴

Algiers attacked Spanish shipping whilst blockaded by the French. The Kingdom of the Two Sicilies sought to reduce their tribute to Tripoli by bombarding the city, but failed. Tunis, according to Piedmont-Sardinia, had insulted their consul, which led to their bombing Tunis. The 1828 bombardment failed to move Tunis, so Sardinia returned two years later and repeated the action in 1830 – only succeeding this second time with help

252.; Rosenstock, 353-7.; Merouche, *Monnaies*, 210.; Merouche, *La course*, 264.; Abun-Nasr, 249-50.; Spencer, 164-5.; Naylor, 153.; Ageron, 5.

⁹¹⁴ NCCC, v. 1, 178-9.

from the British consul, Sir Thomas Reade, who sought to prevent Sardinia from imitating French actions in Algiers.⁹¹⁵

In early 1830, France hoped to distract the populace from their dissatisfaction with King Charles X and launched the invasion of the regency of Algiers, which would lead to its eventual colonisation. The previous year, France had entered into treaties with Egypt's Mehmet Ali regarding plans to invade North Africa – not simply Algiers, but Tunis and Tripoli as well. Spurred by attacks on French men killed in an ambush in June 1829 and two French brigs wrecked, and their crew taken captive in May 1830, the French made landfall at Sidi Ferruch, west of Algiers – drawing on the plan Bonaparte had commissioned in 1808. In less than a month, the French captured the city of Algiers. The Dey capitulated on 5 July, causing Count de Bourmont, French war minister and commander of the army in Algiers, to remark, “Twenty days have been sufficient to destroy the state whose existence has wearied Europe for three centuries.”⁹¹⁶ Unfortunately, while Bourmont's words sound impressive, the truth was all the French had managed to conquer was the city of Algiers and nearby Oran. Bona, to the east, would not fall until 1832. Consantine held out until 1837. The interior of the country – difficult to control (much less conquer) since Roman times – took decades to subdue. The initial French estimate of manpower to conquer Algiers was around 10,000; by 1847, 100,000 men were needed for the ‘pacifying’ mission to control the former Ottoman regency. Also incorrect is the idea North Africa was a ‘wearisome’ problem for Europe. One can see the revisionist history already at work in Bourmont's statement. As previous chapters have demonstrated, for both Britain and France, the region was of importance to their survival and victualing during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, and an active part of many states' foreign policy. The invasion of

⁹¹⁵ Jamieson, 190, 208-9, 213.; Terki-Hassaine, 243.; Brown, 119, 185-6.; Panzac, *Barbary Corsairs*, 332-3.; Rogers, *Anglo-Moroccan Relations*, 139-40.; Bono, *Corsari nel Mediterraneo*, 39.

⁹¹⁶ Jamieson, 212.

Algiers failed even as a distraction from the troubles of Charles X, whose government collapsed one month after the fall of Algiers.⁹¹⁷ In the end, it was colonisation and the start of the European ‘scramble for Africa’ that ended Barbary corsairs – full-scale conquest, not bombardments.

⁹¹⁷ Ibid., 55, 56, 61.; Spencer, 149.; Jarrett, 348.; Jamieson, 210-3.; Panzac, *Barbary Corsairs*, 333.; Earle, *Pirate Wars*, 252.; Dearden, 299.; Abun-Nasr, 185, 202.; Clancy-Smith, *Rebel and Saint*, 70-2.; Weiss, “Barbary Captivity,” 261-4.; Merouche, *Monnaies*, 119.; Clancy-Smith, *Rebel and Saint*, 70, 75, 80-2, 90.; Ian Coller, *Arab France: Islam and the Making of Modern Europe, 1798-1831* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 2011), 180, 194, 198, 207, 216.; Hourani, 269.

CONCLUSION

The animosity and hostility that Europe demonstrated against Barbary after 1815 was a dramatic departure from their relationship Europe during the previous wars, or even the previous century. Peace and strengthening commercial ties characterised the 'long eighteenth-century' between the major maritime powers and Barbary. The status the British consuls in Barbary held within the wider diplomatic system demonstrated the special position of Barbary to Britain. Despite Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli being part of the Ottoman Empire, the consuls held the position and pay of a full ambassador of an independent state. In Morocco, British reliance increased after the capture of Gibraltar, even before diplomatic relations between Britain and Morocco were formalised. By the start of the French Revolutionary War in 1792, the British and French were competing over access to the trade and power of Barbary, both militarily and diplomatically. After Trafalgar, the British overcame French dominance in the region. They not only became the major trading partner of Barbary but also developed a strong symbiotic relationship with Barbary to support British military efforts in the Mediterranean as the Napoleonic War lasted another decade.

The Barbary States were a crucial part of the British military strategy in the Mediterranean and a vital part of their supply chain. The advantageous British-Barbary relationship provided the British with better resources. Better resources allowed the British (and British allies) to be a more effective fighting force against the French. Correspondence between the admirals in the Mediterranean and the British government demonstrated the importance Barbary's trade and friendship held for Britain. Barbary provided supplies and food. Their necessity increased with each new force and garrison established there.




Figure 7: British Shipping to/from Barbary during the French Revolutionary & Napoleonic War

The loss of that supply, or worse, the possibility of a new conflict in the southern Mediterranean, was a potential disaster. Every effort was made to avoid that outcome by all involved, even by the rulers of Barbary itself for whom Britain’s trade and friendship were also necessary. Europe’s increased trade with North Africa over the course of the eighteenth century – *siècle du blé* – had allowed the Barbary states to decrease their reliance on corsair attacks and instead use their reputation established over the preceding century – *siècle de la course* – to extract tribute payments, to prevent attacks, and turn their attentions more towards trade. Barbary mercantile efforts intensified after the Battle of Trafalgar and Bonaparte’s Berlin Decrees, which establish the British as the dominant European power in the Mediterranean and limited European shipping and trade. The Barbary States were neutral and outside Bonaparte’s control, so they assumed the vital role of maintaining the supply lines between Barbary and the British garrisons at Malta and Gibraltar as well as continuing their own mercantile efforts in the Mediterranean.




Figure 8: Cattle Imports for Malta: Malta Public Secretary's Report - Arrivals and Importations from 1801-1811

As trade increased, Barbary's reliance on profits from corsairing decreased. The twin ends of the Napoleonic War and the War of 1812, allowing European and American carriers back into the Mediterranean, came at the expense of the nascent North African trade.

The end of the Napoleonic War also changed the nature of European foreign relations and alliances. Britain had assumed the cost of supporting her Italian allies during the war and Italy wanted this protection to continue (especially from Barbary). The use of foreign actors to supplement military strategy, or the use of privateers at all, was increasingly seen as dangerous to the 'balance of power' system emerging in Europe. Finally, Britain's position as leader of the abolition movement to end the Trans-Atlantic slave trade of black Africans was seen as hypocritical while the 'white slave trade' in North Africa existed. These changes resulted in a reordering of European relations with Barbary, now no longer symbiotic but one of Europe trying to dominate North Africa. Barbary, in turn, responded to the loss of trade and now hostile European relations by returning to corsairing in force. This was shown most clearly by the speed with which Algiers rebuilt its fleet after Exmouth's bombardment. The naval strength of

Europe was vastly superior in the nineteenth century to what it had been in the seventeenth, resulting in fewer successful corsair attacks. Yet despite that military superiority, none of the attacks in Barbary, by any nation, succeeded in putting an end to the corsair system. Only when France invaded Algiers in 1830 did corsairing finally end.

This study has endeavoured to disprove the idea that the Barbary States were an unimportant and collapsing society based on piracy in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. They were never based on ‘piracy’ but part of a Mediterranean-specific type of naval and economic warfare – corsairing. Corsairing, particularly non-state corsairing, declined over the course of the two wars. As Barbary trade increased post-Trafalgar, Barbary corsairing decreased.




Figure 9: Tunis' Public and Private Corsair Fleet

The attention granted to Barbary during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars demonstrated Barbary's importance to the British war effort. The British were reliant upon them for supplies, information, and later, carrying on the intra-Mediterranean shipping between British bases and North Africa. Britain allowed this trade to continue, unlike in Scandinavia or the Americas, because of the dire necessity of supplies to the

Mediterranean and because allowing the French trade cost the French far more than the British. This made ensuring Barbary's goodwill and cooperation a British priority in the Mediterranean, both for the British government and the British military.

Despite much modern scholarship on the last decades of the Barbary states focusing on the 'backwardness' of the corsair institution or Western efforts to get out of paying tribute, the British government and military saw the region as one of great value to the British, especially during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. Strong diplomatic relations with Barbary were crucial and very much a part of Britain's strategy during the 23-year conflict. The value Britain placed on Barbary only increased over the course of the war, especially after British supremacy in the Mediterranean was secured after the 1805 victory at Trafalgar. In 1807, British consul in Tripoli, William Langford, wrote to Viscount Castlereagh, the Secretary of State for War, of a potential loss of supply from his regency owing to a diplomatic dispute between Tripoli and Britain. In his explanation, Langford called that supply, "*of the highest importance* to the service of our fleet, and to the island of Malta."⁹¹⁸ During Langford's tenure as consul, Tripoli alone supplied an average of 38 per cent of all Malta's cattle imports. Pellew, while Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean squadron, wrote to John Wilson Croker, the Secretary to the Board of Admiralty, that, "...supplies from Barbary....in the event of cooperation in the Eastern Provinces of Spain of the present scarcity on England will be *indispensable*."⁹¹⁹ The Duke of Wellington, while fighting in the Peninsular War, stressed to the Secretary of State of the Foreign Office that, "His Majesty's Fleet in the Mediterranean is entirely supplied with Bullocks from Algiers," and that the Barbary supply was, "*of the utmost importance* to continue."⁹²⁰ Those directly involved in the

⁹¹⁸ NA FO 76/6 Langford to Castlereagh, 13 Oct 1807. Emphasis mine.

⁹¹⁹ NA ADM 1/422 no. 189: Pellew to Croker, 13 May 1812. Emphasis mine.

⁹²⁰ NA FO 72/132 Wellesley to Castlereagh, 4 Nov 1812. Emphasis mine.

military and diplomatic aspects of the Napoleonic War placed a high value on the supply trade from North Africa and believed it crucial to the British war effort.

The British government itself viewed that supply as important. This sentiment was alluded to in the Nelson quote above, but also in their own words. While preparing for the A'Court mission in 1813, the high point of British-Barbary relations during the Napoleonic War and culmination of all British diplomatic efforts since the outbreak of war in 1792, the Earl of Bathurst, Secretary of State for War, provided extensive directions to William A'Court along with all the Foreign office correspondence. Bathurst specifically told A'Court:

The war in Spain and the exhausted state of the Peninsula have obliged Great Britain to look to Barbary for supplies of corn and for the support of her business and ...*these countries have risen in comparative importance.*⁹²¹

Bathurst also wrote that Barbary had, “encouraged a trade with Malta which has *grown into some importance.*”⁹²² Though not as strongly worded as the military commanders on the ground (or sea) and themselves dependent on the Barbary supply, high-ranking British government officials considered that supply crucial to the British war effort. The importance the British government, military and diplomats wrote of and emphasized in their correspondence, and the diplomatic and mercantile ties that had grown since Trafalgar, made the British switch to attacking and condemning Barbary after the war that much more sudden and unexpected.

By bringing the Mediterranean under British control and assuming the diplomatic and fiscal responsibility for the Iberian Peninsula and the small Italian States during the Napoleonic War, Britain reinforced the Braudel's theory of a unified Mediterranean.

⁹²¹ BL BL ADD Ms 41512 Heytesbury Papers, Vol. II, p 10: Bathurst to A'Court, 27 Mar 1813. Emphasis mine.

⁹²² BL BL ADD Ms 41512 Heytesbury Papers, Vol. II, p 22: Bathurst to A'Court, 27 Mar 1813. Emphasis mine.

North Africa and southern Europe were connected, diplomatically, politically, and economically as they all fell under Britain's sphere of influence. Barbary's return to corsairing after the end of the Napoleonic War briefly disrupted that Braudelian unity, but Europe's decision to enforce their will on North Africa, eliminate the corsairs, and eventually colonise the region once more created an incorporated Mediterranean, where Europe dictated the terms. This became even more apparent in 1848, when France declared Algeria not merely a French colony but part of France itself.⁹²³

This study is naturally limited by its British focus and the primacy given to European sources. This is an unfortunate effect of the limited time of a D.Phil. course as well as the availability of European sources and funding-body limitations on travel destinations. As Daniel Panzac's *Barbary Corsairs: End of a Legend* (which does draw on *Maghrebi* sources) focuses mostly on links with France, there remains considerable scope for looking at the late Anglo-Barbary relationship whilst focusing more on the Barbary side of that relationship. Another limitation is the on-going efforts in Istanbul to catalogue the Ottoman Imperial archives, which as that project progresses opens up new avenues for research into the Ottoman *Maghreb* and their relationship with the Porte. Until the project's completion, an attempt to mine the un-catalogued documents would require far more time than a doctoral student possesses.

In addition to possibilities opened by the lack of Maghrebi and Ottoman sources discussed above, this study also opens other areas for future research. One of the most glaring holes is the limited research done on the relationship between the Barbary States, their corsairs, and the Jewish population of North Africa. The Algerine-Jewish merchant house of Bacri and Busnach, connected with the British, Spanish, American, and French missions in Algiers and at the centre of the 'fly-swatter incident', would make an

⁹²³ Abun-Nasr, 262.

excellent study on their own. Another area of Jewish scholarship with a North African-sized hole is the work done by Lois Dubin and David Sorkin on the role of ‘Port Jews’, cosmopolitan, principally Sephardic Jews in port cities in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In two different collections edited by David Cesarini, the role of ‘Port Jews’ are traced along the Atlantic world, both in Europe and the Americas, as well as into the northern shore of the Mediterranean, yet the place of Jews in the port cities of Barbary is entirely missing. The Jews of Barbary North Africa neatly fit the paradigm established by Dubin, Sorkin, and Cesarini but no scholarship exists placing them into that context.

Finally, successes against ISIS along the primary Iraq-Syrian supply line, Route 47, in early 2015 underscore the broader importance of supply studies, beyond the specifics of Western reactions to Muslim foes. Kurdish forces seized key towns and eliminated ISIS fighters along Route 47 in February 2015. Help from the Combined Joint Task Force backed up these successes in March, with air strikes targeting the supply line. This further denied ISIS access to their critical supply and communications route.⁹²⁴ Bombardments, sieges, or blockades succeed or fail because of the availability of the combatants’ supplies. One can neither maintain nor resist such an attack without access to fresh food, water, or ammunition. This was as true during the eighteenth century as it is in the early twenty-first.⁹²⁵ Whether attributed to Frederick the Great or Napoleon Bonaparte himself, armies remain like caterpillars, marching on their stomachs. Supply

⁹²⁴ Eric Cunningham, “The Islamic State ‘caliphate’ is in danger of losing its main supply route” *The Washington Post* (19 Feb 2015) <http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/the-islamic-state-caliphate-is-in-danger-of-losing-its-main-supply-route/2015/02/18/aaaabd5a-9045-11e4-a66f-0ca5037a597d_story.html> accessed 16 Mar 2015.; Tom Perry and Suleiman Al-Khalidi, “Syrian Kurds cut IS supply line near Iraq; fears for Christians mount,” *Reuters* (25 Feb 2015) <<http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/25/us-mideast-crisis-syria-northeast-idUSKBN0LT0GB20150225>> accessed 16 Mar 2015.; “ISIS Syria-Iraq supply lines smashed: coalition” *Al Arabiya News* (11 Mar 2015) <<http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2015/03/11/ISIS-Syria-Iraq-communication-lines-smashed-coalition-.html>> accessed 16 Mar 15.; “US-Led air strikes hit key ISIS targets amid battle with Kurdish forces” *The Guardian* (14 Mar 2015) <<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/14/us-led-air-strikes-isis-kurdish-forces-syria>> accessed 16 Mar 2015.

⁹²⁵ Hughes, *Britain in the Mediterranean*, 10.

is crucial to an ability to wage war yet there is still plenty of research to be done on both its modern and historical aspects. John Brewer extends the caterpillar comparison to its more aquatic cousin:

If the eighteenth-century army was like a caterpillar, consuming steadily on the march, the eighteenth-century navy was like a boa constrictor, swallowing up one vast supply to sustain it on its long and frugal voyages.⁹²⁶

How this was carried out, and how successfully, during the Age of Sail is a necessary area of study in its own right, but also as it relates to the long-term study of supply up to the modern age. Understanding the importance of supplies – and free supply lines – is necessary not just for the health of one's fighting force, but also for its ability to hinder and defeat an enemy force. Nelson wrote that the Barbary States “cannot go robbing in the Mediterranean without the consent of Britain.”⁹²⁷ It was precisely because those states consistently and amply supplied the British Royal Navy (and all its dependents) that Barbary was granted that consent. Only after the end of the Napoleonic War did the British withdraw their consent, when their need for Barbary was over. Before then, Barbary remained a critically important part of the British military strategy in the Mediterranean.

⁹²⁶ John Brewer, *The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State, 1688-1783* (London: Unwin Hyman, Ltd., 1989), 36.

⁹²⁷ DLN, v. 4, 121: To the Right Honourable Earl Spence, K.G., Palermo, November 29th, 1799.

APPENDIX I

Barbary Rulers: 1790-1830

<i>Morocco</i> (Emperor)	<i>Algiers</i> (Dey)	<i>Tunis</i> (Bey)	<i>Tripoli</i> (Bashaw)
Sidi Muhammad (1757-1790)	Muhammad b. Uthman (1766-1791)	*Hammouda b. Ali (1777-1814)	*•Ali b. Muhammad Karamanli (1754-1793)
Mawlay Yazid (1790-1792)	*Sidi Hassan (1791-1798)	*°Uthman b. Ali (1814)	*•Ali Burghol (1793-1795)
*Mawlay Suleiman (~1792-1822)	*°Mustapha b. Ibrahim (1798-1805)	*Mahmud b. Muhammad (1814-1824)	*•Ahmed b. Ali Karamanli (1795)
Mawlay Abd al- Rahman (1822-1859)	*°Ahmed b. Ali (1805-1808)	Hussein b. Muhammad (1824-1835)	*•Yusuf b. Ali Karamanli (1795-1832)
	*° Ali b. Muhammad (1808-1809)		
	*° Hajji Ali b. Khalil (1809-1815)		
	*° Hajji Muhammad (1815)		
	*° Omar b. Muhammad (1815-1817)		
	Ali Khodja (1817-1818)		
	•Hussein b. Hassan (1818-1830)		

* = in power during French Revolutionary/Napoleonic Wars

° = Assassinated

• = Deposed

APPENDIX II

British Consuls in Barbary: 1790-1830

<i>Morocco</i>	<i>Algiers</i>	<i>Tunis</i>	<i>Tripoli</i>
*James Matra (1787-1806)	*Charles Logie (1785-1792)	*Perkins Magra (1789-1803)	*Richard Tully (1783-1793)
*James Green (1806-1817)	*Charles Mace (1793-1796)	*Henry Clark (1803-1804)	*Simon Lucas 1793-1801)
James Douglas (1817-1829)	*Richard Masters (1796-1799)	*Richard Oglander (1804-1824)	*Bryan McDonough (1801-1804)
Edward Drummond Hay (1829-1845)	*John Falcon (1799-1803)	Sir Thomas Reade (1824-1849)	*William Langford (1804-1812)
	*Richard Cartwright (1804-1806)		*Patrick Wilkie (1812)
	*Henry Blanckley (1807-1812)		*James Somerville (1812-1814)
	*Hugh McDonell (1812-1825)		*Hanmer Warrington (1814- 1846)
	Morris Thomas (1825-1827)		
	Robert St John (1827-1851)		

* = held office during French Revolutionary/Napoleonic War

APPENDIX III

Lloyd's List Shipping Gazette: Barbary Ports⁹²⁸

A database of over 1,000 data points was compiled from the shipping gazette, *Lloyd's List*. This tracked the movements of British ships to Barbary ports (Mogador/Essaouira, Salé, Tangiers, Bona, Algiers, Tunis, Tripoli) from 1792-1816. The summary below addresses how many individual ships were recorded sailing to or from a Barbary port and how many journeys those ships made.


French Revolutionary War

YEAR	# OF SHIPS	# OF JOURNEYS
1792	15	29
1793	17	24
1794	11	18
1795	9	12
1796	30	41
1797	13	19
1798	10	15
1799	8	14
1800	20	23
1801	12	16
1802	26	34


Napoleonic War

YEAR	# OF SHIPS	# OF JOURNEYS
1803	12	22
1804	10	17
1805	11	16
1806	15	18
1807	22	34
1808	23	35
1809	25	42
1810	27	45
1811	26	46
1812	22	37
1813	21	27
1814	23	34
1815	17	25
1816	20	32

⁹²⁸ *Lloyd's list*. No. 2163-5139 (1792-1816). Westmead, Gt. Brit.: Gregg International, 1969.



Number of British Ships travelling to/from Barbary Ports, 1792-1816




Number of Journeys British Ships made to/from Barbary, 1792-1816

APPENDIX IV

Malta: Public Secretary's Report – Arrivals and Importations, from 1801 to 1811, inclusive.⁹²⁹

The following data is from NA CO 158/20, written in 1812. It is a report on the ship arrivals and imports to Malta in the first decade of British control.


Maltese Cattle Imports, 1801-1811



Year	Cattle from Barbary	Cattle from Elsewhere	Total Cattle	% from Barbary
1801	5179	680	5859	88%
1802	5537	213	5750	96%
1803	3795	313	4108	92%
1804	3086	1271	4357	71%
1805	4962	503	5465	91%
1806	3281	299	3580	92%
1807	3863	147	4010	96%
1808	2626	227	2853	92%
1809	3591	142	3733	96%
1810	5820	1520	7340	79%
1811	8581	889	9470	91%


⁹²⁹ NA CO 158/20, Malta Public Secretary's Report – Arrivals and Importations, from 1801-1811.

Maltese Sheep Imports, 1801-1811




Year	Sheep from Barbary	Sheep from Elsewhere	Total Sheep	% from Barbary
1801	6253	263	6516	96%
1802	12322	768	13090	94%
1803	12986	103	13089	99%
1804	14448	750	15198	95%
1805	18757	972	19729	95%
1806	3732	328	4060	92%
1807	2354	646	3000	78%
1808	5661	1339	7000	81%
1809	5999	1132	7131	84%
1810	11282	298	11580	97%
1811	11130	682	11812	94%

Maltese Ship Arrivals, 1801-1811



Year	Ships originating from Barbary	Ships from Elsewhere	Total Ships	% from Barbary
1801	1228	1023	2251	55%
1802	1400	1134	2534	55%
1803	1108	1269	2377	47%
1804	1257	1159	2416	52%
1805	1085	1445	2530	43%
1806	1009	1797	2806	36%
1807	891	1938	2829	31%
1808	852	2450	3302	26%
1809	1020	2524	3544	29%
1810	1489	2186	3675	41%
1811	1475	2305	3780	39%

Maltese Privateer Arrivals, 1801-1811



Year	Barbary Privateers	Privateers from Elsewhere	Total Privateers	% from Barbary
1801	17	2	19	89%
1802	10	-	10	100%
1803	2	14	16	13%
1804	7	7	14	50%
1805	9	24	33	27%
1806	3	21	24	13%
1807	1	51	52	2%
1808	6	63	69	9%
1809	5	36	41	12%
1810	13	55	68	19%
1811	1	52	53	2%

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